Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for
Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty
and Medium-Duty Vehicles
Response to Comments
rnA United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
-------
Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for
Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty
and Medium-Duty Vehicles
Response to Comments
Assessment and Standards Division
Office of Transportation and Air Quality
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
EPA-420-R-24-005
March 2024
-------
Introduction
EPA's Proposed Rule, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later
Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles," was signed by Administrator Michael Regan on April
11, 2023. A pre-publication version of the proposal was made available on EPA's website on
April 12, 2023, after Administrator Regan's announcement of the program but prior to
publication of the proposal in the Federal Register on May 5, 2023 (88 FR 29184 et seq.). The
proposal indicated that the rule would be open for public comment until July 5, 2023. The
Docket ID No. for the rule is EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829.
This Response to Comments (RTC) document is a compilation of public comments submitted
to the public docket for this rule as well as EPA responses to those comments. Some aspects of
our responses appear in the preamble to the final rule or other documents in this rule's docket
and are incorporated by reference in this document.
This RTC document is organized by category of comment topic. The original documents
submitted by commenters, including any attachments, footnotes, tables, and figures are included
in the docket.
More than 252,400 written comments on the proposal were submitted to the public docket.
The vast majority of these, nearly 248,000 comments, were submitted in the form of 46 mass
comment campaigns. Some of these are identical letters submitted by many individuals, while
others consist of a petition with many signatures. The vast majority of comments submitted in
the form of mass comment campaigns express general support for the proposed rule or urge EPA
to adopt even more stringent standards to reduce air emissions from light- and medium-duty
vehicles, although some other mass comment campaign commenters urged EPA not to adopt the
proposal. More information about the mass comment campaigns can be found in Appendix B to
this RTC document. Mass comment campaigns that provided comments on specific aspects of
the proposal are reproduced verbatim in this RTC document.
There were about 4,600 other, individual comments on the proposal submitted to the public
docket by individuals, organizations, companies, or government entities. Many of these
comments express support for the proposal or urge EPA to adopt more stringent standards,
although some express concern with or opposition to its adoption.
Of these comments, approximately 240 comments provide specific views on elements of the
proposal, information and feedback about particular data or assumptions used in EPA's analysis
supporting the proposal, or other aspects of the proposal. A list of these comments can be found
at the beginning of this RTC document. They are reproduced verbatim, in excerpts, in the
following sections, organized by issue topic. Each section includes a summary of the comments
received on that topic and EPA's response. Note that an individual comment or part of an
individual comment submitted by a particular commenter may be reproduced in more than one
section of this document if it contains observations on more than one aspect of an issue. It is
worth noting that if a comment has been reproduced in more than one section it may be
addressed in only one of those sections. Conversely, an individual comment that touches on
several issues may not be duplicated verbatim across this document if the same issues were
raised by other commenters. In other words, the responses contained in this document reply to
the comments raised in the public process and are not solely to the specific commenters'
11
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verbatim comments that precede the responses in the document. Finally, if several commenters
submit an identical comment, only one comment is included verbatim in the document; the
others are noted on the list of comments for the included comment.
An additional 4,300 individual comments on the proposal express general support for or
opposition to the proposal and/or contain opinions or statements about issues but without
detailed data, information, or comment relating to specific provisions of the proposal or EPA's
supporting analysis. These comments are not reproduced verbatim in this document because they
do not raise issues with reasonable specificity. However, we note that we have provided a
detailed rationale for the final rule in the preamble and that, to the extent the same issues were
raised by other commenters with reasonable specificity, they are addressed in our responses in
this document. These comments are listed in Appendix A along with a brief description of their
overall nature.
EPA held a public hearing on the proposal, and the transcript of that hearing is included in the
docket (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5115). During the 3-day public hearing (May 9-11, 2023),
217 individuals testified. Appendix C contains a list of the testifiers and a brief description of the
overall nature of the testimony. If public testimony provides information that is specific in nature
and was not subsequently included in written comments submitted by the testifier or the
testifier's organization, that statement is included verbatim in this RTC document. Additional
comments received after the comment period closed and through December 15, 2023, were
considered to the extent practicable. See Section 29 for these comments and EPA responses.
The responses presented in this RTC document are intended to augment the rationale and
responses to comments that appear in the preamble to the final rule and to address comments not
discussed in the preamble to the final rule. To the extent there is any confusion or apparent
inconsistency between this RTC document and the preamble, the preamble itself remains the
definitive statement of the rationale for the final rule. This document, together with the preamble
to the final rule and the information contained in the Regulatory Impact Analysis, and related
technical support documents, should be considered collectively as EPA's response to all of the
significant comments submitted on the proposal.
in
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Table of Contents
Introduction ii
Table of Contents iv
List of commenters' excerpts included verbatim in this document ix
1 - General comments in support of or opposing the rulemaking 1
1.1- General support for the program as proposed or more stringent standards 1
1.2 - General opposition to the proposed standards 33
2 - Appropriateness/legal justification of standards under Clean Air Act 56
2.1 - GHG standards 192
2.2 - Criteria pollutant standards 264
2.3 - EPA responses to comments in section 2 289
3 - GHG Standards 369
3.1- Program design and structure 369
3.1.1 - Vehicle regulatory classifications 398
3.1.2 - Averaging, banking, and trading 418
3.1.3 - Vehicle air conditioning system related provisions 437
3.1.4- LDV off-cycle technology credits 472
3.1.5 - 0 g/mi tailpipe emissions forZEVs 520
3.1.6 - PHEV utility factor 596
3.1.7 - LDV small volume manufacturer standards 675
3.1.8 - MDV incentive multipliers 719
3.1.9- Timeframe of the standards 726
3.1.10 - Alternative compliance pathway 730
3.2 - GHG standard curves 738
3.2.1 - LDV footprint curves 738
3.2.2 - MDV work factor curves; work factor definition 770
3.3 - Feasibility 792
3.3.1 - Level s/stringency of the standards 792
3.3.2 - Lead time 856
3.4 - Other 966
4 - Criteria pollutant standards 975
4.1- Program design and structure 989
iv
-------
4.1.1 - Phase-in of criteria pollutant standards 995
4.1.2 -NMOG+NOx 1005
4.1.3 - Particulate matter (PM) 1058
4.1.4 - Carbon monoxide (CO) and formaldehyde (HCHO) 1153
4.1.5 - Refueling incomplete spark-ignition vehicles 1157
4.1.6- Enrichment for power or component protection 1165
4.1.7 - Averaging, banking, and trading provisions 1195
4.1.8 - MDV criteria emissions certification requirements 1202
4.1.9 - Small volume manufacturer alternative criteria standards 1218
4.1.10 - CARB's ACC II supplemental NMOG+NOx standards 1218
5 - On board diagnostics (OBD) 1224
6 - Test procedures 1239
6.1- EV test procedures 1239
6.2 - Testing and certification related to battery durability program 1248
6.3 - Fuel economy testing 1259
6.4 - Engine certification for high-GCWR vehicles 1279
6.5 - Durability test requirements for certification 1293
6.6 - Test fuel for PM measurement 1293
6.7 - Class 3 test cycle 1295
7 - Regulatory amendments/additional changes to the regulatory language 1296
7.1 - Voiding certificates and recall 1296
7.2 - Warranty 1316
7.3 - IUVP/IUCP/FEDV testing 1318
7.4-Puff losses 1326
7.5 - Evaporative emissions 1337
7.6 - Miscellaneous amendments 1342
8 - Benefit cost analysis (BCA) 1348
8.1 - General approach 1354
8.2 - Non-emission costs and benefits 1396
8.3 - Fueling impacts 1430
8.4 - Social cost of GHGs 1448
8.5 - Criteria air pollutant benefits 1524
v
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9 - Environmental justice 1535
10 - Climate science and GHG emissions 1587
11- Criteria and air toxics pollutants 1670
11.1- General comments 1670
11.2- Upstream and downstream criteria pollutant emissions 1750
11.3 - Air quality modeling 1751
12 - Modeling of compliance pathways, associated costs, and emissions reductions 1761
12.1 - General comments about OMEGA 1761
12.1.1 - Producer side modeling 1768
12.1.2 - Consumer side modeling 1794
12.1.3 - Effects/emissions reductions modeling 1817
12.1.4-Other 1848
12.2 - Battery/electrification technologies 1856
12.2.1 - Battery costs 1856
12.2.2 - Battery cost sensitivities 1918
12.2.3 - Non-battery costs 1923
12.2.4 - Inclusion of PHEVs 1936
12.2.5 - Battery replacement 1954
12.2.6 - Other battery/electrification technology 1964
12.2.7 - PEV vehicle costs and cost/price parity 1967
12.3 - ICE vehicle technologies 1971
12.3.1 - ICE costs 2003
12.3.2 - Other ICE topics 2009
12.4 - Modeling of IRA incentives 2014
12.5 - Other modeling comments 2066
12.5.1 - MOVES 2066
12.5.2-[Reserved] 2073
12.5.3 - Compliance modeling pathways 2073
12.5.4 - Sensitivities 2094
12.5.5 - Modeling of MDVs 2096
12.5.6 - Modeling of the no action case 2101
13 - Consumer considerations 2121
vi
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13.1 - Response to recurrent comments 2121
13.2 - Consumer demand 2125
13.3 - Vehicle ownership behavior 2235
13.4 - Consumers' savings and expenses 2254
14 - Vehicle sales 2335
14.1 - Limited vehicle choice 2379
14.2 - Elasticity of demand 2384
14.3 - Energy efficiency gap 2395
15 - PEV supply chain, critical minerals, and mineral security 2405
15.1 - General 2405
15.2 - Battery recycling 2588
16 - Battery durability and warranty 2602
17 - Charging infrastructure 2651
18 - Power sector and grid reliability considerations 2806
18.1 - Electrical distribution level and transmission level reliability 2819
19 - Fuels and life cycle analysis (LCA) 3001
19.1 - Fuels 3001
19.2 - Life cycle analysis 3149
20 - Employment 3281
21 - Energy security 3331
22 - Vehicle safety 3356
23 - Economic concerns from industries that are not directly regulated under this rule 3378
24 - [Reserved] 3383
25 - Statutory provisions and Executive Orders 3383
25.1 - Regulatory Flexibility Act 3394
26 - Coordination/harmonization between EPA's GHG standards, NHTSA's CAFE standards,
and state regulations 3398
27 - Other comments related to the proposed rule 3427
28 - Out of scope 3476
28.1 - Directed to the heavy-duty Phase 3 proposal 3496
29 - Additional comments 3500
Appendix A: Other comments received, not reproduced verbatim in RTC text 3528
Appendix B: Mass comment campaigns 3607
vii
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Appendix C: List of testifiers at public hearings 3630
Appendix D: EPA's request for comment on potential fuels controls for future rulemaking such
as gasoline PM standards 3638
viii
-------
List of commenters' excerpts included verbatim in this
document
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0490
Anonymous public
comment
2
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0562
Anonymous public
comment
3
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0565
Anonymous public
comment
4
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0627
Anonymous public
comment
5
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0573
25x'25 Alliance, et al.
6
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0517
A. Longo (forename not
provided)
7
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0509
Ad Hoc Tier 4 Light-Duty
Small Manufacturer
Group
8
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0736
Ad Hoc Tier 4 Light-Duty
Small OEM Group
9
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0695
Advanced Energy United
10
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5115,
Day 1
Alex Stavis
11
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701
Alliance for Automotive
Innovation
12
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0534
Alliance for Consumers
(AFC)
13
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0631
Alliance for Vehicle
Efficiency (AVE)
14
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0666
American Chemistry
Council Product Approval
Protocol Task Group
(PAPTG)
15
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0663
American Chemistry
Council, Fuel Additives
Task Group (FATG)
16
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0613
American Coalition for
Ethanol (ACE)
17
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0642
American Council for an
Energy-Effi ci ent
Economy (ACEEE)
ix
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
18
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0571
American Enterprise
Institute
19
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683
American Free Enterprise
Chamber of Commerce
(AmFree) et al.
The AmFree Center for Legal
Action, the Energy Equipment and
Infrastructure Alliance, Golden
Grain Energy, LLC, and
Lincolnway Energy, LLC
20
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0699
American Freedom and
America First Policy
Institute (AFPI)
21
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733
American Fuel &
Petrochemical
Manufacturers
22
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0696
American Highway Users
Alliance
23
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0652
American Honda Motor
Co., Inc.
24
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0745
American Lung
Association (ALA)
Allergy & Asthma Network,
Alliance of Nurses for Healthy
Environments, American College
of Physicians, American Medical
Association, American Public
Health Association, American
Thoracic Society, Asthma and
Allergy Foundation of America,
Children's Environmental Health
Network, Climate Psychiatry
Alliance, Health Care Without
Harm, Medical Society
Consortium on Climate and
Health, National Association of
Pediatric Nurse Practitioners, and
Physicians for Social
Responsibility
25
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0641
American Petroleum
Institute (API)
26
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5115,
Day 3
Andrea Strzelec
27
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0741
Arconic Corporation
(ARCO)
28
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0533
Arizona Department of
Environmental Quality
(ADEQ)
X
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
29
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0537
Arizona State Legislature
30
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0566
Aston Martin Lagonda
(AML)
31
EPA-HQ-OAR-
Attorney General's Office,
States of California, Colorado,
2022-0829-0746
State of California et al.
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Washington, and
Wisconsin; the Commonwealths
of Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania; the District of
Columbia; the City and County of
Denver; and the Cities of Chicago,
Los Angeles, New York, and
Oakland
32
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0654
Betsy Cooper and Aaron
Barkhouse
33
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5115,
Day 2
Billy Brooks
34
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0667
BlueGreen Alliance
(BGA)
35
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0677
BMW of North America,
LLC (BMW NA)
36
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0640
BorgWarner Inc.
37
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5115,
Day 3
Brian Kalina
38
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5115,
Day 2
Brian Russo
39
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780
California Air Resources
Board (CARB) (Part 1 of
5)
40
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0618
CALSTART
41
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0658
Center for American
Progress (CAP)
42
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0671
Center for Biological
Diversity et al.
xi
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
43
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0600
Ceres BICEP (Business
for Innovative Climate
and Energy Policy)
Network
44
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0511
Ceres Corporate Electric
Vehicle Alliance (CEVA)
45
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0738
Charles Forsberg
46
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0747
Charles Gordon
47
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3644
Chemours Company FC,
LLC
48
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0553
Chevron
49
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0626
Clean Fuels Alliance
America
50
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0630
Clean Fuels Development
Coalition (CDFC)
51
EPA-HQ-OAR-
Clean Fuels Development
The Corn Producers Association
2022-0829-0712
Coalition et al.
of Texas, ICM Inc., the Illinois
Corn Growers Association, the
Indiana Corn Marketing Council,
the Iowa Corn Growers
Association, the Kansas Corn
Growers Association, the
Kentucky Corn Growers
Association, the Michigan Corn
Growers Association, the Missouri
Corn Growers Association, the
Nebraska Corn Growers
Association, the South Dakota
Corn Growers Association, and
the Wisconsin Corn Growers
Association
52
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0608
Coalition for Safe
Autonomous Vehicles and
Electrification (SAVE)
53
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0694
Colorado Energy Office,
Colorado Department of
Transportation, and
Colorado Department of
Public Health and
Environment
Xll
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
54
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0611
Competitive Enterprise
Institute
55
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0788
Consumer Energy
Alliance (CEA)
56
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0728
Consumer Reports (CR)
Consumer Reports petition with
18,817 signatures included as
Attachment 1 to the main
comment
57
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0665
Countymark
58
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0645
Cummins Inc.
59
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0538
Dana Incorporated
60
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0526
Daniel Hellebuyck
61
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0519
Darius (no surname
provided)
62
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0513
David B Manley III
63
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0548
David Hallberg
64
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0518
David Pedersen
65
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0527
Delek US Holdings, Inc.
66
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0651
DENSO Corporation
67
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0550
District of Columbia
Department of Energy and
Environment (DOEE)
68
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0546
Donn Viviani
69
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0697
Donn Viviani
70
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5115,
Day 2
Donna Jackson
71
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0500
Doug Peterson
72
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5089
Dylan Ondek
73
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0734
East Kansas Agri-Energy
(EKAE)
xiii
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
74
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0708
Edison Electric Institute
(EEI)
75
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0737
Elders Climate Action
76
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0589
Electric Drive
Transportation
Association (EDTA)
77
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0588
Electrification Coalition
(EC)
78
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0568
Elizabeth Boynton
79
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0561
Energy Innovation
80
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0616
Energy Marketers of
America (EMA)
81
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0610
Energy Strategy Coalition
82
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786
Environmental Defense
Fund (EDF) (lof 2)
83
EPA-HQ-OAR-
Environmental, and Public
Center for Biological Diversity,
2022-0829-0759
Health Organizations
Conservation Law Foundation,
Environmental Law &
Policy Center, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Public Citizen,
Sierra Club, the Union of
Concerned Scientists
84
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0632
Exxon Mobil Corporation
85
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0710
Fermata Energy
86
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0572
Ferrari N.V. and Ferrari
North America, Inc.
87
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0605
Ford Motor Company
88
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0432
Fred Reitman
89
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0711
Fuel Freedom Foundation
90
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0455
Gabrielle Lawrence
91
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0700
General Motors, LLC
(GM)
92
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0426
George White
xiv
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
93
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1136
Glenn Passavant
94
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0621
Governing for Impact and
Evergreen Action (GFI)
95
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0457
Green Diesel Engineering
LLC
96
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0789
GreenLatinos et al.
Alliance of Nurses for Healthy
Environments, CALSTART, C40
Cities, Center for Biological
Diversity, Chispa LCV, Clean Air
Coalition Laredo, Clean Energy
Works, Coltura, Conservation
Law Foundation, Dream.org,
Earthjustice, Electric Vehicle
Association, Endangered Species
Coalition, EVHybridNoire, EV
Charging for All Coalition
(EVCAC), Evergreen Action,
GRID Alternatives, itselectric, La
MaraA±a, Mothers Out Front
Silicon Valley, New Mexico
Voices for Children, Plug In
America, Project Green Home,
Prosperity Works, Respiratory
Health Association, Responsible
Alpha, Sierra Club, Southern
Alliance for Clean Energy,
Southwest Energy Efficiency
Project, The Asthma and Allergy
Foundation of America, The Reno
+ Sparks Chamber of Commerce,
Together for Brothers (T4B),
Warehouse Workers for Justice,
and Zero Emission Transportation
Association (ZETA).
97
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0685
Greg Dotson
98
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0560
GROWMARK, Inc.
99
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0580
Growth Energy
100
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579
HF Sinclair Corporation
XV
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
101
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0554
Hyundai America
Technical Center, Inc.
(HATCI)
102
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0599
Hyundai Motor America
103
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0756
Illinois Corn Growers
Association
104
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0532
Illinois Farm Bureau
(IFB)
105
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0545
Ingevity Corporation
106
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0673
Institute for Energy
Research (IER)
107
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0601
Institute for Policy
Integrity at New York
University School of Law
108
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0743
Institute for Policy
Integrity at NYU School
of Law et al.
Comment Signees: Clean Air Task
Force, Environmental Defense
Fund, Montana Environmental
Information Center, Natural
Resources Defense Council and
Sierra Club
109
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0530
Interfaith Power & Light
110
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0569
International Council on
Clean Transportation
(ICCT)
111
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0614
International Union,
United Automobile,
Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement
Workers of America
(UAW)
112
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0681
Jack Spencer
113
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0744
Jaguar Land Rover NA,
LLC (JLR)
114
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0514
Jeremy Michalek and
Matthew Bruchon
115
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0705
Jeremy Michalek et al.
Connor Forsythe, Kenneth
Gillingham, Johnathan Vicente
and Kate Whitefoot, Researchers,
xvi
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Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
Carnegie Mellon University and
Yale University
116
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0706
Jeremy Michalek et al.
Anthony Cheng, Valerie Karplus,
and Kate Whitefoot, Researchers
at Carnegie Mellon University
117
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0497
Jim Hays
118
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0709
Job Creators Network
Foundation (JCNF)
119
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0585
John Graham
120
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1648
John Noble
121
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5115,
Day 2
Jonathan Walker
122
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0635
Joshua Linn
123
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617
KALA Engineering
Consultants
124
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1049
Kari Ostlie
125
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0703
Kate Whitefoot
126
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0649
Kentucky Office of the
Attorney General et al.
111
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0440
Kevin Murphy
128
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0555
Kia Corporation
129
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0547
Landmark Legal
Foundation
130
EPA-HQ-OAR-
Letter Campaign, Ethanol
Letter submitted by seven
2022-0829-0739
Producers (7)
commenters; it is reproduced only
once: Commonwealth Agri-
Energy LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0739). The other
commenters are: Highwater
Ethanol, LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0552), Heartland Corn
Products (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0622), Absolute Energy,
LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0716), Trenton Agri Products LLC
xvii
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
(EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0755), Western New York Energy
LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0753), Southwest Iowa Renewable
Energy LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0582)1
131
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0489
Lillian Davey
132
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5115,
Day 1
Lisa Allee
133
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0664
Lucid Group, Inc.
134
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0593
Marathon Petroleum
Corporation (MPC)
135
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0522
Marie Gluesenkamp
Perez, and Mary Sattler
Peltola, Members of
Congress, Congress of the
United States
136
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0689
Mario Loyola
137
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0698
Maryland Department of
the Environment (MDE)
138
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0692
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsored by Arizona
Interfaith Power & Light,
(web) (216 signatures)
139
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0722
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsored by Center for
Biological Diversity,
(web) (12,460 signatures)
140
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0757
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsored by Michigan
Corn Growers Association
(MCGA). (email) (30
signatures)
141
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0718
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsored by Missouri
Corn Growers Association
(MCGA). (web) (168
signatures)
142
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0724
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsored by Specialty
xviii
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
Equipment Market
Association (SEMA).
(web) (1,488 signatures)
143
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1700
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsoring organization
unknown (web) (679
signatures)
144
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1701
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsoring organization
unknown (118 signatures)
145
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1702
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsoring organization
unknown (5,465
signatures)
146
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1704
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsoring organization
unknown (44,335
signatures)
147
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1707
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsoring organization
unknown (2,088
signatures)
148
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1709
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsoring organization
unknown (76 signatures)
149
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1710
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsoring organization
unknown (1,851
signatures)
150
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1714
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsoring organization
unknown (20 signatures)
151
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1716
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsoring organization
unknown (2,309
signatures)
152
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1717
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsoring organization
unknown (513 signatures)
153
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1721
Mass Comment Campaign
sponsoring organization
unknown (email) (5,313
signatures)
XIX
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
154
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1514
Matthew DiPaulo, BP
Lubricants USA, Inc.
155
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0732
Mayor Becky Daggett,
City of Flagstaff, Arizona
et al.
Aisha Chughtai, Council Member,
Ward 10 Minneapolis, MN, Amy
Falcone, Council Member
Kirkland, WA, Andrew Johnson,
Council Member Minneapolis,
MN, Andy LaBarre, Member of
the Washtenaw County Board of
Commissioners, Ann Arbor, MI,
Angela Conley, County
Commissioner Minneapolis, MN,
Anthony (Tony) Palomba,
Councilor at-Large, City Council,
Watertown, MA, Brendan
Johnson, Oakland County
Commissioner Rochester Hills,
MI, Charlie Cavell,Oakland
County Commissioner Pontiac,
MI, Deputy Mayor Jay Arnold
Kirkland, WA, Dimple Ajmera,
Council Member, At-large
Charlotte, NC, Dow Constantine,
King County Executive Seattle,
WA, Dr. Ajay V. Raman, Oakland
County Commissioner, District 14
Novi, MI, Elliott Payne, Council
Member Minneapolis, MN, Erica
Briggs, Council Member Ann
Arbor, MI, Jarrett Stoltzfus,
Councilmember, Ward 2, Mount
Rainier, MD, Jason Chavez, City
Council Member, Ward 9
Minneapolis, MN, Jeffrey Joneal
Lunde, Hennepin County
Commissioner Brooklyn Park,
MN, John Hayes, Chair,
Sustainability, Energy, and
Resiliency Committee, Salem,
MA, John Odell, Chief,
Department of Sustainability &
Resilience, Worcester, MA,
Katherine Golub, City Councilor
Greenfield, MA, Kelli Curtis,
XX
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
Council Member Kirkland, WA,
Kelly Rae Kirkpatrick, Council
Member Rochester, MN, Kristen
Nelson, Oakland County
Commissioner Waterford, MI,
Marion Greene, Hennepin County
Commissioner Minneapolis, MN,
Martha Simon, School Committee
Member Burlington, MA, Mayor
Angela Birney Redmond, WA,
Mayor Becky Daggett Flagstaff,
AZ, Mayor Cassie Franklin
Everett, WA, Mayor Chance
Cutrano Fairfax, CA, Mayor
Christopher Taylor Ann Arbor,
MI, Mayor Devin T. Murphy
Pinole, CA, Mayor Indya
Kincannon, Knoxville, TN, Mayor
Jacob Frey Minneapolis, MN,
Mayor John J. Bauters Emeryville,
CA, Mayor Justin Wilson,
Alexandria, VA, Mayor Kim
Norton Rochester, MN, Mayor
Louise From University Heights,
IA, Mayor Mason Thompson
Bothell, WA, Mayor Matt Mahan
San Jose, CA, Mayor Melvin
Carter Saint Paul, MN, Mayor
Mike Nelson Edmonds, WA,
Mayor Penny Sweet Kirkland,
WA, Mayor Pro Tem Braxton
Winston Charlotte, NC, Mayor
Pro Tem Travis Radina
Councilmember, Ward 3, Ann
Arbor, MI, Mayor Viola Lyles
Charlotte, NC, Michael
Bettencourt, Select Board Member
Winchester, MA, Mitra Jun Jalali,
Council Member Saint Paul, MN,
Robin Wonsley, Council Member,
Ward 2 Minneapolis, MN, Ryan
N. Mello, Chair, Pierce County
Council Tacoma, WA, Samantha
Perlman, City Councilor
XXI
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
Marlborough, MA, Teresa
Mosqueda, Council Member
Seattle, WA, Trista Matas
Castillo, Chair, Ramsey County
Board of Commissioners, St. Paul,
MN
156
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0595
Mazda North American
Operations
157
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0748
Mclaren Automotive,
McLaren Group
158
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0615
MCS Referral &
Resources (MCSRR)
159
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0564
MECA Clean Mobility
160
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0644
MEMA, The Vehicle
Suppliers Associated
161
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0623
Mercedes-Benz AG
162
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0503
Metropolitan Washington
Air Quality Committee
(MWAQC) et al.
163
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0672
Minnesota Biofuels
Association
164
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0612
Minnesota Corn Growers
Association (MCGA)
165
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0557
Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency (MPCA)
166
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0578
Missouri Corn Growers
Association (MCGA)
167
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0590
Missouri Farm Bureau
(MOFB)
168
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0682
Mitsubishi Motors North
America, Inc. (MMNA)
169
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0559
National Association of
Clean Air Agencies
(NACAA)
170
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0628
National Association of
Convenience Stores
(NACS) et al.
171
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0648
National Association of
Convenience Stores
(NACS) et al.
172
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0633
National Association of
Manufacturers (NAM)
XXII
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
173
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5092
National Association of
Mutual Insurance
Companies (NAMIC)
174
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0656
National Automobile
Dealers Association
(NADA)
175
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0643
National Corn Growers
Association (NCGA)
176
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0581
National Farmers Union
(NFU)
111
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0607
National Parks
Conservation Association
(NPCA)
178
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0634
National Propane Gas
Association (NPGA)
179
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0575
National Rural Electric
Cooperative Association
(NRECA)
180
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0504
National Tribal Air
Association (NT A A)
181
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0597
Natural Gas Vehicles for
America
182
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0583
Nebraska Corn Board
(NCB) and Nebraska Corn
Growers Association
183
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0660
Nebraska Farm Bureau
Federation (NEFB)
184
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0594
Nissan North America,
Inc.
185
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0576
North American Subaru,
Inc.
186
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0586
North Dakota Farmers
Union (NDFU)
187
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0584
Northeast States for
Coordinated Air Use
Management
(NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport
Commission (OTC)
188
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0650
Novozymes North
America
189
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0675
Office of Wyoming
Governor Mark Gordon
XX111
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
190
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0751
Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality
(DEO)
191
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0752
Oryxe International Inc.
192
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0542
Our Children's Trust
(OCT)
193
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0680
Pacific Legal Foundation
(PLF)
194
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0551
Paul Bonifas and Tim
Considine
195
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0577
Pearson Fuels
196
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0713
Plains All American
Pipeline, L.P.
197
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0625
Plug In America
198
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609
POET, LLC
199
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0637
Porsche Cars North
America (PCNA)
200
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0556
Pueblo of Santa Ana
201
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570
Reginald Modlin and B.
Reid Detchon
202
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0602
Renewable Fuels
Association (RFA)
203
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0653
Rivian Automotive, LLC
204
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0793
Roy Littlefield IV, Tire
Industry Association
205
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0629
RV Industry Association
(RVIA)
206
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5088
Sandra Thomas
207
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0687
Satya Consultores
208
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0515
Scott Wilson
Identical comment: Electric
Vehicle Association of Greater
Washington DC (EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0521)
209
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5083
Senator Shelley Moore
Capito et al., United States
Senate
Shelley Moore Capito, Ranking
Member, Environment and Public
Works Committee, and Pete
xxiv
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
Ricketts, Ranking Member, Clean
Air, Climate, and Nuclear Safety
Subcommittee, Roger F. Wicker,
Lindsey O. Graham, John
Barrasso, Dan Sullivan, Chuck
Grassley, James Lankford, Deb
Fischer, Thom Tillis, Kevin
Cramer, Cynthia Lummis, James
E. Risch, Bill Cassidy, John
Hoeven, John Boozman, M.
Michael Rounds, Mike Crapo,
Michael S. Lee, Cindy Hyde-
Smith, Ted Budd, Ted Cruz, Steve
Daines, John Cornyn, John
Kennedy, Tim Scott, and
Markwayne Mullin, Senators
210
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0668
Sierra Club et al.
211
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0659
South Coast Air Quality
Management District
212
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0591
Southern Environmental
Law Center (SELC)
213
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0596
Specialty Equipment
Market Association
(SEMA)
214
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0678
Stellantis
215
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647
Steven Bradbury, The
Heritage Foundation
216
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0646
Strong Plug-in Hybrid
Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
111
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0567
T. Becker Power Systems
218
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0452
TCW Inc.
Identical comments: Transfer
Flow, Inc. (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0442 and -0496), Ben Banks
(EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0502)
and Ernest Quinn (EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0499)
219
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0792
Tesla, Inc.
220
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0510
Texas Public Policy
Foundation (TPPF)
XXV
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
221
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0704
The Aluminum
Association
222
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0674
The Heritage Foundation
223
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0657
The Mobility House et al.
224
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620
Toyota Motor North
America, Inc.
225
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0453
Transport Evolved LLC
(Transportation
Consultancy)
226
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0655
Travis Fisher
227
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0604
U.S. Chamber of
Commerce
228
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0540
U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops
(USCCB)
229
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0525
U.S. Departments of
Transportation of Idaho,
Montana, North Dakota,
South Dakota and
Wyoming
230
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0587
United Steelworkers
(USW)
231
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707
Valero Energy
Corporation
232
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0669
Volkswagen Group of
America, Inc.
233
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0624
Volvo Car Corporation
(VCC)
234
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0679
Western Energy Alliance
235
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0636
Winnebago Industries
(Winnebago Industries)
236
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0494
Wisconsin Automobile
and Truck Dealers
Association
237
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0507
Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources
238
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0544
World Resources Institute
(WRI)
xxvi
-------
Index
Document
Number
Other Signatures
239
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638
Zero Emission
Transportation
Association (ZETA)
240
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0523
South Dakota Department
of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (DANR)
241
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0541
Washington State
Department of Ecology
242
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0676
Western States Air
Resources Council
(WESTAR)
xxvii
-------
1 - General comments in support of or opposing the
rulemaking
1.1 - General support for the program as proposed or more
stringent standards
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Advanced Energy United
Transportation is the largest source of domestic emissions. In 2021, 28% of emissions came
from the transportation sector, 21% of which came from passenger vehicles. 1 We have a unique
opportunity to not only decarbonize this sector, but improve public health, create good paying
jobs, and produce technologically advanced vehicles for consumers and businesses in the
process. The EPA's promulgation of the new emissions reductions rule on light-duty vehicles
provides a pathway to meet emissions reductions targets and expand the adoption of zero-
emissions vehicles on our roads. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, p. 1]
1 EPA. (28 April, 2023). Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions
IV. Conclusion
By providing a predictable business and regulatory environment, EPA's proposed vehicle
rules can help not only decarbonize US transportation, but also bolster a critical segment of the
American economy: automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, pp. 5-6]
EVs present a critical lifeline for the U.S. automotive industry, as total car sales have declined
since 2017. As industry analysts have noted, "[EVs] are the only growth area in the automotive
market." 12 The EPA's rule can simultaneously sustain this growth and accelerate EV adoption,
revitalizing automakers and creating good paying, high-skilled jobs in the process. As such,
EPA's proposed rules complement key parts of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) - namely the
30D and 45W tax credits that incentivize the purchase of electric vehicles, and the host of
industry incentives, such as the manufacturing tax credit (45X) that support the buildout of a
domestic EV industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, p. 6]
12 Carreon, A. (5 May, 2023). The EV Battery Supply Chain Explained. Rocky Mountain Institute.
https://rmi.org/the-ev-battery-supply-chain-explained/
Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
The U.S. needs the strongest vehicle standards
The United States will need to greatly reduce light-duty vehicle (LDV) greenhouse gas
emissions if it is to have any chance of meeting the Biden Administration's economy-wide
emissions reduction goal of 50% by 2030 and stave off the worst impacts of climate change.
Transportation is now the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States and the
light-duty sector makes up 58% of those emissions. 1 Reducing carbon emissions is critical to
tackling climate change but increasing LDV efficiency will also have significant benefits to air
1
-------
quality and will reduce driver fueling costs. Vehicles are a significant contributor to local air
pollution and the associated health impacts, leading to increased rates of asthma, increased risk
of heart attacks, strokes, and lung cancer.2 These impacts are particularly bad in low-income
communities and communities of color, which bear a disproportionate air pollution burden.3
Greater efficiency can also provide significant cost savings for drivers when they refuel their
vehicles. Low-income households are especially burdened by fueling costs, paying three times
more than their higher-income counterparts on gasoline, as a percent of their total income.4
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 1-2]
1 https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/fast-facts-transportation-greenhouse-gas-emissions
2 https://www.consumerreports.org/emissions/how-your-car-can-make-the-air-cleaner/
3 https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/who-is-at-risk/disparities
4 https://www.aceee.org/white-paper/2021/05/understanding-transportation-energy-burdens
EPA should adopt Alternative 1
EPA's GHG vehicle standards have historically been instrumental in advancing emissions
reduction technology beyond what the market would otherwise deliver. Given the activity
already taking place in the light-duty vehicle market as a result of IRA and IIJA investments and
automaker commitments to fully electrifying their lineups, we urge EPA to adopt Alternative 1,
at a minimum, to deliver the strongest emissions reduction and advance emissions reduction
technologies in the market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 2-3]
Organization: American Lung Association (ALA) et al.
On behalf of the undersigned health and medical organizations, we write to call on the United
States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) to adopt the strongest possible standards to
curb emissions from new passenger vehicles and spur the transition to zero-emission
technologies. Health and medical organizations have long advocated for strong emissions
standards as a crucial intervention to protect regional air quality, address disparities in pollution
burdens and reduce the health impacts of the climate crisis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0745, p.
1]
We urge EPA to act in 2023 to finalize the most stringent possible standards for new vehicles
to reduce and eliminate emissions that harm Americans' health. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0745, p. 1]
Health Benefits of Zero-Emission Technologies
EPA's proposals note the significant clean air benefits of the proposed rule and illustrate the
increased benefits of the stronger Alternative 1. The American Lung Association's recent
"Driving to Clean Air" report highlighted that approaching a 100 percent zero-emission sales
scenario by 2035, along with a non-combustion electricity generation grid, could result in major
health benefits. The report found that the cumulative health benefits could reach $978 billion by
2050, including nearly 90,000 premature deaths avoided, over 2 million asthma attacks avoided
and more than 10 million lost workdays avoided due to cleaner air.4 EPA's analysis shows that
a potential compliance pathway for the proposal could result in nearly 70 percent of new vehicle
sales being battery electric vehicles by 2032. We call on EPA to continue the trajectory of a
2
-------
stronger Alternative 1 to include more stringent GHG standards through 2035. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0745, p. 3]
4 American Lung Association. "Driving to Clean Air." June 2023. https://www.lung.org/clean-air/electric-
vehicle-report/driving-to-clean-air.
Organization: Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ)
One of Arizona's largest emission categories is mobile sources (on-road and off-road). In
2022 alone, emissions from highway vehicles in Arizona were over 450,000 tons.l While
Arizona has many control measures in place to reduce emissions from mobile sources - such as
our reformulated gasoline program. These control measures are simply not enough to
significantly reduce emissions from transportation. Therefore, ADEQ supports EPA's goal to
further reduce criteria pollutants and greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector.
The proposed rule would improve the nation's overall air quality by reducing emissions through
the proposed control technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0533, p. 1]
1 https://www.epa.gov/system/files/other-files/2023-04/state_tierl_caps_05Apr2023_Ktons.xlsx (Last
accessed Jun. 1,2023).
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Reducing emissions from motor vehicles is urgently needed to combat climate change and
reduce exposure to harmful air pollution, especially in the nation's most vulnerable communities.
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) commends the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (U.S. EPA) for proposing to adopt multi-pollutant emissions standards for the 2027 and
later model years (MY) for light- and medium-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780,
p. 7]
The emission standards of both the proposal and a more stringent alternative are achievable,
technically feasible, and cost-effective and will significantly reduce emissions from light- and
medium-duty vehicles across the country. U.S. EPA's analysis demonstrates that both its
proposal and the more stringent alternative would result in significant net benefits to society—
benefits like improvements in public health, reduced climate impacts, and cost savings to
consumers. Adopting the most stringent emission standards feasible is a critical step that U.S.
EPA must take to fulfill its mandate to achieve National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) and protect the environment, climate, and public health from motor vehicle
pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 7]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
EPA has long recognized that GHG and criteria pollutant emissions from new motor vehicles
and new motor vehicle engines endanger public health and welfare, and, under Section 202(a) of
the Clean Air Act, this recognition triggers a mandatory duty to reduce such emissions. The
technologies necessary to reduce GHGs and criteria pollutants from new motor vehicles already
exist and are widely in use in the market today. The costs of these technologies are reasonable
and declining, and the application of these technologies generally results in consumers saving
money over the life of a new vehicle. Moreover, the societal benefits of more stringent standards
significantly exceed the costs of those standards. EPA thus has every reason to adopt stronger
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emissions standards to satisfy its statutory mandate to reduce emissions of harmful air
pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 1]
In the Proposal, EPA set forth four alternative sets of GHG standards: the proposed standards,
a more stringent alternative (Alternative 1), a less stringent alternative (Alternative 2), and an
alternative similar in stringency to the proposed standards on a different timeline (Alternative 3).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 1-2]
We believe that the record before the agency supports the adoption of standards more
stringent than the proposed standards and accordingly set forth potential improvements to EPA's
models and compliance program below. As EPA recognizes in the Proposal, the necessary
emission control technologies have already been developed and brought to market, and
automakers have been planning for substantially more stringent standards in large portions of the
global market. In addition, the crediting flexibilities already built into the program (which EPA
has not reopened)—including the ability to trade, carry-forward, and carry-back credits—place
automakers in even better positions to craft strategies to comply with more stringent standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 1-2]
As discussed below, the need for more stringent standards is critical, and the industry's ability
to meet stronger standards and to cost-effectively reduce dangerous pollution is clear. We urge
EPA to adopt standards more stringent than the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0746, pp. 1-2]
Organization: CALSTART
CALSTART strongly supports EPA's proposed multi-pollutant emission standards for light-
and medium-duty vehicles for model years 2027-2032 standards. The multi-pollutant emissions
standard represents a critical and seminal point to mitigate the worse impacts from the climate
crisis and requires a clear and strong signal of the nation's needed direction and pace. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 1]
We appreciate this opportunity to provide comments to help shape an effective and productive
multi-pollutant emission standard and welcome the on-going potential to engage and explain our
recommendations in more detail and assist EPA staff as the rule is finalized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0618, p. 1]
The multi-pollutant emissions standard represents a critical and seminal point to mitigate the
worse impacts from the climate crisis and requires a clear and strong signal of the nation's
needed direction and pace. CALSTART desires to serve as an on-going resource to EPA staff in
finalizing the most effective light-duty vehicle standard. For more than 30 years, CALSTART
has been at the forefront of working with industry, fleets, and the public sector to understand,
develop, and accelerate advanced transportation technology needed to address clean air, energy,
and economic goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 2]
We have developed significant knowledge of the status of zero-emission technologies and
closely track technology readiness levels, vehicle product availability, and infrastructure
deployment status. This experience arises from decades of managing technology demonstration
field projects, administering and shaping two of the world's largest commercial vehicle and
infrastructure incentive programs, and preparing effective commercialization strategies and
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implementation roadmaps in our work supporting California and other global governments
through Drive to Zero. Utilizing this experience, CALSTART is urging EPA to finalize a
regulation that meets our climate obligations while driving U.S. technology leadership and
competitiveness forward. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 2]
2. Adopt the strongest possible option, providing stringency which is at least as strong as
Alternative 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 2]
At a high level, strong standards maintain the recent positive momentum in the light duty
sector and provide a regulatory framework that complements the historic incentives of the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and is consistent with the
current market. We applaud EPA staff for its ambitious and highly necessary Phase 2 stringency
and encourage EPA to adopt a Phase 3 at least as stringent as Alternative 1. Below, we describe
our justification for Recommendation 1 (closing the footprint loophole) and then discuss the
drivers, barriers, and possible solutions to Recommendations 2-4 (adopting standards at least as
stringent as Alternative 1, and extending the standards through 2035, and sending clear market
signals). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 2]
1. Ecosystem-Supportive Activities
This regulation represents a historic step in transitioning the automotive industry toward
100% sales of ZEVs. The proposed rule works in concert with IIJA, IRA, ACC II, LCFS, and
other critical clean transportation programs that will reduce tailpipe emissions and increase the
number and quality of light-duty ZEVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) on the road.
With game changing federal incentives now in place and stringent California regulations leading
the way, the EPA now has the opportunity to match these incentives and guide the nation
towards accelerated light-duty vehicle decarbonization with a Phase 3 standard at least as
stringent as Alternative 1. Transitioning light-duty vehicles to electric power will dramatically
improve air quality as well as substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions due to the
progressively cleaner energy generation portfolio of the nation's electrical grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0618, p. 3]
Organization: Center for American Progress (CAP)
CAP urges EPA to adopt the strongest possible standard by the end of the year, finalizing the
proposed Alternative 1, with modifications, which are discussed below. Alternative 1 should
form the baseline for EPA's final rule as it makes significant achievable improvements to the
proposed rule that are critical for protecting public health and the climate. Alternative 1 features
emissions targets on average 10 g/mi lower than the proposed rule. This results in a $20 billion
increase in net benefits for calendar year 2055 over the proposed rule.8 In EPA's DRIA,
Alternative 1 is expected to result in 69 percent BEV penetration by 2032. This rate of BEV
penetration is possible and indeed likely given the current policy landscape of incentives for
manufacturing and purchasing batteries and electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0658,
p. 2]
8 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis," April 2023, available
online: https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
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Organization: Ceres BICEP (Business for Innovative Climate and Energy Policy) Network
BICEP members recognize that stronger LDV emissions standards and associated fuel cost
savings have clear economic benefits: they mitigate the economic risks of volatile fuel prices,
spur U.S. job creation,9 and reduce transportation costs. 10 ICCT found that the net consumer
benefits of BEVs outweigh their costs as soon as 2024 for passenger vehicles, 11 and between
2023-2025 for commercial vans and pickups with a 200 mile range, 12 even when IRA incentives
are not taken into account. Electric vehicle sales are increasing rapidly, 13 and auto
manufacturers Ford and General Motors have committed to 100% light- duty electric vehicle
(EV) sales in leading markets by 2035.14 While manufacturer commitments and consumer
demand demonstrate the growing momentum toward electric cars, it is critical that EPA provide
a strong market signal to support those commitments by adopting stringent standards. Further,
strong standards will ensure billions of dollars in savings from fuel, health, and climate costs. 15
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0600, p. 2]
9https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344241066_Economic_and_Jobs_Impacts_of_Enhanced_Fuel_
Efficiency_Standards_for_Light_Duty_Vehicle sintheUSA.
10 https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/press_release/new-consumer-reports-analysis-shows-rising-gas-
prices-ramp-up-savings-for-ev- owners/.
11 https://theicct.org/publication/ev-cost-benefits-2035-oct22/.
12 https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/cost-ev-vans-pickups-us-2040-jan22.pdf.
13 https://subscriber.politicopro.eom/newsletter/2023/06/supercharged-ev-sales-00103721.
14 https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/The-Global-Automaker-Rating-2022_final.pdf.
15 https://theicct.org/publication/ev-cost-benefits-2035-oct22/.
Thus, on behalf of the companies in the BICEP network, I urge EPA to adopt light-duty
vehicle (LDV) GHG emissions standards at least as strong as Alternative 1 through 2030, and
stronger thereafter. I also urge EPA to adopt LDV criteria pollutant standards and medium-duty
vehicle (MDV) multi-pollutant emissions standards at least as strong as those currently proposed
to mitigate climate risk, strengthen U.S. economy, and address public health and equity
concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0600, p. 3]
Organization: Ceres Corporate Electric Vehicle Alliance (CEVA)
The Alliance applauds the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for its commitment to
adopting multi-pollutant emissions standards for Model Years (MY) 2027 and later light- and
medium- duty vehicles and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions standards for heavy-duty vehicles,
and urges EPA to align these standards with U.S. climate and public health goals. 1 Specifically,
the Alliance supports: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, p. 1]
1 https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/the-us-national-blueprint-for-transportation-
decarbonization.pdf
-Light-duty vehicle GHG emissions standards aligned with Alternative 1, the strongest
standard proposed in this rulemaking, which will result in a 59% reduction in average fleetwide
carbon dioxide emissions by MY2032 from a MY2026 baseline. The Alliance also encourages
EPA to move forward with its proposed criteria pollutant emissions standards for light-duty
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vehicles, reducing fleetwide average MY2032 criteria pollutant emissions 60% from MY2025
levels.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, p. 1]
2 https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/lmdv-multi-pollutant-emissions-my-2027-nprm-
2023-04.pdf (p.42)
-Medium-duty vehicle (Class 2b and 3) multi-pollutant emissions standards aligned with its
current proposal, which will ensure a 44% reduction in average fleetwide GHG emissions by
MY2032 from a MY2026 baseline, and a 66 76% reduction in criteria pollutant emissions by
MY2032 from aMY2025 baseline.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, p. 1]
3 Ibid. (p.42)
- Heavy-duty vehicle phase 3 GHG emissions standards that are at least as strong as those
proposed, but ideally are stronger to ensure at least 50% zero-emissions vehicle (ZEV) sales
across all market segments by 2032. California's Advanced Clean Trucks (ACT) rule,4
manufacturer commitments,5 and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) funding are all consistent
with such agoal.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, p. 1]
4 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/ACT-1963.pdf (p.5)
5 https ://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/hdv-phase3 -ghg-standards-benefits-apr23 .pdf
6 https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23-2.pdf
Organization: Colorado Energy Office, Colorado Department of Transportation, and Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment
We appreciate the Administration's efforts to re-establish the United States as a leader on
clean air and climate, and to regain ground on clean transportation. The President's agenda,
including the goal to ensure half of all new vehicles sold in 2030 are zero emission and
investments from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and Inflation Reduction Act, are already
having transformational effects and can help support a successful transition to light- and
medium-duty zero emission vehicles. We now urge the Administration to take the next step and
codify this action by adopting the strongest national air pollution and GHG standards possible for
light- and medium-duty vehicles. We appreciate the Administration's leadership, and are looking
forward to collaborating to reach our ambitious collective goals with respect to reducing
emissions from the light- and medium-duty vehicle sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694, p.
3]
Colorado has demonstrated a strong commitment to accelerating adoption of light- and
medium-duty zero emission vehicles, including hosting a robust stakeholder process to update
and publish our most recent state electric vehicle plan [Embedded Hyperlink:
https://energyoffice.colorado.gov/transportation/ev-education-resources/2023-colorado-ev-plan],
and implementing three new transportation electrification enterprises funded by fees on retail
deliveries and transportation network company rides that are forecast to invest over $700M in
transportation electrification over the next decade. Some of the key advancements in the state's
light- and medium-duty electrification efforts include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694, pp. 1-2]
- Adoption of the Advanced Clean Cars, Advanced Clean Trucks, and Low NOx Omnibus
rules at our Air Quality Control Commission (AQCC), and a commitment to complete a
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rulemaking in 2023 to adopt the Advanced Clean Cars II rule through 2032 in our most recent
state EV Plan. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694, pp. 1-2]
- Implementation of the state's National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) plan
[Embedded Hyperlink: https://www.codot.gov/programs/innovativemobility/electrification/nevi-
plan to construct DC fast-charging sites along federally designated EV corridors. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0694, pp. 1-2]
- Developing the Vehicle Exchange Colorado [Embedded Hyperlink:
https://energyoffice.colorado.gov/vehicle-exchange-colorado] program to incentivize low- and
moderate-income Coloradans to retire and replace high-emitting vehicles with electric vehicles
(EVs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694, pp. 1-2]
- Recently passed legislation that includes an extension and expansion of the state's tax credit
for light, medium- and heavy-duty zero emission vehicles (HB23-1272 [Embedded Hyperlink:
https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/hb23-1272]). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694, pp. 1-2]
- Transportation Electrification Plans (TEPs) from the state's investor-owned utilities,
including Xcel Energy's 2024-2026 TEP, which proposes over $400 million in investment in
programs to reduce barriers to adoption of EVs, and Black Hills Energy's 2024-2026 TEP, which
proposes more than $2.6 million for programming to support transportation electrification.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694, pp. 1-2]
- EV CO [Embedded Hyperlink: https://evco.colorado.gov/], a public awareness campaign
designed to promote the convenience and financial and environmental benefits of driving
electric, and answer common questions about incentives and charging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0694, pp. 1-2]
-Recently passed legislation (HB23-1233 [Embedded Hyperlink:
https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/hb23-1233]) and state minimum building energy codes [Embedded
Hyperlink: https://energyoffice.colorado.gov/climate-energy/energy-policy/building-energy-
codes/energy-code-board] that require a minimum level of EV readiness in new construction for
multi-family housing and other building types. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Consumer Reports (CR)
The proposed EPA rule would increase the supply of cleaner, cost-saving transportation
options, such as EVs and hybrids, available to consumers. This proposal, particularly the more
stringent Alternative 1, would support the transition to a cleaner transportation sector, providing
cost savings, as well as other benefits that go beyond the pocketbook. This proposal would save
consumers money on fuel and vehicle maintenance. It would also reduce emissions, thus
contributing to reduced spending on healthcare costs tied to air pollution, and disaster recovery
tied to GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, p. 6]
These savings are particularly important for overburdened communities who overwhelmingly
bear the brunt of the negative impacts of air pollution. Not only do these communities face a
disproportionate exposure to vehicle tailpipe emissions,4 but lower income households also
spend a greater percentage of their income on transportation costs than their wealthier
counterparts, making them more sensitive to fluctuation and uncertainty in fuel prices.5 Thus,
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policies such as the proposed rule, which reduce pollutant exposure and increase accessibility to
clean, reliable modes of transportation, are needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, p. 6]
4 Disparities in the Impact of Air Pollution, American Lung Association, April 2020,
https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/who-is-at-risk/disparities.
5 High Cost of Transportation in the United States, Institute for Transportation and Development Policy,
May 2019, https://www.itdp.org/2019/05/23/high-cost-transportation-united-states.
1.3. Consumer Petitions in Support of Proposed Rule
Consumer Reports collected 18,817 signatures from consumers in support of strengthening
EPA's current proposal for greenhouse gas standards.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728,
Attachment 1, p. 6]
6 Petition: More Clean Vehicles = Better Climate Future, Consumer Reports, 2023,
https://action.consumerreports.org/nb-20230425-epa-cleancars-petition.
Petition Text:
"We're urging the EPA and NHTSA to adopt the strongest possible rules to reduce climate-
and health-damaging vehicle emissions and greatly reduce fuel consumption, while helping
consumers save an estimated $12,000 over the lifetime of a new vehicle. The rules will rapidly
accelerate the number of cleaner vehicles like EVs and hybrids in production over the next
decade; save lives due to a dramatic decrease in tailpipe pollution; and put us on the route
towards a zero emissions future. These rules are a win-win for the climate, consumers' wallets,
and our health." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, p. 6]
Organization: Dana Incorporated
Dana supports the underlying goals of the proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards and
appreciates EPA's receptiveness in receiving stakeholder input. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0538, p. 2]
Organization: Doug Peterson
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the EPA's proposed standards for 2027-2032 light
and medium duty tailpipe emissions. The regulatory effort to accelerate the transition away from
internal combustion vehicles is commendable, given the grave threat of climate change. The
historic stringency increases are clearly feasible, and they reflect an appropriate, urgent response
to the escalating crisis. There is growing optimism that the electrification of the transportation
sector will succeed, and the agency's bold proposal is consistent with similar efforts enacted by
other proactive nations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Electrification Coalition (EC)
We urge this Administration to adopt the Alternative 1 Scenario, as we support the strongest
policies that will accelerate our path to transportation electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0588, p. 1]
In addition to our national security challenges, the U.S. also faces the rapidly growing threat
of climate change. The latest National Climate Assessment^ which Congress mandated in 1990
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under the Global Change Research Act, shows that the U.S. has been observing the impacts of
climate change for decades and that more frequent and extreme weather and climate-related
events are creating new and increasing risks across U.S. communities - which we have recently
seen with wildfires that have ravaged the country, more powerful hurricanes causing loss of lives
and immense destruction, more intense tornadoes destroying communities, and extreme weather
events in areas that we should not expect to see these weather events in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0588, p. 2]
To overcome these national security concerns from climate change, the U.S. must reduce
carbon emissions. The EPA notes that the transportation sector is the largest source of
greenhouse gas emissions, representing 27% of total greenhouse gas emissions. 5 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0588, p. 2]
Organization: Energy Innovation
Energy Innovation appreciates the opportunity to submit these comments to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding its Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for
Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles (proposed rule). Energy
Innovation is a nonpartisan energy and climate policy firm. We provide independent analysis and
science-based research to policymakers and other decision-makers seeking to understand which
policies are most effective to ensure a climate-safe future for all. Our team has expertise in
modeling climate policy, including policies that support a cleaner power grid and electrify
transportation, buildings, and industry. Our recommendations are data-driven and informed, in
part, by our peer-reviewed Energy Policy Simulator (EPS) model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, p. 1]
We appreciate the EPA's extensive work to develop these proposed emissions standards for
criteria pollutants and greenhouse gases for light-duty and medium-duty vehicles (LDVs and
MDVs, respectively) for model years 2027 (MY 2027) and later. We commend the EPA's
diligent analysis in its development of the proposed rule, which reflects the impact of new
federal and state policies and advances in clean vehicle technologies. The EPA has set forth a
proposed rule that aligns with its statutory directive in Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA to enhance
the stringency of LDV and MDV vehicle tailpipe standards needed to reduce emissions that
endanger public health and welfare: '"the Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from
time to time revise)... standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or
classes of new motor vehicles ... which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."'1 We concur with
the EPA's analysis that the proposed rule and Alternative 1 are aligned with its statutory
directive—the proposed more stringent standards offer technologically feasible and cost-
effective options to reduce harmful GHG and other air polluting emissions over the timeframe
the standards would be in place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 1]
1 U.S. EPA, "Proposed Rules: Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-
Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829; FRL 8953-03- OAR)," Federal Register
88, no. 87 (May 5, 2023), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-05-05/pdf/2023-07974.pdf,
29231-2.
CONCLUSION
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We commend the EPA for undertaking such a thorough investigation into the myriad factors
underpinning the proposed tailpipe rules. The stringency of the final rules will have an outsized
impact on climate and public health, and the EPA is the agency with statutory authority under the
CAA to adopt the most stringent standards feasible to mitigate harmful vehicle emissions. The
combination of new federal policies, ongoing state leadership, increased private sector
engagement, and the imperative to address climate change this decade are converging at the right
moment to support the adoption of strong rules for the LDV and MDV sectors. We look forward
to continued engagement with the EPA through this important process, and we invite its full
consideration of our comments in its final decision-making. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p.
27]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) respectfully submits the following comments in support
of Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Proposed Rule, Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg.
29184 (May 5, 2023) ("Proposal" or "Proposed Standards"). These comments highlight the
importance and urgency of finalizing health protective standards for new light- and medium-duty
vehicles by the end of the year that ensure deep reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) and criteria
pollution by leveraging a range of zero emitting technologies and internal combustion engine
vehicle (ICEV) improvements that automakers have available, including battery electric vehicles
(BEVs), plug- in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), hybrid vehicles, fuel cell vehicles, and
internal combustion engine and vehicle technologies. Near-term emissions reductions are vital to
mitigating the effects of climate change and to protecting public health, especially the health of
low-income communities and communities of color, which are disproportionately impacted by
transportation air pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 1-2]
EPA's proposal is a vital step forward toward addressing the largest source of greenhouse gas
emissions and a significant source of health-harming particulate matter (PM) and smog-forming
nitrogen oxide (NOx) pollution in the United States. EDF urges EPA to finalize protective light-
and medium-duty standards, consistent with and building from the proposals the agency has put
forward, that account for the progress already underway thanks to manufacturer and fleet
investments and commitments, federal investments, and state policies like the Advanced Clean
Cars II (ACC II) rule. EDF supports EPA's finalization of the most protective multipollutant
standards possible that deliver pollution reductions at least at the level of the proposal and that
result in about two-thirds of new light-duty vehicles and 40% of new medium-duty vehicles sold
in 2032 are zero-emitting, putting us on the path to zero emissions from new vehicles in 2035.
We encourage EPA to secure even greater pollution reductions by providing for a voluntary (but
once chosen, enforceable) alternative leadership pathway that, for manufacturers choosing the
pathway, would ensure ACC II levels of ZEV deployment nationwide. We also recommend that
the agency consider strengthening the standards in the 2031-32 timeframe, which is especially
vital if EPA finalizes standards that are less protective than the proposal in the early years of the
program. Doing so could potentially increase cumulative benefits relative to the proposal (and, at
minimum, must offset any loss in cumulative benefits). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 1-
2]
The historic investments in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law (BIL) have rapidly accelerated an American electric vehicle manufacturing renaissance,
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dramatically advanced purchase price parity for passenger ZEVs, and accelerated already
declining costs for vehicles at the same time. Leveraging these trends, most manufacturers have
made commitments consistent with and even greater than the levels of ZEV deployment EPA
projects in this rule and leading states have continued to adopt California's ACCI and ACC II
rules. These factors strongly support EPA's proposed standards and, as outlined below, our
comments provide additional analysis and information to support standards that deliver even
greater pollution reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 2]
Organization: Gabrielle Lawrence
I and all the children that I see say thank you to the EPA and President Biden for supporting
new and stronger regulations on USA cars, trucks , buses. Hopefully, these regulations will
significantly eliminate the poisons in our air and help those who are deeply impacted to be
healthy - of body and mind. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0455, p. 2]
Organization: General Motors, LLC (GM)
In August 2021, GM was proud to participate in the Administration's event for Executive
Order 14037 with a goal of 50% EV share by 2030,9 with an associated goal of a 60% GHG
reduction from model year 2020 to 2030.10 At that time, we shared our aspiration of achieving
40-50%) of annual U.S. sales volumes of all EVs by 2030, with the high end of the 40-50%) range
enabled by supportivepolicies.il [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 3]
9 See Executive Order 14037, Aug 5, 2021 (86 FR
43583). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/08/10/2021- 17121/strengthening-american-
leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks
10 "Fact Sheet: President Biden Announces Steps to Drive American Leadership Forward on Clean Cars
and Trucks," Aug 5, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive- american-leadership-forward-on-
clean-cars-and-trucks/
11 "Ford, GM and Stellantis Joint Statement on Electric Vehicle Annual Sales" (August
2021). https://news.gm.eom/newsroom.detail.html/Pages/news/us/en/2021/aug/0805-electric.html
-In September 2022, GM committed to 50% EVs by 2030, the high end of our previously-
stated EV aspiration, as well as a 60%> reduction in new light-
duty vehicle GHG emissions from 2021 to 2030, in coordination with Environmental Defense
Fund. 12 This indicated our support for a regulation that underpins the Biden Administration's
Executive Order 14037, based on passage of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA)
and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 3]
12 "GM and EDF Announce Recommended Principles on EPA Emissions Standards for Model Year 2027
and Beyond" (September,
2022). https://pressroom.gm.com/gmbx/us/en/pressroom/home.detail.html/Pages/news/us/en/2022/sep/092
0-gm.html
Organization: Governing for Impact and Evergreen Action (GFI)
Evergreen Action and Governing for Impact ("GFI") submit this comment on the
Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") notice of proposed rulemaking, "Multi-Pollutant
Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles"
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("the Proposed Rule").l Evergreen Action is a climate policy organization focused on advancing
ambitious, actionable policies to confront the climate crisis and support good jobs to build a
thriving, just and inclusive clean energy economy.2 GFI is a regulatory policy organization
dedicated to ensuring that the federal government operates more effectively for everyday
working Americans. 3 We appreciate the opportunity to comment and we write in support of the
Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 1]
1 88 Fed. Reg. 29184 (2023).
2 Evergreen Action, https://www.evergreenaction.com/mission.
3 Governing for Impact, www.governingforimpact.org.
Organization: GreenLatinos et al.
For Multi-Pollutant L/MDV standards, we urge the U.S. EPA to finalize the strongest possible
standards by the end of 2023. In the proposed rulemaking, Alternative 1 is a good start, but we
need to increase the pace after 2030 to stay on route to achieve a zero emissions transportation
future. We urge the EPA to continue to create standards that make gas cars cleaner and more
efficient. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0789, p. 1]
Organization: Greg Dotson
In seeking to spur the development and deployment of electric vehicles in its recently
proposed rule, the U.S. EPA is not acting in isolation or conflict with Congress. Instead,
Congress has insisted on the development of electric vehicles since 1976 and has provided many
billions of dollars for EV research, development, demonstration, and deployment. With recent
enactment of the IIJA and the IRA, Congress has clearly demonstrated its support for the
widespread adoption of electric vehicles in the years to come. Given the substantial public
resources devoted to developing mature electric vehicle technology and bringing those electric
vehicles to market, it would be absurd for EPA to finalize emissions standards for light- and
medium-duty vehicles that do not fully realize the opportunity and benefits of zero emission
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0685, p. 20]
One needs only to assess the growing importance of EVs to the automotive industry prior to
EPA's proposal or the agency's most recent final rule strengthening standards through model
year 2026 [1] to see the momentum in this transition. Prior to EPA's issuance of its proposed rule
in August 2021 - [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0685, pp. 2-3]
1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, Final Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. 74434 (Dec. 30, 2021).
• The Ford Motor Company had announced that all of the vehicles it sells in Europe would be
electric vehicles by 2030.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0685, pp. 2-3]
• Jaguar announced it would go electric in 2025.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0685, pp. 2-3]
• Volvo announced that it would sell only electric cars by 2030.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0685, pp. 2-3]
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• Volkswagen announced its plan to increase its sales of electric vehicles by 2030, such that
70 percent of the vehicles it sells in Europe and 50 percent of the vehicles it sells in the U.S. and
China would be electric.5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0685, pp. 2-3]
• Honda announced plans for 40 percent of its sales to be zero-emission vehicles by 2030, 80
percent by 2035 and 100 percent globally by 2040.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0685, pp. 2-3]
• Mini announced its transition to electric vehicles.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0685, pp. 2-
3]
• General Motors had announced its intent to produce only electric vehicles by 2035.8 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0685, pp. 2-3]
• The leading trade association for the auto sector had declared that it was committed to "net
zero carbon transportation" and believed that the nation that leads development and adoption of
electrification and other innovative technologies will "shape supply chains, define global
standards, and potentially, reshape the international marketplace."9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0685, pp. 2-3]
• The Alliance for Automotive Innovation, United Autoworkers, and the Motor & Equipment
Manufacturers Association had further stated in a joint letter that business and labor were
"committed to working toward a netzero carbon transportation future that includes a shift to
electric-drive vehicles."10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0685, pp. 2-3]
2 Ford, Press Release, Ford Europe Goes All-in On EVs On Road To Sustainable Profitability; Cologne
Site Begins $1 Billion Transformation (Feb. 17, 2021)
https://media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/feu/en/news/2021/02/17/ford-europe-goes-all-in-onevs-on-road-
to- sustainable-profitabil.html.
3 Jaguar Website, Reimagine, https://www.jaguarlandrover.com/reimagine.
4 Volvo Press Release, Volvo Cars to be fully electric by 2030 (Mar. 2, 2021)
https://www.media.volvocars.com/global/en-gb/media/pressreleases/277409/volvo-cars-to-befully-electric-
by-2030.
5 Volkswagen Press Release, Volkswagen is accelerating transformation into software-driven mobility
provider (Mar. 5, 2021) https://www.volkswagen-newsroom.com/en/pressreleases/volkswagen-is-
accelerating- transformation-into-software-driven-mobility-provider-6878.
6 Aaron Gold, MotorTrend, Honda Plans to Dump Internal-Combustion Engines by 2040 (Apr.23, 2021)
https://www.motortrend.com/news/honda-electric-vehicles-2040/.
7 Viknesh Vijayenthiran, Motor Authority, Mini to go Electric, Launch Last Car with Internal-Combustion
Engine in 2025 (Mar. 17, 2021) https://www.motorauthority.com/news/1124463_mini-to-go-electric-
launch-last- car-with-internal-combustion-engine-in-2025.
8 General Motors, Press Release, General Motors, the Largest U.S. Automaker, Plans to be Carbon Neutral
by 2040 (Jan. 28, 2021)
,https://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/home.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2021/jan/0128-
carbon.html.
9 Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Auto Innovation Agenda (Dec. 2020)
https://www.autosinnovate.org/about/advocacy/AutosInnovationAgendal2152020.pdf; Testimony of John
Bozzella, Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Feb. 2021)
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10 Letter to President Joe Biden from John Bozzella, Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Rory Gamble,
United Autoworkers International Union, and Bill Long, Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association
(Mar. 29, 2021).
At the same time that automakers were making these announcements, national and
subnational jurisdictions around the world were announcing policies to eliminate sales of
emitting vehicles. For example, the United Kingdom had announced in November 2020 that it
would ban fossil fuel powered vehicles by 2030.11 Dozens of other jurisdictions had also
announced commitments to electrification. 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0685, pp. 2-3]
11 Henry Edwardes-Evans, SPG PLatts, UK government brings forward ban on new ICE cars 10 years to
2030 (Nov. 18, 2020) https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latestnews/electric-
power/111820-uk- government-brings-forward-ban-on-new-ice-cars-10-years-to-2030.
12 Hongyang Cui, Dale Hall, and Nic Lutsey, International Council on Clean Transportation, Update on the
global transition to electric vehicles through 2019 (July 2020)
https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/update-global-EV-stats-sept2020-EN.pdf.
All of these developments, again, predated EPA's even proposing its rule regarding Model
Year 2023-2026 standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0685, pp. 2-3]
These developments were not attributable to any one government policy, technological
breakthrough, or private sector action. Instead, momentum for these developments swelled in
national parliaments, corporate boardrooms, research laboratories, and automakers' showrooms.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0685, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Interfaith Power & Light
As faith leaders from diverse religious and spiritual traditions, we speak with one voice in
support of bold and just climate solutions. Climate change is a moral issue that is most harmful
to those least responsible for creating the problem. People of faith and conscience recognize the
need for bold, new transportation solutions, and clean cars and light trucks are an integral step
towards addressing the climate crisis. Today we write to ask you to move swiftly to enact robust
light-duty vehicle multi-pollutant emissions standards. As a nation, we have a moral imperative
to enact the most stringent light-duty vehicle standards in order to address our historically unsafe
pollutant emissions and to protect our public health and Shared Home. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0530, p. 1]
It is of the utmost importance that standards require tighter limits on internal combustion
engine vehicles in order to continually make these vehicles cleaner as manufacturers transition to
zero-emission cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0530, p. 2]
Now is the time to maximize the impact of our national clean car standards—the most
effective policy that the federal government has to reduce dangerous air pollution, lower
greenhouse gas emissions, and save consumers money at the pump. As policymakers, you have a
critical and sacred role in helping to achieve these goals. As faith leaders, we urge you to
establish strong light-duty vehicle multi-pollutant emissions standards that put our nation on a
trajectory to a zero-emissions transportation future, and we ask you to redouble efforts to
announce the draft rule before the end of 2023. For more than a decade, people of faith and
conscience have advocated for strong safeguards on greenhouse gas pollution from
transportation. Since then, the climate crisis has only accelerated, taking an enormous toll on
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human life, our communities, and our world. We have a moral responsibility to act right now as a
nation to do all we can to address climate change for our communities, future generations, and
our Sacred Earth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0530, p. 2]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
ICCT strongly supports EPA's proposed multi-pollutant emission standards for light- and
medium-duty vehicles for model years 2027-2032. The proposed standards are critical to
achieving the pace and scale of needed transportation emission reductions in the United States,
where there is a clear and urgent need to rapidly transition to cleaner vehicles. Continued and
strengthened standards are necessary to protect public health and deliver on national
environmental obligations. We support the proposed standards that would dramatically reduce
climate and air pollution from new passenger and medium-duty vehicles and deliver trillions of
dollars in net benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 3]
ICCT strongly supports the proposed multi-pollutant emission standards for light- and
medium- duty vehicles for model years 2027-2032 and recommends its finalization as quickly as
possible. Doing so will provide a clear long-term signal that automakers, suppliers, charging
companies, and utilities need to make needed investments with confidence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0569, p. 5]
Organization: Lillian Davey
I believe this form of legislation is in the best interests of the people. Regulation on pollutants
and greenhouse gases is vital in ensuring public health and safety as well as limiting
environmental damage. The Environmental Protection Agency enforces the vehicle and engine
provisions of Title II of the Clean Air Act and regulations at 40 C. F. R. Parts 85, 86, 88 through
94, 600, and 1033 through 1068., to which this legislation is directly related. The Clean Air Act,
as well as the EPA are responsible for ensuring that motor vehicles are not emitting a certain
amount of pollutants that can be responsible for the damage of human health, as well as
environmental health. The Clean Air Act has been used several times to attack the EPA and
demand for more stringent guidelines. One major case being Massachusetts v. EPA (2007),
which changed the entire framework for the Clean Air Act and how it has been applied and
monitored since. This legislation is a direct stem from that case. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0489, p. 1]
Greenhouse gases as well as other emitters are the most detrimental to the environment, and
the list only keeps growing as more scientific evidence continues to arise. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0489, p. 1]
Organization: Lucid Group, Inc.
Response to the Proposed Rulemaking
Lucid Applauds EPA's Forward Thinking in Setting Cleaner, More Stringent Emissions
Standards
Lucid strongly supports EPA's proposed rule on Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for
Model Years (MYs) 2027 and Later in Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles. We applaud the
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agency for proposing stringent standards that would reduce tailpipe pollutants and accelerate EV
adoption, ultimately addressing global warming and other air pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0664, p. 2]
Cleaner tailpipe standards for criteria pollutants and greenhouse gases are critical to protect
public health and welfare and to combat the climate crisis. As demonstrated in its 2021 revision
to the GHG standards for MYs 2023-20261, EPA has made significant strides under its authority
to both set and revise standards based on updates to climate-related findings. Even with this
progress, our national and international decarbonization goals require aggressive policies and
standards to ramp up the shift to EVs sooner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, p. 2]
1 86 FR 74434, December 30, 2021, "Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Standards."
Under section 202 of the Clean Air Act, EPA has clear authority to regulate sources of air
pollutants from all mobile sources, including carbon dioxide (C02), non- methane organic gases
(NMOG) plus oxides of nitrogen (NOx) or NMOG+NOx, particulate matter (PM), carbon
monoxide (CO), and formaldehyde (HCHO) from vehicle tailpipes. Lucid applauds EPA's
continued efforts under this authority to improve the nation's air quality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0664, p. 2]
Organization: Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE)
The Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) is writing to express our support for
the above proposed rule to establish Multi-Pollutant Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later
Light- Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles. MDE agrees that this comprehensive federal program
would achieve significant greenhouse gas (GHG) and criteria pollutant emissions reductions,
improve air quality, and result in substantial public health benefits while helping us meet our
climate and air quality goals. MDE urges the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to adopt
the proposed criteria pollutant standards. MDE also urges EPA to adopt the most stringent,
technologically feasible Alternative 1 GHG emissions standards. Alternative 1 is the closest to
being in alignment with the California Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC II) regulations, which
Maryland is in the process of adopting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp. 1-3]
Maryland has made a lot of progress over the past few decades towards clean air. The
improvements have been so substantial that the EPA has proposed to determine that the
Washington, District of Columbia-Maryland-Virginia nonattainment area has clean data for the
2015 8-hour ozone national ambient air quality standard (2015 ozone NAAQS). A Clean Data
Determination (CDD) is the first step in being redesignated from nonattainment to attainment.
The Baltimore nonattainment area will also be eligible for a CDD in the near future if the area
continues to stay at or below the ozone standard. Nitrogen oxides (NOx) are a precursor pollutant
of ground-level ozone and are also precursors to secondary small particulate matter (PM2.5).
Exposures to these two pollutants are associated with premature death, increased
hospitalizations, and emergency visits due to exacerbation of chronic heart and lung diseases and
other serious health impacts. Some areas of the state experience higher rates of illnesses such as
asthma than average, and these illnesses are aggravated by these pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0698, pp.1-3]
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While significant progress has been made statewide, continuing to reduce NOx emissions,
especially those from the transportation sector, is critical to our efforts to attain and maintain the
ozone NAAQS. Regional modeling shows that a significant portion of the ozone-forming
pollutants are transported into Maryland from upwind states. EPA estimates that strengthening
these standards will reduce NOx and PM2.5 emissions nationally by 41% and 35% in 2055,
respectively, which combined with state reductions can provide cleaner air for Marylanders.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp. 1-3]
Maryland is working hard to reduce in-state emissions from the transportation sector. Efforts
include the Maryland Clean Cars Act that instructed MDE to adopt the California Advanced
Clean Car (ACC I) regulations that require manufacturers of passenger cars and light-duty trucks
to sell increasing percentages of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs). The regulations also include
low-emission vehicle (LEV) standards to reduce criteria pollutants and GHG emissions from
new gasoline powered vehicles. As noted above, Maryland is in the process of adopting
California's ACC II regulations. The ACC II regulations require auto manufacturers to sell an
increasing percentage of ZEVs over time, with a phase in of a 100 percent sales target by 2035.
ACC II also established increasingly more stringent exhaust and evaporative emissions standards
for criteria pollutants from these vehicles. Maryland's recently enacted Clean Trucks Act of 2023
requires MDE to adopt California's Advanced Clean Trucks (ACT) regulations that require
manufacturers of medium- and heavy-duty vehicles to sell increasing percentages of ZEVs by
2035. Maryland is also a signatory to both the 2013 Multi-State Zero-Emission Vehicle
Memorandum of Understanding and the 2020 Multi-State Medium- and Heavy-Duty ZEV
Memorandum of Understanding under which the signatory states are working collaboratively to
accelerate ZEV adoption, coordinate ZEV policy, develop the ZEV market, and build out
infrastructure. The recently enacted Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and the Inflation
Reduction Act (IRA) will provide significant funding to advance electrification and charging
infrastructure that will enable the widespread electrification of this vehicle market. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp. 1-3]
Adopting the most stringent, technically technical feasible Alternative 1 GHG emissions
standards at the federal level will provide considerable support for Maryland's efforts to meet
our GHG reduction goals. Transportation accounts for almost half of all GHG emissions
generated in the State. The Climate Solutions Now Act of 2022 (CSNA) established a statewide
goal of a 60 percent reduction in GHG emissions from 2006 levels by 2031. The CSNA requires
more stringent GHG emission reductions economy wide and requires state agencies execute
plans, programs, and policies in order to achieve these goals. Enacting the most stringent GHG
emissions standards that are technologically feasible will complement the many strategies being
implemented under the CSNA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp. 1-3]
Maryland has implemented emissions reduction measures across all sectors, including on-road
transportation to reduce the state's GHG and NOx emissions. Federal programs such as these
standards are needed to provide significant additional reductions of these pollutants as they also
provide benefits across the economy. The EPA's leadership in strong regulatory GHG limits
from motor vehicles could also help reduce ozone and PM2.5 precursors, providing further
reductions to help meet our climate and air quality goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp.
1-3]
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For these reasons, MDE supports the EPA's proposal to adopt the proposed criteria pollutant
standards and the most stringent, technologically feasible Alternative 1 GHG emissions
standards for model year 2027 and later light-duty and medium-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0698, pp.1-3]
Organization: Mayor Becky Daggett, City of Flagstaff, Arizona et al.
Critical pollution reductions
In 2020, the transportation sector contributed 27 percent of total GHG emissions in the United
States—more than any other single sector. Transport also contributes over 55 percent of our
nation's total nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions. NOx and particulate matter pollution pose serious
health risks, leading to devastating human health impacts including asthma, other respiratory
issues, and even premature death. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 2]
Fast-tracking robust car and truck standards is critical for the United States to meet its GHG
targets over the coming decade, meet Clean Air Act requirements and provide long-overdue
protections for environmental justice communities. We believe that such standards would be
consistent with the U.S. nationally determined contribution to the Paris Agreement, under which
the United States committed to cut economy-wide GHG emissions by 50 to 52 percent in 2030,
compared to 2005 levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 2]
Outcomes
The final standards should:
- Ensure the LDV and HDV standards support greater zero-emission vehicle adoption by
considering market growth expected from IRA and IIJA investments (which will surpass existing
commitments outlined in Executive Order 14037);
- Put the nation on a trajectory to ensure 100 percent of all LDVs and HDVs sold in 2035 are
zero-emission vehicles including pathway milestones assuring continuous progress; and
- Reflect recently adopted state LDV and HDV emissions standards, consistent with state
authority under the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 2]
By implementing these recommendations, we believe that the resultant standards will not only
meet the Clean Air Act's statutory command to protect public health, but will also help lower
fuel costs for consumers, create good, green jobs, and reduce burden on frontline communities.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 2]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
Mercedes-Benz supports the Administration's electrification goals.
The EPA has undertaken a monumental task with this NPRM, setting ambitious and
challenging greenhouse gas and criteria emissions standards into the next decade. Mercedes-
Benz proudly supports EPA's goal to advance vehicle electrification and protect the environment
and public health. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 1]
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Organization: Metropolitan Washington Air Quality Committee (MWAQC) et al.
On behalf of the Metropolitan Washington Air Quality Committee (MWAQC), the
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments' (COG) Climate, Energy and Environment
Policy Committee (CEEPC), and the National Capital Region Transportation Planning Board
(TPB), we are writing to express our support for the proposed rule to establish Multi-Pollutant
Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0503, p. 1]
The EPA's current proposal to establish multi-pollutant emissions standards for model years
2027 and later light-duty and medium-duty vehicles would provide the critical leadership needed
for our region to work towards meeting adopted environmental goals and standards. We agree
that this comprehensive federal program would achieve significant greenhouse gas emissions
reductions and would result in substantial public health and welfare benefits. As noted in the
Metropolitan Washington 2030 Climate and Energy Action Plan, underserved communities have
been disproportionately affected by ambient air pollution and climate-change-related health
impacts. Therefore, more stringent greenhouse gas emissions standards and subsequent
emissions reductions have the potential to help the most vulnerable populations. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0503, p. 1]
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
NACAA strongly supports EPA's proposal of these multipollutant emission standards - for
LDVs and Class 2b and Class 3 MDVs (and we specifically support moving MDVs from the
heavy-duty vehicle program to a LDV-program-like structure and the expansion of the definition
of medium-duty "passenger" vehicles) - and the agency's use of its authority under CAA section
202(a) to prescribe "standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or
classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicles engines, which. . .cause, or contribute to,
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."
NACAA concurs with EPA that, consistent with the requirements of CAA section 202(b), the
proposed standards "permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving
appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, p. 6]
The proposal is based on the same regulatory framework that EPA has used for past vehicle
rulemakings, and NACAA agrees with EPA that, "[t]he levels of stringency proposed in this rule
for both light- and medium-duty vehicles continue the trend over the past fifty years for criteria
pollutants, and over the past decade for GHGs, of EPA establishing numerically lower emissions
standards based on continued advancements in emissions control technology that make it
possible to achieve important emissions reductions at a reasonable cost "26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0559, p. 6]
26 Supra note 1, at 29,196
Organization: National Tribal Air Association (NTAA)
As described and documented in the analysis of this proposed rule, when fully implemented,
the U.S. will accomplish reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, the largest
source of these pollutants. Although the proposed rule and anticipated reduction in emissions of
greenhouse gases (specifically carbon dioxide) are characterized as "ambitious" and
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"significant"5, Alternative 1 to the proposed standards will increase the cost of new vehicles as
projected for Alternative 1 requirements. These costs for vehicle purchasers will be mitigated by
increased savings in vehicle operating costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, p. 2]
5 Biden-Harris Administration Proposes Strongest-Ever Pollution Standards for cars and trucks to
Accelerate Transition to a Clean - Transportation Future, USEPA News Release, April 12, 2023
The ravages of climate change continue to be of utmost concern to the NTAA. Alternative 1
to the proposed rule calls for more aggressive carbon monoxide emissions standards. We
recommend its adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, p. 2]
Conclusions
The NTAA appreciates this opportunity to comment on the proposed rule regarding "Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles." We agree with the EPA's stated urgency to improve our air quality and to mitigate
climate change5. The proposed vehicle emissions standards and related provisions can be
important elements in addressing these critical needs. We support the proposed rule including
Alternative 1 to the proposed greenhouse gas emissions standards. The anticipated shift to
electric vehicle fleets must, however, be coincident with greatly enhanced electric infrastructure
in many Tribal communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, p. 3]
5 Biden-Harris Administration Proposes Strongest-Ever Pollution Standards for cars and trucks to
Accelerate Transition to a Clean - Transportation Future, USEPA News Release, April 12, 2023
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
NESCAUM and the OTC strongly support EPA's proposal to establish new and more
stringent criteria pollutant and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions standards for model years
(MYs) 2027 and later light-duty vehicles (LDVs) and Class 2b and 3 medium-duty vehicles
(MDVs). Such standards have the potential to substantially reduce emissions of GHGs, NOx,
fine particulate matter (PM2.5), VOCs, and air toxics, and help states across the country to
achieve attainment with National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and state and federal
climate goals. NESCAUM and the OTC urge EPA to adopt the proposed criteria pollutant
standards and the most stringent GHG emissions standards that are technologically feasible.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 1-2]
II. State Policies and Federal Funding have Primed the Market for Rapid Electrification.
Recognizing the urgent need for action, most of the NESCAUM and OTC states have
established ambitious economy wide or transportation sector specific GHG emission reduction
targets for 2050 and interim targets that require aggressive emissions reductions by as soon as
2030. Transportation electrification is also critical to attaining the NAAQS in large metropolitan
areas like the CSA. For decades, these states have worked individually and collaboratively to
develop and implement a wide range of strategies to accelerate ZEV deployment, priming the
market for increasingly stringent federal emissions standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584,
pp. 3-4]
A. Section 177 State LDV and MDV Emissions Standards
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Under the CAA, California is the only state permitted to establish emissions standards for new
motor vehicles. However, CAA Section 177 authorizes other states to adopt California's
emissions standards, which are generally more stringent than comparable federal requirements.
States first began to utilize this tool over 30 years ago to address smog and more than 15 years
ago to curb GHG emissions. Since 1990, California and a growing number of "Section 177
states," including most of the NESCAUM and OTC states, have adopted regulations designed to
increase production of on-road ZEVs. Adoption of these standards by Section 177 states enables
economies of scale and sends clear market signals to industry and investors. These states also
serve as a proving ground for advanced technologies and provide the foundation for strong
federal standards like those proposed in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 3-4]
Organization: Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)
The Oregon Legislature in 2007 found that "Global warming poses a serious threat to the
economic well- being, public health, natural resources and environment of Oregon." It is
important that the standards set by EPA continue to reduce greenhouse gases and other air
pollutants from new vehicles through at least 2032. In Oregon, motor vehicles are the largest
contributor of greenhouse gas emissions and the adoption of stringent vehicle standards is a
foundational strategy to decarbonize Oregon's transportation sector. As a Section 177 state,
Oregon has adopted regulations, namely California's Advanced Clean Cars program to increase
production of ZEVs and reduce criteria air pollutant emissions from gasoline powered vehicles.
The adoption of this program is one of many significant actions taken toward Oregon's goal of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions 75 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. Additionally, the
Advanced Clean Cars ZEV sales requirements provide the regulatory certainty needed to drive
public and private investment in deployment of ZEVs and charging infrastructure. These
requirements have propelled Oregon into one of the top five states selling light-duty ZEVs.
Federally mandated requirements ensure the entire nation would move towards a cleaner
transportation future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0751]
These rules also provide numerous other environmental, economic and health benefits. Given
that mobile sources contribute over half of the anthropogenic NOx emissions in the U.S.,1 it is
essential to establish standards that lower the emissions from these sources. The proposed rules
would reduce more than 400,000 tons of harmful NOx, PM2.5, and hazardous air pollutant
emissions through 2055, significantly improving public health across America. EPA also
estimates that these standards will result in approximately a 95% reduction in particulate matter
(PM) emissions. These reductions are significant and ensures that Oregon, who has several
ozone and PM maintenance areas, to continue to attain and maintain the existing PM and ozone
standards as well as any revised, more stringent standards EPA may set in the future. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0751]
1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles," Govinfo, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-
05-0S/pdf/2023- 07974.pdf
In the proposed rules, EPA is also requesting comment whether these new standards should be
extended to MY 2035. DEQ recommends EPA extend and increase the GHG standards through
MY 2035, to better align with those states that have already adopted California's Advanced
Clean Cars Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0751]
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The proposed standards would meaningfully reduce emissions from the largest source of
mobile emissions and provide substantial public health and climate benefits, helping Oregon
achieve its greenhouse gas reduction goals. It also accelerates our efforts to decarbonize the
transportation sector. In particular, for those states that lack the authority to address GHG
emissions from on-road vehicles, EPA's action to update these standards is needed to ensure
other states can meet their climate objectives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0751]
Organization: Plug In America
We applaud the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for proposing the most stringent
auto emissions standards in U.S. history. To meet the Paris Climate Agreement, 67% of vehicles
sold in 2030 need to be electric vehicles (EVs).l In addition to the significant climate and health
benefits these standards will provide, we expect to see an increase in energy security, improved
resilience of the electric power system, and a decrease in transportation fuel price volatility for
American families. These emissions standards and the corresponding increase in electric vehicles
have the potential to create a more just, equitable transportation system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0625, p. 1]
1 https ://theicct.org/us-ghg-standard-paris-agreement-dec22/.
EVs make ambitious GHG emissions standards achievable. There are parties who argue that
these standards force a shift to electric transportation before the technology and infrastructure are
ready. With 10 million EVs sold globally in 2022 and operating daily on roads worldwide, the
EV future is here. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0625, p. 1]
In closing, we commend the EPA and the Biden - Harris administration for developing an
elegant policy solution to address the climate change impacts of transportation through both
regulation and incentives. Regulations drive manufacturers to innovate, incentives build the
market, and infrastructure investments build consumer confidence. Together, these elements will
drive change toward cleaner transportation and economic development. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0625, p. 3]
Organization: POET, LLC
POET thanks the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for the opportunity to submit
this comment on the proposed rule, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027
and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles" (the "Proposed Rule"). POET generally
supports standards, like those in the Proposed Rule, that will significantly curb greenhouse gas
("GHG") emissions from cars and light- and medium-duty trucks covered by the Proposed Rule.
However, EPA must broaden the range of technologies the Proposed Rule relies upon to include
renewable fuels, such as bioethanol, in setting standards for reducing GHG and other emissions.
Renewable fuels will be critical to decarbonizing and reducing other air pollutant emissions from
these vehicles. POET urges EPA to credit renewable fuels, including their significant lifecycle
carbon emissions reductions, and adopt POET's other recommendations in these
comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 1]
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Organization: Pueblo of Santa Ana
The Pueblo of Santa Ana ("The Pueblo") is located along the Rio Jemez and Rio Grande in
southeastern Sandoval County, New Mexico, about 15 miles north of Albuquerque and 45 miles
south of Santa Fe. Santa Ana land encompasses 141,191 acres including original land grants,
trust lands, and land purchased by the Tribe. The Pueblo is located in a major transportation
corridor. One major interstate highway (1-25) bisects the Pueblo, and another state highway
(NM-550) runs along the southern boundary, close to residential areas on the Pueblo. There are
high traffic volumes and ongoing road construction in this area, producing heightened levels of
emissions that have a significant impact on the Pueblo's air quality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0556]
From the latest Level 2 emissions inventory the Pueblo has conducted, the percentage of
criteria pollutants contributed by the Pueblo when totaling all sources on-Pueblo and within 50
miles of the Pueblo's boundaries stayed well below 3%. Because of this, the area emissions,
including those from vehicles, that impact Santa Ana are contributed minimally by the Pueblo.
This proposed regulation, along with EPA's other efforts to reduce ozone-causing pollutants,
PM2s, and multiple hazardous air pollutants would benefit Santa Ana which is subject to these
emissions coming from off the Pueblo. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0556]
The acute and continuous impacts of climate change on the Pueblo of Santa Ana are well
documented. Unfortunately, new consequences of this global crisis continue to be revealed. As
described and documented in the analysis of this proposed rule, when fully implemented, the
U.S. will accomplish reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, the largest
source of these pollutants. Although the proposed rule and anticipated reduction in emissions of
greenhouse gases (specifically carbon dioxide) are characterized as "significant" and
"stringent"5, Alternative 1 to the proposed standards will achieve more substantial reductions.
We are mindful of the expected additional costs of new vehicles as projected for Alternative 1
requirements. These costs for vehicle purchasers will be mitigated by increased savings in
vehicle operating costs. We recommend Alternative 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0556]
5 No footnote provided.
The Pueblo of Santa Ana supports the proposed emissions standards for new light-duty and
medium-duty vehicles for non-methane organic gases plus nitrogen oxides (NMOG+ NOx).
When fully implemented, this will be an important step in reducing the impacts from the largest
source of these ozone-precursor pollutants. Concurrently, reduced emissions of NMOG+ NOx
will reduce ambient air concentrations of particulate matter, and PM2.s more specifically.
Reducing these tailpipe emissions will further reduce the release of multiple toxic air pollutants
including benzene - a known human carcinogen. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0556]
In conclusion, the Pueblo of Santa Ana supports this important set of proposed regulations
regarding air pollution emissions from new light-duty and medium-duty vehicles. This support is
contingent upon EPA and other federal agencies' assurances that infrastructure is in place to
support the transition to an electric vehicle fleet nationwide. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0556]
As our light-duty and medium-duty vehicle populations become more electrified, battery
durability and warranty will be increasingly important. The Pueblo of Santa Ana supports the
proposed requirements regarding battery performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0556]
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The anticipated transition from gasoline-powered vehicles to partial or total electric power
trains will require greatly enhanced systems and convenient vehicle charging units. We are aware
that programs are emerging to build this infrastructure. Such initiatives by the EPA, the
Department of Energy (DOE), and others must be operational and reliable for the proposed
emissions standards to be achievable and acceptable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0556]
Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
EPA Proposed Strong Standards but More Stringent Requirements are Feasible
Rivian's mission to Keep the World Adventurous Forever is made manifest in its commitment
to the environment and addressing climate change. We strongly support a program of ambitious
GHG regulation in the transportation sector as core to our values and vision for the world. Given
transportation's role as the country's number one source of GHG emissions at a time when the
urgency of the climate crisis has never been clearer, a program such as this proposal is also
vitally necessary. Rivian strongly supported EPA's revision in 2021 of the U.S. emissions
standards for passenger cars and light trucks through MY26. But we stressed in our comments at
the time that additional action would be necessary to meet the country's broader climate
protection goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 2-7]
EPA's current proposal fundamentally meets the moment. Collectively, automakers' have
officially announced EV investments totaling hundreds of billions of dollars to support EV
production goals that, if achieved, would result in 43 million annual EV sales globally by 2030.2
In the U.S. market specifically, independent analyses find that business as usual—including the
impact of government incentives—now points toward an EV sales share in 2032 of 56-67
percent.3 Similarly, the agency's own sensitivity analysis finds that the central "No Action"
scenario results in 54 percent BEV sales in MY32, while a "faster BEV acceptance" case results
in 66 percent BEV sales on the same timeframe.4 Therefore, EPA's proposal reflects the
industry's new paradigm and ensures that the investments and commitments of the private sector
are matched by the regulatory framework in which they operate. With these rules in place, the
L/MDV sector will be well on its way to a full transition to electrification no later than MY35.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 2-7]
2 BloombergNEF, Zero-Emission Vehicles Factbook: A BloombergNEF Special Report Prepared for
COP27 (November 2022), available at www.assets.bbhub.io/professional/sites/24/2022-COP27-ZEV-
Transition_Factbook.pdf.
3 Peter Slowik et al., The International Council on Clean Transportation, and Robbie Orvis and Sara
Baldwin, Energy Innovation Policy & Technology LLC, Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation Reduction
Act on Electric Vehicle Uptake in the United States (January 2023), available at https://theicct.org/wp-
content/uploads/2023/01/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23-2.pdf.
4 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 87 (May 5, 2023) (revising 40 C.F.R. Parts 85, 86, 600, 1036, 1037, and 1066),
Table 129, 29,340.
The headline target—82 g/mi on a fleet-average basis in MY32—shows the agency's
ambition to remain among the global leaders in emissions regulation. The BEV sales share
projected to result from the target generally keeps pace, at least through MY30, with the broader
ZEV sales requirements of Advanced Clean Cars II ("ACCII") and Canada's newly proposed
amendments to its own GHG standards. 5 The climate and public health benefits of this are clear
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but setting strong standards also positions the U.S. to compete for the automotive jobs of the
future and hedges against potential component cost increases. For example, EPA's sensitivity
analysis shows that a high battery cost scenario paired with no regulatory action results in
industry achieving just 159 g/mi and roughly 29 percent BEV sales in MY32.6 While industry's
investments and product plans today undoubtedly favor electrification, the pace of the transition
must align with the world's midcentury decarbonization imperative. Leaving carbon reduction
solely to the market, even in one now firmly oriented toward an EV future, risks stalled progress
in the face of potential economic headwinds and uncertainty. A strong regulatory driver like
EPA's proposal will ensure that industry moves forward at the pace and scale necessary to avoid
the worst impacts of climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 2-7]
5 EPA did not include PHEVs in its initial analysis of the proposal's impact on technology penetrations.
Nevertheless, we find the comparison with ACCII and Canada's proposal illustrative.
6 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 87 (May 5, 2023) (revising 40 C.F.R. Parts 85, 86, 600, 1036, 1037, and 1066),
Table 129, 29,337.
See original attachment for: Figure 1. BEV sales rates projected under EPA's proposal largely
keep pace with the ZEV sales requirements of ACCII and Canada (proposed), at least through
MY30. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 2-7]
Organization: Scott Wilson
By now, you will have read in public comments that this proposed regulation will transform
the way people have lived, worked, and played for over 100 years" (Alliance for Automotive
Innovation) and "If finalized as proposed, the proposals would have a very significant impact on
all segments of the fuels and vehicle industries and the entire U.S. economy" (American
Petroleum Institute). While these statements are hyperbolic, the rule will indeed lead to
significant changes to our vehicle fleet, spread over many years. That's the whole point. We've
just begun taking the first few steps needed to eventually bring the Gasoline Age to an end. We
have a long way to travel on this road. But, it's clear that the best way to achieve the emission
targets, which even the Texas Public Policy Foundation acknowledges are under EPA's
authority, is to take the combustion out of vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0515, p. 1]
The automaker's position (Alliance for Automotive Innovation) is that the proposed rule is
overly-ambitious and that it requires "stepped-up efforts at the state and local level when it
comes to building codes, permitting, and approval from public utility commissions". That is true,
and is an ongoing effort, however, we cannot wait until the entire EV ecosystem is in place
before ramping up vehicle production. Vehicles and their supporting social and physical
infrastructure must develop together, hand-in-hand, just like the fuel, repair, and dealer systems
did for gasoline vehicles. We would do well to learn from societies that are successfully
transitioning to EVs, like Norway, and the EU more broadly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0515,
p. 1]
Assuming the rule is adopted, opponents will turn to the legal system and rely on an alleged
bedrock (but actually recently invented) legal concept called the "major questions doctrine".
"Major" is in the eye of the beholder. Whether or not a particular trade group is impacted is not a
major question, even if it is offset by an economic bonanza for another trade group. Climate
change is a major question. Particulate air pollution affecting human health is a major question.
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Economic cost due to climate impacts is a major question. As far as major questions, this rule
will be a major win for Americans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0515, p. 1]
In summary, while change can be challenging, it can also contain opportunity. Wise
implementation can manage the former and harvest the latter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0515,
p. 1]
Organization: Sierra Club et al.
On behalf of the 32 undersigned advocacy groups, we thank the Environmental Protection
Agency for its leadership in reducing harmful vehicle pollution. We urge the agency to protect
public health and address the climate crisis by finalizing the strongest possible emissions
standard for light and medium-duty vehicles before the end of 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0668, p. 1]
The final emissions standard should put us on the path to ensuring that all new vehicles sold
in 2035 are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs). This transition is critical to reducing not only GHG
emissions, but smog-forming pollution and particulate matter as well. Passenger vehicles
produce more than one million tons of nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions and 33,400 tons of
particulate matter (PM) pollution every year.l These emissions disproportionately harm people
in low-income communities and communities of color. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0668, p. 1]
1 Zeroing in on Healthy Air, American Lung Association, https://www.lung.org/getmedia/13248145-06f0-
4e35-b79b-6dfacfd29a71/zeroing-in-on-healthy-air-report-2022.
Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
Light- and medium-duty vehicles are a major source of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and other
harmful pollutants that have serious environmental, public health, and economic impacts. These
adverse impacts are particularly significant in the South. While the proposed standards are an
important step towards cleaning up tailpipe emissions from light- and medium-duty vehicles,
more should be done to accelerate the transition to zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) technology. We
therefore support the adoption of standards at least as stringent as the Alternative 1 standards and
urge EPA to consider adopting even stronger standards that would achieve 100 percent ZEV
sales in the transportation sector by 2035. These strengthened standards should be adopted as
soon as possible and take effect no later than model year 2027. In addition, as part of its effort to
strengthen the standards, we support EPA's proposals to close compliance loopholes, accurately
account for tailpipe emissions, and implement stronger certification, durability, and warranty
provisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, p. 1]
Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV) Coalition
We believe this rule when finalized as proposed will send a strong signal to car and truck
manufacturers to produce strong PHEVs. We really appreciate the technology neutral approach
that you have produced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 10]
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Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Foundationally, the primary dynamics that have driven progress in the development of EPA's
program in the past and its fundamental architecture remain and, if anything, have become even
clearer and more imperative, including: the ongoing need to achieve significant additional
emissions reductions from the motor vehicle sector, including for conventional pollutants and
greenhouse gases; the increasingly capable role of advanced vehicle technologies, led by zero-
emissions BEVs, in providing those reductions; the benefits to the automotive industry of
achieving a uniform national program integrating California-led and Federal authorities and
operating seamlessly across EPA, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and state authorities;
and the importance of regulatory stability to the industry — and of standards of sufficiently long
duration — to foster the significant investment needed to cement this transformation to advanced
technology vehicles. The continuation and amplification of these trends provide a sound legal
basis for an even more stringent set of standards than EPA's current proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
6 See, 40 C.F.R. §1037.150(f) (Electric vehicles. Tailpipe emissions of regulated pollutants from electric
vehicles ... are deemed to be zero.).
as the carbon intensity of domestic electricity generation continues to decline, BEV emission
performance becomes better and better over time.43 In short, consistent with Clean Air Act
Section 202(a), BEVs represent a completely designed system to fully prevent and control air
pollution.44 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 7]
43 See e.g., IPCC, AR 6, Working Group III, Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change (April
4, 2022) at 98 available at https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/.
44 42 U.S.C. §7521(a).
147 Id., at 29232.
Organization: Transport Evolved LLC (Transportation Consultancy)
On behalf of Transport Evolved (Transportation Consultancy), I am writing to express broad
support for the updated calculations for the proposed "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for
Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0453, p.1]
It is vitally important, as we see the substantial health and climate impacts from pollution
resulting from automakers who knew their product was harmful, that they are no longer
artificially relieved of the burden of reducing pollution. 1,2 The average age of the US fleet is
approximately 12 years, and urgently reducing fleet emissions must be a priority if we are to
reduce the impacts on the climate and on the health of the population. 3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0453, p.1]
1 https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.1819989116.
2 https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2391360/the-price-of-fossil-fuels-full-report/3412789/.
3 https://www.statista.com/statistics/738667/us-vehicles-projected-age/.
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Organization: The Mobility House et al.
We, the undersigned businesses and organizations support the Biden Administration's new
EV emissions standards as proposed. As leaders in transportation electrification, vehicle-grid
integration, and power control systems (PCS) implementation, the signatories are uniquely
positioned to recognize not only the significance of the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA's) new proposals, but also the context in which they are made. We urge the EPA and other
implementing agencies to prioritize strategies to enable use of PCS to facilitate coherent and
efficient secondary and primary upgrade planning. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0657, p. 1]
Under the Biden Administration, the United States has embraced new technologies and begun
the process of scaling both the manufacture and sale of electric vehicles. We are excited to
participate in the successful integration of millions of new light, medium, and heavy-duty
vehicles, and stand ready to work with you to allow the electric vehicle revolution to continue
and succeed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0657, p. 2]
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
Ambitious and Stringent Standards Proposed
EPA's NPRM proposes historically ambitious and stringent targets towards carbon neutrality
for the light-duty and medium-duty transportation sector. Significantly noted by AFAI, the
automotive industry is committing resources and investments of $1.2 trillion by 2030, while
Volkswagen estimates our worldwide digitalization and electrification investment around $130
billionl between 2023 and 2027. The ambition must be met equally by commitment of segments
outside the automotive Industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 89-91]
1 120 Billion Euro; Exchange rate: 1.09 USD to 1 EUR
To that end, Volkswagen supports continuous reductions in vehicle fleet average GHG
emissions and criteria pollutants. Volkswagen is committed to work with U.S. agencies, utilities,
charging infrastructure providers, raw material suppliers and additional stakeholders in
partnership with AFAI on reasonable and achievable pathways for all manufacturers for 2027
and beyond. Sustained, complementary and supportive policy is paramount in forming a cross-
sector foundation required to scale up growth and infrastructure. To achieve the shared vision of
zero emission mobility, solutions must be instituted in these sectors to allow Volkswagen to
provide customers with a "People's Car" of superior utility and affordability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0669, p. 2]
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
Electrification
VCC shares the Biden administration goals to advance sustainability and electrification. VCC
wants to be a leader in the transition to zero tailpipe emission mobility and our plan is to be a
fully electric car company by 2030. Our goal is to be climate neutral by 2040, in line with the
Paris Agreement. Therefore, VCC supports the Administration's goals of an electric vehicle
future and lower emissions year over year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, p. 2]
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Organization: Washington State Department of Ecology
The Washington State Department of Ecology is pleased to submit comments on EPA's
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027
and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829.
Ecology is encouraged by EPA's proposal to significantly increase the deployment of electric
vehicles throughout the nation using increasingly stringent motor vehicle emissions standards
through 2032. We urge EPA at minimum to adopt the proposed standards. We encourage the
agency to consider increasing the stringency beyond the proposed level, which we believe is
economically and technically feasible and would maximize greenhouse gas and criteria pollutant
reductions. Adoption of any standard less stringent than existing requirements will not serve the
purpose of the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0541]
The transportation sector represents the most significant source of greenhouse gas emissions
nationally, and accounts for around 40% of greenhouse gas emissions in Washington State. Like
many of our peer states, Washington has set necessarily ambitious decarbonization requirements
that cannot be achieved without aggressive and innovative transportation policies. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0541 ]
Washington is one of the 18 states that have adopted California's Advanced Clean Cars II
regulation, which requires automakers to sell an increasing percentage of zero-emission vehicles
each year through 2035, when 100% of new light-duty vehicle sales will need to be zero-
emission. It is clear from the automaker response to this regulation that the zero-emission vehicle
trend is here to stay. Automakers and battery manufacturing companies are spending tens of
billions of dollars to build and retrofit factories across the country and around the world to
produce zero-emission vehicles. Congress and the White House have also recognized the
importance of converting the nation's motor vehicle fleet to zero-emission technology, with
billions of dollars being invested in battery manufacturing, electric vehicle purchase rebates, and
charging infrastructure development through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the
Inflation Reduction Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0541]
Since the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act in August 2022, over $49 billion of new
private investment has been announced in North America for battery-related minerals mining,
minerals processing, battery manufacturing, and zero-emission vehicle manufacturing, according
to the EV Supply Chain Dashboard. 1 These investments are projected to create over 37,000 new
jobs, most of them in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0541]
1 Data from EV Supply Chain Dashboard at https://www.charged-the-book.com/na-ev-supply-chain-map,
accessed Mav 19 2023
With automakers now ramping up their offerings of mass-market zero-emission vehicles,
electric vehicle sales have recently reached a market share of 10% nationwide, a five-fold
increase in just the past couple of years. Zero-emission vehicle options are available in every
segment of the light-and medium-duty market, and more models are being offered every year.
According to the Automaker Dashboard at Atlas EV Hub, there are currently 127 models of
zero-emission vehicles from 33 manufacturers either currently available or projected to be by the
end of this year.2 Yet demand for new electric vehicles still outstrips available supply. A recent
Sierra Club study revealed that two-thirds of auto dealerships nationwide did not have a single
electric vehicle for sale on their lot, mostly due to supply chain, inventory issues, and automaker
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allocations.3 There simply aren't enough electric vehicles being produced to meet demand.
However, by the time the proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027
and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles take effect, most of the new investments in
minerals mining, minerals processing, battery manufacturing, and electric vehicle manufacturing
will result in dramatically increased supply chain capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0541]
2 Data from Atlas EV Hub Automaker Dashboard at
https://www.atlasevhub.com/materials/automakers-dashboard/, accessed May 19. 2023
3 Sierra Club, A Nationwide Study of the Electric Vehicle Shopping Experience, May 2023.
There is no longer any reason to delay the rapid acceleration of the zero-emission vehicle
transition, and we encourage EPA to increase the stringency of emission standards to help
promote this transition and help automakers meet market demand. The climate crisis demands
the most aggressive policies to decarbonize our nation's transportation system as quickly as
possible. [EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0541 ]
In summary, Ecology urges EPA to at a minimum adopt the emissions standards proposed in
this rulemaking and to consider increasing the stringency beyond the proposed level. These
rigorous standards will put the nation on the right path for achieving the ambitious greenhouse
gas reduction targets that we committed to in the Paris Agreement, create Joos in the clean
transportation sector and ensure that all Americans benefit from reduced transportation emissions
in their neighborhoods. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0541]
Organization: Western States Air Resources Council (WESTAR)
WESTAR applauds EPA for its past efforts to reduce emissions from the transportation
sector, and this proposed rule is another step in the right direction toward further reducing
criteria pollutant and GHG emissions from this sector. Given that mobile sources are the primary
contributor to GHG emissions and contribute over half of the anthropogenic NOx emissions in
the U.S.,1 setting standards that lower the emissions from these sources is paramount. EPA
projects that C02 would be reduced by 26 percent relative to the no-action scenario.2 By 2055,
EPA also projects a 35-40 percent reduction in PM2.5, NOx, and SOx, and over 40% reduction
in VOC emissions.3 WESTAR members support regulations that reduce emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0676]
1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles," Govinfo, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-
05-05/pdf/2023- 07974.pdf (accessed June 8, 2023).
2 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis ("DRIA"), EPA-420-D-
23-003, Section VI and Chapter 9 (April 2023), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-
04/420d23003.pdf.
3 See DRIA Section VII and Chapter 9
EPA's action not only yields advantages at the national level but also provides significant
benefits to states, local air agencies, and Tribes in the West who face challenges in meeting
criteria pollutant standards in part due to significant emissions from federally regulated mobile
sources. In terms of ozone formation, many areas in the West are NOx-limited and therefore
focus emissions reduction efforts on NOx reductions, as they are most effective in reducing
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ozone concentrations. The proposed emissions standards for light-duty and medium-duty
vehicles will reduce emissions in these areas and assist these agencies in achieving their ozone
attainment planning goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0676]
In addition, EPA's approach to addressing multiple pollutants simultaneously simplifies the
regulatory landscape and supports the paradigm shift from single to multi-pollutant policies, a
shift many western states, local air agencies, and Tribes appreciate. Beyond regulatory
simplification, the holistic approach to emissions standards outlined in the proposed rule
acknowledges the interconnectedness of different pollutants and their cumulative impacts. This
approach will help to improve overall air quality and protect the health and well-being of
communities in the West. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0676]
Organization: World Resources Institute (WRI)
We applaud the Biden administration for acting swiftly and using the full force of Clean Air
Act authorities to propose new, more stringent vehicle emissions standards to reduce criteria
pollutants and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from passenger (and other) vehicles to address
climate pollution and public health impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
Transportation accounted for the largest portion (29%) of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
in 2021, and light duty vehicles [Link: https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/fast-facts-
transportation-greenhouse-gas-emissions ] (including passenger cars and light-duty trucks)
represent the largest category with 58% of the transportation sector's GHG emissions.
Furthermore, studies (such as the recent 'Zeroing in on Healthy Air' [Link:
https://www.lung.org/getmedia/13248145-06fD-4e35-b79b-6dfacfd29a71/zeroing-in-on-healthy-
air-report-2022.pdf] from the American Lung Association) show that regulations and policies
designed to reduce GHG emissions, such as through accelerating electric transportation, will
have the added benefit of reducing other forms of pollution - including air toxics and particulate
matter - that impact public health and disproportionately impact overburdened communities.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary
The above comments are some of the many general statements of support for EPA's proposed
program to reduce GHG and criteria emissions from light- and medium-duty vehicles included in
the detailed comments reproduced verbatim in this RTC document and the additional comments
described in Appendix A. Many of the commenters note the need for these standards to address
air pollution and climate change, reduce the impacts of emissions on human health, and/or for
environmental justice. While there is support for the standards as proposed, some of the
commenters urge EPA to adopt Alternative 1, or even more stringent standards or the California
standards, and/or encourage EPA to finalize these standards as soon as possible. Some
commenters also provide general statements about battery performance the availability of
electric infrastructure, and the need to make the standards technology neutral so alternative fuels
may be used.
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Response
EPA acknowledges the comments received expressing general support for EPA's rulemaking.
Some of these commenters provided detailed comments about specific aspects of the proposed
program; those comments are reproduced verbatim in other parts of this RTC document.
Regarding the general comments above relating to issues such as battery performance,
warranties, electric infrastructure, and other issues, please see the respective sections of the RTC
and preamble that address those aspects of the program in detail.
1.2 - General opposition to the proposed standards
Comments by Organizations
Organization: A. Longo
Considering the potential economic consequences, the lack of direct evidence supporting
improved health conditions, and the complex nature of the relationship between regulatory
measures and health outcomes, I urge the Environmental Protection Agency to reassess the
proposed restrictions on transportation. It is crucial to strike a balance that achieves
environmental goals while minimizing the financial burden on consumers and businesses.
Additionally, I encourage the EPA to conduct further research and analysis, incorporating inputs
from independent experts, to gather robust scientific evidence directly linking these regulations
to substantial and quantifiable improvements in public health outcomes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0517, p. 2]
Organization: Ad Hoc Tier 4 Light-Duty Small Manufacturer Group
EPA should reconsider its proposed provisions and finalize Small OEM rules that are
consistent with the principles of an incremental phase-in with periods of stability, that are
reflective of both the function and limited emissions contribution of Small OEM products, and
that do not force Small OEMs to be overly-reliant on purchasing credits from other
manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 3]
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
VII. Consideration of Standards Beyond 2032
EPA requests comment on potential light- and medium-duty greenhouse gas and criteria
pollutant standards beyond MY 2032.322 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 214]
322 NPRM at 29239
The standards that EPA is proposing through MY 2032 are already subject to massive
uncertainties. The automotive industry is currently undergoing the single most transformative
period in its history. We are essentially rebuilding and redesigning an entire industrial sector of
the economy. EPA is already making projections and assumptions about this transformation that
must come to fruition in a perfect, or almost perfect, manner to meet the proposed standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 214]
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Predicting the state of the EV market and its supporting conditions beyond MY 2032 is even
more uncertain. If everything goes as hoped for by EPA, there may be an opportunity to continue
further reductions in transportation emissions beyond MY 2032. However, now is much too soon
to set specific standards. Incentives like those of the IRA are scheduled to sunset by 2032. Even
this one factor alone may lead to a fattening of EV market share growth. Other enabling
conditions may also falter or flourish. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 214]
Auto manufacturers and suppliers are already transitioning to EVs, and this transformation
will continue without the need to further extend specific regulatory standards at this time. We
believe that EPA's Proposed Rule already stretches beyond the limits of what is practicable and
feasible to accomplish between now and 2032. Attempting to propose standards beyond 2032
could further jeopardize the fragile drive to electrification with all the variables and stakeholders
involved. EPA should not introduce even greater uncertainty by attempting to set standards
beyond 2032 at this time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 214]
Organization: Alliance for Consumers (AFC)
Alliance for Consumers, by way of its Executive Director, O.H. Skinner, files this comment to
highlight the ways in which the proposed rule fails to serve the interests of everyday consumers
and how EPA's proposal is procedurally and substantively deficient and should not be finalized.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, pp. 1-2]
The current EPA proposal is best understood as yet another attempt to weaponize the agency
rulemaking process, and the power of the federal government, to wipe away things that everyday
consumers overwhelmingly like, use, and rely upon for life's essential needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0534, pp.1-2]
EPA is proposing to replace a majority of the cars on the market today with EVs that are
currently unpopular with everyday consumers in most parts of the country and do not work
within the household budgets of those who need cars to help their families thrive. And that is
before considering how EPA's proposed rule is premised on speculative, wholesale changes to
other parts of the economy and our national infrastructure outside the purview of EPA (e.g., the
energy grid). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, pp. 1-2]
Make no mistake, this is a proposal to forcibly remove from the market a majority of the cars
that everyday consumers currently buy and use. The EPA Fact Sheet for the proposal focuses
throughout on electric vehicle technology as the critical aspect of the proposed rule, from how it
was conceived, through how it would be complied with. See, e.g., EPA Fact Sheet, "Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles," Apr. 2023, at 1 (highlighting EV technologies and support for a "rapid shift away
from" "internal combustion engine (ICE) technologies"); id. at 2 (focusing on "vehicle
electrification technologies" as central to proposed standards); id. at 6 (emphasizing electric
vehicle costs and benefits throughout cost-benefit analysis section). 1[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0534, pp. 1-2]
1 Fact Sheet available at https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1017626.pdf.
Indeed, the path to compliance that EPA chose to highlight features nearly 70% of the
passenger car market shifting to battery electric vehicles (and 40% or so of medium duty vans
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and pickup trucks). See EPA Fact Sheet, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years
2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles," Apr. 2023, at 5. This despite only
about 1% of the current cars on the road being electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0534, pp. 1-2]
The current EPA proposal is an unlawful EV mandate masquerading as a tailpipe regulation.
That is the only conclusion that a disinterested observer or everyday consumer could reach,
given how the proposal was promulgated, the limits that have been proposed, and the
commentary surrounding its release. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, pp. 1-2]
While an extreme EV mandate might be popular in progressive enclaves, and with federal
employees who live in Washington, D.C., a rapid shift to electric vehicles along the lines
proposed by EPA here will make lives worse for everyday consumers while costing them more
for the privilege of having their lives inconvenienced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, pp. 1-2]
Early indications from places like California back up this conclusion and provide warning
signs that were not properly addressed by EPA in the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0534, pp. 1-2]
For the reasons set forth below, and those contained in other comments filed to date, EPA
should not finalize the proposal; rather, it should address the deficiencies identified
herein. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, p. 2]
EPA's proposal—entitled Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles—is procedurally and substantively deficient and
should not be finalized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, p. 3]
EPA should not finalize the proposal; rather, it should address the deficiencies identified
herein and instead promulgate a proposal that properly considers the issues here and sets
standards that better serve everyday consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, p. 5]
Organization: American Coalition for Ethanol (ACE)
From the perspective of tailpipe-focused emissions, EPA's proposal represents the most
ambitious standards ever for light-duty vehicles, effectively requiring 60% of all vehicle sales to
be battery electric vehicles (BEVs) only by 2030, ramping up to BEVs representing 67% of all
vehicle sales just two years later (2032). The Agency is seeking comment on alternative
compliance scenarios; Alternative 1 would require BEVs to represent 69% of all vehicle sales by
2032 and Alternative 2, the "least stringent," would require BEVs to make up 64% of all vehicle
sales by 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, p. 1]
While ACE members share EPA's goal to significantly reduce lifecycle greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions from U.S. passenger vehicles, we know there is a better way than arbitrarily
regulating a solution which merely focuses on the tailpipe and is practically unachievable.
Therefore, ACE does not support the proposal nor either alternative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0613, p. 1]
To be clear, ACE members recognize BEVs can play a meaningful role in decarbonizing the
transportation sector. We also support technology-neutral policies which enable electric vehicles
to compete on a level playing field with other low carbon technology solutions such as ethanol.
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We oppose policies which tilt the scale in favor of BEVs and ignore the lifecycle GHG emissions
associated with them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, p. 1]
Our comments will 1) discuss the practical, technical and legal problems associated with
arbitrarily regulating BEVs as the only solution to reduce GHGs from the transportation sector,
and 2) how EPA can fix its proposal to develop a practical and achievable technology-neutral
final rule which achieves the goals we share to meaningfully reduce carbon pollution from
transportation emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, p. 1]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
We are deeply concerned about the federal government's ongoing push to mandate the
electrification of the American vehicle fleet. Through an ever-expanding list of agency action's,
the Biden Administration is unilaterally attempting to mandate electrification rather than to
improve efficiency and re- duce emissions through realistic, technology-neutral standards is both
bad policy and, in many instances, contrary to law. This proposal exemplifies both
problems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 2]
Through this proposed rule, EPA seeks to transform production of light- and medium-duty
motor vehicles (from passenger cars and SUVs, to large pickups and vans) by forcing
manufacturers to replace a substantial portion of their conventional-vehicle fleets with electric
alternatives—in less than a decade. The agency does so by setting emissions standards for model
years 2027- 2032 that EPA knows internal-combustion-engine vehicles could never satisfy. EPA
itself projects that compliance would compel supplanting roughly 67 percent of light-duty
vehicles and 46 percent of medium-duty vehicles with battery models. Combined with its parallel
proposed rule for heavy-duty vehicles, EPA's proposed light- and medium-duty rule would
radically reshape the American automotive industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 2-3]
EPA should not press forward with finalizing an unlawful, irrational rule that cannot succeed
and is unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny. The transformation EPA seeks to work on all sectors
of the automotive industry at once— including through this rule and the proposed Heavy-Duty
rule—is infeasible, unworkable, and almost certain to fail, particularly given EPA's arbitrary and
unrealistic timeline for compliance. Rather than pursue these rules, the agency should engage
meaningfully with all affected stakeholders to develop sound, workable measures to address
vehicle emissions that are technology-neutral and can also help to reduce life-cycle greenhouse-
gas ("GHG") emissions in the currently existing vehicle fleet, which the proposed regulation
ignores. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 5-6]
Organization: American Freedom and America First Policy Institute (AFPI)
Electric Vehicle Mandate
On May 5, 2023, the EPA proposed regulations that would significantly increase fuel
economy and vehicle emission standards. As the EPA knows, it is physically impossible for
conventional gasoline-powered vehicles to meet these proposed requirements. The rule would
effectively force automakers to shift production to electric vehicles, which do not use fossil fuels
or directly emit pollutants (although the power plants from which electric vehicles draw
electricity typically do).l The Biden Administration expects this rule to require EVs to make up
67% of new vehicles sold by 2032 (Environmental Protection Agency, 2023) (Link:
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https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris-administration-proposes-strongest-ever-
pollution-standards-cars-and). This is a substantial increase from the Biden Administration's
prior target of 50% of EV sales by 2030 (Executive Order 14037, 2021) (Link:
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/08/10/2021-17121/strengthening-american-
leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, p. 2]
1 Obtaining the minerals necessary to produce a single (EV) battery requires mining about 250 tons of
rock—an energy-intensive process (Mills, 2022, p. 21) (Link: https://media4.manhattan-
institute.org/sites/default/files/the-energy-transition-delusion_a-reality-reset.pdf). As a result, between 8
and 20 tons of carbon dioxide are emitted during the production of each EV. If battery production becomes
even more energy intensive as mining shifts to lower-grade ores, EVs could emit more carbon dioxide over
their full lifespan than do conventional vehicles (Mills, 2022, p. 21).
EVs currently make up only 5.6% of U.S. vehicle sales. One company—Tesla—accounts for
almost two-thirds of those sales (Mihalascu, 2023) (Link:
https://insideevs.com/news/653395/evs-made-up-5point6-percent-of-overall-us-car-market-in-
2022-driven-by-tesla/). If this rule is finalized as proposed (and withstands legal challenges) it
would force automobile manufacturers to replace conventional vehicle production with EVs en
masse—irrespective of what cars Americans want to buy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, p.
2]
Organization: Arizona State Legislature
EPA's proposed rule for light-duty and medium-duty vehicles will cost jobs, increase the
price of goods, hurt families, threaten our electric grid's reliability, and endanger our national
security. We are both elected representatives of the people of Arizona, and citizens of Arizona
who purchase and operate vehicles and participate in the Arizona economy on the same footing
as other Arizonans. In both capacities, we have grave concerns about this reckless proposed rule.
EPA should reject the proposed rule for at least the ten reasons set forth in this comment. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 2]
EPA should reject the proposed rule to avoid these and many other terrible consequences. The
people of Arizona and America deserve better. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 3]
Conclusion
EPA's proposed rule will hurt Arizona families and workers by forcing them to buy vehicles
they cannot afford, increasing the cost of goods they need, costing them jobs, decreasing the
reliability of the electricity they depend on, and weakening our national security by making us
dependent on China. EPA's green dream will be a nightmare for Arizona. EPA should reject the
proposed rule and begin acting in the best interests of Arizonans and Americans. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 32]
Organization: BMW of North America, LLC (BMW NA)
Under the circumstances and the high uncertainties outlined herein we join the Alliance of
Automotive Innovators in their comments and expressed concerns about the Proposed Rule's
GHG targets. It is not evident to BMW NA that the Agency has aptly considered the significance
of these external factors, most of which are not under the control of the auto industry to resolve.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 2]
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Organization: Charles Gordon
INTRODUCTION and SUMMARY
I recommend that EPA withdraw this rulemaking. The earlier rules and the subsidies of the
Inflation Reduction Act will lead to a greater reduction of C02 with less controversy. In
addition, the proposal is attempting to force faster adoption of electric cars than the infrastructure
can support. Natural gas power plants cannot be replaced by solar and wind fast enough and
more importantly transmissions line cannot be built quickly enough because of local opposition.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 3]
The EPA has been reducing airborne particulates from gas engines since 1968. Currently the
levels produced by gas engines are so low that they are in the same range as dirt particles, tire
particles, cooking fumes and clothes rubbing together. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 3]
The proposed rules are highly controversial. One half of citizens and politicians bitterly
oppose them. They are likely to be repealed or worse. The auto companies and industry will not
be supportive like they are of the earlier rules and IRA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 3]
Even if the rules are implemented, the effects on global warming will be inconsequential,
perhaps a 0.01 deg. C reduction in global warming from the earlier rules and subsidies. This is
not enough to justify continued inconvenience to citizens and controversy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0747, p. 3]
The prior regulations and the IRA subsidies will substantially reduce C02 and particulates
and improve health with much less controversy. The Auto companies and industry support them
and have based their tens of billions of dollars investment on them. Citizens, industry and even
some Republicans love subsidies and the US is good at doling them out. In addition, private
citizens are more likely to go along with a rule that leaves them a choice. The value of freedom
of choice should be taken into account by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 3]
To make the point again, the earlier rule and IRA subsidies will lead to lower C02 levels and
greater health benefits than the theoretical benefits of the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0747, p. 3]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
Commentors submit this letter to urge EPA to withdraw its unlawful and unreasonable
proposal, and to try a different approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 3]
B. The non-binding company commitments and projections EPA cites do not prove
feasibility.
The non-binding company commitments and projections EPA cites do not prove feasibility.
See 88 Fed. Reg. 29,190-93 ("While manufacturer announcements such as these are not binding,
and often are conditioned as forward-looking and subject to uncertainty, they indicate that
manufacturers are confident in the suitability of PEV technology as an effective and attractive
option that can serve the functional needs of a large portion of light-duty vehicle buyers."). The
auto manufacturers' statements are not binding, and these companies could change their mind at
any time. Many of these statements were made in response to the in direct response to the Biden
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Administrations urging. 16 Further, many of these statements were made with the expectation
that EPA would continue to provide various compliance flexibilities—like multipliers—that
reduce the real-world stringency of the standards. As noted, the proposed rule would cut these
avoidance strategies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 27]
16 Compare FACT SHEET: President Biden Announces Steps to Drive American Leadership Forward on
Clean Cars and Trucks, White House Briefing Room (Aug. 5, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president- biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-
leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/ ("[T]he Presi dent will sign an Executive Order that sets an
ambitious new target to make half of all new vehicles sold in 2030 zero-emissions vehicles, including
battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.... That is why today, American
automakers Ford, GM, and Stellantis and the United Auto Workers (UAW), will stand with President
Biden at the White House with aligned ambition.") with Fred Lambert, Ford, GM, and Stellantis announce
joint 40-50% EV sale goal in 2030, Electrek (Aug. 5, 2021), https://electrek.co/2021/08/05/ford-gm-
stellantis-joint-40-50-ev-sale-goal-2030/. ("To- day, Ford, GM and Stellantis announce their shared
aspiration to achieve sales of 40-50% of annual U.S. volumes of electric vehicles (battery electric, fuel cell
and plug-in hybrid vehicles) by 2030 in order to move the nation closer to a zero-emissions future.").
As John Bozzella, president and CEO of Alliance for Automotive Innovation has explained,
"Requiring 60+ percent of U.S. vehicles sales to be pure battery electric vehicles (BEVs) by
2030 leapfrogged the administration's own 2021 executive order that called for 50 percent
electric vehicles -including plug-in hybrid and fuel cell EVs - by 2030." John Bozzella, EPA's
EV Rules are Out of Whack: Five Ways to Fix Them, Alliance for Automotive Innovation (June
28, 2023), https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/blog/epas-rules-are-out-of-whack-five-ways-to-
fix-them. "[T]he administration's 50 percent target [by 2030] was always a stretch goal. It was
ambitious and challenging by any measure." Mike Hartrick, Testimony from the Alliance for
Automotive Innovation, Before the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPA Multi Pollutant
Proposed Rule, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829, https://www.autosinno- vate.org/posts/agency-
comments/05-09%20EPA%20Multi-Pollutant%20NPRM.pdf. "The 60+ percent BEVs by 2030
plan, on the other hand, is a house of cards.... It rolls up rosy forecasts (like EV batteries will
eventually cost automakers nothing) and other hopeful assumptions." John Bozzella, supra.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 27-28]
The 50 percent goal "was also predicated on several conditions, most significantly: supportive
public policies including the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act with funding for
national public charging (installation not started yet); the manufacturing incentives and consumer
purchase incentives in the Inflation Reduction Act to support EV purchases and affordability
(becoming more, not less constrained); and the supply of critical minerals (projected to be
woefully short of demand and largely controlled by China)." Mike Hartrick, supra. "If
implemented, EPA's proposal will require 60 percent battery electric vehicles by 2030 (a 20
percent increase over the President's goal, which also included PHEVs), and two out of every
three vehicles sold to be BEVs just two years later. These levels are substantially higher than
what the auto industry indicated was achievable even after application of the supportive
policies." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 27-28]
Organization: Letter Campaign, Ethanol Producers (7)
[The following letter was submitted by seven commenters; it is reproduced only once:
Commonwealth Agri-Energy LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0739). The other commenters
are: Highwater Ethanol, LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0552), Heartland Corn Products (EPA-
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HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0622), Absolute Energy, LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0716), Trenton
Agri Products LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0755), Western New York Energy LLC (EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0753), Southwest Iowa Renewable Energy LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0582)]
Commonwealth Agri-Energy, LLC appreciates the Biden administration's goals of increasing
vehicle efficiency and reducing carbon emissions. That's why two years ago, we committed to
achieving a net-zero carbon footprint for our ethanol plant by 2050 or sooner. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0739, p.1]
1 Letter from RFA Member Companies to President Joe Biden. July 27, 2021. See more at
https://ethanolrfa.org/pledge.
However, we firmly oppose regulatory approaches that arbitrarily favor certain technologies
over others, which regrettably seems to be the case with this proposed rule. EPA's proposal
would effectively force automakers to produce more battery electric vehicles and discourage
them from pursuing other technologies that could achieve the same, or even better,
environmental performance at a lower cost to American consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0739, p. 1]
Organization: Competitive Enterprise Institute
The proposed rule is the latest phase of a longstanding unlawful agenda of market-rigging
interventions. It should be withdrawn. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, p. 19]
Organization: Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA)
We appreciate the Agency's commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the
transportation sector. However, we are concerned about the ramifications of the proposed Multi
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, p. 1]
Should this rule be adopted in its current form - lacking both technological feasibility and
economic practicality - the result will be limiting consumer options and thwarting environmental
progress through depressing innovation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, p. 2]
While there are clearly many reasons to pursue EVs as a mobility option, there are many
realworld economic, social, and practical considerations the U.S. ERA should fully review
before adopting overly restrictive transportation policies. Consumer impacts — especially the
impacts imposed on those with low- and fixed-incomes — need to be front and center in these
discussions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, p. 2]
Organization: Daniel Hellebuyck
I am writing to voice my opposition to this draconian rule proposal.
I have been associated with the American auto industry for 30 plus years. In these years, some
regulations were for the benefit of society, consumers, and the industry. However, many of these
regulations worked toward the detriment of the industry, consumers, and/or society. This
proposal is certainly one of them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0526, p. 1]
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This proposal as written needs a serious overhaul. The political posturing and virtue signaling
of proposals such as these often are not based in reality. This proposal does little to balance the
needs of reducing carbon emissions with jobs, a strong auto industry, and a strong American
economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0526, p. 2]
Organization: Darius
I write in opposition to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's proposed multipollutant
standards for light-and medium-duty vehicles (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829). I
have serious concerns with all three of the options included in the draft rulemaking, as the EPA
seeks to lower carbon emissions under timelines that effectively make electric vehicles the only
option for automakers to meet the pollution limits from 2027 through 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0519, p.1]
The future of automotive technology matters to consumers, millions of automotive
enthusiasts, and all the men and women who work in the industry. Accordingly, I ask that the
EPA does not follow through on any of the three options outlined in this proposed rulemaking
and instead pursues a rulemaking for light and medium-duty vehicles that embrace a technology-
neutral approach that factors in the infrastructure that exists, the innovation we are all capable of,
consumer preferences, and the lifecycle emissions of the technology that powers our
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0519, p. 1]
Organization: David Hallberg
The most disturbing thing about this NPRM is that, unless it is substantially revised, it will
dramatically increase the most harmful mobile source emissions that are the predominant cause
of a wide range of adverse health endpoints, from pre-term births and IQ loss to pulmonary
disorders and cancers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, p. 1]
Many of us were encouraged during your confirmation hearing when you pledged that you
would be "driven by the science and rule of law". However, your advisers—particularly Office
of Transportation and Air Quality (OTAQ) experts, some of whom have been in their positions
for more than 30 years—are giving you bad counsel, as this proposed rule falls far short of the
mark on both counts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, p. 1]
Organization: DavidManley III
And, as you plan to penalize Americans, China is increasing its construction of coal-fired
power plants to produce supplies for batteries for EVs and other components and, therefore, it's
carbon emissions. America has 225 coal-fired power plants and China has 1,118 (half of all the
coal-fired plants in the world). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0513, p. 1]
There are many other ways than the proposed regulations to control pollution that may
actually be effective if China, India, and Russia reduce their emissions, which they show no
signs of doing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0513, p. 1]
The bottom line is that the proposed rules will not significantly affect climate change, will
penalize American consumers without significant benefit, and will significantly benefit our
polluting competitor, Communist China. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0513, p. 1]
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We oppose the proposed rule for the following reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0513, p.
1]
You acknowledged that the proposed rule is such that carmakers will have to make up to 67%
of new vehicles electric in order to comply with it while the result will be an additional 10-fold
sales increase in electric vehicles (EVs) in a mere eight years. Yet completely eliminating all
fossil fuels from the United States would result in less than 0.2 degrees Celsius in temperature
mitigation by 2100 while benefiting our rival, communist China, that has no such regulations,
continues to pollute negating our efforts, and either directly makes or controls the production of
the lithium and rare-earth minerals required for EV batteries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0513,
p. 1]
Organization: Delek US Holdings, Inc.
VII. Conclusion
Given EPA's Proposed Rule is based on speculative and unsupported data, fails to analyze the
potential impacts on domestic supply chains and foreign reliance, and overinflates the potential
benefits while underinflating a majority of the costs, we urge EPA to abandon its proposal and
reconsider the emissions standards necessary and feasible in accordance with its directive
pursuant to the CAA and, at the very least, complete a comprehensive analysis of the effects of
its Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 10]
Organization: East Kansas Agri-Energy (EKAE)
EKAE appreciates the Biden administration's goals of increasing vehicle efficiency and
reducing carbon emissions. However, we firmly oppose regulatory approaches that arbitrarily
favor certain technologies over others, which regrettably seems to be the case with this proposed
rule. EPA's proposal would force automakers to produce more battery electric vehicles and
discourage them from pursuing other technologies that could achieve the same, or even better,
environmental performance at a lower cost to American consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0734, p. 1]
Organization: Elizabeth Boynton
Also, the EPA is to be concerned about the environment as a whole, not just the air quality.
As that is the case, EPA needs to realize that encouraging the manufacture, purchase and use of
EVs is not actually that great for the environment. You're just cleaning the air from gas exhaust
pollution by encouraging environmental destruction in the mining of rare earth minerals and
creation of electricity to charge the EV batteries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0568, p. 1]
Organization: Fred Reitman
I submit these comments on the EPA Proposed Rule, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles", Docket ID No. EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829.1 oppose this proposed rule and am submitting these comments to explain
the basis for my opposition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0432, p. 1]
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Electricity comes from fossil fuel combustion. Most of the electricity generated in the U.S. is
from combustion of fossil fuels, which of course means that most of the electricity being used to
charge EVs derives from fossil fuel combustion. Mandating that new cars manufactured and sold
must be EVs will not change this. According to the US Energy Information Agency, in 2021,
60% of electricity generated in the US came from combustion of fossil fuels, primarily coal
(22%) and natural gas (38%). Another 19% came from nuclear power. The remaining 20%
electrical power is sourced from renewables, primarily from wind (9.2%), hydroelectric plants
(6.3%), and solar (2.8%). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0432, p. 1]
Electricity explained - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) [Link:
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0432, p. 1]
This is EPA Overreach. This regulation would have far-reaching ramifications on the
economy and the American people. The EPA has no business imposing this on the American
people via regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0432, pp. 1-2]
For this reason it is Congress via elected representatives that should debate and possibly pass
this initiative as a law. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0432, pp. 1-2]
This rule would have no impact on climate. Any reduction in C02 emissions would be
negligible as compared to emissions from the two largest C02 emitters, China and India. China
is rapidly building coal-fired power plants, currently at the rate of 2-3 every week, which also
illustrates they do not share our concern about climate change due to C02 emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0432, p. 2]
I close with a statement on my opinion. I have thoroughly investigated the subject of
anthropogenically- caused climate change during the past several years. Based on my
investigation I do not believe that is occurring. Nor do I believe the intent of those advancing this
proposal is to somehow mitigate climate change. Rather I believe this administration is beholden
to the radical environmental left and the actual intent of this rule is to drag down our quality of
life of the American people. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0432, p. 2]
Organization: George White
Regulating C02 emissions has absolutely no foundation in legitimate science, where only
science conforming to the scientific method can be considered legitimate. Furthermore, C02 is
not a pollutant, but is at the base of the food chain and that our very existence depends on there
being sufficient atmospheric C02. To justify this level of disruption based on a scientific
conclusion, the science behind it must be bulletproof and what is passed of as the science
demonizing C02 emissions is demonstrably wrong in many ways. Einstein famously said "No
amount of experimentation can prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong" where
he articulated the concept of falsification which implies that the only thing in science that can be
settled is that something is wrong. The absurdly large effect from C02 emissions claimed by the
IPCC and its self serving consensus can be unambiguously falsified in many ways and even
violates basic physics like Conservation of Energy and the immutable Stefan-Boltzmann Law.
It's also important to recognize that the rate of change seen in the climate system since the end of
the Little Ice Age that corresponds roughly with the start of the Industrial Revolution and
increasing C02 emissions is well within the bounds of the natural variability observed in the ice
cores,sediments and other data. If the climate wasn't changing, it would be broken and besides, a
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slight warming is far more beneficial to life than an ice age that no amount of C02 will prevent
from occurring again. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0426, p. 1]
We saw what happens when conclusions are based on rotten science with the draconian
response to COVID that was more harmful than the disease itself that by now, many Americans
have already had regardless of their vaccination status. We can not allow this kind of policy
driven science to completely destroy the integrity of science and take our freedom away with it.
Science is the only objective arbiter of truth we have and politics must not be allowed to subvert
it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0426, p. 1]
I've included several documents in support of my position and all of the references cited can
be found on-line.
fail.pdf -> This is a top level summary of some of the issues with the IPCC's broken climate
science [See original attachment A3 for summary of failures with IPCC's broken climate science]
feedback.pdf -> This explains why feedback has no relevance to the climate system, yet without
it, the IPCC's house of cards science collapses [See original attachment A5 for "Why Feedback is
Fubar"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0426, p. 1]
balance.pdf -> This explains how the radiant balance and consequential climate sensitivity
emerges and what math and physics constrains it [See original attachment A4 for "The Radiant
Balance and Sensitivity"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0426, p. 1]
co2forcing.pptx -> A power point presentation about the ice core data. There are significant
notes explaining each slide. [See original attachment A2 for C02 Forcing: Fact or Fiction]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0426, p. 1]
commentfod.xlxs -> Some of my comments as an official expert reviewer of the latest IPCC
report [See original attachment A1 for "Working Group I contribution to the IPPP sixth
assessment report"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0426, p. 1]
I strongly suggest looking at this web site: http://climatechangereconsidered.org to see what
some other scientists are saying. If you can't accept that climate science is the most controversial
science of the modern age, I suggest you look at the articles and comments on
http://wattsupwiththat.com [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0426, p. 1]
Organization: Growth Energy
While Growth Energy supports efforts to reduce emissions in the transportation sector, it
cannot support the Proposed Rule. The Proposed Rule presents an unnecessarily constraining,
binary choice between a static future of fossil-fuel-only vehicles and an improbable future of
precipitously ramped-up electric vehicle ("EV") production, sale, and use by 2032. But as EPA
should already know, expanding the use of ethanol and other biofuels is a realistic and
achievable third option that does not leave GHG emission reductions on the table. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 3]
So, while EVs should be a part of the solution to decarbonizing the transportation sector, they
are not the complete answer and need additional time to develop. It is neither cost-effective nor
optimal to reduce emissions by shifting almost all new cars to EV technologies at the rate
contemplated in the Proposed Rule when biofuels are a proven, effective solution. EPA should
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not ignore the significant role that biofuels can play in both the near- and long-term as part of a
low-carbon transportation system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 6]
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
HF Sinclair Corporation ("HF Sinclair") submits these comments opposing the United States
Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") proposed rule setting multi-pollutant emissions
standards for model years 2027 and later light-duty ("LD") and medium-duty ("MD") vehicles,
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829 (hereinafter, "Proposed Rule"). 1 Additionally, we support
comments separately filed by the American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers ("AFPM"),
the trade association representing substantially all of the United States' refining capacity, of
which we are a member [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 1]
1 88 Fed. Reg. 29,184 (May 5, 2023) [hereinafter "Proposed Rule"].
HF Sinclair urges EPA to abandon its misguided approach and instead ensure that any
forthcoming regulation adopts a holistic approach, which is technology-neutral, recognizes
consumer choice, and enables the U.S. transportation industry to continue its efforts to produce
safe, affordable, reliable, and clean vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 2]
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, EPA should immediately abandon its misguided approach to
force consumers into a product American consumers do not want. By eliminating consumer
choice and forgoing a single technology solution to GHG emissions, EPA is putting U.S. jobs,
industrial base, and economy at serious risk as highlighted above. Additionally, it is concerning
that EPA would prioritize a policy that significantly benefits the Chinese industrial base which
does not nearly have the environmental oversight as domestic manufacturing. It is also clear that
EPA has not completed the appropriate environmental analysis on PEVs - there is clearly an
environmental impact in the manufacturing these vehicles that EPA fails to account. Finally, the
proposed rule does not account for Congressional intent, if EPA wishes to create such a
significant change in the automobile market EPA should work with Congress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, p.18]
Organization: Illinois Farm Bureau (IFB)
For the reasons stated herein, IFB has significant concerns regarding several aspects of the
proposed rule. In light of these concerns, IFB recommends USEPA reconsider the proposed rule
and go back to the drawing board to draft a new and improved proposed rule. In fact, as of the
date of this filing, over 2,000 individual IFB farmer members have also voiced their serious
concern regarding the proposed rule in the above-referenced docket. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0532, p. 1]
Organization: John Noble
As a manager of over 270 vehicles for a public agency providing public safety services and as
a consumer this ruling puts undue hardship on public agencies, small business and middle class
Americans. The rule as proposed will drive prices up on conventional and zero emission
vehicles. There are already numerous supply chain issues and the ruling will add unnecessary
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strain and make it extremely difficult for small public agencies and consumers to afford adequate
fleet resources to serve our public safety needs. Current emission standards have increased
maintenance costs and fuel consumption, this ruling will increase these costs even more. The
aggressive timeline for implementation ignores the impact to average person and small public
agency/business as well as increasing our reliance on off-shore manufacturing and supply chain.
Extending the timeline for implementation by 10 or more years would allow natural market
forces and the consumer to adjust and embrace the changes being promulgated. As the rules are
currently written many people, and small agencies/businesses will suffer from lack of adequate
resources to maintain levels of service required because they cannot afford new vehicles.
As I write this the sky is hazy from the smoke of wildfires hundreds if not thousands of miles
from my home, causing me to ponder if vehicle emissions are the most effective target or our
GHG reduction strategies - it is early in the fire season and already we have seen impacts across
the nation. Prior to the last 10 years it was a rare occurrence to have widespread issues with
smoke from fires and now it is common every summer. Unlike volcanoes, we can mitigate
rather significantly the impacts from wildland fires. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1648]
Organization: Landmark Legal Foundation
Landmark Legal Foundation ("Landmark") advocates for the immediate revocation of this
rule, Proposed Rule, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later
Light- Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles ("Proposed Rule"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547,
p. 1]
There are three major shortcomings Landmark has identified with the Proposed Rule:
1. The Proposed Rule uses a metric established by an entity with no constitutional or statutory
authority. The Interagency-Working Group ("IWG") is not vested with any statutory authority to
act as an executive agency. Therefore, the President did not have the authority to implement the
IWG in the first place.
2. The IWG nonetheless acts as an agency and is therefore subject to the Administrative
Procedures Act ("APA").
3. The APA requires agencies to follow a proscribed rulemaking process that provides
opportunities for the public to comment on agency actions. The IWG bypassed this process when
it established new metrics for the Social Costs of Greenhouse Gas ("SCGHG"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0547, p.1-2]
Organization: Matthew DiPaulo
I write in opposition to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's proposed multipollutant
standards for light-and medium-duty vehicles (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829). I
have serious concerns with all three of the options included in the draft rulemaking, as the EPA
seeks to lower carbon emissions under timelines that effectively make electric vehicles the only
option for automakers to meet the pollution limits from 2027 through 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1514, p.1]
The future of automotive technology matters to consumers, millions of automotive
enthusiasts, and all the men and women who work in the industry. Accordingly, I ask that the
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EPA does not follow through on any of the three options outlined in this proposed rulemaking
and instead pursues a rulemaking for light and medium-duty vehicles that embrace a technology-
neutral approach that factors in the infrastructure that exists, the innovation we are all capable of,
consumer preferences, and the lifecycle emissions of the technology that powers our
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1514, p. 1]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
Mazda North American Operations (Mazda) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the
proposed rule "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light Duty
and Medium-Duty Vehicles". Mazda is a smaller independent automaker not owned by a larger
brand, and sells light duty vehicles globally with US operations headquartered in Irvine, CA.
Mazda has been selling vehicles in the United States since 1970 and opened a new joint venture
manufacturing facility with Toyota employing approximately 4000 persons in Huntsville, AL, in
2020. Despite being a smaller company, Mazda was able to achieve the highest fleet average fuel
economy of all OEMs for five years in a row, according to EPA's Fuel Economy Trends Report.
As a smaller OEM, we are particularly challenged by these proposals. Overall, we feel the rule is
neither reasonable nor achievable for a variety of reasons that we will touch on below. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, p. 1]
Organization: Minnesota Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
As producers of the feedstock for low carbon ethanol, corn growers are a part of the solution
to reduce emissions from transportation vehicles. Unfortunately, the proposal from EPA doesn't
enable low carbon fuel producers to be recognized in the draft multi-pollutant emission standards
since the proposed regulation focuses on one solution to emissions reductions from the
transportation sector: electric vehicles. Instead, we believe EPA should focus on outcomes and
opening pathways for all low carbon fuels and technologies that enable more stringent vehicle
emission standards, taking advantage of not only the low carbon benefits high ethanol blends, but
also cuts in toxic emissions, greater fuel efficiency and consumer costs savings of increased
renewable fuel blending. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 1]
Higher octane fuel is an essential top for automakers to meet stringent standards. For
automakers to use new technologies and enhanced engines to meet emission standards, they need
updated fuel that enables new vehicles and fuels to work as a system to enhance carbon and other
tailpipe emissions reductions. Higher ethanol blends used with advanced engines optimized for
higher octane would provide a much-needed pathway for low-carbon, low-emission fuels. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 1]
EPA failed to use the proposed rule to broaden the solutions that reduce transportation
emissions by beginning a transition to low-carbon, high-octane fuels to advance goals with these
and future standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 1]
Organization: Missouri Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
As producers of feedstocks for low-carbon biofuels, MCGA strongly opposes the proposed
emissions standards within this rulemaking. We estimate this rule may cost the U.S. corn
industry nearly one-billion bushels annually in lost demand. This would deal a potentially
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devastating blow to corn farmers across the country. But the rule's negative impact will ripple
beyond the corn industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0578, p. 1]
MCGA recognizes electric-powered vehicles play a growing role in tomorrow's
transportation needs, yet strongly disagrees with EPA's approach. The aggressive timeline and,
more importantly, EPA's false narrative that electric vehicles are the only way to reduce
emissions is shortsighted in advancing emission reduction goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0578, p. 2]
Organization: Missouri Farm Bureau (MOFB)
We write today to express our opposition to the proposed rule. MOFB's member-adopted
policy states:
"We oppose increased restrictions on vehicle emissions, including mandates on greenhouse
gas emissions." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0590, p. 1]
As MOFB commented previously in response to EPA's proposed rule Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 (HD rule)l, this proposal affects the
production of later-light duty and medium duty vehicle emissions by usurping the marketplace's
role in developing the most efficient and lowest-cost technologies that can protect the
environment, keep our nation's economy running at full speed and provide affordable
transportation for working families. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0590, p. 1]
1 EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985-1584_attachment_l.pdf, June 16, 2023.
In conclusion, MOFB believes EPA's proposed rule is ill-conceived, and, as currently written,
will not achieve its purported purpose. We call upon EPA to immediately withdraw the proposed
rule and to work with transportation stakeholders, like MOFB, to better allow for emission
reductions from a variety of vehicles and fuels technologies that will support the American
economy, rather than those of foreign countries, and not force heavy-handed mandates on the
vast majority of Americans who will be affected by this proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0590, p. 3]
Organization: National Propane Gas Association (NPGA)
The Proposed Rule is flawed in how quickly it seeks to transform the light- and medium-duty
vehicle market to a zero-emission vehicle market. The goal of 67% of the total vehicle market
becoming battery electric vehicles (BEVs) in by 20323 is unrealistic given sales and available
vehicles in the United States. Further, it ignores consumer preference and fuel choice. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0634, p. 1]
Organization: Nebraska Corn Board (NCB) and Nebraska Corn Growers Association
On behalf of the nearly 2,500 Nebraska Corn Growers Association (NeCGA) dues paying
members and the over 21,000 corn farmers in Nebraska who contribute to the state's corn
checkoff program through the Nebraska Corn Board (NCB), we appreciate the opportunity to
comment on the Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-
Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0583, p. 1]
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Nebraska corn farmers and ethanol producers have worked diligently in reducing greenhouse
gas emissions while supplying the fuels industry with a low carbon, high octane alternative.
However, the EPA seemingly overlooks the contribution that biofuels, such as ethanol, can
provide to reducing carbon emissions through tailpipes and internal combustion engines. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0583, p. 1]
In closing, we strongly urge the EPA to remove this proposal completely and investigate
having a cost- effective, rural friendly approach involving biofuels. Additionally, we refer you to
and support the technical comments submitted by the National Corn Growers Association. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0583, p. 2]
Organization: Nebraska Farm Bureau Federation (NEFB)
On behalf of the Nebraska Farm Bureau Federation (NEFB) and our more than 55,000
member families, I am writing to you today to express our concerns over the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027
and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles rule. Our concerns center on the proposal's
clear attempt to push additional electric vehicles onto our nation's roads, while at the same time
increasing regulations on liquid fuel vehicles. In our opinion, this prescriptive policy move is not
in the interest of U.S. consumers, farmers, ranchers, or the economies of our state and nation as a
whole. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0660, p. 1]
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
While Nissan understands and supports the Administration's efforts to push for progress in
EV penetration, the current proposal goes well beyond the already aggressive goals set in
President Biden's Clean Cars EO. The current proposal is not achievable for numerous reasons,
including technology and resource limitations, limited availability of safe and responsibly-
sourced critical minerals, supply chain and manufacturing constraints, insufficient charging and
energy infrastructure, and significantly lagging consumer adoption, among other reasons. In
order to allow for a safe, reliable, and equitable transition to EVs, the proposal must be modified
to take these factors into consideration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, pp. 9-10]
Organization: North American Subaru, Inc.
The EPA's 2023 NRPM sets a far more challenging path for the U.S. auto industry, going well
above the Administration's 2021 ZEV target, aiming to achieve 67 percent BEV by 2032. In its
comments to the agency, the Alliance for Automotive Innovation ("Auto Innovators"), of which
Subaru is a member, the association provides a detailed analysis of the Proposed Rule and
recommends areas of improvement. Subaru aligns itself with the comments submitted by Auto
Innovators. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0576, p. 2]
The Proposed Rule requires transformative change in the U.S. auto industry. Automakers,
including Subaru, are making significant investments toward electrification, but just as no
automaker is alike, no electrification strategy is alike. A variety of factors including scale and
business model can affect decision-making. Caution should be exercised toward a one-size-fits-
all regulatory approach to electrification, particularly when applied to a dynamic U.S.
automotive industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0576, p. 3]
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Organization: North Dakota Farmers Union (NDFU)
EPA should not focus on one technology. While BEVs may be part of the solution, a balanced
approach to emissions reductions using BEVs and other technologies is needed. 11 It is important
that EPA utilize lifecycle analysis to create a level playing field that encourages speedy adoption
of flex-fuel vehicles, hybrid electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and other
technologies, to achieve the most rapid, affordable, robust, and practical GHG emissions
reductions in a wide range of vehicle segments, while satisfying diverse customer needs and
preferences. Furthermore, EPA should revise the proposed standards to a level which can be
achieved using more realistic estimates for future penetration of vehicle technologies and that
incorporates low carbon fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 5]
11 Pratt, G. (2021, August 23). (More) straight talk about Toyota's electric vehicle strategy. Medium.
Retrieved from https://medium.com/toyotaresearch/more-straight-talk-about-toyotas-electric-vehicle-
strategy- f0aba4be40.
Organization: Office of Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon
Wyoming has a vested interest in the proposed rule. Wyoming stands to feel significant
negative impacts from this rule, including: consumer costs, supply chain effects, our nation's
energy security, highway funding shifts, electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure realities,
rural population accessibility, and state vehicle fleets. It is important that the EPA not mandate
that the personal vehicle and transportation market move to EVs through a rushed and backdoor
emissions approach. Programs such as the Federal Highway Administration's National Electric
Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) program illustrates how difficult a compulsory shift to EVs is to
implement in rural states such as Wyoming. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0675, p. 1]
Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
The EPA's proposed EV Rule is a classic example of government intervention in markets; the
government is trying to "push on a string" using heavy-handed top-down market control tactics.
Governments do not have success when attempting to control markets, and the results of rules
such as this one have been catastrophic and expensive. The EPA's Rule and corresponding RIA
are riddled with contradictions, purposeful omissions, and government double-speak. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 2]
Organization: POET, LLC
Summary
EPA's Proposed Rule on LDV emissions has significant shortcomings in achieving its stated
goal of reducing GHG emissions. By treating only tailpipe emissions for compliance purposes,
the Proposed Rule yields a narrow set of alternatives to reach compliance. In particular, the
difference between zero tailpipe emission BEVs and all other ICE's is so great that only a narrow
range of BEV penetration pathways can allow compliance. While the Proposed Rule's target is
fixed, if the proposal's high projections of BEV deployments are not met, no combination of
improved technology on ICEs in the model is sufficient to compensate for slower growth in
BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 50]
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Organization: Roy Littlefield IV
I am writing to express my opposition to the proposed tailpipe emissions rule outlined in
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829. As proposed, I believe these regulations for light-duty vehicles go
too far, reduce consumer choice, and fail to include safeguards to address serious infrastructure,
resource, and funding shortfalls. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0793, p. 1]
In conclusion, I strongly urge the EPA to reconsider the proposed tailpipe emissions rules. It
is crucial that the EPA engage in meaningful collaboration with Congress, automotive
manufacturers, and other stakeholders to develop a comprehensive approach that accounts for the
current limitations in charging infrastructure, safeguards consumer choice, promotes domestic
energy security, and ensures the continued funding of our vital transportation
infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0793, p. 1]
Organization: Senator Shelley Moore Capito et al.
We request the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) withdraw two recent proposals to
regulate tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions from light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles
(Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-
Duty Vehicles and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3).
These proposals effectively mandate a costly transition to electric cars and trucks in the absence
of congressional direction, and the Agency should immediately rescind both proposals. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5083, p. 1]
Since these proposals are legally flawed, divorced from reality with regard to the associated
costs and domestic capacity to implement them, and would be devastating for American
consumers and workers already burdened by sustained levels of historically high inflation, we
respectfully ask the EPA to rescind these two proposals immediately. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-5083, p. 5]
Organization: Specialty Equipment Market Association (SEMA)
Conclusion
While the automobile's roots are tied to the internal combustion engine, SEMA prides itself
on maintaining a forward-looking vision that embraces innovative technology, including EVs
and other zero-emissions vehicles. The specialty automotive aftermarket has led the way on
alternative fuel innovations from replacing older engine technologies with newer, cleaner
versions to converting older ICE vehicles to new electric, hydrogen, and other alternative-fuel
vehicles. Sadly, the EPA's plans to reduce greenhouse gases and criteria pollutants do not factor
this in. SEMA and its members have serious concerns with this proposal, which aggressively
seeks to lower carbon emissions under timelines that effectively make electric vehicles the de
facto choice for automakers to meet the requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 6]
Clean air and the reduction of greenhouse gases are goals everyone can acknowledge. That
said, when governments arbitrarily pick technology winners and losers, the marketplace is
deprived of choices and the public suffers. Instead of forcing this transition, the EPA should put
in place incentives to support a diversified, zero-emissions approach that takes advantage of
breakthrough technologies across the spectrum. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 6]
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Organization: Stellantis
These are ambitious targets that will require a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder strategy to
build a robust market. Stellantis is committed to do its part to execute an unprecedented
transformation of our products to support the U.S. electrification targets, and other stakeholders
need to do their part to help drive consumer demand and remove barriers to electric vehicle (EV)
market success. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 2]
Stellantis is unwavering in its commitment to an all-electric portfolio and building an EV
dominated market that can achieve the Biden administration's target of 40-50% by 2030.
However, EPA's proposed greenhouse gas (GHG) requirements exceed what is feasible, and the
proposed criteria emissions standards drive a distracting and costly focus on a shrinking internal
combustion engine (ICE) fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 2]
The Proposed Rule exceeds the joint commitments of industry and the Biden administration,
relying heavily on overly optimistic assumptions of EV market growth to meet GHG and criteria
emissions standards. EPA is also proposing changes to the criteria emissions rules that go well
beyond the recently completed CARB ACC II LEV IV standards that are both very challenging
and deliver significant criteria emissions reductions from today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0678, p. 2]
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
Second, I will explain how the EPA has failed adequately to acknowledge and con- sider the
true scope of the colossal costs and burdens these proposals, if finalized, would impose on
American families, the U.S. economy, and our nation's security, and how, at the same time, the
Agency has wildly overestimated the benefits it claims will result from these proposed rules.
Because the key analyses and assumptions on which these proposals are based are so faulty and
ill-considered, if the rules were finalized in the form proposed, they would be arbitrary and
capricious in violation of the APA.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 2-3]
7 See id. § 706(2)(A) (providing that the reviewing court shall strike down a final rule found to be
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
Conclusion
If and when the American people feel the true effects of these rules—when they lose the
vehicle options they love at the local dealership and find themselves stuck driving older and less
safe cars, when the bottom falls out of the job market in the U.S. auto industry, when drivers
cannot find convenient charging stations for their electric vehicles—in sum, when American
voters realize what the EPA's far-reaching regulatory enterprise has wrought for the nation, they
will be angry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 24]
At issue are matters of life, liberty, and prosperity, and the considerations involved are
fundamentally political in nature. That is exactly why, under our constitutional republic, it is for
Congress, and Congress alone, to make the monumental decisions that EPA is purporting to take
upon itself in these proposed rules. For these reasons, EPA should with- draw its proposed
tailpipe rules and reconsider the wisdom of these proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p.
24]
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Organization: T. Becker Power Systems
3- EPA has illegally refused to consider alternatives to the motor vehicle emission standards
of this proposed rule. If implemented, those alternatives can meet the air quality goals of the
proposed rule without the new motor vehicle emission standards found in the proposed
rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0567, p. 1]
4- Most areas of the United States are already meeting EPA air quality standards. Only a few
areas violate EPA "serious" or "severe" air quality standards. Those "serious" and "severe" areas
are mostly located in California. Those areas can achieve EPA air quality standards by
implementing emission reduction strategies that are specific to the area, and do not require
increasingly stringent motor vehicle emission standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0567, p. 1]
6- 90%+ of the population of the USA live in areas that do not require increasingly stringent
motor vehicle emission standards to meet EPA air quality standards. However, that 90% of the
US population will be negatively impacted by this proposed regulation, with higher vehicle
purchase costs, higher repair costs (battery replacement costs) and lower vehicle safety. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0567, p. 1]
7- Every issue in items 1-6 has been presented to both EPA and CARB in numerous
documents submitted to EPA and CARB by myself and others over the years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0567, p.1]
Organization: TCWInc.
The proposal for requiring "ZEV" purchases on a percentage basis is too early, not attainable
and cost restrictive. Let alone, our studies have shown that our net carbon footprint would be
worse with a Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) fleet, compared to our modern diesel fleet today.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0452, p. 1]
"ZEV" is a misleading acronym. While electric vehicles may not have tailpipe emissions,
approximately 60% of our electricity today is generated by fossil fuels. Cobalt, Lithium, etc.,
required to manufacture batteries for BEV's are primarily sourced overseas, with poor
environmental standards, mined with equipment with no emission standards and/or with child
and slave labor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0452, p. 1]
While admirable in nature, the goal of converting a significant portion or our new commercial
truck production over to BEV in a decade is not cost effective, is not achievable and will likely
have a worse environmental impact than focusing on realistic alternatives, such as R99 and
hydrogen power. Interestingly enough, American Transportation Research Institute (ATRI) data
was used in the calculation of maintenance expense on Internal Combustion Engine (ICE)
commercial motor vehicles, but no reference of the valuable studies above was made in the
subject NPRM. We believe strongly that the EPA needs to not only focus on greenhouse gas
emissions (GHG), but the true, net carbon footprint involved with ZET/BEV commercial motor
vehicles. Focusing solely on GHG and neglecting the overall global carbon impact fails to truly
make the best decisions for our environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0452, pp. 1-2]
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Organization: Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF)
These proposed rules are ill-advised, statutorily impermissible, and likely unconstitutional.
They are based on faulty science and an impermissible reading of the Clean Air Act ("CAA").
Together, they will likely devastate the American trucking industry and harm American
automobile and truck buyers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Travis Fisher
Considering the deficiencies in the Proposed Rule, EPA should decline to move forward with
a final rule in this matter. If EPA chooses to move forward, it should first issue a new proposal
that provides an analytically sound DRIA as the basis for reasoned decision-making by the EPA
Administrator. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 1]
Organization: U.S. Chamber of Commerce
For regulatory measures seeking to accelerate this transition to be successful, they must be
technologically achievable, flexible, cost-effective and attentive to practical market and real-
world considerations that affect consumer interest in and support for electric vehicles. They also
must recognize the vital importance of a healthy auto sector to the national economy. According
to the Alliance for Automotive Innovation, auto manufacturing, sales and service supports a total
of 9.6 million American jobs and generates more than $1 trillion of economic activity each year.
The Chamber has strong concerns that the proposed rule fails to meet these criteria by going too
far, too fast, particularly in light of challenges associated with outside-the-vehicle factors that are
critical to facilitating broad consumer support for EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0604, p. 2]
Organization: United Steelworkers (USW)
Our union supports reasonable and well-researched regulations to ensure that our shared
environment and communities are protected. However, EPA's proposed rule on emission
standards for light- and medium-duty vehicles is far-reaching and recklessly hits the accelerator
on the transition to Zero Emission Vehicles (ZEVs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, p. 1]
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
Western Energy Alliance is struck by the magnitude of the proposed rule on tailpipe
emissions standards and the breathtaking assumption of power as EPA seeks to transform a
major portion of the transportation sector fundamentally with this rule along with its heavy-duty
companion. Further, EPA is rushing forward even as a related rule on Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), which
has a substantially similar scope, has not yet been released. The public is being denied the
opportunity to comment holistically on both rules in tandem to understand how the Biden
Administration is attempting to so radically change the mobility choices of all Americans as well
as the foundation for the delivery of goods and services throughout the entire economy in an
unrealistically disruptive amount of time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 1]
Market Assessment: Likewise in I.A.ii EPA's justification follows the logic that because EV
market penetration has increased and carmakers are increasing their investments and innovating,
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therefore EPA needs to regulate. EPA even makes the absurd statement that, "The proposed
standards will also provide regulatory certainty to support the many private automaker
announcements and investments in zero-emission vehicles that have been outlined in the
preceding paragraphs." (p. 29195) The absurd logic is that because the private sector is making
advancements and investments, the government needs to support them with regulation. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 9-10]
Government's role with regulation is to correct so-called market flaws, not promote markets.
Insofar as there are opportunities for businesses to benefit from subsidies, federal loans, tax
credits, and grants for EVs, such as those contained in BIL and IRA, carmakers that are so
inclined can tap into those taxpayer resources. They do not need another agency to force them to
use them. It's simply the nature of an incentive. EPA should not go down the path of regulating
for the supposed benefit of carmakers to help them increase their EV market share, as they
already have government incentives to do so. Unlike government assistance and grants, EPA
regulation is inherently contradictory to the task of promoting carmakers' self interest. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 9-10]
Likewise, if EPA's analysis is correct and, "The year-over-year growth in U.S. PEV sales
suggests that an increasing share of new vehicle buyers are concluding that a PEV is the best
vehicle to meet their needs" then why is the rule necessary? If the market is working, the rule is
unnecessary by EPA's own unwitting admission. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 10]
We appreciate the opportunity to comment but strongly urge EPA to desist with this rule as
exceeding its authority based on arbitrary and capricious legal and technical justification. At a
minimum, we urge EPA to keep this comment period open until the close of the companion
NHTSA CAFE rule. Thank you. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 10]
Organization: Winnebago Industries (Winnebago Industries)
Winnebago Industries opposes the Proposed Rule in so far as it forces zero emission vehicle
(ZEV) technologies upon Winnebago Industries' motorhomes and recreational vehicles (RV) in
an unreasonably short period of time, and because of the potentially serious negative impacts the
Proposed Rule will have on Winnebago Industries' critical recreational vehicle (RV) business.
As provided below, Winnebago Industries requests that EPA include exemptions or other relief
to prevent potential serious negative impacts to a critical area of our business. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0636, p.1]
Organization: Wisconsin Automobile and Truck Dealers Association
To force this more expensive, inferior technology on Americans now is an act of blind
political folly. While Americans may utilize electric powered vehicles at some point in the
future, that point in time should be as a result of the technology meeting the demands of
everyday life and not because it was shoved down the throats of Americans at their own
peril. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0494, p. 2]
Bill Lear designed the popular cartridge of the eight-track tape. Ten years later the compact
cassette arrived on the scene. The music industry went all in with the eight-track tape, only to
create an aftermarket for radios and receivers that would accept a compact cassette. The EPA is
forcing eight-track tape technology on the American public while not allowing research,
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development, and the free market to advance hydrogen fuel cell or other emerging
technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0494, p. 2]
When proposed rules disrupt commerce and the way Americans fundamentally travel, this is
immense. When these rules also change how gigantic manufacturers produce products and limit
availability across the nation, this is distressing. It is not the EPA's mission to pick transportation
winners and losers. It is not the EPA's mission to reimagine transportation in United States. The
EPA can facilitate change, but it should be a manageable transition, based on proven technology
that functions and enhances a strong economy and quality of life. The Wisconsin Automobile
and Truck Dealers Association implores you to reconsider Cost, Affordability, Network Build-
out, Feasibility of Electrical Generation, Range, Climate, National Security, Impact on
Americans, Impact on Climate for ROI, and more. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0494, p. 2]
This is well intentioned and ill-timed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0494, p. 2]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary
The above comments are some of the many general statements in opposition to EPA's
proposed program to reduce GHG and criteria emissions from light- and medium-duty vehicles
included in the detailed comments reproduced verbatim in this RTC document and the additional
comments described in Appendix A. Many of these commenters voiced concerns about the legal
basis for the program, the impacts on the automotive manufacturing sectors, and on jobs and
households. Other commenters express concerns about costs and supply chain impacts. Some
commenters stated that EPA fails to include lifecycle emissions leading it to favor one
technology solution. These commenters request EPA to consider allowing other technologies and
low carbon fuel solutions. Some commenters also mention potential impacts on energy and
national security, or question whether the energy grid can support these changes. Other
commenters are skeptical that the program will reduce emissions or affect global climate change.
Response
EPA acknowledges these comments expressing general opposition to the proposed rule. Some
of these commenters provided detailed comments about specific aspects of the proposed
program; those comments are reproduced verbatim in other parts of this RTC document.
Regarding the general comments above relating to issues such as legal authority, technology
solutions, fuel-based solutions, energy and national security, and electric infrastructure, please
see those sections of the RTC and preamble that address those aspects of the program in detail.
2 - Appropriateness/legal justification of standards under
Clean Air Act
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Comments by Organizations
Organization: 25x '25 Alliance, et al.
The undersigned parties offer the following comments on EPA's proposed rule, "Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles." We write these comments because we believe that the proposed rules would establish
an overly aggressive, high-risk program that would be counterproductive in achieving the
agency's environmental and health objectives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
In establishing or revising Clean Air Act Section 202(a) standards, EPA must consider issues
of technological feasibility, cost of compliance, and lead time. Among other things, that means
the agency must look closely at the impact of its proposed standards on net emissions of air
pollutants and their associated public health effects, impacts on the automotive industry, impacts
on the vehicle purchasers/consumers, energy security, and safety, and how the proposed
approach would compare to other possible rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-
4]
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Additionally, regulations issued under section 202 of the Clean Air Act must not be arbitrary
and capricious, a standard identical to the one imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act. 16
This standard requires that EPA consider all "important aspect[s] of the problem" and engage in
"reasoned decision making," and that it "consider[] the relevant factors and articulate[] a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.'"17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 24-25]
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A); see also Nat'l Petrochem. & Refiners Ass'nv. E.P.A., 287 F.3d 1130,
1135 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
17 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'nv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 53 (1983); Nat'l Ass'n
of Clean Air Agencies v. E.P.A., 489 F.3d 1221, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
2. Statutory Authority
Auto Innovators shares EPA's goal of addressing climate change by achieving a net-zero
carbon transportation future, as part of an ambitious, comprehensive, and national strategy. The
Proposed Rule, however, contemplates a rapid and transformative nationwide shift to
electrification that may be well beyond what the industry or market can bear now or in the
foreseeable future. Given the significant policy and economic consequences that would flow
from this restructuring of the nation's vehicle market, and the breadth and unprecedented nature
of EPA's proposed action, clear congressional authorization is required for the Proposed Rule.
EPA lacks this clear authorization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
The Proposed Rule seeks to use Clean Air Act section 202 rulemaking to force an
extraordinary transformation of the nation's vehicle fleet away from ICE-based vehicles to
BEVs, and it is not at all clear that the level of consumer demand and infrastructure that exists
now and is expected in the future can support the expedited, aggressive timeline in the Proposed
Rule. The Proposed Rule does not include an explicit electrification target, and EPA states that
"a compliant fleet under the proposed standards will include a diverse range of technologies." 152
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But in practice, the stringency of the proposed standards is such that automakers will have no
choice but to convert to BEV fleets on a massive scale. This is the result not only of the Proposed
Rule's GHG emissions standards, but also its criteria pollutant standards and its tightening of
credit programs and other flexibilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
152 NPRM at 29187.
In other words, the Proposed Rule is enormously consequential for the automobile industry,
and for the economy and consumers as a whole. The Proposed Rule's provisions insert EPA into
crucial policy tradeoffs and debates, such as concerns about the extraction and supply of critical
minerals overseas, or the need to maintain a reliable, efficient electric grid. 159 These
considerations range far afield from the traditional ambit of section 202 rulemaking, delving into
areas that are the subject of other regulatory schemes, or within the unique purview and authority
of other agencies and other branches and levels of government. In short, the dramatic shift
toward electrification required by the Proposed Rule implicates issues of tremendous political,
economic, and social significance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
159 See, e.g., NPRM at 29311-24.
Nor is such a transformative rule, with such wide-ranging implications, a typical feature of
section 202 rulemaking. We acknowledge that some past EPA section 202 rules, most notably
the MY 2023-2026 rule, have contemplated greater deployment of EVs as one of many options
for complying with emissions standards. The Proposed Rule, however, is different not merely in
degree but in kind, seeking to impose what is, at bottom, a mandate toward nationwide
electrification. Such a proposal amounts to an unprecedented assertion of power on the part of
EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
"[A]n enormous and transformative expansion in EPA's regulatory authority" such as this
necessitates "clear congressional authorization," as Congress is expected to "speak clearly if it
wishes to assign to an agency decision of vast 'economic and political significance.'"160 But
section 202 does not confer such clear authority. Section 202 authorizes EPA to promulgate
"standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant" from vehicles; it does not empower
EPA to force a historic shift in the makeup of the nation's entire vehicle fleet. In the absence of
plain statutory authorization, such a decision, and the tradeoffs and consequences it entails,
properly belongs to Congress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
160 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
The Proposed Rule frequently cites to the IIJA, also known as the "Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law," 161 and the Inflation Reduction Act. 162 To the extent EPA purports to rely on either
statute as providing a legal basis for the Proposed Rule, 163 it should not do so. No provision of
the IIJA or the IRA expands or modifies EPA's regulatory authority under section 202 or the
Clean Air Act more broadly. Nor can these laws be considered to have implicitly altered EPA's
authority. After all, "implied amendments require 'clear and manifest' evidence of congressional
intent," 164 and "neither courts nor federal agencies can rewrite a statute's plain text to
correspond to its supposed purposes." 165 Those conditions are not satisfied here. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
161 Pub. L. 117-58, 135 Stat. 429 (2021).
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162 Pub. L. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818(2022). See, e.g., NPRM at 29187-90, 29195-96, 29233,29300,
29308, 29313, 29318, 29322-24, 29341 (referencing the IIJA and/or IRA).
163 See, e.g., NPRM at 29233 ("The recently enacted Inflation Reduction Act 'reinforces the longstanding
authority and responsibility of [EPA] to regulate GHGs as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act'")
(quoting floor statement by Rep. Pallone).
164 Sackett v. E.P.A., 598 U.S , 2023 WL 3632751, at *13 (U.S. May 25, 2023) (internal quotation
omitted).
165 LandstarExp. America, Inc. v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 569 F.3d 493, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
We reaffirm that we are fundamentally supportive of EPA's goals of reducing GHG emissions
and transitioning to a net-zero carbon transportation future. Section 202 standards have a place
in this effort, as we have previously expressed. We remain concerned, however, that the
extraordinary and unprecedented nature of the Proposed Rule places it outside the bounds of
EPA's statutory authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
2. Statutory Authority
Auto Innovators shares EPA's goal of addressing climate change by achieving a net-zero
carbon transportation future, as part of an ambitious, comprehensive, and national strategy. The
Proposed Rule, however, contemplates a rapid and transformative nationwide shift to
electrification that may be well beyond what the industry or market can bear now or in the
foreseeable future. Given the significant policy and economic consequences that would flow
from this restructuring of the nation's vehicle market, and the breadth and unprecedented nature
of EPA's proposed action, clear congressional authorization is required for the Proposed Rule.
EPA lacks this clear authorization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
The Proposed Rule seeks to use Clean Air Act section 202 rulemaking to force an
extraordinary transformation of the nation's vehicle fleet away from ICE-based vehicles to
BEVs, and it is not at all clear that the level of consumer demand and infrastructure that exists
now and is expected in the future can support the expedited, aggressive timeline in the Proposed
Rule. The Proposed Rule does not include an explicit electrification target, and EPA states that
"a compliant fleet under the proposed standards will include a diverse range of technologies." 152
But in practice, the stringency of the proposed standards is such that automakers will have no
choice but to convert to BEV fleets on a massive scale. This is the result not only of the Proposed
Rule's GHG emissions standards, but also its criteria pollutant standards and its tightening of
credit programs and other flexibilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
152 NPRM at 29187.
As EPA notes, BEVs accounted for 5.8% of the new U.S. light-duty passenger vehicle market
in 2022.153 Moreover, EPA's MY 2023-2026 GHG emissions standards that were finalized at
the end of 2021 projected only a 17% light-duty penetration rate for both BEVs and PHEVs by
MY 2026.154 Despite this low rate of consumer acceptance, the Proposed Rule projects a light-
duty BEV penetration rate of 67% by MY 2032, up from 36% in MY 2027.155 Importantly, in
the absence of these and other strict regulatory programs (such as California's ZEV mandate),
EPA projects a significantly lower MY 2032 BEV penetration rate of only 39%. 156 It is unclear
from EPA's analysis how the regulations alone justify a 28 percentage point increase in BEV
market between having regulations versus not. This is particularly concerning given that EPA's
no-action analysis presumably includes the same level of existing supportive mechanisms such
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as the IRA and IIJA, assumptions for infrastructure development, and other market-enabling
features. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
153 Id. at 29189
154 See Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86
Fed. Reg. 74434, 74485, Table 33 (Dec. 30, 2021).
155 NPRM at 29329, Table 80.
156 Id. at 29329, Table 81.
In other words, a staggering increase in the implementation and adoption of BEV technology
underpins the Proposed Rule and is the central means by which the rule effectuates its
contemplated emissions reductions. But this shift to electrification is not a simple matter of
swapping one technology for another. The mass adoption of BEVs on the scale required for
compliance with the Proposed Rule's standards requires a much broader transformation in the
way vehicles are manufactured, purchased, fueled, serviced, and disposed of. Indeed, the
Proposed Rule would reorder much of the U.S. automobile industry—which supports roughly
10.3 million American jobs and $558 billion in annual car sales, and about 6% of the U.S.'s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 157 Consumers must be willing to purchase BEVs at mass scale;
the power sector must be able to generate and deliver adequate electricity 158—which itself will
contribute to emissions—while maintaining grid reliability and otherwise meeting consumer and
industrial demand; adequate charging infrastructure must be available; batteries and other
components must be manufactured at an increasing rate, critical minerals sourced, and supply
chains developed. These needs must be met not only for light-duty vehicles, but also for
medium-and heavy-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
157 See Economic Insights, Alliance for Automotive Innovation,
htps://www.autosinnovate.org/resources/insights.
158 In addition to increasing electricity capacity, utilities are also facing a transition in technology types
and more renewable sources, as proposed under the "Greenhouse Gas Standards and Guidelines for Fossil
Fuel-Fired Power Plants" [88 FR 33240, May 23, 2023],
As expressed throughout this comment, we have serious concerns that the market will not be
able to bear the requirements of the Proposed Rule and that those requirements will not be
feasible given these considerations. Compliance will impose significant costs, and require
extraordinary effort, on the part of regulated parties—costs which will be passed along to
consumers. Setting such stringent standards has the potential to create a significant market
disruption, with consequences not only for the automobile industry but for the entire U.S.
economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
In other words, the Proposed Rule is enormously consequential for the automobile industry,
and for the economy and consumers as a whole. The Proposed Rule's provisions insert EPA into
crucial policy tradeoffs and debates, such as concerns about the extraction and supply of critical
minerals overseas, or the need to maintain a reliable, efficient electric grid. 159 These
considerations range far afield from the traditional ambit of section 202 rulemaking, delving into
areas that are the subject of other regulatory schemes, or within the unique purview and authority
of other agencies and other branches and levels of government. In short, the dramatic shift
toward electrification required by the Proposed Rule implicates issues of tremendous political,
economic, and social significance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
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159 See, e.g., NPRM at 29311-24.
Nor is such a transformative rule, with such wide-ranging implications, a typical feature of
section 202 rulemaking. We acknowledge that some past EPA section 202 rules, most notably
the MY 2023-2026 rule, have contemplated greater deployment of EVs as one of many options
for complying with emissions standards. The Proposed Rule, however, is different not merely in
degree but in kind, seeking to impose what is, at bottom, a mandate toward nationwide
electrification. Such a proposal amounts to an unprecedented assertion of power on the part of
EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
"[A]n enormous and transformative expansion in EPA's regulatory authority" such as this
necessitates "clear congressional authorization," as Congress is expected to "speak clearly if it
wishes to assign to an agency decision of vast 'economic and political significance.'"160 But
section 202 does not confer such clear authority. Section 202 authorizes EPA to promulgate
"standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant" from vehicles; it does not empower
EPA to force a historic shift in the makeup of the nation's entire vehicle fleet. In the absence of
plain statutory authorization, such a decision, and the tradeoffs and consequences it entails,
properly belongs to Congress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
160 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
The Proposed Rule frequently cites to the IIJA, also known as the "Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law," 161 and the Inflation Reduction Act. 162 To the extent EPA purports to rely on either
statute as providing a legal basis for the Proposed Rule, 163 it should not do so. No provision of
the IIJA or the IRA expands or modifies EPA's regulatory authority under section 202 or the
Clean Air Act more broadly. Nor can these laws be considered to have implicitly altered EPA's
authority. After all, "implied amendments require 'clear and manifest' evidence of congressional
intent," 164 and "neither courts nor federal agencies can rewrite a statute's plain text to
correspond to its supposed purposes." 165 Those conditions are not satisfied here. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
161 Pub. L. 117-58, 135 Stat. 429 (2021).
162 Pub. L. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818(2022). See, e.g., NPRM at 29187-90, 29195-96, 29233,29300,
29308, 29313, 29318, 29322-24, 29341 (referencing the IIJA and/or IRA).
163 See, e.g., NPRM at 29233 ("The recently enacted Inflation Reduction Act 'reinforces the longstanding
authority and responsibility of [EPA] to regulate GHGs as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act'")
(quoting floor statement by Rep. Pallone).
164 Sackett v. E.P.A., 598 U.S , 2023 WL 3632751, at *13 (U.S. May 25, 2023) (internal quotation
omitted).
165 LandstarExp. America, Inc. v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 569 F.3d 493, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
We reaffirm that we are fundamentally supportive of EPA's goals of reducing GHG emissions
and transitioning to a net-zero carbon transportation future. Section 202 standards have a place
in this effort, as we have previously expressed. We remain concerned, however, that the
extraordinary and unprecedented nature of the Proposed Rule places it outside the bounds of
EPA's statutory authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
7. Modeling of Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles
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In the Proposed Rule, EPA acknowledges that plug-in hybrid electric vehicles "can provide
significant reductions in GHG emissions and that some vehicle manufacturers may choose to
utilize this technology as part of their technology offering portfolio" and, in particular, that a
"PHEV pickup architecture would provide several benefits."210 This is consistent with EPA's
analysis in the MY 2023-2026 GHG emissions standards rulemaking, in which the Agency noted
that "our updated analysis projects that about 17% of vehicles meeting the MY 2026 final
standards will be BEVs or PHEVs," and projected that "BEVs and PHEVs can play a significant
role in complying with the final standards."211 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
210 NPRM at 29298; see also Drati Regulatory Impact Analysis at 2-75 (same).
211 Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86
Fed. Reg. 74434, 74493-94 (Dec. 30, 2021) (emphasis added).
Despite recognizing the importance of PHEVs in meeting GHG emissions standards, EPA has
not attempted to model any PHEVs as part of manufacturers' compliance pathways to meet the
proposed standards or alternatives under consideration. Auto Innovators believes that this
omission of technology that will indisputably be an important part of the transition to a net-zero
carbon transportation future is a significant oversight that should be rectified in the final rule.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
A number of manufacturers are already building PHEVs or have announced plans to do so.
S&P Global Mobility estimates a 5% U.S. market share for PHEVs in 2030.212 Auto
Innovators' commitment to reaching 40-50% EV sales by 2030 was inclusive of PHEVs.
Likewise, President Biden's Executive Order 14037 Specifically set "a goal that 50% of all new
passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric,
plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles." (Emphasis added.)213 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
212 S&P Global Mobility, U.S. light vehicle sales forecast by propulsion system design, January 2023.
213 E.O. 14037 of Aug 5, 2021.
EPA asks for comments on whether PHEVs should be modeled and what type of PHEV
technology should be incorporated. Auto Innovators believes EPA should include PHEVs in
their modeling and it would be appropriate to model both the typical strong PHEVs (accounting
for stronger electrification needed to meet US06 high power cold starts), as well as the range-
extending type that EPA is modelling at SwRI. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
Moreover, assuming EPA includes PHEVs in the final rule, it should not use PHEV
technology as a justification to further increase greenhouse gas stringency. Rather, EPA should
treat PHEVs in the context that manufacturers consider them - as a component of EV
technology, not as a means to further improve ICE vehicle emissions in addition to rapidly
increasing BEV model availability and production. PHEVs offer unique utility, and because
some consumers are not ready for a BEV, we do not believe the inclusion of PHEVs should
increase the combined ZEV share that EPA has modeled as BEVs in the Proposed Rule. Rather,
a PHEV is a preferred EV to a BEV for some vehicle buyers and should be considered as a
substitute for a BEV. Additionally, the California ZEV mandate allows for PHEVs, meeting
certain criteria, to meet requirements, and treats them as it treats BEVs. At a minimum, EPA
could borrow CARB's assumptions regarding PHEV sales and characteristics and apply them for
states that follow California's rules only. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
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PHEVs are well suited to some applications, especially for more capable SUVs and pickup
trucks. Specifically, EPA has modeled 60% BEV light-duty pickup trucks in the Proposed Rule,
see Figure 34 below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
Figure 34: EPA Omega model output - Pickup BEV share percentage 214 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
214 OMEGA output abs_share_frac_pickup_BEV divided by abs_share_frac_pickup significant effort to
model battery capacity constraints, but it is only a model, which carries uncertainty.
In addition to consumer demand (for utility or as a bridge to full electrification), another
reason that EPA should include PHEVs in their modeling is the potential for PHEVs to provide
clean electric miles while reducing the amount of battery material needed. EPA has devoted.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
Further, PHEVs can be very useful to sustain the transition to electrification in the case of
unforeseen disruptions in the development of battery manufacturing capacity due to constraints
in mineral availability, processing, or other supply chain challenges. Using MY 2023 EPA Fuel
Economy Guide data, a 300-mile BEV requires a battery of approximately 109kW-hr on
average. Accounting for energy efficiency differences, the same battery material could be used to
make between four and six PHEVs with 50 miles of all-electric range. Fifty miles exceeds what
most Americans drive on most days, enabling significant all-electric driving. Due to battery
supply chain concerns, EPA should include PHEVs in their modeling as a substitute for some
BEVs so that PHEVs comprise at least 20% of the combined BEV plus PHEV share consistent
with California and other ZEV states. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
Organization: Alliance for Consumers (AFC)
Consumers deserve better, especially given that EPA's proposal is arbitrary and capricious
under the APA because it fails to consider all aspects of the problem. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0534, p. 2]
The Proposed Rule Is Pretextual And Therefore Cannot Be Finalized
The proposed rule is pretextual. It is transparently outcome driven: a poorly disguised attempt
to mandate electric vehicles, a power that otherwise does not lie within the ambit of what EPA
may do. It is therefore not the product of reasoned decision-making and cannot be finalized as
proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, pp. 3-4]
"[I]n order to permit meaningful judicial review, an agency must 'disclose the basis' of its
action." Dep't of Commerce v. N.Y.], 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019). Here, the administration's
longstanding goal of forcing EV adoption has every appearance of being the driving force behind
the strenuousness of the proposed standards, not the underlying statutory requirements or other
more relevant considerations. The framing of this proposal in the press, as informed by briefing
sheets and background briefings done by EPA and White House personnel, as well as the
contents of the surrounding EPA documents all point to the proposal being an attempt to enforce
an EV mandate through other means; it is clear that the goal here was requirements so strict that
they could only be met by replacing nearly all gas-powered cars with EVs, with cross-references
in the agency materials to other efforts by the administration to ensure EV penetration. See page
1, supra. In other words, the rationale for the proposal and its justification in the context of the
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tailpipe emissions program is "pretextual," and thus the proposal itself in its current form is
unlawful. Id. at 2573-76. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, pp. 3-4]
"Reasoned decisionmaking under the Administrative Procedure Act calls for an explanation
for agency action. What was provided here was more of a distraction." Dep't of Commerce
v. N.Y., 139 S. Ct. at 2576. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, pp. 3-4]
Failure To Adequately Consider All Aspects Of The Problem
An agency rule is arbitrary and capricious if "the agency has relied on factors which Congress
has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, p. 4]
Here, EPA has failed to adequately consider all aspects of the problem and adequately address
crucial consideration that go to the validity of the proposal. This includes failure to properly
consider the rising price of electric vehicles in the wake of the Inflation Reduction Act, the limits
on credits and subsidies that have resulted from this surge in electric vehicle pricing, and the true
cost of repairing electric vehicles over a relevant time horizon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534,
p. 4]
Organization: American Coalition for Ethanol
Other legal questions have been raised given recent court rulings with respect to "major
questions" doctrine. Some have suggested this proposal's effect of forcing the production of
BEVs to phase out internal combustion engines is similar to EPA's Clean Power Plan to force
changes in electric power generation, which was struck down by the Supreme Court in West
Virginia v. EPA. And, just days ago, the Supreme Court used the 'major questions doctrine" to
nullify the Administration's student loan forgiveness plan in Biden v. Nebraska. The Agency
risks inviting litigation given the vast and political significance of this rule without clear
congressional authorization to mandate BEVs. In the end, litigation surrounding this rule could
forestall meaningful GHG reductions from liquid transportation fuels simply because EPA
unnecessarily put its thumb on the scale for a preferred outcome that doesn't survive legal
scrutiny. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 3-4]
Even if the U.S. somehow reaches 50% BEV sales by 2030 (President Biden's original
executive order), the U.S. will consume over 1 trillion gallons of motor gasoline in the next
decade. As stated earlier, ACE shares EPA's goal to significantly decarbonize transportation
related GHG emissions in the U.S. We strongly urge the Agency to rework its proposal to
develop a more practical technology-neutral approach discussed below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0613, pp. 3-4]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
This attempt to overhaul motor-vehicle manufacturing is unlawful, unworkable, and
unjustified. EPA lacks legal authority to mandate this shift to- ward electric vehicles. Its
proposed rule is doomed to fail in any event. Satisfying the proposed standards would require a
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massive, abrupt transformation of the light- and medium-duty vehicle sector that would be
impossible in the compressed timeline given. EPA's analysis of costs, benefits, and alternative
approaches is deeply flawed in multiple respects. Its misguided proposal should be abandoned.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 3]
EPA's proposed light- and medium-duty rule is unlawful most centrally because the agency
has no statutory authority to impose it. EPA must have con- gressional authorization for any
action it undertakes. No such authority exists in the Clean Air Act (or anywhere else in the U.S.
Code). And, under the major- questions doctrine, EPA's claim of power to regulate an enormous
segment of the Nation's economy—especially on a matter of great political significance— must
be unmistakably clear in the statute. But far from conferring sweeping authority on EPA to
effectively mandate electrification, the Clean Air Act for- bids EPA's overreach. The Clean Air
Act directs EPA to set emissions levels that individual motor vehicles must meet. EPA's
proposed rule flouts that statutory directive. It dictates electrification of light- and medium-duty
vehicles by setting emissions standards that manufacturers must meet on a fleetwide-average
basis; and unlike previous rules, averaging is used as much more than a regulatory flexibility to
allow for greater manufacturer choice and experimentation. Only by employing that fleetwide-
averaging approach can EPA reverse-engineer its admitted aim of driving manufacturers to
replace a significant portion of their conventional fleets with electric vehicles. If that sounds like
the Clean Power Plan, that's because it's essentially the same kind of scheme. The Clean Air
Act, however, does not authorize fleetwide averaging at all, let alone as a means to mandate
electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 3]
EPA should not and cannot lawfully adopt the Light- and Medium-Duty rule it has proposed.
EPA lacks statutory authority to remake the motor-vehicle industry, a massive segment of the
Nation's economy and daily life, by forcing manufacturers to produce electric and other zero-
emission vehicles. Even if EPA had such authority, the approach it has proposed in the Light-
and Medium-Duty rule is arbitrary and irrational at every turn. The transformation it would
mandate is not feasible, especially on the proposed truncated timeline. EPA's projections of
resulting emissions reductions are unreliable, and its ap- proach to assessing compliance is
illogically selective and sets the rule up for failure. EPA's cost-benefit analysis also suffers
multiple fatal defects, and the proposed rule fails to address obvious, more workable alternatives.
Finally, by relying on a California program that EPA has not yet approved—and that it might
never approve, or might not approve in time to support EPA's forecasts for the period covered by
its proposed Light- and Medium-Duty rule—EPA has both overstated the case for forcing a shift
toward electric vehicles and improp- erly signaled that it has prejudged California's request for a
waiver authorizing that program. EPA should not press forward with its unlawful and unrealistic
Light- and Medium-Duty rule. It should instead engage meaningfully with stakeholders to
develop permissible, viable solutions to GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 8]
the proposed rule wades deep into issues of "political significance" that are "the subject of an
earnest and profound debate across the country." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct at 2613-14 (citations
omitted). Congress is currently considering vehicle electrification. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 117-58,
§§ 25006, 40435, 40436, 135 Stat. 429, 845-49, 1050 (2021) (requiring reports on "the cradle to
grave environmental impact of electric vehicles" and supply-chain im- pacts). Proposals have
been introduced, for example, to impose electric-vehicle mandates, but none thus far has made it
out of committee. See, e.g., Zero-Emis- sion Vehicles Act of 2019, H.R. 2764, 116th Cong.;
Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2018, S. 3664, 115th Cong. That Congress has "considered and
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rejected" such proposals is a sign that EPA is "attempting to 'work around' the legislative
process to resolve for itself a question of great political significance." West Vir- ginia, 142 S. Ct.
at 2620-21 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (brackets and citations omitted). Just recently, 151
members of the U.S. House of Representatives, led by the Energy and Commerce Committee
Chair, joined a letter urging EPA to rescind these proposed emissions standards—calling them an
effort to "com- mandeer America's transportation sector and force its complete vehicle electri-
fication under the guise of mitigating climate change." Letter from Rep. Cathy McMorris
Rodgers et al. to Adm'r Michael S. Regan, at 1 (May 22, 2023). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, pp. 10-11]
The proposed rule also implicates other issues that are the subjects of vigorous public debate,
such as grid reliability and national security. For example, as discussed below, most of the
supply of critical components of batteries and motors for electric vehicles is controlled by
foreign nations, and in particular by China. See 86 Fed. Reg. 49,602, 49,797 (Sept. 3, 2021)
(noting that the United States "has very little capacity in mining and refining any of the key raw
mate- rials" for electric vehicles); IEA, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy
Transitions, at 11-12 (Mar. 2022) ("Role of Critical Minerals"). These broader im- plications of
the proposed rule provide even more reason to doubt that Con- gress would obliquely confer on
EPA sweeping authority over this area. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 10-11]
The Clean Air Act Does Not Permit Fleetwide Averaging
Nothing in the text of Section 202 authorizes a fleetwide-averaging approach. To the contrary,
Section 202's relevant provision authorizes emissions standards for "any class or classes of new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines" that EPA determines "cause, or contribute to, air
pollution." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (emphases added). Those standards must "be applicable to
such vehicles and engines for their useful life." Id. The text thus permits EPA to adopt a standard
applicable to all of the vehicles (or engines) in a particular class. Whatever discretion EPA may
exercise in defining a "class" of vehicles, the text requires standards for the vehicles in that class,
not for the class as a collective. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 14]
The absence of any affirmative authorization for fleetwide averaging should come as no
surprise because, as EPA acknowledged four decades ago, "Con- gress did not specifically
contemplate an averaging program when it enacted the Clean Air Act." 48 Fed. Reg. 33,456,
33,458 (July 21, 1983). EPA's entire averaging edifice is based on the purported fact that the Act
"does not explicitly preclude standards" based on fleetwide averaging. 54 Fed. Reg. 22,652,
22,665 (May 25, 1989) (emphasis added). Under the major-questions doctrine, how- ever, the
absence of a statutory prohibition on the approach the agency seeks authority to pursue is
categorically insufficient: EPA needs "'clear congres- sional authorization' for the power it
claims," West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609 (citation omitted), not congressional silence on the
subject. Even outside of ma-jor-questions cases, congressional silence is not an invitation to
make things up. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 223 (2009) ("statutory
silence, when viewed in context," often is "best interpreted as limiting agency discre- tion");
Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 381 (2013) ("[I]t is fair to sup- pose that Congress
considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it[.]" (citation omitted)); Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 353 (2013). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p.
14]
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EPA must "test. . . any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine" to determine
whether "such vehicle or engine" conforms with Sec- tion 202 emissions standards. 42 U.S.C. §
7525(a)(1). If the "vehicle or en- gine conforms to such regulations," EPA must issue the
manufacturer a "certificate of conformity." Id. And a manufacturer may not sell a vehicle or
engine not "covered by a certificate of conformity." Id. § 7522(a)(1). These provisions are not
compatible with fleetwide-averaging for at least two reasons: first, the use of singular terms
"vehicle" and "engine"—along with "any" and "such"—indicates that testing individual vehicles
is re- quired; and second, EPA cannot determine compliance with Section 202 standards before
issuing a certificate of conformity—as the statute contem- plates—under a fleetwide-averaging
approach. (Instead, conformity is de- termined at "the end of each model year," when the
manufacturer knows the quantity and model of "vehicles produced and delivered for sale." 40
C.F.R. §§ 86.1818-12(c)(2), 86.1865-12(i)(l), G)(3) ) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 15-
16]
Title II's warranty provisions require a manufacturer to "war- rant to the ultimate purchaser
and each subsequent purchaser" "at the time of sale" that each new vehicle complies with
applicable Section 202 stand- ards. 42 U.S.C. § 7541(a)(1). Under an averaging approach,
however, a manufacturer cannot determine compliance "at the time of sale," because actual
compliance with an average standard can be determined only at year's end. Manufacturers may
be able to make a rough predictive judgment ex ante, but they would be effectively warranting an
unknown. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 16]
Under 42 U.S.C. § 7524(a), any violation of applicable standards "shall constitute a separate
offense with respect to each motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine," with each offense subject to
a civil penalty of up to $25,000. But under a fleetwide-averaging approach, "each motor vehicle
or motor vehicle engine" cannot violate applicable emissions standards—only the fleet as a
whole. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 16]
EPA also finds no quarter for fleetwide averaging in the case law. The best it can muster is a
single decision that found no "clear evidence that Congress meant to prohibit averaging."
Thomas, 805 F.2d at 425 (emphasis added); see 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,245 & n.417. But as
explained above, under the major-questions doctrine, the absence of a "clear" prohibition is
irrelevant: on the contrary, Congress must have specifically and clearly authorized the action.
See West Vir- ginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609. Moreover, the Thomas court recognized inconsisten-
cies between averaging and other statutory provisions, including Title II's "test- ing and
certification provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7525," discussed above. 805 F.2d at 425 n.24. The court
reserved judgment on that issue only because "it was not raised by any party before the agency."
Id. EPA's best (indeed, only cited) case thus provides no support for construing Section 202 to
authorize averaging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 16]
EPA Cannot Use Fleetwide Averaging To Mandate Electrifica- tion
Even if Section 202 authorized fleetwide averaging in some circumstances, that approach
cannot be used, as EPA proposes, to blend together the emissions levels of conventional,
pollutant-emitting vehicles with vehicles that (according to EPA) emit zero pollutants. By its
terms, Section 202(a)(1) authorizes EPA to promulgate "standards applicable to the emission of
any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,
which in [its] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (em-
phases added). The text's focus on the "emission" of pollutants that "cause ... air pollution"
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demonstrates that Congress intended to cover only vehicles that actually emit the relevant
pollutant—and to authorize EPA to set standards for the quantity of pollutants those vehicles
may acceptably emit. Nothing in the text authorizes EPA to dragoon light- and medium-duty
vehicle manufacturers into producing a separate line of vehicles that do not themselves emit the
regulated pollutant at all. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 17]
EPA has elsewhere contended that the statute's reference to "classes" of vehicles or engines
permits it to treat polluting and non-polluting vehicles on the same footing. See EPA Br. 76-78,
Texas, v. EPA, No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 2023). But that term cannot rescue EPA's flawed
interpretation. The relevant feature of a "class" of "motor vehicles" that "cause, or contribute to,
air pollution" is that the vehicles in the class all emit the relevant pollutant. 42 U.S.C. §
7521(a)(1). A vehicle that emits zero pollutants is necessarily not part of that class. Given EPA's
own assumption that electric vehicles do not emit pollutants, electric vehicles cannot be among
the "class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines" that EPA may
consider in setting Sec- tion 202 standards and they therefore may not be factored into a
fleetwide av- erage. If EPA were right, the relevant "category" EPA purports to be regulating
would vanish at the point when EPA reaches the President's goal that 50 per- cent of the light-
and medium-duty fleets be "zero-emissions vehicles." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 17]
Beyond exceeding EPA's statutory authority, the proposed Light- and Me- dium-Duty rule
also violates the Clean Air Act's mandate (echoing the Admin- istrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551 et seq., 701 et seq.) that agency action be the product of reasoned decisionmaking. 42
U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (reviewing "court may reverse" EPA action "found to be . . . arbitrary,
capri- cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"); cf. 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A). The proposed rule's feasibility, net emissions, compliance, and cost-benefit analyses
all ignore the facts on the ground and are plagued with unrealistic assumptions and arbitrary
modeling decisions. And the rule does not address potential alternatives to achieve EPA's stated
goals. Even if EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act were otherwise permissible, its pro-
posed rule is still arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 17-
18]
Section 202(a) requires EPA to consider whether compliance with the pro- posed emissions
standards is feasible, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance. 42 U.S.C. §
7521(a)(2) ("Any regulation prescribed . . . shall take effect after such period as the
Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period.").
While the agency may take future advances into account, it may not promulgate rules on the
basis of "crystal ball" prognostications. NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the agency must explain why its projections are
"reasonable]" and defend "its methodology for arriving at numerical estimates." Id. Here, that
includes answering theoretical objec- tions to widespread electrification, identifying the major
steps necessary to achieve that objective, and offering plausible reasons for believing that each of
those steps can be completed in the time available. Id. at 331-32. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, p. 18]
Courts deem rules arbitrary and capricious where a single source underlying large swathes of
the rule is flawed in this manner. Cf. Tex. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 935 (5th Cir.
1998) ("A regulation cannot stand if it is based on a flawed, inaccurate, or misapplied study.");
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Desoto Gen. Hosp. v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 182, 186 (5th Cir. 1985) ("We find arbitrary and
capricious the adop- tion of the Malpractice Rule based on 'a single study criticized extensively
by its authors in its particular application.'" (quoting Walter O. Boswell Mem'l Hosp. v.
Heckler, 749 F.2d 788, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); Almay, Inc. v. Califano, 569 F.2d 674, 682 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (agency action arbitrary and capricious where it was promulgated "on the basis of [a]
flawed survey"). EPA should withdraw the rule and permit more reviewers ample time to review
OMEGA, make any changes necessary to incorporate those reviewers' comments, and then
recon- sider whether the proposed emissions standards are appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0683, pp. 54-55]
In addition, the Interagency Working Group's estimates include global ben- efits from
reducing GHG pollution. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,372.8 This led EPA to rely on factors not
authorized by Congress, because the purpose of the Clean Air Act is to "enhance the quality of
the Nation's air resources," not the world's air resources. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (emphasis
added); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (hold- ing that agency action is arbitrary and capricious if "the agency has relied
on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider"). At minimum, if EPA intends to
consider global benefits, then it must also consider global costs to the rule—including its
potential effects on global supply chains, upstream emis- sions in foreign countries, and the
environmental effects on local communities of extracting critical minerals. The lithium-
extraction process, for instance, has reportedly led to environmental harms in South American
countries like Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia, none of which are accounted for in EPA's analysis.9
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 64]
8 See also Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Technical Support Document:
Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide, at 3 (Feb. 2021).
9 See James Blair et al., Exhausted: How We Can Stop Lithium Mining from Depleting Water Resources,
Draining Wetlands, and Harming Communities in South America, at 4, Nat'l Res. Def. Council (Apr.
2022), https://tinyurl.com/524rsm86; Victoria Flexer et al., Lithium Recovery from Brines: A Vital Raw
Material for Green Energies with a Potential Environmental Impact in Its Mining and Processing, 639 Sci.
of Total Env't 1188 (2018), https://tinyurl.com/9fz6jwah.
EPA's Reliance On California's ACC II Program Is Improper
The Light- and Medium-Duty rule is also arbitrary and capricious because it repeatedly relies
on California's Advanced Clean Cars II ("ACC II") program—which requires, but has not
received, EPA's approval before it could become operational in California or elsewhere. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 66]
Although the Clean Air Act generally preempts state motor-vehicle air-pollution standard,
Section 209(b) of the Act authorizes EPA to waive that preemption for emissions standards
adopted by California (which other States may then copy) if EPA makes certain findings. 42
U.S.C. § 7543(b). In 2022, California adopted its ACC II program, which generally would
require all new cars and light trucks sold in California to be zero-emissions vehicles by 2035,
and establishes increasingly stringent emissions criteria in the years leading up to 2035. In May
2023—after the proposed rule here was published—California submitted to EPA a request for a
waiver for ACC II. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 66]
EPA has not acted on California's waiver request. It has not even proposed action on the
request for public comment. But in the Light- and Medium-Duty rule, EPA nevertheless relies on
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the ACC II program, for three main purposes: (1) as evidence of a purported trend toward
vehicle electrification, see 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,188-89; (2) as a real-world driver of technological
innovation and "increased consumer technology familiarity" with electric vehicles, id. at 29,254,
29,334; and (3) to show that the stringent standards imposed by the rule are "aligned with"
existing state policies and thus reasonable, id. at 29,275, 29,284. This reliance is incurably
improper. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 66]
It is arbitrary and irrational for EPA to rely on ACC II and the effects of its implementation in
California and beyond because that program is not, and may never be, operative anywhere.
Although California has unilaterally "adopted" ACC II, and other States have indicated that they
plan to implement the pro- gram if approved, no State—including California—can actually
implement ACC II unless and until California receives a waiver from EPA under Section 209(b).
California had not even requested EPA approval at the time EPA pub- lished the proposed rule.
A grant of the requested waiver is far from a foregone conclusion: to do so, EPA must first
conclude that California needs its own standards "to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions" specific to the State. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(B). EPA must also conclude that ACC II is
"fea- sib[le]," a rigorous standard that the program may not meet. Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 463 & n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("EPA . . . must deny a waiver for California
if the state's regulations provide inadequate lead time to permit the development of the
technology necessary to implement the new procedures, giving appropriate consideration to the
cost of compliance within the time frame." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In- deed, twice in
recent memory, EPA has rejected or withdrawn waivers sought by California. See 84 Fed. Reg.
51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019); 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008). Even if EPA ultimately grants the
waiver for ACC II, it may not do so in time for that program to produce the effects for which
EPA relies upon it. Whether as evidence of a current trend, a driver of consumer familiar- ity
with and adoption of new technology, or as an indicator that EPA's pro- posed rule aligns with
existing policies, EPA's reliance on that embryonic pro- gram is premature. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683, pp. 66-68]
Yet by relying on ACC II, the Light- and Medium-Duty rule appears to ignore all these
considerations and to presuppose that the waiver will be granted—and soon enough to provide
support for adopting EPA's proposed Light- and Medium-Duty rule. In so doing, EPA has
disregarded "an important aspect of the problem" without "reasonable] explanation]." Am.
Clinical Lab. Ass'n v. Becerra, 40 F.4th 616, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Denial of the waiver would
negate each of the three purposes for which EPA arbitrarily relies on ACC II. Deferral of action
by EPA on the waiver could have the same result. It is also doubtful that an agency is permitted
to justify one regulatory action with some other regulatory action that it has not yet taken and
might never take. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 66-68]
EPA purports not to be "prejudging the outcome" of that "waiver process," 88 Fed. Reg. at
29,334, but it protests too much. The "effect of state adoption" of the ACC II model would not
even be a relevant consideration—much less an "important" one," id.—in EPA's analysis of the
proposed rule unless the ACC II program takes effect. EPA could not rationally treat ACC II as
proba- tive of anything, when that program cannot take effect in any State without EPA's own
signoff, unless EPA either has prejudged the waiver issue or at a minimum believes that
approving the waiver is likely. For the same reason, EPA's effort to disclaim reliance on ACC II
in its modeling, Id. at 29,296, is belied by its substantive reliance on the program in the proposed
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rule's actual reasoning, see, e.g., id. at 29,254, 29,275. 29,284, 29,334. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0683, pp.66-68]
These indications of EPA's ostensible prejudgment of the ACC II waiver will likely have
significant consequences for the validity of any eventual decision by EPA formally granting the
requested waiver. See Cinderella Career & Finishing Schs., Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (holding that decisionmaker may be disqualified where "a disinterested observer may
con- elude that the agency has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a
particular case in advance of hearing it" (cleaned up)). For present pur- poses, EPA's choice to
rely on a state-level program that is not and may never be operative, at least in the period
relevant to the proposed rule, is irrational. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032,
1053 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting that an agency's "model assumptions must have a
rational re- lationship to the real world" (internal quotation marks omitted)). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683, pp. 66-68]
EPA's reliance on the ACC II as a driver or reflection of circumstances out- side California is
especially unjustified. There is no guarantee that any of the other States that EPA believes might
implement ACC II (including Colorado, Maine, and New Jersey), see 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,334,
will do so. At least one State that previously adopted ACC II has attempted (unsuccessfully) to
repeal that adoption, backed by the newly elected governor. See Sarah Rankin, Va. Senate
Democrats Kill Effort to Repeal Electric Car Rule, AP News (Jan. 17, 2023). A State's policy
preferences tomorrow may not match its preferences today, especially in an area subject to
vigorous debate and disagreement like climate policy. That's especially true here, given the
many obstacles to rapid electric vehicle adoption discussed above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, p. 68]
More fundamentally, EPA has no "special expertise" in state politics, Ass'n of Priv. Sectors
Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 70 F. Supp. 3d 446, 452-53 (D.D.C. 2014), and its unreasoned
speculation about States' future environmental poli- cies is arbitrary and capricious, cf. In re
Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (agencies "may not rely on political guesswork
about future congres- sional appropriations"); New York v. DHS, 969 F.3d 42, 83 (2d Cir. 2020)
(agen- cies may not rely on "unsupported speculation" that "run[s] counter to the re- alities" of
the situation); N.M. Farm & Livestock Bureau v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 952 F.3d 1216, 1227
(10th Cir. 2020) (reliance on "speculative" finding was arbitrary and capricious). EPA cannot
justify its sweeping, profoundly mis- guided attempt to overhaul the motor-vehicle industry
based on conjecture about hypothetical state-law developments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, p. 68]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
There are several issues included in the Proposal with impacts that go well beyond EPA's
expertise, and the Agency is not positioned to fully grapple with the consequences that such a
rapid push for ZEVs will have across the nation. Beyond the obvious impacts to consumer
automotive markets, the Proposed Rule will also eliminate American jobs in the refining sector
that will not be offset by the "projected" job growth in the automotive sector.67 It will
significantly strain the electric grid, requiring utilities to rapidly increase generation,
transmission, and distribution capacity to a degree not fully contemplated by EPA. And it will
have profound impacts on national security by forcing the American automotive industry and a
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large share of the domestic transportation market to depend on critical minerals from foreign
suppliers—most notably, China—rather than a domestically-abundant and secure resource. The
fact that mandating ZEVs forces EPA to wade into all these areas outside of vehicle tailpipe
emissions—as EPA must, to appropriately quantify emissions reductions and other impacts of
the Proposal—shows that mandating a wholesale switch to vehicles for which the bulk of
emissions occur upstream, rather than at the tailpipe, was not contemplated or provided for by
Congress. Because the Proposed Rule raises a major question, EPA can only proceed if Congress
clearly authorized EPA to do so. But Congress did not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 19]
67 Proposed Rule at 29,393; DRIA at 4-59 (EPA admits that its proposal may affect employment for firms
providing fuels: "Reduced consumption of petroleum represents cost savings for purchasers of fuel, as well
as a potential loss in value of output for the petroleum refining industry, fuel distributors, and gasoline
stations, which could result in reduced employment in these sectors.").
EPA proposed unachievable standards for light- and medium-duty ICEVs. This attempt to
force an unprecedented transformation of the national transportation system to ZEVs goes far
beyond the authority delegated to the Agency by Congress. The Proposal—which will likely
require hundreds of billions of dollars, dictate what vehicles are permissible for automakers to
sell, and has significant ramifications for the U.S. energy sector, national security, and
consumers—clearly addresses questions of major economic and political significance that EPA
is neither authorized nor equipped to address. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 2]
EPA also misinterprets its authority to establish feasible efficiency improvements by
proposing standards that cannot be achieved with ICEV technologies. First, EPA is not permitted
to rely on averaging, banking, and trading mechanisms as a means to establish the relevant
standards. Second, because ZEVs do not have tailpipe emissions, they do not directly "cause or
contribute to" air pollution within the construct of a tailpipe emissions standard, and therefore
any standard applicable to "any class or classes" of vehicles "which . . . cause, or contribute" to
air pollution cannot include ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 2]
Even if EPA had Congressional authority to promulgate the proposed standards, the proposal
is arbitrary and capricious due to the Agency's reliance on incomplete facts, overly optimistic or
outright mistaken assumptions, and failure to use reason-based decision-making. The Agency
significantly overestimates environmental benefits and feasibility, underestimates costs, and
relies on little more than unsupported hope that consumer preferences will change to enable the
Agency's intended policy. EPA's decision to not only ignore lifecycle emissions of ZEVs, but to
explicitly propose removing the requirement for automakers to account for them, serves neither
consumers nor the environment. EPA's reasoning, that its policy of not accounting for these
emissions serves its goal of promoting the use of EVs, is the definition of arbitrary and
capricious biased decision-making. Unfortunately, the Agency also ignored significant issues
related to energy security and U.S. national security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 2]
II. Banning the Internal Combustion Engine is a "Major Question" that Congress did not
Delegate to EPA.
The Proposed Rule goes beyond imposing regulations that represent appropriate and feasible
technological improvements in the efficiency of ICEVs; rather, it requires the manufacturing of
ZEVs and ultimately phasing out ICEVs. Though EPA contends the proposed standards do not
mandate a specific technology (e.g., ZEVs), the proposed standards are a de facto ZEV mandate
requiring auto manufacturers to shift production away from ICEV and to ZEVs.57 Consequently,
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the Proposed Rule obligates OEMs to increase the percentage of ZEVs they sell well more than
market forces. EPA predicts that for MY 2032, the Proposed Rule will result in ZEV adoption
rates between 62-78 percent across all body styles (sedans, crossovers/SUVs, and pickups).58
This is a tremendous jump from the 8.4 percent of LDV production that was plug-in electric in
2022.59 As a result, implementing this Proposal "requires massive changes from all sectors of
the U.S. economy: from automotive suppliers to home builders to utilities, labor to mining to
mineral processing."60 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 17-18]
57 Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Comments to the Environmental Protection Agency, Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles,
Proposed Rule, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829 (hereinafter AAI Comments) at iii.
58 Proposed Rule at 29,329; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles Draft Regulatory Impact
Analysis" (April 2023) pg. 13-36, 13-37, available at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf [hereinafter, "DRIA"].
59 Proposed Rule at 29,189 (identifying the percentage that was PEV, which included PHEVs and ZEVs).
60 AAI Comments at iv.
But the question of whether this shift is necessary and, if so, how to accomplish this shift, is a
"major question" reserved for Congress, not EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 17-18]
EPA's Proposed Rule here presents an analogous situation, albeit one with substantially
greater costs. Mandating a rapid shift from ICEV to ZEV will reshape the American automotive
market with profound collateral effects, making clear that EPA is encroaching upon an issue of
"vast economic and political significance." As further discussed herein, the Proposal's direct
compliance costs are enormous—even in the face of numerous errors and oversights in its
analysis that materially understate these costs. EPA estimates that the cost of vehicle technology
(not including the vehicle or battery tax credits) would be approximately $180 billion-$280
billion in addition to greater than $7 billion in electric vehicle supply equipment ("EVSE") costs
through 2055. These figures do not include the transformation of the electric power sector and
grid updates needed to meet the electricity demand created by the Proposed Rule, which is
estimated to cost trillions of dollars.66 EPA acknowledges that auto manufacturers are spending
over a trillion dollars by 2030, mainly for manufacturing facilities. By setting emissions
standards requiring production of a different product, the Proposed Rule undoubtedly forces
OEMs to meet production deadlines that would not exist but for EPA's new ZEV mandate.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 18-19]
66 Dan Shreve and Wade Schauer, Deep decarbonization requires deep pockets (June 2019),
https://www.decarbonisation.think.woodmac.com/ (The U.S. needs to invest $4.5 trillion to fully transition
the U.S. power grid to renewables during the next 10-20 years, annual investments exceeding the U.S.
defense budget).
There are several issues included in the Proposal with impacts that go well beyond EPA's
expertise, and the Agency is not positioned to fully grapple with the consequences that such a
rapid push for ZEVs will have across the nation. Beyond the obvious impacts to consumer
automotive markets, the Proposed Rule will also eliminate American jobs in the refining sector
that will not be offset by the "projected" job growth in the automotive sector.67 It will
significantly strain the electric grid, requiring utilities to rapidly increase generation,
transmission, and distribution capacity to a degree not fully contemplated by EPA. And it will
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have profound impacts on national security by forcing the American automotive industry and a
large share of the domestic transportation market to depend on critical minerals from foreign
suppliers—most notably, China—rather than a domestically-abundant and secure resource. The
fact that mandating ZEVs forces EPA to wade into all these areas outside of vehicle tailpipe
emissions—as EPA must, to appropriately quantify emissions reductions and other impacts of
the Proposal—shows that mandating a wholesale switch to vehicles for which the bulk of
emissions occur upstream, rather than at the tailpipe, was not contemplated or provided for by
Congress. Because the Proposed Rule raises a major question, EPA can only proceed if Congress
clearly authorized EPA to do so. But Congress did not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 19]
67 Proposed Rule at 29,393; DRIA at 4-59 (EPA admits that its proposal may affect employment for firms
providing fuels: "Reduced consumption of petroleum represents cost savings for purchasers of fuel, as well
as a potential loss in value of output for the petroleum refining industry, fuel distributors, and gasoline
stations, which could result in reduced employment in these sectors.").
Congress clarified that it, not EPA, must make the important policy decisions affecting if,
when, and how the American automotive industry will transition from ICEVs to ZEVs. In the
116th Congress, for example, Congress introduced 44 bills seeking to reduce petroleum-based
fuel consumption and GHG emissions from the transportation sector through customer rebates,
vehicle and fuel producer incentives, local funding, development of standards, and research and
development. Congress rejected bills that would have banned the sale of new light duty ICEVs
by 204070 and it has consistently disapproved of EPA's efforts to hamstring the automotive
sector with more stringent air pollution standards than are feasible.71 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 20-21]
70 See Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2019, H.R. 2764, 116th Cong. (2019); Zero-Emission Vehicles Act
of 2018, S. 3664, 115th Cong. (2018); see also 116 Cong. Rec. 19238-40 (1970) (proposed amendment to
Title II that would have banned ICEVs by 1978).
71 See, e.g., S. J. Res. 11, 118th Cong. (2023) (Although passed only by the Senate thus far, the joint
resolution calls for disapproval of a similar rule submitted by the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency relating to "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine
and Vehicle Standards," 88 Fed. Reg. 4296 (Jan. 24, 2023)).
It should be no surprise then that in the wake of the Proposed Rule, members of Congress
requested that the Agency rescind the proposals, asserting they "effectively mandate a costly
transition to electric cars and trucks in the absence of congressional direction."72 That
Congress intended for it, not EPA, to direct these policy decisions is made all the more clear by
the passage of the IRA and the BIL whereby Congress identified the policy levers it deemed
appropriate. Congress could have, but did not, delegate the authority to (or otherwise direct) EPA
to establish a fleet-wide credit trading regime to further drive ZEV development and rapid
adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 20-21]
72 Letter from Senator Shelley Capita, et al. to Administrator Michael S. Regan, EPA (May 25, 2023); see
also Senate Resolution S.J. Res. 11, 118th Congress (Apr. 26, 2023) (Although related to heavy duty
vehicles ("HDVs"), Congress has expressed its disapproval of EPA's overreach in this space. For example,
in April of this year both houses of Congress passed a Congressional Review Act resolution to rescind
EPA's December 2022 heavy duty NOx standards, sending a strong signal that Congress views EPA's
efforts in this space as unnecessary, infeasible, and uniformed in light of economic and energy security
concerns); House Resolution H2523 (May 23, 2023); see also Congressional Record, H2523 (May 23,
2023) at 1444, Statement from Mr. Walberg (R-MI) ("From tailpipe emissions regulations that will force
people to buy expensive and less practical EVs to new rules on power plants that will threaten the
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reliability of our electric grid. It seems like the EPA has not even thought about the economic and energy
security of our constituents.").
The Proposed Rule stands in direct contrast to other legislation, such as the Renewable Fuel
Standard Program ("RFS"), whereby Congress mandated that "gasoline sold or introduced into
commerce in the United States" must contain renewable fuels73 and, in 2022, must include
billions of gallons of renewable fuel.74 In fact, EPA's Proposal directly conflicts with the
statutory framework that Congress provided in the RFS for lowering GHG emissions from the
transportation sector. In the proposed rule, EPA cites only its authority under section 202(a) of
the Clean Air Act and Executive Order 14037 as the basis for requirements that will extend from
MY 2027 to 2032.75 Because Executive Orders have no force of law,76 EPA at bottom contends
that a few general paragraphs of the Clean Air Act, enacted over 50 years ago, provides
sufficient legislative authority and direction for the entirety of its proposed rule. But Congress
demonstrated in the RFS that when it wants to transform the transportation sector, and
specifically, when it desires to address GHGs associated with that sector, it does so with
precision and within the context of a prescribed statutory framework. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, p. 21]
73 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i).
74 Id., § 7545(o)(2)(B); 87 Fed. Reg. 39,600 (July 1, 2022).
75 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,186.
76 Rather, Executive Orders "simply serve as presidential directives to agency officials to consider certain
policies when making rulemaking decisions." State of California v. EPA, No. 21-1018 (D.C. Cir. 2023),
Slip Op. at 17.
IV. The Proposed Rule is Arbitrary and Capricious
Even if EPA had Congressional authority to promulgate the Proposed Rule, which it does not,
the Proposal is substantively deficient and based on illogical reasoning and incomplete analysis.
Therefore, it constitutes arbitrary and capricious decision-making. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, p. 28]
A. Advanced Clean Cars II ("ACC II") Cannot be a Basis for this Rulemaking
EPA points to California's ACC II program and adoption by Section 177 states to support its
projections of increased PEV penetration, 122 but the ACC II has not received a waiver, and EPA
did not even have the waiver application when the Proposed Rule was published. 123 The CAA
requires EPA to evaluate California's waiver request to ensure that California did not arbitrarily
determine that it needs "ZEV mandates" to address compelling and extraordinary circumstances.
As Principal Deputy Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation Joe Goffman testified on
June 21, 2023, EPA just received the waiver request. Given that the EPA official responsible for
overseeing the California waiver request publicly acknowledged that EPA has not determined
whether it will grant a waiver for ACC II, the Agency cannot rely on ACC II as a basis for this
Proposal. Moreover, because California concedes that ACC II will not meaningfully address the
impacts of climate change in California and ACC II will slow fleet turnover and retard
California's progress toward meeting the NAAQS, California is NOT eligible for a waiver and
ACC II is preempted. EPA's reliance on ACC II as support for this rule is pre-decisional and
another example of arbitrary and capricious decision-making. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733,
p. 28]
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122 Proposed Rule at 29,118.
123 88 Fed. Reg. 29,189; See, e.g., Initial Br. For Private Petitioners, State of Ohio, et al. v. Envt'l Prot.
Agency, et al., No. 22-1081 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 24, 2022).
D. EPA Cannot Adequately Substantiate the Need for Regulatory Action
EPA has not demonstrated a compelling need to accelerate emissions reductions within the
time frame for which MY27-32 vehicles/engines are already being designed. EPA points
primarily to the emissions associated with motor vehicles, presumably tailpipe emissions, but
provides no information supporting the need for such an accelerated schedule beyond what is
currently known. Rather, EPA makes conclusory assertions that the "need for regulatory action"
is supported by the BIL and the IRA, which "together provide further support for a government-
wide approach to reducing emissions by providing significant funding and support for air
pollution and GHG reductions across the economy, including specifically, for the component
technology and infrastructure for the manufacture, sales, and use of electric vehicles." 193 EPA
notes that under the current standards, ZEV demand is doubling each year, from 2.2 percent of
U.S. light-duty vehicle production in MY 2020, to 4.4 percent in MY 2021 and projected to
reach 8.4 percent in MY 2022.194 Congressional spending on EV charging or vehicle subsidies
does not confer new authority on EPA to mandate EVs. For example, within the IRA, Congress
merely appropriated additional funds "[i]n addition to amounts otherwise available" to the EPA
for certain fiscal years to carry out various activitiesl95 and Congress did not amend or refer to
section 202 of the Clean Air Act or any of the provisions of that Act on which EPA bases its
proposed rule. 196 Thus, EPA's reliance on these enactments to justify and underwrite proposed
standards' feasibility is arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 42]
193 Proposed Rule at 29,187.
194 Proposed Rule at 29,189.
195 See, e.g., sections 60106-60111 of the Inflation Reduction Act
196 In contrast, section 60107 references in the title to that section funding "for Section 21 l(o) of the Clean
Air Act."
As discussed above, because EPA may only prescribe standards applicable to vehicles that
"cause or contribute" to air pollution, its standards cannot account for ZEVs with no tailpipe
emissions. However, if EPA is authorized to promulgate such standards, those standards must
account for any upstream emissions from upstream electric generating units, the mining of
battery materials, and the production of the vehicle. 197 Without consideration of upstream and
full life-cycle impacts (e.g., frequent battery replacements), EPA has failed to inform the public
of the comparative costs of emission reductions, whether from ZEVs, ICEVs, energy efficiency,
or other sectors. EPA's continued failure to address this "major aspect of the problem" is another
example of EPA moving toward its predetermined outcome—the forced electrification of U.S.
transportation. 198 AFPM has continually put EPA on notice of the need to include a LCA to
avoid an arbitrary comparison—the agency continues to ignore this issue of central relevance to
EPA's benefit analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 42-44]
197 Proposed Rule at 29,353-55.
198 See, e.g., Comments of the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers on EPA's Reconsideration
of a Previous Withdrawal of a Waiver of Preemption 10 (July 6, 2021),
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0257-0139, Comments of the American Fuel
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& Petrochemical Manufacturers onEPA's/NHTSA's Proposed The Safe Affordable Fuel-Efficient
Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks 68-73 (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0283-5698; Comments of the American Fuel
& Petrochemical Manufacturers on EPA's California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards;
Advanced Clean Trucks; Zero Emission Airport Shuttle; Zero Emission Power Train Certification; Request
for Waiver of Preemption 7-12 (Aug. 2, 2022), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0331-0088.
D. EPA Cannot Adequately Substantiate the Need for Regulatory Action
EPA has not demonstrated a compelling need to accelerate emissions reductions within the
time frame for which MY27-32 vehicles/engines are already being designed. EPA points
primarily to the emissions associated with motor vehicles, presumably tailpipe emissions, but
provides no information supporting the need for such an accelerated schedule beyond what is
currently known. Rather, EPA makes conclusory assertions that the "need for regulatory action"
is supported by the BIL and the IRA, which "together provide further support for a government-
wide approach to reducing emissions by providing significant funding and support for air
pollution and GHG reductions across the economy, including specifically, for the component
technology and infrastructure for the manufacture, sales, and use of electric vehicles." 193 EPA
notes that under the current standards, ZEV demand is doubling each year, from 2.2 percent of
U.S. light- duty vehicle production in MY 2020, to 4.4 percent in MY 2021 and projected to
reach 8.4 percent in MY 2022.194 Congressional spending on EV charging or vehicle subsidies
does not confer new authority on EPA to mandate EVs. For example, within the IRA, Congress
merely appropriated additional funds "[i]n addition to amounts otherwise available" to the EPA
for certain fiscal years to carry out various activitiesl95 and Congress did not amend or refer to
section 202 of the Clean Air Act or any of the provisions of that Act on which EPA bases its
proposed rule. 196 Thus, EPA's reliance on these enactments to justify and underwrite proposed
standards' feasibility is arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 42]
193 Proposed Rule at 29,187.
194 Proposed Rule at 29,189.
195 See, e.g., sections 60106-60111 of the Inflation Reduction Act
196 In contrast, section 60107 references in the title to that section funding "for Section
21 l(o) of the Clean Air Act."
Organization: American Petroleum Institute
h. Legal Concerns.
The aggressive push to electrify the LDV and MDV fleet is the defining characteristic of the
Proposed Rule from a legal standpoint. EPA explains that its "feasibility assessments in past
rulemaking were predominantly based on ICE-based technologies that provided incremental
tailpipe GHG reductions." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29238. Here, in contrast, EPA projects that the
Proposed Rule at full implementation would result in the electrification of 67% of the LDV fleet
- over 25% more than the 39% penetration rate that EPA projects in the no action base case. Id.
at 29329. EPA similarly projects that 46% of the MDV fleet will be electrified, reflecting 98%
electrification of all vans. Id. at 29331. These numbers make it clear that the Proposed Rule
would establish a legal mandate effectively requiring that electric vehicles must comprise a
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significantly greater proportion of the LDV and MDV fleet than otherwise would be the case.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 24-26]
While BEVs can and should be a choice available to manufacturers and vehicle purchasers,
we disagree that EPA should impose a binding mandate for the production of BEVs and outline
why such a mandate exceeds EPA's authority under the Clean Air Act (CAA). [EPA-HQ-0AR-
2022-0829-064 1, pp. 24-26]
i. EPA does not have authority to impose standards that are only achievable through
the use of BEV technology because there is no clear statement in the Clean Air Act authorizing
EPA to mandate a shift away from internal combustion engines.
The Proposed Rule marks a shift in EPA's approach to regulating emissions from LDVs and
MDVs. EPA, consistent with the Clean Air Act, has traditionally established standards based on
technology that can control the amount of emissions from LDVs and MDVs. EPA deviated from
this approach in its 2021 GHG standards, setting standards based on a formula that the agency
estimated would increase the market share for electric vehicles from 3.6% to 7% for model year
2023 and 17% for model year 2026. But even then, EPA contended that its "assessment,
consistent with past EPA assessments, shows that the final standards can largely be met with
increased sales of advanced gasoline vehicle technologies, and projects modest (17 percent)
penetration rates of electrified vehicle technology" by 2026. 86 Fed. Reg. 74434, 74484 (Dec.
30, 2021). And EPA argued that it relied on advances in internal combustion engine ("ICE")
powertrains to achieve the required GHG reductions and purported not to push for a shift from
ICE powertrains to electrified vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 24-26]
Here, EPA goes even further and seeks to totally transform the transportation sector. It
proposes standards that would effectively require that BEVs must comprise two-thirds of the
LDV fleet and nearly half of the MDV fleet at full implementation, which is a substantially
greater proportion of the fleet any prediction of the market demand would support. Indeed,
according to EPA, "[in] MY 2032 when the proposed standards reach the lowest level, it is
possible that only BEVs and PHEVs are generating positive credits, and all ICE vehicles
generate varying levels of deficits." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29342. In other words, EPA predicts that
manufacturers will not be able to comply with the proposed rule without producing significant
numbers of electric vehicles. EPA thus seeks to require a fundamental transformation of the
LDV fleet from ICE powertrain technology to electric vehicles. [EP A-HQ-0 AR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 24-26]
Such a shift from ICE powertrains to electric powertrains would be truly transformative.
BEVs require fundamentally different vehicle technologies than those used on conventionally
fueled vehicles - e.g., electric motors instead of internal combustion engines, batteries to store
power rather than on-board fuel tanks. Moreover, BEVs rely on a wholly different infrastructure
(e.g., electric power generation and distribution, charging stations, battery manufacturing) -
much of which does not yet exist or exists only in limited form. Additionally, switching to BEVs
will fundamentally change the manner in which vehicles are used, for example requiring careful
scheduling of vehicle operations to accommodate the long periods needed to adequately charge
the vehicles. Lastly, a BEV mandate would produce widespread effects on the national economy,
such as the reduced need for oil and gas production, gas processing, changes to petroleum
refining, and distribution. Such changes are extraordinary and far more expansive than those
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caused by EPA's LDV and MDV GHG standards up to now. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 24-26]
vii. The proposed emissions standards are unfounded because EPA fails to explain its
rationale for selecting the proposed emissions control levels.
EPA provides an expansive explanation of the Proposed Rule in the 263-page Federal
Register notice. But noticeably missing is any explanation of how EPA derived the numeric
emissions standards that the Proposed Rule would establish. The "footprint-based standard curve
coeffcients" for cars and light trucks are clearly presented in the proposal. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29236.
While EPA describes these curves as "targets, rather than standards," the curves effectively
represent the emissions standards because the enforceable obligation for each manufacturer is
derived by summing the actual sales-weighted values derived through application of the curves.
Id. at 29236 n. 405. Because of the ABT compliance provisions, a manufacturer can demonstrate
compliance for its fleet even if each of its vehicles does not meet the emissions limit applicable
to that vehicle according to the curves. But each manufacturer must meet an enforceable in-use
emissions standard for each vehicle type based on the level of emissions to which the vehicle is
certified. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 32-33]
In presenting the curves, EPA discusses a wide variety of relevant factors —including the
upper and lower cutpoints, the slope of the curve, incentives/disincentives for consumer choice
of larger vehicles (and the resulting impact on overall GHG emissions reductions), the impact of
BEVs, and the relationship between the car and truck curves (the later Including consideration of
load and towing capacity). In addition, the preamble includes extensive discussion of the
predicted costs of the Proposed Rule and technical feasibility. But nowhere does EPA explain
how the numeric values of the curves (i.e., the actual GHG emissions rate that would be applied
to each vehicle upon application of the curve) were derived and how those particular values are
justified. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 32-33]
It is bedrock administrative law that an "agency must examine the relevant data and articulate
a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). EPA's failure to do so here renders the Proposed
Rule fatally arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 32-33]
Additionally, the lack of explanation violates EPA's procedural obligation to develop a
statement of basis and purpose that, among other things, explains "the factual data on which the
proposed rule is based" and "the methodology used in ... analyzing the data." CAA § 307(d)(3).
Unless that failure is corrected, API and other interested parties do not have adequate notice of
and opportunity to comment on one of the most fundamental aspects of the Proposed Rule.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 32-33]
Organization: Arizona State Legislature
1. The proposed rule violates the Major Questions Doctrine. EPA has not identified a clear
congressional delegation of the authority to transform the automotive industry through
rulemaking, and none exists. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 2]
I. The proposed rule violates the Major Questions Doctrine
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EPA touts this rule for passenger vehicles and its companion for heavy-duty vehicles as the
"strongest-ever pollution standards for cars and trucks to accelerate transition to a clean-
transportation future."4 Numerous media reports recognize that the goal of the proposed rules is
not to reduce emissions on existing vehicles, but to force a transition to new types of vehicles.
Or, as the EPA administrator put it, "usher in a new generation" of clean cars.5 For example:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 3-4]
4 U.S. EPA, "Biden-Harris Administration Proposes Strongest-Ever Pollution Standards for Cars and
Trucks to Accelerate Transition to a Clean-Transportation Future," Apr. 12, 2023, available at
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris-administration-proposes-strongest-ever-pollution-
standards-cars- and.
5 Camila Domonoske, The big reason why the U.S. is seeking the toughest-ever rules for vehicle
emissions, NPR, Apr. 12, 2023, available at https://www.npr.org/2023/04/12/1169269936/electric-vehicles-
emission-standards-tailpipes- fuel-economy.
- The proposed rules "could require as much as 67% of all new vehicles sold in the U.S. by
2032 to be all-electric, representing the country's most aggressive climate regulations to date."6
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 3-4]
6 Emma Newburger, Biden proposes toughest auto emissions rules yet to dramatically boost EV sales,
CNBC, Apr. 12, 2023, available at https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/12/epa-proposes-auto-pollution-limits-
to-aggressively-boost- ev-sales-.html.
- "The Biden administration is proposing stiff new automobile pollution limits that would
require up to two-thirds of new vehicles sold in the U.S. to be electric by 2032, a nearly tenfold
increase over current electric vehicle sales."7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 3-4]
7 Matthew Daly and Tom Krisher, Stiff EPA emission limits to boost US electric vehicle sales,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 12, 2023, available at https://apnews.com/article/biden-electric-vehicles-epa-
tailpipe-emissions-climate-406d74e 18459bc 13 5f089c68 Iba9e224.
- "The proposal for light- and medium-duty vehicles was accompanied by a proposal for
heavy-duty fleets to electrify 25 percent of their trucks and half of all new buses to be electric by
2032."8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 3-4]
8 Aaron Cole, Proposed vehicle emissions standards would be America's toughest yet, POPULAR
SCIENCE, Apr. 12, 2023, available at https://www.popsci.com/technology/epa-electric-vehicle-emissions-
targets/.
- "The overarching goal is not just cleaner cars, but the transformation of the auto industry:
The EPA would essentially impose regulatory penalties on companies that do not move quickly
enough toward electric cars."9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 3-4]
9 Domonoske, supra note 5.
The former head of EPA's Office of Transportation and Air Quality recognized the
significance of EPA's proposed rules as "the single most important regulatory initiative by the
Biden administration to combat climate change and to really reduce the worst outcomes of
climate change "10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 3-4]
10 Matthew Daly and Tom Krisher, Stiff EPA emission limits to boost US electric vehicle sales,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 12, 2023, available at https://apnews.com/article/biden-electric-vehicles-epa-
tailpipe-emissions-climate-
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They are intended to radically transform America's entire automotive industry. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 3-4]
The West Virginia Court also focused on the technology-based approach to individual
sources. "A technology-based standard, recall, is one that focuses on improving the emissions
performance of individual sources." Id. at 2611. But "[rjather than focus on improving the
performance of individual sources, [EPA] would 'improve the overall power system by lowering
the carbon intensity of power generation.' And it would do that by forcing a shift throughout the
power grid from one type of energy source to another." Id. at 2611-12 (internal citation omitted)
(emphasis original). With this position, "EPA can demand much greater reductions in emissions
based on a very different kind of policy judgment: that it would be 'best' if coal made up a much
smaller share of national electricity generation. And on this view of EPA's authority, it could go
further, perhaps forcing coal plants to 'shift' away virtually all of their generation—i.e., to cease
making power altogether." Id. at 2612. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 5-6]
EPA's proposed standards here require another massive shift away from current market
operations. EPA projects that its proposed standards could be satisfied through a mix of nearly
70% battery electric vehicles for passenger cars, SUVs, and light-duty pickup trucks, and about
40% battery electric vehicles for medium duty vans and pickup trucks by model year 2032.12
But in 2021, less than 1% of the 250 million passenger cars, SUVs, and light-duty trucks in the
United States were electric. 13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 5-6]
12 U.S. EPA Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
13 Feilding Cage, The long road to electric cars, REUTERS, Feb. 7, 2022, available at
https://www.reuters.com/graphics/AUTOS-ELECTRIC/USA/mopanyqxwva/.
In West Virginia, "EPA decides, for instance, how much of a switch from coal to natural gas
is practically feasible by 2020, 2025, and 2030 before the grid collapses, and how high energy
prices can go as a result before they become unreasonably 'exorbitant.'" West Virginia, 142 S.
Ct. at 2612. Here, EPA is deciding how much of a switch from internal combustion engine trucks
to zero-emission vehicles or hydrogen-powered vehicles is practically feasible by model years
2027 to 2032. The West Virginia Court found it "highly unlikely that Congress would leave to
agency discretion the decision of how much coal-based generation there should be over the
coming decades." Id. at 2613. Instead, "[t]he basic and consequential tradeoffs involved in such a
choice are ones that Congress would likely have intended for itself." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0537, p. 6]
The magnitude of EPA's proposed rule implicates the Major Questions Doctrine. EPA is
attempting to use emissions standards for vehicles to force a shift from gasoline-powered
vehicles to electric-and hydrogen-powered vehicles. The shift will impact energy production by
dropping demand for oil exploration and refineries and increasing demand for electricity
generation and mining for rare earth minerals. The rule will cost billions of dollars. 88 Fed. Reg.
29,200. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 6]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Under the Clean Air Act, California retains certain authority to regulate vehicle emissions,
which has allowed California to function as a policy and technology incubator to address the
State's air quality challenges. California's history of reducing pollution from motor vehicles has
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demonstrated that strong emission standards will spur innovation and technological
advancements that reduce costs and improve public health. California's experience also
demonstrates that cleaning the air and protecting the climate are good for the economy— while
pursuing ambitious climate and air quality policies, California has grown to be the largest sub-
national economy in the world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 8-9]
In 2022, California adopted the Advanced Clean Cars (ACC) II program, which establishes a
pathway towards 100 percent zero-emission new passenger car and light-duty truck sales by
2035 and incorporates a suite of assurance measures to help ensure that ZEVs are capable of
fully replacing their conventional counterparts. 5 The ACC II regulations also established more
stringent criteria air pollutant emission standards for vehicles with internal combustion engines
(including PHEVs) to continue reducing harmful emissions from these vehicles. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 8-9]
5 The Advanced Clean Cars (ACC) II Regulations consist of the following new sections of the California
Code of Regulations (Cal. Code Regs.), title 13: 1961.4, 1962.4, 1962.5, 1962.6, 1962.7, and 1962.8; and
amendments to the following sections of tit. 13: 1900, 1961.2, 1961.3, 1962.2, 1962.3, 1965, 1968.2, 1969,
1976, 1978, 2037, 2038, 2112, 2139, 2140, 2147, 2317, and 2903; and incorporated test procedures. On
May 22, 2023, California requested the Administrator of U.S. EPA grant a waiver for the ACC II
Regulations under Clean Air Act Section 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).
California's standards, and their implementation in states that choose to adopt them under
Section 177 of the Clean Air Act, lay a strong technical and policy foundation for U.S. EPA to
adopt more stringent standards nationwide. While the requirements of ACC II and U.S. EPA's
proposed standards differ somewhat, CARB expects that manufacturers will be able to use the
same technologies to comply with both sets of regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp.
8-9]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
In 2009, EPA concluded that "greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may reasonably be
anticipated both to endanger public health and to endanger public welfare." 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496,
66,497 (Dec. 5, 2009); see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2011) (holding that GHGs are
within the scope of air pollution covered by Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act). And, in 2010,
EPA promulgated its first set of GHG emission standards applicable to light-duty vehicles model
years 2012 through 2016. 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010). Since then, EPA has promulgated
and amended GHG emission standards for light-duty vehicles multiple times, most recently
tightening the standards for model years 2023 through 2026. 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15,
2012); 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020); 86 Fed. Reg. 74,434 (Dec. 30, 2021). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 17-18]
Throughout the more than fifty years that it has been translating technological progress into
increasingly stringent standards for various pollutants, EPA's standards have generally
anticipated a wider use of existing emission control technologies and application of new or
emerging emission control technologies across vehicle classes. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 6,650,
6,552 (Feb. 1, 1979) (trap-oxidizers), 66 Fed. Reg. 5,002, 5,049-54 (Jan. 18, 2011) (NOx
adsorbers), 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,454-55 (hybrid technologies); see 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,187-88. This
long-standing practice is consistent with Congress's "expectation that EPA] press for the
development and application of improved technology rather than be limited by that which exists
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today." NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2).
Accordingly, EPA has routinely analyzed a wide array of technologies—from aerodynamic and
air conditioning technologies to hybrid and zero-emission-vehicle technologies—in its
rulemakings to simulate manufacturers' compliance with alternative stringency levels. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 17-18]
A. Section 202(A) Requires EPA to Reduce Threats to Public Health and Welfare from
Harmful Air Pollution
Under Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, EPA "shall by regulation prescribe . . .
standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor
vehicles . . ., which in [its] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). "By employing the
verb 'shall,' Congress vested a non-discretionary duty in EPA," Coalition for Responsible
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev'd in part on other grounds,
Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014), the purpose of which is clear: reduce
or eliminate the threats to public health and welfare of deleterious air pollutants. 42 U.S.C.§
7521(a)(1); see also id. § 7401(b)(1) (declaring a goal of the Clean Air Act "to protect and
enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare
and the productive capacity of its population"); Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532 (explaining that
"EPA has been charged with protecting the public's 'health' and 'welfare'" in Section 202(a)).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 27-28]
D. EPA's Proposal to Retire or Limit Credits Is Consistent with Section 202(a)'s Focus
on Real-World Emission Reductions
Finally, the States and Cities support EPA's Proposal to retire certain compliance flexibilities
associated with the light- and medium-duty vehicle emissions program. In particular, EPA's
rationales for limiting air-conditioning efficiency credits, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,246-48, and for
phasing out off-cycle credits and the MDV multipliers, id. at 29,243-45, 29,249-52, are
consistent with the agency's responsibility to ensure the emissions program's environmental
integrity by tying credits and other flexibilities to real-world emission reductions as closely as
possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 37]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
I. EPA Lacks Statutory Authority to Electrify the Fleet.
Under the major questions doctrine, agencies may not construe a statute to "authoriz[e] [them]
to exercise powers of 'vast economic and political significance'" unless the statute does so in
"clea[r]" terms. Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (quoting
Utility Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)). Thus, an agency seeking to exercise
significant powers must identify "something more than a merely plausible textual basis for the
agency action." West Virginia EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2609 (2022) (quoting Utility Air, 573 U.S.
at 324). "The agency instead must point to 'clear congressional authorization' for the power it
claims." Id. Whether and how to transition the vehicle fleet away from internal combustion
engines to electric motors and thousand-pound batteries is a major question of economic and
political importance. EPA therefore needs clear statutory authority. Section 202(a) of the Clean
Air Act, which authorizes the agency to issue "standards applicable to the emission of any air
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pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles," does not provide this clear authority,
and that is the end of the matter. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 3-4]
Indeed, EPA's proposal is very similar to the Clean Power Plan. Just as in West Virginia v.
EPA, the agency is claiming the power to shift the nation's energy policy by reverse-engineering
its preferred balance of fuel sources through emission standards. In the Clean Power Plan, EPA
attempted to force a shift from coal-fired plants to gas-, wind-, and solar-powered plants. Here,
EPA attempts to force a shift from liquid-fuel vehicles to electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, pp.3-4]
As this proposal shows, there's no stopping point to EPA's claim of authority. As in West
Virginia, with this power EPA "could go further, perhaps forcing [automakers] ... to cease
making [conventional vehicles] altogether." 142 S. Ct. at 2612. Whether "[t]he future of the auto
industry is electric"3 is—pace President Biden— very much an open question. But whether it is
open or not, it is not a future that the Executive Branch can mandate by reimagining a decades-
old statute. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 4]
3 FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Ensuring Future is Made in America, White House Briefing
Room (February 8, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-re-
leases/2022/02/08/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-ensuring-future-is-made-in-america/.
A. The proposal claims a power of vast economic and political significance.
In assessing the economic and political significance of a rule, courts look to both a rule's
direct effects and the implications of the agency's underlying claim of authority. For example, in
West Virginia, although EPA's Clean Power Plan only incrementally shifted power generation,
the Court reasoned that EPA had asserted the "highly consequential power" to "announc[e] what
the market share of coal, natural gas, wind, and solar must be, and then requir[e] plants to reduce
operations or subsidize their competitors to get there." 142 S. Ct. at 2609 & 2613 n.4; see
Alabama Ass'n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489 (considering the "sheer scope of the [agency's]
claimed authority" in addition to the rule's "economic impact"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, pp. 4-5]
The proposal candidly indicates that that is exactly what EPA is doing here. See 88 Fed. Reg.
29,329 ("as the proposed standards become more stringent... the penetration of BEVs increases
by almost 30 percentage points over this 6-year period, from 36 percent in MY 2027 up to 67
percent of overall vehicle production in MY 2032."). This regulatory transformation is exactly
the sort of "highly consequential power" that the Supreme Court had in mind in West Virginia.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 4-5]
To begin with, the "economic impact" of the proposal raises it to a level of significance
capable of triggering major question scrutiny. The proposal estimates $86 billion in costs over
the first six years alone.4 This is comparable to the economic cost of the Clean Power Plan,
which triggered the major-questions doctrine in West Virginia. See 142 S. Ct. at 2610; EPA,
Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule 3-22 (projecting up to $3
billion in 2025 rising to $8.4 billion in costs in 2030). And, as will be discussed later in this
comment, the proposal's listed costs grossly underestimate the rule's true costs. The proper
metric is aggregate cost because the major-questions doctrine asks about the rule's significance
to the "national economy." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609 (2022); see also Biden v. Nebraska,
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600 U.S. ,, slip op. 21 (2023) (looking to projections of total costs to taxpayers). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 4-5]
4 This includes EPA's calculated vehicle technology costs, Table 160, id. at 29,364-65 , Electric Vehicle
Supply Equipment (EVSE) costs, Table 165, id. at 29,367, and refueling costs, Table 166, id. at 29,367-68.
The proposal's political significance is equally vast. The target of EPA's proposal is "the
subject of an earnest and profound debate across the country." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct at 2614.
The Biden Administration and a small number of states favor an aggressive transition away from
the internal combustion engine, while many other states are actively opposing it. See, e.g., State
of Texas v. EPA, No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (where sixteen states are challenging EPA's
current light-duty standards). While Congress has provided certain taxpayer subsidies, grants,
and loans to incentivize electric vehicles, it has never clearly authorized a transition away from
the internal combustion engine by agency fiat. Indeed, proposals to impose electric vehicle
mandates have never even made it out of committee. See, e.g., Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of
2019, H.R. 2764, 116th Cong. (2019); Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2018,S. 3664, 115th Cong.
(2018). Just last month, 151 members of the U.S. House of Representatives joined a letter urging
EPA to withdraw its proposed emissions standards—calling them an attempt to "commandeer
America's transportation sector and force its complete vehicle electrification under the guise of
mitigating climate change." Letter from Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers et al. to Adm'r Michael
S. Regan, at 1 (May 22, 2023), https://dldth6e84htgma.cloudfront.net/DRAFT_05_22_23_
EPA_Tailpipe_Letter_af5a5b04a5.pdf?updated_at=2023-05-19T17:01:36.343Z. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 7-8]
That Congress has consistently rejected forced electrification is also evident from the way in
which it would conflict with its broader legislative schemes it has enacted. For example,
Congress has consistently sought to address greenhouse-gas emissions from the transportation
sector by promoting corn ethanol and other renewable fuels, which can be amply supplied
domestically. See e.g., Renewable Fuel Standard, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i); Inflation
Reduction Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-169, §§ 13202, 13404, 22003, 136 Stat. 1818, 1932-
1935, 1966-1969, 2020 (2022). And it has granted EPA separate—and limited and procedurally
cabined—authority to regulate fuels and fuel additives, further indicating that Section 202 is not
a broad delegation of authority to phase out liquid-fueled internal combustion engines. See 42
U.S.C. § 7545. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 7-8]
The proposal is also a novel assertion of agency authority. The Supreme Court has explained
that skepticism is warranted when an agency asserts an "unheralded power representing a
transformative expansion in its regulatory authority." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2610 (cleaned
up). Until this administration, EPA never claimed the authority to mandate even partial
electrification. Now it claims the power to transform the entire fleet in just a few years' time. Cf.
Nebraska, Slip Op. 22 (Imagine "asking the enacting Congress ... 'Can the Secretary use his
powers to abolish $430 billion in student loans, completely canceling loan balances for 20
million borrowers, as a pandemic winds down to its end?' We can't believe the answer would be
yes."). It is irrelevant that setting mobile-source emissions standards falls within the agency's
"wheelhouse"; the "sweeping and unprecedented impact" of these standards is not. Id. The
"'basic and consequential tradeoffs' inherent in a mass [electrification] pro- gram 'are ones that
Congress would likely have intended for itself.'" Id. at 24-25 (quoting West Virginia, 142 S. Ct.
at 2613). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 8]
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B. EPA lacks clear authority to use fleetwide averaging.
Congress has expressly precluded EPA from using Section 202(a) to phase out internal-
combustion vehicles. EPA achieves that result only by misconstruing the standard-setting tools at
its disposal. The text and structure of Section 202, and of Title II more broadly, unambiguously
require that emission standards under Section 202(a) apply to individual vehicles, not to
manufacturers' fleets on average. EPA claims to find authority for fleetwide averaging in Section
202(a), which authorizes the agency to issue "standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles ... which in [its] judgment cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). This says nothing about averaging across fleets. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 8-9]
EPA has already conceded as much. When the agency first adopted fleetwide averaging, it
recognized that "Congress did not specifically contemplate an averaging program when it
enacted the Clean Air Act." 48 Fed. Reg. 33,456, 33,458 (July 21, 1983). And "[j]ust as the
statute does not explicitly address EPA's authority to allow averaging, it does not address the
Agency's authority to permit banking and trading." 54 Fed. Reg. 22,652, 22,665 (May 25, 1989);
see also 55 Fed. Reg. 30,584, 30,593 (July 26, 1990) (same). That is the end of the analysis. The
statute does not "explicitly" allow averaging and so EPA lacks "clear congressional
authorization" to enact the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 8-9]
This statutory silence means that even if the phasing out of the internal combustion engine
were not a major question, EPA would have no power to use averaging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0712, pp. 8-9]
When a statute "says nothing about" a potential regulatory power, it "would be improper to
conclude that what Congress omitted from the statute is nevertheless within its scope." Univ. of
Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 353 (2013); see also Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper,
Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 223 (2009) ("statutory silence, when viewed in context," is in many situations
"best interpreted as limiting agency discretion," not creating it). After all, "[a]n agency ...
'literally has no power to act' ... unless and until Congress authorizes it to do so by statute."
FEC v. Cruz, 142 S. Ct. 1638, 1649 (2022). And agencies no less than courts have a "duty to
respect not only what Congress wrote but, as importantly, what it didn't write." Va. Uranium,
Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1900 (2019) (plurality op.). "And supplying the extra words 'on
average' would have a significant substantive effect: 'roller coaster riders must be 48 inches tall'
means something very different from 'roller coaster riders must be 48 inches tall on average.'"
Initial Brief for Private Petitioners at 41, Texas v. EPA, No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 3, 2022).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 9-10]
The inference against EPA's claim to be able to write into its authority a fleet- wide averaging
power is especially strong because Congress knows full well how to create such a program—it
did so not only in EPCA, but also in other provisions of Title II of the Clean Air Act. See 42
U.S.C. § 7545(k)(l)(B)(v)(II) (directing EPA to take certain actions if "the reduction of the
average annual aggregate emissions of toxic air pollutants in a [designated district] fails to meet"
certain standards). Simply put: "if Congress had wanted to adopt [an averaging] approach" for
motor vehicle standards under Section 202(a), "it knew how to do so." SAS Inst., Inc. v. lancu,
138 S. Ct. 1348, 1351 (2018). That Congress didn't is dispositive. See Marx v. Gen. Revenue
Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 381 (2013) ("[I]t is fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed
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possibility and meant to say no to it[.]"); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983);
Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360-361 (2019) ("Atextual judicial supplementation is
particularly inappropriate when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the
omitted language or provision.").6 To quote Justice Frankfurter: "It is quite impossible... when
Congress did specifically address itself to a problem.. .to find secreted in the interstices of
legislation the very grant of power which Congress consciously withheld." Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, pp.9-10]
6 At the very least, EPA should await the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v.
Raimondo (22-451), which will consider "[w]hether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify
that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the
statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency."
Add to this that the "silence" argument is simply not correct. That fleet-wide averaging is
forbidden can be seen in several parallel provisions of the Clean Air Act. For example, the plain
text of the testing requirements that accompany the Section 202(b) standards require those
standards apply to all vehicles individually. EPA must "test any emission control system
incorporated in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine ... to determine whether such system
enables such vehicle or engine to conform to the standards required to be prescribed under
[Section 202(b)]." 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(2). If the system complies with the testing, then EPA
must issue a "'verification of compliance with emission standards for such system." Id. These
provisions plainly require standards that apply to individual vehicles.7 The fundamental premise
of this testing regime is that a vehicle can meet individually applied emission standards. Thus
"the broader context of the statute as a whole," Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341
(1997), confirms that EPA is out over its skis here. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 10]
7 See also, Initial Brief for Private Petitioners, Texas v. EPA, No. 22-1031 at 51-62 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 3,
2022) (detailing myriad ways in which statutory text, structure, and related provisions confirm that
fleetwide averaging is not authorized).
C. Even if EPA could use fleetwide averaging, this cannot be used to force electrification.
Part of the reason EPA has traditionally been granted deference in its averaging schemes is
because the agency has historically used averaging as an accommodation to regulated parties,
allowing them additional flexibility that the statute does not in fact authorize. In prior rules, the
use of fleet-wide averaging meant that a vehicle manufacturer could comply by making some
vehicles that emitted more and others that emitted less. Thus, while some commentors have
pointed out the illegality of this scheme, vehicle manufacturers have not opposed EPA's
averaging approach because it provided them with the flexibility necessary to achieve in a more
cost-effective way otherwise impractical standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 10-11]
Thus, when considering EPA's authority to use averaging, the D.C. Circuit has always noted
that it was critical that the averaging serve as merely a flexibility. See NRDC v. Thomas, 805
F.2d 410, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("EPA's argument that averaging will allow manufacturers more
flexibility in cost allocation while ensuring that a manufacturer's overall fleet still meets the
emissions reduction standards makes sense.") (emphasis added); cf. White Stallion Energy Ctr.,
LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (permitting averaging across multiple utility
units under 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) because averaging is a "'more flexible, and less costly
alternative.'"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 10-11]
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But in this new proposal EPA is not offering an extrastatutory accommodation to a regulated
party, but is instead taking an additional step away from the statutory text by using fleetwide
averaging to mandate electrification. The proposal would set emissions standards in such a way
that no fleet of internal combustion engine vehicles can meet the standards. This means that
averaging no longer provides flexibility about which kinds of internal-combustion vehicles a
manufacturer may sell, but instead amounts to a de facto mandate to incorporate electric vehicles
to comply with its proposed standards. Much as in the Clean Power Plan, crediting is deployed as
a tool for reverse engineering a share of preferred technologies by setting targets that cannot be
achieved by disfavored technologies. Thus, even if the agency was properly entitled to deference
in its previous averaging schemes, this deference evaporates when the scheme is used coercively,
rather than permissively. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 10-11]
Of course, EPA freely admits that electric vehicles do produce upstream emissions, and that
these upstream emissions matter. This is true and very important. And the proposal does consider
upstream emissions when determining the rule's impact on total emissions. EPA's position is
that this inconsistent approach to electric vehicles' upstream emissions is reasonable because it
treats upstream emissions of all vehicles, electrified or not, the same way for compliance
purposes. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,252 ("EPA proposes to include only emissions measured directly from
the vehicle in the vehicle GHG program for MYs 2027 and later (or until EPA changes the
regulations through future rulemaking) consistent with the treatment of all other vehicles.
Electric vehicle operation would therefore continue to be counted as 0 g/mile, based on tailpipe
emissions only.") [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 11-12]
But this "consisten[cy]" is precisely what makes the rule unreasonable. Electric vehicles are
not like "all other vehicles." EPA has previously recognized that "that for each EV that is sold, in
reality the total emissions off-set relative to the typical gasoline or diesel powered vehicle is not
zero, as there is a corresponding increase in up-stream C02 emissions due to an increase in the
requirements for electric utility generation." 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454, 49,533 (Sept. 28, 2009). EPA
only chose the initial "zero grams/mile compliance value [a]s an incentive," Response to
Comments, EPA-420-R-10-012a at 5-237 (Apr. 2010),), and explained that in future standards it
"would at-tribute a pro rata share of national C02 emissions from electricity generation to each
mile driven under electric power minus a pro rata share of upstream emissions associated with
from gasoline production," 88 Fed. Reg. 29,252. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 11-12]
D. EPA lacks the statutory authority to ignore upstream emissions for electric vehicles.
EPA has statutory authority to prescribe "standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in
[its] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). This presents an interpretive
dilemma. On the one hand, if electric vehicles are not "vehicles" "which cause[ ] or contribute
to" a given type of air pollution, then EPA may not set standards for them. Id. On the other, if
electric vehicles are "vehicles" "which cause, or contribute to" a given type of air pollution, then
EPA must set "standards applicable to the[ir] emissions." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712,
p. 11]
The proposal tries to solve this problem by splitting the baby.8 EPA reasons that electric
vehicles are vehicles that "cause or contribute to air pollution," but EPA just chooses to set their
contribution to zero. This cannot be right. Cf. C.S. Lewis, That Hideous Strength 291 (Samizdat
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ed., 2015) ("Just imagine a man who was too dainty to eat with his fingers and yet wouldn't use
forks!"). If electric vehicles truly emit no emissions, then they are not the sort of vehicle EPA
can regulate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 11]
8 Of course, the point of the story about Solomon is that the baby wasn't split. See 1 Kings 3:16- 28 ("Give
the living child to the first woman, and by no means put him to death; she is his mother.").
EPA never had authority to incentivize electric vehicles in this way. Section 202(a) requires
the agency to "standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes
of new motor vehicles." Because it acknowledged that these emissions are "not zero," it is
arbitrary to treat them as such. Indeed, as EPA previously acknowledged, treating upstream
emissions of all vehicles, electrified or not, the same way puts a thumb on the scale against
conventional vehicles in favor of electric vehicles. An agency's bare preference for one
technology cannot satisfy the requirement that it "reasonably consider[] the relevant issues and
reasonably explain[] the decision." FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1158
(2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 12-13]
At the very least, the agency is not permitted to change its position on the future inclusion of
upstream emissions in compliance calculations without explanation. When an agency makes a
decision, it must articulate a "satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.'" Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). If the agency fails to "cogently explain why it
has exercised its discretion in a given manner," its action will be held invalid. Id. at 48. In
addition, the agency must "provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a
new policy created on a blank slate . . . when, for example, its new policy rests upon factual
findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy." FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1209
(2015). EPA previously thought that the zero grams-per-mile compliance value was only viable
as a temporary incentive because "in reality" the total emissions were not zero. Failure to
consider and adequately explain departure from this finding would render the entire rulemaking
arbitrary and capricious. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, pp.12-13]
E. Nothing in the Inflation Reduction Act grants EPA additional authority to mandate
electrification.
The proposal also suggests that the Inflation Reduction Act ("IRA") provides some additional
reinforcement to its claims of statutory authority for these sweeping changes. "The recently-
enacted Inflation Reduction Act 'reinforces the longstanding authority and responsibility of
[EPA] to regulate GHGs as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act,' and 'the IRA clearly and
deliberately instructs EPA to use' this authority by 'combining] economic incentives to reduce
climate pollution with regulatory drivers to spur greater reductions under EPA's CAA
authorities.'" 88 Fed. Reg. 29,233 (quoting 168 Cong. Rec. E868-02 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 2022)
(statement of Rep. Pallone) and 168 Cong. Rec. E879-02, at 880 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 2022)
(statement of Rep. Pallone)).
Not so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 13-14]
The words in a statute must be read in their context to understand how they fit into an overall
statutory scheme. Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). In making this
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determination, consideration must be given to the overall type and purpose of the statute. Dolan
v. U.S. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006). Here, the relevant context is that the IRA was
passed through the reconciliation process under the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act. That act established the congressional budget process giving Congress an expedited
process by which it can pass by a majority vote legislation pertaining to revenue, spending, or the
debt limit levels. This reconciliation process was intended to be used to reduce the deficit
through some combination of spending reductions or revenue increases. Cong. Rsch. Serv.,
RL30862, The Budget Reconciliation Process: The Senate's "Byrd Rule" (updated Sept. 28,
2022), at 1, available at https://crsreports.con gress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30862. Legislation
passed under this process does not alter other substantive obligations and it must be related to
spending, revenue, or the federal debt limit. In other words, "If Congress wants to assign this
authority to EPA or any other federal agency, it cannot do so by way of a budget reconciliation
bill such as the IRA." John Dixon, et al., No Inflation Act Boost For EPA Power Over
Greenhouse Gases, Law360 (Sep. 19, 2022), https://www.law360.com/arti- cles/1531794/no-
inflation-act-boost-for-epa-power-over-greenhouse-gases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp.
13-14]
Indeed, nothing in the IRA grants any regulatory authority "under the Clean Air Act" at all.
Instead, the IRA provides several section-specific definitions of green house gases, that apply
only to that section for the purposes of grantmaking. For example, "Definition of Greenhouse
Gas.—In this section, the term 'greenhouse gas' means the air pollutants carbon dioxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, methane, nitrous oxide, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride" 136
Stat. 2069. And none of these various definitional provisions address EPA's authority under
Section 202. See, e.g., 136 Stat. 2069 (applying the term to grants to address air pollution at
schools under Section 103 and 105); id. (grants to states under Section 177); id. (grants for
"education" and "outreach" about low-emissions electricity generation); id. at 2070 (grants for
biofuels under Section 211); id. at 2072 (grants for corporate reporting); id. at 2077-78 (grants
for labeling of construction materials); id. at 2083 (same for federal buildings). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, p. 14]
These provisions do nothing to change EPA's ability to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
and do not alleviate the many problems the proposal already has under the major questions
doctrine. Rather, they highlight the problem: Congress just legislated in this area and failed to
pass anything like the transformative program EPA now seeks to impose by its own ukase.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 14]
As John Bozzella, president and CEO of Alliance for Automotive Innovation has explained,
"Requiring 60+ percent of U.S. vehicles sales to be pure battery electric vehicles (BEVs) by
2030 leapfrogged the administration's own 2021 executive order that called for 50 percent
electric vehicles -including plug-in hybrid and fuel cell EVs - by 2030." John Bozzella, EPA's
EV Rules are Out of Whack: Five Ways to Fix Them, Alliance for Automotive Innovation (June
28, 2023), https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/blog/epas-rules-are-out-of-whack-five-ways-to-
fix-them. "[T]he administration's 50 percent target [by 2030] was always a stretch goal. It was
ambitious and challenging by any measure." Mike Hartrick, Testimony from the Alliance for
Automotive Innovation, Before the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPA Multi Pollutant
Proposed Rule, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829, https://www.autosinno-vate.org/posts/agency-
comments/05-09%20EPA%20Multi-Pollutant%20NPRM.pdf. "The 60+ percent BEVs by 2030
plan, on the other hand, is a house of cards.... It rolls up rosy forecasts (like EV batteries will
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eventually cost automakers nothing) and other hopeful assumptions." John Bozzella, supra.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 27-28]
The 50 percent goal "was also predicated on several conditions, most significantly: supportive
public policies including the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act with funding for
national public charging (installation not started yet); the manufacturing incentives and consumer
purchase incentives in the Inflation Reduction Act to support EV purchases and affordability
(becoming more, not less constrained); and the supply of critical minerals (projected to be
woefully short of demand and largely controlled by China)." Mike Hartrick, supra. "If
implemented, EPA's proposal will require 60 percent battery electric vehicles by 2030 (a 20
percent increase over the President's goal, which also included PHEVs), and two out of every
three vehicles sold to be BEVs just two years later. These levels are substantially higher than
what the auto industry indicated was achievable even after application of the supportive
policies." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 27-28]
C. EPA cannot rely on California's Advanced Clean Cars program to justify feasibility.
EPA also points to the adoption of California's Advanced Clean Cars II program to justify the
feasibility of the rule. The agency asserts that California's program makes the rule more feasible
because it: provides as evidence of a trend toward vehicle electrification, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,188-
89; serves as a driver of technological innovation and "increased consumer technology
familiarity" with electric vehicles, id. at 29,254, 29,334; and that the impossible standards
imposed by the proposal are "aligned with" existing state policies and thus reasonable, id. at
29,275, 29,284. This is improper. These standards have not yet received a waiver—California
only applied for a waiver after the rule was proposed, and EPA has not yet determined whether a
waiver is warranted—and the presence of a second regulation cannot make the first more
feasible. See 88 Fed. Reg. 29,189. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 28-29]
To make matters worse, Advanced Clean Cars II is unlawful. Advanced Clean Cars I is
already being challenged in court, as is its companion regulation for heavy- duty vehicles,
Advanced Clean Trucks. See State of Ohio, et al. v. EPA, No. 22-1081 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
According to EPA, California's standards are permitted under Section 209 of the Clean Air Act.
Section 209(a) preempts states from setting emission standards for new cars and new engines. 42
U.S.C. § 7543(a). There are two exceptions. First, § 209(b) allows EPA to give California—and
only California—a waiver allowing it to set emission standards more stringent than the federal
standards. § 7543(b)(1). Second, the Act allows states, in some circumstances, to adopt emission
standards "identical to the California standards." Id. § 7507(1). In other words, "the 49 other
states" may depart from the federal standard if and only if they adopt "a standard identical to an
existing California standard." Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir.
1998). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 28-29]
As petitioners in those lawsuits make clear, California's standards violate the constitution's
structural guarantee of equal sovereignty to all states, are forbidden by the plain text of the Clean
Air Act, are preempted by EPCA, and fail to properly account for costs and technology
limitations. 17 EPA cannot rely on these illegal rules to justify its own rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, p. 29]
17 For the same reasons, the proposed rule would be contrary to law if finalized in anything resembling its
current form.
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At the very least, EPA is improperly commenting on an impending adjudication that it has not
yet evaluated or even made available for public comment. While EPA purports not to be
"prejudging the outcome" of that "waiver process," 88 Fed. Reg. 29,334, it is difficult to see how
EPA can expect ACC II to have any impact at all unless it has already concluded the waiver is a
fait accompli. Such prejudgment would jeopardize the waiver process itself, threatening it
vacatur, and thus undermining EPA's reliance on that decision here. Cinderella Career &
Finishing Schs., Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. C970) (a decisionmaker is disqualified
where "a disinterested observer may conclude that the agency has in some measure adjudged the
facts as well as the law of a particular case in advance of hearing it" (cleaned up)); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (courts vacate standards
where a decisionmakers has "demonstrably made up [its] mind about important and specific
factual questions and [is] impervious to contrary evidence"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712,
p. 29]
But EPA also has the authority to consider the impact of these fuels in its consideration of
life-cycle emissions under the agency's Section 202 powers. The agency has done so in the past,
and acknowledging these benefits again would incentivize the use of more renewable fuels, and
allow automakers to achieve greater emissions reductions, in a shorter time frame, and at a net
savings to consumers. Agencies are required, as part of any reasoned decision making process, to
consider all "'significant and viable and obvious alternatives'" to their proposed action. Dist.
Hosp. Partners, L.P. v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see Spirit Airlines, Inc. v.
DOT, 997 F.3d 1247, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ("'[T]he failure of an agency to consider obvious
alternatives has led uniformly to reversal.'"). Ignoring the benefits of renewable fuels— and of
ethanol in particular—violates EPA's duty to give "appropriate consideration to the cost of
compliance" with the proposed regulations, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2), and would render the rule
arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 38-39]
A. EPA has authority to consider the lifecycle emissions from different fuels in its standard
setting.
Section 202(a)(3)(A)(ii) authorizes EPA to look beyond the basic engine to set its engine or
vehicle emission standards. Specifically, it states that, "[i]n establishing classes or categories of
vehicles or engines for purposes of regulations under this paragraph, the [agency] may base such
classes or categories on gross vehicle weight, horsepower, type of fuel used, or other appropriate
factors." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). To account for the "type of fuel used,"
EPA would need to engage in lifecycle emissions analysis. EPA has often eschewed lifecycle
analysis because of the nature of the pollutants it regulates, but it is the obvious best fit for
greenhouse gas regulations. Section 202(a)(1) gives EPA's authority to issue rules setting
emissions standards for "air pollutants" that it finds may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare. And while most air pollutants work on the local and regional level,
which makes lifecycle analysis a poor fit, greenhouse gases' harms are all at the global level.
Except in truly extreme concentrations, C02 emissions do not lead to adverse health effects if
breathed in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 39-40]
Clean Air Act Section 202(a)(4)(A) and (B) require that EPA consider whether its proposed
standards "will cause or contribute to an unreasonable risk to public health, welfare or safety",
including whether the proposed standard "causes, increases, reduces, or eliminates emissions of
any unregulated pollutants" and to assess "the availability of other devices, systems, or elements
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of design which may be used to conform to requirements prescribed under this subchapter
without causing or contributing to such unreasonable risk." Neglecting lifecycle greenhouse gas
emissions incentivizes compliance options that increase upstream carbon emissions at the
expense of measured tailpipe emissions. This is exactly the sort of "other ... element[ ] of
design" that Congress imagined might "increase[ ] emissions." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, pp. 39-40]
Organization: Competitive Enterprise Institute
III. The Proposed Standards Trigger the Major Questions Doctrine
West Virginia v. EPA
The EPA's plan to drive gasoline-powered cars out of the marketplace is highly controversial
and sure to be litigated. In fact, as the agency knows, plaintiffs in State of Texas v.
Environmental Protection Agency, who include the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI)
among other private petitioners, are suing to overturn the agency's milder electrification
mandates for MY 2023-2026 motor vehicles.25 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 6-7]
25 Texas v. EPA, Docket Numbers: 22-1031, 22-1032, D.C. Cir., http://climatecasechart.com/case/texas-v-
epa-2/.
Private petitioners' initial brief 26 and initial reply brief, 27 which have been submitted to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, are pertinent to the current rulemaking. As the briefs
explain, the EPA's proposal triggers the major-questions doctrine that was the basis of the
Supreme Court's decision, in West Virginia v. EPA, 28 to vacate the Obama administration's
Clean Power Plan (CPP). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 6-7]
26 Initial Brief for Private Petitioners, Texas v. EPA, November 3, 2022, http://climatecasechart.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2022/20221103_docket-22-103 l_brief-2.pdf (hereafter
"Petitioners' Initial Brief').
27 Initial Reply Brief for Private Petitioners, Texas v. EPA, April 18, 2023, https://cei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/09/Filestamped-Texas-v.-EP A-Private-Pet-Reply-Br-l.pdf (hereafter "Petitioners'
Reply Brief').
28 W. Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022).
The major-questions doctrine is a jurisprudence of political accountability. Under Article I,
Section 1, all legislative powers granted by the Constitution are vested in Congress. Accordingly,
agencies have only such rulemaking power as Congress delegates to them. The major-questions
doctrine focuses judicial (and public) attention on the big picture through a set of interrogatories.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 6-7]
- Does the agency's rulemaking affect a significant portion of the U.S. economy?
- Does it have significant political implications?
- Does it attempt to settle an issue Congress is still debating?
- Does it adopt a policy Congress has considered and rejected?
- Does it entail a "transformative expansion" of the agency's power? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0611, pp. 6-7]
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If the answer to one or more of those queries is "yes" (it is "yes" to all five queries for both
the CPP and the EPA's proposal), a final interrogatory is considered: Does the agency's
purported statutory authority clearly authorize the rule? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 6-
7]
If there is no "clear statement" of congressional authorization, the agency's action is very
likely unlawful. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 6-7]
The CPP was a plan to restructure a significant portion of the U.S. economy—the electric
power sector. The CPP established C02 performance standards for existing coal and natural gas
combined cycle (NGCC) power plants that none could meet via affordable modifications made at
and by the regulated facilities. A coal or NGCC power plant could comply only by averaging its
emissions with those of lower- or non-emitting power plants elsewhere on the grid to which it
cedes production and market share. For example, the owner of a coal power plant could buy
power from an NGCC power plant, invest in renewables, or buy emission credits from lower- or
non-emitting facilities in a carbon cap-and-trade program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp.
6-7]
The EPA claimed that such "generation shifting" is the adequately demonstrated "best system
of emission reduction" (BSER), and encouraged States to establish or join cap-and-trade
programs as the most efficient way to implement generation shifting. The CPP was
fundamentally a plan to herd States into the sorts of carbon cap-and-trade programs Congress
had debated for years and declined to enact. No clear statement authorizing such a plan could be
found in CAA Section 111(d), the CPP's putative statutory basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0611, pp. 6-7]
More fundamentally, the CPP would make the EPA a de-facto industrial policy czar for
electricity, coercing a national shift from fossil to renewable generation despite States'
traditional authority over electricity fuel mix within their borders. Congress was still debating
how to tackle climate change, and much of the country did not support regulating or taxing fossil
generation out of existence. A clear statement authorizing the EPA to take charge of the nation's
electric grid and resolve the climate policy debate was also nowhere to be found in CAA Section
111(d). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 7-10]
West Virginia should be the starting point for all subsequent EPA climate policy planning.
Yet the words "major questions" and "West Virginia" occur nowhere in the proposal's 225-page
preamble. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 7-10]
West Virginia applies directly to the current rulemaking. Once again, the EPA seeks to
regulate a "significant portion of the American economy." Indeed, the EPA projects the vehicle
technology investments required to meet the proposed MY 2027 and later standards will cost
$280 billion by 2055, with annual costs rising from $6.8 billion in 2028 to $22 billion in 2035.29
Those expenditures are substantially larger than the CPP's projected compliance costs (estimated
at up to $3.0 billion in 2025 and up to $8.4 billion in 2030).30 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611,
pp. 7-10]
29 88 FR 29365.
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30 EPA Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating
Units, Final Rule, 80 FR 64662, 64679, October 23, 2015, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-
10-23/pdf/2015- 22842.pdf.
Like the CPP, the proposed standards would settle energy and climate policy issues Congress
is still debating. The EPA would once again wield the powers of an industrial policy czar,
"restructuring" the automotive sector with huge knock-on effects for the U.S. oil, gas, and
biofuel industries,31 as well as for the electric power sector. 32 As private petitioners in Texas v.
EPA put it: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 7-10]
31 Petitioners' Initial Brief, pp. 25-29.
32 "Assuming an immediate scenario of 100% EV usage and projecting electricity requirements, the U.S.
electricity grid would need to generate 33%, or 1.4 trillion kWhs, more of electricity," according to the
Energy Policy Research Foundation (EPRINC). The impacts of the EPA's mandates on utilities, reliability,
and ratepayers could be severe, EPRINC cautions: "Historically, U.S. electricity generation has grown at an
annualized rate of 0.4% over the last ten years. At this rate, it would require 79.8 years to accommodate a
full EV transition of the U.S. fleet." The historic growth rate must increase rapidly to accommodate vehicle
electrification on the EPA's schedule. Yet, at the same time, the EPA is proposing GHG standards for
power plants projected to retire 42 gigawatts of coal generation capacity and 37 percent less generation
from natural gas. See Max Pyziur, EPRINC Chart of the Week, #2023-2026 EV Electricity Requirements
and EPA's Changing Rules, July 5, 2023, https://fxc6e4.p3cdnl.secureserver.net/wp-
content/uploads/2023/07/EPRINC-Chart2023-26-EVElectricityRequirementsAndChallengingEPARules-
Versionl.pdf.
Just as in West Virginia, EPA is claiming the power to shift the Nation's energy policy by
reverse-engineering its preferred balance of technologies through emission standards. In West
Virginia, it attempted to force a shift from coal-fired plants to wind- and solar- powered plants;
here, it attempts to force a shift from liquid-fuel vehicles to electric vehicles.33 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0611, pp. 7-10]
33 Petitioners' Reply Brief, p. 13.
The EPA is even using the same CPP regulatory tactic—setting standards the targeted
vehicles cannot meet except by averaging their emissions with those of non-emitting vehicles, to
which they must cede market share. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 7-10]
Congress has considered legislation to compel vehicle electrification. Such proposals have
garnered far less support than cap-and-trade. For example, a bill introduced in the 116th
Congress, H.R. 2764, the Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2019, would establish a national ZEV
mandate requiring 50 percent of all new vehicles sold to be EVs by 2030. The House Energy and
Commerce Committee took no action on the bill beyond referral to the appropriate
sub committee. 3 4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 7-10]
34 H.R. 2764, Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2019, https://www.congress.gOv/bill/l 16th-congress/house-
bill/2764/all-actions?overview=closed#tabs.
Most critically, private petitioners observe, "Congress nowhere provided clear authorization
for EPA to effectively mandate electrification of the Nation's vehicles." Hence, they conclude,
the MY 2023-2026 standards "cannot stand." 35 The same reasoning applies to the more
aggressive standards the EPA now proposes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 7-10]
35 Petitioners' Initial Brief, p. 17.
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The EPA claims the 2021 rule raises no major questions requiring clear direction from
Congress because it "broke no new legal ground." Rather, the rule merely "tighten[ed] existing
emission standards under its longstanding and oft-invoked authority."36 Private petitioners rebut
that claim: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 7-10]
36 EPA's Answering Brief, February 24, 2023, p. 48, http://climatecasechart.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/case- documents/2023/20230224_docket-22-103 l_brief.pdf (hereafter "EPA's
Answering Brief').
Before the [2021] rule, EPA set greenhouse gas vehicle emission standards for vehicles, and
some automakers chose to comply in part by producing electric vehicles. Now, EPA has set
standards that—by design— "[d]rive" electric-vehicle production and promote a market
penetration rate double what it would be without the rule.... Petitioners do not argue that EPA
can require some, but lower, electric-vehicle penetration; they challenge EPA's authority to set
standards that, for the first time, require the substitution of electric vehicles for liquid-fuel
vehicles—a difference in kind, not degree.37 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 7-10]
37 Petitioners' Reply Brief, pp. 13-14.
The EPA denies there is any such qualitative difference. Mandating electric vehicles is just
another way to prescribe emission controls, whether "designed as complete systems" or "devices
to prevent or control such pollution," the agency argues.38 But that is tantamount to saying that
an EV is a pollution control device for gasoline-powered vehicles, which is nonsensical. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 7-10]
Petitioners explain:
38 EPA's Answering Brief, p. 40.
The component parts of an electric vehicle, such as their batteries, are not add-in devices that
block the emission of pollution or minimize pollution that would otherwise occur. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 7-10]
They are integral to the basic functioning of the vehicle, which does not emit the relevant
pollutant in the first place.39 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 7-10]
39 Petitioners' Reply Brief, pp. 28-29.
Although not mentioned by petitioners, the claim that EVs are pollution control devices for
gasoline-powered vehicles bears a striking resemblance to the EPA's claim in 2012 that natural
gas combined cycle (NGCC) power plants are the "best system of emission reduction" (BSER)
for coal power plants. Based on that determination, the EPA proposed to establish C02 emission
standards that no commercially-viable coal power plant could meet.40 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0611, pp.7-10]
40 EPA, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, Proposed Rule, 77 FR 22392, April 13, 2012,
https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/FR-2012-04- 13/pdf/2012-7820.pdf. For new coal power plants, the
EPA proposed "a standard of 1,000 pounds of C02 per megawatt-hour (lb. C02/ MWh), based on the
performance of widely used natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) technology." The emission rate of new
efficient ("supercritical") coal power plants was much higher—1,800 lbs. C02/MWh (77 FR 22394). New
coal plants could comply only by installing carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology. However, the
levelized cost of a new coal power plant was already higher than that of a new NGCC unit (77 FR 22413).
The standards seemed contrived to render new coal generation uneconomic.
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The EPA had to drop that proposal because it effectively banned investment in new coal
generation—a policy Congress had not approved and which would have been dead on arrival if
proposed in legislation. Classifying EVs as pollution control devices for gasoline-powered cars is
as contorted as classifying NGCC power plants as emission reduction systems for coal power
plants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 7-10]
The IRA Does Not Override West Virginia
One week after President Biden signed the IRA,41 Senate Environment and Public Works
Chairman Tom Carper (D-Del.), Harvard Law professor Jody Freeman, and other unnamed
"experts" told the New York Times that "Democrats designed" certain IRA provisions to
undercut West Virginia. Supposedly, those provisions supply "clear" language authorizing
"aggressive" GHG regulations, including California's ZEV mandates. 42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0611, pp.10-13]
41 Public Law 117-169, August 16, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publl69/PLAW-
117publl69.pdf.
42 Lisa Friedman, "Democrats Designed the Climate Law to be a Game Changer. Here's How," New York
Times, August 22, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/22/climate/epa-supreme-court-pollution.html,
To its credit, the proposal does not affirm that viewpoint, but perhaps because it says nothing
about West Virginia. The proposal details the "clean vehicle" "incentives" in the BIL 43 and
IRA, and touts those statutes as "pivotal milestones in the creation of a broad-based
infrastructure instrumental to the expansion of clean transportation, including light-and medium-
duty zero-emission vehicles "44 Careless readers may infer that the EPA is simply proposing to
effectuate congressional intent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
43 Public Law 117-58, November 15, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-
117publ58.pdf.
44 88 FR 29196.
For the record, the BIL and IRA do not enlarge the scope of the EPA's regulatory authorities
under the Clean Air Act. The BIL mentions the Clean Air Act three times: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
-BIL Section 11115 establishes a "Congestion mitigation and air quality improvement
program" (CMAQI) and stipulates that eligible projects must use "verified technologies" as
"defined in section 216 of the Clean Air Act." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
-BIL Section 11516 requires the Comptroller General to report on the CMAQI program's
progress with "respect to attainment or maintenance of national ambient air quality standards
under section 109 of the Clean Air Act." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
-BIL Section 71101 amends the 2005 Energy Policy Act's Clean School Bus program to
define a zero-emission school bus as one that has zero exhaust emissions of "any air pollutant
that is listed pursuant to section 108(a) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7408(a)) (or any
precursor to such an air pollutant.)" [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
Clearly, the BIL does not amend the Clean Air Act.
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Six IRA provisions expressly amend the Clean Air Act, lending a superficial plausibility to
Carper's theory. However, all those provisions are fiscal in nature; none expands or otherwise
modifies existing CAA regulatory authority: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
-IRA Section 60101 establishes a "Clean heavy-duty vehicles" program, authorizing up to
$600 million in grants, rebates, and contracts for zero-emission heavy-duty vehicles,
infrastructure, and workforce training. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
-IRA Section 60102 authorizes grants to reduce air pollution at ports—up to $2.25 billion
through 2027 for the purchase and installation of zero-emission port equipment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
-IRA Section 60103 establishes a "Greenhouse gas reduction fund," authorizing billions of
dollars in support for States, municipalities, and tribal governments to "deploy or benefit from
zero-emission technologies, including distributed technologies on residential rooftops, and to
carry out other greenhouse gas emission reduction activities." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611,
pp. 10-13]
-IRA Section 60107 establishes a Low Emission Electricity Program, authorizing $17 million
in grants and technical assistance to each of four groups—households, low-income communities,
industries, and State and Tribal governments—for the purpose of reducing electricity-related
emissions. The provision also authorizes $1 million for program monitoring, and $18 million for
EPA efforts to ensure reductions are achieved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
-IRA Section 60113 establishes the "Methane emissions reduction program," authorizing up
to $850 million in "grants, rebates, contracts, loans, and other activities of the Environmental
Protection Agency for the purposes of providing financial and technical assistance to owners and
operators of applicable facilities." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
-IRA Section 60114 authorizes billions of dollars in "greenhouse gas air pollution planning
grants" to state governments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
-IRA Section 60201 authorizes billions of dollars in "environmental and climate justice block
grants." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
In short, where the IRA amends the CAA, it authorizes subsidies, not mandates. The
amending provisions create new carrots, but no new sticks.45 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611,
pp. 10-13]
45 For example, the IRA Low Emission Electricity Program is a non-regulatory substitute for policies
President Biden could not persuade Congress to enact: a national clean energy standard, mandating a
nationwide transition to 100 percent zero-emission electricity, and a Clean Electricity Performance
Program, imposing tax penalties on utilities that fail to decarbonize according to a national schedule. See
Ashley J. Lawson, "Clean Energy Standards: Selective Issues for the 117th Congress," Congressional
Research Service, November 2, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gOv/product/pdf/R/R46691, and Ben
Adler, "Biden's emission pledge hanging by a thread after Manchin's climate budget cut," October 21,
2021, Yahoo News, https://news.yahoo.com/biden-emissions-pledge-hanging-by-a-thread-after-manchins-
climate-change-budget-cut-090056653.html.
Sen. Carper, Prof. Freeman, and the other "experts" interviewed by the Times surely know
that post-enactment elucidation of a statute's meaning carries little to no weight in ascertaining
congressional intent. 46 As it happens, the actual legislative history Carper made on August 6,
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2022 when debating the IRA on the Senate floor before passage, contradicts the post-hoc spin he
later shared with the Times. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
46 And whatever interpretive force one attaches to legislative history, the Court normally gives little weight
to statements, such as those of the individual legislators, made after the bill in question has become law."
Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 486 (2010). "The Court has previously found the post-enactment
elucidation of the meaning of a statute to be of little relevance in determining the intent of the legislature
contemporaneous to the passage of the statute." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596 n.19 (1987).
"This is a good example of why floor statements by individual legislators rank among the least illuminating
forms of legislative history." N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 580 U.S. 288, 137 S. Ct. 929, 943 (2017).
Only once during the day-long Vote-A-Rama, in a two-minute exchange between Sens.
Shelley Capito (R-W.Va.) and Carper, did senators debate the IRA's potential impact on West
Virginia v. EPA. The exchange occurs on page 4178 of the Congressional Record.47 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
47 Congressional Record, Senate, August 6, 2022, p. 4178,
https://www.congress.gOv/117/crec/2022/08/06/168/133/CREC-2022-08-06-senate.pdf.
Sen. Capito offered an amendment to strike what was then IRA Sec. 60105(g), which would
appropriate $45 million for the EPA "to carry out" CAA Section 111 and eight other sections
"with respect to greenhouse gases." Here is the text:
(G) OTHER ACTIVITIES - In addition to amounts otherwise available, there is appropriated to
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for fascial year 2022, out of any
money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, $45,000,000, to remain available until
September 30, 2031, to carry out, with respect to greenhouse gases, sections 111, 115, 163, 177,
202, 211, 213, 231, and 612 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7411, 7415, 7475, 7507, 7521,
7545, 7547, 7571, and 7671k). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
Capito warned that Sec. 60105(g) would create talking points for EPA lawyers and
environmental groups "when they try and convince courts to uphold future overreaching climate
regulations," such as the CPP. Sen. Carper countered that Section 60105(g) "would fund the
EPA to use its existing narrow Clean Air Act authorities to address greenhouse gas
emissions."48 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
48 Emphasis added.
In short, before passage, Sen. Carper effectively denied Sec. 60105(g) would reverse or
undercut West Virginia. Rather, the IRA language would fund the EPA's use of "existing
narrow" CAA authorities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
Although Capito's amendment lost on a 50-50 vote, Section 60105(g) was later deleted on a
point of order. That means the final IRA does not even contain a section authorizing the EPA to
use "existing narrow" regulatory authorities with respect to greenhouse gases. And, as noted
above, all the CAA amendments in the IRA are fiscal policy provisions, which as such cannot
create or expand any CAA regulatory authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
Congress Prohibits NHTSA, the Only Agency Authorized to Establish Fleetwide-Average
Standards, from Regulating Gasoline-Powered Vehicles Out of the Market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0611, p. 18]
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In 1992, Congress prohibited NHTSA from considering the fuel economy of EVs and other
alternative vehicles when promulgating CAFE standards. The clear intent was to ensure that
NHTSA does not set fleet-average standards that no gasoline-powered vehicle can meet.
Petitioners explain: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, p. 18]
In the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress directed NHTSA to set fuel-economy standards
based on averages, but prohibited NHTSA from setting fuel-economy standards that average in
the fuel economy of electric vehicles. See Pub. L. No. 102-486 §§ 302,403, 106 Stat. 2776,
2870-2871, 2876 (later codified at 49 U.S.C. § 32902(h)). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, p.
18]
Petitioners spotlight the key point:
This prohibition bars NHTSA from doing exactly what EPA is doing here: misusing its
regulatory authority to force a transition from conventional vehicles to electric vehicles by
artificially tightening the "average" standard a fleet must meet. Of course, when Congress
finalized the language of Section 202(a)(1) in 1977, it had no need to explicitly block EPA from
considering electric vehicles, because it did not contemplate that EPA would set emission
standards using averaging in the first place (or that EPA would be setting standards for
greenhouse gases). The prohibition on NHTSA nevertheless underscores just how far EPA is
reaching here: it is straining statutory language to seize a power that Congress expressly denied
to a sister agency that actually has authority to promulgate fleetwide-average standards.71 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, p. 18]
71 Petitioners' Initial Brief, pp. 61-62.
V. Conclusion
The EPA observes that the "levels of stringency in this proposal continue the trend of
increased emissions reductions which have been adopted by prior EPA rules."72 However, that
does not rescue the proposal from legal peril. If petitioners' argument is correct, the EPA's MY
2023- 2026 standards are also de-facto EV mandates, which as such trigger the major questions
doctrine. Moreover, the proposed standards, being fleetwide-average standards, are
impermissible under the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, p. 18]
72 88 FR 29188.
Organization: Elders Climate Action
B. Failure to Consider Relevant Factors is Arbitrary and Capricious and Inconsistent with
Law.
EPA refers to the Administrator's 2009 Endangerment Finding as the basis for promulgating
standards for GHG emissions, but makes no reference to U.S. obligation to achieve its NDC
under the U.N. Framework Climate Convention, or the declaration by the President to achieve a
net zero economy by 2050. In fact, EPA makes passing reference to the IPCC report as a source
of science that supports the need for GHG reductions from the transport sector, but identifies no
environmental objective and no GHG emission reduction target as the motivating factor
underlying the rulemaking goal of its rulemakings for either the multi-pollutant L/MD vehicle
rule or the GHG rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 6]
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We contend that the proposed rule is arbitrary, capricious and inconsistent with law because -
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 6]
1. The failure to explain the environmental and/or air quality objective of the rule
violates the obligation to describe the purpose of the rule under the APA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0737, p. 6]
2. The failure to consider -[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 6]
a) the extent that GHG emissions from the transport sector contribute to the
endangerment that the Administrator determined is the basis for conducting the rulemaking,
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 6]
b) the extent to which those emissions must be reduced to protect the public health and
welfare from the risks identified in the endangerment finding; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737,
p. 6]
c) the extent that the proposed rule will achieve the reductions needed to protect public
health and the general welfare from the dangerous effects of GHGs that underlie the
endangerment finding; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 6]
d) the failure to consider and evaluate alternatives that could achieve the GHG emission
reductions needed to protect the public health and welfare from adverse effects; [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0737, p. 6]
is a failure to consider relevant factors required by the CAA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0737, p. 6]
3. It is also arbitrary and capricious to -[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 6]
a) not identify the NOx and VOC reductions from the transport sector that are needed to
attain the NAAQS in all nonattainment areas by the attainment deadline; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0737, p. 6]
b) not identify and consider alternative NOx and PM emission standards that would be
needed to attain the ozone and PM2.5 NAAQS in all nonattainment areas by the attainment
deadline; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 6]
c) not analyze the availability of vehicle control technologies capable of achieving zero
NOx and PM emissions with respect to the economic and technological factors prescribed in the
Act for the purpose of determining the feasibility of setting standards under CAA section 202
that would be adequate to achieve the statutory goal of attainment by the statutory deadlines, and
thereby informing the Administrator so that he could properly exercise his statutory obligation to
determine what standards are necessary and appropriate under the Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0737, p. 6]
B. Needed GHG Reductions Cannot Be Achieved Without Zero Emission Standard.
EPA does not investigate a ZEV sales mandate for the years 2027-2029 with respect to GHG
emissions reductions, but the Rhodium Group estimates that light duty ZEV sales would need to
reach 99% of total LDV sales by 2030 to achieve a zero emission fleet by 2045 (Fig. 2). Since
L/MDVs have longer useful lives than LDVs, converting the L/MDV fleet to zero emission will
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require more aggressive regulatory approaches. Assuming the electric power sector achieves zero
emissions by 2035 as President Biden has proposed, the L/MDV portion of the transport sector
could achieve zero emissions by 2050 if a zero emission standard applies to all new L/MDVs by
2031. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 19-20]
In its Regulatory Impact Assessment for the SAFE 2 rule, at 2-15, EPA acknowledges that —
... long-term GHG reduction goals will require a far greater penetration of ZEVs than this
proposal would require through MY2026. The need for substantial increases in fleet penetration
of ZEVs over the long term is supported by the recommendations of the National Academy of
Sciences, which states in its 2021 Light-duty Vehicle Technology Assessment: "The agencies
should use all their delegated authority to drive the development and deployment of ZEVs,
because they represent the long-term future of energy efficiency, petroleum reduction, and
greenhouse gas emissions reduction in the light-duty fleet". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737,
pp. 19-20]
But EPA does not disclose what its "long-term GHG reduction goals" are for either LDVs or
L/MDVs, how it intends to achieve them, or whether and how the current rulemaking contributes
to achieving those goals. The reasonableness of the current proposal turns on whether EPA 1) is
committed to achieving the GHG reductions identified by the IPCC as necessary to avoid the
dire public health and environmental consequences of warming greater than 1.5°C, 2) recognizes
that zero emissions from on-road vehicles are a necessary component of the President's national
policy of transforming the U.S. into a zero emission economy by 2050, and 3) can establish how
the current proposal contributes to a strategy designed to achieve those objectives. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 19-20]
In the absence of any consideration of these factors and an explanation by the Agency of how
it has addressed those factors in developing its proposed decision in this rulemaking, the current
proposal fails to consider relevant factors, fails to provide a rational basis for the proposal, and is
arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 19-20]
Action requested:
Elders Climate Action requests that EPA revise the standards for HDVs to set a zero emission
standard for nitrogen oxides (NOx), PM2.5 and C02 for the classes of L/MDVs or types of
L/MDVs that operate in duty cycles for which zero emission power trains are currently in use or
which EPA expects will be available by 2027. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 1-2]
ECA requests that EPA use its authority to set emission standards to -
1) respond meaningfully to the urgency of the climate crisis that threatens to destroy the
future for our children and grandchildren by destroying or disrupting the natural systems upon
which all life, including human civilization, relies to thrive and survive, to avoid turning the
planet into an unsustainable Hell on Earth; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 1-2]
2) optimize the emission reductions needed from L/MD on-road vehicles to ensure
attainment of the ozone and PM2.5 NAAQS within the deadlines established by the CAA rather
than delaying attainment until 2045 for some areas, and not attaining at all in the New
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York/Connecticut?New Jersey, Houston, South Coast and San Joaquin Valley nonattainment
areas; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 1-2]
3) to end the inequitable and unlawful disparate impact on BIPOC and low income
frontline communities who are most exposed to emissions from L/MDVs in violation of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act and thereby suffer "disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects on minority populations and low-income populations" in violation of EO
12,898. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 1-2]
A. EPA's Proposed Standards Fail to Meet the Global Climate, and National Air Quality and
Public Health Emergencies.
EPA's proposed light and medium duty vehicle (L/MDV) rule will allow millions of polluting
light and medium duty vehicles to be sold in the U.S. in 2027 and beyond without requiring any
manufacturer to sell a single zero emission vehicle. The proposed standards fail to - [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 2]
1) implement the call from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for
immediate action to transform the transportation sector to zero C02 emissions as soon as
possible to achieve a net zero economy by 2050, with half of that reduction by 2030 to avoid the
worst impacts of the looming climate disaster; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 2]
2) Implement the President's commitment in E.O. 14008 to transform the U.S. to a "net
zero" economy by 2050; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 2]
3) fulfill the U.S. "nationally declared contribution" (NDC) submitted at COP 26 to
achieve a 50-52% reduction in C02 by 2030; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 2]
4) achieve the reductions in ozone forming precursors (nitrogen oxides (NOx) and
volatile organic compounds (VOCs)) needed to attain the ozone NAAQS in all ozone
nonattainment areas by the deadline enacted in the CAA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 2]
1. C02 Reductions Fall Far Short of the Reductions Needed to Stabilize the Climate.
The transportation sector is the leading source of climate pollution in the US, but between
now and 2030 the proposal fails to make any significant progress toward ending C02 emissions
from transport to avoid the worst consequences of a warming climate. The IPCC reports make
clear that the global mean temperature will rise much more than 1.5o C above the pre-industrial
baseline if we fail to reduce C02 emissions by half in 2030 on the path to "net zero" by 2050.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 2-4]
Together, the proposed L/MD rule and HD rule will reduce on-road emissions in 2030 by less
than 4% from 2021 levels. The L/MD rule claims to achieve only a 47% reduction by 2055. Both
rules guarantee that the US will fail to meet its 50% C02 reduction target by 2030 that was
submitted as our NDC, and will make it impossible for the President to fulfill his promise to
achieve a "net zero" economy by 2050. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 2-4]
Reflecting the science reported by the IPCC, the U.S. NDC commits to reducing C02
economy- wide 50-52% from 2005 levels by 2030. To meet the 2030 economy-wide 50%
reduction target, and assuming that the electric power sector achieves the 80% reduction target in
2030 set by the President, U.S. transport emissions must be reduced about 800 million MT from
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1800 million MT in 2021 to 1000 million MT by 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 2-
4]
Nearly all of the C02 reductions from the transportation sector must be achieved by replacing
on-road internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles with zero emission vehicles (ZEVs) because
zero emission technologies are not yet commercially available for aviation or ocean-going
vessels, and rail is too small a contributor to national C02 to achieve meaningful reductions.
EPA's C02 emissions inventory shows that Heavy duty (on-road diesel) vehicles emitted 430
million MT (24%), and LD (on-road gasoline) vehicles about 1020 million MT (57%) of C02
from the transport sector, for a total of 1450 million MT from on-road vehicles in 2021. To
reduce on-road C02 emissions by close to 800 million MT by 2030, more than half of HD
vehicles (215 MMT) and 70% of LD vehicles (714 MMT) need to be replaced with ZEVs by
2030, and 80% of the electric power used to charge the vehicles must be zero emissions (215 +
714 = 929 x .8 = 743 MMT). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 2-4]
Estimates reported by EPA in the proposed HD show that the rule will reduce C02 from
trucks about 12 million MT by 2030, or by 2.9% from 2021 levels. EPA estimates that the
proposed L/MD rule will induce (but not require) manufacturers to achieve 67% ZEV sales by
2032, with about 60% of new vehicle sales by 2030. But when increased fleet size is accounted
for, new ZEVs will replace only about 5% of ICE vehicles by 2030, and reduce C02 from LD
and MD vehicles by 42 million MT (EPA NPR, Table 135), or 4% below 2021 levels.
Alternative 1, the only more stringent option proposed for comment, would reduce C02 49
million MT by 2030, or nearly 5% below 2021 emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp.
2-4]
Together, the HD rule and the LD/MD rules in 2030 would reduce C02 from on-road
vehicles by 54 MMT compared to no action, for a total reduction of (54/1450) 3.7% from 2021
emissions. Your proposal allows millions more new gasoline and diesel cars and medium duty
trucks and buses to be added to the U.S. vehicle fleet between 2027 and 2032 that will remain on
the road for twenty years locking-in billions of tons of additional C02. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0737, pp. 2-4]
The effect of these emissions will be to prevent the U.S. from honoring its obligation under
the U.N. Climate Framework Convention to achieve the C02 reductions promised in its NDC
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 2-4]
In its 2022 heavy duty rule, EPA acknowledged that the proposed rule reduces C02 emissions
by only 221,000 metric tons (MT) (0.75%) compared to the current rule (from 29.088 million
MT to 28.867 million MT in 2027), allowing new L/MDVs sold in 2027, 2028 and 2029 to emit
an estimated 86.6 million MT annually after 2029, totaling 1.78 billion metric tons of C02 over
the 20 year useful life of those L/MDVs. C02 from these vehicles would be equivalent to adding
21 new large coal-fired power plants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 2-4]
The proposed L/MD rules for the 2027-2032 MYs, will still allow more than 90% of the C02
that would be emitted under the current GHG standards for those model years. Total C02
emissions from future vehicles will double these emissions for each additional three to four
model years that these standards continue to apply after 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737,
pp. 2-4]
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C02 from these model years will effectively prevent the US from achieving the IPCC's call
for a 50% cut in C02 by 2030, and make it impossible to achieve the zero emission economy
promised by President Biden by 2050. These vehicles will remain on the road for at least 20
years, add to C02 and prevent the U.S. from achieving the C02 reductions identified by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as necessary to keep within the 1.5o C
target to avoid a climate catastrophe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 2-4]
A. To Stabilize the Climate as Quickly as Possible, EPA Must Set a Zero Emissions Standard
for GHG Emissions from New L/MDVs, and Begin Phasing in the Standard With the 2027
Model Year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 11]
As discussed above in section II, the Clean Air Act requires EPA to set emission standards for
L/MDVs that "reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable... "[EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0737, p. 11]
Given the science informing the world that the climate cannot be stabilized short of achieving
"net zero" GHG emissions, and the President's commitment to achieving a net zero economy by
2050, we ask the Administrator to make the determination that emissions of both GHGs and
precursors to the criteria pollutants PM and ozone emitted from light duty vehicles must be
reduced to zero to protect the public health and welfare from the many adverse effects of climate
warming. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 11]
The Act provides that "[a]ny such [standard] under this subchapter may provide for a phase-in
of the standard."3 We ask the Administrator to begin phasing in a zero emission standard by
establishing a sales mandate that requires each manufacturer to achieve ZEV sales during the
2027 MY that are comparable to CARB's ACT rule with the goal of achieving 100% L/MDV
ZEV sales by 2035 in order to achieve zero emissions from on-road vehicles by 2050. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 11]
3 Id.
B. Needed GHG Reductions Cannot Be Achieved Without Zero Emission Standard.
EPA does not investigate a ZEV sales mandate for the years 2027-2029 with respect to GHG
emissions reductions, but the Rhodium Group estimates that light duty ZEV sales would need to
reach 99% of total LDV sales by 2030 to achieve a zero emission fleet by 2045 (Fig. 2). Since
L/MDVs have longer useful lives than LDVs, converting the L/MDV fleet to zero emission will
require more aggressive regulatory approaches. Assuming the electric power sector achieves zero
emissions by 2035 as President Biden has proposed, the L/MDV portion of the transport sector
could achieve zero emissions by 2050 if a zero emission standard applies to all new L/MDVs by
2031. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 19-20]
In its Regulatory Impact Assessment for the SAFE 2 rule, at 2-15, EPA acknowledges that —
... long-term GHG reduction goals will require a far greater penetration of ZEVs than this
proposal would require through MY2026. The need for substantial increases in fleet penetration
of ZEVs over the long term is supported by the recommendations of the National Academy of
Sciences, which states in its 2021 Light-duty Vehicle Technology Assessment: "The agencies
should use all their delegated authority to drive the development and deployment of ZEVs,
because they represent the long-term future of energy efficiency, petroleum reduction, and
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greenhouse gas emissions reduction in the light-duty fleet". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737,
pp. 19-20]
But EPA does not disclose what its "long-term GHG reduction goals" are for either LDVs or
L/MDVs, how it intends to achieve them, or whether and how the current rulemaking contributes
to achieving those goals. The reasonableness of the current proposal turns on whether EPA 1) is
committed to achieving the GHG reductions identified by the IPCC as necessary to avoid the
dire public health and environmental consequences of warming greater than 1.5°C, 2) recognizes
that zero emissions from on-road vehicles are a necessary component of the President's national
policy of transforming the U.S. into a zero emission economy by 2050, and 3) can establish how
the current proposal contributes to a strategy designed to achieve those objectives. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 19-20]
In the absence of any consideration of these factors and an explanation by the Agency of how
it has addressed those factors in developing its proposed decision in this rulemaking, the current
proposal fails to consider relevant factors, fails to provide a rational basis for the proposal, and is
arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 19-20]
Organization: Energy Innovation
The EPA's statutory authority under Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA supports and enables the
adoption of the most stringent standards feasible: '"the Administrator shall by regulation
prescribe (and from time to time revise)... standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles... which in his judgment cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare."'19 We concur with the EPA's analysis that the proposed rule (and Alternative 1) are
aligned with this statutory directive, offering technologically feasible and cost-effective options
to reduce harmful emissions over the timeframe the standards would be in place. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 8]
19 U.S. EPA, "Proposed Rules," May 5, 2023, 29231-2 and 29186.
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
In addition, Congress affirmed its commitment to achieving ambitious reductions in GHG and
criteria pollutant emissions from motor vehicles in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL)2 and
the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA),3 which provide unprecedented financial support for ZEV
technology and infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 8]
2 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-58, 135 Stat. 429 (2021),
www.congress.gov/bill/117thcongress/house-bill/3684/text.
3 Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818 (2022),
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376/text.
II. EPA Must Establish Strong Emission Standards to Meet Its Obligations Under the Clean
Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 9]
To carry out its statutory mandate, EPA must promulgate emission standards that protect
public health and welfare by minimizing harmful air pollution. In passing the Clean Air Act,
Congress found that "the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by
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urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles, has resulted in
mounting dangers to the public health and welfare."5 Congress thus declared that the express
purpose of the Clean Air Act is to "protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources
so as to promote the public health and welfare."6 As detailed throughout this comment letter,
EPA must use this clear statutory authority to meet its mandate to protect public health and
welfare by finalizing standards more stringent than it proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 9]
5 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2).
6 Id. § 7401(b)(1). Congress affirmed this goal in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, which
"emphasize[d] the preventive or precautionary nature of the act, i.e., to assure that regulatory action can
effectively prevent harm before it occurs; [and] emphasize[d] the predominant value of protection of public
health." Lead Industries Ass'nv. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-
294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1977)); see also 74 Fed. Reg. 66496, 66507 (Dec. 15, 2009).
A. Section 202 requires EPA to set standards that protect public health and welfare from the
dangers of GHGs, criteria pollutants, and air toxics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 9]
Section 202(a)(l)7 of the Clean Air Act directs EPA to promulgate motor vehicle standards
that "prevent or control" emissions of air pollutants that "cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."8 The criteria and
toxic pollutants at issue in this Proposal9 have long been subject to regulation based on their
harmful effects. And the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA that Congress clearly
provided EPA with "the statutory authority to regulate the emission of [greenhouse] gases from
new motor vehicles" pursuant to Section 202(a)(l)-(2). 10 In response to this decision, in 2009
EPA found that greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles "contribute to the total
greenhouse gas air pollution, and thus to the climate change problem, which is reasonably
anticipated to endanger public health and welfare." 11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 9]
7 EPA's specific statutory authority to set standards for emissions of criteria pollutants from medium-duty
vehicles is addressed in Section VIII.B.
8 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
9 The terms "Proposal" and "Proposed Standards" are used interchangeably to refer to this proposed
rulemaking and the standards that EPA is proposing to establish.
10 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
1174 Fed. Reg. at 66499.
Given that the danger to public health and welfare from GHG emissions continues to
intensify, and in light of the ongoing harm from criteria pollutant and air toxics emissions, EPA
must use its authority under Section 202(a) to set strong emission standards. Section 202(a)(2)
provides that standards promulgated pursuant to Section 202(a)(1) "shall take effect after such
period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of the
requisite technology." 17 As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, this language embodies Congress's
intent that EPA "press for the development and application of improved technology rather than
be limited by that which exists today." 18 Here, adopting more stringent standards would not
require EPA to press for the development of new technologies; zero-emission and combustion
vehicle technologies have reached technological maturation and are on the market for light- and
medium-duty vehicles. Because greater deployment of those technologies within the fleet is
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feasible and readily achievable, EPA must go further to address the dangers to public health and
welfare wrought by GHG, criteria pollutant, and air toxics emissions from these vehicles—
specifically, by finalizing Alternative 1 with a steeper increase in stringency after 2030.19 As
detailed in Section III below, greenhouse gas emissions from light- and medium-duty vehicles
contribute massively to the worsening climate crisis, while criteria pollutant and air toxics
emissions from those vehicles continue to threaten public health. EPA should therefore choose a
regulatory response that will better address the pollution responsible for the "endanger[ment]"
that these vehicles pose to public health and welfare.20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp.
10-11]
17 Id. § 7521(a)(2).
18 NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-1196 (1970)).
19 Granted, Section 202(a) provides discretion to EPA as to the exact manner of "preventing] or
controlling]" emissions of dangerous air pollutants. And Section 202 places certain limitations on EPA in
setting standards. EPA's standards pursuant to Section 202(a) must allow lead time for technical feasibility
and must give "appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2). Accounting
for these requirements, EPA must promulgate standards that adequately address the danger to public health
and welfare caused by the pollutant at issue.
20 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532; 74 Fed. Reg. at 66525-26.
Congress directed EPA, the expert agency with authority over air pollution from vehicles and
engines, to develop a record and apply the Section 202(a) criteria to the facts to develop
standards.21 In doing so, the Agency is "not obliged to provide detailed solutions to every
engineering problem, but ha[s] only to identify the major steps for improvement and give
plausible reasons for its belief that the industry will be able to solve those problems in the time
remaining."22 Indeed, courts have consistently upheld EPA's vehicle and engine regulations
over manufacturers' objections about technological readiness.23 And manufacturers have
consistently risen to the challenge, complying with the very standards they previously claimed
were impossible to meet.24 ). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 11]
21 See Coal, for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 126.
22 Nat'l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass'nv. EPA, 287 F.3d 1130, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (cleaned up).
23 Id. at 1136-41 (upholding NOx and PM regulations predicated on future developments in pollution
control technology); NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d at 428-34 (upholding PM regulation over manufacturers'
concerns about the feasibility of trap-oxidizer technology); NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d at 331-36 (same).
24 See, e.g., 87 Fed. Reg. 17414, 17536 (explaining that manufacturers deployed technologies that EPA
had not predicted to meet the 2001 heavy-duty criteria pollutant standards, which they had unsuccessfully
challenged in National Petrochemical & Refiners Association
B. The Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to rely on zero-emission technologies in standard-
setting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 11]
We agree with EPA's assessment of its statutory authority to set vehicle emission standards
that rely on the full spectrum of technologies to prevent and control tailpipe pollution, including
both zero-emission and combustion vehicle technologies.25 As set forth in detail in the Proposal,
the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to consider zero-emission technologies when setting emission
standards and to finalize standards at levels that will lead to greater deployment of ZEVs.26
Section 202(a) does not give preference to any particular emission control technology,
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propulsion system, or powertrain type.27 And far from enshrining the status quo or protecting
the market share of polluting vehicles, Congress intended that EPA set standards that drive
improvements in emission control technologies.28 Indeed, Congress was intensely interested in
electrification and other emerging vehicle technologies as far back as the 1960s and 1970s, and it
expected EPA to consider emission reductions that could be achieved through the use of
alternative fuels and propulsion systems (including electrification) that control air pollution more
effectively than combustion vehicle technologies.29 As "complete systems.. .to prevent" air
pollution,30 ZEVs fall well within the scope of Section 202(a)(1).31 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, pp.11-12]
25 See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29232-33.
26 See id. at 29231-33 (relying on statutory language, legislative materials, case law, and regulatory
history).
27 See EPA Br. 7-10; Oge & Hannon Amicus Br. 17-18; Final Br. of State & Pub. Int. Respondent-
Intervenors, Texas v. EPA, Case No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2023), ECF No. 1996908, 6-8, 28-29
[hereinafter "State & Pub. Int. Br."]; Br. of Sen. Thomas R. Carper & Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Texas v. EPA, Case No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 2, 2023), ECF No.
1988363, 12-16, 19-22 [hereinafter "Carper & Pallone Amicus Br."].
28 See Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (recognizing that Congress's
choices in the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments may lead to "fewer models and a more limited choice of
engine types"). As EPA explained in its brief in Texas v. EPA, Section 202(a), "by design, seeks
innovation and change." EPA's Final Answering Br., Texas v. EPA, Case No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27,
2023), ECF No. 1996730, at 43-44 [hereinafter "EPA Br."]. Indeed, over the decades, EPA's emission
standards have led to significant technological innovation and advancements in the auto industry. See id. at
7; Br. of Amici Curiae Margo Oge & John Hannon in Support of Respondents, Texas v. EPA, Case No. 22-
1031 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 8, 2023), ECF No. 1989149, 7-8, 21-22, 26-27 [hereinafter "Oge & Hannon Amicus
Br."].
29 See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29232-33; EPA Br. at 7-10, 40-46; State & Pub. Int. Br. at 6-8, 28-29; Carper &
Pallone Amicus Br. at 12-16, 19-22.
30 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
31 Section 202(a)(4), which references an "emission control device, system, or element of design," 42
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added), provides further evidence that Congress envisioned that EPA
may consider, and that manufacturers may use, a wide variety of emission control technologies and
approaches. Electrification is a "system" and an "element of' motor vehicle "design."
Accelerating the deployment of zero-emission technologies through this rulemaking would
also build on EPA's long and consistent practice of both considering and incentivizing these
technologies in its Section 202(a) rulemakings.32 EPA began doing so more than two decades
ago when it finalized the "Tier 2" criteria pollutant standards.33 That rule required
manufacturers to certify all new light-duty vehicles into one of eight emissions profiles, or
"bins."34 A sales-weighted average of those bins determined the manufacturer's compliance
with the fleet-average NOx standard.35 Bin 1 was designated for ZEVs.36 EPA recognized that
including ZEVs in the fleet average would "provide a strong incentive" for manufacturers to
develop and introduce ultra-clean vehicle technologies, serving as "a stepping stone to the[ir]
broader introduction."37 (EPA's prediction has proven correct, as ZEVs have grown to comprise
ever-greater portions of the light-duty38 and heavy-duty fleets39 since that time.) Later, in a
series of GHG emission rulemakings spanning three presidential administrations, the Agency
continued to include ZEVs in fleet average standards for light- and heavy-duty vehicles, as
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shown in the table below. EPA took the same approach in 2014 for its Tier 3 criteria pollutant
standards for light-duty vehicles.40 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 12-13]
32 Oge & Hannon Amicus Br. at 14-15, 24-25, 28-30.
33 65 Fed. Reg. 6698 (Feb. 10, 2000). Even before the Tier 2 standards, EPA included ZEVs in its 1997
National Low Emission Vehicle Program regulation. Those standards, however, were voluntary. 62 Fed.
Reg. 31192, 31208, 31211-12, 31224 (June 6, 1997).
34 65 Fed. Reg. at 6734.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 6746.
37 Id.
38 EPA, The 2022 Automotive Trends Report, at 74, Table 4.1 (2022),
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-12/420r22029.pdf (production share by powertrain,
showing increasing shares of hybrids, plug-in hybrids, and battery electric vehicles).
39 88 Fed. Reg. 25926, 25939-43.
40 79 Fed. Reg. 23414, 23454, 23471 (Apr. 28, 2014).
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table II.B-1: Electrification, fleet-average standards, and
averaging, banking, and trading in prior GHG rulemakings41 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
p. 13]
41 Reproduced from EPA Br. at 16.
Finally, we agree with EPA that recent actions by Congress reinforce the Agency's authority
to set emission standards that rely on and accelerate the deployment of zero-emission vehicle
technologies.42 As members of Congress have emphasized, the BIL and IRA provide "a clear
signal of Congress' intent to support vehicle electrification and robust EPA authority to
accelerate it "43 By increasing the market penetration of ZEVs44 and significantly lowering the
cost of zero-emission technologies, the BIL and IRA assist EPA in setting standards that will
achieve ambitious reductions in GHG, criteria pollutant, and air toxics emissions.45 EPA should
use its clear authority under the Clean Air Act to do so here by finalizing standards more
stringent than it has proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 13-14]
42 See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29233.
43 Carper & Pallone Amicus Br. at 29; see generally id. At 29-35.
44 As EPA notes, pre-IRA projections predicted that PEVs would make up nearly 40% of U.S. market
share by 2030. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29189. In contrast, post-IRA projections by the International Council on
Clean Transportation (ICCT) estimate that battery-electric vehicles will increase to 56 to 67% of market
share in the U.S. by 2032. Id. at 29189 n.40.
45 See Greg Dotson & Dustin J. Maghamfar, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 2022: Clean Air, Climate
Change, and the Inflation Reduction Act, 53 Env'tL. Rep. 10017, 10018, 10029 (2023)
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
II. EPA has authority to set standards under the Clean Air Act that ensure deep reductions in
harmful pollution based on the availability of ZEV technologies.
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EPA has clear authority to establish performance-based emission standards under Section
202(a)(1). EPA's approach, including setting performance-based standards, considering ZEVs,
and continuing the longstanding use of averaging, banking, and trading (ABT), is consistent with
the text and structure of the CAA and the history of EPA regulation of vehicular emissions under
CAA Section 202(a). Moreover, the recent enactment of the IRA strongly reaffirms EPA's
authority under the CAA and removes any doubt that EPA's actions here are fully consistent
with Congress's will. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 9]
The IRA and BIL both include myriad provisions that seek to support a transition to ZEV
technology through funding of credits for vehicles, components, and critical infrastructure. These
laws were passed with the knowledge that EPA was already setting standards under Section
202(a) that would increase ZEV proliferation and an intent to support those regulations. 15
Congress' aim with the funding was to "combine[] new economic incentives to reduce climate
pollution with bolstered regulatory drivers that will allow EPA to drive further reduction under
its CAA authorities," 16 with the expectation that "future EPA regulations will increasingly rely
on and incentivize zero-emission vehicles as appropriate." 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
pp. 10-11]
15 The BIL was passed after EPA's 2023-2026 light-duty GHG standards, which rely on ZEV technology,
had been proposed and the IRA was passed 9 months after they were finalized. Brief of Senator Thomas R.
Carper and Representative Frank Pallone, Jr. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Texas v. EPA,
No. 22-1031, 29 (D.C. Cir, Mar. 2, 2023), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/Texas%20-
%20Members%20of%20Congress%20%28Sen.%20Carper%20and%20Rep.%20Pallone%29.pdf
(Attachment J).
16 168 Cong. Rec. E868-02 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 2022) (statement of Rep. Pallone discussing the IRA).
17 168 Cong. Rec. at 880-02 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 2022) (statement of Rep. Pallone); see also Greg Dotson
and Dustin J. Maghamfar, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 2022: Clean Air, Climate Change, and the
Inflation Reduction Act, 53 ENV'T L. REP. 10017, 10030 (2023) ("The IRA directs EPA to support zero
emission technologies for heavy-duty vehicles and port equipment, to reduce emissions in low-income and
disadvantaged communities, as well as to support state ZEV requirements. This is a recognition of the
evolving importance and availability of zero emission technologies."),
https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/files-pdf/53.10017.pdf (Attachment K).
Additionally, several provisions in the IRA directly affirm EPA's authority to consider ZEVs
under Section 202(a). Section 60106 of the law provides $5 million for EPA "to provide grants
to States to adopt and implement greenhouse gas and zero-emission standards for mobile sources
pursuant to section 177 of the [CAA]." 18 Section 177 allows other states to adopt California's
vehicle emission standards, which must be at least as protective as the federal standards and meet
certain other statutory requirements. 19 As members of Congress explained in an amicus brief
supporting EPA's MY 2023-2026 light-duty GHG standards, "Congress's explicit endorsement
of states' use of Section 177 to enact 'greenhouse gas and zero-emission standards' clearly
demonstrates its comfort with and support for state and federal standards that contemplate
compliance through zero-emission vehicle manufacturing."20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
p. 11]
18 Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, P.L. 117-1698 ,136 Stat. 2068-69 (2022).
19 42 U.S.C. § 7507, 7543(b).
20 Brief of Senator Thomas R. Carper and Representative Frank Pallone, Jr. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Texas v. EPA, No. 22-1031, 33 (D.C. Cir, Mar. 2, 2023); see also Greg Dotson and Dustin J.
Ill
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Maghamfar, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 2022: Clean Air, Climate Change, and the Inflation
Reduction Act, 53 ENV'T L. REP. 10017, 10030 (2023) ("[I]t is a necessary precondition [of the IRA's
funding for zero-emission standards under section 177] that. . . EPA can establish zero emission standards
pursuant to the CAA.").
The IRA also made amendments to the CAA affirming that Congress regards programs
incorporating ZEV technology as an important aspect of EPA's mission to reduce air pollution
under the law.21 Those amendments include adding a definition of "zero-emission vehicle" into
the newly added CAA Section 132, which consists of a program of EPA grants and rebates
towards the purchase of zero-emission heavy duty vehicles.22 In passing the IRA, Congress
made clear that it "recognizes EPA's longstanding authority under CAA Section 202 to adopt
standards that rely on zero emission technologies."23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 11]
21 Brief of Senator Thomas R. Carper and Representative Frank Pallone, Jr. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Texas v. EPA, No. 22-1031, 32 (D.C. Cir, Mar. 2, 2023) ("By incorporating these new
programs into the Act's existing air pollution control framework, Congress clearly demonstrated that clean
energy and zero- emission vehicle programs are central to the Act's implementation going forward.").
22 42 U.S.C. § 7432(d)(5); see also Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, P.L. 117-1698, 136 Stat. 2064-65
(2022) (creating new CAA section 133 to provide grants for "zero-emission port equipment or
technology.").
23 168 Cong. Rec. E879-02, at 880 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 2022) (statement of Rep. Pallone).
Organization: Governing for Impact and Evergreen Action (GFI)
Our comment explains why the Proposed Rule, if finalized, would not implicate the Major
Questions Doctrine ("MQD") under West Virginia v. E.P.A., the doctrine's landmark case.4
Some opponents to the regulation have argued otherwise, pointing in particular to the Proposed
Rule's projected impact on electric vehicle ("EV") sales.5 However, such claims rest on
mischaracterizations of the Proposed Rule's effects and mistaken readings of West Virginia (and
related cases). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 1-2]
4 See generally, West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 142 S.Ct. 2587 (2022).
5 See, e.g., Press Release, "The EPA Is At It Again: Attorney General Morrisey Blasts Biden Rule Forcing
EV on American Consumers," West Virginia Attorney General's Office (April 12, 2023) ("the EPA likely
doesn't have the statutory authority to do what it proposes to do, and the whole exercise may run afoul of
the major-questions doctrine recognized in West Virginia v. EPA."), https://mailchi.mp/2c52bdb49f71/the-
epa-is-at-it-again-wva-agblasts-biden-rule- forcing-ev-on-american-consumers-713977; Texas Public
Policy Foundation, "RE: Docket Numbers EPA-HQ-OAR- 2022-0985 and EPA-HQ-OAR2022-0829;
Comments," 2 (June 15, 2022) (available here: https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0510). Opponents, including the West Virginia attorney general, to the most recent greenhouse
gas emissions tailpipe rule, finalized in December 2021, have already challenged that regulation on MQD
grounds. See, e.g., Private Petitioners' brief, Texas v. E.P.A., D.C. Cir. No. 22-1031.
Much has been made of the EPA's projection that, under the Proposed Rule, EV sales will
increase to 67 percent of new vehicle sales by model year ("MY") 2032.6 Pointing to this
projection, commentators have described the proposal as "a major step toward a ban on the
vehicles Americans rely on," "nothing short of a complete transformation of the automotive
industrial base," and "requiring nothing short of a revolution."? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0621, pp. 1-2]
6 Proposed Rule at 29329.
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7 Jennifer Hijazi, "Biden Tailpipe Emission Rules Face 'Major Questions' Legal Wave," Bloomberg Law
(April 14, 2023), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/biden-tailpipe-emission-rules-
face-major-questions-legal- wave; Coral Davenport, "E.P.A. Is Said to Propose Rules Meant to Drive Up
Electric Car Sales Tenfold," N.Y. Times (April 8, 2023),
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/08/climate/biden-electric-cars-epa.html?smid=nytcore-ios-
share&referringSource=articleShare; Coral Davenport, "E.P.A. Lays Out Rules to Turbocharge Sales of
Electric Cars and Trucks," N.Y. Times (April 12, 2023),
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/12/climate/biden-electric-cars-epa.html.
Yet it is important to appreciate that, according to both the EPA and outside analysts, the
primary drivers of projected EV growth are market trends and the Inflation Reduction Act's
(2022) new tax incentives—not the Proposed Rule.8 For example, according to a new analysis of
EPA modeling data by the Institute for Policy Integrity, the rule would only boost the EV-share
of the total auto fleet by 6 percentage points in 2032.9 Nor is the Proposed Rule's compliance
burden out of step with past tailpipe emissions rules. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 1-
2]
8 See discussion infra at 7-10. Specific Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (2021) funding programs
for EV charging also contribute to expected growth.
9 See infra at 9.
10 See discussion infra at 10-12.
An accurate accounting of the Proposed Rule's EV impacts and compliance costs will favor
the agency in any forthcoming MQD legal challenge. Indeed, a survey of the Supreme Court's
MQD cases reveals a number of distinctions between the regulatory schemes at issue in those
cases, including the Clean Power Plan, and the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621,
p. 2]
In short, and as this comment will demonstrate, the Proposed Rule's legal vulnerabilities
under the MQD have been grossly exaggerated—mostly due to misunderstandings about the
rule's impact and the doctrine's contours. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 2]
According to West Virginia, the MQD operates by subjecting "certain extraordinary cases" to
a more demanding legal standard, in which regulations must demonstrate "something more than
a merely plausible textual basis" in a statute in order to avoid invalidation.29 In West Virginia,
the majority refers to this heightened legal bar as "clear congressional authority"—but whatever
its name, it marks a break from the past several decades of judicial practice. Under the once-
regnant Chevron Doctrine,30 courts deferred to agency legal interpretations about ambiguous
statutes so long as those interpretations were reasonable. In other words, demonstrating "a
merely plausible textual basis" was once all that an agency needed to do in order to survive legal
challenge; now, if a court deems a rule to be a "major question," that is no longer true.31 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 4]
29 W. Virginia at 2609.
30 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Supreme
Court may limit or overturn Chevron in a case it will consider next term, Loper Bright Enterprises v.
Raimondo. And even though Chevron formally remains good law, the Supreme Court has declined to
invoke the doctrine for several years. See Thomas W. Merrill, "The Major Questions Doctrine: Right
Diagnosis, Wrong Remedy," 3 (January 2023) (working paper available here:
https://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4437332).
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31 As noted above (see supra at fn. 28), many have criticized this development for effectively shifting core
policy making functions from the politically accountable branches — Congress and the presidency — to
the unelected judiciary.
A. The Major Questions Doctrine
The Major Questions Doctrine ("MQD") traces its lineage to a pair of cases at the turn of the
millennium, but has taken on a more aggressive (and controversial27) form in recent years—
culminating in last summer's landmark decision, West Virginia v. E.P.A.28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0621, p. 4]
27 See, e.g., Jody Freeman and Matthew Stephenson, "The Anti-democratic Major Questions Doctrine,"
The Supreme Court Review (forthcoming) (explaining that "the new MQD is more likely to weaken
democratic accountability by shifting power from the elected branches to the courts, undermining
transparency, and exacerbating the already excessive tendency toward minoritarian obstruction in
Congress") (available here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4409630); Dan Deacon
and Leah Litman, "The New Major Questions Doctrine," Virginia Law Rev. (forthcoming) ("The Court's
new approach allows political parties and political movements more broadly to effectively amend otherwise
broad regulatory statutes outside of the formal legislative process by generating controversy surrounding an
agency policy... It supplies an additional means for minority rule in a constitutional system that already
skews toward minority rule. And it operates as a powerful deregulatory tool that limits or substantially
nullifies congressional delegations to agencies in the circumstances where delegations are more likely to be
used, and more likely to be effective.") (available here:
https://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4165724). Criticism of the doctrine has spanned the
political spectrum, and includes those sympathetic to the doctrine's apparent goals. See infra at fn. 37.
28 See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994); FDA v. Brown& Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S.
Ct. 2485 (2021); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep't of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 142 S.
Ct. 661 (2022); and West Virginia. For a thorough review of the MQD up until West Virginia, see Natasha
Brunstein & Donald L. R. Goodson, "Unheralded and Transformative: The Test for Major Questions After
West Virginia," 47 Wm. & Mary Env't L. & Pol'y Rev. (forthcoming 2023) (working paper available here:
https://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4300622).
Specifically, Chief Justice John Roberts, who authored the West Virginia majority opinion,
articulated a two- step test for resolving MQD cases. First, a court will determine whether a
given exercise of regulatory power poses a "major question"—a task accomplished by assessing
"the history and breadth of the authority that [the agency] has asserted, and the economic and
political significance of that assertion."32 Put differently: a "major question" exists, the Court
suggested, when an agency (a) claims "to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power"
that (b) represents "a transformative expansion in its regulatory authority."33 Second, and only if
a court decides the first inquiry in the affirmative, an agency regulation will only survive if the
government can point to "clear congressional authorization" for its interpretation.34 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 5]
32 W. Virginia at 2608 (internal citations omitted).
33 Id. at 2610 (internal citations omitted).
34 Which, as noted above, requires "something more than a merely plausible textual basis." Id. at 2609
(internal citations omitted).
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With a single exception, noted below, every regulation that the Supreme Court has deemed to
be a "major question" has also failed to meet the "clear congressional authority" standard (and so
has been invalidated).3 5 As a consequence, most MQD challenges hinge primarily on the first
inquiry: whether the regulation at issue poses a "major question." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0621, p. 5]
35 That exception came in King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015). Of the twenty-one lower court decisions
to grapple with the doctrine since last June, only one upheld the agency action at issue under the second,
"clear congressional authorization" step of the MQD inquiry. See Natasha Brunstein, "Taking Stock of
West Virginia on its One-Year Anniversary," Yale J. Reg., https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/taking-stock-of-
west-virginia-on-its-one-year-anniversary-by- natasha-brunstein/ (June 18, 2023).
Given the MQD's infancy,36 a degree of uncertainty remains about how future courts will
conduct that threshold inquiry.37 However, Natasha Brunstein and Donald L. R. Goodson have
persuasively argued that "major question" status under West Virginia depends on a court
concluding that both of two features are present: (1) the agency is effecting a "transformative
expansion in its regulatory authority,"3 8 in a manner reminiscent of past MQD cases; and (2) the
agency is deploying its authority in an "unheralded"39 or "unprecedented"40 manner that strays
from the agency's own past practice.41 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 5]
36 No Supreme Court majority opinion had ever used the phrase "Major Questions Doctrine" until West
Virginia.
37 Even some sympathetic to the doctrine's apparent goals have criticized Roberts's West Virginia opinion
for articulating a "problematic" standard. See, e.g., Merrill at 24; Randolph J. May, "A Critique of the
'Congressional Dysfunction' Critique of the Major Questions Doctrine," The Federalist Society (Jan. 23,
2023), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/a-critique-of-the-congressional-dysfunction-critique-of-
the-major- questions-doctrine ("I admit there are many aspects of the major questions doctrine worthy of
debate, including, perhaps foremost, the feasibility of distinguishing, on a principled basis, between major
and non-major questions").
38 W. Virginia at 2610.
39 Ibid.
40 Id. at 2611.
41 See Brunstein & Goodson, "Unheralded and Transformative: The Test for Major Questions After West
Virginia," 47 Wm. & Mary Env't L. & Pol'y Rev. (forthcoming 2023) (working paper available here:
https://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4300622).
For one thing, as EPA itself admitted when requesting special funding, 'Understanding] and projecting]
system-wide ... trends in areas such as electricity transmission, distribution, and storage' requires 'technical
and policy expertise not traditionally needed in EPA regulatory development.' ... 'When [an] agency has
no comparative expertise' in making certain policy judgments, we have said, 'Congress presumably would
not' task it with doing so").
As to the first, "transformative expansion" prong, the Supreme Court's MQD line of cases
provide a sense of the relevant indicia for concluding that an agency has overstepped, including:
whether the agency is acting outside of its traditional area of expertise;42 whether the agency is
seeking to exert control over a new or greatly expanded class of private entities or persons;43
whether the agency is relying on a little-used statutory provision;44 whether the rule creates a
program that Congress has "conspicuously and repeatedly declined to enact itself';45 and
whether the regulation at issue is of vast "economic and political significance."46 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 5-6]
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42 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006) ("The Government's interpretation of the
prescription requirement also fails under the objection that the Attorney General is an unlikely recipient of
such broad authority, given the Secretary's primacy in shaping medical policy under the CSA, and the
statute's otherwise careful allocation of decisionmaking powers"); NFIB at 665 ("The Act empowers the
Secretary to set workplace safety standards, not broad public health measures... And no provision of the
Act addresses public health more generally, which falls outside of OSHA's sphere of expertise"); W.
Virginia at 2612-13 ("There is little reason to think Congress assigned such decisions to the Agency.
43 See Utility Air Regulation Group v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 322 (2014).
44 W. Virginia at 2609-10.
45 W. Virginia at 2610.
46 See, e.g., Alabama Assoc. at 2489; W. Virginia at 2608. Some commentators prefer to conceive of this
as a third prong in the "major question" status inquiry. See Merrill at 6.
The second feature that determines a regulation's "major question" status, as various legal
commentators have observed, is its novelty relative to past agency practice.47 For example, the
Supreme Court invalidated the Centers for Disease Control's Covid-19 eviction moratorium
under the MQD partly because "no regulation premised on [the statutory provision] has even
begun to approach the size or scope of the eviction moratorium," since that provision's
enactment.48 By contrast, a past pattern of analogous agency conduct — in which the agency
has previously deployed comparable regulatory mechanisms or imposed similar compliance
costs on private entities — weighs in the agency's favor under the MQD. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0621, p. 6]
47 See, e.g., Dan Deacon and Leah Litman, "The New Major Questions Doctrine," Virginia Law Rev.
(forthcoming) 49 (available here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4165724); Richard
L. Revesz and Max Sarinsky, "Regulatory Antecedents and the Major Questions Doctrine," Gtown Enviro.
L. Rev. (forthcoming) (available here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4291030).
48 Alabama Assoc. at 2489.
It is also important to appreciate what West Virginia (and its predecessors) did not say—
especially about the role of a rule's "economic and political significance" in the MQD analysis.
As one forthcoming law review article keenly observes, "in no case has economic significance or
political controversy alone been enough to trigger application of the MQD."49 Justice Gorsuch
perhaps argues for such a standard in his West Virginia concurrence, but that opinion was joined
by only one other justice (and so does not constitute binding legal precedent). 50 Rather, the case
law makes clear that in order to implicate the doctrine, a rule must be of vast economic and
political significance and meet the MQD's other "contextual factors," described above.51 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 6]
49 Brianne J. Gorod et al., "Major Questions Doctrine: An Extraordinary Doctrine for 'Extraordinary'
Cases," 19 Wake Forest L. Rev. (forthcoming) 19 (available here:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4419602) (emphasis added).
50 W. Virginia at 2620-21 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("First, this Court has indicated that the doctrine
applies when an agency claims the power to resolve a matter of great 'political significance,' ... Second,
this Court has said that an agency must point to clear congressional authorization when it seeks to regulate
'a significant portion of the American economy'").
51 See Gorod et al. at 18.
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Nor did West Virginia hold that any regulation touching on climate change constitutes a
major question.52 In fact, that decision never suggested that the EPA lacks the power to regulate
carbon emissions from power plants under the relevant section of the CAA—it merely held that
the Clean Power Plan's particular method for doing so was impermissible.53 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0621, pp. 6-7]
52 Commentators have suggested as much across various regulatory proposals. See e.g., Letter from
Attorney General Patrick Morrisey, West Virginia, et al. to Chair Rostin Behnam, CFTC, re: Comments on
the CFTC's "Climate-Related Financial Risk RFI" by the Attorneys General of the States of West Virginia,
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming
(Oct. 7, 2022), comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=70868&SearchText=. In
comments to a Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council proposal requiring certain large federal contractors
to make limited disclosures about carbon emissions, the Washington Legal Foundation cited West Virginia
for the proposition that "climate policy is the exclusive prerogative of Congress"—concluding that
executive action touching on the issue therefore poses a "major question." Comment of Washington Legal
Foundation, "FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION: DISCLOSURE OF GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL RISK," 1 (Feb. 13, 2023),
https ://www. regulations .gov/comment/F AR-2021 -0015-0158.
53 See W. Virginia at 2615 ("the only interpretive question before us, and the only one we answer, is more
narrow: whether the 'best system of emission reduction' identified by EPA in the Clean Power Plan was
within the authority granted to the Agency in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. For the reasons given,
the answer is no").
Finally, note that even if a court concludes that an agency action constitutes a "major
question," the court's work is not complete. The regulation can still survive if the agency can
demonstrate "clear congressional authority" for its interpretation that goes beyond "a merely
plausible textual basis."54 To date, most regulations that the Supreme Court has characterized as
"major questions" have failed to meet this standard. But in King v. Burwell, a majority of the
Court led by Chief Justice Roberts upheld an Internal Revenue Service interpretation concerning
Affordable Care Act tax credits, even after finding that the action effectively qualified as a major
question.55 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 6-7]
54 W. Virginia at 2609.
55 King at 485 ("In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that
Congress has intended such an implicit delegation... This is one of those cases") (internal citations
omitted).
II. The Proposed Rule, if finalized, will survive scrutiny under the Major Questions Doctrine.
As explained below, the Proposed Rule does not pose a major question under the Supreme
Court's MQD precedents. But even if a court found otherwise, the Proposed Rule should still
survive because the EPA can demonstrate "clear congressional authority" for its proposal. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 7]
A. The Proposed Rule does not pose a "major question" under West Virginia.
Above we explained that whether a rule poses a major question hinges on two main inquiries:
(1) whether the action seeks to transform the nature of the agency's regulatory power; and (2)
whether the action represents a stark departure from past regulatory practice. Here, both inquiries
weigh against a finding of "major question" status. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 7]
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1. The Proposed Rule does not seek to transformatively expand the EPA's authority.
A likely source of MQD objections to the Proposed Rule stems from the EPA's projections
about EV uptake in the rule's wake. 56 According to the agency, if the Proposed Rule were to go
into effect, EVs could comprise 67 percent of new light- and medium-duty vehicle production
for Model Year ("MY") 2032, based on the EPA's modeling of automakers' possible cost-
effective compliance pathways.57 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 7-8]
56 See Jennifer Hijazi, "Biden Tailpipe Emission Rules Face 'Major Questions' Legal Wave," Bloomberg
Law (April 14, 2023), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/biden-tailpipe-emission-
rules-face-major-questions- legal-wave (quoting a statement from the American Petroleum Institute that the
"deeply flawed proposal is a major step toward a ban on the vehicles Americans rely on").
57 Proposed Rule at 29329.
But it is crucial to recognize that projection does not attribute this uptick exclusively (or even
primarily) to the Proposed Rule. In fact, according to the EPA and outside analysts, most of the
projected progress on EV uptake will result from market demand and the IRA's historic set of
tax incentives, which are already catalyzing private sector action.58 Consequently, any claim
that the Proposed Rule's impact on future EV sales will qualify it for MQD scrutiny must
contend with the fact that most of the likely boost to EV sales described in the rule is due mainly
to factors beyond the forthcoming regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 7-8]
58 As discussed below, predictable technological adoption dynamics will also contribute.
According to EPA estimates, if the agency declines to finalize any new tailpipe emissions
regulations at all — under what the agency calls its central "No Action" baseline — EV sales
will nonetheless comprise approximately 39 percent of new car sales by MY 2032.59 As the
EPA itself acknowledges, this may prove a conservative estimate of IRA and other non-rule
impacts on EV adoption.60 For example, a synthesis of automakers' public EV commitments to
date compiled by the International Energy Agency, which the EPA declined to incorporate into
its projections, suggested that EVs would comprise 50 percent of new car sales by 2030 (again,
even in the Proposed Rule's absence).61 Nor, in reaching its central No Action baseline, did the
EPA take into account certain new state level policies, like California's, which may drive EV
penetration even further.62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 8]
59 Proposed Rule at 29329, "Fleet BEV Penetration Rates, by Body Style, Under the No Action Case,"
Table 81. As discussed below, the EPA also conducted alternate No Action sensitivity cases.
60 Proposed Rule at 29296.
61 See Proposed Rule at 29296 ("[F]or purposes of this proposal we have not integrated manufacturer
announcements directly into our modeling of the No Action baseline") (citing International Energy
Agency, "Global EV Outlook 2022," p. 107, May 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/e0d2081d-
487d-4818-8c59-69b638969f9e/ GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf).
62 Proposed Rule at 29296 ("[0]ur analysis does not include the effect of state-level policies whereas
projections from other sources may include those policies. We did not include these policies because many
are still not in effect; however, we do anticipate that in the next decade, state level policies may play an
important role in driving BEV penetration.").
Moreover, as other advocates have noted elsewhere, adoption of innovative technologies does
not follow a linear trajectory, but rather "an S-shaped curve, with the adoption rate increasing
more rapidly once a critical mass is reached—as we are now seeing with electric vehicles."63 As
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a result, now that the United States has crossed the EV "tipping point,"64 we would expect steep
growth over the next several years regardless of the EPA's regulatory path. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0621, p. 8]
63 See Proof Brief of the Institute for Policy Integrity, Texas v. E.P.A., D.C. Cir. No. 22-1031 8 (Mar. 3,
2023), https://policyintegrity.org/documents/Amicus_Brief_of_the_Institute_for_Policy_Integrity_4.pdf
(citing Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations 344 (5th ed. 2003) and Tom Randall, US Crosses the
Electric-Car Tipping Point for Mass Adoption, Bloomberg (July 9, 2022),
https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/articles/2022-07-09/us-electric-carsales- reach-key-milestone
(discussing the S-shaped technology adoption curve and noting that the United States has crossed the 5%
market share "tipping point" that triggers "rapidly accelerating demand")).
64 See Randall.
Isolating the Proposed Rule's contribution to EV penetration projections reveals that the
Proposed Rule follows a well-marked trail. Past GHG tailpipe standards have also projected
boosts to EV uptake. The 2012 GHG tailpipe regulations, for example, were projected to boost
EV production from 0 percent to 2 percent.70 And the EPA estimated that the 2021 GHG
emissions rule for passenger vehicles would yield an increase of 11 points for EV production as a
share of overall auto manufacturing by MY 2026 (from a "no action" projection of 6 percent
penetration to a projected 17 percent under the standards).? 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621,
p. 9]
70 EPA, "Regulatory Impact Analysis: Final Rulemaking for 2017-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse
Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards," 3-48 tbl.3.5-19, 3-54 tbl.3.5-25
(Aug. 2012), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100EZIl.PDF?Dockey=P 100EZI1.PDF (hereafter
"2012 Final Rule RIA").
71 EPA, "Regulatory Impact Analysis: Final Rulemaking for Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-
Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions Standards," 4-29, Table 4-31 (2021),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P 10130RN.pdf (hereafter "2021 Final Rule RIA").
Other metrics offer a fuller sense of the Proposed Rule's relative modesty. New York
University School of Law's Institute for Policy Integrity ("IPI") used the data presented in
Figures 9-1 and 9-2 of the draft Regulatory Impact Assessment to calculate how the proposal
will affect the makeup of the total motor vehicle fleet on the road (as opposed to just that of new
car sales in a given model year).72 The analysis concludes that under a No Action baseline, EVs
will comprise 15 percent of automobiles on the road in 2032; by comparison, a finalized version
of the Proposed Rule, IPI calculates, will result in EVs comprising 21 percent of the on-road fleet
that year—an increase of just 6 points.73 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 9]
72 The Ml analysis will be available in the Institute for Policy Integrity's forthcoming comment to the
rulemaking docket; see also EPA, "Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis: Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles," 9-2, Figures 9-1, 9-2 (April
2023), https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0360 (hereafter "Proposed Rule
RIA").
73 Ibid.
In short, the Proposed Rule hardly represents the harbinger of revolution that its critics claim.
This is true beyond the headline-grabbing EV-growth estimates as well. Recall that the Supreme
Court's MQD jurisprudence has identified a set of characteristics that suggest an agency is
impermissibly seeking to expand its regulatory authority, including: straying outside of the
agency's sphere of expertise; seeking to exert agency authority over a new class of regulated
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entities; or relying on a little-used statutory provision. 74 None of those features apply to the
Proposed Rule, which concerns a subject of core EPA expertise (vehicle emissions standards,
which Congress has tasked the agency with setting since the 1970s), applies to a traditional set of
regulated entities (automakers), and is premised on one of the landmark provisions of the Clean
Air Act (Section 202(a)). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 9]
74 See discussion supra at 5-6.
B. Even if the Proposed Rule does pose a "major question," Congress has provided clear
authorization affirming the EPA's action.
For all the above reasons, the Proposed Rule does not pose a "major question." But even if a
court found otherwise, the Proposed Rule would still survive scrutiny at the final step of the
MQD inquiry: whether the agency can demonstrate "clear congressional authority" that goes
beyond a "merely plausible textual basis "100 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 12]
100 W. Virginia at 2609.
As a preliminary matter, the plain text of the CAA appears to unambiguously suggest that the
EPA can rely on electrification in setting Section 202(a) regulations for "new motor
vehicles." 101 The statute defines "motor vehicle," as "any self-propelled vehicle designed for
transporting persons or property on a street or highway "102 Note that definition omits any
reference to a specific type of technology, like the internal combustion engine. Section 202 also
makes clear that the standards are to apply to vehicles whether they are "designed as complete
systems or incorporate devices to prevent or control" pollution—language that clearly anticipates
vehicles, like EVs, designed as complete systems to prevent pollution. 103 Indeed, given Section
202(a)'s charge to protect the "public health and welfare," it would arguably be arbitrary (and
therefore unlawful) for EPA to fail to facilitate the adoption of zero-emission technology. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 12]
101 See 42 U.S.C. §7521.
102 42 U.S.C. §7550(2).
103 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(l)
In addition to this plain-faced textual basis for EPA's authority, Congress has provided clear
authorization affirming the EPA's action in at least two additional ways. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0621, p. 12]
First, legislative history from the 1970 CAA amendments suggests Congress anticipated that
the EPA would use its authorities to reduce air quality hazards, including by encouraging the
development and adoption of technologies beyond the internal combustion engine. 104 As the
agency notes in its Proposed Rule, the Senate Report accompanying those amendments
explained that the EPA "is expected to press for the development and application of improved
technology rather than be limited by that which exists." 105 That report further added that motor
vehicle emissions standards should be "a function of the degree of [emission] control required,
not the degree of technology available today." 106 And so Congress also eventually granted the
EPA the power to fund "low emission alternatives to the present internal combustion
engine." 107 It additionally, in Section 202(e), permitted the EPA to certify new types of motor
vehicles based on "new power source[s] or propulsion system[s] "108 Indeed, electric vehicles,
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which had proved popular among early car consumers during the first years of the 20th century,
were a topic of renewed national interest (thanks to oil price spikes and resulting gas shortages)
during the period that Congress was debating the CAA.109 As a D.C. Circuit panel summarized
in 1973, "[i]t is clear from the legislative history that Congress expected the Clean Air
Amendments to force the industry to broaden the scope of its research-to study new types of
engines and new control systems."110 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 12]
104 See generally, EPA's Proof Answering Brief at 7-10.
105 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 24-27 (1970); see also Proposed Rule at 29233.
106 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 24.
107 42 U.S.C. §7404(a)(2)(B).
108 42 U.S.C. §7521(e).
109 U.S. Dep't of Energy, "The History of the Electric Car," https://www.energy.gov/articles/history-
electric-car (last accessed May 25, 2023).
110 International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 634-35 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing 116 Cong.
Rec. 32,906 (1970) (Sen. Muskie); H.R.Rep. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970)).
As a result, 202(a) standards have historically served a technology-forcing function, pushing
the market to develop and adopt innovative technologies that will better serve the public health
and welfare. In the 1970's and 1980's, for example, the EPA used its Section 202(a) authority to
facilitate uptake of a then-nascent technology: catalytic converters, now commonplace. Ill The
fact that, some forty-plus years later, the innovation has shifted to zero emissions engines does
not change the fundamental tenor of the legal analysis or EPA's core statutory responsibilities.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 13]
111 See "Timeline of Major Accomplishments in Transportation, Air Pollution, and Climate Change," U.S.
Enviro. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/timeline-
major-accomplishments- transportation-air (last visited June 15, 2023).
Second, as the EPA also notes in its Proposed Rule, the IRA includes language reaffirming
the core holding of Massachusetts v. E.P.A. and the agency's subsequent scientific conclusions:
that the EPA is obligated to regulate GHGs as air pollutants under the CAA, and specifically to
regulate such emissions from mobile sources. 112 In the IRA, Congress appropriated funds for
states "to adopt and implement greenhouse gas and zero-emission standards for mobile sources
pursuant to §177 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7507)."113 The CAA cross-reference in this
IRA provision holds important implications. CAA §177 allows states, which are normally
preempted from setting their own motor vehicle emissions standards under the CAA, to adopt
California's standards (for which the EPA must waive pre-emption unless specific findings are
made). 114 So to expressly fund "greenhouse gas and zero emission" activities under §177
necessarily implies that these are the types of standards states would normally be preempted
from pursuing because the CAA reserves their regulation to EPA. The IRA, then, necessarily
implies that GHGs are regulable under the CAA. 115 Indeed, during consideration and passage of
the IRA, key drafters explicitly stated on the record their understanding that the IRA's provisions
statutorily affirmed the Supreme Court's Mass v. EPA decision. 116 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0621, p. 13]
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112 See generally, Greg Dotson and Dustin J. Maghamfar, "THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF
2022: CLEAN AIR, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THE INFLATION REDUCTION ACT," 53 Enviro. L.
Rep. 10017, 10030 (2023), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/files-pdf/53.10017.pdf.
113 IRA, Pub. L. No. 117-169, §60105(g), 136 Stat. 1818 (2022).
114 See 42 U.S.C. §7507.
115 See Dotson and Maghamfar at 10030 ("If GHGs were not considered to be air pollutants or EPA could
not regulate GHGs from motor vehicles pursuant to the CAA, then § 177 would not apply to state GHG and
zero emission standards because such standards for motor vehicles would not be preempted by §209(a)").
116 See Lisa Friedman, "Democrats Designed the Climate Law to Be a Game Changer. Here's How," N.Y.
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/22/climate/epa-supreme-court-pollution.html (Aug. 22, 2022)
(quoting Senate Environmental and Public Works Chairman Tom Carper, a lead drafter, explaining that
"[t]he language, we think, makes pretty clear that greenhouse gases are pollutants under the Clean Air
Act"). See also Proposed Rule at 29233 (quoting House Energy and Commerce Chairman Frank Pallone
explaining that the IRA "reinforces the longstanding authority and responsibility of [EPA] to regulate
GHGs as air pollutants under the Clean Air act" and "the IRA clearly and deliberately instructs EPA to
use" this authority by "combining] economic incentives to reduce climate pollution with regulatory drivers
to spur greater reductions under EPA's CAA authorities"); 168 Cong. Rec. E868-02 (daily ed. Aug. 12,
2022) (statement of Rep. Pallone); 168 Cong. Rec. E879-02, at 880 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 2022) (statement of
Rep. Pallone).
III. Conclusion
Suggestions that the Proposed Rule, if finalized, will pose a "major question" are misguided.
The Proposed Rule's impact on the motor vehicle fleet, especially as concerns projected EV
uptake, has been overblown. And its compliance costs and regulatory mechanisms closely follow
in the footsteps of past 202(a) rulemakings. As a result, we urge the EPA, at minimum, to
finalize the rule as proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 14]
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
By mandating the rapid electrification of the U.S. LD and MD passenger fleet, EPA's
Proposed Rule exceeds its statutory and Congressional authority and severely constrains
consumer choice. In so doing, EPA fails to fully account for the total carbon footprint of PEVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 2]
Notably, EPA's assumption that PEVs produce zero GHGs - coupled with its failure to
account for the overall carbon intensity associated with not only powering PEVs but also the
emissions tied to mining, processing, and manufacturing of critical minerals necessary for PEV
batteries - impedes the agency's ability to conduct a complete comparison of the GHG emissions
resulting from different vehicle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 2]
EPA's regulations also have a chilling effect on additional investments by companies, such as
HF Sinclair, in carbon reducing technologies like carbon capture and sequestration projects,
green hydrogen, renewable fuels and other low-carbon liquid fuel technologies that can reduce
emissions from ICE vehicles. In addition, HF Sinclair has voluntarily announced a target to
reduce its net greenhouse gas emissions intensity by 25% by 2030 compared to a 2020
baseline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 2]
The "major questions doctrine" holds that Congress must "speak clearly when authorizing an
agency to exercise [such] powers" of "vast economic and political significance."4 As EPA is
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aware, this doctrine applies in the context of environmental regulation. Last year, in West
Virginia v. EPA, the Supreme Court relied on the major questions doctrine in holding that the
EPA exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the Clean Power Plan. That regulation sought to
impose caps on GHG emissions by requiring utilities and other providers to shift electricity
production from coal-fired power plants to natural gas and then to renewable energy in place of
imposing source-specific requirements reflective of the application of state-of-the-art emission
reduction technologies.5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 3]
4 Nat'l Fed. Of Indep. Bus. v. Dep't of Labor, 595 U.S., slip op. at 6 (Jan 13, 2022); see also Ala. Assoc.
of Realtors v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021); Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014); U.S. Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 419-21 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (explaining provenance of "major rules
doctrine").
5 West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. (2022).
As noted by the Court, EPA "announced] what the market share of coal, natural gas, wind,
and solar must be, and then require[d] plants to reduce operations or subsidize their competitors
to get there."6 EPA's attempt to devise GHG emissions caps based on a generation-shifting
approach would have had major economic and political significance impacting vast swaths of
American life and substantially restructuring the American energy market; however, EPA's
purported authority was only based on a "vague statutory grant" within Section 111(d) of the
Clean Air Act—far from the "clear authorization required by [Supreme Court] precedents."7
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 3]
6 Id., slip op. at 33, n.4.
7 Id., slip op. at 24. EPA's Proposed Rule here presents an analogous, if not identical, situation. Mandating
a shift from ICE to PEV will reshape the American automotive market with profound collateral effects,
making clear that EPA is encroaching upon an issue of "vast economic and political significance." As
further discussed herein, the direct compliance costs are enormous—EPA estimates that the cost of vehicle
technology (not including the vehicle or battery tax credits) would be approximately $ 180 billion-$280
billion respectively, in addition to over $7 billion in electric vehicle supply equipment ("ESVE") costs
through 2055, and these figures do not include the complete transformation of the electric power sector.8
The Proposed Rule will go above and beyond natural market forces to change what consumers are able to
purchase by requiring the production of a different product. The Proposed Rule undoubtedly forces OEMs
to meet production lead times that would not exist but for EPA's new PEV mandate.
8 Proposed Rule at 29,199.
As discussed in further detail below, the Proposed Rule will have significant impacts beyond
the traditional automotive market. It will eliminate American jobs in the refining sector, which
directly employs more than 100,000 individuals across the United States - it is also widely
accepted that every refinery job is a job multiplier of ten. It will significantly strain the electric
grid, requiring utilities to rapidly increase generation, transmission, and distribution capacity to a
degree not fully contemplated by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 3-4]
And it will have profound impacts on national security by forcing the American automotive
industry to depend on critical minerals from foreign suppliers, with geopolitical challenges—
most notably, China—rather than a domestically-abundant and secure resource. These issues go
well beyond EPA's expertise, and the Agency is not positioned to fully grapple with the
consequences that such a rapid push for PEV will have across the nation. As a result, EPA can
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only proceed with the Proposed Rule if Congress bestowed upon EPA clear authorization to do
so. But Congress did not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 4]
II. EPA's Proposed Rule Exceeds its Statutory Authority and Contravenes Federal Law
a. Phasing out the Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) is a "Major Question" that Congress
did not Delegate to EPA
The Proposed Rule does not represent appropriate and feasible technological improvements in
the efficiency of ICE vehicles; rather, it requires the manufacturing of PEVs and ultimately
replacement of ICE vehicles in the U.S. transportation sector. Though EPA contends the
proposed standards do not mandate a specific technology (e.g., PEVs), OEMs cannot comply
with the proposed standards unless they drastically shift production away from ICE and to PEVs.
Consequently, the Proposed Rule obligates OEMs to increase the percentage of PEVs in their
fleets and to do so at rates well in excess of market forces. EPA predicts that for MY 2032, PEV
adoption rates will be between 62-78% across all body styles (sedans, crossovers/SUVs, and
pickups).2 This is an exponential increase from the roughly 4.4 percent of the LD market share
by PEVs in 2021.3 The Proposed Rule will introduce a transformational shift in the automotive
industry far beyond that which EPA is able to mandate under the authority delegated to it by
Congress. But the question of whether this shift is necessary and, if so, how to accomplish this
shift, is a "major question" reserved for Congress, not EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579,
pp. 2-3]
2 Proposed Rule at 29,329; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles Draft Regulatory Impact
Analysis" (April 2023) pg. 13-36, 13-37, available at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf [hereinafter, "RIA"].
3 Proposed Rule at 29,189 (identifying the percentage that was plug in electric ("PEV"), which included
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles ("PHEV') and BEVs).
As with the Clean Power Plan, EPA lacks Congressional authorization in the Clean Air Act to
impose a manufacturing shifting standard to a preferred powertrain and effectively order
regulated parties to phase out combustion engine technologies. EPA's standard-setting tools are
limited to those which Congress provided in Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act. Here, EPA is
only authorized to set "standards" for "emission[s]" from "any class or classes of new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which . . . cause, or contribute to," potentially harmful air
pollution. EPA has elected to focus solely on tailpipe emissions and not the entire lifecycle
analysis. But PEVs do not have tailpipe emissions of carbon dioxide, the pollutant of concern
here, so the operation of such vehicles alone cannot "cause, or contribute to," air pollution within
the constructs of a tailpipe emissions regulation, especially when EPA does not require vehicle
manufactures to account for the upstream emissions from PEVs in their compliance calculations.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 4-5]
Far from "clear congressional authorization," Section 202(a) provides EPA no authority to set
standards that go above and beyond that which could be achieved by improvements to ICE
vehicles alone such that OEMs must completely cease to produce the underlying technology
governed at the time the Clean Air Act was adopted and amended. Nor does it permit EPA to
establish a fleet averaging and credit trading program as a mechanism to limit ICE sales.9
Notably, Congress instituted a clean fuel vehicles program with reference to "clean alternative
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fuel" vehicles, which includes BEVs, in its 1990 updates to the Clean Air Act. In doing so,
Congress explicitly distinguished such vehicles from "conventional gasoline-fueled or diesel-
fueled vehicles of the same category and model year," dispelling the notion that BEVs and ICE
vehicles can be lumped together to set standards that will enable the former to eventually
displace the latter. 10 EPA does not—and cannot—explain how such authority can be read to
regulate PEVs and ICE vehicles under a common standard. It is no surprise then that up until the
current Administration, EPA has never claimed the authority to mandate even partial
electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 4-5]
9 See supra, II.B.
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 7581, 7582(b); see also § 7585(a) (defining NOx and non-methane hydrocarbon emission
standards for heavy-duty clean-fuel vehicles as a percentage of conventional heavy-duty vehicles).
Congress clarified that it, not EPA, must make the important policy decisions affecting if,
when, and how the American automotive industry will transition from ICE vehicles to BEVs. In
the 116th Congress, for example, Congress introduced 44 bills seeking to reduce petroleum-
based fuel consumption and GHG emissions from the transportation sector through customer
rebates, vehicle and fuel producer incentives, local funding, development of standards, and
research and development. But none went so far as to propose requiring adoption, let alone mass
adoption of heavy duty PEVs through the phase-out of ICE vehicles. 11 In fact, Congress rejected
bills that would have banned the sale of new LD ICE vehicles by 2040,12 and it has consistently
disapproved of EPA's efforts to hamstring the automotive sector with more stringent air
pollution standards than are feasible. 13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 4-5]
11 "Alternative Fuel and Vehicles: Legislative Proposals," Congressional Research Service (July 28, 2021).
12 See Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2019, H.R. 2764, 116th Cong. (2019); Zero-Emission Vehicles Act
of 2018, S. 3664, 115th Cong. (2018); see also 116 Cong. Rec. 19238-40 (1970) (proposed amendment to
Title II that would have banned ICE vehicles by 1978).
13 See, e.g., S. J. Res. 11, 118th Cong. (2023) (Although passed only by the Senate thus far, the joint
resolution calls for disapproval of the rule submitted by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency relating to "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle
Standards," 88 Fed. Reg. 4296 (January 24, 2023).).
It should be no surprise then in the wake of the Proposed Rule, members of Congress have
requested that the Agency rescind the proposals, asserting they "effectively mandate a costly
transition to electric cars and trucks in the absence of congressional direction "14 That Congress
intended for it, not EPA, to direct these policy decisions is made all the more clear by the
passage of the IRA and BIL whereby Congress identified the policy levers it deemed
appropriate. Congress could have, but did not, delegate the authority to (or otherwise direct) EPA
to establish a fleet-wide credit trading regime to further drive PEV development and rapid
adoption. Instead, the Proposed Rule stands in direct contrast to other legislation, such as the
Renewable Fuel Standard Program, whereby Congress mandated that "gasoline sold or
introduced into commerce in the United States" must contain a year-over-year increasing share
of renewable fuelsl5 and, in 2022, must include tens of billions of gallons of renewable fuel.16
An EPA-mandated shift in transportation technology from vehicles that can operate on
increasing volumes of renewable fuel to PEVs does not square with such requirements.
Consequently, Congress, not EPA, should determine how to regulate electrification of
transportation. 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 4-5]
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14 Letter from Senator Shelley Capita, et al. to Administrator Michael S. Regan, EPA (May 25, 2023); see
also Senate Resolution S.J. Res. 11, 118th Congress (April 26, 2026) (Although related to heavy duty
vehicles ("HDVs"), Congress has expressed its disapproval of EPA's overreach in this space. For example,
in April of this year both houses of Congress passed a Congressional Review Act resolution to rescind
EPA's December 2022 heavy duty NOx standards, sending a strong signal that Congress views EPA's
efforts in this space as unnecessary, infeasible, and uniformed in light of economic and energy security
concerns); House Resolution H2523 (May 23, 2023); see also Congressional Record, H2523 (May 23,
2023) at 1444, Statement from Mr. Walberg (R-MI) ("From tailpipe emissions regulations that will force
people to buy expensive and less practical EVs to new rules on power plants that will threaten the
reliability of our electric grid. It seems like the EPA hasn't even thought about the economic and energy
security of our constituents.").
15 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i).
16 Id., § 7545(o)(2)(B); 87 Fed. Reg. 39,600 (July 1, 2022).
17 See "Grassley-Cornyn Bill Pulls Plug on Latest Biden Boon for EVs," (May 18, 2023),
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-cornyn-bill-pulls-plug-on-latest-biden-boon-
for-evs (discussing proposed legislation entitled "No Fuel Credits for Batteries Act" introduced to
"preserve the integrity of the Renewable Fuels Standard" in light of EPA's proposed E-RINS rule").
III. The Proposed Rule is Arbitrary and Capricious
a. EPA Fails to Properly Account for All GHG Emissions from PEVs
In an attempt to hinder consumer choice and penalize specific forms of technology, EPA's
proposed rule fails fully account for the lifecycle GHG emissions that come from PEVs, creating
a disparity between how ICE and PEV vehicle emissions are treated. While EPA purports to
have considered the GHG emissions attributed to upstream emissions impacts from fuel
production at refineries and electricity generating units,27 EPA assumes - without any factual
basis - that the power sector will become cleaner over time through the increased use of wind
and solar generation and electricity storage (i.e., more batteries). This in turn will purportedly
mitigate EPA's recognized concern that, as a result of the proposed rule, "increases in emissions
from [Electric Generating Units] . . . would lead to changes in exposure for people living in
communities near these facilities."28 But, EPA glosses over this analysis, and instead only
focuses on tailpipe emissions. And even if EPA's assumptions on a cleaner electric grid are
correct, EPA fails to account for the increased GHG emissions that will come from an increasing
effort to mine, process, and manufacture the critical minerals that will be required to both deliver
batteries to power an all-electric future fleet as well as deliver "zero-emission" power to the grid.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 7-9]
27 Proposed Rule at 29,252.
28 Proposed Rule at 29,327.
Moreover, EPA's proposal to remove upstream emissions from vehicle compliance
determinations will incentivize vehicle manufacturers to produce PEVs without having to
account for any of the associated emissions impact while ignoring labor and environmental
standards of other nations. Preferentially accounting for certain air pollutant emissions over
others within the same regulated vehicle class flies in the face of both EPA's statutory authority
to prescribe "standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of
new motor vehicles.. ."29 and its purported regulatory objective to reduce GHG emissions. If
PEVs are vehicles which cause or contribute to air pollution, then all associated pollution must
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be accounted for. If not, EPA may not include PEVs in the regulated "class" of motor vehicles
along with comparable ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 7-9]
29 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
For instance, the power source of a PEV—a battery composed of carbon intensive minerals
and the electricity generated to power the battery—produces emissions. The fact such emissions
occur 100% upstream of the vehicle's operation and therefore fall outside of the tailpipe
emissions calculation stacks the deck in favor of this technology. In fact, according to the
International Energy Association, PEVs require six times the raw materials as a traditional ICE
vehicle.30 There is no logical basis for this omission because, as EPA is aware, concerns about
GHG emissions relate to their longer term global concentrations. Consequently, air pollutant
emissions should be an important consideration regardless of where such emissions occur and,
by myopically prioritizing PEVs, EPA fails to look at all technologically feasible options that
may provide commensurate GHG reductions in a more cost-efficient manner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, pp.7-9]
30 IEA, "In the transition to clean energy, critical minerals bring new challenges to energy security," (June
2023), available at https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions/executive-summary.
The flaw in EPA's approach is illustrated by the fact that emissions standards easily become
meaningless by changing the engine's location. The proposed rule would treat a PEV charged by
a diesel-powered generator as if it had zero tailpipe emissions, notwithstanding the fact that it
remains "powered" by a diesel engine located outside the vehicle. A light-duty vehicle directly
powered by a diesel engine inside the vehicle, however, is credited with the emissions produced
by that engine. Thus, the source of the "fuel" matters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 7-9]
Finally, EPA has not considered the foreseeable, indirect impacts the Proposed Rule will have
on ambient air quality. First, with the high purchase price of new PEVs, consumers will likely
hold on to their older, higher-emitting ICE vehicles to avoid the increased purchase price of a
PEV. Second, PEVs are heavier, and will increase particulate matter emissions through increased
brake, tire, and road wear. Ultimately, EPA arbitrarily ignores the full scope of emissions that
will come from PEVs, and a full lifecycle analysis of all potential vehicle technologies must be
conducted to fully understand the environmental impacts of the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, pp.7-9]
b. EPA Cannot Adequately Substantiate the Need for Regulatory Action
EPA has not demonstrated a compelling need to accelerate emissions reductions within the
timeframe for which MY27-32 vehicles are subject to the Proposed Rule. PEVs accounted for
less than 5% of light-duty vehicles sold in the U.S. in 2021, yet EPA's proposal would require
PEVs to account for over 60% of light-duty vehicle sales by 2030 despite the White House
setting a goal of 50% in this same timeframe.31 EPA provides no information supporting the
need for such an accelerated schedule and instead makes conclusory assertions that the "need for
regulatory action" is supported by the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law32 ("BIL") and the Inflation
Reduction Act33 ("IRA"),34 which "together provide further support for a government-wide
approach to reducing emissions by providing significant funding and support for air pollution
and GHG reductions across the economy, including specifically, for the component technology
and infrastructure for the manufacture, sales, and use of electric vehicles."3 5 But far from
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capturing the automotive industry's current pace of electrification, the Proposed Rule exceeds
rational projections on the rate of electrification, which expect PEVs (including plug-in hybrid
vehicles) to account for only 13-29% of new light-duty vehicle sales in 2050.36 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, pp.9-10]
31 Executive Order 14037, "Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks," 86 Fed. Reg.
43583 (Aug. 5, 2021).
32 Public Law 117-58, Nov. 15, 2021.
33 Public Law 117-169, Aug. 16, 2022.
34 EPA, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis for Proposed Rule, 3-19-29 (Apr. 2023) [hereinafter "DRIA"].
Notably, EPA concludes that U.S. oil consumption is projected to be fairly steady for the time period from
2027 to 2050" and will actually increase gradually over that time. Id. at 11-26 (Table 11-1). EPA also
concludes that the Proposed Rule will result in a 90.7% reduction in oil imports.
35 Proposed Rule at 29,187.
36 EIA, "Incentives and lower costs drive electric vehicle adoption in our Annual Energy Outlook," (May
15, 2023) available at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=56480.
In fact, during a House Energy and Commerce Hearing on June 22, 2023, Joseph Goffman,
Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator for U.S. EPA's Office of Air and Radiation, testified
that he had not reviewed the petition from the state of California requesting a Clean Air Act
Waiver that ultimately seeks to ban ICE vehicles.37 This is concerning given the fact that the
justification provided for the Proposed Rule was that same petition by the state of California,
further demonstrating EPA's incomplete analysis and lack of preparedness to compel consumers
into a single technology solution to combat climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579,
pp. 9-10]
37 Testimony of Joseph Goffman, Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Air and Radiation,
U.S. EPA before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee for Environment, Manufacturing, and
Critical Materials Legislative Hearing: ""Driving Affordability: Preserving People's Freedom to Buy
Affordable Vehicles and Fuel," (June 22, 2023) available at
https://energycommerce.house.gov/events/environment-manufacturing-and-critical- materials-
subcommittee-legislative-hearing-driving-affordability-preserving-people-s-freedom-to-buy-affordable-
vehicles-and-fuel.
Moreover, EPA's reliance on the BIL and IRA is further problematic because Congress could
have, but did not, choose to mandate PEVs directly through these actions. Congress provided
subsidies, not mandates, and EPA cannot rely on these subsidies as a basis for the feasibility of
its mandates. Furthermore, 66% of Americans do not support policies and regulations that ban
the sale of new ICE vehicles, while only 23% support such mandates.3 8 Doing so contravenes
Congress's intent and results in a regulatory structure premised on federal funding that can easily
vanish under a new Administration or Congress.39 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 9-10]
38 RFA, "New Poll: Voters Support Ethanol and RFS, Oppose EV Mandates," (Jan. 9, 2023), available at
https://ethanolrfa.org/media-and-news/category/news-releases/article/2023/01/new-poll-voters-support-
ethanol-and- rfs-oppose-ev-mandates.
39 The BIL and IRA themselves are at risk of recission under a new Administration or Congress. See, e.g.,
Josh Siegel and Kelsey Tamborrino, Politico, GOP's debt-limit plan would gut Biden's climate law. White
House's response: 'Jobs' (Apr. 20, 2023), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/20/house-
gop-debt-limit- plan-inflation-reduction-act-00092891 ("The GOP proposal would revive a prior $7,500 tax
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credit for qualifying electric vehicles, but would restore that tax break's per-manufacturer limit of 200,000
vehicles. It would entirely repeal the IRA's new incentives for critical battery minerals that are extracted
from the U.S. or a close trading partner, and for batteries manufactured or assembled in North America.").
Organization: Institute for Energy Research (IER)
EPA's claimed authority contradicts recent Supreme Court precedent
EPA's asserted power to force a transition is an impermissible claim of new authority. The
Supreme Court made clear in the various cases around the Clean Power Plan, culminating with
West Virginia v. EPA, that such forced shifting (in that case from coal to natural gas or
renewables) is a claim of new authority, and thus needs clear statutory mandate from Congress
Just like in the West Virginia case, EPA is seeking to force a shift from one product to another.
Thus this rulemaking raises the same major question issues as the Clean Power Plan. Absent
express authorization from Congress, EPA cannot claim this power to shift the motor vehicle
industry from internal combustion-powered to electric-powered engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0673, p. 3]
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at NYU School of Law et al.
I. Extensive Justification Supports EPA's Reliance on Global Climate Damage
Valuations
In the Proposed Rule, EPA appropriately focuses on a global estimate of climate benefits,
continuing its historical approach and once again rejecting its temporary and arbitrary practice
during the Trump administration of disregarding all climate effects that occur outside the
physical borders of the United States. While EPA offers persuasive justifications for this
decision, many additional justifications—some of which EPA itself provides in the Draft SC-
GHG Updatel2—further support this approach. 13 In particular, EPA could emphasize the
concern for the impacts of U.S. pollution on foreign welfare in the Clean Air Act and other
sources of law, further highlight the significance of U.S. strategic interests and reciprocity,
further emphasize the importance of extraterritorial impacts and spillovers, and highlight the
inconsistency that would occur if the agency considered only domestic benefits while focusing
on global costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 3]
12 Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 9, at 10-15.
13 See generally Jason A. Schwartz, Inst, for Pol'y Integrity, Strategically Estimating Climate Pollution
Costs in a Global Environment (2021),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Strategically_Estimating_Climate_Pollution_Costs_in_a_Glob
alEnvir onment.pdf.
A. Relevant Statutes and Executive Orders Compel, and Certainly Permit, a Global
Perspective on Climate Damages
The Clean Air Act, National Environmental Policy Act, Administrative Procedure Act, and
other key sources of law not only permit, but in fact require, EPA to consider international
effects. EPA should highlight these legal requirements as justification for its focus on global
climate impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 3-4]
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Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, under which EPA issues the Proposed Rule, charges EPA
with regulating "air pollutant[s] which may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare," 14 where "welfare" is defined to include "effects on . . . weather . . . and climate." 15
When interpreting Section 202, the Supreme Court found "there is nothing counterintuitive to the
notion that EPA can curtail the emission of substances that are putting the global climate out of
kilter." 16 And when industry challenged another EPA climate program under Title I of the Clean
Air Act by arguing that the statute "was concerned about local, not global effects," the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had "little trouble disposing of Industry Petitioners'
argument that the [Clean Air Act's prevention of significant deterioration] program is
specifically focused solely on localized air pollution," finding instead that the statute was "meant
to address a much broader range of harms," including "precisely the types of harms caused by
greenhouse gases."17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 3-4]
14 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
15 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1447 (2007).
16 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1461 (emphasis added). This case concerned Section 202 of the Clean Air
Act, which similarly permits EPA to regulate "any air pollutant. . . which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare." Id. at 1454 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)).
17 Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 137-38 (D.C. Cir. 2012), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
A recent law-review article exhaustively reviewed the legislative history of the Clean Air
Act's definition of "welfare" and concluded that "when Congress included the 'effects on . . .
climate' language in the statute, it understood that adverse climate effects could occur on a
global scale." 18 For instance, Senator Caleb Boggs, a Republican from Delaware and ranking
minority member of the Public Works Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, which was
considering the Clean Air Act in 1970, entered a report into the record stating that air pollution
"alters climate and may produce global changes in temperature." 19 Senator Jennings Randolph
of West Virginia likewise submitted a statement into the record explaining that U.S. air pollution
could "produce unacceptable worldwide climate changes."20 Congress's clear concern for the
effects of domestic pollution on the global climate—many more examples of which are
discussed in this law-review article—demonstrates that a global perspective is appropriate, if not
required, when EPA regulates under the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 4]
18 Richard L. Revesz, Bostock and the End of the Climate Change Double Standard, 46 COLUM. J.
ENV'TL. 1,9(2020).
19 Id. at 32-33.
20 Id. at 3
This interpretation is further compelled by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
Though best known for requiring agencies to prepare environmental impact statements before
taking certain actions (a requirement that does not apply to Clean Air Act actions),21 NEPA also
much more broadly declares a national environmental policy and requires of all agencies that "to
the fullest extent possible[,] the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall
be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter,"22
including the need to "recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental
problems" and to "lend appropriate support" to help "maximize international cooperation."23 In
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other words, especially because adopting a global perspective on climate damages will advance
U.S. foreign policy goals (see the next subsection), NEPA requires EPA to interpret all of its
laws, including the Clean Air Act, in ways that recognize the worldwide character of
environmental problems. As EPA recognizes in the Draft SC-GHG Update,24 using global social
cost of greenhouse gas estimates helps fulfill that requirement. Likewise, in a recent guidance
document, the Council on Environmental Quality highlighted this very statutory language to
conclude that "it is most appropriate for agencies to focus on [social cost of greenhouse gases]
estimates that capture global climate damages."25 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 4-5]
21 While actions taken under the Clean Air Act "shall [not] be deemed a major Federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of [42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)]," 15
U.S.C. § 793(c)(1), the other provisions of NEPA—including those quoted and cited in this paragraph—
continue to apply.
22 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (emphasis added).
23 Id. § 4332(2)(I); see also EDF v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Section 102(2)(F)
further supports the conclusion that Congress, when enacting NEPA, was concerned with worldwide as
well as domestic problems facing the environment.. . Compliance with one of the subsections can hardly
be construed to relieve the agency from its duty to fulfill the obligations articulated in other subsections.");
NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (J. Robinson, concurring; J. Wilkey wrote for the
Court, but there was no majority opinion) (concluding that even if a conflict with another statute prevents
the agency from conducting an environmental impact statement, that "does not imply that NRC may ignore
its other NEPA obligations," including the "provision for multinational cooperation" and the "policy of the
United States with respect to the ecological well-being of this planet"; rather, the agency "should remain
cognizant of this responsibility"); Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412,
424 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The Commission's 'hands-off' attitude is even more startling in view of the explicit
requirement in NEPA that the Commission 'recognize the worldwide and long-range character of
environmental problems' and interpret its mandate under the Federal Power Act in accordance with the
policies set forth in NEPA.").
24 Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 9, at 15 n.37.
25 Council on Env't Quality, National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change, 88 Fed. Reg. 1196, 1203 (Jan. 9, 2023).
I. EPA Should More Extensively Document Why the Proposed Rule Does Not Trigger
the Major Questions Doctrine
Litigation over the 2021 Rule has focused primarily on the major questions doctrine, and
some opponents of the Proposed Rule have raised similar objections. Petitioners in the ongoing
D.C. Circuit litigation argue that the 2021 Rule triggered the major questions doctrine primarily
because, in their words, "[t]he rule effectively mandates that a decreasing percentage of the fleet
be gasoline-powered, and an increasing percentage be electric." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0601, pp. 5-6]
22 Brief for Private Petitioners at 24, Texas v. EPA (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 3, 2022).
Challenges to both the 2021 Rule and this rule under the major questions doctrine lack merit.
Nonetheless, as explained in this section, EPA could provide more extensive legal analysis
rebutting these challenges. Specifically, EPA should catalog regulatory antecedents for its
approach to considering vehicle electrification and provide additional context about the
economic significance of the Proposed Rule. We begin, however, with a brief description of the
major questions doctrine. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 5-6]
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A. Economic and Political Significance Are Not Sufficient to Trigger the Major
Questions Doctrine—The Agency's Action Must Also Be Unlike Anything It Has Done Before
and Represent a "Transformative Expansion" of Its Authority
Litigants and commenters invoking the major questions doctrine—including challengers in
the ongoing litigation over the 2021 Rule—often invoke the major questions doctrine without
properly describing its contours. To provide legal context, this section describes how the
Supreme Court has articulated the doctrine. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 5-6]
In West Virginia v. EPA, the Supreme Court stressed that only "extraordinary cases" trigger
the major questions doctrine—"cases in which the 'history and the breadth of the authority that
the agency has asserted,' and the 'economic and political significance' of that assertion, provide
a 'reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress' meant to confer such authority."23 The
bulk of West Virginia's legal analysis of the doctrine's triggers examined whether EPA had
'"claim[ed] to discover in a long-extant statute [1] an unheralded power' [2] representing a
'transformative expansion in [its] regulatory authority.'"24 In other words, the Supreme Court
focused on (1) regulatory history and (2) the transformative nature of the agency's asserted
authority. In Biden v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court again reiterated the importance of "the
'history and the breadth of the authority that the agency had asserted,"' in addition to "the
'economic and political significance' of that assertion."25 For example, the Court stressed that
"[t]he Secretary [of Education] has never previously claimed powers of this magnitude under"
the statute at issue in Nebraska and, "[u]nder the Government's reading of [that statute], the
Secretary would enjoy virtually unlimited power to rewrite" it.26 Both West Virginia and
Nebraska reveal that an agency action does not trigger the major questions doctrine unless its
history and breadth and economic and political significance provide a reason for a court to be
skeptical of the agency's action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 5-6]
23 West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2608 (2022) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000)) (alteration omitted).
24 Id. at 2610 (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)).
25 Biden v. Nebraska, — S. Ct. —, 2023 WL 4277210, at *12 (June 30, 2023) (quoting West Virginia, 142
S. Ct. at 2608) (alterations omitted).
26 Id. at * 12—*13.
To trigger the major questions doctrine, regulatory history must reveal that an agency action is
unlike anything the agency has ever done. Of course, the agency need not identify an identical
regulatory antecedent, because new regulations will rarely, if ever, be identical to previous ones
as they would then be unnecessary. Rather, West Virginia's and Nebraska's analyses suggest that
the relevant regulatory antecedent must be an analogous exercise of authority. The cases cited in
West Virginia similarly focus on the unprecedented nature of the agency's action.27 And the
Court reaffirmed the centrality of "past practice under the statute" in Nebraska, both in terms of
the "scope" of prior agency actions and the "size" of those actions' effects.28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0601, pp. 5-6]
27 For example, UARG notes that EPA's newfound statutory interpretation would have "swept" many
sources under the agency's control that it had "not previously regulated." 573 U.S. at 310. Alabama
Association of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Services (Alabama Realtors)] also highlights
that the "expansive authority" asserted was "unprecedented." 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (per curiam).
And National Federation of Independent Business v. Occupational Safety & Health Administration
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likewise focused on the "lack of historical precedent" for the agency's action. 142 S. Ct. 661, 666 (2022)
(per curiam) (cleaned up). In contrast, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a vaccine mandate from
the Department of Health and Human Services for certain healthcare workers because "the Secretary
routinely imposes conditions of participation that relate to the qualifications and duties of healthcare
workers." Biden v. Missouri, 142 S. Ct. 647, 653 (2022) (per curiam).
28 Nebraska, 2023 WL 4277210, at *12 (quoting Alabama Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489)); see also id. at *14
(describing the action as "unprecedented").
To trigger the major questions doctrine, the breadth of the agency action must also suggest the
agency is dramatically changing its authority. In West Virginia, the Supreme Court explained
that the challenged Clean Power Plan represented a "transformative expansion [of EPA's]
regulatory authority."29 In other words, the Supreme Court concluded that it "effected a
'fundamental revision of the statute, changing it from [one sort of] scheme of. . . regulation' into
an entirely different kind."30 In discussing this factor, the Court focused on whether the
challenged action transformed the role of the regulator (i.e., EPA), not the regulated sector.31
Nebraska32 and the major questions cases cited in West Virginia33 contain similar analyses of
whether the agency action represented a transformation of the agency's authority. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 6-8]
29 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2610.
30 Id. at 2612 (citation omitted).
31 See id.; see also Mayes v. Biden, 67 F.4th 921, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2023) (focusing not on whether the
government sought "to regulate a significant portion of the American economy," but on whether its action
"represent[ed] an 'enormous and transformative expansion in [its] regulatory authority'" (quoting UARG,
573 U.S. at 324)).
32 Nebraska, 2023 WL 4277210, at *13 ("[The Government's reading of the [statute] . . . would 'effect a
"fundamental revision of the statute, changing it from one sort of scheme of regulation" into an entirely
different kind '" (quoting West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2596) (alterations omitted)).
33 See, e.g., UARG, 573 U.S. at 312, 325 (noting that EPA's action "would radically expand" the programs
at issue, "making them both unadministrable and 'unrecognizable to the Congress that designed' them"
(citation omitted)); MCI Telecom. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225, 229, 234 (1994)
(finding that the agency action had effected a "basic and fundamental" change that went to the "heart" of
the statute and constituted "effectively the introduction of a whole new regime of regulation").
The economic and political significance of an agency's action is necessary but insufficient to
trigger the major questions doctrine. Although the Supreme Court often references economic and
political significance in its major questions cases, these indicators alone have never sufficed to
trigger the doctrine. For example, West Virginia's legal analysis omits any references to
economic significance, such as regulatory costs or the number of persons or entities affected.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has decided numerous recent cases under sizable government
programs without resort to the major questions doctrine, including cases involving gargantuan
programs like Medicare34 and myriad other agency actions implicating the energy, utility, and
telecommunications industries.35 And although Nebraska discusses economic and political
significance, it does so only after reviewing regulatory antecedents and the transformation of the
regulatory scheme.36 Much of Nebraska's economic discussion also focused on the relative
costs of the challenged action compared to prior agency actions under the same statute,
highlighting how this aspect of the regulatory history demonstrated the action was unlike
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anything the Secretary of Education had done before.37 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 6-
8]
34 See, e.g., Becerra v. Empire Health Found., 142 S. Ct. 2354 (2022); Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Becerra, 142 S.
Ct. 1896 (2022); Azarv. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019).
35 See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014); Nat'l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
36 Nebraska, 2023 WL 4277210, at *12-* 13.
37 Id. at * 12 (noting that "past waivers and modifications issued under the Act have been extremely modest
and narrow in scope").
In short, economic significances 8 and political significance are sometimes relevant but have
never been sufficient by themselves to trigger the major questions doctrine, which instead also
requires examining whether the agency action at issue is of sufficient novelty and breadth to
counsel skepticism. Only when the doctrine is so triggered must the agency point to "clear
congressional authorization" for the agency's approach.39 But this is not the same as a "clear
statement rule"—a phrase found nowhere in the majority opinions in either West Virginia or
Nebraska (or any the Court's other major question precedents).40 Or, as Justice Barrett
explained in her concurrence in Nebraska, the necessary clear congressional authorization should
not be equated with "'an "unequivocal declaration'" from Congress authorizing the precise
agency action under review, as [the Court's] clear-statement cases do in their respective
domains."41 This explanation of "clear Congressional authorization" reflects the Court's
interpretive approach in West Virginia.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 6-8]
38 As discussed above, relative economic significance as compared to regulatory antecedents is also
relevant and is most appropriately considered when evaluating whether the action is sufficiently novel in
scope or size.
39 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2614 (quoting UARG, 573 U.S. at 324).
40 Natasha Brunstein & Donald L. R. Goodson, Unheralded and Transformative: The Test for Major
Questions After West Virginia, 47 WM. & MARY ENV'T L. & POL'Y REV. 47, 95-100 (2022).
41 Nebraska, 2023 WL 4277210, at *17 (Barrett, J., concurring) (quoting Financial Oversight and
Management Bd. for P. R. v. Centra De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc., 143 S. Ct. 1176, 1183 (2023)).
42 Brunstein & Goodson, supra note 40, at 99-100 ("| Although a court must approach an agency's
assertion of authority with 'skepticism' after having determined it is 'unheralded' and represents a
'transformative' change, if the most natural reading of the statute would permit the agency action, the
agency has 'clear congressional authorization' for the action.").
B. EPA Should More Thoroughly Document Regulatory Antecedents for Vehicle
Electrification
EPA thoroughly documents antecedents for certain aspects of the Proposed Rule, such as the
treatment of upstream emissions and the application of averaging, banking, and trading.43 But
EPA should do more to emphasize that its current treatment of vehicle electrification (the issue at
the heart of the major questions challenge to the 2021 Rule) is not of sufficient novelty or
breadth to trigger the doctrine. Although it is not legally required for EPA to provide regulatory
antecedents to survive a major questions challenge, relevant antecedents provided in the
regulation itself would assist in a future defense of the rule.44 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601,
pp. 8-10]
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43 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,245 (averaging, banking, and trading); id. at 29,252 (treatment of
upstream emissions).
44 See Richard L. Revesz & Max Sarinsky, Regulatory Antecedents and the Major Questions Doctrine,
GEO. ENV'T L. REV. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 29).
The Proposed Rule includes only a limited discussion of how EPA's current approach to
electrification continues that of prior rulemakings.45 EPA should say more. EPA's brief in the
D.C. Circuit defending the 2021 Rule presents a table of greenhouse gas vehicle regulations that
considered electrification, complete with pincites.46 At a minimum, EPA should incorporate this
table by reference (as the Proposed Rule already does for the same briefs discussion of the
regulatory antecedents for averaging, banking, and trading47). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601,
pp. 8-10]
45 E.g., Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,297 (noting that "[i]n EPA's 2021 rule that set GHG emission
standards for MYs 2023 through 2026, we projected that manufacturers would comply with the 2026
standards with about 17 percent PEVs at the industry-wide level"); id. at 29,243 (describing the history of
advanced technology credits for hybrid powertrains, all-electric vehicles, and fuel cell electric vehicles for
heavy-duty vehicles).
46 Brief for EPA at 16 tbl.l, Texas v. EPA (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 24, 2023).
47 See Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,233 n.393.
EPA could also provide more detail on these antecedents. For instance, EPA might describe
specific features and provide quotations demonstrating that EPA has consistently exercised its
power to consider and incentivize electrification.48 For example, the 2012 Rule was projected to
increase electric vehicle penetration from 0% to 2% by model year 2025,49 and to increase
penetration of mild hybrid electric vehicles from 0% to 26%.50 And the 2020 Rule was projected
to increase fleetwide electric vehicle sales to 7.9% by model year 2029, as compared to 6.9% had
EPA not required emissions reductions.51 (These increases are relatively small in absolute
numbers because these rules covered model years in which electric vehicles were at the bottom
of an S-shaped curve, which is how adoptions rates are typically represented. 52 But the adoption
rate for electric vehicles is now increasing more rapidly after a critical mass has been reached.53)
In addition to greenhouse gas rules, EPA may also discuss the Tier 2 criteria pollutant standards
from 2000, in which the agency established a zero-emissions-vehicles bin and weighted these
vehicles double when calculating a manufacturer's fleet average NOX emissions.54 EPA
retained a zero-emissions bin for the Tier 3 standards in 2014.55 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0601, pp. 8-10]
48 See Revesz & Sarinsky, supra note 44, at 24-25.
49 EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: FINAL RULEMAKING FOR 2017-2025 LIGHT-
DUTY VEHICLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION STANDARDS AND CORPORATE AVERAGE
FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS 3-48 tbl.3.5-19, 3-54 tbl.3.5-25 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 RIA],
50 Compare id. 3-48 at tbl.3.5-19 with id. at 3-54 tbl.3.5-25.
51 NHTSA & EPA, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL-
EFFICIENT (SAFE) VEHICLES RULE FOR MODEL YEAR 2021-2026 PASSENGER CARS AND
LIGHT TRUCKS 2018 tbl.VIII-11 (2020).
52 E.g., Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations 344 (5th ed. 2003) (describing S-shaped adoption
curve).
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53 Tom Randall, US Crosses the Electric-Car Tipping Point for Mass Adoption, BLOOMBERG (July 9,
2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-09/us-electric-carsales-reach-key-milestone
(discussing the S- shaped technology adoption curve and noting that the United States has crossed the 5%
market share "tipping point" that triggers "rapidly accelerating demand").
54 Brief of Amicus Curiae Margo Oge & John Hannon at 25, Texas v. EPA (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 8, 2023)
(citing 65 Fed. Reg. 6,698, 6,734 tbl. IV.B.-2A, 6,746 (Feb. 10, 2000)).
55 Id. at 27 (citing 79 Fed. Reg. 23,414, 23,714 tbl. 2 of § 86.181 l-17(b)(4)(i) (Apr. 18, 2014)).
Finally, EPA should provide more historical examples of how its standards have caused
manufacturers to adopt emerging technologies. For example, just looking at the 2010 and 2012
rules reveals numerous potentially helpful examples: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 8-10]
- The 2010 Rule was projected to boost the penetration of six-speed dual-clutch transmission
from 7% to 55% by model year 2016.56 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 8-10]
- The 2010 Rule was projected to boost the penetration of 42-volt stop-start hybrid system
technology from 3% to 42%.57 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 8-10]
- The 2012 Rule was projected to boost the penetration of high-efficiency gearbox technology
from 0% to 95% by model year 2025.58 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 8-10]
- The 2012 Rule was projected to boost the penetration of exhaust gas recirculation
technology from 6% to 68%.59 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 8-10]
- The 2012 Rule was projected to boost the penetration of lower rolling resistance tires from
0% to 97%.60 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 8-10]
- The 2012 Rule was projected to boost the penetration of engine friction reduction
technology from 0% to 95%.61 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 8-10]
56 Compare EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: FINAL RULEMAKING TO ESTABLISH
LIGHT-DUTY VEHICLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION STANDARDS AND CORPORATE
AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS 4-22 tbl.4-10 (2010) with id. at 4-25 tbl.4-13.
57 Id.
58 2012 RIA, supra note 49, at 3-48 tbl.3.5-19, 3-54 tbl.3.5-25.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
The Proposed Rule's discussion of legal authority already mentions how "EPA's CAA Title II
emissions standards have been based on and stimulated the development of a broad set of
advanced automotive technologies, such as on-board computers and fuel injection systems."62
But EPA could further plumb these and other examples to demonstrate that the Proposed Rule's
treatment of vehicle electrification would not transform EPA's authority as a regulator. To the
extent that EPA regulations have previously considered the adoption of electronic/computerized
updates of once-analog vehicle components,63 EPA should document these especially relevant
examples as further support for its current consideration of electric motors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0601, pp. 8-10]
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62 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,233.
63 See Oge & Hannon, supra note 54, at 21-22 (describing how "[mjanufacturers transformed the
combustion process from a mechanical one to a sophisticated system with feedback loops, run by
computers with electronic sensors and controls," and "[electronic controls were developed to optimize the
[catalytic] converter's efficiency"); 2012 Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,672 (noting that EPA tailpipe standards
have "stimulated the development of a much broader set of advanced automotive technologies, such as on-
board computers and fuel injection systems, which are the building blocks of today's automotive designs
and have yielded not only lower pollutant emissions, but improved vehicle performance, reliability, and
durability").
C. EPA Should Better Contextualize the Proposed Rule's Economic Significance, in
Both Relative and Absolute Terms
EPA could better insulate the Proposed Rule from a future major questions challenge by
providing a more nuanced discussion of economic effects, both as compared to prior EPA
tailpipe rules and in absolute terms.64 In terms of relative costs, the Proposed Rule already notes
that the estimated average cost to manufacturers per vehicle is within the range of costs projected
in prior tailpipe rules.65 EPA could strengthen this point by also providing a table that
comprehensively describes annualized costs of prior tailpipe rules updated for inflation.66 This
table would bolster EPA's conclusion that the costs of the Proposed Rule are not exceptional.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 10-12]
64 EPA does make clear that the projected BEV penetration rate of 67% by 2032 should be compared to
the projected 39% penetration under the No Action case, not today's penetration rate. Compare Proposed
Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,329 tbl. 80, with id. tbl. 81.
65 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,343.
66 Governing for Impact & Evergreen Action, Comment Regarding NPRM "Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles" 10-12 (July 5, 2023).
EPA should further underscore this point by explaining that this cost similarity with prior
regulations obtains even though the Proposed Rule would simultaneously establish GHG and
criteria pollutant standards, instead of only one or the other. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601,
pp. 10-12]
In terms of absolute economic significance, EPA discusses BEV adoption primarily in terms
of the annual percentage of new vehicle sales,67 but an even more useful statistic would be the
percentage of BEVs out of all the vehicles on the road at a given time. First and foremost, doing
so would help the public better comprehend the rule's anticipated effects. It may be easier to
conceptualize increased vehicle electrification in terms of the percentage of vehicles on the road,
rather than the percentage of new sales. Presenting the data in this way would also help the
public to better understand how the Proposed Rule would affect transportation emissions, the
need for charging infrastructure, the demand for gasoline, and the demand for vehicle repair and
maintenance services. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 10-12]
67 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,329 tbl.80.
In terms of the major questions doctrine, reporting such data would provide compelling
context regarding economic significance. For example, under the proposed program, in 2032,
new vehicle sales would be 67% BEVs compared to 39% under the No Action case.68 But BEVs
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would comprise only 21.2% of the total fleet compared to 15% for the No Action case.69 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 10-12]
68 Id. & id. at 29,329 tbl.81.
69 This presentation would also enable a more apt comparison to the stock numbers of electricity
generation that the Supreme Court noted in West Virginia's background section. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct.
at 2593.
The RIA provides two figures that relate to this issue: Figure 9-1 depicts the total number of
internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles on the road every year under the proposed program,
and Figure 9-2 does the same for BEVs.70 Using EPA's data underlying these two figures,71
Policy Integrity generated the table below showing percentage rates by year for the No Action
case, EPA's proposed program, and Alternative 1. (For brevity, this table provides figures
annually from 2027-2032, and then every five years beginning in 2035.) EPA should provide
such a table or similar information in the regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 10-
12]
70 RIA at 9-2 tbls. 9-1, 9-2.
71 Optimization Model for Reducing Emissions of Greenhouse Gases from Automobiles, EPA (Apr.
2023), https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/optimization-model-reducing-
emissions- greenhouse-gases (download "Light- and medium-duty effects (zip); select
"20230315_091353_effects_central"; select "20230315_091353_cost_effects_annual.csv"; refer to
"registeredcount").
Table 1: Share of BEVs in U.S. Fleet by Year
Year No Action BEV % Proposed Program BEV % Alt. 1 BEV %
2027
5.2%
5.7%
5.7%
2028
6.9%
8.1%
8.3%
2029
8.9%
11.1%
11.2%
2030
11.0%
14.3%
14.6%
2031
13.1%
17.7%
18.0%
2032
15.0%
21.2%
21.6%
2035 19.2% 30.8% 31.7%
2040
24.6%
44.1%
46.0%
2045
27.4%
52.6%
55.3%
2050
28.4%
56.6%
59.8%
2055
29.2%
58.1%
61.5%
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 10-12]
As Table 1 illustrates, under both the proposed program and Alternative 1, the share of BEVs
out of all cars in the U.S. vehicle fleet compared to the No Action case increases gradually,
reaching less than seven percentage points higher than the No Action case by 2032. This
difference increases in later years. This relatively slow growth—particularly when viewed in
comparison to the share of all vehicles sold per year, which EPA provides in the Proposed
Rule—is not surprising given that cars remain on the road for many years, and the new cars sold
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in a single year reflect a small percentage of vehicles on the road at that time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0601, pp. 10-12]
Monetizing climate impacts may also be legally required. In 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that the federal government must monetize climate impacts when it
conducts a cost-benefit analysis. In Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, the Ninth Circuit remanded a fuel economy rule to the Department of
Transportation (DOT) for failing to monetize the benefits of carbon dioxide reductions in its
regulatory analysis. 153 The Court recognized the presence of uncertainty in the valuation of
climate damages, but explained that "the value of carbon emissions reduction is certainly not
zero." 154 By failing to value the benefit of greenhouse gas emission reductions in its analysis,
the Court continued, DOT effectively ignored the adverse impacts of greenhouse gas emissions
and thus "put a thumb on the scale by undervaluing the benefits ... of more stringent
standards." 155 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 23]
153 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1198-1203 (9th Cir. 2008).
154 Id. at 1200.
155 Id. at 1198.
In the Proposed Rule, EPA monetizes not only the expected benefits of the proposal but also
the expected compliance costs from industry. EPA then compares quantified cost and benefit
estimates in determining whether and how to regulate, as instructed by federal guidance and
executive order. 158 Capturing climate benefits is thus essential to ensuring a balanced analysis.
As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, "failure to monetize the most significant benefit of more
stringent standards: reduction in carbon emissions"—while continuing to value estimated
compliance costs—would "put a thumb on the scale by undervaluing the benefits and
overvaluing the costs of more stringent standards." 159 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 24]
158 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (directing that "in choosing among
alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits").
159 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1198-99.
2. The Working Group Did Not Bias Its Estimates by Ignoring Positive Impacts of
Climate Change
Critics sometimes claim that the Working Group's social cost values ignore important
positive impacts of a warming climate. Examples that have been offered to support this argument
include alleged agricultural benefits from higher temperatures and decreased wintertime
mortality. But these arguments are legally and factually dubious, and miss the forest for the trees.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 26-27]
Mere omission of some impacts does not counsel for abandoning the social cost estimates,
particularly since independent experts—and EPA's Draft SC-GHG Update—widely agree that
those estimates likely undervalue true climate damages because they omit far more negative
effects than positive ones. For instance, the Working Group has explained that several of the
underlying economic models omit certain major damage categories such as catastrophic damages
and certain cross-regional spillover effects. 176 These effects can be massive: One paper, for
instance, finds that the inclusion of tipping points doubles the social cost estimates, 177 with
another paper concluding that the effect is even greater and thus the Working Group's existing
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values "may be significantly underestimating the needs for controlling climate change." 178 The
current consensus of experts puts damages for a 3°C increase at roughly 5% to 10% of gross
domestic product, 179 which is substantially higher than the damages estimated by the IAMs.180
And as the Ninth Circuit has explained, the presence of some omitted damages does not provide
a legal basis to ignore established methodologies to monetize climate damages, since while
"there is a range of [plausible] values, the value of carbon emissions reduction is certainly not
zero."181 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 26-27]
176 2010 TSD, supra note 171, at 26, 32.
177 Derek Lemoine & Christian P. Traeger, Economics of Tipping the Climate Dominoes. 6 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 514 (2016).
178 Yongyang Cai et al., Environmental Tipping Points Significantly Affect the Cost-Benefit Assessment
of Climate Policies, 112 PROCS. NAT'L ACADS. SCIS. 4606 (2015).
179 See, e.g., Peter Howard & Derek Sylvan, Inst. forPol'y Integrity, Gauging Economic Consensus on
Climate Change 25 (2021) (reporting mean estimate of 8.5% GPD loss and median estimate of 5% loss,
based on elicitation of over 700 climate-policy experts).
180 2010 TSD, supra note 171, at 9 fig.lA (showing range of GDP loss below 5% for 3°C temperature
increase).
181 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 38 F.3d at 1200.
For the reasons discussed in supra Section I and elsewhere in this letter, Alternative 1 would
not substantially increase legal risk under the major questions doctrine. Alternative 1 relies on
the same regulatory approaches that have considerable precedent in prior EPA tailpipe rules.212
It also has similar effects on BEV penetration.213 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 30-31]
212 See generally supra Part I.B.
213 See supra p. 10 tbl.2.
Accordingly, barring a compelling reason otherwise, EPA should select the regulatory
alternative that maximizes net benefits—according to EPA's current analysis, Alternative 1.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 30-31]
Organization: Job Creators Network Foundation (JCNF)
EPA's Proposed Rule Is Illegal
To begin, JCNF does not believe that EPA has the legal authority to issue these proposed
regulations. Although it claims authority under the Clean Air Act to promulgate such a
transformative rule, recent decisions issued by the United States Supreme Court indicate that the
CAA does not give EPA such broad authority. In what has come to be known as the "major
questions doctrine," the Court has rejected agency claims of authority to act when the claim of
authority concerns an issue of "vast 'economic and political significance'" and Congress has not
expressly delegated such vast power to the agency.2 While the doctrine has "arisen from all
corners of the administrative state,"3 in West Virginia v. EPA the Court applied it to EPA's
power under the CAA.3 In that case the Court rejected EPA's attempt to use the CAA to
"substantially restructure the American energy market."5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0709, pp.
1-2]
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2 Congressional Research Service, "The Major Questions Doctrine," (Link:
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12077) In Focus (Nov. 2, 2022).
3 Biden v. Nebraska, Slip Op. at 24 (June 30, 2023).
4 West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022).
5 Id. at 2610.
By requiring that sixty-seven percent of new vehicle sales be electric by 2032, with this
proposed rule the agency would restructure the entire automobile industry. Absent express
authorization from Congress, EPA does not have the legal authority to issue this rule. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0709, pp. 1-2]
Organization: John Graham
EPA's Response to Comments document for the 2023-2026 light-duty standards dismissed
lifecycle arguments as irrelevant since the Agency has not proposed to address a possible change
in the "form" of the standard. However, lifecycle emissions are not a "form of the standard",
they are part of what determines the total amount of C02 emissions caused by vehicles. It is
disingenuous to suggest that, for example, selecting between footprint- and weight-based
adjustments to the standards, which is well accepted as a change in the form of the standards, is
the same as ignoring C02 emissions equivalent to 40% of 2021 ICEV emissions. Delaying
indefinitely a move to a lifecycle standard is not technology-neutral, as it retards HEV
deployment and innovation, while hurting the environment and the economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0585, p.38]
Therefore, we are requesting that EPA also consider our comment as a petition for rulemaking
(under the APA and CAA) to adopt a lifecycle emissions standard for vehicles. If necessary, the
agency could go final with the 2027 standards with the tailpipe metric and hold on finalization of
the 2028-2032 standards until the lifecycle rulemaking is completed. This would ensure that
automakers have ample lead time (4-5 years) to adjust to the new lifecycle metric and the new
lifecycle performance standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 38]
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
The Proposed Rule tries to expand EPA's authority under Section 202 of the CAA to force
automobile manufacturers to build fewer vehicles with internal combustion engines and make
more EVs instead—many more, and quickly. The numbers are staggering: EPA expects that the
proposal will create enough EVs to penetrate 67% and 46% of overall light- and medium-duty
vehicle sales respectively in less than a decade. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,329, 29,331. Forcing that
market transformation goes far beyond the statutory limits Congress set. And it is bad policy.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 3]
The Agency points to no textual hook for the Proposed Rule in Section 202—much less a
connection clear enough to support the hefty political and economic issues at stake. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 3]
The Proposed Rule also generates tension with the regulatory efforts of agencies in other
areas. As described above, the Department of Transportation, through NHTSA, has the authority
to set average fuel economy standards for automobiles. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a). EPA and NHTSA
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have previously acted in conceit. Now that those efforts have been bifurcated, EPA's proposals
could limit dramatically not just the effect of NHTSA's regulatory scheme, but also automakers'
ability to comply with the suite of regulations. It seems this may have been the plan all along.
See Private Pet'r Opening Br., Texas v. EPA, No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2023), ECF No.
1996915, at 9-10 ("Before joining the administration, the heads of the Council on Environmental
Quality and EPA's Office of Air and Radiation (which wrote this rule) advocated this
'decoupling' precisely so that EPA could take 'a bolder approach on light duty vehicle
electrification.'" (quoting Climate 21 Proj., Transition Memo: Environmental Protection Agency
11 (2021))). But EPA has no authority to wield this kind of power and reduce NHTSA's role in
this way, especially considering that Congress has spoken clearly thatNHTSA "may not
consider" EV fuel economy in setting its own standards. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(h)(1). EPA's
apparent attempt to expand its own authority under the CAA ignores the broader statutory
context. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 5]
The Proposed Rule also does not grapple with the fact that EPA needs more than a "plausible
textual basis" to issue rules that, as here, implicate significant political and economic issues.
West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2610 (2022). Indeed, the proposal is long on explaining
that climate change "threatens human health." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,207. And it does not hide the
ball that the Agency is "forc[ing] the industry to" make EVs that it would not otherwise. Id. at
29,233 (quoting International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 634-35 (D.C. Cir.
1973)). But the Proposed Rule is short on explaining how Congress made it "clea[r]" that the
CAA "authorizes] [the] agency to exercise powers of [such] 'vast economic and political
significance." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 5-6]
Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (quoting Utility Air Regul.
Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) ("UARG")). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 5-6]
So the reality is that the Proposed Rule is another EPA attempt to "substantially restructure"
an important sector of the American economy. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2610. Yet in the 263
Federal Register pages the Proposed Rule spans, the Agency does not reckon with the Supreme
Court's recent rebuke of a similarly "transformative expansion" of "regulatory authority,"
UARG, 573 U.S. at 324, nor explain where Congress clearly delegated EPA power to remake the
nation's car fleets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 6]
In fact, many of the same indicators that made West Virginia "a relatively easy case for the
[major questions] doctrine's application," are present here, too. 142 S. Ct. at 2621 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). The "serious[ness] [of] the problem"—in both cases, climate change policy—does
not excuse an attempt to exert "authority in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative
structure that Congress enacted into law." FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 125 (2000) (cleaned up). Rather, regulating in an area that remains "the subject of an
earnest and profound debate across the country" should counsel more restraint, not less. West
Virginia, 142 S. Ct at 2614. Yet the Proposed Rule shifts a longstanding scheme to regulate
internal combustion engine vehicles into one that erases most of those same cars from the
market. Major questions often follow "transformative expansion^]" of agency power like these.
West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2614 (cleaned up); see also id. at 2612 (describing agency
interpretations that "effect a fundamental revision of [a] statute, changing it from [one sort of]
scheme of. . . regulation into an entirely different kind"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 6]
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
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EPA first regulated GHG emissions from motor vehicles following the Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, which held that EPA had certain authority under the CAA to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Following the
Massachusetts decision, EPA issued an endangerment finding for "six well-mixed greenhouse
gases," including carbon dioxide ("C02"). 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). EPA then
promulgated its initial standards for these gases through joint rulemaking with the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"). NHTSA is authorized to set corporate
average fuel economy standards under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 2-3]
The first of these joint EPA-NHTSA rulemakings occurred in 2010. At that time, EPA and
NHTSA set initial C02 emissions standards for model years 2012-2016 and later. 75 Fed. Reg.
25,234 (May 7, 2010). In 2012, EPA and NHTSA set new, more stringent C02 emissions
standards for model years 2017-2025 and later. 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012). In 2020,
EPA and NHTSA issued a rule ("the 2020 Rule") that revised the standards for model years
2022- 2025, making those standards less stringent and setting a new standard for model years
2026 and later. 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 2-3]
Then President Biden took office and began instituting his climate agenda. By executive
order, he required the whole of the federal government to commit the full extent of its authority
to reducing GHG emissions. Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and
Abroad, Exec. Order No. 14008 of January 27, 2021 ("[W]e must combat the climate crisis with
bold, progressive action that combines the full capacity of the Federal Government with efforts
from every corner of our Nation, every level of government, and every sector of our economy.").
In response, EPA revised the C02 emissions standard for model years 2023 and later (the "2021
Rule"). 86 Fed. Reg. 74,434 (Dec. 30, 2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 2-3]
The 2021 Rule fundamentally changed EPA's approach to the regulation of motor vehicle
emissions. Previously, emissions standards occurred via joint rulemaking with NHTSA and were
set in concert with its promulgation of fuel economy standards. This approach made sense
because emissions and fuel economy standards are inextricably linked. But the President's
climate agenda made joint rulemaking with NHTSA problematic. NHTSA is statutorily
prohibited from considering the fuel economy of EVs when setting fuel economy standards. 49
U.S.C. § 32902(h)(1). Consequently, to avoid legal impediments to the President's climate
agenda, the 2021 Rule decoupled EPA emissions standards from NHTSA fuel economy
standards. The State of Texas, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and other state and private
petitioners challenged the 2021 Rule in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C Circuit.
Texas, et al. v. EPA, et al., Case No. 22-1031. Those challenges remain pending. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 2-3]
In December 2021, President Biden issued yet another executive order, stating that "America
must lead the world on clean and efficient cars and trucks" by "bolstering our domestic market
by setting a goal that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-
emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric
vehicles." Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks, Exec. Order 14037 of
August 5, 2021. In support of this policy, the President specifically dictated that "[t]he
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) shall, as appropriate and
consistent with applicable law, consider beginning work on a rulemaking under the [CAA] to
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establish new multi-pollutant emissions standards, including for greenhouse gas emissions, for
light- and medium-duty vehicles beginning with model year 2027 and extending through and
including at least model year 2030." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 2-3]
The Proposed Rule is the result of the President's mandate. The Proposed Rule sets
"increasingly stringent" standards for C02. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,240. For light-duty passenger
cars, the proposal would require a reduction in emissions from 152 grams of C02 emitted per
mile traveled ("g/mile") for model year 2026 to 73 g/mile for model years 2032 and later—a
reduction of 52%. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,239. For light-duty trucks, the Proposed Rule would require
a reduction from 207 g/mile for model year 2026 to 89 g/mile for model years 2032 and later—a
reduction of 57%. Id. Fleet-wide for all light-duty vehicles, the Proposed Rule would require a
reduction in emissions from 186 g/mile for model year 2026 to 82 g/mile for model years 2032
and later—a reduction of 56%. Id. at 29,239-29,240. For medium-duty vehicles, the Proposed
Rule would require a reduction in C02 emissions from 438 g/mile for model year 2027 to 275
g/mile for model years 2032 and later—a reduction of 37%. Id. at 29,243. In addition to the
revised C02 standards, EPA's proposal establishes more stringent emissions standards for non-
methane organic gases plus nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, and
formaldehyde. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 2-3]
I. The Proposed Rule Exceeds EPA's Statutory Authority.
The Proposed Rule violates EPA's statutory limitations in several ways. EPA may "prescribe .
. . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in [its] judgment cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7521(a)(1). Such standards "shall take effect after such period as the Administrator finds
necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving
appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." Id. § 7521(a)(2). [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 4]
A vehicle must be tested to determine whether it complies with emissions standards. The
administrator "shall test, or require to be tested in such a manner as he deems appropriate, any
new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine submitted by a manufacturer to determine
whether such a vehicle or engine conforms with the regulations prescribed under section 7521 of
this title." 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1). If a vehicle or engine complies, each manufacturer must
"indicate by means of a label or tag permanently affixed to such a vehicle or engine that such
vehicle or engine is covered by a certificate of conformity issued for the purpose of assuring
achievement of emissions standards prescribed under section 7521 of this title." Id. §
7541(c)(3)(C). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 4]
The Proposed Rule exceeds EPA's authority because EPA is permitted to set emissions
standards only for classes of new motor vehicles that "cause, or contribute to, air pollution." 42
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). But EPA asserts that EVs do not emit C02. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,252
("Electric vehicle operation would therefore continue to be counted as 0 g/mile."). If EVs are not
subject to the Agency's emissions standards, then it follows that EPA cannot include EVs in any
calculations that determine those emissions standards. By allowing EVs to help set standards for
internal combustion engines, the Proposed Rule puts its thumb on the scale of free markets. This
preference for EVs goes well beyond EPA's statutory role, as it contemplates a wholesale
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substitution of a new vehicle or engine rather than the mere "application" of a "technology" to an
existing vehicle or engine type. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 4]
And even if a shift to EVs could be termed the "development and application of [a] requisite
technology," EPA has failed to recognize the "period" that will be "necessary" to develop and
implement that technology, as required. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0649, p. 4]
But as for EVs, EPA does not adequately explain how it can expand its authority to designate
certain batteries and other "associated electric powertrain components" in the same way. Id. at
29,286-29,287. It says only that the expansion is an important one, and that these components
"were not in general use prior to 1990" and exceed the necessary cost threshold. Id. Missing, of
course, is an adequate explanation of how these batteries and other nameless associated electric
powertrain components qualify as "pollution control device[s] or components]" under the
statute. 42 U.S.C. § 7541(i)(2). And given the robust body of state warranty law already in place,
a power grab this bold—and in an area (consumer protection) that is typically under the purview
of other agencies—needs a much more thorough explanation than the passing one EPA
provided. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 4-5]
Congress has also "conspicuously and repeatedly declined to enact" legislation targeting the
precise issues the Proposed Rule presses, West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2610, making EPA's
"claimed delegation all the more suspect," Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006); cf.
Private Pet'r Opening Br., Texas v. EPA, No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2023), ECF No.
1996915, at 28-29, 31-33 (noting that Congress "remains in factfinding mode" on the issue of
electrification and has "previously considered and rejected multiple bills with effects similar to
EPA's rule"); see also Letter to the EPA Administrator of May 25, 2023, https://bit.ly/42EwSBI
(letter from 27 U.S. Senators asking EPA to withdraw the Proposed Rule because, among other
things, it "violates the separation of powers"); Letter to the EPA Administrator of May 22, 2023,
https://bit.ly/43AvMs7 (letter from over 150 members of the U.S. House of Representatives
expressing concern about the "unworkable and impractical" standards in the Proposed Rule).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 7-8]
So there is a strong potential that reviewing courts will conclude that whether EPA can force
electrification of the vast majority of the nation's automobile industry is a major question that
only Congress can answer, or else it must delegate in exceedingly clear terms. And just as in
West Virginia, the Proposed Rule fails to identify the necessary textual hook. It is not enough to
say that the proposal just "prescribe[s] . . . standards" for a "class" of vehicles. 42 U.S.C. §
7521(a)(1). When the rule deliberately forces car dealers to take two-thirds of the most common
types of vehicles off showroom floors to meet those "standards," the rule has morphed into
something else. Under the Proposed Rule's approach, for instance, EPA could "demand much
greater reductions in emissions based on a very different kind of policy judgment" than what
technology allows for existing fleets: "that it would be 'best' if' internal combustion engine
vehicles "made up a much smaller share of' automobile manufacturing and sales. West Virginia,
142 S. Ct. at 2612. What, after all, would stop EPA from "go[ing] further, perhaps forcing"
automakers "to cease making [internal combustion engine vehicles] altogether"? Id. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 7-8]
And recall that Congress went out of its way to recognize that rules under this portion of the
CAA may need waiting periods "to permit the development and application of the requisite
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technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2).
Again, and as detailed below, EPA is ignoring this requirement by putting automakers in the
impossible position of trying to satisfy the Proposed Rule's fast-and-furious production demands
with a supply chain that is not ready for it, and at the cost of innovation that would have
otherwise improved EV efforts in the short and long term. Clearly, Congress was concerned with
not outpacing existing technology. In other words, though EPA can put a thumb on the scale to
speed developments along, it cannot use its standard-setting power to will new fleets into
existence that the market cannot deliver. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 7-8]
II. The Proposed Rule Is Arbitrary And Capricious.
The Administrative Procedure Act requires EPA "to engage in reasoned decisionmaking, and
directs that agency actions be set aside if they are arbitrary or capricious." Dep't of Homeland
Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1905 (2020) (cleaned up). Courts will
evaluate whether the Proposed Rule "was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Id. (cleaned up). So among other things, EPA
must show that it "examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for [its]
decision, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." Dep't of
Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569 (2019) (cleaned up). "Unsubstantiated or bare
assumptions" are not enough. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 31 F.4th 1203, 1207 (9th Cir.
2022) (cleaned up). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 8]
The Proposed Rule would not survive this review for several reasons. EPA built it on faulty
premises and inaccurate cost-benefit projections. And EPA ignored critical aspects of the
problem that make the Proposed Rule's world unrealistic and dangerous. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0649, p. 8]
Organization: Landmark Legal Foundation
Further exacerbating its affronts against the separation of powers, the Proposed Rule also
violates the Major Questions Doctrine. According to the EPA's own projections, this regulation
could incur up to $565 billion in costs to industry. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,199nl30 (see: Table 156)
(May 5, 2023). This figure comes from the "present future value" of repair, maintenance, and
refueling time costs that this regulation imposes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 4-5]
In just the past two years, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down several economically
overreaching agency actions. In 2021, the Justices upheld a stay on a nationwide eviction
moratorium instituted by the HHS, concerned by economic costs that could be estimated at
"nearly $50 billion." Alabama Assoc. of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021). Last
year, the Court struck down an EPA program which would have raised nationwide electricity
costs by "over $200 billion." West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2623 (2022) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). In both cases, the tremendous economic burden factored heavily into their rulings.
A government program costing the public over $565 billion would fall well within the totals
established by these earlier Major Questions Doctrine cases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547,
pp. 4-5]
Levying such dramatic economic impacts via a federal regulation, and without a clear
delegation from Congress, is not within the prerogatives of the executive branch. The
government may not justify hundreds of billions in costs to the public by accounting for the
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"benefits" of reducing SC-GHGs, which totals themselves were estimated in a manner that
lacked public comment. At best, to do so is a colossal regulatory mistake. At worst, it is an
intentional deception of the American public. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Mario Loyola
Discussion
A. Statutory Background
In the Proposed Rule, EPA proposes to set standards for multiple pollutants from multiple
classes and categories of vehicles and engines in MYs 2027-2032, under multiple provisions of
the CAA. With respect to "Light Duty Vehicles" ("LDVs"), which includes cars and light trucks,
the Proposed Rule would promulgate standards under Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA. With
respect to "Medium Duty Vehicles" ("MDVs"), which includes heavy-duty pickups and vans,
the Proposed Rule would promulgate standards under Section 202(a)(3). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0689, pp. 2-3]
Section 202(a)(1) is the general standard-setting provision for mobile sources, while Section
202(a)(3) provides further specificity for heavy-duty vehicles (which includes MDVs) with
respect to emissions of hydrocarbons and certain criteria pollutants, and does not apply to most
GHGs . The two sections differ with respect to how standards are set and what factors EPA must
consider in setting them. Section 202(a)(1) authorizes the EPA's Administrator to set "standards
applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." Section 202(a)(2) provides
that any regulation promulgated under the basic provision of (a)(1) can only take effect "after
such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of
the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such
period." For heavy duty vehicles (including MDVs), Section 202(a)(3) further requires that
emissions standards must "reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through
the application of technology which the Administrator determines will be available for the model
year to which such standards apply, giving appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety
factors associated with the application of such technology." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689,
pp. 2-3]
Both sections refer to standards applicable to "classes or categories" of vehicles. For LDVs,
EPA has used a system of "footprint" classification, with different standards applicable to
different classes of vehicle depending on the surface area covered by the vehicle, in square feet.
For MDVs, by contrast, EPA relies on a "work factor" classification that it has used for heavy-
duty vehicles, with different standards applicable to different vehicles depending on a weighting
of factors that include payload and towing capacity. Importantly, Section 202(a)(3)(A)(ii), which
provides that the Administrator "may base such classes or categories on gross vehicle weight,
horsepower, type of fuel used, or other appropriate factors," applies only to the classes or
categories of heavy-duty vehicles mentioned in paragraph (a)(3)(A), which in turn applies mostly
to criteria pollutants, and does not apply to most GHGs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 2-
3]
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It is important to highlight that the Proposed Rule's GHG emission standards for both LDVs
and MDVs would be promulgated under Section 202(a)(1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689,
pp. 2-3]
B. Battery Electric Vehicles Do Not Belong to Any Class of Vehicle Subject to Regulation
under Title II of the CAA.
EPA is explicit about its purpose in the Proposed Rule: "Our analysis projects that for the
industry overall, 65 percent of new vehicles in MY 2032 would be BEVs,"7 referring to fully
electrical vehicles.8 That compares to less than six percent of new vehicle registrations for fully
electric vehicles last year.9 As EPA says in the Proposed Rule: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0689, pp. 3-6]
7 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,342.
8 EPA distinguishes between Batery Electric Vehicles ("BEVs"), which are fully electric, and other sorts of
electric vehicles, such as hybrids.
9 Ana Faguy, "Planned EPA Rules Could Make 67% of New U.S. Cars Electric by 2032," Forbes, April
12, 2023.
Among the range of technologies that have been demonstrated over the past decade,
electrification technologies have seen particularly rapid development and lower costs, and as a
result the number of PEVs projected across all the policy alternatives considered here is much
higher than in any of EPA's prior rulemaking analyses. In particular, BEVs have zero tailpipe
emissions and so are capable of supporting rates of annual stringency increases that are much
greater than were typical in earlier rulemakings. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
10 88 Fed. Reg. at 29341
The Proposed Rule is designed to accomplish its mission by imposing emissions standards on
new motor vehicles so strict that no vehicle powered by an internal combustion engine would be
able to comply with them. Hence, if the Proposed Rule applied only to vehicles with emissions
subject to regulation under the CAA, the rule would not satisfy statutory requirements, which
include feasibility and reasonable cost-of-compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
EPA gets around this by what amounts to a clever accounting trick. It defines the "classes" of
vehicles subject to Title II as including EVs, even though, according to EPA, they have zero
emissions and should therefore be excluded from regulation under the CAA entirely. EPA then
sets "emission standards" that reflect not its estimate of how much time manufacturers of
regulated vehicles would need to develop and adopt any emissions-control technology on the
vehicles subject to regulation—the determination required by Section 202 of the CAA—but
rather only its estimate of the average emissions from vehicles of various sizes that would result
from its guestimate of the extent to which EVs will displace combustion engine vehicles during
the MYs in question. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
Because Title II of the CAA provides no guidance on how the Administrator is to define the
"class or classes" of vehicles subject to Section 202(a)(1), the phrase "any class or classes of new
motor vehicles" must be given its natural, plain meaning. While the Administrator doubtless has
wide latitude to define the classes subject to regulation under Section 202(a)(1), and no federal
court has ruled on this precise question, the phrase "class or classes of new motor vehicles"
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cannot mean whatever the Administrator wants it to mean. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp.
3-6]
The phrase could not, for example, include both electric scooters and gasoline-powered cars,
even though both are "motor vehicles" under the Clean Air Act. 11 The structure of Title II
clearly precludes that possibility. Section 202(a)(2) provides that any standard issued under
Section 201(a) can only take effect after "such period as the Administrator finds necessary to
permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate
consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." Common sense dictates that this
could not be read as authorizing EPA to force car manufacturers to produce electric scooters
instead of cars in order to comply with emissions standards under Title II. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
11 The CAA defines "motor vehicle" as "any self-propelled vehicle designed for transporting persons or
property on a street or highway." Section 216, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7550.
Section 202(a)(1) obviously contemplates that a "class or classes of new motor vehicles" will
share a common configuration, such that "the requisite technology" can be developed and
applied to all vehicles of a future MY of that vehicle class. In that sense, "class or classes of new
motor vehicles" is akin to the source categories under the New Source Performance Standards
program of Section 111. Clearly, EPA could not define Portland Cement Manufacturing to
include artisanal pottery for the purpose of imposing the latter's emissions rates on the former.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
One further observation bears mentioning in this connection. Section 202(a) authorizes EPA
to regulate emissions "from any class or classes of new motor vehicles." EPA has made no effort
to study the emissions from battery EVs, because, as it explains in the Proposed Rule, "BEVs
have zero tailpipe emissions." But Section 202 is not limited to "tailpipe emissions." Its purview
is much broader, referring to emissions "from" new motor vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0689, pp. 3-6]
That the word "from" is susceptible of a broader meaning becomes clear when one considers
that in the Proposed Rule, EPA continues the practice, introduced in the 2014 "Tier 3" final rule,
of "considering the vehicle and its fuel as an integrated system." 12 As the Proposed Rule
explains, "The Tier 3 standards achieved reductions of up to 80 percent in tailpipe criteria
pollutant emissions by treating the engine and fuel as an integrated system and requiring cleaner
fuel as well as improved catalytic emissions control systems "13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0689, pp. 3-6]
12 Control of Air Pollution From Motor Vehicles: Tier 3 Motor Vehicle Emission and Fuel Standards",79
Fed. Reg. 23414, 23416 (April 28, 2014).
13 88 Fed. Reg. at 29188.
EPA's practice of treating "the engine and fuel as an integrated system" is fully in keeping
with the general scope of Section 202(a). There is no reason, and no reasonable basis, for EPA
not to follow this same practice with EVs that EPA insists on including EVs in its definition of
"classes" of new motor vehicles subject to Title II. EVs are not perpetual motion machines. Like
all other motor vehicles, they use fuel, namely the fuel needed to produce the electricity needed
to charge them. And that fuel—only a small fraction of which is renewable—produces
significant emissions, including carbon emissions. The difference between EVs and combustion
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engine vehicles is not that EVs have zero emissions, but rather that their emissions occur
elsewhere than at the tailpipe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
This is particularly important considering the massive increases in electrical grid capacity that
would be required by a transition to widespread EV use. There is a limit to how much renewable
energy can be put on a grid while still maintaining grid reliability, and under current technology
the limit appears to be quite low: At 30 percent renewable, the California grid is beset by a
massive excess of solar electricity in the middle of the day and is often on the verge of blackouts
by evening, particularly in summer months. 14 Hence, in the near term, the Proposed Rule will
result in a massive increase in the need for dispatchable power, which (given the long
construction and permitting lead-times of nuclear power) can only come from coal and natural
gas. That puts the Proposed Rule on a collision course with the EPA's proposed new power plant
rule, 15 which will require many coal and natural gas plants to cease operations at the same time
as the Proposed Rule on vehicle emissions will require many more such plants to be built. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
14 Mario Loyola, "Unleashing America's Energy Abundance Permitting Reform Is Vital for Affordable
Clean Energy," Competitive Enterprise Institute, September 27, 2022.
15 New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean
Energy Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 33240 (May 23, 2023).
EPA's failure to recognize that power plant emissions associated with EVs should be
considered "emissions from" such vehicles is understandable, given that Title II of the CAA was
clearly not designed with EVs in mind. That only highlights the absurdity of including them in
the same "classes of new motor vehicles" as combustion engine vehicles subject to regulation
under Title II. It also highlights the great political significance of the choices that EPA is taking
upon itself to make, on the basis of sweeping powers that it claims to have found in a long-extant
provision of the Clean Air Act that explicitly delegates no such power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
C. EPA's Interpretation of Section 202(a) Would Give it Sweeping Powers to Reorganize the
American Economy.
The Supreme Court recently struck down a rule very similar to the Proposed Rule, namely the
2015 Clean Power Plan. In West Virginia v. EPA, 16 the Court took a close look at EPA's
authority to set emissions limits for existing stationary sources under Section 111(d) of the CAA.
Section 111(d) provides that EPA may set, for particular source categories, the emissions limits
that are achievable by application of the "best system of emissions reduction" that has been
adequately demonstrated in that source category. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 6-7]
16 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022).
That standard, known as "BSER," had always been interpreted to refer to technologies, such
as scrubbers, that sources like coal plants could feasibly install within the facility to reduce
emissions. But in a move at least as clever as defining "classes" of gasoline vehicles to include
EVs, EPA decided that the BSER could extend beyond the fence line to the whole economy,
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encompassing utilities' choice of power sources for generating electricity—a matter that the
Federal Power Act specifically leaves to the states and, in certain situations, to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission. 17 Under its power to regulate emissions from coal plants, the
Clean Power Plan would have forced states to switch to natural gas and eventually renewables.
Indeed, as originally proposed the Clean Power Plan would have established EPA's authority to
control how and when people are allowed to use electricity in their own homes. 18 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 6-7]
17 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828c (1940), as amended.
18 See, Block 4 (demand side) BSER, "Carbon Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electrical Utility Generating Units," 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014) (proposed rulemaking).
As the Supreme Court explained, once EPA expanded the concept of "BSER" from power
plants to utilities' choice of power sources, it could set the emission standard at whatever level it
liked:
The Agency recognized that—given the nature of generation shifting—it could choose from
"a wide range of potential stringencies for the BSER." 80 Fed. Reg. 64730. Put differently, in
translating the BSER into an operational emissions limit, EPA could choose whether to require
anything from a little generation shifting to a great deal. 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp.
6-7]
19 142 S. Ct. at 2603.
The standards in the Clean Power Plan "resulted in numerical emissions ceilings so strict that
no existing coal plant would have been able to achieve them without engaging in [generation-
shifting],"20 The Court went on to note, "Rather than focus on improving the performance of
individual sources, it would improve the overall power system by lowering the carbon intensity
of power generation. And it would do that by forcing a shift throughout the power grid from one
type of energy source to another" :21 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 6-7]
20 142 S. Ct. at 2604.
21 142 S. Ct. at 2611 (quotations and citations omitted).
On EPA's view of Section 111(d), Congress implicitly tasked it, and it alone, with balancing
the many vital considerations of national policy implicated in deciding how Americans will get
their energy. EPA decides, for instance, how much of a switch from coal to natural gas is
practically feasible by 2020, 2025, and 2030 before the grid collapses, and how high energy
prices can go as a result before they become unreasonably "exorbitant." There is little reason to
think Congress assigned such decisions to the Agency.22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp.
6-7]
22 142 S. Ct. at 2612.
"We presume that Congress intends to make major policy decisions itself, not leave those
decisions to agencies."23 The same may be said of the Proposed Rule. Its emissions limits are so
strict that no manufacturer of combustion engine vehicles will be able to comply with it except
by switching to the production of a completely different type of vehicle. The switch from
traditional cars to renewable cars is the definition of a major policy decision, and nowhere in the
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CAA does it say that Congress wanted EPA to make the choice of where, how, and when that
switch should happen. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 6-7]
23 142 S. Ct. at 2609 (quotations and citations omitted).
"In arguing that Section 111(d) empowers it to substantially restructure the American energy
market," the Supreme Court held, "EPA claimed to discover in a long-extant statute an
unheralded power representing a transformative expansion in its regulatory authority."24 That is
virtually indistinguishable from what EPA is trying to do in the Proposed Rule: It is claiming to
have found in a long-extant statute the power to substantially restructure the transportation
sector, and with it, a major part of the American economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp.
6-7]
24 142 S. Ct. at 2610 (quotations and citations omitted).
In West Virginia v. EPA, the Court held that the EPA's sudden discovery of a "transformative
expansion" in its regulatory authority based on an obscure provision of "a long-extant statute"
raised a "major question" about the agency's authority, requiring Congress to speak with far
greater clarity than it had in the statute. The EPA's expansive definition of BSER entailed
impacts of great political significance and sought to regulate a significant portion of the
American economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 6-7]
Just so, EPA's infinitely elastic interpretation of its authority under Title II of the CAA
presents a major question. The claimed power entails impacts of great political significance and
would regulate a significant portion of the American economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0689, pp. 6-7]
Organization: Mayor Becky Daggett, City of Flagstaff, Arizona et al.
Outcomes
The final standards should:
Ensure the LDV and HDV standards support greater zero-emission vehicle adoption by
considering market growth expected from IRA and IIJA investments (which will surpass existing
commitments outlined in Executive Order 14037);
Put the nation on a trajectory to ensure 100 percent of all LDVs and HDVs sold in 2035
are zero-emission vehicles including pathway milestones assuring continuous progress; and
Reflect recently adopted state LDV and HDV emissions standards, consistent with state
authority under the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 2]
By implementing these recommendations, we believe that the resultant standards will not only
meet the Clean Air Act's statutory command to protect public health, but will also help lower
fuel costs for consumers, create good, green jobs, and reduce burden on frontline communities.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 2]
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
Importance of More Protective Federal Standards for Light-Duty Vehicle and Medium-Duty
Vehicle Emissions of Multiple Pollutants [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, p. 2]
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The U.S. transportation sector has surpassed the manufacturing and power generation sectors
as the largest source of GHG emissions in the country, representing over 27 percent of total
GHG emissions nationwide. However, in numerous areas of the country the contribution of the
transportation sector is far greater - 40 percent or more. Light-duty vehicles (LDVs) alone, not
even considering the medium-duty vehicles (MDVs) also addressed by this rule, are the largest
contributor nationwide to transportation-sector GHG emissions at 57 percent and are responsible
for 15.5 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions. LDVs are also responsible for an overwhelming
portion of pollutants that cause or contribute to ozone and soot and cancer-causing pollutants,
particularly in disadvantaged communities, reinforcing the need for continuously strengthened
standards to cut, and eventually eliminate, emissions from these vehicles.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0559, p. 2]
6 Supra note 1, at 29,186
In its March 20, 2023, "AR6 Synthesis Report: Climate Change 2023," the United Nations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concludes, among many other things, that 1)
"Human activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally
caused global warming, with global surface temperature reaching 1.1 °C above 1850-1900 in
2011-2020. Global greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase, with unequal historical
and ongoing contributions arising from unsustainable energy use, land use and land-use change,
lifestyles and patterns of consumption and production across regions, between and within
countries, and among individuals"; 2) "Policies and laws addressing mitigation have consistently
expanded since AR5. Global GHG emissions in 2030 implied by nationally determined
contributions (NDCs) announced by October 2021 make it likely that warming will exceed 1.5°C
during the 21st century and make it harder to limit warming below 2°C. There are gaps between
projected emissions from implemented policies and those from NDCs and finance flows fall
short of the levels needed to meet climate goals across all sectors and regions"; and 3) "For any
given future warming level, many climate-related risks are higher than assessed in AR5, and
projected long-term impacts are up to multiple times higher than currently observed. Risks and
projected adverse impacts and related losses and damages from climate change escalate with
every increment of global warming. Climatic and non-climatic risks will increasingly interact,
creating compound and cascading risks that are more complex and difficult to manage."7 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, p. 2]
7 https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/
Organization: National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) et al.
V. EPA's Proposed Rule Is a "Major Question" Reserved for Congress.
EPA's proposed standards should not favor one technology over another. The Proposed Rule,
however, goes beyond favoritism and signals the Agency's intention to phase out non-EV
technologies, such as ICE vehicles. Despite EPA's assertions to the contrary, the Proposed Rule
mandates non-ICE technologies because auto manufacturers cannot comply with the standards
through the sale of ICE vehicles alone. And EPA explicitly anticipates EV adoption rates high
and above current market rates to achieve these standards. By MY2032, EPA predicts an EV
adoption rate between 62-78 percent across all subcategories of vehicles to achieve compliance
with the proposed standards.44 The Proposed Rule will therefore introduce a transformational
shift in the automotive industry—including the fuel retail industry—far beyond that which EPA
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has authority to mandate as delegated by Congress. Whether this shift is necessary and how best
to achieve such a shift are "major questions" reserved for Congress and Congress alone.45
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 14-15]
44 Proposed Rule at 29,329.
45 Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the "major questions" doctrine just one week ago,
concluding that the tradeoffs "inherent in a mass debt cancellation program 'are ones that Congress would
likely have intended for itself." Biden v. Nebraska, No. 22-506, slip op. at 24-25 (Jun. 30, 2023) (internal
citations omitted) (applying major questions doctrine to strike down student loan repayment program that
will cost taxpayers approximately $500 billion and affects nearly every student loan borrower). Similarly,
the tradeoffs inherent in a mass EV-adoption program are those that Congress would have intended for
itself, not EPA.
Consistent with the "major questions doctrine," Congress must "speak clearly" to authorize an
agency to exercise powers of "vast economic and political significance."46 Overreaching
environmental regulatory programs like the Proposed Rule fit precisely into this doctrine. In
West Virginia v. EPA, the Supreme Court invoked the doctrine when it held that EPA had
exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the Clean Power Plan.47 Through the Clean Power
Plan, EPA sought to reduce emissions by requiring utilities and other power generators to
transition from coal-fired power to natural gas and, ultimately, renewable energy sources rather
than by imposing source- specific requirements reflective of the best available emission
reduction technologies, as it had done in the past.48 EPA announced the Clean Power Plan
would dictate "what the market share of coal, natural gas, wind, and solar must be, and then
require[e] plants to reduce operations or subsidize their competitors to get there."49 The
Supreme Court struck down the proposed program, concluding that EPA's relied upon "vague
statutory grant" within the Clean Air Act was far from the "clear authorization required" for a
regulatory program that would have major economic and political significance, impacting vast
swaths of American life, and substantially restructuring the American energy market.50 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 14-15]
46 Nat'l Fed. Of Indep. Bus. v. Dep't of Labor, 595 U.S., slip op. at 6 (Jan 13, 2022); see also Ala. Assoc.
of Realtors v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021); Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014); U.S. Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 419-21 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (explaining provenance of "major rules
doctrine").
47 West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. (2022).
48 Id.
49 Id., slip op. at 33, n. 4.
50 Id., slip op. at 24.
EPA's Proposed Rule presents an analogous situation. Mandating a rapid shift from ICE to
EV technology will reshape the American automotive market with profound and far-reaching
collateral effects, thus encroaching on an issue of "vast economic and political significance."
These standards are contrary to natural market forces and would vastly alter what consumers are
able to purchase by indirectly requiring the production of a product different from that currently
being purchased (e.g., ICE vehicles). The Proposed Rule forces both the manufacturers' and
consumer's hand in requiring rapid scaling to meet production lead times and adoption rate
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requirements that would not exist but for EPA's electrification mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0648, pp. 14-15]
Further evidencing EPA's lack of authority, the Proposal attempts to sidestep regulatory
requirements established by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 ("EPCA") and the
Energy Independence and Security Act ("EISA"). Pursuant to these authorities, NHTSA has the
authority to issue Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, but may not consider the
fuel economy of EVs in doing so.58 Notably, this restricts how NHTSA evaluates the
technological feasibility of fuel economy standards. Thus, joint rulemakings by EPA and
NHTSA for complementary emissions and CAFE requirements ensure that manufacturers can
comply with both agencies' standards with the same fleet. Foregoing a joint rulemaking, as EPA
does here, ignores Congress's determination that EVs cannot be taken into account when
considering what the maximum feasible fuel economy level from which to develop regulations.
Importantly, this directly contravenes the underlying premise of the Supreme Court's holding in
Massachusetts v. EPA—"[EPA and NHTSA] obligations may overlap, but there is no reason to
think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency."59
That EPA ignores these directives undercuts Congress' intent in EPCA and regulating in a way
that is inconsistent with NHTSA's authority as well as its own.60 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0648, pp. 16-17]
58 49 U.S.C. § 32902(h). Here, NHTSA may not consider the fuel economy of "dedicated automobiles,"
which are defined as those that operate only on "alternative fuel." Alternative fuel, in turn, includes
electricity. 49 U.S.C. § 32901®.
59 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) ("The [EPA and NHTSA] obligations may overlap,
but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid
inconsistency.").
60 Id.
Moreover, EPA has never before claimed authority to mandate even partial electrification—
similar to EPA's reliance on Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act for promulgation of the Clean
Power Plan. Congress has made clear that it, not EPA, must make policy decisions— or, rather,
answer the "major question"—regarding if, when, and how the American automotive industry
will transition from ICE vehicles to EVs. In the 116th Congress (2019-21), Congress introduced
44 bills seeking to reduce petroleum-based fuel consumption and GHG emissions from the
transportation sector through customer rebates, vehicle and fuel producer incentives, local
funding, development of standards, and research and development.61 But none went so far as to
propose the mass adoption of EVs through the phase-out of ICE vehicles. 62 In fact, Congress
rejected one bill that would have banned the sale of new light-duty ICE vehicles by 2040,63 and
it has continuously disapproved of EPA's efforts to hamstring the automotive sector with more
stringent air pollution standards than are feasible.64 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 16-
17]
61 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, "Alternative Fuel and Vehicles: Legislative Proposals"
(Jul. 28, 2021).
62 Id.
63 See Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2019, H.R. 2764, 116th Cong. (2019); Zero-Emission Vehicles Act
of 2018, S. 3664, 115th Cong. (2018); see also 116 Cong. Rec. 19238-40 (1970) (proposed amendment to
Title II that would have banned ICE vehicles by 1978).
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64 See, e.g., S. J. Res. 11, 118th Cong. (2023). (Although passed only by the Senate thus far, the joint
resolution calls for disapproval of the rule submitted by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency relating to "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle
Standards," 88 Fed. Reg. 4296 (January 24, 2023).)
More telling, in the wake of the Proposed Rule and EPA's parallel proceedings proposing new
standards for light-duty vehicles,65 members of Congress have requested that the Agency
rescind the proposals, asserting they "effectively mandate a costly transition to electric cars and
trucks in the absence of congressional direction."66 That Congress intended for it, not EPA, to
direct these policy decisions is made all the more clear by the passage of the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law67 and the Inflation Reduction Act68 whereby Congress identified the policy
levers it deemed appropriate. Congress could have, but did not, direct EPA to establish a fleet-
wide credit trading regime to further drive EV development and rapid adoption. Instead, the
Proposed Rule stands in direct contrast to other legislation, such as the RFS, whereby Congress
mandated that "gasoline sold or introduced into commerce in the United States" must contain a
year-over-year increasing share of renewable fuels69 and, in 2022, must include tens of billions
of gallons of renewable fuel.70 An EPA-mandated shift in transportation technology from
vehicles that can operate on increasing volumes of renewable fuel to EVs does not square with
such requirements. Consequently, Congress, not EPA, should determine how to regulate
electrification of transportation and the many industries affected thereby.71 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0648, pp. 16-17]
65 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,184 (May 5, 2023).
66 Letter from Senator Shelley Capita, et al. to Administrator Michael S. Regan, EPA (May 25, 2023).
67 Public Law 117-58, November 15, 2021.
68 Public Law 117-169, August 16, 2022.
69 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i).
70 Id., § 7545(o)(2)(B); 87 Fed. Reg. 39,600 (July 1, 2022).
71 See "Grassley-Cornyn Bill Pulls Plug on Latest Biden Boon for EVs" (May 18, 2023), available at
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-cornyn-bill-pulls-plug-on-latest-biden-boon-
for-evs (discussing proposed legislation entitled "No Fuel Credits for Batteries Act" introduced to
"preserve the integrity of the Renewable Fuels Standard" in light of EPA's proposed E-RINS rule").
Similar to the Supreme Court's finding in West Virginia, EPA lacks congressional
authorization in the Clean Air Act to impose a shifting manufacturing standard to a preferred
powertrain and effectively require regulated manufacturers to phase out combustion engine
technology. EPA's authority to impose emissions standards is limited to that provided in Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act. The Proposed Rule results in fleet-wide standards that cannot be
met by ICE vehicles alone; however, under the Clean Air Act, EPA's authority is limited to
setting individual vehicle-level "standards" for "emission[s]" from "any class or classes of new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicles engines, which ... cause or contribute to," potentially
harmful air pollution.51 The plain language of this provision authorizes EPA to set standards for
classes of individual vehicles or engines that emit air pollutants. EVs do not have tailpipe
emissions, however. Thus, operating such vehicles alone cannot "cause, or contribute to," air
pollution. In stark contrast to "clear congressional authorization," Section 202(a) of the Clean
Air Act provides EPA no authority to set fleet-wide standards, and certainly not standards
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beyond that which could be achieved by improvements to the tailpipe emissions of ICE vehicles.
Even if EPA had such authority, it could not lawfully use it to force electrification by including
vehicles that have no tailpipe emissions in the fleetwide average standard for ICE vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 15-16]
51 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
EVs are simply not the "technology" contemplated by Congress. Instead, Congress enabled
EPA to increase emission standard stringency through cleaner fuels and improved emissions-
related systems to be incorporated into ICE vehicles such as advances in fuel injection, exhaust
gas combustion management, and advances catalysts to neutralize pollutants of concern.52 By
factoring in EV performance as a part of its averaging scheme, EPA is ignoring the technological
feasibility of emissions-related systems and simply requiring the production of fewer ICE
vehicles. EPA does not consider advances to ICE technologies under the Proposed Rule. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 15-16]
52 For example, Section 202(m) requires the monitoring of "emission-related systems" such as the
"catalytic converter and oxygen sensor." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(m)(l).
The Clean Air Act similarly says nothing about averaging across fleets or banking and trading
credits across different model years, different vehicle classes, and manufacturers for criteria
pollutants emitted from ICE vehicles. Despite EPA previously adopting fleetwide averaging, it
acknowledges that "Congress did not specifically contemplate an averaging program when it
enacted the Clean Air Act."53 And "[j]ust as the statute does not explicitly address EPA's
authority to allow averaging, it does not address the Agency's authority to permit banking and
trading."54 By definition, then, the Act does not address—let alone clearly authorize—the use of
averaging, banking, and trading in a manner that mandates electrification of the national vehicle
fleet of motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 15-16]
53 48 Fed. Reg. 33,456, 33,458 (July 21, 1983)
54 54 Fed. Reg. 22,652, 22,665 (May 25, 1989); see 55 Fed. Reg. 30,584, 30,593 (July 26, 1990) (same).
The structure of the Clean Air Act and its regulatory provisions for standard setting,
certification, compliance enforcement, warranties, and penalties also directly conflict with a
fleet- wide averaging regulatory regime. Notably, under Section 202(a), EPA "shall test, or
require to be tested in such manner as [it] deems appropriate, any new motor vehicle or new
motor vehicle engine submitted by a manufacturer" and issue a certificate of conformity "if such
vehicle or engine" complies with the standards.55 And EPA must "test any emission control
system incorporated in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine ... to determine whether such a
system enables such vehicle or engine to conform to the standards required to be prescribe under
[Section 202(b)] of the Act. 56 Section 202(b)(3) further authorizes EPA to grant waivers from
certain nitrogen-oxide emission standards-which, again, are standards "under" Section 202(a),
for no "more than five percent of [a] manufacturer's production or more than fifty thousand
vehicles or engines, whichever is greater."57 This provision would be nonsensical under a
fleetwide-averaging regime where, if applied, a manufacturer could essentially give itself a
waiver for large swaths of its fleet by electrifying certain product lines. Taken together, the
Clean Air Act regulatory framework contemplates EPA regulating vehicles on an individual
basis according to the powertrain of those vehicles. This cannot be accomplished if there is not a
clear emission standard applicable to a single vehicle at the start of a model year. Thus, EPA
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lacks clear authorization from Congress to impose a regulatory program restructuring the
American automotive market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 15-16]
55 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1).
56 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(2).
57 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(3).
Organization: Our Children's Trust (OCT)
The Earth's Energy Is Imbalanced and thus the EPA's Must Cease Infringing the
Constitutional Rights of Youth. EPA has Public Trust and Constitutional Obligations to use its
Authority to Protect the Atmosphere. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 3]
Under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the government is restrained from
engaging in conduct that infringes upon fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property, and
equal protection of the law, all of which includes a climate system that sustains human life and
liberty. Under the Public Trust Doctrine, embedded in our Constitution and other founding
documents, and in the very sovereignty of our Nation, U.S. residents (both present and future,
i.e., Posterity) have a right to access and use crucial natural resources, like air and water. The
U.S. government, and its executive agencies, have fiduciary duties as trustees to manage, protect,
and prevent substantial impairment to our country's vital natural resources which the government
holds in trust for present and future generations. 20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 5]
20 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1254 (D. Or. 2016).
Given the fact that U.S. government conduct has resulted in a quarter of all global GHG
emissions that are causing the current climate catastrophe, it is well past time for the EPA to take
all steps within its power to ensure its GHG emission standards for cars and trucks are aligned
with the best available science and are eliminating tailpipe GHG emissions from all new vehicles
by 2030, which is technically feasible and economically beneficial, and at minimum by 2035.
EPA must set a national ambient air quality standard for greenhouse gases immediately,
including a C02 standard of 350 ppm, as it has been petitioned to do, which will protect children
and require climate stabilization. Without immediate effective action, our children and future
generations will continue to suffer injury with long-lasting and potentially irreversible
consequences. 21 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 6]
21 See Assessing "Dangerous Climate Change"; James Hansen et al., Ice Melt, Sea Level Rise and
Superstorms: Evidence from Paleoclimate Data, Climate Modeling, and Modern Observations that 2°C
Global Warming Could be Dangerous, 16 Atmos. Chem. & Phys. 3761 (2016); U.S. Global Change
Research Program, Fourth National Climate Assessment, Vol. II (2018).
Organization: Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF)
PLF offers comments to highlight the serious separation-of-powers problems with the
Proposed Tailpipe Rule. The American people delegated to Congress the legislative power to
make the laws and policies governing society. And for good reason: the Constitution's
lawmaking process provides checks and balances to protect against arbitrary government and
ensure the government will not restrict freedom without broad consensus. 1 Indeed, the
Constitution's structural provisions reflect the founding generation's deep conviction that
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lawmaking should be hard and that "checks and balances were the foundation of a structure of
government that would protect liberty."2 The Proposed Tailpipe Rule contravenes this
fundamental first principle and should be withdrawn. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 1-2]
1 See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222-23 (2011) (finding the Constitution's "checks and
balances" protect individual liberty); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787 not to
promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.").
2 Bowsherv. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986).
First, the Proposed Tailpipe Rule violates the major questions doctrine. That doctrine
establishes that executive agencies cannot assert unheralded regulatory power over issues of vast
political and economic significance without clear congressional authorization. Yet that is what
the Proposed Tailpipe Rule seeks to do. At the President's direction, EPA is attempting to phase
out the internal combustion engine and alter the automobile market without clear authority from
Congress. Congress did not give EPA the power to reshape the entire auto industry through the
Clean Air Act's broad language. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 1-2]
Second, if Congress gave EPA the unfettered discretion to alter the automobile market— with
no limiting principle on its power to do so—then the Clean Air Act violates the Constitution's
nondelegation doctrine. Article I of the Constitution delegates only to Congress the power to
enact legislative policy, and it cannot delegate that power to the executive branch. Yet under the
EPA's reading of the Act, Congress has given EPA unbounded authority to set emissions
standards at a level forcing automobile manufacturers to shift to electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 1-2]
There is a national debate about what, if any, balance needs to be struck between economic
policies and environmental regulation. In our constitutional system, this debate must take place
in the legislative branch, but the President and EPA have removed that debate from the American
people and are illegally exercising legislative power to strike that balance in the Proposed
Tailpipe Rule. If the federal government will revamp an entire industry and force automobile
manufacturers to transition their fleets, that policy must come from Congress. Accordingly, EPA
should withdraw the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 1-2]
B. The Tailpipe Rule is a sweeping regulation with vast economic and political
consequences that Congress has not clearly authorized.
The Proposed Tailpipe Rule's requirement that the automobile industry "shift" their fleets
from the internal combustion engine to electric vehicles is, in effect, a rerun of West Virginia.
Indeed, just like West Virginia, the Tailpipe Rule is an example of "presidential administration"
seeking to alter an entire sector of the economy under the Clean Air Act with no clear authority
from Congress. In this way, it is almost on all fours with West Virginia. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0680, pp. 6-7]
Rather than persuade Congress to enact legislation to regulate automobile emissions and
mandate electric vehicles, President Biden issued an executive order. In doing so, he announced
his administration's "goal that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030
be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric
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vehicles."21 To put this policy into practice, he directed EPA to consider suspending, revising,
or rescinding the automobile emissions standards issued by his predecessor administration.22
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 6-7]
21 86 Fed. Reg. 43,583, 43,583 (Aug. 5, 2021).
22 86 Fed. Reg. 7037, 7037-38 (Jan. 20, 2021).
EPA responded by issuing substantially more stringent emissions standards for vehicle carbon
dioxide emissions in 2022.23 That regulation sought to force the nationwide vehicle fleet to
reach 17% electrification by 2026.24 In doing so, EPA attempted to expand its power into new
territory: functionally forcing vehicle manufacturers to start shifting their fleet production to an
ever-increasing share of electric vehicles. They did that by measuring not whether an individual
vehicle complies with the emission standards but whether a manufacturer's fleet as a whole
complies after averaging the emissions from vehicles fleet-wide. And that averaging counted
electric vehicle emissions as zero. So stringent were those standards that, in EPA's own words,
they would "necessitate" that manufacturers "further deploy[]" electric vehicles to comply under
the fleet-averaging.25 By some estimates, that rule was the most expensive regulation in the
nation's history.26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 6-7]
23 86 Fed. Reg. 74,434 (Dec. 20, 2021) (effective date Feb 28, 2022).
24 Id. at 74,485.
25 Id. at 74,493.
26 https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/commentary/the-biden-administrations- electric-
vehicle-gambit-illegal-and
That rule is now being challenged by state governments and various industry petitioners as
unconstitutional in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.27 Yet rather
than wait for the outcome of that litigation, EPA is now, less than a year later, seeking to
exponentially compound the costs to the American public by mandating that the automobile
industry shift to 67% electrification by 2032—which is neither reasonable nor achievable in the
time frame mandated by the Proposed Tailpipe Rule.28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 6-
7]
27 Texas v. EPA, Dkt. No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
28 Comment submitted by Alliance for Automotive Innovation,
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0481.
But it is not just the price tag that makes the Proposed Tailpipe Rule a major question; the
proposed rule, like the 2022 rule, is also an unprecedented agency action that would significantly
expand EPA's authority.29 EPA is attempting to issue a rule setting emissions standards without
the National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration (NHTSA). Why? Because
NHTSA operates under a statutory restraint on its discretion to factor electric vehicles into its
decision-making.30 By "decoupling" itself from NHTSA, the EPA is expanding its purported
authority to transform the automobile market through the forced adoption of electric vehicles. Of
course, other factors abound. Directing the automobile market is not within the EPA's expertise
and mandating the transition to electric vehicles is a policy that Congress has repeatedly
considered but declined to enact into law. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 6-7]
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29 The major questions doctrine not only applies for claims of authority specific to an issue addressed in a
single case, but also to future uses an agency can use with the power it is claiming. See The Past and Future
of the Major Questions Doctrine, supra note 12, at 33 (citing Daniel T. Deacon & Leah M. Litman, The
New Major Questions Doctrine, 109 Va. L. Rev. at 3 (forthcoming 2023)).
30 49 U.S.C. § 32902(h)(1).
At bottom, the Tailpipe Rule's attempt to set emissions standards to require manufacturers to
shift to electric vehicles—and thus transform the automobile market— is a major question that
Congress has not enacted into law. And like West Virginia, its attempt violates the major
questions doctrine. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 6-7]
II. If Congress subdelegated the EPA the extraordinary legislative power to alter the
entire automobile market through a vague delegation, then the Clean Air Act violates the
nondelegation doctrine. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 7-9]
The alternative is that Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by delegating EPA open-
ended legislative authority through a vague provision in the Clean Air Act. But Congress cannot
delegate EPA the power in broad, open-ended language to legislate— which is what it is doing
by altering the automobile market by mandating manufacturers transition to electric vehicles. Yet
under the EPA's reading of the statute, Congress did just that. Indeed, under the agency's
reading, "the law would afford it almost unlimited discretion—and certainly, impose no 'specific
restrictions' that 'meaningfully constrai[n]' the agency."31 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680,
pp. 7-9]
31 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 142 U.S. at 669 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Touby v. United States, 500
U.S. 160, 166-67 (1991)).
It is a fundamental rule of the Constitution's Separation of Powers that Congress cannot
delegate its lawmaking power to the executive branch.32 That fundamental principle is enforced
through the nondelegation doctrine—which requires that Congress resolve fundamental policy
issues and provide a governing standard enabling courts to judge whether the executive has
faithfully executed, and not made, the law.33 In other words, legislation must provide a
governing standard to limit and channel the executive's exercise of discretion; Congress must
decide the "important subjects," and the executive is left to merely "fill in the details."34 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 7-9]
32 See U.S. Const, art. I, § 1 (" [a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States"). See also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) ("Congress, this Court
explained early on, may not transfer to another branch 'powers which are strictly and exclusively
legislative.'" (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825))); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at
371-72 (quotingU.S. Const, art. 1, § 1).
33 E.g., Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 210 (1894) (finding that Congress had decided the important
subject).
34 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825); see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct.
2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Put into practice, the Supreme Court has distilled this precept into a requirement that
legislation provide an "intelligible principle" to properly direct the executive branch when it
implements statutes.35 For example, in Panama Refining v. Ryan, the Court found a provision of
the National Recovery Act (NRA) unconstitutional because it gave unfettered discretion to the
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President to decide whether and under what conditions to prohibit the transport of hot oil.36
Even though the statute had the general goal of improving American economic conditions, the
NRA was unconstitutional because Congress made no policy decision governing when the
proscription applied.37 In other words, the President was not merely left to fill in the details but
was simply free to weigh competing policy considerations as he deemed "fit."38 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 7-9]
35 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001). See also Mistretta, 488 U.S.
at 371-72 (1989) (finding that the nondelegation doctrine "is rooted in the principle of separation of
powers" and the Constitution's provision that "[a]ll legislative Powers . . . shall be vested in. . . Congress"
(quoting U.S. Const, art. 1, § 1)).
36 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935).
37 Id. at 416-18.
38 Id. at 415.
Under the Clean Air Act, EPA has the power to promulgate "standards which reflect the
greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the application of technology which the
Administrator determines will be available for the model year to which such standards apply,
giving appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety factors associated with the
application of such technology."39 Yet nothing in this grant of authority allows the EPA to
regulate in a way that pushes the use of electric vehicles over internal-combustion vehicles. Put
another way, under EPA's assertion of authority in the Proposed Tailpipe Rule, the Clean Air
Act is essentially a blank check under which the President and EPA may fill in their preferred
policy, and Congress will have effectively enacted a law that is "nothing except a raw delegation
to enact rules."40 It will have "designated a lawmaker, not a law interpreter."41 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0680, pp. 7-9]
39 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i).
40 G. Lawson & G. Seidman, "A Great Power of Attorney:" Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution 126
(2017).
41 Id.
In short, if Congress delegated EPA the authority to legislate under the Clean Air Act and set
emissions standards at a level forcing automobile manufacturers to shift to electric vehicles—
despite that being near if not downright impossible—there is simply no limiting, much less
intelligible, principle in the statutory scheme. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 7-9]
Conclusion
For these reasons, PLF requests EPA withdraw the Proposed Tailpipe Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0680, pp. 7-9]
Organization: POET, LLC
Incorporating renewable fuels could also shore up the rule against a challenge that it violates
precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court in West Virginia v. EPA. That case overturned EPA's
Clean Power Plan because the Court determined that EPA's regulatory program went too far
toward requiring a shift from conventional sources of electricity generation to renewables, which
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in the Court's view would have substantially restructured the American energy market.61
Crediting biofuels in the Proposed Rule would have the opposite effect. Biofuels are already a
key component of the American transportation sector. This is not the case in which, as the
Supreme Court stated in West Virginia v. EPA, the "history and the breadth of the authority that
[EPA] has asserted, and the economic and political significance of that assertion, provide a
reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress meant to confer such authority."62 Congress
has given EPA plain authority to incentivize biofuels under the Clean Air Act and RFS. Those
preexisting programs have encouraged producers to make billions of gallons of renewable fuels
every year. Congress' mandate was clear. The RFS was meant to encourage the production of
renewable fuels that are "used to replace or reduce the quantity of fossil fuel present in a
transportation fuel."63 EPA must interpret its § 202 authority in a manner that is consistent with
the other directives that Congress has imposed on the transportation sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 18-19]
61 See West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2616.
62 Id. at 2595 (quotations omitted).
62 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(l)(J).
63 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(l)(J).
Organization: Scott Wilson
Assuming the rule is adopted, opponents will turn to the legal system and rely on an alleged
bedrock (but actually recently invented) legal concept called the "major questions doctrine".
"Major" is in the eye of the beholder. Whether or not a particular trade group is impacted is
not a major question, even if it is offset by an economic bonanza for another trade group.
Climate change is a major question. Particulate air pollution affecting human health is a
major question. Economic cost due to climate impacts is a major question. As far as
major questions, this rule will be a major win for Americans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0515,
p. 1]
Organization: Senator Shelley Moore Capito et al.
Forcing a transition to battery electric vehicles (BEVs) through regulation without explicit
delegated authority from Congress violates the separation of powers, as reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court's decision in West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 142 S. Ct. 2587
(2022). Under that precedent, the EPA cannot force a wholesale change to "substantially
restructure the American energy market" without explicit congressional authorization. According
to the EPA's own analysis for the light- and medium-duty rule, the proposal will require
approximately 67 percent of new vehicles sold in model year 2032 to be BEV s - a dramatic shift
away from internal combustion engine vehicles, which made up around 95 percent of the new
light-duty vehicle market in 2022.1 The heavy-duty vehicle rule will require 40-percent sales of
zero-emission vehicles by 2032, up from a mere 0.1 percent globally for heavy-duty trucks and 4
percent globally for bus fleets.2 If finalized, these proposals will effectively require a wholesale
conversion from powering vehicles with widely available liquid fuel to charging BEVs off our
nation's electric grid. This is a major, multi-billion dollar, policy-driven technology transition
mandate to be imposed on American consumers by your Agency, without any semblance of the
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clear and direct statutory authority required by the ruling in West Virginia v. EPA. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-5083, p. 1]
1 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-
Duty Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,329.
2 Trends in electric heavy-duty vehicles, IEA (2022).
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
Congress has not delegated to EPA the power to force the conversion to elec- trie vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 6]
EPA is very candid about the goal of its proposed rules: The Agency is trying to use tailpipe
emissions limits on carbon dioxide and criteria pollutants as a tool to coerce the automotive
industry to build far more electric vehicles (EVs) than market demand would currently support.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 6]
Right now, EVs account for less than 6 percent of new light-duty vehicle sales in the United
States and an even lower percentage of medium- and heavy-duty commercial truck sales.
Following the script laid down by President Biden in an executive order, 12 the EPA is aiming to
force those percentages way up—to 60 percent of light-duty vehicle sales by 2030 and 67
percent by 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 6]
12 See Executive Order 14037 ("Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks"), August
5, 2021 (setting goal of 50 percent of U.S. new vehicle sales to be zero-emission vehicles by 2030).
And through these rulemakings, the Agency is proposing to align its regulatory objec- tives
with the zero-emission vehicle, or ZEV, mandates recently issued by CARB, the Cali- fornia Air
Resources Board, which are designed to phase out the sale of all gas-powered passenger cars and
light trucks by 2035 and all medium- and heavy-duty trucks by 2045. The EPA now appears to
be committed to a similar trajectory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 6]
It is not surprising the Agency would act to conform its policies to CARB's, since CARB was
able to issue its mandates only because the EPA has granted California a special waiver from
preemption under the Clean Air Act. Both sets of rules flow from the policy decisions of the
EPA in accordance with directions from the White House. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p.
6]
Where does EPA purport to find this authority in the Clean Air Act?
The logic is as follows:
Because most automakers have announced ambitious timetables for transitioning to the
production of EVs going forward and have pledged to make large capital investments to finance
this gradual switchover, 13 and because Congress has recently approved generous federal
subsidies for some EV purchases and charging infrastructure, 14 EPA says it can now declare that
battery-electric vehicle technology is a "feasible" alternative to the tradi- tional internal-
combustion engine (ICE) powertrain. 15 And on that basis, EPA is proposing to treat EVs as an
available "control technology" for achieving compliance with the tailpipe emissions restrictions
under Clean Air Act section 202.16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 6-8]
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13 See 88 FR at 29191, Figure 1 (reproducing a chart prepared by the Environmental Defense Fund
depicting the automakers' announced goals for future electrified vehicle sales as a percentage of total
sales); id. at 29193-94 (summarizing automakers' announced plans for investments in EV technology).
14 See id. at 29195-96; Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law 117-58, 135 Stat. 429 (2021),
https://www.congress.gOv/l 17/plaws/publ58/PLAW 117publ58.pdf; Inflation Reduction Act of 2022,
Public Law 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818 (2022),
https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr5376/BILLS117hr5376enr.pdf.
15 See 88 FR at 29194 (light-duty and medium-duty vehicles); 88 FR at 25972 (heavy-duty trucks).
16 See 88 FR at 29284 (for light-duty and medium-duty vehicles); 88 FR at 26015 (for heavy-duty trucks).
This reasoning obviously depends on a kind of feedback loop. The automakers are pledging to
invest in the transition to EVs because governments around the world—like China, the EU, the
Biden White House, and Governor Gavin Newsom and his climate regulators in California—are
demanding that they do so. But everyone knows there is a large looming impediment to this
Green Dream: resistance from American consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 6-8]
The American public is not jumping on the electric bandwagon. EVs are expensive— beyond
the reach of many American families—and most Americans remain skeptical that EVs will
reliably serve the full range of their needs, that quick and convenient charging stations will be
widely available, that EVs will maintain their promised driving range over time or in cold
weather, that they will have any significant resale or trade-in value down the road, and that
insurance carriers will cover the huge costs of battery replacement when the battery wears out or
is damaged in a minor accident. 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 6-8]
17 See Nick Carey, Paul Lienert, and Sarah McFarlane, "Scratched EV battery? Your insurer may have to
junk the whole car," Reuters, March 20, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-
transportation/scratched-ev-battery-your-insurer-may-have-junk-whole-car-2023-03-20/ ("For many elec-
tric vehicles, there is no way to repair or assess even slightly damaged battery packs after accidents, forcing
insurance companies to write off cars with few miles—leading to higher premiums and under-cutting gains
from going electric.").
To push the automakers to convert to EV production in the absence of sufficient mar- ket
demand, EPA plans to ratchet down the emissions limits for carbon dioxide and for the
traditional criteria and other pollutants associated with smog (such as unburned hydrocar- bons,
particulate matter, oxides of nitrogen, and ozone) to super-stringent levels that are
technologically impossible for gas-powered vehicles (even hybrids) to satisfy. 18 At the same
time, EPA is proposing to phase out certain regulatory buffers that allow automakers to report
better emissions compliance results, such as "off-cycle credits" for the addition of onboard
technologies that improve the fuel efficiency of ICE vehicles. 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 6-8]
18 See, e.g., 88 FR at 29237-38; id. at 29257-61.
19 See id. at 29249-50.
The automakers' only recourse will be to replace more and more of the ICE vehicles in their
fleets (including hybrids) with the "alternative control technology" of battery-elec- trie vehicles.
And here is the trick: For enforcement purposes, EPA applies the emissions limits to each
automaker on a fleetwide average basis, and it proposes to reduce these fleetwide averages
dramatically each model year from 2027 through 2032 on a ramp rate calculated to achieve the
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Biden administration's desired percentage mix of EVs in the U.S. auto fleets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 6-8]
In other words, EPA is now proposing to set fleetwide average tailpipe pollution limits that
are intended by design to apply increasingly over time to vehicles that have no tailpipes and that
EPA says emit none of the pollutants covered by the regulations.20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 6-8]
20 Automakers can avoid violating the average emissions limits in certain circumstances with regulatory
"credits," earned by producing vehicles, like EVs, that outperform the limits. Under the EPA's rules,
credits can be "banked" from one model year to another within limits, "transferred" from one fleet to
another (for example, from the automaker's light truck fleet to its passenger car fleet), or "traded" between
automakers, which usually involves a privately negotiated purchase. Tesla, which manufactures nothing but
EVs and accounts for approximately 70 percent of the U.S. EV market, receives a large portion of its
income from selling emissions credits to the other automakers. Predictably, the EPA is proposing to retain
this credit system to continue the subsidization of EV manufacturing. See 88 FR at 26245-46.
EPA should withdraw and reconsider these rulemaking proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0647, pp. 21-22]
In light of the deficiencies in the cost analyses and underlying assumptions laid out above,
EPA should withdraw and reconsider both of its proposed tailpipe rules. If EPA had more
carefully considered its legal authorities under the Clean Air Act and more thoroughly accounted
for the market realities and facts relevant to these proposals, I am confident EPA would not have
proposed the radical and far-reaching approach to emissions control reflected in the current
proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 21-22]
Even if EPA persists in proposing something along the same lines, at a minimum, it should
put these concepts out for public comment in a much more preliminary form—for example, in an
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, or ANPRM. By setting out the general ideas it plans to
consider in an ANPRM, EPA could suggest its own preliminary supporting analysis and view of
the relevant facts and considerations and then ask for meaningful input on all aspects of the
issues, seeking recommendations for alternative approaches from interested parties and the
public. That would be more respectful of the American people and all interested stakeholders and
would be more accommodating of the need for and the value of greater public input and
deliberation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 21-22]
Such an alternative process would provide the opportunity for EPA to receive deeper and
broader information on all sides of the issues raised by these regulatory proposals, as well as a
more probing analysis of the scope of EPA's authority to set emissions limits for automobiles
and commercial trucks. In that way, an ANPRM process would help redirect EPA's thinking
about the true costs, market disruptions, and secondary consequences of its preferred approach
and about its authority to undertake these transformational pro- posals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0647, pp. 21-22]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Foundationally, the primary dynamics that have driven progress in the development of EPA's
program in the past and its fundamental architecture remain and, if anything, have become even
clearer and more imperative, including: the ongoing need to achieve significant additional
emissions reductions from the motor vehicle sector, including for conventional pollutants and
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greenhouse gases; the increasingly capable role of advanced vehicle technologies, led by zero-
emissions BEVs, in providing those reductions; the benefits to the automotive industry of
achieving a uniform national program integrating California-led and Federal authorities and
operating seamlessly across EPA, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and state authorities;
and the importance of regulatory stability to the industry — and of standards of sufficiently long
duration — to foster the significant investment needed to cement this transformation to advanced
technology vehicles. The continuation and amplification of these trends provide a sound legal
basis for an even more stringent set of standards than EPA's current proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
6 See, 40 C.F.R. §1037.150(f) (Electric vehicles. Tailpipe emissions of regulated pollutants from electric
vehicles ... are deemed to be zero.).
II. Rapid Electrification of the Light-Duty Vehicle Sector Is Necessary to Protect the Public
Health and Welfare
Tesla supports EPA's efforts to accelerate light-duty vehicle electrification as it is essential
for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) and criteria pollutants and addressing the rapidly escalating
climate crisis. Regardless of the application, EPA has long considered BEVs to be the most
effective mobile source pollution mitigating technology, stating over a decade ago, "From a
vehicle tailpipe perspective, EVs are a game-changing technology."38 Additionally, study after
study shows BEVs are a superior technology for reducing air pollution and GHG emissions over
their lifetime.39 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 7]
In short, electrifying the light-duty duty sector will provide significant improvements in air
quality and benefits to all Americans through reduced GHG, NOX, PM, and other air pollutant
emissions. Tesla believes it is essential for EPA to establish stringent longer-term light-duty
multi-pollutant emission standards that actively embrace a more rapid transition to BEVs. A
failure of the agency to finalize a performance standard that substantially puts the light-duty
sector on a path to full electrification by at least 2035 and sufficiently reduces U.S. emissions
commensurate with the country's commitment to holding global warming to well below 2
degrees Celsius would not meet the legal benchmark of the Clean Air Act to protect the nation's
public health and welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 11]
The Clean Air Act (CAA), and Section 202(a), is directed at protecting public health and
welfare. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (identifying the Act's purpose as to "protect and enhance the
quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the
productive capacity of its population."); 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (providing that the Administrator
shall prescribe and from time to time revise "standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in
his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare."). The Proposed Rule recognizes that the purpose of adopting
standards under CAA section 202 is to address air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health and welfare. Indeed, as EPA notes, "Since the earliest days of the
CAA, Congress has emphasized that the goal of section 202 is to address air quality hazards
from motor vehicles, not to simply reduce emissions from internal combustion engines to the
extent feasible." 124 As courts have recognized, given the overriding goal of the statute to protect
public health and welfare, EPA may "plac[e] primary significance on the 'greatest degree of
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emission reduction achievable,'" and consider other factors such as "cost. . . energy and safety
factors as important but secondary factors." 125 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 20]
124 88 Fed. Reg. at 29233.
125 Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Further, there should be no doubt, in view of recent amendments to the Clean Air Act and
Congressional ratification accomplished by the IRA, 126 that EPA has ample authority to address
the regulation of greenhouse gas pollutants, from motor vehicles, through electrification, and in
the light-duty sector. 127 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 21]
126 Pub. L. No. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818 (2022).
127 See, Greg Dotson and Dustin J. Maghamfar, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 2022: Clean Air,
Climate Change, and the Inflation Reduction Act, 53 ELR 10017 at 10019, 10032 (2023) (discussing Clean
Air Act sec. 137 and other revisions) available at
https://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4338903
The criteria referred to in §209(a) relate to the emission characteristics of a vehicle or engine.
To meet them the vehicle or engine must not emit more than a certain amount of a given
pollutant, must be equipped with a certain type of pollution-control device, or must have some
other design feature related to the control of emissions. 137 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p.
22]
137 Id.
Certainly zero emissions technology capabilities are such a design feature, and should be
factored into the overall fleet performance that manufacturers must meet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0792, p. 22]
Likewise, other courts have held that full ZEV programs are appropriately considered to be
standards under the Clean Air Act:
To be sure, the ZEV sales requirement does not impose precise overall quantitative limits on
levels of emissions, as do the classification system and fleet averages. It mandates only that a
specified percentage of the cars sold by a manufacturer in any model year be ZEVs.
Nevertheless, the ZEV sales requirement must be considered a standard 'relating to the control of
emissions.' ZEV, after all, stands for 'zero-emission vehicle,' and a requirement that a particular
percentage of vehicle sales be ZEVs has no purpose other than to effect a general reduction in
emissions. 138 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 22]
138 Am. Auto Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 1998); Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v.
Comm'r, 208 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000)
If such a percentage designation of zero emissions vehicle targets is permissible under the
Clean Air Act, EPA's approach merely incorporating consideration of that technology is a
fortiorari an appropriate emissions standard setting exercise of authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0792, p. 22]
Nor is it a particularly large conceptual leap from EPA's well-established embrace of overall
fleet emissions averages, 139 a practice which has long departed from strict pollutant-by-
pollutant numerical limits, to the concept of addressing such emissions at the federal level by
recognizing the possibility that an increasingly large proportion of BEVs may become part of a
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manufacturer's compliance strategy and should be factored into the overall level of permissible
emissions. As technology has evolved, the overriding Clean Air Act statutory command to set
standards that reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the
application of such available technology, is fully consistent with this approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0792, p. 22]
139 See, e.g., 79 Fed. Reg. at 451 (EPA adoption of sales-weighted fleet averages for its Tier 3 emissions
regulations).
For the U.S. to meet its decarbonization goals and to mitigate the public health and welfare
impacts from climate change, EPA's proposal should be amended to meet increasingly more
stringent regulatory requirements that incentivize all vehicle manufacturers to rapidly scale up
delivery of high-quality BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 23]
The Clean Air Act is designed to be "technology-forcing" and light- and medium-duty
manufacturers are poised to meet significant new emission reduction performance standards. 143
The Clean Air Act is "intended to be a 'drastic remedy to ... a serious and otherwise
uncheckable problem.' . . . Subsequent legislative history confirms that the technology-forcing
goals of the 1970 amendments are still paramount in today's Act."144 As courts have recognized
in the specific context of CAA section 202(a)(1) and as the preamble to the proposal
appropriately acknowledges, "Congress intended the agency to project future advances in
pollution control capability. It was 'expected to press for the development and application of
improved technology rather than be limited by that which exists today.'"145 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0792, p. 23]
143 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 258 (1976); Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 90 (1975).
144 Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 491-92, (Breyer, J. concurring), citing Union
Elec. 427 U.S. at 256.
145 NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
At the outset, nothing in the statute directs EPA to give great weight to infrastructure or
similar considerations in evaluating whether a standard can be implemented in a time period the
Administrator finds sufficient "to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." 184
This is in contrast to other portions of the statute, which specifically direct the agency to
consider, for example, "the impact of renewable fuels on the infrastructure of the United States,
including deliverability of materials, goods, and products other than renewable fuel, and the
sufficiency of infrastructure to deliver and use renewable fuel." 185 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0792, p. 30]
184 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2).
185 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii)(IV).
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
Finally, as discussed in detail below, EPA must consider the consequences of reduced demand
for and production of renewable fuels such as ethanol and renewable diesel. By phasing out the
vehicles that consume these fuels, the proposed rule stands in direct conflict to EPA's statutory
obligations under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), which was
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designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the domestic transportation sector while
enhancing energy security by promoting increased volumes of renewable fuel production,
including requirement that EPA provide for specific minimum volumes of advanced biofuel
(including renewable diesel) and biomass-based diesel from 2022 onward.299 In response to the
incentives created by the RFS as well as state programs like the California Low Carbon Fuel
Standard, Valero as well as some of our competitors have responded by investing heavily in
renewable fuel production capacity. EPA must consider the chilling effect the proposed action
will have on production of ethanol and renewable diesel and the corresponding loss of jobs in the
agricultural and fuel production sectors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 54-55]
299 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(iii),(v).
H. EPA should consider the consequences of diminishing liquid fuel supplies as refineries
and renewable fuel production facilities are shut down.
When proposing rules to implement the phase-out of liquid fuels, a foundational issue to
address is the impact(s) of refinery shutdowns. In the proposed EV rules, EPA takes credit for
reduced emissions from oil production and refinery operation and places points on the positive
ledger for energy security in dollar amounts as a result of reduced reliance on oil. But EPA does
not account for the loss of jobs or other impacts related to refinery shutdowns, reduced
renewable fuel production, and the loss of liquid fuel supplies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
p. 54]
EPA acknowledges that existing ICEs will continue to operate but has not accounted for any
increased burden on those owners of ICEs related to fewer options for fuel or decreased
competition in the fuel market. EPA must consider how reducing volumes of liquid fuels will
change regional pricing and availability of fueling options for consumers as reducing reliance on
liquid fuels will also lead to a direct decrease in both federal and state excise tax revenues from
gasoline and diesel, as has been demonstrated in the numerous states that have already adopted
ZEV mandates.297 This, in turn, will decrease state and federal funding for construction and
maintenance of transportation infrastructure in the US, which is primarily funded from these tax
revenues.298 Thus, not only will ZEV-centric policy destroy the domestic production of asphalt
used primarily for road construction and repairs, it will also lead to a precipitous decline in each
state's ability to pay for road maintenance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 54]
297 See Berkeley Research Group, Policy Briefs, The Effect of Zero-Emission Vehicle Policies on
Dedicated Highway Infrastructure Funding in Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Nevada, New York,
Oregon, and Virginia, available at https://www.thinkbrg.com/insights/publications/effect-of- zev-policies-
on-dedicated-highway-infrastructure-funding/.
298 Id.
Finally, as discussed in detail below, EPA must consider the consequences of reduced demand
for and production of renewable fuels such as ethanol and renewable diesel. By phasing out the
vehicles that consume these fuels, the proposed rule stands in direct conflict to EPA's statutory
obligations under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), which was
designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the domestic transportation sector while
enhancing energy security by promoting increased volumes of renewable fuel production,
including requirement that EPA provide for specific minimum volumes of advanced biofuel
(including renewable diesel) and biomass-based diesel from 2022 onward.299 In response to the
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incentives created by the RFS as well as state programs like the California Low Carbon Fuel
Standard, Valero as well as some of our competitors have responded by investing heavily in
renewable fuel production capacity. EPA must consider the chilling effect the proposed action
will have on production of ethanol and renewable diesel and the corresponding loss of jobs in the
agricultural and fuel production sectors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 54-55]
299 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(iii),(v).
A. The proposed action addresses a major question for which EPA must have clear
congressional authority.
Under the major-questions doctrine, a court may not construe a statute to "authoriz[e] an
agency to exercise powers of 'vast economic and political significance'" unless the statute does
so in "clea[r]" terms.352 Thus, an agency seeking to exercise such significant powers must
identify "something more than a merely plausible textual basis for the agency action."353 "The
agency instead must point to 'clear congressional authorization' for the power it claims." Id.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 66-68]
352 Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Grp.
v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)).
353 West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2609 (2022) (quoting Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 324).
In assessing the economic and political significance of a rule, the Supreme Court has
considered both the rule's direct effects and the implications of the agency's underlying claim of
authority. For example, in West Virginia, although EPA's Clean Power Plan only incrementally
shifted power generation, EPA had asserted the "highly consequential power" to "announc[e]
what the market share of coal, natural gas, wind, and solar must be, and then requir[e] plants to
reduce operations or subsidize their competitors to get there."354 An agency cannot avoid the
need for clear backing from Congress by claiming an awesome power but exercising only a little
of it in the first instance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 66-68]
354 142 S. Ct. at 2609 & 2613 n.4; see Alabama Ass'n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489 (considering the
"sheer scope of the [agency's] claimed authority" in addition to the rule's "economic impact").
If EPA were to finalize this proposal, just as in West Virginia, EPA would be claiming the
power to effect a wholesale shift in energy policy: moving the Nation's light and medium duty
vehicle fleets from vehicles powered by internal-combustion engines ("ICEs") that use liquid
fuels to vehicles powered by battery-operated electric motors. The only difference is that EPA is
waving its wand over motor vehicles instead of power plants. At a more specific level, the
Supreme Court in West Virginia identified several clues from the statutory and regulatory
scheme indicating that EPA needed clear congressional authorization for its Clean Power Plan.
Those same clues are present here in spades. The lesson should be unavoidable: EPA needs clear
support from Congress to redefine the source and replace the kind of vehicles America drives on
its roads and uses for work and delivery of goods that keep the economy running. In this
proposal, EPA claims power to radically change numerous sectors in the economy that depend
on LDVs and MDVs, including for every day personal transportation and for services that
deliver goods, supplies and equipment throughout the country, as well as the numerous sectors
that depend on the liquid fuels (and related byproducts) on which such vehicles currently run.355
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 66-68]
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355 Of course, the proposed rule electrifying LD and MD vehicles is only part of the current
administration's broader plan to electrify the entire fleet of the nation's vehicles. See E.O. 14307, 88 Fed.
Reg. 43,583 (Aug. 5, 2021) ("50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-
emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.") ("Given
the significant expertise and historical leadership demonstrated by the State of California with respect to
establishing emissions standards for light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles, the Administrator of the
EPA shall coordinate the agency's activities ... with the State of California as well as other States that are
leading the way in reducing vehicle emissions, including by adopting California's standards."); EPA
Finalizes Greenhouse Gas Standards for Passenger Vehicles, Paving Way for a Zero-Emissions Future
(Dec. 20, 2021), https://bit.ly/3wJFsTD (EPA Administrator declaring the rule "a giant step forward" in
"paving the way toward an all-electric, zero-emission transportation future."); https:joebiden.com/climate-
plan/# (promising to "use the full authority of the executive branch to make progress and significantly
reduce emissions" by "developing rigorous new fuel economy standards aimed at ensuring 100% of new
sales for light- and medium-duty vehicles will be electrified." EPA's claimed authority to mandate EVs in
place of ICE vehicles is the same for Light Duty, Medium Duty, and Heavy Duty vehicles; therefore, it is
appropriate to consider (for purposes of the major question issue) not just the effects of this proposed rule
but the effect of the entire "whole of government" approach to electrify all vehicles.
1. EPA claims a power of vast economic significance.
At the threshold, the rule's economic significance is staggering, in both its direct effects and
the implications of the authority EPA claims. Several considerations underscore the rule's
enormous economic cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 66-68]
Transformation of the LD and MD Vehicle Market. EPA makes no secret of its approach to
setting the standards for LDVs and MDVs—the standards require replacing ICE vehicles with
BEVs or FCEVs. The result of this transition has dramatic consequences, as described more fully
in these comments and by others. Such consequences include increased consumer acquisition
costs, lack of adequate public and personal charging infrastructure (e.g., multi-family housing
and rural areas), increased charging times (particularly for those relying on public charging
stations), increased demand for electricity, increased wear on public roads from heavier ZEVs,
and increased tire wear, among others. And beyond personal, everyday use, there are also many
other sectors that rely on LDVs and MDVs and the liquid fuels on which they currently run (and
indeed, the byproducts of such fuels)—e.g., the refining, agriculture, and manufacturing
industries—each with transition issues of their own. But EPA has not acknowledged the
obstacles and burdens that will be on such industries or considered whether those obstacles or
burdens can be reasonably overcome. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 66-68]
In West Virginia, the Court explained that EPA had sought to "substantially restructure the
American energy market." 142 S. Ct. at 2611. With this proposal, EPA seeks to "substantially
restructure" the American LD and MD vehicle markets, and with them, many sectors and supply
chains in the U.S. economy. As discussed above, the overall cost and economic impact of this
proposed restructure is staggering—despite EPA's gross understatements to the contrary. And
EPA's failure to consider the full extent of this economic impact is indicative of its limited
authority; if Congress truly meant to grant such an awesome power to EPA, it would not have
restricted EPA's cost considerations to vehicle manufacturers only. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 66-68]
Indeed, the effects of EPA's rule would extend well beyond personal consumer use. As
described previously in these comments, the rule will impact, among other sectors, the refining,
agriculture, and manufacturing industries, how and to what extent they operate, where they
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source their supply chains, and how and whether they continue to produce products that are
essential to modern life. This will have ripple effects throughout the economy, both with regard
to supply chain costs and availability and, ultimately, increased costs to consumers. Moreover,
many industries dependent upon the refining sector, such as the asphalt, petrochemical and sulfur
industries (all of which are, ironically, essential to increased EV production), will see their
supply chains reduced and prices increased to the extent the proposal reduces liquid fuel demand
and, consequently, impacts refining. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 66-68]
By any relevant economic measure—"the amount of money involved for regulated and
affected parties, the overall impact on the economy, [or] the number of people affected," U.S.
Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc)—EPA's asserted power to force a transition from diesel- and
gasoline-powered LD and MD vehicles to electric ones represents "an enormous and
transformative expansion in [its own] regulatory authority," affecting "a significant portion of
the American economy." Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 324. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 66-
68]
2. EPA claims a power of vast political significance.
The rule's political significance is just as vast. In West Virginia, the Court identified several
considerations that are equally present here. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 68-69]
Ongoing Policy Debate. The target of EPA's rule—to say nothing of climate change more
generally356—is "the subject of an earnest and profound debate across the country." West
Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2614. While California is moving aggressively to accelerate electrification
by regulatory fiat,357 other States oppose efforts to shift energy-investment and generation from
petroleum to other sources, see, e.g., Act Relating to Financial Institutions Engaged in Boycotts
of Energy Companies, 2022 W. Va. Legis. Ch. 235. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 68-
69]
356 See West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2625 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("As the dissent observes, the agency's
challenged action before us concerns one of 'the greatest... challenge^] of our time.' If this case does not
implicate a 'question of deep economic and political significance,' King, 576 U.S. at 486, 135 S. Ct. 2480
(internal quotation marks omitted), it is unclear what might."
357 See, e.g., Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 13, § 1962.4 (Zero-Emission Vehicle Standards for 2026 and
Subsequent Model Year Passenger Cars and Light-Duty Trucks); California Air Resources Board Final
Regulation Order, "Advanced Clean Fleets Regulation: 2036 100 Percent Medium and Heavy
Duty Zero Emissions Vehicle Sales Requirements,"
https ://ww2. arb .ca.gov/rulemaking/2022/acf2022.
Congress itself is debating this very issue, which makes EPA's claim to policymaking
authority "all the more suspect." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2614; see FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 155 (2000). Congress has yet to reach an answer and
instead remains in factfinding mode as it considers the benefits and risks of electrification.
Congress enacted the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, which requires several
agencies— notably not EPA—to prepare three separate reports for Congress on the implications
of electrifying the Nation's vehicle fleet. Pub. L. No. 117-58, §§ 25006, 40435, 40436, 135 Stat.
429, 845-49, 1050 (2021) (requiring reports on "the cradle to grave environmental impact of
electric vehicles" and "the impact of forced labor in China on the electric vehicle supply chain,"
among other things). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 68-69]
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Balancing National Policy Considerations. In West Virginia, the Court found it significant
that EPA's rule would put the agency in the position of "balancing the many vital considerations
of national policy implicated in the basic regulation of how Americans get their energy." 142 S.
Ct. at 2612. The Court was concerned that the agency would decide "how much of a switch from
coal to gas" the grid could tolerate, and "how high energy prices [could] go" before becoming
"exorbitant." Id. Here, too, EPA's rule puts it in the position of deciding "how much of a switch"
to electrification the nation's power grids can tolerate, and how high vehicle and electricity
prices can climb without being "exorbitant." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 68-69]
EPA's asserted authority also implicates another key "consideration^ of national policy":
national security. NHTSA has acknowledged that the United States "has very little capacity in
mining and refining any of the key raw materials" for electric vehicles. 86 Fed. Reg. 49,602,
49,797 (Sept. 3, 2021). And unlike biofuels and petroleum, most of the supply of critical
components of batteries and motors for electric vehicles is controlled by hostile or unstable
foreign powers, in particular China. Shifting to electric vehicles would thus make the American
automotive industry critically dependent on one of the Nation's primary geopolitical rivals.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 68-69]
Specifically, China is by far the largest source of graphite, which is used for lithium- ion
batteries, and rare-earth elements like neodymium, which are used for permanent-magnet motors.
By some estimates, a transition to electric vehicles would raise demand for graphite by 2500%
and rare-earth elements by 1500%. International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals
in Clean Energy Transitions 97 (March 2022). Another key component of lithium batteries,
cobalt, is controlled by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is implicated in significant
human-rights concerns (including child labor), and Chinese state-owned enterprises have a
controlling interest in 70% of Congo's cobalt mines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 68-
69]
Lack of Agency Expertise. To force electrification, EPA would need to understand and weigh
"many vital considerations of national policy." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2612. The policy
judgments here involve not only climate impacts but millions of jobs, the restructuring of entire
industries, the Nation's energy independence and relationship with hostile powers, and supply-
chain and electric-grid vulnerabilities. EPA does not have any expertise in those matters. The
judgments here are not ones "Congress presumably would" entrust to "an agency [with] no
comparative expertise," but are "ones Congress would likely have intended for itself." West
Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2612-13. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 69-71]
Prior Rejections by Congress of Similar Policies. As evidence that the judgments here belong
to Congress rather than the Executive, both Houses of Congress have previously "considered and
rejected" multiple bills with effects similar to EPA's rule. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2614
(quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 144). Congress even rejected one bill that would
have mandated a level of electric- vehicle penetration roughly equal to the 50%-by-2030 target
EPA embraces in this proposal. See, e.g., Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2019, H.R. 2764, 116th
Cong. (2019); Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2018, S. 3664, 115th Cong. (2018); see also 116
Cong. Rec. 19238-40 (1970) (proposed amendment to Title II that would have banned internal-
combustion vehicles by 1978). Congress's "consistent judgment" against the very sorts of
mandates imposed by EPA undercuts any claim of congressional authorization. Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 147-48, 160; accord West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2614. The fact that the
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current administration has been required to rely on executive actions to force electrification of
the vehicle fleets demonstrates the lack of congressional authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 69-71]
Indeed, the U.S. House and Senate recently passed a joint resolution358 nullifying EPA's
recent rule on HDVs relating to air pollution, including ozone and particulate matter. The
resolution was subsequently vetoed by President Biden,359 which only further confirms that
EPA's recent attempts to alter the Nation's vehicle fleet is unsupported by Congress and instead
driven by the current administration's agenda. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 69-71]
358 Heavy Duty Truck rule Congressional Review Act joint resolution (S.J. Res. 11)("A Joint resolution
providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted
by the Environmental Protection Agency relating to "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles:
Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards").
359 https://www.whitehouse.gOv/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/06/14/message-to-the-senate- on-
the-presidents-veto-of-s-j-res-11/
To be sure, with regard to this proposal on LDVs and MDVs, as well as EPA's related
proposal for HDVs, 151 members of the House submitted a letter360 to EPA urging the
rescission of the proposals, citing such concerns as the proposal being "unworkable,"
"impractical," a "deliberate market manipulation to prop up EVs," a benefit to the Chinese
Communist Party ("as China has a stranglehold on the critical minerals supply chain and
manufacturing of EV batteries"), "not necessarily better for the environment in terms of
emissions reductions," and "worst of all," a burden on Americans and their families, forcing
them to pay "an excessive amount for a car they do not want and cannot afford." Similarly, 26
senators issued a letter361 to EPA requesting withdrawal of the LDV, MDV, and HDV
proposals, which "effectively mandate a costly transition to electric cars and trucks in the
absence of congressional direction." (emphasis added). The Senate letter further cited the
proposal's increased burden on the electric grid, the lack of supporting charging infrastructure,
safety risks associated with EVs, roadway lifespan impacts and planning, consumer choice and
affordability, domestic job losses, national security, and questionable cost metrics as concerns
with, and flaws under, the proposal and also emphasized the application of the major questions
doctrine and EPA's lack of clear authority: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 69-71]
360
https://dldth6e84htgma.cloudfront.net/DRAFT_05_22_23_EPA_Tailpipe_Letter_af5a5b04a5.pdf7updated
_at=2023-05-19T17:01:36.343Z; see also https://mccaul.house.gov/media-center/press-
releases/mccaul-mcmorris-rodgers-demand-epa-end-effort-dictate-cars-americans.
361 https://www.epw.senate.gOv/public/_cache/files/4/c/4c8alccf-a225-4e7b-b028"
f4674cl2bdaf/0EBFAF9F23EC0CCA86DDFCBBCF6044F8.05.25.2023-capito-letter-to-epa-on- tailpipe-
standards.pdf; see also https://www.capito.senate.gov/news/press-releases/capito- colleagues-
urge-epa-to-withdraw-recent-vehicle-emissions-rules-.
If finalized, these proposals will effectively require a wholesale conversion from powering
vehicles with widely available liquid fuel to charging BEVs off our nation's electric grid. This is
a major, multi-billion dollar, policy-driven technology transition mandate to be imposed on
American consumers by your Agency, without any semblance of the clear and direct statutory
authority required by the ruling in West Virginia v. EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
69-71]
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In short, Congress has rejected not only a mandatory shift to EVs in general, but also this
precise proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 69-71]
Conflict with Congress's Broader Design. EPA's rule is also inconsistent with the broader
statutory scheme and Congress's plan for tackling climate change. See Utility Air, 573 U.S. at
321. When Congress has sought to address greenhouse-gas emissions from the transportation
sector, it has done so by promoting corn ethanol and other biofuels, which are used in
conventional vehicles and which—unlike electric-vehicle components—are in abundant
domestic supply. See, e.g., Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-169. §§ 13202,
13404, 22003, 136 Stat 1818, 1932, 1966-69, 2020 (2022). Indeed, Congress has consistently
legislated against the background expectation that conventional vehicles powered by liquid fuels
will remain on the market. The Renewable Fuel Standard program is designed to promote, not
diminish, renewable fuel demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 69-71]
For example, in Title II's Renewable Fuel Standard Program, Congress mandated year-over-
year increases in renewable fuel. EPA is thus working at cross-purposes with Congress, which
has required increases in liquid renewable fuels at the same time that EPA is seeking to eliminate
vehicles that use such fuels.362 The obvious reason for the mismatch is that Congress has not
decided to mandate electrification—nor has it placed that power in EPA's hands. See West
Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2633 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that when the agency's "action, if
allowed, would have conflicted with, or even wreaked havoc on, Congress's broader design" it
should not be allowed based on normal statutory interpretation of a broad delegation of
authority). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 69-71]
362 362 87 Fed. Reg. 80582, "Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program: Standards for 2023-2025 and
Other Changes" (December 30, 2022).
B. The Clean Air Act's general grants of authority and EPA's new interpretations of the
same do not authorize the proposal's mandatory shift in the Nation's vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 73-76]
Not only does EPA lack the clear congressional authorization necessary to support the
proposal's wholesale shift in energy policy pursuant to West Virginia, but the text, structure, and
legislative history of the Clean Air Act demonstrate that it also lacks general statutory authority
to force the electrification of LDVs and MDVs. The proposed standards thus exceed EPA's
statutory authority, even absent application of the major-questions doctrine. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 73-76]
1. EPA has incorrectly interpreted the text of the Clean Air Act provisions cited as a
general authorization to mandate ZEVs.
EPA claims that Section 202(a) of the CAA authorizes it to force a change in technology. But
the cases EPA cites as authoritative are not based on Section 202(a), and Section 202(a) does not
provide EPA clear authority to force technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 73-76]
EPA makes several additional critical errors in its interpretation of its authority to conclude
that the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to set standards that mandate increasing percentages of
sales of ZEVs. To set these standards, EPA first assumes that the standards can regulate any
"motor vehicles," including electric vehicles, even if it has deemed such vehicles to not emit the
relevant pollutant. Second, EPA characterizes electrification, more specifically BEVs and
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FCEVs, as a "pollution control device or system" that would apply to motor vehicles. Third,
EPA assumes authority to use fleetwide averaging rather than to set standards for individual
vehicles and engines. Fourth, EPA ignores other sections of the Clean Air Act, which are
inconsistent with the proposal's forced shift in energy. Finally, EPA relies on a novel and highly
revisionist spin on legislative history to support its authority to mandate electrification. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 73-76]
EPA errs with each of these steps.
a) The statutory text demonstrates that the vehicles covered by the standards must emit
the relevant pollutant.
Section 202(a)(1) provides that EPA shall prescribe "standards applicable to the emission of
any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,
which in [its] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). The statute, of course, does not
expressly specify which vehicles are to be included in any average emission standard because, as
discussed below, it does not contemplate averaging in the first place. But to the extent averaging
is permissible, the text makes clear that the vehicles included in such averaging must, in EPA's
judgment, actually emit the relevant pollutant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 73-76]
To begin with, EPA improperly relies on a broad definition of "motor vehicle," as the statute
focuses on standards for the "emission" of an air pollutant, which immediately indicates
Congress's focus on vehicles deemed to actually "emi[t]" the relevant pollutant. 42 U.S.C. §
7521(a)(1) (emphasis added). Here, EPA's proposal stipulates that electric vehicles are to be
treated for averaging purposes as if they emit no carbon dioxide (even when they pull electricity
from a grid that is powered by carbon-emitting sources and rely on batteries whose production,
disposal, and recycling emits carbon) or criteria pollutants.364 EPA has thus decided that electric
vehicles as a class do not "emi[t]" the relevant pollutants. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). And given the
textual focus on harmful emissions, EPA cannot include vehicles it determines to be non-
emitting in the standards that EPA calculates and imposes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
73-76]
364 See, e.g., 88 Fed. Reg. 29,187.
Next, the statute is explicit that the things for which EPA sets standards must "in [EPA's]
judgment, cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). The key textual question is thus what exactly
EPA must "judg[e]" to "cause, or contribute to" potentially dangerous air pollution. The
grammatical structure of the provision offers only two plausible options. Because the verbs
"cause" and "contribute" are in the plural form, their subject must be plural as well. See Scalia &
Garner, supra, at 140 ("Judges rightly presume . . . that legislators understand subject-verb
agreement."). The only plural nouns that could plausibly "cause" or "contribute" to pollution are
either the "new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines," or the "class or classes" of those
vehicles or engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 73-76]
Under either reading, all of the covered vehicles must emit the relevant pollutants. If it is the
"vehicles" or "engines" that EPA must judge to "cause, or contribute to, air pollution," then
Section 202(a) authorizes EPA to set standards only for "new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines which in [EPA's] judgment cause, or contribute to" potentially dangerous
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pollution. In other words, EPA may set standards only for motor vehicles that in its judgment
actually emit the regulated pollutants—here, combustion-engine vehicles that emit greenhouse
gases and criteria pollutants. The converse is equally true: Section 202(a) does not authorize
EPA to set standards for vehicles that it deems not to cause or contribute to harmful pollution.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 73-76]
That is the natural reading of the statute under the "grammatical 'rule of the last antecedent,'"
which provides that a "limiting clause or phrase ... should ordinarily be read as modifying only
the noun or phrase that it immediately follows." Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003).
Here, the relevant limiting phrase is: "which in [EPA's] judgment cause, or contribute, to air
pollution." And the immediately antecedent phrase is "new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines." The rule of the last antecedent thus indicates that it is the "vehicles" in the class that
must "cause, or contribute" to the pollution, and not the "class" as a whole. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 73-76]
Courts have also adopted that natural reading. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, for
example, has observed that Section 202(a) "requires the EPA to set emissions standards for new
motor vehicles and their engines if they emit harmful air pollutants." Truck Trailers Mfrs. Ass'n
v. EPA, 17 F.4th 1198, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (emphasis added); see NRDC v. EPA, 954 F.3d
150, 152 (2d Cir. 2020) (Section 202(a) "requires EPA to regulate emissions from new motor
vehicles if EPA determines that the vehicles 'cause, or contribute to,' [potentially dangerous] air
pollution") (emphasis added). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 73-76]
Alternatively, if it is the "class or classes" of vehicles or engines that must "cause, or
contribute to, air pollution," the result is the same. When we refer to a class of objects that does
something, the ordinary and accurate meaning is that all the members of the class do that thing.
For example, when a doctor warns a patient about a "class of medications that cause drowsiness,"
the class does not include non- drowsiness-inducing medicines. And that is the best way to read
the statute here: a class that causes pollution is most naturally defined to include only those
vehicles that cause pollution. EPA has broad leeway to group those pollution-emitting vehicles
into classes how it sees fit. See NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But the
vehicles must actually be pollution-emitting in EPA's judgment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 73-76]
In short, under either plausible reading of the statute, when EPA sets an emission standard for
a pollutant, it must consider only the vehicles that it judges to emit the relevant pollutant. Even if
fleetwide averaging were allowed as a general matter, averaging would be permissible only
among types of vehicles that "emi[t]" the harmful pollutant and that, "in [EPA's] judgment cause,
or contribute" to harmful air pollution. If EPA determines that a particular category of vehicle is
not "emitting]" the relevant pollutant or "caus[ing], or contributing] to" the resulting pollution,
it makes no sense to include that category in calculating the emission standard. That is not really
"averaging" at all, as it does not help EPA arrive at a technologically feasible threshold for
pollutant-emitting vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 73-76]
EPA has adopted such a faux "average" here. The agency proposes carbon- dioxide and
criteria pollutant emissions targets for LDVs and MDVs that "average" in a category of vehicles
that it deems not to emit either carbon dioxide or criteria pollutants. EPA treats electric vehicles
as "zero-emission vehicles," and assumes they contribute "zero grams/mile" of carbon dioxide or
criteria pollutants "from their tailpipes."365 Setting aside the flaws in that assumption, if EPA
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chooses to treat electric vehicles as "zero emission," it must abide by the statutory consequences
of that decision: the electric-vehicle category cannot textually or logically be "averaged" into the
emission standards under Section 202(a). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 73-76]
365 88 Fed. Reg. 29,187, 29,197.
This error is not new. The Supreme Court recently rejected parallel reasoning in West
Virginia. There, a similar provision of the Clean Air Act authorized EPA to guide States in
"establishing] standards of performance for any existing [power plant] for any air pollutant." 42
U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1). The Court explained that authorization to "establish[] standards of
performance for existing source[s]" does not equate to the power "to direct existing sources to
effectively cease to exist." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2612 n.3 (quoting42 U.S.C. § 7411(d))
(second alteration in original). The same logic applies to Section 202(a): in empowering EPA to
set emission standards for "vehicles" or "classes" of "vehicles" that "cause, or contribute to, air
pollution," Congress did not permit EPA "to direct [conventional vehicles] to effectively cease to
exist." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 73-76]
b) EVs and ZEVs do not constitute "emission control devices or systems," rather, they
are different technologies altogether.
EPA next claims that Congress gave it clear authority to require automotive manufacturers to
use ZEVs as "emission control devices or systems" to prevent or control the emission of
greenhouse gases and criteria pollutants from LDV and MDV tailpipes.366 EPA first asserted
this novel argument in response to litigation challenging its attempt to force electrification of
LDVs in its Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards, 86 FR 74434. See EPA's Answering Brief in Texas v. EPA (D.C. Cir. 22-1031), pp.
40-47. In that case, EPA claimed that when 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(l), which allows it to prescribe
pollution-emission standards to vehicles whether they are "designed as complete systems or
incorporate devices to prevent or control such pollution," is read in conjunction with subsection
(a)(2), which prohibits EPA from prescribing such standards until "the requisite technology" can
be developed and applied in a cost-efficient manner, Congress provided EPA "clear
authorization" to mandate electric vehicles. EPA's Answering Brief at pp. 40-41, 47. In other
words, EPA reads the limiting language in (a)(2) to somehow expand the authority granted in
(a)(1), which as described above does not apply to ZEVs deemed not to emit the relevant
pollutant. But neither the plain language nor the statutory history provides EPA with newfound
authority to replace ICEVs with ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 76-78]
366 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,286.
Not only does the statute not mention EVs or any other type of purported ZEVs, which one
would expect if Congress were providing EPA clear authority to force electrification of the
nation's vehicle fleet, but ZEVs are also not even "systems" or "devices" that "prevent or
control" pollution; they are just different kinds of vehicles that EPA states do not emit the
relevant pollutant in the first place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 76-78]
ZEVs are not "designed as complete systems" to prevent or control harmful pollution,
because they do not have "built-in pollution control" or prevention. Truck Trailer Mfrs. Ass'n,
Inc. v. EPA, 17 F.4th 1198, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2021). To "prevent" something means to "keep [it]
from happening" or "impede" it. American Heritage Dictionary 1038 (1st ed. 1969). To
"control" means to "hold in restraint" or "check." Id. at 290. Thus, a vehicle with "built-in
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pollution control" or prevention is one that has a self-contained mechanism to block or capture
pollution that would otherwise be emitted. This is consistent with EPA's own definition of
"emission control system," as "a unique group of emission control devices, auxiliary emission
control devices, engine modifications and strategies, and other elements of design designated by
the Administrator used to control emissions of vehicles." 40 C.F.R. §86.1803-01 (emphasis
added). ZEVs, on the other hand, are designed to run on an entirely different power system, not
to limit or control pollution from a carbon- dioxide- or criteria-pollutant-emitting engine. To
draw an analogy, it would not be natural to refer to an iPod as "a system that prevents or controls
record skips." An iPod is not a record player with some built-in method of impeding or reducing
record skips; it is a different technology altogether. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 76-78]
Nor do electric vehicles incorporate "add-in devices for pollution control" or prevention.
Truck Trailer Mfrs., 17 F.4th at 1202. The component parts of ZEVs, such as their batteries, are
not merely add-in devices that block the emission of pollution or minimize pollution that would
otherwise occur. They are integral to the basic functioning of the vehicle, which does not emit
the relevant pollutant in the first place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 76-78]
EPA also notes that the statutory definition of "motor vehicles" is "broad" and includes the
phrase "any self-propelled vehicle."367 But the statutory history refutes any implication that this
definition was intended to cover EVs. The relevant "motor vehicle" definition was introduced to
the Clean Air Act in 1965 and has remained unchanged since. Pub. L. No. 89-272, § 101, 79
Stat. 992, 995 (1965). In 1965, the ordinary vehicle on the road had an internal-combustion
engine, so there was no need for Congress to specify that the term meant anything else. By
contrast, for example, Congress added the reference to "nonroad vehicles" in 1990, when other
types of power were being explored and it made sense to clarify which type of engine was
covered. See Pub. L. 101-549, § 223, 104 Stat. 2399, 2503 (1990); see also id. § 229, 104 Stat.
2511 (establishing pilot program for "clean fuel vehicles" including those powered by
"electricity"). There is nothing to read into Congress's omission of that qualifier 25 years earlier.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 76-78]
367 88 Fed. Reg. at 92,231.
2. The statutory structure of the Clean Air Act further confirms that EPA is not
authorized to mandate the sale of ZEVs.
i. The statutory structure confirms Congress' focus on technologically achievable
emission controls.
Several provisions of Section 202 of the Clean Air Act confirm that Congress focused on
technologically feasible standards for vehicles deemed to emit pollutants that actually cause or
contribute to pollution. Section 202(a)(2) requires EPA to provide manufacturers with lead time
to comply with the standards, in order "to permit the development and application of the
requisite technology." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2). Similarly, Section 202(a)(3)(A)(i) provides that
EPA's HDV standards for certain criteria pollutants should reflect the "greatest degree of
emission reduction achievable through the application of technology which the [EPA]
determines will be available" during the relevant model year. Id. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i). Those
provisions contemplate that technological feasibility will meaningfully constrain the emission
standards that EPA sets under Section 202(a). EPA cannot ignore technological feasibility and
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simply decide to require production of fewer internal combustion vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, p. 78]
Other provisions show the type of "technology" that Congress contemplated vehicle
manufacturers would develop to meet those standards. Section 202(m) requires EPA to
command manufacturers to install on "all" new light-duty vehicles and trucks "diagnostic
systems" that identify "emission-related systems deterioration or malfunction ... which could ...
result in failure of the vehicles to comply with emission standards established under this section."
42 U.S.C. § 7521(m)(l). The required diagnostic systems must monitor, "at a minimum, the
catalytic converter and oxygen sensor." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 78]
In other words, to ensure compliance with emission standards under Section 202(a), Congress
required "emissions-related systems" and accompanying "diagnostic systems" on each vehicle—
again underscoring Congress's view that the vehicles subject to an emission standard actually
emit the relevant pollutant in EPA's judgment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 78]
As the statutory structure demonstrates, EPA may set standards that are "technology-forcing,"
because they require manufacturers to adopt nascent technology that may not yet be "adequately
demonstrated." NRDC, 805 F .2d at 419. EPA's rules thus have promoted the development of
"automotive technologies, such as on-board computers and fuel injection systems" that improve
emissions from combustion engines. 86 Fed. Reg. at 74,451. But the statute does not permit what
EPA proposes here: enacting "average" standards divorced from technologically achievable
limits on emitting vehicles, which instead force manufacturers to produce a different type of
supposedly non-emitting vehicle altogether. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 78]
a) The statutory structure confirms EPA lacks statutory authority to use fleetwide averaging
to mandate ZEVs.
EPA's proposal would require electrification by setting average emission standards for
manufacturers' nationwide fleets and "averaging" in more and more zeros to represent the
electric vehicles it wants to see in future years. Manufacturers that exceed the standards may
bank credits and trade them to other manufacturers that fall short. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 78-80]
EPA relies on NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986), for the proposition that it is
authorized to average vehicles. That case found EPA could average a manufacturer's different
engine families. Id. at 425. It did so, however, with some caveats. First, its reasoning was based
on a deference to EPA's interpretation of the statute "in the absence of clear evidence Congress
meant to prohibit averaging." This standard, of course, is directly contrary to the standard
applicable in this case in which EPA is proposing regulations that affect a major question—clear
Congressional authority to permit averaging to mandate electric vehicles. Second, the parties
failed to raise a textual argument against averaging. Id. at n.24 ("Although it was not raised by
any party before the agency, and accordingly cannot be dispositive here ... there is an additional
argument against emissions averaging. The Act's testing and certification provision, 42 U.S.C. §
7525 [Link:
https://l.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=42
USCAS7525&originatingDoc=I80714eef94d31 ld9a707f4371c9c34f0&refType=LQ&originatio
nContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=0591cc222593448083058c4608d3
c583&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)], speaks of'any,' 'a,' or 'such' motor vehicle or
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engine being tested and certified. With averaging, some vehicles or engines would not be
required to comply with the standards and would not be subject to NCPs for failing to so comply.
This practice appears inconsistent with the requirement that 'any,' 'a,' or 'such' vehicle or
engine be tested and required to comply with emissions standards."). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
On the other hand, EPA has previously acknowledged that the Act is silent on the
mechanisms of averaging, banking, and trading (ABT). When EPA first adopted fleetwide
averaging, it recognized that "Congress did not specifically contemplate an averaging program
when it enacted the Clean Air Act." 48 Fed. Reg. 33,456, 33,458 (July 21, 1983). And "[jjust as
the statute does not explicitly address EPA's authority to allow averaging, it does not address the
Agency's authority to permit banking and trading." 54 Fed. Reg. 22,652, 22,665 (May 25, 1989);
see 55 Fed. Reg. 30,584, 30,593 (July 26, 1990) (same). By definition, then, the Act does not
address—let alone clearly authorize—the use of averaging, banking, and trading to electrify the
Nation's vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
That should be the end of the analysis. Section 202 of the Clean Air Act does not itself "direct
[conventional vehicles] to effectively cease to exist." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2612 n.3. EPA
has instead relied on mechanisms that are not themselves spelled out in the statute and that have
never before been used to mandate LD and MD electric vehicles. Just as in West Virginia, EPA
has nothing "close to the sort of clear authorization" necessary for such a transformational policy
shift. 142 S. Ct. at 2614. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
But in truth, the problem is far worse for EPA than that. As explained below, the Act
unambiguously precludes fleetwide-average emission standards under Section 202(a). And even
if the statute permitted some fleetwide averaging, it does not allow EPA to take the additional
step of incorporating non-emitting vehicles into emission averages and thus forcing the market
toward electric vehicles. The proposal is not merely stretching vague statutory language. It is
defying clear statutory text. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
The text and structure of Section 202, and of Title II more broadly, unambiguously require
that emission standards under Section 202(a) apply to individual vehicles, not manufacturers'
fleets on average. EPA claims to find authority for fleetwide averaging in Section 202(a), which
authorizes EPA to issue "standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class
or classes of new motor vehicles ... which in [its] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
On its face, that provision authorizes EPA to set standards for vehicles that emit harmful air
pollutants. It says nothing about averaging across fleets. As noted, when EPA first adopted
fleetwide averaging, it acknowledged that "Congress did not specifically contemplate an
averaging program when it enacted the Clean Air Act." 48 Fed. Reg. at 33,458. EPA claimed to
have the authority because the Act "does not explicitly preclude standards" based on averaging.
54 Fed. Reg. at22,666 (emphasis added). EPA was wrong. "[T]he broader context of the statute
as a whole," Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997), makes clear that Section
202(a) does not permit fleetwide averaging. And, even if EPA could somehow show that the
statute tacitly or implicitly allows (or does not expressly preclude) averaging, that would still be
insufficient to meet the necessary clear congressional authority to use fleetwide averaging as a
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means to force a transition from internal-combustion engines to ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
a. Other provisions in Section 202 demonstrate that emission standards may not be based
on averaging.
Title II is replete with provisions that necessarily apply to vehicles individually, not to fleets
on average. That is evident first in the emission standards prescribed by Section 202 itself. For
example, in Section 202(b), the Act sets forth specific light-duty vehicle emission standards that
EPA must promulgate in "regulations under" Section 202(a). 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b). For vehicles
in model years 1977 to 1979, the standards must provide that "emissions from such vehicles and
engines may not exceed 1.5 grams per vehicle mile of hydrocarbons and 15.0 grams per vehicle
mile of carbon monoxide." Id. § 7521(b)(1)(A). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
Those provisions require that the "regulations under [Section 202(a)]" apply to "vehicles and
engines," not "vehicles and engines on an average basis across a fleet." Construing those
provisions to allow averaging would, in effect, add words to the statute that change its meaning.
Neither courts nor agencies may "supply words ... that have been omitted." Antonin Scalia &
Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (2012); accord Rotkiske.v.
Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360-361 (2019). And supplying the extra words "on average" would
have a significant substantive effect: "roller coaster riders must be 48 inches tall" means
something very different from "roller coaster riders must be 48 inches tall on average." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
The testing requirements accompanying the Section 202(b) standards confirm that those
standards apply to all vehicles. In particular, EPA must "test any emission control system
incorporated in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine ... to determine whether such system
enables such vehicle or engine to conform to the standards required to be prescribed under
[Section 202(b) of the Act]." 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(2). If the system complies, EPA must issue a
"verification of compliance with emission standards for such system." Id. Those requirements
plainly contemplate standards that apply to individual vehicles and their emission-control
systems. Not only does the statutory text frame the inquiry as whether an individual "vehicle" or
"engine" conforms to the emission standards, but the provision's foundational premise-that an
emission-control system can enable a vehicle to meet emission standards depends on individually
applied standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
Other parts of Section 202 further demonstrate that emission standards under Section 202(a)
cannot rely on averaging. Section 202(b)(3), for example, authorizes EPA to grant waivers from
certain nitrogen-oxide emission standards—which, again, are standards "under" Section 202(a),
see 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(B)—for no "more than 5 percent of [a] manufacturer's production or
more than fifty thousand vehicles or engines, whichever is greater." Id. § 7521(b)(3). This
provision would be nonsensical under a fleetwide-averaging regime. It contemplates a default
under which every vehicle meets a standard, then gives manufacturers a waiver from that default
for up to 5% of the fleet. But under fleetwide averaging, no waiver is needed. Instead, a vast
proportion of a manufacturer's fleet—perhaps 50% or more— effectively has a "waiver" so long
as a sufficient number of vehicles outperform the standard. Likewise, Section 202(g), which
specifies an increasing "percentage of each manufacturer's sales volume" of each model year's
vehicles that must comply with specified emission standards, is fundamentally incompatible with
averaging. Id. § 7521(g)(1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
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Similarly, under Section 202(m), EPA must require manufacturers to install on "all" new
light-duty vehicles and trucks "diagnostic systems" capable of identifying malfunctions that
"could cause or result in failure of the vehicles to comply with emission standards established
under this section." Id. § 7521(m)(l). As this requirement makes clear, individual vehicles must
"comply with emissions standards established under [Section 202]." Id. Otherwise, requiring
diagnostic equipment on "all" vehicles makes no sense. In a fleetwide-averaging regime, this
requirement would be pointless, as the deterioration or malfunction of an individual vehicle's
emission-related systems would provide virtually no information about whether the fleet as a
whole is compliant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
b. Title II's compliance and enforcement provisions for emission standards confirm that
EPA cannot use fleetwide averaging.
Fleetwide averaging also clashes with "the design and structure of [Title II] as a whole."
Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 321 (citation omitted). Title II sets forth a comprehensive, interlocking
scheme for enforcing emission standards through testing, certification, warranties, remediation,
and penalties. Fleetwide-average standards are incompatible with these provisions, which are
"designed to apply to" individual vehicles and "cannot rationally be extended" to fleets. Id. at
322. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 81-82]
Testing and Certification. Under Title II, EPA must "test, or require to be tested in such
manner as [it] deems appropriate, any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine submitted
by a manufacturer to determine whether such vehicle or engine conforms with the regulations
prescribed under [Section 202]." 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1). If the "vehicle or engine conforms to
such regulations," EPA must issue the manufacturer a "certificate of conformity." Id. EPA may
later test a manufacturer's vehicles and engines, and if "such vehicle or engine does not conform
with such regulations and requirements, [EPA] may suspend or revoke such certificate insofar as
it applies to such vehicle or engine." Id. § 7525(b)(2)(A)(ii). A manufacturer may not sell a
vehicle or engine not "covered by a certificate of conformity." Id. § 7522(a)(1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 81-82]
Fleetwide averaging is incompatible with these requirements in at least two respects. First, by
using the singular terms "vehicle" and "engine," along with "any" and "such," the statute
contemplates that individual vehicles may be tested, determined to "not conform" with the
standards, and have their certificates of conformity suspended or revoked. In a fleetwide-
averaging regime, testing an individual vehicle or engine does not enable EPA to determine
whether it "conforms with the regulations prescribed under [Section 202]," 42 U.S.C. §
7525(a)(1), because conformity turns not on an individual vehicle's emissions but on the fleet's
average performance overall. Second, fleetwide averaging also makes it impossible to determine
compliance with applicable emission standards before a vehicle is sold, as required to obtain the
certificate of conformity needed for a sale. See 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1). Under fleetwide-average
standards, a vehicle's "conformity] with the regulations prescribed under [Section 202]" cannot
be determined until the manufacturer calculates its production-weighted average at "the end of
each model year," when the manufacturer knows the quantity and model of "vehicles produced
and delivered for sale." 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.1818-12(c)(2)(2), 86.1865-12(i)(l), (j)(3). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 81-82]
For similar reasons, fleetwide averaging is inconsistent with the statutory definition of an
"emission standard," which "limits the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air
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pollutants on a continuous basis." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k). It is impossible to know on a "continuous
basis" whether a manufacturer's fleet complies with EPA's proposed average standards, because
a manufacturer cannot calculate its production-weighted average until the end of the year.
Simply put, an after-the-fact compliance regime is incompatible with the Act's testing and
certification scheme. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 81-82]
c. The broader text and history of Title II confirm that the rule exceeds EPA's authority
through fleetwide averaging.
Other indicia of statutory meaning demonstrate that the proposed rule exceeds EPA's statutory
authority under Section 202(a). Elsewhere in Title II, Congress showed that it knew how to
legislate with respect to "average annual aggregate emissions." 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(l)(B)(v)(II)
(directing EPA to take certain actions if "the reduction of the average annual aggregate emissions
of toxic air pollutants in a [designated district] fails to meet" certain standards). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 83-84]
Thus, "if Congress had wanted to adopt an [averaging] approach" for motor vehicle standards
under Section 202(a), "it knew how to do so." SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1351
(2018); seeRotkiske, 140 S. Ct. at 360-361 ("Atextual judicial supplementation is particularly
inappropriate when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted
language or provision."). It did not choose that approach in Section 202(a). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 83-84]
The Energy Policy Conservation Act, enacted just two years before the 1977 Clean Air Act
amendments, reinforces that conclusion. There, Congress directed the Secretary of
Transportation to issue regulations setting "average fuel economy standards for automobiles
manufactured by a manufacturer" in a given model year. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a). That Congress
has not used similar language in Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act is a "telling clue" that the
Act does not permit fleetwide averaging. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1626 (2018).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 83-84]
The Clean Air Act's history also reflects Congress's understanding that emission standards
would apply to all vehicles individually. Congress was so focused on reducing emissions at the
level of the individual vehicle that, in the 1970 amendments, Congress permitted EPA to test any
individual vehicle as it comes off the assembly line. See Pub. L. No. 91-601, § 8, 84 Stat. 1676,
1694-1696. Such a vehicle-by-vehicle test was meant to supplement the pre-1970 testing of
prototypes. Congress explained that while testing of prototypes "will continue," "tests should
require each prototype rather than the average of prototypes to comply with regulations
establishing emission standards." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, at 6 (1970). And if Congress forbade
averaging across prototypes, it certainly did not permit averaging across entire fleets. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 83-84]
d. Related provisions confirm that Section 202(a) does not authorize averaging of non-
emitting electric vehicles.
Other provisions of the Clean Air Act drive home the lack of statutory authorization to
mandate electrification as well. In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress spoke
directly to the phase-in of electric vehicles on America's roads. Congress instructed EPA to
establish standards for "clean-fuel vehicles" operating on "clean alternative fuel," including
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"electricity." Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 229, 104 Stat. 2399, 2513 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
7581(2), (7), 7582(a)). Congress required that certain areas of the country with the worst
pollution would have to "phase-in" a "specified percentage" of "clean-fuel vehicles" using "clean
alternative fuels" (defined to include "electricity") in certain fleets. 42 U.S.C. § 7586; see id. §
7581(a). The 1990 amendments highlight that Congress knows how to clearly establish standards
that apply to electric vehicles, and to directly require that such vehicles be phased into a
particular fleet. But Congress chose to do so only on a targeted, regional basis. The contrast
between the 1990 amendments and Section 202(a) highlights the absence of any statutory
authority for EPA's rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 84]
Other related statutes also suggest the same. In the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress
directed NHTSA to set fuel-economy standards based on averages, but prohibited NHTSA from
setting fuel-economy standards that average in the fuel economy of electric vehicles. See Pub. L.
No. 102-486 §§ 302, 403, 106 Stat. 2776, 2870-2871, 2876 (later codified at 49 U.S.C. §
32902(h)). This prohibition bars NHTSA from doing exactly what EPA is doing here: misusing
its regulatory authority to force a transition from conventional vehicles to electric vehicles by
artificially tightening the "average" standard a fleet must meet. Of course, when Congress
finalized the language of Section 202(a)(1) in 1977, it had no need to explicitly block EPA from
considering electric vehicles, because it did not contemplate that EPA would set emission
standards using averaging in the first place (or that EPA would be setting standards for
greenhouse gases). The prohibition on NHTSA nevertheless underscores just how far EPA is
reaching here: it is straining statutory language to seize a power that Congress expressly denied
to a sister agency that actually has authority to promulgate fleetwide-average standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 84]
e. EPA's lack of authority for a credit-trading scheme further confirms its lack of
authority to set fleetwide averages.
The proposal's credit banking and trading program is critical to EPA's electrification mandate.
But the agency also lacks authority under Title II to establish a credit scheme as part of its
emission standards under Section 202(a). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
As with fleetwide averaging, EPA has previously acknowledged that Title II says nothing
about banking and trading credits in connection with motor-vehicle emission standards. See 54
Fed. Reg. at 22,665. What EPA has ignored, however, is that Title II is not silent regarding
banking and trading in other contexts. Indeed, in multiple other provisions under Title II,
Congress expressly authorized the use of bankable and tradable credits. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
7545(k)(7) (reformulated gasoline credits); § 7545(o)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(cc), (5)(A)(i) (renewable fuel
credits); id. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(cc), (5)(A)(ii) (biodiesel credits); id. §
7545(o)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(cc), (5)(A)(iii) (small refineries credits); id. § 7586(f) (clean- fuel fleet-
operator credits); id. § 7589(d) (California pilot test program's clean-fuel vehicle manufacturer
credit). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
Under EPA's proposed approach, those provisions would all be superfluous, because EPA
already had the discretion to adopt a credit-trading regime for any program. If Congress had
wanted to permit credits in connection with emission standards under Section 202(a), it knew
how to and would have done so expressly. See SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1351. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
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For all these reasons, courts have cast substantial doubt on EPA's authority to set fleetwide-
average emission standards. As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained in NRDC v.
Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the "engine specific thrust" of Title II's "testing and
compliance provisions" is evident both in Congress's choice to "spea[k] of'any,' 'a,' or 'such'
motor vehicle or engine" in the text of the statute and in the "troubling" legislative history
recounted above. Id. at 425 n.24. The arguments were not dispositive in Thomas only because
the parties there had failed to present them. Id. But the Court nevertheless recognized that the
arguments were relevant to "future proceedings." Id.. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-
86]
f. At a minimum, EPA may not use fleetwide averaging to require electrification.
Despite the absence of statutory authorization for fleetwide averaging, EPA has long
employed that mechanism without significant industry pushback. That is likely because fleetwide
averaging has generally been offered as an accommodation to regulated parties, allowing them
flexibility that the statute does not in fact permit. In its current proposal, however, EPA is not
offering an extrastatutory accommodation. It is taking an additional step away from the statutory
text by using fleetwide averaging to mandate electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
pp. 84-86]
To be clear, in prior rules EPA set an average emission standard and allowed manufacturers to
make some vehicles that emitted more and some that emitted less. Here, EPA has set tailpipe
emission standards at a level so stringent that manufacturers must incorporate an increasing
percentage of LD and MD electric vehicles—which EPA treats as zero-emission vehicles—into
their averages in order to comply with the "standards." See p. 13, supra. Put differently, the
agency is proposing an emission standard that is artificially low because it incorporates electric
vehicles, which EPA treats as emitting zero pollutants for averaging purposes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
Whatever the permissibility of fleetwide averaging, the text and structure of Title II make
plain that EPA cannot manipulate averaging as a means to force production of an increasing
market share of electric vehicles. Section 202 does not grant EPA the power to make the
internal-combustion engine go the way of the horse and carriage. At the very least, Section 202 is
hardly clear in granting that awesome power—which is what matters under West Virginia. For
automobiles as for power plants, EPA has purported to discover in the Clean Air Act the
authority to "forc[e]" manufacturers to "cease making" a particular type of energy "altogether."
142 S. Ct. at 2612. We have seen that play recently before, and it should end the same way.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
C. EPA's action would undermine the Renewable Fuel Standard and Congress'goals for
renewable fuels and energy security.
EPA's proposal and ZEV sales mandate are also inconsistent with the broader statutory
scheme and Congress's plan for tackling climate change. When Congress sought to address
greenhouse-gas emissions from the transportation sector, it did so by promoting renewable liquid
fuels, which are used in conventional vehicles and which—unlike electric-vehicle components—
are in abundant domestic supply. See, e.g., Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-
169. §§ 13202, 13404, 22003, 136 Stat 1818, 1932, 1966-69, 2020 (2022). Indeed, Congress has
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consistently legislated against the background expectation that conventional vehicles powered by
liquid fuels will remain on the market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 86-]
The Clean Air Act also includes the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program, which
"requires that increasing volumes of renewable fuel be introduced into the Nation's supply of
transportation fuel each year." Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA (ACE), 864 F.3d 691, 697
(D.C. Cir. 2017). Two goals animate the RFS: (1) to "move the United States toward greater
energy independence and security," and (2) to "increase the production of clean renewable
fuels." Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492, 1492 (2007)). To these ends, "Congress
ordained the inclusion of 4 billion gallons of renewable fuel in the Nation's fuel supply" for
calendar year 2006, and required that, "[b]y 2022, the number will climb to 36 billion gallons."
HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass'n, 141 S. Ct. 2172, 2175 (2021).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 86-]
In other words, through the RFS, which is also in the Clean Air Act, Congress mandated that
"fuel sold or introduced into commerce in the United States" must contain increasing shares of
renewable fuels and specifically increasing shares of advanced biofuel, cellulosic biofuel, and
biomass-based diesel. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i). For these fuels, Congress called for not
simply a percentage of the fuel market but mandated a minimum volume of biofuel in the
market. The proposed standards, on the other hand, would reduce the use of renewable fuels,
particularly renewable diesel and other advanced biofuels, cellulosic biofuels, and biomass-
based diesel, and make it impossible to meet the mandates of the RFS. EPA is thus working at
cross-purposes with Congress, which has required a move toward increases in liquid renewable
fuels at the same time that EPA is seeking to eliminate vehicles that use such fuels. Congress has
never mandated, nor authorized, that EPA issue regulations to phase out the use of liquid fuels.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 86-]
The congressional intent underlying these mandated obligations under the RFS was to
incentivize liquid fuels with lower lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions. For example, renewable
diesel generates credits under the RFS, whereas traditional diesel generates an obligation. Here,
however, treating renewable diesel and traditional diesel the same—giving no recognition of or
benefit to manufacturers based on use of liquid fuels with lower lifecycle greenhouse gas
emissions— underscores EPA's failure to read its statutory authority as a whole and emphasizes
the conflict between the proposal and the RFS. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 86-]
Congress also cited national energy security as one of the primary reasons for implementing
the RFS. In the proposal, EPA deigns to resolve energy security concerns by reducing use of
liquid fuels without accounting for the impact on renewable fuels. EPA has also not adequately
accounted for increased energy security risks associated with battery production and use in the
transportation of the nation's commerce and in all the industries that use and rely on LDVs and
MDVs. See supra at XX. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 86-]
With no apparent recognition that its proposed vehicle standards will reduce consumption of
both nonrenewable and renewable fuels, EPA continues to mandate increasing volumes of
renewable fuels consistent with its mandates under the RFS, proposing a 1.7 billion gallon
increase in all renewable fuels by 2025 in its proposed "RFS Set" rule.368
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368 Final Rule: Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program: Standards for 2023-2025 and Other Changes,
signed June 2023, pre-publication version available at https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel- standard-
program/final-renewable-fuels-standards-rule-2023 -2024-and-2025 .
i. Legislative History
Lacking in direct authority, EPA resorts to non-textual, legislative history, emphasizing that at
various times Congress has made clear it "expected the Clean Air Amendments to force the
industry to broaden the scope of its research—to study new types of engines and new control
systems." Under the major questions doctrine, however, only a clear textual statement is
sufficient to grant such sweeping and consequential authority as contemplated by the proposal.
Yet even in the absence of the major questions doctrine, each source of legislative history relied
on by EPA is irrelevant to the question of whether Congress authorized EPA to mandate
electrification of the Nation's LDV and MDV fleets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 87-
88]
First, EPA cites five days of public hearings regarding "electric vehicles and other alternatives
to the internal combustion engine" held by the Senate Committee on Commerce and Public
Works in 1967 as evidence that "ICE vehicles might be inadequate to achieve the country's air
quality goals." (emphasis added). These standalone statements regarding the potential benefits of
the electric car as an additional technology are not only wholly unrelated to the enactment of the
Clean Air Act and its amendments, but they also do not speak to EPA's emission standards,
much less indicate a grant of authority to EPA to mandate such vehicles nationwide through such
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 87-88]
EPA's citation to a statement made by President Nixon in 1970 regarding a program to
develop "an unconventionally powered, virtually pollution free automobile" likewise fails to
support EPA's asserted authority to mandate vehicles that it purports to be zero-emitting. Not
only is this statement made by the executive, rather than legislative, branch, but the mere
announcement of a research program is also a far cry from a delegation of authority to mandate
wholesale policy changes for the nation. For this same reason, EPA's claimed authority to "fund
the development" of low emission alternatives, to certify low emission vehicles and encourage
federal purchases of such vehicles, and to institute a clean fuel vehicles program are also
irrelevant to EPA's authority for the proposed rule; researching and incentivizing electric
vehicles is simply not equivalent to mandating them—far from it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 87-88]
EPA next states that, in 1970, when Congress amended the Clean Air Act to target criteria
pollutants, it considered "unconventional" technologies like steam and natural-gas piston. EPA
relies on a Senate Report that addressed emissions associated with those sources. See S. Rep. No.
91-1196, at 27 (1970). But again, the report nowhere suggested that EPA would have authority to
require automakers to shift to those technologies. Moreover, according to the report, all of those
technologies emitted some pollutants. Id. So EPA's resort to legislative history as a means to
replace ICE vehicles with vehicles it deems to have zero emissions proves nothing. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 87-88]
EPA's resurrection of 50-year-old dicta369 in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,
478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973), as the basis for its authority to replace the combustion engine as
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an emission-control technology also fails, as the court was discussing legislative history, not text
requiring electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 88-89]
369 EPA claims that International Harvester "held" that the legislative history indicates that Congress
authorized EPA to replace ICEVs. The only holding in International Harvester was that EPA erred when it
denied the automakers' request for a one-year suspension of the 1975 emissions standards prescribed by
Congress. Id. at 649-50.
As a final attempt to find Congressional authorization, EPA turns to more recent legislation,
which of course has nothing to do with any purported authority of EPA under the Clean Air Act.
The Inflation Reduction Act, like all appropriations bills which "have the limited and specific
purpose of providing funds," Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978), cannot
be construed to provide any agency authority and, even then, merely incentivized rather than
mandated the use of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 88-89]
Ultimately, Congress's limited approval of electric vehicles hurts EPA's position. Where
Congress has sought to increase the usage of electric vehicles, it has done so only through
incentives; as explained previously, each time a proposal to mandate the sale of electric vehicles
has been presented in Congress, it has failed to even make it out of committee. And when
Congress chose to set standards focused on electric vehicles, it did so on a regionally targeted,
pilot basis only. It did not bury a nationwide program in Section 202, at EPA's sole discretion.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 88-89]
E. The proposal may violate other constitutional provisions and principles.
Finally, EPA's proposal may violate other constitutional provisions and principles, which
EPA should consider in making its final rule. These include, but may not be limited to, the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which precludes the taking of private party (or the
elimination of entire industries) for public use without just compensation, as contemplated by the
proposal with regard to liquid fuels and related industries (e.g., asphalt, sulfur, etc.), as well as
the following to the extent the final rule relies on and/or incorporates state ZEV mandates: the
Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits state regulations that improperly discriminate
against out-of-state commercial interests or that unduly burden interstate commerce (such as by
increasing transportation and logistics costs, disrupting entire supply chains and industries, and
effectively requiring other states to adopt electric vehicles that would not otherwise be adopted);
the dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrine under the Supremacy Clause, which preempts
state laws that intrude on the exclusive federal power to conduct foreign affairs (such as by
increasing the Nation's reliance on foreign minerals and by creating two separate and
incompatible vehicle fleets on either side of the U.S.-Mexico border, thereby increasing the cost
of conducting international personal and business travel and disrupting international trade and
supply chains); the equal sovereignty doctrine, which constrains the federal government from
treating States disparately (such as by allowing California alone to dictate national transportation
policy); the Import-Export Clause, which prohibits any State from imposing "any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing" its
"inspection Laws," Art. I, § 10, cl. 2, seeNat'l Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 143 S.Ct. 1142,
1175 (2023) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In other words, if one
State conditions sale of a good on the use of preferred farming, manufacturing, or production
practices in another State where the good was grown or made, serious questions may arise under
the Import-Export Clause."); the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which provides that the
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"Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States," Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, seeNat'l Pork Producers Council, 143 S.Ct. 1175 ("Under this
Court's precedents, one State's efforts to effectively regulate farming, manufacturing, or
production in other States could raise significant questions under that Clause."); and the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, which requires each State to afford "Full Faith and Credit" to the
"public Acts" of "Every other State," Art. IV, § 1, and prevents States from adopting any policy
of hostility to the public Acts of another State, see Nat'l Pork Producers Council, 143 S.Ct. 1175
("A State's efforts to regulate farming, manufacturing, and production practices in another State
(in a manner different from how that other State's laws regulate those practices) could in some
circumstances raise questions under that Clause"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 91-92]
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
Arbitrary and Capricious
The proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious because EPA relies on incomplete facts, biased
studies, and mistaken assumptions in an attempt to restructure the entire vehicle market. The rule
exposes the country to severe grid instability and increases the chances for electricity blackouts
and brownouts. EPA's reasoning and justification for the rule are similarly flawed, based on a
market assessment that is faulty. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 8]
However, with the generous assumption that the market penetration numbers are correct, then
why does EPA need to move forward with this rule at all? If EPA is right and EV sales will
increase to 67% by 2032 anyway, why is the rule necessary? We are inclined to think that a more
robust market analysis would reach another conclusion, especially as market penetration
increases and the effects from the strain on the electrical grid would become apparent. Given the
fundamental lack of authority to force this transition, EPA's own analysis of market penetration
by 2032 suggests the rule is unwise. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 8]
New Legislation: EPA also cites the impact of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) to show increased market penetration of EVs. While it is a simple
statement of fact that, "These measures represent significant Congressional support for
investment in expanding the manufacture, sale, and use of zero emission vehicles ..." (p. 29195),
the existence of these laws to fund EV infrastructure and subsidize their sale is not akin to giving
EPA authority to compel carmakers to manufacture more EVs and consumers to buy them.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 9]
Further, EPA unwittingly offers the counter argument for this rule. With the BIL and IRA,
Congress spoken clearly on the desire specifically to incentivize EVs, not compel their use.
Coupled with the lack of authority in the Clean Air Act to reorient an entire industry and with the
Supreme Court's ruling in West Virginia v. EPA, EPA must reverse the justification in Section I.
A. iii for the proposed rule that relies on these two laws. The reasoning is arbitrary and
capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 9]
Organization: Wisconsin Automobile and Truck Dealers Association
Just one year ago, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in West Virginia v. EPA that agencies do not
have unfettered authority to make sweeping rule changes that have major economic impact
without specific direction from Congress. Under this proposed Rule, the EPA is proposing to
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disrupt the world's largest transportation system. The astronomical cost of converting the U.S.
transportation fleet and its power source is being loaded onto the backs of American taxpayers.
Electric motor vehicles (be they passenger cars, buses, trucks, earth moving equipment, etc.) are
an unproven and less efficient technology compared to internal combustion vehicles. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0494, p. 2]
EPA Summary and Response
EPA responds to these comments, together with the comments reprinted in sections 2.1 and
2.2, below in section 2.3.
2.1 - GHG standards
Comments by Organizations
Organization: A. Longo
I will continue to reiterate that clean air is important. However, the debate over what level of
clean air is necessary to balance against the cost of regulation does not seem to be resolved, and
the timeline and levels sought are very aggressive without much analysis of economic impact.
Lastly, the Supreme Court ruled in West Virginia v. EPA, that the Environmental Protection
Agency does not have broad authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from power plants.
The six to three decision, written by Chief Justice John Roberts, was a major victory for states
that had challenged the EPA's authority. The EPA had argued that it had broad authority under
the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from power plants, analogous to the
attempt here to regulate light to medium-duty vehicles. However, the Supreme Court ruled that
the EPA's authority is limited to emissions that "contribute significantly" to air pollution. The
Court found that the EPA's emissions standards for power plants went beyond what is allowed
under the Clean Air Act. It is more than likely that this regulation would face similar scrutiny
around the ability to prove that light to medium-duty vehicles reach the bar that they currently
"contribute significantly" to air pollution. Instead of mandating emission standards, which will
result in legal challenges I urge the EPA to use the carrot and not the stick approach by working
with manufacturers and providing incentives to switch to alternative fuels or consider funding
research to accelerate technology advancement making more fuel-efficient vehicles less costly to
produce. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0517, p. 2]
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
2. Statutory Authority
Auto Innovators shares EPA's goal of addressing climate change by achieving a net-zero
carbon transportation future, as part of an ambitious, comprehensive, and national strategy. The
Proposed Rule, however, contemplates a rapid and transformative nationwide shift to
electrification that may be well beyond what the industry or market can bear now or in the
foreseeable future. Given the significant policy and economic consequences that would flow
from this restructuring of the nation's vehicle market, and the breadth and unprecedented nature
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of EPA's proposed action, clear congressional authorization is required for the Proposed Rule.
EPA lacks this clear authorization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
The Proposed Rule seeks to use Clean Air Act section 202 rulemaking to force an
extraordinary transformation of the nation's vehicle fleet away from ICE-based vehicles to
BEVs, and it is not at all clear that the level of consumer demand and infrastructure that exists
now and is expected in the future can support the expedited, aggressive timeline in the Proposed
Rule. The Proposed Rule does not include an explicit electrification target, and EPA states that
"a compliant fleet under the proposed standards will include a diverse range of technologies." 152
But in practice, the stringency of the proposed standards is such that automakers will have no
choice but to convert to BEV fleets on a massive scale. This is the result not only of the Proposed
Rule's GHG emissions standards, but also its criteria pollutant standards and its tightening of
credit programs and other flexibilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
152 NPRM at 29187.
As EPA notes, BEVs accounted for 5.8% of the new U.S. light-duty passenger vehicle market
in 2022.153 Moreover, EPA's MY 2023-2026 GHG emissions standards that were finalized at
the end of 2021 projected only a 17% light-duty penetration rate for both BEVs and PHEVs by
MY 2026.154 Despite this low rate of consumer acceptance, the Proposed Rule projects a light-
duty BEV penetration rate of 67% by MY 2032, up from 36% in MY 2027.155 Importantly, in
the absence of these and other strict regulatory programs (such as California's ZEV mandate),
EPA projects a significantly lower MY 2032 BEV penetration rate of only 39%. 156 It is unclear
from EPA's analysis how the regulations alone justify a 28 percentage point increase in BEV
market between having regulations versus not. This is particularly concerning given that EPA's
no- action analysis presumably includes the same level of existing supportive mechanisms such
as the IRA and IIJA, assumptions for infrastructure development, and other market-enabling
features. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
153 Id. at 29189
154 See Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86
Fed. Reg. 74434, 74485, Table 33 (Dec. 30, 2021).
155 NPRM at 29329, Table 80.
156 Id. at 29329, Table 81.
In other words, a staggering increase in the implementation and adoption of BEV technology
underpins the Proposed Rule and is the central means by which the rule effectuates its
contemplated emissions reductions. But this shift to electrification is not a simple matter of
swapping one technology for another. The mass adoption of BEVs on the scale required for
compliance with the Proposed Rule's standards requires a much broader transformation in the
way vehicles are manufactured, purchased, fueled, serviced, and disposed of. Indeed, the
Proposed Rule would reorder much of the U.S. automobile industry—which supports roughly
10.3 million American jobs and $558 billion in annual car sales, and about 6% of the U.S.'s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 157 Consumers must be willing to purchase BEVs at mass scale;
the power sector must be able to generate and deliver adequate electricity 158—which itself will
contribute to emissions—while maintaining grid reliability and otherwise meeting consumer and
industrial demand; adequate charging infrastructure must be available; batteries and other
components must be manufactured at an increasing rate, critical minerals sourced, and supply
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chains developed. These needs must be met not only for light-duty vehicles, but also for
medium- and heavy-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
157 See Economic Insights, Alliance for Automotive Innovation,
htps://www.autosinnovate.org/resources/insights.
158 In addition to increasing electricity capacity, utilities are also facing a transition in technology types
and more renewable sources, as proposed under the "Greenhouse Gas Standards and Guidelines for Fossil
Fuel-Fired Power Plants" [88 FR 33240, May 23, 2023],
As expressed throughout this comment, we have serious concerns that the market will not be
able to bear the requirements of the Proposed Rule and that those requirements will not be
feasible given these considerations. Compliance will impose significant costs, and require
extraordinary effort, on the part of regulated parties—costs which will be passed along to
consumers. Setting such stringent standards has the potential to create a significant market
disruption, with consequences not only for the automobile industry but for the entire U.S.
economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
In other words, the Proposed Rule is enormously consequential for the automobile industry,
and for the economy and consumers as a whole. The Proposed Rule's provisions insert EPA into
crucial policy tradeoffs and debates, such as concerns about the extraction and supply of critical
minerals overseas, or the need to maintain a reliable, efficient electric grid. 159 These
considerations range far afield from the traditional ambit of section 202 rulemaking, delving into
areas that are the subject of other regulatory schemes, or within the unique purview and authority
of other agencies and other branches and levels of government. In short, the dramatic shift
toward electrification required by the Proposed Rule implicates issues of tremendous political,
economic, and social significance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
159 See, e.g., NPRM at 29311-24.
Nor is such a transformative rule, with such wide-ranging implications, a typical feature of
section 202 rulemaking. We acknowledge that some past EPA section 202 rules, most notably
the MY 2023-2026 rule, have contemplated greater deployment of EVs as one of many options
for complying with emissions standards. The Proposed Rule, however, is different not merely in
degree but in kind, seeking to impose what is, at bottom, a mandate toward nationwide
electrification. Such a proposal amounts to an unprecedented assertion of power on the part of
EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
"[A]n enormous and transformative expansion in EPA's regulatory authority" such as this
necessitates "clear congressional authorization," as Congress is expected to "speak clearly if it
wishes to assign to an agency decision of vast 'economic and political significance.'"160 But
section 202 does not confer such clear authority. Section 202 authorizes EPA to promulgate
"standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant" from vehicles; it does not empower
EPA to force a historic shift in the makeup of the nation's entire vehicle fleet. In the absence of
plain statutory authorization, such a decision, and the tradeoffs and consequences it entails,
properly belongs to Congress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
160 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
The Proposed Rule frequently cites to the IIJA, also known as the "Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law," 161 and the Inflation Reduction Act. 162 To the extent EPA purports to rely on either
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statute as providing a legal basis for the Proposed Rule, 163 it should not do so. No provision of
the IIJA or the IRA expands or modifies EPA's regulatory authority under section 202 or the
Clean Air Act more broadly. Nor can these laws be considered to have implicitly altered EPA's
authority. After all, "implied amendments require 'clear and manifest' evidence of congressional
intent," 164 and "neither courts nor federal agencies can rewrite a statute's plain text to
correspond to its supposed purposes." 165 Those conditions are not satisfied here. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
161 Pub. L. 117-58, 135 Stat. 429 (2021).
162 Pub. L. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818(2022). See, e.g., NPRM at 29187-90, 29195-96, 29233,29300,
29308, 29313, 29318, 29322-24, 29341 (referencing the IIJA and/or IRA).
163 See, e.g., NPRM at 29233 ("The recently enacted Inflation Reduction Act 'reinforces the longstanding
authority and responsibility of [EPA] to regulate GHGs as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act'")
(quoting floor statement by Rep. Pallone).
164 Sackett v. E.P.A., 598 U.S , 2023 WL 3632751, at *13 (U.S. May 25, 2023) (internal quotation
omitted).
165 LandstarExp. America, Inc. v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 569 F.3d 493, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
We reaffirm that we are fundamentally supportive of EPA's goals of reducing GHG emissions
and transitioning to a net-zero carbon transportation future. Section 202 standards have a place
in this effort, as we have previously expressed. We remain concerned, however, that the
extraordinary and unprecedented nature of the Proposed Rule places it outside the bounds of
EPA's statutory authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
d) EPA's Reliance on Credit Trading for SVMs to Meet the Proposed GHG Standards
Despite EPA's projections for rapid EV update and ICE improvement, EPA's modeling also
suggests that SVMs will be required to heavily rely on credit trading flexibility to maintain
compliance with GHG standards.320 We believe this is inappropriate for several reasons and
demonstrates that the proposed alternative standards do not meet the requirements of CAA §
202(a) that standards "take effect after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit
the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to
the cost of compliance within such a period." First, it is inappropriate to set a standard so
stringent as to effectively require a manufacturer to entirely rely on another manufacturer to
maintain compliance. Additionally, there is an inherent risk that even if a credit-generating
manufacturer is willing to sell credits, the credits may be purchased by other parties before
SVMs can access them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 211]
320 Credit purchase claim based on examination of EPA's proposal central analysis OMEGA output files
for credit transactions, noting degree of credit balances listed as "PAST DUE". Such deficits would require
credit purchases.
These proposed standards for SVMs do not meet the Clean Air Act's requirement to provide
adequate time for the development and application of the necessary technologies (BEVs in the
case of such rapid increases in stringency and overall stringency levels). They are also not
equitable to those of other manufacturers given the significantly higher BEV market share
required to meet them and the more rapid increases in stringency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 211]
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2. Recommendations for SVM GHG Standards
Auto Innovators proposes the following approach to address these concerns:
We support EPA's proposal to sunset the individual application process for alternative
standards. However, for the above reasons, we recommend that EPA maintain the approved MY
2021 individual standards through MY 2026. Such an approach would provide time to start
implementing electrification-compatible technologies, help address lead-time concerns in
general, and make the timing of later changes consistent with the model years EPA is focused on
in this rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 211]
As described above, and related to overall industry concerns highlighted in Section I of these
comments (EV Feasibility), SVMs are concerned with both the overall level of electrification
likely required by EPA's proposed standards and the relatively greater improvements that EPA is
proposing for SVMs relative to industry as a whole. For MY 2032 SVM alternative standards,
we recommend that EPA address these concerns by requiring SVMs to improve their emissions
levels by the same percentage as the primary standards require between MY 2026 (which would
be based on MY 2021 for SVMs) and MY 2032. (E.g., 50% under the current proposal.) [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 211]
2. Classification of Batteries as "Major Emission Control Components"
Utilizing the Administrator's authority mandated in Section 207(i)(l) of the CAA, EPA is
proposing under this NPRM to designate high-voltage battery systems and associated powertrain
components as "specified major emission control components," thus imposing a warranty period
of eight years or 80,000 miles of use, whichever first occurs. Such a designation for BEVs,
however, is entirely inconsistent with the statute. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 225-226]
Section 207(i)(2) enumerates a discrete list of items that qualify as "specified major emission
control components," and authorizes the Administrator to designate "any other pollution control
device or component" as such if certain conditions are met.334 But a BEV produces zero
emissions from its battery and associated electric powertrain components. It follows that no
device or component of a BEV could logically be a "pollution control device or component" that
can be designated as a "specified major emission control component" under section 207(i)(2),
because there are no emissions from the BEV to control.335 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 225-226]
334 42 U.S.C. § 7541(i)(2).
335 We acknowledge that this designation for PHEVs is more consistent with the statutory authorization,
because the battery-electric power displaces use of the vehicle's ICE, controlling the PHEV's emissions.
The NPRM attempts to justify its counter-textual reasoning in the NPRM, but its reasoning
cannot cure the fundamental legal flaw in its proposal. For instance, the NPRM claims that its
"proposed warranty requirements would be equivalent to those that EPA has the authority to
require and has historically applied to other specified major emission control-related components
for ICE vehicles under EPA's light-duty vehicle regulations..."336 But this is a false
equivalency, because ICE vehicles produce emissions, and a component in the vehicle designed
to reduce those emissions (such as, for example, a catalytic converter or an electronic emissions
control unit) can be considered a "major emission control component." The same cannot be said
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of any component of a BEV that produced no emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
225-226]
336 NPRM at 29286.
Recognizing that BEVs do not have any emission themselves, the NPRM nonetheless argues
that BEV batteries can be considered a major emissions control component to the extent that
BEVs are used to displace ICE vehicles. This portion of the NPRM refers back to the battery
durability requirements, 3 3 7 which argues that a "loss of a large portion of the original driving
range capability as the vehicle ages could reduce total lifetime mileage and the ability for electric
miles to displace conventional miles traveled."338 Not only does this argument find no support
in the statute, but it proves way too much. Just about any component on a BEV that helps it run
or that is important to the consumer will impact the extent to which the BEV will continue to
displace conventional miles traveled. For instance, a consumer may elect to not to drive their
BEV if that vehicle's infotainment system fails completely, but that certainly would not make the
infotainment system a "major emissions control component." Simply put, there is absolutely no
basis in the CAA for EPA to impose any battery warranty requirements on BEVs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 225-226]
337 NPRM at 29286-87.
338 Id. At 29284
C. EPA Has the Authority to Regulate Fuels to Improve GHG Emissions
The Clean Air Act provides statutory authority for the EPA to regulate GHG emissions, which
can "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the
public health or welfare."408 Section 211 of the Clean Air Act provides EPA with the authority
to regulate motor vehicle fuels in furtherance of the Act's goals. Specifically, Section 211(c) of
the Act grants EPA the authority to set new national fuel standards, including octane rating,
under the following circumstances: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 261-262]
408 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
- (1)(A) "if in the judgment of the Administrator, any fuel or fuel additive or any emission
product of such fuel or fuel additive causes or contributes to air pollution or water pollution...
that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health or welfare," or
- (l)(B)"if emission products of such fuel or fuel additive will impair to a significant degree
the performance of any emission control device or system which is in general use, or has been
developed to a point where in a reasonable time it would be in general use were such regulations
to be promulgated." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 261-262]
It is important to note that the addition of GHGs to the list of Clean Air Act "pollutants" is
changing how one thinks of emissions control. For purposes of considering EPA's authority
under 211(c)(1)(B), it is important to realize that the term "any emission control device or
system" must be understood more broadly than it once was. With this realization, it is easy to see
that engine efficiency improvements offer emission control benefits. However, low-octane fuel
acts as a barrier to these efficiency benefits. EPA has the authority and must stand firmly on the
side of removing these barriers and providing manufacturers with a full menu of options for
striving to meet the future GHG standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 261-262]
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In light of increasing GHG and CAFE requirements, it continues to be essential for vehicles
and the fuels they operate on to be treated as a system and developed in tandem. Prospective
fuels should enable greater vehicle efficiency and lower emissions, optimize the consumer
experience, and fulfill societal values. Technology is in place to produce advanced engines.
However, without a promulgated higher-octane fuel standard, the advanced engines cannot
optimize their potential operational efficiency. It is now timely for EPA to undertake an
accelerated process to implement and synchronize the market introduction of higher-octane
gasoline that will enable the benefits of advanced technologies and support manufacturer
investments. EPA has the authority to regulate national commercial gasoline octane
specifications under the Clean Air Act. EPA should initiate a fast-track process to assure higher
octane gasoline that meets the market and timing needs of new vehicle technologies for the U.S.
commercial supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 261-262]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
the proposed Light- and Medium-Duty rule would impose strict GHG and criteria-pollutant
standards for model year 2027 through 2032, which become more stringent each year. 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29,196. Although the proposed rule portrays those emission standards as "performance-
based" and as allowing manufacturers to choose which emissions-control technologies to adopt,
id. at 29,255, 29,257, EPA has stated openly that it expects manufactur- ers to shift from
internal-combustion engines toward battery-electric vehicles, id. at 29,297-98. By 2032, EPA
projects, for instance, that 78 percent of sedans, 62 percent of crossovers and SUVs, and 98
percent of vans will be battery-electric vehicles. See id. at 29,329-31. In a break from its historic
practice, EPA now overtly proposes to wield its Section 202 authority over emission levels to
mandate the adoption of alternatives to internal-combustion engines—replacing pollutant-
emitting motor vehicles that Section 202 governs with other, non- emitting vehicles that the
statute does not cover. The proposed Light- and Medium-Duty rule seeks to accomplish that
unprecedented transformation on a highly compressed timeline, remaking the sectors within less
than a decade. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 7-8]
I. The Proposed Rule Exceeds EPA's Statutory Authority
Like every agency, EPA '"literally has no power to act' . . . unless and until Congress
authorizes it to do so by statute." FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 142 S. Ct. 1638, 1649 (2022)
(citation omitted). Moreover, under the major-questions doctrine, given the nature and breadth of
the power EPA claims to reshape a large sector of the economy, congressional authorization
would have to be unmistakably clear. But nothing in the Clean Air Act plausibly—let alone
clearly— authorizes EPA to mandate replacing a particular percentage of internal-com- bustion-
engine vehicles with a different category of vehicles that themselves emit no GHGs at all. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 8-9]
EPA cannot justify the proposed rule's attempted transformation of the light-and-medium-
duty-vehicle sector as an application of its fleetwide-averaging approach to emissions. Fleetwide
averaging itself contravenes the Clean Air Act. At a minimum, it is not clearly and unmistakably
authorized as a back- door means of remaking the auto industry, as the major-questions doctrine
requires. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 8-9]
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A. The Forced Electrification Of The Country's Light- and Medium- Duty Vehicles Is A
Major Question
EPA recognizes that its proposed light- and medium-duty vehicle-emissions standards cannot
be met by internal-combustion-engine vehicles alone. Instead, as EPA forthrightly admits, its
proposed Light- and Medium-Duty rule (like its proposed Heavy-Duty rule) would compel
manufacturers to transform their light- and medium-duty vehicle fleets. From a starting point
roughly in the single digits, manufacturers would have to increase the percentage of electric
vehicles in their light-duty fleets to 67 percent by 2032. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,189, 29,329. And
they would have to increase the percentage of electric vehicles in their medium-duty fleets from
virtually zero percent today to 46 percent by 2032. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,331; Draft RIA at 3-
11. That is the proposed rule's purpose, consistent with the Administration's avowed goal "that
at least 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission
vehicles."2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 9-10]
2 FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Proposes New Standards to Protect Public Health that Will
Save Consumers Money, and Increase Energy Security, White House Briefing Room (Apr. 12, 2023)
https://www.whitehouse.gOv/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/12/fact- sheet-biden-harris-
administration-proposes-new-standards-to-protect-public-health-that-will- save-consumers-money-and-
increase-energy-security/.
EPA's proposal "to substantially restructure" a major sector of the American economy
implicates the major-questions doctrine, under which EPA must identify "'clear congressional
authorization' for the power [EPA] claims." West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2609-10
(2022) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court formally recognized and applied the major-
questions doctrine last Term in West Virginia, which rejected a similarly aggressive assertion of
regulatory power by EPA under the Clean Air Act. Under West Virginia and in a long line of
cases predating it, the proposed rule here presents a major question, for at least three reasons.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 9-10]
First, EPA has claimed a power of "vast economic . . . significance," West Virginia, 142 S.
Ct. at 2605 (citation omitted): the power, in effect, to phase out internal-combustion-engine light-
and medium-duty vehicles in favor of electric vehicles. The financial consequences alone are
staggering: EPA's own esti- mates project that the rule will have a net effect of $1.6 trillion,
orders of mag- nitude more than in West Virginia. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,361; cf. Ala. Ass'n of
Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (per curiam) (noting that the "sheer scope" of the
agency's "claimed authority . . . counsels] against the Govern- ment's interpretation"). The
economic significance of the proposed rule extends beyond those immediate financial effects. A
shift of this scale would have spillover effects on the broader economy that EPA's projections do
not even attempt to capture. For example, in addition to those who manufacture and purchase
conventional vehicles, the proposed rule would affect those who fuel them (oil, natural-gas, and
biofuel producers), and in turn other sectors that depend on those products (from asphalt to
lubricants). These effects would also spread to industries that rely on light- and medium-duty
vehicles, such as the passenger-transportation, delivery, and logistics industries. From any
standpoint, the "magnitude" of the "'unprecedented power over American industry'" EPA has
claimed reflects a major question. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2612 (quoting Indus. Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645 (1980)). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0683, p. 10]
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EPA's assertion of authority here is an "unheralded power representing a transformative
expansion in its regulatory authority." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2610 (quotation marks
omitted). Although EPA has long set emis- sions standards with which manufacturers must
comply, until recently it has treated shifting to electric vehicles merely as one "option"
manufacturers may select that provides them "flexibility" in meeting much less radical emissions
standards. See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,917 (Oct. 15, 2012); NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d
410, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("EPA's argument that averaging will allow manufacturers more
flexibility in cost allocation while ensuring that a manufacturer's overall fleet still meets the
emissions reduction standards makes sense." (emphasis added)). Unlike the proposed rule, prior
emissions standards "were predominantly based on advancements in [internal-combustion-
engine] technologies that provided incremental emissions reductions," not on a large- scale shift
toward electric-vehicle technologies. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,196. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683,
pp.11-12]
Under the proposed rule, however, manufacturers will have no choice but to introduce a
significant number of electric light- and medium-duty vehicles into their fleets to meet EPA's
stringent standards. EPA "anticipates that a compliant fleet under the proposed standards will
include a diverse range of technologies, including higher penetrations of advanced gasoline
technologies as well as zero-emission vehicles," 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,187, and it projects that by
2032, in order for manufacturers to comply with the standards, electric vehicles will have to
make up 67 percent of their light-duty fleets (78 percent of sedans, 62 percent of SUVs, and 68
percent of pickups) and 46 percent of their medium-duty fleets (98 percent of vans and 19
percent of pickups), id. at 29,329, 29,331. EPA's projections of a massive shift to a new,
purportedly non-emitting category of motor vehicles belie its suggestion that the proposed rule
amounts to business as usual and merely continues a longstanding regulatory approach. See id. at
29,187. As in West Virginia, EPA has never previously claimed power to use emissions
limitations to shift a significant portion of this industry from one technology to another. Its
proposed rule thus embodies "an enormous and transformative expansion [of] EPA's regulatory
authority." Util. AirRegul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, pp.11-12]
Like EPA's assertion of authority in West Virginia, its unprecedented claim of power in the
proposed rule to reshape a major industry through emissions limitations presents a major
question. EPA therefore lacks authority to promulgate the rule absent "'clear congressional
authorization' for the power [EPA] claims." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609 (citation omitted).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 11-12]
EPA has no clear congressional authorization for the proposed rule's electrification mandate.
Under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, EPA may "prescribe . . . standards" applicable to GHG
emissions "from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines" that
EPA determines "cause, or contribute to, air pollution." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1); see also Massa-
chusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007); 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). Section 202
specifies that "[s]uch standards shall be applicable to such vehicles and engines for their useful
life . . . whether such vehicles and engines are de- signed as complete systems or incorporate
devices to prevent or control such pollution." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). Nothing in the statutory
text clearly author- izes EPA to mandate a compulsory shift toward zero-emission vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 12-13]
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EPA has attempted to ground its electrification mandate in its standard- setting authority
under Section 202 through fleetwide averaging. Averaging and its corollaries in EPA's ABT
program—crediting (whereby manufacturers can use "credits" generated for one fleet that
surpassed the emissions level to offset a deficit in another fleet), banking (saving credits earned
one year to offset deficits in future years), and trading (selling credits to competitors for
money)— are crucial to EPA's effort to mandate electrification. The proposed rule speci- fies
emissions standards that would operate not as maximum-emission thresh- olds for particular
pollutants that any individual vehicle must meet, but rather as fleetwide-average emission levels
that manufacturers' fleets must collectively satisfy. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,196-97 ("EPA is not
reopening its averaging, banking, and trading provisions, which continue to be a central part of
its fleet average standards compliance program and which help manufacturers to em- ploy a wide
range of compliance paths."). That averaging approach is essential to EPA's electrification
mandate because it plainly would not be feasible for EPA to set maximum permissible GHG
emissions at zero for individual vehi- cles: the "cost of compliance" with a zero-emissions
mandate for every light- and medium-duty vehicle would doom such a requirement. 42 U.S.C. §
7521(a)(2). Instead, by allowing lower-emitting vehicles in a manufacturer's fleet to offset
higher-emitting vehicles (in its own fleet or that of another man- ufacturer, through trading of
credits), and by setting very stringent fleetwide- average GHG-emission standards that no
conventional motor vehicle could satisfy, EPA's proposed rule forces manufacturers to produce a
significant number of zero-emission (i.e., electric) vehicles. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,342; see also
id. at 29,284 ("[VJehicles of all types (including [internal-combustion-en- gine] vehicles as well
as PEVs) are assessed on a fleet average basis in which credits that are generated by vehicles that
over-comply with their footprint- based standard act to offset debits generated by vehicles that do
not themselves meet the proposed standards, and these credits can also be traded among man-
ufacturers."). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 12-13]
The Clean Air Act, however, does not authorize EPA to employ that fleet- wide-averaging
approach at all—much less with the unmistakable clarity the major-questions doctrine demands.
EPA's contrary interpretation has no foun- dation in the statutory text and would make a hash of
the statutory structure, which repeatedly uses language that makes sense only in the context of
emis- sions standards applicable to individual vehicles. Even if fleetwide averaging were
permissible as a general matter, it cannot be exploited to shoehorn zero- emission vehicles—i.e.,
vehicles that do not "cause, or contribute to, air pollu- tion," 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), and thus fall
outside Section 202 entirely—into the fleetwide-average calculation as a means of mandating
electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 12-13]
In any event, the Clean Air Act refutes EPA's view that Congress left the door open to
fleetwide averaging. Other provisions in Section 202 itself and Title II as a whole make clear that
fleetwide averaging is fundamentally incom- patible with the statutory structure and design.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 14-15]
Other portions of Section 202 confirm Section 202(a)(1)'s focus on emission standards
applicable to individual vehicles. For example:
Under 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(A), the standards for light-duty vehicles and engines in
model years 1977-79 must provide that "emissions from such ve- hides and engines may not
exceed 1.5 grams per vehicle mile of hydrocarbons and 15.0 grams per vehicle mile of carbon
monoxide." Id. (emphasis added). This provision contemplates that "such vehicles"—i.e.,
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individual light-duty vehicles—will not exceed these limits. Under an averaging ap- proach,
however, individual vehicles would be permitted to exceed these statutorily mandated standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 14-15]
Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(3) authorizes EPA to grant waivers from cer- tain
nitrogen-oxide emission "standards," see id. § 7521(b)(1)(B), for no "more than 5 percent of [a]
manufacturer's production or more than fifty thousand vehicles or engines, whichever is
greater." Id. § 7521(b)(3). The provision thus provides a default rule under which every vehicle
must meet a per-vehicle emissions standard, then permits a waiver from that default rule for up
to 5 percent of the fleet. Averaging is inconsistent with this pro- vision, which depends on a set
number of individual vehicles meeting the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 14-
15]
And under 42 U.S.C. § 7521(m)(l), EPA must require manufacturers to in- stall
"diagnostic systems" on "all" new light-duty vehicles and trucks that are capable of identifying
malfunctions that "could cause or result in failure of the vehicles to comply with emission
standards established under this section." Requiring diagnostic equipment on "all" vehicles
makes no sense on an averaging approach; each vehicle must have a diagnostic system that
ensures that vehicle's "compliance] with emission standards established un- der [Section 202],"
id., yet under EPA's averaging approach, no particular vehicle need be in compliance. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 14-15]
Beyond Section 202 itself, averaging is also deeply in tension with "the de- sign and structure
of [Title II] as a whole." Util. Air, 573 U.S. at 321 (citation omitted). Consider Title II's
provisions addressing testing, warranties, and pen- alties: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp.
14-15]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
There is no doubt that if promulgated in its current form, the proposal would have major
implications for consumers, our economy, and our national security. The Supreme Court made
clear in a string of recent rulings that regulations of such magnitude require unambiguous
Congressional authority. Congress has never come anywhere close to providing EPA with the
authority it asserts here - the power to effectively ban internal combustion engine vehicles by
setting emission standards that only battery electric vehicles can achieve. To comply with the
Clean Air Act, EPA must set emission standards that individual, well-controlled ICEV can
attain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 1]
EPA proposed unachievable standards for light- and medium-duty ICEVs. This attempt to
force an unprecedented transformation of the national transportation system to ZEVs goes far
beyond the authority delegated to the Agency by Congress. The Proposal—which will likely
require hundreds of billions of dollars, dictate what vehicles are permissible for automakers to
sell, and has significant ramifications for the U.S. energy sector, national security, and
consumers—clearly addresses questions of major economic and political significance that EPA
is neither authorized nor equipped to address. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 2]
EPA also misinterprets its authority to establish feasible efficiency improvements by
proposing standards that cannot be achieved with ICEV technologies. First, EPA is not permitted
to rely on averaging, banking, and trading mechanisms as a means to establish the relevant
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standards. Second, because ZEVs do not have tailpipe emissions, they do not directly "cause or
contribute to" air pollution within the construct of a tailpipe emissions standard, and therefore
any standard applicable to "any class or classes" of vehicles "which . . . cause, or contribute" to
air pollution cannot include ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 2]
Even if EPA had Congressional authority to promulgate the proposed standards, the proposal
is arbitrary and capricious due to the Agency's reliance on incomplete facts, overly optimistic or
outright mistaken assumptions, and failure to use reason-based decision-making. The Agency
significantly overestimates environmental benefits and feasibility, underestimates costs, and
relies on little more than unsupported hope that consumer preferences will change to enable the
Agency's intended policy. EPA's decision to not only ignore lifecycle emissions of ZEVs, but to
explicitly propose removing the requirement for automakers to account for them, serves neither
consumers nor the environment. EPA's reasoning, that its policy of not accounting for these
emissions serves its goal of promoting the use of EVs, is the definition of arbitrary and
capricious biased decision-making. Unfortunately, the Agency also ignored significant issues
related to energy security and U.S. national security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 2]
The "major questions doctrine" holds that Congress must "speak clearly when authorizing an
agency to exercise [such] powers" of "vast economic and political significance."61 And as EPA
is aware, this doctrine applies in the context of environmental regulation. Last year, in West
Virginia v. EPA, the Supreme Court relied on the major questions doctrine in holding that the
EPA exceeded its statutory authority in adopting its Clean Power Plan. That regulation sought to
impose caps on GHG emissions by requiring utilities and other providers to shift electricity
production from coal-fired power to natural gas and then to renewable energy in place of
imposing source-specific requirements reflective of the application of state-of-the-art emission
reduction technologies.62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 18]
61 Nat'l Fed. Of Indep. Bus. v. Dep't of Labor, 142 S. Ct. 661,665 (2022); see also Ala. Assoc. of Realtors
v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021); Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014); U.S. Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 419-21
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (explaining
provenance of "major rules doctrine"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 18]
62 West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022).
As noted by the Court, EPA "announced] what the market share of coal, natural gas, wind,
and solar must be, and then require[d] plants to reduce operations or subsidize their competitors
to get there."63 EPA's attempt to devise GHG emissions caps based on a generation-shifting
approach would have had major economic and political significance impacting vast swaths of
American life and substantially restructured the American energy market; however, EPA's
purported authority was only based on a "vague statutory grant" within Section 111(d) of the
Clean Air Act—far from the "clear authorization required by [Supreme Court] precedents."64
The need for clear congressional authorization for such sweeping regulatory programs is nothing
new - just last week the Supreme Court reaffirmed the major questions doctrine "as an
identifiable body of law that has developed over a series of significant cases spanning
decades "65 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 18]
63 Id. at 2613, n4.
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64 Id. at 2614.
65 Biden v. Nebraska, No. 22-506, slip op. at 23 (June 30, 2023) (internal quotations omitted) (applying
major questions doctrine to strike down student loan repayment program that will cost taxpayers
approximately $500 billion and affects nearly every student loan borrower). Just as the trade-offs inherent
in a mass debt cancelation program are ones that Congress would likely have reserved for itself, id., slip op.
at 25, so too are those that must be considered for the mass adoption of electric vehicles.
As with the Clean Power Plan, EPA lacks Congressional authorization in the Clean Air Act to
impose a manufacturing-shifting standard to a preferred powertrain and effectively order
regulated parties to phase out combustion engine technologies. EPA's standard-setting tools are
limited to those which Congress provided in Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act. Here, EPA is
only authorized to set "standards" for "emission[s]" from "any class or classes of new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which . . . cause, or contribute to," potentially harmful air
pollution. EPA has elected to focus solely on tailpipe emissions. But EPA acknowledges that
ZEVs do not have tailpipe emissions of carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, non-methane organic
gases, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, or formaldehyde, the pollutants of concern here, so
the operation of such vehicles alone cannot "cause, or contribute to," air pollution within the
constructs of a tailpipe emissions regulation, especially when EPA does not require vehicle
manufactures to account for the upstream emissions from ZEVs in their compliance calculations.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 19-20]
Far from "clear congressional authorization," Section 202(a) provides EPA no authority to set
standards that go beyond that which could be achieved by improvements to ICEVs alone such
that OEMs are required to cease producing the underlying technology governed at the time the
Clean Air Act was adopted and amended. Nor does it permit EPA to establish a fleet averaging
and emission credit trading program as a mechanism to limit ICEV sales.68 Notably, in its 1990
updates to the Clean Air Act, Congress instituted a clean fuel vehicles program with reference to
"clean alternative fuel" vehicles, which includes ZEVs. In doing so, Congress explicitly
distinguished such vehicles from "conventional gasoline-fueled or diesel-fueled vehicles of the
same category and model year," dispelling the notion that ZEVs and ICEVs can be lumped
together to set standards that will enable the former to eventually displace the latter.69 EPA does
not—and cannot—explain how such authority can be read to regulate ZEVs and ICEVs under a
common standard, especially in light of the statutory language requiring EPA to set standards for
any class or classes of vehicles. It is no surprise then that up until the current Administration,
EPA has never claimed the authority to mandate even partial electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp. 19-20]
68 See supra II.A.
69 42 U.S.C. §§ 7581, 7582(b).
Congress clarified that it, not EPA, must make the important policy decisions affecting if,
when, and how the American automotive industry will transition from ICEVs to ZEVs. In the
116th Congress, for example, Congress introduced 44 bills seeking to reduce petroleum-based
fuel consumption and GHG emissions from the transportation sector through customer rebates,
vehicle and fuel producer incentives, local funding, development of standards, and research and
development. Congress rejected bills that would have banned the sale of new light duty ICEVs
by 204070 and it has consistently disapproved of EPA's efforts to hamstring the automotive
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sector with more stringent air pollution standards than are feasible.71 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 20-21]
70 See Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2019, H.R. 2764, 116th Cong. (2019); Zero-Emission Vehicles Act
of 2018, S. 3664, 115th Cong. (2018); see also 116 Cong. Rec. 19238-40 (1970) (proposed amendment to
Title II that would have banned ICEVs by 1978).
71 See, e.g., S. J. Res. 11, 118th Cong. (2023) (Although passed only by the Senate thus far, the joint
resolution calls for disapproval of a similar rule submitted by the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency relating to "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine
and Vehicle Standards," 88 Fed. Reg. 4296 (Jan. 24, 2023)).
It should be no surprise then that in the wake of the Proposed Rule, members of Congress
requested that the Agency rescind the proposals, asserting they "effectively mandate a costly
transition to electric cars and trucks in the absence of congressional direction."72 That
Congress intended for it, not EPA, to direct these policy decisions is made all the more clear by
the passage of the IRA and the BIL whereby Congress identified the policy levers it deemed
appropriate. Congress could have, but did not, delegate the authority to (or otherwise direct) EPA
to establish a fleet-wide credit trading regime to further drive ZEV development and rapid
adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 20-21]
72 Letter from Senator Shelley Capita, et al. to Administrator Michael S. Regan, EPA (May 25, 2023); see
also Senate Resolution S.J. Res. 11, 118th Congress (Apr. 26, 2023) (Although related to heavy duty
vehicles ("HDVs"), Congress has expressed its disapproval of EPA's overreach in this space. For example,
in April of this year both houses of Congress passed a Congressional Review Act resolution to rescind
EPA's December 2022 heavy duty NOx standards, sending a strong signal that Congress views EPA's
efforts in this space as unnecessary, infeasible, and uniformed in light of economic and energy security
concerns); House Resolution H2523 (May 23, 2023); see also Congressional Record, H2523 (May 23,
2023) at 1444, Statement from Mr. Walberg (R-MI) ("From tailpipe emissions regulations that will force
people to buy expensive and less practical EVs to new rules on power plants that will threaten the
reliability of our electric grid. It seems like the EPA has not even thought about the economic and energy
security of our constituents.").
The Proposed Rule stands in direct contrast to other legislation, such as the Renewable Fuel
Standard Program ("RFS"), whereby Congress mandated that "gasoline sold or introduced into
commerce in the United States" must contain renewable fuels73 and, in 2022, must include
billions of gallons of renewable fuel.74 In fact, EPA's Proposal directly conflicts with the
statutory framework that Congress provided in the RFS for lowering GHG emissions from the
transportation sector. In the proposed rule, EPA cites only its authority under section 202(a) of
the Clean Air Act and Executive Order 14037 as the basis for requirements that will extend from
MY 2027 to 2032.75 Because Executive Orders have no force of law,76 EPA at bottom contends
that a few general paragraphs of the Clean Air Act, enacted over 50 years ago, provides
sufficient legislative authority and direction for the entirety of its proposed rule. But Congress
demonstrated in the RFS that when it wants to transform the transportation sector, and
specifically, when it desires to address GHGs associated with that sector, it does so with
precision and within the context of a prescribed statutory framework. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, p. 21]
73 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i).
74 Id., § 7545(o)(2)(B); 87 Fed. Reg. 39,600 (July 1, 2022).
75 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,186.
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76 Rather, Executive Orders "simply serve as presidential directives to agency officials to consider certain
policies when making rulemaking decisions." State of California v. EPA, No. 21-1018 (D.C. Cir. 2023),
Slip Op. at 17.
III. The Proposed Rule Contravenes or is Otherwise Contrary to the Clean Air Act and
Energy Policy and Conservation Act
A. EPA Lacks Statutory Authority Under the Clean Air Act.
1. The Clean Air Act Requires Standards With Which All Vehicles In A Class Can Comply
As set forth in detail in the brief appended as Attachment 1, EPA lacks statutory authority
under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act to set fleetwide emission standards, and even if it had
such authority, it could not lawfully use it to force electrification by including vehicles that have
no tailpipe emissions in the fleetwide average standard for ICEVs. While EPA purports to rebut
arguments that it lacks such statutory authority, EPA's own search for its expansive authority
turns into a circular argument. If "Congress's focus was on emissions from classes of motor
vehicles and the 'requisite technologies' that could feasibly reduce those emissions" as EPA
suggests, it follows that those "requisite technologies" must be applied to directly reduce
emissions from the vehicles on which they are installed.77 And those technologies must remain
with the vehicle for its useful life.78 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 21]
77 Proposed Rule at 29,231 (emphasis added).
78 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
The Proposed Rule results in fleet-wide standards that cannot be met by ICEVs alone;
however, under the Clean Air Act, EPA may only set individual vehicle-level emission
standards. Such standards must be for "emission[s]" from "any class or classes of new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which . . . cause, or contribute to," potentially harmful air
pollution.79 The plain language of this provision authorizes EPA to set standards for classes of
individual vehicles or engines that emit air pollutants. As EPA acknowledges, EPA's "rules have
historically not required the use of any particular technology, but rather have allowed
manufacturers to use any technology that demonstrates the engines or vehicles meet the
standards over the applicable test procedures."80 This precedent is squarely at odds with the
Proposed Rule, where "any technology" cannot be used to meet the proposed emission standards,
which can only be met by phasing out ICEVs, distorting as well as exceeding EPA's authority to
set standards to permit the "development and application of the requisite technology." 81 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 21-22]
79 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
80 Id. at 29,232. Moreover, while EPA suggests that the Clean Air Act's legislative history shows that
Congress contemplated replacing the ICEV with ZEVs, id., such an interpretation is squarely at odds with
the text of the statute. If EPA were to replace ICEVs with ZEVs - as the Proposed Rule would put it on
track to do - each and every statutory reference to an "engine" would be meaningless as ZEVs do not have
engines.
81 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2).
The Clean Air Act does not provide EPA authority to regulate vehicles that have tailpipe
emissions by including them within the same standards that apply to vehicles without tailpipe
emissions. For LDVs specifically, emission standards must reflect "the greatest degree of
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emission reduction achievable through the application of technology which the [EPA]
determines will be available" during the relevant model year.85 The Supreme Court noted that
similar language in Section 111(d) of the Act generally refers to "measures that would reduce
pollution by causing [sources] to operate more cleanly."86 Congress enabled EPA to increase
emission standard stringency through cleaner fuels and improved emissions-related systems to be
incorporated into ICEVs such as advances in fuel injection, exhaust gas combustion
management, and advances in catalysts to neutralize pollutants of concern.87 ZEVs are not
similarly situated "technology" originally contemplated by Congress. To ensure compliance with
emission standards under Section 202(a), Congress required "emissions-related systems" and
accompanying "diagnostic systems" on each vehicle, underscoring its view that the vehicles
subject to an emission standard emit the relevant pollutant in EPA's judgment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, p. 22]
85 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i).
86 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2599.
87 For example, Section 202(m) requires the monitoring of "emission-related systems" such as the
"catalytic converter and oxygen sensor." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(m)(l).
The structure of the Clean Air Act and its regulatory provisions for standard setting,
certification, compliance enforcement, warranties, and penalties also directly conflict with a
fleet- wide averaging regulatory regime. Notably, under Section 202(a), EPA "shall test, or
require to be tested in such manner as [it] deems appropriate, any new motor vehicle or new
motor vehicle engine submitted by a manufacturer" and issue a certificate of conformity "if such
vehicle or engine" complies with the standards.94 And EPA must "test any emission control
system incorporated in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine ... to determine whether such a
system enables such vehicle or engine to conform to the standards required to be prescribe under
[Section 202(b)]" of the Act.95 EPA's use of a fleetwide averaging regulatory regime directly
conflicts with the statutory provisions that Congress already included to provide manufacturers
with compliance flexibility. For example, section 202(b)(3) provided compliance flexibilities for
NOx, but only for no "more than 5 percent of [a] manufacturer's production or more than fifty
thousand vehicles or engines, whichever is greater "96 This provision would be nonsensical
under a fleetwide-averaging regime where, if applied, an OEM could give itself a waiver for
large swaths of its fleet by over-complying for certain product lines well beyond its 5 percent or
50,000 vehicle allotment.97 Together, the Clean Air Act regulatory framework contemplates
EPA regulating vehicles individually. But this cannot be accomplished if there is not a clear
emission standard applicable to a single vehicle at the start of a model year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp. 23-24]
94 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1).
95 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(2).
96 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(3).
97 While Clean Air Act Section 202(b)(3) is specific to legacy light-duty vehicles through model year 1985
subject to a 1.5 grams/mile NOx standard and no longer directly applicable, the provision is incongruent
with fleet-wide averaging, and no associated amendments to Section 202(a) would support a different
reading today.
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Relatedly, Congress established the need to consider technology feasibility in establishing
fuel economy regulations under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act ("EPCA"). Here, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") "may not consider" the fuel
economy of EVs in setting Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. 107 Conducting
joint EPA- NHTSA rulemakings for complementary GHG and CAFE requirements helps OEMs
comply with both agencies' standards. But in forgoing joint rulemaking, EPA ignores Congress'
determination that EVs cannot be considered when determining what is the maximum feasible
fuel economy level from which to develop regulations. Allowing EPA to consider EVs and, in
turn, establish de facto ZEV mandates (and de facto average fuel economy standards) ultimately
skews the new vehicle market and impede NHTSA's ability to establish its own CAFE standards
that comport with EPCA. Most importantly, such an approach directly contravenes the
underlying premise of the Supreme Court's holding in Massachusetts v. EPA that "[EPA and
NHTSA] obligations may overlap, but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both
administer their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency." 108 After implementing GHG
standards jointly with NHTSA's fuel economy standards since 2012, and despite Government
Accountability Office recommendations to the contrary, 109 EPA separated the rulemaking to
undo previously established MY 2023-2026 standards and, in this case, to avoid the direct
statutory prohibition on consideration of EVs when establishing fuel economy standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 25-26]
107 49 U.S.C. § 32902(h). Here, NHTSA may not consider the fuel economy of "dedicated automobiles,"
which are defined as those that operate only on "alternative fuel." Alternative fuel, in turn, includes
electricity. 49 U.S.C. § 32901®.
108 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
109 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, "NHTSA and EPA's Partnership for Setting Fuel
Economy and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards Improved Analysis and Should be Maintained"
(February 2010) available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-10-336.pdf
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
EPA is Not Taking a Realistic Approach.
i. EPA's limits are not set on a realistic scientific based approach.
EPA's proposed standards are based on projected ZEV penetration rates based on OEM stated
ambitions and on California ZEV mandates and states that follow California rules under Section
177 of the Clean Air Act. These ambitions are stretch goals that OEMs may not reach. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 11]
h. Legal Concerns.
The aggressive push to electrify the LDV and MDV fleet is the defining characteristic of the
Proposed Rule from a legal standpoint. EPA explains that its "feasibility assessments in past
rulemaking were predominantly based on ICE-based technologies that provided incremental
tailpipe GHG reductions." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29238. Here, in contrast, EPA projects that the
Proposed Rule at full implementation would result in the electrification of 67% of the LDV fleet
- over 25% more than the 39% penetration rate that EPA projects in the no action base case. Id.
at 29329. EPA similarly projects that 46% of the MDV fleet will be electrified, reflecting 98%
electrification of all vans. Id. at 29331. These numbers make it clear that the Proposed Rule
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would establish a legal mandate effectively requiring that electric vehicles must comprise a
significantly greater proportion of the LDV and MDV fleet than otherwise would be the case.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 24-26]
While BEVs can and should be a choice available to manufacturers and vehicle purchasers,
we disagree that EPA should impose a binding mandate for the production of BEVs and outline
why such a mandate exceeds EPA's authority under the Clean Air Act (CAA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0641, pp. 24-26]
i. EPA does not have authority to impose standards that are only achievable through
the use of BEV technology because there is no clear statement in the Clean Air Act authorizing
EPA to mandate a shift away from internal combustion engines. [EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 24-26]
The Proposed Rule marks a shift in EPA's approach to regulating emissions from LDVs and
MDVs. EPA, consistent with the Clean Air Act, has traditionally established standards based on
technology that can control the amount of emissions from LDVs and MDVs. EPA deviated from
this approach in its 2021 GHG standards, setting standards based on a formula that the agency
estimated would increase the market share for electric vehicles from 3.6% to 7% for model year
2023 and 17% for model year 2026. But even then, EPA contended that its "assessment,
consistent with past EPA assessments, shows that the final standards can largely be met with
increased sales of advanced gasoline vehicle technologies, and projects modest (17 percent)
penetration rates of electrified vehicle technology" by 2026. 86 Fed. Reg. 74434, 74484 (Dec.
30, 2021). And EPA argued that it relied on advances in internal combustion engine ("ICE")
powertrains to achieve the required GHG reductions and purported not to push for a shift from
ICE powertrains to electrified vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 24-26]
Here, EPA goes even further and seeks to totally transform the transportation sector. It
proposes standards that would effectively require that BEVs must comprise two-thirds of the
LDV fleet and nearly half of the MDV fleet at full implementation, which is a substantially
greater proportion of the fleet any prediction of the market demand would support. Indeed,
according to EPA, "[in] MY 2032 when the proposed standards reach the lowest level, it is
possible that only BEVs and PHEVs are generating positive credits, and all ICE vehicles
generate varying levels of deficits." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29342. In other words, EPA predicts that
manufacturers will not be able to comply with the proposed rule without producing significant
numbers of electric vehicles. EPA thus seeks to require a fundamental transformation of the
LDV fleet from ICE powertrain technology to electric vehicles. [EP A-HQ-0 AR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 24-26]
Such a shift from ICE powertrains to electric powertrains would be truly transformative.
BEVs require fundamentally different vehicle technologies than those used on conventionally
fueled vehicles - e.g., electric motors instead of internal combustion engines, batteries to store
power rather than on-board fuel tanks. Moreover, BEVs rely on a wholly different infrastructure
(e.g., electric power generation and distribution, charging stations, battery manufacturing) -
much of which does not yet exist or exists only in limited form. Additionally, switching to BEVs
will fundamentally change the manner in which vehicles are used, for example requiring careful
scheduling of vehicle operations to accommodate the long periods needed to adequately charge
the vehicles. Lastly, a BEV mandate would produce widespread effects on the national economy,
such as the reduced need for oil and gas production, gas processing, changes to petroleum
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refining, and distribution. Such changes are extraordinary and far more expansive than those
caused by EPA's LDV and MDV GHG standards up to now. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 24-26]
EPA asserts that the BEV mandate is authorized under Clean Air Act ("CAA") Sections
202(a)(1) and (2). 88 Fed. Reg. at 29231. EPA claims that these provisions "are technology
forcing when EPA considers that to be appropriate." Id. at 29232. EPA further asserts that
"Section 202 does not specify or expect any particular type of motor vehicle propulsion system
to remain prevalent." Id. The Agency also asserts that its extraordinary new interpretation of the
statute is supported by legislative history claiming that Congress understood that powertrain
technologies might evolve over time and quotes Representative Pallone as opining that the
"recently enacted [Inflation Reduction Act] "reinforces the longstanding authority and
responsibility of [EPA] to regulate GHGs as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act," 204 and
"the IRA clearly and deliberately instructs EPA to use" this authority by "combin[ing] economic
incentives to reduce climate pollution with regulatory drivers to spur greater reductions under
EPA's CAA authorities."" Id. at 29233. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 26-27]
But the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that such an "extraordinary" claim of authority
exists only when there is "clear congressional authorization." West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S.Ct.
2587, 2609 (2022). CAA §§ 202(a)(1) and (2) contain no such clear authorization. At their core,
CAA §§ 202(a)(1) and (2) authorize EPA to establish "standards applicable to the emission of
any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,
which in [the Administrator's] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." Because this provision includes
no clear statement that EPA may mandate a fundamental shift in propulsion technology, EPA
lacks authority to impose emissions limitations that effectively will require the production and
sale of electric vehicles. EPA cannot rely on the views of individual Members who participated
in the CAA or the IRA to claim vast new authority from long extant statutory provisions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 26-27]
The lack of a clear statement is particularly notable given that Congress's most recent efforts
to address GHG emissions - the Inflation Reduction Act and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Act -
almost exclusively consisted of economic incentives and pointedly gave EPA no new or
expanded authority to substantively regulate GHG emissions. If Congress had intended to give
EPA authority to mandate a fundamental shift in powertrain technology, surely it would have
done more than create consumer facing incentives. Moreover, EPA's claim of authority plainly
conflicts with other relevant statutes, such as the Renewable Fuel Program, under which
Congress mandated that significant and increasing volumes of renewable fuels should be blended
into that national motor fuel supply. In contrast, the Proposed Rule is designed to significantly
reduce the amount of motor fuel consumed by the light and medium duty fleet. The Proposed
Rule thus would frustrate Congressional intent by reducing rather than expanding the volume of
renewable fuel consumed by motor vehicles in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp.
26-27]
It also is telling that EPA has abandoned any pretense of "co-regulating" with NHTSA, the
national regulatory authority that actually has been authorized by Congress to establish motor
vehicle fuel effciency standards. Id. at 29227 n. 384. Among other things, this is a clear attempt
to free EPA from unambiguous statutory obligations that otherwise would constrain a joint
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rulemaking (e.g., NHTSA "may not consider "the fuel economy (i.e., the availability) of
dedicated alternative fueled automobiles - including battery-electric vehicles - in any model year
for which standards are being set." 87 Fed. Reg. 25710, 25994 (May 2, 2022)). It is simply not
plausible that the general standard-setting authority of CAA § 202(a) can be construed to confer
omnibus authority for EPA to effectively rewrite directly relevant statutory directives. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 26-27]
ii. EPA's authority under CAA §§ 202(a)(1) and (2) to prescribe emissions standards
for vehicles and engines does not extend to a mandatory shift in powertrain technology. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 27-29]
As explained above, the Proposed Rule would effectively require that a significant proportion
of new LDV and MDV must be powered by electric drivetrains. That proportion significantly
exceeds the level of new vehicle electric vehicle sales that otherwise would occur. As a result,
the Proposed Rule would constitute a mandate to produce electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0641, pp. 27-29]
Moreover, electric vehicles are not just another form of conventional diesel or gasoline fueled
ICE-driven vehicles. For example, a BEV cannot be produced by modifying a conventional ICE
drivetrain (e.g., by changing combustion conditions) or by adding pollution control technology to
a conventional ICE drivetrain (e.g., catalytic converter or gasoline particulate filter). Rather,
BEVs employ wholly different propulsion technology as compared with conventional ICE
drivetrains. BEVs use electricity and batteries rather than liquid fuels stored in fuel tanks and
employ electric motors for propulsion rather than ICE engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 27-29]
EPA asserts that CAA §§ 202(a)(1) and (2) authorize the imposition of an electric vehicle
mandate. But for the following four reasons, EPA does not have authority under CAA §§
202(a)(1) and (2) or under any other CAA provision to impose such a fundamental and
mandatory shift in powertrain technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 27-29]
First, EPA may regulate a class of motor vehicles under CAA § 202(a)(1) only if emissions
from that class of vehicles "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." EPA treats BEVs as if they do not have
emissions for the purposes of this proposal. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29297. As a result, under EPA's
rationale, BEVs do not emit the pollutants that are the object of the Proposed Rule and cannot
cause or contribute to the endangerment that EPA asserts as the basis for its authority to regulate
here under CAA § 202(a)(1). Thus, it is beyond EPA's authority to include electric vehicles in its
regulations under § 202(a) or to impose an electrification mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 27-29]
Second, CAA § 202(e) - entitled "New power sources or propulsion systems" - states that
EPA may defer the certification for a new motor vehicle employing a new power source or
propulsion system until after the Agency has "prescribed standards for any air pollutants emitted
by such vehicle or engine which in [the Administrator's] judgment cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health or welfare but for
which standards have not been prescribed under [CAA § 202(a)]." Thus, EPA must take two
actions when assessing a new power source or propulsion system. EPA first must determine
whether emissions from the new power source or propulsion system cause or contribute to air
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pollution that endangers public health or welfare. If the answer is yes, EPA must then establish
new emissions standards for the new power source or propulsion system or, alternatively,
determine that appropriate standards have already been established. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 27-29]
BEVs clearly constitute a new power source or propulsion system. As a result, before
certifying any BEVs, CAA § 202(e) requires that EPA determine whether emissions from BEVs
cause or contribute to air pollution that endangers public health or welfare. But, EPA treats
BEVs as if they do not have emissions. Consequently, EPA cannot determine that emissions
from BEVs cause or contribute to any endangerment caused by emissions and, therefore, the
Agency has no need or authority to impose emissions standards on BEVs prior to certifying
them. [EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 27-29]
Third, CAA § 202(a)(1) authorizes EPA to establish "standards applicable to the emission of
any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines."
CAA § 202(a)(1) (emphasis added). This provision requires EPA to define appropriate classes of
vehicles for purposes of making the cause/contribute finding and in subsequently establishing
emission standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 27-29]
From the outset of its CAA-based motor vehicle regulatory program, EPA has properly
distinguished between fundamentally different powertrain technologies - e.g., regularly
developing and issuing separate standards for gasoline-powered vehicles and diesel-powered
vehicles. In contrast, EPA here combines all powertrain types into the same classes for purposes
of imposing emission standards. That is contrary to the statute, arbitrary, and capricious because
conventionally powered vehicles have fundamentally different emissions characteristics than
electric powered vehicles. See also CAA § 202(e) (requiring EPA to separately evaluate
emissions from "a new power source or propulsion system.") [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 27-29]
As demonstrated by EPA's prior LDV GHG standards, there is a wide variety of emissions
control techniques that may be applied to conventionally powered LDV to reduce GHG
emissions - including such things as improved engine effciency, better aerodynamics, and lower
rolling resistance. Applying such measures to BEVs does not affect their GHG emissions profile
because, by EPA's definition, BEVs do not emit GHGs. This shows that conventionally powered
vehicles and BEVs should not occupy the same class under these rules because wholly different
regulatory approaches are needed to appropriately control GHG emissions from these two
fundamentally different types of vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 27-29]
Fourth, EPA's regulatory approach is unlawful because it treats BEVs as if their powertrain
were an emissions control technology and then mandates the use of that purported emission
control technology. EPA claims throughout the proposed rule that its proposed standards do not
require manufacturers to implement any specific technology and, instead, that they retain
flexibility to comply with the rule in whatever manner they deem appropriate. See, e.g., 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29232. But the proposed rule inescapably will require a significant industry- wide
shift from internal combustion to BEVs. A particular manufacturer may avoid producing a BEV
though creative use of the ABT provisions, but the industry as a whole will have no choice but to
produce increasing numbers of BEVs over time. This is contrary to CAA § 202(a), which
authorizes EPA to set emissions standards, but does not authorize EPA to mandate the use of any
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particular emissions control technology in meeting those standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 27-29]
iii. EPA has no authority under CAA §§ 202(a)(1) and (2) to establish emissions
standards based on credit trading among manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 29]
The Proposed Rule is fundamentally different from prior LDV GHG rules in that EPA factors
credit trading among manufacturers into its standard setting analysis. EPA explains that "[i]n
light of the evidence of increased adoption of trading as a compliance strategy, EPA has included
the ability of manufacturers to trade credits as part of our central case compliance modeling for
this proposal, rather than as a sensitivity analysis as we did in the modeling for the 2021 rule." 88
Fed. Reg. at 29343. So, rather than allowing for credit trading as a "compliance flexibility" for
purposes of implementing the standards, credit trading is included in setting the standards in the
first instance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 29]
The use of credit trading in standard setting is legally flawed for two reasons. First, it is true
that EPA has long used credit trading as a compliance method under its vehicle emissions
standards. But here EPA is doing more - EPA uses credit trading in setting the standards
themselves. EPA provides no explanation of its legal authority for this novel approach. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 29]
Second, CAA § 202(a)(2) requires EPA to consider cost and technical feasibility in setting
emissions standards. By factoring credit trading into standard setting, EPA unreasonably is
diluting the cost impact of the Proposed Rule on manufacturers that opt not to engage in credit
trading. As EPA notes, "trading is an optional compliance flexibility." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29343.
And EPA acknowledges "that automakers may choose to use it in their compliance strategies to
varying degrees." Id. But rather than assess the costs of compliance for manufacturers that
choose not to engage in credit trading, EPA asserts without analysis or other support that
"reduced use of credit trading may result in somewhat higher costs for the program, but we do
not believe it would alter our conclusion that the standards are feasible." Id. An agency "belief'
that is untethered to facts or analysis does not provide an adequate basis for EPA to conclude that
the proposed emissions standards are cost effective in the absence of trading. EPA thus fails to
satisfy its clear statutory obligation to factor costs into the proposed emissions standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 29]
v. The use of BEV technology is not an emissions standard under CAA §§ 202(a)(1)
and (2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 30-31]
By factoring BEVs into the proposed emission standards, EPA effectively is treating BEVs as
an emissions control technology that can form the basis of an emission standard. This exceeds
EPA's authority under CAA § 202(a). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 30-31]
CAA § 202(a)(1) authorizes EPA to prescribe "standards applicable to emissions." In other
words, EPA is authorized to prescribe emission standards for motor vehicles. The term "emission
standard" means a requirement "which limits the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of
air pollutants." CAA § 302(k). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 30-31]
The problem with EPA's regulatory approach here is that a BEV is not an emissions control
technology for a conventionally powered vehicle. A BEV does not and cannot limit the
"quantity, rate, or concentration" of air pollutant emissions from a conventionally powered
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vehicle. Rather, a BEV represents an entirely different type of propulsion system and powertrain.
The existence of BEVs has no bearing on the relative emissions from conventionally powered
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 30-31]
Consequently, a BEV powertrain is not an emissions reduction technology applicable to
conventionally powered vehicles and cannot form the basis of emission standards applicable to
conventionally powered vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 30-31]
vi. The Clean Air Act already expressly provides a regulatory scheme for Clean Fuel
Vehicles in Part C of Title II. That regulatory scheme precludes the regulation of BEVs together
with internal combustion engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 31-32]
CAA § 242(a) requires EPA to "promulgate regulations under this part containing clean- fuel
vehicle standards for the clean-fuel vehicles specified in this part." A clean fuel vehicle is one
that is powered by a "clean alternative fuel," which is defined to include electricity. CAA §
241(2). The state implementation plan for areas designated in severe or greater nonattainment
with ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards must include a clean-fuel vehicle program.
CAA § 182(c)(4). The program must apply to centrally fueled fleets. Id. at § 246. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 31-32]
EPA cities the Clean Fuel Vehicles program as an indication that Congress generally intended
to "promote further progress in emissions reductions." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29233. EPA thus points to
the Clean Fuel Vehicles program as supporting its proposed interpretation that CAA §§ 202(a)(1)
and (2) authorize EPA to mandate the production and sale of BEVs. But in doing so, EPA fails to
address the regulatory program required under the Clean Fuel Vehicles program and fails to
reconcile the particular requirements of that program with the CAA § 202(a) general rulemaking
authority on which it relies as the primary authority for the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0641, pp. 31-32]
The Clean Fuel Vehicles program plainly requires EPA to establish a separate regulatory
scheme for clean fuel vehicles, including electric powered vehicles. "Clean-fuel vehicles . . .
subject to standards set forth in this part shall comply with all motor vehicle requirements of this
subchapter. . . which are applicable to conventional gasoline-fueled vehicles of the same
category and model year . . . except to the extent that any such requirement is in conflict with the
provisions of this part." CAA § 242(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7582(b). This provision clearly signals that
Congress intended for EPA to develop specific standards for clean fuel vehicles (including
BEVs) and also ensure that those clean fuel vehicles comply with the separate emissions
standards set for ICE powered vehicles. In the very least, Congress's explicit inclusion of electric
powered vehicles in the Clean Fuel Vehicles program and its exclusion of any mention of
electric powered vehicles in Section 202 must be given meaning. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7581
with 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a), (e); Bittner v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 713, 720 (2023) ("When
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it from a neighbor, we
normally understand that difference in language to convey a difference in meaning (expressio
unius est exclusio alterius)") This Clean Fuel Vehicles Program would be rendered meaningless
if, as in the Proposed Rule, EPA were to consider conventionally fueled vehicles together with
clean fuel vehicles (including BEVs) in developing and implementing emissions standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 31-32]
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Moreover, the Clean Fuel Vehicles program is narrowly targeted to the worst ozone
nonattainment areas and to the pollutants that contribute to ambient ozone levels. The program
also imposes important constraints on how vehicles may be regulated (for example, as explained
above, it dictates separate emissions standards for clean fuel vehicles). These detailed and
prescriptive requirements demonstrate that Congress intended EPA to regulate clean fuel
vehicles only in particular ways. EPA's claim in the Proposed Rule of omnibus authority to
regulate clean fuel vehicles along with conventionally fueled vehicles cannot be reconciled with
the targeted and carefully crafted regulatory scheme set out in the Clean Fuel Vehicles program.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 31-32]
In sum, the CAA clearly instructs EPA as to where and how clean fuel vehicles should be
regulated. Those specific requirements displace any authority EPA might otherwise have had to
regulate clean fuel vehicles under the general authority of CAA §§ 202(a)(1) and (2). EPA is
thus mistaken in asserting that CAA §§ 202(a)(1) and (2) authorize the proposed LDV and MDV
emissions standards. In addition, by failing to explain the legal basis on which EPA purports to
fulfil its obligations under CAA §§ 202 and 242, the Proposed Rule fails to provide adequate
notice and opportunity to commenters on the important legal questions surrounding the scope
and extent of the Clean Fuel Vehicles program and how the specific regulatory scheme
established under that program can be reconciled with EPA's claim of authority under CAA §§
202(a)(1) and (2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 31-32]
5. Statutory Authority
The proposed rule asks for comments on whether EPA should engage in a rulemaking to
address potential limits on aromatics and high-boiling material as fuel standards under CAA §
211(c). Although EPA has not proposed to engage in a rulemaking at this time, API urges the
agency to avoid a costly and burdensome rulemaking effort that would exceed its authority.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
The proposed rule acknowledges that fuel standards would not assist the new vehicle fleet to
comply with the new standards, but suggests the agency is thinking about them to reduce
particulate matter from the existing fleet. However, EPA lacks authority to set fuel standards to
address vehicle emissions from the existing vehicles, which are already able to comply with their
applicable particulate matter standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
EPA's authority to regulate vehicle emissions applies only prospectively. EPA may only set
standards for classes of "new motor vehicles." CAA § 202(a)(1). In turn, EPA may only consider
controlling or regulating fuel after it has determined there are no other "economically feasible
means of achieving emissions standards under section [202]." Regulating fuel cannot be needed
to achieve the Section 202 standards for existing vehicles because those vehicles already meet
their applicable particulate matter standards without any additional fuel regulation. Any attempt
to rely on the inability of existing vehicles to comply with the particulate matter standards for
new vehicles because of lack of alternative controls would be contrary to the Act's focus on
prospective standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
In any event, EPA may not issue standards under CAA § 211(c) at this time because, as the
proposed rule readily admits, EPA has not "considered all relevant medical and scientific
evidence available to [it], including consideration of other technologically or economically
feasible means of achieving" the standards under section 202. See § 202(c)(2)(A). Unless and
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until EPA completes that analysis and allows stakeholders an opportunity to comment on it, EPA
may not set new standards under CAA § 211(c). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
Please note that due to the compressed comment period for such a complex request for
information, coupled with the lack of an extension, API may supplement the docket. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
Organization: Arizona State Legislature
A. The proposed rule violates the Major Questions Doctrine because Congress did not clearly
delegate EPA this authority.
But Congress has not delegated to EPA the authority to transform the automotive industry.
EPA relies on Clean Air Act section 202(a)(l)-(2) for its authority to issue the proposed
regulation. See 88 Fed. Reg. 29,184, 29,186 (May 5, 2023). This portion of Section 202(a)
provides in full: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 4-5]
(a) Authority of Administrator to prescribe by regulation Except as otherwise provided in
subsection (b)~
(1) The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in
accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in
his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare. Such standards shall be applicable to such vehicles and
engines for their useful life (as determined under subsection (d), relating to useful life of vehicles
for purposes of certification), whether such vehicles and engines are designed as complete
systems or incorporate devices to prevent or control such pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0537, pp. 4-5]
(2) Any regulation prescribed under paragraph (1) of this subsection (and any revision
thereof) shall take effect after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the
development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the
cost of compliance within such period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 4-5]
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
EPA's proposal extends beyond this authority because it seeks to transform the automotive
industry. EPA implicitly acknowledges that its emissions standards for carbon dioxide cannot be
met exclusively with existing internal combustion engines. See, e.g., 88 Fed. Reg. 29,187 ("EPA
anticipates that a compliant fleet under the proposed standards will include a diverse range of
technologies, including higher penetrations of advanced gasoline technologies as well as zero-
emission vehicles."). In addition, EPA's analysis of requisite technology and cost-benefit
balancing focuses primarily on production and purchase of electric vehicles. See, e.g., id. at
29,199 ("Note EPA projects lower maintenance and repair costs for several advanced
technologies (e.g., battery electric vehicles) and those societal maintenance and repair savings
grow significantly over time, and by 2040 and later are larger than our projected new vehicle
technology costs."); id. at 29,201 ("While the average purchase price of vehicles is estimated to
be higher, this is attributable to the larger share of [battery electric vehicles] relative to [internal
combustion engine] vehicles."). Although EPA uses averaging to avoid requiring a specific
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percentage of electric and hydrogen- powered vehicles, EPA "projects that one potential pathway
for the industry to meet the proposed standards would be through" nearly 70% battery electric
vehicles for passenger cars, SUVs, and light-duty pickup trucks, and about 40% battery electric
vehicles for medium duty vans and pickup trucks in model year 2032.11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0537, pp. 4-5]
11 U.S. EPA Fact Sheet, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty
and Medium-Duty Vehicles," Apr. 2023, 5, available at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1017626.pdf.
The transformative nature of EPA's proposal is reminiscent of EPA's past attempt to
transform power plants, which the Supreme Court struck down under the Major Questions
Doctrine last year. See West Virginia v. Env't Prot. Agency, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022). As set
forth in West Virginia, the Supreme Court presumes that "Congress intends to make major
policy decisions itself, not leave those decisions to agencies." Id. at 2609 (internal citation
omitted). In "extraordinary cases," like here with a regulation that seeks to transform the entire
automotive industry and entire American vehicle fleet, "[t]he agency instead must point to 'clear
congressional authorization' for the power it claims." Id. (internal citation omitted). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 5]
The Court's description of what happened in West Virginia closely resembles what EPA
proposes here. "Prior to 2015, EPA had always set emissions limits under Section 111 based on
the application of measures that would reduce pollution by causing the regulated source to
operate more cleanly," explained the Court. Id. at 2610 (internal citation omitted). EPA "had
never devised a cap by looking to a 'system' that would reduce pollution simply by 'shifting'
polluting activity 'from dirtier to cleaner sources.'" Id. (internal citation omitted). Shifting
polluting activity from "dirtier" to "cleaner" sources is exactly what EPA proposes here by
forcing a transition from internal combustion engines powered by fossil fuel to zero-emission
vehicles powered by electricity or hydrogen fuel cells. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 5]
The West Virginia Court also focused on the technology-based approach to individual
sources. "A technology-based standard, recall, is one that focuses on improving the emissions
performance of individual sources." Id. at 2611. But "[rjather than focus on improving the
performance of individual sources, [EPA] would 'improve the overall power system by lowering
the carbon intensity of power generation.' And it would do that by forcing a shift throughout the
power grid from one type of energy source to another." Id. at 2611-12 (internal citation omitted)
(emphasis original). With this position, "EPA can demand much greater reductions in emissions
based on a very different kind of policy judgment: that it would be 'best' if coal made up a much
smaller share of national electricity generation. And on this view of EPA's authority, it could go
further, perhaps forcing coal plants to 'shift' away virtually all of their generation—i.e., to cease
making power altogether." Id. at 2612. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 5-6]
EPA's proposed standards here require another massive shift away from current market
operations. EPA projects that its proposed standards could be satisfied through a mix of nearly
70%) battery electric vehicles for passenger cars, SUVs, and light-duty pickup trucks, and about
40%o battery electric vehicles for medium duty vans and pickup trucks by model year 2032.12
But in 2021, less than 1% of the 250 million passenger cars, SUVs, and light-duty trucks in the
United States were electric. 13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 5-6]
12 U.S. EPA Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
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13 Feilding Cage, The long road to electric cars, REUTERS, Feb. 7, 2022, available at
https://www.reuters.com/graphics/AUTOS-ELECTRIC/USA/mopanyqxwva/.
In West Virginia, "EPA decides, for instance, how much of a switch from coal to natural gas
is practically feasible by 2020, 2025, and 2030 before the grid collapses, and how high energy
prices can go as a result before they become unreasonably 'exorbitant.'" West Virginia, 142 S.
Ct. at 2612. Here, EPA is deciding how much of a switch from internal combustion engine trucks
to zero-emission vehicles or hydrogen-powered vehicles is practically feasible by model years
2027 to 2032. The West Virginia Court found it "highly unlikely that Congress would leave to
agency discretion the decision of how much coal- based generation there should be over the
coming decades." Id. at 2613. Instead, "[t]he basic and consequential tradeoffs involved in such a
choice are ones that Congress would likely have intended for itself." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0537, p. 6]
The magnitude of EPA's proposed rule implicates the Major Questions Doctrine. EPA is
attempting to use emissions standards for vehicles to force a shift from gasoline-powered
vehicles to electric- and hydrogen-powered vehicles. The shift will impact energy production by
dropping demand for oil exploration and refineries and increasing demand for electricity
generation and mining for rare earth minerals. The rule will cost billions of dollars. 88 Fed. Reg.
29,200. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 6]
Under the Major Questions Doctrine, EPA must point to "clear congressional authorization"
to regulate in this manner. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2614. EPA relies exclusively on Section
202(a), which provides EPA with authority to set vehicle emissions standards for any air
pollutant that causes or contributes to air pollution "which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a). This terse provision does not vest EPA
with authority to determine the types of vehicles manufactures can make or the proper vehicle
energy mix in the country. "A decision of such magnitude and consequence rests with Congress
itself, or an agency acting pursuant to a clear delegation from that representative body." West
Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2616. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 6]
Accordingly, EPA should reject the proposed rule because it violates the Major Questions
Doctrine. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 6]
B. The proposed rule violates the Major Questions Doctrine because it conflicts with authority
Congress delegated to another agency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 7]
In determining that the Clean Power Plan violated the Major Questions Doctrine, the West
Virginia Court also emphasized EPA's lack of expertise. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2612-13.
"When an agency has no comparative expertise in making certain policy judgments, we have
said, Congress presumably would not task it with doing so." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 7]
For almost 50 years, Congress has looked to the U.S. Department of Transportation to set
vehicle fuel efficiency standards. 49 U.S.C. § 32902. Indeed, as recently as 2007, Congress
directed the Secretary of Transportation to set a fuel efficiency improvement program for heavy-
duty trucks. Id. at § 32902(k). Congress prohibited the Department of Transportation from
considering electric vehicles when it sets fuel efficiency standards. Id. at § 32902(h)(2). [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 7]
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When EPA has previously proposed vehicle greenhouse gas emissions standards, it has done
so in a joint rulemaking with the Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration. See Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards
for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57106 (Sept. 15, 2011);
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty
Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, 81 Fed. Reg. 73478 (Oct. 25, 2016). Yet this time, EPA only
"coordinated" with the Department of Transportation and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration and did not issue a proposed joint rulemaking. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,293. In the
preamble, EPA states, "EPA has similarly concluded that it is not necessary for this EPA
proposal to be issued in a joint action with NHTSA." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 7]
EPA does not explain why it did not issue a proposed joint rulemaking with the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration. EPA claims there is no "statutory requirement for EPA
to consult with NHTSA" and that its charge to protect public health and welfare is "wholly
independent" of the Department of Transportation's energy efficiency mandate. Id. However,
EPA does not reconcile how its independent rulemaking will affect the Department of
Transportation's energy efficiency standards. EPA even rejected a request to extend the public
comment period "to align with the end of the soon to be released National Highway Safety
Administration (NHTSA) Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) proposed rulemaking
comment deadline since the intent of NHTSA's CAFE rulemaking and your greenhouse gas
(GHG) rulemaking overlaps." 14 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 7]
14 Letter from Alliance for Automotive Innovation to EPA, May 25, 2023, available at
https://www.epa.gOv/system/files/documents/2023-06/lmdv-alliance-auto-inno-comment-period-ext-req-
2023-05-25_0.pdf; Letter from EPA to Alliance
for Automotive Innovation, June 2, 2023, available at
https://www.epa.gOv/system/files/documents/2023-06/lmdv-alliance-auto-inno-comment-period-ext-req-
response- 2023-06-02_0.pdf; see also Letter from National Automobile Dealers Association to EPA, May
30, 2023, available at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-06/lmdv-nada-comment-period-
ext-req-2023-05-30_0.pdf (expressing full support for Alliance for Automotive Innovation's request to
extend the public comment period to align with NHTSA's proposed CAFE rulemaking); Letter from
Hyundai Motor America to EPA, June 1, 2023, available at
https://www.epa.gOv/system/files/documents/2023-06/lmdv-hyundai-motor-america-comment-period-ext-
request- 2023-06-01.pdf (requesting extension to align with NHTSA's proposed CAFE rulemaking).
EPA's proposed rule intrudes upon the Department of Transportation's delegated authority to
determine energy efficiency standards. Under EPA's stringent standards, manufacturers that are
fully compliant with the Department of Transportation's standards will be unable to meet EPA's
standards without changing production to non-fossil-fuel-powered vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0537, p. 8]
Congress charged the Department of Transportation with setting energy efficiency standards,
not EPA. This is further evidence that the proposed rule exceeds EPA's authority and violates the
Major Questions Doctrine. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 8]
II. The proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious because it fails to rely on a cost- benefit
analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 8]
The proposed rule also is arbitrary and capricious. An agency rule is arbitrary and capricious
if "the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed
to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
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counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc.
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p.
8]
In a Clean Air Act case involving power plant regulation, the Supreme Court held that EPA
"must consider cost—including, most importantly, cost of compliance—before deciding whether
regulation is appropriate and necessary." Michigan v. E.P.A., 576 U.S. 743, 759 (2015). EPA
had determined that the statute conferring authority to regulate if EPA found that "such
regulation is appropriate and necessary" did not require EPA to consider costs. Id. at 750-51
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(l)(A)). The Supreme Court found EPA's interpretation
unreasonable. Id. at 760. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 8]
The law applicable to EPA's proposed rule here even more expressly requires consideration
of costs than the law before the Court in Michigan v. EPA. Section 202(a) requires "appropriate
consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2) (emphasis
added). And when revising standards for heavy-duty trucks or other mobile sources, which
would include light- and medium-duty vehicles, Congress specifically directed EPA to consider
costs: "On the basis of information available to the Administrator concerning the effects of air
pollutants emitted from heavy-duty vehicles or engines and from other sources of mobile source
related pollutants on the public health and welfare, and taking costs into account, the
Administrator may promulgate regulations under paragraph (1) of this subsection ..." Id. at §
7521(a)(3)(B)(i) (emphasis added). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 8-9]
Despite this clear direction, EPA openly admits that it did not rely on a cost-benefit analysis
to set the standards in the proposed rule. According to EPA, "EPA's practice has been to set
standards to achieve improved air quality consistent with CAA section 202, and not to rely on
cost- benefit calculations, with their uncertainties and limitations, as identifying the appropriate
standards." 88 Fed. Reg. 29,198; see also 29,347 ("We recognize the uncertainties and
limitations in these estimates (including unquantified benefits), and the Administrator has not
relied on these estimates in identifying the appropriate standards under section 202."). EPA
provides no citation of statutory authority to support its "practice," and the applicable statutes
instruct EPA to do the opposite. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 8-9]
By openly admitting that it did not rely on a cost-benefit analysis to set the standards in the
proposed rule, EPA runs afoul of the clear statutory requirements in Section 202(a) and the
reasoning in Michigan v. EPA requiring it to consider costs. EPA's failure to consider cost-
benefit analysis to set the requirements in the proposed rule is thus arbitrary and capricious.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 8-9]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
Standards more stringent than EPA's proposed standards would comport with its statutory
mandate in Section 202(a) and further the statutory objective by reducing the threats from
vehicle pollution to public health and welfare. EPA projects that the proposed standards will
reduce GHG emissions by more than 7.3 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide (C02), 120,000
metric tons of methane (CH4), and 130,000 metric tons of nitrous oxide (N20) through 2055, in
addition to criteria pollutant reductions of 44,000 tons per year of nitrogen oxides (NOx), 9,800
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tons per year of fine particulate matter (PM2.5), 200,000 tons per year of non-methane organic
gases (NMOG), 2,800 tons per year of sulfur oxides (SOx), and 1.8 million tons per year of
carbon monoxide (CO) by 2055. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,348 (Table 135); id. at 29,351 (Table 139).
More emission reductions are feasible. See CARB Comment at 17-22. Given EPA's description
of these emissions reductions as an "essential factor" in its determination of the appropriate level
of the proposed standards, id. at 29,344, and the primacy Congress placed on addressing
pollution's danger to public health and welfare in Section 202(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), our
States and Cities urge EPA to increase the stringency of its standards beyond those
proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 28]
Organization: Competitive Enterprise Institute
The IRA Does Not Override West Virginia
One week after President Biden signed the IRA,41 Senate Environment and Public Works
Chairman Tom Carper (D-Del.), Harvard Law professor Jody Freeman, and other unnamed
"experts" told the New York Times that "Democrats designed" certain IRA provisions to
undercut West Virginia. Supposedly, those provisions supply "clear" language authorizing
"aggressive" GHG regulations, including California's ZEV mandates. 42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0611, pp.10-13]
41 Public Law 117-169, August 16, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publl69/PLAW-
117publl69.pdf.
42 Lisa Friedman, "Democrats Designed the Climate Law to be a Game Changer. Here's How," New York
Times, August 22, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/22/climate/epa-supreme-court-pollution.html,
To its credit, the proposal does not affirm that viewpoint, but perhaps because it says nothing
about West Virginia. The proposal details the "clean vehicle" "incentives" in the BIL 43 and
IRA, and touts those statutes as "pivotal milestones in the creation of a broad-based
infrastructure instrumental to the expansion of clean transportation, including light- and medium-
duty zero- emission vehicles."44 Careless readers may infer that the EPA is simply proposing to
effectuate congressional intent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
43 Public Law 117-58, November 15, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-
117publ58.pdf.
44 88 FR 29196.
For the record, the BIL and IRA do not enlarge the scope of the EPA's regulatory authorities
under the Clean Air Act. The BIL mentions the Clean Air Act three times: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
- BIL Section 11115 establishes a "Congestion mitigation and air quality improvement
program" (CMAQI) and stipulates that eligible projects must use "verified technologies" as
"defined in section 216 of the Clean Air Act." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
- BIL Section 11516 requires the Comptroller General to report on the CMAQI program's
progress with "respect to attainment or maintenance of national ambient air quality standards
under section 109 of the Clean Air Act." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
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- BIL Section 71101 amends the 2005 Energy Policy Act's Clean School Bus program to
define a zero-emission school bus as one that has zero exhaust emissions of "any air pollutant
that is listed pursuant to section 108(a) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7408(a)) (or any
precursor to such an air pollutant.)" [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
Clearly, the BIL does not amend the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-
13]
Six IRA provisions expressly amend the Clean Air Act, lending a superficial plausibility to
Carper's theory. However, all those provisions are fiscal in nature; none expands or otherwise
modifies existing CAA regulatory authority: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
- IRA Section 60101 establishes a "Clean heavy-duty vehicles" program, authorizing up to
$600 million in grants, rebates, and contracts for zero-emission heavy-duty vehicles,
infrastructure, and workforce training. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
- IRA Section 60102 authorizes grants to reduce air pollution at ports—up to $2.25 billion
through 2027 for the purchase and installation of zero-emission port equipment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
- IRA Section 60103 establishes a "Greenhouse gas reduction fund," authorizing billions of
dollars in support for States, municipalities, and tribal governments to "deploy or benefit from
zero-emission technologies, including distributed technologies on residential rooftops, and to
carry out other greenhouse gas emission reduction activities." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611,
pp. 10-13]
- IRA Section 60107 establishes a Low Emission Electricity Program, authorizing $17 million
in grants and technical assistance to each of four groups—households, low- income
communities, industries, and State and Tribal governments—for the purpose of reducing
electricity-related emissions. The provision also authorizes $1 million for program monitoring,
and $18 million for EPA efforts to ensure reductions are achieved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0611, pp. 10-13]
- IRA Section 60113 establishes the "Methane emissions reduction program," authorizing up
to $850 million in "grants, rebates, contracts, loans, and other activities of the Environmental
Protection Agency for the purposes of providing financial and technical assistance to owners and
operators of applicable facilities." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
- IRA Section 60114 authorizes billions of dollars in "greenhouse gas air pollution planning
grants" to state governments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
- IRA Section 60201 authorizes billions of dollars in "environmental and climate justice block
grants." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
In short, where the IRA amends the CAA, it authorizes subsidies, not mandates. The
amending provisions create new carrots, but no new sticks.45 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611,
pp. 10-13]
45 For example, the IRA Low Emission Electricity Program is a non-regulatory substitute for policies
President Biden could not persuade Congress to enact: a national clean energy standard, mandating a
nationwide transition to 100 percent zero-emission electricity, and a Clean Electricity Performance
Program, imposing tax penalties on utilities that fail to decarbonize according to a national schedule. See
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Ashley J. Lawson, "Clean Energy Standards: Selective Issues for the 117th Congress," Congressional
Research Service, November 2, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gOv/product/pdf/R/R46691, and Ben
Adler, "Biden's emission pledge hanging by a thread after Manchin's climate budget cut," October 21,
2021, Yahoo News, https://news.yahoo.com/biden- emissions-pledge-hanging-by-a-thread-after-manchins-
climate-change-budget-cut-090056653.html.
Sen. Carper, Prof. Freeman, and the other "experts" interviewed by the Times surely know
that post-enactment elucidation of a statute's meaning carries little to no weight in ascertaining
congressional intent. 46 As it happens, the actual legislative history Carper made on August 6,
2022 when debating the IRA on the Senate floor before passage, contradicts the post-hoc spin he
later shared with the Times. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
46 And whatever interpretive force one attaches to legislative history, the Court normally gives little weight
to statements, such as those of the individual legislators, made after the bill in question has become law."
Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 486 (2010). "The Court has previously found the post-enactment
elucidation of the meaning of a statute to be of little relevance in determining the intent of the legislature
contemporaneous to the passage of the statute." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596 n.19 (1987).
"This is a good example of why floor statements by individual legislators rank among the least illuminating
forms of legislative history." N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 580 U.S. 288, 137 S. Ct. 929, 943 (2017).
Only once during the day-long Vote-A-Rama, in a two-minute exchange between Sens.
Shelley Capito (R-W.Va.) and Carper, did senators debate the IRA's potential impact on West
Virginia v. EPA. The exchange occurs on page 4178 of the Congressional Record.47 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
47 Congressional Record, Senate, August 6, 2022, p. 4178,
https://www.congress.gOv/117/crec/2022/08/06/168/133/CREC-2022-08-06-senate.pdf.
Sen. Capito offered an amendment to strike what was then IRA Sec. 60105(g), which would
appropriate $45 million for the EPA "to carry out" CAA Section 111 and eight other sections
"with respect to greenhouse gases." Here is the text:
(G) OTHER ACTIVITIES - In addition to amounts otherwise available, there is appropriated
to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for fascial year 2022, out of any
money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, $45,000,000, to remain available until
September 30, 2031, to carry out, with respect to greenhouse gases, sections 111, 115, 163, 177,
202, 211, 213, 231, and 612 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7411, 7415, 7475, 7507, 7521,
7545, 7547, 7571, and 7671k). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
Capito warned that Sec. 60105(g) would create talking points for EPA lawyers and
environmental groups "when they try and convince courts to uphold future overreaching climate
regulations," such as the CPP. Sen. Carper countered that Section 60105(g) "would fund the
EPA to use its existing narrow Clean Air Act authorities to address greenhouse gas
emissions "48 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
48 Emphasis added.
In short, before passage, Sen. Carper effectively denied Sec. 60105(g) would reverse or
undercut West Virginia. Rather, the IRA language would fund the EPA's use of "existing
narrow" CAA authorities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
Although Capito's amendment lost on a 50-50 vote, Section 60105(g) was later deleted on a
point of order. That means the final IRA does not even contain a section authorizing the EPA to
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use "existing narrow" regulatory authorities with respect to greenhouse gases. And, as noted
above, all the CAA amendments in the IRA are fiscal policy provisions, which as such cannot
create or expand any CAA regulatory authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 10-13]
IV. The Proposed Standards Are Unlawful as a Matter of Statutory Law
Fleet Average Standards Are Incompatible with CAA Title II
Unlike emission standards that apply to individual vehicles, the EPA's GHG standards are
fleet- average standards. That has been the case since 2010, when the EPA first promulgated
GHG motor vehicle standards. The EPA's reliance on fleet-average standards was inevitable for
two main reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, p. 13]
First, C02 emissions from motor fuel consumption constitute more than 95 percent of all
tailpipe GHG emissions, and no practical onboard C02 filtration or capture technology has ever
been invented. 49 That means the only feasible method of reducing tailpipe C02 emissions per
mile is to reduce fuel consumption per mile—in other words, boost fuel economy.50 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0611, p. 13]
49 NHTSA, Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011, Final Rule, 71
FR 17566, 17670, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2006-04-06/pdf/FR-2006-04-06.pdf.
50 EPA and Department of Transportation, Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, Final Rule, 75 FR 25324, 25327, May 7, 2010,
https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/FR-2010-05-07/pdf/2010-8159.pdf.
Apparently, the EPA got it right when it told the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) that
motor vehicle GHG standards would either uselessly duplicate or supplant NHTSA's CAFE
standards.56 In any event, the EPA's GHG standards are fleet-average standards. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 14-15]
56 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 513 (2007).
That is a major problem, private petitioners in Texas v. EPA contend, because the Clean Air
Act "unambiguously precludes fleetwide-average emission standards under Section 202(a)."57
Nor is that all: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 14-15]
57 Petitioners' Initial Brief, p. 38.
Fleetwide averaging also clashes with "the design and structure of [Title II] as a whole."
Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 321 (citation omitted). Title II sets forth a comprehensive, interlocking
scheme for enforcing emission standards through testing, certification, warranties, remediation,
and penalties. Fleetwide-average standards are incompatible with these provisions, which are
"designed to apply to" individual vehicles and "cannot rationally be extended" to fleets. Id. at
322.58 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 14-15]
58 Petitioners' Initial Brief, pp. 43-44.
My comments will now excerpt and briefly summarize petitioners' groundbreaking argument
on this critical matter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 14-15]
To begin with, CAA Section 202(a), the EPA's putative statutory authority "says nothing
about averaging across fleets."59 Moreover, 202(a) specifies that the standards apply "to such
vehicles and engines for their useful life (as determined under subsection (d) of this section,
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relating to useful life of vehicles for purposes of certification)." Useful life and certification are
legal concepts that apply to individual vehicles, not fleets on average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0611, pp.14-15]
59 Petitioners' Initial Brief, p. 39.
Certification and testing are addressed more broadly in CAA Section 206, hence the full
meaning of 202(a) depends on the whole of interrelated parts to which it belongs.60 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 14-15]
60 Under the "whole-text cannon," provisions should be read in the context of other provisions to which
they are linked. See Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts,
pp. 145-149, https://jm919846758.files.wordpress.com/2020/09/rlilt.pdf.
CAA 202(a) is explicitly linked to CAA 202(b), which "sets forth specific light-duty vehicle
emission standards that EPA must promulgate in 'regulations under' Section 202(a)."61 Such
standards, which are required for carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and oxides of nitrogen,
"necessarily apply to vehicles individually, not to fleets on average "62 For example: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 14-15]
61 Petitioners' Initial Brief, p. 40.
62 Petitioners' Initial Brief, p. 40.
The regulations under subsection (a) of this section applicable to emissions of oxides of
nitrogen from light-duty vehicles and engines manufactured during model years 1977 through
1980 shall contain standards which provide that such emissions from such vehicles and engines
may not exceed 2.0 grams per vehicle mile. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 14-15]
There is no room in such language for averaging. Congress did not intend to allow
automakers to produce some vehicles that emit more than the standard as long as other vehicles
emit less. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 14-15]
Section 202(b) testing requirements confirm that those standards apply to individual vehicles,
petitioners contend:
In particular, EPA must "test any emission control system incorporated in a motor vehicle or
motor vehicle engine ... to determine whether such system enables such vehicle or engine to
conform to the standards required to be prescribed under [Section 202(b) of the Act]." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7525(a)(2). If the system complies, EPA must issue a "verification of compliance with
emission standards for such system." 63 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 15-17]
63 Petitioners' Initial Brief, p. 41.
Petitioners draw the only reasonable conclusion:
Those requirements plainly contemplate standards that apply to individual vehicles and their
emission-control systems. Not only does the statutory text frame the inquiry as whether an
individual "vehicle" or "engine" conforms to the emission standards, but the provision's
foundational premise—that an emission-control system can enable a vehicle to meet emission
standards—depends on individually applied standards.64 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp.
15-17]
64 Petitioners' Initial Brief, p. 42.
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Other parts Section 202 further demonstrate that emission standards under Section 202(a)
cannot rely on averaging, petitioners argue:
Section 202(b)(3), for example, authorizes EPA to grant waivers from certain nitrogen- oxide
emission standards—which, again, are standards "under" Section 202(a), see 42 U.S.C. §
7521(b)(1)(B)—for no "more than 5 percent of [a] manufacturer's production or more than fifty
thousand vehicles or engines, whichever is greater." Id. § 7521(b)(3). This provision would be
nonsensical under a fleetwide-averaging regime. It contemplates a default under which every
vehicle meets a standard, then gives manufacturers a waiver from that default for up to 5% of the
fleet. But under fleetwide averaging, no waiver is needed. Instead, a vast proportion of a
manufacturer's fleet—perhaps 50% or more effectively has a "waiver" so long as a sufficient
number of vehicles outperform the standard. Likewise, Section 202(g), which specifies an
increasing "percentage of each manufacturer's sales volume" of each model year's vehicles that
must comply with specified emission standards, is fundamentally incompatible with averaging.
Id. § 7521(g)(1).65 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 15-17]
65 Petitioners' Initial Brief, p. 42.
The same conclusion follows from Section 202(m), under which the EPA must require
manufacturers to install on "all" new light-duty vehicles and trucks "diagnostic systems" capable
of identifying malfunctions that "could cause or result in failure of the vehicles to comply with
emission standards established under this section." Id. § 7521(m)(l). Petitioners comment:
As this requirement makes clear, individual vehicles must "comply with emissions standards
established under [Section 202]." Id. Otherwise, requiring diagnostic equipment on "all" vehicles
makes no sense. In a fleetwide-averaging regime, this requirement would be pointless, as the
deterioration or malfunction of an individual vehicle's emission-related systems would provide
virtually no information about whether the fleet as a whole is compliant.66 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0611, pp. 15-17]
66 Petitioners' Initial Brief, p. 43.
Petitioners go on to explain that "Title II sets forth a comprehensive, interlocking scheme for
enforcing emission standards through testing, certification, warranties, remediation, and
penalties," and that "fleetwide-average standards are incompatible with these provisions, which
are 'designed to apply to' individual vehicles and 'cannot rationally be extended' to fleets." A
few excerpts must here suffice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 15-17]
Under Section 206, EPA must "test, or require to be tested in such manner as [it] deems
appropriate, any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine submitted by a manufacturer to
determine whether such vehicle or engine conforms with the regulations prescribed under
[Section 202]." 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1)." Petitioners comment:
Fleetwide averaging is incompatible with these requirements in at least two respects. First, by
using the singular terms "vehicle" and "engine," along with "any" and "such," the statute
contemplates that individual vehicles may be tested, determined to "not conform" with the
standards, and have their certificates of conformity suspended or revoked. In a fleetwide-
averaging regime, testing an individual vehicle or engine does not enable EPA to determine
whether it "conforms with the regulations prescribed under [Section 202]," 42 U.S.C. §
7525(a)(1), because conformity turns not on an individual vehicle's emissions but on the fleet's
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average performance overall. Second, fleetwide averaging also makes it impossible to determine
compliance with applicable emission standards before a vehicle is sold, as required to obtain the
certificate of conformity needed for a sale. See 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1) ... Simply put, an after-
the-fact compliance regime is incompatible with the Act's testing and certification scheme. 67
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 15-17]
67 Petitioners' Initial Brief, pp. 45-46.
Fleetwide-average standards similarly clash with Section 207 warranty provisions. Petitioners
explain:
Under Section 207, a manufacturer must "warrant to the ultimate purchaser and each
subsequent purchaser" "at the time of sale" that each new vehicle complies with applicable
regulations under [Section 202], 42 U.S.C. § 7541(a)(1) (emphasis added). Yet, as with
certificates of conformity, manufacturers cannot warrant conformity with fleetwide-average
emission standards at the time of sale, because compliance can be determined only at the end of
the year. See 40 C.F.R. § 86.1865-12(i)(l) (requiring manufacturers to compute their "production
weighted fleet average" by "using actual production [ data]" for the year in question).68 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 17-18]
68 Petitioners' Initial Brief, p. 46.
Fleetwide-average emission standards are also inconsistent with Section 207 remediation and
notification provisions. Petitioners explain:
Those provisions state that if EPA "determines that a substantial number of any class or
category of vehicles or engines ... do not conform to the regulations prescribed under [Section
202]," the manufacturer must remedy "the nonconformity of any such vehicles or engines." 42
U.S.C. § 7541(c)(1). If "a motor vehicle fails to conform," the manufacturer bears the cost. Id. §
7541(h)(1). Further, "dealers, ultimate purchasers, and subsequent purchasers" must be given
notice of any nonconformity, id. § 7541(c)(2), which requires identification of specific
nonconforming vehicles. None of this is possible where the nonconformity is tied to a fleet on
average.69 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 17-18]
69 Petitioners' Initial Brief, pp. 46-47.
Finally, fleetwide averaging is inconsistent with Section 205 penalty provisions. Petitioners
explain:
Under Section 205, any violation "shall constitute a separate offense with respect to each
motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine," with each offense subject to its own civil penalty of up
to $25,000. 42 U.S.C. § 7524(a) (emphasis added). Under EPA's approach, however, no
individual vehicle or engine violates the applicable standard, only the fleet as a whole. The
statute provides no method for calculating penalties when a fleet fails to meet its fleetwide-
average standard—because it does not authorize fleetwide-average standards.70 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 17-18]
70 Petitioners' Initial Brief, p. 47.
Organization: Elders Climate Action
C. EPA's Failure to Set Zero Emission Standards Violates the CAA.
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The CAA declares that the primary purpose of the Act is "to protect and enhance the quality
of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive
capacity of its population." 42 U.S.C. §7401(b)(l). To implement this purpose, section
202(b)(1)(C) grants the Administrator discretion to commence a rulemaking to revise standards
previously promulgated under subsection (a)(1), but once that rulemaking is commenced, as
here, the Act requires that the Administrator determine what revisions are "needed to protect
public health and welfare." That statutory benchmark has not been addressed in this rulemaking,
either with respect to the emission reductions needed to prevent endangerment of the public
health and welfare from the climate impacts of GHG emissions, or from the impacts of criteria
pollutant violations of NAAQS on public health. The failure to undertake an analysis to
determine what emission standards are needed to protect public health and welfare renders this
rulemaking unlawful and fundamentally flawed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 6-8]
L/MDVs that are commercially available today with zero emission power trains obviously
satisfy the available technology requirement. A large fraction of the C02 emitted from on-road
vehicles comes from L/MD vehicle types that are NOW commercially available with zero
emission power trains. These include transit and school buses, delivery vans, service trucks, and
shuttles serving airports, hotels and resorts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 6-8]
EPA admits that ZEV technologies are available, and are the most cost-effective technologies,
but the Agency only estimates the zero emission L/MDVs that will likely be available in 2027 as
a result of current incentive policies and state regulations. EPA does not estimate the potential
availability of zero emission L/MDVs that could be produced and sold if EPA were to
promulgate zero emission standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 6-8]
Instead EPA assumes that the rule will marginally improve the efficiency of IC engines and
"induce" enough ZEV sales to reduce C02 emissions less than 5% by 2030 from new L/MDVs
sold in 2027 and subsequent years. By failing to require the production and sale of zero emission
L/MDVs along with a fleet averaging rule that allows engine manufacturers to sell "dirty"
uncontrolled L/MDVs through the use of emission reduction credits obtained by selling zero
emission vehicles in California and section 177 states, EPA is effectively allowing engine
manufacturers to capture the benefits of clean zero emission vehicles for themselves while
increasing the exposure of at-risk communities to harmful pollutants in non-177 states. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 6-8]
We include a legal analysis that demonstrates EPA's failure to set standards that will achieve
the maximum deployment of zero emission technologies fails to achieve the public health
purpose of the Act, and is not consistent with the statutory text and the legislative history of the
Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 6-8]
By setting zero emission standards for NOx beginning in 2027 for the vehicle types currently
available as zero emission vehicles (ZEVs), EPA should determine the NOx emissions that
would be avoided in nonattainment areas where EPA's modeling for the 2022 HD rule shows
that current and proposed HD emission standards will not be sufficient to provide for attainment.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 6-8]
CONCLUSION.
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EPA must determine the extent to which a zero emission standard for L/MD vehicles
beginning in 2027 would be needed to put our nation's vehicle fleet on a clear path to attaining
the ozone and PM NAAQS by the statutory deadline. In addition, EPA must, at a minimum, use
the IPCC modeling analysis and data to estimate the endangerment that will result from climate
warming if global mean temperature is allowed to exceed 1.5o C as the benchmark for
determining endangerment to the public health and welfare, and determine what emission
standard is needed for L/MD vehicles to achieve the reductions needed to ensure that the U.S.
contribution to atmospheric loadings of C02 will be reduced to the levels need to prevent more
severe effects of climate warming. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 6-8]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
A. EPA has authority to consider ZEV technology in setting emission standards.
The language, structure, and legislative history of the CAA clearly show that Congress
granted EPA authority to consider all available technologies, including ZEV technologies, in
setting emission standards under Section 202(a). More recent acts of Congress have reaffirmed
legislative intent that EPA consider the emissions-reducing potential of ZEVs in its rules. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 10]
Section 202(a)(1) directs EPA to set emissions standards for new "motor vehicles" — a term
defined broadly and functionally to include "any self-propelled vehicle designed for transporting
persons or property on a street or highway," 42 U.S.C. 7550(2). Such standards are applicable
regardless of "whether such vehicles and engines are designed as complete systems or
incorporate devices to prevent or control such pollution "9 The Act's language thus explicitly
rejects limitations to internal-combustion engines or to particular kinds of technologies. It just as
clearly includes technology beyond ICEVs, including ZEVs, which are plainly a "complete
system[]" that can "prevent" pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 10]
9 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
This reading of Section 202 is well supported by its core function and by the long history of
its interpretation by EPA and the courts. In Section 202, Congress authorized EPA to "project
future advances" in technology, and not be confined to pollution-control methods that were
currently available. 10 Indeed, Congress expected EPA to "adjust to changing technology." 11
Based on its clear CAA authority, EPA has factored ZEV technologies (ranging from mild
hybrid technologies to fully electric battery-powered vehicles) into its rules for more than two
decades. 12 EPA first included ZEVs in its fleetwide averages in its 2000 "Tier 2" criteria
pollutant standards. 13 The agency has continued to consider and incentivize these technologies
in every one of its six greenhouse gas rules for both light- and heavy-duty vehicles. 14
Accordingly, its decision to do so again in this rule now that ZEV technologies are more widely
available is eminently reasonable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 10]
10 NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 329 (1981) (quoting Senate report from 1970 amendments stating EPA
was "expected to press for the development and application of improved technology rather than be limited
by that which exists today." S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1970)).
11 S. Rep. No. 89-192, at 4 (1965).
12 65 Fed. Reg. 6698 (Feb. 10, 2000) ("Tier 2" criteria pollutant standards). For a detailed review of this
history, see Brief of Amici Curiae Margo Oge and John Hannon in Support of Respondents, Texas v. EPA,
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No. 22-1031, 24-31 (D.C. Cir, Mar. 2, 2023), Texas v. EPA, No. 22-1031, 33 (D.C. Cir, Mar. 2, 2023),
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/Texas%20-%20Former%20EPA%20Managers.pdf
(Attachment H).
13 65 Fed. Reg. 6698 (Feb. 10, 2000).
14 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010) (Light-duty model year 2011 and later); 76 Fed. Reg. 57106 (Sept.
15, 2011) (Heavy-duty model year 2014 and later); 77 Fed. Reg. 62624 (Oct. 15, 2012) (Light-duty model
year 2017 and later); 81 Fed. Reg. 73478 (Oct. 25, 2016) (Heavy-duty model year 2021 and later); 85 Fed.
Reg. 24174 (Apr. 30, 2020) (Light-duty model year 2021 and later); 86 Fed. Reg. 74434 (Dec. 30, 2021)
(Light-duty model year 2023 and later); See also EPA's Answering Brief, Texas v. EPA, No. 22-1031, 15-
16 (D.C. Cir, Apr. 27, 2023), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-05/Texas%20-
%20EPA%20Final%20Brief.pdf (Attachment I).
Organization: Governing for Impact and Evergreen Action (GFI)
I. Background: the Proposed Rule & the Major Questions Doctrine
The EPA's Proposed Rule, covering light and medium duty vehicle emissions of both
greenhouse gases ("GHGs") and criteria pollutants for MYs 2027-2032, appropriately fulfills the
statutory obligation under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act ("CAA") to issue standards for
motor vehicle emissions that "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 11 It also marks a positive and necessary step
towards reducing carbon emissions in line with current domestic and international climate
commitments, as well as addressing environmental justice concerns. This administration has
committed to reducing GHG pollution by 50-52 percent by 2030 (relative to 2005 levels)—and
policies to address pollution from the transportation sector will be critical to achieving this
goal. 12 The transportation sector accounts for the largest share of domestic GHG pollution (29
percent); and light duty vehicles are responsible for the largest share of greenhouse emissions
within the transportation sector (58 percent). 13 Despite the EPA's previous GHG regulations
under Section 202(a), transportation emissions in the United States continue to grow, 14
demonstrating that greater action is needed to fulfill the CAA's statutory goals and achieve this
administration's climate targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 2]
11 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(l).
12 "FACT SHEET: President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction Target Aimed at
Creating Good- Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S. Leadership on Clean Energy Technologies," The
White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-
president-biden-sets-2030- greenhouse-gas-pollution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good-paying-
union-jobs-and-securing-u-s-leadership-on- clean-energy-technologies/ (April 22, 2021).
13 Fast Facts on Transportation Greenhouse Gas Emissions," U.S. Enviro. Prot. Agency,
https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/fast-facts-transportation-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited June
15, 2023).
14 See "Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks," U.S. Enviro. Prot. Agency,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks (last visited June 15,
2023).
The Proposed Rule, contrary to some public commentary, 18 simply follows the course laid by
decades of CAA §202(a) emissions standards for new motor vehicles and motor vehicle
engines. 19 Since the 1970s, the EPA has used this authority to set standards for passenger
vehicles that reduced deadly emissions such as lead, carbon monoxide, particulate matter, and
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nitrogen oxide. In the wake of the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. E.P.A.,
which held that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions as air pollutants under the
CAA,20 the EPA released its first Section 202(a) standard targeting GHG emissions from light
duty vehicles in 2010, covering MYs 2012-2016.21 As new data about the urgency of the
climate crisis and its ensuing public health impacts, especially to environmental justice
communities, have emerged over the last decade, the EPA has further tightened those standards
in a series of subsequent rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 3]
18 18 See supra at 1.
19 See EPA, "Timeline of Major Accomplishments in Transportation, Air Pollution, and Climate Change,"
https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/timeline-major-accomplishments-
transportation- air (last visited June 15, 2023).
20 549 U.S. 497.
21 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards; Final Rule," 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 2010), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2010-
05-07/pdf/2010-8159.pdf.
The Proposed Rule meets the moment. It carefully balances current technological capacities,
market trends, and the need to reduce emissions on the most accelerated timeline possible in
order to protect public health and welfare, as the CAA demands. Because the average vehicle
lifespan is 10 years, and Section 202(a) rules only apply to new vehicles, it is rational for GHG
standards to become iteratively more stringent so that we can achieve our climate and pollution
(and therefore our public health and welfare) goals on an adequate timeline and in response to
the latest scientific data—as the Proposed Rule does. While we are also supportive of the
proposed Alternative I — as we believe the statute, ambitious automaker commitments, and
scientific data robustly support an even stronger standard — this comment narrowly focuses on
the Proposed Rule's central proposal, which has been the subject of MQD criticism.26 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 4]
26 See supra at 1.
Finally, suggestions by some opponents that the EPA must promulgate its emissions standards
in coordination with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"),75 which
sets fuel- economy standards but is prohibited from taking EVs' fuel economy into account in
setting those standards, are wrong. While it is true that the two agencies have jointly
promulgated GHG and fuel economy regulations in the past, there is no statutory requirement
that they do so—and the agencies did not do so in 2021 when the EPA promulgated 202(a) GHG
regulations for MYs 2023-2026.76 In fact, the Supreme Court has described the EPA's authority
to regulate carbon emissions from motor vehicles as "a statutory obligation wholly independent"
from NHTSA's energy efficiency mandate regarding mileage requirements.77 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0621, pp. 9-10]
75 See, e.g., Private Petitioners' brief, Texas v. E.P.A., D.C. Cir. No. 22-1031.
76 "Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards," 86
Fed. Reg. 74434 (Dec. 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/12/30/2021-27854/revised-
2023-and-later-model-y ear- light-duty-vehicle-greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards.
77 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). See also Coal, for Responsible Regul., Inc. v.
E.P.A., 684 F.3d 102, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining why NHTSA's regulatory obligations do not affect
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the EPA's obligations under the CAA); Proposed Rule at fn. 388; Dan Farber, "The Car Rule and the Major
Questions Doctrine," Legal Planet (April 24, 2023), https://legal-planet.org/2023/04/24/the-car-rule-and-
the-major-questions-doctrine/; Proof Brief of the Institute for Policy Integrity at 10-11.
2. The Proposed Rule does not mark a novel use of the EPA's regulatory authority.
A review of the agency's past actions also weighs in the agency's favor under the MQD. The
EPA has deployed the same suite of regulatory mechanisms — for example, its reliance on
fleetwide averages — for decades.78 As the Proposed Rule does for zero emission vehicles, past
Section 202(a) standards have encouraged automakers to develop and deploy cutting edge
technologies that fulfill the statute's "public health and welfare" mandates.79 And as noted
above, the Proposed Rule's modest effects on EV growth find ample precedent in previous
202(a) GHG regulations.80 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 10]
78 See Proposed Rule at 29233 ("Congress also directed EPA to phase-in certain section 202(a) standards,
see CAA section 202(g), which confirms EPA's authority to promulgate standards, such as fleet averages,
phase-ins, and averaging, banking, and trading programs, that are fulfilled through compliance over an
entire fleet, or a portion thereof, rather than through compliance by individual vehicles"). See also EPA's
Proof Answering Brief, Texas v. E.P. A., D.C. Cir. No. 22-1031 10-18 (Feb. 24, 2023),
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-02/Texas%20-%20EPA%200pening%20Brief.pdf; Proof Brief
of State and Public Interest Repondent-Intervenors, Texas V. E.P. A.,D.C. Cir. 22-1031 6-19 (Mar. 21,
2023), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/Texas-%20NGO%20and%20State%20brief.pdf;
Proof Brief of the Institute for Policy Integrity at 8-10.
79 See infra at 13.
80 See supra at 9.
Given the importance that the MQD places on regulatory antecedents,99 the agency might
consider including in its final rule a more sophisticated version of the above chart (or an
analogous qualitative description), which compares the agency's GHG tailpipe rules (and
perhaps its criteria pollutant rules) across a range of metrics. Such an analysis would help
demonstrate to a non-expert reviewing court that the Proposed Rule does not pose an
impermissibly "unheralded" or "unprecedented" exercise of agency authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0621, pp.11-12]
99 Revesz and Sarinsky at 2 ("[T]he concept of regulatory novelty plays an important role in the doctrine
under both Supreme Court precedent and lower-court application. If an action represents a marked and
substantial departure from anything the agency has done before (i.e., is "unheralded"), then this could favor
the application of the major questions doctrine to strike down the challenge action—so long as the
doctrine's other prongs are met. If, however, the agency can point to analogous exercises of authority in the
past, such a showing could strongly support the agency's statutory authority for the challenged action").
As a result, 202(a) standards have historically served a technology-forcing function, pushing
the market to develop and adopt innovative technologies that will better serve the public health
and welfare. In the 1970's and 1980's, for example, the EPA used its Section 202(a) authority to
facilitate uptake of a then-nascent technology: catalytic converters, now commonplace. Ill The
fact that, some forty-plus years later, the innovation has shifted to zero emissions engines does
not change the fundamental tenor of the legal analysis or EPA's core statutory responsibilities.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 13]
111 See "Timeline of Major Accomplishments in Transportation, Air Pollution, and Climate Change," U.S.
Enviro. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/timeline-
major-accomplishments- transportation-air (last visited June 15, 2023).
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Second, as the EPA also notes in its Proposed Rule, the IRA includes language reaffirming
the core holding of Massachusetts v. E.P.A. and the agency's subsequent scientific conclusions:
that the EPA is obligated to regulate GHGs as air pollutants under the CAA, and specifically to
regulate such emissions from mobile sources. 112 In the IRA, Congress appropriated funds for
states "to adopt and implement greenhouse gas and zero-emission standards for mobile sources
pursuant to §177 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7507)."113 The CAA cross-reference in this
IRA provision holds important implications. CAA §177 allows states, which are normally
preempted from setting their own motor vehicle emissions standards under the CAA, to adopt
California's standards (for which the EPA must waive pre-emption unless specific findings are
made). 114 So to expressly fund "greenhouse gas and zero emission" activities under §177
necessarily implies that these are the types of standards states would normally be preempted
from pursuing because the CAA reserves their regulation to EPA. The IRA, then, necessarily
implies that GHGs are regulable under the CAA. 115 Indeed, during consideration and passage of
the IRA, key drafters explicitly stated on the record their understanding that the IRA's provisions
statutorily affirmed the Supreme Court's Mass v. EPA decision. 116 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0621, p. 13]
112 See generally, Greg Dotson and Dustin J. Maghamfar, "THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF
2022: CLEAN AIR, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THE INFLATION REDUCTION ACT," 53 Enviro. L.
Rep. 10017, 10030 (2023), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/files-pdf/53.10017.pdf.
113 IRA, Pub. L. No. 117-169, §60105(g), 136 Stat. 1818 (2022).
114 See 42 U.S.C. §7507.
115 See Dotson and Maghamfar at 10030 ("If GHGs were not considered to be air pollutants or EPA could
not regulate GHGs from motor vehicles pursuant to the CAA, then § 177 would not apply to state GHG and
zero emission standards because such standards for motor vehicles would not be preempted by §209(a)").
116 See Lisa Friedman, "Democrats Designed the Climate Law to Be a Game Changer. Here's How," N.Y.
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/22/climate/epa-supreme-court-pollution.html (Aug. 22, 2022)
(quoting Senate Environmental and Public Works Chairman Tom Carper, a lead drafter, explaining that
"[t]he language, we think, makes pretty clear that greenhouse gases are pollutants under the Clean Air
Act"). See also Proposed Rule at 29233 (quoting House Energy and Commerce Chairman Frank Pallone
explaining that the IRA "reinforces the longstanding authority and responsibility of [EPA] to regulate
GHGs as air pollutants under the Clean Air act" and "the IRA clearly and deliberately instructs EPA to
use" this authority by "combining] economic incentives to reduce climate pollution with regulatory drivers
to spur greater reductions under EPA's CAA authorities"); 168 Cong. Rec. E868-02 (daily ed. Aug. 12,
2022) (statement of Rep. Pallone); 168 Cong. Re.
Organization: Growth Energy
And, more fundamentally, it will require manufacturers to primarily make EVs at the expense
of ICE vehicles—including those that can use higher blends of biofuels. Effectively picking one
greenhouse gas reduction technology to the exclusion of another is arbitrary and outside the
scope of EPA's authority under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act. It is also inconsistent with
Congress's directive in the 2007 EISA to establish and maintain a credit system for encouraging
minimum levels of biofuel use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 4]
B. There is No Rational Basis for the Disparate Treatment of EVs and Biofuels.
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EPA is by no means constrained to consider only emissions from the tailpipe in Section 202
of the Act. EPA itself has already concluded as much, explaining in response to a comment on a
prior tailpipe rule that:
EPA disagrees with Nissan that excluding upstream GHGs is legally required under section
202(a)(1). In this rulemaking, EPA is adopting standards under section 202(a)(1), which provides
EPA with broad discretion in setting emissions standards. This includes authority to structure the
emissions standards in a way that provides an incentive to promote advances in emissions control
technology. This discretion includes the adjustments to compliance values adopted in the final
rule, the multipliers we proposed, and other kinds of incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0580, p. 10]
75 Fed. Reg. at 25,437.
EPA's statutory analysis is correct. Section 202(a) broadly authorizes EPA to establish
"standards" applicable to harmful pollutants emitted from new motor vehicles. Despite the
colloquial framing of rules promulgated under Section 202 as "tailpipe rules," nothing about
Section 202 constrains the standards EPA may set to apply strictly standards that affect the
amount of a pollutant emitted from the tailpipe of a vehicle. In the past, EPA has used Section
202 to create a variety of types of standards and incentives related to non-tailpipe aspects of
motor vehicle, like air conditioning efficiency credits and off-cycle credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0580, p.10]
Indeed, EPA has already created a methodology for accounting for upstream emissions from
EVs; prior light-duty vehicle rules committed to begin accounting for upstream emissions above
a certain cap in future years. See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. 62624. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p.
10]
EPA provided the following example of how that emissions accounting would work for a
Nissan Leaf:
- A measured 2-cycle vehicle electricity consumption of 238 watt-hours/mile over the EPA
city and highway tests[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
- Adjusting this watt-hours/mile value upward to account for electricity losses during
electricity transmission (dividing 238 watt-hours/mile by 0.935 to account for grid/transmission
losses yields a value of 255 watt-hours/mile) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
- Multiplying the adjusted watt-hours/mile value by a 2030 EV/PHEV electricity upstream
GHG emissions rate of 0.534 grams/watt-hour at the power plant (255 watt-hours/mile
multiplied by 0.534 grams GHG/watt-hour yields 136 grams/mile) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0580, p. 10]
- Subtracting the upstream GHG emissions of a comparable midsize gasoline vehicle of 41
grams/mile to reflect a full net increase in upstream GHG emissions (136 grams/mile for the EV
minus 41 grams/mile for the gasoline vehicle yields a net increase and EV compliance value of
95 grams/mile). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
Id. at 82,822. While that methodology is a simplification of the upstream emissions to a
certain extent, it is an easily workable estimate for the upstream emissions from EVs. EPA could
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and should, at a minimum, use that approach or a similar one to account for EV emissions for
2027 and later years in this rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
Yet, EPA backed away from its promise to account for upstream emissions in the 2020 rule,
and it has now proposed to make the continued lack of any such accounting "permanent." 88
Fed. Reg. at 29,252. EPA articulated two purported reasons for doing so: (1) that its regulations
have "functioned as intended" without any upstream accounting by "encouraging the continued
development and introduction of electric vehicle technology," and (2) that upstream emissions
are "addressed by separate stationary source programs." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p.
10]
Neither of those justifications is a rational reason to continue deliberately underestimating the
emissions from EVs. To begin with, while it is true that systematic underestimates of emissions
incentivize EV development, this ignores the fact that they disincentivize development in other
promising GHG-reduction technologies like biofuels. By incentivizing one technology to the
exclusion of others, EPA is reducing an opportunity to develop different technologies that will be
appropriate for more applications across the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
And the fact that upstream emissions are addressed by stationary source permitting programs
is no justification at all. Those programs help reduce emissions but do not eliminate them—
EPA's rule still fails to estimate the true lifecycle emissions from EVs even when considering
that power plants must get Title V, PSD, and NSPS permits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580,
p. 10]
EPA also points out that, if it estimated upstream emissions from EVs, "it would appear
appropriate to do so for all vehicles, including gasoline-fueled vehicles." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,252.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
That's right—EPA should compare apples to apples. But that additional burden of estimating
another set of upstream emissions is no reason not to do it. By comparing the lifecycle emissions
of EVs and the lifecycle emissions of ICE vehicles, EPA could much better align the incentives
provided by its tailpipe rules with the real world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
Moreover, whether EPA has authority to require what amounts to a mandate to shift mainly to
EVs across the country presents a "major question." See West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587,
2595 (2022). And Section 202 of the Clean Air Act does not provide the necessary "clear
congressional authorization" for a regulation with such a fundamental economic and practical
impact on U.S. citizen's lives. Section 202 gives EPA authority to set "standards" that relate to
particular air pollutants, not the authority to pick an entire set of vehicles over another. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7521(a). But the latter is exactly what EPA is proposing. The proposal's very stringent
standard, combined with EPA's decision to both underestimate the emissions from BEVs and
overestimate the emissions from biofuels, means that the only way for auto manufacturers to
comply is to shift rapidly towards producing primarily EVs. If finalized in its current form, the
proposal would exceed EPA's Section 202 authority under West Virginia. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0580, pp. 14-15]
EPA's proposal also conflicts with Congress's instructions to incentivize greater biofuel use
in the 2007 EISA. That statute, which established the Renewable Fuel Standard ("RFS")
program, requires refiners and importers of petroleum fuels to blend increasing percentages of
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biofuels into their products. See Clean Air Act §21 l(o), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o). So, not only does
Section 202 not give any indication that Congress delegated EPA authority to effectively
mandate EV usage, Section 21 l(o) demonstrates that Congress spoke clearly to the contrary.
EPA cannot ignore Congress's instructions in one part of the Clean Air Act to better fit its policy
preferences under another part. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 14-15]
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
The "major questions doctrine" holds that Congress must "speak clearly when authorizing an
agency to exercise [such] powers" of "vast economic and political significance."4 As EPA is
aware, this doctrine applies in the context of environmental regulation. Last year, in West
Virginia v. EPA, the Supreme Court relied on the major questions doctrine in holding that the
EPA exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the Clean Power Plan. That regulation sought to
impose caps on GHG emissions by requiring utilities and other providers to shift electricity
production from coal-fired power plants to natural gas and then to renewable energy in place of
imposing source- specific requirements reflective of the application of state-of-the-art emission
reduction technologies.5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 3]
4 Nat'l Fed. Of Indep. Bus. v. Dep't of Labor, 595 U.S., slip op. at 6 (Jan 13, 2022); see also Ala. Assoc.
of Realtors v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021); Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014); U.S. Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 419-21 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (explaining provenance of "major rules
doctrine").
5 West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. (2022).
As noted by the Court, EPA "announced] what the market share of coal, natural gas, wind,
and solar must be, and then require[d] plants to reduce operations or subsidize their competitors
to get there."6 EPA's attempt to devise GHG emissions caps based on a generation-shifting
approach would have had major economic and political significance impacting vast swaths of
American life and substantially restructuring the American energy market; however, EPA's
purported authority was only based on a "vague statutory grant" within Section 111(d) of the
Clean Air Act—far from the "clear authorization required by [Supreme Court] precedents."?
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 3]
6 Id., slip op. at 33, n.4.
7 Id., slip op. at 24. EPA's Proposed Rule here presents an analogous, if not identical, situation. Mandating
a shift from ICE to PEV will reshape the American automotive market with profound collateral effects,
making clear that EPA is encroaching upon an issue of "vast economic and political significance." As
further discussed herein, the direct compliance costs are enormous—EPA estimates that the cost of vehicle
technology (not including the vehicle or battery tax credits) would be approximately $ 180 billion-$280
billion respectively, in addition to over $7 billion in electric vehicle supply equipment ("ESVE") costs
through 2055, and these figures do not include the complete transformation of the electric power sector.8
The Proposed Rule will go above and beyond natural market forces to change what consumers are able to
purchase by requiring the production of a different product. The Proposed Rule undoubtedly forces OEMs
to meet production lead times that would not exist but for EPA's new PEV mandate.
8 Proposed Rule at 29,199.
As with the Clean Power Plan, EPA lacks Congressional authorization in the Clean Air Act to
impose a manufacturing shifting standard to a preferred powertrain and effectively order
regulated parties to phase out combustion engine technologies. EPA's standard-setting tools are
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limited to those which Congress provided in Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act. Here, EPA is
only authorized to set "standards" for "emission[s]" from "any class or classes of new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which . . . cause, or contribute to," potentially harmful air
pollution. EPA has elected to focus solely on tailpipe emissions and not the entire lifecycle
analysis. But PEVs do not have tailpipe emissions of carbon dioxide, the pollutant of concern
here, so the operation of such vehicles alone cannot "cause, or contribute to," air pollution within
the constructs of a tailpipe emissions regulation, especially when EPA does not require vehicle
manufactures to account for the upstream emissions from PEVs in their compliance calculations.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 4-5]
Far from "clear congressional authorization," Section 202(a) provides EPA no authority to set
standards that go above and beyond that which could be achieved by improvements to ICE
vehicles alone such that OEMs must completely cease to produce the underlying technology
governed at the time the Clean Air Act was adopted and amended. Nor does it permit EPA to
establish a fleet averaging and credit trading program as a mechanism to limit ICE sales.9
Notably, Congress instituted a clean fuel vehicles program with reference to "clean alternative
fuel" vehicles, which includes BEVs, in its 1990 updates to the Clean Air Act. In doing so,
Congress explicitly distinguished such vehicles from "conventional gasoline-fueled or diesel-
fueled vehicles of the same category and model year," dispelling the notion that BEVs and ICE
vehicles can be lumped together to set standards that will enable the former to eventually
displace the latter. 10 EPA does not—and cannot—explain how such authority can be read to
regulate PEVs and ICE vehicles under a common standard. It is no surprise then that up until the
current Administration, EPA has never claimed the authority to mandate even partial
electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 4-5]
9 See supra, II.B.
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 7581, 7582(b); see also § 7585(a) (defining NOx and non-methane hydrocarbon emission
standards for heavy-duty clean-fuel vehicles as a percentage of conventional heavy-duty vehicles).
Congress clarified that it, not EPA, must make the important policy decisions affecting if,
when, and how the American automotive industry will transition from ICE vehicles to BEVs. In
the 116th Congress, for example, Congress introduced 44 bills seeking to reduce petroleum-
based fuel consumption and GHG emissions from the transportation sector through customer
rebates, vehicle and fuel producer incentives, local funding, development of standards, and
research and development. But none went so far as to propose requiring adoption, let alone mass
adoption of heavy duty PEVs through the phase-out of ICE vehicles. 11 In fact, Congress rejected
bills that would have banned the sale of new LD ICE vehicles by 2040,12 and it has consistently
disapproved of EPA's efforts to hamstring the automotive sector with more stringent air
pollution standards than are feasible. 13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 4-5]
11 "Alternative Fuel and Vehicles: Legislative Proposals," Congressional Research Service (July 28, 2021).
12 See Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2019, H.R. 2764, 116th Cong. (2019); Zero-Emission Vehicles Act
of 2018, S. 3664, 115th Cong. (2018); see also 116 Cong. Rec. 19238-40 (1970) (proposed amendment to
Title II that would have banned ICE vehicles by 1978).
13 See, e.g., S. J. Res. 11, 118th Cong. (2023) (Although passed only by the Senate thus far, the joint
resolution calls for disapproval of the rule submitted by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency relating to "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle
Standards," 88 Fed. Reg. 4296 (January 24, 2023).).
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It should be no surprise then in the wake of the Proposed Rule, members of Congress have
requested that the Agency rescind the proposals, asserting they "effectively mandate a costly
transition to electric cars and trucks in the absence of congressional direction." 14 That Congress
intended for it, not EPA, to direct these policy decisions is made all the more clear by the
passage of the IRA and BIL whereby Congress identified the policy levers it deemed
appropriate. Congress could have, but did not, delegate the authority to (or otherwise direct) EPA
to establish a fleet- wide credit trading regime to further drive PEV development and rapid
adoption. Instead, the Proposed Rule stands in direct contrast to other legislation, such as the
Renewable Fuel Standard Program, whereby Congress mandated that "gasoline sold or
introduced into commerce in the United States" must contain a year-over-year increasing share
of renewable fuelsl5 and, in 2022, must include tens of billions of gallons of renewable fuel.16
An EPA-mandated shift in transportation technology from vehicles that can operate on
increasing volumes of renewable fuel to PEVs does not square with such requirements.
Consequently, Congress, not EPA, should determine how to regulate electrification of
transportation. 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 4-5]
14 Letter from Senator Shelley Capito, et al. to Administrator Michael S. Regan, EPA (May 25, 2023); see
also Senate Resolution S.J. Res. 11, 118th Congress (April 26, 2026) (Although related to heavy duty
vehicles ("HDVs"), Congress has expressed its disapproval of EPA's overreach in this space. For example,
in April of this year both houses of Congress passed a Congressional Review Act resolution to rescind
EPA's December 2022 heavy duty NOx standards, sending a strong signal that Congress views EPA's
efforts in this space as unnecessary, infeasible, and uniformed in light of economic and energy security
concerns); House Resolution H2523 (May 23, 2023); see also Congressional Record, H2523 (May 23,
2023) at 1444, Statement from Mr. Walberg (R-MI) ("From tailpipe emissions regulations that will force
people to buy expensive and less practical EVs to new rules on power plants that will threaten the
reliability of our electric grid. It seems like the EPA hasn't even thought about the economic and energy
security of our constituents.").
15 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i).
16 Id., § 7545(o)(2)(B); 87 Fed. Reg. 39,600 (July 1, 2022).
17 See "Grassley-Cornyn Bill Pulls Plug on Latest Biden Boon for EVs," (May 18, 2023),
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-cornyn-bill-pulls-plug-on-latest-biden-boon-
for-evs (discussing proposed legislation entitled "No Fuel Credits for Batteries Act" introduced to
"preserve the integrity of the Renewable Fuels Standard" in light of EPA's proposed E-RINS rule").
b. EPA Lacks Statutory Authority to Set Fleetwide Average Emission Standards, and In All
Events May Not Average In Vehicles that Do Not Emit the Relevant Pollutant.
EPA lacks statutory authority under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act to set fleetwide
emission standards, and even if it had such authority, it could not lawfully use it to force
electrification by including vehicles that have no tailpipe emissions in the fleetwide average
standard for ICE vehicles. The Proposed Rule results in fleetwide standards that cannot be met
by ICE vehicles alone; however, under the Clean Air Act, EPA may only set individual vehicle-
level emission standards. Such standards must be for "emission[s]" from "any class or classes of
new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which . . . cause, or contribute to," potentially
harmful air pollution. 18 The plain language of this provision authorizes EPA to set standards for
classes of individual vehicles or engines that emit air pollutants. Because PEVs do not directly
"cause, or contribute to," air pollution individually within the construct of a tailpipe emissions
standard, any standard applicable to "any class or classes" of vehicles cannot include PEVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 6]
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18 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
PEVs are simply not the "technology" contemplated by Congress here. Instead, Congress
enabled EPA to increase emission standard stringency through cleaner fuels and improved
emissions-related systems to be incorporated into ICE vehicles such as advances in fuel
injection, exhaust gas combustion management, and advances catalysts to neutralize pollutants of
concern. 19 By factoring in PEV performance as a part of its averaging scheme, EPA is ignoring
the technological feasibility of emissions-related systems and simply requiring the production of
fewer ICE vehicles. The Proposed Rule does not consider advances to ICE technologies when
setting the standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 6]
19 For example, Section 202(m) requires the monitoring of "emission-related systems" such as the
"catalytic converter and oxygen sensor." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(m)(l).
And even for criteria pollutants emitted from ICE vehicles, the Clean Air Act says nothing
about averaging across fleets or banking and trading credits across different model years,
different vehicle classes, and OEMs. While EPA has previously adopted fleetwide averaging, it
has also acknowledged that "Congress did not specifically contemplate an averaging program
when it enacted the Clean Air Act."20 And "[jjust as the statute does not explicitly address
EPA's authority to allow averaging, it does not address the Agency's authority to permit banking
and trading."21 By definition, then, the Act does not address—let alone clearly authorize—the
use of averaging, banking, and trading in a manner that mandates electrification of the national
vehicle fleet of motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p.
6]
20 48 Fed. Reg. 33,456, 33,458 (July 21, 1983).
21 54 Fed. Reg. 22,652, 22,665 (May 25, 1989); see 55 Fed. Reg. 30,584, 30,593 (July 26, 1990) (same).
The structure of the Clean Air Act and its regulatory provisions for standard setting,
certification, compliance enforcement, warranties, and penalties also directly conflict with a
fleet-wide averaging regulatory regime. Notably, under Section 202(a), EPA "shall test, or
require to be tested in such manner as [it] deems appropriate, any new motor vehicle or new
motor vehicle engine submitted by a manufacturer" and issue a certificate of conformity "if such
vehicle or engine" complies with the standards.22 And EPA must "test any emission control
system incorporated in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine ... to determine whether such a
system enables such vehicle or engine to conform to the standards required to be prescribe under
[Section 202(b)] of the Act.23 Section 202(b)(3) further authorizes EPA to grant waivers from
certain nitrogen-oxide emission standards-which, again, are standards "under" Section 202(a),
for no "more than 5 percent of [a] manufacturer's production or more than fifty thousand
vehicles or engines, whichever is greater."24 This provision would be nonsensical under a
fleetwide-averaging regime where, if applied, an OEM could essentially give itself a waiver for
large swaths of its fleet by electrifying certain product lines. Taken together, the Clean Air Act
regulatory framework contemplates EPA regulating vehicles on an individual basis according to
the powertrain of those vehicles. But this cannot be accomplished if there is not a clear emission
standard applicable to a single vehicle at the start of a model year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0579, pp. 6-7]
22 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1).
23 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(2).
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24 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(3).
Organization: Institute for Energy Research (IER)
This proposed rule on tailpipe emissions standards from the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) is a massive overreach, using a novel application of EPA motor vehicle authorities in an
attempt to force a transition in the motor vehicles market to products that align with the
ideological preferences of the Biden administration. This rule is a de facto electric vehicle
mandate. Congress has not given EPA the authority to require the purchase or production of
certain types of motor vehicles or outlaw the purchase or production of other types of vehicles.
Congress has not given EPA the authority to require the purchase or production of electric
vehicles. EPA's attempt to infer such power is contrary to longstanding administrative practice
and contrary to recent Supreme Court precedent. Thus this rulemaking must be withdrawn and
modified to fit within the motor vehicle regulatory authority granted by Congress. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0673, pp. 1-2]
EPA openly states that the intent of this rulemaking is to force a transition to electric vehicles
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0673, pp. 1-2]
In this rulemaking and press announcements surrounding it, EPA repeatedly makes clear that
the intent of this rulemaking is to transition the motor vehicles market to electric vehicles,
pollution reduction is merely an aside. For example, the first sentence of EPA's press release
announcing the rulemaking states "Today, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
announced new proposed federal vehicle emissions standards that will accelerate the ongoing
transition to a clean vehicles future." The rulemaking itself extensively focuses on trends in
electric vehicle manufacturing and announced plans from automakers and state governments
regarding electric vehicles. But EPA's mandate from Congress is to reduce criteria pollutants
from vehicles, not to pick and choose what type of vehicles can be sold. EPA cites an executive
order from the Biden administration as impetus for this de facto electric vehicle mandate, but an
executive order does not create new authority. Congress never intended the Clean Air Act motor
vehicle regulations to be used to mandate or ban certain classes of product, it was always
intended and has always been interpreted to give EPA the power to reduce pollution from those
classes products. Yet EPA openly states that this rulemaking is meant to force a transition to
electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0673, pp. 1-2]
1 https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris-administration-proposes-strongest-ever-pollution-
standards-cars-and
EPA's statutory authority is to control emissions of vehicles, not to require the manufacture
and sale of entirely different vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0673, pp. 1-2]
Congress has not directed EPA to force the adoption of electric vehicles, EPA is claiming this
mandate unilaterally. The Clean Air Act directs EPA to reduce pollutant emissions from vehicles
themselves, by for example requiring emissions control devices like catalytic converters. Electric
vehicles are entirely separate products, they are not an emissions control device for internal
combustion powered vehicles. EPA is thus for the first time seeking to mandate substitution of a
different product in order to comply with its tailpipe emissions standards. This is a novel
application of existing authority, and is frankly illegal. This illegality is made clear by an
alternative scenario where EPA mandates the use of mass transit rather than individual motor
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vehicles. This would certainly reduce emissions from motor vehicles, but would be transparently
beyond EPA's regulatory authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0673, pp. 1-2]
There is no authority to eliminate internal combustion engines or to require the sale of electric
vehicles in the plain language of the Clean Air Act. That EPA is now claiming such authority
raises a major question of whether Congress has in fact given EPA such authority. Without a
clear statement from Congress, this claim of new authority cannot be assumed by administrative
fiat. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0673, pp. 1-2]
EPA is attempting to hide its illegal electric vehicles mandate behind a "fleetwide" average
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0673, pp. 2-3]
EPA is setting fleetwide average standards for vehicles rather than setting individual
standards for specific classes of vehicles as a means of hiding its de facto electric vehicle
mandate. While these two actions may appear indistinguishable in many applications, the
distinctness is put on clear display by the EPA's proposed rulemaking here. Setting fleetwide
average standards at reasonable levels allows for the inclusion of new emissions control
technologies in new vehicles. This has similar effect to setting a reasonable emissions standard
for each specific class of vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0673, pp. 2-3]
However, setting a fleetwide average at an unreasonably low level, as this rulemaking does,
disguises that there is no means of compliance through new control technologies, the only means
of compliance is transitioning to a different product. If EPA set the same unreasonably low
standard for a given class of vehicles, it would effectively outlaw that class of vehicles. If EPA
were to directly say that a class of vehicles was illegal and require that an alternative replacement
must be purchased, that would be clearly acknowledged as beyond EPA's authority. Congress
has given EPA no such power. But using the "fleetwide" average set at an unreasonably low rate,
EPA can pretend it is not outlawing the manufacture or sale of any class of products, while it is
effectively requiring carmakers to produce and sell an alternative product (electric vehicles) as
that is the only way to comply with the unreasonable low standard. But hiding behind a
"fleetwide" average to attempt to disguise this kind of impermissible mandate does not suddenly
give EPA the power to impose such a mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0673, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Mario Loyola
B. Battery Electric Vehicles Do Not Belong to Any Class of Vehicle Subject to Regulation
under Title II of the CAA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
EPA is explicit about its purpose in the Proposed Rule: "Our analysis projects that for the
industry overall, 65 percent of new vehicles in MY 2032 would be BEVs,"7 referring to fully
electrical vehicles.8 That compares to less than six percent of new vehicle registrations for fully
electric vehicles last year.9 As EPA says in the Proposed Rule: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0689, pp. 3-6]
7 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,342.
8 EPA distinguishes between Batery Electric Vehicles ("BEVs"), which are fully electric, and other sorts of
electric vehicles, such as hybrids.
9 Ana Faguy, "Planned EPA Rules Could Make 67% of New U.S. Cars Electric by 2032," Forbes, April
12, 2023.
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Among the range of technologies that have been demonstrated over the past decade,
electrification technologies have seen particularly rapid development and lower costs, and as a
result the number of PEVs projected across all the policy alternatives considered here is much
higher than in any of EPA's prior rulemaking analyses. In particular, BEVs have zero tailpipe
emissions and so are capable of supporting rates of annual stringency increases that are much
greater than were typical in earlier rulemakings. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
10 88 Fed. Reg. at 29341
The Proposed Rule is designed to accomplish its mission by imposing emissions standards on
new motor vehicles so strict that no vehicle powered by an internal combustion engine would be
able to comply with them. Hence, if the Proposed Rule applied only to vehicles with emissions
subject to regulation under the CAA, the rule would not satisfy statutory requirements, which
include feasibility and reasonable cost-of-compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
EPA gets around this by what amounts to a clever accounting trick. It defines the "classes" of
vehicles subject to Title II as including EVs, even though, according to EPA, they have zero
emissions and should therefore be excluded from regulation under the CAA entirely. EPA then
sets "emission standards" that reflect not its estimate of how much time manufacturers of
regulated vehicles would need to develop and adopt any emissions-control technology on the
vehicles subject to regulation—the determination required by Section 202 of the CAA—but
rather only its estimate of the average emissions from vehicles of various sizes that would result
from its guestimate of the extent to which EVs will displace combustion engine vehicles during
the MYs in question. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
Because Title II of the CAA provides no guidance on how the Administrator is to define the
"class or classes" of vehicles subject to Section 202(a)(1), the phrase "any class or classes of new
motor vehicles" must be given its natural, plain meaning. While the Administrator doubtless has
wide latitude to define the classes subject to regulation under Section 202(a)(1), and no federal
court has ruled on this precise question, the phrase "class or classes of new motor vehicles"
cannot mean whatever the Administrator wants it to mean. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp.
3-6]
The phrase could not, for example, include both electric scooters and gasoline-powered cars,
even though both are "motor vehicles" under the Clean Air Act. 11 The structure of Title II
clearly precludes that possibility. Section 202(a)(2) provides that any standard issued under
Section 201(a) can only take effect after "such period as the Administrator finds necessary to
permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate
consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." Common sense dictates that this
could not be read as authorizing EPA to force car manufacturers to produce electric scooters
instead of cars in order to comply with emissions standards under Title II. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
11 The CAA defines "motor vehicle" as "any self-propelled vehicle designed for transporting persons or
property on a street or highway." Section 216, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7550.
Section 202(a)(1) obviously contemplates that a "class or classes of new motor vehicles" will
share a common configuration, such that "the requisite technology" can be developed and
applied to all vehicles of a future MY of that vehicle class. In that sense, "class or classes of new
motor vehicles" is akin to the source categories under the New Source Performance Standards
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program of Section 111. Clearly, EPA could not define Portland Cement Manufacturing to
include artisanal pottery for the purpose of imposing the latter's emissions rates on the former.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
One further observation bears mentioning in this connection. Section 202(a) authorizes EPA
to regulate emissions "from any class or classes of new motor vehicles." EPA has made no effort
to study the emissions from battery EVs, because, as it explains in the Proposed Rule, "BEVs
have zero tailpipe emissions." But Section 202 is not limited to "tailpipe emissions." Its purview
is much broader, referring to emissions "from" new motor vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0689, pp. 3-6]
That the word "from" is susceptible of a broader meaning becomes clear when one considers
that in the Proposed Rule, EPA continues the practice, introduced in the 2014 "Tier 3" final rule,
of "considering the vehicle and its fuel as an integrated system." 12 As the Proposed Rule
explains, "The Tier 3 standards achieved reductions of up to 80 percent in tailpipe criteria
pollutant emissions by treating the engine and fuel as an integrated system and requiring cleaner
fuel as well as improved catalytic emissions control systems "13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0689, pp. 3-6]
12 Control of Air Pollution From Motor Vehicles: Tier 3 Motor Vehicle Emission and Fuel Standards",79
Fed. Reg. 23414, 23416 (April 28, 2014).
13 88 Fed. Reg. at 29188.
EPA's practice of treating "the engine and fuel as an integrated system" is fully in keeping
with the general scope of Section 202(a). There is no reason, and no reasonable basis, for EPA
not to follow this same practice with EVs that EPA insists on including EVs in its definition of
"classes" of new motor vehicles subject to Title II. EVs are not perpetual motion machines. Like
all other motor vehicles, they use fuel, namely the fuel needed to produce the electricity needed
to charge them. And that fuel—only a small fraction of which is renewable—produces
significant emissions, including carbon emissions. The difference between EVs and combustion
engine vehicles is not that EVs have zero emissions, but rather that their emissions occur
elsewhere than at the tailpipe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
This is particularly important considering the massive increases in electrical grid capacity that
would be required by a transition to widespread EV use. There is a limit to how much renewable
energy can be put on a grid while still maintaining grid reliability, and under current technology
the limit appears to be quite low: At 30 percent renewable, the California grid is beset by a
massive excess of solar electricity in the middle of the day and is often on the verge of blackouts
by evening, particularly in summer months. 14 Hence, in the near term, the Proposed Rule will
result in a massive increase in the need for dispatchable power, which (given the long
construction and permitting lead-times of nuclear power) can only come from coal and natural
gas. That puts the Proposed Rule on a collision course with the EPA's proposed new power plant
rule, 15 which will require many coal and natural gas plants to cease operations at the same time
as the Proposed Rule on vehicle emissions will require many more such plants to be built. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
14 Mario Loyola, "Unleashing America's Energy Abundance Permitting Reform Is Vital for Affordable
Clean Energy," Competitive Enterprise Institute, September 27, 2022.
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15 New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean
Energy Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 33240 (May 23, 2023).
EPA's failure to recognize that power plant emissions associated with EVs should be
considered "emissions from" such vehicles is understandable, given that Title II of the CAA was
clearly not designed with EVs in mind. That only highlights the absurdity of including them in
the same "classes of new motor vehicles" as combustion engine vehicles subject to regulation
under Title II. It also highlights the great political significance of the choices that EPA is taking
upon itself to make, on the basis of sweeping powers that it claims to have found in a long-extant
provision of the Clean Air Act that explicitly delegates no such power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0689, pp. 3-6]
Organization: National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) et al.
The Proposed Rule also exceeds the scope of the Agency's statutory authority, which does not
include the authority to set greenhouse gas emission standards that effectively mandate EVs.
Indeed, Congress directly precluded EPA from using Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act to
phase out internal combustion vehicles. The Supreme Court has also made clear in recent
decisions that an agency must have clear congressional authorization in order to exercise
significant powers.2 The Agency's attempt to shift the U.S. transportation fleet to EVs is
analogous to the shift in energy policy that EPA directed in the Clean Power Plan, which was
rejected by the Supreme Court in West Virginia v. EPA. The Agency also projects its rule will
result in enormous compliance costs, indicating that the Proposal is economically significant and
therefore likely to fall within the Supreme Court's "major question" doctrine. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0628, p. 2]
2 See Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021); West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct.
2587, 2609 (2022).
Organization: National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA)
I. EPA has a Statutory Mandate to Develop Strong Rules to Reduce Climate Pollution from
Light and Medium-Duty Vehicles.
The Clean Air Act (CAA) explicitly calls on EPA to promulgate emission standards for motor
vehicles that "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare." 1. As held by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts vs. EPA,
greenhouse gases (GHGs) qualify as air pollutants that could endanger public welfare under §
202(a)(1), and EPA has statutory authority to regulate carbon dioxide and other GHG emissions
from sources like light and medium-duty vehicles.2 Subsequently, EPA in their 2009
endangerment finding held that GHG emissions from motor vehicles, including LDVs and
MDVs, "contribute to the total greenhouse gas air pollution, and thus to the climate change
problem, which is reasonably anticipated to endanger public health and welfare."3 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0607, pp. 1-2]
142 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
2 See generally, 549 U.S. 497, 531 (2007).
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3 74 Fed. Reg. at 66499.
EPA thus has an affirmative duty to develop GHG standards for light and medium-duty
vehicles that reflect the "greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the application
of technology which the Administrator determines will be available for the model year to which
such standards apply."4 While the CAA provides some room for considerations of cost, energy,
and safety,5 "it must place primary importance on achieving the greatest degree of emissions
reduction."6 We strongly agree with EPA's assessment that the greatest degree of emission
reductions can be achieved through EPA acting on its statutory authority to rely on a variety of
technologies to reduce LDV and MDV GHG pollution. We believe these technologies should
include zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) technologies like battery electric vehicles (EVs), as well as
improvements to combustion engine technologies.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0607, pp. 1-2]
4 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i).
5 Id.
6 See Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195, at 200 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
7 See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29232-33.
We urge EPA to finalize these LDV and MDV regulations quickly and to strengthen this
proposal to achieve the greatest degree of reductions that protect public health and welfare.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0607, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
IV. Conclusion
Given the urgency of the climate crisis, the impacts of pollution from transportation on air
quality and public health, anticipated growth of the transportation sector, and the rapid growth in
ZEV adoption, it is necessary and appropriate for EPA to exercise its authority in CAA Section
202(a) to establish new and more stringent GHG and criteria pollutant and emissions standards
for MYs 2027 and later LDVs and MDVs. NESCAUM and the OTC urge EPA to finalize a rule
with the most stringent standards feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 12]
Organization: Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF)
Analysis
I. The Proposed Tailpipe Rule violates the major questions doctrine.
A. The major questions doctrine prevents executive agencies from issuing rules with
"vast political and economic consequences" without clear congressional authorization.
Courts have long applied clear statement rules to protect the freedom provided by the
Constitution's structure and protect foundational constitutional guarantees. 5 As Chief Justice
Marshall explained, "the laws of the United States ought not, if it be avoidable, so to be
construed as to infract the ... general doctrines of national law."6 The major questions doctrine is
one such clear statement rule. It is grounded in the Constitution's exclusive delegation of
legislative power to Congress and protects against other branches from claiming unheralded
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subdelegations of that power. In this way, the doctrine presumes that Congress did not seek to
transgress the Constitution's nondelegation limits through vague, open-ended statutory text. In
other words, the major questions doctrine, like the nondelegation doctrine, "ensures that the
national government's power to make the laws that govern us remains where Article I of the
Constitution says it belongs— with the people's elected representatives."? [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0680, pp.3-6]
5 See West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2616 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
6 Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 43 (1801).
7 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep't of Lab., 142 S. Ct. 661, 668 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). See
also id. at 669-70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("Whichever the doctrine, the point is the same[:] Both serve to
prevent 'government by bureaucracy supplanting government by the people.'").
The doctrine thus is grounded in "separation of powers principles,"8 and requires "Congress
to speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast economic and political
significance "9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 3-6]
8 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609.
9 Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The principle is not new. As Justice Gorsuch recently explained, "[s]ome version of [the
major questions doctrine] can be traced to at least 1897," when the Supreme Court in ICC v.
Cincinnati denied the agency's "vast and comprehensive" claim of authority absent a clear
delegation in the statutory text. 10 In ICC, the Court found that claims of delegations of
legislative power to "any administrative body is not to be presumed or implied from any doubtful
and uncertain language." 11 And this principle has persisted, in some form or another, in state
and federal courts throughout the last 125 years. 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 3-6]
10 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2619 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing ICC v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R.
Co., 167 U.S. 479, 499 (1897)).
11 Id.
12 Louis Capozzi, The Past and Future of the Major Questions Doctrine, 84 Ohio St. L. J., vol. 84, no. 2,
191 (2023) (explaining the major questions doctrine's history in state and federal courts to prevent agencies
from expanding their regulatory reach without a clear statement from respective legislative branches).
While the doctrine's principle is not new, it has become more prominent over the last few
decades as the primary constitutional check against executive lawmaking. This is because the
federal government today is characterized by "presidential administration," as famously
described by then-professor Elena Kagan.13 Because of the relative ease of regulating compared
to legislating, the President—and not Congress—now leads "in setting the direction and
influencing the outcome of' administrative policy. 14 Rather than go through proper
constitutional procedures and persuade lawmakers to enact laws, contemporary presidents bypass
the Constitution's checks and balances and chart a unilateral path by directing agencies to adopt
expansive interpretations of long-extant statutes. 15 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 3-6]
13 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2248 (2001) (describing how
"presidential control of administration ... expanded dramatically during the Clinton years").
14 Id. at 2246.
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15 To be sure, the President has the authority, indeed the duty, to make sure the laws are "faithfully
executed." See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 498 (2010).
But that does not mean the executive branch may transgress the Constitution's Separation of Powers
through the laws' execution.
To curb the worst excesses of executive lawmaking inherent to "presidential administration,"
the Supreme Court has embraced the major questions doctrine. For example, the case that
ushered in the resurgence of the doctrine, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., involved
a challenge to one of the first examples of "presidential administration": a sweeping tobacco
regulation ordered by President Clinton in the late 1990s. 16 And the trend has continued. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has applied the major questions doctrine mainly when presidents compelled
agencies to exercise novel and capacious authority. 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 3-6]
16 Compare 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (reviewing tobacco regulation under major questions framework),
with Kagan, 114 Harv. L. Rev. at 2282-83 (using same tobacco regulation as exemplar of presidential
administration).
17 See, e.g., Biden v. Nebraska, No. 22-506, 2023 WL 4277210 (U.S. June 30, 2023); Nat'l Fed'n of
Indep. Bus., 142 S. Ct. 661 (reviewing agency's vaccine mandate ordered by the president); Alabama Ass'n
of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. 2485 (reviewing agency's eviction moratorium requested by the president).
This executive branch overreach is nowhere more pronounced than in environmental
regulation. For years, presidents have directed EPA and similar agencies to expand their power
and "update" laws to fit modern environmental problems—most prominently through the Clean
Air Act. But the Court has been unwilling "to stand on the dock and wave goodbye as EPA
embarks on [] multiyear voyage[s] of discovery" under the Act. 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0680, pp. 3-6]
18 Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 328 (2014).
Most recently, the Court applied the major questions doctrine to the EPA's overreach in West
Virginia. After failing to persuade Congress to enact a bill addressing climate change, President
Obama directed EPA to use the Clean Air Act to regulate powerplants and require them to
"shift" from using traditional forms of energy, such as coal and natural gas, to "clean energy"
such as wind and solar. 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 3-6]
19 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2602-03.
The Court held EPA did not have this power. In doing so, the Court explained there are
"extraordinary cases" where "both separation of powers principles and a practical understanding
of legislative intent" should make courts hesitant to "read into ambiguous statutory text the
delegation claimed to be lurking there."20 "To convince" the Court "otherwise, something more
than a merely plausible textual basis for the agency action is necessary." Id. Instead, under the
major questions doctrine, an agency "must point to clear congressional authorization for the
power it claims." Id. EPA flunked the test. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0680, pp. 3-6]
20 Id. at 2609 (citing Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 324).
Organization: POET, LLC
Under EPA's own justification for the Proposed Rule, bioethanol is an essential strategy that
must be recognized and given due credit under the GHG standards. EPA justifies the proposal
based on (i) GHG emission reduction benefits, (ii) manufacturer cost and consumer cost, (iii)
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energy security, (iv) "criteria" and toxic air pollutant reductions, and (v) environmental justice.7
EPA inadequately addresses each of these key factors because EPA fails to consider the benefits
of bioethanol for each. By taking this narrow approach that effectively pushes biofuels out of the
market, EPA undermines its own criteria for undertaking the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 5-6]
7 See e.g., 88 Fed. Reg. at 29347.
The Proposed Rule's analytical gaps regarding the failure to credit real-world biogenic
lifecycle emission benefits and BEV feasibility call into question the legality of the Proposed
Rule as currently structured. As EPA knows, courts will invalidate rules if the agency has
"entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem" or "offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency."8 Additionally, the United States
Supreme Court in West Virginia v. EPA faulted EPA for exercising Clean Air Act authority to
"substantially restructure the American energy market" in a way that "Congress had
conspicuously and repeatedly declined to enact itself "9 By pressing for the extraordinarily rapid
deployment of light-duty BEVs without thoroughly evaluating the lifecycle drawbacks of BEVs
and BEV feasibility, supply chain and infrastructure challenges, and by failing to credit the
lifecycle benefits of biofuels, the Proposed Rule is similarly deficient. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, pp. 5-6]
8 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
9 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2610 (2022) (quotation omitted). Similarly, under the "major questions" doctrine,
agencies may not construe a statute to authorize them to exercise powers of "vast economic and political
significance" unless the statute does so in clear terms. Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485,
2489 (2021) (quoting Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 324 (2014)).
If EPA adds incentives for the real-world GHG benefits of renewable liquid fuels, EPA's rule
would build on historical carbon-reducing policies and help ensure the success of its light- duty
GHG emission reduction program. EPA's vehicle GHG program would not be, as the West
Virginia Court put it, an impermissible "transformative expansion of' the agency's "regulatory
authority." 10 Instead, if EPA revises its proposed approach so as to credit bioethanol's real-
world GHG emission reductions, EPA would have more well-considered, legally durable,
flexible, cost-effective, and successful regulations to reduce GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, p. 6]
10 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2595.
B. EPA Has the Authority to Set GHG Emissions Standards Based on Lifecycle GHG
Emissions Reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 11-12]
EPA has broad authority under Clean Air Action § 202 to set vehicle emissions standards that
extends beyond tailpipe emissions reductions to other emissions in the fuel and vehicle
manufacturing lifecycle. Clean Air Act § 202(a) requires EPA to set vehicle emissions standards
for any air pollutant the Administrator determines may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare. EPA may regulate emissions of such a pollutant "from any class or
classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines."30 The statute does not expressly
limit EPA to regulating emissions only from vehicle tailpipes or the engines themselves. Instead,
it is broadly worded to include emissions of any air pollutant that "cause[s], or contribute^] to,
air pollution."31 Lifecycle (upstream) emissions, especially for GHGs, fit that description.32
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And in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court confirmed EPA's broad authority to regulate
additional, non-specified pollutants, provided the agency determines they endanger the public
health or welfare.33 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 11-12]
30 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
31 Id.
32 Other constraints in § 202(a) do not bar EPA from considering lifecycle emissions. The statute states
that EPA's standards must apply to vehicles and engines during their useful life, cannot take effect until
after a time that the EPA Administrator determines is necessary for the development and application of the
technologies needed to meet EPA's standards, and must consider costs. Id. § 7521(a). None of those
provisions prohibit EPA from crediting bioethanol vehicles for their positive lifecycle GHG emissions
benefits.
33 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 506-07 (2007).
The best reading of Clean Air Act § 202(a) is that it mandates that EPA consider lifecycle
GHG emissions as part of considering GHG emissions "from" motor vehicles. Otherwise, EPA
would be failing "to consider an important aspect of the problem" in violation of U.S. Supreme
Court precedent in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm.34 Emissions of
GHGs, which are a globally mixed pollutant, from any phase of a LDV's lifecycle should be
equally subject to § 202(a). Biofuels address the hazards caused by GHG emissions by reducing
emissions on a lifecycle basis. As a result, the benefits generated by bioethanol in reducing
lifecycle GHG emissions must be recognized through a crediting mechanism or other compliance
flexibility benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 12-13]
34 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, supra. If EPA considers accounting for upstream
emissions inappropriate under 202(a), query if 202(a) is inappropriate for addressing GHGs at all since
GHGs are a globally mixed pollutant not a "tailpipe" pollution issue. Such a question is timely now since
EPA proposes in this rulemaking to affirmatively ignore EV upstream emissions (as opposed to temporarily
excluding upstream emissions when EVs were only an emerging and de minimis share of the vehicle
market).
Courts interpreting § 202 have also found that EPA has the type of discretion sufficient to
allow crediting bioethanol compatible vehicles for their lifecycle benefits. The D.C. Circuit has
observed that "[manufacturers produce a wide variety of motor vehicles of different sizes, some
using different engine technologies resulting in unusual emission characteristics "35 If EPA's
authority to set emissions standards is flexible enough to address those varying vehicle
characteristics, it should be similarly flexible to allow EPA to credit lifecycle emissions
reductions from bioethanol. Under a common sense reading of section 202(a), EPA's ability to
regulate GHGs from vehicles includes those lifecycle emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp.12-13]
35 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 655 F.2d 318, 322 (1981).
EPA's statements in the Proposed Rule are consistent with the need for the vehicle GHG
program to address lifecycle GHG emissions beyond a narrow focus on tailpipe emissions. EPA
observes that, "[s]ince the earliest days of the CAA, Congress has emphasized that the goal of
section 202 is to address air quality hazards from motor vehicles, not to simply reduce emissions
from internal combustion engines to the extent feasible."36 While EPA is referring to electric
vehicles, that sentiment also applies to the need for EPA to credit the lifecycle benefits of
bioethanol. EPA's goal is to address air quality hazards from carbon dioxide emissions
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associated with classes of vehicles. One ton of GHG emissions causes the same harm whether it
is released from a vehicle tailpipe or further upstream. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 12-
13]
36 88 Fed. Reg. at 29233.
The Proposed Rule's discussion of the legislative and regulatory history regarding automotive
emissions under the Clean Air Act repeatedly refers to alternative power sources and fuels,
which further supports EPA's authority to establish a crediting program that accounts for
bioethanol's lifecycle emissions benefits.37 Nothing in the record suggests that alternative power
sources exclude other low-carbon alternatives, such as liquid renewable fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 12-13]
37 Id.
The Proposed Rule, in fact, confirms that EPA believes it can regulate upstream emissions
under § 202. EPA notes that its own current regulations would require "upstream emissions
accounting for BEVs and PHEVs as part of a manufacturer's compliance calculation" to begin in
MY 2027.38 EPA is now proposing, for the very first time, to permanently eliminate that
upstream emissions accounting.39 But the fact that the current regulations do account for
upstream emissions demonstrates that EPA knows it has the power to account for them in this
Proposed Rule as well. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 12-13]
38 Id. at 29197.
39 Id.
Incorporating lifecycle emissions reductions into the Proposed Rule is the best reading of §
202 for carbon dioxide as an air pollutant, because, unlike other regulated substances, carbon
dioxide (as a GHG) is a global, rather than a local, pollutant, meaning that it does not necessarily
cause adverse effects in the specific places where emitted. GHGs instead result in adverse effects
at a global scale, such as rising sea levels and eroding coastlines, flooding, more frequent and
intense storms, melting polar icecaps, and droughts. A GHG emissions rule that focuses only on
tailpipe emissions when emissions at all lifecycle stages have equal import is the very definition
of arbitrary and capricious.40 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 12-13]
40 See Section IlI.e of these comments regarding absurd results in terms of emissions increases that may
arise from the Proposed Rule as currently structured.
EPA has broad authority under Section 211(c)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act to issue regulations
controlling fuels or fuel additives that cause and/or contribute to air pollution that may endanger
public health. 155 This authority permits EPA to limit high-boiling compounds/heavy aromatics
because these fuel additives contribute to PM emissions which endanger public health. Pursuant
to Section 211(c)(2)(A), EPA must consider all relevant scientific evidence available to the
agency when setting these standards, including the significant evidence that bioethanol blending
is the most practicable replacement for heavy aromatics, and that bioethanol has particularly
significant emissions benefits for PM, other criteria pollutants, and GHGs. 156 The further
reduction of aromatics in gasoline would also be consistent with EPA's mandates and authority
under the Mobile Source Air Toxics Program. 157 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 33]
155 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A).
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156 Id. § 7545(c)(2)(A).
157 See Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources, 72 Fed. Reg. 8428 (Feb. 26, 2007).
Bioethanol does not receive the credit it deserves as a powerful tool in reducing both criteria
pollutant and GHG emissions. Replacing heavy aromatics with bioethanol blending would
maintain octane levels, reduce tailpipe PM emissions, and reduce lifecycle GHG emissions,
furthering many of EPA's Clean Air Act mandates. EPA should carefully consider the benefits
of bioethanol blending as a key solution in any potential rulemaking to further reduce tailpipe
PM reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 33]
Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)
VIII. EPA Lacks Legal Authority to Force Electrification of the U.S. Transportation Fleet
Because of its emphasis on promoting EVs, EPA's proposed rule exceeds the scope of its
statutory powers, which do not include authority to set GHG emission standards that effectively
mandate electric vehicles. Indeed, Congress directly precluded EPA from using Section 202(a) of
the Clean Air Act to phase out internal combustion vehicles. Section 202(a) requires EPA to set
standards for emissions from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines which cause or contribute to potentially harmful air pollution. If EPA maintains its
assumption that electric vehicles do not emit any C02 or other air pollution—which is
inaccurate, as explained throughout these comments—it may only set standards for internal
combustion vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 13-14]
In addition, EPA must have clear congressional authorization to promulgate electrification-
forcing regulations, and it does not have that authorization here. The Supreme Court has made
clear in recent decisions that an agency must have clear congressional authorization in order to
exercise significant powers.30 EPA's attempt to shift the U.S. transportation fleet to EVs is
analogous to the shift in energy policy that EPA directed in the clean power plan, which was
rejected by the Supreme Court in West Virginia v. EPA. EPA also projects its standards will
result in enormous compliance costs, indicating that the rule is economically significant and
therefore likely to fall within the Supreme Court's "major question" doctrine. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0602, pp. 13-14]
30 See Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021); West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct.
2587, 2609 (2022).
EPA's proposed rule is also arbitrary and capricious because it fails to accurately account for
the GHG emissions reductions achieved by both EVs and biofuels. EPA should use the best
available science to accurately account for the lifecycle carbon intensity associated with
particular fuels and technologies, but its proposed approach ignores the upstream emissions and
emissions from electricity generation associated with EVs. Specifically, EPA proposes to assign
a value of 0 grams/mile to EVs, which in effect assumes that electricity and battery minerals
powering EVs are always 100% renewable and free of any C02 emissions impacts. This
assumption is flawed because the C02 emissions associated with producing and transmitting
electricity, as well as the emissions linked to critical mineral extraction and battery production,
are significant. Indeed, lifecycle analysis studies show that some EVs (using coal-generated
electricity and battery minerals from intensive mining practices) may have a larger carbon
footprint than conventional vehicles using internal combustion engines. At the same time, EPA's
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proposal fails to recognize or account for the meaningful C02 emissions savings that can be
achieved through greater use of low-carbon ethanol in vehicles designed to accommodate higher
blends (e.g., flex fuel vehicles). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 13-14]
In sum, we urge EPA to revise its proposal to create a technology neutral rule that accounts
for all lifecycle emissions of the vehicles it regulates. A technology neutral rule will not only
avoid some of the legal issues EPA's current proposal will face, but incentivizing multiple
technologies is also the best way for EPA to achieve its ambitious goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0602, pp.13-14]
Organization: South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR)
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations for both the light-
duty/ medium-duty vehicles and heavy-duty vehicles - phase 3 published in the federal register
on April 27, 2023, and May 5, 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0523, p. 1]
DANR opposes the proposed emissions standards for the following reasons:
Lack of Clear Authority
EPA's fact sheet states the proposed standards would contribute "toward the goal of holding
the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius ...." The U.S.
Supreme Court has consistently told EPA it may not expand its federal regulatory reach beyond
what Congress has given it authority to implement. The U.S. Congress has not established this 2
degrees Celsius goal under the requirements of Clean Air Act, and this goal is not found in a
promulgated regulation. Using this standard for justification for the proposed regulations falls
under the Supreme Court's major questions doctrine. It is evident that EPA lacks clear authority
from Congress to require a generation-shifting approach to reduce vehicle emissions. Therefore,
DANR does not think EPA has clear authority to implement these proposed emission standards
and views this effort as federal overreach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0523, p. 1]
Electric Vehicle (EV) Mandate
The proposed emissions standards are based on the projection that 70 percent of all new light
duty passenger vehicles will need to be EVs for manufacturers to meet the standards. Setting the
standards based on a projected level of EV production essentially mandates the manufacturing of
EVs to comply. As discussed below, EVs do not make sense in all situations and environments
and EPA should not be setting emissions standards that mandate their production. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0523, p. 2]
Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
EPA must adopt the strongest possible standards for light- and medium-duty vehicles under
the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, p. 6]
Given the substantial impacts that light- and medium-duty vehicle emissions have on
communities and the environment, EPA must adopt the most stringent standards possible under
the Clean Air Act. As EPA correctly notes, "Congress has emphasized that the goal of [this
Clean Air Act provision] is to address air quality hazards from motor vehicles, not to simply
reduce emissions from internal combustion engines to the extent feasible[]" and that it expects
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EPA "to press for the development and application of improved technology rather than be
limited by that which exists."51 We are now at a point where technology already exists that
eliminates—not just reduces—tailpipe pollution, and EPA should therefore implement tailpipe
emissions standards that accelerate the transition to ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, p.
6]
51 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 29184, 29233 (May 5, 2023) (internal quotations omitted).
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
My comments are divided into two parts:
First, I will explain why I believe these proposed rules far exceed the EPA's authority under
section 202 of the Clean Air Act4 and clearly implicate the Supreme Court's "Major Questions
Doctrine" under West Virginia v. EPA and related cases. 5 Thus, if finalized as proposed, these
rules would be "in excess of statutory ... authority" within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act, or APA.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 2]
4 42 U.S.C. § 7521, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7521.
5 See West Virginia v. EPA, No. 20-1530, 597 U.S. (2022), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/20-
1530.
6 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) ("The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, find-
ings, and conclusions found to be ... in excess of statutory ... authority.").
The Proposed Rules Exceed EPA's Statutory Authority
Congress has never voted to cede to the Administrator of the EPA the far-reaching power and
discretion the Agency is claiming in these rulemakings. There has been no dele- gation from the
people's elected representatives—let alone a clear and express delega- tion—of such economy-
wide transformational power that could survive analysis under the Major Questions Doctrine.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 3-4]
If finalized as proposed, these rules would exceed the bounds of EPA's statutory authority in
two fundamental respects—one relating generally to the Agency's regulation of carbon dioxide
emissions from new motor vehicles; the other involving its leveraging of pollution-control
authority to force on the American people a hyper-accelerated transi- tion to electric vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 3-4]
This scheme bears no resemblance to EPA's past approach to the regulation of vehicle
emissions under the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 8-10]
Previously, when EPA has set emissions limits for criteria pollutants under section 202, the
available control technologies that EPA has recognized as feasible for achieving compliance
have involved cleaner fuels and discrete types of equipment added to the ICE vehicle. This
equipment includes, for example, enhanced catalytic converters to capture certain types of
pollutants and scrub them out of the vehicle's exhaust, onboard computers to control more
precisely the fuel mixture burned by the vehicle's engine, vapor-capture systems for refueling,
and fuel-injection systems to recycle unburned fuel back into the cylinders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 8-10]
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The use of these types of discrete control technologies has already achieved impres- sive
reductions in smog-producing criteria pollutants. As EPA itself acknowledges, exist- ing control
technologies applied under previous regulations have enabled automakers to attain "reductions of
up to 80 percent in tailpipe criteria pollutant emissions" from ICE vehicles.21 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 8-10]
21 88 FR at 29188.
But now, in these rules, EPA is proposing to do something radically different. The so-called
control technology here is not some discrete equipment added to the ICE vehicle to achieve
lower emissions; it is entirely separate replacement technology that uses a new and different
powertrain. These are replacement vehicles, not true control technology; they are different
vehicles from bumper to bumper, built on entirely different production lines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 8-10]
The EPA's current proposals are thus closely analogous to the Clean Power Plan that was
struck down by the Supreme Court last year in West Virginia v. EPA:
There, EPA was relying on its Clean Air Act authority to regulate power plant emis- sions
based on the "best system of emission reduction" available to the plant operator. EPA had
previously exercised that authority by setting emissions standards that required indi- vidual
plants to take measures "to operate more cleanly." But in the Clean Power Plan, EPA concluded
that coal-fired power plants could not eliminate enough carbon dioxide emissions to satisfy EPA
simply by employing additional measures at the plant. Instead, EPA proposed to require them to
choose between greatly reducing their own electricity production (potentially even shutting down
the plant) or paying to subsidize increased elec- tricity generation from alternative sources,
including natural gas, wind, and solar power (the so-called "generation shifting" concept). The
overall goal was to reduce the percentage of national electricity generation supplied by coal and
increase the percentage contribution from wind and solar. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp.
8-10]
The Supreme Court held that the Clean Power Plan implicated the Major Questions Doctrine
because EPA was claiming the power to "restructure the American energy mar- ket," and this
represented a "transformative expansion" in the Agency's exercise of its regulatory authority.
The Court was unconvinced that Congress had "implicitly tasked" the EPA "with balancing the
many vital considerations of national policy implicated in deciding how Americans will get their
energy," or with the authority to decide "how much of a switch from coal to natural gas is
practically feasible" for the nation. There was "little reason to think Congress" had assigned
matters of such economic and political significance to the EPA's discretion. "The basic and
consequential tradeoffs involved" are "ones that Congress would likely have intended for itself."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 8-10]
Everything the Supreme Court said about the Clean Power Plan can be said about the EPA's
current proposals for regulating vehicle emissions. As it tried to do with the power market, EPA
is now attempting to leverage its authority to set emissions limits for particu- lar types of
vehicles into a grand new scheme for shifting and rebalancing the overall mix of ICE, battery-
electric, and other powertrains in the national auto fleet—an extravagant role for the Agency to
play, and one with enormous economic and political implications. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 8-10]
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Indeed, the current proposals represent an even more extreme example of regulatory
overreach than the Clean Power Plan. Here, EPA is attempting to coerce the automakers into
financing the entire transformation of the manufacturing base of a major industrial sector by
converting their own production of ICE vehicles to EVs on a large scale, not simply contributing
toward the marginal subsidization of alternative investments by others. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0647, pp. 8-10]
Moreover, in the name of ensuring that its own preferred "control technology" will actually
deliver the expected performance as a suitable long-term substitute for ICE vehicles, EPA is also
claiming the authority to regulate the design and functionality of battery-electric technology over
the entire life cycle of EVs. Like CARB, EPA proposes to adopt and enforce "Global Technical
Requirement" (GTR) No. 22, promulgated by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe, which sets standards and requirements for validating electric battery durability.22 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 8-10]
22 See 88 FR at 29284-85; 88 FR at 26013-15.
Thus, EPA expects to be in the permanent business of regulating EV technologies, which
involve no tailpipes at all, let alone tailpipe emissions—all under the aegis of a statute enacted by
Congress to address air pollution from vehicle tailpipes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 8-
10]
What is clear is that EPA sees an endless horizon for its new-found power to regulate
practically all aspects of the American automotive market. No doubt, for example, the Agency
intends to be involved in overseeing the buildout and operation of electric vehicle charging
infrastructure around the country—once again, as an incident of the regulators' own expansive
conception of their section 202 authority to ensure the adequacy of EPA's chosen control
technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 10-11]
We can easily imagine that someday this self-assumed mandate will include the power to
ration the timing and extent of drivers' access to charging networks, as EPA deems necessary to
maintain the general supply of electricity for EVs. California is already doing this. Because the
buildout of charging infrastructure will depend critically on gov- ernment subsidies and
approvals, government rationing of access to this infrastructure is a very real prospect, especially
given the strains on grid reliability that I discuss below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp.
10-11]
The bottom line under the Major Questions Doctrine is that section 202, on which the
proposed rules rest, contains no clear and express delegation of any authority that could sustain
these massively consequential proposals. As the Court observed in West Virginia v. EPA,
"Congress certainly has not conferred [such] authority upon EPA anywhere ... in the Clean Air
Act." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 10-11]
The Analyses and Assumptions on Which the Proposed Regulatory Actions Are Based Are
Arbitrary, Fundamentally Flawed, and Fail to Recognize and Account Properly for the Hugely
Negative Consequences that Would Result from These Actions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 10-11]
EPA claims that, despite the coercive power and industry-transforming ambition behind its
proposals, these rules will somehow deliver a stupendous bounty of net benefits, ranging at the
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high end from $1.5 trillion to $2.3 trillion for the light- and medium-duty vehicle rule,23 plus
another $180 billion to $320 billion for the heavy-duty truck rule.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 10-11]
23 Id. at 29200.
24 88 FR at 25937.
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Tesla's proposed changes will significantly reduce emissions, result in increased deployment
of the best available emissions reduction technology - BEVs6 - consistent with the emissions
reduction technology requirements of the Clean Air Act standard setting mandate under section
202, and ensure the Administration is meeting it statutory mandate to protect the public health
and welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
Further, there should be no doubt, in view of recent amendments to the Clean Air Act and
Congressional ratification accomplished by the IRA, 126 that EPA has ample authority to address
the regulation of greenhouse gas pollutants, from motor vehicles, through electrification, and in
the light-duty sector. 127 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 21]
126 Pub. L. No. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818 (2022).
127 See, Greg Dotson and Dustin J. Maghamfar, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 2022: Clean Air,
Climate Change, and the Inflation Reduction Act, 53 ELR 10017 at 10019, 10032 (2023) (discussing Clean
Air Act sec. 137 and other revisions) available at
https://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4338903
Tesla believes that this proposed rule — in substance and structure — is firmly in the
mainstream of long and well-established agency motor vehicle emissions standard setting
activities, and well within industry expectations and the agency's authorities. Indeed, the agency
has deployed fleet averaging approaches for decades to provide manufacturers flexibility while
increasing the stringency of motor vehicle emissions standards. 128 And it has addressed GHG
emissions and criteria pollutants in doing so since 2010. 129 EPA's action has been rooted in the
Clean Air Act's textual recognition that EPA is to set and revise standards controlling emissions
from vehicles, "whether such vehicles and engines are designed as complete systems or
incorporate devices to prevent or control such pollution." 130 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792,
p. 21]
128 See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 79382-83 (Nov. 28, 1980); Nat. Res. Defense Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410,
425-26 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
129 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010) (Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule for MY 2011 and later).
130 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
In addition, EPA has, for example, repeatedly expressed its own understanding that GHG
standards should be viewed as a strategy to help control criteria pollutants to address National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) nonattainment, as well as to address the climate crisis.
EPA has previously explained that "[c]limate change is expected to increase regional ozone
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pollution, with associated risks in respiratory illnesses and premature death."131 Whether
through its impact on reducing atmospheric temperatures that contribute to the formation of
ozone, or through its direct impact on air quality by lowering or eliminating altogether tailpipe
emissions of smog-forming pollutants and PM, enhanced BEV recognition in the development of
these requirements will have a significant impact on achieving air quality targets. 132 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 21]
131 Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66525 ("There is now consistent evidence from models and
observations that 21st century climate change will worsen summertime surface ozone in polluted regions of
North America compared to a future with no climate change."); (While ozone "is a local or regional air
pollution problem, the impacts of global climate change can nevertheless exacerbate this local air pollution
problem.").
132 Nonattainment for conventional pollutants such as NOx is also significantly affected by upstream fuel
impacts from refinery emissions that are reduced or eliminated by a conversion to zero emissions vehicles.
See California Air Resources Board, Analysis in Support of Comments on the SAFE Rule at 69, available
at https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/CARB_Detailed_Comments_on_SAFE_NPRM.pdf.
Furthermore, the seemingly sharp former distinctions between regulatory strategies to address
criteria pollutant emissions and GHG emissions have continued to erode in view of the
appropriate control strategies and technologies and the increasingly smaller margins for
improvement from conventional ICE emissions. States have noted that zero emission vehicles
(ZEVs) produce no tailpipe emissions, reduce brake wear PM emissions, and have lower
upstream emissions to contribute to their State Implementation Plan (SIP) strategies. 133 EPA's
2017 Tier 3 standards, for example, achieved reductions of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide
(N20), each of which are GHGs that were part of EPA's endangerment finding. 134 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 21-22]
133 See e.g., CARB, Staff Report: Initial Statement of Reasons (Oct. 22, 2019) at 5, Table ES-1: Expected
Emission Reductions of Proposed ACT Regulation Calendar Year (NOx (tpd) PM2.5 (tpd) WTW GHG
(MMT/yr.) 2031 5.0 0.16 0.4 2040 16.9 0.46 1.7 (Proposed Rule)) available at h
ttps://ww3 .arb.ca.gov/regact/2019/act2019/isor.pdf
134 79 Fed. Reg. at 23445.
EPA has previously recognized the importance of this harmonization. In promulgating its Tier
3 motor vehicle emissions standards, for example, the agency noted:
The Tier 3 program addresses interactions with the 2017 LD GHG rule in a manner that aligns
implementation of the two actions, to achieve significant criteria pollutant and GHG emissions
reductions while providing regulatory certainty and compliance efficiency. As vehicle
manufacturers introduce new vehicle platforms for compliance with the GHG standards, they
will be able to design them for compliance with the Tier 3 standards at the same time. 135 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 21-22]
135 79 Fed. Reg. at 23417.
Given the continuing need for emissions reductions in both the criteria pollutant and the GHG
arenas and the increasing capabilities presented by advanced technologies, the multi-pollutant
standards EPA is proposing are fully expected by automotive manufacturers, appropriate, and
essential. Indeed, the Supreme Court has broadly defined emissions "standards" under the Clean
Air Act as including instances where fleet ZEV standards were sought to be enforced. 136 The
Court explained that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 22]
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136 Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 258 (2004).
Organization: Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF)
Both Tailpipe Rules Are Likely Unconstitutional [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 2-3]
In the recent landmark West Virginia v. EPA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the EPA
did not have the power to "substantially restructure the American energy market" by regulation
under the CAA. 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2610 (2022). That case dealt with the EPA's attempt to
establish carbon dioxide ("C02") emissions limits for new and existing coal-fired power plants
under the Clean Power Plan, through regulations requiring plant operators to shift energy
generation to cleaner sources. The EPA based the regulation on a misguided and overbroad
reading of 42 U.S.C. § 7411 ("Section 111"). The Supreme Court informed the EPA that a
scheme of regulations that restructures the national energy market to shift towards renewable
energy did not qualify as the "best system of emission reduction" under Section 111, because
Congress had not clearly delegated the "sweeping and consequential authority" to force vast
energy market change by EPA regulation. See id. at 2608. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp.
2-3]
Yet that is exactly what the EPA seeks to do with these Tailpipe Rules. As the EPA's own
press release states, the Tailpipe Rules are intended to "accelerate the ongoing transition to a
clean vehicles future and tackle the climate crisis." Biden-Harris Administration Proposes
Strongest-Ever Pollution Standards for Cars and Trucks to Accelerate Transition to a Clean-
Transportation Future, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Apr. 12, 2023),
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris-administration-proposes-strongest-ever-
pollution-standards-cars-and. The LMD Tailpipe Rule, specifically, is "projected to accelerate
the transition to electric vehicles." Id. The EPA states that these regulatory changes are part of a
push to "support the development and market for clean vehicle technologies and associated
infrastructure" and to "expand the manufacture, sale, and use of zero emission vehicles." Id.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 2-3]
The EPA has no constitutional authority to make these regulatory changes. They have the
power, and indeed the duty, to promulgate "standards which reflect the greatest degree of
emission reduction achievable through the application of technology which the Administrator
determines will be available for the model year to which such standards apply, giving
appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety factors associated with the application of
such technology." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i). Nothing in this grant of authority allows the
EPA to regulate in a way that pushes the use of electric vehicles over internal-combustion
vehicles. The EPA did the same thing when it tried to force power producers to adopt so-called
clean energy solutions through the Clean Power Plan, which the Supreme Court rightly rejected.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 2-3]
Both Tailpipe Rules Violate The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0510, p.3]
The Tailpipe Rules also violate the Administrative Procedure Act's prohibition against agency
action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law . . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 706. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, p. 3]
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The statute defines "air pollutant" as "any air pollution agent or combination of such agents,
including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (including source material, special
nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise
enters the ambient air." 42 U.S.C. § 7602. Because the statute fails to define the meaning of the
term "air pollution agent," this definition is facially circular and therefore void for vagueness.
Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, READING LAW 134 (Thomson/West 2012) ("An
unintelligible text is inoperative."); see also Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. (2023), slip op. at 24
(stating that a "broad and unqualified" interpretation of the Clean Water Act "gives rise to
serious vagueness concerns"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, p. 3]
Furthermore, carbon dioxide, the most plentiful greenhouse gas, is a natural substance
essential to life on Earth. It is everywhere and in everything, yet EPA claims the power to
regulate it. Congress could not possibly have intended to grant the EPA such wide-ranging
regulatory power when it passed the Clean Air Act. Courts analyzing grants of authority to
executive agencies must consider "whether Congress in fact meant to confer the power the
agency has asserted." West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2608 (2022). In West Virginia, the
Supreme Court affirmed that when "the history and breadth of the authority that the agency has
asserted, and the economic and political significance of that assertion" are large and weighty,
courts have "reason to hesitate" before concluding Congress meant to delegate such power. Id.
(cleaned up). At the very least, the Court "expect[s] Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to
assign to an agency decisions of vast economic and political significance." Util. Air Regulatory
Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (cleaned up). Because EPA's interpretation of the CAA
to regulate C02 "would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA's
regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization," it is "patently unreasonable" for
EPA to seize such authority. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, p. 3]
EPA points to their Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding, see 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 15,
2009), as the source of their conclusion that it may regulate greenhouse gases. EPA made this
Endangerment Finding without seeking peer review from the Science Advisory Board ("SAB"),
a blue-ribbon panel of experts established by Congress to ensure that EPA regulations are based
on accurate data and credible scientific analyses. In enacting the peer review requirement,
Congress was concerned that EPA not impose unnecessary restrictions on economic and personal
freedom by unintelligently pursuing its regulatory goals. By ignoring the peer review
requirement, EPA violated 42 U.S.C. § 4365(c)(1), which states that EPA "shall" make its
regulatory proposals available to the SAB for peer review. That fundamental error stemmed from
a desire to impress the community of nations by being among the first to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions timed to coincide with the 2009 Copenhagen international climate conference. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 3-4]
The Endangerment Finding has other flaws. In making it, EPA made no showing that the
Finding or any of its related greenhouse gas rules will remove any dangers to human health or
welfare. Indeed, EPA disclaimed any obligation to define its ultimate regulatory objectives or its
chosen means of achieving them and even refused to articulate how the Endangerment Finding
could lead to successfully combating anthropogenic climate change. Furthermore, EPA claimed
it was 90-99% certain that human-caused climate change threatened public health and welfare,
see 74 Fed. Reg. at 66518 n.22, while failing to state what constitutes a safe climate, acceptable
global temperature ranges, how levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (whether natural or
man-made) may affect those ranges, or even whether its regulatory actions would ameliorate any
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risk. Because of these substantial gaps in its analysis, no one could accurately judge whether
EPA achieved any discernable public benefit or congressionally-authorized goal when it made
the Endangerment Finding. Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA requires the EPA to exercise its own
independent judgment to determine how its regulatory response to a perceived risk will reduce or
eliminate that risk. Instead, the EPA left evidentiary analysis and risk assessment almost entirely
to international non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") when making the Endangerment
Finding. Congress did not clearly delegate the significant power to make regulatory
determinations affecting public policy to NGOs. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 324.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 3-4]
For all these reasons, the Endangerment Finding was itself arbitrary, capricious, and ultra
vires, and any regulation based on its authority suffers the same problems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0510, pp.3-4]
Organization: Travis Fisher
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA's) proposal regarding Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles in Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829
(Proposed Rule). The Proposed Rule violates the Clean Air Act because it relies on an incorrect
factual basis—on multiple counts discussed below—derived from a misinformed and incomplete
Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 1]
1. THE PROPOSED RULE VIOLATES SECTION 202 OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The Proposed Rule would establish new emissions standards for light-duty and medium-duty
vehicles pursuant to section 202 of the Clean Air Act. Significantly, unlike other sections of the
Clean Air Act (such as those covering National Ambient Air Quality Standards, for example),
section 202 requires the EPA Administrator to consider the impacts of a new standard on cost,
energy, and safety. Section 202 states that regulations should apply "standards which reflect the
greatest degree of emission reduction achievable" while "giving appropriate consideration to
cost, energy, and safety factors associated with the application of such technology."4 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 2]
4 42 U.S. Code § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i).
The EPA Administrator has not given appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety,
and thus the Proposed Rule violates section 202 of the Clean Air Act. EPA's failure to consider
cost, energy, and safety in the Proposed Rule is a major flaw that, if left uncorrected, would
make the final rule arbitrary and capricious. Not only does the Proposed Rule not provide an
accurate assessment of its own impacts in a vacuum, but it also fails to consider key, well-known
interactions between the Proposed Rule and other EPA regulations. Because the Proposed Rule
fails to offer the Administrator a sound factual basis upon which to build, it is impossible that the
Administrator gave "appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety factors" when
establishing the standards in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 2]
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Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
V. EPA lacks statutory authority—much less clear congressional authorization—to
support the proposed action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 65-66]
In this proposal and its companion proposal regarding HDV greenhouse gas emissions
standards, EPA relies, for the first time outside of litigation, on its purported authority to
mandate electrification as an "emission control device" or "emission control technology." It is
also the first time that EPA proposes standards for MDVs, a subset of HDVs under the Clean Air
Act, that rely on the availability of ZEV technologies.351 And it is also the first time that EPA
utilizes its criteria pollutant standards, either standing alone or in combination with EPA's
greenhouse gas emissions standards, to force further vehicle electrification. For these dramatic
changes, however, EPA must have clear congressional authority. Yet EPA has failed to identify
such clear authority for the standards and the electrification mandate. Instead, EPA relies on
general authority and congressional statements that do not provide clear authority for the
proposed action. To the contrary, EPA's references in the proposal demonstrate that Congress
had many opportunities to provide clear authority but declined to do so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 65-66]
351 Because the adoption of ZEVs contemplated by EPA in the proposal consists primarily, if not
exclusively, of electric vehicles, these comments focus on the proposal's forced electrification of the
Nation's LDV and MDV fleet; however, it should be noted that EPA's definition of ZEVs also includes
other technologies, such as hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, which face even greater hurdles to widespread
adoption and, more importantly, are equally unauthorized by Congress.
1. EPA claims an unheralded power with staggering implications.
In asserting the sweeping power to mandate increasingly high levels of electrification, EPA
claims to have "discovered] in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate 'a
significant portion of the American economy.'" Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 324 (quoting Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159). The novelty and broad implications of the agency's approach are
powerful clues that Congress never authorized it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 71-73]
Novel Assertion of Agency Authority.
Skepticism is warranted when an agency asserts an "unheralded power representing a
transformative expansion in its regulatory authority." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2610 (internal
quotation marks omitted). In prior rules setting greenhouse-gas emission standards, EPA has
treated electric vehicles as a compliance "option" or "flexibility." In fact, for the 2021 GHG
standards for LDVs, EPA argues that electrification was not mandated but was an option, that
manufacturers could comply without using EVs. However, for the proposed LDV and MDV rule,
EPA does not claim that electrification is merely an option and EPA's model clearly
demonstrates that EPA expects OEMs to comply with the proposed standard by increasing
production of BEVs and FCEVs while phasing out production of ICEVs. Indeed, with the
exception of the companion HDV standards proposed in concert with this rule, forced
electrification has never before even been on the table for MDVs (and other HDVs). Nor has
EPA previously utilized its criteria pollutant standards in a thinly-cloaked strategy to
disincentivize further ICEV production in favor of vehicle electrification, as it does in the
proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 71-73]
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Future Implications of the Agency's Claimed Power.
EPA has made no secret of the significance of the power it proposes to exercise here. In its
proposed rule, EPA asserts the authority to force electrification as an "emission control
technology" and notes that "[vjehicle manufacturers can use powertrain electrification as an
emissions control technology to comply with EPA standards and to generate credits for use in
averaging, banking, and trading." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29184; see id. at 29346 ("This proposal seeks
to build on the trends that these developments and projections indicate, and accelerate the
continued deployment of these technologies...."); id. at 29312 ("Although the market share of
PEVs in the U.S. is already rapidly growing, EPA recognizes that the proposed standards may
accelerate this trend."). And as described above, this proposal is only part of a greater "whole of
government" approach to mandate electrification at the Biden Administration's direction. By
claiming the power of mandating some electrification of the Nation's vehicle fleet, EPA is
claiming the authority to mandate 100% electrification as well. As in West Virginia, there is no
reason to believe that EPA will stop here. "[0]n this view of EPA's authority, it could go further,
perhaps forcing" LDV and MDV manufacturers to "cease making" internal-combustion vehicles
altogether. 142 S. Ct. at 2612. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 71-73]
In fact, this is exactly where EPA is headed. When EPA announced its proposal, it stated that
the standards would "accelerate the ongoing transition" to an all-electric future, "delivering on"
the Biden-Harris Administration's climate agenda.363 And in related rulemakings, EPA
authorized California to adopt its own greenhouse-gas emission standards in its Advanced Clean
Cars and Advanced Clean Trucks programs—an authority California is already citing to ban new
combustion-engine vehicles and require 100-percent electrification of the LDV, MDV, and HDV
fleets by 2036 via its Advanced Clean Cars II and Advanced Clean Fleets programs. See 87 Fed.
Reg. 14,332; 88 Fed. Reg. 20,688. Both parts of EPA's strategy reveal the agency's goal to
convert America to electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 71-73]
363 https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris-administration-proposes-strongest-ever-pollution-
standards-cars-and. (emphasis added).
Given the vast economic and political significance of EPA's proposal, it "must point to 'clear
congressional authorization' for the power it claims." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609. There is
not one word in the Clean Air Act about a nationwide agency-led transition from conventional
internal-combustion vehicles to electric vehicles, or any other so-called ZEV. To be sure, EPA
has the power to set emission standards for air pollutants from motor vehicles, just as EPA had
the power in West Virginia to set emission standards for air pollutants from power plants. But
what EPA claims here for the first time is the authority to set standards in such a way that
manufacturers can comply only by abandoning internal-combustion vehicles in favor of electric
vehicles. And nothing in the Clean Air Act authorizes that. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
71-73]
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
Congress did not give EPA authority to mandate the electrification of the vehicle fleet. The
Energy Policy Act and Clean Air Act do not allow EPA to set standards that cannot be met with
an internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEV). EPA does not have the authority to compel the
transition to completely new vehicle types under the guise of setti ng tailpipe standards for
ICEVs. Electric vehicles (EV) do not have a tailpipe, and although their emissions should be
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evaluated over the full lifecycle and not assumed to be zero as EPA does with this proposed rule,
EPA only has authority to consider tailpipe emissions from ICEVs with this rule. EVs are
technically not subject to the standards and thus ineligible for the fleet averaging scheme. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 1]
The proposed rule would require 60% of new car sales to be battery-powered electric vehicles
by 2030 and 67% by 2032, compared to 5.8% in 2022. With this rule, EPA is running afoul of
the Supreme Court's ruling in West Virginia v. EPA. Congress nowhere provided authorization
for EPA to effectively mandate a shift from ICEVs to electric vehicles (EV). Further, attempting
to interfere with the market and compel market penetration up ten-fold in less than ten years is
simply unrealistic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 1-2]
EPA attempts to subvert the major questions doctrine by citing its authority under the Clean
Air Act 202(a) to tighten emissions standards. Carbon Dioxide (C02) emissions from vehicles
constitute more than 95% of all tailpipe GHG emissions (75 FR 25326), yet there has not yet
been invented a technology to control or capture these C02 emissions from vehicles. In the
absence of such a technology, the only means to meet the standards in the proposed rule is by
switching to a so -called zero-emissions vehicle (ZEV). We encourage EPA to discard the use of
the term "ZEV" in the rule, as no vehicle is zero emissions but merely transfers its emissions
from the tailpipe to the power plant. I realize that EPA acknowledges that in its definition of
ZEV, but that subtlety is largely lost on the public and serves as legerdemain. As we find EPA's
use of BEVs, PEVs, PHEVs, and ZEVs to be inconsistent and at times interchangeable
throughout the rule, we will use the simple term "EV" throughout these comments. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 1-2]
With its logic, EPA is equating emissions control technology to a EV, but an electric vehicle
is not akin to a pollution control device. EPA cannot use its authority to control emissions under
the CAA to treat EVs as pollution control devices, as doing so is an artifice that does not pass the
major questions doctrine test and is arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679,
pp.1-2]
Despite finding that:
".. .the standards proposed herein are consistent with EPA's responsibilities under the CAA
and appropriate under CAA section 202(a). EPA has carefully considered the statutory factors,
including technological feasibility and cost of the proposed standards and the available lead time
for manufacturers to comply with them.. .Based on our analysis, it is our assessment that the
proposed standards are appropriate and justified under section 202(a) of the CAA. Our analysis
for this proposal supports the preliminary conclusion that the proposed standards are
technologically feasible and that the costs of compliance for manufacturers would be
reasonable." (p. 29187) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 1-2]
While acknowledging that EPA must:
"consider issues of technological feasibility, the cost of compliance, and lead time. EPA also
may consider other factors, and in previous vehicle standards rulemakings, [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0679, pp.3-4]
as well as in this proposal, has considered the impacts of potential standards on emissions of
air pollutants and associated public health and welfare effects, impacts on the automotive
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industry, impacts on the vehicle purchasers/consumers, oil conservation, energy security and
other energy impacts, safety, and other relevant considerations." p. 29186 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0679, pp. 3-4]
it does not appear that EPA has actually done so. EPA's logic is often flawed in the analysis
and the information relied on is biased or incomplete. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 3-4]
EPA Summary and Response
EPA responds to these comments, together with the comments reprinted in sections 2 and 2.2,
below in section 2.3.
2.2 - Criteria pollutant standards
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
2. Statutory Authority
Auto Innovators shares EPA's goal of addressing climate change by achieving a net-zero
carbon transportation future, as part of an ambitious, comprehensive, and national strategy. The
Proposed Rule, however, contemplates a rapid and transformative nationwide shift to
electrification that may be well beyond what the industry or market can bear now or in the
foreseeable future. Given the significant policy and economic consequences that would flow
from this restructuring of the nation's vehicle market, and the breadth and unprecedented nature
of EPA's proposed action, clear congressional authorization is required for the Proposed Rule.
EPA lacks this clear authorization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
The Proposed Rule seeks to use Clean Air Act section 202 rulemaking to force an
extraordinary transformation of the nation's vehicle fleet away from ICE-based vehicles to
BEVs, and it is not at all clear that the level of consumer demand and infrastructure that exists
now and is expected in the future can support the expedited, aggressive timeline in the Proposed
Rule. The Proposed Rule does not include an explicit electrification target, and EPA states that
"a compliant fleet under the proposed standards will include a diverse range of technologies." 152
But in practice, the stringency of the proposed standards is such that automakers will have no
choice but to convert to BEV fleets on a massive scale. This is the result not only of the Proposed
Rule's GHG emissions standards, but also its criteria pollutant standards and its tightening of
credit programs and other flexibilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
152 NPRM at 29187.
As EPA notes, BEVs accounted for 5.8% of the new U.S. light-duty passenger vehicle market
in 2022.153 Moreover, EPA's MY 2023-2026 GHG emissions standards that were finalized at
the end of 2021 projected only a 17% light-duty penetration rate for both BEVs and PHEVs by
MY 2026.154 Despite this low rate of consumer acceptance, the Proposed Rule projects a light-
duty BEV penetration rate of 67% by MY 2032, up from 36% in MY 2027.155 Importantly, in
the absence of these and other strict regulatory programs (such as California's ZEV mandate),
EPA projects a significantly lower MY 2032 BEV penetration rate of only 39%. 156 It is unclear
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from EPA's analysis how the regulations alone justify a 28 percentage point increase in BEV
market between having regulations versus not. This is particularly concerning given that EPA's
no- action analysis presumably includes the same level of existing supportive mechanisms such
as the IRA and IIJA, assumptions for infrastructure development, and other market-enabling
features. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
153 Id. at 29189
154 See Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86
Fed. Reg. 74434, 74485, Table 33 (Dec. 30, 2021).
155 NPRM at 29329, Table 80.
156 Id. at 29329, Table 81.
In other words, a staggering increase in the implementation and adoption of BEV technology
underpins the Proposed Rule and is the central means by which the rule effectuates its
contemplated emissions reductions. But this shift to electrification is not a simple matter of
swapping one technology for another. The mass adoption of BEVs on the scale required for
compliance with the Proposed Rule's standards requires a much broader transformation in the
way vehicles are manufactured, purchased, fueled, serviced, and disposed of. Indeed, the
Proposed Rule would reorder much of the U.S. automobile industry—which supports roughly
10.3 million American jobs and $558 billion in annual car sales, and about 6% of the U.S.'s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 157 Consumers must be willing to purchase BEVs at mass scale;
the power sector must be able to generate and deliver adequate electricity 158—which itself will
contribute to emissions—while maintaining grid reliability and otherwise meeting consumer and
industrial demand; adequate charging infrastructure must be available; batteries and other
components must be manufactured at an increasing rate, critical minerals sourced, and supply
chains developed. These needs must be met not only for light-duty vehicles, but also for
medium- and heavy-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
157 See Economic Insights, Alliance for Automotive Innovation,
htps://www.autosinnovate.org/resources/insights.
158 In addition to increasing electricity capacity, utilities are also facing a transition in technology types
and more renewable sources, as proposed under the "Greenhouse Gas Standards and Guidelines for Fossil
Fuel-Fired Power Plants" [88 FR 33240, May 23, 2023],
As expressed throughout this comment, we have serious concerns that the market will not be
able to bear the requirements of the Proposed Rule and that those requirements will not be
feasible given these considerations. Compliance will impose significant costs, and require
extraordinary effort, on the part of regulated parties—costs which will be passed along to
consumers. Setting such stringent standards has the potential to create a significant market
disruption, with consequences not only for the automobile industry but for the entire U.S.
economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
In other words, the Proposed Rule is enormously consequential for the automobile industry,
and for the economy and consumers as a whole. The Proposed Rule's provisions insert EPA into
crucial policy tradeoffs and debates, such as concerns about the extraction and supply of critical
minerals overseas, or the need to maintain a reliable, efficient electric grid. 159 These
considerations range far afield from the traditional ambit of section 202 rulemaking, delving into
areas that are the subject of other regulatory schemes, or within the unique purview and authority
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of other agencies and other branches and levels of government. In short, the dramatic shift
toward electrification required by the Proposed Rule implicates issues of tremendous political,
economic, and social significance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
159 See, e.g., NPRM at 29311-24.
Nor is such a transformative rule, with such wide-ranging implications, a typical feature of
section 202 rulemaking. We acknowledge that some past EPA section 202 rules, most notably
the MY 2023-2026 rule, have contemplated greater deployment of EVs as one of many options
for complying with emissions standards. The Proposed Rule, however, is different not merely in
degree but in kind, seeking to impose what is, at bottom, a mandate toward nationwide
electrification. Such a proposal amounts to an unprecedented assertion of power on the part of
EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
"[A]n enormous and transformative expansion in EPA's regulatory authority" such as this
necessitates "clear congressional authorization," as Congress is expected to "speak clearly if it
wishes to assign to an agency decision of vast 'economic and political significance.'"160 But
section 202 does not confer such clear authority. Section 202 authorizes EPA to promulgate
"standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant" from vehicles; it does not empower
EPA to force a historic shift in the makeup of the nation's entire vehicle fleet. In the absence of
plain statutory authorization, such a decision, and the tradeoffs and consequences it entails,
properly belongs to Congress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
160 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
The Proposed Rule frequently cites to the IIJA, also known as the "Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law," 161 and the Inflation Reduction Act. 162 To the extent EPA purports to rely on either
statute as providing a legal basis for the Proposed Rule, 163 it should not do so. No provision of
the IIJA or the IRA expands or modifies EPA's regulatory authority under section 202 or the
Clean Air Act more broadly. Nor can these laws be considered to have implicitly altered EPA's
authority. After all, "implied amendments require 'clear and manifest' evidence of congressional
intent," 164 and "neither courts nor federal agencies can rewrite a statute's plain text to
correspond to its supposed purposes." 165 Those conditions are not satisfied here. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
161 Pub. L. 117-58, 135 Stat. 429 (2021).
162 Pub. L. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818(2022). See, e.g., NPRM at 29187-90, 29195-96, 29233,29300,
29308, 29313, 29318, 29322-24, 29341 (referencing the IIJA and/or IRA).
163 See, e.g., NPRM at 29233 ("The recently enacted Inflation Reduction Act 'reinforces the longstanding
authority and responsibility of [EPA] to regulate GHGs as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act'")
(quoting floor statement by Rep. Pallone).
164 Sackett v. E.P.A., 598 U.S , 2023 WL 3632751, at *13 (U.S. May 25, 2023) (internal quotation
omitted).
165 LandstarExp. America, Inc. v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 569 F.3d 493, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
We reaffirm that we are fundamentally supportive of EPA's goals of reducing GHG emissions
and transitioning to a net-zero carbon transportation future. Section 202 standards have a place
in this effort, as we have previously expressed. We remain concerned, however, that the
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extraordinary and unprecedented nature of the Proposed Rule places it outside the bounds of
EPA's statutory authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
n any event, the Clean Air Act refutes EPA's view that Congress left the door open to
fleetwide averaging. Other provisions in Section 202 itself and Title II as a whole make clear that
fleetwide averaging is fundamentally incompatible with the statutory structure and design. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 14-15]
Other portions of Section 202 confirm Section 202(a)(1)'s focus on emission standards
applicable to individual vehicles. For example: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 14-15]
Under 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(A), the standards for light-duty vehicles and engines in
model years 1977-79 must provide that "emissions from such vehicles and engines may not
exceed 1.5 grams per vehicle mile of hydrocarbons and 15.0 grams per vehicle mile of carbon
monoxide." Id. (emphasis added). This provision contemplates that "such vehicles"—i.e.,
individual light-duty vehicles—will not exceed these limits. Under an averaging approach,
however, individual vehicles would be permitted to exceed these statutorily mandated standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 14-15]
Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(3) authorizes EPA to grant waivers from certain
nitrogen-oxide emission "standards," see id. § 7521(b)(1)(B), for no "more than 5 percent of [a]
manufacturer's production or more than fifty thousand vehicles or engines, whichever is
greater." Id. § 7521(b)(3). The provision thus provides a default rule under which every vehicle
must meet a per-vehicle emissions standard, then permits a waiver from that default rule for up
to 5 percent of the fleet. Averaging is inconsistent with this pro- vision, which depends on a set
number of individual vehicles meeting the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 14-
15]
And under 42 U.S.C. § 7521(m)(l), EPA must require manufacturers to in- stall
"diagnostic systems" on "all" new light-duty vehicles and trucks that are capable of identifying
malfunctions that "could cause or result in failure of the vehicles to comply with emission
standards established under this section." Requiring diagnostic equipment on "all" vehicles
makes no sense on an averaging approach; each vehicle must have a diagnostic system that
ensures that vehicle's "compliance] with emission standards established un- der [Section 202],"
id., yet under EPA's averaging approach, no particular vehicle need be in compliance. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 14-15]
Beyond Section 202 itself, averaging is also deeply in tension with "the de- sign and structure
of [Title II] as a whole." Util. Air, 573 U.S. at 321 (citation omitted). Consider Title II's
provisions addressing testing, warranties, and penalties: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp.
14-15]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
And even for criteria pollutants emitted from ICEVs, the Clean Air Act says nothing about
averaging across fleets or banking and trading credits across different model years, different
vehicle classes, and OEMs. While EPA previously adopted fleetwide averaging, it has also
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acknowledged that "Congress did not specifically contemplate an averaging program when it
enacted the Clean Air Act."91 And "[jjust as the statute does not explicitly address EPA's
authority to allow averaging, it does not address the Agency's authority to permit banking and
trading."92 By definition, then, the Act does not address—let alone clearly authorize—the use of
averaging, banking, and trading in a manner that mandates electrification of the national vehicle
fleet of motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines. Instead, as EPA acknowledges, even if its
authority to use averaging, banking, and trading could be inferred, such programs are limited to
compliance flexibilities rather than setting the standards with which vehicles must comply or
phasing out ICEVs on a national scale.93 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 23]
91 48 Fed. Reg. 33,456, 33,458 (July 21, 1983)
92 54 Fed. Reg. 22,652, 22,665 (May 25, 1989); see 55 Fed. Reg. 30,584, 30,593 (July 26, 1990) (same).
93 Proposed Rule at 29,196-97 (describing averaging, banking, and trading provisions as "help[ing]
manufacturers to employ a wide range of compliance paths").
The structure of the Clean Air Act and its regulatory provisions for standard setting,
certification, compliance enforcement, warranties, and penalties also directly conflict with a
fleet- wide averaging regulatory regime. Notably, under Section 202(a), EPA "shall test, or
require to be tested in such manner as [it] deems appropriate, any new motor vehicle or new
motor vehicle engine submitted by a manufacturer" and issue a certificate of conformity "if such
vehicle or engine" complies with the standards.94 And EPA must "test any emission control
system incorporated in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine ... to determine whether such a
system enables such vehicle or engine to conform to the standards required to be prescribe under
[Section 202(b)]" of the Act.95 EPA's use of a fleetwide averaging regulatory regime directly
conflicts with the statutory provisions that Congress already included to provide manufacturers
with compliance flexibility. For example, section 202(b)(3) provided compliance flexibilities for
NOx, but only for no "more than 5 percent of [a] manufacturer's production or more than fifty
thousand vehicles or engines, whichever is greater "96 This provision would be nonsensical
under a fleetwide-averaging regime where, if applied, an OEM could give itself a waiver for
large swaths of its fleet by over-complying for certain product lines well beyond its 5 percent or
50,000 vehicle allotment.97 Together, the Clean Air Act regulatory framework contemplates
EPA regulating vehicles individually. But this cannot be accomplished if there is not a clear
emission standard applicable to a single vehicle at the start of a model year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp. 23-24]
94 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1).
95 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(2).
96 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(3).
97 While Clean Air Act Section 202(b)(3) is specific to legacy light-duty vehicles through model year 1985
subject to a 1.5 grams/mile NOx standard and no longer directly applicable, the provision is incongruent
with fleet-wide averaging, and no associated amendments to Section 202(a) would support a different
reading today.
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
C. History of Regulation of Multi-Pollutant Emissions
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More than half a century ago, Congress established a statutory regime to reduce motor vehicle
emissions in light of evidence that "[t]he automobile has had a devastating impact on the
American environment" and "automotive pollution constitutes in excess of 60% of our national
air pollution problem." 103 Under this regime, Congress has directed EPA to promulgate
"standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7521(a)(1). 104 Congress has required that these standards apply "whether such vehicles and
engines are designed as complete systems or incorporate devices to prevent or control such
pollution." Id. 105 EPA's standards "shall take effect after such period as the Administrator finds
necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving
appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, pp. 16-17]
103 Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Pub. L. 89-272 § 201, 79 Stat.
992, 992-93 (1965).
104 Compare with Pub. L. 89-272 § 202(a), 79 Stat. 992, 992-93 (1965) ("The Secretary shall by
regulation, giving appropriate consideration to technological feasibility and economic costs, prescribe as
soon as practicable standards, applicable to the emission of any kind of substance, from any class or classes
of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause or contribute to, or are
likely to cause or contribute to, air pollution which endangers the health or welfare of any persons ").
105 Compare with Pub. L. 89-272 § 202(a), 79 Stat. 992, 992-93 (1965) ("[S]uch standards shall apply to
such vehicles or engines whether they are designed as complete systems or incorporate other devices to
prevent or control such pollution.").
From 1966 through 1970, pursuant to its statutory mandate, EPA's predecessor 106
promulgated three sets of emissions standards to control crankcase emissions, exhaust emissions
of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide, and evaporative fuel emissions. 31 Fed. Reg. 5,170 (Mar.
30, 1966); 33 Fed. Reg. 8,304 (June 4, 1968); 35 Fed. Reg. 17,288 (Nov. 10, 1970). Since it was
formed in 1970, EPA has finalized upwards of fifty rules setting or amending emissions
standards for various classes of vehicles and myriad air pollutants that EPA determined may
endanger public health or welfare. See e.g., 36 Fed. Reg. 12,652 (Jul. 2, 1971) (EPA's first
emission standards for NOx), 45 Fed. Reg. 14,496 (Mar. 5, 1980) (EPA's first emission
standards for PM). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 16-17]
106 At the time, the federal body responsible for carrying out the statutory mandate was the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Standards more stringent than EPA's proposed standards would comport with its statutory
mandate in Section 202(a) and further the statutory objective by reducing the threats from
vehicle pollution to public health and welfare. EPA projects that the proposed standards will
reduce GHG emissions by more than 7.3 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide (C02), 120,000
metric tons of methane (CH4), and 130,000 metric tons of nitrous oxide (N20) through 2055, in
addition to criteria pollutant reductions of 44,000 tons per year of nitrogen oxides (NOx), 9,800
tons per year of fine particulate matter (PM2.5), 200,000 tons per year of non-methane organic
gases (NMOG), 2,800 tons per year of sulfur oxides (SOx), and 1.8 million tons per year of
carbon monoxide (CO) by 2055. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,348 (Table 135); id. at 29,351 (Table 139).
More emission reductions are feasible. See CARB Comment at 17-22. Given EPA's description
of these emissions reductions as an "essential factor" in its determination of the appropriate level
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of the proposed standards, id. at 29,344, and the primacy Congress placed on addressing
pollution's danger to public health and welfare in Section 202(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), our
States and Cities urge EPA to increase the stringency of its standards beyond those
proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 28]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CDFC)
EPA Experts Have Warned About "Atmospheric Transformation Products" from Aromatics
for Many Years. Outside of OTAQ, EPA experts have been clear about EPA's duty under the
Clean Air Act to control carcinogenic and mutagenic atmospheric reaction products, the
predominant precursors of which are gasoline aromatics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 9]
"Although oxidized VOCs can be components of primary emissions from a variety of sources,
most result from secondary reactions of hydrocarbons emitted into the atmosphere, making them
late-generation atmospheric reaction products. Assessments of health effects based solely on
direct emissions are incomplete if potentially important contributions from such products are
neglected, as has been noted by the Clean Air Act, which mandates consideration of atmospheric
transformation products. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 9]
5. Conclusions and implications for control strategies
Other than 1,2,4- and 1,3,5-trimethylbenzene, all of the precursor aromatic VOCs investigated
here are classified as hazardous air pollutants by the U.S. EPA, and therefore emissions of these
species from industrial activities are controlled under the Clean Air Act (U.S. EPA, 2015a).
Nonetheless, of the 8 VOCs that produced mutagenic atmospheres, all did so only under
irradiation. Thus, only late-generation reaction products were responsible for the mutagenicity,
not the precursor VOCs, raising an interesting point regarding potential control strategies when
the photochemistry of certain chemical species is similar to those described here. Non-mutagenic
primary compounds may be less likely to be controlled; however, the resulting late-generation
products may be more likely to be mutagenic. Therefore, consideration should be given to
precursor compounds based not only on their intrinsic health concerns but also on those of their
potential late-generation atmospheric photochemical products. It seems that these products,
which are typically not monitored or controlled, account for much of the gas-phase direct-acting
mutagenicity. Based on these limited studies, reducing the concentrations of primary VOCs
would likely result in a corresponding reduction in the concentrations of the products, with a
parallel reduction in atmospheric mutagenicity."5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 9]
5 "Mutagenic atmospheres resulting from the photooxidation of aromatic hydrocarbon and NOx mixtures",
Theran P. Riedela,* , David M. DeMarinib , Jose Zavalac , Sarah H. Warrenb , Eric W. Corsed, John H.
Offenberga, Tadeusz E. Kleindiensta, Michael Lewandowski]
[Dr. Riedel is a senior scientist at EPA's National Exposure Research Lab in Research
Triangle Park, NC. He and his colleagues published this study in 2018 ResearchGate
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/31586423 l_Mutagenicity_and_Carcinogen icity]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 9]
Organization: Elders Climate Action
C. EPA's Failure to Set Zero Emission Standards Violates the CAA.
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The CAA declares that the primary purpose of the Act is "to protect and enhance the quality
of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive
capacity of its population." 42 U.S.C. §7401(b)(l). To implement this purpose, section
202(b)(1)(C) grants the Administrator discretion to commence a rulemaking to revise standards
previously promulgated under subsection (a)(1), but once that rulemaking is commenced, as
here, the Act requires that the Administrator determine what revisions are "needed to protect
public health and welfare." That statutory benchmark has not been addressed in this rulemaking,
either with respect to the emission reductions needed to prevent endangerment of the public
health and welfare from the climate impacts of GHG emissions, or from the impacts of criteria
pollutant violations of NAAQS on public health. The failure to undertake an analysis to
determine what emission standards are needed to protect public health and welfare renders this
rulemaking unlawful and fundamentally flawed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 6-8]
L/MDVs that are commercially available today with zero emission power trains obviously
satisfy the available technology requirement. A large fraction of the C02 emitted from on-road
vehicles comes from L/MD vehicle types that are NOW commercially available with zero
emission power trains. These include transit and school buses, delivery vans, service trucks, and
shuttles serving airports, hotels and resorts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 6-8]
EPA admits that ZEV technologies are available, and are the most cost-effective technologies,
but the Agency only estimates the zero emission L/MDVs that will likely be available in 2027 as
a result of current incentive policies and state regulations. EPA does not estimate the potential
availability of zero emission L/MDVs that could be produced and sold if EPA were to
promulgate zero emission standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 6-8]
Instead EPA assumes that the rule will marginally improve the efficiency of IC engines and
"induce" enough ZEV sales to reduce C02 emissions less than 5% by 2030 from new L/MDVs
sold in 2027 and subsequent years. By failing to require the production and sale of zero emission
L/MDVs along with a fleet averaging rule that allows engine manufacturers to sell "dirty"
uncontrolled L/MDVs through the use of emission reduction credits obtained by selling zero
emission vehicles in California and section 177 states, EPA is effectively allowing engine
manufacturers to capture the benefits of clean zero emission vehicles for themselves while
increasing the exposure of at-risk communities to harmful pollutants in non-177 states. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 6-8]
We include a legal analysis that demonstrates EPA's failure to set standards that will achieve
the maximum deployment of zero emission technologies fails to achieve the public health
purpose of the Act, and is not consistent with the statutory text and the legislative history of the
Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 6-8]
By setting zero emission standards for NOx beginning in 2027 for the vehicle types currently
available as zero emission vehicles (ZEVs), EPA should determine the NOx emissions that
would be avoided in nonattainment areas where EPA's modeling for the 2022 HD rule shows
that current and proposed HD emission standards will not be sufficient to provide for attainment.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 6-8]
CONCLUSION.
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EPA must determine the extent to which a zero emission standard for L/MD vehicles
beginning in 2027 would be needed to put our nation's vehicle fleet on a clear path to attaining
the ozone and PM NAAQS by the statutory deadline. In addition, EPA must, at a minimum, use
the IPCC modeling analysis and data to estimate the endangerment that will result from climate
warming if global mean temperature is allowed to exceed 1.5o C as the benchmark for
determining endangerment to the public health and welfare, and determine what emission
standard is needed for L/MD vehicles to achieve the reductions needed to ensure that the U.S.
contribution to atmospheric loadings of C02 will be reduced to the levels need to prevent more
severe effects of climate warming. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 6-8]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
F. EPA should strengthen the Tier 4 NMOG+NOX standards and finalize the proposed PM
requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 53]
We now turn to EPA's proposed criteria pollutant standards for LDVs. As detailed below,
while the proposed PM2.5 requirements are appropriate, EPA should strengthen the
NMOG+NOX standards and consider ways to limit over-crediting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 53]
1. EPA should increase the stringency of the proposed NMOG+NOX standards. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 53]
a. EPA should strengthen the NMOG+NOx standards to better reflect available, feasible,
and cost-effective technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 53]
EPA's 2014 Tier 3 emissions standards were set based on the deployment of technologies
applicable to combustion vehicles. The NMOG+NOx standards are meant to continuously phase
in from 2017-2025, ultimately reaching a fleet average of 30 mg/mile on the FTP and 50
mg/mile on the SFTP. However, over this time period, an increasing share of BEVs will be sold,
which are certified to 0 mg/mile NMOG+NOx. While the deployment of BEVs will not alter the
tailpipe emissions reductions anticipated under the Tier 3 program, the additional BEVs, counted
as 0 mg/mile, substantially reduce manufacturers' incentives to deploy the full extent of
technologies EPA identified in the Tier 3 rulemaking to their combustion vehicles. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 53]
Two responses are possible from manufacturers: they either (1) deploy the same suite of
internal combustion engine technologies to their combustion vehicle fleet, and therefore generate
a significant amount of overcompliance credits that can be used to reduce their compliance
obligations under the Tier 4 standards EPA is now proposing; or (2) reduce the deployment of
technologies as EPA originally envisioned when setting the Tier 3 standards, leaving emissions
reductions for their combustion vehicle fleet on the table. Either response weakens compliance
with the standards. Strengthening the Tier 4 standards will help avoid these problems. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 53]
Therefore, EPA's proposed NMOG+NOx standards leave a significant gap between the
feasible deployment of zero-emission technologies (indicated by the share of BEVs modeled for
GHG compliance) and the feasible deployment of improvements to combustion vehicles
(indicated by the achievement of a Tier 3 fleet average standard without the deployment of
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BEVs). Figure VI.F-1 illustrates, on the left, the implicit requirements on combustion vehicles
under the proposed NMOG+NOx standards with EPA's modeled adoption of BEVs under the
GHG standards; and, on the right, the implied share of BEVs required by the proposed Tier 4
standards if combustion vehicles achieve Tier 3 compliance. If BEVs are deployed at levels
modeled by the Agency to comply with its GHG Proposal, NMOG+NOx emissions from
combustion vehicles would remain about 30% higher than the Tier 3 requirement over the
timeframe of the rule. If, instead, the combustion vehicle fleet matches the Tier 3 requirements in
2027-2032, far fewer BEVs would need to be deployed to meet the Tier 4 proposed targets.
These scenarios demonstrate that numerous technological pathways are available to
manufacturers to comply with the Tier 4 standards and that stronger standards are entirely
feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 53-54]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure VI.F-1. Emissions performance and ZEV market
share implied by the combination of achieving the proposed GHG standards and Tier 3 /
Proposed Tier 4 NMOG+NOx standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 54]
If manufacturers deploy ZEVs consistent with EPA's projection of compliance with the GHG
standards, tailpipe emissions performance from the remaining combustion vehicles will exceed
Tier 3 standards (left). If combustion vehicles instead achieve Tier 3 emissions standards, far
fewer ZEVs will be required to meet the proposed Tier 4 fleet average standards than are
modeled to comply with the GHG standards (right). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 54]
EPA should close this gap in relative stringency by setting a standard that reflects the full
emissions reductions of the combustion vehicle technologies it has already identified as feasible
(and which are readily available). Aligning the Agency's assessment of ZEV deployment and its
analysis (covered primarily in the Tier 3 rulemaking) of what is achievable to reduce
NMOG+NOx emissions from combustion vehicles would yield a 2032 target of 10 mg/mi, a
17% reduction from its Proposal. Interim targets would then be adjusted accordingly. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 54]
Such a standard for LDVs would still be technology-neutral: The target corresponds to the
lowest non-zero bin in the Proposal (Tier 4 Bin 10), 137 and the Agency has already identified
combustion vehicles that have certified FTP emissions below 10 mg/mi. 138 Moreover, we
expect that manufacturers seeking to comply with the multipollutant standards primarily through
combustion vehicle technologies would be investing in further emission-reduction technologies
from those vehicles, such as by ensuring their vehicles are more in line with the emissions
profiles of the industry-leading vehicles, including through deployment of hybridization and
other EPA-identified strategies to reduce tailpipe emissions. Alternatively, for manufacturers that
want to comply with the multipollutant standards through greater deployment of zero-emission
technologies, this pathway would still allow flexibility for their combustion vehicle fleet to fall
short of the Tier 3 requirements, provided they sell ZEVs beyond EPA's modeled industry
average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 54-55]
137 88 Fed. Reg. at 29419.
138 DRIA at 3-41, Tbl. 3-14.
EPA has embarked on a multipollutant rulemaking precisely because technologies exist to
simultaneously achieve reductions in GHGs and criteria pollutants. 139 Reducing the stringency
of the final standards to 10 mg/mi NMOG+NOx better aligns with the feasible and cost-
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appropriate technologies already identified by the Agency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
55]
139 88 Fed. Reg. at 29187.
b. EPA should consider ways to limit over-crediting.
Figure VI.F-1 (left side) shows a non-monotonic behavior—that is, the allowable emissions
profile of the combustion vehicles (green line) first increases significantly from 2026-2029, then
decreases. This is largely due to the delay in increasing stringency for LDT3, LDT4, and MDPV
classes (Class 2 light trucks), the result of EPA's interpretation of lead time requirements under
the Clean Air Act. 140 The Agency has offered an optional "early compliance" pathway for
manufacturers; however, this pathway increases the total stringency over the six years covered
by the proposal, reducing the likelihood of manufacturers choosing this path to
compliance. 141 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 55]
140 See id. at 29258.
141 If EPA sets a 10 mg/mile standard in 2032 as recommended in Section VI.F.l.a, and thus reduces the
step for Class 2 light trucks to 10 mg/mile, there would presumably be no such gap in stringency between
the early and default compliance pathways.
In an effort to induce manufacturers to align with the early compliance pathway and to
acknowledge the reduced emissions benefits of the stagnant standard for Class 2 light trucks
from 2025-2029 (a full five-year window corresponding to the lifetime of Tier 3 credits) under
the default compliance pathway, EPA should condition manufacturers' full utilization of credits
in this time period on their utilization of the early compliance pathway. For example, EPA could
set a limit on the amount of averaging, banking, and trading (ABT) credits that could be utilized
for compliance, in order to limit windfall credits from reductions in fleet emissions that occur
during the 4-year period of stagnation. This would also ensure that manufacturers do not
artificially prolong compliance through an overreliance on such credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 55]
2. The proposed PM2.5 requirements are appropriate.
EPA is also proposing to set a limit on the allowable particulate matter (PM2.5) emissions
from all LDVs. This is an appropriate step under the Agency's authority and is well-grounded in
both the need for additional emissions reductions and technical feasibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 55]
Stoichiometric gasoline direct-injection is deployed in over half the new vehicle fleet in the
United States and supports the deployment of turbocharged, downsized engines as well as high-
compression ratio engines, both of which are key technologies to reduce GHG emissions. 142 At
the same time, moving from port-fuel injection to direct-injection leads to an increase in both the
amount of PM2.5 and the particle count. 143 Addressing PM2.5 emissions from the vehicles
deploying these technologies is critical as they become a larger share of the on-road fleet. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 56]
142 See U.S. EPA, The 2022 Automotive Trends Report: Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Fuel Economy, and
Technology Since 1975, EPA-420-R-22-029 (Dec. 2022), Chapter 4, available at
https://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends/download-automotive-trends-report.
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143 Omar I. Awad, et al, Particulate emissions from gasoline direct injection engines: A review of how
current emission regulations are being met by automobile manufacturers, Sci. Total Env. 718, 137302
(2020), at https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.137302 (subscription required).
Gasoline particulate filters (GPFs) have been successfully deployed globally for years to
address these emissions, as EPA has documented in the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis
(DRIA).144 Additionally, in-cylinder strategies can help mitigate emissions, including through
the design of both the injector and the cylinder surface. 145 Aftertreatment design can also be
used to mitigate cold-start emissions, in particular. 146 All of the technology developments
described above are well-established, and many are analogous to technologies that have been
deployed to limit PM2.5 emissions from diesel engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 56]
144 DRIA, Section 3.2.5.
145 See Awad. et al. 2020 for a review.
146 Id.
As part of its Advanced Clean Cars program, California finalized a PM2.5 standard of 1
mg/mile, to begin phasing in with the 2025 model year. 147 As part of its review, the California
Air Resources Board (CARB) conducted tests demonstrating the feasibility of achieving this
standard, including data on particle count, GPF effectiveness, and the ability to measure sub-mg
quantities of PM2.5.148 While these standards have not gone into effect, the underlying data
support EPA's proposed PM2.5 program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 56]
147 Cal. Code of Regs. Tit. 13, § 1961.2(a)(2)(A).
148 For measurement capability, see CARB, An Update on the Measurement Of PM Emissions at LEV III
Levels, (2015), available at https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
01/lev_iii_pm_measurement_feasibility_tsd_20151008_ac.pdf. For additional tests on GPF capability, see
CARB, California[']s Advanced Clean Cars Midterm Review, Appendix K: PM Emission Testing Results
(Jan. 8, 2017), available athttps://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
01/appendix_k_pm_test_results_ac.pdf.
The benefits of the PM2.5 standards are significant—depending on the assumed rate of
deployment, EPA's Proposed Standards could cut tailpipe PM2.5 emissions by up to 90% by
2050.149 This could lead to cumulative health benefits of $85 to $160 billion over that same
timeframe, at a 3% discount rate. 150 Importantly, it could also lead to measurable improvements
in near-roadway air quality,151 which could be significant for the more than 41 million people
living within close proximity of high-traffic roadways. 152 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp.
56-57]
149 Oak Leaf Envtl., Impacts Analysis of a Revised Federal Light-Duty On-Road Particulate Matter
Standard, Prepared for the Manufacturers of Emissions Controls Association (MECA) (June 2023), at 20,
Fig. 7, available at https://www.meca.org/wp-
content/uploads/2023/06/LD V_PM_Standard_Final_Report_06272023.pdf.
150 Id. at 22-23, Figs. 9, 10 & "9" [Fig. 11 appears to be incorrectly labeled as Fig. 9],
151 Id. at 24, Tbl. 5.
152 88 Fed. Reg. at 26060.
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Organization: Governing for Impact and Evergreen Action (GFI)
I. Background: the Proposed Rule & the Major Questions Doctrine
The EPA's Proposed Rule, covering light and medium duty vehicle emissions of both
greenhouse gases ("GHGs") and criteria pollutants for MYs 2027-2032, appropriately fulfills the
statutory obligation under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act ("CAA") to issue standards for
motor vehicle emissions that "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 11 It also marks a positive and necessary step
towards reducing carbon emissions in line with current domestic and international climate
commitments, as well as addressing environmental justice concerns. This administration has
committed to reducing GHG pollution by 50-52 percent by 2030 (relative to 2005 levels)—and
policies to address pollution from the transportation sector will be critical to achieving this
goal. 12 The transportation sector accounts for the largest share of domestic GHG pollution (29
percent); and light duty vehicles are responsible for the largest share of greenhouse emissions
within the transportation sector (58 percent). 13 Despite the EPA's previous GHG regulations
under Section 202(a), transportation emissions in the United States continue to grow, 14
demonstrating that greater action is needed to fulfill the CAA's statutory goals and achieve this
administration's climate targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 2]
11 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(l).
12 "FACT SHEET: President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction Target Aimed at
Creating Good- Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S. Leadership on Clean Energy Technologies," The
White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-
president-biden-sets-2030- greenhouse-gas-pollution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good-paying-
union-jobs-and-securing-u-s-leadership-on- clean-energy-technologies/ (April 22, 2021).
13 Fast Facts on Transportation Greenhouse Gas Emissions," U.S. Enviro. Prot. Agency,
https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/fast-facts-transportation-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited June
15, 2023).
14 See "Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks," U.S. Enviro. Prot. Agency,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks (last visited June 15,
2023).
The Proposed Rule, contrary to some public commentary, 18 simply follows the course laid by
decades of CAA §202(a) emissions standards for new motor vehicles and motor vehicle
engines. 19 Since the 1970s, the EPA has used this authority to set standards for passenger
vehicles that reduced deadly emissions such as lead, carbon monoxide, particulate matter, and
nitrogen oxide. In the wake of the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. E.P.A.,
which held that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions as air pollutants under the
CAA,20 the EPA released its first Section 202(a) standard targeting GHG emissions from light
duty vehicles in 2010, covering MYs 2012-2016.21 As new data about the urgency of the
climate crisis and its ensuing public health impacts, especially to environmental justice
communities, have emerged over the last decade, the EPA has further tightened those standards
in a series of subsequent rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 3]
18 18 See supra at 1.
19 See EPA, "Timeline of Major Accomplishments in Transportation, Air Pollution, and Climate Change,"
https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/timeline-major-accomplishments-
transportation- air (last visited June 15, 2023).
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20 549 U.S. 497.
21 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards; Final Rule," 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 2010), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2010-
05-07/pdf/2010-8159.pdf.
Nor did West Virginia hold that any regulation touching on climate change constitutes a
major question.52 In fact, that decision never suggested that the EPA lacks the power to regulate
carbon emissions from power plants under the relevant section of the CAA—it merely held that
the Clean Power Plan's particular method for doing so was impermissible.53 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0621, pp. 6-7]
52 Commentators have suggested as much across various regulatory proposals. See e.g., Letter from
Attorney General Patrick Morrisey, West Virginia, et al. to Chair Rostin Behnam, CFTC, re: Comments on
the CFTC's "Climate-Related Financial Risk RFI" by the Attorneys General of the States of West Virginia,
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming
(Oct. 7, 2022), comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=70868&SearchText=. In
comments to a Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council proposal requiring certain large federal contractors
to make limited disclosures about carbon emissions, the Washington Legal Foundation cited West Virginia
for the proposition that "climate policy is the exclusive prerogative of Congress"—concluding that
executive action touching on the issue therefore poses a "major question." Comment of Washington Legal
Foundation, "FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION: DISCLOSURE OF GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL RISK," 1 (Feb. 13, 2023),
https ://www. regulations .gov/comment/F AR-2021 -0015-0158.
53 See W. Virginia at 2615 ("the only interpretive question before us, and the only one we answer, is more
narrow: whether the 'best system of emission reduction' identified by EPA in the Clean Power Plan was
within the authority granted to the Agency in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. For the reasons given,
the answer is no").
Finally, note that even if a court concludes that an agency action constitutes a "major
question," the court's work is not complete. The regulation can still survive if the agency can
demonstrate "clear congressional authority" for its interpretation that goes beyond "a merely
plausible textual basis."54 To date, most regulations that the Supreme Court has characterized as
"major questions" have failed to meet this standard. But in King v. Burwell, a majority of the
Court led by Chief Justice Roberts upheld an Internal Revenue Service interpretation concerning
Affordable Care Act tax credits, even after finding that the action effectively qualified as a major
question.55 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 6-7]
54 W. Virginia at 2609.
55 King at 485 ("In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that
Congress has intended such an implicit delegation... This is one of those cases") (internal citations
omitted).
Finally, suggestions by some opponents that the EPA must promulgate its emissions standards
in coordination with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"),75 which
sets fuel- economy standards but is prohibited from taking EVs' fuel economy into account in
setting those standards, are wrong. While it is true that the two agencies have jointly
promulgated GHG and fuel economy regulations in the past, there is no statutory requirement
that they do so—and the agencies did not do so in 2021 when the EPA promulgated 202(a) GHG
regulations for MYs 2023-2026.76 In fact, the Supreme Court has described the EPA's authority
to regulate carbon emissions from motor vehicles as "a statutory obligation wholly independent"
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from NHTSA's energy efficiency mandate regarding mileage requirements.77 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0621, pp. 9-10]
75 See, e.g., Private Petitioners' brief, Texas v. E.P.A., D.C. Cir. No. 22-1031.
76 "Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards," 86
Fed. Reg. 74434 (Dec. 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/12/30/2021-27854/revised-
2023-and-later-model-y ear- light-duty-vehicle-greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards.
77 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). See also Coal, for Responsible Regul., Inc. v.
E.P.A., 684 F.3d 102, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining why NHTSA's regulatory obligations do not affect
the EPA's obligations under the CAA); Proposed Rule at fn. 388; Dan Farber, "The Car Rule and the Major
Questions Doctrine," Legal Planet (April 24, 2023), https://legal-planet.org/2023/04/24/the-car-rule-and-
the-major-questions-doctrine/; Proof Brief of the Institute for Policy Integrity at 10-11.
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
b. EPA Lacks Statutory Authority to Set Fleetwide Average Emission Standards, and In All
Events May Not Average In Vehicles that Do Not Emit the Relevant Pollutant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, p. 6]
EPA lacks statutory authority under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act to set fleetwide
emission standards, and even if it had such authority, it could not lawfully use it to force
electrification by including vehicles that have no tailpipe emissions in the fleetwide average
standard for ICE vehicles. The Proposed Rule results in fleetwide standards that cannot be met
by ICE vehicles alone; however, under the Clean Air Act, EPA may only set individual vehicle-
level emission standards. Such standards must be for "emission[s]" from "any class or classes of
new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which . . . cause, or contribute to," potentially
harmful air pollution. 18 The plain language of this provision authorizes EPA to set standards for
classes of individual vehicles or engines that emit air pollutants. Because PEVs do not directly
"cause, or contribute to," air pollution individually within the construct of a tailpipe emissions
standard, any standard applicable to "any class or classes" of vehicles cannot include PEVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 6]
18 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
PEVs are simply not the "technology" contemplated by Congress here. Instead, Congress
enabled EPA to increase emission standard stringency through cleaner fuels and improved
emissions-related systems to be incorporated into ICE vehicles such as advances in fuel
injection, exhaust gas combustion management, and advances catalysts to neutralize pollutants of
concern. 19 By factoring in PEV performance as a part of its averaging scheme, EPA is ignoring
the technological feasibility of emissions-related systems and simply requiring the production of
fewer ICE vehicles. The Proposed Rule does not consider advances to ICE technologies when
setting the standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 6]
19 For example, Section 202(m) requires the monitoring of "emission-related systems" such as the
"catalytic converter and oxygen sensor." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(m)(l).
And even for criteria pollutants emitted from ICE vehicles, the Clean Air Act says nothing
about averaging across fleets or banking and trading credits across different model years,
different vehicle classes, and OEMs. While EPA has previously adopted fleetwide averaging, it
has also acknowledged that "Congress did not specifically contemplate an averaging program
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when it enacted the Clean Air Act."20 And "[jjust as the statute does not explicitly address
EPA's authority to allow averaging, it does not address the Agency's authority to permit banking
and trading."21 By definition, then, the Act does not address—let alone clearly authorize—the
use of averaging, banking, and trading in a manner that mandates electrification of the national
vehicle fleet of motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p.
6]
20 48 Fed. Reg. 33,456, 33,458 (July 21, 1983).
21 54 Fed. Reg. 22,652, 22,665 (May 25, 1989); see 55 Fed. Reg. 30,584, 30,593 (July 26, 1990) (same).
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
More than one-third of the U.S. population currently lives in an area that does not meet the
health- and welfare-based National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone, PM or
both. Many of these areas are over-burdened communities whose citizens are exposed to a
disproportionate share of harmful environmental conditions. Transportation-related emissions are
a primary cause. EPA data show that in 2023, mobile sources will be responsible for about 54
percent of anthropogenic emissions of NOx, 5 percent of anthropogenic direct emissions of
PM2.5 and 19 percent of anthropogenic emissions of VOCs - the key pollutants contributing to
the formation of ozone and soot, which are linked with premature death as well as serious
respiratory and cardiovascular impacts, cancer and other serious health effects. Of these
amounts, about 20 percent of the NOx, 19 percent of the PM2.5 and 41 percent of the VOCs will
come from LMDVs.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 2-3]
8 Supra note 1, at 29,186
While state and local air agencies have made great strides in reducing emissions from
stationary sources, for the most part they lack the authority to regulate mobile sources and never
have had the authority to regulate mobile sources across their borders. The regulation of mobile
sources is an authority that lies almost entirely within the purview of the federal government.
While air agencies in regions across the country may pursue standards under Clean Air Act
(CAA) section 177 that are first adopted by California (under CAA section 209), most are
precluded, by state policies or legislation, from adopting standards more stringent than those of
the federal government. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 2-3]
As many parts of the country slip deeper into nonattainment, or are on the cusp of it, many
state and local air agencies are left with few remaining mechanisms to achieve the emission
reductions the CAA requires. Areas that miss their attainment deadlines face the threat of
"bump-up" to a more demanding classification of nonattainment - if they are not already
classified as Extreme - and statutorily required economic sanctions if they fail to meet their
attainment deadlines. On October 7, 2022, EPA bumped up over 25 areas in nonattainment of the
20089 and 201510 ozone NAAQS, meaning the citizens of these areas continue to suffer the
detrimental impacts of unhealthful air. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 2-3]
9 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-10-07/pdf/2022-20458.pdf
10 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-10-07/pdf/2022-20460.pdf
Further, EPA is now in the process of reconsidering the existing PM and ozone NAAQS,
which were revised with greater stringency in 2012 and 2015, respectively, and retained without
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revision in December 2020. Regardless of whether either or both standards are strengthened, the
fact is that many areas across the country need reductions in pollutants that contribute to PM2.5
and ozone just to meet or sustain the current NAAQS and provide clean air to their citizens.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 2-3]
Regarding attainment and maintenance of the ozone NAAQS, most areas of the country are
"NOx- limited," meaning that reducing NOx emissions is the key to success. In addition,
research shows that in some areas of the country, such as much of the East Coast, NOx
reductions are now "supercharged," meaning that a one-pound reduction in NOx emissions
equals more than one pound of ozone reduction. Failure to adequately address transportation-
related NOx sources, including LDVs and MDVs, will have a direct and consequential impact on
state and local air agencies' abilities to fulfill their statutory obligations to attain and maintain
federal air quality standards by mandated deadlines and achieve their environmental justice
goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 2-3]
Carbon, criteria pollutant and toxic emissions from LMDVs harm public health and threaten
our climate. Every area of the nation is adversely affected by these emissions and their growing
impacts. Those living in communities that bear a disproportionately and unjustly greater burden
of the consequences of these emissions must be the central focus, rather than on the margins, of
EPA's attention when the agency finalizes this rule. Toward all these ends, NACAA offers the
following for EPA's consideration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
IV. Conclusion
Given the urgency of the climate crisis, the impacts of pollution from transportation on air
quality and public health, anticipated growth of the transportation sector, and the rapid growth in
ZEV adoption, it is necessary and appropriate for EPA to exercise its authority in CAA Section
202(a) to establish new and more stringent GHG and criteria pollutant and emissions standards
for MYs 2027 and later LDVs and MDVs. NESCAUM and the OTC urge EPA to finalize a rule
with the most stringent standards feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 12]
Organization: POET, LLC
EPA has broad authority under Section 211(c)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act to issue regulations
controlling fuels or fuel additives that cause and/or contribute to air pollution that may endanger
public health. 155 This authority permits EPA to limit high-boiling compounds/heavy aromatics
because these fuel additives contribute to PM emissions which endanger public health. Pursuant
to Section 211(c)(2)(A), EPA must consider all relevant scientific evidence available to the
agency when setting these standards, including the significant evidence that bioethanol blending
is the most practicable replacement for heavy aromatics, and that bioethanol has particularly
significant emissions benefits for PM, other criteria pollutants, and GHGs. 156 The further
reduction of aromatics in gasoline would also be consistent with EPA's mandates and authority
under the Mobile Source Air Toxics Program. 157 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 33]
155 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A).
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156 Id. § 7545(c)(2)(A).
157 See Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources, 72 Fed. Reg. 8428 (Feb. 26, 2007).
Bioethanol does not receive the credit it deserves as a powerful tool in reducing both criteria
pollutant and GHG emissions. Replacing heavy aromatics with bioethanol blending would
maintain octane levels, reduce tailpipe PM emissions, and reduce lifecycle GHG emissions,
furthering many of EPA's Clean Air Act mandates. EPA should carefully consider the benefits
of bioethanol blending as a key solution in any potential rulemaking to further reduce tailpipe
PM reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 33]
Organization: ReginaldModlin andB. ReidDetchon
We note the comment in the Proposed Rule that "in addition to substantially reducing GHG
emissions, a longer-term rulemaking could also address criteria pollutant and air toxics emissions
from the new light-duty vehicle fleet - especially important considerations during the transition
to zero-emission vehicles." Most vehicles entering the market today use gasoline direct
injection (GDI) to enhance performance. DOE studies have identified a notable increase in
ultrafine particle emissions from GDI engines. The increased number of particles and their size
include emissions of toxic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 2-3]
For mobile source air toxics, such as PAHs derived from gasoline emissions, the Clean Air
Act requires "the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the application of
technology which will be available." In that context, just as with greenhouse gas emissions,
vehicles and fuels must be seen as parts of an integrated system. The Department of Energy
clearly understands the need for such an approach. Since 2016, the Co-Optimization of Fuels &
Engines initiative (known as Co-Optima) has explored how simultaneous innovations in fuels
and engines can boost fuel economy and vehicle performance, while reducing emissions. The
Co-Optima team views fuels "not as standalone elements in the transportation system, but as
dynamic design variables that can work with modern engines to optimize and revolutionize the
entire on-road fleet." Their work will be useful as EPA considers the adoption of improved fuels
in current and future rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 2-3]
b. In the 30 years since the law was enacted, EPA has issued specific regulations on the
subject of mobile source air toxics (MSATs) only twice - putting modest limits on benzene
emissions in 2001 and on the benzene content of gasoline in 2007, but largely deferring action on
the others. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 25-26]
i. The 2001 rule did list the BTEX aromatics as mobile source air toxics and noted that
mobile sources accounted for more than 75% of total national emissions in each instance. Also
listed was polycyclic organic matter: A group of seven PAHs, "which have been identified by
EPA as probable human carcinogens" - including BaP - were used as surrogates for the larger
group of POM compounds. Mobile sources were said to account for only 6% of total national
emissions - but as measured by mass, not particle number. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp.
25-26]
129 U.S. EPA, "Control of Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants fromMobile Sources" (2001), op. cit.,
supra note 22.
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c. Congress reiterated its 1990 mandate in the Energy Policy Act of 2005: "Not later than
July 1, 2007, the [EPA] Administrator shall promulgate final regulations to control hazardous air
pollutants from motor vehicles and motor vehicles fuels ... as authorized under section 202(1) of
the Clean Air Act." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 25-26]
130 Energy Policy Act of 2005, P.L. 109-58, "Elimination Of Oxygen Content Requirement For
Reformulated Gasoline," sec. 1504(b)(l)(vi): https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ58/PLAW-
109publ58.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021). Codified at 42 U.S. Code, sec.?7545(k)(l)(B)(vi), "Regulation of
fuels": https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7545 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. EPA issued its 2007 mobile-source rule in response to this congressional directive. It
acknowledged that "Recent studies have found that maternal exposures to PAHs in a population
of pregnant women were associated with several adverse birth outcomes, including low birth
weight and reduced length at birth, as well as impaired cognitive development at age three."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 25-26]
131 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Mobile Sources;
Final Rule," Federal Register (2007): 72(37): p. 8439: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2007-02-
26/pdf/E7-2667.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
1. But EPA took no action, saying that, according to its model, emissions of polycyclic
organic matter "correlate directly with VOC emissions" and thus would decline as VOC
emissions decline - failing to anticipate the contrary effect of new GDI engine technology,
noted above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 25-26]
132 Ibid., p. 8478.
ii. In proposing the rule, the agency also acknowledged "limited data that suggest that
aromatic compounds (toluene, xylene, and benzene) react photochemically in the atmosphere to
form secondary particulate matter (in the form of secondary organic aerosol (SOA)), although
our current modeling tools do not fully reflect this" (emphasis added) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 25-26]
133 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Mobile Sources;
Proposed Rule," Federal Register (2006): 71(60): p. 15864: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
2006-03-29/pdf/06-2315.pdf#page=62 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
My comments are divided into two parts:
First, I will explain why I believe these proposed rules far exceed the EPA's authority under
section 202 of the Clean Air Act4 and clearly implicate the Supreme Court's "Major Questions
Doctrine" under West Virginia v. EPA and related cases. 5 Thus, if finalized as proposed, these
rules would be "in excess of statutory ... authority" within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act, or APA.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 2]
4 42 U.S.C. § 7521, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7521.
5 See West Virginia v. EPA, No. 20-1530, 597 U.S. (2022), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/20-
1530.
6 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) ("The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be ... in excess of statutory ... authority.").
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The Proposed Rules Exceed EPA's Statutory Authority
Congress has never voted to cede to the Administrator of the EPA the far-reaching power and
discretion the Agency is claiming in these rulemakings. There has been no delegation from the
people's elected representatives—let alone a clear and express delegation—of such economy-
wide transformational power that could survive analysis under the Major Questions Doctrine.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 3-4]
If finalized as proposed, these rules would exceed the bounds of EPA's statutory authority in
two fundamental respects—one relating generally to the Agency's regulation of carbon dioxide
emissions from new motor vehicles; the other involving its leveraging of pollution-control
authority to force on the American people a hyper-accelerated transition to electric vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 3-4]
This scheme bears no resemblance to EPA's past approach to the regulation of vehicle
emissions under the Clean Air Act.
Previously, when EPA has set emissions limits for criteria pollutants under section 202, the
available control technologies that EPA has recognized as feasible for achieving compliance
have involved cleaner fuels and discrete types of equipment added to the ICE vehicle. This
equipment includes, for example, enhanced catalytic converters to capture certain types of
pollutants and scrub them out of the vehicle's exhaust, onboard computers to control more
precisely the fuel mixture burned by the vehicle's engine, vapor-capture systems for refueling,
and fuel-injection systems to recycle unburned fuel back into the cylinders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 8-10]
The use of these types of discrete control technologies has already achieved impressive
reductions in smog-producing criteria pollutants. As EPA itself acknowledges, exist- ing control
technologies applied under previous regulations have enabled automakers to attain "reductions of
up to 80 percent in tailpipe criteria pollutant emissions" from ICE vehicles.21 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 8-10]
21 88 FR at 29188.
But now, in these rules, EPA is proposing to do something radically different. The so-called
control technology here is not some discrete equipment added to the ICE vehicle to achieve
lower emissions; it is entirely separate replacement technology that uses a new and different
powertrain. These are replacement vehicles, not true control technology; they are different
vehicles from bumper to bumper, built on entirely different production lines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 8-10]
The EPA's current proposals are thus closely analogous to the Clean Power Plan that was
struck down by the Supreme Court last year in West Virginia v. EPA:
There, EPA was relying on its Clean Air Act authority to regulate power plant emissions
based on the "best system of emission reduction" available to the plant operator. EPA had
previously exercised that authority by setting emissions standards that required individual plants
to take measures "to operate more cleanly." But in the Clean Power Plan, EPA concluded that
coal-fired power plants could not eliminate enough carbon dioxide emissions to satisfy EPA
simply by employing additional measures at the plant. Instead, EPA proposed to require them to
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choose between greatly reducing their own electricity production (potentially even shutting down
the plant) or paying to subsidize increased elec- tricity generation from alternative sources,
including natural gas, wind, and solar power (the so-called "generation shifting" concept). The
overall goal was to reduce the percentage of national electricity generation supplied by coal and
increase the percentage contribution from wind and solar. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp.
8-10]
The Supreme Court held that the Clean Power Plan implicated the Major Questions Doctrine
because EPA was claiming the power to "restructure the American energy market," and this
represented a "transformative expansion" in the Agency's exercise of its regulatory authority.
The Court was unconvinced that Congress had "implicitly tasked" the EPA "with balancing the
many vital considerations of national policy implicated in deciding how Americans will get their
energy," or with the authority to decide "how much of a switch from coal to natural gas is
practically feasible" for the nation. There was "little reason to think Congress" had assigned
matters of such economic and political significance to the EPA's discretion. "The basic and
consequential tradeoffs involved" are "ones that Congress would likely have intended for itself."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 8-10]
Everything the Supreme Court said about the Clean Power Plan can be said about the EPA's
current proposals for regulating vehicle emissions. As it tried to do with the power market, EPA
is now attempting to leverage its authority to set emissions limits for particular types of vehicles
into a grand new scheme for shifting and rebalancing the overall mix of ICE, battery-electric,
and other powertrains in the national auto fleet—an extravagant role for the Agency to play, and
one with enormous economic and political implications. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 8-
10]
Indeed, the current proposals represent an even more extreme example of regulatory
overreach than the Clean Power Plan. Here, EPA is attempting to coerce the automakers into
financing the entire transformation of the manufacturing base of a major industrial sector by
converting their own production of ICE vehicles to EVs on a large scale, not simply contributing
toward the marginal subsidization of alternative investments by others. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0647, pp. 8-10]
Moreover, in the name of ensuring that its own preferred "control technology" will actually
deliver the expected performance as a suitable long-term substitute for ICE vehicles, EPA is also
claiming the authority to regulate the design and functionality of battery-electric technology over
the entire life cycle of EVs. Like CARB, EPA proposes to adopt and enforce "Global Technical
Requirement" (GTR) No. 22, promulgated by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe, which sets standards and requirements for validating electric battery durability.22 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 8-10]
22 See 88 FR at 29284-85; 88 FR at 26013-15.
Thus, EPA expects to be in the permanent business of regulating EV technologies, which
involve no tailpipes at all, let alone tailpipe emissions—all under the aegis of a statute enacted by
Congress to address air pollution from vehicle tailpipes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 8-
10]
What is clear is that EPA sees an endless horizon for its new-found power to regulate
practically all aspects of the American automotive market. No doubt, for example, the Agency
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intends to be involved in overseeing the buildout and operation of electric vehicle charging
infrastructure around the country—once again, as an incident of the regulators' own expansive
conception of their section 202 authority to ensure the adequacy of EPA's chosen control
technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 10-11]
We can easily imagine that someday this self-assumed mandate will include the power to
ration the timing and extent of drivers' access to charging networks, as EPA deems necessary to
maintain the general supply of electricity for EVs. California is already doing this. Because the
buildout of charging infrastructure will depend critically on government subsidies and approvals,
government rationing of access to this infrastructure is a very real prospect, especially given the
strains on grid reliability that I discuss below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 10-11]
The bottom line under the Major Questions Doctrine is that section 202, on which the
proposed rules rest, contains no clear and express delegation of any authority that could sustain
these massively consequential proposals. As the Court observed in West Virginia v. EPA,
"Congress certainly has not conferred [such] authority upon EPA anywhere ... in the Clean Air
Act." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 10-11]
The Analyses and Assumptions on Which the Proposed Regulatory Actions Are Based Are
Arbitrary, Fundamentally Flawed, and Fail to Recognize and Account Properly for the Hugely
Negative Consequences that Would Result from These Actions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 10-11]
EPA claims that, despite the coercive power and industry-transforming ambition behind its
proposals, these rules will somehow deliver a stupendous bounty of net benefits, ranging at the
high end from $1.5 trillion to $2.3 trillion for the light- and medium-duty vehicle rule,23 plus
another $180 billion to $320 billion for the heavy-duty truck rule.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 10-11]
23 Id. at 29200.
24 88 FR at 25937.
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Tesla believes that this proposed rule — in substance and structure — is firmly in the
mainstream of long and well-established agency motor vehicle emissions standard setting
activities, and well within industry expectations and the agency's authorities. Indeed, the agency
has deployed fleet averaging approaches for decades to provide manufacturers flexibility while
increasing the stringency of motor vehicle emissions standards. 128 And it has addressed GHG
emissions and criteria pollutants in doing so since 2010. 129 EPA's action has been rooted in the
Clean Air Act's textual recognition that EPA is to set and revise standards controlling emissions
from vehicles, "whether such vehicles and engines are designed as complete systems or
incorporate devices to prevent or control such pollution." 130 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792,
p. 21]
128 See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 79382-83 (Nov. 28, 1980); Nat. Res. Defense Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410,
425-26 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
129 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010) (Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule for MY 2011 and later).
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130 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
In addition, EPA has, for example, repeatedly expressed its own understanding that GHG
standards should be viewed as a strategy to help control criteria pollutants to address National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) nonattainment, as well as to address the climate crisis.
EPA has previously explained that "[cjlimate change is expected to increase regional ozone
pollution, with associated risks in respiratory illnesses and premature death."131 Whether
through its impact on reducing atmospheric temperatures that contribute to the formation of
ozone, or through its direct impact on air quality by lowering or eliminating altogether tailpipe
emissions of smog-forming pollutants and PM, enhanced BEV recognition in the development of
these requirements will have a significant impact on achieving air quality targets. 132 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 21]
131 Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66525 ("There is now consistent evidence from models and
observations that 21st century climate change will worsen summertime surface ozone in polluted regions of
North America compared to a future with no climate change."); (While ozone "is a local or regional air
pollution problem, the impacts of global climate change can nevertheless exacerbate this local air pollution
problem.").
132 Nonattainment for conventional pollutants such as NOx is also significantly affected by upstream fuel
impacts from refinery emissions that are reduced or eliminated by a conversion to zero emissions vehicles.
See California Air Resources Board, Analysis in Support of Comments on the SAFE Rule at 69, available
at https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/CARB_Detailed_Comments_on_SAFE_NPRM.pdf.
Furthermore, the seemingly sharp former distinctions between regulatory strategies to address
criteria pollutant emissions and GHG emissions have continued to erode in view of the
appropriate control strategies and technologies and the increasingly smaller margins for
improvement from conventional ICE emissions. States have noted that zero emission vehicles
(ZEVs) produce no tailpipe emissions, reduce brake wear PM emissions, and have lower
upstream emissions to contribute to their State Implementation Plan (SIP) strategies. 133 EPA's
2017 Tier 3 standards, for example, achieved reductions of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide
(N20), each of which are GHGs that were part of EPA's endangerment finding. 134 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 21-22]
133 See e.g., CARB, Staff Report: Initial Statement of Reasons (Oct. 22, 2019) at 5, Table ES-1: Expected
Emission Reductions of Proposed ACT Regulation Calendar Year (NOx (tpd) PM2.5 (tpd) WTW GHG
(MMT/yr.) 2031 5.0 0.16 0.4 2040 16.9 0.46 1.7 (Proposed Rule)) available at h
ttps://ww3 .arb.ca.gov/regact/2019/act2019/isor.pdf
134 79 Fed. Reg. at 23445.
EPA has previously recognized the importance of this harmonization. In promulgating its Tier
3 motor vehicle emissions standards, for example, the agency noted:
The Tier 3 program addresses interactions with the 2017 LD GHG rule in a manner that aligns
implementation of the two actions, to achieve significant criteria pollutant and GHG emissions
reductions while providing regulatory certainty and compliance efficiency. As vehicle
manufacturers introduce new vehicle platforms for compliance with the GHG standards, they
will be able to design them for compliance with the Tier 3 standards at the same time. 135 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 21-22]
135 79 Fed. Reg. at 23417.
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Given the continuing need for emissions reductions in both the criteria pollutant and the GHG
arenas and the increasing capabilities presented by advanced technologies, the multi-pollutant
standards EPA is proposing are fully expected by automotive manufacturers, appropriate, and
essential. Indeed, the Supreme Court has broadly defined emissions "standards" under the Clean
Air Act as including instances where fleet ZEV standards were sought to be enforced. 136 The
Court explained that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 22]
136 Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 258 (2004).
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
V. EPA lacks statutory authority—much less clear congressional authorization—to
support the proposed action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 65-66]
In this proposal and its companion proposal regarding HDV greenhouse gas emissions
standards, EPA relies, for the first time outside of litigation, on its purported authority to
mandate electrification as an "emission control device" or "emission control technology." It is
also the first time that EPA proposes standards for MDVs, a subset of HDVs under the Clean Air
Act, that rely on the availability of ZEV technologies. 3 51 And it is also the first time that EPA
utilizes its criteria pollutant standards, either standing alone or in combination with EPA's
greenhouse gas emissions standards, to force further vehicle electrification. For these dramatic
changes, however, EPA must have clear congressional authority. Yet EPA has failed to identify
such clear authority for the standards and the electrification mandate. Instead, EPA relies on
general authority and congressional statements that do not provide clear authority for the
proposed action. To the contrary, EPA's references in the proposal demonstrate that Congress
had many opportunities to provide clear authority but declined to do so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp.65-66]
351 Because the adoption of ZEVs contemplated by EPA in the proposal consists primarily, if not
exclusively, of electric vehicles, these comments focus on the proposal's forced electrification of the
Nation's LDV and MDV fleet; however, it should be noted that EPA's definition of ZEVs also includes
other technologies, such as hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, which face even greater hurdles to widespread
adoption and, more importantly, are equally unauthorized by Congress.
1. EPA claims an unheralded power with staggering implications.
In asserting the sweeping power to mandate increasingly high levels of electrification, EPA
claims to have "discovered] in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate 'a
significant portion of the American economy.'" Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 324 (quoting Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159). The novelty and broad implications of the agency's approach are
powerful clues that Congress never authorized it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 71-73]
Novel Assertion of Agency Authority.
Skepticism is warranted when an agency asserts an "unheralded power representing a
transformative expansion in its regulatory authority." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2610 (internal
quotation marks omitted). In prior rules setting greenhouse-gas emission standards, EPA has
treated electric vehicles as a compliance "option" or "flexibility." In fact, for the 2021 GHG
standards for LDVs, EPA argues that electrification was not mandated but was an option, that
manufacturers could comply without using EVs. However, for the proposed LDV and MDV rule,
EPA does not claim that electrification is merely an option and EPA's model clearly
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demonstrates that EPA expects OEMs to comply with the proposed standard by increasing
production of BEVs and FCEVs while phasing out production of ICEVs. Indeed, with the
exception of the companion HDV standards proposed in concert with this rule, forced
electrification has never before even been on the table for MDVs (and other HDVs). Nor has
EPA previously utilized its criteria pollutant standards in a thinly-cloaked strategy to
disincentivize further ICEV production in favor of vehicle electrification, as it does in the
proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 71-73]
Future Implications of the Agency's Claimed Power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
71-73]
EPA has made no secret of the significance of the power it proposes to exercise here. In its
proposed rule, EPA asserts the authority to force electrification as an "emission control
technology" and notes that "[v]ehicle manufacturers can use powertrain electrification as an
emissions control technology to comply with EPA standards and to generate credits for use in
averaging, banking, and trading." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29184; see id. at 29346 ("This proposal seeks
to build on the trends that these developments and projections indicate, and accelerate the
continued deployment of these technologies...."); id. at 29312 ("Although the market share of
PEVs in the U.S. is already rapidly growing, EPA recognizes that the proposed standards may
accelerate this trend"). And as described above, this proposal is only part of a greater "whole of
government" approach to mandate electrification at the Biden Administration's direction. By
claiming the power of mandating some electrification of the Nation's vehicle fleet, EPA is
claiming the authority to mandate 100% electrification as well. As in West Virginia, there is no
reason to believe that EPA will stop here. "[0]n this view of EPA's authority, it could go further,
perhaps forcing" LDV and MDV manufacturers to "cease making" internal-combustion vehicles
altogether. 142 S. Ct. at 2612. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 71-73]
In fact, this is exactly where EPA is headed. When EPA announced its proposal, it stated that
the standards would "accelerate the ongoing transition" to an all-electric future, "delivering on"
the Biden-Harris Administration's climate agenda.363 And in related rulemakings, EPA
authorized California to adopt its own greenhouse-gas emission standards in its Advanced Clean
Cars and Advanced Clean Trucks programs—an authority California is already citing to ban new
combustion-engine vehicles and require 100-percent electrification of the LDV, MDV, and HDV
fleets by 2036 via its Advanced Clean Cars II and Advanced Clean Fleets programs. See 87 Fed.
Reg. 14,332; 88 Fed. Reg. 20,688. Both parts of EPA's strategy reveal the agency's goal to
convert America to electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 71-73]
363 https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris-administration-proposes-strongest-ever-pollution-
standards-cars-and. (emphasis added).
Given the vast economic and political significance of EPA's proposal, it "must point to 'clear
congressional authorization' for the power it claims." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609. There is
not one word in the Clean Air Act about a nationwide agency-led transition from conventional
internal-combustion vehicles to electric vehicles, or any other so-called ZEV. To be sure, EPA
has the power to set emission standards for air pollutants from motor vehicles, just as EPA had
the power in West Virginia to set emission standards for air pollutants from power plants. But
what EPA claims here for the first time is the authority to set standards in such a way that
manufacturers can comply only by abandoning internal-combustion vehicles in favor of electric
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vehicles. And nothing in the Clean Air Act authorizes that. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
71-73]
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
While acknowledging that EPA must:
"consider issues of technological feasibility, the cost of compliance, and lead time. EPA also
may consider other factors, and in previous vehicle standards rulemakings, [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0679, pp.3-4]
as well as in this proposal, has considered the impacts of potential standards on emissions of
air pollutants and associated public health and welfare effects, impacts on the automotive
industry, impacts on the vehicle purchasers/consumers, oil conservation, energy security and
other energy impacts, safety, and other relevant considerations." p. 29186 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0679, pp. 3-4]
it does not appear that EPA has actually done so. EPA's logic is often flawed in the analysis
and the information relied on is biased or incomplete. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 3-4]
EPA Summary and Response
EPA responds to these comments, together with the comments reprinted in sections 2 and 2.1,
below in section 2.3.
2.3 - EPA responses to comments in section 2
Major Questions Doctrine
A number of commenters expressed views that EPA lacks statutory authority to adopt this
rule because it is an extraordinary exercise of agency power for which EPA lacks clear authority
from Congress. Other commenters express the view that CAA section 202(a)(1) provides clear
authority for EPA to set performance-based standards using ABT that take into consideration
electrification technologies, and this rule does not raise a so-called "major question."
EPA agrees with the latter commenters. In Section 202(a), Congress directed EPA to regulate
motor vehicle emissions based on its consideration of available technologies, their costs, and
lead-time. In the final rule, consistent with its earlier rules, EPA considered updated data on
pollution control technologies. The agency found that a range of technologies—including certain
BEV technologies which prevent motor vehicle emissions—could be produced at a reasonable
cost during the years covered by this rule, model years 2027-32. Based on the agency's
evaluation of all available technologies, EPA decided to strengthen the existing emissions
standards for light and medium duty vehicles.
Commenters asserted that EPA lacks authority to adopt the final standards because the
agency's approach raised a major question and the statute is not sufficiently clear in granting
EPA the necessary authority. Notwithstanding the plain statutory language in section 202(a) and
EPA's consideration of BEV technologies since the Tier 2 rule in 2000, commenters newly
contended that the statute limits the agency to considering only technologies applicable to
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vehicles with specific types of engines—namely gasoline and diesel internal combustion engine
(ICE) vehicles—or only encouraging the adoption of BEV technologies at some lower level.
Commenters' arguments are misplaced. As we discuss in preamble I. A-B and part I below,
the statute provides clear Congressional authorization for EPA to consider updated data on all
types of pollution control technologies—including BEV technologies—and to determine the
emission standards accordingly. In section 202(a), Congress made the major policy decision to
regulate air pollution from motor vehicles. Congress also prescribed that EPA should accomplish
this mandate through a technology-based approach, and it plainly entrusted to the
Administrator's judgment the evaluation of available pollution control technologies and the
consequent determination of the emission standards. In the final rule, the Administrator
determined that a wide variety of technologies exist to further control emissions from light and
medium duty vehicles—including various ICE, hybrid, and BEV technologies, as well as add-on
controls—and that such technologies could be applied at a reasonable cost to significantly reduce
emissions of air pollutants that contribute to pollution that endangers the public health and
welfare. These subsidiary technical and policy judgments were clearly within the Administrator's
delegated authority. Because the meaning of the statutory text, read in its context, is
unambiguous, there is no need to evaluate whether a major question exists.
In any event, EPA does not agree that this rule implicates the major questions doctrine as
elucidated by the Court in West Virginia and related cases. The Court has made clear that the
doctrine is reserved for extraordinary cases involving assertions of highly consequential power
beyond what Congress could reasonably be understood to have granted.1 The Court considers
whether the agency's exercise of power is consistent with prior precedents or whether it claims
"to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power representing a transformative
expansion in [its] regulatory authority."2 This is not such an extraordinary case in which
congressional intent is unclear. Here, EPA is acting within the heartland of its statutory authority
and faithfully implementing Congress's precise direction and intent. As we explain in part II, the
final rule does not invoke a novel and transformative exercise of agency authority. Rather, the
agency is acting in its traditional area of expertise, as it has for decades, to promulgate emission
standards for motor vehicles. The rule maintains the fundamental regulatory structure of the
existing program and iteratively strengthens the existing emissions standards, consistent with a
long history of similar rules.
In part III, we assess the consequences of the rule. While this rule is a significant regulation of
the motor vehicle industry, the nature and impacts of the rule are similar in kind to prior rules.
On some important metrics, its impacts are smaller than prior rules. We also address
commenters' reliance on alleged indirect impacts—on areas like national security, grid
reliability, and the viability of fossil fuel companies—to claim that this rule creates extraordinary
1 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2607-08 (cleaned up).
2 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2610 (citing Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)) (alterations in
original); id. at 2596 ("This view of EPA's authority was not only unprecedented; it also effected a "fundamental
revision of the statute, changing it from [one sort of] scheme of... regulation' into an entirely different kind.");
Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2023) (applying the doctrine upon noting that "past waivers and
modifications issued under the Act have been extremely modest and narrow in scope"). But see Biden v. Missouri,
595 U.S. 87, 94, 95 (2022) (declining to apply the major questions doctrine in light of the "longstanding practice of
Health and Human Services in implementing the relevant statutory authorities," even though "the vaccine mandate
goes further than what the Secretary has done in the past").
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consequences. We do not agree that these indirect impacts are relevant to assessing the
consequential nature of this rule. The statute does not direct EPA to consider indirect impacts,
the legislative history indicates that Congress intended for EPA to regulate despite them, and
they are the routine consequence of agency regulation and thus unsuitable for identifying
extraordinary exercises of power. Even if these indirect impacts were relevant, EPA has
comprehensively assessed these issues, often in consultation with other expert agencies, and
found that the final rule does not cause significant indirect harms as alleged by commenters and
on balance creates net benefits for society.
In part IV, we consider several additional factors which also weigh against application of the
major questions framework: the agency's assertion of authority does not create an unworkable
conflict with any other statutory provision; the action does not significantly alter the balance of
Federal and state power or the power of government over private property; and notwithstanding
ongoing political interest in motor vehicle GHG regulation, the weight of statutory and
legislative evidence supports EPA's authority.
I. I lll STATUTE PROVIDES CLEAR CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION.
As we explain in great detail in preamble III.B, the statute clearly authorizes EPA to consider
BEV technologies in setting emission standards under section 202(a). Section 202(a) requires the
Administrator to establish emission standards for classes of motor vehicles based on the
"development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the
cost of compliance within such period."3 "Motor vehicles" are defined broadly to mean "any
self-propelled vehicle designed for transporting persons or property on a street or highway."4
Electrification technologies, including BEVs, are "technologies" that reduce emissions and apply
to "motor vehicles." Thus, EPA may consider such technologies in determining the emissions
standards. The statutory context, purpose, and history, as well as administrative precedent,
support this conclusion. Indeed, the statute unambiguously mandates EPA to consider BEVs on
this record, as they are highly effective pollution control technologies available during the
timeframe of this rule and at a reasonable cost.5 In preamble III.B and later in this RTC section,
we further address related statutory interpretation comments, including that BEVs cannot belong
to the same "class" of vehicles as ICE vehicles and that BEVs are not "complete systems" or
"devices" that "prevent or control" air pollution under section 202(a)(1).
We make three additional observations here in support of our argument that the statute
provides clear Congressional authorization: (1) in section 202(a), Congress made the major
policy decision to regulate air pollution from motor vehicles and appropriately delegated to EPA
the interstitial judgments of identifying available pollution control technologies—like
electrification technologies—and the level of the standards; (2) the statutory language is clear,
and does not rely on modest or vague terms; and (3) the statutory provision is central to
controlling motor vehicle emissions, not some ancillary or backwater enactment.
3 CAA section 202(a)(1), (a)(2).
4 CAA section 216(2).
5 See Guedes v. ATF, 45 F.4th 306, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (holding that when "traditional tools of statutory
interpretation" show that the agency's interpretation is "the best one," the court can uphold the interpretation without
resorting to deference principles).
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First, in enacting Section 202(a), Congress itself made the relevant major policy decision: to
regulate dangerous air pollution from motor vehicles. Granting the Executive Branch such
authority was a decision of enormous import. To that point, Congress's prior forays into air
pollution control had largely focused on research, funding, and study. Motivated by recent
environmental crises and a growing awareness of the dangers of air pollution to public health and
welfare, Congress in 1965 conferred upon the agency authority to regulate motor vehicle
emissions.6
Congress also made the key policy decision that motor vehicle emissions control would be
achieved through a technology-based approach: EPA is to identify the available control
technologies and establish emissions standards based on the performance of such technologies,
their costs, and the lead-time necessary for their development and application. Congress charged
the agency with technical determinations and policy judgments of an interstitial nature: what
kind of pollution is harmful to public health and welfare, which classes of motor vehicles cause
or contribute to such pollution, what technologies exist to mitigate such pollution, the rate and
costs at which such technologies can be adopted, the appropriate stringency of the emissions
standards in light of findings on technology and costs, and how such standards should be
complied with and enforced.7 Congress conferred on the Administrator the authority to make
these subsidiary, but also significant, judgments, recognizing both his expertise in this area, as
well as the need to confer "regulatory flexibility" absent which "changing circumstances and
scientific developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete."8 These sorts of technical
and policy determinations were well within Congress's power to delegate, and such delegations
are ubiquitous throughout the Clean Air Act.9
In subsequent amendments to the Act, Congress made clear the reach of section 202(a): it
could be used to drive not merely modest reductions in motor vehicle emissions, but order-of-
magnitude reductions. For example, in the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress mandated
that the Administrator issue regulations to reduce emissions of certain pollutants by 90% over a
five-year period.10 The 1990 Amendments required 100% phase-in of a new set of demanding
6 Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. 89-272 (1965). See generally Arthur C. Stern, History of Air
Pollution Legislation in the United States, 32 J. of the Air Pollution Control Ass 'n 44 (1982), available at
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00022470.1982.10465369.
7 See CAA section 202(a)(1) (delegating authority to determine what "air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare" and which emissions of air pollutants from a class or classes of
motor vehicles "cause, or contribute" to such air pollution, and to establish standards to control such emissions),
CAA section 202(a)(2) (delegating authority to determine the "period ... necessary to permit the development and
application of the requisite technology" to control such emissions and the "cost of compliance," and to balance these
factors in determining the emissions standards), CAA sections 203-208 (delegating authority to determine the
manners of compliance and enforcement).
8 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007); see also NRDC. v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
9 See, e.g., CAA section 108, 109, 111, 112, 169A, 202.
10 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, at sec. 6, 84 Stat. 1676, 1690 (Dec. 31, 1970) (amending
section 202 of the CAA and directing EPA to issue regulations to reduce carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons from
LD vehicles and engines by 90 percent in MY 1975 compared to MY 1970 and directing EPA to issue regulations to
reduce NOx emissions from LD vehicles and engines by 90 percent in MY 1976 compared to MY 1971).
Subsequent factual developments led to relaxation of the standards, see CAA section 202(b)(1); however, the 1970
statute nonetheless illustrates the breadth of EPA's statutory authority to mandate rapid emissions reductions. See
generally preamble III.B (discussing the statutory numeric standards in section 202(b), (g)-(j), which required
dramatic and rapid reductions in emissions).
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standards over a six to seven model year period.11 Congress further clarified that EPA should not
view even such enormous reductions as the full extent of Congress's pollution-control intentions,
but expressly empowered the agency to go still further.12
Commenters do not seriously question that the final rule implements the major policy decision
Congress made: regulating air pollution from motor vehicles. Nor do commenters raise any
plausible argument against the fact that Section 202(a)(l)-(2) entrusts to the Administrator's
judgment the evaluation of pollution control technologies, their costs, and their rate of adoption.
Rather, commenters disagree with how the Administrator has considered specific pollution
control technologies (i.e., BEVs) in determining the standards. But the evaluation of pollution
control technologies is fundamentally an interstitial decision well within EPA's authority.13
Commenters fail to seriously question this beyond suggesting that the final rule is unlawful
absent an explicit legislative command to consider BEVs or (conversely) to only consider
technologies applicable to ICE vehicles.14 But Congress intentionally chose not to limit EPA's
authority to ICE vehicles. Instead, it made the major policy decision here to control motor
vehicle pollution via a technology-based approach and delegated to the Administrator the
responsibility to implement that policy. Were this not so, any time a significant new pollution
control technology has come along—and many have over the years—Congress would need to
pass a new statute. While some commenters may prefer this outcome, they articulate no good
reason for why Congress must serve as a perpetual monitor of new technological developments
in the field of motor vehicle emissions control, as opposed to delegating such technical matters to
the expert agency.
Second, the statutory language is clear, and does not use modest words, vague terms, or subtle
devices.15 As explained above and in preamble III.B, the statute is replete with clear language.
Among other things, section 202(a) directs the Administrator to regulate emissions from "motor
vehicles," which the statute defines as "any self-propelled vehicle designed for transporting
persons or property on a street or highway."16 Unlike other statutory provisions, Congress
intentionally abstained from using limiting language such as "internal combustion engine"17 or
"gasoline" or "diesel" engine vehicles.18 Section 202(a)(2) then directs EPA to establish the
11 See CAA section 202(g).
12 See, e.g., CAA section 202(b)(1)(C) ("The Administrator may promulgate regulations under subsection (a)(1)
revising any standard prescribed or previously revised under this subsection.... Any revised standard shall require a
reduction of emissions from the standard that was previously applicable."), (i)(3)(B)(iii) ("Nothing in this paragraph
shall prohibit the Administrator from exercising the Administrator's authority under subsection (a) to promulgate
more stringent standards for light-duty vehicles and light-duty trucks ... at any other time thereafter in accordance
with subsection (a).")
13 See also West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2601, 2602, 2611 (2022) (under statutes that provide for a technology-
based approach to pollution control, noting with approval EPA's determination that "more traditional pollution
control measures" include "efficiency improvements, fuel-switching," and "add-on controls").
14 But see Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2378 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring) (concluding that none of the Court's
cases "requires an unequivocal declaration from Congress authorizing the precise agency action under review").
15 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609.
16 CAA section 216(2).
17 See CAA section 216(10) (definition of nonroad engine).
18 Compare, e.g., CAA section 202(a)(l)-(2) (granting general power to the Administrator to establish emission
standards for "any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines"), with section
202(a)(3)(B)(ii) (addressing regulations under section 202(a)(1) for certain "gasoline and diesel-fueled" vehicles),
202(h) tab. H (same), (i)(l) (same), (k) (addressing regulation of "all gasoline-fueled motor vehicles").
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standards for motor vehicles based on the "development and application of the requisite
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." The
statute does not confine the agency to consider any specific technology, but rather contains
explicitly expansive language on the types of eligible technology.19 Again, Congress made the
major policy decision to regulate air pollution from motor vehicles and plainly entrusted the
means of achieving such regulation to the Administrator's judgment. "The broad language of §
202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall ...
obsolescence."20
Third, section 202(a) is not a mere "ancillary" or backwater provision,21 but rather has been
the cornerstone of motor vehicle emissions regulation since its enactment in 1965. Section
202(a)(1) confers on EPA the "general regulatory power" to regulate motor vehicle emissions.22
Additionally, over the course of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 1977, and 1990,
Congress directed EPA to exercise this authority to promulgate many specific and stringent
standards for controlling motor vehicle emissions.23 Congress also enacted numerous other
provisions providing for compliance with and enforcement of such standards.24 Since section
202(a)'s enactment, EPA has also regularly exercised this authority to promulgate highly
consequential motor vehicle emission standards, including numerous criteria pollutant and GHG
standards.25
II. I lll FINAL RULE DOES NOT ASSERT A TRANSFORMATIVE EXPANSION
IN AGENCY POWER.
A. The final standards represent an iterative strengthening of existing standards.
The final rule is an iterative strengthening of existing emission standards, not "an unheralded
power representing a transformative expansion in [the agency's] regulatory authority" or a
"fundamental revision of the statute, changing it from one sort of scheme of regulation into an
entirely different kind."26 The rule asserts the same authority as asserted in earlier rules adopted
under section 202(a), and it is premised on technical and policy judgments regarding motor
vehicle pollution control that lie in the heartland of EPA's expertise.
19 See CAA section 202(a)(1) ("Such standards shall be applicable to such vehicles and engines for their useful life
... whether such vehicles and engines are designed as complete systems or incorporate devices to prevent or control
such pollution.").
20Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007); see also NRDC. v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(characterizing section 202(a)(1) as a "general regulatory power" to establish "technology-based" standards for
motor vehicles); S. Rep. No. 89-192, at 4 (1965) and H.R. Rep. No. 89-899, at 4 (1965) (House and Senate reports
on 1965 legislation indicating the agency should adjust to changing technology in setting standards).
21 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2610.
22 NRDC, 655 F.2d 318, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
23 See, e.g., CAA section 202(b), (g)-(j), (1).
24 See, e.g., CAA section 202(d), 203-08; see also CAA sections 209(b)(1)(C) (imposing consistency with section
202(a) as a condition for granting a waiver of preemption), 213 (modeling nonroad provisions on section 202).
25 See EPA, Emission Standards Reference Guide for On-road and Nonroad Vehicles and Engines,
https://www.epa. gov/emission-standards-reference-guide.
26 West Virginia, 597 U.S. 697, 724, 728 (2022).
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As a preliminary matter, we emphasize the real-world context antecedent to this rulemaking:
the industry is making a significant shift to electrification and BEVs in particular. EPA's
determination of what emissions reductions are feasible and appropriate is based first on its
assessment of the future market for light and medium duty vehicles. EPA's assessment of the
record—including technical information, manufacturer plans, third-party projections, and other
relevant data—indicates that advancements in technology, together with the support provided by
the BIL, IRA, and other government programs, will lead to significantly greater adoption of
electrification technologies even absent new standards. For example, EPA anticipates that, absent
this rule, PEVs will represent 39% of new light duty vehicles by MY 2030, as compared to our
central estimate of 53% under the rule.27 Some commenters may anticipate somewhat higher or
lower figures than EPA's projection, but it is clear that increasing numbers of PEVs will be
produced regardless of EPA rulemaking.
This fact is understood by the regulated community; Ford, Stellantis, and GM have all
previously committed to selling 50% or more BEVs by 2030, and several other companies have
indicated even higher targets; by comparison, EPA only projects 44% BEV penetration under the
final standards. In comments on the proposal, manufacturers reiterated their continued
commitment to electrification. Ford, for example, stated "Ford is all-in on electrification. We are
investing more than $50 billion through 2026 to deliver breakthrough electric vehicles (EVs)"
and expressed their support for a 2032 endpoint of approximately 67 percent PEVs.28 GM's
comments "reiterate[] our commitment" to sell 50 percent EVs by 2030 as "the appropriate path
toward all EVs by 2035."29 Stellantis stated it "is unwavering in its commitment to an all-electric
portfolio and building an EV dominated market" including a 50 percent EV mix for passenger
cars and light trucks by 2030.30 Volkswagen expressed its goal of 20 percent BEV sales globally
by 2025, and more than 50 percent by 2030.31 Other OEMs also restated their own significant
commitments to electrification, with Honda restating its commitment to selling 40 percent zero-
emitting vehicles by 2030 and 80 percent by 203 532 and Hyundai noting their support for selling
50 percent PEVs in 2030.33 The final rule builds on these technological advancements,
Congressional support, and industry trends.
As discussed in preamble III.B, the rule aligns with decades of the agency's exercise of its
CAA section 202(a) authority and enacts an iterative strengthening of the emissions standards
established in the earlier rules, including the Tier 3 rule and the 2021 Rule.34 Since the 1970s,
EPA has relied on its CAA section 202(a) authority to set emissions standards for classes of new
motor vehicles. In 1971, EPA established the earliest standards for emissions of hydrocarbons,
nitrogen oxides (NOx), and carbon monoxide (CO) from light-duty vehicles, requiring a 90%
reduction in emissions. Since then, EPA has continued to set standards achieving significant
reductions in criteria pollutant (and precursor) emissions for the full range of vehicle classes
(including light-duty, medium-duty, and heavy-duty vehicles and passenger, cargo, and
27 See Preamble section I.
28 Ford Motor Company, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605 at p. 1.
29 General Motors, LLC, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700 at p. 3-4.
30 Stellantis, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678 at p. 2.
31 Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669 at p. 2.
32 American Honda Motor Co. Inc., EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652 at p. 3.
33 Hyundai Motor America, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599 at p. 2
34 See also Brief of Amici Curiae Margo Oge and John Hannon in Support of Respondents, Texas v. EPA (D.C. Cir.
No. 22-1031) (discussing the history of motor vehicle pollution control and EPA's emissions standards).
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vocational vehicles). Over the last several decades, EPA has set progressively more stringent
vehicle emissions standards for criteria pollutants. For example, in 1997 EPA adopted the
National Low Emission Vehicle program, which included provisions for certifying zero
emissions vehicles. In 2000, EPA adopted the Tier 2 standards, which required passenger
vehicles to be 77 to 95 percent cleaner (and further encouraged certification of zero-emitting
vehicles through the establishment of "Bin 1", which is now referred to as "Bin 0"). Most
recently, in 2014, EPA adopted Tier 3 emissions standards, which required a further reduction of
60 to 80 percent of emissions (depending on pollutant and vehicle class). Similar to the prior Tier
2 standards, Tier 3 established "bins" of Federal Test Procedure (FTP) standards, including bins
for zero-emitting vehicles. EPA has also consistently set GHG emissions standards applicable to
light-duty vehicles pursuant to CAA section 202(a), beginning with the 2010 rule, and
continuing through subsequent rulemakings in 2012, 2020, and 2021.35
This rule exercises the same basic authority as asserted in many prior rules. The standards are
similar with their predecessors in six fundamental ways: they (1) are promulgated pursuant to the
same statutory authority, CAA section 202(a)(l)-(2); (2) address the same endangerment
findings for GHG and criteria pollutants as applicable; and (3) impose the same basic regulatory
requirement to meet more protective, performance-based standards to reduce emissions from
motor vehicles,36 on (4) the same parties (manufacturers of new motor vehicles); are (5) based on
the same basic kind of technical justification, as required by 202(a)(2), namely a demonstration
that the standards can be met, within the timeframe of the rule, through the "development and
application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of
compliance within such period"; and (6) consider the ability of a manufacturer to average the
emissions performance of different vehicles across its fleet, which enables manufacturers to
achieve emissions reductions more rapidly and for lower cost.37'38
Not only is the nature of the power asserted the same as in earlier rules, but the final rule also
involves making the same kinds of technical and policy judgments that lie in the heartland of
EPA's traditionally delegated authority, matters in which the agency has clear expertise. As in
prior CAA section 202(a) rulemakings, EPA assessed the availability of potential technologies to
35 See 75 FR 25324 (May 7, 2010) (setting GHG standards applicable to model year 2012-2016 LD vehicles); 77 FR
62624 (Oct. 15, 2012) (setting GHG standards for model year 2017-2025 LD vehicles and "building on the success
of the first phase of the National program for these vehicles"); 86 FR 774434 (Dec. 30, 2021) (revising GHG
standards for model year 2023 and later light-duty vehicle).
36 Commenters suggest in passing that the rule raises a major question because EPA failed to consider lifecycle
emissions impacts associated with BEVs. EPA has considered certain lifecycle impacts, including GHG emissions
from both EGUs and oil refineries, in setting the standards. Further, to the extent that commenters are concerned
about the rule asserting a transformative and unprecedented exercise of power, EPA fails to see how an expansive
consideration of GHG impacts across the entire vehicle and fuels supply chain—e.g., farms, mines, and factories,
both domestic and foreign—would mitigate that concern. We further respond to comments about lifecycle emissions
impacts inRTC 19.
37 Averaging provides compliance flexibilities for manufacturers, allowing them to decide how and when to redesign
specific vehicles and to deploy new technologies, and to balance these considerations in the way that makes the most
sense for their individual vehicle fleets. This flexible structure is consistent with many previous vehicle rules and is
effectively designed to reflect the diverse nature of the motor vehicle industry. For further discussion of averaging,
as well as banking and trading, please see the later response on ABT in this RTC 2.3.
38 This sentence applies in its entirety to the GHG and LD NMOG+NOx fleet average standards. As we explain in
preamble III, certain standards in this rule are subject to some different requirements, also consistent with their
predecessors; for example, the criteria pollutant standards for statutory heavy-duty vehicles are subject to the
additional requirements in CAA section 202(a)(3)(A)(i), and the PM standards are per-vehicle standards.
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reduce the pollutant at issue, lead time necessary for development and deployment of those
technologies, cost of compliance with the standards, cost to purchasers, and broader societal and
economic impacts. And as in those prior rules, EPA exercised its policy judgment and technical
expertise to determine the final standards giving due consideration to the statutory and other
relevant criteria. For example, EPA evaluated the light and medium duty vehicles industry, the
technologies to further control GHG and criteria pollutant emissions from such vehicles, their
feasibility, and their effectiveness at controlling emissions. EPA designed and applied its state-
of-the-art model, OMEGA. EPA calculated cost metrics, including costs of compliance to
regulated entities, costs to purchasers, and social costs, as well as other economic impacts. The
agency analyzed emissions impacts, including based on the agency's longstanding MOtor
Vehicle Emission Simulator (MOVES), and evaluated the health and welfare impacts of the
emission reductions. EPA also monetized certain benefits associated with emissions reductions
and energy security and performed a cost-benefits analysis. EPA has fully documented all of
these steps in the record, including in the preamble and RIA. Finally, the agency exercised its
policy judgment to determine the emissions standards based on its assessment of technological
feasibility, lead-time, costs, and other factors.39 Although the specific facts surrounding each rule
vary, these are all among the kinds of considerations that EPA regularly evaluates in its motor
vehicle rules: the nature of the industry and the regulated vehicles, the availability of control
technologies, costs, emissions impacts, health and welfare impacts, economic and other impacts,
cost-benefits analysis,40 and of course the resulting emissions standards.41
While these standards are more protective than their predecessors, this difference is premised
not on any transformative assertion of agency power, but rather on changing circumstances, most
notably the increasing market adoption of technological advances that permit greater emissions
reductions, as well as BIL and IRA funding that support greater adoption of BEVs. As required
by the statute, the rule incorporates an updated technical analysis, including of feasibility, lead
time, and costs, for emissions control strategies. As we explain in the preamble (e.g., sections III
and V), there are more effective control technologies, such as increased electrification, that are
being used at greater rates and are available at a reasonable cost for the timeframe of this rule
(MY 2027-32) than at the time of prior rules, including the recent 2021 LD GHG rule. The
agency also considered updated data on ICE vehicle technologies that are also available to
reduce emissions. On balance, we determined that the potential for increased adoption of control
technologies, including add-on controls as well as lower emitting powertrains, warranted
strengthening the emissions standards.
This iterative strengthening of the emissions standards thus presents an ordinary exercise of
agency power and is in no way "a transformative expansion" of EPA's regulatory authority as
commenters would suggest. Instead, it is yet another action in a long list of EPA's exercises of
its standard-setting authority under CAA section 202. Considerable precedent holds that merely
39 See Preamble V.
40 As discussed in preamble V and RTC 8, in addition to the statutory factors, EPA also evaluated additional factors,
including factors to comply with E.O. 12866. Our assessment of these additional factors lends further support to the
final rule.
41 See, e.g., the final rule preamble and RIA for the HD Phase 2 and Phase 1 rules, and the 2021, 2020, 2012, and
2010 LD GHG rules. As we explain in Part III.E below, the agency also consulted with numerous other expert
agencies in formulating its judgments.
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strengthening an existing regulatory program does not amount to an extraordinary assertion of
power.42
Commenters nonetheless claim that EPA's assertion of power here augurs a future where the
agency might require the complete elimination of tailpipe pollution from motor vehicles and is
therefore transformative. EPA agrees that the statute contemplates the possibility of completely
preventing motor vehicle tailpipe pollution which contributes to endangerment, where that result
is supportable under the statutory criteria and the record.43 The natural outcome of Congress's
major policy decision to control dangerous air pollution from motor vehicles is that such
pollution might one day be eliminated. Nowhere does the statute afford a perpetual safe harbor
for the production of vehicles that emit pollutants that contribute to air pollution which is
endangering public health and welfare when pollution-free vehicles are available at a reasonable
cost. This was Congress's, not the Administrator's, decision. In any event, this rule does not
require the complete elimination of pollutants from vehicles; such a result is not justified on the
current record.
The regulated community also supports EPA's authority to consider BEVs in establishing the
standards.44 While regulated entities filed comments questioning the available lead-time and rate
at which the emissions standards should be strengthened, they indicated support for standards
that would achieve significantly greater penetration rates for BEVs relative to the status quo. The
Alliance for Automotive Innovators, a major trade group representing entities regulated by the
final rule, support the goal "to accelerate the transition to zero-emission vehicles"45 and endorses a
PEV market share of 40-50% in 2030, with continued increases through 2032.46 As noted above,
major vehicle manufacturers also filed comments supportive of significant increases in BEV
penetration, demonstrating both their intention to produce BEV products and support for EPA's
consideration of BEVs in setting the standards.
B. Key aspects of the final rule are not transformative.
Commenters' assertions that certain aspects of this rule—its regulation of GHGs, evaluation
of electric technologies, and consideration of the ABT compliance provisions—are nonetheless
so transformative as to implicate the major questions doctrine are misplaced. First, commenters
42 See West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2610 (2022) (distinguishing EPA's Mercuiy Rule, 90 Fed. Reg. 28616 (2005),
from the Clean Power Plan and noting that "[t]he Mercury Rule ... is one more entry in an unbroken list of prior
[CAA] section 111 rules"); Missouri, 595 U.S. 87, 95 (2022) ("Of course the vaccine mandate goes further than
what the Secretary has done in the past to implement infection control. But he has never had to address an infection
problem of this scale and scope before. In any event, there can be no doubt that addressing infection problems in
Medicare and Medicaid facilities is what he does."); Utility Air, 573 U.S. 302, 332 (2014) (declining to apply the
major questions doctrine where the regulation "moderately increases] the demands EPA (or a state permitting
authority) can make of entities already subject to its regulation")
43 Indeed, an analogous result—of completely preventing a type of emissions—was achieved as early as 1966. The
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the agency then in charge of administering section 202,
determined that a different type of emissions—crankcase emissions—could be completely prevented from certain
motor vehicles. See 31 FR 5171 (Mar. 30, 1966) ("No crankcase emissions shall be discharged into the ambient
atmosphere from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine subject to this subpart.").
44 Missouri, 595 U.S. 87, 95 (2022) (regulated communities' "support suggests that a vaccination requirement under
these circumstances is a straightforward and predictable example of the health and safety regulations that Congress
has authorized the Secretary to impose").
45 AAI comment at i.
46 AAI comment at vi.
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wrongly suggest that any significant regulation of motor vehicles to address climate change
creates a major question. But Massachusetts considered and rejected a similar argument—"that
climate change was so important that unless Congress spoke with exacting specificity, it could
not have meant the Agency to address it" under section 202(a).47 While the Court had occasion
to revisit that conclusion in American Electric, Utility Air, and West Virginia, it did not. And
since Massachusetts, EPA has promulgated 6 motor vehicle GHG rules including 4 light duty
GHG rules—there is nothing new here.48
Second, commenters erroneously claim that EPA's consideration of electric technologies as a
basis for the standards is novel. As we explain in preamble III, electric technologies are at the
heart of motor-vehicle pollution control. They are used by all new motor vehicles produced
today. Electric technologies are fundamental to key emissions control technologies currently in
use, including catalytic converters, selective catalytic reduction, particulate filters, and engine
and powertrain electrification. Without electric technologies, no motor vehicle would be able to
start, or operate, or control emissions. Congress also recognized "electronic emission control
units," a kind of electric technology, as a specified major emissions control device in CAA
section 207(i)(2). EPA has also repeatedly considered engine and powertrain electrification,
including BEV, technologies in its prior rules, as shown in Table 1 and discussed in Preamble III
and in greater detail below.
Table 1. Certain Prior Criteria Pollutant and GHG Rules and their Consideration of
Averaging in Standard-Setting, ABT, and Electrification Technologies
Rule
Averaging in Standard-
Setting
ABT
Considering
Electrification
Technologies
Tier 2, 65 FR 6698 (Feb. 10,
2000)
6744
6743-44
6746, 6793-4
2010 LD (MY 2011 and
later), 75 FR 25324 (May 7,
2010)
25405/1, 25412/1-3
25412/3
25328/3, 25456 (tbl.
III.D.6-3)
HD Phase 1 (MY 2014 and
later), 76 FR 57106 (Sept. 15,
2011)
57119/1
57238/2-39/1
57204/3-05/2, 57220/1-
21/2, 57224/3-25/1,
57246/1
2012 LD (MY 2017 and
later), 77 FR 62624 (Oct. 15,
2012)
62627/3-28/1
62628/1-2
62705/1-06/1, 62852/2-61
Tier 3, 79 FR 23414 (Apr. 28,
2014)
23480-81
23480-81, 23488-89
23471, RIA Tables 2-42,
2-43
HD Phase 2 (MY 2021 and
later), 81 FR 73478 (Oct. 25,
2016)
73730/2-3, 73733/2-34/1
73495/2-3, 73568/2-69/3
73751/1-3
2020 LD (MY 2021 and
later), 85 FR 24174 (Apr. 30,
2020)
24246/3-47/3
25206/3-07/1, 25275/1-
76/2
24320/1, 24469/1-524/3
2021 LD (MY 2023 and
later), 86 FR 74434 (Dec. 30,
2021)
74446/3-51/1
74453/1-56/1
74493/1-94/3, 74484/2-
87/3
47 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497, 512, 530-31 (2007) (distinguishing I'oocl & Drug Admin, v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)).
48 These rules are the 2010, 2012, 2020, and 2021 LD GHG rules, and the 2011 and 2016 HD GHG rules.
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EPA has considered the role of electrification in national rulemakings since Tier 2.49 In that
rule, EPA stated that "we believe it is appropriate to provide inducements to manufacturers to
certify vehicles to very low levels and that these inducements may help pave the way for greater
and/or more cost effective emission reductions from future vehicles."50 Accordingly, EPA
adopted a "multiplier" to allow BEVs to be counted more than once in compliance calculations
for the standards and allowed manufacturers to "propose HEV contribution factors for NOx to
EPA . . . [to] be used in the calculation of a manufacturer's fleet average NOx emissions and . . .
provide a mechanism to credit an HEV for operating with no emissions over some portion of its
life."51 EPA continued to consider electrification, and where appropriate to incentivize BEVs, in
multiple rules under 202(a) since 2000.
EPA built on this technological approach in 2010 when it first adopted standards controlling
emissions of GHG, stating we "expect[ed] that automobile manufacturers will meet these
standards by utilizing technologies that will reduce vehicle GHG emissions . . . [including]
increased use of hybrid and other advanced technologies, and the initial commercialization of
electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids."52 As technology advanced by the time of the 2012 LD
GHG Rule, EPA continued to expand its consideration of electrification technology, including
electric power steering/electro-hydraulic power steering, improved accessories (such as
electrically driven water pumps and cooling fans), 12-volt stop-start, higher voltage stop-
start/belt integrated starter generator, integrated motor assist/crank integrated starter generator,
P2 hybrid (transmission integrated electric motor placed between engine and a gearbox or
continuously variable transmission), 2-mode hybrid, power-split hybrid, plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles, and electric vehicles with all-electric drive.53 In 2014, EPA adopted the Tier 3 rule,
coordinating its criteria pollutant standards with the recently adopted GHG standards. EPA
projected that manufacturers would choose to meet the criteria pollutant standards with an
increase in electric vehicle sales.54
In 2020, EPA continued to consider the above technologies in the context of "electric paths
[which] include a large set of technologies that share the common element of using electrical
power for certain vehicle functions that were traditionally powered mechanically by engine
power. Electrification technologies thus can range from electrification of specific accessories . . .
to electrification of the entire powertrain."55 In the 2021 light duty vehicle rule, covering
vehicles from MY 2023 to 2026, EPA explained that "[t]he technological readiness of the auto
industry to meet the final standards ... is best understood in the context of the decade-long light-
duty vehicle GHG emission reduction program .... [Manufacturers have access to a wide range
49 Even before Tier 2, the voluntary National Low Emission Vehicle (NLEV) program allowed LD motor-vehicle
manufacturers to comply with tailpipe standards for cars and light-duty trucks more stringent than that required by
EPA in exchange for compliance credits for such low emission and zero emission vehicles. 63 FR 926 (Jan. 7,
1998).
50 65 FR 6698, 6746 (Feb. 10, 2000)
51 65 FR 6793.
52 75 FR 25324, 25328 (May 7, 2010) ("Although many of these technologies are available today, the emissions
reductions . . . finalized in this notice will involve more widespread use of these technologies across the light-duty
vehicle fleet.").
53 77 FR 62706 (Oct. 15, 2012).
54 Tier 3 RIA, Tables 2-42 and 2-43.
55 85 FR 24174, 24320 (Apr. 30, 2020).
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of GHG-reducing technologies, many of which were in the early stages of development at the
beginning of EPA's program in 2012, and which still have potential to reach greater penetration
across all new vehicles."56 We noted that, "[i]n addition to the technologies that were anticipated
by EPA in the 2012 rule . . . recent technological advancements and successful implementations
of electrification have been particularly significant and have greatly increased the available
options for manufacturers to meet more stringent standards."57 As in prior rules, EPA continued
to consider electrified vehicles of all kinds alongside every other form of propulsion available
and anticipated in light-duty vehicles.
In addition to the above-cited rules regulating the light-duty sector, EPA has also considered
electrification in rules regulating the heavy-duty sector. Within the HD GHG program, EPA has
considered the role of electrification since the Phase 1 rule in 2011. In that rule, EPA stated that
"[technologies such as hybrid drivetrains, advanced bottoming cycle engines, and full electric
vehicles [were] promoted in this first step through incentive concepts . . . but we believe[d] that
these advance technologies [would] not be necessary to meet the final standards."58 However, we
"expect[ed] these advanced technologies to be an important part of the regulatory program and
[would] consider them in setting the stringency of any standards beyond the 2018 model year."59
In 2016, when EPA promulgated the HD Phase 2 GHG standards, EPA continued to look toward
electrification in the future because "we [had] found only one all-electric heavy-duty vehicle
manufacturer that [had] certified through 2016."60
As electrified HD vehicles have become available in the market in the intervening years and
with more HD electric vehicles under development, EPA's most recent rulemaking for the HD
sector in 2023 again included consideration of HD electric vehicles.61 This rulemaking finalized
emission standards for NOx, PM, and other pollutants for model years 2027 and later HD
vehicles. EPA explained that we developed "performance-based final standards" that allow
"manufacturers [to] choose from any number of technology pathways to comply with the final
standards (e.g., alternative fuels, including biodiesel, renewable diesel, renewable natural gas,
renewable propane, or hydrogen in combination with relevant emissions aftertreatment
technologies, and electrification, including plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, battery-electric or
fuel cell electric vehicles)."62
In sum, there is nothing novel about EPA's consideration of electrification technologies,
including BEVs, in promulgating the standards. To the contrary, were EPA to ignore BEV
technologies in establishing these standards as these commenters suggest, that would be an
unprecedented and extraordinary break from the agency's consistent historical practice. The
resulting standards under such an approach would also bear little correlation with the regulated
community's own plans for reducing emissions. For example, some commenters suggest that
EPA—lacking authority to consider the emissions performance of BEV and ICE vehicles in the
same class—could instead adopt a more stringent GHG standard specifically for ICE vehicles
alone, while ignoring electrification technologies. Such an approach would likely lead to a
56 86 FR 74434, 74493 (Dec. 30, 2021).
57 Id.
58 76 FR 57106, 57133 (Sept. 15, 2011).
59 Id.
60 81 FR 73478, 73500 (Oct. 25, 2016).
61 88 FR 4296, 4330-31 (Jan. 24, 2023).
62 88 FR 4296, 4330-31 (Jan. 24, 2023) (emphasis added).
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significant loss in emissions reductions, and by restricting or eliminating manufacturers' ability
to average the emissions performance of BEV and ICE vehicles, also increase the costs of
compliance. And given the enormous investments that the regulated community has made in
BEVs and their support for the agency's consideration of BEVs in setting the standards, such a
shift would create enormous regulatory uncertainty and undermine significant reliance
interests.63
As we detail in Preamble ES and III, and as the manufacturers themselves state in their
comments,64 manufacturers have already shifted their research and development programs and
selected BEVs as a central element of their future sales strategy, and as a principal, and in some
cases the exclusive, long-term GHG emissions reduction strategy. To now prohibit
manufacturers from complying through fleet-average emissions reductions achieved through
BEVs and instead force them to deliver cleaner ICE vehicles would upend the industry's plans.
The agency appreciates that some commenters, especially those representing or supporting oil
and biofuel companies, oppose BEV technologies as BEVs do not demand the liquid fuels these
companies produce. But the purpose of section 202(a) is to reduce air pollution from motor
vehicles, not to preserve the market share of any particular type of fuel or drivetrain. In light of
the statutory language as described in Preamble III.B, BEVs being highly effective technologies
available for controlling GHG emissions during MY 2027-32, the agency's longstanding practice
of considering such technologies, and the regulated community's reliance on such technologies
to achieve emissions goals, the agency can identify no reasoned justification for ignoring BEV
technologies in establishing the standards. As we explain in Preamble III.B, such an approach is
impermissible under the statute; it would also be arbitrary and capricious.
Commenters raise some sub-flavors of their argument that consideration of electric
technologies is novel. They claim, for example, that consideration of electrification technologies
that reduce or eliminate the use of liquid fossil fuels, or that prevent pollution from being
generated entirely as opposed to controlling it after the fact, are novel. These comments are
misplaced. To date, there has been no commercially viable technology that blocks or controls
carbon pollution in motor vehicles after such pollution has been created. Rather, all motor
vehicle GHG technologies, including all technologies that can be applied to ICE vehicles, result
in the reduction of liquid fossil fuel consumption. All of these technologies also prevent
pollution from being generated in the first place, for example by increasing engine efficiency,
improving aerodynamics, or relying on fuel-switching (to electricity or hydrogen). These
63 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 222 (2016) ("longstanding policies may have engendered
serious reliance interests that must be taken into account. In such cases ... a reasoned explanation is needed for
disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy. It follows that an
unexplained inconsistency in agency policy is a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious
change from agency practice. An arbitrary and capricious regulation of this sort is itself unlawful ....").
64 See e.g., Ford Motor Company, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605 at p. 1; General Motors, LLC, EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0700 at p. 3-4; Stellantis, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678 at p. 2; Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.,
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669 at p. 2; American Honda Motor Co. Inc., EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652 at p. 3;
Hyundai Motor America, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599 at p. 2.
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technologies, moreover, prevent not only GHGs, but criteria pollution.65 We further address this
issue later in this RTC 2.3.
Some commenters, recognizing EPA's authority to consider BEVs, nonetheless claim that the
extent to which EPA is basing the standards on increased adoption of BEVs, or increased
electrification generally, is novel. EPA agrees that BEV technologies will be available in greater
quantities and at lower costs during the timeframe for this rulemaking relative to earlier years,
and that manufacturers will likely significantly increase their adoption of BEV technologies.
These are new factual developments since our earlier rules, which we detail in Preamble ES and
III, and these changing facts support more stringent standards. But regulation responsive to
changing facts is part and parcel of the normal course of agency administration, not the sort of
transformative action that gives rise to a major question.66 Just as questions about the appropriate
level of stringency of a standard are not extraordinary, so too questions about the penetration
rates of a given technology that may be expected to occur under different stringencies are not
extraordinary.
Commenters also wrongly claim that EPA's consideration of ABT is novel, whether in
isolation or specifically with respect to how EPA considers ABT and BEVs in determining the
stringency of the standards. As shown in Table 1, ABT is not at all novel: EPA has employed
ABT throughout all its GHG rules and many criteria pollutant rules, and the use of averaging,
both as a compliance provision and in standard-setting, dates back to 1985.67 EPA did not even
reopen the ABT program in this rule (excepting certain discrete changes discussed in Preamble
III). Regulated entities also strongly support ABT and have come to rely on it as a cost-effective
way to comply with the standards. By contrast, it would be an extraordinary break from
precedent to now cease the ABT program or to cease considering the availability of averaging in
determining the standards. We further address comments regarding ABT later in this RTC 2.3.
In sum, the final rule does not assert an unprecedented and transformative expansion of
agency power, but merely iterates on the existing criteria pollutant and GHG control programs.
65 Criteria pollutants have historically been controlled by both systems that treat pollution after it has been created
(such as catalytic converters) as well as by systems that prevent pollution from being created in the first place.
Examples of criteria pollution prevention technologies include exhaust gas recirculation (EGR) and other
combustion chamber improvements that lead to a cleaner combustion process. See, e.g., 66 FR 5002, 5035
(explaining that as of time of the 2001 HD rule, "the emission control development work for diesels has
concentrated on improvements to the engine itself to limit the emissions leaving the combustion chamber"), 5055
("non-catalyst related improvements to gasoline emission control technology include higher speed computer
processors which enable more sophisticated engine control algorithms and improved fuel injectors providing better
fuel atomization thereby improving fuel combustion"), 5092 (expecting certain vehicles to meet the standards
through various technologies, including EGR and other combustion process improvements).
66 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) ("[W]e
fully recognize regulatory agencies do not establish rules of conduct to last forever and that an agency must be given
ample latitude to adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances.... there is no more reason
to presume that changing circumstances require the rescission of prior action, instead of a revision in or even the
extension of current regulation."); Missouri, 595 U.S. 87, 94, 95 (2022) ("Of course the vaccine mandate goes
further than what the Secretary has done in the past to implement infection control. But he has never had to address
an infection problem of this scale and scope before. In any event, there can be no doubt that addressing infection
problems in Medicare and Medicaid facilities is what he does.").
67 See 50 FR 10606 (Mar. 15, 1985). The availability of averaging as a compliance flexibility has an even earlier
pedigree. See also 48 FR 33456 (July 21, 1983) (EPA's first averaging program for mobile sources); 45 FR 79382
(Nov. 28, 1980) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking investigating averaging for mobile sources).
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The nature and scope of the agency's authority is the same as in prior rules. The rule is premised
on technical and policy judgments that lie in the heartland of EPA's traditionally delegated
authority. And the agency's consideration of electrification and ABT in setting the standards
follow decades of precedent.
III. I lll FINAL RULE DOES NOT IMPOSE UNPRECEDENTED
CONSEQUENCES.
A. The final rule standards impose similar regulatory costs to earlier rules.
In evaluating whether a regulation is of vast economic and political significance, the Supreme
Court has typically compared the effects of the current rule with those of prior exercises of the
agency's authority.68 In particular, the Court has paid special attention to the number of directly
affected entities and the costs of complying with the regulation69—whether in the form of dollars
or other economic consequences such as forced plant closures or permitting delays.70 In some
cases, the Court has also considered the costs to customers of the regulated entity.71
Table 2 of this response presents a comparison of the impacts of this rule with three prior LD
GHG rules: the original 2010 LD GHG rule, the 2012 LD GHG rule, and the most recent 2021
LD GHG rule. We begin by explaining why we chose to compare this rule with prior LD GHG
rules. First, we believe this comparison is most responsive to commenters raising major
questions doctrine concerns. With regard to their major questions arguments, commenters were
principally concerned with the increasing penetration of vehicle electrification technologies EPA
projected to meet the GHG standards, as opposed to, for instance, the application of gasoline
particulate filters to meet the PM standards. Commenters also expressed significantly greater
interest in the LD GHG standards as opposed to the MD GHG standards.
Second, as we explain in Section III of the preamble, we previously regulated MD vehicles
under the heavy-duty program, for instance, as part of the HD Phase 1 and Phase 2 GHG rules.
We also previously regulated criteria pollutants in separate rulemakings from GHGs. As such,
there is no ready comparison between this rule, which regulates both criteria pollutants and
GHGs and both LD and MD, with a particular past rule that regulates all the above. More
importantly, this choice of presentation makes the comparisons we draw highly conservative
from the perspective of the major questions doctrine. Were we to combine the aggregate impacts
68 The Court has not viewed vast consequences, in isolation, as sufficient to warrant departure from the traditional
principles of statutory interpretation. See Brianne J. Gorod et al., Major Questions Doctrine: An Extraordinary
Doctrine for 'Extraordinary' Cases, 19 Wake Forest L. Rev. (forthcoming) 19 ("in no case has economic
significance or political controversy alone been enough to trigger application of the MQD"), available at
https://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4419602.
69 See, e.g., Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2023) ("43 million borrowers from their obligations to repay $430
billion in student loans"); West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2604 (2022); id at 2622 (Gorsuch, J., concurring);
Alabama Association, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021); Utility Air, 573 U.S. 302, 322 (2014).
70 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2604 (2022) (closures of coal power plants); Utility Air, 573 U.S. 302, 322 (2014)
(permitting delays).
71 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2604 (2022) (noting the impact of EPA's EGU regulation on "retail electricity
prices").
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of prior LD and MD GHG and criteria pollutant rules, those aggregate impacts would be
significantly greater than the impacts of just prior LD GHG rules.
Table 2. Comparison of the Impacts of the Final Rule
and Prior Light-Duty Vehicle GHG Rules.
Rulemaking
2010 LD
2012 LD
2021 LD
2024 LMD
Phase-In Schedule (MY)
2012-2016
2017-2025
2023-2026
2027-2032
Costs of Compliance for Manufacturers,
Total (PV 3% billion 2022$)" b
47572
68973
32374
76075
Average Per-Vehicle Costs of Compliance at
Full Phase-In,
LD Vehicles (Car + Truck) (2022$) ^c
1,30276
2,42977
1,15378
2,07479
Net GHG Reductions, Final Year
(million metric tons C02e) d
50680
56981
17282
41083
Reduction in Oil Consumption
(billion barrels)
2284
2285
MD
00
00
1587
Net Benefits, Final Year (billion 2022$)11 d
275 88
28789
4290
27091
Net Benefits
(PV 3% trillion 2022$)" d
2.392
1.993
0.1994
2.095
a Comparing Values: We present all dollar values in constant 2022$ to facilitate ease of comparison between the
rules. We adjusted values from prior rules for inflation. Where values have been adjusted, the original values are
noted in footnotes. For total costs of compliance and net benefits, we note there are differences in the methodologies
used to present and estimate these values across the rules, including updates in certain modeling and monetization
72 20 1 0 RIA Table 6-14 ($345,940 ($2007)).
73 2012 RIA Table 5.2-1 ($521,000 ($2010)).
74 86 FR 74509 Table 43.
75 RIA Table 9-21 "Summary of costs, fuel savings and benefits of the final standards (billions of 2022 dollars)."
76 75 FR 25463, Table III.D.6-4. ($948 ($2007)).
77 77 FR 62853, Table 111-25 ($1,836 ($2010)).
78 86 FR74444, Table 5; 86 FR 74483, Table 28 ($1,000) ($2018)).
79 RIA 12-25, Table 12-40.
80 2010 LD RIA at ES-5, Table 4.
81 2012 LD RIA Table 4.3-17.
82 86 FR 74488, Table 34; 2021 RIA Table 5-1. The value presented above is the sum of reductions of C02, CH4,
and N02 (166 million metric tons, 178,391 metric tons, 5,187 metric tons, respectively), adjusted for global
warming potential of each pollutant (1, 28, and 265, respectively).
83 Preamble VLB Table "Estimated GHG impacts of the final standards relative to the No Action scenario," RIA
Table 8-22 "Greenhouse gas emission inventory impacts, Final standards."
84 2010 LD RIA Table 6-16. The value presented above is the sum of fuel impacts in the RIA table in millions of
gallons (CY2012-50) and then converted to barrels.
85 2012 RIA Table 4.3-23.
86 86 FR 74521; 2021 LD RIA at 5-16, Table 5-10.
87 RIA Table 8-40.
88 2010 LD RIA at 8-25, Table 8-13 ($200,700 million (2007$)).
89 2012 LD RIA at 7-35, Table 7.3-5. ($217,000 million (2010$)).
90 86 FR 74511, Table 48 ($36 billion (2018$)).
91 RIA Table 9-21 "Summary of costs, fuel savings and benefits of the final standards (billions of 2022 dollars)."
92 75 FR 25536, Table III.H.10-3 ($1,653,900 million (2007$)).
93 2012 LD RIA at 7-35, Table 7.3-5. ($1,430,000 million (2010$)).
94 86 FR 74443, Table 4 ($190 billion (2018$)).
95 RIA Table 9-21 "Summary of costs, fuel savings and benefits of the final standards (billions of 2022 dollars)."
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approaches (e.g., updates to MOVES and SC-GHG). Nonetheless, as EPA estimated these figures at the time of each
rule, they appropriately reflect the impacts of the agency's exercise of authority in each such rule. Thus, these figures
are suitable for evaluating the scope of the agency's exercise of authority in this rule compared to prior rules.
Specifically with respect to net benefits, for the 2010, 2012, and 2021 LD GHG rules, we present net benefits using
a 3% average social cost of carbon (SC-GHG) figure, based on the social cost of carbon methodology developed and
recommended by the IWG on the SC-GHG, as described in the RIAs for those rules. For this rule, we present the
climate benefits associated with the SC-GHG estimates under the 2-percent near-term Ramsey discount rate. See
RIA 6.2 for a discussion of changes to the methodology for monetizing the social cost of carbon. Were EPA to apply
the methodology developed and recommended by the IWG on the SC-GHG for calculating the social cost of carbon,
the net benefits of this rule would appear smaller. See RIA 9 Appendix Table 6.
More generally, we note there are differences in how values are presented across the preambles for various rules.
For example, in some cases, we highlight the impacts of the program through 2050 or 2055, whereas in other cases
we highlight the impacts during the years of the phase-in (e.g., MY 2012-16 for the 2010 LD GHG Rule). We
compare like values to the fullest extent possible. For example, with regard to total costs of compliance and net
benefits, we compare the 3% net present value over the full program (through 2050 or 2055). See also note d below
on Final Year. Detailed discussion of the approach to calculating costs and benefits for each rule may be found in
that rule's RIA.
b Costs of Compliance, Total: The costs of compliance for manufacturers represents the total vehicle technology
costs for the program relative to the regulatory baseline for each rule. We note that for this rule, the value presented
is taken from the summary table of costs and benefits and does not include the battery tax credit, which reduces the
costs of compliance to manufacturers below that stated in the table. As shown in RIA 9.7 Table 9-25, the value of
the battery tax credit is $17 billion (3% PV).
0 Average Per-Vehicle Costs of Compliance: This row refers to the average per-vehicle cost for the light-duty fleet
(passenger cars and light trucks) for the year of full-phase in for the program, i.e., the last year shown on the phase-
in schedule row for each rule.
dFinal Year: For this table, the "Final Year" for prior rules refer to 2050, and for this rule refers to 2055. These
years approximate when most of the regulated fleet will consist of vehicles subject to the relevant standards due to
fleet turnover.
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We turn now to the comparison and highlight some key observations. First, this rule regulates
the same community of regulated entities as earlier EPA rules: vehicle manufacturers.96'97
Congress provided explicit textual authorization for regulating these entities, which EPA has
been doing for five decades,98 and they comprise "a relative handful of large sources capable of
shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens" of section 202(a) regulation, and distinct
from the millions of regulated entities that the Court found to give rise to major questions in
other cases.99
As for the costs of compliance, the rule's costs are not so vast as to be unprecedented or
transformative relative to earlier rules. The average costs per-vehicle for LD vehicles in the final
year of the phase-in ($2,100 in MY 2032) fall within the range of prior rules, for example less
than that of the 2012 rule ($2,400 in MY 2025) but greater than the costs of the 2010 and 2021
rule.100 The per-vehicle costs, moreover, are small relative to what Congress itself accepted in
enacting section 202.101 The per-vehicle costs for earlier years of the program are also
significantly lower, for example, with costs of about $200 in MY 2027.102 We acknowledge that
the total costs of compliance for this rule are greater than for prior rules, for example slightly
over 10% higher than the costs for the 2012 rule after adjusting for inflation ($760 billion versus
$689 billion in 2022$ (3% PV)). This is partly because, notwithstanding the significant
emissions reductions achieved through compliance with prior GHG rules, we expect the
regulated community to produce more vehicles than ever before to meet increasing consumer
demand. And even these kinds of metrics reflect an iterative strengthening of the program, not
the kind of unprecedented and transformative change that gives rise to a major question. They
are a far cry, for instance, from the multiple order-of-magnitude increases in the number of
regulated entities and in costs that the Court found in Utility Air.103 The changes here reflect
96 As noted in the text above, this rule regulates both LD and MD vehicle manufacturers. EPA previously regulated
LD and MD vehicles separately, for instance, with the latter under the heavy-duty program through the Phase 1 and
2 GHG Rules. The more important point here, however, is that we continue to regulate the same regulated
community as in prior rules.
97 Perhaps the most notable development in the automotive market in recent years has been the rise of EV-only
automakers. Since EPA adopted its first light duty GHG rule, Tesla's market has grown from virtually zero to 4.2%,
ahead of Volkwagen, Subaru, and BMW. See Pras Subramian, Tesla's US Market Share Now Tops Volkswagen,
Subaru, and BMW, Yahoo Finance (Jan. 9, 2024), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/teslas-us-market-share-now-tops-
volkswagen-subaru-and-bmw-161055575 .html.
98 See CAA sections 202, 203, 216.
99 Utility Air, 573 U.S. 302, 322 (2014).
100 Note that per-vehicle costs for earlier years of the program are significantly lower than the costs in MY 2032.
101 Compare Preamble V ("the highest estimated model year cost (MY 2032) of $2,100 represents about 4.5 percent
of the projected average cost of a new MY 2032 light-duty vehicle (about $46,700)"), with Motor & Equip. Mfrs.
Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("Congress wanted to avoid undue economic disruption in
the automotive manufacturing industry and also sought to avoid doubling or tripling the cost of motor vehicles to
purchasers.").
102 See preamble V for further discussion of costs in different years of the program.
103 See, e.g., Utility Air, 573 U.S. 302, 322 (2014) ("Under the PSD program, annual permit applications would jump
from about 800 to nearly 82,000; annual administrative costs would swell from $12 million to over $1.5 billion....
The picture under Title V was equally bleak: The number of sources required to have permits would jump from
fewer than 15,000 to about 6.1 million; annual administrative costs would balloon from $62 million to $21 billion;
and collectively the newly covered sources would face permitting costs of $147 billion.")
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nothing more than an ordinary fluctuation in regulatory impacts in response to changed
circumstances.104
Nor does the rule impose the kinds of other economic disruptions that the Supreme Court has
noted in prior cases. For example, the rule does not require, legally or practically, any vehicle
manufacturers to shut down or even to reduce their production. Nor does the rule create
excessive, or any, delays in their ability to continue to produce vehicles—we expect that the
certification process for compliance will continue entirely uninterrupted.
As for consumer costs, the statute does not require consideration of such costs.105 Congress,
of course, recognized that pollution control would entail costs, and the technologies used to meet
EPA's motor vehicle emissions standards have historically increased costs for consumers. There
is a subset of pollution control technologies, however, that provide savings to the consumer over
the operational lifetime of a vehicle. When such technologies are available, they will obviously
be of greater interest to customers. In the final rule, EPA considered the upfront costs associated
with purchasing cleaner vehicles, including the costs of any charging infrastructure where
applicable, as well as the costs of operating such vehicles over their lifetime. EPA found that
lower operating costs for vehicles substantially outweigh the increased costs of meeting the
standards over the life of the vehicles. For example, over the average period of first ownership of
eight years, we estimate a MY 2032 PEV owner will on average save more than $8,000 on
purchase and operating costs compared to a gasoline vehicle that meets these standards.106
We also carefully designed the final rule to avoid other kinds of disruptions to consumers. For
example, we recognized that light and medium duty vehicles represent a very diverse array of
vehicles (e.g., passenger cars, light trucks, work vans, etc.), and that even within a single
grouping, there are a diversity of vehicle types and use cases. We carefully tailored the standards
so that manufacturers would not be incentivized by the standards to limit the types of vehicles
and vehicle sizes they offer to consumers. Furthermore, we recognize that vehicles require
supporting infrastructure (e.g., fueling and charging stations) to operate, and we accounted for
sufficient lead-time for the development of that infrastructure, including electric charging
infrastructure. We also identified numerous industry standards and safety protocols to ensure the
safety of vehicles, including BEVs.
Commenters generally failed to acknowledge the analog between this rule and prior rules. In
some cases, they focused on the absolute size of the rules' impacts. But as we explain above, the
major questions doctrine cases have evaluated the consequential nature of the regulation relative
to prior exercises of agency power. And many regulations with large absolute impact, by virtue
104 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'nof U.S., Inc. v. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983Missouri,
595 U.S. 87, 94, 95 (2022); All. for Fair Bd. Recruitment v. Sec. &Exch. Comm'n, 85 F.4th226, 256-58 (5th Cir.
2023).
105 See Motor & Equipment Mfrs. Ass 'n Inc. v. EPA, 627 F. 2d 1095, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("Section 202's cost of
compliance concern, juxtaposed as it is with the requirement that the Administrator provide the requisite lead time to
allow technological developments, refers to the economic costs of motor vehicle emission standards and
accompanying enforcement procedures. It relates to the timing of a particular emission control regulation rather than
to its social implications."); Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("as long as
feasible technology permits the demand for new passenger automobiles to be generally met, the basic requirements
of the Act would be satisfied, even though this might occasion fewer models and a more limited choice of engine
types. The driving preferences of hot rodders are not to outweigh the goal of a clean environment.").
106 See Preamble I.C; RIA 4.2.2.
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of their continuity with earlier assertions of authority, are not subject to major questions
scrutiny.107 The size of the impacts, moreover, is largely a product of the large size of the vehicle
market,108 as well as EPA's choice to assess impacts through 2055, which allows the agency to
consider the long-term impacts of the rule in light of the gradual turnover of the motor-vehicle
fleet.
B. The final rule does not impose a BEV mandate
Commenters also claim that the final rule imposes vast economic and political consequences
because it effectively mandates specific pollution control technologies—namely BEVs—and
effectively bans ICE vehicles. As an initial matter, commenters fail to explain why they believe
establishing standards based on particular pollution control technologies imposes vast economic
and political consequences inconsistent with congressional intent. More importantly, the rule
does not require manufacturers to follow a particular technology pathway.109 The rule is not a
BEV mandate or ICE ban.
To begin with, commenters do not explain why emissions standards based on a specific
pollution control technology run afoul of EPA's authority. West Virginia v. EPA addressed an
analogous issue. In West Virginia, the Supreme Court reviewed the legality of EPA's Clean
Power Plan, which regulated GHGs from the power sector by requiring a shift from regulated
sources—coal fired plants—to completely different facilities—natural gas and renewable power
plants. The agency determined that a coal fired power plant operator could comply by reducing
its own production of electricity, building a new natural gas or renewable power facility,
investing in another entity's such facility, or buying allowances generated by such facilities.110
The Court applied the major questions doctrine to hold that this generation shifting scheme
exceeded the agency's statutory authority under CAA section 111(d) to establish standards based
on the "best system of emission reduction." By contrast, the Court noted a "technology-based"
approach to regulation traditionally "focuses upon the control technologies that are available to
industrial entities and requires the agency to ensure that regulatedfirms adopt the appropriate
cleanup technology ."m The Court observed that a wide range of technologies could fall under
107 Compare, e.g., Missouri, 595 U.S. 87 (2022) (declining to apply the major questions doctrine), with id. at 104
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing the rule should be applied because it "is undoubtedly significant—it requires
millions of healthcare workers to choose between losing their livelihoods and acquiescing to a vaccine they have
rejected for months"); see also, e.g., Becerra v. Empire Health Found., 142 S. Ct. 2354 (2022); EPA v. EMEHomer
City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014)).
108 See Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Economic Insights Map, available at
https://www.autosinnovate.org/resources/insights ($1.21 trillion total car sales in 2022).
109 But see Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252-53 (2004) (noting "the use of
'standard' throughout Title II of the CAA.. .to denote requirements such as numerical emission levels with which
vehicles or engines must comply... or emission-control technology with which they must be equipped.").
110 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2603.
111 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2601 (2022) (emphasis added); see also id. at 2610 (describing that the Mercury
and Air Toxics Rule, which was "no precedent for the Clean Power Plan" but only "one more entry in an unbroken
list of prior Section 111 rules," as one where EPA "set the cap based on the application of particular controls, and
regulated sources could have complied by installing them.").
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this approach, including "more traditional air pollution control measures" such as "efficiency
improvements, fuel-switching," and "add-on controls."112
The final rule is unlike the generation shifting that the Court condemned, but rather a
prototypical example of the traditional technology-based approach. The statute authorizes EPA
to regulate pollutant emissions from motor vehicles. Unlike the Clean Power Plan, the final rule
does not require any manufacturer to reduce its production of motor vehicles; rather, as with all
prior section 202(a) rules, manufacturers can produce as many vehicles as they want, so long as
their fleet meets the emissions standards.113 The rule also does not require manufacturers to
build, invest in, or otherwise support any other forms of transportation, or any strategies to
reduce transportation-sector emissions, besides producing cleaner motor vehicles—for example,
we do not require motor vehicle manufacturers to build or invest in railroads, public
transportation, bicycles, or smart zoning. The rule does not decree that "it would be best if [cars]
made up a much smaller share of national [transportation]," 114 or prescribe that only X% of
transportation can be accomplished by car, while Y% must occur via lower emitting modes such
as rail, boat, or bicycle.115 Nor does the final rule even require manufacturers to shift production
within the light and medium duty vehicle categories toward subcategories that can achieve
greater emissions reductions. Rather, EPA recognizes the diverse needs of consumers, and,
consistent with its past rulemakings, has maintained separate car and truck standards, with the
continuation of existing attribute-based standards for light and medium duty vehicles. EPA's
goal in keeping this approach was to avoid unduly influencing the market strategies of
manufacturers (e.g., by incentivizing upsizing or downsizing of vehicles, or the use of cars over
light trucks for transportation of people) and instead to preserve the diversity of products in the
market. The final rule thus enacts no "sector-wide shift" in transportation.116 The agency is not
seeking to "improve the overall [transportation] system by lowering the carbon intensity of
[transportation] "117
Rather, EPA is requiring manufacturers who make motor vehicles to produce vehicles that
pollute less. The final standards are based on the application of pollution control technology to
such vehicles: "traditional air pollution control measures" such as "efficiency improvements"
that allow vehicles to consume less fuel and therefore produce fewer GHGs and "fuel-switching"
including from gasoline and diesel to fuels such as electricity and hydrogen.118 To be clear, the
final rule does require manufacturers to apply some additional control technology, but it does not
112 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2611 (2022) (citing 80 Fed. Reg. 64784); see also id. at 2602 ("high-efficiency
production processes and carbon capture technology" (citing 80 Fed. Reg. 64512)).
113 Cf. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2610 (2022) ( "[0]ur traditional interpretation ... has allowed regulated
entities to produce as much of a particular good as they desire provided that they do so through an appropriately
clean (or low-emitting) process." (citing 80 Fed. Reg. 64726, 64738)).
114 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2612 (2022).
115 We offer these other forms of transportation for illustrative purposes only, not to suggest any finding regarding
their relative GHG emissions.
116 While the final rule does allow for credit trading, credits are generated solely by manufacturers of vehicles, not
by other kinds of sources, like railroad, bike, or fitness product manufacturers. In other words, as with the MATS
trading program that the Court recognized as falling within EPA's authority, "EPA set the cap based on the
application of particular controls, and regulated sources could have complied by installing them." West Virginia, 142
S. Ct. 2587, 2610 (2022). Below, we further explain why the ABT program does not implicate a major question.
117 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2611.
118 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2611 (2022). Cf. CAA section 241(2) (defining "clean alternative fuel" to mean
any fuel including specifically "hydrogen" and "electricity").
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mandate any particular technology pathway. As a legal matter, the rule imposes performance-
based standards, not a specific technology mandate. So although EPA accounted for BEV
technologies along with other technologies in determining the level of the standards, there is no
requirement for any manufacturer to produce a certain number of BEVs, ICE vehicles, or any
particular kind of vehicle. This is in significant contrast to other programs to which commenters
refer, such as California's ACT program or the Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2019, H.R. 2764,
116th Cong. (2019), both of which are ZEV sales mandates.
Commenters are correct that EPA considered available technologies, including BEV
technologies, in assessing the feasibility of the standards; the standards are based on our
assessment of various technologies. But this kind of technological assessment is what the statute
requires. Section 202(a)(1) commands EPA to set technology-based standards, considering
among other things the time "necessary to permit the development of the requisite technology"
and the "cost of compliance." To do so, EPA must necessarily identify potential control
technologies, evaluate the rate the technology could be introduced, and its cost.119 In setting the
standards, EPA has accordingly investigated potential compliance pathways, considering
technological feasibility, costs, and lead time. Having identified a means of compliance, EPA's
task is to "answer[] any theoretical objections" to that means of compliance, and to "offer[]
plausible reasons for believing that each of those steps can be completed in the time
available."120 That is what EPA has done here, and indeed, what it has done in all of the emission
standards rules implementing section 202(a) of the Act.121
As a practical matter, EPA's technical modeling demonstrates that the final standards do not
require manufacturers to produce additional BEVs for compliance. EPA's modeling of a
potential compliance pathway in preamble Section IV.D does show an increasing penetration of
BEVs. But this is just one possible path for manufacturers to comply. In Section IV.F of the
preamble, EPA presents several alternate pathways for attaining the standards, based on other
technologies, including advanced ICE, hybrids, and PHEVs. In addition to our "central case,"
where BEVs reach 56% in 2032, we also provide details on a Lower BEV Production pathway in
which BEVs reach 43%, and a higher HEV/PHEV pathway where BEVs never exceed 35
percent (which is what we project in our No Action case). Finally, in preamble Section IV.H, we
discuss a potential illustrative compliance scenario in which BEVs never exceed 5%, which is
well below their share of the market for 2023.122 In Section IV of the preamble and in the RIA,
EPA further discusses the feasibility, lead-time, costs of compliance, and consumer acceptance
associated with these alternate technological pathways. Manufacturers have the discretion to
choose to produce any of these vehicle mixes, or any other vehicle mix they choose, so long as
they meet the numerical standards.
119 See NRDC v. EPA, 655 F. 2d 321, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that in order to provide a reasoned explanation
for its section 202(a)(1) standards, EPA must "include[] a defense of the methodology for arriving at numerical
estimates").
120 NRDC v. EPA, 655 F. 2d at 332.
121 See, e.g., 11FR 62624, 62777 (Oct. 15, 2012) (light duty vehicle GHG standards predicated on a mix of potential
technologies to improve engine and vehicle fuel economy); 66 FR 5002, 5035-36 (Jan. 18, 2001) (standards forPM
and NOx from heavy duty diesel engines predicated on use of catalyzed diesel particulate traps and NOx adsorbers,
respectively)
122 EIA, "Electric vehicles and hybrids surpass 16% of total 2023 U.S. light-duty vehicle sales" Jan. 31, 2024,
available at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61344#.
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Further, even under the modeled central compliance pathway, the rate at which BEVs enter
the overall onroad fleet is gradual. This is largely due to the lengthy operational lives of vehicles,
which can be decades. Our modeling for this pathway shows that 84% of light-duty vehicles on
the road will still use gasoline or diesel in 2032.123 This is a far cry from the commenters' claims
of 100% electrification or a gasoline engine ban.124
Historical precedent shows that EPA's performance-based standards have provided real
choices to manufacturers. For example, in promulgating the 2010 LD GHG rule, EPA modeled a
technology pathway for compliance with the MY 2016 standards. In actuality, manufacturers
significantly diverged from EPA's projections across a wide range of technologies, instead
choosing their own technology pathways best suited for their fleets.125 For example, EPA
projected 62 percent dual clutch transmissions, but in practice less than 3 percent of the MY
2016 vehicles used them; by contrast, EPA projected 28 percent 6 speed automatic
transmissions, but in actuality 55 percent of vehicles used them. Looking specifically at
electrification technologies, start-stop systems were projected at 45 percent and were used in 10
percent of vehicles, while strong hybrids were projected to be 6.5 percent of the MY 2016 fleet
and were actually only 2 percent.126 Notwithstanding these differences between EPA's
projections and actual manufacturer decisions, the industry as a whole was not only able to
comply with the standards during the period of those standards (2012-2016), but to generate
substantial additional credits for overcompliance.127
Likewise, for the HD Phase 2 rule, EPA projected compliance pathways for each of the HD
subcategories.128 To date, of the approximately 415,000 successful certifications showing
compliance with the Phase 2 standards, not one has utilized the exact mix of technologies that
EPA analyzed in its potential compliance pathways.
Manufacturers may also adopt entirely different strategies than what EPA anticipated. For
example, in 1985, EPA set HD PM standards that were anticipated to require the use of
particulate filters.129 Manufacturers chose not to adopt such filters but rather to address the
combustion process instead.130 In 2001, EPA set HD NOx standards. We analyzed the feasibility
123 See RIA Figure 8-5.
124 Commenters point to various aspirational statements about achieving 100% PEVs, such as those made by the
White House press office and the Joe Biden Presidential campaign, often citing to dead hyperlinks. While the
President did direct EPA to initiate consideration of more stringent motor vehicle GHG standards, the Administrator
is promulgating this final rule under his own statutory authority in section 202(a) based on his policy judgment and
the voluminous technical record developed by EPA's technical experts. Aspirational statements made in White
House press releases and campaign promises are not the basis for the final rule, and in any event, cannot alter the
authority Congress granted in section 202(a).
125 See EPA Memorandum to the docket for this rulemaking, "Comparison of EPA C02 Reducing Technology
Projections between 2010 Light-duty Vehicle Rulemaking and Actual Technology Production for Model Year
2016."
126 Although in 2010, EPA overestimated technology penetrations for strong hybrids, in the 2012 LD GHG Rule, we
underestimated technology penetrations for PEVs, projecting only 1 percent penetration by MY 2021, while actual
sales exceeded 4 percent. Compare 2012 Rule RIA, table 3.5-22 with 2022 Automotive Trends Report, table 4.1.
127 See 2022 Automotive Trends Report, Fig. ES-8 (industry generated credits each year from 2012-2015 and
generated net credits for the years 2012-2016).
128 See, e.g., 81 FR at 73620-21 (technology packages in support of numerical GHG standard for class 7 and 8
tractors).
129 50 FR 10606, (Mar. 15, 1985).
130 See 66 FR 5002, 5035-36 (Jan. 18, 2001).
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of selective catalyst reduction (SCR) and concluded that "there [were] significant barriers to" the
use of SCR,131 such that the NOx adsorber would "be the only likely broadly applicable
technology choice by the makers of engines and vehicles for the national fleet in this
timeframe."132 Manufacturers instead chose to implement SCR to achieve the standards. In other
cases, manufacturers did uniformly choose to adopt a single technology—for example,
manufacturers have installed catalytic converters on all new ICE vehicles. But this is not because
EPA mandates catalytic converters, but rather because manufacturers have themselves chosen
that technology as the most effective way to comply with the performance-based standards.
Commenters' subsidiary argument—that even if EPA could drive BEV adoption, the agency
has done so at too rapid a rate—fails for similar reasons: EPA is not mandating any manufacturer
to adopt BEVs at any rate. The majority of the shift to BEVs that is expected to occur over the
next decade is reflected in our No Action scenario, or a rate of BEV adoption that is expected
regardless of whether EPA adopts this final rule.133 In addition, the rate at which EPA projects
uptake of BEV, as well as PHEV, technologies in its modeled compliance pathway is consistent
with, and often significantly smaller relative to uptake of new technologies projected in prior
rules. Table 3 of this response presents projected technology adoption rates for the central case
for this rule, as well as for the 2010 and 2012 LD GHG rules. The table shows that the increased
adoption rates for BEV and PHEV technologies are well within the range of increased adoption
rates for technologies evaluated in prior rules.
131 Id. at 5053.
132 Id. at 5036; see also id. at 5049.
133 As discussed in the preamble, many third-party "moderate" projections anticipate even higher BEV projections
than EPA's No Action scenario.
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Table 3. Technology Penetration Rates for Previous Vehicle Rules
Rulemaking
Technology
Initial Penetration
Rate (MY)134
Projected Penetration
Rate (First MY of
Phase-in)
Projected Penetration
Rate (Final MY of
Phase-in)
2024 LMD
Rule
BEV
10% (2023)135
26% (2027)
56% (2032)
2024 LMD
Rule
PHEV
2% (2023)136
6% (2027)
13% (2032)
2012 LD
Rule
High-efficiency
gearbox
0% (2013)137
44% (2021)138
95% (2025)139
2012 LD
Rule
Exhaust gas
recirculation
6% (2021)140
12% (2021)141
68% (2025)142
2012 LD
Rule
Gasoline direct
injection
9 (2010)143
65% (2021)144
94% (2025)145
2010 LD
Rule
42-volt stop-
start
0% (2008)146
—
42% (2016)147
Indeed, premising protective emission standards on rapid technology adoption has been a
mainstay of section 202(a) regulation since the earliest days of the Act. In 1971, EPA finalized
standards for MY 1975, just three model years away, based on catalytic converter technology.148
134 The Initial Penetration Rate column reflects the level of technology adoption prior to the promulgation of the
rule. The data on this varies by rule; for example, in some cases, we report the level of adoption at the time the
analysis for the rule was completed, while in other cases, we report the level of adoption for the baseline fleet
evaluated in the rule.
135 Environmental Protection Agency, "The 2023 EPA Automotive Trends Report: Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Fuel
Economy, and Technology since 1975," EPA-420-R-23-033, December 2023.
136 Environmental Protection Agency, "The 2023 EPA Automotive Trends Report: Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Fuel
Economy, and Technology since 1975," EPA-420-R-23-033, December 2023.
137 EPA and NHTSA Joint Technical Support Document for 2012 LD Rule at 3-105. This refers to a suite of
incremental gearbox improvements that were to be available within the 2017 to 2025 timeframe and were not
previously used.
138 77 FR 62867, Table 111-36.
139 77 FR 62856-7.
140 The 2012 Rule does not appear to report existing EGR use. However, the 2012 Rule does report 6% EGR in the
reference case for MY 2021, suggesting that existing EGR use at or before the time of the rule's publication was
very low. 77 FR 62855 Table 111-26.
141 77 FR 62867, Table 111-36.
142 77 FR 62868, Table 111-38.
143 EPA and NHTSA Joint Technical Support Document for 2012 LD Rule at 1-37, Table 1-22.
144 77 FR 62867, Table 111-36.
145 77 FR 62868, Table 111-38.
146 EPA and NHTSA Joint Technical Support Document for 2010 LD Rule at 1-11, Table 1-2. 42-volt stop-start
hybrid technology is also referred to as "BISG."
147 See 2010 LD Rule RIA at 4-25, Table 4-13.
148 36 FR 12652 (1971); 36 FR 12657 (1971).
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At the time of the final rule, catalytic converters were not yet in widespread commercial
production.149 Faced with the ongoing air pollution crisis, EPA nonetheless established stringent
standards premised on a technology that the agency believed would become available in the lead-
time permitted. Many in the industry argued that the technology would not be ready in time and
sought extensions, including based on testing data showing that many vehicles were not expected
to meet the standards. The Administrator denied those requests.150 By MY 1975, automakers
began installing catalytic converters on their vehicles that achieved 85% reductions in
emissions.151 Over time, greater use of electrification technologies to control and monitor the
performance of catalytic converters further increased their efficacy. Today, the catalytic
converter "is considered to be one of the great environmental inventions of all time."152 This
history dating back to the very beginning of the Clean Air Act further reflects that the major
questions comments, notwithstanding their citation to recent court cases, reflect fairly ordinary
concerns. We emphasize, however, a critical difference between EPA's 1971 rules and this rule:
unlike the catalytic converter, which was unproven at the time of the 1971 rule, PEV technology
has been around for many years. For example, as noted above in table 3, we expect 10% of new
MY 2023 vehicles to be BEVs. EPA's rule is predicated on a technological pathway associated
with more of an existing commercialized technology, and in that respect it is far less
transformative than the agency's earliest CAA section 202(a) rulemakings.
The size of emissions decreases also reflect a rule that is in line with its predecessors. Table 2
shows that the net GHG emissions reductions in the final year of the program are greater than the
2021 LD GHG Rule, but smaller than the 2010 and 2012 LD GHG Rules. When considering
emissions reductions on a percent basis, the same is true: EPA's projected emissions reduction of
50% of GHG and NMOG+NOx emissions from light duty vehicles (and somewhat larger
NMOG+NOx reductions and slightly smaller GHG reductions for medium duty vehicles) are
well within the range of recent rules.153 The statute itself also contemplates rapid emissions
reductions. As noted in Part I above, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 required emissions
149 See Glenn Rifkin, John Mooney, a father of the catalytic converter, dies at 90, Washington Post (June 26, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/john-mooney-a-father-of-the-catalytic-converter-dies-at-
90/2020/06/26/afbd87da-b7b4-l lea-aca5-ebb63d27elff_story.html (describing "the development of the first wave
of production catalytic converters in 1973" in response to "new requirements for reduced auto emissions in the
Clean Air Act of 1970").
150 See generally Aaron Robinson, Fifty years ago, the government decided to clean up car exhaust. It's still at it.,
Hagerty (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.hagerty.com/media/magazine-features/fifty-years-ago-the-government-
decided-to-clean-up-car-exhaust-its-still-at-it/ 7, 2020), https://www.hagerty.com/media/magazine-features/fifty-
years-ago-the-government-decided-to-clean-up-car-exhaust-its-still-at-it/; EPA, EPA: A Retrospective, 1970-1990
(Nov. 29, 1990), https://www.epa.gov/archive/epa/aboutepa/epa-retrospective-1970-1990.html ("The Agency's
strong stand led to strict enforcement of the Clean Air Act. Ruckelshaus refused to grant extensions requested by
automobile manufacturers to meet hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide standards. In effect, he forced the adoption of
the catalytic converter."); EPA, Hearings Set on Automobile Pollution Control (Mar. 4, 1971),
https://www.epa.gov/archive/epa/aboutepa/hearings-set-automobile-pollution-control.html;
151 Dennis C. Williams, The Guardian: EPA's Formative Years, 1970-1973 (Sept. 1993),
https://www.epa.gov/archive/epa/aboutepa/guardian-epas-formative-years-1970-1973.html ("By 1973, EPA and
auto manufacturers had agreed to adopt the catalytic converter as a means to reduce automobile emissions by 85% in
1975 year model cars.").
152 EPA, Accomplishments and Successes of Reducing Air Pollution from Transportation in the United States (Jan.
3, 2024), https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/accomplishments-and-successes-
reducing-air
153 The 2010 and 2012 LD GHG rules when considered together achieved approximately a 50% reduction of GHG
emissions and Tier 2 required reductions in NOx emissions of 77-95%.
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decreases of 90% over a five-model-year period, the 1990 Amendments required a 100% phase-
in of demanding standards over a six- to seven-year period, and Congress expressly preserved
the Administrator's authority to promulgate even more stringent standards.
C. The final rule's indirect impacts do not give rise to a major question.
Commenters claiming the existence of a major question generally did not grapple with the
considerable similarities between this rule and its predecessors. Rather, they focused on the
rule's alleged impacts on third parties beyond the regulated entities and their customers, which
we refer to here as "indirect impacts." They cite considerations as diverse as how demand for
critical minerals could implicate US-China geopolitics, increased consumption of electricity to
operate BEVs could destabilize the electric grid, decreased oil consumption could cause oil
companies to fail, and so on. They claim that the proposal's costs grossly underestimate the
rule's "true costs," based on their assertion that the proper metric is "aggregate cost" for the
rule's significance to the "national economy." But commenters fail to identify any precedent
holding that mere indirect impacts on unregulated entities give rise to a major question.154 To the
contrary, legal and technical reasons provide substantial reasons to hesitate before relying on
indirect impacts to ascertain the existence of a major question.
First, the statute here does not require consideration of such indirect impacts, suggesting that
their presence should not limit the agency's statutory authority. Section 202(a) mandates the
Administrator to regulate emissions from motor vehicles, upon making the endangerment
finding, subject to considerations of feasibility, lead-time, costs of compliance, and safety. While
EPA is authorized to consider other factors and has in this rulemaking considered certain indirect
impacts, as described in Part III.E below, consideration of other factors is not mandated by
law.155 As such, the agency's consideration of these additional impacts does not limit the
agency's authority.
Second, the statutory context and legislative history supports not relying on indirect impacts
to gauge the limits of statutory authority. For example, with respect to employment, Congress in
enacting the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments debated the employment impacts associated with
the addition of new control technology for motor vehicles, with some Members projecting job
increases of up to 180,000 new jobs and others projecting job losses in the tens of thousands.156
Nonetheless, Congress enacted stringent statutory standards for motor vehicle emissions control.
Congress in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments chose to further address labor dislocations
through funding and training. It added Clean Air Employment Transition Assistance provisions
154 See, e.g., West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) (considering the consequential nature of a regulation of electric
generating units with regard to its direct burdens on that sector), 2613 (noting "an obvious difference between (1)
issuing a rule that may end up causing an incidental loss of coal's market share, and (2) simply announcing what the
market share of coal, natural gas, wind, and solar must be, and then requiring plants to reduce operations or
subsidize their competitors to get there").
155 Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also id. ("There is no
indication that Congress intended section 202's cost of compliance consideration to embody social costs of the type
petitioners advance," and holding that the statute does not require EPA to consider antitrust concerns); Coal, for
Responsible Regul., Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that the statute "does not mandate
consideration of costs to other entities not directly subject to the proposed standards"); Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497,
534 (2007) (impacts on "foreign affairs" are not sufficient reason for EPA to decline making an endangerment
finding under section 202(a)(1)).
156 123 Cong. Rec. 18182 (1977).
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to the Job Training Partnership Act. The added provisions provided funding for "training,
adjustment assistance, and employment services to [eligible dislocated workers] adversely
affected by compliance with the Clean Air Act" and for "needs-related payments to such
individuals."157 In short, Congress was well aware that impacts to employment were a
possibility and provided funding and training for affected workers; but it did not prohibit the
agency from further regulation on the basis of employment.
To take another example, in enacting the CAA Amendments of 1990, Congress recognized
the need for the critical mineral rhodium for the production of catalytic converters (a ubiquitous
motor vehicle pollution control technology) and that South Africa was home to the vast majority
of the world's then-known rhodium deposits.158 While Congress acknowledged concerns with
South Africa's human rights record, it nonetheless proceeded to significantly strengthen the
motor vehicle emissions standards, such that the production of the necessary technologies could
require dependence on South African rhodium supplies. Thus, Congress understood that the
nation may need to look to other countries for critical materials where necessary to improve
motor vehicle emissions control technology, but mandated emissions reductions regardless. At
the same time, Congress also mandated that EPA study the appropriateness of even stronger
standards and expressly reserved the agency's authority to promulgate such standards, without
including critical minerals as a specific factor to consider.159
Third, indirect impacts are often subject to greater uncertainties, and in many cases are not
reasonably foreseeable, particularly when separated from the agency's action by a lengthy causal
chain. For instance, while EPA has assessed indirect impacts in calculating the rule's costs and
benefits—and the presence of positive net benefits supports the rationality of the Administrator's
judgment—we do not rely on cost-benefit calculations, with their uncertainties and limitations, in
identifying the appropriate standards.160 Some other impacts are so tenuously linked that they are
not amenable to estimation at all, such as—to provide one example raised by a commenter—how
the final rule might impact child labor in Congo, a matter which the final rule does not regulate
157 Pub. L. 101-549, at sec. 1101, amending the Job Training Partnership Act, 29 U.S.C. 1501 et seq. (since
repealed). See also 136 Cong. Reg. H12911-01 (Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Representative William D. Ford)
("When a business closes or lays off workers as a consequence of this act, because demand for its products or
services is adversely affected, because a product is banned, or because its production processes have become
uneconomical, State government, substate grantees, employers, employer associations, and representatives of
employees may apply to the Secretary of Labor for funds to help laid off workers find new employment.").
158 See 136 Cong. Rec. 5102-04 (1990). The 1990 CAA Amendment are not the first time that Congress wrestled
with potential dependence on South Africa for rhodium. Congress also recognized this issue when developing the
1977 CAA Amendments. See 123 Cong. Rec. 18173-74 (1977).
159 See CAA section 202(i), (i)(3)(B).
160 To provide a more specific example, the agency has modeled the impacts of the final rule on grid reliability and
found that grid reliability is not expected to be adversely affected by the modest increase in electricity demand
associated with increasing use of PEVs. Yet, as the agency explains in the Resource Adequacy and Grid Reliability
Technical Memo, any potential reliability impacts would not be a direct result of this rule but rather of the
compliance choices source owners, operators, ISOs and RTOs may pursue, none of which are directly regulated
under the final rule. This is a critical difference between this rule and the rule under review in West Virginia, where
EPA did directly regulate EGUs, and is why grid reliability impacts are of limited relevance to ascertaining the
existence of a major question here.
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and which, to the extent the United States has any influence, would involve matters of trade and
foreign policy outside the scope of the CAA.161
Finally, regulations routinely have wide-ranging indirect impacts, so such impacts cannot
practically be relied on to identify "extraordinary" cases. For example, EPA's motor vehicle
rules generally impose costs on industry, and as such may affect the economics of the regulated
entities as well as their employees, suppliers, and customers; fuel producers, distributors, and
retailers; and generally the global supply chains to manufacture vehicles, parts, and raw
materials. The same can be said for every major regulation, such that relying on indirect effects
would offer no limiting principle in determining the existence of major questions.
As such, commenters' assertions about the myriad indirect effects do not reflect the rule's
extraordinary nature, but rather the ordinary state of the global supply chain associated with
motor vehicles. For instance, although commenters criticize US motor vehicles manufacturers'
reliance on China for certain critical minerals used in manufacturing batteries, they fail to
acknowledge that reliance on foreign trade is not unique to BEVs; rather manufacturers rely on
imports from China and other nations for a wide range of inputs used in production of ICE
vehicles,162 and such reliance is continuously adapting to changing market and regulatory
forces.163 For example, a 2018 EPA case study of Ford found that Ford has "approximately
11,000 suppliers in over 60 countries."164 Such reliance is not unique to the motor vehicle
industry. Aluminium, for instance, is an important raw material used in motor vehicle
manufacturing and numerous other industrial applications. It is largely imported, and such
161 The commenter claims that EPA's final rule will increase demand for cobalt, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo controls large reserves of cobalt, and therefore the final rule will aggravate the human rights concerns
associated with Congolese child labor as well as geopolitical risks with China, which owns and refines a significant
portion of Congolese cobalt output. But the final rule does not regulate battery manufacturers, much less the labor
practices at Congolese critical minerals mines, or Chinese ownership of Congolese companies, rendering any such
associated impacts highly speculative. (The same, of course, can be said in relation to critical minerals used in ICE
vehicles emissions control technologies—e.g., the final rule does not regulate the labor practices of those mines
either.) We also note that future technological developments may diminish the use of cobalt in vehicle batteries,
which provides another reason not to place weight on the extended chain of hypothetical causation raised by the
commenter. See Chen et al., "A Layered Organic Cathode for High-Energy, Fast Charging, and Long-Lasting Li-Ion
Batteries." .ICS Cent. Sci. 2024 (demonstrating "the operational competitiveness of sustainable organic electrode
materials [derived from earth-abundant elements] in practical batteries"), available at
https://pubs.acs.org/doi/epdf/10.1021/acscentsci.3c01478.
162 See, e.g., David Coffin, China's Growing Role in U.S. Automotive Supply Chains, Office of Industries of the U.S.
International Trade Commission (USITC) Working Paper ID-060 (Aug. 2019).
163 For example, the US motor vehicle industry relies on the global supply chain for semiconductors. The recent
shortage in semiconductors caused significant impacts on the motor vehicle industry. See, e.g., Jeanne Whalen,
Semiconductor Shortage that Has Hobbled Manufacturing Worldwide is Getting Worse (Sep. 23, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/09/23/chip-shortage-forecast-automakers/. The shortage was due
to numerous factors, ranging from impacts of pandemic lockdowns on semiconductor production and international
trade; the impacts of the pandemic in increasing demand for automobiles and other electronics that use
semiconductors; natural disasters that shuttered production facilities; trade conflicts between the US, China, Korea,
and Japan; and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. See KPMG, Russia-Ukraine war: Impact on the Semiconductor
Industry, https://kpmg.com/ua/en/home/insights/2022/05/russia-ukraine-war-impact-semiconductor-industry.html;
Esther Shein, Global Chip Shortage: Everything You Need to Know (Oct. 19, 2023),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/global-chip-shortage-cheat-sheet/.
164 See EPA Center for Corporate Climate Leadership, Success Stories: Case Studies in Supply Chain Engagement
(Aug. 21, 2023), https://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/success-stories-case-studies-supply-chain-engagement.
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imports can have potential national security implications.165 To provide another example,
Apple's supply chain comprises "more than 400 facilities across 180 regions in nearly 30
countries."166 Overcoming supply chain vulnerabilities is a key component of managing any
significant manufacturing operation in today's global world.167
Turning to infrastructure, although commenters take aim at the need for new electric charging
infrastructure to supply BEVs, they fail to mention that ICE vehicles depend on extensive
infrastructure for their operation too,168 and that infrastructure has changed considerably over the
decades in response to environmental regulation. Important changes include the elimination of
lead from gasoline, the provisioning of diesel exhaust fluid (DEF) at truck stops to support
selective catalytic reduction (SCR) technologies, and the introduction of low sulfur diesel fuel to
support diesel particulate filter (DPF) technologies.169 Each of these changes required
establishment of new manufacturing and distribution systems to ensure these fuels and DEF were
available to drivers across the country.
Commenters also speculated that the costs of the rule will dramatically increase the costs of
transportation; but all pollution control technologies impose upfront costs. And commenters
neglected to mention that BEV technologies are actually expected to save purchasers money due
to their lower operating expenses, such that the economic costs of transportation are likely to
decrease.170 Commenters also complain about the potential losses for the petroleum industry but
fail to mention that this is true for all of EPA's motor vehicle GHG rules, which have continually
been premised on reducing petroleum consumption.171 Indeed, as shown in Table 2 of this
response, both the 2010 and 2012 LD GHG rules were anticipated to cause even greater
reductions in petroleum consumption. And commenters fail to grapple with the fact that
increased demand for fossil fuels is associated with adverse impacts to US energy security.
I). EPA has expertise in assessing indirect impacts of its environmental regulations.
To the extent indirect impacts are relevant, EPA has relevant expertise in assessing such
impacts, particularly in consultation with other expert agencies. In addition to the agency's
principal expertise in pollution control, EPA also has broad expertise in evaluating the indirect
impacts of its actions, both independently and in consultation with other expert agencies.
165 See, e.g., White House Briefing Room, A Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States
(Feb. 24, 2023), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/02/24/a-proclamation-on-
adjusting-imports-of-aluminum-into-the-united-states-4/.
166 Bloomberg, Apple's Supply Chain Is on a Collision Course with Climate Change (Sep. 26, 2023),
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2023-opinion-apple-supply-chain-climate-change/.
167 See, e.g., Willy C. Shih, Global Supply Chains in a Post-Pandemic World (Sept. - Oct. 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/09/global-supply-chains-in-a-post-pandemic-world; KPMG, Vulnerable Supply in Automotive,
https://kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2022/05/vulnerable-supply-in-automotive.html.
168 Moreover, we expect that through 2055 the majority of light and medium duty PEV charging will occur at home;
by contrast, ICE vehicles are typically not refueled at home, but require a trip to the gas station.
169 See, e.g., 88 FR 4376 (inducement requirements associated with SCR and DEF); 79 FR 23414 (low sulfur fuel
and advanced control technologies for gasoline vehicles); 66 FR 5002 (low sulfur fuel and diesel particulate filters);
CAA 218 (Prohibition on production of engines requiring leaded gasoline).
170 See Preamble VIII.
171 Commenters also neglect to note that the vast majority of such reduced consumption (estimated by EPA as
94.8%) would come from reduced net imports, with only the remaining small fraction linked to reduced domestic
production. See Preamble VIII.D.
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Congress itself recognized that EPA's CAA actions could have a wide range of non-
environmental impacts and entrusted the Administrator with regulating notwithstanding such
impacts.172 For example, in section 202(a)(3)(A), Congress directed EPA to establish motor
vehicle emission standards "giving appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety factors
associated with the application of such technology." Congress also authorized EPA, in
administering the motor vehicle emissions standards, to "exempt any new motor vehicle or new
motor vehicle engine" from certain statutory requirements "upon such terms and conditions as he
may find necessary ... for reasons of national security."173 Congress further directed EPA to
promulgate emissions standards not only for domestically produced vehicles, but also vehicles
imported into the United States from foreign nations.174 Thus, while we agree that EPA is not the
exclusive or principal Federal agency charged with regulating energy, safety, national security,
international trade, and so forth, Congress nonetheless vested EPA with authority, and EPA
possesses sufficient expertise, to evaluate concerns in these and other areas in relation to its
motor vehicle emissions control program. It bears mentioning, moreover, Congress directed EPA
alone—not in consultation with or subject to the agreement of any other agency—to evaluate the
above effects, indicating Congress's decision to entrust such judgments to EPA's expertise.
More generally, Congress has also recognized the agency's general expertise in considering
the "public health and welfare" implications of air pollution.175 In addition to EPA's authority
to act on its own, Congress further directed EPA, in consultation with other agencies, to conduct
a "comprehensive analysis of the impact of this chapter on the public health, economy, and
environment of the United States."176 The statute also requires EPA to establish emission
standards for electric generating units, including based on consideration of "the energy. . .
impacts of compliance."177 These statutory provisions further indicate that Congress believed
EPA had sufficient expertise to evaluate manifold indirect impacts.178 Moreover, EPA has in
172 See generally Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 427, 428 (2011) ("As with other questions of
national or international policy, informed assessment of competing interests is required. Along with the
environmental benefit potentially achievable, our Nation's energy needs and the possibility of economic disruption
must weigh in the balance. The Clean Air Act entrusts such complex balancing to EPA in the first instance, in
combination with state regulators.... Congress designated an expert agency, here, EPA, as best suited to serve as
primary regulator of greenhouse gas emissions.").
173 CAA section 203(b)(1).
174 CAA section 203(a)(1); see also, e.g., CAA section 216(1).
175 See, e.g., CAA section 202(a)(1) (requiring EPA to promulgate standards for emissions from motor vehicles
"which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare"), 202(a)(4)(A) (precluding the use of any emissions control device that creates "unreasonable risk
to public health, welfare, or safety in its operation or function").
176 CAA section 312(a) (directing EPA to conduct a "comprehensive analysis of the impact of this chapter on the
public health, economy, and environment of the United States").
177 See, e.g., CAA section 169A(b), (g)(2) (requiring EPA to determine best available retrofit technology for existing
"fossil-fuel fired generating powerplant[s]," giving consideration to factors including "the energy and nonair quality
environmental impacts of compliance").
178 See also, e.g., CAA section 202(1)(2) ("noise, energy, and safety factors"), 211(o)(2)(B)(ii)(II) ("energy
security"), (IV) ("the infrastructure of the United States, including deliverability of materials, goods, and products
other than renewable fuel, and the sufficiency of infrastructure to deliver and use renewable fuel"), (VI) ("job
creation, the price and supply of agricultural commodities, rural economic development, and food prices").
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numerous prior rulemakings considered the indirect impacts of its motor vehicle regulations on
factors like employment, national security, and the electric grid.179
E. EPA determined that the final rule does not cause significant indirect harms and has
large net benefits.
EPA carefully assessed the indirect impacts of the final rule, pursuant to its own expertise and
in consultation with many expert agencies. The agency projects that the final rule accrues
positive net benefits for society and will not cause significant indirect harms, such as to national
security, grid reliability, or employment. The rule also creates the potential for positive benefits
in these and other areas, including through mitigating air pollution and climate change, reducing
dependence on foreign oil, and creating regulatory certainty for the manufacturing of advanced
pollution control technologies and the development of electric charging infrastructure.
In promulgating the final rule, EPA applied its own considerable expertise in motor vehicle
pollution control as well as assessing related environmental and economic impacts. Further, the
agency engaged in extensive consultation both during the interagency review process pursuant to
Executive Order 12,866 and outside of that process.180 EPA consulted with numerous Federal
agencies and workgroups181 with a wide range of expertise, including in the availability of
critical minerals, battery technologies, charging infrastructure, grid reliability, employment,
safety, foreign trade, national security, and more. The agency also consulted with State and
regional agencies with relevant expertise.182 And EPA conducted extensive engagement with a
diverse range of stakeholders, including vehicle manufacturers, labor unions, technology
suppliers, dealers, utilities, charging providers, environmental justice organizations,
environmental organizations, public health experts, tribal governments, and other organizations.
EPA also carefully considered the input it received through the public hearing and written
comments, including 252,439 comments representing diverse stakeholders.
EPA finds that this rule creates $99 billion in annualized net benefits (2022$ 2% AV). The
rule's positive net benefits support the rationality of the Administrator's judgment. But the
agency did not rely on the cost-benefit calculations, with their uncertainties and limitations, in
identifying the appropriate standards. We recognize that some commenters claimed this large net
179 See, e.g., HD Phase 2 RIA, 8.8 (Petroleum, Energy and National Security Impacts), 8.10 (Employment Impacts);
HD Phase 1 RIA, 9.7 (Petroleum, Energy and National Security impact), 9.9 (Employment Impacts); 2021 LD RIA,
3.2 (energy security impacts); 8.2 (employment); 2021 LD RTC 12-83 (grid reliability), 19-18 (national security);
see also EPA, Power Sector Modeling, https://www.epa.gov/power-sector-modeling_(describing EPA's IPM model
of the power sector, which the agency applies in its rulemaking affecting that sector and listing numerous rules that
have applied the model).
180 See Preamble ES.
181 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) at the Department of Transportation (DOT),
Department of Energy (DOE) including several national laboratories (Argonne National Laboratory (ANL),
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), and Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL)), United States Geological Survey (USGS) at the Department of Interior (DOI), Joint
Office of Energy and Transportation (JOET), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Department of
Commerce (DOC), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State, Federal Consortium for Advanced
Batteries (FCAB), and Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
182 California Air Resources Board (CARB), and other States, including members of the National Association of
Clean Air Agencies (NACAA), the Association of Air Pollution Control Agencies (AAPCA), the Northeast States
for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM), and the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC).
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benefits figure itself amounted to vast economic and political consequences. We do not agree for
the reasons stated above in Part III.C. It would also be particularly perverse, given Congress's
grant of authority in section 202(a) to control motor vehicle air pollution, to conclude that where
an agency action is accomplishing what Congress directed the agency to do and achieves large
benefits, for those benefits to somehow call into question EPA's authority for the action in the
first place. Even were the size of the net benefits to be relevant, as we show in Table 2 of this
response, the rule's net benefits ($2.0 trillion) are not different in kind from its predecessors: just
slightly higher than those of the 2012 LD GHG Rule ($1.9 trillion) and lower than those of the
2010 LD GHG Rule ($2.3 trillion, all values expressed in 3% PV, 2022$).
Throughout the Preamble, RIA, and RTC, EPA further addresses specific impacts, including
those of particular concern to these commenters, including electric charging infrastructure and
grid reliability; oil imports and energy security; critical minerals; and employment. We
summarize some key observations here.
We project that there will be adequate electric charging and refueling infrastructure to support
the standards. Grid reliability is not expected to be adversely affected by the modest increase in
electricity demand associated with PEV charging, and managed charging strategies can be
applied to further decrease grid impacts.183 We anticipate sufficient supplies of critical minerals
to support battery production, given both global supplies as well the significant government
efforts through the BIL and IRA as well as private investments to develop domestic mining and
processing capacity. The rule is projected to significantly reduce the consumption of petroleum,
whether through increased adoption of BEVs or other advanced ICE vehicle technologies that
reduce petroleum use; we expect the vast majority of this decrease (94.8%) to reflect decreased
net imports, which yields significant positive benefits for energy security ($2.1 billion 2% AV),
with relatively limited impacts on domestic refining. We find the potential for employment shifts
between industries (e.g., from ICE and ICE vehicle manufacturing to BEV, battery); and while
we do not have sufficient data to quantify employment impacts, there is evidence that—assuming
production of PEVs and their power supplies are done in the US at the same rates as ICE
vehicles—US employment is likely to increase in response to PEV adoption.
Moreover, as we explain in the Preamble, EPA considers our estimates of battery costs and
BEV adoption to be conservative, such that there is a reasonable likelihood that the market
moves even more quickly toward BEV adoption and achieves greater emissions reductions at a
lower cost than we anticipate. At the same time, the standards do not mandate a specific level of
BEV technologies—or any at all —such that in the event the barriers to BEV adoption are
greater than we project, manufacturers have the flexibility to adopt other technologies and
mitigate the need for BEV-related critical minerals, infrastructure, and so forth.
Furthermore, as discussed in Preamble ES and throughout the RIA, many ongoing efforts help
ensure the smooth implementation of the final rule. Significant initiatives by the Federal
government (such as the BIL and IRA), State and local government, and private firms
complement EPA's final rule, including initiatives to reduce the costs to purchase BEVs; support
the development of domestic critical mineral, battery, and BEV production; and accelerate the
establishment of charging infrastructure. EPA is also monitoring industry's performance in
183 Specifically, EPA assessed the cumulative impacts of BEV charging in response to the combined impact of this
rule and the HD Phase 3 rule. Taken together, these rules are associated with a modest and manageable increase in
electricity demand and are not expected to adversely impact grid reliability.
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complying with mobile source emissions standards, including the final rule. As appropriate and
consistent with our CAA section 202(a) authority, EPA may decide to issue guidance documents,
initiate a future rulemaking to consider modifications to the final rule, or make no changes to the
program.
Moreover, commenters raising major questions concerns unduly focused on the potential for
negative indirect impacts associated with the final rule, while neglecting the negative impacts of
inaction. Put differently, they ignored the rule's potential to create positive impacts, which—as
many other stakeholders noted—are many and great. Foremost, the positive impacts include the
beneficial impacts of mitigating air pollution—the primary purpose of section 202(a). Section II
of the preamble extensively documents the adverse effects of criteria pollutants and carbon
pollution on human health, the environment, and the economy.184 Other positive impacts include
reduced dependence on foreign oil and increased energy security and independence; increased
regulatory certainty for encouraging domestic production of advanced pollution control
technologies and their components (including BEVs, batteries, fuels cells, battery components,
and critical minerals) and for the development of electric charging infrastructure, with attendant
benefits for employment and US global competitiveness in these sectors; and increased use of
electric charging and potential for vehicle-to-grid technologies that can support electric resource
adequacy and grid reliability.185
In sum, the final rule does not create vast economic and political consequences of an
unprecedented kind. The rule builds upon the market's transition to PEVs—in response to
emerging technological developments, Congress's support in the IRA, and other factors—and
strengthens the existing emissions standards. Its direct impacts are analogous to, and in some
respects less impactful than, its predecessors. And contrary to what commenters claim, the final
rule is not a BEV mandate, whether legally or practically, as a manufacturer can comply with the
standards without producing additional BEVs. As for indirect impacts, there is nothing different
in kind about the impacts of the final rule compared to the impacts of prior rules; the presence of
such impacts merely reflects the ordinary nature of the global supply chain for motor vehicles.
Even were the agency to consider indirect regulatory impacts, the final rule causes no significant
indirect harms of the kinds that commenters allege, has the potential for positive impacts, and on
balance provides positive net benefits to society.
IV. ADDITIONAL FACTORS COUNSEL AGAINST APPLICATION OF I II I MAJOR
QUESTIONS DOCTRINE
Additional factors present further evidence that the major questions doctrine does not apply:
the agency's assertion of authority does not create an unworkable conflict with any other
statutory provision, the action does not significantly alter the balance of Federal and state power
or the power of government over private property, and notwithstanding political interest in motor
184 See Preamble II (describing, for instance, the adverse impacts of climate change as including catastrophic risks
for human health and the environment, water supply and quality, storm surge and flooding, electricity infrastructure,
agricultural disruptions and crop failures, human rights, international trade, and national security).
185 EPA did not rely on these other positive impacts, or the net benefits calculations, in identifying the level of the
standards. Nonetheless, the potential for such positive impacts as well as the presence of positive net benefits
support the rationality of the standards.
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vehicle GHG regulation, the weight of statutory and legislative evidence supports EPA's
authority.
First, the final rule is not in conflict with other statutory provisions. As an initial matter,
commenters' attempts to wrap their many statutory interpretation challenges in the major
questions cloth are misplaced. Ordinary claims of statutory inconsistency, even when "multiple
Federal statutes" are allegedly in conflict, are governed by the "traditional rules of statutory
interpretation."186 For example, in Utility Air, the Court deferred to EPA's interpretation of the
statute notwithstanding petitioners' arguments that the agency's approach was "fundamentally
unsuited" given the statutory context, because such approach was not "so disastrously
unworkable, and need not result in such a dramatic expansion of agency authority."187 Here, the
commenters' allegations of inconsistency with other statutory provisions188 are basically run-of-
the-mill interpretive disputes that can be resolved under traditional principles of interpretation,
and in any event, lack merit. We generally respond to commenters' statutory interpretation
arguments later in this section of the RTC. Here, we summarize a few of the responses
specifically as they pertain to the major questions doctrine.
Commenters assert that EPA's averaging, banking, and trading (ABT) program is inconsistent
with various compliance and enforcement provisions in the statute, e.g., CAA sections 203-207,
and specifically criticize EPA's decision to assess the feasibility of the standards based on an
average of the emissions performance of different vehicle technologies, including ICE vehicles
and BEVs. We respond to the statutory interpretation arguments against ABT later in this RTC
section. We also do not see how ABT gives rise to a major question either as to its own validity
or to EPA's use of averaging as part of the process of determining stringency of the standards.
Congress has decided the major question here: EPA must control air pollution from motor
vehicles. ABT is a compliance mechanism to achieve that aim. ABT recognizes the practical
realities of the motor vehicle industry and its strategies for reducing certain pollutants;
manufacturers do not redesign every vehicle in every single year, any given manufacturer may
find it cheaper to reduce emissions on one kind of vehicle versus another, certain manufacturers
may be more cost effective at reducing emissions than other ones, and advanced pollution
control technologies are typically phased in over a period of time as opposed to all at once. ABT
thus enables EPA to ensure emissions reductions from the class of motor vehicles, while
providing manufacturers with greater flexibility in developing their products and achieving
emissions reductions at lower cost. ABT also has a lengthy pedigree—beginning (with the
averaging component) in 1985 and being applied consistently for NMOG+NOx since 2000 and
GHG emissions standards since their inception in 2010. It would be extraordinary for an
186 POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2236 (2014); cf. Dep't of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural
Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, No. 22-846, 2024 WL 478567, at *11 (U.S. Feb. 8, 2024) ("we approach federal statutes
touching on the same topic with a strong presumption they can coexist harmoniously.... Where two laws are merely
complementary—as is undisputedly the case here—our duty lies not in preferring one over another but in giving
effect to both.").
187 Utility Air, 573 U.S. 302, 332 (2014)
188 In some cases, commenters do not even identify an actual conflict, but base their argument primarily on the
expressio unius canon. We offer specific responses regarding the application of expressio unius later in this RTC
2.3.
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interstitial compliance mechanism that EPA has implemented for nearly forty years to suddenly
become a major question.189
Commenters claim there is a conflict between the final rule and the statute's Clean Fuel
Vehicles provisions.190 But the Clean Fuel Vehicle provisions, which are contained in a separate
Part of the statute, have little bearing on the scope of EPA's section 202(a) authority.191 That
program was a specific project to advance alternative fuels and technologies.192 The program
prescribes more stringent criteria pollutant standards for certain years (e.g., MY 1998 and later
for HD vehicles)193 in some ozone nonattainment areas, relative to the standards applicable
nationwide.194 There is an obvious mismatch between these requirements and EPA's section
202(a) authority, under which we are setting GHG standards applicable to the entire nation for
MY 2027-32. Moreover, the specific provision on which commenters place most weight, section
242(b), actually says that clean fuel vehicles and "conventional gasoline-fueled or diesel fueled
vehicles" may be part of the "same category" of vehicles.195 Finally, commenters erroneously
presume that the distinction between clean fuel and conventional vehicles is a distinction
between electric vehicles and gasoline and diesel vehicles. Clean fuel vehicles as a category
include all kinds of vehicles, including those fueled by diesel, reformulated gasoline, ethanol,
hydrogen, electricity, and so on.196
Commenters also allege a conflict between the final rule and the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (EPCA). The Supreme Court has already rejected a similar argument as EPCA
and the CAA are two different statutes that impose independent duties.197 If anything, the fact
that EPCA precludes DOT from considering battery electric vehicles in exercising certain
regulatory powers, and the CAA contains no similar limitation, suggests that Congress knew
189 West Virginia, moreover, suggests this is not a major question. In describing the cap-and-trade program for the
Mercury and Air Toxics Rule, the Court noted that there, "EPA set the cap based on the application of particular
controls, and regulated sources could have complied by installing them." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2610
(2022). This case is analogous. EPA sets the final standards based on technical factors such as feasibility, lead time,
and costs, see section 202(a)(l)-(2), comparable to the "scientific, objective criterion" the Court noted with favor,
not "wherever the Agency sees fit" based on vague notions of societal welfare.
190 See generally Guidance for Fulfilling the Clean Fuel Fleets Requirement of the Clean Air Act, EPA-420-B-22-
027 (June 2022).
191 As we explain in Preamble III.B, however, we do think the Clean Fuel Vehicles program supports interpreting
the statutory term "motor vehicle" to include electric vehicles. CAA section 241(2).
192 See H. Rep. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 283 (1990), 1990 WL 1222133, at *65-66 (Congress wanted "to encourage a
broad range of vehicles," including those using electricity, and break the "chicken and the egg" supply-and-demand
problem among automakers, consumers, and fuel producers).
193 CAA section 245(a).
194 Compare, e.g., clean fuel vehicle statutory numeric standards in CAA sections 243 and 245, with the those
applying to conventional vehicles in CAA section 202(g)-(i).
195 CAA section 242(b) says that clean fuel vehicles "shall comply with all requirements of this subchapter which
are applicable in the case of conventional gasoline-fueled or diesel fueled vehicles of the same category and model
year" (emphasis added).
196 CAA section 241(2).
197 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (". . . [T]hat DOT sets mileage standards in no way licenses EPA to
shirk its environmental responsibilities. EPA has been charged with protecting the public's "health" and "welfare,"
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), a statutory obligation wholly independent of DOT's mandate to promote energy efficiency.
See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, § 2(5), 89 Stat. 874, 42 U.S.C. § 6201(5). The two obligations may
overlap, but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid
inconsistency.").
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how to limit EPA's authority but intentionally declined to do so. We address the consistency of
this rule with NHTSA's authority later in RTC 2.3.
As for the Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) program, the statute explicitly states that the RFS
provisions do not limit EPA's other authorities to regulate GHGs.198 Commenters, moreover,
erroneously claim that the increasing statutory biofuel volumes in the RFS program suggest that
any future GHG decreases from the transportation sector must come from renewable fuels; but
actually, the statute imposes no such requirement. In fact, beginning in 2023, there are no
increasing statutory biofuel requirements, and the only statutory biofuel volume is a requirement
that biomass-based diesel is not less than the volume in 2012.199 We further address this
comment in RTC 19, finding among other things that the final rule is consistent with EPA's
recently promulgated RFS "Set" rule, under which EPA exercised its discretion to mandate
increased renewable fuel volumes.
Second, the final rule does not intrude upon areas traditionally reserved for State police
power. While Congress recognized the importance of cooperative Federalism in the Clean Air
Act, it intended for regulation of motor vehicle emissions to be principally the domain of the
Federal EPA. As such, section 209(a) preempts most State and local standards "relating to the
control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines."200 Moreover,
motor vehicles are instruments of interstate commerce, the air pollutants they emit readily travel
over state lines, and the same manufacturers produce motor vehicles for sale nationwide, such
that regulation of motor vehicle emissions is eminently suitable for the Federal government.
Third, the final rule does not "significantly alter the balance ... the power of the Government
over private property."201 Pursuant to section 202(a), EPA has imposed emissions standards on
the motor vehicle industry since the 1970s, and we have regulated GHG emissions from LD
vehicles since 2010. The final rule continues regulation of the same regulated community by
implementing iteratively more protective emissions standards.
Fourth and finally, commenters erroneously claim that the presence of earnest political debate
gives rise to a major question here. Notwithstanding ongoing political interest in motor vehicle
regulation, the weight of statutory and legislative evidence strongly favors EPA's authority. EPA
summarizes in Preamble III.B the considerable Federal statutory enactments and legislative
history that support the agency's consideration of BEVs.202 Without restating that history, we
note that Congress has declared a policy of supporting electric vehicles. 15 USC 2501(b)(4)
198 CAA section 21 l(o)(12) ("Nothing in this subsection, or regulations issued pursuant to this subsection, shall
affect or be construed to affect the regulatory status of carbon dioxide or any other greenhouse gas, or to expand or
limit regulatory authority regarding carbon dioxide or any other greenhouse gas, for purposes of other provisions
(including section 7475) of this chapter....").
199 See CAA section 21 l(o)(2)(B)(ii), (v).
200 CAA section 209(b) creates an exception for "any State which has adopted standards (other than crankcase
emission standards) for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to
March 30, 1966." The only State to meet this requirement is California, which has developed its own motor vehicle
emissions program, subject to EPA's waivers of preemption. In addition, other States may adopt programs identical
to the California program under section 177, but they may not establish their own programs. We note that California
strongly supports EPA's further regulation of GHGs from motor vehicles.
201 Alabama Ass 'n ofRealtors v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (citation omitted).
202 See also Greg Dotson, Comments to Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-
Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles; Greg Dotson & Dustin Maghamfar, The Clean Air Act Amendments of2022:
Clean Air, Climate Change, and the Inflation Reduction Act, 53 Envl. L, Reporter 10017, 10030-32 (2023).
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states that it is "the policy of Congress" to "support accelerated research into, and development
of, electric and hybrid vehicle technologies," to "facilitate, and remove barriers to, the use of
electric and hybrid vehicles in lieu of gasoline- and diesel-powered motor vehicles, where
practicable," and "promote the substitution of electric and hybrid vehicles for many gasoline-
and diesel-powered vehicles... " IRA Section 60106 provides $5 million for EPA "to provide
grants to States to adopt and implement greenhouse gas and zero-emission standards for mobile
sources pursuant to section 177 of the [CAA]."203 The legislative history accompanying the IRA
states, "Congress recognizes EPA's longstanding authority under CAA Section 202 to adopt
standards that rely on zero emission technologies, and Congress expects that future EPA
regulations will increasingly rely on and incentivize zero-emission vehicles as appropriate."204
The statutory and legislative history unquestionably tilts in favor of Congress viewing electrified
vehicles and BEVs as important technologies for pollution control, supporting EPA's authority
to consider such technologies in establishing emissions standards.
In light of the substantial history in favor of BEV technologies, we think the various
legislative history materials cited by commenters are of little relevance. Commenters point to a
few failed bills. But failed legislation "offers a particularly dangerous basis on which to rest an
interpretation of an existing law a different and earlier Congress" adopted.205 Especially where,
as here, Congress has passed laws regarding a topic, failed bills are of questionable relevance.
Moreover, the specific failed bills that commenters cite sought to impose different regulatory
outcomes than the final rule. For example, the Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2019, H.R. 2764,
116th Cong. (2019), which applied to light-duty vehicles, "sets a schedule for increasing the
percentage of zero-emission vehicles a vehicle manufacturer delivers for sale, culminating in a
requirement to sell only zero-emission vehicles from 2040 on."206 The final rule, however, does
not depart from EPA's historic approach of performance-based standards in favor of sales
mandate-based standards, nor does the final rule project, much less require, that manufacturers
only sell BEVs from 2040 on.
Separately, the commenters claim Congress's support for research and incentives for BEVs
undermines EPA's Clean Air Act authority. But such efforts do not constitute a "distinct
regulatory scheme"207 that displaces the agency's authority. Rather, "[collaboration and research
do not conflict with any thoughtful regulatory effort; they complement it."208 And as we explain
in Section III of the preamble, the considerable incentives and other funding that Congress has
provided for BEVs and their infrastructure support EPA's ability to establish strong emission
standards accounting for the availability of such technologies. Besides, Congress's recent
enactment of BEV incentives in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the Inflation Reduction
203 Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, P.L. 117-169, 136 Stat. 2068-69 (2022).
204 1 68 Cong. Rec. E879-02, at 880 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 2022) (statement of Rep. Pallone, Chairman of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee).
205 Bostockv. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1747 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
206 https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2764. The similarly named Zero-Emission Vehicles Act
of 2018, S. 3664, 115th Cong. (2018), is similar to the 2019 Act and differs from this final rule for similar reasons.
See https://www.congress.gOv/bill/l 15th-congress/senate-bill/3664?s=l&r=59. The proposed amendment to the
1970 CAA at 116 Cong. Rec. 19238-40 (1970) sought to ban ICE vehicles by 1978, but this final rule does not ban
ICE vehicles and also regulates the industry nearly five decades later in the face of completely different facts.
207 Food & Drug Admin, v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 144 (2000).
208Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 530 (2007).
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Act occurred not "against a regulatory backdrop of disclaimers of regulatory authority,"209 but
rather with Congress's full knowledge that EPA was actively regulating motor vehicle GHG
emissions; indeed the legislative history to the IRA shows affirmative Congressional support for
EPA's efforts.210
Commenters also identify some letters from Congressional Members that criticized EPA's
proposed rule. Member letters obviously have no legal effect on the agency's statutory
authority.211 To the extent they are relevant, many other Members of Congress sent letters
supporting EPA's further regulation of GHGs from motor vehicles.212
We also give little weight to the commenters' claims about State-level political debates. As
already explained, this rule relates to an area—control of emissions from new motor vehicles—
where Congress has placed primary authority in the Federal government. To the extent State
political action is relevant, the statute permits only certain State motor vehicle emissions
regulation that is more stringent than the Federal regulation. Such regulations, moreover, can
only be adopted in the first instance by California, and certain other States may then follow
suit.213 State regulation that is less stringent than the Federal program is expressly forbidden by
the statute. So even if a State thinks less stringent motor vehicle emissions standards are better,
that State cannot legally require that result. And notwithstanding the diversity of perspectives on
BEVs, all states are actively taking actions to support BEVs. Among other things, all States are
actively implementing plans for vehicle electrification infrastructure through the National
Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Program.214 And localities within all States have sought
209Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531 (2007).
210168 Cong. Rec. E879-02, at 880 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 2022) (statement of Rep. Pallone).
211 See U.S. Const. Art. 1 § 7.
212 See, e.g., Padilla, Colleagues Lead Bicameral Letter Urging EPA to Impose Strong Emissions Standards for
Heavy-Duty Vehicles (letter from 75 Members urging the agency to finalize the strongest feasible greenhouse gas
emission standards for heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) as part of their Phase 3 rule), available at
https://www.padilla.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/padilla-colleagues-lead-bicameral-letter-urging-epa-to-
impose-strong-emissions-standards-for-heavy-duty-vehicles/; Lawmakers lead 91 colleagues in pushing for robust
light- and medium-duty vehicle emission standards to protect public health, benefit climate and economy (letter
from 91 members urging the EPA to finalize the strongest feasible multi-pollutant vehicle emission standards for
light- and medium-duty vehicles before the end of this year), available at https://matsui.house.gov/media/press-
releases/matsui-clarke-markey-padilla-urge-epa-finalize-strongest-possible-light-and
213 Section 209(b) allows the Administrator to waive preemption for the State of California where California's
"standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal
standards," while section 177 allows certain other States to adopt a program identical to that of California.
214 US Department of Transportation, Fiscal Year 2024 EVInfrastructure Deployment Plans (Feb. 2, 2024),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/. See, e.g., West Virginia National Electric
Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Deployment Plan (July 2023), WV-NEVI-PLAN_9-28-23-Final.pdf (wboy.com);
West Virginia Code §17-30-1, Department of Transportation to Develop Electric Vehicle Plan, available at
https://code.wvlegislature.gov/17-30-l/; Team Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, Kentucky: Leading
the Way Toward an Electric Future, https://ced.ky.gov/LP/electric_vehicle (asserting that "Kentucky is the premier
location in the United States to manufacture electric vehicles and their parts," and there have been "$22.9 billion
announced in investments by automotive-related facilities since 2014"); State of Ohio, Ohio First State in Nation to
Activate NEVI Chargers (Dec. 8, 2023), https://governor.ohio.gov/media/news-and-media/ohio-first-state-in-
activate-nevi-chargers (statement from Ohio Governor) ("Electric vehicles are the future of transportation, and we
want drivers in Ohio to have access to this technology today."); Letter from Gov. Greg Abbott to Mr. Marc D.
Williams (Mar. 22, 2022) (directing Texas Department of Transportation to develop a plan to "ensure that every
Texan can access the infrastructure they need to charge an EV"), https://ftp.txdot.gov/pub/txdot/get-
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and obtained funds to replace existing school buses with zero-emission and clean school buses
under EPA's Clean School Bus Program.215
V. CONCLUSION
There is clear Congressional authorization for the final rule. In section 202(a), Congress made
the major policy decision to control air pollution from motor vehicles and directed EPA to do so
through a technology-based approach. The determination of what technology is available for
achieving this policy is a subsidiary technical and policy judgment that Congress plainly
entrusted to the Administrator's expertise. The statutory text of section 202(a), read in its
context, is clear. And decades of legislative and administrative precedent specifically support the
Administrator's authority to consider BEVs, a highly effective pollution control technology.
Even were the Court to apply the major questions framework, no major question exists. This
rule represents an iterative strengthening of emissions standards based on the agency's
evaluation of updated data within its technical expertise. The impacts of this rule are analogous
to, and in some instances less significant than, its predecessor. And while the indirect impacts of
the rule are not a suitable basis for assessing a major question, the agency performed a
comprehensive assessment of such effects, finding that the final rule does not cause significant
indirect harms, has the potential for indirect benefits, and creates net benefits for society.
Additional factors considered by the courts also counsel against application of the major
questions doctrine.
In the final rule, the Administrator did what he has been doing for over fifty years: evaluate
updated data on pollution control technologies and set emissions standards accordingly. The
agency recognizes that some stakeholders are unhappy with the increasing availability of BEV
technologies, and they would prefer weaker standards, while others prefer stronger standards.
But these are garden variety disputes amenable to arbitrary and capricious review. This rule is
not an extraordinary and unprecedented assertion of agency power that implicates the major
questions doctrine.
EPA's authority to issue standards under section 202 that determine compliance by reference to
a fleetwide average
Several commenters suggest that various provisions of section 202 indicate that fleetwide
averaging is inconsistent with provisions of title II. Other commenters support the use of
averaging, noting that it has been used for more than two decades and is appropriate to continue
to use, in light of BEVs becoming an increasingly large part of the vehicle fleet. EPA disagrees
with commenters suggesting EPA lacks authority to incorporate ABT into emissions standards
involved/statewide/EV%20Charging%20Plan/040422-
Letter%20from%20Governor%20on%20Electric%20Vehicle%20Charging.pdf.
215 EPA, Clean School Bus Program Awards (Feb. 7, 2024), https://www.epa.gov/cleanschoolbus/clean-school-bus-
program-awards. See also US Department of Energy Alternative Fuels Data Center, Electricity Laws and Incentives,
https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/laws/ELEC (cataloguing additional state laws and incentives to support EV and EVSE
infrastructure); US Department of Energy Alternative Fuels Data Center, Hydrogen Laws and Incentives,
https ://afdc. energy .gov/fuels/laws/HY (hydrogen).
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for several reasons as explained in section III.B.3 of the preamble and as further detailed below.
First, EPA has employed fleetwide averaging in standard-setting and compliance since 1985. The
final rule merely maintains and did not reopen the existing ABT programs, such that these
comments are beyond the scope of the rulemaking. Second, ABT is consistent with the standard-
setting authority conferred by Congress in section 202(a)(l)-(3). Indeed, ABT furthers the goals
of the statute in enabling greater emissions reductions with lower costs and greater lead time.
Third, ABT is consistent with the compliance and enforcement provisions of the Act.
Commenters are simply wrong that ABT precludes compliance and enforcement of individual
vehicles; rather, the regulatory program explicitly requires the compliance of individual vehicles,
and EPA may also enforce against individual vehicles. Fourth, the fact that Congress required
EPA or other agencies to provide for tradable credits in some other programs outside of the
motor vehicle emissions control context is not relevant in ascertaining the agency's authority to
provide for ABT in our motor vehicle programs. Fifth, the statute does not require EPA to
classify motor vehicles by whether they emit or have an ICE powertrain. Indeed, EPA previously
defined the relevant classes for GHG regulation as including passenger cars, light-duty trucks,
and medium and heavy-duty trucks, in the 2009 Endangerment Finding, and we did not reopen
that finding in this proceeding. Moreover, the commenters' preferred classification is
unreasonable as it would delay the adoption of effective and available pollution control
technologies and forgo large benefits for the public health and welfare. EPA responds to
comments about the major questions doctrine earlier in this RTC 2.3.216
I. The comments are untimely.
These comments are untimely and beyond the scope of this final rule. EPA did not reopen
whether it is permissible to use an averaging approach to setting standards under section
202(a)(l)-(2), or the general ABT program's flexibilities. EPA disagrees that how EPA has used
averaging in this rulemaking is novel as compared with past rulemakings; EPA has repeatedly
used averaging in setting standards under section 202(a)(l)-(2), beginning as early as 1985217
and as recently as the 2020 and 2021 light duty GHG rules, and noted the importance of ABT
program flexibilities overall. EPA also repeatedly has explained that ABT is consistent with and
gives full effect to the requirements of section 202 as well as the statutory scheme, including
Title II's compliance and enforcement provisions applicable to vehicles.218 Under such
circumstances, it is eminently reasonable for EPA not to reconsider a question that has been
settled for decades.219 Additionally, the commenter's assertions of a change from EPA's
historical approach rest on a false assertion that this rule mandates adoption of a specific
compliance pathway; rather, the final standards are performance-based standards with many
potential compliance pathways, of which we provide several examples to further support that
EPA is agnostic as to what technologies are ultimately applied in complying with the standards.
216 Some commenters recycle arguments from the petitioners' briefs in Texas v. EPA, No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir.). To
the extent applicable, EPA also incorporates its responsive brief in that case by reference. EPA's Br., Texas v. EPA,
No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir.).
217 50 FR 10606.
218 To the extent the commenters suggest that the use of averaging is novel because it amounts to a BEV mandate,
this contention is inaccurate both legally and factually, as discussed in the preceding response.
219 See Growth Energy v. EPA, 5 F.4th 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
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Commenters' claims that this rule is novel in treating ABT as integral to standard-setting,
while prior rules viewed ABT only as a flexibility, are misplaced.220 EPA has relied on the
availability of averaging in countless standard-setting rulemakings since 1985. For example, the
1985 rule found that averaging was a key consideration in supporting the technological
feasibility and lead-time of the standards. That rule stated:
Particulate trap technology is heretofore untried on the fleet level. EPA believes
that the ... standard which, through averaging, effectively requires use of traps on
70 percent of all heavy-duty vehicles will significantly reduce the risk of
widespread noncompliance while allowing manufacturers to gain valuable
experience with this new technology. To promulgate this standard without allowing
averaging ... would increase the technological risk associated with the standard
because traps would have to be used in even the most difficult design
applications.221
Numerous subsequent rules have followed the same approach.222 For example, the 1990 rule
stated that "the standards were set with averaging in mind, making averaging integral to the
standard."223 Further, EPA has always viewed averaging as integral to standard-setting in the LD
GHG program. In the 2010 LD GHG final rule, EPA established "a system of averaging,
banking, and trading of credits integral to the fleet averaging approach," that was "similar to
averaging, banking, and trading (ABT) program EPA has established in other programs."224 We
stated that "ABT is an integral part of the standard setting itself, and not just an add-on to help
reduce costs," as "ABT resolves issues of lead-time or technical feasibility...."225 All subsequent
GHG rules followed the same approach.226
220 EPA performed a no-credit-trading sensitivity and concluded that the standards can be met at a reasonable cost
even in the absence of any credit trading. As such, while trading provides manufacturers with additional flexibility
in meeting the standards, it is not necessary to EPA's judgment as to the feasibility of the standards. As such, trading
is also severable from the final standards.
221 50 FR 10634-35.
222 See also, e.g., 65 FR 6698, 6743-46 (Feb. 10, 2000) (Tier 2) ("An ABT program is an important factor that EPA
takes into consideration in setting emission standards that are appropriate under section 202 of the Clean Air Act.
ABT allows us to consider a more stringent emission standard than might otherwise be appropriate under the CAA,
since ABT reduces the cost and improves the technological feasibility of achieving the standard[;] ABT enhances
the technological feasibility and cost effectiveness of the proposed standard and allows the standard to be attainable
earlier than might otherwise be possible."); 64 FR 58471, 58481 (Oct. 29, 1999) (describing how EPA set the 2004
and later model year NOX+NMHC standards for HD diesel engines (62 FR 54694) in consideration of modified
ABT provisions: "The final rule also contained modified ABT provisions for heavy-duty diesel engines, allowing
EPA to finalize a more stringent engine standard than might otherwise be appropriate under the CAA, since ABT
reduces the cost and improves the technological feasibility of achieving the NMHC+NOX standard.").
223 55 FR 30594.
224 75 FR 25412-13 (describing setting fleet average LD GHG standards, as EPA had previously set for Tier 2 NOx
standards, and the integral role of ABT in standard setting itself for Title II engine and vehicle programs).
225 75 FR 25412-13 (May 7, 2010).
226 See 77 FR 62788 ("ABT is an integral part of the standard setting itself, not just an add-on to help reduce costs.
In many cases, ABT resolves issues of cost or technological feasibility which might otherwise arise.... The ABT
provisions are integral to the fleet averaging approach established in the MY 2012-2016 rule and we view them as
equally integral to the MY 2017-2025 standards."); 86 FR 74453 ("The ABT provisions are an integral part of the
vehicle GHG program and the agency expects that manufacturers will continue to utilize these provisions into the
future[.]"); see table 1 in the above response on Major Questions Doctrine.
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Moreover, the legality of averaging under section 202(a) has already been litigated in NRDC
v. Thomas, 805 F. 2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986), where the court of appeals ruled in favor of the
agency. Commenters rely heavily on footnote dicta from that case to allege that the court
identified potential statutory inconsistencies but did not reach them only because they were not
raised in the litigation. We address the substance of these points later in our response. However,
we note here that the footnote dicta were comprehensively addressed by EPA's 1989 proposal227
and 1990 final rule,228 where we also received copious comments on this specific issue. Any
party wishing to challenge EPA's authority for averaging in light of the Agency's interpretation
of NRDC v. Thomas had ample opportunity to do so following EPA's promulgation of the 1989
and 1990 rulemakings, and yet, no party did so.
EPA also disagrees with commenters who claim this is the first time EPA has considered
electrified technologies in establishing standards based on averaging. As we explain in Section
III.B.2-3 of the preamble and in our major questions doctrine response in RTC 2, all vehicles—
including all ICE vehicles—today are electrified to some extent, and electrification exists on a
large spectrum. The agency has considered powertrain electrification specifically since at least
the 1998 NLEV rule and the 2000 Tier 2 standards. In the LD GHG program itself, EPA has
previously adopted vehicle standards under 202(a)(l)-(2) where compliance pathways supporting
the standards reflected inclusion of powertrain electrification technologies and included
averaging with ICE vehicle technologies. For example, in the 2010 LD GHG Rule, EPA justified
the feasibility of the standards based on a projection that strong hybrids would make up 6.5% of
the MY 2016 fleet.229 In promulgating the 2012 GHG Rule, EPA conducted a company-by-
company projection of potential compliance pathways for MY 2021 and 2025 light duty vehicle
GHG emission standards, indicating hybrid electric vehicle penetrations of up to 15% for some
companies.230 The 2012 Rule also projected the availability of PEV at 1% in MY 2021.231 The
227 54 FR 22652, 22665-66 (May 25, 1989) ("EPA does not believe that the statutory text or legislative history cited
by the court necessarily means that the CAA requires or that Congress intended that every vehicle or engine family
emit at the same level. As the court itself noted, the Act gives EPA broad latitude in the testing of vehicles and, more
fundamentally, in the formulation of standards. EPA promulgated the HDE NOx and PM emissions standards as
averaged standards. It thus follows that in testing 'any' engine for compliance with those standards, EPA may hold
particular engine families to different control levels as part of an averaged set of engine families so long as the
engine families' average emission levels meet the applicable standard.").
228 55 FR 30584, 30593-94 (July 26, 1990) ("In [NRDC v. Thomas], the court upheld averaging, but expressed some
reservations about averaging in light of a statutory provision and some legislative history not raised by the parties to
the case. The court pointed out that under averaging some vehicles would not be required to comply with the
standards and that this appeared inconsistent with the requirement that "any," a" or "such" vehicle or engine be
tested and required to comply with emission standards. At the same time the court noted that the statutory language
was ambiguous and that the testing and certification provisions empower the Agency to test vehicles and engines in
the manner it 'deems appropriate' so as to conform to the prescribed standards. EPA fully discussed in the preamble
to the proposed rule why the statute and its legislative history should be read to allow the Agency discretion to
determine the manner of testing and certification of vehicles. EPA also found that the broad type of averaging
represented by trading and banking would be consistent with the Congressional scheme. ... EPA continues to
believe that the statute provides the Agency discretion in this matter, and that trading and banking are consistent
with the statutory aims.").
229 See EPA Memorandum to the docket for this rulemaking, "Comparison of EPA C02 Reducing Technology
Projections between 2010 Light-duty Vehicle Rulemaking and Actual Technology Production for Model Year
2016."
230 See 77 FR at 62854-55, 62856-57 (October 15, 2012).
231 2012 LD GHG Rule RIA, Table 3.5-22.
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2021 rule projected further increases in powertrain electrification technologies, with PEV
technologies reaching 17% in 2026.232
EPA also notes that given the lengthy pedigree of the ABT program, manufacturers have
come to rely on it for compliance with many of EPA's motor vehicle programs. As we explain in
Section V.B of the preamble, manufacturers are widely utilizing the various credit programs
available, and we have every expectation that manufacturers will continue to take advantage of
the compliance flexibilities and crediting programs to their fullest extent, thereby providing them
with additional tools in finding the lowest cost compliance solutions in light of the revised
standards. 233 Unsurprisingly, no directly regulated manufacturer is opposing the agency's
authority for ABT or to establish standards with a fleet average form. While the agency has
authority to change its policies when warranted, commenters have advanced no persuasive
justification for reopening ABT at this time, particularly in light of manufacturers' reliance
interests and the ABT program's ability to effectuate greater emissions reductions at lower costs.
Indeed, their comments do not appear to even recognize the considerable reliance interests of
directly regulated entities, recycle legal arguments that the agency considered and rejected long
ago in the 1990 rule,234 and effectively concede that abandoning averaging would delay the
application of pollution control technologies and forgo otherwise feasible emission reductions.
The little that commenters do say about manufacturers' interests is fundamentally wrong. They
erroneously claim that the reason manufacturers have not pushed back on ABT is because the
manufacturers view it solely as an extra-statutory accommodation that allows them greater
flexibility. EPA thinks manufacturers understand very well how the agency has relied on
averaging generally and ABT specifically to establish countless standards since 1985. In sum,
commenters have not adduced sufficient reasons to adopt a policy, much less revisit a
longstanding, foundational part of the motor vehicle program with a forty-year pedigree.
We reiterate that EPA did not reopen this issue in this rulemaking and the comments are
outside the scope of the rule. In responding, EPA notes that we are not here "undertaking] a
serious, substantive reconsideration of the existing" position.235 EPA's response is intended
solely to clarify and correct the misstatements and misrepresentations made by commenters
concerning EPA's historical approach to averaging in standard setting and ABT program
flexibilities, how EPA's ABT program is implemented, and the corresponding statutory basis. In
providing this response, EPA also notes the extraordinary nature of commenters' claims: given
the widespread use of ABT across EPA's section 202(a) programs, commenters—none of whom
are regulated entities under section 202(a)—are implying that the agency has continually violated
countless Title II compliance provisions for nearly forty years. That is completely false, and the
agency here sets the record straight.
232 2021 LD GHG Rule RIA, 4-28 to 29.
233 See also Environmental Protection Agency, "The 2023 EPA Automotive Trends Report: Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, Fuel Economy, and Technology since 1975," EPA-420-R-23-033, December 2023.
234 See, e.g., 55 FR 30584, 30593-94.
235 Growth Energy v, EPA, 5 F. 4th 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2021). See also Pub. Emps. for Env 'tResp. v. EPA, 11 F.4th 899,
913 (D.C. Cir. 2023) ("PEER cites no cases, and we are aware of none, in which an agency reopened an issue by
merely responding to a petition for rulemaking submitted by a third party.") (citing Am. Rd.& Transp. Builders
Ass 'n. EPA, 705 F.3d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("[A]n agency's response to a petitioner's comments cannot provide
the sole basis for reopening.")).
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II. Section 202(a) delegates authority to EPA to adopt standards with a fleet average
form.
Commenters maintained that section 202(a) does not mention averaging, banking, and
trading. They assert that, whether under standard principles of statutory construction or under the
major questions doctrine, Congressional silence is not tantamount to a delegation of authority.
The commenters are correct that section 202(a)(1) does not include the words "averaging,
banking or trading."236 But the standard-setting framework in section 202(a)(1) readily
encompasses performance-based standards that are based on consideration of averaging. In later
subsections, we explain how such a standard fits well within the Act's implementation and
enforcement mechanisms, and how other provisions of section 202 and elsewhere confirm EPA's
authority under section 202(a)(1) to set such standards.
Section 202(a)(1) mandates that EPA "prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of
any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles . . . The Supreme Court has
made clear that fleet average and other requirements applicable at the fleet-wide (as opposed to
individual vehicle) level are "standards" within the meaning of Title II of the Act. In Engine
Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004),237 the Court indicated that
"standards" encompass "fleet average emission requirements," which "decrease over time,
requiring manufacturers to sell progressively cleaner mixes of vehicles," and under which
"[manufacturers retain flexibility to decide how many vehicles in each emission tier to sell in
order to meet the fleet average."238 The Court also found that "standards" include other types of
fleet-wide requirements like mandates that fleet owners purchase vehicles of a given type,239 and
that a certain percentage of a manufacturer's new vehicle sales must consist of vehicles of a
given type.240
Section 202(a)(1) also applies to "class or classes of new motor vehicles." "Class or classes"
necessarily refers to groups of vehicles, as opposed to individual vehicles. So section 202(a)(1) is
naturally read to authorize EPA to set standards for groups of vehicles, which would include a
manufacturer's fleet of vehicles that are in this group.
Regulation under section 202(a)(1) is also conditioned on the Administrator finding that
emissions from a class or classes of motor vehicles "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
236 EPA's response here focuses on averaging. However, "trading and banking are simply forms of averaging
between manufacturers and over time. Thus, they pose similar legal issues." 54 FR 22665. With respect to the
arguments raised by the adverse comments, EPA believes trading and banking are justified on similar bases as
averaging. See also generally 54 FR 22665-67 (discussing the legal bases for trading and banking), 55 FR 30593-99
(same).
237 The Court in. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. was construing CAA section 209(a), which refers to "any
standard relating to control of emissions from new motor vehicles". This language is similar to the text of section
202(a). The South Coast Court made clear that there is no reason to read "standard" in section 202(a) differently
than in section 209(a)): "A 'standard' is defined as that which 'is established by authority, custom, or general
consent, as a model or example; criterion; test.' This interpretation is consistent with the use of 'standard'
throughout Title II of the CAA (which governs emissions from moving sources) to denote requirements such as
numerical emission levels with which vehicles or engines must comply, e.g., [CAA section 202] (a)(3)(B)(ii), or
emission-control technology with which they must be equipped, e.g., [CAA section 206](a)(6)." Id. at 253.
238 Id. at 250, n.3.
239 Mat 250, 258.
240 Id. at 255.
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may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." In enacting section
202(a)(1), Congress was concerned with classes of motor vehicles contributing to dangerous air
pollution, not with individual vehicles doing so. Indeed, it is ordinarily only emissions from a
group of vehicles (i.e., a class) not a single vehicle that could cause dangerous air pollution. As
we explain later in this response, this is also how EPA has long interpreted the statute, including
in making the 2009 GHG endangerment finding for motor vehicles. This further indicates that
EPA may regulate the class of vehicles as a whole, including at the fleet-wide level, not just
individual vehicles.
The statute explicitly subjects regulation under section 202(a)(1) to the requirements of
section 202(a)(2), which states that "[a]ny regulation prescribed under paragraph (1) of this
subsection (and any revision thereof) shall take effect after such period as the Administrator
finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving
appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." Fleet average standards
relate directly to section 202(a)(2)'s considerations of technical feasibility, cost, and lead time.
As we explain above, EPA has found for decades that establishing fleet average standards allows
the agency to set standards at a given stringency for lower cost. It also affords regulated entities
more flexibility in determining how to meet those standards, accommodating practical realities
of vehicle redesign cycles and market fluctuations, and allowing additional lead-time for a
portion of the fleet to meet the standards if the regulated entity decides to have another portion of
the fleet achieve the standards more rapidly.241 Similarly, the ability to generate credits promotes
earlier introduction of advanced technologies, furthering the Act's emission reduction and
technology advancement goals.
The D.C. Circuit reviewed and upheld EPA's use of averaging in promulgating section 202(a)
standards in NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Observing that there was no
"clear congressional prohibition of averaging," the Court held that "the EPA's argument that
averaging will allow manufacturers more flexibility in cost allocation while ensuring that a
manufacturer's overall fleet still meets the emissions reduction standards makes sense."242 While
the Court noted in dicta that its analysis did not consider certain potential arguments not raised
by the litigants—arguments which we addressed in a subsequently rulemaking243 and which we
discuss later in this response—its holding was unquestionably to uphold EPA's averaging
program.
Congress subsequently ratified EPA's and the Court's interpretation in the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments. "Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without
change."244 Ratification is particularly applicable here because there is explicit evidence in both
the House and Senate legislative history indicating that Congress knew of EPA's and the Court's
241 See also White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (allowing averaging
across multiple utility units under CAA section 112(d), which "neither expressly allows nor disallows emissions
averaging," where averaging is a "more flexible, and less costly alternative" than unit-by-unit compliance, even
though "this may allow individual units to exceed the emissions limitation"), rev'd on other grounds, Michigan v.
EPA, 516 U.S. 743 (2015).
242 NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d at 425.
243 55 FR 30584, 30593-94 (July 26, 1990); 54 FR 22652, 22665-66 (May 25, 1989).
244 See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978).
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interpretation on this issue.245 Legislative history from the House recognized that, under the
Clean Air Act:
EPA has promulgated regulations for averaging (50 Fed. Reg. 10606) and for
banking and trading (55 Fed. Reg. 30584). Cognizant of these rules and the Court's
decision in NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986) the House-Senate
conferees chose not to amend the Clean Air Act to specifically prohibit averaging,
banking and trading authority.
Averaging, banking and trading programs, in fact, have very positive impacts on
air quality. Such programs preserve the requirement that each family of engines
must meet or exceed a preassigned standard. Furthermore, averaging programs
create an incentive to produce engines lower than the applicable standard, and
encourage the development and early use of improved emission control
technologies, and the development and sale of alternative-fueled vehicles. Such
programs also aid manufacturers in reducing the costs of controlling emissions.246
As such, "[t]he intention was to retain the status quo," that is, the agency's continued application
of averaging in establishing the standards following NRDC v. Thomas241 Similar legislative
history is found in the Senate.248
The text of the Clean Air Act further corroborates Congress's ratification of EPA's use of
averaging in setting section 202(a) standards. In section 219 of the Act, Congress directed EPA
to establish standards for urban buses pursuant to section 202(a). Section 219(b)(1) provides:
The standards under section 7521(a) of this title applicable to urban buses shall
require that, effective for the model year 1994 and thereafter, emissions of
particulate matter (PM) from urban buses shall not exceed 50 percent of the
emissions of particulate matter (PM) allowed under the emission standard
applicable under section 7521(a) of this title as of November 15, 1990, for
particulate matter (PM) in the case of heavy-duty diesel vehicles and engines
manufactured in the model year 1994.
The referenced 1994 HD PM standard (i.e., "the emission standard applicable under section
7521(a) of this title as of November 15, 1990, for particulate matter (PM) in the case of heavy-
duty diesel vehicles and engines manufactured in the model year 1994") was a standard with a
fleet average form. Indeed, it was one of the standards litigated in NRDC v. Thomas on the issue
of averaging.249 Thus, Congress expressly recognized an EPA standard with an averaging form
and endorsed such a standard as the basis for further standard-setting under section 202(a).
245 136 Cong. Rec. 35,367 (1990), 1990 WL 1222469, at *1; 136 Cong. Rec. 36,713 (1990), 1990 WL 1222468, at
*1.
246 1 36 Cong. Rec. 35,367, 1990 WL 1222469, at *1.
247 Id.
248 136 Cong. Rec. 36,713, 1990 WL 1222468, at *1. (Congress, noting NRDC v. Thomas, instead opted to let the
existing law "remain in effect.").
249 See NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The NRDC challenges the EPA's program of
emissions averaging for the 1991 and 1994 PM standards and the 1991 NOx standard.").
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Pursuant to this provision, EPA promulgated urban bus standards, and those standards provided
for averaging, as well as banking and trading.250
Following the 1990 Amendments, EPA continued to establish many other motor vehicle
standards based on averaging, and the use of ABT became a well-settled part of the regulatory
landscape. Consistent with this, in enacting the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,
Congress specifically recognized the possibility of fleet average GHG standards. The statute
generally barred Federal agencies from acquiring "a light duty motor vehicle or medium duty
passenger vehicle that is not a low greenhouse gas emitting vehicle."251 It directed the
Administrator to promulgate guidance on such "low greenhouse gas emitting vehicles," but
explicitly prohibited vehicles from so qualifying "if the vehicle emits greenhouse gases at a
higher rate than such standards allow for the manufacturer's fleet average grams per mile of
carbon dioxide-equivalent emissions for that class of vehicle, taking into account any emissions
allowances and adjustment factors such standards provide."252 In other words, Congress
explicitly contemplated the possibility of fleet-average GHG standards for motor vehicles.253
In light of the clear congressional authorization for averaging, EPA also does not agree with
commenters who claim that averaging is precluded by the major questions doctrine. We further
address the applicability of the major questions doctrine earlier in this RTC 2.3. We also disagree
with commenters who claim that EPA is relying on silence as an implicit delegation of
authority.254 EPA is not asserting authority for ABT based on statutory silence; as explained
above, the basis for ABT is the statutory text of section 202(a)(l)-(2), read in light of the context,
purpose, and history.255
250 See 58 FR 15781, 15784, 15787.
251 42 USC 13212(f)(2)(A).
252 42 USC 13212(f)(3)(C) (emphasis added).
253 42 USC 13212 does not specifically refer back to section 202(a). However, we think it is plain that Congress
intended for EPA to consider relevant section 202(a) standards in implementing section 13212. See 42 USC
13212(f)(3)(B) ("In identifying vehicles under subparagraph (A), the Administrator shall take into account the most
stringent standards for vehicle greenhouse gas emissions applicable to and enforceable against motor vehicle
manufacturers for vehicles sold anywhere in the United States.").
254 In addition, the commenters' selective quotation from Entergy v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208,223 (2009), is
inapposite. That case upheld EPA's determination that the delegation for EPA to issue standards reflecting "best
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact" allowed standards based on cost-benefit
analysis, notwithstanding that such an authorization appears nowhere in the statutory text. Id. at 218, 226. The
commenters cite the following language from the opinion in support of their argument: "sometimes statutory silence,
when viewed in context, is best interpreted as limiting agency discretion." Id. at 223. The following sentence of the
opinion, however, states that "[f]or the reasons discussed earlier, § 1326(b)'s silence cannot bear that interpretation."
Id. The Court thereupon concluded, "This extended consideration of the text of § 1326(b), and comparison of that
with the text and statutory factors applicable to four parallel provisions of the Clean Water Act, lead us to the
conclusion that it was well within the bounds of reasonable interpretation for the EPA to conclude that cost-benefit
analysis is not categorically forbidden." Id. In any event, this case is not applicable because EPA is not relying on
statutory silence here.
255 Notwithstanding commenters' selective citations of past preambles, the agency has never touted statutory silence
as the basis for the ABT program. We have, as we do today, noted the fact that the statute does not explicitly specify
an ABT program. But in promulgating such programs, we have also consistently justified them in light of the text
and purpose of the Act. See, e.g., 55 FR 30593-99 (describing in detail the legal bases for ABT and concluding on
page 30599 that "EPA believes that trading, banking and expanded averaging are consistent with and support the
goals and provisions of the Act. Compliance with the technology forcing 1991 and 1994 NOX and PM emissions
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III. Standards with a fleet average form are consistent with the statutory context and
structure.
As explained above, in section 202(a)(1), Congress delegated to EPA the authority to adopt
new motor vehicle standards and to revise the standards as appropriate. Specifically, Congress
entrusted to the Administrator the determination of the class or classes of vehicles subject to the
standards, the form of the standard, the lead time provided, the consideration of the costs of
compliance, and, taking all of these elements and other factors into account, the stringency of the
standards. As we explain further in our response to the major questions doctrine comments, this
delegation provides EPA the flexibility needed to appropriately address the widely varying
circumstances that can arise under section 202, such as differences in the need for emissions
control, and differences in technology and cost considerations. This provision's authority readily
encompasses the kind of fleet averaging standards EPA has adopted over many years and
covering many different types of vehicles and pollutants.
At various points, Congress directed EPA to exercise its section 202(a) authority to adopt
certain specific standards.256 These various provisions identify the specific group of vehicles to
which they apply, as well as the specific model years, pollutants, and stringency of the standards.
Although Congress limited EPA's discretion for those specific vehicles, model years, and
pollutants, even in those cases Congress recognized and adopted provisions reflecting a variety
of the flexibilities authorized in standard setting under section 202(a). For example, Congress
directed that EPA provide for waivers; alternative standards for small volume manufacturers;
phase-ins over time based on a percentage of a manufacturer's production; as well as standards
that changed over the useful life of the vehicles.
In addition, Congress specifically addressed to what extent, if any, EPA's authority was
limited to revise these standards in the future, including under its general section 202(a)(1)
authority. In general, Congress placed only a few limitations on EPA's future standard setting.
Congress typically specified that EPA's future revisions of the standards for these vehicles and
pollutants had to preserve a specified degree of stringency, and in some cases Congress specified
the number of model years before revisions were allowed. But these provisions do not constrain
EPA's general authority to set standards under section 202(a)(1) in other circumstances. Most
importantly for purposes of this response, none of these provisions limit fleetwide averaging or
otherwise limit EPA's authority to structure the form of future section 202(a)(1) standards in this
rulemaking.
These provisions place no other limits on EPA's standard setting under section 202(a)(1).
They did not limit EPA's ability to structure the form and level of future standards for these
vehicles and pollutants, only the stringency and lead time. Through these provisions Congress
placed no limits at all on EPA's authority to set standards under section 202(a)(1) for other
vehicles and other pollutants. Congress directly addressed the specific limits it placed on EPA's
future standard setting, and those are the only limits it imposed on the authority it provided EPA
in setting standards under section 202(a).
standards will be enhanced, emissions will be reduced, not increased, and the important role of NCPs will not be
supplanted. Furthermore, as indicated in the discussion above, EPA does not think that banking, trading or expanded
averaging contradict the provisions of section 206 regarding certification and testing.").
256 See, e.g., CAA section 202(a)(3)(A)(i), 202(b), (g), (h).
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EPA's past fleet averaging standards, as well as the standards at issue in this rulemaking, are
fully consistent with the grant of authority in section 202(a)(1). In no case do these standards
violate the limited conditions Congress placed on future standard setting in the provisions
discussed in section 202.
We now discuss each of these provisions that commenters cite. Commenters refer to section
202(a)(3)(A)(i) as evincing Congressional intent not to include averaging as part of the standard
setting process for heavy duty vehicles. But this provision, like section 202(a)(1), refers to
standards for emission from "classes" of heavy-duty vehicles (and from "categories" as well).
This language is most naturally applicable to groups of vehicles like fleets.
Commenters viewed sections 202(b)(1) and 206(a)(2) as showing incompatibility with
standards predicated on averaging. The argument goes that section 202(b)(1) commands
standards for "vehicles and engines," and that the testing of "any emission control system
incorporated in a motor vehicle or engine" provisions in section 206(a)(2) only make sense on a
per vehicle basis. They further point to the 5 percent waiver authority in section 202(b)(3) and
the testing provision for section 202(b) standards found in section 206(a)(2). They maintain that
the waiver provision is unnecessary in a fleet averaging regime since well over 5% of a
manufacturer's vehicles could be above a fleet average limit without the need of a waiver, and
they further note that the testing provision is written in the singular ("vehicle or engine"), and so
can only be read to mean vehicle-by-vehicle testing.
These arguments are misplaced. First, section 202(b)(1) is an explicit exception to EPA's
general standard-setting authority (see section 202(a)(1) opening clause, "Except as otherwise
provided in subsection (b)"). Section 202(b)(1) establishes standards for certain pollutants,
model years, and classes of vehicles. It thus cannot derogate from the general scope of authority
in section 202(a)(1) and has no applicability on its face to these standards. Moreover, section
202(b)(1) accords with fleet-average standards because it specifically refers to standards for
certain classes of vehicles (e.g., light-duty vehicles for certain model years), as opposed to
individual vehicles; the provision also uses the term "such vehicles and engines," which naturally
refers back to the classes identified in the provision.
CAA section 206(a)(2) adds nothing to the commenters' argument. That provision requires
EPA in some cases to test emission-control systems to determine whether they enable vehicles to
conform with standards Congress prescribed in section 202(b). As such, section 206(a)(2)
prescribes duties relating to standards under section 202(b), and as just discussed, that section
has no bearing on the section 202(a) authority beyond the specific circumstances to which it
applies, circumstances inapplicable here. Moreover, in section 206(a)(2), Congress had a specific
reason to speak to individual vehicles. Added in 1970, it enabled a private party that developed a
new "emission control system," such as a new catalyst, to submit a vehicle or engine
incorporating that system for testing "to determine whether such system enables such vehicle or
engine to conform to the [Subsection 202(b)] standards."257 It was sensible for Congress to
establish this mechanism for testing new technologies in the context of specific vehicles and
individuals, rather than fleets. But there is no basis in section 206(a)(2) to think Congress meant
to prohibit fleet averages even under section 202(b), let alone section 202(a). To the extent that it
257 CAA section 206(a)(2); see Environmental Policy Division of the Congressional Research Service, Volume 1,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., A Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, at 128, 200 (Comm. Print 1974).
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is relevant, section 206(a)(2) confirms that Congress intended EPA to consider all feasible
emission-control technologies, even those that had not been developed as of 1970.
The commenters' reference to section 202(b)(3) is also mistaken.258 That provision allows
EPA to impose standards less stringent than subsection (b)(1) standards for nitrogen-oxides
emissions for up to 5% of production of model-years 1977-1979 light-duty vehicles, where an
automaker "demonstrates that such waiver is necessary to permit the use of an innovative power
train technology."259 Under subsection (b)(3), an automaker identifies its total production for the
year and the specific emission standard to which each vehicle was certified. EPA would then
assess whether at least 95% of the fleet met the subsection (b)(1)(B) standard and whether the
rest met the subsection (b)(3) standard. But this would be true whether each of those standards
was a vehicle specific standard, a fleet-average standard, or both. None of these approaches
would be inconsistent with subsections (b)(1) and (b)(3). More basically, nothing in either
subsection speaks to EPA's authority under section 202(a)(1). We reiterate that nothing in
section 202(b), including the waiver provision in (b)(3), has any applicability beyond the specific
circumstances to which it applies, which circumstances are inapplicable here. Nor does anything
in section 202(g) constrain standards with a fleet average form. This provision—as well as the
parallel provision in section 202(h)—is another example of Congress directing EPA to use its
section 202(a) authority in a specific manner, for specific vehicles (light-duty trucks and light-
duty vehicles), pollutants (NMHC, CO, NOx, and PM), and model years. Under this provision
for these specified pollutants and model years, such vehicles must meet one or the other of the
specified phase-in standards. These provisions say nothing about EPA's authority to establish
standards for different types of vehicles, pollutants, or model years. It is worth noting, however,
that the phase-in of standards Congress specified in section 202(g) is an example of the range of
forms available to EPA. As we explain further below, a phase-in form of a standard requiring
specified percentages of a manufacturer's production of vehicles to meet a standard is similar to
the fleet averaging-based form used in this rule.
Commenters also assert that compliance with a fleet average is inconsistent with the definition
of "emission standard" in section 302(k): "a requirement ... which limits the quantity, rate, or
concentration of emissions of air pollutants on a continuous basis." The argument is that one
cannot "know" "on a continuous basis" whether an automaker is meeting its fleet-average
standard. It is not clear that the definitions in section 302 apply to Title II,260 but even if they do,
the emission standard definition requires standards to apply continuously, not that compliance be
measured continuously. In general, fleet-average standards control emissions from vehicles on a
continuous basis. The same is true for the vehicle-specific standards, such as the in-use LD GHG
standard and the LD NMOG+NOx bin standard, which are both applicable continuously261 and
measurable at any time throughout the vehicle's useful life.
258 Fuel Br. 41.
259 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(3).
260 Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass 'n. 627 F.2d at 1112 n.35. The commenters' arguments are also inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of "standard' in the context of Title II provisions on controlling emissions from
motor vehicles in South Coast, as explained above.
261 The standards (whether fleet average or per-vehicle standards) are subject to different testing cycles, testing
requirements, and other provisions, such that different requirements may apply in different circumstances. For
example, vehicles are allowed under EPA's regulations to have excursions that exceed their certified levels of
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Finally, we note that the commenters' reliance on specific provisions in section 202 to limit
EPA's more general authority under section 202(a)(l)-(2) is at odds with normal tenets of
statutory construction. Broad grants of discretionary authority like section 202(a)(1) are
generally not limited by other narrower provisions focused on particular situations.262 Moreover,
Congress has expressly indicated what limitations the specific provisions impose on future EPA
standard setting, but they do not impose any limitations which preclude fleet average standards,
indicating that no such limitations should be implied.263
IV. Standards using a fleet average standard form fit the Act's implementation and
enforcement provisions
A number of commenters viewed fleet average standards as fundamentally incompatible with
the certification of conformity provisions of section 206. They maintain that these provisions are
written as vehicle specific; they refer to "engine" and "vehicle" in the singular, and they require
a determination "whether such vehicle or engine" (referring back to the individual vehicle or
engine) "conforms with the [section 202 emission standards] " They argue that testing of an
individual vehicle, however, does not indicate whether or not a fleet average is achieved, since in
their view conformity cannot be determined until the conclusion of a model year. For similar
reasons, these commenters claim that fleet average standards are inconsistent with section
203(a)(1), which prohibits sale of a vehicle or engine not "covered by a certificate of
conformity," and section 205(a), under which any violation of applicable standards "shall
constitute a separate offense with respect to each motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine."
criteria pollutant emissions under certain operating conditions as controlled by the Auxiliary Emission Control
Device definition.
262 See Catawba Cnty. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("[A] congressional mandate in one section and
silence in another often suggests ... a decision not to mandate any solution in the second context, i.e., to leave the
question to agency discretion."); Corbettv. Transportation Sec. Admin., 19 F.4th 478, 489 (D.C. Cir. 2021J, cert,
denied, 143 S. Ct. 395 (2022) ("Petitioner turns the holding in Alabama Realtors on its head by asking this court to
apply limiting constructions to provisions plainly granting TSA broad authority to act by drawing on entirely
separate provisions that appear throughout 49 U.S.C. Chapter 449. .. There is no viable canon of construction that
endorses this interpretive approach."); Helicopter Ass'n Int'l, Inc. v. FAA, 722 F.3d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(holding that specific statutory provisions amplifying the FAA's regulatory authority merely indicated that Congress
intended to address the matters subject to regulation in several different ways, not to limit the statute's broad grant of
authority); Farrellv. Blinken, 4 F.4th 124, 136-37 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
263 See Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, 764 F. 3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] is
the sole way for a plaintiff suing a foreign sovereign to invoke the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, and the exceptions
enumerated by the FSIA are exhaustive"); cf. Law v. Siegel, U.S. , 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1196, 188 L.Ed.2d 146
(2014) (enumeration of exemptions "confirms that courts are not authorized to create additional exceptions"); Air
Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. United States Dep't ofAgric., 37 F.4th 667, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (standing for the
proposition that one does not infer a limitation from a provision authorizing a different sort of activity; "[t]he section
containing the 'commensurate' language is a limitation on how much can be collected in fees from a particular user
class. It is not a limitation on how those fees may be spent. Therefore, Appellants' argument that fees collected from
multiple user classes cannot be comingled in a fund that pays for the inspections of fee-paying user classes fails
because the FACT Act does not prohibit this form of cross-subsidization"); GPA Midstream Ass'n v. United States
Dep't of Transp., 67 F.4th 1188, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2023) ("Section 4 creates neither a condition precedent nor a ban.
As the petitioners themselves explain at length in their opening brief, § 4 does not apply to gathering pipelines.
Section 4 by its plain terms applies only to "transmission pipeline facilities." We do not understand how § 4 could
plausibly be read to create a condition precedent for a different type of pipeline facility.").
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These commenters further maintain that fleetwide-average emission standards are inconsistent
with Title II's remediation and notification provisions. Those provisions state that if EPA
"determines that a substantial number of any class or category of vehicles or engines ... do not
conform to the regulations prescribed under [Section 202]," the manufacturer must remedy "the
nonconformity of any such vehicles or engines."264 If "a motor vehicle fails to conform," the
manufacturer bears the cost.265 Further, "dealers, ultimate purchasers, and subsequent
purchasers" must be given notice of any nonconformity,266 which requires identification of
specific nonconforming vehicles. These commenters maintain that none of this is possible where
the nonconformity is tied to a fleet average.
EPA disagrees with these comments. The regulatory provisions for demonstrating compliance
with emissions standards have been successfully implemented for decades, including provisions
in our regulations for demonstrating compliance through our ABT program. Commenters who
alleged inconsistency with the compliance and enforcement provisions fundamentally
misapprehend the nature of EPA's motor vehicle program and the ABT regulations, where
compliance and enforcement do in fact apply to individual vehicles consistent with the statute. It
is true that ABT allows manufacturers to meet emissions standards by offsetting emissions
credits and debits for individual vehicles. However, individual vehicles must also continue to
themselves comply with standards applicable on a vehicle-by-vehicle basis throughout that
vehicle's useful life, as described below. As appropriate, EPA can suspend, revoke, or void
certificates for individual vehicles. Manufacturers' warranties, which are mandated under CAA
section 207, apply to individual vehicles. EPA and manufacturers perform testing on individual
vehicles, and recalls can be implemented based on evidence of non-conformance by a substantial
number of individual vehicles within the class. The above is true for all of EPA's ABT programs,
including for NMOG+NOx and GHG for light- and medium-duty vehicles. Each program,
however, differs somewhat from other programs, and below we examine in detail the ABT
programs for LD NMOG+NOx and LD GHG. We then turn to specific statutory arguments
raised by the commenters. The ultimate conclusion is that the regulatory scheme fully satisfies
the compliance and enforcement requirements of the statute.
Under the Tier 3 fleet average standard for LD NMOG+NOx, each vehicle must certify its
emissions performance using a "Bin" structure (i.e., a vehicle with no emissions will certify to
Bin 0, a vehicle with emissions over 0 mg/mi but less than or equal to 10 mg/mi will certify to
Bin 10, and so on, up to Bin 70; vehicles emitting over 70 mg/mi, can certify to Bin 125 or Bin
160).267 No vehicle is required to certify to any particular bin, so long as the average of all
vehicles is equal to or less than the fleet average standard (30 mg/mi under Tier 3). In other
words, a manufacturer can certify all of its vehicles to Bin 30 to meet the Tier 3 standard, or it
could certify half of its vehicles to Bin 0 and half to Bin 60, or any other combination that on
average meets the fleet average standard. However, once a manufacturer certifies an individual
vehicle to a particular bin, that individual vehicle is required to emit at the corresponding
emissions level or below. Under a fleet average scheme, a manufacturers' compliance with fleet
average obligations is determined by aggregating the compliance determinations for individual
vehicles, and these individual vehicles must also meet their own obligations. These requirements
264 CAA section 207(c)(1).
265 CAA section 207(h)(1).
266 CAA section 207(c)(2).
267 See 79 FR 23451 ("Structure of the Primary Tier 3 Tailpipe Standards").
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are therefore entirely consistent with Title II's compliance and enforcement provisions that apply
to individual vehicles—including those related to a vehicle's conformance with applicable
regulations, its certificate of conformity and warranty, and on-board diagnostics requirements.
EPA retained and did not reopen this general scheme for NMOG+NOx standards in today's Tier
4 rulemaking, with some discrete changes to the bin structure as discussed in preamble III.D.2
(e.g., eliminating bin 125 and 160 so as to remove the dirtiest vehicles from the future fleet).
EPA's LD GHG fleetwide average standards are structured similarly.268 Under the GHG
program, instead of vehicles certifying to a bin value, manufacturers determine the emissions
performance of each vehicle through testing. Based on that testing, EPA assigns each vehicle an
in-use compliance value which it is obligated to meet. EPA also evaluates the manufacturer's
compliance with the fleetwide average based on the testing results.269 However, compliance with
the GHG program is fundamentally established the same way as the NMOG+NOx program—by
determining the emissions performance of individual vehicles—which are measurable and
enforceable—and then determining compliance with the fleet average standards based on the
emissions performance of individual vehicles. Again, the regulatory scheme is entirely consistent
with the compliance and enforcement provisions in Title II.270 We further discuss how GHG
compliance and enforcement function in Section III.G.5 of the preamble.
The ABT program has been in place for decades and has worked admirably in practice,
including as applied to both NMOG+NOx and GHG compliance. The elements of the program
described above are entirely consistent with the Act, including all the provisions cited by
commenters.271 First, the argument that the regulatory approach is unlawful because conformity
cannot be determined until the end of the model year is incorrect. Congress itself used this kind
of approach when it mandated certain standards under section 202. For example, Congress
268 See 75 FR 25412-14 (establishing the ABT program for LD GHG and explaining its similarities and differences
from criteria pollutant ABT programs). The somewhat different structure of the GHG ABT program is because
GHG emissions performance, relative the criteria emissions performance, typically varies to a greater degree among
different models of vehicles, and because the GHG ABT program structure allows for greater harmonization with
NHTSA's fuel economy standards.
269 Generally for the NMOG+NOx standard, manufacturers include a compliance margin in their compliance plans,
such that a vehicle will not be certified to a bin unless the manufacturer's testing indicates that the vehicle performs
sufficiently below the required level for that bin, in order to avoid compliance issues that could arise due to minor
variability in testing and manufacturing of individual vehicles. The GHG program addresses this issue by allowing
manufacturers a 10% compliance margin between the in-use compliance standard and the emissions performance
level use.
270 To spell things out further, under Title II's compliance and enforcement provisions, EPA issues a certificate of
conformity for every vehicle, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1). This certificate is conditioned on the
automaker's compliance with the standards, including for example both the in-use and the fleet-average GHG
standard, and warrant that each new vehicle is designed to comply with all applicable emissions standards. 75 FR
25412/1-2; 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.1848-10(c)(2), (5), (9), 86.1865-12(j)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 7541. Automakers (and EPA) then
test vehicles post-sale, to obtain "real-world in-use data representing the majority of certified vehicles." 75 FR
25474/3; 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.1865-12(1)(2), 86.1848-10(c)(9), 600.010(d). This "ensure[s] that an individual vehicle
complies with the [greenhouse-gas] standards in-use," and throughout the vehicle's useful life. 75 FR 25476/1; see
id. at 25468/3. The certificate and the warranty are both based on the automaker's compliance plan and ability to
manufacture individual vehicles meeting particular emission specifications. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.1848- 10(c)(2), (5),
(9), 86.1865-12(j)(2).
271 See CAA section 206(a)(1) (leaves to EPA the means of determining "whether such vehicle... conforms with" the
section 202 emissions standards and authorizes EPA to "test, or require to be tested in such manner as he deems
appropriate" for purposes of vehicle certification); see also EDFv. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 425 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(noting this discretion).
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mandated phase-ins over time of certain emission standards for certain vehicles and model
years.272 Each of these provisions requires that a specified percentage of a manufacturer's
production has to meet a specified standard. This made the level of a manufacturer's production
over a model year a core element of the standard.273 The form of the standard mandated by
Congress recognized that pre-production certification would need to be based on a projection of
production for the upcoming model year, with actual compliance with the required percentages
not demonstrated until after the end of the model year.274 EPA's ABT provisions use this same
kind of approach, which also makes the level of a manufacturer's production a core element of
the standard. In both forms, compliance is evaluated not only with respect to individual vehicles,
but with respect to the fleet as a whole. The difference is that EPA's provisions provide
manufacturers with greater flexibility in meeting the performance-based standards, allowing
them the ability to achieve the required level of emissions reductions even more cost-effectively.
That is, Congress's approach required a specific number of vehicles each year to meet more
stringent standards, while EPA allows manufacturers to choose how many vehicles each year
will meet the more stringent standards, subject to the overall constraint of a fleet average
standard that gradually increases in stringency.275
Vehicle manufacturers also warrant at the time of sale that each new vehicle is designed to
comply with all applicable emission standards and will be free from defects that may cause
noncompliance.276 Manufacturers must warrant to the ultimate purchaser, and to subsequent
purchasers, that the vehicle is designed, built, and equipped to conform at time of sale with all
applicable standards, and is free of defects that will cause it to fail to conform in use during the
applicable warranty period. Components covered by the warranty include all emission-related
components included in the manufacturer's application for a certificate of conformity.
Consistent with section 205, civil penalties are provided for under CAA section 205 for
violations of section 203, which prohibits sale or offering into commerce any equipment not
covered by a valid certificate of conformity, and authorizes assessment of civil penalties up to
272 CAA sections 202(a)(6), (g)(1) (as noted earlier), (g)(2), and (j) (all of which require EPA to issue standards
pursuant to section 202(a)).
273 See, e.g., CAA section 202(g)(1) (defining "standards which provide that emissions from a percentage of each
manufacturer's sales volume of such vehicles and trucks shall comply with the levels specified in table G"
(emphasis added)).
274 See 56 FR 25724, 25733-34 (June 5, 1991).
275 EPA continues to apply phase-ins of emissions standards in some contexts. For reasons noted in Section III of the
preamble, the PM standard is being phased in, with increasing percentages of automakers' fleets being subject to the
new 0.5 mg/mi standard from 2027 to 2032. Again, each vehicle will have an individual emissions standard which
that vehicle is required to meet. However, that standard could be 3 mg/mi (25° FTP) or it could be 0.5 mg/mi,
depending to which standard the manufacturer certified the vehicle. If the phase-in percentage is 30%, a
manufacturer is not allowed to simply represent 30% of all vehicles sold meet the 0.5 mg/mi standard. Rather the
manufacturer must certify each vehicle to a particular performance level and 30% of those vehicles must be below
0.5 mg/mi. It is worth noting that there is nothing in theory or practice which would prevent EPA from combining
both a fleet average and a phase in of standards if it were appropriate. EPA could decide to allow the revised PM
standard to be met be through fleet averaging of individual vehicle PM emissions performance and also phase in the
adoption of that standard, such that increasing percentages of the fleet would need to be included in the averaging
set for the lower standard. These approaches are alternative approaches to addressing lead time for technology
adoption, but they are certainly not inconsistent or mutually exclusive.
276 CAA section 207.
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$57,617 per vehicle in violation.277 Individual certificates are conditioned on compliance with all
regulatory requirements including all those pertaining to compliance demonstrations via
averaging. A certificate can be voided "ab initio" in the event of a violation of averaging
requirements. For example, if a manufacturer fails to meet the required standard using averaging,
they can be required to identify the vehicles causing the deficit. The conditions in the certificates
mean EPA may declare that the deficit-causing vehicles are not covered by the certificate. If
EPA exercises that authority, the vehicles causing the deficit would no longer be considered to
be covered by the certificate and would be deemed to be introduced into commerce without a
valid certificate of conformity. This could lead to enforcement action and civil penalties for each
of the vehicles not covered by a certificate, consistent with sections 203 and 205 of the Act. In
addition, automakers can be penalized for prohibited acts like selling uncertified vehicles or
failing to honor the emissions warranty, all of which apply under a fleet-average standard in the
same way as they do under vehicle-specific standards.
Failure of vehicles to achieve their standards in-use could lead to a recall under section
207(c)(1). Commenters' arguments that there is no way to assess if a substantial number of
vehicles are non-conforming is incorrect. Testing provides a ready means of determining if and
how many vehicles fail to meet their applicable standard in-use. We further discuss the GHG
compliance and enforcement program in preamble III.G.4, including discrete changes EPA is
making to provisions relating to recall and in-use testing.
Similarly incorrect is the commenters' argument that the standards do not allow for section
202(m) emissions control diagnostic systems that accurately identify emissions control-related
deterioration that could result in failure of vehicles to comply with emissions standards. Once
again, every vehicle is certified to an emissions limit that is determinable, as are means of
diagnosing potential deterioration of the vehicle's emission control system relative to this
emissions limit.
Further, commenters reliance on the NRDC v. Thomas dicta is misplaced. First, the court
noted that Section 206(a)'s testing and certification provisions refer to vehicles, not to classes of
vehicles.278 As explained above, however, the certification is conditioned not only on
compliance with the fleet-average standards, but also on each vehicle complying with its vehicle-
specific standards.279
Second, the NRDC court noted that in legislative history to the 1970 amendments, Congress
indicated that each prototype, rather than the average of prototypes, should meet emission
standards.280 EPA addressed this concern in the preamble to a 1990 rule. Congress's concern was
that "we did not have an adequate testing program" to "get to this problem of cleaning up the
auto emissions,"281 and that the testing of a small number of prototypes and averaging of those
prototypes did not provide an accurate assessment of vehicle compliance with standards. But
277 The statutory penalty figure in section 205 has been updated pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation
Adjustment Act of 1990, as amended through the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements
Act of 2015. See 88 FR 89309 (Dec. 27, 2023).
278 NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d at 425 n.24.
279 The NRDC court also noted the "counterargument" to its concern, that "the manner of testing deemed appropriate
or the content of the standards themselves is within the discretion of the agency." NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d at 425
n.24.
280 Id.
281 Id.
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EPA's current certification and in-use standards are vehicle-specific and "ensure that each engine
meets the [applicable] limit."282 Averaging as used in the current program does not create any
uncertainty as to whether automakers are in compliance with the standards because every vehicle
must achieve its certified emission performance as part of the fleetwide compliance framework.
V. The Russello Canon is inapplicable
Commenters invoked the Russello and expressio unius canons of statutory construction,
claiming that various provisions of both the CAA and other statutes indicate that Congress knew
how to specify ABT-based standards when it wished, and therefore that the absence of such an
explicit delegation in section 202(a)(1) is an indication that no such delegation is intended. We
disagree with the relevance of these canons here, which we refer to collectively as the Russello
canon. To begin with, the "canon does not apply unless it is fair to suppose that Congress
considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it, and that the canon can be
overcome by contrary indications that adopting a particular rule or statute was probably not
meant to signal any exclusion."283 As explained above, a more direct and explicit indication of
Congressional intent vis-a-vis ABT is available, as Congress ratified EPA's use of ABT as
upheld by the D.C. Circuit's decision in NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F. 2d 410, 425 (D.C. Cir.
1986).284 For this reason alone, the Russello canon does not apply.
Moreover, the Russello canon has limited, if any, utility where wording is not identical or
otherwise substantially similar.285 That is the case with respect to the provisions cited by the
commenters. Commenters cite the Clean Fuels Vehicle provisions in Part C of Title II for the
proposition that Congress knew how to specify an ABT program.286 This program is found in a
separate Part of the statute, uses different language than section 202, and is not otherwise parallel
to section 202. Namely, the Part C provisions direct EPA to set standards for clean-fuel vehicles
operating on clean alternative fuel including electricity, but only on a targeted regional basis.
This was a specific project to advance alternative fuels and technologies,287 not a limit on EPA's
general section 202(a)(1) authority. Moreover, the credit provisions are highly detailed, and in
some cases, mandatory. For example, the credit provisions in section 246(f) are mandatory,
specific to certain State Implementation Plan (SIP) revisions, and subject to limits on how the
credits can be used, such as "to demonstrate compliance with other requirements applicable
282 5 5 FR at 30594.
283 Marxv. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 381 (2013).
284 See 88 FR at 25950.
285 See Nat'l Postal Pol'y Council v. PostalRegul. Comm'n, 17 F.4th 1184, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 2021), cert, denied, 142
S. Ct. 2868 (2022) ("The Mailers also invoke the presumption in Russello v. United States — that the inclusion of a
phrase in one provision and its absence in another is deliberate, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S. Ct. 296, 78 L. Ed.2d 17
(1983) — to argue that the exception to the price cap for emergencies in § 3622(d)(1)(E) demonstrates that Congress
decided not to grant the Commission the authority to override the price cap in § 3622(d)(3). Mailers Br. 20-21. That
canon has limited force here, however, because the two provisions use different words and are not otherwise
parallel. See City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 435-36, 122 S. Ct. 2226, 153 L.
Ed.2d 430 (2002).").
286 Commenters also cite to the Clean Fuel Vehicles program as evidence that Congress knew how to explicitly
specify a program for electric vehicles. We respond to these comments in RTC 2.3.
287 See H. Rep. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 283 (1990), 1990 WL 1222133, at *65-66 (Congress wanted "to encourage a
broad range of vehicles," including those using electricity, and break the "chicken and the egg" supply-and-demand
problem among automakers, consumers, and fuel producers).
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under this section in the same nonattainment area."288 By contrast, section 202(a)(1) does not
explicitly mandate or specify a credit program, and it also provides for nationally applicable
standards. EPA's decision to implement ABT and fleet-average standards falls within Congress's
delegation to the agency to establish the standards. Thus, sections 246 and 249 are quite different
from section 202(a)(1), and the Russello canon is inapplicable.
Commenters cited the Reformulated Gasoline and Renewable Fuel Standards provisions of
the Act as further examples of Congress knowing how to specify averaging or credit programs
when it wished to adopt them.289 These provisions involve fuels, not emissions from motor
vehicles, and so are not the same or parallel to section 202(a). Moreover, the credit programs in
those provisions are also mandatory.290 Further, Congress explicitly specified that the RFS
program does not limit the agency's authority to promulgate other GHG programs.291
EPA notes that the ABT program for section 202(a) standards is not unique in lacking an
explicit statutory ABT provision. Over the decades, EPA has also promulgated ABT programs in
other similar instances. For instance, EPA implemented a highly successful ABT program for
fuels standards under section 211(c).292 Indeed, many fuels companies, such as members of
commenters API and AFPM, have historically supported and benefited from these ABT
programs. Like the section 202(a) ABT programs, fuels programs containing ABT provisions
that are promulgated under section 211(c) also lack an explicit statutory ABT provision. Such
absence is also in marked contrast to the section 211 (k) ABT program.
More broadly, in light of the history of Federal environmental law, it is not surprising that the
later-enacted clean fuel vehicles, reformulated gasoline, and RFS programs have explicit
provisions relating to credits, while the earlier-enacted sections 211(c) fuels and 202(a) motor
vehicle programs do not. Credit programs generally and ABT programs specifically were not
widely used in the early days of federal air pollution control, and the lawmakers likely had
limited knowledge of such programs.293 For instance, at the time of the Motor Vehicle Air
Pollution Control Act of 1965, there was no ABT program for any federal air pollution
regulatory program. Congress, recognizing the need for regulatory flexibility so as to avoid
obsolescence, declined to specify the details of how the standards should be implemented,
entrusting those technical judgments to the expertise of the administrative agency.
Even further afield is Valero's assertion that the Energy Policy Conservation Act provision
directing NHTSA to issue regulations setting "average fuel economy standards for automobiles
manufactured by a manufacturer" (49 U.S.C. § 32902(a)) constrains EPA's section 202(a)
authority. EPCA is a different statute from the CAA, and it is also concerned with entirely
different purposes. Section 202(a) is concerned with preventing or controlling emissions of air
288 CAA section 246(f)(2)(A).
289 See CAA section 21 l(k)(7) (credits relating to reformulated gasoline), section 21 l(o)(5) (credit program for
RFS).
290 See CAA section 21 l(k)(7) (regulations "shall provide" for credits for certain reformulated gasoline), section
21 l(o)(5) (RFS regulations "shall provide" for credits).
291 CAA section 21 l(o)(12).
292 See, e.g., 65 FR 6698 (Feb. 10, 2010); 79 FR 23416 (Apr. 28, 2014); 66 FR 5002 (Jan. 18, 2001); 72 FR 8428
(Feb. 26, 2007).
293 See Ellerman, P.L. Joskow & D. Harrison, Jr., Emissions Trading in the U.S.: Experience, Lessons and
Considerations for Greenhouse Gases (2003), available at https://globalchange.mit.edu/publication/13922
(discussing the history of ABT and other credit programs in US environmental law, summarized on p. 7 tab. 1).
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pollutants from motor vehicles which contribute to endangerment, not with vehicular fuel
economy.294 The Russello canon has no applicability here.
VI. EPA may include BEV and ICE vehicles within a single regulatory class.
Several of the commenters argue that even if section 202(a)(1) authorizes fleet average
standards, ICE and non-ICE vehicles' performance cannot be averaged together because they are
not of the same "class" as required by section 202(a)(1). There are two versions of this argument:
that all members of the class being averaged must emit the pollutant(s) which are contributing to
endangerment, or that they have fundamentally different powertrains and so cannot be
reasonably grouped together.
EPA disagrees. As discussed in Section III.B.l of the preamble, Congress required EPA to
prescribe standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of
new motor vehicles, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which endangers
public health and welfare. Congress defined "motor vehicles" by their function: "any self-
propelled vehicle designed for transporting persons or property on a street or highway."295
Likewise, with regard to classes, Congress explicitly contemplated functional categories: "the
Administrator may base such classes or categories on gross vehicle weight, horsepower, type of
fuel used, or other appropriate factors."296 It is indisputable that electric vehicles are "new motor
vehicles" as defined by the statute and that they fall into the weight-based "classes" that EPA
established with Congress's explicit support.
Under section 202(a), regulation of motor vehicle emissions has two distinct aspects: (1) if the
Administrator finds that "any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines, ... in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare," then (2) "[t]he Administrator shall by
regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this
section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from" such class or classes. The
first step of this inquiry is the endangerment finding, while the second step is setting the
standards.297 As the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts and the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed in
Coalition for Responsible Regulation, the Endangerment Finding is a matter of "scientific
judgment"—whether air pollution endangers and whether the class of motor vehicles contributes
294 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) ("[T]hat DOT sets mileage standards in no way licenses
EPA to shirk its environmental responsibilities. EPA has been charged with protecting the public's "health" and
"welfare," 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), a statutory obligation wholly independent of DOT's mandate to promote energy
efficiency. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, § 2(5), 89 Stat. 874, 42 U.S.C. § 6201(5). The two obligations
may overlap, but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid
inconsistency.").
295 CAA section 216(2).
296 CAA section 202(a)(3)(A)(ii). This section applies to standards established under section 202(a)(3), not to
standards otherwise established under section 202(a)(1). But it nonetheless provides guidance on what kinds of
classifications and categorizations Congress thought were appropriate.
297 See 74 FR 66544 ("the decisions on cause or contribute and endangerment are separate and distinct from the
decisions on what emissions standards to set under CAA section 202(a)."); see also id. at 66501-02; Endangerment
and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act: EPA's
Response to Public Comments, Volume 11: Miscellaneous Legal, Procedural, and Other Comments, 11.3.
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to such pollution.298 By contrast, the decision on what standards to set is a policy decision
subsequent to the endangerment finding based on technical determinations of technology
availability, cost of compliance, and lead-time.299
In making the GHG Endangerment Finding in 2009, EPA defined the classes of motor
vehicles and engines as "Passenger cars, light-duty trucks, motorcycles, buses, and medium and
heavy-duty trucks."300 Light and medium-duty BEVs fall within the classes of passenger cars,
light-duty trucks, and medium and heavy-duty trucks. In making the Endangerment Finding,
EPA satisfied the statutory prerequisite for establishing GHG standards for these entire classes,
which includes zero-emitting vehicles that do not emit pollutants.301 That is, the Administrator's
judgment as to endangerment applied to the above-stated classes as wholes, with no qualification
as to the level of emissions, powertrain, or any other characteristic. The Endangerment Finding
was upheld after extensive litigation.302 EPA did not reopen the 2009 Endangerment Finding in
this rulemaking, and comments collaterally challenging it are beyond the scope of this
rulemaking. Once EPA made the endangerment finding for the class, EPA was required to set
emission standards for vehicles in that class to address the contribution to endangerment. In the
final rule, as in prior GHG rules, EPA acts consistently with the endangerment finding in
promulgating GHG regulations for the classes of passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium
and heavy-duty trucks. 303
Some commenters nonetheless contend that BEVs fall outside of EPA's regulatory reach
under this provision because they do not cause, or contribute to, air pollution which endangers
human health and welfare. That misreads the statutory text. Section 202(a)(1)'s focus on
regulating emissions from "class or classes" indicates that Congress was concerned by the air
pollution problem generated by a class of vehicles, as opposed to from individual vehicles.
Accordingly, Congress authorized EPA to regulate classes of vehicles, and EPA has concluded
that the classes of passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium and heavy-duty trucks, cause or
298 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007); Coal, for Responsible Regul., Inc. v. EPA. 684 F.3d 102, 117-
19 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
299 See Coal, for Responsible Regul., Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 118 (Policy inquiries "muddle the rather
straightforward scientific judgment about whether there may be endangerment by throwing the potential impact of
responding to the danger into the initial question. To be sure, the subsection following § 202(a)(1), § 202(a)(2),
requires that EPA address limited questions about the cost of compliance with new emission standards and the
availability of technology for meeting those standards, but these judgments are not part of the § 202(a)(1)
endangerment inquiry. The Supreme Court made clear in Massachusetts v. EPA that... policy concerns were not
part of the calculus for the determination of the endangerment finding in the first instance."); see generally id. at
117-19.
300 74 FR 66496, 66537 (Dec. 15, 2009).
301 We note that this is not special to GHGs. For example, EPA has also made endangerment findings and
established criteria pollutant standards for an entire class or classes of vehicles (e.g., for light-duty vehicles and
heavy-duty vehicles), with includes ICE only vehicles, hybrid vehicles, and ZEV vehicles. Of course the nature of
compliance demonstration may differ by vehicle. For example, it would be a waste of resources to test BEVs for
tailpipe emissions, and thus EPA allows BEVs to certify to certain standards without testing.
302 Coal, for Responsible Regul., Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 117 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("We ultimately conclude that the
Endangerment Finding is consistent -with Massachusetts v. EPA and the text and structure of the CAA, and is
adequately supported by the administrative record.").
303 Our response focuses on GHG regulation. However, similar arguments also apply to the regulation of criteria
pollutants. See, e.g., 79 FR 23414 (Tier 3 criteria pollutant rule) (establishing standards for "both tailpipe and
evaporative emissions from passenger cars, light-duty trucks, medium-duty passenger vehicles, and some heavy-
duty vehicles"), 23416 (assessing the contribution to air pollution due to emissions from "passenger cars").
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contribute to dangerous pollution. As noted, the classes of these vehicles include BEVs, along
with ICE and hybrid vehicles. And EPA has consistently viewed passenger cars, light-duty
trucks, and medium and heavy-duty trucks as classes of motor vehicles for regulatory purposes,
including in our prior GHG rules.
Commenters do not seriously question that passenger cars, light duty trucks, and medium and
heavy-duty trucks as defined by EPA are classes of vehicles, which they clearly are. A "class" is
a "set, group, collection.. .containing members having.. .at least one attribute in common."304
Each of these three classes is a "set" or "group" of vehicles "containing members" having
attributes in common. The members of these classes are all motor vehicles as defined in section
216(2) of the Act, and the members of each class further share specific attributes. For example,
EPA historically defined "light-duty truck" to mean:
any motor vehicle rated at 8,500 pounds GVWR or less which as [sic] a vehicle
curb weight of 6,000 pounds or less and which has a basic vehicle frontal area of
45 square feet or less, which is:
(1) Designed primarily for purposes of transportation of property or is a derivation
of such a vehicle, or
(2) Designed primarily for transportation of persons and has a capacity of more than
12 persons, or
(3) Available with special features enabling off-street or off-highway operation and
use.305
The statute plainly permits this kind of classification. Congress ratified this historical
approach in the 1990 amendments to the CAA. Congress added definitions in section 216 that
incorporated into the statute EPA's prior inclusive definitions of "light duty vehicle" and "light
duty truck" which "have the meaning provided in regulations promulgated by the Administrator
and in effect as of November 15, 1990." Congress then mandated certain standards for light duty
vehicles and light duty trucks that incorporated those inclusive definitions, which do not include
any distinction based on whether a vehicle emits pollutants or has a certain powertrain. CAA
sections 202(g), (h)(1), and (j)(l).306
Commenters fail to seriously grapple with these arguments, but nonetheless claim that the
prerequisite for EPA regulation is the agency finding that individual regulated vehicles must
themselves emit air pollutants. This claim is completely unmoored from the statutory text and
purpose, which speaks in terms of "classes" of vehicles that emit pollutants. Section 202(a)(1)
does not speak to emissions from individual vehicles at all. For that view to be right, section
202(a) would have to be rewritten to say the emission of air pollutants "from any new motor
vehicle."
304 Webster's II Universal Dictionary.
305 40 CFR 86.082-2; see also id. ("Light-duty vehicle means a passenger car or passenger car derivative capable of
seating 12 passengers or less."); 46 FR 50464-01, 50476-77 (Oct. 13, 1981).
306 EPA has subsequently revised the definition of "light-duty truck" over the years, including in this final rule;
however, the revised definitions also are not based on whether vehicles emit pollution or have a certain powertrain.
See the regulatory text at the end of this notice amending 40 CFR 86.1803-01 (defining "light-duty vehicle," "light-
duty truck," "heavy-duty vehicle," "medium-duty passenger vehicle," and "medium-duty vehicle").
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Furthermore, while an individual vehicle could possibly "contribute" to dangerous air
pollution warranting regulation, it would not typically "cause" such pollution. Instead, the more
common "cause" would be a group of vehicles aggregated as a class. This confirms that "cause,
or contribute to" clause as a whole modifies emissions from a "class or classes" of vehicles,
rather than emissions from individual vehicles.307
These commenters also misunderstand the broader statutory scheme. Congress directed EPA
to apply the standards to vehicles whether they are designed as complete systems or incorporate
devices to prevent or control pollution. Thus, Congress understood that the standards may be
premised on and lead to technologies that prevent pollution in the first place. It would be
perverse to conclude that in a scheme intended to control the emissions of dangerous pollution,
Congress would have prohibited EPA from premising its standards on controls that completely
prevent pollution, while also permitting the agency to premise them on a technology that reduces
99 percent of pollution. Such a nonsensical reading of the statute would mean that the
availability of technology that can reduce 99 percent of pollution could serve as the basis for
highly protective standards, while the availability of a technology that completely prevents the
pollution could not be relied on to set emission standards at all. Such a reading would also create
a perverse safe harbor allowing polluting vehicles to be perpetually produced, resulting in
harmful emissions and adverse impacts on public health, even where available technology
permits the complete prevention of such emissions and adverse impacts at a reasonable cost.
That result cannot be squared with section 202(a)(1)'s purpose to reduce emissions that "cause or
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare,"308 or with the statutory directive to not only "control" but also "prevent" pollution.
Commenters' suggestion that EPA define the class to exclude BEVs would also be
unreasonable and unworkable. Ex ante, EPA does not know which vehicles a manufacturer may
produce and, without technological controls including add-on devices and complete systems, all
of the vehicles have the potential to emit dangerous pollution.309 Therefore, EPA establishes
standards for the entire class of vehicles, based upon its consideration of all available
technologies. It is only after the manufacturers have applied those technologies to vehicles in
actual production that the pollution is prevented or controlled. To put it differently, even
hypothetically assuming EPA could not set standards for vehicles that manufacturers intend to
build as electric vehicles—a proposition which we do not agree with—EPA could still regulate
vehicles manufacturers intend not to build as electric vehicles and that would emit dangerous
pollution in the absence of EPA regulation.310 When regulating those vehicles, Congress
307 The rule of last antecedent does not alter that conclusion. That rule is sometimes used to interpret "a list of terms
or phrases followed by a limiting clause." Lockhartv. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 351 (2016). But section
7521(a)(1) presents no such list, and thus no conundrum of whether the final modifier applies to everything in a
preceding list or just the last item.
308 See also Coal, for Responsible Regulation, 684 F. 3d at 122 (explaining that the statutory purpose is to "prevent
reasonably anticipated endangerment from maturing into concrete harm").
309 As noted above, manufacturers in some cases choose to offer different models of the same vehicle with different
levels of electrification. And it is the manufacturer who decides whether a given vehicle will be manufactured to
produce no emissions, low emissions, or higher emissions controlled by add-on technology.
310 In other words, the additional BEVs EPA projects in the modeled central case analysis exist in the baseline case
as pollutant-emitting vehicles with ICE. We further note that it would be odd for EPA to have authority to regulate a
given class of motor vehicles so long as those vehicles emit air pollution at the tailpipe, but to lose its authority to
regulate those very same vehicles should they install emission control devices to limit such pollution or be designed
to prevent the endangering pollution in the first place.
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explicitly authorized EPA to premise its standards for those vehicles on a "complete system"
technology that prevents pollution entirely, like BEV technologies.
Commenters' claim that EPA must classify or categorize vehicles by powertrain is also
misplaced. For any given class of vehicles, the Administrator may make appropriate
subcategorizations in establishing the standards.311 Section 202(a)(1) does not explicitly
delineate how EPA should categorize, indicating that Congress entrusted this subsidiary
technical determination to the Administrator's judgment.312 EPA routinely makes categorizations
based on characteristics like vehicle weight and functionality, and establishes different standards
for each category where that is warranted, for instance, often establishing less stringent standards
for heavier vehicles as compared to lighter vehicles of the same functionality in light of
differences in technological feasibility and costs. For example, as we explain in Section III.C.2
of the preamble, EPA's light-duty GHG program—which applies to both passenger cars and
light-duty trucks—employs attribute-based standards that depend on the size of the vehicle's
footprint and also provides additional offsets for towing and all-wheel drive functionality.
Commenters do not identify anything in the statute that mandates categorization based on
whether a vehicle emits or whether it has a certain powertrain. And in fact, Section 202(a)(1)
does not require categorization (or classification) on these bases. Moreover, the intention
underlying the commenters' preferred categorization is to delay the introduction of effective
pollution control technologies like BEVs, with the result of perpetuating dangerous air pollution.
That is not a reasonable way to implement section 202(a)(1).
Although it does not directly apply to section 202(a)(1) standards, Section 202(a)(3)(A)(ii)
provides guidance on what kinds of classifications and categorizations Congress thought were
appropriate.313 That section states "[i]n establishing classes or categories of vehicles or engines
for purposes of regulations under this paragraph, the Administrator may base such classes or
categories on gross vehicle weight, horsepower, type of fuel used, or other appropriate factors."
As noted above, the class of light-duty trucks, for instance, is distinguished from other motor
vehicles by its members having a certain weight and function. Within that class, vehicles are
subject to different standards based on their footprint and functionality (the availability of all-
wheel drive and towing), which the Administrator views as "other appropriate factors."314
311 We acknowledge that we have not always clearly delineated between the terms "class" versus "category." But the
key point here is not the semantics of these two words, but rather a substantive distinction: the "classes" of vehicles
that contribute to dangerous pollution for which EPA makes the endangerment finding and are thereby subject to the
regulation for the relevant pollutant, and the "categories" or "subcategories" of vehicles within a class for which the
agency may in its discretion establish different standards based on the characteristics of those subcategories.
312 Congress, however, did provide indicia as to what appropriate categorizations could be in section
202(a)(3)(A)(ii), which we discuss further below. This section does not apply directly to this rulemaking but is
nonetheless instructive as to potential means of categorizing (as well as classifying) heavy duty vehicles.
313 Section 202(a)(3)(A)(ii) applies to standards established under section 202(a)(3), not to standards otherwise
established under section 202(a)(1). Nonetheless, we think it provides guidance more generally on what
classifications and categorizations Congress thought appropriate.
314 See White Stallion Energy Center v. EPA, 748 F. 3d 1222, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("[N]othing in the Clean Air
Act 'requires' EPA to create a CFB subcategory. Rather, the statute gives EPA substantial discretion in determining
whether subcategorization is appropriate."); see also CAA § 112(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1) (EPA "may
distinguish among classes, types, and sizes of sources"); Nat'lAss'n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d
1115, 1159 (D.C.Cir.2013) ("EPA's subcategorization authority under § 112 involves an expert determination,
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Moreover, we note that other parts of the statute do actually require distinctions based on
powertrain or based on fuel type (which corresponds to powertrain). Even within section 202
itself, Congress specified certain standards applicable only to some "gasoline and diesel-fueled"
vehicles.315 In section 216(1), Congress also limited the definition of a nonroad engine to mean
only certain kinds of "internal combustion engine."316 This treatment shows that when Congress
wants to require distinctions related to powertrain, it knew how to do so. The conspicuous
absence of any such limitation in section 202(a)(1) suggests that no such limitation should be
implied.
Commenters' suggestion that BEVs are somehow so fundamentally different from ICE
vehicles as to require different classification or categorization is also misplaced. EPA has found
that, during the timeframe for this rule, BEVs are generally capable of performing the same
functions as ICE vehicles of their respective types and established the standards accordingly.
Indeed, manufacturers will sometimes produce the same vehicle model with varying levels of
electrification.317
Relatedly, a commenter claims that because there is no identifiable vehicle configuration that
corresponds to the standards, industry as a whole would have to certify at least two
fundamentally different types of vehicles to satisfy them. It is not entirely clear what this
comment means. Motor vehicles are highly diverse, and different manufacturers produce
different subsets of such vehicles, with diverse vehicle configurations. We expect manufacturers
to continue to produce the kinds of vehicles they have traditionally produced as the standards do
not limit manufacturers to only producing a single vehicle configuration or applying only a
single type of pollution control technology. Moreover, it is up to manufacturers to decide how to
comply with EPA's standards, and we expect each manufacturer to choose the compliance
pathway that best suits its business.
Commenters suggest that calculating a fleetwide average that includes both BEVs and other
vehicles creates an illogical or false average, but EPA rejects that suggestion. It is entirely
consistent with the history of motor vehicle regulation under the CAA for advanced pollution
control technologies to be phased in across the fleet, and there is nothing false about the tailpipe
emissions compliance figures being averaged together under this rule. After all, BEVs do indeed
produce no tailpipe emissions, so it is accurate to account for them as such. Indeed, it would be
more inaccurate to exclude BEVs in calculating fleetwide compliance. And there is nothing false
about regulatory averages that include electric vehicles. Emission standards apply to all motor
vehicles in the relevant class. Automakers count the emissions of every vehicle in their fleet
when calculating fleet-average emissions. Electric vehicles are thus treated just like any other
placing a heavy burden on a challenger to overcome deference to EPA's articulated rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made."); NRDC v. EPA, 489 F. 3d 1364, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("Because Congress has
vested EPA with subcategorization authority under Section 112(c)(1), and its exercise of that authority involves an
expert determination, L-P carries a heavy burden to overcome deference to the agency's articulated rational
connection between the facts found and the choices made.").
315 CAA section 202(a)(3)(B)(ii), (h) tab. H, (i)(l); see also CAA section 202(a)(5)(A) ("gasoline vapor recovery"),
(g) tab. G ("diesel-fueled LDTs"), (k) ("gasoline-fueled motor vehicles").
316 CAA section 216(10).
317 For example, the Ford F-150 has been offered in ICE and EV versions, while the Hyundai Ioniq and Kia Niro has
been offered in HEV, PHEV, and EV versions. Jaguar Land Rover has also indicated that every model will be
available with a fully electric version by the end of the decade. The Freightliner Cascadia and eCascadia are ICE and
BEV versions of Freightliner's HD semi truck.
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vehicle with emission-control technology. For that reason, averaging is technology neutral. The
impact a particular technology has on a fleet's performance depends on its effectiveness. And
electric vehicles are very effective at reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. But that effectiveness
does not mean EPA must categorize electric vehicles separately or that such vehicles are beyond
EPA's regulatory authority.
EPA acknowledges that we have at times established separate categories for vehicles based on
powertrain or fuel type. For example, EPA has traditionally established separate categories for
spark ignition and compression ignition vocational vehicles for purposes of HD GHG
regulation.318 EPA proposed to retain this categorization scheme in the recent HD Phase 3 GHG
rule. We expect manufacturers to continue producing both spark and compression ignition ICE
vocational vehicles during the timeframe of that rule; that is, we projected that manufacturers
will likely comply with the Phase 3 standards, as with their Phase 2 predecessors, in whole or in
part based on the GHG performance of both types of vocational vehicle engines. Given
technological differences, spark and compression ignition ICE emit different amounts of
pollutants, including GHGs, and including when using the same pollution control
technologies.319 As such, EPA's standards and categorization scheme appropriately reflect the
different feasible emissions performance of these two types of internal combustion engines and
vehicles. In principle, this is no different than having different GHG standards for, say, an ICE
long-haul tractor and an ICE light HD vocational vehicle: they emit different amounts of
pollutants, even when using the same pollution control technologies, and the standards
appropriately reflect this difference.320
We note the key difference between this scheme and the ones that commenters say are
compelled. Under EPA's proposed HD Phase 3 rule, vocational vehicles with all engine types
must meet GHG standards whose stringency is supported by the feasible emission reductions
under the modeled compliance pathway, which includes both zero-emitting vehicles and ICE
vehicles technologies.321 Under the commenters' approach, EPA is precluded from requiring any
emission reductions associated with zero-emitting vehicle technologies that are available at a
reasonable cost, and the nation has to forgo large public health and welfare benefits. We do not
think such a result is reasonable.
Finally, many of the commenters' arguments rest on a false premise that BEVs cannot emit
any air pollutants. EPA structures its light duty standards to regulate GHG leakage from AC
systems which occurs in BEVs as well as other vehicles,322 and EPA recognizes that BEVs like
other vehicles emit PM through tire wear. Thus, to the extent the commenters view BEVs as not
being part of the class subject to regulation under section 202 because BEVs do not emit
pollutants, that view is factually inaccurate as well.
318 See 40 CFR section 1037.105 (b)(1).
319 See, e.g., 81 FR at 73562, 73679, 73703 (Phase 2 rule discussions of engine technologies considered in vehicle
standard-setting).
320 To provide another example, EPA has promulgated specific provisions for light-duty PHEVs to properly account
for the way the internal combustion engine is used in PHEVs under certain conditions. But broadly speaking the
same light duty tailpipe standards apply to all vehicles regardless of powertrain or fuel type, including to gasoline
vehicles, diesel vehicles, HEV, PHEV, BEV, etc.
321 The standard can of course be met by any means a manufacturer chooses.
322 See Preamble III.C.5.
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BEVs as systems or devices to prevent or control emissions
Some commenters further suggest that BEVs are beyond the scope of regulation under section
202(a) because the provision does not specifically mention BEVs, and because they view the
clause at the end of section 202(a) which requires standards to be applicable for the useful life of
vehicles "whether such vehicles and engines are designed as complete systems or incorporate
devices to prevent or control pollution" as not describing BEVs. Other commenters argue that
BEVs are best considered a design feature related to the control of emissions which should be
considered in determining fleet average standards in order to achieve the goals and requirements
of the Clean Air Act, and that BEVs constitute vehicles designed as a "system" within the
meaning of section 202.
EPA disagrees with these comments. First, section 202(a)(1) directs EPA to regulate
emissions from motor vehicles, and BEVs are motor vehicles as defined in section 216(2) of the
Act. Second, in the 2009 Endangerment Finding, EPA identified the classes of motor vehicles
subject to GHG regulation without any distinction as to whether they emit or to their powertrain.
Once EPA made the endangerment finding for the class, EPA was required to set emission
standards for vehicles in that class to address the contribution to endangerment. Third, the last
clause in section 202(a)(1)—"whether such vehicles and engines are designed as complete
systems or incorporate devices to prevent or control pollution"— does not alter the scope of
vehicles subject to regulation under the Act. It does, however, confirm the broad scope of
Congressional intent of the kinds of technologies that EPA may consider in establishing the
standards, including "complete systems" and technologies that "prevent" pollution, which
describe BEVs. We reject the commenters' subsidiary arguments, including that BEVs are
beyond the scope of regulation because they do not control pollution from a carbon-dioxide or
criteria-pollutant emitting engine, they are not designed for emissions control, or they do not
block or capture pollution.
First, as we explain in Section III.B of the preamble, BEVs unambiguously fall under the
statutory definition of motor vehicles in section 216(2), and the statute also unambiguously
allows EPA to consider electrified technologies, including BEVs, in establishing section
202(a)(1) standards. Section 202(a)(1) applies to the "emission of any air pollutant from any
class ... of new motor vehicles .... which ... cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." Vehicles with electric
powertrains, including BEVs, are indisputably "motor vehicles," since they are "self-propelled"
and are "designed for transporting persons or property on a street or highway."323
Commenters wrongly suggest that despite the very broad statutory definition of motor
vehicles, which remained untouched through repeated revisions of Title II, Congress could not
have possibly intended to include BEVs in that definition simply because most vehicles in 1965
were gasoline. It is worth noting that "[a]t the beginning of the 20th century, 40 percent of
American automobiles were powered by steam, 38 percent by electricity, and 22 percent by
CAA section 216(2).
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gasoline,"324 and as noted in the preamble and by other commenters, by the 1960s Congress was
actively considering the potential role of EV technology for reducing motor vehicle pollution.325
In any case, as the Supreme Court has held, "the Congresses that drafted § 202(a)(1) ... did
understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific
developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad language of § 202(a)(1)
reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence."326
Just as greenhouse gases "fit well within the Clean Air Act's capacious definition of 'air
pollutant,'"327 BEVs likewise fit well within the definition of motor vehicles. And as we explain
in the preamble, the Administrator appropriately considered BEVs in establishing the standards
as they are a highly effective technology for reducing vehicle emissions and available at a
reasonable cost during the timeframe of the rulemaking.
Second, as we explain in our prior response regarding ABT, EPA identified the classes of
vehicles subject to GHG regulation in the 2009 Endangerment Finding. The classes identified
included passenger cars, light duty trucks, and medium and heavy-duty trucks, without exception
as to their level of emissions or powertrain. BEVs are included in each class of vehicles. Once
EPA made the endangerment finding for the class, EPA is required to set emission standards for
vehicles in that class to address the contribution to endangerment.
Third, contrary to what commenters argue, the final clause of section 202 (a)(1) does not
change the class of vehicles for which EPA must promulgate emission standards. That clause
states that the standards "shall be applicable to those vehicles for their useful life whether such
vehicles ... are designed as complete systems or incorporate devices to prevent or control such
pollution." This language requires that the standards apply to vehicles over their useful life, as
opposed to, for example, only at the certification stage. The final standards do this.
As we explain in Section III.B of the preamble, this statutory language also confirms the
breadth of Congress's intent with regard to the technologies that EPA may consider. We think it
is clear that BEVs fall under this language as they are designed as complete systems. It is also
reasonable to view BEVs as incorporating devices (e.g., batteries and e-motors) that prevent
pollution from being created. Either way, BEVs clearly fall within the statutory text.
The commenters' arguments to the contrary are all misplaced. Commenters suggest that EPA
cannot consider BEVs in establishing the standards because BEVs are designed to run on an
entirely different power system, not to limit or control pollution from a carbon-dioxide-emitting
engine. The argument first of all ignores the statutory language in section 202(a)(1), which
speaks to EPA establishing emissions standards for classes of motor vehicles that contribute to
324 Britannica, Early Electric Vehicles, https://www.britannica.com/technology/automobile/Early-electric-
automobiles; see also Amicus Brief of Margo Oge and John Hannon in Texas v. EPA (D.C. Cir. No. 22-1031) at 9,
16-17.
325 For example, in 1967, Congress was working on research-and-development programs for vehicle electrification.
See S. Rep. No. 90-403, at 59-61 (1967). As part of that effort, Congress held hearings on "electric vehicles and
other alternatives to the internal combustion engine." Joint Hearings Before the Committees on Commerce and
Public Works for S. 451 and S. 453, 90th Cong. 297 (1967). Later that year, a Senate report approvingly noted that
electrified vehicles could comprise one third of the market by 1985. S. Rep. No. 90-403, at 60 (1967). A few years
later, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to create a research program for new vehicle technology, including "low
emission alternatives to the present internal combustion engine." CAA section 104 (a)(2).
326Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
327 Id.
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dangerous air pollution, not for classes of "carbon-dioxide emitting engines." Moreover, the
argument proves far too much. Many GHG and criteria pollution control technologies are
"designed" for or have other purposes beyond merely pollution control. For instance, many of
the technologies on which the GHG emissions standards are predicated - e.g., improved engines
and transmissions, low rolling resistance tires, aerodynamic improvements, lightweighting,
improved accessories, mild and strong hybrids328—also improve vehicle functionality (e.g.,
turbocharging and engine downsizing, high efficiency automatic transmissions, electrified power
steering) and fuel economy. The same is true for criteria pollutant technologies that improve the
combustion process, such as exhaust gas recirculation, which beyond improving emissions
performance can also improve knock resistance, reduce the need for high load fuel enrichment,
and so on.329
Commenters similarly maintain that BEVs are not designed as complete systems because they
lack a self-contained mechanism to block or capture pollution that otherwise would be emitted.
This argument lacks a statutory basis and is premised on an incorrect understanding of how
pollution control technology works. The statute speaks to vehicles "designed as complete
systems or incorporate devices to prevent or control such pollution." 330 Preventing pollution
includes reducing or eliminating pollution at the source, as opposed to merely blocking or
capturing the pollution after it has been emitted.331 Relatedly, controlling pollution could mean
blocking or capturing pollution that otherwise would be emitted, but could also mean using
chemical processes to transform air pollutants into harmless compounds. Technologies to address
GHG emissions work by preventing pollution, e.g., by making the vehicle lighter or more
aerodynamic or by increasing engine efficiency, so as to reduce fuel consumption and associated
emissions, or by relying on a different fuel (e.g., natural gas, hydrogen, or electricity) that
inherently creates and emits less pollution from the motor vehicle. To date, no motor vehicle
GHG add-on control or aftertreatment technologies have become widely available. Criteria
emissions technologies can also prevent pollution—for example by increasing the efficiency of
the fuel combustion process or by fuel-switching—or control it—for example by a catalyst
transforming pollutants into less harmful compounds.
The commenters' reading is implausible for another obvious reason. It reads the statute as
disallowing technologies which are best suited to "prevent" the emissions which contribute to
endangerment. Instead of preventing and controlling the emissions which contribute to
endangerment, the commenters' reading would preclude EPA from considering highly effective
technologies for reducing emissions, with the result of perpetuating emissions that contribute to
dangerous air pollution. This result is antithetical to the statutory goal of using emission
standards to prevent endangerment from "maturing into concrete harm."332
328 81 FR at 73747-53.
329 See Hannu Jaaskelainen & Magdi K. Khair, Exhaust Gas Recirculation (May 2022),
https://dieselnet.com/tech/engine_egr.php.
330 EPA notes that some commenters, both those that read section 202(a) as authorizing consideration of
electrification technologies in setting vehicles standards and those that do not, appear to read the last phrase of
section 202(a)(1), "to prevent or control pollution," as modifying "designed as complete systems." An alternate
reading would be to construe "to prevent or control pollution" as solely modifying "incorporate devices." EPA finds
it is unnecessary to resolve this interpretive issue because either way BEVs do prevent pollution.
331 See CAA section 101(a)(3) ("air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or elimination, through any measures,
of the amount of pollutants produced or created at the source)").
332 Coal, for Responsible Regulation, 684 F. 3d at 122.
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The commenters' reliance on Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association, Inc. v. EPA, 17 F.4th
1198, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2021) is misplaced. The case involved whether trailers were "motor
vehicles," not which emissions control technologies are permissible under the statute. The
commenter seizes on language in the decision stating that section 202(a)(1) creates two
categories of complete motor vehicles: those with built-in pollution control, and those with add-
on devices for pollution control. Nothing in this language supports a reading that BEVs are not
"complete systems" or "devices." Indeed, BEVs can be regarded as "built-in pollution control,"
since the pollution control system is integral to the vehicle design, as opposed to being an add-
on. In this way, BEVs are similar to many other pollution prevention technologies described
above. For example, improved vehicle aerodynamics, lightweighting, and ICE engine and
transmission improvements are integral aspects of the vehicle that can also be regarded as "built-
in pollution control." By contrast, for example, an aftertreatment system can be seen as an "add-
on device." Thus, to the extent Truck Trailer is relevant to the issue, we think it, like the
statutory language it glosses, confirms the breadth of technologies Congress intended for EPA to
consider and further supports our decision to consider BEV technologies in setting the standards.
Further, as discussed in Section III of the preamble, EPA does not mandate which vehicles a
manufacturer may produce or how a manufacturer may choose to design individual vehicles or
their overall fleet composition to meet emission standards. Without technological controls,
including add-on devices and complete systems, all of the vehicles EPA regulates under section
202(a) have the potential to emit dangerous pollution.333 Therefore, EPA establishes standards
for the entire class of vehicles, based upon its consideration of all available technologies. Once
EPA promulgates the emission standards, it is incumbent upon manufacturers to determine
which technology or mix of technologies, whether they be add-on devices or complete systems,
to use to meet the standards for their individual fleets. Accordingly, and consistent with the text
of section 202(a), EPA has authority to set standards for an entire class of motor vehicles—and
must have this authority—irrespective of how manufacturers ultimately comply. It would be
absurd for EPA to set standards for a class of motor vehicles only for EPA to lose its authority to
regulate those very same vehicles based on how manufacturers ultimately choose to comply after
EPA has issued its standards. And it is only after EPA issues standards, and manufacturers begin
to produce cars to meet those standards that the Agency can know with certainty what
technologies manufacturers are using to meet the standards; accordingly, it is only after the
manufacturers have applied those technologies to vehicles in actual production that the pollution
is prevented or controlled.
Section 202(e)
One commenter points to section 202(e) as support for their view that BEVs should not be
treated as part of the same class as other vehicles, and argues that any new propulsion system
must be evaluated by the Administrator under section 202(e) before being certified. However,
that provision is mostly notable for the specific circumstances under which it applies and is
entirely permissive as an optional additional source of authority for the Administrator regarding
certification.
333 As noted above, manufacturers in some cases choose to offer different models of the same vehicle with different
levels of electrification. And it is the manufacturer who decides whether a given vehicle will be manufactured to
produce no emissions, low emissions, or higher emissions controlled by add-on technology.
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Section 202(e) clarifies that if a vehicle or engine with a novel power source or propulsion
system would meet currently applicable emissions requirements but would emit air pollutants
which the Administrator judges are harmful but for which EPA has not yet established standards,
the Administrator may postpone certifying the vehicle for sale (notwithstanding the fact that the
vehicle nominally meets the currently applicable emissions standards) until standards to address
the novel pollutants are issued.
For example, in 1975 an inventor sought, and in 1977 was issued, a US Patent (No.
4,006,595) for a "refrigerant-powered engine."334 In explaining the need for such an engine, the
patent states, "[pjerhaps the most serious problem facing this generation is the creation of air
pollution as a result of the by-products of the automobile internal combustion engine," and thus
there "exists a need for a practical alternative to the internal combustion engine."335 The engine
in question would use Freon vapor to drive a turbine (the Freon would then be collected in a
sealed system and reused).
Were an automaker to develop such an engine today (using Freon or a chemical with similar
characteristics), it would appear that no standards would apply to leaks of the chemical from the
powertrain of the vehicle. In the absence of section 202(e), the Administrator might be required
to issue a certificate of conformity allowing the vehicles to be sold, even if the leaks of the
chemical were expected to have serious, long-lasting adverse impacts on the environment.
Section 202(e) authorizes the Administrator to delay issuing certificates to such vehicles until
appropriate standards can be established to protect public health and the environment.
Thus, this provision simply confirms the breadth of EPA's authority to regulate any self-
propelled vehicles—regardless of their form of propulsion (be it internal combustion, external
combustion, electric, or a technology unknown to Congress in 1970 or to the agency today).
Notably the provision has no potential application where a vehicle does not emit novel air
pollutants (i.e., those for which an endangerment finding has not been made), and the provision
certainly does not limit EPA to classifying vehicles according to their fuel or method of
propulsion. As a discretionary power regarding certification, the provision also does not limit
EPA's standard-setting authority in any way.
Coordination with NHTSA
Some commenters suggest that EPA is bound by the terms of EPCA, either implicitly or
because EPA is required to coordinate its standards with NHTSA's fuel economy standards.
Similarly, some commenters suggest that EPA decided not to undertake a joint rulemaking with
NHTSA in order to avoid legal constraints on its standard-setting that would otherwise have
applied.
EPA disagrees with the view that it is required to engage in joint rulemaking with NHTSA,
that its legal authority with respect to establishing section 202 standards changes in any way if it
does not engage in joint rulemaking with NHTSA, or that EPCA in any way constrains the scope
of EPA's authority to set standards under section 202.
334 The patent also discloses a prior patent, filed in 1973, which likewise uses Freon in a piston-reciprocating engine.
335 Id. at 7
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EPA issued its earliest light duty GHG rules jointly with the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. However, from the beginning the two agencies have recognized their standards
have different statutory mandates and that each agency must set its standards according to its
respective statute, which has always resulted in the agencies' standards being varied in certain
ways. In the very first joint LD GHG rule, EPA and NHTSA explained at length the distinct
statutory authority of each agency and the areas in which they were similar and in which they
were different, and the ways in which the agencies would coordinate their standard-setting and
the ways in which the standards would diverge.336 EPA thus has never viewed joint rulemaking
as altering the scope of its authority. As discussed in Section III of the preamble and in Chapter
26 of the RTC, EPA has continued to coordinate closely with NHTSA in setting GHG standards
even when not proceeding through joint rulemaking, and EPA has continued that practice for this
rule, closely coordinating with NHTSA on a full range of issues related to feasibility, modeling,
and stringency.
EPA continues to believe that EPA and NHTSA can and should each implement their
respective statutory authorities while avoiding inconsistency. However, EPA does not believe
that to avoid inconsistency EPA must, or can, ignore technological developments that enable
significant advances toward necessary pollution reductions. As the Supreme Court made clear,
"EPA has been charged with protecting the public's 'health' and 'welfare,'"337 a statutory
obligation wholly independent of DOT's mandate to promote energy efficiency."338 Congress
specified for NHTSA how to consider alternative fueled vehicles for purposes of calculating fuel
economy, and Congress directed EPA to be forward-looking in assessing all available
technologies when assessing feasibility of emissions reductions. These two mandates may result
in somewhat different treatment of BEVs for purposes of assessing the feasibility of standards,
but that does not indicate that either approach is inconsistent with the relevant statute, or that the
ultimate standards will necessarily be inconsistent with each other. As the Supreme Court has
already held, these statutes are complementary and do not displace one another.339 EPA further
discusses the lack of relevance of EPCA for interpreting section 202 in the Section 2.3 of the
RTC concerning major questions.
Needfor standards to adequately protect public health and welfare
Several commenters stated that the purpose of CAA section 202 is to reduce threats to public
health and welfare. They supported standards more stringent than the final standards, with some
commenters supporting zero emissions standards (i.e., standards of 0 g/mile). One commenter
suggested that EPA was required under CAA 202(b)(1)(C) to undertake an analysis to determine
what emission standards are needed to protect public health and welfare, including the NOx and
PM standards that are needed to attain the ozone and PM2.5 NAAQS in all nonattainment areas,
and then to establish standards on that basis. An association of state agencies commented that
stringent emissions standards are needed to ensure state and local air agencies can meet their
statutory obligations to timely attain and maintain NAAQS. Other commenters pointed to the
336 See 74 FR at 49460-67.
337 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
338 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532.
339 See id.
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standard-setting provisions of CAA section 202(a)(3), which apply to criteria pollutant standards
for heavy duty vehicles.
As discussed in Section III and elsewhere in the preamble, EPA agrees with commenters that
the purpose of the Clean Air Act is to reduce emissions of air pollutants that have been
determined to contribute to dangerous air pollution, and Congress expected and directed that
EPA would consider a full range of available technologies (not only internal combustion engine
technologies) in carrying out that statutory purpose. As further discussed in the preamble, EPA
agrees that section 202(a)(3)(A), which applies to certain standards adopted in this rule, is
intended to achieve the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable, subject to EPA's
consideration of certain factors, although section 202(a)(l)-(2) (which applies to light duty
standards and HD GHG standards) provides more discretion to EPA whether to adopt technology
forcing standards or not. EPA agrees with commenters who pointed out that federal mobile
source standards are critically necessary to reduce harmful air pollution and in particular to assist
states to come into attainment with the NAAQS. EPA is promulgating standards to achieve
significant reductions in criteria pollution, as well as GHG. For the reasons stated in Section V of
the preamble, EPA finds that the standards in this rule are consistent with section 202(a)
(including, where applicable, section 202(a)(3)). These topics are further addressed in Section II
of the preamble, Chapter 6 of the RIA, and Section 11 of the RTC.
Some commenters supported standards even more stringent than the proposed (or final)
standards, including "zero emission standards." Some commenters suggested that standards
should be set by determining what reductions are necessary to attain the NAAQS or achieve
other public health goals. EPA finds, for the reasons explained in Section V of the preamble, that
more stringent standards would not be appropriate under section 202(a). In particular, EPA finds
that zero emissions standards would not be feasible or appropriate for these model years, taking
into consideration cost and lead time. Although EPA recognizes that emissions reductions are the
primary focus and purpose of section 202, and has adopted standards to achieve significant
reductions in emissions, EPA disagrees that standards must be set by first identifying a specific
amount of reductions needed, such as NOx reductions needed to attain the NAAQS, and then
setting the standards to achieve those reductions. Section 202(a) directs EPA to achieve
reductions in air pollutants, but does not suggest that the level of the standard must be tied to
achieving a particular amount of reductions. Rather, section 202(a) is focused on technological
feasibility, including cost. This approach enables EPA to achieve significant reductions which
are critical to achieving public health goals, including attainment of the NAAQS, but there is
nothing in section 202(a) that directs EPA to set standards based on achieving a specific quantity
of emissions reductions, and EPA disagrees that such an approach is required under section
202(a).
EPA recognizes that some commenters read the text of section 202(b)(1)(C) as applying to
these standards and as requiring such an analysis of what standards are necessary to prevent
endangerment of public health and welfare, but EPA disagrees. First, section 202(b)(1)(C) has no
relevance to GHG standards or to medium duty vehicles, as section 202(b) does not specify any
such standards for EPA to promulgate. Second, EPA disagrees that the light duty criteria
pollutant standards promulgated in this rulemaking are revising standards prescribed under or
previously revised under section 202(b).
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Third, even hypothetically assuming section 202(b) was intended to displace section 202(a)
for all rulemakings going forward as the statutory criteria for light duty criteria pollutant
standards, EPA further disagrees that it has not satisfied this requirement. EPA does not read the
clause "as needed to protect public health or welfare, taking costs, energy and safety into
account" to require that EPA conduct an analysis of what mobile source standards would result
in nationwide attainment of the NAAQS, or some more nebulous goal, before adopting
standards. Certainly, EPA has considered the public health and welfare implications of these
pollutants and the need for additional mobile source controls, as discussed at length in Section II
of the preamble. As discussed in Section V of the preamble, EPA is setting standards that it
views as appropriate in light of the critical need for further pollutant reductions, but also taking
into consideration costs, as well as energy, safety, and other factors. For those vehicles over
6,000 lbs, EPA has expressly found that the standards being adopted reflect the greatest degree
of emissions reduction achievable through the application of available technology, giving
appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety. In this way, EPA, by considering both the
need for additional emission reductions and cost, feasibility, and additional factors including
energy and safety, is adopting standards "as needed to protect public health and safety, taking
costs, energy and safety into account." EPA does not find a separate analysis of what standards
would be necessary to achieve attainment of the NAAQS across the country to be required or
appropriate under section 202(b)(1)(C).
Had Congress wanted that result, it could have said so. Cf., e.g., CAA 110(a)(2)(C) (requiring
certain measures "as necessary to assure that national ambient air quality standards are
achieved"), 202(i)(2)(A) (requiring the Administrator to "examine the need for further reductions
in emissions in order to attain or maintain the national ambient air quality standards"), 213(a)(2)
(requiring a study of nonroad engine contribution to nonattainment of national ambient air
quality standards for ozone or carbon monoxide). Instead, Congress in section 202(b)(1)(C)
simply said that "[a]ny revised standard shall require a reduction of emissions from the standard
that was previously applicable." It would be strange to read the modest phrase "as needed to
protect public health or welfare" coupled with an anti-backsliding provision to mean a newfound
mandate to achieve the NAAQS. Further while light duty vehicles are significant sources of
pollution, other mobile and stationary sources are also very significant sources for these
pollutants. Thus, it is doubtful that it would even be possible to ensure attainment of the NAAQS
solely through light duty standards. Moreover, it is evident from the extensive statutory
provisions in title I, part D of the Clean Air Act that attainment of the NAAQS was never
intended to be achieved solely by mobile sources (much less solely light duty vehicles). It would
be unreasonable to read the requirement for EPA to consider the "need" for protecting public
health and welfare as requiring an analysis of what light duty standards would result in
attainment of the NAAQS. To the extent this provision applies to this rulemaking, EPA's
decision to set standards taking into account the critical need for further emissions reductions to
protect public health and welfare but also considering cost, energy, and safety, is consistent with
the provision.
Nondelegation
The Pacific Legal Foundation comments that "if Congress gave EPA the unfettered discretion
to alter the automobile market—with no limiting principle on its power to do so—then the Clean
Air Act violates the Constitution's nondelegation doctrine." They assert that under the EPA's
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assertion of authority in this rule, "the Clean Air Act is essentially a blank check under which the
President and EPA may fill in their preferred policy, and Congress will have effectively enacted
a law that is 'nothing except a raw delegation to enact rules.'"
Contrary to Pacific Legal Foundation's comment, the Clean Air Act, and this rule's
promulgation thereunder, is sound under the nondelegation doctrine. "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . ,"340 As reaffirmed in
Gundy v. United States, the Supreme Court held "that a statutory delegation is constitutional as
long as Congress 'lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform.'"341 Justice
Rehnquist described the doctrine further:
First, and most abstractly, it ensures to the extent consistent with orderly
governmental administration that important choices of social policy are made by
Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will. See
Arizona v. California 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part);
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
Second, the doctrine guarantees that, to the extent Congress finds it necessary to
delegate authority, it provides the recipient of that authority with an "intelligible
principle" to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion. See J. W. Hampton &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935). Third, and derivative of the second, the doctrine
ensures that courts charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative
discretion will be able to test that exercise against ascertainable standards. See
Arizona, 373 U.S. at 626 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part); American Power & Light
Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 106 (1946).342
In considering nondelegation, the Court looks to both the statutory context of the provisions,343
and the "statutory purpose."344
The scope of congressional delegation need not be precise to be effective. As of early 2001,
"[i]n the history of the Court we have found the requisite 'intelligible principle' lacking in only
two statutes, one of which provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the
other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise
a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring 'fair competition.'"345 The Court has
340 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1.
341 588 U.S. , 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)
(internal citation omitted)).
342 Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (cleaned up).
343 See Utility Air Regulatory Gp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014) ("| Reasonable statutory interpretation must
account for both the specific context in which. . . language is used and the broader context of the statute as a whole"
(internal quotation marks omitted).
344 Gundy, 588 U.S. at , 139 S. Ct. at 2,126 (quoting Nat 7 Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 216; Am. Power &
Light, 329 U.S. at 104 (stating that the delegation at issue "derive[d] much meaningful content from the purpose of
the Act, its factual background and the statutory context").
345 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass 'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (citing Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
(1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
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upheld as providing sufficient guidance statutes authorizing the War Department
to recover "excessive profits" earned on military contracts, see Lichter v. United
States, 334 U.S. 742, 778-86 (1948); authorizing the Price Administrator to fix
"fair and equitable" commodities prices, see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,
426-27 (1948); and authorizing the Federal Communications Commission to
regulate broadcast licensing in the "public interest," see National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).346
The Court has "almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible
degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law."347
As noted throughout the preamble and other sections of this rule regarding statutory authority,
Congress clearly and intelligibly established EPA's mandate in the Clean Air Act with respect to
air pollution from motor vehicles. The statute provides that "[t]he Administrator shall by
regulation (and from time to time revise) . . . standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in
his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare."348 Further, the statute requires that "[a]ny regulation
prescribed under paragraph (1) of this subsection (and any revision thereof) shall take effect after
such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of
the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such
period."349 As we further explain in our response to major questions doctrine comments,
Congress made the major policy decision here to control air pollution from motor vehicles, while
delegating to the Administrator interstitial technical and policy judgments to achieve that goal.
The statute lays down intelligible principles, and indeed numerous statutory criteria and
constraints on EPA's discretion. These include, but are not limited to, (1) any standards must be
premised on an endangerment finding—that some "air pollutant from any class or classes of new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines . . . cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare"; (2) the standards must be
developed through an approach based on available "technology"; (3) the standards must provide
for sufficient lead-time "to permit the development and application" of such technology; and (4)
the standards give "appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period."
Advanced Clean Cars II
Some commenters state that this rule cannot be based on California's ACC II program, as that
program does not have a waiver, and suggest that the standards do rely on them.
EPA agrees that it has not issued a preemption waiver for the ACC II standards and without
such waiver California and other states cannot enforce the ACC II program. However, this rule is
independent from California's ACC II standards and EPA's feasibility analysis does not depend
on the implementation of ACC II. EPA's authority to promulgate rules is independent from
346 Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1991) (holding the Controlled Substances Act clause requiring
"imminent hazard to the public safety" to be an intelligible principle, even in the higher-specificity criminal
context).
347 Misretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see id. at 373 (majority opinion).
348 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
349 CAA section 202(a)(2).
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California's; this rule is being promulgated in accordance with that independent authority. EPA
has conducted a sensitivity analysis ("state level ZEV policies") to explore the potential impact
implementation of ACC II in California and section 177 states might have. That analysis
indicates that the costs of the standards would be less, compared to the No Action baseline, if
ACC II were implemented than if it was not. However, EPA finds that the cost estimates of its
central analysis (i.e., without ACC II) are reasonable and is not relying on the results of this
sensitivity analysis to justify adoption of these standards. It is true that EPA pointed to the
adoption of ACC II as an example of international and state trends towards encouraging further
sales of PEVs, but this was illustrative of international market trends in the marketplace and the
standards adopted in this rule do not depend on ACC II being implemented, or indeed on further
international regulatory developments. ACC II has been fully adopted by California and although
it may not be enforced until a waiver is granted, the very fact it has been adopted, and that other
states have adopted the standards, is relevant information for automakers and in turn for EPA.
Past experience has suggested that manufacturers may choose to consider in their product
planning the adoption by California of new standards, even in the absence of a waiver. Similarly,
EPA has taken certain ACC II standards into account in its planning, judging that EPA's
standards are appropriate and will only become more appropriate if a waiver is granted. Thus,
EPA is not relying on the waiver for ACC II being granted in the future, we are simply taking
into consideration in a limited way the fact that ACC II has been adopted. EPA finds that this is
entirely reasonable and consistent with the current status of ACC II (as adopted but lacking a
waiver). EPA has judged the standards to be feasible and appropriate based on its assessment of
the state of technology, lead-time, costs, and other relevant factors. To the extent that EPA
considers ACC II in its impact analysis, such consideration does not contribute to the rule itself,
only to the expected impact of this rule compared to various baselines, one of which is the
potential impact of ACC II on the light-duty vehicle market.
Significance of Congressional enactment of IRA and BIL
Commenters disagree on the significance of Congressional action in the IRA and BIL for
EPA's legal authority, with some commenters stating that these statutes do not add to EPA's
regulatory authority, and other commenters stating that these statutes reinforce EPA's authority
and confirm Congress's commitment to reducing motor vehicle emissions through
electrification. Similarly, some commenters point to the fact that legislation passed under
Congressional budget reconciliation rules must be related to spending, revenue, or the federal
debt limit, as evidence that the legislation did not increase EPA's authority, while other
commenters point to the fact that Congress only incentivized BEVs in the legislation and did not
mandate them as evidence that EPA lacks authority to consider EVs in standard-setting under
section 202(a).
EPA agrees with those commenters who state that the IRA and BIL reinforce EPA's authority.
Although the BIL and IRA are not necessary to find that the statute plainly authorizes the final
rule, they confirm and extend Congress's longstanding interest (which, as discussed in Section
III of the preamble and elsewhere in this RTC, dates back to the 1960s) in encouraging the
development and deployment of BEVs. EPA acknowledges that the IRA and BIL are not what
gives EPA authority to include consideration of electrification technologies in standard-setting,
but finds that this legislation, which is consistent with the long history of congressional support
for cleaner alternative-fueled vehicles, provides further support for the conclusion that the
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Congresses that enacted and amended section 202(a)(1) gave EPA the authority to take into
consideration the emissions performance of BEVs when setting standards for motor vehicles.
Likewise, EPA does not find that it would be appropriate to infer from the massive incentives
of this legislation that Congress wanted EPA to change course and stop taking into consideration
the emissions performance of BEVs in setting standards. This rulemaking does not constitute an
EV mandate, so the fact that Congress likewise did not adopt an EV mandate provides no basis
for suggesting that this rulemaking is beyond the scope of EPA's authority. In fact, since EPA's
2021 rule was adopted shortly after the BIL but shortly before the IRA, Congress can be
presumed to have acted in the IRA with knowledge of EPA's approach to regulating motor
vehicles for GHG emissions. The fact that Congress increased incentives for EVs and provided
funding for states to adopt GHG standards, rather than objecting to EPA's approach, confirms
that the purpose of this legislation was not to displace EPA's authority (or to correct EPA's
views of its authority) but to support EPA's authority to set standards based on BEV emissions
performance—to "combine[] new economic incentives to reduce climate pollution with bolstered
regulatory drivers that will allow EPA to drive further reduction under its CAA authorities."350
We further address this issue in Section 2.3 of the response to comments regarding the major
questions doctrine.
Other constitutional claims
Valero comments that the proposed rule may violate the Takings Clause of the Constitution
and, to the extent that the rule relies on any state's ZEV mandate, a number of other
Constitutional provisions: the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Import-Export Clause, the
Privilege and Immunities Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Our Children's Trust comments that "[ujnder the Public Trust Doctrine . . . U.S. residents . . .
have a right to access and use crucial natural resources, like air and water," and the government
has "fiduciary duties as trustees to manage, protect, and prevent substantial impairment to our
country's vital natural resources which the government holds in trust for present and future
generations." They state that as such, the EPA has a duty to use its authority to protect "a climate
system that sustains human life and liberty."
EPA disagrees with Valero that the Takings Clause applies here. The Takings Clause of the
U.S. Constitution states that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation."351 The purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent "Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole."352 The protections of the Takings Clause apply to real property,353
personal property,354 and intangible property.355
350 1 68 Cong. Rec. E868-02 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 2022) (statement of Rep. Pallone discussing the IRA); see also 168
Cong. Rec. at 880-02 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 2022) (statement of Rep. Pallone).
351 U.S. Const, amend. V.
352 Perm Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
353 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
354 See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
355 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
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Regulatory takings are treated more narrowly. A compensable taking can occur by
government regulations that unduly burden private property interests.356 However, "[t]he mere
regulation of the use of property, even if it results in the diminution of its value and profitability
does not constitute a taking within the meaning of the fifth amendment."357 In considering
whether a regulation constitutes a taking of private property, '"the aggregate must be viewed in
its entirety'" such that "for example, a regulation that prohibited commercial transactions in
eagle feathers, but did not bar other uses or impose any physical invasion or restraint upon them,
was not a taking."358
We do not believe the rule takes the property of any entity, let alone does it take the entirety
of any industry. The rule sets feasible emission standards, allowing industry to comply by the
means of its choosing. EPA's modeling of various pathways of compliance does not direct any
certain path, and even shows that no particular industry need be ceased to comply. To the extent
that a court could find a taking here, it cannot be viewed as barring all economic uses of such
property. This is true for all industries affected by this rule, from vehicle manufactures to fuels
and beyond.
Further, the injury that the commenter, who represents fuels interests, complains of is no more
than derivative economic injury not recognized by the courts as a takings violation. A takings
claimant must, at minimum, assert that its property interest was actually taken by the government
action.359 But where, as here, the regulation's indirect impact to the claimant flows only through
its impact to another, the claimant lacks a cognizable property interest.360 The rule addresses
emissions from motor vehicles, without directing the means of reduction. Although the affected
vehicles may decrease fossil fuel demand, that impact is secondary to the emissions controls
required in the vehicles themselves. As such, the commenter's warning of a takings violation
through the rule's perceived economic impact to fossil fuel demand is misplaced.
As for the remaining constitutional principles cited by the commenter relating to state ZEV
mandates, EPA disagrees that any such principles apply. As noted in the response on ACC II,
EPA is not basing its standards on any assumptions that ACC II will be implemented. This action
is a final rule issued by the federal EPA, not an action issued by any State government. While
EPA has carefully considered and addressed comments on how the agency should account for
state ZEV mandates in assessing factors like technology availability and costs, comments on the
constitutionality of those state ZEV mandates are beyond the scope of this rulemaking.
With respect to comments raising Public Trust legal theories, the Agency does not dispute that
climate change poses a serious threat, nor that addressing climate change requires the active
356 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
357 Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 715 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981).
358 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 328 (2002) (quoting
Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987)
(holding that a requirement that coal pillars be left in place to prevent mine subsidence was not a regulatory taking).
359 See United States v. Gen. Motors Corps., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945); see also Yuba Nat. Res., Inc. v. United
States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that "the measure of just compensation is the fair value of
what was taken, and not the consequential damages the owner suffers as a result of the taking"); Klein v. United
States, 375 F.2d 825, 829 (1967) (holding that "compensation under the Fifth Amendment may be recovered only
for property taken and not for incidental or consequential losses, the rationale being that the sovereign need only pay
for what it actually takes rather than for all that the owner has lost.").
360 Air Pegasus ofD.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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involvement of the federal government. Commenters espouse novel Constitutional and Public
Trust legal theories not relevant to this rulemaking and cite Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d.
1159 (9th Cir.), Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1254 (D. Or. 2016) and Held v.
Montana, No. CDV-2020-307 (1st Dist. Ct. Mont., 2023). The Agency notes that the referenced
district court decision in Juliana was overruled for lack of jurisdiction, and further notes that the
referenced 9th Circuit decision did not reach the merits of the Constitutional and public trust
theories at issue in that case. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020), reh'g
en banc denied, 986 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir. 2021). Further, Held v. Montana (currently subject to
appeal) is a case decided by a Montana state court judge interpreting Montana's constitution.
Role of cost/benefit analyses
One commenter suggests that the standards are arbitrary and capricious because EPA gave
insufficient weight to the results of the benefit-cost analysis.
To be clear, as documented in Section VIII of the preamble (and in the RIA), EPA did assess
the costs and benefits of the final standards. As explained in Sections III and V, when section
202(a) requires EPA to consider "the cost of compliance," it is referring to costs to automobile
manufacturers, not total social costs. However, EPA considered both costs to manufacturers and
total social costs before adopting the standards. The Administrator identified the standards that
he finds appropriate taking into account emissions reductions, costs to manufacturers, feasibility,
and other required and discretionary factors. The fact that the estimated benefits exceed the
estimated costs of the program reinforces our view that the standards are appropriate under
section 202(a). However, as noted in the preamble, EPA did not rely on benefit-cost analysis to
identify the appropriate standards. That is, EPA did not seek to select standards that would
maximize net benefits as calculated by the benefit-cost analysis. Based on the RIA and the range
of scenarios we evaluated, we anticipate such an approach would have required significantly
more stringent standards, which would, in EPA's judgment, be inconsistent with the requirement
to give appropriate consideration to costs of compliance and lead time.361 EPA finds that our
approach, of placing weight on judging the appropriate level of emissions reduction in light of
the costs of compliance and lead time, while still evaluating and considering total social costs
and benefits, is consistent with both the Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S.
743 (2015) and with section 202 of the CAA.
Limiting global temperature increases
A commenter alleged that the rule is directed at the goal of limiting global temperature
increase to 2 degrees Celsius. EPA disagrees. The final rule is not predicated on any global
temperature-specific metric. EPA is acting consistent with our CAA statutory authority and the
applicable statutory factors in CAA section 202(a) to limit emissions from motor vehicles which
contribute to air pollution that endangers public health and welfare.
361 The benefit-cost analyses for this rulemaking suggest that, at least across the range being considered, more
stringent standards have higher net benefits than less stringent standards.
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3 - GHG Standards
3.1 - Program design and structure
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Consumers (AFC)
Indeed, the path to compliance that EPA chose to highlight features nearly 70% of the
passenger car market shifting to battery electric vehicles (and 40% or so of medium duty vans
and pickup trucks). See EPA Fact Sheet, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years
2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles," Apr. 2023, at 5. This despite only
about 1% of the current cars on the road being electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0534, pp. 1-2]
The current EPA proposal is an unlawful EV mandate masquerading as a tailpipe regulation.
That is the only conclusion that a disinterested observer or everyday consumer could reach,
given how the proposal was promulgated, the limits that have been proposed, and the
commentary surrounding its release. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, pp. 1-2]
While an extreme EV mandate might be popular in progressive enclaves, and with federal
employees who live in Washington, D.C., a rapid shift to electric vehicles along the lines
proposed by EPA here will make lives worse for everyday consumers while costing them more
for the privilege of having their lives inconvenienced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, pp. 1-2]
Early indications from places like California back up this conclusion and provide warning
signs that were not properly addressed by EPA in the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0534, pp. 1-2]
Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
ACEEE commends EPA for proposing several positive changes to the standards. We support
the phase-out of off-cycle credits, limiting A/C credits to internal combustion engine vehicles
(ICEVs), eliminating the advanced vehicle multiplier incentives, and lowering the cut-points in
the light truck curves. Many of these credits and incentives provide automakers with loopholes
for meeting their fleetwide targets and have the potential to weaken the proposed standards. By
limiting the off-cycle and A/C credits to vehicles with internal combustion engines, EPA is
rightly avoiding over-crediting battery electric vehicles (BEVs) for compliance. Use of these
credits by BEVs would result in negative emissions for these vehicles, which distorts their real-
world GHG impact. Lowering the cut-points on the light truck curve, or the point at which the
emissions level flatlines as footprint increases, from 74 sq-ft to 70 sq-ft ,over the life of the
standards is a welcome change that will limit further upsizing in the pick-up truck market. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 2-3]
Organization: BMW of North America, LLC (BMW NA)
BMW NA strongly believes that hydrogen technology will play a key role on the path to
climate neutrality across all industries and has great potential, particularly for individual
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mobility. The pilot series of the BMW iX5 Hydrogen, which is currently being presented to the
public during various events all around the globe, highlights the possibilities of hydrogen
technology in this context. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 3]
BMW NA would like to encourage EPA to extend the regulatory guidance for FCEVs by the
means of incorporating an official test procedure (e.g., incorporation of SAE J2572). We believe
that this will benefit the automotive industry to better evaluate the technology's potential
compared to BEV and quantify its contribution to the overall electrification goals. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 3]
In general, we support that no changes have been proposed to the basic structure of the
regulation (separate PC and LT fleet, footprint base, averaging, banking and trading possibility).
We also support the treatment of EV with Og/mile in the CREE fleet. Upstream emissions should
not be part of a vehicle-based regulation but being treated by specific and targeted regulation
regarding the emission sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 3]
3. Extend the proposed rule to 2035, resulting in the equivalent of 100% ZEV sales by
2035, consistent with ACC II.
4. Lock in a rapid transition to a zero-carbon transportation system, while sending a
clear market signal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 6]
Organization: BorgWarner Inc.
To meet EPA's forecast for BEV penetration levels, there is little room for supply chain or
production delays. Any setback could negatively impact the availability or purchase of new
BEVs. EPA can reduce these risks to manufacturers by incentivizing vehicles with longer ranges
and adjusting multipliers as better BEVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) are
introduced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 3-4]
BorgWarner supports the proposed adjustments to compliance credits. BorgWarner agrees
with EPA's proposed changes to the current compliance credits offered for BEVs, PHEVs and
fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs). Credits can serve as a valuable tool to incentivize the
development of new vehicle technologies and should be used to create new technology
pathways. Once these technologies are clearly established, EPA should eliminate these credits.
Offering credits once a technology is established could potentially disincentivize new
innovations in efficiency-and performance-improving vehicle technologies.
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB)
Greenhouse Gas Standards
U.S. EPA is proposing more stringent GHG emission standards for the 2027 through 2032
MYs, along with several modifications to the existing GHG program. Generally, CARB supports
U.S. EPA's proposal, but offers several recommendations to further strengthen the proposed
standards to achieve the greatest degree of emission reductions available, considering costs and
technology readiness, to further protect public health and combat climate change. As described
in detail below, CARB recommends that U.S. EPA adopt more stringent light-duty GHG
emission standards; include provisions to ensure manufacturers do not allow emissions to
increase from conventional vehicles and instead continue to apply all available cost-effective
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emission control technologies; estimate real-world PHEV emissions based on the best available
data and collect additional data to inform future updates; and update elements of the
comprehensive regulatory program, including retiring elements of the off-cycle and air
conditioning credits programs as proposed, establishing explicit requirements to eliminate leaks
from air conditioning systems, eliminating credit multipliers for medium-duty ZEVs as
proposed, and requiring small-volume manufacturers to comply with the proposed standards as
proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 12]
Medium-Duty Vehicle GHG Standards
In addition to the proposed light-duty standards, U.S. EPA is also proposing to tighten GHG
fleet average standards for medium-duty vehicles along with other program modifications.
CARB supports U.S. EPA's decision to better delineate the medium-duty vehicle class from
heavy-duty vehicles to enable application of the most rigorous and appropriate GHG emission
standards and procedures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 16]
CARB supports the proposed medium-duty vehicle GHG fleet average standards and has
recently adopted several regulations that are driving emission reductions for this market segment.
Adopted in June 2020, the Advanced Clean Trucks (ACT) regulation establishes requirements
for manufacturers to sell zero-emission medium- and heavy-duty trucks. This regulation was
followed in April 2023 by the Advanced Clean Fleets (ACF) regulation that further drives fleet
purchases and turnover to ZEVs and requires that 100 percent of sales of vehicles above 8,500
lbs. gross vehicle weight rating be zero-emission beginning in 2036. Together, these regulations
will dramatically increase penetration of ZEVs in the medium- and heavy-duty sectors. CARB
has also previously adopted GHG fleet average standards largely aligned with U.S. EPA's Phase
2 heavy-duty GHG regulations for the 2021 through 2027 MYs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0780, p. 16]
Conclusion
Reducing GHG emissions from motor vehicles is imperative to combat climate change and
protect public health. Given the ZEV market trends, manufacturer commitments, and emission
reduction opportunities associated with retaining cost-effective technologies on conventional
vehicles, CARB finds that U.S. EPA could establish a more stringent light-duty GHG fleet
average standard than it has proposed. CARB recommends that U.S. EPA adopt the most
stringent standard feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 16]
The U.S. has no choice but to take bold action to dramatically reduce GHG emissions across
the economy. Motor vehicles are a key GHG emissions source, and U.S. EPA's proposal
represents an absolutely critical step towards reducing transportation emissions and stabilizing
the climate. However, there are opportunities to do more, particularly protecting or insuring
against conventional vehicles increasing their GHG emissions. Motor vehicles also continue to
contribute to poor air quality for millions of people across the country. The public health benefits
from the suite of proposed standards will reduce healthcare costs and improve quality of life.
These benefits are especially important for our country's most vulnerable residents, many of
whom face disproportionate exposure to air pollution and are the first to suffer the effects of
climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 67]
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CARB finds that a more stringent set of standards, and thus certainly the proposed standards
as well, are technically feasible and cost-effective and recommends that U.S. EPA incorporate
CARB's recommendations and adopt the most stringent standards feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, p. 67]
Organization: Competitive Enterprise Institute
I. The Proposed Standards Are Electric Vehicle Mandates
The EPA protests that, unlike California's motor vehicle program, which officially bans the
sale of gasoline-powered cars by 2035,2 "the GHG program in this proposal is performance-
based and not a ZEV mandate."3 In fact, like the California program, the EPA program compels
automakers to manufacture and sell increasing percentages of ZEVs, only at a slower pace. It
does this by establishing fleet-average GHG emission standards that automakers can meet only
by phasing out gasoline-powered vehicles. The EPA's program is not a bare-naked EV mandate,
but almost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 2-4]
2 California Air Resources Board, "California moves to accelerate to 100% new zero-emission vehicle
sales by 2035, Press Release, August 25, 2022, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-
100-new-zero- emission-vehicle-sales-2035. The release explains: "The rule establishes a year-by-year
roadmap so that by 2035 100% of new cars and light trucks sold in California will be zero-emission
vehicles, including plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. The regulation realizes and codifies the light-duty
vehicle goals set out in Governor Newsom's Executive Order N-79-20. [Link:
https://www.gov.ca.gOv/2020/09/23/governor-newsom-announces-california-will-phase-out-gasoline-
powered-cars-drastically-reduce-demand-for-fossil-fuel-in-californias-fight-against-climate-change/]"
3 88 FR 29255.
The evidence is palpable. According to the EPA, in 2022, EVs accounted for 5.8 percent of
new light-duty passenger vehicle sales. 4Under the policy baseline established by the EPA's MY
2023-2026 GHG emission standards, EV market share in 2032 is projected to reach 39 percent.5
Under the proposed standards, EV market share in 2032 is projected to reach 67 percent6—two-
thirds of all new light-duty vehicles sold. The California Air Resources Board may be in the fast
lane, but the EPA is driving down the same regulatory freeway and with no plan to stop before
the final destination. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 2-4]
4 88 FR 29189.
5 88 FR 29296.
6 88 FR 29329.
Here's an easy way to visualize the substance of the EPA's proposal. The Toyota Prius is the
most popular hybrid car. In terms of fuel efficiency and GHG emissions, the Prius is the best-in-
class gasoline-powered car on the market.7 Could Toyota comply with the EPA's proposed
standards in 2032 if all its light-duty vehicles were hybrids matching today's Prius in fuel
economy and GHG emissions per mile? No, far from it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 2-
4]
7 TrueCar, Hybrids with Best Gas Mileage, https://www.truecar.com/best-cars-trucks/fuel-hybrid/by-gas-
mileage/ (accessed June 27, 2023).
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The EPA's GHG standards are calibrated in grams per mile (g/mi) of carbon dioxide (C02).
According to the EPA, "for passenger cars, the proposed MY 2032 standards are projected to
result in C02 fleet-average levels of 73 g/mi in MY 2032, which is 52 percent lower than that of
the (adjusted) MY 2026 standards."8 The MY 2032 standard is less than half the C02 emissions
per mile of MY 2023 Toyota Prius hybrids, which range from 155 g/mi to 179 g/mi.9 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 2-4]
8 88 FR 29239.
9 Fueleconomy.gov, Accessed June 26, 2023.
[See original for graphic on the gas mileage of various cars] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0611, pp. 2-4]
To comply with the proposed standards, the fleet-average C02 emissions of Toyota passenger
cars in MY 2032 will have to be 52 to 60 percent lower than that of an MY 2023 Prius. To reach
those targets, Toyota will have to rapidly increase the percentage of ZEVs it sells—and rapidly
reduce the percentage of hybrids it sells. Toyota will have to do so regardless of whether most
consumers can afford or want to buy ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 2-4]
Even the EPA's previous (December 2021) rule establishing tailpipe GHG standards for MY
2023-2026 motor vehicles is functionally a ZEV mandate, although less ambitious, and therefore
less conspicuous. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 2-4]
Organization: Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA)
As a practical, real-world policy solution, CEA, therefore, encourages the U.S. EPA to pursue
attainable, technologically neutral standards to meet consumer needs and emission reduction
targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, p. 2]
Organization: Cummins Inc.
II. General Principles
Aligned with Cummins' commitments described above, Cummins offer these principles for
consideration as EPA develops its Final Rule addressing criteria pollutant and GHG emissions
for light-duty (LD) and medium-duty vehicles (MDV): [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-
3]
A harmonized national program for criteria pollutant, GHG, and fuel efficiency standards by
EPA, the California Air Resources Board (CARB), and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) is essential to assure the greatest improvements are achieved in the
most cost-efficient manner and to provide vehicle and engine manufacturers, suppliers, and end-
users with the certainty necessary for investment in technologies to improve emissions. We urge
the agencies to work together towards a single, nationwide program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
Sufficient regulatory lead time and stability should be provided to allow manufacturers to
develop and implement the technologies needed to improve emissions and spread investments
over time to minimize cost to customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
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Standards should be performance-based and technology neutral, as opposed to standards
which mandate a specific technology, to allow manufacturers to innovate across a broad range of
technologies to meet customers' diverse needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
Standards should be fuel neutral (i.e., same stringency regardless of fuel type) to ensure the
environmental benefits of the regulation are achieved regardless of the fuel type chosen by
customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
The tradeoff between oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and carbon dioxide (C02) reductions must be
considered when setting the stringency of standards. Also, linkage of criteria pollutant and GHG
certification and compliance protocols is important so that improvement in one type of pollutant
is not achieved at the expense of the other. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
Well-to-wheels emissions should be considered in assessing technology effectiveness to
ensure alignment of the standards with the most beneficial path to zero emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
Cummins currently certifies heavy-duty (HD) pickup trucks with gross vehicle weight ratings
(GVWR) between 8,501 and 14,000 pounds, also known as Class 2b and 3 vehicles, meeting
EPA's Tier 3 criteria pollutant emissions standards and Phase 2 GHG standards. Diesel Class 2b
and 3 pickup trucks can have significant towing capability and are used in applications going
beyond personal use such as construction and agriculture, and as such, do vital work for
America. Our additional comments detailed below pertain to those vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Donn Viviani
Recommendations for changes in the rule to decrease emissions further
What can be done under this rule to extract additional reductions in GHGs? Reducing the
average weight of the fleet can address both the NEE issue and reduce carbon emissions further.
Lighter EVs extend mileage and reduce EGU emissions. Lighter IC vehicles will reduce fuel
combustion. Lighter vehicles result in less NWW PM. Perhaps more importantly, lighter vehicles
can reduce emissions in the manufacturing sector, especially important in light of the quantity
new BEVs EPA projects will penetrate the market. EPA should investigate regulatory options for
reducing fleet gross vehicle weights (GVW). One way to require lower fleet average weight and
decrease the emissions from manufacture of vehicles is to limit the embedded carbon allowed per
ton of vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0697, pp. 6-7]
Savings promoted by weight reduction are immediate and do not depend on the pace of
decarbonization of the electricity grid. The sooner the emission reductions occur the better the
chance of avoiding catastrophic non- linear feedback warming effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0697, pp. 6-7]
GHG emissions embedded in the production of vehicles is responsible for -10% of vehicle
carbon footprints. Slowly reducing down the allowable embedded carbon by class will have
several outcomes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0697, pp. 6-7]
Limiting the embedded carbon per ton would result in, e.g., more steel made with green
hydrogen, less metal and more plastic parts (already these are replacing metal) which can require
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less energy to produce, and even parts made with bio-based plastics which count as negative
carbon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0697, pp. 6-7]
Lighter vehicles burn less fuel or draw less electrical power from EGUs, all these reduce
carbon emissions. The lighter weight will produce less NEE PM as well. Weight is one driver of
road friction and resuspension of PM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0697, pp. 6-7]
Lastly, here, it is important to ensure that imports would be subject to any such embedded
carbon restrictions, as that would serve to increase pressure on overseas EGUs to transition away
from coal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0697, pp. 6-7]
Organization: Electric Drive Transportation Association (EDTA)
We recommend that the final rules integrate flexibility that recognizes the uncertainties of the
policy and market landscapes, while establishing ambitious goals for Multi-Pollutant Emissions
reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0589, p. 2]
Organization: Electrification Coalition (EC)
III. The EPA should consider additional regulatory frameworks or policies to achieve mass
adoption of EVs for MY 2032 and beyond.
The EPA specifically requests comments on whether the standards should increase in
stringency beyond MY 2032, in particular through 2035, or whether EPA should consider
additional approaches to the trajectory of any standards that were to continue increasing in
stringency beyond 2032.6 The EC applauds the EPA for prioritizing emissions reductions
through electrification. For future rulemakings, the EPA should consider policies that will further
drive electrification and prioritize clean electricity as a transportation fuel. This could be
accomplished through enabling electricity as an eligible pathway in the existing renewable fuel
standard (RFS) program or modifying the RFS into a clean fuels standard (CFS). Both an RFS
and CFS could direct a portion of the credits back to the EV industry that would then further
promote and incentivize the manufacturing of clean vehicles such as EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0588, p. 3]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
2.EPA should finalize a fuel-neutral standard and a maximum cap on the work factor.
EPA has made two significant changes to its GHG program for Class 2b-3 pickups and vans:
1) setting a fuel-neutral standard; and 2) setting a maximum cap on the work factor. As described
below, both such changes are appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 73]
208 88 Fed Reg. at 29242.
During the rulemaking process for the Phase 2 standards, numerous commenters opposed
setting separate emissions standards for diesel and gasoline engines, with Cummins, Honeywell,
Daimler, Bosch, and the Motor and Equipment Manufacturing Association all supporting a
single fuel-neutral standard.209 As noted in the sections above on gasoline- and diesel-powered
MDVs, there is a significant overlap in the available technologies to reduce emissions from
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either powertrain (e.g., variable geometry turbocharging, cylinder deactivation, hybridization).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 73]
And technological advancements since finalization of the Phase 2 standards, including the
advancement of zero-emission technologies, supports setting a single standard for the fleet that
well exceeds the Phase 2 requirements for either gasoline- or diesel-powered Class 2b-3 vehicles.
For these reasons, we support EPA setting a fuel-neutral standard for MDVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 73]
209 81 Fed. Reg. at 73738-39.
We also support EPA setting a maximum cap on the work factor. As noted in Section
VIII. A. 1.a regarding GM's latest Duramax diesel engine, manufacturers continue to prioritize
increases in power for new engines for Class 2b-3 pickups. Unfortunately, the existing work
factor structure creates no disincentive to this path, and may actually encourage manufacturers to
try to game the system by increasing tow capacity across their fleets in order to increase the
allowable emissions of their fleet, particularly since tow capacity is not captured in the emissions
certification tests. EPA's proposal to cap the work factor at least creates a limit to this behavior.
While concerns may remain about the safety and emissions impacts from manufacturers' efforts
to out-spec their competition, a cap on the work factor would limit regulatory incentives for such
behavior. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 73]
Organization: General Motors, LLC (GM)
In many cases, an EPA final rule aligned with CARB's LEV IV in internal combustion engine
criteria emission stringency and the associated test and certification procedures will help GM
achieve significant emissions reductions for internal combustion engine products as soon as MY
2027 despite limited lead time, while continuing to transition to zero-emission vehicle
technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 6]
Organization: Hyundai Motor America
The Final Rule Should Include Incentives for PEV Penetration Within Disadvantaged
Communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 8]
Hyundai appreciates EPA's specific request for comment on how to address the unique
impacts of vehicle emissions on disadvantaged communities because we believe the NPRM
simply does not go far enough. EPA acknowledges the "differential exposure levels" to criteria
pollutants experienced by these communities and notes they are "especially vulnerable to the
impacts of climate change."25 However, the NPRM simply concludes that "this action is likely
to reduce existing disproportionate and adverse effects" and "the GHG emission reductions from
this proposal would contribute to efforts to reduce the probability of severe impacts related to
climate change "26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 8]
25 88 Fed. Reg. 29184, 29407 (May 5, 2023)
26 Id.
Increasing PEV penetration within these communities to reduce emissions throughout these
neighborhoods is an untapped solution. For example, disadvantaged communities experience
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disproportionately higher exposure to emissions from higher polluting vehicles. This is due, in
part, to the high cost of replacing their older and higher-emitting vehicles with a newer, cleaner
car. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 8]
Turning over the fleet of the dirtiest cars will go a long way in improving the health of
disadvantaged communities.27 Unfortunately, the NPRM does not discuss these impacts or
propose to address them. We believe that vehicle fleet turnover within these communities can
improve quality of life by mitigating emissions impacts. Notably, these
communities are less likely to have a place to charge their vehicles at home, a challenge that
should be addressed either through the final rule or via credit flexibility eligibility. Accordingly,
we urge the EPA to create a new flexibility that incentivizes automakers to place PEVs into
disadvantaged communities. See Attachment 1. Due to its unprecedented nature, our concept
provides a framework within which automakers may innovate solutions to access this credit but
we are open to other concepts that will facilitate a meaningful difference in the lives of these
vulnerable populations. The framework design is inspired in part by the off-cycle credit
flexibility, which also was created to spur innovation. In the alternative, we encourage
creation of a PEV Equity Taskforce, much like what California has commenced, to address
issues of equitable access to zero- or low-emitting vehicles. To the extent such a taskforce is
convened, Hyundai is interested in participating in this important work. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0599, p. 8]
27 Beyer, M., et al. Cleaner Cars, Cleaner Air. June 2023. Report available at
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/cleaner- cars-cleaner-air-report.pdf.
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
COMPARISON WITH AUTOMAKER COMMITMENTS
In the proposed rule, EPA highlighted the proliferation of announcements by automakers in
the past couple of years signaling a market shift away from internal-combustion technologies
toward plug-in electric vehicles. The rapid growth in the global vehicle market shows that more
automakers are committed to developing and investing in ZEV technologies at a global and
regional level. ICCT recognizes the increasing number of commitments made by automakers and
the speed at which the automotive industry is electrifying its fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0569, pp. 19-22]
ICCT previously collected information and analyzed announcements made by automakers on
ZEV targets through the end of 2022. The analysis, from ICCT's 2022 Global Automaker Rating
report, shows that 19 out of 20 top global automakers have made specific commitments on their
pace of electrification. For example, General Motors and Ford Motors (the second and third
largest automakers in the U.S by 2022 sales), as well as Mercedes-Benz have committed to cease
internal combustion engine in leading markets by 2035 as COP26 ZEV declaration signatories.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 19-22]
With the rapid development of ZEV technologies, automakers are constantly updating their
targets. Consequently, ICCT recommends the EPA to incorporate more recent ZEV target
announcements in Table 2 (right column) in addition to those outlined in page 24-28 of section II
of the proposed rule (left column). We believe these developments further reflect the desirability
of ZEV technologies in the market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 19-22]
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The increased ambition in announced ZEV targets among automakers is observed to be in
parallel with the growing number of regulations proposed by governments across the globe
pledging for zero-emission transportation policies and transitioning to a ZEV fleet. The
implementation of regulations in these jurisdictions that establish more stringent C02 standards
or require higher ZEV penetration can steer automakers to prioritize investments and ZEV
deployment in these markets to comply. Thus, regulatory mechanisms can be one of the driving
factors to accelerate ZEV penetration in the new vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569,
pp. 19-22]
In the case of the European Union, the C02 emission standards, adopted in March 2023, sets
a more stringent C02 emission performance standards for LDVs, with a requirement for zero-
C02 LDVs in 2035. Aligned with this, automakers operating in the region have pledged more
ambitious ZEV targets or commitment to electrify their new sales. For example, Volkswagen
(VW) and Stellantis, the two biggest automakers in Europe (by sales), have pledged to sell 80%
and 100% ZEVs, respectively, by 2030. This sales target is more ambitious than their targets in
other regions including the U.S in which VW and Stellantis are committed to a 50% ZEV target
by 2030 for its new passenger cars and light-duty vehicles respectively. Another example is
Toyota, which aims for 100% C02 emission reductions in all new vehicle sales in Europe by
2035 with at least 50% ZEV mix in 2030. In addition to the global ZEV target sales, Europe is
the only region where Toyota is ready to commit to cease its ICE sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 19-22]
The trend observed among automakers provides evidence of the suitability of ZEVs as
emissions-reducing technologies. The developments outlined above further underscore the fact
that ZEV technology is feasible and desirable as evidenced by the increasing fleet penetration.
Automakers will need to transition toward ZEVs to stay on track as government policies
continued to push for regulations that align with the Paris Agreement climate goals and as
market forces continue to push in this direction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 19-22]
This changing reality is already reflected in new LDV sales. The share of EVs has been
growing rapidly in leading markets such as China and Europe at 24% and 21%, respectively in
2022. The demand for these vehicles in the U.S., although lagging, also increased rapidly, even
under the current standards. In 2022, PEV accounted for approximately 7.3% of total LDVs sold,
an increase from 4.8% in 2021 and 2.6% in 2020. In terms of absolute number, total PEV sales in
2022 nearly reached 1 million with 80% of sales being BEVs, and 20% PHEVs. With the right
supporting regulatory mechanism, the proposed regulation will enable the U.S. to achieve the
ZEV penetration rate needed to achieve the emission reductions projected under the proposed
scenario. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 19-22]
In conclusion, a strong market force to advance ZEV technologies, as evidenced by the
increasing commitment among automakers and a more stringent standards in place such as the
proposed rule, can push the automotive industry to accelerate ZEV technology penetration in the
fleet. ICCT supports the proposition of EPA to advance technologies that will further enable
emission reductions and consequently the proposed rule needed to achieve those targets. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 19-22]
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Organization: International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW)
The footprint-based approach to increase efficiency and emissions reductions is a proven
policy that acknowledges that stringency increases should be targeted based on the fact that
different vehicles serve different functions and markets. Changes to the footprint-based formulas,
particularly regarding the light- truck fleet, could undermine domestic manufacturing and quality
union jobs. We urge EPA to continue to work with all key stakeholders to ensure the new rules
do not disproportionately impact domestic union auto production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0614, p. 8]
Organization: KALA Engineering Consultants
Before full comments begin, a personal note
As a personal note, the principal of KALA Consulting wants to let all of EPA administrators,
scientists, and engineers know that I am ON YOUR SIDE. I happen to disagree with the
approach used in this proposed rulemaking that appears to promote extensive electrification of
the US fleet, which I believe to be unsupportable from a GHG reduction standpoint. I believe
that you may not have reviewed the National Academy of Sciences 2010 report that shows, when
all knowable upstream and downstream GHG emissions are considered, BEV associated GHG
emissions are essentially the same as conventional gasoline-fueled vehicles for a projected 2030
time frame. Once Republican law makers and think tank mavens read my section on that study,
they may use it to bash this attempted rulemaking the likes of which you may never have
experienced. I hate to do this to the EPA because I support most of the emissions reduction
efforts you have made up to now and your agency and the national laboratories were so
beleaguered and mistreated by the Trump Administration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, p.
2]
However in my best engineering judgement, this rulemaking is misguided. There is a biofuel
substitute that could make significant reductions in both criterial pollutants and GHG emissions
if it were to be made from cellulosic sources and entrained into the national fuel mix in high
percentages. We have done extensive research and engineering adaptation of this biofuel,
butanol, that could surprise many of you. We ask your forbearance as we have included a
discussion of this advanced biofuel in our comments as an alternative to mass electrification.
Therefore, we are extending our hand and our knowledge base to EPA and the Department of
Energy to contact us and discuss what we might learn from each other. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, p. 2]
No Conflict of Interest Disclaimer Statement: The author(s) of this document, principals,
officers, staff and others associated with KALA Consulting hereby declare that none of those
persons or the Corporation itself have any potential employment, contracted services, financial,
or familial interests or connections of any kind to any interest, corporations or other entities
mentioned, referenced, or in any other way could be construed to benefit either financially,
public relations or potential contracting of services or equipment sales from any statements or
mentions by name or other reference in this document. No one associated with KALA
Consulting has ever been employed nor wishes to be employed by any entity mentioned or
refenced herein. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, p. 2]
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Comments
2. We never expected to see blatant examples in the explanation given for proposed EPA
rulemaking to be so obviously biased toward a so-called solution for emission reductions, the all-
electric vehicle, using batteries as their propulsive energy source. Let us give some examples of
what appears to us as rulemaking with what amounts to only one option for vehicle
manufacturers to comply with the proposed regulatory standards, the BEV. EPA repeatedly
states that the rulemaking provides "options" for auto makers when in reality few if any actually
exist. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
From Section I. A. 2, i "[CJontinued GHG emission reductions in the motor vehicle sector are
needed to protect public health and welfare... .Also separately from this proposal, the
Administration has recognized the recent industry advancements in zero- emission vehicle
technologies and their potential to bring about dramatic reductions in emissions... .EPA
anticipates that a compliant fleet under the proposed standards will include a diverse range of
technologies, including higher penetrations of advanced gasoline technologies as well as zero-
emission vehicles.... Based on our analysis, it is our assessment that the proposed standards are
appropriate and justified under section 202(a) of the CAA. Our analysis for this proposal
supports the preliminary conclusion that the proposed standards are technologically feasible and
that the costs of compliance for manufacturers would be reasonable. The proposed standards
would result in significant reductions in emissions of criteria pollutants, GHGs, and air toxics,
resulting in significant benefits for public health and welfare. We also estimate that the proposal
would result in reduced vehicle operating costs for consumers and that the benefits of the
proposed program would significantly exceed the costs." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
4-8]
Well, that all sounds good and substantially founded in good science and technological
feasibility. However, in later statements in the FedReg text we begin to find indications of bias
and attempts at "Steering" manufacturers toward one technology, the BEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
From Section I. A. 2, ii "In designing the scope, structure, and stringency of the proposed
standards, the Administrator considered previous rulemakings, as well as the increasing
availability of vehicle technologies that can be utilized by manufacturers to further reduce
emissions. This proposal continues EPA's longstanding approach of establishing an appropriate
and achievable trajectory of emissions reductions by means of performance-based standards, for
both criteria pollutant and GHG emissions, that can be achieved by employing feasible and
available emissions-reducing vehicle technologies for the model years for which the standard
will apply.... While standards promulgated pursuant to CAA section 202(a) are based on
application of technology, the statute does not specify a particular technology or technologies
that must be used to set such standards; rather, Congress has authorized and directed EPA to
adapt its standards to emerging technologies. Compliance with the EPA GHG standards over the
past decade has been achieved predominantly through the application of advanced technologies
to internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles. In that same time frame, as the EPA GHG
standards have increased in stringency, automakers have relied to a greater degree on a range of
electrification technologies, including hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) and, in recent years, plug-
in electric vehicles (PEVs) which include plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and battery-
electric vehicles (BEVs). As these technologies have been advancing rapidly in just the past
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several years, and battery costs have continued to decline, automakers have begun to include
BEVs and PHEVs as an integral and growing part of their current and future product lines,
leading to an increasing diversity of these clean vehicles planned for high volume production. As
a result, zero and near-zero emission technologies are more feasible and cost-effective now than
at the time of prior rulemakings." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
So now we start to see a rosy picture being painted of new vehicle propulsion technologies
ready to become "planned for high-volume production." It is as though the EPA is indirectly
telling auto makers that the BEV is expected to become a greater and greater share of their model
lines as a result of these new emission regulations. How nice that the EPA would be providing
such guidance. But it gets worse from here. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
From Section I. A. 2, ii "The year-over-year growth in U.S. PEV sales suggests that an
increasing share of new vehicle buyers are concluding that a PEV is the best vehicle to meet their
needs. Many of the zero-emission vehicles already on the market today cost less to operate than
ICE vehicles, offer improved performance and handling, have a driving range similar to that of
ICE vehicles, and can be charged at a growing network of public chargers as well as at home."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
Again, EPA is painting a glowing portrait of the future where most people in the US will
gladly accept the new BEV form of personal transportation and enjoy multiple benefits from this
change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
We can't help compare this form of cheerleading for the latest new transportation "hot thing"
to the EPA's description of a wonderous new fuel additive that was going to make life in the US
better: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
MTBE, which is the most common fuel oxygenate, is used in more than 80 percent of
oxygenated fuels. Since 1993, MTBE has been the second most produced organic chemical
manufactured in the United States. Ethanol, which is the second most common fuel oxygenate, is
used in about 15 percent of the oxygenated fuels.... Three major factors have influenced how
these two fuel oxygenates are used in petroleum products. MTBE: In addition to requiring that
fuels burn cleaner, EPA requires areas with high levels of smog (including but not limited to
RFG areas) to reduce the vapor pressure of gasoline in the summer months in order to decrease
the volatilization of petroleum constituents at storage facilities and during fuel transfer. Because
MTBE- blended gasoline has a lower vapor pressure than ethanol- blended gasoline, MTBE is
the preferred oxygenate in warm weather. The cost of transportation and the convenience of use
favors MTBE over ethanol. Because MTBE is more compatible with gasoline, it can be blended
at the refinery and distributed with gasoline through pipelines. Ethanol, on the other hand, must
be shipped separately from gasoline and added at the distribution terminal soon before use. If
ethanol-blended gasoline is exposed to water or even water vapor (as in pipelines), ethanol will
bring the water into solution and make the gasoline unusable. In addition, if ethanol-blended
gasoline is stored for an extended period, the ethanol will begin to separate from the gasoline
(emphasis ours). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
Methyl-Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) is produced by combining methanol with iso- butylene.
Refineries could produce methanol cheaply from natural gas and combine it with one of the by-
products of refining oil, iso-butylene to obtain a very inexpensive oxygenate that it seemed EPA
was favoring more than ethanol when EPA in a January 1998 publication by the EPA's Office of
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Underground Storage Tanks, the MTBE Fact Sheet #3, Use of and Distribution of MTBE and
Ethanol gave short shrift to ethanol by extolling the virtues of MTBE in the quoted text provided
above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
We really cannot blame EPA for gushing over MTBE because the oil companies could freeze
out ethanol producers and make the required oxygenate cheaply and entirely from fossil
petroleum and natural gas with no one getting a piece of the profits but them, and EPA and the
executive administration at the time, did not have a problem with that arrangement. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
But, there was one small problem with MTBE - it was poisoning the fresh water supplies of
the nation. The environmental disaster-in-the-making was best described in the Harvard
Environmental Law Review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
The expanded use of MTBE as a gasoline additive in the 1990s and the deteriorating state of
America's sixty-year-old infrastructure of Underground Storage Tank Systems (USTS) for
gasoline combined to yield an MTBE groundwater crisis by the end of the 1990s when studies
had documented "the widespread detection of MTBE in the nation's water supplies." The United
States Geological Survey in 1999 reported a 27% incidence of MTBE-contaminated groundwater
in urban areas where MTBE was used substantially. A 1999 EPA Blue Ribbon Panel reported
that between 5 and 10% of community drinking water supplies in high MTBE-use areas
contained detectable amounts of MTBE. Because of the "inadequacy of long-term monitoring
data," however, the "extent and trends" of groundwater contamination in the country are "still
not well known." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
The Harvard Review continues by stating that the MTBE fiasco is the largest and most recent
example of US regulatory failure and perhaps the new poster child for the Law of Unintended
Consequences: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
At the same time that MTBE was easing the transition away from tetra-ethyl lead and helping
states attain the national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") for photochemical oxidants in
some of the most heavily polluted areas of the country, it was silently polluting the groundwater
feeding the aquifers used by cities throughout the country for their drinking water. Indeed, if
taking the lead out of gasoline is a striking example of the virtues of the modern environmental
regulatory regime, the addition of MTBE to gasoline in full view of a powerful regulatory
agency armed with multiple authorities designed to prevent the kind of environmental damage
that MTBE is now causing throughout the country represents one of its most striking failures.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
While we hate to bring up this example of American regulatory failure and perhaps the most
embarrassing set of events ever for the US EPA, we must look at MTBE as a lesson in how not
to move forward with a proposal for a major overhaul of our nation's transportation options, as
presented by the EPA in this proposed rulemaking, without comprehensive engineering and
environmental review of such a proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
So, the question becomes: Is EPA favoring one method of meeting their new regulations over
most others, as unfortunately, they seem to have done in the past? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 4-8]
The proof might lie in statements found in the FedReg text as follows:
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From Section I. A. 2, ii "Taken together, these developments indicate that proven, zero-
emissions technologies such as BEVs, PHEVs, and FCEVs are already poised to become a
rapidly growing segment of the U.S. fleet... Accordingly, EPA considers these technologies to
be an available and feasible way to greatly reduce emissions, and expects that these technologies
will likely play a significant role in meeting the proposed standards for both criteria pollutants
and GHGs." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
Aha! Now we have statements that reveal the "expectations" of the EPA that three different
kinds of low operating emission vehicle types "will likely play a significant role in meeting the
proposed standards for both criteria pollutants and GHGs." Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles (FCEV)
are a tiny fraction of low operating emission vehicles and will remain so for some time. Plug-In
Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEV) are more numerous, but EPA has a special regulatory formula
for those types in order to meet the new standards. Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV) are the only
vehicles that can easily meet the more stringent emission standards being proposed for both air
pollutants and GHG according to how EPA will consider emissions from BEVs. If you were an
auto manufacturer what sort of signals would you be getting from statements like this? We could
cite many more similar "Expectation/Anticipation" EPA statements in the FedReg publication,
but we think the statement made below sums up the overt messaging to auto makers the EPA is
sending. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
From Section III. C. "Given the cost effectiveness of BEVs for compliance with both criteria
pollutant and GHG standards, EPA anticipates that most (if not all) automakers will include
BEVs in their compliance strategies." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
We were astonished that EPA would allow such an obvious "Steering" statement to be
published in the Federal Register publication, but there it is for everyone to see. When zealots
take over the rulemaking, statements like this inevitably leak out because those zealots are so
passionate about their "Mission from God" they have to tell everybody about it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 4-8]
Good sound science and sound engineering is what its needed to formulate sound
environmental regulations that do not "Force" a change in vehicle propulsion methods that may
never achieve the desired results, especially in reducing GHG emissions. We have more to say
about changes that appear to be forced upon the American public by zealots at the EPA when it
comes to the kind of vehicle they use for their transportation needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 4-8]
A statement of the definition of Scientific Integrity appears on Page 8 of The Framework"
document. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/01-2023-Framework-for-
Federal-Scientific-Integrity-Policy-and-Practice.pdf [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 16-
19]
"A substantial gap identified in the Report was that the US Federal Government lacked a
consistent definition of scientific integrity. A definition was developed and agreed upon by the
National Science and Technology Council 2022 Scientific Integrity Framework Interagency
Working Group and the 2021 Scientific Integrity Fast Track Action Committee. Federal agencies
should adopt this definition, incorporate it into their scientific integrity policy, and communicate
it to their workforce. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 16-19]
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Scientific integrity is the adherence to professional practices, ethical behavior, and the
principles of honesty and objectivity when conducting, managing, using the results of, and
communicating about science and scientific activities. Inclusivity, transparency, and protection
from inappropriate influence are hallmarks of scientific integrity." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 16-19]
"The Framework" document further states in Section I on Page 30: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 16-19]
"I. Protecting Scientific Processes
Scientific Integrity fosters "honest scientific investigation, open discussion, refined
understanding, and a firm commitment to evidence". It also enables consideration and
documentation of differing scientific opinions, and includes peer review. Science, and public
trust in science, thrives in an environment that shields scientific data and analyses and their use
in policymaking from political interference or inappropriate influence. It is the policy of this
agency to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 16-19]
1. Prohibit political interference or inappropriate influence in the funding, design,
proposal, conduct, review, management, evaluation, or reporting of scientific activities and the
use of scientific information. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 16-19]
2. Prohibit inappropriate restrictions on resources and capacity that limit and reduce the
availability of science and scientific products outside of normal budgetary or priority- setting
processes or without scientific justification." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 16-19]
We emphasized the requirements of a "firm commitment to evidence" and "consideration and
documentation of differing scientific opinions," which includes peer review. We do so because
KALA intends to present scientific findings from a group of scientists selected by the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the National Research Council (NRC) to respond to a study
request and funding for same made by Congress. Therefore, the study segments and results
depictions we present are part of the response made by NAS and NRC to a Congressional
commission and are, therefore, part of the record of Federal Research studies made either by
Federal Agencies or by outside contractors, such as NAS. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
16-19]
The name of the study we are presenting material from is:
Hidden Costs of Energy
Unpriced Consequences of Energy Production and Use
Committee on Health, Environmental, and Other External Costs and Benefits of
Energy Production and Consumption Board on Environmental Studies and
Toxicology
Division on Earth and Life Studies
Board on Energy and Environmental Systems Division on Engineering and Physical
Sciences
Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy Policy and Global Affairs
Division
National Research Council of the National Academies The National Academies
Press, Washington, DC
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https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/12794/hidden-costs-of- energy-unpriced-
consequences-of-energy-production-and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 16-
19]
The following are front matter statements and notices by the National Academy of Sciences
for this publication:
NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the
Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from
the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of
Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee
responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard
for appropriate balance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 16-19]
This project was supported by Contract No. TOS-08-038 between the National
Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Any opinions,
findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of
the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of the organizations or agencies
that provided support for this project. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 16-19]
International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-309-14640-1 (Book)
International Standard Book Numb er-10: 0-309-14640-2 (Book)
International Standard Book Numb er-13: 978-0-309-14641-8 (PDF)
International Standard Book Number-10: 0-309-14641-0 (PDF)
Library of Congress Control Number: 2010925089
Preface
The U.S. Congress directed the U.S. Department of the Treasury to arrange for a review
by the National Academy of Sciences to define and evaluate the health, environmental,
security, and infrastructural external costs and benefits associated with the production and
consumption of energy - costs and benefits that are not or may not be fully incorporated
into the market price of energy, into the federal tax or fee, or into other applicable revenue
measures related to production and consumption of energy.
In response, the National Research Council established the Committee on Health,
Environmental, and Other External Costs and Benefits of Energy Production and
Consumption, which prepared this report. Biographic information on the committee
members is presented in Appendix A. In the course of preparing this report, the committee
met six times. At two of the meetings, oral presentations were made by the following
individuals at the invitation of the committee: Christopher Miller (staff for U.S. Senator
Harry Reid); Mark Heil and John Worth (U.S. Department of the Treasury); Raymond
Braitsch, Thomas Grahame, and Robert Marlay (U.S. Department of Energy); Robert
Brenner and James Democker (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency); Arthur Rypinski
(U.S. Department of Transportation); Nicholas Muller (Middlebury College); and Richard
Tol (Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland). Interested members of the
public at large were also given an opportunity to speak on these occasions. Subsequently,
the committee held two teleconferences and one subgroup meeting to complete its
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deliberations. In addition to the information from those presentations, the committee made
use of peer-reviewed scientific literature, government agency reports, and databases.
This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse
perspectives and technical expertise in accordance with procedures approved by the
National Research Council Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent
review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making
its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional
standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 16-19]
We include the foregoing to emphasize that the study materials we will present below are
serious business and were taken seriously by the NAS and NRC. A cavalcade of science, health
and engineering professionals were selected to research and write the study results. Therefore,
we view the Transportation Section results of this 2009 study as relevant today as it was when
presented to Congress 14 years ago, due mainly to the fact that the laws of physics,
thermodynamics, chemodynamics of battery chemistry, engineering principals, and the logical
projections that could be made for the subject matter in the Transportation Section were subject
to those and other predictable progressions in both transportation, energy production and
emission controls. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 16-19]
We would further point out that oral presentations were given just prior to publishing by EPA
staff members at the time, Robert Brenner & James Democker, and we would have thought that a
copy of the report would have made its way into the records kept by the EPA, since it was a
Congressionally commissioned report and its contents may well have been informative to the
EPA's future rulemaking. However, in our search of cited references and other materials cited in
the materials relating to the current EPA Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR- 2022-0829 the 2010
NAS report was never cited or mentioned. It is unknown whether EPA staff consulted this 2009-
2010 study for this or any other docket and if it was not, why it was not consulted. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 16-19]
Organization: Lucid Group, Inc.
Battery/Vehicle Efficiency is Critical to Long-Term Viability of EVs
EPA solicited input on additional ways the program could provide alternative pathways
encouraging manufacturers to achieve lower C02 emissions earlier than projected in the
proposal. Incentivizing EV efficiency measured by either miles/kWh or miles per gallon
equivalent (MPGe) would help achieve lower C02 emissions and reduce the demand for raw
materials and on the grid. We must ensure that we do not electrify for the sake of electrification,
but instead establish policies and programs that prioritize efficient use of electricity and
resources, yielding benefits such as: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 7-9]
Reduced upstream emissions: Most EVs are charged from the power grid, which, while
rapidly becoming cleaner, still includes emitting sources. More efficient EVs would use less grid
electricity, thereby reducing the upstream emissions associated with their charging and vehicles
miles traveled. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 7-9]
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Conservation of critical minerals and associated de-risking of the supply chain: Using fewer
batteries reduces the demand per vehicle for lithium and other critical materials. Reducing the
use of these materials reduces supply chain bottlenecks and enhances national security. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 7-9]
Reduced consumer purchase costs: EV efficiency speeds mass adoption by reducing vehicle
prices. It seeds a virtuous cycle—efficiency lowers vehicle production costs and purchase prices
by reducing the number of batteries (the largest cost input for EVs) needed to achieve a targeted
range. Fewer batteries lower the vehicle curb weight thereby further reducing the required cell
count to achieve a desired range. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 7-9]
Reduced consumer energy costs: Efficient vehicles require less energy to travel a given
distance. More efficient ICE vehicles have demonstrably reduced the gas bill for consumers, and
more efficient BEVs reduce consumers' electric bill. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 7-9]
A more resilient grid through smarter energy consumption: While government programs have
been known to encourage the use of electricity and have even extended to promote energy
derived from wind, solar, and renewables, there exists a common denominator—use of energy.
By focusing on increasing efficiency, we can foster smarter energy consumption easing the
resources necessary for the grid's clean energy transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp.
7-9]
Environmental Justice benefit: The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) states "low
income and minority communities are more likely to be located near highways and other
transportation facilities that produce local reduced air quality, and to suffer from negative health
effects such as asthma." Addressing environmental inequality goes beyond roadway design and
extends to the vehicles on the roads. Zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) are a first line of defense in
addressing respiratory and cardiovascular disease and other pollution-related health disparities by
improving air quality in communities located in or near traffic-dense areas. Efficiency brings
down the costs of such vehicles and will help increase equitable adoption of medium- and heavy-
duty electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 7-9]
Higher overall vehicle performance: There is a misconception regarding the correlation
between vehicle efficiency and vehicle performance. Traditionally, fuel efficient vehicles were
not associated with high performance. However, Lucid's vehicles demonstrate that increased
efficiency in EVs yields faster charging, increased power density, and higher output power
derived from the same energy input providing faster acceleration capability. With higher vehicle
performance often comes increased consumer interest, which in the case of electrification
supports consumer adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 7-9]
OEMs should be incentivized and rewarded for the engineering and production of highly
efficient EVs and to continue developing cutting edge technologies that would further enhance
vehicle efficiency. To gain additional efficiency, greater investment in technologies is generally
required, and higher EV credit should be awarded to incentivize this investment. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 9-10]
An example of such a bonus credit structure could involve EPA adding a fleet average MPGe
for the OEM as a basis for an efficiency incentive, in the form of a bonus GHG credit. For
demonstration purposes this method would use threshold values of MPGe, based on current
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MY22 EV MPGe data to assign credit multipliers and a higher multiplication at higher values of
MPGe. This method would not use vehicle footprint as a variable because previous CAFE MPG
target curves as described in the CAFE Standards for Model Years 2024-2026 Passenger Cars
and Light Trucks already allow for OEMs to meet lower MPG targets if they make larger
footprint vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 9-10]
Additional efficiency credits would be awarded to OEMs with a certain minimum MPGe fleet
average which reflects the current competitiveness of the market. Above this minimum
threshold, OEMs would continue to be awarded credits according to a linear function to
incentivize incremental improvements in vehicle efficiency. Similarly, above a certain threshold,
the linear function or slope increases to reward improvements at the higher end of technological
limits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 9-10]
Under this example, a minimum threshold of 90 MPGe reflects the current competitiveness of
the EV market at that range and encourages further efficiency development. The threshold of 115
MPGe recognizes the significant step in technology that is required to achieve a fleet MPGe in
that range, as it becomes exponentially tougher to realize any incremental improvement in this
range which the greater slope of credit multiplier targets specifically. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0664, pp.9-10]
The proposed credit structure would be determined as below:
- The minimum threshold to receive an efficiency credit multiplication is 90 MPGe. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 9-10]
- From 90 MPGe to 115 MPGe, the linear scale is Credit Multiplier = l+(0.0132*(xl- 90)); xl
being the fleet MPGe of the OEM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 9-10]
- Above 115 MPGe the linear scale is increased, and the function is Credit Multiplier
=1.33+(0.0268*(x2-l 15)); x2 being the fleet MPGe of the OEM. Each 1 MPGe incremental gain
in the 115 to 140 band is awarded a 103.03% more credit over the same gain in the 90 to 115
band. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 9-10]
OEMs should be encouraged to produce more efficient EVs; such a program would inspire
competitiveness that ultimately leads to the desired benefits of transportation electrification. This
methodology is also highly flexible and adaptable. EPA would be able to adjust the threshold
values of MPGe for credit multiplication based on available technologies, similar to what the
agency and NHTSA do for GHG and CAFE standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 9-
10]
Like efficiency standards for ICE vehicles, MPGe as the basis for EV efficiency would
indirectly achieve other benefits in vehicle weight and form. For example, OEMs producing
compact EVs with high efficiency can leverage this to buffer larger SUV or truck offerings. This
approach minimizes the complexities in calculations, thus lowering the administrative burden on
OEMs and the EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 9-10]
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Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Center for Biological Diversity, (web)
(12,460 signatures)
To fight climate change and protect public health, the United States MUST confront the
massive pollution from passenger cars. Fossil fueled vehicles worsen the climate crisis and air
quality for everyone — especially for low-income communities and communities of color, which
are disproportionately located near major roadways and transportation infrastructure. This is an
unfortunate legacy of racist planning and policy that you have the power to remedy. Reducing
vehicle emissions is the low-hanging fruit of the battle against climate change. We need you to
set new clean car standards strong enough to protect our communities and our health. I urge you
to instruct the Environmental Protection Agency to write new rules that: - Cut auto pollution
75% by 2030 — in line with the Paris Agreement — by rapidly increasing sales of electric
vehicles and slashing pollution from new gas-powered cars and trucks. - Close all loopholes
that allow manufacturers to make more gas guzzlers. - Ensure that the communities most
impacted by fossil fuel pollution have ample access to affordable electric vehicles, purchase
incentives, and charging infrastructure. Automakers already have the technology to safely
improve vehicle efficiency and reduce emissions. You must require them to build the vehicles
people want and need, as their past actions show that the key to low-pollution cars is strong
government standards. NOW is the time for making strong and effective rules — not for half-
measures. For you to truly protect public health, especially for those on the frontlines, clean car
standards MUST meet this critical moment and lead the world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0722]
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown (email) (5,313
signatures)
I write in opposition to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's proposed multipollutant
standards for light-and medium-duty vehicles (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829). I
have serious concerns with all three of the options included in the draft rulemaking, as the EPA
seeks to lower carbon emissions under timelines that effectively make electric vehicles the only
option for automakers to meet the pollution limits from 2027 through 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1721]
The large-scale shift to electric vehicles, comprising two-thirds of all new-car sales in the U.S.
by 2032 under this proposal, will hurt consumers, workers, and small businesses while doing
little to help the environment. The proposed rule would lead to fewer vehicle choices for
individuals and families, reducing the selection of vehicles that fit their household budgets and
unique needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1721]
This proposal flies in the face of consumers being free to purchase the vehicles that best suit
their needs. According to an April 2023 report from Kelley Blue Book, the average cost of a
Battery electric vehicle (BEV) is $58,000, which is over 20% more than the average cost of a
non-BEV which puts undue, financial burden on American consumers. The average cost of a
BEV outpaces the medium salary of $54,132 of American as reported by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics from 2022. In addition to the increased up-front costs to consumers to purchase a BEV,
J.D. Power reported that approximately 28 million American homeowners must spend on
average, an additional $1,300 to install at-home chargers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1721]
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While the goal of this proposal is to reduce the U.S. automotive fleet's carbon footprint, it
simply shifts how emissions are produced. The EPA is ignoring the value of technologies
produced by American workers, manufacturers, and farmers critical to our transportation future.
Specialty automotive aftermarket businesses are leading the way through other fuel innovations.
There are numerous lower-and-zero emissions fuels and technologies available today, such as
hydrogen, domestic biofuels, hybrid technologies, and more. Today's innovations also include
replacing older internal combustion engine technologies with newer, cleaner versions and
converting older ICE vehicles to new electric, hydrogen, and other fuels. Sadly, the EPA's plans
to reduce greenhouse gases and criteria pollutants do not factor this in nor provide an equal
playing field for technologies beyond EV. Studies show that we can reach lower and zero-
emissions goals faster by employing multiple technology solutions compared to the proposed
"all-in" on EV rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1721]
The EPA's proposal boosts an electric vehicle supply chain dominated by China, which
powers its manufacturing-base through coal-fired power plants and mines critical minerals for
EV batteries with the use of environmental practices that we would never approve of in the
United States. Emissions coming out of tailpipe matter, but so do the lifecycle emissions of
building a car, constructing and charging a battery, and retiring vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-1721]
During the pandemic, the average cost of new and used vehicles increased by five percent and
30 percent, respectively, according to Edmunds, who tracked prices from May 2020-2021. These
increases resulted from supply chain issues, such as the ongoing global microchip shortage,
which has upended the automotive market over the last couple of years. The shortage of critical
components today will potentially be repeated as a direct result of this proposed rule, which still
has many unanswered questions about how the U.S. is going to end its dependence on sourcing
critical minerals and resources from foreign countries, including nations such as China that are
geopolitical foes, that are needed to produce more electric batteries for vehicles. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-1721 ]
As a consumer, I believe that the EPA should not dictate the types of vehicles that can be sold
in the United States. Despite 8.5% of new vehicles sold being BEV, a May 2023 report from J.D.
Power found that 21% of consumers are very unlikely to consider purchasing an EV due to
issues such as price, range, and limited charging availability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1721]
The future of automotive technology matters to consumers, millions of automotive
enthusiasts, and all the men and women who work in the industry. Accordingly, I ask that the
EPA does not follow through on any of the three options outlined in this proposed rulemaking
and instead pursues a rulemaking for light and medium-duty vehicles that embrace a technology-
neutral approach that factors in the infrastructure that exists, the innovation we are all capable of,
consumer preferences, and the lifecycle emissions of the technology that powers our vehicles.
[EP A-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1721 ]
Organization: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
Include regulatory mechanism(s) to prevent backsliding on emissions from non-EVs
EPA's fleet average standard would allow for increasing emissions from non-EVs as the EV
share of the fleet rises. With EPA's projected EV shares, non-EV emissions could increase while
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the overall fleet would be compliant. While some emissions would result from the dirtier
vehicles remaining in the fleet, the standard would not prevent new internal combustion engine
vehicles from having higher emissions than earlier models. These vehicles should have equal if
not lower emissions than their earlier models to prevent backsliding on emissions. Backsliding is
inconsistent with climate goals that necessitate pursuing all feasible, cost-effective greenhouse
gas emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, p. 5]
Organization: National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)
As stated in the proposed rule, the transportation sector is the largest source of U.S. GHG
emissions, representing 27.2 percent of total U.S. emissions. Within the sector, light-duty
vehicles are the largest contributor, comprising 15.5 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions.
Immediate progress toward decarbonizing the light duty fleet will help meet the Administration's
goal of cutting emissions by 2030 and reaching net zero emissions by 2050. Achieving those
decarbonization goals in transportation will require a mix of solutions. As recent analysis from
the Rhodium Group concludes, a "portfolio of strategies is the lowest cost and most likely to
succeed," including low carbon liquid fuels such as biofuels. However, the singular focus of the
currently proposed multi-pollutant emission standards for model year (MY) 2027 through 2032
light and medium duty vehicles on battery electric vehicles (BEVs), ignores the immediate and
long-term benefits of leveraging a portfolio of various transportation technologies and the
emission reductions they can achieve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 2]
In order to achieve emission reduction goals in the most robust, rapid, and affordable way,
EPA must instead encourage multiple additional solutions such as hybrid electric vehicles
(including plug-in hybrids), reinstating meaningful flex-fuel vehicle credits, and the introduction
of credits that encourage the utilization of internal combustion engines (ICE) designed to utilize
higher blends of biofuels (such as ethanol) by recognizing the combined carbon and multi-
pollutant emission reduction benefits of the engine technology and fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0643, p. 2]
Low-carbon liquid fuels have a unique and important role to play, immediately and in the
long term. Fuels such as El 5 (15% ethanol) are approved for and available for use in the millions
of vehicles already on the road today, and thus offer immediate emissions benefits on a much
larger scale than changes to only new vehicles. In the longer term, low-carbon or zero-carbon
liquid fuels offer emissions solutions for market segments and customers that may not be well
served by battery electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 2]
To foster a vibrant and competitive landscape of multiple solutions, it is critical for EPA to set
performance-based and technology-neutral emissions standards. Unfortunately, the proposed
standard falls short of this ideal. It is essential to look beyond the tailpipe and use life cycle
analysis for fair comparisons and a "level playing field". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 2]
Organization: National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA)
As it relates to medium-duty vehicles, we believe that EPA underestimates the number of
MDVs that can be electrified as well as the full scope of new technologies that can be used to
reduce emissions of remaining fossil fuel powered MDVs. We request that EPA include
additional MDV electrification in the final rule while also requiring technological improvements
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to make fossil fuel powered MDVs sold after 2027 more efficient and less polluting. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0607, p. 4]
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
NESCAUM and the OTC have some concerns that EPA's fleet average allows for emissions
from ICE vehicles manufactured during the regulated period to increase for MYs 2028 and later.
Specifically, assuming EPA's projected increases in battery-electric vehicle (BEV) market share
over time, it appears that non-BEV emissions could increase from approximately 240 g/mi in
2027 to approximately 250 g/mi in 2032. As a policy matter, we believe it is appropriate for EPA
to include in its final rule a regulatory mechanism, such as a maximum allowable emissions rate,
to ensure emissions from non-BEVs do not increase during the regulated period and
beyond. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 9]
Organization: Plug In America
Since the EPA has offered multiple scenarios for multi-pollutant emissions standards
reduction for MY 2027 and later light- and medium-duty vehicles and has requested comments
on these scenarios, Plug In America asks that for administrative consistency and efficiency, the
final standards align with an overall goal of achieving a 50 percent to 52 percent reduction from
2005 levels in economy-wide net greenhouse gas pollution in 2030 to reach the U.S. Nationally
Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement. A holistic approach will be necessary to
determine this pathway and requires incorporating other economic sectors into the calculations.
Given that the ongoing rulemaking process for "New Source Performance Standards for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric
Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Fossil
Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean Energy Rule" this
presents an opportunity to align the multi-pollutant emissions standards to levels consistent with
the goal of limiting global warming to no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius by 2050. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0625, p. 2]
Organization: POET, LLC
II. POET Generally Supports Aggressive Emissions Reduction Standards for Light-Duty
Vehicles, But Those Standards Must Truly Be Technology Neutral.
Light-duty vehicles are the largest contributor to GHG emissions from the transportation
sector, accounting for over 57 percent of transportation emissions and over 15 percent of total
GHG emissions nationwide. 12 POET stands behind technology-neutral standards that achieve
significant GHG emission reductions in the transportation sector. Indeed, reducing transportation
GHG emissions is POET's business. POET produces more bioethanol and other low carbon
bioproducts than any other company in existence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 7]
12 See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29186.
Regarding PHEV pickup trucks, the Proposed Rule correctly notes that "PHEV pickup
architecture would provide several benefits" including among others "zero-emission electric
range," "increased total vehicle range during heavy towing and hauling," and "job-site utility
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with auxiliary power capabilities." Also, pickup trucks have been a difficult-to-decarbonize class
of vehicles. Even under the Proposed Rule's extremely aggressive electrification scenarios,
medium-duty pickup trucks only obtain a 19% BEV deployment rate in 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, p. 20]
EPA should specifically incentivize PHEV FFV pickup trucks with additional incentives,
which could go even further beyond incentives for other FFVs. FFV architecture has been
broadly used with pickup trucks, so consumers are familiar with the role biofuels can play.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 20]
Pickup trucks are also broadly used in Midwestern states where bioethanol is readily
available. Various precedent exists for specially incentivizing pickup trucks given the difficulties
in decarbonizing pickup trucks and other work vehicles where consumers need high towing
capacity, reliability, and extended range. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 20]
Organization: Stellantis
Improve liquid fuels to reduce GHG and criteria emissions from the approximately 280M ICE
vehicles on the road [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 24-25]
Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
EPA should consider adding a small bonus for vehicles that have on-board AC bidirectional
chargers or are integrated with multiple DC off-board chargers. Alternatively, at minimum, EPA
should conduct an analysis on how EPA can advance bi-directional charging in the future.
Justification: The promise of bi-directional charging (AC or DC) to address air pollution, GHG
and electric grid issues is very significant with BEVs and PHEVS in light-, medium- and heavy-
duty vehicles, or off-road equipment. For example, a recent May 2022 presentation by the World
Resources Institute using Bloomberg NEF and Energy Information Administration data found
the power capacity in 2030 for EVs to be 10 to 20 times more than the 2030 power capacity of
stationary storage. EPA can and should play a role in helping to unlock this potential. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 9]
a. For example, the internal combustion engine in a PHEV has a much lower emission
signature than a stand-alone, backup generator. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 9]
b. Bidirectional charging, like battery stationary energy storage, can reduce GHG and
traditional pollutants from fossil fueled power plants by shifting electricity use to renewable
energy in the cleanest hours of the day and reducing the need for high- emitting plants (such as
traditional peaker power plants). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 9]
c. Bidirectional charging can also provide many types of grid services including
ancillary services, providing resource adequacy, and helping with the evening transition from
renewables to other generation resources. Because the batteries are already paid for by the car
and truck owners, utilities can gain a low-cost resource compared to battery stationary storage.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 9]
d. The potential value is significant and can contribute to lower operating costs for
BEVs and PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 9]
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While we understand the desire by EPA to simplify the regulation and reduce the use of bonus
multiplier credits, we believe a small bonus credit in the final regulation for a few years is
justified and needed to unlock this technology because of the large emission reduction benefits
and other benefits enabled by bidirectional charging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 9]
EPA should require automakers who sell PHEVs to include in the sale a portable cord set that
can charge at level 1 and/or level 2 similar to the Advanced Clean Cars II regulation as this will
increase the likelihood of consumers charging. While this adds cost, it does not add much cost
and, like CARB, we think this will make it easier for purchasers and should increase consumers
using a PHEV's all-electric miles. Similarly, we are concerned about automakers and dealers
selling PHEVs without a portable cord set and potentially turning PHEVs into a so-called
"compliance."
EPA should provide small bonus credits (multipliers) in 2027 to 2030 for several advanced
technologies including PHEVs with a long all-electric range that are not being produced today.
While we understand the need to simplify the regulation and dramatically reduce the use of
multipliers, we do support very limited continuation of multiplier to advance technologies that do
not exist today or are in very limited numbers such as bidirectional charging vehicles
(recommendation 4) and PHEVs with an all-electric range of 60 or more miles. These
technologies need extra lead time to develop. Having multiple technologies helps in reaching
many hard-to-reach customer segments, and PHEVs with over 60 mile all-electric range by
legacy automakers are not offered today and have rarely been produced and sold. Also see our
recommendation 8 below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 10]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Accordingly, Tesla asserts the EPA should amend its proposal with a more stringent version
of Alternative 1 and take, inter alia, the following additional steps to increase the performance
and overall stringency of the proposed standards: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
2 See, 88 Fed. Reg. 29332-33, Table 96.
3 Id., at 29348 (comparing Tables 135 and 136).
- Eliminate off-cycle crediting for all types of vehicles; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p.
2]
- Revisit the plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) utility factor to accurately reflect real
world emissions; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Amend the proposal to create parity in promoting motor vehicle air conditioning (MVAC)
efficiency adoption; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Maintain the existing zero emissions upstream approach for BEVs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0792, p. 2]
- Eliminate credit multipliers for all vehicles; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Ensure BEVs continue to be accounted for, and participate in, the NMOG + NOx reduction
standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
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Tesla also supports increasing the stringency of standards through MY 2035 in a manner that
is consistent with the 100% ZEV sales achieved in California's Advanced Clean Car II (ACC
II).4 However, recognizing that there are some uncertainties within the marketplace, in the final
rule EPA should clearly denote that such an extension for MY 2033-35 is intended to be
severable from the rest of the proposal and provide a rationale for this severability.5 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
4 88 Fed. Reg. at 29239; See also, California Air Resources Board (CARB), Advanced Clean Cars II
Regulations: All New Passenger Vehicles Sold in California to be Zero Emissions by 2035 available at h
ttps://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our- work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii.
5 See generally, Administrative Conference of the U.S., Severability in Agency Rulemaking (June 29,
2018) available ath ttps://www.acus.gov/recommendation/severability-agency-rulemaking.
Tesla welcomes the EPA's proposal to reduce GHG emission standards across the light- and
medium- fleet and to adjust the footprint-based standards curves to reduce incentives to upsize
vehicles. 115 Further, Tesla encourages the agency to quickly implement more stringent
emissions standards for light- duty vehicles, and to finalize standards well-before the end of the
calendar year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 16]
115 88 Fed. Reg. at 29196.
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
While acknowledging that EPA must: "consider issues of technological feasibility, the cost of
compliance, and lead time. EPA also may consider other factors, and in previous vehicle
standards rulemakings, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 3-4] as well as in this proposal, has
considered the impacts of potential standards on emissions of air pollutants and associated public
health and welfare effects, impacts on the automotive industry, impacts on the vehicle
purchasers/consumers, oil conservation, energy security and other energy impacts, safety, and
other relevant considerations." p. 29186 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 3-4]
It does not appear that EPA has actually done so. EPA's logic is often flawed in the analysis
and the information relied on is biased or incomplete. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 3-4]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Supportive comments were received from American Council for an Energy-Efficient
Economy, BMW, BorgWarner, California Air Resources Board, Consumer Energy Alliance,
Electric Drive Transportation Association, Environmental, and Public Health Organizations,
General Motors, ICCT, International Union, United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, Lucid Group, Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Center
for Biological Diversity, POET LLC, and Tesla. Many elements of the program were supported
including phase-out of off-cycle credits, limiting AJC credits to internal combustion engine
vehicles (ICEVs), eliminating the advanced vehicle multiplier incentives, lowering the cut-points
in the light truck curves, technology neutrality, program flexibilities, work factor, and the
footprint-based standard.
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Response:
EPA appreciates the supportive comments.
Summary:
Alliance for Consumers, KALA Engineering Consultants, and Competitive Enterprise
Institute commented with concern the rulemaking forces BEVs into the vehicle fleet. Cummins
commented that standards should be performance-based and technology neutral, and not
"mandate a specific technology" and also be fuel neutral.
Response:
For this rulemaking, we are continuing our longstanding approach (with over 50 years of
experience in reducing criteria pollutants and 14 years of history for GHGs) of establishing an
appropriate and achievable trajectory of emissions reductions by means of performance-based
standards. As we state in Section I. A.2 of the preamble, we anticipate that a compliant fleet
under the final performance-based emissions standards will include a diverse range of
technologies. The standards are fuel neutral. In Section I.B.I, of the preamble we discuss the
GHG emissions standards and illustrate multiple potential pathways which demonstrate
compliance with varying mixes of non-hybrid ICE vehicles, hybrids, PHEVs and BEVs (Table
4).
Summary:
BMW NA submitted comments encouraging the Agency to adopt test procedures for
hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles. BMW believes hydrogen FCEVs will be a key technology
for achieving climate neutrality. BMW requested EPA adopt SAE technical standard J2572,
Recommended Practice for Measuring Fuel Consumption and Range of Fuel Cell and Hybrid
Fuel Cell Vehicles Fueled by Compressed Gaseous Hydrogen, which defines a procedure for
testing FCEVs and possibly adopting a time-limited advanced technology vehicle credit
multiplier for hydrogen FCEVs.
Response:
EPA has considered BMW's comment encouraging the Agency to propose a specific test
procedure for hydrogen FCEVs by adopting SAE technical standard J2572. At this time the
Agency is not prepared to propose specific test procedures for hydrogen FCEVs. Manufacturers
producing hydrogen FCEVs are eligible to propose special test procedures according to the
provisions of §1065.10(c)(2). BMW and other hydrogen FCEVs are eligible to request approval
to use SAE J2572 for testing. The request to use the special procedure needs to be made prior to
the manufacturer beginning the test program.
Summary:
The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy and Donn Viviani, Alliance for
Vehicle Efficiency, and Lucid Group commented with concern that zero emissions for PEVs,
lack of requirements for PEV efficiency, and lack of requirements for mass reduction will
contribute to larger vehicles being manufactured and consume additional energy. Donn Viviani
commented on the need to account for embedded carbon in the manufacturing of vehicles.
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Response:
The final rulemaking establishes performance-based standards allowing manufactures to
choose any combination of technologies to meet the standards. Furthermore, EPA is adopting
revised footprint curves that EPA considers will not encourage changes in the size of vehicles
(see Section 3.2.1 of this RTC). For further discussion of the compliance treatment of PEVs
with zero grams/mile C02 tailpipe emissions, and related issues about vehicle efficiency, please
refer to Section 3.1.5 of the RTC. EPA interprets comments from Mr. Viviani on embedded
carbon to be in support of lifecycle analysis, which we are not adopting for this rulemaking. For
further comments related to lifecycle emissions refer to Section 19.2 of this RTC.
Summary:
BMW, Electrification Coalition, National Corn Growers Association, Stellantis, and POET
LLC commented with suggestions to include additional fuels such as gasoline blends, biofuels,
and hydrogen in the program for compliance.
Response:
The final rule does not include any modifications to vehicle fuels. Some commenters noted
the importance of hydrogen technology and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs). While EPA is
aware that a few vehicle manufacturers either are producing light-duty FCEVs today (e.g.,
Toyota Mirai, Hyundai Nexo) or have plans to produce FCEVs in the future, at present such
vehicles are at low volumes, and EPA has not explicitly modeled FCEVs as a technology option
in our rule analysis. Nevertheless, under our performance-based standards, manufacturers can
choose to utilize FCEV technology as part of their mix in complying with the standards.
Summary:
Hyundai Motor America, Mass Comment Campaign, and Western Energy Alliance
commented that the high cost of EVs present affordability issues and affect consumer choice.
Response:
EPA has considered impacts on consumers as part of this final rule. See RTC Section 13 for
discussion of consumers issues, including affordability and consumer choice.
Summary:
Several commenters expressed the importance of PHEVs in the current and future vehicle
fleet.
Response:
PHEVs were not included in the proposed rule as the necessary modeling data was
unavailable at that time. As we had indicated in the proposal was our intention, EPA has in fact
explicitly included PHEVs as a technology option within our modeling of potential compliance
pathways to meet the final standards, as detailed in Section 12.2.4 of this RTC.
Summary:
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Environmental and Public Health Organizations,
California Air Resources Board, District of Columbia Department of Energy and Environment,
Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management, Ozone Transport Commission, and
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International Council on Clean Transportation expressed concern of backsliding of ICE vehicle
emissions due to the addition of PEVs to the fleet.
Response:
EPA understands that in theory some backsliding of individual vehicles is possible due to the
nature of a fleetwide average standard. At the same time, the revised GHG and criteria pollutant
standards require significant reductions. For example, the final standards for NMOG+NOX
reduce the level of emissions from the worst performing vehicles by eliminating the highest
"bins" and any backsliding would have to be offset with additional technologies to reduce
emissions. As another example, the GHG standards require significant year-over-year emissions
reductions, and though manufacturers are not prohibited by the standards from backsliding on
existing ICE vehicles, if they were to do so, they would then be obligated to make even further
emission reductions elsewhere in their fleet, as this is the nature of fleetwide averaging
standards. For these reasons, EPA does not consider it likely that significant backsliding will
occur or would undermine the public health and welfare benefits of the rule.
3.1.1 - Vehicle regulatory classifications
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
3. Separate Car and Truck Standards
Auto Innovators supports EPA's intent to continue to set separate passenger car and light-duty
truck / medium-duty passenger vehicle standards. Separate standards recognize the physical
energy demands of larger, more capable vehicles. Appropriately set standards will continue to
drive improvements in both passenger cars and light trucks. In the long term the two standards
will naturally converge, assuming similar percentage reductions for both fleets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 110]
4. NHTSA Car and Truck Definitions
EPA intends to continue to use the NHTSA car and truck definitions for its light-duty GHG
program. We generally support this approach. However, because NHTSA has yet to propose its
CAFE rules for MY 2027 and beyond, we do not know for certain whether NHTSA will
maintain the existing definitions that EPA has based its proposal upon. Additionally, our
understanding is that NHTSA is developing test procedures that may have the effect of changing
the classification of some vehicles regardless of the present definitions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.110-111]
There is also the potential for misalignment between EPA and NHTSA in the definition of
medium-duty passenger vehicles. EPA is proposing to modify the definitions of medium-duty
vehicles / medium-duty passenger vehicles. It is unclear what NHTSA may or may not do to
align with EPA's proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 110-111]
We urge EPA to coordinate with NHTSA in developing its final rule to ensure that the
proposed greenhouse gas standards in the NPRM are not in conflict with changes NHTSA may
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propose in its CAFE rulemaking, or through later test procedure changes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.110-111]
D. MDPV Definition
6. Background
In EPA's 2000 Tier 2 criteria pollutant rule299, EPA established a new regulatory
classification: Medium Duty Passenger Vehicle (MDPV). EPA states it created this classification
to include larger, heavier vehicles that were driven similarly to passenger vehicles in the
passenger vehicle averaging sets for emissions.300 EPA defined this new regulatory class with
references to Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR), seating configuration, and pickup bed
length.301 Currently, the MDPV definition may include vehicles up to 10,000 lbs. GVWR. If a
vehicle meets the EPA definition of an MDPV, the vehicle is removed from the Class 2b and 3
vehicle averaging set (proposed in the NPRM to be called Medium Duty Vehicles, or "MDVs"),
which typically includes vehicles used for "work" purposes (i.e., trailering, towing, and hauling).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 195-196]
299 Add citation.
30 NPRM at 29278.
301 CFR-2014-title40-voll9-sec86-1803-01.pdf (govinfo.gov) page 10/14
EPA is proposing to expand the definition of MDPV to include heavier vehicles in the
passenger vehicle emissions averaging sets. EPA recognizes that including zero emissions
vehicles (ZEVs), and particularly BEVs, will be important to comply with its proposed Tier 4
multipollutant standards for passenger vehicles and MDVs. BEVs typically have higher curb
weight than comparable-capability internal combustion engine vehicles due to battery weight, so
it's likely that some EV light-duty trucks and sport utility vehicles will exceed the current 10,000
lbs. GVWR threshold for MDPV when equipped with BEV technology and change averaging
sets. EPA's compliance pathway and cost-benefit analysis does not explicitly model vehicles
switching regulatory classes due to BEV weight, but EPA purports that the proposed updates to
the MDPV definition capture vehicles with significant weight changes due to batteries - and only
these vehicles - to maintain regulatory continuity in emissions averaging sets. EPA states that
"[i]n selecting the proposed 5,000-pound work factor cut point, EPA reviewed current vehicle
offerings and does not believe this threshold would pull into the MDPV category a significant
number of work vans or trucks."302 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 195-196]
302 NPRM at 29278.
7. Summary of EPA MDPV Definition Proposal
As shown below, EPA proposes to use "Work Factor (WF)," in combination with GVWR and
pickup bed length, to expand the definition of MDPV, or rather to define which MDVs would
not be MDPVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 196-197]
[See original comment for Figure 72: NPRM Table 56: Summary of Exclusions for the
Proposed Revised MDPV Definition] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 196-197]
Previously, EPA has used WF to set GHG targets for Class 2b and 3 vehicles, and EPA
proposes to carry-over the WF equation through 2029MY. In 2030MY, EPA proposes to limit
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the maximum threshold of Gross Combined Weight Rating (GCWR) to 22,000 pounds in the
WF equation.303 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 196-197]
303 NPRM at 29425.
This means the calculated work factor for vehicles above 22,000 pounds GCWR will change
between 2029MY and 2030MY (see text below). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 196-197]
[See original attachment for equations] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 196-197]
EPA largely carries over elements of the previous MDPV definition related to seating
configurations and bed length. Pickups with one row of seating or an eight-foot pickup bed
remain in Class 2b and 3 (MDV). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 196-197]
EPA proposes, however, to require manufacturers to use its new definition for MDPV in
2027MY. Alternatively, manufacturers may adopt the new definition of MDPV prior to
2027MY, and if the manufacturer chooses to do so, the manufacturer must apply the MDPV
definition for GHG and criteria emissions standards. EPA proposes special consideration of
criteria emissions in 2027MY-2029MY for vehicles that become MDPV due to the new
definition:
"(vi) MDPV. Any vehicle that becomes an MDPV as a result of the revised definition in
§86.1803 starting in model 2027 remains subject to the heavy-duty Tier 3 standards in §
86.1816-18 under the default phase-in specified in paragraph (b)(6)(ii) of this section for model
years 2027 through 2029."304 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 196-197]
304 htps://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/lmdv-multi-pollutant-emissions-nprm-redline-
memo-2023-04.pdf (page 41 /129).
Manufacturers may opt in to the new MDPV definition early without selecting an early phase-
in schedule for Tier 4 multipollutant criteria standards. Said another way, manufacturers may
opt- in to the MDPV definition early, and still choose the default compliance scenario (Scenario
H).305 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 196-197]
305 NPRM at 29259.
8. Observations and Concerns with Proposed MDPV Definition
EPA's MDPV definition proposal may not produce the stated outcome EPA desires. For
instance, the proposed expanded MDPV definition will capture some Class 2b and Class 3
internal combustion engine vehicles when the work factor is used in combination with the
GCWR limit in MY 2030, resulting in those vehicles being included in a BIN12 averaging set.
Many BEV trucks may be classified as MDPV, and therefore not be available to contribute to the
stringent BIN60 criteria emissions standard for MDV. Some vehicles will both meet the MDPV
definition and be regulated as light-duty, and yet paradoxically be over the proposed 22,000
pounds GCWR limit, which would otherwise require heavy-duty engine dyno certification for
criteria emissions. If a manufacturer optionally adopts the MDPV definition early, the vehicle
may change criteria emissions averaging sets three times in the span of five years. Certification
and label requirements for MDPVs may complicate lab procedures. And finally, the EPA
definition of MDPV may differ from the Department of Transportation regulatory classes used in
the Corporate Average Fuel Economy / Corporate Average Fuel Consumption programs, adding
complexity to certification workstreams. Each of these items is discussed in detail below along
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with Auto Innovators' suggested modifications to address these observations while working
toward EPA's stated goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 196-198]
In the Proposed Rule, EPA makes clear that the expanded MDPV definition is intended to
address heavier BEVs likely to be driven as passenger vehicles, and the definition updates are
not meant to pull gasoline or diesel-powered work vehicles into light-duty standards:306 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 196-198]
306 NPRM at 29278.
- "First, EPA is proposing to include in the MDPV definition any passenger vehicles at or
below 14,000 pounds GVWR with a work factor at or below 5,000 pounds except for pickups
with an open bed interior length of eight feet or larger.. .This modification would address new
BEVs that are primarily passenger vehicles but fall above the current 10,000 pound MDPV
threshold primarily due to battery pack weight increasing the vehicle's GVWR." [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 196-198]
- "In selecting the proposed 5,000 pound work factor cut point, EPA reviewed current vehicle
offerings and does not believe this threshold would pull into the MDPV category a significant
number of work vans or trucks..." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 196-198]
- "Currently, there is a clear distinction between pickups in the light-duty vehicle category and
those in the medium-duty category.. .The proposed changes to the MDPV definition are intended
to account for any new pickup offerings that would fall into the GVWR "space" at or above
8,501 pounds but below 9,900 pounds. EPA is not aware of any current or planned products that
would be covered by this proposed modification." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 196-
198]
However, when evaluating the existing vehicles pulled into the new MDPV definition and
making conclusions that the proposed definition would not affect the classification of existing
Class 2b and 3 ICE vehicles, it does not appear that EPA considered the proposed 22,000-pound
limit to GCWR in the WF calculation, which is proposed to begin in MY 2030, in combination
with the 5,000-pound WF threshold. After the WF GCWR limit, many ICE work trucks in the
market today would be classified as MDPV in MY 2030 and beyond (see examples below).
Manufacturers encourage EPA to review compliance data submissions to reassess how the
proposed MDPV definition may interact with 2023MY and 2024MY ICE products. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 198-200]
[See original attachment for Figure 73: Sample ICE Work Trucks and Classifications]
307 Press Kit: 2023 Ram Heavy Duty, Towing specifications (Public "Base Weight Total" used for
example may vary from "EPA Curb" weight)
htps://media.stellantisnorthamerica.com/newsrelease.do?id=24053&mid=,
The consequences of shifting ICE work vehicles to the MDPV regulatory class are significant.
For criteria emissions, the MDPV NMOG+NOx targets are proposed to be 12 mg/mi in MY
2030 vs. 178 or 247 mg/mi for MDV in MY 2029 in the default compliance pathway308 (see
Figure 74 below), and the MDPV definition would preclude these work trucks from certifying to
proposed Bin 160 or Bin 125, which are reserved only for MDVs.309 The EPA NPRM analysis
does not appear to recognize that many ICE work trucks would switch to MDPV with the
proposed new MDPV definition, and no technology pathway is discussed to bring a 2029MY9
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MDV work truck into a compliant light-duty averaging set. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 198-200]
308 NPRM at 29261, Table 41.
309 NPRM at 29261, Table 42.
[See original attachment for Figure 74: NPRM Table 41: LDV, LDT, MDPV and MDV Fleet
Average NMOG+NOx Standards Under the Default Compliance Pathway] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 198-200]
With the proposed new MDPV definition, after the WF calculation adjustments beginning in
MY 2030, many ICE work trucks over 22,000 pounds GCWR would otherwise be required to
engine dyno cert if they were not MDPVs. The logic appears paradoxical and unintended. These
vehicles cannot be both so alike to passenger vehicles that they should be regulated as passenger
vehicles, and so alike to heavy-duty purpose-built work trucks that they should be regulated the
same as light-heavy engines. Many of these ICE vehicles pulled into the new MDPV definition
in MY 2030 today share engine hardware with vehicles that would be required to engine dyno
cert under Part 1036 in MY 2030 due to the 22,000-pound GCWR limit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, p. 200]
There is a stark difference between light-duty chassis dyno certification procedures, required
for MDPVs, and engine dyno certification procedures for vehicles over 22,000-pound GCWR.
Similar vehicles sharing parts and development resources today could be forced to pursue
different development paths based on the proposed MY 2030 class definitions and test
procedures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 200]
Complexity with the proposal is not limited to within the EPA program. Department of
Transportation, through the Corporate Average Fuel Economy program, may have different
regulatory class definitions for fuel consumption regulations than proposed by EPA. California
Air Resources Board, through Advanced Clean Cars II, has different NMOG+NOx Bins, and
different certification requirements than EPA proposes.310 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
200]
310 htps ://ww2. arb .ca. gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/2acciifro 1961.4 .pdf
9. Recommendations on MDPV Definition
EPA is correct in its desire to ensure vehicles, including ZEVs, are included in the appropriate
compliance category. EPA identifies that some light trucks and sport utility vehicles, used often
passenger vehicles, will cross weight thresholds and regulatory class definitions. Adjusting the
MDPV definition is one mechanism for EPA to maintain some continuity in GHG and criteria
emissions averaging sets as more BEVs are required to meet proposed standards. EPA proposes
changes to the MDPV definition, but the structure and mechanisms need improvement from the
proposal to the final rule to better achieve the stated intent as well as address the concerns noted
above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 200-202]
EPA offers manufacturers the option to adopt the new MDPV definition early. Adopting the
MDPV option early may help manufacturers apply credit for ZEVs in the light-truck fleet as
GHG stringency increases, consistent with the compliance pathway of adding battery electric
vehicle technology to light-trucks and large sport utility vehicles, possibly for the model years
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2024 (depending on the timing of the final rule), 2025, and 2026. We agree with EPA's proposal
to allow manufacturers to adopt the MDPV definition early independent of the choice of criteria
pollutant phase-in scenario. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 200-202]
To reduce complexity and regulatory burden associated with the proposed MDPV definition,
and to address some potentially unintended consequences of the NPRM as written,
manufacturers recommend the following changes to the proposed MDPV definition for the final
rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 200-202]
- Our preferred option is that EPA should maintain the current MDPV definition, and also
allow Class 3 BEV/FCEV/PHEV vehicles the option to contribute to either Medium-Duty or
Light-Duty GHG compliance, but not both. This is similar to the approach taken by CARB for
compliance with the heavy-duty ZEV regulation. This is a common sense approach that would
achieve agency goals and also enable OEMs the flexibility needed with Class 3 vehicles, given
the very aggressive standards in both the Light- and Medium- Duty GHG rules along with the
anticipated relatively low volume of traditionally light- duty vehicles that could end up with
Class 3 weight. The added benefit of this proposal is thatNHTSA's CAFE rule could remain
aligned with EPA's, as NHTSA is statutorily constrained from revising the MDPV definition.
When fleets are not aligned, this creates a stringency burden that neither agency may recognize,
but drives additional cost and complexity on OEMs . Alignment between the various regulatory
programs is an ongoing goal of (and necessity for) OEMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
200-202]
- If EPA chooses not to accept the above, the following alternatives are proposed; while either
would be acceptable for addressing concerns, we recommend the first approach:
o Implement a new MDPV definition that would simply make Class 3 BEV/FCEV/PHEVs
with a work factor less than 4,500 lbs subject to the MDPV requirements and otherwise maintain
the current MDPV definition. Given the relative lack of popularity of bed lengths 72" and greater
in the light-duty segment, this would accomplish essentially all of EPA's goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 200-202]
o Implement a 9,500-pound GVWR limit and a 4,500 pound work factor limit versus the
proposed 9,900 and 5,000 pound limits. This would reduce the risk of unintentionally capturing
Class 2b and 3 trucks as could occur with the proposed limits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 200-202]
- Manufacturers should not be required to adopt the MDPV definition until MY 2030.
Aligning the required use of a new MDPV definition with the required timing of engine dyno
certification for Class 2b and 3 vehicles may reduce test burden and streamline lab procedures,
while giving manufacturers reasonable lead time to produce a fleet that meets such stringent
requirements. Alignment in timing of MDPV definitions and Part 1036 requirements is
especially important given the narrow definition of MDVs qualifying for chassis certified criteria
emissions in the proposal in MY 2030 and beyond. MY 2030 also aligns with the timing of the
proposed cap in GCWR for the WF equation. The GCWR cap as proposed in the WF equation,
both in terms of timing and the value and mechanism of the cap, would result in many ICE
vehicles flipping between MDV and MDPV at a critical time for criteria emissions phase-ins.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 202]
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- Manufacturers recommend eliminating the proposed GCWR cap in the WF equation. If
EPA's intention is to limit the upper bound of WF for determining GHG stringency, EPA should
explicitly set an upper bound for WF or GHG stringency itself - like footprint and GHG
stringency for light-trucks — instead of adding limits to components of the WF calculation. The
GCWR limit as proposed in the WF equation interacts with and disrupts the applicability of the
MDPV definition, pulling capable ICE work trucks into MDPV, subjecting them to more
stringent criteria emissions targets and GHG targets, and changing their averaging sets. The
mechanism as proposed by EPA is so complex that EPA's own analysis for compliance
pathways to meet Tier 4 multipollutant standards overlooked the applicability of MDPV for a
significant portion of the ICE work truck fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 202]
- Manufacturers recommend EPA clarify in the final rule that the new MDPV definition
measures bed length with tailgate and mid-gates up. Often battery electric trucks have the option
of a mid-gate that can extend the usable bed length of the vehicle in some configurations with
mid-gates or tailgates down. If EPA were to measure bed length with the mid-gate down, many
BEV trucks, the very trucks EPA intended to include in the MDPV class with the new proposed
definitions, would exceed the maximum bed length allowed for MDPVs and remain MDVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 202]
Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
The proposed standards need to limit upsizing as the light-duty fleet electrifies
In the past decade the U.S. automotive market has seen a shift towards larger vehicles. The
average footprint for all vehicle types has increased and more and more light trucks are being
sold compared to cars. This has been a major factor for the recent stagnation in real- world fuel
efficiency of the fleet. 17 We applaud EPA for attempting to counter these trends with the
proposed standards and for correcting conditions from past GHG rulemakings that have
exacerbated the issue. Lowering the cutpoints on the light truck curve will reduce emissions by
setting a more stringent standard for the largest trucks, as will the flattening of both the car and
light truck curves and reducing the GHG grams per mile (gpm) gap between them. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
17 https://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends
EPA must correct the slope of its car curve to accurately reflect BEV penetration [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
ACEEE agrees that the slopes of the car and light truck curves that demonstrate the
relationship between vehicle footprint and the relevant emissions targets should reflect rising
BEV penetration over the period of the standards, and that the appropriate slope for ZEVs should
be zero. Tailpipe-only accounting combined with steep curves means that the production of large
ZEVs can generate a considerable number of credits for a given manufacturer, which will
incentivize vehicle companies to upsize their ZEV offerings and ignore improvements to ICEV
options. For an ICEV car curve, EPA has determined that the appropriate slope to avoid
incentivizing vehicle upsizing or downsizing is 0.8 gpm/ft2 and contends that the curve should
be adjusted over time based on the ZEV share of sales. However, the car curve slopes for both
the proposed standards and Alternative 1 are inconsistent with this finding, as explained below.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
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Table 1. Car curve slope unadjusted and adjusted for BEV penetration
Model Year Proposed Standard Car Curve Slope (gpm/sq-ft) Expected Car BEV
Penetration Adjusted Slope (gpm/sq- ft) Alternative 1 Car Curve Slope Expected Car BEV
Penetration Adjusted Slope (gpm/sq-ft)
2027
0.64
43%
1.12
0.59
44%
1.05
2028
0.56
51%
1.14
0.51
50%
1.02
2029
0.47
59%
1.15
0.42
58%
1.00
2030
0.43
65%
1.23
0.38
67%
1.15
2031
0.39
69%
1.26
0.34
72%
1.21
2032
0.35
73%
1.30
0.30
74%
1.15
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
ACEEE calculated the adjusted slopes in Table 1 based on EPA's description of their
methodology in the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA) where a slope of 0.8 is scaled to
0.4 to reflect 50% ZEV penetration (p. 1-7). The adjusted slopes shown in Table 1 are far higher
than 0.8 and rise over time with increases in BEV penetration. If 0.8 is the slope that minimizes
the incentive to upsize or downsize vehicles, then anything higher than that would encourage the
manufacture of larger vehicles and lead to higher emissions. Given that the light truck curve is
based on EPA's car curve but has added offsets, the light truck curve would be similarly
affected. EPA projects that average footprints will rise as a result of the proposed standard,
further evidence that the curves as proposed are too steep (DRIA p.l- 14). We strongly
recommend that EPA flatten both curves to accurately reflect expected BEV penetration in
accordance with its own analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
Offsets for the light truck curve should be decreased to reflect real-world conditions
EPA constructs the light truck curve for the proposed standards by adding offsets (in the form
of higher levels of emissions for a given footprint) to the car curve then similarly adjusting it for
light truck BEV penetration. The first offset is for all-wheel drive (AWD) capability. EPA
assumes that crossover vehicles need additional emissions allowances to allow for AWD
capability, which would effectively classify them as truck crossovers (DRIA p. 1-8). This offset is
set at 10 grams per mile (gpm) and is applied uniformly across the entire ICEV-only light truck
curve. However, not all light trucks have AWD and EPA's adjustment to the emissions
allowance is based on an analysis of what is needed to add AWD to a model (DRIA p. 1-8 - 1-9).
Therefore, applying this offset to all light trucks, regardless of whether they have AWD,
unnecessarily increases the allowable emissions level. In 2021, 78% of pickups and 87% of truck
SUVs had AWD while almost 20% of car SUVs and sedans had AWD capabilities. 18 The 10
gpm offset should be reduced to account for this and not further incentivize the shift of cars to
trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
18 https://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends
The second adjustment that EPA makes to the car curve to create the light truck curve is for
towing and hauling capability. To accommodate towing and hauling, EPA increases towing
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allowance linearly from 0-63 gpm for light trucks with footprints between 45 and 70 square feet
on an all-ICEV curve. However, EPA assumes that all light trucks need to be able to haul and
tow and therefore applies the allowance across the board . Not every vehicle classified as a light
truck needs to tow or haul significant amounts of cargo. The vehicles that do need to tow or haul
may only do so occasionally, and some may never need to. 19 The 63 gpm offset for the all-ICEV
light truck curve should be lowered to reflect the data on usage of towing and hauling
capabilities by light truck owners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
19 https://www.thedrive.com/news/26907/you-dont-need-a-full-size-pickup-truck-you-need-a-cowboy-
costume
Complementary elements of EPA's LDV program should be extended to MDVs
Two other areas in which MDVs could benefit from being folded into the LDV program are
compliance reporting requirements and consumer labeling. EPA's compliance report for heavy-
duty vehicles24 does not include heavy-duty pickups and vans, and we are not aware of any
other source for this data. This situation has hampered our ability to make informed judgments
on the current proposal for MDV standards, as data on matters such as compliance credit
balances and rates of ICEV technology adoption are not currently available for these vehicles.
These vehicles should be incorporated into EPA's Trends report no later than MY 2027. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, p. 11]
24 https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-05/420r22028A.pdf
MDVs also should have a consumer label, and the label should provide a basis for comparison
with LDVs. This could be an important element, along with the reclassification of vehicles for
purposes of the standards, of EPA's effort to discourage the upward creep in size and
performance attributes of light-duty trucks. California began labeling MDVs on January 1,
2021.25 While the MDV scores are not directly comparable to California's LDV scores, CARB
provides a comparison table with LDV GHG scores. We urge EPA to create a meaningful
consumer label for MDVs in time for MY 2027. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, p. 11]
25 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/greenhouse-gas-standards-medium-and-heavy-duty-engines-
and-vehicles/ep-label
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
Moreover, EPA's Proposal further conflicts with the Clean Air Act by establishing a new
class of medium duty vehicles that conflicts with the plain language of the CAA defining heavy-
duty vehicles. Congress created specific lead time requirements for heavy-duty vehicles to
ensure technological feasibility: "Any standard promulgated or revised under this paragraph and
applicable to classes or categories of heavy-duty vehicles or engines shall apply for a period of
no less than 3 model years beginning no earlier than the model year commencing 4 years after
such revised standard is promulgated."98 In the Proposed Rule, EPA lumps a newly-defined
category of Class 2b and 3 "medium-duty vehicles" (with a gross vehicle weight rating between
8,501 and 14,000 pounds) in with light-duty vehicles. But medium-duty vehicles are actually
"heavy-duty vehicles" under the Clean Air Act, which defines "heavy-duty vehicle" as "a truck,
bus, or other vehicle manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways
(not including any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails) which has a gross vehicle
weight (as determined under regulations promulgated by the Administrator) in excess of six
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thousand pounds."99 Presuming the Proposed Rule results in a final rule promulgated in 2024,
any new standards for Class 2b or 3 vehicles cannot apply until model year 2028.100
Furthermore, EPA is ignoring Congressional direction to issue separate standards for heavy-duty
and light-duty vehicles by comingling them into the same fleet averaging, banking, and trading
program (which is also unlawful, see Section III.A. 1). 101 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p.
24]
98 Id., § 7521(a)(3)(C).
99 Id., § 7521(b)(3)(C) (emphasis added).
100 EPA's promulgation of standards for medium duty vehicles and light duty trucks along with other light
duty vehicles is arbitrary and capricious as EPA itself recognizes that its approach - "for regulatory
purposes" - differs from the statutory definition of heavy-duty vehicles in the Clean Air Act. See 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29226, n. 382.
101 See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(B) (recognizing additional requirements for heavy-duty vehicles).
EPA recognized the need to treat different motor vehicle technologies differently. In previous
rulemakings, EPA distinguished between Otto-cycle (primarily gasoline-fueled vehicles) and
diesel heavy-duty vehicles. 115 EPA also differentiated between gasoline- and diesel-fueled
vehicles and those operated on natural gas. 116 And more than 30 years ago, EPA promulgated
specific standards for methanol-fueled vehicles. 117 The regulations varied emission-control
requirements based on fuel type. 118 For example, in promulgating regulations for methanol-
fueled vehicles, EPA explained that "because the design and function of methanol vehicles is
very much like that of their petroleum counterparts, the methanol emission control requirements
are comparable (in most cases identical) to those already in existence." 119 At the same time,
within the methanol vehicle rule, EPA noted that "in some future cases, this criterion may not be
sufficient to adequately determine the classification of a vehicle . . . [EPA] may need to take into
account other relevant factors, such as compression ratio, combustion characteristics,
characteristics of the engine's operating thermodynamics, or intended in-use duty cycle." 120 In
other words, EPA recognized the varying methods of converting energy into motive power could
require different criterion (classification) for regulating different vehicles. And the agency did so
in circumstances where the drivetrain technologies were substantially more similar to ZEV than
to ICEV. To remain consistent in its regulatory approach, were EPA to have the authority to set
emissions standards for ZEVs, it must promulgate separate emission standards that apply solely
to ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 26-27]
115 See e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§86.098-10, 86.099-11.
116 59 Fed. Reg. 48472 (Sept. 21, 1994).
117 54 Fed. Reg. 14426 (April 11, 1989).
117 Id. at 14428.
118 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §80-090-8(a)(l)(A)-(B), differentiating as between hydrocarbon standards for
petroleum-fueled vehicles and organic material hydrocarbon equivalent for methanol-fueled vehicles;
§86.090-11, imposing different standards for 1990 and later MY Otto-cycle heavy-duty
vehicles from same weight methanol-fueled vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 26-
27]
119 Id. at 14428.
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120 Id. at 14429.
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
c. Both this Proposal and the Heavy-Duty Vehicle Proposal Miss the Mark.
i. EPA is missing millions of vehicles that will contribute to emissions.
API is concerned that this proposal, as well as EPA's Heavy-Duty proposedl 1 GHG rule,
seriously miss the mark with respect to reducing emissions from the transportation sector. The
proposals focus heavily on ZEV technologies, and specifically BEVs, for reductions in the 2027
to 2032 timeframe. Yet, EPA is leaving emissions reductions on the table for existing LMDVs,
given the lifespan of these vehicles, as well as new ICE vehicles that will be sold between now
and 2032. According to Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL)12 there were over 105 million cars
and 148 million light trucks in the U.S. in 2020. In 2021, over 3.3 million new cars and over 11.2
million new light trucks were sold. The average age of a light-duty vehicle (LDV) is over 12
years. The U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA)13 projects
the stocks of light-duty internal combustion engines will exceed 247 million vehicles in 2050.
EPA's overly limited focus on ZEVs, and specifically BEV solutions, ignores options that could
better accomplish the agency's objectives to achieve greater transportation sector-related
emission reductions at lower cost to society. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 7-8]
11 88 Fed. Reg. 25,926 (April 27, 2023).
12 "Transportation Energy Data Book: Edition 40", Oak Ridge National Laboratory. ORNL/TM-
2022/2376. https://tedb.oml.gov/.
13 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Annual Energy Outlook 2023." March 2023.
https://www.eia. gov/outlooks/aeo/.
EPA's proposal extends to "medium-duty vehicles" (MDVs), previously referred to as
"heavy-duty class 2b and 3 vehicles or heavy-duty pickups and vans." 14 Vehicles in this class
may include large SUVs, heavy-duty pickups, utility vans, mini-buses, step vans, delivery vans,
and light dump trucks (i.e., GVWR up to 14,000 pounds) which have different and diverse usage
applications 15 compared to lighter LDVs and medium-duty passenger vehicles (MDPVs),
which fall into EPA's LDV classifications of light-duty passenger cars and light-duty trucks. The
MDV market (i.e., class 2b and 3 vehicles) is made up of purchasers that want to get "the right
tool for the job" and often include service providers such as plumbers, landscapers, and utility
company fleets. 16 Although there is little published regarding makeup, usage, and environmental
impact of class 2b and class 3 vehicles, there are approximately 13 million class 2b and 3 million
class 3 vehicles in the U.S. fleet and these vehicles may remain in fleets up to 15 years. 17
Purchasing decisions and usage of class 2b and class 3 vehicles are driven by demands of
meeting commercial, business, and personal use and these vehicles are likely used in distinctly
different applications compared to lighter LDVs covered by EPA's proposal. Accordingly, these
vehicles should not be included in the LMDV program. Further, as discussed in Section h below,
EPA exceeded its authority in changing the definitions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 7-
8]
14 88 Fed. Reg. 29196 (May 5, 2023).
15 Oak Ridge National Laboratory. "Electrification Beyond Light Duty: Class 2b-3 Commercial Vehicles."
ORNL/TM- 2017/744. 2017. https://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/Files/Publ06416.pdf.
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16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
EPA explains in the Proposed Rule that "[l]ight-duty trucks (LDTs) that have gross vehicle
weight ratings above 6,000 pounds and all MDVs are considered "heavy-duty vehicles" under
the CAA." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29226 n. 382. This comports with CAA § 202(b)(3)(C), which defines
the term "heavy duty vehicle" to mean "a truck, bus, or other vehicle manufactured primarily for
use on the public streets, roads, and highways (not including any vehicle operated exclusively on
a rail or rails) which has a gross vehicle weight (as determined under regulations promulgated by
the Administrator) in excess of six thousand pounds." This definition communicates Congress's
clear intent that heavy-duty vehicles should be regulated as a distinct class of vehicles, separate
from light-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 29-30]
The Proposed Rule violates this obligation by regulating certain heavy-duty vehicles as light-
duty vehicles and by commingling these two classes in the same averaging, banking, and trading
program (which, as addressed in subsection iii, above, is unlawfully considered in formulating
the proposed emissions standards). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 29-30]
The problem here involves "medium duty vehicles" ("MDV"), which EPA defines to mean
Class 2b and 3 vehicles. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29226. EPA explains that it "has not previously used the
MDV nomenclature, referring to these larger vehicles in prior rules as either heavy-duty Class 2b
and 3 vehicles or heavy-duty pickups and vans." EPA further explains that it previously
"addressed medium-duty vehicle emissions as part of regulatory programs for GHG emissions
along with the heavy-duty sector." Id. at 29227. The exception was "medium duty passenger
vehicles" ("MDPV") which EPA previously has defined as "vehicles between 8,501 and 10,000
pounds GVWR designed primarily for the transportation of persons." Id. at 29226 n. 382.
According to EPA, "[w]hen [it] established its GHG standards in 2010, EPA included MDPVs in
the light-duty vehicle GHG program as well," such that "[essentially, MDPVs are heavy-duty
vehicles that are included in light-duty vehicle programs." Id. at 29278. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, pp. 29-30]
EPA here proposes to expand the definition of MDPV in two ways: (1) "EPA is proposing to
include in the MDPV definition any passenger vehicles at or below 14,000 pounds GVWR with
a work factor at or below 5,000 pounds except for pickups with an open bed interior length of
eight feet or larger which would continue to be excluded from the MDPV category"; and (2)
EPA proposes "to include in the MDPV category any pickups with a GVWR below 9,900
pounds and an interior bed length less than eight feet regardless of whether the vehicle work
factor is above 5,000 pounds. Pickups at or above 9,900 pounds up to 14,000 pounds GVWR
with a work factor above 5,000 pounds would be included as MDPVs only if their interior bed
length is less than six feet." Id. EPA proposed these changes out of concern that "potential
market changes [] could move passenger vehicles out of the LD regulatory class." Id. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 29-30]
The inclusion of heavy-duty vehicles (i.e., "a truck, bus, or other vehicle manufactured
primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways ... which has a gross vehicle weight
... in excess of six thousand pounds," CAA § 202(b(3)(C)) in the same class as light-duty
vehicles for purposes of setting emissions standards violates EPA's obligation to regulate heavy-
duty vehicles and light-duty vehicles as separate classes under CAA § 202. This fundamental
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error is magnified by the current proposal to expand the category of MDPVs to include both
heavier vehicles and an expanded range of lighter vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 29-30]
EPA explains in the Proposed Rule that "light-duty trucks (LDTs) that have gross vehicle
weight ratings above 6,000 pounds and all MDVs are considered "heavy-duty vehicles" under
the CAA." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29226 n. 382. This comports with CAA § 202(b)(3)(C), which defines
the term "heavy duty vehicle" to mean "a truck, bus, or other vehicle manufactured primarily for
use on the public streets, roads, and highways (not including any vehicle operated exclusively on
a rail or rails) which has a gross vehicle weight (as determined under regulations promulgated by
the Administrator) in excess of six thousand pounds." This definition communicates Congress's
clear intent that heavy-duty vehicles should be regulated as a distinct class of vehicles, separate
from light-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 29-30]
The problem here involves "medium duty vehicles" ("MDV"), which EPA defines to mean
Class 2b and 3 vehicles. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29226. EPA explains that it "has not previously used the
MDV nomenclature, referring to these larger vehicles in prior rules as either heavy-duty Class 2b
and 3 vehicles or heavy-duty pickups and vans." EPA further explains that it previously
"addressed medium-duty vehicle emissions as part of regulatory programs for GHG emissions
along with the heavy-duty sector." Id. at 29227. The exception was "medium duty passenger
vehicles" ("MDPV") which EPA previously has defined as "vehicles between 8,501 and 10,000
pounds GVWR designed primarily for the transportation of persons." Id. at 29226 n. 382.
According to EPA, "[w]hen [it] established its GHG standards in 2010, EPA included MDPVs in
the light-duty vehicle GHG program as well," such that "essentially, MDPVs are heavy-duty
vehicles that are included in light-duty vehicle programs." Id. at 29278. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, pp. 29-30]
EPA here proposes to expand the definition of MDPV in two ways: (1) "EPA is proposing to
include in the MDPV definition any passenger vehicles at or below 14,000 pounds GVWR with
a work factor at or below 5,000 pounds except for pickups with an open bed interior length of
eight feet or larger which would continue to be excluded from the MDPV category"; and (2)
EPA proposes "to include in the MDPV category any pickups with a GVWR below 9,900
pounds and an interior bed length less than eight feet regardless of whether the vehicle work
factor is above 5,000 pounds. Pickups at or above 9,900 pounds up to 14,000 pounds GVWR
with a work factor above 5,000 pounds would be included as MDPVs only if their interior bed
length is less than six feet." Id. EPA proposed these changes out of concern that "potential
market changes [] could move passenger vehicles out of the LD regulatory class." Id. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 29-30]
The inclusion of heavy-duty vehicles (i.e., "a truck, bus, or other vehicle manufactured
primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways ... which has a gross vehicle weight
... in excess of six thousand pounds," CAA § 202(b(3)(C)) in the same class as light-duty
vehicles for purposes of setting emissions standards violates EPA's obligation to regulate heavy-
duty vehicles and light-duty vehicles as separate classes under CAA § 202. This fundamental
error is magnified by the current proposal to expand the category of MDPVs to include both
heavier vehicles and an expanded range of lighter vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 29-30]
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Organization: Arconic Corporation (ARCO)
5. Arconic agrees with the proposed modifications to the medium duty passenger vehicle
definition. The previous definition is that any vehicle with a GVWR over 8500 pounds is a
medium duty vehicle. This change would prevent vehicles that are used as light duty vehicles to
be moved into the "medium duty" category by higher vehicle weights and minor capacity
improvements and thus qualify for higher emission targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, p.
3]
Organization: Electrification Coalition (EC)
We suggest the EPA address the topic of vehicle right-sizing in the future in the context of
reducing the overall impact of emissions from the transportation sector, and to more widely
enable the benefits of transportation electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0588, p. 3]
The EC agrees with the EPA's projection that a future fleet will be characterized by a greatly
increased projection of EVs. It is also reasonable to project that the future light duty fleet will, in
the absence of regulatory action on vehicle size, continue to be dominated by large and heavy
vehicles such as trucks and SUV EVs. An increasing number of larger EVs are appearing on the
consumer market, whilst there has not been similar growth in the variety of smaller EVs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0588, p. 3]
The EC believes that the approach by the EPA in this proposal is understandable and
appropriate given the structure of the existing regulatory framework and we appreciate the work
EPA has done to broaden he definition of medium duty passenger vehicles (MDPVs) to ensure
that auto manufacturers will not upsize vehicles to avoid emissions controls. However, the
question of vehicle size and cost must continue be thoughtfully considered by the EPA and other
regulators going forward in the context of reducing the emissions impact of the transportation
sector and helping to expand the benefits of electrified transportation more widely. To help
accelerate and optimize the electrification transition, in future rulemakings, emissions standards
for internal combustion engine vehicles should be paired with policy that incentivizes the
production of a wider range of EV choices for all consumers and transportation needs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0588, p. 3]
We suggest the EPA address the topic of vehicle right-sizing in the future in the context of
reducing the overall impact of emissions from the transportation sector, and to more widely
enable the benefits of transportation electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0588, p. 3]
The EC agrees with the EPA's projection that a future fleet will be characterized by a greatly
increased projection of EVs. It is also reasonable to project that the future light duty fleet will, in
the absence of regulatory action on vehicle size, continue to be dominated by large and heavy
vehicles such as trucks and SUV EVs. An increasing number of larger EVs are appearing on the
consumer market, whilst there has not been similar growth in the variety of smaller EVs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0588, p. 3]
The EC believes that the approach by the EPA in this proposal is understandable and
appropriate given the structure of the existing regulatory framework and we appreciate the work
EPA has done to broaden the definition of medium duty passenger vehicles (MDPVs) to ensure
that auto manufacturers will not upsize vehicles to avoid emissions controls. However, the
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question of vehicle size and cost must continue be thoughtfully considered by the EPA and other
regulators going forward in the context of reducing the emissions impact of the transportation
sector and helping to expand the benefits of electrified transportation more widely. To help
accelerate and optimize the electrification transition, in future rulemakings, emissions standards
for internal combustion engine vehicles should be paired with policy that incentivizes the
production of a wider range of EV choices for all consumers and transportation needs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0588, p. 3]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
IV. EPA should finalize medium-duty standards that deliver needed pollution reductions from
Class 2b and 3 vehicles.
EPA reasonably included Class 2b and 3 vehicles, referred to in the proposal as medium-duty
vehicles (MDVs), in the same rule as the light-duty vehicles. The medium-duty large vans and
pick-up trucks included in this proposal are more similar to LDVs in their use patterns and
configurations than HDVs. Indeed, many 2b trucks are simply larger versions of 2a trucks with
engines and transmissions that are nearly identical in configuration. Like LDVs, Class 2b and 3
vehicles are chassis certified rather than engine certified. Including MDVs in this proposal also
aligns the treatment of these vehicles with previous criteria pollutant standards where chassis
certified vehicles are considered separately from engine certified vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, p. 45]
Organization: Lucid Group, Inc.
Lucid Supports the Medium-Duty Passenger Vehicle Definition
Lucid supports EPA's proposed new medium-duty passenger vehicle (MDPV) classification,
which closes a loophole for larger passenger vehicles. In recognizing the actual uses of certain
larger and heavier vehicles as passenger vehicles, EPA's proposed MDPV classification would
subject these heavier passenger vehicles to the same standards as all other passenger vehicles,
i.e., light duty passenger vehicles. Without this change, larger SUVs and passenger vans would
be regulated as heavy-duty vehicles with less stringent emissions standards despite available
technology to allow these vehicles to meet the same standards as light duty vehicles. Further, in
the absence of the classification change proposed by EPA, automakers would be perversely
incentivized to continue making and selling larger, potentially more dangerous vehicles with
higher emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, p. 5]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
We would like to emphasize the importance of setting feasible and achievable standards for
Class 2b and Class 3 vehicles. Similar to light-duty vehicles ("LDVs"), there remain many
uncertainties in customer uptake and acceptance of medium-duty electric vehicles. Moreover,
electrification in this segment lags that of light-duty, as production of these vehicles is only just
beginning. As a result, there are currently limited options available to consumers, and medium-
duty charging infrastructure requires additional attention, funding, and considerations
appropriate for medium-duty vehicle usage. Medium-duty vans are being increasingly swept into
pick-up truck focused regulations, as well as EPA's intent to treat medium-duty more like light-
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duty. Yet, medium-duty vans remain fundamentally different than either pick-ups or light-duty,
and therefore warrant specific consideration of their technologies, customer uses, and
corresponding regulatory requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 2-3]
Section V: MDVs (Vans)
Use-Cases
In the MDV segment, there are typically two kinds of vehicles included, pickup trucks and
vans. These two vehicle types are fundamentally different. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp.
16-17]
For vans, there are use cases with high potential for rapid electrification, but also segments
with long-distance driving, high payload requirements and thus lower potential for rapid
electrification. As shown in 2021 sales data, although last mile delivery applications form a
portion of Sprinter van sales, they are used for a wide variety of other applications as well-
construction vehicles, small businesses such as plumbers and electricians, people movers, and
recreational vehicles. These applications are not typically fulfilled by pick-up trucks, but the
EPA NPRM makes no differentiation between the diversity of use cases within the MDV
segment. Further, EPA increasingly treats MDVs as light-duty vehicles. Yet traditionally they
were aligned with the heavy-duty segment. The MDV segment provides unique functionality
separate from light-duty or heavy-duty vehicles. As such, standard setting for MDVs should be
differentiated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 16-17]
[See original for diagram for 2021 sales data] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 16-17]
When standard setting, EPA should consider the unique use cases that MDV vans fulfill in the
market and reflect that in standards proposed. It is unreasonable for the agency to set one
standard for pickup trucks with towing capacities approaching 50,0001b that also includes vans
that are used as people movers and recreational vehicles. EPA should also not tie MDV
emissions standards to the same expectations as light-duty. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp.
16-17]
Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
Rivian Supports Proposed Technical Changes to Ensure Strict Standards Govern Larger
Vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, p. 12]
Rivian commends EPA for its thoughtfully proposed modifications to certain vehicle
classifications and the car and truck standards. As the agency notes, the regulatory structure of
the GHG standards could "inadvertently provide an incentive for manufacturers to change the
size or regulatory class of vehicles as a compliance strategy"—an increasingly important concern
in light of sustained fleet mix changes in the market in favor of truck-classified passenger
vehicles and the use of larger high-utility vehicles like pickups.34 This set of concerns predates
the current proposal, and we welcome the actions proposed by EPA in response—namely
commonsense modifications to expand the MDPV definition and valuable changes to the car and
truck curves. As a manufacturer of MDPVs, Rivian understands the importance of vehicle
classification for ensuring that the full universe of passenger vehicles adheres to the appropriate
emissions standards and consumer assurance measures. Similarly, adjusting the slopes of the
standards curves and narrowing the difference in stringency between the car and truck standards
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should moderate any perverse incentives for manufacturers to upsize and/or reclassify vehicles.
EPA should finalize the proposed vehicle classification changes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0653, p. 12]
34 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 87 (May 5, 2023) (revising 40 C.F.R. Parts 85, 86, 600, 1036, 1037, and 1066),
29,196.
Organization: Stellantis
Implicit / Explicit MDV GHG Standards are Infeasible
The EPA is proposing a very challenging set of regulatory changes for the medium-duty
vehicles that are infeasible. This includes direct core stringency changes along with four other
actions that further increase stringency: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 17-18]
- Medium-duty Passenger Vehicle (MDPV) - Changes the MDPV definition which negatively
impacts both light-duty and medium-duty greenhouse gas stringency [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0678, pp. 17-18]
Medium-Duty Passenger Vehicle Classification Changes Hurt Medium-Duty Pickup Trucks
Revisions to the MDPV definition are proposed by EPA. EPA notes that the Work Factor
threshold of 5,000 lb. was set to avoid capturing a significant number of work vans or
trucks, [redacted text.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 20-22]
In summary, the MDPV proposed revised definition needs to be changed because it:
- Reclassifies some GHG reducing BEVs back to LDT fleet, effectively harming MD GHG
fleet
- [redacted text.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 20-22]
Stellantis recommends that EPA should:
GHG Standards
-Fix incorrect MDV adjustments that mistakenly force medium-duty vehicles into light-duty
standards and double stringency of high capability products arbitrarily [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0678, p. 24]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Tesla Supports EPA's Proposed Changes to the Medium Duty Definition
Tesla supports the agency's proposed definitional changes around medium-duty passenger
vehicles. 166 As more electrification takes place across the passenger vehicle fleet, the
definitional changes will allow the agency to recognize the increased weight associated with
such electrification while ensuring that passenger vehicles are appropriately subject to more
stringent passenger-vehicle emissions standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 26]
166 Id., at 29278-79.
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Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
7. ZETA Comments on the Additional Proposed Regulatory Changes
Beyond the overall stringency of EPA's proposed GHG and multipollutant emissions
standards for LMDVs, ZETA is providing the following comments on the various regulatory
changes proposed in the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 28]
ZETA supports EPA's proposed changes to the medium-duty passenger vehicle (MDPV)
definition. As MDPVs become increasingly electrified, EPA regulations should reflect the
increased weight associated with the onboard battery. MDPVs are predominantly used to
transport people, rather than goods, and therefore should be subject to emissions standards whose
stringency is consistent with non-work based applications. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p.
28]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
EPA received a variety of comments regarding proposed vehicle regulatory class changes.
Comments ranged from highly supportive to strong opposition, with some comments either
being out of scope or more nuanced.
EPA received supportive comments from Arconic Corporation (ARCO), the Electrification
Coalition, Lucid Group, Rivian, Tesla and the Zero Emissions Transportation Association
(ZETA). Referring to the proposed expansion of the Medium Duty Passenger Vehicle Definition
(MDPV), Rivian commented that EPA's proposed change to the MDPV definition was a
"common sense modification" and agreed with EPA that retaining the existing MDPV definition
could inadvertently provide an incentive for manufacturers to change the size or regulatory class
of vehicles as a compliance strategy.
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI) provided a significant number of comments
regarding potential changes to regulatory classifications. AAI noted that the MDPV definition
change may result in misalignment with NHTSA's regulatory classifications, and they suggested
the definition change might not result in the intended outcome. They further noted that moving
heavy BEVs out of the medium-duty averaging set would result in the cleanest vehicles not
contributing to medium-duty vehicle compliance. AAI also expressed concerns with the
consistency of the revised MDPV definition and the proposed 22,000-pound GCWR limit for
engine certification. AAI went on to make several recommendations: 1. Allow the revised
MDPV definition to be adopted early in MY 2027 as an option but delay mandatory adoption
until MY 2030. 2. Preferred option is to retain the existing MDPV definition and allow Class 3
BEV/FCEV/PHEV vehicles the option to contribute to either Medium-Duty or Light-Duty GHG
compliance, but not both. 3. If the MDPV definition is adopted, the GVRW threshold should be
lowered to 9,500 pounds and the work factor threshold should be lowered to 4,500 pounds. AAI
also recommended clarification in the revised MDPV definition for the measured bed length.
AFPM objected to the classification of some vehicles as medium duty vehicles, on the ground
that the Clean Air Act defines these vehicles as heavy-duty vehicles, which triggers certain
statutory provisions such as lead time and stability.
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API stated that the inclusion of heavy-duty vehicles in the same class as light-duty vehicles
for purposes of setting emissions standards, and commingling the vehicles for the ABT program
violates EPA's obligation to regulate heavy-duty vehicles and light-duty vehicles as separate
classes under CAA § 202.
EPA also received Confidential Business Information (CBI) from several vehicle
manufacturers which provided specific feedback on the proposed MDPV definition change
which are largely reflected in the AAI comments above.
Response:
EPA appreciates the comments received regarding changes to regulatory classifications. Upon
review of the public comments, EPA has decided to finalize changes to the MDPV definition,
but with several specific modifications from the proposal. EPA is adopting AAI's recommended
changes to the thresholds for the MDPV definition, with 9,500 pounds and 4,500 pounds being
the final thresholds for GVWR and work factor, respectively because the agency agrees with the
commenters that these thresholds more appropriately encompass the range of vehicle weights
and utility that the agency was attempting to address. In addition, EPA agrees with AAI that we
should allow vehicle manufacturers the option of adopting the revised MDPV definition prior to
MY 2027, but the Agency has decided against delaying the requirement until MY 2030 because
the agency believes that there is risk of manufacturers moving light-duty vehicles into the
medium duty category to gain less stringent standards; the revised MDPV definition will be
required starting in MY 2027. Because there are little to no ICE-based vehicles that fall under the
MDPV definition as a result of the changes in this rule, the Agency does not believe that there
are any lead time issues associated with adopting the revised definition at the start of the
program.
EPA has collaborated extensively with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) during the development of this rulemaking and have consulted with NHTSA about our
intent to revise the MDPV definition for GHG and criteria pollutant emissions. EPA understands
that NHTSA does not have the same flexibility under the CAFE statute to follow suit with EPA's
revised MDPV definition change. We have accordingly amended 40 CFR part 600 to maintain
consistency with NHTSA's MDPV definition for regulatory provisions related to fuel economy
standards and labeling. However, EPA does not view the differences in program structure for
applying emission standards as being significantly different than other programmatic and
statutory differences between the two agencies. Differences already exist, such as the CAFE
program's limitation on car/truck credit trading that require vehicle manufacturers to manage two
different averaging sets. We do not believe that this difference in MDPV definition will cause
difficulties with or be disruptive to manufacturers' strategies to simultaneously comply with both
the CAFE standards and these GHG standards.
Regarding AFPM's objections to the medium duty class, EPA recognizes that these vehicles
are heavy duty vehicles for purposes of Clean Air Act section 202(a)(3). In fact, the regulation
defines "Medium-duty vehicle" at 40 CFR 86.1803-01 to be a subset of heavy-duty vehicles. As
such, we use the term medium-duty vehicles only to more clearly establish how the regulation
applies for that collection of heavy-duty vehicles. It is precisely because these are heavy-duty
vehicles that EPA has adopted a default compliance schedule, consistent with the lead time and
stability requirements of CAA section 202(a)(3)(C), as well as an optional compliance schedule
for these vehicles. In addition, in setting the standards, EPA identified criteria pollutant
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standards for the greatest degree of emissions reduction achievable pursuant to CAA section
202(a)(3)(A). However, EPA does not see any basis for concluding that the Clean Air Act
prohibits EPA from grouping these vehicles together (or to allow very limited credit transfers for
ABT purposes) for purposes of these emissions standards. To the contrary, CAA section
202(a)(3)(A)(ii) authorizes EPA to establish classes or categories of vehicles based on gross
vehicle weight or other appropriate factors.
With respect to API's objection that heavy duty vehicles should be regulated in the same class
as light duty vehicles, EPA notes, as previously stated, that it is regulating heavy duty vehicles
pursuant to section 202(a)(3), as appropriate. To the extent API objects to vehicles above 6,000
lbs GVWR being subject to the same standards as vehicles below 6,000 lbs GVWR, EPA
disagrees that there is anything that makes such an outcome impermissible under the CAA,
provided EPA promulgates standards under the relevant statutory provision. Moreover, EPA has
a longstanding practice of adopting standards for certain light trucks with GVWR somewhat
above 6,000 lbs GVWR consistently with light trucks at or below 6,000 lbs GVWR, in
recognition of the fact that these trucks generally serve similar purposes and have similar control
strategies available. EPA considers it beneficial for the environment, the public, and
manufacturers to avoid creating sharp divides in regulatory treatment that do not reflect real-
world differences in vehicles. This approach prevents situations where disparate regulatory
treatment shapes the market, rather than reflecting differences in vehicles and market demand.
EPA allows exchanging emission credits across vehicle types when doing so is consistent with
the rationale of the ABT program, providing flexibility and incentives to manufacturers to
identify efficient areas for pollution reduction, within comparable segments of the market.
In response to comments received from AAI regarding the GCWR cap in the WF equation,
please see Section 3.2.2 of this RTC.
3.1.2 - Averaging, banking, and trading
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Averaging, Banking, and Trading
Auto Innovators supports EPA's greenhouse gas averaging, baking, and trading (ABT)
program. This flexibility helps manufacturers plan more cost-effective compliance. We agree
with EPA's proposal to not change ABT provisions at this time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 108]
O2 Credits for Advanced Technology Vehicles
EPA proposes changes to the method for calculating MY 2022-2024 caps on multiplier-based
advanced technology vehicle credits in the proposed 40 C.F.R. § 86.1866-12.195 Given the
limited comment period and the denial of our request to extend it, Auto Innovators did not have
sufficient time to evaluate the proposed change. Additionally, we were unable to locate a
description of the proposed change in the preamble of the NPRM, so it is difficult to know what
the intent of the proposed change is. Following the formal comment period, we may revisit this
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issue and request a meeting with EPA staff if there is a concern. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 108-109]
195 NPRM at 29438.
E. Structure and Development of GHG Standards
1. Authority to Set Fleet Average Standards
Auto Innovators reaffirms its previously expressed support for the fleetwide averaging,
banking, and trading approach used by EPA in the Proposed Rule, including for EVs. EPA has
repeatedly employed this approach in prior section 202 rulemakings, including in the GHG
context, and this approach is amply supported by statute. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
109-110]
EPA and automakers have long relied on averaging, credits, and banking, and these features
are now integral to many manufacturers' business strategies. Indeed, fleetwide averaging has
been essential to the auto industry's efforts to meet EPA's GHG reduction goals in past
rulemakings. Fleetwide averaging, credits, and banking provides manufacturers with flexibility,
and reflects the realities of product life cycles, while still ensuring that the manufacturer's overall
fleet meets emissions reduction standards. Thus, averaging permits the imposition of tough
emissions standards on manufacturers, while reducing compliance costs and encouraging the
development and marketing of emissions reduction technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 109-110]
Fleetwide averaging is fully supported by the text of section 202, which requires EPA to
"prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes
of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines." As the D.C. Circuit has recognized,
"[n]nothing" in this language precludes EPA's consideration "of a manufacturer's ability to meet
emissions standards by averaging different engine families." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 109-110]
Consistent with this statutory text, EPA has employed fleetwide averaging in its section 202
standards for decades. EPA first adopted an averaging program for certain light-duty vehicles in
1983, followed by an averaging program for certain types of emissions from heavy-duty engines
and light-duty trucks in 1985. This program was unanimously upheld by a panel of the D.C.
Circuit in Thomas. A few years later, EPA extended the averaging approach to include banking
and trading. Each of EPA's GHG emissions standards, since the agency began regulating GHG
emissions under section , has employed fleetwide averaging, banking, and trading. And EPA has
long recognized that EVs may be accounted for in complying with fleet- average emissions
regulations, dating back to EPA's approval in 1990 of California's Low Emission Vehicle
Program—which effectively employed a fleet average standard including EVs— as "consistent
with section 202(a) "202 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 109-110]
We endorse EPA's continued use of fleetwide averaging, banking, and trading, which is well-
supported by statute and essential to comply with any GHG emissions standards. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 109-110]
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Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
Credit issues should be addressed further in the final rule
EPA states that MDVs are a separate averaging set and credits are not allowed to be
transferred between MDVs and LDVs due to differences in the structure of the standards for
these two vehicle categories and manufacturer competitiveness issues (FR 29245). ACEEE
strongly supports this decision and believes that keeping the categories separate will help to
avoid unintended consequences. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 10-11]
ACEEE also supports EPA's proposal to remove the BEV, PHEV, and FCEV multipliers for
MY 2027 (FR 29244), especially in view of the changing environment for the electrification of
MDVs, including availability of federal purchase incentives. However, leaving in place advanced
technology multipliers through MY 2026 could severely erode the real-world emissions
reductions of the proposed standards. In particular, we find that if advanced technology credits
were to retain the 5-year life assigned under the Phase 2 rule, credits generated by BEV vans sold
in MY 2024-2026 would eliminate the need for manufacturers to produce any of the BEV pickup
sales that EPA has projected for MY 2027-2031. Alternatively, these credits could be used to
offset the modest medium-duty ICE pickup efficiency gains EPA projects for MY 2027-2031.
We recommend that EPA eliminate advanced technology multipliers for MY 2024-2026 in the
final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 10-11]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
That fleetwide-averaging approach is at the heart of EPA's proposed rule at issue—which sets
stringent new GHG and criteria-pollutant emission stand- ards for light- and medium-duty
vehicles (broad categories that together encompass sedans, pickup trucks and SUVs, vans, and
more) for model years 2027 and beyond, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years
2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,184 (May 5, 2023)—
and its parallel proposed rule for heavy-duty vehicles, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for
Heavy-Duty Vehicles—Phase 3, 88 Fed. Reg. 25,926 (Apr. 27, 2023). Although prior EPA rules
issued under Section 202 have employed fleetwide averaging—including a light-duty motor-
vehicle rule for earlier model years, currently being litigated, see Texas v. EPA, No. 22-1031
(D.C. Cir.)—EPA's proposed Light- and Medium-Duty and Heavy-Duty rules do so in a
fundamentally different way to achieve a different end. Previously, averaging was presented as
merely a flexibility. Now, prompted by an Executive Order calling for a massive shift to "zero-
emission vehicles" by 2030 and directing EPA to undertake rulemakings on these issues with
that goal in mind, Exec. Order 14,037, 86 Fed. Reg. 43,583 (Aug. 5, 2021); see 88 Fed. Reg. at
29,186, EPA openly seeks in both rules to shift a substantial portion of motor-vehicle production
toward vehicles that emit zero GHG emissions in operation. Fleetwide averaging is the linchpin
of that ambition—it is this that allows EPA to reverse engineer its preferred outcomes. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 7]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
The structure of the Clean Air Act and its regulatory provisions for standard setting,
certification, compliance enforcement, warranties, and penalties also directly conflict with a
fleet- wide averaging regulatory regime. Notably, under Section 202(a), EPA "shall test, or
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require to be tested in such manner as [it] deems appropriate, any new motor vehicle or new
motor vehicle engine submitted by a manufacturer" and issue a certificate of conformity "if such
vehicle or engine" complies with the standards. And EPA must "test any emission control system
incorporated in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine ... to determine whether such a system
enables such vehicle or engine to conform to the standards required to be prescribe under
[Section 202(b)]" of the Act. EPA's use of a fleetwide averaging regulatory regime directly
conflicts with the statutory provisions that Congress already included to provide manufacturers
with compliance flexibility. For example, section 202(b)(3) provided compliance flexibilities for
NOx, but only for no "more than 5 percent of [a] manufacturer's production or more than fifty
thousand vehicles or engines, whichever is greater." This provision would be nonsensical under a
fleetwide-averaging regime where, if applied, an OEM could give itself a waiver for large swaths
of its fleet by over-complying for certain product lines well beyond its 5 percent or 50,000
vehicle allotment. Together, the Clean Air Act regulatory framework contemplates EPA
regulating vehicles individually. But this cannot be accomplished if there is not a clear emission
standard applicable to a single vehicle at the start of a model year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, pp.23-24]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
iv. EPA exceeded its authority by ignoring the distinctions Congress made between
heavy duty vehicles and light-duty vehicles and commingling them in the same averaging,
banking, and trading (ABT) program with smaller vehicles.
The Proposed Rule violates this obligation by regulating certain heavy-duty vehicles as light-
duty vehicles and by commingling these two classes in the same averaging, banking, and trading
program (which, as addressed in subsection iii, above, is unlawfully considered in formulating
the proposed emissions standards). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 29-30]
Organization: Aston Martin Lagonda (AML)
SVMs cannot effectively fleet average
One assumption supporting the NPRM which is not applicable to SVMs is that all OEMs
have the ability to average the emissions of their various test groups in order to meet a fleet
standard. SVMs have long maintained that with only one or two high-performance test groups,
they cannot use "averaging" as a compliance strategy and have therefore needed, and still need,
the long-standing EPA policy affording extra leadtime and flexibility to SVMs. In the absence of
such flexibility, a fleet average standard becomes in effect a required (BIN) standard for these
SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 4-5]
This point further underlines the simple reality that large car makers can achieve lower
averages, whereas an SVM with a narrow or niche offering of products simple does not have this
ability to comply with the regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 4-5]
It is improper to set a standard so stringent that it requires an SVM to rely entirely on credits
from another manufacturer to maintain compliance
EPA projects that SVM fleets on average, and individually, will exceed the proposed
standards, requiring purchased credits to continue selling vehicles in the US. EPA therefore
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relies on credit trading flexibility as a key means by which SVMs will maintain compliance with
standards. We disagree with this approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 4-5]
It is counterproductive to set a standard so stringent that it requires a manufacturer to rely
entirely on credits from another manufacturer to maintain compliance. The decision to sell
credits, who to sell them to, at what price to sell them, and when to sell them (or to keep them for
drafted later use or future value} is a business decision. There is nothing that requires a
manufacturer to sell its credits, or to sell them to a particular party. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0566, pp. 4-5]
This approach would prevent SVMs from focusing valuable resources on investment in the
development and production of zero emission cars and instead divert resources to buy credits or
pay financial penalties. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 4-5]
On the one hand, EPA justifies its standard setting on the basis that credits can be bought, but
on the other hand, EPA steadfastly maintains that it will not get involved in credit trading and
leaves it to the free market. As a result, the availability and cost of credits is inherently risky,
including the risk that credit-generating manufacturers may strategically withhold credits to limit
SVMs' market access. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 4-5]
And finally, compliance with EPA's proposed standards is largely premised on very high
levels of electrification. If EPA's projections are incorrect, and sales of electric vehicles are not
as high as expected, many manufacturers will likely need to hold onto credits to maintain their
own compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
C. Even if EPA could use fleetwide averaging, this cannot be used to force electrification.
Part of the reason EPA has traditionally been granted deference in its averaging schemes is
because the agency has historically used averaging as an accommodation to regulated parties,
allowing them additional flexibility that the statute does not in fact authorize. In prior rules, the
use of fleet-wide averaging meant that a vehicle manufacturer could comply by making some
vehicles that emitted more and others that emitted less. Thus, while some commentors have
pointed out the illegality of this scheme, vehicle manufacturers have not opposed EPA's
averaging approach because it provided them with the flexibility necessary to achieve in a more
cost-effective way otherwise impractical standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 10-11]
Thus, when considering EPA's authority to use averaging, the D.C. Circuit has always noted
that it was critical that the averaging serve as merely a flexibility. See NRDC v. Thomas, 805
F.2d 410, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("EPA's argument that averaging will allow manufacturers more
flexibility in cost allocation while ensuring that a manufacturer's overall fleet still meets the
emissions reduction standards makes sense.") (emphasis added); cf. White Stallion Energy Ctr.,
LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (permitting averaging across multiple utility
units under 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) because averaging is a '"more flexible, and less costly
alternative.'"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 10-11]
But in this new proposal EPA is not offering an extra statutory accommodation to a regulated
party, but is instead taking an additional step away from the statutory text by using fleetwide
averaging to mandate electrification. The proposal would set emissions standards in such a way
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that no fleet of internal combustion engine vehicles can meet the standards. This means that
averaging no longer provides flexibility about which kinds of internal-combustion vehicles a
manufacturer may sell, but instead amounts to a de facto mandate to incorporate electric vehicles
to comply with its proposed standards. Much as in the Clean Power Plan, crediting is deployed as
a tool for reverse engineering a share of preferred technologies by setting targets that cannot be
achieved by disfavored technologies. Thus, even if the agency was properly entitled to deference
in its previous averaging schemes, this deference evaporates when the scheme is used coercively,
rather than permissively. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 10-11]
Organization: Environmental and Public Health Organizations
D. The averaging, banking, and trading program continues to be an important way for
manufacturers to maintain flexibility in meeting EPA's vehicle emission standards.
Like its previous GHG emission standards for light- and heavy-duty vehicles, and standards
for certain vehicle criteria pollutant emissions dating back to 1983, EPA's Proposed Standards
rely on an averaging, banking, and trading (ABT) approach allowing manufacturers to meet the
standards by averaging emissions across vehicles. Given its longstanding use of this approach
under Section 202, EPA's Proposal emphasizes that EPA is "not proposing any revisions to the
[light-duty or medium-duty] GHG program ABT provisions or reopening them." 88 Fed. Reg. at
29246; id. at 29245; see also id. at 29277 (similar statement regarding ABT provisions for the
proposed criteria pollutant program for NMOG+NOx standards). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 85]
We agree with EPA's determination that there is no reason to reopen the question whether it
is permissible to use an ABT approach under Section 202. EPA has not only repeatedly used
ABT in Section 202 standards but also repeatedly explained that ABT is consistent with and
gives full effect to the requirements of Section 202 as well as the Clean Air Act's compliance
and enforcement provisions applicable to standards issued under Section 202. Under such
circumstances, it is eminently reasonable for EPA not to reconsider a question that has been
settled for decades. See Growth Energy v. EPA, 5 F.4th 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2021). In promulgating
its final standards, EPA should refrain from "substantive reconsideration," id. at 21, of whether
ABT is a permissible approach under Section 202, which might inadvertently suggest,
notwithstanding the statements in the Proposal, that EPA has reopened the issue. EPA may, of
course, express its continued adherence to its previously settled view that Section 202 permits
standards using ABT without reopening the issue, and it may respond to any unsolicited
comments it may receive on the issue. See Banner Health v. Price, 867 F.3d 1323, 1341 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (quoting Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1213
(D.C. Cir. 1996)). But reexamination and reconsideration of whether ABT is consistent with the
Clean Air Act is unnecessary and uncalled-for. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 85-86]
EPA first promulgated a Section 202 standard that used averaging when it issued its
particulate standards for light-duty diesel vehicles in 1983. See 43 Fed. Reg. 33456 (July 21,
1983). EPA explained at that time that standards employing averaging fell within its "broad
authority" under Section 202 and were "consistent with the [Clean Air Act's] certification
scheme." Id. at 33458. Specifically, the 1983 standard required EPA to certify the conformity of
a manufacturer's vehicles with a standard that was established based on a combination of testing
of the families of vehicles making up their fleets and planned production volumes. This process
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would yield a fleet whose average emissions complied with the standard; the certificate would be
conditioned on the manufacturer actually "maintaining] family production volumes such that the
production-weighted average of the manufacturer's family limits indeed meets the standards at
year's end." Id. at 33459. As EPA explained, averaging thus accords with the Act's prohibition
on the sale of vehicles not covered by a certificate of conformity and allows imposition of
appropriate penalties for any violations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 86]
EPA's 1985 standard for NOx emissions from light-duty trucks, as well as for NOx and
particulates from HD engines, similarly employed an averaging approach. See 50 Fed. Reg.
10606 (Mar. 15, 1985). EPA's final rulemaking notice again explained that its averaging
approach was consistent with the statutory requirement that compliance be certified before
vehicles were sold, and that certification was subject to the condition that the certificate would be
voided if the manufacturer's production-weighted average emissions did not meet the standard at
the end of the model year. See id. at 10633, 10636-37. EPA found that "the averaging concept"
was "fully consistent with the technology-forcing mandate of the Act," id. at 10634, while at the
same time "eas[ing] the compliance burden" for manufacturers, id. at 10635. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 86]
The D.C. Circuit rejected arguments that the 1985 standard's averaging approach was
unauthorized under the Clean Air Act in NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The
court observed that "EPA's agreement that averaging will allow manufacturers more flexibility
in cost allocation while ensuring that a manufacturer's overall fleet still meets the emissions
reduction standards makes sense." Id. at 425. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 86-87]
Thomas noted that there were potential arguments against averaging that it did not address
because they had not been raised before the Agency, including an argument that an averaging
approach might not be consistent with the Act's testing and certification provision, Section 206.
Id. at 425 n.24. The court suggested that EPA consider this question in future proceedings and
provide a further explanation of how averaging conformed to statutory requirements. Id. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 87]
EPA took the court up on that invitation in its subsequent 1990 rulemaking proceeding
establishing certification programs for banking and trading of NOx and particulate emission
credits for HD engines. That rulemaking resulted in an expanded averaging regime, with the
addition of provisions for banking and trading of credits generated if manufacturers production-
weighted average emissions were below the requirements of the NOx and particulate standards.
See 55 Fed. Reg. 30584, 30584-86 (July 26, 1990). Both in the final rulemaking notice and the
proposal for those standards, EPA addressed the issues flagged in Thomas and explained at
length how the ABT program conformed with the Clean Air Act's certification requirements. See
id. at 30593-94 (final rule); 54 Fed. Reg. 22652, 22665-67 (May 25, 1989) (proposed rule). EPA
articulated in detail how its ABT approach entails presale certification of the conformity of each
engine or vehicle with the applicable standards based on testing of emissions generated by
engine families and projected production estimates, with certification conditioned on a final end-
of-model-year determination that a manufacturer's actual production-weighted average
emissions comply with the standard. See 55 Fed. Reg. at 30585, 30594, 30600-04. These features
of the ABT program, EPA explained, facilitate application of the Act's enforcement and penalty
provisions. See id. at 30594, 30603-04. EPA similarly used ABT in its Tier 2 light-duty NOx
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standards promulgated in 2000. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 6744. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
87]
Having determined in these earlier rules that ABT standards are consistent with Section 202,
EPA employed the ABT approach pioneered in the 1990 HD standards when it first adopted
GHG standards for LDVs in 2010 and HD engines and vehicles in 2011. See 75 Fed. Reg.
25324, 25405 (May 7, 2010); 76 Fed. Reg. 57106, 57127-28 (Sept. 15, 2011). In each case, EPA
explained at length how, in implementing ABT standards, it fulfills its statutory obligations to
certify conformity of vehicles or engines with the standards before they are introduced into
commerce, to require warranties of compliance, and to test for in-use compliance. See 75 Fed.
Reg. at 25468-77; 76 Fed. Reg. at 57254-92. EPA also explained how, under an ABT approach,
it would give full effect to the statute's provision for calculation of penalties for each
nonconforming vehicle in the event of a violation of the standards. See 75 Fed. Reg. at 25482; 76
Fed. Reg. at 57257. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 87]
Subsequent iterations of GHG and other motor-vehicle emission standards under Section 202
for both LD and HD vehicles and engines have likewise used an ABT approach consistent with
that used in the 2010 and 2011 GHG standards. See 77 Fed. Reg. 62624, 62788 (Oct. 15, 2012)
(LD GHG standards); U.S. EPA, Control of Air Pollution From Motor Vehicles: Tier 3 Motor
Vehicle Emission and Fuel Standards; Final rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 23414, 23419 (LD and HD Tier 3
NOx standards); 81 Fed. Reg. 73478, 73495 (Oct. 25, 2016) (HD Phase 2 GHG standards); 85
Fed. Reg. 24174, 25103-04, 25114 (Apr. 30, 2020) (LD GHG standards); 86 Fed. Reg. 74434,
74441 (Dec. 30, 2021) (LD GHG standards). In none of those rulemaking proceedings did EPA
reopen the issue whether Section 202 permits use of ABT in standard-setting; the Agency treated
the option to use ABT under Section 202 as a settled matter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
p. 88]
The Agency's settled practice of using ABT in Section 202 standards from 1990 onward did
not generate further legal challenges until the most recent set of light-duty GHG standards. As to
the latter standards, however, petitioners challenging the standards have argued in review
proceedings pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that Section 202 permits
only the use of standards that specify emissions limits on an individual-vehicle basis, and that
standards employing averaging render the Clean Air Act's compliance and enforcement
provisions meaningless. See Final Br. for Priv. Petitioners, Texas v. EPA, Case No. 22-1031
(D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2023), ECF No. 1996915, at 36-50. EPA rejected those arguments when it
considered them in the 1990 rulemaking, and they run counter to the settled construction of the
statute on the basis of which EPA has issued standards since that time. EPA's brief in the D.C.
Circuit and the brief of the state and nongovernmental organizations supporting EPA explain that
challenges to ABT are untimely attempts to challenge determinations made decades ago, but also
detail the reasons ABT is consistent with the language and structure of Section 202 and the
applicable enforcement and compliance provisions of the Act. See EPA Br. 34-39, 62-75; State
& Pub. Int. Br. at 3-6, 9-17. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 88]
In sum, the Proposal's statements that "EPA has included ABT in many programs across a
wide range of mobile sources," 88 Fed. Reg. at 29245, and that the "ABT provisions are an
integral part of the vehicle GHG program," id. at 29246, are unquestionably accurate. Given that
EPA long ago addressed and resolved the lawfulness of ABT under Section 202, that EPA's use
of ABT is consistent with the D.C. Circuit's precedent in Thomas, that EPA has repeatedly
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explained how the statute's certification, warranty, testing, and enforcement provisions function
effectively in the context of ABT, and that the arguments against the use of ABT are essentially
the same as those discussed in Thomas and revisited in the round of rulemaking that followed,
there is no reason for the Agency to reopen these settled questions by reexamining them
substantively in this rulemaking (or appearing to do so). The Agency should adhere to its
statement in the Proposal that it is not reopening these issues. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
p. 88]
To foster understanding of how the Act's testing, certification, warranty, in-use compliance,
and penalty provisions operate in the context of a standard using ABT, it may be useful to
include in the final rule's preamble a clear description of how EPA uses testing and
manufacturers' production plans to issue certificates of conformity before vehicles or engines are
marketed; how manufacturers warrant compliance; how EPA determines in-use compliance; how
EPA determines whether a manufacturer's vehicles and engines have met the conditions imposed
on their initial certification by ultimately complying with the production-weighted emission
standards to which they are subject; and, in the event of noncompliance, how EPA would
identify noncompliant vehicles and impose penalties or other remedies. If it does so, EPA should
make clear that it is describing the operation of the statute and the ABT rules, not reexamining
EPA's settled view that its ABT standards and their implementation conform to the Act's
requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 89]
Although the Agency need not, and should not, reconsider the lawfulness of ABT standards
under Section 202, EPA's analysis more than adequately explains the benefits of continuing to
use the ABT approach for this latest set of emission standards. EPA's analysis of the benefits
ABT provides in this context, see 88 Fed. Reg. at 29342-43, amply justifies the Agency's choice
of retaining the ABT approach for this set of standards. As EPA has indicated, the ABT structure
allows EPA to require the reductions in vehicle pollutant emissions that are essential to
addressing the endangerment of public health and welfare attributable to those emissions in a
manner that best balances the need for significant cuts in emissions with the requirement that
standards be feasible and achievable within the time allowed for compliance. The ABT approach
"recognize[s] that automakers typically have compliance opportunities and strategies that differ
across their fleet, as well a multi-year redesign cycle, so not every vehicle will be redesigned
every year to add emissions-reducing technology;" ABT allows manufacturers to keep pace with
required improvements by overcomplying with newly designed or redesigned vehicles while
other vehicles whose designs are already locked in undercomply. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29342. Thus,
"performance-based standards with ABT provisions give manufacturers a degree of flexibility in
the design of specific vehicles and their fleet offerings, while allowing industry overall to meet
the standards and thus achieve the health and environmental benefits projected for this
rulemaking at a lower cost." Id. at 29343. These benefits of the ABT approach are recognized by
regulators, environmental advocates, and industry alike. See Final Answering Br. for Intervenor
Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Texas v. EPA, Case No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2023),
ECF No. 1996757, at 8-9 (stating that ABT has "been essential to the auto industry's efforts to
meet EPA's increasingly ambitious goals for greenhouse gas reduction" and that "the automotive
industry has relied for more than a generation" on ABT "to enable cost-effective emissions
reductions"). These considerations more than justify EPA's continued use of this approach for
purposes of these standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 89]
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Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF)
B. EPA properly decided not to reopen its longstanding use of averaging, banking, and
trading.
EPA has used an ABT approach in standards for light- and heavy-duty vehicles since the
1980s, including each of its previous light-duty GHG rules upon which this proposal builds.
Within this decades-long history, EPA has repeatedly explained why such an approach is
reasonable and consistent with the text of Section 202. Based on EPA's settled and longstanding
use of ABT in its Section 202 rules and ABT's well-established basis in the statute, the agency's
decision not to reopen "the basic structure of the ABT program" is reasonable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, p. 12]
Organization: Jaguar Land Rover NA, LLC (JLR)
We particularly support the EPA's continuation of the existing regulation in two areas:
Credit Banking and Trading Flexibilities [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 3-4]
JLR fully supports EPA's decision to make no changes to averaging, banking, and trading
provisions. We commend the agency for the continued inclusion of the flexibility to carry
backwards and forwards the overcompliance in a given calendar year to offset any shortfalls in
another year. As a lower volume manufacturer, JLR relies on this flexibility due to our limited
product line up with typically less than half the opportunities to introduce new models and
technologies to the market compared to larger manufacturers. We believe flexibilities are a
fundamental part of any GHG or ZEV regulation. They allow for car manufacturers' different
plans and launch cadences, allowing each manufacturer to develop their own path for
compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 3-4]
Credit Trading between Manufacturers
JLR disagrees with the conclusion that EPA has come to with regards to calculating the
feasibility of the regulation including the purchase of credits as a viable compliance option as
referenced in the NPRM. ".. EPA has included the ability of manufacturers to trade credits as
part of our central case compliance modeling for this proposal, rather than as a sensitivity
analysis as we did in the modeling for the 2021 rule." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 9]
As there is no option to resolve non-compliance through a fine payment, EPA should not
determine the feasibility of a regulation that includes a pathway where an OEM potentially has to
rely on a competitor to achieve compliance, especially as there is no requirement that an OEM
must sell the credits they have generated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 9]
The GHG regulation should be designed to ensure there are sufficient flexibilities in the
regulation for the manufacturer to achieve compliance on its own. This ensures that a car
manufacturer's budget is spent on funding its transition to an EV future. JLR does not view fine
payment as an appropriate compliance route or as a flexibility in the regulation, but we would
like to highlight one benefit of a fine is to help set an appropriate price of credits. As it is absent
in this regulation, there is no limit on credit price, which further compounds the significant
planning uncertainty. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 9]
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From the 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report as detailed in Table 5.15, the balance of
credit/debit generation by industry resulted in a credit deficit across 2016-2021MY, with only
historical banked credits bridging the gap. If this trend continues, we can expect less availability
of credits in the market. Even for those companies producing electric vehicles only, the number
of credits they will have available to sell will reduce over time as the stringency of the regulation
increases which could lead to increases in credit prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 9]
In response to EPA's suggestion of alternative routes to compliance if an OEM chooses not to
partake in credit trading. "... manufacturers also could elect to shift market segments and sales
volumes as a strategy for increasing the proportion of credit-generating vehicles relative to debit-
generating vehicles." This is correct, however JLR disagrees that it is a viable option within the
regulation time period due to the lead time involved with such a drastic restructure of a
manufacturer's product plans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 9]
JLR requests that EPA excludes the ability of manufacturers to trade credits from the central
case compliance model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 9]
Organization: Kia Corporation
Kia strongly supports the ABT credit program remaining unchanged. The ABT program is
critical for automakers to plan and strategize product planning with long-term compliance. Kia
agrees that the ABT program encourages technological innovations and helps increase fleetwide
emissions. Kia emphasizes that keeping the ABT program does not resolve all potential lead time
and cost challenges. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 12-13]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
Advanced technology credit multipliers for PHEV, BEV and FCEV should end before MY
2027. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 35-36]
Analyses by ICCT and researchers at Carnegie Mellon have shown that extended use of super
credits in the light-duty sector has resulted in the unintended consequence of increased emissions
from the non-ZEV fleet as it is allowed to emit more under a fleet average regulatory structure
that includes averaging, banking and trading provisions. Given the considerable incentives
created by the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and other
federal and state programs supporting the production, sale and operation of medium-duty zero
tailpipe emitting vehicles, MECA agrees that Advanced Technology Multipliers for PHEVs,
BEVs and FCEVs are no longer needed for medium-duty vehicles beyond MY 2026. Similar to
the light-duty sector, an over-incentivized credit scheme for medium-duty ZEVs is likely to
result in market distortions that will reduce the broader deployment of electric and hydrogen fuel
cell powertrains and thus decrease the benefits anticipated by the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0564, pp. 35-36]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
Credits will help leverage the averaging, banking, and trading (ABT) portion of the C02
regulation that EPA notes in the NPRM as being an important and successful part of the
regulation. The extent to which electric vehicles can earn additional credits through flexibilities
will further enhance the benefits of ABT by providing additional credit liquidity to be traded by
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manufacturers. ABT is a successful incentive for manufacturers to over comply and an important
flexibility for manufacturers who may fall short in a single year. Porsche does not see the
programmatic value in reducing liquidity within the ABT market, especially given the ambition
of the future proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 20]
Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
EPA should continue to tailor compliance flexibilities to close loopholes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0591, pp.9-10]
The credit system is a longstanding component of federal tailpipe emissions standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp. 9-10]
Credits issued for overcompliance with the standards can be averaged, banked, or traded,
allowing vehicle manufacturers to design compliance strategies that best suit their unique fleet
composition. It is critical, however, that EPA carefully construct these credit systems in a way
that balances compliance flexibility and incentivization of innovation with the inevitable loss of
stringency of the standards that result from the use of credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591,
pp. 9-10]
We therefore support EPA's proposal to not restore the advanced technology credit
multipliers for light-duty vehicles that currently end in model year 2024, and to end advanced
technology credit multipliers for medium-duty vehicles in model year 2027. Two of the three
advanced technologies currently provided favorable treatment through the application of credit
multipliers—BEVs and PHEVs—are common technologies in today's marketplace. The use of
credit multipliers for these technologies would create a compliance loophole that allows
manufacturers to continue making and selling dirtier vehicles and could result in backsliding on
emissions reductions. For these same reasons, we also urge EPA to consider phasing out credit
multipliers for medium-duty vehicles prior to model year 2027. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0591, pp. 9-10]
Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
EPA, in the final rule or future rule, should include a true-up system for automaker's FUF
where debits or credits are provided based on actual data from on-board diagnostics and
reporting by automakers of a fairly large sample. In other words, under this proposal, an
automaker would lose or gain credits after-the-fact based on actual data on how consumers drive
both new and older PHEVs. If EPA opts not to do this, we request that EPA should, at minimum,
require manufacturers in this rulemaking to share anonymized actual data from PHEVs so that in
future years, the EPA can make informed decisions about the FUF based upon real world
data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 7]
Our coalition is supportive of continuing averaging, banking and trading (ABT) provisions as
long as it is technology neutral, and performance based and does not favor engine-based
technology for either current or future vehicles. Specifically, an ABT program should reward
automakers who are making PHEVs, BEVs and FCEVs today by allowing these credits to carry
forward into the new MY 2027 program. We also support including the ability to trade the C02
reduction benefits of PHEVs, BEVs and FCEVs between different sizes and types of vehicles
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until at least MY 2032. We believe this is a modest way to help encourage the most advanced
clean technologies in this regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 10]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
a) The statutory structure confirms EPA lacks statutory authority to use fleetwide averaging
to mandate ZEVs.
EPA's proposal would require electrification by setting average emission standards for
manufacturers' nationwide fleets and "averaging" in more and more zeros to represent the
electric vehicles it wants to see in future years. Manufacturers that exceed the standards may
bank credits and trade them to other manufacturers that fall short. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 78-80]
EPA relies on NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986), for the proposition that it is
authorized to average vehicles. That case found EPA could average a manufacturer's different
engine families. Id. at 425. It did so, however, with some caveats. First, its reasoning was based
on a deference to EPA's interpretation of the statute "in the absence of clear evidence Congress
meant to prohibit averaging." This standard, of course, is directly contrary to the standard
applicable in this case in which EPA is proposing regulations that affect a major question—clear
Congressional authority to permit averaging to mandate electric vehicles. Second, the parties
failed to raise a textual argument against averaging. Id. at n.24 ("Although it was not raised by
any party before the agency, and accordingly cannot be dispositive here ... there is an additional
argument against emissions averaging. The Act's testing and certification provision, 42 U.S.C. §
7525 [Link:
https://l.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=42
USCAS7525&originatingDoc=I80714eef94d31 ld9a707f4371c9c34f0&refType=LQ&originatio
nContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=0591cc222593448083058c4608d3
c583&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)], speaks of'any,' 'a,' or 'such' motor vehicle or
engine being tested and certified. With averaging, some vehicles or engines would not be
required to comply with the standards and would not be subject to NCPs for failing to so comply.
This practice appears inconsistent with the requirement that 'any,' 'a,' or 'such' vehicle or
engine be tested and required to comply with emissions standards."). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
On the other hand, EPA has previously acknowledged that the Act is silent on the
mechanisms of averaging, banking, and trading (ABT). When EPA first adopted fleetwide
averaging, it recognized that "Congress did not specifically contemplate an averaging program
when it enacted the Clean Air Act." 48 Fed. Reg. 33,456, 33,458 (July 21, 1983). And "[j]ust as
the statute does not explicitly address EPA's authority to allow averaging, it does not address the
Agency's authority to permit banking and trading." 54 Fed. Reg. 22,652, 22,665 (May 25, 1989);
see 55 Fed. Reg. 30,584, 30,593 (July 26, 1990) (same). By definition, then, the Act does not
address—let alone clearly authorize—the use of averaging, banking, and trading to electrify the
Nation's vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
That should be the end of the analysis. Section 202 of the Clean Air Act does not itself "direct
[conventional vehicles] to effectively cease to exist." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2612 n.3. EPA
has instead relied on mechanisms that are not themselves spelled out in the statute and that have
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never before been used to mandate LD and MD electric vehicles. Just as in West Virginia, EPA
has nothing "close to the sort of clear authorization" necessary for such a transformational policy
shift. 142 S. Ct. at 2614. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
But in truth, the problem is far worse for EPA than that. As explained below, the Act
unambiguously precludes fleetwide-average emission standards under Section 202(a). And even
if the statute permitted some fleetwide averaging, it does not allow EPA to take the additional
step of incorporating non-emitting vehicles into emission averages and thus forcing the market
toward electric vehicles. The proposal is not merely stretching vague statutory language. It is
defying clear statutory text. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
The text and structure of Section 202, and of Title II more broadly, unambiguously require
that emission standards under Section 202(a) apply to individual vehicles, not manufacturers'
fleets on average. EPA claims to find authority for fleetwide averaging in Section 202(a), which
authorizes EPA to issue "standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class
or classes of new motor vehicles ... which in [its] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
On its face, that provision authorizes EPA to set standards for vehicles that emit harmful air
pollutants. It says nothing about averaging across fleets. As noted, when EPA first adopted
fleetwide averaging, it acknowledged that "Congress did not specifically contemplate an
averaging program when it enacted the Clean Air Act." 48 Fed. Reg. at 33,458. EPA claimed to
have the authority because the Act "does not explicitly preclude standards" based on averaging.
54 Fed. Reg. at 22,666 (emphasis added). EPA was wrong. "[T]he broader context of the statute
as a whole," Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997), makes clear that Section
202(a) does not permit fleetwide averaging. And, even if EPA could somehow show that the
statute tacitly or implicitly allows (or does not expressly preclude) averaging, that would still be
insufficient to meet the necessary clear congressional authority to use fleetwide averaging as a
means to force a transition from internal-combustion engines to ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
a. Other provisions in Section 202 demonstrate that emission standards may not be based
on averaging.
Title II is replete with provisions that necessarily apply to vehicles individually, not to fleets
on average. That is evident first in the emission standards prescribed by Section 202 itself. For
example, in Section 202(b), the Act sets forth specific light-duty vehicle emission standards that
EPA must promulgate in "regulations under" Section 202(a). 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b). For vehicles
in model years 1977 to 1979, the standards must provide that "emissions from such vehicles and
engines may not exceed 1.5 grams per vehicle mile of hydrocarbons and 15.0 grams per vehicle
mile of carbon monoxide." Id. § 7521(b)(1)(A). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
Those provisions require that the "regulations under [Section 202(a)]" apply to "vehicles and
engines," not "vehicles and engines on an average basis across a fleet." Construing those
provisions to allow averaging would, in effect, add words to the statute that change its meaning.
Neither courts nor agencies may "supply words ... that have been omitted." Antonin Scalia &
Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (2012); accord Rotkiske.v.
Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360-361 (2019). And supplying the extra words "on average" would
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have a significant substantive effect: "roller coaster riders must be 48 inches tall" means
something very different from "roller coaster riders must be 48 inches tall on average." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
The testing requirements accompanying the Section 202(b) standards confirm that those
standards apply to all vehicles. In particular, EPA must "test any emission control system
incorporated in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine ... to determine whether such system
enables such vehicle or engine to conform to the standards required to be prescribed under
[Section 202(b) of the Act]." 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(2). If the system complies, EPA must issue a
"verification of compliance with emission standards for such system." Id. Those requirements
plainly contemplate standards that apply to individual vehicles and their emission-control
systems. Not only does the statutory text frame the inquiry as whether an individual "vehicle" or
"engine" conforms to the emission standards, but the provision's foundational premise-that an
emission-control system can enable a vehicle to meet emission standards depends on individually
applied standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
Other parts of Section 202 further demonstrate that emission standards under Section 202(a)
cannot rely on averaging. Section 202(b)(3), for example, authorizes EPA to grant waivers from
certain nitrogen-oxide emission standards—which, again, are standards "under" Section 202(a),
see 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(B)—for no "more than 5 percent of [a] manufacturer's production or
more than fifty thousand vehicles or engines, whichever is greater." Id. § 7521(b)(3). This
provision would be nonsensical under a fleetwide-averaging regime. It contemplates a default
under which every vehicle meets a standard, then gives manufacturers a waiver from that default
for up to 5% of the fleet. But under fleetwide averaging, no waiver is needed. Instead, a vast
proportion of a manufacturer's fleet—perhaps 50% or more— effectively has a "waiver" so long
as a sufficient number of vehicles outperform the standard. Likewise, Section 202(g), which
specifies an increasing "percentage of each manufacturer's sales volume" of each model year's
vehicles that must comply with specified emission standards, is fundamentally incompatible with
averaging. Id. § 7521(g)(1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
Similarly, under Section 202(m), EPA must require manufacturers to install on "all" new
light-duty vehicles and trucks "diagnostic systems" capable of identifying malfunctions that
"could cause or result in failure of the vehicles to comply with emission standards established
under this section." Id. § 7521(m)(l). As this requirement makes clear, individual vehicles must
"comply with emissions standards established under [Section 202]." Id. Otherwise, requiring
diagnostic equipment on "all" vehicles makes no sense. In a fleetwide-averaging regime, this
requirement would be pointless, as the deterioration or malfunction of an individual vehicle's
emission-related systems would provide virtually no information about whether the fleet as a
whole is compliant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
b. Title II's compliance and enforcement provisions for emission standards confirm that
EPA cannot use fleetwide averaging.
Fleetwide averaging also clashes with "the design and structure of [Title II] as a whole."
Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 321 (citation omitted). Title II sets forth a comprehensive, interlocking
scheme for enforcing emission standards through testing, certification, warranties, remediation,
and penalties. Fleetwide-average standards are incompatible with these provisions, which are
"designed to apply to" individual vehicles and "cannot rationally be extended" to fleets. Id. at
322. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 81-82]
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Testing and Certification. Under Title II, EPA must "test, or require to be tested in such
manner as [it] deems appropriate, any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine submitted
by a manufacturer to determine whether such vehicle or engine conforms with the regulations
prescribed under [Section 202]." 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1). If the "vehicle or engine conforms to
such regulations," EPA must issue the manufacturer a "certificate of conformity." Id. EPA may
later test a manufacturer's vehicles and engines, and if "such vehicle or engine does not conform
with such regulations and requirements, [EPA] may suspend or revoke such certificate insofar as
it applies to such vehicle or engine." Id. § 7525(b)(2)(A)(ii). A manufacturer may not sell a
vehicle or engine not "covered by a certificate of conformity." Id. § 7522(a)(1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 81-82]
Fleetwide averaging is incompatible with these requirements in at least two respects. First, by
using the singular terms "vehicle" and "engine," along with "any" and "such," the statute
contemplates that individual vehicles may be tested, determined to "not conform" with the
standards, and have their certificates of conformity suspended or revoked. In a fleetwide-
averaging regime, testing an individual vehicle or engine does not enable EPA to determine
whether it "conforms with the regulations prescribed under [Section 202]," 42 U.S.C. §
7525(a)(1), because conformity turns not on an individual vehicle's emissions but on the fleet's
average performance overall. Second, fleetwide averaging also makes it impossible to determine
compliance with applicable emission standards before a vehicle is sold, as required to obtain the
certificate of conformity needed for a sale. See 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1). Under fleetwide-average
standards, a vehicle's "conformity] with the regulations prescribed under [Section 202]" cannot
be determined until the manufacturer calculates its production-weighted average at "the end of
each model year," when the manufacturer knows the quantity and model of "vehicles produced
and delivered for sale." 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.1818-12(c)(2)(2), 86.1865-12(i)(l), (j)(3). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 81-82]
For similar reasons, fleetwide averaging is inconsistent with the statutory definition of an
"emission standard," which "limits the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air
pollutants on a continuous basis." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k). It is impossible to know on a "continuous
basis" whether a manufacturer's fleet complies with EPA's proposed average standards, because
a manufacturer cannot calculate its production-weighted average until the end of the year.
Simply put, an after-the-fact compliance regime is incompatible with the Act's testing and
certification scheme. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 81-82]
Warranties and Remediation. Fleetwide-average standards similarly clash with Title II's
warranty provisions. Under Section 207, a manufacturer must "warrant to the ultimate purchaser
and each subsequent purchaser" "at the time of sale" that each new vehicle complies with
applicable regulations under [Section 202], 42 U.S.C. § 7541(a)(1) (emphasis added). Yet, as
with certificates of conformity, manufacturers cannot warrant conformity with fleetwide-average
emission standards at the time of sale, because compliance can be determined only at the end of
the year. See 40 C.F.R. § 86.1865-12(i)(l) (requiring manufacturers to compute their "production
weighted fleet average" by "using actual production [ data]" for the year in question). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 82-83]
Fleetwide-average emission standards are also inconsistent with Title II's remediation and
notification provisions. Those provisions state that if EPA "determines that a substantial number
of any class or category of vehicles or engines ... do not conform to the regulations prescribed
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under [Section 202]," the manufacturer must remedy "the nonconformity of any such vehicles or
engines." 42 U.S.C. § 7541(c)(1). If "a motor vehicle fails to conform," the manufacturer bears
the cost. Id. § 7541(h)(1). Further, "dealers, ultimate purchasers, and subsequent purchasers"
must be given notice of any nonconformity, id. § 7541(c)(2), which requires identification of
specific nonconforming vehicles. None of this is possible where the nonconformity is tied to a
fleet on average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 82-83]
c. The broader text and history of Title II confirm that the rule exceeds EPA's authority
through fleetwide averaging.
Other indicia of statutory meaning demonstrate that the proposed rule exceeds EPA's statutory
authority under Section 202(a). Elsewhere in Title II, Congress showed that it knew how to
legislate with respect to "average annual aggregate emissions." 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(l)(B)(v)(II)
(directing EPA to take certain actions if "the reduction of the average annual aggregate emissions
of toxic air pollutants in a [designated district] fails to meet" certain standards). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 83-84]
Thus, "if Congress had wanted to adopt an [averaging] approach" for motor vehicle standards
under Section 202(a), "it knew how to do so." SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1351
(2018); seeRotkiske, 140 S. Ct. at 360-361 ("Atextual judicial supplementation is particularly
inappropriate when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted
language or provision."). It did not choose that approach in Section 202(a). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 83-84]
The Energy Policy Conservation Act, enacted just two years before the 1977 Clean Air Act
amendments, reinforces that conclusion. There, Congress directed the Secretary of
Transportation to issue regulations setting "average fuel economy standards for automobiles
manufactured by a manufacturer" in a given model year. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a). That Congress
has not used similar language in Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act is a "telling clue" that the
Act does not permit fleetwide averaging. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1626 (2018).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 83-84]
The Clean Air Act's history also reflects Congress's understanding that emission standards
would apply to all vehicles individually. Congress was so focused on reducing emissions at the
level of the individual vehicle that, in the 1970 amendments, Congress permitted EPA to test any
individual vehicle as it comes off the assembly line. See Pub. L. No. 91-601, § 8, 84 Stat. 1676,
1694-1696. Such a vehicle-by-vehicle test was meant to supplement the pre-1970 testing of
prototypes. Congress explained that while testing of prototypes "will continue," "tests should
require each prototype rather than the average of prototypes to comply with regulations
establishing emission standards." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, at 6 (1970). And if Congress forbade
averaging across prototypes, it certainly did not permit averaging across entire fleets. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 83-84]
d. Related provisions confirm that Section 202(a) does not authorize averaging of non-
emitting electric vehicles.
Other provisions of the Clean Air Act drive home the lack of statutory authorization to
mandate electrification as well. In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress spoke
directly to the phase-in of electric vehicles on America's roads. Congress instructed EPA to
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establish standards for "clean-fuel vehicles" operating on "clean alternative fuel," including
"electricity." Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 229, 104 Stat. 2399, 2513 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
7581(2), (7), 7582(a)). Congress required that certain areas of the country with the worst
pollution would have to "phase-in" a "specified percentage" of "clean-fuel vehicles" using "clean
alternative fuels" (defined to include "electricity") in certain fleets. 42 U.S.C. § 7586; see id. §
7581(a). The 1990 amendments highlight that Congress knows how to clearly establish standards
that apply to electric vehicles, and to directly require that such vehicles be phased into a
particular fleet. But Congress chose to do so only on a targeted, regional basis. The contrast
between the 1990 amendments and Section 202(a) highlights the absence of any statutory
authority for EPA's rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 84]
Other related statutes also suggest the same. In the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress
directed NHTSA to set fuel-economy standards based on averages, but prohibited NHTSA from
setting fuel-economy standards that average in the fuel economy of electric vehicles. See Pub. L.
No. 102-486 §§ 302, 403, 106 Stat. 2776, 2870-2871, 2876 (later codified at 49 U.S.C. §
32902(h)). This prohibition bars NHTSA from doing exactly what EPA is doing here: misusing
its regulatory authority to force a transition from conventional vehicles to electric vehicles by
artificially tightening the "average" standard a fleet must meet. Of course, when Congress
finalized the language of Section 202(a)(1) in 1977, it had no need to explicitly block EPA from
considering electric vehicles, because it did not contemplate that EPA would set emission
standards using averaging in the first place (or that EPA would be setting standards for
greenhouse gases). The prohibition on NHTSA nevertheless underscores just how far EPA is
reaching here: it is straining statutory language to seize a power that Congress expressly denied
to a sister agency that actually has authority to promulgate fleetwide-average standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 84]
e. EPA's lack of authority for a credit-trading scheme further confirms its lack of
authority to set fleetwide averages.
The proposal's credit banking and trading program is critical to EPA's electrification mandate.
But the agency also lacks authority under Title II to establish a credit scheme as part of its
emission standards under Section 202(a). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
As with fleetwide averaging, EPA has previously acknowledged that Title II says nothing
about banking and trading credits in connection with motor-vehicle emission standards. See 54
Fed. Reg. at 22,665. What EPA has ignored, however, is that Title II is not silent regarding
banking and trading in other contexts. Indeed, in multiple other provisions under Title II,
Congress expressly authorized the use of bankable and tradable credits. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
7545(k)(7) (reformulated gasoline credits); § 7545(o)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(cc), (5)(A)(i) (renewable fuel
credits); id. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(cc), (5)(A)(ii) (biodiesel credits); id. §
7545(o)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(cc), (5)(A)(iii) (small refineries credits); id. § 7586(f) (clean- fuel fleet-
operator credits); id. § 7589(d) (California pilot test program's clean-fuel vehicle manufacturer
credit). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
Under EPA's proposed approach, those provisions would all be superfluous, because EPA
already had the discretion to adopt a credit-trading regime for any program. If Congress had
wanted to permit credits in connection with emission standards under Section 202(a), it knew
how to and would have done so expressly. See SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1351. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
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For all these reasons, courts have cast substantial doubt on EPA's authority to set fleetwide-
average emission standards. As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained in NRDC v.
Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the "engine specific thrust" of Title II's "testing and
compliance provisions" is evident both in Congress's choice to "spea[k] of'any,' 'a,' or 'such'
motor vehicle or engine" in the text of the statute and in the "troubling" legislative history
recounted above. Id. at 425 n.24. The arguments were not dispositive in Thomas only because
the parties there had failed to present them. Id. But the Court nevertheless recognized that the
arguments were relevant to "future proceedings." Id.. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-
86]
f. At a minimum, EPA may not use fleetwide averaging to require electrification.
Despite the absence of statutory authorization for fleetwide averaging, EPA has long
employed that mechanism without significant industry pushback. That is likely because fleetwide
averaging has generally been offered as an accommodation to regulated parties, allowing them
flexibility that the statute does not in fact permit. In its current proposal, however, EPA is not
offering an extra statutory accommodation. It is taking an additional step away from the statutory
text by using fleetwide averaging to mandate electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
pp. 84-86]
To be clear, in prior rules EPA set an average emission standard and allowed manufacturers to
make some vehicles that emitted more and some that emitted less. Here, EPA has set tailpipe
emission standards at a level so stringent that manufacturers must incorporate an increasing
percentage of LD and MD electric vehicles—which EPA treats as zero-emission vehicles—into
their averages in order to comply with the "standards." See p. 13, supra. Put differently, the
agency is proposing an emission standard that is artificially low because it incorporates electric
vehicles, which EPA treats as emitting zero pollutants for averaging purposes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
Whatever the permissibility of fleetwide averaging, the text and structure of Title II make
plain that EPA cannot manipulate averaging as a means to force production of an increasing
market share of electric vehicles. Section 202 does not grant EPA the power to make the
internal-combustion engine go the way of the horse and carriage. At the very least, Section 202 is
hardly clear in granting that awesome power—which is what matters under West Virginia. For
automobiles as for power plants, EPA has purported to discover in the Clean Air Act the
authority to "force" manufacturers to "cease making" a particular type of energy "altogether."
142 S. Ct. at 2612. We have seen that play recently before, and it should end the same way.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
EPA's own compliance trends show that significant emissions reductions are being left on the
table in the form of banked credits. While credit banking and trading provisions are a key
component of these emissions standards, the size of the OEMs' collective credit bank-as shown
in Figure 3—highlights the need for EPA to set stringent standards that turn these theoretical C02
reductions into real-world, on-road reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 17-18]
The pressing need to reduce GHG and criteria pollutant emissions from the light- and
medium-duty transportation sectors justifies EPA finalizing stringent emissions standards. While
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the standards are technology neutral, the auto industry has chosen electrification as the preferred
option for reducing emissions and the standards should support the considerable investments
being made to continue bringing these technologies to market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
pp. 17-18]
ZETA supports the proposed accelerated phaseout of MDEV credit multipliers by MY 2027.
EPA has recognized that multipliers present a tradeoff between driving emissions reductions and
incentivizing new technology. Based on the technology available today, multipliers are no longer
required to incentivize MDEV technology investments, and a more stringent GHG standard
would most effectively drive MDEV adoption and, in turn, emissions reductions. As such, we
encourage the agency to finalize the phaseout of MDEV credit multipliers as proposed and
encourage EPA to consider the benefits of sunsetting multipliers for advanced technology
vehicles in the MD category starting in MY 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 29]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy,
American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce, Environmental and Public Health
Organizations, Environmental Defense Fund, Jaguar Land Rover NA, Kia Corporation, MECA
Clean Mobility, Porsche Cars North America, Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle, and Zero
Emission Transportation Association have expressed support for the Averaging, Banking, and
Trading provisions of this final rulemaking.
Response:
EPA appreciates the comments in support of the Averaging, Banking, and Trading (ABT)
provisions in this rulemaking. EPA has not reopened the ABT provisions in this rule (except for
the carry-forward of criteria pollutant Tier 3 credits during the phase-in of the Tier 4 standards as
described in section 4.1.7 of this RTC). EPA agrees with commenters that these provisions
continue to allow manufacturers flexibility in planning compliance with the standards at
potentially lower costs.
Summary:
Clean Fuels Development Coalition and Valero Energy Corporation commented concern that
the proposed rule is forcing electrification for compliance.
Response:
The final standards do not require any specific compliance path. Manufacturers are free to
utilize any combination of technologies as pathways for compliance, as well as utilization of the
program's Averaging, Banking, and Trading provisions.
Summary:
Aston Martin raised concerns about whether the standards are so stringent that they can only
be complied with using credits.
Response:
EPA does not consider the standards to be so stringent as to require credit trading among
firms. EPA has undertaken a sensitivity analysis which models the absence of credit trading
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(even for small volume manufacturers such as Aston Martin) and finds the standards are feasible,
with sufficient lead time and at reasonable costs even under that limiting assumption, an
assumption which EPA considers unrealistic. EPA recognizes that decisions about trading
credits are business decisions for individual firms, but EPA sees no evidence that the market is
not available to firms seeking credits. To the contrary firms appear to be actively trading credits
and increasing sales volumes of EV-only manufacturers (who likely view credits as a potential
revenue source, particularly given the limited lifespan and compliance benefits of credits for
those manufacturers) suggest the market will continue to be a viable and economically efficient
compliance tool in the future. Additional discussion of SVM-specific concerns is found below in
RTC 3.1.7.
Summary:
Jaguar Land Rover NA commented that only credits are available for compliance and would
like to see fines added as a compliance option.
Response:
EPA does not have the statutory authority under the Clean Air Act to use fines as a routine
compliance option. The Averaging, Banking, and Trading provisions of the final rule provide
multiple flexibilities for compliance. As discussed in section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, EPA has made
several changes to reduce the stringency of the standards and provide additional lead time
compared to the proposal, which we believe address manufacturers' comments about concerns
for compliance.
3.1.3 - Vehicle air conditioning system related provisions
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Ad Hoc Tier 4 Light-Duty Small Manufacturer Group
- The Small OEM GHG situation is exacerbated by the following:
-EPA proposes to eliminate AC leakage credits (we do not fully understand why the goal of
fighting climate change demands this)
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
D. Light-Duty GHG Program Flexibilities
Flexibilities have been an important part of EPA's light-duty vehicle GHG program since its
inception in 2012. Features such as the averaging, banking, and trading program have helped
smooth product planning and investment cycles. Other flexibilities like off-cycle technology and
air conditioning credits have encouraged the development of new technologies and have resulted
in real-world emissions improvements beyond those that would have been achieved on
laboratory test cycles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 95]
Auto Innovators believes that such flexibilities still play an important role moving forward.
They are a potential lever for addressing uncertainties in the transition to electric vehicles,
particularly in the early years of the proposed 2027-2032 program. While manufacturers would
prefer that the core footprint-based standards reflect achievable emission reductions, flexibilities
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could also serve to ensure that desired emission targets are met. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 95]
Instead, EPA proposes to eliminate and/or phase down many existing flexibilities, including
paring back the off-cycle credit menu and limiting GHG improving technologies to the ICE fleet.
The result of this will be abandonment of GHG benefits from prior rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 95]
The existing refrigerant, AC efficiency, and off-cycle credits are balanced to produce a
verifiable real-world result. EPA's proposal to change the credit system will unbalance those
results, leaving unprecedented rates of electrification as the main flexibility left to meet fleetwide
stringency targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 95]
1. Air Conditioning Refrigerant Leakage Credits
EPA encouraged the auto industry's move from R134a refrigerant to R1234yf with a credit
program that recognized both improvements to minimize leakage of refrigerant and the use of
low global warming potential (GWP) refrigerants. The credit program is responsible for the
quick adoption of R1234yf in U.S. light-duty vehicles since it became commercially available in
2013. Already, 95% of the light-duty vehicle fleet has moved from R134a with GWP of 1,430 to
R1234yf with a GWP of 4.176 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
176 EPA Trends Report at 91.
EPA has proposed a rule for phasing down HFC refrigerants sooner than anticipated or
required by the AIM Act. 177 The proposed HFC phase down would eliminate R134a from light-
duty vehicles, effectively leaving one refrigerant, R1234yf, to serve current and future heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system designs. 178 Auto Innovators can see why EPA
believes this is a good time to eliminate the air conditioning refrigerant leakage credit program,
but there are a number of good reasons to continue the program that EPA has not considered.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
177 Phasedown of Hydrofluorocarbons: Restrictions on the Use of Certain Hydrofluorocarbons Under
Section (i) the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act of 2020, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 87 Fed. Reg. 76738 (Dec. 15, 2022).
178 Although other low-GWP refrigerants exist, they have not come into common use in the U.S.
Therefore, new HVAC system designs are under development for electric vehicles.
a) HVAC Systems for Electric Vehicles
Current electrified HVAC systems are not up to the challenge of an electrified future. High
voltage positive temperature coefficient ("PTC") system heaters that indirectly heat the cabin
using glycol as a heat transfer fluid are inefficient. Energy that otherwise would be used to
extend driving range is instead diverted to defrosting cabin glass, warming the battery, and
passenger comfort. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
Electric range may be reduced by 30% or more in a -10 °F setting which is common in winter
around much of the country. Consistently colder climates can reduce range even more. Even in
variable climates, the thermal mass of the battery must be conditioned to enable fast charging.
The variable nature of diurnal temperature excursions means battery conditioning will continue
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to be a large consumer of stored energy at the expense of vehicle range, customer comfort and
acceptance of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
Similarly, today's common HVAC systems have significant power requirements when used in
a cooling mode. Cabin occupants and battery cooling systems are the beneficiaries of the AC
system in an electrified vehicle where up to 10 kW or more of power may be expended to keep
the battery at proper operating temperatures and occupants comfortable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
b) Future HVAC Systems Need Costly Technology to Minimize Refrigerant Leakage
The conditions that exacerbate the shortcomings of today's HVAC systems are expected to be
overcome by heat pump systems currently under development. 179 Heat pump systems extract
energy from the atmosphere, collect and concentrate that energy through onboard heat
exchangers, then transfer it to where it is needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
179 We recognize that certain manufacturers already use a heat pump HVAC system, but this technology
has yet to become commonplace across the industry.
Heat pumps use a refrigerant to transfer heat. Heat pump systems resemble AC systems, but
are modified to heat and cool the cabin and battery. Heat pump systems also have additional
complexity over today's AC systems. They need to be designed for assembly, adding additional
connections and hose length to reach distant components. The additional valving to make a heat
pump system operate flawlessly results in potential additional leak paths. Heat pump systems
also have one or more additional heat exchangers, adding another potential leak path to the
system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
Though much of the leakage concern may be solved, the credit recognizing reduced AC
refrigerant leakage technology is still needed and would still recognize real-world benefits. In the
drive to electrify vehicles, all costs will be scrutinized, and history shows that better sealing
systems were only implemented following the availability of low-leak system credits. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
c) New Refrigerants in Heat Pump Systems Benefit from Low-Leak Technology
Refrigerant R1234yf is suitable for heat pump applications, but is performance limited at high
and low temperature extremes. Other refrigerants are better suited to heat pump applications.
SAE International has several subcommittees investigating seven diffierent refrigerants. Each of
these refrigerants have performance benefits, but come with tradeoffs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
Many of these refrigerants are blended using R1234yf or C02 as the base. Other refrigerants
in different concentrations are added to the base refrigerant to address performance needs at
temperature extremes. Different suppliers have unique formulations. It is expected that each of
these refrigerants will be brought to market and be available for heat pump applications, though
none have SNAP approval at this time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
Each of the refrigerant blends being considered are zeotropic, i.e., they have constituents
whose boiling points differ. Other molecular properties will differ with the refrigerant blend
including permeation rates. Permeation in turn can be selective and the refrigerant component
that permeates fastest may be the component that gives the blend its low or high temperature
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performance. What permeates or leaks selectively may also have undesirable properties that EPA
will address during the SNAP approval process. These are additional reasons for EPA to
continue the leakage credit program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
The semi-hermetic nature of heat pump systems is still largely undefined and not understood
enough to place a meaningful limit on leakage. SAE International is developing an updated
J2727 standard to address heat pumps and new refrigerant blends. The credit formula using the
SAE J2727 leak score, in being revised for the new refrigerants, will yield the correct values in
terms of leakage and GWP and therefore inform a refrigerant leakage program credit level.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
Auto Innovators believes that leaving the credit program in place is in the best interest of
EPA, industry, and the environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
d) Impact of the AC Leakage Credit Program on Leak Rates
Over 200 million vehicles on the road today were produced prior to the EPA low leak/low
GWP program's implementation. Assessing the HVAC systems of these vehicles with the SAE
J2727 methodology demonstrates that they have a wide range of leakage and well over the
amount observed in vehicles with HVAC systems designed to minimize refrigerant leakage.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
Lifetime AC system service needs are proportional to refrigerant leakage rates. Low-leak
technology drastically lowers the service levels needed. Manufacturers should be encouraged to
minimize the refrigerant leakage from electric vehicles given their larger charge sizes and
chemically active refrigerant components. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
In summary, electrification is driving new HVAC system architecture and using new
refrigerants in greater quantities than in ICE vehicles. These new refrigerants are likely to have
higher-GWP components than R1234yf and selectively leak at different rates. Encouraging the
use of the lowest GWP blends possible and minimizing leakage is still an important
environmental consideration. EV heat pumps systems are expensive, 180 as are the improved
components and fittings that minimize leakage. Recognition of efforts to reduce leakage and to
minimize its environmental impact when leakage occurs will provide additional incentives to
manufacturers to include best-in-class low-leak technology in HVAC system designs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
180 The electric compressor of a heat pump system alone may cost up to eight times that of a comparable
electronic carriable displacement compressor in an ICE application.
e) Recommendations
-Maintain C02 credits for reducing leakage of air conditioning refrigerant and limiting the
environmental impact of leakage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 96-99]
-If EPA decides to eliminate leakage credits, implement a phase-down instead of an
immediate elimination as a potential lever to reduce concerns with and to provide flexibility for
meeting the stringency of the proposed GHG standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
96-99]
2. Air Conditioning Efficiency and Off-Cycle Credits on Electric Vehicles
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EPA's concern of negative emissions on individual vehicles is misplaced. EPA's regulations
calculate air conditioning efficiency and off-cycle credits on a fleet average basis, which are then
combined with fleet average tailpipe emissions and other adjustments. 181 However, we
acknowledge the concern that, once combined with fleet average tailpipe emissions, air
conditioning and off-cycle credits may result in a fleet that implies a negative emission rate.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0701, p. 99]
181 In actual practice, greenhouse gas credits and tailpipe emissions (relative to target) are first converted
to megagrams (metric tons) of carbon emissions and then combined. (See 40 CFR 86.1865-12.) Air
conditioning and off-cycle credits are always positive megagrams. Tailpipe fleet average emissions may
result in either a positive (credit generating) or negative (credit needed) megagram balance. In short, EPA's
regulations never result in negative emissions for an individual vehicle, nor negative emissions for an
overall fleet, although such a result might be implied.
Our recommendation is to handle this situation at the fleet average level. If the summed fleet
average tailpipe emissions, credits, and other adjustments would result in a negative value, total
fleet megagrams of credit for the model year would be truncated at the level equivalent to that
which would have been achieved by a fleet at zero g/mile fleet average emissions before credits
and other adjustments. Such an approach would address EPA's concern of "negative" emissions
while still providing an incentive for and recognition of air conditioning and -cycle
improvements on electric vehicles during the remaining time when many manufacturers' fleets
have net positive emission rates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 99]
3. Air Conditioning efficiency Credits
Auto Innovators disagrees with EPA's proposal to eliminate AC efficiency credits for
electrified vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 99-101]
The AC efficiency credit program has been a success, resulting in verified emission
reductions and conservative credit values. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 99-101]
The SAE Interior Climate Control Committee has helped, having developed the testing and
specifications for hardware technologies on the AC efficiency credit menu. The hardware
specifications taken together with the AC 17 test procedure improvements ensure a robust and
verifiable greenhouse gas benefit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 99-101]
We agree with EPA that the program has been valuable. Many automakers have utilized the
program. EPA calls the air conditioning efficiency and refrigerant leakage credit programs
voluntary, but they have been relied upon by manufacturers to meet GHG standards. EPA itself
has assumed the benefits of the AC efficiency and leakage credit programs in setting GHG
targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 99-101]
a) AC efficiency Improvements Benefit Both ICE Vehicles and BEVs
The AC efficiency credit menu has been successful in recognizing and encouraging AC
system improvements. Due to their expense, the technologies on the AC efficiency menu were
not widely deployed in the fleet prior to the creation of the AC efficiency credit program. The
AC efficiency menu provided the needed business justification to widely deploy the included
technologies in light-duty vehicles. The EPA Trends Report demonstrates the dramatic year over
year growth of AC efficiency credits. Twenty automakers have deployed high levels of AC
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efficiency technology in mass market vehicles, including in PHEVs and BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 99-101]
Although it may be appropriate to limit eligibility for AC efficiency credits to ICE vehicles in
the future, we do not believe that time is now. Removing BEVs from participation in the credit
program now may undermine the system efficiency improvements made to date. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 99-101]
b) AC efficiency Credit Values
The AC efficiency credit values developed for the menu were based on ICE vehicles but also
apply to BEVs. The technology benefits between ICE vehicles and BEVs are similar in that they
lower the amount of energy needed to condition the cabin. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
99-101]
The AC efficiency credits related to the reduced reheat, automatic recirculation algorithms,
and PWM controlled blowers are dependent on system operation. They do not depend on the
powertrain type. Their energy-savings benefit is equivalent between BEV and ICE vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 99-101]
Oil separator technology is deployed in both BEV electric compressors and ICE vehicle
compressors. The efficiency benefit is proportional to the refrigerant flow exiting the compressor
and that in turn is based on the vehicle cabin thermal load. The differences in efficiency between
BEV and ICE vehicles is similar under the same conditions. The way that BEV compressors are
decoupled from an engine's accessory drive means they are operated at a more consistent speed
that yields a greater oil separator benefit. The BEV version of an oil separator may be
underrepresented in terms of menu credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 99-101]
The credit values for internal heat exchanger technology in ICE vehicles are not usually
applied to a BEV. BEVs generally have efficiency improvements incorporated into the heat
exchanger designs. Both heat exchange technology improvements are quantified by bench testing
per SAE specifications. The additional benefit that a BEV provides is underrepresented in terms
of menu credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 99-101]
Compressor efficiency depends on how the compressor is driven. Isentropic and volumetric
efficiency improve as the compressor is driven at greater speeds. Belt driven compressors such
as the fixed displacement or internally controlled variable displacement compressors are least
efficient among the compressor types since they are controlled by engine speed. Electronically
controlled variable compressors are also belt driven and suffer from the same engine speed issues
but are more efficient since they can vary their output and tailor it more directly to cabin load.
The most efficient variable displacement compressor is the electric scroll variant that is
independent of engine operation and used on EVs. The compressor is driven to the most efficient
operating point for the given cabin thermal load. In this case, the electric scroll type of variable
displacement compressor is more efficient than those on ICE vehicles. The benefit of this
technology is underrepresented relative to the menu credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 99-101]
Evidence of this conservative nature of the menu credits exists with the Denso ESB
compressor off-cycle applications that were approved by EPA. Credit levels for this compressor
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are above those of the menu and apply exclusively to BEVs and PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 99-101]
The AC efficiency menu credits, while developed for ICE vehicles, remain conservative for
EVs. Industry will continue to work with EPA if a new credit menu that correctly recognizes
these technologies in BEVs is deemed necessary. Measuring the efficiency benefits in a BEV is
straightforward based as measured energy consumption during an operating cycle. Eliminating
the credit for BEVs due to the credits' basis on ICE vehicles is not the appropriate solution.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 99-101]
c) AC efficiency Credit Menu Adjustments
Several air conditioning efficiency technologies have been approved for credit under the
alternative method off-cycle credit program. These technologies provide on-road greenhouse gas
emission and energy consumption improvements. We recommend that EPA add any air
conditioning efficiency technologies approved under the off-cycle program's alternative
methodology to the air conditioning efficiency credit menu, and that the credit caps be adjusted
accordingly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 101-102]
d) Solar Thermal Control Technologies
Auto Innovators believes that technologies on the AC efficiency credit interact with
technologies on the solar-thermal control submenu of the off-cycle credit menu and need to be
considered. Given that EPA has proposed the phaseout of menu-based off-cycle credits, we
recommend that EPA move the solar thermal control technologies to the AC efficiency credit
menu and adjust the caps accordingly. These technologies reduce air conditioning system load,
thereby reducing energy consumption and related GHG emissions from operation of the HVAC
system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 101-102]
e) Conclusion
The current AC efficiency credits should remain available to both the ICE and BEV fleetss
during the transition from ICE to BEV vehicles. Keeping the credits (and therefore the
technologies that they encourage) improve range, preserve customer comfort, and ensure lower
energy consumption regardless of source. Continuing the AC credit program ensures the
continued application of existing technologies and ensure future innovation in this area. Auto
Innovators believes that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 101-102]
-Limiting eligibility for AC efficiency credits to only ICE vehicles makes sense only once the
transition to BEV mass volumes is more robust. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 101-102]
-That a subsequent rulemaking is the appropriate time to revisit this issue once BEV AC
system architecture is better developed and mature. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 101-
102]
-That AC credits applied to BEV vehicles is at an acceptably conservative level. The ICE
values are conservative and verifiable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 101-102]
-The solar thermal control technologies on the off-cycle menu are synergistic with the
technologies on the AC efficiency credit menu and should be combined if the off-cycle credit
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menu is phased out. The resulting credit menu should have the caps adjusted to accommodate the
solar thermal control technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 101-102]
Organization: Arconic Corporation (ARCO)
3. Arconic agrees with the proposed phase out of the air conditioning (AC) system
related credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, p. 3]
Organization: BorgWarner, Inc.
We also agree with EPA's decision to discontinue air conditioning credits under the new
standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 4-5]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Greenhouse Gas Standards
U.S. EPA is proposing more stringent GHG emission standards for the 2027 through 2032
MYs, along with several modifications to the existing GHG program. Generally, CARB supports
U.S. EPA's proposal, but offers several recommendations to further strengthen the proposed
standards to achieve the greatest degree of emission reductions available, considering costs and
technology readiness, to further protect public health and combat climate change. As described
in detail below, CARB recommends that U.S. EPA adopt more stringent light-duty GHG
emission standards; include provisions to ensure manufacturers do not allow emissions to
increase from conventional vehicles and instead continue to apply all available cost-effective
emission control technologies; estimate real-world PHEV emissions based on the best available
data and collect additional data to inform future updates; and update elements of the
comprehensive regulatory program, including retiring elements of the off-cycle and air
conditioning credits programs as proposed, establishing explicit requirements to eliminate leaks
from air conditioning systems, eliminating credit multipliers for medium-duty ZEVs as
proposed, and requiring small-volume manufacturers to comply with the proposed standards as
proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 12]
Motor Vehicle Air Conditioning
U.S. EPA is proposing several GHG program modifications that would impact motor vehicle
air conditioning (AC). Controlling emissions from AC systems is an important climate
stabilization strategy as traditional refrigerants used in AC systems are short-lived climate
pollutants with high global warming potential (GWP). Acting now to reduce emissions of these
powerful climate forcers can have an immediate beneficial impact. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0780, p. 24]
Air Conditioning Efficiency Credit Eligibility
U.S. EPA requested comments on its proposal to limit eligibility of AC efficiency credits to
internal combustion engine vehicles starting in MY 2027. CARB supports this proposed change.
CARB agrees with U.S. EPA that with an increasing ZEV market share, retaining AC efficiency
credit eligibility for ZEVs would generate large negative calculated GHG emissions, which
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would not be representative of the vehicles' actual emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780,
P- 24]
Air Conditioning Leakage Credit Elimination for Light-Duty Vehicles
U.S. EPA requested comments on its proposal to end the existing AC leakage credit for light-
duty vehicles starting in the 2027 MY. CARB agrees with U.S. EPA's proposal to eliminate the
AC leakage credit but recommends that U.S. EPA establish a leakage standard for light-duty
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 24-25]
CARB agrees with U.S. EPA that the GHG benefits of the AC leakage credit program are
being achieved primarily through industry-wide adoption (around 95 percent of 2021 MY light-
duty vehicles) of HFO-1234yf, a low-GWP refrigerant. 26 CARB further agrees that the GWP
limit of 150 for light-duty vehicles starting with the 2025 MY in the newly proposed U.S. EPA
"Technology Transitions" regulation would—if finalized as proposed—provide a backstop for
any reversion back to high-GWP refrigerants. 27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 24-25]
26 U.S. EPA. 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report. EPA-420-R-22-029. (2022).
https://www.epa.gov/automotive- trends/download-automotive-trends-report.
27 U.S. EPA. Phasedown of Hydrofluorocarbons: Restrictions on the Use of Certain Hydrofluorocarbons
Under Subsection (i) the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act of 2022. Federal Register 87, no.
240 (December 15, 2022). Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0643. Available at:
https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/FR-2022- 12-15/pdf/2022-26981.pdf and U.S. EPA. "Greenhouse
Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles - Phase
2." Federal Register 81, No. 206 (October 25, 2016). Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0827. Available at:
https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/FR-2016-10- 25/pdf/2016-21203.pdf.
However, CARB notes that there are secondary benefits—including GHG benefits—for
having low-leak AC systems regardless of refrigerant type, including: helping to maintain AC
system efficiency; 28 reducing the generation of trifluoroacetic acid (TFA), an atmospheric
degradation byproduct of fluorinated gases such as HFO-1234yf; 29 and reducing the need for
AC recharge and therefore the associated cost to consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780,
pp. 24-25]
28 Prolss, K., G. Schmitz, D. Limperich, and M. Braun. "Influence of Refrigerant Charge Variation on the
Performance of an Automotive Refrigeration System." Proceedings of the 2006 International Refrigeration
and Air Conditioning Conference at Purdue. July 17-20, 2006, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana.
29 Luecken, D.J., R.L. Waterland, S. Papasawa, K.N. Taddonio, W.T. Hutzell, J.P. Rugh, and S.O.
Andersen. Ozone and TFA Impacts in North America from Degradation of 2,3,3,3-Tetrafluoropropene
(HFO-1234yf), A Potential Greenhouse Gas Replacement. Environmental Science and Technology, 44(1),
343-348. Published December 8, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/es902481f.
Given the benefits associated with low-leak AC systems and the risk that manufacturers may
not pursue this technology in the absence of the leakage credit, CARB recommends that U.S.
EPA establish an AC leakage standard for light-duty vehicles, similar to the AC leakage standard
for heavy-duty vehicles in the current U.S. EPA Heavy-Duty Vehicle GHG regulations. 30
CARB notes that one data source that U.S. EPA could analyze to establish the appropriate
leakage threshold for light-duty vehicles is the AC leakage data reported by auto manufacturers
to the State of Minnesota's Mobile Air Conditioning Leakage Reporting Requirements. 31 The
same data source was used in U.S. EPA's analysis to establish the leakage threshold for the AC
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leakage standard in its Heavy-Duty Vehicle GHG regulations. 32 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0780, pp. 24-25]
30 U.S. EPA. "Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles." Federal Register 76, No. 179 (September 15, 2011). Docket ID: EPA-
HQ-OAR-2010-0162. Available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2011-09-15/pdf/2011-
20740.pdf.
31 Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. "High Global Warming Potential Greenhouse Gases - Leakage
from Vehicle Air Conditioners." Available at: https://www.pca.state.mn.us/business-with-us/high-global-
warming- potential-greenhouse-gases. Accessed June 15, 2023.
32 U.S. EPA. "Final Rulemaking to Establish Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency
Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles - Regulatory Impact Analysis". Docket ID:
EPA-HQ-OAR- 2010-0162. Available at: https://downloads.regulations.gov/EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0162-
3634/content.pdf.
Elimination of Air Conditioning Leakage Standard for Medium-Duty Vehicles
U.S. EPA requested comments on the proposed ending of the AC leakage standard for
medium-duty vehicles starting in the 2027 MY. As noted above for light-duty vehicles, while
CARB agrees with U.S. EPA that the majority of the GHG emissions from medium-duty vehicle
AC refrigerants can be reduced with the proposal to require low-GWP alternative refrigerants,
CARB recommends continuing to subject medium-duty vehicles to the existing AC leakage
standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 26]
Again, as noted above for light-duty vehicles, there are secondary benefits—including GHG
benefits—associated with low-leak AC systems regardless of the refrigerant type, including:
helping to maintain AC system efficiency; reducing the generation of TFA; and reducing the
need for AC recharge and therefore the associated cost to consumers. CARB notes that in the
existing U.S. EPA Heavy-Duty Vehicle GHG standards for the 2021 through 2027 MYs (also
known as the GHG "Phase 2" regulation), which currently applies to these medium-duty
vehicles, the same AC leakage standard applies to all refrigerant types. For these reasons, CARB
recommends that U.S. EPA retain the existing AC leakage standard for medium-duty vehicles
regardless of refrigerant type. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 26]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
However, we urge EPA to consider retaining a smaller-value air conditioning credit for
refrigerant leakage, id. at 29,247-48, or other, similar measures to continue preventing leakage of
air conditioning refrigerants. Although the use of refrigerants with low global warming potential
("GWP") indicates refrigerant leaks will contribute less to climate change, even low-GWP
refrigerant leaks continue to be harmful in the aggregate. Id. at 29,246 (low-GWP refrigerant
HFO-1234yf has a GWP of 4, compared to HFC134(a)'s GWP of 1430). Continuing to
incentivize the prevention of refrigerant leaks still appears beneficial, even if the credit itself
should be reduced to reflect the lower GWP of the predominant refrigerant. See CARB
Comment at 35-37. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 37-38]
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Organization: Chemours Company FC, LLC
The Chemours Company FC, LLC ("Chemours") appreciates the opportunity to comment on
the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA" or "Agency") proposed rule. We support the
Agency's proposal to revise the air conditioning (AC) credits program to remove the refrigerant-
based AC provision. We agree that statutory requirements under the American Innovation and
Manufacturing (AIM) act will continue to drive adoption of lower GWP refrigerants in vehicles.
Because this proposal, in part, relies upon a pending rule under Subsection (i) of the AIM Act,
the Agency must remain cognizant of any changes to the final AIM regulation and what, if any,
impacts those changes could have on this proposed rule. To avoid such discrepancy, it would be
prudent to finalize this rule after the Technology Transition final rule under Subsection (i) of the
AIM Act for auto AC is published and effective. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-3644, p. 1]
Organization: DENSO Corporation
4) A/C Efficiency Credit Program
DENSO supports the A/C efficiency credit program and appreciates EPA continuing the
program. 2
2 Ibid.
If EPA sunsets the alternative method off-cycle credit program, then interactions with the A/C
efficiency credit program need to be considered. For example, several A/C efficiency
technologies have been approved for credit under the alternative method off-cycle credit
program. These technologies provide on-road greenhouse gas emission and energy consumption
improvements. Therefore, we request EPA consider adding any A/C efficiency technologies
approved under the off-cycle program's alternative methodology to the A/C efficiency credit
menu, and that the credit caps be adjusted accordingly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, pp. 4-
6]
Also similar to our comments on off-cycle, concerning the 5-Cycle and Alternative Method
pathways, EPA should follow through under the current regulation and complete action on all
submitted applications, even if it requires additional discussions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0651, pp. 4-6]
In addition, and as shared in previous comments to EPA, DENSO requests the agency
consider expanding the AC efficiency credit cap based on the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (NREL) study showing greater A/C improvement possibilities.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0651, pp.4-6]
3 NREL Presentation 17TMSS-0056 at SAE Thermal Management Systems Symposium 2017 (October
2017).
NREL Study 17TMSS-0056 estimates the latest A/C energy consumption at 23.5 g/mile
based on a series of simulations were performed to three vehicle platforms using various US
driving patterns. This is compared to 11.9 g/mile for passenger car and 17.2 g/mile for light
truck, which were baseline A/C emissions impacts previously used by the agencies to determine
A/C efficiency credit cap, new baseline A/C emission impact is calculated to 20.3 g/mile for
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passenger car and 29.3 g/mile for light truck by using the latest A/C energy consumption (23.5
g/mile). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, pp. 4-6]
Based on the new baseline emission impact and A/C improvement possibility, 42% of which
were previously used by the agencies, the increased A/C credit cap would be 8.5 g/mile for
passenger car and 12.3 g/mile for light truck. Therefore, DENSO would request EPA to consider
increasing A/C efficiency credit cap as supported by this study. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0651, pp. 4-6]
These recommendations are explained in more detail here:
A/C Impact on Vehicle C02 Emissions: New NREL Research4
30 gal/yr=23.5 g/mi where individual traveling 11,246 miles/yr
8887 grams C02 per gallon of gasoline
• 2012MY LD Vehicle Production5: Car (64%), Truck (36%)
Baseline A/C Emissions Impact: Car: 11.9 g/mi, Truck: 17.2 g/mil
Split NREL results into car/truck based on EPA ratios:
Car: 11.9/13.8*23.5 = 20.3 g/mi
Truck: 17.2/13.8*23.5 = 29.3 g/mil [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, pp. 4-6]
4 EPA-NHTSA Joint Technical Support Document for Final Rulemaking for 2017-2025 Light-Duty
Vehicle GHG & CAFE Standards:
https://nepis.epa.gOv/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P 100F1E5 ,PDF?Dockey=P 1000F1E5 .PDF.
5 EPA Light-Duty Automotive Technology, Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Fuel Economy Trends: 1975
through 2017.
A/C Credit Cap Revisions
New Baseline A/C Emissions Impact (based on new research by NREL) Car: 20.3
g/mi, Truck: 29.3 g/mi
A/C Credit Cap
Improvement possibility = 42% (current assumption in Joint TSD 6)
Car: Current 11.9 g/mi x 42% = 5.0 g/mi; New: 20.3 g/mi x 42% = 8.5 g/mil Truck: Current:
17.2g/mi x 42% = 7.2 g/mi; New: 29.3 g/mi x 42% = 12.3 g/mi [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0651, pp. 4-6]
6 Ibid, 4.
The A/C efficiency credit program is robust and verifiable; however, the current cap
constraints can create situations where an A/C technology that reduces GHG emissions may not
be applied on a vehicle's system. For example, a technology may be left on the shelf if it will not
be accounted for through direct contribution to achieving the standard, nor recognized through a
credit recognizing the technology contribution to emissions reduction. Therefore, we again ask
EPA to consider increasing the credit cap for this program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, pp.
4-6]
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5) Technologies Supporting ZEV Energy Consumption Reduction
DENSO requests EPA to reconsider its proposal to eliminate A/C efficiency and off- cycle
credits for electrified vehicles. Off-cycle and AC efficiency credits for technologies applied
across all powertrain types encourage their continued use with commensurate benefits to
consumers and the environment. The elimination of off- cycle and air conditioning efficiency
credits on electric vehicles would have an unfortunate effect on the application of existing
technologies and further innovation in this area. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 6]
DENSO also encourages EPA to explore how energy reductions from thermal technologies
could be rewarded when used on BEVs, PHEVs and FCEVs. All technologies and all
powertrains should continue to improve their performance. Consequently, technologies that
reduce use of the vehicle battery (and reduce the amount of battery charging needed) and
therefore the electricity used to power the vehicle should be recognized in MYs 2027 and
beyond. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 6]
Beyond the off-cycle and A/C efficiency credit programs, DENSO would welcome the
opportunity to discuss the possibility of credits to further incentivize BEV energy consumption
reduction directly and further support the industry during this critical technology transition
period.7 A credit or incentive for technologies that support BEV energy consumption reduction
from a consumer comfort and battery comfort perspective, as well as to encourage responsible
critical mineral usage and grid management, would also contribute to US climate goals
generally. Similar to the off- cycle and A/C efficiency program, a similar ZEV-focused
technology credit would help to support industry investment in innovative and forward-looking
technologies that provide additional environmental benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p.
6]
7 Please see Appendix 2 for a partial list of DENSO technologies that support ZEV energy consumption
reduction.
6) Air Conditioning Refrigerant Leakage Credits
As a supplier committed to the environment, we support maintaining the low Global Warming
Potential (low GWP) refrigerant credits. This credit program advances technological leadership
and recognizes significant technological investments. The credits also provide an important
incentive to voluntarily transition to next- generation refrigerants with low GWP. Therefore, we
request EPA to consider continuation of the air conditioning refrigerant leakage credits. If EPA
decides to eliminate the leakage credits, we request EPA to consider a phase-down instead of an
immediate elimination. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 6]
Appendix 1
DENSO GREEN Technology Examples:
Off-Cycle Credit/AC Efficiency Credit Technologies for ICE and ZEV Powertrains [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
1. SAS Compressor w/CS Valve: Technology has improved pressure drop through the
cylinders and a crankcase suction valve that minimizes internal compressor losses at conditions
other than maximum capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
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2. Electric Scroll Air Conditioning Compressor Variation B (ESB) with pressure
adjusting valve technology: This technology improves the efficiency of the electric scroll
compressor using a pressure adjusting valve to optimize back pressure on the fixed scroll and
reduce mechanical losses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
3. S-Flow System: Reduces the thermal load on the air conditioning system through
targeted cooling of only the occupied cabin areas, and for a pulse width modulated brushless
motor power controller used in the HVAC system, which improves the efficiency of the HVAC
system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
4. High-Efficiency Alternator: High efficiency alternators use new technologies to
reduce the overall load on the engine yet continue to meet the electrical demands of the vehicle
systems, resulting in lower fuel consumption and lower C02 emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0651, p. 8]
5. Compressor Oil Separator: Technology removes at least 50% of the oil entrained in
the oil/refrigerant mixture exiting the compressor and returns it to the compressor housing or
compressor inlet, or a compressor design, which does not rely on the circulation of an
oil/refrigerant mixture for lubrication. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
6. Internal Heat Exchanger (SCX): An Internal Heat Exchanger reduces load on the
compressor by transferring heat from the high-pressure liquid entering the expansion valve
(TXV) to the low- pressure gas exiting the evaporator. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
7. 2-Layer HVAC: Full technology explanation is below (from SAE Paper 2018-01-
1368). Short explanation: In cold ambient conditions, two-layer HVAC recirculates already
warmed air in the lower part of the HVAC unit and distributes it to the lower part of the vehicle
cabin, while using air from outside the vehicle in the upper part of the HVAC unit, distributing it
to the upper part of the vehicle cabin. Outside air is necessary to keep windows fog-free.
Recirculated air requires less energy to re-heat. Two-layer HVAC allows both, minimizing
energy needed to keep the cabin warm and fog-free. In an ICE vehicle, this results in an energy
savings by enabling faster engine warm-up (since less heat is needed for cabin heating), while in
a BEV the energy savings impact is even greater, since the energy used for heating the vehicle
cabin needs to come from the vehicle battery. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
8. LE40: This technology allows for reduced power consumption during compressor
operation through improved and more efficient clutch technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0651, p. 8]
9. Cold-Storage Evaporator: (Off-Cycle Alt-Method/Off-Cycle Cap): This technology
utilizes phase change material in the HVAC evaporator of vehicles equipped with engine Start &
Stop technology to extend the time that cold air can be delivered to the cabin with the engine and
compressor off. This reduces the amount of time the engine would otherwise operate solely for
the purpose of cooling the cabin. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
A. Air conditioning credits
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For light-duty vehicles,215 EPA proposes to renew credits for manufacturers that install
technology that improves the efficiency of air conditioning ("AC") systems, but to exclude BEVs
from eligibility, while retaining current 5-cycle testing protocols that confirm the systems
actually reduce emissions as anticipated. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29246. EPA also proposes not to renew
light-duty vehicles' hydrofluorocarbon ("HFC") refrigerant leakage control credits and to sunset
current refrigerant standards for medium-duty vehicles, because another rulemaking under a
different statute is addressing HFCs. Id. We generally support EPA's proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 79]
215 The medium-duty vehicle fleet does not include air conditioning efficiency-related credits or
requirements, and EPA is not taking comments on that matter. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29246; 81 Fed. Reg. at
73742; 76 Fed. Reg. at 57196.
1 .Background
AC systems create tailpipe emissions by using additional power generated through the
combustion of gasoline. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29246. Since 2012 EPA has granted credits for AC
systems that reduce this extra fuel usage by means of installing more efficient components and
air recirculation settings, both measures that reduce engine loads. EPA states it has consistently
increased the stringency of the light-duty C02 footprint curves in the amount of the anticipated
AC credits by shifting the footprint curves downwards. Thus, according to EPA, manufacturers
who opt not to install the more efficient systems must meet the increased stringency by means of
other technology. AC efficiency credits are capped at 5.0 g/mile for passenger cars and 7.2
g/mile for light trucks, and all vehicles in these classes have been eligible for the credits. EPA
deems the credits to be effective in reducing emissions and reports increased usage. In MY 2021,
17 of 20 manufacturers reported efficiency credits resulting in an average credit of 5.7 g/mile. 88
Fed. Reg. at 29246. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 79]
2.Proposal to renew AC efficiency credits for vehicles with combustion engines only
EPA now proposes to renew AC efficiency credit eligibility only for vehicles equipped with
internal combustion engines. EPA reasons that such credits for BEVs are no longer required
because BEVs running AC systems do not combust gasoline; AC efficiency credits are not
representative of their emission reductions; and BEVs are already counted as 0 g/mile, so that
adding AC efficiency credits to the calculation has led to reporting of BEV emissions at less than
zero (in the case of Tesla, a fleet average of negative 126 g/mile, including 18.8 g/mile of AC
credits). 88 Fed. Reg. at 29247. The credits, EPA explains, were adopted when BEV sales were
low and incentivized BEVs, but are no longer needed. EPA next proposes to renew AC
efficiency credits for combustion vehicles while increasing the standards' stringency to reflect
use of those credits. EPA states it will continue to condition credit approval on mandatory 5-
cycle testing216 of certain grouped vehicles to confirm that the projected emission reductions are
occurring in the real world (the "AC17" test). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 79-80]
216 The test includes a highway cycle, a high temperature condition cycle, a preconditioning cycle, and a
cycle at solar peak periods of four hours. Where test results do not support full menu credits, proportional
credits may be allowed. Tests are performed on one vehicle model for each platform, starting with the
highest sales volume vehicles, and moving to the next-highest sales volume vehicle annually thereafter,
until all vehicle models have been tested or the platform undergoes redesign. EPA is not taking comments
on the testing procedures. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29247.
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We fully support EPA's proposal not to grant any AC credits to vehicles without a
combustion engine. BEVs should no longer be credited with fictitious tailpipe emission
reductions, in this case or otherwise. BEVs do not combust gasoline, regardless of whether they
use AC systems. We also agree that the current credits are not representative of BEV upstream
emissions and are no longer justified to incentivize BEVs, and that BEVs should not be
accounted for as if they produce less than zero grams per mile. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
p. 80]
We generally support the proposal to retain AC efficiency credits for vehicles with internal
combustion engines, with some caveats. Historically, credits have allowed manufacturers to
significantly delay compliance with EPA's standards, leading to near-term emission increases, as
EPA has often acknowledged. E.g., 86 Fed. Reg. at 43756; 77 Fed. Reg. 62812. That problem is
exacerbated when vehicles do not have to undergo testing to confirm the technologies for which
credits are awarded do in fact reduce emissions by an equivalent amount, and where the
stringency of the standards has not been increased to reflect the anticipated credit use. Here, the
latter concern is addressed if EPA does in fact increase stringency by lowering the footprint
curve to reflect the available credits, and the AC 17 test is vigorous. We would, however, oppose
these AC efficiency credits should EPA relax any of the current AC 17 test procedures, as their
real-world effectiveness could no longer be assured. We also ask EPA to fully explain exactly
how it ensures that the standards' stringency is in fact increased by an amount equivalent to the
credits it grants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 80]
We also support renewed AC efficiency system credits (for combustion vehicles only) for an
additional reason. In light of the astonishingly rapid and dangerous temperature increases all
across the country produced by the climate crisis, more frequent and more energy-intensive use
of air conditioning is inevitable. Assuring that these systems are as efficient as possible is
therefore of great importance. For that reason, we urge EPA to adopt an AC efficiency standard
rather than a voluntary credit, as it has done for the medium-duty fleet in the case of refrigerant
credits or, at a minimum, in its post-MY 2023 rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
80]
B.Proposal not to renew air conditioning leakage credits
1 .Background
When EPA established the current refrigerant leakage credits in 2012, the most common HFC
refrigerant used in mobile air conditioners was HFC-134a, carrying a global warming potential
("GWP") of 1430 times that of C02. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29246. The most emission-reducing
alternative at that time was HFO-1234yf, with a GWP of 4. To encourage the shift from HFC-
134a, the 2012 standards allowed manufacturers to earn refrigerant credits for light duty vehicles
and trucks, respectively, that are capped at 13.8 and 17.2 g/mile when an alternative refrigerant is
used, and at 6.3 and 7.8 g/mile for employing leak-tight components. For the medium-duty fleet,
EPA adopted a refrigerant leakage standard rather than a voluntary credit. Id. EPA describes the
program as successful and reports that as of MY 2021, 95% of new vehicles use the refrigerant
HFO-1234yf, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29247, which has a GWP of 4. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29246. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 81]
2.Proposal to eliminate refrigerant credits
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EPA now proposes not to renew refrigerant credits beginning in MY 2027 for the light-duty
fleet, and to sunset the refrigerant standards for medium-duty vehicles, largely because of the
passage of the American Innovation and Manufacturing ("AIM") Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7675, in
December 2020. Two years later, EPA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking under the AIM
Act (the "AIM Proposal") to restrict the HFCs used in light- and medium-vehicles to those not
exceeding a GWP of 150, with effective dates, respectively, of MY 2025 for the light-duty fleet
and MY 2026 for the heavy-duty fleet.217 EPA states that there is no reason to believe
manufacturers would use higher GWP refrigerants in the absence of EPA vehicle-based credits,
and that not renewing the credits would avoid duplicative programs, simplify this rule, and
reduce manufacturer credit reporting burdens. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 81]
217 Phasedown of Hydrofluorocarbons: Restrictions on the Use of Certain Hydrofluorocarbons Under
Subsection (i) of the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act of 2020, 87 Fed. Reg. 76738 (Dec. 15,
2022).
EPA requests comments on whether there is any value in retaining the refrigerant credits. In
our view, the answer is no. The AIM Proposal is expected to be finalized this summer or early
fall, before EPA completes this rulemaking. If the current refrigerant credits are eliminated, there
is no reason to believe manufacturers would use refrigerants other than HFC-1234yf (with its
GWP of 4). Two possible alternative refrigerants with GWP values under 150 exist (HFC-152a
and carbon dioxide), but adopting either would require a significant redesign of mobile air
conditioners. We are not aware of any manufacturers currently planning to use HFC-152a, and
while a few companies that import vehicles have investigated C02-based systems in northern
Europe, it is our understanding that those systems would not work well in the temperature ranges
experienced in the U.S. market. Thus, we concur with EPA's judgment that neither the majority
of manufacturers already using HFO-1234yf nor the minority of manufacturers still using HFC-
134a are likely to switch to either of the other two alternatives with GWPs under 150. Thus,
while the AIM Proposal could be tightened to bar refrigerants with GWP greater than 4, the
potential for backsliding under that proposal appears minimal. Thus, we agree that if the AIM
Proposal is finalized as proposed, and considering that HFO-1234yf is already used in 95% of
vehicles, there is no reason to renew a refrigerant credit program dating from 2012. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 81-82]
As a backstop, however, any remaining concerns can be resolved if either the AIM Proposal
or this rule, once finalized, adopts a standard requiring refrigerants with no more than GWP
values of 4, effective for MY 2026 and 2027, respectively. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
82]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Likewise, Ford recommends that EPA establish a phase-out for refrigerant credits, rather than
discontinue them all at once. Ford understands EPA's rationale for discontinuing these credits in
the long-term given the American Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act program, but we
encourage EPA to coordinate these separate actions to allow a phase-out over time. This would
help mitigate the stringency increases early in the GHG program, and make the final program
more feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 8]
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Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI)
HMG requests ZEVs to remain eligible for both Off-Cycle Credits and indirect
A/C (efficiency) credits [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 7]
Under the Proposed Rule, from MY 2027, ZEVs will no longer be eligible for A/C efficiency
credits. HMG believes the same argument can be made here as related to the OCC proposal. A/C
technology improvements will lead to reduced energy use in ZEVs and thus reduced emissions
associated with such vehicles. Therefore, when considering overall emissions reductions and
EPA's broader goals to improve human health and the environment by such emissions
reductions, there is considerable value in incentivizing energy-saving ZEVs, particularly while
challenges to developing and deploying ZEV technology remain. HMG therefore opposes the
Proposed Rule's elimination of indirect A/C efficiency credits for ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0554, p. 7]
HMG believes direct A/C (leakage) credits should not be eliminated [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0554, p. 7]
EPA also proposes to remove direct A/C leakage credits from MY 2027 for all vehicles.
HMG again opposes the removal of this important incentive. If retained , the majority of auto
manufacturers would receive these credits because great efforts were made over the past few
years to switch to a low global warming potential (GWP) refrigerant. Removing this credit
opportunity places a greater burden on manufacturers already undergoing substantial challenges
associated with the push to electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 7]
For this reason, HMG believes the A/C leakage credits should exist beyond MY 2027. Auto
manufacturers made large investments to make the switch to their entire fleet with the
expectation that earned credits would offset some of these costs. HMG suggests slowly phasing
out A/C leakage credits over 5 years instead of eliminating them completely in MY 2027. A/C
leakage credits are also a large percentage of credits currently earned, and with the reduction of
these credits, it will be much more difficult to meet the more stringent GHG emissions standards
than it ap pears. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 7]
Organization: Hyundai Motor America
The Final Rule Should Delay the Start of Off-Cycle Credit Phase Down Until MY 2031.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, pp. 7-8]
The final rule should enable compliance pathways by offering a real choice of clean
technology innovation or greater PEV penetration. However, the fundamental stripping away of
technology- earning credit flexibilities, in effect, creates an EV mandate. The result will cause an
industrywide race to simply "buy" compliance through credit trading provisions. In this way, the
Proposed Alternative's restructured off-cycle and air conditioning credit provisions incentivize
the wrong behavior by industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, pp. 7-8]
Organization: Kia Corporation
- Kia strongly supports preserving many of the current program flexibilities - a phase- down
of the A/C refrigerant leakage credits and preserving the off-cycle technology credits. These
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flexibilities should still play an important role as these credits could help ease the uncertainties in
the transition to EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 3]
Kia Supports Continuation of the AJC Efficiency Credit Program
EPA proposes to continue the AJC efficiency credit program, but limit the eligibility for the
AJC efficiency credits to only ICE vehicles starting in MY2027. Starting with MY2027, BEVs
are no longer eligible for AJC efficiency credits. Kia supports the continuation of the AJC
efficiency credit program. These efficiency technologies result in real-world GHG emissions
reductions. Therefore, they should not be eliminated or viewed as cutting into the effective
stringency of the program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 14-15]
Kia Supports a Phase Down of the AJC Refrigerant Leakage Credit Program
EPA proposes to remove the AJC refrigerant leakage credits for both light and medium duty
vehicles and trucks because of the separate law disallowing the use of high global warming
potential refrigerants under the American Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act of 2020.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 14-15]
Because of the mandate in the AIM Act and because the transition to low global warming
refrigerant is in effect, Kia recommends, instead of immediate elimination, a phase-down of
credits before eventually discontinuing the AJC leakage credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555,
pp. 14-15]
Kia urges EPA to accurately reflect the transition of the credit in the stringency curve. While
this transition has been reflected in the stringency curve for passenger vehicles from MYs 2027 -
2032, it is less clear how the stringency curve for light trucks reflects this change. We
recommend EPA further adjust the stringency curves for light trucks to better reflect the
transition to low global warming refrigerants from MYs 2027 - 2032. Both of these
recommended adjustments will provide flexibility for meeting the extremely stringent and front-
loaded GHG standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 14-15]
Organization: Lucid Group, Inc.
Lucid Supports Eliminating AC Leakage and Off-Cycle Menu Credits
EPA proposes removing the air conditioning (AC) refrigerant leakage control credit starting
with MY27. Lucid supports the agency's decision to remove the leakage control credit; the credit
has led to the reduction of leakage of hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) 134a refrigerant by
manufacturers transitioning to leak-tight components in the AC system or to refrigerants with a
lower global warming potential. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, p. 7]
Lucid Encourages EPA to Consider Parity with AC Efficiency Credits
Lucid agrees with EPA that AC efficiency credits have been effective in incentivizing AC
efficiency improvements since the program's inception, and the usage of these credits by
manufacturers has increased over time. AC efficiency improvements have a direct impact on
tailpipe emissions for ICE vehicles. As a corollary, improvements to AC efficiency in EVs yields
benefits such as better vehicle range, increased vehicle efficiency, and less demand on the grid.
These benefits directly impact EV usage, vehicle miles traveled, and consumer sentiment toward
the adoption of EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, p. 7]
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Lucid encourages EPA to consider parity in treatment of ICE vehicles and EVs under the AC
efficiency credit program. The benefits in increased efficiency should be recognized in both or
neither. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, p. 7]
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
Continue Off-Cycle Technologies Credit & A/C Efficiency Technology Credit Programs
MEMA urges EPA to continue to provide the off-cycle technology credit program and the
A/C efficiency credit program. The supplier community, working independently and in
collaboration with OEMs, develop and engineer innovative technologies that contribute to
vehicle manufacturers' strategies for real-world GHG and fuel consumption reductions often
beyond those measured with standard test procedures. The off-cycle credit program and A/C
efficiency credit program have helped to support industry investment in innovative and forward-
looking technologies that provide environmental benefits. These technologies offer measurable,
demonstrable, and verifiable real-world benefits that improve efficiencies and reduce GHG
emissions. They also provide an important cost-effective option for OEMs to achieve fuel
economy and GHG targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 9-10]
These credit programs are not loopholes and do not distort the market but instead recognize
technologies that are not measured accurately on the existing test-cycles. These technologies are
often more cost effective than other available technologies to reduce pollutant emissions. It is
important that the MY27+ program allows a variety of regulatory tools to broaden compliance
pathways for vehicles to manage their product mix during this transition period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0644, pp. 9-10]
The continuation of the off-cycle credit program is critical in encouraging technologies that
allow greater innovation which can provide a cost-efficient range of technology options that
ultimately lower compliance costs and increase consumer choice. These technologies will
continue to promote consumer choice, spur technology development, and minimize compliance
costs while achieving significant pollutant emissions and oil reductions. Importantly,
continuation of the off-cycle technology credit program will help maintain market certainty for
these technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 9-10]
Similarly, MEMA encourages EPA to explore how emissions reductions from off-cycle
technologies and A/C efficiency technologies could be rewarded when used on BEVS, PHEVs,
FCEVS, and other ZEVs. Many off-cycle and A/C efficiency technologies, along with emerging
ZEV technologies, could help reduce battery energy use and therefore lower the amount of
electricity used to power the vehicle overall. Consequently, technologies that reduce the amount
of battery charging needed and, therefore, the electricity used to power the vehicle should be
recognized in MY2027 and beyond. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 9-10]
MEMA urges:
EPA to maintain off-cycle credits and A/C credits programs at full value through 2032
for all vehicle types, including ZEV, and consider additional ways emerging technologies that
reduce ZEV energy consumption can be rewarded. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 9-10]
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Organization: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
- Phase out air conditioning and off-cycle credits
The MPCA agrees with EPA's proposal to phase out air conditioning and off-cycle credits.
While useful to encourage manufacturers to invest in improved technology in earlier phases of
EPA's greenhouse gas vehicle emissions standards, they no longer provide substantive benefit,
and it is appropriate to sunset these programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, p. 5]
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
Mitsubishi participated in the development of - and supports - the comments submitted by
Auto Innovators. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
In addition, based on its considerable experience discussed previously with BEV and PHEV
leadership, Mitsubishi provides the following recommendations to supplement the comments of
Auto Innovators:
1. Closely align the multi-pollutant emissions standards with President Biden's 2030
goal by assuming no more than 40-50% PHEVs and FCEVs by 2030, even though our
experience leads us to caution that this itself is very ambitious, and is predicated on the
assumption that the necessary supportive policies will be effectively implemented. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
2. Consider the many benefits of PHEVs to consumers and the environment during the
expected period of constrained battery critical minerals production capacity, and how PHEVs are
the perfect stepping- stone to full BEV acceptance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
3. Maintain the current PHEV Utility Factor (UF) and work with industry to identify
opportunities to increase PHEV electric operation. This is the ideal stepping-stone technology to
encourage long-term BEV acceptance and utilization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
4. Keep the proposed approach to determine the passenger car curves, and consider
adjusting the cutpoint and stringency levels of the light-duty trucks during the early years of the
program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
5. Maintain the existing GHG program flexibilities, such as Air Conditioning and Off-
Cycle technologies credits (including the alternative method to apply off-cycle credits), and
allow previously approved technologies to continue receiving credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0682, p. 2]
6. Align the Tier-4 (criteria pollutants) with CARB's LEV-IV criteria test procedures and
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
7. Consider the impact that very aggressive GHG standards will have on vehicle
affordability, and especially the detrimental impact to low-to-moderate income families.
Regardless of the vehicles that regulation may require us to produce, it is critical that regulators
always keep the accessibility of consumers in mind. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
The rationale for each one of these recommendations is further explained below. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
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5. GHG Program Flexibilities
At the onset of GHG regulations in MY2012, EPA developed a set of program flexibilities
designed to provide credits for technologies that provide real-world GHG emissions benefits but
are unable to be measured under the required test procedures. Specifically, credits are available
for refrigerant systems which use low global warming potential refrigerants and reduce leakage,
improvements to air conditioning efficiency, and "off-cycle" technologies which improve
emissions but are not fully measured during 2-cycle testing. This proposed regulation intends to
phase out and eliminate several of these credits as well as limit their application for electric
vehicles. Mitsubishi supports the position of Auto Innovators to maintain these program
flexibilities as these technologies provide real-world environmental benefits. Mitsubishi also
supports Auto Innovators' position that any vehicles with previously approved alternative
method off-cycle technology continue to receive credits for MY27 and later. In addition,
Mitsubishi believes that the alternative method to apply for off-cycle credits should remain as an
option for MY27 and later. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 8-9]
It is important to note that NHTSA's CAFE program in the past has mirrored EPA's GHG
approach to these flexibilities. Since it is not possible to comment on a proposed CAFE
regulation that has not yet been published, it is only reasonable to assume that NHTSA will
follow previous precedent regarding flexibilities and adopt the same structure as EPA. However,
there is a significant deviation with regard to the treatment of EV compliance under the CAFE
and GHG programs. Where EVs are rightly considered zero g/mi under the GHG program, the
CAFE program requires EVs to be assign a mile per gallon equivalent compliance value based
on the PEF. Increasing this discrepancy in the GHG and CAFE programs, DOE has proposed
reducing the PEF by 72% compared to the current value. The PEF reduction will lead to a
substantial decrease in the CAFE compliance value of BEVs and PHEVs. The elimination of air
conditioning and off- cycle credits for EVs combined with changes to the PEF, and UF within
the CAFE program could put BEVs and PHEVs at a distinctive compliance disadvantage relative
to some Strong Hybrid-Electric Vehicles (SHEVs). Keeping these flexibilities in the GHG
program for electric vehicles should reduce potential harmonization issues between the GHG and
CAFE regulations. For this reason and the reasons stated by Auto Innovators, Mitsubishi
supports Auto Innovators proposed approach to apply all available credits at the vehicle level
regardless of propulsion, but ensure fleet-wide average emissions are not allowed to go below a
value equivalent to zero g/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 8-9]
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
We also support the proposed elimination of air conditioning (AC) leakage credits and
recommend that EPA include in the final rule a leakage design standard to serve as a backstop
against the impact of any leakage. In the December 2020 American Innovation and
Manufacturing (AIM) Act Congress authorized EPA to phase down production and consumption
of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) in various sectors and subsectors, including vehicle AC systems.
As EPA explains in the proposal, "The AIM Act has sent a strong signal to all vehicle
manufacturers that there is no future for using high GWP [Global Warming Potential]
refrigerants in new vehicles. In December 2022, in response to the AIM Act, EPA proposed to
restrict the use of high GWP refrigerants such as HFCs in vehicle applications. The new
restriction on refrigerant use, if finalized as proposed, would be effective in MY 2025 for light-
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duty vehicles and MY 2026 for MDVs, well ahead of the start of the new C02 vehicle standards
EPA is proposing."28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, p. 8]
28 Supra note 1, at 29,247.
Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
It would also revise the air conditioning credit program by limiting credit eligibility to light-
duty internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles for tailpipe C02 emissions control beginning in
MY 2027, and remove refrigerant- based air conditioning provisions for both light- and medium-
duty vehicles to maintain consistency with a separate proposal to disallow their use. 10 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 3]
10 88 Fed. Reg. 29196, 29246-48.
NADA generally supports retention of all compliance flexibilities that will afford OEMs a
greater ability to cost-efficiently deliver compliant vehicles, and to help incentivize the
acceptance of new technology and alternative fuel vehicles in the marketplace. Hence, NADA
opposes EPA's proposals to (i) eliminate or reduce the incentive multiplier for medium-duty
vehicles prior to MY 2027, (ii) limit eligibility for the air conditioning credit to light-duty
internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles, (iii) eliminate refrigerant-based air conditioning
credit provisions for both light-duty and medium-duty vehicles, and (iv) to sunset the off-cycle
credits program for both light-duty and medium-duty vehicles. NADA shares the concerns
expressed by AAI in its comments regarding the changes EPA proposes on these matters. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 16]
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
As a member of the Alliance for Automotive Innovation ("the Alliance"), Nissan fully
endorses the comments on the Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule submitted separately by the
Alliance. In particular, Nissan highlights several points from the Alliance's comments, including:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Request continuing AC and off-cycle credit eligibility for EVs that are part of mixed fleets
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
We also support EPA's air conditioning credit programs and its proposal to sunset the off-
cycle credits program for both LDVs and MDVs and suggest EPA consider whether shorter
timeframes are appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 9]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
2. Porsche supports continued availability of flexibilities for electrified vehicles.
Porsche supports the continued allowance for electric vehicles to participate in the off-cycle
and air conditioning related GHG flexibilities. Porsche does not support the proposal from EPA
to remove both for electric vehicles beginning in model year 2027. Off-cycle technology and air
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conditioning credits have been a pragmatic and supportive pillar within the suite of flexibilities
in EPA's GHG regulation for many years and Porsche believes that these flexibilities can
continue to provide value within the overall construct of the GHG fleet regulation, even for fully
electrified vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 19-20]
Electric vehicles operate as a supportive element within a manufacturers GHG fleet and
should provide a compliance incentivize intended to increase production of EVs. Electric
vehicles like any other vehicle should have the opportunity to leverage additional off-cycle or air
conditioning technologies that further contribute to C02 reduction goals and for those credits to
be equally available for use within a manufacturers fleet. These types of credits act as an internal
flexibility for the manufacturer to manage their overall annual compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0637, p. 20]
3. Porsche supports continued availability of GHG credits for newer, low-GWP air
conditioning systems.
Specific to air conditioning leakage credits, Porsche recommends EPA retain the provision for
new, low GWP refrigerants such as R-744 that offer even lower global warming potential (GWP)
values that the commonly used 1234-YF refrigerant. Porsche recommends that a credit be
provided that reflects the GWP of 1.0 for R744 versus the 4.0 of 1234-YF. Furthermore, Porsche
recommends EPA revisit the HiLeakDis equation and associated values as defined in 86.1867-12
to establish an appropriate set of values HiLeakDis equation for R-744 systems. R-744 is a
smaller molecule than 1234-yf and R-744 systems operate at a much higher pressure. As such,
the values reflected in the current HiLeakDis do not provide a benchmark system leakage rate
appropriate to benchmark R-744 systems. The current values reduce the overall credit available
for R-744 systems even though the R-744 has a lower GWP than 1234-YF. The values within the
current HiLeakDis were established to reflect average system leakage rates for 1234- YF in order
to prevent backsliding in system leakage control. A similar HiLeakDis may be appropriate to
ensure quality R-744 systems but would need to be established to set a benchmark for reasonable
leak control specific to R-744. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 21]
Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
Consider the Tradeoffs in Ending Air Conditioning ("AC") Efficiency Credits for BEVs
EPA proposes two actions related to AC credits. First, EPA proposes to end credits for use of
AC refrigerants with a lower global warming potential ("GWP"). Rivian supports this change.
Pursuant to the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act of 2020, EPA has proposed to
disallow high-GWP refrigerants, obviating the need for the existing incentives in the vehicle
emissions rules.27 Second, EPA proposes to make BEVs ineligible for AC system efficiency
credits beginning in MY27. Rivian appreciates the agency's rationale for making BEVs
ineligible for AC efficiency credits but encourages consideration of the tradeoffs. As in the off-
cycle program, Rivian believes EPA should maintain parity in its treatment of BEVs and ICEs
for AC credit purposes. While AC efficiency directly affects an ICE's tailpipe emissions,
efficiency credits for BEVs incentivize manufacturers to maintain maximally efficient AC
systems in those vehicles—a contributing factor in a BEV's overall energy efficiency and a
feature the agency acknowledges in the NPRM.28 Energy efficiency is an important value even
without a tailpipe impact. While direct regulation of BEV efficiency would be premature at this
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stage, EPA should consider the benefits of regulatory provisions that indirectly incentivize
efficiency improvements as the BEV fleet grows. To address potential concerns about AC
efficiency credits for BEVs—and the resulting "negative" emissions credited to BEV
manufacturers—eroding the stringency of the regulation, the agency could increase stringency of
the standards as needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 9-10]
27 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 87 (May 5, 2023) (revising 40 C.F.R. Parts 85, 86, 600, 1036, 1037, and 1066),
29,196.
28 Id. at 29,246-29,247.
Unlike advanced technology multipliers that do not represent real-world emissions
improvements, AC efficiency credits for BEVs do link to a real-world reduction in energy
demand. Rivian understands the agency's argument for eliminating efficiency credits for BEVs
but believes this would come at a cost. EPA should consider the tradeoffs involved and
reexamine this proposal by treating BEV and ICE vehicle AC efficiency similarly. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 9-10]
Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
EPA is proposing several modifications to other credit systems that are part of the tailpipe
emissions standards in order to ensure these systems actually result in emissions reductions. We
support EPA's proposal to eliminate the air conditioning (AC) system credits for AC refrigerant
leakage control. Since the phase out of high global warming potential (GWP) refrigerants is
required under other laws and regulations, manufacturers should not be rewarded under the
tailpipe emissions standards for actions they are already required to take. Vehicles, however, will
continue to use low GWP refrigerants, and EPA should implement a leakage design standard to
protect against potential system leaks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, p. 10]
EPA is also proposing to close loopholes that allow for emissions reductions provided by
ZEVs to be claimed more than once. We support EPA's modification to the AC efficiency credit
so that it applies only to internal combustion engine vehicles starting in model year 2027. This
makes sense because AC efficiency credits are earned solely by improving internal combustion
engine vehicles. Under the current tailpipe emissions standards, however, some manufacturers
were reporting ZEV emissions of less than zero when implementing AC efficiency technology in
those vehicles. For similar reasons, we also support EPA's proposal to modify the off-cycle
credit system to only include eligible vehicles (i.e., internal combustion engine vehicles) in
calculating the cap used for these types of credits until they are phased out. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0591, p.10]
Organization: Stellantis
EPA's Discounting of Technology Benefits Increases Implicit GHG Stringency
EPA has proposed AC, off-cycle and PHEV technology actions that would increase the
implicit GHG stringency, making it even more difficult to achieve the explicit aggressive GHG
targets. These EPA proposed actions are summarized below:
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- Remove the Direct AC refrigerant and leak credit in a single model year (2027MY) [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 11-12]
- Impose an artificial phase down of off-cycle credits, disregarding the real-world benefits of
GHG saving technology [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 11-12]
- Exclude PHEV technology from modeling and discount highly capable PHEV technology
that would provide a bridge to a fully electrified future [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 11-
12]
These long-standing flexibilities have incentivized significant investment in GHG saving
technology that now proliferates across the light-duty fleet. The Direct AC credit incentive has
been a very successful program that industry has moved to implement at a very high rate. The
investment and piece costs incurred to develop and introduce the lower Global Warming
Potential (GWP) refrigerants and their systems are partially offset by the GHG credits received.
In addition, the lower leak technologies and materials, now deployed across the ICE fleet,
continue to achieve real-world GHG savings. This GHG benefit of low AC leak rates does not go
away as we transition the fleet to higher rates of electrified product. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0678, pp. 11-12]
Similarly, the ongoing and already incurred investment and costs of GHG saving off-cycle
technologies in the fleet have led to real world benefits. These benefits also do not go away as
the fleet adds more EVs and PHEVs. While there may be less available menu credits for EVs
versus ICE products, this naturally achieves what the EPA is now proposing in this rule via a
forced phase-down of the allowed credit cap. That is, the menu of available technologies will
naturally decrease as fleet mix shifts to EVs. EPA's effort to drastically reduce the cap will
immediately call into question the ongoing development and deployment of these GHG saving
technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 11-12]
These combined actions significantly increase the stringency of the proposed rule by making
the extremely aggressive fleet targets more difficult to achieve while at the same time
incentivizing OEMs to remove this GHG saving technology from products. ICE vehicles and
EVs both benefit from many of these technologies and therefore their GHG compliance and real-
world benefits should not be removed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 11-12]
- The Direct AC credit and off-cycle credit programs need to be retained for continued GHG
benefits on both ICE and EV products. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 11-12]
- The implicit stringency impact in the early years of this rulemaking is drastically increased
by the additional burden experienced if the proposed flexibilities are removed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0678, pp.11-12]
Stellantis recommends that EPA should:
-Retain GHG saving technology flexibilities recognizing the GHG benefit that continues to be
present on electric vehicles and that will naturally decrease as EV penetration increases [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
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Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Tesla supports the proposed Alternative 1 with added stringency so that the final performance
standards achieves a fleet BEV penetration rate greater than 69% in MY 2032.2 Alternative 1 is
estimated to provide greater C02 emissions reduction of -51% from no action by 2050 compared
to -46%) under EPA's proposal, and the additional stringency will result in even greater emission
reductions.3 Accordingly, Tesla asserts the EPA should amend its proposal with a more stringent
version of Alternative 1 and take, inter alia, the following additional steps to increase the
performance and overall stringency of the proposed standards: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792,
p. 2]
2 See, 88 Fed. Reg. 29332-33, Table 96.
3 Id., at 29348 (comparing Tables 135 and 136).
- Eliminate off-cycle crediting for all types of vehicles; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p.
2]
- Revisit the plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) utility factor to accurately reflect real
world emissions; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Amend the proposal to create parity in promoting motor vehicle air conditioning (MVAC)
efficiency adoption; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Maintain the existing zero emissions upstream approach for BEVs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0792, p. 2]
- Eliminate credit multipliers for all vehicles; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Ensure BEVs continue to be accounted for, and participate in, the NMOG + NOx reduction
standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
Reducing short-lived climate pollutant emissions, such as HFC-134a, is a critical step toward
mitigating climate change. Accordingly, Tesla supports EPA's actions to prohibit high GWP
(>## 150) refrigerants such as HFC 134a in new light-duty A/C systems post MY-2025.158 As
the proposal recognizes, the transition to lower GWP refrigerants is rapidly underway and all
manufacturers can be compliant before the implementation of the proposed standards go into
effect. Accordingly, the agency has correctly eliminated the A/C leakage credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0792, p. 25]
158 88 Fed. Reg. at 29247.
EPA Should Create Parity on A/C Efficiency Crediting
The EPA's decision to limit voluntary A/C efficiency credits to only ICE vehicles is bad
policy. 159 In proposing this limitation, the agency runs the risk of creating a disincentive for
manufacturers of BEVs to continue to improve and deploy the most efficient cooling systems.
The agency instead should consider a technology neutral approach allowing the crediting of all
vehicles and increasing the stringency of the overall standard consistent with the additional level
of credit generation that will accumulate with BEV A/C efficiency credit generation eligibility.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 25]
159 88 Fed. Reg. at 29239.
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Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
A/C Efficiency Credits - Proposed Vehicle Air Conditioning System Related Provisions
(Section III.B.5.)
Beginning with MY 2027, EPA is proposing to retain A/C efficiency credits but with
eligibility limited to vehicles equipped with only IC engines. Volkswagen recommends keeping
the current A/C efficiency credits approach for PEVs within the compliance calculation. The A/C
credits considered as a part of an incentive program for manufacturers to include efficient A/C
technologies since the A/C is continuously running while the vehicle is driven. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0669, p. 5]
The electrical energy consumption of BEVs should be incentivized. Real world efficiency of
BEVs can be improved year-round, e.g., through efficient air-conditioning systems. Efficient
A/C gives the customer a greater driving range and contributes to feasibility of the GHG
stringency as the overall energy demand of the vehicle is reduced. A/C credits allow a
quantifiable internal positive business case to offset the expense of more expensive technologies
as part of vehicle development. In addition to efficient air conditioning systems, the current
method of evaluating A/C efficiency should be applied to heat pumps. The use of heat pumps
should also be considered to be rewarded with A/C efficiency credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0669, p. 5]
It should not be an advantage for manufactures with a higher ICE fleet share to claim A/C
efficiency credits and contrarily a disadvantage for manufacturers with a higher fleet PEV share.
A PEV is always "0 g/mi" and not negative. The credit value by itself is part of the fleet
compliance calculation and not truly a discrete negative GHG score for a given PEV. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 5]
A/C Leakage Credits (Section III.B.5.ii)
EPA proposes sun setting the voluntary refrigerant-related credits in MY 2027 in its vehicles
GHG program as appropriate and reasonable due to the American Innovation and Manufacturing
(AIM) Act of 2020 (42 U.S.C. § 7675). Yet, there is no incentive provided to use refrigerants
with even lower global warming potential (GWP) and in addition to the current standard
refrigerant R1234yf (GWP = 4), the refrigerant R744 (GWP = 1) has an even lower GWP.
Continuation or further development of A/C leakage credits for refrigerants with GWP <= 4
would provide an incentive to increase installation rates of low GWP refrigerants such as R744
and help to further improve the A/C system leakage effects. Volkswagen suggests continuation
of leakage credits as an incentive to motivate the automotive industry to continue application or
development of these improved A/C systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 5]
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
VCC believes it is important to continue flexibilities (air conditioning credits for ZEVs and
off- cycle credits for ICE vehicles) because low AC emissions and AC efficiency are
environmental improvements. EPA should continue these programs and develop a new process
so that pure ZEV companies receive these credits without resulting in an overall negative C02
result. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, p. 4]
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Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
While we appreciate EPA's intent behind making BEVs ineligible to generate AC efficiency
credits, we would note that AC efficiency does affect the overall vehicle efficiency, regardless of
the fuel type of the vehicle. As such, EPA should maintain parity between ICE and BEVs in
regards to AC efficiency credits in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 28-29]
EPA Summary and Response
A/C leakage credit: general comments:
Summary:
The following organizations and companies recommend maintaining A/C leakage credits.
Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Ad Hoc Tier 4 Light-Duty Small Manufacturer
Group, DENSO, Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI), Mitsubishi Motors
North America, Inc. (MMNA), National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA),
Nissan North America, Inc., Porsche Cars North America (PCNA), Stellantis,
Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
The following organizations and companies support a phase-out over time if EPA decides to
eliminate leakage credits given provisions of the American Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM)
Act.
- Ford Motor Company, Kia Corporation
The following organizations and companies support phase-out and the elimination of air
conditioning (A/C) leakage credits and some commenters recommend that EPA include in the
final rule a leakage design standard to serve as a backstop against the impact of any leakage.
Arconic Corporation (ARCO), California Air Resources Board (CARB), Chemours
Company FC, LLC, Environmental, and Public Health Organizations, Lucid Group, Inc.,
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), National Association of Clean Air
Agencies (NACAA), Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management
(NESCAUM) and the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC), Rivian Automotive, LLC,
Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC), Tesla, Inc.
CARB recommends that U.S. EPA retain the existing AC leakage standard for medium-
duty vehicles regardless of refrigerant type and establish an AC leakage standard for light-
duty vehicles.
California Attorney General's Office, et al. recommend retaining a smaller value A/C
leakage credit to continuously incentivize the prevention of refrigerant leaks for the lowest
GWP refrigerant.
- NACAA recommends that EPA include in the final rule a leakage design standard to serve
as a backstop against the impact of any leakage.
NESCAUM recommends EPA consider whether shorter timeframes for sunsetting the
leakage credits are appropriate.
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Response:
As discussed in preamble Section III.C.5, EPA agrees with commenters who expressed
support for retaining some credits and regulatory support for reducing leakage. We agree with
commenters (e.g., California Attorney General's office) that it would be environmentally
beneficial to continue a small credit for the cleanest A/C refrigerants under the GWP threshold of
EPA's Technology Transitions rule established pursuant to the AIM Act. For MY 2031 and later,
EPA is establishing A/C leakage credits of 1.6 g/mile cars and 2.0 g/mile trucks A/C leakage
credits to incentivize using the lowest-GWP refrigerants and the use of low leak systems. The
A/C credits have been very successful in encouraging the adoption of low leak systems and
lower GWP refrigerants and EPA finds it is appropriate to continue the credits, but at a lower
level to reflect more recent developments, including the AIM Act. We also recognize that the
proposed elimination of A/C leakage credits in MY 2027 would pose challenges for
manufacturers with respect to lead time and feasibility. We recognize that a phase-out of these
credits would provide for a more orderly transition and also provide necessary additional lead
time in meeting the stringency of standards in the early years of the program. Therefore, in this
final rule, EPA is phasing down the existing A/C leakage credits from 2027 through MY 2030.
We agree with commenters supporting the existing MDV refrigerant leakage standard. EPA is
retaining the existing MDV refrigerant leakage standard that was established under the Phase 2
program. The current MDV leakage standard requires that loss of refrigerant from A/C systems
may not exceed a total leakage rate of 11.0 grams per year or a percent leakage rate of 1.50
percent per year, whichever is greater. This leakage standard applies regardless of the refrigerant
used in the A/C system.
In the Phase 2 rule, EPA revised the refrigerant leakage standard to be refrigerant neutral,
meaning that regardless of the type of refrigerant used, the loss of refrigerant cannot exceed the
standard of 11 g/year or a percentage leakage rate greater than 1.5 percent per year for maximum
leakage credits. The MDV program does not include A/C efficiency related credits or
requirements.
A/C maximum leakage credits (MaxCredit) available to manufacturers, final program
(CO2 g/mile).
MY
Car
Truck
2026
13.8
17.2
2027
11.0
13.8
2028
8.3
10.3
2029
5.5
6.9
2030
2.8
3.4
2031
1.6
2.0
2032 and later
1.6
2.0
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Leakage: use of heat pumps and alternative refrigerants in future HVAC systems
Summary
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI), Porsche Cars North America (PCNA) and
Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. made the following comments:
AAI commented that the use of heat pumps is expected to become more prevalent in HVAC
systems, particularly in BEVs. These systems resemble AC systems but are modified to heat and
cool the cabin and battery. Thus, they have additional connections, valving, and heat exchangers
that represent additional leak paths in the system. For these systems in particular, the credit
recognizing reduced AC refrigerant leakage technology is still needed and would still recognize
real-world benefits.
AAI further commented that refrigerant R1234yf is suitable for heat pump applications, but is
performance limited at high and low temperature extremes. Other refrigerants are better suited to
heat pump applications. Electrification is driving new HVAC system architecture and using new
refrigerants in greater quantities than in ICE vehicles. These new refrigerants are likely to have
higher-GWP components than R1234yf and selectively leak at different rates. Encouraging the
use of the lowest GWP blends possible and minimizing leakage is still an important
environmental consideration.
Volkswagen commented that there is no incentive provided to use refrigerants with even
lower global warming potential (GWP) than the current standard refrigerant R1234yf (GWP =
4), such as the refrigerant R744 (GWP = 1). Volkswagen recommended further AJC leakage
credits for refrigerants with GWP <= 4 to provide an incentive to increase installation rates of
low GWP refrigerants such as R744 and help to further improve the AJC system leakage effects.
PCNA: Porsche recommended EPA retain the provision for new, low GWP refrigerants such
as R-744 that offer even lower global warming potential (GWP) values that the commonly used
1234-YF refrigerant. Porsche recommends that a credit be provided that reflects the GWP of 1.0
for R744 versus the 4.0 of 1234-YF. Porsche also recommended EPA revisit the HiLeakDis
equation to establish a different set of values in the HiLeakDis equation for R-744 systems.
Response:
EPA agrees with commenters that it would be environmentally beneficial to continue a small
credit for the cleanest AJC refrigerants under the GWP threshold of EPA's Technology
Transitions rule established pursuant to the AIM Act.
As discussed above, EPA is phasing down the AJC leakage credits from MY 2027 through
2030; the AJC leakage credits will be available but for a reduced credit value when using higher
GWP refrigerants. For AJC leakage credits for MY 2031 and later, AJC leakage credits in the
vehicle program are only available for those refrigerants with GWPs at or below 150 (the
threshold established by EPA's Technology Transitions rule).
In response to Porsche's comment on the GWP of 1.0 for R-744 versus the 4.0 of HFO-
1234yf refrigerant, EPA has previously revised the GWP value of HFO-1234yf refrigerant to 1.
Therefore, the leakage credits of both HFO-1234yf and R-744 refrigerants are identical when
using the same HiLeakDis values. EPA believes the current values in the HiLeakDis equation
remain appropriate for all refrigerants.
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EPA agrees with the comment that an A/C leakage credit could incentivize refrigerants
cleaner than the EPA Technology Transitions rule's threshold. For model year 2031 and later,
EPA has established A/C leakage credit values of up to 1.6 g/mile for cars and 2.0 g/mile for
trucks, dependent on the GWP of the refrigerant used, to incentivize using the lowest GWP
refrigerant. EPA notes that the most recent GWP value of R1234yf refrigerant is 1; thus,
manufacturers' use of this or other refrigerants less than 150 GWP are eligible to earn the
available optional A/C credits.
A/C efficiency credit for electric vehicles: general comments
Summary:
The following organizations and companies oppose limiting A/C efficiency credits to ICE
vehicles and urged EPA to continue allowing A/C efficiency credits for BEVs:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation, DENSO, Ford Motor Company, Hyundai America
Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI), Hyundai Motor America, Kia Corporation, Lucid Group,
Inc., MEMA (The Vehicle Suppliers Associated), Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc.
(MMNA), National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA), Nissan North America,
Inc., Porsche Cars North America (PCNA), Rivian Automotive, LLC , Stellantis, Tesla,
Inc., Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
Alliance for Automotive Innovation comments that eliminating eligibility for AC
efficiency credits for BEV vehicles makes sense only once the transition to BEV mass
volumes is more robust.
- Many of the organizations and companies commented that maintaining A/C efficiency
credits for both ICE vehicles and BEVs would maintain "parity" between the two types of
powertrains.
The following organizations and companies support excluding BEV air conditioning (A/C)
efficiency credits, while retaining current 5-cycle testing protocols that confirm the systems
actually reduce emissions.
Arconic Corporation (ARCO), BorgWarner, Inc., California Air Resources Board
(CARB), Environmental, and Public Health Organizations, Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency (MPCA), National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA), Northeast
States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the Ozone Transport
Commission (OTC), Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
Response:
EPA disagrees with commenters who urged us to continue allowing A/C efficiency credits for
BEVs. EPA is finalizing its proposal to limit A/C efficiency credits to vehicles equipped with IC
engines beginning in MY2027, which is responsive to the many commenters who supported this
provision. The A/C efficiency credits are based on emissions reductions from ICE vehicles.
They correspond to motor vehicle emissions reductions that occur when the A/C systems on ICE
vehicles are operated more efficiently, which in turn reduces their use of electricity produced by
the alternator and engine, and which in turn reduces pollution emitted by the motor vehicle
engine. The credits provide an incentive for manufacturers to increase the efficiency of their A/C
systems and in turn reduce the pollution emitted by the vehicle engine. The amount of the credits
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was determined based on our technical analysis of the emissions produced by an ICE engine and
how A/C efficiency improvements could reduce such emissions.
As explained in the preamble Section III.C.5.ii., currently, BEVs are generating credits even
though the credits are based solely on improvements to ICE vehicles, and not representative of
emissions reductions for BEVs. That is, BEVs completely prevent engine emissions. Thus,
improving A/C efficiency does not and is not needed to further decrease vehicle engine
emissions. Moreover, the amount of the credits EPA previously determined based on ICE vehicle
emissions has no real-world correlation to BEVs. Allowing BEVs to generate A/C efficiency
credits is therefore not technically sound. It also means they are receiving a windfall of credits
that fails to correspond to any real-world reduction in vehicle emissions, a problem which
increases in significance as the manufacturers choose to produce an increasing number of BEVs.
As described for off-cycle credits in preamble Section III.C.6.i, the final rule also restricts the
applicability of A/C efficiency credits for PHEVs to the portion of vehicle operation when the
engine is running, based on the vehicle's utility factor. Similar to the preceding discussion of
BEVs and A/C efficiency credits, this calculation adjustment is appropriate to associate A/C
efficiency credits only with ICE operation beginning in MY 2027.
Efficiency: testing for A/C efficiency credits
Summary:
Environmental, and Public Health Organizations and Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
made the following comments.
Environmental, and Public Health Organizations: We would, however, oppose these AC
efficiency credits should EPA relax any of the current AC 17 test procedures, as their real-world
effectiveness could no longer be assured. We also ask EPA to fully explain exactly how it
ensures that the standards' stringency is in fact increased by an amount equivalent to the credits
it grants.
Volkswagen commented that the current method of evaluating A/C efficiency should be
applied to heat pumps used for cabin heating in BEVs, and heat pumps should also be rewarded
with A/C efficiency credits.
Response:
EPA agrees with Environmental and Public Health Organizations that the existing AC 17 test
procedures for A/C efficiency credits should not be relaxed and remain an important means of
verifying A/C efficiency credits. EPA did not reopen the AC 17 testing procedures in this
rulemaking, and thus the existing AC 17 test procedures remain in effect. Additionally, in
response to Volkswagen's comment on heat pumps, for the reasons described above, EPA is
finalizing its proposal to limit A/C efficiency credits to vehicles equipped with IC engines
beginning in MY2027, and thus BEVs will not be eligible for A/C efficiency credits.
In response to the comment from Environmental, and Public Health Organizations, we
understand the commenter was concerned about impacts on overall stringency of the program if
we were to relax the existing AC 17 testing provisions, as those tests are critical in ensuring that
GHG reductions are in fact achieved in the real-world commensurate with the AC efficiency
credits. EPA has not reopened the AC 17 testing provisions as part of this rulemaking, and thus
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the existing AC 17 testing requirements remain in effect. EPA agrees with the commenter that
these testing provisions are a vital part of the program to ensure the validity of the AC efficiency
credits.
Efficiency: A/C efficiency and off cycle credit interactions
Summary:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI) and DENSO Corporation made the following
comments.
AAI: Auto Innovators believes that technologies affecting the AC efficiency credit interact
with technologies on the solar-thermal control submenu of the off-cycle credit menu that reduce
AC load. AAI recommended that EPA move the solar thermal control technologies to the AC
efficiency credit menu and adjust the caps accordingly.
DENSO: DENSO recommended that EPA consider adding any A/C efficiency technologies
approved under the off-cycle program's alternative methodology to the A/C efficiency credit
menu, and that the credit caps be adjusted accordingly.
Response:
EPA does not agree with the commenters' suggestion of moving the off-cycle menu's thermal
control technologies to the A/C efficiency credits menu. As discussed in Section III.C.6, EPA is
phasing out off-cycle credits for a number of reasons, including shifts in the vehicle marketplace,
the scale of credits relative to the standards, and continued concerns about how to verify whether
off-cycle technologies provide emissions reductions in use commensurate with the level of the
credits the menu provides.
For those technologies on the off-cycle credit menu including solar-thermal control, reliable
efficiency data cannot be measured repeatedly, e.g., using AC 17 test. For example, the efficiency
of solar panels is dependent on many unpredictable factors such as daylight, clear sunny days,
clouds, etc. Therefore, for the reasons discussed in the preamble for phasing out off-cycle credits,
GHG credits for A/C technologies previously on the off-cycle menu are being phased out.
However, EPA is finalizing a phase-out of the off-cycle credits that is slower than proposed.
Specifically, EPA is phasing down the off-cycle menu cap from MYs 2030 through MY 2032;
beginning in MY 2033 off-cycle credits will no longer be available. See Section 3.1.4 of this
RTC for additional discussion.
As discussed in Section III.C.6 of the preamble, while EPA is phasing out the off-cycle
credits entirely after MY 2032, EPA is not phasing out A/C efficiency credits for ICE vehicles
because the A/C efficiency credits program is more robust as it includes a check of vehicle
emissions performance through AC 17 testing.
Efficiency: increase of A/C efficiency credit cap
Summary:
DENSO Corporation made the following comment:
DENSO: DENSO requests the agency consider expanding the AC efficiency credit cap based
on the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) study showing greater A/C improvement
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possibilities. NREL Study 17TMSS-0056 estimates the latest A/C energy consumption at 23.5
g/mile based on a series of simulations were performed to three vehicle platforms using various
US driving patterns. This is compared to 11.9 g/mile for passenger car and 17.2 g/mile for light
truck, which were baseline A/C emissions impacts previously used by the agencies to determine
A/C efficiency credit cap). The current cap constraints can create situations where an A/C
technology that reduces GHG emissions may not be applied on a vehicle's system.
Response:
As discussed in Section III.C.5.ii of the preamble, EPA is not changing the requirement that
A/C efficiency credits for ICE vehicles be based on emissions performance through AC 17
testing. EPA established the AC17 testing requirements as part of the 2012 rule to provide an
assurance that the A/C systems earning credits were providing anticipated emissions reductions.
As established in the 2012 rule, the AC17 test is mandatory for MYs 2017 and later (with the
exception that manufacturers are not required to test BEVs). The off-cycle credits program
includes no such mechanism to check performance. EPA did not reopen the existing AC 17
testing provisions as part of this rule; therefore, the AC 17 testing requirements for manufacturers
earning A/C efficiency credits will remain in effect under the MY 2027 and later program. The
AC 17 test is mandatory for MYs 2017 and later. A series of simulations cannot be accepted to
replace AC 17 tests on A/C efficiency credits for ICE vehicles.
Efficiency: adoption of an A/C efficiency standard rather than credit
Summary:
Environmental, and Public Health Organizations commented that more frequent and more
energy-intensive use of air conditioning is inevitable, and therefore recommended EPA adopt an
AC efficiency standard rather than a voluntary credit, as it has done for the medium-duty fleet in
the case of refrigerant credits.
Response:
EPA disagrees that AC efficiency should be a standard rather than a voluntary credit. We
conclude that the availability of the AC credit, together with sufficiently stringent tailpipe
standards, appropriately incentivizes manufacturers to identify GHG reductions from AC
efficiency improvements and concentrate efforts to reduce GHGs in the areas they feel are most
cost-effective, thus producing the greatest environmental impact for the least cost.
Efficiency: CAFE program harmonization
Summary:
Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA) recommends keeping AC efficiency credits
for BEVs to reduce potential harmonization issues between the GHG and CAFE regulations. In
support they note that NHTSA's CAFE program in the past has mirrored EPA's GHG approach
to flexibilities, and they therefore assume that NHTSA will follow previous precedent regarding
flexibilities and adopt the same structure as EPA. However, they further note that while EVs are
considered zero g/mi under the GHG program, the CAFE program requires EVs to be assigned a
mile per gallon equivalent compliance value based on the PEF, which DOT has proposed to
reduce. The PEF reduction will lead to a substantial decrease in the CAFE compliance value of
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BEVs and PHEVs, and thus could put BEVs and PHEVs at a distinctive compliance
disadvantage relative to some strong HEVs.
Response:
As explained in the preamble Section III.C.5.ii., currently, BEVs are generating air
conditioning efficiency credits even though the credits are based solely on improvements to ICE
vehicles, and not representative of emissions reductions for BEVs. That is, BEVs completely
prevent engine emissions. Thus, improving A/C efficiency does not and is not needed to further
decrease vehicle engine emissions. Allowing BEVs to generate A/C efficiency credits under the
GHG program is therefore not technically sound. Regarding the comment about NHTSA's
CAFE program and the PEF, we respond to these comments in section 26 of this RTC.
3.1.4 - LDV off-cycle technology credits
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
D. Light-Duty GHG Program Flexibilities
Flexibilities have been an important part of EPA's light-duty vehicle GHG program since its
inception in 2012. Features such as the averaging, banking, and trading program have helped
smooth product planning and investment cycles. Other flexibilities like off-cycle technology and
air conditioning credits have encouraged the development of new technologies and have resulted
in real-world emissions improvements beyond those that would have been achieved on
laboratory test cycles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 95]
Auto Innovators believes that such flexibilities still play an important role moving forward.
They are a potential lever for addressing uncertainties in the transition to electric vehicles,
particularly in the early years of the proposed 2027-2032 program. While manufacturers would
prefer that the core footprint-based standards reflect achievable emission reductions, flexibilities
could also serve to ensure that desired emission targets are met. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 95]
Instead, EPA proposes to eliminate and/or phase down many existing flexibilities, including
paring back the off-cycle credit menu and limiting GHG improving technologies to the ICE fleet.
The result of this will be abandonment of GHG benefits from prior rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 95]
The existing refrigerant, AC efficiency, and off-cycle credits are balanced to produce a
verifiable real-world result. EPA's proposal to change the credit system will unbalance those
results, leaving unprecedented rates of electrification as the main flexibility left to meet fleetwide
stringency targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 95]
2. Air Conditioning Efficiency and Off-Cycle Credits on Electric Vehicles
EPA's concern of negative emissions on individual vehicles is misplaced. EPA's regulations
calculate air conditioning efficiency and off-cycle credits on a fleet average basis, which are then
combined with fleet average tailpipe emissions and other adjustments. 181 However, we
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acknowledge the concern that, once combined with fleet average tailpipe emissions, air
conditioning and off-cycle credits may result in a fleet that implies a negative emission rate.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 99]
181 In actual practice, greenhouse gas credits and tailpipe emissions (relative to target) are first converted
to megagrams (metric tons) of carbon emissions and then combined. (See 40 CFR 86.1865-12.) Air
conditioning and off-cycle credits are always positive megagrams. Tailpipe fleet average emissions may
result in either a positive (credit generating) or negative (credit needed) megagram balance. In short, EPA's
regulations never result in negative emissions for an individual vehicle, nor negative emissions for an
overall fleet, although such a result might be implied.
Our recommendation is to handle this situation at the fleet average level. If the summed fleet
average tailpipe emissions, credits, and other adjustments would result in a negative value, total
fleet megagrams of credit for the model year would be truncated at the level equivalent to that
which would have been achieved by a fleet at zero g/mile fleet average emissions before credits
and other adjustments. Such an approach would address EPA's concern of "negative" emissions
while still providing an incentive for and recognition of air conditioning and -cycle
improvements on electric vehicles during the remaining time when many manufacturers' fleets
have net positive emission rates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 99]
4. Off-Cycle Technology Credits
EPA is proposing to sunset the off-cycle credit program by eliminating 5-cycle and alternative
method credits in MY 2027 and by lowering the menu credit caps over several years with an
elimination of menu credit in MY 2031. EPA's proposed actions will not only increase the
stringency of the rulemaking, but also disincentivize and disregard the proven real-world GHG
savings that this technology provides. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 102-104]
As documented in previous rulemakings, peer-reviewed research, national laboratory studies,
and public applications for credits, off-cycle technologies provide direct GHG benefits. They can
continue to provide actual emission reductions in MY 2027 and beyond and should remain a part
of EPA's GHG emissions program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 102-104]
Automobile manufacturers and suppliers have invested significant resources to develop these
technologies, manufacturers have included them as part of their compliance plans, and the
technologies will continue to provide real-world benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
102-104]
Off-cycle credits should be continued. If some total reduction is deemed necessary besides the
natural occurrence from increased BEV volumes, the proposed phasedown should not be as rapid
as proposed, nor occur prior to MY 2032, thereby encouraging continued investment in off-cycle
emission improvements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 102-104]
a) Menu-Based Credits
EPA proposes a phase-out of menu-based off-cycle credits for vehicles equipped with internal
combustion engines, and eliminating these credits after MY 2030.182 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 102-104]
182 NPRM at 29249.
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The menu-based off-cycle technologies still provide real-world benefits beyond those
observed in GHG certification testing. There is no reason to eliminate them entirely. This is
particularly true for ICE vehicles. The average emissions of non-EVs were approximately 275
g/mile in MY 2022.183 Off-cycle technologies can still provide meaningful emission
improvements for these vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 102-104]
183 S&P Global Mobility, MYs 2012-2022 Baseline Study for Auto Innovators.
Auto Innovators recommends that EPA maintain menu-based off-cycle credits. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 102-104]
i) Credit Cap Phase Down
EPA notes that with increasing volumes of electric vehicles, fewer ICE vehicles will be on the
road to justify continued credit levels. In general, a phase-down of the off-cycle credit cap is
unnecessary if the goal is to simply reduce fleet average credits. Many of the off-cycle
technologies on the credit menu are not available to BEVs, such as engine oil heaters,
transmission oil heaters, engine stop-start systems, and high efficiency alternators. As the
production and market share of BEVs increase, the lower availability of off-cycle credits
applicable to BEVs will result in lower fleet average credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 102-104]
As discussed elsewhere, Auto Innovators opposes EPA's proposal to limit off-cycle credits to
vehicles equipped with internal combustion engines. However, we note that that proposal in
combination with the EV market share that would be required to meet the GHG targets under
consideration also effectively phases out menu-based off-cycle credits. Thus, EPA's proposal to
set a separate, declining cap on menu-based credits is duplicative and unnecessary. If EPA
decides to finalize its proposal to limit off-cycle credits to only vehicles equipped with internal
combustion engines, it should discard the proposal to set a declining cap on menu-based off-
cycle credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 102-104]
Nevertheless, if EPA decides to proceed with a phasedown in the off-cycle menu credit cap,
the proposed phasedown is too rapid and should not phaseout before MY 2032, at which time at
least 30% ICEVs will continue to be sold in the fleet and who will continue to benefit from these
off-cycle technologies. EPA's proposal includes a reduction in the menu credit cap from 15 g/mi
to 10 g/mi in the first year. The NPRM fails to consider this difference between MYs 2026 and
2027 in its "normalization" of the MY 2026 standards for the purposes of estimating the MY
2027 stringency increase. 184 EPA estimates that roughly 41 million ICE vehicles will be sold in
MYs 2027-2032.185 To disincentivize continued or potentially new off-cycle credit technologies
so early in a phasedown would severely impact decisions on investment and implementation of
them. If the credit cap was not reduced so quickly early in the MYs 2027-2032 program,
additional costs and investments might still be justified by automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.102-104]
184 See NPRM at 29237. (Table 28. EPA's analysis assumes only 10 g/mile off-cycle credit in MY 2026,
when the cap on off-cycle credits is 15 g/mile in 2026. See 40 C.F.R. § 86.1869-12 prior to proposed
amendments.)
185 Calculation by Auto Innovators based on data in EPA's central analysis OMEGA output file
2023_03_14_22_42_30_central_3alts_20230314_Proposal_vehicles.csv.
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In the previous GHG rulemaking, the cap on off-cycle credits was recognized by the agency
as important enough to increase the allowed amount from 10 g/mile to 15 g/mile beginning MY
2023. In response to this increased incentive, OEMs potentially invested in additional off-cycle
technologies, but due to the development time to implement and fund some of this technology,
production would not necessarily occur that soon. Now, because of the proposed rapid phase-
down, the development and application of some off-cycle technologies may no longer be
worthwhile, stranding investments and foregoing potential benefits both before and during the
proposed MY 2027-2032 program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 102-104]
ii) Menu Credit Values
Auto Innovators continues to see the GHG benefit of off-cycle technology and agrees with
previous assessments that many technologies are achieving higher on-road benefit amounts than
credited. However, EPA is concerned that newer vehicles would not see as much benefit from
off-cycle technologies. 186 While some of both arguments may be warranted, as understood in
the original GHG rulemaking, the average credit amounts continue to be applicable for most
vehicles. To the extent that the absolute emission benefits of such technologies may have
changed over time, it would be more reasonable for EPA to estimate new absolute benefits or to
convert the menu to a percentage improvement basis using tools such as EPA's ALPHA model
instead of simply dismissing the benefits of such technologies entirely. If EPA wishes to reduce
the amount allowed, a gradual decrease in credit values is preferable to avoid stranding the
investments OEMs have made in response to the last GHG rulemaking. Slightly steeper cuts to
the desired allowed credit amount only make some sense at the end of the rulemaking, and
credits should not be reduced to zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 104-106]
186 NPRM at 29250.
EPA also expresses concerns that other equipment such as roof racks or remote start systems
might increase real-world emissions. 187 To the extent such equipment is added by dealerships,
customers, or other aftermarket equipment suppliers, EPA's certification and compliance
program is based on vehicles as delivered for sale (i.e., what the regulated manufacturers can
reasonably control), those concerns are out of scope. In the case of equipment included on the
vehicle when delivered for sale, consideration should be given to the extent such equipment is
likely to be used. Technologies that are granted menu-based credit are generally used on a
regular or continuous basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 104-106]
187 NPRM at 29250.
b) 5-Cycle Method Credits
EPA notes that there have been few 5-cycle demonstrations of off-cycle technologies, and
proposes to eliminate the 5-cycle pathway, effective MY 2027.188 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 104-106]
188 NPRM at 29249.
Automakers have reviewed with EPA their 5-cycle testing plans for off-cycle technologies.
This path is being pursued according to the current regulation but is a difficult path to follow.
This method has not been used to a great extent since allowed under the original GHG
rulemaking, because the auto industry and EPA concurred that the original formula to calculate
credits under the 5-cycle method was in error. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 104-106]
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Errors in the formula were finally corrected in 2020. Since then, automakers report that
testing has begun to evaluate certain technologies. At the same time, automakers report that the
threshold to prove emissions impacts has been very challenging to meet. Therefore, we believe
that even the corrected 5-cycle formula has not addressed the problem. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.104-106]
Under the current formula in 40 C.F.R. § 86.1869.12(c)(3), the unadjusted 2-cycle benefit is
subtracted from the adjusted 5-cycle benefit of the off-cycle technology. This unadjusted 2- cycle
value often masks the adjusted 5-cycle benefit within the test-to-test variability and makes this
very hard to statistically quantify. We believe the formula should be amended again to compare
the adjusted 5-cycle results without the off-cycle technology to the adjusted 5-cycle results with
the technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 104-106]
Auto Innovators recommends that EPA retain the 5-cycle method and improve upon the
formula to reduce unnecessary burden of proof by making the revisions noted above. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 104-106]
If EPA decides to eliminate the 5-cycle method, we ask EPA to consider the following.
-Retain the 5-cycle method for the same period of time as the menu-based credits.
-For vehicles that have 5-cycle method credits approved prior to MY 2027 that remain in
production in MY 2027 and later, Auto Innovators recommends that credit continue to be
granted (i.e., carry-over). If this is EPA's intent (or final decision), clarifying text should be
added to the regulation. Alternatively, EPA should consider adding previously approved
technologies to the off-cycle credit menu and adjusting the caps as appropriate for the additional
technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 104-106]
c) Alternative Method Credits
EPA is also proposing to eliminate the alternative method process for off-cycle credits. EPA
has rationalized this credit elimination proposal by stating that very few OEMs are utilizing the
alternative analysis application method. The proper context should be that the agency has
actioned very few of the proposed credit submissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
106-108]
Auto Innovators is aware that there are multiple alternative applications that have been
submitted by OEMs in 2020 to 2023 that are awaiting a decision by EPA, or even published for
public comment, even after multiple technical reviews with the agency to answer questions and
supply additional analysis. Even after agency assurances that the technology is understood, and
proper explanation has been provided for the public review process, no action has occurred for
many months. While we agree that this alternative analysis process is not effective, EPA should
follow through under the current regulation and complete action on all submitted applications,
even if it requires additional back-and-forth with the manufacturer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 106-108]
For vehicles that have had alternative method off-cycle credits approved prior to MY 2027
that remain in production in MY 2027 and later, Auto Innovators recommends that credit
continue to be granted. If this is EPA's intent (or final decision), clarifying text should be added
to the regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 106-108]
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Alternatively, EPA should consider adding previously approved technologies to the off-cycle
credit menu and adjusting the caps as appropriate for the additional technologies. Automobile
manufacturers and suppliers have invested significant resources to develop these technologies,
manufacturers have included them as part of their compliance plans, and the technologies will
continue to provide real-world benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 106-108]
d) Adjustments to Off-Cycle Credits for Electric Operation of PHEVs
As described above, Auto Innovators opposes EPA's proposal to limit off-cycle credits to
only ICE-equipped vehicles. In the same vein, we believe that off-cycle credits should not be
adjusted for PHEVs to address electric vs. ICE operation. Notwithstanding those positions, Auto
Innovators provides the following comment in response to EPA's request on how to handle
PHEVs if it decides to limit off-cycle credits to only the ICE portion of their operation. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 106-108]
As a threshold consideration, making such adjustments adds significant complexity to
calculating credit values and/or compliance with credit caps. EPA should consider whether the
difference resulting from those adjustments in overall emissions is worth the complexity added
for regulated stakeholders, EPA compliance staff, and EPA staff preparing public reports to
describe the use of such provisions. This is particularly true if EPA finalizes related proposals to
reduce credit applicability to only vehicles equipped with internal combustion engines and to
phase-out menu-based off-cycle credits relatively quickly. Given these considerations, we
recommend that EPA simply afford PHEVs the same credits as other ICE-equipped vehicles and
to assess compliance to applicable credit caps without further adjustments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 106-108]
EPA describes in the preamble that "manufacturers would apply the utility factor to the total
off-cycle credits generated by the PHEVs to properly account for the value of the off-cycle credit
corresponding to expected engine operation." 189 This concept does not appear to be captured in
the regulatory text. The only place PHEVs and utility factors are Specifically mentioned in the
proposed regulatory text is at 40 C.F.R. § 86.1869-12(b)(2)(v).190 Based on the first sentence of
this paragraph, this appears to be instructions for ensuring average credit values do not exceed
applicable limits. We also note that, in this paragraph, there is a conspicuous absence of any
instruction for how to calculate off-cycle credits in the case that such limits are not exceeded.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 106-108]
189 NPRM at 29251.
190 NPRM at 29440.
Therefore, we conclude that, as drafted, 40 C.F.R. § 86.1869-12(b)(2)(v) does not address
applying the utility factor to off-cycle credits generated by PHEVs as long as the credit cap is not
exceeded. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 106-108]
EPA also describes scaling "the menu cap for PHEVs by the vehicle's assigned utility factor"
and that "the menu credit cap for each manufacturer's eligible vehicles would be the production-
weighted average of ICE vehicles counting at the full cap amount and PHEVs at their maximum
credit allowance." 191 This approach seems to be captured in the regulatory text at the proposed
40 C.F.R. § 86.1869-12(b)(2)(v).192 The first sentence of the proposed regulatory text discusses
the need to assess whether the "fleet average C02 emissions attributable to use of the default
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credit valuesl93 in (b)(1)" exceed the specified values in (b)(2)(v). However, even that is not
entirely clear. Unlike (b)(2)(iii) and (b)(2)(iv), which both refer to comparing values determined
in (b)(2)(i) to the cap at (b)(2)(v), the text at (b)(2)(v) doesn't describe how to derive the "fleet
average" value that should be compared to values in (b)(2)(v). For example, one could just as
easily interpret the instruction in the context of individual car and truck fleets as opposed to the
combined car and truck fleets as is clearer in (b)(2)(i). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
106-108]
191 NPRM at 29251.
192 NPRM at 29440.
193 EPA should consider adding "credit" after "fleet average C02 emissions" in the term "fleet average
C02 emissions attributable to use of the default credit values" to avoid confusion between calculated fleet
average emission values and off-cycle credits if this term continues to be used in a final rule.
Setting aside whether PHEV adjustments should be made to off-cycle credits, and if so, where
adjustments should be made, the adjustment in (b)(2)(v) of the proposed regulatory text has a
technical error. The proposed regulatory text describes as an example: "if a PHEV has a utility
factor of 0.3 and an off-cycle credit of 3.0, count it as having a credit value of 10 (3/0.3) for
calculating the fleet average value." A utility factor of 0.3 implies 30% operation on electricity
and 70% operation on conventional fuel. Therefore, if the credit is for improved emissions
during ICE operation, it should be 70% of the menu credit, i.e., credit x (1 - UF). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 106-108]
e) Calculation of the Off-Cycle Credit Cap
As described elsewhere, we oppose EPA's proposal to exclude ZEVs from off-cycle credits.
However, if EPA decides to finalize that proposal, we note that EPA has not proposed regulatory
text that would exclude zero-emission vehicles in model years 2027 and later from the
assessment of whether a credit cap has been exceeded as described in the preamble. 194 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 106-108]
194 NPRM at 29250.
Also, the proposed paragraphs (b)(2)(iii) and (b)(2)(iv) discuss comparing a calculated value
from (b)(2)(ii) to a given value in (b)(2)(v). However, the value derived in (b)(2)(ii) is in
megagrams, and the values in (b)(2)(v) are in grams per mile. We would agree that a conversion
can be calculated, but the text should be modified such that any comparison is made in consistent
units without the need to rely on otherwise undefined calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 106-108]
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Off-Cycle Credits
Over the years, Honda has remained supportive of the off-cycle technology program,
recognizing the real emissions reductions these technologies deliver. The program provides a
practical rationale to apply GHG reduction measures to new and/or existing technologies and
systems that might not otherwise occur, given that the benefits are (by definition) not captured
through standard test procedures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 29-30]
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That said, we recognize that uncertainty associated with agency approvals, among other
things, remain core impediments to the pursuit of these technologies. Over the years, we have
expressed support for periodic updating of the off-cycle menu, to reflect better understanding of
off-cycle technologies, as well as a recognition of an industry shifting toward greater levels of
electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 29-30]
As we have noted in the past, "changes should be data driven, include opportunity for
stakeholder input, and provide sufficient lead time to ensure continuity of compliance plans."49
In the proposed rule, the agency suggests sunsetting the off-cycle credit program as follows:
49 American Honda Motor Co., Inc. comments on Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions. September 27, 2021. Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0208.
First, EPA proposes to phase out menu-based credits by reducing the menu credit cap year-
over- year until it is fully phased out in MY 2031. Specifically, EPA is proposing a declining
menu cap of 10/8/6/3/0 g/mile over MYs 2027-2031 such that MY 2030 would be the last year
manufacturers could generate optional off-cycle credits. Second, EPA proposes to eliminate the
5-cycle and public process pathways starting in MY 2027. Third, EPA proposes to limit
eligibility for off-cycle credits only to vehicles with tailpipe emissions greater than zero (i.e.,
vehicle equipped with IC engines) starting in MY 2027.50 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp.
29-30]
50 88 Fed. Reg. 29196 (May 5, 2023)
Honda understands the agency's motivation for sunsetting the program. Ironically, however,
by pairing stringent GHG standards that dictate aggressive EV adoption with a sunsetting off-
cycle program, the agency is forcing the use of technologies that reside high on the technology
cost curve, while prohibiting the use of more cost-effective technologies that reside on the low
end of the curve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 29-30]
All else being equal, ending the program does not necessarily impact stringency, so long as
modifications to top-line stringency are adjusted in accordance with the phase-out.
Unfortunately, evidence of this is obfuscated in the proposed rule. The agency appears to have
upward-adjusted (relaxed) topline stringency in the first year of the program by approximately
20 g/mi (presumably to account for the changing off-cycle and AJC programs), but beyond that
Honda was unable to track whether stringencies in subsequent years were similarly adjusted.
Given the exceedingly challenging GHG standards, and the fact that off-cycle technologies are
among the lowest-cost means to reduce emissions, Honda recommends the agency continue the
existing off-cycle program at least throughout MY2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp.
29-30]
Finally, Honda respectfully requests that the agency approach its handling of the off-cycle
(and A/C) programs with greater transparency in the Final Rule. We believe off-cycle technology
can continue to play an important role in decarbonizing the fleet, but only if the program
meaningfully allows a manufacturer to apply the technology and earn credit in a streamlined
fashion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 29-30]
Recommendation: Honda respectfully requests that the agency continue the existing off-cycle
program at least throughout MY2032 and, in order to ensure its role as a compliance flexibility,
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provide sufficient transparency that its inclusion is not offset by a corresponding stringency
increase. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 29-30]
Organization: Betsy Cooper
Aaron Barkhouse is a Rhodes Scholar material scientist and Technology Strategy Manager at
Maxeon Technologies. Betsy Cooper is the Director of the Aspen Institute's Tech Policy Hub,
and a founder of the Aspen Institute's Climate Cohort, a training program teaching climate
scientists to influence policy (including by submitting public comments). We also happen to be a
married couple who own a plug-in hybrid vehicle (PHEV). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, p.
1]
Together, we write to propose that the EPA reconsider its approach to PHEVs in its recent
draft regulations, particularly to incentivize car manufacturers to develop longer range PHEVs.
In particular, we recommend you give full off-cycle credits to manufacturers who develop
PHEVs with a range of 50 or more miles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 1]
In recent years, the electric range capacity of PHEVs has dropped precipitously. We own a
Chevy Volt, which before it was discontinued in 2019 advertised up to 53 miles of electric
range. 1 [Link: https://www.recurrentauto.com/guides/chevrolet-volt] Today even the best
PHEVs on the market have approximately 40 or less miles of range [Link:
https://www.autoguide.eom/auto-news/2022/03/the-plug-in-hybrid-with-the-longest-range-top-
10-list.html], The only exceptions, the Land Rover Plug-In Hybrid [Link:
https://www.edmunds.com/land-rover/range-rover/2023/plug-in-hybrid/] and the Land Rover
Range Rover Sport [Link: https://www.edmunds.com/land-rover/range-rover-sport/2023/plug-in-
hybrid/], retail for more than $100,000 apiece. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 1]
1 And we use the electric range most of the time; we have maintained a 112 mile-per-gallon average over 4
years.
Off-cycle credits give manufacturers credit for using technologies that decrease greenhouse
gas emissions and fuel consumption but are not detectable using EPA's existing city and
highway test cycles (otherwise known as the two-cycle test). (Federal Register (FR) at 29248.)
The EPA's rule proposes to lower the amount that PHEVs are driven using electric power for the
purposes of off-cycle credits. "While PHEVs would remain eligible for off-cycle credits under
EPA's proposed eligibility criteria, EPA proposes, as a reasonable approach for addressing off-
cycle credits for PHEVs, to scale the menu credit cap for PHEVs by the vehicle's assigned utility
factor." (FR at 29251.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 1]
Discussion
The EPA should give full off-cycle credit to PHEVs with adequate distance to enable
commuters to cover their daily driving needs without charging, even after degradation: those
with more than 50 miles of range. By downgrading all PHEVs with no differentiation by miles of
range, the EPA is missing an opportunity to incentivize manufacturers to build PHEVs that work
for consumers and allow them to feel the full benefits of electric power without the range anxiety
that plagues current consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 2]
Together, we write to propose that the EPA reconsider its approach to PHEVs in its recent
draft regulations, particularly to incentivize car manufacturers to develop longer range PHEVs.
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In particular, we recommend you give full off-cycle credits to manufacturers who develop
PHEVs with a range of 50 or more miles. EPA's current plan will disincentivize all PHEVs,
ignoring the real market benefits to keeping long-range versions of these cars in the market.
Intentional or not, the effects of the EPA's current policy will be to push vehicle manufacturers
further towards full EVs—before the charging infrastructure is ready to support them. In the
meantime, consumers not ready to adopt full EVs - including for the same reasons we are not yet
able to do so - will continue to buy gas cars instead. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, pp. 1-4]
With more long-range PHEVs on the market, more Americans will be able to drive their full
commute on electricity and charge overnight at home (with reduced demand on the grid
relatively to fast-charging of full EVs). Moreover, as longer range PHEV cars grow more
popular, there will be greater incentives for individuals and communities to invest in improving
charging infrastructure, thus reducing the friction facing current consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0654, pp.1-4]
We propose a 50+ mile PHEV range requirement for full off-cycle credit. There is already
momentum in favor of this standard; California is planning to require 50+ mile range PHEVs by
2035 [Link: https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-
vehicle-sales-2035]. Moreover, even with battery degradation, a PHEV rated for 50+ miles at the
point of sale will still cover the average American commute many years later. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0654, p. 4]
The EPA may respond that its scaled utility factor already takes into account miles of range in
its calculation. Even if true, by penalizing all PHEVs across the board, the EPA is incentivizing
manufacturers to make fewer plug-in hybrid vehicles, period. Especially until charging
infrastructure resembles the gas station infrastructure of today, long-range PHEV cars remain an
important consumer option. By rewarding manufacturers for making PHEVs with a 50+ mile
range, EPA will help bring an important class of climate-friendly vehicles back to market. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 4]
Organization: BMW of North America, LLC (BMW NA)
BMW NA opposes the proposal to phase out the OCT credit cap for the full fleet based on the
assumption that a changing fleet mix from ICE to BEV removes the benefit of an OCT credit
provision. The menu credit technologies and alternative pathway technologies already approved
by the EPA still provide a real-world C02 benefit on ICE vehicles and phase-out of the OCT
credit cap could lead manufacturers to reconsider implementation of certain C02-reducing
technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 3]
As an alternative, BMW proposes that rather than phase-out the OCT cap from 10 g/mi in
2027MY to 0 g/mi in 2031, EPA should maintain a 10 g/mi cap which applies only to the ICE
vehicle portion of the fleet (including PHEV). Manufacturers would continue to receive credit
for innovative C02 reducing technologies listed in the menu and for alternative and 5-cycle
pathway technologies which are approved prior to 2027MY for those ICE vehicles. This would
still allow manufacturers to receive credits for technologies with a real-world C02 benefit. Based
on the anticipated electric vehicle percentages in EPA's standard proposal, the effective whole-
fleet OCT g/mi cap would stifl reduce significantly compared to the current cap (for example, a
50% BEV fleet would create an effective OCT cap of 5 g/mi), in line with the agencies intent to
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change the approach to accommodate a changing fleet mix. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p.
3]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Greenhouse Gas Standards
U.S. EPA is proposing more stringent GHG emission standards for the 2027 through 2032
MYs, along with several modifications to the existing GHG program. Generally, CARB supports
U.S. EPA's proposal, but offers several recommendations to further strengthen the proposed
standards to achieve the greatest degree of emission reductions available, considering costs and
technology readiness, to further protect public health and combat climate change. As described
in detail below, CARB recommends that U.S. EPA adopt more stringent light-duty GHG
emission standards; include provisions to ensure manufacturers do not allow emissions to
increase from conventional vehicles and instead continue to apply all available cost-effective
emission control technologies; estimate real-world PHEV emissions based on the best available
data and collect additional data to inform future updates; and update elements of the
comprehensive regulatory program, including retiring elements of the off-cycle and air
conditioning credits programs as proposed, establishing explicit requirements to eliminate leaks
from air conditioning systems, eliminating credit multipliers for medium-duty ZEVs as
proposed, and requiring small-volume manufacturers to comply with the proposed standards as
proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 12]
Off-Cycle Credits Program
U.S. EPA's GHG emission standards allow manufacturers to receive credit for technologies
that reduce GHG emissions but whose reductions may not be measured on the "2-cycle" city and
highway tests (or Federal Test Procedure [FTP] and Highway Fuel Economy Test [HFET]) for
determining compliance with the standards. Credit may be obtained under three approaches: (1)
from a "menu" of technologies, (2) testing emissions under five different specified test cycles to
better estimate real-world performance, or (3) approval of a specific technology. U.S. EPA
requested comment on its approach for phasing out the off-cycle program, including the number
of years over which the menu phase out would occur as well as the proposed menu credit caps in
those years. 24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 22-23]
24 87 Fed. Reg. at 29,248 - 250.
CARB supports U.S. EPA's proposal to phase out the off-cycle program. As U.S. EPA
acknowledges, the current off-cycle program credits are based on the projected impact the
technologies would have when paired with 2008 MY vintage engine and vehicle baseline
technologies (assessed during the 2012 rule). In the 11 years since the rule was adopted, new
vehicles have lower GHG emissions and have incorporated technologies that target similar areas
of emission reductions thereby reducing the opportunities for some of the off-cycle technologies.
The credit levels are therefore becoming increasingly less representative of the actual emission
reductions provided by the off-cycle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 22-23]
With its comments, CARB submits additional evidence supporting U.S. EPA's claim that the
credit levels are less representative of the emission reductions provided by off-cycle
technologies. Specifically, CARB has acquired BAR data that confirm at least one of the off-
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cycle credit technologies, idle stop-start, is not being used in a manner reflected by the original
assumptions described in the Joint Technical Support Document (TSD): Final Rulemaking for
2017-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards. 25 CARB arrived at this conclusion by analyzing SmogCheck data for
over 40,000 vehicles (2019 through 2023 MYs) in the BAR data set. For each idle start-stop-
equipped vehicle within the data set, CARB staff assessed the total idle time (seconds) and total
idle stop-start timer duration (seconds). Using these data points, staff divided total idle time by
idle stop-start timer duration for each vehicle to derive the total percentage of idle time with the
engine off. This value, 9.38 percent, was significantly lower than the value used under the
original assumptions of the TSD (87.75 percent). When this fraction is applied to the total idle
fraction (25.8 percent), the idle fraction eligible for engine-off is only 2.42 percent. This is also
substantially lower than the fraction assumed in the TSD (12.07 percent). Table 2 summarizes
these findings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 23-24]
25 U.S. EPA and the U.S. Department of Transportation. Joint Technical Support Document: Final
Rulemaking for 2017-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards. August 2012. Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-12013. Available
at: https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/joint_final_tsd.pdf or
https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA- HQ-OAR-2010-0799-12013.
Table 2. CARB Analysis of Idle Stop-Start Emissions.
Cycle: Projected by U.S. EPA (2012 TSD)
Idle Fraction: 13.8%
Percentage of Idle with Engine-off: 87.75%
Resultant Idle Fraction Eligible for engine-Off: 12.07%
Cycle: Real-World (2019-2023 MY BAR)
Idle Fraction: 25.8%
Percentage of Idle with Engine-off: 9.38%
Resultant Idle Fraction Eligible for engine-Off: 2.42% [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp.
23-24]
CARB believes these results further support U.S. EPA's contention that off-cycle credits, for
idle stop-start in this case, are not representative of emission reductions originally assumed in the
TSD. In this case, the credits for idle stop-start significantly overestimate the reductions achieved
in the real world and further supports the case for a phase out of such credits during the
regulatory timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 23-24]
U.S. EPA requested comments on ways of addressing off-cycle credits for PHEVs. As
proposed, the off-cycle credit cap for PHEVs would be scaled by the vehicle's assigned utility
factor. CARB believes this approach is appropriate given that off-cycle credits would only apply
to vehicles with internal combustion engines under the proposal. As a result, this is a reasonable
way to attribute off-cycle credits to PHEVs in a manner that is consistent with the limited
application of off-cycle credits to conventional vehicles. CARB has also provided comments on
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U.S. EPA's proposed FUF and supports lowering the values to better reflect real-world PHEV
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 23-24]
Finally, U.S. EPA requested comment on its proposal to eliminate the 5-cycle and public
process pathways for OEMs to obtain off-cycle credits starting in the 2027 MY. CARB supports
this proposal as stated. Given the rarity with which manufacturers chose these pathways, CARB
believes they no longer need to be made available as compliance options in the future. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 24]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
D. EPA's Proposal to Retire or Limit Credits Is Consistent with Section 202(a)'s Focus
on Real-World Emission Reductions
Finally, the States and Cities support EPA's Proposal to retire certain compliance flexibilities
associated with the light- and medium-duty vehicle emissions program. In particular, EPA's
rationales for limiting air-conditioning efficiency credits, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,246-48, and for
phasing out off-cycle credits and the MDV multipliers, id. at 29,243-45, 29,249-52, are
consistent with the agency's responsibility to ensure the emissions program's environmental
integrity by tying credits and other flexibilities to real-world emission reductions as closely as
possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 37]
Organization: Consumer Reports (CR)
6.5. Elimination of Additional Credits for EVs
CR supports EPA eliminating credits for EVs that could allow vehicles to achieve compliance
values below Og/mi. These credit provisions were in place to capture real-world emissions
benefits that were not captured by EPA's test cycle. They are not appropriate when applied to
vehicles that already have eliminated all tailpipe emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, p.
23]
Organization: Dana Incorporated
Off-cycle Credit
Dana supports continuing an off-cycle technology credit program based on the success of this
program in encouraging the adoption of technologies such as those identified in Tables 34 and 35
of the NPRM. As noted in the NPRM, the off-cycle credit program has helped support industry
investment in innovative and forward-looking technologies that provide environmental benefits
and reduce GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0538, p. 3]
Dana does not have a firm opinion on EPA's proposals to phase-out the current off-cycle
credit program. Dana does propose that EPA continue to offer off-cycle credits, however, for
new technologies for BEVS, PHEVS, FEVs, and other ZEVs. Such off-cycle technologies could
help reduce battery use and therefore lower the amount of electricity used to power ZEVs. Off-
cycle technologies that reduce the amount of ZEV battery charging should be recognized in MY
2027 and beyond. Potential examples of efficiency and sustainability enablers specific to ZEVs
include magnet-free motors, technology improvements in continuous power relative to peak
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power, use of carbon-free eFluids, etc. Incentivizing the use of these technologies could also help
address some of the sustainability concerns raised above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0538, p. 3]
Dana thus proposes that EPA consider ways to provide credits to emerging technologies that
reduce ZEV energy consumption, such as those listed above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0538,
p. 3]
Organization: DENSO Corporation
2) DENSO Green Technologies
DENSO is committed to supporting our customers in their application of technology to
improve fuel economy performance and reduce the greenhouse gas emissions of their products to
in line with consumer preferences, while meeting regulatory requirements. In this work, there are
challenges and sometimes trade-offs to allowing multiple pathways to compliance, but we
believe there can be a balance in achieving a successful regulatory program between stringency
and real-world achievement of the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, pp. 3-4]
Around the world, successful fuel economy and emissions programs offer credit programs to
support the deployment of technologies, which may otherwise take multiple years to penetrate
the market. DENSO encourages the agency to continue to offer flexible options supporting
emerging technologies for both ICE and ZEV powertrains. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, pp.
3-4]
3) Off-Cycle Technology Credit Program
DENSO supports the continuation of the off-cycle technology credit program at its full value
through at least MY 2032. It also encourages both EPA and NHTSA to recognize the important
contribution the off-cycle program makes to the overall goals of the regulations, especially
during this technological transition period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, pp. 3-4]
DENSO, along with others in the supplier community working independently and in
collaboration with OEMs, develop and engineer innovative technologies that contribute to
vehicle manufacturers' strategies for real-world GHG and fuel consumption reductions often
beyond those measured with standard test procedures. The off-cycle credit program has helped to
support industry investment in innovative and forward-looking technologies that provide
environmental benefits, while improving the consumer experience. These technologies offer
measurable, demonstrable, and verifiable real-world benefits that improve efficiencies and
reduce GHG emissions. They also provide an important cost-effective option for OEMs to
achieve fuel economy and GHG targets. Therefore, DENSO has a vested interest in making sure
innovative technologies continue to be deployed and utilized by OEMS to ensure these benefits
are realized. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, pp. 3-4]
1 Please see Appendix 1 for a partial list of DENSO GREEN Technologies supporting GHG reductions via
the Off- Cycle and AC Efficiency programs.
Off-cycle credits should be continued, and if some total reduction is necessary besides the
natural occurrence from increased BEV volumes, the proposed phasedown should not be as rapid
as proposed, thereby encouraging continued investment in off-cycle emission improvements.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, pp. 3-4]
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Concerning the 5-Cycle and Alternative Method pathways, EPA should follow through under
the current regulation and complete action on all submitted applications, even if it requires
additional discussions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, pp. 3-4]
It is also critically important that vehicles with alternative method off-cycle credits approved
prior to MY 2027 and that remain in production in MY 2027 and later continue to be granted
credits during the timeframe of this regulation. If this is EPA's intent (or final decision),
clarifying text should be added to the regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, pp. 3-4]
Alternatively, EPA could consider adding previously approved technologies to the off- cycle
credit menu and adjusting the caps as appropriate for the additional technologies. Automobile
manufacturers and suppliers have invested significant resources to develop these technologies,
manufacturers have included them as part of their compliance plans, and the technologies will
continue to provide real-world benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, pp. 3-4]
5) Technologies Supporting ZEV Energy Consumption Reduction
DENSO requests EPA to reconsider its proposal to eliminate A/C efficiency and off- cycle
credits for electrified vehicles. Off-cycle and AC efficiency credits for technologies applied
across all powertrain types encourage their continued use with commensurate benefits to
consumers and the environment. The elimination of off- cycle and air conditioning efficiency
credits on electric vehicles would have an unfortunate effect on the application of existing
technologies and further innovation in this area. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 6]
DENSO also encourages EPA to explore how energy reductions from thermal technologies
could be rewarded when used on BEVs, PHEVs and FCEVs. All technologies and all
powertrains should continue to improve their performance. Consequently, technologies that
reduce use of the vehicle battery (and reduce the amount of battery charging needed) and
therefore the electricity used to power the vehicle should be recognized in MYs 2027 and
beyond. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 6]
Beyond the off-cycle and A/C efficiency credit programs, DENSO would welcome the
opportunity to discuss the possibility of credits to further incentivize BEV energy consumption
reduction directly and further support the industry during this critical technology transition
period.7 A credit or incentive for technologies that support BEV energy consumption reduction
from a consumer comfort and battery comfort perspective, as well as to encourage responsible
critical mineral usage and grid management, would also contribute to US climate goals
generally. Similar to the off- cycle and A/C efficiency program, a similar ZEV-focused
technology credit would help to support industry investment in innovative and forward-looking
technologies that provide additional environmental benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p.
6]
7 Please see Appendix 2 for a partial list of DENSO technologies that support ZEV energy consumption
reduction.
Appendix 1
DENSO GREEN Technology Examples:
Off-Cycle Credit/AC Efficiency Credit Technologies for ICE and ZEV Powertrains
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1. SAS Compressor w/CS Valve: Technology has improved pressure drop through the
cylinders and a crankcase suction valve that minimizes internal compressor losses at conditions
other than maximum capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
2. Electric Scroll Air Conditioning Compressor Variation B (ESB) with pressure
adjusting valve technology: This technology improves the efficiency of the electric scroll
compressor using a pressure adjusting valve to optimize back pressure on the fixed scroll and
reduce mechanical losses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
3. S-Flow System: Reduces the thermal load on the air conditioning system through
targeted cooling of only the occupied cabin areas, and for a pulse width modulated brushless
motor power controller used in the HVAC system, which improves the efficiency of the HVAC
system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
4. High-Efficiency Alternator: High efficiency alternators use new technologies to
reduce the overall load on the engine yet continue to meet the electrical demands of the vehicle
systems, resulting in lower fuel consumption and lower C02 emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0651, p. 8]
5. Compressor Oil Separator: Technology removes at least 50% of the oil entrained in
the oil/refrigerant mixture exiting the compressor and returns it to the compressor housing or
compressor inlet, or a compressor design, which does not rely on the circulation of an
oil/refrigerant mixture for lubrication. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
6. Internal Heat Exchanger (SCX): An Internal Heat Exchanger reduces load on the
compressor by transferring heat from the high-pressure liquid entering the expansion valve
(TXV) to the low- pressure gas exiting the evaporator. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
7. 2-Layer HVAC: Full technology explanation is below (from SAE Paper 2018-01-
1368). Short explanation: In cold ambient conditions, two-layer HVAC recirculates already
warmed air in the lower part of the HVAC unit and distributes it to the lower part of the vehicle
cabin, while using air from outside the vehicle in the upper part of the HVAC unit, distributing it
to the upper part of the vehicle cabin. Outside air is necessary to keep windows fog-free.
Recirculated air requires less energy to re-heat. Two-layer HVAC allows both, minimizing
energy needed to keep the cabin warm and fog-free. In an ICE vehicle, this results in an energy
savings by enabling faster engine warm-up (since less heat is needed for cabin heating), while in
a BEV the energy savings impact is even greater, since the energy used for heating the vehicle
cabin needs to come from the vehicle battery. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
8. LE40: This technology allows for reduced power consumption during compressor
operation through improved and more efficient clutch technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0651, p. 8]
9. Cold-Storage Evaporator: (Off-Cycle Alt-Method/Off-Cycle Cap): This technology
utilizes phase change material in the HVAC evaporator of vehicles equipped with engine Start &
Stop technology to extend the time that cold air can be delivered to the cabin with the engine and
compressor off. This reduces the amount of time the engine would otherwise operate solely for
the purpose of cooling the cabin. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 8]
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Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
IX.EPA Should Finalize the Proposed Changes to the Credit Program, but Should Not Renew
Off-Cycle Menu Credits.
Below, we address EPA's proposal to renew the existing credit program with the following
changes: (1) exclude all BEVs from eligibility for any off-cycle credits; (2) allow off-cycle credit
eligibility for PHEVs based only on a ratio called the "utility factor"; (3) eliminate two of the
three ways to obtain off-cycle menu credits (undergoing a 5-cycle testing procedure and
documenting the efficacy of new technology via public notice and comment), while retaining
only the third way (menu credits); and (4) renew but phase out the off-cycle menu credits for the
remainder of the light- and medium-duty fleets over four years, in 10/8/6/3/0 gram/mile annual
steps between MY 2028-2031. We support most of EPA's proposals but strongly urge EPA not
to renew any off-cycle menu credits in this rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 78]
We support EPA's continued use of an averaging, banking, and trading (ABT) compliance
credit program for light- and medium-duty vehicle emissions, as it has for decades. We agree
with EPA's determination that there is no reason to reopen those program provisions in this
rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 78]
We also note that the current compliance credit program includes multipliers for vehicles
equipped with batteries, creating negative grams per mile values, and that EPA does not propose
to renew those multipliers. We strongly support the sunsetting of all PEV multipliers and any
other measures that create fictitious emission reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp.
78-79]
B. Off-cycle credits
We strongly urge EPA not to renew any part of the off-cycle credit program after MY 2026.
As explained below, EPA concedes that the program will cause significant fleet emissions
increases even though it no longer achieves any of its purposes. There is no reasonable basis for
carrying any part of the program forward beyond 2026, and doing so would be arbitrary and
capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 82]
1.Excluding BEVs from off-cycle credit eligibility
We concur with EPA's determination that off-cycle credits are inappropriate for BEVs for
each of the reasons EPA states. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29251-52. Because EPA does not adjust the
footprint curves downward to compensate for off-cycle credits, fleet emissions increase.
Awarding credits is particularly inappropriate for BEVs because they have no tailpipe emissions
and are already counted as emitting zero grams per mile, meaning that any credit awards tip their
emission values into fictional negative territory. This in turn creates phantom benefits that further
reduce the rule's average stringency. Because off-cycle credits are intended to stimulate the
development of new combustion vehicle technologies, awarding them to BEVs also cannot, by
definition, incentivize the development or application of new technology. Off-cycle credit values
are also not representative of upstream emissions. These reasons for not awarding any off-cycle
credits to BEVs become even more pertinent as the number of BEVs increases. Id. We urge EPA
to finalize its proposal to exclude BEVs from off-cycle credit eligibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 82]
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2. Renewing PHEV off-cycle credits based on the utility factor only.
We also concur with EPA that off-cycle credits for PHEVs exceeding their utility factor is
inappropriate. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29251. Granting credits for any portion of time when PHEVs do
not run on electricity is inappropriate for the reasons discussed in connection with BEVs. We
agree with EPA that the current utility factor is inaccurate, as PHEVs run on electricity far less
often than estimated. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29252, and see detailed discussion in Section XII, infra.218
That is an additional reason why, as discussed below, off-cycle credits should not be renewed for
PHEVs at all, regardless of whether they run on electricity or gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, pp. 82-83]
218 See also the numerous studies EPA cites at 88 Fed. Reg. 29252 n.274-475.
3. Eliminating the 5-cycle test procedures and the public notice and comment pathway
EPA justifies not renewing these two pathways for claiming off-cycle credits mainly because
manufacturers have little or no interest in them. EPA points out that since 2021, the 5-cycle
process has led to no new credits, and only one manufacturer has used it since 2012. As to the
notice-and-comment pathway, EPA states that it has resulted in the award of only a few small
credits since 2021. 88 Fed. Reg. at 20251. We agree that these programs should not be renewed,
but we note that under EPA's Proposal, aside from air conditioning credits, the only off-cycle
credits remaining would be menu credits, which require neither testing nor public comment, and
as such are the least reliable and least defensible credits of all. Yet, as EPA reports, the use of
menu credits has only grown over the years, and now constitutes a whopping 95% of credit use.
88 Fed. Reg. at 29249. Eliminating pathways that automakers eschew because they impose the
burden of demonstrating their effectiveness thus does very little indeed to address the
fundamental flaws. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 83]
Because EPA's prior rules limited medium-duty fleet off-cycle credits to those approved
under the 5-cycle test procedures or the notice-and-comment pathway and contained no menu
credits, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29249, EPA's proposal not to renew those two pathways effectively
terminates the credit program for that fleet, a decision we fully support. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 83]
4. Phasing out menu credits through MY 2030
EPA proffers numerous reasons for "phasing out" the menu credits program—for vehicles
with internal combustion engines only—through 2030. But those reasons all demonstrate that
retaining the program in any form has no verifiable benefits even as it significantly increases the
fleet's emissions. Renewal of menu credits thus would be arbitrary and capricious, and we
strongly urge EPA to abandon the proposal and not to renew the program at the end of MY 2026.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 83]
First, the Agency states that menu credits were designed "to provide an incentive for new and
innovative technologies that reduce real world C02 emissions primarily outside of the 2-cycle
test procedures." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29249. But EPA now concedes the program no longer
accomplishes this purpose. It notes that industry is rapidly shifting its research and development
resources and vehicle mix away from combustion vehicles to electrification, and is not likely to
continue to "invest resources on off-cycle technology in the future for their ICE vehicle fleet." 88
Fed. Reg. at 29250. Moreover, industry has fewer and fewer opportunities of "recouping" its
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investments as "ICE vehicle production declines." Id. In other words, chances of menu credits
stimulating any new technologies at all are slim to none. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp.
83-84]
Since 2012, EPA has also assured the public in its rulemakings that the increased emissions
driven by credits are intended to be short-term and of a temporary nature only.219 But EPA
proposes to renew the program once again, even as it acknowledges the voluminous record
evidence demonstrating its shortcomings and failures.220 Reinstating the program through 2030
(for a total of 20 years) is in no way temporary and cannot be supported, as it is not delivering
the hope for technical innovations that initially may have justified it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 84]
219 E.g., 88 Fed. Reg. at 29246, 29248; 86 Fed. Reg. at 74441; 75 Fed. Reg. at 25331.
220 See generally EPA, Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards: Response to Comments, EPA-420-R-21-027, at 6-51 (Dec. 2021).
221 The fleet average-modeled sum of off-cycle and air conditioning menu credits for MYs 2027-2032
represents about 3% of the MYs 2027-2032 Proposed Standards. We calculated this number by first sales-
weighted averaging the direct off-cycle credits (i.e. air-conditioning plus off-cycle credits) in the modeled
Proposal output file. We then compared these values to the Proposed Standards for the combined fleet. 88
Fed. Reg. at 29202, Table 10.
Eliminating menu credits for MYs 2027-2055 improves the cumulative C02 emissions
reductions of the Proposal by 275 million metric tons (roughly 3% of the total 8,000MMT shown
in DRIA table 9-21). We calculated this number by first assuming manufacturers would achieve
the same combustion vehicle emissions levels as they do in the modeled Proposal output file
with only on-cycle technologies. We used this file because the on-cycle emissions values in a no-
off-cycle scenario are equal to the currently-modeled certified emissions values (used for
compliance calculations). These on-cycle values are then converted to on-road (i.e. real-world)
emissions using conversion factors calculated from the output file. Finally, total fleetwide
lifetime emissions are estimated by multiplying on-road C02e by lifetime vehicle-miles traveled
and annual sales. For the detailed calculations, see the Excel Workbook attachment to this
comment letter titled "No Off-Cycle Credits 2027-2055.". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
84]
EPA also concedes that menu credits meet neither of the guardrails that justify continuation of
air conditioning credits. Menu credits undergo no or at most minimal testing to ascertain what, if
any, emission reductions they may yield, and EPA once again is not proposing to increase the
standards' stringency to account for the increased emissions. In 2021, EPA calculated the impact
of the off-cycle credits it allowed under the MY 2023-2026 rulemaking as the loss of 42 g/mile.
88 Fed. Reg. at 29249 n.453, citing Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle
GHG Emissions Standards: Regulatory Impact Analysis," EPA-420-R-21-028 (Dec. 2021). For
MY 2016-2025, the impact of all off-cycle credits amounted to a stringency loss of 4-6%. 88
Fed. Reg. at 29249. EPA also notes that for this Proposal, emission increases caused by all off-
cycle credits (i.e., under a full renewal of the program) would be even larger by 2032, when they
would "become an outsized portion (e.g., up to 12 percent) of the program." 88 Fed. Reg. at
29250. We note, however, that under EPA's proposal to retain menu credits through the
proposed phase-out schedule, these compliance giveaways would still amount to some 3%
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reduction in stringency and a 3% increase in MY 2027-2055 cumulative C02e emissions.221.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 84]
Next, EPA discusses that the synergistic effects and overlap among menu technologies—
which reduce effectiveness—become more pronounced as credits represent a larger portion of
emissions reductions and the standards become more stringent. Further, "the menu credits are
based on MY 2008 vintage engine and vehicle baseline technologies . . . and therefore the credit
levels are potentially becoming less representative of the emissions reductions." Id. And
crucially, the Agency frankly admits that there is "not currently a mechanism to check that off-
cycle technologies provide emissions reductions in use commensurate with the level of the
credits the menu provides." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29250 (emphasis added). That the program simply
cannot be fixed is all by itself sufficient reason not to carry it on. . [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 85]
The single reason proffered to justify a step-wise phase-out through MY 2030 as a
"reasonable way to bring the program to an end" is the creation of "a transition period to help
manufacturers who have made substantial use of the program in their product planning." 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29250. But nothing backs up the need for a lead time of six or seven years (from the
expected rule finalization in 2023 or 2024 through MY 2030). To the contrary, no lead time
beyond MY 2026 is warranted, particularly in an industry racing toward zero-emission
technologies. In any event, the menu program does not have to be "brought to an end" through
this new rulemaking: it expires on its own after MY 2026. In its 2023-2026 rule (as before), EPA
characterized the program as "temporary" and gave no indication that it would be extended, 86
Fed. Reg. at 74441, and commenters have implored EPA to jettison it for more than a decade. If
a manufacturer has nonetheless made menu credits part of its post-MY 2026 product planning, it
did so at its own risk. There is no need for a "transition period" for a program that ends in MY
2026. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 85]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Off-cycle Credits
Ford believes that the EPA off-cycle credit program encourages adoption of technologies that
reduce on-road C02 emissions. We also believe that the program can serve an
important function during this transition period, and we encourage EPA to consider continuing
targeted off- cycle credits for both ICE and EV technologies. If EPA discontinues certain off-
cycle credits, the agency should phase-out them out over time, much like the phase-out proposal
for the menu- based credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 8]
Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI)
HMG requests all technologies approved to earn credit through the alternative or 5- cycle
pathway be moved to the menu from 2027 model year [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 6]
HMG appreciates EPA s inclusion of off-cycle credits (OCC), which incentivize the
application of technologies that provide real word greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
improvements, but whose improvements are not fully reflected on the 2-cycle test. HMG
currently claims credits from all three available pathways: menu technologies, 5-cycle testing,
and the public process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 6]
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Many challenges remain on the path to ZEVs, and HMG believes incentives will continue to
be key to encouraging swift adoption of ZEV technologies. Given such challenges, now is not
the time for EPA to reduce OCC incentives as part of the transition to ZEVs. Accordingly, HMG
provides the below comments regarding the Proposed Rule's changes to the OCC program.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 6]
EPA proposes to phase out the menu pathway by decreasing the menu credit cap from MY
2027-2031 (10, 8, 6, 3, 0 g/mi) and prohibiting battery electric vehicles (BEVs) from earning
OCC from MY 2027. HMG believes the cap should remain at its current level (15 g/mi) or
should be phased out at a slower rate. EPA may believe that with the shift to electrified
technology, OCC are not going to be a key area of focus for manufacturers, but this is not the
case. GHG-reducing technologies, such as high efficiency lighting, are used in both ICE and
ZEVs. Keeping the menu cap at its current level will support EPA's original goal for the OCC
program to encourage and develop new and innovative technologies that lead to significant GHG
reductions. Reducing and eventually eliminating OCC technology credits will likely
disincentivize future ICE technologies that further contribute to GHG reductions. HMG also
believes ZEVs should remain a part of the OCC program. Although ZEVs have no tailpipe
emissions, if an off cycle technology improves electrical energy efficiency of the EV, that
technology is providing a reduction in overall emissions. ZEV market penetration is also not yet
high enough, nor is it likely to be by MY 2027, to justify eliminating these incentives. The
ultimate goal of a 100% ZEV fleet continues to require substantial support in these early stages.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 6]
EPA further proposes to eliminate the 5-cycle and the alternative credit pathways by MY
2027. HMG opposes this proposal and believes the non-menu pathways offer valuable GHG
reductions. As stated previously, overall emissions reductions can be achieved through both ZEV
and ICE improvements . Without the credit incentives for innovative GHG technologies,
manufacturers may be less inclined to develop and invest in OCC technologies, leading to
increased ICE emissions , particularly in the early stages of consumer ZEV adoption when ICE
vehicles are still dominant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 6]
If EPA decides to eliminate the 5-cycle and alternative credit pathways, HMG suggests all
credits approved through these pathways prior to the start of the new rule be transferred to the
menu from MY 2027 and the menu cap be adjusted accordingly. Between development and the
application process, HMG has spent considerable time and resources on OCC technologies that
would seek approval through the alternative pathway. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 6]
HMG believes EPA should encourage every GHG reducing effort, including non menu off-
cycle technologies . There is precedent for moving technologies from the alternative pathway to
the menu as mentioned in the Proposed Rule: "[t]he public process pathway was used
successfully by several manufacturers for high efficiency alternators, resulting in EPA adding
them to the off-cycle menu beginning in MY 2021. "HMG believes the EPA should review and
approve/reject all pending alternative pathway applications by June 1, 2025, and from MY 2027
move those technologies and the corresponding credit values to the menu. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0554, p. 7]
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Organization: Hyundai Motor America
The Final Rule Should Delay the Start of Off-Cycle Credit Phase Down Until MY 2031.
The final rule should enable compliance pathways by offering a real choice of clean
technology innovation or greater PEV penetration. However, the fundamental stripping away of
technology- earning credit flexibilities, in effect, creates an EV mandate. The result will cause an
industrywide race to simply "buy" compliance through credit trading provisions. In this way, the
Proposed Alternative's restructured off-cycle and air conditioning credit provisions incentivize
the wrong behavior by industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, pp. 7-8]
Historically, Hyundai has earned credits from its light duty innovations under the off-cycle
credit provision and we remain interested in continuing to do so. However, the proposed
phasedown creates a deterrent effect. Real world considerations include the reduced credit value
compared to the time and resources required to develop qualifying technologies. While we agree
that a phase- out will eventually be appropriate, we urge the EPA to retain existing off-cycle
credits through at least MY 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, pp. 7-8]
Retaining existing off-cycle credits for BEVs through MY 2030 allows time for industry to
make gains in BEV technology, such as efficiency and price. In this way, off-cycle credit
opportunities will serve as a bridge to support compliance during this time. We would support a
phasedown of off-cycle credits for both ICE and PEVs beginning at 80% in MY 2031 and 60%
in MY 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, pp. 7-8]
Recommendations
In summary, we support AFAI's proposal as it aligns with Executive Order 14037. In
addition, the final rule should include a:
- Revised No Action case to more adequately account for infrastructure and grid capacity
constraints, challenges related to IRA-related supply chain restructuring, and significantly
reduced consumer access to EV tax incentives in the near and medium term, [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0599, p. 9]
- Confidential and aggregated industry survey to understand real costs associated with supply
chain and manufacturing changes caused by the 30D tax credit requirements, [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0599, p. 9]
- Off-cycle credit provision consistent with current rules through MY 2030, with a phasedown
beginning MY 2031 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 9]
- Credit incentive for automakers to reduce tailpipe emissions within in disadvantaged
communities, and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 9]
- Federal Advisory Committee to, by July 1, 2030, assess and issue recommendations
regarding the status of key enablers necessary to support the final rule's BEV penetration
requirements [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 9]
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Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
ICCT supports EPA's proposed improvements on a number of technical design elements that
will strengthen the overall rule. ICCT strongly supports EPA's proposal to phase out additional
credits given to automakers for technologies that are not captured in the test cycle (off-cycle
credits; OC) and that previously were considered novel but now are fully commercialized. In
particular, ICCT supports EPA's proposal to sunset or eliminate off-cycle (OC) credits for air-
conditioning (AC), to phaseout off-cycle (OC) credits by MY2031, to eliminate the off-menu OC
credit option starting MY2027, and to limit OC credits to ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, p. 5]
OFF-CYCLE CREDITS
ICCT strongly supports EPA's proposal to sunset or eliminate air-conditioning (AC) and off-
cycle (OC) credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 43-44]
Eliminating the AC leakage credit is reasonable, since at least 95% of new LD vehicles now
use HFO-1234yf,109 which is a low-GWP refrigerant. Since virtually all vehicles have this low-
GWP refrigerant, this low-GWP status is now the baseline and there is no need to grant further
AC leakage credits. Regarding AC efficiency credits, ICCT supports EPA limiting these credits
to ICEVs, as the credits are based on ICE tailpipe emissions reductions for AC-system
improvements. While BEVs also benefit from improved AC system efficiency, BEVs do not
require the additional incentive provided by AC credits. BEVs already are granted compliance
emissions values of 0 g/mi, and advances in AC efficiency are inherent to BEV development, as
passenger and battery heating/cooling loads can significantly impact BEV range and battery size
requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 43-44]
109 EPA. (2022). Automotive Trends Report, https://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends/download-
automotive-trends- report#Full%20Report
ICCT supports the proposal to phaseout OC credits by MY2031, to eliminate the off-menu
OC credit option starting MY2027, and to limit OC credits to ICE vehicles. As with AC credits,
a large portion of the fleet already incorporates the technologies that are granted OC credits.
According to the 2022 Automotive Trends Report data, MY2021 cars averaged 5.1 g/mi in OC
credits (51% of the 10 g/mi cap) and trucks averaged 10.2 g/mi in OC credits (102% of the 10
g/mi cap). 110 With these averages as a proxy for the share of the car and truck fleets with OC
technology, this technology is already widespread in the baseline and requires no further
incentivization. Evidence suggests that the menu OC credit values (such as solar and thermal
load control) overestimate the real-world impact of OC technologies. Ill Moreover, the menu
credits are defined in terms of absolute g/mi reductions, rather than relative or percentage- based
reductions, as virtually all on-cycle technologies are defined. Because of this inappropriate
definition, as vehicles become increasingly efficient, these absolute credit values represent
unrealistically large shares of vehicles' overall emissions improvement. Additionally, as OC
credits are based on reduced tailpipe emissions from ICE vehicles, they are not applicable to
BEVs. As with AC efficiency improvements, any innovation that reduces real world energy
consumption in BEVs is inherently incentivized by the reduced battery capacity requirements of
incorporating such innovations. Relatedly, ICCT supports the proposal to scale PHEV OC credits
by the (newly proposed) utility factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 43-44]
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110 EPA. (2022). Automotive Trends Report [data], https://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends/explore-
automotive-trends- data
111 Lutsey, N., Isenstadt, A. (2018). How will off-cycle credits impact U.S. 2025 efficiency standards?
International Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/how-will-off-cycle-credits-
impact-u-s-2025- efficiency-standards/
ICCT recommends EPA adjust its modeling of OC credits to more accurately reflect the trend
of the car and truck fleets taking full advantage of the OC credit cap. As currently modeled, both
the car and truck fleets use the full value of their respective AC efficiency credit cap. 112 The OC
credits, however, are not modeled as reaching their cap for either car or truck fleet in any model
year. As evidenced in the 2022 Automotive Trends Report data discussed above, the car fleet is
currently receiving at least 50% of the full OC credit cap, while the truck fleet is receiving at
least 100% of the full OC credit cap. ICCT suggests EPA modify its inputs to OMEGA to
capture the real-world trend of manufacturers taking full advantage of the off-cycle credit cap.
(The AC efficiency credits are appropriately modeled at the full value of the cap, which
accurately represents the trend of the fleet receiving nearly 90% of the AC credit cap in
MY2021.) If EPA incorporates the maximal use of OC credits during years that the OC cap is
nonzero, then the standards could be made more stringent to offset this higher OC credit usage
and maintain the same GHG emissions impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 43-44]
112 Based on analysis of column BV of output file
2023_03_14_22_42_30_central_3alts_20230314_Proposal_vehicles.csv as well as inspection of input file
offcycle_credits_20230206.csv
Organization: International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW)
Given the potential barriers to compliance, it is also crucial that the system of credits and
multipliers for advanced powertrain technology, over-compliance, and off-cycle technologies
provide automakers for multiple-pathways to reach compliance. No two automakers are the same
when it comes to technologies or markets. Any adjustments to the regulatory credit system
should prioritize promoting advanced technology production domestically and recognizing the
economic, social, and environmental benefits of a resilient domestic supply chain. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 8]
Organization: Kia Corporation
- Kia strongly supports preserving many of the current program flexibilities - a phase- down
of the AJC refrigerant leakage credits and preserving the off-cycle technology credits. These
flexibilities should still play an important role as these credits could help ease the uncertainties in
the transition to EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 3]
Kia Supports Preserving Off-cycle Technology Credits
EPA proposes to phase out the off-cycle technology credit program as follows: (1) credit
eligibility is limited to ICE vehicles; (2) a phase out of menu-based credits by reducing the menu
credit cap year over-year until it is fully phased out in MY 2031 (10 g/mile cap in MY 2027 then
8.0/6.0/ 3.0/0, with MY 2030 being the last year manufacturers could generate credits); (3) EPA
proposes to eliminate the 5-cycle and alternative method process pathways starting in MY
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2027.22 EPA proposes that PHEVs would remain eligible for off-cycle credits but off-cycle
credit would scale the menu credit cap for PHEVs by the vehicles' utility factor.23 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 13-14]
22 88 Fed. Reg. 29,249.
23 88 Fed. Reg. 29,251.
Kia opposes EPA's proposal to phase out and eventually eliminate off-cycle technology
credits by MY2031. While Kia agrees that a phase-out of off-cycle credits will eventually be
appropriate, we urge the EPA to retain existing off-cycle menu-based credits through at least
2032. Off-cycle credits should be continued. Any eventual phasedown should be much slower
than proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 13-14]
Historically, Kia has invested significant resources to develop these off-cycle technologies
and has used all three pathways to obtain off-cycle credits. Kia remains interested in earning off-
cycle credits as we have invested in these technologies, included them in our compliance plans,
and know these technologies continue to provide real-world emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 13-14]
In EPA's most recent vehicle GHG emissions standards rule, finalized in December 2021,
EPA increased the off-cycle credit cap obtained from the off-cycle menu from 10 g/mi to 15 g/mi
for MYs 2023-2026.24 The increased menu cap signaled to industry that EPA would continue to
encourage and account for these off-cycle technologies. Consequently, Kia made investments in
these technologies and would appreciate the opportunity to earn a return on investment (ROI).
EPA's proposed immediate phase down in MY2027 will hurt our ROI, stranding investments
and potentially foregoing potential emissions benefits both before and throughout the MYs 2027
- 2032 program. While EPA is proposing automakers make new investments in ICE vehicles,
Kia is urging EPA to allow automakers to benefit from off-cycle technology investments that
have already been made. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 13-14]
24 86 Fed. Reg. 74,446.
These program flexibilities, particularly the off-cycle menu, still play an important role for
automakers in compliance. Retaining the existing off-cycle credits, particularly the off-cycle
menu, is critical as this allows time for automakers to make gains in EV penetration and allows
for industry to earn credits for investments already made in ICE technologies. These credits
could help ease the uncertainties in the transition to EVs, particularly early in the MYs 2027 -
2032 program. Kia strongly supports preserving current program flexibilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0555, pp.13-14]
Kia also recommends that EPA keep the 5-cycle and alternative method process off-cycle
pathways through MY2032. While these pathways are not used as often as the menu, it is
important that these pathways are still allowed. These pathways will encourage new, innovative,
emissions-reducing technologies that are a cost-efficient range of technology options that
ultimately lower compliance costs and increase consumer choice. By eliminating the credits and
pathways, there will be no incentive or benefit to invest in these GHG reducing technologies.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 13-14]
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However, if EPA does eliminate the 5-cycle and alternative method process off-cycle
pathways starting in MY2027, we recommend that EPA consider the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0555, pp.13-14]
- EPA should follow through under the current regulation and complete action on all
submitted applications, no later than June 1, 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 13-14]
- EPA should add technologies approved through the 5-cycle and alternative off-cycle
pathways to the off-cycle credit menu. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 13-14]
- If an automaker has off-cycle credits approved through the alternative or 5-cycle method
prior to MY2027 and that vehicle remains in production after MY2027, the credit continues to be
granted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 13-14]
Organization: Lucid Group, Inc.
Lucid Supports Eliminating AC Leakage and Off-Cycle Menu Credits
The intent behind the off-cycle program was to incentivize innovations that would reduce real
world C02 emissions outside of the 2-cycle test procedures. However, transportation
technologies and the makeup of the vehicles on U.S. roads has drastically changed since the
program's launch in 2014. In part, EPA proposes limiting the off-cycle program to vehicles with
tailpipe emissions greater than zero starting in MY27 and sunsetting the program entirely by
MY31. The accelerated transition to EVs, spurred by both government and industry
commitments/investment as well as the exacerbation of the climate crisis, provides the
opportunity for EPA to narrow the allowance of credits for vehicles that emit tailpipe emissions.
Lucid urges the agency to eliminate the off-cycle program as proposed, or on an accelerated
timeline ending with Og/mile prior to MY31, and to eliminate the 5-cycle and public process
pathways starting in MY27. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, p. 7]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
Off-cycle credits provide real-world emission benefits and should continue to be offered.
We continue to support EPA's off-cycle credit program for recognizing the breadth of
engineering ingenuity to reduce real-world C02 through a verifiable credit process. This
program has offered a method for vehicle manufacturers to apply for off-cycle C02 credits
through three pathways with increasing levels of complexity. We agree that the five-cycle
approval process is complex and thus has had limited subscribership. The program requires that
off-cycle technologies be fully integrated into vehicles, and thus suppliers have had a difficult
time generating enough evidence to convince their customers to commit resources to
demonstrate the technology across a fleet of vehicles without any indication of the amount of
credits the technology may deliver. Furthermore, suppliers have found it difficult to take
advantage of the 5-cycle pathway to generating data toward demonstrating the C02 reduction
benefits of a technology to their customers without access to the methodology the agency uses
for calculating the final credit value. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, p. 36]
However, light-duty super credits were recently sunset in 2022 and advanced technology
multiplier credits for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles are phasing out by 2027, and we believe
this could lead to increased interest and use of the current off-cycle credit program. While we
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understand EPA's rationale in its decision to simplify and eliminate the off-cycle credit process
by removing the 5-cycle pathway and phasing out the credits, we request: (1) that the agency
retain the five-cycle pathway; and (2) that the agency continue off-cycle menu credits at the 10
g/mile cap rather than phasing credit caps down to zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, p. 36]
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
Continue Off-Cycle Technologies Credit & A/C Efficiency Technology Credit Programs
MEMA urges EPA to continue to provide the off-cycle technology credit program and the
A/C efficiency credit program. The supplier community, working independently and in
collaboration with OEMs, develop and engineer innovative technologies that contribute to
vehicle manufacturers' strategies for real-world GHG and fuel consumption reductions often
beyond those measured with standard test procedures. The off-cycle credit program and A/C
efficiency credit program have helped to support industry investment in innovative and forward-
looking technologies that provide environmental benefits. These technologies offer measurable,
demonstrable, and verifiable real-world benefits that improve efficiencies and reduce GHG
emissions. They also provide an important cost-effective option for OEMs to achieve fuel
economy and GHG targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 9-10]
These credit programs are not loopholes and do not distort the market but instead recognize
technologies that are not measured accurately on the existing test-cycles. These technologies are
often more cost effective than other available technologies to reduce pollutant emissions. It is
important that the MY27+ program allows a variety of regulatory tools to broaden compliance
pathways for vehicles to manage their product mix during this transition period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0644, pp. 9-10]
The continuation of the off-cycle credit program is critical in encouraging technologies that
allow greater innovation which can provide a cost-efficient range of technology options that
ultimately lower compliance costs and increase consumer choice. These technologies will
continue to promote consumer choice, spur technology development, and minimize compliance
costs while achieving significant pollutant emissions and oil reductions. Importantly,
continuation of the off-cycle technology credit program will help maintain market certainty for
these technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 9-10]
Similarly, MEMA encourages EPA to explore how emissions reductions from off-cycle
technologies and A/C efficiency technologies could be rewarded when used on BEVS, PHEVs,
FCEVS, and other ZEVs. Many off-cycle and A/C efficiency technologies, along with emerging
ZEV technologies, could help reduce battery energy use and therefore lower the amount of
electricity used to power the vehicle overall. Consequently, technologies that reduce the amount
of battery charging needed and, therefore, the electricity used to power the vehicle should be
recognized in MY2027 and beyond. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 9-10]
MEMA urges:
EPA to maintain off-cycle credits and A/C credits programs at full value through 2032
for all vehicle types, including ZEV, and consider additional ways emerging technologies that
reduce ZEV energy consumption can be rewarded. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 9-10]
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Organization: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
- Phase out air conditioning and off-cycle credits
The MPCA agrees with EPA's proposal to phase out air conditioning and off-cycle credits.
While useful to encourage manufacturers to invest in improved technology in earlier phases of
EPA's greenhouse gas vehicle emissions standards, they no longer provide substantive benefit,
and it is appropriate to sunset these programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, p. 5]
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
Mitsubishi participated in the development of - and supports - the comments submitted by
Auto Innovators. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
In addition, based on its considerable experience discussed previously with BEV and PHEV
leadership, Mitsubishi provides the following recommendations to supplement the comments of
Auto Innovators: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
1. Closely align the multi-pollutant emissions standards with President Biden's 2030
goal by assuming no more than 40-50% PHEVs and FCEVs by 2030, even though our
experience leads us to caution that this itself is very ambitious, and is predicated on the
assumption that the necessary supportive policies will be effectively implemented. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
2. Consider the many benefits of PHEVs to consumers and the environment during the
expected period of constrained battery critical minerals production capacity, and how PHEVs are
the perfect stepping- stone to full BEV acceptance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
3. Maintain the current PHEV Utility Factor (UF) and work with industry to identify
opportunities to increase PHEV electric operation. This is the ideal stepping-stone technology to
encourage long-term BEV acceptance and utilization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
4. Keep the proposed approach to determine the passenger car curves, and consider
adjusting the cutpoint and stringency levels of the light-duty trucks during the early years of the
program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
5. Maintain the existing GHG program flexibilities, such as Air Conditioning and Off-
Cycle technologies credits (including the alternative method to apply off-cycle credits), and
allow previously approved technologies to continue receiving credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0682, p. 2]
6. Align the Tier-4 (criteria pollutants) with CARB's LEV-IV criteria test procedures and
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
7. Consider the impact that very aggressive GHG standards will have on vehicle
affordability, and especially the detrimental impact to low-to-moderate income families.
Regardless of the vehicles that regulation may require us to produce, it is critical that regulators
always keep the accessibility of consumers in mind. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
The rationale for each one of these recommendations is further explained below. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
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5. GHG Program Flexibilities
At the onset of GHG regulations in MY2012, EPA developed a set of program flexibilities
designed to provide credits for technologies that provide real-world GHG emissions benefits but
are unable to be measured under the required test procedures. Specifically, credits are available
for refrigerant systems which use low global warming potential refrigerants and reduce leakage,
improvements to air conditioning efficiency, and "off-cycle" technologies which improve
emissions but are not fully measured during 2-cycle testing. This proposed regulation intends to
phase out and eliminate several of these credits as well as limit their application for electric
vehicles. Mitsubishi supports the position of Auto Innovators to maintain these program
flexibilities as these technologies provide real-world environmental benefits. Mitsubishi also
supports Auto Innovators' position that any vehicles with previously approved alternative
method off-cycle technology continue to receive credits for MY27 and later. In addition,
Mitsubishi believes that the alternative method to apply for off-cycle credits should remain as an
option for MY27 and later. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 8-9]
It is important to note that NHTSA's CAFE program in the past has mirrored EPA's GHG
approach to these flexibilities. Since it is not possible to comment on a proposed CAFE
regulation that has not yet been published, it is only reasonable to assume that NHTSA will
follow previous precedent regarding flexibilities and adopt the same structure as EPA. However,
there is a significant deviation with regard to the treatment of EV compliance under the CAFE
and GHG programs. Where EVs are rightly considered zero g/mi under the GHG program, the
CAFE program requires EVs to be assign a mile per gallon equivalent compliance value based
on the PEF. Increasing this discrepancy in the GHG and CAFE programs, DOE has proposed
reducing the PEF by 72% compared to the current value. The PEF reduction will lead to a
substantial decrease in the CAFE compliance value of BEVs and PHEVs. The elimination of air
conditioning and off- cycle credits for EVs combined with changes to the PEF, and UF within
the CAFE program could put BEVs and PHEVs at a distinctive compliance disadvantage relative
to some Strong Hybrid-Electric Vehicles (SHEVs). Keeping these flexibilities in the GHG
program for electric vehicles should reduce potential harmonization issues between the GHG and
CAFE regulations. For this reason and the reasons stated by Auto Innovators, Mitsubishi
supports Auto Innovators proposed approach to apply all available credits at the vehicle level
regardless of propulsion, but ensure fleet-wide average emissions are not allowed to go below a
value equivalent to zero g/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 8-9]
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
NACAA agrees with EPA's assessment that the off-cycle credit program - originally created
over a decade ago to provide flexibility to automakers and incentives for the development of new
and innovative technologies - has successfully served its purpose. We therefore support the
agency's proposal to phase out, between 2027 and 2030, the off-cycle credit program for LDVs
and MDVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, p. 8]
Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
EPA also proposes to sunset the off-cycle credits program for both light- and medium-duty
vehicles by: (i) reducing the menu credit cap annually until its unavailable in MY 2031; (ii)
eliminating the 5-cycle and public process pathways starting in MY 2027; and (iii) limiting
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eligibility for off-cycle credits to vehicles with tailpipe emissions greater than zero starting in
MY 2027.11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 3]
11 88 Fed. Reg. 29196, 29249-52.
NADA generally supports retention of all compliance flexibilities that will afford OEMs a
greater ability to cost-efficiently deliver compliant vehicles, and to help incentivize the
acceptance of new technology and alternative fuel vehicles in the marketplace. Hence, NADA
opposes EPA's proposals to (i) eliminate or reduce the incentive multiplier for medium-duty
vehicles prior to MY 2027, (ii) limit eligibility for the air conditioning credit to light-duty
internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles, (iii) eliminate refrigerant-based air conditioning
credit provisions for both light-duty and medium-duty vehicles, and (iv) to sunset the off-cycle
credits program for both light-duty and medium-duty vehicles. NADA shares the concerns
expressed by AAI in its comments regarding the changes EPA proposes on these matters. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 16]
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
Additionally, Nissan requests that EPA re-consider the proposed changes to its AC system
efficiency credits and off-cycle credit programs. Nissan agrees with the comments of the
Alliance for Automotive Innovation on these topics as described in more detail in Section VII
below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 6]
VII. Endorsement of Comments from the Alliance for Automotive Innovation
As a member of the Alliance for Automotive Innovation ("the Alliance"), Nissan fully
endorses the comments on the Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule submitted separately by the
Alliance. In particular, Nissan highlights several points from the Alliance's comments, including:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Support realigning the GHG standard stringency ramp up rates with market reality and
uncertainties. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Support realigning the Federal criteria emission standards with California's program. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Emphasis regarding the industry's commitment to work towards electrification as quickly as
practicable, while also taking into consideration resource availability, technological capabilities,
market challenges and limitations, and consumer adoption hurdles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0594, p. 9]
- Support continuation of tailpipe-based program and treatment of 0 g/mi for EVs [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Request reconsideration of the proposed changes in the AC and off-cycle credit programs:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Request continuing AC and off-cycle credit eligibility for EVs that are part of mixed fleets
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Oppose phase-out of off-cycle credits and request the off-cycle credit cap be maintained at
15 g/mi [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
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- Support coordination and harmonization between EPA, NHTSA, and CARB. One fleet
should meet all programs with a common goal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
We also support EPA's air conditioning credit programs and its proposal to sunset the off-
cycle credits program for both LDVs and MDVs and suggest EPA consider whether shorter
timeframes are appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 9]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
2. Porsche supports continued availability of flexibilities for electrified vehicles.
Porsche supports the continued allowance for electric vehicles to participate in the off-cycle
and air conditioning related GHG flexibilities. Porsche does not support the proposal from EPA
to remove both for electric vehicles beginning in model year 2027. Off-cycle technology and air
conditioning credits have been a pragmatic and supportive pillar within the suite of flexibilities
in EPA's GHG regulation for many years and Porsche believes that these flexibilities can
continue to provide value within the overall construct of the GHG fleet regulation, even for fully
electrified vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 19-20]
Electric vehicles operate as a supportive element within a manufacturers GHG fleet and
should provide a compliance incentivize intended to increase production of EVs. Electric
vehicles like any other vehicle should have the opportunity to leverage additional off-cycle or air
conditioning technologies that further contribute to C02 reduction goals and for those credits to
be equally available for use within a manufacturers fleet. These types of credits act as an internal
flexibility for the manufacturer to manage their overall annual compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0637, p. 20]
Porsche recognizes that the current menu-based credit system may not be appropriate for
electric vehicles. As such, Porsche thinks it would be reasonable for manufacturers to continue to
be able to leverage the application type pathway to seek off-cycle credits for EVs on a case-by-
case basis. Efforts could be made to establish a revised menu-based credit system in the future,
like what was envisioned in the California Framework Agreement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0637, pp. 20-21]
The GHG program leverages other broad assumptions that are equally applied to all vehicles
that are also not representative of real-world usage. For example, many Porsche vehicles have
very low annual vehicle miles traveled. As such, the assumed lifetime miles used within the
GHG regulation to determine debits or credits (i.e., 195k for LDV and 225k for LDT) are
nowhere near reflective of the miles that an average Porsche will likely ever see in its lifetime. A
Porsche model type that underperforms relative to gram/mile C02 footprint target would have to
purchase credits in megatons that are likely far in excess of the actual potential overage of
megatons emitted by the vehicle over its lifetime. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 20-21]
Nevertheless, these common accounting methods are embedded within the regulation to give
consistent calculations for all OEMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 20-21]
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Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
Phase Out the Off-Cycle Program Expeditiously
Rivian welcomes the proposal to phase out the off-cycle program but encourages EPA to end
off-cycle crediting for all vehicles in MY27—both ICEs and BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0653, pp. 8-9]
We have submitted comments to previous rulemaking dockets expressing fundamental
concerns with off- cycle credits and their effect on the environmental integrity of the GHG
regulations. As ICCT has noted, one of the "most disconcerting findings" of its examination of
off-cycle crediting is that the credited technologies "are still largely without validated real-world
benefits."25 In fact, evidence suggests that not only are the real-world benefits of many off-cycle
technologies less significant than claimed since the inception of the off-cycle program, but the
provision has failed to ensure additionality, often creating windfalls by awarding credits to
automakers for technologies that were already installed.26 Moreover, the off-cycle provisions do
not account for technologies that could increase emissions in a manner not captured by test
procedures, creating in essence an off-cycle debit. Consider remote-start technology that turns on
a car engine before a driver arrives at the vehicle, often for the purpose of heating or cooling the
cabin. The resulting emissions offset the benefits of an off-cycle technology like stop-start. For
all these reasons, and with rapidly increasing electrification of the fleet largely obviating the
need for an off-cycle program in the first place, Rivian believes that evidence supports an end to
off-cycle crediting for all vehicles in MY27. We call on the agency to pursue and maintain parity
between BEVs and ICEs in the elimination of all off-cycle credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0653, pp. 8-9]
25 Nic Lutsey and Aaron Isenstadt, The International Council on Clean Transportation, How Will Off-
Cycle Credits Impact U.S. 2025 Efficiency Standards? (2018), available at
https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/Off- Cycle-Credits_ICCT-White-Paper_vF_20180327.pdf.
26 Dave Cooke, Union of Concerned Scientists, "EPA Can't Let 'Off-Cycle' Credits Become an Off-Ramp
for Automakers," July 28, 2021, available atwww.blog.ucsusa.org/dave-cooke/epa-cant-let-off-cycle-
credits-become-an-off-ramp-for-automakers/.
However, if the agency elects to finalize a bifurcated approach and maintain the off-cycle
provisions for ICEs only, at a minimum we urge EPA to accelerate the proposed phaseout by
reducing the menu cap as suggested below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 8-9]
MY: 2026; EPA's Proposed Menu Cap(g/mi): 10; EPA's Proposed Cap as Share of Overall
GHG Standard: 5.4%; Rivian's Proposed Menu Cap (g/mi): 10; Rivian's Proposed Cap as Share
of Overall GHG Standard: 5.4% [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 8-9]
MY: 2027; EPA's Proposed Menu Cap(g/mi): 10; EPA's Proposed Cap as Share of Overall
GHG Standard: 6.6%; Rivian's Proposed Menu Cap (g/mi): 8; Rivian's Proposed Cap as Share
of Overall GHG Standard: 5.3% [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 8-9]
MY: 2028; EPA's Proposed Menu Cap(g/mi): 8; EPA's Proposed Cap as Share of Overall
GHG Standard: 6.1%; Rivian's Proposed Menu Cap (g/mi): 6; Rivian's Proposed Cap as Share
of Overall GHG Standard: 4.6% [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 8-9]
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MY: 2029; EPA's Proposed Menu Cap(g/mi): 6; EPA's Proposed Cap as Share of Overall
GHG Standard: 5.4%; Rivian's Proposed Menu Cap (g/mi): 3; Rivian's Proposed Cap as Share
of Overall GHG Standard: 2.7% [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 8-9]
MY: 2030; EPA's Proposed Menu Cap(g/mi): 3; EPA's Proposed Cap as Share of Overall
GHG Standard: 2.9%; Rivian's Proposed Menu Cap (g/mi): 0; Rivian's Proposed Cap as Share
of Overall GHG Standard: 0.0% [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 8-9]
MY: 2031; EPA's Proposed Menu Cap(g/mi): 0; EPA's Proposed Cap as Share of Overall
GHG Standard: 0.0%; Rivian's Proposed Menu Cap (g/mi): 0; Rivian's Proposed Cap as Share
of Overall GHG Standard: 0.0% [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 8-9]
Table 1. At a minimum, Rivian proposes decreasing the menu cap beginning in MY27 as
opposed to MY28. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 8-9]
Under Rivian's alternative proposal, which begins decreasing the menu cap in MY27 as
opposed to MY28, off-cycle credits—if claimed up to the menu cap—represent a declining share
of total compliance toward the overall standard. In contrast, under EPA's proposal off-cycle
credits would increase in their contribution to overall compliance, from 5.4 percent in MY26 to
6.6 percent in MY27. We believe that Rivian's proposal delivers more effectively on the intent
of the agency to phase out off-cycle credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 8-9]
Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
EPA is proposing several modifications to other credit systems that are part of the tailpipe
emissions standards in order to ensure these systems actually result in emissions reductions. We
support EPA's proposal to eliminate the air conditioning (AC) system credits for AC refrigerant
leakage control. Since the phase out of high global warming potential (GWP) refrigerants is
required under other laws and regulations, manufacturers should not be rewarded under the
tailpipe emissions standards for actions they are already required to take. Vehicles, however, will
continue to use low GWP refrigerants, and EPA should implement a leakage design standard to
protect against potential system leaks. We also support EPA's proposal to phase out off-cycle
credits. It is often difficult to verify that off-cycle technologies provide the emissions reductions
claimed, and this becomes more of a concern as vehicles become less polluting overall. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, p. 10]
EPA is also proposing to close loopholes that allow for emissions reductions provided by
ZEVs to be claimed more than once. We support EPA's modification to the AC efficiency credit
so that it applies only to internal combustion engine vehicles starting in model year 2027. This
makes sense because AC efficiency credits are earned solely by improving internal combustion
engine vehicles. Under the current tailpipe emissions standards, however, some manufacturers
were reporting ZEV emissions of less than zero when implementing AC efficiency technology in
those vehicles. For similar reasons, we also support EPA's proposal to modify the off-cycle
credit system to only include eligible vehicles (i.e., internal combustion engine vehicles) in
calculating the cap used for these types of credits until they are phased out. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0591, p.10]
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Organization: Stellantis
EPA's Discounting of Technology Benefits Increases Implicit GHG Stringency [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 11-12]
EPA has proposed AC, off-cycle and PHEV technology actions that would increase the
implicit GHG stringency, making it even more difficult to achieve the explicit aggressive GHG
targets. These EPA proposed actions are summarized below: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678,
pp.11-12]
- Remove the Direct AC refrigerant and leak credit in a single model year (2027MY) [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 11-12]
- Impose an artificial phase down of off-cycle credits, disregarding the real-world benefits of
GHG saving technology [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 11-12]
- Exclude PHEV technology from modeling and discount highly capable PHEV technology
that would provide a bridge to a fully electrified future [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 11-
12]
These long-standing flexibilities have incentivized significant investment in GHG saving
technology that now proliferates across the light-duty fleet. The Direct AC credit incentive has
been a very successful program that industry has moved to implement at a very high rate. The
investment and piece costs incurred to develop and introduce the lower Global Warming
Potential (GWP) refrigerants and their systems are partially offset by the GHG credits received.
In addition, the lower leak technologies and materials, now deployed across the ICE fleet,
continue to achieve real-world GHG savings. This GHG benefit of low AC leak rates does not go
away as we transition the fleet to higher rates of electrified product. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0678, pp. 11-12]
Similarly, the ongoing and already incurred investment and costs of GHG saving off-cycle
technologies in the fleet have led to real world benefits. These benefits also do not go away as
the fleet adds more EVs and PHEVs. While there may be less available menu credits for EVs
versus ICE products, this naturally achieves what the EPA is now proposing in this rule via a
forced phase-down of the allowed credit cap. That is, the menu of available technologies will
naturally decrease as fleet mix shifts to EVs. EPA's effort to drastically reduce the cap will
immediately call into question the ongoing development and deployment of these GHG saving
technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 11-12]
These combined actions significantly increase the stringency of the proposed rule by making
the extremely aggressive fleet targets more difficult to achieve while at the same time
incentivizing OEMs to remove this GHG saving technology from products. ICE vehicles and
EVs both benefit from many of these technologies and therefore their GHG compliance and real-
world benefits should not be removed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 11-12]
- The Direct AC credit and off-cycle credit programs need to be retained for continued GHG
benefits on both ICE and EV products. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 11-12]
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- The implicit stringency impact in the early years of this rulemaking is drastically increased
by the additional burden experienced if the proposed flexibilities are removed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0678, pp.11-12]
Third, EPA should retain credit for off-cycle GHG technologies that will continue to reduce
real-world GHG emissions on ICE and EV product without artificially ramping down credit
prematurely. Similarly, EPA should retain today's PHEV Utility Factor to motivate sales of even
more capable PHEVs. These technologies remain important in reducing the GHG emissions of a
combined ICE/EV fleet, and the overall influence of the credit mechanisms in place to
incentivize technology proliferation will scale down naturally as BEV technology proliferates.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 14-15]
In addition to these three pieces, and as a separate matter to setting feasible standards, EPA
should consider implementing transparent and objective mechanisms that monitor key market
enablers (infrastructure, battery costs, and raw material availability) and create adjustments if
these essential enablers fall short of projections. These mechanisms are not a substitute for
appropriately set targets, but rather a compliment to address uncertainties that are beyond the
control of both industry and EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 14-15]
Stellantis recommends that EPA should:
-Retain GHG saving technology flexibilities recognizing the GHG benefit that continues to be
present on electric vehicles and that will naturally decrease as EV penetration increases [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Tesla supports the proposed Alternative 1 with added stringency so that the final performance
standards achieves a fleet BEV penetration rate greater than 69% in MY 2032.2 Alternative 1 is
estimated to provide greater C02 emissions reduction of -51% from no action by 2050 compared
to -46%) under EPA's proposal, and the additional stringency will result in even greater emission
reductions.3 Accordingly, Tesla asserts the EPA should amend its proposal with a more stringent
version of Alternative 1 and take, inter alia, the following additional steps to increase the
performance and overall stringency of the proposed standards: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792,
p. 2]
2 See, 88 Fed. Reg. 29332-33, Table 96.
3 Id., at 29348 (comparing Tables 135 and 136).
- Eliminate off-cycle crediting for all types of vehicles; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p.
2]
- Revisit the plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) utility factor to accurately reflect real
world emissions; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Amend the proposal to create parity in promoting motor vehicle air conditioning (MVAC)
efficiency adoption; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Maintain the existing zero emissions upstream approach for BEVs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0792, p. 2]
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- Eliminate credit multipliers for all vehicles; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Ensure BEVs continue to be accounted for, and participate in, the NMOG + NOx reduction
standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
Accordingly, to meet strictures and pathway established under section 202, in addition to
adopting Alternative 1 with increased stringency, Tesla also asserts that the following
amendments to the proposal will result in a more "forward-looking" performance standard
providing greater protection to the public health and welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792,
p. 24]
A. EPA Should Fully Eliminate Off-Cycle Credits Staring in Model Year 2027
In the proposal, EPA takes steps to phasedown the amount of allowed off-cycle credits with a
declining cap on such credits from MY 2027 through MY 2030, reducing the menu of eligible
credits, eliminating the five-cycle pathway, and allowing only ICE vehicles to generate off-cycle
credits. 148 While sunsetting off-cycle credits is directionally positive, the agency should instead
eliminate all off-cycle credit generation starting in MY 2027. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792,
p. 24]
148 Id., at 29248-929252.
While reduced, continuing off-cycle crediting creates asymmetry in the regulation favoring
ICE vehicles, diverts research and development investment away from the best emissions
reduction technology of electrification, and unnecessarily weakens the stringency of the
standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 24]
Ongoing utilization of off-cycle credit in only ICE and PHEV vehicles creates a disparity in
the type of vehicles that are rewarded for deploying efficiency technology. Originally created in
2010, the off-cycle menu credits consisted almost entirely of technologies (i.e., Active Engine
Warmup, Active Transmission Warmup, Engine Stop Start) applicable only for use on ICE
vehicles. Subsequently, in its 2012 rules, EPA moved forward the timeline for generating these
credits from a proposed MY 2017 to MY 2014. As a result, the off-cycle program has its origins
in technologies now over thirteen years old. Despite being an antiquated part of the standard,
EPA now proposes extending crediting rewards to manufacturers for deploying these
technologies for what amounts to another eight model years. This means ongoing off-cycle
credits will reduce the stringency of the proposed standard by rewarding many now commonly
deployed efficiency technologies that provide, at best, negligible real-world emissions, or
technology advancement benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 24]
Moreover, previous analysis has shown that manufacturers reliance on off-cycle credits
diverts investment and deployment away from the most efficient vehicle technologies.
Continuing these credit rewards old technology and, to the extent new technologies are deployed
to generate off-cycle credits, focuses critical research and development budgets on tweaking
legacy ICE and PHEV platforms rather than directing these budgets to full electrification and
greater emissions reductions. In extending the off-cycle program and limiting it to ICE and
PHEV vehicles, EPA's proposal half-heartedly confronts this built-in bias toward legacy
technology. Especially at a time when manufacturers should be further developing next
generation BEV technology and eliminating legacy technology, the agency should not maintain
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such perverse incentives and should eliminate all off-cycle crediting starting in MY 2027.149
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 24]
149 See generally, Bloomberg Hyperdrive, Carmakers Start to Starve Combustion Models Out of Existence
(July 11, 2022) available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-08/carmakers-start-to-
starve-combustion-models-out-of-
existence?cmpid=BBD070822_hyperdrive&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&utm_term=220
708&utm_campa i gn=hyperdrive.
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
1 Off-Cycle Technology Credits
From the start of the GHG program effective with 2012 model year vehicles, off-cycles
credits35 have collectively motivated the introduction of technologies that would not been
launched otherwise because they often provide no perceivable benefit for customers. However,
these technologies net immediate real-world emissions reductions and should be viewed no
differently than emissions reductions achieved over the Federal Test Procedure. Off-cycle credits
encourage the continued use of these technologies with commensurate benefits to consumers, the
environment and further innovation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 45-46]
35 Which includes A/C refrigerant leakage credits and A/C efficiency credits for these comments.
Toyota has invested billions of dollars in off-cycle technologies which have saved over
approximately 100 million tons of C02 emissions from our products and avoided high GWP
refrigerants from entering the environment. Off-cycle credits have become pivotal in Toyota's
compliance planning and longer-term technology strategy affecting future products over the next
several years that could potentially include PEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 45-46]
The proposal:
- Eliminates AC refrigerant credits as well as the 5-cycle and alternative credit methods
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 45-46]
- Phases out the off-cycle credit menu, and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 45-46]
- Excludes BEV and the electric operation of PHEVs from the remaining available credits.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 45-46]
Toyota has invested in and will deploy technologies that have been approved under the 5-
cycle and Alternative test methods. We request all previously approved credits be added to the
off-cycle credit menu and the cap increased by the amount of those added credits. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 45-46]
Toyota also requests BEVs and PHEVs be fully eligible for the remainder of the off-cycle
credit program. The efficiency of PEVs can be improved with off-cycle technologies. For
example, solar panels and solar thermal control technologies conserve battery energy improving
PEV driving range and reducing electricity consumption. Improved PEV HVAC system
efficiency can produce similar benefits. In a March 2022 meeting with AAI that explored
potential approaches for 2027 model year and later GHG standards, EPA mentioned the
possibility of incentivizing increased PEV efficiency and range. Market factors alone will
motivate improved efficiency and range over time, but off-cycle credits could help accelerate
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advancements as PEV technologies continue to evolve and mature. EPA and the auto industry
could collaborate on appropriate credit values and how to avoid negative fleet emissions if PEV
penetration eventually were to reach such a threshold market share. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0620, pp. 45-46]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
C. EPA should retain the off-cycle credits program for ICEV and should modify the
program to recognize vehicle fuel-based carbon intensity reduction measures such as low-carbon
fuels and fuel sequestration.
EPA requests comment on its proposal to phase out the off-cycle credits program that
currently allows auto manufacturers to realize credit for C02 reduction technologies for which
the emission reduction benefits are not adequately reflected in the Federal Test Procedure and/or
the Highway Fuel Economy Test.349 EPA acknowledges in the preamble that this program has
been successful in encouraging a variety of technologies that otherwise would not have been
implemented, such as engine start-stop, active aerodynamics, high efficiency alternators, and
others. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding EPA's claims regarding the urgent need for GHG
reduction measures, EPA now proposes to eliminate this option based on a self-fulfilling
prophecy: Now that EPA is forcing manufacturers to abandon ICE technology, "EPA believes it
is not likely that manufacturers would invest resources on off-cycle technology in the future for
their ICE vehicle fleet that is likely to become a smaller part of their overall vehicle mix over the
next several years... manufacturers would be recouping any investment in off-cycle
technologies, with relatively small emission reductions, over a decreasing number of vehicles as
ICE vehicle production declines."350 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 64-65]
349 40 CFR 86.1869-12.
350 Proposed Rule at 29250.
It is true that manufacturers will not use this option to reduce GHG emissions from ICE
vehicles if EPA takes it away. This statement belies EPA's disclaimers in the introductory
passages of the preamble denying that EPA seeks to force transition of the domestic fleet to EVs.
If EPA is correct that OEMs will not invest in further innovation to improve GHG emission
performance of ICE vehicles, then what harm is there in leaving this option available? The
rationale that "off-cycle applications take time for us to review" is both weak and nonsensical -
if OEMs in fact do not apply for off-cycle credits, then no EPA resources will be needed to
review their applications. EPA's proposal to eliminate this option for EVs on the basis that the
program was intended to encourage reductions in C02 emissions for ICE that have tailpipe
emissions makes sense. But the only logical reason for removing this option from the rule for the
ICE vehicles for which it was intended - and for which it has been successful - is because EPA
is afraid that OEMs will use this option to reduce their ICE vehicles' GHG emissions instead of
discontinuing them in favor of EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 64-65]
Therefore, to the extent the purpose of the proposed rules is to reduce GHG emissions from
the transportation fleet, EPA should retain the off-cycle credits program, at least for the ICE
vehicles for which this was intended. Moreover, EPA should consider expanding the program to
provide for recognition of lifecycle emissions reductions based on use of fuel-related measures
such as low-carbon renewable fuels and carbon sequestration. In much the same manner as EPA
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has suggested EV manufacturers could generate "e-RINS" on the basis of entering contractual
agreements with biogas suppliers, EPA should consider expanding the off-cycle credit
calculation methodology to allow OEMs to realize credits for GHG reductions on the basis of
agreements with fuel producers to reduce the carbon intensity of fuels. Such a measure would be
consistent with EPA's GHG reduction goals as well as with Congressional mandates under the
Renewable Fuel Standard and with Congressional support for carbon sequestration under the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 64-65]
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
Off-Cycle Credit Program
EPA is proposing to sunset the off-cycle credit program fully by MY 2031. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0669, p. 5]
Volkswagen has invested in off-cycle technologies. The EPA had recognized the value of off-
cycle technologies recently by increasing the cap from 10 g/mi to 15 g/mi. This NPRM now
abruptly reverses this previous indication of the importance of developing innovative energy
saving technologies. Volkswagen advocates for keeping the off- cycle credit program and its cap
of 15 g/mi. If the EPA's intent is to simplify the methodologies to approve new technologies,
EPA should consider adding previously proven technologies to the off-cycle credit menu and
adjusting the caps as appropriate for the additional technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0669, p. 5]
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
VCC believes it is important to continue flexibilities (air conditioning credits for ZEVs and
off- cycle credits for ICE vehicles) because low AC emissions and AC efficiency are
environmental improvements. EPA should continue these programs and develop a new process
so that pure ZEV companies receive these credits without resulting in an overall negative C02
result. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, p. 4]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
The following comments relate to the proposed changes to credit generation:
- ZETA supports the phaseout of off cycle credit generation by MY 2031. While a useful
policy tool to promote marginal technological improvements to vehicle efficiency, the urgency in
needing to reduce emissions from LMDVs warrants removing such programs that enable more
tailpipe emissions. We believe the urgent need to reduce GHG emissions and prevent the worst
effects of climate change warrants EPA accelerating the timeline to end offcycle credit
generation by MY 2027. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 29]
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EPA Summary and Response
Off-cycle menu credits - general:
Summary:
The following organizations and companies recommend retaining existing off-cycle credits
through at least MY 2030 or MY 2032, with some suggesting a phase-out starting in MY 2031
or MY 2033.
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI), American Honda Motor Co., Inc (Honda), Dana
Incorporated, DENSO Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Hyundai America Technical Center,
Inc. (HATCI), Hyundai Motor America (HMA), International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), Kia Corporation, MECA
Clean Mobility, MEMA (The Vehicle Suppliers Associated), MEMA (The Vehicle Suppliers
Associated), Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA), Mitsubishi Motors North
America, Inc. (MMNA), National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA), Nissan North
America, Inc, Stellantis, Toyota Motor North America, Inc., Valero Energy Corporation,
Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., and Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
- AAI: AAI recommends that EPA maintain menu-based off-cycle credits and continue off-
cycle credits for both ICE vehicles and BEVs. AAI suggested that off-cycle credits should
not phaseout before MY 2032, at which time they project that at least 30% ICEVs will
continue to be sold in the fleet.
BMW proposes that rather than phase-out the off-cycle menu cap from 10 g/mile in MY
2027 to 0 g/mile in 2031, EPA should maintain a 10 g/mile cap which applies only to the
ICE vehicle portion of the fleet (including PHEVs).
Dana supports continuing an off-cycle technology credit program based on the success of
this program in encouraging the adoption of new technologies.
DENSO supports the continuation of the off-cycle technology credit program at its full
value through at least MY 2032.
Ford: Ford encourages EPA to consider continuing targeted off-cycle credits for both ICE
and EV technologies. If EPA discontinues certain off-cycle credits, the agency should
phase them out over time, much like the phase-out proposal for the menu- based credits.
HATCI: recommends that the off-cycle cap should remain at its current level (15 g/mile)
or should be phased out at a slower rate.
HMA: HMA agrees that a phase- out will eventually be appropriate but urges the EPA to
retain existing off-cycle credits through at least MY 2030. They would support a
phasedown of off-cycle credits for both ICE and PEVs beginning at 80% in MY 2031 and
60% in MY 2032.
Honda: Honda requests that the agency continue the existing off-cycle program at least
throughout MY 2032 and additionally requests EPA provide sufficient transparency that
its inclusion is not offset by a corresponding stringency increase.
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UAW: Any adjustments to the regulatory credit system should prioritize promoting
advanced technology production domestically and recognizing the economic, social, and
environmental benefits of a resilient domestic supply chain.
Kia: Kia opposes EPA's proposal to phase out and eventually eliminate off-cycle
technology credits by MY 2031. While Kia agrees that a phase-out of off-cycle credits
will eventually be appropriate, they urge the EPA to retain existing off-cycle menu-based
credits through at least 2032. Kia made investments in these technologies and would
appreciate the opportunity to earn a return on investment (ROI). EPA's proposed
immediate phase down in MY2027 will hurt their ROI, stranding investments and
potentially foregoing potential emissions benefits. Kia recommends off-cycle credits be
continued and any eventual phasedown should be much slower than proposed.
MECA: Off-cycle credits provide real-world emission benefits and should continue to be
offered.
MEMA: MEMA recommends EPA maintain off-cycle credits at full value through 2032
for all vehicle types, including ZEV, and consider additional ways emerging technologies
that reduce ZEV energy consumption can be rewarded.
MMNA: Maintain the existing GHG program flexibilities, such as Off-Cycle technologies
credits (including the alternative method to apply off-cycle credits) and allow previously
approved technologies to continue receiving credits.
NADA: NADA opposes EPA's proposals to sunset the off-cycle credits program
Nissan: Nissan opposes phase-out of off-cycle credits and requests the off-cycle credit cap
be maintained at 15 g/mile.
Stellantis: Stellantis recommends that EPA retain the credit for off-cycle GHG
technologies that will continue to reduce real-world GHG emissions on ICE and EV
product without artificially ramping down credit prematurely. The ongoing and already
incurred investment and costs of GHG saving off-cycle technologies in the fleet have led
to real world benefits.
Toyota: Off-cycle credits encourage the continued use of these technologies with
commensurate benefits to consumers, the environment and further innovation. Toyota has
invested billions of dollars in off-cycle technologies which have saved over approximately
100 million tons of C02 emissions from our products.
Valero: Valero recommends that EPA retain the off-cycle credits program, at least for the
ICE vehicles for which this was intended. Moreover, EPA should consider expanding the
program to provide for recognition of lifecycle emissions reductions based on use of fuel-
related measures such as low-carbon renewable fuels and carbon sequestration.
Volkswagen: Volkswagen has invested in off-cycle technologies, and advocates for
keeping the off- cycle credit program and its cap of 15 g/mile. If the EPA's intent is to
simplify the methodologies to approve new technologies, EPA should consider adding
previously proven technologies to the off-cycle credit menu and adjusting the caps as
appropriate for the additional technologies.
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VCC: VCC believes it is important to continue flexibilities (air conditioning credits for
ZEVs and off- cycle credits for ICE vehicles) because low AC emissions and AC
efficiency are environmental improvements.
The following organizations and companies support removing off-cycle credits on an
accelerated timeline ending with 0 g/mile prior to MY 2031, with some organizations and
companies recommending an earlier phase-out of off-cycle credits.
California Air Resources Board (CARB), California Attorney General's Office, et al.,
Environmental, and Public Health Organizations, International Council on Clean Transportation
(ICCT), Lucid Group, Inc., Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), National Association
of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA), Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management
(NESCAUM) and the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC), Rivian Automotive, LLC, Southern
Environmental Law Center (SELC), Tesla, Inc., and Zero Emission Transportation Association
(ZETA)
CARB supports U.S. EPA's proposal to phase out the off-cycle program. New vehicles
have lower GHG emissions and have incorporated technologies that target similar areas of
emission reductions thereby reducing the opportunities for some of the off-cycle
technologies, and therefore credit levels are becoming increasingly less representative of
the actual emission reductions provided by the off-cycle technologies.
CARB additionally submitted evidence the credit levels are less representative of the
emission reductions provided by off-cycle technologies. Specifically, CARB assessed
vehicles equipped with idle start-stop, finding that the total percentage of idle time with
the engine off was 9.38 percent, which was significantly lower than the value used under
the original assumptions of the TSD (87.75 percent).
California Attorney General's Office, et al.: The States and Cities support EPA's
Proposal to phase out off-cycle credits.
Environmental, and Public Health Organizations strongly urge EPA not to renew any
part of the off-cycle credit program after MY 2026. They state that the program will cause
significant fleet emissions increases even though it no longer achieves any of its purposes.
There is no reasonable basis for carrying any part of the program forward beyond 2026,
and doing so would be arbitrary and capricious.
ICCT: ICCT strongly supports EPA's proposal to phase out off-cycle credits given to
automakers for technologies that are not captured in the test cycle and that previously
were considered novel but now are fully commercialized. In particular, ICCT supports
EPA's proposal to phaseout off-cycle credits by MY 2031. Evidence suggests that the
menu credit values of these technologies (such as solar and thermal load control)
overestimate the real-world impact of these technologies.
Lucid urges the agency to eliminate the off-cycle program as proposed, or on an
accelerated timeline ending with Og/mile prior to MY 2031, and to eliminate the 5-cycle
and public process pathways starting in MY 2027.
MPCA: The MPCA agrees with EPA's proposal to phase out off-cycle credits. While
useful to encourage manufacturers to invest in improved technology in earlier phases of
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EPA's greenhouse gas vehicle emissions standards, they no longer provide substantive
benefit, and it is appropriate to sunset these programs.
NACAA: NACAA supports the agency's proposal to phase out, between 2027 and 2030,
the off-cycle credit program for LDVs and MDVs.
NESCAUM: supports EPA's proposal to sunset the off-cycle credits program for both
LDVs and MDVs and suggest EPA consider whether shorter timeframes are appropriate.
Rivian welcomes the proposal to phase out the off-cycle program but encourages EPA to
end off-cycle crediting for all vehicles in MY 2027—both ICEs and BEVs. Rivian
believes that evidence supports an end to off-cycle crediting for all vehicles in MY 2027.
Further, Rivian encourages the agency to pursue and maintain parity between BEVs and
ICEs in the elimination of all off-cycle credits.
SELC: supports EPA's proposal to phase out off-cycle credits. It is often difficult to
verify that off-cycle technologies provide the emissions reductions claimed, and this
becomes more of a concern as vehicles become less polluting overall.
Tesla: Tesla recommends eliminating off-cycle crediting for all types of vehicles starting
in Model Year 2027.
- ZETA: ZETA supports the phaseout of off cycle credit generation by MY 2031. While a
useful policy tool to promote marginal technological improvements to vehicle efficiency,
the urgency in needing to reduce emissions from LMDVs warrants removing such
programs that enable more tailpipe emissions.
Response:
EPA has considered the wide range of comments on off-cycle credits. After further
considering the off-cycle credits program in the context of our final light-duty GHG standards,
EPA agrees with the auto industry commenters who raised the concern that the proposed phase-
down of the off-cycle credits would contribute to a challenging transition in meeting the
standards especially in the early years of the program. We also understand the auto
manufacturers points that they have invested in off-cycle technologies and these credits represent
an additional option to reduce C02 emissions under the standards for the early years of the
program.
At the same time, EPA also agrees with commenters who raised concerns that the off-cycle
credit values may be too generous, especially for vehicles in the MY 2032 and later time frame
when the standards are the lowest CO2 grams per mile level. In recognition of both of these
concerns, EPA is finalizing an extension of the phase-out of the off-cycle credits menu cap, as
follows (and further described in preamble Section III.C.6). EPA is finalizing a phase-out of
menu credits over the MY 2030-2033 timeframe as a reasonable way to bring the program to an
end. After considering the public comments, EPA is extending the phase-out of off-cycle menu
credits, compared to our proposal, to provide a longer transition period. EPA believes the slower
phase-out schedule will provide additional pathways for reducing CO2 emissions for
manufacturers who have made substantial use off cycle credits in their product planning. The
extended phase-out schedule also will address lead time in the early years of the program. We
believe this phase-out schedule is an appropriate way to address concerns that the off-cycle
credits may not be reflective of the real-world emissions impact of the off-cycle technologies, by
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scaling back the menu cap in MYs 2031-2032, and eliminating off-cycle credits altogether in
MY 2033 and beyond. Specifically, instead of the proposed menu cap phase-out of 10/8/6/3/0
g/mile in MYs 2027-2031, EPA is finalizing provisions that retain the 10 g/mile menu cap
through MY 2030, with a phase-out of 8/6/0 g/mile in MYs 2031-2033. The final phase-out of
the menu cap is shown in the following Table:
Off-cycle menu credit cap phase down, final program, expressed in CO2 g/mile
MY
Off-cycle Menu Credit Cap
2027
10.0
2028
10.0
2029
10.0
2030
10.0
2031
8.0
2032
6.0
2033 and later
0.0
5-cycle and public process pathway off-cycle credits:
Summary:
The following organizations and companies recommend retaining the existing 5-cycle and
public process pathway methodologies:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI), BMW of North America, LLC (BMW NA),
DENSO, Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI), Hyundai Motor America (HMG),
Kia, MECA Clean Mobility, Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA), and Toyota.
AAI: AAI recommends that EPA retain the 5-cycle method for the same period of time as
the menu-based credits. For vehicles that have 5-cycle and alternative method off-cycle
credits approved prior to MY 2027 that remain in production in MY 2027 and later, Auto
Innovators recommends that off-cycle credit continue to be granted (i.e., carry-over). If
this is EPA's intent (or final decision), clarifying text should be added to the regulation.
Alternatively, EPA should consider adding previously approved technologies to the off-
cycle credit menu and adjusting the caps as appropriate for the additional technologies.
Furthermore, AAI recommends that EPA should follow through under the current
regulation and complete action on all submitted applications for alternative method
credits.
BMW suggests that EPA continue to allow credits for those vehicles with alternative
pathway credits approved prior to MY 2027.
DENSO urges EPA to follow through to complete action on all submitted applications for
5-cycle and alternative pathway applications. Denso also suggests that EPA consider
adding previously approved technologies to the off- cycle credit menu and adjusting the
caps as appropriate for the additional technologies.
HATCI: HATCI opposes the proposal to eliminate the 5-cycle and the alternative credit
pathways by MY 2027 and believes the non-menu pathways offer valuable GHG
reductions. Without the credit incentives for innovative GHG technologies, manufacturers
may be less inclined to develop and invest in off-cycle credits (OCC) technologies,
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leading to increased ICE emissions, particularly in the early stages of consumer ZEV
adoption when ICE vehicles are still dominant.
If EPA decides to eliminate the 5-cycle and alternative credit pathways, HATCI suggests
all credits approved through these pathways prior to the start of the new rule be transferred
to the menu from MY 2027 and the menu cap be adjusted accordingly. Furthermore, EPA
should review and approve/reject all pending alternative pathway applications by June 1,
2025, and from MY 2027 move those technologies and the corresponding credit values to
the menu.
Kia: Kia recommends that EPA keep the 5-cycle and alternative method process off-cycle
pathways through MY 2032. If EPA does eliminate the 5-cycle and alternative method
process off-cycle pathways starting in MY 2027, they further recommend that EPA (a)
follow through under the current regulation and complete action on all submitted
applications, no later than June 1, 2025, (b) add technologies approved through the 5-
cycle and alternative off-cycle pathways to the off-cycle credit menu, and (c) if an
automaker has off-cycle credits approved through the alternative or 5-cycle method prior
to MY 2027 and that vehicle remains in production after MY 2027, the credit continues to
be granted.
MECA: MECA understands EPA's rationale in its decision to simplify and eliminate the
off-cycle credit process by removing the 5-cycle pathway and phasing out the credits, but
requests that the agency retain the five-cycle pathway.
MMNA: Maintain the existing GHG program flexibilities, such as Off-Cycle technologies
credits (including the alternative method to apply off-cycle credits).
Toyota: Toyota recommends that all previously approved 5-cycle and alternative method
credits be added to the menu, and that the cap be increased.
The following organizations and companies recommend eliminating the existing 5-cycle and
public process pathways starting in MY 2027.:
California Air Resources Board (CARB) and Environmental, and Public Health
Organizations.
CARB: CARB supports U.S. EPA's proposal to eliminate the 5-cycle and public process
pathways for OEMs to obtain off-cycle credits starting in the 2027 MY.
Environmental, and Public Health Organizations: EPA points out that since 2021, the
5-cycle process has led to no new credits, and only one manufacturer has used it since
2012. As to the notice-and-comment pathway, EPA states that it has resulted in the award
of only a few small credits since 2021. We agree that these programs should not be
renewed.
Response
EPA disagrees with commenters who suggested that we should retain the additional two
pathways to generate off-cycle credits (i.e., the 5-cycle and public process pathways). In EPA's
experience in implementing the off-cycle credits program, there have been few 5-cycle credit
demonstrations, and the public process pathway has been challenging due to the complexity of
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demonstrating real-world emissions reductions for technologies not listed on the menu. The
public process pathway was used successfully by several manufacturers for high efficiency
alternators, resulting in EPA adding this technology to the off-cycle menu in a prior rulemaking,
beginning in MY 2021. The public process pathway program has resulted in a number of
concepts for potential off-cycle technologies over the years, but few have been implemented, at
least partly due to the difficulty in demonstrating the quantifiable real-world emissions
reductions associated with using the technology. Many credits sought by manufacturers have
been relatively small (less than 1 g/mile). Manufacturers have commented that the process takes
too long, but the length of time is often associated with the need for additional data and
information or issues regarding whether a technology is eligible for credits. Therefore, EPA is
finalizing its proposal to eliminate the 5-cycle and the public process pathways for off-cycle
credits beginning in MY 2027.
With regard to comments that EPA should add to the off-cycle credits menu all previously
approved 5-cycle and public process pathway credits with an associated increase in the cap, EPA
disagrees. Likewise, EPA disagrees that further action on other submitted applications is
warranted. The few credits that have been approved under the 5-cycle and public process
pathways have been specific to individual vehicle models and EPA does not have sufficient data
on the real-world emissions impact of these technologies across a wide range of vehicle
segments which would be necessary to assess an appropriate menu credit for these technologies.
Further, EPA notes that commenters did not provide such data.
Applicability to BEV and PHEVs:
Summary:
The following companies and organizations recommend the full availability of off-cycle
credits be retained for BEVs and/or PHEVs:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI), Betsy Cooper, Dana Incorporated, DENSO, Ford,
Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI), MEMA (The Vehicle Suppliers Associated),
Porsche Cars North America (PCNA), Stellantis, and Toyota.
- AAI: Auto Innovators opposes EPA's proposal to limit off-cycle credits to only ICE-
equipped vehicles and believes that off-cycle credits should not be adjusted for PHEVs to
address electric vs. ICE operation. For BEVs, AAI further recommends that negative
emissions of individual BEV electric vehicle should be handled at the fleet average level
rather than the individual model. For PHEVs, AAI questions whether making adjustments
in emissions using the vehicle's utility factor is worth the complexity added for regulated
stakeholders, EPA compliance staff, and EPA staff preparing public reports to describe
the use of such provisions.
AAI also notes that the proposed regulatory text does not properly describe the procedure
for applying the adjustment for PHEVs.
Betsy Cooper: The EPA should give full off-cycle credit to PHEVs with adequate range,
particularly to incentivize car manufacturers to develop longer range PHEVs.
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Dana recommends EPA continue to offer off-cycle credits for BEVS, PHEVS, FEVs, and
other ZEVs. Such off-cycle technologies could help reduce battery use and therefore
lower the amount of electricity used to power ZEVs.
DENSO requests EPA to reconsider its proposal to eliminate off- cycle credits for
electrified vehicles. Off-cycle credits for technologies applied across all powertrain types
encourage their continued use with commensurate benefits to consumers and the
environment.
Ford: Ford encourages EPA to consider continuing targeted off- cycle credits for both
ICE and EV technologies.
HATCI: HATCI recommends that ZEVs remain a part of the OCC program. Although
ZEVs have no tailpipe emissions, if an off cycle technology improves electrical energy
efficiency of the EV, that technology is providing a reduction in overall emissions.
HMA: Retaining existing off-cycle credits for BEVs through MY 2030 allows time for
industry to make gains in BEV technology, such as efficiency and price. In this way, off-
cycle credit opportunities will serve as a bridge to support compliance during this time.
MEMA: MEMA recommends EPA maintain off-cycle credits at full value through 2032
for all vehicle types, including ZEV, and consider additional ways emerging technologies
that reduce ZEV energy consumption can be rewarded.
PCNA: Porsche supports the continued allowance for electric vehicles to participate in the
off-cycle program and does not support the proposal from EPA to remove electric vehicles
beginning in model year 2027. Porsche recognizes that the current menu-based credit
system may not be appropriate for electric vehicles. As such, Porsche thinks it would be
reasonable for manufacturers to continue to be able to leverage the application type
pathway to seek off-cycle credits for EVs on a case-by-case basis.
Stellantis: EPA should retain credit for off-cycle GHG technologies that will continue to
reduce real-world GHG emissions on both ICE and EV products.
Toyota: Toyota recommends that BEVs and PHEVs be eligible for the off-cycle program,
as the efficiency of these vehicles can be improved through off-cycle technologies (e.g.
solar panels and solar thermal control technologies that improve efficiency and range).
The following companies and organizations recommend eliminating off-cycle credits for
BEVs and/or and PHEVs:
California Air Resources Board (CARB), Consumer Reports (CR), International Council on
Clean Transportation (ICCT), Rivian, Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC), and Tesla.
CARB: CARB believes scaling the off-cycle credit cap for PHEVs by the vehicle's
assigned utility factor is an appropriate approach.
CR supports EPA eliminating credits for EVs that could allow vehicles to achieve
compliance values below 0 g/mile, as they are not appropriate.
Environmental, and Public Health Organizations concur with EPA's determination
that off-cycle credits are inappropriate for BEVs for each of the reasons EPA states. They
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also concur with EPA that providing off-cycle credits for PHEVs exceeding their utility
factor is inappropriate.
ICCT: ICCT supports EPA's proposal to limit off-cycle credits to ICE vehicles. Off-cycle
credits are based on reduced tailpipe emissions from ICE vehicles, they are not applicable
to BEVs. Relatedly, ICCT supports the proposal to scale PHEV OC credits by the (newly
proposed) utility factor.
Rivian recommends EPA maintain parity between BEVs and ICEs in the elimination of
all off-cycle credits.
Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC): SELC supports EPA's proposal to
modify the off-cycle credit system to only include eligible vehicles (i.e., internal
combustion engine vehicles) in calculating the cap used for these types of credits until
they are phased out.
Tesla: Eliminate off-cycle crediting for all types of vehicles starting in MY 2027.
Response
EPA agrees with commenters who suggested that off-cycle credits should not apply to BEVs.
EPA is finalizing its proposal to limit eligibility of off-cycle credits to vehicles equipped with an
IC engine beginning in MY 2027; thus, BEVs will no longer be eligible for off-cycle credits
beginning in MY 2027. In response to automaker and automotive supplier comments that off-
cycle credits should continue to apply to BEVs, EPA disagrees. The off-cycle menu credits were
established based on potential emissions reductions from ICE vehicles and are not representative
of emissions reductions from BEVs. Further, EPA notes that it is concluding in this rule that it is
appropriate and consistent with the CAA to determine compliance with emissions standards
adopted under section 202 by reference to emissions from vehicles and engines. For these
reasons, we are also finalizing our proposal that manufacturers use a zero g/mile tailpipe
emissions compliance value for BEVs, as discussed in preamble Section III.C.7 and Section
3.1.5 of this RTC. Since off-cycle credits for BEVs do not reflect reductions in emissions from
the vehicles, we believe it is appropriate to end off-cycle credits for BEVs beginning in MYs
2027.
With regard to comments regarding the application of off-cycle credits to PHEVs, EPA is, for
similar reasons, finalizing its proposal to restrict the applicability of off-cycle credits for PHEVs
to the portion of vehicle operation when the engine is running, based on the vehicle's utility
factor. This calculation adjustment is appropriate to associate off-cycle credits only with ICE
operation beginning in MY 2027. See preamble Section III.C.6. The final rule includes a
corrected approach for applying the adjustment for PHEVs. Rather than applying the adjustment
to the maximum credit value that applies for a manufacturer's fleet, the final rule includes a per-
vehicle adjustment to reduce off-cycle credit quantities based on a PHEV's utility factor.
In addition, one commenter (Betsy Cooper) suggested that PHEVs should have a 50+ mile
PHEV range to qualify for full off-cycle credit. In response, EPA does not specify a PHEV range
requirement to qualify for any applicable off-cycle credits. Off-cycle credits for PHEVs would
be calculated as described in the paragraph above. However, we note that our finalized PHEV
utility factor curve (Section III.C.8 of the preamble) provides a natural incentive for more
capable PHEVs, with continuously higher utility factor values for vehicles with greater range,
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which reflects that such vehicles can be expected to be driven greater distances in charge
depleting mode.
Comments on regulatory text:
Summary:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI) made the following comments:
We oppose EPA's proposal to exclude ZEVs from off-cycle credits. However, if EPA decides
to finalize that proposal, we note that EPA has not proposed regulatory text that would exclude
zero-emission vehicles in MYs 2027 and later from the assessment of whether a credit cap has
been exceeded as described in the preamble.
Also, the proposed paragraphs (b)(2)(iii) and (b)(2)(iv) discuss comparing a calculated value
from (b)(2)(ii) to a given value in (b)(2)(v). However, the value derived in (b)(2)(ii) is in
megagrams, and the values in (b)(2)(v) are in grams per mile. We would agree that a conversion
can be calculated, but the text should be modified such that any comparison is made in consistent
units without the need to rely on otherwise undefined calculations.
Response
In response to the comment that EPA did not propose regulatory text to exclude zero emission
vehicles in MY 2027 and later, EPA notes that the proposed rule at 40 CFR 86.1869-12 included
the following statement in the introductory text: "Manufacturers may no longer generate credits
under this section starting in model year 2027 for vehicles deemed to have zero tailpipe
emissions and in model year 2031 for all other vehicles." For the final rule, we are delaying the
final implementation date from 2031 to 2033, and thus have updated this regulatory text, but we
are finalizing as proposed the phase-out of off-cycle credits for electric vehicles in MY 2027.
In response to AAI's comment on the regulatory text, 40 CFR 86.1869-12(b)(2)(iii) and (iv)
give an instruction to compare g/mile values between paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (v), without
reference to the megagram value in (b)(2)(ii). The instruction further explains that the megagram
cap in (b)(2)(ii) applies if the calculated g/mile fleet value exceeds the maximum allowable
credit value in g/mile. There is no conversion.
3.1.5 - 0 g/mi tailpipe emissions for ZEVs
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
F. Treatment of PEVs and FCEVs in the GHG Fleet Average
1. ZEV Emissions
The Proposed Rule continues EPA's practice of assigning a compliance value of zero grams
per mile of carbon-related exhaust emissions for BEVs and fuel cell electric vehicles, as well for
the electric portion of PHEVs, and makes this approach—which was originally scheduled to
expire in MY 2026—permanent.224 Auto Innovators reaffirms its support for basing compliance
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only on tailpipe emissions, rather than considering upstream emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.123-124]
224 See NPRM at 29252.
This approach is required by statute. Section 202(a) authorizes EPA to regulate the "emission
of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles."225 By definition,
"upstream emissions" from electricity-generating units do not originate "from" a class of
vehicles. Such upstream air pollutants thus cannot be included in emission standards. Nor does
section 202 permit EPA to impose any regulations on upstream emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 123-124]
225 42 U.S.C. §7521(a).
The recognition of zero tailpipe emissions from operation on electricity is also consistent with
the treatment of vehicle operation on all other fuels—emissions are measured at the tailpipe no
mater what fuel the vehicle is operating on, and upstream emissions are addressed at their
upstream sources. EPA has been regulating motor-vehicle emissions under section 202(a) since
1975, and in that time, has never included in its compliance standards any emissions occurring
during the production or transport of liquid fuels. Electricity should be treated no differently than
gasoline, ethanol, natural gas, or other fuels used in motor vehicles. We continue to support
EPA's approach in this regard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 123-124]
To be clear, the fact that EPA cannot—and should not—include upstream emissions in its
vehicle compliance calculations does not mean that the Agency cannot or should not consider
upstream emissions when evaluating the costs and benefits of the Proposed Rule more generally.
Indeed, consideration of upstream emissions and power generation effects is a crucial part of
determining whether the Proposed Rule is technologically feasible, reasonable, and supported by
the record evidence. As an "important aspect[s] of the problem,"226 EPA must consider these
issues to ensure that any final rule does not run afoul of the reasoned decision- making standard.
And indeed, EPA itself recognizes that it is appropriate to consider upstream emissions impacts
as a general mater.227 It is also common practice as a general mater for EPA to consider the
effects of a regulatory action even for topics that EPA cannot regulate via the proposed
action.228 The situation is no different here. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 123-124]
226 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'nv. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
227 See, e.g., NPRM at 29252, 29298, 29303-07, 29353-58, 29379-82.
228 As just one example, EPA regularly considers air quality-related impacts of its Steam Electric Power
Generating Effluent Guidelines issued under the Clean Water Act, even though EPA cannot directly
regulate air quality under that program. See, e.g., Supplemental Effluent Limitations Guidelines and
Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 88 Fed. Reg. 18824, 18874-76
(Mar. 29, 2023).
Organization: Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE)
AVE requests that EPA account for upstream emissions for all technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0631, pp.4-6]
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AVE urges EPA to include upstream emissions in ZEV calculations. The decision to omit this
from compliance calculations contradicts earlier assertions by the Agency and undermines
efforts by the automotive sector to plan appropriately. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
In 2010, EPA saw the need to limit the zero grams/mile accounting for BEVs. The Agency
not only foresaw the need to limit doing so in the future, but also capped the number of vehicles
for which each manufacturer could obtain a 0/grams/mile credit. 11 EPA also noted that although
regulatory programs existed to account for upstream emissions with the production and
distribution of fuels, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
11 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 88 / Friday, May 7, 2010 / at 25341
"[a]t this time, however, there is no such comprehensive program addressing upstream
emissions of GHGs, and the upstream GHG emissions associated with production and
distribution of electricity are higher than the corresponding upstream GHG emissions of gasoline
or other petroleum based fuels."12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
12 Ibid.
EPA went on to promise that "EPA will reassess the issue of how to address EVs, PHEVs,
and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCVs) in rulemakings for model years 2017 and beyond, based on
the status of advanced vehicle technology commercialization, the status of upstream GHG
control programs, and other relevant factors." 13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
13 Ibid.
In 2012, EPA reasserted a compliance value of 0 g/mile designation for EVs, FCVs, PHEVs
and extended the sales caps on manufacturers. Similarly, in 2010, EPA again saw the need to
address upstream emissions in the future for all these vehicles, but only for the sales that
exceeded the maximum sales caps. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
"Starting with MY 2022, the compliance value for EVs, FCVs, and the electric portion of
PHEVs in excess of individual automaker cumulative production caps must be based on net
upstream accounting. 14 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
14 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 199 / Monday, October 15, 2012 / at 62651
Despite acknowledging the need to account for the upstream emissions, EPA has never
incorporated upstream emissions from electricity generation as a compliance factor for these
vehicles. Now, with little explanation, EPA is proposing to ignore upstream emissions for BEVs
in perpetuity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
"EPA is also proposing that the requirement for upstream emissions accounting for BEVs and
PHEVs as part of a manufacturer's compliance calculation, which under the current regulations
would begin in MY 2027, would be removed under the proposed program; thus, BEVs would
continue to be counted as zero grams/mile in a manufacturer's compliance calculation as has
been the case since the beginning of the light-duty GHG program in MY 2012."15 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
15 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 87 / Friday, May 5, 2023 / at 29197
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Congress has repeatedly seen the need to employ lifecycle assessments for future compliance
standards and has asked EPA to look beyond a vehicle's tailpipe when analyzing GHG
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
"Vehicle Emissions Lifecycle Analysis. — The Committee encourages the Agency to build
upon its efforts to develop standardized modeling to evaluate the full lifecycle of all vehicle
technologies and transportation fuels by integrating full lifecycle analysis accounting into new
vehicle standards aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The Agency is also encouraged to
coordinate with other federal agencies that are conducting similar lifecycle models for vehicles
to best understand the full impact of standards seeking to reduce greenhouse gas emissions." 16
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
16 H. Rept. 117-400 - Department Of The Interior, Environment, & Related Agencies Appropriations Bill,
2023 at P.86
Continuing to focus solely on tailpipe emissions for future standards also disregards President
Biden's January 25, 2021, Executive Order, in which he stressed the need for environmental
standards to account for all GHG. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
"Sec. 5. Accounting for the Benefits of Reducing Climate Pollution, (a) It is essential that
agencies capture the full costs of greenhouse gas emissions as accurately as possible, including
by taking global damages into account. Doing so facilitates sound decision- making, recognizes
the breadth of climate impacts, and supports the international leadership of the United States on
climate issues." 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
17 7040 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 14 / Monday, January 25, 2021 / Presidential Documents
Accounting for upstream emissions is consistent with our environmental goals, technology
neutrality, and global carbon neutrality goals. More importantly, by including upstream
emissions for compliance purposes, EPA will avoid unintentionally promoting inefficiencies
with ZEVs. Counting upstream emissions will promote cleaner and more efficient components
for all vehicle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
ZEVs will continue to require efficiency improvements away from the tailpipe that reduce
C02 production and energy intensity. If BEVs do indeed become the predominant vehicle
technology on U.S. roads, even small efficiency gains could have a large impact. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
We support a transition from a tailpipe-based standard to a more complete life-cycle
assessment. This approach is consistent with technology neutrality and will allow the U.S. to
truly reach its environmental goals by promoting cleaner and more efficient technologies. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 4-6]
AVE requests that EPA finalize a rule that is genuinely technology neutral. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0631, p. 6]
The Proposal sets out to incentivize specific technologies, including BEVs and FCVs. AVE
supports the development of these important technologies and all relevant technologies to
address the urgent need to decarbonize the transportation sector. An incentive for one technology
can disincentivize other technologies and stifle innovation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p.
6]
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An example of the unintended consequences of earlier incentives is that they led to the
upsizing of the U.S. fleet and saw the manufacturing of vehicles with larger footprints. Prior to
2010, passenger car sales were above or close to 50% of all vehicle sales. Today, passenger cars
are less than 25% of all new sales. Clearly, this was not the intent of EPA and NHTSA when
they set standards in 2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 6]
The environmental group American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy recently
echoed this obvious concern: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 6]
The Environmental Protection Agency should explore ways to factor EV efficiency into fuel-
efficiency and greenhouse gas standards, starting with accounting for EVs' upstream emissions.
At the moment, regulators calculate the emissions from gasoline vehicles and set requirements
for automakers, but EVs are counted as causing no C02 emissions. This means the sale of an EV
Hummer can offset the sale of a highly polluting gasoline vehicle and increase emissions overall.
Accounting for upstream emissions would mean that the sale of a more efficient EV would be
more advantageous for automakers to meet their regulatory requirements. All EVs do not have
the same impact on the environment, and our vehicle regulations should reflect that. 18 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 6]
18 https://www.aceee.org/blog-post/2022/06/9000-pound-electric-hummer-shows-we-cant-ignore-
efficiency-evs
Instead of crediting specific technologies, EPA should create a credit program that promotes
cleaner and more efficient vehicles and the development of components that can reduce C02
emissions in all vehicles. Such a strategy will encourage technology investments in ALL vehicle
platforms that significantly reduce C02. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 6]
Suppliers have invested heavily in developing technologies that will significantly improve
efficiency and lower the emissions of LD and MD vehicles; gasoline direct injection, cylinder
deactivation, and advanced turbo charging are just a few of the technologies that can greatly
reduce the emissions footprint of the U.S. fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 6]
These options, along with other technologies like mild hybrid systems, advanced
aftertreatment, and emission control systems, could bring further significant improvements to
internal combustion engines (ICE) vehicles if GHG regulations were more results driven.
Without support for engine improvements, manufacturers are less likely to deploy these
technologies in future ICE offerings. As a result, we will miss the opportunity to make sizable
C02 and criteria pollutant reductions today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 6]
Compliance pathways that incentivize increased use of renewable fuels, advanced emission
control technologies, and new internal combustion platforms will lead to greater adoption of
cost-effective technologies that are available today, not eight to ten-years from now. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 6]
Organization: American Coalition for Ethanol (ACE)
What's more, EPA lacks the authority to ignore upstream emissions for BEVs. The Agency
has authority under 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) to prescribe "standards applicable to the emission of
any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,
which in its judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
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to endanger public health or welfare." If BEVs are not "vehicles" "which cause, or contribute to,
air pollution," then EPA may not set standards for them. If BEVs are "vehicles" "which cause, or
contribute to, air pollution," then EPA must account for those emissions, which in the case of
BEVs come from upstream electricity generating units. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, p. 3]
Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
EPA should implement upstream accounting to encourage BEV Efficiency
EPA proposes to continue, and make permanent, the treatment of electric vehicles as entirely
zero emission vehicles (ZEVs)(FR 29252). While it is true that BEVs generate no emissions at
the tailpipe, charging these vehicles does create emissions upstream. The major flaw with
ignoring refueling emissions is that EPA loses the opportunity to influence the efficiency of a
growing component of the vehicle market. EPA is both empowered and required to regulate the
emissions from on-road light duty vehicles. Given that BEVs are expected to reach the majority
of new sales within this decade, 13 it is imperative we address their emissions. Using the rule to
improve BEV efficiency will accomplish this. Upstream accounting in compliance is a simple
and effective way to promote efficiency. It recognizes that different BEVs, by virtue of their
wide range of efficiencies, are responsible for different levels of emissions from our still fossil
fuel-based electricity grid. EPA's GHG standards for LDVs have historically led to innovations
in emissions reduction technology and design for ICEVs and the same should be true in an all-
electric future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 4-6]
13 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-
announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/
Our own analysis shows that even among BEVs of the same vehicle type and weight there can
be considerable differences in efficiency and, therefore, upstream emissions, as shown in Figure
1.14 Not all BEVs are created equal and there is still plenty of room for innovation and
emissions improvements in the BEV market. The fact that BEVs with curb weights of 5,000
pounds can have efficiencies varying from under 2.5 mi/kWh to over 4 mi/kWh demonstrates
how important it is that these standards continue their historical role in advancing automotive
innovation as we electrify. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 4-6]
14 https://www.aceee.org/blog-post/2023/04/boosting-ev-efficiency-would-cut-emissions-and-reduce-
strain-grid
[See original for graph titled "Figure 1. Efficiency versus weight in model year 2023 BEVs"]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 4-6]
By our calculations, if upstream accounting, or another mechanism, led to a 3% annual
growth in BEV efficiency over the life of the standards, lifetime emissions from MY 2027- 2032
vehicles would be reduced by over 170 million metric tons under both the proposed standards
and Alternative 1. This does not include the benefits from vehicles sold from model year 2033
onwards that would take advantage of advancements in efficiency technologies and designs
potentially spurred by this standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 4-6]
Greater BEV efficiency has a number of benefits beyond just reducing upstream emissions.
Greater BEV efficiency can allow a vehicle to go the same distance with a smaller battery,
effectively reducing the use of high-demand minerals and the emissions generated from vehicle
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production (the calculations discussed above do not account for these emissions reductions
impacts from improved BEV efficiency). While BEVs are certainly still better from an emissions
perspective than their equivalent ICEV when looking at the entire life-cycle, it is still important
to reduce their environmental impact. Mineral supply and battery manufacturing capacity also
have the potential to be limiting factors for rapid electrification, so reducing battery needs per
vehicle by increasing efficiency can facilitate achievement of the MY 2027-2032 standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 4-6]
Greater BEV efficiency also means a smaller impact on our electricity grid and drivers'
wallets, as less electricity is needed to drive the same distance. 15 If all LDVs on the road were
electric and had an average efficiency equivalent to the highest-efficiency vehicle on the market
today, we could save enough electricity annually to power 21 million homes. Full on- road
fleetwide electrification is not expected for decades so this improvement in BEV efficiency is
feasible and could even be surpassed if incentivized by the standards. 16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0642, pp.4-6]
15 https://www.aceee.org/blog-post/2022/09/evs-surge-utilities-need-transparent-equitable-comprehensive-
plans-support-them
16 https://www.aceee.org/blog-post/2023/04/boosting-ev-efficiency-would-cut-emissions-and-reduce-
strain-grid
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
EPA exacerbates that arbitrarily selective approach in the proposed rule's method for
measuring compliance. EPA proposes to determine whether manufacturers' fleets meet the new
standards based solely on their tailpipe emissions—disregarding the other downstream and all
upstream emissions caused by producing and operating vehicles. EPA's proposal thus would
skew producers' and purchasers' incentives toward electric vehicles even though they may
increase emissions overall. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 5]
Given those serious problems, EPA would not be justified in adopting the proposed rule even
if it would substantially benefit the environment. But EPA has not even shown that the new
standards would achieve that goal. In evaluating the proposed rule's impact on net emissions,
EPA understates emissions from producing and powering electric vehicles ("upstream"
emissions). It counts only emissions from producing electricity or fuel—failing to consider the
substantially greater emissions incurred producing electric vehicles and their components
compared to conventional vehicles—and improperly discounts the emissions it does
consider. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 5]
EPA's Analysis Of Net Emissions Is Flawed
EPA estimates that the proposed rule will result in a net reduction of GHG, criteria air
pollutant, and air toxic emissions in 2055. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,198. That estimate is dubious.
In numerous ways, EPA has underestimated the up- stream emissions—i.e., those that do not
come from the vehicle itself but can still be attributed to its manufacture and operation—that will
result from a widespread shift to electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 55-56]
First, EPA improperly cabins its upstream analysis to only those emissions caused by
electricity generating units ("EGUs") and refineries. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,198, 29,347, 29,353,
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29,355; Draft RIA at 9-32-33. But the emissions associated with powering a vehicle—whether
by electricity from an EGU or fuel from a refinery—are far from the only ones reasonably
attributed to its operation. Depending on the vehicle, there are also emissions associated with
producing, recycling, and disposing of batteries; operating charging infrastructure; and
extracting, refining, transporting, and storing petroleum fuels. These emissions can be substantial
and, when considered together, may undermine EPA's assumption that swapping internal-
combustion-engine vehicles for electric ones will necessarily result in an environmental good.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 55-56]
The International Energy Agency's discussion of emissions from mining illustrates this point.
According to the IEA, "the production and processing of energy transition minerals are energy-
intensive" and involve "relatively high emission[s]." Role of Critical Minerals at 15, 130; see
also Charging Infrastructure Challenges for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Fleet, Am. Transp. Rsch.
Inst., https://tinyurl.com/3ktjd85v ("Mining and processing produce considerable C02 and
pollution issues."). For this reason, producing an electric vehicle is a more carbon-intensive
process than producing a conventional one. Role of Critical Minerals at 194. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683, pp. 55-56]
EPA never explains why emissions from EGUs and refineries are the only ones relevant to the
analysis. Instead, it acknowledges that "[t]he upstream emissions inventory does not account for
all upstream sources related to vehicles, fuels, and electricity generation, such as charging
infrastructure, storage of petroleum fuels, battery manufacture, etc." Draft RIA at 8-14. But EPA
makes no attempt to justify that selective, incomplete approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, pp. 55-56]
Moreover, EPA's current position marks a change from settled agency practice. In earlier
GHG and criteria-pollutant rulemakings, the agency did consider additional upstream sources in
assessing net emissions. See SAFE Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars
and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174, 24,872 (Apr. 30, 2020) (noting that emissions "model
accounts for upstream emissions" from "extraction, transportation, refining, and distribution of. .
. fuel"); Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106, 57,301 (Sept. 15, 2011) ("To project
these impacts, EPA estimated the impact of reduced petroleum volumes on the extraction and
transportation of crude oil as well as the production and distribution of finished gasoline and
diesel."); Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-
Duty Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478, 73,852 (Oct. 25, 2016) ("To project
these impacts, Method B estimated the impact of reduced petroleum volumes on the extraction
and transportation of crude oil as well as the production and distribution of finished gasoline and
diesel."). The agency has not acknowledged its change in position here, let alone explained "why
the new approach" of ignoring these upstream emissions "better comports with ... the provisions
that Congress enacted." Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. FLRA, 25 F.4th 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
That is reason enough to conclude that "the [agency] has not, in fact, engaged in reasoned
decision-making." Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Nor could EPA offer a
valid explanation for its change. Upstream emissions are more important in the current
rulemaking than they were in previous regulations given that EPA, for the first time, intends to
effectively mandate widespread adoption of electric vehicles, which (as explained above)
produce emissions primarily through upstream sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 56]
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The Method For Measuring Compliance Is Irrational
Under existing rules, beginning in model year 2027, manufacturers are required to account for
upstream emissions as part of their compliance calculation. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,197. But
under the proposed rule, EPA has explicitly changed course and would "remove[]" that
requirement—meaning that electric vehicles, rather than fairly reflecting their actual total
emissions, would "be counted as zero grams/mile in a manufacturer's compliance calculation."
Id. In other words, EPA proposes that vehicle compliance with the new standards be measured
solely by the grams of pollutants emitted from the tailpipe. Id. To survive arbitrary-and-
capricious review, EPA must provide a reasoned explanation for this change and show that there
are "good reasons" for its new policy. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 221
(2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). The proposed rule does not do so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683, p. 59]
First, EPA attempts to justify its change in position by explaining that it does not include
upstream emissions when calculating the compliance of internal-combustion-engine vehicles,
contending that the principle of equal treatment requires that it take the same approach for
electric vehicles. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,252. But that compares apples to oranges. These vehicle
technologies emit air pollutants in different ways. Internal-combustion-engine vehicles cause
emissions mostly from the tailpipe, whereas electric vehicles cause emissions mostly by other
means. The timing and manner of their respective emissions is thus fundamentally different.
Granularly focusing on tailpipe emissions would mean that almost none of the emissions from
electric vehicles are counted, while almost all of the emissions from vehicles with internal-
combustion vehicles are. If equal treatment is the goal, EPA must account for both types of
emissions when calculating compliance, rather than myopically focusing on tailpipe emissions,
which prejudges any analysis in favor of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p.
59]
Second, EPA states that it originally proposed including upstream emissions in compliance
calculations at a time when there was "little if any regulation" of those upstream sources for
GHGs, noting that this approach was "a departure from its usual practice of relying on stationary
source programs to address pollution risks from stationary sources." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,252.
Now that power-generation emissions are declining, EPA asserts that "manufacturers should not
account for upstream utility emissions" any longer. Id. That circular explanation assumes that the
only or principal reason to consider upstream emissions is to indirectly regulate the power-
generation industry itself—to make each unit of power generated by that industry cleaner. But as
EPA acknowledges elsewhere in the proposed rule, it designs vehicle-emissions standards to
force vehicle manufacturers to adopt technology that reduces the harmful emissions it is charged
with regulating. See, e.g., id. at 29,233. Thus, if a vehicle has no tailpipe emissions but massive
upstream emissions—e.g., from producing vehicles and their components, and from generating
increased amounts of electricity to operate them—incentivizing manufacturers to incorporate that
vehicle into their fleets would be contrary to the agency's stated goal. The increased regulation
of stationary sources will not solve this problem. Increased reliance on electric vehicles will
increase demand for the electricity that the power-generation industry produces, and
improvements in emissions per unit of power generated would not address the total increase in
emissions. Moreover, regulation of stationery sources will not capture many of the upstream
emissions associated with electric vehicles. As discussed above, operating charging
infrastructure and producing, recycling, and disposing of batteries all result in emissions. If
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upstream emissions are not included in the compliance calculation, these emissions may not be
accounted for at all. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 59-60]
EPA itself correctly recognized elsewhere in the proposed rule that upstream emissions are
relevant to its overall effort to address the "well-documented buildup of GHGs due to human
activities." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,207. For instance, when estimating the proposed rule's impact on
overall emissions, as well as the costs and benefits that it generates, EPA took into account at
least some (though far from all) relevant upstream emissions. In doing so, EPA acknowledged
that it would be irrational to adopt a rule that decreases downstream emissions but has the effect
of increasing overall emissions. The same principle applies here: It would be irrational to find a
manufacturer's fleet compliant if the vehicles within the fleet have lower tailpipe emissions but
cause emission of harmful pollutants in other ways that exceeds the levels permitted for tailpipe
emissions. EPA offers no explanation for this inconsistent approach to upstream emissions.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 59-60]
Moreover, factoring a broader set of emissions into the compliance calculation will not be
difficult or unduly burden EPA. The agency has already developed a method for attributing some
of these emissions to manufacturers. In its proposed rule, EPA explained that it initially planned
to take emissions from electricity generation into account by "attributing a pro rata share of
national C02 emissions from electricity generation to each mile driven under electric power
minus a pro rata share of upstream emissions associated with . . . gasoline production." 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29,252. That method remains available now. And EPA could develop similarly simple
and administrable techniques to account for other key sources of upstream emissions like battery
production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 60-61]
For all of these reasons, EPA's proposed method of calculating compliance is irrational. Any
final rule must comprehensively account for the emissions generated by electric vehicles to
ensure that EPA's solution (a widespread shift to electric vehicles) bears a rational connection to
its regulatory goal of reducing harmful emissions. Cf. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., 25 F.4th at 9
(faulting agency for failing to explain why the standard it adopted will address "the principal
problem the new standard is designed to fix"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 60-61]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
EPA both describes ZEVs as having "zero emissions"82 for purposes of compliance with its
standards and is "proposing to make the 0 g/mile treatment of ZEV operation a permanent part of
the program."83 If so, then EPA's proposed standards that apply to ZEVs do not apply "to the
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes vehicles ... that cause, or contribute to, air
pollution."84 In other words, EPA cannot have it both ways. It cannot claim to be regulating
emissions from ZEVs while at the same time considering such vehicles to have no emissions.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 22]
82 "As the term 'zero-emission vehicle' suggests, these cars and trucks have zero GHG and criteria
pollutant emissions from their tailpipes." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,187.
83 Id. at 29,251,
84 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
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C. In the Alternative, EPA Should Set Separate Emissions Standards for Each Vehicle
Class.
The Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to establish and revise standards for the emissions of air
pollutants from "any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines... .that
endanger public health or welfare" 111 Assuming for sake of argument EPA has authority to set
emissions standards for EVs, which we posit it does not, 112 EPA should promulgate distinct
emissions standards for each vehicle class on the basis of the vehicle's powertrain (e.g., diesel,
gasoline, natural gas, electricity). At a minimum, this would obligate EPA to abandon its position
that ZEVs are emission-less and account for upstream and other lifecycle emissions as the
agency envisioned in its 2012 rule. 113 This approach would ensure that EPA is regulating
relevant pollutants from specific vehicle classes and would promote a level playing field for
different vehicle technologies. 114 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 26]
11142 U.S.C.§ 7521(a)(1).
112 As discussed in Section III.A., supra, the CAA sec. 202 does not authorize EPA to regulate ZEV
emissions because EPA characterizes them as having "zero" emissions.
113 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,341 (May 7, 2010).
114 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(ii) ("In establishing classes or categories of vehicles or engines for purposes
of regulations under this paragraph, the Administrator may base such classes or categories on gross vehicle
weight, horsepower, type of fuel used, or other appropriate factors."). Although this section of CAA
Section 202 references "heavy-duty" vehicles, this applies to light-duty vehicles that weigh more than
6,000 lbs gross vehicle weight rating, such as light-duty heavy trucks, and if EPA has authority to set
emissions standards for EVs, the Clean Air Act does not otherwise limit EPA's discretion to expand its
classification of vehicles by fuel type.
ZEVs are entirely distinct from other classes of vehicles. Their powertrain design frontloads
emissions, meaning the air pollutants associated with these vehicles are emitted before operation
(i.e., during vehicle production and recharging). During operation, a ZEV experiences no direct
drivetrain emissions. In contrast, most emissions from ICEVs generally occur during operation,
not production and refueling. Such different emissions points require different regulatory
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 26]
As discussed above, because EPA may only prescribe standards applicable to vehicles that
"cause or contribute" to air pollution, its standards cannot account for ZEVs with no tailpipe
emissions. However, if EPA is authorized to promulgate such standards, those standards must
account for any upstream emissions from upstream electric generating units, the mining of
battery materials, and the production of the vehicle. 197 Without consideration of upstream and
full life- cycle impacts (e.g., frequent battery replacements), EPA has failed to inform the public
of the comparative costs of emission reductions, whether from ZEVs, ICEVs, energy efficiency,
or other sectors. EPA's continued failure to address this "major aspect of the problem" is another
example of EPA moving toward its predetermined outcome—the forced electrification of U.S.
transportation. 198 AFPM has continually put EPA on notice of the need to include a LCA to
avoid an arbitrary comparison—the agency continues to ignore this issue of central relevance to
EPA's benefit analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 42-44]
197 Proposed Rule at 29,353-55.
198 See, e.g., Comments of the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers on EPA's Reconsideration
of a Previous Withdrawal of a Waiver of Preemption 10 (July 6, 2021),
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https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0257-0139, Comments of the American Fuel
& Petrochemical Manufacturers onEPA's/NHTSA's Proposed The Safe Affordable Fuel-Efficient
Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks 68-73 (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.regulations.gOv/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0283-5698; Comments of the American Fuel
& Petrochemical Manufacturers on EPA's California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards;
Advanced Clean Trucks; Zero Emission Airport Shuttle; Zero Emission Power Train Certification; Request
for Waiver of Preemption 7-12 (Aug. 2, 2022), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022- 0331-0088.
For instance, the fuel source of a PEV, like a ZEV—a battery composed of carbon intensive
minerals and the electricity generated to power the battery—produces emissions. The fact that
emissions occur 100 percent upstream of the vehicle's operation and therefore fall outside of the
tailpipe emissions calculation does not make these emissions any less significant. There is no
logical basis for this omission because, as EPA is aware, concerns about GHG emissions relate
to their longer-term global concentrations. Consequently, air pollutant emissions are an
important consideration regardless of where such emissions occur. Without comparing lifecycle
ZEV emissions to lifecycle emissions from ICEVs, EPA cannot know if or how much its
standards are decreasing total emissions. Thus, while EPA is not required to solve all emissions
problems in one rulemaking, EPA cannot claim to be solving part of the problem here without
addressing upstream and downstream emissions. EPA's approach of mandating ZEVs cannot
possibly be reasonable if it is merely shifting emissions from one source to another at the cost of
hundreds of billions of dollars—trillions when costs to upgrade EV infrastructure are factored
in— or could do so more cost-effectively by choosing a different approach. 199 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp. 42-44]
199 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); cf. Antonin Scalia, "Regulatory Review and Management," Regulation
Magazine 19 (Jan./Feb. 1982) ("Is it conceivable that a rule would not be arbitrary or capricious if it
concluded with a statement to the effect that 'we are taking the foregoing action despite the fact that it
probably does more harm than good, and even though there are other less onerous means of achieving
precisely the same desirable results'?").
The flaw in EPA's approach is illustrated by the fact that emissions standards easily become
meaningless by changing the engine's location. The proposed rule would treat a ZEV charged by
a diesel-powered generator as if it had zero tailpipe emissions, notwithstanding the fact that it
remains "powered" by a diesel engine located outside the vehicle. A LDV directly powered by a
diesel engine inside the vehicle, however, is credited with the emissions produced by that engine.
EPA's inconsistent approach begs the question of how nascent technologies such as a vehicle
propelled by compressed air would be evaluated. Thus, the energy source of the "fuel" matters
and EPA arbitrarily ignores lifecycle emissions from ZEVs and also proposes to remove
requirements for upstream emissions calculations.200 EPA admits "the program has now been in
place for a decade, since MY 2012, with no upstream accounting and has functioned as intended,
encouraging the continued development and introduction of electric vehicle technology."201
EPA's mandate is to establish feasible standards rooted in the statute, not to ignore real-world
emissions to "encourage" the development of its favored technology. EPA requested comment
on whether it should account for upstream emissions for all fuel and vehicles. If technologies are
being treated equally, as they must, the answer is an unequivocal yes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 42-44]
200 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,197.
201 Id. at 29,253.
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EPA compounds this flaw by making unsupported assumptions regarding the total emissions
impacts of its Proposal. While it claims that the overall analysis for combined downstream and
upstream emissions "likely underestimates the net emissions reductions that may result" from the
Proposed Rule, EPA fails to offer a data-based substantiation. The Proposed Rule failed to assess
emissions from battery manufacturing or electricity production. EPA acknowledges that its
standards will increase the demand for electricity and that demand will simultaneously increase
emissions from the electric generating sector, but by making the unsupported assumption that
low carbon electricity will be readily available, it makes no real attempt to quantify those
emissions or compare them to alternative options for reducing emissions from this sector. EPA
must provide a more comprehensive analysis to comply with its directive under the Clean Air
Act and better assess the resulting impact of the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, pp. 42-44]
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
G. Additional items
The agency solicited public comment on a wide array of topics included in the proposed rule.
Below, Honda shares brief feedback on a few of these items. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652,
p. 29]
Upstream Emissions Accounting
In the proposed rule, the agency proposes to indefinitely exclude upstream emissions from
BEV compliance calculations: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 29]
EPA is also proposing that the requirement for upstream emissions accounting for BEVs and
PHEVs as part of a manufacturer's compliance calculation, which under the current regulations
would begin in MY 2027, would be removed under the proposed program; thus, BEVs would
continue to be counted as zero grams/mile in a manufacturer's compliance calculation as has
been the case since the beginning of the light-duty GHG program in MY 2012.48 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 29]
48 88 Fed. Reg. 29197 (May 5, 2023)
Honda strongly concurs with this position. Although full lifecycle accounting is necessary to
quantify emissions inventories, it is inappropriate to hold the auto industry accountable for
emissions that are beyond its control. As such, Honda supports a clear division of regulatory
responsibility between the auto and utility industries. Applying 0 g/mi upstream emissions
accounting for BEVs, FCEVs and the electric-operation portion of PHEVs is not only logically
appropriate but will encourage the transition toward greater levels of vehicle electrification.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 29]
Recommendation: Honda strongly urges the agency to indefinitely apply 0 g/mi upstream
emissions accounting for BEVs, FCEVs and the electric-operation portion of PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 29]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
ii. Zero emission vehicles also have emissions impacts.
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As with ICEVs, ZEVs7 have carbon emissions impact associated both with their production
and throughout their lifetime which EPA should incorporate in its analysis. While ZEVs can be
an important part of a diverse transportation future to reduce emissions, they do produce GHG
emissions. For instance, BEV production, use, and the disposal of BEV batteries, are not zero-
emission activities. Further, all fuels - whether conventional fuels or electricity - have associated
carbon emissions regardless of their source. A study conducted by Ricardo, which is included in
a report by the Transportation Energy Institute^ concludes that BEVs "have higher embedded
GHG emissions" and therefore carbon intensity of the electricity mix also plays a vital role in
defining the magnitude of carbon emissions in this phase. While meaningful reductions have
historically been accomplished by focusing on tailpipe emissions from the vehicle, the growing
market share of diffierent technologies that include significant upstream emissions warrant
inclusion of those emissions in the standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 5-6]
7 In these comments, "ZEV" refers broadly to PHEVs, FCEVs and BEV refers specifically to battery
electric vehicles.
8 Ricardo, Inc. "Life Cycle Analysis Comparison: Electric and Internal Combustion Engine Vehicles",
study prepared for the Transportation Energy Institute (formerly known as the Fuels Institute). January
2022. https://www.transportationenergy.org/research/reports/life-cycle-analysis-comparison-electric-and-
internlife- cycle-analysis-comparison-electric-and-intern.
We encourage the agency to not only acknowledge and address the emissions of ZEVs, but to
also continue to study the impacts. Failure to do both would be arbitrary and capricious. As noted
below in these comments, and in our comments on the Heavy-Duty GHG Phase 3 proposed
rule,9 we strongly recommend that EPA include both a readiness assessment prior to program
implementation as well as a program review once implementation begins. There will be C02
emissions associated with the production and use of BEVs, 10 and it is important to address these
emissions to provide a full picture of the emissions impacts and mitigation needs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 5-6]
9 API Comments on "Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles—Phase 3",
Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985-1423.
10 Kelly, J. et al., "Cradle-to-grave lifecycle analysis of U.S. light-duty vehicle-fuel pathways: a
greenhouse gas emissions and economic assessment of current (2020) and future (2030-2035)
technologies", June 2022, ANL- 22/27. Figure B.8. https://greet.es.anl.gov/publication-c2g_lca_us_ldv.
Organization: Arconic Corporation (ARCO)
In general, Arconic urges EPA to consider a few key points as it moves to finalize this
proposed rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, p. 2]
Arconic recommends including the upstream power generation emissions for BEV vehicles.
With that change, Arconic supports more stringent EPA standards in coordination with DOT
CAFE standards beyond the 2027-2032 range covered in this proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0741, p. 4]
EPA should include a fixed electric generation emission value per kWh in the standard for
calculation of vehicle emissions for battery electric vehicles (BEVs) based upon their energy
efficiency. This would provide an incentive for improved vehicle efficiency, and it would also
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allow the EPA rules to easily equate to the DOT CAFE standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0741, p. 2]
Emissions standards should correlate with passenger and pedestrian safety imperatives. If all
BEVs are counted as zero emission, irrespective of their size and weight, there is no incentive for
vehicle manufacturers to continue seeking weight reductions that clearly improve safety. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, p. 2]
Similarly, adding incentives for weight reduction for BEVs will correlate to reductions in
electricity use, reduced embedded emissions and reduced use of critical minerals that can be
difficult to produce in an environmentally friendly manner or recycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0741, p. 2]
Specifically, Arconic provides the following comments and recommendations:
1. In Section 7, EPA requests comments on the proposed treatment of electrified vehicles
in manufacturers compliance calculations. The proposed rule states that C02 emissions for a
battery electric vehicle (BEV) are zero. Emissions from power generation are not included in
BEV emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, pp. 2-3]
This is quite different from the current DOT CAFE rule, which uses Miles Per Gallon
equivalent (MPGe) to compare BEV efficiency with Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) and
hybrid vehicle efficiency. When it comes to environmental impact, the size, weight and
efficiency of the vehicle do matter: the most efficient BEV (Lucid Air) uses one third the energy
per mile as compared to a Hummer EV according to the CAFE MPGe ratings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0741, pp. 2-3]
EPA should include a fixed electric generation emission value per kWh for MY 2027- 2032 in
the standard for calculation of vehicle emissions for BEV vehicles, based upon their efficiency.
The emissions associated with generating 33.7 kWh of electricity (or 23.16 kWh/gal if 10 CFR
Part 474 (EERE-2021-VT-0033) is enacted) could be used along with the MPGe values from
vehicle testing to get the g/mile C02 emissions for any BEV. This would provide an incentive
for improved vehicle efficiency. It would also allow the EPA rules to easily equate to the DOT
CAFE standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, pp. 2-3]
As currently formulated, the proposed policy would not encourage more energy efficient BEV
vehicles. Larger, heavier, less aerodynamic vehicles require higher capacity batteries which
consume more critical minerals, more electricity and its associated emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0741, pp. 2-3]
We understand the argument that current ICE based standards do not include emissions for
gasoline production. However, the bulk of the emissions for an ICE vehicle come from burning
gasoline while the bulk of the emissions for an EV come from electricity generation - both of
which are captured effectively in the MPG/MPGe rating. Therefore, utilizing MPG/MPGe
ratings would provide a meaningful measure of efficiency that customers and manufacturers can
act upon and would result in reduced emissions overall. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, pp. 2-
3]
Arconic suggests revising the definition of emissions for BEVs to include the upstream power
generation emissions. Revising this definition would likely require some modification to the
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yearly emissions targets. With targets modified in this manner, Arconic does not have a position
on the trajectory (i.e., the levels of year-over-year stringency rates) in this rule making. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, pp. 3-4]
Organization: BorgWarner Inc.
BorgWarner urges EPA to consider new emission metrics for zero emission vehicles (ZEVs)
that benefit and develop new efficiency improvements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 6-
7]
Defining vehicle emissions exclusively at the tailpipe creates a de facto technology mandate
and excludes technologies that could make a timely real-world difference in C02 emissions.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 6-7]
BorgWarner supports EPA moving beyond analyzing vehicle emissions only at the tailpipe
and proposes that EPA incorporate accounting of upstream emissions for compliance purposes.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 6-7]
EPA should not ignore upstream emissions as it would be inconsistent with previous
assertions that future compliance standards would look beyond a vehicle's tailpipe.6 As we
invest in advanced technologies, it is critical to look at their overall environmental impact to
determine broad pathways to achieve our emission reduction goals. This approach is consistent
with technology neutrality, global carbon neutrality goals, and a holistic environmental impact
assessment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 6-7]
6 Federal Register: Volume 77, No. 199 - October 15, 2012, Page 62651
More importantly, by including upstream emissions for compliance purposes, EPA will
address a vehicle's total embedded C02 instead of unintentionally promoting inefficiencies.
Counting upstream emissions promotes cleaner and more efficient components for all vehicle
technologies. It is important to set metrics for all vehicles, including BEV, that continue to
require efficiency improvements that reduce C02 production and energy intensity - while small
efficiency gains in electric vehicle operation seem to make no difference if measuring at the
tailpipe, they would have an impact on the burden to the electricity grid when we have a future
BEV vehicle pare in the tens of millions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 6-7]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
D. EPA lacks the statutory authority to ignore upstream emissions for electric vehicles.
EPA has statutory authority to prescribe "standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in
[its] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). This presents an interpretive
dilemma. On the one hand, if electric vehicles are not "vehicles" "which cause[ ] or contribute
to" a given type of air pollution, then EPA may not set standards for them. Id. On the other, if
electric vehicles are "vehicles" "which cause, or contribute to" a given type of air pollution, then
EPA must set "standards applicable to the[ir] emissions." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712,
p. 11]
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The proposal tries to solve this problem by splitting the baby.8 EPA reasons that electric
vehicles are vehicles that "cause or contribute to air pollution," but EPA just chooses to set their
contribution to zero. This cannot be right. Cf. C.S. Lewis, That Hideous Strength 291 (Samizdat
ed., 2015) ("Just imagine a man who was too dainty to eat with his fingers and yet wouldn't use
forks!"). If electric vehicles truly emit no emissions, then they are not the sort of vehicle EPA
can regulate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 11]
8 Of course, the point of the story about Solomon is that the baby wasn't split. See 1 Kings 3:16- 28 ("Give
the living child to the first woman, and by no means put him to death; she is his mother.").
Of course, EPA freely admits that electric vehicles do produce upstream emissions, and that
these upstream emissions matter. This is true and very important. And the proposal does consider
upstream emissions when determining the rule's impact on total emissions. EPA's position is
that this inconsistent approach to electric vehicles' upstream emissions is reasonable because it
treats upstream emissions of all vehicles, electrified or not, the same way for compliance
purposes. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,252 ("EPA proposes to include only emissions measured directly from
the vehicle in the vehicle GHG program for MYs 2027 and later (or until EPA changes the
regulations through future rulemaking) consistent with the treatment of all other vehicles.
Electric vehicle operation would therefore continue to be counted as 0 g/mile, based on tailpipe
emissions only.") [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 11-12]
But this "consisten[cy]" is precisely what makes the rule unreasonable. Electric vehicles are
not like "all other vehicles." EPA has previously recognized that "that for each EV that is sold, in
reality the total emissions off-set relative to the typical gasoline or diesel powered vehicle is not
zero, as there is a corresponding increase in up-stream C02 emissions due to an increase in the
requirements for electric utility generation." 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454, 49,533 (Sept. 28, 2009). EPA
only chose the initial "zero grams/mile compliance value [a]s an incentive," Response to
Comments, EPA-420-R- 10-012a at 5-237 (Apr. 2010),), and explained that in future standards it
"would attribute a pro rata share of national C02 emissions from electricity generation to each
mile driven under electric power minus a pro rata share of upstream emissions associated with
from gasoline production," 88 Fed. Reg. 29,252. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 11-12]
EPA never had authority to incentivize electric vehicles in this way. Section 202(a) requires
the agency to "standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes
of new motor vehicles." Because it acknowledged that these emissions are "not zero," it is
arbitrary to treat them as such. Indeed, as EPA previously acknowledged, treating upstream
emissions of all vehicles, electrified or not, the same way puts a thumb on the scale against
conventional vehicles in favor of electric vehicles. An agency's bare preference for one
technology cannot satisfy the requirement that it "reasonably consider[] the relevant issues and
reasonably explain[] the decision." FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1158
(2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 12-13]
At the very least, the agency is not permitted to change its position on the future inclusion of
upstream emissions in compliance calculations without explanation. When an agency makes a
decision, it must articulate a "satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.'" Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). If the agency fails to "cogently explain why it
has exercised its discretion in a given manner," its action will be held invalid. Id. at 48. In
addition, the agency must "provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a
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new policy created on a blank slate . . . when, for example, its new policy rests upon factual
findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy." FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1209
(2015). EPA previously thought that the zero grams-per-mile compliance value was only viable
as a temporary incentive because "in reality" the total emissions were not zero. Failure to
consider and adequately explain departure from this finding would render the entire rulemaking
arbitrary and capricious. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, pp.12-13]
F. EPA lacks authority to Misleads Consumers by Using the Term "Zero-emissions
Vehicle."
While it is true that all-electric vehicles have no tailpipe emissions, it is completely false to
claim that they are "zero-emissions vehicles." As already noted, EPA acknowledges that what it
calls "ZEVs" have significant upstream emissions. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,303. Despite this, the
proposal repeatedly describes these vehicles as having no emissions. This is per se unreasonable,
and it enables illegal marketing by auto- manufacturers. Seizing on EPA's label, dozens of auto-
manufacturers have described their electric vehicles as "zero-emissions." Making false claims in
the marketing of products is prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce" 15 U.S.C. § 45. The agency
lacks authority to facilitate these deceptive acts or to promote innumerable other false "zero
emission" statements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 14-15]
Organization: Coalition for Safe Autonomous Vehicles and Electrification (SAVE)
Introduction of this technology will yield substantial safety, environmental, accessibility, and
equity benefits to the motoring public, as well as help keep the United States in a global
technology leadership position. AV-EVs promote safer streets by reducing collisions caused by
human error. They promote sustainability through shared zero-emission fleets that will reduce
congestion and pollution in our cities. And AV-Evs hold the promise to increase equity and
accessibility in transportation by providing affordable and accessible mobility options for those
who are unable to drive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0608, pp. 1-2]
The SAVE Coalition appreciates EPA's commitment to improving air quality, reducing
emissions from the transportation sector, and encouraging further adoption of electric vehicles
(EVs). We want to start by commending EPA's decision to treat EVs the same as non-EVs as it
relates to tailpipe emissions, i.e., by not including upstream emissions in the calculation of
tailpipe emissions. We agree that it is therefore reasonable and appropriate to assign EVs 0
grams of C02 per mile for tailpipe emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0608, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Delek US Holdings, Inc.
The flaw in EPA's approach is illustrated by the fact that emissions standards easily become
meaningless by changing the engine's location. A BEV charged by the owner through the use of
a diesel-powered generator has zero emissions, notwithstanding the fact that it remains
"powered" by a diesel engine located outside the vehicle. A LDV or MDV directly powered by a
diesel engine inside the vehicle, however, is credited with the emissions produced by that engine.
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Thus, the source of the "fuel" matters. EPA's myopic approach fails to account for such
impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 5]
Finally, instead of sufficiently analyzing and quantifying upstream emissions, including those
from battery manufacturing or electricity production, EPA proposes to instead extend ZEV
manufacturers' "free pass" and allow them to calculate upstream emissions of a BEV as 0 g/mi
C02.22 This compliance flexibility should have expired with MY27 and instead, as EPA
concedes, manufacturers producing an all-BEV flight to comply with the new proposed
standards will be able to claim their fleet "emit[s] 0 g/mi, regardless of their respective
footprints.23 If EPA considers these upstream emissions in BEV compliance calculations, the
proposed standards are likely unachievable so it appears EPA has instead cherry-picked data and
calculation parameters to ensure a ZEV transition rather than comprehensively analyze a
technology-neutral approach to the posited concerns. EPA should provide a more comprehensive
analysis to comply with its directive under the Clean Air Act and better assess the resulting
impact of the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 5]
22 Proposed Rule at 29,235, 29,251.
23 Id.
EPA's reference to electric vehicles as "zero emission vehicles" is misleading. The fuel
source of a BEV—a battery composed of carbon intensive minerals and the electricity generated
to power the battery—produces emissions. The fact such emissions occur 100% upstream of the
vehicle's operation and therefore fall outside of the tailpipe emissions calculation stacks the deck
in favor of this technology. There is no logical basis for this omission because, as EPA is aware,
GHG and other criteria pollutant emissions such as PM2.5 have a global impact. Consequently,
controlling air pollutant emissions should be important regardless of where such emissions
occur. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 5]
Organization: Doug Peterson
The Environmental Protection Agency Should Include the Upstream Carbon Dioxide
Emissions of Battery Electric Vehicles When Calculating Fleet Performance and Determining
Compliance [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, p. 1]
The EPA has solicited comments regarding its proposal to continue granting all light duty
battery electric vehicles (BEVs) a carbon dioxide emissions value of zero grams per mile when
averaging an automaker's fleet performance. There are many strong arguments for maintaining
the current approach, and it is important to acknowledge them before making the much stronger
case for reforming the upstream emissions policy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, p. 2]
Upstream carbon dioxide emissions have never been considered when determining fleet
compliance, in accordance with statutory language directing the agency to regulate emissions
that come "from" regulated vehicles. There are other life cycle emissions that are also set aside,
and vehicles powered by gasoline have their own significant upstream emissions related to the
production and distribution of gasoline that are not incorporated into the mathematical formulas
that govern compliance. The overwhelming share of carbon dioxide emissions from light duty
vehicles are generated by the combustion of gasoline and enter the troposphere through tailpipes.
The primary objective of the regulatory framework is to curtail these emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0500, p. 2]
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The rules governing compliance have evolved through many rulemaking cycles, and the
ongoing focus on tailpipe emissions is, in part, a manifestation of pragmatism. The agency's
2009 endangerment finding regarding carbon dioxide created an obligation to regulate this major
tailpipe greenhouse gas, and it was no small task to determine how to go about it. The regulatory
framework that was agreed to under President Obama was a remarkable achievement that has
served the nation well. Fleet averaging, targets based on vehicles footprints, and the
establishment of a cap-and-trade C02 credit market were effective methodologies that continue
to provide valuable flexibility to automakers and are reasonably fair. The framework was crafted
when BEV market penetration was very low and there was little need to consider upstream
emissions. The 2012 framework envisioned net upstream emissions accounting that would
commence in 2022, but that approach was abandoned in 2020. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500,
pp. 2-3]
The mathematical formulas used to determine individual fleet standards and performance
values are extremely complex, surpassing the mathematical reasoning skills of most people, but
they work. Adding adjustments for upstream emissions would add another layer of complexity. It
would be difficult to estimate upstream emissions accurately, but not impossible. Tailpipe carbon
dioxide emissions are directly related to gasoline fuel economy, and the agency has reason to
trust the C02 values it assigns to the gas-powered vehicles it regulates. A high level of accuracy
in the quantification of tailpipe emissions is a valuable attribute of the framework that enhances
its effectiveness. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 2-3]
Quantifying upstream emissions would require the application of subjective assumptions, and
broadening the scope of compliance determination beyond tailpipe emissions would likely
increase differences of opinion among stakeholders. It might even lead to more litigation, though
that hardly seems possible. Automakers need to design their vehicles years in advance and
depend on a stable regulatory framework. They have invested billions of dollars in electrification
and seem satisfied with the existing upstream emissions policy. Keeping things simple and
consistent yields important benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 3-4]
Most importantly, the current approach appears to accelerate the electrification of the national
fleet. BEVs are currently our best hope for fully decarbonizing light duty transportation. Ending
the use of gasoline will take decades, and the worthwhile effort must proceed with a sense of
urgency. The EPA's current policy on upstream emissions leverages the extraordinary potential
of BEVs, which are increasingly recognized as a feasible, scalable alternative to conventional
vehicles. There are many challenges that come with widespread BEV adoption, and the EPA's
obligation to reduce anthropogenic carbon dioxide is well served when it accelerates the
electrification of ground transportation. The EPA is addressing upstream emissions by regulating
the utilities that produce them and believes that this strategy is adequate and appropriate. The
upstream emissions generated by BEVs will fall to zero when our grids are fully decarbonized,
and they do not currently represent a large percentage of light duty emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0500, pp.3-4]
The EPA is to be commended for soliciting comments on its treatment of upstream emissions,
which would remain the same under its proposal. BEVs that produce zero tailpipe emissions will
proliferate dramatically between now and 2032, and this inevitable change in the future
composition of the national fleet has important implications that the agency must acknowledge
as it considers reforming its policy on upstream emissions. My arguments focus exclusively on
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the EPA's proposed upstream emissions policy for light duty vehicles, which I oppose.
Accelerating electrification has always been and continues to be a very worthy goal, but the time
has come for BEVs to be held accountable for their upstream emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0500, pp. 4-5]
As the agency primarily responsible for the abatement of anthropogenic carbon dioxide, the
EPA is obligated to enact policies that will maximize the fuel economy of the emerging electric
fleet. The existing policy on upstream emissions fails to do this. When BEV technology was in
its infancy, there was a sensible consensus that the regulatory framework should incentivize its
growth. This was the rationale for multipliers, and the same reasonable rationale was applied to
hydrogen fuel cell technology. Explaining its proposed decision on upstream emissions, the EPA
argues that the current approach has incentivized electrification effectively for over a decade and
should therefore continue. Given the considerable momentum that is now driving electrification
forward, that argument is somewhat questionable. The decisions made today will have a major
impact on the fuel economy of future BEVs, and this impact is arguably more consequential for
the environment than the pace of the ongoing transition. It is time for the agency to begin
fostering improvements in electric fuel economy, and it should do so by reforming its policy on
upstream emissions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 4-5]
When all life cycle emissions are considered, BEVs generate far fewer carbon dioxide
emissions than other powertrains, but there is currently wide efficiency variation among different
BEV models. Fueleconomy.gov currently shows the Lordstown Endurance earning a combined
MPGe rating of just 48. The 2023 Hyundai Ioniq 6 Long range RWD has a much higher
combined MPGe rating of 140. The most efficient BEV is currently three times as frugal as the
least efficient. When, for compliance purposes, the regulatory framework treats both vehicles as
generating zero emissions, it systematically ignores this large disparity in fuel economy. Until
our grids are fully decarbonized, the upstream emissions of the two vehicles will be proportional
to their disparate MPGe ratings. Those upstream emissions need to be curtailed., and it is
imperative that we moderate additional electricity demand while we struggle to produce it
cleanly. There are also new challenges associated with the widespread distribution of electric
auto fuel that are made more difficult by inefficient BEVs. The most straightforward way to
optimize the fuel economy of BEVs is to hold them accountable for their upstream emissions
when averaging fleet performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, p. 5]
The continuation of the existing policy through 2032 would have significant implications for
the fuel economy of the emerging electric fleet. Assessing these implications requires a clear-
headed view of the "favoritism" that is currently embedded in the regulatory framework.
Misleading criticism of BEV favoritism is rooted in the erroneous view that electric fuel
produces upstream emissions, but gasoline does not. Both fuels produce upstream emissions that
represent a significant portion of their powertrain's life cycle emissions, and neither powertrain
is currently held accountable for them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 5-6]
A more compelling articulation of BEV favoritism argues that the existing regulatory
framework forces automakers to improve the fuel economy of gas-powered vehicles but allows
BEVs to squander as much electricity as they please. Conventional vehicles do produce upstream
emissions that are not tallied for compliance purposes, but those emissions are subject to the
considerable restraint that the framework imposes on gasoline fuel economy. The EPA's
treatment of BEVs is fundamentally different, and it can only be seen as favorable treatment,
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ignoring electric fuel economy altogether. The framework does nothing to curtail the upstream
emissions associated with the production of electric auto fuel. It also does nothing to conserve
the electrical energy that powers our growing electric fleet. Energy is conserved when BEVs
displace conventional vehicles, but more is conserved when those BEVs use their fuel
efficiently. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 5-6]
Energy conservation is a fundamental goal of environmental stewardship, and this is
especially true as we struggle to generate an adequate supply of clean electricity. Light duty
vehicles are not the only machines running on fossil fuels that need to be electrified. A day will
come when our grids are fully decarbonized, clean electricity is plentiful, and BEV fuel economy
makes no difference, but that day is far off. Until then, the EPA is obligated to reduce upstream
emissions and conserve energy by optimizing the fuel economy of BEVs. It shares this
obligation with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and the two agencies
should harmonize their approaches to electric fuel economy, consistent with their overlapping
statutory goals. The cleanest electricity on Earth is electricity that never has to be generated to
begin with. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 6-7]
The upstream emissions generated by BEVs are proportional to their fuel economy, and the
agency cannot skirt its obligation to minimize them by arguing that it will control these
emissions by regulating the power plants that produce them. The synergistic benefits of
regulating power plants and BEVs simultaneously are obvious. Improving the fuel economy of
BEVs reduces overall demand for electricity and the quantity of upstream emissions. The
regulation of power plants reduces the carbon intensity of electric auto fuel. Both regulatory
efforts reinforce one another as they work to reduce carbon dioxide accumulating in the
troposphere. It makes little sense to regulate one but not the other, carelessly wasting electric
auto fuel while investing billions to produce it cleanly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 6-
7]
The EPA appears to take the view that displacing the copious emissions associated with
gasoline combustion justifies an incentivize now, economize later approach to the electric fleet.
Before arguing further, I will pause to admit, with an appropriate level of humility, that assessing
the efficacy of the current approach is a very tough judgement to make. Reasonable people will
disagree, and the sophisticated computer models that the agency uses to project outcomes
informs its view beyond my level of expertise. When this rulemaking process is completed, I
believe that the EPA will make a sound decision regarding its treatment of upstream emissions. I
intend to exercise my right to comment, at length, laying out the very strong case for upstream
emissions accountability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, p. 7]
The EPA's current policy on upstream emissions frees automakers from any legal obligation
to optimize electric fuel economy. The framework regulates the fuel economy of conventional
vehicles, but it does not regulate the fuel economy of BEVs. When averaging fleet performance,
each BEV model is arbitrarily assumed to have perfect fuel economy that produces zero
emissions. Its MPGe rating is immaterial. Absent any regulatory limits on electric fuel
consumption, consumer desire for additional vehicle size, horsepower, and range will decrease
the fuel economy of the emerging electric fleet. (It is worth noting here that the federal tax
incentive provided by the Inflation Reduction Act also does nothing to optimize electric fuel
economy. Plug-in hybrids with very poor fuel economy will qualify for the same $7,500 tax
break as the most efficient BEVs.) If BEVs are going to begin replacing conventional vehicles in
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large numbers, they need to be as efficient as possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 7-
8]
The increasingly stringent standards will force automakers to continue moderating the
desirable attributes of their conventional vehicles, but the corresponding attributes of BEVs will
not be subject to similar restraint. This will give BEVs a significant marketing advantage in the
2027-2032 time frame as automakers strive to sell enough electric vehicles to achieve
compliance. Ample size and horsepower will help offset convenience drawbacks that discourage
consumers from purchasing BEVs. Conventional muscle cars, jumbo SUVs, and overpowered
pickups have difficulty meeting their footprint targets, and extremely inefficient BEVs are
already being designed to compete against them. As important as it is to displace the dirtiest gas
burners, the EPA should not give its blessing to the unbridled exploitation of inefficient BEV
attributes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 7-8]
BEVs will also square off against each other, with size and horsepower increasing in an
inflationary cycle of one-upmanship. The observable attributes of the 2023 BEV fleet
demonstrate that automakers intend to weaponize the marketing advantages that the EPA's
generous upstream emissions policy confers. The ability of these advantages to accelerate BEV
adoption does not justify the additional inefficiency that will be embedded in the emerging
electric fleet to satisfy consumer demands. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 8-9]
There is already evidence that automakers are upsizing their BEV offerings, and there appears
to be a very strong reluctance to market small models that might deliver outstanding fuel
economy. Volkswagen decided not to sell its small id.3 in the United States, replacing the
electric Golf with the id.4. General Motors recently announced that it will discontinue production
of the efficient Chevy Bolt. There is a lot of competition emerging to capture market share in
electrified pickup trucks and luxury SUVs, and nobody appears overly concerned about their
abysmal MPGe ratings. An unrestrained upsizing trend will thwart efforts to reduce the average
price of BEVs, strengthening the public perception that BEVs are toys that only rich people play
with. The notable absence of BEVs in the more affordable compact and subcompact segments
does not bode well for widespread BEV adoption, and the regulatory framework does little to
encourage their availability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 8-9]
In fact, the existing policy on upstream emissions has an unintentional mathematical quirk
with great potential to upsize the emerging electric fleet. Compliance is ultimately achieved by
maintaining an adequate supply of credits, and the number of credits that an efficient model
generates is determined by its production volume and the degree to which it outperforms its
footprint target. All BEVs generate copious credits because the rules allow them to beat their
footprint targets by 100 percent. A BEV with a larger footprint generates more credits than a
smaller BEV because there is a greater disparity between its larger footprint target and its
arbitrary zero emissions value. The entire rationale for the footprint model is nonsensical when
applied to BEVs, and the credits they generate exceed the emission reductions they deliver in the
real world. It is extremely troubling that these disingenuous windfall credits are used to offset the
shortcomings of the worst gas guzzlers. Holding BEVs accountable for their upstream emissions
would allow them to compete against their footprint targets in a conventional way. The credits
BEVs generate would more accurately reflect their actual environmental benefits, and the
unintended incentive to upsize BEVs would be neutralized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500,
pp. 9-10]
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Efficiency losses associated with upsizing will be compounded by increasingly excessive
BEV horsepower. Consumer thirst for horsepower appears to be unquenchable, and BEVs are
well suited for serving it up. Many BEV models have high performance variants that earn lower
MPGe ratings than their standard counterparts. Many models offer a variety of driving modes
that allow the motorist to boost performance by sacrificing fuel economy. Automakers know that
additional horsepower will win market share far more than fuel economy. Consumers have
shown that they will tolerate a considerable increase in the cost of gasoline to obtain a vehicle
that delivers brisk acceleration or outstanding towing capacity, and it is unlikely that a different
fuel will alter their priorities. The inherent athleticism of BEVs will be optimized to outperform
conventional vehicles that are forced to take fuel economy into account, and BEVs in all
segments will compete against each other for market share by prioritizing acceleration. We are
already seeing the emergence of an overpowered electric fleet that is far less efficient than it
could be. If the regulatory framework is not modified, electric fuel economy will continue to be a
low priority for automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 9-10]
Consumer desire for additional range may also put downward pressure on fuel economy.
Conventional vehicles have the upper hand with this critical vehicle attribute. Gasoline tanks are
sized to provide adequate range. Inadequate range is currently a major convenience drawback for
BEVs, and they will not sell in large numbers until range figures increase substantially. Poor
range also compounds the convenience drawback of slow refueling because it increases the
frequency of charging station visits when travelling far from home. When battery packs are
enlarged to provide additional range, fuel economy often suffers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0500, pp. 10-11]
The relationship between range and electric fuel economy is complex. Higher fuel economy
increases range, but automakers can achieve the same result by increasing the size of the battery
pack. This approach adds considerable weight to the vehicle and tends to reduce fuel economy.
The tradeoff between range and efficiency will shift as engineers improve the gravimetric energy
density of battery cells, and impressive breakthroughs appear to be just around the corner. It is
also worth noting that some automakers are producing BEV models that deliver impressive range
along with outstanding fuel economy. Still, the EPA should be very concerned that its failure to
regulate BEV fuel economy will result in the unrestrained upsizing of battery packs. The trend
will increase demand for limited supplies of resources like lithium which will also be needed for
batteries that store intermittent renewable energy. In the near term, the inability to secure an
adequate supply of battery materials will slow BEV proliferation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0500, pp. 10-11]
Incorporating upstream emissions accountability into the regulatory framework would be
consistent with the phasing out of multipliers that have been used to incentivize the early growth
of BEVs. The EPA is to be commended for agreeing to end the generous incentive in the latter
half of the 2023-2026 time frame. As BEVs began to sell in larger numbers, the multipliers had
growing potential to undermine the integrity of the cap-and-trade credit market, which resulted in
the EPA capping the benefit, then eliminating it altogether. The rationale for multipliers was
rooted in their power to catalyze BEV manufacturing, and the fact that they were finally phased
out reflects the agency's wise judgement that they had accomplished their mission and were no
longer necessary. Introducing upstream emissions accountability in the 2027-2032 time frame
would be consistent with this same judgement, adjusting the framework in response to projected
increases in BEV proliferation. If BEVs are going to make up 67% of car sales in 2032, we
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should not wait until then to begin optimizing electric fuel economy. The EPA's rationale for
continuing the current upstream emissions policy echoes the original rationale for multipliers.
That obsolete rationale becomes less and less compelling as BEVs reach higher levels of market
penetration all around the globe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 13-14]
The 2027 model year appears to be a very appropriate time to begin regulating the efficiency
of the emerging electric fleet, but automakers would likely prefer more lead time to adjust to
such a major change. Fortunately, the agency has the ingenuity to craft regulations that phase in
upstream emission accountability, just as it phased out multipliers. It also has the necessary
expertise to adjust the overall stringency and slope of the footprint curves to compensate for an
evolving upstream emissions policy. If upstream emissions accountability were to be phased in
between 2028 and 2032, automakers would have five years to prepare. If accountability were to
commence in 2029, they would have six. The impact of the change could also be softened by
making a generous calculation of upstream BEV emissions that averages the projected carbon
intensity of the national grid across the expected operational life of the BEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0500, pp.13-14]
The upstream emissions associated with gasoline production could be phased in during the
same time frame, with similar adjustments to keep the overall stringency of the framework
reasonable. This might be seen by some as negating the new policy regarding the upstream
emissions of electric fuel. Such an argument would fail to persuade. Gasoline and electricity
both come with significant upstream emissions that can be estimated with reasonable accuracy,
and an effective, equitable framework would treat them roughly the same way. (There are
currently not enough fuel cell vehicles in operation to worry about the upstream emissions of
hydrogen fuel.) If both gasoline and electricity were held accountable for their upstream
emissions and stringency was adjusted accordingly, the obligation to improve the fuel economy
of gasoline powered vehicles would remain about the same, and there would now be an
appropriate regulatory incentive to optimize the fuel economy of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0500, pp. 14-15]
The agency should not refrain from implementing such a change based on the legal argument
that it is only authorized to regulate tailpipe emissions that come "from" the vehicles themselves.
The statute does not confine the agency to emissions that come "directly from" vehicle tailpipes,
and a broader interpretation of the word "from" is well within the agency's discretion. In 2012,
net upstream emissions accountability was scheduled to commence in 2022. The EPA is
responsible for multiple approaches to carbon dioxide abatement, and it is entirely appropriate
for the agency to recognize the synergistic benefits of increasing the fuel economy of the
emerging electric fleet while decreasing the carbon intensity of the grid. The fact that upstream
emissions have not been regulated in the past is also a poor excuse to maintain the current
approach. BEVs are going to proliferate on a much larger scale, and the old policy needs to give
way to this new reality. Compromising the agency's longstanding commitment to energy
conservation is a much larger break from precedent than a reinterpretation of the word "from".
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 14-15]
The EPA must ultimately strike a balance between two fundamental goals that contribute to
carbon dioxide abatement. First, it must accelerate the adoption of BEVs, displacing
conventional vehicles that are creating the lion's share of light duty vehicle emissions. Second, it
must conserve energy by maximizing the efficiency of the emerging electric fleet, reducing
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aggregate demand for electric auto fuel. The current upstream emission policy fails to strike this
balance because it places far too much weight on accomplishing the first goal. Both goals are
very important, and they do not undermine one another nearly as much as it may appear. In many
ways mentioned above, increasing electric fuel economy supports rapid BEV adoption. I urge the
agency to initiate efforts to achieve the second goal by phasing in upstream emissions
accountability. The battle against climate change will only be won if we make the very best use
of our most promising mitigation strategies. If BEVs are to deliver the full measure of their
enormous potential, they can no longer be allowed to squander electricity. Thank you for
soliciting comments on this very important issue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, p. 15]
Organization: East Kansas Agri-Energy (EKAE)
EKAE appreciates the Biden administration's goals of increasing vehicle efficiency and
reducing carbon emissions. However, we firmly oppose regulatory approaches that arbitrarily
favor certain technologies over others, which regrettably seems to be the case with this proposed
rule. EPA's proposal would force automakers to produce more battery electric vehicles and
discourage them from pursuing other technologies that could achieve the same, or even better,
environmental performance at a lower cost to American consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0734, p. 1]
The Agency's decision to assign a Zero grams/mile compliance value to EVs unfairly favors
electric vehicle manufacture, while falsely assuming EVs have no carbon impact whatsoever. In
this case the Agency is only following the science when it's convenient and nowhere near being
consistent with fact. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0734, p. 1]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
C. EPA should not foreclose the possibility of including upstream emissions in compliance
accounting.
The Agency's 2012 rule included net compliance accounting for PEVs' upstream emissions
from electricity generation beginning with MYs 2022-2025. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29252; 77 Fed. Reg.
at 62816. Under that rule, net upstream emissions were to be determined by "attribut[ing] a pro
rata share of national C02 emissions from electricity generation to each mile driven under
electric power minus a pro rata share of upstream emissions" from gasoline production. 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29252. EPA justified leaving these emissions unaccounted for through MY 2023 as a
then-necessary incentive for EV technology adoption. However, EPA's 2020 rule, effective
before MY 2023, removed net upstream accounting requirements through MY 2026. 85 Fed.
Reg. at 25208. EPA now proposes to eliminate upstream emissions accounting permanently,
reasoning that upstream C02 accounting has consistently been absent from the vehicle program
since its inception; that Section 202 regulates only tailpipe emissions; and that power plant
emissions, regulated under separate statutory programs, are on the decline. EPA also notes that it
does account for upstream emissions in its separate analysis of overall estimated vehicle
emissions impacts and the projected benefits of its rules, and that any EV upstream accounting
for compliance purposes, were it to take place, would have to be accompanied by a calculation of
upstream emission impacts of combustion vehicles from refineries. 88 Fed. Reg. at
29252.168[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 62-63]
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168 On a "lifecycle" basis, ZEVs offer superior emissions reductions compared to combustion vehicles.
See generally Adrian O'Connell et al., Int'l Council on Clean Transp. (ICCT), A Comparison of the Life-
Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of European Heavy-Duty Vehicles and Fuels (2023),
https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/lca-ghg-emissions-hdv-fuels-europe-feb23.pdf; Lu Xu, Life
Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Conventional and Alternative Heavy-duty Trucks: Literature Review
and Harmonization (Thesis), at chs. 3-4 (2021), https://hdl.handle.net/1807/108920; Dora Burul & David
Algesten, Scania, Life cycle assessment of distribution vehicles: Battery electric vs diesel driven (undated),
https://www.scania.com/content/dam/group/press-and-media/press-releases/documents/Scania-Life-cycle-
assessmen t-of-distribution-vehicles.pdf; Georg Bieker, ICCT, A Global Comparison of the Life-cycle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Combustion Engine and Electric Passenger Cars (2021),
https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Global-Vehicle-LCA-White-Paper-A4-revised-v2.pdf;
Jarod C. Kelly et al., Argonne National Laboratory, Cradle-to-Grave Lifecycle Analysis of U.S. Light-Duty
Vehicle-Fuel Pathways: A Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Economic Assessment of Current (2020) and
Future (2030-2035) Technologies, at ch. 8 & app. B, (2022),
https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2022/07/176270.pdf; Fuels Institute, Life Cycle Analysis Comparison,
(2022), https://www.transportationenergy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/10/FI_Report_Lifecycle_FINAL.pdf; Maxwell Woody et al., Corrigendum: The role
of pickup truck electrification in the decarbonization of light-duty vehicles, Env't Rsch. Letters, July 15,
2022, https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ac7cfc/pdf; David Reichmuth et al., Union of
Concerned Scientists, Driving Cleaner: Electric Cars and Pickups Beat Gasoline on Lifetime Global
Warming Emissions (2022), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/driving-cleaner-report.pdf;
Florian Knobloch et al., Net emission reductions from electric cars and heat pumps in 59 world regions
overtime (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7308170/pdf/EMS85812.pdf
(author manuscript; published in final edited form at 3 Natural Sustainability 437 (2020)).
If EPA proceeds as proposed, it must undertake a full and comprehensive upstream emissions
analysis for all vehicles as part of its cost-benefit analysis. However, as noted above, EPA itself
previously (and reasonably) interpreted the statute as granting it discretion to include upstream
emissions and has set standards that do so. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29252; 77 Fed. Reg. at 62816. We
believe the better option is to include upstream emissions of all vehicles in compliance
accounting, particularly as EVs are becoming a larger part of the new vehicle fleet and the
proliferation of ever larger and heavier EVs increases their upstream emissions. In either case, as
EPA states, any accounting of upstream emissions—whether for compliance purposes or cost-
benefit analysis—must be consistent for all vehicles. If the Agency proceeds as proposed, we
strongly urge it not to characterize its decision as "permanent." Both the vehicle and power
generation industries are currently undergoing rapid changes. Though power generation
emissions have been declining, the need for electricity is increasing, and the reduction of EV
energy use will become more important as the fleet becomes more electrified. Any decision now
to permanently omit fleet upstream emissions compliance accounting would be premature.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 63-64]
Organization: Exxon Mobil Corporation
EPA should also consider complementary GHG emission standards for new vehicles based on
a well-to-wheels (WTW) lifecycle emissions accounting methodology. Such standards would
encourage lower C02e emissions per mile driven (gC02e/mile) complementing the above-
mentioned carbon-intensity based standards for the energy used by the vehicles. Current vehicle
GHG standards account only for fuel combustion or tank- to-wheels emissions. A WTW
approach, which accounts for lifecycle GHG emissions, allows for a more transparent
comparison between the lifecycle emissions associated with vehicle types. In the case of BEVs
or plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, such a standard would allow consumers to see the emissions
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associated with the electricity used to power these vehicles. Moreover, it enables consistent GHG
accounting, and thus provides a more holistic approach toward encouraging advancement in
vehicle technologies that can reduce GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0632, pp. 3-4]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Upstream emissions
Ford fully supports EPA's proposal to continue to exclude upstream emission accounting
from manufacturer's compliance calculations for PHEVs and EVs, and we encourage CARB and
NHTSA to align with EPA's approach when developing future standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0605, p. 9]
Organization: General Motors, LLC (GM)
We support continued treatment of EVs as zero gram per mile in the GHG and Tier 4
regulations. This is appropriate due to EVs emitting zero emissions, and due to EV upstream
emissions being outside the control of regulated auto companies [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0700, p. 5]
Organization: Growth Energy
Yet the Proposed Rule almost entirely ignores the GHG-reduction and other benefits of
ethanol and other biofuels. Most significantly, it fails even to consider the upstream carbon sink
that results from growing crops used in biofuels while simultaneously dismissing the upstream
carbon emissions of building and powering EVs. EPA assesses the emissions lifecycles of two
complex vehicle systems—EVs and internal combustion engine ("ICE") vehicles—in a way that
heavily puts the thumb on the scale in favor in EVs. First, although both EVs and ICE vehicles
generate "upstream" emissions from vehicle and engine production and power generation, EPA
dismisses this reality. Second, although ICE vehicles can run on a diverse range of fuels with
vastly different GHG emissions profiles, EPA fails to consider this diversity when assessing
"downstream" emissions from petroleum-based and biofuels-based vehicle systems. The result is
a proposal that inaccurately treats EVs as if they generate zero grams per mile of carbon and just
as inaccurately treats emissions from the use of biofuels the same as emissions from combusting
petroleum fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 3]
The Proposed Rule is different in kind than EPA's prior tailpipe rules. For one, it makes
permanent EPA's disregard of the upstream emissions of EVs, which prior rules promised would
be temporary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 4]
The zero grams/mile compliance value for EVs ... does not reflect the increase in upstream
GHG emissions associated with the electricity used by EVs compared to the upstream GHG
emissions associated with the gasoline or diesel fuel used by conventional vehicles. For example,
based on GHG emissions from today's national average electricity generation (including GHG
emissions associated with feedstock extraction, processing, and transportation) and other key
assumptions related to vehicle electricity consumption, vehicle charging losses, and grid
transmission losses, a midsize EV might have an upstream GHG emissions of about 180
grams/mile, compared to the upstream GHG emissions of a typical midsize gasoline car of about
60 grams/mile. Thus, the EV would cause a net upstream GHG emissions increase of about 120
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grams/mile (in general, the net upstream GHG increase would be less for a smaller EV and more
for a larger EV). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 6-7]
75 Fed. Reg. 25,324.
And that estimate of 120 grams/mile for EVs' upstream emissions does not even account for
emissions associated with production of batteries. Recent research has increasingly revealed that
there are significant GHG emissions associated with the mining of materials for production of
batteries used in EVs.6 For example, mining nickel alone requires both significant fossil energy
expenditures and GHG emissions associated with land use, including the clear-cutting of
rainforest in Indonesia.7 When compared to production of an ICE vehicle on a cradle-to-grave
basis, those emissions represent another source of emissions from EVs that are not addressed in
EPA's assumption that EVs produce zero grams per mile of GHGs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0580, pp. 6-7]
6 See, e.g., Catherine Early, The new 'gold rush' for green lithium, BBC News (Nov. 24, 2020)
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201124-how-geothermal-lithium-could-revolutionise-green-energy.
7 Jon Emont, EV Makers Confront the 'Nickel Pickle', Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2023.
Indeed, a recent National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") assessment explained that an
approach like EPA's fails to "fully capture" emissions from "the total light-duty vehicle
system."8 NAS noted that one issue of that type of non-system-based analysis is that it would
lead to inaccurate comparisons between vehicles using different fuels.9 And NAS further opined
that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 6-7]
8 National Academy of Sciences (NAS), Assessment of Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle
Fuel Economy—2025-2035 at 13-416 (2021).
9 Id.
[I]f deep GHG emissions reduction is a goal, then there will need to be consideration of not
only onboard vehicle emissions, but also the emissions from related sectors, like electricity (for
vehicle charging), and manufacturing (of vehicles and their materials and components). This
motivates the need for life cycle thinking. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 6-7]
10 Id.
Moreover, EPA has not acknowledged the inaccuracy of failing to account for the carbon
absorbed by biofuel feedstocks when they are grown. Because all of the carbon emitted from a
tailpipe is sequestered by crops while they grow, EPA's emissions values assigned to ICE
vehicles using biofuels misses dramatically in the other direction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0580, pp. 7-8]
The fundamental scientific reality that emissions from combusting biofuels is offset by crops'
absorption of carbon is reflected in other EPA programs like the Renewable Fuel Standard
program. There, emissions from combustion of biofuels in a vehicle are excluded in lifecycle
analyses because "[o]ver the full lifecycle of the fuel, the C02 emitted from biomass-based fuels
combustion does not increase atmospheric C02 concentrations, assuming the biogenic carbon
emitted is offset by the uptake of C02 resulting from the growth of new biomass." 74 Fed. Reg.
24,904, 25040 (May 26, 2009). Similarly, the IPCC excludes emissions from combustion of fuels
from biogenic sources when assessing national or sectoral carbon emissions. See 2006 IPCC
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Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Vol. 2 at 2.3.3.4. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0580, pp.7-8]
EPA's failure to recognize biofuels' upstream carbon benefits leads to absurd results in the
context of the Proposed Rule. For example, a 2019 MIT study found that, when accounting for
emissions from all aspects of a vehicle's manufacturing, fueling, and use, EVs emitted about 200
grams/mile over their lifetimes, compared to about 350 grams per mile for gasoline powered
cars, for an emissions reduction of about 43 percent. 11 That emissions reduction is very similar
to the 46 percent reduction of 100 percent ethanol compared to petroleum. 12 Yet, the Proposed
Rule would treat an EV as emitting zero GHGs while treating an ICE vehicle running on 100
percent ethanol as having the same lifecycle GHG emissions as petroleum. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0580, pp. 7-8]
11 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Insights into Future Mobility (2019), available at
https://energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/ll/Insights-into-Future-Mobility.pdf.
12 Scully, et. al., Carbon intensity of corn ethanol in the United States: state of the science 16 Environ. Res.
Lett. 043001 (2021).
Indeed, EPA has already created a methodology for accounting for upstream emissions from
EVs; prior light-duty vehicle rules committed to begin accounting for upstream emissions above
a certain cap in future years. See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. 62624. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p.
10]
EPA provided the following example of how that emissions accounting would work for a
Nissan Leaf: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
-A measured 2-cycle vehicle electricity consumption of 238 watt-hours/mile over the EPA
city and highway tests [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
-Adjusting this watt-hours/mile value upward to account for electricity losses during
electricity transmission (dividing 238 watt-hours/mile by 0.935 to account for grid/transmission
losses yields a value of 255 watt-hours/mile) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
-Multiplying the adjusted watt-hours/mile value by a 2030 EV/PHEV electricity upstream
GHG emissions rate of 0.534 grams/watt-hour at the power plant (255 watt-hours/mile
multiplied by 0.534 grams GHG/watt-hour yields 136 grams/mile) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0580, p. 10]
-Subtracting the upstream GHG emissions of a comparable midsize gasoline vehicle of 41
grams/mile to reflect a full net increase in upstream GHG emissions (136 grams/mile for the EV
minus 41 grams/mile for the gasoline vehicle yields a net increase and EV compliance value of
95 grams/mile). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
Id. at 82,822. While that methodology is a simplification of the upstream emissions to a
certain extent, it is an easily workable estimate for the upstream emissions from EVs. EPA could
and should, at a minimum, use that approach or a similar one to account for EV emissions for
2027 and later years in this rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
Yet, EPA backed away from its promise to account for upstream emissions in the 2020 rule,
and it has now proposed to make the continued lack of any such accounting "permanent." 88
Fed. Reg. at 29,252. EPA articulated two purported reasons for doing so: (1) that its regulations
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have "functioned as intended" without any upstream accounting by "encouraging the continued
development and introduction of electric vehicle technology," and (2) that upstream emissions
are "addressed by separate stationary source programs." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p.
10]
Neither of those justifications is a rational reason to continue deliberately underestimating the
emissions from EVs. To begin with, while it is true that systematic underestimates of emissions
incentivize EV development, this ignores the fact that they disincentivize development in other
promising GHG-reduction technologies like biofuels. By incentivizing one technology to the
exclusion of others, EPA is reducing an opportunity to develop different technologies that will be
appropriate for more applications across the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
And the fact that upstream emissions are addressed by stationary source permitting programs
is no justification at all. Those programs help reduce emissions but do not eliminate them—
EPA's rule still fails to estimate the true lifecycle emissions from EVs even when considering
that power plants must get Title V, PSD, and NSPS permits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580,
p. 10]
EPA also points out that, if it estimated upstream emissions from EVs, "it would appear
appropriate to do so for all vehicles, including gasoline-fueled vehicles." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,252.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
That's right—EPA should compare apples to apples. But that additional burden of estimating
another set of upstream emissions is no reason not to do it. By comparing the lifecycle emissions
of EVs and the lifecycle emissions of ICE vehicles, EPA could much better align the incentives
provided by its tailpipe rules with the real world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
EPA should ensure that its tailpipe rule maximizes emissions reductions and minimize costs.
Appropriately accounting for the lifecycle GHG emissions of vehicles would eliminate
unintended consequences like incentivizing fossil hydrogen over low-carbon biofuels. And it
would align the incentives provided by EPA's tailpipe rule with an accurate calculation of
lifecycle GHG emissions so that the market can achieve the greatest emissions reductions in the
most efficient way. For some vehicle needs and local markets, that may be investing in EVs, but
in others it may be investing in vehicles with efficient ICE engines that can and do use higher
biofuel blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 11-12]
V. The Proposed Rule's Permanence and Stringency Make its Disparate Treatment of
Biofuels and EVs More Problematic.
A. The Impacts of the Proposed Rule are Much More Dramatic than in Previous Tailpipe
Rules.
While previous tailpipe rules have made similar mistakes in failing to properly estimate
emissions from biofuels and EVs, the impacts of the Proposed Rule are much greater, for two
reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 13-14]
First, EPA's decisions in prior rules not to account for the upstream emissions of EVs were
characterized as temporary. In 2012, EPA committed to accounting for upstream emissions
above a certain cap for each automaker starting in model years 2022 through 2025. 77 Fed. Reg.
at 62,822. EPA later extended the time period of not accounting for upstream emissions through
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2026, but it still indicated that such treatment would be temporary. See 86 Fed. Reg. at 74,446.
In contrast, the proposed rule is clear that EVs would be considered to emit zero grams per mile
permanently. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,252. Permanence changes the nature of and basis for that
decision. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 13-14]
There may have been some justification for previously treating EVs as emitting zero grams
per mile on a temporary basis. When EVs were in their relative infancy and needed some
assistance to become better established, EPA could credibly assert that it was rational to give
EVs an additional boost relative to other vehicles by conducting a skewed assessment of their
emissions. Similarly, it would have been understandable if EPA had needed some time after EVs
were introduced into commerce on a wider scale to best determine how to calculate their
upstream emissions. But both of those excuses are now gone. EPA has already had over a decade
since it promised in 2012 to account for upstream emissions of EVs in the future, and
manufacturers have had that same amount of time with a thumb on the scale in their favor to
ramp up their production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 13-14]
Second, the proposed rule's stringency makes the impact of EPA's failure to consider both the
upstream carbon sinks of biofuels and the upstream carbon emissions of EVs much greater. To
date, EPA's tailpipe rules have incentivized EVs at the expense of other technologies, but they
have done so in a manner that left room for other vehicles and fuels to play an important part in
meeting the country's transportation needs. Today, EPA is putting all of its eggs in the EV
basket. The only compliance scenario EPA discusses in the proposal would require more than
two-thirds of all new vehicles to be EVs by 2032 (and, if it continues on its current trajectory, the
percentage will presumably climb from there). That dramatic shift to EVs is fundamentally
different than in prior rules. It disincentivizes biofuel use, even where biofuels could help reduce
GHG emissions and be more suited to certain applications, like providing a low-carbon option in
areas without sufficient charging infrastructure or with a carbon-intensive electric grid. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 14]
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
By mandating the rapid electrification of the U.S. LD and MD passenger fleet, EPA's
Proposed Rule exceeds its statutory and Congressional authority and severely constrains
consumer choice. In so doing, EPA fails to fully account for the total carbon footprint of PEVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 2]
Notably, EPA's assumption that PEVs produce zero GHGs - coupled with its failure to
account for the overall carbon intensity associated with not only powering PEVs but also the
emissions tied to mining, processing, and manufacturing of critical minerals necessary for PEV
batteries - impedes the agency's ability to conduct a complete comparison of the GHG emissions
resulting from different vehicle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 2]
III. The Proposed Rule is Arbitrary and Capricious
a. EPA Fails to Properly Account for All GHG Emissions from PEVs
In an attempt to hinder consumer choice and penalize specific forms of technology, EPA's
proposed rule fails fully account for the lifecycle GHG emissions that come from PEVs, creating
a disparity between how ICE and PEV vehicle emissions are treated. While EPA purports to
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have considered the GHG emissions attributed to upstream emissions impacts from fuel
production at refineries and electricity generating units,27 EPA assumes - without any factual
basis - that the power sector will become cleaner over time through the increased use of wind
and solar generation and electricity storage (i.e., more batteries). This in turn will purportedly
mitigate EPA's recognized concern that, as a result of the proposed rule, "increases in emissions
from [Electric Generating Units] . . . would lead to changes in exposure for people living in
communities near these facilities."28 But, EPA glosses over this analysis, and instead only
focuses on tailpipe emissions. And even if EPA's assumptions on a cleaner electric grid are
correct, EPA fails to account for the increased GHG emissions that will come from an increasing
effort to mine, process, and manufacture the critical minerals that will be required to both deliver
batteries to power an all- electric future fleet as well as deliver "zero-emission" power to the
grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 7-9]
27 Proposed Rule at 29,252.
28 Proposed Rule at 29,327.
Moreover, EPA's proposal to remove upstream emissions from vehicle compliance
determinations will incentivize vehicle manufacturers to produce PEVs without having to
account for any of the associated emissions impact while ignoring labor and environmental
standards of other nations. Preferentially accounting for certain air pollutant emissions over
others within the same regulated vehicle class flies in the face of both EPA's statutory authority
to prescribe "standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of
new motor vehicles.. ."29 and its purported regulatory objective to reduce GHG emissions. If
PEVs are vehicles which cause or contribute to air pollution, then all associated pollution must
be accounted for. If not, EPA may not include PEVs in the regulated "class" of motor vehicles
along with comparable ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 7-9]
29 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
For instance, the power source of a PEV—a battery composed of carbon intensive minerals
and the electricity generated to power the battery—produces emissions. The fact such emissions
occur 100% upstream of the vehicle's operation and therefore fall outside of the tailpipe
emissions calculation stacks the deck in favor of this technology. In fact, according to the
International Energy Association, PEVs require six times the raw materials as a traditional ICE
vehicle.30 There is no logical basis for this omission because, as EPA is aware, concerns about
GHG emissions relate to their longer term global concentrations. Consequently, air pollutant
emissions should be an important consideration regardless of where such emissions occur and,
by myopically prioritizing PEVs, EPA fails to look at all technologically feasible options that
may provide commensurate GHG reductions in a more cost-efficient manner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, pp.7-9]
30 IEA, "In the transition to clean energy, critical minerals bring new challenges to energy security," (June
2023), available at https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions/executive- summary.
The flaw in EPA's approach is illustrated by the fact that emissions standards easily become
meaningless by changing the engine's location. The proposed rule would treat a PEV charged by
a diesel-powered generator as if it had zero tailpipe emissions, notwithstanding the fact that it
remains "powered" by a diesel engine located outside the vehicle. A light-duty vehicle directly
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powered by a diesel engine inside the vehicle, however, is credited with the emissions produced
by that engine. Thus, the source of the "fuel" matters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 7-9]
For instance, the power source of a PEV—a battery composed of carbon intensive minerals
and the electricity generated to power the battery—produces emissions. The fact such emissions
occur 100% upstream of the vehicle's operation and therefore fall outside of the tailpipe
emissions calculation stacks the deck in favor of this technology. In fact, according to the
International Energy Association, PEVs require six times the raw materials as a traditional ICE
vehicle.30 There is no logical basis for this omission because, as EPA is aware, concerns about
GHG emissions relate to their longer term global concentrations. Consequently, air pollutant
emissions should be an important consideration regardless of where such emissions occur and,
by myopically prioritizing PEVs, EPA fails to look at all technologically feasible options that
may provide commensurate GHG reductions in a more cost-efficient manner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, pp.7-9]
30 IEA, "In the transition to clean energy, critical minerals bring new challenges to energy security," (June
2023), available at https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions/executive- summary.
Finally, EPA has not considered the foreseeable, indirect impacts the Proposed Rule will have
on ambient air quality. First, with the high purchase price of new PEVs, consumers will likely
hold on to their older, higher-emitting ICE vehicles to avoid the increased purchase price of a
PEV. Second, PEVs are heavier, and will increase particulate matter emissions through increased
brake, tire, and road wear. Ultimately, EPA arbitrarily ignores the full scope of emissions that
will come from PEVs, and a full lifecycle analysis of all potential vehicle technologies must be
conducted to fully understand the environmental impacts of the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, pp.7-9]
Organization: Jaguar Land Rover NA, LLC (JLR)
0 g/mile of ZEVs
JLR supports the EPA's proposal to only include direct vehicle tailpipe emissions for a
vehicle, thereby maintaining the 0 g/mile accounting of ZEV in the regulation. In the case of
battery electric vehicles (BEVs), it is entirely true that they emit zero tailpipe C02 emissions, so
they should be treated in the regulation as such. To expand or change this definition would be a
fundamental change to the regulation. JLR opposes such a drastic change, especially while the
technology is still scaling up. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 4]
Organization: John Graham
The Preamble states on page 29342:
"At the same time, we note that the proposed standards are performance-based and do not
mandate any specific technology for any manufacturer or any vehicle. Moreover, the overall
industry does not necessarily need to reach this level of BEVs in order to comply—the projection
in our analysis is one of many possible compliance pathways that manufacturers could choose to
take under the performance-based standards. For example, manufacturers that choose to increase
their sales of HEV and PHEV technologies or apply more advanced technology to non-hybrid
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ICE vehicles would require a smaller number of BEVs than we have projected in our assessment
to comply with the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 37]
While EPA is correct that specific technologies are not actually mandated and manufacturers
can choose to increase their sales of HEV and PHEV technologies, EPA is NOT correct that the
"proposed standards are performance-based". As illustrated in Table 1, EPA has put its thumb on
the scale and given BEVs approximately a $4,500 ($3,000 DMC) advantage - in addition to the
temporary advantages that Congress gave BEVs in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. Given
that the incremental cost (DMC) of a HEV is only about $2,000, this is a huge artificial
disadvantage to HEVs. Had EPA used a lifecycle metric in the C02 performance standards
(rather than the tailpipe metric), the deployment rates of BEVs and hybrids would be more
evenly distributed and the overall impact of the standards on total C02 emissions and total costs
would have been more favorable. The agency should run the OMEGA modeling using our
suggested assumptions in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 37]
When EPA first decided, in the 2012 rulemaking (for 2017-2025 models), to use the 0
gram/mile tailpipe assumption for BEVs, it was defended as a temporary provision to spur
additional BEV offerings at a time when few BEVs were available for consumers. The
circumstances are totally different today. The number of new BEV offerings has proliferated, as
ably documented in the NPRM, and Congress has provided a special set of subsidies (in the
Inflation Reduction Act) to spur BEV deployment. EPA has no basis for using its discretionary
authority to weaken environmental protection by giving a special compliance advantage for
BEVs relative to HEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 38]
Organization: KALA Engineering Consultants
Comments
1. If I was not an engineer deeply steeped in the subtleties of transportation emission
issues and I read your Federal Register (FedReg) text or news reports written by reporters
unfamiliar with the actual science basis for your proposed rulemaking for Docket EPA-HQ-
OAR- 2022-0829 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-
Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, I might come away from certain descriptions of vehicles
discussed in such text as describing transportation vehicles that have absolutely no emissions
coming from them or attributable to them at all. Repeated use by the EPA of the terms Zero
Emission and Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) could lead some to believe there actually is such a
thing, when all of EPA's emission scientists and engineers know this is not the case. We hesitate
to charge EPA with putting out deliberately misleading characterizations of Battery Electric
Vehicles (BEV) as true ZERO emission vehicles, but it seems that way. Examples from the
FedReg text below: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 3-4]
From Section I. A. 2, i: "These industry advancements in the production and sales of zero-
and near-zero emission vehicles are already occurring both domestically and globally,... [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 3-4]
As the term "zero-emission vehicle" suggests, these cars and trucks have zero GHG and
criteria pollutant emissions from their tailpipes, which can represent significant reductions over
current emissions (particularly for GHG). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 3-4]
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[I]t is important to recognize that, despite this anticipated growth in zero-emission vehicles,
many internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles will continue to be sold during the time frame
of the rule and will remain on the road for many years afterward." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 3-4]
KALA strenuously objects to what seems to be un-scientific and cavalier use of the "zero
emission" terminology when referring to all-electric rechargeable vehicles when all of you know
that there may well be fossil-fueled electric generating units (EGU), emitting lots of GHG,
supplying the electric power to recharge those vehicle batteries. We implore the EPA to be more
scientifically precise in its terminology for BEVs as Zero Operating Emission vehicles and use
acronyms of (ZOE and ZOEV). Such proper terminology gives the uninformed reader the idea
that there may be no emissions from operation of BEVs, but there might be emissions associated
with the electrical refueling, ie, recharging, of those vehicles. Yes, we know that the ZEV
terminology used by EPA fits into what we believe is misguided regulatory consideration of
ONLY the operating emissions or lack thereof from ZOEVs while entirely ignoring the
"Upstream" GHG emissions associated with battery recharge. EPA cannot have this situation
represent realistic GHG considerations if you cling to that artifice. We could give you several
dandy analogies, but we won't waste your time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 3-4]
EPA waxes poetic about all the upcoming public and private BEV recharging facilities that
have been and are being installed or planned to be installed. It seems odd to us that the GHG
emissions associated with all those charging facilities are simply being ignored in any
calculations of attributable GHG emissions that could arguably be linked to BEV expansion in
the US fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 3-4]
Charging facilities are NOT zero emission when all of the associated GHG emissions are
considered. These recharging facilities would not be being installed if there were no BEVs.
Therefore, all of these recharging stations and facilities are new to the status quo situation and
therefore have GHG emissions directly relatable to the presence of BEVs. All of the copper used
in these facilities has GHG emissions associated with mining, haulage, transport, smelting, wire
drawing and reeling. The plastic used in these facilities and as wire insulation almost certainly
comes from petroleum stocks with GHG emissions associated with the creation of the plastics.
Concrete and reinforcing steel used to support the facilities and provide driveways and parking
areas have GHG emissions directly associated with the construction of these facilities, plus the
fossil fuels used by construction machinery and vehicles doing that construction. We could go
on, but it seems that EPA staff is conveniently ignoring the GHG emissions associated with what
will become the millions of recharging facilities and stations needed to support the advancement
of electric vehicles promulgated under these proposed regulatory rules. Such willful dismissal or
ignoring of these types of issues when it comes to GHG emissions associated with rule making
that essentially requires vehicle manufacturers to move to BEV adoption as virtually their sole
option for compliance smacks of the work of zealots - in this case electrification zealots within
the EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 3-4]
Comment
3. The EPA appears to be using a very "special" consideration of emissions that are to be
counted as regulated emission from Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV). In unbelievable statements
of contorted logic, the EPA has set forth what we describe as a complete artifice designed to
promote and "force" a major change to vehicle propulsion starting in model year 2027. While it
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is true that during operation BEVs produce no criteria pollutants and emit no GHG gasses, the
same cannot be said for the probable sources of the electric power used to recharge the batteries
of BEVs. We wish this were not so, but we must deal factually with emissions associated with
BEV recharging. If the EPA is serious about GHG reductions, they MUST include and consider
the GHG emissions of grid-connected Electric Generating Units (EGU). Much like the water that
comes from our faucets, several water sources could be being used to provide that water. So it is
with electricity. No one can distinguish or filter out clean electrons coming from wind and solar
sources and "dirty" electrons coming from GHG-intensive electric generation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 8-10]
Power that comes into homes and businesses may well be a mix of so-called clean energy and
emission-laden dirty energy produced by burning fossil fuels. In fact, the mix of electricity
generation varies greatly by state or region, depending on what the "serving utility" chooses to
use for generation. Some regions rely almost entirely on fossil fuel and nuclear generation
methods, while others have added or switched to renewable energy production methods, such as
wind and solar as part of their generation mix. There are few if any regions of the United States
that are completely powered by renewable or GHG-free energy. There are GHG implications for
most of the so-called renewable generation methods. Solar panels are often produced with high
Global Warming Potential (GWP) chemicals being released and there are GHG emissions
associated with the steel, carbon fibers, plastics and copper conductors used in wind turbines. All
this is to say there are GHG emissions associated with virtually all forms of electric generation
that cannot be ignored when considering whether or not the introduction of a new form of
vehicle propulsion that relies on recharging batteries will have associated GHG emissions. The
latest figures from the Energy Information Agency for 2022, show the mix of energy production
for the US: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 8-10]
[See original attachment for U.S. utility-scale electricity generation by source, amount, and
share of total in 20221 Data as of February 2023] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 8-10]
As you can see, 60.2% of overall US electricity generation was still produced by burning
fossil fuels with their associated GHG and other pollutant emissions. When we aggregate how
much GHG emissions might be attributable to recharging Battery Electric Vehicles we normally
do so on a nation-wide scale using the latest available information. Since regional electric power
generation is so varied, we cannot say a BEV in Southern California will have lower associated
GHG emissions than one recharging in St. Paul, Minnesota. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617,
pp. 8-10]
Therefore, as of 2022, we can say in aggregate, there is a 60% chance that the electrons used
to recharge BEVs over the next few years will be from fossil C02 emitting fossil fuel generating
plants. That is why, any scientific calculations made for the GHG contributions that a BEV
makes must consider how the recharging power delivered to the BEV was generated. A BEV
may have zero operating emissions but they do NOT have zero GHG emissions associated with
their use. It is our considered engineering opinion that much of the so-called "low-hanging fruit"
for renewable generation in the US has already been implemented and is now on-line or soon
will be. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 8-10]
Think about an Electric Utility company that has literally made billions of dollars of
investments in coal and/or natural gas fired power plants. In their board room minds, they are
doing just fine making electricity in the same old way as they did 50 years ago and feel no
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compunction at all about charging their customers more for electricity when the cost of the fossil
fuels they burn go up. Why would such a business feel compelled to create "stranded assets" of
their fossil-fired generating facilities long before their estimated useful life expires and switch
over to renewable forms of electricity generation? Might it be because the board of directors and
the management suddenly "feel" like it is the "right" thing to do for the planet. Really??
Seriously, businesses have built-in inertia when they have made large investments in what brings
in revenue for the business and for their stock holders. They might agree that new generating
capacity should be renewable, but there is great impetus to expand their existing fossil fuel-fired
facilities with a new generator unit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 8-10]
So, the 60% fossil fuel number may stubbornly stay close to that figure for some time. The
EPA attempted to control both pollutant and GHG emissions from power plants when the "Clean
Power Plan" was part of policy thrusts, but they were less than successful in courts and
countering the Utility and Fossil Fuel lobbies in Congress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
8-10]
https://www.nationofchange.org/2022/07/05/the-supreme-court-has-curtailed-epas-power-to-
regulate- carbon-pollution-and-sent-a-warning-to-other-regulators/ [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 8-10]
Given that background, let us look at how EPA proposes to treat and count emissions from
BEV vehicles from excerpts from the Federal Register publication: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 10-15]
From Section III. B. 7. "Treatment of PEVs and FCEVs in the Fleet Average: As originally
envisioned in the 2012 rule, starting with MY 2022, the compliance value for BEVs, FCEVs, and
the electric portion of PHEVs in excess of individual automaker cumulative production caps
would be based on net upstream emissions accounting (i.e., EPA would attribute a pro rata share
of national C02 emissions from electricity generation to each mile driven under electric
power...). The 2012 rule would have required net upstream emissions accounting for all MY
2022 and later electrified vehicles. However, in the 2020 rule, prior to upstream accounting
taking effect, EPA revised its regulations to extend the use of 0 g/mile compliance value through
MY 2026 with no production cap, effectively continuing the practice of basing compliance only
on tailpipe emissions for all vehicle and fuel types." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 10-
15]
Let's stop here and parse out this set of statements. Prior to the cited text, EPA gave some
history on how they were thinking about applying regulations for BOTH criteria pollutants and
GHG emissions. Ostensibly because the number of BEVs was so small, auto makers were given
credit for emission reductions, particularly GHG reductions, up to a company-wide vehicle
production cap (a maximum value over which the company would not receive any emission
credits). That is why the "individual automaker cumulative production caps" is part of the cited
statements above. EPA states that their original thinking on GHG emissions from BEVs would
be "based on net upstream emissions accounting," which they further explain would be a "pro-
rata share of national C02 emissions from electricity generation to each mile driven under
electric power." As we discussed above, a nation-wide aggregation of the share of recharging
GHG emissions attributable to fossil fueled generation would be about 60% as of 2022. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 10-15]
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However, for some reason the EPA made a decision prior to doing any actual "upstream"
C02 accounting in their 2020 rulemaking that they would NOT do any upstream (meaning
emissions attributable to activities that produced either the fuel in a gas tank or electricity to
recharge a battery) accounting specifically for GHG emissions AND for criteria pollutants. EPA
seems to justify its astonishing position on not accounting for GHG emissions related to battery
recharge by saying they are treating all vehicles the same by not trying to account for all
upstream emissions for BOTH liquid petroleum fuels and recharge electricity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 10-15]
Let us state for the record that we agree with EPA for regulatory treatment of criteria
pollutants from BEVs as zero grams per mile. We don't see any other way of accounting for both
upstream and operations-attributable emissions, even though there were emissions related to the
production of the materials used in the BEV, those emissions are virtually the same as those for
producing a conventional gasoline vehicle. The only emission exceptions would be for battery
production and electric motor components that would have different emission profiles than gas
engine parts. We think these are minor differences and the upstream emissions for both the
gasoline and BEV vehicles themselves are a wash. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 10-15]
However, KALA, in the most strenuous way possible, disagrees that upstream GHG
emissions for battery recharge should treated the same way as zero grams per mile. The
justification that you are treating each vehicle type the same is simply not tenable in any stretch
of the imagination. We think that the EPA may have been incorrectly influenced by
electrification zealots within the agency who when discussing how BEV GHG emissions should
be handled argued something like this: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 10-15]
Hey guys we all know that we want to electrify the fleet as much as possible, after all we
know that electrification is the only way to truly get GHG emissions under control in a big way,
don't we? So, hey, let's figure out a way to justify treating the emissions from BEVs as zero all
the way around even though we know there are upstream GHG emissions for battery recharge.
Maybe if we say that we will treat emissions the same as "tail pipe' emissions while operating
the vehicles, we can get away with counting BEV emissions as zero and really push the auto
makers away from gasoline into making predominantly BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617,
pp. 10-15]
Now, we don't know how the decision was made to treat BEV GHG emissions as zero
without any regard for how different BEVs are. The method used for regulating tail pipe
emissions from gasoline vehicles requires fuel to be stored in the gas tank and that fuel is used to
power the internal combustion engine, which emits both GHG and other air pollutants. That is no
different than filling a battery up with "electric fuel" and then accounting for the emissions that
made the BEV go down the road. It just so happens that the emissions to fill up the BEV's "tank"
occur before the stored energy is used, but that is because the mode of propulsion and the way in
which energy is stored and "refilled" is so different in a BEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617,
pp. 10-15]
No matter how the EPA moved from the "correct" way to treat BEV emissions by accounting
for net upstream GHG emissions as a pro-rata share of national C02 emissions from electric
generation to the "insane" way of completely ignoring them, the initial way of treating GHG
emissions from BEVs was the correct first impulse. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 10-15]
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Otherwise we have no way of comparing GHG emissions from gasoline and diesel powered
vehicles and BEVs. It could be that the EPA attempted to make calculations for that pro-rata
share of national electric generation C02 emissions (as an engineer that is what I would do) and
found the results not to their liking. That could well be because of the abysmal final efficiency of
converting the energy in fossil fuels into rolling motion of a BEV. We offer an info graphic way
of showing that terrible efficiency below: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 10-15]
[See original attachment for graphics of electric vehicle issues] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 10-15]
The science and engineering behind the GHG emission figures associated with BEVs has
principally to do with efficiencies of conversion of fossil fuels (remember we still have 60.2% of
all electricity being generated by fossil fuels) to electricity and the losses that are seen in
transmission, recharge of batteries and conversion of electric charge stored in batteries to rolling
motion of the vehicle. The GHG impact of this horrendously low final efficiency is that far more
GHG is produced to propel a BEV one mile than a comparable gasoline-powered vehicle. We
believe it is entirely possible that the EPA understood the implications of such poor efficiencies,
decided that it was in the national interest of the country to electrify the US fleet anyway
regardless of the true GHG emission aspects of BEVs and found a way to drive or "Steer" fleet
change over by ignoring upstream GHG emissions associated with BEV battery recharge in the
regulatory scheme. We hope that is not the case, but it sure looks and feels that way. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 10-15]
EPA further continues to justify the compliance treatment of BEVs in Section III. B. 7. "EPA
is proposing to make the current treatment of PEVs and FCEVs through MY 2026 permanent.
EPA proposes to include only emissions measured directly from the vehicle in the vehicle GHG
program for MYs 2027 and later (or until EPA changes the regulations through future
rulemaking) consistent with the treatment of all other vehicles. Electric vehicle operation would
therefore continue to be counted as 0 g/ mile, based on tailpipe emissions only.... The program
has now been in place for a decade, since MY 2012, with no upstream accounting and has
functioned as intended, encouraging the continued development and introduction of electric
vehicle technology." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 10-15]
What did the EPA just say? They brazenly state that no matter what, GHG emissions from
BEVs would continue to be counted as zero grams per mile. The program that counts emissions
that way has "functioned as intended" to encourage BEV development and introduction into the
vehicle fleet. Did they really just say that? Yes, EPA seems to be saying that it doesn't matter
how illogical their counting method is for BEVs for GHGs, they are going to continue to do it
that way and their motives to encourage or even force BEV transition and displacement through
regulation becomes clear. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 10-15]
EPA further tries to justify their zero GHG emissions policy by again stating in Section III. B.
7. the following: "This approach of looking only at tailpipe emissions and letting stationary
source GHG emissions be addressed by separate stationary source programs is consistent with
how every other light duty vehicle calculates its compliance value. If EPA deviated from this
tailpipe emissions approach by including upstream accounting, it would appear appropriate to do
so for all vehicles, including gasoline- fueled vehicles." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
10-15]
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We applaud the EPA for attempting, once again, to reduce stationary source (Electric
Generating Units are considered to be stationary emissions sources) emissions. But, we are
questioning the motives of the EPA for counting emissions from BEVs. As explained above, the
equivalence way of looking at attributable GHG emissions is the "Filled Tank" approach
suggested in this comment. How it was filled and whether or not the tank has associated
emissions either from burning the stored contents of the tank in the case of liquid fuels or
consuming the energy stored in a battery should make no difference in attributing GHG
emissions to either situation. The only difference is when the related emissions occurred, before
the stored energy was used or after the stored energy was used. This minor temporal difference
cannot be ignored unless the EPA has an ulterior motive of forcing the change over of vehicle
types in the US fleet through regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 10-15]
The excuse in the cited FedReg text above that if EPA somehow deviated from the tail pipe
emissions approach by including upstream [emissions] accounting they might have to do so for
gasoline-fueled vehicles. Our response to that "terrible burden" on the EPA to account for
upstream petroleum emissions is that such an argument is specious at best and just another
vacuous justification. So what if the EPA had to account for upstream petroleum emissions. That
might give us a higher resolution picture of the entirety of the vehicle GHG problem in a larger
context. If the EPA considers the issue of accounting for upstream petroleum emissions too great
a burden, the good news is that others have actually done this accounting. The group that we
believe had the best methodology for accounting GHG emissions at stages of petroleum
production and refining is the Renewable and Appropriate Energy Laboratory (RAEL) at UC
Berkeley In a paper by the late Alex Farrell, GHG emissions at production stages provided total
upstream emissions leading up to gasoline burned in ICEs. That group had a uniquely legible
way to portray those upstream emissions graphically as shown below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 10-15]
[See original attachment for alternative metrics for evaluating ethanol] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 10-15]
http://rael.berkeley.edu/old_drupal/sites/default/files/EBAMM/FarrellEthanolScience012706.
pdf [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 10-15]
Overall Comment #3 Conclusions:
A. Despite EPA's published protestations that their new rulemaking will provide leeway
for multiple methods of vehicle propulsion to continue and that they have no wish to direct
which propulsion method is the one they prefer, the evidence from statements made in describing
the unreasonable "regulatory trick" of counting ONLY BEV tail pipe emissions for GHGs, has
and will "Steer" automakers decisions toward BEVs as THE compliance solution. When EPA
essentially says: "BEVs would be counted as 0 g/ mile in compliance calculations. The program
has now been in place for a decade with no upstream accounting and has functioned as intended,
encouraging the continued development and introduction of electric vehicle technology.," there
is no doubt left in our minds as to the intentions of the EPA to change out ICE vehicles for BEVs
through regulatory fiat. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, p. 15]
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
A. Treating EVs as zero-emitting vehicles is inaccurate.
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EPA's claim that EVs should be counted as emitting zero tailpipe emissions is arbitrary.
Electricity fuels battery-powered vehicles, and C02-emitting sources create most electricity.
What is U.S. electricity generation by energy source? U.S. Energy Information Administration
(Feb. 2023), https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 (In 2022, "[a]bout 60% of. . .
electricity generation was from fossil fuels"). This is important because "[tjailpipe emissions
from an [internal combustion engine] vehicle can be comparable to . . . upstream electricity
generation emissions." Vehicle criteria pollutant (PM, NOx, CO, HCs) emissions: how low
should we go? NPJ Climate and Atmospheric Science (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41612-018-0037-5. Yet EPA ignores these "upstream
emissions" when determining compliance with the Proposed Rule. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,252 ("EPA
proposes to include only emissions measured directly from [EVs] consistent with the treatment
of all other vehicles"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 8]
EPA argues that refusing to account for upstream emissions furthers its mission to develop
EVs. Id. ("The program has now been in place for a decade, since MY 2012, with no upstream
accounting and has functioned as intended, encouraging the continued development and
introduction of electric vehicle technology."). Congress has never authorized such a mission. To
the contrary, the CAA states that "A primary goal of this chapter is to encourage or otherwise
promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions, consistent with the provisions
of this chapter, for pollution prevention." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c). Thus, EPA's sanctioned mission
here is pollution prevention, not EV development. Because the CAA announces no policy for
special treatment of EVs, the Proposed Rule is arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0649, p. 8]
Organization: Kia Corporation
Kia Supports Limiting Accounting of Upstream Emissions
Kia supports EPA's proposed treatment of limiting emission scope for vehicle programs to
tailpipe only. This policy is consistent with previous rulemakings. 16 The agency currently has a
separate comment period to reduce thermal power stationary source GHG emissions to address
concerns of upstream emissions to generate electricity. EPA's analysis of overall estimated
emissions impact and projected benefits includes upstream emissions from fuel production and
electricity generation. Accordingly, EPA's use of assumptions to limit emission scope for
vehicles is appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 9]
16 88 Fed. Reg. 29,288.
Organization: Letter Campaign, Ethanol Producers (7)
[The following letter was submitted by seven commenters; it is reproduced only once. The
other commenters are: Highwater Ethanol, LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0552), Heartland
Corn Products (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0622), Absolute Energy, LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0716), Trenton Agri Products LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0755), Western New York
Energy LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0753), Southwest Iowa Renewable Energy LLC (EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0582)]
The Agency's decision to assign a zero grams/mile compliance value to EVs unfairly favors
electric vehicle manufacturers, while falsely assuming EVs have no carbon impacts whatsoever.
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This approach fails to acknowledge the carbon impacts associated with electricity generation, as
well as the immense emissions involved in battery mineral extraction and vehicle construction.
Therefore, we strongly disagree with the EPA's proposal to exclude upstream emissions from
greenhouse gas accounting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0739, p. 1]
Organization: Marathon Petroleum Corporation (MPC)
EPA's tailpipe-only approach also ignores the potential increase in upstream C02 emissions
that will result from manufacturing and fueling of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0593, p. 2]
Alignment of EPA's tailpipe emissions standards with other programs that promote domestic
renewable liquid fuels, such as the RFS is needed. Mandating the blending and use of renewable
liquid fuels in vehicles in one program while simultaneously ignoring the positive impacts of
their use in another results in rules that are at cross purposes. Renewable liquid fuels can be a
part of a multifaceted solution for reducing carbon emissions and similar treatment of their
benefits from program to program would be a significant step forward for the EPA. This change
would lead to significantly more investments in renewable liquid fuels, providing an option for
meeting EPA's goals that is compatible with ICE vehicles and does not require a wholesale shift
in vehicle manufacturing and infrastructure, with its concomitant effects on U.S. drivers who
would bear the costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, p. 4]
A continued push from the Agency to further narrow regulations in regard to renewable liquid
fuels results in lost opportunities for investments and places additional burden on the
transportation and fuels industry, as well as consumers. In addition, these lost opportunities for
decarbonization are impactful, as renewable liquid fuels can be deployed quickly, at a large
scale, and with significant carbon reductions in the transportation fuel sector. The renewable
liquid fuel industry is well-positioned to produce the fuels needed to contribute to the EPA's
goals because renewable liquid fuels are widely accepted throughout the country. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0593, p. 4]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
Rather than permanently removing the requirement for BEV certification to account for
upstream electricity generation, EPA should require upstream emission accounting for the
generation of energy to power electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 30-31]
MECA supports EPA's continued use of lifecycle analysis to analyze the regulatory impacts
of its vehicle regulations. However, to drive future U.S. technology leadership and incentivize
efficiency improvements in all vehicles, EPA should recognize the need to include life cycle
analysis in the design of standards and compliance. When EPA began regulating GHG emissions
from light-duty vehicles starting with MY 2012, the Agency decided to allow electric vehicles
and fuel cell vehicles to claim 0 g/mile GHG in order to encourage the initial commercialization
of these promising technologies.40,41 However, the Agency also finalized requirements for
upstream emissions to be factored into electric and fuel cell vehicle certification levels as
penetration of these vehicles increased. The justification given by EPA was that "upstream GHG
emission values associated with electric vehicles are generally higher than the upstream GHG
emission values associated with gasoline vehicles, and that there is currently no national program
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in place to reduce GHG emissions from electric powerplants." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564,
pp. 30-31]
40 https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/final-rule-model-year-2012- 2016-
light-duty-vehicle
41 https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/final-rule-model-year-2017- and-later-
light-duty-vehicle
EPA is now proposing to make the 0 g/mile GHG treatment of battery and fuel cell vehicles
permanent. The Agency's rationale is that "the program has now been in place for a decade, with
no upstream accounting and has encouraged the continued development and introduction of
electric vehicle technology." EPA further reasons that "these emission reduction technologies are
now coming into the mainstream and can serve as the primary technologies upon which EPA can
base more stringent standards" and that "power sector emissions are declining and the trend is
projected to continue." Finally, EPA concludes that the "approach of looking only at tailpipe
emissions and letting stationary source GHG emissions be addressed by separate stationary
source programs is consistent with how every other light duty vehicle calculates its compliance
value." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 30-31]
Regarding the first two points, while the program has indeed been in place for a decade, the
sales volumes of electric and fuel cell vehicles remain in the minority of new vehicle sales
(<10%). As sales increase, there is a potential for erosion of benefits if the pace of grid
decarbonization and charging infrastructure build-out do not meet projections. Regarding EPA's
final point, the agency previously recognized the inconsistency in treatment of upstream
emissions of the power sector versus the oil and gas sectors. The Agency's justification then, and
still valid today, is that upstream emissions related to power production to propel battery electric
vehicles is higher than the upstream GHG emissions associated with gasoline vehicles, and there
remains no final federal regulation to reduce GHG emissions from electric power plants. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 30-31]
For these reasons, MECA suggests that EPA maintain an upstream accounting mechanism for
the GHG emissions from electricity generation to charge electric vehicles in its requirements.
Rather than removing the upstream accounting provision entirely, MECA suggests that the
Agency postpone it to a future year as has been the Agency's practice in previous light-duty
GHG regulations. It is important to consider the emissions generated from the energy used for
propulsion of all vehicles. Currently, this is well established for ICE vehicles since the emissions
from fuel combustion are measured at the tailpipe. However, the electricity used to power
electric vehicles comes from a mix of sources that includes combustion of fuel, and those
emissions could reasonably estimated and reported during certification. It should be noted that
we are not suggesting a full life cycle certification method at this time due to the complexity of
such an approach. Our suggestion is to exclude the upstream emissions associated with the fuel
production (mining, drilling, refining) and delivery that would affect both the fuels supplied to
ICE power plants and the fuels used by ICE vehicles. We believe that a simplified approach
could be applied while the Agency works with stakeholders to assess the potential of a full life
cycle method that could be implemented in a future regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0564, pp. 30-31]
For a simplified approach, EPA could include in the final rule an annual U.S. average grid
carbon intensity based on the one used to determine the upstream GHG emissions impacts of this
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rule in the Agency's Regulatory Impact Analysis. This lookup table could be used by all
manufacturers to certify their electric vehicles with the same grid carbon intensity values such
that all manufacturers are treated equally. The manufacturer would then use a test determined
electric vehicle efficiency value multiplied by the grid carbon intensity averaged over the useful
life of the vehicle to report a gram per mile C02 value for an electric vehicle at certification. By
assigning realistic "non-zero" emission values to electric and fuel cell vehicles, EPA will provide
a regulatory incentive to further improve the electric efficiency of components and powertrain
technologies that will further reduce vehicle related environmental impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0564, pp. 30-31]
Efficiency incentives and regulations have historically driven vehicle manufacturers and
technology suppliers to continue to innovate and develop better materials, components, and
vehicle systems to reduce energy demand, operating costs and related emissions of vehicles.
Electric vehicle efficiency does not provide large benefits at today's EV sales penetration rates.
However, if the goals of this rule are met by 2032, electric vehicle sales will be over 60% and
EVs will make up a much larger fraction of the in-use passenger car fleet. Therefore, small
improvements in efficiency will result in large reductions in grid demand. MECA suggest that
EPA consider a range of both incentives and requirements to advance the efficiency of
technologies that reduce the emissions footprint of all mobile sources, regardless of the source of
propulsion energy. As noted above, setting non-zero certification values for battery electric and
fuel cell vehicles will continue to motivate vehicle manufacturers to work with suppliers to
improve vehicle efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 31-32]
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
Technology Neutrality and BEV Emissions. EPA should ensure that battery electric
vehicles (BEV) are included in metrics for vehicle-to-vehicle comparison by assigning a metric
that captures the pollutant emissions related to BEV operation, aligned with national electricity
generation figures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
The proposed rule states that emissions for an electric vehicle are zero. This position leaves
no regulatory incentive to maximize efficiency or reduce weight within electrified vehicles and
could result in larger amounts of critical elements consumed by larger batteries, as well as
greater emissions from electric power sources needed to propel these vehicles than would
otherwise be needed. This disregard for vehicle efficiency distinction across BEVs conflicts and
does not align with the existing and historic approaches of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) program and is a potential disruption to harmonization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0644, pp. 6-7]
Consistent with its current authority to regulate power plant emissions, EPA should specify a
value for electric generation emissions for each year 2027-2032 and include this in BEV
emissions calculations, based on vehicle energy use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 6-7]
The assignment of an emission value per kWh of battery capacity in BEV would assure that
public incentives for larger BEVS provide the environmental benefits promised and other
advanced clean transportation alternatives also improve their propulsion system efficiencies.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 6-7]
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This approach will also ensure more accurate assessments of BEV emissions. EPA could use
the readily known and available national electricity generation data paired with miles per gallon
equivalent (MPGe) to serve as a BEV emissions value for comparison. It is important this metric
be aligned with NHTSA Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. This metric is
justified in the directions of 49 USC 39204 (a)(2)(B)(i), which require the Administrator of the
EPA to consider net upstream emissions of electric vehicles when calculating fleet average fuel
economy.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 6-7]
4 49 USC 39204 (a)(2)(B) "(B) If a manufacturer manufactures an electric vehicle, the Administrator shall
include in the calculation of average fuel economy under paragraph (1) of this subsection equivalent
petroleum based fuel economy values determined by the Secretary of Energy for various classes of electric
vehicles. The Secretary shall review those values each year and determine and propose necessary revisions
based on the following factors: (i) the approximate electrical energy efficiency of the vehicle, considering
the kind of vehicle and the mission and weight of the vehicle."
A well-constructed rule will be technology-neutral and provide added regulatory certainty by
fairly assessing carbon content of vehicle's technologies, their production and where vehicle
charging electricity comes from. At this time, there is no review of carbon content of
components or vehicles in the draft regulatory impact analysis. We understand the complexity of
this endeavor, but EPA overlooks broad environmental impacts through a selectively narrow
focus on tailpipe emissions. Electric vehicles have no tailpipe, and thus no tailpipe emissions. If
EPA is determined to regulate zero-emissions vehicles, EPA should address lifecycle carbon
content of vehicles in scope of this rule to better balance technology vs. tailpipe. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 6-7]
Organization: Minnesota Biofuels Association
Secondly, the proposed rule falsely assumes that electric vehicles have a zero grams per mile
compliance value. Under a proper lifecycle evaluation, the upstream carbon emissions associated
with using an electric vehicle would include electricity generated from coal or natural gas, high-
energy and land use changes from critical mineral extraction, and vehicle construction and
assembly. Ignoring the upstream emissions related to electricity generation and critical mineral
extraction for electric vehicles creates an uneven playing field and risks undermining efforts to
achieve our net-zero climate goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0672, pp. 1-2]
Before finalizing the rule, we urge EPA to consider the role of American-made biofuels in
achieving enhanced vehicle efficiency and emissions reductions. A technology-neutral final rule
can be achieved by equally incentivizing technologies like Flex Fuel Vehicles and Plug-in
Hybrid Flex Fuel Vehicles and subjecting all vehicle and fuel options to similar carbon
accounting treatment through a full lifecycle analysis that considers upstream emissions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0672, pp. 1-2]
Thank you for considering our comments and we look forward to working with you on
meaningful and achievable solutions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from transportation.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0672, pp. 1-2]
Thank you for considering our comments and we look forward to working with you on
meaningful and achievable solutions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from transportation.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0672, pp. 1-2]
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Organization: Minnesota Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
PERFOMANCE BASED/TECHNOLOGY NEUTRAL RULEMAKING NEEDED
The EPA is proposing that upstream emissions accounting for BEVs, which under the current
regulations would begin in MY 2027, would be removed under the proposed program; thus,
BEVs would continue to be counted as zero grams/mile in a manufacturer's compliance
calculation. This is clearly not a performance-based or technology-neutral proposal, and it would
have dire consequences for all other technologies which could potentially reduce emissions at
lower cost, more quickly, with fewer geopolitical implications (such as critical minerals), and
with greater consumer acceptance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 4-5]
A recent study4 by Argonne National Lab, in cooperation with coauthors from the automotive
and energy industries, shows a BEV with 400-mile range (BEV400) has lifecycle GHG
emissions of about 250 g/mi. This is an improvement from a conventional internal combustion
engine vehicle (ICEV) which is about 430 g/mi. However, the lifecycle GHG emissions of a
BEV are far from zero. In fact, lifecycle GHG emissions of a BEV400 are comparable to other
low-emission options such as E85 or PHEV. Regulations based only on tailpipe emissions are
clearly inadequate for comparing BEVs to other pathways for reducing GHG emissions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 4-5]
4 Kelly et al., "Cradle-to-Grave Lifecycle Analysis of U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle-Fuel Pathways: A
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Economic Assessment of Current (2020) and Future (2030-2035)
Technologies", report ANL-22/27, June 2022.
The Argonne report demonstrates that other "vehicle-fuel pathways" can compete with BEVs.
For example, a conventional gasoline hybrid (HEV) achieves about 310 g/mi and E85 in a non-
HEV FFV achieves 260 g/mi. The future potential of HEVs combined with FFV technology,
utilizing E85, is comparable to future BEVs with wind and solar power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0612, pp. 4-5]
The proposed rulemaking does not allow other vehicle-fuel pathways to compete with BEVs.
By regulating only tailpipe emissions, and ignoring the rich literature of lifecycle analysis, EPA
would create artificial incentives for auto manufacturers to pursue only BEVs. This could have
disastrous impacts on both the cost and the GHG emissions of future vehicles. The same
Argonne report found the cost and GHG emissions of a BEV are strongly affected by the driving
range. A BEV with 400-mile range is dramatically more expensive than one with 200-mile
range, and its lifetime GHG emissions are substantially worse. In fact, a BEV with 400-mile
range has only a slight GHG benefit compared to a HEV or an E85 FFV. But the proposed rule
counts all BEVs as zero GHG emissions, regardless of battery size - and regardless of vehicle
size and weight. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 4-5]
UPSTREAM EMISSIONS
EPA's proposal continues to treat EVs as carbon neutral, without regard to the source of
electricity powering the vehicles. Depending on the sources of electricity - whether coal, natural
gas, wind or nuclear and the mix of those sources - full lifecycle emissions of EVs vary widely,
masking the true GHG emissions from these vehicles. Without accounting for upstream
emissions from these vehicles, full lifecycle emissions are not considered. Furthermore, EPA
notes in the proposal that increases in electricity demand will result in increased non-GHG
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emissions for some upstream pollutants. EPA does a disservice to emissions reduction goals by
accounting for upstream emissions from some fuels and vehicle technologies but not others,
providing an advantage to the sources for which "wells-to- wheels" upstream emissions are
excluded and concealing emissions from coal power generation, mineral extraction, and other
high-carbon sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 6]
Organization: National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) et al.
III. The Proposed Rule Fails to Account for the Lifecycle Emissions of Electric Vehicles.
Under the Proposal, electric vehicles effectively serve as the only means of compliance with
the standards in part because the Agency focuses solely on tailpipe emissions rather than the full
lifecycle emissions of light- and medium-duty EVs. This is a flawed approach. To ensure an
accurate accounting of the lifecycle carbon intensity associated with each technology, EPA
should incorporate lifecycle emissions into its analysis. This will facilitate continued investment
in all decarbonization technologies alongside deployment of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
Though EVs do not directly have tailpipe emissions, other segments along the lifecycle of the
EV do. The fuel source of an EV—a battery composed of carbon intensive minerals and the
electricity generated to power the battery—produces meaningful emissions to which the Proposal
turns a blind eye. Addressing the impact of climate change, however, requires mitigating
emissions irrespective of whether they originate from a tailpipe, a mining operation, a power
plant, or a battery plant. Consequently, emissions standards should account for the entire
lifecycle emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
EPA's analysis examines only logistical challenges to EV manufacturing and does not
account for carbon impacts of critical mineral mining, the use of natural resources for refining
and processing, engine and battery manufacturing, and other confounding variables such as
prolonged ICE turnover rates and vehicle end-of-life consequences. Importantly, a lifecycle
analysis of EV emissions impacts will better equip EPA to understand the varying costs and
emissions reductions associated with all technologies and best inform manufacturers and
consumers of their options. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
EPA also makes flawed assumptions regarding the total emissions impacts of the Proposal.
Despite claiming that "upstream emissions impacts from fuel production at refineries and
electricity generating units are considered in EPA's analysis of overall estimated emissions
impacts and project benefits," 31 this analysis uses overgeneralizations and assumes cleaner and
less expensive generation over time—incorrectly assuming as a certainty that the power sector
will become cleaner through the increased use of wind and solar generation as well as electricity
storage (e.g., batteries) despite opposition from the power sector.32 Although the Agency
concedes these assumptions will still result in "some increases in ambient pollutant
concentrations" and that "the specific locations of increased air pollution are uncertain," EPA
fails to meaningfully engage with the consequences of even its own flawed analysis.33 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
31 Proposed Rule at 29,252.
32 See, e.g., David Pomerantz, The New York Times, "Guess Who's Been Paying to Block Green Energy?
You Have." (Jul. 5, 2023) available at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/05/opinion/utility-bills-clean-
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energy.html; Susan Cosier, "Why Electric Utilities Are Resorting to Dark Money and Bribes to Resist
Renewables," Audubon, March 16, 2021, available at https://www.audubon.org/news/why-electric-utilities-
are-resorting-dark-money-and-bribes-resist- renewables ("Many utility companies cling to old business
models and dirty fuels rather than go through the tough energy transition that climate change demands.")
Comment from Southern Company on EPA Proposed Rule, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0723,
Comment ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0723-0029 (Dec. 21, 2022) available at
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0723-0029 (advocating for continued
construction of new EGU infrastructure for fossil fuels and cautioning against unattainable limits for
existing coal and natural gas EGUs); Valerie Volcovici and Nichola Groom, Reuters, "U.S. utilities want
protection from Biden's tight timeline in clean energy mandate" (Apr. 14, 2021) available at
https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/us- utilities-want-protection-bidens-tight-timeline-
clean-energy-mandate-2021-04-14/.
33 Proposed Rule at 29,361.
The Proposed Rule fails to adequately evaluate local ambient air quality impacts from
increased power generation. Though EPA modeled changes to power generation anticipated by
the Proposed Rule as part of its upstream analysis, the Agency does not consider the potential
degradation of air quality in areas in the direct vicinity of existing or new power plants.34 This is
further complicated by the fact that emissions associated with electricity generation are not
consistent across the U.S. In contrast to EPA's generalized emissions benefits, the emissions
advantages of EVs are much lower in states with relatively high carbon profiles for electricity
generation than those states with relatively low carbon profiles. Indeed, the Fuels Institute
analyzed these differences and concluded that in states with high-carbon intensity electric
generation, such as West Virginia, ICE vehicles produced decidedly less carbon emissions
relative to EVs over the entire 200,000-mile life of the vehicles.35 Of course, the Report
recognizes emissions advantages to EVs in those low-carbon states as well, but these differences
further illustrate the importance of accurately accounting for full lifecycle emissions. Instead of
comprehensively accounting for these emissions in compliance calculations, the Agency
proposes to continue providing EVs with a discounted emissions rate by allowing these vehicles
to be counted as producing 0 g/mile of C02, and solidifying preferential treatment of one mode
of technology: electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
34 Proposed Rule at 29,361.
35 Ricardo Inc., FUELS INSTITUTE, "Lifecycle Analysis Comparison" (Jan. 2022) available
https://transportationenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/FI_Report_Lifecycle_FINAL.pdf.
While ICE-powered vehicles generally emit more carbon dioxide during operation, the
emissions associated with the manufacturing of ICE-powered vehicles are significantly lower
than those emitted from battery-electric vehicles.36 There is no climate rationale for EPA to
pursue this rulemaking from a state of willful blindness over these distinctions. A recent
examination conducted by Volvo provides a directly applicable case study. Volvo concluded that
the "accumulated emissions from the [mjaterials production and refining, [Lithium-ion] battery
modules and Volvo Cars manufacturing phases of C40 Recharge are nearly 70 percent higher
than for XC40 ICE."37 Volvo explains, "[electrification of cars causes a shift of focus from the
use phase to the materials production and refining phase."38 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648,
pp. 10-12]
36 See IEA, "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transition" (May 2021) available at
https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions; see also David Biello,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, "Electric Cars Are Not Necessarily Clean,"(May 11, 2016) available at
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https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/electric-cars-are-not-necessarily-clean/ ("Your battery-powered
vehicle is only as green as your electricity supplier"); see also Nina Lakhani, THE GUARDIAN,
"Revealed: How US Transition to Electric Cars Threatens Environmental Havoc," the Guardian, (January
24, 2023) available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jan/24/us-electric-vehicles-lithium-
consequences-research. ("The US's transition to electric vehicles could require three times as much lithium
as is currently produced for the entire global market, causing needless water shortages, Indigenous land
grabs, and ecosystem destruction.").
37 Elisabeth Evrard, et al., VOLVO, "Carbon footprint report - Volvo C40 Recharge," (2021), pg. 24,
available at https://www.volvocars.eom/images/v/-/media/Market"
Assets/INTL/Applications/DotCom/PDF/C40/Volvo-C40- Recharge-LCA-report.pdf.
38 Id. atpg. 5.
Further, the Proposed Rule overlooks the emissions impacts from the substantial expansion of
the electrical grid. While EPA credits emissions reductions from assuming the power sector will
become cleaner over time using renewable generation and electricity storage (e.g., batteries), it
ignores the impacts of building out that associated infrastructure. New power generation,
renewable power generation, and energy storage require the same critical minerals necessary for
manufacturing EV batteries. Increased electricity demand will only further compound the stress
on critical minerals. Indeed, copper and aluminum—both needed for EVs—are also the two main
materials in wires and cables. Battery storage equipment for solar and other renewable energy
sources rely on similar battery chemistries as EVs.39 Again, EVs may be the most
environmentally compelling solution, but it does neither the climate nor American consumers
any favors for the Agency to pretend the solution is more compelling or achievable than it
actually is. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
39 And, as described above, higher prices on these materials could have a major impact on future grid
investments. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy
Transitions (Mar. 2022), 77-80, available at https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-
980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.
The simultaneous spike in demand for materials such as copper and aluminum for both the
grid and EV manufacturing will increase extraction and refining efforts globally, potentially
exacerbating consequences on a regional level.40 By failing to consider geographic electricity
generation differences and the potential benefits of a non-homogenized vehicle population, the
Proposal misses the opportunity to most effectively respond to emissions concerns and, more
importantly, could indirectly lead to increased emissions in certain regions. A full accounting of
the relative advantages and disadvantages of the different vehicle technologies is necessary to
ensure the Proposal harnesses the benefits of competition among different current and potential
future vehicle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
40 The U.S. is almost entirely dependent on other countries, especially China, for materials essential to
manufacturing EVs, meaning the Proposal may potentially raise national security concerns.
Organization: National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)
The EPA is proposing that upstream emissions accounting for BEVs, which under the current
regulations would begin in MY 2027, would be removed under the proposed program; thus,
BEVs would continue to be counted as zero grams/mile in a manufacturer's compliance
calculation. This is clearly not a performance-based or technology-neutral proposal, and it would
have dire consequences for all other technologies which could potentially reduce emissions at
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lower cost, more quickly, with fewer geopolitical implications (such as critical minerals), and
with greater consumer acceptance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 3]
A recent study 4 by Argonne National Lab, in cooperation with coauthors from the
automotive and energy industries, shows a BEV with 400-mile range (BEV400) has lifecycle
GHG emissions of about 250 g/mi. This is an improvement from a conventional internal
combustion engine vehicle (ICEV) which is about 430 g/mi. However, the lifecycle GHG
emissions of a BEV are far from zero. In fact, lifecycle GHG emissions of a BEV400 are
comparable to other low-emission options such as E85 or PHEV. Regulations based only on
tailpipe emissions are clearly inadequate for comparing BEVs to other pathways for reducing
GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 3]
4 Kelly et al., "Cradle-to-Grave Lifecycle Analysis of U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle-Fuel Pathways: A
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Economic Assessment of Current (2020) and Future (2030-2035)
Technologies", report ANL-22/27, June 2022
The Argonne report demonstrates that other "vehicle-fuel pathways" can compete with BEVs.
For example, a conventional gasoline hybrid (HEV) achieves about 310 g/mi and E85 in a non-
HEV FFV achieves 260 g/mi. The future potential of HEVs combined with FFV technology,
utilizing E85, is comparable to future BEVs with wind and solar power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0643, pp.3-4]
The proposed rulemaking does not allow other vehicle-fuel pathways to compete with BEVs.
By regulating only tailpipe emissions, and ignoring the rich literature of lifecycle analysis, EPA
would create artificial incentives for auto manufacturers to pursue only BEVs. This could have
disastrous impacts on both the cost and the GHG emissions of future vehicles. The same
Argonne report found the cost and GHG emissions of a BEV are strongly affected by the driving
range. A BEV with 400-mile range is dramatically more expensive than one with 200-mile
range, and its lifetime GHG emissions are substantially worse. In fact, a BEV with 400-mile
range has only a slight GHG benefit compared to a HEV or an E85 FFV. But the proposed rule
counts all BEVs as zero GHG emissions, regardless of battery size - and regardless of vehicle
size and weight. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 3-4]
EPA's proposal continues to treat EVs as carbon neutral, without regard to the source of
electricity powering the vehicles. Depending on the sources of electricity - whether coal, natural
gas, wind or nuclear and the mix of those sources - full lifecycle emissions of EVs vary widely,
masking the true GHG emissions from these vehicles. Without accounting for upstream
emissions from these vehicles, full lifecycle emissions are not considered. Furthermore, EPA
notes in the proposal that increases in electricity demand will result in increased non-GHG
emissions for some upstream pollutants. EPA does a disservice to emissions reduction goals by
accounting for upstream emissions from some fuels and vehicle technologies but not others,
providing an advantage to the sources for which "wells-to-wheels" upstream emissions are
excluded and concealing emissions from coal power generation, mineral extraction, and other
high-carbon sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 4]
Organization: National Farmers Union (NFU)
IV. Regulatory Bias in Favor of Battery Electric Vehicles
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EPA is proposing that upstream emissions accounting for battery electric vehicles (BEVs) as
part of a manufacturer's compliance calculation, which under the current regulations would
begin in MY 2027, be removed; "thus, BEVs would continue to be counted as zero grams/mile in
a manufacturer's compliance calculation." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,197. We do not believe such an
approach is appropriate for a performance-based or technology-neutral proposal, as this approach
would disadvantage and have negative consequences for all other technologies even if those
technologies can reduce emissions at a lower cost, more quickly, with fewer geopolitical
implications (such as those related to the need for critical minerals), and with less obstacles to
gain increasing consumer acceptance that is critical to expand electric vehicle use. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 6]
Numerous studies have used lifecycle analysis to quantify GHG benefits of BEVs compared
to other options including hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) and renewable fuels. As these studies
show, BEVs are not zero emissions. Further, they are not the most cost-effective way to reduce
GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 6]
The proposed rulemaking would not allow other vehicle-fuel pathways to compete with
BEVs. By regulating only tailpipe emissions, EPA would create artificial incentives for only
BEVs. This could have disastrous effects on both the cost and the GHG emissions of future
vehicles. As shown in Figure 37 from the same Argonne report (reproduced below), 14 the cost
and GHG emissions of a BEV are strongly affected by the driving range. A BEV with a 400-mile
range is dramatically more expensive than one with a 200-mile range, and its lifetime GHG
emissions are substantially worse. A 400-mile-range BEV has only a slight GHG benefit
compared to a HEV or an E85 internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV). But the proposed rule
would count all BEVs as zero GHG emissions, regardless of battery size, vehicle size, or
weight—all of which can have an impact on lifecycle GHG emissions and costs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 8]
14 Id. at 114.
[See original comment for graph of Lifetime Cost vs. GHGs, Current Tech] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0581, p. 8]
But the proposed emissions standards fail to address the large and growing problem of
particulate emissions from tires, and instead focus on more stringent tailpipe particulate
standards which will add cost without necessarily improving air quality. EPA should not
artificially incentivize heavy BEVs by counting them as "zero emissions," when lighter weight
solutions can provide similar GHG emissions benefits and better safety. EPA needs to look
beyond the tailpipe and create holistic standards which incentivize real improvements. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 12]
Organization: Natural Gas Vehicles for America
EPA Must Amend its Proposal to Account for Benefits of Biofuels
NGVAmerica is not alone in making the case that EPA must amend its proposal. Other
organizations including the refinery industry, independent fuel retailers, and the ethanol industry
have argued that EPA must make a course correction and following through on its prior
commitment to do so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 9-10]
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In 2012, EPA10 committed to sunset the use of the 0 g/mi allowance for electric vehicles as
explained below:
10 2012-21972.pdf (govinfo.gov)
EPA is finalizing the full net upstream GHG emissions approach for the compliance treatment
for EV/PHEV/ FCVs beyond the per-company vehicle production threshold caps in MYs 2022-
2025. EPA is not adopting any type of "phase-in", i.e., the compliance value will change from 0
g/mi to the full net upstream GHG emissions value once a manufacturer exceeds the cap. EPA
believes that the levels of the per company vehicle production caps in MYs 2017-2025 are high
enough to provide a sufficient incentive such that any production beyond those caps should use
the full net upstream GHG emissions accounting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 9-10]
The preamble to that rule included the following discussion aptly summarizing the opposition
to the use of the 0 g/mi standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 9-10]
Two automakers opposed the use of 0 g/mi. Honda "believes that EPA should separate
incentives and credits from the measurement of emissions. Honda believes that without
accounting for the upstream emissions of all fuels, inaccurate comparisons between technologies
will take place * * *. EPA's regulations need to be comprehensive and transparent. By zeroing
out the upstream emissions, EPA is conflating incentives and credits with proper emissions
accounting." EcoMotors International "encourages EPA to drop the 0 g/mile tailpipe
compliance value." Environmental advocacy groups also opposed the 0 g/ mi compliance
treatment. The Natural Resources Defense Council claimed that 0 g/mi "undermines" the
pollution and technology benefits of the program. Along with other environmental groups, the
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy also opposed 0 g/mi, but added that "[m]ost
important, however, is that a zero-upstream treatment of plug-in vehicles not be continued
indefinitely, and that full upstream accounting be applied to these vehicles by a date certain.
EPA's proposed treatment of EVs largely accomplishes this, so we strongly support that aspect
of the proposal." The American Petroleum Institute argued that "[i]gnoring the significant
contribution of (and extensive compilation of published literature on) upstream C02 emissions
from electricity generation, defies principles of transparency and sound science and distorts the
market for developing transportation fuel alternatives. It incentivizes the electrification of the
vehicle fleet with a pre- defined specific and costly set of technologies whose future potential is
not measured with the same well-to-wheels methodology against that of advanced biofuels or
other carbon mitigation strategies." Organizations advocating fuels other than electricity also
opposed the use of 0 g/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 10-11]
Despite the expressed views, EPA nevertheless retained the 0 g/mi standard. In defense of
continuing to retain the 0 g/mi treatment and providing multiplier credits, EPA stated that: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 10-11]
EPA believes that it is both reasonable and appropriate to accept some short- term loss of
emissions benefits in the short run to increase the potential for far- greater game-changing
benefits in the longer run. The agency believes that these multipliers may help bring some
technologies to market more quickly than in the absence of incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0597, pp. 10-11]
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The European Biogas Association eloquently explained why the EU Commissions rules
should account for well-to-wheel emissions and their explanation is worth including here: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 10-11]
The current "tank-to-wheel" approach does not compare the different technologies
appropriately because it ignores emissions associated with the production of the fuel. It does not
recognise the positive contribution of renewable fuels such as biomethane to climate protection,
and thus biases one technology over others without a climate protection rationale. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 10-11]
The revised C02 regulation should propose technology-neutral solutions to reduce emissions
in an accelerated and cost-effective way. It should avoid one-size-fits-all options that could prove
insufficient in the long-term and may lead to a slow, unfair and costly emissions reduction
process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 10-11]
The C02 regulation should be amended to ensure an integrated transition that picks no single
green technology over others and leaves no-one behind. All alternative fuels are necessary if
transport decarbonisation is to be delivered at pace. 11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 10-
11]
11 SMART C02 STANDARDS FOR LEAN MOBILITY (europeanbiogas.eu)
Organization: Nebraska Corn Board (NCB) and Nebraska Corn Growers Association
This proposal gives EVs an unfair advantage when the EPA upstream emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0583, p. 1]
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
In addition to an adjusted assumed EV phase-in schedule that accounts for market and societal
challenges, the program should account for appropriate tailpipe emission benefits. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0594, pp. 5-6]
- Nissan supports EPA's proposal to extend its policy of measuring GHG emissions for all
vehicles, including EVs, based on tailpipe emissions, and not including upstream emissions
associated with the electricity that powers these vehicles. Nissan supports the proposal to
permanently apply a 0 g/mi C02 measure for EV operation without any quantity cap. This is
consistent with EPA's long-term goal of increasing the EV market share and with the fact that
automobile manufacturers only control tailpipe emissions and have no control over the fuel
source for electric power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, pp. 5-6]
VII. Endorsement of Comments from the Alliance for Automotive Innovation
As a member of the Alliance for Automotive Innovation ("the Alliance"), Nissan fully
endorses the comments on the Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule submitted separately by the
Alliance. In particular, Nissan highlights several points from the Alliance's comments, including:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Support continuation of tailpipe-based program and treatment of 0 g/mi for EVs [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
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Organization: North Dakota Farmers Union (NDFU)
Regulatory Bias in Proposed Rule
EPA is proposing that upstream emissions accounting for BEVs as part of a manufacturer's
compliance calculation, which under the current regulations would begin in MY 2027, be
removed; "thus, BEVs would continue to be counted as zero grams per mile in a manufacturer's
compliance calculation." This is not an appropriate approach for a performance-based or
technology-neutral proposal, because it would disadvantage all other technologies, regardless of
whether those technologies can reduce emissions at a lower cost and more quickly. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 5]
The proposed rulemaking would not allow other vehicle-fuel pathways to compete with
BEVs. By regulating only tailpipe emissions, EPA would create artificial incentives for only
BEVs. This could have disastrous effects on both the cost and the GHG emissions of future
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 5]
Organization: Plains All American Pipeline, L.P.
In addition, the Proposal fails to fully consider all the implications and costs of effectively
mandating EVs.8 It is contrary to a robust energy policy where all forms of energy are utilized to
maintain and improve quality of life and promote economic growth. By effectively mandating a
particular consumer product (i.e., EVs), the Proposal is favoring one technology, while
dismissing the potential benefits of a more holistic approach to emission reduction, and
additional conservation activities / mandates. It also omits from the discussion advances in
technologies including lower carbon fuels, hybrid EVs and fuel cells, which are moving us
towards a lower-emission future while also offering consumers multiple options to meet their
needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, p. 2]
8 https://consumerenergyalliance.org/cms/wp-
content/uploads/2023/06/CEA_EV_REPORT_2023.pdf
For all the above these reasons, Plains strongly urges the EPA to withdraw the Proposal, or in
the alternative, modify the Proposal so that it employs a technology-neutral approach that
accounts for the lifecycle emissions of all fuels and vehicles, not just tailpipe emissions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, p. 2]
Organization: Plug In America
3. EPA requests comments on its proposed treatment of electrified vehicles in manufacturer
compliance calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0625, pp. 2-3]
Plug In America agrees with the EPA that manufacturers of either EVs or fossil-fuel vehicles
should not account for upstream utility emissions in compliance calculations. EPA regulates
fossil-fuel-fired power plants under separate authority and expects declining GHG emissions in
the future. EPA should continue to focus on tailpipe emissions and count any vehicle with zero
tailpipe emissions as Og/mi as its compliance value. Consistent with other light-duty vehicles,
compliance calculations should only include tailpipe emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0625, pp. 2-3]
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Organization: POET, LLC
OnLocation also finds that if BEV upstream emissions are considered, "real-world" emissions
to the atmosphere from covered vehicles would be at levels significantly higher than the
proposed compliance standards. More specifically, if upstream fuel production emissions are
accounted for regarding BEVs, the Proposed Rule's 86 gram per mile target in 2032 cannot be
met when using electric grid GHG emission intensities from EIA, the leading U.S. governmental
source for independent energy statistics and analysis. 116 Note that OnLocation's analysis does
not seek to account for battery manufacturing lifecycle emissions, which is addressed in Trinity's
report, as described above. As Trinity has shown, "actual BEV lifecycle emissions would be
even higher if battery manufacturing impacts are considered." 117 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp. 26-27]
116 Id. at 1, 10.
117 Id. at 10.
OnLocation further finds that "using only tailpipe emissions provides inconsistent incentives
between BEV and ICE vehicles, while optimistic projections for the grid carbon intensity and
BEV penetration could reduce the effectiveness of the Proposed Rule in reducing carbon." 118
Regarding electric grid intensity, OnLocation finds that EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis
(DRIA) using its model shows a 70% reduction of power sector-related C02 emissions from
current levels by 2055, while EIA's reference case "shows closer to a 50% reduction from
current levels and substantially less C02 reduction if renewable costs do not decline as quickly
as in the Reference scenario." 119 While ICE vehicles have incentives under the proposal to
reduce their tailpipe GHG emissions, BEVs and the electric grid lack GHG reduction incentives
since the Proposed Rule effectively assumes that all electricity used by BEVs is zero carbon. 120
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 26-27]
118 Id. at 14.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 16.
Scenario 6: Adding Low Carbon Fuel and Upstream Emissions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp. 47-48]
[See original attachment for Figure 11 Compliance Path with Low Carbon Fuel and Upstream
Emissions] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 47-48]
[See original attachment for Figure 12 Market Shares with Low Carbon Fuel and Upstream
Emissions] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 47-48]
Scenario 6 presents a 75% reduction in fuel carbon intensity for gasoline, though including
upstream emissions including those for BEVs. Figure 11 and Figure 12 show that using the
model compliance with the Proposed Rule's targets still could be achievable, though outside of
2027 - 2032 timeframe when considering both upstream emissions and the impact if biofuels
reduce ICE vehicle carbon intensity by 75%. In this scenario, the market share of BEVs only
changes slightly from the Proposed Rule, however in the model greater total emission reductions
(i.e., those that consider upstream emissions) are achieved by deploying low-carbon ICE
vehicles. This scenario shows that with lower-carbon ICE fuels (such as low carbon bioethanol),
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and considering upstream emissions, compliance within the range of EPA's proposed target is
possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 47-48]
Ignoring Upstream Emissions is Inconsistent with Incentivizing GHG Emission Reductions
The following section demonstrates that using only tailpipe emissions provides inconsistent
incentives between BEV and ICE vehicles, while optimistic projections for the grid carbon
intensity and BEV penetration could reduce the effectiveness of the Proposed Rule in reducing
carbon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 48]
Upstream Emissions are Uncertain
While EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA) using its model shows a 70%
reduction of power sector- related C02 emissions from current levels by 2055. As shown in
Figure 13, EIA's reference scenario shows closer to a 50% reduction from current levels and
substantially less C02 reduction if renewable costs do not decline as quickly as in the Reference
scenario. If included in the C02 targets, differences between grid emissions and projections used
in the Proposed Rule could have a significant impact on the ability of manufacturers to achieve
compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 48]
[See original attachment Figure 13. Grid Intensity] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 48]
Source: AEO 2023 Reference, High Technology Cost Tables 8, 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, p. 48]
Manufacturing emissions differ between EV and ICE [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp.
49-50]
[See original attachment for Figure 14. Vehicle Manufacturing Emissions] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
Emissions for BEV200, BEV300, and BEV400 compared with midsize gasoline ICEV.
Source: Cradle-to-Grave Lifecycle Analysis of U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle-Fuel Pathways: A
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Economic Assessment of Current (2020) and Future (2030-
2035) Technologies, Argonne National Lab, 2022 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
As shown in Figure 14, compared with a midsize gasoline ICEV, a BEV has higher emissions
from vehicle manufacturing under current technologies, ranging from approximately 10
gC02e/mi in a BEV200, to 25 gC02e/mi in a BEV300, and 35 gC02e/mi in BEV400, according
to the lifecycle analysis by the Argonne National Lab (battery emissions are embedded in Figure
14 within "vehicle" emissions, and are most significant in the data in Figure 14 labelled "Current
Tech"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
Relative to the -80 gC02e/mi EPA proposed compliance value, where the alternatives are +-
10 gC02e/mi, these are substantial incremental emissions that are neglected when upstream
emissions are ignored. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
Ignoring upstream emissions has other negative effects on incentivizing reductions of GHG
emissions from LDVs, including disregarding the substantially greater GHG manufacturing
footprint of BEVs over conventional vehicles and decreasing incentives for clean electricity
(since EPA assumes, under the Proposed Rule's compliance scheme, that all electricity used in
EVs is effectively zero carbon). This analysis also shows that a rulemaking that also considers
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low-carbon ICE vehicles (such as enabled by low-carbon bioethanol) can facilitate compliance
with EPA standards while decreasing the larger system emissions (including upstream
emissions) in the atmosphere. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 50]
The first of these concerns is that U.S. EPA has ignored upstream sources of GHG emissions
other than electricity generation. This is of particular concern given that there are significant
upstream emissions associated with the manufacturer of batteries for BEVs that do not occur
with conventional vehicles. A paper published by ICCT4 notes that estimates of these GHG
emissions range from 56 to 494 kilograms of C02eq emissions per kWh of battery pack capacity
which translates to between about 5 and 50 metric tons of GHG emissions per 100 kWh battery
pack. Using U.S. EPA's assumption that the Proposed Rule will result in an additional
80,000,000 BEVs on the road in the U.S. by 2055 relative to the no- action case, and these
estimates of GHG emissions from battery production, the cumulative increase in GHG emissions
by would be between 400 and 4000 metric tons. This value can be compared to U.S. EPA's 710
metric ton estimate of the cumulative GHG emissions increase due to electricity generation for
BEVs and the 8,000 ton reduction from conventional vehicles (see DRIA Table 9-21) to show
the importance of accounting for battery production emissions. U.S. EPA might respond by
noting that they have not accounted for upstream GHG emissions associated with the production
of gasoline and diesel, but those are small compared to the GHG emissions from fuel combustion
and accounting for them would assume a net global reduction in the use of those fuels which
would likely, even with the Proposed Rule, still be used in other parts of the developing world.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 62]
4 https ://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/EV-life-cycle-GHG_ICCT-Briefing_09022018_vF.pdf.
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
Porsche supports the zero upstream accounting of emissions for pure electric vehicles (and
FCVs) and recognizes that stakeholders may view additional credit opportunities for these
vehicles as resulting in vehicles with "negative C02" values. Stakeholders may claim that the
optics of having a vehicle with "negative C02" appears nonsensical. However, Porsche contends
that it is appropriate to step back and reconsider that the GHG fleet average regulations are not
intended to be, and do not operate as, individual vehicle regulations. The program is not designed
to reflect individual real-world performance of such vehicles. Rather, the C02 regulation is a
fleet level policy that operates in essence as an accounting program that utilizes a variety of
calculations and credit mechanisms to drive down the overall annual C02 emissions of a
manufacturer's fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 20]
Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)
I. Executive Summary
EPA's proposed tailpipe emissions standards for 2027 and later years set extremely
aggressive goals for reducing vehicular greenhouse gas (GHG) and criteria pollutant emissions.
Achieving these goals would require dramatic changes not only in vehicle design, but also in the
entire transportation energy supply chain. In addition, meeting the proposed emissions standards
in the manner envisioned by EPA would require a massive and rapid shift in the vehicle
purchasing and refueling behavior of American consumers. Indeed, if the rule is finalized as
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proposed, EPA projects that electric vehicles (EVs) "could account for 67% of new light-duty
vehicle sales and 46% of new medium-duty vehicle sales in MY 2032." 1 By comparison, EVs
accounted for just 5.8% of new light-duty vehicle sales in 2022 and accounted for just 1% of
total registered light-duty vehicles.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 3-4]
1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Biden-Harris Administration Proposed Strongest-Ever Pollution
Standards for Cars and Trucks to Accelerate Transition to a Clean-Transportation Future." April 12, 2023.
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris-administration-proposes-strongest-ever-pollution-
standards-cars-and.
2 Kelly Blue Book. "America Splits Into Thirds on Electric Cars." (March 22, 2023).
https://www.kbb.com/car- news/america-splits-into-thirds-on-electric-cars/.
While EVs are likely to play an important role in achieving emissions reductions goals, the
growth in EVs projected by EPA would require enormous investment and rapid expansion in
many global industrial sectors. Such a transition would require immediate and dramatic growth
in the mining and processing of critical minerals, a massive increase in the generation and
distribution of lower-carbon electricity, and the rapid buildout of a nationwide infrastructure
network for recharging EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 3-4]
It would be naive and unrealistic to believe that such extraordinary changes in the
marketplace can be achieved smoothly and quickly. There are numerous obstacles involved in a
transition of this scale, including geopolitical and national security concerns; long lead times in
permitting, material supply, design, and manufacturing; substantial capital investments; safety
considerations; and unprecedented changes in consumer behavior and purchasing habits. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 3-4]
To achieve the Agency's ambitious emissions reduction goals in the most robust, rapid, and
affordable way, EPA should use this rulemaking to encourage multiple additional solutions that
can decarbonize light- and medium duty transportation. EPA must also recognize that vehicles
and fuels operate as integrated systems. Focusing only on emissions from the vehicle—while
ignoring emissions related to the extraction and production of the fuel used to power the
vehicle—will almost certainly result in falling far short of the administration's overall climate
goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 3-4]
Low-carbon liquid fuels like ethanol have a unique and vital role to play in the
administration's efforts to combat climate change and reduce overall emissions from the
transportation sector—both immediately and in the long term. Fuels such as El 5 (15% ethanol)
are compatible with nearly all vehicles on the road today, and thus offer immediate emissions
benefits on a much larger scale than changes to only new vehicles. In addition, E85 (51-83%)
ethanol) used in flexible fuel vehicles (FFVs) can substantially reduce GHG emissions from the
light-duty vehicle sector. More than 25 million FFVs are already on the road today and FFV
production can be ramped up quickly by automakers at no additional cost to the consumer. In the
longer term, low-carbon or zero-carbon liquid fuels used in FFVs or plug-in hybrid electric FFVs
can offer emissions solutions for market segments and customers that may not be well served by
battery electric vehicles (BEVs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 3-4]
To foster a vibrant and competitive landscape of multiple low-carbon solutions, it is critical
for EPA to set performance-based and technology-neutral emissions standards. Unfortunately,
the proposed rule falls short of this ideal by focusing narrowly on one technology and only one
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segment of the GHG emissions lifecycle (i.e., tailpipe emissions). It is essential that EPA look
beyond tailpipe emissions; the Agency should use a full lifecycle3 analysis to fairly and
accurately compare the climate impacts of all current and future transportation options. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 3-4]
3 Throughout these comments, the terms "full lifecycle analysis" refer to a complete "well-to-wheel"
analysis as defined by Argonne National Laboratory.
II. The Proposed Rule Uses Inappropriate GHG Accounting Gimmicks to Create a De Facto
Mandate for Battery Electric Vehicles
For light-duty vehicles, EPA is proposing an industry-wide average GHG emissions target of
82 grams C02/mile (g/mile) in model year (MY) 2032. This represents a drastic 56% reduction
from the MY 2026 target of 186 g/mile and a 63% reduction from the MY 2022 target of 224
g/mile. Notably, the estimated industrywide average GHG emissions rate has exceeded the
annual standard each year since 2016, requiring automakers to use banked credits and other
adjustments to comply.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 4-5]
4 Congressional Budget Office. "Emissions of Carbon Dioxide in the Transportation Sector." December
2022. https ://www.cbo.gov/publication/58861.
For the purposes of calculating fleet-average GHG emissions, EPA is proposing to allow auto
manufacturers to use a compliance value of 0 g/mile for BEVs, fuel cell electric vehicles
(FCEVs), and the electric-only portion of operation for plug-in hybrid EVs (PHEVs). As EPA
acknowledges, a compliance value of 0 g/mile for EVs ignores the upstream emissions
associated with battery production and electricity generation (i.e., the "fuel" for EVs). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 4-5]
Given the stringency of the proposed standards (and the inability of most internal combustion
engine (ICE) vehicles to meet them), EPA expects auto manufacturers will be strongly
compelled to substantially increase EV production in order to benefit from the 0 g/mile
assumption when calculating fleet-wide average emissions. According to EPA's own analysis, it
is highly unlikely that automakers will be able to meet EPA's proposed emissions standards for
2027-2032 without dramatically increasing the production of EVs and reducing the production of
ICE vehicles. The proposal's forced push toward EVs would be exacerbated by EPA's proposal
to eliminate the "multiplier incentive" that allows automakers to count one BEV as more than
one "zero emissions vehicle" in compliance calculations. In this way, EPA is essentially forcing
auto manufacturers to increase production of EVs, and in turn forcing the entire transportation
supply chain to undergo a massive shift toward electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602,
pp. 4-5]
While significantly increasing the production of EVs may help automakers comply with the
proposed future emissions standards, such a transition certainly does not guarantee that real-
world GHG emissions associated with the full transportation supply chain will be meaningfully
reduced. In fact, depending on the sources of electricity used to power EVs and the practices
used for extraction and refining of critical battery minerals, EPA's proposal to force increased
EV production could fall far short of accomplishing the administration's climate objectives.
Thus, EPA's tailpipe emissions standards could perversely incentivize the production and sale of
more expensive vehicles that, in reality, have little practical impact on reducing overall
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 4-5]
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a. BEVs are Not "Zero Emissions Vehicles." Counting Only Tailpipe Emissions Results in a
Flawed and Incomplete Assessment of the True Climate Impacts of BEVs
EPA's proposal to assign a value of 0 g/mile to BEVs ignores the fact that significant C02
emissions result from the extraction and processing of the critical minerals for EV batteries, as
well as the production of electricity for BEVs. Some lifecycle analysis studies show that certain
BEVs (using coal-generated electricity and battery minerals from intensive mining practices)
may have a larger carbon footprint than conventional vehicles using liquid fuels in internal
combustion engines.5,6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 5-6]
5 See, for example, Paul Leinert. "Analysis: When do electric vehicles become cleaner than gasoline cars?"
Reuters. July 7, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/when-do-electric-vehicles-
become-cleaner-than- gasoline-cars-2021-06-29/.
6 International Energy Agency. "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions." May 2021.
https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions.
On average basis, a recent comprehensive analysis by Argonne National Laboratory (in
cooperation with automotive and energy industry experts) found that the full lifecycle GHG
emissions associated with a typical 400-mile range BEV are approximately 253 g/mile.7 This
estimate takes into account the upstream emissions associated with the EV battery and
production of the electricity used to power the vehicle. While the 253 g/mile figure represents a
roughly 40% reduction in GHG emissions compared to a gasoline-powered ICE vehicle, it is far
from "zero emissions." At the same time, the Argonne study found that using today's average
E85 in an ICE FFV resulted in lifecycle GHG emissions of approximately 255 g/mile—generally
the same as the 400-mile BEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 5-6]
7 Kelly et al., "Cradle-to-Grave Lifecycle Analysis of U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle-Fuel Pathways: A
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Economic Assessment of Current (2020) and Future (2030-2035)
Technologies", report ANL-22/27, June 2022. https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1875764.
EPA's proposed approach of assigning a 0 g/mile value to BEVs essentially assumes that the
electricity and battery minerals powering the BEV are 100% renewable and free of any C02
emissions impacts in every instance. Of course, we know this is not the case. Today, more than
60% of U.S. electricity generation comes from fossil fuels that contribute significant C02
emissions (19.5% coal, 40% natural gas, 1% petroleum and other).8 Wind and solar provide only
13.6%) of the nation's electricity, with hydropower providing another 6.2%. Nuclear accounts for
18%) of U.S. electric power generation. Overall, electric power generation is the second largest
source of GHG emissions in the United States, accounting for 25% of total emissions (trailing
only the transportation sector, which is responsible for 28% of U.S. emissions).9 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 5-6]
8 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "What is U.S. electricity generation by energy source?" March
2023. https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3.
9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions." Accessed June 17,
2023. https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions.
To ensure the final tailpipe standards have the desired effect of truly reducing GHG emissions
from transportation, RFA strongly urges EPA to adopt a full lifecycle GHG accounting approach
for all vehicles in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 5-6]
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III. EPA Admits its GHG Accounting Loophole for BEVs is Not Rooted in Science and is
Instead Meant to Incentivize Production of BEVs
In the proposal, EPA readily acknowledges that operation of an EV is directly responsible for
some amount of upstream GHG emissions related to electricity generation. Yet, the Agency
proposes to ignore these emissions and continue the use of a scientifically dubious assumption
that operation of an EV is entirely free of any GHG impacts. Indeed, EPA says it is proposing to
continue the 0 g/mile compliance value for BEVs strictly as a means of "encouraging the
continued development and introduction of electric vehicle technology." 10 In other words, EPA
proposes to use the 0 g/mile compliance value as a veiled subsidy to compel the production of a
specific technology to the exclusion of other technologies that could deliver similar levels of
emissions reduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 6-8]
10 88 Fed. Reg. 29252 (May 5, 2023).
The Agency's reasoning for maintaining the 0 g/mile compliance value for BEVs is highly
questionable. EPA says it is continuing the 0 g/mile assumption because in 2020, "power sector
emissions were declining and the trend was projected to continue." 11 Yet, EPA also reports that
"[i]n 2021, the electric power sector was the second largest source of U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions, accounting for 25% of the U.S. total."12 EPA data show the electric power sector
emitted nearly 1.6 billion metric tons of GHG emissions in 2021, yet the Agency's proposal
effectively assumes those emissions don't exist and have no bearing on the climate impacts of
EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 6-8]
11 Id.
12 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions." Accessed July 1,
2023. https://www.epa.gOv/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions#electricity (emphasis added).
Additionally, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), "C02
emissions created in the U.S. electric power sector rose by 7% in 2021 (102 MMmt) as a result
of changes in both electricity usage and fuel mix." 13 The 7% increase in electric power sector
emissions was more than double the 3% increase in electric power generation, as the use of coal
and petroleum both increased in 2021. EIA reports that these changes "led to a 4% increase in
the carbon intensity of electricity" in 2021.14 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 6-8]
13 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "U.S. Energy Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions 2021."
Accessed May 20,
2023.https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/carbon/#:~:text=Commercial%20sector%20emissions%2
0increased%20by,in%20the%20electricity%20fuel%20mix. (emphasis added).
14 Id.
[See original comment for graph of electricity generation] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602,
pp. 6-8]
While the use of coal for electricity declined in 2022 versus 2021, the use of both petroleum
and natural gas for electricity in 2022 increased over 2021 levels, meaning total fossil fuel use
for electricity continued to increase in 2022.15 Clearly, it is not safe to simply assume that
electric power sector emissions will steadily decline over time, especially as electricity demand
increases as a result of expanded EV sales and other factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602,
pp. 6-8]
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15 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Monthly Energy Review." Table 7.2a Electricity Net
Generation. Accessed July I, 2023. https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec7_5.pdf.
Notwithstanding the fact that RFA favors a full lifecycle GHG analysis and recommends
against the use of the 0 g/mile compliance value for EVs, if EPA intends to use g/mile
compliance values as policy incentives to stimulate the production of lower-carbon vehicles, it
should be equitable in doing so. If the Agency believes it has the authority to compel greater
production of lower-carbon vehicle technologies using GHG compliance values that always
assume the best-case technology and energy mix, then it should do so fairly across the full
portfolio of lower-carbon fuel and vehicle options. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 6-8]
IV. EPA Should Discontinue the Use of its Zero Gram per Mile Emissions Assumption for
BEVs
EPA's proposal solicits comment on the "proposed treatment of electrified vehicles in
manufacturer compliance calculations" (i.e., the use of a 0 g/mile compliance value). 16 For the
reasons described throughout these comments, RFA strongly recommends that EPA discontinue
the use of its 0 g/mile compliance value for BEVs. The 0 g/mile value unfairly compels
automakers to produce one specific technology type, while also providing an inaccurate and
incomplete picture of the true climate impacts of EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 8-
9]
16 88 Fed. Reg. 29252 (May 5, 2023).
Importantly, the 0 g/mile measure was also meant to be temporary. EPA previously finalized
regulations that would phase down and ultimately eliminate the 0 g/mile compliance value for
EVs. In response to public comments on EPA's 2012 proposed rule for MY 2017 and later light-
duty vehicle GHG standards, the Agency finalized an approach that would have required
automakers to account for upstream electricity emissions for all MY 2022 and later EVs.
However, in the 2020 vehicle GHG emissions standards rule, EPA reversed this approach and
instead extended the use of the 0 g/mile compliance value through MY2026, with no phasedown.
Now, defying the original temporary intent of the 0 g/mile value, EPA proposes to make the 0
g/mile assumption permanent for EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 8-9]
RFA believes the 0 g/mile compliance value for EVs should be discontinued with MY2026 or
sooner, as this "incentive" results in inaccurate accounting of emissions related to BEVs and it is
no longer necessary to spur production of EVs. As EPA acknowledges, the 0 g/mile "functioned
as intended" to stimulate increased production in EVs, which are "now coming into the
mainstream "17 As stated by EPA, automakers have already committed enormous investments
toward EVs, and increased production of EVs is strongly incentivized under state policies and
other federal programs like the Inflation Reduction Act. Thus, no additional incentive is needed
under the tailpipe emissions regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 8-9]
17 Id.
It is time for EPA to eliminate the use of the 0 g/mile compliance value for EVs and adopt a
full lifecycle approach for determining GHG values. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 8-9]
VI. EPA Should Adopt a Full Lifecycle Analysis Approach for All Vehicle Options that
Includes Upstream GHG Emissions Associated with Vehicle Fuel/Energy Use
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Vehicles and fuels operate together as integrated systems. This is true whether the system is a
battery electric vehicle operating on electricity, or an ICE vehicle operating on liquid fuel. To
effectively regulate emissions associated with the operation of light- and medium-duty vehicles,
EPA must adopt approaches that most accurately assess the overall climate impacts of various
transportation options. Specifically, EPA should examine the full scope of lifecycle GHG
emissions associated with each vehicle/fuel system and allow automakers to use g/mile
compliance values that reflect the overall GHG impacts of various vehicle/fuel options. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 11-12]
In the proposal, EPA requests comments on its proposed treatment of electrified vehicles in
manufacturer compliance calculations (i.e., the use of a 0 g/mile compliance value for EVs). As
part of its rationale for proposing to maintain the 0 g/mile value for EVs, the Agency states that
"[i]f EPA deviated from this tailpipe emissions approach [i.e., using 0 g/mile] by including
upstream accounting, it would appear appropriate to do so for all vehicles, including gasoline-
fueled vehicles."28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 11-12]
28 88 Fed. Reg. 29252 (May 5, 2023).
RFA agrees with this statement by EPA and recommends that the Agency should indeed
adopt an approach that accounts for full lifecycle emissions for all fuel and vehicle combinations.
In fact, this is the only scientifically defensible approach for regulating emissions from light- and
medium-duty vehicles. Implementing an approach that accounts for all lifecycle emissions would
not only open the automotive market to greater competition and lower costs for consumers, but it
would stimulate investment in lower- carbon technologies and practices across the entire
fuel/vehicle supply chain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 11-12]
RFA believes the final rule should take a market-based approach that sets clear and
predictable annual full lifecycle GHG reduction requirements for automakers (in g/mile values),
then allows the marketplace to determine the most cost-effective means for achieving the
reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 11-12]
Robust, peer-reviewed methodologies already exist for conducting full lifecycle emissions
analysis for current and future vehicle and fuel options. Specifically, EPA should use the
Department of Energy Argonne National Laboratory GREET model, which is accepted
worldwide as the most robust and authoritative tool for lifecycle GHG accounting for a wide
array of transportation fuels. The GREET model is also updated annually to incorporate the latest
data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 11-12]
VII. If EPA Maintains its Zero Gram per Mile Incentive for EV Production, the Agency
Should Allow for a Similar Incentive for FFV Production
For the reasons described in detail above, RFA objects to the continued use of a 0 g/mile
compliance value for EVs for the purposes of calculating fleet averages. However, if EPA
ultimately finalizes a permanent incentive of 0 g/mile for EVs, then it must consider applying a
similar incentive for other low-carbon vehicle technologies, including FFVs that can operate on
E85 and other higher ethanol blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 12-13]
EPA's proposed approach for BEVs (i.e., using a value of 0 grams/mile) essentially assumes
every BEV produced by automakers will only use zero-carbon renewable electricity over the
entire lifespan of the vehicle. In other words, EPA's proposal credits all BEVs for their
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maximum potential C02 benefit, without requiring any evidence that such a benefit is actually
achieved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 12-13]
In order to create an equitable opportunity for biofuels to contribute to the effort to
decarbonize light-duty transportation, EPA should institute a C02 emissions compliance value
that similarly recognizes the potential carbon benefits of light-duty vehicles designed to operate
on liquid fuels containing high levels of renewable ethanol. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602,
pp. 12-13]
EPA's final rule should adopt an assumption that FFVs operate on E85 all the time, just as the
proposed 0 g/mile value effectively assumes BEVs operate on zero-carbon electricity all the
time. Automakers who manufacture FFVs should be allowed to use a C02 emissions compliance
value that reflects the lifecycle C02 savings from using E85. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602,
pp. 12-13]
According to the latest Argonne National Laboratory GREET model results, E85 made with
average corn ethanol reduces full lifecycle C02-equivalent GHG emissions by 31% per mile
compared to gasoline.29 This estimate includes hypothetical/potential emissions from direct and
indirect land use changes. Accordingly, for the purposes of calculating fleet averages, EPA
should allow automakers to use a C02 compliance value for an FFV that is 31% lower than the
compliance value for a corresponding non-FFV model. As an example, if a non-FFV car is
determined by the automaker to have a C02 value of 181 g/mile, the automaker should be
allowed to use a compliance value of 125 g/mile for an FFV version of that same car. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 12-13]
29 The GREET2022 model shows that EO gasoline results in fleet average full lifecycle GHG emissions of
421 g/mile, compared to fleet average emissions of 291 g/mile for the use of E85 in an FFV. Results
verified via personal communication between RFA and Longwen Ou of Argonne National Laboratory.
This approach to incentivizing FFVs would be no different than the approach EPA has used
historically, and is proposing to continue, for incentivizing EV production. This FFV mechanism
would create a more level playing field for low-carbon liquid fuels and would provide a
meaningful incentive for automakers to manufacture FFVs in addition to BEVs. Increased
production of FFVs would unlock increased use of lower-carbon liquid fuel blends containing
higher levels of ethanol, such as E85 and E30. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 12-13]
Alternatively, EPA could allow auto manufacturers to use the same 0 g/mile compliance value
for ethanol's portion of FFV operation, given that the ethanol-related "tailpipe" C02 emissions
from an FFV are biogenic in nature and fully offset by atmospheric C02 removal by the biomass
feedstock at the beginning of the lifecycle. That is, if EPA remains committed to focusing only
on tailpipe emissions (and ignoring upstream fuel production and supply chain emissions), then
biofuels like ethanol should be treated as "zero emissions" fuels because C02 emissions from the
vehicle are fully offset by C02 uptake by the feedstock. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp.
12-13]
Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
EPA must accurately account for tailpipe emissions and should not lose sight of upstream
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, p. 9]
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EPA is also proposing that BEVs and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs)—i.e., vehicles with
no internal combustion—retain a zero gram per mile (g/mi) compliance value and not be
required to account for upstream emissions under the GHG standards.69 This aligns with the
standards' treatment of other, fossil fuel-powered vehicles. Even though this regulatory regime
deals specifically with tailpipe emissions, EPA should not lose sight of the upstream GHG or
other emissions associated with light- and medium-duty vehicles—ZEVs or otherwise. We
therefore support EPA's consideration of future gasoline fuel property standards that could
provide additional meaningful reductions in PM emissions.70 However, even more could be
done. Some states, for example, are leading the way by implementing low carbon fuel standards
that consider lifecycle GHG emissions from energy used for fuel.71 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0591, p. 9]
69 Id.
70 See id. at 29197.
71 See, e.g., KELSIBRACMORT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46835, A LOW CARBON FUEL
STANDARD: IN BRIEF 2 (2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R46835.pdf.
Organization: Specialty Equipment Market Association (SEMA)
Tailpipe Emissions vs. Lifecycle Emissions
SEMA is disappointed that this proposal exclusively looks at tailpipe emissions and not the
full carbon footprint surrounding the manufacture of BEVs, including their batteries and
components. The EPA's calculations should include the environmental impacts associated with
mining for battery minerals, manufacturing batteries, and the resources from the power grid to
power a full fleet of BEVs. Of note, the U.S. Energy Information Administration reported that
fossil fuels are the largest sources of energy for electricity generation in the United States with an
estimated 61% of all the electricity generated in 2021 coming from a combination of coal,
natural gas, and petroleum.4 While BEVs do not have tailpipe emissions, it is na'i ve to assume
that they are carbon neutral given the fossil fuels that the U.S. and other countries around the
world rely upon to produce the power to operate these vehicles. An analysis from S&P Global
Mobility found that for the sixth consecutive year in a row the average age of a vehicle on the
road today is 12.5 years old. Conversely, the "average age of battery electric vehicles in the U.S.
fell to 3.6 years down slightly from 3.7 years in 2022."5 According to a 2022 EPA report on
greenhouse gas emissions, new vehicle fuel economy has increased 32% since model year
2004.6 SEMA believes that tailpipe emissions can continue to be reduced without shifting to a
zero-based tailpipe emissions model. A diverse approach to addressing GHG emissions through
a multifaceted approach of cleaner fuels, alternative fuels and electrification provides consumers
with a choice in how they reduce their carbon footprint. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 4]
4 U.S. Energy Information Administration: Electricity in the United States (Link:
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/electricity-in-the-us.php).
5 S&P Global Mobility: US consumers keep vehicles for a record 12.5 years on average (Link:
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/us-consumers-keep-vehicles-record-125-years-
average-sp-2023-05-15/).
6 The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report (Link: https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-
12/420s22001.pdf).
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Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Accordingly, Tesla asserts the EPA should amend its proposal with a more stringent version
of Alternative 1 and take, inter alia, the following additional steps to increase the performance
and overall stringency of the proposed standards: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
2 See, 88 Fed. Reg. 29332-33, Table 96.
3 Id., at 29348 (comparing Tables 135 and 136).
- Maintain the existing zero emissions upstream approach for BEVs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0792, p. 2]
A number of studies show that the light-duty sector must rapidly decarbonize beginning this
decade to meet the U.S. commitments. Further, the need for the rapid deployment of light-duty
BEVs is even more critical given the lengthening time it takes to turn over the light-duty fleet.
Currently, the average age of light-duty vehicles on the road in the U.S. is now at an all-time
high of 12.5 years compared to two decades ago when the average age was 9.7 years.58 To meet
the goal of limiting global warming for below 1.5 degrees C the passenger fleet must primarily
be composed of BEVs by 2050.59 Given the aging vehicle fleet, this requires vehicles sales
consisting of 100% BEVs in the early 2030s.60 Other studies have similarly highlighted BEV
sales need to reach 95% by 2035 to meet the 1.5 degree C target.61 Still others have found that
in order to meet net-zero emission by 2050 60% of vehicle sales must be BEVs in 2030 with no
new ICE vehicle sales occurring after 2035.62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 9]
58 Axios, Gas-powered cars won't die off any time soon (May 15, 2023) available at h
ttps://www.axios.com/2023/05/15/ev- e lectric-vehicles-gas-trucks-suvs-cars-a
ging?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosgenerate&stream=top
59 Dimanchev, et al. T he 4Ds of Energy Transition: Decarbonization, Decentralization, Decreasing Use
and Digitalization, E lectric Vehicle Adoption Dynamics on the Road to Deep Decarbonization (July 15,
2022) (highlighting that published pathways indicate that the passenger vehicle fleet must be primarily
comprised of zero-emission vehicles by 2050, in a future consistent with keeping global warming below 2
or 1.5 °C. With the average lifetime of internal combustion cars in the U.S. is 16 years, achieving a ZEV
share consistent with 1.5°C pathways would require a combination of a relatively early ban by around 2030
and an average non-ZEV lifetime shorter than 10 years.) available at h
ttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9783527831425.ch8 (last visited Sept 12, 2022).
60 Id.
61 Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Net-Zero Road Transport By 2050 Still Possible, As Electric Vehicles
Set To Quintuple By 2025 (June 1, 2022) (finding that be on n track for a net-zero global fleet by 2050,
zero-emission vehicles need to represent 61% of global new passenger vehicle sales by 2030, 93% by 2035,
and the last ICE vehicle of any segment needs to be sold by 2038.) available at h
ttps://about.bnef.com/blog/net-zero-road-transport-by-2050-still-possible-as-electric-vehicles-set-1 o-
quintuple-by-2
025/?utm_source=Email&utm_campaign=596500&utm_medium=Newsletter&utm_content=BNEFMonthI
nReviewJune&t a ctic=596500&pchash=
62 International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2022, An updated roadmap to Net Zero
Emissions by 2050, How do we get to net zero emissions by 2050? (Oct. 27, 2022) available at h
ttps://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook- 2 022/an-updated-roadmap-to-net-zero-emissions-by-
2050#abstract; See generally, ICCT, Emissions reduction benefits of a faster, global transition to zero-
emission vehicles (March 2022) available at https://theicct.org/wp-c ontent/uploads/2022/03/Accelerated-
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ZEV-transition-wp-f inal.pdf?utm_source=ICCT+mailing+list&utm_campaign=01b4a8f70d-l
ately_from_feb2018_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_ef73e76009-01b4a8f70d-510835924
EPA's Continuation of Its Zero Upstream Emissions Approach is Appropriate
Tesla agrees with the agency's decision to continue its approach of not requiring net upstream
emissions accounting for BEVs in these standards. 160 As described supra, BEVs represent the
best emission reduction technology and have by far the lowest climate impact of any vehicle
technology, and, in this regard, should not be treated differently than ICE vehicles. To date, EPA
has not gone outside the tailpipe to account for upstream petroleum production or petroleum
refinery emissions in setting ICE vehicles emission standards. Instead, the agency has
historically sought to addresses these dangerous emissions through separate stationary source
regulations. 161 Similarly, in addressing electricity as a vehicle fuel, emissions from electric
generating units are otherwise addressed through stationary source regulation. 162 Accordingly,
Tesla agrees that "If EPA deviated from this tailpipe emissions approach by including upstream
accounting, it would appear appropriate to do so for all vehicles, including gasoline-fueled
vehicles." 163 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 25-26]
160 Id., at 29252.
161 See e.g. EPA, Petroleum Refinery Sector Rule (Risk and Technology Review and New Source
Performance Standards) available at h ttps://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/petroleum-
refinery-sector-rule-risk-and-technology-r eview-and-new; EPA, Clean Air Act Standards and Guidelines
for Petroleum Refineries and Distribution Industry available at h ttps://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-
pollution/clean-air-act-standards-and-guidelines-petroleum-refineries-and
162 EPA, Greenhouse Gas Standards and Guidelines for Fossil Fuel-Fired Power Plants available at h
ttps://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/greenhouse-gas-standards-and-guidelines-fossil-fuel-
fired-power
163 88 Fed. Reg. at 29252.
Organization: The Aluminum Association
The EPA's Proposal is Inconsistent With its Obligation to Account for Upstream Emissions
and Does Not Take Into Account Important Factors that Support Assigning Carbon Emissions to
BEVs
As referenced at 88 FR 29252, EPA requests comments on its proposed treatment of
electrified vehicles in manufacturer compliance calculations. Its proposed treatment reflects that
it plans to assign a permanent value of zero g/mile to BEV's and that this approach "has
functioned as intended, encouraging the continued development and introduction of electric
vehicle technology." While the Association agrees that this approach has incentivized the
development and implementation of electric vehicle technology, it's permanent use is
inconsistent with statutory requirements in addition to not fully considering incentives for
vehicle efficiency improvements as has been the case in the past. The EPA's prior rulemakings
showed that the agency recognizes a range of non-powertrain efficiency improvements, such as
lowering aerodynamic coefficients, lower rolling resistance tires, more efficient air conditioning
systems, and mass reduction as important components in helping automakers safely meet
increasingly aggressive GHG reduction and fuel efficiency targets for their fleets2. The
Association therefore encourages EPA to continue that focus in the current rulemaking. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 2-3]
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2 86 FR 74485
Specifically, concerns regarding statutory requirements and incentives for vehicle efficiency
improvements are further articulated below along with recommendations for addressing the
concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 3-4]
As expressed in prior rulemakings3, the alternative to the universal zero g/mile approach is to
use net upstream GHG emissions accounting to consider the GHG emissions impact of BEV's
and include them in sales fleet compliance calculations. This alternative is consistent with 49
USC 39204 (a)(2)(B)4 that requires the Administrator of the EPA to consider net upstream
emissions of electric vehicles when calculating fleet average fuel economy: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0704, pp.3-4]
3 77 FR 62651
4 49 USC 39204 - https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2021-title49/pdf/USCODE-2021-
title49-subtitleVI-partC-chap329-sec32904.pdf (Accessed June 23, 2023)
(B) If a manufacturer manufactures an electric vehicle, the Administrator shall include in
the calculation of average fuel economy under paragraph (1) of this subsection equivalent
petroleum based fuel economy values determined by the Secretary of Energy for various classes
of electric vehicles. The Secretary shall review those values each year and determine and
propose necessary revisions based on the following factors: (i) the approximate electrical energy
efficiency of the vehicle, considering the kind of vehicle and the mission and weight of the
vehicle, (ii) the national average electrical generation and transmission efficiencies... [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 3-4]
The EPA is not free to disregard the statutory mandate to consider net upstream GHG
emissions aligned with the Department of Energy's designation, albeit revising the process for its
implementation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 3-4]
EPA was set to properly implement this statutory requirement as of MY 2022, prior to
subsequent factors that delayed its implementation. In the rulemaking for GHG emissions from
light duty vehicles5 for the 2017-2025 Model Years, EPA determined that, while zero g/mile
GHG emissions would initially be assigned to EV's in order to incentivize their production/sale,
net upstream GHG emissions accounting would be applied to EV's once sales thresholds had
been met, which ultimately was expected for MY 2022 as per 77 FR 62651): [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0704, pp.3-4]
5 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards; Final Rule (77 FR 63624)
For EVs, PHEVs and FCVs, EPA is also finalizing, as proposed, to set a value of 0 g/mile for
the tailpipe C02 emissions compliance value for EVs, PHEVs (electricity usage) and FCVs for
MY 2017-2021, with no limit on the quantity of vehicles eligible for 0 g/mi tailpipe emissions
accounting. For MY 2022-2025, EPA is finalizing, as proposed, that 0 g/mi only be allowed up
to a per-company cumulative sales cap, tiered as follows: 1) 600,000 EV/ PHEV/FCVs for
companies that sell 300,000 EV/PHEV/FCVs in MYs 2019- 2021; or 2) 200,000
EV/PHEV/FCVs for all other manufacturers. Starting with MY 2022, the compliance value for
EVs, FCVs, and the electric portion of PHEVs in excess of individual automaker cumulative
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production caps must be based on net upstream accounting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704,
PP- 4-5]
In rulemakings subsequent to the original 2017-2025 rulemaking, EPA has postponed
implementing this provision and now suggests that it need not follow this path at all because the
program has successfully achieved its goals of "encouraging the continued development and
introduction of electric vehicle technology" without it. Yet EPA is losing sight of the fact that the
long-term applicability of net upstream GHG emissions accounting to EV's continues to be the
most effective way to capture differences in EV efficiencies and therefore provide incentives for
efficiency improvements chronologically across model years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704,
pp. 4-5]
EPA also finds that zero grams/mile is appropriate because of expectations regarding power
sector emissions, which may or may not be borne out by the future facts. EPA further relies on
the notion that "if EPA deviated from this tailpipe emissions approach by including upstream
accounting, it would appear appropriate to do so for all vehicles, including gasoline-fueled
vehicles." It is understood that current ICE based standards do not include emissions for gasoline
production. However, nearly all the GHG emissions for an ICE vehicle come from burning
gasoline while nearly all the GHG emissions for an EV come from electricity generation.
Aligned with this reality, the Association believes that GHG emissions related to actual
propulsion of the vehicle must be accounted for, regardless of the mechanism that provides that
propulsion and that meaningful measures of efficiency must be provided for customers and
manufacturers to act upon that would result in reduced GHG emissions overall. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0704, p. 5]
In order to comply with its statutory requirements and incentivize continued efficiency
improvements in both the internal combustion and electrified vehicle fleets of the future in the
most implementable way, EPA should utilize the existing metrics of miles per gallon (MPG) for
internal combustion engine vehicles and miles per gallon equivalent (MPGe) for electrified
vehicles as surrogates for GHG emissions. Using this metric, the GHG emissions related to
actual propulsion of the vehicle are accounted for, regardless of the mechanism that provides that
propulsion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, p. 5]
Alternately, EPA can include a fixed electric generation emission value per kWh for MY
2027-2032 vehicles in the standard for calculation of vehicle emissions for BEV vehicles, based
upon their efficiency. The emissions associated with generating 33.7 kWh of electricity (or 23.16
kWh/gal if the proposed revision to 10 CFRPart 474 (EERE-2021-VT- 0033) is enacted) can
then be used along with the values obtained from vehicle dynamometer testing to get the g/mile
C02 emissions for any BEV. This would provide an incentive for improved vehicle efficiency
and would also allow comparability between the EPA rules and the upcoming revised
DOT/NHTSA CAFE standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 5-6]
In order to achieve the competitive offering that will attract wider consumer adoption, BEV's
will need to come down in cost and increase driving range. The major constraint that drives both
overall vehicle cost and range is the size and weight of the battery pack required to achieve the
desired performance. Based upon current production technology, lithium-ion battery specific
energy density is between 150-200 wh/kg. Therefore, at an average consumption of
~0.30kwh/100 mi, for the average BEV to achieve a range of 300 miles, it will require a battery
pack of 90-100 kwh, which can cost upwards of $15K dollars per car. Since the largest cost
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component of a BEV are the batteries, cost reductions are critical to reaching price parity with
gas-powered vehicles.10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 7-8]
10 According to Wright's Law, for every cumulative doubling of units produced, battery cell costs should
fall by 28%.
A 100 kwh battery pack can add over 650 Kg of mass to the vehicle. Therefore, a BEV can
save approximately $50 for every mile of range improvement by a reduction of the battery pack
of 0.3 kwh or by a vehicle mass reduction of just 2kg. and, the lighter the vehicle, the smaller the
battery pack needed, which further reduces mass and cost. As can be seen in Figure 1, BEV's
with lower curb weight are significantly more efficient in their energy consumption. Therefore,
mass reduction technology will remain a critical incentive beyond 2030 to ensure that the
industry does not reverse the trend of improving vehicle efficiency in larger/heavier vehicles,
thereby permitting the downsizing of IC engines to achieve significant improvements in
emissions. In a similar fashion the EPA should not create the circumstance where there is no
regulatory compliance difference between a large heavy BEV that requires an oversized battery
to achieve the desired range performance and consumes significantly more energy per mile than
a smaller lighter BEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 7-8]
[See original for graph titled "Figure 1: BEV Curb weight vs. Energy Consumption, Source:
OEM Product Data Sheets"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 7-8]
This disregard for vehicle efficiency distinction across BEV's in the proposed rule conflicts
with the existing and historic approaches of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
program and is a potential disruption to harmonization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 7-
8]
Taken in totality, assigning GHG emissions to BEV's accounts for emissions differentials
between vehicles which will incentivize the best technologies for all vehicles regardless of
propulsion system. For EV's in particular, efficiency drives lower costs, which will assist with
faster adoption. Efficiency also permits smaller batteries for the same range, which is essential
for less critical mineral/material usage. Finally, efficiency promotes lighter weight vehicles in the
larger vehicle classes, which enhances societal safety. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 8-
10]
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
Toyota supports EPA's proposal to permanently codify the zero g/mile treatment of tailpipe
emissions for BEVs, FCEVs, and the all-electric driving portion of PHEVs. We have long
opposed auto manufacturers being held responsible for upstream emissions beyond our control.
That said, we do believe vehicle technology assessments supporting GHG rulemakings should
account for life-cycle emissions under real-world operating conditions when evaluating the
relative benefits of competing technologies. Limiting technology assessments to tailpipe
emissions ignores factors such as geography, weather, and power sources which can
mischaracterize the true relative performance and value of electrified powertrains, missing
opportunities for further GHG emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 32]
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Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
B. EPA has inappropriately made the 0 g/mile upstream incentive permanent in the
proposed rule.
EPA has proposed to "indefinitely exclude upstream emissions from BEV compliance
calculations."332 EPA has long maintained that its decision to not count upstream emissions
from BEVs was to provide a "temporary regulatory incentive."333 A temporary incentive was
appropriate because while EVs do not have a tailpipe, the incentive did not "reflect the increase
in upstream GHG emissions associated with electricity used by EVs."334 As EPA explained, in
2010 a midsize EV caused a net upstream GHG emissions increase of about 120 grams/mile
compared to a midsize gasoline car.335 EPA's proposal to permanently extend this incentive is
entirely unmerited. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 62-64]
332 Proposed Rule at 29247.
333 See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324, 25434-5 (May 7, 2010) (hereinafter 2010 rule); 2017 and Later
model Year Light- Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62624, 62650-1 (Oct. 15, 2012) ("In order to provide temporary regulatory
incentives . . . EPA is [] finalizing. . . a value of 0 g/mile."); see also, Proposed Rule at 185 ("[T]he 0 g/mile
accounting was temporary.").
334 2010 Rule at 25435.
335 Id.
EV charging necessarily affects the grid, one such effect is a contribution to greater electricity
demand during peak demand hours.336 While today's grid has seen some emissions reductions
in annual total output emission rates since 2010,337 based on EPA's own prior analysis,
upstream greenhouse gas emissions would have needed to fall by two-thirds (or -66%) from
2010 to the present day before the upstream emissions increase caused by EVs is equivalent to
the ICE's upstream emissions.338 But greenhouse emissions, from a pure generation-basis
perspective, have not fallen by nearly the required amount based on EPA's most recently
available data.339 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 62-64]
336 See Siobhan Powell et al., Charging infrastructure access and operation to reduce the grid impacts of
deep electric vehicle adoption, NATURE ENERGY 7, at 932 (Jan. 1, 2022).
337 Cf. eGRID 9th edition Version 1.0 Year 2010 GHG Annual Output Emission Rates, EPA (Feb. 2015),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-02/documents/egrid_9th_edition_vl-
0_year_2010_ghg_rates.pdf, with eGRID Summary Tables 2021, EPA (Jan. 30, 2023),
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023- 01/eGRID202 l_summary_tables.pdf
338 See 2010 Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25435.
339 In 2010, the U.S. average GHG emissions rate for electricity was 1,238.52 lbs/MWh C02e (eGRID 9th
edition Version 1.0 year 2010 GHG Annual Output Emission Rates, supra). But in 2021, the U.S. average
GHG emissions rate was 857.0 lbs/MWh C02e (eGRID Summary Tables 2021, supra, at 2), that means
U.S. average GHG emissions have only fallen by approximately one-third.
Even worse, the emissions associated with power plants called upon to supply the grid at peak
hours generally have higher emissions per generated MWh.340 A fact borne out in EPA's data
that shows that non-baseload power, which reflects the power dispatched to the grid during peak
demand,341 has not seen any major declines in C02 emissions since 2010, and is worse than the
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emissions associated with baseload power in 2010.342 This data suggests that the impact of EVs
on C02 emissions might be, at best, nearly identical to the upstream emissions increase in 2010.
Regardless of which emissions source is used to calculate an EV's true footprint. Indeed, the
table below illustrates just how arbitrary and inappropriate it is for EPA's proposal to ignore the
upstream emissions increase caused by electric vehicle in light of this reality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 62-64]
340 See DOE, Emission Reduction Calculation Roadmap (Jan. 2019),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2019/01/f58/Emission_Roadmap_FINAL.pdf
341 Susy S. Rothschild & Art Diem, Total, Non-baseload, EGRID Subregion, State? Guidance on the Use
of eGRID Output Emission Rate, at 5 (last accessed May 2023),
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/chief/conference/eil8/session5/rothschild.pdf
342 In 2010, baseload power GHG emissions rate was 1,238.52 lbs/MWh C02e (eGRID 9th edition
Version 1.0 year 2010 GHG Annual Output Emission Rates, supra). In 2021, non-baseload GHG
emissions rate was 1,417.3 lbs/MWh C02e (eGRID Summary Tables 2021, supra, at 2). Despite the fact
that "non-baseload values should not be used for assigning an emissions value for electricity," (Rothschild
& Diem, supra) the non-baseload emissions rate reflects emissions for plants "that operate coincident with
peak demand for electricity." (id.) Because EVs are expected to increase demand at peak hours (See Powell
et al., supra) this may be the proper emissions rate to use when evaluating the upstream emissions
associated with EVs.
eGRID C02e Emissions
EV Upstream C02e Emissions343
ICEV Upstream C02e Emissions344
Net Increase345
2010 1,238.52 lbs/MWh346 173.6 g/mile
2021 857.0 lbs/MWh347 120.1 g/mile
2021 1,417.3 lbs/MWh348 198.6 g/mile
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 62-64]
343 Calculated based on 2022 Tesla Model 3 Long Range AWD with an efficiency of 0.26 kWh/mi (see
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/Find.do?action=sbs&id=45011). Calculation uses anEV charging
efficiency of 90% and a transmission efficiency of 93.5% (EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance
Modeling Runs, "onroad_fuels_20220325.csv," supra).
344 See 2010 Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25435. Refers to a "typical midsize gasoline car."
345 Calculated as (EV upstream C02e emissions) - (ICEV upstream C02e emissions).
346 EPA eGRID 9th edition Version 1.0 year 2010 GHG Annual Output Emission Rates.
347 EPA eGRID Summary Tables 2021.
348 Reflects non-baseload power emissions. (See eGRID Summary Tables 2021, supra, at 2.)
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
Upstream Emissions - Treatment of PEVs and FCEVs in the Fleet Average (Section III.B.7.)
60 g/mile 113.6 g/mile
60 g/mile 60.1 g/mile
60 g/mile 138.6 g/mile
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Volkswagen supports EPA's proposal to make the current treatment of fully electrified
vehicles (PEVs and FCEVs) through MY2026 permanent, accounting 0 g/mile toward emission
compliance. Upstream emissions are emitted by power plants when producing electricity.
Volkswagen supports the premise that upstream emissions linked to the production of electricity
should not be accounted for in on-road vehicle regulations. Volkswagen has no control or
influence on emissions from stationary source sectors and opposes tying emissions from
stationary sources being tied to motor vehicle regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p.
4]
The transition to - 0 g/mile GHG for PEVs and FCEVs holds vehicle manufacturers
accountable for our fleets in accordance with the standards. Energy suppliers have their own
goals and regulations as we transition to increased "green" energy production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0669, p. 4]
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
Congress did not give EPA authority to mandate the electrification of the vehicle fleet. The
Energy Policy Act and Clean Air Act do not allow EPA to set standards that cannot be met with
an internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEV). EPA does not have the authority to compel the
transition to completely new vehicle types under the guise of setti ng tailpipe standards for
ICEVs. Electric vehicles (EV) do not have a tailpipe, and although their emissions should be
evaluated over the full lifecycle and not assumed to be zero as EPA does with this proposed rule,
EPA only has authority to consider tailpipe emissions from ICEVs with this rule. EVs are
technically not subject to the standards and thus ineligible for the fleet averaging scheme. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 1]
Further, it is not at all clear that the proposed rule will reduce GHGs as planned. Pure plug-in
battery- powered vehicles can create more emissions than hybrid EVs (HEV) and even more than
some traditional ICEVs for a variety of reasons including the fuel mix of the electrical grid
where the EV is being charged and the large GHG footprint for producing the battery. The
manufacture of a battery can produce GHGs equivalent to driving 24,000 miles, in the case of a
Nissan Leaf up to 60,000 miles in the case of a Tesla Model S.4 Those numbers are before a
single mile is driven by the supposed ZEV with its associated GHGs from the electricity used.
When C02 emissions linked to the production of batteries and the energy mix are considered, a
study in Germany found EVs emit 11% to 28% more than their diesel counterparts. 5 Volvo
reports that in comparing a gas-burning model with its fully electric equivalent, with both
vehicles built in the same factory, on the same assembly line, and sharing a large number of
components, it found the electric version results in 70% more emissions.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0679, p. 3]
4 "A Data-Driven Greenhouse Gas Emission Rate Analysis for Vehicle Comparisons," SAE International,
Journal of Electrified Vehicles, V132-14EJ, April 13, 2022.
5 Kohlemotoren, Windmotoren und Dieselmotoren: Was zeigt die C02-Bilanz?, Crhristoph Buchal et al.,
Ifo Institut, 2019.
6 "Building An EV Produces 70% More Emissions Than ICE, Says Volvo," InsideEVs, Andrei Nedelea,
November 20, 2021.
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EPA needs better analysis of the GHG reductions by EVs. The assumption that they are "zero
emission" must be tested using a more comprehensive analysis of full lifecycle emissions
sources from EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 3]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
ZETA supports the proposal to continue omitting upstream emissions from electricity
generation for purposes of BEV C02 g/mile calculations. As EPA notes, this is not currently
done for ICE vehicles and there is a robust regulatory framework in place to reduce emissions
from stationary sources. ZETA encourages EPA to finalize this policy of omitting upstream
emissions from mobile source emissions control regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
p. 29]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
In Section III.B.7 of the preamble in the NPRM, EPA proposed making the current treatment
of PEVs and FCEVs through MY 2026 permanent; that is, EPA is including only emissions
measured directly from the vehicle in the vehicle GHG program for MYs 2027 and later,
consistent with the treatment of all other vehicles. Electric vehicle operation would continue to
be counted as 0 g/mile, based on tailpipe emissions only; thus, vehicles with no IC engine (i.e.,
BEVs and FCEVs) would be counted as 0 g/mile in compliance calculations, while PHEVs
would apply the 0 g/mile factor to electric-only vehicle operation (addressed in preamble Section
III.C.7). EPA requested comments on its proposed treatment of electrified vehicles (i.e., ZEVs)
in manufacturer compliance calculations.
We received comments from many stakeholders both supporting and opposing EPA's
proposed compliance treatment of ZEVs. In Section III.B.7 of the preamble in the NPRM we
discussed, at length, the justification for the decision to maintain a 0 g/mi tailpipe accounting for
ZEVs. However, we reiterate some of those reasons in responses below.
The following summary addresses similar comments made by multiple commenters.
Auto manufacturers (and a few electric vehicle consortia) universally supported EPA's
continued treatment of zero g/mi tailpipe emissions for BEVs, with some of them (GM, Honda)
citing that it was inappropriate to hold the auto industry accountable for emissions that are
beyond its control. EPA agrees with these comments. As we discuss in preamble Section III.C.7,
this approach of only regulating vehicle emissions and letting stationary source GHG emissions
be addressed by separate stationary source programs is consistent with how the compliance value
for every other motor vehicle is calculated (and has been calculated). Emissions from stationary
sources under CAA title I are regulated under an entirely different statutory scheme than mobile
sources under CAA title II and the upstream adjustment EPA originally adopted (in the 2012
rule) would make the compliance test results of BEVs depend in part on factors entirely beyond
the control of BEV manufacturers (i.e., the carbon emissions and transmission efficiency of the
electricity grid, as compared to emissions of the refinery sector). We note that while upstream
emissions are not included in vehicle compliance determinations, which are based on direct
vehicle emissions, upstream emissions impacts from fuel production at refineries and electricity
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generating units are considered in EPA's analysis of overall estimated emissions impacts and
projected benefits, as detailed in Sections VI and VII of the preamble.
Many commenters (including fuel suppliers and producers, renewable fuel producers, some
environmental groups, automotive suppliers) voiced their opposition to the proposed treatment of
ZEVs in compliance accounting and recommended that EPA include the upstream emissions
from fuel production in the compliance calculations for ZEVs. (Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency,
ACEEE, Arconic, BorgWarner, Clean Fuels Development, Commonwealth Agri-Energy, Delek
US Holdings, Doug Peterson, East Kansas Agri-Energy, Environmental and Public Health
Organizations, Exxon Mobil, John Graham, Kentucky AG, MECA, MEMA, Minnesota Corn
Growers, National Corn Growers, National Farmers Union, Natural Gas Vehicles for America,
Nebraska Corn Board, North Dakota Farmers Union, POET, Southern Environmental Law
Center, The Aluminum Association, Valero).
Some commenters (AFP, Peterson) argued that the CAA gives EPA the authority to establish
emissions of pollutants from "any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines... that endanger public health or welfare..." and that "this would obligate EPA to
abandon its position that ZEVs are emission-less and would have to account for upstream and
other lifecycle emissions."
Similarly, several traditional and alternative fuel providers argued that EPA lacks the statutory
authority to ignore upstream emissions for ZEVs (AVE, ACE, American Fuel and Petroleum
Mfrs, Clean Fuels Development Coalition, HF Sinclair, Kentucky AG, Marathon, NGVA,
POET, RFA, Valero).
Finally, some commenters claimed that our lack of upstream accounting for ZEVs renders the
rule "arbitrary and capricious" (API, Clean Fuels Dev, Kentucky AG).
Response:
To these four groups of comments summarized above, EPA disagrees. In short, we already
address those emissions under our stationary source provisions of Title I of the CAA; for further
discussion, reference our discussion in the preamble and additional responses to comments in
Sections 2 and 19 of the RTC.
In their comments, Arconic, the Aluminum Association, MECA and MEMA recommended a
fixed electric generation emission value per kWh for BEVs. While this is a different approach
than the prior upstream calculation in EPA's regulations (that would have been applicable for
future model years), it still adds an upstream component to the compliance calculation of vehicle
emissions. EPA disagrees with this recommendation; as we discuss above and at length in
Section III.C.7 of the preamble, we have provided a rationale for why we are only using tailpipe
emissions in calculating GHG compliance from all vehicles.
Some commenters (fuel suppliers, fuel producers, automotive suppliers, non-governmental
organizations, and a few environmental groups) advocated for EPA to adopt a full lifecycle
analysis (LCA) approach in its treatment of BEVs, PHEVs and FCEVs, which would include the
upstream emissions from fuel or electricity generation, including the mining and extraction of
feedstocks, and production and disposal of the vehicles. EPA disagrees and is not adopting full
lifecycle emissions in its regulation of motor vehicles. A majority of these commenters and
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similar comments are already represented in Section 19 of this RTC; likewise, responses for
those comments also apply to the commenters in this section.
Some commenters (e.g., AVE, ACEEE) expressed the importance and the various benefits of
more efficient BEVs and their belief that EPA has an obligation to regulate ZEV efficiency.
While EPA recognizes the importance of more efficient ZEVs, we do not believe it is necessary
or appropriate to adopt standards for efficiency. We believe there are strong market incentives
for manufacturers to produce efficient electric vehicles, as doing so will improve driving range
and reduce battery size and costs; in addition, the fuel economy and environment labels on new
vehicles provide consumers with information on efficiency via the range and annual fuel cost
metrics.
3.1.6 - PHEV utility factor
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
2.PHEV Utility Factor
EPA is proposing a change to PHEV fleet utility factor (FUF), which will result in a
calculated increase in GHG emissions of light- and medium-duty PHEVs. EPA claims "the real-
world data available today clearly no longer supports the FUF established in SAE J2841 more
than a decade ago."229 Auto Innovators disagrees and believes that the current published FUFs
should remain in use for the purposes of GHG and CAFE compliance calculations. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 124-127]
229 88 Federal Register 29253.
EPA's analysis is limited to multiple publications from the International Council on Clean
Transportation (ICCT). The ICCT publications focus on the limited electric driving share of
PHEVs in Europe. In Europe, some corporations purchased only PHEVs for their fleet to take
advantage of government incentives/subsidies. The users of these company cars could typically
fuel the vehicle for free, and unfortunately had no incentive to plug-in their vehicle. The situation
in Europe with tax incentives encouraging PHEVs coupled with limited charging infrastructure
available in predominantly multifamily dwellings is simply not comparable to the United States.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 124-127]
We have also observed that the proposal excludes several relevant peer-reviewed
publications, including papers by Toyota230 and UC Davis 231 that provide counter-balancing
arguments to the claims that the SAE FUF is no longer appropriate. The lack of consideration of
other studies, such as these, suggests that further consideration is required. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 124-127]
230 Hamza, K., Laberteaux, K. and Chu, K.C. "On inferred real-world fuel consumption of past decade
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles in the US," Environ. Res. Let. 17 (2022) 104053.
htps://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac94e8
231 Raghavan, S. and Tal, G. "Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle observed utility factor: why the observed
electrification performance differ from expectations." Int. J. Sustain. Transp. (2020) 16: 105-136
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For its U.S. analysis ICCT, inspired by the European analysis, evaluated two data sources:
user- reported data from Fuelly.com, and OBD data from the California Bureau of Automotive
Repair (BAR). For the Proposed Rule, EPA has taken the ICCT datasets and performed their
own analysis, which is essentially a copy of ICCT's work. The PHEV data analysis should
include nationwide usage data and be peer-reviewed before it is used in rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 124-127]
a)Fuelly Dataset
The data from fuelly.com is user-reported and subject to data entry errors. There is also a
potential for data bias in the self-selected participants. (For example, users are likely more
interested in fuel economy than the average driver, and may also be those less satisfied by their
fuel economy given their own unique driving habits.) It should not be relied upon. Further, the
fuelly.com data entry is built around gasoline fuel use with a miles per gallon perspective. An
example of the unsuitability of this data for regulatory analysis is shown in Figure 35, below.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 124-127]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 35: Fuelly.com data for Tesla Model 3.232 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 124-127]
Tesla 3 MPG
32 Tesla 3s have provided 313 thousand miles of real world fuel economy & MPG data.
Click here to view all the Tesla 3s currently participating in our fuel tracking program.
Any Engine" v
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232 Tesla 3 MPG - Actual MPG from 32 Tesla 3 owners (fuelly.com)
The Fuelly web app is primarily designed to track operating costs of gasoline vehicles and
does not appear to be intended for electric or plug-in vehicles. The web-app has only one entry
field for "fuel," which is intended to help users track their fuel costs. We have observed that
most Tesla drivers appear to enter their electricity kWh values in the "fuel" data field of the
Fuelly web app, where it is then treated as if it were gasoline. Although the graph shows "Avg
MPG", the data suggests that it is actually "miles per kWh". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 124-127]
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Most Tesla Model 3 users have entered between 3 to 4 miles/kW which converts to between
0.25 to 0.33 kWh/mile, the actual typical range of values for a Model 3. Vehicles entered as
having very high "Fuel" numbers such 11 miles/kWh (converts to 0.09kWh/mile), let alone those
entered as having 111 or 3,003 miles/kWh values (corresponds to between 0.009 kWh/mile to
0.0003 kWh/mile) are likely due to users forgetting to enter all of their charging events. It is
possible these Model 3 users only counted charging at a Tesla supercharger but not the kWh
from day-to-day charging at home. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 124-127]
As seen from the example above, electricity consumption values for a Model 3 and other
BEVs are mistaken for gasoline consumption, resulting in a distinguishable pattern of
impossibly low efficiency refueling events alongside normal refueling events. Data entry errors
like this would cause the Fuelly web application to severely over-estimate the fuel consumption
of PHEVs, therefore severely under-estimating the derived utility factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 124-127]
The refueling events for PHEVs having an accurately high charging frequency and utility
factor have been excluded as outliers by the Fuelly application because their fuel economy is
deemed too high. For example, a regularly charged Chevrolet Volt can attain 200+ MPG which
can be filtered from the distribution of re-fuel events because the value lies beyond Fuelly's 3-
sigma screening limit that is applied to fleet average MPG (see Figure 36 below). These
omissions further mischaracterize PHEV real-world fleet performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 124-127]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 36: Fuelly.com data for 2019 Chevrolet Volt.
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2019 Chevrolet Volt MPG
Based on data from 27 vehides 1,365 fuei-ups and 388 513 mites of driving the 2019
Chevrolet Volt gets a combined Avg MPG of 34 30 with a 2 40 MPG margin of error
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These errors can be readily identified and corrected through a tedious manual process, which
neither ICCT nor EPA appear to have attempted to date. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
124-127]
Given the web app is not designed for electric vehicles and the resulting plethora of
uncorrected errors, Fuelly.com data should not be considered in rulemaking, even as a secondary
source. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 124-127]
b)BAR Dataset
EPA also uses the California BAR OBD data downloaded from vehicles. The OBD data is
reliable and is certainly a valid source of information. Still, Auto Innovators has concerns with
which data is selected and how the data is processed and used. The proposal notes limitations
with data availability. The BAR smog test program did not begin tracking PHEV operation until
the 2019 model year. Participation in the program is required by vehicle age,233 or if a vehicle
has been registered in California after moving from another state. Given the dataset cited for the
proposal was collected during the 2022 calendar year, the age criteria do not apply. Therefore,
the data is predominantly from registered MY 2019-2022 PHEVs arriving from another state
collected during the 2020 through 2022 calendar years. Long-distance moves between states can
involve significant miles accumulated primarily in charge sustaining mode which skews the
recorded OBD data, making it unrepresentative of normal PHEV operation. Given that EPA
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accepted PHEVs with as low as 1,865 lifetime miles from the BAR dataset, even a few hundred
miles without charging can bias the data toward a lower utility factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 124-127]
233 Any vehicle 8 years or older, or vehicles 4 model years or older that change ownership. See Frequently
Asked Questions: Smog Check Program, CALIFORNIA BUREAU OF AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR,
htps://www.bar.ca.gov/consumer/smog- check-program/faq.
In the DRIA, EPA notes, "As of October 2022, the BAR OBD dataset has around 8,400
PHEV vehicles, and over 233.2 million vehicle miles traveled. The filtered dataset has 30 PHEV
models, and 2,060 individual vehicles that travelled 58.9 million miles."234 While some filtering
of data to exclude outliers is expected, removing approximately 75% of the vehicles and vehicle
mileage is not. As a result, many of the PHEV variants studied by EPA have a sample size of 30
vehicles, which is statistically insignificant to draw conclusions about real-world PHEV
operation. Most PHEVs in the cited BAR dataset underwent the smog check during 2020
through 2022 calendar years, which includes the COVID pandemic, which significantly altered
transportation trends. This period entailed unusual fluctuatioions in gasoline prices including a
10-year low in 2020 making for both unusual driving patterns and less motivation to charge. We
expect that post- pandemic, real-world FUF trends will increase. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 124-127]
234 DRIA at 3-73.
Unfiltered BAR data and an explanation of filtering methodology was not provided as part of
the NPRM or with the DRIA. Following a request, EPA did share the raw data and an
explanation of the filtering used. While the information is now posted to the docket, the lack of
inclusion with the regulatory documents means most stakeholders will not have awareness of the
availability during the short 60-day comment period. Due to the large dataset, late delivery of
information, and limited comment period, Auto Innovators is providing an initial analysis, but
may submit more information to the docket once available, and likely after the comment period
closes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 124-127]
c)The Proposed Utility Factor
Utility factors have been fitted to an exponential equation, as shown below. The C
coefficients are used to fit the curve and normalized distance establishes the distance where the
utility factor is 100%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 128-130]
UF = 1 - exp{ -[Cl*(x/norm_dist) + C2*(x/norm_dist)2+ ... + C10*(x/ norm_dist)10]}
ICCT did not properly fit the data, and that data was subsequently used to create EPA's
proposal. As shown in Figure 37, instead of fitting the data properly, ICCT copied the 10 curve
fitting coefficients from SAE J2841's multi-day independent utility factor (MDIUF) (developed
from a different data set) and only changed the normalized distance to create their "curve fit".
But normalized distance is the one variable in the equation that need not change. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 128-130]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 37: Comparison of J2841 and ICCT Utility Factor
Coefficients [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 128-130]
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Because of this error, we are not confident that ICCTs curve appropriately fits the underlying
data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 128-130]
EPA notes that they "created the proposed curve by averaging the SAE J2841 FUF curve and
the ICCT-BAR curve."235 While EPA used a least-squares regression method to create this
average line, they changed only the normalized distance in this fit, otherwise copying the SAE
J2841 FUF curve fitting coefficients that were also developed from a completely different
dataset. Changing normalized distance doesn't make sense unless overall driving distances have
changed. In fact, EPA confirms that this isn't the case, which is highlighted in their
DRIA Footnote 35: "we used the latest NHTS data (2017) and executed the utility factor code
that is in SAE J2841, Appendix C, and found that the latest NHTS data did not significantly
change the utility factor curves."236 This would indicate that the driving distances and overall
distribution of driving has not changed. The normalized distance (Utility Factor=l) should
remain unchanged. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 128-130]
235 DRIA at 3-78.
236 DRIA at 3-74.
In Figure 38, the first two rows are the curve fitting data for the two inputs EPA used to
generate their proposed fleet utility factor, which is shown in the 3rd row. This shows the six
curve fitting coefficients that were copied from earlier work contained in SAE J2841 fleet utility
factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 128-130]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 38: EPA Proposed Utility Factor Coefficients
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 128-130]
Using this curve fitting technique, the result is that regardless of all-electric miles traveled on
a certification test, only 68.5% of those miles count. This is equally true for PHEVs that travel 20
miles or 200 miles. This is not appropriate, and the proposed utility factor should not be included
in the final regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 128-130]
differences Between Real-World and Laboratory
The normal method to address differences between real-world and laboratory results,
especially when due to driving behaviors, has been through post-compliance adjustments aimed
at consumer awareness and occasionally by expanding test cycle requirements, and not by
revising calculations used to determine compliance with the standards. While some data may
suggest PHEVs are not being plugged in as frequently as the assumptions underlying the SAE
UF curve, this should not be a problem atributed to automakers, nor should it be grounds to
adjust a compliance measurement. Charging equipment is supplied with the vehicles sold by
automakers. Changing regulatory outcomes based on variable consumer charging behavior
would be akin to forcing derated C02 compliance on ICE applications because some drivers
behave aggressively performing "jack rabbit" starts frequently, thereby consuming more fuel.
Fuel economy labels show adjusted values for the laboratory fuel economy and C02 emissions
results. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 128-130]
EPA recognizes that BEV technology is still maturing and needs support to build consumer
acceptance. Appropriately, the proposal does not examine the advertised range, efficiency, and
emissions performance of BEVs under real-world operation. PHEVs are in the same fragile stage
of growth and should be treated no differently. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 128-130]
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The proposal notes BEV technology improvements and charging infrastructure expansion,
which applies to PHEVs as well. Given the investments in charging infrastructure being made as
part of the IIJA, it is expected that over time more public and multi-unit family dwelling
charging will become available. Also, as more vehicles electrify, plugging in a vehicle to charge
will become ubiquitous, which should help reduce unwillingness to charge, and resolve
knowledge gaps in how to charge. Lack of charging, to the extent it exists, should be best solved
by consumer education, not by a change to the utility factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 128-130]
Efforts to address perceived concerns about real-world performance need to account for other
solutions already in progress. The BAR dataset and more rigorous, peer-reviewed studies
indicate some PHEVs have a lower ratio of EV driving versus ICE operation on-road versus
certification, while other vehicles' performance is well-aligned to certification values.237 We
believe this difference is due to the spread of performance capability of the electric machines in
PHEVs. Lower capability electric machines demonstrate a greater difference in on-road versus
on-cycle performance. EPA's proposed PHEV high power cold start requirement encourages
more all-electric operation capability. Further, CARB requires a minimum 70-mile combined
city /highway and minimum 40-mile US06 all-electric range starting with MY 2029. These
requirements force all new PHEVs under development to be highly capable. EPA's linear curve
fit is weighted toward vehicles with a range below 30 miles. Changing the utility factor based on
such skewed data would discourage the introduction of new, higher-capability PHEVs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 128-130]
237 Restate of FN 6 Hamza, K., Laberteaux, K. and Chu, K.C. "On inferred real-world fuel consumption of
past decade plug-in hybrid electric vehicles in the US," Environ. Res. Let. 17 (2022) 104053.
htps://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac94e8.
Many current PHEVs already demonstrate good utility factor alignment between certification
tests in the laboratory and real on-road driving. These vehicles would be unnecessarily punished
by the proposed change in utility factor. Auto Innovators believes that growth in charging
infrastructure coupled with higher capability PHEVs means that the current utility factor will be
representative for future PHEVs and should remain unchanged. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 128-130]
e)Next Steps
Auto Innovators supports PHEVs attaining their advertised range for charge depleting/all-
electric operation. We do not believe EPA's proposed regulatory action will achieve this
outcome. The poor quality of supporting data in the proposal would make such an action
arbitrary and capricious. We propose that industry, EPA, SAE, DOT, and the national
laboratories collaborate on a project to acquire and process a large sample of nationwide PHEV
data. This collaboration can be used to better understand the sources of variation and agree on
logical data processing or filtering. If proven necessary, adjustments to SAE J2841 or advertised
all- electric range, and other potential solutions can be explored following appropriate
deliberation and peer review of the collaborative effort. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
128-130]
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Organization: Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE)
PHEV Utility Factor
AVE urges EPA to review its approach to the utility factor proposed for plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles (PHEV) and provide more certainty for this vehicle segment. It appears that
EPA has established the proposed Utility Factor by averaging earlier estimates for PHEV range
and consumer driving habits. Recent analysis, however, indicates significant improvement in
PHEV's electric range.9 Additionally, to comply with California's Advanced Clean Cars II
regulations, automakers are already announcing PHEVs that will greatly exceed California's
requirements. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 4]
9 https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles
10 https://www.greencarreports.com/news/1139305_toyota-plans-to-push-plug-in-hybrid-ev-range-beyond-
120-miles
EPA should account for current and expected improved range for future PHEV models to
determine the utility factor curve that should apply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 4]
Organization: Betsy Cooper
PHEVs fill an important gap, providing a transition vehicle that allow consumers to
experience the benefits of all-electric driving without some of the risks: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0654, pp. 2-3]
First, a gas backup can reduce range anxiety, especially in uncertain terrain or cold
temperatures. While our family also owns a pure EV, we are not yet ready to commit to being a
fully electric household. Not least, our PHEV is our vehicle of choice for any road trip in the
snow or mountains, as we do not want to test our full range in a precarious, unpredictable
location. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, pp. 2-3]
Second, PHEVs are more family friendly than EVs; as parents (like us) of small
children will tell you, charging on a road trip is one thing. Charging on the road with an unhappy
toddler - or heaven forbid, one who only sleeps when the car is moving - is quite another.
Having the option to keep driving on gas once the electric range runs out is a blessing. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, pp. 2-3]
Third, and relatedly, this is particularly true because charging infrastructure has not
yet caught up with EV demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, pp. 2-3]
Rural and disadvantaged communities disproportionately lack access to public
charging infrastructure [Link: https://www.marketplace.org/shows/marketplace-tech/rural-
communities-are-slow-to-adopt-evs-but-a-national-charging-network-depends-on-them/]. So
long as charging infrastructure is not as ubiquitous as gas stations are, gas backups remain an
important option for long haul driving. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, pp. 2-3]
Moreover, even in areas with well-developed charging infrastructure, such as in
California where we live, it can be very difficult to find an available and working charger in a
convenient location. Betsy's current commute has only two chargers within a mile, and both are
broken. Aaron's work sponsors chargers, but even then demand is so high that employees require
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a complex interoffice notification system to ensure everyone gets a charge by the end of the day.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, pp. 2-3]
Short-Range PHEVs Do Not Achieve EPA's Greenhouse Gas Emissions Goals
While PHEVs fill an important market need, manufacturers' move to short range PHEVs
(those with less than 40 miles of range) has reduced these benefits significantly. Small electric
batteries do less to reduce range anxiety. Shorter ranges require more frequent charging, and
make it more likely that drivers will need to charge in inconvenient locations away from home.
And these annoyances may make it more likely that new PHEVs will rely on gas. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 3]
EPA may rightfully wish to disincentivize the use of gas cars for any reason. But doing so by
disincentivizing all PHEVs, as the current regulation proposes, is a mistake. The fundamental
problem here is not with PHEVs; it is with the small electric range on offer in those vehicles.
Longer range PHEVs with smaller gas tanks will reduce reliance on gas, helping to get the first-
time electric vehicle consumer more comfortable relying on electric power for their daily needs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 3]
EPA Should Use Its Regulatory Authority To Incentivize Long-Range PHEVs
The EPA thus should use its regulatory process to encourage PHEV manufacturers to return
long-train PHEVs to the market: by providing full off-cycle credits to those who give 50 or more
miles of electric range. EPA's current plan will disincentivize all PHEVs, ignoring the real
market benefits to keeping long-range versions of these cars in the market. Intentional or not, the
effects of the EPA's current policy will be to push vehicle manufacturers further towards full
EVs—before the charging infrastructure is ready to support them. In the meantime, consumers
not ready to adopt full EVs - including for the same reasons we are not yet able to do so - will
continue to buy gas cars instead. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, pp. 3-4]
With more long-range PHEVs on the market, more Americans will be able to drive their full
commute on electricity and charge overnight at home (with reduced demand on the grid
relatively to fast-charging of full EVs). Moreover, as longer range PHEV cars grow more
popular, there will be greater incentives for individuals and communities to invest in improving
charging infrastructure, thus reducing the friction facing current consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0654, pp.3-4]
By encouraging both EVs and long-range PHEVs, the EPA will encourage manufacturers to
offer more long-range PHEV models, and to make more of them. As demand for the 42-mile
RAV4 PHEV shows, consumers crave these long-range PHEV options. There just aren't
currently any affordable and available ones to choose from. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654,
pp. 3-4]
We propose a 50+ mile PHEV range requirement for full off-cycle credit. There is already
momentum in favor of this standard; California is planning to require 50+ mile range PHEVs by
2035 [Link: https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-
vehicle-sales-2035]. Moreover, even with battery degradation, a PHEV rated for 50+ miles at the
point of sale will still cover the average American commute many years later. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0654, p. 4]
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The EPA may respond that its scaled utility factor already takes into account miles of range in
its calculation. Even if true, by penalizing all PHEVs across the board, the EPA is incentivizing
manufacturers to make fewer plug-in hybrid vehicles, period. Especially until charging
infrastructure resembles the gas station infrastructure of today, long-range PHEV cars remain an
important consumer option. By rewarding manufacturers for making PHEVs with a 50+ mile
range, EPA will help bring an important class of climate-friendly vehicles back to market. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 4]
Organization: BorgWarner Inc.
BorgWarner supports the goals of EPA's proposal.
BorgWarner supports EPA's approach to decarbonize the light- and medium-duty vehicle
sectors. However, the proposed pace for battery electric vehicle (BEV) adoption requires
continued significant support and incentives from state and federal regulators. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0640, pp.3-4]
The demand for BEVs across all vehicles sectors is rising. Critical mineral supply will need to
increase significantly to support the growth of the BEV market. Battery production, along with
the necessary charging infrastructure, will ultimately depend on suppliers and manufacturers
having access to increasingly domestically sourced and processed critical materials and minerals
in sufficient quantities. Automotive suppliers operate in an integrated, complex worldwide
supply chain and access to international markets is critical to our ability to meet production
demands. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 3-4]
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), and
CHIPS & Science Act were each important initial steps to enable industry, consumers, and
communities to make the EV transition across the U.S. These significant investments are critical
in supporting the continued growth of U.S. manufacturing and ensuring the initial transition
results in affordable EVs for consumers and profitability for manufacturers. EPA should
recognize that a majority of the programs needed to help achieve the EV transformation are still
awaiting regulations and guidelines. In addition, the supplier industry, along with automakers
and communities, will need time to implement the necessary investments in supply chains,
infrastructure, and workforce to make the shift to electrification successful. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0640, pp.3-4]
To meet EPA's forecast for BEV penetration levels, there is little room for supply chain or
production delays. Any setback could negatively impact the availability or purchase of new
BEVs. EPA can reduce these risks to manufacturers by incentivizing vehicles with longer ranges
and adjusting multipliers as better BEVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) are
introduced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 3-4]
BorgWarner asks EPA to reconsider the agency's approach to the proposed PHEV utility
curve. As proposed, EPA is addressing its concern for PHEVs operating on a vehicle's engine
mode, based on dated assumptions of average consumer usage of prior generation PHEV models.
To meet many of the requirements set by both EPA in this proposal and California in its
Advanced Clean Car II rulemaking, PHEVs would have significantly increased electric range
that make them more capable of all-electric operation, and together with a much-improved
charging infrastructure, will change the pattern of consumer use. In fact, average new PHEV
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driving range increased 8.5% in 2021 and is expected to continue increasing.3 As such, EPA
should model future consumer usage based on the expected models on sale from MY 2027, and
further improvements to charging availability, and use the model to determine the utility factor
curve that should apply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 3-4]
3 https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles
California's ACC II program allows manufacturers to fulfill a portion of their ZEV sales
requirements with PHEVs that meet certain standards, including certification to at least 70 miles
of all-electric range (equivalent to approximately 50 miles of label range). While U.S. EPA's
analysis of compliance pathways to meet the GHG standards does not rely on the use of PHEVs
within the fleet to meet the proposed standards and most industry experts agree that PHEVs are a
less cost-effective solution, CARB expects that PHEVs may have greater appeal to some
consumers and comprise some share of the light-duty vehicle fleet in U.S. EPA's regulatory
timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 18]
The majority of emission benefits from a PHEV result from the vehicle's ability to travel on
electric power, as opposed to combustion power. While PHEVs offer flexibility to consumers
and can play an important role in broader ZEV adoption, emission benefits can vary widely. To
determine how a PHEV's emission rate is counted toward meeting a manufacturer's GHG fleet
average, U.S. EPA uses a fleet utility factor (FUF) to convert PHEV electric driving range into a
weighting factor for 2-cycle GHG emission test results. Overvaluing PHEVs with an inflated
FUF curve would be detrimental to the environment and overstate the emission reductions from
the vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 18]
The FUF curve U.S. EPA applies in its current regulation is the "SAE J2841 19 FUF" curve.
Out of concerns that this curve overstates benefits, U.S. EPA is proposing to adopt a revised FUF
curve that is less generous than the current curve in estimating GHG reductions from PHEVs.
CARB has previously analyzed data that demonstrate that the SAE J2841 FUF curve may
overestimate benefits, and CARB therefore supports U.S. EPA's proposal to revisit the FUF.
However, based on a recent analysis of real-world PHEV data, CARB recommends that U.S.
EPA adopt an even more conservative curve than it is currently proposing. U.S. EPA also
presents—but does not propose to adopt—an additional curve, the "ICCT-BAR" curve, based on
an analysis conducted by the International Council on Clean Transportation. The ICCT-BAR
curve is even lower than the revised FUF curve U.S. EPA is proposing. CARB recommends that
U.S. EPA adopt the ICCT-BAR curve, which is most representative of current data. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 18]
19 SAE J2841 is an SAE Information Report that establishes a set of "Utility Factor" curves and the
method for generating these curves.
Existing fleet utility factor
CARB agrees with U.S. EPA that the SAE J2841 FUF curve that U.S. EPA applies in its
current regulation likely overstates emission benefits from PHEVs and points to two references
to support this finding. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 19-20]
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First, as part of its ACC I Midterm Review (MTR) completed in 2017, CARB analyzed
millions of data points on thousands of ZEVs and PHEVs and found that the criteria pollutant
and GHG emission benefits are highly driver dependent but generally increase with vehicle
electric power capability and electric range. 20 CARB found that PHEVs were not driven the
amount of electric vehicle miles traveled (eVMT) expected by the SAE J2841 FUF curve,
particularly those with less range and more blended powertrains that turn on the internal
combustion engine when a driver requires more vehicle power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0780, pp. 19-20]
20 20 CARB. California Advanced Clean Cars Midterm Review. Appendix G: Plug-in Electric Vehicle In-
Use and Charging Data Analysis. January 2017. https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
01/appendix_g_pev_in_use_and_charging_data_analysis_ac.pdf.
Second, as a separate data source, CARB contracted with the University of California, Davis
(UC Davis) Institute of Transportation Studies to collect and analyze household-level travel and
refueling behavior centered around BEVs, PHEVs, and FCEVs. 21 The study included installing
data loggers on individual vehicles, including many different models of PHEVs. UC Davis found
that all PHEVs, apart from the Chevrolet Volt, demonstrated lower utility factors than the SAE
J2841-based FUF curve. The Chevrolet Volt had a much more capable electric powertrain that
could keep its internal combustion engine from turning on before the battery depleted in almost
all driving conditions, which made the Volt relatively unique amongst the other PHEVs in the
logged data set. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 19-20]
21 Tal, Gil, Karanam, Vaishnavi Chaitanya, Favetti, Matthew P., et al. "Emerging Technology Zero
Emission Vehicle Household Travel and Refueling Behavior." April 2019.
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2v0853tp.
CARB analysis of updated real-world data
In its proposal, U.S. EPA proposes a revised FUF curve that is lower than the SAE J2841
FUF curve. Based on an analysis of additional real-world data, summarized below, CARB finds
that the ICCT-BAR curve is even closer to what real-world data supports for eVMT. CARB
therefore recommends that U.S. EPA adopt the ICCT-BAR curve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0780, pp. 19-20]
In mid-May 2023, CARB staff acquired an updated dataset containing newer PHEV
operational data from the California Bureau of Automotive Repair (BAR), which administers the
State's light-duty vehicle inspection and maintenance program known as SmogCheck. These
data expand on the original dataset (acquired in October 2022) ICCT analyzed that U.S. EPA
references in its proposal and contain various operational parameters related to PHEV operation.
Among the relevant parameters in the dataset for this analysis were charge-depleting engine-off
distance traveled and total distance traveled (i.e., odometer readings). Staff filtered the BAR
dataset to remove low-mileage PHEVs (<## 3,000 miles), which may not provide sufficient data
to be representative of the population. In addition, CARB staff ensured that all PHEV data were
internally consistent by omitting those vehicles that had different readings for odometer distance
and lifetime distance traveled as recorded by the vehicle's on-board diagnostic system. Then,
using the same calculations described in U.S. EPA's proposal, CARB staff calculated utility
factors for a wide range of 16 PHEV models from the 2019 through 2022 MYs. CARB included
aggregated vehicle model data only for those vehicle models containing 30 or more individual
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vehicles. The final filtered dataset contained 3,454 vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780,
pp. 19-20]
There are certain inherent limitations to the BAR data, though. Vehicles are not required to
participate in the SmogCheck program until they are eight years old unless they are undergoing a
change of ownership or being newly imported into the State. As a result, the current sample of
vehicles is only a fraction of the PHEVs in the State, and there may be some selection bias in
those vehicles that are included. Therefore, until sufficient time has passed, and more PHEVs
become subject to the SmogCheck program, this dataset will not have the necessary cross-section
of PHEVs operating within California to be a truly representative sample. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp. 19-20]
Analytical results
Figure 2 and Table 1 present CARB's results. As shown in Figure 2, most recent PHEV
models fall below both the SAE J2841 22 curve and U.S. EPA's proposed FUF curve. Rather,
the ICCT-BAR FUF curve that U.S. EPA's presents—but is not proposing to use—appears to be
better correlated with actual real-world electric operation in these cases, and CARB's analysis
reaffirms ICCT's original analysis. The notable exceptions are two vehicle models with unique
architectures and higher all-electric ranges: the 2019 Chevrolet Volt (53-mile label range) and
the 2019 BMW i3 REX (126-mile label range). 23 The 2019 Volt performed nearly identically to
the U.S. EPA proposed FUF curve, and the i3 REX delivered more zero-emission miles than
would be assigned under the SAE J2841 FUF. Notably, both of these models have been
discontinued and used designs like a range-extender concept where the battery had to be depleted
before the gasoline engine could be utilized. More recent models with similar all-electric
capabilities like the Toyota RAV4 Prime and the Honda Clarity PHEV both averaged at or below
even the lower ICCT-BAR FUF curve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 20-22]
22 SAE J2841 is an SAE Information Report that establishes a set of "Utility Factor" curves and the
method for generating these curves.
23 Data from prior MYs of these two vehicle models are not available as the necessary data parameters
were not required until 2019 MY.
[See original for graph titled "Figure 2. Plug in Hybrid Electric Vehicle Utility Factors from
Bureau of Automotive Repair Data."] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 20-22]
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SAE J2841 FUF
— — Proposed FUF
ICCT-BAR FUF
# BAR Data
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
k. 0.60
o
tj
0.50
^ 0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
0 10 20 30 40 SO 40 70 30 90 100 110 12D 130 140
All Electric Range (miles)
BAR Data Utility Factors for Various Plug-in Hybrid Models
13 REX
-VOLT
CLARITY
X5XDRIVE45E
NIRO
-RAV4 Prime
IONIQ
2019/20 PRIUS PRIME
LC 350E
2021/22 PRIUS PRIME
330E
Q5 E
COUNTRYMAN
2019 53OE
[See original attachment for "Table 1. Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles Included in CARB's
Analysis of Bureau of Automotive Repair (BAR) Data."] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp.
20-22]
Data collection and reporting
Given the variability in PHEV usage displayed to date, CARB recommends that U.S. EPA
require auto manufacturers to collect and report in-use operational data at discrete intervals on
PHEVs in future MYs. This would enable U.S. EPA to more accurately assess the GHG
emissions associated with different PHEVs. Based on these data, EPA may then be better
positioned to reassess the FUF curve for subsequent rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0780, p. 22]
There are many factors that may alter the utility factor in the future that warrant ongoing data
collection. For example, driver propensity to charge may change with time as the ZEV
ecosystem evolves and drivers gain more access to home charging or other charging
infrastructure, face varying differentials in cost for charging compared to gasoline refueling, or
experience some battery degradation. Additionally, the types of PHEVs offered may also change
in response to regulatory programs like ACC II or incentive funding. Finally, the everchanging
dynamics of consumer awareness and market acceptance may influence the types of consumers
who purchase PHEVs and how frequently they charge. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 22]
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Organization: Consumer Reports (CR)
6.4. Plug-in Hybrid Utility Factor Changes
CR generally supports EPA's proposed changes to the utility factor for plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles (PHEVs). Real-world emissions from PHEVs are often significantly higher than the
theoretical values estimated assuming optimum use conditions.46 CR agrees with EPA adjusting
their approach to better match real-world use data. CR does not take a position on which of the
proposed utility factor curves is the best option. However, CR does recommend that EPA
periodically update their analysis of real world PHEV usage as more vehicles are sold, and more
data becomes available. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, p. 23]
46 Real World Usage of Plug-In Hybrid Vehicles in the United States, The International Council on Clean
Transportation, December 20, 2022, https://theicct.org/publication/real-world-phev-us-dec22/.
Organization: Electric Drive Transportation Association (EDTA)
We would also urge the agency to revisit modeling assumptions regarding the proposed plug-
in hybrid (PHEV) utility curve to reflect next-generation PHEVs, whose electric range will be
significantly larger than those modelled. New PHEVs' driving range increased 8.5% in 2021 and
that trend is expected to continue. The increase in all-electric operation capability will change
consumer use patterns over the regulated period and the rule for 2027-2032 should reflect that in
an updated utility factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0589, p. 2]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
XII. EPA Should Improve Its Proposed Adjustment to the PHEV Fleet Utility Factor to More
Accurately Capture the True Emissions from PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 93]
Below, we offer comment on EPA's proposed adjustment to the PHEV Fleet Utility Factor
(FUF). EPA is correct to adjust the FUF to reflect real-world driving and recharging behavior,
but the modification proposed is not sufficient to reflect the true emissions from PHEVs. Prior to
the availability of PHEV models (and therefore in the absence of data on their actual usage), it
was rational to use the Fleet Utility Factor as formulated in SAE 2841 in 2010 as the basis for
estimating the percentage of operation without internal combustion engine use occurring in
charge-depleting (CD) mode. However, there is now a significant body of real-world data that
can be used to develop utility factors that more accurately reflect the actual tailpipe C02
emissions from PHEV operation.227 Because EPA proposes to retain a zero gram per mile value
for operation in CD mode, the choice of utility factor will play an important role in determining
the compliance value for PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 93-94]
227 Aaron Isenstadt et al., ICCT, Real World Usage of Plug-in Hybrid Vehicles in the United States (Dec.
2022), https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/real-world-phev-us-dec22.pdf.
EPA has obtained California Bureau of Automotive Repair (BAR) data from onboard
diagnostics devices (OBD) that show the real-world utilization of PHEVs in CD mode. The data
show that all PHEV models in the dataset have actual utility factors lower than the current (SAE
2841) FUF. In some cases, the BAR data show real-world utility factors that are nearly 50%
lower than the current FUF values. For example, the BAR data show the Honda Clarity PHEV as
having a real-world utility factor of 0.359 while the SAE 2841 method gives the Clarity a FUF
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of 0.676.228 These results show that the SAE2841 method using travel survey data is a poor
estimator of actual vehicle usage. The Agency proposes to reduce the FUF for compliance
calculations by averaging the current FUF with a curve derived from the BAR real-world data.
This averaging will lower the gap between actual emissions performance and the compliance
value, but will still allow for compliance values for PHEVs that are higher than justified. Given
that EPA now has clear real-world data showing that the current FUF is not reflective of actual
emissions from PHEVs, it is inappropriate to use the original SAE J2841 FUF or to use it in an
average with other data. EPA should instead use a FUF consistent with the actual in-use data
from BAR and adopt the FUF labeled "ICCT-BAR" in the DRIA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 94]
228 The data is from EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0465_attachment_2.xlsx, and was processed using the
method described inEPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0465_attachment_l.pdf.
The decision to average real-world usage data with the SAE 2841 estimate is poorly justified.
EPA states that "an overly low FUF curve could disincentivize manufacturers to apply this
technology." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29254. However, both the current FUF curve and the proposed
curve over-credit PHEVs. A curve that correctly credits PHEVs' reductions in emissions (such as
the ICCT-BAR curve) will not disincentivize adoption of PHEVs, but instead will provide a
lower incentive for the partial elimination of tailpipe emissions and a greater incentive for
complete elimination via fully-electric powertrain options. Even with a lower FUF, the ability to
reduce the compliance emissions values by use of zero grams per mile for the CD mode phase
will provide a significant incentive for a manufacturer to choose a PHEV powertrain over a non-
plug-in hybrid. Choice of a lower FUF curve will at the same time ensure that there is a
sufficient incentive to encourage the continued development and deployment of zero-emission
technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 94]
EPA also cites future models with longer electric range and greater all-electric performance as
leading to future real-world performance that meets the proposed FUF curve. This is not
supported by the available data. The longest electric range PHEV currently available is the
Toyota RAV4 Prime. The RAV4 Prime data from the BAR dataset show a real-world utility
factor of 0.35, significantly lower than the proposed FUF for a 42-mile all-electric range (AER)
vehicle (0.52) and even lower than the ICCT-BAR curve (0.41). EPA states that "increased
consumer technology familiarity" will also make future PHEV usage approach the proposed FUF
curve. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29254. Increased consumer knowledge may make purchasers able to shift
more driving to electric-only mode. However, it is also possible that purchasers (especially in the
secondary market) may buy a PHEV without the ability to plug in or may choose a PHEV
because of incentives that make the purchase more attractive relative to a non-plug-in vehicle.
Existing research on the use of PHEVs shows that the largest factor leading to lower real-world
observed utility factors is lack of charging, with 20-30% of some PHEV models starting their
travel day on a nearly empty battery.229 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 94-95]
229 Seshadri Srinivasa Raghavan & Gil Tal, Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle observed utility factor: Why
the observed electrification performance differ from expectations, 15 Int'l J. of Sustainable Transp. 105,
122 (2022), https://www.sciencedirect.com/org/science/article/pii/S1556831822004269.
The proposed FUF could lead to PHEVs with a large difference between real-world emissions
and the compliance values for C02 emissions. The use of PHEV powertrains in larger vehicles
such as SUVs and pickups will cause this gap to grow, due to the gap between the zero grams per
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mile CD operation and the high gram per mile operation when the internal combustion engine is
running. Over-crediting PHEVs' purported electric driving would create a new and unjustified
loophole that would likely slow down the path to greater deployment of zero-emission
technologies within the fleet. For example, for a PHEV that has compliance C02 charge
sustaining (CS) mode emissions of 250 g/mile and an electric range of greater than 28 miles, the
proposed FUF would artificially reduce the combined mode PHEV emissions by over 25 g/mile
when compared to the ICCT-BAR FUF. (Figure XII. 1). The gap between the proposed FUF and
the real-world data (ICCT-BAR) is highest for vehicles with a CD range between 42 and 62
miles. California's ZEV regulations for model year 2029 and subsequent vehicles require a
minimum certification electric range of 70 miles to be eligible for credit values, which is
approximately a 50-mile label range. Therefore, PHEVs designed to meet the minimum range for
ZEV credit value eligibility are likely to have the largest deviations between real-world
emissions and the compliance emissions calculated using the proposed FUF. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 95]
Figure XII. 1. Difference in Compliance C02 Between Proposed FUF and ICCT-BAR FUF
for 250 g/mi CS Mode Vehicle [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 96]
[See original attachment for graph Figure XII. 1.]. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 96]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
Using EPA's proposed formula for calculating a vehicle model's utility factor (UF)—the split
of a PHEV's driving between gasoline and electricity—the UF for a PHEV50 is about 0.67. This
means that 67% of a PHEV50's mileage is performed using electricity and 33% of its mileage
uses gasoline. In terms of C02 emissions, a PHEV50 can be considered equivalent to two-thirds
of a BEV and one-third of a strong hybrid ICEV. EDF further assumed that the GHG
performance of a PHEV50 while operating on gasoline would be 205 g/mi, the same level as
described in the ICEV control-focused run above.32 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 13-
15]
32 Since PHEVs are required to meet the same criteria pollutant emission standards as ICEVs when
operating on gasoline, substituting PHEVs for BEVs at equivalent fleetwide GHG levels has no impact on
criteria pollutant emissions.
PHEVs cost more than BEVs due to requiring both electric and gasoline powertrains. Because
the OMEGA 2 output did not project costs for complete PHEVs, we used the incremental cost
difference between Roush's BEV and PHEV50 costs and applied that difference to EPA's BEV
costs to derive projected PHEV costs.33 On a sales-weighted basis, considering the difference in
electrification costs across vehicle segments and the types of vehicles that OMEGA2 is
projecting to become electrified, we found that the average incremental PHEV50 cost, absent
IRA vehicle tax credits, was $6,700 in MY 2032 relative to a BEV.34 Following EPA's
methodology for applying the IRA vehicle tax credits, we included the credit for the additional
number of BEV plus PHEV sales in each pathway, as EPA had already accounted for the tax
credits available for BEVs projected in their analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 13-
15]
33 Roush's BEV costs are lower than EPA's, so we took this approach in lieu of substituting Roush's costs
for both BEVs and PHEV50s.
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34 Based on interpolation between costs in MY 2027 and MY 2035.
C. The PHEV utility factor should be conservative, with manufacturers given a voluntary
alternative to use a utility factor based on real world data.
We likewise support EPA's proposal to amend its current approach to PHEV utility factors
based on improved data about real world PHEV usage. 178 However, we encourage EPA to rely
fully on this more accurate data, rather than continuing to consider the UFs developed in SAE
J2841, which are based on dated and inaccurate assumptions. 179 The data compiled by ICCT
from real- world sources represents the best estimate of actual PHEV utilization and should be
the primary source for EPA's UF curves. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 64]
178 88 Fed. Reg. 29254.
179 88 Fed. Reg. 29253.
EPA's current approach to assigning fuel economy to PHEVs was first adopted in a 2011
rulemaking supporting the 2010 GHG standards.180 Under that rulemaking, PHEVs are given a
fuel economy that combines a 0 g/mi emissions value with their measured GHG emissions from
operation on liquid fuel.181 The utility factor for weighting the two values is based on a PHEV's
charge-depleting range for city and highway driving. 182 These utility factor numbers were
developed in SAE J2841"using data from the 2001 Department of Transportation 'National
Household Travel Survey.'"183 Because PHEVs were just beginning to be introduced at that
time, 184 the utility factors were not based on real-world PHEV use. Instead, they assume that
"[t]he first mode of operation is always electric assist or all electric drive, vehicles will be
charged once per day, and future PHEV drivers will follow drive patterns exhibited by the
drivers in the surveys used [in calculating the utility factors]." 185 EPA acknowledged in
promulgating these utility factors that "current understanding of the above assumptions and the
data upon which UFs were developed may change" and that "therefore, EPA may change the
application of UFs in light of new data." 186 However, these utility factors have not been
amended since the 2011 rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 64]
180 See Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 40 Fed. Reg. 39478 (Jul. 6,
2011), https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/FR-2011-07-06/pdf/2011-14291.pdf; Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25436
(May 7, 2010) ("PHEV compliance values will be determined by combining zero grams/ mile for grid
electricity operation with the GHG emissions from the 2-cycle test results during operation on liquid fuel,
and weighting these values by the percentage of miles traveled that EPA believes will be performed on grid
electricity and on liquid fuel, which will vary for different PHEVs. EPA is currently considering different
approaches for determining the weighting factor to be used in calculating PHEV GHG emissions
compliance values"), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2010-05- 07/pdf/2010-8159.pdf.
181 86 Fed. Reg. 74457 (Dec. 30, 2021), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-
30/pdf/2021- 27854.pdf.
182 40 C.F.R. § 600.116-12 ("To determine CREE values to demonstrate compliance with GHG standards,
calculate composite values representing combined operation during charge-depleting and charge-sustaining
operation using the following utility factors .. . ").
183 40 Fed. Reg. 39478 (Jul. 6, 2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2011-07-06/pdf/2011-
14291.pdf
184 88 Fed. Reg. 29253.
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185 40 Fed. Reg. 39478 (Jul. 6, 2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2011-07-06/pdf/2011-
14291.pdf
186 40 Fed. Reg. 39478 (Jul. 6, 2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2011-07-06/pdf/2011-
14291.pdf
Meanwhile, California's treatment of PHEVs under the ACC II program is far more
conservative, resulting in lower utility factors than EPA. ACC II allows PHEVs to "fulfill a
portion of their total Annual ZEV Requirement" if they meet several qualifications. 187 A PHEV
must have a "minimum certification range value of greater than or equal to 70 miles," based on
California's 2026 ZEV and PHEV test procedures, 188 and have a minimum US06 all-electric
range value greater than or equal to 40 miles to be considered a ZEV under the rules. 189 PHEVs
that don't meet these requirements can still be counted for partial credit if they have a minimum
certification range value between 43 and 70 milesl90 or have a US06 all-electric range of at least
10 miles. 191 Additionally, PHEVs can only be used to meet 20 percent of a manufacturer's total
ZEV requirement. 192 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 64-65]
187 California Zero-Emission Vehicle Requirements for 2026 and Subsequent Model Year Passenger Cars
and Light-Duty Trucks, 13 C.C.R. § 1962.4(c)(e)(l).
188 California Test Procedures for 2026 and Subsequent Model Year Zero-Emission Vehicles and Plug-In
Hybrid Electric Vehicles, in the Passenger Car, Light-Duty Truck and Medium-Duty Vehicle Classes,
incorporated by reference in 13 C.C.R. § 1962.4, available at
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/ACC II/ACC IIfro_zev_tp_2026%2B.pdf.
Certification range value is defined as a "PHEV's calculated combined urban and highway all-electric
range values," equal to ".55 x Urban-All Electric (or Driving for FCEV) Range Value + .45 x Highway All-
Electric (or Driving for FCEV) Range Value." 13 C.C.R. §1962.4(1).
189 Id. at § 1962.4(c)(e)(l)(A)(8).
190 Id. at § 1962.4(c)(e)(l)(A)(9).
191 How much credit these PHEVS get is calculated based on an equation where the partial vehicle value
is equal to Certification Range Value/100 + .20. Id. at § 1962.4(c)(e)(l)(B)(l).
192 Id. at § 1962.4(c)(e)(l)(B)(2)
It is imperative that EPA assign a utility factor for PHEVs that reflects real-world electric
drive share. A recent ICCT study examined the current state of PHEV usage in the United States
and found strong evidence that real-world electric drive share is far below EPA's current utility
factor label rating. 193 According to ICCT, "previous research and data from early adopters of
PHEVs in the United States demonstrated that PHEVs achieved real-world electric drive share
close to that expected by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)." ICCT notes that EPA assumes that PHEVs
achieve real-world electric drive share close to EPA's utility factor label rating in its treatment of
PHEVs in the 2023-2026 light-duty GHG rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 64-65]
193 Isenstadt, A., Zifei, Y., Searle, S., German, J. 2022. Real World Usage of Plug-In Hybrid Vehicles in
the United States, ICCT. https://theicct.org/publication/real-world-phev-us-dec22/ (Attachment Y).
ICCT's analysis uses more recent data from two previously unexplored sources: self-reported
fuel consumption from Fuelly.com and engine-off distance traveled collected by the California
Bureau of Automotive Repair (BAR), which cover a broader variety of PHEV models and newer
model years than prior datasets. ICCT concludes that real-world electric drive share may be 26-
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56% lower than assumed and real-world fuel consumption may be 42-67% higher than assumed
within EPA's labeling program for light-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 65-
66]
ICCT also looked at studies in Europe that echoed their findings. "Recent studies with user
data from over 20,000 European PHEVs have shown that, in real-world usage conditions, the
[electric drive share] of PHEVs falls far short of the [utility factor] curve assumed in the
[Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP)]. For PHEVs owned by private
individuals, the real-world fuel consumption is on average three times higher than the official
WLTP values, while for company car PHEVs the fuel consumption is on average five times
higher. Moreover, despite an increasing electric range and more public charging infrastructure,
the deviation between real-world and official fuel consumption of PHEVs in Europe is observed
to be growing." 194 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 65-66]
194 Id.
EPA acknowledges in the proposal that its current approach "significantly underestimates
PHEV C02 emissions" 195 and that the real-world data collected by ICCT from BAR is, in
contrast, "a reasonable source for evaluating the real-world utility factors for recent PHEV
usage." 196 However, instead of relying fully on this new data for developing its UF curve, EPA
proposes to average the two datasets, giving each an equal weight. 197 Because, as discussed
above, the ICCT- BAR UFs are a significantly better representation of real-world PHEV usage
than EPA's current approach, EDF suggests that the agency rely solely on this data in setting its
new UF curve. In addition to aligning EPA's default UF with the best available real-world data,
we encourage the agency to provide manufacturers with an option to submit rigorous, real-world
data to demonstrate their UFs are higher than these default values. An approach along these lines
could allow for retrospective adjustment based on annual driving information submitted along
with a manufacturer's compliance demonstration. An approach along these lines—a rigorous
default UF combined with the option to certify better performance—would help to better reflect
the actual emissions performance of PHEVs and provide incentives for manufacturers to develop
and deploy PHEVs that operate more regularly on electricity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
pp. 65-66]
195 88 Fed. Reg. 29252.
196 88 Fed. Reg. 29254
197 88 Fed. Reg. 29253.
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Plug-In Hybrid Vehicle Utility Factor
Ford does not support the proposed update to the Plug-In Hybrid (PHEV) utility factor (UF).
We do not believe it is appropriate to recalibrate the PHEV compliance benefit at the same time
the EPA is proposing other sweeping changes and historically stringent standards. Product
planning lead time and uncertainty in EV market growth requires that all electrification options
be available with stable and predictable compliance benefits. Ford would support an EPA
program designed to gather additional data for use in a future rulemaking which would yield a
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robust basis for a UF update and prevent disruption to EV product compliance plans. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 8]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
On PHEVs, ICCT applauds EPA for and its proposal to adjust the PHEV utility factor (UF)
curve to better fit real-world PHEV usage data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 5]
PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES
Utility factor
ICCT applauds EPA for adjusting the PHEV utility factor (UF) curve to better fit real-world
PHEV usage data. As the PHEV models available for purchase today differ in operation and all-
electric utility from when the original UF curve was developed, this update is direly need (ICCT
2022 PHEV). 149 Due to the growing repository of public, real-world PHEV data, ICCT
recommends EPA adjust the proposed fleet utility factor (FUF) curve to reflect the best-available
data, while allowing for potential updates to the curve based on more real-world data as it
accumulates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 58-60]
149 Isenstadt, A., Yang, Z., Searle, S., German, J. (2022). Real world usage of plug-in hybrid vehicles in
the United States. International Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/real-world-
phev-us-dec22/ (ICCT 2022 PHEV)
In DRIA figure 3-29, EPA's analysis of the California Bureau of Automotive Repair (BAR)
PHEV data clearly shows that a reduced UF curve is a better fit of the real-world data. This fit
matches ICCT's non-linear regression fit of the BAR data. Utilizing the same methodology
described in ICCT 2022 PHEV but with EPA's proposed FUF coefficients (Preamble 29442),
ICCT finds the appropriate normalized distance to be 802 miles (vs proposed 583 miles). This
curve more accurately reflects the current state of PHEV usage. Thus, ICCT recommends that
EPA adopt a normalized distance of 802 miles, instead of 583 miles as proposed. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 58-60]
Within the timeframe of the proposed rule EPA expects PHEVs with longer all-electric range
to become available (in part due to California's ACCII PHEV performance requirements), and
EPA seeks to avoid disincentivizing PHEVs with a too low FUF curve (Preamble 29254). For
these reasons, EPA proposed a FUF curve higher than what the BAR data supports. This
argument puts the expectation of future PHEV performance ahead of the data. However, because
there is no guarantee that future PHEV models will achieve the assumed higher electric driving
shares, the best practice is to let the data dictate the shape of the UF curve. EPA can establish a
provision by which it can adjust the UF curve to better account for PHEVs with varying all-
electric range, as additional data is collected. To simultaneously ensure PHEVs are not given
too-high UF without disincentivizing longer all-electric range PHEVs, EPA can allow
manufacturers to provide publicly available, real-world data with accurate UF measurements that
support higher FUF for specific PHEV models. Alternatively, EPA could automatically apply the
higher FUF curve (e.g., the current proposed curve, as opposed to the ICCT-BAR curve) for
vehicles that meet minimum all-electric performance requirements, such as 70 miles all-electric
2-cycle range and 40 miles all-electric US06 range. This latter option would incentivize greater
all-electric capability among PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 58-60]
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Organization: Jaguar Land Rover NA, LLC (JLR)
JLR would like to highlight our concerns over EPA's plans to incorporate PHEVs into their
analysis for the final rule. If EPA proceeds with the planned changes to the certified PHEV C02
value, namely through the adjustment of the utility factor, they must acknowledge the impact this
will have on fleet compliance, greatly reducing their contribution to the fleet. As such, the
baseline GHG target and projected ZEV share should also be adjusted by an equal amount, to
avoid an increase in target stringency by stealth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 4-5]
We would like to comment on the statement made by EPA that "this is a projection and
represents one out of many possible compliance pathways for the industry. The proposed
standards are performance-based and do not mandate any specific technology for any
manufacturer or any vehicle type." Due to the multitude of changes including those to PHEVs
and reduction in credit flexibilities, there is very little choice with regards to technologies that
will meet the incredibly challenging standards set. [REDACTEDJCBI [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0744, pp. 4-5]
In addition, the goals set out in the E.O. 14037 and Blueprint refer to vehicles sales in 2030
Calendar Year (CY), whereas the ambitious target set by EPA refers to the 2030MY fleet, which
will contain a combination of vehicles sold in 2029 and 203 0CY, effectively bringing the target
forward by six months. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Kia Corporation
- Kia supports EPA assuming PHEVs will see higher levels of electric operation and continue
to see high penetration rates. Kia opposes EPA's assumptions for PHEVs including revising the
Fleet Utility Factor (FUF) curve to reflect a PHEVs lower electric operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0555, p.3]
Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles Play Critical Role in the Transition
Kia does not support the assumptions on PHEVs outlined in the NPRM. EPA explains that its
current PHEV compliance methodology significantly underestimates PHEV C02 emissions.
Consequently, EPA proposes to revise the light vehicle PHEV Fleet Utility Factor (FUF) curve
downward to reflect as assumed PHEVs lower electric operation beginning in MY2027.13
EPA's proposal essentially lowers the benefits of PHEVs for compliance which will reduce
consumer choice and make feasibility of the standards much more challenging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0555, pp. 7-8]
13 88 Fed. Reg. 29,252.
EPA's analysis is limited to multiple publications from the International Council on Clean
Transportation (ICCT). The EPA's use of the ICCT-BAR curve is inappropriate given the
expansion of Level 2 charging occurring as EVs increase across the country. The ICCT
publications focus on the limited electric driving share of PHEVs in Europe. ICCT's assumptions
are skewed as they assume the same situation in Europe where there were unique PHEV tax
incentives, coupled with limited charging infrastructure available in multifamily dwellings. All
of which are not good comparisons to the United States. If EPA feels strongly that the real-world
fleet utility factor is too low, Kia recommends that EPA work with industry to help incentivize
reminders for consumers to plug in more often. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 7-8]
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PHEVs play an integral role in facilitating the transition to higher vehicle electrification. Kia
strongly supports EPA assuming PHEVs will continue to see high penetration rates and higher
levels of electric drive. PHEVs will lower emissions, promote consumer acceptance of electrified
powertrains, and reduce tension in the supply chain, workforce, and needed U.S. charging
infrastructure. PHEVs are expected to represent at least 20 percent of ZEV sales for the next five
years. 14 Consequently, Kia continues to strongly support multiple ZEV technological pathways
to meet the targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 7-8]
14 CARB ACCII Workshop, slide 38 (May 6, 2021).
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
EPA should conduct a prospective analysis of appropriate PHEV utility factors based on more
recent PHEV models with longer all electric range likely to result in a shift to greater electric
operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, p. 29]
PHEVs will continue to be an important compliance strategy which can integrate and
optimize the best of combustion and electric technologies to increase vehicle efficiency and
facilitate the transition to fully zero tailpipe emissions vehicles. This will be particularly
important as the charging infrastructure and supply chains develop that are necessary for battery
electric vehicle adoption at the rates projected in the proposal. PHEVs also serve as a bridge
technology that can provide consumers confidence in electric vehicle technology while
alleviating range anxiety for those who drive long distances. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564,
p. 29]
Similar to previous EPA technology analyses prepared to support future rulemakings, MECA
requests that EPA conduct a prospective analysis of utility factors of PHEVs based on the
direction of the technologies being released into the market place today as well as
announcements of future releases. Of particular note, EPA relied upon past data of older
technology PHEVs with limited all electric ranges to justify the proposed reduction in the PHEV
utility factors from today's acceptable values that are based on SAE J2841.38 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0564, p. 29]
38 https://www.sae.org/standards/content/j2841_201009/
While EPA is not proposing to adopt the minimum range requirements for PHEVs that are
included in CARB ACC II, MECA believes that these requirements along with the market will
drive PHEVs with longer all electric ranges. In fact, VW recently announced a PHEV Tiguan
SUV available for MY 2025 with an all-electric range of 62 miles.39 This in combination with
build out of charging infrastructure, especially from Inflation Reduction Act and Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act funding sources, will provide consumers with easier access to charge
PHEVs and enable them to drive more miles on electricity rather than petroleum. The result will
be that future fleet utility factors will increase rather than decrease. MECA suggests that EPA
consider these developments, including studying the correlation between fleet utility factor and
workplace charger availability, and not base utility factors on older PHEV technology. Finally,
MECA suggests that EPA allow PHEVs certifying with all electric range greater than 50 miles to
claim higher fleet utility factors, and consider scaling utility factor with a vehicle's all electric
range. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, p. 29]
3 9 https://www.caranddriver.com/volkswagen/tiguan
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Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV) Utility Factor
The data relied upon to establish the proposed reduction in utility factor for PHEV is flawed
for a number of reasons and we urge EPA to conduct its own, current and future, real-world U.S.
measurement of PHEV usage prior to implementing a revised utility factor. Such an analysis will
find greater utility in PHEV usage than is suggested by the data used in the current proposal.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 7-9]
The current data is inappropriate because it is primarily non-domestic, selective and ignores
the significant changes already underway in infrastructure and vehicle design that enable greater
PHEV utility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 7-9]
Much of the current data leverages European Union (EU) use patterns in PHEV owners,
which has several flaws. First, as the ICCT notes,5 there was a significant deviation between the
utility factor for personally owned vs. company owned vehicles. Logic would suggest this makes
sense - if drivers do not own their vehicles themselves, they are likely to be less-inclined to
maximize their electric utility. That argument is compounded by the fact that many companies in
Europe also provide gas cards to employees to support their transportation needs but provide no
similar subsidization of charging needs. From this one may infer that EU employees used their
"free" gas rather than pay for electricity, which would cause distortive bias in the data. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 7-9]
5 https ://theicct.org/publication/real-world-phev-use-jun22/
The ICCT study additionally relied on prominently for EPA's U.S. utility factor analysis used
data collected in California, where incentives for PHEV purchasing are more generous than in
the rest of the country and may even make the purchase of a PHEV less costly than a traditional
ICE vehicle. While California is an admirable leader in ZEV deployment, its incentive structure
for PHEV purchases differs from the rest of the country; a large percentage of population resides
in multi-unit dwellings (often without consistent overnight charging access), and it ranked (as of
last year) behind at least 15 other U.S. states in terms of charging ports per EV, signifying a
potential problem of constrained charging access that needs further examination.6 The ICCT
itself stated that, "More data collection could provide greater precision and clarity regarding the
deviation of real-world electric drive share and what is assumed in EPA labeling." There is no
indication that this additional data collection has since occurred. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0644, pp. 7-9]
6 https://www.govtech.com/biz/data/which-states-have-the-most-chargers-per-electric-vehicle
Another distinction worth noting is that the PHEVs and charging infrastructure of the past
five years (primarily in Europe, in the case of the data relied upon) have little resemblance to the
vehicles and charging capacity projected by EPA in its forecast for the U.S. For example,
CARB's ACC II regulation compels PHEVS to have an electric range of at least 50 miles to meet
its ZEV criteria for real-world conditions and 70 miles for minimum certification range.7 This
will enable many drivers to complete all daily driving tasks on a single charge,8 and will likely
promote greater utility in PHEVs. Furthermore, the need for a more comprehensive nationwide
EV charging infrastructure has been recognized by Congress and the Administration several
times in recent years, whether through billions of dollars in new EV charging infrastructure
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direct investment and billions more for incentives to support private and public charging. Those
investments will enable greater accessibility for PHEV drivers to charging stations, but it has yet
to be realized at this point in time or reflected in the studies on which EPA relies to propose this
amended utility factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 7-9]
7 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035 and
Clause § 1962.4(e)(1)(a) in Title 13 CCR
https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/2acciifrol962.4.pdf
8 US Average miles traveled per year. 13,476; per day: 36.92 - https://www.caranddriver.com/auto-
loans/a32880477/average-mileage-per-year/
If further study indicates that a change in PHEV utility factor is warranted, it must be
substantiated by real-world and forward-looking data collected by EPA under reliable and
repeatable test conditions. Absent that needed analysis, we strongly urge EPA to reconsider its
amendment to utility factor calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 7-9]
MEM A urges:
EPA to maintain previous PHEV utility factor or conduct U.S.-based study and
forecast to replace current PHEV utilization data and recalculate PHEV utility factor. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 7-9]
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
Mitsubishi participated in the development of - and supports - the comments submitted by
Auto Innovators. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
In addition, based on its considerable experience discussed previously with BEV and PHEV
leadership, Mitsubishi provides the following recommendations to supplement the comments of
Auto Innovators: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
1. Closely align the multi-pollutant emissions standards with President Biden's 2030
goal by assuming no more than 40-50% PHEVs and FCEVs by 2030, even though our
experience leads us to caution that this itself is very ambitious, and is predicated on the
assumption that the necessary supportive policies will be effectively implemented. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
2. Consider the many benefits of PHEVs to consumers and the environment during the
expected period of constrained battery critical minerals production capacity, and how PHEVs are
the perfect stepping- stone to full BEV acceptance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
3. Maintain the current PHEV Utility Factor (UF) and work with industry to identify
opportunities to increase PHEV electric operation. This is the ideal stepping-stone technology to
encourage long-term BEV acceptance and utilization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
4. Keep the proposed approach to determine the passenger car curves, and consider
adjusting the cutpoint and stringency levels of the light-duty trucks during the early years of the
program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
5. Maintain the existing GHG program flexibilities, such as Air Conditioning and Off-
Cycle technologies credits (including the alternative method to apply off-cycle credits), and
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allow previously approved technologies to continue receiving credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0682, p. 2]
6. Align the Tier-4 (criteria pollutants) with CARB's LEV-IV criteria test procedures and
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
7. Consider the impact that very aggressive GHG standards will have on vehicle
affordability, and especially the detrimental impact to low-to-moderate income families.
Regardless of the vehicles that regulation may require us to produce, it is critical that regulators
always keep the accessibility of consumers in mind.
The rationale for each one of these recommendations is further explained below. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
Equally as importantly, we also ask EPA to consider our recommendations regarding the
PHEV NMOG+NOx Contribution Factor and the PHEV Utility Factor (UF) as discussed in other
sections of our comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 3-4]
3. PHEV Utility Factor
Mitsubishi shares the views expressed by Auto Innovators regarding application of the PHEV
Utility Factor (UF). In addition to Auto Innovators' comments, we also provide the following
observations in support of retaining the existing UF. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 4-5]
A. PHEV Data Sources
In developing the proposed utility factor (UF), EPA relies primarily on the work conducted by
the International Council on Clear Transportation (ICCT) and comparisons to its own analysis
with PHEV data from the California Bureau of Automotive Repair (BAR). The BAR data is
based on vehicle information retrieved from the vehicle On-board Diagnostic (OBD) system and
includes total distance traveled and distance traveled during charge-depleting mode. Upon
comparison of its results with ICCT's, EPA averaged the current SAE J2841 UF curve with the
curve generated by ICCT based on the BAR data to generate the proposed UF equation. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 4-5]
The BAR data is a collection of PHEV data from MY19 through MY22 vehicles. The data
was then filtered to remove any vehicles that show inconsistent data regarding distance traveled
and grid energy utilization. While filtering of incomplete or inconsistent data is a typical
operation in data analysis, the results of the analysis can be substantially altered based on the
filters applied. We believe the filtering methods used by EPA filtered out too many vehicles. For
example, the grid energy in/out filter completely removes one of the highest utility factor vehicle
models4 from the entire data set. Whether such filtering was necessary for that vehicle is
questionable. At the same time, it may be necessary to apply alternative filters. Due to the time
constraints of this comment period, Mitsubishi was unable to fully evaluate the filtering methods
EPA used in its analysis, but we may still provide feedback to EPA after the comment period.
We ask EPA to provide additional information about the filters applied, and the effect those
filters have on the overall utility factor analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 4-5]
4 The BMW i3
B. Current PHEV Performance and Future PHEV Requirements
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Mitsubishi appreciates the work conducted by EPA and ICCT to analyze recent PHEV
performance to reevaluate the electric operation of plug-in electric hybrid vehicles. The data can
be a powerful tool in understanding the habits of consumers and the levers needed for both
current and future consumers to fully utilize the electric capability of PHEVs. However, with
regard to applying the data to utility factor estimates, the BAR data does not represent PHEVs
within the timeframe of the proposed rule as EV utility is likely to increase compared to today's
PHEVs due to improved EV performance and increased availability of EV charging
infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 4-5]
PHEVs come in many forms due to the flexibility they offer in terms of internal combustion
engine (ICE) and EV operation. The amount of EV range, charge time, and ICE operation during
charge-depleting mode are just a few of the specifications that can vary between PHEV models.
It is important to ensure the utility factor applied to MY27 and later vehicles is reflective of the
specifications and performance for vehicles of that time period. In addition, the utilization of
PHEV electric mode is dependent on the charging and driving behaviors of the vehicle owner.
As with the vehicle, owner behavior today may be different than PHEV owners in the MY27 and
later time frame. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 4-5]
California's MY26 and later Advanced Clean Car II (ACC II) regulation developed PHEV
technical requirements "that functionally emphasize the ZEV capabilities of these vehicles."
CARB estimates the minimum all-electric range required under ACC II will meet the daily needs
of 74 to 84 percent of new car and truck buyers in California5. It is likely that most, if not all,
MY27 and later PHEVs will be more ZEV- capable than the vehicles provided in the BAR data.
Among requirements CARB included in the ACC II regulation are: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0682, pp. 4-5]
Starting with MY26: Phase in of PHEVs capable of operating in all-electric mode at
further distances, and under most driving conditions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 4-5]
• MY29 and later: All PHEVs must meet extended range (70-mile 2-cycle and 40-mile
US06 EV range) and charging requirements to be eligible ZEVs under the ACC II regulation
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 4-5]
Enhanced battery durability requirements to ensure PHEV capabilities for the first
owner as well as subsequent owners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 4-5]
In addition to CARB's intention to increase ZEV capability through PHEV technical
requirements, the approach vehicle owners take to PHEV operation may change. Consumer
education and increased available of charging infrastructure will make it easier for PHEV owners
to charge vehicles when convenient, and thus more likely that they will do so on a more regular
basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 4-5]
C. Potential Effect of UF and PEF on CAFE Standard
The development of the proposed utility factor by EPA considers the impact of changes
within the context of the light-duty GHG standard. However, the utility factor is also used in
developing fuel economy compliance values for the NHTSA CAFE standard. There is little
mention of the utility factor's influence on CAFE compliance, despite the direct effect it has on
PHEV CAFE compliance values. Unlike the GHG standard, which correctly treats electric
operation as zero emissions, the CAFE regulation assigns PHEVs and BEVs a petroleum-
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equivalent fuel economy. The disconnect between the GHG and CAFE programs results in
different weighting of compliance benefits for PHEVs and BEVs relative to conventional ICE
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 5-6]
Expanding on this issue, the Department of Energy (DOE) is proposing changes to the
Petroleum Equivalency Factor (PEF) starting with MY27. The PEF is used to estimate the mile
per gallon equivalent (MPGe) of BEV and PHEV electric mode operation. The DOE is
proposing a 72% reduction of the PEF resulting in a significant reduction of the BEV and PHEV
CAFE compliance value. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 5-6]
The combined effect of the changes to the UF and PEF on the CAFE standard are difficult to
assess considering the proposed CAFE standard for MY27 through MY32 has not been
published. For now, we can only assume that the structure of the current CAFE standard will
remain unchanged. Based on this assumption, the combined effect of the UF and PEF will result
in certain PHEVs having less compliance benefit than comparable Strong Hybrid-Electric
Vehicles (SHEVs). Figure 1 is an example of the effects the proposed UF and PEF would have
on the CAFE compliance of small SUV PHEVs relative to comparable SHEVs. In Figure 1
(left), the current Utility Factor and PEF means most PHEVs correctly have fuel economy
greater than all comparable SHEVs. For Figure 1 (center), the proposed PEF with current UF
results in a CAFE compliance value reduction of all PHEVs, in addition, several PHEVs would
have a CAFE compliance value less than many SHEVs. For Figure 1 (right), the proposed
changes to the UF are added resulting in further reductions in PHEVs compliance values and
additional reductions in performance relative to SHEVs. Despite the real-world petroleum
reduction advantage of PHEVs, the reduced UF and PEF will result lower CAFE compliance
values for several PHEVs relative to comparable SHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp.
5-6]
[See original for graph titled "Figure 1. Comparison of PHEV and SHEV CAFE Compliance
Value with Current and Proposed PEF and UF"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 5-6]
D. PHEV Utility Factor Recommendations
For the reasons described above, Mitsubishi believes the PHEV data EPA used to derive its
proposed UF is outdated and not representative of the ACC II compliant PHEVs that will be in
the market for the timeframe covered by this rulemaking. Therefore, Mitsubishi recommends
EPA maintain the utility factor as it is currently, and continue to collect PHEV data to develop
programs that encourage customers to maximize the EV operation of PHEVs. In addition,
Mitsubishi recommends EPA coordinate with DOE and NHTSA to ensure the combined effects
of the proposed UF, PEF and structure of the NHTSA CAFE standard ensure CAFE compliance
reflects the real-world petroleum reduction benefit of PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682,
pp. 5-6]
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
With respect to other issues, NACAA believes plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) have
an important role to play in the LMDV GHG program provided their contribution toward the
fleet average GHG requirements is limited strictly to the distance over which they operate fully
on electricity. We concur with EPA's conclusion that the current LDV PHEV compliance
methodology overstates the operation of PHEVs on electricity thereby significantly
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underestimating PHEV C02 gm/mi compliance results. Therefore, NACAA commends EPA for
proposing to reduce the PHEV Fleet Utility Factor (FUF) curve used in the C02 compliance
calculation for PHEVs beginning in MY 2027 but recommends that the FUF curve be even lower
than proposed. We also recommend that EPA require data collection and reporting or
accessibility to better inform the methodology in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, p.
8]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
4. Porsche does not support the proposed reduction in the PHEV utility factor.
EPA's proposed reduction in the utility factor for PHEVs will reduce the weighting for
electric operation which will negatively impact the GHG compliance value for PHEVs. This is
an unfortunate proposal to undercut an incentive to deploy electrified vehicles especially in the
context of the MPR that is premised on a fleet that in less than 10 years must have 2 out of every
3 new cars sold be electrified. Porsche recognizes that PHEVs may play a minority role in the
overall composition of future electrified vehicles sales, but nevertheless continues to see an
important market role for PHEVs. PHEVs expand the range of electrification choice for
consumers, choice that provides access to the benefits of electrification in cases where a
consumer may be unable or unwilling to adopt fully electrified vehicles. For a regulation as
aggressive as this proposal, a regulation that seeks to transform the US light-duty market towards
electrification, adopting this change would simply be counter to that effort. Worse yet, it's a
change whose entire premise is based on looking backward on PHEV recharging, and not
leveraging the anticipated future charging environment included within the assumptions of the
MPR. A future that EPA projects will greatly expand the availability, reliability, and usage of
electric vehicle charging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 21-23]
EPA's proposal devalues future PHEV performance based on historic charging behavior of
existing on-road PHEV drivers. Porsche has not reviewed the details of the California BAR or
fuelly.com data but can understand if in some cases consumer use of electric drive has been
lower than expected. This is not surprising given the well-documented challenges and complaints
related to the general lack of public charging infrastructure in the past few years. Besides
challenges within finding reliable public charging, many consumers have faced difficulties in
installing home charging, especially for multifamily and rental dwellers, and have complained
about the general lack of workplace charging. However, the entire foundation of this MPR and
the dramatic shift towards electrification rests upon assumptions regarding improvements in
electric vehicles and more specifically in the availability and reliability of public and private
electric vehicle charging. Issues that past owners of PHEVs may have experienced that likely led
to the examples of lower-than-expected usage of electric drive would be addressed according to
EPA's assumptions on improved charging. As such, the decision to alter the utility factor for
future PHEVs should not focus on decreasing the utility factor due to challenges customers
experienced in the past, but rather should maintain the existing utility factor based on improved
usage of charging in 2027 and later given EPA's projections for rapidly expanding charging
infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 21-23]
It is nonsensical that future PHEV drivers would continue to pass up on charging
opportunities once charging is more ubiquitous in the public, at home and at work. In fact, this
would be counter to EPA's assumed consumer valuation of fuel savings that has been
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consistently referred to in GHG rulemakings. If consumers value fuel savings, and if charging
availability is no longer a barrier to usage, EPA would have to assume that PHEV drivers would
naturally seek to maximize their usage of electric drive if the cost per mile to drive electric is less
than that of gasoline. If for some reason drivers continued to avoid using electric operation, then
EPA would have to reevaluate the entire premise of consumer demanded fuel savings. As
charging resources increase, utility factor should increase along with it, not go down. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 21-23]
EPA acknowledges uncertainty regarding future charging usage by stating that the agency
could revisit the utility factor once again in a future rulemaking if it appears that PHEVs are
using more electric operation due to improved vehicle technology and greater charging
infrastructure. However, undercutting PHEVs in this rulemaking, only to increase the value of
PHEVs in a future rulemaking creates too much uncertainty. If EPA expects the charging
environment to improve, why reduce the assumed driving usage now only to increase it again
later? This back-and-forth uncertainty on utility factor would not be helpful since the current
proposal would so undercut the incentive for PHEVs that manufacturers would have likely
reconsidered continued support for the technology. If the agency is concerned about the actual
real-world usage of PHEV electric operation, it seems that the approach would be to work with
stakeholders to improve the charging experience today while the charging infrastructure is
expanding over the next few years. "Fixing" the issue by undercutting the technology in
regulation neither improves the technology, nor helps address charging challenges customers are
facing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 21-23]
Porsche anticipates that with improved electric ranges and greatly increased charging
opportunities, PHEVs electric operation should increase in the future. The White House reported
on June 27 that the goal to achieve 500,000 public chargers remains on track and the 2030 DOE
report on nationwide charging supports the point that current public and private investment into
charging also appears on track to support projected EV penetrations. Why would EPA undercut a
class of electrified vehicles based on yesterday's charging challenges, when other government
entities are increasingly declaring charging challenges to be on track to being solved? [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 21-23]
Porsche continues to offer PHEVs in the US market and has recently launched an upgraded
version of a PHEV utility that features significantly increased electric range. Porsche recognizes
that PHEVs can play a valuable role in helping our customers achieve the benefits that even
partial electrification can provide in terms of improved efficiency, reduced petroleum
consumption and dynamic performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 21-23]
Porsche notes that EPA's proposed update to the PHEV utility factor will also influence
CAFE compliance calculations due to the allowance within statute and regulation for
manufacturers to optionally select weighted operation. EPA did not provide analysis as to how
this change would affect CAFE compliance especially considering Department of Energy (DOE)
recent NPRM to reduce the Petroleum Equivalence Factor (PEF) by 72% for electric vehicles.
This dramatic proposal from DOE to undercut the incentive for electric vehicles within CAFE is
premature given that proposed CAFE standards for model years 2027 and later have not yet been
released by NHTSA. Porsche recommended in comments to DOE for their NPRM that DOE
include the assessment of EPA's proposed change in the utility factor to better understand the
combined effect of lower PEF and lower utility factor. DOE did not acknowledge, or was
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unaware of, the proposed reduction in utility factor from EPA. The PEF statutory basis requires
DOE, as it has done for over 40 years, to incentivize electrified vehicles in CAFE. This statute
also requires DOE, NHTSA and EPA to consult on changes related to PEF and CAFE. Neither
the EPA MPR NPRM nor the DOE PEF NPRM appear to discuss the mutual impacts that each
other's proposed updates could have on future CAFE compliance. As NHTSA has yet to release
their CAFE proposal, it is unclear if NHTSA will address both the EPA and DOE proposals and
how both could impact CAFE compliance. To Porsche, it is unclear as to why these NPRMs
appear disjointed and so far, have failed to discuss the impacts of each other's proposals on the
other regulations. Porsche recommends EPA provide analysis of the impact of the reduced utility
factor on the PEF and CAFE compliance in coordination with DOE and NHTSA. Ideally, all the
proposals would have been released together to provide manufacturers with the ability to
understand how each of the agency's actions would interact with each other and continue to
support and incentivize technologies such as PHEV. This is especially relevant considering the
overarching goal to achieve a dramatic increase in light-duty electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0637, pp. 21-23]
Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
Additional Technical Comments
Modifications to the PHEV Fleet Utility Factor ("FUF")
Rivian applauds EPA's decision to revise the FUF for PHEVs. We agree with the agency that
the current compliance methodology "significantly underestimates PHEV C02 emissions."35 As
the agency details in its analysis, and as Rivian has commented in the past, PHEVs exhibit
significant variability in their environmental performance. Research from Europe shows that
PHEVs deliver poorer environmental benefits in real-world usage than certified under test
procedures, with troubling implications for the projected benefits of regulatory programs that
encourage the development and sale of these vehicles.36 In the United States, PHEVs drive
fewer electric miles than assumed for labeling purposes, with fuel consumption as much as two-
thirds higher than nominally anticipated.37 Simply put, PHEV drivers often do not plug in their
vehicles as much as was previously assumed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 12-13]
35 Id. at 29,252.
36 Patrick Plotz et al., The International Council on Clean Transportation, Real-World Usage of Plug-In
Hybrid Electric Vehicles in Europe: A 2022 Update on Fuel Consumption, Electric Driving and C02
Emissions (June 2022), available at www.theicct.org/publication/real-world-phev-use-jun22/.
37 Aaron Isenstadt, Zifei Yang, Stephanie Searle, and John German, The International Council on Clean
Transportation, Real-World Usage of Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles in the United States (December
2022), available at www.theicct.org/publication/real-world-phev-us-dec22/.
The FUF remains important for calculating PHEV emissions for regulatory compliance, but
the weight of the evidence clearly compels EPA to revise the curve. The initial proposal marks a
significant improvement over the status quo, but onboard diagnostic data from California support
an even lower FUF.38 EPA rightly acknowledges this in the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis
("DRIA").39 Nonetheless, EPA proposes a higher curve. The agency's justification rests on
speculation that future PHEVs could deliver greater all-electric performance as well as stated
concerns that an accurate FUF would "disincentivize" PHEV development.40 If PHEVs fall
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short of their environmental promise, the technology does not merit an artificially inflated
regulatory incentive regardless of its potential. Far from an unfair disincentive, an accurate FUF
would ensure that the regulation works as intended—achieving reliable, real-world emissions
reductions. To safeguard the regulation's environmental integrity, Rivian encourages EPA to
finalize a FUF that accurately reflects the best available data from real-world driving behavior.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 12-13]
38 Stephanie Searle and Aaron Isenstadt, The International Council on Clean Transportation, "Don't Plug
In Your Plug- In Hybrid? EPA Will Now Hold Automakers Responsible," June 1, 2023, available at
www.theicct.org/us-phev-usage- regs-jun23/.
39 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light- Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles: Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (April 2023), 3-78.
40 Id.
Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
Under the GHG standards portion of the tailpipe emissions standards, a Fleet Utility Factor
(FUF) is used to determine the portion of the electric operation of a plug-in hybrid electric
vehicle (PHEV) that contributes to the fleet average. Studies have shown, however, that the
current FUF overestimates the operation of PHEVs on electricity.67 As a result, "the current
light- duty vehicle PHEV compliance methodology significantly underestimates PHEV C02
emissions."68 We therefore support EPA's proposal to revise the FUF curve used in C02
compliance calculations for PHEVs beginning in model year 2027 and urge EPA to consider a
FUF curve that is even lower than the current proposal. It is essential that the GHG emissions
from vehicles are properly accounted for in fleet averages to ensure the standards are resulting in
the greatest emission reductions possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, p. 9]
67 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 29252 (May 5, 2023).
68 Id.
Organization: Stellantis
Separately, EPA is discounting the benefit of a consumer facing technology that in the near-
term addresses many of the concerns around pure BEV technology (e.g., range, infrastructure,
etc.). Specifically, EPA is decreasing the GHG benefits of PHEV technology by proposing a
change to PHEV Fleet Utility Factor (FUF) that will increase GHG emissions of light- and
medium-duty PHEVs. EPA claims the published FUF used on test cycles to account for on-road
electric operation is no longer appropriate. We have analyzed EPA's work and find shortcomings
in the data sets (both the fuelly.com and CA-BAR), the filtering and analysis of the data, and the
curve fitting techniques used. To address these problems, we propose that industry, EPA, SAE,
DOT, and the national labs collaborate on an update to SAE J2841 that can be published
following peer reviews. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 12-13]
The two issues that can lead to shortfalls in PHEV electric operation usage are (1) lack of
charging and (2) differences in performance between regulated cycles and on-road operation. We
believe charging rates will improve as more public infrastructure emerges and charging becomes
ubiquitous. As for capability concerns, CARB is requiring a 70-mile combined cycle minimum
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range and a high-power cold start requirement (that EPA also proposes to adopt in this rule).
These two requirements will force future PHEVs to have more range and power in all-electric
operation, thus eliminating or minimizing any performance differences on-road versus regulated
cycles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 12-13]
EPA should be encouraging PHEV technology, not discouraging it. EPA clearly recognizes
PHEVs could be an appropriate form of electrification for:
- Pickup trucks where BEVs struggle to deliver the needed range while towing
- Consumers who are not ready for BEVs, but could use a PHEV as a bridge [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0678, pp. 12-13]
Improved capability PHEVs are coming and offer a battery mineral preserving bridge to full
electrification (i.e., PHEVs can address consumer needs with smaller batteries than pure BEVs).
EPA's own analysis in the prior 2023-2026MY GHG emissions standards rulemaking5 found
that PHEVs can play a significant role in meeting GHG emissions standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0678, pp. 12-13]
5 Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86 Fed.
Reg. 74434, 74493-94 (Dec. 30, 2021).
Stellantis agrees with the Auto Innovators' recommendation that EPA should explicitly model
PHEVs in the light-duty and MDV pickup applications in the final rule. However, the proposed
Utility Factor will discourage PHEVs. Stellantis disagrees with the proposed Utility Factor
changes and recommends that the current published Utility Factor remain in use. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 12-13]
The combined impact of the proposed changes described above compound the stringency of
an already aggressive target makes the overall "net effect" of what EPA is proposing infeasible -
especially in the initial year of the program, [redacted text.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678,
pp. 12-13]
Third, EPA should retain credit for off-cycle GHG technologies that will continue to reduce
real-world GHG emissions on ICE and EV product without artificially ramping down credit
prematurely. Similarly, EPA should retain today's PHEV Utility Factor to motivate sales of even
more capable PHEVs. These technologies remain important in reducing the GHG emissions of a
combined ICE/EV fleet, and the overall influence of the credit mechanisms in place to
incentivize technology proliferation will scale down naturally as BEV technology proliferates.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 14-15]
In addition to these three pieces, and as a separate matter to setting feasible standards, EPA
should consider implementing transparent and objective mechanisms that monitor key market
enablers (infrastructure, battery costs, and raw material availability) and create adjustments if
these essential enablers fall short of projections. These mechanisms are not a substitute for
appropriately set targets, but rather a compliment to address uncertainties that are beyond the
control of both industry and EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 14-15]
Stellantis recommends that EPA should:
GHG Standards
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- Revise standards that align to achievable EV adoption rates that do not force an overly
optimistic technology transition for the market and industry: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678,
P- 24]
-Revise stringency adopting an 'Alternative 3' profile removing front-loading of EV
adoption, modified to ensure 2030MY standards can be met with a 40-50% BEV+PHEV+FCEV
combined technology penetration [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
-Include PHEV technology as a critical transition technology to a fully electrified future -
without incorrect discounting - particularly in highly capable vehicle segments [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
-Retain GHG saving technology flexibilities recognizing the GHG benefit that continues to
be present on electric vehicles and that will naturally decrease as EV penetration increases [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
-Treat trucks and SUVs fairly by including PHEV technology as an important bridge to a
BEV future, and ensure year-over-year required improvements are the same as cars [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
-Fix incorrect MDV adjustments that mistakenly force medium-duty vehicles into light-duty
standards and double stringency of high capability products arbitrarily [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0678, p. 24]
- Include a provision that compliance with EPA's GHG standards would constitute
compliance with CAFE standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
Regarding the Fleet Utility Factor (FUF or UF) and the issue of PHEVs plugging in we have
many recommendations. We recognize this is an important issue and a complicated one. We
share EPA's desire to have PHEVs plug-in frequently in order to achieve needed emission
reductions and make the averaging, banking and trading system work. We believe that a
combination of regulatory requirements, incentives and disincentives discussed below will
address the issues EPA raised and improve the FUF. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 6]
a) We strongly recommend against using the California Bureau of Automotive
Repair (BAR) data and Fuelly.com data as the basis for a new FUF for PHEVs. The Technical
Committee of the Strong PHEV Coalition includes researchers who have been engaged with
development and evaluation of UF calculations for more than 20 years. We are very familiar
with the set of datasets that are available in the public and private domain for UF evaluation and
have researched the datasets and authored many of the studies referenced in the Draft Regulatory
Impact Analysis (DRIA). Our assessment and recommendations in response to the request for
input on UF data in the DRIA is that the proposed changes to UF are based on a very poor
dataset, poor analysis, and statistically indefensible methods. These datasets and methods are
inadequate to inform policy of the importance and impact of EPA's emissions standards. See
Appendix A for our critique of the BAR and Fuelly.com data sets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0646, p. 6]
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We strongly recommend keeping the SAE J2841 FUF curve for PHEVs in the final rule
because the SAE standard FUF is an accepted, standardized, and well-understood model. The
analyses that are presented by EPA and ICCT as evidence of the unrepresentativeness of J2841
are based on very poor data sources and analysis that is not statistically relevant or predictive.
We agree that FUF and PHEV credits should be derived from operational data, but the proposed
data sources and analyses are inadequate and reflect poorly on EPA's knowhow. EPA should
engage with experts to derive a data-driven FUF using more representative datasets and methods
including those of the CARB-funded UC Davis data logger study, or the EV Project analysis .
See Appendix A for more explanation. Another factor that we request EPA informally consider
is that PHEV batteries typically use five times or less lithium per all-electric mile than battery
EVs, and as a result save substantial amounts of GHG from battery manufacturing. Strong
PHEVs have the same GHG footprint as a 300-mile range BEV and Strong PHEVs have much
higher all-electric range than PHEVs with a low all-electric range. (See Appendix B below.) We
support EPA not considering battery manufacturing GHG emissions in this rulemaking, but
request that EPA informally include this factor when developing the final FUF. While SAE
J2841 is not perfect given the factors above it is more than adequate when combined with our
package of recommendations below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 6-7]
c) Further, we support EPA's desire to update the FUF in a future rulemaking
when new data becomes available, and we commit to helping EPA acquire this data as we are a
very data driven coalition that includes five universities (or similar research centers). Over time
data derivable from CA BAR and other state's smog check programs will improve as more on-
board diagnostic data becomes available which should be used in a future rulemaking with
appropriate data quality testing, and improved methods. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 6-
7]
EPA should extend the FUF to 130 miles in order to encourage automakers. For example,
Toyota has announced that it is planning a PHEV with over 124-mile all- electric range.4 While
we don't know which test cycle this range is based on, EPA should encourage this long all
electric range.5 Another example is the BMW i3 REX which was designed to primarily drive all-
electric miles but is now only sold as a used PHEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 7]
EPA, in the final rule or future rule, should include a true-up system for automaker's FUF
where debits or credits are provided based on actual data from on-board diagnostics and
reporting by automakers of a fairly large sample. In other words, under this proposal, an
automaker would lose or gain credits after-the-fact based on actual data on how consumers drive
both new and older PHEVs. If EPA opts not to do this, we request that EPA should, at minimum,
require manufacturers in this rulemaking to share anonymized actual data from PHEVs so that in
future years, the EPA can make informed decisions about the FUF based upon real world data.
g) EPA should adopt a provision to discourage low-range PHEVs by requiring them to count
as an HEV with no zero emission miles. We suggest a cut-off of 50 km (31 miles). Further we
are not suggesting a ban on low-range PHEVs but rather a disincentive to produce them. Low-
range PHEVs according to the UC Davis data logger project and the EV Project have greater
likelihood of not plugging in and this could increase as PHEVs get older. PHEVs with a long all-
electric range offer much greater benefits to consumers and show much higher levels of plugging
in.
4 Toyota Planning Plug-In Hybrid Vehicles With Over 124 Miles Of Electric Range (motorl.com)
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5 If this 124-mile range is based on the WLTP test (instead of EPA two cycle test) it is a very good all
electric range for a PHEV.
Our assessment and recommendations in response to the request for input on UF data in the
DRIA is that the proposed changes to UF are based on a very poor dataset, poor analysis, and
statistically indefensible methods. These datasets and methods are inadequate to inform policy of
the importance and impact of EPA's emissions standards. See our recommendations section
above for what should be done instead. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 12]
Critiques of the datasets that are input into the EPA UF calculations The BAR and Fuelly.com
datasets that are referenced in the DRIA are both very poor datasets, methodologically and
practically ill-suited to sample the population of PHEV owners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0646, p. 12]
The Fuelly.com dataset is wholly inadequate to perform this function. It is a self-selected,
self-reported online gasoline consumption log; Fuelly.com is not a survey, makes no claim to
statistical representativeness, and does not have inputs or data to electric operation in any way.
Methodologically, the means by which ICCT and EPA calculate UF from Fuelly.com data is to
compare real-world fuel consumption to EPA rated CS fuel consumption, which is completely
incoherent if one realizes that EPA rated fuel consumption and on-road fuel consumption are not
the same thing. EPA researchers know better than any the many sources of variance between
real-world fuel consumption and EPA -rated fuel consumption. In the ICCT calculation, the
variance between these two fuel consumptions (which is strongly correlated with weather
conditions, driving conditions, tire inflation, etc.) has entirely and indefensibly been allocated to
a lower UF. In both the data and analysis ofFuelly.com fuel logs, EPA and ICCT are using
unrepresentative data and deeply inadequate analysis to make policy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0646, p. 12]
The BAR dataset is a relatively improved dataset, and we believe that in the future, a
nationally representative dataset derived from many states who will be gathering this data will
have value for measuring the real-world operation of PHEVs and will enable a data driven UF
calculation in a future EPA rulemaking. At present, the BAR dataset has comprehensive data
quality problems, and the naive data filtering algorithms that ICCT and EPA used to wrangle and
preprocess the data are inadequate to realize a coherent and representative analysis. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 12]
Because our coalition has been systematically studying the operation of PHEVs, we have also
seen that the FUFs of vehicle models in the BAR dataset are changing as a function of time. We
asked for and received from ICCT and CA BAR both the datasets that ICCT used for their
analyses (from ICCT), and an updated dataset of the same fields of data up to the present date
(May 2023).These datasets show comprehensively different results in calculating PHEV
operation. For example, BMW X5 XDRIVE45E vehicles (MY 2019-2022) that meet the
ICCT/EPA filtering criteria tested before 17 May 2022 have an average individual UF of 30%.
X5 XDRIVE45E vehicles (MY 2021-2023) that meet the ICCT/EPA filtering criteria tested after
17 May 2022 have an average individual UF of 68%. These types of problems with the BAR
dataset seem to be unrecognized and not validated by the research community, and further
strengthen the case for not using the BAR dataset for research or policy making. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 12-13]
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There is evidence of systematic importing of used PHEVs into California, a type of data
pollution that is not affecting most of the conventional vehicles. For example, a set of vehicles
included in the ICCT dataset are six 2019-2020 Toyota Prius Primes. These six Prius Primes are
all tested on a single day, they each have >#### 3000 mi, and five of six of them are present in
the ICCT analysis (one has a technician-recorded odometer inconsistency). Whatever the history
of these vehicles, the fact that 6 of them are being tested back-to-back on the same day is
evidence that these vehicles are not under the operation and ownership of the general public, and
that their operational history is not representative of the general public. These clusters of similar
vehicles undergoing back-to-back testing are common and easily identifiable in the BAR data
used for ICCT and EPA analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 13]
Prius
Prime
1
tested
on
02NOV2020:09:00:00.442000
Prius
Prime
2
tested
on
02NOV2020:10:34:51.141000
Prius
Prime
3
tested
on
02NOV2020:11:28:26.939000
Prius
Prime
4
tested
on
02NOV2020:12:14:16.189000
Prius
Prime
5
tested
on
02NOV2020:12:25:32.846000
Prius
Prime
6
tested
on
02NOV2020:13:36:16.952000
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 13]
There is strong evidence that automakers (OEMs) are not implementing the data collection
algorithms consistently. For example, all 2019 Chrysler Pacifica hybrid vehicles, transmitted the
data required for these calculations from the HPCM-HybridPtCtrl control module, instead of
from the ECM*-EngineControl control module which was used by all other OEMs. In reviewing
and operating the ICCT's Data Import Algorithm (BAR Data Import.R, shared by A. Isenstadt
5/13/23), these vehicles are excluded from ICCT's analysis. Given that 2019 is the first year that
on- board diagnostic technology allows data collection, and we anticipate better data reporting
and processing in future years, but the handling of these types of inconsistencies is not in
evidence in the ICCT/EPA data wrangling processes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 13-
14]
4. There is strong evidence of many significant inconsistencies between the technician
and OEM-derived data that are present in the BAR data. For example, of the BMW 530e PHEVs
in the ICCT dataset (ICCTOBDDATASETMY2019, requested from BAR in April 2023),
585 (of a total 988) of them failed the odometer reading test (that the technician-entered
odometer [in mi] is well-outside the OBD-reported odometer reading [converted to mi]). There is
no reason why technicians are so comprehensively misreporting this very simple datum for a
vehicle that is one of the most reported vehicles in this dataset (which has -4000 PHEVs in
total). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 13-14]
There are many more examples of these types of problems, none of which are identified or
discussed in any of the ICCT/EPA literature or analyses. In summary, at this time, the BAR
dataset is not a representative dataset to be able to assess the operation of PHEV in real world
operation. In the future, as vehicles in CA (and in other states) 10 age into annual emissions
testing, the BAR datasets will have a more comprehensive sample of privately owned and
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operated vehicles and may be evaluated at that time for its suitability for research and policy
making. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 13-14]
10 For example, in the state of Colorado, Colorado's Department of Public Health and the Environment
will record and make available similar data when 2019 MY vehicles enter emissions inspections after they
are 8 years old. This data will be available for researchers and policy makers.
We assert that the methods used to derive the proposed fleet utility factors (FUFs) from
transportation datasets are not statistically defensible, and that the process of "averaging" FUF
curves is inappropriate and does not improve predictive ability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0646, pp. 14-18]
Apart from the inconsistencies described in the section above, policy makers and researchers
must take caution in deriving findings from transportation data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0646, pp. 14-18]
Figure 1 illustrates the set of individual vehicle-level UFs that are derived from an updated
data pull from BAR. Of course, the data are extremely scattered and do not illustrate the validity
of the UF curves for either the SAE J2841 FUF or the proposed FUF. When EPA or ICCT
perform least-squares regression to derive a particular UF curve, they must calculate the
confidence interval around the parameter estimates. When we perform that regression with
vehicle models' pooled averages, we find that this dataset provides no evidence that the EPA
FUF model is more representative than the SAEJ2841 model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646,
pp. 14-18]
To illustrate this point more visually, Figure 2 provides additional statistical detail for some
selected vehicle models. Figure 2 illustrates the wide dispersion of measured individual UFs and
shows that the 95% confidence intervals on the mean value may or may not encompass any
particular pre- derived response curve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 14-18]
Finally, EPA's method of "averaging" of Fuelly/BAR/J2841 UF curves does not have any
statistical/theoretical/practical power in achieving UF prediction and is inappropriate given the
varied and disperse nature of these data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 14-18]
A more data-driven approach that incorporates a number of driver and vehicle operating
factors is needed to better characterize the real-world utility factors that are likely to arise over
time. As the BAR database expands and becomes cleaner and more regularized, it can form the
basis of a statistically relevant and more acceptable data-driven model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0646, pp.14-18]
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Real-World PHEV Utility Factors
[See original for graph titled "Figure 1. Calculated real-world PHEV utility factors for all vehicle
models in the data set compared to the SAE J2841 FUF and the proposed FUF. Values are
displayed as a functi on of EPA range irrespective of vehicle model and model year (e.g., EPA
CD range of 31 encompasses two versions of the 2022 Hyundai Santa Fe and three model years
of the BMW X5 XDrive45E). Note the wide variation in calculated utility factors compared to
the two FUF curves for all EPA ranges."] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 14-18]
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EPA Range
[See original for graph titled "Figure 2. Statistics of calculated real-world utility factors for four
selected PHEV models compared to SAE J2841 FUF and proposed FUF. Model variations (e.g.,
Volt and Volt Premier) do not exhibit significantly different utility factors, on average, and are
combined in this figure. Model year is constant for each model to minimize potential year-to-
year differences"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 14-18]
There are better data sets that support EPA using SAE J2741 for now. Regarding PPIEVs not
plugging in, there are many factors that impact plugging in and it is a complicated subject that
needs more research. 11 This August 2020 paper from UC Davis is one of the best analyses and
uses data loggers from actual drivers and shows that PFDEVs with longer AERs do not have a
substantial issue with not plugging in (e.g., about 3-5%). 12 See Table 1 below. Also, there are
many factors that could see this decrease in the future. We make the case above that better data
in the future will allow a new rulemaking on the FUF issue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646,
pp. 14-18]
11 Four studies 1) Bucher, J.D. and Bradley, T.H. (2018). Modeling operating modes, energy'
consumptions, and infrastructure requirements of fuel cell plug-in hybrid electric vehicles using
longitudinal geographical transportation data. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy' 43, 12420-12427.
2) Raghavan, S. S. and Tal. G. (2022). Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle observed utility factor: Why the
observed electrification performance differs from expectations. International Journal of Sustainable
Transportation 16, 105-136. 3) Mandev, A., Plotz, P., Sprei, F„ and Tal, G. (2022). Empirical charging
behavior of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. Applied Energy 321, 119293 ,
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2022.119293. 4) [1] Smart, J., Bradley, T., and Salisbury, S. (2014).
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Actual versus estimated utility factor of a large set of privately owned Chevrolet Volts. SAE International
Journal of Alternative Powertrains 3, 30-35.
12 https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ab8ca5/meta
Table 1.
For short range PHEVs
AER EPA label
Percent not plugging in
Toyota Prius Gen 1
11 miles
17.6%
Ford Cmax and Ford Fusion
20 miles
12%
Audi e-tron
17 miles
9%
Toyota Prius Prime Gen 2
25 miles
9%
For longer-range PHEVs
AER EPA label
Percent not plugging in
Chrysler Pacifica
33 miles
4%
Chevy Volt Gen 2-
53 miles
5%
Chevy Volt Gen 1-
38 miles
3%
Honda Clarity
48 miles
4%
For very long-range PHEVs
AER EPA label
Percent not plugging in
BMW i3 rex
128 miles
no data
Karma Revero
60 miles
no data
[See original for graph on the Average Utility Factor of the Short-Range PHEVs] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 14-18]
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Real-World Range
Average Utility Factor of the Short-Range PHEVsis Much Lower than Expected
(including survey data on no charging)
0.80 0-76
Prius Plug-in C-Max Energi Volt 16 Volt 18
| Comb Utility Factor (SAE2841) ¦ UC Davis Study HWith Hybrid-only Users
Strang Plug-in Hytrld EV
/ C O A l Ml On
[See original for graphic on PI II* V Mils Driven in Charge-Sustaining Mode (Using Gasoline)
or Charge-Depleting Mode (Using Battery)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 14-18]
While we understand the desire by EPA to simplify the regulation and reduce the use of bonus
multiplier credits, we believe a small bonus credit in the final regulation for a few years is
justified and needed to unlock this technology because of the large emission reduction benefits
and other benefits enabled by bidirectional charging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 9]
EPA should provide small bonus credits (multipliers) in 2027 to 2030 for several advanced
technologies including PHEVs with a long all-electric range that are not being produced today.
While we understand the need to simplify the regulation and dramatically reduce the use of
multipliers, we do support very limited continuation of multiplier to advance technologies that do
not exist today or are in very limited numbers such as bidirectional charging vehicles
(recommendation 4) and PHEVs with an all-electric range of 60 or more miles. These
technologies need extra lead time to develop. Having multiple technologies helps in reaching
many hard-to-reach customer segments, and PHEVs with over 60 mile all-electric range by
legacy automakers are not offered today and have rarely been produced and sold. Also see our
recommendation 8 below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 10]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Tesla supports the proposed Alternative 1 with added stringency so that the final performance
standards achieves a fleet BEV penetration rate greater than 69% in MY 2032.2 Alternative 1 is
estimated to provide greater C02 emissions reduction of -51% from no action by 2050 compared
to -46% under EPA's proposal, and the additional stringency will result in even greater emission
reductions.3 Accordingly, Tesla asserts the EPA should amend its proposal with a more stringent
version of Alternative 1 and take, inter alia, the following additional steps to increase the
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performance and overall stringency of the proposed standards: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792,
p. 2]
2 See, 88 Fed. Reg. 29332-33, Table 96.
3 Id., at 29348 (comparing Tables 135 and 136).
- Eliminate off-cycle crediting for all types of vehicles; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p.
2]
- Revisit the plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) utility factor to accurately reflect real
world emissions; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Amend the proposal to create parity in promoting motor vehicle air conditioning (MVAC)
efficiency adoption; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Maintain the existing zero emissions upstream approach for BEVs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0792, p. 2]
- Eliminate credit multipliers for all vehicles; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Ensure BEVs continue to be accounted for, and participate in, the NMOG + NOx reduction
standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
While the agency proposes limiting the remaining off-cycle credit generation based on
PHEVs fleet utility factor, as discussed above, this still would inequitably favor a legacy
technology at the expense of full vehicle electrification. 150 Nevertheless, EPA is appropriately
revisiting the PHEV Fleet Utility Factor because PHEV compliance to date has significantly
underestimated C02 emissions by overestimating their use of electricity. 151 Reducing the
PHEV utility factor is appropriate and overdue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 24-25]
150 88 Fed. Reg. at 29251.
151 Id., at 29252.
PHEVs have consistently been overrewarded compared to their actual emissions reduction
performance. 152 In a 2020 study, the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
found that real-world PHEV fuel consumption and emissions were about 2-4 times higher than
certified levels. 153 According to ICCT, one of the main reasons for this is that, "For private cars,
the average utility factor (UF)—an expression for the portion of kilometers driven on electric
motor versus kilometers driven on combustion engine—is 69% for New European Drive Cycle
(NEDC) type approval but only around 37% for real-world driving. For company cars, an
average UF of 63% for NEDC and approximately 20% for real-world driving was found." 154
Essentially, PHEV drivers utilize ICE engines for travel far more than electric drive when
operated in real world conditions. Similarly, Transport and Environment found that emissions
from three of the most popular PHEVs in the EU were 28-89% higher than certified levels even
under ideal test conditions (e.g., fully charged battery). 155 Other studies suggest hybrids offer
little benefit compared to ICE vehicles. 156 The California Air Resources Board (CARB) has
also recognized these concerns by calling out excessive PHEV cold start emissions. 157 In sum,
Tesla supports the agency revisiting the PHEV Fleet Utility Factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0792, pp. 24-25]
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152 See e.g., Guardian, Major plug-in hybrid cars pollute more than official measures suggest (Feb. 7,
2023) available at h ttps://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/feb/08/major-plug-in-hybrid-cars-
pollute-more-than-official-measures-suggest.
153 ICCT, Real-World Usage of Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles: Fuel Consumption, Electric Driving,
and C02 Emissions (Sept. 27, 2020) available at https://theicct.org/publication/real-world-usage-of-plug-
in-hybrid-electric-vehicles-fuel- c onsumption-electric-driving-and-co2-emissions/.
154 Id., at 1.
155 Transportation & Environment, Fixing the PHEV loophole (Dec. 2021) available at h
ttps://www.transportenvironment.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/02/2022_TE_position_PHEV_UF_timeline.pdf;See also, CleanTechnica, Plugin
Hybrid Cars Pollute 200-400% More Than Official Ratings (Feb. 13, 2022) available at
https://cleantechnica.com/2022/02/ll/phevs-pollute-2-4x-more-than-official-ratings-lets-fix-the-eu-
loophole/
156 See e.g., Impact Living, Study on the consumption of plug-in hybrid vehicles in Valais topography
(Jan. 11, 2022) available at https://impact-living.ch/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Consommation-vehicules-
hybrides-rapport-publie-IMPACT- L IVING-canton-Valais-ll-01-22.pdf
157 CARB, Advanced Clean Cars (ACC) II Workshop Presentation at 27 (May 6, 2021) available at
https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/2021-05/acc2_workshop_slides_may062021_ac.pdf
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
4. The proposed rule discriminates against plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) based on
flawed data and analysis from an environmental NGO to arbitrarily lower the "Utility Factor"
(UF). EPA's proposed UF slashes the compliance benefit of PHEVs by between 25% and 45%
and discourages OEMs from pursuing this technology. EPA should retain the current Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) method for assessing the UF. PHEVs should be encouraged by this
regulation, not discouraged - they are an extremely efficient use of limited and expensive
minerals, provide significant GHG reduction benefits, are more affordable than similar BEVs,
and require less reliance on charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 2]
EPA requests any relevant performance or utility data that may help inform their analyses for
the Final Rule. We appreciate the opportunity to share data which will help elevate the role
PHEVs in the Final Rule to be an important part of a sustainable transition to electrification. We
plan to share such PHEV data outside of the comment period, possibly, including confidential
information. For now, we request EPA consider the data we have provided that suggests PHEVs
should be considered be an important contributor in whatever assumed PEV sales mix. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 32]
6.4. PHEV Utility Factor
The proposed revisions to the SAE vehicle Fleet Utility Factor (FUF) curve would
significantly diminish PHEV compliance benefits and challenge the technology's market
viability at a time when consumers and the proposed standards need more plug-in electric vehicle
(PEV) options available. Toyota believes the FUF should remain unchanged as the proposal
offers insufficient evidence to support such a consequential test procedure change for which
there has been minimal industry engagement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 33]
6.4.1. Supporting Studies Lack Peer Review
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EPA contends available real-world data suggests the current PHEV compliance methodology
which incorporates the SAE J2841 FUF curve significantly underestimates PHEV C02
emissions. The proposal references the authors of several studies that have questioned the
efficacy of the SAE UF for PHEVs in Europe. These studies are not relevant to PHEV operation
in the U.S. It is well documented that the real-world data in Europe is skewed by less capable
PHEVs that were provided by companies to employees with free gasoline as a perk, but not free
electricity. Further, tax policy in Europe incentivizes PHEV purchases but charging opportunities
are often limited for multifamily dwellings which are common. Not surprisingly, PHEVs in the
Europe-focused studies were primarily driven as conventional hybrids on gasoline. Finally, the
potential for discrepancies in label versus real-world all-electric PHEV range is greater in Europe
where the values resulting from the labeling procedure are significantly more optimistic than
those in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 33-34]
As seen in Table 4, several studies or articles are referenced in support of the proposed
revision to the SAE FUF, only one of which has been peer reviewed by a neutral third-party, i.e.
not chosen by the authoring organization. The proposal excludes several relevant peer-reviewed
publications, including papers by Toyota22 and UC Davis23 that provide counter-balancing
arguments to the claims that the SAE UF is no longer appropriate. Toyota's paper was peer-
reviewed using a double- blind process managed by the editors of the journal Environmental
Research Letters. This paper directly rebuts the Fraunhofer/International Council on Clean
Transportation (ICCT) paper and was published in the same journal as that Fraunhofer/ICCT
paper, and after the Fraunhofer/ICCT appeared. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 33-34]
22 Hamza, K., Laberteaux, K. and Chu, K.C. "On inferred real-world fuel consumption of past decade
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles in the US," Environ. Res. Lett. 17 (2022) 104053.
23 Raghavan, S. and Tal, G. "Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle observed utility factor: why the observed
electrification performance differ from expectations." Int. J. Sustain. Transp. (2020) 16: 105-136.
[See original attachment for Table 4 Supporting References for Revision to J2841 FUF Curve
Reference Number in EPA NPRM | Primary Authorizing Organization | Type of Article |
Geographic Area of Focus | Publication Year | Peer Reviewed?
472
473
474
475
481
482
483
T&E | Report | Europe/World | 2020 | No
ICCT | White Paper | World | 2020 | No
ICCT | White Paper | Europe | 2022 | No
Fraunhofer | Journal Paper | World | 2021 | Yes
Fraunhofer | Report | Europe | 2021 | No
T&E | Report | Europe | 2022 | No
ICCT | White Paper | US | 2022 | No]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 33-34]
Instead, the proposed FUF change relies on the analyses of two error-filled datasets to depict
real- world PHEV operation in the U.S. ICCT first presented the Fuelly and California BAR
datasets in a December 2022 whitepaper.24 Both the data and the analyses lack the scientific
640
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rigor required to support revising the SAE FUF curve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 33-
34]
24 "Real world usage of plug-in hybrid vehicles in the United States." Aaron Isenstadt, Zifei Yang,
Stephanie Searle, John German, ICCT Report, December 2022.
6.4.2. Fuelly Web Application Dataset
The Fuelly website application is designed for gasoline vehicle users to input miles driven,
refuel amount, and fuel price to calculate fuel economy and the operating costs incurred.25 The
input parameters do not allow charge-depleting (CD) and charge-sustaining (CS) driving miles to
be calculated. The web application lacks separate inputs for electricity and gasoline
consumption. Instead, there is a single input field labeled "Fuel" used to calculate the cost of fuel
consumption which is the primary purpose of the web application. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0620, pp. 34-37]
25 Fuelly is also available as a mobile phone application.
Inspecting the data in the Fuelly application has confirmed the lack of a dedicated interface
for electricity consumption leads to data input errors. For example, samples of certain Tesla
battery electric vehicles have values labeled as "miles per gallon" (MPG) entered in the "Fuel"
input field instead of the appropriate "miles per kilowatt-hour" (kWh) units. This results in
extremely low mile-per-gallon numbers being reported, significantly lower than expected for
comparable- class gasoline vehicles. We believe that when owners attempt to track their
electricity cost with the Fuelly interface, the application's back-end code treated the entered
kilowatt-hour values as gasoline miles per gallon values, as suggested by Figure 11. This error
significantly increases the inferred fleet-wide fuel usage and decreases the utility factor for
PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 34-37]
[See original for Graphic, Figure 11 Selected Fuelly Data Entries for Tesla Model S] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 34-37]
At the opposite end of the error spectrum, refueling events for PHEVs with an accurately high
charging frequency and utility factor have been excluded as outliers by the Fuelly application
solely because of their superior fuel economy. For example, it is not uncommon for a regularly
charged Chevrolet Volt to attain 200+ MPG which can be filtered by from the distribution of re-
fuel events because the value lies beyond Fuelly's 3-sigma screening limit that is applied to fleet
average MPG (see Figure 12 below). These omissions further mischaracterize PHEV real-world
fleet performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 34-37]
[See original for graphic, Figure 12 Fuelly Results for 2019 Chevrolet Volt] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 34-37]
The left side of Figure 13 compares for selected PHEVs the UFs that ICCT inferred from the
Fuelly data to both the SAE and EPA proposed UF curves. Though tedious, it is possible to
correct or "clean" the Fuelly data for every refuel event of the selected PHEVs. The right side of
Figure 13 shows that Toyota's cleaning of those selected data points results in the corrected
Fuelly data curve being much closer to the SAE curve.26 It is also important to note that, using
the methodology ICCT used, and Toyota repeated (after appropriately cleaning the data), if the
charge sustaining (CS) fuel-economy (in MPG) is lower than the EPA label CS fuel-economy (in
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MPG), then the calculated values, shown below, only represent lower bounds of UF on the on-
road.27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 34-37]
26 No footnote text provided.
27 See Appendix B for a description of the data cleaning process.
[See original for graphs, Figure 13 Impact of Correcting Erroneous Data on Fleet Utility
Factor (FUF)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 34-37]
Prior to the proposal being issued, Toyota met with EPA to raise concerns about the efficacy
of ICCT attempt to infer a real-world PHEV UF from the Fuelly web application. We reviewed a
slide deck that deconstructed ICCT's methodology and identified examples of uncorrected data
entry errors that directly impact the conclusions reached in ICCT's whitepaper.28 Our efforts to
replicate the Fuelly-based calculations described by ICCT in the 2022 Whitepaper and this
proposal strongly suggest such cleaning of the data errors still has not happened. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 34-37]
28 The slide deck from the March 13, 2023 meeting is included as Appendix C.
6.4.3 BAR OBD Dataset
The OBD data obtained from the California Bureau of Automotive Repair (BAR) program
does provide the vehicle parameters necessary to calculate an in-situ Utility Factor such as
charge- depleting distance, charge-sustaining distance, and total distance traveled. However, as
the proposal notes, there are limitations with the available data which Toyota believes make it
unfit for depicting normal PHEV usage patterns. The BAR Smog Check program, which
periodically collects the abovementioned parameters, is required in California for vehicles:
- 8-years or older,
- 4 model-years or older that change ownership, or
- Registered in California after moving from another state. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620,
pp. 37-40]
The PHEV data tracking requirement in the BAR program started with 2019 model year but
did not fully phase in until 2021 model year. The most recent vehicles in the cited BAR dataset
used to support the proposal are from the 2022 model year, so none of the PHEVs in the sample
were obligated to participate due to the age criteria referenced above. Considering a California
Smog Test requires some effort and money from the vehicle owner, it is reasonable to conclude
that few vehicle owners are going to pursue a test if it is not required. Therefore, the BAR OBD
data evaluated for this proposal is dominated by recently registered 2019-2022 model year
PHEVs that underwent the mandatory smog check, because they were recently registered in CA
from another state. It is reasonable to assume that many of those moves to California involved a
long-distance trip, and possibly relocation arrangements that at least temporarily limited access
to charging. The recorded OBD data for vehicles that move between states is likely to include
hundreds or thousands of recent miles accumulated primarily in CS mode, even if the owner
regularly charges before and after the relocation. These unique circumstances suggest that cited
BAR data will significantly underestimate typical, real-world FUF for PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 37-40]
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EPA's attempts to manage the rampant errors in the BAR dataset renders it statistically
insignificant for an analysis of normal PHEV usage. The proposal explains that despite relaxing
the data quality criteria to accept up to 20 percent mileage error29 and vehicles with as low as
1,865 lifetime miles, only 2,060 out of more than 8,000 vehicles were retained from the BAR
dataset. As a result, many of the PHEV variants studied by EPA have a sample size of 30
vehicles or less as seen in the legend on the right in Figure 14 below. The cleaned BAR dataset
Excel file shared by EPA in the docket also confirms the inadequate sample size.30 Because
EPA accepted very low-mileage PHEVs for their supporting analysis, even a few hundred miles
without charging can bias the results to a lower Utility Factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620,
pp. 37-40]
29 The mileage error is in the discrepancy between odometer reading and vehicle lifetime miles reported
from the OBD system.
30 Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0408.
As mentioned previously, most PHEVs in the cited BAR dataset underwent the smog check in
2020 through 2022 calendar years. The data collection through the 2020 calendar year includes
the period when transportation was significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Impacts
included unusual fluctuations in gasoline prices including a 10-year low in 2020 making for both
unusual driving patterns and less motivation to charge. We expect real-world FUF trends will
increase post-pandemic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 37-40]
During the March 2023 meeting with EPA, Toyota raised general concerns that the collection
limitations and the necessary error filtering of the BAR dataset make it statistically insignificant
and unrepresentative of typical PHEV usage patterns. We were unable to conduct a quantitative
analysis of the data until it was placed in the docket after the proposal was issued. After
evaluating the BAR dataset, our concerns are now bolstered by findings that long distance
moving trips and the anomaly of COVID impacts bias the observed driving patterns and charging
behaviors making the BAR data unfit for assessing the appropriateness of the SAE J2841 FUF
curves. According to the proposal, EPA analyzed a filtered subset of the BAR OBD data results
to address the data quality challenges and developed the "EPA BAR Linear Regression" curve
listed in Figure 14 which also contains the two ICCT UF curves labeled as "ICCT-BAR" and
"ICCT-FUELLY/EPA Proposal". EPA points out their linear regression fit of the BAR data
subset lies on top of the "ICCT-BAR" curve fit from the full OBD dataset, implying good
agreement between the two separate analyses of the BAR data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0620, pp. 37-40]
Figure 14 PHEV Utility Factor Curves Considered in the Proposal.31 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0620, pp. 37-40]
31 Multi-Pollutant Emission Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, EPA- 420-D-23-003, DRIA, April 2023, Fig. 3-29, pg. 3-79.
[See original for graph, Figure 14 PHEV Utility Factor Curves Considered in the Proposal]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 37-40]
Just how EPA developed the linear regression fit from the BAR OBD data is unclear. Given
the scatter in the data, an exponential regression seems more appropriate if the aim is to infer a
Utility Factor curve. The linear regression happens to match the ICCT analysis but provides no
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scientifically significant information unless EPA intends to propose linear UF curves. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 37-40]
6.4.4 Proposed UF Based on EPA's Analysis
The proposed FUF curve that results from EPA's analysis is calculated as the average of the
SAE J2841 FUF curve and the ICCT-BAR curve which happens to match the curve fit of the
problematic Fuelly data. The proposed curve shares the same weighting coefficients as the SAE
curve under scrutiny. As seen in Table 5, the only difference between the SAE curve and the
proposed curve is the Normalized Distance (ND) increasing from 399.9 miles to 583 miles. All
other terms in the proposed revised equation to the right of Table are the same. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 40-42]
[See original for table and equation, Table 5 Comparison of Proposed and Existing SAE FUF
Terms] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 40-42]
The proposed ND adjustment amounts to discounting the advertised electric range of every
PHEV by about 32 percent for compliance calculations because increasing the normalized
distance has the same effect as lowering the CD range (see Figure 15). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0620, pp. 40-42]
Figure 15 Revised Normalized Distance Derates All-Electric Range for Compliance
[See original for graph, Figure 15 Revised Normalized Distance Derates All-Electric Range for
Compliance] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 40-42]
The Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis explains that EPA "used the latest NHTS data (2017)
and executed the utility factor code that is in SAE J2841, Appendix C, and found that the latest
NHTS data did not significantly change the utility factor curves."32 We are therefore confused
over the basis for revising the normalized distance if overall driving distances have not changed.
EPA's analysis suggests the normalized distance should remain unchanged. Toyota opposes the
normalized distance being changed based on the existing data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620,
pp. 40-42]
32 Multi-Pollutant Emission Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, EPA- 420-D-23-003, DRIA, April 2023, Footnote 35, pg. 3-74.
6.4.5 EPA's Analysis and Conclusions Misaligned with Available Data
The previously mentioned Toyota and UC Davis work conclude that the real-world
performance of previous-decade PHEVs in the US approximate the SAE UF curves reasonably
well as seen in Figure 16. This is especially the case with more capable, longer-range PHEVs, a
trend the problematic Fuelly and BAR datasets also support. However, EPA's linear curve fit
that anchors the proposed UF curve revision is weighted toward vehicles with a range below 30
miles (see legend to right of Figure 14) whereas modern PHEVs with higher range and motor
power outperform the vehicles used for EPA's analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 42]
[See original for graphs, Figure 16 Estimated Real World Utility Factor for U.S. Datasets
Versus SAE J28] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 42]
6.4.6 Treat Potential Discrepancies Between Real-World and Laboratory Evenly [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 42-44]
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Concerns over differences between real-world and laboratory performance, particularly those
due to driving behaviors, have traditionally been resolved through post-compliance data
adjustments aimed at consumer awareness and occasionally by expanding test cycle
requirements. Not by revising the calculations used to determine compliance with the standards.
The compliance benefit of internal combustion powertrains has never been penalized when
studies have found on-road driving is more aggressive or fuel consuming than the test cycles
indicate. Instead, lab results for C02 emissions and fuel economy are adjusted on the fuel
economy label to better reflect real- world performance, and consumers are educated on how
their mileage may vary based on their driving conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp.
42-44]
PHEVs should be treated no differently than BEVs. Both technologies are still evolving,
maturing and need support towards mainstream market adoption. The proposal appropriately
does not scrutinize the advertised range, efficiency, and emissions performance of BEVs under
real-world conditions. A BEV not attaining its advertised range can result in more ICE miles
driven. One recent vehicle usage study concluded the average BEV is driven 29% less than the
average non- BEV.33 Figure 17 comes from another academic study that found that battery
electric vehicles (BEVs) are driven on average 2,700 fewer miles annually compared to their
conventional counterparts.34 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 42-44]
33 https://www.iseecars.com/most-driven-evs-study
34 A. Zhao, E. Costigliolo, J. Helveston, L. Roberson, E. Ottinger, L. Zhao, J. Dunckley, "Coming of Age:
Understanding Electric Vehicle (EV) Use Over Time via Used Vehicle Market Data", Electric Vehicles
Symposium, 2023, Sacramento, CA)
Figure 17 Mileage Accumulation by Powertrain Type
[See original for graphs, Figure 17 Mileage Accumulation by Powertrain Type] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 42-44]
The proposal heavily relies on the BEV technology improvements and charging infrastructure
expansion to justify the standards. Those same improvements will also benefit PHEVs, since
home charging, consumers awareness, and technology advancements will drive PHEV utilization
closer to that of pure BEVs as consumers place greater emphasis on achieving advertised range
and have greater desire and means to achieve it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 42-44]
Existing regulation will also help spread the deployment of more capable PHEV designs that
perform closer to their advertised all-electric range. The California ACC2 provisions will drive
more capable architectures by requiring PHEVs to have a minimum all-electric range of 40 miles
over the aggressive US06 test cycle that eventually increases to 50 miles, and a minimum of 70
mile range over the combined city /highway test cycle. Further, EPA's proposed PHEV high-
power cold-start requirement will necessitate more all-electric capability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0620, pp. 42-44]
6.4.7 Suggested Approach Moving Forward
Toyota is interested in ensuring PHEVs achieve their assumed emissions benefits. However, a
proper science-based data collection and assessment of PHEV performance needs to inform real-
world PHEV usage patterns and the resulting emissions. An analysis of a small sample of two
error-filled datasets is not an appropriate basis from which to draw conclusions about PHEV all-
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electric range during real-world operation. An unprecedented revision of the Utility Factor curve
based on the data in the proposal would be arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0620, pp. 44-45]
We recommend EPA request SAE establish a consortium of auto companies, DOE, DOT, and
other stakeholders to evaluate PHEV usage trends by architecture and performance capability. A
first order of business should be determining a consensus method for measuring real-world EV
range. The output of this effort should be a report that EPA would use to consider adjustments to
the UF curve, alternative metrics such as PHEV design criteria, and/or improved information for
consumer purchase decisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 44-45]
If proven necessary, PHEV electric range on the consumer-facing label could be adjusted. In
such a scenario, increased knowledge about all-electric range could stoke competition in a
growing market and motivate continued investment to refine and improve PHEV performance.
Penalizing PHEV compliance with the proposed revision to the Utility Factor curve would only
stifle investment and hamper deployment of new PHEVs leaving consumers less choice to
reduce C02 emissions at a suitable price. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 44-45]
Appendix B - Procedure for (Partial) Cleaning of Fuelly Data for PHEVs
1 Overview of Errors in Using Fuelly Data
When examining Fuelly web site for some make-model (example in Figure 1 shows Chevrolet
Volt), it shows multiple data cards, one for each model-year. Each data card shows some notable
pieces of information including number of vehicles, total miles tracked and average MPG. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 67-99]
Figure 1 Screenshot From: https://www.fuelly.com/car/chevrolet/volt
[See original for graphic on Fuelly website for Chevrolet Volt] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0620, pp. 67-99]
One might be tempted to compare the average MPG to the EPA label for combined cycle
MPG in charge sustaining (CS) mode to infer fleet utility factor (FUF). This is how it was done
in the 2022 ICCT Whitepaper (which the EPA NPRM relied heavily on), and this is an incorrect
approach that includes several errors stemming from limitations of Fuelly data, summarized as
follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 67-99]
l.The average MPG for make/model/model-year reported on data cards (such as in Figure 1)
excludes what Fuelly web site's back-end code considers to be "Outlier refueling" events. Spot-
checking Fuelly data suggests that the criteria for being considered an outlier is the "standard"
statistical criterion of being outside of 3-sigma (three standard deviations) bounds from the
average value. Unfortunately, in case of PHEVs, the variation in "MPG numbers" can be very
large, with some PHEVs that are charged regularly capable of attaining more than 200 MPG (as
a single vehicle average). Thus, with a fleet that has an average of 100 MPG and standard
deviation of 50 MPG is often, a refueling event at near- zero-MPG is still "within 3-sigma",
while a refueling event at 300 MPG is "outside of 3- sigma" thus, large amounts of electric-miles
can be missing from the make/model/model- year data card shown in Figure 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 67-99]
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2. Since Fuelly data is self-report by users and the website (or phone App) has only one data
field for the amount of "Fuel", one observed recurring error is when a user mistakenly enters an
amount of electricity as "fuel]", which, for a typical electric driving at -0.33 kWh per mile = 3
miles per kWh, can completely distort the average MPG if/when seen by the back end code of
Fuelly as a "3 MPG" refueling event [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 67-99]
3. Assumption that a PHEV is "exactly attaining" its EPA label for combined cycle CS mode
fuel economy, when in fact, most vehicles (PHEVs being no exception) can be somewhat less
efficient (within certain limits, 10% to 15% worse MPG than EPA label often considered
"normal") leads to under-estimation of the faction of miles driven on grid electricity. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 67-99]
In section 2 of this appendix, we show a procedure to correct error #1 and error #2, but Fuelly
data, which does not show the split between charge sustaining and charge depletion, is
insufficient for making corrections to error #3. As such, after conducting the data cleaning, the
estimated utility factors are still only lower bounds for the true real-world utility factors. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 67-99]
2 Correction of Error #1 and Error #2
Clicking on an individual data card for make/model/model-year (such as the ones shown in
Figure 1) opens a set of data card summaries for each individual vehicle sample, as shown in
Figure 2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 67-99]
[See original for graphic on Fuelly] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 67-99]
Next, one needs to click on the data card of each individual vehicle sample in order to open a
detailed page for the individual vehicle sample, as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Details
included in these pages show the total miles tracked, as well as the average MPG of the vehicle
(throughout its total miles tracked). These numbers should be noted separately for each vehicle
(thereby bypassing Error #1). The detailed page also includes the log book of miles travelled and
refueling events, which one needs to carefully inspect for entries that may have incorrectly
reported electricity usage as gasoline (example in Figure 4), and if discovered, the affected
vehicle sample is excluded. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 67-99]
Ones then needs to repeat the procedure for every individual vehicle sample. Next, would be
to infer (lower bound of) each vehicle's fraction of electric miles, and then lastly, one can
estimate (lower bound of) overall fleet utility factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 67-
99]
Figure 3 Screenshots
From:https://www.fuelly.com/car/chevrolet/volt/2019/bbhagat/l 155376
[See original for screenshot from Fuelly] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 67-99]
Figure 4 Screenshots From:https://www.fuelly.com/car/chevrolet/volt/2019/twoply/880546
[See original for screenshot from Fuelly] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 67-99]
[See original for Appendix C - Materials from EPA-Toyota Meeting on SAE Utility Factor
for PHEVs] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 67-99]
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Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
PHEV Utility Factor - Proposed Approach for the PHEV Fleet Utility Factor (Section
III.B.8.)
Based on the driving statistics from a 2001 national household travel survey and
supplementary datasets as input for the utility factor in SAE J2841, EPA believes that the current
fleet utility factory (FUF) underestimates the PHEV C02 emissions in real world. Beginning
MY2027, EPA has proposed a revised light-duty vehicle PHEV Fleet Utility Factor curve to be
used in the PHEV C02 compliance calculation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 4-5]
In addition to AFAI's detailed comments regarding the lack of statistically based changes to
EPA's proposed FUF, Volkswagen also requests no modifications to the current FUF at this
time. Data quality to derive a FUF is highly dependent on assumptions that can be easily
influenced by multiple variables. In additional to the conditions discussed by AFAI (e.g.,
charging infrastructure, driving behavior, customer use education, etc.), Volkswagen believes
that PHEV ownership is influenced by current Federal and State purchasing incentives and the
environmental benefits may be a secondary or tertiary reason for the purchase of a PHEV over
the ICE vehicle alternative. The DoE Alternative Fuels Data Center shows 398 incentives for
personal vehicle owner for PHEVs. In addition, the FUF should take into account future driving
behavior where PHEVs attain a higher range for ZEV-qualifying PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0669, pp. 4-5]
Volkswagen acknowledges there are ongoing discussions in the U.S. and Europe to modify
the FUF. Both regions are comparing the current FUF with newly collected real world data.
Europe is updating its FUF on 01/01/2028, where the methodology defined in the legislation and
the factor will be dependent on data collected over next several years. Volkswagen suggests that
this timing is appropriate and recommends that the current FUF remain in place until the new
data is available. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
- ZETA supports the proposed changes to the PHEV fleet utility factor (FUF) to more
accurately apportion the benefit of PHEVs' electric operation. Ensuring accurate compliance
calculations is critical to preserving programmatic integrity and reducing emissions. As EPA
notes, SAE J2841 was developed more than ten years ago during the early introduction of light-
duty PHEVs and at the time was a reasonable approach. However, with the benefit of more real
world data and information about actual vehicle operating characteristics, we support EPA
revisiting the FUF curve at this time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 29]
EPA Summary and Response
Use of European publications andfuelly.com dataset
Summary:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI), Kia, MEMA (The Vehicle Suppliers Associated),
Strong PHEV Coalition, and Toyota made the following comments:
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AAI: In Europe, some corporations purchased only PHEVs for their fleet to take advantage of
government incentives/subsidies. The users of these company cars could typically fuel the
vehicle for free, and unfortunately had no incentive to plug-in their vehicle. The situation in
Europe with tax incentives encouraging PHEVs coupled with limited charging infrastructure
available in predominantly multifamily dwellings is simply not comparable to the United States.
For its U.S. analysis ICCT, inspired by the European analysis, evaluated two data sources:
user- reported data from Fuelly.com, and OBD data from the California Bureau of Automotive
Repair (BAR). For the Proposed Rule, EPA has taken the ICCT datasets and performed their
own analysis, which is essentially a copy of ICCT's work. The PHEV data analysis should
include nationwide usage data and be peer-reviewed before it is used in rulemaking.
The data from fuelly.com is user-reported and subject to data entry errors. There is also a
potential for data bias in the self-selected participants.
Kia: EPA's analysis is limited to multiple publications from the International Council on
Clean Transportation (ICCT). The EPA's use of the ICCT-BAR curve is inappropriate given the
expansion of Level 2 charging occurring as EVs increase across the country. The ICCT
publications focus on the limited electric driving share of PHEVs in Europe. ICCT's assumptions
are skewed as they assume the same situation in Europe where there were unique PHEV tax
incentives, coupled with limited charging infrastructure available in multifamily dwellings. All
of which are not good comparisons to the United States.
MEMA: The current data is inappropriate because it is primarily non-domestic, selective and
ignores the significant changes already underway in infrastructure and vehicle design that enable
greater PHEV utility.
Strong PHEV Coalition: The Fuelly.com dataset is wholly inadequate to perform this
function. It is a self-selected, self-reported online gasoline consumption log; Fuelly.com is not a
survey, makes no claim to statistical representativeness, and does not have inputs or data to
electric operation in any way. Methodologically, the means by which ICCT and EPA calculate
UF from Fuelly.com data is to compare real-world fuel consumption to EPA rated CS fuel
consumption, which is completely incoherent if one realizes that EPA rated fuel consumption
and on-road fuel consumption are not the same thing. EPA researchers know better than any the
many sources of variance between real-world fuel consumption and EPA -rated fuel
consumption. In the ICCT calculation, the variance between these two fuel consumptions (which
is strongly correlated with weather conditions, driving conditions, tire inflation, etc.) has entirely
and indefensibly been allocated to a lower UF. In both the data and analysis ofFuelly.com fuel
logs, EPA and ICCT are using unrepresentative data and deeply inadequate analysis to make
policy.
Toyota: The data cited for lower Ufs lack peer review. The studies of PHEVs in Europe are
not applicable to the US. Of the UF studies referenced, only Fraunhoffer/ICCT was peer
reviewed by a neutral third-party. The proposed FUF relies on two error-filled datasets: Fuelly
and CA BAR.
Response:
EPA did not use any European dataset or the fuelly.com dataset to calculate fleet utility
factors. Therefore, the literature using European datasets, fuelly.com dataset or fuel consumption
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data are not applicable to EPA's revised FUF curve and data analysis. EPA provided references
to some of the European studies as support that the Agency should review the current PHEV UF
values as some researchers may have documented regional behavior which is not captured in
their respective compliance procedures. In no way was EPA suggesting that US domestic PHEV
operation and activity was identical to Europe or any other countries.
EPA did not use or depend on ICCT's analysis of the FUF curve. FUF data analysis at EPA
was performed independently using the November 2023 CARB OBD PHEV dataset versus 2-
cycle combined GHG emission-certified CD ranges while ICCT analyzed the 2022 version of
CARB OBD dataset versus label CD ranges. Therefore, the two analyses use different data sets
and have different data filtering criteria. As is common in any scientific assessment it is often
useful and important to compare and contrast other related technical work. In this case, EPA was
merely comparing other studies to its only conclusions.
The CARB BAR dataset used by EPA in its analysis is the best large public data set available
at this time. Despite multiple stakeholders providing negative comments on the BAR data set,
none of the commentors provided alternative datasets to be considered. Independent analyses by
EPA, CARB and ICCT found very similar results of UF fitting curve using the real-world CARB
OBD PHEV big dataset.
We carefully reviewed the peer-reviewed publications and the recent ICCT paper using U.S.
PHEV dataset. All of the UF values in the literature are calculated using the labeled CD ranges
which were multiplied by the "0.7" 5-cycle adjustment factors from 2-cycle combined GHG
emission-certified CD ranges. There are significant discrepancies when translating the same UF
values on 2-cycle combined GHG emission certified CD ranges, which were about 43 percent
higher than the labeled CD ranges. When including OEM's voluntary labeled CD range
reductions, the FUF values on 2-cycle combined GHG emission-certified CD ranges are not
directly related to the MDIUF (Multi-Day Individual Utility Factor) on the labeled CD ranges.
Therefore, the UF values on the labeled CD ranges in the literature cannot be directly compared
to the FUF values on 2-cycle combined GHG emission-certified CD ranges.
Comments on other datasets
Summary:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI), California Air Resources Board (CARB), and
Toyota made the following comments:
AAI: The proposal excludes several relevant peer-reviewed publications, including papers by
Toyota and UC Davis that provide counter-balancing arguments to the claims that the SAE FUF
(Fleet Utility Factor) is no longer appropriate. The lack of consideration of other studies, such as
these, suggests that further consideration is required.
CARB: CARB contracted with the University of California, Davis (UC Davis) Institute of
Transportation Studies to collect and analyze household-level travel and refueling behavior
centered around BEVs, PHEVs, and FCEVs. The study included installing data loggers on
individual vehicles, including many different models of PHEVs. UC Davis found that all
PHEVs, apart from the Chevrolet Volt, demonstrated lower utility factors than the SAE J2841-
based FUF curve. The Chevrolet Volt had a much more capable electric powertrain that could
keep its internal combustion engine from turning on before the battery depleted in almost all
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driving conditions, which made the Volt relatively unique amongst the other PHEVs in the
logged data set.
Toyota: The data cited for lower Ufs lack peer review. The Toyota/UC Davis paper was
excluded.
EPA requests any relevant performance or utility data that may help inform their analyses for the
Final Rule. We appreciate the opportunity to share data which will help elevate the role PHEVs
in the Final Rule to be an important part of a sustainable transition to electrification. We plan to
share such PHEV data outside of the comment period, possibly, including confidential
information. For now, we request EPA consider the data we have provided that suggests PHEVs
should be considered be an important contributor in whatever assumed PEV sales mix.
Response:
The BAR data is the best available public data set at this time. Despite multiple stakeholders
providing negative comments on the BAR data set, none of the commentors provided any other
new datasets for consideration and referred only to third party analyses. The BAR dataset comes
directly from production vehicles being operated on public roads by private owners. The data is
recorded in production vehicles using algorithms and storage techniques derived by the
individual vehicle manufacturers. While the data did not come directly from vehicle
manufacturers, the data is recorded in accordance with regulations established by the California
Air Resources Board and the vehicle manufacturers are under a legal obligation to ensure the
quality of the recorded data.
The filtered CARB OBD PHEV dataset has 42 PHEV models and 89 model variants, and
approximately 8,600 individual vehicles that travelled approximately 163.2 million miles. This
filtered dataset contains approximately 98 percent of the 43 PHEV models and about 8,800
PHEV vehicles from the unfiltered data in the November 2023 version of CARB OBD PHEV
public dataset.
In contrast to the CARB OBD PHEV dataset, the UC Davis paper referenced by commenters
used a small selection of volunteer vehicle owners to create the dataset used to develop UF
values. The data consists of 3 PHEV models and four model variants of 153 PHEV owners (out
of 19,000 recruited owners) in the USA. Likewise, the Toyota paper referenced by commenters
combined datasets obtained with multiple methodologies. Some of these datasets included only
one model; others were based on fuel consumption, from which all-electric mileage was inferred.
As the UF is based on travel distance rather than energy usage, the additional steps required to
extract a UF from fuel consumption data make the datasets less robust for this purpose.
As noted by CARB, UC Davis also found that all PHEVs, apart from the discontinued
Chevrolet Volt, demonstrated lower utility factors than the SAE J2841-based UF curve.
After carefully considering alternative datasets, EPA believes that the CARB OBD PHEV
dataset is the most robust dataset for UF analysis available at this time for use in setting the FUF
curve. EPA, having reviewed the data in two consecutive years, also believes that the data is a
valid representation of how PHEV's are being operated and an appropriate basis for a revised UF
curve. In the event that vehicle manufacturers or other stakeholders come forward in the future
with additional PHEV data that could be used to inform future evaluations of the FUF, EPA is
committed to working with stakeholders in conducting a future evaluation. If such evaluation
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were to support a proposed revision to the FUF, EPA could initiate a rulemaking to revise the
FUF.
EPA acknowledges receiving a presentation from Toyota evaluating the ICCT methodology
for determining UF; however, EPA has not received new data pertaining to the FUF curve for
consideration. EPA considered the points raised by Toyota in their evaluation of the ICCT
methodology, and provides more detailed responses to individual points in other portions of this
Chapter.
BAR dataset issues: out-of-state vehicles, low gasoline prices, back-to-back testing, data
collection algorithms and technician-entered odometer readings
Summary:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI), Toyota, and Strong PHEV Coalition made the
following comments:
AAI: The data is predominantly from registered MY 2019-2022 PHEVs arriving from another
state collected during the 2020 through 2022 calendar years. Long-distance moves between
states can involve significant miles accumulated primarily in charge sustaining mode which
skews the recorded OBD data, making it unrepresentative of normal PHEV operation.
Most PHEVs in the cited BAR dataset underwent the smog check during 2020 through 2022
calendar years, which includes the COVID pandemic, which significantly altered transportation
trends. This period entailed unusual fluctuations in gasoline prices including a 10-year low in
2020 making for both unusual driving patterns and less motivation to charge. We expect that
post-pandemic, real-world FUF trends will increase.
Toyota: The BAR data is made up mostly of vehicles that came into CA from out of state,
possibly traveling a long-distance with limited access to charging. Also, after reducing the data
set to 2,060 from 8,000 many of the PHEV variants studied by EPA have a sample size of 30 or
less. Finally, the time period sampled includes the pandemic, when there were low gas prices.
Toyota expects UF trends will increase post-pandemic.
Strong PHEV Coalition: There is evidence of systematic importing of used PHEVs into
California, a type of data pollution that is not affecting most of the conventional vehicles. For
example, a set of vehicles included in the ICCT dataset are six 2019-2020 Toyota Prius Primes.
These six Prius Primes are all tested on a single day, they each have 3000 miles, and five of six
of them are present in the ICCT analysis (one has a technician-recorded odometer inconsistency).
Whatever the history of these vehicles, the fact that 6 of them are being tested back-to-back on
the same day is evidence that these vehicles are not under the operation and ownership of the
general public, and that their operational history is not representative of the general public. These
clusters of similar vehicles undergoing back-to-back testing are common and easily identifiable
in the BAR data used for ICCT and EPA analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 13]
Prius Prime 1 tested on 02NOV2020:09:00:00.442000
Prius Prime 2 tested on 02NOV2020:10:34:51.141000
Prius Prime 3 tested on 02NOV2020:11:28:26.939000
Prius Prime 4 tested on 02NOV2020:12:14:16.189000
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Prius Prime 5 tested on 02NOV2020:12:25:32.846000
Prius Prime 6 tested on 02NOV2020:13:36:16.952000
There is strong evidence that automakers (OEMs) are not implementing the data collection
algorithms consistently. For example, all 2019 Chrysler Pacifica hybrid vehicles, transmitted the
data required for these calculations from the HPCM-HybridPtCtrl control module, instead of
from the ECM*-EngineControl control module which was used by all other OEMs. In reviewing
and operating the ICCT's Data Import Algorithm (BAR Data Import.R, shared by A. Isenstadt
5/13/23), these vehicles are excluded from ICCT's analysis. Given that 2019 is the first year that
on- board diagnostic technology allows data collection, and we anticipate better data reporting
and processing in future years, but the handling of these types of inconsistencies is not in
evidence in the ICCT/EPA data wrangling processes.
There is strong evidence of many significant inconsistencies between the technician and
OEM-derived data that are present in the BAR data. For example, of the BMW 530e PHEVs in
the ICCT dataset (ICCTOBDDATASETMY2019, requested from BAR in April 2023), 585
(of a total 988) of them failed the odometer reading test (that the technician-entered odometer [in
mi] is well-outside the OBD-reported odometer reading [converted to mi]). There is no reason
why technicians are so comprehensively misreporting this very simple datum for a vehicle that is
one of the most reported vehicles in this dataset (which has -4000 PHEVs in total).
Response:
In response to comments on out-of-state registration, EPA notes that in the BAR dataset,
about 79 percent of PHEV vehicles that traveled approximately 140.4 million miles are from in-
state ownership transfers, and around 21 percent of PHEV vehicles that traveled around 23.1
million miles are from out-of-state vehicle registrations. The "BAR Regression Fit" in RIA
Chapter 3.4.3.2.1 is more influenced by about a factor of six by in-state ownership transfer
PHEV vehicles since the FUF values are calculated by a distance-weighted basis. Additionally,
there is no reason to expect one-time long-distance moving miles to make up more than a small
portion of the 23.1 million miles from out-of-state vehicle registration vehicles.
The averaged FUF values calculated by the regression fit curves of the in-state ownership
transfers and out-of-state registrations are within 2.3 percent and -4.8 percent of the averaged
FUF values represented by the "BAR Regression Fit" curve when using a minimum sample size
of 2. When using larger sample sizes greater than or equal to 10, the averaged FUF values of in-
state ownership transfers and out-of-state PHEV vehicle registrations in the filtered model data
are within 1.5 percent. As shown in Figure 3-38 in RIA Chapter 3.4.3.2.1, the difference between
averaged FUF values calculated using in-state ownership transfers and averaged FUF values
calculated using out-of-state registrations are insignificant. In contrast, the averaged FUF values
calculated by the "SAE J2841 FUF" fit curve are about 51.4 percent higher than those
represented by the best-case regression fit curve of in-state ownership transfers.
In response to comments about low gasoline prices, EPA notes that about 4.7 percent of
PHEV vehicles in the BAR dataset, which had traveled approximately 5.6 million miles, are
from the period of low gasoline prices (the pandemic period from March 1, 2020, to March 30,
2021). Around 95.3 percent of PHEV vehicles that traveled around 157.6 million miles are from
the normal gasoline price period (mostly pre- and post-pandemic). The distance weighted "BAR
Regression Fit" curve in RIA Chapter 3.4.3.2.2 is more significantly affected by about a factor of
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28 by the higher total distance travelled when gasoline prices (U.S. EIA 2023) were normal.
Furthermore, the averaged FUF values calculated by the regression fit curves of the normal
gasoline price period and the low gasoline price period are within 0.1 percent and -8.1 percent of
the averaged FUF values represented by the "BAR Regression Fit" curve when using a minimum
sample size of 2. When using larger sample sizes greater than or equal to 10, the averaged FUF
values of the normal gasoline prices and the low gasoline prices in the filtered model data are
within 1.6 percent. The averaged FUF values predicted by the "SAE J2841 FUF" curve are still
approximately 54.7-percent higher than those represented by the best-case regression fit curve at
normal gasoline prices.
In response to comments about back-to-back testing, EPA notes that the UF represents an
average of all PHEV operation. There is no indication that the small number of vehicles
referenced by the commenter are operated in a way that is being over-represented in the dataset.
The six vehicles mentioned by the Coalition have an average FUF of 0.40, which is in fact
somewhat higher than the approximately 0.25 average FUF of the Prius Prime PHEVs in the
November 2023 version of CARB OBD PHEV dataset. The "Prius Prime 4" and "Prius Prime 6"
mentioned by the Coalition were filtered out by 3000-km minimum ICCT filter. EPA believes
that the CARB BAR dataset used by EPA in its analysis is the best large public data set available
at this time.
In response to comments about data collection, EPA notes that CARB OBD requirements
mandate that the vehicle, as a whole, supports and reports the required data. CARB does not
dictate that a particular ECU has to have the data or that it all has to come from one ECU.
CARB filtered the updated the November 2023 version of CARB OBD dataset to include
only PHEV vehicles, and to exclude vehicles with less than 3,000 miles of total lifetime distance
traveled. Also, vehicles that CARB identified as having incorrectly logged data in the lifetime
distance OBD data fields used for this analysis were excluded. Excluded vehicles included the
Chrysler Pacifica referenced by the Strong PHEV Coalition. However, EPA calculated the FUF
values of Pacifica using PHEV data from separated ECU in the October 2022 version of CARB
OBD dataset.
In response to comments on odometer readings, EPA notes that the odometer reading data
field was not used for filtering the updated November 2023 version of CARB OBD dataset. EPA
concluded that a mismatch between the technician-recorded odometer reading and the OBD data
was not indicative of any issue with our use of the OBD lifetime distance traveled data fields for
calculating FUF.
BAR dataset: data filtering
Summary:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI), Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA),
and Toyota made the following comments:
AAI: Given that EPA accepted PHEVs with as low as 1,865 lifetime miles from the BAR
dataset, even a few hundred miles without charging can bias the data toward a lower utility
factor.
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In the DRIA, EPA notes, "As of October 2022, the BAR OBD dataset has around 8,400
PHEV vehicles, and over 233.2 million vehicle miles traveled. The filtered dataset has 30 PHEV
models, and 2,060 individual vehicles that travelled 58.9 million miles." While some filtering of
data to exclude outliers is expected, removing approximately 75% of the vehicles and vehicle
mileage is not.
MMNA: The BAR data is a collection of PHEV data from MY19 through MY22 vehicles.
The data was then filtered to remove any vehicles that show inconsistent data regarding distance
traveled and grid energy utilization. While filtering of incomplete or inconsistent data is a typical
operation in data analysis, the results of the analysis can be substantially altered based on the
filters applied. We believe the filtering methods used by EPA filtered out too many vehicles. For
example, the grid energy in/out filter completely removes one of the highest utility factor vehicle
models4 from the entire data set. Whether such filtering was necessary for that vehicle is
questionable. At the same time, it may be necessary to apply alternative filters. Due to the time
constraints of this comment period, Mitsubishi was unable to fully evaluate the filtering methods
EPA used in its analysis, but we may still provide feedback to EPA after the comment period.
We ask EPA to provide additional information about the filters applied, and the effect those
filters have on the overall utility factor analysis.
Toyota: The proposal explains that despite relaxing the data quality criteria to accept up to 20
percent mileage error and vehicles with as low as 1,865 lifetime miles, only 2,060 out of more
than 8,000 vehicles were retained from the BAR dataset. As a result, many of the PHEV variants
studied by EPA have a sample size of 30 vehicles or less.
Response:
CARB filtered the November 2023 CARB BAR OBD dataset to include only PHEV vehicles,
and to exclude vehicles with less than 3,000 miles of total lifetime distance traveled. Also,
vehicles that CARB identified as having incorrectly logged data in the lifetime distance OBD
data fields used for this analysis were excluded. Only a few data points like the "missing" and
the "Z" rows in the "INSPECTIONREASON" data field were filtered out in EPA. The detailed
"Descriptions of Data Source and Filtering Method" and the "Influence of Data Filtering" are
presented in RIA Chapters 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.
The November 2023 "CARB BAR OBD PHEV" dataset used for the finalized FUF curve
contains approximately 8,800 PHEV vehicles from 43 PHEV models with 90 PHEV model
variants, and over 169.4 million vehicle miles traveled. The filtered dataset used in the RIA
Chapter 3.4.2.1 removes only about 2 percent of the vehicles. This final filtered dataset contains
approximately 8,600 individual vehicles from 42 PHEV models and 89 model variants, and
approximately 163.2 million miles travelled.
Similar findings and conclusions are observed by independent studies from EPA, CARB and
ICCT.
BAR dataset: statistical validity
Summary:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI), Strong PHEV Coalition, and Toyota made the
following comments:
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AAI: Many of the PHEV variants studied by EPA have a sample size of 30 vehicles, which is
statistically insignificant to draw conclusions about real-world PHEV operation.
Strong PHEV Coalition: We strongly recommend against using the California Bureau of
Automotive Repair (BAR) data and Fuelly.com data as the basis for a new FUF for PHEVs. The
Technical Committee of the Strong PHEV Coalition includes researchers who have been
engaged with development and evaluation of UF calculations for more than 20 years. We are
very familiar with the set of datasets that are available in the public and private domain for UF
evaluation and have researched the datasets and authored many of the studies referenced in the
Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA). Our assessment and recommendations in response to
the request for input on UF data in the DRIA is that the proposed changes to UF are based on a
very poor dataset, poor analysis, and statistically indefensible methods. These datasets and
methods are inadequate to inform policy of the importance and impact of EPA's emissions
standards. See Appendix A for our critique of the BAR and Fuelly.com data sets.
Our assessment and recommendations in response to the request for input on UF data in the
DRIA is that the proposed changes to UF are based on a very poor dataset, poor analysis, and
statistically indefensible methods. These datasets and methods are inadequate to inform policy of
the importance and impact of EPA's emissions standards.
Individual vehicle-level UFs that are derived from an updated data pull from BAR are
extremely scattered and do not illustrate the validity of the UF curves for either the SAE J2841
FUF or the proposed FUF. When EPA or ICCT perform least-squares regression to derive a
particular UF curve, they must calculate the confidence interval around the parameter estimates.
When we perform that regression with vehicle models' pooled averages, we find that this dataset
provides no evidence that the EPA FUF model is more representative than the SAEJ2841 model.
An examination of four models illustrates the wide dispersion of measured individual UFs and
shows that the 95% confidence intervals on the mean value may or may not encompass any
particular pre- derived response curve.
Toyota: EPA's attempts to manage the rampant errors in the BAR dataset renders it
statistically insignificant for an analysis of normal PHEV usage. The proposal explains that
despite relaxing the data quality criteria to accept up to 20 percent mileage error29 and vehicles
with as low as 1,865 lifetime miles, only 2,060 out of more than 8,000 vehicles were retained
from the BAR dataset. As a result, many of the PHEV variants studied by EPA have a sample
size of 30 vehicles or less as seen in the legend on the right in Figure 14 below. The cleaned
BAR dataset Excel file shared by EPA in the docket also confirms the inadequate sample size.30
Because EPA accepted very low-mileage PHEVs for their supporting analysis, even a few
hundred miles without charging can bias the results to a lower Utility Factor.
Response:
The November 2023 CARB BAR OBD PHEV dataset used for the finalized FUF curve
contains approximately 8,800 PHEV vehicles from 43 PHEV models with 90 PHEV model
variants, and over 169.4 million vehicle miles traveled. The filtered dataset used in the RIA
Chapter 3.4.2.1 removes only about 2 percent of the vehicles. This final filtered dataset contains
approximately 8,600 individual vehicles from 42 PHEV models and 89 model variants, and
approximately 163.2 million miles travelled.
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EPA disagrees with the commenters' assessment of the statistical validity of our FUF
analysis. In particular, the FUF curve represents the average usage of the fleet as a whole rather
than individual vehicles. A scattering of individual vehicle-level UFs is to be expected. EPA also
disagrees with the comment that the "UF are based on a very poor dataset". The BAR dataset
comes directly from production vehicles being operated on public roads by private owners. The
data is recorded in production vehicles using algorithms and storage techniques derived by the
individual vehicle manufacturers. While the data did not come directly from vehicle
manufacturers, the data is recorded in accordance with regulations established by the California
Air Resources Board and the vehicle manufacturers are under a legal obligation to ensure the
quality of the recorded data.
EPA has expanded the statistical analysis of all of the available data to address some of the
technical concerns raised in comments. EPA has done a statistical check on the November 2023
version of CARB OBD PHEV dataset EPA used and found it to be statically significant as
shown in RIA Chapter 3.4.3.3. In their statistical analysis, the Strong PHEV Coalition appears to
be using does vehicle-weighted individual UF (MDIUF) values, rather than the distance-
weighted FUF values used for GHG emission certifications. The vehicle-weighted individual UF
(MDIUF) values used by the Strong PHEV Coalition are used for CAFE (Corporate Average
Fuel Economy) standards compliance and labeling the all-electric ranges and CD ranges of
PHEV vehicle stickers and not for GHG emission certifications.
Curve Fitting Comments
Summary:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI) and Toyota made the following comments:
AAI: Utility factors have been fitted to an exponential equation. The C coefficients are used
to fit the curve and normalized distance establishes the distance where the utility factor is 100%.
But Normalized Distance (ND) is the one variable in the equation that need not
change. Changing normalized distance doesn't make sense unless overall driving distances have
changed.
Using this curve fitting technique, the result is that regardless of all-electric miles traveled on
a certification test, only 68.5% of those miles count. This is equally true for PHEVs that travel 20
miles or 200 miles. This is not appropriate, and the proposed utility factor should not be included
in the final regulation.
EPA's linear curve fit is weighted toward vehicles with a range below 30 miles. Changing the
utility factor based on such skewed data would discourage the introduction of new, higher-
capability PHEVs.
Toyota: EPA's linear curve fit is weighted towards vehicles with a range below 30miles.
The proposed FUF curve that results from EPA's analysis is calculated as the average of the
SAE J2841 FUF curve and the ICCT-BAR curve. The only difference between the SAE curve
and the proposed curve is the Normalized Distance (ND) increasing from 399.9 miles to 583
miles. All other terms in the proposed revised equation to the right of Table are the same.
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The proposed ND adjustment amounts to discounting the advertised electric range of every
PHEV by about 32 percent for compliance calculations because increasing the normalized
distance has the same effect as lowering the CD range.
Response:
The "BAR Regression Fit" shown in Figure 3-46 of RIA Chapter 3.4.3.2.5, contains about
8,600 valid PHEV data points from the November 2023 BAR OBD dataset fitted using nonlinear
6-fitting coefficients. The dataset contains multiple vehicles with ranges above 30 miles to 180-
miles. EPA believes the "BAR Regression Fit" line shown in the figure accurately represents
performance of vehicles both above and below 30 miles range.
Five hundred eighty-three (583)-mile normalized distances in the "FUF Finalized (FRM)" of
Table 3-23 in RIA Chapter 3.4.3.2.5 were calculated by the minimization of the sum of the
squared residual norm in Equation 3-2 when using SAE J2841 FUF fitting coefficients. The
"FUF Illustrative Final" curve, which is created using 6-new curve fitting coefficients and 399.9-
mile normalized distances in the "FUF Illustrative Final, using SAE Normalized Distance" of
Table 3-23, lies on top of the "FUF Finalized" curve in Figure 3-46 of RIA Chapter 3.4.3.2.5.
Therefore, the same FUF fitting curve can be developed using either a new ND and current SAE
J2841 FUF fitting coefficients or 399.9-mile SAE Normalized Distance and new 6-fitting
coefficients.
With respect to the suggestion that the changes will discourage the introduction of new,
higher-capability PHEVs, our goal with the finalized FUF curve is to appropriately characterize
the actual charge depleting share of driving distance for PHEVs in the rulemaking timeframe,
rather than incentivizing PHEVs with certain ranges. However, our finalized FUF curve already
provides an incentive for more capable PHEVs, based on operational data, with continuously
higher FUF values for vehicles with greater charge depleting range.
Comments on the Effect of Future Charging Availability, PHEV Capability, and Incentives on
FUF
Summary:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI), BorgWarner, Stellantis, MECA Clean Mobility
(MECA), MEMA, Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA), Strong PHEV Coalition,
Toyota, Porsche, VW, and Kia made the following comments:
AAI: The BAR dataset and more rigorous, peer-reviewed studies indicate some PHEVs have
a lower ratio of EV driving versus ICE operation on-road versus certification, while other
vehicles' performance is well-aligned to certification values. We believe this difference is due to
the spread of performance capability of the electric machines in PHEVs. Lower capability
electric machines demonstrate a greater difference in on-road versus on-cycle performance.
EPA's proposed PHEV high power cold start requirement encourages more all-electric
operation capability. Further, CARB requires a minimum 70-mile combined city/highway and
minimum 40-mile US06 all-electric range starting with MY 2029.
Lack of charging, to the extent it exists, should be best solved by consumer education, not by
a change to the utility factor.
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While some data may suggest PHEVs are not being plugged in as frequently as the
assumptions underlying the SAE UF curve, this should not be a problem attributed to
automakers, nor should it be grounds to adjust a compliance measurement. Charging equipment
is supplied with the vehicles sold by automakers.
BorgWarner: To meet many of the requirements set by both EPA in this proposal and
California in its Advanced Clean Car II rulemaking, PHEVs would have significantly increased
electric range that make them more capable of all-electric operation, and together with a much-
improved charging infrastructure, will change the pattern of consumer use. In fact, average new
PHEV driving range increased 8.5% in 2021 and is expected to continue increasing. As such,
EPA should model future consumer usage based on the expected models on sale from MY 2027,
and further improvements to charging availability, and use the model to determine the utility
factor curve that should apply.
Stellantis: The two issues that can lead to shortfalls in PHEV electric operation usage are (1)
lack of charging and (2) differences in performance between regulated cycles and on-road
operation. We believe charging rates will improve as more public infrastructure emerges and
charging becomes ubiquitous. As for capability concerns, CARB is requiring a 70-mile
combined cycle minimum range and a high-power cold start requirement (that EPA also
proposes to adopt in this rule). These two requirements will force future PHEVs to have more
range and power in all-electric operation, thus eliminating or minimizing any performance
differences on-road versus regulated cycles.
MECA: This in combination with build out of charging infrastructure, especially from
Inflation Reduction Act and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act funding sources, will provide
consumers with easier access to charge PHEVs and enable them to drive more miles on
electricity rather than petroleum. The result will be that future fleet utility factors will increase
rather than decrease. MECA suggests that EPA consider these developments, including studying
the correlation between fleet utility factor and workplace charger availability, and not base utility
factors on older PHEV technology.
MEMA: While California is an admirable leader in ZEV deployment, its incentive structure
for PHEV purchases differs from the rest of the country; a large percentage of population resides
in multi-unit dwellings (often without consistent overnight charging access), and it ranked (as of
last year) behind at least 15 other U.S. states in terms of charging ports per EV, signifying a
potential problem of constrained charging access that needs further examination.
MMNA: In addition to CARB's intention to increase ZEV capability through PHEV technical
requirements, the approach vehicle owners take to PHEV operation may change. Consumer
education and increased available of charging infrastructure will make it easier for PHEV owners
to charge vehicles when convenient, and thus more likely that they will do so on a more regular
basis.
Strong PHEV Coalition: We have also seen that the FUFs of vehicle models in the BAR
dataset are changing as a function of time. For example, BMW X5 XDRIVE45E vehicles (MY
2019-2022) that meet the ICCT/EPA filtering criteria tested before 17 May 2022 have an average
individual UF of 30%. X5 XDRIVE45E vehicles (MY 2021-2023) that meet the ICCT/EPA
filtering criteria tested after 17 May 2022 have an average individual UF of 68%. These types of
problems with the BAR dataset seem to be unrecognized and not validated by the research
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community, and further strengthen the case for not using the BAR dataset for research or policy
making.
Toyota: The proposal heavily relies on the BEV technology improvements and charging
infrastructure expansion to justify the standards. Those same improvements will also benefit
PHEVs, since home charging, consumers awareness, and technology advancements will drive
PHEV utilization closer to that of pure BEVs as consumers place greater emphasis on achieving
advertised range and have greater desire and means to achieve it.
Existing regulation will also help spread the deployment of more capable PHEV designs that
perform closer to their advertised all-electric range. ACC2 and EPA's proposed high-power cold
start requirement will result in more all-electric capability. Recommend that EPA request SAE
establish a consortium to evaluate PHEV usage trends.
Porsche: Porsche does not support the proposed reduction in the PHEV utility factor. EPA's
proposal devalues future PHEV performance based on historic charging behavior of existing on-
road PHEV drivers. Porsche has not reviewed the details of the California BAR or fuelly.com
data but can understand if in some cases consumer use of electric drive has been lower than
expected. This is not surprising given the well-documented challenges and complaints related to
the general lack of public charging infrastructure in the past few years. Besides challenges within
finding reliable public charging, many consumers have faced difficulties in installing home
charging, especially for multifamily and rental dwellers, and have complained about the general
lack of workplace charging. However, the entire foundation of this MPR and the dramatic shift
towards electrification rests upon assumptions regarding improvements in electric vehicles and
more specifically in the availability and reliability of public and private electric vehicle charging.
Issues that past owners of PHEVs may have experienced that likely led to the examples of lower-
than-expected usage of electric drive would be addressed according to EPA's assumptions on
improved charging. As such, the decision to alter the utility factor for future PHEVs should not
focus on decreasing the utility factor due to challenges customers experienced in the past, but
rather should maintain the existing utility factor based on improved usage of charging in 2027
and later given EPA's projections for rapidly expanding charging infrastructure.
It is nonsensical that future PHEV drivers would continue to pass up on charging
opportunities once charging is more ubiquitous in the public, at home and at work. In fact, this
would be counter to EPA's assumed consumer valuation of fuel savings that has been
consistently referred to in GHG rulemakings. If consumers value fuel savings, and if charging
availability is no longer a barrier to usage, EPA would have to assume that PHEV drivers would
naturally seek to maximize their usage of electric drive if the cost per mile to drive electric is less
than that of gasoline. If for some reason drivers continued to avoid using electric operation, then
EPA would have to reevaluate the entire premise of consumer demanded fuel savings. As
charging resources increase, utility factor should increase along with it, not go down.
VW: In addition to the conditions discussed by AFAI (e.g., charging infrastructure, driving
behavior, customer use education, etc.), Volkswagen believes that PHEV ownership is
influenced by current Federal and State purchasing incentives and the environmental benefits
may be a secondary or tertiary reason for the purchase of a PHEV over the ICE vehicle
alternative. The DoE Alternative Fuels Data Center shows 398 incentives for personal vehicle
owner for PHEVs. In addition, the FUF should take into account future driving behavior where
PHEVs attain a higher range for ZEV-qualifying PHEVs.
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Kia: If EPA feels strongly that the real-world fleet utility factor is too low, Kia recommends
that EPA work with industry to help incentivize reminders for consumers to plug in more often.
Response:
EPA's task in this rulemaking is to evaluate the expected use of the secondary fuel used on
these dual fuel vehicles and properly give credit much like EPA does when assigning the F-
factor for E85 Vehicles. After careful consideration of the available data, EPA finds that the
SAE-based FUF is assigning lower CO2 emissions for PHEV compliance calculations than are
being realized in in-use data.
However, EPA recognizes that PHEV owners' propensity to recharge the battery may change
in the future for multiple reasons, including those described by commenters. As discussed in the
preamble Section III.C.8, we are delaying the application of the revised FUF until MY 2031 to
provide additional lead time for manufacturers, including consideration of the availability of
future charging infrastructure and vehicle manufacturers influence on improving PHEV owners'
propensity to charge. We consider the final FUF to be a reasonable FUF for model years
beginning 2031. As noted in the preamble and in RIA Chapter 3.4.1, if vehicle manufacturers or
other stakeholders come forward in the future with additional PHEV data that could be used to
inform future evaluations of the FUF, EPA is committed to working with stakeholders in
conducting a future evaluation.
In response to comments on the FUFs of the BMW X5 XDRIVE45E vehicles, EPA calculated
the FUFs for vehicles tested before and after 17 May 2022 as indicated by the Strong PHEV
Coalition, using the November 2023 CARB OBD dataset. The calculated FUF values are 0.32
for vehicles tested before 17 May 2022 and 0.39 for vehicles tested after 17 May 2022. These are
both substantially lower than 0.65 FUFs calculated by SAE J2841 standard certified at 2-cycle
combined CD ranges.
EPA further notes that PHEV GHG emissions are certified using fleet utility factors (FUF)
over 2-cycle combined CD ranges. Strong PHEV Coalition appears to be using the individual
UFs (MDIUF) over the label CD range. These are used for CAFE (Corporate Average Fuel
Economy) standards compliance and labeling the all-electric ranges and CD ranges of PHEV
vehicle stickers, but not for GHG compliance purposes.
Comments recommending a lower FUF curve
Summary:
California Air Resources Board (CARB), Environmental Defense Fund (EDF),
Environmental. And Public Health Organizations, International Council on Clean Transportation
(ICCT), National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA), Southern Environmental Law
Center (SELC), Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA), Tesla, Inc and Rivian
Automotive, LLC made the following comments.
CARB: In its proposal, U.S. EPA proposes a revised FUF curve that is lower than the SAE
J2841 FUF curve. Based on an analysis of additional real-world data, summarized below, CARB
finds that the ICCT-BAR curve is even closer to what real-world data supports for eVMT.
CARB therefore recommends that U.S. EPA adopt the ICCT-BAR curve.
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Environmental Defense Fund (EDF): The data compiled by ICCT from real- world sources
represent the best estimate of actual PHEV utilization and should be the primary source for
EPA's UF curves. Meanwhile, California's treatment of PHEVs under the ACC II program is far
more conservative, resulting in lower utility factors than EPA. ACC II allows PHEVs to "fulfill a
portion of their total Annual ZEV Requirement" if they meet several qualifications. A PHEV
must have a "minimum certification range value of greater than or equal to 70 miles," based on
California's 2026 ZEV and PHEV test procedures and have a minimum US06 all-electric range
value greater than or equal to 40 miles to be considered a ZEV under the rules. PHEVs that don't
meet these requirements can still be counted for partial credit if they have a minimum
certification range value between 43 and 70 miles or have a US06 all-electric range of at least 10
miles. Additionally, PHEVs can only be used to meet 20 percent of a manufacturer's total ZEV
requirement.
A recent ICCT study examined the current state of PHEV usage in the United States and
found strong evidence that real-world electric drive share is far below EPA's current utility
factor label rating. According to ICCT, "previous research and data from early adopters of
PHEVs in the United States demonstrated that PHEVs achieved real-world electric drive share
close to that expected by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)." ICCT notes that EPA assumes that PHEVs
achieve real-world electric drive share close to EPA's utility factor label rating in its treatment of
PHEVs in the 2023-2026 light-duty GHG rule.
Environmental. And Public Health Organizations: The BAR data show the Honda Clarity
PHEV as having a real-world utility factor of 0.359 while the SAE 2841 method gives the
Clarity a FUF of 0.676. These results show that the SAE2841 method using travel survey data is
a poor estimator of actual vehicle usage. The Agency proposes to reduce the FUF for compliance
calculations by averaging the current FUF with a curve derived from the BAR real-world data.
This averaging will lower the gap between actual emissions performance and the compliance
value, but will still allow for compliance values for PHEVs that are higher than justified. Given
that EPA now has clear real-world data showing that the current FUF is not reflective of actual
emissions from PHEVs, it is inappropriate to use the original SAE J2841 FUF or to use it in an
average with other data. EPA should instead use a FUF consistent with the actual in-use data
from BAR and adopt the FUF labeled "ICCT-BAR" in the DRIA.
The decision to average real-world usage data with the SAE 2841 estimate is poorly justified.
EPA states that "an overly low FUF curve could disincentivize manufacturers to apply this
technology. However, both the current FUF curve and the proposed curve over-credit PHEVs. A
curve that correctly credits PHEVs' reductions in emissions (such as the ICCT-BAR curve) will
not disincentivize adoption of PHEVs, but instead will provide a lower incentive for the partial
elimination of tailpipe emissions and a greater incentive for complete elimination via fully-
electric powertrain options. Even with a lower FUF, the ability to reduce the compliance
emissions values by use of zero grams per mile for the CD mode phase will provide a significant
incentive for a manufacturer to choose a PHEV powertrain over a non-plug-in hybrid. Choice of
a lower FUF curve will at the same time ensure that there is a sufficient incentive to encourage
the continued development and deployment of zero-emission technologies.
EPA also cites future models with longer electric range and greater all-electric performance as
leading to future real-world performance that meets the proposed FUF curve. This is not
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supported by the available data. The longest electric range PHEV currently available is the
Toyota RAV4 Prime. The RAV4 Prime data from the BAR dataset show a real-world utility
factor of 0.35, significantly lower than the proposed FUF for a 42-mile all-electric range (AER)
vehicle (0.52) and even lower than the ICCT-BAR curve (0.41). EPA states that "increased
consumer technology familiarity" will also make future PHEV usage approach the proposed FUF
curve. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29254. Increased consumer knowledge may make purchasers able to shift
more driving to electric-only mode. However, it is also possible that purchasers (especially in the
secondary market) may buy a PHEV without the ability to plug in or may choose a PHEV
because of incentives that make the purchase more attractive relative to a non-plug-in vehicle.
Existing research on the use of PHEVs shows that the largest factor leading to lower real-world
observed utility factors is lack of charging, with 20-30% of some PHEV models starting their
travel day on a nearly empty battery.
The proposed FUF could lead to PHEVs with a large difference between real-world emissions
and the compliance values for C02 emissions. The use of PHEV powertrains in larger vehicles
such as SUVs and pickups will cause this gap to grow, due to the gap between the zero grams per
mile CD operation and the high gram per mile operation when the internal combustion engine is
running. Over-crediting PHEVs' purported electric driving would create a new and unjustified
loophole that would likely slow down the path to greater deployment of zero-emission
technologies within the fleet. For example, for a PHEV that has compliance C02 charge
sustaining (CS) mode emissions of 250 g/mile and an electric range of greater than 28 miles, the
proposed FUF would artificially reduce the combined mode PHEV emissions by over 25 g/mile
when compared to the ICCT-BAR FUF. (Figure XII. 1). The gap between the proposed FUF and
the real-world data (ICCT-BAR) is highest for vehicles with a CD range between 42 and 62
miles. California's ZEV regulations for model year 2029 and subsequent vehicles require a
minimum certification electric range of 70 miles to be eligible for credit values, which is
approximately a 50-mile label range. Therefore, PHEVs designed to meet the minimum range for
ZEV credit value eligibility are likely to have the largest deviations between real-world
emissions and the compliance emissions calculated using the proposed FUF.
ICCT: ICCT applauds EPA for adjusting the PHEV utility factor (UF) curve to better fit real-
world PHEV usage data. As the PHEV models available for purchase today differ in operation
and all-electric utility from when the original UF curve was developed, this update is direly need
(ICCT 2022 PHEV). Due to the growing repository of public, real-world PHEV data, ICCT
recommends EPA adjust the proposed fleet utility factor (FUF) curve to reflect the best-available
data, while allowing for potential updates to the curve based on more real-world data as it
accumulates.
In DRIA figure 3-29, EPA's analysis of the California Bureau of Automotive Repair (BAR)
PHEV data clearly shows that a reduced UF curve is a better fit of the real-world data. This fit
matches ICCT's non-linear regression fit of the BAR data. Utilizing the same methodology
described in ICCT 2022 PHEV but with EPA's proposed FUF coefficients (Preamble 29442),
ICCT finds the appropriate normalized distance to be 802 miles (vs proposed 583 miles). This
curve more accurately reflects the current state of PHEV usage. Thus, ICCT recommends that
EPA adopt a normalized distance of 802 miles, instead of 583 miles as proposed.
Within the timeframe of the proposed rule EPA expects PHEVs with longer all-electric range
to become available (in part due to California's ACCII PHEV performance requirements), and
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EPA seeks to avoid disincentivizing PHEVs with a too low FUF curve (Preamble 29254). For
these reasons, EPA proposed a FUF curve higher than what the BAR data supports. This
argument puts the expectation of future PHEV performance ahead of the data.
NACAA: We concur with EPA's conclusion that the current LDV PHEV compliance
methodology overstates the operation of PHEVs on electricity thereby significantly
underestimating PHEV C02 gm/mi compliance results. Therefore, NACAA commends EPA for
proposing to reduce the PHEV Fleet Utility Factor (FUF) curve used in the C02 compliance
calculation for PHEVs beginning in MY 2027 but recommends that the FUF curve be even lower
than proposed.
ZETA: supports the proposed changes to the PHEV fleet utility factor (FUF) to more
accurately apportion the benefit of PHEVs' electric operation. Ensuring accurate compliance
calculations is critical to preserving programmatic integrity and reducing emissions. As EPA
notes, SAE J2841 was developed more than ten years ago during the early introduction of light-
duty PHEVs and at the time was a reasonable approach. However, with the benefit of more real
world data and information about actual vehicle operating characteristics, we support EPA
revisiting the FUF curve at this time.
SELC: Studies have shown, however, that the current FUF overestimates the operation of
PHEVs on electricity. As a result, "the current light- duty vehicle PHEV compliance
methodology significantly underestimates PHEV C02 emissions." We therefore support EPA's
proposal to revise the FUF curve used in C02 compliance calculations for PHEVs beginning in
model year 2027 and urge EPA to consider a FUF curve that is even lower than the current
proposal.
Tesla: Tesla asserts the EPA should revisit the plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) utility
factor to accurately reflect real world emissions.
Nevertheless, EPA is appropriately revisiting the PHEV Fleet Utility Factor because PHEV
compliance to date has significantly underestimated C02 emissions by overestimating their use
of electricity. Reducing the PHEV utility factor is appropriate and overdue.
Rivian: Rivian applauds EPA's decision to revise the FUF for PHEVs. We agree with the
agency that the current compliance methodology "significantly underestimates PHEV C02
emissions." As the agency details in its analysis, and as Rivian has commented in the past,
PHEVs exhibit significant variability in their environmental performance. In the United States,
PHEVs drive fewer electric miles than assumed for labeling purposes, with fuel consumption as
much as two-thirds higher than nominally anticipated. Simply put, PHEV drivers often do not
plug in their vehicles as much as was previously assumed.
The FUF remains important for calculating PHEV emissions for regulatory compliance, but
the weight of the evidence clearly compels EPA to revise the curve. The initial proposal marks a
significant improvement over the status quo, but onboard diagnostic data from California support
an even lower FUF. EPA rightly acknowledges this in the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis
("DRIA"). Nonetheless, EPA proposes a higher curve. The agency's justification rests on
speculation that future PHEVs could deliver greater all-electric performance as well as stated
concerns that an accurate FUF would "disincentivize" PHEV development. If PHEVs fall short
of their environmental promise, the technology does not merit an artificially inflated regulatory
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incentive regardless of its potential. Far from an unfair disincentive, an accurate FUF would
ensure that the regulation works as intended—achieving reliable, real-world emissions
reductions. To safeguard the regulation's environmental integrity, Rivian encourages EPA to
finalize a FUF that accurately reflects the best available data from real-world driving behavior.
Response:
As discussed in preamble III.C.8, although we believe the data on current PHEV activity
supports further revisions to the utility factor, EPA is setting a FUF for future model years based
on our expectations about charging and PHEV performance that will occur in those future years.
We are also taking into consideration the likelihood that the improvements automakers anticipate
in product design (such as range), consumer education and awareness, and charging convenience
with expanded infrastructure will result in PHEV activity that is similar to the finalized FUF. In
light of manufacturer plans to improve PHEV technology and the potential for improved
customer knowledge and infrastructure, EPA is finalizing the PHEV utility factor as proposed.
At the same time, EPA is committed to an ongoing evaluation of future PHEV FUF data to
assess whether the revised FUF is in fact adequately representative of future PHEV operation, as
a result of future PHEV designs and consumer charging behavior, or if there is merit in further
adjusting the FUF. EPA encourages researchers and other stakeholders, including manufacturers,
to supplement the publicly available data by providing data directly to EPA for inclusion in an
updated analysis. EPA will engage with stakeholders to share results of our assessments, and to
hear from stakeholders who may have their own data and analysis to share, for example, through
public forums. If EPA determines that changes to the FUF are warranted, we will engage with
stakeholders on technical details such as the shape of the FUF curve and the appropriate timing
for its implementation. If such evaluation were to support a proposed revision to the FUF, EPA
could initiate a future rulemaking to revise the FUF for MY 2031.
Comments recommending a higher FUF curve; timing and compliance effects
Summary:
Ford, Jaguar Land Rover NA, LLC (JLR), Kia Corporation, MECA Clean Mobility, MEMA,
The Vehicle Suppliers Associated, Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA), Stellantis,
Toyota, Porsche Cars North America (PCNA), and Volkswagen Group of America, Inc (VW)
made the following comments.
Ford: does not support the proposed update to the Plug-In Hybrid (PHEV) utility factor (UF).
We do not believe it is appropriate to recalibrate the PHEV compliance benefit at the same time
the EPA is proposing other sweeping changes and historically stringent standards. Product
planning lead time and uncertainty in EV market growth requires that all electrification options
be available with stable and predictable compliance benefits. Ford would support an EPA
program designed to gather additional data for use in a future rulemaking which would yield a
robust basis for a UF update and prevent disruption to EV product compliance plans.
JLR: JLR would like to highlight our concerns over EPA's plans to incorporate PHEVs into
their analysis for the final rule. If EPA proceeds with the planned changes to the certified PHEV
C02 value, namely through the adjustment of the utility factor, they must acknowledge the
impact this will have on fleet compliance, greatly reducing their contribution to the fleet. As
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such, the baseline GHG target and projected ZEV share should also be adjusted by an equal
amount, to avoid an increase in target stringency by stealth.
Kia: Kia does not support the assumptions on PHEVs outlined in the NPRM. EPA explains
that its current PHEV compliance methodology significantly underestimates PHEV C02
emissions. Consequently, EPA proposes to revise the light vehicle PHEV Fleet Utility Factor
(FUF) curve downward to reflect as assumed PHEVs lower electric operation beginning in
MY2027. EPA's proposal essentially lowers the benefits of PHEVs for compliance which will
reduce consumer choice and make feasibility of the standards much more challenging.
MECA: Similar to previous EPA technology analyses prepared to support future
rulemakings, MECA requests that EPA conduct a prospective analysis of utility factors of
PHEVs based on the direction of the technologies being released into the marketplace today as
well as announcements of future releases. Of particular note, EPA relied upon past data of older
technology PHEVs with limited all electric ranges to justify the proposed reduction in the PHEV
utility factors from today's acceptable values that are based on SAE J2841.
MEMA: EPA to maintain previous PHEV utility factor or conduct U.S.-based study and
forecast to replace current PHEV utilization data and recalculate PHEV utility factor.
MMNA: Maintain the current PHEV Utility Factor (UF) and work with industry to identify
opportunities to increase PHEV electric operation. This is the ideal stepping-stone technology to
encourage long-term BEV acceptance and utilization.
Stellantis recommends keeping the current UF for the final rule. The combined impact of the
proposed changes described above compound the stringency of an already aggressive target
makes the overall "net effect" of what EPA is proposing infeasible - especially in the initial year
of the program.
Toyota: EPA's proposed UF discriminates against PHEVs based on flawed data and analysis
from and environmental NGO. PHEVs should be encouraged, rather than discouraged by these
regulations. Toyota plans to provide PHEV data outside of comment period. The data cited for
lower Ufs lack peer review.
Porsche: EPA acknowledges uncertainty regarding future charging usage by stating that the
agency could revisit the utility factor once again in a future rulemaking if it appears that PHEVs
are using more electric operation due to improved vehicle technology and greater charging
infrastructure. However, undercutting PHEVs in this rulemaking, only to increase the value of
PHEVs in a future rulemaking creates too much uncertainty. If EPA expects the charging
environment to improve, why reduce the assumed driving usage now only to increase it again
later? This back-and-forth uncertainty on utility factor would not be helpful since the current
proposal would so undercut the incentive for PHEVs that manufacturers would have likely
reconsidered continued support for the technology. If the agency is concerned about the actual
real-world usage of PHEV electric operation, it seems that the approach would be to work with
stakeholders to improve the charging experience today while the charging infrastructure is
expanding over the next few years. "Fixing" the issue by undercutting the technology in
regulation neither improves the technology, nor helps address charging challenges customers are
facing.
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VW: Volkswagen acknowledges there are ongoing discussions in the U.S. and Europe to
modify the FUF. Both regions are comparing the current FUF with newly collected real world
data. Europe is updating its FUF on 01/01/2028, where the methodology defined in the
legislation and the factor will be dependent on data collected over next several years.
Volkswagen suggests that this timing is appropriate and recommends that the current FUF
remain in place until the new data is available.
Response:
EPA carefully considered all of the comments we received in response to the proposed
revised FUF. EPA agrees with commenters on the importance of PHEVs as a technology that
might be best suited to meet the needs of some consumers, particularly over the timeframe of this
rulemaking. PHEVs have the potential to reduce vehicle GHG emissions, but the degree to which
that potential is realized depends on whether they are charged and operating on electricity. Based
on our updated assessment of the latest and best available data in the public record, EPA finds
that the SAE-based FUF is assigning lower CO2 emissions for PHEV compliance calculations
than are being realized in in-use data. In other words, PHEVs are currently over-credited for the
amount of electric range and zero-emissions operation. Although the data could support an even
lower FUF than that proposed, EPA has decided to finalize a moderate change to the FUF.
As discussed in preamble III.C.8, although we believe the data on current PHEV activity
could support further revisions to the utility factor, EPA is setting a FUF for future model years
based on our expectations about charging and PHEV performance that will occur in those future
years. EPA disagrees that there is any compelling evidence that typical PHEVs in the future will
reach the SAE J2841 level of charge depleting operation.
As shown in RIA Chapter 3.4.3, the "BAR Regression Fit" curve between 0 and 180-mile 2-
cycle combined GHG emission-certified CD ranges using November 2023 CARB dataset are
substantially lower than those by the SAE J2841 FUF curve. In addition, EPA conducted a
statistical evaluation of the FUF based on real-world data (RIA Chapter 3.4.3.3). The confidence
intervals for the vast majority of models do not span the SAE J2841UF trend, suggesting that the
measured FUFs are lower than the trend.
The finalized FUF curve represents a modest change of about 11 percent from SAE J2841
FUF curve while the averages of the SAE J2841 FUF curve are approximately 55 percent higher
than those calculated using the "BAR Regression Fit" curve between 0 and 180-mile 2-cycle
combined GHG emission-certified CD ranges using November 2023 CARB dataset.
However, we do see evidence in the BAR data, such as the Chevy Volt, where PHEVs with
higher charge depleting driving capability and power tend to have higher FUF than typical
PHEVs in use today. The agency has built on comments received from the Strong PHEV
Coalition, specifically their statistical analysis of several PHEVs and the range of charge
depleting operation associated with these vehicles. EPA expanded on that analysis and applied a
similar technique to the California BAR data. In performing this analysis, EPA noted that several
vehicles are demonstrating utility at or near the proposed utility factor. In other words, EPA
noted that there are "top runner" vehicles and behavior that supports the final utility factor.
At the time of this final rule, MY 2025 vehicle production has already commenced. This
means that manufacturers have approximately two years of lead time to address the revised
standards and provisions finalized in this final rule. While lead time is addressed in many ways
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throughout this rulemaking, such as the year over year change in emission standard stringency
and extensions of the phase-down of off-cycle and air conditioning leakage credits, we recognize
that a fundamental change to the compliance methodology for any single technology in as little
as two years could be significantly disruptive to some vehicle manufacturers' current compliance
plans. Several auto manufacturers commented that the proposed revised PHEV utility factor
would impact product planning and the overall emission reductions projected for their fleets to
meet the standards. We also understand that several vehicle manufacturers have already made
significant investments in PHEV technology and are relying on PHEVs as an important portion
of their GHG compliance strategy. Without adequate time to adjust their product plans to the
revised compliance values for PHEVs under the revised utility factor, and to plan for additional
GHG-reducing technologies to ensure adequate additional emissions reductions to meet the
standards, the revised FUF may disproportionately impact those manufacturers planning large
volumes of PHEVs as compared to manufacturers who are not relying as heavily on PHEV
technology. To mitigate such a potential impact and to address concerns about adequacy of lead
time for the early years of the program, we are delaying the application of the revised FUF until
MY 2031. EPA believes that the revising the FUF in MY 2031 will provide vehicle
manufacturers adequate lead time for product development and product plan adjustments, given
that the average vehicle redesign cycle is approximately five years.
CAFE compliance calculations
Summary:
Porsche and Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA) made the following comments:
Porsche notes that EPA's proposed update to the PHEV utility factor will also influence
CAFE compliance calculations due to the allowance within statute and regulation for
manufacturers to optionally select weighted operation. EPA did not provide analysis as to how
this change would affect CAFE compliance especially considering Department of Energy (DOE)
recent NPRM to reduce the Petroleum Equivalence Factor (PEF) by 72% for electric vehicles.
This dramatic proposal from DOE to undercut the incentive for electric vehicles within CAFE is
premature given that proposed CAFE standards for model years 2027 and later have not yet been
released by NHTSA. Porsche recommended in comments to DOE for their NPRM that DOE
include the assessment of EPA's proposed change in the utility factor to better understand the
combined effect of lower PEF and lower utility factor. DOE did not acknowledge, or was
unaware of, the proposed reduction in utility factor from EPA. The PEF statutory basis requires
DOE, as it has done for over 40 years, to incentivize electrified vehicles in CAFE. This statute
also requires DOE, NHTSA and EPA to consult on changes related to PEF and CAFE. Neither
the EPA MPR NPRM nor the DOE PEF NPRM appear to discuss the mutual impacts that each
other's proposed updates could have on future CAFE compliance. As NHTSA has yet to release
their CAFE proposal, it is unclear if NHTSA will address both the EPA and DOE proposals and
how both could impact CAFE compliance. To Porsche, it is unclear as to why these NPRMs
appear disjointed and so far, have failed to discuss the impacts of each other's proposals on the
other regulations. Porsche recommends EPA provide analysis of the impact of the reduced utility
factor on the PEF and CAFE compliance in coordination with DOE and NHTSA. Ideally, all the
proposals would have been released together to provide manufacturers with the ability to
understand how each of the agency's actions would interact with each other and continue to
support and incentivize technologies such as PHEV. This is especially relevant considering the
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overarching goal to achieve a dramatic increase in light-duty electrification, proposal is changing
test fuel, which is broadly supported by industry).
MMNA: The development of the proposed utility factor by EPA considers the impact of
changes within the context of the light-duty GHG standard. However, the utility factor is also
used in developing fuel economy compliance values for the NHTSA CAFE standard. There is
little mention of the utility factor's influence on CAFE compliance, despite the direct effect it has
on PHEV CAFE compliance values.
Response:
CAFE compliance calculations will not be affected, as EPA is not revising the SAE J2841
MDIUF curve, which is used for CAFE standards compliance and labeling all electric range
(AER), CD range, and electric energy consumption of PHEV vehicle stickers.
Real-world vs. laboratory performance
Summary:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI) and Toyota made the following comments:
AAI: The normal method to address differences between real-world and laboratory results,
especially when due to driving behaviors, has been through post-compliance adjustments aimed
at consumer awareness and occasionally by expanding test cycle requirements, and not by
revising calculations used to determine compliance with the standards. While some data may
suggest PHEVs are not being plugged in as frequently as the assumptions underlying the SAE
UF curve, this should not be a problem attributed to automakers, nor should it be grounds to
adjust a compliance measurement.
EPA recognizes that BEV technology is still maturing and needs support to build consumer
acceptance. Appropriately, the proposal does not examine the advertised range, efficiency, and
emissions performance of BEVs under real-world operation. PHEVs are in the same fragile stage
of growth and should be treated no differently.
Toyota: Concerns over differences between real-world and laboratory performance,
particularly those due to driving behaviors, have traditionally been resolved through post-
compliance data adjustments aimed at consumer awareness and occasionally by expanding test
cycle requirements. Not by revising the calculations used to determine compliance with the
standards. The compliance benefit of internal combustion powertrains has never been penalized
when studies have found on-road driving is more aggressive or fuel consuming than the test
cycles indicate. Instead, lab results for C02 emissions and fuel economy are adjusted on the fuel
economy label to better reflect real- world performance, and consumers are educated on how
their mileage may vary based on their driving conditions.
PHEVs should be treated no differently than BEVs. Both technologies are still evolving,
maturing and need support towards mainstream market adoption. The proposal appropriately
does not scrutinize the advertised range, efficiency, and emissions performance of BEVs under
real-world conditions. A BEV not attaining its advertised range can result in more ICE miles
driven. One recent vehicle usage study concluded the average BEV is driven 29% less than the
average non- BEV. Another academic study found that battery electric vehicles (BEVs) are
driven on average 2,700 fewer miles annually compared to their conventional counterparts.
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Response:
The UF for a PHEV represents the proportion of electric miles driven by the vehicle, and is
entirely dependent on how often the consumer is willing to recharge the vehicle. This charging
frequency is not determined by a laboratory test, and thus a change in the FUF is not due to any
differences between real-world and laboratory performance. Instead, it is due to differences
between observed real-world behavior and assumed real-world behavior during in the
development of the original SAE J2841 curve.
EPA disagrees that the issue is a discrepancy between laboratory results and the real world.
For example, SAE J2841, which is based on real-world driving behavior, states explicitly that the
UF represented in SAE standard assumes that a PHEV is fully charged at least once per day.
However, there are about 3 percent of PHEVs which were charged less than 1-kwh and about 28
percent of PHEVs which were charged less than 200-kWh lifetime total grid energy into the
battery packs, respectively, when filtering out vehicles with less than 3,000-mile total lifetime
traveled distance. FUF values are significantly affected by charging frequencies.
EPA disagrees that this rule treats BEVs and PHEVs differently. In this rule, EPA is treating
PHEVs, BEVs, and conventional vehicles in the same manner. Both BEVs and PHEVs are
allocated zero g/mile C02 in all-electric driving. Average annual VMT variations, while
different for individual vehicle models, is not considered in compliance calculations for BEVs,
PHEVs, or conventional vehicles.
Incentivizing PHEV range with a modified FUF
Summary:
ICCT, Strong PHEV Coalition, MECA Clean Mobility (MECA), Electric Drive
Transportation Association (EDTA), Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE), and Betsy Cooper
made the following comments:
ICCT: EPA could automatically apply the higher FUF curve (e.g., the current proposed
curve, as opposed to the ICCT-BAR curve) for vehicles that meet minimum all-electric
performance requirements, such as 70 miles all-electric 2-cycle range and 40 miles all-electric
US06 range. This latter option would incentivize greater all-electric capability among PHEVs.
Strong PHEV Coalition: EPA should extend the FUF to 130 miles in order to encourage
automakers. For example, Toyota has announced that it is planning a PHEV with over 124-mile
all electric range.4 While we don't know which test cycle this range is based on, EPA should
encourage this long all electric range. Another example is the BMW i3 REX which was designed
to primarily drive all-electric miles but is now only sold as a used PHEV.
EPA should adopt a provision to discourage low-range PHEVs by requiring them to count as
an HEV with no zero emission miles. We suggest a cut-off of 50 km (31miles). Further we are
not suggesting a ban on low-range PHEVs but rather a disincentive to produce them. Low-range
PHEVs according to the UC Davis data logger project and the EV Project have greater likelihood
of not plugging in and this could increase as PHEVs get older. PHEVs with a long all-electric
range offer much greater benefits to consumers and show much higher levels of plugging in.
EPA should provide small bonus credits (multipliers) in 2027 to 2030 for several advanced
technologies including PHEVs with a long all-electric range that are not being produced today.
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While we understand the need to simplify the regulation and dramatically reduce the use of
multipliers, we do support very limited continuation of multiplier to advance technologies that do
not exist today or are in very limited numbers such as bidirectional charging vehicles
(recommendation 4) and PHEVs with an all-electric range of 60 or more miles. These
technologies need extra lead time to develop. Having multiple technologies helps in reaching
many hard-to-reach customer segments, and PHEVs with over 60-mile all-electric range by
legacy automakers are not offered today and have rarely been produced and sold. Also see our
recommendation 8 below.
In a future rule, EPA should require automakers to only produce in the early 2030s PHEVs
with 50 miles or greater all-electric range, along with BEVs and fuel cell EVs. Due to the climate
catastrophe, even more electrification will be required. However, for all the reasons provided in
this letter, we do not believe the approach taken by the European Union to ban PHEVs is
appropriate. Further, this current rulemaking by adopting our recommendations above will help
lead to a transition in the 2030s to requirements for Strong PHEVs, BEVs and FCEVs.
MECA: MECA Clean Mobility: Finally, MECA suggests that EPA allow PHEVs certifying
with all electric range greater than 50 miles to claim higher fleet utility factors, and consider
scaling utility factor with a vehicle's all electric range.
EDTA: New PHEVs' driving range increased 8.5% in 2021 and that trend is expected to
continue. The increase in all-electric operation capability will change consumer use patterns over
the regulated period and the rule for 2027-2032 should reflect that in an updated utility factor.
AVE: Additionally, to comply with California's Advanced Clean Cars II regulations,
automakers are already announcing PHEVs that will greatly exceed California's requirements.
EPA should account for current and expected improved range for future PHEV models to
determine the utility factor curve that should apply.
Betsy Cooper: Shorter ranges require more frequent charging, and make it more likely that
drivers will need to charge in inconvenient locations away from home. And these annoyances
may make it more likely that new PHEVs will rely on gas.
EPA Should Use Its Regulatory Authority to Incentivize Long-Range PHEVs. The EPA thus
should use its regulatory process to encourage PHEV manufacturers to return long-train PHEVs
to the market: by providing full off-cycle credits to those who give 50 or more miles of electric
range. We propose a 50+ mile PHEV range requirement for full off-cycle credit. There is already
momentum in favor of this standard; California is planning to require 50+ mile range PHEVs by
2035 [Link: https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-
vehicle-sales-2035]. Moreover, even with battery degradation, a PHEV rated for 50+ miles at the
point of sale will still cover the average American commute many years later.
The EPA may respond that its scaled utility factor already takes into account miles of range in
its calculation. Even if true, by penalizing all PHEVs across the board, the EPA is incentivizing
manufacturers to make fewer plug-in hybrid vehicles, period.
Response:
Our goal with the finalized FUF curve is to appropriately characterize the actual charge
depleting share of driving distance for PHEVs in the rulemaking timeframe, rather than
incentivizing PHEVs with certain ranges. However, our finalized FUF curve already provides an
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incentive for more capable PHEVs, based on operational data, with continuously higher FUF
values for vehicles with greater charge depleting range. We do not believe that appropriately
accounting for C02 emissions of PHEVs incentivizes of or penalizes PHEVs; instead, it treats
these vehicles equally compared to other technologies.
We don't currently have any evidence or data that vehicles above and below a particular range
value (e.g. 70 miles 2-cycle charge depleting range and 40 miles all-electric US06 range, or 50-
mile all-electric labeled range) are used in dramatically different ways that would support a
discontinuous FUF curve. However, in the event that vehicle manufacturers or other stakeholders
come forward in the future with additional PHEV data that could be used to inform future
evaluations of the FUF, EPA is committed to working with stakeholders in conducting a future
evaluation. If such evaluation were to support a proposed revision to the FUF, EPA could initiate
a rulemaking to revise the FUF.
Requiring or incentivizing in-use data collection and reporting:
Summary:
California Air Resources Board (CARB) and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), NACAA,
and Strong PHEV Coalition made the following comments:
CARB: Given the variability in PHEV usage displayed to date, CARB recommends that U.S.
EPA require auto manufacturers to collect and report in-use operational data at discrete intervals
on PHEVs in future MYs. This would enable U.S. EPA to more accurately assess the GHG
emissions associated with different PHEVs. Based on these data, EPA may then be better
positioned to reassess the FUF curve for subsequent rulemakings.
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF): However, instead of relying fully on this new data for
developing its UF curve, EPA proposes to average the two datasets, giving each an equal weight.
Because, as discussed above, the ICCT- BAR UFs are a significantly better representation of
real-world PHEV usage than EPA's current approach, EDF suggests that the agency rely solely
on this data in setting its new UF curve. In addition to aligning EPA's default UF with the best
available real-world data, we encourage the agency to provide manufacturers with an option to
submit rigorous, real-world data to demonstrate their UFs are higher than these default values.
An approach along these lines could allow for retrospective adjustment based on annual driving
information submitted along with a manufacturer's compliance demonstration. An approach
along these lines—a rigorous default UF combined with the option to certify better
performance—would help to better reflect the actual emissions performance of PHEVs and
provide incentives for manufacturers to develop and deploy PHEVs that operate more regularly
on electricity.
NACAA: We also recommend that EPA require data collection and reporting or accessibility
to better inform the methodology in the future.
Strong PHEV Coalition: EPA, in the final rule or future rule, should include a true-up
system for automaker's FUF where debits or credits are provided based on actual data from on-
board diagnostics and reporting by automakers of a fairly large sample. If EPA opts not to do
this, we request that EPA should, at minimum, require manufacturers in this rulemaking to share
anonymized actual data from PHEVs so that in future years, the EPA can make informed
decisions about the FUF based upon real world data.
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Response:
Thank you for your suggestion to collect and report in-use PHEV operational data. After
careful consideration, EPA is not requiring manufacturers to collect or report data in this final
rulemaking. EPA may consider mandatory data submission in the future and/or allow vehicle
manufacturers to submit data to inform their own UF calculation.
However, in the event that vehicle manufacturers or other stakeholders voluntarily come
forward in the future with additional PHEV data that could be used to inform future evaluations
of the FUF, EPA is committed to working with stakeholders in conducting a future evaluation. If
such evaluation were to support a proposed revision to the FUF, EPA could initiate a rulemaking
to revise the FUF. EPA will continue to monitor real-world data as new BAR OBD datasets
become available, or an OEM dataset becomes available.
Data collection and analysis post-rulemaking:
Summary:
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI), Strong PHEV Coalition, Toyota, Consumer
Reports (CR), and ICCT made the following comments:
AAI: We propose that industry, EPA, SAE, DOT, and the national laboratories collaborate on
a project to acquire and process a large sample of nationwide PHEV data. This collaboration can
be used to better understand the sources of variation and agree on logical data processing or
filtering. If proven necessary, adjustments to SAE J2841 or advertised all-electric range, and
other potential solutions can be explored following appropriate deliberation and peer review of
the collaborative effort.
Strong PHEV Coalition: Further, we support EPA's desire to update the FUF in a future
rulemaking when new data becomes available, and we commit to helping EPA acquire this data
as we are a very data driven coalition that includes five universities (or similar research centers).
Over time data derivable from CA BAR and other state's smog check programs will improve as
more on-board diagnostic data becomes available which should be used in a future rulemaking
with appropriate data quality testing, and improved methods.
In the longer term, EPA, the DOE, or the national labs should conduct an analysis on the
value of PHEVs as a platform for low-carbon alternative fuels including whether to allow
PHEVs with 85% or more low carbon liquid biofuels blended with gasoline to be treated as zero
emission vehicles (ZEVs) in future EPA regulations. The main issue to be studied is feedstock
availability in the long run for both diesel and gasoline substitutes that could be used in PHEVs
to make them have lower life cycle emissions. Related environmental issues could be studied.
EPA should engage with experts to derive a data-driven FUF using more representative
datasets and methods including those of the CARB-funded UC Davis data logger study, or the
EV Project analysis. Another factor that we request EPA informally consider is that PHEV
batteries typically use five times or less lithium per all-electric mile than battery EVs, and as a
result save substantial amounts of GHG from battery manufacturing. Strong PHEVs have the
same GHG footprint as a 300-mile range BEV and Strong PHEVs have much higher all-electric
range than PHEVs with a low all-electric range. We support EPA not considering battery
manufacturing GHG emissions in this rulemaking, but request that EPA informally include this
factor when developing the final FUF.
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Toyota: EPA requests any relevant performance or utility data that may help inform their
analyses for the Final Rule. We appreciate the opportunity to share data which will help elevate
the role PHEVs in the Final Rule to be an important part of a sustainable transition to
electrification. We plan to share such PHEV data outside of the comment period, possibly,
including confidential information. For now, we request EPA consider the data we have provided
that suggests PHEVs should be considered be an important contributor in whatever assumed
PEV sales mix.
We recommend EPA request SAE establish a consortium of auto companies, DOE, DOT, and
other stakeholders to evaluate PHEV usage trends by architecture and performance capability. A
first order of business should be determining a consensus method for measuring real-world EV
range. The output of this effort should be a report that EPA would use to consider adjustments to
the UF curve.
Consumer Reports (CR) CR agrees with EPA adjusting their approach to better match real-
world use data. CR does not take a position on which of the proposed utility factor curves is the
best option. However, CR does recommend that EPA periodically update their analysis of real-
world PHEV usage as more vehicles are sold, and more data becomes available.
ICCT: However, because there is no guarantee that future PHEV models will achieve the
assumed higher electric driving shares, the best practice is to let the data dictate the shape of the
UF curve. EPA can establish a provision by which it can adjust the UF curve to better account
for PHEVs with varying all-electric range, as additional data is collected. To simultaneously
ensure PHEVs are not given too-high UF without disincentivizing longer all-electric range
PHEVs, EPA can allow manufacturers to provide publicly available, real-world data with
accurate UF measurements that support higher FUF for specific PHEV models.
Response:
EPA appreciates commenters acknowledgement of the importance of data collection. As
discussed in the preamble, EPA is committed to an ongoing evaluation of future PHEV UF data
to assess whether the revised UF is in fact adequately representative of future PHEV operation,
as a result of future PHEV designs and consumer charging behavior, or if there is merit in further
adjusting the UF. EPA will continue to gather and monitor publicly available data such as that
made available by California BAR. EPA will also collect, and monitor data extracted from
available in-use PHEV testing and may further supplement the data set through other data
gathering mechanisms, such as work done by the Department of Energy or independent
contractors and researchers. Although vehicle manufacturers chose not to submit data as part of
their public comments, EPA believes that with additional time it is reasonable to project that
vehicle manufacturers can gather the same type of data, and in greater quantities, on their own
PHEV models than available to EPA through the California BAR; we encourage auto
manufacturers to share such data with EPA to inform this future assessment. Thus, second, EPA
encourages researchers and other stakeholders, including manufacturers, to supplement the
publicly available data by providing data directly to EPA for inclusion in an updated analysis.
Stakeholders will also be encouraged to independently assess the publicly available data and
provide individual conclusions.
EPA's task in this rulemaking is to evaluate the expected use of the secondary fuel used on
these dual fuel vehicles and properly give credit much like EPA does when assigning the F-
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factor for E85 Vehicles. EPA may reevaluate the utility factor in the coming years as more data
becomes available.
EPA appreciates the comments on including battery manufacturing GHG emissions in a
future FUF rulemaking; however, this is beyond the scope of this current rulemaking.
3.1.7 - LDV small volume manufacturer standards
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Ad Hoc Small OEM Group
B. Overview
-The US sales of Small OEMs have a minuscule impact on US air pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0563, pp.1-2]
-The US sales of Small OEMs represent a tiny fraction of the US automobile market [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 1-2]
-Together the companies in the Ad Hoc Group accounted for about 4000 car sales in the US in
CY 2022 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 1-2]
-If we just look at the Small Businesses in the Ad Hoc Group, they collectively sold about 100
cars in the US in 2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 1-2]
-In addition, Small OEM vehicles drive far fewer miles than the average car. Typical Small
OEM vehicle lifetime mileage is around 60,000 miles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 1-
2]
-Lower lifetime Vehicle Miles Travelled (VMT) is typical for Small OEM vehicles because
they are niche vehicles bought by enthusiasts and collectors, who typically own numerous cars
used only for short, occasional rides. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 1-2]
The combination of low sales volumes plus low VMT means that the actual real world
pollution impact of Small OEM vehicles is de minimis. This key fact supports granting Small
OEMs extra lead-time and flexibility [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 1-2]
-Small OEMs are distinct from large volume manufacturers [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563,
pp.1-2]
Small OEMs are different from large volume manufacturers because Small OEMs have:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 1-2]
-Limited product portfolios [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 1-2]
-Limited number of drivetrains [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 1-2]
-Limited financial and human resources, and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 1-2]
-Longer product development times and vehicle life cycles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563,
pp.1-2]
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The above facts: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 1-2]
-Restrict Small OEMs' ability to meet frequent and significant increases in the stringency of
standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 1-2]
-Make it unreasonable to expect Small OEMs to meet fleet average standards aimed at large
OEMs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 1-2]
II. EPA'S NPRM FAILS TO PROVIDE SMALL OEMS WITH SUFFICIENT AND
REASONABLE LEAD-TIME AND FLEXIBILITY
A. In General
EPA has recognized in prior criteria pollutant and GHG rulemakings that special flexibility
rules for Small OEMs are appropriate. Historically, EPA has therefore had a policy for many
years to allow SVMs to skip phase-ins and comply 100% at the end of the phase-in period. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 2-3]
The GHG rules and the Tier 3 rules provided even further SVM and Small Business
flexibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 2-3]
Tier 3 included a separate SVM-only compliance pathway for a period of 10 years with
specific SVM-only fleet average requirements. This flexibility in 40 CFR 86.1811 -17(h) —
specifically for SVMs — was the result of extensive SVM discussions with EPA during the Tier
3 rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 2-3]
Similarly, the GHG rules to date have both afforded Small Businesses an exemption from
GHG requirements as well as provided an SVM procedure for company-specific GHG standards.
These flexibilities were also the result of extensive Small OEM input to EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0563, pp. 2-3]
In both the Tier 3 and GHG rulemakings, EPA promulgated these flexibilities after
acknowledging that SVMs and Small Businesses are distinct from large volume manufacturers
and special provisions for Small OEMs were necessary and proper. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0563, pp. 2-3]
Significantly, California has very recently reaffirmed the appropriateness of special SVM
provisions in promulgating the CARB 2022 Advanced Clean Cars II (ACCII) rulemaking. EPA
should follow this approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 2-3]
-The NPRM, does not sufficiently consider the proposal's effect on SVMs and Small
Businesses [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 2-3]
Unlike in past rulemakings, EPA's multi-pollutant NPRM, fails to adequately address SVM
and Small Business issues — and EPA does not explain why it did not do so.l The proposal has
no provision for Small OEM lead-time / flexibility with respect to criteria emissions. This
omission is a significant, unreasonable and unexplained change of policy. The NPRM also
proposes to revamp SVM alternative GHG standards by sweeping SVMs into the large volume
rules. The manner in which EPA proposes to do this will result in significant hardship for SVMs
without achieving meaningful air quality benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 2-3]
1 On the positive side, we do acknowledge that the NPRM
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-SVMs may delay complying with the proposed new Tier 4 OBD requirements until model
year 2030; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 2-3]
-OEMs can count BEVs in their Tier 4 fleet average calculations; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0563, pp.2-3]
-Small entities have certain exemptions from the 86.1815 Battery-related requirements for
electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid (but no special provisions for SVMs); [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0563, pp. 2-3]
-Continues the current GHG exemption for small entity manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0563, pp.2-3]
Under the Clean Air Act, EPA must recognize and fully consider the impacts of its proposed
standards on Small OEMs and must promulgate standards that are feasible for Small OEMs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 3-4]
In the NPRM Preamble, EPA states as follows:
The Administrator finds that the standards proposed herein are consistent with EPA's
responsibilities under the CAA and appropriate under CAA section 202(a). EPA has carefully
considered the statutory factors, including technological feasibility and cost of the proposed
standards and the available lead time for manufacturers to comply with them. Based on our
analysis, it is our assessment that the proposed standards are appropriate and justified under
section 202(a) of the CAA. Our analysis for this proposal supports the preliminary conclusion
that the proposed standards are technologically feasible and that the costs of compliance for
manufacturers would be reasonable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 3-4]
As regards Small OEMs, we do not agree with the above EPA conclusions. First, Small
OEMs are not mentioned in the above conclusion. Furthermore, the NPRM provides no support
for the applying the above conclusions to Small OEMs. In this regard, the Preamble has an entire
section ("V") on "EPA's Basis That the Proposed Standards Are Feasible and Appropriate Under
the Clean Air Act", but nowhere in that section are the terms "Small Volume Manufacturer" or
"Small Business" mentioned. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 3-4]
We further believe that the NPRM's proposed Small OEM standards and trajectories do not
meet the requirements of CAA § 202(a) that standards "take effect after such period as the
Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such a period."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 3-4]
EPA should reconsider its proposed provisions from a Small OEM impact viewpoint,
determine what is feasible for Small OEMs, and finalize Small OEM rules that are consistent
with what Small OEMs can achieve. Small OEM rules must have emissions levels and an
incremental phase-in with periods of stability, all of which reflect both the limited resources of
Small OEMs and the specialized nature and limited sales of their products. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0563, pp.3-4]
-EPA's apparent misunderstanding of what Small OEMs are selling in the US [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 4-5]
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And EPA's apparent misunderstanding of who is selling what in the US may also extend
beyond the Small Business segment of the industry to the larger SVM segment as well. All
SVMs in the AD Hoc Group sell ICE vehicles. Nowhere in the Draft RIA does the term "small
volume manufacturer" even appear, and the Draft RIA thus also fails to address the SVM
segment of the industry. We question to what extent EPA has considered the NPRM's impact on
SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 4-5]
Small OEMs cannot effectively fleet average
Perhaps the absence of Small OEM extra lead-time and flexibility may also be the result of
EPA's incorrect assumptions. One assumption supporting the NPRM which is not applicable to
Small OEMs is that all OEMs have the ability to average the emissions of their various test
groups in order to meet a fleet standard. Small OEMs have long maintained - and do so again
here — that with only one or two high-performance test groups, they cannot use "fleet averaging"
as a compliance strategy and therefore have needed, and still need, the long-standing EPA policy
affording extra lead-time and flexibility to Small OEMs. In the absence of such flexibility, a fleet
average standard becomes in effect a REQUIRED (BIN) STANDARD for these Small OEMs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, p. 5]
Significantly, because Small OEMs cannot effectively utilize fleet averaging, without extra
flexibility and lead-time, they are placed at a distinct competitive disadvantage in the
marketplace. Why? Because Small OEMs must compete with niche products of large OEMs who
CAN fleet average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, p. 5]
-It is improper for EPA to justify the stringency of a standard on the theoretical availability of
credits for sale - especially when EPA knows that a Small OEM would have to rely
predominantly/entirely on credits from another manufacturer to maintain compliance [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0563, p. 5]
EPA projects that SVM fleets on average, and individually, will exceed the proposed
standards, thereby requiring purchased credits in order to continue selling vehicles in the US.
EPA therefore justifies the standards it has proposed for Small OEMs on the assumption that
credit purchasing will be the means for Small OEMs to achieve compliance. We strongly believe
that this regulatory approach in fundamentally unfair. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 5-6]
Relying on credits from another manufacturer is an illusory compliance option without some
impartial mechanism supporting the availability of credits. The decision to sell credits, who to
sell them to, what price to sell them at, and when to sell them (or to keep them for later use or
future value) is a business decision 9f the selling manufacturer. There is nothing that requires a
manufacturer to sell its credits, or to sell them to a particular party. Realistically speaking, how
can a reasonable Small OEM business plan be based on buying credits? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0563, pp. 5-6]
[Non-footnote statement at the bottom of page: Interestingly, the SBREFA processes for
EPA's Tier 2 and Tier 3 rulemakings DID include foreign Small Businesses. See Final Report of
the Small Business Advocacy Review Panel on EPA's Planned Proposed Rule Control of Air
Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Tier 3 Emission and Fuel Standards (October 14, 2011)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 5-6]
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Final Report of the SBREFA Small Business Advocacy Review Panel on EPA's Planned
Proposed Rule for Tier 2 Light- Duty Vehicle and Light-Duty Truck Emission Standards, Heavy-
Duty Gasoline Engine Standards, and Gasoline Sulfur Standards (October 26, 1998)] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 5-6]
It is interesting -and we have pointed this out in the past — that on the one hand EPA justifies
its standard setting on the basis that credits can be bought, but on the other hand, EPA steadfastly
maintains that it will not get involved in credit trading and leaves it to the free market. As a
result, the availability and cost of credits is inherently risky, including the risk that credit-
generating manufacturers may strategically withhold credits to limit Small OEM market access.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 5-6]
And finally, compliance with EPA's proposed standards is largely premised on very high
levels of electrification. If EPA's projections are incorrect, and sales of electric vehicles are not
as high as expected, many manufacturers will likely need to hold onto credits to maintain their
own compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, p. 6]
-It is critical that EPA
-Acknowledge that for Small OEMs to achieve fleet electrification, they face challenges that
can be particularly acute given their limited resources and the high-performance nature of Small
OEM product lines, which necessitates lighter- weight, high-density batteries. Overcoming these
challenges requires time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, p. 6]
-Understand that given these technical challenges facing Small OEMs seeking to electrify
their lightweight sports cars, it is not possible for them to reduce emissions to the level set for
Large Volume Manufacturers on the timetable set for Large Volume Manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0563, p. 6]
-Recognize that requiring Small OEMs to do so would be contrary to the Clean Air Act's
mandate that EPA provide sufficient lead-time "to permit the development and application of the
requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within [the lead-
time] period." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, p. 6]
-Adhere to past EPA precedent and established policy providing Small OEM flexibility and
extra lead-time [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, p. 6]
-Set the Small OEM standards and trajectory with step-downs whose frequency and degree
reflect the realities facing Small OEMs as regards limited product lines, longer product
development and life cycles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, p. 6]
-Seriously consider harmonizing as much as possible with the CARB 2022 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0563, p. 6]
Advanced Clean Cars II (ACCII) rulemaking with regard to special Small OEM provisions
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, p. 6]
1. CRITERIA EMISSIONS
-EPA cannot "move the NMOG+NOx goalpost" for MY 27 and 28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0563, pp. 6-8]
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EPA proposes to abandon the MY 27 and 28 SVM NMOG+NOx standards set forth in Tier 3
(and on which SVMs have been rightfully relying), and to require SVMs to adhere to the Tier 4
large volume (and short) phase-in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 6-8]
This inequitably conflicts with the already-established and in effect SVM phase-in set forth in
40 CFR 86.1811-17 (h)(1), as follows:
SVM Fleet Average NMOG+NOx Standard (mg/mile)
Model year: 2027 In effect Tier 3:51 Proposed Tier 4: 22
Model year: 2028 In effect Tier 3: 30 Proposed Tier 4: 20
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 6-8]
The NPRM's proposed change means that in MY 27, SVMs would have to meet a fleet
average NMOG+NOx standard that is 57% more stringent than what they have been planning in
reliance on 40 CFR 86.181 l-17(h)(l). And then, for MY 28, they would have to meet a fleet
average NMOG+NOx standard that is 33% lower than what they have been planning in reliance
on 40 CFR 86.181 l-17(h)(l). This would be an unjust and impermissible "moving the goalpost".
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 6-8]
-The proposed NMOG+NOx requirements are excessively stringent for Small OEMs - too
stringent, too soon [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 6-8]
This is especially so considering the starting point of existing Tier 3 levels and how the
CARB ACCII rulemaking appropriately maintained an SVM NMOG+NOx fleet standard of 51
mg/mi through MY 34, as shown shown in the graph below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563,
pp. 6-8]
[See original attachment for graph titled "SVM FTP NMOG+NOx LIMIT 9g/mi] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 6-8]
EPA assumes that OEMs will move to electrification in order to meet the Tier 4 standards. As
Small OEMs have explained, however, the batteries necessary to provide performance and range
required by Small OEM sports cars is not yet available, and thus Small OEMs cannot move
forward with EVs on the same timeline as Large Volume Manufacturers producing mass market
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 6-8]
The Proposed Tier 4 NMOG+NOx fleet average is unrealistic for companies that cannot make
use of fleet averaging; Small OEMs should not have to rely on credit purchasing [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 6-8]
There is no recognition in the NPRM that an SVM may have only one or two ICE test groups,
neither of which meets the Tier 4 fleet NMOG+NOx average. The fleet average concept in such
a situation offers no flexibility; having nothing to "average", such an SVM would simply fall
into a deficit situation. It was precisely to address this type of scenario that the Tier 3 SVM
flexibility provisions in 40 CFR 86.1811 -17(h) were promulgated. The current rulemaking
should follow suit and adopt comparable SVM flexibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp.
6-8]
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As regards credit purchasing, we reiterate how it is unfair to force Small OEMs to rely on
risky credit purchasing (at an unknown cost) in order to meet criteria emissions requirements.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 6-8]
-Bin 125 should remain available to Small OEMs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 6-8]
Moreover, the NPRM also proposes to eliminate Bin 125, a Bin currently relied upon by
SVMs. Eliminating Bin 125 would bring about the severe result of preventing some hypercar
manufacturers from certifying with EPA and from selling in the Federal US market. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 8-9]
For other SVMs, the elimination of Bin 125 would be unfair and unreasonable because it
would put them in the untenable position of having to, with limited resources, simultaneously
implement EVs while also investing in an attempt to reengineer Bin 125 vehicles to a much more
stringent standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 8-9]
Bin 125 should be kept in place for the exclusive use of SVMs, as California has permitted.
CARB 's ACCII rules allow SVMs to continue to use Bin 125 until 2035. EPA should follow
suit. Retaining Bin 125 for SVMs is simply not contrary to the goal of cleaner air. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 8-9]
-The Proposed Interim Tier 4 provision does not provide flexibility to SVMs
We note that one general flexibility concession in the NPRM — the category of "Interim Tier
4 vehicles" — does not provide relief to SVMs. As proposed, the Interim Tier 4 provision leaves
SVMs empty-handed because the benefits of Interim Tier 4 are restricted to OEMs who can
otherwise meet the 40% and 80% phase-in percentages with their full Tier 4 test groups (and thus
use the Interim Tier 4 category for the remaining 60% and 20% of their fleets during the phase
in). Given that SVMs - particularly those with only one or two test groups — cannot meet the
phase-in percentages with full Tier 4 cars, EPA's proposal unfairly denies SVMs the ability to
make use of the benefits of the Interim Tier 4 category. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 8-
9]
-In sum, as regards criteria emissions, EPA: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 8-9]
-Should follow CARB's ACCII rules and continue the availability of Bin 125 to SVMs
through MY 2034. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 8-9]
-Must justify imposing on SVMs the proposed new cold NMOG+NOx standard; until EPA
can establish that the environmental benefits outweigh the burdens on SVMs, SVMs should be
exempted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 8-9]
-With regard to NMOG+NOx FTP and US06 standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp.
8-9]
-In order to properly account for the problems facing SVMs with regard to "fleet averaging"
and the risks of credit purchasing, as explained above, set [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp.
8-9]
-The degree and frequency of SVM step-downs to reflect SVM realities — limited product
lines, longer product development and life cycles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 8-9]
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-MY 2027 -- Maintain for all SVMs the already-in effect (86-1811-17(h) MY 27 Tier 3 SVM
NMOG+NOx standard (51m g/mi) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 8-9]
-MY 2028 - Maintain for all SVMs the already-in effect MY 28 Tier 3 SVM NMOG+NOx
standard (30 g/mi) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 8-9]
-MY 2029-32 - continue the 30 mg/mi standard for SVMs given that the doubtful
environmental benefits of a more stringent SVM standard are vastly outweighed by the burden
on SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 8-9]
-Make the Interim Tier 4 category more flexible and available to Small OEMs [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 8-9]
-Add a new paragraph (e) to proposed 40 CFR 86.1811-27 to read as follows:
(e) If meeting the standards set forth in this section 40 CFR 86.1811-27 would cause severe
economic hardship, small-volume manufacturers may ask us to approve an extended compliance
deadline under the provisions of 40 CFR 1068.250, except that the solvency criterion does not
apply and there is no maximum duration of the hardship relief. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0563, pp. 8-9]
This provision would mirror the SVM relief made available under Tier 3 in 40 CFR 86.1811-
17. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 8-9]
The above steps are necessary to comply with the Clean Air Act's section 202(a) mandate that
EPA provide sufficient lead-time "to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such [lead-time]."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 8-9]
2. GHG
-EPA's Small OEM GHG policy must be fair and equitable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0563, pp. 9-11]
As explained by the Alliance for Automotive Innovation, the NPRM's GHG standards are a
bridge too far for large automakers, https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/blog/epas-rules-are-
out-of-whack-five-ways-to-fix-them . They are especially onerous for Small OEMs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
As explained above, Small OEMs need extra time and flexibility for GHG compliance. The
Ad Hoc Group's GHG position is therefore founded on two main points:
-Small Businesses should, as EPA has proposed, continue to be exempted from GHG
requirements [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
-The current system of setting company-by-company SVM alternative standards should be
eliminated as unwieldly — too time-consuming and burdensome for all parties - and replaced
with reasonable and achievable separate GHG standards for all SVMs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
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The set of SVM GHG standards would be separate from the large volume standards and
would reflect the challenges faced by SVMs, discussed above, while still requiring SVMs to
make significant GHG improvement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
Simply requiring Small OEMs to switch to the large volume standards over a short period of
time would impose a dramatic increase in stringency of the GHG standard applicable to SVMs
(from MY 24 to 25). In fact, the standard's level would drop precipitously, akin to falling off a
cliff, and this is both unfair and unachievable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
-Small OEMs cannot rely on fleet averaging or GHG credits as a compliance strategy
As discussed above, SVMs cannot use averaging as a successful compliance strategy. In
addition, forcing SVMs to use credits as a primary if not exclusive compliance strategy is both
unfair and improper, and this is especially so as regards GHG since SVMs expect the open
market availability of GHG credits to decline starting in 2026MY when the phase-in of changes
to MPGe begins to affect the ability of manufacturers of PHEVs and BEVs to generate GHG
credits.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
4 The Small OEM GHG situation is also exacerbated by the following:
-EPA proposes to eliminate AC leakage credits (we do not fully understand why the goal of fighting
climate change demands this) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
-The NPRM would maintain AC Efficiency Credits (which we support) but the NPRM test procedure
unfairly penalizes SVMs who cannot provide suitable test samples to perform the test as proposed. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
-In sum, as regards GHG, EPA should proceed as follows:
-For Small Businesses — continue the existing GHG exemption for Small Businesses5
-For SVMs
-For MY 22, 23, 24 and 25 — for SVMs that have been granted alternative bespoke standards
in the 2020 notice Federal Register :: Determinations of Light-Duty Vehicle Alternative
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Small Volume Manufacturers, continue for MY 22, 23,
24 and 25 the alternative standards for MY 21 set in the FR notice [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0563, pp. 9-11]
-For MY 2026 and later, eliminate company-by-company alternative SVM GHG standards
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
-Instead, in order to properly account for the problems facing SVMs with regard to "fleet
averaging" and the risks of credit purchasing (as discussed above), create a new regulatory
provision applicable to all SVMs (using the definition of SVM in 40 CFR 86.1838-01) setting
forth SVM standards and an SVM trajectory [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
-The SVMs in the Ad Hoc Group who are not Small Businesses believe that [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
-It is untenable that EPA's NPRM would require SVMs to have more than 50% BEVs in their
fleet in MY2026 - a level far higher than that expected from Large Volume [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
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Manufacturers under the Primary Standard phase-in starting in MY 2027. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
-Reasonably achievable SVM C02 levels and a feasible SVM trajectory are necessary to
account for challenges and limitations specific to SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp.
9-11]
-An SVM-specific phase-in must understandably require a substantial GHG reduction by MY
2032, but it must also start with a period of stability in order to account for SVMs' limited
product lines and limited availability/access to necessary technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
-EPA should therefore, in order to comply with the Clean Air Act's section 202(a) lead-time
mandate:
-Set an SVM phase-in that requires in MY 2032 a 50% GHG reduction compared to MY 25
(e.g., compared to the average of the MY 25 alternative bespoke standards). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
-Establish a trajectory from MY 2026 to MY 2032 that has either a reasonable linear
reduction or one or more reasonable stepped reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-
11]
[See original attachment for graph titled "2022 + GHG Proposed Targets"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
-Defer consideration of incorporating SVMs into the Primary Standard until a subsequent
separate rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 9-11]
-Add a new paragraph to 40 CFR 86.1818-12 to read as follows:
(e) If meeting the standards set forth in this section 40 CFR 86.1818-12 would cause severe
economic hardship, small- volume manufacturers may ask us to approve an extended-compliance
deadline under the provisions of 40 CFR 1068.250, except that the solvency criterion does not
apply and there is no maximum duration of the hardship relief. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0563, pp. 9-11]
5 EPA is requesting comment on the idea of imposing on Small Business manufacturers an annual
production cap (e.g., 200-500 vehicles per year) on vehicles eligible for the Small Business GHG
exemption. The Small Business members of the AD Hoc Group oppose any such cap on the grounds that
setting a cap at a given level would be totally arbitrary, and the environmental benefits of any such cap are
virtually nonexistent and are vastly outweighed by the potential burden.
Organization: Ad Hoc Tier 4 Light-Duty Small Manufacturer Group
II. EPA'S NPRM FAILS TO PROVIDE SMALL OEMS WITH SUFFICIENT AND
REASONABLE LEADTIME AND FLEXIBILITY
A. IN GENERAL
EPA has recognized in prior criteria pollutant and GHG rulemakings that special flexibility
rules for Small OEMs are appropriate. Historically, EPA has therefore had a policy for many
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years to allow SVMs to skip phase-ins and comply 100% at the end of the phase-in period.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 2-3]
The GHG rules and the Tier 3 rules provided even further SVM and Small Business
flexibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 2-3]
Tier 3 included a separate SVM-only stepped increase in fleet average stringency over a
designated period of time (apart from the large volume phase-in). This flexibility in 40 CFR
86.1811-17(h) — specifically for SVMs — was the result of extensive SVM discussions with EPA
during the Tier 3 rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 2-3]
Similarly, the GHG rules to date have both afforded Small Businesses an exemption from
GHG requirements as well as provided an SVM procedure for company-specific GHG standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 2-3]
These flexibilities were also the result of extensive Small OEM input to EPA. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 2-3]
In both the Tier 3 and GHG rulemakings, EPA promulgated these flexibilities after
acknowledging that SVMs and Small Businesses are distinct from large volume manufactures
and special provisions for them were necessary and proper. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509,
pp. 2-3]
Significantly, California has very recently reaffirmed the appropriateness of special SVM
provisions in promulgating its 2022 Advanced Clean Cars II (ACCII) rulemaking. EPA should
follow this approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 2-3]
- The NPRM, does not consider the proposal's effect on SVM and Small Business [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 2-3]
The problem here is that in EPA's multi-pollutant NPRM, SVM and Small Business
considerations have largely disappeared without explanation. [1] The proposal has no provision
for Small OEM leadtime / flexibility with respect to criteria emissions. This omission is a
significant and unreasonable change of policy. The NPRM also proposes to revamp SVM
alternative GHG standards by sweeping SVMs into the large volume rules. The manner in which
EPA proposes to do this will result in significant hardship for SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0509, pp. 2-3]
1 On the positive side, we do acknowledge that the NPRM
- SVMs may delay complying with the proposed new Tier 4 OBD requirements until model
year 2030; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 2-3]
- OEMs can count BEVs in their Tier 4 fleet average calculations; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0509, pp. 2-3]
- Small entities have certain exemptions from the 86.1815 Battery-related requirements for
electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid (but no special provisions for SVMs); [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0509, pp. 2-3]
- Continues the current GHG exemption for small entity manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0509, pp.2-3]
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Limited product portfolios and longer product development and life cycles restrict Small
OEM ability to meet frequent and significant increases in stringency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0509, pp. 2-3]
Simply put, EPA must recognize and fully consider the impacts of its proposed standards on
Small OEMs, and must promulgate standards that are feasible as required by the Clean Air Act.
We believe that the proposed Small OEM standards do not meet the requirements of CAA §
202(a) that standards "take effect after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit
the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to
the cost of compliance within such a period." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 3]
And EPA's apparent misunderstanding of who is selling what in the US may also extend
beyond the Small Business segment to the larger SVM segment as well. All SVMs in the AD
Hoc Group sell ICE vehicles. Nowhere in the Draft RIA does the term "small volume
manufacturer" even appear, and the Draft RIA thus fails to address the SVM segment of the
industry. Should we take this to mean that the NPRM's impact on SVMs was not thoroughly
considered? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 3-4]
- Small OEMs cannot effectively fleet average [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 3-4]
Perhaps the absence of Small OEM extra leadtime and flexibility may be the result of EPA's
incorrect assumptions. One assumption supporting the NPRM which is not applicable to Small
OEMs is that all OEMs have the ability to average the emissions of their various test groups in
order to meet a fleet standard. Small OEMs have long maintained - and do so again here — that
with only one or two high-performance test groups, they cannot use "averaging" as a compliance
strategy and have therefore needed, and still need, the long-standing EPA policy affording extra
leadtime and flexibility to Small OEMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 3-4]
It is improper to set a standard so stringent that it requires a Small OEM to rely entirely on
credits from another manufacturer to maintain compliance [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p.
4]
EPA projects that SVM fleets on average, and individually, will exceed the proposed
standards, requiring purchased credits in order to continue selling vehicles in the US. EPA
therefore relies on credit trading flexibility as a key means by which Small OEMs will maintain
compliance with standards. We disagree with this approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p.
4]
It is inappropriate to set a standard so stringent that it requires a manufacturer to rely entirely
on credits from another manufacturer to maintain compliance. The decision to sell credits, who
to sell them to, what price to sell them at, and when to sell them (or to keep them for later use or
future value) is a business decision. There is nothing that requires a manufacturer to sell its
credits, or to sell them to a particular party. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 4]
It is interesting -and we have pointed this out in the past — that on the one hand EPA justifies
its standard setting on the basis that credits can be bought, but on the other hand, EPA steadfastly
maintains that it will not get involved in credit trading and leaves it to the free market. As a
result, the availability and cost of credits is inherently risky, including the risk that credit-
generating manufacturers may strategically withhold credits to limit Small OEM market access.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 4]
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And finally, compliance with EPA's proposed standards is largely premised on very high
levels of electrification. If EPA's projections are incorrect, and sales of electric vehicles are not
as high as expected, many manufacturers will likely need to hold onto credits to maintain their
own compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 4]
B. THERE ARE FOUR SPECIFIC TOPICS IN THE NPRM THAT ARE OF DEEP
CONCERN TO SMALL OEMS
1. CRITERIA EMISSIONS
- You can't "move the goalpost" for MY 27 and 28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 4-
6]
EPA proposes to abandon the MY 27 and 28 SVM NMOG+NOx standards set forth in Tier 3
(AND ON WHICH SVMs HAVE BEEN RIGHTFULLY RELYING), and to require SVMs to
adhere to the Tier 4 large volume (and short]) phase-in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 4-
6]
This inequitably conflicts with the already-established and in effect SVM phase-in set forth in
40 CFR 86.1811-17 (h)(1), as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 4-6]
SVM Fleet Average NMOG+NOx Standard (mg/mile)
Model year: 2027; In effect Tier 3:51; Proposed Tier 4: 22
Model year: 2028; In effect Tier 3: 30; Proposed Tier 4: 20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509,
pp. 4-6]
The NPRM's proposed change means that in MY 27, SVMs would have to meet a fleet
average NMOG+NOx standard that is 57% more stringent than what they have been planning in
reliance on 40 CFR 86.181 l-17(h)(l). And then, for MY 28, they would have to meet a fleet
average NMOG+NOx standard that is 33% lower than what they have been planning in reliance
on 40 CFR 86.181 l-17(h)(l). This would be an unjust "moving the goalpost". [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0509, pp.4-6]
- The proposed NMOG+NOx requirements are excessively stringent - too stringent, too soon
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 4-6]
This is especially so considering Tier 3 levels and that the CARB ACCII rulemaking
appropriately maintained an SVM NMOG+NOx fleet standard of 51 mg/mi through MY 34, as
shown shown in the graph below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 4-6]
[See original attachment for "SVM FTP NMOG+NOx LIMIT [g/mi]"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0509, pp. 4-6]
-The Proposed Tier 4 NMOG+NOx fleet average is unrealistic for companies that cannot
make use of fleet averaging; Small OEMs should not have to rely on credit purchasing [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 4-6]
There is no recognition in the NPRM that an SVM may have only one or two ICE test groups,
neither of which meets the Tier 4 fleet NMOG+NOx average. The fleet average concept in such
a situation offers no flexibility; having nothing to "average", such an SVM would simply
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fall into a deficit situation. It was precisely to address this type of scenario that the Tier 3 SVM
flexibility provisions in 40 CFR 86.1811 -17(h) were promulgated. The current rulemaking
should follow suit and adopt comparable SVM flexibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp.
4-6]
As regards credit purchasing, we reiterate how it is unfair to force Small OEMs to rely on
risky credit purchasing (at an unknown cost) in order to meet criteria emissions requirements.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 4-6]
- Bin 125 should remain available to Small OEMs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 4-6]
Moreover, the NPRM also proposes to eliminate Bin 125, a Bin currently relied upon by
SVMs. EPA has not provided a reason why Bin 125 cannot be kept in place for the exclusive use
of Small OEMs as California has permitted. CARB 's ACCII rules allow SVMs to continue to
use Bin 125 until 2035. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 4-6]
The elimination of Binl25 is unfair and unreasonable as regards SVMs because it puts SVMs
in the untenable position of having to, with limited resources, simultaneously implement EVs
and also reengineer Binl25 vehicles to a much more stringent standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0509, pp. 4-6]
- The Proposed Interim Tier 4 provision does not provide flexibility to SVMs [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 6]
We note that one general flexibility concession in the NPRM — the category of "Interim Tier
4 vehicles" — does not provide relief to SVMs. As proposed, the Interim Tier 4 provision leaves
SVMs empty-handed because - [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 6]
-The benefits of Interim Tier 4 are restricted to OEMs who can otherwise meet the 40% and
80% phase-in percentages with their full Tier 4 test groups (and thus use the Interim Tier 4
category for the remaining 60% and 20% of their fleets during the phase in). Given that SVMs -
particularly those with only one or two test groups — cannot meet the phase-in percentages with
full Tier 4 cars, EPA's proposal unfairly denies SVMs the ability to make use of the benefits of
the Interim Tier 4 category. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 6]
In sum, as regards criteria emissions, EPA should:
-Follow CARB's ACCII rules and continue the availability of Bin 125 to SVMs through MY
2034 and not require NMOG+NOx limits for cold testing.[3] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509,
p. 6]
-With regard to NMOG+NOx FTP and US06 standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p.
6]
-In order to properly account for the problems facing SVMs with regard to "fleet averaging"
and the risks of credit purchasing, as explained above, set the degree and frequency of SVM
step-downs to reflect SVM realities — [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 6]
limited product lines, longer product development and life cycles and limited access to
technologies (particularly batteries). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 6]
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-MY 2027 -- Maintain for all SVMs the already-in effect (86-1811-17(h) MY 27 Tier 3 SVM
NMOG+NOx standard (51m g/mi) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 6]
-MY 2028 - Maintain for all SVMs the already-in effect MY 28 Tier 3 SVM NMOG+NOx
standard (30 g/mi) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 6]
-MY 2029-32 - continue the 30 mg/mi standard for SVMs given that the environmental
benefits of a more stringent standard have not been established and are vastly outweighed by the
potential burden on SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 6]
-Make the Interim Tier 4 category more flexible and available [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0509, p. 6]
-Add a new paragraph (e) to proposed 40 CFR 86.1811-27 to read as follows:
(e) If meeting the standards set forth in this section 40 CFR 86.1811-27 would cause severe
economic hardship, small-volume manufacturers may ask us to approve an extended compliance
deadline under the provisions of 40 CFR 1068.250, except that the solvency criterion does not
apply and there is no maximum duration of the hardship relief. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0509, p. 6]
This provision would mirror the SVM relief made available under Tier 3 in 40 CFR 86.1811-
17. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 6]
3 EPA must justify imposing on SVMs the proposed new cold NMOG+NOx standard. Until EPA can
establish that the environmental benefits outweigh the burdens on SVMs, SVMs should be exempted.
2. GHG
- EPA's Small OEM GHG policy needs to be fair and equitable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0509, p. 7]
As explained above, extra time and flexibility are very much needed by Small OEMs. Our
GHG position is founded on two main points: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 7]
-Small Businesses should, as EPA has proposed, continue to be exempted from GHG
requirements [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 7]
-The current system of setting company-by-company SVM alternative standards should be
eliminated as unwieldly — too time-consuming and burdensome for all parties - and replaced
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 7]
We therefore propose that there be a separate GHG standard for all SVMs - separate from the
large volume standard — which requires significant GHG improvement, yet reflects the
challenges faced by SVMs discussed above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 7]
Requiring a Small OEM to switch to large volume standards over a short period of time
would impose a dramatic decrease in the GHG standard (from MY 24 to 25). Simply put, the
standard would drop precipitously, akin to falling off a cliff. This is both unfair and
unachievable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 7]
- Small OEMs cannot rely on fleet averaging or GHG credits as a compliance strategy [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 7]
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As discussed above, SVMs cannot use averaging as a successful compliance strategy. In
addition, forcing SVMs to use credits as a primary if not exclusive compliance strategy is both
unfair and improper, and this is especially so as regards GHG since SVMs expect the
open market availability of GHG credits to decline starting in 2026MY when the phase-in of
changes to MPGe begins to affect the ability of manufacturers of PHEVs and BEVs to generate
GHG credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 7]
In sum, as regards GHG, EPA should
-Continue the existing GHG exemption for Small Businesses [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0509, pp. 7-8]
-For MY 22, 23 and 24 — for all SVMs that have been granted alternative bespoke standards
in the 2020 notice Federal Register :: Determinations of Light-Duty Vehicle [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0509, pp.7-8]
Alternative Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Small Volume Manufacturers, continue
for MY 22, 23 and 24 the alternative standard for MY 21 set in the FR notice [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0509, pp.7-8]
- For MY 2025 and later, eliminate company-by-company alternative SVM GHG standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 7-8]
- Instead, in order to properly account for the problems facing SVMs with regard to "fleet
averaging" and the risks of credit purchasing (as discussed above), create a new regulatory
provision applicable to all SVMs (using the definition of SVM in 40 CFR 86.1838-01) setting
forth [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 7-8]
- SVM GHG targets (expressed as a multiple of the large volume GHG targets) and [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 7-8]
- an SVM GHG trajectory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 7-8]
-Recognize that given technical challenges in electrifying lightweight super cars it is not
possible for SVMs to reduce GHG to level of set for large volume manufacturers by MY 2032.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 7-8]
-Set an SVM trajectory that has step-downs whose frequency and degree reflect the realities
facing SVMs as regards limited product lines, longer product development and life cycles, and
limited access to technologies (particularly batteries); [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 7-8]
-Add a new paragraph to 40 CFR 86.1818-12 to read as follows: (e) e. If meeting the
standards set forth in this section 40 CFR 86.1818-12 would cause severe economic hardship,
small-volume manufacturers may ask us to approve an extended compliance deadline under the
provisions of 40 CFR 1068.250, except that the solvency criterion does not apply and there is no
maximum duration of the hardship relief], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 7-8]
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
3. Allow Carry-Over Throughout the Duration of the Rule
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The NPRM allows a three-year phase in from MY 2027 through MY 2029, but that phase-in
is too quick of a transition. Auto Innovators recommends the use of carry-over throughout the
duration of the rule. Requiring new data, for a vehicle that is carryover, for MY2030 and beyond
adds unnecessary testing burden. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 132]
VI. Small-Volume Manufacturer Provisions
Auto Innovators includes Ferrari and McLaren among its members. Both have U.S. sales of
less than 5,000 units per model year and are considered small-volume manufacturers (SVM).
Their low U.S. and global volumes result in lower access to suppliers and delayed access to
supplier- provided technologies. They have limited, narrowly focused product lines that do not
have significant redesigns every year, and that receive little flexibility from fleet emission
averaging programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 207]
The products of these small volume manufacturers are high-performance supercars and track
cars that are nonetheless certified for on-road use. The purchasers of such vehicles expect high
performance, including racetrack capability, even if most will not be used for racing and are
constrained in on-road use by U.S. traffic laws and highway designs and conditions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 207]
Emissions from vehicles sold by small volume manufacturers are negligible. Despite
generally having higher emission rates (grams per mile), their average lifetime mileage
accumulation is extremely low - approximately 2,543 miles.313 EPA should consider the de
minimis use of these vehicles when considering final standards under this rulemaking. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 207]
313 U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Exemptions
From Average Fuel Economy Standards; Passenger Automobile Average Fuel Economy Standards
(Proposed rule; proposed decision to grant exemption), 87 Fed. Reg. 39439, 39449 (Jul. 1, 2022).
Historically, EPA has recognized the unique design considerations and compliance challenges
faced by SVMs. They have been provided with additional flexibilities such as alternative, less
stringent standards and alternative phasedowns with periods of stability to address those
challenges. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 207]
These challenges and the need for additional flexibility remain pertinent for MY 2027 and
later regulations. The customers of these companies will still demand high performance from any
vehicle sold by these manufacturers. The challenges of limited, highly focused product lines will
not be eased by vehicle electrification. Limited product portfolio and product development
cycles mean the ability to make regular improvements is a challenge. Battery technology has not
developed enough for application within high-performance supercars. Technology is developing
and SVMs have plans to electrify further; however, time is needed. Supply chain access and
lead-time challenges will continue and potentially grow given rapidly rising global demand for
lithium-ion batteries and trends toward vertical integration by larger companies to secure critical
mineral supplies. Furthermore, given low production volumes there is also limited ability to
amortize expensive product development across a volume of products - R&D and investment
payback is longer. This leads to SVMs having different investment cycles which will mean they
will require additional time to comply with GHG and criteria pollutant regulations. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 207-208]
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With this backdrop, we are concerned that EPA appears to now dismiss these challenges in
general, proposing much reduced flexibility in MY 2027 and later. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 207-208]
A. SVM Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards
EPA has proposed alternative greenhouse gas emission standards for SVMs. We appreciate
that EPA has at least considered alternative standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
208-210]
1. Concerns with the Proposed SVM GHG Standards
a) Massive Increase in Stringency Without Lead-Time
Auto Innovators is concerned that EPA's proposal envisions a massive increase in stringency
in MY 2025 SVM standards (a 53% average stringency increase314) with no lead-time. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 208-210]
314 Calculation by Auto Innovators based on the proposed targets for Ferrari and McLaren, assuming
constant footprint and production.
EPA states, "SVM alternative standards established for MY 2021 would apply through MY
2024 to provide stability for SVMs so that SVMs have an opportunity to reduce their GHG
emissions in future years." However, there is no lead-time provided. MY 2023 production has
already begun, the start of MY 2024 production is imminent, and will certainly be underway by
the time this proposal is finalized in early 2024, and MY 2025 could begin as early as January 2,
2024.315 Therefore, the lead-time provided by EPA's proposed MY 2025 alternative standards
is at most approximately four months, and potentially less.316 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 208-210]
315 See 40 C.F.R. § 85.1502(a)(8).
316 Assuming a March 2024 final rule and a July 2024 start of MY 2024 production. EPA's proposal
affects SVM GHG standards long before MY 2027. EPA has failed to provide any explanation of how
circumstances for SVMs have changed so significantly that the revised requirements can be met in general
and particularly without lead-time. The lack of lead-time may also raise reliance interest concerns.
b) Equitability of SVM GHG Standards
It is important for GHG policy to be fair and equitable. However, EPA's proposal would
increase the stringency of SVM standards more rapidly than the primary standards with the goal
of moving SVMs to the primary standard by 2032, another concern (Figure 76). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 208-210]
[See original comment for Figure 76: Cumulative GHG standard stringency increase relative
to MY 2021, comparing the proposed SVM standards to the current and proposed primary
standards.]317 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 208-210]
317 Calculation by Auto Innovators based on the current and proposed targets and assuming constant
footprint and production mix.
c) Projected Technology Requirements of SVM GHG Standards
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The technology requirements of EPA's proposal are also concerning. EPA estimates SVMs
will be required to achieve a higher EV market share than the industry on average (Figure 77)
[See original comment for Figure 77: EPA-Projected BEV Market Share for SVMs compared to
other manufacturers.]318, while also rapidly improve remaining ICE vehicles (Figure 78). [See
original comment for Figure 78: EPA-Projected ICE Improvement Rates for SVMS.]319 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 208-210]
318 Auto Innovators calculation based on data in EPA's proposal central analysis OMEGA
[... ]vehicles.csv output file.
319 Auto Innovators calculation based on data in EPA's proposal central analysis OMEGA
[...]vehicles.csv output file.
d) EPA's Reliance on Credit Trading for SVMs to Meet the Proposed GHG Standards
Despite EPA's projections for rapid EV update and ICE improvement, EPA's modeling also
suggests that SVMs will be required to heavily rely on credit trading flexibility to maintain
compliance with GHG standards.320 We believe this is inappropriate for several reasons and
demonstrates that the proposed alternative standards do not meet the requirements of CAA §
202(a) that standards "take effect after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit
the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to
the cost of compliance within such a period." First, it is inappropriate to set a standard so
stringent as to effectively require a manufacturer to entirely rely on another manufacturer to
maintain compliance. Additionally, there is an inherent risk that even if a credit-generating
manufacturer is willing to sell credits, the credits may be purchased by other parties before
SVMs can access them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 211]
320 Credit purchase claim based on examination of EPA's proposal central analysis OMEGA output files
for credit transactions, noting degree of credit balances listed as "PAST DUE". Such deficits would require
credit purchases.
These proposed standards for SVMs do not meet the Clean Air Act's requirement to provide
adequate time for the development and application of the necessary technologies (BEVs in the
case of such rapid increases in stringency and overall stringency levels). They are also not
equitable to those of other manufacturers given the significantly higher BEV market share
required to meet them and the more rapid increases in stringency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 211]
2. Recommendations for SVM GHG Standards
Auto Innovators proposes the following approach to address these concerns:
We support EPA's proposal to sunset the individual application process for alternative
standards. However, for the above reasons, we recommend that EPA maintain the approved MY
2021 individual standards through MY 2026. Such an approach would provide time to start
implementing electrification-compatible technologies, help address lead-time concerns in
general, and make the timing of later changes consistent with the model years EPA is focused on
in this rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 211]
As described above, and related to overall industry concerns highlighted in Section I of these
comments (EV Feasibility), SVMs are concerned with both the overall level of electrification
likely required by EPA's proposed standards and the relatively greater improvements that EPA is
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proposing for SVMs relative to industry as a whole. For MY 2032 SVM alternative standards,
we recommend that EPA address these concerns by requiring SVMs to improve their emissions
levels by the same percentage as the primary standards require between MY 2026 (which would
be based on MY 2021 for SVMs) and MY 2032. (E.g., 50% under the current proposal.) [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 211]
We suggest that the improvements be done as annual linear decreases. Figure 79 provides a
generic demonstration of the above concepts. [See original attachment for Figure 79: Conceptual
Illustration of Recommended SVM Alternative Standard Approach] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 212]
EPA seeks to bring SVM targets into alignment with the primary 2032 targets. Given the
unique challenges SVMs face as compared to full-line manufacturers, we believe it is too soon to
propose a convergence of the alternative and primary standards. We respectfully suggest that
EPA defer consideration of placing SVMs on the primary standards to a subsequent rulemaking.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 212]
B. SVM Criteria Pollutant Standards
q) SVM Concerns with the Proposed Criteria Pollutant Standards
As described above, small-volume manufacturers face unique challenges in meeting very
stringent emission regulations, particularly those premised largely on electrification. Such is also
the case for criteria pollutant standards, particularly given that EPA has not proposed any
additional flexibility for SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 212-213]
Under EPA's proposal, SVMs would need to meet the same criteria, air toxic, and particulate
mater emission standards on the same schedule as large manufacturers with diverse product
lines. EPA is also proposing to truncate a previously granted flexibility.321 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 212-213]
321 Under EPA's Tier 3 standards, small volume manufacturers were allowed to meet a 0.051 g/mile
NMOG+NOx standard through MY 2027.
Historically, EPA has provided special provisions for meeting criteria pollutant emission
standards, recognizing these manufacturers' challenges. Likewise, similar provisions are
provided in CARB's ACC II LEV IV regulation. For this reason, Auto Innovators recommends
that EPA align with the current California's emissions standards and related phase-in flexibilities
for small volume manufacturers. This would be particularly helpful given the limited number of
vehicle models in SVMs' portfolio and the additional time required to implement new
technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 212-213]
b) Recommendations for SVM Criteria Pollutant Standards
In particular we recommend that EPA include the following additional flexibilities for SVMs.
These are largely based on the California ACC II approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 212-213]
- NMOG+NOx fleet average requirement of 0.051 g/mile (including BEVs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 212-213]
- Availability of Bin 125 through MY 2034. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 212-213]
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- SVM-specific phase-in provisions, allowing SVMs to defer compliance with new regulatory
requirements until the end of the phase-in period granted under the primary regulations. (E.g., if
the primary phase-in is 40/80/100, the SVM phase-in would be 0/0/100.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.212-213]
Organization: Aston Martin Lagonda (AML)
Selling fewer than 5000 units per year in the US, AML qualifies as a small volume
manufacturer (SVM) and has many specific dynamics and characteristics when it comes to
design, manufacturing, sales, C02 footprint and lifecycle of its vehicles compared to larger
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). The specific challenges of SVMs have long been
recognised in US regulations, with the consistent provision of appropriate derogations. These
flexibilities are especially important for an operationally independent SVM like AML because
we are not part of a larger automotive group and therefore cannot access benefits from being part
of a large manufacturer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 1-2]
Furthermore, SVMs represent a tiny fraction of the US automobile market and have a
minuscule impact on US air pollution. AML sold 977 cars in the US in 2022, which represents
0.03% of the total market. As SVMs contribute an extremely small fraction of C02 emissions,
EPA can offer levels of temporary but necessary flexibility, without compromising its overall
policy ambition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 1-2]
In addition, Aston Martin cars are typically not vehicles which are driven daily, but rather
tend to be bought by enthusiasts and collectors, and are driven occasionally, mainly for shorter
distances. As a result, the average annual mileage driven by these vehicles is likely to be
drastically lower. Considering information from the EPA and the UK's Royal Automobile Club
Foundation, we estimate due to this lower average usage, the C02 emissions from an Aston
Martin in the US per year amount to less than half that of the average US car. The combination
of low sales volumes plus low vehicle miles travelled (VMT) means that the actual pollution
impact of SVMs is de minimis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 2]
Limited product portfolios, fewer number of drivetrains, limited financial and human
resources, and longer product development times and vehicle life cycles restrict SVMs' ability to
meet frequent and significant increases in the stringency of standards and to meet fleet average
standards aimed at large OEMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 2]
The approach to provide flexibilities, as was done in the past, would enable AML to focus
valuable resources on investment in the development and production of zero emission cars rather
than diverting them to pay financial penalties imposed by any new regulation in the next few
years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 2]
AML is committed to doing its fair share to introduce advanced technology at the earliest
technically and commercially feasible opportunity. However special accommodation must be
made for companies that took strategic decisions and made technological and financial
commitments more than 5 years ago and are unable to make rapid adjustments to meet new
regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 2]
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We understand EPA's ambition and we share the goal of decarbonisation however we have
some concerns regarding the proposed legislation. We outline our position and recommendations
in the pages that follow. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 2]
A. IN GENERAL: EPA'S NPRM FAILS TO PROVIDE SVMs WITH SUFFICIENT AND
REASONABLE LEADTIME AND FLEXIBILITY
EPA has recognized in prior criteria pollutant and GHG rulemakings that special
flexibility rules for SVMs are essential. Historically, EPA has therefore had a policy for many
years to allow SVMs to skip phase-ins and comply 100% at the end of the phase-in period.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 3]
The GHG rules and the Tier 3 rules provided even further SVM flexibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0566, p.3]
Tier 3 included a separate SVM-only compliance pathway for a period of 10 years with
specific SVM only fleet average requirements. This flexibility is clearly articulated in 40 CFR
86.1811 -17(h). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 3]
Similarly, the GHG rules to date have both afforded Small Businesses an exemption from
GHG requirements as well as providing a SVM procedure for company-specific GHG standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 3]
In both the Tier 3 and GHG rulemakings, EPA promulgated these flexibilities after
acknowledging that SVMs are distinct from large volume manufactures and special provisions
for them were necessary and proper. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 3]
California has very recently reaffirmed the appropriateness of special SVM provisions in
promulgating the CARB 2022 Advanced Clean Cars II (ACCII) rulemaking. EPA should follow
this approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 3]
The NPRM, does not sufficiently consider the proposal's effect on SVMs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 3]
Unlike in past rulemakings, EPA's multi-pollutant NPRM, fails to adequately address SVM
issues - and EPA does not explain why it did not do so.l The proposal has no provision for SVM
lead-time/ flexibility with respect to criteria emissions. This omission is a significant,
unreasonable and unexplained change of policy. The NPRM also proposes to revamp SVM
alternative GHG standards by sweeping SVMs into the large volume rules. The manner in which
EPA proposes to do this will result in significant hardship for SVMs without achieving
meaningful air quality benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 3]
1 On the positive side, we do acknowledge that the NPRM
• SVMs may delay complying with the proposed new Tier 4 OBD requirements until model
year 2030; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 3]
• OEMs can count BEVs in their Tier 4 fleet average calculations; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0566, p. 3]
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• Small business entities have certain exemptions from the 86.1815 Battery-related
requirements for electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid (but no special provisions for SVMs);
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 3]
• Continues the current GHG exemption for small business entity manufacturers [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 3]
Due to their low volume, specialisms, and diversity, it is critical that the impact of regulations
and standards for SVMs is fully understood when under development. Regulatory impact
assessments catering to the different vehicle segments are required to ensure the impact is felt
proportionately. Suitable lead times are required ahead of the introduction of new regulations.
SVMs' products have much longer life cycles than mass market products, which is necessary to
recover investment costs due to lower annual volumes of sales. Therefore limited product
portfolios and longer product development and life cycles restrict SVMs' ability to meet frequent
and significant increases in stringency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 3]
Under the Clean Air Act, EPA must recognize and fully consider the impacts of its proposed
standards on SVMs and must promulgate standards that are feasible for SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0566, pp.3-4]
In the NPRM Preamble, EPA states as follows:
The Administrator finds that the standards proposed herein are consistent with EPA's
responsibilities under the CAA and appropriate under CAA section 202(a). EPA has carefully
considered the statutory factors, including technological feasibility and cost of the proposed
standards and the available lead time for manufacturers to comply with them. Based on our
analysis, it is our assessment that the proposed standards are appropriate and justified under
section 202(a) of the CAA. Our analysis for this proposal supports the preliminary conclusion
that the proposed standards are technologically feasible and that the costs of compliance for
manufacturers would be reasonable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 3-4]
SVMs are not mentioned in the above conclusion and the NPRM provides no support for
applying the above conclusions to SVMs. In this regard, the Preamble has an entire section ("V")
on "EPA's Basis That the Proposed Standards Are Feasible and Appropriate Under the Clean Air
Act", but nowhere in that section are the terms "Small Volume Manufacturer" or "Small
Business" mentioned. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 3-4]
We believe that the NPRM's proposed SVM standards and trajectories do not meet the
requirements of CAA§ 202(a) that standards "take effect after such period as the Administrator
finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving
appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such a period." The reality is that
SVMs do not have access to technology developed by larger OEMs or tier one suppliers and this
difficulty has been recognised in prior EPA regulations. It is only fair that such derogations are
provided for SVMs under these new rules. The ability of SVMs to make changes at the same rate
as large companies has not changed, therefore appropriate legislative consideration is needed for
SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 3-4]
EPA should reconsider its proposed provisions and finalize SVM rules that are consistent with
the principles of an incremental phase-in with periods of stability, that are reflective of both the
function and limited emissions contribution of SVM products, and without forcing SVMs to be
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overly-reliant on purchasing credits from other manufacturers. Note that compelling SVMs
through a regulatory regime which forces credits to be purchased will limit the ability of SVMs
to invest in EVs and other lower carbon technologies with R&D funds being allocated to pay for
credits. This is not an effective way to enable technological progress by imposing a charge on a
company which has no ability to make a rapid course correction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0566, pp. 3-4]
Understanding what SVMs are selling in the US
Neither with regard to criteria emissions nor GHG does EPA explain in the NPRM the paucity
(verging on absence) of Small OEM flexibility or additional lead-time. A misstatement in the
preamble may shed light on this: in the preamble (88 FR 29405) (May 5, 2023), EPA incorrectly
states (as does the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis) that the "proposed NMOG+NOx standards
should have no impact on the existing Small Business manufacturers, which currently produce
only electric vehicles." This is simply not so. There most certainly are SVMs that produce
internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles for the US market, AML being one of them. Nowhere
in the draft RIA does the term "small volume manufacturer" even appear, and the draft RIA thus
fails to address the SVM segment of the industry. Given that the EPA has consistently
recognised the SVM category, it is unusual that it would bring forward punitive regulations at
those companies less able to deal with heavy sanctions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 4]
SVMs cannot effectively fleet average
One assumption supporting the NPRM which is not applicable to SVMs is that all OEMs
have the ability to average the emissions of their various test groups in order to meet a fleet
standard. SVMs have long maintained that with only one or two high-performance test groups,
they cannot use "averaging" as a compliance strategy and have therefore needed, and still need,
the long-standing EPA policy affording extra leadtime and flexibility to SVMs. In the absence of
such flexibility, a fleet average standard becomes in effect a required (BIN) standard for these
SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 4-5]
This point further underlines the simple reality that large car makers can achieve lower
averages, whereas an SVM with a narrow or niche offering of products simple does not have this
ability to comply with the regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 4-5]
It is improper to set a standard so stringent that it requires an SVM to rely entirely on
credits from another manufacturer to maintain compliance
EPA projects that SVM fleets on average, and individually, will exceed the proposed
standards, requiring purchased credits to continue selling vehicles in the US. EPA therefore
relies on credit trading flexibility as a key means by which SVMs will maintain compliance with
standards. We disagree with this approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 4-5]
It is counterproductive to set a standard so stringent that it requires a manufacturer to rely
entirely on credits from another manufacturer to maintain compliance. The decision to sell
credits, who to sell them to, at what price to sell them, and when to sell them (or to keep them for
later use or future value} is a business decision. There is nothing that requires a manufacturer to
sell its credits, or to sell them to a particular party. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 4-5]
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This approach would prevent SVMs from focusing valuable resources on investment in the
development and production of zero emission cars and instead divert resources to buy credits or
pay financial penalties. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 4-5]
On the one hand, EPA justifies its standard setting on the basis that credits can be bought, but
on the other hand, EPA steadfastly maintains that it will not get involved in credit trading and
leaves it to the free market. As a result, the availability and cost of credits is inherently risky,
including the risk that credit-generating manufacturers may strategically withhold credits to limit
SVMs' market access. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 4-5]
And finally, compliance with EPA's proposed standards is largely premised on very high
levels of electrification. If EPA's projections are incorrect, and sales of electric vehicles are not
as high as expected, many manufacturers will likely need to hold onto credits to maintain their
own compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 4-5]
It is critical that EPA:
acknowledge that for SVMs to achieve fleet electrification, they face challenges that
can be particularly acute given their limited resources and the high-performance nature of SVMs
product lines, which necessitates lighterweight, high-density batteries. Overcoming these
challenges requires time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 5-6]
understand that given these technical challenges facing SVMs seeking to electrify
their lightweight sports cars, it is not possible for them to reduce emissions to the level set for
Large Volume Manufacturers on the timetable set for Large Volume Manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 5-6]
recognize that requiring SVMs to do so would be contrary to the Clean Air Act's
mandate that EPA provide sufficient lead-time "to permit the development and application of the
requisite technologies, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within [the
lead-time] period." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 5-6]
adhere to past EPA precedent and established policy providing SVM flexibility and
extra lead time set the SVM standards and trajectory with step-downs whose frequency and
degree reflect the realities facing SVMs as regards limited product lines, longer product
development and life cycles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 5-6]
consider harmonizing as much as possible with the CARB 2022 Advanced Clean Cars
II (ACCII) rulemaking with regard to special SVM provisions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566,
pp. 5-6]
B. THERE ARE FOUR SPECIFIC TOPICS IN THE NPRM THAT ARE OF DEEP
CONCERN TO SVMs
1. CRITERIA EMISSIONS
"Moving the goalpost" for MY 27 and 28 makes the trajectory exceptionally
challenging for SVMs therefore appropriate derogations are essential. Special accommodation
must be made for SVMs that took strategic decisions and made technological and financial
commitments more than 5 years ago and are unable to make rapid adjustments to adapt to new
regulation at pace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 6-7]
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EPA proposes to abandon the MY 27 and 28 SVM NMOG+NOx standards set forth in Tier 3
( and on which SVMs have been rightfully relying), and to require SVMs to adhere to the Tier 4
large volume (and short) phase-in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 6-7]
This inequitably conflicts with the already established and in effect SVM phase-in set forth in
40 CFR 86.1811-17 (h)(1), as follows:
SVM Fleet Average NMOG+NOx Standard (mg/mile)
Model year: 2027: In effect Tier 3: 51; In effect Tier 4: 22
Model year: 2028: In effect Tier 3: 30; In effect Tier 4: 20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566,
pp. 6-7]
The NPRM's proposed change means that in MY 27, SVMs would have to meet a fleet
average NMOG+NOx standard that is 57% more stringent than what they have been planning in
reliance on 40 CFR 86.1811 -17(hl(l). And then, for MY 28, they would have to meet a fleet
average NMOG+NOx standard that is 33% lower than what they have been planning in reliance
on 40 CFR 86.181 l-17(h)(l). This would be an unjust "moving the goalpost".[EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0566, pp.6-7]
The proposed NMOG+NOx requirements are excessively stringent - too stringent, too
soon This is especially so considering Tier 3 levels and that the CARB ACCII rulemaking
appropriately maintained an SVM NMOG+NOx fleet standard of 51 mg/mi through MY 34, as
shown in the graph below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 6-7]
[See original comment for bar graph of SVM FTP NMOG+NOx LIMIT [g/mi]]
The Proposed Tier 4 NMOG+NOx fleet average is unrealistic for companies that
cannot make use of fleet averaging; SVMs should not have to rely on credit purchasing. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 6-7]
There is no recognition in the NPRM that an SVM may have only one or two ICE test groups,
neither of which meets the Tier 4 fleet NMOG+NOx average. The fleet average concept in such
a situation offers no flexibility; having nothing to "average", such an SVM would simply have no
ability to comply and would fall into a deficit situation. It was precisely to address this type of
scenario that the Tier 3 SVM flexibility provisions in 40 CFR 86.1811 -17(h) were promulgated.
The current rulemaking should follow suit and adopt comparable SVM flexibility. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 7]
As regards credit purchasing, we reiterate how it is unfair to force SVMs to rely on risky
credit purchasing (with unknown availability and at an unknown cost) to meet criteria emissions
requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 7]
Bin 125 should remain available to SVMs
Moreover, the NPRM also proposes to eliminate Bin 125, a Bin currently relied upon by
SVMs. EPA has not provided a reason why Bin 125 cannot be kept in place for the exclusive use
of SVMs as California has permitted. CARB's ACCII rules allow SVMs to continue to use Bin
125 until 2035. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 7]
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The elimination of Bin 125 is unfair and unreasonable as regards SVMs because it puts SVMs
in the untenable position of having to, with limited resources, simultaneously implement EVs
and also reengineer Bin 125 vehicles to a much more stringent standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0566, p. 7]
Bin 125 should be kept in place for the exclusive use of SVMs, as California has permitted.
CARB's ACCII rules allow SVMs to continue to use Bin 125 until 2035. EPA should follow suit.
Retaining Bin 125 for SVMs is simply not contrary to the goal of cleaner air. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0566, p. 7]
The Proposed Interim Tier 4 provision does not provide flexibility to SVMs [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
We note that one general flexibility concession in the NPRM — the category of "Interim Tier
4 vehicles" — does not provide relief to SVMs. As proposed, the Interim Tier 4 provision leaves
SVMs empty-handed because the benefits of Interim Tier 4 are restricted to OEMs who can
otherwise meet the 40% and 80% phase-in percentages with their full Tier 4 test groups (and thus
use the Interim Tier 4 category for the remaining 60% and 20% of their fleets during the phase
in}. Given that SVMs - particularly those with only one or two test groups — cannot meet the
phase-in percentages with full Tier 4 cars, EPA's proposal unfairly denies SVMs the ability to
make use of the benefits of the Interim Tier 4 category. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-
8]
In sum, as regards criteria emissions, EPA should:
follow CARB's ACCII rules and continue the availability of Bin 125 to SVMs through
MY 2034 and not require NMOG+NOx limits for cold testing.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0566, pp. 7-8]
2 EPA must justify imposing on SVMs the proposed new cold NMOG+NOx standard. Until EPA can
establish that the environmental benefits outweigh the burdens on SVMs, SVMs should be exempted.
• with regard to NMOG+NOx FTP and US06 standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0566, pp. 7-8]
In order to properly account for the problems facing SVMs with regard to
"fleet averaging,, and the risks of credit purchasing, as explained above, set the degree and
frequency of SVM step-downs to reflect SVM realities — limited product lines, longer product
development and life cycles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
• MY 2027 — Maintain for all SVMs the already-in effect {86-1811-17{h} MY
27 Tier 3 SVM NMOG+NOx standard {51m g/mi} [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
• MY 2028 — Maintain for all SVMs the already-in effect MY 28 Tier 3 SVM
NMOG+NOx standard (30 g/mi) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
MY 2029-32 - continue the 30 mg/mi standard for SVMs given that the
environmental benefits of a more stringent standard have not been established and are vastly
outweighed by the potential burden on SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
• Make the Interim Tier 4 category more flexible and available [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0566, pp.7-8]
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Add a new paragraph (e} to proposed 40 CFR 86.1811-27 to read as follows:
(e) If meeting the standards set forth in this section 40 CFR 86.1811-27 would
cause severe economic hardship, small-volume manufacturers may ask us to approve an
extended compliance deadline under the provisions of 40 CFR 1068.250, except that the
solvency criterion does not apply and there is no maximum duration of the hardship relief [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
This provision would mirror the SVM relief made available under Tier 3 in 40 CFR 86.1811-
17. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
The above steps are necessary to comply with the Clean Air Act's section 202{a} mandate
that EPA provide sufficient lead-time "to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such [lead-time]."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
2. GHG
EPA's SVM GHG policy needs to be fair and equitable.
The current system of setting company-by-company SVM alternative standards should be
eliminated as unwieldly — too time-consuming and burdensome for all parties - and be replaced.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 8-9]
We therefore propose that there be a separate GHG standard for all SVMs - separate from the
large volume standard — which still requires significant GHG improvement, yet reflects the
challenges faced by SVMs discussed above. Requiring SVMs to switch to large volume
standards over a short period of time would impose a dramatic decrease in the GHG standard
(from MY 24 to 25). Simply put, the standard would drop precipitously, akin to falling off a cliff.
This is both unfair and unachievable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 8-9]
SVMs cannot rely on fleet averaging or GHG credits as a compliance strategy
As discussed above, SVMs cannot use averaging as a successful compliance strategy. In
addition, forcing SVMs to use credits as a primary if not exclusive compliance strategy is both
unfair and improper, and this is especially so as regards GHG since SVMs expect the open
market availability of GHG credits to decline starting in 2026MY when the phase-in of changes
to MPGe begins to affect the ability of manufacturers of PHEVs and BEVs to generate GHG
credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 8-9]
In sum, as regards GHG, EPA should:
For MY 22, 23, 24 and 25 — for SVMs that have been granted alternative bespoke standards
in the 2020 notice Federal Register :: Determinations of Light-Duty Vehicle Alternative
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Small Volume Manufacturers, continue for MY 22, 23,
24 and 25 the alternative standard for MY 21 set in the FR notice [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0566, pp. 8-9]
For MY 2026 and later, eliminate company-by-company alternative SVM GHG standards,
Instead, in order to properly account for the problems facing SVMs with regard to "fleet
averaging" and the risks of credit purchasing (as discussed above), create a new regulatory
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provision applicable to all SVMs (using the definition of SVM in 40 CFR 86.1838-01) setting
forth SVM standards and an SVM trajectory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 9-10]
Reasonably achievable SVM C02 levels and a feasible trajectory are needed to account for
challenges and limitations specific to SVMs. EPA's NPRM proposal would require SVMs to
have more than a 50% BEVs in their fleet in MY2026 - a level far higher than that expected from
Large Volume Manufacturers under the Primary Standard phase-in starting in MY 2027. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 9-10]
There is a need for an SVM-specific phase-in requiring a substantial GHG reduction by MY
2032, but starting with a period of stability in order to account for SVMs' limited product lines
and limited availability/access to necessary technologies. Therefore, EPA should: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 9-10]
Bring SVMs towards the Primary Standard via an SVM phased-in target reduction requiring a
50% GHG reduction in MY 2032 compared to MY 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp.
9-10]
• Establish a trajectory from MY 2026 to MY 2032 that has either a linear reduction or
one or more reasonable step changes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 9-10]
Defer consideration of incorporating SVMs into the Primary Standard until a
subsequent separate rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 9-10]
[See original attachment for 2022+ GHG Proposed Targets] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0566, pp. 9-10]
Add a new paragraph to 40 CFR 86.1818-12 to read as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0566, p.10]
(e) If meeting the standards set forth in this section 40 CFR 86.1818-12 would cause severe
economic hardship, small-volume manufacturers may ask us to approve an extended compliance
deadline under the provisions of 40 CFR 1068.250, except that the solvency criterion does not
apply and there is no maximum duration of the hardship relief. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0566, p. 10]
4. PARTICULATE MATTER
EPA's proposed PM reduction to O.Smg/mi across the FTP and US06 and Cold
Testing goes far beyond what SVMs are able to achieve in a short period of time [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 11-12]
EPA's proposed PM reduction to O.Smg/mi across the FTP and US06 and Cold Testing is an
enormous increase in stringency over a short period of time. This is a regulatory combination
that SVMs simply cannot meet. We recognize that the regulation of PM is headed towards
necessitating the use of Gasoline Particulate Filters (GPF), but further research and development
is needed with respect to GPF aging and monitoring for purposes of California OBD. This issue
is not yet fully understood and requires more lead-time under the CAA section 202(a). [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 11-12]
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In addition, there are also technical issues and costs associated with measuring PM emissions
below 1 mg/mile, and specialized, expensive test facilities may be needed to reliably measure
PM at such a low level. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 11-12]
It is thus unreasonable to impose the proposed PM standards and timetable on SVMs,
especially considering the minimal environmental benefit obtained together with how drastic the
proposed change is compared to existing Tier 3 levels and the CARB ACCII PM standards, as
shown in the graph below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 11-12]
[See original attachment for bar graph of Tailpipe PM Limit [mg/mi]] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0566, pp.11-12]
In sum, as regards SVMs and PM, EPA should harmonize with the CARB ACC/1 SVM PM
approach as follows:
FTP
- For MY 2027-2028 - 3 mg/mile.
- For MY 2029 and later - 1 mg/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 11-12]
SFTP
- For MY 2027 - 2029 - 6 mg /mi
- For MY 2030 and later - 3 mg/mi [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 11-12]
No Cold Testing for SVMs given that it is not yet fully understood what is needed to
meet the 0.5mg standard at 20F with high-performance engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0566, pp. 11-12]
We further note the above levels and timetable are consistent with the EU regulation of PM.
GPFs will be necessary on all European engines in 2030 with the implementation of EU7's
mandating PM measurement for both Port Fuel Injection Engines and Gasoline Direct Injection
Engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 11-12]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Inclusion of Small Volume Manufacturers
U.S. EPA is proposing to include small volume manufacturers in its GHG program by MY
2032. CARB supports this proposal and finds that the lead time is appropriate. Under ACC II,
CARB requires that small volume manufacturers comply with the annual ZEV sales requirement
beginning with the 2035 MY and submit a compliance plan to CARB's Executive Officer by
2032. The investments these small volume manufacturers make to comply with California's
policies will facilitate their compliance with U.S. EPA's proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, p. 26]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
XIV. EPA Should Finalize Its Proposed Changes for Small Volume Manufacturers.
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We support EPA's proposal to transition small volume manufacturers ("SVMs") into the
primary program standards by MY 2032.236 As illustrated in Table 37, the emissions standards
presently applicable to SVMs are significantly less protective than those that apply to other
manufacturers.237 For MY 2021, SVM standards ranged from 308-376 g/mile.238 By
comparison, the revised footprint curve in SAFE 2 for passenger cars for MY 2021 was 161.8 to
220.9 g/mile.239 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 98]
236 88 Fed. Reg. at 29197, 29255.
237 Id. at 29256.
238 Id.
239 84 Fed. Reg. 24174, 25268 (Apr. 30, 2020).
As EPA explains, there has been a significant shift in the vehicle market since EPA
established the SVM alternative standards.240 For example, "[vjehicle electrification
technologies are currently being implemented across many vehicle types including both luxury
and high-performance vehicles by larger manufacturers and EPA expects this trend to
continue."241 In addition, as EPA notes, the credit trading market has become more robust since
the SVM alternative standards were initially developed, expanding compliance options for
SVMs. EPA concluded that "meeting the C02 standards is becoming less a feasibility issue and
more a lead time issue for SVMs."242 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 98-99]
240 88 Fed. Reg. at 29256.
241 Id.
242 Id.
EPA's conclusions that a transition of SVMs to the primary program coheres with the recent
announcements and developments in the business model of the SVMs who have previously
pursued less stringent standards. There are only four SVMs currently subject to less stringent
standards: Ferrari, Aston Martin, Lotus, and McLaren. All are moving toward greater
hybridization and electrification, which will facilitate compliance with the primary LDV GHG
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 99]
Ferrari in 2022 announced plans to rapidly electrify its vehicle offerings, achieving 40% BEV
sales by 2030 and 80% electrified (PHEV + BEV) vehicles.243 Ferrari already sells two PHEVs,
the SF90 Stradale244 and the 296 GTB.245 Likewise, Aston Martin has committed to
electrification. It will offer its first BEV in 2025 and has committed to having every model
available with an electrified powertrain by 2026.246 It will begin delivering its first PHEV, the
Valhalla, in 2024.247 Lotus is offering the all-electric Evija248 and Eletre SUV.249 The Eletre
will be available in the United States beginning in 2024.250 And McLaren has recently
developed its first hybrid vehicle, the Artura, and indicated that all its vehicles will eventually be
gas-electric hybrids or electric-only.251 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 99]
243 Michael Taylor, Ferrari to Go Electric in 2025, with 40% EV Sales by 2030, Forbes (June 16, 2022),
https://www.forbes.eom/sites/michaeltaylor/2022/06/16/ferrari-to-go-electric-in-2025-with-40-ev-sales-by-
2030/?sh=7fd8646d66a2.
244 SF90 Stradale, Ferrari, https://www.ferrari.com/en-EN/auto/sf90-stradale (last visited June 29, 2023).
245 296 GTB, Ferrari, https://www.ferrari.com/en-US/auto/296-gtb (last visited June 29, 2023).
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246 Eric Stafford, Aston Martin Is Going Electric, Launching Its First EV in 2025, Car and Driver (Apr.
22, 2022), https ://www.caranddriver.com/news/a3 9798418/aston-martin-electric-lineup-reveal-first-ev-
2025/.
247 Id.; see also Aston Martin Valhalla, Aston Martin, https://www.astonmartin.com/en-us/models/special-
projects/valhalla (last visited June 29, 2023).
248 Evija, Lotus, https://www.lotuscars.com/en-US/evija (June 29, 2023).
249 Eletre, Lotus, https://www.lotuscars.com/en-US/eletre (last visited June 29, 2023).
250 Mike Duff, Lotus Moves to Float Its EV Division, Autoweek (Feb. 8, 2023),
https://www.autoweek.com/news/green-cars/a42801104/lotus-moves-to-float-its-ev-division/.
251 Josh Max, McLaren Rolls Out the Hybrid 2023 Artura Supercar, Forbes (Jan. 5, 2023),
https://www.forbes.eom/sites/joshmax/2023/01/05/mclaren-throws-its-hat-into-the-electrichybrid-ring-
with-the-2023-artura/?sh=42c0eb057746.
Based on the SVMs' active transition into hybrid and battery electric vehicles—with its
attendant improvements in GHG emissions—the existence of a robust credit trading market, and
the significant lead time proposed by EPA for transitioning the SVMs into the broader program,
We support EPA's proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 99]
Organization: Ferrari N. V. and Ferrari North America, Inc.
Innovation runs within Ferrari, so the challenge of building a Ferrari for a low-emissions
future is one that we are already embracing despite our negligible contribution to the total air
pollutant emissions due to the low volumes and typical low average annual mileage. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 2-3]
FERRARI CONTRIBUTION
Ferrari fully supports and welcomes the climate protection initiatives of the United States
(US) Government, provided that all stakeholders contribute their share, and that the
achievements obtained so far are taken into account. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 2-3]
Saying that all stakeholders should contribute their part means that the negligible contribution
to air pollutant emissions of vehicles registered in US and produced by SVMs should be taken
into account in the Impact Analysis evaluations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 2-3]
The even more negligible contribution to the total emissions of high performance vehicles
registered in US and produced by low volume manufacturers due to the typical low mileage of
2,543 miles per year2 should also be considered. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 2-3]
2 Proposed Decision on "Exemption from Average Fuel Economy Standards", National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration
The integration of hybrid and electric technologies more broadly into our car portfolio over
time may present challenges and costs. We expect to increase R&D spending in the medium term
particularly on hybrid and electric technologies related projects. In addition, this transformation
of our car technology creates risks and uncertainties such as the impact on driver experience, and
the impact on the cars' residual value over time, both of which may be met with an unfavorable
market reaction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, p. 3]
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In the long term, although we believe that combustion engines will continue to be
fundamental to the Ferrari driver experience, hybrid and pure electric cars may become a much
more essential technology for performance sports cars thereby displacing combustion engine
models. Having said that, we trust that the effort required by EPA must be commensurate with
the share of emissions for which each stakeholder is responsible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0572, p. 3]
SVM's PECULIARITIES
The strong reduction in greenhouse gas and air pollutant emissions over the past decade -
driven mainly by engine and after treatment efficiency improvements - was achieved despite our
peculiarities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 3-4]
Customer acceptance [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 3-4]
Our brand symbolizes exclusivity, innovation, state-of-the-art sporting performance and
Italian design, craftsmanship and engineering heritage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 3-
4]
The heart of a Ferrari is its engine. Proof of this, for the fourth year running, Ferrari's
turbocharged V8 engine has been named Engine of the Year 2019 at the prestigious International
Engine of the Year Awards, a feat never achieved by any other engine in the history of the
awards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 3-4]
Ferrari cars should make a customer's dream become true. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572,
pp. 3-4]
Ferrari cars are developed for the joy of driving to deliver an exhilarating experience behind
the wheel, they are not simple passenger cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 3-4]
Therefore, considering that SVM have to face more severe technology requirements in order
to maintain their unique selling points like sounds and performance, Ferrari trusts this to be taken
into proper consideration by providing more time to such manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0572, pp.3-4]
Unique solutions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, p. 4]
Several emission control technologies may not be simply implemented on a high performance
vehicle without losing the performance level and the real nature of the product. More time is
needed to develop and adapt emission control technologies to the sports cars, finding the way to
guarantee peculiarities. Moreover, for an OEM, the development of an ad-hoc technological
solution is linked to the technological capacity of a company and therefore to its global size:
considering Small Volume Manufacturer's production capacity and their Companies size, more
time should be guaranteed due to the resulting limited technological potential. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0572, p. 4]
No benefit related to mass production standard technologies [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0572, p. 4]
SVM suppliers have to adapt their products to unique applications without the mass
production standard technologies benefits, since the SVM production volume request is very
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low. Therefore, extra time is needed also for the supply chain adjustment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0572, p. 4]
Keep achieving outstanding results on technological innovation with limited human and
financial resources [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, p. 4]
As a luxury performance car manufacturer and low volume producer, despite the high
margins of our cars, we compete with larger automobile manufacturers many of which have
greater financial resources. Nevertheless, we have been able to achieve outstanding results on
technological innovation with limited human and financial resources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0572, p. 4]
SVM Criteria Pollutant Standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, p. 5]
As described above, EPA has historically recognized the peculiarities and challenges that
manufacturers responsible of high-performance vehicles face. This is also the case for criteria
pollutant standards, especially considering that EPA, differently from the current Tier 3
approach, has not proposed any special provisions for SVMs. In this regard, we suggest
including a specific impact assessment on the elimination of Tier 4 derogations for SVMs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, p. 5]
Ferrari also suggests EPA to reconsider the possibility of maintaining provisions like those
already granted in current US Regulation. Similarly, the CARB ACC II LEV IV Regulation,
recognizing the challenges and negligible impact of SVMs4, allows them to benefit from special
provisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, p. 5]
4 CARB ACC II Regulations Initial Statement of Reasons (April 12, 2022), chapter III, section C,
paragraph 7
a) NMOG+NOx Standards
EPA is proposing to remove any NMOG+NOx fleet-average flexibility for SVMs, requiring
an alignment to Large Volume Manufacturers (LVMs) targets starting with MY 2027,
unreasonably changing the current Tier 3 regulation that allows SVMs to comply with 51 mg/mi
standard until MY 2027, and therefore cutting their target by more than half (i.e. 22 mg/mi
compared to 51 mg/mi). For later years, EPA is requiring SVMs to comply with an overall 76%
standard reduction in just 5 model years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 5-6]
Ferrari strongly believes this approach is unfair, especially in light of the unexpected change
of the Tier 3 regulation and the huge implied percentage of BEVs that manufacturers responsible
of high performance vehicles shall include in their fleet. While most LVMs can benefit from a
wide range of models to compensate for the few vehicles that pollute the most, independent
SVMs like Ferrari have to deal with a huge and unfeasible BEV penetration in their car
portfolios since the beginning of the legislation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 5-6]
Ferrari acknowledges EPA's intention of aligning SVM targets to those of LVMs. However,
this sharp reduction in NMOG+NOx standards is not feasible in such a short amount of time. In
support of this, California recognized the impracticability of these manufactured, allowing
them to comply with a fleet-average standard of 51 mg/mi for the entire regulatory period. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 5-6]
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4 CARB ACCII Regulations Initial Statement of Reasons (April 12, 2022), chapter III, section C,
paragraph 7
Ferrari's commitment to reducing NMOG+NOx emissions is reflected on several of our
models (Ferrari Portofino M, Ferrari Roma, 296 GTB, Ferrari Purosangue) which are currently
certified as BIN 50. An even more remarkable result has been achieved with our Ferrari
Purosangue, the first and only V12 model certified as BIN 50 in the United States. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 5-6]
However, the current state of art does not allow high-performance vehicles with modern
passive heating systems to achieve a certification level below BIN 50, and therefore large
investments and time-consuming activities on active heating devices (e.g. burner, electric heating
catalyst) are required. In addition, the very limited demand of those devices due to mass market
focus on electrification will inevitably lead to ad hoc development with related huge costs and
times. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 5-6]
SVM Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 7-8]
Historically, EPA has recognized the unique design considerations and compliance challenges
faced by SVMs, allowing them to benefit from alternative GHG standards. EPA is now
proposing to keep providing SVMs special provisions, resulting in an extension of the already
approved MY 2021 alternative C02 target through MY 2024 included. And then, starting with
MY 2025, EPA is requesting SVMs to align with Large Volume Manufacturer (LVM) C02
targets with a very limited phase-in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 7-8]
Ferrari welcomes EPA's proposal of keep providing flexibilities for SVMs. However, we
strongly believe that these provisions are minor as they require SVMs to comply with a very
sharp GHG standard reduction well before the commencement of the regulation (i.e. MY 2025
rather than MY 2027). Moreover, by establishing an alignment with LVM standards, EPA is
currently requesting SVMs an improvement that is far greater than that required to LVMs (see
Figure 1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 7-8]
EPA also recognized that it is impossible for SVMs to comply with the proposed C02
standards and expects them to seek credit purchases as a compliance strategy. This demonstrates
that the proposed alternative targets do not meet the requirements of CAA §202 (a) which states
that standards "take effect after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the
development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the
cost of compliance within such a period". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 7-8]
Ferrari completely agree with EPA's statement on the unfeasibility of the proposed C02
standards for small volume manufacturers. Moreover, we believe it is unfair to set a standard so
stringent as to effectively require SVMs to entire rely on another manufacturer to guarantee
compliance. For these reasons, Ferrari strongly believes that the same GHG improvements
requested to LVMs should also be applied to SVMs (see Figure 2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0572, pp. 7-8]
Therefore, the alternative standards approved for model year 2021 should continue to apply
through model year 2026 included. Starting with new regulation in model year 2027, small
volume manufacturers should comply with GHG standards according to a reduction percentage
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of no more than 50% in MY 2032 compared to MY 2026, consistent with the improvement
requested to LVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 7-8]
Ferrari's commitment to reducing GHG emissions is reflected in several business decisions,
such as large investments in advanced assets and industrial buildings with the aim of extending
our concept of global GHG emission reduction. To deliver our commitment to electrification, in
2022, we started the construction of the 40 thousand square meter e-building, where we will
handcraft the unique Ferrari electric engines, inverters, battery modules, magnets and assembly
lines that you will only find in a Ferrari. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 7-8]
This plant development will assure us a technical capacity in excess of our needs for the years
to come, while maintaining the uniqueness of our model and remaining true to the Ferrari DNA
which has characterized our history. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 7-8]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR FIGURE 1: Cumulative GHG standard stringency
increase relative to MY 2021, comparing the proposed SVM standards to the current and
proposed primary standard and considering a constant footprint value. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0572, pp.7-8]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR FIGURE 2: Proposed cumulative GHG standard
stringency increase relative to MY 2026, considering a constant footprint value. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0572, pp.7-8]
Organization: Mclaren Automotive, McLaren Group
Background
Given that we are significantly below the 5,000 USA sales per year, we fall within the Small-
volume manufacturer (SVM) definition. As a SVM we have limited product portfolios, limited
number of drivetrains, limited financial and human resources, and longer product development
times and vehicle life cycles. Unlike other parts of the market, given our limited product
portfolio we do not have the ability to make significant redesigns each year and as such we are
unable to take advantage of fleet emission averaging programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0748, pp. 1-2]
We produce lightweight high-performance supercars, which drive far fewer miles than the
average car. As such, emissions from our vehicles are negligible. Despite generally having
higher emission rates (grams per mile), SVM average total mileage accumulation is extremely
low - approximately 2,543 milesl. We believe that EPA should consider the de minimis use of
our vehicles and those of SVMs when considering final standards under this rulemaking. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, pp. 1-2]
1 U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Exemptions From
Average Fuel Economy Standards; Passenger Automobile Average Fuel Economy Standards (Proposed
rule; proposed decision to grant exemption), 87 Fed. Reg. 39439, 39449 (Jul. 1, 2022).
EPA'S NPRM need to provide SVMs with sufficient and reasonable lead time together with
adequate flexibilities [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, pp. 1-2]
Historically, EPA has recognized the unique design considerations and compliance challenges
faced by SVMs. We have been provided with additional flexibilities such as alternative, less
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stringent standards, and alternative phasedowns with periods of stability to address the
challenges we face. Unlike in past rulemakings, we do not believe that the EPA's multi-pollutant
NPRM adequately addresses SVM concerns and challenges. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748,
p. 2]
The need for additional flexibilities and lead-times remains exceptionally high for SVMs and
McLaren for the following reasons: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, p. 2]
Electrification remains extremely challenging given limited resources available and the
lack of technological developments in battery technology to produce the lightweight high-density
batteries required to electrify a high-performance supercar. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, p.
2]
Battery technology has not developed enough for application within high-performance
lightweight supercars. Technology is developing and we have plans to electrify further, however
time is needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, p. 2]
Limited product portfolio and longer product life cycles mean that making regular
improvements to products is exceptionally challenge for SVMs like McLaren. When
electrification is available, there is limited ability to rapidly roll out technology across the whole
product portfolio - time will be needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, p. 2]
While technology is developing and there are plans for electrification in the future, it still
remains that time is needed for technology to catch up to the needs of a lightweight high-
performance super car. Furthermore, with low production volumes our ability to amortize
expensive product development costs is also limited, our R&D paybacks are far longer. At
McLaren, our journey to electrification will be challenging given the pressures we see in the
market, the demand for battery components and key materials, furthermore, we are without a
larger OEM partner to share the development burden or to take external technology. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0748, p. 2]
These challenges and the need for additional flexibilities remain important for MY 2027 and
later. Demand for our products remains high, as does the performance. Electrifying lightweight
high performance supers is exceptionally challenging. While there has been greater
electrification of mass market vehicles, as outlined above, it is important to note that battery
technology has not developed enough for application within high-performance supercars.
Technology is developing and we have plans to electrify further; however, time is needed.
McLaren are targeting launching a full BEV towards the end of the decade, we see some
developments in battery technology and other core components which may make a BEV
lightweight supercar possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, pp. 2-3]
This is further evident when looking at the market for BEV supercars and the current and
potential market offerings which are around the $lm plus price bracket. Lightweight BEV
supercars must compete with ICE/PHEVs for all performance attributes. Below the $lm+ low
volume segment, there are currently no lightweight high-performance BEV Supercars in the
'series production' category, which for brands such as McLaren, are products that contribute the
majority of our annual production volume. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, pp. 2-3]
Given the challenges we have highlighted in moving towards greater electrification for SVMs
like McLaren, EPA is effectively relying on credit trading flexibility as the means by which
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SVMs will maintain compliance with GHG standards. We believe this is inappropriate for
several reasons and demonstrates that the proposed alternative standards do not meet the
requirements of CAA§ 202(a) that standards "take effect after such period as the Administrator
finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving
appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such a period". First, we believe it is
inappropriate to set a standard so stringent as to effectively require a manufacturer to entirely
rely on another manufacturer to maintain compliance. Additionally, there is an inherent risk that
even if a credit-generating manufacturer is willing to sell credits, the credits may be purchased
by other parties before SVMs can access them. Having to purchase credits to comply with the
proposed GHG standard would also divert resources away from electrification challenges. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, p. 3]
As stated, allowing for certainty and time to adjust to changes remains important for SVM
like McLaren. An SVM standard also must take into account that engines and vehicles already
developed will have to company with a standard in MY2024 which is currently unknown.
Allowing for early years less stringent targets is essential given that design decisions which have
already been made. It is also important for GHG policy to be fair and equitable. The EPA SVM
proposal would require over 50% BEV mix in MY2026, based on McLaren analysis, far higher
than Primary Standards requirements and effectively impossible given the lack of technology
available to electrify high performance supercars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, p. 3]
Key areas of concern for McLaren
In order to address the concerns that we have highlighted in this submission we propose the
following recommendations to the EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, pp. 3-4]
SVM Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards
We support the EPA's proposal to sunset the individual application process for alternative
SVM standards. However, given the challenges we have outlined above around technology
developments and the need for extra lead time, we propose that the EPA maintain the approved
MY2021 individual standards through to the end of MY2025. The EPA proposes to change
requirements for SVMs before MY 2027 with little or no explanation of how circumstances have
changed significantly since those regulations were agreed or how SVMs will meet the revised
requirements with virtually no lead-time. Furthermore, the EPA's proposal envisions a massive
increase in stringency in MY 2025 (53% average stringency increase) again, with no lead-time.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, pp. 3-4]
Allowing certainty to the continued individual standards through to MY2025, will allow for
greater time for developing and implementing electrification compatible technologies and help
address lead time concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, pp. 3-4]
We propose the following:
For MY 22, 23, 24 and 25: For SVMs that have been granted alternative bespoke
standards in the 2020 notice Federal Register: Determinations of Light-Duty Vehicle Alternative
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Small Volume Manufacturers, continue for MY 22, 23,
24 and 25 the alternative standard for MY 21 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, pp. 3-4]
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For MY 2026 and later, eliminate company-by-company alternative SVM GHG
standards and create a new regulatory provision applicable to all SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0748, pp.3-4]
Bring SVMs towards the Primary Standard via an SVM phased-in target reduction
requiring a 50% GHG reduction in MY 2032 compared to SVM MY 2025 emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0748, pp. 3-4]
Establish a trajectory from MY 2026 to MY 2032 that has either a linear reduction or
one or more reasonable step changes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, pp. 3-4]
Defer consideration of incorporating SVMs into the Primary Standard until a
subsequent separate rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, pp. 3-4]
This proposal will provide the additional time SVMs like McLaren [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0748, pp. 3-4]
SVM Criteria Pollutant Standards
As outlined above, as a SVM we face unique challenges in meeting very stringent GHG
standards, particularly those that rely on electrification. This is also the case for criteria pollutant
standards which we are impacted by further, given the reduction in flexibilities proposed by the
EPA. The EPA proposes to abandon the MY 27 and 28 SVM NMOG+NOx standards set out in
Tier 3 (and on which we have been planning towards), and propose instead to increase stringency
and require SVMs to adhere to the primary Tier 4 NMOG+NOx standard. Under the EPA's
proposal, we would need to meet the same criteria pollutant and particulate matter emission
standards on the same schedule as large manufacturers, despite our much less frequent new
model platform introductions and lower fleet diversity, resulting in our corresponding limited
ability to utilise average provisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, p. 4]
Historically, EPA have provided additional flexibilities and provision to SVMs, recognising
the challenges we face. Furthermore, these flexibilities have been recognised and provided for in
CARB's ACC II LEV IV regulation. With limited engine families, SVMs like McLaren are
unable to utilise flexibilities with averaging, unlike mass market OEMs with many product lines.
In order to properly account for the unique challenges faced by SVMs with regard to fleet
averaging - based standards, it is important to set the degree and frequency of SVM step-downs
to reflect SVM realities — limited product lines, with longer product development and life cycles.
We would propose the following alternative to the EPA's proposal: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0748, p. 4]
MY 2027 — Maintain for all SVMs the already-in effect MY 27 Tier 3 SVM
NMOG+NOx standard (51m g/mi) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, p. 4]
MY 2028 — Maintain for all SVMs the already-in effect MY 28 Tier 3 SVM
NMOG+NOx standard (30 g/mi) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, p. 4]
MY 2029-32 - continue the 30 mg/mi standard for SVMs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0748, p. 4]
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Organization: Specialty Equipment Market Association (SEMA)
Effects on Low-Volume Manufacturers and Major Manufacturers
The current proposal, if finalized, would end the exemption for low-volume manufacturers.
The EPA's prior criteria pollutant and GHG rulemakings recognized that special flexibility rules
for small automakers were necessary and appropriate. These smaller OEMs typically
manufacture and sell about 4,000 cars each year, which represents 0.02% of the total 14 million
US passenger car sales in 2022.15 Most of these specialty vehicles are not "daily drivers" but are
for "occasional use." As a result, the average annual miles driven by these vehicles is drastically
less than that of a typical passenger vehicle. SEMA believes that small-volume manufactured
vehicles have minimal impact on the environment, and their existing exemption should remain in
place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 6]
15 The Detroit News: Cox Automotive increases its 2023 new-vehicle sales forecast (Link:
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/2023/06/27/cox-automotive-boosts-new-vehicle-sales-
forecast-2023/70359959007/).
EPA Summary and Response
Summary
General comments:
SVMs commented that most of their vehicles are for "occasional use," with average annual
miles driven far less than that of a typical passenger vehicle, and typical lifetime mileage of
about 60,000 miles. The SVMs also commented that their low U.S. and global volumes result in
lower access to suppliers and delayed access to supplier-provided technologies. They further
assert that they have limited, narrowly focused product lines that do not have significant
redesigns every year, and that receive little flexibility from fleet emission averaging programs.
SVMs also commented that EPA should establish provisions for hardship relief, which would
allow the Agency to approve requests for extended compliance deadlines based on a situation of
severe economic hardship, but with no requirement to demonstrate all of the elements of severe
economic hardship and no maximum duration of the hardship relief.
Air conditioning (AC) GHG comments:
SVMs commented that the elimination of AC leakage credits along with what they believe are
changes in the AC efficiency test procedures make the compliance situation worse for them.
They specifically are concerned with the number of suitable test samples needed to perform the
AC efficiency tests.
GHG comments:
SVM commenters assert that EPA projects that SVM fleets on average, and individually, will
exceed the proposed standards, requiring purchased credits in order to continue selling vehicles
in the US. SVM commenters disagree that they should be required to rely on credit trading
flexibility as a key means to maintain compliance with standards. SVM commenters assert that
the proposed standards would have a large increase in stringency without proper lead time. In
order to comply with the proposed standards, they believe credits would have to be purchased,
and there is uncertainty in an SVM's ability to obtain credits. SVMs believe that a standard that
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cannot be achieved without the purchase of credits is unfair. SVMs noted that EPA's modeling
shows that the proposed standards cannot be met without purchasing credits which they feel
demonstrates that the proposed alternative targets do not meet the requirements of C AA §202
(a). SVMs support EPA's proposal to sunset the individual application process for alternative
standards and recommend that EPA maintain the approved MY 2021 individual standards
through MY 2026. SVMs also noted that EPA proposed to start their program before most of the
regulation comes into effect (MY 2025 rather than MY 2027), and to bring SVM targets into
alignment with the primary MY 2032 targets. SVMs believe that this proposal would require
SVMs to comply with a very sharp GHG emissions reduction. They believe that given the unique
challenges they face as compared to full-line manufacturers it is too soon to propose a
convergence of the alternative and primary standards. They suggested that EPA defer
consideration of placing SVMs on the primary standards to a subsequent rulemaking.
Mclaren Automotive commented that battery technology has not developed enough for
application within high-performance supercars, and that BEV supercars must compete with
ICE/PHEVs for all performance attributes.
Environmental and Public Health Organizations supports our approach for phasing in the
SVMs into the primary program. They also stated that EPA's conclusions that a transition of
SVMs to the primary program coheres with the recent announcements and developments in the
business model of the SVMs who have previously pursued less stringent standards. They noted
that there are only four SVMs currently subject to less stringent standards (Ferrari, Aston Martin,
Lotus, and McLaren) and all are moving toward greater hybridization and electrification, which
will facilitate compliance with the primary LDV GHG standards.
Criteria pollutant comments:
SVMs commented that EPA has a history of giving SVMs additional lead time to comply
with criteria pollutant standards. In the proposal they felt EPA has not given additional lead time
to SVMs and did not explain a basis, which they felt was a mistake. They comment that the
phase-in proposed for larger OEMs does not work for SVM since they have few models. They
also noted that the new NMOG+NOx standards supersede the previously established Tier 3
phase in for SVM which extended compliance through MY 2027 and MY 2028. They also stated
the proposed NMOG+NOx requirements are excessively stringent - too stringent, too soon.
Some SVMs commented that the elimination of Bin 125 would be unfair and unreasonable
because it would put them in the untenable position of having to, with limited resources,
simultaneously implement EVs while also investing in an attempt to reengineer Bin 125 vehicles
to a much more stringent standard.
SVMs commented that it is thus unreasonable to impose the proposed PM standards and
timetable on SVMs, especially considering the minimal environmental benefit obtained together
with how drastic the proposed change is compared to existing Tier 3 levels and the CARB
ACCII PM standards. SVMs further recommended that they be exempt from cold testing
requirements given that they believe it is not yet fully understood what is needed to meet the 0.5
mg/mile standard at 20F with high-performance engines.
Specialty Equipment Manufacturers stated that SVMs have an existing exemption from
criteria pollutants.
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Response:
General comments response:
In response to the SVM claims that they should be exempt from standards on the basis that
their high performance vehicles are driven less than typical vehicles, EPA disagrees that
standards should be established based on a projection of annual miles driven or lifetime mileage
accumulation. Any such data is too speculative, and anecdotal at best, to serve as a basis for
determining appropriate emissions standards, and would be unenforceable as there would be no
workable means to track vehicles subject to the SVM standards as they are driven over their
useful lives to monitor mileage.
Regarding the comment that SVMs have limited access to technology and need additional
lead time, as discussed further below, for both the GHG and criteria pollutant programs, EPA is
providing additional lead time compared to the proposal. We believe that this additional lead
time will provide the time needed to access the technologies needed to meet the standards.
SVMs requested hardship relief. EPA notes that there are existing hardship provisions for
small businesses in 40 CFR part 1068 allowing for temporary exemption from certain standards
in the case of severe economic hardship. These existing provisions attempt to balance concerns
about the need for every manufacturer to take steps to produce vehicles that meet the standards
with concerns that EPA does not wish to force small businesses into insolvency if it can be
avoided. Accordingly, under 40 CFR 1068.250 where a small business can demonstrate it has
"taken all possible business, technical, and economic steps to comply" and "[n]ot having the
exemption will jeopardize the solvency of your company" and "[n]o other allowances are
available under the regulations in this chapter to avoid the impending violation," EPA has
discretion to grant up to three one-year delays in the compliance deadline.
EPA believes it would be inappropriate to extend the existing hardship provision to SVMs for
multiple reasons. First, the SVMs are not small businesses, but established automotive
companies. Second, EPA judges that the credit market is sufficiently robust and mature that it is
highly unlikely an SVM could make a showing that "no other allowances are available" for
compliance. Third, the purpose of this provision is to provide a temporary relief valve to avoid
insolvency, but the commenters propose eliminating the requirement to show a risk of insolvency
and to make the process indefinite. This would be fundamentally inconsistent with the purpose
and function of the hardship exemption. While we disagree that hardship relief is appropriate for
SVMs, we are providing several years of additional lead time to meet the final standards, as
described further below in this section.
AC GHG comments response:
SVMs commented that it would not be fair to eliminate AC leakage credits. For the final rule,
EPA is not eliminating AC leakage credits as proposed, but instead is phasing them down over
multiple years as discussed in Section 3.1.3 of this RTC and preamble section III.C.5. SVMs
commented that the AC efficiency test procedure was problematic. EPA has not reopened the
AC efficiency test procedures in this rulemaking. Manufacturers have successfully complied
with the existing AC efficiency test procedures, and those procedures continue to apply.
GHG comments response:
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Commenters asserted that EPA's modeling shows that SVMs will not comply as a group or
individually without credit trading. EPA disagrees. We have modeled reasonable compliance
paths for the SVMs and have also modeled a "no credit trading" scenario which identifies a
reasonable compliance path for the SVMs even if no automaker is willing to sell credits, a
situation which we consider very unlikely to occur (especially in light of the surplus credits
generated by EV-only manufacturers).
In other words, EPA demonstrates that SVMs can comply with the final standards if either
appropriate GHG-reducing technologies are applied or, like other OEMs, SVMs avail themselves
of the credit trading flexibilities.
SVMs commented that their respective MY2021 alternative standards should be kept in place
through MY 2026, instead of EPA's proposal that SVMs phase into the primary program
standards starting in MY 2025. EPA acknowledges that MY 2025 has already begun, and that
MY 2026 begins as early as January 2, 2025, approximately 9 months from the date of this final
rule. In response to these comments, EPA believes it is appropriate to extend the SVM
alternative standards established in MY2021 through MY 2026, instead of through MY 2024 as
proposed. Specifically, EPA is finalizing that SVM alternative standards established for MY
2021 will apply through MY 2026 to provide the requested stability for SVMs so that SVMs
have an opportunity to reduce their GHG emissions in future years. This schedule provides a
total of an additional five years of stability for the SVMs to transition from their existing MY
2021 standards into delayed primary program standards after MY 2026. Starting in MY 2027,
SVMs will meet primary program standards albeit with additional lead-time. EPA is finalizing
that SVMs will meet the primary program standards for MY 2025 in MY 2027, providing an
additional two years of lead time, and then under a continued phase-in SVMs will be subject to
the primary program standards for MYs 2032 and later. EPA believes this phase-in structure
provides adequate lead time for the SVMs to transition into the primary program.
Commentors stated they had concerns about the availability of the credit market, but our
compliance data indicates that SVMs in fact all have purchased GHG credits in the past several
years, evidence that the credit market is available to them if needed. EPA notes that the cost of
credits is likely to be small relative to the MSRP of the supercars that these manufacturers
produce.
SVMs commented that we should establish provisions similar to the California ACC II
program. As EPA has discussed in responding to other comments, the ACC II program has a
somewhat different structure, focused primarily on a phased-in ZEV mandate, than EPA's
performance-based standards. Accordingly, EPA does not believe it is always appropriate to
compare the individual standards in each program to each other without considering the broader
context. More broadly, EPA recognizes that CARB has offered some special accommodations to
SVMs, but notes that EPA has likewise offered significant accommodations to SVMs. EPA notes
that CARB commented that they expect that ACC II will set the SVMs on the correct path to be
in compliance with EPA's standards by 2032, which is exactly as we have phased SVMs into the
EPA final standards. We did not propose tracking the ACC II provisions for SVMs because we
found it is more appropriate, for purposes of EPA's program, to bring SVMs into compliance
with the generally applicable standards, albeit with significant additional lead time, and because
we found that there is a feasible compliance path for SVMs to meet the GHG standards as
finalized. After reviewing comments (including both those of SVMs as well as those of CARB
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and other commenters) we find our proposed conclusions, that the standards are feasible and
appropriate for SVMs, are still warranted and we decline to adopt ACC II standards for SVMs. .
In response to McLaren Automotives comment on supercars and BEV technology, EPA notes
that the final rule provides the SVMs a delayed phase-in that should allow the time needed for
SVMs to develop appropriate pollution control technologies suited for their products, or if they
choose to rely on credits trading, to purchase such credits.
Criteria pollutant comments response:
In response to SVM concerns about the need for additional lead time in meeting the criteria
pollutant emissions standards, in the final rule EPA has provided additional lead time. Upon
consideration of the comments, EPA recognizes that the proposed phase-in would be challenging
for the SVMs. Thus, EPA is delaying the phase-in period for SVMs to comply with the Tier 4
criteria pollutant program until the last year of the overall program's phase-in period, MY 2032.
This extended phase-in should alleviate the concerns that the standards stringency increases too
quickly. EPA is also re-establishing the phase-in that existed under the Tier 3 program for MYs
2027 and 2028. In response to commenters concerns about the availability of the credit market,
our compliance records show that at least one SVM has participated in the criteria pollutant
credit market, and all SVMs have participated in the GHG credit market (see response above in
this section).
Regarding the SVM concerns that Bin 125 should be available indefinitely, as discussed in
Section III.D.10 of the preamble, EPA believes it is not appropriate to keep Bin 125 indefinitely,
given this emissions level is considerably higher than the final fleet average standard of 15
mg/mi, and that producing vehicles far below 125 g/mi is feasible in the timeframe of this rule.
However, EPA is providing SVMs with additional time to phase-down to lower emissions bin
certification levels in that we are allowing SVMs the option to certify at Bin 125 through the end
of the phase-in period, MY 2032.
Specialty Equipment Market Association states that SVMs have been exempted previously
from criteria pollutant and GHG standards, which is an incorrect statement. EPA's rules have not
in the past exempted SVMs; for GHGs, in past rules we have provided a process for SVMs to
seek alternative emissions standards, and in this final rule we are providing an extended time
period for SVMs to continue being subject to higher (less stringent) emissions standards than in
the primary program for larger volume manufacturers, with a final phase-in to the primary
program by MY 2032. For criteria pollutants, EPA is providing an extended phase-in for SVMs,
similar to past programs.
SVM's commented that EPA must justify imposing on SVMs the proposed new cold
NMOG+NOx standard. EPA disagrees that it must specifically evaluate with respect to SVMs
the costs of compliance relative to the air quality benefits, or that it must conduct a benefit-cost
analysis specific to SVMs. The standards that EPA is adopting in this rule are fully justified
under the Clean Air Act as explained in preamble Sections III-V. The text and structure of Act
sets forth EPA's authority to set forth emissions standards for classes of motor vehicles and
generally require all "manufacturers" to comply, see, e.g., CAA section 202(a)(l)-(3), 206(a),
with specific exceptions not applicable here, see, e.g., CAA section 202(b)(1), 206(a)(5).
Consistent with the statute, EPA generally requires all manufacturers to meet the standards that
EPA has found to be feasible and appropriate under the CAA. This approach achieves the
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pollution control and public health goals of the CAA and the particular standards at issue, and it
ensures a level playing field for all manufacturers. Nothing in applicable standard-setting
provisions imposes special analytical requirements on EPA with regard to SVMs or indicates
that EPA is legally required to exempt SVMs from generally applicable emissions regulations.362
In some cases, EPA has derogated from the general policy of uniform standards when other
policy concerns provide a sufficient reason to do so. For example, small businesses have been
granted certain exemptions, consistent with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
Act. Similarly, EPA has provided certain accommodations to small volume manufacturers in the
past in recognition that the small volume manufacturers do have some features that distinguish
them from larger OEMs. However, EPA has never indicated that prior accommodations would
persist permanently; rather we evaluate the additional flexibility granted to SVMs based on the
record before us. In our judgment, the market for pollution control technologies and the market
for tradeable credits have both developed significantly since EPA originally provided some
additional leeway to SVMs. Although the Act does not require EPA to conduct analysis specific
to SVMs, EPA has done so. We assessed the feasibility of SVMs to comply with these standards
and have found that the SVMs can attain standards could be attained at a reasonable cost in the
lead time allowed. Even in the absence of modeling, EPA would be justified in expecting that
large, sophisticated automotive manufacturing firms such as these, selling luxury cars and other
vehicles at the high end of the automotive market, could identify a path to compliance, whether
by installing additional pollution control technologies or the purchase of credits. EPA has judged
that the standards being adopted today are justified under the CAA and that over the course of
these model years SVMs will no longer warrant special treatment under those standards, and
those conclusions together justify the application of these standards to SVMs.
3.1.8 - MDV incentive multipliers
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Alliance)
V. Medium-Duty Vehicle (MDV) Requirements
A. MDV Incentive Multipliers
EPA requests comment on two suggested changes to MDV Incentive Multipliers for BEVs,
PHEVs and FCEVs as part of this proposal296; neither of these two changes are appropriate and
neither should be adopted. First, EPA proposes to eliminate the multiplier one year earlier than
currently allotted in the regulations. Second, EPA proposes potentially also phasing out the
multiplier incentive over multiple model years by revising the multipliers to reduce their
magnitude for model years prior to MY2027, for example for MYs 2025-2026. EPA points to
"rapid increase in vehicle electrification in the MDV market" as a justification for its proposal.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 190-191]
296 NPRM at 29244.
362 See also International Harvester Co., 478 F.2d at 640 ("The driving preferences of hot rodders are not to
outweigh the goal of a clean environment.").
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The current advanced technology multipliers in existing Heavy-Duty GHG Phase 2 for MYs
2021 through 2027 [297] are reproduced below:
297 Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty engines and
Vehicles -Phase 2, 81 Fed. Reg. 73478 (October 25, 2016) (Phase 2 rule).
Figure 68: Advanced Technology Multipliers in Existing Heavy-Duty GHG Phase 2
Technology: Multiplier
Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles: 3.5
All-electric vehicles: 4.5
Fuel cell-electric vehicles: 5.5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 190-191]
Due to multiple unknowns in the market uptake for battery electric MDVs, it would be
inappropriate to reduce the magnitude of the multipliers prior to MY2027 or end the use of these
multipliers one year early. Sales volumes of electric powertrains are much lower for MDV and
heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs), especially for specialized vehicles applications. These vehicles are
primarily work vehicles, which makes predictable reliability of existing technologies and
versatility important. HDVs are generally more expensive than light-duty vehicles, which makes
it a greater monetary risk for purchasers to invest in new technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.190-191]
EPA also points to the Inflation Reduction Act as an enabling factor to reduce the multipliers
prior to MY2027; however, there remain significant uncertainties to the extent customers will be
able to take advantage of IRA tax incentive provisions of for MDVs. If MDV battery packs do
not meet the battery component and critical mineral requirements, or the MDVs are not
assembled in North America, those vehicles will be ineligible for 30D tax incentives. Moreover,
while businesses and fleets can use IRA Section 45W, it is not clear to what extent MDV buyers
will utilize these provisions, because the commercial entity, particularly if purchasing the
vehicles, must have sufficient tax headroom to offset any claimed the credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 190-191]
EV multipliers are crucial to provide sufficient time for the market to develop, especially to
support a substantial transformation in the MDV segment. EPA recognized important reasons for
these EV multipliers in the Phase 2 rule, including medium- and heavy-duty vehicles are more
expensive, they are primarily work vehicles, sales volumes are lower, and adoption rates for
advanced technologies are minimal. EPA proposes to continue to provide EV incentives for at
least FCEVs in the concurrent EPA HD GHG rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
191]
While EPA suggests the IRA and other measures might cushion the blow, these other factors
are uncertain and do not warrant eliminating the EV multipliers. Importantly, the IRA tax
incentives are not coupled with charging infrastructure funding. These MDVs will likely require,
in many cases, dedicated high-power charging stations to ensure work and fleet vehicles are
charged in a timely and efficient manner for their work cycle. Larger batteries will require more
time and power to charge, an aspect of EPA's EV feasibility analysis that was not addressed and
ignores the additional challenges of electrification for this sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 191]
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Further, any change in the multipliers would disrupt the planning and development cycles
already underway. Any such change would also reduce stability and certainty associated with
MDV GHG standards, potentially resulting in compliance challenges or additional, unnecessary
industry cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 191]
For all the reasons provided above, these EV multipliers for BEVs, PHEVs, and FCEVs
should be left in place and unaltered through MY2027 to encourage manufacturers to continue to
invest in advanced technologies in the Medium-Duty space and provide manufacturers necessary
lead-time to make appropriate investment decisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 191]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB)
U.S. EPA requested comment on its proposal to eliminate advanced technology multipliers
for medium-duty BEVs, PHEVs, and FCEVs after the 2026 MY. CARB supports this proposal.
As U.S. EPA rightly notes, multipliers provide important incentives for spurring technology
advancement but must be balanced with potential emission increases from conventional vehicles.
With rapid ZEV technology development in the medium-duty vehicle segment, the timing is
appropriate to sunset multiplier credits for medium-duty vehicles as U.S. EPA has already done
for light-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 17-18]
As noted above, the ACT and ACF rules will dramatically increase the penetration of ZEVs in
the medium- and heavy-duty vehicle segments in California. These policies will accelerate ZEV
technology development and adoption in the medium-duty sector, further reducing the need for
multiplier credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 17-18]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
Regarding some finer details of the proposed MD standards, ICCT supports EPA's proposal
to phaseout ZEV multipliers in MY2026 instead of MY2027. The expected growth in MD BEV
van share by MY2027 could result in overcompliance credits being available in MY2027, which
can be used to offset undercompliance by vans and pickups which are still ICE-powered.
Generally, ending multipliers earlier would improve the real-world climate benefits of the
proposed rule. Additionally, recent ICCT research on the costs of BEV and PHEV MD vans and
pickups suggests that within the timeframe of the proposed rule, plug-in MDVs will be cost-
competitive with their gasoline or diesel counterparts either upfront or both upfront and during
ownership. 160 Consequently, such advanced technology vehicles will not need multipliers as a
production incentive. Lastly, ICCT also supports the proposed 22,000 lbs limit to the GCWR
input in the work factor equation, for the reasons EPA provided in its proposal (Preamble
29242). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 60-62]
160 Mulholland, E. (2022). Cost of electric commercial vans and pickup trucks in the United States through
2040. International Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/cost-ev-vans-pickups-
us-2040-jan22/
Organization: Natural Gas Vehicles for America (NGVA)
EPA Must Take Steps to Address the Damage Caused by Its Uneven Treatment of Low
Carbon Technologies
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EPA's prior notice as part of the Clean Truck Initiative was extremely frank about the reasons
that the agency had provided significant regulatory credits for electric vehicles. 12 Pertinent parts
of that discussion are included here: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 12-13]
12 2022-04934.pdf (govinfo.gov)
As stated in the HD GHG Phase 2 rulemaking, our intention with these multipliers was to
create a meaningful incentive to those considering adopting these qualifying advanced
technologies into their vehicles. The multipliers are consistent with values recommended by
California Air Resources Board (CARB) in their supplemental HD GHG Phase 2 comments,
(footnote omitted). CARB's values were based on a cost analysis that compared the costs of
these technologies to costs of other conventional GHG- reducing technologies. Their cost
analysis showed that multipliers in the range we ultimately promulgated would make these
technologies more competitive with the conventional technologies and could allow
manufacturers to more easily generate a viable business case to develop these technologies for
heavy-duty vehicles and bring them to market at a competitive price. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0597, pp. 12-13]
****
As we stated in the 2016 HD GHG Phase 2 final rule preamble, we determined that it was
appropriate to provide such large multipliers for these advanced technologies at least in the short
term, because they have the potential to provide very large reductions in GHG emissions and fuel
consumption and advance technology development substantially in the long term. However,
because the credit multipliers are so large, we also stated that we should not necessarily allow
them to continue indefinitely. Therefore, they were included in the HD GHG Phase 2 final rule
as an interim program continuing only through MY 2027. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp.
12-13]
The above passages appear on pages 17594 and 17595 of the March 28, 2022, Federal
Register notice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 12-13]
It is noteworthy that EPA acknowledges the credits are not based on emission benefits. The
credits are based on cost with the intent on making electric vehicles "more competitive" with
conventional technologies. It is noteworthy that the notice in this rulemaking contains virtually
the exact word for word explanation regarding the incentives for electric vehicles. 13 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 12-13]
13 See 87 FR at 26010-26011.
Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
Evaluate Stricter MDV Emissions Standards and Begin Phasing Out Advanced
Technology Vehicle ("ATV") Multipliers in MY25 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 10-12]
Second, EPA should phase out ATV multipliers starting in MY25. EPA originally devised
ATV multipliers to encourage the use of advanced technologies such as electric drivetrains.
According to the agency, when first implemented in the GHG Phase 2 program, ATV multipliers
represented a "tradeoff between incentivizing nascent technologies and providing credits
unattached to real-world environmental benefits, "which could allow higher emissions from
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credit-using engines and vehicles."32 At least one study of policy design issues in fuel economy
and GHG emissions standards calls the efficacy of multipliers into question for precisely this
reason. By artificially enhancing the compliance value of BEVs, PHEVs, and FCEVs, the
multiplier can enable manufacturers to sell additional conventional vehicles if those units deliver
a greater financial return at the expense of greater emissions.33 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0653, pp.10-12]
32 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 87 (May 5, 2023) (revising 40 C.F.R. Parts 85, 86, 600, 1036, 1037, and 1066),
29,244.
33 Kenneth Gillingham, NBER Working Paper No. 29067, Designing Fuel-Economy Standards in Light of
Electric Vehicles (2021), available at
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w29067/w29067.pdf.
As EPA acknowledges, the costs and benefits of this approach might balance out differently
when the incentivized technologies barely exist on a commercial scale, but that is simply no
longer the case among MDVs. Accordingly, Rivian welcomes the agency's proposal to remove
ATV multipliers but recommends beginning a phaseout in MY25 as suggested below, with the
value of the BEV/FCEV multiplier stepping down to 2.5 and then 1.5 before sunsetting entirely.
PHEV multipliers should step down in value to 1.75 and 1.25 in MY25 and MY26, respectively.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 10-12]
Technology: PHEV; MY24: 3.5; MY25: 1.75; MY26: 1.25; MY27: -
Technology: BEV; MY24: 4.5; MY25: 2.5; MY26: 1.5; MY27: -
Technology: FCEV; MY24: 5.5; MY25: 2.5; MY26: 1.5; MY27: -
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 10-12]
Table 3. Rivian recommends phasing out ATV multipliers on a declining schedule beginning
in MY25. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 10-12]
With sales of BEV vans already growing quickly, a glut of multiplied credits could come into
the market before the proposed sunset year of MY27. New regulatory obligations under ACT
will come into force in six states by MY25 and only compound this reality, leading to the sale of
thousands of MD BEVs nationwide— each worth potentially 4.5 times their true benefit for
federal GHG compliance purposes. This could have consequences for BEV sales across the MD
segment for several years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 10-12]
For the most impactful rules possible, we recommend EPA reconsider more stringent
emissions standards and begin phasing out ATV multipliers in MY25. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0653, pp.10-12]
Organization: Stellantis
EPA should maintain previously defined EV Multipliers
EPA is proposing to end advanced technology (BEV, FCEV, and PHEV) multipliers for
medium-duty vehicles in 2027MY, one year earlier than scheduled. The agency also seeks
comment on reducing the magnitude of the multipliers for 2025-26MY. Aligned with Auto
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Innovators, Stellantis does not believe the advanced technology credit multipliers should be
adjusted or reduced in the 2025-27MY timeframe. The Phase 2 rule was finalized in 2016, and
[redacted text.] We believe the proposal to change or end advanced technology multipliers in the
2025-27MY does not provide sufficient lead time as required by the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 22]
EV Multipliers - Ends Advanced Technology (EV) multipliers in 2027MY (one year early)
and is considering limiting/reducing 2025-26MY multiplier credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0678, pp. 17-18]
Stellantis recommends that EPA should:
-Retain GHG saving technology flexibilities recognizing the GHG benefit that continues to
be present on electric vehicles and that will naturally decrease as EV penetration increases [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Accordingly, Tesla asserts the EPA should amend its proposal with a more stringent version
of Alternative 1 and take, inter alia, the following additional steps to increase the performance
and overall stringency of the proposed standards: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
2 See, 88 Fed. Reg. 29332-33, Table 96.
3 Id., at 29348 (comparing Tables 135 and 136).
- Eliminate credit multipliers for all vehicles; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
Credit Multipliers Decrease BEV Deployment and Should Not Be Extended or Renewed
Tesla supports the continuing elimination of advanced technology multipliers to ensure
overall program integrity. Firmly establishing a one-for-one credit ratio is a more rational and
transparent compliance mechanism and creates actual BEV vehicle deployment, thereby
enabling deeper emission reduction targets. 164 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 26]
164 Id., at 29197.
Tesla asserts that providing credit multipliers can unnecessarily dampen actual deployment of
BEVs and lead to backsliding on emission reductions. This is true regardless of the technology to
which a multiplier may be attached and is not applicable just to BEVs. Accordingly, Tesla also
supports the agency's proposed elimination of the medium-duty credit multipliers for all ZEVs
after MY 2026.165 Indeed, considering the high level of the current medium-duty multiplier,
rather than serve as an incentive, the multiplier is likely to further delay manufacturers from
deploying large amounts of medium-duty BEVs in the U.S. until 2027. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0792, p. 26]
165 Id., at 29244-45.
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EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
EPA received comments both in support of and in opposition to its proposal to eliminate
MDV multiplier incentives for MY 2027 vehicles. The Alliance and Stellantis opposed the
elimination of the multipliers for MY 2027, which were established in 2016 under the Phase 2
GHG standards, as they believed the multipliers are important given market uncertainties, the
lower sales volumes of MDVs compared to LDVs, and that any changes in the multipliers would
be disruptive to manufacturers' planning and development cycles already underway. Stellantis
asserted that removing the MY 2027 multipliers would be counter to the Clean Air Act lead time
provisions. In response to EPA's request for comment on whether we should phase-down the
existing MDV multipliers for MYs 2025 and 2026, the Alliance and Stellantis also opposed any
changes in the multipliers for these model years, on the same basis as their comments regarding
the MY 2027 multipliers.
In contrast, several commenters (CARB, ICCT, Rivian and Tesla) supported EPA's proposal
to remove multipliers for MY 2027. These commenters believed that multipliers are no longer
necessary given the rapid advancement of BEVs in the MDV market and given their concern that
multipliers erode the emissions benefits of the program and could result in emissions
backsliding. With respect to EPA's request for comment on whether to phase-down the
multipliers for MYs 2025 and 2026, Rivian supported phasing out the multipliers starting in MY
2025 and suggested specific values for stepping down the MY 2025-2026 multipliers. Rivian
pointed to BEV van sales growing rapidly, especially with the adoption of the Advanced Clean
Trucks program by several states, and the concern that the existing multipliers could result in a
glut of credits.
NGVA asserts that the multiplier credits were originally established with the "intent on
making electric vehicles more competitive" with conventional technologies.
Response:
EPA agrees with the commenters who supported elimination of the MDV multipliers for MY
2027, and we are finalizing that provision as proposed. As discussed further in section III.C.3.iii
of the preamble, while we did anticipate some growth in electrification would occur due to the
credit incentives in the Phase 2 final rule back in 2016, we did not expect the level of innovation
since observed, or the IRA or BIL incentives. Given these developments, we believe the existing
advanced technology multiplier credit levels for MY 2027 MDVs are no longer appropriate for
maintaining the balance between encouraging manufacturers to continue to invest in new
advanced technologies over the long term and potential emissions increases in the short term. We
further agree with commenters that, if left as is, the MY 2027 MDV multiplier credits may allow
for backsliding of emission reductions expected from ICE vehicles for some manufacturers in the
near term (i.e., the generation of excess credits which could delay the introduction of technology
in the near or mid-term) as sales of advanced technology MDVs that can generate the incentive
credit continue to increase. In light of the rapid increase in vehicle electrification in the MDV
market, as proposed, EPA is removing the BEV, PHEV, and FCEV multipliers for MY 2027.
Though EPA requested comment on phasing down the MDV multipliers for MYs 2025 and
2026, we have decided not to make any changes to the multiplier levels for those model years.
In response to the comment from Stellantis that ending the MDV multipliers in 2025-2027 does
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not provide sufficient lead time under the Clean Air Act (CAA), EPA notes that for GHG
standards the statute does not establish minimum lead time requirements. However, EPA does
consider lead time as a factor in determining the appropriate standards under CAA section
202(a), and we have in fact considered the issue of lead time in the context of the MDV
multipliers and the overall stringency of MDV standards. Given that MY 2025 has already begun
and that MY 2026 begins as early as nine months from this final rule, EPA believes it would not
be appropriate to change the MY 2025 or 2026 multipliers. Therefore, the MDV MY 2025-2026
multipliers will remain in effect as established under the Phase 2 rule.
In response to NGVA, as EPA discussed in the Phase 2 rule initially establishing the MDV
multipliers and recapped in the light/medium-duty proposal, we acknowledge that multipliers
represent a tradeoff between incentivizing new advanced technologies that could have significant
benefits well beyond what is required under the standards and providing credits that do not
reflect real world reductions in emissions, which could allow higher emissions from credit-using
engines and vehicles. At relatively low adoption levels, we believe the balance between the
benefits of encouraging development of advanced technologies as compared to any negative
emissions impacts of multipliers would be appropriate and justify maintaining the current
advanced technology multipliers through MY 2026.
3.1.9 - Timeframe of the standards
Comments by Organizations
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Regulation End Date
The agency requests stakeholder feedback on whether standards under this program should be
set beyond MY2032: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 30-31]
EPA is requesting comments on whether the standards should increase in stringency beyond
MY 2032. EPA seeks comment on whether the trajectory (i.e., the levels of year-over-year
stringency rates) of the proposed standards for MYs 2027 through 2032 should be extended
through 2033, 2034 or 2035, or whether EPA should consider additional approaches to the
trajectory of any standards that were to continue increasing in stringency beyond 2032.51 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 30-31]
51 88 Fed. Reg. 29239 (May 5, 2023)
Although Honda would prefer that EPA set standards through MY2031 in order to align its
regulatory timeline with that of the upcoming CAFE rule by NHTSA (an agency that is
statutorily restricted to setting rules no longer than five years in length), we acknowledge that
approach is not under consideration by EPA.52 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 30-31]
52 Honda also plans to provide feedback to NHTSA on its forthcoming CAFE NPRM, a similarly
important rule that has significant overlap - as well as distinct differences - with the vehicle GHG
regulation.
As noted earlier in these comments, the agency's proposed stringency is heavily predicated
upon an assumed swift and seamless EV market transformation. In reality, that transformation
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has many uncertainties and risks associated with it, including multiple influential factors that are
entirely outside the control of automakers. Given the high degree of uncertainty associated with
this market transformation, we believe this rulemaking should not include standards beyond the
agency's proposed MY2032 window. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 31]
Recommendation: Honda suggests the agency set standards no later than MY2032. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 31]
Organization: American Lung Association (ALA) et al.
EPA should set a course to emission controls out through the 2035 model year to address the
ongoing need for cleaner combustion and increased certainty for zero-emission technologies. By
capturing vehicle model years out to 2035 as an increasing number of states' ACCII standards
have, EPA can ensure that the policies stay ahead of, rather than trail, zero-emission vehicle
markets and automakers' announced combustion engine phaseouts to provide ongoing certainty
in emission reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0745, p. 3]
Organization: Arconic Corporation (ARCO)
7. The EPA is requesting comments on whether the standards should increase in
stringency beyond MY 2032. EPA seeks comment on whether the trajectory (i.e., the levels of
year-over-year stringency rates) of the proposed standards for MYs 2027 through 2032 should be
extended through 2033, 2034 or 2035, or whether EPA should consider additional approaches to
the trajectory of any standards beyond 2032.
Arconic recommends including the upstream power generation emissions for BEV vehicles.
With that change, Arconic supports more stringent EPA standards in coordination with DOT
CAFE standards beyond the 2027-2032 range covered in this proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0741, p. 4]
Organization: CALSTART
2. Automaker Market Signal
In addition to pairing impactful incentives with ambitious regulations in the legislative
ecosystem, automakers benefit from clear market signals. The automotive industry has
committed to expanding ZEV offerings and many automakers are already on a roadmap to
transitioning to 100% ZEVs by 2035. Providing market certainty through strong regulation
unlocks greater deployment of capital, as evidenced by the $200+ billion worth of announced
sector investments within the past two years.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, pp. 3-4]
2 https://www.atlasevhub.com/data_story/210-billion-of-announced-investments-in-electric-vehicle-
manufacturing-headed-for-the-u-s/.
By enacting strong vehicle emissions standards that require vehicle manufacturers to produce
increasingly efficient and clean vehicles, as well as drive the electrification of the transportation
sector, the EPA will help ensure wide-scale availability of the vehicles that support healthy
communities. Commensurately, as battery and vehicle production achieve greater economies of
scale, ZEV cost declines are expected. Projections show ZEVs reaching purchase cost parity
with internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles by the mid to late 2020's, after which they are
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projected to further decline in cost, saving money for all consumers, with particular benefit for
low-income consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, pp. 3-4]
CALSTART believes there are important takeaways from these comments that can help
inform and structure a stronger Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles standard:
3. Extend the proposed rule to 2035, resulting in the equivalent of 100% ZEV sales by
2035, consistent with ACC II.
Organization: Elders Climate Action
We ask EPA to revise the rule to set a zero emission standard for all new L/MDVs by 2035,
and establish a phase-in schedule for the standard that includes ZEV sales targets for MYs 2027-
29 that are the same as the CARB ACT rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 10-11]
Organization: Kia Corporation
- Kia supports EPA's six model year time period proposed for the standards from MYs 2027-
2032. There is considerable uncertainty associated with the uptake of these technologies in ways
that are difficult to predict even within the six model years.3 Consequently, extending the rule
beyond MY2032 is inappropriate at this time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 3]
3 88 Fed. Reg. 29,311.
Six Model Year Timeline for Program is Appropriate
EPA requests feedback on whether the standards should extend beyond MY2032.5 Kia urges
EPA not to extend the rulemaking beyond MY2032. As drafted, the proposal - any or all of the
alternatives proposed - will require the automotive industry to take on transformative efforts,
including historic investments, and rely on sufficient investments from industries beyond the
automotive industry. Further, the industry will take on significant risks regarding consumer EV
acceptance. As EPA has pointed out in the proposal, there is considerable uncertainty associated
with the uptake of these technologies in ways that are difficult to predict even within the six
model years.6 Consequently, extending the rule beyond MY2032 is inappropriate at this time.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2020829-0555, p. 4]
12 5 88 Fed. Reg. 29,239.
6 88 Fed. Reg. 29,311.
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
EPA should consider extending and increasing both the LDV and MDV standards through
MY 2035, which will send a strong signal to industry and the public and align with MYs covered
by the ACC II and ACT regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 9]
Organization: POET, LLC
VII. EPA Should Not Yet Extend Continually More Aggressive Standards Beyond Model
Year 2032.
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Vehicle technologies and market dynamics may considerably change by 2023, including
BEV-induced strains on the electric transmission and local distribution grids, critical mineral
supply chains, and energy security risks created by EPA over-indexing on a preferred
technology. Accordingly, POET strongly recommends against having standards set now that
continue to increase in stringency beyond 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 29]
Organization: South Coast Air Quality Management District
12. There are five key issues we request U.S. EPA address before finalizing the rule. Extend
the phase-in period and adopt more stringent standards to align with California's ACC II
regulation. The proposed standards will be phased in over a six-year period from model
year (MY) 2027 through 2032 with increasing stringency each year. We recommend that
the phase-in period be extended to 2035 and later model years to better align with the
ACC II implementation schedule which extends out to MY 2035 and subsequent years.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0659, p. 2]
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
EPA requests comment on whether the standards should extend beyond the 2032 model year.
Toyota is concerned that the proposal has not adequately addressed the market uncertainty
surrounding the proposed standards through 2032 model year. Therefore, we believe it would be
inappropriate to extend the standards beyond 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 26-27]
Organization: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
In this action, EPA is proposing new, more stringent emissions standards for criteria
pollutants and greenhouse gases (GHG) for light-duty vehicles and medium-duty vehicles that
would phase-in over model years 2027 through 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 1]
The WDNR offers the following specific comments on the proposal:
2. Extending standards to model year 2035. EPA is requesting comment on if these new
standards should be extended to MY 2035. If EPA elects to extend the standards an additional
three years, EPA should consider undertaking a "mid-course review" to ensure the standards are
still appropriate and whether a change in stringency (to reflect the current state of technologies
and the market) is warranted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 2]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
In its NPRM, EPA requested comment on whether the trajectory (i.e., the levels of year-over-
year stringency rates) of the proposed standards for MYs 2027 through 2032 should be extended
through 2033, 2034 or 2035, or whether EPA should consider additional approaches to the
trajectory of any standards beyond 2032.
In their comments, some NGOs and state organizations supported extending the standards
through 2035, citing the need to send a strong market signal, and/or to be consistent with ACC II.
In contrast, automakers that responded expressed concerns of market uncertainty, were EPA to
extend the rulemaking past MY 2032. In its comments, while acknowledging that EPA did not
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seek comment on a shorter timeframe, Honda requested that EPA only set standards through MY
2031 which they believe is important to align with the proposed CAFE standards.
Response:
EPA responds to many of these comments in Section III.C.2.iv.c of the preamble. In sum,
EPA understands commenters' concerns about uncertainty out to the MY 2035 time frame, and
believes it is appropriate to consider standards for MY 2033 and beyond in a future rulemaking.
EPA disagrees with Honda's request to set standards only through MY 2031 as the rulemaking
lays out a strong basis that standards through MY 2032 are feasible and appropriate under the
Clean Air Act.. After considering all of these comments, EPA is finalizing standards for MYs
2027 through MY 2032 for both light-duty and medium-duty vehicles.
3.1.10 - Alternative compliance pathway
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
ii. EPA should finalize a Leadership Pathway to incentivize compliance with ACC II
nationwide.
In response to EPA's request for comments on GHG regulatory alternatives, EDF
recommends EPA finalize an alternative, "Leadership Pathway." Under the Leadership Pathway,
manufacturers could choose to comply with California's ACC IIZEV sales requirements
nationwide to demonstrate compliance with EPA's greenhouse gas requirements. Manufacturers
would continue to comply with EPA's proposed Tier 4 air pollution standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
The leadership pathway would be a voluntary, alternative compliance framework that
manufacturers could choose, but once chosen, it would be enforceable. EPA has included
similar, alternative pathways in past regulations where doing so would deliver equivalent or
greater environmental benefits. Adopting a leadership pathway along these lines in these
standards would allow manufacturers that anticipate exceeding the level of ZEVs reflected in
EPA's proposal to comply with the same set of requirements in California and 177 states and
nationwide in a consistent and streamlined fashion. As we demonstrate below, it would also
deliver significant additional pollution reductions as compared to any of EPA's proposed
alternatives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
Under ACC II, ZEVs must constitute a set percentage of a manufacturer's light-duty sales in
MYs 2026 through 2035. The percentage of ZEV sales in MY 2032 is 82% growing to 100% by
2035. PHEVs with an EPA rated range of 50 miles count as a ZEV up to 20% of the ZEV
percentage requirement (i.e., 16.4% of total sales in 2032). There are no explicit GHG standards
for ICEVs starting in 2026. EPA projects that manufacturers could meet its proposed 2032 GHG
standards by selling 67% BEVs by 2032, 15% less than under ACC II. While ICEV emissions
are included in fleet-average GHG emissions counting towards the proposed standards, EPA's
modeling indicates that little new ICEV controls are applied beyond 2026. Thus, on the surface,
the ACC II ZEV standards appear to be more stringent than EPA's proposed GHG standards. In
order to confirm this, EDF has conducted modeling using OMEGA 2 to compare fleet-average
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GHG emissions under ACC IIZEV standards and under EPA's proposed GHG standards. We
analyzed a scenario in which ACC II ZEV requirements would be met through 2035, with ZEV
sales constant thereafter (ACC II 2035). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
EDF used OMEGA 2 to model the ZEV sales requirements by setting the minimum fraction
of BEV sales within a vehicle segment (i.e., sedans, CUV/SUVs, and pickups) in the "required
sales share" file to match those of ACC II. This is analogous to the approach taken by EPA when
it modeled the impact of ACC II in California and ACC II adopting States. However, our
analysis applied minimum ZEV sales requirements to all vehicle sales and did not create a
second vehicle fleet for those sold in the ACC II states. 111 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
pp. 41-45]
111 EDF also increased the cap on total battery capacity usage on line 67 of the OMEGA 2 batch file. This
arbitrary increase is not material to this case, as EDF is not claiming that there will be sufficient battery
availability for all manufacturers to comply with ACC II nationwide. We only want to determine the
relative benefits of individual manufacturers who might desire this option. They would only do so if they
believed that they would have adequate access to ZEV battery capacity.
As discussed above, ACC II allows PHEVs with a 50-mile on-road range to count as a full
ZEV. EPA's proposal would set the utility factor for a PHEV50 at roughly 67%. The current
OMEGA 2 model does not include the modeling of PHEVs. However, if a manufacturer chose to
meet the ACC II ZEV sales requirements with the maximum 20% level of PHEV50 sales,
effectively 6.7% of total ZEV operation would be powered by gasoline. For example, assuming
maximum PHEV share in 2032, the 82% ZEV standard could be equivalent to 16.5% BEVs and
23.5% ICEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
We left the selection of which vehicles to electrify entirely up to OMEGA 2. We also left the
GHG standards constant at the levels of the current MY 2025 GHG standards, as ACC II
imposes no direct restrictions on ICEV emissions after 2025. As a practical matter, the control of
ICEV emissions has little or no impact on fleetwide GHG emissions or vehicle electrification
after 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
Table 9 shows BEV sales under the ACC II scenario, as well as under EPA's proposed GHG
standards and EPA's Alternative 1 standards.
[See original attachment for Table 9: ZEV Sales as a Function of Total Vehicle Sales] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
As the Table shows. Projected ZEV sales under the EPA proposal and Alternative 1 are
significantly less than those projected for the ACC II scenario. At the same time, while still
higher than EPA's two scenarios, the projected BEV sales under the ACC II scenario using
OMEGA 2 are lower than required by ACC II. The shortfall between the ACC II ZEV sales
requirement and the level of ZEV sales in the OMEGA 2 simulation in 2032 is 8%. In 2035, the
shortfall grows to 17%for ACC II 2035.112 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
112 EDF was unable to direct OMEGA 2 to increase BEV sales to meet the ACC II targets. As a result, the
projected impacts for the ACC II scenarios are under-estimated.
We noticed that OMEGA 2 decreases its projections of ZEV sales in 2033 for some
GHG/ZEV scenarios presumably due to the end of the IRA tax credits. This occurs to a greater
degree for less stringent scenarios, like the Proposal, but to a much smaller degree for
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Alternative 1 and ACC II 2035. BEV sales then recover to 2032 levels by 2035 under the
Proposal. Regardless of these modeling differences, actual real-world compliance with ACC II
requirements would result in greater levels of ZEVs and greater environmental benefits than we
have shown here. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
Fleetwide GHG levels under the various scenarios are shown in Table 10.
[See original attachment for Table 10: Fleetwide GHG Certification Levels from OMEGA 2
Output (g/mi)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
The above table shows fleetwide certification (tailpipe) GHG emission levels are significantly
lower under the ACC II scenario than under either EPA scenario. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0786, pp. 41-45]
We then used EPA's Effects Model to project total GHG and criteria air pollutant emission
reductions from passenger cars and light-trucks through 2055. EDF used the same emission input
files as EPA used in modeling its Proposal and Alternative, which assumed that new vehicles
were equipped with gasoline particulate filters (i.e., emission_rates_vehicles-with_gpf.csv).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
The results are shown in Table 11. Reductions of both upstream and downstream emissions
relative to EPA's No Action scenario are included, using EPA's upstream emissions input
files. 113 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
113 We believe that EPA's estimates of upstream gasoline emissions are substantially under-estimated, as
they fail to consider emissions from petroleum production, petroleum transportation and gasoline
distribution. This issue is discussed in more detail in our heavy-duty comments.
[See original attachment for Table 11: Cumulative GHG and Criteria Pollutant Emission
Reductions from Passenger Car and Light Trucks Through 2055 (GHG: million metric tons;
criteria pollutant: U.S. tons)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
ACC II 2035 is projected to achieve 53% more cumulative GHG emission reductions through
2055 than EPA's Proposal and 36% more than EPA's Alternative 1. The ACC II scenario would
also achieve substantially greater criteria pollutant emission reductions than either EPA scenario.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
Table 12 shows the monetized benefits projected for the three scenarios.
[See original attachment for Table 12: Cumulative Net Monetized GHG and Criteria Pollutant
Benefits from Passenger Car and Light Trucks Through 2055: Net Present Value in 2027 (billion
2021 dollars, discounted at 3% per year)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
The ACC II scenario would provide more GHG and criteria pollution benefits than either of
the two EPA scenarios. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 41-45]
Accordingly, EDF recommends that EPA adopt an alternative Leadership Pathway with ZEV
sales consistent with ACC II through 2035 as an option for compliance with its Final Rule. 114
While the above analysis focuses on ACC II through 2035, EDF also evaluated ACC II through
2032 and likewise found it would deliver greenhouse gas and air pollutant benefits as compared
to the proposal (although lesser in magnitude than ACC II through 2035). This reinforces our
conclusion that a voluntary compliance alternative along these lines would deliver important
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additional environmental benefits and provide a pathway to align requirements with those that
California and many other states either have, or likely will, adopt. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0786, pp. 41-45]
114 EDF also modeled a leadership pathway with ACCIIZEV consistent sales through only 2032. While
EDF recommends having the leadership pathway extend through 2035, if EPA limited it to only 2032, it
would still provide benefits in excess of any of EPA's current proposals. See Appendix B for more details.
Organization: General Motors, LLC (GM)
GM is an industry leader with plans to become carbon neutral in its global product portfolio
and its operations by 2040 and has set science-based targets in line with the Paris Agreement and
the U.S. Nationally Determined Contribution in support of that goal. GM understands the
importance of greenhouse gas (GHG) regulations that are aligned with complementary policies.
Ultimately, these policies, which include support for permitting reform, domestic supply chain
development,consumerncentives, and charging infrastructure, are critical to the overall success o
f the regulations. GM, and the U.S. auto industry overall, have made great strides with GHG
reduction technologies since the first GHG standards were adopted for the 2012 model year. We
look forward to accelerating that progress with our EV transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0700, pp. 2-3]
Today, GM reiterates our commitment to support a regulation that reaches the Administration'
s original goals (i.e., 50% EV share 2030, 60% GHG reduction from model year 2021 to 2030)
and is aligned with other applicable vehicle regulations. These goals represent the appropriate
path toward all EVs by 2035 and re-affirm our commitment to long-term science-based climate
targets. These goals also recognize the profound uncertainties of supply chain, manufacturing,
infrastructure, and consumer market dynamics through the interim years, as well as related to the
implementation of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) through the regulation timeframe. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 3]
GM supports the creation of a "Leadership Pathway," an optional compliance path for fast-
moving companies that will further accelerate EV deployment. We encourage EPA to develop an
innovative opt- in compliance pathway that rewards companies that deliver greater-than-
projected EV volumes for greater multipollutant reductions. A voluntary program for companies
with higher EV deployment has the potential to result in greater overall national EV volumes
than the Executive Order 2030 goal (i.e., 50% EVs), the NPRM 2032 goal (67% EVs), and
California's Advanced Clean Cars II. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 5]
This Leadership Pathway is consistent with General Motors's ground-
breaking call in 2018 for a National Zero Emission Vehicle (NZEV) program that enables scale
by promoting ZEV investment that meets customer demand throughout the entire nation to
address climate change. Given the continued acceleration of EV sales, a Leadership Pathway
would provide a logical extension of that NZEV concept. Given companies have committed to
the transition in the U.S., we believe that U.S. transportation climate, local air pollution, and
petroleum use goals can and should be achieved through high-volume EV sales. If properly
conceived, a Leadership Pathway would exceed the Administration's criteria
pollutant, GHG emission, and fuel consumption goals, and reward automakers that are acceleratin
g that transition to zero-emission vehicles with less complexity and with fewer
certification requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 5]
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Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
Porsche supports the development of an alternative compliance pathways, providing
additional flexibility within the overall suite of light-duty regulation.
Porsche appreciates EPA including within the MPR preamble reference to alternative
compliance pathways that may be considered and included within the Final Rule. Porsche agrees
with the agency that an alternative pathway could be developed to help encourage earlier
adoption of zero- and near-zero emission technologies that would match or even accelerate GHG
and criteria emission reductions beyond the levels proposed within the various scenarios in the
proposal. Alternative compliance pathways have been, and can continue to be, a pragmatic
regulatory tool that helps agencies achieve their desired policy outcomes while providing
manufacturers with greater choice and potentially improved alignment with their individual
product strategies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 4-5]
Porsche would support the development of an alternative pathway for this final rule. An
alternative pathway could be an option available to any Original Equipment Manufacturer that
would establish requirements that could be met in lieu of primary vehicle certification and fleet
average performance-based standards. Each manufacturer would have an equal opportunity to
review and participate in this pathway. Porsche believes that an alternative pathway could be
developed that would be equitable in terms of manufacturers contributing to the policy goals of
the NPRM. Furthermore, Porsche believes that an alternative pathway could be structured such
that regardless of how many manufacturers chose to participate, there would be no incremental
burden on non-participating manufacturers. Porsche respects that manufacturers serve very
different market segments and that an alternative pathway may not be appropriate for all
manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 4-5]
An alternative pathway that focuses on the deployment of zero- and near-zero emission
vehicles will directly contribute to the carbon and pollution reduction policy goals of this MPR,
in addition to the petroleum reduction goals of DOT's CAFE regulation and with the air quality
goals within California's recently adopted Advanced Clean Cars 2 regulations. In addition, this
pathway will help manufacturers concentrate their human and financial resources into the
development and manufacturing capacity of zero- and near-zero emission vehicles, potentially
leading to accelerated deployment of such vehicles and with the greater potential for cost
reductions. This type of pragmatic focused pathway can deliver regulatory certainty, compliance
streamlining, and increased environmental and energy benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0637, p. 5]
.In general, like the primary suite of regulations, Porsche believes an alternative pathway
would center upon an annual compliance requirement that would contain a mix of targets,
boundary conditions, and flexibilities. Manufacturers would commit to utilizing this pathway the
details of which could be defined within a new Subpart. Compliance with the terms within this
new Subpart would be in lieu of compliance with the primary performance-based fleet average
and vehicle certification requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 5-6]
With regards to form and structure, Porsche generally views an alternative pathway that
would likely be centered on an accelerated ramp rate of zero- and near-zero emission vehicles
and technologies. The alternative pathway could include annual targets for the nationwide
deployment of zero- and near-zero emission vehicles. The targets could reflect an incremental
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level above the industrywide projected rates of zero- and near-zero emission vehicles needed to
comply with finalized performance-based standards. In addition, Porsche believes that the
pathway could provide recognition for actions from manufacturers that support electrification
through complementary measures such as deployment of charging infrastructure or customer
education programs that would both be helpful to increasing consumer adoption. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 5-6]
Porsche recognizes that this type of pathway may be characterized as a Nationwide "EV
mandate" which could negatively impact consumer choice and remove other technologies from
the market. Porsche believes that the alternative pathway could be structured with flexibility to
include technologies that are able to demonstrate significant and meaningful emissions benefits.
Porsche recognizes that certain vehicle segments may better achieve emissions goals and
customer acceptance through technologies other than full electrification. As such, a flexibility for
being inclusive, even if for a limited portion of the overall requirement, may be a pragmatic and
helpful approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 5-6]
Porsche is aware of discussions associated with these types of zero-emission vehicle policies
regarding the performance requirements for the remaining combustion models that would
continue to be sold. The dialogue being that combustion models would be free to "backslide" in
their emission performance or fuel efficiency should they no longer be subjected to stringent
certification and fleet average requirements. Stakeholders have contended that this potential
"backsliding" could erode or otherwise offset the benefits being achieved even with increased
zero-emission vehicle sales. Porsche believes that a reasonable set of boundary conditions could
be developed as part of the alternative pathway that would help ensure policy outcomes by
preventing backsliding of the remaining combustion fleet. There are likely a series of measures
that could be implemented to protect against such erosion of emissions or fuel economy
performance that would allow manufactures to focus on their zero-emission fleet, but not at the
expense of reduced combustion vehicle performance. These types of "anti-backslide" measures
have been used in the past within vehicle regulations. Manufacturers could outline their roadmap
of remaining combustion models and demonstrate to the Administrator how the manufacturer
would preserve the level of performance for each remaining vehicle over the duration of the
regulation. Porsche believes there could also be some requirements for limited, targeted
improvements in these combustion concepts that may help achieve incremental emissions
benefits without major redesign or certification resources. Overall, this approach could
effectively "snap a chalk line" for each manufacturer to preserve combustion vehicle
performance as the vehicles phase-down in a manufacturers fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0637, pp. 5-6]
As mentioned above, Porsche believes it is likely that the terms of an alternative pathway
would need to be consistent for each participating manufacturer regardless of overall size within
the US market. Because smaller volume-based manufacturers already are provided limited
flexibilities for annual compliance, it is unlikely that additional flexibilities would be needed
within an alternative pathway. As such, EPA could consider whether it remains appropriate to
maintain provisions for related entities as such provisions may no longer serve a purpose.
Manufacturers could be provided the option to participate in the alternative pathway on an
individual basis or to continue with the current coordinated compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0637, pp. 5-6]
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Porsche also believes that the potential benefits of an alternative pathway could extend
beyond the boundaries of this specific NPRM. Porsche recognizes that an alternative pathway
developed within this rulemaking would necessarily be limited to acting in lieu of regulatory
requirements directly under EPA's management. However, Porsche recognizes that an
alternative pathway could provide similar benefits within the regulatory structure of other related
State and Federal regulations. As noted earlier, an accelerated ramp rate of zero- and near-zero
emission technologies could equally serve these programs. As such, Porsche recommends that an
alternative pathway be structured and coordinated across agencies to provide manufacturers with
a holistic, comprehensive compliance strategy that would significantly improve regulatory
certainty and streamlined implementation. Porsche believes it could be possible for California
and NHTSA to coordinate with EPA to develop equivalent alternative pathways that would work
separately under each agencies own statutory authority, but aligned to ensure that a manufacturer
who brings an accelerated rate of zero- and near-zero emission vehicles to market can achieve
compliance with the full range of requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 6-7]
Porsche acknowledges that this would be an extensive investment in agency resources to
define the specifics of an alternative path in time for a Final Rule as projected in CY2024.
Nevertheless, Porsche hopes that these comments are sufficiently responsive to the request for
comment by EPA which could create the opportunity for details to be developed by EPA.
Porsche would seek to be an active, constructive resource for the agency in helping to inform the
details on such an alternative pathway. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 6-7]
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
Alternative Pathway
With respect to alternatives to the current Averaging, Banking and Trading (ABT) program to
allow manufacturers flexibility to comply, EPA seeks public comment on the potential merits of
such an alternative pathway concept, whether it would be advantageous for both the GHG as
well as the criteria pollutant standards program, and how it might be structured. Volkswagen
supports the EPA's consideration of alternative pathways to help encourage earlier adoption of
zero emission vehicles with the aim to accelerate GHG and criteria emission reductions beyond
the levels adopted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 3-4]
Electrification is the core of future mobility. Volkswagen believes an inter-agency
coordinated alternative compliance pathway could simplify overall GHG, CAFE and criteria
compliance to all standards by recognizing an optional National ZEV program alternative. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 3-4]
Alternative optional compliance pathways can be a regulatory tool for agencies to achieve
their desired policy outcomes while providing manufacturers with greater choice and improved
alignment with their product strategies. Volkswagen recognizes that manufacturers follow
different strategies, while serving very different market segments and customer needs. Each
manufacturer would have an opportunity to participate. The pathway would require structuring
such that non-participating manufacturers would not be disadvantaged. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0669, pp. 3-4]
Volkswagen proposes that OEMs who meet the optional National ZEV alternative pathway,
above the EV final rule threshold, be found in compliance with all performance-based standards,
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including GHG, CAFE and Tier 4/LEV IV emissions regulation. Local ZEV III standards would
stay in place. This would become a meaningful alternative to achieve EPA's objective of
transitioning the U.S. automotive fleet towards EVs and would set a clear focus on
transformation and investment in ZEV technologies. A comparable approach is currently in
development in the United Kingdom, which plans to establish a ZEV mandate as the new lead
regulation, instead of strengthening the existing C02 fleet standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0669, pp. 3-4]
Volkswagen believes that an alternative pathway that focuses on the acceleration of zero
emission vehicles will help manufacturers concentrate their resources into development and
manufacturing of these vehicles. Investing in a diminishing ICE fleet would direct resources
away from EV ramp-up, which would be counterproductive to the goal. By having a complete
focus on an EV fleet, the regulatory complexity and burden for manufacturers would be
drastically reduced. In turn, this could improve vehicle speed to market and deliver more choices
at lower costs for customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 3-4]
Volkswagen acknowledges that the alternative pathway could potentially result in an emission
"backslide" in ICE vehicles. Volkswagen therefore suggests establishing a reasonable set of
boundary conditions as part of the alternative pathway to ensure anti-backsliding for the
remaining ICE fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 3-4]
The optional alternative pathway will ultimately serve the objectives of the Clean Air Act,
State air quality and federal fuel economy standards. Volkswagen believes that legislative and
regulatory action would be needed to complete the transition of vehicles on the road from ICE to
ZEV. A clear, focused pathway will help provide regulatory certainty, compliance streamlining
and increased environmental benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 3-4]
Volkswagen recognizes that this would be a potentially significant agency and legislative
resource investment to include in time for the Final Rule, and that these comments do not
provide exact suggestions for structure and requirements of such an alternative path. Volkswagen
does not have specific parameters outlined for this pathway as they could extend past the scope
of this NPRM. However, EPA should consider using this rulemaking as an opportunity to offer
an optional alternative ZEV compliance pathway for greenhouse gas and criteria emissions that
could be implemented in concert with similar alternative ZEV compliance pathways for the
CAFE and CARB regulatory programs. Volkswagen will be an active and constructive resource
for the agencies and manufacturers to discuss and define the details on such an alternative
pathway. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 3-4
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
In the NPRM, EPA solicited public comments on whether there would be merit to considering
alternative pathways that might encourage manufacturers to achieve lower CO2 emissions than
the final standards earlier in the program. Three stakeholders (EDF, GM, Porsche and
Volkswagen) each provided comment in support of a conceptual voluntary pathway that would
be more stringent than the standards finalized in this rulemaking.
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Response:
EPA appreciates commenters feedback and willingness to discuss and develop such an
alternative, or "leadership" pathway concept. As we more fully describe in Section III.C.2.iv.c of
the preamble, EPA is not finalizing such a pathway in its final rulemaking, due to the need for
additional exploration and assessment of such a pathway. However, EPA is open to continued
dialogue with stakeholders in the spirit of trying to better define such a pathway for a potential
future action.
3.2 - GHG standard curves
3.2.1 - LDV footprint curves
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
A. Major Concerns with the Proposed GHG Standards
2. Footprint Attribute
Auto Innovators supports the continued use of footprint-based standards. Historically, the
footprint attribute has served relatively well as a surrogate for vehicle tractive energy
requirements, providing a means to set standards appropriate to different sizes of vehicles. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 110]
9.Development of Footprint Curves
a)Footprint Trends
Auto Innovators disagrees with EPA's assessment that the footprint-based standards have
resulted in a general increase in vehicle footprint as a means to reduce compliance burden. When
vehicles are redesigned, their footprint may change for any number of reasons. Furthermore, we
believe a closer look at vehicle trends would reveal that vehicle type and segment size shifts play
as large a role in changing average footprints as increases in footprint for any given model of
vehicle. Finally, while a slightly larger footprint may yield a nominal compliance benefit, such
benefits are relatively small (a couple of g/mile at most) and are limited by other model design
parameters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 120-121]
The relatively short comment period prevents us from exploring this topic more thoroughly,
and we may take time outside of the rulemaking comment period to discuss this issue further if it
remains a concern to EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 120-121]
b).Footprint Curves
Regardless of the shape of the footprint curves, we are concerned that their level in general
will require rapid EV uptake through both the early and late majority market phases in less than a
decade, from the early adopter stage the market is in today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 120-121]
EPA's proposed approach to seeing footprint-based target curves is a dramatic change from
prior rulemakings.
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In the 2010 rule, target curves were developed with the concept of fitting known vehicle data,
and then applying gram per mile improvement requirements across the range of vehicle sizes. In
2012, some adjustments were made to the truck curve shape and cut-points to better reffect the
light-duty truck fleet. EPA then generally applied percentage reductions to the targets year- over-
year with the understanding that greenhouse gas reduction technologies would achieve similar
percentage improvements across the entire size range of vehicles. That same general process was
followed in the 2020 and 2021 GHG rulemakings. Mathematically and technologically, this
process has resulted in gradually flattening slopes and a truck target curve that has generally
moved closer to passenger car target curve in each year, other than when corrections were made
to the curve fitting in the 2012 rulemaking. Over the history of these developments, one can still
trace back to the premise of curves that reflect the energy demands of various sizes and types of
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 120-121]
Now, EPA proposes to move away from the prior process of applying a percentage reduction
to both passenger car and light-duty truck curves. For light trucks, EPA proposes to set a target
curve based on the passenger car curve with an off-set for four-wheel/all-wheel-drive and a
linear function to represent increasing towing capacity with increasing vehicle size. The base
passenger car target curve (upon which the truck curve is based) has had its slope fattened to the
point where footprint plays little role in the target. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 120-
121]
These changes, particularly setting a truck curve based on the car curve, are technical in
nature, and difficult to fully evaluate and comment adequately on in the short period of time
provided for comment. The proposed changes are based on the sort of analysis that would have
been better discussed with the public in advance of a proposed rule. Auto Innovators may
continue analysis post-comment period and would appreciate further discussion with EPA if
needed. In the meantime, we offer the following observations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 120-121]
i)Target Curve Slope
Flater GHG performance across vehicle size is an expected outcome of applying ZEV
technology (with zero tailpipe emissions instead of a percentage improvement to a prior
technology) across the entire range of vehicle sizes. However, making the assumption of rapid
EV market share gains across all vehicle sizes effectively forecloses opportunities for plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles that have some zero emission operation, but also include ICE operation
that would be better suited to a target curve with some slope. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 121-123]
Concerns with a flat passenger car curve grow when that passenger car curve is then used to
derive a light truck curve. Although the proposed truck curves have more slope than the
passenger car curves they are derived from, that slope is intended (at least to our understanding
of EPA's analysis) to account for towing capacity. However, the underlying assumption of
massive EV uptake is there because the towing adjustment is applied to the underlying passenger
car curve. Such an approach fails to consider potential differences in overall EV uptake and type
of EV uptake in the light-duty truck fleet. EPA may model that BEV uptake in the light-duty
fleet will rapidly catch and equal that in the passenger car fleet across all vehicle types, but that
is an artifact of the model itself. The model simply reacts to whatever targets it is given, and
outputs the technology path, associated emission levels, etc. that would be required to meet that
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target. It does not consider the market as automakers do, where different technologies might be
better suited to different vehicles to meet market needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
121-123]
ii)Light-Duty Truck Curves Based on Passenger Car Curves
There was insufficient time for us to analyze EPA's derivation of the four-wheel/all-wheel-
drive offset and towing utility functions for light-duty trucks. However, we are concerned that
even if applying such adjustments to passenger car targets is technically accurate (we withhold
judgement here) and the derivations are correct (again withholding judgement), EPA proposes to
make the switch from a system based on historic performance to a new one based on the
passenger car curves starting in MY 2027. This results in a large increase in truck stringency in
the first year of the proposed program. As can be observed in the EPA Trends Report, light-duty
trucks have already gradually fallen behind regulatory requirements on average.223 Now, EPA
asks them to make a large leap forward in emissions performance from an already disadvantaged
position with virtually no lead-time. (Some manufacturers have already begun offering MY 2024
vehicles; MY 2027 can begin in less than three years.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
121-123]
223 To some extent, this is likely because manufacturers have generally added electric vehicles to
passenger car fleets, using passenger car compliance to offset truck fleet emissions. Light-duty truck
electrification has generally trailed that of passenger cars.
iii)"Footprint Neutral" Slope
We similarly have not had enough opportunity to evaluate EPA's derivation of a "footprint-
neutral" slope. However, we can say that regardless of any math that EPA might apply,
manufacturers simply don't think about vehicle footprint in those terms. They consider
wheelbase and trackwidth in terms of driving dynamics, vehicle customer functionality, safety,
and other attributes that customers care about. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 121-123]
iv)Low and High Footprint Cut Point Changes
EPA also proposes changes to the cut points where the target curves become flat instead of
following a function of footprint. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 121-123]
We do not oppose moving the low footprint cut points for passenger cars and light-duty trucks
higher. While the market implications of such action are unclear, we can certainly agree that the
extremely low GHG emission targets for the smallest vehicles have been a challenge to meet.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 121-123]
EPA is also proposing to lower the high footprint cut point for trucks. In 2012, the high cut
point was increased in recognition that there were already a number of larger vehicles with
footprints higher than the cut point, resulting in standards that did not reflect their size. There
remain a number of vehicles up to approximately 78 ft2 footprint in the light truck fleet.
Lowering the high footprint cut point would only serve to punish those vehicles. We recommend
that EPA keep the light-duty truck high footprint cut-point at 74 ft2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp.121-123]
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Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
The proposed standards need to limit upsizing as the light-duty fleet electrifies [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
In the past decade the U.S. automotive market has seen a shift towards larger vehicles. The
average footprint for all vehicle types has increased and more and more light trucks are being
sold compared to cars. This has been a major factor for the recent stagnation in real- world fuel
efficiency of the fleet. 17 We applaud EPA for attempting to counter these trends with the
proposed standards and for correcting conditions from past GHG rulemakings that have
exacerbated the issue. Lowering the cutpoints on the light truck curve will reduce emissions by
setting a more stringent standard for the largest trucks, as will the flattening of both the car and
light truck curves and reducing the GHG grams per mile (gpm) gap between them. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
17 https://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends
EPA must correct the slope of its car curve to accurately reflect BEV penetration [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
ACEEE agrees that the slopes of the car and light truck curves that demonstrate the
relationship between vehicle footprint and the relevant emissions targets should reflect rising
BEV penetration over the period of the standards, and that the appropriate slope for ZEVs should
be zero. Tailpipe-only accounting combined with steep curves means that the production of large
ZEVs can generate a considerable number of credits for a given manufacturer, which will
incentivize vehicle companies to upsize their ZEV offerings and ignore improvements to ICEV
options. For an ICEV car curve, EPA has determined that the appropriate slope to avoid
incentivizing vehicle upsizing or downsizing is 0.8 gpm/ft2 and contends that the curve should
be adjusted over time based on the ZEV share of sales. However, the car curve slopes for both
the proposed standards and Alternative 1 are inconsistent with this finding, as explained below.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
Table 1. Car curve slope unadjusted and adjusted for BEV penetration
Model Year Proposed Standard Car Curve Slope (gpm/sq-ft) Expected Car BEV
Penetration Adjusted Slope (gpm/sq- ft) Alternative 1 Car Curve Slope Expected Car BEV
Penetration Adjusted Slope (gpm/sq-ft)
2027
0.64
43%
1.12
0.59
44%
1.05
2028
0.56
51%
1.14
0.51
50%
1.02
2029
0.47
59%
1.15
0.42
58%
1.00
2030
0.43
65%
1.23
0.38
67%
1.15
2031
0.39
69%
1.26
0.34
72%
1.21
2032
0.35
73%
1.30
0.30
74%
1.15
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
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ACEEE calculated the adjusted slopes in Table 1 based on EPA's description of their
methodology in the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA) where a slope of 0.8 is scaled to
0.4 to reflect 50% ZEV penetration (p. 1-7). The adjusted slopes shown in Table 1 are far higher
than 0.8 and rise over time with increases in BEV penetration. If 0.8 is the slope that minimizes
the incentive to upsize or downsize vehicles, then anything higher than that would encourage the
manufacture of larger vehicles and lead to higher emissions. Given that the light truck curve is
based on EPA's car curve but has added offsets, the light truck curve would be similarly
affected. EPA projects that average footprints will rise as a result of the proposed standard,
further evidence that the curves as proposed are too steep (DRIA p.l- 14). We strongly
recommend that EPA flatten both curves to accurately reflect expected BEV penetration in
accordance with its own analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
Offsets for the light truck curve should be decreased to reflect real-world conditions [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
EPA constructs the light truck curve for the proposed standards by adding offsets (in the form
of higher levels of emissions for a given footprint) to the car curve then similarly adjusting it for
light truck BEV penetration. The first offset is for all-wheel drive (AWD) capability. EPA
assumes that crossover vehicles need additional emissions allowances to allow for AWD
capability, which would effectively classify them as truck crossovers (DRIA p. 1-8). This offset is
set at 10 grams per mile (gpm) and is applied uniformly across the entire ICEV-only light truck
curve. However, not all light trucks have AWD and EPA's adjustment to the emissions
allowance is based on an analysis of what is needed to add AWD to a model (DRIA p. 1-8 - 1-9).
Therefore, applying this offset to all light trucks, regardless of whether they have AWD,
unnecessarily increases the allowable emissions level. In 2021, 78% of pickups and 87% of truck
SUVs had AWD while almost 20% of car SUVs and sedans had AWD capabilities. 18 The 10
gpm offset should be reduced to account for this and not further incentivize the shift of cars to
trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
18 https://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends
The second adjustment that EPA makes to the car curve to create the light truck curve is for
towing and hauling capability. To accommodate towing and hauling, EPA increases towing
allowance linearly from 0-63 gpm for light trucks with footprints between 45 and 70 square feet
on an all-ICEV curve. However, EPA assumes that all light trucks need to be able to haul and
tow and therefore applies the allowance across the board . Not every vehicle classified as a light
truck needs to tow or haul significant amounts of cargo. The vehicles that do need to tow or haul
may only do so occasionally, and some may never need to. 19 The 63 gpm offset for the all-ICEV
light truck curve should be lowered to reflect the data on usage of towing and hauling
capabilities by light truck owners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 6-8]
19 https://www.thedrive.com/news/26907/youIt-need-a-Ml-size-pickup-truck-you-need-a-cowboy-
costume
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
vii. The proposed emissions standards are unfounded because EPA fails to explain its
rationale for selecting the proposed emissions control levels.
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EPA provides an expansive explanation of the Proposed Rule in the 263-page Federal
Register notice. But noticeably missing is any explanation of how EPA derived the numeric
emissions standards that the Proposed Rule would establish. The "footprint-based standard curve
coeffcients" for cars and light trucks are clearly presented in the proposal. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29236.
While EPA describes these curves as "targets, rather than standards," the curves effectively
represent the emissions standards because the enforceable obligation for each manufacturer is
derived by summing the actual sales-weighted values derived through application of the curves.
Id. at 29236 n. 405. Because of the ABT compliance provisions, a manufacturer can demonstrate
compliance for its fleet even if each of its vehicles does not meet the emissions limit applicable
to that vehicle according to the curves. But each manufacturer must meet an enforceable in-use
emissions standard for each vehicle type based on the level of emissions to which the vehicle is
certified. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 32-33]
In presenting the curves, EPA discusses a wide variety of relevant factors — including the
upper and lower cutpoints, the slope of the curve, incentives/disincentives for consumer choice
of larger vehicles (and the resulting impact on overall GHG emissions reductions), the impact of
BEVs, and the relationship between the car and truck curves (the later Including consideration of
load and towing capacity). In addition, the preamble includes extensive discussion of the
predicted costs of the Proposed Rule and technical feasibility. But nowhere does EPA explain
how the numeric values of the curves (i.e., the actual GHG emissions rate that would be applied
to each vehicle upon application of the curve) were derived and how those particular values are
justified. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 32-33]
It is bedrock administrative law that an "agency must examine the relevant data and articulate
a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). EPA's failure to do so here renders the Proposed
Rule fatally arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 32-33]
Additionally, the lack of explanation violates EPA's procedural obligation to develop a
statement of basis and purpose that, among other things, explains "the factual data on which the
proposed rule is based" and "the methodology used in ... analyzing the data." CAA § 307(d)(3).
Unless that failure is corrected, API and other interested parties do not have adequate notice of
and opportunity to comment on one of the most fundamental aspects of the Proposed Rule.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 32-33]
Organization: Arconic Corporation (ARCO)
4. Arconic agrees with proposed cut points on the proposed emission target curves.
These cut point changes will limit the future vehicle footprint increases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0741, p. 3]
Organization: CALSTART
12. 1. Close the footprint loophole which incentivizes automakers to classify
vehicles as light trucks resulting in larger, less efficient vehicles that decrease overall
safety for all road users. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 2]
Footprint Loophole
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As the EPA is well aware, SUV and light truck sales have surged over recent decades because
these vehicle types have faced less stringent emissions regulations, leading OEMs to focus on
their sales. While stricter emissions regulations have reduced the missions impact of cars, the
loophole has also decreased new car sales from around 50% to 20% as OEMs prioritized SUVs
and light trucks. These larger vehicles consume around 20% more fuel than conventional cars,
making it especially important to address this loophole. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, pp.
2-3]
1 https://www.wired.com/story/the-us-wants-to-close-the-suv-loophole-that-supersized-cars/.
One possible solution to address the loophole is the changes to footprint-based standards,
which would reduce the "offset" between the car and truck slopes. Extending standards through
2035 would also minimize uncertainty and provide the market ample clarity that it must
transition all light cars, trucks, and SUVs to be zero-emission by 2035. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0618, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Center for American Progress (CAP)
d. Eliminate Incentives to Make Larger Vehicles-In its final rule, EPA should work to
eliminate all incentives to make vehicles larger, including avoiding incentivizing larger ZEVs.
To accomplish this, EPA should remove ZEVs from the footprint curve system entirely. At a
minimum, EPA should credit ZEVs at the midpoint of their respective curves, removing the
incentive to build larger ZEVs. Eliminating incentives to build larger vehicles both increases
pedestrian safety and contributes to the overall success of the rule in decreasing emissions.26
Larger vehicles are on average more expensive and their larger size and corresponding losses in
aerodynamic efficiency are realized by the consumer as reduced range or increased upfront cost
in order to compensate for this inefficiency. EPA should also remove incentives to upsize ICE
vehicles in its final rule. To do so, EPA should further reduce the difference between the car and
truck curves and scale the car curve such that it does not create an incentive to upsize ICE
vehicles. Larger ICE vehicles present the same safety concerns as large ZEVs and also emit more
during operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0658, p. 6]
26 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety and the Highway Loss Data Institute, "SUVs, other large
vehicles often hit pedestrians while turning, March 17, 2022, available online:
https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/suvs-other-large-vehicles-often-hit-pedestrians-while-turning
Organization: Consumer Reports (CR)
6.3. Changes to the Footprint Curves
Overall CR supports the efforts by EPA to eliminate the regulatory incentive for automakers
to shift their fleet mix from smaller cars to larger light trucks. This shift towards larger and less
efficient vehicles has eroded a significant portion of the emissions improvements that could have
been delivered by EPA's past light-duty vehicle GHG standards. A recent analysis by CR found
that while the average fuel economy from new vehicles has improved by 30% from 2003 to
2021, it would have improved by 43% had the fleet mix stayed the same as it was in 2003.44
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, p. 22]
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44 Vehicle Price Trends: Fuel Economy and Safety Improvements Come Standard, Consumer Reports,
February 21, 2023, https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/CR-Vehicle-Price-
Trends-Feb-21-202 3.pdf.
While consumers can and should be able to select the vehicle that best suits their needs, the
EPA GHG program should not provide an implicit incentive for automakers to build and
promote larger and more polluting vehicles. The efforts by EPA to narrow the gap between the
car and light truck curves, and to reduce the slopes of both footprint curves in this current
rulemaking will go a long way towards reducing the incentive for automakers to use mix shifting
as a compliance strategy, but it is unclear if it will completely eliminate the incentive. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0728, p. 22]
CR agrees with the data-driven approach EPA used to identify the appropriate offset for
vehicles with 2-wheel drive versus vehicles with 4-wheel drive. However, there are questions
about the use of towing as a means to define the slope of the truck curve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0728, p. 22]
Most Americans never use their vehicle's towing capabilities.45 Granting vehicles significant
additional emissions allowance for an attribute that is rarely actually utilized by consumers has
the potential to continue to perpetuate the shift towards larger vehicles, without appreciable
improvement in functional utility for consumers. At a minimum, EPA should factor in the actual
consumer demand and usage of towing capabilities into their analysis for the footprint curves, or
consider alternative potential definitions of utility. One alternative would be to consider
combined passenger and cargo volume, which is more likely to be valued and utilized by
consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, p. 22]
45 You Don't Need A Full-Size Pickup Truck, You Need a Cowboy Costume, The Drive, March 15, 2019,
https://www.thedrive.com/news/26907I-dont-need-a-Ml-size-pickup-truck-you-need-a-cowboy-costume.
Organization: District of Columbia Department of Energy and Environment (DOEE)
Footprint Curves
DOEE is generally supportive of the concept of revising the vehicle footprint curves.
Research has shown that vehicle footprint's use in determining compliance can distort
production decisions toward larger vehicles 17, which results in vehicles that are less safe to
pedestrians and bicyclists and also can lead to an emission rebound effect. However, there are
still issues with EPA's proposal. Perpetuating a disconnection between cars and trucks will likely
continue the movement toward larger vehicles, therefore, EPA should apply only one curve to all
passenger vehicles. This curve should either be flat or near flat since vehicle downsizing is a
preferred policy effect that reduces vehicle footprints, and the reduced vehicle footprint in turn
reduces emission rebound effects and dangers to pedestrians and bicyclists that engage in the
truest zero-emission transportation options. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, pp. 5-6]
17 Whitefoot,K.S.,Skerlos,S.J.,DesignincentivestoincreasevehiclesizecreatedfromtheU.S.footprint-based
fueleconomystandards.EnergyPolicy(201 l),doi: 10.1016/j .enpol.2011.10.062
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
VII. Revisions to Elements of the Light-Duty Regulatory Program Are Warranted.
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In addition to promulgating strong emission standards for light-duty vehicles, EPA should
finalize important revisions to the light-duty regulatory program. As detailed below, we
recommend that EPA revise the light-duty footprint curves and ensure that the final standards do
not incentivize larger BEVs. We also urge EPA not to permanently foreclose the possibility of
including upstream emissions in compliance accounting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
57]
A. EPA is correct to address the misaligned incentives present in the current footprint
attribute curves.
As EPA identified in its analysis of the market, sales of utility vehicles have greatly outpaced
the sales of cars (sedans, coupes, etc.) over the past decade. 153 Unfortunately, the design of the
footprint attribute curves underpinning the Agency's GHG standards has played a role in
incentivizing manufacturers to shift market share towards utility vehicles, which generally have
emissions targets much higher than passenger car equivalents. 154 EPA is appropriately
proposing to revise the design of these curves by considering not just what is technically
achievable but also how manufacturers would respond to a given attribute curve, 155 rather than
starting from a broader view of makeup of the current fleet, as was used to originally define the
attribute curves. 156 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 57]
153 DRIA, Section 1.1.1 & 1-4, Figs. 1.1 & 1.2.
154 A review of this evidence is available at Union of Concerned Scientists, The SUV Loophole: How a
changing sales mix is affecting the efficacy of light-duty vehicle efficiency regulations (2016),
https://downloads.regulations.gOv/EPA-HQ-OAR-2015-0827-4016/attachment_2.pdf.
155 "In determining an appropriate slope for the car curve, EPA modeled a range of car slopes to evaluate
the footprint response - that is, to assess the tendency of the fleet to upsize or downsize as a compliance
strategy." DRIA at 1-6.
156 A full discussion is available in Section 3.2 of the RIA to EPA's MY 2012-2016 LDV GHG standards.
U.S. EPA, Final Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards: Regulatory Impact Analysis. EPA-420-R-10-009 (Apr.
2010), available at https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P1006V2V.PDF?Dockey=P1006V2V.PDF. See
also U.S. EPA & NHTSA, Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 35324, 25359-68 (May 7).
1. EPA has appropriately characterized its footprint attribute curve for passenger cars.
In developing the car curve, EPA has appropriately balanced technology-driven emissions
reductions for vehicles of different sizes and manufacturers' likely non-technology responses to
its attribute curves. EPA should finalize these updates to the car curve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 57]
2. EPA has overestimated performance-related emissions when calculating the footprint
attribute curves for light trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 58]
In determining the shape of the light truck attribute curve, EPA has appropriately started from
the passenger car curve, compensating for different features that distinguish a passenger car and
light truck. However, EPA has overestimated the impacts of those factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 58]
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The first characteristic it uses to distinguish a light truck is the addition of 4- or all-wheel-
drive (4/AWD) to a crossover utility vehicle, which shifts a vehicle from the passenger car to
light truck classification. 157 EPA estimated this value in a similar manner to previous work and
arrived at a comparable but slightly reduced value for the difference in C02 values, 158 likely
resulting from improvements in all-wheel-drive packages that have diminished the powertrain
losses associated with the driveshaft and differential. This is a reasonable estimate to use as an
offset, if the offset is applied solely to the share of light trucks with 4/AWD, as EPA has
done. 159 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 58]
157 This is true provided the vehicle also meets the requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 523.5(b)(2).
158 Compare 12.5 g/mi (EPA, DRIA at 1-9) to 14.2 g/mi from UCS, The SUV Loophole, at 3.
159 "Based on this anal'sis, EPA's proposed footprint curves reflect an offset between the car and truck
curves of 10 g/mi for ICE vehicles equipped with AWD." DRIA at 1-9.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure VII.A-1. Maximum tow rating, by footprint
(model year 2019) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 58]
The other additional criterion EPA uses to distinguish the light truck curve from the passenger
car curve is the application of towing. Considering the maximum towing capacity, we were
largely able to reproduce the slope of the curve for maximum towing capacity vs. footprint
independently (Figure VII.A-1). However, maximum towing capacity does not actually reflect
the real towing capabilities of the fleet because the maximum towing capability for a large share
of models is dependent upon additional equipment installation. As a result, EPA is
unintentionally incorporating into its regulatory curves excess performance capability—while
there may be variance for a vehicle's maximum tow capability based on powertrain and
drivetrain, without a tow package (which may include a trailer hitch, changes to wiring to
support connection to a trailer, and an upgraded rear axle), a vehicle's ability to tow may be
significantly more limited (as illustrated in Table VII.A-1). With one ton or more difference
between a vehicle's capability with and without the tow package, ascribing the maximum
capability to all vehicles could unreasonably allow more than 20 g/mi additional GHG emissions
based on the Agency's estimate of 9 g/mi per 1,000 pounds payload. 160 EPA should apply any
adjustment only according to the capability of vehicles as sold in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, pp. 58-59]
160 DRIA at 1-11.
Table VII.A-1. Maximum towing capacity for 10 most popular light trucks with and without
tow packagel61 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 59]
161 These towing capacities reflect the trim variant with the highest towing packages, both with and
without the vehicle's tow package. Many of these vehicles have engine options that offer lower towing
capability.
Vehicle Make and Model: Ford F-150
Maximum Towing Capacity (lbs.)
With Tow Package: 14,000
Without Tow Package: 11,300
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Vehicle Make and Model: Chevy Silverado/GMC Sierra
Maximum Towing Capacity (lbs.)
With Tow Package: 13,300
Without Tow Package: 9,900
Vehicle Make and Model: Ram 1500
Maximum Towing Capacity (lbs.)
With Tow Package: 12,750
Without Tow Package: 10,100
Vehicle Make and Model: Toyota RAV-4
Maximum Towing Capacity (lbs.)
With Tow Package: 3,500
Without Tow Package: 1,500
Vehicle Make and Model: Honda CR-V
Maximum Towing Capacity (lbs.)
With Tow Package: 1,500
Without Tow Package: n/a
Vehicle Make and Model: Toyota Tacoma
Maximum Towing Capacity (lbs.)
With Tow Package: 6,800
Without Tow Package: 3,500
Vehicle Make and Model: Jeep Grand Cherokee
Maximum Towing Capacity (lbs.)
With Tow Package: 7,200
Without Tow Package: 3,500
Vehicle Make and Model: Toyota Highlander
Maximum Towing Capacity (lbs.)
With Tow Package: 5,000
Without Tow Package: n/a
Vehicle Make and Model: Chevy Equinox
Maximum Towing Capacity (lbs.)
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With Tow Package: 1,500
Without Tow Package: n/a
Vehicle Make and Model: Ford Explorer
Maximum Towing Capacity (lbs.)
With Tow Package: 5,600
Without Tow Package: 3,000
In contrast to its application of the 4/AWD emissions factor, EPA did not apply its adjustment
for towing-related emissions in a sales-weighted fashion. By instead applying the assumed
maximum tow capability regardless of application of the towing package needed to support this,
EPA is basing the curve on outsized performance characteristics. Just as EPA did not factor in
whether there might be sports cars or high-output luxury models in determining the passenger car
attribute curve, EPA should limit its assessment of light truck characteristics to only those
features which are actually deployed. While there may be a subset of the market that requires
towing performance, which thus differentiates the light trucks from cars, that additional
emissions offset should be applied on a sales-weighted basis solely to the respective segment
of the fleet that is utilizing the maximum tow package. For the remainder of the fleet, only the
base tow capability should be considered. This will necessarily reduce the slope of the attribute
curve as currently defined. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 59-60]
3. EPA should further reduce the footprint of the cut point for light trucks based on pickup
certification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 60]
EPA has proposed phasing down the footprint of the cut point ("elbow") of the light truck
attribute curve down to 70 sq. ft. The Agency should reduce it further, faster. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 60]
EPA has identified the need for the reduction in the cut point but has mistakenly focused on
the average footprint of full-size pickups as the rationale. 162 While it is true that the average
footprint has increased, and EPA is right to be concerned about incentives to upsize the pickup
fleet, a large part of the reason for this increasing footprint is related to the growing share of
four-door pickups. For example, the Ford F-150 has shifted from a mix of
standard/extended/crew cab split of 17/50/33 in 2012 to 5/30/65 in 2022,163 which increases the
average wheelbase significantly for a standard bed and, thus, the vehicle's footprint. However, it
is not the average footprint that is the relevant factor in setting the location of the cut point, but
the relationship between the certified emissions from a full-size pickup truck and its footprint.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 60]
162 DRIA-at 1-14 -1-15.
163 Data from Wards Intelligence, "U.S. Light Vehicles by Bod' Style, '22 Model Ye'r" and "'12 Model
U.S. Domestic Car and Light Truck Output by Body Style."
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure VII. A-2. 2020 light-duty pickup market share and
emissions, by footprintl64
164 MY 2020 data taken from EPA's CCEMS modeling supporting the 2023-2026 final rulemaking.
https://www3.epa.gov/otaq/ld/EPA-CCEMS-PostProcessingTool-Project-FRM.zip.
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(left) While one-quarter of pickup sales are so-called "mid-size" pickups, the full-size pickup
market in 2020 was highly concentrated around a footprint of 66 to 70 square feet, with 68% of
all pickup sales falling in that narrow range, (right) While some larger pickups exist, those
vehicles have virtually the same emissions because they have similar capability as the smaller
vehicle, even if they have a larger bed and/or cab. This is indicated by horizontal "lines" of dots
(proportional to sales) for a given sub-model trim (e.g., the Stellantis pickups with 410 g/mi).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 60]
The effect of increasing the footprint at which the cut point occurs is to relax the standard for
full-size pickup trucks, particularly those with longer beds and larger cabs, which have larger
footprints. This cut point does not reflect the level of technical feasibility or actual certification
of those larger pickups, however. As can be seen in Figure VII. A-2, pickups of a given
powertrain and towing package configuration are certified to virtually identical fuel economy
and emissions standards, as indicated by the flat rows of dots in Figure VII. A-2 spanning a range
of footprints. This suggests that these larger pickup trucks should have standards consistent with
the smallest full-size footprint vehicles, as was identified when the curves were first designed.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 61]
EPA should move swiftly to set the cut point of its standards at the average footprint of full-
size pickups with a standard cab and bed because any vehicles with a larger footprint will be
certified at virtually identical emissions levels, and it is precisely this flattening that the position
of the cut point of the curve is meant to reflect. That footprint would correspond to 68.1 sq. ft.
for MY 2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-07591]
12. B. EPA should ensure that the final standards do not incentivize larger BEVs.
While we support EPA's incorporation of projected BEV penetration into the slopes of the
footprint curves for the model years covered by the Proposal, we remain concerned that the
Proposal retains the incentive for automakers to manufacture larger BEVs, a trend that has the
potential to erode the environmental benefits of EPA's vehicle standards and that EPA
anticipates will occur under the Proposed Standards. The final standards should incorporate a
regulatory treatment of BEVs that discourages upsizing or selective manufacturing of larger
BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 61]
As discussed previously, we support EPA's proposal to reflect projected BEV penetration in
developing the slopes of the footprint curves. As EPA explains, the curves' flatter slope is "by
design and reflects our projection of the likelihood that a future fleet will be characterized by a
greatly increased penetration of BEVs, even in a no-action scenario." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29235.
Inclusion of BEVs in establishing the curves has the effect of flattening their slope because
BEVs have no tailpipe emissions and therefore factor into the curves at 0 g/mile. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 61]
While it is appropriate to reflect projected rates of BEV penetration in setting the slope of the
footprint curves, it does not follow that it is appropriate to distinguish BEVs based on their
vehicle footprint for purposes of regulatory compliance, effectively "rewarding" larger footprint
BEVs. "From a physics perspective, a positive footprint slope for [combustion] vehicles makes
sense because as a vehicle's size increases, its mass, road loads, and required power (and
corresponding tailpipe C02 emissions) will increase accordingly." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29235. The
corollary, however, is that regulatory distinctions based on vehicle footprint lack a compelling
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basis for BEVs. As EPA notes, "a fleet of all BEVs would emit 0 g/mi, regardless of their
respective footprints." Id. "[FJootprint does not have any relationship with tailpipe emissions
from BEVs." DRIA at 1-6. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 61-62]
Currently, manufacturers receive a considerable regulatory compliance benefit from
producing larger-footprint BEVs: these BEVs increase the average footprint of the fleet and thus
loosen the GHG emissions standard that the overall fleet will be required to meet. Because the
GHG benefit of BEVs does not depend on their footprint and there is no practical need for
crediting larger-footprint BEVs more robustly than smaller-footprint BEVs, the laxer standards
applicable to fleets with larger-footprint BEVs come without any attendant climate benefit. At
the same time, larger-footprint BEVs are likely to be heavier and less efficient, requiring more
electricity to travel a given distance and typically requiring larger batteries and more of the
materials that comprise those batteries, and carrying increased purchase costs. BEV footprint
upsizing has adverse consumer, grid-related, and environmental consequences. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 62]
Concerns about incentivizing a shift to larger BEVs are well-founded. According to EPA's
modeling, BEVs in MY 2032 are projected to increase in size relative to MY 2020. DRIA at 1-
13-1-14, Fig. 1-12. The increase is 1.6 sq. feet for sedans, 1.9 square feet for CUVs/SUVs, and
3.3 square feet for pickups. DRIA at 1-13, Tbl. 1-2. Selective manufacturing of larger-footprint
BEVs—which similarly raises the average footprint of the fleet—is already occurring.
Automaker GM recently ceased production of its lone small-footprint BEV: the Chevy Bolt. 165
GM's remaining near-term BEV offerings are all larger vehicles: SUVs and pickup trucks. 166 A
number of other automakers are also selectively manufacturing exclusively larger-footprint
BEVs, including Ford, which currently produces only an SUV (the Mustang Mach-E) and a
pickup truck (the F-150 Lightning); Rivian, which produces only an SUV (the R1S) and pickup
truck (the R1T); and Volvo, which produces only a cross-over (the C40) and three SUVs (the
XC40, EX30, and EX90).167[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 62]
165 KMstopher J. Brooks, GM to stop making Chevrolet Bolt, its best-selling electric vehicle, CBS News
(Apr. 26, 2023), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/chevy-bolt-end-production-gm-vehicle/.
166 See General Motors, Electrification, EV Spotlight, https://www.gm.com/commitments/electrification.
167 See Ford, Explore Going Electric, https://www.ford.com/electric/; Rivian, Vehicles Made for the
Planet, https://rivian.com/; Volvo, Our Cars, Our Full Range, https://www.volvocars.com/us/.
EPA's final regulations should include a regulatory mechanism that discourages the
manufacture of larger BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 62]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Car vs. Truck Stringency
Ford appreciates EPA's efforts to develop a data-driven, analytical basis for determining the
appropriate relative stringency between the car and truck footprint curves. It is essential to full-
line OEMs that the utility provided by trucks—particularly large pickup trucks—continue to be
appropriately credited in the footprint-based standards. Any changes should made cautiously and
gradually, with awareness of the broader context of the other sweeping changes that automakers
are managing during the timeframe of this rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 5-6]
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Ford believes the following modifications to the EPA's truck utility methodology are
appropriate:
- Increase the 9 g C02/mile per 1000 lbs of incremental towing to 11 g C02/mile to account
for increased road loads on highly capable towing vehicles (e.g., losses from larger brakes, axles,
and engine parasitics). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 5-6]
- Increase the sales weighted towing delta from 7000 lbs to 8500 lbs to better capture the full
range of towing capabilities for full size pickup trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 5-
6]
- Decrease the expected EV penetration rate from 50% to 35% for the harder-to-electrify full-
size pickup truck market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 5-6]
These refinements would result in an approximately 40 g C02/mile difference between the
Car and Truck curves by 2032MY utilizing the maximum footprint of 70 ft2, as shown in the
graph below. Ford would like to continue to work with EPA to fully explain our rational and
recommendations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 5-6]
[See original comment for Graph 1: Vehicle Utility vs Truck Footprint Curves] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 5-6]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
On footprint curves, ICCT commends EPA for its proposed standards becoming increasingly
flat, and we see clear evidence that the car and truck footprint curves could be flattened even
further, as discussed below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 5]
OBSERVATIONS ABOUT PROPOSED FOOTPRINT CURVES
ICCT supports EPA's proposed standards' stringency, as well as the shape of the footprint
curves. Nevertheless, data suggests that the footprint curves can be adjusted both to increase
stringency (within the limits of the proposal) as well as to slow or reverse the trend of upsizing
and the shift from cars to trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 56-58]
ICCT commends EPA for its proposed standards becoming increasingly flat. The proposal to
flatten the curves over time and move the truck cutpoints inwards are a welcome shift that can
help prevent upsizing to some extent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 56-58]
ICCT also commends EPA for reducing the gap between the truck and the car curves, and for
its transparency and request for comments on the development of the truck curve (Preamble
III.B.2.ii; DRIA 1.1.3.2). By EPA's own acknowledgement, and supported by recent data, there
is clear evidence that EPA could flatten both the car and the truck curves even further. This is
discussed below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 56-58]
EPA assumed in the OMEGA model inputs that the willingness-to-pay (WTP) of vehicle
footprint is $200/sq ft, which is "on the low end of the range suggested in the literature (e. a.
Greene 2018)" and recognizes "a higher WTP would create a stronger upsizing tendency, which
would suggest an even flatter "size-neutral" slope". The Greene, (2018) paper cited by EPA
refers to the summary in Whitefoot and Skerlos, (2012) that the average marginal WTP ranges
from $340 to $2,000 for an additional square foot of vehicle size (i.e., the overall length of a
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vehicle multiplied by the width). Considering the potentially wide difference in the average
consumer valuation of vehicle attributes in the literature, EPA could assume the mid-point, rather
than the low end, of the average values of WTP from literature as the basis to determine the
slope of the footprint-based standard curve. As a result, the slope of the passenger cars curve,
which is also used as the baseline to develop the truck curve, would be flatter than the proposed
standard curves. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 56-58]
EPA recognizes that the majority of light-duty vehicles serve to "move passengers and their
nominal cargo" which implies light-duty vehicles "could be represented by a single curve"
(Preamble 29234). ICCT supports the application of a single curve for all light-duty vehicles, due
to the similar purpose and utility across all light vehicles. However, in the absence of a
single curve for all light-duty vehicles, the proposed approach of deriving the truck curve from
the car curve is generally sound. As discussed further below, ICCT recommends flattening the
truck curve further by reducing the offset allocated to trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569,
pp. 56-58]
To justify the truck curve offset, EPA states that it "identified a subset of light trucks.. .which
are more appropriately controlled with a modified set of standards" (Preamble 29234). EPA
identifies these vehicles as those "larger trucks which are designed for more towing and hauling
capability [and] require design changes to allow for handling of these larger loads and this is
reflected in increased engine capability, body-on-frame design, and greater structural mass"
[emphasis added] (DRIA 1.1.3.2, page 1-8). EPA's analysis of fleet tailpipe C02 emissions data
from these vehicles establishes the "utility offset" which is built into the truck curve. (EPA also
analyzed an AWD offset, but this offset is a significantly lower g/mi adjustment than the utility
offset.) Importantly, EPA states: "many crossover vehicles and SUVs exhibit similar towing
capability between their 2WD and AWD versions" (Preamble 29235). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 56-58]
Since many crossovers and SUVs classified as trucks differ from their car variants only due to
the presence of AWD, these truck crossovers and SUVs benefit from the utility offset of the
truck curve, without demonstrating any purported need for such a utility. This leads to targets
that are comparatively easy to meet for these vehicles. EPA further states, "The purpose of
maintaining a unique truck curve is centered around accounting for the utility of [full size
pickups] in particular" (Preamble 29235). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 56-58]
In summary, the utility offset is calculated by and added to the truck curve to specifically
account for the higher emissions of full-size pickups, or body-on-frame vehicles, as these
vehicles are distinguished by "[use] for more work-like activity" (Preamble 29235). Because the
utility offset is based on the vehicles most likely to be used for their higher utility, the offset
ideally would be calculated based on the number of vehicles that meet those criteria. Bearing
these criteria in mind, there is evidence that the utility offset could be adjusted lower. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 56-58]
Although the utility offset is based on pickups, since this offset is added to the truck curve, it
applies to all vehicles classified as trucks. EPA projects that pickups will represent 24% of all
trucks in MY2027-2032.146 Thus, only 24% of trucks meet the criteria EPA used to determine
the utility offset. Furthermore, by MY2030, EPA projects the MY2030 pickup share to be 45%
(EPA chooses MY2030 as a reference point, DRIA 1-12). The initial estimated utility offset of
63 g/mi (DRIA 1-11) could be reduced accordingly to account for the projected share of vehicles
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that actually have higher utility and non-zero tailpipe emissions: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0569, pp. 56-58]
Initial utility offset: 63 g/mi MY2030 pickup share: 24% MY2030 ICE pickup share: 55%
ICE pickup share-adjusted utility offset: 8.3 g/mi [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 56-58]
146 central analysis output file, 2023_03_14_22_42_30_central_3alts_20230314_Proposal_vehicles.csv
Alternatively, the utility offset could be recalculated according to the projected MY2030 sales
share of body-on-frame vehicles, which is roughly one third. Of these, roughly half are ICE,
leading to a body-on-frame-based utility offset of about 11 g/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0569, pp. 56-58]
In addition to the characteristic of having greater structural mass (mainly due to body-on-
frame construction), EPA stipulates that increased engine capability also supports the addition of
the utility offset. However, as discussed previously (see Atkinson cycle and MHEV subsections),
most pickups and large SUVs spend most driving time under low load. Contrary to EPA's
assertion that these vehicles are used for more work-like activity (Preamble 29235), data
suggests truck drivers rarely use the extra utility for which their light-duty trucks are built. One
2019 study found 75% of truck owners tow once or never each year, 35% haul once or never
each year, and 70% go off-road once or less per year.147 In a 2023 report, 63% of F150 owners
were found to tow rarely or never, 32% rarely or never hauled, over half frequently commuted in
their trucks, and 87% frequently used their trucks for shopping/errands. 148 That is, despite
having more capable engines, data supports the conclusion that pickups rarely use this extra
capability. Consequently, when outfitted with advanced engines, such vehicles are likely to
spend more time than cars in highly efficient combustion modes, which are better suited for
lower load driving. Pickups and SUVs also stand to benefit the most from advances in MHEV
technologies. As current MY2023-2026 and proposed MY2027-2032 standards engender
efficient pickups, the real-world utility impact will diminish, due to both greater efficiency and
high share of low load driving. This conclusion further supports reducing the truck utility offset.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 56-58]
147 Berk, B. (2019, March 13). You Don't Need a Full-Size Pickup Truck, You Need a Cowboy Costume.
Thedrive.com. https://www.thedrive.com/news/26907/you-dont-need-a-full-size-pickup-truck-you-need-a-
cowboy-costume
148 Chase, W., Whalen, J., Muller, J. (2023, Jan 23) Pickup Trucks: from workhorse to joyride. Axios.
https://www.axios.com/ford-pickup-trucks-history
Organization: Joshua Linn
1. How Much Do Regulations for Fuel Economy and Emissions Incentivize the
Production of Larger Vehicles?
In Section III.B.2.ii of the proposed standards, EPA "solicits comments on the proposed
changes to the shape of the footprint curves, including the flattening of the car curve and our
approach for deriving the truck curve from the car curve." Using estimated compliance costs
estimated from a recent working paper, I quantify how much the existing footprint curves
incentivize vehicle manufacturers to reclassify cars as light trucks and to increase vehicle
footprint. The implication is that flattening the curves would reduce these incentives. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 4-6]
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Since 2012, vehicle manufacturers have faced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions requirements
that depend on the mix of vehicles sold; a manufacturer that sells larger vehicles and light trucks
rather than cars faces less stringent requirements for GHG emissions. This regulatory structure
incentivizes manufacturers to shift their product offerings to avoid strict GHG requirements,
which potentially increases emissions. Just how strong are those incentives? [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0635, pp.4-6]
1.1. Regulatory Background and Recent Vehicle Size and Class Trends
Safety and technology rationales have driven GHG emissions standards to depend on vehicle
size and class (e.g., car or light truck). Prior to 2012, a single fuel economy standard of 27 miles
per gallon applied to all cars, and about 20-25 miles per gallon applied to all trucks. Reducing a
car's weight and size can both increase its fuel economy and reduce its GHG emissions—making
a vehicle smaller and lighter could help a manufacturer meet both standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0635, pp.4-6]
However, the US Department of Transportation's (DOT) concerns about the safety of smaller
vehicles have led it to discourage manufacturers from reducing vehicle size by setting higher
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) requirements for smaller vehicles relative to larger
ones. In turn, EPA harmonized its GHG standards with CAFE standards by setting weaker GHG
emissions standards for larger vehicles like trucks, given that GHG emissions are inversely
related to fuel economy. DOT and EPA have made the car/truck distinction for statutory and
technological reasons, since vehicle attributes that are common to light trucks, such as all-wheel
drive, increase a vehicle's emissions rate and reduce its fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0635, pp. 4-6]
Since the adoption of size-based standards in 2012, new vehicles have been getting larger, and
sales have shifted from cars to light trucks. Between 2011 and 2022, the average vehicle
footprint (roughly, the area defined by the four wheels) increased by about 4 percent, and the
share of cars in total passenger vehicle sales dropped from about 65 percent to 40 percent. In the
GHG standards that EPA proposed in April this year, the agency notes that the increasing size
and shift from cars to trucks has increased average emissions rates by about 10 percent. [Link:
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635,
pp. 4-6]
1.2. Incentives to Increase Vehicle Size or Convert Cars to Light Trucks
What could have caused the size increase of vehicles and the shift to light trucks? The GHG
regulations themselves could be a factor, since increasing a vehicle's size or converting a car to a
light truck hypothetically would yield extra compliance credits, all else equal (a car can be
reclassified as a light truck if it has all-wheel drive and satisfies a few other conditions).
Consumer demand also could play a role, if consumers want big cars and light trucks and
manufacturers respond to consumer preferences. Production costs also may affect vehicle size.
For instance, lower production costs for larger vehicles may motivate manufacturers to make
more large vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 4-6]
Disentangling these explanations is not easy since we'd have to predict what sizes and
car/truck mix manufacturers would have offered if consumer demand were different or if
emissions and fuel economy standards did not depend on vehicle footprint. But we can get a
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sense of the relative incentive of the existing standards by comparing them with incentives that
instead are created by consumer demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 4-6]
From a regulatory standpoint, the value of making a vehicle larger or converting a car to a
light truck depends on how many compliance credits are generated and the value of those credits.
In recent research [Link: https://www.resources.org/common-resources/can-state-level-
regulations-help-reduce-national-emissions-from-passenger-vehicles/], I estimated those credit
values (other research [Link: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1093/reep/rex010]
has used the few publicly observed trades to estimate those credit values). Table 1 shows how
much a manufacturer would have profited by increasing a vehicle's size or converting a car to a
light truck, based on the credit values and crediting rules from 2022. Note that these calculations
hold all else equal, so the numbers don't account for the decrease in fuel economy that typically
results from making a vehicle larger (and heavier) or converting a car to a light truck. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 4-6]
Table 1. Incentives to Increase Vehicle Size or Convert Cars to Light Trucks
Increase vehicle size Reclassify car
as a light truck
Value of additional greenhouse gas credits $2,679 $3,124
How much consumers would pay $12,264 $8,942
Note: Figures are presented as 2022 dollars.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 4-6]
Table 1 shows that increasing a vehicle's footprint from 45 to 55 square feet generates about
$2,700 in additional credits per vehicle. For reference in terms of smaller vehicles, a Toyota
Prius v has a footprint of 45 square feet, and the Mercedes S-Class (a large luxury car) has a
footprint of 55 square feet. For light trucks, the Honda CRV (a small crossover) has a footprint
of 45 square feet, and the Range Rover has a footprint of roughly 55 square feet. These examples
are meant to contextualize the footprint numbers—remember that the $2,700 refers to
hypothetically taking the Prius v or CRV and increasing its footprint from 45 to 55 square feet
without changing the vehicle's fuel economy or performance. The table also shows that
converting a car to a light truck, again without changing fuel economy or performance, yields
about $3,100 per vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 4-6]
Consumers also incentivize manufacturers to offer larger vehicles and convert cars to light
trucks. Consumers tend to prefer larger vehicles because of the additional cabin and cargo space.
They also may prefer light trucks to cars (all else equal) because of some of the attributes that
trucks tend to offer, such as all-wheel drive or extra towing capacity, or because of differences in
style or perception. I've estimated consumer preferences for vehicle size and all-wheel drive,
which can provide a sense of how much consumers have incentivized manufacturers to offer
larger vehicles or convert cars to light trucks. Table 1 shows that consumers value a car or light
truck that has 55 rather than 45 square feet to the tune of about $12,000, which is more than four
times the value of the additional credits derived from selling a larger vehicle. Likewise,
consumers are willing to pay about $8,900 extra for all-wheel drive, which captures some of the
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value of a light truck over a car, which is about three times larger than the value of the additional
credits for reclassifying the vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 4-6]
Do these numbers represent a big or small incentive for a manufacturer to increase a vehicle's
footprint or convert a car to a light truck? The calculations in Table 1 show that the standards for
GHG emissions and fuel economy have provided a substantial incentive to increase vehicle size
or convert cars to light trucks. The incentives from the regulations are smaller than the incentives
of consumer demand, but several thousand dollars per vehicle could be sufficient to change how
manufacturers approach vehicle size or classification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 4-6]
1.3. Conclusions
When EPA finalizes the post-2026 standards, the agency could reduce the importance of
vehicle footprint or the difference in credit value between cars and light trucks. Such changes
would make it less likely that reclassifying cars or increasing vehicle size would undermine
expected emissions gains of the post-2026 standards. The changes would reduce the incentives
for increasing vehicle size or reclassifying vehicles, not just for gasoline-powered vehicles but
also for plug-in electric models. Any changes in the final standards also could affect the demand
for batteries and critical minerals indirectly, given that larger plug-in vehicles require larger
batteries, which in turn increases vehicle weight and the need for critical minerals. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 4-6]
Organization: Lucid Group, Inc.
Industry commitments and investment in EVs along with both government and industry
investments in the associated infrastructure demonstrate the momentum and capacity to
accelerate the electrification transition. Lucid agrees with the agency and expects that the U.S.
vehicle fleet in the future will be largely electric. Vehicle footprints on U.S. roadways are
steadily getting larger.9 Whether attributable to consumer demand or in conjunction with other
factors, EPA has noted that previously finalized footprint curves may have played a role in
fostering this trend and states that a slope too flat would incentivize overall fleet downsizing,
while a slope too steep would encourage upsizing as a compliance strategy. Lucid believes the
reversal of this trend is highly dependent on the outcome of this rulemaking process and will
require stringent tailpipe emission standards in addition to the mitigation of potential compliance
avoidance strategies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 3-5]
9 The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report, available at
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-12/420r22029.pdf.
Organization: Kate Whitefoot
1. The proposed flatter footprint curves are advantageous to decreasing incentives to further
increase vehicle size. Since MY2008, the light-duty GHG regulations have set different targets
for vehicles depending on the vehicle's footprint (a measure of size computed as wheelbase track
width). A peer-reviewed study by Whitefoot and Skerlos (Whitefoot and Skerlos, 2012) shows
that these standards en- courage automakers to design larger vehicles as a path to compliance.
Specifically, they encourage a combination of adjusting prices to shift demand to larger vehicles
and making adjustments to vehicle footprint during redesign. As EPA's 2022 Automotive Trends
Report shows, sales-weighted average size and weight of light-duty vehicles has indeed
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increased since the footprint-based standards first went into effect. This increase in vehicle size
has been seen across all body-styles from MY2008-MY2022, with the largest size increases in
pickup trucks. Moreover, the share of larger vehicles in the market has grown dramatically, with
a decrease in sedans, and increase in pickup trucks, and a large increase in truck SUVs. In the
proposed regulation, EPA proposes flattening both the passenger car and light truck footprint
curves to decrease this incentive to further increase the size of vehicles in response to the policy.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0703, pp. 2-3]
Recommendation: EPA move forward with flattening the footprint curves for both passenger
cars and light trucks in the final rule to decrease the incentive to increase vehicle size. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0703, pp. 2-3]
2. Differences between the car and light truck footprint curves may still create incentives to
further "upsize" the fleet. Differences in the passenger car and light truck footprint curves - both
in terms of the offset between the curves and differences in slope - can create an incentive to
produce more light trucks or reclassify what would have been a passenger car as a light truck as a
compliance pathway, as pointed out in Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012) and National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2021). In the proposed rule, EPA has decreased the
difference between the car and truck curves and flattened the curves to reduce the numerical
difference be- tween passenger car and light trucks. This is advantageous to reducing these
incentives to shift the fleet further toward light trucks and reclassify cars as light trucks in
response to the policy. However, since light trucks have less stringent GHG targets than
passenger cars, even if they are of identical size, the proposed regulations may still create an
incentive to reclassify cars as light trucks and/or further increase production of light trucks
relative to cars due to the structure of the policy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0703, pp. 2-3]
Recommendation: EPA should consider further flattening the footprint curve for light trucks
or other changes to the structure of the regulation that would disincentivize reclassifying cars as
light trucks and/or further increasing the production of light trucks relative to cars in response to
the regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0703, pp. 2-3]
3. Drawbacks of using footprint as a proxy for towing and hauling capability. EPA describes
that the reasoning for the offset and steeper slope of the light truck footprint curve from that of
the car curve is (in addition to AWD) because of the towing requirements of light trucks, which
may make it more difficult for these vehicles to meet lower GHG rate targets. However, there is
significant variation of towing and hauling ratings of different light trucks of the same size. And,
consumers have a range of preferences for the towing and hauling rating of the light trucks they
consider purchasing. By using vehicle footprint as a proxy for towing and hauling capabilities,
the proposed regulation may create distorted incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0703, pp. 2-
3]
Recommendation: EPA should consider whether using towing and hauling capability directly
as attributes in this or future rules rather than using footprint as a proxy for towing and hauling
capabilities would eliminate incentives to further "up- size" the fleet or otherwise create
unintended shifts in vehicle designs in response to the GHG regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0703, pp.2-3]
Supporting Information [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0703, pp. 2-3]
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We attach as supporting information the following peer-reviewed publications:
References
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2021). Assessment of
Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy—2025-2035. The National
Academies Press, Washington, DC.
Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012). Design incentives to increase vehicle size created from the us
footprint-based fuel economy standards. Energy Policy, 41:402-411. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0703, pp.2-3]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
In addition, the standards immediately increase dramatically in stringency beginning in
27MY, with a resulting 36% BEV requirement. These standards are particularly accelerated for
vehicles classified as light trucks, since the gap between passenger cars and light trucks is
reduced. Mazda believes it is very important that the ramp-up and the light truck gap reduction
should be slower in the early years of the program, as the industry, consumers, and suppliers
adapt to this new reality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
Mitsubishi participated in the develo-ment of - and -upports - the comments submitted by
Auto Innovators. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
In addition, based on its considerable experience discussed previously with BEV and PHEV
leadership, Mitsubishi provides the following recommendations to supplement the comments of
Auto Innovators:
1. Closely align the multi-pollutant emissions standards with President Biden's 2030
goal by assuming no more than 40-50% PHEVs and FCEVs by 2030, even though our
experience leads us to caution that this itself is very ambitious, and is predicated on the
assumption that the necessary supportive policies will be effectively implemented. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
2. Consider the many benefits of PHEVs to consumers and the environment during the
expected period of constrained battery critical minerals production capacity, and how PHEVs are
the perfect stepping- stone to full BEV acceptance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
3. Maintain the current PHEV Utility Factor (UF) and work with industry to identify
opportunities to increase PHEV electric operation. This is the ideal stepping-stone technology to
encourage long-term BEV acceptance and utilization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
4. Keep the proposed approach to determine the passenger car curves, and consider
adjusting the cutpoint and stringency levels of the light-duty trucks during the early years of the
program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
5. Maintain the existing GHG program flexibilities, such as Air Conditioning and Off-
Cycle technologies credits (including the alternative method to apply off-cycle credits), and
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allow previously approved technologies to continue receiving credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0682, p. 2]
6. Align the Tier-4 (criteria pollutants) with CARB's LEV-IV criteria test procedures and
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
7. Consider the impact that very aggressive GHG standards will have on vehicle
affordability, and especially the detrimental impact to low-to-moderate income families.
Regardless of the vehicles that regulation may require us to produce, it is critical that regulators
always keep the accessibility of consumers in mind. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
The rationale for each one of these recommendations is further explained below. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
4. GHG Footprint Curves
Mitsubishi holds a unique position in the industry as the manufacturer with the smallest fleet-
average vehicle footprint. As such, Mitsubishi also has the strictest GHG and CAFE standard
among vehicle manufacturers. Despite having the lowest fleet GHG emissions of any mass-
market vehicle manufactured, Mitsubishi has accrued GHG deficits for MY20 and MY21, while
other manufacturers with higher GHG fleet emissions have accrued credits7. While we
understand the math that delivers this result, we question whether this outcome is what the
program set out to achieve. Mitsubishi supports EPA's reevaluation of the footprint curves, and
the attempt to ensure fleetwide GHG reduction in a neutral manner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0682, pp. 6-8]
6 Excludes BEV-only manufacturers
7 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report
The following section includes suggestions for improving upon the proposed curves. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, 6-8]
12. A. Footprint Curve Slope
The footprint curves were developed to ensure all vehicles large and small are encouraged to
improve efficiency. But the curves must also prevent unintended consequences resulting in total
fleet GHG reductions not meeting the original intended goal. To that end, the footprint curves
should not place larger vehicles at an advantage over smaller vehicles, thereby biassing the
market toward larger, heavier vehicl-s which - even if fully ele-trified - are worse for the
environment that smaller electric vehicles, primarily because of the amount of battery minerals
they use, and the amount of energy needed to propel them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp.
6-8]
In developing the proposed footprint passenger car curves, EPA utilized a "willingness-to-
pay" methodology, which compares the willingness of a consumer to purchase a larger vehicle,
against the additional cost and emissions of a larger vehicle. In addition to willingness-to-pay,
EPA adjusts the curves based on projected BEV sales, which are set at a compliance-value of
zero g/mi. The result is a relatively flat curve compared to previous light-duty GHG regulations.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 6-8]
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Mitsubishi supports an approach for creating a "neutral" slope that balances vehicle size and
emissions improvements, to ensure all vehicles are incentivized equally. Due to the limited
comment period, Mitsubishi is not able to comment on whether EPA has achieved a neutral
slope, but Mitsubishi believes EPA is taking the right approach to achieve this goal, and that the
adjustments made in the proposed passenger car curves are directionally correct. Mitsubishi may
provide EPA additional feedback after the defined comment period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0682, pp. 6-8]
In developing the light truck footprint curves, EPA uses the passenger car curve as a baseline.
EPA then adds two offsets in developing the light truck curves, 2WD vs AWD performance and
towing/hauling capability. Finally, these offsets are reduced by the BEV share expected by
passenger cars and light trucks for the given model year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp.
6-8]
The light truck fleet will be affected the most by this approach by requiring a 21% reduction
in GHG emissions between MY26 and MY27. To date, the light truck fleet between MY12 and
MY21 has, at best, achieved a year-over-year GHG reduction of 4% (MY18)8. As it is proposed,
the standard puts an unreasonable burden on the light truck fleet to achieve historic GHG
reductions in a very limited timeframe. Based on considerable historical performance, a 21%
improvement in one model year is simply not reasonable or achievable, and EPA should
reconsider the stringency increase of light trucks for MY27. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682,
pp. 6-8]
8 Ibid
With the current proposed light duty footprint curve, a typical BEV light-duty pickup truck
could receive a credit of 46 Mg while a typical small CUV would receive a credit of 32 Mg9.
The proposed footprint curves would still result in a considerable incentive to electrify the largest
of vehicles, which typically use more battery resources than a smaller electrified vehicle (see
Figure 2). One possible approach to mitigate this discrepancy could be to adjust the lower
cutpoint on the footprint curve. EPA has proposed increasing the cutpoint to 45 sq.ft. to provide
an additional incentive for smaller Icles which are both economical and fuel efficient. However,
EPA also decided to phase in the cutpoint by increasing the cutpoint by 1 sq.ft. each year, until
achieving a cutpoint of 45 sq.ft. by MY30. To provide additional incentive for these smaller
vehicles, EPA should increase the cut point to 45 sq.ft for all vehicles in MY27, rather than
phasing it from MY27 to MY30. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 6-8]
9 ForMY27: a 69 sq.ft. light truck would earn a credit of 202.2 g/mi/vehicle (~46 Mg/vehicle) and a 45
sq.ft. light truck would earn 140.8 g/mi/vehicle (~32 Mg/vehicle)
[See original for graph titled " Figure 2. BEV Battery System Weight versus Vehicle
Footprint" ]10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 6-8]
10 Survey of BEV Battery System Weight in A2MAC1 Database
Mitsubishi asks EPA to reconsider the approach used in developing the light truck footprint
curve and take into further consideration the over-incentive to upsizing light truck BEVs. In
addition, EPA should consider incentivizing smaller light truck BEVs, as we believe this would
provide a zero emissions benef [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 6-8]
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Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
The proposal would maintain the footprint structure of the existing light-duty standards, but
update the footprint standard curves "to flatten the slope of each curve and to narrow the
numerical stringency difference between the car and truck curves" based on the vehicle
technologies EPA projects automakers will use to comply.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p.
3]
9 88 Fed. Reg. at 29196, 29234.
D. EPA Should Retain the Existing Compliance Flexibilities, Multipliers, Credits, and
Footprint- Based Structure of its Standards.
NADA strongly supports EPA's stated intention to retain the footprint-based structure of its
light-duty standards.70 The vehicle footprint attribute-based framework has worked well to
encourage continuous improvements across all vehicle types, regardless of product mix, to
reduce incentives to downsize or down-weight vehicles (thereby helping to maximize occupant
safety), to spread compliance costs broadly across all regulated OEMs, and to enable fleet mixes
that allow OEMs to capitalize on the critical consumer choice factors that drive successful fuel
economy and emissions improvements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 16]
70 88 Fed. Reg. at 29196, 29234.
NADA strongly opposes any flattening of footprint curves to correspond with projected
increases in new EV market penetration.71 Fleet-wide standards should be technology neutral
and set at levels that are achievable without EVs so as not to penalize those OEMs (and their
dealers) that choose not to aggressively develop, produce, and push EVs to market.72 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 16]
7188 Fed. Reg. at 29234-38.
72 NADA shares the concerns raised by AAI in it comments regarding proposed footprint curve changes.
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
NESCAUM and the OTC also generally support EPA's proposal to revise the footprint
standards for LDVs and work factor standards for MDVs. EPA should adopt footprint curves
that incentivize downsizing of all LDV and MDV types and classes to protect pedestrians and
cyclists. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 9]
Organization: POET, LLC
On Location also finds other technical issues that EPA should further evaluate to support a
robust vehicle GHG regulatory program. For instance, OnLocation finds that if BEV
"penetration is different than EPA projections, then EPA's proposed compliance curves are
likely to be inconsistent with the analysis used in their development and penalize larger footprint
vehicles." 124 OnLocation also finds that additional review by EPA of its battery learning curve
(i.e., the extent to which EPA projects battery costs will decline) is warranted, for reasons
including that EPA could be substantially understating the total cost of the rule. 125 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 27]
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124 Id.
125 Id at 8.
Shape of footprint curve depends on BEV penetration rate
As noted in the Proposed Rule, "The slope that corresponded with a neutral response for ICE
vehicles only (overall, no change in the average footprint of ICE vehicles) was 0.8 g/mi/square
foot. This slope was then scaled down accordingly-for example, based on a nominal BEV sales
penetration of around 50%, this 0.8 slope would be scaled down to 0.4 (based on the remaining
50% of ICE vehicles)."6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
6 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis, 1-7.
The targets defined in the Proposed Rule are a function of vehicle footprint. That is, the
compliance target depends upon the footprint of the vehicle. Figure 15 shows the EPA's
proposed footprint for cars. If the penetration of BEV is much below the proposal, the footprint
target function is too flat relative to the actual market share of non-BEV vehicles, penalizing ICE
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
[See original attachment for Figure 15]
Source: "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty
and Medium-Duty Vehicles," Federal Register Vol. 88, No. 87, pg. 29237. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
Organization: Stellantis
Proposed Standards Tougher on the Most Popular Vehicles
As discussed above, EPA's rule sets aggressive targets for vehicle GHG emissions reductions.
EPA's proposed rule targets fleet performance improvement exceeding a 50% reduction in C02
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 9-11]
Analysis shown in EPA's NPRM showcases industry fleet targets and impacts representing an
aggregate of vehicle types. In reality, an industry or OEM fleet target is actually comprised of
volume weighted targets of different vehicles divided into two separate car and truck fleets.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 9-11]
EPA proposes significantly more stringent standards for trucks and SUVs - the segments
most demanded by customers - than it does for sedans/small cars. As seen in Figure 8 below,
pickup stringency exceeds sedan stringency by 14% in 2027MY, and SUV stringency exceeds
sedan stringency by 10%. In fact, sedan stringency is relaxed in the first year of the rule (by
1%). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 9-11]
Change in GHG Standards Per Year by Vehicle Type (Preferred Alternative)
Figure 8 - Pick-up truck and SUV stringency is more severe than sedans at the start of the
proposed rule
2007
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Total Fleet: -7%
CUV/SUV: -9%
Pickup: -13%
Sedan: 1%
2008
Total Fleet: -13%
CUV/SUV: -13%
Pickup: -13%)
Sedan: -13%>
2009
Total Fleet: -15%
CUV/SUV: -16%
Pickup: -16%
Sedan: -15%
2030
Total Fleet: -8%
CUV/SUV: -8%
Pickup: -9%
Sedan: -8%
2031
Total Fleet: -9%
CUV/SUV: -9%
Pickup: -9%
Sedan: -9%
2032
Total Fleet: -11%
CUV/SUV: -12%
Pickup: -11%)
Sedan: -11%
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 9-11]
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The disproportionate impact of EPA's proposal on different vehicle types can been seen in the
footprint curves in the proposed rule. As seen in Figure 9 below, EPA is applying much more
stringent targets to trucks and large sedans with much less stringent standards for small cars.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 9-11]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR CHART Car Fleet Stringency Curves vs Light Duty
Truck Feet Stringency Curves Figure 9 - Large cars and all trucks face more difficult standards
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 9-11]
As shown in Figure 10 below, taken from the 2022 EPA Trends Report, pickups and truck
SUVs are by far the most popular vehicles demanded by customers, making up over 60% of
industry vehicle sales. EPA's proposed rule disproportionately punishes these vehicles while
giving small sedans relief in initial years of the rule. This results in certain vehicles taking on
more of the GHG reduction burden than others. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 9-11]
Also shown in Figure 10, OEM mix of vehicle types can vary widely, and these differences
drive significant stringency differences when calculating an OEM's overall fleet average target.
As discussed above, the NPRM proposes drastically different stringencies for cars vs trucks. This
stringency imbalance will compound through an OEM's higher or lower mix of certain vehicle
types producing disproportionately easier standards for "car centric" OEMs and harder standards
for truck and SUV biased OEMs. These disproportionate stringencies may result in an
electrification pace that is infeasible for some vehicle types and less challenging for others.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 9-11]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table 3 .4 Model Year 2021 Estimated Real-World Fuel
Economy and C02 by Manufacturer and Vehicle Type and Figure 10 - EPA is proposing more
stringent standards on the trucks and SUVs - the most popular vehicles in the market today
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 9-11]
EPA should apply stringency evenly across vehicle types driving the entire industry at the
same rate of improvement regardless of vehicle types or product mix towards the ultimate goal
of further GHG reductions by 2032MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 9-11]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Tesla welcomes the EPA's proposal to reduce GHG emission standards across the light- and
medium- fleet and to adjust the footprint-based standards curves to reduce incentives to upsize
vehicles. 115 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 16]
115 88 Fed. Reg. at 29196.
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
ZETA supports the proposed revisions to the car and light truck footprint curves, including
the flattening of each slope over the timeframe covered by the standards, and we encourage EPA
to finalize the changes as proposed. As EVs continue to grow in market share, EPA emission
standards should reflect the decreasing disparity in emissions from different sized vehicles within
each vehicle segment. In other words, there are no tailpipe emissions from EVs and as they
become the predominant vehicle technology in automakers' fleets, EPA standards should be
designed to continue incentivizing zero-emission technologies rather than to encourage
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production of larger, higher-emitting ICEVs. To that same end, we support the proposed
revisions to the footprint outpoints as well and encourage EPA to finalize them as
proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 27]
EPA Summary and Response
In the NPRM, EPA requested comment on its methodology for establishing the slopes for the
car and truck curves. EPA received comments from several stakeholders. We summarize and
address a majority of them in our discussion of the derivation of car and truck slopes in Section
III.C.2.ii of the preamble.
Other unique aspects of stakeholder comments are provided here:
In its comments, API argues that EPA did not have any basis or explain how the numeric
values of the curves were derived. API stated "nowhere does EPA explain how the numeric
values of the curves (i.e., the actual GHG emissions rate that would be applied to each vehicle
upon application of the curve) were derived and how those particular values are justified." EPA
disagrees. As the commenter correctly notes, compliance with the GHG program is based on
fleet average emissions values and includes flexibilities for banking and trading credits. As such,
there is no requirement or expectation that any single vehicle will meet its own GHG target. This
is a well-established approach based on previous light- and medium-duty GHG standards (which
EPA did not reopen) and is an important feature of the GHG program, since it gives
manufacturers the flexibility to apply technologies in a way that best meets individual vehicle
product characteristics with their respective business strategies. In selecting the numerical level
of the GHG targets, EPA considered ranges of values both higher and lower than the final
standards and the costs, lead time and emission reductions associated with various levels of
stringency, as well as other factors. These ranges were presented as Alternatives in the NPRM,
and the higher and lower values were excluded considering the balance of factors such as
feasibility and lead time, cost, and safety as described in preamble Section V of the NPRM
preamble. Upon consideration of public comments and our updated analysis based on the best
available information in the public record, EPA refined the range of considered values further for
this final rule with curves and numerical targets that are higher and lower than the final
standards. Furthermore, in addition to the level of the final standards, EPA has described the
technical bases upon which the numerical values for curve slopes and cut points were determined
(as described in Sections III.C.2.ii and iii of the final rule preamble). Throughout the process of
evaluating various levels of stringency and the associated emissions reductions EPA also
assessed each stringency level in consideration of manufacturing costs and lead time. EPA's
selection of the final standards was neither arbitrary nor capricious but firmly guided by EPA's
CAA authority to reduce vehicle emissions, and is fully described in Sections III, IV and V of
the preamble to this final rule and the accompanying RIA.
The Alliance commented that EPA had deviated in its traditional methodology for
establishing footprint curves. The Alliance noted that EPA had historically assessed the
performance of the existing fleet and used the current fleet as a basis for year over year
improvements. EPA disagrees with the Alliance's comments. Although on the surface the
methodology for establishing the curves may look different as compared to previous rulemakings
the fundamental objectives and metrics remain the same. The agency considered various levels
of stringency and the associated emissions reductions with respect to cost of compliance, energy,
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lead-time and safety as well as manufacturing constraints for emerging technology and materials.
The relative increases in stringency of past rulemakings were largely tempered by incremental
improvements in advanced gasoline technology and low to moderate penetrations of
electrification. However, given significant amounts of electrification which support a
manufacturers compliance at 0 g/mile, a methodology which focuses on incremental
improvements in ICE technology is no longer appropriate.
In its comments, the Alliance "disagrees with EPA's assessment that the footprint-based
standards have resulted in a general increase in vehicle footprint as a means to reduce
compliance burden." In contrast, EPA received comments from other stakeholders which
supported EPA's approach to establishing the footprint curves. In its comments, RFF estimated
that increasing a vehicle's footprint from 45 to 55 square feet generates about $2,700 in
additional credits per vehicle. Dr. Whitefoot referenced a peer-reviewed study showing that the
footprint standards have encouraged automakers to design larger vehicles as a path to
compliance.363 EPA disagrees with the Alliance's position. While EPA acknowledges that there
are multiple other factors (target market/consumer preference, profit potential, etc) that might
incentivize a manufacturer to redesign a vehicle with a larger footprint than its predecessor, there
is clear evidence that the average vehicle footprint - for each of the five vehicle classes presented
in the EPA Trends report - has increased since the outset of the footprint-based standards.364
Later, the Alliance commented that EPA's "assumption of rapid EV market share gains across
all vehicle sizes effectively forecloses opportunities for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles that have
some zero-emission operation, but also include ICE operation that would be better suited to a
target curve with some slope." EPA disagrees: there are certainly opportunities for PHEVs to
contribute towards compliance, as they will achieve an appropriate percentage of zero-tailpipe
GHG according to their respective utility factor. In fact, EPA demonstrates through a sensitivity
case that the standards could be met largely through the use of PHEVs, under a scenario where
we held the level of BEVs to those available in the current market; see preamble Section III.F.4.
The Alliance and Stellantis noted that under the proposed standards there was an effective
large increase in truck stringency for the first year of the program due to the change in the slopes
and relative offset between the car and truck curves. As we discuss in Section I.C of the
preamble and more fully in RTC Section 3.3, we have addressed this concern raised by the
Alliance and other stakeholders in our selection of the final standards, which provide adequate
lead time and a slower pace of the standards in the early years of the program.
The following comments address EPA's approach to using towing in the utility offset in the
development of the truck curve:
In its comments, Consumer Reports was supportive of the reduction in both the car/truck
offset and the overall slope; it expressed "questions about the use of towing as a means to define
the slope of the truck curve," while pointing to a survey that shows most Americans never tow.
Instead, CR suggested using combined passenger and cargo volume as an alternative attribute to
towing for purposes of establishing the truck slope. While EPA recognizes there might be other
363 Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012). Design incentives to increase vehicle size created from the us footprint-based fuel
economy standards. Energy Policy, 41:402-411
364 Environmental Protection Agency, "The 2023 EPA Automotive Trends Report: Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Fuel
Economy, and Technology since 1975," EPA-420-R-23-033, December 2023.
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attributes that could indicate an appropriate slope of the truck curve, we believe that towing is
the most appropriate; further unlike other attributes where consistent data across vehicles is
lacking, towing data is available for each vehicle model, and were able to successfully correlate
towing with increased tailpipe C02 (via GCWR rating and required engine torque) as we
describe in RIA Chapter 1.1.3.2.
Dr. Whitefoot outlined the drawbacks of using footprint as a proxy for towing and hauling
capability and highlighted the variation of towing and hauling of different trucks of the same
size. She recommended that EPA might consider whether using towing and hauling capability
directly as attributes in this or future rules, rather than using footprint as a proxy for towing and
hauling capabilities, would eliminate incentives to further "up-size" the fleet or otherwise create
unintended shifts in vehicle designs in response to the GHG regulations. EPA thanks the
commenter for this suggestion. However, as towing and hauling ratings may vary by model and
trim level, these ratings are not as easily verified and may present an opportunity for towing
capability to be added to a vehicle as means of complying with less stringent standards if they
are directly used as attributes that determine a vehicle's C02 target. This may have an
unintended consequence of added weight and reduced aerodynamics and increased vehicle
emissions.
The following comments address the level of the utility offset in the development of the truck
curve:
In its critique of the utility offset for the truck curve, the Alliance claims that EPA "fails to
consider potential differences in overall EV uptake and type of EV uptake in the light-duty truck
fleet." We are interpreting this commenter's remark as asserting that EVs are more suitable for
some market segments and may be preferred in some market segments more than others. While
the OMEGA model does not restrict EVs from any particular vehicle segment within the light-
duty fleet because EPA has concluded that the technology is feasible across the entire light duty
fleet, EPA does recognize that there may be varying consumer preferences for EVs, for example,
between a sedan buyer and a pickup truck buyer. These consumer differences are characterized
in the consumer module of OMEGA, described in RIA Chapters 8.1 through 8.3, and also
discussed further in RTC Section 13.2. EPA anticipates that vehicle manufacturers will continue
to balance their customer product preferences and compliance plans, just as they have
historically done.
In its comments, Ford - while supportive of the general methodology used to derive the truck
curve - suggested modifications to EPA's assumptions used to calculate the truck slope,
including increasing the towing-based C02 offset (from 9 g/mile per 1000 lbs towing to 11
g/mile to account for increased road loads on highly capable towing vehicles), an increase in the
towing delta from least to most capable truck offset, and a reduction in assumed PEV
penetrations (from 50% down to 35%) of full-size pickups. Taken together, all of these changes
to inputs would result in an increase of 40 g/mi to the maximum utility offset. While EPA
appreciates the specific technical recommendations, we have investigated each one and believe
there is insufficient data on which to base changes in these factors of our analysis (and note that
Ford did not provide data upon which to support their technical recommendations), especially
upon consideration of comments from other stakeholders as discussed below.
In contrast, several other commenters (e.g., ACEEE, CR) argued that EPA overestimated the
utility offset, because we did not scale down the offset according to real-world usage data
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indicating minimal levels of towing and hauling. While aware of this usage disparity, EPA
disagrees with this suggestion. Regardless of the amount of time a truck is used to tow or haul in
the real world, the 2-cycle emissions of a vehicle designed for greater towing and hauling will
consistently reflect an increase in tailpipe emissions commensurate with a more capable
powertrain, a heavier frame, and higher road loads (even though it is tested unloaded per the
regulations). In essence, the design changes necessary to enable the more capable vehicle will
continuously impact vehicle emissions independent of the real-time towing/hauling activity, and
thus EPA believes it is appropriate to reflect such utility in the relative C02 targets for light
trucks.
ICCT argued that EPA should not base the full offset on only 24% of the light truck fleet that
is projected to be pickups in MY 2027-2032. Instead, ICCT believes the offset should be scaled
down accordingly. EPA disagrees, as the applied amount of g/mi offset increases linearly with
footprint, and the majority of pickup trucks reside at the maximum footprint near 70 square feet.
Because of the linearly increasing nature of the offset from smallest to largest footprint, the
smaller footprint trucks naturally scale down as they are also reflective of lower utility. The
sales-weighted average footprint of all light trucks was approximately 53 square feet in MY 2022
- so in terms of its overall stringency effect for light trucks under this approach, the sales-
weighted utility-based offset would only average about 1/3 of the maximum offset, or about 10.5
g/mile over the fleet. This is almost the same as the magnitude of the offset that ICCT suggested
(11 g/mile) in their alternative scaling using percentage of body-on-frame trucks as a basis for
the offset.
On the other hand, Environmental and Public Health Organizations also commented that EPA
based its utility offset calculation assuming the maximum towing capacity for each model, which
does not apply to each individual vehicle within towing models. It argued that the maximum
towing capacity is only relevant to those models equipped with additional options (towing
packages, etc). EPA agrees with this comment, although we do not have sales data to identify
exact tow ratings (or a distribution of tow ratings) for all vehicles sold. We recognize that our
assessment of average utility offset might be conservative for this reason.
In its comments, CAP stated "EPA should further reduce the difference between the car and
truck curves and scale the car curve such that it does not create an incentive to upsize ICE
vehicles. " EPA thanks CAP for its comment recommending that the offset be further decreased;
however, CAP did not provide any supporting basis or data for EPA to review in this context.
Regarding the car curve: in RIA Chapter 1.1.3.1, EPA explains the methodology used to
determine a "neutral-slope" car curve. Supported by our modeling analysis, it is EPA's
assessment that the derivation of the neutral slope strikes a balance in neither incentivizing
increase or decreases in vehicle footprint. Overall, the fleet average footprint is projected to
remain relatively unchanged under the final footprint curves.
As we discussed in Section III.C.2.ii of the preamble, upon consideration of all the above
comments in support of both larger and smaller offsets, we believe that the proposed level of
offsets applied to the truck curve are appropriate and are finalizing the offsets between the car
and truck footprint curves as proposed.
Environmental and Public Health Organizations and CAP expressed a desire for EPA to avoid
incentivizing large ZEVs. Furthermore, CAP recommended that EPA should remove ZEVs from
the footprint curve and credit ZEVs at the midpoint of the car and truck curves. As we describe
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in Section III.C.7 of the preamble, EPA is treating all light duty vehicles similarly. Thus, we are
setting the emissions targets for BEVs based on their footprints and including only emissions
measured directly from the vehicle in the vehicle GHG program for MYs 2027 and later,
consistent with the treatment of all other vehicles. We have taken into consideration the goal
raised by these commenters to avoid incentivizing larger BEVs, and we believe our adjustments
to the footprint curves are a more appropriate means of addressing this concern, For further
discussion on comments related to the treatment of BEV emissions in this rulemaking refer to
Section 3.1.5 of this RTC.
NESCAUM / OTC recommended curves that incentivize downsizing of all types to protect
pedestrians/cyclists. EPA's aim in establishing the footprint curves is to neither incentivize
upsizing or downsizing of the fleet. We further consider issues of vehicle safety in RTC section
22.
DOEE and ICCT recommended that EPA adopt a single curve applicable to all vehicles, both
cars and trucks. EPA stated in the proposal that we did not reopen the issue of separate standards
(footprint curves) for cars and trucks. While we are maintaining the two curve standards, as we
discuss in Section III.C.2. of the preamble and Chapter 1.1.3 of the RIA, we are establishing car
and truck curves more appropriate for their respective fleets while accounting for differences in
utility within the footprint-based standards. With these changes, EPA believes the program
mitigates any incentives manufacturers might have had in the prior program to shift regulatory
classes or upsize vehicles as a means of compliance.
ICCT commented that EPA used too low of a willingness to pay (WTP) valuation in its
OMEGA inputs, and suggested that EPA use a higher value, for example, the midpoint of the
range they cited which would be $1170. EPA thanks commenter for the suggestion, but we
consider our WTP to be appropriate at this time.
In its comments, NAD A "strongly opposes any flattening of footprint curves to correspond
with projected increases in new EV market penetration." Similarly, in its comments, POET
stated "If the penetration of BEV is much below the proposal, the footprint target function is too
flat relative to the actual market share of non-BEV vehicles, penalizing ICE vehicles." EPA
disagrees with both commenters claims. As in past GHG rulemakings, these standards are
performance based, fleet-averaging, and technology-neutral. When the curves were first
established, almost every vehicle was a conventional ICE vehicle and steeper slopes were more
appropriate for that type of powertrain as those vehicles emitted more GHG on a g/mile basis and
emissions rates were more sensitive to increases in footprint. However, with cleaner vehicle
technologies, regardless of the powertrain (with BEVs as the extreme case of 0 g/mi tailpipe),
vehicle emissions are less sensitive to increases in footprint, and the slope will appropriately
become flatter as a byproduct of a more stringent fleet average. In short, the stringency defines
the slope rather than an example BEV penetration which might be achieved to comply with that
stringency. There should be no difference in the curve slope amongst complying fleets of
different BEV penetrations and technology mixes which achieve the same fleet stringency.
3.2.2 - MDV work factor curves; work factor definition
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Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Alliance)
B. Major Concerns with the Proposed Medium-Duty GHG
Standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 192-193]
1. Too Stringent of a GHG Standard
EPA has set too difficult of a GHG target for medium-duty vehicles. The proposal, shown in
Figure 69 below, requires a 37% GHG reduction from 2028MY to 2032MY, with an additional
6.1% burden on 2027MY gas engines with a retroactive change to the previously published GHG
standards to achieve fuel neutral standards. The agency relies on flawed modeling that results in
overly aggressive EV penetration estimates to develop the work factor standards. The overall
stringency is harder still with the proposed early removal of EV multipliers, capping GCWR
contribution to work factor, and adjustments to the Medium-Duty Passenger Vehicle Definition.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 192-193]
[See original attachment for Figure 69: EPA Proposed Medium-Duty GHG Standards (2027-
32MY)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 192-193]
2. Assumes overly aggressive EV penetration (98% EV cargo vans)
EPA, through modeling, has forecast an unreasonably high EV penetration. This is
particularly true for Medium-Duty cargo vans. For example, Figure 70 below shows the results
of EPA's Omega modeling for Industry compared to CARB's HD ZEV rule. While we agree that
last mile delivery is a great opportunity for electrification, it is preposterous to believe that
nationwide electrification of cargo vans will outstrip CARB requirements by 20% in 2027,
almost 50% in 2030 and over 60% in 2032. Similarly, it is unrealistic and infeasible for new
cargo vans sales to reach 98% EV in 2032 (starting from essentially 0% today in EPA's model).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 192-193]
[See original attachment for Figure 70: Comparison of electrification -EPA OMEGA Forecast
vs CARB HD ZEV rule] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 192-193]
Light-duty electrification is already well under way and has been progressing for about 20
years. Plus, the Administration set a stretch goal of 40-50% electrification by 2030. It does not
make sense to estimate 92% electrification of this MDV segment in 2030MY when it is only just
starting to introduce EVs in the formative years of the rule. There is no empirical support for a
forecast of such rapid market adoption. Further, public charging infrastructure will not generally
be practical to delivery companies. This means a massive installation of charging infrastructure
on private property will be required within a few years. It has not, however, begun in a
meaningful way. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 192-193]
For EPA's forecast to be true, it would have to apply to not just the well-known last mile
delivery companies, but also to many small businesses such as HVAC, plumbing, and flower
delivery. It is very unlikely that such small businesses will be near EPA's assumed EV
penetration rate for cargo vans. Based on the above, at most, EPA should model industry as just
meeting CARB's requirements each year, with no more than one half of the estimated
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electrification in states that do not adopt CARB's rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
192-193]
EPA attempts to justify reopening of the published HD Phase 2 final rule due to its anticipated
levels of electrification of medium duty vehicles in 2027MY, as shown in Figure 71, below.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 192-193]
[See original attachment for Figure 71: EPA Table 13-132, Projected BEV Penetrations,
Proposed Standards - MDVs]298 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 192-193]
298 Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis, p. 13-53.
3. Weight Impacts of Proposal
Manufacturers recommend that EPA not limit GCWR beginning in MY 2030 in the Work
Factor equation. The EPA proposed action interacts with MDPV definition, and creates more
stringent standards for high GVWR, high GCWR vehicles when compared to lower GVWR,
high GCWR counterparts. If EPA would like to limit GHG targets for high work factor vehicles,
manufacturers recommend that EPA do that directly, like how EPA limits GHG targets for high
footprint vehicles in light-duty. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 194]
Manufacturers recommend that EPA consider the extent to which pickups may "weight out"
to Class 4, if equipped with battery electric vehicle technology, while retaining the capability of
Class 3 internal combustion engine vehicles common in the market today. In other words, to
maintain these vehicles' work functionality, a larger (heavier) battery will be needed, resulting in
possibly increasing vehicle weight to exceed the Class 3 category. To the extent that adopting
ZEV technology would shift vehicles to different regulatory (weight) classes, EPA should take
this into account when setting standards by either offering manufacturers flexibilities on
regulatory groupings or by setting stringency that reflects the vehicles remaining in the
regulatory set, after manufacturers incorporate ZEV technology. This concern is also discussed
below under the MDPV definition section. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 194]
Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
Medium-duty pickups need to electrify faster
The proposed standards for medium-duty vehicles (MDVs) are premised on 46% BEV
adoption by MY 2032 (FR 29331), well below the 67% BEV penetration anticipated for LDVs.
EPA expects MDV electrification to be driven by vans, 98% of which would be electric by MY
2032. Pickups, which account for almost two-thirds of MDV sales (DRIA Table 3-1), would
reach only 19% electrification. EPA should adjust penetration estimates for these large pickups.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 8-9]
It is not clear from the proposal or DRIA how EPA arrived at such low medium-duty pickup
electrification projections. These projections stand in sharp contrast with those for light-duty
pickup electrification, which would reach 68% in 2032 (FR 29329 Table 80). Not long ago, full-
size light-duty pickups were viewed as unlikely candidates for electrification. That concern was
not borne out, as evidenced by several recent popular releases. EPA projects an average footprint
of 69.1 square feet for BEV pickups in MY 2032 (DRIA 1-14), placing the average BEV pickup
well into the full-size pickup range. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 8-9]
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Medium-duty BEV pickups are not yet on the market, and skepticism regarding their
imminent arrival is common, based largely on high towing requirements common for these
trucks. Yet at this juncture, it is reasonable to anticipate that their electrification potential would
approach that of full-size light-duty pickups. EVs excel at providing the torque needed for
towing, so the challenge for electric medium-duty pickups is not capability to tow but rather
towing range, i.e., battery capacity. Even vehicles requiring high towing capacity may not need
to tow their loads for extended distances; many medium-duty pickups are engaged in mining,
construction, and utility work, where towing needs may be for work on site, rather than for
accessing the site. EPA should segment medium-duty pickups by application and by towing and
range requirements and assess their electrification potential accordingly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0642, pp. 8-9]
California's Advanced Clean Trucks program requires 40% of Class 2b-3 pickups to be ZEVs
in 2032. After considering the various applications of these trucks in California, over 70% of
which were for personal use, and following developments in the electric truck market, CARB
decided to accelerate requirements for Class 2b-3 pickups to start in MY 2024 instead of waiting
until 2027 as initially proposed.20 California's Advanced Clean Fleet program also will require
about 40%) of pickups to be ZEVs by 2032 under the EV milestone option.21 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0642, pp. 8-9]
20 https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/regact/2019/act2019/fsor.pdf
21 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/acf22/fsor.pdf Table IV-8
Moreover, EPA's heavy-duty Phase 3 proposal finds electrification potential rates for all
categories of heavy-duty trucks, ranging from Class 4 versions of medium-duty pickups to tow
trucks to long haul tractors, higher than the 19% projected for medium-duty pickups in MY
2032. This is further evidence that EPA should consider in more detail the actual requirements
for medium-duty pickups and the extent to which BEVs might meet those needs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 8-9]
Finally, for those medium-duty pickups that must tow heavy loads long distances, both plug-
in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and fuel cell vehicles (FCEVs) should be considered. As
EPA notes, PHEVs may be well suited to Class 2b pickups (DRIA 3-11). We urge EPA to
incorporate in the final rule findings from contract work now underway to investigate the
potential for PHEVs in pickup applications (FR 29298), including by adding PHEVs as a
compliance option and increasing the stringency of MDV standards to the extent appropriate.
Similarly, EPA should include an analysis of fuel cells for high-mileage, high-towing pickups.
EPA's heavy-duty Phase 3 proposal projected that 25% of long haul tractors could be FCEVs by
MY 2032, indicating confidence that any infrastructure and cost challenges associated with
FCEVs can be addressed by then. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 8-9]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
VIII. Stronger GHG and Criteria Pollutant Standards for Medium-Duty Vehicles Are
Feasible.
We now turn to EPA's proposed emission standards for medium-duty vehicles. Below, we
examine the combustion vehicle and zero-emission technologies that can further reduce GHG
emissions from the medium-duty fleet, comment on EPA's modeling, address economic
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considerations, and make suggestions on certain aspects of EPA's regulatory program. We also
offer recommendations for the Tier 4 NMOG+NOx standards and PM requirements. As detailed
below, strong GHG and criteria pollutant emission standards for MDVs are feasible and cost-
reasonable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 64]
A. EPA must strengthen its GHG standards for MDVs.
EPA's proposed GHG standards for MDVs significantly underestimate the potential for
feasible emissions reductions from the Class 2b-3 fleet, particularly pickup trucks. EPA has
primarily focused on the electrification of MDVs in setting its standards. 169 However, not only
has it underestimated the share of MDVs that could be electrified, it has underestimated the
technologies available to reduce GHG emissions from gasoline- and diesel-fueled vehicles. EPA
should adopt more stringent final standards for MDVs that reflect greater application of both the
zero-emission powertrain and conventional emission control technologies that are feasible and
widely available. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 64]
169 DRIA at 1-21: "The feasibility of the 2027-2032 GHG standards is based primarily upon an assessment
of the potential for a steady increase in MDV electrification, primarily within the van segment."
1. The combustion vehicle technology pathways show the feasibility of stronger standards.
EPA proposes as its 2027 standard the current (Phase 2) standards for diesel pickups and
vans, and then adjusts those standards in the future based on assumptions about the level of
electrification within the fleet. In fact, in EPA's modeling, combustion MDVs actually increase
average direct tailpipe emissions by 1.5% between 2022 and 2032, with the increase being even
larger for the Phase 2 baseline. The modeling thus indicates that no technological improvements
to combustion MDVs are needed to comply with even the existing Phase 2 standards through
2027.170 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 64]
170 This remains true for the "No IRA" sensitivity, though there is virtually no difference in the assumed
production of electric MDVs between the default modeling run and this sensitivity case, indicating the
degree to which electrification is expected to take off in the commercial van space due to improved TCO.
Subsequent to finalization of the Phase 2 standards in 2016, a number of technologies have
been developed that EPA did not originally consider in establishing those standards; nor were the
Phase 2 standards predicated on the full adoption of even those technologies that were identified
at the time. As EPA noted in its Phase 3 heavy-duty vehicle proposal: "In developing the Phase 2
C02 emission standards, we developed technology packages that were premised on technology
adoption rates of less than 100%. There may be an opportunity for further improvements and
increased adoption through MY 2032 for many of these technologies included in the heavy-duty
(HD) GHG Phase 2 technology package used to set the existing MY 2027 standards." 171 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 65]
17188 Fed. Reg. at 25960.
By ignoring technologies for Class 2b-3 combustion vehicles that could achieve emissions
reductions beyond the Phase 2 standards, EPA is setting its MDV standards below a level of
readily achievable technology adoption (and, indeed, many of these technologies are already
being deployed). Below, we walk through a number of the technologies that EPA should assume
will be deployed by MDV manufacturers in the timeframe of the MDV Proposal. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 65]
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a. EPA should consider additional compression-ignition (diesel) engine technologies.
Manufacturers of diesel engines for Class 2b-3 pickups and vans will deploy new engines in
order to meet the 2027 NOX standards that EPA finalized last year. 172 However, the Agency's
modeling assumes that diesel vehicles will reduce GHG emissions by less than 1% from 2022 to
2032. This leaves a tremendous amount of technology on the table, not just from what the
Agency identified in the Phase 2 rulemaking and assumed would be needed to meet the standards
already on the books, but also from additional improvements that have been developed since
then. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 65]
172 See 88 Fed. Reg. 4296.
Diesel engine efficiency continues to increase, with HHD (Class 8) diesel engines
demonstrating up to 55% brake-thermal efficiency (BTE) in response to the second phase of the
SuperTruck program. The Navistar and Cummins/Peterbilt teams demonstrated 55% BTE,
compared to the 50% target for the first phase, while Daimler, Volvo, and PACCAR all
demonstrated over 50% BTE, with a clear pathway towards the 55% target. The PACCAR
team's progress is particularly illuminating, as they undertook an additional challenge to meet
"ultra low NOX" targets consistent with EPA's recent regulation as part of their overall
efficiency effort, indicating that these levels of thermal efficiency are not incompatible with
achieving the 2027 NOX standards. 173 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 65-66]
173 See Zukouski, Russ, Navistar SuperTruck II: Development and demonstration of a fuel-efficient class
8 tractor & trailer, DOE Annual Merit Review, (Jun. 21-23, 2022)
https://wwwl.eere.energy.gOv/vehiclesandfuels/downloads/2022_AMR/acel03_%20Zukouski_2022_o_4-
29_1232p m_ML.pdf; Mielke, David, 2022 Annual Merit Review: Cummins/Peterbilt SuperTruck II, DOE
Annual Merit Review, (Jun. 21-23, 2022)
https://wwwl.eere.energy.gOv/vehiclesandfuels/downloads/2022_AMR/acel02_dickson_2022_o_rev2%20
-%20Trai lLife-GCCC%20IN0110%20REVISED.pdf; Bashir, Murad, etal., Daimler: Improving
transportation efficiency through integrated vehicle, engine, and powertrain research - SuperTruck 2, DOE
Annual Merit Review, (Jun. 21-23, 2022)
https://wwwl.eere.energy.gOv/vehiclesandfuels/downloads/2022_AMR/acel00_Villeneuve_2022_o_4-
301116am_ ML.pdf; Bond, Eric, et al, Volvo SuperTruck 2: Pathway to cost-effective commercialized
freight efficiency, DOE Annual Merit Review, (Jun. 23, 2022)
https://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/downloads/2022_AMR/acel01_bond_2022_o_5-
l_129pm_ML.pdf; Meijer, Maarten, Development and demonstration of advanced engine and vehicle
technologies for class 8 heavy-duty vehicle ([PACCAR] SuperTruck II), DOE Annual Merit Review (Jun.
21-23, 2022),
https://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/downloads/2022_AMR/acel24_Meijer_2022_o_4-
29_1056pm_KF. pdf.
Significant improvements in efficiency are not limited to the largest engines and can also be
feasibly deployed on Class 2b-3 vehicles. Ford's latest iteration of its 6.7L Power Stroke diesel
engine cut GHG emissions by 3.5% over the previous generation when it was introduced in
2020, and 2023 saw an additional 3% improvement due to a revised injection system. 174
General Motors released its new 6.6L Duramax diesel engine in 2023 with improved cylinder
heads, fuel injection, and other features in a design that is meant to increase both power and
efficiency, particularly at higher output. 175 These engine improvements are already being
deployed today but are not captured in the Agency's OMEGA2 modeling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 66]
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174 To assess these improvements, we refer to the combined transient cycle certification results for the
MHD Power Stroke family of diesel engines available in the chassis cab/F-650 and F-750 configurations.
The engines available in the heavy-duty pickups are not required to certify to isolated engine tests, but are
likely to see similar levels of improvement, even with the higher power output, since they also have the
same underlying technology.
175 GMC Pressroom, The Ultimate Heavy Duty: GMC Introduces its Most Luxurious, Advanced and
Capable Sierra HD Ever (Oct. 6, 2022),
https://media.gmc.com/media/us/en/gmc/home.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2022/oct/1006-
sierra.html. It is difficult to compare apples-to-apples between the new and old Duramax engines due to
limited certification data and because some of that efficiency improvement was used to reduce tailpipe
NOx, since the new diesel-equipped Silverado/Sierra HD 2500 have a reduced NMOG+NOx bin of 200 vs.
250 mg/mile. Additionally, because the standards are set by "work factor," the increase in power used to
raise towing capacity by 4000 pounds increases the allowable emissions for the engine, which means that
despite an apparent increase in certified C02 emissions of 2.4%, there could be a net improvement in
compliance of up to nearly 5% as the result of up to a 7% increase in the model year 2023 emissions target.
Mild electrification also offers increased emissions reduction capabilities. Eaton demonstrated
that it is possible to outperform simultaneously the 2027 NOx standards and the Phase 2 C02
standards through a number of different aftertreatment and powertrain combinations, 176
including those applicable to Class 2b-3 vehicles. A recent research paper by Eaton demonstrates
various combinations of control technologies manufacturers can target C02 and NOx emissions
levels over different regulatory cycles to develop a technology package that is suitable for
compliance, including packages that can achieve C02 reductions beyond Phase 2 while meeting
EPA's future 2027 NOx standards. 177 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 66-67]
176 See generally Dorobantu, Mihai, Eaton considerations on MD/HD GHG Phase 3, OIRA-Eaton
meeting, (Mar. 23, 2023),
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoDownloadDocument?pubId=&eodoc=true&documentID=215442
177 McCarthy, J., et al. 2023. "Technology levers for meeting 2027 NOX and C02 regulations." SAE
Technical Paper 2023-01-0354. https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0354.
One of the strategies deployed by Eaton is a 48V electric heater, which could be deployed
easily with a 48V mild hybrid powertrain, again illustrating the complementary technology
packages available to manufacturers to simultaneously meet GHG and NOx standards. The 48V
mild hybrid powertrain can power accessories, including those related to emissions control, and
can also help reduce engine-out NOx. This was also demonstrated through testing by FEV as a
strategy particularly relevant to medium-heavy-duty vehicles that share chassis and power
requirements with the Class 2b-3 pickups and vans covered by this proposal. 178 Such
developments should be incorporated into the Agency's analysis of the level of emissions
reductions achievable from diesel-powered Class 2b-3 vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 67]
178 Fnu, D., et al. 2023. "Application of 48V mild-hybrid technology for meeting GHG and low NOX
regulation for MHD vehicles." SAE Technical Paper 2023-01-0484. https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0484.
In the Phase 2 rulemaking, EPA excluded cylinder deactivation from medium-duty diesel
engines, 179 but its own analysis now shows that manufacturers are likely to deploy that
technology to meet the heavy-duty NOx standards. 180 Similarly, a recent report by Roush
identified cylinder deactivation as a likely engine configuration for many Class 2b-3
vehicles. 181 The Agency should consider this technology in its OMEGA2 modeling, further
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increasing the available emissions reductions technologies for diesel-powered vehicles. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 67]
179 81 Fed. Reg. at 73754, Table VI-4. Note, however, that the agencies did consider a "right-sizing" of
diesel engines, based on a 4-cylinder vs. 6-cylinder engine, and cylinder deactivation could be seen as a
control-based attempt to yield the equivalent improvement without altering the maximum output. See
NHTSA, Commercial medium- and heavy-duty truck fuel efficiency technology study - Report #2, U.S.
Dep. of Transportation, 52-53 (Feb. 2016),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/812194_commercialmdhdtruckfuelefficiency.pdf.
180 EPA, Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards,
Regulatory Impact Analysis, at 108-131 (Dec. 2022),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1016A9N.pdf.
181 Himanshu Saxena et al., Electrification Cost Evaluation of Class 2b and Class 3 Vehicles in 2027-
2030, Roush, at 24-25, 28-30 (May 2023),
https://cdn.mediavalet.eom/usva/roush/rOYBSBBvOOedOiBP759yoA/3Hcv7F_W-
OG9ekOODPgNMg/Original/Elect rification%20Cost%20Evaluation%20of%20Class%202b-
3%20Vehicles%20in%202027-2030_ROUSH.pdf. [hereinafter Saxena et al., Electrification Cost
Evaluation],
b. EPA should consider additional spark-ignition (gasoline) engine technologies.
Another significant opportunity for increased improvement to combustion vehicles lies in
spark-ignition (SI) engines, for which Phase 2 required no engine improvements beyond the
2016 SI engine standard. While this is somewhat rectified in EPA's move to a fuel-neutral
standard for Class 2b-3 pickups and vans—which effectively results in a 5-6% increase in
stringency for MDVs—this still does not fully recognize the potential improvement available
from gasoline engines. And in fact, in the Agency's modeling, gasoline vehicles see, on average,
5% higher emissions in 2032, compared to 2022.182 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 67-
68]
182 Because the model preferentially selects vans for electrification, some of this decrease is related to a
shift in the vehicles included in the remaining gasoline fleet. However, even when limited to gasoline
pickups there is an apparent backsliding in emissions, with an increase of 3%. This is similar to the
backsliding that appears in the modeling of light-duty vehicles (see Section VI.A.2).
The weakness in EPA's Phase 2 targets for SI engines and vehicles is apparent in looking at
manufacturers' growing bank of compliance credits to-date, particularly for Ford Motor
Company, the largest SI engine supplier. Ford has run a credit surplus in every year of the
vocational engine program, but this surplus exploded in MY 2020 with the release of its latest
7.3L V8 engine, codenamed "Godzilla." 183 Even though the engine platform is relatively low-
tech (naturally aspirated, pushrod V8), by utilizing variable cam timing and a variable-
displacement oil pump, Ford's engine achieved a significant improvement in efficiency. The
engine was also designed with fuel economy at load in mind for applications like towing. A
smaller engine built on the same platform replaced the older base engine in 2023, no doubt
increasing Ford's overcompliance and increasing the efficiency of even more of the MDV fleet.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 68]
183 EPA, Final Phase 1 EPA Heavy-Duty Vehicle and Engine Greenhouse Gas Emissions Compliance
Report (Model Years 2014-2020), Appendix B, at 40-42 (Nov. 2022)
https://nepis.epa.gOv/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P 1016962.PDF?Dockey=P1016962.pdf.
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General Motors is not standing still, either—its fifth-generation small-block V8 platform is
getting a next generation update to a 5% improvement over the current generation, 184 and the
current generation is already a credit generator for GM's heavy-duty vehicles under the Phase 2
program. 185 No further details are available about the heir to the current iron-block direct-
injection L8T variant found in GM's heavy-duty offerings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
68]
184 Wren, Wesley, This is why GM is launching a new small block V8, Autoweek, (Feb. 3, 2023)
https://www.autoweek.com/news/industry-news/a42746723/why-gm-is-launching-a-new-small-block-v8/.
185 EPA, Final Phase 1 EPA Heavy-Duty Vehicle and Engine Greenhouse Gas Emissions Compliance
Report (Model Years 2014-2020), Appendix B, at 43.
Note that neither of these new improvements reflect technology adoption that was further
anticipated for gasoline engines when the Phase 2 regulations were finalized. EPA assumed that
cylinder deactivation (discrete or continuous), downsizing, and mild and strong hybridization
would be used to meet those standards, 186 yet none have yet been deployed in Class 2b-3
pickups and vans. This further underscores the significant amount of emissions reductions that
are still readily achievable for Class 2b-3 vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 68]
186 81 Fed Reg. at 73776, Table VI-13.
Organization: Ford Motor Company (Ford)
Medium-Duty Vehicle GHG Stringency
Ford does not support EPA's proposal to limit the gross combined weight rating (GCWR)
input into the work factor equation to 22,0001b. EPA's stated goal with this proposed
modification is "to prevent increases in the GHG emissions target standards that are not fully
captured within the loads and operation reflected during chassis dynamometer GHG emissions
testing." However, work factor is not only used in determining MDV GHG emissions targets—it
is also part of determining whether a vehicle in the 8,501-14,0001b gross vehicle weight rating
(GVWR) range is an MDV or an MDPV in EPA's proposed revisions to the MDPV definition.
Limiting work factor by capping GCWR input may reclassify MDVs as MDPVs in ways
contrary to EPA's stated goals of capturing vehicles that "do not have significant work
capabilities (e.g., towing and hauling), as measured by the work factor, relative to other vehicles
in the MDV category." This would be an inappropriate and inaccurate comparison to make if
work factor, the basis of the comparison, is not calculated in the same way over time. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 9-10]
To meet EPA's stated goal and ensure that manufacturers do not "generate windfall
compliance credits for higher GCWR ratings," it would be more straightforward to modify the
structure of MDV GHG standards directly. As one possibility, rather than a linear equation with
the C02 g/mi standard constantly increasing as a function of work factor, the C02 standard
could increase linearly only up to a certain work factor value, after which it would remain
constant even if work factors continued to increase. In this way, EPA could address increases in
GHG emission standards due to increasing GCWRs without distorting the use of work factors in
other areas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 9-10]
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Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
MEDIUM-DUTY VEHICLES
ICCT supports EPA's proposed standards for MDVs but believes the available evidence could
justify greater stringency than proposed. ICCT also recommends the MDV standards be fuel
neutral and require public availability of MDV-related data (sales, emissions, fuel consumption,
vehicle attributes/technologies). 152 These recommendations form the basis for ICCT's
comments on the proposed MDV standards, discussed further below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 60-62]
152 Lutsey. N. (2015). Regulatory considerations for advancing commercial pickup and van efficiency
technology in the United States. International Council on Clean Transportation.
https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/ICCT_pickup-van-efficiency_20150417.pdf
Stringency
ICCT supports the proposed MDV standards but believes they could be strengthened. The
proposed standards would not require as high GHG reductions for MDVs as for light-duty
trucks. The proposed MDV standards, if finalized, would require a net 36.5% improvement in
tailpipe C02 emissions, for a given work factor over MY2027-2032. This total improvement is
much higher than that required by the current Phase 2 standards. However, the proposed LD
truck standards require a total 46% improvement for a given footprint over MY2027-2032. This
level of improvement comes after years of increased efficiency required by MY2017-2026
regulations. Figure 16 compares the 2-cycle C02-e emissions of ICE LD pickups, MD vans, and
MD pickups versus footprint. Each datapoint represents a single ICE model as calculated by
OMEGA in MY2022 (baseline MY2021 emissions values are not available for all models, and
OMEGA projects virtually 0% BEV share of these segments in MY2022). Since MD vehicles
are tested at higher weight than LD vehicles, to compare MD and LD data, the emissions data of
MDV were adjusted downwards assuming a test weight equal to curb weight plus 300 lbs
(equivalent to the LD test weight). It was assumed that for every 10% reduction in test weight,
C02 emissions decreased by 4%. 153 Solid-filled points represent a single model, and pattern-
filled points represent the sales-weighted average emissions in MY2022, and the projected
emissions in MY2032 to comply with the standard. 154 Projected emissions were calculated
based on the proposed standard curves for MY2032 assuming constant footprint (for LD
pickups) or constant work factor with average test weight adjustment (for MD vehicles). As the
figure shows, LD pickups are more efficient than similarly sized MDV, and the required
improvement over the course of MY2022-MY2032 is much higher for LD than for MD. The
different utility of LD vs MD notwithstanding, due to years of lagging behind the stringency
levels of LDV, there are opportunities for increasing the stringency of the MD standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 60-62]
153 Isenstadt, A. and German, J (ICCT); PiyushBubna and Marc Wiseman (Ricardo Strategic Consulting);
Umamaheswaran Venkatakrishnan and Lenar Abbasov (SABIC); Pedro Guillen and Nick Moroz (Detroit
Materials); Doug Richman (Aluminum Association), Greg Kolwich (FEV). (2016). Lightweighting
technology development and trends in U.S. passenger vehicles, http://www.theicct.org/lightweighting-
technology-development-and-trends-us-passenger-vehicles]
154 Preamble Tables 27 & 31
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SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 16. Comparison of on-cycle C02 emissions of
light-and medium-duty trucks, by model (solid fill) and sales-weighted average (pattern fill)
calculated in OMEGA in MY2022. Average MY2022 and projected required MY2032 emissions
are shown connected by arrows, indicating the percent reduction in emissions over MY2022-
2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 60-62]
As acknowledged by EPA (DRIA 1-19), many gasoline and diesel efficiency-improving
technologies have yet to be broadly implemented among medium-duty vehicles. In particular,
many LD-related technologies like those discussed in previous sections in these comments can
be applied to MD vans and some pickups. For instance, strong and mild hybrid systems that are
well-suited for full-size LD SUVs and pickups could be scaled up for MD implementation. Light
heavy-duty diesel powertrains can also benefit from hybridization and heavy-duty versions of
LD efficiency technologies. 155,156,157 Hybrid versions of LD vans and pickups today suggest
that mild, strong, or plugin hybridization may be viable options for certain MD applications. 158
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 60-62]
155 Isenstadt, A., German, J. (2017). Diesel Engines. International Council on Clean
Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/diesel-engines/
156 Buysse, C., Sharpe, B., Delgado, O. (2021). Efficiency technology potential for heavy-duty diesel
vehicles in the United States through 2035. International Council on Clean Transportation.
https://theicct.org/publication/efficiency-technology-potential-for-heavy-duty-diesel-vehicles-in-the-united-
states-through-2035/
157 Posada, F., Isenstadt, A., Badshah, H. (2020). Estimated cost of diesel emission-control technology to
meet the future California low NOx standards in 2024 and 2027. International Council on Clean
Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/estimated-cost-of-diesel-emissions-control-technology-to-
meet-the-future-california-low-nox-standards-in-2024-and-2027/
158 According to the MY2023 Fuel Economy Guide (https://fueleconomy.gov/feg/download.shtml), the
Ford F150 hybrid is 17%-20% more efficient in combined, unadjusted (2-cycle) fuel consumption than its
non-hybrid counterpart with the same 3.5L engine; the Pacifica PHEV in charge sustaining mode is 31%
more efficient than its equivalent non-hybrid counterpart (3.6L engine); Tundra HEV is 5.3%-10.3% more
efficient than non-HEV equipped with Atkinson cycle engine; Ram 1500 mild hybrid is 13.3%-16% more
efficient than its non-hybrid version
If EPA incorporated into its analysis additional cost curve classes (incorporating MD versions
of advanced gasoline engines and hybrid powertrains), as well as additional options for
lightweighting (high strength steel body and frame and/or percentage-based mass reduction), and
PHEVs (see PHEV discussion earlier), then its MD analysis would be much more robust. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 60-62]
Just as many LD ICE technology improvements extend to MD ICE vehicles, all of the
innovations and developments in BEV technologies and battery packs discussed earlier also
apply to both LD and MD classes. As with LDV BEV modeling, incorporating lower battery
costs, rightsized motors, and improved EV efficiency within OMEGA for MDV would reduce
the cost of MD BEVs. In a 2022 study on relative costs of EV MDV, ICCT projected that MD
pickups and vans of 300-mile range or less would reach price parity with their diesel
counterparts within the timeframe of this proposal. 159 Over the first five years of ownership,
MD BEVs of 300-mile range or less reach total cost parity with both their diesel and gasoline
counterparts before 2030. In other words, well within the timeframe of the proposal battery-
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electric MDVs are cheaper to purchase and own than non-plugin MDVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 60-62]
159 Mulholland, E. (2022). Cost of electric commercial vans and pickup trucks in the United States through
2040. ICCT. International Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/cost-ev-vans-
pickups-us-2040-jan22/
Discussed further below, it is difficult to assess specific areas to improve the analysis of the
MD proposed standards due to minimal explanation of the technical inputs into the MD analysis,
and how they differ from or are similar to the LD analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp.
60-62]
Regarding some finer details of the proposed MD standards, ICCT supports EPA's proposal
to phaseout ZEV multipliers in MY2026 instead of MY2027. The expected growth in MD BEV
van share by MY2027 could result in overcompliance credits being available in MY2027, which
can be used to offset undercompliance by vans and pickups which are still ICE-powered.
Generally, ending multipliers earlier would improve the real-world climate benefits of the
proposed rule. Additionally, recent ICCT research on the costs of BEV and PHEV MD vans and
pickups suggests that within the timeframe of the proposed rule, plug-in MDVs will be cost-
competitive with their gasoline or diesel counterparts either upfront or both upfront and during
ownership. 160 Consequently, such advanced technology vehicles will not need multipliers as a
production incentive. Lastly, ICCT also supports the proposed 22,000 lbs limit to the GCWR
input in the work factor equation, for the reasons EPA provided in its proposal (Preamble
29242). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 60-62]
160 Mulholland, E. (2022). Cost of electric commercial vans and pickup trucks in the United States through
2040. International Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/cost-ev-vans-pickups-
us-2040-jan22/
Fuel neutrality
ICCT strongly supports EPA's switch to a single set of standards curves for all MDVs,
regardless of fuel type. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 62-64]
Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
EPA proposes meaningful improvements to the MDV standards that, as modeled, would
result in BEV sales of 46 percent in the MDV segment by MY32—higher even than the
requirements of the Advanced Clean Trucks ("ACT") rule. Rivian applauds this level of
foresight. As our own products demonstrate, BEVs can readily meet the needs of Class 2b-3
fleets. Regulations can and should push the pace of emissions reduction via electrification in this
category. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 10-12]
However, closer examination of the proposal reveals uneven outcomes. While EPA rightly
expects rapid and widespread electrification of vans—achieving 98 percent BEV penetration in
MY32—pickups languish. In fact, EPA's modeling shows electrification backsliding in the
pickup segment in the early years of the regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 10-12]
Projected BEV Penetrations29
MY: 2027; Vans: 35%; Pickups: 7%; Combined: 17%
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MY: 2028; Vans: 55%; Pickups: 1%; Combined: 20%
MY: 2029; Vans: 73%; Pickups: 3%; Combined: 28%
MY: 2030; Vans: 92%; Pickups: 4%; Combined: 34%
MY: 2031; Vans: 97%; Pickups: 15%; Combined: 43%
MY: 2032; Vans: 98%; Pickups: 19%; Combined: 46%
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 10-12]
Table 2. The penetration rate for BEVs declines in the pickup segment in the early years of
the regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 10-12]
29 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light- Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles: Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (April 2023), 13-53.
EPA should take care not to inadvertently establish a regulatory framework that allows for
"slow-walking" MD pickup electrification. The technology can meet the needs of many duty
cycles, including those involving towing. But the rapid uptake of BEVs in the van fleet coupled
with ATV multipliers in the early years of the program could inflate credit banks. As a
consequence, van electrification could slow to some extent, and/or manufacturers could prolong
the life of conventional MD pickups in their planning portfolios for longer than would otherwise
be necessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 10-12]
We recommend a two-track approach to ensuring the strongest possible standards for MDVs.
First, EPA should evaluate the feasibility of even more stringent emissions requirements. As in
the LD segment, EPA's modeling appears to omit Rivian.30 Yet, Rivian's order book includes
100,000 all-electric Class 2b-3 vans, several thousand of which already operate on U.S. roads.
Similarly, the agency's analysis does not appear to account for the effects of California's
Advanced Clean Fleets ("ACF") regulation. Approximately 142,000 Class 2b-3 vehicles will be
subject to the requirements of ACF in California alone and will be required to electrify over the
coming years. CARB expects ACF to add significantly to the state's medium- and heavy-duty
ZEV population above and beyond the impact of the companion ACT rule. 31 The agency should
assess to what extent ACF implementation and the addition of Rivian's committed BEV van
production to the national fleet could support a lower fleet average emissions target. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 10-12]
30 The agency reports projected GHG emission rates for five MDV manufacturers—Ford. General Motors,
Mercedes- Benz, Nissan, and Stellantis, per U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Multi-Pollutant
Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles: Draft
Regulatory Impact Analysis (April 2023), 13-49.
31 California Air Resources Board, "Advanced Clean Fleets Regulation Summary," May 17, 2023,
available at www.arb.ca.gov/resources/fact-sheets/advanced-clean-fleets-regulation-summary.
Organization: RVIndustry Association (RVIA)
RVIA strongly opposes EPA's overreaching proposed rule for the reasons discussed below
and requests the agency exclude motor homes from having to comply with the proposed
medium- duty vehicle standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
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In contradiction to this NPRM, the EPA has already proposed, in the Phase 3 GHG rule (see
88 FR 25996), to establish standards for motor homes that correctly acknowledge the reality that
motor homes are not well-suited for electrification. Under the proposed Phase 3 GHG rules, the
EPA would establish a C02 standard of 226 g/mi for MY2027 and later motor homes. As
discussed in the Phase 3 GHG NPRM, the agency has proposed this standard given the negative
implications of electrifying the motor home chassis. To power a motor home, the batteries would
take up space that is otherwise necessary for housing the various elements of a motor home. It
would also add significant amounts of weight to the motor home making it no longer capable of
being equipped with the components typically found in a motor home. It makes no difference
whether a motor home falls under the MD/HD Phase 3 GHG rules or the LD/MD rules, the
issues are the same. Standards which can only be met by battery-powered vehicles are not
practicable for motor homes. EPA staff who authored the Phase 3 GHG rule have acknowledged
this. In establishing standards for medium-duty vehicles within this rule, staff need to be
consistent and exclude motor homes from standards that would force them to be electrified.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
Motor homes are often operated in locations where there is no electricity. This is known as
"boondocking." Frequently, motor homes will be operated for weeks at a time at such locations.
When motor homes are operated in a boondocking scenario, there is no possibility of EV
charging. Electrification simply does not work for this operating use case. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
Unlike medium-duty vehicles that might be conveniently recharged overnight, motor homes
are routinely driven 500 miles or more a day making it necessary to fully recharge mid-trip. A
multi- hour charging event is simply not something the typical motor home driver would find
acceptable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
Motor homes are typically a discretionary purchase by families who tend to be very cost
sensitive. Large increases in price for a vehicle that is operated on average only 20 days per year
and that travels on average only 4,000 miles will not be viewed favorably by potential buyers.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
The ability to recoup higher vehicle costs through refueling savings is minimal given motor
homes are driven sparingly by their owners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
If finalized, EPA's rule will severely limit the use and affordability of motor homes. As a
result, it will severely hurt motor home manufacturers, dealers, their employees and their
families. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
Regarding the certification of medium-duty motor homes powered by internal combustion
engines, as well as vehicles used to tow RVs, RVIA supports the concerns raised by the Alliance
for Automotive Innovation in its comment letter. Such concerns include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
• EPA's proposed rule is neither reasonable nor achievable in the timeframe provided. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
• EPA's proposed rule is a de facto battery electric vehicle mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
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• EPA outstrips Biden administration's own 50 percent light-duty electrification executive
order from 2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
• EPA underestimates battery costs and makes unrealistic battery electric vehicle (BEV) sales
assumptions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
• EPA makes no concurrent requirements to support the infrastructure and battery critical
minerals for the required EVs or the drivers that must buy them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0629, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Stellantis
Implicit / Explicit MDV GHG Standards are Infeasible
The EPA is proposing a very challenging set of regulatory changes for the medium-duty
vehicles that are infeasible. This includes direct core stringency changes along with four other
actions that further increase stringency: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 17-18]
- Core Stringency Changes - Proposes an overall 37% reduction in work factor based GHG
standards for 2028-32MY [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 17-18]
- Work Factor Cap - Introduces a 22,000 lbs. GCWR Cap on Work Factor that further
increases the GHG stringency [redacted text.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 17-18]
- Fuel Neutrality Changes - Saddles gas product with an additional 6.1% reduction by
modifying current 27MY standards (i.e., pushing fuel neutrality) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0678, pp. 17-18]
Core Stringency - EPA overestimated MDV GHG Reduction [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0678, pp. 17-18]
EPA has proposed a 37% GHG reduction from 2028MY to 2032MY. The overall stringency
is largely driven by a very high assumed rate (98% in 2032MY) of electrification for cargo vans.
Stellantis supports AAI's comments questioning this level of electrification for cargo vans, and
requests that EPA model industry electrification for the cargo van segment as just meeting
CARB's requirements each year in California and states that adopted the HD ZEV rule, and no
more than half that rate in other states. GHG standards should be established from this more
realistic electrification rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 17-18]
Work Factor Cap - Further increases MDV GHG Stringency (and Forces Criteria Engine
Certification) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 17-18]
In the multi-pollutant draft rule, the agency proposes to limit the GCWR contribution to work
factor calculations at 22,000 lb. starting in 2030MY. This is proposed due to an agency concern
that higher GCWR values are not reflected in the inertia weight of the vehicle when tested for
GHG. In the HD GHG Phase 1 rule7, work factor was developed as a standard due its very high
correlation to C02. The agency has not provided data to demonstrate this is no longer accurate.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 17-18]
7 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty
Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57106 (Sept. 15, 2011).
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[redacted text.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 17-18]
Fuel Neutrality - EPA Punishes Gasoline ICE MDVs
EPA proposes new, fuel neutral GHG standards for medium-duty vehicles beginning in
2027MY for spark-ignition (gas) engines by reopening the Phase 2 GHG rule, resulting in a
6.1% jump in stringency. EPA explains that reopening of the current published rule is needed
due to their anticipated levels of electrification of MDVs in 2027MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0678, p. 20]
Stellantis disagrees with this approach, [redacted text.] Respecting lead time needs, fuel
neutrality should be phased in over several years (30/60/100), and not fully implemented until
2032MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 20]
Stellantis recommends that EPA should:
GHG Standards
- Revise standards that align to achievable EV adoption rates that do not force an overly
optimistic technology transition for the market and industry: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678,
p. 24]
-Revise stringency adopting an 'Alternative 3' profile removing front-loading of EV
adoption, modified to ensure 2030MY standards can be met with a 40-50% BEV+PHEV+FCEV
combined technology penetration [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
-Include PHEV technology as a critical transition technology to a fully electrified future -
without incorrect discounting - particularly in highly capable vehicle segments [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
-Treat trucks and SUVs fairly by including PHEV technology as an important bridge to a
BEV future, and ensure year-over-year required improvements are the same as cars [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
-Fix incorrect MDV adjustments that mistakenly force medium-duty vehicles into light-duty
standards and double stringency of high capability products arbitrarily [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0678, p. 24]
- Include a provision that compliance with EPA's GHG standards would constitute
compliance with CAFE standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
Organization: Winnebago Industries (Winnebago Industries)
While Winnebago Industries is very excited about the potential to introduce ZEVs such as the
eRV2, there are significant practical technological and economic challenges to ZEV motorhomes
in the motorhome Class B product category, which often align with EPA medium duty vehicles
between 8,501 and 14,000 lbs. gross vehicle weight rating. The Proposed Rules do not
adequately address this category of motorhomes, and if promulgated in its current state, these
rules will create a serious risk of substantial negative impacts to this important Winnebago
Industries group of products. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0636, p. 2]
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For reference, the Proposed Rule will impact eighty-nine percent of the Winnebago brand
motorhomes currently being produced. For the larger RV industry, based on calendar year 2022,
the Proposed Rule would affect approximately fifty percent of the nearly 50,000 motorized RVs
produced. This is very significant and impactful for the RV industry but, in comparison, is an
extremely small portion of the millions of light- and medium-duty vehicles produced annually
for the U.S. market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0636, p. 2]
As EPA is aware, RVing throughout the United States often involves driving several hundred
miles to reach a stationary location, frequently through very remote areas of the country
including to "off-the grid" locations. In particular, Winnebago Industries' medium duty Class B
camper vans have a highly unique use compared to other products in the same regulatory
category, a reality which is not currently reflected in the Proposed Rule. This very unique vehicle
usage presents great practical challenges to the RV/motorhome industry to transition to ZEV
technologies with current and foreseeable future developments in battery and overall vehicle
design as well as the obviously critical charging and energy supply infrastructures that are
needed for long-distance and remote-area RV usage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0636, pp. 2-3]
It is therefore of critical importance to Winnebago Industries (and the entire motorhome
industry) that EPA provide sufficient flexibility in engine and vehicle certifications to allow
Americans to continue to take part in one of our country's favorite recreational activities and
avoid catastrophic impacts to our business and the RV industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0636, pp. 2-3]
Based on this impact, Winnebago Industries respectfully requests the Proposed Rule exclude
motor homes from having to comply with the proposed medium-duty vehicle standards. Given
the low volumes in question, there would be a negligible impact on overall vehicle emissions,
allowing the RV industry to continue to serve the important roles in American business and way
of life. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0636, pp. 2-3]
In the alternative, we have two further suggestions to address the impacts the Proposed Rule
would have on Winnebago Industries. First, that EPA adopt a low volume exemption for the
medium-duty vehicle category, specific to motor homes, that would allow Winnebago Industries
and its certifying chassis suppliers to continue to produce internal combustion engine (ICE)
vehicles while ZEV technologies for medium duty vehicles continues to evolve. The potential
ramifications cannot be overstated: if Winnebago Industries' chassis suppliers determine that
production of a low volume of chassis for motorhomes is no longer commercially beneficial or
technically viable, Winnebago Industries and the entire RV industry could suffer tremendously.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0636, p. 3]
Secondly, we encourage EPA to adopt a form of optional custom chassis motorhome vehicle
certification standard, similar to the provisions in the heavy-duty greenhouse gas (GHG) 2 and
proposed GHG 3 rules. An optional certification standard for manufacturers of medium duty
motorhome chassis - again, manufacturing at a very low volume compared to other vehicle types
in the Proposed Rule - would permit Winnebago Industries' chassis suppliers to meet our limited
needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0636, p. 3]
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EPA Summary and Response:
Summary
EPA appreciates the comments received regarding the MDV Work Factor (WF) Curves. EPA
received a range of comments and recommendations that are summarized below.
ACEEE and ICCT both commented that the Agency's analysis incorporated too few BEV
pickups and that increased levels of electrification of MDV. ACEEE, ICCT, and EPHO all
supported more stringent MDV GHG standards than proposed. ACEEE and ICCT provided
comparisons of MDV pickup truck electrification to light-duty pickup truck electrification as
justification for increased electrification of MDV pickups, including MDV applications requiring
high towing capacity. ACEE commented that the Heavy-duty Phase 3 NPRM had higher
percentages of BEV in heavy-duty categories of Class 4 and above than included within the
analysis of MDV for the Light- and Medium-duty Multipollutant NPRM. ACEEE also
commented that both PHEVs and FCEVs should be incorporated into EPA's MDV analysis.
ICCT commented that PEV MDVs would be cost competitive with ICE MDVs within the
timeframe of this rulemaking. ICCT further supported phasing out ZEV multipliers in 2026
instead of 2027. EPHO commented that additional compression ignition technologies could be
applied within the Agency's analysis and provided examples of specific Class 8 long-haul trucks
within the DOE SuperTruck Program achieving 55% brake thermal efficiency. EPHO also
provided examples of recent, more efficient versions of the Ford 6.7L and GM 6.6L MDV
compression ignition engines. Similarly, EPHO commented that additional spark ignition engine
technologies could be applied within the Agency's analysis, citing recently developed Ford 7.3L
and GM MDV spark ignition engines. EPHO also commented that 48V MHEV would also be
applicable to MDV applications.
Within its comments on MDV GHG, Ford neither specifically supported nor opposed the
stringency of the GHG standards. Ford's MDV GHG comments focused specifically on
opposition to the proposed changes to the work factor (WF) calculation that capped GCWR
within the WF calculation to no greater than 22,000 pounds. Ford suggested that the GHG
standards could increase linearly up to a certain WF value and then standards could flatten above
such a WF value and that such an approach would adequately address the Agency's concerns as
stated in the proposal.
Winnebago's comments asserted that the proposed regulations, if unchanged would pose a
serious risk to Winnebago's motorhome products. Winnebago was specifically concerned
regarding its Class B motorhome products and in general described that there would be practical
challenges for motorhomes to transition to ZEV technologies "... with current and foreseeable
future developments in battery and overall vehicle design as well as the obviously critical
charging and energy supply infrastructures that are needed for long-distance and remote-area RV
usage." Winnebago asked the Agency consider two alternatives to the proposed GHG standards
specifically for MDV motorhome applications:
1. Adoption of a low volume exemption from GHG standards specifically for MDV
motorhomes
2. Adoption of an optional custom chassis motorhome vehicle certification standard,
similar to the provisions in the Heavy-Duty Greenhouse Gas Phase 2 Final Rule and
the Heavy-Duty Greenhouse Gas Phase 3 GHG Proposed Rule
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RVIA voiced strong opposition to the proposed GHG standards. They asserted that there were
specific exceptions for motorhomes both within the Heavy-Duty Phase 3 GHG Proposed Rule
and within the previous Heavy-Duty Phase 2 GHG standards. They also asserted that the
proposed MDV standards could only be met by battery electric vehicles and thus represented a
BEV mandate for MDV. RVIA stated that battery electric drivetrains are not practical for motor
homes. RVIA further asserted that the standards would not be achievable within the rulemaking
timeframe. They also stated that there would be no EV charging capability during RV
boondocking (off-grid camping). RVIA asked for motorhomes to be excluded from GHG
emissions standards.
Both the Alliance and Stellantis opposed the GHG standards for MDV, stating that were too
stringent and with Stellantis further characterizing the standards as "infeasible". The Alliance
and Stellantis specifically cited a 37% reduction in GHG from MY 2028 through MY 2032 as
too stringent, and that the assumption of 98% electrification of van applications in the proposal
was too high. The Alliance referred to an Administration electrification "stretch goal" for MDV
of 40 to 50%) vs. what the Alliance estimated to be 92% electrification of MDV. Both the
Alliance and Stellantis opposed proposed changes to the WF calculation that capped GCWR
within the WF calculation to no greater than 22,000 pounds.
The Alliance requested that the Agency ".. .consider the extent to which pickups may "weight
out" to Class 4, if equipped with battery electric vehicle technology..." and to take into
consideration vehicles shifting to different regulatory weight classes when setting GHG
standards and/or offering GHG compliance flexibilities.
Stellantis requested that van electrification not exceed that required for CARB HD ZEV
compliance for vans. Stellantis also requested that the GHG standards be revised to "achievable
EV adoption rates that do not force an overly optimistic technology transition for the market and
industry". Stellantis stated that the move to fuel neutral standards for MDV GHG in 2027
"punishes ICE gasoline" and that such neutrality should be phased in at a rate of 30%, 60%, and
100%), with the 100% not occuring until 2032. Stellantis asked the Agency to include PHEV
technology within its analysis. Stellantis requested that EPA include provisions such that
compliance with Federal GHG standards for MDV would constitute simultaneous compliance
with Federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards for MDV.
Response:
The Agency does not agree with ACEEE and ICCT that GHG standards and levels of
electrification, and other technologies applicable light-duty pickup trucks are necessarily
appropriate for MDV pickup trucks. Such an approach does not take into full consideration the
different use cases for MDV trucks compared to light-duty pickups, in particular substantially
higher tow capability which, in the case of some diesel MDV pickups, includes GCWR as high
as 45,000 pounds, approximately twice that of the highest light-duty truck GCWR. The
adjustments applied by ICCT to MDV pickup trucks to allow comparison with light-duty pickup
trucks do not fully account for differences between testing at loaded vehicle weight for light-duty
trucks versus adjusted loaded vehicle weight for MDV. The adjustment applied by ICCT also
does not account at all for other significant impacts on vehicle road loads for MDV, such as
increased aerodynamic drag from the increased frontal area due to both powertrain cooling
requirements and higher load suspension requirements; increased road load from tire friction and
tire aerodynamic drag, especially for dual-rear-wheel applications; increased frictional and
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rotational losses from heavier-duty axle and differential components; etc. Vehicle dynamometer
testing, PEMS testing, or use of full vehicle energy simulations using models such as the EPA
ALPHA model or using commercial simulation packages such as Gamma Technologies GT-
SUITE™ would allow a valid estimate comparing similar technologies applied to both light-duty
and MDV applications and their resulting impacts on either footprint-based or WF-based GHG
standards; however none of these approaches appear to have been used within ICCT's analysis.
With respect to ACEEE's comparison of MDV electrification to the analysis supporting the
Heavy-duty Phase 3 proposal, similar to light-duty to MDV comparisons, the use cases for
heavy-duty applications are also different from MDV. The higher percentages for BEVs in the
heavy-duty proposal were for a combination of vocational and long-haul applications, and there
are also considerable differences between electrification of vocational heavy-duty compared to
that of long-haul heavy-duty applications. Vocational applications in MDV are largely
represented by incomplete MDV, which make up less than 5% of MDV sales. Towing capability
and adaptability to a variety of uses are key considerations within the design of MDV pickup
trucks, and the required utility for MDV differs from that of both lighter and heavier weight
categories, and also differs within MDV between van and pickup truck applications. Our
compliance modeling for the final rule shows a PEV total of 41% of total MDV sales in 2032, of
which more than three-fourths of the PEVs are BEVs (See RIA Chapter 12.2.3).
With regards to EPHO's comments that more advanced technology should be considered
within EPA's analysis, many updates to the MDV technologies available within OMEGA are
consistent with EPHO's recommendations. For example, the Ford 7.3L MDV spark ignition
referred to by EPHO is used within EPA's updated ALPHA and OMEGA analyses for the final
rule (see RIA Chapter 3.5.1). A more recent and higher efficiency engine design than the two
MDV compression ignition engines cited by EPHO was used to represent future MDV
compression ignition engines. The agency also included more advanced engine technologies in
its analysis for the final rule, going beyond EPHO's recommendations. For example, we included
advanced spark ignition Miller-cycle dedicated hybrid engines and downsized compression
ignition dedicated hybrid engines within the OMEGA analysis of MDV PHEVs for the final rule.
With respect to comments from ACEEE and Stellantis regarding the Agency including
PHEVs within its analysis of MDV GHG emissions, EPA completed a detailed modeling study
that included modeling of an MDV PHEV with considerable all-electric range capability and
very high towing capability, referred to as a range extended electric truck or REET
(Bhattachaijya et al. 2024). The study demonstrated the potential for an approximately 80%
reduction in CO2 emissions over the regulatory drive cycles for a MDV REET pickup with a
maximum GCWR of approximately 30,000 pounds and without compromising towing range
relative to ICE MD while in charge-sustaining operation. Results from the study were
incorporated into OMEGA compliance modeling of MDV for the final rule. Our OMEGA
compliance modeling for the final rule shows that PHEVs may play a larger role than BEVs with
respect to MDV pickup truck GHG compliance. For example, OMEGA results for MY 2032
estimated MDV pickup truck sales at 11% PHEV and 10% BEV (See RIA Chapter 12.2.3).
Bhattachaijya, S. et al. (2024). Heavy-light-duty and Medium-duty Range-extended Electric Truck Study
- Final Report. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829.
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The Agency has not finalized a ZEV multiplier phase out in 2026 as recommended by ICCT.
Within the final rule, the BEV, PHEV, and FCEV multipliers are removed for MY 2027. The
rate of MDV electrification, particularly with respect to anticipated growth of electric van sales
used for last mile delivery applications, is consistent with a MY 2027 elimination of multiplier.
The Agency agrees with Ford that eliminating the cap on GCWR within the WF calculation
and instead applying a flattening of standards above a WF threshold would still address the
Agency's concerns. This approach would also eliminate the impacts on MDPV work factors and
the MDPV definition as described in the comments from Stellantis and the Alliance. We
estimated that the GCWR of 22,000 pounds from the proposed WF calculation change would be
approximately equivalent to an MDV WF of 5,500 pounds and implemented a change in the
MDV GHG compliance curve coefficients such that flat standards apply above a WF of 5,500
pounds beginning in MY 2030. The Agency also finalized a more gradual change to the impact
of WF on the standards than that reflected by the WF calculation change in the proposal. The
flattening of the standards applies at WF > 8,000 pounds in 2028 and WF > 6,800 pounds in
2029. This approach is analogous that the Agency has taken with respect to the gradual phase-in
of flattening within the light-duty foot-print-based curves. For more information regarding the
final WF-based MDV GHG compliance curves and coefficients, please see preamble Section
IHC.3.
Regarding the two specific recommendations from Stellantis to "Fix incorrect MDV
adjustments that mistakenly force medium-duty vehicles into light-duty standards and double
stringency of high capability products arbitrarily and "include a provision that compliance with
EPA's GHG standards would constitute compliance with CAFE standards," EPA responds to the
former in Section 3.1.1 of this document. Regarding the latter recommendation about CAFE
standards, EPA does not have the statutory authority to implement this type of declaration.
RVIA's and Winnebago's comments regarding the proposed 2027 and later MDV GHG
standards, potential impacts on MDV Class B and Class C365 motorhomes, the manner in which
Heavy-Duty Phase 2 has been implemented for motorhomes, and the provisions regarding
motorhomes in the Heavy-duty Phase 3 proposal incorrectly conflate previous and current
flexibilities available for engine-certified applications which are not, and have not been,
applicable to chassis-certified applications. For example, 2022 through 2024 model MDV Class
B and Class C motorhomes have certificates of conformity as either complete MDV vans (in the
case of Class B motorhomes) and thus are subject to GHG standards under 40 CFR § 86.1819 or
are incomplete vehicles (in the case of Class C motorhomes) that are certified as "cab-complete"
vehicles using the cab-complete and sister-vehicle provisions of 40 CFR § 86.1819-14 (j) (2).
There are currently motorhome-specific GHG standards for motorhomes subject to engine
certification. These provisions were discussed by RVIA and Winnebago within the context of
Class 2b and Class 3 vehicles under the Heavy-duty Phase 2 GHG and within the context of
MDV subject to 2027 and later GHG standards. The Phase 2 GHG standards applicable to
motorhomes are summarized in Table 5 of 40 CFR § 1037.105. Those specific standards are
only applicable to heavy-duty vehicles at or below 14,000 pounds GVWR that are excluded from
the standards in 40 CFR 86.1819. Since MDV (or previously, Class 2b and Class 3) motorhomes
are currently certified as either complete vehicles or as cab-complete vehicles, they must comply
with GHG standards under 40 CFR § 86.1819 and are specifically excluded from GHG
365 Note that Class B and Class C are industry designations for motorhomes and are not regulatory terms.
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compliance under 40 CFR § 1037 and thus the motorhome-specific standards under 40 CFR §
1037.105 have not been applicable to MDV motorhomes under the Heavy-Duty Phase 2 program
(see 40 CFR § 86.1819, 40 CFR § 1037.5 and 40 CFR § 1037.105). Also, the specific
applicability under 40 CFR § 86.1819 and 40 CFR § 1037.5 was not changed within either the
2027 and later Light- and Medium-duty Multipollutant NPRM, the Heavy-duty Phase 3 GHG
NPRM, nor the Light- and Medium-duty Multipollutant Final Rule. Since we did not propose
changes to applicability for the MDV and/or Class 2b and Class 3 GHG standards, and since we
did not ask for comment on any such changes to applicability, we consider such changes to
applicability to be out of scope for this final rule.
Both RVIA and Winnebago provide details regarding the challenges of applying BEV
technology to MDV motorhomes. The GHG standards are performance-based standards that do
not require specific technologies for compliance. Our OMEGA compliance modeling for the
final rule estimates that approximately 32% of MDVs sold in MY 2032 are projected to be BEV
and 9% are projected to be PHEV, with remaining 59% being conventional ICE vehicles. If we
look solely at vans, OMEGA projects 75% of vans to be BEV, 5% to be PHEV, and the
remaining 20% to be conventional ICE. For the final rule, we also analyzed a "No Additional
BEVs" sensitivity in OMEGA that relied primarily on PHEVs for GHG compliance and assumed
no MDV BEVs at all. For that sensitivity, OMEGA projects 50% of total MDV sales as PHEV.
See preamble section IV.G.2. Of those, 63% of MDV pickup sales and 25% van sales were
projected to be PHEV, and the remaining vehicles were conventional ICE.
According to RVIA published data (RVIA, 2020), Class B motorhome sales for MY2020
totaled 7,222 vehicles, which represents 0.82% of total MDV sales in 2020 or 2% of MDV van
sales in 2020. Similarly, Class C motorhome sales for MY2020 totaled 21,685, which represents
2.5% of total MDV sales in 2020 or 7% of total MDV van sales in 2020. These percentages are
very small when compared either to total MDV sales or MDV van sales, and thus there are many
different compliance scenarios under which manufacturers of MDVs can provide either complete
vans or cab-complete vehicles to the RV industry for completion into motorhomes that are
entirely based upon either:
• conventional ICE technologies
• a combination of ICE and PHEV technologies -or -
• a combination of ICE, PHEV and BEV
RVIA (2020). 2020 RV Shipments Surpass 2019 By 6% With December Shipments Best on Record -
Market Report, December 2020. https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/2020-rv-shipments-surpass-2019-6-
december-shipments-best-record
With respect to Winnebago's request that the Agency consider two MDV GHG alternatives
for the final rule, namely, a low volume exemption specifically for MDV motorhomes or
adopting an optional custom chassis motorhome vehicle certification standard, either alternative
would be a significant departure from either the proposed rule or from the manner in which
chassis-certified MDV have been treated in previous GHG regulations. Motorhome
manufacturers do not certify these products to MDV GHG standards - they purchase complete
and cab-complete vans from manufacturers who hold certificates of conformity. The van designs
upon which MDV motorhomes are based on not small volume, despite the relatively small
volume of the motorhomes that the MDV vans are converted to. Manufacturers will continue to
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produce products suitable for RV use, including complete and cab-complete PHEV and
conventional ICE vans in sufficient quantity to meet demand for RV use while still complying
with the MDV GHG standards that we have finalized. Neither Winnebago nor RVIA provided
any information to substantiate that MDV manufacturers intend to cease sales of future ICE and
potential future PHEV vans or cab-complete vans to RV manufacturers as MDV manufacturers
comply with future GHG standards. Given the changes EPA has made in the stringency of the
final MDV standards in the early years of the program, which provide additional lead time for
manufacturers to develop and apply technologies compared to the proposal, and given the
importance of the air pollutant emissions reductions for public health and welfare, we believe it
is not appropriate to provide additional exemptions and flexibilities.-
3.3 - Feasibility
EPA appreciates the comments received on the topic of the feasibility of the final GHG
standards. Many of the more detailed comments that are focused on specific aspects of feasibility
are addressed in other sections of the preamble and RTC. The discussion and responses here are
related to feasibility of the GHG standards in the broad sense and the appropriateness of the level
of standards that EPA is setting (RTC Section 3.3.1). Also addressed are the specific topic of
lead time needed to reach the final level of stringency in MY 2032 (RTC Section 3.3.2) and the
feasibility of vehicle technologies for reducing GHG emissions (RTC Section 3.3.3). Comments
related to the feasibility of the PEV supply chain and critical materials are addressed in RTC
Chapter 15. Comments related to the feasibility of electricity generation and charging
infrastructure needed to support greater numbers of PEVs are addressed in RTC Chapters 17 and
18. Comments related to the consumer markets for light- and medium-duty vehicles are
addressed in RTC Chapters 13 and 14.
3.3.1 - Levels/stringency of the standards
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
GHG Standards
Leap-frogs Biden administration's own 50% executive order
The stringency of the NPRM proposed standards increases faster than at any time in history.
In fact, by assuming BEVs alone will make up 60% of the new vehicles sold in 2030 and 67% of
new vehicles just two years later, the proposed requirements leap-frog even President Biden's
ambitious 2030 target of 50%, which included BEVs, fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs), and
plug- in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) by 2030. The 60% BEV-only proposal also goes
beyond the same goal of 50% electric vehicles by 2030 (which again included BEVs, PHEVs,
and FCEVs) described in The U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization,
authored by four cabinet level agencies including EPA and issued in January 2023 - just a few
months before this proposal was published. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 3-4]
Recommendation
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GHG - Better align to President Biden's 2030 electrification goal
To address the concerns identified above, Auto Innovators and our members recommend EPA
reevaluate the GHG standards and more closely align with President Biden's 2030 goal. Thus,
we recommend adopting requirements for 40 to 50% BEV, PHEV, and FCEVs in 2030 with
continued increases through 2032. These standards should be coupled with and connected to
regularly measured infrastructure deployment and battery critical mineral supply levels available
during this rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 7-8]
A. Major Concerns with the Proposed GHG Standards
1. Overall Stringency / BEV Market Share Required
EPA has proposed greenhouse gas standards that it estimates will require approximately 60%
BEV sales by MY 2030 and 67% BEV sales by 2032.150 As explained in Section I (EV
Feasibility), the conditions which would enable such a high level of BEV market share are not
present today and are highly uncertain in the timeframe considered by this rulemaking. Some
manufacturers have already started to build MY 2024 vehicles,151 and establishing the
necessary infrastructure, supply chains, manufacturing capacity, and customer acceptance in less
than six years (in the case of MY 2030) or eight years (in the case of MY 2032) is far from
certain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 89]
150 NPRM at 29329.
151 SeeFuelEconomy.gov.
B. Discussion on Alternatives Considered by EPA
1. Alternative 1 (More Stringent)
We support EPA's conclusion that "Alternative 1 would not be appropriate because of
uncertainties concerning the cost and feasibility of such standards." 170 Alternative 1 would
lower GHG standards by approximately 10 g/mile relative to the proposed standards, bringing
forward proposed requirements by approximately one to two years. This alternative would
further exacerbate the concerns, and further stress the need for market feasibility, that Auto
Innovators already has with the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 93-
94]
170 NPRM at 29347.
2. Alternative 2 (Less Stringent)
Although Alternative 2 is relatively easier than the proposed standards, it still does not
address Auto Innovators' concerns. In particular, Alternative 2 is estimated to require greater
than 50% BEV market share by 2030, albeit with somewhat less of a requirement in 2032. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 93-94]
3. Alternative 3 (More Consistent Stringency Increases MYs 2027-2029)
Of the alternatives presented by EPA, Alternative 3 best addresses our concerns with the
front- loading of the proposed standards while still achieving 97% of the estimated C02
emission reductions. 171 However, MY 2030 (which can begin as early as calendar year 2029)
BEV penetration rates estimated by EPA under Alternative 3 remain in excess of 50%, which is
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a cause for concern, without any inclusion of the role of PHEVs. Post-2030 BEV penetration is
also a potential concern, but at least provides a couple of more years of lead-time to develop the
necessary supply chains, manufacturing capacity, market, and supporting fueling infrastructure.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 93-94]
171 7,300 MMT total C02 emissions reduction through 2055 under the proposed standards (NPRM at
29348, Tablel35) vs. 7,100 MMT total C02 emissions reduction through 2055 under Alternative 3 (NPRM
at 29350, Table 138).
C. Auto Innovators Recommendation
As a logical outgrowth from EPA's Alternative 2 and 3 and The U.S. National Blueprint for
Transportation Decarbonization, Auto Innovators recommends the following approach. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p 71]
1. Adjust the linear approach in Alternative 3 from MY 2026 to MY 2030 to arrive at Auto
Innovators' goal of achieving 40-50% EV market share (inclusive of BEVs, PHEVs, and
FCEVs) in 2030 and The U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization. 172 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 71]
172 Note, MY 2031 can start as early as January 2, 2030.
2. From MY 2030 to MY 2032 use a separate linear reduction to arrive at final performance-
based standards that are supported by reasonably certain projections of EV supply chain,
manufacturing, market, and infrastructure in that timeframe. (Please see our additional comments
on EV feasibility in Section I, comments on EPA's other alternatives in Section III.B, and
comments on a conceptual adjustment mechanism in Section II.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 71]
3. Performance-based standards should assume de minimis improvements in the overall
efficiency of the average internal combustion engine vehicle, allowing manufacturers to focus
investments on the design and production of EVs, and improving ICE vehicles only where it
makes sense to do so. (Please see our additional comments on improvements to internal
combustion engine vehicles, below.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 71]
Auto Innovators' proposed alternative outlined above represents a logical outgrowth of the
Proposed Rule. "Agencies, are free — indeed, they are encouraged — to modify proposed rules
as a result of the comments they receive," as long as "interested parties 'should have anticipated'
that the change was possible, and thus reasonably should have filed their comments on the
subject during the notice-and-comment period." 173 Indeed, stakeholder comments proposing an
idea may themselves indicate that an outcome was the logical outgrowth of the agency's initial
proposal. 174 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 71-72]
173 Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. V. E.P.A., 358 F.3d 936, 951-52 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
omitted).
174 See, e.g., id. At 952 (noting that "|n|numerous commenters" raised an issue); Nat. Res. Defense
Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that "public comments raised the
possibility" of a particular approach).
In this case, our proposal naturally flows from the objectives, approach, and broad range of
alternatives identified in the Proposed Rule and could have reasonably been anticipated by
interested parties. To the extent EPA has concerns as to whether adopting this proposal would be
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a logical outgrowth of the Proposed Rule, we encourage it to take steps that would explicitly
identify the proposal as a possibility for comment by interested parties. 175 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 72]
175 See, e.g., Thomas, 838 F.2d at 1243 (endorsing a procedure in which EPA issued a public notice
advising of the possibility of a new approach suggested by a comment on the proposed rule, affording
interested parties the opportunity to respond prior to promulgation of the final rule).
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
In our view, neither the proposed standards nor any of the three alternatives adequately
address the inherent market uncertainties and potential for noncompliance that exists within the
agency's ambitious timeline. Rather, the proposal sets the stage for what may be a profoundly
disruptive and costly set of noncompliance obligations across the industry. We respectfully urge
the agency to finalize a more reasonable emissions reduction trajectory, along with a broader
array of compliance flexibilities. We believe that standards in line with Honda's publicly stated
electrification targets are representative of a challenging but workable requirement. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 32-33]
Organization: American Lung Association (ALA) et al.
Fortunately, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
(IIJA) provide for hundreds of billions in investment in cleaner vehicles, energy and
infrastructure to accelerate the transition away from combustion to protect health across the
nation. Further, seven states have so far adopted the Advanced Clean Cars II program
(ACCII) that sets a 100 percent sales requirement by 2035. EPA's stronger standards through
Model Year 2026 were strengthened to deliver a critical ramp to greater zero-emission
technology pathways. Given these developments and the rapid growth in the zero-emission
vehicle market, we view the proposed standards and stronger Alternative 1 as strong starting
points for approving stringent standards in 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0745, p. 2]
Therefore, we recommend that EPA set multi-pollutant passenger vehicle standards for 2027
and later years that:
Build upon the more stringent Alternative 1 Greenhouse Gas Proposal
EPA's proposal includes a more stringent Alternative 1 that should be strengthened and adopted
as the final rule. Alternative 1 provides for a more stringent standard of approximately 10
mg/mile of greater GHG emission reductions. This is a good start that should be
strengthened further to achieve greater reductions in the later years of the program beyond 2030.
The final rule should be based upon increasingly tighter standards beyond the 2030 timeframe to
exceed the benefits of the proposed rule, but to also accelerate emission reductions in the later
years of the rule. As noted above, a growing number of states have adopted the Advanced Clean
Cars II program to establish a 100 percent zero-emission vehicle sales standard for model year
2035. EPA's proposal estimates that one technology pathway for compliance could see battery
electric vehicles representing nearly 70 percent of new vehicle sales by 2032. Setting the
Alternative 1 GHG standard in line with the states' pathway to 100 percent sales in 2035 would
increase the benefits of the standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0745, p. 2]
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Health Benefits of Zero-Emission Technologies
EPA's proposals note the significant clean air benefits of the proposed rule and illustrate the
increased benefits of the stronger Alternative 1. The American Lung Association's recent
"Driving to Clean Air" report highlighted that approaching a 100 percent zero-emission sales
scenario by 2035, along with a non-combustion electricity generation grid, could result in major
health benefits. The report found that the cumulative health benefits could reach $978 billion by
2050, including nearly 90,000 premature deaths avoided, over 2 million asthma attacks avoided
and more than 10 million lost workdays avoided due to cleaner air.4 EPA's analysis shows that
a potential compliance pathway for the proposal could result in nearly 70 percent of new vehicle
sales being battery electric vehicles by 2032. We call on EPA to continue the trajectory of a
stronger Alternative 1 to include more stringent GHG standards through 2035. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0745, p. 3]
4 American Lung Association. "Driving to Clean Air." June 2023. https://www.lung.org/clean-air/electric-
vehicle-report/driving-to-clean-air.
Organization: Arconic Corporation (ARCO)
6. EPA is soliciting comment on the proposed standards as well as Alternatives 1, 2, and
3. EPA anticipates that the appropriate choice of final standards lies within this range. We
understand the suggested three alternatives to the proposed standards to be:
Alternative 1 is more stringent than the proposal across the MY 2027-2032
time period-on average 10 g/mile lower than the proposed targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0741, pp. 3-4]
Alternative 2 is less stringent than the proposal across the MY 2027-2032 time
period-on average 10 g/mile higher than the proposed targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741,
pp. 3-4]
Alternative 3 achieves the same stringency as the proposed standards in MY
2032 but provides for a more consistent rate of stringency increase for MY 2027-2031. This has
the effect of less stringent year-over-year increases in the early years of the program. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0741, pp. 3-4]
Arconic suggests revising the definition of emissions for BEVs to include the upstream power
generation emissions. Revising this definition would likely require some modification to the
yearly emissions targets. With targets modified in this manner, Arconic does not have a position
on the trajectory (i.e., the levels of year-over-year stringency rates) in this rule making. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, pp. 3-4]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
CARB finds that a more stringent set of standards, and thus certainly the proposed standards
as well, are technically feasible and cost-effective and recommends that U.S. EPA incorporate
CARB's recommendations and adopt the most stringent standards feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, p. 67]
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Organization: California Attorney General's Office, etal.
Our States and Cities 1 hereby submit these comments in response to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") notice of proposed rulemaking titled "Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles." 88 Fed. Reg. 29,184 (May 5, 2023) ("Proposal"). We strongly support increasing the
stringency of EPA's greenhouse gas ("GHG") and criteria pollutant emissions standards, and we
urge EPA to adopt standards more stringent than the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0746, p. 1]
1 The States of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin; the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania; the District of
Columbia; the City and County of Denver; and the Cities of Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and
Oakland.
EPA has long recognized that GHG and criteria pollutant emissions from new motor vehicles
and new motor vehicle engines endanger public health and welfare, and, under Section 202(a) of
the Clean Air Act, this recognition triggers a mandatory duty to reduce such emissions. The
technologies necessary to reduce GHGs and criteria pollutants from new motor vehicles already
exist and are widely in use in the market today. The costs of these technologies are reasonable
and declining, and the application of these technologies generally results in consumers saving
money over the life of a new vehicle. Moreover, the societal benefits of more stringent standards
significantly exceed the costs of those standards. EPA thus has every reason to adopt stronger
emissions standards to satisfy its statutory mandate to reduce emissions of harmful air
pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 1]
In the Proposal, EPA set forth four alternative sets of GHG standards: the proposed standards,
a more stringent alternative (Alternative 1), a less stringent alternative (Alternative 2), and an
alternative similar in stringency to the proposed standards on a different timeline (Alternative 3).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 1-2]
We believe that the record before the agency supports the adoption of standards more
stringent than the proposed standards and accordingly set forth potential improvements to EPA's
models and compliance program below. As EPA recognizes in the Proposal, the necessary
emission control technologies have already been developed and brought to market, and
automakers have been planning for substantially more stringent standards in large portions of the
global market. In addition, the crediting flexibilities already built into the program (which EPA
has not reopened)—including the ability to trade, carry-forward, and carry-back credits—place
automakers in even better positions to craft strategies to comply with more stringent standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 1-2]
As discussed below, the need for more stringent standards is critical, and the industry's ability
to meet stronger standards and to cost-effectively reduce dangerous pollution is clear. We urge
EPA to adopt standards more stringent than the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0746, pp. l-2]DISCUSSION
EPA's proposed standards carry out the purpose and requirements of Section 202(a) of the
Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a). The proposed standards would reduce current and
impending threats to public health and welfare and provide manufacturers sufficient lead time to
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apply the requisite emission control technologies, all at reasonable costs of compliance.
However, given that emissions reductions beyond the proposed standards are feasible and cost-
effective, our States and Cities urge EPA to adopt standards more stringent than the proposed
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 27]
Standards more stringent than EPA's proposed standards would comport with its statutory
mandate in Section 202(a) and further the statutory objective by reducing the threats from
vehicle pollution to public health and welfare. EPA projects that the proposed standards will
reduce GHG emissions by more than 7.3 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide (C02), 120,000
metric tons of methane (CH4), and 130,000 metric tons of nitrous oxide (N20) through 2055, in
addition to criteria pollutant reductions of 44,000 tons per year of nitrogen oxides (NOx), 9,800
tons per year of fine particulate matter (PM2.5), 200,000 tons per year of non-methane organic
gases (NMOG), 2,800 tons per year of sulfur oxides (Sox), and 1.8 million tons per year of
carbon monoxide (CO) by 2055. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,348 (Table 135); id. At 29,351 (Table 139).
More emission reductions are feasible. See CARB Comment at 17-22. Given EPA's description
of these emissions reductions as an "essential factor" in its determination of the appropriate level
of the proposed standards, id. At 29,344, and the primacy Congress placed on addressing
pollution's danger to public health and welfare in Section 202(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), our
States and Cities urge EPA to increase the stringency of its standards beyond those
proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 28]
Our States and Cities agree with EPA's recent conclusion that, in light of the "increased
urgency of the climate crisis," the United States needs "to achieve far deeper GHG reductions
from the light-duty sector in future years beyond the compliance timeframe for the [2023-26]
standards." 86 Fed. Reg. 74,434, 74,498 (Dec. 30, 2021). EPA's proposed standards are an
important step toward those deeper reductions, but it can go further. Standards that effectively
require the production and deployment of lower-emitting and zero-emission vehicles will
promote longer- term, deeper emissions reductions critical to avoiding catastrophic impacts of
climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 29]
C. The Benefits of the Proposed Standards Significantly Outweigh their Costs
Our States and Cities agree with EPA's practice to "set standards to achieve improved air
quality consistent with [S]ection 202, and not to rely on cost-benefit calculations, with their
uncertainties and limitations, as identifying the appropriate standards." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,198.
Likewise, we agree that EPA's cost-benefit analysis "reinforces [EPA's] view that the proposed
standards are appropriate," id., and we believe it also supports adoption of standards more
stringent than the proposed standards. To promote transparency and clarity around the proposed
standards, we add a few comments pertinent to EPA's cost-benefit analysis below. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 36]
Organization: CALSTART
2. Adopt the strongest possible option, providing stringency which is at least as strong
as Alternative 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 2]
At a high level, strong standards maintain the recent positive momentum in the light duty
sector and provide a regulatory framework that complements the historic incentives of the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and is consistent with the
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current market. We applaud EPA staff for its ambitious and highly necessary Phase 2 stringency
and encourage EPA to adopt a Phase 3 at least as stringent as Alternative 1. Below, we describe
our justification for Recommendation 1 (closing the footprint loophole) and then discuss the
drivers, barriers, and possible solutions to Recommendations 2-4 (adopting standards at least as
stringent as Alternative 1, and extending the standards through 2035, and sending clear market
signals). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 2]
1. Ecosystem-Supportive Activities
This regulation represents a historic step in transitioning the automotive industry toward
100% sales of ZEVs. The proposed rule works in concert with IIJA, IRA, ACC II, LCFS, and
other critical clean transportation programs that will reduce tailpipe emissions and increase the
number and quality of light-duty ZEVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) on the road.
With game changing federal incentives now in place and stringent California regulations leading
the way, the EPA now has the opportunity to match these incentives and guide the nation
towards accelerated light-duty vehicle decarbonization with a Phase 3 standard at least as
stringent as Alternative 1. Transitioning light-duty vehicles to electric power will dramatically
improve air quality as well as substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions due to the
progressively cleaner energy generation portfolio of the nation's electrical grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0618, p. 3]
3. Fleet Electrification
A strong Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles standard will enable businesses small and
large to electrify their light duty fleets and operations, which will result in cost savings through
lower fuel and maintenance costs, a significant reduction in the risks that volatile fuel prices and
supply pose to the economy and will help those businesses meet their climate goals. Coupled
with incentives and programs associated with the IRA, the EPA's Alternative 1 proposed
standards will accelerate electric vehicle adoption and allow manufacturers to meet the demand
of businesses and consumers across the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 5]
For example, CALSTART recently hosted a Ride and Drive event in Fresno, California on
behalf of CARET s Advanced Clean Fleets (ACF) Rule. In support of this rule, CALSTART
launched its Cal Fleet Advisor program that educates and offers fleets assistance as they work to
electrify and meet ACF requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 5]
After meeting with dozens of fleets in Fresno, one takeaway became clear: most of these
fleets were not planning to electrify until they were regulated to do so, but now that a clear time
horizon has been set, they are beginning the necessary conversations with utilities, OEMs, and
other relevant stakeholders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 5]
The lack of a clear and ambitious requirement like ACF was bottlenecking progress rather
than technical and market limitations. Similarly, a clear and expedited timeline like Alternative 1
and beyond will drive fleets to make electrification a priority. Ultimately, this will benefit fleets
with lifetime cost savings, reduced local air pollution, and climate mitigation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0618, p. 5]
Organization: Center for American Progress (CAP)
CAP Recommendations:
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1. Based upon the above considerations, CAP urges EPA to adopt a final rule that reflects
its Alternative 1 proposal with the following modifications:
a. Increase Later Year Stringency-Alternative 1 features robust emissions reductions from
2027 through 2029, with emissions targets decreasing by at least 17 g/mi between those years.22
This continued pace of increasing stringency is essential to ensuring the uptake of available
technologies that reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, the potential benefits of
this robust ramp up may be lost due to a lack of continued stringency in the latter years of the
rule from 2029 through 2032, during which time emissions targets only decrease by a maximum
of 9 g/mi per year.23 EPA should improve upon its Alternative 1 stringency levels between 2029
and 2032 to achieve more significant emissions reductions in its final rule. Failing to do so could
undermine the standard because automakers could count on credits generated by overcompliance
during the rule's later years to delay investments in emissions reducing technologies. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0658, p. 5]
22 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027
and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis," April 2023,
available online: https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
23 Ibid.
b. Maintain Early Year Ramp-up-Likewise, it is also critical that EPA maintain Alternative
l's ramp up between 2027 and 2029 to encourage investments in proven technologies to reduce
emissions and avoid automakers delaying investments in compliance technologies that are
available now. As noted previously, automakers are making historical investments in EV
manufacturing and technology24. A weakening of the early year ramp up could potentially allow
for overcompliance during those years, with credits being relied upon for compliance in later
years. Such delay would needlessly increase the volume of higher emission vehicles to the
American vehicle fleet for decades to come. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0658, p. 5]
24 Environmental Defense Fund, "U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs," March
2023, available online: https://www.edf.org/media/report-finds-investments-us-electric-vehicle-
manufacturing-reach-120-billion- create-143000
Organization: Ceres BICEP (Business for Innovative Climate and Energy Policy) Network
The BICEP Network commends the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for
proposing multipollutant emission standards for light- and medium-duty vehicles (LMDV)
through Model Year (MY) 2032 and urges EPA to finalize standards aligned with U.S. climate
commitments. As businesses with footprints across the country, BICEP network companies seek
greater availability of clean vehicles in every state to reduce consumer and business
transportation costs as well as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, protect public health, and
enhance the global competitiveness of U.S. industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0600, p. 1]
Specifically, the BICEP Network urges EPA to adopt light-duty vehicle (LDV) GHG
emissions standards at least as strong as Alternative 1 through 2030, and stronger thereafter. The
BICEP Network also urges EPA to adopt LDV criteria pollutant standards and medium-duty
vehicle (MDV) multi-pollutant emissions standards at least as stringent as currently proposed. To
ensure alignment with U.S climate goals, support businesses in reducing transportation costs,
meeting corporate commitments, and address public health concerns, these regulations must
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drive a significant shift to electrification as well as ensure the efficiency of and reduce criteria
pollutants from internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0600, p.
1]
Existing policies, market trends, and available funding, including the Advanced Clean Cars II
(ACC II) rule adopted by California and six other states; manufacturer and corporate zero-
emission vehicle (ZEV) commitments; and the significant incentives provided by the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) for vehicle
and battery manufacturers, purchasers, and charging infrastructure, all justify standards
supporting greater ZEV sales shares. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0600, p. 1]
BICEP Network companies see climate change as a significant business risk, reducing GHG
emissions as a major economic opportunity, and recognize the urgency of ensuring near-term
reductions. In its most recent March 2023 report, 1 the International Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) emphasized the necessity to "massively fast-track climate efforts by every country and
every sector and on every timeframe,"2 underscoring the urgency of drastically reducing GHG
emissions by 2030. Given that the transportation sector is the largest source of U.S. GHG
emissions,3 strong vehicle emission standards are critical to meeting U.S. climate goals. Recent
analysis from the International Council of Clean Transportation (ICCT) concludes that aligning
the light-duty vehicle sector with climate goals would require a 77% zero- emission vehicle
(ZEV) sales share in 2030.4 A key finding of BloombergNEF's 2023 Electric Vehicle Outlook
was that "(d)irect electrification via batteries is the most efficient, cost-effective and
commercially available route to fully decarbonizing road transport."5 Although ICCT predicts
that IRA incentives could stimulate up to 56-67% electric vehicle sales by 2032,6 even
Alternative 1 falls short of this level of electric vehicle sales share, let alone what is needed to
meet climate goals. Further, given that ICE vehicles will make up the majority of the fleet for
many years, it is also necessary to ensure greater GHG reductions from these vehicles. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0600, pp. 1-2]
1 https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/.
2
https://www.unmultimedia.org/avlibrary /asset/3022/3022200/#:~:text=UN%20Secretary%2Dgeneral%20A
nt%C3%B3nio%20Guterres%20said%
20that%20the%20new%20IPCC,on%20all%20fronts%20%2D%2D%20everything%2C.
3 https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions.
4 https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/The-Global-Automaker-Rating-2022_final.pdf.
5 https://about.bnef.com/electric-vehicle-outlook/.
6 https://theicct.org/publication/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23/ (p. ii).
BICEP members' abilities to meet their own climate commitments are contingent on strong
standards that will ensure the availability of clean vehicles across the U.S. and drive the
necessary shift to electrification. Unfortunately, the U.S. currently lags behind the European
Union and China in EV sales,7and a recent study projects a shortage of EVs needed to meet
American consumer demand.8 Strong U.S. vehicle emission standards are necessary to ensure
the availability of clean vehicles for our members and the global competitiveness of the U.S.
auto industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0600, pp. 1-2]
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7 https://theicct.org/epa-pr-rule-ldv-mdv-apr23/.
8 https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Excess-Demand-The-Looming-EV-
Shortage.pdf.
Thus, on behalf of the companies in the BICEP network, I urge EPA to adopt light-duty
vehicle (LDV) GHG emissions standards at least as strong as Alternative 1 through 2030, and
stronger thereafter. I also urge EPA to adopt LDV criteria pollutant standards and medium-duty
vehicle (MDV) multi-pollutant emissions standards at least as strong as those currently proposed
to mitigate climate risk, strengthen U.S. economy, and address public health and equity
concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0600, p. 3]
Organization: Ceres Corporate Electric Vehicle Alliance (CEVA)
The Alliance applauds the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for its commitment to
adopting multi-pollutant emissions standards for Model Years (MY) 2027 and later light- and
medium- duty vehicles and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions standards for heavy-duty vehicles,
and urges EPA to align these standards with U.S. climate and public health goals. 1 Specifically,
the Alliance supports: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, p. 1]
1 https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/the-us-national-blueprint-for-transportation-
decarbonization.pdf
-Light-duty vehicle GHG emissions standards aligned with Alternative 1, the strongest
standard proposed in this rulemaking, which will result in a 59% reduction in average fleetwide
carbon dioxide emissions by MY2032 from a MY2026 baseline. The Alliance also encourages
EPA to move forward with its proposed criteria pollutant emissions standards for light-duty
vehicles, reducing fleetwide average MY2032 criteria pollutant emissions 60% from MY2025
levels.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, p. 1]
2 https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/lmdv-multi-pollutant-emissions-my-2027-nprm-
2023-04.pdf (p.42)
-Medium-duty vehicle (Class 2b and 3) multi-pollutant emissions standards aligned with its
current proposal, which will ensure a 44% reduction in average fleetwide GHG emissions by
MY2032 from a MY2026 baseline, and a 66 76% reduction in criteria pollutant emissions by
MY2032 from aMY2025 baseline.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, p. 1]
3 Ibid. (p.42)
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/ACT-1963.pdf (p.5)
Light- and Medium-Duty Vehicle Standards:
Coupled with the significant financial incentives of the Inflation Reduction Act, EPA's
Alternative 1 proposed standards for light-duty vehicles will galvanize manufacturers to improve
battery technology, increase ZEV range, and boost production volume, thus providing more
affordable and operationally diverse zero-emission light-duty vehicles as the ZEV market
matures. Alternative 1 will go farthest in supporting Alliance members' fleet electrification
goals, many of which aim to reach full fleet electrification by 2030 or soon thereafter. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0511, p. 2]
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Organization: Colorado Energy Office, Colorado Department of Transportation, and Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment
In response to EPA's request for comments on specific aspects of the rule, we offer the
following suggestions to ensure the rule is as successful as possible:
- EPA requested comment on what levels of carbon dioxide (C02) emissions stringency to
pursue between 2026 and 2032, and suggested one recommended stringency schedule and three
alternative schedules. We believe that the federal government needs to streamline widespread
adoption of EVs to avoid the inefficiency that comes with significantly varied markets across the
country. At times, it has been hard to get the products consumers want in Colorado, because the
initial stock of popular models gets sent to larger states like California even though our state is
an ideal market with strong EV incentives. For example, the State of Colorado put In an order for
over 100 Ford F-150 Lightnings, but only four have been delivered thus far. Similarly, it has
been challenging for consumers to access popular models with great potential for mountain
driving, such as the Toyota RAV-4 Prime. Thankfully, delivery times are starting to improve, but
as the supply chain normalizes, it is critical that states like Colorado have equal access to the full
range of vehicle choices, and that will be enhanced by the federal government taking the lead on
regulations that normalize production and delivery across the country. Alternative 1 would
provide the most consistency with what Colorado is already pursuing. We urge the federal
government to place even greater focus on consistency and streamlining of regulations in order
to help us accelerate EV adoption with the urgency that we need. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0694, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Darius
I write in opposition to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's proposed multipollutant
standards for light-and medium-duty vehicles (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829). I
have serious concerns with all three of the options included in the draft rulemaking, as the EPA
seeks to lower carbon emissions under timelines that effectively make electric vehicles the only
option for automakers to meet the pollution limits from 2027 through 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0519, p.1]
The future of automotive technology matters to consumers, millions of automotive
enthusiasts, and all the men and women who work in the industry. Accordingly, I ask that the
EPA does not follow through on any of the three options outlined in this proposed rulemaking
and instead pursues a rulemaking for light and medium-duty vehicles that embrace a technology-
neutral approach that factors in the infrastructure that exists, the innovation we are all capable of,
consumer preferences, and the lifecycle emissions of the technology that powers our
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0519, p. 1]
Organization: District of Columbia Department of Energy and Environment (DOEE)
DOEE supports EPA's action to address light-duty and medium-duty vehicle emissions.
DOEE believes the Proposal and Alternatives 2 and 3 are not sufficiently stringent to ensure the
health, prosperity, and safety of citizens, particularly those who are already overburdened and
vulnerable to air pollution from vehicles. DOEE supports the multipollutant emissions standards
in Alternative 1 as it is projected to result in industry-wide reductions of 61 percent (61%) in
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fleet average GHG emissions target levels from existing MY 2026 standards. Alternative 1 also
boasts C02 levels that are 10 g/mi lower on average than the proposed targets and reduces
greenhouse gasses (GHG) at more significant rates than either the Proposal, Alternative 2, or
Alternative 3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 1]
EPA Proposal and Alternatives 1, 2, and 3
DOEE recognizes that EPA's proposed light-duty and medium-duty Multi-Pollutant
Emissions Standards requiring lower vehicle emissions are feasible and appropriate under the
Clean Air Act (CAA). The proposed rulemaking, while it falls short, is a necessary important
step toward meeting climate goals and cleaner, healthier air. As EPA illustrates, there is a critical
need for further criteria pollutant and GHG reductions to address the adverse impacts of air
pollution from light and medium duty vehicles on public health and welfare. With continued
advances in internal combustion emissions controls and vehicle electrification technologies
coming into the mainstream as primary vehicle emissions controls, EPA believes substantial
further emissions reductions are feasible and appropriate under the Clean Air Act. 88 FR 29341.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, pp. 1-2]
Vehicle emission reduction technology advancements validate substantial reductions in
vehicle emissions to impactfully address climate change and people's health. Eliminating
polluting emissions from vehicles is crucial to protect public health and mitigate the negative
effects of climate change. EPA has demonstrated in its proposal that light- and medium-duty
emissions reductions are both technologically feasible and will result in varying degrees of
health benefits. Despite each proposal's feasibility and health benefits, DOEE finds that EPA's
Proposal, Alternative 2, and Alternative 3 are insufficient in comparison to the feasible
Alternative 1. Alternative 1 provides a stronger foundation for improving quality of life and
mitigating detrimental climate change impacts. Therefore, DOEE recommends that EPA adopts
Alternative 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, pp. 1-2]
As EPA mentions in Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later
Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles Section II, without substantial changes to the way people
drive, how people travel, or what people use to travel, the District, and the United States as a
whole, will not avoid the worst consequences of climate change. EPA recognizes that vehicles,
including passenger vehicles, are major sources of air pollution and poor health, yet the proposed
rulemaking from EPA fails to be analogous to the severity of the ensuing climate change
impacts. In fact, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 2]
EPA proposes to find that standards substantially more stringent than Alternative 1 would not
be appropriate because of uncertainties concerning the cost and feasibility of such standards.
EPA proposes to find that standards substantially less stringent than Alternative 2 or 3 would not
be appropriate because they would forgo feasible emissions reductions that would improve the
protection of public health and welfare. 88 FR 29201. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 2]
DOEE recognizes that the costs involved in implementing and meeting stringent emissions
requirements would be high. However, DOEE disagrees that standards substantially more
stringent than Alternative 1 would be inappropriate due to cost and feasibility. The cost of
inaction or insufficient action toward eliminating vehicle emissions in conjunction with climate
change will be far greater to both public and environmental health and welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0550, p. 2]
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Summary
It is crucial that EPA promulgate the new criteria pollutant and greenhouse gas emission
standards for light-duty and medium-duty vehicles in a timely fashion. DOEE urges the EPA to
alleviate air pollution burdens by adopting vehicle emission standards as strict as those stated in
Alternative 1. The criteria pollutant and greenhouse gas emission standards in Alternative 1 will
result in tangible and sufficient emission reductions that substantially reduce adverse health
burdens while mitigating further disastrous health, climate, and environmental consequences.
The cost of inaction on the health of people and the environment far outweighs the cost of a
rulemaking requiring zero or near-zero emission vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p.
6]
Organization: Elders Climate Action
The latest climate modeling report (AR6) from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) now makes clear that exceeding 1.5o C before 2050 is "more likely than not"
even with implementation of the most aggressive GHG reduction scenario, but that the excursion
above 1.5o C can be limited to a few decades if we reduce GHG emissions by half before 2030,
and achieve net zero emissions by 2050. But if we fail to meet either of those targets, it is "more
likely than not" that global temperatures will reach 2.0 o C with dire consequences for humanity.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 10-11]
To achieve net-zero emissions economy wide by 2050, zero emission technologies currently
available must be deployed as soon as possible to put GHG emissions from our largest source of
emissions - transportation - on the path toward zero. EPA's proposed rule merely reduces
carbon fuel combustion by less than 1%. A zero emission economy cannot be achieved if
vehicles continue to burn carbon fuels. Internal combustion engines (ICEs) must be replaced as
quickly as possible by zero emission vehicles (ZEVs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 10-
11]
EPA's proposed L/MDV rule does not chart a course toward implementing either the national
policy declared by President Biden or reflect the urgent need to cut GHG emissions in half by
2030 to avoid much worse future climate catastrophes. The rule preamble acknowledges that the
proposed rule changes will reduce L/MDV C02 emissions by only .2 MMT during MY 2027
from 29 MMT to 28.8 MMT. Over the 20 year useful life of vehicles sold in MYs 2027-29 the
rule will allow millions of diesel and gasoline vehicles to be added to the Nation's highways
which will emit an estimated 1.7 billion MT of C02. These emissions will wipe out more than
half of the 3.1 billion MT of C02 reduction achieved by EPA's SAFE 2 rule for light duty
vehicles. These L/MDV emissions are the equivalent of operating 21 new coal-fired power
plants. A large fraction of these emissions could be avoided if EPA adopted the CARB zero
emission standard for L/MDVs in the ACT rule. The rule does not achieve, or describe how it
will contribute to achieving, zero emissions by 2050. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 10-
11]
We ask EPA to revise the rule to set a zero emission standard for all new L/MDVs by 2035,
and establish a phase-in schedule for the standard that includes ZEV sales targets for MYs 2027-
29 that are the same as the CARB ACT rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 10-11]
ZEV sales targets are needed now - [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 10-11]
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to establish benchmarks for all engine manufacturers to create a level playing field
that promotes competitive market conditions for zero emission vehicles based on performance,
reliability and cost;
to ensure a market for ZEVs that will justify early investment by third parties in the
development of supply chains needed for production of batteries and fuel cells;
to ensure the capacity of the industry to ramp up to 100% of sales to ensure that ZEVs
will be available in time to replace on-road ICE vehicles by 2050;
for MY 2027 to give the industry enough lead time to develop supply chains, plan the
conversion of production facilities and develop marketing campaigns designed to assure public
acceptance of their products. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 10-11]
Organization: Electrification Coalition (EC)
To mitigate the impacts of climate change and to reduce national and economic security
threats, the U.S. needs a solution that will decarbonize our economy, reduce dependence on oil
and position the U.S. to maintain our status as a global leader in a new economy that is based on
minerals. The shift to electricity as a fuel source, also called transportation electrification, is the
solution to this triad of concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0588, pp. 2-3]
For these reasons, the adoption of the strongest possible proposal would significantly limit the
greenhouse gas emissions from internal combustion engine vehicles and require them to be
cleaner, bringing the market for these internal combustion engine vehicles to the tipping point
and thereby accelerating the adoption of EVs. The EPA forecasts that the proposed rule would
lead to 67% of new sales of LD/MD vehicles being zero-emission (electric) in 2032, depending
on the vehicle type. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0588, pp. 2-3]
Therefore, the EC supports the adoption of the strongest possible proposal, as it will
accelerate the adoption of EVs in the LD/MD sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0588, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Energy Innovation
Energy Innovation appreciates the opportunity to submit these comments to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding its Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for
Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles (proposed rule). Energy
Innovation is a nonpartisan energy and climate policy firm. We provide independent analysis and
science-based research to policymakers and other decision-makers seeking to understand which
policies are most effective to ensure a climate-safe future for all. Our team has expertise in
modeling climate policy, including policies that support a cleaner power grid and electrify
transportation, buildings, and industry. Our recommendations are data-driven and informed, in
part, by our peer-reviewed Energy Policy Simulator (EPS) model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, p. 1]
We appreciate the EPA's extensive work to develop these proposed emissions standards for
criteria pollutants and greenhouse gases for light-duty and medium-duty vehicles (LDVs and
MDVs, respectively) for model years 2027 (MY 2027) and later. We commend the EPA's
diligent analysis in its development of the proposed rule, which reflects the impact of new
federal and state policies and advances in clean vehicle technologies. The EPA has set forth a
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proposed rule that aligns with its statutory directive in Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA to enhance
the stringency of LDV and MDV vehicle tailpipe standards needed to reduce emissions that
endanger public health and welfare: '"the Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from
time to time revise)... standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or
classes of new motor vehicles ... which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."'1 We concur with
the EPA's analysis that the proposed rule and Alternative 1 are aligned with its statutory
directive—the proposed more stringent standards offer technologically feasible and cost-
effective options to reduce harmful GHG and other air polluting emissions over the timeframe
the standards would be in place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 1]
1 U.S. EPA, "Proposed Rules: Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-
Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829; FRL 8953-03- OAR)," Federal Register
88, no. 87 (May 5, 2023), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-05-05/pdf/2023-07974.pdf,
29231-2.
II. Modeling shows that new federal policies combined with state policies will advance the
battery electric vehicle (BEV) market faster, which supports the EPA's adoption of the more
stringent Alternative 1 in the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 2]
In the EPA's proposed rule, the GHG tailpipe standards for LDVs are "projected to result in
an industry-wide average target for the light-duty fleet of 82 grams/mile (g/mile) of carbon
dioxide (C02) in MY 2032, representing a 56 percent reduction in projected fleet average GHG
emissions target levels from the existing MY 2026 standards." 12 The proposed GHG standards
for MDVs are "projected to result in an average target of 275 grams/mile of C02 by MY 2032,
which would represent a reduction of 44 percent compared to the current MY 2026 standards." 13
The proposed rule will also reduce cumulative GHG emissions between 2027 and 2055: C02 by
26 percent, methane (CH4) by 17 percent, and nitrous oxide (N20) by 25 percent, compared to
no-action scenario. 14 See table 135 below from the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, pp. 5-7]
12 U.S. EPA, "Proposed Rules," May 5, 2023, 29196.
13 U.S. EPA, 29196.
14 U.S. EPA, 29348.
[See original attachment for "Table 135 - Estimated GHG Impacts of the Proposed Standards
Relative to the No Action Scenario, Light-Duty and Medium-Duty"]
While the proposed rule is an improvement over the status quo, greater emissions reductions
via higher rates of electrification in the LDV and MDV sectors are needed to reduce harmful air
pollutants and mitigate climate change. We believe EPA's alternative to the proposed rule
(Alternative 1) is the preferred option (as discussed further below) because it will achieve greater
emissions reductions more quickly, while still being technologically feasible and cost-effective.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 5-7]
Fortunately, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL)
helped tip the scale in favor of climate-oriented investments and the adoption of zero-emission
technologies,[ii] particularly battery electric vehicles (BEVs), and also hydrogen fuel cell electric
vehicles (FCEVs).[iii] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
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ii This includes technologies that eliminate tailpipe GHG emissions and other pollutants, namely battery
electric vehicles (BEVs) for LDVs and MDVs.
iii Based on our analysis and current market trends, we do not anticipate FCEVs will play a sizable role in
the LDV and MDV market for the foreseeable future. However, we recognize the value of technology-
neutral standards.
Energy Innovation's modeling reveals that the IRA's transportation electrification incentives
(combined with infrastructure investments in the BIL) can jump-start transportation
decarbonization this decade. However, these federal policies are insufficient to cut the sector's
GHG emissions at the pace needed to achieve the U.S. nationally determined contribution (NDC)
and to align with the Paris Agreement to limit global warming and achieve net zero by 2050.
Mitigating the transportation sector's (especially LDVs and MDVs) impact on the climate and
public health will require additional policy and regulatory action in the next decade, including
stronger federal tailpipe emissions standards. Our modeling shows that widespread deployment
of clean vehicles, powered by a clean grid, can help reduce GHG emissions to meet the U.S.
NDC.8 See Figures 1 and 2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
8 Robbie Orvis et al., "Closing the Emissions Gap Between the IRA and 2030 NDC: Policies to Meet the
Moment" (Energy Innovation Policy and Technology LLC, December 2022),
https://energyinnovation.org/publication/closing-the-emissions-gap-between-the-ira-and-ndcpolicies-to-
meet-the-moment/.
[See original attachment for line graph titled "Economy-Wide Greenhouse Gas Emissions"]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
Figure 1. Economy-wide GHG emissions by scenario. Source: Orvis, Robbie, et al., Closing
the Emissions Gap Between the IRA and 2030 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
U.S. NDC: Policies to Meet the Moment (Energy Innovation, December 2022), available at:
https://energyinnovation.org/publication/closing-the-emissions-gap-between-the-ira-and-ndc-
policies-to-meet-the-moment/. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
[See original attachment for line graph titled "Transportation Sector GHG Emissions and
Reductions"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
Figure 2. Reductions in transportation sector emissions in the IRA and NDC scenarios relative
to business as usual. Source: Orvis et al., [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
Closing the Emissions Gap Between the IRA and 2030 U.S. NDC. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
As we discuss in the next section, BIL and IRA have put the U.S. on the cusp of a cleaner
transportation future. Incentives and investments made possible by these laws will help tip the
scale in favor of BEVs and zero- emission technologies. However, they are not enough to fully
transform the transportation sector. The standards set forth in the final rule must be sufficiently
stringent to expedite the shift away from polluting ICE vehicles for the sake of climate stability,
human health, society, and future generations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 8]
II. MODELING SHOWS THAT NEW FEDERAL POLICIES COMBINED WITH STATE
POLICIES WILL ADVANCE THE BEV MARKET FASTER, WHICH SUPPORTS THE
EPA'S ADOPTION OF THE MORE STRINGENT ALTERNATIVE 1 IN THE PROPOSED
RULE. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 8]
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We agree with the EPA that the passage of the BIL and IRA represent significant "support for
investment in expanding the manufacture, sale, and use of zero-emission vehicles by addressing
elements critical to the advancement of clean transportation and clean electricity generation in
ways that will facilitate and accelerate the development, production and adoption of zero-
emission technology during the time frame of the rule."20 Our modeling supports these findings.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 8]
20 U.S. EPA, 29195.
A primary takeaway from the ICCT-EI Study analysis is that the IRA's financial incentives
for vehicles and manufacturers enable and support the adoption of more stringent federal vehicle
standards at a lower cost and higher benefit to consumers.25 However, EV sales shares from our
analysis are not guaranteed. Federal tailpipe standards are a critical tool that give auto
manufacturers clear direction to retool their production lines to produce ZEVs at scale. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 9-11]
25 Peter Slowik et al., "Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act on Electric Vehicle Uptake in
the United States" (International Council on Clean Transportation and Energy Innovation, January 2023),
https://energyinnovation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2023/01/Analyzing-the-Impact-of-the-Inflation-Reduction-
Act-on-EV-Uptake-in-the-U. S. .pdf.
The IRA incentives provide one lever to move the market, and the EPA's standards provide
an additional lever. The ICCT-EI Study and other studies mentioned in the EPA's proposed rule
point to "greatly increased penetration of electrification across the U.S. light-duty fleet in the
coming years, without specifically considering the effect of increased emission standards under
this proposed rule."26 Given that fact, it is reasonable to infer that the EPA's proposed rule
represents more of a floor, not a ceiling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 9-11]
26 U.S. EPA, "Proposed Rules," May 5, 2023, 29189.
Given the urgent need to reduce harmful GHG emissions and other tailpipe pollutants, any
additional amount of emissions reductions that final standards can achieve is preferable to other
alternatives. And modeling demonstrates that more emissions reductions are feasible in the time
frame, given the availability of incentives in the BIL and IRA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561,
p. 12]
In conclusion, we invite the EPA to rely on the ICCT-EI Study and other analyses to support
adoption of the most stringent set of emission standards (Alternative 1) to accelerate the adoption
of pollution-free BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 12]
In the next section, we discuss several relevant factors that may further accelerate EV
adoption and impact learning curves for BEV economics, which provide additional rationale for
the adoption of the most stringent standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 12]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
While the market is clearly heading in the right direction, EPA's standards should facilitate
even greater deployment of zero-emission and combustion vehicle technologies to help protect
the public from the destructive effects of climate change and air pollution generally. To this end,
we urge EPA to finalize the strongest possible emission standards. While we do not believe it is
necessary for EPA to set standards beyond 2032 at this point, it is critical that the final standards
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are sufficiently stringent through model year 2032 to ensure that the U.S. is on track to reach
100% new ZEV sales in 2035. The standards in Alternative 1, but with greater stringency after
2030, are feasible and would better serve EPA's statutory mandate to address the environmental
and health impacts of air pollution from light- and medium-duty vehicles. Finalizing such
standards will provide feasible, critical air pollution emission reductions, as directed by Congress
in the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 8-9]
IV. EPA's Own Analysis Shows that Additional Stringency Is Feasible and Would Produce
Greater Societal Benefits.
While we support the Proposed Standards, EPA must go further—specifically, by adopting
Alternative 1 with a steeper increase in stringency after 2030 to ensure the country is on track to
reach 100% new ZEV sales by 2035. As detailed throughout this comment letter, such standards
are feasible and offer significantly more air pollution reductions, consumer savings, and societal
benefits. And as EPA itself acknowledges, adopting less stringent standards where more
stringent ones are achievable "would forgo feasible emissions reductions that would improve the
protection of public health and welfare." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29201. In this section, we explain how
EPA's own data show that final standards more stringent than the Proposed Standards are
warranted. In the sections that follow, we detail the feasibility and superiority of Alternative 1
with a steeper increase in stringency after 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 24]
Alternative 1 also provides greater pollution reductions and societal benefits than the
Proposed Standards. Under EPA's modeling, Alternative 1 would avoid 8,100 million metric
tons (MMT) of C02 emissions through 2055 relative to the No Action scenario, id. at 29203, tbl.
14, in contrast to the 7,300 MMT avoided under the Proposed Standards, id. at 29198, tbl. 3.
Alternative 1 also provides greater reductions in criteria pollutants and air toxics. Compare id. at
29198-99, tbls. 4 and 5, to id. at 29203-05, tbls. 13-16. In addition, Alternative 1 has greater
societal net benefits: ranging from $1,500-2,500 billion through 2055, id. at 29205-06, tbl. 17
(3%> discount rate), depending on the values used for the GHG emission reductions, versus a
range of $1,400-2,300 billion under the Proposed Standards. Id. at 29200, tbl. 6. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 25]
EPA's analysis shows that Alternative 1 is also feasible. It relies on the same existing
technology—vehicle electrification—at the core of the Proposed Standards, and the share of
battery-electric vehicles (BEVs) in the new vehicle fleet projected by EPA under Alternative 1 is
very similar to those under the Proposed Standards, with the share under Alternative 1 never
exceeding those under the Proposed Standards by more than 3 percentage points through 2032.
Id. at 29333, tbl. 99 (BEV penetration of 60% under the Proposed Standards in 2030, versus 63%
under Alternative 1). While we are recommending that EPA finalize a modified version of
Alternative 1 (which would yield higher levels of BEV penetration, as detailed in Section V
below), EPA's analysis at least shows that BEV levels associated with Alternative 1 are
eminently feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 25]
According to the Alliance for Automotive Innovation, in the first quarter of 2023, there were
55 BEV models and 40 Plug-in Hybrid (PHEV) models available in the United States,
representing a variety of vehicle types, including sedans, crossovers, SUVs, and light-duty
trucks. 102 The technology is only improving, and the number of models of plug-in electric
vehicles (PEVs, which include both BEVs and PHEVs) available in the U.S. is projected to reach
197 by the end of 2025.103 Higher levels of PEV adoption are already driven by strong
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consumer demand and greater model choice. And as is discussed throughout these comments, the
charging infrastructure, electric grid, and vehicle supply chain will be able to accommodate the
projected levels of BEVs—indeed, sending a strong regulatory signal will facilitate that process.
Moreover, given the flexibility in EPA's program, as well as the fact that EPA's modeling did
not include any PHEVs or improvements to combustion vehicle greenhouse gas emissions (and
in fact projects increasing GHG emissions from the combustion vehicle fleet, as discussed in
Section VI.A), it is likely that the levels of BEVs would be lower in the real-world than EPA
projected as automakers employ such technologies to comply with the final standards. That is
because making even minor improvements in combustion vehicle GHG emissions—or even
simply holding the average emissions of the combustion vehicle fleet constant—or
manufacturing PHEVs will allow automakers to achieve compliance with relatively fewer levels
of ZEVs than EPA projected. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 26]
102 Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Get Connected: Electric Vehicle Quarterly Report, First Quarter,
2023 (2023), https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/papers-
reports/Get%20Connected%20EV%20Quarterly%20Report%202023% 20Ql.pdf.
103 Rachel Macintosh et al., Electric Vehicle Market Update, Environmental Defense Fund and ERM 7
(April 2023), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-
05/Electric%20Vehicle%20Market%20Update%20April%202023.pdf; see also Jeff S. Bartlett & Ben
Preston, Automakers are Adding Electric Vehicles to Their Lineups. Her"s Wha"s Coming, Consumer
Reports (Jan. 6, 2023),https://www.consumerreports.org/hybrids-evs/why-electric-cars-may-soon-flood-
the-us-market-a9006292675/.
V. Outside Analysis Demonstrates the Significant Benefits of Stronger Emission Standards,
Particularly Alternative 1 with a Steeper Increase in Stringency After 2030.
Outside analysis also shows the benefits of adopting final standards stronger than EPA
proposed. Environmental Resources Management, Inc (ERM), one of the largest sustainability
consultancies globally, was commissioned by NRDC to provide an independent, third-party
analysis of EPA's proposed standards and alternative proposals, as well as a recommended
approach. ERM's methodology, assumptions, and results are described throughout this section,
and the ERM report is attached to this comment letter. 104 ERM's analysis shows that
Alternative 1 with a steeper increase in stringency after 2030 would produce significant societal
benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 26]
104 Dave Seamonds, et al., ERM, Impacts of EPA Light-& Medium-Duty Multi-Pollutant Standards:
National Scenario Results, June 2023 [hereinafter ERM, Impacts Report] (attached to this comment letter).
ERM's analysis employed a modeling framework that leveraged EPA's tools to inform and
develop inputs to ERM's Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) framework. It is important to note that
while this analysis is based on EPA's "baseline" scenario, we believe this "baseline" is
ultimately not an accurate reflection of a "No Action" scenario, as it is overly conservative. We
explore this further in Section XV, but ultimately the most relevant of the analyses that EPA
considered supports baseline ZEV sales greater than the baseline levels projected in the "EPA No
Action" scenario. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 26]
Where possible, ERM mirrored EPA's methodology to keep its analytical approach and
resultant comparisons consistent with EPA's approach in the Proposal, and to allow for an
apples-to-apples comparison. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 26]
Policy Scenarios
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ERM investigated five different policy scenarios: EPA's no action "baseline" ("EPA No
Action"); EPA's preferred approach ("EPA Main Proposal"); our recommended approach, which
reflects greater increases in stringency after model year 2030 ("Alternative 1+"); EPA's strongest
option ("EPA Alternative 1"); and EPA's weakest option ("EPA Alternative 3"). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 27] Modeling Background
EPA's updated MOVES model (MOVES3.R3105) was utilized to model electric vehicle (EV)
adoption rates (sales and in-use), vehicle miles traveled (VMT), and pollutant emissions by
vehicle type. Cost assumptions (battery costs, incremental vehicle costs, charging equipment
costs, etc.) and vehicle classification/identification information and sales shares were
incorporated into both ERM's BCA framework and its modification and application of
MOVES3.R3 data outputs. ERM's BCA framework was applied to compare and evaluate the
impacts across several policy scenarios as compared to the EPA No Action case. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 27]
105 Although MOVES3.R1 was used for L/MD rulemaking, MOVES3.R3 reflects an updated version of
MOVES3.R1 but maintains relevant L/MDV data and assumptions.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR PIE CHART— Figure V.B-1: National Light- and
Medium-Duty Vehicle Fleetl06. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 28]
106 ERM, Impacts Report at 6.
This pie chart is based on EPA's modified version of MOVES. EPA projects that the majority
of vehicles subject to the rule will be SUVs and light trucks (-160 million), followed by
passenger cars (i.e., sedans), which are projected to number just over 100 million vehicles. The
remainder is made up of Class 2b (chassis-certified only) and Class 3 medium-duty vehicles,
projected to number around 14 million vehicles nationwide; note that "incomplete" class 2b/3
vehicles covered by the proposed Phase 3 heavy-duty rulemaking were not included in this
analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 28]
1. Reductions in greenhouse gas emissions will bring climate change benefits to
environmental justice communities.
Reducing GHG emissions from light- and medium-duty vehicles will help reduce the
significant harm that climate change inflicts on environmental justice communities. By 2055, the
Proposed Standards would avoid 7,300 million metric tons (MMT) of C02 emissions, 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29198, tbl. 3, and EPA's calculations show the Proposal would produce climate benefits
of between $82 and $1,000 billion in 2020 dollars by 2055, depending on the values used for
GHG emission reductions. Id. at 29200, tbl. 6 (using a 3% discount rate). As compared to the
Proposed Standards, by 2055 Alternative 1 would achieve an additional 800 MMT of C02
savings, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29203, tbl. 14, and increase climate benefits by between $9 and $100
billion. Id. at 29205, tbl. 17. And adopting Alternative 1 with a faster ramp rate after 2030 would
bring even more climate benefits to environmental justice communities. See infra Section V
(detailing the societal benefits of more stringent standards). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
19]
D. Alternative 1+ Results in Greater Emissions Reductions and Public Health Impacts than
EPA's Preferred Approach
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The ERM modeling results regarding GHG tailpipe and upstream emissions, shown below in
Figure V.E-1, show the emissions reductions possible by taking an Alternative 1+ approach from
2026-2040, as well as the cumulative reductions from the other policy scenarios and the
monetized value of these reductions (shown in Table V.E-1). These benefits are compared to
EPA's No Action scenario, which is quite conservative in its projections for what market
conditions are expected to be in a no action scenario. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 30]
A final rule aligned with our recommended approach would be expected to achieve more than
a 52% reduction in emissions of C02 by 2040 compared to 2026 and result in almost $148
billion in climate benefits by 2040 - approximately $35 billion more than would be possible
from an EPA Main Proposal approach during the same timeframe. Accordingly, EPA's failure to
finalize a rule that aligns with our recommended approach would unnecessarily leave significant
climate benefits on the table. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 30-31]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure V.E-1: Comparison of Projected Climate
BenefitsllO [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 31]
110 Id. at 11.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table V.E-1: Projected Cumulative Reduction and
Monetized Value (per policy scenario)lll [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 31]
111 Id.
ERM analysis used EPA's identified Social Cost of Carbon as the basis for monetized social
benefits. This analysis also used a 3% average discount rate and escalated the monetary values to
2021 levels to be consistent with other costs contained within the benefit cost model. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 30-31]
1. Comparison of Overall Societal Benefits
The results from ERM's analysis (depicted in Figure V.I-1) show that on a net societal basis-
-inclusive of the costs to fleets as well as air quality benefits, climate benefits, and reduced
utility bills—the greatest benefits are seen with Alternative 1+ at about $125.7 billion through
the 2040 timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 35]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure V.I-1: Comparison of Possible Annual Net
Societal Benefitsll9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 36]
119 Id. at 15.
This figure depicts net annual societal benefits (which incorporates net incremental fleet cost
savings, climate benefits, air quality benefits, and reduced utility bills). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 36]
XXIX. Conclusion
EPA should finalize emission standards for light- and medium-duty vehicles that are at least
as stringent as Alternative 1 but with increasing stringency from 2030 to 2032 to put the country
on track for 100% new ZEV sales by 2035. EPA can and must go further than it has proposed.
Adopting the recommendations set forth in this comment letter would result in feasible, cost-
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beneficial emission standards that would better serve EPA's statutory mandate to protect public
health and welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 205]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
III. EPA's final light-duty standards should deliver pollution reductions at least at the level of
the proposal.
In this section, we outline the breadth of factors supporting the feasibility and cost-
effectiveness of protective pollution standards. We recommend that EPA strengthen the
standards in a manner that delivers pollution reductions at least as great as the proposal that EPA
is considering. We also highlight the importance of adjustments that could secure even greater
pollution reductions by including in the final rule a voluntary (but once chosen, enforceable)
alternative leadership pathway that, for manufacturers choosing the pathway, would ensure ACC
II levels of ZEV deployment nationwide. In addition, especially if EPA modifies the proposal's
phase-in of the standards in the early years of the program as indicated in Alternative 3, we
recommend that EPA consider increasing the stringency of the 2031-2032 standards to
potentially increase cumulative GHG reductions relative to the proposal, and at minimum,
protect the benefits achieved under the standards as proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
p. 16]
A. Feasibility, cost, and lead time support final standards at least as protective as the proposal.
In this section, we examine a series of interlocking analyses and factors that support standards
at least as protective as EPA's proposed emissions standards, including 1) extensive independent
analysis related to rapidly-declining ZEV costs, including the impacts of the IRA in further
advancing ZEV cost declines and accelerating ZEV deployment; 2) manufacturers' projections
of battery cost declines; 3) an assessment of market indicators, including manufacturer
investments and commitments, which are broadly consistent with and reinforce these study
findings; 4) a discussion of leading state actions, including the ACC II rule; and 5) presentation
of a revised baseline analysis, which synthesizes and quantifies each of these factors. Each of
these factors, both individually and when taken together, demonstrate that EPA's proposed
standards are feasible and cost-effective. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 16]
B. EPA should strengthen standards in a manner that delivers pollution reductions at least as
great as the proposal.
The above analysis demonstrates the feasibility of standards that deliver pollution reductions
at least as great as EPA's proposal. In this section we offer two suggested approaches EPA
should pursue to further strengthen the standards: 1) adopting stronger standards in later model
years of the program, reflecting additional ZEV deployment; and 2) finalizing a voluntary (but
once chosen, enforceable) leadership pathway that incentivizes ACC II levels of ZEV
deployment nationwide. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 37]
i. Primary standards should be strengthened to reflect additional ZEV deployment in later
years of the program.
The foregoing factors support protective standards. They also especially underscore the
opportunities to strengthen the later model years of the program, similar to EPA's decision in its
MY 2023-2026 standards to strengthen the MY 2026 standards. Even more so here,
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manufacturers have substantial lead-time, and most cost assessments project both upfront cost-
parity (or savings) and substantial savings on a total cost of ownership basis in that timeframe.
IRA credits will still apply, delivering further cost savings. Moreover, though our comments
show that EPA has reasonably considered infrastructure, grid-related issues, supply and critical
mineral considerations in both the near and long term, even stakeholders raising concerns about
those considerations have focused most on perceived near-term constraints. And California's
ACC II program will be delivering 76% ZEVs in 2031 and 82% in 2032. In summary, in the
2031-32 timeframe, there is broad consensus that ZEVs will be cheaper to purchase, own, and
operate, will be produced at significant volumes relying on supply chains that have been
strengthened and secured, and will be sold at percentages significantly greater than EPA's
proposal in the states that have adopted ACC II standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp.
38-41]
In addition to being feasible, strengthening standards in later model years of the program is
critical to delivering additional pollution reductions and important to ensure we are firmly on the
pathway to ensuring all new vehicles sold by 2035 are zero-emitting. In this section, we have
demonstrated how adjustments in stringency in these later model years will deliver significant
emissions reductions. EPA should consider strengthening the later model years of the program
across all of its proposed alternatives, but we underscore the vital importance of such
strengthening in circumstances that would ensure any finalized alternative delivers pollution
reductions at least as great as the proposal. To illustrate this, we have examined EPA's proposed
Alternative 3 and examined how EPA might strengthen the later model years to ensure modified
standards would deliver emission reductions at least as great as the proposal and, separately, at
least as great as Alternative 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 38-41]
Table 5, below, shows the fleetwide targets for EPA's no action case, as well as the Proposal
and Alternatives 1 and 3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 38-41]
[See original attachment for Table 5: Fleetwide Certification C02 Targets Sales Under
Certain EPA Options (g/mi)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 38-41]
As the table demonstrates, GHG standards under the EPA Proposal and Alternative 1 are
front- loaded, with the largest year over year reductions occurring between 2026 and 2029. In
contrast, Alternative 3 achieves roughly the same GHG target as the Proposal in 2032, but
achieves this level more gradually. In terms of "cumulative 2027-2032 MY grams per mile",
Alternative 1 achieves 60 gram-years per mile more control than the Proposal, while Alternative
3 achieves 27 gram-years per mile less control than the Proposal. In other words, the slower
decrease means cumulative GHG reductions from Alternative 3 are lower than the Proposal even
though they reach the same standard by 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 38-41]
As described above, we have combined the slower, but steadier levels of GHG reductions
reflected in Alternative 3 with greater levels of GHG reductions in the later MYs so that the
overall level of GHG reductions afforded in one scenario by the Proposal and the other, by
Alternative 1, are achieved. EDF selected cumulative GHG emission reductions through CY
2055 as a reasonable metric for overall GHG reduction potential. To do this, we used a
spreadsheet model that reflects the basic scrappage and annual mileage versus age distributions
used in EPA's OMEGA 2 model. EDF assumed constant vehicle sales between 2027 and 2055,
which is consistent with the results of EPA's OMEGA modeling. We also ignored VMT
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rebound, which is again reasonable given the small changes in ICEV C02 emissions projected in
EPA's OMEGAmodeling.llO [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 38-41]
110 EPA assumed that BEVs would be driven the same number of miles as the ICEVs they replaced, so
electrification produced no change in fleet VMT.
Using this model, EDF found that reducing the fleetwide GHG targets of Alternative 3 in
MYs 2031 and 2032 by 2.1 and 4.2 g/mi, respectively, would match the Proposal's cumulative
2055 GHG emission reduction. Analogously, reducing the fleetwide GHG targets of Alternative
3 by 8.7 and 17.4 g/mi in MYs 2031 and 2032 would match Alternative l's cumulative 2055
GHG emission reductions. The C02 emission targets under these amended scenarios are shown
in Table 6. EPA assumed that BEVs would be driven the same number of miles as the ICEVs
they replaced, so electrification produced no change in fleet VMT. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0786, pp. 38-41]
[See original attachment for Table 6: Fleetwide Certification C02 Targets Sales Under
Certain EPA Options and Two New Scenarios (g/mi)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 38-
41]
EDF also estimated the level of BEV sales under the two new control scenarios by assuming
that ICEV emissions in 2032 continue through 2055 (roughly 250 g/mi C02 for average ICEV).
The results are shown in Table 7. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 38-41]
[See original attachment for Table 7: BEV Sales Under Various EPA Options and Two New
Scenarios] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 38-41]
The increased level of BEV sales in the last two years of Alternative 3 in order to match the
performance of the Proposal are modest: less than 1% increase in MY 2031 and 3% points in
MY 2032. The increases in BEV sales required to match the performance of Alternative 1 are
more substantial but still reasonable: 3% points in MY 2031 and 7% points in MY 2032. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 38-41]
Moreover, as we discuss earlier in these comments, automakers can also choose to meet
standards through additional ICEV reductions and deployment of PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 38-41]
EDF used the OMEGA 2 and OMEGA Effects models to project the cumulative benefits of
the Proposal, Alternative 1 and the two other scenarios based on Alternative 3. The emission
reductions projected for the four scenarios are summarized in Table 8. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 38-41]
[See original attachment for Table 8: Cumulative Emission Reductions for Calendar Years
2027-2055 (Million metric tons for GHG, metric tons for criteria pollutants)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp.38-41]
The GHG emission reductions for the two scenarios with strengthened later year standards
either exceed those of the Proposal and Alternative 1 or are within 1%. The same relationship
holds for emissions of fine PM and NOx. However, the sOx emission reductions for the two
scenarios with strengthened later year standards are much larger than those for the Proposal and
Alternative 1, likely due to the fact that vehicle electrification is larger in the later years when the
electrical grid is cleaner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 38-41]
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Accordingly, we encourage EPA to consider strengthening standards in later model years of
the program (2031 and 2032), which can deliver important, additional emission reductions
regardless of the alternative EPA finalizes. It is especially vital that the agency do so to ensure
any final rule delivers emission reductions at least as great as the proposal, should EPA
otherwise choose to pursue a pathway like Alternative 3 that, absent strengthening, would not
deliver these benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 38-41]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Ford supports the 2032 endpoint of the Multi-Pollutant Proposal which may result in
approximately 67 percent of new light- and medium-duty vehicles being ZEVs. As summarized
here and detailed in the Attachment, the most reliable way to reach that endpoint is for the EPA
to adopt the "Alternative 3" GHG standards with several, modest adjustments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0605, p. 2]
To achieve the 2032MY goals EPA has proposed and Ford supports, the final regulation must
have the following elements. First, regarding the stringency of the GHG standards, the EPA
should finalize the Alternative 3 standards with minor adjustments to the utility allowance
inherent in the truck curves and provide a phase-out for refrigerant credits (rather than eliminate
all at once). The Alternative 3 standards effectively draw a straight line from 2026 to 2032; that
is, they would require roughly equal reductions in absolute grams-per-mile targets over the
duration of the program. Alternative 3 reaches the same endpoint in 2032 as the EPA's main
proposal, and therefore would achieve the primary goal shared by Ford and EPA—widespread
adoption of ZEVs. In contrast, EPA's main proposal, Alternative 1, and Alternative 2 each would
require precipitous reductions in 2027 - 2029; this is not feasible and does not align with the
anticipated scaling of the EV supply chain and manufacturing base. Similarly, the EPA's
proposal to end refrigerant credits altogether in 2027 would be abrupt and have the effect of
standards being even more strict; EPA should phase these credits out over time. Lastly, EPA's
final regulations must continue to recognize the utility provided by trucks. Although electrified
vehicles hold promise for all vehicles classes, ICE-powered trucks will continue to provide
unique capability and utility for many years. The EPA proposal (and Alternative 3) would reduce
the existing truck utility allowance too severely. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 3]
As the EPA and others consider the many trade-offs in this rulemaking, Ford must emphasize
that investments in EVs will yield far greater emissions reductions than investments toward
incremental improvements to already-advanced ICE technologies. These considerations are
particularly important in the early years of the EPA program, where the EV market must reach
critical mass. Accordingly, we encourage EPA to avoid setting criteria emissions requirements
that will force unnecessarily large or ill-timed investments and distract both automakers and the
supply base with little air quality benefit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 4]
Light-Duty GHG Stringency and Alternatives
Ford commends EPA staff for recognizing the uncertainty and challenges associated with
such a transformation rulemaking effort by including alternatives to the main proposal. Ford
believes that Alternative 3 represents the most feasible pathway toward achieving a successful
program, and considers the following aspects of Alternative 3 to be essential elements of a final
rule: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 5]
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1) Alternative 3 includes a more feasible, uniform ramp rate across the 2027 - 2032MY
program timeframe while reaching the same endpoint as the main proposal. In contrast, the main
proposal, and Alternatives 1 and 2 are impractically "front-loaded", with higher year-over-year
stringency increases in the early years of the program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 5]
2) Alternative 3 also distributes a change in the relative stringency of the car and truck curves
over the 2027 - 2032MY timeframe. The main proposal and Alternatives 1 and 2 apply this
adjustment all in one year (2027MY) creating a step-change in the truck stringency that is
infeasible for full-line OEMs. It should be noted that while Ford supports the distributed
approach of such a rebalancing as implemented in Alternative 3, Ford disagrees with the
magnitude of this rebalancing as described in the following section. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0605, p. 5]
Organization: Hyundai Motor America
President Biden's Executive Order 14037 - setting an EV penetration target of 50% in MY
2030 - Should Guide the Final Rule.
Hyundai supports EPA's overall emissions reduction goals and, as a legacy automaker with a
high share of EV sales compared to our peers, we understand EPA's goal of the NPRM to
aggressively accelerate penetration of BEVs. Hyundai continues to support the already
aggressive goal set by the Biden Administration on August 5, 2021, in the "Executive Order on
Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks" ("Executive Order 14037") that
50 percent of all new passenger car and light truck sales in MY 2030 be battery, fuel cell, and
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 2]
However, the Proposed Alternative deviates in substantial ways from Executive Order 14037.
First, the Proposed Alternative not only significantly increases the penetration rates, but also
ignores the PHEVs and FCEVs that were previously included in that calculation, and which are
critical to facilitating a safe and reliable transition to EVs. These adjustments are premised on
overly- optimistic assumptions and do not account for the numerous hurdles facing
implementation of such an aggressive transition timeline. As described in more detail in this
comment and in the comments of the Alliance for Automotive Innovation ("AFAI"), the
Proposed Alternative does not adequately consider significant challenges faced by all aspects of
the market when forcing such transformational change. For example, the Proposed Alternative
insufficiently accounts for supply chain constraints, availability of safe and responsibly sourced
critical minerals (which are essential for battery production), manufacturing limitations,
inadequate charging infrastructure, and significantly lagging consumer acceptance. In light of
these challenges, the ambitious timelines proposed by EPA will likely further drive up the cost of
EVs, making these vehicles less available to the mass market consumers and priority
communities who arguably need them the most. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 2]
Accordingly, we request that EPA modify the final standard to appropriately consider these
significant challenges, and encourage EPA to adopt the proposal put forward by AFAI. We look
forward to working with EPA in finalizing a rule that achieves historic emission reductions and
fortifies our path toward full electrification while also allowing for a safe, affordable, and
reliable transition for US consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 2]
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We appreciate EPA's efforts to finalize a rule that achieves historic emissions reductions and
puts industry on a firm path toward full electrification. However, the Proposed Alternative goes
beyond what was already an aggressive target set by the Biden Administration, setting a
drastically steep ramp for compliance while simultaneously removing much needed flexibilities.
The current proposal inadequately accounts for real-world challenges, including the short lead
time provided to vastly improve charging infrastructure, significant supply chain challenges,
availability of safe and reliable supply of critical minerals, manufacturing limitations, and
significantly lagging consumer acceptance rates. In addition, the true cost to consumers and
automakers resulting from the IRA provisions is not fully reflected in the NPRM. We encourage
the EPA to work directly with industry to better understand and analyze these challenges. For
these reasons, we believe the Proposed Alternative may not be achievable and therefore support
the AFAI Proposal which - while it is ambitious - better reflects real-world challenges and
opportunities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 10]
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law
IV. Barring a Compelling Reason Otherwise, EPA Should Select the Alternative That
Will Maximize Net Social Welfare
Section 202 of the Clean Air Act instructs EPA to balance its mandate to safeguard "public
health and welfare" with an "appropriate" consideration of costs. 198 In the Proposed Rule, EPA
"finds that the expected compliance costs for automakers are reasonable in light of the emissions
reductions in air pollutants and the resulting benefits for public health and welfare" and
recognizes that a finding of significant net benefits "reinforces" its conviction that the proposed
standards are "appropriate "199 Moreover, President Biden has reaffirmed the principles of
Executive Order 12866,200 which include a mandate that each agency, "in choosing among
alternative regulatory approaches, . . . should select those approaches that maximize net
benefits," including "distributive impacts" and "equity," to the extent permitted by law.201 EPA
should follow these principles in setting these standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp.
29-30]
198 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521(a)(l)-(2).
199 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed Reg. at 29,198, 29,344.
200 Exec. Order 14,094 § 1, 88 Fed. Reg. 21,879 (Apr. 11, 2023).
201 Exec. Order 12,866 § 1(a), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
Applying these standards, EPA should more strongly consider Alternative 1 (the most
stringent among the options analyzed), particularly in light of the economic recommendations
and analysis presented in this letter. EPA's proposed program would reduce emissions and
increase net social welfare and so is justifiable,202 yet the analysis accompanying the Proposed
Rule shows that Alternative 1 would result in $200 billion more net benefits through 2055.203
Critically, EPA concludes that Alternative 1 is "anticipated to be feasible."204 Alternative 1 is
more net beneficial than the proposed program in part because of greater reductions in air
pollution,205 which EPA describes as "[a]n essential factor ... in determining the appropriate
level of the proposed standards."206 Moreover, the $200 billion figure does not take into account
significant unmonetized benefits that would likely further increase Alternative l's relative
advantages.207 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 29-30]
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202 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,200 tbl.6.
203 Compare Proposed Rule at 29,200 tbl.6, with id. at 29,200 tbl. 17 (at a 3% discount rate and the 95th
percentile values for the SC-GHG at a 3% discount rate).
204 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed Reg. at 29,280. EPA concludes that "standards substantially more stringent than
Alternative 1 would not be appropriate because of uncertainties concerning the cost and feasibility of such
standards." Id. at 29,201.
205 Compare Proposed Rule, 88 Fed Reg. at 29,348 tbl. 135, and id. at 29,355-56 tbl. 147, with id. at 29,348
tbl. 136, and id. at 29,356 tbl. 148.
206 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed Reg. at 29,344.
207 See Proposed Rule, 88 Fed Reg. at 29,380 (noting that the Proposed Rule does not monetize the
benefits associated with reducing ambient concentrations of ozone, reductions in direct exposure to N02
and mobile source air toxics, improved ecosystem effects, or visibility); id. at 29,389 (noting that the
Proposed Rule does not monetize military benefits as a result of reductions in U.S. oil imports); RIA at 7-
38 tbl.7-1 (showing that the Proposed Rule does not monetize numerous adverse impacts of PM2.5,
including certain cardiovascular, respiratory, cancer, nervous system, metabolic, reproductive, and
developmental effects).
Additionally, further analysis shows that Alternative 1 is likely even more net beneficial
versus the proposed program than EPA currently acknowledges. Applying updated discount rates
and climate-damage valuations shows that Alternative 1 is $300 billion more net beneficial than
the proposed program.208 Furthermore, approval of the preemption waiver for California's
Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC II)—which could occur before this rule is finalized, and thereby
shift the analytical baseline—may further reinforce the conclusion that Alternative 1 is most net-
beneficial.209 According to EPA's analysis, selecting Alternative 1 in the absence of the waiver
would increase BEV penetration relative to the proposed program by 2 percentage points and
increase per-vehicle cost by $611 in 2032.210 In contrast, selecting Alternative 1 with the waiver
already in place would increase BEV penetration relative to the proposed program by 4
percentage points (i.e., doubling the incremental effect) while increasing per-vehicle cost by
$763 in 2032 (a far more modest increase on a percentage basis).211 This suggests that
Alternative 1 may be even more net beneficial compared to the proposed program with ACC II
in place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 29-30]
208 See supra p. 12 tbl.3.
209 EPA conducts sensitivity analysis that considers how approval of the ACC II preemption waiver would
affect the agency's regulatory impact analysis but does not present the benefits, cost, or net benefits under
that scenario. Nor was Policy Integrity able to determine the benefits, cost, and net benefits under this
sensitivity in OMEGA.
210 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed Reg. at 29,333 tbl.99; id. at 29,203 tbl. 12.
211 Id. at 29,355 tbl. 108; id. at 29,355 tbl. 109.
For the reasons discussed in supra Section I and elsewhere in this letter, Alternative 1 would
not substantially increase legal risk under the major questions doctrine. Alternative 1 relies on
the same regulatory approaches that have considerable precedent in prior EPA tailpipe rules.212
It also has similar effects on BEV penetration.213 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 29-30]
212 See generally supra Part I.B.
213 See supra p. 10 tbl.2.
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Accordingly, barring a compelling reason otherwise, EPA should select the regulatory
alternative that maximizes net benefits—according to EPA's current analysis, Alternative 1.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 30-31]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
ICCT recommends the adoption of Alternative 1, the most stringent option EPA presents in its
proposal for the light-duty vehicle (LDV) GHG standards. We believe even greater GHG
reductions than laid out in Alternative 1 would be feasible because today's technology, policy,
and market landscape have primed the market for a rapid transition to cleaner vehicles.
Substantial public and private sector investments and a comprehensive package of federal and
state level policies make the timing and stringency of the proposed rule achievable, feasible, and
cost-effective. At the federal level, the combination of substantial consumer and industry
incentives from the $370 billion allocated to climate and clean energy investments through the
Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) will accelerate the shift to electric vehicles while
supporting a domestic supply chain and charging infrastructure buildout. In parallel, the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law complements the IRA by investing $7.5 billion in electric vehicle
charging infrastructure, $10 billion in clean transportation, and more than $7 billion in battery
components, critical minerals, and materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 3]
At the state level, policymakers are charging ahead with their own zero-emission vehicle
regulations, investments, consumer incentives, planning, and infrastructure deployment.
California's Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC II) regulations will require dramatic reductions in
light-duty vehicle emissions to 100% zero-emissions by 2035 through the Zero-Emission
Vehicle Regulation and the Low-emission Vehicle Regulations. Many other U.S. states follow
California's leadership on automotive emissions regulations. As of May 2023, 7 states have
adopted ACC II and it is likely that others will follow. By adopting its proposal, EPA can build
on ACC II and expand access to cleaner vehicles more broadly across the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0569, p.3]
Globally, automakers have already announced over $1.2 trillion in investments in
electrification. These investments will lead to greatly expanded model line-ups and production
volumes, technological advancements, and reduced costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p.
3]
ICCT recommends EPA finalize Alternative 1 for the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
standards for light-duty vehicles (LDV) and believes the GHG standards for medium-duty
vehicles (MDV) could also be strengthened. These recommendations are based on thorough and
clear evidence (detailed in the sections below) that additional GHG reductions could be possible
through continued and cost-effective internal combustion engine (ICE) technology
improvements and battery electric vehicle (BEV) penetration at lower costs than EPA estimates
in its modeling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 4]
ICCT strongly supports the proposed multi-pollutant emission standards for light-and
medium-duty vehicles for model years 2027-2032 and recommends its finalization as quickly as
possible. Doing so will provide a clear long-term signal that automakers, suppliers, charging
companies, and utilities need to make needed investments with confidence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0569, p. 5]
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PROPOSED STRINGENCY
ICCT supports the proposed standards and recommends EPA finalize Alternative 1. Our
research shows that the proposed standards are likely less costly than estimated and can be met
with a variety of technological approaches and pathways, evidenced by the BEV and ICE
technology updates discussed above. Alternative 1 is even more cost-effective and delivers
greater environmental and health benefits than the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 55-56]
Comparing Tables 6, 17-19 of the Preamble, Alternative 1 is projected to result in higher net
benefits than any other standards contained in the proposal. Moreover, fuel savings alone offset
increased technology costs several times over. As discussed above, BEV and ICE technology
cost, effectiveness, and availability that has yet to be incorporated by EPA's modeling will make
complying with Alternative 1 standards easier and less costly than currently modeled.
Furthermore, with widespread adoption of California's ACC II program in other states, the cost
of Alternative 1 decreases substantially. Comparing DRIA Tables 13-45 and 13-49, by MY2032
the projected manufacturing cost under Alternative 1 (versus the ACC II adoption sensitivity
baseline) are nearly identical to the costs of the proposed standards (versus the central analysis
baseline without ACCII adoption). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 55-56]
Organization: Jaguar Land Rover NA, LLC (JLR)
To support the transition to a zero-emission future, JLR would welcome EPA's
consideration of our following recommendations:
1) An Alternative Glidepath to Reaching the 2032MY Target
Disconnect between Targets Set by U.S. Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization, Biden
Executive Order (E.O. 14037) and EPA Proposed Standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744,
pp. 4-5]
Despite being one of the four agencies who created the U.S. Blueprint for Transportation
Decarbonization, published in early 2023, there is a disconnect between the goals identified in
the roadmap and EPA proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 4-5]
The actions highlighted in the Blueprint build on the August 2021 E.O. 14037 4 which set an
ambitious goal for:
"50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles,
including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles." [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0744, pp. 4-5]
4 Executive Order 14037 of August 5, 2021 - Federal Register: Strengthening American Leadership in
Clean Cars and Trucks
The Blueprint specifically calls to:
"Continue to provide funding and policy incentives to accelerate the uptake of low- or zero-
emission vehicles and invest in supporting infrastructure.. .Achieve 50% of electric light-duty
vehicle sales by 2030". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 4-5]
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EPA's proposal is significantly more aggressive than the above targets, with a total fleet
projected BEV rate of 60% in 203OMY to achieve the new standards, which would require
coordination and investment above and beyond that already accounted for within the Blueprint to
achieve. The true delta between the targets cannot be quantified fully, as EPA's analysis does not
include PHEVs, and we would like to highlight the comment made by EPA that they "recognize
that the inclusion of PHEVs could potentially increase the combined ZEV share projection
beyond the BEV penetration levels shown...". If PHEV share remained constant at 20% of the
ZEV fleet (including PHEV) as per 2022 sales,5 the 60% BEV share required to achieve
standards could rise to 72% ZEV share in 2030MY, 22% greater than the E.O. 14037 and
Blueprint goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 4-5]
5 S&P Global Mobility (IHS Markit) - Automotive Global Vehicle Registrations -
https://www.marketplace.spglobal.com/en/datasets/automotive-global-vehicle-registrations-(248)
(subscription)
JLR suggests that EPA's 2030MY target reflects a maximum projected ZEV share of 50%,
aligning with both the Blueprint and E.O. 14037 which JLR supports. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0744, p. 5]
We need less stringent targets in the early years and then, based on our plan, we expect to
achieve the more ambitious targets in the outer years which will allow us to meet EPA's
2032MY target. The front-loaded stringency in the NPRM, drives tough targets before 2030MY
and could divert investment away from this journey. This could drive us to accrue large liabilities
for 2024 and 2025MY as we begin to transition our fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp.
5-7]
The difficulty in the beginning of the regulation is compounded by the extremely high step
change between 2026 and 2027MY standards (when adjusted to reflect the proposed reduction in
allowable AC and off-cycle credits.) Due to the changes to the footprint curves, light truck
standards increase at almost double the rate of passenger car (21% vs 12%). This particularly
impacts JLR as an OEM with a high percentage of off-cycle technologies (OCT) and air
conditioning (A/C) featured in our vehicles, as noted in the 2022 EPA Automotive Trends
Report8. Reaching the 10 g/mile OCT cap and with the highest reported A/C credit (24.2 g/mile),
equivalent to an 8% reduction from tailpipe emissions for A/C credits alone in 2021. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 5-7]
8 The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report— https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-
12/420s22001.pdf
[See original for graph, "Figure 2— See appendix A1 for more details"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0744, pp. 5-7]
Our alternative proposal for the standards as illustrated in Figure 2 above includes a lower rate
of stringency increase in the earlier years (MYs 2027-2030) than in the later years. The 2027MY
combined fleet target is identical to the proposed target for EPA's Alternative 3 scenario.
Although this is less stringent than the central EPA proposal, we propose from 2030MY onwards
an increased ramp rate to match the central proposed target of 82 g/mile in 2032MY. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 5-7]
Setting targets out to 2032MY, eight years in advance, is appreciated from a planning
perspective, and we support the end goal, however it is difficult to predict what will happen with
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regards to the EV transition and we need time to develop the fleet and grow the EV market
sustainably. This suggested amendment to the stringency rates will not affect the overall aim of
the regulation as our proposed end target is equivalent to EPA's goal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0744, pp. 5-7]
We believe that reduced stringency in the earlier years of the regulation is essential and JLR
requests that EPA adopt our alternative stringency proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744,
pp. 5-7]
Appendix A1
To generate our alternative proposal, we have taken the projected BEV penetration values for
the NPRM Proposed Alternatives 2 and 3 in 2029MY, (46%, 52%) and the corresponding
proposed combined fleet targets in g/mile. (132, 122) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 13]
The JLR Alternative Proposal is based on a 50% BEV penetration rate at 2030MY. To find
the corresponding appropriate target in g/mile, the fleet target change between Alternative 2 and
3 (10) is divided by the difference in proposed BEV rates (6%). This increment is multiplied by
four to find the step change between Alternative 3 and JLR Alternative Proposal. This value is
subtracted from the Alternative 3 target to give the new JLR combined fleet target in g/mile as
stated in the table below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 13]
2029MY Standards Alternative 3 JLR Alternative
Proposal Alternative 2
Proposed Combined Fleet Target (g/mile) 132 125.3 122
Projected BEV Penetration (%) 46 50 52
In terms of YoY stringency increases, the JLR Alternative proposal:
• 2027MY matches Alternative 3,
2028 and 2029MY have identical stringency increases compared to the NPRM Proposal
for 2030 and 2031MY,
2030MY increase is equal to the 2028MY Alternative 3 step change,
• 2031MY jump aligns with Alternative 3 in 2032MY,
• 2032MY increase is slightly higher than proposed in both NPRM and Alternative 3 to
reach the same end point.
Stringency NPRM Proposal Alternative 3 JLR Alternative Proposal
2027MY
18%
11%
11%
2028MY
14%
10%
8%
2029MY
15%
11%
9%
203 0MY
8%
13%
10%
2031MY
9%
14%
17%
2032MY
12%
17%
21%
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 13]
Organization: Kia Corporation
- Kia strongly recommends EPA reevaluate its proposed GHG standards and instead align
closer with the 2030 goal set in President Biden's Executive Order (EO) 14037.2 Kia supports a
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goal of 40-50 percent zero emission vehicles (ZEVs) - battery electric vehicles (BEVs), plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) by model year (MY)
2030 with continued increases through MY2032, coupled with appropriate supporting policies.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 2-3]
2 "Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks," Executive Order 14037, August 5,
2021,86 Fed Reg 43,583.
EPA discusses that standards substantially more stringent than Alternative 1 would be
inappropriate "because of the uncertainties concerning the cost and feasibility of such
standards." 10 Kia argues that proposing requirements above 40-50 percent ZEV penetration by
2030 would be inappropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 5-6]
10 88 Fed. Reg. 29,201.
If EPA finalizes any of the proposed GHG standards included in the NPRM, it could have
harmful consequences to the EV market by going too far too fast by forcing EVs at a rate that
outpaces EV affordability, EV infrastructure, and critical mineral supply chain. Going too fast
could end in consumer rejection of EVs that will be difficult to ever overcome. [EP A-HQ-0 AR-
2022-0829-0555, pp. 5-6]
However, out of EPA's proposed standards, Alternative 3 would be harmful, but the least
harmful, to automakers, the EV market, and consumers. To be clear, Alternative 3 proposed
standard, achieving the same stringencies as the proposed standards in MY2032, is still grossly
overly optimistic. However, Alternative 3 at least provides for a more consistent rate of
stringency and a more realistic slope of consumer acceptance over MYs 2027 - 2031 than EPA's
other proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 5-6]
Kia is staunchly committed to electrification. But regulation of the vehicle industry alone will
not create a dramatic increase in demand for electric vehicles or smooth supply chain volatilities.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 5-6]
Organization: Lucid Group, Inc.
Support for the Cleanest Alternative
As proposed, GHG standards would increase in stringency each year over a six-year period
starting in MY 2027, targeting a resulting industry-wide light-duty fleet average of 82
grams/mile (g/mi) of C02 in MY 2032. Lucid recognizes the significance of a 56% reduction in
the projected fleet average GHG emissions target levels from the existing MY 2026 standards,
however, we believe we face an existential crisis from climate change and industry needs to do
their part to address this threat. As such, Lucid strongly encourages the agency to adopt
Alternative 1, which is estimated to lead to C02 targets that are 10 g/mi lower on average than
the proposed rule. We find that Alternative 1 is consistent with actions from this Administration
to combat the climate crisis and ramps up the nation's progress toward a zero-emission future
and its benefits sooner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 3-5]
Of the alternatives provided by EPA alongside the proposed standards, Lucid finds that
Alternative 1, which is projected to result in an average light-duty target of 72g/mi and EPA has
determined to be feasible in terms of cost and highly protective of human health and the
environment, provides the most appropriate and immediate response to the tailpipe emissions
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that are attributable to light-duty combustion vehicles on our roadways. However, an updated
assessment that includes current production EVs in the market would further affirm EPA's
feasibility findings. EPA cited Ward's Automotive Intelligence data that portrays U.S. electrified
new sales percentages implied by OEM announcements for 2030 or before, yet the dataset
omitted several EV market participants that could have further influenced EPA's findings. EPA
used MY 2019 as the basis for their analysis in the proposed rulemaking, which is not reflective
of the tremendous strides that yielded the EV marketplace of today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0664, pp. 3-5]
The benefits of stringent tailpipe emissions standards are widespread. One such example can
be found in the health disparities between communities that are close in proximity to major
roadways and arteries and those that aren't, as these locations often exhibit high concentrations
of air pollutants from motor vehicles. Populations who live, work, or go to school near high-
traffic roadways experience higher rates of adverse health effects as compared to populations
that are located away from major roads.7 Relatedly, EPA regulations for vehicles have lowered
the near-road concentrations and gradients of traffic-related air pollution around major roads.8
This impact demonstrates that tailpipe emission standards go beyond combatting the climate
crisis and directly impact the health of communities today, an output that EPA has stated each of
the alternatives must reflect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 3-5]
7 In the widely-used PubMed database of health publications, between January 1, 1990 and December 31,
2021, 1,979 publications contained the keywords "traffic, pollution, epidemiology," with approximately
half the studies published after 2015.
8 Sarnat, J.A.; Russell, A.; Liang, D.; Moutinho, J.L; Golan, R.; Weber, R.; Gao, D.; Sarnat, S.; Chang,
H.H.; Greenwald, R.; Yu, T. (2018) Developing Multipollutant Exposure Indicators of Traffic Pollution:
The Dorm Room Inhalation to Vehicle Emissions (DRIVE) Study. Health Effects Institute Research Report
Number 196, available at: https://www.healtheffects.org/publication/developing-multipollutant-exposure-
indicators-trafficpollution-dorm-room-inhalation.
Organization: Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE)
The Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) is writing to express our support for
the above proposed rule to establish Multi-Pollutant Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later
Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles. MDE agrees that this comprehensive federal program
would achieve significant greenhouse gas (GHG) and criteria pollutant emissions reductions,
improve air quality, and result in substantial public health benefits while helping us meet our
climate and air quality goals. MDE urges the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to adopt
the proposed criteria pollutant standards. MDE also urges EPA to adopt the most stringent,
technologically feasible Alternative 1 GHG emissions standards. Alternative 1 is the closest to
being in alignment with the California Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC II) regulations, which
Maryland is in the process of adopting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp. 1-3]
Maryland has made a lot of progress over the past few decades towards clean air. The
improvements have been so substantial that the EPA has proposed to determine that the
Washington, District of Columbia-Maryland-Virginia nonattainment area has clean data for the
2015 8-hour ozone national ambient air quality standard (2015 ozone NAAQS). A Clean Data
Determination (CDD) is the first step in being redesignated from nonattainment to attainment.
The Baltimore nonattainment area will also be eligible for a CDD in the near future if the area
continues to stay at or below the ozone standard. Nitrogen oxides (NOx) are a precursor pollutant
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of ground-level ozone and are also precursors to secondary small particulate matter (PM2.5).
Exposures to these two pollutants are associated with premature death, increased
hospitalizations, and emergency visits due to exacerbation of chronic heart and lung diseases and
other serious health impacts. Some areas of the state experience higher rates of illnesses such as
asthma than average, and these illnesses are aggravated by these pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0698, pp.1-3]
While significant progress has been made statewide, continuing to reduce NOx emissions,
especially those from the transportation sector, is critical to our efforts to attain and maintain the
ozone NAAQS. Regional modeling shows that a significant portion of the ozone-forming
pollutants are transported into Maryland from upwind states. EPA estimates that strengthening
these standards will reduce NOx and PM2.5 emissions nationally by 41% and 35% in 2055,
respectively, which combined with state reductions can provide cleaner air for Marylanders.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp. 1-3]
Maryland is working hard to reduce in-state emissions from the transportation sector. Efforts
include the Maryland Clean Cars Act that instructed MDE to adopt the California Advanced
Clean Car (ACC I) regulations that require manufacturers of passenger cars and light-duty trucks
to sell increasing percentages of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs). The regulations also include
low-emission vehicle (LEV) standards to reduce criteria pollutants and GHG emissions from
new gasoline powered vehicles. As noted above, Maryland is in the process of adopting
California's ACC II regulations. The ACC II regulations require auto manufacturers to sell an
increasing percentage of ZEVs over time, with a phase in of a 100 percent sales target by 2035.
ACC II also established increasingly more stringent exhaust and evaporative emissions standards
for criteria pollutants from these vehicles. Maryland's recently enacted Clean Trucks Act of 2023
requires MDE to adopt California's Advanced Clean Trucks (ACT) regulations that require
manufacturers of medium-and heavy-duty vehicles to sell increasing percentages of ZEVs by
2035. Maryland is also a signatory to both the 2013 Multi-State Zero-Emission Vehicle
Memorandum of Understanding and the 2020 Multi-State Medium-and Heavy-Duty ZEV
Memorandum of Understanding under which the signatory states are working collaboratively to
accelerate ZEV adoption, coordinate ZEV policy, develop the ZEV market, and build out
infrastructure. The recently enacted Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and the Inflation
Reduction Act (IRA) will provide significant funding to advance electrification and charging
infrastructure that will enable the widespread electrification of this vehicle market. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp. 1-3]
Adopting the most stringent, technically technical feasible Alternative 1 GHG emissions
standards at the federal level will provide considerable support for Maryland's efforts to meet
our GHG reduction goals. Transportation accounts for almost half of all GHG emissions
generated in the State. The Climate Solutions Now Act of 2022 (CSNA) established a statewide
goal of a 60 percent reduction in GHG emissions from 2006 levels by 2031. The CSNA requires
more stringent GHG emission reductions economy wide and requires state agencies execute
plans, programs, and policies in order to achieve these goals. Enacting the most stringent GHG
emissions standards that are technologically feasible will complement the many strategies being
implemented under the CSNA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp. 1-3]
Maryland has implemented emissions reduction measures across all sectors, including on-road
transportation to reduce the state's GHG and NOx emissions. Federal programs such as these
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standards are needed to provide significant additional reductions of these pollutants as they also
provide benefits across the economy. The EPA's leadership in strong regulatory GHG limits
from motor vehicles could also help reduce ozone and PM2.5 precursors, providing further
reductions to help meet our climate and air quality goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp.
1-3]
For these reasons, MDE supports the EPA's proposal to adopt the proposed criteria pollutant
standards and the most stringent, technologically feasible Alternative 1 GHG emissions
standards for model year 2027 and later light-duty and medium-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0698, pp.1-3]
Organization: Mayor Becky Daggett, City of Flagstaff, Arizona et al.
On behalf of the 52 undersigned local officials, we urge the EPA to protect the health of our
cities' residents and fight climate change by finalizing the strongest clean car and truck vehicle
emission standards before the end of 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
EPA should finalize the most stringent standards possible for the Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles (LDV) and
the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles Phase 3 (HDV).
We recommend these car and truck standards: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
Be aligned on rulemaking timelines; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
Account for technological advances and cost-savings in zero-emission technologies,
including those made possible by recent legislation; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
Achieve critically necessary reductions in greenhouse gases (GHGs) and other
pollutants; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
Be developed with thorough stakeholder involvement that ensures all affected
communities can engage in the rulemaking process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
Ambitious federal standards, coupled with actions we are taking in our cities and towns to
accelerate the use of clean vehicles, will enable our localities to more quickly cut transportation
pollution and help ensure our residents and businesses have access to zero-emission
technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
By implementing these recommendations, we believe that the resultant standards will not only
meet the Clean Air Act's statutory command to protect public health, but will also help lower
fuel costs for consumers, create good, green jobs, and reduce burden on frontline communities.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 2]
Outcomes
The final standards should [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, p. 8]:
Ensure the LDV and HDV standards support greater zero-emission vehicle adoption by
considering market growth expected from IRA and IIJA investments (which will surpass existing
commitments outlined in Executive Order 14037); [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, p. 8]
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Put the nation on a trajectory to ensure 100 percent of all LDVs and HDVs sold in
2035 are zero-emission vehicles including pathway milestones assuring continuous progress; and
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, p. 8]
Reflect recently adopted state LDV and HDV emissions standards, consistent with
state authority under the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, p. 8]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
GHG
The C02 fleet average standard reductions go well beyond what Mazda and the rest of the
industry expected from this rule. President Biden's Executive Order 14037 targeted a goal of
50% new EV (BEV and PHEV) sales by 2030. The auto industry also publicly committed to a
similar 40-50% EV target by 2030 (BEV and PHEV). The standards proposed under this rule
would result in a requirement of 60% new BEV sales in 2030, and 67% by 2032. Not only are
we concerned about the exceptional stringency of the proposed rule but also very concerned that
these targets do not include PHEVs in any way: Mazda believes strongly that PHEVs are part of
the solution as we undergo the largest vehicle powertrain transformation since the ICE became
dominant in about 1920. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, p. 2]
In addition, the standards immediately increase dramatically in stringency beginning in
27MY, with a resulting 36% BEV requirement. These standards are particularly accelerated for
vehicles classified as light trucks, since the gap between passenger cars and light trucks is
reduced. Mazda believes it is very important that the ramp-up and the light truck gap reduction
should be slower in the early years of the program, as the industry, consumers, and suppliers
adapt to this new reality. EPA's proposed "Alternative 3" is a step in the right direction, but the
linear reduction in standards is insufficient to alleviate the harsh early years when the long-term
targets are so aggressive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
we recommend EPA seek a more modest ramp-up, similar to Alternative 3, to appropriately
provide flexibility in the early years of the greenhouse gas ("GHG") program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0623, p. 2]
Organization: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
The MPCA has supported EPA's previous efforts to strengthen vehicle emissions standards
and appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule. We see the proposed
rulemaking as an opportunity to advance climate action, reduce harm to Minnesotans from
criteria pollutants and air toxics, and accelerate the transition to electric vehicles in our state.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
Importance of new federal greenhouse gas standards for climate action
The transportation sector represents the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in
Minnesota. The top three sources in the transportation sector are light-duty trucks, heavy-duty
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trucks, and passenger cars.l These categories are inclusive of light and medium-duty vehicles
discussed in this proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
Stronger vehicle emissions standards at the federal level have lowered greenhouse gas
emissions from vehicles generally. However, the long-term consumer trend of choosing larger
vehicles and the general trend of more miles driven (except during the pandemic) are
counteracting more significant emissions reductions in this sector. Increased emissions
stringency at the federal level is critical to continuing the trend of emission reductions in this
sector. Accelerating light-and medium-duty vehicle electrification is vital for Minnesota to meet
its climate and air pollution goals. Specifically, adopting new light-and medium-duty vehicle
emissions standards would: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
1 Greenhouse gas emissions in Minnesota 2005-2020, https://www.pca.state.mn.us/sites/default/files/lraq-
2sy23.pdf.
-Help the state meet economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals.
In 2022, as part of the publication of the state's Climate Action Framework,2 Governor Walz
and Lieutenant Governor Flanagan endorsed the economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions
reduction goal for the state to reduce emissions by 50% by 2030 and to become carbon-neutral
by 2050. In May 2023, Minnesota codified these targets in statute. Achieving these goals will
require action at all levels of government, across businesses, and by individuals. The proposed
multipollutant standards will be critical for reducing emissions from the transportation sector.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
2 Minnesota's Climate Action Framework, https://climate.state.mn.us/minnesotas-climate-action-
framework.
-Advance transportation actions and targets in the state's Climate Action Framework.
Minnesota's Climate Action Framework is a plan that sets a vision for how the state will
address and prepare for climate change. The framework broadly guides the direction of climate
action toward a carbon-neutral, resilient, and equitable future for Minnesota and contains
immediate, near-term actions, as well as key progress indicators with measurable targets. The
framework was developed based on significant input from stakeholders, the public, and the
Tribal Nations located within Minnesota's modern borders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557,
pp.1-2]
The proposed light-and medium-duty vehicle standards would advance the following actions
in the Clean Transportation goal: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
—Increase the use of clean fuels, including lower-carbon biofuels (Sub-initiative 1.2.1)
—Expand electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure (Sub-initiative 1.2.2)
—Increase EV availability and access (Sub-initiative 1.2.3)
—Accelerate the transition to EVs and clean transportation (Sub-initiative 1.2.4)
—Improve vehicle efficiency and emissions standards (Sub-initiative 1.2.5)
Additionally, the proposed standards would advance the following targets for the Clean
Transportation goal:
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—Reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector 80% by 2040
—Reach 20% electric vehicles on Minnesota roads by 2030 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557,
pp.1-2]
Importance of new federal standards in accelerating vehicle electrification efforts in
Minnesota
The MPCA agrees that zero emission vehicle technology is available and viable in many use
cases, and the technology is rapidly advancing. Vehicle manufacturers have made major
commitments to electrification. However, to address its regulatory obligations to reduce harmful
climate-changing pollutants, EPA must lock in those commitments, ensure all manufacturers act,
and push the manufacturers to go farther faster. The significant investments that Minnesota is
making, as well as the investments from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and Inflation
Reduction Act will support the industry's transition to electrification and its ability to achieve
stringent emissions standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, p. 3]
The proposed standards would provide more certainty in these efforts and help Minnesota
transition more quickly to electric vehicles, achieving earlier reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions, criteria air pollutants, and air toxics. Minnesota has made significant efforts toward
electrification; now we need EPA to adopt stringent vehicle emissions standards that will drive
manufacturers to produce these vehicles at the scale needed to address climate change. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, p. 4]
MPCA comments and recommendations
The following are Minnesota's comments and recommendations on the proposed rulemaking:
- Set greenhouse gas emissions standards that are at least as stringent as Alternative 1 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, p. 4]
The MPCA strongly supports EPA's initiative to develop greenhouse gas emissions standards
for light- and medium-duty vehicles. Specifically, MPCA supports standards that are at least as
stringent as Alternative 1. The MPCA recognizes the regulation of greenhouse gases as an
important role for the EPA and sees the proposed rule as an important step forward for climate
action and pollution reduction. While states have the right under Section 177 of the Clean Air
Act to adopt the more stringent alternative emissions standards adopted by California, it remains
critical that the federal government meet its obligation to implement strong national standards.
MPCA encourages EPA to adopt the most stringent standards that are technologically feasible.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, p. 4]
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
To determine a realistic maximum volume of EVs the market can support for each of the
model years covered by the rule, we believe EPA should consider certain critical factors. Among
these factors, we believe EPA must make a thorough and realistic year-by-year assessment of
key factors like projected battery costs, projected supply of battery critical-minerals, projected
residential and public charging infrastructure availability, projected electrical grid capacity, and
consumer acceptance of BEV technology in the broader arena. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682,
p. 2]
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Mitsubishi participated in the development of -and supports -the comments submitted by Auto
Innovators. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
In addition, based on its considerable experience discussed previously with BEV and PHEV
leadership, Mitsubishi provides the following recommendations to supplement the comments of
Auto Innovators [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2] :
1. Closely align the multi-pollutant emissions standards with President Biden's 2030
goal by assuming no more than 40-50% PHEVs and FCEVs by 2030, even though our
experience leads us to caution that this itself is very ambitious, and is predicated on the
assumption that the necessary supportive policies will be effectively implemented. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
2. Consider the many benefits of PHEVs to consumers and the environment during the
expected period of constrained battery critical minerals production capacity, and how PHEVs are
the perfect stepping-stone to full BEV acceptance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
3. Maintain the current PHEV Utility Factor (UF) and work with industry to identify
opportunities to increase PHEV electric operation. This is the ideal stepping-stone technology to
encourage long-term BEV acceptance and utilization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
4. Keep the proposed approach to determine the passenger car curves, and consider
adjusting the cutpoint and stringency levels of the light-duty trucks during the early years of the
program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
5. Maintain the existing GHG program flexibilities, such as Air Conditioning and Off-Cycle
technologies credits (including the alternative method to apply off-cycle credits), and allow
previously approved technologies to continue receiving credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0682, p. 2]
6. Align the Tier-4 (criteria pollutants) with CARB's LEV-IV criteria test procedures and
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
7. Consider the impact that very aggressive GHG standards will have on vehicle
affordability, and especially the detrimental impact to low-to-moderate income families.
Regardless of the vehicles that regulation may require us to produce, it is critical that regulators
always keep the accessibility of consumers in mind. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
The rationale for each one of these recommendations is further explained below. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
1. Overall GHG Stringency
Mitsubishi shares the views expressed by Auto Innovators regarding stringency of the GHG
standards from MY27 through MY32. In particular, Mitsubishi is concerned that the BEV shares
needed for compliance and the accelerated rate of increasing stringency proposed by EPA will
create considerable risk based on factors outside the control of the industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0682, pp. 2-3]
The White House, on August 5, 2021, announced Executive Order 14037 which set a target of
50% electric vehicles by 2030. In this NPRM, EPA is estimating a BEV share of 60% by 2030,
and 67%) by 2032, well beyond the 50% goal of EO 14037, which included BEVs, PHEVs, and
FCEVs. EPA justifies this, in part, due to manufacturer announcements and recent policies such
and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA).
However, similar analysis by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) in May 2023,
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projects such programs will result in an EV share between 11 and 26 percent by 2050. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 2-3]
In its paper, the EIA acknowledges, "... significant uncertainties are inherent to projecting the
rate..of EV adoption. Among the factors EIA includes for this uncertainty are future policies,
technology advancement, availability and access to EV infrastructure, consumer behavior, and
mineral supply chains. Even with the most optimistic assumptions, the EIA only projected a 26%
share of new sales coming from EVs, and that is at nearly thirty years from now3. The wide
range of projected EV market shares by two government agencies within the same
Administration illustrates the uncertainty of EV market drivers, yet this proposal offers no
opportunities for course correction should market conditions, which are outside the control of
automakers, fall short of EPA's optimistic assumptions. This, of course, leads to questions on the
methodology of this NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 2-3]
3 https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=56480, Accessed June 23, 2023
EPA included three alternatives to the proposed standard: Alternative 1 is more stringent by
10 g/mi, Alternative 2 is less stringent by 10 g/mi, and Alternative 3 proposes a linear reduction
in GHG emissions starting with the MY26 standard and ending with the proposed GHG standard
in MY32. While Alternative 3 reduces the stringency burden in the early years of the program, it
would still require over 50% BEVs by MY30. Mitsubishi supports Auto Innovators' proposed
approach to overall stringency, as, regardless of early-adopter acceptance of BEVs, we question
the penetration of this technology into the mass-market approaching 50% by 2030. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 2-3]
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
GHG Emission Standards and Related Issues [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 7-8]
NACAA supports the strongest LMDV C02 emission standards that are technologically
feasible. EPA proposes progressively more effective performance-based C02 emission standards
for MY 2027 through 2032 LDVs and MDVs. The proposed standards do not mandate the use of
any specific technology, nor do they mandate that any percentage of vehicle production be
ZEVs. Instead, each manufacturer may choose what mix of emission control technologies is best
suited for its fleet to meet the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 7-8]
The proposed LDV standards are projected to result in an industry-wide average target for the
light-duty fleet of 82 gm/mi of C02 in MY 2032, which represents a 56-percent reduction in
projected fleet average GHG emissions target levels from the existing MY 2026 standards. EPA
also puts forth three LDV alternatives for comment. Alternative 1 has more rigorous LDV C02
standards than the proposal; Alternative 2 has weaker LDVs C02 standards than the proposal;
and Alternative 3 culminates with the same MY 2032 LDV C02 standard as the proposal but
reaches that standard at a more gradual rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 7-8]
For LDVs, NACAA supports, at a minimum, EPA's proposed C02 standards with the
addition of anti-backsliding requirements to ensure that non-ZEV vehicle emissions do not
increase over time. NACAA firmly opposes Alternative 2 or any final program that is weaker
than the proposal. Also, EPA should not pursue a more gradual rate of phase in for any standards
it finalizes, such as under Alternative 3, unless the agency tightens the standards in MYs 2031
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and 2032 to make up in full for the loss of the emission reductions that would occur from the less
protective standards in the earlier years of the program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 7-
8]
For MDVs, NACAA supports EPA's proposed C02 standards including the proposal to
revise the existing MY 2027 C02 standard because of the increased feasibility of GHG
emission-reducing technologies for this sector in this time frame. EPA's proposed MDV C02
standards would increase in stringency from MY 2027 through MY 2032, when the standards are
projected to result in an average target of 275 gm/mi of C02, representing a reduction of 44
percent from the current MY 2026 standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 7-8]
Organization: National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA)
First and foremost, NPCA urges EPA to move forward with Alternative 1 for light-duty
vehicles instead of proceeding with other less stringent alternatives included in the proposal. We
further urge EPA to increase the stringency of Alternative 1 starting in 2030 to require additional
ZEV sales and ensure a greater degree of certainty in achieving one hundred percent ZEV LDV
sales by no later than 2035. We firmly believe a strengthened Alternative 1 provides the greatest
degree of emission reductions, the highest level of health, climate, and cost benefits, and is both
technologically and economically feasible. A more stringent Alternative 1 is also necessary to
keep the U.S. in line with the administration's stated 50% ZEV sales by 2030 vehicle
electrification goal, as well as follow what many experts say is needed to stay under the 2° C
warming threshold. 18 NPCA, moreover requests that for non-ZEV vehicles sold post 2027, EPA
improve upon Alternative 1 to include additional emission reduction controls for the remaining
fossil fuel powered vehicles on the market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0607, p. 4]
18 See, The White House, FACT SHEET: President Biden Announces Steps to Drive American Leadership
Forward on Clean Cars and Trucks, (August 5, 2021), available at, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact- sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-
leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/.
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc..Nissan appreciates the Administration's focus on
and support for advancing electrification and carbon neutrality and shares the same long-term
goal of transitioning to zero emission vehicle society. However, Nissan believes that market
realities, infrastructure needs, consumer impacts, and lack of battery critical mineral availability
necessitate an adjustment of the GHG standard stringency in this rulemaking timeframe. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 1]
Nissan is committed to transitioning its vehicle portfolio to EVs over time and intends to
remain an industry leader in EV and related battery technology innovations. Nissan supports
President Biden's overall efforts to increase sales of battery, fuel cell, or plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles (BEVs, FCEVs, and PHEVs, respectively) over the next decade. The Administration
already announced aggressive penetration targets in the August 5, 2021 "Executive Order on
Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks" (hereinafter "Clean Cars EO").
The Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule, however, goes well beyond the already ambitious goals
announced in President Biden's Clean Cars EO. Not only has the penetration percentage been
significantly increased (jumping from 50 percent to 60 percent in 2030), but the make-up of that
percentage has drastically changed: EPA's Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule would require a 60
percent penetration rate for BEVs only, excluding the FCEV and PHEV technologies that are
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critical to shepherding a safe, affordable, and reliable transition to clean vehicles. EPA has
moved the goalpost, not by a few feet but by miles.
In light of these myriad challenges, EPA should adjust the proposed GHG standards set forth
in the Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule. Nissan supports a final rule that takes these realities into
consideration and seeks an ambitious yet achievable target for plug-in electric vehicle
("PEV")penetration, closer to the already ambitious targets set in the Clean Cars EO. At a
minimum, Nissan requests that EPA adjust the proposed GHG standards and targets to account
for a blended PEV percentage, taking into consideration emissions reductions from PHEVs and
BEVs collectively. EPA has historically considered the emissions benefits of both groups of
advanced technology vehicles, acknowledging the importance and need of PHEVs in the
consumer shift towards clean vehicles. Nissan and others in the industry are committed to
transforming the industry and have already invested significantly in pressing forward on the
transition to EVs. The Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule goes beyond what is achievable and simply
forces too much too quickly. There simply is not a realistic path to achieve the level of
accelerated shift in the proposed timeframe. More time is needed for such extensive and
transformational change.
VII. Endorsement of Comments from the Alliance for Automotive Innovation
As a member of the Alliance for Automotive Innovation ("the Alliance"), Nissan fully
endorses the comments on the Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule submitted separately by the
Alliance. In particular, Nissan highlights several points from the Alliance's comments, including:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Support realigning the GHG standard stringency ramp up rates with market reality and
uncertainties. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Support realigning the Federal criteria emission standards with California's program. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Emphasis regarding the industry's commitment to work towards electrification as quickly as
practicable, while also taking into consideration resource availability, technological capabilities,
market challenges and limitations, and consumer adoption hurdles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0594, p. 9]
- Support continuation of tailpipe-based program and treatment of 0 g/mi for EVs [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Request reconsideration of the proposed changes in the AC and off-cycle credit programs:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Request continuing AC and off-cycle credit eligibility for EVs that are part of mixed fleets
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Oppose phase-out of off-cycle credits and request the off-cycle credit cap be maintained at
15 g/mi [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
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Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
These new proposed targets lose sight of the transformational change that is needed from all
sectors of the U.S. economy. Automobile manufacturers such as Nissan have made and will
continue to make significant investments to push the industry forward; however, such drastic and
front-loaded timelines require significant changes and investments from suppliers, energy
providers, mineral extraction and processing industries, battery and charging equipment
manufacturers, etc. Such drastic changes to the market are nearly impossible on such a
compressed timeline, particularly given the current market constraints affecting nearly all
impacted sectors, such as supply-chain complications and limited availability of raw materials.
This is especially true with respect to the critical minerals that are essential to battery production
for EV expansion and development; EPA has not demonstrated that the critical minerals needed
to meet the extremely aggressive EV penetration rates are available to be extracted in a safe,
responsible, and reliable manner. Significant cooperation and organization from federal, state,
and local governments will also be required to facilitate the roll-out and adoption of EVs and
related charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 4]
Beyond the significant market and governmental challenges posed by such a drastic
implementation timeline, consumer adoption will be critical to success. Consumer adoption of
EVs has historically lagged behind expectations, leaving a significant hurdle to encourage a large
and swift shift to EVs. Consumers need to be convinced not only of the appeal, safety,
affordability, and reliability of EVs themselves, but they need to adopt the necessary community
and home charging equipment to facilitate their use. Consumers will need to adapt their trip
planning and driving behavior to allow for vehicle charging needs. The only way to drive these
significant behavioral changes is to assure consumers that charging infrastructure is available and
reliable. This is simply not a reality today and is unlikely to be a reality in time to drive such a
significant shift within the timeline of the Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule. These challenges are
magnified due to the unclear and uncertain benefits under the Inflation Reduction Act, which
place significant limitations on EV consumer incentive programs and charging infrastructure
programs. Moreover, many consumers are reluctant or unable to purchase EVs due to their
significant price premium. The Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule will only exacerbate these
inequalities, with EV prices likely to increase even more due to extreme investments required by
all market sectors involved. Driving too much change too quickly will shut out many
communities who need clean vehicles the most. It will likely force consumers who are uncertain
about ZEV adoption to continue to operate aging ICE vehicles much longer. This is contrary to
the intent of the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 5]
VII. Endorsement of Comments from the Alliance for Automotive Innovation
As a member of the Alliance for Automotive Innovation ("the Alliance"), Nissan fully
endorses the comments on the Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule submitted separately by the
Alliance. In particular, Nissan highlights several points from the Alliance's comments, including
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]:
- Support realigning the GHG standard stringency ramp up rates with market reality and
uncertainties. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Support realigning the Federal criteria emission standards with California's program. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
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- Emphasis regarding the industry's commitment to work towards electrification as quickly as
practicable, while also taking into consideration resource availability, technological capabilities,
market challenges and limitations, and consumer adoption hurdles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0594, p. 9]
- Support continuation of tailpipe-based program and treatment of 0 g/mi for EVs [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Request reconsideration of the proposed changes in the AC and off-cycle credit programs:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Request continuing AC and off-cycle credit eligibility for EVs that are part of mixed fleets
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Oppose phase-out of off-cycle credits and request the off-cycle credit cap be maintained at
15 g/mi [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
- Support coordination and harmonization between EPA, NHTSA, and CARB. One fleet
should meet all programs with a common goal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
While Nissan understands and supports the Administration's efforts to push for progress in
EV penetration, the current proposal goes well beyond the already aggressive goals set in
President Biden's Clean Cars EO. The current proposal is not achievable for numerous reasons,
including technology and resource limitations, limited availability of safe and responsibly-
sourced critical minerals, supply chain and manufacturing constraints, insufficient charging and
energy infrastructure, and significantly lagging consumer adoption, among other reasons. In
order to allow for a safe, reliable, and equitable transition to EVs, the proposal must be modified
to take these factors into consideration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, pp. 9-10]
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
NESCAUM and the OTC offer the following specific comments on the NPRM.
A. Proposed LDV and MDV GHG Emissions Standards
NESCAUM and the OTC strongly support EPA's proposal to establish C02 emissions
standards for LDVs and MDVs that would increase in stringency each year from MYs 2027-
2032. EPA should adopt the most stringent standards that are technologically feasible. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 8-9]
EPA's proposed LDV standards are projected to result in an industry-wide average target for
the light-duty fleet of 82 g/mi of C02 in MY 2032, representing a 56 percent reduction in
projected fleet average GHG emissions target levels from existing MY 2026 federal standards.
EPA's proposed MDV standards are projected to result in an average target of 275 g/mi of C02
by MY 2032, which would represent a reduction of 44 percent compared to the current MY 2026
standards. EPA also proposes to revise the existing standard for MY 2027 given the increased
feasibility of GHG emissions reducing technologies in this time frame. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0584, pp. 8-9]
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EPA's analysis finds that the proposed LDV and MDV standards could reduce net C02
emissions by 7.3 billion metric tons through 2055. EPA estimates the cumulative monetized
climate benefits of the standards through 2055 to be $330-$500 billion (2020 $US) depending on
upstream emissions and the selected discount rate.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 8-9]
24 See EPA, DRIA, EPA-420-D-23-003 (Apr. 14, 2023), https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0360.
Considering the state of the U.S. and global LDV and MDV markets, NESCAUM and the
OTC believe that GHG standards more stringent than EPA's proposal are technologically
feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 8-9]
B. Multi-State Collaboration
The NESCAUM and OTC states have long understood the benefits of a coordinated approach
to transportation electrification policy development and implementation. Many are signatories to
the 2013 Multi-State Zero-Emission Vehicle Memorandum of Understanding, 17 which set light-
duty ZEV sales targets for ten states to achieve by 2025; memorialized their commitment to
work together to develop policies and programs to achieve those targets; and created the Multi-
State ZEV Task Force, facilitated by NESCAUM, to enable states to collaborate and coordinate
on ZEV policy. NESCAUM and the Task Force have developed two action plans with
recommendations for states to accelerate light-duty ZEV adoptionl8 and policy guidance on a
wide range of related issues and topics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 5-6]
17 Multi-State Zero-Emission Vehicles Program Memorandum of Understanding (Oct. 2013),
https ://www. nescaum. org/documents/zev-mou-10-governors-signed-20191120.pdf/.
18 See, e.g., Multi-State ZEV Task Force, Multi-State ZEV Action Plan 2018-2021: Accelerating the
Adoption of Zero Emission Vehicles (June 2018), https://www.nescaum.org/topics/zero-emission-
vehicles/multi-state-zev-action-plan-2018-2021-accelerating-the-adoption-of-zero-emission-vehicles;
Multi-State ZEV Action Plan (May 2014).
Most of the NESCAUM and OTC states are also signatories to the 2020 Multi-State Medium-
and Heavy-Duty ZEV Memorandum of Understanding, 19 now signed by a diverse coalition of
17 states, the District of Columbia, and the Canadian province of Quebec. Collectively, the U.S.
signatories represent 43 percent of the U.S. population, 49 percent of the U.S. economy, and 36
percent of the nation's medium-and heavy-duty vehicles.20 The 2020 MOU commits the
signatories to collaborate to accelerate the market for zero-emission trucks, vans, and buses, and
sets targets to achieve at least 30 percent medium-and heavy-duty ZEV sales by 2030 and 100
percent ZEV sales by no later than 2050. Some of the signatories have established more
ambitious targets. In July 2022, NESCAUM and the Task Force released an action plan with
more than 65 strategies and recommendations for state policymakers to support the rapid,
equitable, and widespread electrification of MHD vehicles.21 The signatories and other Task
Force states are currently working to implement these recommendations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0584, pp. 5-6]
19 Multi-State Medium-and Heavy-Duty Zero-Emission Vehicle Memorandum of Understanding (July
2020), https://www.nescaum.org/documents/mhdv-zev-mou-20220329.pdf/.
20 Collectively, the U.S. signatories represent 43 percent of the U.S. population, 49 percent of the U.S.
economy, and 36 percent of the nation's MHD vehicles. See Census Bureau, 2020 Population and Housing
State Data (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/interactive/2020-population-and-
housing-state-data.html; Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP and Personal Income,
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https://apps.bea.gov/itable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=70&step=l#reqid=70&step=l&isuri=l (visited June 23,
2022) (2021 Real GDP); Atlas Public Policy, EVHub, https://www.atlasevhub.com/materials/medium-and-
heavy-duty-vehicle-registrations-dashboard/#06f2a5dfc39daf9cc (visited June 23, 2022) (2019 IHS market
data).
21 See Multi-State ZEV Task Force, Multi-State Medium-and Heavy-Duty Zero-Emission Vehicle Action
Plan: A Policy Framework to Eliminate Harmful Truck and Bus Emissions (July 27, 2022),
https://www.nescaum.org/documents/multi-state-medium-and-heavy-duty-zero-emission-vehicle-action-
plan/.
NESCAUM and the OTC strongly support EPA's proposal to establish C02 emissions
standards for LDVs and MDVs that would increase in stringency each year from MYs 2027-
2032. EPA should adopt the most stringent standards that are technologically feasible. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 8-9]
EPA's proposed LDV standards are projected to result in an industry-wide average target for
the light-duty fleet of 82 g/mi of C02 in MY 2032, representing a 56 percent reduction in
projected fleet average GHG emissions target levels from existing MY 2026 federal standards.
EPA's proposed MDV standards are projected to result in an average target of 275 g/mi of C02
by MY 2032, which would represent a reduction of 44 percent compared to the current MY 2026
standards. EPA also proposes to revise the existing standard for MY 2027 given the increased
feasibility of GHG emissions reducing technologies in this time frame. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0584, pp. 8-9]
EPA's analysis finds that the proposed LDV and MDV standards could reduce net C02
emissions by 7.3 billion metric tons through 2055. EPA estimates the cumulative monetized
climate benefits of the standards through 2055 to be $330-$500 billion (2020 $US) depending on
upstream emissions and the selected discount rate.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 8-9]
24 See EPA, DRIA, EPA-420-D-23-003 (Apr. 14, 2023), https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0360.
Considering the state of the U.S. and global LDV and MDV markets, NESCAUM and the
OTC believe that GHG standards more stringent than EPA's proposal are technologically
feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 8-9]
Organization: Our Children's Trust (OCT)
On behalf of America's youth, Our Children's Trust respectfully provides these comments on
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles. As the
Nation's only law firm dedicated to representing youth whose constitutional rights are being
infringed by their government's conduct that causes climate change, we write to advise EPA to
strengthen the federal emission standards for light- and medium-duty vehicles so that they meet
the urgency of the climate crisis and align with the deep emission reductions scientists say are
needed to protect the climate system and the constitutional rights of youth. We also ask that the
EPA revise its Draft Regulatory Impacts Analysis so that it reflects the true costs of climate
change, the true benefits of more swiftly electrifying the transportation sector, and utilizes no
discount rate or a discount rate that does not discriminate against children and future generations.
EPA must align its rulemaking with the best available science to protect children. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 1]
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We are well beyond the time for incremental measures. These rules need to go further, faster
and across a longer time horizon so that the entire transportation sector, and supporting industrial
sectors, can plan and respond as quickly as feasible. The technology is there to expedite the
transition away from the internal combustion engine and eliminate their sales by 2030 for
passenger cars and light duty trucks. This is not only economically feasible, it is enormously
beneficial. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 1] Wim Thiery et al., Intergenerational
Inequities in Exposure to Climate Extremes, 374 Science 158 (2021).
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
Porsche provides the following comments in support of and in conjunction with the AFAI.
These comments seek to define a more achievable regulatory package that makes meaningful
progress towards decarbonization goals. Furthermore, Porsche supports the concept of broadly
monitoring our collective progress across all sectors involved in the march towards
electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 19] 1. Porsche supports the AFAI proposal
for an annual GHG reduction goal that aligns with the 40-50% electrification industry position.
As described within the AFAI comments, Porsche is supportive of a piecewise linear annual
compliance pathway that is a logical extension of the three alternative pathways proposed within
the NPRM. The piecewise linear pathway could be designed with stringency levels that reflect
the industrywide anticipated levels of electrification at various years from 2027-2032MY. The
estimated annual compliance curve (reflecting industry average annual fleet average targets)
would consist of two linear phases. The phases would essentially reflect industry wide annual
percent levels of electrification that would include both pure battery electric and plug-in hybrid
electric. The first phase of the piecewise linear curve defining stringency for MY2027-2030
would extend from MY2026 estimated levels of industrywide electrification and arrive at GHG
targets that reflect 40-50% of industrywide electrification. The second phase of the piecewise
curve could then extend from those targets in MY2030 to a more ambitious level of stringency in
MY2032 that best reflects an achievable level of industrywide electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0637, p. 19]
The importance of having a clear touch point in 2030 model year is that it reflects general
industry wide positioning regarding support for an ambitious goal of 40-50% of new electrified
vehicle sales at that time. This goal is aligned with the President's Executive Order and with the
National Blueprint for Electrification. The range of 40 to 50% reflects a reasonable variance for
such an ambitious transformative goal and as such Porsche believes that it would be reasonable
to select the midpoint of this range to inform the program stringency in MY2030. In addition,
Porsche believes it is reasonable for the 40-50% to include within it a mix of BEVs and PHEVs
that reflects the anticipated allowance of PHEVs within CARB's ACC2 ZEV mandate (i.e.,
approximately 20% PHEV within the 40-50% of total BEV/FCV/PHEV portion of new vehicle
sales). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 19]
Beyond 2030, the pathway should again use a linear progression, but towards a more
ambitious level of electrification. The appropriate level of electrification should reflect a
reasonable assessment of consumer adoption and industry readiness that pushes electrification.
This target could again include a mix of BEV and PHEV vehicles consistent with the
consideration during the initial phase and reflective of the continued allowance for PHEVs
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within CARB's ACC2 ZEV mandate (i.e., 20% PHEV of the total % of BEV/FCV/PHEV).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 19]
Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
EPA's proposal is clearly a big step toward a fully decarbonized L/MDV sector. Nonetheless,
Rivian believes an even stronger rule is possible and appropriate. Our analysis of the NPRM
identified opportunities to strengthen the standards further with the adoption of Alternative 1 and
targeted adjustments to certain flexibility provisions. We also offer various comments in
response to other proposed changes in the discussion below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653,
pp. 2-7]
EPA Should Select Alternative 1 and Make Other Changes to Strengthen the Rule
EPA should select Alternative 1—and weigh the feasibility of even more stringent targets—
for three key reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 2-7]
EPA shows that, of the alternatives considered, Alternative 1 delivers the greatest net benefits.
Agency modeling demonstrates that Alternative 1 rests on realistic assumptions of improvement
in emissions from ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 2-7]
Alternative 1 Offers the Greatest Net Benefits
In the documents introducing and accompanying the proposed rule, agency staff detailed the
results of an extensive cost-benefit analysis performed as part of its deliberations. EPA's own
calculations show that Alternative 1, of the proposed alternatives, will deliver the greatest net
benefits to Americans, including an array of monetized climate and public health benefits.
Specifically, the agency found that their main proposal would result in present value net benefits
ranging from $850 billion to $1.6 trillion (7 percent and 3 percent discount rates, respectively;
SC-GHG at 3 percent) while Alternative 1 would result in benefits ranging from $930 billion to
$1.8 trillion (using the same the discount rates and SC-GHG).7 Despite these clear findings, EPA
initially proposed a less beneficial alternative without a compelling justification. This
is inconsistent with both the Biden Administration's stated goals and priorities and, perhaps most
importantly, with the directive of Executive Order 12866, later reaffirmed by Executive Order
13563, that "in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those
approaches that maximize net benefits..."8 Accordingly, Rivian believes EPA should, and is
obligated to, select Alternative 1 in its final determination. Finalizing any of the other proposed
alternatives would not be justifiable on cost- benefit grounds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653,
pp. 2-7]
7 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light- Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles: Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (April 2023), 10-30 - 10-
31.
8 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Oct. 4, 1993); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 14 (Jan.
21,2011).
Finalize Standards at Least as Stringent as Alternative 1 to Put the U.S. on the Path to 100
Percent EV Sales
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With the multi-pollutant emissions standards proposal for MY27 and later, EPA rose to the
occasion. The standards as proposed are well calibrated to industry's investments in vehicle
electrification. With the growing focus on EV development and sales, automakers can achieve
deep cuts to vehicles emissions in the next decade. Indeed, Rivian finds that the available
evidence supports at least the most stringent of the alternatives EPA considered. While some
stakeholders argue for softening the requirements, Rivian's analysis shows that tighter standards
are feasible. We call on the agency to finalize Alternative 1. EPA should strengthen its analysis
with full inclusion of Rivian's production volumes, which we believe will further support the
case for Alternative 1 and a second look at the MDV standards. We also recommend sunsetting
the off-cycle program for all vehicle types earlier than proposed and phasing out MDV ATV
multipliers. We generally support battery durability and warranty standards aligned with GTR 22
but offer some considerations regarding implementation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, p.
17]
The need for urgent action on climate change has never been greater. We have also never
before seen such a committed partner in the federal government. With some modifications and
the selection of Alternative 1, the proposed regulations could mark a true turning point in our
industry's journey toward a fully decarbonized future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, p. 17]
Organization: Sierra Club et al.
We appreciate the EPA's proposal, which moves our vehicles in the right direction. However,
the final emissions standard for light-duty vehicles should: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0668, p.
2]
-Secure greater pollution reductions with a focus on strengthening the later model years of the
program, reflecting the cost-effective availability of greater zero-emission
vehicle adoption due to market growth expected from IRA and IIJA investments (which will
surpass existing commitments outlined in Executive Order 14037) and state leadership; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0668, p. 2]
-Put the nation on a trajectory to ensure 100 percent of all light- and medium-duty vehicles
sold in 2035 are zero-emission vehicles including pathway milestones assuring
continuous progress; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0668, p. 2]
-Appropriately take advantage of available cost-effective improvements to new fossil-
fuel vehicles; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0668, p. 2]
-Leverage the growth in ZEV deployment associated with state clean car standards adopted
under state authority granted by the Clean Air Act; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0668, p. 2]
-Establish protective zero-emission vehicle durability and warranty requirements [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0668, p. 2]
We appreciate the EPA's proposal, which moves our vehicles in the right direction. However,
the final emissions standard for light-duty vehicles should: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0668, p.
2]
-Secure greater pollution reductions with a focus on strengthening the later model years of the
program, reflecting the cost-effective availability of greater zero-emission
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vehicle adoption due to market growth expected from IRA and IIJA investments (which will
surpass existing commitments outlined in Executive Order 14037) and state leadership; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0668, p. 2]
-Put the nation on a trajectory to ensure 100 percent of all light- and medium-duty vehicles
sold in 2035 are zero-emission vehicles including pathway milestones assuring
continuous progress; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0668, p. 2]
Organization: South Coast Air Quality Management District
There are five key issues we request U.S. EPA address before finalizing the rule.l. Extend the
phase-in period and adopt more stringent standards to align with California's ACC II regulation.
The proposed standards will be phased in over a six-year period from model year (MY) 2027
through 2032 with increasing stringency each year. We recommend that the phase-in period be
extended to 2035 and later model years to better align with the ACC II implementation schedule
which extends out to MY 2035 and subsequent years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0659, p. 2]
In terms of stringency, the proposed non-methane organic gases plus nitrogen oxides
(NMOG+NOx) standard would phase down to 12 mg/mi by MY 2032 for light-duty vehicles
(LDVs), a 60 percent reduction from the Tier 3 standard of 30 mg/mi. For medium-duty vehicles
(MDVs), the NMOG+NOx standard would phase down to 60 mg/mi by MY 2032, representing
66 percent to 76 percent reduction from the Tier 3 standard of 178 mg/mi for Class 2b and 247
mg/mi for Class 3 vehicles, respectively. While these standards represent substantial progress,
we urge U.S. EPA to consider more stringent standards for C02 and criteria pollutants to help
our region achieve the national ambient air quality standards. We therefore support the adoption
of the Alternative 1 stringency level for greater reductions of emissions, including NOx (47,000
tons vs 44,000 tons in 2055) as well as a higher BEV (Battery Electric Vehicle) penetration rate
compared to the proposed standards (69% vs 67% in MY 2032). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0659, p. 2]
Furthermore, U.S. EPA should consider additional measures that are technically and
economically feasible. For example, the ACC II requires manufacturers to comply with an
annual zero emission vehicle (ZEV) sales percentage requirement that scales up from 35 percent
in MY 2026 to 100 percent by MY 2035 (including up to 20% PHEVs). CARB's analysis
supports this requirement to be both technically and economically feasible based on projected
technology advancements. In comparison, the projected 69 percent BEV penetration rate in MY
2032 for Alternative 1 falls short of the ACC II requirements. We understand the proposed
standards are performance-based without any mandate on ZEV sales percentages, however, U.S.
EPA should conduct an additional feasibility analysis for more stringent standards that will
achieve higher BEV penetration rates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0659, p. 2]
Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
This means EPA must adopt standards that are least as strong as those it has identified as
Alternative 1—the most stringent alternative analyzed as part of this proposal and a standard that
EPA itself notes is "anticipated to be feasible."52 Alternative 1 will result in significant benefits
compared to the current proposal, and these benefits add up. The Alternative 1 standards are
projected to result in fleet-wide C02 targets that are on average 10 g/mi lower than the current
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proposal,53 resulting in 800 million metric tons fewer C02 emissions through 2055.54 This is an
approximately 61 percent reduction in projected fleet average GHG emissions target levels from
the existing model year 2026 standards,55 and the Alternative 1 standards are expected to result
in an approximately 69 percent battery-electric vehicle (BEV) penetration—one of the main ZEV
technologies—in 2032.56 Alternative 1 also results in significantly fewer emissions of criteria
pollutants and other air toxics through 2055.57 Together, these and other benefits from the
stronger Alternative 1 standards are projected to deliver between $20 and $30 billion more in net
benefits in calendar year 2055 than the current proposal.58 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp.
6-7]
52 Id. at 29201.
53 Id. at 29201.
54 See id. attbls. 135, 136.
55 Id. at 29202.
56 Id. attbl. 96.
57 Id. at tbls. 139, 140. We note that some of these tables appear to be mislabeled.
58 Id. attbls. 156, 157.
Ultimately, these and other factors suggest that EPA should consider adopting even stronger
standards than Alternative 1. Standards that put the United States on the path of achieving 100
percent ZEV sales by 2035 should be feasible and have the potential to result in significant
benefits for communities and the environment. For example, it has been estimated that standards
ensuring that all passenger vehicle sales are zero-emission by 2035 could "avoid more than 600
million metric tons of greenhouse gas emissions every year by 2040 and a total of more than 11.5
billion tons by 2050."64 Studies have projected that the widespread transition to ZEVs coupled
with a shift to non-combustion electricity would result in over $978 billion in cumulative public
health benefits by 2050 nationwide,65 and 40 percent of these benefits would be experienced by
the 500 counties with the highest populations of color.66 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, p. 8]
64; See ENV'T DEF. FUND, CLEAN CARS, CLEAN AIR, CONSUMER SAVINGS: 100% NEW ZERO
EMISSION VEHICLE SALES BY 2035 WILL DELIVER EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC, HEALTH, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS TO ALL AMERICANS 12 (Jan. 2021),s.edf.org/climate411/wp-
content/blogs.dir/7/files/2021/01/FINAL-National- White-Paper-Protective-Clean-Car-Standards-
1.26.21.pdf.
65 Driving to Clean Air: Health Benefits of Zero Emission Cars and Electricity, AM. LUNG ASS'N 2
(June 2023), https://www.lung.org/clean-air/electric-vehicle-report/driving-to-clean-air.
66 Zeroing in on Healthy Air, AM. LUNG ASS'N 11 (2022), https://www.lung.org/getmedia/13248145-
06fl)-4e35-b79b-6dfacfd29a71/zeroing-in-on-healthy-air-report-2022.
Organization: Stellantis
Greenhouse Gas Reductions are Front-Loaded
EPA proposes stringent standards for the 2027-2032MY that achieve ambitious GHG
reductions. As shown in Figure 5 below, even the least stringent alternative (Alternative 2)
proposed by EPA achieves a 50% reduction in GHG emissions by 2032 compared to 2026, while
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EPA's proposed or preferred stringency achieves 56% total reduction by 2032 compared to 2026.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 7-9]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table 10. Comparison of proposed combined fleet
standards to alternatives. Figure 5 -Comparison of alternatives proposed in the EPANPRM
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 7-9]
In addition to setting ambitious overall targets for C02 reduction, EPA's proposed rule
demands that these reductions are primarily achieved early in the program with less reduction
required in later years. In the proposed standards, the stringency jump required in the first year of
the program (2027MY) is close to double that of stringency change in later years. This "front-
loaded" stringency is even more evident when looking at the different fleets. Figure 6 below
shows that in EPA's proposed stringency, pickup trucks must reduce GHG emissions by 14% per
year in the initial 3 years in 2027-2029MY of the program followed by 10% per year reduction
required in 2030-2032MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 7-9]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Graph Industry Fleet Targets by MY (Preferred
Alternative) Figure 6 -Standards are much more stringent in the early years of the program -
especially for trucks [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 7-9]
Figure 7 below summarizes output from EPA's OMEGA model estimating the millions of
megagrams of C02 saved under the proposed rule and Alternative 3, which is a more linear
alternative that EPA also included the proposed rule that does not front load reductions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 7-9]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR GRAPH C02 Saved vs 2026MY Figure 7-Proposed
cumulative GHG savings are significantly front-loaded [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 7-
9]
This analysis shows that under the EPA's proposed rule 63% of the C02 saved would be
achieved in the first 3 years of the program with the remaining approximately 35% being saved
in the back end of the new program. Alternative 3 (or the more linear alternative) takes a more
rational approach to realizing aggressive GHG reductions driven by a dramatic technology
transformation. Stellantis shares AAI concerns that Alternative 3 exceeds the 40-50% EV
commitment in 2030, however at least the C02 savings under Alternative 3 are spread out more
evenly over the entire rulemaking period allowing more time early on to address market
concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 7-9]
Stellantis (and industry) have made bold commitments supporting an electrified future, but
time and flexibility are needed to transition from an automotive market that today is less than
10%) BEV and PHEV combined to a future that is dominated by electric vehicles. EPA's
proposed rule significantly front loads stringency and GHG savings during this critical time of
transition in a way that overlooks the needed market enablers. EPA should deploy a stringency
that allows the time needed for a more practical transition to an EV dominated market.
Stringency and GHG reductions should not be front-loaded but, instead, should ramp up and
increase as the market increases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 7-9]
EPA Needs to Address EV Market Uncertainty & GHG Stringency Concerns [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 13-14]
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As discussed above, EPA has erred by assuming an overly optimistic market adoption of a
single EV technology justified by policies that represent partial solutions. The GHG targets
justified by these assumptions exceed what industry and the Biden administration jointly agreed
to and likely exceed what reasonably can be achieved in a 50-state market. Targets are front-
loaded and biased against the most popular trucks and SUVs that customers demand today.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 13-14]
Stellantis believes that EPA can address these concerns by incorporating key changes into the
GHG footprint targets in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 13-14]
First, EPA should finalize a fleet GHG target that can be achieved with a combined BEV,
PHEV, and fuel cell electric vehicle (FCEV) penetration rate of 40-50% in 2030MY. This would
align EPA to the ambitious and unprecedented transformation of the market that was jointly
agreed to by the Biden administration, the UAW, Stellantis and other OEMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0678, pp.13-14]
Second, EPA should set a footprint stringency that does not front-load the needed EV
penetration rates and GHG savings by adopting a profile like Alternative 3 proposed in the
NPRM. Alternative 3 (unlike the proposed scenario) is less stringent earlier in the program when
new products and supply chains are critically coming "online". The Alternative 3 profile makes
up for this early relief with increased stringency over the proposed option in later years. This
strategy of "back loading" stringency ultimately delivers the same GHG savings as the proposed
standards but does so in a way that recognizes the needed transition the market and industry need
to make. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 13-14]
Figure 12 below demonstrates the approach Stellantis believes EPA should take when
finalizing these targets. It is important to note that penetration rates and GHG targets beyond
2030 are uncertain as we remain focused on achieving the ambitious levels in 2030 jointly
committed to by the Biden administration and industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp.
13-14]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR FIGURE 12— EPA should set linear stringency through
2030 that can be achieved with 40-50% BEV+PHEV+FCEV penetration [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0678, pp.13-14]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Tesla supports the proposed Alternative 1 with added stringency so that the final performance
standards achieves a fleet BEV penetration rate greater than 69% in MY 2032.2 Alternative 1 is
estimated to provide greater C02 emissions reduction of -51% from no action by 2050 compared
to -46%) under EPA's proposal, and the additional stringency will result in even greater emission
reductions.3 Accordingly, Tesla asserts the EPA should amend its proposal with a more stringent
version of Alternative 1 and take, inter alia, the following additional steps to increase the
performance and overall stringency of the proposed standards: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792,
p. 2]
2 See, 88 Fed. Reg. 29332-33, Table 96.
3 Id., at 29348 (comparing Tables 135 and 136).
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-Eliminate off-cycle crediting for all types of vehicles; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p.
2]
-Revisit the plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) utility factor to accurately reflect real
world emissions; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
-Amend the proposal to create parity in promoting motor vehicle air conditioning (MVAC)
efficiency adoption; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
-Maintain the existing zero emissions upstream approach for BEVs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0792, p. 2]
-Eliminate credit multipliers for all vehicles; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
-Ensure BEVs continue to be accounted for, and participate in, the NMOG + NOx reduction
standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
EPA has long considered BEVs to be the most effective mobile source pollution mitigating
technology, stating over a decade ago, "From a vehicle tailpipe perspective, EVs are a game-
changing technology."38 Additionally, study after study shows BEVs are a superior technology
for reducing air pollution and GHG emissions over their lifetime.39 On a well to wheels analysis
including upstream emissions, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has repeatedly found
BEVs to be far superior in emission performance than internal combustion engine (ICE)
technology.40 For example, a Tesla Model 3 or Model Y charging on the U.S. grid has average
lifecycle emissions almost 3.5 times less than an average premium ICE vehicle.41 As a result,
over a 17-year lifetime, a Tesla vehicle driver can avoid emitting over 55 tons of C02e.42 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 6-7]
38 77 Fed. Reg.62624, 62815 (Oct. 15, 2012); See also, IPCC, AR6 Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of
Climate Change (April 4, 2022) at 2-78 (Electric vehicles (EVs) powered by clean electricity can reduce
GHG emissions and such policies are important for spurring adoption of such vehicles and GHG emission
reductions); at 10-41 (BEVs manufactured and operated can lower emission by 85% compared to ICE
vehicles) available at https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg3/pdf/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf
(last visited Sept. 12, 2022).
39 See e.g., McKinsey, Battery 2030: Resilient, sustainable, and circular (Jan. 16, 2023) (In the worst case
scenario, with no low-carbon electricity, total life-cycle emissions for BEVs are about 50 percent lower in
Europe and 72 percent lower in the United States compared with ICE vehicles) available at h
ttps://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-a ssembly/our-insights/battery-2030-resilient-
sustainable-and-c ircular?stcr=032392E457A548838A737BD614EB8B24&cid=other-eml-alt-mip-m
Ck&hlkid=38d0ad0585af40979275683ed8a9dl67&hctky=10204926&hdpid=b8cb9677-a52c-48al-b6ae-
ded25e562aac; Environmental Research Letters, Mapping electric vehicle impacts: greenhouse gas
emissions, fuel costs, and energy justice in the United States (Jan. 11, 2023) (finding that over 90% of
vehicle-owning U.S. households would see reductions in both GHGs and transportation energy burden by
adopting an EV) available at h ttps://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9
326/aca4e6?utm_source=cbnewsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_term=2023 -01-1
4&utm_campaign=Daily+Briefing+12+01+2023; ICCT, A global comparison of the life-cycle greenhouse
gas emissions of combustion engine and electric passenger cars (July 20, 2021) available at h
ttps://theicct.org/publications/global-LCA-p assenger-cars-jul2021 ; National Academies of Science,
Accelerating Decarbonization of the U.S. Energy System (Feb. 2, 2021) at 97 ("Further, light-duty trucks
and buses should be electrified, particularly in urban areas. Over the next decade, the United States needs to
ensure that electric vehicles become the predominant share of new purchases."); available at h
ttps://www.nap.edu/read/25932; Environment International, Assessing the health impacts of electric
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vehicles through air pollution in the United States (Nov. 2020) available at h
ttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016041202031970X.
40 See, Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Center, Emissions from Hybrid and Plug-In Electric
Vehicles available at h
ttps://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_emissions.htmlhttps://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_emissions.
html
41 Tesla, Impact Report 2022 at 31-34.
42 Tesla, Impact Report 2022 at 22, 149.
First, Tesla modelling points toward a significant overcompliance with the existing MY 2023-
26 standards. Tesla's internal modeling projects 28% ZEV sales in MY 2026. See Figure 2 -
Projected U.S. BEV Market Share. This represents an 11% over EPA's earlier predicted MY
2026 ZEV sales level (17%) resulting from the amendments to the MY 2023-26 standards. 116
Indeed, there are 206 different BEVs announced for the market in 2027. See Figure 3 - BEV
Model Availability in the U.S. Thus, this expected overcompliance carries into future model
years as Tesla projects business as usual BEV market share sales to be above those projected by
EPA under its proposal. See Figure 2 - Projected U.S. BEV Market Share. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0792, pp. 16-17]
116 EPA, EPA Finalizes Greenhouse Gas Standards for Passenger Vehicles, Paving Way for a Zero-
Emissions Future (Dec. 20, 2021) available at h ttps://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-finalizes-
greenhouse-gas-standards-passenger-vehicles-paving- way-zero-emissions
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 2 - Projected U.S. BEV Market Share [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 16-17]
Figure 3 - BEV Model Availability in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 16-17]
Second, the overcompliance with the existing standards should be a precursor to the EPA's
modelling of the proposed alternatives. The agency's own modelling shows significant
overcompliance with both the proposed standard and Alternative 1 in MY 2032. EPA indicates
the proposed standard results in a cumulative credit surplus of over 36.8M Mg representing
almost 1.6M BEVs that will not be sold. 117 See Figure 4. EPA's Projected Credit Surpluses in
MY 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 17-18]
117 Draft RIA at 13-13, Table 13-23. See EPA, The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report (Dec. 2022) at
79 (calculation utilizing conversion table to back out production Annual Implied Missing BEVs = (Net
credits * 1,000,000) / (Tesla Annual 2027-2032 Weighted g/mi Target * Weighted VMT)).
Similarly, the agency finds that Alternative 1 still results in a credit surplus of over 18.5M
Mg.l 18 As provide in Figure 4, this credit surplus represents the credit value of approximately
1.3M BEVs that would not be sold over the 2027-32 period. 119 See Figure 4. EPA's Projected
Credit Surpluses in MY 2032. This oversupply of credits in My 2032 indicates that
manufacturers have the capability to comply with a standard that is more stringent than
Alternative 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 17-18]
118 Id., at 13-17, Table 13-30.
119 See, footnote 117.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 4. EPA's Projected Credit Surpluses in MY 2032
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 17-18]
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Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
2. The annual stringency increases in the first three years of the proposed rule are extreme and
outside historical norms. EPA has historically recognized that technology penetration is slower
in early stages of market development and increases more rapidly over time. The proposed early
ramp rates run directly contrary to this reality. We are also concerned that this extreme rate may
have a paradoxical effect on C02 emissions - lowering the volume of older, higher polluting
vehicles replaced because artificial shortages will be created of low-carbon non-BEV vehicles
that many customers prefer. Automakers need time to invest in EV and battery production
capacity, for the charging infrastructure to develop across the country, and for the market to
mature. To reduce carbon dioxide emissions as much as possible, as soon as possible, customers
need choices that encourage replacement of high-C02 emitting vehicles with low-or zero-C02
emitting vehicles. EPA should smooth the early rates of increase in recognition of these
factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 2]
5. GHG Program
The Proposed Rule fails to demonstrate the penetration of BEVs assumed for compliance with
the proposed standards is feasible. The proposal notes "While emission standards set by the EPA
under CAA section 202(a)(1) generally do not mandate use of particular technologies, they are
technology-based, as the levels chosen must be premised on a finding of technological
feasibility." 17 CAA section 202(a)(1) states "Any regulation prescribed under paragraph (1) of
this subsection (and any revision thereof) shall take effect after such period as the Administrator
finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving
appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
17 88 Fed. Reg at 29232.
18 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2).
The aggressive ramp up of BEVs (see Table 1) required to comply forces a rapid
transformation of how vehicles are manufactured, driven, fueled, and serviced. As such,
"leadtime and requisite technology" must extend to the availability of critical minerals, the
readiness of a sustainable battery supply chain and fueling infrastructure, as well as other
market-related factors that will affect the price and consumer demand of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
[Table 1 Annual BEV Penetration Assume for Compliance w/ Proposed Standards] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
MY
2027
: BEV Share 36
MY
2028:
BEV Share 45
MY
2029:
BEV Share 55
MY
2030:
BEV Share 60
MY
2031:
BEV Share 63
MY
2032:
BEV Share 67]
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[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
Today's PEV support system clearly cannot meet the needs of the future envisioned by the
proposal. Our comments explain why the proposal lacks a clear justification for how the support
system will be in place over the period of the proposed standards. Neither EPA nor auto
manufactures can control the timing or outcomes of these essential support measures. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
Finally, EPA has taken a more measured view of technology risk and uncertainty in past
vehicle emissions rulemakings in which technology costs were lower and automakers had
significantly more direct control over managing their technology development, deployment, and
sales mix to comply. In this Proposed Rule, EPA appears to be taking a much more cavalier
approach to risk, lead time, and ensuring the "requisite technology" is available, despite the high
cost of BEVs, the massive uncertainty around mineral supplies, the significant investment
needed in charging infrastructure and the power grid, and the uncertain market demand for
BEVs. The standards in the Final Rule should be adjusted to better account for market
uncertainties. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
Supporting President Biden's Goal
Together with many other manufacturers, Volkswagen remains committed to President
Biden's goal to reach 40- 50% EV sales by 2030. Taking into account the concerns for the
current and future market situation and the uncertainties not in our control, we expect achieving
these targets will be a stretch goal for the industry. To establish a feasible pathway into e-
mobility for the entire automotive industry, we recommend making the NPRM's targeted EV
share consistent with President Biden's Executive Order 14037 on Strengthening American
Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks and to ensure they are safeguarded by similar ambitious
EV ecosystems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 2]
GHG Standards
GHG Alternative Target Curves - Aligned with AFAI (Section III.E.)
The EPA has proposed three alternative light-duty GHG standards. AFAI has suggested a
logical outgrowth of Alternatives 2 and 3. Volkswagen agrees with the linear Alternative 3 with
the combined goal of 50% Plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs), which includes plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles (PHEVs) and battery-electric vehicles (BEVs), penetration by 2030.
Volkswagen prefers the AFAI aligned proposal. However, if EPA seeks input only on the
proposed Alternatives, Volkswagen then prefers Alternative 3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669,
p. 4]
Alternative 3 has consumer-based advantages from cost, product availability perspective, and
better aligns with the regulatory aims toward improving human health and environment
protection. Alternative 3 is characterized by similar year-over-year reduction rates (as compared
to Alternatives 1 and 2) with all targets converging and achieving the same overall results by
MY2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 4]
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Volkswagen believes that Alternatives 1 and 2, both having high reduction rates in the earlier
years, do not align with projections of consumer adoption of EVs in the market. Furthermore,
when additional EV models are available in the market with improved range, consumer
acceptance and demand is expected to improve more linearly. EPA also recognizes that the
Alternative 1 and 2 are not recommended due to feasibility, cost, public health and welfare.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 4]
Organization: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
In this action, EPA is proposing new, more stringent emissions standards for criteria
pollutants and greenhouse gases (GHG) for light-duty vehicles and medium-duty vehicles that
would phase-in over model years 2027 through 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 1]
The WDNR offers the following specific comments on the proposal:
Proposed standards. EPA's proposed GHG standards for light-duty vehicles will result in a
56% increase in stringency of C02 standard from model year (MY) 2026 to 2032. EPA is
proposing three alternatives to this standard (one more stringent, one less stringent, and one with
the same final stringency as the proposal, but with a different rate of increase). EPA is not
proposing specific alternatives to its proposed GHG standards for medium duty vehicles or the
criteria pollutant standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 2]
Both the proposal and the alternatives presented by EPA will result in substantial decreases in
C02 and criteria pollutant emissions. As such, EPA should finalize standards within this range
that best reflect the technology available to manufacturers in the timeframe of the affected model
years and that will be achievable in practice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 2]
Organization: World Resources Institute (WRI)
We applaud the Biden administration for acting swiftly and using the full force of Clean Air
Act authorities to propose new, more stringent vehicle emissions standards to reduce criteria
pollutants and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from passenger (and other) vehicles to address
climate pollution and public health impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
Transportation accounted for the largest portion (29%) of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
in 2021, and light duty vehicles [Link: https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/fast-facts-
transportation-greenhouse-gas-emissions ] (including passenger cars and light-duty trucks)
represent the largest category with 58% of the transportation sector's GHG emissions.
Furthermore, studies (such as the recent 'Zeroing in on Healthy Air' [Link:
https://www.lung.org/getmedia/13248145-06fD-4e35-b79b-6dfacfd29a71/zeroing-in-on-healthy-
air-report-2022.pdf] from the American Lung Association) show that regulations and policies
designed to reduce GHG emissions, such as through accelerating electric transportation, will
have the added benefit of reducing other forms of pollution -including air toxics and particulate
matter -that impact public health and disproportionately impact overburdened communities.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
To address these significant sources of transportation pollution and its legacy of
disproportionate impacts, we express our support for EPA's proposed "Alternative 1," which
would set the most stringent emissions reduction standards. While these proposed standards are
851
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technology neutral, electric vehicles present the best option for compliance as they emit zero
tailpipe pollution, resulting in improved public health and climate outcomes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0544, pp.1-3]
Thus, we urge EPA to strengthen and finalize the strongest rule possible as [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0544, pp.1-3]
1. Complementary policies provide incentives for vehicle manufacturers and consumers
in the transition; and
2. Strong private investments are rapidly expanding supply chains and manufacturing,
helping to accelerate the transition to cleaner, electric vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
We thank the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the opportunity to comment
on its notice of proposed rulemaking to set multipollutant emission standards for model years
2027 and later light- and medium-duty vehicles. ZETA encourages the agency to finalize more
stringent standards than Alternative One for light-duty greenhouse gas emissions and finalize
light-duty multipollutant standards that are equally as stringent. We also encourage the agency to
finalize medium-duty GHG and multipollutant standards that are as stringent as possible. We
believe these standards are achievable and will ensure the supply chain has the regulatory
certainty needed to protect the investments being made today that will put the sector on a path to
a ze—emission future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 1]
1. Introduction
The Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA) appreciates the opportunity to
comment on EPA's proposed rulemakingl to set multi-pollutant emission standards for model
years 2027-2032 light- and medium-duty vehicles (LMDVs), consistent with Executive Order
14037.2 ZETA applauds EPA's ambition shown in these proposed standards and we believe
EPA should finalize more stringent standards than Alternative One to further incentivize zero
emission vehicle deployment and improve local health outcomes. This proposed rulemaking
offers an opportunity to begin to phase out internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs)—
thereby locking in significant emissions reductions, protecting public health and the
environment, and backstopping the industry's investments in electrification technologies. These
standards will also play a key role in helping achieve the Biden-Harris Administration's
blueprint for decarbonizing the transportation sector while adhering to U.S. commitments under
the Paris Climate Agreement.3 The blueprint calls for continuously strengthened vehicle
emissions standards through the next two decades as a central pillar of the U.S. GHG reduction
strategy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 5]
1 See 88 FR 29184 (May 5, 2023)
2 Executive Order 14037 "Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks," (August 5,
2021) https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/08/10/2021-17121/strengthening-american-
leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks
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3 The U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization (January 2023)
https://www.energy.gOv/sites/default/files/2023-01/the-us-national-blueprint-for-transportation-
decarbonization.pdf
5. ZETA Comments on the Proposed Emission Standards for LDVs
ZETA and its member companies appreciate the opportunity to submit comments on EPA's
proposed rule to set multipollutant and GHG emission standards for class l-2a LDVs. We urge
the agency to finalize standards more stringent than Alternative One for LDV GHG emissions
and to finalize LDV multipollutant standards that are equally as stringent. For reasons discussed
throughout these comments, we believe such stringency is feasible and finalizing such standards
will ensure the supply chain has the regulatory certainty needed to protect the investments being
made today that will put the sector on a glide path to a zero-emission future. Backtracking on the
stringency of these proposed standards in the final rule will not only jeopardize the health,
climate, and environmental benefits but would create regulatory uncertainty. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, p. 26]
6. ZETA Comments on the Proposed Emission Standards for MDVs
In regards to the proposed GHG and multipollutant emission standards for class 2b-3 MDVs,
we encourage EPA to finalize standards that are as stringent as possible. ZETA supports the
proposed revisions to the work factor curves, including the cutpoints and slope changes over
time, for the same reasons discussed above in the LDV footprint curve context. Ultimately, we
believe EPA's proposed changes to the work factor curves will more accurately capture the
benefits of EVs and drive greater emissions reductions over the MY 2027-2032 time frame
covered by these standards. We encourage EPA to finalize these changes as proposed. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 27-28]
EPA Summary and Response
EPA received many comments supporting, opposing, or recommending changes to the
proposed standards or the alternatives on which EPA sought comment. As discussed in greater
detail in preamble sections III.D and V, in evaluating the proposal and alternatives in arriving at
a decision on the appropriateness of final standards, EPA considered several factors, including
differences in manufacturer costs and lead time, C02 emissions reductions and technology
penetration projections.
The following summary addresses similar comments made by multiple commenters.
EPA received many comments in support of either the proposed standards, or of the more
stringent light-duty GHG standard, Alternative 1. Several stakeholders (the American Lung
Association, the California Attorney General's Office, CALSTART, Ceres BICEP, Ceres
CEVA, Colorado Energy Office et. al, DOEE, Energy Innovation, Institute for Policy Integrity at
NYU Law, ICCT, Lucid, MDE, MPCA, Southern Env. Law Center, Tesla, WRI) supported the
most stringent alternative - Alternative 1 - or recommended that EPA finalize standards "at least
as strong as Alternative 1." More commenters (CAP, Environmental and Public Health
Organizations, NPCA, Rivian, South Coast Air Quality Management District) recommended that
EPA modify Alternative 1, predominantly by increasing the stringency in the later years to
ensure that the US is on a path to full electrification by 2035. Other groups (EC, NACAA,
NESCAUM, Our Children's Trust, Sierra Club) requested that EPA strengthen the standards
853
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beyond the proposed levels, or that EPA make the standards the "strongest possible." The Sierra
Club supported the proposed standards, but analogous to other stakeholders, recommended
greater stringency in the later model years (2030-2032).
While many traditional OEMs commented that the stringency of the proposed standards was
too stringent, only one manufacturer (Honda) overtly rejected all of the stringency options
presented in the NPRM. In fact, several automakers commented in support of Alternative 3,
albeit with some modifications. In its comments (which member companies Hyundai, Kia,
Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Porsche, Stellantis, Toyota and Volkswagen endorsed), the Alliance
for Automotive Innovation highlighted concerns with front-loading of the proposed standards
and Alternatives 1 and 2 while preferring the less steep ramp rate of Alternative 3 in the early
years of the program. However, they recommended that EPA adjust the stringency in MY 2030
to align with a projected market share of 40-50% EVs (which includes BEVs, PHEVs and
FCEVs), and then adjust standards with stringency increases from MY 2030 to 2032 "that are
supported by reasonably certain projections of EV supply chain, manufacturing, market and
infrastructure in that timeframe." Several auto manufacturers suggested that, in additional to the
Alternative 3's more linear year-over-year phase-in of the standards and its lesser stringency
prior to 2032 compared to the proposal, that EPA also consider a slower phase-down or phase-
out of some of the credit flexibilities, such as off-cycle credits and air conditioning leakage
credits. Those credit provisions are further discussed in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 of this RTC.
Generally, the auto manufacturer comments noted that additional lead time was needed,
especially in the early years of the program, in order to provide time for the scale up of battery
supply chains and for the production of PEVs. Many individual auto manufacturers provided
specific examples of such lead time and feasibility issues, especially for the early years of the
standards phase-in.
After carefully reviewing all comments, combined with our updated technical analysis, EPA
selected the Alternative 3 footprint curves for its final standards. As EPA explains in Sections
III.C and V of the preamble, Alternative 3 strikes a balance by allowing for a more linear
stringency increase in the early years (which will help to address concerns over lead time) while
ending at the same numerical stringency in MY 2032 as the proposed standards. Moreover, the
delayed phase-out of the AJC refrigerant and off-cycle credits described in Section III.C.5 and
III.C.6 of the preamble (and Sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 of this RTC) address automaker concerns
about lead time and the transition to the more stringent standards in the later years. See Sections
I.B and III.C. 1 of the preamble for further details on the final standards and their basis. For the
final rulemaking, EPA considered two new alternatives to the final standards (Alternative A,
which were the proposed standards as presented in the NPRM, and Alternative B, less stringent
than the final standards). A more detailed discussion of the alternatives for the final rule is
provided in Section IV.E of the preamble. In order to assess feasibility in light of uncertainties in
our assumptions, EPA conducted multiple sensitivity analyses. These are described in Section
IV.F of the preamble.
In response to commenters who recommended Alternative 1, upon considering the entirety of
the comments and record, especially in light of the auto manufacturers comments and in
consideration of our updated analysis including higher battery costs for PEVs, and for the
reasons discussed in section V of the preamble, EPA concluded that the proposed standards
would present challenging issues of feasibility and lead time. In light of the fact that Alternative
1 was more stringent than the proposed standards, we concluded, without undertaking further
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final rule analysis, that the Alternative 1 standards would present even greater issues of
feasibility and lead time. As we discussed above, several commenters requested that EPA
strengthen the standards beyond the proposed levels, or that EPA make the standards the
"strongest possible." In consideration of emission reductions, technological feasibility, costs,
lead time concerns (including scale up of battery supply chains and PEV production capacity)
and other factors, EPA believes the final standards are appropriate as discussed at length in
section V of the preamble. As shown in Table 8-23 and Table 8-24 in RIA Chapter 8.6.6.1, EPA
projects that the final rule with the more gradual year-over-year stringency but landing with the
same stringency in MY2032 as the proposal will achieve 98% of the cumulative emissions
reductions of the proposed standards (Alternative A) by 2055. A more detailed comparison of the
per-vehicle incremental costs (12.1.2), and technology penetrations (12.1.3) for each alternative
can be found in the RIA. We also discuss some related comments in Section 2.3 of this RTC.
The following is a summary of unique comments related to stringency:
In comments, Ford expressed support for Alternative 3 and its 2032 MY endpoint (which is
equal to the MY 2032 stringency of the proposed standards). Additionally, Ford suggested its
own modifications to Alternative 3, including a phase-out for refrigerant credits and an increase
in the utility allowance in the truck curve which would effectively increases the slope (and thus
decrease the stringency) of the truck curve. These structural modifications are addressed in more
detail in RTC Sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.1, respectively.
In its comments, Honda opposed the three alternatives presented in the NPRM, pointing to
market uncertainties and potential for noncompliance. While not providing specifics, Honda
requested a "more reasonable" emissions reduction trajectory and a broader array of compliance
flexibilities. EPA believes that the final standards (i.e., the C02 footprint curves of Alternative
3), when combined with the slower phase-down of A/C and off-cycle credits, addresses Honda's
request for a more reasonable trajectory of stringency increase. We believe these standards to be
appropriate as we discuss in preamble Section III.C and V.
Separately, Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) recommended an alternative trajectory to that of
Alternative 3 which would relax the stringency in years 2028 through 2031, in part to offset
EPA's proposed reduction in allowable A/C and off-cycle credits. JLR suggested targets of
approximately 150 g/mi in 2028 and roughly 140 g/mi in 2029 (both by visual inspection of
Figure 2 in its comments [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744]), 125.3 g/mi in 2030, and
approximately 104 g/mi in 2031. Upon review, the difference in JLR's suggested stringency
from the updated Alternative 3 targets (updated in the final rulemaking to reflect the MY 2022
base year fleet and AEO 2023 car/truck shares) is minimal. In MY 2030, the stringency that JLR
is requesting is more than offset by the delayed phase down of potential A/C and off-cycle
credits that we have included in the final standards, and thus should largely address the
numerical stringency adjustments to Alternative 3 that JLR has requested in its comments. EPA
provides a summary of the A/C and off-cycle credits available in the final standards in Section
III.C.2.iv, Table 21 of the preamble.
Arconic, which advocated for inclusion of upstream power generation emissions in
compliance calculations for electric vehicles, acknowledged that the numerical standards would
have to be modified if such an approach were taken, but did not take a position on the
trajectory/stringency rates in this rulemaking. We address comments received on the compliance
treatment for BEVs in Section 3.1.5 of this RTC.
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In its comments, Darius opposed all three alternatives and while not specifying a
recommended level of stringency, requested that the rulemaking be technology-neutral and
account for lifecycle emissions. As these are fleet-averaging, performance-based standards, this
is a technology-neutral rulemaking. However, consistent with past rulemakings, we are not
adopting a lifecycle emissions approach, as we discuss in greater detail in Chapter 19.2 of this
RTC.
EDF supported Alternative 3 although it recommended an increase in stringency beyond MY
2030 by reducing fleetwide GHG targets of Alternative 3 in MYs 2031 and 2032 by 2.1 and 4.2
g/mi, respectively, so that this revised trajectory would match the cumulative 2055 GHG
emissions reductions projected for the proposed standards. In response, the stringency of our
final standards is based on our updated analysis which considers technology feasibility, lead time
and cost. The emissions reductions which we discuss in the preamble are an outcome of our
analysis; in summary, we are not trying to maintain the reductions of the proposed standards (or
any other predetermined future cumulative GHG reduction goal). EDF also recommended that
EPA finalize a voluntary leadership pathway that incentivizes ACC II levels of ZEV deployment
nationwide; that comment is addressed in RTC Section 3.1.10.
Elders Climate Action, while not commenting on the proposed standards or the three
alternatives, recommended that EPA include ZEV sales targets for MYs 2027-29 that are the
same as the CARB ACT rule, and set a zero emissions standard by 2035. We disagree with this
approach. We are adopting fleet average performance-based standards through MY 2032 as
described in section I.B. of the preamble, we do not believe it is appropriate to set minimum
sales targets for any technology. We address this comment and additional comments on the
timeframe for the standards in RTC Section 3.1.9.
In addition to its comments on overall stringency, Tesla also made recommendations to
several program structure elements which we address in the appropriate subsections of RTC
Section 3.1.
Some commenters explicitly requested that EPA add anti-backsliding requirements for non-
ZEVs: these comments are addressed within RTC Section 12.3.
Additionally, the Alliance urged that the final standards should be based on an assumption of
little to no improvement in ICE vehicle emission reductions due to required investments in BEV
development. In preamble I.B and as discussed in RTC Section 12.5.3, EPA presents multiple
pathways available to manufacturers to comply with the final standards. Several commenters
pointed out that ICE improvements are available (addressed in RTC Section 12.3). Each
manufacturer may choose the technologies and compliance path most appropriate for their
situation.
3.3.2 - Lead time
Comments by Organizations
Organization: 25x '25 Alliance, et al.
The undersigned parties offer the following comments on EPA's proposed rule, "Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
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Vehicles." We write these comments because we believe that the proposed rules would establish
an overly aggressive, high-risk program that would be counterproductive in achieving the
agency's environmental and health objectives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
In establishing or revising Clean Air Act Section 202(a) standards, EPA must consider issues
of technological feasibility, cost of compliance, and lead time. Among other things, that means
the agency must look closely at the impact of its proposed standards on net emissions of air
pollutants and their associated public health effects, impacts on the automotive industry, impacts
on the vehicle purchasers/consumers, energy security, and safety, and how the proposed
approach would compare to other possible rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-
4]
EPA's review of relevant factors in the current proposal is seriously deficient. The chief
failure comes because the agency elides two distinct types of feasibility: the technological
feasibility of electric vehicles as a part of the fleet and the technological feasibility of electric
vehicles as the whole of the fleet. We do not dispute the former, but overwhelming evidence
disproves the latter. First, there are no established supply chains capable of supplying the raw
materials to manufacture the millions of vehicles needed—just over the next decade—to supply
the projected market. Second, the infrastructure necessary to support these vehicles, particularly
recharging infrastructure, is not and will not be available in the necessary timescales. The high
density of chargers needed in major metropolitan areas and vast web of chargers needed to span
the rural areas of the Country will require tremendous planning and investment. The long lead
times associated with new renewable generation means that this added marginal electric load will
be powered by natural gas and coal for the foreseeable future. And current prices, lack of
infrastructure, and public opinion militate strongly against the conclusion that a ten-fold increase
in the annual sales of electric vehicles will occur in the next eight years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0573, pp.1-4]
And current prices, lack of infrastructure, and public opinion militate strongly against the
conclusion that a ten-fold increase in the annual sales of electric vehicles will occur in the next
eight years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Neither reasonable nor achievable in the timeframe provided
With that said, as proposed, the NPRM standards—both greenhouse gas (GHG) and criteria—
are neither reasonable nor achievable in the timeframe covered in this proposal. Auto Innovators
does not believe they can be met without substantially increasing the cost of vehicles, reducing
consumer choice, and disadvantaging major portions of the United States population and
territory. EPA's proposed rules effectively assume that everything will go perfectly in the
transformation to electric vehicles (EVs)3 between now and 2032. For example, the NPRM
appears to assume that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 2-3]
3 The term "electric vehicles" as used herein refers collectively to battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric,
and fuel cell electric vehicles.
- An over-abundance of battery critical mineral mines, critical mineral processing capacity,
and battery component, cell, and pack production facilities leads to continued battery price
reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 2-3]
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- Most critical minerals for light- and medium-duty vehicles (LDVs and MDVs) are sourced
and processed from the U.S. or countries with which we have a free trade agreement (FTA).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 2-3]
- Every EV battery is produced in the U.S. by 2027 and receives the maximum Inflation
Reduction Act (IRA)4 Section 45X manufacturing tax credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 2-3]
- Most battery electric vehicle (BEV) and most BEV buyers qualify for maximum tax credits
when purchasing or leasing a BEV under the IRA 30D and 45W. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 2-3]
- Congress makes no future changes to the federal law that reduces tax credits for BEVs or
BEV batteries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 2-3]
- Apartments, condominiums, and residential street parking throughout the U.S. (roughly half
of the U.S. housin8581oomberg858858re retrofited to provide convenient, low- cost, reliable
BEV charging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 2-3]
- Public and workplace charging infrastructure deployment keeps pace with vastly increased
BEV deployments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 2-3]
- Utilities and their regulators in all 50 states request, approve, and build out the needed power
generation, service lines, and the corresponding connections to charge not only the proposed
light-duty BEVs but also medium-duty and heavy-duty BEVs required in this proposal and other
state regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 2-3]
- Electricians and construction professionals are available nationwide to install, maintain, and
repair electric vehicle chargers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 2-3]
- New criteria emission requirements involve "off the shelf' technology and will not draw
resources away from the industry transformation to EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
2-3-
4 H R.5376 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): Inflation Reduction Act (Aug. 16, 2022), available at
htps://www.congressgov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376/text.
GHG Standards
Leap-frogs Biden administration's own 50% executive order [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 3-4]
The stringency of the NPRM proposed standards increases faster than at any time in history.
In fact, by assuming BEVs alone will make up 60% of the new vehicles sold in 2030 and 67% of
new vehicles just two years later, the proposed requirements leap-frog even President Biden's
ambitious 2030 target of 50%, which included BEVs, fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs), and
plug- in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) by 2030. The 60% BEV-only proposal also goes
beyond the same goal of 50% electric vehicles by 2030 (which again included BEVs, PHEVs,
and FCEVs) described in The U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization,
authored by four cabinet level agencies including EPA and issued in January 2023 - just a few
months before this proposal was published. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 3-4]
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Unlike EPA's past regulations that could be met by automaker action alone and without
consumer participation or even knowledge, these standards require large numbers of BEVs and
are based on many assumptions that are largely outside the control of either EPA or individual
automakers. Getting these standards right is critical not only to the automakers that must comply
with them, but also to the U.S. global competitiveness and the U.S. economy. If the standards
push too fast, too soon, we risk relying on other nations to supply the minerals and batteries
needed to produce more EVs. If the standards push too slowly, there is less incentive to develop
the necessary supply chain capacity in the U.S. Balancing the requirements with the realities of
the marketplace and the supply chain will be key to a successful rule that also solidifies our
nation's electric vehicle competitiveness and leadership. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
3-4]
Successfully transitioning from ICE vehicles to electric vehicles—a goal we share with
EPA— requires massive changes from all sectors of the U.S. economy: from automotive
suppliers to home builders to utilities, labor to mining to mineral processing. Successful
implementation also requires substantial consumer changes such as installing home charging and
pre-planning long trips to ensure adequate fueling infrastructure along the way. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp.3-4]
For our part, automakers can produce electric vehicles, but the proposed regulations are only
feasible if we can address and affirmatively answer these questions:
1. Can people afford EVs? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 3-4]
2. Can people fuel EVs? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 3-4]
3. Can automakers obtain the battery critical minerals to power EVs? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 3-4]
4. Will customers embrace the technology on such a large scale in such a short time? [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 3-4]
The answers to these questions are not yet known, but lead to the fundamental question and
the substance of these comments: Is the U.S. ready for the transformation in the timeframe the
NPRM lays out? No. We are not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 3-4]
Automakers are committed to electrification. The industry publicly agreed in August 2021
that BEVs, PHEVs, and FCEVs could constitute 40 to 50% of new vehicle sales by 2030 with
the right combination of supportive measures. Some, but not all, of those supportive measures
have started, but they are nowhere near complete and certainly not sufficient to support the even
higher requirements in the proposed regulations that substantially leapfrog that target. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 5]
I. EV Feasibility
A. Overview
EPA proposes to set transformat ive greenhouse gas (GHG) standards that are projected to
require reaching 55% battery electric vehicle (BEV) sales by calendar year (CY) 2028 (model
year 2029),7 63% sales by CY 2030 (MY 2031), and 67% sales by the end of this rule (MY
2032).8 It is also proposing criteria pollutant standards that are generally premised on the same
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or similar BEV sales. By the time these regulations are finalized, MY 2027 will be less than two
years away, and MY 2032 seven years away.9 The projected levels of BEV market share are a
substantial increase over the 50% EV sales by 2030 described in Executive Order 14037 (which
included plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) in
addition to BEVs)10 and reafirmed by EPA and three other cabinet-level agencies in The U.S.
National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization in January 2023.11 Although EPA's
analysis attempts to demonstrate the possibility of achieving such lofty goals, EPA fails to
demonstrate a reasonable probability of doing so in the timeframe of its proposal. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 24-25]
7 Model years can begin as early as January 2 of the calendar year preceding the model year designation.
(40 C.F.R. § 86.1803-01, definition of "model year"; § 85.2304, definition of "annual production period".)
Therefore, model year 2029 can begin as early as January 2, 2028, effectively making a model year 2029
standard a calendar year 2028 requirement.
8 NPRM at 29329. (Table 80.)
9 EPA anticipates finalizing this rulemaking in March 2024. (Spring 2023 Unified Agenda of Regulatory
and Deregulatory Actions, RIN 2060-AV49.) Model year 2025 can begin as early as January 2, 2024,
making the lead-time of this rule less than two to seven years.
10 Executive Order 14037, "Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks" (Aug. 5,
2021). 86 Fed. Reg. 43583 (Aug. 10, 2021).
11 U.S. Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and Environmental Protection Agency, The U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation
Decarbonization (Jan. 2023). Available at htps://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/the-us-
national-blueprint-for-transportation- decarbonization.pdf. (Retrieved Jun. 20, 2023).
Technological feasibility is a cornerstone of rulemaking under section 202(a) of the Clean Air
Act. Regulations promulgated under section 202 "shall take effect after such period as the
Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." 12 As
EPA acknowledges, this means that emission standards "must be premised on a finding of
technological feasibility." 13 EPA's conclusions regarding technological feasibility are subject to
review under the Administrative Procedure Act; they must be the "product of reasoned decision
making," and the agency must provide a reasoned explanation for its projections of feasibility. 14
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 24-25]
12 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2).
13 NPRM at 29232; see also Nat. Res. Defense Council v. E.P.A., 655 F.2d 318, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
14 Nat. Res. Defense Council, 655 F.2d at 328.
The Proposed Rule requires an aggressive ramp-up in BEV sales, forcing a staggering
increase in the use of a nascent technology at unprecedented levels and on an expedited
timeframe. This Proposed Rule will constitute a transformative shift in the makeup of the
nation's vehicle fleet. In this context, EPA must take a holistic approach in evaluating
technological feasibility, considering not just whether BEV technology presently exists in a
vacuum, but also weighing whether the market is able to support the level of BEVs demanded by
the rule—that is, whether the "application of the requisite technology" (here BEVs), to the extent
required by the Proposed Rule and on the timeline required, is feasible. This assessment must
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include full and adequate consideration of important factors including, but not limited to, the
availability of adequate charging infrastructure, consumer acceptance of BEV technology,
electricity generation and capacity concerns, and issues related to battery manufacturing and
supply chains. 15 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 24-25]
15 See NPRM at 29297-324, 29341-42 (acknowledging that it is appropriate to consider such issues in
discussing feasibility); see also, e.g., Bluewater Network v. E.P.A., 370 F.3d 1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(considering whether EPA had adequately explained the basis of its "prediction of the feasible pace of
implementation").
Additionally, regulations issued under section 202 of the Clean Air Act must not be arbitrary
and capricious, a standard identical to the one imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act. 16
This standard requires that EPA consider all "important aspect[s] of the problem" and engage in
"reasoned decision making," and that it "consider[] the relevant factors and articulate[] a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.'"17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 24-25]
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A); see also Nat'l Petrochem. & Refiners Ass'nv. E.P.A., 287 F.3d 1130,
1135 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
17 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'nv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 53 (1983); Nat'l Ass'n
of Clean Air Agencies v. E.P.A., 489 F.3d 1221, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
With respect to the Proposed Rule, we are concerned that EPA has fallen short of these legal
and procedural obligations. We are seriously concerned that the requirements of the Proposed
Rule go beyond what is technologically feasible, contrary to the requirements of the statute,
when these important feasibility factors are taken into account. 18 We are also concerned that the
Proposed Rule fails to consider—or inadequately considers—crucial issues and evidence, and the
standards contained in the Proposed Rule do not bear a rational connection to the facts in the
record. We outline our concerns as to feasibility below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
25-26]
18 EPA states that it selected the range of alternatives presented in the Proposed Rule "because they
represent a range of standards that are anticipated to be feasible and are highly protective of human health
and the environment." NPRM at 29201; See also id. at 29280 (same). To the extent that EPA is determining
section 202 standards based on which standards are "highly protective of human health and the
environment," this is goes beyond what is legally required. This language is absent from section 202(a),
which simply instructs EPA to "prescribe .. . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant,"
subject to the considerations of feasibility and cost of compliance. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
The NPRM, which aims to establish stringent emission standards for light-duty automotive
vehicles, including EVs, highlights the complex challenges that lie ahead. While this Proposed
Rule represents a crucial step toward a cleaner and more sustainable transportation sector, its
implementation poses unique hurdles and underestimates the actions needed to realize the
targeted EV market share. Addressing concerns such as manufacturing capacity, battery
production, charging infrastructure, and consumer acceptance of EVs are paramount to the
success of this ambitious proposed regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 25-26]
Despite these major gaps, the EPA in its Proposed Rule incorrectly assumes these policy
actions represent a complete answer to achieve not just a 40-50% EV market in the U.S., but in
fact go well beyond this level by assuming a perfect transition to a BEV market of 60% in MY
2030. This incredibly aggressive technology diffusion curve for BEV adoption is faster than any
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new automotive technology to date, even exceeding the adoption rate targeted by California (the
most mature EV market in the U.S.). Moreover, EPA's reliance on its model projections depends
heavily on factors beyond the control of it and the automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 27-28]
Although the push toward electrification to combat climate change and reduce greenhouse gas
emissions is moving forward, implementing a nationwide regulation that essentially requires
automakers to produce and sell a certain percentage of EVs poses significant obstacles. From
technological limitations to infrastructure gaps and consumer adoption barr'ers, the EPA's
electric vehicle mandate is poised to encounter numerous hurdles that will inhibit successful
implementation. Affordability, charging and refueling infrastructure, permitting reform, and
critical mineral supply chains are significant challenges that need to be addressed for the
widespread adoption of EVs to be feasible at the levels contained in EPA's proposal. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 27-28]
In the following subsections, Auto Innovators provides perspective on the multitude of market
enablers needed to support a mature EV market and show how EPA's assumptions take an
overly optimistic, if not infeasible, approach to technology adoption and EV market growth.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 27-28]
C. Historical Technology Adoption Versus EV Penetration Assumptions
Figure 2 shows the penetration rate of automotive technologies that have been introduced in
the last nineteen years. Technologies that follow the most aggressive growth curve are those that
are generally transparent to the customer. Eight speed transmissions, gasoline direct injection
(GDI) engines, and stop-start have become standard features, and have little or no impact on
customer driving behaviors. BEVs, on the other hand, require drivers to make active changes to
their driving habits and potentially additional investments (e.g., home charging equipment). In
short, BEVs require change, whereas many of the most successful automotive technologies do
not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 29-30]
EPA is assuming that automobile manufacturers can increase BEV production as quickly as
they have adopted new transmission or engine technologies, despite the need to build entirely
new supply chains and manufacturing facilities. Underlying such rapid growth is also an
assumption that the majority of new vehicle buyers will accept BEVs and their inherent changes
to driving habits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 29-30]
[See original comment for Figure 2: Examples of historical automotive technology
adoption29 compared to projected BEV market share under the EPA proposal.30] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 29-30]
29 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Automotive Trends Report (Mar. 2023), Detailed data.
Available at htps://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends/explore-automotive-trends-data#DetailedData. See
Detailed Real-World Fuel Economy, C02 Emissions, and Vehicle Attribute and Technology data.
30 Reflects EPA proposal, central analysis.
EPA has assumed a steep growth in BEV adoption at rates typically only seen in the evolution
of disruptive technologies such as the cell phone, the television and microwave ovens, all of
which added significant direct convenience and other benefits to customers and that cost
substantially less at the time of purchase than an automobile. BEVs, on the other hand, have not
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thus far experienced such rapid adoption. In terms of convenience or additional new utility,
BEVs offer generally superior acceleration performance, home refueling (a convenience not
available to all customers), potentially lower fuel costs (that are dependent on where and when a
vehicle is charged), and environmental benefits (important to some, but transparent to many).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 31]
Thus, EPA makes an extremely aggressive assumption for a nascent technology that has not
been fully embraced by the consumer and that faces many additional industrial and market
challenges. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 31]
J. Conclusion
EPA suggests that reaching a U.S. light-duty battery electric vehicle market share 60% by
MY 2030 and two-thirds of all light-duty vehicle sales by MY 2032 is feasible and practicable.
The conditions which would enable such a high level of BEV market share are not present today
and are highly questionable based on the estimates that EPA relied on in this proposed
rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 83]
III. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Standards
In 2021, Auto Innovators accepted the challenge of driving light-duty EV purchases
(including BEVs, PHEVs, and FCEVs) to between 40 and 50% of new vehicle sales by 2030.145
This commitment was, and remains, premised on having the necessary complementary policies
in place to support the 40-50% goal. The Inflation Reduction Act and the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act are steps in the right direction, which industry had identified as critical
to meeting, not exceeding, our goal of 40-50% EVs by 2030. However, these policies are not a
guarantee of the future state of the U.S. EV market and are only part of the coordinated and
parallel actions that will be necessary to expand EV sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
88]
145 Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Aug. 5, 2021), "Auto Innovators: Aligning Policies for a Cleaner
Future." htps://bit.ly/45GXdC5.
Concurrent with Auto Innovators announcement, President Biden signed Executive Order
14037 calling for 50% of all new passenger car and light truck sales to be EVs, including BEVs,
PHEVs, and FCEVs. 146 This policy direction was again affirmed by four cabinet level agencies,
including EPA, in The U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization in early
2023.147 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 88]
146 Executive Order 14037, "Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks" (Aug. 5,
2021). 86 Fed. Reg. 43583 (Aug. 10, 2021).
147 U.S. Departments of Energy, Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development; U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, The U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization (Jan.
2023) at 9.
EPA's proposed rule for MY 2027 to 2032 unilaterally moves those goal posts, requiring
approximately 60% BEV sales by 2030.148 The proposed rule also excludes consideration of
PHEVs, a technology that is readily available, comprises 1.4% of today's overall EV sales, 149
and that serves an important role in advancing consumer acceptance of EVs. If manufacturers
were to substitute PHEVs for some of those BEVs, the overall EV market share would increase
further. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 88]
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148 NPRM at 29333. (Table 99, Proposed standards, 2030.)
149 Alliance for Automotive Innovation (2023), Advanced Technology Sales Dashboard, calendar year
2022. Data compiled by the Alliance for Automotive Innovation using information provided by S&P
Global Mobility (formerly IHS Markit). Last updated Mar. 3, 2023; retrieved Jun. 23, 2023.
Auto Innovators does not believe the GHG standards, as proposed, are feasible for the
industry as a whole given the lead-time provided to apply the necessary technologies (electric
vehicles) to meet them. Our specific concerns with EPA's analysis vis-a-vis electric vehicles are
focused on the lack of assessment of necessary and critical market, supply chain, and
infrastructure development as described in more detail in Section I (EV Feasibility). Our
comments here focus more specifically on the proposed light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 88]
As EPA notes, BEVs accounted for 5.8% of the new U.S. light-duty passenger vehicle market
in 2022.153 Moreover, EPA's MY 2023-2026 GHG emissions standards that were finalized at
the end of 2021 projected only a 17% light-duty penetration rate for both BEVs and PHEVs by
MY 2026.154 Despite this low rate of consumer acceptance, the Proposed Rule projects a light-
duty BEV penetration rate of 67% by MY 2032, up from 36% in MY 2027.155 Importantly, in
the absence of these and other strict regulatory programs (such as California's ZEV mandate),
EPA projects a significantly lower MY 2032 BEV penetration rate of only 39%. 156 It is unclear
from EPA's analysis how the regulations alone justify a 28 percentage point increase in BEV
market between having regulations versus not. This is particularly concerning given that EPA's
no- action analysis presumably includes the same level of existing supportive mechanisms such
as the IRA and IIJA, assumptions for infrastructure development, and other market-enabling
features. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
153 Id. at 29189
154 See Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86
Fed. Reg. 74434, 74485, Table 33 (Dec. 30, 2021).
155 NPRM at 29329, Table 80.
156 Id. at 29329, Table 81.
In other words, a staggering increase in the implementation and adoption of BEV technology
underpins the Proposed Rule and is the central means by which the rule effectuates its
contemplated emissions reductions. But this shift to electrification is not a simple matter of
swapping one technology for another. The mass adoption of BEVs on the scale required for
compliance with the Proposed Rule's standards requires a much broader transformation in the
way vehicles are manufactured, purchased, fueled, serviced, and disposed of. Indeed, the
Proposed Rule would reorder much of the U.S. automobile industry—which supports roughly
10.3 million American jobs and $558 billion in annual car sales, and about 6% of the U.S.'s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 157 Consumers must be willing to purchase BEVs at mass scale;
the power sector must be able to generate and deliver adequate electricity 158—which itself will
contribute to emissions—while maintaining grid reliability and otherwise meeting consumer and
industrial demand; adequate charging infrastructure must be available; batteries and other
components must be manufactured at an increasing rate, critical minerals sourced, and supply
chains developed. These needs must be met not only for light-duty vehicles, but also for
medium- and heavy-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
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157 See Economic Insights, Alliance for Automotive Innovation,
htps://www.autosinnovate.org/resources/insights.
158 In addition to increasing electricity capacity, utilities are also facing a transition in technology types
and more renewable sources, as proposed under the "Greenhouse Gas Standards and Guidelines for Fossil
Fuel-Fired Power Plants" [88 FR 33240, May 23, 2023],
As expressed throughout this comment, we have serious concerns that the market will not be
able to bear the requirements of the Proposed Rule and that those requirements will not be
feasible given these considerations. Compliance will impose significant costs, and require
extraordinary effort, on the part of regulated parties—costs which will be passed along to
consumers. Setting such stringent standards has the potential to create a significant market
disruption, with consequences not only for the automobile industry but for the entire U.S.
economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
3. Front-Loading of the Proposed Standards
The proposed standards are heavily front-loaded, seeking over half of the required GHG
emissions improvements in the first two years, and nearly three-quarters of the improvements in
the first three years. 166 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 92-93]
166 Calculation by Auto Innovators based on EPA-estimated fleetwide C02 targets corresponding to the
proposed standards (NPRM at 29240, Table 29).
The proposed front-loading of the standards increases the risk to the feasibility of the
standards since they are largely premised on widespread fleet electrification. As noted, it will
take time to develop the supply chains, infrastructure, and market for EVs, and the proposed
front-loading further limits recovery opportunities if everything doesn't go exactly as planned.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 92-93]
While both passenger car and light truck standards are front-loaded in general, the proposed
MY 2027 standard stringency increase for trucks (21%) is almost double that of cars (12%). 167
Although these reductions become more balanced over the course of the proposed MY 2027-
2032 program, light-duty trucks would shoulder more of the burden with a 52% stringency
increase between MY 2026 and 2032 as compared to cars with a 45% stringency increase. 168
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 92-93]
167 Calculation by Auto Innovators based on EPA-estimated fleetwide C02 targets corresponding to the
proposed standards (NPRM at 29240, Table 29).
168 Calculation by Auto Innovators based on EPA-estimated fleetwide C02 targets corresponding to the
proposed standards (NPRM at 29240, Table 29).
Much of this difference between passenger car and light-duty truck stringency increases
(particularly in MY 2027) likely stems from EPA's proposal to move away from its historic
approach to setting standards (a set percentage reduction to an existing footprint target curve)
toward setting light-duty truck standards based on passenger car standards. 169 EPA proposes to
make this switch in a single year (MY 2027), which results in a large step change in light-duty
truck stringency, which should be reassessed on whether such a jump is feasible. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 92-93]
169 See DRIA at 1-8 et seq. (Development of truck curve.)
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Organization: Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE)
Evaluation of feasibility
In contrast to previous rulemakings, EPA's assessment of the proposed standards' feasibility
must account for a major transformation of the automotive market, its supply chains, technical
workers, and the materials needed to produce a compliant fleet. EPA should also account for
ZEV production volatility based on China's ability to withhold critical minerals which are not
mined in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 2-4]
Many of the estimates for future compliance in the Proposal assume that within four years, all
the following requirements will be in place: that significant quantities of critical minerals and
materials will be available, that the nation's electrical grid will be reliable (and cleaner), that new
supply chains will be established, and that all the necessary technology and components needed
for zero- emission vehicles (ZEVs) will be mass produced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp.
2-4]
Should any of these assumptions be inaccurate, automotive manufacturers will likely assume
significant financial risks as they modify their operations and production. The Proposal also
assumes that consumers will purchase enough of these new vehicles for manufacturers to meet
sales volumes for compliance levels. To reduce these risks, EPA should re-evaluate the ZEV
marketplace to determine the new standards' feasibility prior to the effective date. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 2-4]
Technology integration across the U.S. fleet does not happen quickly
EPA is predicting a very significant number of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) to be
available to consumers.5 Advanced vehicle technology integrations, however, are historically
slow to take effect. As indicated in EPA's 2020 Trends Report, ".. .it has taken, on average,
approximately 15- 20 years for new technologies to reach maximum penetration across the
industry." 6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-06, pp. 2-4]
12 5 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 87 / Friday, May 5, 2023 / at 29188
6 EPA 2020 Trends Report at p.63
Eleven years ago, EPA made similar predictions about the increased use of then-available
technologies to meet future standards, many of which never came close to EPA's predictions.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 2-4]
"The agencies believe that advances in gasoline engines and transmissions will continue for
the foreseeable future, and that there will be continual improvement in other technologies,
including vehicle weight reduction, lower tire rolling resistance, improvements in vehicle
aerodynamics, diesel engines, and more efficient vehicle accessories." 7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0631, pp. 2-4]
7 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 199 / October 15, 2012 / at 62631
Indeed, broad acceptance of BEVs by consumers is still a question for large portions of the
country, and the Proposal does not fully address this issue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp.
2-4]
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Organization: American Coalition for Ethanol (ACE)
Hurdles to Arbitrarily Regulating BEVs as the Only Way to Reduce Vehicle GHG Emissions
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, BEVs will comprise about 17% of
all vehicle sales by 2030.1 EPA's proposal aims to force an astonishing transition requiring
BEVs to represent an average of 78% of all sales of sedans, 68% of all pickup sales, and 62% of
all crossover and SUV sales by 2032.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 2-3]
1 https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/narrative/consumption/sub-topic-01.php.
2 Table 80 of EPA's Proposed Rule.
On the surface, this transition does not seem feasible, and in the draft regulatory impact
analysis, the Agency itself admits that prior tailpipe GHG emission standards have
underperformed relative to what was originally projected. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp.
2-3]
Automakers are highly skeptical of the feasibility of reaching this immense level of BEV
sales in EPA's proposed timeframe. According to John Bozzella, the President and CEO of the
Alliance for Automotive Innovation, "a lot has to go right for this massive - and unprecedented -
change in our automotive market and industrial base to succeed, especially as 284 million light-
duty vehicles across the country (that average 12 years in age) remain on the roads. As of last
year, EVs accounted for just over 1% of all light-duty vehicles."3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0613, pp. 2-3]
3 April 12, 2023 blogpostby John Bozzella, President and CEO of the Alliance of Automotive Innovation.
The Auto Innovators have pointed out President Biden's 2021 Executive Order (EO 14037),
which seeks 40 to 50% electric vehicle sales by 2030, was always a "stretch goal," and it
includes plug-in hybrids, fuel cell, and BEVs and depends upon complimentary policy relating to
dozens of factors outside of the vehicle, such as charging station availability, mineral
availability, and grid capacity.4 EPA's proposal represents a "significant movement of the
country's electrification goal posts - not by a little, but by a lot" according to Auto Innovators
testimony from Mike Hartrick. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-06, pp. 2-3]
12 4 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-
strengthening-american- leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/.
Setting aside whether this proposal is feasible or not from an automaker standpoint, the fact is
the Agency is relying on dozens of factors outside of the direct control of automakers and their
suppliers for the proposal to come to fruition. In fact, EPA itself lacks the jurisdiction to regulate
or control complimentary polices needed to solve for many of these needs, such as securing
foreign supplies of raw materials and minerals to make batteries, access to home and public
charging infrastructure, state and local building codes, grid capacity and reliability, and perhaps
most importantly, consumer preferences and fears associated with such a monumentally fast
transition to BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 2-3]
In response to these practical hurdles, testimony from Mr. Hartrick of the Auto Innovators
goes on to say ".. .there is no clear pathway to meet the totality of these needs in the timeframe
considered in the proposed rulemaking without significant impacts to automakers, workers,
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consumers, and ultimately the availability of vehicles that meet the needs of individuals,
families, and businesses across the country." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 2-3]
Non-binding company commitments about BEV production and EPA's reliance upon them
does not prove the proposal is feasible. The number of these non-binding commitments and
projections relied upon by the Agency is astounding and unprecedented. Indeed, recently in
setting final 2023 through 2025 renewable volume obligations (RVOs) for advanced biofuel,
EPA specifically chose not to rely on the non-binding production capacity forecasts and
commitments of prospective advanced fuel producers. As a result, the final advanced biofuel
RVOs are lower than desired by many of these prospective producers, but achievable in EPA's
view. Why would the Agency abandon that logic for this rulemaking and put all its faith in
similarly non-binding commitments from BEV enthusiasts when proposing these ambitious
tailpipe standards for vehicles? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 2-3]
Mr. Bozzella, the President and CEO of the Auto Innovators, sums it up this way: "The
administration's 50% (electric vehicle) goal in 2021 was aspirational, but it was also based on
clearly defined climate goals, credible assumptions, and data. The 60+% BEVs by 2030 plan, on
the other hand, is a house of cards. It rolls up rosy forecasts (like EV batteries will eventually
cost automakers nothing) and other hopeful assumptions."5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-06, pp.
2-3]
12 5 June 28, 2023 blogpost by John Bozzella, President and CEO of the Alliance of Automotive Innovation.
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
The proposed light- and medium-duty rule is also arbitrary and irrational in many ways. The
Clean Air Act and common sense alike require that EPA adopt regulations only if the agency
first determines that compliance will be feasible. The proposed rule flunks that core criterion
many times over. Electric vehicles are barely in use today, and the numbers needed to meet
EPA's new emissions standards are many times higher than current levels. As EPA admits,
compliance with its proposed rule depends on a drastic increase in the number of electric
vehicles produced and purchased by 2032. Sales of battery-electric light-duty vehicles, for
example, would likely have to jump tenfold or more. Achieving such a surge in the availability
and adoption of electric vehicles would present grave challenges in any circumstance, but it is
especially implau- sible given EPA's arbitrary and unjustifiably truncated timeline. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 3-4]
EPA predicts that such a sea change would occur, but its forecast fails on its own terms: it
relies heavily on manufacturers' nonbinding and aspirational announcements of future plans,
oversimplified and illogical assumptions about the purchasing decisions of light- and medium-
duty vehicle owners, and unreliable estimates of the costs that electric-vehicle users will incur.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 3-4]
Moreover, EPA's feasibility analysis fails to meaningfully confront multiple serious obstacles
to the widespread adoption of electric vehicles on which its proposed rule depends. Increased
production of electric vehicles is constrained by the supply of certain minerals critical to
manufacturing batteries. That supply is sharply limited; mining and processing operations are
nowhere near the levels needed to support the expansion of electric vehicles EPA's proposed rule
would require. The supply chain is subject to serious disruptions, as other fed- eral agencies have
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underscored. For example, nearly all existing supply of several critical minerals is controlled by
a small number of foreign and unfriendly nations. The insufficiency of these essential inputs will
only become more acute as worldwide demand for them increases. And developing new
operations would be a decades-long process that extends far beyond the compliance period for
the proposed rule. On average, it takes 16 years to move mining projects from discovery to first
production, and another ten to begin producing at max- imum capacity. EPA barely addresses
this problem in its proposed rule and offers no plausible solution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, p. 4]
Section 202(a) requires EPA to consider whether compliance with the proposed emissions
standards is feasible, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance. 42 U.S.C. §
7521(a)(2) ("Any regulation prescribed . . . shall take effect after such period as the
Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period.").
While the agency may take future advances into account, it may not promulgate rules on the
basis of "crystal ball" prognostications. NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the agency must explain why its projections are
"reasonable]" and defend "its methodology for arriving at numerical estimates." Id. Here, that
includes answering theoretical objec-tions to widespread electrification, identifying the major
steps necessary to achieve that objective, and offering plausible reasons for believing that each of
those steps can be completed in the time available. Id. at 331-32. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, p. 18]
EPA's proposed rule is not feasible for multiple independent reasons. Over- all, EPA's
conclusion that compliance with its proposed standards is possible assumes a drastic increase in
the adoption of light- and medium-duty electric vehicles that is implausible and unrealistic
within the proposed rule's con- strained timetable. In addition, EPA has failed to confront several
specific im- pediments to the expanded availability and adoption of light- and medium-duty
electric vehicles, including serious threats to the supply of minerals critical to manufacturing
batteries; the Nation's inadequate charging and refueling infra- structure and limitations of its
electricity grid; and safety concerns with electric vehicles that will deter uptake by users and may
prompt intervention by other regulators. EPA cannot rationally conclude that compliance with its
proposed emission standards is feasible without demonstrating how these obstacles will be
overcome. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 18]
The agency's conclusion that compliance with the proposed rule is feasible critically depends
on the electric-vehicle adoption rates it projects for model years 2027 through 2032. EPA
expects that by 2032, 67 percent of light-duty vehicles and 46 percent of medium-duty vehicles
will be battery-electric. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,329, 29,331. Those numbers are staggering. Current
adoption rates are much lower, and the assumptions that EPA makes to project such sizeable
increases are unwarranted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 19]
a. Current Adoption Of Electric Vehicles
Today, battery-electric vehicles make up a small minority of vehicles in both the light- and
medium-duty categories. Manufacturers offer a limited number of models, and relatively few
consumers buy them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 19]
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Although EPA claims that the production of electric vehicles is growing rapidly, see 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29,188-89, the U.S. Department of Energy reports that there are only 68 models of light-
and medium-duty battery-electric vehicles available for the current model year. See U.S. Dep't
of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Ctr., Alternative Fuel and Advanced Vehicle Search, https://ti-
nyurl.com/y853dwvt (last accessed June 26, 2023). Thirty-five of them are se- dans or wagons;
twenty-nine are SUVs; four are pickup trucks; and none are vans. Id. This limited number of
options may be a result of exceedingly low demand. According to the agency, in 2022, battery-
electric vehicles accounted for only 807,000 new car sales, or about 5.8 percent of the new light-
duty passenger-vehicle market. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,346. Currently, "in most of the United States,
the share of EVs is zero or near-zero." Kenneth T. Gillingham et al., Has Consumer Acceptance
of Electric Vehicles Been Increasing?, Forthcoming, Am. Econ. Ass'n, at 6 (Jan. 2023)
("Consumer Acceptance"). This is particularly true in rural areas. In Wyoming for example,
there were "only 456 electric cars and light trucks registered statewide as of March 2022."
Robert N. Charette, The EV Transition Explained: Converting Gasoline Superusers, IEEE
Spectrum (Dec. 11, 2022) ("EV Transition"), https://tinyurl.com/5dnry66s. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683, p. 19]
By and large, the light- and medium-duty sectors have not embraced a shift from internal-
combustion-engine vehicles to electric ones. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 19]
To reach EPA's projected rates of adoption, the manufacture and sale of electric vehicles
would have to experience rampant growth. EPA has identified no evidence to demonstrate that
this will occur, let alone on the constrained timetable of its proposed rule. Instead, the agency
relies on speculation and ignores important and relevant data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683,
p. 20]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
C. The Proposal's Deployment Timeline is Impracticable
EPA's emissions standards rely on the unsubstantiated assumption that the U.S. electricity
and transmission grid and ZEV charging infrastructure will be available to charge the massive
numbers of ZEVs that will enter the market. As outlined below, available data supports the
Alliance for Automotive Innovation's conclusion that the timeline for EPA's standard is
infeasible.36 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 13]
36 Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Comments to the Environmental Protection Agency, Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles,
Proposed Rule, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829 (hereinafter AAI Comments) at iv.
B. The Proposed Rule Contravenes the Clean Air Act's Direction that EPA's Regulations
be Technologically Feasible
Section 202(a)(2) requires EPA to provide lead time to "permit the development and
application of the requisite technology." 104 But, as discussed in Section IV.B, EPA's overly-
aggressive demands for electrification cannot be supported—there will not be sufficient
infrastructure to generate and transmit electricity and charge the vehicles EPA is requiring OEMs
to produce. EPA has simply failed to provide both the OEMs, as well as the ancillary services
required to sustain an electrified fleet, with enough time to develop the necessary
infrastructure. 105 EPA's failure to adequately ensure sufficient infrastructure demonstrates that
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it is not providing sufficient lead time to "permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." 106
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 25]
104 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2).
105 See AAI Comments at ii-iv.
106 Id. (emphasis added).
As EPA considers the technological feasibility of its Proposal, it should further consider the
OEMs' position that they will not possess adequate resources to adapt to these stringent
requirements within the prescribed timeframe, especially in light of increasing global supply
chain issues and price increases associated with battery demand. 110 EPA's proposal will require
an unprecedented rate of vehicle technology change that the nation and OEMs have never
experienced before. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 25-26]
110 AAI Comments at ii-iv.
B. The Proposed Rule is Impracticable
1. EPA's Proposed Rule Ignores the Reality of Current ZEV Production.
In describing the need for this regulatory action, EPA suggests that rapid electrification
resulting from the Proposed Rule either is already in progress or aligned with the automotive
industry. In support, EPA cites public statements of the automotive industry to justify the
proposed standards. 124 Representing 42 car companies, automotive suppliers, and automotive
technology companies that produce about 97 percent of the new vehicles sold in the United
States, the Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI) submitted the following comments on this
Proposal: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 28-29]
124 Proposed Rule at 29,329.
The proposed GHG and criteria pollutant standards "are neither reasonable nor achievable
in the timeframe covered in this proposal"; 125 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 28-29]
125 Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Comments to the Environmental Protection Agency, Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles,
Proposed Rule, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829 (hereinafter AAI Comments) at ii.
EPA's proposal cannot be met "without substantially increasing the cost of vehicles,
reducing consumer choice, and disadvantaging major portions of the United States population
and territory"; 126 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 28-29]
126 Id.
The Proposed Rule's standards exceed even the public aspirations of OEMs' vehicle and
market share targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 28-29]
2. EPA's Proposed Rule Commands Impractical Adoption Rates.
Automakers may be publicly acquiescing to government demands, but this does not
demonstrate that the technology and infrastructure will be available in the stated period and,
most critically, that consumers are ready and willing to adopt electric vehicles. Indeed, many of
the automakers have set "goals" for their electrification, premised explicitly on a litany of federal
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and state subsidies for purchase and infrastructure assistance. And these government demands,
and indeed government subsidies, can vanish in an instant, through changes in administrations or
judicial challenges. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 30-31]
Organization: American Highway Users Alliance
Key Concerns with the Proposed Rule
The Highway Users is deeply concerned that the proposed requirements for significant
reduction in GHG emissions from new light-duty and medium-duty vehicles are very, very
possibly not achievable by manufacturers in the limited time frame provided to achieve such
significant reductions in emissions. The Alliance for Automotive Innovation has already
submitted testimony in this docket that the proposed rule would require 2/3 of vehicles covered
by this docket to be battery electric vehicles by 2032. In today's market the share of new light-
duty and medium-duty vehicles that are electric vehicles (EVs) is one-tenth of that share
nationally, and far, far lower in many regions of the country. So, the rule essentially calls for an
industrial transformation, something more easily said than done, not to mention the proposed
rule's impacts on consumers and vehicle choice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, p. 2]
More specifically, EPA's proposal in this docket appears to be premised on huge and rapid
growth in the portion of light-duty and medium-duty vehicles that are electric powered (EVs) as
well as on rapid transformation of the marketplace in a number of related areas that are not the
subject of the proposed regulation. EPA seems to have made favorable assumptions on many
issues bearing on the feasibility of the proposal, including as to the issues set forth below. The
Highway Users, on the other hand, drawing on the expertise of its members, questions that,
within the MY 2027 - 2032 timeframe of the proposed rule, all or most of the following will-
ccur, that - [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
high-speed and other electric charging stations will be sufficiently available to service
light- duty and medium-duty EVs in quantities and locations sufficient to encourage customers to
buy EVs, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
electric utilities can timely provide connections from the electric grid to those
charging stations, or hydrogen fueling stations - and provide the refueling and charging
connections at reasonable cost, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
the electric grid will have the capacity to meet the demand for electricity that will be
required to support increased electrification of trucks, buses, and passenger cars, even if the
connections can be timely made to charging stations (both public and private) that do not yet
exist in sufficient numbers, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
charging times can be reduced sufficiently to encourage customers to buy these EVs,
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
major industries, including vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers, can implement
major changes in vehicles as rapidly as the NPRM assumes (given the limited current market
penetration of these EVs), [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
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there will be an adequate supply of rare earth and other critical minerals, and the
ability to process them, with those minerals being so essential to the manufacture of EVs and
batteries, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
with a large portion of such minerals being sourced and/or processed overseas,
including in China and Africa, whether the national interest in sourcing and processing such
minerals in the United States can be met, and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
potential customers of these EVs will proceed to purchase them in sufficient quantity,
notwithstanding significantly higher up-front costs, uncertain availability of charging facilities,
and other concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
This last consideration is highly important because if the potential customers of these EVs do
not become actual customers to a sufficient extent, the manufacturers are unlikely to produce the
vehicles in the quantities EPA has estimated will be required to be compliant with the
regulations, in turn greatly reducing the benefits of the proposal as EPA estimated. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
Significantly, at the same time that EPA has issued this NPRM, it has also issued a major
proposal calling for reduced tailpipe emissions of C02, other GHGs, and other substances from
heavy-duty vehicles. See 88 Fed. Reg. 25926 (April 27, 2023). That proposed rule, similar to the
one in this docket, assumes astronomical growth in EVs as a percentage of new heavy-duty
vehicles. That rule faces similar questions regarding feasibility due to, among other uncertainties,
the availability of charging infrastructure that is sufficiently fast, the cost of such heavy duty
EVs, the ability of the electric grid to provide electricity to support the growth in those EVs, the
ability of the electric utilities to provide connections from the grid to charging facilities, and the
availability of critical minerals, processing facilities and battery components, and electrical steel,
widely used in transformers, electric vehicle chargers and other products important to the
widespread adoption of electric vehicles.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 3-4]
2 A May 22, 2023 letter from nine major organizations to President Biden expressed concern over the
"skyrocketing demand and limited availability of domestically produced electrical steel. Signatories
included the Alliance for Automotive Innovation, the Edison Electric Institute and the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
With these two large-scale rules being advanced at the same time, the feasibility of the
proposals is even more challenging. It is not as if manufacturing charging stations for heavy-
duty, light-duty, and medium-duty vehicles is unrelated. At least some supplies and components
are relevant to all; the critical minerals and related processing are needed for all. But suppliers
and electric utilities can only gear up so quickly. This confluence of proposed regulations
(further combined with separate and significant regulatory actions by the California Air
Resources Board) compounds the challenges for relevant industries to comply. It makes it harder
to make favorable assumptions on how quickly changes can be made to facilitate marketplace
acceptance of EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 3-4]
For reasons including those outlined above, the proposed rule should be revised to provide
more time for vehicles to achieve the proposed emission reductions A revised proposal should
not only provide more time to achieve a given level of emission reductions but, while still calling
for reductions, should call for achievable reductions. The need for revision of the proposal is so
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significant that EPA should not proceed directly to a final rule after considering comments in this
docket. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, p. 4]
Instead, EPA should issue a revised NPRM so the public can have the opportunity to
comment on a more realistic approach to the effort to reduce GHG and criteria emissions from
light-duty and medium-duty vehicles. Such a solution would reduce emissions but more
gradually, over a longer period of time than the model years that are the subject of the proposed
rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, p. 4]
Feasibility of the proposal is highly questionable and benefits are likely overestimated [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 4-5]
We are skeptical that the GHG and criteria reductions estimated by EPA can be realized in the
proposed rule's timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 4-5]
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Achieving these goals will not be easy, requiring (among other activities) new technology and
vehicle development, factory renovations, battery and auto assembly factories, realignment of the
supply network, the existence of a vast, well-functioning public charging infrastructure, and the
formation of joint ventures and alliances. It was with such considerations in mind that, in our
comments to the agency regarding proposed MY2023-2026 vehicle greenhouse gas (GHG)
standards, Honda specifically cautioned EPA that "it is important that the agencies not approach
such [electrification target] announcements as foregone conclusions."4 Unfortunately, in this
rulemaking the agency did just that - set aggressive targets while pointing to industry statements
as a basis for the feasibility of its proposed standards. It is worth noting that the agency's
proposed level of electrification just six years from now - barely one product design cycle away
- is a full 50% higher than Honda's publicly stated target.5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-06, pp.
4-5]
12 4 American Honda Motor Co., Inc. comments on Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions. September 27, 2021. Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OA2021-0208.
12 5 60% in 2030, versus Honda's publicly stated goal of 40% in 2030
Pointing to complementary policies, including those in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the
agency has characterized its standards as "readily achievable,"6 a position that suggests the
agency believes all major stakeholders (including consumers, the critical minerals supply chain,
utilities, state and local governments, charging infrastructure providers, parts suppliers, battery
manufacturers and automakers, among others) are "ready" to effectuate an electrified
transportation system in line with the agency's proposed stringency and timeline. Honda
respectfully disagrees. Based on our experience in creating and marketing battery electric
vehicles over the past 25 years, we believe the agency has significantly underestimated the
numerous intertwined external challenges that lie ahead - and, moreover, the fact that a missed
target in any one of these areas has significant potential to derail not only our shared
decarbonization goals, but also the compliance status of regulated parties. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0652, p. 5]
6 https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris-administration-proposes-strongest-ever-pollution-
standards- cars-and
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In the auto industry, internal forecasts of future environmental regulations are a necessity, as
multi-year planning timelines for products often dictate that development decisions be made well
in advance of full clarity on the status of a given future regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0652, p. 10]
E. Agency Faith in a Swift and Seamless EV Market Transition
As noted earlier in these comments, one of the more troubling aspects of the NPRM is the
agency's assumed fast and smooth market transition to widespread electric vehicle adoption.
This assumption permeates numerous regulatory requirements and key parameters in the
proposal, including fleet average GHG stringency, fleet average NMOG+NOx stringency, and
overall cost of the regulation to consumers. While major automakers, including Honda, have
announced significant targets for levels of vehicle electrification in the coming years, those
intentions have also been sincerely caveated - not as excuses or planned off-ramps, but rather to
acknowledge the many uncertainties that remain about consumer adoption, a substantial number
of which hinge on the development of a full and robust vehicle electrification ecosystem which
includes numerous factors outside of Honda's control. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 22]
iv. Feasibility and Modeling.
A review of EPA's modeling cost and assumptions for battery costs, critical minerals, battery
raw materials, and impacts of federal incentives calls into question EPA's approach and
conclusions regarding feasibility of the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 22-23]
The cost reduction model used in the analysis seems to be based on a model used for
part cost reductions driven by improved economies of scale on fixed capital equipment. Given
that raw materials make up a significant portion of battery costs, EPA should also use a raw
material supply cost model that considers the increasing costs for raw materials with increased
supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 22-23]
Cost and price are concepts that the agency uses interchangeably in the regulation.
The true cost of the regulation is not fully calculated since the portion of the consumer- facing
price is paid for by the government. The agency should fully account for the technical feasibility
of any C02-reducing technology on a cost basis as defined in the CAA regardless of
governmental taxation breaks for electric vehicle technology production and sale. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 22-23]
The cost impact of "fueling" the significant number of electric vehicles assumed in
the regulation (67% implied EV share by 2032) is not fully calculated or considered as part of
the technical feasibility analysis and cost for the technology. The costs of adding additional solar,
wind, and hydropower plants should be considered in the regulation as they are a necessary part
of bringing electric vehicles to market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 22-23]
These topics are further addressed in Appendix B. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 22-
23]
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Organization: BlueGreen Alliance (BGA)
Automakers have announced $120 billion in new investments in clean vehicle manufacturing
in the last eight years, with over 40% of those investments occurring in the six months following
the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act in August 2022.8 Domestic automakers' 2023 Q3
profits were the highest they have been since 2016.9 Moreover, due to the passage of
transformative programs in the Inflation Reduction Act and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law,
automakers and their suppliers have more federal resources than ever before to support the
transition to cleaner vehicles in ways that do not shortchange their workers, their communities,
or the environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, p. 7]
8 Environmental Defense Fund, "Report finds U.S. investments in electric vehicle manufacturing reach
$120 billion, create 143,000 new jobs," March 2023. Available Online: https://www.edf.org/media/report-
finds-investments-us-electric-vehicle-manufacturing-reach-120-billion- create-143000.
9 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Corporate profits with inventory valuation adjustments: Domestic
industries: Nonfinancial: Manufacturing: Durable goods: Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts,
March 2023. Available Online: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/N411RClQ027SBEA.
Organization: BMW of North America, LLC (BMW NA)
Ultimately, BMW NA believes that the 'roposed Rule's target of 67% EV share by MY32 is
overly ambitious and cannot reasonably be achieved given the short amount of remaining time
that is left to resolve the outstanding challenges. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 2]
BMW NA does have concerns and questions regardi'g the Agency's basis for proposing the
massive jump in stringency, particularly for the light truck fleet, from MY26 to MY27. An
increase in the BEV market share from 17% to 36% within one year, as predicted by EPA, is
impractical to achieve. BMW NA has no indication that the light truck segment will change
dramatically in 2027. Therefore, an incremental increase of BEV share is more
appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 3]
Organization: BorgWarner Inc.
BorgWarner supports the goals of EPA's proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 3-4]
BorgWarner supports EPA's approach to decarbonize the light-and medium-duty vehicle
sectors. However, the proposed pace for battery electric vehicle (BEV) adoption requires
continued significant support and incentives from state and federal regulators. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0640, pp.3-4]
The demand for BEVs across all vehicles sectors is rising. Critical mineral supply will need to
increase significantly to support the growth of the BEV market. Battery production, along with
the necessary charging infrastructure, will ultimately depend on suppliers and manufacturers
having access to increasingly domestically sourced and processed critical materials and minerals
in sufficient quantities. Automotive suppliers operate in an integrated, complex worldwide
supply chain and access to international markets is critical to our ability to meet production
demands. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 3-4]
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), and
CHIPS & Science Act were each important initial steps to enable industry, consumers, and
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communities to make the EV transition across the U.S. These significant investments are critical
in supporting the continued growth of U.S. manufacturing and ensuring the initial transition
results in affordable EVs for consumers and profitability for manufacturers. EPA should
recognize that a majority of the programs needed to help achieve the EV transformation are still
awaiting regulations and guidelines. In addition, the supplier industry, along with automakers
and communities, will need time to implement the necessary investments in supply chains,
infrastructure, and workforce to make the shift to electrification successful. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0640, pp.3-4]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
The technologies to meet and exceed the proposed standards are available today. U.S. EPA's
analysis finds that zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) technologies are cost-effective compliance
options that manufacturers will increasingly deploy. With the rapid development of ZEV
technology—supported by commitments from automobile manufacturers, unprecedented public
investments in vehicles and infrastructure, and growing consumer demand—the U.S. market is
poised to adopt these clean vehicle technologies at scale. The two most common examples of
ZEVs are battery electric vehicles (BEV) and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV), which rely on
different control technologies to eliminate vehicle emissions. BEVs use batteries with an on-
board charger to store energy from the electrical grid to power electric motors. Fuel cell electric
vehicles are full electric drive vehicles where the propulsion energy is supplied by hydrogen
stored on board and a fuel cell stack that transforms the chemical energy stored in hydrogen into
electricity for the drive motor. Although not fully zero-emission because of the use of internal
combustion engines, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) also use battery packs to power
electric motors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 7-8]
The Proposal Will Deliver Urgently Needed Emission Reductions and is Technologically
Feasible
The proposed standards at a minimum are technologically feasible with significant net
benefits. The proposal is consistent with U.S. EPA's clear authority to regulate motor vehicle
emissions, and manufacturers have control technologies available and in use today to meet and
exceed the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 11-12]
The ACC II regulations and U.S. EPA's proposed standards both address multiple pollutants,
including GHGs, particulate matter (PM), and non-methane organic gas (NMOG) and nitrogen
oxides (NOx), from light- and medium-duty vehicles. Control technologies are available today to
meet and exceed the proposed standards. Although ZEV technologies are not the only approach
manufacturers can use to comply with the proposed standards, U.S. EPA's analysis concludes
that they are one of the most cost-effective and thus will play a large role. ZEVs are especially
beneficial and effective because they eliminate vehicle tailpipe emissions across all pollutants,
and many manufacturers are actively supporting ZEV market expansion and have publicly
committed to significantly increase ZEV production. This is being driven in large part by
technology improvements such as declining battery costs, dedicated electric vehicle platform
design enabling lower manufacturing costs and reduced vehicle energy consumption,
improvements in battery pack capacity and energy efficiency, and fuel cell system
improvements. 6 In response, the market has grown significantly with the availability of
numerous BEV and FCEV models that meet consumer preferences and operational needs. A
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variety of state and federal programs, including California and Section 177 state regulatory
actions and incentive programs, the federal Inflation Reduction Act, and the federal
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act are supporting ZEV penetration, building the necessary
infrastructure, and providing a backbone for the successful implementation of U.S. EPA's
proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 11-12]
6 For additional discussion on zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) technology improvements, see: CARB.
Advanced Clean Cars II, Staff Report: Initial Statement of Reasons (ISOR). April 2022.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/isor.pdf.
CARB has reviewed the proposed standards and finds that they are technically feasible within
the proposal's timeframe. CARB also finds that more stringent standards are technically feasible
and offers recommendations to that end. CARB also reviewed the draft regulatory impact
analysis (DRIA) and finds that U.S. EPA has taken an appropriate but generally conservative
approach to estimating costs, suggesting that the net benefits are likely understated. This section
summarizes CARB's review and offers specific recommendations to strengthen the proposal to:
achieve additional emission reductions and public health benefits; advance equity and
environmental justice; ensure ZEVs meet the needs of drivers, including those who purchase
vehicles in the used car market; and provide as consistent a set of standards for ZEVs nationwide
as possible, reducing complexity for manufacturers and consumers alike. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp. 11-12]
Feasibility of proposed standards
California's effective vehicle GHG fleet average emission rate for new vehicles is similar to
U.S. EPA's proposal due to similar expected shares of ZEVs entering the market in the 2026
through 2032 MYs and beyond. California's ACC II regulations require that an increasing share
of new vehicle sales be zero-emission, ramping up from 35 percent for the 2026 MY to 100
percent for the 2035 MY. As part of the ACC II rulemaking, CARB estimated that 75 percent of
new car sales in California in 2032 will be BEVs to comply with the ACC II regulations (with a
small percentage of additional fuel cell and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles). In comparison, U.S.
EPA projects a 67 percent BEV market share nationwide to comply with the proposed federal
GHG standards in the same year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 12-13]
In establishing its ZEV sales requirement, CARB assessed the technical feasibility and cost of
ZEV technologies to determine a feasible pace of ZEV introduction in California. 7 This
assessment found several market trends that will drive widespread ZEV penetration in the
coming years, including a rapidly expanding number of ZEV models, increasing all-electric
range, technological battery and fuel cell advancements, energy efficiency improvements, and
declining battery costs. These market trends are also occurring at the national and international
levels, and they underpin the technical feasibility of U.S. EPA's proposed standards. Further, as
U.S. EPA notes in its proposal, every manufacturer has a public commitment to significant if not
full electrification in the next 20 years. 8 Based on public announcements, it is expected that over
100 ZEV and PHEV models will be available to consumers before the 2026 MY. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 12-13]
7 CARB. ACC II ISOR. Appendix G: ACC II ZEV Technology Assessment. April 2022.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/appg.pdf.
8 87 Fed. Re-, at 29,191 - 192.
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In addition to these existing market trends, the implementation of ACC II in California and an
expanding number of other states will further spur technological development, supporting
widespread ZEV deployment and providing additional support that the proposal is not only
achievable, but that manufacturers could exceed the standards as proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, pp.12-13]
U.S. EPA's modeling shows that the lowest cost compliance option to meet the proposed
standards would result in 46 percent of medium-duty vehicles being battery-electric by the 2032
MY, relying primarily on zero-emission van technologies. Under California's ACT regulation,
40 percent of a manufacturer's medium-duty vehicle sales will be required to be zero-emission in
the 2032 MY, increasing up to 45 percent the following MY. In its 2023 ACF rulemaking,
CARB identified at least ten zero-emission Class 2b-3 van and pick-up truck models that are
commercially available, up from only two manufacturers offering zero- emission Class 2b and 3
vehicles when CARB developed ACT. 10, 11 As in the light-duty sector, manufacturers are
investing and will continue to invest in new technologies to comply with California's
regulations, providing support that U.S. EPA's proposed standards are technically feasible. In the
van category, four of the largest medium-duty van manufacturers—Ford, GM, Stellantis, and
Daimler—have announced product availability by 2024 in the U.S.. 12, 13, 14, 15 For pickups,
numerous zero-emission models are coming to market as some pickups designed for the
passenger vehicle market are now being certified as medium-duty pickups, including the Ford
F150 Lightning, the Rivian R1T, and the Tesla Cybertruck. 16 , 17 , 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp. 16-17]
10 CARB. Advanced Clean Fleets (ACF) ISOR. August 2022.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/acf22/isor2.pdf.
11 CARB. ACF Initial Statement of Reasons. Appendix J: Commercial ZEV List. August 2022.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/acf22/appj.xlsm.
12 Ford. 2023 eTransit Van. https://www.ford.com/commercial-trucks/e-transit/. Accessed June 15, 2023.
13 Mercedes-Benz. The all-new eSprinter. https://www.mbvans.com/en/esprinter. Accessed June 15, 2023.
14 BrightDrop. BrightDrop Zevo. https://www.gobrightdrop.com/. Accessed June 15, 2023.
15 Car and Driver. "Ram Confirms Electric ProMaster Van Is Coming to the U.S. in 2023." February 24,
2023. https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a43063537/2023-ram-promaster-ev-confirmed/. Accessed June
15,2023.
16 CARB. Ford Executive Order A-0120-2424-1.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/classic/msprog/nvepb/executive_orders/EO%20Web%20Files/PC
- LDT-MDV/2023/0002/pc-ldt-mdv_ldt-mdpv_a—2424-1 sdt-20221205 .pdf
17 CARB. Rivian Executive Order A?480?0005.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/classic/msprog/nvepb/executive_orders/EO%20Web%20Files/PC
- LDT-MD V/2023/0006/pc-ldt-mdv_mdp-a-480-4 sdt~20221216.pdf
18 Tesla. Re: Support for a Strengthened Advanced Clean Truck Rule. December 9, 2019.
https://www.arb.ca.gov/lists/com-attach/120-act2019-VyMFZlAiWWYEYwdY.pdf
As with ACC II, many other states have adopted or announced plans to adopt CARB's
regulations on medium- and heavy-duty vehicles, including the ACT rule. This broader adoption
of ZEV technologies in the medium-duty sector will continue to drive technological
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advancement and support compliance with the proposed standards, further illustrating the
technical feasibility of the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 16-17]
The U.S. has no choice but to take bold action to dramatically reduce GHG emissions across
the economy. Motor vehicles are a key GHG emissions source, and U.S. EPA's proposal
represents an absolutely critical step towards reducing transportation emissions and stabilizing
the climate. However, there are opportunities to do more, particularly protecting or insuring
against conventional vehicles increasing their GHG emissions. Motor vehicles also continue to
contribute to poor air quality for millions of people across the country. The public health benefits
from the suite of proposed standards will reduce healthcare costs and improve quality of life.
These benefits are especially important for our country's most vulnerable residents, many of
whom face disproportionate exposure to air pollution and are the first to suffer the effects of
climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 67]
CARB finds that a more stringent set of standards, and thus certainly the proposed standards
as well, are technically feasible and cost-effective and recommends that U.S. EPA incorporate
CARB's recommendations and adopt the most stringent standards feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, p. 67]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
Recent congressional actions demonstrate the federal commitment to substantial
electrification of the transportation sector. In 2021, Congress passed the Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law, which allocates $7.5 billion to building out a national network of electric vehicle chargers,
$7 billion to ensure domestic manufacturers have the critical minerals and other components
necessary to make electric vehicle batteries, and $10 billion for clean transit and school
buses. 110 In 2022, Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, which invests $52.7 billion in
America's manufacturing capacity for the semiconductors used in electric vehicles and
chargers. 111 Later in 2022, Congress passed the Inflation Reduction Act, which provides $7,500
to buyers of new electric vehicles and $4,000 to purchasers of pre-owned electric vehicles. 112
Additionally, the Inflation Reduction Act provides billions of dollars to support vehicle
manufacturers' expansion of their domestic production of clean vehicles, 113 and billions to
support battery production in the United States and mining and processing of critical minerals
needed for battery cells and electric motors. 114 The Inflation Reduction Act also allocates
billions to upgrade the nation's power grid in order to help address the new surge in grid demand
from electric vehicles. 115 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 18-19]
110 White House, Building a Better America: A Guidebook to the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law for State,
Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments, and Other Parties (May 2022), at 136, available at
https://www.whitehouse.gOv/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/BUILDING-A-BETTER-AMERICA-V2.pdf.;
White House, Building a Clean Energy Economy: A Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act's
Investments in Clean Energy and Climate Action (Jan. 2023) at 46, available at,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Inflation-Reduction-Act-Guidebook.pdf.
111 White House, Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act, supra n. 110, at 46.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 47.
114 Id. at 10, 26, 47.
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115 Id. at 34.
In the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, Congress directed $5 billion toward States to expand
charging infrastructure under the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure ("NEVI") Formula
Program. 134 To date, all 50 States have submitted and received approval for their NEVI
plans. 135 These plans detail the considerable resources and local expertise that state
transportation, energy, and environmental agencies bring in support of Congress's vision of a
"national network of electric vehicle charging infrastructure."136 Those resources include the
mobilization of significant public and private nonfederal monies, 137 the strategic siting of EVSE
infrastructure in high-demand areas and major transportation corridors, 138 designing resilience
strategies to pair chargers with distributed generation and storage resources, 139 and providing
model ordinances for municipal governments to support EVSE expansion. 140 These plans also
illustrate the importance of greater EV adoption to States' climate targets. 141 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, pp. 22-24]
134 Pub. L. No. 117-58, § 801 (Nov. 15, 2021), 135 Stat. 1421.
135 Federal Highway Administration, Fiscal Year 2022/2023 EV Infrastructure Deployment Plans,
available at
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/index.cfm?format=list#map.
136 Pub. L. No. 117-58, §801, 135 Stat. 1422.
137 See, e.g., Colorado NEVI State Plan, at 31, available at
https://www.codot.gov/programs/innovativemobility/assets/co_neviplan_2022_final-l.pdf (describing state
funds available for cost sharing); New Jersey NEVI State Plan, at 23 (describing establishment of a New
Jersey Green Fund with monies from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative to provide low-cost financing
for EVSE projects).
138 See, e.g., California NEVI State Plan, at 34-40, available at
https://www.codot.gov/programs/innovativemobility/assets/co_neviplan_2022_final-l.pdf (describing
phases of EVSE build-out along transport corridors).
139 See, e.g., Oklahoma NEVI State Plan, at 54, available at
https://www.codot.gov/programs/innovativemobility/assets/co_neviplan_2022_final-l.pdf (proposing, e.g.,
preferences for EVSE paired with distributed energy resources like solar or battery storage).
140 See, e.g., Pennsylvania NEVI State Plan, at 7, available at
https://www.penndot.pa.gov/ProjectAndPrograms/Planning/EVs/Documents/Final%20PA%20NEVI%20
State%20Plan%20(ver%207-21-2022).pdf; Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, EV Model
Ordinance Toolkit, available at https://www.penndot.pa.gov/ProjectAndPrograms/Planning/EVs/Pages/EV-
Model-Ordinance-Toolkit.aspx
141 See, e.g., North Carolina NEVI State Plan, at 5, 16, 28, available at
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/nc_nevi_plan.pdf (discussing state
climate and transportation policy and NEVI program); New York NEVI State Plan, at 19-26, available at
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/ny_nevi_plan.pdf (same).
B. The Proposed Standards Allow Adequate Lead Time to Apply the Requisite
Technologies, and the Costs of Compliance Are Reasonable
Section 202(a) requires EPA to afford manufacturers the lead time necessary for the
"development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the
cost of compliance within such period." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2). Given that the requisite
technologies needed to satisfy the proposed standards (as well as the more stringent alternative)
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have already been developed and are widely used today, EPA need only provide the lead time
necessary for manufacturers to continue deploying these technologies across their vehicle fleets.
Indeed, the ALPHA and OMEGA models that EPA used to model manufacturer compliance with
the proposed standards utilized a menu of only existing technologies. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,294. In
addition to Section 202(a)'s general lead time requirement, for criteria pollutant standards
applicable to medium-duty vehicles with gross vehicle weight over 6,000 pounds, the Clean Air
Act further requires EPA to provide a minimum of four years' lead time and three years'
stability, because it defines these vehicles as "heavy-duty" for purposes of Section 202(a)(3)(C).
42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(3)(C). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 32-33]
Our States and Cities believe that EPA's proposed standards, as well as standards more
stringent than EPA's proposed standards, satisfy these statutory requirements. EPA estimates the
proposed standards per-vehicle cost to industry as ranging from $401 (for model-year 2029) to
$1,164 (for model-year 2032) relative to the no-action scenario. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,328 (Tables
77 & 78). These are in line with or lower than the per-vehicle costs of previous GHG standards
EPA has adopted. 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,463 (May 7, 2010) (Table III.D.6-4) ($948 for model
year 2016); 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,865 (Oct. 15, 2012) (Table 111-34) ($1,836 for model year
2025); 86 Fed. Reg. 74,434, 74,483 (Table 30) (Dec. 30, 2021) ($1,000 for model year 2026). 184
Likewise, these projected costs are in line with historical exercises of EPA's Section 202(a)
authority. 185 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 32-33]
184 The per-vehicle costs for Alternative l's standards are similarly comparable to the per-vehicle costs of
the 2012 rulemaking. Draft RIA, at 13-29 ($1,775 for model year 2032).
185 See, e.g., J.R. Mondt, Cleaner Cars: The History & Technology of Emission Control Since the 1960s
(2000), at 214 ("[W]hen three-way catalytic converters were implemented in 1980-83, the additional cost
increment [per vehicle, in 1996 dollars] amounted to approximately $1200").
Organization: CALSTART
2. Expected EV Deployment Timelines
One commonly discussed concern is the timeline related to EV deployments and whether
there will be a sufficient number of EV options to justify more ambitious standards. The U.S. EV
market is significantly more robust than it was only a few years ago. IHS Markit predicts that by
2026, there will be 130 available models offered by 43 brands.2 Having over 43 brands offering
over 130 models by 2026 supports the argument that we do not need a delayed ramp up of
standards (Alternative 3), and rather the market will be prepared by 2027 to meet Alternative l's
accelerated timeline. Additionally, numerous OEMs have committed to an all-electric lineup in
the coming decade. This includes General Motors, Ford, Nissan, Volkswagen, and others.3
Helping guide all OEMs towards 100% zero-emission vehicle sales by 2035 with Alternative 1
and extending the timeline through 2035 would lead more OEMs to plan for this benchmark,
increasing competition and decreasing costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 4]
2 htps://www2.deloite.com/us/en/insights/focus/future-of-mobility/electric-vehicle-trends-
2030.html#:~:text=In%20the%20United%20States%2C%20IHS,2026%2C%20o?ered%20by%2043%20br
ands.&text=Achieving%20price%20parity%20with%2C%20or,adapt%20to%20manufacturer%20emission
%20targets.
3 htps://qmerit.com/blog/ev-inevitability-what-the-2035-auto-manufacturer-commitment- means-for-
utilities/
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Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
11. The Proposed Rule in Infeasible Because it Dramatically Underestimates the Cost of
Electric Vehicles.
Section 202(a) requires that standards under that provision cannot take effect until "after such
period as [EPA] finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." 42
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2). This consideration is commonly known as the "feasibility" requirement.
See 88 Fed. Reg. 29,232. If the "cost of compliance" would discourage the adoption of the
"requisite technology," then the rule is not feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 15]
The proposal suggests that compliance with its proposed standards is fie only because it
anticipates that the share of electric vehicles will increase dramatically, "by almost 30 percentage
points over [a] 6-year period, from 36 percent in MY 2027 up to 67 percent of overall vehicle
production in MY 2032." 88 Fed. Reg. 29,329. As a result, the cost of electric vehicles is the
linchpin of this plan. If electric vehicles cost too much, consumers will buy fewer, and proposed
standards will become infeasible. While the exact costs are difficult to disentangle, the
proposal's estimated vehicle technology costs suggest that electrifying the fleet comes with a
price tag of about $3,900 per added electric vehicle sold.9 But these estimates are flawed in at
least three ways: they underestimate current electric vehicle costs, they underestimate future
electric battery costs, and overestimate the availability of Clean Vehicle Tax credits. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 15]
9 This is based on $59.6 billion in vehicle technology costs between 2027 and 2032, divided by the
approximately 15 million additional electric vehicles EPA expects its proposal to require over the same
time span. This neglects that some of the vehicle technology costs are incurred by the adoption of new
technology for internal combustion engine vehicles. It is also only the cost incurred for the additional
electric vehicles EPA projects to be sold only as a result of its regulation. In the agency's projected "no-
action" scenario, the share of electric vehicles rises from 27 percent in 2027 to 39 percent in 2032. See
Table 129, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,340. These "baseline" electric vehicle penetrations are calculated using the
same vehicle technology costs discussed below, and thus represent inflated numbers. If electric vehicle
costs are recalculated appropriately, the baseline share of electric vehicles would decrease, the number of
additional electric vehicles over this baseline to comply with EPA's proposed standards would increase,
and the cost of compliance with EPA's proposal would riseortionately.
12. B. The non-binding company commitments and projections EPA cites do not prove
feasibility.
The non-binding company commitments and projections EPA cites do not prove feasibility
See 88 Fed. Reg. 29,190-93 ("While manufacturer announcements such as these are not binding,
and often are conditioned as forward-looking and subject to uncertainty, they indicate that
manufacturers are confident in the suitability of PEV technology as an effective and attractive
option that can serve the functional needs of a large portion of light-duty vehicle buyers."). The
auto manufacturers' statements are not binding, and these companies could change their mind at
any time. Many of these statements were made in response to the in direct response to the Biden
Administrations urging. 16 Further, many of these statements were made with the expectation
that EPA would continue to provide various compliance flexibilities—like multipliers—that
reduce the real-world stringency of the standards. As noted, the proposed rule would cut these
avoidance strategies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 27]
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16 Compare FACT SHEET: President Biden Announces Steps to Drive American Leadership Forward on
Clean Cars and Trucks, White House Briefing Room (Aug. 5, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president- biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-
leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/ ("[T]he Presi dent will sign an Executive Order that sets an
ambitious new target to make half of all new vehicles sold in 2030 zero-emissions vehicles, including
battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.... That is why today, American
automakers Ford, GM, and Stellantis and the United Auto Workers (UAW), will stand with President
Biden at the White House with aligned ambition.") with Fred Lambert, Ford, GM, and Stellantis announce
joint 40-50% EV sale goal in 2030, Electrek (Aug. 5, 2021), https://electrek.co/2021/08/05/ford-gm-
stellantis-joint-40-50-ev-sale-goal-2030/. ("To- day, Ford, GM and Stellantis announce their shared
aspiration to achieve sales of 40-50% of annual U.S. volumes of electric vehicles (battery electric, fuel cell
and plug-in hybrid vehicles) by 2030 in order to move the nation closer to a zero-emissions future.").
Organization: Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA)
As consumers become more accepting of electric vehicles (EV), taxpayer-funded incentives
expand, and automobile manufacturers produce a greater variety of models, EV purchases are
expected to keep growing. Policymakers, however, should be increasingly mindful not to put the
cart before the horse when it comes to attempting to drive consumers to purchase'products they
aren't ready 'o accept, they can't afford to purchase, and that face significant supply-chain
bottlenecks that are already limiting supply and increasing costs. This is an area which we
explored in-depth in our report Freedom to Fuel: Consumer Choice in the Automotive
Marketplace. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp. 1-2]
1 https://consumerenergvalliance.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CEA EV REPORT 2023.pdf
Should this rule be adopted i- its current form - lacking both technological feasibility and
eco-omic practicality - the result will be limiting consumer options and thwarting environmental
progress through depressing innovation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Consumer Reports (CR)
2. The Proposed EPA GHG Standards for MYs 2027+ are Achievable
Transportation accounts for 28% of GHG emissions in the United States7—more than any
other sector. EPA's GHG Standards for Light- and Medium-Duty vehicles offer a cost-effective
way to reduce these emissions and criteria pollutants, while maintaining a technology-neutral
approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 7-8]
7 Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2021,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions.
2.1. Automakers Have Multiple Options for Compliance
EPA's proposal for MY27+ Light- and Medium-Duty vehicle GHG standards are strong,
achievable, technology-neutral performance standards. EPA's analysis found that electric
vehicles (EVs) are likely to be the most cost-effective compliance pathway for automakers to
meet these standards, but they are not the only option. EPA estimated that an EV-only
compliance pathway would require 67% of vehicles sold to be EVs by 2032. However,
automakers can also use a mix of improvements in internal combustion engine (ICE) fuel
efficiency, conventional hybrids, plug-in hybrids (PHEV), and even hydrogen fuel cell electric
vehicles (FCEV) to comply with these standards. CR's modeling presented in Section 6.2 shows
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that automakers can utilize a wide range of options to comply with these rules. Most automakers
will be able to comply with these rules while only selling between 50-60% battery electric
vehicles (BEVs) by using a mix of widely available and cost effective technologies. Automakers
that invest heavily in conventional and plug-in hybrids will be able to comply while selling as
few as 40% BEVs in 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 7-8]
CR estimates that an EV-only compliance pathway would result in the production of enough
EVs for approximately 25% of Americans to own one by the end of 2032. In a 2022 nationally
representative survey of 8,027 US adults, CR found that 36% of Americans were already
"definitely" or "seriously considering" an electric vehicle if they were to buy or lease a vehicle
today, indicating that consumer demand may already exceed what is needed to comply with
these standards.8 This demand will also increase as consumers see the benefits from recently
enacted investments in public charging infrastructure. A deeper dive on consumer demand
dynamics can be found in Section 4 of this comment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 7-8]
8 More Americans Would "Definitely" Get Electric Vehicles, Consumer Reports, July 7, 2022,
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/press_release/more-americans-would-definitely-get-electric-vehicle
s/.
2.2. The Proposal is in Line With Automakers Commitments
EPA's analysis of existing automaker EV commitments shows that the industry was already
on track to deliver around 50% EVs by 2030. The proposed standards simply reflect a slight
boost to the trajectory the industry was on according to public commitments by automakers.9
Since these are technology-neutral standards automakers can adjust to this either by slightly
increasing their electrification plans or by deploying existing, cost-effective efficiency
technology to their remaining ICE vehicle fleets. As of January 2023, automakers and battery
makers planned to invest $860 billion in the transition to EVs by 2030, including $210 billion in
the U.S, according to an analysis by Atlas Public Policy. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728,
pp. 7-8]
9 Automakers Are Adding Electric Vehicles to 'heir L'neups. Here's What's Coming., Consumer Reports,
March 10, 2023, https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/hybrids-evs/why-electric-cars-may-soon-flood-the-
us-market-a9006 292675/.
10 $210 Billion of Announced Investments in Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Headed for the U.S., Atlas
EVHub, January 12, 2023, https://www.atlasevhub.com/data_story/210-billion-of-announced-investments-
in-electric-vehicle-manufact uring-headed-for-the-u-s/.
6.2. Modeling of Compliance Pathways
EPA's compliance modeling estimates the single most cost-effective compliance pathway for
the vehicle fleet under the proposed regulation. However, it is not the only possible compliance
pathway automakers can take. Different automakers are likely to take wildly different
compliance pathways, with some automakers going all in on EVs, while other automakers may
hedge their bets with more hybrids and PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 20-21]
CR modeled a range of reasonable alternative compliance pathways that automakers might
consider. The modeling considers different levels of continued ICE improvement and
deployment of PHEVs as a percentage of all plug-in vehicles.43 The results of this analysis for
model year 2032 are shown in Table 6.1. They show that a wide range of compliance pathways
are available to automakers that can reduce the required BEV sales market share for model year
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2032 to between 50-60% with varying levels of ICE improvement and PHEV deployment. There
is even a feasible compliance option which would allow compliance with only 40% BEVs with
heavy investment in hybrid and PHEV technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 20-21]
43 ICE improvements of 1% (low), 3.5% (medium) and 5% (high) are modeled. PHEV market share was
modeled as a percentage of all plug-in vehicles with values of 0%, 10%, 20% and 40% modeled.
[See original com-ent for Table 6.1 - Modeling of Compliance Alternatives for EPA's
Proposed Standards for MY2032] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 20-21]
A few scenarios were also modeled for EPA's Alternative 1. These results are shown in Table
6.2. They find that with only a small improvement in ICE vehicles (1% per year reduction in
emissions), automakers can comply with these stronger standards with a minimal increase in
BEV market share from 67% to 68% compared to EPA's modeling of the proposed standards.
Further reductions in BEV market share are also possible with further investment in ICE
improvement and PHEV deployment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 20-21]
[See original com-ent for Table 6.2 - Modeling of Compliance Alternatives for EPA's
Alternative 1 for MY 2032] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 20-21]
Overall these results show that automakers have many potential reasonable compliance
pathways to comply with either EPA's proposed standards or the stronger Alternative 1. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 20-21]
Organization: Cummins Inc.
II. General Principles
Aligned with Cummins' commitments described above, Cummins offer these principles for
consideration as EPA develops its Final Rule addressing criteria pollutant and GHG emissions
for light-duty (LD) and medium-duty vehicles (MDV): [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-
3]
A harmonized national program for criteria pollutant, GHG, and fuel efficiency
standards by EPA, the California Air Resources Board (CARB), and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is essential to assure the greatest improvements are
achieved in the most cost-efficient manner and to provide vehicle and engine manufacturers,
suppliers, and end-users with the certainty necessary for investment in technologies to improve
emissions. We urge the agencies to work together towards a single, nationwide program. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
Sufficient regulatory lead time and stability should be provided to allow
manufacturers to develop and implement the technologies needed to improve emissions and
spread investments over time to minimize cost to customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645,
pp. 2-3]
Standards should be performance-based and technology neutral, as opposed to
standards which mandate a specific technology, to allow manufacturers to innovate across a
broad range of technologies to meet customers' diverse needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645,
pp. 2-3]
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Standards should be fuel neutral (i.e., same stringency regardless of fuel type) to
ensure the environmental benefits of the regulation are achieved regardless of the fuel type
chosen by customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
The tradeoff between oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and carbon dioxide (C02) reductions
must be considered when setting the stringency of standards. Also, linkage of criteria pollutant
and GHG certification and compliance protocols is important so that improvement in one type of
pollutant is not achieved at the expense of the other. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
Well-to-wheels emissions should be considered in assessing technology effectiveness
to ensure alignment of the standards with the most beneficial path to zero emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
Cummins currently certifies heavy-duty (HD) pickup trucks with gross vehicle weight ratings
(GVWR) between 8,501 and 14,000 pounds, also known as Class 2b and 3 vehicles, meeting
EPA's Tier 3 criteria pollutant emissions standards and Phase 2 GHG standards. Diesel Class 2b
and 3 pickup trucks can have significant towing capability and are used in applications going
beyond personal use such as construction and agriculture, and as such, do vital work for
America. Our additional comments detailed below pertain to those vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Delek Holdings, Inc.
I. EPA's Proposed Rule is Based on Flawed Market Projections.
EPA's proposed standards are based on ZEV adoption rates that are unrealistic and
unsupported by any concrete evidence. Because higher rates of ZEV adoption are essentially
required for engine manufacturers to even come close to meeting the proposed standards, EPA
projects adoption rates for MY2027 through MY2032 will be: 45-78% for sedans, 38-62% for
SUVs, and 11—68% for pickups, totaling an adoption rate of 36-67%> fleet-wide.3 These MY27
estimates are essentially required, despite the reality of the current ZEV market: for MY21, only
4.4% of the U.S. light-duty vehicles produced were PEVs (including both BEVs and plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles).4 But EPA does little to acknowledge this reality, much less account for
the true feasibility of ZEV penetration into the LD/MD vehicle market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0527, p. 2]
3 Proposed Rule at ,329 (Table 80).
12 4 Proposed Rule at 29,189 (BEVs alone made up only 5.8% in MY22).
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
VI. EPA's Proposed Standards Are Technologically Feasible at Reasonable Cost, as Are
Alternative 1 Standards with a Faster Ramp Rate After 2030.
Not only does Alternative 1 with increasing stringency after 2030 yield significant societal
benefits, it is also technologically feasible at reasonable cost. In this section, we detail the
combustion vehicle and zero-emission technologies that can secure additional emissions
reductions from the light-duty fleet, comment on EPA's modeling, and address technology costs.
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We also offer recommendations for the Tier 4 NMOG+NOx standards and PM requirements.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 36]
2. The electrification technology pathway shows the feasibility of stronger standards.
When it comes to electrification, EPA's OMEGA2 modeling applies electrification almost
exclusively to commercial vans, with the model assuming just 236,000 Class 2b-3 electric
pickups will be sold out of more than 5.2 million Class 2b-3 pickups sold between 2022-2032
(4.5%). On the other end of the spectrum, the model shows sales of just over 1.2 million
electric vans out of just under 2.8 million total sales over the same period (43.4%), with electric
vans achieving a 98% market share by 2032. The reasons for such a broad disparity are entirely
artificial—for example, the model's 25% cap on production of Class 2b-3 BEV pickups—and do
not reflect the latest available data on technology or cost. 187 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
pp. 68-69]
187 In its OMEGA2 modeling, EPA has set an artificial cap of 25% on the maximum production of Class
2b-3 BEV pickups, identified in the productionconstraints-bodystyleMD.csv input file. There is no
sufficient justification for this cap in the DRIA or preamble, with the exclusive reference found on p. 1-21
of the DRIA, for which the Agency writes: "The primary assumptions within the work factor based GHG
standards for MDV from 2028 to 2032 include an approximately 8 percent year over year improvement, to
a large degree from electrification of MDV vans and to a lesser degree electrification of a small fraction
(<##########25 percent) of MDV pickups and adoption of other technologies."
a.EPA's modeling should better reflect the favorable economic case for electric pickup trucks.
A recent report by Roush examined the potential for electrification of MDVs under a range of
scenarios, finding that electrification is cost-competitive in the great majority of them. 188 It is
clear that some amount of the difference between the uptake of Class 2b-3 pickups and vans in
the OMEGA2 modeling stems from the far lower range assumed for vans (150 miles) compared
to that of pickups (300 miles). But as illustrated in Table VI. A-1 below, 189 Roush finds that by
2030, even when comparing a low-cost combustion powertrain to the most costly battery
chemistry (NMC811) deployed in a 400-mile electric Class 3 pickup, 190 the electric pickup still
achieves total cost of ownership (TCO) parity within the typical loan length for a new vehicle (7
years). And when comparing a Class 3 pickup with a low-cost battery (LFP) to a high-cost
internal combustion engine powertrain, a 400-mile electric pickup would pay off within 1 year,
well within the payback period assumed for consumers by manufacturers within EPA's
OMEGA2 model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 69]
188 Saxena et al., Electrification Cost Evaluation at 26.
189 Table VI.A-1 is adapted from Saxena et al., Electrification Cost Evaluation, Tbl. 24, at 145. Scenario 1
represents the adoption of low-cost BEV and high-cost combustion vehicle technologies; Scenario 2,
medium-cost BEV and combustion vehicle technologies; and Scenario 3, high-cost BEV and low-cost
combustion vehicle technologies. Id. at 28-29.
190 Roush used an LFP battery for its low-cost BEV, an NMC811 battery for its medium-cost BEV, and a
"10% costlier" NMC811 battery for its High-bost BEV. Id. at 30-31.
Table VIII.A-l. Time to achieve TCO parity for Class 2b-3 BEVs with a 2027 and 2030
purchase timeframe [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 69]
[See original comment for Table VIII.A-l.].
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When accounting for the impacts of the IRA, the economic case for electrification of Class
2b-3 pickups is even clearer, as shown in Table VI.A-2. Here the impact of the full § 30D credit
is shown, which is also the maximum allowable limit of the § 45W (commercial clean vehicle)
credit for Class 2b-3 vehicles. 191 Roush's analysis finds that purchase price parity is achieved
for virtually all BEV classes in the timeframe of the analysis, so the § 45W commercial vehicle
credit is not applicable in the later years of their analysis. 192 In fact, Roush finds that, with the
application of IRA credits, by MY 2027 all BEVs except the 400-mile pickup will be priced at or
below a comparable combustion vehicle 193; and that all MY 2027 BEVs will achieve TCO
parity within the first two years of vehicle ownership. 194 Here it is worth noting that, despite
the large share of MDVs that are purchased for commercial fleets, EPA did not directly include
the § 45W credit in its analysis, instead applying the same combination of the § 30D and § 45W
credit as it did for LDVs. 195 Because the § 45W credit is based on the lesser of $7500 or the
difference in purchase price, this credit should act to hedge uncertainty in the Agency's analysis,
though that is not how it was treated within the OMEGA2 modeling runs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 70]
191 Id. at 175-79. The § 45W credit is based on 30% of the basis of a vehicle not powered by a gasoline or
diesel internal combustion engine, or the difference in purchase price between a qualified clean vehicle and
a comparable combustion vehicle. In the case of vehicles that have a GVWR less than 14,000 pounds
(which includes Class 2b-3 vehicles), the total credit is capped at $7500.
192 Id. at 195.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 197-98.
195 This is not immediately apparent in the text of the preamble or DRIA but can be assessed by
comparing the contents of the vehicle_price_modifications_20230314b.csv input files from the LDV and
MDV modeling runs, which are identical.
Table VIII. A-2. Time to achieve TCO parity with IRA § 30D credits for MYs 2023 and 2027
196 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 69-71]
196 This table is adapted from Saxena et al., Electrification Cost Evaluation, Tbl. 30, at 193.
[See original comment for Table VIII.A-2.].
The Roush report is not the only analysis to find a strong economic rationale for the adoption
of zero-emission MDVs. A recent report from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory
(NREL) found that cost parity will be achieved before 2035 (even in the absence of the IRA) for
medium- and heavy-duty vehicles, including Class 3 vans and Class 4-5 vehicles that share a
platform with Class 2b-3 pickups (which were not part of that analysis). 197 Similarly, a recent
International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) report on electric MDVs finds that
purchase price parity with diesel MDVs will be achieved prior to 2032 for 300-mile and lower
BEVs, even in the absence of IRA funding. 198 And when IRA funding is considered, even 400-
mile BEV pickups would achieve purchase price parity in the timeframe of this rule. 199 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 71]
197 Catherine Ledna et al., NREL, Decarbonizing medium- and heavy-duty on-road vehicles: Zero-
emission vehicles cost analysis, Mar. 2022, at 2, 46 https://www.nrel.gov/docs/Iy22osti/82081.pdf.
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198 Eamonn Mulholland, ICCT, Cost of electric commercial vans and pickup trucks in the United States
through 2040 (Working Paper 2022-01), Jan. 2022, at 11 (Fig. 5), https://theicct.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/01/cost-ev-vans-pickups-us-2040-jan22.pdf.
199 See id.
There is some difference in costs between EPA's assessment and other studies such as those
described above: on average, according to EPA, Class 2b-3 combustion pickups will cost about
$5,000 less (from a purchase price standpoint) than a comparable electric pickup.
However, with the Agency's application of an average IRA credit of $6,000 in 2032, this
would still yield cost parity, on average, so even EPA's higher cost assessment cannot fully
explain the reason for Class 2b-3 pickups electrifying at such a reduced rate in the Agency's
modeling. Even more than that, this disparity is almost entirely influenced by the relative price
difference of gasoline and diesel pickups in EPA's modeling, with the Agency's BEV300
pickups just $1,100 more expensive than diesel pickups without the IRA incentives, not far off
ICCT's conclusion that BEV300 pickups will achieve cost parity with diesel pickups by
2031.200 Despite this, the model's conversion rate of combustion vehicle sales to electric
vehicle sales is virtually indistinguishable between gasoline and diesel pickups, at roughly 20%
for each, seemingly indicating that neither purchase price nor TCO parity have a significant
impact on sales. Given that many Class 2b-3 vehicles are purchased for commercial use,201 such
modeling behavior is inconsistent with the economically-driven decisionmaking that would be
expected to occur in the real world.202 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 71]
200 Id.
201 See id. at 1; Saxena et al., Electrification Cost Evaluation, at 49.
202 For example, EPA's own analysis of the heavy-duty market assumed a conversion rate of 80% when
cost parity is achieved. 88 Fed. Reg. at 25992, Tbl. 11-23. And analysis from NREL finds this number to be
nearly 100%; see comparison at pp. 59-60 of EDF, Comment Letter on GHG Standards for HD Vehicles,
June 16, 2023, https://downloads.regulations.gov/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985-1644/attachment_l.pdf (data
from Ledna et al. 2022).
Based on EPA's own modeling, BEV variants for over 71% of the Class 2b-3 market achieve
first cost parity with their combustion-powered equivalent by 2032 when including IRA
incentives, including 57% of the Class 2b-3 pickup truck market.203 This is a substantially
higher share of vehicles than the model assumes will be deployed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 72]
203 This was established using the output files for the OMEGA2 MDV runs, using the vehicles file
(2023_03_14_22_42_30_central_3alts_20230314_Proposal_vehicles.csv) to compare in a given model
year BEV variants with their combustion equivalent, sharing a base-year vehicle ID.
For all of these reasons, EPA's modeling does not accurately reflect the favorable economic
case for commercial MDV electrification, particularly for pickups. While some of these
modeling problems can be ascribed to differences in battery costs and EPA's unreasonable
choice to include an artificial 25% production cap on BEV pickups, other problems are intrinsic
to assumptions made within the model that do not reflect the Agency's own assessment of likely
adoption of electrification for commercial vehicles, particularly considering the incentives
available under the IRA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 72]
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XVI. EPA Should Not Repeat Its Past Pattern of Underestimating ZEV Technology
Advancements and ZEV Deployment Within the Fleet.
The regulatory history shows that EPA's projections of ZEV technology advancements and
overall ZEV deployment within the fleet routinely prove too conservative. EPA should not repeat
those same mistakes in this rulemaking. For example, EPA's light-duty GHG rule finalized in
2012 set standards for MYs 2017-2025 and projected "very small" numbers of electric vehicles
in the light-duty fleet through MY 2025. 77 Fed. Reg. at 62917. In the 2012 rule, EPA projected
combined PHEV and BEV penetration of only 1% for the MY 2021 car fleet. Id. at 62872. Yet
BEV sales alone accounted for at least 3.2% of all vehicle sales in MY 2021.278 In the 2012
rule, EPA did not even project combined BEV and PHEV sales that high by MY 2025. For the
combined car and truck fleet, EPA projected BEV and PHEV penetration of only 2% by MY
2025, and for the car fleet alone, BEV and PHEV penetration of only 3% by MY 2025. Id. at
62874, 62875 Tbl. 111-52. EPA re-evaluated those projections in 2016 and 2017, again projecting
MY 2025 technology penetrations of around 3% or less for BEVs.279 And EPA's 2020 rule still
projected only 3.4% BEVs by MY 2025. 85 Fed. Reg. at 24936 Tbl. VII-29. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, pp. 106-107]
278 Cox Automotive, In a Down Market, EV Sales Soar to New Record (Jan. 13, 2023),
https://www.coxautoinc.com/market-insights/in-a-down-market-ev-sales-soar-to-new-record/; EPA, The
2022 Automotive Trends Report, at 74. See also lima Fadhil et al., ICCT, Electric Vehicles Market Monitor
for Light-Duty Vehicles: China, Europe, United States, and India, 2020 and 2021, at 6 (2023),
https://theicct.org/publication/ev-ldv-major-markets-monitor-jan23/ (estimating nearly 5% total U.S. BEV
and PHEV sales in MY 2021).
279 See EPA, Draft Technical Assessment Report: Midterm Evaluation of Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse
Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years 2022-2025, at
ES-10 (2016) https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/draft-tar-final.pdf; EPA, Final Determination on
the Appropriateness of the Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards under the Midterm Evaluation, at 4-5, 21 (2017),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100QQ91.pdf.
In the 2012 rulemaking, EPA also considered a more stringent alternative projecting a 5%
combined BEV and PHEV penetration for MY 2025 for the car fleet, but it rejected this
alternative based on "serious concerns about the ability and likelihood manufacturers can
smoothly implement [that level of] increased technology penetration." 77 Fed. Reg. at 62877.
Yet automakers ultimately surpassed that "serious[ly] concerning]" electrification penetration
level in MY 2022 with BEVs alone. In MY 2022, BEV sales reached at least 5.8% of total light-
duty vehicle sales,280 and this growth has continued, with the United States on track to vastly
outpace EPA's previous projections of MY 2025 light-duty vehicle electrification. In Q1 of
2023, for example, U.S. light-duty BEV sales alone reached 7.2% of total vehicle sales.281
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 107]
280 Cox Automotive, In a Down Market, EV Sales Soar to New Record. See also EPA, The 2022
Automotive Trends Report, at 74 (preliminary report that electric vehicle sales, including both BEVs and
PHEVs, were 7.2% of total sales in 2022).
281 Cox Automotive, Another Record Broken: Q1 Electric Vehicle Sales Surpass 250,000, as EV Market
Share in the U.S. Jumps to 7.2% of Total Sales (Apr. 12, 2023), https://www.coxautoinc.com/market-
insights/q1 -2023 -ev-sales/.
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EPA's projections of ZEV technology advancements and deployment have also proven too
conservative in the heavy-duty sector. In the 2016 Phase 2 Final Rule, for example, EPA
projected very small levels of HD ZEV penetration through MY 2027. In that rule, EPA
projected "limited adoption of all-electric vehicles into the market," and stated that the Agency
"do[es] not project fully electric vocational vehicles to be widely commercially available in the
time frame of the final rules." 81 Fed. Reg. at 73500, 73704.282 By the time EPA proposed a
new rule in 2022, however, the Agency recognized that its 2016 projections were underestimates.
See, e.g., 87 Fed. Reg. at 17595 ("Several factors have changed our outlook for heavy-duty
electric vehicles since 2016. First, the heavy-duty market has evolved such that in 2021, there are
a number of manufacturers producing fully electric heavy-duty vehicles in several
applications."). Despite having predicted very limited HD ZEV penetration through MY 2027 in
2016, EPA noted that by 2019, there were already approximately 60 makes and models of HD
BEVs available for purchase, "with additional product lines in prototype or other early
development stages." Id. EPA explained that "manufacturers and U.S. states have announced
plans to shift the heavy-duty fleet toward zero-emissions technology beyond levels we accounted
for in setting the existing HD GHG Phase 2 standards in 2016," and recognized the need "[t]o
update the MY 2027 vehicle C02 standards from the HD GHG Phase 2 rulemaking to reflect the
recent and projected trends in the electrification of the HD market." Id. at 17598. EPA
acknowledged its 2016 under-projections again in the Phase 3 proposal, stating that the Agency
has "considered new data and recent policy changes," and is "now projecting that ZEV
technologies will be readily available and technologically feasible much sooner than we had
projected." 88 Fed. Reg. at 25939. In both the light- and heavy-duty sectors, then, EPA's
previous projections of ZEV deployment have proven far too conservative, and automakers have
repeatedly shown they can deploy zero-emission technologies on a scale and at a pace far greater
than EPA originally predicted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 107-108]
282 See also 81 Fed. Reg. at 73818 ("As we look to the future, we are not projecting the adoption of
electric HD pickups and vans into the heavy duty market.. .we believe there is no need to a cap for HD
pickups and vans because of the infrequent projected use of EV technologies in the Phaseeframe.").
12. A. EPA has broad discretion in considering consumer preferences when promulgating
emission standards but should not give undue weight to that factor.
As explained in EPA's Proposal and Section II of these comments, when promulgating new
emissions standards under Clean Air Act § 202(a), EPA must consider the statutory criteria of
technological feasibility, cost of compliance, and lead time.412 EPA may consider other factors,
and in the past has considered a rule's various impacts on vehicle purchasers.413 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 152]
412 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a); 88 Fed. Reg. at 29186.
413 88 Fed. Reg. at 29186.
While EPA has often considered consumer acceptance in its Section 202 rulemakings, the
Agency may not let the unique preferences of each and every consumer dictate its consideration
of the appropriateness or feasibility of emission standards. In International Harvester Company,
v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 152]
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We are inclined to agree with the Administrator that as long as feasible technology permits
the demand for new passenger automobiles to be generally met, the basic requirements of the Act
would be satisfied, even though this might occasion fewer models and a more limited choice of
engine types. The driver preferences of hot rodders are not to outweigh the goal of a clean
environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 152]
While International Harvester involved emission requirements for light-duty vehicles under a
provision of the 1970 Amendments, the principles the court expressed apply just as well to
standards under Section 202(a)(1). As detailed in Section II, Congress intended EPA's standards
to push the industry toward greater emission reductions and did not expect them to preserve the
market dominance of any particular type of powertrain or power source. EPA should not give
oversized weight to arguments questioning consumer preferences, which is not a factor Congress
identified in Section 202(a)(1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 152]
While EPA has discretion whether to consider and how much weight to give purchaser
acceptance in setting emission standards, that discretion is limited by EPA's primary statutory
duty to set standards that adequately protect public health and welfare. An understanding of
consumers' willingness to purchase and drive PEVs could inform the feasibility and
effectiveness of EPA's regulations. EPA's attention to consumer preferences, however, cannot
compromise its overall Clean Air Act mandate to mitigate the automobile's "devastating impact
on the American environment," International Harvester, 478 F.2d at 622, or the Agency's
primary duty to protect public health and welfare by minimizing harmful air pollution. Most
importantly here, however, is that consumer acceptance of PEVs is widespread and growing, and
PEVs provide the vehicle features and characteristics that drivers want and need. Thus, as this
section will explain, consumer acceptance is not a barrier to PEV penetration at the levels
projected by EPA's Proposal or at levels consistent with Alternative 1 with increasing stringency
after 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 152-153]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
Executive Summary
EPA's primary proposal is eminently feasible and consistent with the automakers own
publicly announced product plans. In fact, EPA's proposed standards, in certain aspects, reflect a
conservative assessment of zero-emitting vehicle (ZEV) deployment in the coming years. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-202829-0786, p. 2]
12. C. EPA's proposal is performance-based and can be cost-effectively met with a range of
different technologies.
As with EPA's decades-long reliance on the ABT provisions described above, EPA has
likewise long established performance-based standards that can be met with a range of
emissions- improving technologies. EPA's proposed standards are no exception - they are
performance- based and can be met using a range of ZEV and ICEV improvements. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 12]III. EPA's final light-duty standards should deliver pollution
reductions at least at the level of the proposal.
In this section, we outline the breadth of factors supporting the feasibility and cost-
effectiveness of protective pollution standards. We recommend that EPA strengthen the
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standards in a manner that delivers pollution reductions at least as great as the proposal that EPA
is considering. We also highlight the importance of adjustments that could secure even greater
pollution reductions by including in the final rule a voluntary (but once chosen, enforceable)
alternative leadership pathway that, for manufacturers choosing the pathway, would ensure ACC
II levels of ZEV deployment nationwide. In addition, especially if EPA modifies the proposal's
phase-in of the standards in the early years of the program as indicated in Alternative 3, we
recommend that EPA consider increasing the stringency of the 2031-2032 standards to
potentially increase cumulative GHG reductions relative to the proposal, and at minimum,
protect the benefits achieved under the standards as proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
p. 16]
A. Feasibility, cost, and lead time support final standards at least as protective as the proposal.
In this section, we examine a series of interlocking analyses and factors that support standards
at least as protective as EPA's proposed emissions standards, including 1) extensive independent
analysis related to rapidly-declining ZEV costs, including the impacts of the IRA in further
advancing ZEV cost declines and accelerating ZEV deployment; 2) manufacturers' projections
of battery cost declines; 3) an assessment of market indicators, including manufacturer
investments and commitments, which are broadly consistent with and reinforce these study
findings; 4) a discussion of leading state actions, including the ACC II rule; and 5) presentation
of a revised baseline analysis, which synthesizes and quantifies each of these factors. Each of
these factors, both individually and when taken together, demonstrate that EPA's proposed
standards are feasible and cost-effective. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 16]
ii. Market developments further support the feasibility and lead time reflected in EPA's
proposal.
Market developments, including manufacturer plans to introduce new BEVs, concrete
investments to produce these and other vehicles at volume, and future commitments for
significant BEV sales are all consistent with and reinforce the conclusions of the above-
described analyses and likewise support the feasibility of protective EPA standards. In fact, these
market developments in many cases show manufacturers' plans to produce BEVs at even greater
volumes than EPA has assumed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Increasing BEV Availability and Sales Volumes. An updated report by ERM, based on
announcements by major auto manufacturers, finds the number of electrified models available in
the U.S. is projected to dramatically increase, reaching 197 by the end of 2025, with over 58 new
models slated to launch in model years 2022-2025 (Figure 5).58 As Figure 6 shows, these
vehicles will be available across all vehicle types and classes, and, as a result of IRA tax
incentives, there will be five light-duty EV models available with a net cost of under $30,000
manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) by the end of 2023 and 15 models available for
under $40,000.59 In the United States, more than 800,000 light-duty EVs were purchased in
2022, a 65 percent increase from 2021. The first quarter of 2023 saw EV sales reach over
258,000 units, almost a 45 percent year over year increase.60 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
pp. 23-26]
58 Electric Vehicle Market Update: Manufacturer and Commercial Fleet Electrification Commitments
Supporting Electric Mobility in the United States. April 2023. ERM for EDF.
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-
05/Electric%20Vehicle%20Market%20Update%20April%202023 .pdf (Attachment S)
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59 Id.
60 Id.
[See original attachment for Figure 5: Total Light-duty PHEV and BEV U.S. Models
Available by Year] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Source: ERM, EV Market Update (April 2023) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
[See original attachment for Figure 6: Total Light-duty PHEV and BEV U.S. Models
Available by Body Type] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Source: ERM, EV Market Update (April 2023) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Near-Term Investments Dramatically Increase Production Capacity. In addition to introducing
new electric vehicles, manufacturers are investing billions of dollars to produce them at volume.
As noted above, a report by WSP for EDF found over $120 billion in private EV supply
ecosystem investments and 143,000 new jobs announced in the last eight years. That analysis
also evaluated the production capacity of announced facilities with concrete investments. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
As shown in the Figures below, by 2026, U.S. manufacturing facilities will be capable of
producing an estimated 4.3 million new electric passenger vehicles each year, which represents
about 33 percent of all new vehicles sold in 2022. And by 2026, battery manufacturing facilities
will be capable of producing more than 1,000 gigawatt hours (GWh) in battery capacity,
sufficient to supply up to 11.2 million new passenger vehicles each year, which represents an
estimated 84 percent of new vehicle sold in 2022. Both of these levels far exceed EPA's
projections for BEV deployment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
[See original attachment for Figure 7: Total Announced EV Manufacturing Capacity (2020-
2026)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Source: WSP, U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
[See original attachment for Figure 8: Total Announced Battery Manufacturing Capacity
(2017-2027)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Source: WSP, U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Manufacturer Commitments. In addition to near-term model availability and supporting
production investments, vehicle manufacturers have articulated medium- to long-term
commitments to even more substantially grow ZEV sales with many working toward a full ZEV
fleet within the next decade. For instance, according to the recent market update from ERM,
Ford expects 50 percent of its global vehicle volume, and 100 percent of its European volume, to
be fully electric by 2030 with a goal of producing 2 million EVs annually by 2026; GM plans to
offer a lineup of electric-only models by 2035; Honda has a goal of achieving carbon neutrality
by 2050 and 100 percent ZEV sales in North America by 2040—with interim sales goals of 40
percent by 2030 and 80 percent by 2035; Volvo has committed to becoming a fully electric car
company by 2030—with an interim goal of reaching 50 percent of global EV car sales and
having one million EVs on the road by 2025; and Stellantis aims for 100 percent of sales in
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Europe and 50 percent of sales in the U.S. to be BEVs by the end of the decade,61 As EPA notes
in the preamble to this proposal, virtually every major automaker is already planning on
widespread electrification across global fleets. Figure 9, below, is an updated synthesis of these
manufacturer commitments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
61 Id.
[See original attachment for Figure 9: Global Sales Goals by Manufacturers]
Source: ERM, EV Market Update (April 2023) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Market indicators are consistent with and strongly support protective standards.
Manufacturers have (and are planning to continue to) offer new vehicles. They have invested
billions of dollars to produce these vehicles at near term volumes that far exceed EPA's
projections. And almost every company has articulated medium- to longer term ZEV
commitments that are broadly consistent with levels in EPA's proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Vehicle Manufacturer EV Commitments
Many vehicle manufacturers have made commitments to transition a significant portion of
their sales to ZEVs. While many of the commitments are for a share of manufacturers' global
sales, several OEMs have made U.S. specific commitments or have committed to transition their
entire fleet which would mean all of their U.S. sales would be ZEV as well. Even for global
commitments, manufacturers with significant U.S. sales volumes will nonetheless need to sell
meaningful ZEVs to meet their commitments. Because some sales might exceed these global
commitments while others fall short, we used global commitments as a reasonable proxy for U.S.
sales share. Table 4 below shows OEM commitments and includes a total using 2022
manufacturer sales shares to calculate a weighted ZEV commitment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 31-34]
[See original attachment for Table 4: Manufacturer ZEV Commitments as Share of Total
Sales] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 31-34]
78 Jerry Reynolds. Full-Year 2022 National Auto Sales by Brand. 2023. CarPro,
https://www.carpro.com/blog/full- year-2022-national-auto-sales-by-brand
79 Paul Eisenstein, Mercedez-Benz Goes All-Electric by 2030, Forbes (Oct. 4, 2021),
https://www.forbes.com/wheels/news/mercedes-benz-all-electric-2030/.
80 Luke Wilkinson, Volkswagen 'New Auto' Strategy Predicts Near 100 percent EV Sales by 2040, (July
15, 2021), https://www.carscoops.com/2023/03/bmw-expects-to-smash-50-ev-sales-goal-before-own-2030-
deadline/.
81 Mariella Moon, Faraday Future's FF 91 Electric Vehicles Will Cost as Much as $309,000, Engadget
(June 1, 2023), https://www.engadget.com/faraday-futures-ff-91-electric-vehicles-will-cost-as-much-as-
309000- 053144006.html.
82 Luke Wilkinson, Volkswagen 'New Auto' Strategy Predicts Near 100 percent EV Sales by 2040, (July
15, 2021), https://www.carscoops.eom/2023/03/bmw-expects-to-smash-50-ev-sales-goal-before-own-2030-
deadline/.
83 David Shepardson, GM Backs Setting Tough U.S Emissions Targets for 2030 (Sep. 20, 2022),
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/gm-backs-setting-tough-emissions-targets-2030-
2022-09-20/.
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84 PR Newswire, Honda Targets 100% EV Sales in North America by 2040, Makes New Commitments to
Advances in Environmental and Safety Technology (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/honda- targets-100-ev-sales-in-north-america-by-2040-makes-new-commitments-to-advances-in-
environmental-and-safety- technology-301275727.html.
85 ET Auto, Hyundai to Raise Electric Vehicles Ration to 80% by 2040 (Sep. 7, 2021),
https://auto.economictimes.i8971oombees.com/news/hyundai-to-raise-electric-vehicles-ratio-to-80-by-
2040/85998266.
86 Inside EVs, Hyundai Announces Accelerated Electrification Strategy,
https://insidee8971oombenews/571125/hyundai-accelerated-electrification-strategy/.
87 Mark Kane, Mazda Announces Full-Scale Launch of BEVs in 2028-2030 (Nov. 22, 2022),
https://insidee8971oomm/news/623055/mazda-full-scale-launch-bevs-2028-2030//
88 Reuters, Nissan Raises Global EV Targets; to Boost U.S. Input (Feb. 27, 2023),
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/nissan-plans-build-second-us-battery-plant-gupta-
says-2023- 02-27/.
89 Stellantis, Accelerating the Drive to Electrification,
https://www.stellantis.com/en/technology/electrification.
90 Reuters Staff, Subaru Sets Mid 2030s Target to Sell Only Electric Vehicles (Jan. 19, 2021),
lhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-subaru-ev-idUSKBNlZJOBU.
91 JustAuto, Subaru to Invest $1.9 Billion in New EV Plant, Batteries,
https://www.8971oombuto.com/news/subaru-to- invest-usl-9bn-in-new-ev-plant-batteries.
92 Jasper Jolly, Jaguar Land Rover to Ramp up EV Production with £15bn Investment, The Guardian (Apr.
19, 2023), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/apr/19/electric-car-jaguar-land-rover-ev-
production-investment.
93 Peter Johnson, Toyota's New CEO Adjusts EV Plans but Sticks to a Hybrid Approach, electrek (Apr. 7,
2023), https://elec8971oombe/2023/04/07/toyotas-new-ceo-adjusts-ev-plans-but-sticks-to-a-hybrid-
approach/.
94 Anjani, Trivedi, This is Toyota's Boldest EV Rebranding Exercise Yet, Washington Post (Jan. 30,
2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/this-is-toyotas-boldest-ev-rebranding-exercise-
yet/2023/0 l/30/7dlaf020-a063-l led-8b47-9863fda8e494_story.html.
95 Volvo, The Future is Electric, https://group.volvocars.com/company/innovation/electrification.
96 Volvo, Volvo Cars to be Fully Electric by 2030, https://www.media.volvocars.com/global/en-
gb/media/pressreleases/277409/volvo-cars-to-be-fully-electric-by-2030
97 https://insideevs.com/news/574853/vw-group-bevs-make-up-55percent-us-sales-2030/
98 Luke Wilkinson. Volkswagen 'New Auto' strategy predicts near 100 per cent EV sales by 2040 (Jul. 15,
2021), https://www8971oomberg897ss.co.uk8971oomberg897n/355550/volkswagen-new-auto-strategy-
predicts-near-100-cent-ev-sales- mix-2040
*Due to rounding, the sum of the market share may not equal the total
All major OEMs have set ZEV targets of at least 30% sales starting in 2030. Considering both
U.S.-specific and global commitments would result in 47% of new vehicles sold in the U.S. in
2030 being ZEVs. Even unrealistically assuming only the US-specific commitments and the
100%) commitments apply, at least 29% of LDV sales in 2030 would be ZEVs growing to 44% in
2035 and 48% in 2040. The 2030 value is plotted above in Figure 12. We also note that the 2035
and 2040 estimates using both approaches are perhaps significantly understated given that some
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manufacturers with commitments in 2030 have not made 2035 or later commitments but will
nonetheless likely increase ZEV sales during that timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
pp. 31-34]
EV Manufacturing Investment Announcements
As discussed above, in their March 2023 report, WSP analyzed investment announcements
for domestic EV manufacturing. Their analysis found that announced investments amount to the
production of 4.4 million EVs per year by 2026 in the U.S.99 This equals roughly a third (31%)
of all LDVs sold in the U.S. last year. Vehicle manufacturers have already committed to
manufacturing these vehicles and it provides a lower bound for what might be expected as more
manufacturers make EV investment announcements, and the industry continues to grow. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 34-35]
99 U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs, Characterizing the Impacts of the Inflation
Reduction Act after 6 Months, WSP for EDF, (March 2023).
https://blogs.edf.org/climate41 l/files/2023/03/State-Electric- Vehicle-Policy-Landscape.pdf.
Over the past ten years, between 60% and 70% of the LDVs sold in the U.S. were
domestically manufactured with imports accounting for the remaining 30% to 40%. 100,101 It is
reasonable to expect that not all EVs purchased in the U.S. will be domestically produced. To
scale the vehicles, we have assumed that the proportion of EVs within the pool of domestically
produced vehicles will be the same as those imported. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 34-
35]
100 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization-
G.17 Table 3. Originally from Ward's Communications, Chrysler, and GM. 16 Nov 2022.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl7/current/table3.htm.
101 Bureau of Economic Analysis. Motor Vehicle Unit Retail Sales, Table 6. 2023,
https://apps.bea.gov/national/xls/gap_hist.xlsx
If the U.S. imported 35% of its vehicles, the average of the last ten years, the EV
manufacturing investments have been made already account for 48% of domestically made
vehicles sold in the U.S. If the trend of more domestically produced EVs continues and only 20%
of sales are imports, the U.S. produced 4.4 million EVs would result in 39% of LDV sales being
EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 34-35]
For this analysis, we chose an assumption of 80% domestically produced EVs. While this
number is higher than the current share of domestic production, it is in line with the recent trend
of onshoring EV manufacturing. 102 There are significant incentives and funding opportunities to
make domestically producing EVs more attractive to manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 34-35]
102 David Gohlke, Zhou, Yan, Wu, Xinyi, and Courtn"y, Calista. 2022. "Assessment of Light-Duty Plug-
in Electric Vehicles in the United "tates, 2010 - 2021". United States, https://doi.org/10.2172/1898424.
https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1898424. (Attachment Z)
Manufacturers only make announcements for facilities a few years in advance of production.
As such, this gives a glimpse into the near future but should the general trend in announcements
continue, tremendous growth would be expected for domestic EV manufacturing. To that end,
WSP's analysis is current only through March of 2023. Since that time, manufacturers have
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announced billions of dollars in additional investment and production capacity, which reinforces
the likelihood that these trends will continue to grow and accelerate over time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 34-35]
ii. Market developments further support the feasibility and lead time reflected in EPA's
proposal for Class 2b and 3 vehicles.
Automakers have already begun producing electric versions of Class 2b and 3 cargo vans,
step vans, box trucks, large SUVs and pickup trucks. According to ERM, there are currently 13
automakers - including Ford, GM, Daimler, Lightning, Rivian and VW - with plans to produce
or already producing 17 models of medium-duty ZEVs with battery ranges up to 500 miles. 117
And fleets have already started ordering and implementing these ZEVs. USPS announced that it
will purchase 9,250 Ford E-Transit electric delivery vans, which will contribute to USPS' pledge
to buy at least 66,000 electric vehicles through 2028.118 In just two years since its launch in
2021, General Motors' BrightDrop has secured more than 30 commercial customers across
industries like retail, rental, parcel delivery and service-based utilities, including FedEx,
Walmart, Hertz, DHL Express and Purolator.l 19 The company anticipates accelerating
production of its electric delivery vans to reach a 50,000-unit annual volume capacity by
2025.120 Amazon signed a deal with Rivian in 2019 to buy 100,000 Rivian step vans by 2030.
Thousands of the delivery vans had been delivered to Amazon and put in circulation in cities
across the nation by the end of 2022.121 New York City announced it will purchase 925 EVs,
including 382 Chevy Bolts, 360 Ford E-Transit vans, 150 Ford F-150 E-Lightning pickup trucks,
25 PHEV street sweepers, and seven Mack LR BEV garbage trucks. 122 These fleet and
automaker commitments and investments are another clear indication that EPA's proposed
standards for Class 2b and 3 vehicles are feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 50-51]
117 Rachel Macintosh, Harrison Branner, Kayla Escobar, and Sophie Tolomiczenko, Electric Vehicle
Market Update: Manufacturer & Commercial Fleet Electrification Commitments Supporting Electric
Mobility in the United States, ERMforEDF (April 2023). https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-
05/Electric%20Vehicle%20Market%20Update%20April%202023 .pdf. (Attachment S)
118 Mihalascu, Dan, "USPS To Purchase 9,250 Ford E-Transit Electric Delivery Vans." insideEvs. 1 Mar
2023. https://insideevs.com/news/655022/usps-purchase-9250-fordetransit-electric-delivery-vans
119 Roberts, Daniel and Maria Violette, "Order Update: Your BrightDrop EV is on the Way." Brightdrop.
3 April 2023. https://www.gobrightdrop.com/newsroom/first-canadian-built-zevos-shipped.
120 Id.
121 Amazon, Amazon's Electric Delivery Vehicles from Rivian Roll Out Across the U.S. (July 21, 2022),
https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/transportation/amazons-electric-delivery-vehicles-from-rivian-roll-
out-across- the-u-s
122 Lewis, Michelle, "New York City is buying 925 EVs - here's what's included." electrek. 4 Jan 2023.
https://electrek.co/2023/01/04/new-york-city-is-buying-925-evs-heres-whats-included/.
Organization: Ford Motor Company
To achieve the 2032MY goals EPA has proposed and Ford supports, the final regulation must
have the following elements. First, regarding the stringency of the GHG standards, the EPA
should finalize the Alternative 3 standards with minor adjustments to the utility allowance
inherent in the truck curves and provide a phase-out for refrigerant credits (rather than eliminate
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all at once). The Alternative 3 standards effectively draw a straight line from 2026 to 2032; that
is, they would require roughly equal reductions in absolute grams-per-mile targets over the
duration of the program. Alternative 3 reaches the same endpoint in 2032 as the EPA's main
proposal, and therefore would achieve the primary goal shared by Ford and EPA—widespread
adoption of ZEVs. In contrast, EPA's main proposal, Alternative 1, and Alternative 2 each would
require precipitous reductions in 2027 - 2029; this is not feasible and does not align with the
anticipated scaling of the EV supply chain and manufacturing base. Similarly, the EPA's
proposal to end refrigerant credits altogether in 2027 would be abrupt and have the effect of
standards being even more strict; EPA should phase these credits out over time. Lastly, EPA's
final regulations must continue to recognize the utility provided by trucks. Although electrified
vehicles hold promise for all vehicles classes, ICE-powered trucks will continue to provide
unique capability and utility for many years. The EPA proposal (and Alternative 3) would reduce
the existing truck utility allowance too severely. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 3]
As the EPA and others consider the many trade-offs in this rulemaking, Ford must emphasize
that investments in EVs will yield far greater emissions reductions than investments toward
incremental improvements to already-advanced ICE technologies. These considerations are
particularly important in the early years of the EPA program, where the EV market must reach
critical mass. Accordingly, we encourage EPA to avoid setting criteria emissions requirements
that will force unnecessarily large or ill-timed investments and distract both automakers and the
supply base with little air quality benefit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 4]
Standards Continuation Beyond 2032MY
In multiple areas of the NPRM the EPA has requested comment on continuation of light- and
medium-duty GHG and criteria pollutant standards beyond 2032MY. Ford opposes continuation
of any of the standards beyond the 2032MY. Industry already faces substantial uncertainty
before 2032MY, and it is not feasible to establish a robust program beyond that time. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 8]
Organization: Governing for Impact and Evergreen Action (GFI)
Fortunately, technological solutions to combat the rising emissions have become more
abundant and more affordable.22 Electric vehicles represent the most promising technology to
reduce vehicle emissions at the scale needed, as major automakers and fleet owners are aware.
Many have made commitments to transition to exclusively manufacturing or buying EVs by the
end of the next decade, as noted in the Proposed Rule.23 These automaker commitments come at
a time when clear market demand — the number of EVs sold in the US jumped from 1.7% of
new car sales in 2020 to a startling 5.7% in 202224 — is supported by an abundance of new
federal funding incentives, thanks to the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the Inflation
Reduction Act ("IRA"). So far in 2023, EV demand continues to grow: EVs made up 7% of new
cars sales in the first quarter.25 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 3]
22 Jack Ewing, "Electric Vehicles Could Match Gasoline Cars on Price This Year," N.Y. Times,
https://www.nytimes.eom/2023/02/10/business/electric-vehicles-price-cost.html (Feb. 10, 2023).
23 Proposed Rule at 29296 (citing International Energy Agency, "Global EV Outlook 2022," p. 107, May
2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/e0d2081d-487d-4818-8c59-69b638969f9e/
GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf).
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24 Zachary Shahan, "US Electric Car Sales Increased 65% in 2022," CleanTechnica,
https://cleantechnica.com/2023/02/25/us-electric-car-sales-increased-65-in-2022/ (Feb. 25, 2023).
25 Mark Kane, "US: All-Electric Car Sales Increased in ql 2023: 257,000 registrations," INSIDEEVS,
https://insideevs.com/news/667516/us-electric-car-sales-2023ql/ (May 16, 2023).
Outside analyses pre-dating the Proposed Rule have also proved more bullish than the EPA's
central No Action scenario. In 2021 — prior to the IRA's passage — IHS Markit "predicted a
nearly 40 percent U.S. [Private] EV share" of car sales in 2030, according to the Proposed Rule's
literature review.65 (In other words, what the EPA projects will occur after accounting for
generous IRA tax credits, IHS Markit estimated would take place even without those historic
incentives.) Post-IRA, Bloomberg New Energy Finances estimates the 2030 EV share of new car
sales at 52 percent by 2030.66 The International Council on Clean Transportation and Energy
Innovation concluded that share will reach between 56-67 percent by 2032.67 Indeed, the
Proposed Rule acknowledges the inherent uncertainty involved in projecting into the future.68
As a result, the agency conducted several sensitivity cases beyond the central No Action
baseline, modeling various alternate "No Action" assumptions (for example, likely forthcoming
state policies) that predicted a range of EV shares—in one of these alternate No Action cases,
EV penetration reached as high as 66 percent in MY 2032.69 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621,
pp. 8-9]
65 Proposed Rule at 29189 (citing IHS Markit, "US EPA Proposed Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2023-2026; What to Expect," August 9, 2021. Accessed on March 9, 2023 at
https://www.spglobal.com/ mobility/en/research-analysis/us-epa-proposed-greenhouse-gas-emissions-
standards-my2023 -26. html).
66 Proposed Rule at 29189 (citing Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), "Electric Vehicle Outlook
2022," Long term outlook economic transition scenario).
67 Proposed Rule at 29189 (citing International Council on Clean Transportation, "Analyzing the Impact of
the Inflation Reduction Act on Electric Vehicle Uptake in the US," ICCT White Paper, January 2023.
Available at https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23.pdf).
68 Proposed Rule at 29296.
69 Ibid.
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
c. The Proposed Rule Is Not Technologically Feasible Within the Required extend
The Clean Air Act does not direct EPA to drive emission standards for regulated pollutants to
zero as quickly as possible. Rather, under section 202(a)(2), EPA must ensure that any standards
are issued with sufficient lead time "to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, given appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period."40 For
EPA's aggressive PEV mandates, the "requisite technology" not only includes manufacturing the
vehicles themselves but also the underlying charging infrastructure necessary to power these
vehicles. Here, EPA has not demonstrated that sufficient charging stations, utilities, and other
infrastructure needed to support the deployment of an electrified fleet within the Proposed Rule's
contemplated timeline is possible. Without the ability to charge the PEVs EPA will be requiring
OEMs to produce, the Proposed Rule is nonsensical. Furthermore, according to a recent study,
23% of 657 public charging stations in the San Francisco Bay area were broken, and a big
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charging company, ChargePoint, had an operational success rate of just 61%.41 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, pp.10-11]
40 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2).
41 NYT, "A Frustrating Hassle Holding Electric Cars Back: Broken Chargers," (Aug 16, 2022), available
at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/16/business/energy-environment/electric-vehicles-broken-
chargers.html.
Take Virginia as a representative example highlighting the gap between the Proposed Rule's
required infrastructure and that which is actually feasible. According to a report by the Consumer
Energy Alliance, attached herein, Virginia currently has 7.6 million light-duty vehicles on the
road. Assuming Virginia transitions to 100% PEV by 2035, the state would need an additional
35.5 billion kWh of generation - equivalent to the generation required to power almost 70% of
the homes in the state. And to maximize the zero-emission benefit of PEVs, this generation
would need to come from zero-emitting sources such as nuclear or renewables (ignoring, for a
moment, the energy intensity required to construct these resources). But 35.5 billion kWh
corresponds to either 4 new nuclear reactors in the state or over 450,000 acres of off-shore
windfarms. Neither of which is remotely feasible under the Proposed Rule.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, pp.11-12]
42 CONSUMER ENERGY ALLIANCE, "Freedom to Fuel: Consumer Choice in the Automotive
Marketplace," August 2023 [hereinafter, "CEA Study"]. Nor has EPA shown that the electric grid itself can
meet this increased demand. As highlighted by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
("NERC"), certain high-risk areas do not today meet resource adequacy criteria, posing significant concern
about adding even more demand to the grid.43 This risk is further exacerbated by EPA's new carbon
dioxide standards for fossil-fuel fired power plants, proposed shortly after the Proposed Rule and not
otherwise considered in the Proposed Rule, that may rapidly phase out affordable base-load generation.44
Far from what the Proposed Rule requires, the infrastructure upgrades to support a U.S. LD fleet that is
only 7% PEV would require an additional $75-125 billion, which would be passed on from utilities directly
to customers.45 Today, energy insecure households, defined as those that are unable to adequately meet
basic household energy needs because of cost, pay 26 cents more per square foot in energy costs as
compared to energy secure households.46 This disparity will only increase as infrastructure upgrades to
accommodate the increased load from PEVs is passed along to ratepayers.
43 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2022 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (Dec. 2022),
21, available at
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2022.pdf
(indicating that increased demand projections may lead to reliability concerns for the electric grid,
especially as dual-peaking or seasonal peaking times change with increased electrification).
44 See Proposed Rule, "New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New,
Modified, and Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the
Affordable Clean Energy Rule," 88 Fed. Reg. 33,240 (May 23, 2023).
45 CEA Study at 8 (noting that the average price to consumers in New Mexico would be $117-195 per
year).
46 EIA, "U.S. energy insecure households were billed more for energy than other households," (May 30,
2023) available at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=56640.
Absent a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between PEV manufacturing and
charging infrastructure, vehicle manufacturers are left in vulnerable position. If the underlying
infrastructure cannot support the influx of PEVs, or if consumers perceive the requisite
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infrastructure is not available or reliable, consumers will simply not purchase PEVs in the
quantities requires for OEMs to meet the proposed standards. Case in point, Toyota has publicly
stated that given the three major barriers to widespread PEV adoption—1) the availability of
sufficient critical minerals; 2) a sufficient nation-wide charging infrastructure; and 3) overall
affordability—"the most immediate way to reduce carbon emissions is through a mix of
electrified options, which includes battery electric, plug-in hybrid, and hybrid vehicles."47
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 11-12]
47 Forbes, "Toyota Says Public Charging Not Ready for Pure EVs," (May 20, 2023) available at
https://www.forbes.eom/sites/brookecrothers/2023/05/20/toyota-admits-inconvenient-truth-about-electric-
vehicle-ev-charging-time-prius-prime-rav4-prime/?sh=2b7ed7ab38bl.
Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI)
Overal', HMG supports EPA's push toward a ZEV future. However, we find elements of the
Proposed Rule to be not only challenging, but in some cases, infeasible a nd thus
counterproduct've to our (and EPA's) ultimate goal of 100% ZEVs in the future. HMG believes
that if the Proposed Rule is implemented as written, it will have significant negative impacts on
the transition to ZEVs by forcing manufacturers to devote considerable resources into short-term,
temporary compliance strategies with relatively little overall benefit. HATCI is also a member of
the Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AFAI) and further supports the positions and comments
the AFAI submitted for the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 1]
HMG is concerned that the Proposed Rule will require re-prioritizing ICE instead of EV
technology investments [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 2]
HMG has made considerable investments and changes to its business consistent with its focus
on the transition to vehicle electrification and goal to achieve carbon neutrality by 2045. With
these objectives in mind, HMG has proactively moved its work force over the last five years
from ICE development and manufacturer to ZEV development. Such changes have been
necessary to expedite the transition to 100 percent ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p.
2]'Unfortunately, EPA's proposed Tier 4 regulations would require extensive changes to our
current ICE engines, and thus a shift in our plans back to ICE development, and consequently
away from ZEV acceleration. Essentially, the Proposed Rule is likely to cause a backslide in
ZEV development in order to address a short-term focus on bridge ICE technologies. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 2]
Moreover, if the Proposed Rule goes into effect as of model year (MY) 2027, HMG would
need to start work in calendar year 2024 to implement the extensive new engine re-developments
required to comply with the Proposed Rule. The work force available to respond to the proposed
Tier 4 regulations is limited due to the proactive re-organization efforts the company made to
transition towards electrification, and HMG staff would have to be transitioned away from ZEV
and back to ICE development. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 2]
The Tier 4 regulations would also require an excessive investment in new facilities and
equipment. Specifically, for just the proposed 0.5mg particulate matter (PM) requirement, HMG
would need to invest in Cold FTP and PM measurable equipment and facilities. This large
investment in technology for ICE vehicles would be an additional delay in our desired ZEV
903
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transformation and would likely be unavailable in time to support MY 2027 vehicle design
timing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 2]
As previously noted, the Proposed Rule provides a woefully inadequate amount of lead-time
to develop, prepare for, and secure the needed equipment, plus the construction and operation of
new facilities to be compliant with the proposed regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554,
p. 2]
HMG believe' the Proposed Rule's criteria pollutant standards for particulate matter (PM) of
0.5 mg/mi across FTP, 20F and US06 are technically infeasible and financially impracticable
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 4]
The EPA proposed a PM standard of0.5 mg/mi for LDV and MDV that must be met across
three test cycles (-7°C FTP, 25°C FTP, US06), a requirement for PM certification tests at the test
group level, and a requirement that every in-use vehicle program (IUVP) test vehicle is tested for
PM. The 0.5 mg/mi standard is a per-vehicle cap, not a fleet average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0554, p.'4]
HMG opposes EPA's proposed PM standard for LDVs and MDVs as technically infeasible
and financially'impracticable. HMG's positi'n aligns with AFAl's recommendation that EPA
instead adopt ACC II PM standards. HMG also recommends eliminating the proposed Cold FTP
PM standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 4]
Organization: Illinois Corn Growers Association
In the current rulemaking, there is only one technology that could achieve the standards in the
current rulemaking: electric vehicles. EPA estimates that it will be necessary for automakers to
electrify over half of the light and medium duty vehicles they produce and sell by the 2032
model year. This is less than nine years from now. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 1]
Moreover, successful electrification of the transportation sector involves sweeping changes in
other sectors, such as power generation, energy distribution and the extraction of rare materials
essential to maki9041oombergthing from bateries to computer chips. There is no guarantee these
changes will be in place by 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 1]
The standards being proposed in the current rulemaking are at least as difficult to achieve as
those promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for criteria pollutants for
the 1975 model year. Meeting those standards required the adoption of catalytic converters,
unleaded gasoline detuned engines and ultimately on-board computer control. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0756, p. 2]
Today, EPA is proposing even more stringent standards for criteria pollutants and Carbon
Dioxide (C02), the most significant of the greenhouse gases that are altering the global climate.
It is estimated that the rise in C02 levels since the 1950's has largely been the result of the
burning of fossil fuels such as gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 2]
[See original attachment for table titled "Table 1. Fuel Consumption Impact Due to Proposed
Standards"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 2]
Table 1 is reproduced from EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis for the proposed Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards. 1 According to this table, EPA expects the consumption of liquid
904
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fuel in the U.S. (primarily gasoline, diesel and biofuels) to drop by 50% and electrical use to
increase by 110% as a result of these rules. Clearly this will result in sweeping changes to the
transportation system even greater than the emission standards enacted in the 1970's. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 2]
1 "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis," EPA-420-D-23-003 April 2023
In justifying the technological feasibility of the standards, the Technical Support Document3
supporting the rulemaking listed 34 technologies automakers could potentially use to comply
with the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 4-5]
3 "Draft Joint Technical Support Document: Proposed Rulemaking for 2017-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards Office of
Transportation and Air Quality, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and National Highway Trafic
Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation EPA- 420-D-l 1-901,November 2011
By contrast, in support of the proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards, EPA listed only
9 potential technologies that they believe could be employed to meet the proposed standards. As
shown on Table 2, page 5, the twelve automakers with the most U.S. sales have already
significantly adopted these technologies on the vehicles they are producing today. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 4-5]
For instance:
-9 of the 12 automakers have employed at least one of the technologies on 70% or more of
their products sold in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 4-5]
-5 of the 12 automakers have employed at least three of the technologies on at least 70% of
their products sold in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 4-5]
-One manufacturer has employed three of these technologies on over 90% of their products
sold in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 4-5]
It appears that automakers have already widely utilized those technologies that work best with
their company's vehicles and powertrains while meeting the needs of their customers.
Technologies that have not found favor with multiple manufacturers are likely to have been
found to be ineffective, overly expensive or failure prone. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp.
4-5]
Thus, electric vehicles are the only technology on the list that remains largely unutilized and
can deliver the massive reductions in tailpipe emissions required to meet the standards. Given the
uncertainty associated with this technology, however, it seems reasonable to make other
approaches to meeting the standards available to automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756,
pp. 4-5]
[See original attachment for figure "Table 2. Manufacturers Utilization of Proven
Technologies"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 4-5]
905
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Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
ICCT recommends the adoption of Alternative 1, the most stringent option EPA presents in its
proposal for the light-duty vehicle (LDV) GHG standards. We believe even greater GHG
reductions than laid out in Alternative 1 would be feasible because today's technology, policy,
and market landscape have primed the market for a rapid transition to cleaner vehicles.
Substantial public and private sector investments and a comprehensive package of federal and
state level policies make the timing and stringency of the proposed rule achievable, feasible, and
cost-effective. At the federal level, the combination of substantial consumer and industry
incentives from the $370 billion allocated to climate and clean energy investments through the
Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) will accelerate the shift to electric vehicles while
supporting a domestic supply chain and charging infrastructure buildout. In parallel, the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law complements the IRA by investing $7.5 billion in electric vehicle
charging infrastructure, $10 billion in clean transportation, and more than $7 billion in battery
components, critical minerals, and materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 3]
Organization: International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW)
We encourage the EPA to calibrate the proposed standards to an alternative set of strong
standards that better reflect the feasibility of compliance so that the projected adoption of ZEVs
is set to feasible levels, increases stringency more gradually, and occurs over a greater period of
time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 1-2]
II. Barriers to Compliance
The EPA's proposed GHG emissions standards for light- and medium-duty vehicles set out an
ambitious target for ZEV adoption. While the proposed standards are performance-based and do
not mandate the use of a specific technology, compliance all but requires the increased adoption
of ZEV technologies. The EPA projects that one potential pathway for the industry to meet the
proposed standards would be through the following mix of ZEV and ICE vehicles: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 7]
ZEV Share Projection. 17
17 Supra note 1 at 29329.
Vehicle Class MY 2027 MY 2028 MY 2029 MY 2030 MY
2031 MY 2032
Sedans 45% 53% 61% 69% 73%
78%
Crossovers/ SUV s3 8% 46% 56% 59% 61%
62%
Pickups 11% 23% 37% 45% 55%
68%
Total 36% 45% 55% 60% 63%
67%
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[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 7]
While GHG emissions standards seek to hold manufacturers accountable, many of the factors
that make compliance feasible are outside of the control of manufacturers. These factors include
consumer demand for EVs (market penetration), reliable charging infrastructure, grid capacity,
energy costs, or the costs of key inputs, such as batteries or critical minerals. Together, under the
proposed standards, these variables will serve as substantial obstacles to OEM compliance. The
UAW supports using regulation to bring new technology to the auto industry, so long as the
technology is proven and cost effective; regulatory timelines are feasible; and manufacturers
have flexibility to meet stringency requirements through multiple technology paths. Through
balanced rules, it is possible to take feasibility into account while still making substantial
reductions in GHG emissions and meeting key long-term targets. As the EPA highlights,
manufacturers have declared their commitment to long-term emissions reductions and
electrification targets, but the pathway to those targets must be feasible and strengthen domestic
manufacturing. Therefore, we encourage the EPA to recalibrate the standards so that the
projected adoption of ZEVs reflects more feasible alternatives, increases more gradually, and
occurs over a greater period of time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 7]
A. ICE Sales Fund EV Transition
The proposed standards must reflect what is feasible for manufacturers to produce and sell to
consumers and promote domestic production of cleaner technologies. The continued production
of ICE vehicles, particularly light trucks (pickup trucks, sport utility vehicles, vans, and
minivans), must be supported by proposed standards. The EV industry is in its infancy. On their
own, EVs are not yet profitable. 18 Some automakers will lose billions producing EVs and don't
expect to reach profitability any time soon. 19 Therefore, federal programs and regulation must
work in concert to incentivize the production of EVs. While the transition is progressing, the
auto industry relies on the continued production of ICE vehicles to reach profitability and fund
required investments in electrification. Domestic automakers specifically rely on the sale of light
trucks to fund investment into the EV transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 8]
18 YeonBaik, Russell Hensley, et. al., "Making electric vehicles profitable", (McKinsey and Company,
Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/making-
electric-vehicles-profitable.
19 Chris Bibey, "Electric Vehicles Are Draining Billions From Profitable ICE Legacy Automakers With
Ford Projecting $3 Billion in Losses" (Yahoo Finance, Mar. 30, 2023),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/electric-vehicles-draining-billions-profitable-151050558.html.
Organization: Jaguar Land Rover NA, LLC (JLR)
JLR would like to highlight our concerns over EPA's plans to incorporate PHEVs into their
analysis for the final rule. If EPA proceeds with the planned changes to the certified PHEV C02
value, namely through the adjustment of the utility factor, they must acknowledge the impact this
will have on fleet compliance, greatly reducing their contribution to the fleet. As such, the
baseline GHG target and projected ZEV share should also be adjusted by an equal amount, to
avoid an increase in target stringency by stealth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 4-5]
We would like to comment on the statement made by EPA that "this is a projection and
represents one out of many possible compliance pathways for the industry. The proposed
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standards are performance-based and do not mandate any specific technology for any
manufacturer or any vehicle type." Due to the multitude of changes including those to PHEVs
and reduction in credit flexibilities, there is very little choice with regards to technologies that
will meet the incredibly challenging standards set. [REDACTEDJCBI [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0744, pp. 4-5]
In addition, the goals set out in the E.O. 14037 and Blueprint refer to vehicles sales in 2030
Calendar Year (CY), whereas the ambitious target set by EPA refers to the 2030MY fleet, which
will contain a combination of vehicles sold in 2029 and 203 0CY, effectively bringing the target
forward by six months. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 4-5]
Increased Lead Time
Automakers need to fund their transition to electrification with their sales today. In today's
extremely challenging environment, this transition is being impacted in real terms. To account
for this, whilst JLR strongly supports the goals of EPA, the early years of the proposed
regulation represent a considerable challenge, particularly for smaller OEMs, and should be
tempered to allow for automakers to catch up following the recent stresses on industry. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 5-7]
JLR is very familiar with the challenge to traditional ICE manufacturers of transitioning to
zero emission vehicles. We launched the first all-electric SUV by a luxury manufacturer, the
Jaguar I-PACE, in 2018. Since its debut, it has won more than 90 global awards, including
World Car of the Year Award 2019. Despite this, sales peaked at only 2.1% of the JLR fleet in
2019MY in the US. [REDACTED]CBI This is our starting point today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0744, pp. 5-7]
We're taking our lessons from the Jaguar I-PACE as we radically redesign and launch our
future fleet. Jaguar Land Rover is transforming into a sustainability-rich, electric-first business;
however, we need the increased lead time to successfully execute the transformation. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 5-7]
JLR made difficult decisions to launch a superior "BEV first" architecture. We relinquished
two flex platforms (platform prioritizing ICE but could support BEV options), which has had
subsequent timing implications. While it was a difficult decision to make, the product strategy
decisions related to our Reimagine Strategy will unquestionably accelerate Jaguar Land Rover's
electrified future. We support the ambition of EPA but need time to pivot our fleet to achieve the
goal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 5-7]
[REDACTED]CBI Despite this aggressive electrification strategy, the proposed GHG targets
will be extremely challenging to meet, especially in the beginning years as we ramp up
production of our new BEV models. Our manufacturing facilities need to go through an
unprecedented transformation. Our largest facility (-8000 employees) where Velar and F- PACE
nameplates are built on a flex ICE/PHEV platform will be repurposed to accommodate the new
all-electric Jaguar platform. Our next largest facility (-3500 employees) which currently builds
our Evoque and Discovery Sport nameplates on a flex ICE/PHEV platform will become JLR's
first all-electric manufacturing facility for our EMA platform. Changes to the manufacturing
facilities are complex and require time to execute while old products are still being produced.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 5-7]
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Additionally, with the significant uncertainty around enabling conditions (e.g., infrastructure,
consumer acceptance, market readiness and critical mineral supply chains) the transition period
will be difficult to navigate. Due to the large number of factors outside of OEMs control, we
propose that the agency take inspiration from other global legislation and commit to formal
monitoring points every two years similar to the reports featured in Article 14a in the EU
2023/851 C02 emission regulation?. Such formal monitoring points form regulatory good
practice and can examine the progress of the regulation and whether any aspects need revising.
The report should also take into account the progress made with factors outside industry and
agency control including: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 5-7]
7 REGULATION (EU) 2023/851 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 (C02 emission perf-rmance
standards) - Article 14a https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32023R0851
• EV adoption rates
• Charging infrastructure deployment
• Battery costs (including critical minerals)
• Consumer impact
The reports will provide an objective assessment of the effectiveness of the regulation and a
basis for any changes should they be required. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 5-7]
We need less stringent targets in the early years and then, based on our plan, we expect to
achieve the more ambitious targets in the outer years which will allow us to meet EPA's
2032MY target. The front-loaded stringency in the NPRM, drives tough targets before 2030MY
and could divert investment away from this journey. This could drive us to accrue large liabilities
for 2024 and 2025MY as we begin to transition our fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp.
5-7]
The difficulty in the beginning of the regulation is compounded by the extremely high step
change between 2026 and 2027MY standards (when adjusted to reflect the proposed reduction in
allowable AC and off-cycle credits.) Due to the changes to the footprint curves, light truck
standards increase at almost double the rate of passenger car (21% vs 12%). This particularly
impacts JLR as an OEM with a high percentage of off-cycle technologies (OCT) and air
conditioning (A/C) featured in our vehicles, as noted in the 2022 EPA Automotive Trends
Report8. Reaching the 10 g/mile OCT cap and with the highest reported A/C credit (24.2 g/mile),
equivalent to an 8% reduction from tailpipe emissions for A/C credits alone in 2021. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 5-7]
8 The 2022 EPA Automo-ive Trends Report - https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-
12/420s22001.pdf
[See original fo- graph, "Figure 2 - See appendix A1 for more details"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0744, pp. 5-7]
Although there is significant uncertainty in how the ZEV market will develop in this
regulatory time period, JLR supports EPA's goals. We are committed to investing in reducing
our greenhouse gas footprint and making a positive societal impact on our journey to net zero
carbon emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 11]
The past few difficult trading years have left a tangible impact on this journey. We had to
make business decisions in light of this reduced cashflow, which means we need more time to
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transition. The end goal is the same. We ask for the agency's support in allowing us to meet it,
by giving us enough time to successfully transition our fleet to an electric future. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 11]
Organization: Job Creators Network Foundation (JCNF)
EPA's Proposed Rule Is Not Feasible [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0709, pp. 2-3]
In addition to being illegal, the proposal is not technically feasible. Daniel Yergi', one of the
world's leading energy experts, highlights how electric cars have 2.5 times more copper in them
than regular vehicles.6 He cites the Internat'onal Monetary Fund's warning that such
environme"tal policies will "spur unprecedented demand for some of the m"st crucial metals,"
with pr"ce increases that "could derail or delay the energy transition itself "7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0709, pp.2-3]
6 Daniel Yergin, "'Net Zero' Will Mean a Mining Boom," (Link: https://www.wsj.com/articles/net-zero-
will-mean-a-mining-boom-electric-cars-minerals-oil-fossil-fuels-climate-change-policy-cb8d5137) Wall
Street Journal (April 12, 2023).
7 Lukas Boer, Andrea Pescatori, Martin Stuermer, Nico Valckx, "Soaring Metal Prices May Delay Energy
Transition," (Link: https://www.imf.Org/en/Blogs/Articles/2021/l 1/10/soaring-metal-prices-may-delay-
energy-transition) IMF Blog (Nov. 10,2021).
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
As discussed below, the automotive supply chain is nowhere close to ready when it comes to
meeting the production demands that the Proposed Rule forces through it. And even if it were,
the scope and speed of the Proposed Rule requires automakers to devote every last resource they
have to keeping up with that pace—including precious resources they would have spent on the
development of more innovative EV technology than we have right now. This sacrifice of
innovation at the altar of speed will lead to disastrous consequences down the line as the demand
grows for later generations of EVs and their component parts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649,
p. 4]
Start with what the Proposed Rule aims to do: restructure the American car industry around
EVs in under a decade. Specifically, the Agency is pressing to grow today's 8.4% share of light-
duty new EV sales to 67% by 2032. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,189, 29,329. That allows just eight years
from when the proposal will likely be finalized to achieve an eight-fold increase. How? By
altering emission assessments and imposing the harshest emissions standards the Agency has
ever promulgated—on the heels of what are already the "most stringent GHG standards ... to
date" for 2023-2026 model year light-Duty vehicles. Id. at 29,227 (citing 86 Fed. Reg. at
74,434). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 6]
EPA tries to disclaim how extreme this proposal is by saying that the Agency is responding to
"[r]ecent trends and developments in emissions control technology, including vehicle
electrification and other advanced vehicle technologies," that make the "stringent emissions
standards . . . feasible at reasonable cost." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,186. But it also admits, as it must,
that the Proposed Rule will forcibly accelerate market transformations—or in the Agency's more
euphemistic terms, require "an increasing pace" across more of manufacturers' "vehicle fleets,"
id. at 29,341. Indeed, far from being "technologically neutral," the proposal's "dramatic
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reductions in emissions" means that the "only automaker that would meet" them right now is
Tesla, which produces only EVs. See Riley Beggin, Proposed Emission Rules That Favor EVs
Face Political Blowback, Government Technology (May 23, 2023), https://bit.ly/3qIesCH.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 6]
Organization: Kia Corporation
EPA's proposed standards, requiring 60 percent of new vehicle sales be EVs by 2030 and 67
percent by 2032, are unrealistic in the proposed timeframe because of the vast number of market
risks, consumer EV demand uncertainty, and multiple external challenges. Neither the current
trajectory of consumer adoption of EVs, nor existing levels of complementary government
policies are robust enough to meet the target in the timeframe outlined. EPA discusses
"uncertainties" several times in the proposal, but the proposed standards do not reflect the
uncertainties industry will face in transitioning our powertrain to electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0555, p. 2]
Kia is committed to speeding the transition by investing billions in popularizing EVs to all
consumers up and down the market. We urge the agency to work with stakeholders on a
reasonable path forward that will result in a balanced set of standards that are achievable for
automakers, workers, and consumers. A rule that is set at a more reasonable pace will ensure this
transition to EVs is successful for the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 2]
EPA's Proposed GHG Standards Are Unrealistic in the Timeframe Proposed
EPA requests comment on its proposed light-duty GHG standards that would require a 60
percent EV penetration by 2030 and 67 percent EV penetration by 2032. Alternative 3 achieves
the same stringency as the proposed standards in MY2032 but provides for a more consistent rate
of stringency inc-ease for MYs 2027 - 2031.7 Importantly, EPA asserts that standards
substantially more stringent than Alternative 1, which is more stringent than the proposal, would
be inappropriate "because of the uncertainties concerning the cost and feasibility. "8 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 4-5]
7 88 Fed. Reg. 29,201.
8 88 Fed. Reg. 29,201.
Kia continues to make dramatic investments in electrification and shares EPA's goal of fully
transitioning to electrification. The EPA-proposed GHG standards in the timeframe proposed,
however, are not realistic given the vast uncertainties in the market. While Kia is optimistic that
we can get to 60 percent electric vehicle penetration in the future, the proposed time frame of
2030 is not realistic. This timeframe is too fast given the uncertainties around EV affordability,
EV charging infrastructure, and EV battery critical mineral supplies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0555, pp. 4-5]
The proposed rule of requiring 60 percent BEVs of new vehicles sold in 2030 has gone well
beyond President Biden's 2021 EO14037 goal of 50 percent ZEVs. As it stands today, the
national BEV percentage stands at 8.6 percent market share.9 EPA is assuming aggressive
penetration for EV adoption, a new technology that has not been fully embraced by consumers
yet, more than any new automotive technology to date. Electric powertrain technology is not
seamless to the customer like all other recent technologies have been. Additionally, the new EV
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powertrain technology can be upwards to +$20,000 more than competing ICE models.
Affordability, EV charging infrastructure, and EV battery critical minerals are significant
challenges that need to be addressed for the widespread adoption of EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0555, pp. 4-5]
9 https://www.autosinnovate.org/resources/electric-vehicle-sales-dashboard
Because of all these factors, Kia strongly recommends that EPA reevaluates the GHG
standards proposed. Kia recommends EPA align standards more closely with President Biden's
2021 goal set in the EO14037. Kia can support a target of 40-50 percent ZEVs - BEVs, PHEVs,
and FCEVs by 2030 with continued increases through 2032 coupled with the right supporting
policies. Even this 40-50 percent ZEVs penetration goal by 2030 was and still is an extremely
challenging goal. A goal that will hinge on whether there is (1) sustained and supportive policies
from the government supporting a successful EV market; (2) consumers continue to demand this
new technology; and, (3) other industries outside the automotive industry make supporting
market investments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 4-5]
EPA Underestimates Market and External Challenges
EPA's proposed rule highlights the very complex challenges that lie ahead for the EV market.
There are an enormous number of factors that are outside the control of automakers including
manufacturing capacity, battery production, charging infrastructure, critical mineral supply, and
consumer acceptance. A successful transition in the timeframe proposed will require massive
changes in commitments from all sectors of the economy: vehicle suppliers, labor, utilities,
charging infrastructure, home builders, mining, and mineral processing. Consumer behavior and
acceptance also needs to significantly change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 6]
EPA's proposal requires automakers to sell EVs but does not propose any requirements to
ensure adequate charging infrastructure to homes, highways, or businesses, or mandate utilities
to have adequate capacity or provide reasonably priced high-power charging, or mandate easily
accessible and affordable battery critical minerals for EV batteries. Government policies need to
start today to ensure there are enough critical minerals for batteries and high-power charging.
Unfortunately, there is not yet a roadmap to developing these and other essential pieces to the
transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 6]
All of the above market challenges will need to have complementary policies supporting all of
the sectors outside the vehicle industry including utilities, mining, charging companies and will
require them to meet targets too. It is critical that EPA take these factors into consideration when
setting standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 6]
EPA's Analysis of Supporting Government Policies is Extremely Optimistic
EPA over-estimates the utility of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJ A) and
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) that have started but are nowhere near complete. And we certainly
cannot tell yet if these programs will be successful. Kia is also hopeful that the IIJA and IRA
clean vehicle tax credit can help expedite the sales of EVs, but EPA justifies its proposal with
overly optimistic forecasts about these programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 6]
As an example, EPA forecasts that the average IRA clean vehicle credit amount (30D) will be
$6000 across all EV purchases by 2032.11 Currently, there are 91 ZEVs available to purchase
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but only ten vehicles qualified for the tax credits in February 2023. The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) proposed rules released in March 2023 further decreased the vehicles eligible and will
continue to decrease the vehicles eligible, at least in the short-term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0555, p. 6]
1188 Fed. Reg. 29,201.
Organization: Lucid Group, Inc.
Lucid agrees with EPA's finding from its technology feasibility assessment—the increasing
availability of zero and near-zero tailpipe emissions technologies not only makes it ripe, but
critical, to strengthen emissions standards. EV sales in the U.S. are increasing at a rapid pace.
When coupled with the historic level of investment from the Biden Administration through the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, CHIPS and Science Act, and Inflation Reduction Act, this
moment is opportune to complement those incentives with cleaner tailpipe standards. Industry is
currently demonstrating the feasibility of a zero-emission transition. Lucid is a modern-day
example in its ability to develop the most advanced EV technology with a fraction of the capital
available to larger automakers. Industry capital can similarly be redeployed to zero- emission
vehicles thus transforming an original equipment manufacturers (OEM) fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0664, pp. 2-3]
The Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA) and its members have found that
electricity providers and grid-readiness will keep pace with the transition to zero-emission
vehicles. In 2021, the U.S. fleet of electric vehicles used 6.1 terawatt hours (TWhs) of electricity,
accounting for 0.15% of the total national energy generation that year.2, 3 It's estimated that an
additional 15-27 TWh of annual new power generation will be needed to service EVs and related
technologies. In the past, nearly 100 TWh have been added in a single year, demonstrating that
such an increase is accomplishable.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 2-3]
2 "Assessment of Light-Duty Plug-in Electric Vehicles in the United States, 2010-2021," Argonne
National Lab, November 2022, available at https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2022/ll/178584.pdf.
3 "Monthly Energy Review May 2023," EIA, available at
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/month/pdf/sec7_3.pdf.
4 "Summary Report on EVs at Scale and the U.S. Electric Power System," US Drive
https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/summary-report-evs-scale-and-us- electric-power-system-
2019.
Transmission of the energy generated is another key component, and one that this
Administration has begun to address. This year, the Administration published its plan to decrease
permitting timelines, including those for new transmission projects.5 Additionally, the U.S.
Department of Energy proposed a rule on designating National Interest Electric Transmission
Corridors.6 The Federal government is demonstrating its intent to bolster grid resilience, which
in part will ensure electricity demand is met. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-09-0664, pp. 2-3]
5 "FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Outlines Priorities for Building America's Energy
Infrastructure Faster, Safer, and Cleaner," (May 2023) available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2023/05/10/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-outlines-priorities-for-
building-americas-energy- infrastructure-faster-safer-and-cleaner/.
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6 Notice of Intent and Request for Information: Designation of National Interest Electric Transmission
Corridors, 88 FR 30956 (May 15, 2023).
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown '(513 signatures)
I'm writing to express my concern about the new proposed EPA emissions rules on light and
medium-duty vehicles and heavy-d'ty trucks. The EPA's recent proposals to effectively require
up to 60% heavy-duty and 70% light and medium-duty vehicles s"les by 2032 t" be "zero
emission" is very concerning to me. Among other defects, the proposals fail to consider lifecycle
emissions and overlooks the potential for internal combustion vehicles and liquid fuels, such as
biofuels, to continue improving and reducing carbon intensity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1717]
Specifically, I have the following concerns with the proposals:
• Limits consumer choice and increases cost: The proposals may limit choices and increase
costs for consumers, including those in economically disadvantaged groups. Many people can
not afford to buy new cars already let alone top end model EVs which also require modifications
to home to enable charging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1717]
• Potentially affects U.S. energy security and use of biofuels: These proposals do not address
the potential for biofuel to be used to create energy security benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-1717]
• Potentially provides a too optimistic forecast for EV Sales: Projected EV sales rates may be
optimistic and may overstate the benefits of the proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1717]
• The lack of infrastructure for EVs: Increased sales of EVs may rely on optimistic forecasts
of increased electricity generation and charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1717]
• The lack of critical materials: There is concern about the supply and availability of critical
minerals and supply chains for battery manufacturing. The increased environmental impact of
mineral mining has not been considered. Lanscape impacts to large scale surface mining
operations far outweigh impacts of oil and gas drilling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1717]
• Provides no incentives for existing vehicles to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions:
This is a missed opportunity to accelerate GHG reduction in the early years of the program.
[EP A-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1717]
• Fails to consider electric vehicles are not zero emissions: The proposals are focused on
tailpipe GHG emissions rather than life cycle emissions. Therefore, upstream GHG emissions for
fuel and vehicle manufacturing and electricity generation are not included in the analysis.
Maintaining an existing vehicle consumes far less energy and thus generates less overall
emissions than the emissions generated by manufacturing new fleets of vehicles. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-1717]
The EPA is not acknowledging how these proposals would trade our hard-earned U.S. energy
security for mineral dependence on China. It is not in our strategic interest to ban cars that run on
fuels extracted, refined, and grown in the United States, especially considering all the work that
is being done here to lower the carbon intensity of those fuels. To do so would leave us more
dependent on and beholden'to China and I don't think the EPA is the entity that should be
making such critical economic and geopolitical decisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1717]
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The EPA's proposals take the misguided position that only emissions from the vehicle
tailpipes are worth counting. In doing so, the proposals do not consider internal combustion
engine vehicles as a factor in lowering carbon right now using existing technologies. Consumers
should have the greatest number of choices to meet their needs and budget. The final standards
need to take a tech and fuel neutral approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1717]
Therefore, I ask that you do not support the new proposed EPA emissions rules on light and
medium-duty vehicles and heavy-duty trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1717]
Organization: Mayor Becky Daggett, City of Flagstaff, Arizona et al.
Technological advances and cost savings
EPA should ensure the LDV and HDV standards reflect major advancements in zero-emission
technologies. Globally, there are more than 839 different models of zero-emission vans, trucks and buses
commercially available with new models being introduced at an unprecedented rate. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-//globaldrivetozero.org/tools/zeti-data-explorer (Accessed March 15, 2023).
Timelines
The sooner that long-term LDV and HDV standards are in place, the sooner that vehicle
manufacturers and related companies will have the regulatory certainty needed to plan their
decision-making, product development, and rollout. We urge the EPA to finalize both standards
by the end of 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
In addition, the standards immediately increase dramatically in stringency beginning in
27MY, with a resulting 36% BEV requirement. These standards are particularly accelerated for
vehicles classified as light trucks, since the gap between passenger cars and light trucks is
reduced. Mazda believes it is very important that the ramp-up and the light truck gap reduction
should be slower in the early years of the program, as the industry, consumers, and suppliers
adapt to th's new reali"y. EPA's prop"sed "Alternative 3" is a step in the right direction, but the
linear reduction in standards is insufficient to alleviate the harsh early years when the long-term
targets are so aggressive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, pp. 2-3]
Summary
Mazda is proud of its heritage and contributions to personal mobility, and wecelebrated our
100th anniversary in 2020. Mazda has also long been an engineering leader known for
innovative powertrains like the rotary engine and Skyactiv technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0595, pp. '-4]
We look at EPA's NPRM and its preferred option through the lens of a company that is
already working towards an ele'trified future. It's not a matter of if this transformation will
happen, but when and how. Mazda, like the rest of the industry, faces many challenges: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, pp. 3-4]
- Will charging infrastructure be sufficient?
- Can the electric grid handle the increased demands?
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- How will EV incentives on the federal and state level impact this shift?
- Will suppliers be able to develop and produce components like batteries (that currently
require critical minerals, many from China) quickly enough and in enough volume?
- How might future laws or regulations in trade and re-shoring impact our ability to meet
goals?
- Are consumers ready and willing"to move away f'om "tried and true" internal combustion
engines in numbers sufficient to meet these goals?
- Can OEMs remain sufficiently profitable to fuel the transition to EVs? [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0595, pp.3-4]
Mazda strongly requests that EPA take these considerations into account and make necessary
adjustments to the proposed rule as it works towards a Final Rule. We feel the Final Rule should
have more realistic targets and associated ramp ups, include PH' Vs, and adopt CARB's current
LEV IV for criteria emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, pp. 3-4]
Organization: Mclaren Automotive, McLaren Group
Given the challenges we have highlighted in moving towards greater electrification for SVMs
like McLaren, EPA is effectively relying on credit trading flexibility as the means by which
SVMs will maintain compliance with GHG standards. We believe this is inappropriate for
several reasons and demonstrates that the proposed alternative standards do not meet the
requirements of CAA§ 202"a) that standards "take effect after such period as the Administrator
finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving
appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance w"thin such a period". First, we believe it is
inappropriate to set a standard so stringent as to effectively require a manufacturer to entirely
rely on another manufacturer to maintain compliance. Additionally, there is an inherent risk that
even if a credit-generating manufacturer is willing to sell credits, the credits may be purchased
by other parties before SVMs can access them. Having to purchase credits to comply with the
proposed GHG standard would also divert resources away from electrification challenges. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, p. 3]
As stated, allowing for certainty and time to adjust to changes remains important for SVM
like McLaren. An SVM standard also must take into account that engines and vehicles already
developed will have to company with a standard in MY2024 which is currently unknown.
Allowing for early years less stringent targets is essential given that design decisions which have
already been made. It is also important for GHG policy to be fair and equitable. The EPA SVM
proposal would require over 50% BEV mix in MY2026, based on McLaren analysis, far higher
than Primary Standards requirements and effectively impossible given the lack of technology
available to electrify high performance supercars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, p. 3]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
EPA should try to finalize this proposed rule by the end of 2023 in order to provide lead time
that would enable implementation of the medium-duty vehicle requirements prior to MY 2030.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, p. 4]
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MECA appreciates the need for EPA to set standards respective to the lead time requirements
stipulated in section 202(a)(3)(C) of the Clean Air Act. For this reason, the NPRM proposes new
requirements for vehicles with GVWR > 6,000 lbs. to begin with MY 2030. We support EPA's
inclusion of multiple voluntary early compliance pathways for vehicles with GVWR > 6,000 lbs
offered in the proposed rule. Our analysis concludes that technologies are commercially
available to enable phase-in of proposed medium-duty vehicle criteria pollutant standards
starting with MY 2028, which EPA recognized in the proposal by allowing for alternative early
compliance pathways. Therefore, we request EPA work to finalize this proposed rule by the end
of 2023. We believe this will provide the necessary lead time to begin the required phase-in of
criteria pollutant standards for vehicles with GVWR > 6,000 lbs starting with MY 2028. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, p. 4]
The previous light-duty GHG and CAFE regulations covering MY 2017-2025 included
provisions for mid-term evaluation or review. These regulations were designed to set emission
standards further into the future than this regulation proposes. In addition, significant uncertainty
existed during the handling of the previous mid-term review. For these reasons, MECA does not
support a similar mid-term evaluation provision in this proposal nor compliance "off-ramps" that
would be triggered by results of a review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, p. 4]
MECA members are commercializing components for electric and hydrogen fuel cell
vehicles. This includes battery materials for the manufacture of both cathode and anodes utilizing
unique macrostructure and composite formulations to improve efficiency and energy density.
Electric component manufacturers are using state of the art transistor materials in their motors
and power electronics that operate at higher voltages and temperatures thus requiring simpler
cooling strategies. These next generation component designs reduce switching losses and
improve electric efficiency of the system architecture in electric powertrains. To facilitate
integration, component suppliers are integrating the motor, inverter and transmission into electric
drive units to simplify the thermal management of the electric components and ease integration
into vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 31-32]
As demonstrated for combustion vehicles over the past 50 years, the market can not always be
relied upon to drive innovation towards conservation of critical resources and energy security by
improving the efficiency of vehicles. This has led agencies to set fuel efficiency and GHG
standards. There is a significant disparity in the electric efficiency of similarly sized passenger
electric vehicles today, as shown in Table 4. [See original comment for Table 4. Comparison of
Energy Efficiency of BEV and PHEV Models] We urge EPA to begin compiling electric
efficiency information and consider setting a minimum efficiency or energy consumption by
weight class in a future rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 31-32]
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
The success of our industry is interwoven with the success of this proposal and the ability of
the government to work with industry and other stakeholders to meet significant challenges.
Therefore, the rule must address: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
The need for regulatory certainty. The final rule must contain an effective mix of
feasible, demonstrated technology along with emerging technology, leaving options to improve
emissions 'eductions in today's advanced propulsion designs. This will foster innovation in a
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coordinated direction, aligned with U.S. policy, but not mandate application of a narrowly
defined technology path to make a positive im'act on the country's urgent environmental goals.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
The influence of-ther technologies - including internal combustion engines fueled by
hydrogen and other renewable ca-bon-neutral fuels - which can impact measurable
environmental improvements at scale technologies can provide immediate improvement to the
environment. This is important not only for environmental improvements but for environmental
justice in providing cleaner consumer vehicles immediately to communities living and working
close to busy streets, highways, and other transportation networks. Inclusion of all technologies
that can decarbonize the transportation sector will foster the necessary growth in manufacturing
capacity, vocational performance, infrastructure improvements, and consumer acceptance. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Technology Neutrality and BEV Emissions. EPA should ensure that battery electric
vehicles (BEV) are included in metrics for vehicle-to-vehicle comparison by assigning a metric
that captures the pollutant emissions related to BEV operation, aligned with national electricity
generation figures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Chall'nges in our nation's infrastructure and power grid. MEMA appreciates the
significant public investments being made to support clean transportation infrastructure. As these
new investments in highways and main corridors are deployed, federal and state incentives are
needed to further expand the EV charging and refueling infrastructure in areas that connect these
major thoroughfares. Urban industrial centers will need focused buildout while rural areas will
need thoughtful rollouts to achieve an effective EV charging infrastructure. These buildouts must
include Direct Current Fast Charge (DCFC) and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) bidirectional charging.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Supply chain challenges. The proposed rule assumes that all materials advanced
vehicles, which are not available today in the quantities needed to support the massive growth in
vehicle construction, will become available within sufficient time. This places a significant and
unnecessary risk on manufacturers and suppliers. Furthermore, once a company has converted
production to new technology lines, that company cannot easily pivot its facilities and workforce
back to the previous technology if EPA projections are not realized by the mid-to-late-2020s.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Workforce challenges. A significant increase in skilled workers will be needed to
support the implementation of this rule and long-term success thereof [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Extended warranty. The necessity to clearly define the applicability of the extended
warranty and the need to provide repair access to service these new vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
MEMA members are working to accelerate the performance and availability of clean-
operating vehicle technologies and are directly contributing to their realization. Besides battery
electric options, effective low- and zero-carbon technologies for future and current in-use
vehicles also exist and can readily be put to use to reduce nationwide emissions and help EPA
meet its climate goals. The success of this rule depends on greater inclusion of all available
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emissions reduction technologies, significant investment in infrastructure, careful understanding
and investment in the domestic and global supply chain and ensured repair access to serve the
improved and enhanced domestic vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Detailed MEMA Comments and Concerns on our Shared Challenges [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0644, p. 4]
The Final Rule Must Reflect Regulatory Certainty Paired with Technology Neutrality [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 4]
EPA must provide sufficient regulatory certainty to manufacturers and consumers to ensure
the most favorable outcome of this ambitious market transformation. The final rule must contain
an effective mix of feasible, demonstrable technology along with emerging technology, and
leverage all available options to improve emissions 'eductions in today's advanced propulsion
designs. At the same time, the final rule must encourage innovation in clean transportation,
including more advanced low- and zero-emissions technology. Conversely, a 100% ZEV
mandate is not realistic, would stifle innovation and would disallow technologies that could
address the urgent need to decarbonize applications for LD and MD vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0644, p. 4]
Technology Neutrality Pairs with Regulatory Certainty
The proposed rule disproportionally favors battery electric propulsion, which in turn
discourages any further advancements for internal combustion technology, including carbon-
neutral renewable fuels. Emerging innovations and recent technologies offer significant
reduction in emissions from ICE vehicles, in both future and current fleets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0644, pp. 5-6]
Technology-forcing regulations that foster innovation aligned with policy, rather than
regulations that mandate a narrowly defined technology path, will lead to a more positive
national outcome. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 5-6]
MEMA recognizes that the proposal attempts a performance-based standard, and the agency
makes forecasts that estimate a variety of technology combinations in future fleets. By accepting
the potential for technologies other than battery electric and hydrogen fuel cell, EPA can make a
more immediate, widespread, positive impact on nationwide emissions reductions. Therefore,
EPA must incent the development and deployment of advanced technology options to include
advanced internal combustion (ICE) technologies, renewable fuels, and post-combustion C02
capture (known as mobile carbon capture). These incentives will assist in accelerating the
necessary infrastructure improvements needed to support advanced technology vehicles. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 5-6]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
Now more than ever, it is critical that EPA strike the right balance between regulatory
objectives, supportive policies, and feasibility. As Mercedes-Benz assesses global trends and our
company's commitments, we believe that, even with funding under the Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law and the Inflation Reduction Act, there remain many challenges and unknowns regarding the
development of the U.S. EV market - charging infrastructure, the supply chain, battery critical
minerals availability, electric grid capacity, customer acceptance, etc. It is thus uncertain how
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EV sales will keep pace with the agency's NPRM targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p.
2]
We would like to emphasize the importance of setting feasible and achievable standards for
Class 2b and Class 3 vehicles. Similar to light-duty vehicles ("LDVs"), there remain many
uncertainties in customer uptake and acceptance of medium-duty electric vehicles. Moreover,
electrification in this segment lags that of light-duty, as production of these vehicles is only just
beginning. As a result, there are currently limited options available to consumers, and medium-
duty charging infrastructure requires additional attention, funding, and considerations
appropriate for medium-duty vehicle usage. Medium-duty vans are being increasingly swept into
pick-up truck focused regulations, as well as EPA's intent to treat medium-duty more like light-
duty. Yet, medium-duty vans remain fundamentally different than either pick-ups or light-duty,
and therefore warrant specific consideration of their technologies, customer uses, and
corresponding regulatory requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Minnesota Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
The proposed EPA standards for 2027 and later set very aggressive goals for reducing GHG
and criteria emissions. Achieving these goals will require dramatic changes not only in vehicle
design, but in the entire automotive supply chain. While the U.S. market share of BEVs will
continue to expand, establishing regulations where success is solely contingent upon an
unattainable tenfold increase in the production and sales of BEVs over the next eight years
represents an avoidable mistake. The proposed rule would require huge investments and rapid
growth in many industries, including the mining and processing of key minerals, the generation
and distribution of electricity, and the recharging of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0612, p. 3]
The proposed rulemaking assumes that BEVs will be the dominant technology for future
emissions reductions. But relying on a single technology is a risky strategy; many factors could
interfere including the supply and/or cost of critical minerals, lack of BEV recharging
infrastructure, slow ramp-up of wind and solar power, poor customer acceptance of BEVs in
some market segments, etc. EPA estimates that 67% of U.S. vehicles sales will be BEVs in 2032,
but most major automakers predict much lower BEV sales, and the world's largest automaker
predicts only 20% in 2030. For comparison, MIT predicts9 that China will achieve only 40% in
2030 despite a head start and extremely strong government interventions. EPA should not base
mandatory emissions standards on unrealistic predictions of BEV sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0612, pp. 5-6]
9 https://news.mit.edu/2021/chinas-transition-electric-vehicles-0429.
Organization: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
MPCA believes the proposed standards are technologically feasible and necessary and urges
EPA to adopt them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, p. 5]
Organization: Missouri Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
Monumental challenges in implementing this rule.
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Notwithstanding the vast challenges to everyday Americans, the aggressiveness of EPA's
proposal raises immediate doubt about whether such targets are feasible within the required
timeframe. The rule gives a wholly unrealistic and false impression the U.S. has a robust and
reliable public EV charging infrastructure ready to accommodate the vast number of BEVs.
MCGA members driving Missouri's rural roads know this is not the case. In addition, most
American families will find BEVs' dismal range, extended charge time, shortage of maintenance
technicians, and poor performance under heavy loads and extreme temperatures both frustrating
and entirely impractical for everyday personal and business needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0578, p. 2]
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
Feasibility of More Protective Federal Standards for LDV and MDV Emissions of Multiple
Pollutants
The evolution of light- and medium-duty zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) and charging
infrastructure is the result of leadership, commitment and innovation on numerous fronts and, by
all accounts, this evolution will continue on an upward trajectory further increasing the
feasibility, availability and cost competitiveness of ZEV technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0559, pp. 4-5]
Electric vehicle (EV) sales and model availability continue to grow. 11 In 2022, one in seven
(10 million) light-duty vehicles sold worldwide was an EV.12 More than 800,000 of those sales
were in the U.S., representing a 65-percent increase over 2021,13 and the first quarter of 2023
saw nearly 260,000 EV sales in the U.S.14 Cox Automotive has forecast that U.S. EV sales will
reach 1 million in 2023.15 Further, a study prepared by ERM reports that, "Based on
announcements by major automakers, the number of electrified models available in the U.S. is
projected to reach 187 by the end of 2025, with over 58 new models slated to launch in model
years 2022-2025." 16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 4-5]
11 https://blogs.edf.org/climate41 l/wp-content/blogs.dir/7/files/2022/09/ERM-EDF-Electric-Vehicle-
Market- Report_September2022.pdf
12 Id at 7.
13 https://www.coxautoinc.com/market-insights/in-a-down-market-ev-sales-soar-to-new-record
14 https://www.coxautoinc.com/market-insights/ql-2023-ev-sales
15 Supra note 13
16 Supra note 11, at 36
Most light- and some medium-duty vehicle manufacturers have publicly announced
commitments or goals to increase ZEV sales between now and 204017 and demand by
commercial fleet owners is on the rise as are their commitments to fleet electrification. 18
Meanwhile, vehicle manufacturers are investing heavily in EVs. According to an October 2022
Reuters analysis of public data and projections released by 37 global automobile manufacturers,
"The world's top automakers are planning an extraordinary level of spending to develop and
produce millions of electric vehicles, along with the batteries and raw materials to support that
production, over the next eight years. Reuters calculates that global automakers expect to spend
nearly $1.2 trillion through 2030 on EVs, batteries and materials. The number, which has not
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previously been published, dwarfs previous investment estimates by the industry and is more
than twice the previous calculation published just a year ago." 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0559, pp. 4-5]
17 Id at 38.
18 Id at 41.
19 https://www.reuters.com/graphics/AUTOS-INVESTMENT/ELECTRIC/akpeqgzqypr/
The federal government is demonstrating its deep commitment to accelerating ZEV
deployment. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)
enacted by Congress and signed by President Biden in 2021 and 2022, respectively, infuse
unprecedented funding into EV charging infrastructure and tax credits for commercial and
personal ZEVs and battery manufacturing. As EPA acknowledges in its proposal, "These
measures represent significant Congressional support for investment in expanding the
manufacture, sale, and use of zero-emission vehicles by addressing elements critical to the
advancement of clean transportation and clean electricity generation in ways that will facilitate
and accelerate the development, production and adoption of zero-emission technology during the
time frame of the rule."20 Moreover, EPA states, "Congressional passage of the BIL and IRA
represent pivotal milestones in the creation of a broad-based infrastructure instrumental to the
expansion of clean transportation, including light- and medium-duty zero-emission vehicles, and
we have taken these developments into account in our assessment of the feasibility of the
proposed standards."21 NACAA notes that given the importance of this federal funding EPA
should ensure that it is allocated equitably across the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559,
pp. 4-5]
20 Supra note 1, at 29,195
21 Id at 29,196
State leadership is also playing a pivotal role in rapidly ramping up light- and medium-duty
ZEV adoption. A number of states have established ambitious GHG emission reduction targets -
some economy-wide and others transportation-specific - requiring aggressive reductions by as
soon as 2030. States have also chosen to exercise their authority under CAA section 177 and
adopt portions of the California Advanced Clean Cars (ACC) Regulation, which requires light-
duty car and truck manufacturers to sell increasing percentages of ZEVs. The regulation also
includes low-emission vehicle (LEV) standards to reduce criteria pollutant and GHG emissions
from new cars and trucks with internal combustion engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559,
pp. 4-5]
Seventeen states have adopted the LEV standards and 15 states have adopted the LEV
standards and ZEV sales requirements. Additional states have efforts underway regarding LEV
and/or ZEV adoption and with each additional adopting state comes a greater share of the
national light-duty vehicle market. Last year, California finalized its Advanced Clean Cars II
(ACC II) Regulation, requiring manufacturers of passenger cars and light trucks to produce and
deliver for sale increasing percentages of ZEVs overtime culminating with 100 percent ZEVs by
2035. Six states have adopted ACC II, six more have announced that they are pursuing adoption
and still others are contemplating such action. With each additional adopting state comes a
greater share of the national LDV market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 4-5]
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Regarding MDVs, in the summer of 2020, 17 states and the District of Columbia entered into
the Multi-State Medium- and Heavy-Duty Zero Emission Vehicle Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), including specific goals and targets, agreeing to collaborate "to foster a
self-sustaining market for zero emission medium- and heavy-duty vehicles."22 In July 2022, this
group reaffirmed and strengthened its commitment to the MOU by releasing an Action Plan for
accelerating a transition to zero-emission trucks and buses.23 Eight of these states have chosen
to exercise their authority under CAA section 177 to adopt the California Advanced Clean
Trucks (ACT) Regulation requiring manufacturers that certify Class 2b through Class 8 chassis
or complete vehicles with internal combustion engines (ICE)24 to sell increasing (through MY
2032) percentages of ZEVs as part of their annual sales through 2035, with 60 percent ZEVs for
vocational vehicles and 40 percent ZEVs for tractors (short-haul and long-haul combined).
Additional states have efforts underway regarding ACT and, as with LDVs, with each additional
adopting state comes a greater share of the national MDV (and heavy-duty vehicle) market.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 4-5]
22 https://www.nescaum.org/documents/mhdv-zev-mou-20220329.pdf
23 https://www.nescaum.org/documents/multi-state-medium-and-heavy-duty-zev-action-plan.pdf
24 For the first time, EPA's proposes to group Class 2b and Class 3 MDVs with LDVs in the LMDV rule
(historically these vehicles have been grouped with heavy-duty vehicles).
In September 2021, five states signed the Regional Electric Vehicle Midwest Coalition
Memorandum of Understanding "to accelerate vehicle electrification in the Midwest" and
provide "the foundation for cooperation on fleet electrification along key commercial corridors
to safeguard economic security, reduce harmful emissions, improve public health, and advance
innovation" while positioning the region "to realize additional economic opportunity in clean
energy manufacturing and deployment."25 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 4-5]
25 https://www.michigan.gov/-
/media/Project/Websites/leo/REV_Midwest_MOU_master.pdf?rev=6dd781b5a4eb4551b3b3a5b875d67fb9
Finally, NACAA recommends that EPA include provisions in the final rule that align with
ACC II regarding data standardization, durability, warranty, minimum mileage range labeling,
charging and serviceability requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, p. 8]
Organization: National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) et al.
II. Proposed Electrification Timelines are Unworkable.
The challenges associated with electrifying the light- and medium-duty fleet cannot be
understated. EPA projects that the Proposed Rule will result in 67 percent of light-duty vehicles
sold in 2032 being electric. That figure is an average of 78 percent electric sedans, 68 percent
electric pickups and 62 percent electric crossover and SUVs.3 Conversely, EPA estimates that in
the absence of any regulations, electric vehicles would make up only 39 percent of new sales in
2032.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 3-4]
3 Proposed Rule at ,329 (Table 80).
4 Reputable estimates on how quickly EV sales will increase vary widely. S&P Global Mobility estimates
that by 2030, EVs will be 40 percent of new vehicle sales. The Energy Information Administration, on the
other hand, estimates that EVs will be 17 percent of new vehicle sales by 2030. McKinsey has the highest
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estimate and projects that EVs will be 48 percent of new vehicle sales by 2030. Given these varying
estimates - all from highly respected sources - the Agency should exercise caution about consumers'
willingness to purchase, and manufacturers' ability to deliver, EVs at the rates required by the Proposed
Rule. Writing rules on its own does not mean that challenges related to supply chains for making the
vehicles or consumer sentiment will change.
These timelines are entirely untethered from the market's capabilities. Most prospective EV
drivers will need fast, high-powered on-the-go charging solutions before they're comfortable
buying an EV.5 Although fuel retailers are very active in the National Electric Vehicle
Infrastructure Program ("NEW Program) and other federal and state funding opportunities, it
remains unacceptably difficult to identify a viable business case for installing EV charging
stations. Unless those obstacles are permanently removed, these challenges will remain
regardless of what the final rule demands. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-09-0628, pp. 3-4]
5 Consumer Reports, "Battery Electric Vehicles and Low Carbon Fuel: Overview of Methodology," April
2022,
https://article.images.consumerreports.org/prod/content/dam/surveys/Consumer_Reports_BEV%20 AND%
20LCF% 20SURVEY18FEBRUARY 2022.
Most of these impediments involve an electricity market structure that was not designed for -
and is thus incompatible with - the retail fuel market. Many fuel retailers have installed EV
charging stations at their outlets, utilizing any number of business models and ownership
structures. Very few, if any, of these investments are profitable on a self-sustaining basis. The
structural impediments to the profitability of public EV charging are too significant to overcome.
These existing investments should therefore be interpreted as "beta tests" by companies
exploring the charging space, rather than indicators of a viable, sustainable business model.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 3-4]
We are confident that the right combination of policy incentives and signals will enable the
market to overcome any barriers that exist today. We simply fail to understand the rationale for
leaving emission reduction opportunities on the table while we work toward those aspirational
objectives. The best way to address practical impediments to electrification is to inject flexibility
into the Proposed Rule while simultaneously promoting near-term emissions reductions through
the use of multiple technologies, including renewable liquid fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0628, pp. 3-4]
No one solution will decarbonize transportation energy. What policymakers think is the best
solution today may be surpassed by subsequent ingenuity and innovation. Sound policy should
not stifle innovation by mandating specific solutions. Instead, policy should set performance
goals and let the market - guided by consumers - innovate to find the best way to meet those
goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 3-4]
II. Electrification Timelines Proposed Under the Rule are Divorced from Reality.
EPA projects that the Proposed Rule will result in 67 percent of light-duty vehicles sold in
2032 being electric. That figure is an average of 78 percent electric sedans, 68 percent electric
pickups and 62 percent electric crossover and SUVs.5 Conversely, EPA estimates that in the
absence of any regulations, electric vehicles would make up only 39 percent of new sales in
2032.6 The extraordinary pace of electrification mandated under this rulemaking is entirely
divorced from the world in which consumers and the broader marketplace operate. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2020829-0648, p. 4]
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5 Proposed Rule at 29,329 (Table 80).
6 Reputable estimates on how quickly EV sales will increase vary widely. S&P Global Mobility estimates
that by 2030, EVs will be 40% of new vehicle sales. The Energy Information Administration, on the other
hand, estimates that EVs will be 17% of new vehicle sales by 2030. McKinsey has the highest estimate and
projects that EVs will be 48% of new vehicle sales by 2030. Given these varying estimates—all from
highly respected sources—the Agency should exercise caution about consumers' willingness to purchase,
and manufacturers' ability to deliver, EVs at the rates required by the Proposed Rule. Promulgation of this
Proposed Rule, alone, does not mean that challenges related to supply chains for making the vehicles or
consumer sentiment will change.
The challenges to electrification cannot be overstated and will require an unprecedented effort
irrespective of regulatory mandates. Public charging deployment is a principal obstacle. In the
Proposed Rule, EPA catalogs many of the federal incentives currently in place for charging
infrastructure, suggesting that these policies may ameliorate many of these challenges. 7 This
suggestion is short-sighted and incorrect. Subsidies alone will not create a long-term, sustainable
proliferation of EV charging stations. For electrification policies to succeed in the long term,
there must be a competitive, public charging market to refuel electric vehicles. 8 Cars will need
places to refuel, and private companies need a financial justification to spend capital to install
charging stations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p. 4]
7 Proposed Rule at 29,307.
8 EV charging policy should promote competitive market dynamics and work with consumers' existing
behavior and fuel retailers' real estate and business infrastructure. In a competitive market, private dollars
will make sure infrastructure is there to meet consumers' needs. Without these market-oriented policies in
place as a foundation for any public investment, there is a very real risk that public dollars spent will be
stranded and wasted in ways that do not serve an appreciable number of consumers and ultimately do little
to combat EV range anxiety.
c. Supply Chain and Market-Related Barriers to EV Adoption
Various other barriers to EV adoption exist beyond public charging, including consumer
skepticism toward new technology, higher costs than internal combustion engine ("ICE")
vehicles, limited range, lack of convenient public charging infrastructure, uncertain battery aging
and resale value, dismissive or deceptive car dealerships, lack of available models, and other
supply constraints.29 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p. 9]
29 Matteo Muratori et al., PROG. ENERGY 3 022002 "The rise of electric vehicles—2020 status and
future expectations" (Mar. 25, 2021) available at https://doi.org/10.1088/2516-1083/abe0ad.
EPA acknowledges, though does not meaningfully address, many of the barriers to EV
adoption.30 If the Agency is interested in electrifying light-duty transportation in the United
States, it should proactively redress these obstacles rather than assume they will dissipate on
their own under the full weight of unachievable mandates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p.
9]
30 Proposed Rule at 29,311.
Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
II. Proposal Overview
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Earlier this year, EPA proposed to revise its multipollutant emissions standards for light-duty
passenger cars and trucks and light medium-duty vehicles (defined as classes 2b and 3).l EPA
states that the proposal is authorized under section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA),2 and was
issued in response to Executive Order (E.O.) 14037, "Strengthening American Leadership in
Clean Cars and Trucks" (Aug. 5, 2021), which set a U.S. new vehicle sales goal of 50 percent
zero-emission vehicles by 2030.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 2-5]
1 88 Fed. Reg. 29184 et seq. (May 5, 2023).
2 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
3 88 Fed. Reg. at 29186, 29187, 29231-33.
The proposal seeks to establish more stringent standards for light- and medium-duty vehicles
beginning with MY 2027 and to progressively tighten them through MY 2032.4 For light-duty
vehicles, EPA proposes a 56 percent reduction in combined fleet average greenhouse gas (GHG)
emission target levels compared to the existing MY 2026 standards.5 For medium-duty vehicles,
EPA proposes a 44 percent GHG emissions reduction compared to existing MY 2026 standards,
and a 37 percent reduction compared to MY 2027 standards.6 EPA also proposes non-methane
organic gases plus nitrogen oxides (NMOG+NOx) standards that represent a 60 percent
reduction from the existing MY 2025 light-duty standards and a 66 to 76 percent reduction for
medium-duty vehicles.7 And for both light- and medium-duty vehicles, EPA's proposed
standards project to reduce particulate matter emissions by more than 95 percent.8 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-09-0656, pp. 2-5]
4 88 Fed. Reg. at 296, 29234, 29257.
5 88 Fed. Reg. at 29196, 29234, 29239-40.
6 88 Fed. Reg. at 29196, 29234.
7 88 Fed. Reg. at 29197.
8 Id
The proposal would maintain the footprint structure of the existing light-duty standards, but
update the footprint standard curves "to flatten the slope of each curve and to narrow the
numerical stringency difference between the car and truck curves" based on the vehicle
technologies EPA projects automakers will use to comply.9 It would also revise the air
conditioning credit program by limiting credit eligibility to light-duty internal combustion engine
(ICE) vehicles for tailpipe C02 emissions control beginning in MY 2027, and remove
refrigerant- based air conditioning provisions for both light- and medium-duty vehicles to
maintain consistency with a separate proposal to disallow their use. 10 EPA also proposes to
sunset the off-cycle credits program for both light- and medium-duty vehicles by: (i) reducing
the menu credit cap annually until its unavailable in MY 2031; (ii) eliminating the 5-cycle and
public process pathways starting in MY 2027; and (iii) limiting eligibility for off-cycle credits to
vehicles with tailpipe emissions greater than zero starting in MY 2027.11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0656, pp. 2-5]
9 88 Fed. Reg. at 29196, 29234.
10 88 Fed. Reg. 29196, 29246-48.
11 88 Fed. Reg. 29196, 29249-52.
EPA forecasts that the average marginal per-vehicle cost for regulated manufacturers (OEMs)
to comply with its proposed light-duty mandates will rise from $633 in MY 2027 to $944 in MY
2031, and projects that the marginal per vehicle cost of compliance will jump to approximately
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$1,200 in MY 2032.12 For medium-duty vehicles, EPA's estimated average marginal per vehicle
OEM cost of compliance ranges from $364 in MY 2027 to approximately $1,800 in MY 2032.13
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 2-5]
12 88 Fed. Reg. at 29201, 29328, 29343; See also EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA) at 1
(able 11), 4-17, 13-25 (Table 13-45).
Importantly, these costs are in addition to those imposed by EPA in prior rules, which are
necessarily built into the cost of MY 2027 and later vehicles. EPA asserts, however, that higher
light- and medium-duty costs will be offset by purchase incentives arising from the Inflation
Reduction Act (IRA), and by lower EV operating costs. 14 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp.
2-5]
14 88 Fed. Reg. at 29201, 29328-29, 29344, 29364.
Based on OEM fleet electrification investment and production plan announcements and
federal subsidies in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the IRA, EPA
contends that EV technologies have advanced to such a degree that EVs now "are a feasible way
to greatly reduce emissions" and can be used "as an emissions control technology to comply
with" the proposed standards. 15 EPA projects that, although "[t]he proposed standards are
performance- based and do not mandate any specific technology...or any vehicle type[,]" new
light-duty EV sales will increase from 36 percent in MY 2027 to 67 percent in MY 2032.16 EPA
also projects new medium-duty EV sales ranging from 17 percent in MY 2027 to 46 percent in
MY 2032.17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 2-5]
15 88 Fed. Reg. at 29194, 29284, 29341-44.
16 88 Fed. Reg. at 29329.
17 88 Fed. Reg. at 29331.
EPA also projects that its proposed standards will cause new light-duty vehicle sales to
decrease a small amount during the first two years, increase a small amount in the next two
years, and then decrease by a small amount in the final two years. 18 EPA projects no change in
new medium-duty vehicle sales as a result of its proposed standards based on an assumption that,
because commercial buyers "are less sensitive to changes in vehicle prices than personal vehicle
owners[,]" they will not "change purchase decisions if the price of the vehicle changes" and "will
still purchase the vehicle that fts their needs." 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 2-5]
18 88 Fed. Reg. at 29370.
19 88 Fed. Reg. at 29371.
The following NAD A comments focus on the potential impacts of EPA's proposal on new
light- and medium-duty sales, and on fleet turnover. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 2-5]
III. EPA Has Not Demonstrated That Its Proposed Standards Are Technologically
Feasible, Economically Practical, or Cost Beneficial.
Of the 285 million vehicles on U.S. roads today, only 2.1 million (less than one percent) are
EVs,20 but OEMs are investing and preparing significantly for the production and deployment of
EVs. Indeed, 800,000 EVs were sold in 2022, capturing 5.8% of total new vehicle sales, up from
3.2% in 2021.21 And EV market share is generally expected to increase significantly over time.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 2-5]
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20 See Global EV Data Explorer - Data Tools - IEA. A recently-issued Alliance for Automotive
Innovation (AAI) report indicates that 3.3 million EVs—or 1.17 percent—are today operating on U.S.
roads. See Get Connected EV Quarterly Report 2023 Ql.pdf (autosinnovate.org) ("Registration and
Infrastructure").
21 See In a Down Market, EV Sales Soar to New Record - Cox Automotive Inc. (coxautoinc.com).
Since EPA began regulating tailpipe emissions, OEMs have successfully made incremental
but affordable ICE vehicle emissions improvements while simultaneously developing and
bringing new alternative technologies and fuels to market. But OEMs are limited in their ability
to further improve ICE vehicle emissions in conformity with EPA's proposed standards without
substantial cost increases. Consequently, it is concerning that EPA's proposed standards, if
adopted, will increase the cost of covered new motor vehicles, and hinder the deployment of EVs
at a critical juncture for this emerging market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 2-5]
NADA has long supported continuous vehicle emissions improvements that are
technologically achievable and affordable for household and commercial new vehicle customers.
As noted above, NADA's franchised dealer members are "all-in" with selling and servicing the
new EVs being produced by the OEMs they represent. In fact, nationwide, NADA expects
franchised dealers to spend some $5 billion installing EV chargers, buying EV-related
equipment, parts, and tools, and investing in EV training for sales and service personnel. As
evidenced by these investments and by the EV-related activities at the 2022 and 2023 NADA
Shows,22 America's new motor vehicle dealers recognize their importance to the broad, mass
market adoption of EVs. However, they also are concerned that EPA's proposal could undermine
that adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 2-5]
22 See Exhibit A: "Everything Electric" at NADA Show 2022-2023.
Appropriately structured standards must involve a national, holistic approach to improving
tailpipe emissions. EPA claims that it is not proposing to mandate specific technologies or the
production of specific vehicle types, but its proposal is anything but technology neutral. Unlike
prior rules governing tailpipe emissions, EPA's proposed standards cannot be met by ICE
vehicles alone and would phase-out existing credits for ICE vehicle and hybrid technologies that
have to date helped OEMs to achieve better emissions compliance. Moreover, they are premised
on overly aggressive assumptions regarding future EV market penetration. If adopted, the
cumulative practical effect of the proposal would be to greatly reduce the market availability of
new ICE vehicles. This "if you build them, they will come" approach ignores the fact that, while
franchised dealers are the OEMs' primary customers, actual emission reductions cannot be
achieved unless and until new EVs take to the road. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 2-5]
Unlike for many regulated goods, prospective purchasers of new light-duty vehicles have
transportation options, including the used vehicle marketplace, the service and repair of existing
vehicles, and alternatives like public transit and micro-mobility. Consequently, vehicle consumer
purchase behaviors must be viewed through the lens of an ever-changing marketplace that hinges
on the willingness and ability of prospective purchasers to buy ever more expensive new vehicles
with enhanced emissions performance. Similarly, new commercial medium-duty vehicle
purchase decisions hinge on affordability, cost-efficiency, and reliability (i.e., uptime). At
bottom, the market will avoid new vehicles that are too costly, that offer performance comprises,
or that pose unacceptable downtime risks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 2-5]
928
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EPA's current proposal is flawed in that it disregards these critical demand-side marketplace
factors. It also appears aimed at promoting EVs to the exclusion of ICE, hybrid, and other
alternative fuel vehicles. It will likely cause OEMs to produce fewer new technology ICE and
alternative fueled vehicles and will increase their cost, thereby dissuading consumers from
considering their purchase. EPA's final rule should set truly technology-neutral emissions
standards that maximize, not inhibit, fleet turnover. Doing so is critical to maximizing emissions
reduction given that, as noted above, regulatory objectives will not be achieved unless and until
new vehicles subject to more stringent emissions standards are bought. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0656, pp. 2-5]
Organization: National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)
The proposed EPA standards for 2027 and later set very aggressive goals for reducing GHG
and criteria emissions. Achieving these goals will require dramatic changes not only in vehicle
design, but in the entire automotive supply chain. While the U.S. market share of BEVs will
continue to expand, establishing regulations where success is solely contingent upon an
unattainable tenfold increase in the production and sales of BEVs over the next eight years
represents an avoidable mistake. The proposed rule would require huge investments and rapid
growth in many industries, including the mining and processing of key minerals, the generation
and distribution of electricity, and the recharging of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0643, p. 2]
There are many obstacles to this shift including geopolitics, long lead times, capital
investments, and consumer acceptance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 2]
Organization: National Fers Union (NFU)
I. Executive Summary
The proposed EPA standards for 2027 and later set very aggressive goals for reducing GHG
and criteria emissions. Achieving these goals will require dramatic changes not only in vehicle
design, but in the entire automotive supply chain. Battery electric vehicles will play a large role
in achieving the goals, but this will require huge investments and rapid growth in many
industries including the mining and processing of key minerals, the generation and distribution of
electricity, and the recharging of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 2]
It would be naive to believe that these dramatic changes will be achieved smoothly and
quickly. There are many obstacles including geopolitics, long lead times, capital investments,
and consumer acceptance. In order to achieve emissions goals in the most robust, rapid, and
affordable way, EPA should encourage multiple additional solutions such as hybrid electric
vehicles (including plug-in hybrids), biofuels, and E-Fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p.
2]
Organization: National Propane Gas Association (NPGA)
The EPA's goals in reducing GHGs and other pollutants is laudable, but its timeline is
unachievable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0634, p. 2]
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Organization: Nebraska Corn Board (NCB) and Nebraska Corn Growers Association
The EPA's proposed rule is a pre-mature way to ensure electric vehicles (EV) are a part of the
Biden Administration's plan for EV sales to be 50% of all vehicle sales by 2030. The "most
stringent emissions proposal to date" is pushing to exceed that plan to implement around 69%
acceptance by the proposed deadline. This is not feasible for rural America. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0583, p.1]
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
III. GHG Proposal
Thanks to the leadership and early investment of Nissan, the EV market has steadily grown
over the last 10 years, albeit slower than many expected. Transitioning from long-existing and
established technology takes time and significant financial investment. This responsibility must
be shared among the industry, its customers, and governmental entities. Widespread adoption of
EVs requires not only that the automotive industry broadly embrace investment in this
technology, but also that consumers show willingness to adopt the new technology. Nissan has
invested billions of dollars in an effort to stimulate growth, not only investing in technology and
product development but also in infrastructure and consumer outreach/education. Nissan strongly
supports federal, state, and local investment in market measures to complement the efforts
already in place by industry leaders such as Nissan to further encourage this shift towards EVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, pp. 3-4]
Nissan is committed to transitioning its vehicle portfolio to EVs over time and intends to
remain an industry leader in EV and related battery technology innovations. Nissan supports
President Biden's overall efforts to increase sales of battery, fuel cell, or plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles (BEVs, FCEVs, and PHEVs, respectively) over the next decade. The Administration
already announced aggressive penetration targets in the August 5, 2021 "Executive Order on
Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks" (hereinafter "Clean Cars EO").
The Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule, however, goes well beyond the already ambitious goals
announced in President Biden's Clean Cars EO. Not only has the penetration percentage been
significantly increased (jumping from 50 percent to 60 percent in 2030), but the make-up of that
percentage has drastically changed: EPA's Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule would require a 60
percent penetration rate for BEVs only, excluding the FCEV and PHEV technologies that are
critical to shepherding a safe, affordable, and reliable transition to clean vehicles. EPA has
moved the goalpost, not by a few feet but by miles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, pp. 3-4]
In light of these myriad challenges, EPA should adjust the proposed GHG standards set forth
in the Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule. Nissan supports a final rule that takes these realities into
consideration and seeks an ambitious yet achievable target for plug-in electric vehicle ("PEV")
penetration, closer to the already ambitious targets set in the Clean Cars EO. At a minimum,
Nissan requests that EPA adjust the proposed GHG standards and targets to account for a
blended PEV percentage, taking into consideration emissions reductions from PHEVs and BEVs
collectively. EPA has historically considered the emissions benefits of both groups of advanced
technology vehicles, acknowledging the importance and need of PHEVs in the consumer shift
towards clean vehicles. Nissan and others in the industry are committed to transforming the
industry and have already invested significantly in pressing forward on the transition to EVs. The
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Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule goes beyond what is achievable and simply forces too much too
quickly. There simply is not a realistic path to achieve the level of accelerated shift in the
proposed timeframe. More time is needed for such extensive and transformational change. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 5]
IV. EPA Tier 4 Proposal
Nissan has continued to improve ICE vehicle technologies and steadily reduce corresponding
criteria pollutant emissions. While Nissan is committed to achieving emissions reductions on all
fronts - GHG and criteria pollutants - the Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule would set criteria
pollutant standards that require significant investment of financial and research and development
resources to ICE technologies, thereby diverting these limited resources that are critical to
achieving the Administration's aggressive electrification goals. EPA should encourage and allow
manufacturers to invest their available resources towards the ultimate goal of transitioning to
EVs, which mitigates the criteria pollutant emissions as fleet electrification continues to ramp up.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, pp. 6-7]
The standards and requirements set out in the proposal are costly and inconsistent with
already established standards under California's Advanced Clean Cars ("ACC") II program. The
stringency and accelerated timeline for implementation as proposed are technically,
economically, and logistically unrealistic. In particular, the proposed PM standards and
elimination of commanded enrichment strategies for component protection will pose significant
challenges for the industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, pp. 6-7]
- The proposed PM standard and accompanying phase-in schedule are not feasible given
current technology and lead time considerations. The proposed new 0.5 mg/mile standard would
require the installation of a gasoline particulate filter (GPF) on every vehicle in order to comply.
While GPFs are not new technology, they are relatively new to the U.S. market and the proposed
requirements are unique globally. Adding an emission control component such as a GPF is no
simple task and requires significant research, development, and testing, as well as re-calibration
of relevant software systems to account for new systems, components, and monitors within the
overall vehicle software architecture. Such hardware and software changes require sufficient lead
time, which is not provided under the proposal. EPA's proposed new standard would also be
implemented in the middle of the phase-in period for California's new PM standards. EPA
should align its proposal with the standard recently finalized in California, for which
manufacturers have already started planning. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, pp. 6-7]
Organization: North American Suba 'u, Inc.
The agency's proposed MY2027-2032 GHG standards aim to front-load standards in the early
years, starting at an 18 percent increase in stringency in 2027 and declining to eight percent in
2030, nine percent in 2031, and 11 percent in 2032. While Subaru shares the goal of making
significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, the feasibility of achieving the standards,
particula'ly in the proposal's early years, must be considered particula"ly noting various "outside
the vehic'e" factors (addressed below) needed to support a more aggressive EV posture. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0576, p. 2]
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Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
Collectively, California and the 15 Section 177 ZEV states account for roughly 35 percent of
U.S. sales of new light-duty ZEVs.12 The ZEV sales requirements in these states have helped to
create a national market that enables ZEV automakers, suppliers, and charging providers to
achieve economies of scale, lowers consumer costs, and promotes job creation in automotive,
manufacturing, infrastructure, and supporting industries. Experience proves that ZEV sales
requirements provide the regulatory certainty needed to drive public and private investment in
deployment of ZEVs and charging infrastructure. Indeed, states with these requirements
consistently outperform the national average for light-duty ZEV sales. From 2019 to 2022, light-
duty ZEV market penetration in the Section 177 ZEV states more than quadrupled, exceeding 10
percent of total LDV sales. 13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 4-5]
12 National Automobile Dealers Association, NADA Data 2021 (2022),
https://www.nada.org/media/4695/download7inline.
13 Atlas Public Policy, EV Hub, https://www.atlasevhub.com/ materials/automakers-dashboard/ (2023 IHS
data) (visited Feb. 23, 2023).
Outside of California, nearly half of the nation's public charging infrastructure has been
deployed in states with ZEV sales requirements. These states also account for roughly three
quarters—nearly $5 billion—of all utility funding for transportation electrification approved by
state public utility commissions. 14 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 4-5]
14 U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Center, Alternative Fueling Station Counts by State,
https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/states (visited June 9, 2023).
California's ACC II program, finalized in 2022, requires manufacturers of passenger vehicles
(designed to transport 12 persons or less) and light-duty trucks (gross vehicle weight rating less
than 8,500 pounds) to produce and deliver for sale an increasing percentage of ZEVs over time
and 100 percent ZEVs by 2035. ACC II also establishes increasingly more stringent exhaust and
evaporative emission standards for light- and medium-duty ICE vehicles. To date, California,
Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington have adopted ACC II.
These seven states represent over 20 percent of the LDV market. 15 Six more jurisdictions—
Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Rhode Island—have
announced their intentions to adopt ACC II. More are expected to follow given the anticipated
climate, air quality, and economic benefits of the program. 16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584,
p. 5]
15 Recent modeling for select Section 177 states shows that adopting ACC II will result in even greater
cumulative NOx and GHG emissions reductions than EPA's proposed standards between 2025 and 2040.
Across all of the states modeled, ACC II achieved 30 percent greater well-to-wheel C02 equivalent
reductions and 75 percent greater NOx reductions than EPA's proposed standards. Some states modeled
saw even greater reductions. In Connecticut and New Jersey, for example, ACC II would provide an
incremental benefit of roughly two times more than EPA's proposal. See Sonoma Technology, ACC II
Program - EPA 2027 Proposal Comparison (June 8, 2013), [LINK TO NESCAUM WEBSITE WHEN
POSTED],
16 National Automobile Dealers Association, NADA Data 2021 (2022),
https://www.nada.org/media/4695/download7inline.
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California's Advanced Clean Trucks (ACT) regulation requires manufacturers of Class 2b-8
on- road medium- and heavy-duty vehicles to sell increasing percentages of ZEVs. By model
year 2035, 55 percent of sales of Class 2b-3 vehicle sales, 75 percent of class 4-8 vehicle sales,
and 40 percent of Class 7-8 truck tractor sales must be ZEVs. In addition to California, seven
states— Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington—
have adopted the ACT regulation. These states have also adopted California's Heavy-Duty Low
NOx and Phase II GHG regulations, which are designed to reduce emissions from new diesel
fueled heavy-duty vehicles while the market transitions to ZEVs. Many more states are expected
to follow. Like the ACC II regulation, state adoption of the ACT regulation creates economies of
scale, lowers costs, promotes job creation, and provides the regulatory certainty needed to drive
investment in ZEVs and infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 5]
C. Market-Enabling Complementary Policies
Many of the NESCAUM and OTC states have state-specific plans to reduce GHGs and air
pollution from on-road transportation and have adopted a diverse set of market-enabling policies
and programs designed to advance the market for light-, medium, and heavy-duty ZEVs.
Examples include ZEV sales and purchase requirements as discussed above; ZEV and
infrastructure purchase incentives; utility programs and investments in ZEV infrastructure;
consumer and fleet outreach and education programs; innovative financing mechanisms; multi-
family dwelling and workplace charging programs; and deployment of public charging in
communities and along major travel corridors. Many states have established requirements or
goals to transition state vehicles and transit fleets to ZEVs. In addition, most states have adopted
clean energy or renewable portfolio standards, which require a share of power sold by their
utilities to come from renewable sources. Some states have adopted 100 percent renewable
energy goals. States recognize that transitioning to renewable energy sources will maximize
emissions reductions from ZEVs overtime. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 7]
III. NESCAUM and OTC Comments on the NPRM
For the reasons carefully considered and articulated in the NPRM, and those discussed above,
NESCAUM and the OTC strongly support EPA's exercise of its authority under CAA Section
202(a) to establish new and more stringent criteria pollutant and GHG emissions standards for
MYs 2027 and later LDVs and Class 2b and 3 MDVs. As an initial matter, we agree with EPA's
conclusion that the standards it proposes are technologically feasible and that the costs of
compliance for manufacturers would be reasonable. The proposed standards would generate
substantial reductions in emissions of GHGs, criteria pollutants, and air toxics, creating
significant benefits for public health and welfare. We also agree that the proposal would result in
reduced vehicle operating and maintenance costs for consumers. Moreover, the benefits of the
regulation would far exceed its costs. EPA estimates the cumulative monetized benefits of the
GHG and criteria pollutant standards through 2055, considering both upstream and downstream
emissions, to be between $850 billion and $1.6 trillion (2020 $US) depending on the selected
discount rate.23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 7-8]
23 See EPA, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA), EPA-420-D-23-003 (Apr. 14, 2023),
https://www.regulations.gOv/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0360.
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Considering the state of the U.S. and global LDV and MDV markets, NESCAUM and the
OTC believe that GHG standards more stringent than EPA's proposal are technologically
feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 8-9]
Announcements by major manufacturers to transition their vehicles to ZEVs, agreements by
large public and private fleets to purchase ZEVs, the deployment and rapid expansion of
charging infrastructure networks across the country, an increasing number of states adopting the
ACC II and ACT programs, and accelerating global momentum, all support the conclusion that
the LDV and MDV markets are ready for rapid and widespread electrification. Alternative 1 in
the NPRM is projected to result in an industry-wide average target of 72 g/mi of C02 in MY
2032, representing a 61 percent reduction in projected fleet average GHG emissions target levels
from the existing MY 2026 standards. NESCAUM and the OTC believe the standards described
in Alternative 1 are technologically feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 9]
Organization: Office of Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon
Wyoming has a vested interest in the proposed rule. Wyoming stands to feel significant
negative impacts from this rule, including: consumer costs, supply chain effects, our nation's
energy security, highway funding shifts, electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure realities,
rural population accessibility, and state vehicle fleets. It is important that the EPA not mandate
that the personal vehicle and transportation market move to EVs through a rushed and backdoor
emissions approach. Programs such as the Federal Highway Administration's National Electric
Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) program illustrates how difficult a compulsory shift to EVs is to
implement in rural states such as Wyoming. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0675, p. 1]
Organization: POET, LLC
EPA also assumes that, provided batteries are available, automakers will be able to
manufacture BEVs in essentially unlimited quantities.83 EPA simply states that "vehicle
assembly capacity" can "respond relatively quickly to the necessary investment commitments,"
because it is a "relatively well understood process."84 The situation, however, is far more
complex. As the Trinity report explains, "MY 2024 is beginning which means there is at most
three years of lead time remaining before automakers would be required to comply."85 EPA fails
to justify its assumption of unlimited production capacity given that short lead time. EPA also
fails to explain why it has assumed that vehicle redesign schedules for shifting from conventional
vehicles to BEVs would be essentially identical to such schedules for conventional vehicles:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 22]
83 Id. at 4.
84 Id. (quotations omitted).
85 Id. at 5.
Given the radical nature of the changes in chassis design, powertrain components, tooling,
availability of components and supply chain issues, the need for new vehicle control strategies
and components, and other challenges specific to electrification, it is far from clear that the
existing redesign schedules are valid and likely that they need to be longer than the existing
schedules.86 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 22]
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86 Id.
Uncertainty in BEV Penetration Rate
In its proposal, EPA forecasts almost 70% BEV penetration will occur in MY 2032 across the
light duty categories (passenger car, crossover/SUV, and light truck), or over 10 million BEVs.
In addition, this compliance pathway would require almost 40% BEV penetration in the medium-
duty van and pickup truck categories. By comparison, EIA projects approximately 1.5 million
BEVs in 2050, with only 1.2 million in 2032.2 Thus, EPA's projections of sales of
approximately 11 million BEVs are almost nine times higher than those of EIA, the leading U.S.
governmental source for independent energy statistics and analysis.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, p. 36]
2 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2023 Reference Table 38,
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/tables_ref.php
3 Regarding BEV sales in EPA's analysis, EPA finds 15,834,010 total light duty vehicle sales in 2032
(Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis Table 4-18) multiplied by 70% BEV penetration (Multi-Pollutant
Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles Fact Sheet,
EPA-420-F-23-009 pg. 5).
1. The analysis U. S. EPA has performed to "demonstrate" the feasibility of a dramatic
increase in BEV penetration into the light-duty vehicle fleet is based on a number of
unreasonable and/or unsupported assumptions that cause the agency to substantially overstate the
likely penetration rate and underestimate the cost of compliance with the Proposed Rule. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 53]
Review of U.S. EPA's BEV Technology Assessment
In both the Proposed Rule and the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA), U.S. EPA
projects that manufacturer compliance will require dramatic increases in the sale of new battery
electric vehicles (BEVs). In the Fact Sheetl accompanying the publication of the Proposed Rule,
U.S. EPA states that compliance will require ".. .nearly 70 percent BEV penetration in MY 2032
across the combined light- duty passenger car, crossover/SUV, and pickup truck categories."
This 70 percent BEV penetration value can be compared to the present (MY 2022) BEV
penetration which is less than 5 percent and the 20 to 40 BEV percent rate in MY 2032 that U.S.
EPA assumes will be achieved in the absence of the proposed rule even without accounting for
the Proposed Rule (See DRIA Figures 4-2 and 4-3). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 53-
54]
1 https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1017626.pdf.
The first step in a review of the agency's BEV technology assessment needs to focus on the
dramatic increase in BEV penetration forecast to occur even in the absence of the Proposed Rule.
As noted above, U.S. EPA expects BEV penetration to increase by 4 to 10 times over the period
of only ten years from MY 2022 to MY 2032 without the Proposed Rule. The agency also points
out (DRIA Chapter 3.1.3.1) that worldwide demand for BEVs is expected to grow dramatically
again in the absence of the Proposed Rule because of actions taken by other jurisdictions.
However, despite the fact that a radical transformation of the auto industry and the vehicle
battery industry will be required to achieve even these highly optimistic levels, U.S. EPA
assumes that both BEV supply and demand in the U.S. can be accelerated by only the Proposed
Rule to 2 to 3 times by MY 2032 relative to the aggressive growth already represented in the No
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Action Case. Further, in its analyses of the Proposed Rule, U.S. EPA assumes that this high level
of demand for BEVs will continue unchanged through MY 2055. A more reasonable assumption
given U.S. EPA's apparent position that transformation of the new light- and medium-duty
vehicle market to BEVs is inevitable would be to assume much slower growth in the near term
along with a continuation in growth into the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 53-54]
U.S. EPA's overall forecast of BEV penetration into the vehicle fleet with and without the
Proposed Rule can be seen in Figure 9-2 of the DRIA which is reproduced below. [See original
attachment for Figure 9-2 BEV stock used in OMEGA effects calculations] As shown, even
without the Proposed Rule, the fraction of BEVs in the overall light-duty vehicle fleet is
projected, relative to 2027 levels, to double by 2032, triple by 2037, and reach four times by
about 2050. In contrast, the agency assumes the Proposed Rule will force BEV penetration rates
up by another 50% in 2032, almost double them in 2037, and more than double them by 2050.
Although U.S. EPA purports that its analyses support these forecasts of incredible growth in
BEV penetration, those analyses rest on a series of unreasonable, unsupported, and highly
optimistic assumptions regarding BEVs as discussed below. As a result, the conclusions drawn
by U.S. EPA regarding BEV penetration cannot be relied on. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609,
pp. 53-54]
In addition to making optimistic assumptions regarding the availability of batteries for BEVs,
U.S. EPA has also assumed that even as early as MY 2027 there will be no limit to the number of
BEVs that automakers can produce provided that batteries are available. More specifically, U.S.
EPA states (DRIA Chapter 2.6.5) that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 56-57]
.. .vehicle assembly capacity is a relatively well understood process that can respond
relatively quickly to the necessary investment commitments. Given the existing activities among
automakers in this area, and the relatively long lead time before MY 2027 when the proposed
rule would begin, EPA did not specifically impose a limit on vehicle assembly capacity. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 56-57]
The reference to the amount of lead time prior to MY 2027 is an example of the disingenuous
nature of U.S. EPA's analysis. At present, MY 2024 is beginning which means there is at most
three years of lead time remaining before automakers would be required to comply with the new
regulatory requirements. Another issue with the U.S. EPA analysis is that while it does purport to
account for vehicle redesign schedules (DIRA Chapter 2.6.4.1), it does so based on the
unsupported assumption that schedules that have applied for the redesign of conventional
vehicles also apply to the transformation of a conventional vehicle platform to a BEV platform.
Given the radical nature of the changes in chassis design, powertrain components, tooling,
availability of components and supply chain issues, the need for new vehicle control strategies
and components, and other challenges specific to electrification, it is far from clear that the
existing redesign schedules are valid and likely that they need to be longer than the existing
schedules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 56-57]
Overall, U.S. EPA's analysis fails to provide convincing support for the agency's position that
it is technically feasible and reasonable to expect BEV penetration to increase by 14 times
current levels (e.g. -5% to -70%) in the space of only ten years given the complete
transformation that the auto industry. U.S. EPA has failed to demonstrate that there will be a
sufficient supply of batteries and then relied on the unsupported assumption that battery supply is
936
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the only factor limiting the number of BEVs that can be produced even over a very short period
of time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 57]
In summary, U.S. EPA's conclusions regarding the technical feasibility and costs of achieving
the BEV penetration rates associated with compliance with the Proposed rest on a set of
unreasonable and unsupported assumptions. These assumptions include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, p. 61]
1. The auto industry can switch from making primarily conventional vehicles to making
primarily BEVs in under ten years; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 61]
2. Sufficient quantities of batteries for BEVs will be available to automakers at costs that
will drop by 50% or more from current levels within a few years despite the fact that plants
needed to produce those batteries largely have not yet been built; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, p. 61]
3. Costs of BEV componentry will drop by approximately 40% in under ten years; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 61]
4. Automakers will not incur significant costs associated with redesigning conventional
vehicles to BEVs and in reconfiguring manufacturing facilities to produce BEVs [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 61]
5. Large federal purchase incentives will be available to all consumers who wish to
purchase BEVs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 61]
6. Likely higher insurance costs and lower resale values for BEVs will not deter
consumers from purchasing BEVs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 61]
7. Despite the fact that the Proposed Rule is forecast to double the number of BEVs in
operation in the U.S. by 2055 relative to the no action case, only minimal increases in BEV
infrastructure will be required to support that larger population of BEVs; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, p. 61]
8. Consumers will prefer to purchase BEVs rather than conventional vehicles; [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 61]
These assumptions appear to be designed to allow the agency to reach the conclusion that the
large reductions in GHG emissions required for compliance with the Proposed Rule can be easily
achieved through dramatic growth in BEV penetration that will save automakers and consumers
considerable amounts of money. However, they also raise the question of "if the transformation
of the auto industry from conventional vehicles to BEVs is both inevitable due2 to consumer
demand and will save the auto industry and consumers billions of dollars, then why is the
Proposed Rule necessary? A directly related question given that the period of benefit analysis of
the Proposed Rule spans the period from 2027 to 2055 is why the standards proposed by U.S.
EPA which increase in stringency over the period from the MY 2027 to MY 2032 are so
aggressive. If the effective date of the most-stringent standard were pushed back from MY 2032
to MY 2037, that would still provide for 18 years of full benefit compared to 23 years (80%)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 61]
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Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
EPA's proposal reflects a historic level of ambition for low-carbon, low-emission mobility.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 2]
EPA has proposed ambitious targets within this NPRM for the accelerated decarbonization of
the light- and medium- duty vehicle segments, in addition to incremental reductions in criteria
pollutants from remaining combustion models. This proposal represents one of the most stringent
and technologically demanding regulatory frameworks in the history of US automotive
emissions regulations. EPA projects that to achieve these requirements, consumer adoption of
electric vehicles must quadruple over the next 3-4 model years from current rates of
approximately 8% to nearly one-third of new vehicle sales by 2027. Over the next six model
years, this growth must double again, with electric vehicles comprising of over two-thirds of
annual new vehicle sales by 2032. The extent of this proposal reflects the urgency and magnitude
in carbon reductions being sought by EPA to address potential impacts of climate change. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 2]
EPA's proposal also reflects the historic and transformative investments being made across
the auto industry by OEMs like Porsche into electromobility. As noted in the comments from
AFAI, the auto industry is projected to invest over $1.2 trillion in the development and
production of electric vehicles by 2030. As AFAI outlines, this investment and commitment
must be matched by an equal level of effort from segments outside of the auto industry for the
range of electrification goals within this proposal to have a chance at being successfully
achieved. Many other sectors will play an increasingly important role in enabling the electric
vehicle transition. Utilities, charging infrastructure providers, and raw material suppliers will
need to execute their own transformative plans at unprecedented speed. Sustained, supportive
public policy will be critical in forming a robust foundation across many sectors that need to
scale up growth and capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 2]
Comments specific to the proposed Light-Duty Vehicle and Light-Duty Truck Greenhouse
Gas Standards for MY2027 and Later [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 18]
As noted in the opening section of these comments, Porsche views EPA's proposed GHG
standards for MY2027-2032 as a highly ambitious package of increasing annual stringency
combined with overall reductions in program flexibilities. In total this proposal presents a highly
challenging set of standards for the industry that will demand an unprecedented rate of electrified
vehicle development, production, and consumer adoption. This proposal appears to exceed what
may be achievable for the light-duty industry as a whole across all vehicle segments, price
points, and utility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 18]
In less than 10 years, EPA projects that 2 out of 3 new vehicles sold to American individuals,
families and businesses will need to be fully electric. The importance of this statement cannot be
underestimated as vehicle purchases remain one of the most, if not the most, expensive purchase
that a consumer will ever make in their lifetime. In 10 years, two out of three customers must
view electrification as a completely superior mobility choice that outshines any competitive
combustion vehicle in the class in which that customer is shopping. EPA's regulations create no
binding obligation on consumer adoption or on matching policy requirements of other sectors
who will contribute to the success of electrification. Customers cannot broadly be expected to
adopt technologies that are inconvenient, difficult to live with, or ultimately more expensive to
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own and operate. Auto manufacturers like Porsche are investing unprecedented levels of funding
to provide exciting, electrified vehicle products to meet the needs of our customers. However,
manufacturers will in part be reliant on the action of other sectors to help reduce the cost of
electrification and to ensure that once a consumer purchases an EV that they are supported with a
reliable, convenient, and affordable charging ecosystem. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p.
18]
EPA has described throughout the NPRM and its supporting materials, that the agency
believes these standards to be achievable based upon assumptions that outline ambitious
improvements in electrification costs and supply chain readiness and in the rapid deployment of
affordable, accessible nationwide charging infrastructure. These assumptions are being used by
EPA to justify legally binding, regulatory compliance obligations on the auto industry.
Obligations that rely significantly on the successful execution of policy and development by
sectors outside of the auto industry's control. Shortfalls in any number of these underlying
assumptions could have direct influence on future electrified vehicle costs and readiness which
in turn would negatively impact consumer adoption and future compliance. Given the extent to
which the standards are premised on high levels of electrification, it is unlikely that non-
electrified technologies could be deployed to make up a significant compliance shortfall should
EVs fail to achieve the levels of adoption assumed by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p.
18]
Porsche recognizes the urgency underlying t'e magnitude of EPA's proposal to'address the
agency's concerns related to the effects of climate change. Porsche, like many other
manufacturers, has established holistic decarbonization goals throughout our products and
business operations. Porsche supports the goal of increasing the level of electrification within the
light duty car park and views electrification as a key enabler for achieving climate and energy
security benefits. Nevertheless, the rate of transformation inherent within regional regulations
must ultimately be achievable within the boundary conditions of each market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0637, p. 18]
Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)
I. Executive Summary
EPA's proposed tailpipe emissions standards for 2027 and later years set extremely
aggressive goals for reducing vehicular greenhouse gas (GHG) and criteria pollutant emissions.
Achieving these goals would require dramatic changes not only in vehicle design, but also in the
entire transportation energy supply chain. In addition, meeting the proposed emissions standards
in the manner envisioned by EPA would require a massive and rapid shift in the vehicle
purchasing and refueling behavior of American consumers. Indeed, if the rule is finalized as
proposed, EPA projects that electric vehicles (EVs) "could account for 67% of new light-duty
vehicle sales and 46% of new medium-duty vehicle sales in MY 2032." 1 By comparison, EVs
accounted for just 5.8% of new light-duty vehicle sales in 2022 and accounted for just 1% of
total registered light-duty vehicles.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 3-4]
1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Biden-Harris Administration Proposed Strongest-Ever Pollution
Standards for Cars and Trucks to Accelerate Transition to a Clean-Transportation Future." April 12, 2023.
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris-administration-proposes-strongest-ever-pollution-
standards-cars-and.
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2 Kelly Blue Book. "America Splits Into Thirds on Electric Cars." (March 22, 2023).
https://www.kbb.com/car- news/america-splits-into-thirds-on-electric-cars/.
While EVs are likely to play an important role in achieving emissions reductions goals, the
growth in EVs projected by EPA would require enormous investment and rapid expansion in
many global industrial sectors. Such a transition would require immediate and dramatic growth
in the mining and processing of critical minerals, a massive increase in the generation and
distribution of lower-carbon electricity, and the rapid buildout of a nationwide infrastructure
network for recharging EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 3-4]
It would be naive and unrealistic to believe that such extraordinary changes in the
marketplace can be achieved smoothly and quickly. There are numerous obstacles involved in a
transition of this scale, including geopolitical and national security concerns; long lead times in
permitting, material supply, design, and manufacturing; substantial capital investments; safety
considerations; and unprecedented changes in consumer behavior and purchasing habits. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 3-4]
Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
Alternative 1 is Feasible
We find that EPA's compliance modeling and other evidence demonstrates the feasibility of
this target. The agency modeled average vehicle certification values in a scenario compliant with
Alternative 1. In this scenario, it appears that ICE vehicles in MY32 average approximately 230
g/mi (see Figure 2 below). (Unless otherwise specified, all emissions rates quoted in this section
refer to 2-cycle test values.) Several automakers already perform at a similar standard. For
example, in MY21 Mitsubishi reported average emissions of 218 g/mi while Subaru reported 238
g/mi.9 Neither manufacturer made significant use of electrification technologies in that MY. 10
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 2-7]
9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report: Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, Fuel Economy, and Technology since 1975 (December 2022), 85.
10 Id. at 88.
See original attachment for: Figure 2. Outputs from EPA's modeling show an Alternative 1
compliance scenario in which the remaining ICE vehicles emit approximately 230 g/mi on
average in MY32 (the chart's legend somewhat obscures the blue ICE line). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0653, pp.2-7]
Going forward, evidence suggests that automakers could improve fleet average ICE emissions
commensurate with the targets of Alternative 1—and perhaps achieve even deeper reductions.
For example, the International Council on Clean Transportation ("ICCT") projects that the
gasoline vehicle fleet can achieve average emissions of 168 g/mi by 2030, well below the ICE-
only performance modeled in the Alternative 1 scenario. 11 This would allow industry to comply
with fewer BEV sales than EPA currently projects—or to achieve an even more stringent fleet
average target by MY32. Certainly, several non- electrification emissions reduction technologies
are still far from full or even majority utilization across the current fleet. 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0653, pp.2-7]
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11 Stephanie Searle and Josh Miller, The International Council on Clean Transportation, "To Put the
United States on Track to Reach 50% Electric Vehicle Sales in 2030, Cut the Greenhouse Gas Target in
Half," September 7, 2022, available at www.theicct.org/us-ghg-standards-ev-sales-sep22/.
12 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light- Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles: Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (April 2023), 3-1 -3-6.
Large credit banks also continue to characterize the program, indicating that some degree of
emissions reduction "slack" exists in the industry. Manufacturers ended MY21 with 131 Tg of
GHG credit. Of that total, 24 Tg do not expire until MY25. Another 33 Tg will remain in banks
until MY26.13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 2-7]
13 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report: Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, Fuel Economy, and Technology since 1975 (December 2022), 123-124.
Booming EV sales in the coming years could further strengthen industry's compliance
position entering the MY27+ program. When EPA finalized GHG standards for MY23 and
beyond in 2021, it projected that automakers could meet the requirements with EV sales of
approximately 17 percent in MY26.14 To the extent that manufacturers exceed that figure by
MY26—and with EV sales already at approximately 8 percent in MY22, the treld is positive—
the industry might enter the new regulatory window in MY27 well positioned to comply with
more stringent targets. 15 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 2-7]
14 Inclusive of PHEVs, per U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Revised 2023 and Later Model Year
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards: Regulatory Update (December 2021).
15 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light- Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles: Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (April 2023), 3-5;
Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Get Connected: Electric Vehicle Quarterly Report (June 26, 2023),
available atwww.autosinnovate.org/posts/papers-reports/get-connected-2023-ql.
Organization: RVIndustry Association (RVIA)
RVIA strongly opposes EPA's overreaching proposed rule for the reasons discussed below
and requests the agency exclude motor homes from having to comply with the proposed
medium- duty vehicle standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
In contradiction to this NPRM, the EPA has already proposed, in the Phase 3 GHG rule (see
88 FR 25996), to establish standards for motor homes that correctly acknowledge the reality that
motor homes are not well-suited for electrification. Under the proposed Phase 3 GHG rules, the
EPA would establish a C02 standard of 226 g/mi for MY2027 and later motor homes. As
discussed in the Phase 3 GHG NPRM, the agency has proposed this standard given the negative
implications of electrifying the motor home chassis. To power a motor home, the batteries would
take up space that is otherwise necessary for housing the various elements of a motor home. It
would also add significant amounts of weight to the motor home making it no longer capable of
being equipped with the components typically found in a motor home. It makes no difference
whether a motor home falls under the MD/HD Phase 3 GHG rules or the LD/MD rules, the
issues are the same. Standards which can only be met by battery-powered vehicles are not
practicable for motor homes. EPA staff who authored the Phase 3 GHG rule have acknowledged
this. In establishing standards for medium-duty vehicles within this rule, staff need to be
consistent and exclude motor homes from standards that would force them to be electrified.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
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Motor homes are often operated in locations where there is no electricity. This is known as
"boondocking." Frequently, motor homes will be operated for weeks at a time at such locations.
When motor homes are operated in a boondocking scenario, there is no possibility of EV
charging. Electrification simply does not work for this operating use case. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0629, pp.1-2]
Unlike medium-duty vehicles that might be conveniently recharged overnight, motor homes
are routinely driven 500 miles or more a day making it necessary to fully recharge mid-trip. A
multi- hour charging event is simply not something the typical motor home driver would find
acceptable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
Motor homes are typically a discretionary purchase by families who tend to be very cost
sensitive. Large increases in price for a vehicle that is operated on average only 20 days per year
and that travels on average only 4,000 miles will not be viewed favorably by potential buyers.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
The ability to recoup higher vehicle costs through refueling savings is minimal given motor
homes are driven sparingly by their owners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
If finalized, EPA's rule will severely limit the use and affordability of motor homes. As a
result, it will severely hurt motor home manufacturers, dealers, their employees and their
families. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
Regarding the certification of medium-duty motor homes powered by internal combustion
engines, as well as vehicles used to tow RVs, RVIA supports the concerns raised by the Alliance
for Automotive Innovation in its comment letter. Such concerns include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0629, pp.1-2]
• EPA's proposed rule is neither reasonable nor achievable in the timeframe provided. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
• EPA's proposed rule is a de facto battery electric vehicle mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0629, pp.1-2]
• EPA outstrips Biden administration's own 50 percent light-duty electrification executive
order from 2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
• EPA underestimates battery costs and makes unrealistic battery electric vehicle (BEV) sales
assumptions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
• EPA makes no concurrent requirements to support the infrastructure and battery critical
minerals for the required EVs or the drivers that must buy them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0629, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Scott Wilson
By now, you will have read in public comments that this proposed regulation will transform
the way people have lived, worked, and played for over 100 years" (Alliance for Automotive
Innovation) and "If finalized as proposed, the proposals would have a very significant impact on
all segments of the fuels and vehicle industries and the entire U.S. economy" (American
Petroleum Institute). While these statements are hyperbolic, the rule will indeed lead to
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significant changes to our vehicle fleet, spread over many years. That's the whole point. We've
just begun taking the first few steps needed to eventually bring the Gasoline Age to an end. We
have a long way to travel on this road. But, it's clear that the best way to achieve the emission
targets, which even the Texas Public Policy Foundation acknowledges are under EPA's
authority, is to take the combustion out of vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0515, p. 1]
The automaker's position (Alliance for Automotive Innovation) is that the proposed rule is
overly-ambitious and that it requires "stepped-up efforts at the state and local level when it
comes to building codes, permitting, and approval from public utility commissions". That
is true, and is an ongoing effort, however, we cannot wait until the entire EV ecosystem is in
place before ramping up vehicle production. Vehicles and their supporting social and physical
infrastructure must develop together, hand-in-hand, just like the fuel, repair, and dealer systems
did for gasoline vehicles. We would do well to learn from societies that are successfully
transitioning to EVs, like Norway, and the EU more broadly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0515,
p. 1]
Organization: Sierra Club et al.
A strong LDV rule is technologically feasible and achievable because we are seeing dramatic
cost and performance improvements in zero emission electric vehicle technology. This is
bolstered by the availability of significant federal financial incentives, and affirmed by existing
automaker commitments to deploy ZEV technologies and the adoption of state clean car
standards across the country. A strong emissions standard can position the United States as a
leader in ZEV technology development and manufacturing and create high-quality jobs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0668, p. 2]
Organization: Stellantis
Electrification Rates Misaligned to Market and Exceed Commitments
Stellantis fully supports comments submitted through The Alliance for Automotive
Innovation (AAI or the Auto Innovators) detailing the challenges associated with EPA's overly
optimistic expectation for EV market growth. Stellantis remains steadfast to delivering on our
commitments to achieve an electrified future, and we acknowledge EPA's efforts with this
rulemaking to help support this difficult yet critical transition. However, the proposed rule
significantly underestimates the actions needed to build the targeted EV market. Addressing
concerns such as manufacturing capacity, battery production, charging infrastructure, and
consumer acceptance of EVs will be paramount to the success of this ambitious proposed
regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 2-3]
- The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) committed significant funds to incentivize the purchase
of EVs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
- however these incentives come with criteria that exclude many EV models today, and
pending guidance from the IRS likely could exclude more in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
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- The IRA also provides an incentive to produce the needed batteries helping to offset their
cost - however this only applies to the U.S., ignoring the global supply chain needed to support a
40- 50% U.S. EV market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
Despite these major gaps, the EPA in its proposed rule incorrectly assumes these policy
actions represent a complete answer to achieve a 40-50% market. EPA's proposed rule extends
even further by assuming a "perfect" transition to a battery electric vehicle (BEV) only market at
60% in 2030MY - exceeding the commitment made to President Biden, the Administration's
National Blueprint for Transport Decarbonization, and the Stellantis Dare Forward commitment.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
These EV penetrations are greater than those of the most mature and forward leaning EV
markets in the U.S. Figure 1 below summarizes the electrification rates projected by the EPA
proposed rule against the penetration rates required in California's ZEV mandate as part of their
recent Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC II) program. California, the most mature EV market in the
U.S., will require at least 34% BEVs in 2027, increasing to 54% in 2030, and reaching 66% in
2032. EPA's proposed rule exceeds these California rates in every year from 2027-2032 and by
as much as 6% in 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR TABLE Industry Average Electrification Rates Figure 1-
EV Requirements of EPA NPRM vs. CARB ZEV Mandate and Biden Executive Order [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
EPA projects BEV rates that exceed Biden EO and the penetration of California's ZEV
mandate [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 4]
Overly optimistic EV penetration assumptions are especially evident in the high-capability
pickup segment as shown in Figure 2 below. EPA projects a 60% BEV penetration of pickup
trucks by 2032MY, completely ignoring the market benefit of plug-in hybrid electric vehicle
(PHEV), while assuming an "ideal" transition to BEVs despite the technology challenges to
maintain range while providing the towing and hauling capabilities of today's ICE trucks. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 4]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR NPRM Share of Light-Duty Pickups that are BEV*
Figure 2- Pickup truck BEV penetration of the proposed rule [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678,
p. 4]
Stellantis supports Auto Innovators' comments recommending that EPA take a less optimistic
approach in applying IRA incentives incorporating a more realistic price influence on future EV
market projections. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 5-6]
This incredibly aggressive assumption for BEV adoption is faster than any new automotive
technology to date, even exceeding the adoption rate targeted by California (the most mature EV
market in the U.S.). This adoption rate far exceeds what is supported by the policy actions in
place and adds significant risk to the automotive industry who must comply with these standards
whether these assumptions hold true or not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 5-6]
12 Stellantis supports the concerns the Auto Innovators raise that the NPRM mandates a very
aggressive ramp-up in BEV sales and forces new technology at unprecedented levels in an
expedited timeframe such that it may go beyond what is technically feasible, contrary to
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section 202 of the Clean Air Act (CAA).4 The stringency of the proposed standards for
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and criteria pollutants, as well as its restrictions on
credit programs and other flexibilities, all would force automakers to convert to BEV
fleets on a massive scale. In short, there is concern that the NPRM is seeking a
transformative shift to electrification beyond what is feasible for the industry or market to
bear - and beyond what Congress has provided. [EPA-HQ-OAR-20-0829-0678, p. 6]
4 42 U.S.C. §7521.
Stellantis also supports the Auto Innovators' concerns raised regarding the proposed rule's
reliance on the BIL and the IRA to support the Agency's feasibility determination. In particular,
EPA's reliance on these statutes as proposed to support projected BEV infrastructure, battery
production and consumer demand, may be speculative and therefore call into question EPA's
feasibility determination. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 6]Criteria Emissions
Requirements are Infeasible & Distract from Electrification
Separate from the proposed GHG standards, EPA is proposing dramatic criteria emission
reductions. Left unchanged, these reductions will force OEMs to divert engineering and financial
resources from our march to electrification and refocus those resources on improvements to our
shrinking ICE fleet. The rationale for these proposed actions now is difficult to fathom. EV
technology greatly reduces or eliminates criteria emissions - and Stellantis has committed to
50% EV technology by 2030. EPA actions exceed aggressive CARB ACCII LEV IV
requirements that could provide a large benefit over EPA's existing criteria standards (e.g.,
CARB PM standards are a 10-fold improvement over current EPA standards) while still
maintaining an EV-focused plan. Below are the most critical changes EPA is proposing. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 15]
EPA should maintain previously defined EV Multipliers
EPA is proposing to end advanced technology (BEV, FCEV, and PHEV) multipliers for
medium-duty vehicles in 2027MY, one year earlier than scheduled. The agency also seeks
comment on reducing the magnitude of the multipliers for 2025-26MY. Aligned with Auto
Innovators, Stellantis does not believe the advanced technology credit multipliers should be
adjusted or reduced in the 2025-27MY timeframe. The Phase 2 rule was finalized in 2016, and
[redacted text.] We believe the proposal to change or end advanced technology multipliers in the
2025-27MY does not provide sufficient lead time as required by the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 22]
Recommendations and Conclusion
The standards proposed in the 2027-2032MY Multi-pollutant NPRM represent a focus on
electrification of the automotive market that directionally Stellantis supports. However, the rate
at which EPA has projected this transition far exceeds the ambitious targets the Biden
administration and industry jointly agreed to, and even exceeds penetrations of the most mature
EV markets in the U.S. The EPA bases these EV penetrations on an overly optimistic outcome of
policy actions that represent only a fraction of what is needed to support a mature EV market.
EPA compounds these errors by removing compliance flexibilities that have successfully
incentivized proliferation of GHG saving technologies throughout the fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0678, pp. 23-24]
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Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Given the acceleration of public health and welfare impacts associated with climate change, it
is incumbent upon the EPA to recognize the crucial role battery electric vehicle (BEV)
technology plays today and how widespread commercial availability of BEVs in the U.S. today
should inform the implementation of a more stringent finalized standard as part of this
rulemaking. In designing new standards that increasingly depend upon achieving reductions of
tailpipe conventional criteria pollutant emissions and ever-enhanced efficiency to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, it is fully appropriate for the agency to recognize that while the
industry may be nearing the limits of incumbent internal comb-tion technologies — or those
additional gains may occur at ever greater costs per gram of-llutant reduction — alternative
technologies are increasingly available with competitive cost and performance
capabilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 1]
As provided below, the rapid pace of light-duty vehicle electrification strongly supports
efforts to address the significant public health and community impacts of air pollution associated
with the current light-duty vehicle fleet. This transformative technology has been amply
demonstrated, is being rapidly deployed, and has significantly decreasing competitive costs.
Tesla believes it is essential for EPA to establish stringent longer-term light-duty multi-pollutant
emission standards that actively embrace a more rapid transition to BEVs. Such standards are
well within EPA's long-standing and well- established authority and are compelled by the record
before the agency. Accordingly, Tesla encourages the agency to finalize multi-pollutant light-
duty standards that are more stringent than the preferred proposed emission reduction
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 1]
A number of studies show that the light-duty sector must rapidly decarbonize beginning this
decade to meet the U.S. commitments. Further, the need for the rapid deployment of light-duty
BEVs is even more critical given the lengthening time it takes to turn over the light-duty fleet.
Currently, the average age of light-duty vehicles on the road in the U.S. is now at an all-time
high of 12.5 years compared to two decades ago when the average age was 9.7 years.58 To meet
the goal of limiting global warming for below 1.5 degrees C the passenger fleet must primarily
be composed of BEVs by 2050.59 Given the aging vehicle fleet, this requires vehicles sales
consisting of 100% BEVs in the early 2030s.60 Other studies have similarly highlighted BEV
sales need to reach 95% by 2035 to meet the 1.5 degree C target.61 Still others have found that
in order to meet net-zero emission by 2050 60% of vehicle sales must be BEVs in 2030 with no
new ICE vehicle sales occurring after 2035.62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 9]
58 Axios, 'as-powered cars won't die off any time soon (May 15, 2023) available at h
ttps://www.axios.com/2023/05/15/ev- e lectric-vehicles-gas-trucks-suvs-cars-a
ging?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosgenerate&stream=top
59 Dimanchev, et al. T he 4Ds of Energy Transition: Decarbonization, Decentralization, Decreasing Use
and Digitalization, E lectric Vehicle Adoption Dynamics on the Road to Deep Decarbonization (July 15,
2022) (highlighting that published pathways indicate that the passenger vehicle fleet must be primarily
comprised of zero-emission vehicles by 2050, in a future consistent with keeping global warming below 2
or 1.5 °C. With the average lifetime of internal combustion cars in the U.S. is 16 years, achieving a ZEV
share consistent with 1.5°C pathways would require a combination of a relatively early ban by around 2030
and an average non-ZEV lifetime shorter than 10 years.) available at h
ttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9783527831425.ch8 (last visited Sept 12, 2022).
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60 Id.
61 Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Net-Zero Road Transport By 2050 Still Possible, As Electric Vehicles
Set To Quintuple By 2025 (June 1, 2022) (finding that be on n track for a net-zero global fleet by 2050,
zero-emission vehicles need to represent 61% of global new passenger vehicle sales by 2030, 93% by 2035,
and the last ICE vehicle of any segment needs to be sold by 2038.) available at h
ttps://about.bnef.com/blog/net-zero-road-transport-by-2050-still-possible-as-electric-vehicles-set-1 o-
quintuple-by-2
025/?utm_source=Email&utm_campaign=596500&utm_medium=Newsletter&utm_content=BNEFMonthI
nReviewJune&t a ctic=596500&pchash=
62 International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2022, An updated roadmap to Net Zero
Emissions by 2050, How do we get to net zero emissions by 2050? (Oct. 27, 2022) available at h
ttps://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook- 2 022/an-updated-roadmap-to-net-zero-emissions-by-
2050#abstract; See generally, ICCT, Emissions reduction benefits of a faster, global transition to zero-
emission vehicles (March 2022) available at h ttps://theicct.org/wp-c ontent/uploads/2022/03/Accelerated-
ZEV-transition-wp-f inal.pdf?utm_source=ICCT+mailing+list&utm_campaign=01b4a8f70d-l
ately_from_feb2018_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_ef73e76009-01b4a8f70d-510835924
In general, EPA appropriately recognizes the acceleration of electrification technology being
developed and deployed throughout the auto industry.75 Indeed, the agency points toward the
numerous manufacturer statements announcing BEV production goals that encompass the
timeframe of the proposed standard. These announcements have continued to expand during the
process of this rulemaking with Toyota, Hyundai, JLR, and Subaru, among others, announcing
new commitments on BEVs.76 Correctly, EPA utilizes these public commitments in its analysis
of the industry, and they reflect manufacturers' ability to meet stringent multi- pollutant
emissions standards.77 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 11-12]
75 See generally, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29187-29195.
76 See e.g., Toyota, Toyota Unveils New Technology That Will Change the Future of Cars (June 13, 2023)
available at h
ttps://global.toyota/en/newsroom/corporate/39288520.html?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medlum=email&
utm campa i gn=newsletter_axiosgenerate&stream=top; Reuters, H yundai Motor Group to invest $18 bin
in South Korean EV industry b y 2030 (Apr. 11, 2023) (expanding annual EV production in Korea to 1.51
million units and global volume to 3.64 million units by 2030 available at h
ttps://www.reuters.com/business/9471oomberansportation/hyundai-motor-groIp-invest-18-bln-ev- i
ndustry-skorea-by-2030-2023-04-11/; Reuters, J aguar Land Rover boosts investment to catch up in EV
race (Apr. 20, 2023) (Investing $19 billion over the next five years in BEVs) available at h
ttps://www.reuters.com/business/autos-t ransportation/jaguar-land-rover-plans-invest-15-bln-pounds-
electric-push-2023-04-1
9/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosgenerate&stream=top;
Electrek, S ubaru suddenly breaks electric following tripled annual profits, promises 4 crossover EVs in US
(May 11, 2023) available at https://e9471oombk.co/2023/05/ll/subaru-electric-tripled-annual-profits-
promises-4-crossover-ev-us/
77 See generally, BNEF, Zero Emission Vehicle Factbook: A BloombergNEF Special Report for COP 27
(Nov. 2022) (finding automakers have collectively committed to sell around 43 million EVs per year by
2030, and automakers with planned phase-outs of combustion engines now account for 30% of the global
auto market.) available at h ttps://assets.bbhub.io/professional/sites/24/2022-COP27-ZEV-T
ransition_Factbook.pdf?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosge
nerate&stream =top. It should be note that even this figure from less than a year ago is already outdated.
Nonetheless, EPA's proposed standards are set at a level less stringent than the depth and
pace of electrification technology deployment that has already occurred and will be accelerated
through market forces and numerous other state and federal policies. BEV deployment, like other
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technologies, will follow a S curve leading to a much more rapid pace of adoption between now
and when the proposed regulations take hold. Indeed, many manufacturers have rapidly placed
innovative technology across major portions of their new vehicle offerings in only a few model
years.78 BEV technology will continue to follow similar paths, and deployment has already been
shown to outperform the traditional S curve.79 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 12]
78 See e.g., Hula, et al, Analysis of Technology Adoption Rates in New Vehicles, SAE International (April
1, 2014) available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-10/documents/2014-01-0781_0.pdf
79 Ark Investment, Electric Vehicles Are Outperforming the Traditional S-Curve Dynamics (July 2, 2019)
available at h ttps://ark-invest.com/articles/analyst-research/ev-growth-outperforming-the-traditional-s-
curve-dynamics/
As EPA recognizes, "zero and near-zero emission technologies are more feasible and cost-
effective now than at the time of prior rulemakings."87. To address this Tesla has been a leader
in reducing the costs of high- performance BEVs. A Tesla Model 3's starting price is $40,240
and, inclusive of individual qualification with the current U.S. 30D tax credit, can reach an
equivalent price of $32,740.88 As recently reported, the Model 3 sells for now sells for $4,930
less than the average new vehicle sold in the U.S.89 Tesla has further outlined a pathway to
reducing the production cost of its next generation vehicle by 50%.90 As evidenced by the
popularity of its Model Y and Model 3 vehicles, Tesla has also demonstrated that increases in
production volumes can reduce BEV costs to levels favoring them in the marketplace and
facilitating broad consumer acceptance.91 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 13]
87 88 Fed. Reg. at 29188.
88 Tesla, Model 3 available at https://www.tesla.com/model3
89 Bloomberg, Tesla Undercuts Average US Car by Almost $5,000 in EV Shakeout (Feb. 21, 2023)
available at h ttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-21/tesla-undercuts-average-us-car-by-
almost-5-000-in-ev- s hakeout#xj4y7vzkg
90 Tesla, 2023 Investor Day Presentation (March 1, 2023) at 31-73, 119-131, 158 available at h
ttps://digitalassets.tesla.com/tesla-contents/image/upload/IR/Investor-Day-2023-Keynote; Tesla, Impact
Report 2022 at 64.
91 88 Fed. Reg. at 29312; See also, Bloomberg, Tesla and BYD Post Record Sales on Surge in Electric-Car
Demand (July 3, 2023) available at https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/articles/2023-07-02/tesla-sets-a-
new-delivery-record-as-price-cuts- y ield-results
Furthermore, the time frames for which these standards are being now proposed and will be
set are ones that are perfectly appropriate under the Act. As we have repeatedly noted in
comments to the Agency, auto manufacturers have acknowledged that, "integrating technologies
that improve fuel economy across multiple product lines requires several years of lead time and a
substantial investment of capital and engineering resources."141 Further, "once a vehicle
redesign incorporating a new vehicle technology is planned, [i]t takes a significant amount of
time to retool a factory and smoothly validate the tooling and processes to mass produce a
replacement technology." 142 It is critical that the rules be set now, which will provide the
regulatory certainty that companies need to make these investments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0792, p. 23]
141 Brief of the Association of Global Automakers and the Alliance Of Automobile Manufacturers in
Opposition, Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, No. 12-1253 (Sup, Ct„ July 22, 2013) at 4
available at http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/12-1253-Brief-in-Opposition-Auto-Manufacturers.pdf.
948
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142 Id., at 5, quoting 75 Fed. Reg. 25324, 25468.
Consistent with this approach, EPA appropriately states "While standards promulgated
pursuant to CAA section 202(a) are based on application of technology, the statute does not
specify a particular technology or technologies that must be used to set such standards; rather,
Congress has authorized and directed EPA to adapt its standards to emerging technologies." 146
Furthermore, as the agency recognizes, "This forward-looking regulatory approach keeps pace
with real-world technological developments and comports with Congressional intent." 147 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 23]
146 88 Fed. Reg. at 29187 (emphasis added).
147 Id., at 29232.
Lead Time and Rapid Deployment Mean Other Factors Are Not Barriers to More Stringent
Standards
While Section 202(a) directs the agency to have the proposed emission standards take effect
after such period found necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, these considerations must take place under the same technology forcing context
utilized in assessing the vehicle technology. Under this rubric, any assessment of BEV charging
infrastructure adequacy should not, based upon the extensive record available to the agency,
dampen the agency's move forward with a more a stringent standard. First and foremost, all
levels of light-duty BEV charging utilize proven and demonstrably effective technology that
have been applied for years. Second, economics dictate that increased build out of charging
infrastructure follows deployment of BEVs, as without adequate vehicles on the road investment
in such infrastructure risks becoming a stranded asset. Third, new charging technologies and
solutions will continue to develop. 183 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 29-30]
183 See, S&P Global, EV Chargers: How many do we need? (Jan. 9, 2023) (discussing battery swapping,
wireless charging, and increased deployment of DC wallbox solutions) available at h
ttps://press.spglobal.com/2023-01-09-EV-Chargers-How-m any-do-we-need
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
2. The annual stringency increases in the first three years of the proposed rule are extreme and
outside historical norms. EPA has historically recognized that technology penetration is slower
in early stages of market development and increases more rapidly over time. The proposed early
ramp rates run directly contrary to this reality. We are also concerned that this extreme rate may
have a paradoxical effect on C02 emissions - lowering the volume of older, higher polluting
vehicles replaced because artificial shortages will be created of low- carbon non-BEV vehicles
that many customers prefer. Automakers need time to invest in EV and battery production
capacity, for the charging infrastructure to develop across the country, and for the market to
mature. To reduce carbon dioxide emissions as much as possible, as soon as possible, customers
need choices that encourage replacement of high-C02 emitting vehicles with low- or zero- C02
emitting vehicles. EPA should smooth the early rates of increase in recognition of these
factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 2]
1. Overview
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When President Biden issued Executive Order 14037 in 2021 calling for 50% electrified
vehicles (defined then as battery electrics (BEVs), plug-in hybrids (PHEVs) and fuel cell hybrid
electrics (FCHVs), Toyota publicly committed to making every effort to achieve those targets.
However, the Proposed Rule would force about 60% BEVs alone by 2030, and 67% by 2032.
This significantly moves the goal line on electrification and is paramount to a BEV mandate on
an incredibly aggressive timeline. Taken separately, the proposed GHG standards and the
proposed tailpipe/criteria standards each attempts to steer the future toward a BEV-only vehicle
market. Together they do that and impose significant costs on internal combustion engine (ICE)
vehicles currently accounting for about 94% of the new vehicle market. Toyota shares the
administration's goal to decarbonize transportation, but believes the Proposed Rule requires
significant adjustments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 8]
Data show that a portfolio approach to electrification which includes the technologies above
plus hybrid electrics (HEVs), provides the same or greater carbon reductions as an approach that
focuses exclusively on BEVs. A portfolio approach utilizing scarce critical minerals in the most
effective manner to remove more traditional ICE vehicles from the road more quickly. It also
provides consumers with more carbon-reducing options that fit their lifestyles and purchasing
power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 8]
The Proposed Rule also for the first time imposes standards on automakers for which
compliance requires significant actions by third parties over which we (or EPA) have no control.
First, achieving the level of BEVs required by the Proposed Rule will require massive new
supplies of critical minerals, the mines to extract them, and the refining facilities to turn ore into
battery-grade material. Currently, virtually the entire mineral and battery supply chain is outside
the U.S. Second, it requires massive investments in home and public charging infrastructure, as
well as upgrades to the electrical grid throughout the U.S. and an accelerated shift to renewable
power generation. Various provisions of the IIJA and IRA directionally support some of these
areas but fall significantly short of what will be needed for the expected level of electrification.
And finally, the ultimate impact of these factors on vehicle costs and consumer demand are
unclear, at best. The are few contingencies for automakers and our customers in the event any or
all these factors stand in the way of complying with the Proposed Rule. Our comments below
address these and other issues. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 8-9]
We are prepared to follow up with additional information beyond these comments. We look
forward to collaborating toward a more workable Final Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620,
pp. 8-9]
5. GHG Program
The Proposed Rule fails to demonstrate the penetration of BEVs assumed for compliance with
the proposed standards is feasible. The proposal notes "While emission standards set by the EPA
under CAA section 202(a)(1) generally do not mandate use of particular technologies, they are
technology-based, as the levels chosen must be premised on a finding of technological
feasibility." 17 CAA section 202(a)(1) states "Any regulation prescribed under paragraph (1) of
this subsection (and any revision thereof) shall take effect after such period as the Administrator
finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving
appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
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17 88 Fed. Reg at 29232.
18 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2).
The aggressive ramp up of BEVs (see Table 1) required to comply forces a rapid
transformation of how vehicles are manufactured, driven, fueled, and serviced. As such,
"leadtime and requisite technology" must extend to the availability of critical minerals, the
readiness of a sustainable battery supply chain and fueling infrastructure, as well as other
market-related factors that will affect the price and consumer demand of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
[Table 1 Annual BEV Penetration Assume for Compliance w/ Proposed Standards
MY 2027: BEV Share 36
MY 2028: BEV Share 45
MY 2029: BEV Share 55
MY 2030: BEV Share 60
MY 2031: BEV Share 63
MY 2032: BEV Share 67]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
Today's PEV support system clearly cannot meet the needs of the future envisioned by the
proposal. Our comments explain why the proposal lacks a clear justification for how the support
system will be in place over the period of the proposed standards. Neither EPA nor auto
manufactures can control the timing or outcomes of these essential support measures. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
Therefore, it is disappointing that EPA removed the e-RIN proposal from the RFS set rule as
it is one of the few measures for which EPA has direct authority to provide at least some level of
assistance in supporting the EV shares required in the GHG proposal. After a muti-year
collaboration with the auto industry, a valuable policy tool for establishing PEV markets and
promoting clean energy has been lost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
Finally, EPA has taken a more measured view of technology risk and uncertainty in past
vehicle emissions rulemakings in which technology costs were lower and automakers had
significantly more direct control over managing their technology development, deployment, and
sales mix to comply. In this Proposed Rule, EPA appears to be taking a much more cavalier
approach to risk, lead time, and ensuring the "requisite technology" is available, despite the high
cost of BEVs, the massive uncertainty around mineral supplies, the significant investment
needed in charging infrastructure and the power grid, and the uncertain market demand for
BEVs. The standards in the Final Rule should be adjusted to better account for market
uncertainties. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
5.1. Annual Stringency Increase
The greatest rate of emissions reductions is required over the first three years of the proposed
standards with annual rates of improvement is as high as 16% (compared to a maximum of 12%
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annual rate over the final three years) (see Figure 8). This front-loaded stringency runs contrary
to the longstanding recognition that technology penetration is slower in early stages of market
development and accelerates with continuous refinements and growing consumer awareness and
acceptance. The situation is made worse by the BEV-forcing nature of the proposal and the
requisite need to establish battery supply chains, production capacity, and charging
infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 26-27]
[See original for graphs, Figure 8 Required PEV Growth Versus Infrastructure Ramp Up]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 26-27]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
II. EPA unreasonably relies on unreliable information and speculation to conclude that
the proposed rule is feasible.
EPA cites to numerous sources in support of the feasibility of its proposal, such as the
proposition that many OEMs have announced investments in ZEV technologies and have
released projections for additional makes and models of LD ZEVs. However, EPA does not
account for the fact that these projections are contingent on a multitude of best-case assumptions
and market factors that EPA's own sources caveat heavily. Although EPA could have obtained
specific data and credible information regarding manufacturers' investments and capabilities and
infrastructure buildout, EPA chose not to do so. By cherry-picking headlines that appear to
support the Administration's policy objectives, meanwhile disregarding material assumptions
and contingencies outside the control of regulators and OEMs alike that are relevant to its
analysis, EPA unreasonably relies on optimistic projections that have no basis in actual fact
while overlooking the large body of credible evidence that strongly indicates that EPA's
proposed standards are infeasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 18]
This approach is inexplicably at odds with the approach EPA takes in the recently announced
"RFS Set" rule, in which EPA expressly declined to rely upon fuel producers' announcements of
anticipated renewable diesel production capacity in establishing the renewable fuel volumes for
2023-2025.91 Consequently, EPA's proposed rule is unsupported, arbitrary, and exceeds EPA's
statutory authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 18]
91 Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) Program: Standards for 2023-2025 and Other Changes, announced
June 21, 2023, pre-publication version available at https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-
program/final-renewable- fuels-standards-rule-and-2025.
B. EPA disregards caveats regarding ZEV production capabilities.
EPA cites to "[a] proliferation of announcements by automakers in the past two years[,]
signaling] a rapidly growing shift in product development focus among automakers away from
internal-combustion technologies and toward electrification."! 18 Drawing support from these
announcements, EPA concludes that it is feasible within the next decade to force transition of the
domestic LDV fleet to BEV largely on the basis of third-hand sources and news articles taken
out of context. Though EPA acknowledges in passing that "manufacturer announcements such as
these are not binding, and often are conditioned as forward-looking and subject to
uncertainty[,]"119, EPA's proposed rule is not characterized by any reciprocal flexibilities to
adjust ambitious targets in order to accommodate material realities and uncertainties impacting
BEV production. In contrast to EPA's projections, the same OEMs EPA cites to for support of
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the Proposed Rule have raised material concerns with an accelerated transition to LD BEVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
118 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29190.
119 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29193.
For example, EPA cites to a May 2021 announcement from Ford, providing that "they expect
40 percent of their global sales will be all-electric by 2030." 120 However, the Ford press release
EPA cites to also contains the following laundry list of caveats: 121 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 22-25]
120 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29190 (citing to Ford Motor Company, "Superior Value From EVs,
Commercial Business, Connected Services is Strategic Focus of Today's 'Delivering Ford+' Capital
Markets Day," Press Release, May 26, 2021).
121 Ford Motor Company, "Superior Value From EVs, Commercial Business, Connected Services is
Strategic Focus of Today's 'Delivering Ford+' Capital Markets Day," Press Release, May 26, 2021).
"Cautionary Note on Forward-Looking Statements
Statements included or incorporated by reference herein may constitute 'forward- looking
statements' within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
Forward-looking statements are based on expectations, forecasts, and assumptions by our
management and involve a number of risks, uncertainties, and other factors that could cause
actual results to differ materially from those stated, including, without limitation: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford and Ford Credit's financial condition and results of operations have been and
may continue to be adversely affected by public health issues, including epidemics or pandemics
such as COVID-19; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford is highly dependent on its suppliers to deliver components in accordance with
Ford's production schedule, and a shortage of key components, such as semiconductors, can
disrupt Ford's production of vehicles; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford's long-term competitiveness depends on the successful execution of its Plan;
Ford's vehicles could be affected by defects that result in delays in new model
launches, recall campaigns, or increased warranty costs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
22-25]
Ford may not realize the anticipated benefits of existing or pending strategic alliances,
joint ventures, acquisitions, divestitures, or new business strategies; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 22-25]
Operational systems, security systems, and vehicles could be affected by cyber
incidents and other disruptions; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford's production, as well as Ford's suppliers' production, could be disrupted by labor
issues, natural or man-made disasters, financial distress, production difficulties, or other factors;
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
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Ford's ability to maintain a competitive cost structure could be affected by labor or
other constraints; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford's ability to attract and retain talented, diverse, and highly skilled employees is
critical to its success and competitiveness; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford's new and existing products and mobility services are subject to market
acceptance and face significant competition from existing and new entrants in the automotive
and mobility industries; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford's results are dependent on sales of larger, more profitable vehicles, particularly
in the United States; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
With a global footprint, Ford's results could be adversely affected by economic,
geopolitical, protectionist trade policies, or other events, including tariffs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Industry sales volume in any of Ford's key markets can be volatile and could decline
if there is a financial crisis, recession, or significant geopolitical event; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford may face increased price competition or a reduction in demand for its products
resulting from industry excess capacity, currency fluctuations, competitive actions, or other
factors; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Fluctuations in commodity prices, foreign currency exchange rates, interest rates, and
market value of Ford or Ford Credit's investments can have a significant effect on results; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford and Ford Credit's access to debt, securitization, or derivative markets around the
world at competitive rates or in sufficient amounts could be affected by credit rating
downgrades, market volatility, market disruption, regulatory requirements, or other factors;
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford's receipt of government incentives could be subject to reduction, termination, or
clawback; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford Credit could experience higher-than-expected credit losses, lower-than-
anticipated residual values, or higher-than-expected return volumes for leased vehicles; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Economic and demographic experience for pension and other postretirement benefit
plans (e.g., discount rates or investment returns) could be worse than Ford has assumed; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Pension and other postretirement liabilities could adversely affect Ford's liquidity and
financial condition; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford could experience unusual or significant litigation, governmental investigations,
or adverse publicity arising out of alleged defects in products, perceived environmental impacts,
or otherwise; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
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Ford may need to substantially modify its product plans to comply with safety,
emissions, fuel economy, autonomous vehicle, and other regulations; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford and Ford Credit could be affected by the continued development of more
stringent privacy, data use, and data protection laws and regulations as well as consumers'
heightened expectations to safeguard their personal information; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford Credit could be subject to new or increased credit regulations, consumer
protection regulations, or other regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
We cannot be certain that any expectation, forecast, or assumption made in preparing
forward-looking statements will prove accurate, or that any projection will be realized. It is to be
expected that there may be differences between projected and actual results. Our forward-
looking statements speak only as of the date of their initial issuance, and we do not undertake
any obligation to update or revise publicly any forward-looking statement, whether as a result of
new information, future events, or otherwise. For additional discussion, see "Item 1 A. Risk
Factors" in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2020, as updated
by subsequent Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and Current Reports on Form 8-K." [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Moreover, in March 2023, figures released by Ford highlighted that Ford Motor Co.'s EV
business had lost $3 billion before taxes during the past two years and will lose a similar amount
this year as the company invests heavily in EV technology. 122 Ford's 10-K filed in February
2023 further disclosed: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
122 Krishner, Tom, Associated Press, "Ford's electricity vehicle unit losing billions, as company invests in
new technolo23, 2023), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/fords-electric-vehicle-unit-losing-
billions-as-company-invests-in-new-technology; see also Ford News Release, "'Refounded' Ford to Show
How Customer-Focused Segments Will Drive Value and Growth, Changes in Financial Repor3, 2023)
https://media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/fna/us/en/news/2023/03/23/_refounded_-ford-to-show-how-
customer-focused-segments-will-driv.html.
"We have announced plans to significantly increase our electric vehicle production
volumes; however, our ability to produce higher volumes of electric vehicles is dependent upon
the availability of raw materials necessary for the production of batteries, e.g., lithium, cobalt,
nickel, graphite, and manganese, among others." 123 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-
25]
123 Ford 10-K Annual 3) https://shareholder.ford.com/Investors/financials/sec-filings/sec-filings-
details/default.aspx?FilingId=16361873 (emphasis added).
"As a result of the competition for and limited availability of the raw materials needed
for our electric vehicle business, the costs of such materials are difficult to accurately forecast as
they may fluctuate during the term of the offtake agreements and other long-term purchase
contracts based on market conditions. Accordingly, we may be subject to increases in the prices
we pay for those raw materials, and our ability to recoup such costs through increased pricing to
our customers may be limited. As a result, our margins, results of operations, financial condition,
and reputation may be adversely impacted by commitments we make pursuant to offtake
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agreements and other long-term purchase contracts." 124 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
22-25]
124 Ford 10-K Annual 3) https://shareholder.ford.com/Investors/financials/sec-filings/sec-filings-
details/default.aspx?FilingId=16361873 (emphasis added).
III. EPA fails to adequately consider important aspects and consequences of the proposed
rule.
EPA's claims in the preamble seeking to distance itself from the policy directives established
by the Biden Administration in Executive Order 14037 are belied by the numerous specific
instances in the preamble in which EPA assumes without serious, critical, and independent
analysis that the LMD vehicle fleet should be forced to transition to BEV and FCEV
technologies. In its haste to fulfill the Administration's predetermined policy objectives, EPA
fails to adequately consider important aspects of the rule and overlooks significant impacts and
consequences that will inevitably result if the rule is adopted as proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, p. 29]
The lack of rigor and discipline in EPA's methodology stands in stark contrast with EPA's
typical approach to rulemaking and defies the general assessment factors for evaluating the
quality of scientific and technical information that the Science Policy Council (SPC) has
issued. 140 In particular, this rulemaking does not have the hallmarks of the "weight-of-
evidence" approach which "considers all relevant information in an integrative assessment that
takes into account the kinds of evidence available, the quality and quantity of the evidence, the
strengths and limitations associated with each type of evidence."141 Nor does this proposal
comport with the Action Development Process outlined by EPA, which states that rules should
be "based on sound scientific, economic, legal, and policy analyses" and "reflect appropriate
solicitation and consideration of views outside EPA." 142 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
28-29]
140 EPA, Science Policy Council, A Summary of General Assessment Factors for Evaluating the Quality
of Scientific and Technical Informationailable at https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-
0 l/documents/assess2.pdf.
141 Id. at p. 2.
142 EPA, Action Development Process: Guidance for EPA Staff on Developing Quality Actions
(2011)lable at https://nepis.epa.gov/.
Additionally, rulemaking under the CAA almost always starts with EPA gathering and
analyzing relevant information from various sources included regulated entities and other
impacted entities and suppliers of controls. EPA could have requested information from vehicle
manufacturers, battery manufacturers, mineral suppliers, auto dealers, insurance carriers,
consumer organizations, small businesses, and others in order to obtain credible, verifiable, and
standardized information in order to support a thoughtful and critical analysis of its projections
regarding vehicle availability, purchase costs, battery availability, battery performance, charging
infrastructure availability and performance, and other aspects of this proposal. EPA should not
rely on self-serving OEM announcements as a shortcut to using its authority to gather data and
complete analysis for an action with vast economic consequences. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 28-29]
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2. The statutory structure of the Clean Air Act further confirms that EPA is not
authorized to mandate the sale of ZEVs.
i. The statutory structure confirms Congress' focus on technologically achievable
emission controls.
Several provisions of Section 202 of the Clean Air Act confirm that Congress focused on
technologically feasible standards for vehicles deemed to emit pollutants that actually cause or
contribute to pollution. Section 202(a)(2) requires EPA to provide manufacturers with lead time
to comply with the " standards, in order "to permit the development and application of requisite
technology." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2). Similarly, Section 202(a)(3)(A)(i) provides thatEPA's
HDV standards for certain criteria pollutants should reflect the "greatest degree of emission
reduction achievable through the application of technology which the [EPA] determines will be
available" during the relevant model year. Id. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i). Those provisions contemplate
that technological feasibility will meaningfully constrain the emission standards that EPA sets
under Section 202(a). EPA cannot ignore technological feasibility and simply decide to require
production of fewer internal combustion vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 78]
Other provisions show the type of "technology" that Congress contemplated vehicle
manufacturers would develop to meet those standards. Section 202(m) requires EPA to
command manufacturers to install on "all" new light-duty vehicles and trucks "diagnostic
systems" that identify "emission-related systems deterioration or malfunction ... which could ...
result in failure of the vehicles to comply with emission standards established under this section."
42 U.S.C. § 7521(m)(l). The required diagnostic systems must monitor, "at a minimum, the
catalytic converter and oxygen sensor." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 78]
In other words, to ensure compliance with emission standards under Section 202(a), Congress
required "emissions-related systems" and accompanying "diagnostic systems" on each vehicle—
again underscoring Congress's view that the vehicles subject to an emission standard actually
emit the relevant pollutant in EPA's judgment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 78]
As the statutory structure demonstrates, EPA may set standards that are "technology-forcing,"
because they require manufacturers to adopt nascent technology that may not yet be "adequately
demonstrated." NRDC, 805 F .2d at 419. EPA's rules thus have promoted the development of
"automotive technologies, such as on-board computers and fuel injection systems" that improve
emissions from combustion engines. 86 Fed. Reg. at 74,451. But the statute does not permit what
EPA proposes here: enacting "average" standards divorced from technologically achievable
limits on emitting vehicles, which instead force manufacturers to produce a different type of
supposedly non-emitting vehicle altogether. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 78]
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
Ambitious and Stringent Standards Proposed
EPA's NPRM proposes historically ambitious and stringent targets towards carbon neutrality
for the light-duty and medium-duty transportation sector. Significantly noted by AFAI, the
automotive industry is committing resources and investments of $1.2 trillion by 2030, while
Volkswagen estimates our worldwide digitalization and electrification investment around $130
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billionl between 2023 and 2027. The ambition must be met equally by commitment of segments
outside the automotive Industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 2]
1 120 Billion Euro; Exchange rate: 1.09 USD to 1 EUR
To that end, Volkswagen supports continuous reductions in vehicle fleet average GHG
emissions and criteria pollutants. Volkswagen is committed to work with U.S. agencies, utilities,
charging infrastructure providers, raw material suppliers and additional stakeholders in
partnership with AFAI on reasonable and achievable pathways for all manufacturers for 2027
and beyond. Sustained, complementary and supportive policy is paramount in forming a cross-
sector foundation required to scale up growth and infrastructure. To achieve the shared vision of
zero emission mobility, solutions must be instituted in these sectors to allow Volkswagen to
provide customers with a "People's Car" of superior utility and affordability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0669, p. 2]
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
Particulate Matter (PM)
For several reasons, VCC is opposed to EPA's proposal on particulate matter. Implementing
the PM requirements as proposed in the NPRM is just not feasible. The EPA proposal differs
from the CARB approach on PM and it is also more stringent than ACCII. Therefore, it will
cause a lot of additional burden on manufacturers that are spending most of their resources on
electrification. It is not just a matter of adding the gasoline particulate filter, rather it includes
substantial development and investments. Such massive hardware changes are just not possible
by 2027MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
If CARB and EPA are not harmonized then VCC would need to have two sets of hardware in
the US market, one Federal and one California + S177 states. This would be very costly for a
small OEM like VCC. In 2027MY VCC will only have few engine families in production
according to our current plan, but this approach would mean VCC needs to double its engine
programs. In addition, VCC has already decided on a hardware technical solution that meets
CARB ACCII for 2026 MY and beyond but a final EPA rule is not expected until spring 2024.
So it will be very difficult to implement an EPA specific hardware technical solution in time for
the 2027 MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
VCC's recommendation is that EPA align with CARB with regards to PM. EPA should
follow the CARB ACCII PM-regulations and the CARB phase-in plan that is already in effect.
This is fully consistent with the way that CARB ACC1 (LEV III) and EPA Tier3 was
synchronized in the prior set of regulations. So, there is a precedent for this approach, and given
that California and 177 states make up over 40% of the US car market, this approach is efficient
and consistent with those regulations already in place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
EPA's proposal on particulate matter would create a stringent standard that requires additional
hardware which is much worse for a small OEM like VCC due to our small fleets. This means
investment costs need to be split on much smaller fleets. In addition, there are major
development costs which would put VCC at a significant disadvantage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
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VCC has invested substantially to upgrade our dynos used for US certification testing to the
latest 1066 standard. VCC did not anticipate any further upgrades to these dynos because VCC
will be all electric in 203OMY. Therefore, the EPA proposal would require upgrades for one
market (USA) for only 3 model years and then VCC would discontinue the whole emission
measurement system in 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
The proposal would also necessitate additional test capacity and different separate tests for
EPA and CARB. So, it would mean doubling the number of the tests and this would create
additional administrative burden in order to implement. Increasing test cells does not happen
overnight and it would likely not be feasible for VCC to get the additional test cells needed for
MY 2027 testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
In addition to separate tests, the EPA proposal differs from CARB requirements on emission
and OBD certifications. If CARB and EPA are not harmonized VCC must submit two OBD
applications for each engine, one for CARB and one for EPA. Many OEMs are likely in a similar
position, but the implication to small volume manufacturers is much more significant than it is to
the larger OEMs. VCC encourages EPA to harmonize with CARB and not require separate EPA
certifications. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
New certification and compliance programs will likely be costly, especially with new
tightened criteria that is proposed. VCC believes measurement accuracy is a concern at this low
level. See the section on tunnel blank PM testing contained in the Alliance for Auto Innovation
comments. In addition, it is not feasible with current existing sensor technology to monitor and
detect the proposed requirement of 30% efficiency (See appendix for technical comments on the
OBD proposal). It is also important to note that active regeneration is very infrequent on petrol
engines and happens only during extreme conditions. This would make it problematic to
consistently detect frequent or incomplete regeneration (See appendix for technical comments on
the OBD proposal). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
The NPRM proposed PM standard alone would mean the few remaining HEVs in Volvo
Cars' cycle plan 2027MY-2029MY would likely need new hardware to accommodate a new
gasoline particulate filter (GPF). For a small manufacturer like VCC, this would be necessary for
3 years only for vehicles with short life span and it would be challenging and costly. It would
result in very little environmental benefit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
EPA should consider requiring more stringent fuel requirements which would have a
more significant environmental impact at a lower cost. Although changes to fuel standards are
outside the scope of this NPRM, VCC believes that fuels which contain reduced particulate
formation can be utilized in today's vehicles and future vehicle fleets. This would have faster and
greater environmental benefit without all the burden and investment of PM filters which would
be utilized for future vehicles only. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
Rather than the EPA proposed particulate matter requirements in the NPRM, VCC strongly
encourages EPA adopt the CARB PM1 Regulation and allow for a Phase-In for these
requirements. This is best pathway for harmonization and will deliver environmental benefits
without unnecessary additional costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
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Organization: Western Energy Alliance
it is hard to fathom how EPA comes to that conclusion. The electric grid is in no way capable
of handling the huge increase in electricity demand that the rule would require, the United States
does not have access to the critical minerals required for such a high market penetration of EVs,
nor is the increased wind and solar energy generation available now nor in the foreseeable future
to make supposedly ZEVs actually ZEVs. EPA has failed to adequately consider the impact of
this rule on grid reliability. EPA should analyze grid reliability in this rulemaking and reference
the large body of work raising concerns about how increased EVs will destabilize the grid.l
Without the grid capability and the critical minerals, EPA's EPA Proposed Rule on Light-Duty
Vehicle Emissions Standards July 5, 2023 statement on technical feasibility is logically flawed,
as current and projected grid infrastructure cannot support the goal of the proposed rule. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 2-3]
1 For example see E lectric Vehicle Dynamic Charging Performance Characteristics during Bulk Power
System D isturbances, North American Electric Grid Reliability Corp. et al., April 2023; T estimony of
Federal Energy Regulatory Commissioners Willie Phillips, Mark Christie, and James Danly before the
Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee, May 4, 2023, warning: "We face unprecedented
challenges to the reliability of our nation's electric system.".. .the U.S. electric grid is "heading for a very
catastrophic situation in terms of reliability..." and there is a "looming reliability crisis in our electricity
markets."
EPA must reconsider its analysis on technical feasibility by considering a full range of data on
grid reliability. The Rapid Energy Policy Evaluation and Analysis Toolkit Domestic, a project of
Princeton University, projects electricity demand would need to increase 18% by 2030 and 38%
by 2035 to meet the president's EV goals.2 Many are warning of the lack of infrastructure to
support the EV goals. The nation would need to spend $20 billion to $30 billion annually on new
transmission lines for the increased demand, but is spending next to nothing.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0679, p.3]
2 Preview: Final REPEAT Project Findings on the Emissions Impacts of the Inflation Reduction Act and
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Rapid Energy Policy Evaluation and Analysis Toolkit, Princeton
University, April 2023.
3 Rob Gramlich, founder and president of Grid Strategies, a transmission policy group, as quoted in "Why
the electric vehicle boom could put a major strain on the U.S. power grid," CNBC, July 1, 2023.
Technical Infeasibility and Impracticalities for Consumers: EPA uses flawed analysis about
the technical feasibility of the rule, but the behavior aspects are also seriously deficient. There is
little evidence that EVs are being accepted by consumers other than a small niche of high-end,
wealthy individuals who can afford to purchase an expensive vehicle with limited range. 11
Given the long refueling times and battery drain when operating the heater or air conditioning,
only those who can afford a second or third vehicle for exclusive use in-town are currently
purchasing EVs. There has been no evidence to date that these problems of limited range and
functionality will be overcome soon to achieve the high market penetration EPA hopes with this
rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 6]
11 The Energy Information Administration (EIA) shows that 2/3 of households with EVs have incomes
over $100,000. Electrified vehicles continue to see slow growth and less use than conventional vehicles,
EIA, May 2018
EPA's assertion is simply not supported by facts:
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"The year-over-year growth in U.S. PEV sales suggests that an increasing share of new
vehicle buyers are concluding that a PEV is the best vehicle to meet their needs. Many of the
zero-emission vehicles already on the market today cost less to operate than ICE vehicles, offer
improved performance and handling, have a driving range similar to that of ICE vehicles, and
can be charged at a growing network of public chargers as well as at home." (p. 29189) [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 6]
At only 5.8% of new vehicle sales, EVs has a long way to go to meet the targets EPA is
setting of 67%, a more than ten-fold increase that is a far goal from the "increasing share of new
vehicle buyers..Further, asserting that the range is similar to an ICEV is preposterous,
especially in anything less than the most favorable mild weather conditions, as EVs lose range in
cold and hot weather. 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 6]
12 Winter & Cold Weather EV Range Loss in 7,000 Cars, Recurrent, December 12, 2022.
The most fuel-efficient car on the market is the Toyota Prius, but even it would not meet the
proposed standards. With this proposed rule EPA is squeezing out the Prius' successful hybrid
technology. The Prius MY 2032 standard is less than half the C02 emissions per mile of MY
2023, which range from 155 g/mi to 179 g/mi. To comply with the proposed rule, the fleet-
average C02 emissions of Toyotas in MY 2032 would have to be 52 to 60% lower than that of
today's Prius, forcing Toyota to rapidly increase the percentage of EVs sells, regardless of
consumer choice. Clearly EPA is stepping well beyond its authority by advancing a technically
infeasible rule that attempts to reshape the entire vehicle marketplace. The historical record of
governments attempting to plan an entire economy or sector has not been a successful one. EPA
should abandon this rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 6-7]
Organization: World Resources Institute (WRI)
Locking in cleaner vehicle standards, and potentially extending them through 2035 as
requested by auto manufacturers, will create market stability and will give manufacturers,
investors, and consumers greater confidence in the direction of the vehicle market. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
Based on the current and growing uptake of electric vehicles, paired with public and private
investments in charging, purchasing, and manufacturing from the Inflation Reduction Act and
the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, these standards would be achievable under the model
years proposed. Public investments from recent legislation include but are not limited to: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
• National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Program [Link:
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/]
Electric Vehicle Tax Credit [Link: https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/credits-
for-new-clean-vehicles-purchased-in-2023-or-after]
Commercial Clean Vehicle Credit (45W) [Link: https://www.irs.gov/credits-
deducti ons/commerci al -cl ean-vehi cl e-credit]
Used Clean Vehicle Credit [Link: https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/used-clean-
vehicle-credit]
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Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit (45X) [Link:
https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i7207]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
Complementary policies provide incentives
By leveraging the billions of dollars in new federal investments in electric vehicle charging in
the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the hundreds of millions of dollars of clean
transportation incentives in the Inflation Reduction Act these standards have the potential to be
the floor not the ceiling for transportation emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0544, pp. 1-3]
These policies provide unprecedented levels of public support for electric vehicles specifically
including at least $83 billion of loans, grants, and tax credits that could support the production of
low or zero-emission vehicles, batteries, or chargers according to a recent analysis [Link:
https://www.atlasevhub.com/data_story/210-billion-of-announced-investments-in-electric-
vehicle-manufacturing-headed-for-the-u-s/#_ftn4] by Atlas Public Policy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
Complemented by existing state policies like the Advanced Clean Trucks and Advanced
Clean Fleets rules, which require manufacturers to begin selling an increasing percentage of
zero-emission vehicles starting in 2024, EPA's proposed rules can help to accelerate the
transition to zero-emission transportation while improving public health and reducing climate
pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
Private investments are rapidly expanding supply chains and manufacturing [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0544, pp.1-3]
Since the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act less than one year ago, companies have
announced tens of billions of dollars in renewable energy, battery, and electric vehicle projects
across the country. From the announcement that Our Next Energy [Link:
https://www.michiganbusiness.org/press-releases/2022/10/whitmer-announces-2000-jobs-
investment-of-$1.6-billion-michigan-based-our-next-energy-builds-battery-manufacturing-
campus-wayne-county/] has invested $1.6 billion in their first battery manufacturing campus in
Wayne County, Michigan to the news that Hyundai Motor Group and SK On [Link:
https://fortune.com/2022/12/08/hyundai-new-5-billion-electric-battery-plant-georgia-atlanta-
biden-inflation-reduction-act/] are jointly investing $4-$5 billion to build electric battery plants
outside of Atlanta, Georgia to BMW's [Link: https://apnews.com/article/technology-north-
america-spartanburg-south-carolina-climate-and-environment-
96753f092b29e0d384903591b5221fl3] recent announcement of their $1.7 billion investment
near Spartanburg, South Carolina in their shift to EV manufacturing there is ample evidence that
recent policies are helping to drive substantial private investments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0544, pp. 1-3]
These investments are leading to rapidly developing supply chains, domestic battery
production capacity, and increased manufacturing which will lead to further reductions in the
cost and increases in the availability of zero-emission vehicles. This market growth will continue
to increase with additional supportive policies and regulations, such as these proposed rules.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
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EPA Summary and Response
EPA appreciates the comments received on the topic of the lead time needed to reduce
emissions from light- and medium-duty vehicles in order to comply with the proposed GHG
standards. A number of commenters shared the view that the existence of vehicle technologies
for reducing GHG emissions was not in question. However, many of those same commenters
objected to the pace of the standards under EPA's proposal, and specifically EPA's modeled
projection of the year-over-year increases in BEV penetrations to meet the proposed standards,
as well as the projected level of BEVs in MY 2032.
The feasibility of complying with GHG standards in a given future model year is closely
related to the level of stringency of the standards. EPA's responses to comments on the topic of
stringency/level of the GHG standards are provided in RTC Section 3.3.1. This section contains
EPA responses to comments regarding the year-over-year trajectory of the ramp down of the
standards, and the associated lead time available to meet the level of standards for each year -
including MY 2032 when the most stringent level of standards is reached. Comments specifically
related to the lead time needed to build up the PEV supply chain and secure critical materials are
addressed in RTC Section 15. Comments related to the lead time needed to build out charging
infrastructure and prepare electricity generation for greater numbers of PEVs are addressed in
RTC Sections 17 and 18, respectively. Comments related to the rate of growth of consumer
markets for light- and medium-duty vehicles are addressed in RTC Sections 13 and 14.
Various commenters (25 x '25 Alliance, AAI, AVE, ACE, AmFree, American Highway
Users Alliance, BMW, Delek Holdings) asserted that the rate of ramp-up of BEV's projected
through MY 2032 by EPA in the proposal does not provide sufficient lead-time for the industry
and supporting developments in infrastructure, critical material supply and vehicle market. The
commenters cite the NPRM's central case BEV penetration value of 67 percent in 2032, and note
that value is substantially higher than today. In response, EPA does not agree that level of
proposed and final standards in 2032 provides insufficient lead-time to introduce emissions-
reducing technology needed to for compliance. As discussed in more detail in Preamble Section
V.B, EPA's central case analysis for this final rulemaking, consistent with the NRPM analysis,
considers the constraints on the ramp-up of vehicle technologies and the required lead time to
introduce technologies into the new vehicle fleet. Specifically, EPA's compliance analysis
accounts for the time required between vehicle redesign cycles, limits to the rate at which a
manufacturer can alter its technology mix, limits to the ramp up of battery production and the
availability of critical materials, and limits related to consumer acceptance as described in
Chapters 2.6 and 4 of the RIA, and Section IV.C.5 of the preamble. These explicit limits are
applied along with the feasibility assessment of the available technologies, which is described in
RIA Chapter 3. While EPA has concluded that the central case trajectory for compliance
provides sufficient lead-time, we note that it is not necessary for every manufacturer to reach the
technology penetrations that EPA has presented for the industry overall. For example, because
several manufacturers already produce 100 percent PEVs, or plan to do so prior to MY 2032,
remaining manufacturers will necessarily have a PEV penetration rate below the industry overall
rate (assuming the industry does not overcomply as a whole). Furthermore, EPA agrees with, and
would like to emphasize here a comment received from Consumer Reports that the overall
industry penetration rate projected for the central case is only one of many possible feasible
pathways for compliance. As discussed further in RTC Section 12.5.3, for this final rulemaking
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analysis EPA is presenting multiple feasible pathways for compliance, which span a wide range
of technology penetrations as described in the Preamble Executive Summary, and RIA Chapter
12.
Multiple commenters (AAI, AVE, Honda) asserted that the EPA's lead-time assessment for
the NPRM was based on various optimistic assumptions and that the increase in vehicle
electrification projected in the central analysis by 2032 was infeasible. AAI asserted that EPA
effectively assumed that "that everything will go perfectly in the transformation to electric
vehicles between now and 2032", while Honda commented that "a missed target in any one of
these areas has significant potential to derail... the compliance status of regulated parties." EPA
does not agree that the determination of compliance lead time and feasibility in the NPRM, or for
these final standards, is based on assumptions that either overly optimistic or overly pessimistic.
Instead, EPA's central case assumptions are derived using central estimates of important trends
projected into the future from the best available sources, taking into account a wide range of
potential limitations. At the same time, after considering comments and updating our data with
the latest available information, EPA has adjusted both some of its cost estimates, e.g. higher
estimated battery costs, and the stringency of the standards, particularly in the early years.
The two key examples of battery costs and consumer acceptance illustrate the approach used
by EPA. As described in RIA Chapters 12.2.1 and 4.1, EPA did not make the most optimistic
assumptions, but instead chose scenarios between a high and low range of feasible scenarios.
Furthermore, EPA again notes that the central analysis is only one many feasible pathways for
compliance. The various sensitivities presented in RIA Chapter 12 are selected, in part, to
illustrate what might happen if key assumptions do not follow the trajectories projected for the
central case analysis. These sensitivity results demonstrate that there is sufficient lead time for
manufacturers to comply with these final standards using alternative pathways that reflect
different combinations of compliance strategies and market conditions.
AAI, BMW, and Toyota raised a concern that the proposed light-duty GHG standards are
heavily front-loaded, and have greater reductions in GHG emissions in the earlier years of the
2027-2032 timeframe. These commenters noted that supply chains, infrastructure, and market for
BEVs takes time to develop, and that front-loading makes it more difficult to recover if future
conditions depart significantly from projections. To illustrate, AAI notes that the initial increases
in car and truck stringencies between MYs 2026 and 2027 are 12 percent and 21 percent,
respectively, noting that the truck increase is significantly more than for cars. BMW noted the
increase in EPA's projected BEV market share for the light-duty truck regulatory class from MY
2026 to MY 2027. Other commenters asserted that the proposed standards provided an
appropriate ramp up in stringency from 2027 onward. CALSTART commented in support of the
front-loaded ramp up of the proposed standards, and stated that the market would be prepared to
support the proposal's Alternative 1. Overall, in response to the range of comments on the
trajectory of stringency increases between MYs 2027 and 2032, EPA maintains that the proposed
standards are technically feasible. However, taking into account the comments expressing
concern about the relatively large portion of stringency increase that occurs before MY 2030,
and between MYs 2026 and 2027 in particular, EPA concludes that compared to the proposed
standards, a more gradual ramp-in of GHG stringency would be appropriate. EPA is finalizing
standards that are less stringent than the proposed standards for each year from 2027 through
2031. This stringency reduction is the result of changes to several program elements in this final
rule compared to the proposal, including a more gradual ramp down of the footprint standard
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curve (i.e., Alternative 3), an extended phase-out period for off-cycle credits a ramp down of
AJC credits to a non-zero value, and a delay in the transition to the revised PHEV utility factor.
For 2032, the GHG footprint standard curves are the same as the proposed standards. The overall
result is that compared to the proposed standards, manufacturers will be able to deploy GHG
emissions reducing technology more gradually in the early years of the program. Manufacturers
will also have more time take advantage of ongoing development in the consumer market and
charging infrastructure for PEVs. EPA believes that collectively all of these changes from the
proposal to the final rule will be adequate to address the lead time issues raised by auto
manufacturers.
CARB and the California Attorney General's Office et al. commented that the proposed
standards are technically feasible, and control technologies already exist to achieve compliance
in the rulemaking timeframe. The California Attorney General's Office et al. also noted that
EPA's modeling included a "menu of only existing technologies" to show feasible compliance
pathways. These commenters generally noted also the important role that the IRA and other
incentives will have in enabling the production and market adoption of vehicles equipped with
emissions-reducing technology. CARB cited several market trends that support a positive
feasibility assessment, including the rapid expansion of available ZEV models, increasing all-
electric range, technological advancements in batteries, declining battery costs, and improved
energy efficiency. EPA acknowledges and agrees with these comments. EPA further notes that
our judgement of the technical feasibility of these standards is standards is not dependent on the
development of new technology, but instead is based on the increased production and adoption
of technologies that have already been demonstrated at scale today.
AFPM commented specifically on the lead time needed for the development of the electrical
grid and charging infrastructure needed to support the levels of BEVs projected in the NPRM's
central case analysis. EPA's discussion of preparedness of infrastructure is provided in RIA
Chapter 5 and RTC Sections 17 and 18.
ACE, AmFree, AFPM, and Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al. commented that the
non-binding commitments of automakers for future BEV production cited by EPA in the NPRM
does not prove that the proposed standards are feasible. In response, EPA notes that we chose to
document automaker commitments and plans as supporting evidence for our underlying
feasibility assessment. We agree with the commenter that by themselves, such statements from
automakers do not, by themselves, prove that the standards are feasible.
Borg Warner commented on the importance of continued support and incentives from state
and federal entities and specifically cited the importance of The Infrastructure Investment and
Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), and CHIPS & Science Act. The BlueGreen
Alliance provided a description of industry investments that have already been made as a result
of these incentives. EPA acknowledges and appreciates comments received about the necessary
investments needed to support continued GHG reductions needed, even in the absence of new
GHG standards, but also as a result of the proposed and final standards for MY 2032.
The American Highway Users Alliance commented that the concurrence of new and more
stringent light and medium duty rule standards together with heavy duty standards would place
additional pressure on the electrical grid and charging infrastructure, and the supply of critical
materials and production capacity for batteries. This issue is addressed in RTC Sections 15 and
18.
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3.4 - Other
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
II. Adjustments to Address EV Market Uncertainties
As demonstrated in Section I (EV feasibility) of these comments, there is a great deal of
uncertainty in EPA's projections including the ability to use the various federal tax incentives,
battery cost improvements, and infrastructure development. In particular, charging/refueling
infrastructure and supply of critical minerals and raw materials from IRA-compliant sources are
well outside the control of either EPA or automakers. We understand EPA must use projections
in its modeling. But with all of the uncertainty around these items, large inaccuracies can lead to
a final rule that is grossly misaligned with the market. We propose the following conceptual
market-based target adjustment system to allow for year-by-year adjustments to be made within
the framework of a rule that can be finalized on EPA's desired timeline and will minimize the
potential need to be reopened to react to real-world market conditions. These market- based
adjustments are proposed to work in conjunction with whatever combination of target
stringencies and flexibilities is promulgated in a final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
84-85]
A. Critical Mineral Availability
There are many different ways to attempt to measure or evaluate the supply of critical
minerals and raw materials needed for battery production. We believe the simplest and most
direct way is to look at the total percentage battery capacity across the entire U.S. market per
model year that is able to qualify for the full $3,750 30D tax credit tied to extracting and
processing critical minerals in the U.S. or a country with which we have a free trade agreement.
If the supply of critical minerals from these countries is sufficient, then the IRA will have done
the job EPA claims it will do. But if these materials are not available from qualifying sources,
then the IRA will not have accomplished what EPA projected through no fault of the
automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 84-85]
Automakers cannot build batteries with materials that don't exist or that are unavailable.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 84-85]
An adjustment mechanism would be applied as follows. For MY 2027, each automaker will
submit a pre-model year report by December 2025. Within this report, battery capacity of each
EV model could be detailed, along with planned volumes and whether or not each will qualify
for the critical mineral portion of 30D. Material sourcing contracts will be executed for MY 2027
by that time. EPA can aggregate this data from all manufacturers. For example, if a total of 2,000
GWh of battery capacity is planned for sale in MY 2027 according to the combined pre- model
year reports, and 1,200 GWh of this capacity will qualify for the $3,750 30D credit based on
sourcing and processing countries of origin, a 10 g/mi (for example) maximum potential target
adjustment would be scaled according to this formula: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 84-
85]
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Adjustment (CM) = Adjustment (Max) * (MY (capacity) - MY (qualifying)) / (MY
(capacity))
Where
Adjustment (CM) = Critical material adjustment (g/mi)
Adjustment (Max) =10 g/mi
MY (capacity) = Industry total battery per model year (GWh)
MY (qualifying) = Industry total battery capacity (GWh) per model year qualifying for the
full $3750 tax credit
Using the example data from above,
Adjustment (CM) 10 g/mi * (2,000 GWh - 1,200 GWh) / (2,000 GWh) = 4 g/mi
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 84-85]
This simple calculation could be published by EPA in the second quarter of calendar year
2026, giving automakers time to react for the bulk of MY 2027 production. This appears to be
the best compromise for getting accurate information to EPA close enough to a given model year
to be more accurate than projections made over three years in advance, while also providing
enough time in advance to be of use for a given model year without having to be retroactively
applied. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 84-85]
These challenges and the need for additional flexibility remain pertinent for MY 2027 and
later regulations. The customers of these companies will still demand high performance from any
vehicle sold by these manufacturers. The challenges of limited, highly focused product lines will
not be eased by vehicle electrification. Limited product portfolio and product development
cycles mean the ability to make regular improvements is a challenge. Battery technology has not
developed enough for application within high-performance supercars. Technology is developing
and SVMs have plans to electrify further; however, time is needed. Supply chain access and
lead-time challenges will continue and potentially grow given rapidly rising global demand for
lithium-ion batteries and trends toward vertical integration by larger companies to secure critical
mineral supplies. Furthermore, given low production volumes there is also limited ability to
amortize expensive product development across a volume of products - R&D and investment
payback is longer. This leads to SVMs having different investment cycles which will mean they
will require additional time to comply with GHG and criteria pollutant regulations. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 207-208]
With this backdrop, we are concerned that EPA appears to now dismiss these challenges in
general, proposing much reduced flexibility in MY 2027 and later. [EP A-HQ-0 AR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 207-208]
B. Battery Cost Reductions
There is great uncertainty as to whether battery costs will fall significantly during the time
frame of this rule, as projected by EPA. While battery costs have dropped over the last decade,
they appear to have plateaued around $150/kWh. With dramatic increases in demand coming and
high inflation in recent years, battery costs appear to even be trending upward recently. We
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propose that battery pack costs could also be disclosed to EPA at the time of the pre-model year
reports. EPA could then aggregate data from all automakers to develop a volume-weighted
average battery pack cost per kWh for a given model year. Costs for all these battery packs will
be locked in by this point in time, so there is no uncertainty in actual costs. The cost delta
between EPA's projected cost estimate used as the basis for the rule and the actual cost would be
used to calculate a target adjustment using, for example, the following formula: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 85-86]
Adjustment (BC) = Scaler * (Cost (actual) - Cost (estimate))
Where
Adjustment (BC) = Battery cost adjustment (g/mi)
Scaler = 0.2 g/mi/$
Cost (actual) = Industry total battery cost per model year ($/kWh)
Cost (estimate) = EPA estimated total battery cost per model year ($/kWh)
Using MY 2029 as an example with an EPA projected cost of $90/kWh and an actual industry
cost of $105/kWh:
Adjustment (BC) = 0.2 g/mi * ($105/kwh) - ($90/kWh) = 3 g/mi [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 85-86]
This target adjustment would be published at the same time as the critical mineral adjustment
in Q2 of the calendar year preceding the model year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 85-
86]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
g. Program Review.
i. Assessment of both vehicle and infrastructure development/deployment progress.
The design of a program with heavy reliance on infrastructure that may not be widely
available on the timeline proposed is optimistic at best. The proposal appears premature on the
stated timeline, and essentially in conjunction with the HD GHG Phase 3 program, which would
be competing for the same resources. If EPA is not willing to adjust the timeline and/or standards
of the proposed programs, API requests that the agency consider incorporating a pre-program
assessment as well as a program progress assessment. It is imperative that EPA provide a real-
world evaluation, with an honest assessment provided to the public, regarding progress on
infrastructure readiness and ZEV technology deployment. The opportunity for stranded
investments by all stakeholders impacted by this program is just too great not to incorporate pre-
and mid-program reviews. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 23]
For a mid-program assessment, EPA could consider something akin to the Midterm
Evaluation that was finalized in the 2012 joint agency rulemaking establishing the MY 2017-
2025 LD GHG standards.77 Further, we recommend that EPA engage a broad stakeholder
community to identify necessary elements to incorporate into such an assessment. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 23]
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77 "Midterm Evaluation of Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Years
2022-2025." https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/midterm-evaluation-light-
duty-vehicle-greenhouse-gas.
ii. Future program incentives and program adjustment of standards.
In addition, we also request that the agency report on the findings following review with
enough time to adjust the standards if needed. Adequate lead time must be provided to the
regulated community to allow for necessary adjustments to regulatory compliance strategies, and
to avoid stranded investments as much as possible. A proposal based on stretch goals must
incorporate an "offramp" or some opportunity to pivot if the essential elements of the program,
such as charging/fueling infrastructure, do not materialize. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p.
23]
Organization: Jaguar Land Rover NA, LLC (JLR)
EPA should consider formal monitoring points every two years to evaluate the effectiveness
of the regulation given the uncertainty in how the market will develop [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0744, pp. 5-7]
Organization: Kia Corporation
The government's ability to implement the right complementary policies and monitoring these
factors will be paramount to the success of this ambitious rulemaking. EPA standards alone
cannot and will not create demand or infrastructure for EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555,
pp. 6-7]
EPA's Program Should Include Mechanism to Adjust Standards if Necessary
EPA's proposal does not include any mechanism to adjust standards or correct course if the
various assumptions in the model do not materialize. Market assumptions in EPA's model
include adequate charging infrastructure, consumer acceptance and demand, critical mineral
supply, manufacturing capacity, power capacity, power rates, and low cost discrepancy between
ICE and EVs. All of these elements - market realities and external challenges - are outside the
control of automakers. There needs to be a mechanism that allows or requires EPA to revise
standards if certain market conditions do not materialize at the level necessary to increase
demand for EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 7]
Organization: Lucid Group, Inc.
Battery/Vehicle Efficiency is Critical to Long-Term Viability of EVs
EPA solicited input on additional ways the program could provide alternative pathways
encouraging manufacturers to achieve lower C02 emissions earlier than projected in the
proposal. Incentivizing EV efficiency measured by either miles/kWh or miles per gallon
equivalent (MPGe) would help achieve lower C02 emissions and reduce the demand for raw
materials and on the grid. We must ensure that we do not electrify for the sake of electrification,
but instead establish policies and programs that prioritize efficient use of electricity and
resources, yielding benefits such as: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 7-9]
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-Reduced upstream emissions: Most EVs are charged from the power grid, which, while
rapidly becoming cleaner, still includes emitting sources. More efficient EVs would use less grid
electricity, thereby reducing the upstream emissions associated with their charging and vehicles
miles traveled. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 7-9]
-Conservation of critical minerals and associated de-risking of the supply chain: Using fewer
batteries reduces the demand per vehicle for lithium and other critical materials. Reducing the
use of these materials reduces supply chain bottlenecks and enhances national security. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 7-9]
-Reduced consumer purchase costs: EV efficiency speeds mass adoption by reducing vehicle
prices. It seeds a virtuous cycle—efficiency lowers vehicle production costs and purchase prices
by reducing the number of batteries (the largest cost input for EVs) needed to achieve a targeted
range. Fewer batteries lower the vehicle curb weight thereby further reducing the required cell
count to achieve a desired range. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 7-9]
-Reduced consumer energy costs: Efficient vehicles require less energy to travel a given
distance. More efficient ICE vehicles have demonstrably reduced the gas bill for consumers, and
more efficient BEVs reduce consumers' electric bill. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 7-9]
-A more resilient grid through smarter energy consumption: While government programs
have been known to encourage the use of electricity and have even extended to promote energy
derived from wind, solar, and renewables, there exists a common denominator—use of energy.
By focusing on increasing efficiency, we can foster smarter energy consumption easing the
resources necessary for the grid's clean energy transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp.
7-9]
-Environmental Justice benefit: The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) states "low
income and minority communities are more likely to be located near highways and other
transportation facilities that produce local reduced air quality, and to suffer from negative health
effects such as asthma." Addressing environmental inequality goes beyond roadway design and
extends to the vehicles on the roads. Zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) are a first line of defense in
addressing respiratory and cardiovascular disease and other pollution-related health disparities by
improving air quality in communities located in or near traffic-dense areas. Efficiency brings
down the costs of such vehicles and will help increase equitable adoption of medium-and heavy-
duty electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 7-9]
-Higher overall vehicle performance: There is a misconception regarding the correlation
between vehicle efficiency and vehicle performance. Traditionally, fuel efficient vehicles were
not associated with high performance. However, Lucid's vehicles demonstrate that increased
efficiency in EVs yields faster charging, increased power density, and higher output power
derived from the same energy input providing faster acceleration capability. With higher vehicle
performance often comes increased consumer interest, which in the case of electrification
supports consumer adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 7-9]
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) CAFE and EPA GHG
programs already apply standards to ICE vehicles for efficiency, measured by MPG and g/mi
respectively. Instituting a similar standard to EVs would apply the same expectations of
efficiency to all surface transportation. Vehicle efficiency is determined by several systems and
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how well they've been optimized to work together. In EVs this includes but is not limited to the
battery pack, drive motors, power train, and aerodynamics of the vehicle itself. The overall
efficiency in EVs can be measured by MPGe or miles per kWh. EPA has the authority to
establish multiplier incentives for EVs and advanced technologies to encourage such
technologies in the market. 10 Using this authority to implement standards for EV efficiency will
encourage manufacturers to not only electrify their fleets, but also prioritize efficiency. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, p. 9]
10 "EPA also believed that the temporary regulatory incentives may help bring some technologies to
market more quickly than in the absence of incentives Since the GHG performance for these vehicle types
is significantly better than that of conventional vehicles, the multiplier provides a significant benefit to the
manufacturer." 86 Fed. Reg. 74458-59 (Dec. 30, 2021).
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
EPA should consider incentives and potential future requirements that advance efficiency of
electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 31-32]
Efficiency incentives and regulations have historically driven vehicle manufacturers and
technology suppliers to continue to innovate and develop better materials, components, and
vehicle systems to reduce energy demand, operating costs and related emissions of vehicles.
Electric vehicle efficiency does not provide large benefits at today's EV sales penetration rates.
However, if the goals of this rule are met by 2032, electric vehicle sales will be over 60% and
EVs will make up a much larger fraction of the in-use passenger car fleet. Therefore, small
improvements in efficiency will result in large reductions in grid demand. MECA suggest that
EPA consider a range of both incentives and requirements to advance the efficiency of
technologies that reduce the emissions footprint of all mobile sources, regardless of the source of
propulsion energy. As noted above, setting non-zero certification values for battery electric and
fuel cell vehicles will continue to motivate vehicle manufacturers to work with suppliers to
improve vehicle efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 31-32]
MECA requests that EPA explore additional incentivization structures that would allow
consumers to make informed choices when purchasing electric and fuel cell vehicles. For
example, EPA could institute a labeling requirement for electric vehicles with similarities to
Energy Star and displaying how an electric vehicle compares to other similar electric vehicles in
its class. The simplified Energy Star graphic is recognizable and understood by the majority of
consumers who might not be able to interpret the value of an electric vehicle efficiency in
kilowatt-hours per 100 miles, which is currently on the window sticker. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0564, pp. 31-32]
MECA members are commercializing components for electric and hydrogen fuel cell
vehicles. This includes battery materials for the manufacture of both cathode and anodes utilizing
unique macrostructure and composite formulations to improve efficiency and energy density.
Electric component manufacturers are using state of the art transistor materials in their motors
and power electronics that operate at higher voltages and temperatures thus requiring simpler
cooling strategies. These next generation component designs reduce switching losses and
improve electric efficiency of the system architecture in electric powertrains. To facilitate
integration, component suppliers are integrating the motor, inverter and transmission into electric
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drive units to simplify the thermal management of the electric components and ease integration
into vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 31-32]
As demonstrated for combustion vehicles over the past 50 years, the market can not always be
relied upon to drive innovation towards conservation of critical resources and energy security by
improving the efficiency of vehicles. This has led agencies to set fuel efficiency and GHG
standards. There is a significant disparity in the electric efficiency of similarly sized passenger
electric vehicles today, as shown in Table 4. [See original comment for Table 4. Comparison of
Energy Efficiency of BEV and PHEV Models] We urge EPA to begin compiling electric
efficiency information and consider setting a minimum efficiency or energy consumption by
weight class in a future rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 33-34]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
Porsche's double-E strategy of electromobility and near carbon-neutral combustion
As stated above, Porsche has established an ambitious goal for the electrification of our cars
and trucks over the next several years. This goal builds upon the range of electrified models that
Porsche has offered in the United States for the past decade. Within the premium, high-
performance and luxury segments in which Porsche competes, Porsche has delivered almost
45,000 BEVs and PHEVs to our US customers. These vehicles have brought a new level of
complexity in development and manufacturing and continue to incur higher costs associated with
batteries and electric drive componentry. Nevertheless, with continued innovation, Porsche is
confident that the expanding range of electrified models, with continuously improving technical
performance, will meet the needs and desires of many of our customers for the high degree of
utility and performance that they demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 4]
Importance of Monitoring Progress on the Advancement of Electrification
EPA's proposal includes a wide array of assumptions related to the development of the
electrification market, costs of components, supply chain readiness, and charging infrastructure.
These assumptions each contribute towards the percent of electrification that was used to inform
the overall stringency of the targets. As outlined by the AFAI, Porsche supports the concept of a
holistic program to monitor the overall progress of each of these assumptions and their related
impacts on electrification readiness and adoption. Monitoring progress with transparent reporting
is a pragmatic policy decision that does not cast doubt on the success of each of the assumptions.
Rather, monitoring and reporting establishes a clear and transparent basis for ongoing dialogue
between stakeholders and the EPA. This type of monitoring can provide early awareness of
unexpected challenges or disruption and allow stakeholders to understand how requirements may
need to be adjusted to help ensure that the requirements remain achievable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0637, p. 7]
Organization: Stellantis
Target Adjustment Mechanisms Needed Based on Market Enablers
Stellantis fully supports the Auto Innovators' comments proposing a target adjustment
mechanism based on key EV market enablers. This mechanism is in addition to making the other
revisions needed to address concerns raised with the standards. There is a great deal of
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uncertainty with how critical mineral and raw material supplies, battery cost improvements, and
charging/refueling infrastructure will develop over the next decade. In particular,
charging/refueling infrastructure and supply of critical minerals and raw materials from non-
countries of concern are well outside the control of either EPA or automakers. We understand
EPA must use projections in its modeling. However, given the uncertainty around these items,
large inaccuracies can lead to a final rule that is grossly misaligned with the market. The Auto
Innovators' proposal of a market-based target adjustment system would allow for year-by-year
adjustments to be made within the framework of a rule that can be finalized on EPA's desired
timeline and will minimize the need to be reopened to react to real-world market conditions.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 7]
This proposal contains three individual adjustment mechanisms of roughly equivalent
magnitude. The first is based on the percentage of the entire U.S. light-duty fleet qualifying for
the full $3,750 30D retail tax credit which is tied to extracting and processing critical minerals in
the U.S. or a country with a free trade agreement. This is the most simple and direct way to
assess whether or not raw material supplies are developing adequately. The second adjustment
mechanism is based on actual EV battery costs that could be confidentially disclosed to the EPA
by each automaker every model year and compared with EPA's projected battery costs used in
the development of this rule. The third mechanism is simply tracking the ratio of public
charging/refueling points to the number of light-duty EVs registered and on the road. As the total
size of the on-road EV fleet grows, so does the amount of charging/refueling infrastructure. If
these three key market enablers develop as envisioned by EPA in this rule, then the impact of
these adjustments will be negligible. But if one or more of these key enablers do not develop
quickly enough, then this proposed system will allow for simple, objective, and transparent
metric-based adjustments to be applied equally to all of industry. These are industry-wide issues
and thus should be resolved on an industry-wide basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 7]
At a House Committee on Energy and Commerce hearing on driving affordability held on
June 22, 2023, Rep. Dingell (D-MI) raised concerns with EPA Principal Deputy Administrator
Goffman on what happens under the NPRM if companies cannot reach BEV as 67% of new
vehicle sales in 2032, consumers cannot afford EVs, the charging stations aren't there, and the
assumptions and forecasting EPA relies upon are not viable. Mr. Goffman's response included a
reference to a possible market assessment review. Stellantis believes the Auto Innovators'
recommended ongoing market-based target adjustment system to be the best embodiment of a
direct market review. However, Stellantis could support an additional market-based review that
is both objective and transparent in reaching the necessary adjustments to allow this rule to be
reasonable and achievable given the large amount of uncertainty with how these key market
enablers will develop over the next decade. At a minimum, Stellantis supports EPA adding
modules to its annual EPA Automotive Trends Reports that capture important metrics such as the
number of public EV charging stations deployed and percent of EVs purchased. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0678, p. 7]
EPA Summary and Response
Some manufacturers suggested that one response to the uncertainty and risk surrounding
supply chain, critical minerals, manufacturing costs and charging infrastructure would be to
implement a stringency adjustment mechanism based, for example, on an assessment of progress
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in domestic critical mineral sourcing, PEV infrastructure, or other developments the commenters
deem necessary to accompany increased penetration of PEVs under the standards.
EPA notes that we have assessed issues such as the supply chain (including critical minerals),
charging infrastructure needs and development, and manufacturing costs as part of our
assessment of the feasibility of these standards, although actual implementation of specific
measures to advance issues such as infrastructure, mining, supply chain development etc. are
largely outside of EPA's statutory authority to control and are outside the scope of this
rulemaking. Regarding the implementation of a stringency adjustment mechanism, EPA
disagrees with this recommendation.
As we discuss in Section I.B.I of the preamble, our final standards have been adjusted (with
the more linear Alternative 3 from the proposal, combined with a slower phase-down of several
credit provisions) in response to concerns about lead time and feasibility. Our technical
assessment, as discussed in Sections IV and V of the preamble, is that the final standards are
feasible and appropriate for the years at issue. Despite commenters' concerns over uncertainty
and risk in the development of the market for electric vehicles, feasibility is not dependent on
one singular technology pathway (such as BEVs): the final standards, as in previous
rulemakings, are performance-based and do not require any particular technology to meet the
standards. Manufacturers may choose many potential pathways to compliance that involve
different mixtures of vehicle technologies. Table 4 in Section I.B of the preamble gives examples
of technology pathways for compliance (with varying levels of BEV penetration, as well as
varying levels of PHEVs, HEVs and non-hybrid ICE technologies) based on OMEGA modeling.
Additionally, we have run sensitivity analyses (Section IV.F of the preamble) addressing low
critical mineral availability, higher battery costs, and lower consumer acceptance (for any
particular reason, including a lack of optimal number of chargers). In Section IV.F.4 of the
preamble, we discuss a sensitivity and path to compliance in which no additional BEV models
are produced that are not currently in production.
Finally, EPA notes that an automatic stringency adjustment would eliminate the predictability
and certainty of the standards, which in turn would make it more likely that developments in
these areas would not occur. EPA finds that making the standards contingent on future
developments is unlikely to provide the appropriate signal to both the automotive industry and to
those in related industries to make the investments (e.g., in development of the supply chain by
the automotive industry and further deployment of charging infrastructure) about which the
commenters are concerned. Many commenters (e.g., CALSTART, NESCAUM, Environmental
and Public Health Organizations, ICCT) have expressed the need for clear market signals to
drive these necessary investments.
Instead of introducing additional uncertainty into automakers' long-term planning, EPA has
chosen to adopt standards that can reasonably be met with a variety of technology paths under a
variety of potential future circumstances.
In their comments, both Lucid and MECA recommended that EPA include some mechanisms
to incentivize the efficiency of electric vehicles. While EPA does recognize several goals
commenters have in supporting such an idea (reduced upstream emissions, reduced demand for
critical minerals, reduced purchase and operating costs, decreased grid demand, etc), - we do not
agree it is appropriate to establish regulatory incentives for more efficient EVs in this final rule.
However, we do note that there should be a considerable business case for manufacturers to
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improve EV efficiency as it will have a direct impact on required battery size, weight, range and
resulting battery costs. Manufacturers that can design more efficient BEVs may benefit from a
market advantage over competing vehicles in the same segment with lower efficiency. We also
note that the fuel economy and environment labels on new vehicles provide information related
to efficiency, including EV range and annual operating costs. To the extent that consumers
demand more efficient EVs, the label is a source of information that may help consumers
identify the most efficient EVs.
4 - Criteria pollutant standards
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Criteria - Adopt California's LEV IV Standards
For the Tier 4 criteria pollution standards, we recommend that EPA adopt California's LEV
IV exhaust and evaporative emission standards adopted just seven months ago and begin in
2026MY. LEV IV standards were adopted by California last year as an effective and appropriate
path forward to address the toughest in the nation air quality challenges. EPA should align with
this comprehensive strategy to enable a nationwide criteria emissions program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 7-8]
If EPA finalized the multi-pollutant regulations with these two recommendations, the final
regulations would still be the most aggressive and challenging in U.S. history, and they would
provide dramatic reductions in GHG and criteria emissions. However, EPA would reduce the
risk of potential harmful consequences to both the EV market, and the new vehicle market in
general, by forcing BEVs at a rate that outpaces the EV supply chain, infrastructure, critical
mineral supplies, and customer acceptance. Getting the pace right is critical to the success of the
automakers and to U.S. leadership and competitiveness. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 7-
8]
2. Proposed 40 C.F.R. § 86.1811-27(c)
The proposed 40 C.F.R. § 86.181 l-27(c)(l) specifies to "Measure emissions as described in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section, but use the driving cycle identified in 40 CFR
1066.801(c)(5)."294 The driving cycle identified in the proposed 40 CFR § 1066.801(c)(5) is the
HFFET.295 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 189]
294 NPRM at 29420.
295 NPRM at 29444.
IV. Light-Duty Criteria and Toxic Pollutant Standards
Automakers are committed to ultimately achieving net-zero transportation carbon emissions
and electrification of the light-duty vehicle fleet. However, this transformation requires massive
investment in EV technology and supporting mechanisms such as infrastructure, all involving
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many stakeholders. To be successful, automakers must primarily focus resources on the
transformation rather than incremental changes to existing internal combustion engine (ICE)
vehicles, which are already very near zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-142]
The focus of EPA and the automakers is and should be on electrification. Thus, Auto
Innovators supports changes to traditional criteria emission (e.g., NMOG, NOx, and PM)
standards that measurably reduce emissions, but do not add substantial additional hardware or
capital costs to ICE vehicles that will soon be retired. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-
142]
Unfortunately, EPA proposes to adopt new requirements that will divert resources from our
shared goal of widespread electrification. Prohibiting enrichment could require complete engine
redesigns and possibly larger displacement engines to provide customers with the capability they
demand. The proposed PM standards substantially increase costs and vehicle development
complexity in addition to adding testing requirements. Finally, in several cases, EPA provides
less flexibility and/or chooses not to align with ACC II. This lack of alignment is particularly
troubling as automakers and suppliers have already developed product plans and spent resources
toward meeting the ACC II regulations, and in some cases, EPA's proposal would require
substantial changes during the middle of ACC II regulatory phase-ins. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.141-142]
3 .NMOG+NOx Cold FTP Fleet Average
EPA proposes to set a cold FTP NMOG+NOx fleet average requirement of 300 mg/mile,
excluding ZEVs.258 EPA requests comment on whether a 400 mg/mile vehicle cap should be
used instead of a fleet average.259 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
258 NPRM at 29262.
259 NPRM at 29262.
Auto Innovators prefers a fleet average requirement, but requests a value of 300mg/mi for
LDV+LDT1 and 400mg/mi for LDT2+HLTD+MDPV for the following reasons: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
At -7 °C, emission reduction right after engine start-up and during catalyst warm-up is the key
factor. Large displacement engines (V6, V8, etc.) inevitably have substantially higher emissions
at engine startup before the catalyst is warmed up. For downsized turbocharged engines, the
amount of heat supplied to the catalyst decreases due to the relationship between the recovery of
the exhaust energy by the turbocharger and the heat capacity of the turbocharger itself; thus, the
warm-up time tends to be longer than that of an engine without a turbocharger. During this
longer warm-up time when the catalyst is in a semi-active state, the heavier vehicle with a
turbocharger under high running load conditions has much higher emissions than other vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
According to the DRIA, EPA developed the proposal based on the test results of three models.
The results of these three models certainly meet 300 mg/mi. However, due to differences in
exhaust system layout (i.e., front catalyst distance from the engine) and engine control from
these models, there are some models that cannot achieve both emission reduction before catalyst
warm-up and early catalyst warm-up at a high level under -7 °C condition. There are also
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vehicles that are heavier than the vehicles EPA tested. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
147-148]
Developing technology to adapt these vehicles to 300 mg/mi would require diverting
substantial resources from electrification [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148] :
1.For emission systems development and evaluation, update and/or increase of chassis
dynamometer system testing to make it possible to reproduce cold temperature condition is
necessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
2.Development of pistons and injectors for better combustion and designing arrangement of
emission purification devices are necessary. When changing the catalyst system (increase in the
amount of precious metals, increase in the number of cells), increase in costs occurs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
Regarding the 300 mg/mile fleet average, EPA proposes that the family emission limit (FEL)
be set to a resolution of 0.1 g/mile (100 mg/mile).260 An FEL set to only a single decimal place
(i.e., 0.x g/mile) provides very little flexibility among different vehicles. We recommend that
EPA allow an FEL resolution to three decimal places (i.e., O.xxx g/mile). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
260 NPRM at 29436.
We also note that although EPA describes the 300 mg/mile fleet average as excluding ZEVs
in the preamble,261 the proposed 40 C.F.R. § 86.1811-27(c)(3)(i) regulatory text does not reflect
that exclusion.262 Auto Innovators agrees with the exclusion and recommends updating the
regulatory text accordingly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
261 NPRM at 29262.
262 NPRM at 29420.
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Unlike with previous automotive emissions regulations, in which an OEM had numerous
compliance technology pathways and could strategically invest in a package of technologies that
best suited its customers' needs, this proposal sets stringencies at such a level where there is just
one way to comply: significant levels of electrification. Yet should the market not pan out within
the agency's ambitious timeline - even for reasons entirely beyond an automaker's control, such
as a slower-than-expected rollout of public charging infrastructure that has a chilling effect on
consumer interest in EVs - there is no safety net, no alternate package of technologies to which
an OEM can pivot and maintain compliance. Regulated parties will simply fall short, facing a
profoundly disruptive and costly set of noncompliance obligations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0652, p. 5]
Further complicating matters, the agency has also chosen to propose criteria emissions
standards and engine operation requirements that surpass even California's stringent LEV IV
tailpipe pollution standards (part of the Advanced Clean Cars II regulation) finalized just last
year. As proposed, EPA's requirements will necessitate significant new internal combustion
engine (ICE) development which, in turn, diverts critical resources previously allocated for
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vehicle electrification that would have served the very same air quality goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0652, pp. 5-6]
Recognizing California's longstanding leadership in air quality management and the historical
relationship between California and federal emissions standards (where California sets a
vanguard target, automakers invest to meet that requirement, and EPA subsequently
accommodates a national compliance pathway by setting federal regulations similar to California
upon its next round of standards), it is not an unreasonable notion for automakers to theorize that
EPA's upcoming PM emissions standards might land in a similar place to California's LEV IV
program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 10]
We thoroughly support the decarbonization and air quality improvement objectives promoted
by the agency, as well as various elements pertaining to this regulatory proposal's design. We
share the agency's desire for widespread adoption of vehicle electrification in the U.S.,
accelerating our mutual goal of broad transportation decarbonization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0652, p. 32]
In our view, neither the proposed standards nor any of the three alternatives adequately
address the inherent market uncertainties and potential for noncompliance that exists within the
agency's ambitious timeline. Rather, the proposal sets the stage for what may be a profoundly
disruptive and costly set of noncompliance obligations across the industry. We respectfully urge
the agency to finalize a more reasonable emissions reduction trajectory, along with a broader
array of compliance flexibilities. We believe that standards in line with Honda's publicly stated
electrification targets are representative of a challenging but workable requirement. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 32-33]
Moreover, the emissions inventory will naturally improve as older, dirtier vehicles age out of
the car pare and are replaced by cleaner, potentially even zero-emission technologies. EPA's
Mobile Sources Technical Review Subcommittee (MSTRS), a diversely represented advisory
group to both EPA's Clean Air Act Advisory Committee and staff from EPA's Office of
Transportation and Air Quality, made similar observations to the agency in an October 2021
report: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 16]
It is expected that the most meaningful reductions in criteria emissions moving forward will
come not from further incremental ratcheting of standards, but rather from the ongoing process
of fleet turnover: the routine replacement of old (dirty) vehicles with new (clean) vehicles. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 16]
Recent research supports this understanding. 29 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 16]
29 The Future of Mobility: A Report by the EPA Mobile Sources Technical Review Subcommittee.
Available online at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-01/mstrs-10-14-2021-meeting-
future-of-mobility-report, pdf
Recommendation: Honda strongly urges the agency to include, as part of its Final Rule,
feasible GHG and NMOG+NOx standards that properly reflect risk and uncertainty associated
with the electrification transition, including a possible removal or substantial weakening of IRA
and BIL incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 24]
we understand and appreciate the agency's desire to further reduce criteria emissions from the
fleet. While we support this goal in principle, we disagree with the agency's suggested
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approach. The NPRM's proposed PM and commanded enrichment requisites would offer only
marginal emissions benefit while forcing costly new engine development (and possibly even
chassis development) activities. These aspects of the proposal are highly disruptive to Honda's
efforts to focus resources as we pivot to vehicle electrification. We strongly encourage the
agency to adopt a federal criteria emissions program aligned with California's recently finalized
LEV IV emissions standards and testing regimens. Doing so would deliver continued criteria
emissions reductions for all Americans, while sidestepping unnecessary and costly regulatory
inefficiencies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 33]
Organization: BlueGreen Alliance (BGA)
[Automakers have historically succeeded at reducing criteria pollutants from their ICE fleets
while investing in their ZEV production capacities. EPA's light- and medium-duty standards
must incentivize them to continue to achieve gains in reducing tailpipe pollutants and in their
ZEV offerings. Reducing tailpipe pollution emissions from ICE vehicles is technologically
feasible and affordable; there are off-the-shelf technologies like GFPs that automakers are
already applying to their vehicles sold in Europe and Asia in order to comply with emission
regulations there. Such technologies could easily and affordably be applied to light- and
medium- duty vehicles sold in the United States, with no additional research and development
needed. Because EPA's standards are performance-based and technology-agnostic, automakers
can and will employ a combination of ZEV and ICE vehicle improvement technologies to
comply, while supporting a range of auto manufacturing supply chain jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0667, p. 5]
Organization: BMW of North America, LLC (BMW NA)
BMW NA supports the comments filed by the Alliance of Auto Innovators to the EPA docket.
Our main concern is that a diverging approach in the United States between Federal regulations
and California's regulations will substantially increase the hurdles to fulfill fleet and vehicle
standards. BMW NA is aiming for one single US fleet and therefore would like to motivate EPA
to align the Tier 4 rules with LEV IV as much as possible. This is referring to the rules for the
NMOG+NOx fleet (bin structure and EV treatment) as well as to the vehicle standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 4]
The fleet regulation should be harmonized, so that the same fleet composition should lead to
compliance in both regulations. Other than the CARB approach, the Tier 4 fleet regulation is
heavily dependent on the BEV share. As mentioned above, there is a high uncertainty what BEV
share could be reached in each single year. From our perspective, the Tier 4 regulation should
focus on regulating pollutant emissions of ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 4]
There should be no additional burdens on top of CARB vehicle standards, which are leading
to additional substantial investments for a mature technology in its phase-out - e.g. for test labs
or completely new after-treatment systems beyond the CARB standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0677, p. 4]
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Organization: BorgWarner Inc.
BorgWarner supports EPA's proposal for a lower criteria pollutant standard. BorgWarner
supports increased stringency for criteria pollutants on new LD and MD vehicles. BorgWarner
produces cost-effective technology that can meet or even exceed the tighter stringency limits. We
also support the gradual phase-in of these standards to allow manufacturers to develop and test
the new design architectures before installing the necessary emission systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0640, pp. 6-7]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
CARB supports U.S. EPA's proposal to tighten criteria air pollutant emission standards,
particularly given the continued role that internal combustion engine vehicles will play in the
national fleet over the regulatory timeframe and beyond. Reducing exposure to harmful air
pollution is a key element of the proposed standards, and the proposals to tighten criteria air
pollutant emissions are needed to protect public health, especially in communities with
disproportionate exposure to air pollution. Because U.S. EPA's proposal does not require ZEV
sales, as California's rules do, the tightening of criteria air pollutant emission standards is even
more critical to ensure that the internal combustion engine vehicles that will continue to be sold
are becoming cleaner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 26-27]
As part of its ACC II rulemaking, CARB adopted its fourth iteration of its Low Emission
Vehicle (LEV) standards, referred to as LEV IV. CARB finds that U.S. EPA's proposals are
appropriate and largely consistent with the LEV IV standards. CARB has documented our
analysis and recommends strengthening the proposal to realize the greatest degree of emission
reductions achievable, considering cost and technology availability, to further protect public
health. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 26-27]
Organization: Center for Biological Diversity et al.
As environmental, community, and health organizations, we call on you to take more
aggressive action to clean up the gas-powered car and truck fleet that will be polluting our
nation's air and communities for decades to come. EPA's latest round of emissions reductions
standards, covering Model Years 2027 through 2032, focuses on the rise of zero-emission
technologies, including electrification, and the growing number of electric vehicle (EV) models
that already have or will soon enter the market. While electrification is undoubtedly an effective
and important means of securing emissions reductions, there will also be tens of millions of gas
guzzlers that will be sold before EVs become dominant. EPA's rule should focus on curbing
emissions from these vehicles as well, as they fuel climate change and needlessly pollute low-
income and communities of color. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0671, p. 1]
Organization: Ceres Corporate Electric Vehicle Alliance (CEVA)
The Alliance applauds the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for its commitment to
adopting multi-pollutant emissions standards for Model Years (MY) 2027 and later light- and
medium- duty vehicles and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions standards for heavy-duty vehicles,
and urges EPA to align these standards with U.S. climate and public health goals. 1 Specifically,
the Alliance supports: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, p. 1]
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1 https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/the-us-national-blueprint-for-transportation-
decarbonization.pdf
-Light-duty vehicle GHG emissions standards aligned with Alternative 1, the strongest
standard proposed in this rulemaking, which will result in a 59% reduction in average fleetwide
carbon dioxide emissions by MY2032 from a MY2026 baseline. The Alliance also encourages
EPA to move forward with its proposed criteria pollutant emissions standards for light-duty
vehicles, reducing fleetwide average MY2032 criteria pollutant emissions 60% from MY2025
levels.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, p. 1]
2 https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/lmdv-multi-pollutant-emissions-my-2027-nprm-
2023-04.pdf (p.42)
-Medium-duty vehicle (Class 2b and 3) multi-pollutant emissions standards aligned with its
current proposal, which will ensure a 44% reduction in average fleetwide GHG emissions by
MY2032 from a MY2026 baseline, and a 66 76% reduction in criteria pollutant emissions by
MY2032 from aMY2025 baseline.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, p. 1]
3 Ibid. (p.42)
Organization: Colorado Energy Office, Colorado Department of Transportation, and Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment
In response to EPA's request for comments on specific aspects of the rule, we offer the
following suggestions to ensure the rule is as successful as possible: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0694, pp. 2-3]
- Regarding criteria pollutants, we urge EPA to consider ways to align these proposed
standards with California, and in doing so to avoid any backsliding in remaining conventional
vehicles sold, while avoiding a scenario in which OEMs are forced to divert investment away
from transportation electrification and towards technology advancement on conventional
vehicles. We are concerned that the criteria standards in the EPA draft rule could have this
unintended effect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694, pp. 2-3]
Organization: General Motors, LLC (GM)
In many cases, an EPA final rule aligned with CARB's LEV IV in internal
combustion engine criteria emission stringency and the associated test and certification procedure
swill
help GM achieve significant emissions reductions for internal combustion engine products as soon
as MY 2027 despite limited lead time, while continuing to transition to zero-emission
vehicle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 6]
Considering the unprecedented nature of EPA concurrently proposing GHG and criteria
pollutant standards for light-duty and medium-duty vehicles, we urge EPA to carefully align the
standard stringency, phase-in percentages, assumed EV shares, and vehicle categories applicable
to Tier 4 standards and the GHG standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 5]
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Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI)
HMG strongly supports AFAl's call for the harmonization of California Air Resources Board
(CARB) and EPA requirements to avoid the need for separate software for each. It is crucial to
streamline the regulatory framework and establish consistent guidelines to facilitate compliance
for automotive manufacturers, as well as ensure cost-effective compliance, again resulting in
benefits to the environment and consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 9]
Organization: Kia Corporation
- Kia recommends EPA adopt the criteria emission standards the California Air Resources
Board (CARB) adopted under the Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC II)(i.e., Low Emission Vehicle
IV (LEV IV)). California's final standards significantly reduce criteria pollutants quickly -
Particulate matter (PM), Nitrogen Oxide (NOx), Non-methane organic gasses (NMOG) - but
does not divert critical resources needed to increase EV market penetration. It is critical that the
criteria emissions regulatory framework is streamlined. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 3]
Kia Supports Aligning with CARB's Criteria Emissions Standards Under ACC II
Kia supports a tightening of criteria emissions standards that can be accomplished cost-
effectively through vehicle software calibration changes. EPA's proposed changes to criteria
emissions standards would require large capital improvements, additional hardware on vehicles,
and/or complete engine redesigns to maintain capability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp.
9-10]
Kia recommends EPA adopt the criteria emission standards CARB adopted under the ACC II
(i.e., LEV IV) as well as harmonization with CARB's phase-in schedule. Industry negotiated
with California in a transparent process over years in several workshop and comment periods to
develop final standards. California's final standards significantly reduce criteria pollutants - PM,
NOx, MNOG - quickly but does not strand technologies or divert much needed resources. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 9-10]
While EPA is proposing a 10-fold increase in electric vehicles sales, EPA is proposing
automakers redesign ICEs to meet new criteria emission standards. EPA's proposed
requirements will divert the much-needed capital away from vehicle electrification. If EPA
wants the vehicle industry to succeed in increasing new vehicle sales to 50-60 percent in seven
years, EPA must allow automakers to focus resources on the full transformation to EVs - an
expensive and monumental task. Not on incremental changes to near-zero criteria emissions on
ICE vehicles. As discussed above, Kia will invest $36.3 billion by 2027 in EVs and other
advanced vehicle technologies. This is a downpayment as Kia continues our aggressive EV
transition to perfect our electric powertrain technology. Focusing resources on EVs is critical to
ensure electrification transition is successful. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 9-10]
EPA proposes bins that are slightly different from bins finalized in ACC II. Specifically, EPA
is not proposing Bin 125, Bin 25, or Bin 15, as found in ACC II, and instead is proposing a Bin
10. Kia recommends aligning EPA's new bin structure with CARB's bin structure. While Kia
has no issue with the stringency of EPA's proposed bins, it would be beneficial for the bin
structure to be harmonized between CARB and EPA as this would eliminate compliance and
testing complexity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 9-10]
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Organization: Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE)
The Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) is writing to express our support for
the above proposed rule to establish Multi-Pollutant Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later
Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles. MDE agrees that this comprehensive federal program
would achieve significant greenhouse gas (GHG) and criteria pollutant emissions reductions,
improve air quality, and result in substantial public health benefits while helping us meet our
climate and air quality goals. MDE urges the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to adopt
the proposed criteria pollutant standards. MDE also urges EPA to adopt the most stringent,
technologically feasible Alternative 1 GHG emissions standards. Alternative 1 is the closest to
being in alignment with the California Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC II) regulations, which
Maryland is in the process of adopting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp. 1-3]
Maryland has made a lot of progress over the past few decades towards clean air. The
improvements have been so substantial that the EPA has proposed to determine that the
Washington, District of Columbia-Maryland-Virginia nonattainment area has clean data for the
2015 8-hour ozone national ambient air quality standard (2015 ozone NAAQS). A Clean Data
Determination (CDD) is the first step in being redesignated from nonattainment to attainment.
The Baltimore nonattainment area will also be eligible for a CDD in the near future if the area
continues to stay at or below the ozone standard. Nitrogen oxides (NOx) are a precursor pollutant
of ground-level ozone and are also precursors to secondary small particulate matter (PM2.5).
Exposures to these two pollutants are associated with premature death, increased
hospitalizations, and emergency visits due to exacerbation of chronic heart and lung diseases and
other serious health impacts. Some areas of the state experience higher rates of illnesses such as
asthma than average, and these illnesses are aggravated by these pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0698, pp.1-3]
While significant progress has been made statewide, continuing to reduce NOx emissions,
especially those from the transportation sector, is critical to our efforts to attain and maintain the
ozone NAAQS. Regional modeling shows that a significant portion of the ozone-forming
pollutants are transported into Maryland from upwind states. EPA estimates that strengthening
these standards will reduce NOx and PM2.5 emissions nationally by 41% and 35% in 2055,
respectively, which combined with state reductions can provide cleaner air for Marylanders.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp. 1-3]
Maryland is working hard to reduce in-state emissions from the transportation sector. Efforts
include the Maryland Clean Cars Act that instructed MDE to adopt the California Advanced
Clean Car (ACC I) regulations that require manufacturers of passenger cars and light-duty trucks
to sell increasing percentages of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs). The regulations also include
low-emission vehicle (LEV) standards to reduce criteria pollutants and GHG emissions from
new gasoline powered vehicles. As noted above, Maryland is in the process of adopting
California's ACC II regulations. The ACC II regulations require auto manufacturers to sell an
increasing percentage of ZEVs over time, with a phase in of a 100 percent sales target by 2035.
ACC II also established increasingly more stringent exhaust and evaporative emissions standards
for criteria pollutants from these vehicles. Maryland's recently enacted Clean Trucks Act of 2023
requires MDE to adopt California's Advanced Clean Trucks (ACT) regulations that require
manufacturers of medium-and heavy-duty vehicles to sell increasing percentages of ZEVs by
2035. Maryland is also a signatory to both the 2013 Multi-State Zero-Emission Vehicle
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Memorandum of Understanding and the 2020 Multi-State Medium-and Heavy-Duty ZEV
Memorandum of Understanding under which the signatory states are working collaboratively to
accelerate ZEV adoption, coordinate ZEV policy, develop the ZEV market, and build out
infrastructure. The recently enacted Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and the Inflation
Reduction Act (IRA) will provide significant funding to advance electrification and charging
infrastructure that will enable the widespread electrification of this vehicle market. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp. 1-3]
Adopting the most stringent, technically technical feasible Alternative 1 GHG emissions
standards at the federal level will provide considerable support for Maryland's efforts to meet
our GHG reduction goals. Transportation accounts for almost half of all GHG emissions
generated in the State. The Climate Solutions Now Act of 2022 (CSNA) established a statewide
goal of a 60 percent reduction in GHG emissions from 2006 levels by 2031. The CSNA requires
more stringent GHG emission reductions economy wide and requires state agencies execute
plans, programs, and policies in order to achieve these goals. Enacting the most stringent GHG
emissions standards that are technologically feasible will complement the many strategies being
implemented under the CSNA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp. 1-3]
Maryland has implemented emissions reduction measures across all sectors, including on-road
transportation to reduce the state's GHG and NOx emissions. Federal programs such as these
standards are needed to provide significant additional reductions of these pollutants as they also
provide benefits across the economy. The EPA's leadership in strong regulatory GHG limits
from motor vehicles could also help reduce ozone and PM2.5 precursors, providing further
reductions to help meet our climate and air quality goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0698, pp.
1-3]
For these reasons, MDE supports the EPA's proposal to adopt the proposed criteria pollutant
standards and the most stringent, technologically feasible Alternative 1 GHG emissions
standards for model year 2027 and later light-duty and medium-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0698, pp.1-3]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
Mazda strongly requests that EPA take these considerations into account and make necessary
adjustments to the proposed rule as it works towards a Final Rule. We feel the Final Rule should
have more realistic targets and associated ramp ups, include PHEVs, and adopt CARB's current
LEV IV for criteria emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, pp. 3-4]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
Furthermore, we emphasize the need for flexibility in the rulemaking, particularly related to
the criteria emissions. We recommend EPA align its criteria emissions standards to those
adopted in California's Advanced Clean Cars II ("ACCII") Low Emission Vehicle IV ("LEV
IV") standards. The ACCII program, including ZEV and LEV IV, was designed purposefully to
advance electric vehicles and secure important, additional criteria emissions improvements from
internal combustion engines. Aligning Tier 4's light-duty and medium-duty bins, levels of the
standards, and phase-in commensurate with LEV IV will provide significant nationwide air
quality benefits. To the extent EPA deviates from the LEV IV pathway, Mercedes-Benz is
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prepared to work with the agency to identify more appropriate pathways and timelines that
maximize technology development underway for the worldwide market. We further implore
EPA to use this rulemaking to seek additional areas that reduce burden, without compromising
environmental benefits; as proposed, the rule significantly increases testing burden and likely
requires investments in lab upgrades that detract from ongoing and necessary EV
investment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 2]
The EPA NPRM contains aggressive criteria emissions standards that push the bounds of
current technologies, and also rely heavily on the sale of electric vehicles. In addition, these
criteria emissions standards do not properly account for the proceeding three to four years of
work with the California Air Resources Board ("CARB") to develop and implement the ACCII
LEV IV standards. LEV IV was developed under a mutual understanding that important and real
criteria emissions controls could and should be implemented, and at the same time, as auto
industry investments increasingly shift into electrification, a balance must be struck. LEV IV
therefore provides air quality and health benefits without requiring automakers to divert electric
vehicles investments into internal combustion engine technology upgrades and expanded testing.
Additionally, Mercedes-Benz has already begun development efforts for LEV IV, and EPA's
proposed standards would in many cases negate the research and development dollars already
committed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 4]
Thus, Mercedes-Benz's recommends that EPA align its Tier 4 standards with the LEV IV
standards, which includes adoption of the same bins used in LEV IV [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0623, p. 4]
Organization: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
- Adopt the proposed criteria pollutant standards for light- and medium-duty vehicles
MPCA also strongly supports EPA's proposal to establish more stringent emissions standards
for criteria pollutants for both light- and medium-duty vehicles. EPA's modeling suggests the
proposed standards would result in significant criteria pollutant and air toxics emissions
reductions, which would provide substantial health and air quality benefits to Minnesotans.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, p. 4]
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
Align the Tier-4 (criteria pollutants) with CARB's LEV-IV criteria test procedures and
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
Comments specific to the proposed Criteria Exhaust Emission Standards for Model Years
2027 and Later [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 8]
Porsche provides the following comments in supplement to the comments from the AFAI
specific to the proposed Tier- 4 standards for light-duty vehicles. As noted earlier, Porsche does
not currently market medium-duty vehicles in the United States and offers no input for those
regulatory requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 8]
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In general, Porsche continues to maintain that the vast majority of emission reduction
opportunity will be realized through the deployment of zero- and near-zero emission technology
vehicles. As projected within the NPRM and the support documents, the bulk of emissions
benefits should be achieved through the significant growth in electric vehicles projected by EPA
for the US market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 8]
While focusing on a majority electrification strategy, Porsche continues to see a role for future
advanced combustion engines in limited applications. As such, Porsche appreciates the sections
of the proposal that align with California's recently adopted Advanced Clean Cars IILEV-IV
program and supports comments that seek additional alignment between the two programs. This
alignment will help manufacturers optimize resources and streamline planning. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0637, p. 8]
Organization: Stellantis
From a criteria emissions standpoint, not only did EPA assume the same optimistic EV
penetrations, it also proposes tailpipe requirements on ICE products that demand significant
levels of all-new technology investment on a shrinking ICE fleet. Again, EPA chooses to exceed
even the most forward-leaning precedent of California driving new requirements and
development that distracts from the focus needed to execute on our commitment to transition to
an EV dominated market by 2035. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 23-24]
Adopt the aggressive CARB ACC II LEV IV criteria emission standards recently finalized by
California. Specifically, EPA should: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 24-25]
EPA Should Adopt Stringent CARB ACCII LEV IV Criteria Emissions Standards
Stellantis fully supports AAI's comments and the recommendation to align to CARB ACC II
LEV IV criteria emissions requirements. EPA should either adopt or align with California's
stringent ACCII LEV IV criteria requirements, avoiding the unnecessary development of all new
technology to apply to a shrinking ICE fleet (distracting from EV focus). As highlighted in the
examples above, the California standards still provide significant improvements over EPA's Tier
3 standards. EPA must also continue to allow enrichment for component protection which is
critically needed for continued use of highly efficient downsized turbocharged powertrains and
avoid PM requirements that mandate development of all-new GPF systems and/or extraneous
new testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 16-17]
Also, vehicles over 22,000 lb. GCWR will be forced to certify on an engine dyno for criteria
emissions. Because this is misaligned with California's ACC II LEV IV rules, it forces dual
certification efforts, different hardware and uncertain impacts on GHG performance. Stellantis
believes the 22,000 lb. GCWR proposed requirement should not be implemented for
determination of criteria emissions standards, nor should it be used to alter the GHG stringency.
To address EPA concerns, criteria emissions standards should be aligned with CARB's ACC II
LEV IV rules instead. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 19]
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
3. The stringency of the criteria pollutant standards (i.e., tailpipe standards) exceed
California's recently finalized LEV 4 standards with little technical or scientific justification. In
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fact, the proposed tailpipe standards serve as a de facto BEV mandate. EPA should adopt
California's LEV4 standards - the most stringent ever put in place in the U.S. - and not go
beyond these. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 2]
9.1 Overall comments
Toyota believes that the focus of OEM's efforts should be on electrifying the fleet and that
additional and unnecessary provisions with minimal impact on air quality should be reconsidered
by the EPA. We believe that the California Air Resources Board (CARB), with their long,
collaborative process with all stakeholders, has done a good job of balancing the need to protect
human health and with the structure and additional provisions in their LEV IV regulation. Since
conventional vehicles will remain in the sales mix though and beyond the timeframe of this
Proposed Rule, the unnecessary stringency of certain Tier 4 provisions does not promote more
electrification, but rather reduced Toyota's ability to assign resources from conventional engines
and hinders EPA's goal of alignment with President Biden's electrification goals. Therefore, we
highly recommend that EPA harmonize with the regulatory structure and stringency of the
California LEV IV regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 48]
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
The proposal if adopted would create unnecessary additional burden on manufacturers that are
spending most of their resources on electrification. VCC believes the US government should
instead pursue policy that encourages and develops the US electric vehicle market. VCC shares
the Biden administration goals on electrification and encourages EPA to implement a rule that
does not have unintended consequences like delaying or deterring future electrification
plans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, p. 5]
Organization: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
4. Alignment with California Air Resources Board (CARB) programs. EPA proposes to align
certain program elements with CARB's Advanced Clean Cars II rule (such as accounting for
high-powered cold starts in plug-in vehicles) and to update onboard diagnostics (OBD)
requirements to reflect CARB's 2022 OBD-II rule. To ensure national consistency and ease
compliance requirements for manufacturers, EPA should seek to align such elements with
approved CARB regulations whenever possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 3]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI) as well as Ford Motor Company, Kia, Mazda,
Mitsubishi, Porsche North America, Stellantis, Aston Martin, BMW and the SVM Ad Hoc group
all recommended that EPA adopt CARB's ACC II criteria pollutant program in lieu of EPA's
proposal. AAI along with Mitsubishi stated their belief that the proposed criteria pollutant
program diverted resources away from EV development and towards ICE technologies. Honda,
Mercedes-Benz AG, Porsche, Stellantis and Volvo all commented that the proposed criteria
pollutant standards will distract resources from efforts to electrify the fleet and act as an
unnecessary burden on the vehicle manufacturers. The Colorado Energy Office, Colorado
Department of Transportation, and Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment
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seemed to echo this comment and expressed concern that the criteria pollutant program could
have the unintended effect of delaying electrification. In addition, Honda commented that the
criteria pollutant program proposed by EPA is too reliant on electric vehicles and ancillary
systems, such as charging infrastructure, to achieve the levels of electrification required to meet
the proposed criteria pollutant standards and suggested. "We respectfully urge the agency to
finalize a more reasonable emissions reduction trajectory, along with a broader array of
compliance flexibilities." Honda, Mercedes-Benz and Stellantis also commented on the
stringency of CARB's ACC II program and stated that the proposed criteria pollutant program
from EPA went beyond the stringency of ACC II.
On the other hand, the California Air Resources Board (CARB), Ceres Corporate Electric
Vehicle Alliance (CEVA) and the Center for Biodiversity (CBD) et al. all commented in favor of
the proposed criteria pollutant standards, with CBD noting that "While electrification is
undoubtedly an effective and important means of securing emissions reductions, there will also
be tens of millions of gas guzzlers that will be sold before EVs become dominant." CARB
commented similarly "Because U.S. EPA's proposal does not require ZEV sales, as California's
rules do, the tightening of criteria air pollutant emission standards is even more critical to ensure
that the internal combustion engine vehicles that will continue to be sold are becoming cleaner."
The Auto Alliance pointed out that the instructions for -7°C testing in 40 CFR 86.1811-
27(c)(1) improperly cited a provision describing the Highway Fuel Economy Test.
Response:
EPA thanks all the commenters for providing comments regarding the proposed criteria
pollutant standards. EPA believes that the form and the stringency of final criteria pollutant
program addresses the comments received, provides additional alignment with the CARB ACC
II program in certain respects, and is within EPA's Clean Air Act statutory authority.
As several commenters noted, there will most likely be over 100 million ICE-based vehicles
sold in the U.S. in the coming decades. Under our central case projections nearly 40% of new
vehicles sold and 82% of the on-road fleet will have internal combustion engines in 2032. In
addition, EPA's GHG and criteria pollutant programs are performance-based, and vehicle
manufacturers will most likely adopt different technology solutions to meet the final standards,
some of which could include heavy reliance on a spectrum of ICE-based technologies such as
advanced gasoline engines, hybrids and plug-in hybrids. EPA agrees that tightening emission
standards for ICE-based vehicles is critically important to ensure that these vehicles continue to
become cleaner.
EPA disagrees with comments that the criteria pollutant program is a distraction from
electrification and with comments that the criteria pollutant program can only be met with the
adoption of BEVs. Several vehicle manufacturers have announced new engine development
programs, such as GM's 6th generation V8, and it seems clear that vehicle manufacturers
continue to invest in ICE technology even as they ramp up their EV portfolios. In addition to
electrification, manufacturers have the ability to reduce emissions from their ICE-based vehicles
through available technologies including better combustion control and improved after-treatment
systems allowing them to comply with the final standards with a combination of ICE
improvements and electrification. The basis for our technical conclusion that these standards are
feasible without the adoption of BEVs is explained further in Chapter 3.2 of the RIA.
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Regarding AAI's comment that the instructions for -7°C testing in 40 CFR 86.181 l-27(c)(l)
improperly cited a provision describing the Highway Fuel Economy Test, we have corrected this
for the final rule to refer to the testing instructions for -7°C testing at 40 CFR 1066.801(c)(6).
Many auto industry commenters recommended that EPA adopt the CARB ACC II program in
lieu of our proposed criteria pollutant program. While elements of EPA's final standards are
consistent with the CARB standards, as discussed further in responses later in this section, and
EPA did consider aspects of the CARB standards in evaluating appropriate standards under the
Clean Air Act, EPA disagrees with commenters that we should adopt the CARB's ACC II
program as recommended by commenters. The CARB ACC II program holistically considers
both greenhouse gas and criteria pollutant emissions, with the foundation of the ACC II program
being a manufacturers' production requirement for ZEVs. Commenters did not recommend
adopting the ZEV requirement provisions of ACC II and instead recommended that EPA only
adopt some of the criteria pollutant elements of ACC II. This a la carte approach to emissions
standards fails to consider the interdependent nature of CARB's ACC II program. CARB's
treatment of ICE-based vehicles is premised on an increasing penetration of ZEVs in the
California fleet, and the associated emission reductions that result from an increasing percentage
of ZEVs. EPA's program, being performance-based for both GHG and criteria pollutant
emissions, relies on increasingly stringent performance-based standards to achieve substantial
emissions reductions nationwide. As a result, ICE-based vehicles are anticipated to be part of
most manufacturers' product plans under the EPA standards. With ICE-based vehicles
representing such a substantial portion of new vehicles sold and the on-road fleet for decades to
come, to achieve the necessary emissions reductions for both GHG and criteria pollutant
emissions it is important that ICE vehicles, in addition to electric vehicles, continue to reduce
emissions. GM supports this position and commented "In many cases, an EPA final rule aligned
with CARB's LEV IV in internal combustion engine criteria emission stringency and the
associated test and certification procedures will help GM achieve significant emissions reductions
for internal combustion engine products as soon as MY 2027 despite limited lead time, while
continuing to transition to zero-emission vehicle technologies." EPA is, however, finalizing
additional provisions which are responsive to certain comments recommending alignment with
ACC II, as discussed further in responses later in this section.
4.1 - Program design and structure
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Cummins
Standards should be fuel neutral (i.e., same stringency regardless of fuel type) to
ensure the environmental benefits of the regulation are achieved regardless of the fuel type
chosen by customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
-------
Organization: General Motors, LLC (GM)
The following appendices provide further detailed regulatory and technical comments.
Appendix A
provides recommended edits to EPA's proposed regulatory text to clarify various parts of the regu
latory language to ensure a successful and aligned set of EPA regulatory requirements. The other
appendices provide confidential business information to help inform various technical aspects of
the criteria emission and GHG standards. In many cases, an EPA final rule aligned with CARB's
LEV IV in internal
combustion engine criteria emission stringency and the associated test and certification procedure
swill
help GM achieve significant emissions reductions for internal combustion engine products as soon
as MY 2027 despite limited lead time, while continuing to transition to zero-emission
vehicle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 6]
[See original attachment for April 7, 2023 EPA Memorandum with subject: Redline Version
of EPA's Proposed Regulations to Adopt New Standards for Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicle Standards"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 6]
[See original attachment containing redacted confidential comments titled, "Summary of GM
Technical Comments and Recommendations in Response to Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for
Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles (Tier IV)" [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0700, p. 6]
Organization: KALA Engineering Consultants
Suggested Alternatives
KALA is an engineering firm and would not be making these comments unless we had some
alternatives to suggest to EPA. If the EPA does the right thing and makes known the attributable
upstream and downstream GHG emissions for both gasoline and BEV vehicles in a straight-
forward comparison, the GHG reduction premise for the EPA Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829 would be nullified. That leaves the criteria air pollutant emission reduction premise
for the proposed rulemaking. As we stated above, we concur with EPA that BEVs would reduce
criteria pollutant levels where they operate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
However, looking at what has been happening with weather events, forest and wildfire
emissions and more frequent flooding events over the last 20 years, the number of lives lost from
those Climate Change-related calamities may soon overwhelm any life-saving measures that
would stem from implementing the criteria pollution standards proposed in this docket, previous
dockets and future dockets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
Despite that grim assessment, we feel that continuing to try and reduce criteria pollutants is
worthwhile, even though massive forest fires in Canada this year seem to have wiped out any
progress in that area for the time being. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
Focusing Criteria Pollutant Emission Reductions on Nonattainment Areas
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In the Federal Register Text for the EPA-HQ-OAR- 2022-0829, EPA identifies the number
of air pollution nonattainment areas around the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
27-30]
From Section I. A. 2, i: "There are currently 15 PM2.5 nonattainment areas with a population
of more than 32 million people and 57 ozone nonattainment areas with a population of more than
130 million people." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
Each of those PM 2.5 and Ozone nonattainment areas of the country have vehicles that are
either registered within the nonattainment area or are registered in surrounding counties that by
regularly driving into the nonattainment area contribute to criteria pollutant emissions within the
geographic nonattainment area. The vehicles registered outside the nonattainment area itself that
contribute to emissions within the actual geographic confines of the defined nonattainment area
are probably used to drive to destinations inside the nonattainment area for work or other
reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
Our reasoning for what we are about to suggest is based on the question we asked ourselves.
"If we really want to make the biggest impact on highly air polluted locations, as defined by
nonattainment areas, why require nation-wide criteria pollutant standards when requiring low or
no operating emission vehicles to be used within or to enter nonattainment areas might obtain
acceptable significant reductions?" We really must agree with the comments from South Dakota
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR), in which they said, [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
South Dakota is a large state with significant driving distance between many of our
communities. Although several new electrical vehicles indicate they have a 200 mile or greater
range (note - it is 224 miles one way from Pierre to Sioux Falls), a recent study shows electric
vehicles (EVs) do not consistently achieve EPA s range estimates. In addition, all batteries
degrade over time. Reports indicate EV vehicle batteries will degrade between 10 and 40 percent
over a 10-year life span. To maintain the battery's life, manufactures recommend batteries are not
frequently depleted below 10 percent capacity or charged above 90 percent capacity. This means
that an electrical vehicle should be limited to 80 percent of its capacity range to maintain the
battery's life. In addition, cold, hot, and windy weather conditions may reduce an EV vehicle's
range between 20 to 40 percent and may further impact the reliability of EV. South Dakota is
known to have cold and windy winters and hot and windy summers, which, with current EV
ranges, batteries conditions, and availability of charging stations, makes widespread use of EV s
impractical in South Dakota. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
We believe that a regulatory scheme targeted at vehicles that regularly operate within
nonattainment areas, requiring vehicle registrants to use low or no operating emission vehicles if
they wish to operate those vehicles inside the nonattainment area on a regular basis would be one
approach to reduce criteria emissions in those designated areas. Such a regulatory scheme would
require cooperation with the automobile registration agencies, the air quality or resources
agencies and potential enforcement agencies within the state where the nonattainment areas are
located. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
By shifting focus to nonattainment areas, the efforts underway to add charging stations all
over the country could be re-focused to install many more charging stations within
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nonattainment areas and get more bang for the Federal buck spent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 27-30]
Here is how we see such a plan could work. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
A. Vehicle registrants who reside inside the non-attainment area would receive notices
that their vehicle(s) do not meet newly promulgated EPA regulations for lowering air pollutant
emissions in the local nonattainment area. These of course, would include fleet owners of
delivery vans, service vehicles, school busses and other owners of large numbers of vehicles that
operate principally inside or very nearby the nonattainment area boundaries. These notices would
inform them that one or more of the vehicles they own may no longer be used to drive within the
local area because the emissions from the vehicle(s) are too high. The notice would inform the
registrants that they can ask for monetary assistance with purchase of a compliant vehicle (sort of
like Cash for Clunkers, i.e. high polluting vehicles) or ask for a waiver due to the age of the
registrant and/or very low use of the non-complying vehicles (you know, that little old lady who
just drives her car to church and the grocery store). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
B. Since vehicles are re-registered every year, state registration bureaus would ask
registrants if they work or travel to destinations inside the nonattainment area on a regular basis.
If so and their vehicles are non-compliant, they would receive the same notice that the non-
compliant vehicle they drive into the nonattainment area must be changed out to a compliant
vehicle by a date certain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
C. Enforcement could be carried out by application of modern technology. With the
advancement of Artificial Intelligence, cameras, many of which are now in place, could be
connected to computer systems using software that reads the license plate numbers for vehicles
entering the nonattainment area. As time goes by and the same license plates, which of course
have vehicle information tied to them including engine type and possibly latest emissions testing
data, are read over and over again, the registrant for that vehicle would be notified that the
vehicle they are using has been spotted entering the nonattainment area multiple times, enough
times to meet criteria for regular entry, and they must switch to a compliant vehicle by a date
certain. Warnings and then fines could be levied in stepped amounts against repeat offenders
who regularly operate non- compliant vehicles in the nonattainment area. Impoundment would
be the final step. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
D. The states where these focused programs would be operating could set up a vehicle
connection service similar to or connected to Craig's List in which non-compliant vehicle
owners could sell or swap their vehicles with interested parties within the state or outside of the
state. The description of such vehicles would be required to notify potential buyers that the
vehicle does not comply with nonattainment area emission requirements and buyers should not
attempt to register the vehicle if they will be entering a nonattainment area with it regularly.
There should also be a website that will show car buyers where nonattainment areas and possible
candidates for nonattainment areas are located and the qualifying vehicles for each, which could
be tailored to the particular criteria pollutant group, such as PM2.5 or Ozone, the area falls under.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
E. EPA might require large over-the-road trucks to drive to a central off-loading location
where their cargo would be removed in a timely manner from their trailers into covered or
enclosed staging platforms where pallets or other items would be re-loaded onto heavy-duty all-
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electric urban delivery vehicles that would then distribute the goods to various destination points
within the nonattainment area (about a 75 mile round trip distance). These truck off-loading
facilities would be located downwind of the prevailing winds for the area so that PM and diesel
soot would be blown away from the nonattainment area most of the time and be dispersed
through dilution. Moving trucks and special loads that require heavy lift machinery to off-load
would be exempt from these requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
We believe this sort of regulatory scheme could work better than applying universal, nation-
wide criteria pollutant standards for all vehicles, especially in those locations where such
standards are not actually required to meet local air quality goals. If the proposed rulemaking
standards were revised to apply to nonattainment areas, and major urban corridor areas, such as
the more dense parts of the 1-95 corridor, the complaints seen in the comments to this rulemaking
would be lessened or mitigated. We think most people can agree that vehicle requirements that
address the worst air pollution areas in the country should be acceptable to protect the health of
those who live and work in those areas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
Mitsubishi participated in the development of - and supports - the comments submitted by
Auto Innovators. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
In addition, based on its considerable experience discussed previously with BEV and PHEV
leadership, Mitsubishi provides the following recommendations to supplement the comments of
Auto Innovators:
1.
2. Consider the many benefits of PHEVs to consumers and the environment during the
expected period of constrained battery critical minerals production capacity, and how PHEVs are
the perfect stepping- stone to full BEV acceptance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
3.
4. Keep the proposed approach to determine the passenger car curves, and consider
adjusting the cutpoint and stringency levels of the light-duty trucks during the early years of the
program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
5. Maintain the existing GHG program flexibilities, such as Air Conditioning and Off-
Cycle technologies credits (including the alternative method to apply off-cycle credits), and
allow previously approved technologies to continue receiving credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0682, p. 2]
6.
7. Consider the impact that very aggressive GHG standards will have on vehicle
affordability, and especially the detrimental impact to low-to-moderate income families.
Regardless of the vehicles that regulation may require us to produce, it is critical that regulators
always keep the accessibility of consumers in mind. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
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Organization: Stellantis
Eliminate counting vehicles without tail pipes (BEV, FCEVs) as part of a tail pipe emissions
fleet [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 24-25]
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
3. The stringency of the criteria pollutant standards (i.e., tailpipe standards) exceed
California's recently finalized LEV 4 standards with little technical or scientific justification. In
fact, the proposed tailpipe standards serve as a de facto BEV mandate. EPA should adopt
California's LEV4 standards - the most stringent ever put in place in the U.S. - and not go
beyond these. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 2]
9. Tier 4 Program
Toyota supports the comments by the Alliance for Automotive Innovation by reference. The
comments here are to add emphasis or additional perspective to those items. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, p. 48]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
In addition to the broad comments regarding the proposed criteria pollutant program, EPA
also received comments from several stakeholders regarding the overall program design and
structure. Mitsubishi Motors recommended that EPA consider the benefits of PHEVs in meeting
future standards and that EPA should maintain the existing standards in form and stringency in
the early years of this rulemaking. Toyota and Stellantis commented that they felt the stringency
of the criteria pollutant program goes beyond the California ACC II program and Toyota also
stated that the stringency acts a "de facto BEV mandate." Toyota also recommended that EPA
adopt the California ACC II standards.
Kala Engineering Consultants provided detailed comments regarding restricting operation of
vehicles with high emissions in non-attainment areas. Kala noted that not all areas in the United
States were in non-attainment and recommended that vehicles and/or vehicle operation be
controlled within these non-attainment areas to reduce emissions. These recommendations were
made as an alternative to nationwide emissions standards that would broadly impact the entire
country.
Cummins commented that standards should be fuel-neutral.
Response:
EPA has considered the vehicle manufacturer comments within the context of the overall
criteria pollutant design, structure and stringency and concluded that the program design and
structure, as proposed and as finalized, is appropriate. While some manufacturers commented
that EPA's proposed criteria pollutant program goes beyond the stringency of California's ACC
II program, EPA addresses the rationale for final standards and not adopting CARB ACC II in
RTC Section 4.1.1 above.
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EPA disagrees that the criteria pollutant program is a de facto BEV mandate. Each of the
criteria pollutant standards is performance-based. Vehicle manufacturers are anticipated to apply
a variety of technologies to meet the standards, including but not limited to BEVs. For example,
many ICE-based vehicles are already being certified at or below the final fleet average
NMOG+NOX standards being finalized in this rule and vehicle manufacturers have a variety of
technologies that can be applied to ICE-based vehicles to reduce their criteria pollutant
emissions. For additional detail regarding the current fleet compliance status and technologies
that could be applied to reduce criteria pollutant emissions, please refer to RIA Chapter 3.2.
Regarding Kala Engineering Consultants recommendation to limit vehicles and/or vehicle
operation to reduce emissions only within non-attainment areas instead of broadly applied
national standards, while the concept of "geofencing" vehicle operation is known to EPA, we do
not believe it to be an effective approach to ensuring emissions reductions, and such a concept is
outside the scope of this rulemaking.
Regarding Cummins comments on fuel neutrality of the standards, the standards are fuel
neutral except for medium-duty diesels at low ambient temperatures. Diesel MDV are exempt
from the -7°C FTP NMOG+NOx standard but we are requiring manufacturers to report results
from this test cycle in their certifications. We are also applying a NOx temperature correction to
the in-use standards for high GCWR diesel MDV. These differences for diesel MDV are due to
current limitations with respect to NOx control from selective catalytic reduction (SCR) systems
at cold ambient temperatures. The Agency will continue to monitor technology developments
with respect to diesel SCR system NOx emissions control at cold ambient temperatures.
4.1.1 - Phase-in of criteria pollutant standards
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
B. Tier 4 Phase-Ins
1.General Tier 4 Phase-In Approach
EPA proposes to require a general phase-in of Tier 4 provisions, under which 40% (in MY
2027), 80% (in MY 2028) and 100% (in MY 2029) would need to meet all Tier 4 requirements.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 143-145]
If EPA was simply proposing to adopt the same provisions as California adopted in ACC II, a
short phase-in such as that proposed might be adequate. However, EPA is proposing more
stringent standards, across more test cycles and conditions, than the ACC II program
requirements. Manufacturers are likely to encounter technical challenges as they develop
solutions to meet these new requirements, particularly if EPA finalizes its proposed general
prohibition on enrichment, which will significantly impact vehicle drivability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 143-145]
Auto Innovators is also concerned that every vehicle and powertrain combination would need
to pass all of the new, individual requirements in order to be counted in the phase-in. Should a
vehicle that a manufacturer planned to include in a test group in the phase-in encounter
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unexpected challenges with one or more of the Tier 4 provisions, it would need to be pulled from
the test group and would not count in the volume-weighted phase-in calculation. With the short
duration provided to comply with the aggressive Tier 4 phase-in, there will likely not be enough
time to solve all technical issues while still meeting the proposed phase-in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 143-145]
To address this concern, we recommend that EPA offer the option of an alternate phase-in
plan, similar to what is done with current and CARB ACC II LEV IV regulations. We also
recommend that EPA allow credits to be earned for early compliance, and that EPA provide a
four-year phase-in period. This will allow OEMs to solve significant technical challenges and
procure the hardware needed to address the Tier 4 (unique) proposed requirements. We
recommend a 25/50/75/100% (MY 2027-2030) four-year phase-in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp.143-145]
In addition, we request that EPA separate the Tier 4 requirements, similar to CARB's ACC II
LEV IV regulation, allowing flexibility to meet different aspects of the Tier 4 regulation (e.g.,
PM standards vs. enrichment prohibitions), with different vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp.143-145]
1 PM Phase-In
As discussed elsewhere, Auto Innovators opposes EPA's proposed PM standards, but would
support adoption of the California ACC II PM standards. However, if EPA finalizes its proposals
instead of adopting the California PM standards as we recommend, we believe that EPA should
reconsider the Tier 4 PM phase-in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 143-145]
Automakers have already begun research, design, and development of strategies to meet
California's phase-in of more stringent PM standards in MYs 2026-2030. EPA's PM standards,
if adopted as proposed, would likely strand those investments. Our preferred approach (if EPA
proceeds with its proposal) would be to implement the federal standards after completion of the
California ACC II PM phase-in. We recommend that any unique EPA PM requirements take
effect starting in MY 2030 and phase-in by 40/80/100% through MY 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 143-145]
2. Light- and Heavy-Duty Vehicle Phase-In Split
As required under the Clean Air Act, EPA treats vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating
(GVWR) less than or equal to 6,000 lbs. (light-duty vehicles in this discussion) differently than
vehicles with a GVWR greater than 6,000 lbs. (heavy-duty vehicles in this discussion). [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 143-145]
Auto Innovators is concerned that EPA does not appear to have considered the implications of
electrification on GVWR where some vehicles that have historically been considered light-duty,
might become heavy-duty vehicles due to battery weight and no longer count in the light-duty
phase-in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 143-145]
In such a scenario, EPA's assumptions about the market share of BEVs (upon which
NMOG+NOx fleet average standards are premised) could be in error. Furthermore, separating
the <6,000 lb. GVWR fleet from the 6,001 - 8,500 lb. GVWR fleet separates vehicles that are
currently being used in a combined "compliant" <8,500 lb. fleet. Combined fleets are managed
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by offsetting less capable vehicles with more capable vehicles, which provides automakers the
opportunity to maintain compliance while phasing out legacy vehicles and focusing on the
transition to electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 143-145]
We recommend that EPA allow BEV applications to optionally count in the <6,000 lb.
GVWR fleet phase-in, regardless of GVWR. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 143-145]
3. Enrichment Phase-In
Notwithstanding the above comments on EPA's proposed prohibition on enrichment, if EPA
does proceed with its proposal, it should be clear how this provision is phased in. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 143-145]
Auto Innovators suggests a longer phase-in for Tier 4 requirements and that separate, and
appropriately timed phase-ins be applied instead of a single vehicle needing to meet all aspects
of the Tier 4 requirements. The same should apply to a prohibition on enrichment, if adopted.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 143-145]
Furthermore, we note a lack of clarity in the proposed regulatory text related to the phase-in
for prohibition of enrichment. The proposed text at 40 C.F.R. 86.1809-12(d)(2) specifies that
"This determination [that enrichment is unnecessary] is effective for all vehicles certified to Tier
4 standards."256 The proposed Tier 4 regulations require all vehicles to meet the Tier 4
NMOG+NOx standards, effective MY 2027, but other provisions of Tier 4 are phased in over
three years, and vehicles that do not meet the other provisions are "interim" Tier 4 vehicles.
Thus, it is not completely clear whether the proposed general prohibition on enrichment is tied to
vehicles that meet the Tier 4 NMOG+NOx standards, or whether it is tied to full Tier 4 vehicles
(as opposed to interim Tier 4 vehicles). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 143-145]
256 NPRM at 29418.
We recommend that if EPA adopts its proposal to prohibit enrichment for Tier 4 vehicles, it
should then also modify the proposed 40 C.F.R. 86.1809-12(d)(2) text to ensure the text is
interpreted as applying to only those vehicles which EPA intends it to apply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 143-145]
2. Phase-in of Criteria Pollutant Standards and 40 CFR §86.1813-17(b)(l)(i)
Clarification is requested regarding the 8.5K - 14K incomplete vehicle ORVR phase in
requirements. Is the ORVR compliance phase-in independent of the exhaust emissions phase-in
tables or are the phase-in options associated. I.e., if an OEM uses a model year 2027 exhaust
phase-in does that mean the ORVR phase-in must also start in model year 2027? [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 188]
Auto Innovators disagrees with this approach. The current 2027MY requirements should not
be reopened. The 2027MY standards should remain unchanged from the final rule that EPA
issued in 2016CY, as that is what OEMs have relied upon to create compliance plans. Further,
the Clean Air Act section 202(a)(3)(C) mandates four-year lead time and three-year stability
periods. The agency is proposing only three full years of lead time (assuming the Proposed Rule
is finalized later this year) and no stability period between any of the proposed annually
decreasing GHG standards. EPA's proposal is inconsistent with the CAA and, thus, no change
should occur in 2027MY. Finally, OEMs need more time to adapt to a fuel neutral standard.
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Therefore, when fuel neutrality is implemented, it should be phased in over several years
(30/60/100), and not fully implemented until 2032MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
193-194]
K. Technical Issues with Proposed Tier 4 Regulatory Text
1. Proposed 40 C.F.R. § 86.1811-27(b)(6)(i)
The proposed 40 C.F.R. § 86.181 l-27(b)(6)(i) specifies to "Include all light-duty program
vehicles at or below 6,000 pounds GVWR in the calculation to comply with the Tier 4 fleet
average NMOG+NOx standard."293 We believe the preamble text and this command's
placement as part of (b)(6) makes it clear that this instruction applies only to the NMOG+NOx
standards at (b)(2), and their phase-in at (b)(6)(i). Nevertheless, for the avoidance of any doubt,
EPA may want to explicitly describe the standards at (b)(2) and the phase-in at (b)(6)(i) to make
clear that the command does not apply to the cold temperature NMOG+NOx fleet average
standards at (c)(3)(i). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 188]
293 NPRM at 29420.
Organization: Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE)
AVE supports EPA's proposal for lower criteria pollutants and requests that the EPA
accelerate the fleet compliance phase-in requirements for particulate matter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0631, pp.7-8]
AVE supports EPA's proposal for a PM standard of 0.5 mg/mi for both LD and all MD
vehicles. AVE members produce technologies like gasoline particulate filters (GPFs) that make
this stringency level feasible and cost-effective. Furthermore, AVE members are already
working with manufacturers to design and install the requisite technology into many of today's
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 7-8]
AVE is concerned about the longer than necessary phase-in for compliance with the new PM
stringency levels and recommends that EPA consider a 60% compliance level in 2027, followed
by 90% in 2028, and then 100% in 2029. Delaying implementation appears counterproductive
and unnecessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 7-8]
The need for quicker action is obvious. The International Coalition for Clean Transportation
(ICCT) recently reported that PM emission levels across the U.S. have risen since 2015 and are
now back to 2005 levels. 19 In the Proposal, EPA strongly emphasizes the significant health
benefits that will accrue from the lower PM standard but does not fully justify the basis for a
long phase-in period. The American Lung Association reports of a long-term study of people in
six U.S. cities from 1974 to 2009 that supports faster action addressing PM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0631, pp.7-8]
19 See ICCT https://theicct.org/publication/true-pm-emissions-jun23/
"The findings suggest that cleaning up particle pollution had almost immediate health
benefits. The researchers estimated that the U.S. could prevent approximately 34,000 premature
deaths a year if the nation could lower annual levels of particle pollution by 1 |ig/m3."20 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 7-8]
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20 See https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/what-makes-air-unhealthy/particle-pollution
EPA references the agency's consideration of bringing environmental justice to at-risk
communities and AVE supports this effort. Still, a shorter phase-in period for new stringency
levels would do a great deal more to accomplish this effort and bring more immediate relief to
the communities that bear a disproportionate amount of the country's particulate pollution.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 7-8]
The technologies needed to meet the proposed PM standard have already been deployed on
millions of vehicles in Europe and China by the same global manufacturers who sell vehicles in
the U.S. market. This experience likely negates the need for a long lead time before MY 2027.
Moreover, suppliers stand ready to support manufacturers with cost-effective technology and the
experience to meet the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 7-8]
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Phase-in timeline for compliance with 0.5 mg/mi standard is unreasonable [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0652, p. 14]
In addition to concern about the agency's proposed 0.5 mg/mi stringency, we are similarly
concerned with the agency's proposed phase-in schedule. EPA's proposed phase-in timeline to
reach 100% compliance is just three years (from 2027-2029), providing virtually no lead time
and forcing unplanned development for technologies the industry is already planning to sunset.
Development cycles required by manufacturers would need to be initiated in 2023 to begin the
40% phase-in for MY2027 vehicle production. As this NPRM is unlikely to be finalized until
early-to-mid 2024, manufacturers could possibly already be late in being able to meet a 40%
compliance requirement for MY2027, as vehicles will already be going down the manufacturing
line by late 2026. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 14]
Organization: Cummins
Sufficient regulatory lead time and stability should be provided to allow
manufacturers to develop and implement the technologies needed to improve emissions and
spread investments over time to minimize cost to customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645,
pp. 2-3]
Organization: Energy Innovation
In the EPA's proposed rule, the GHG tailpipe standards for LDVs are "projected to result in
an industry-wide average target for the light-duty fleet of 82 grams/mile (g/mile) of carbon
dioxide (C02) in MY 2032, representing a 56 percent reduction in projected fleet average GHG
emissions target levels from the existing MY 2026 standards." 12 The proposed GHG standards
for MDVs are "projected to result in an average target of 275 grams/mile of C02 by MY 2032,
which would represent a reduction of 44 percent compared to the current MY 2026 standards." 13
The proposed rule will also reduce cumulative GHG emissions between 2027 and 2055: C02 by
26 percent, methane (CH4) by 17 percent, and nitrous oxide (N20) by 25 percent, compared to
no-action scenario. 14 See table 135 below from the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, pp. 5-7]
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12 U.S. EPA, "Proposed Rules," May 5, 2023, 29196.
13 U.S. EPA, 29196.
14 U.S. EPA, 29348.
[See original attachment for "Table 135 - Estimated GHG Impacts of the Proposed Standards
Relative to the No Action Scenario, Light-Duty and Medium-Duty"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0561, pp. 5-7]
While the proposed rule is an improvement over the status quo, greater emissions reductions
via higher rates of electrification in the LDV and MDV sectors are needed to reduce harmful air
pollutants and mitigate climate change. We believe EPA's alternative to the proposed rule
(Alternative 1) is the preferred option (as discussed further below) because it will achieve greater
emissions reductions more quickly, while still being technologically feasible and cost-effective.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 5-7]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Standards Continuation Beyond 2032MY
In multiple areas of the NPRM the EPA has requested comment on continuation of light- and
medium-duty GHG and criteria pollutant standards beyond 2032MY. Ford opposes continuation
of any of the standards beyond the 2032MY. Industry already faces substantial uncertainty
before 2032MY, and it is not feasible to establish a robust program beyond that time. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 8]
Finally, Ford recommends that EPA defer the phase-in requirement of the new PM standards
to starting in 2029MY, consistent with the Ford recommendation for the new fuel enrichment
requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 13]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
Mercedes-Benz also requests that EPA provide, at a minimum, a one-year delay and four-year
phase- in for these changes in order to allow sufficient engineering development time to update
engine strategies for compliance, and time to phase new engines into the fleet. This timing would
be consistent with EPA's own recognition of product cycles: "EPA has also considered vehicle
redesign cycles. Based on previous public comments and industry trends, manufacturers
generally require about five years to design, develop, and produce a new vehicle model."5
Application of a new engine would not be incorporated during a vehicle refresh and instead
would occur at the time of major redesign. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 7]
5 NPRM at 29341.
although EPA provides several different phase-in approaches for the criteria emissions
standards to meet the lead-time and stability requirements as obligated by the Clean Air Act,
EPA should recognize that the proposed phase-ins do not necessarily follow industry standard
product cycles. Particularly in this instance, where standards adopted by CARB have formed the
main driver of emission standards since the rulemaking process began in 2020. Powertrain
improvement and development of new engine platforms and is a multi-year process. These
developments improve emissions performance and customer experience, but the three model
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year lead-time proposed for the early compliance option may not align with product cycle
refreshes in the MDV segment. EPA should alter the phase-in schedule to better align with
existing product cycle planning or allow manufacturers to request an alternative early-
compliance pathway. This would encourage early compliance and associated emissions benefits
as product cycles refresh and evolve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 19]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
2. Porsche supports an extended phase-in timeline and alternative phase-in for Tier-4
Compliance
Porsche supports the comments from AF AI regarding an extended phase-in for the percentage
of projected new vehicles that must comply with Tier-4 standards. As recommended by the
AFAI, Porsche supports a revision to the proposed language in 86.1811-27(b)(6)(i) to require
25% in MY2027, 50% in MY2028, 75% in MY2029 and 100% in MY2030. Porsche supports
this extension given the requirement in (b)(6)(i) for a vehicle to meet all the proposed standards
to be considered within the phase-in. As AFAI notes, manufacturers may have difficulty in
meeting narrow elements of the overall proposal, especially elements that are not aligned with
California's LEV-IV programs. Because EPA is requiring vehicles to meet Tier-4 in its entirety,
regardless of which part is unable to be achieved, the vehicle would not be included in the phase-
in. The longer phase-in could provide additional flexibility for vehicles that need time to meet all
the requirements, especially the newer requirements being proposed by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0637, pp. 9-10]
In addition, Porsche supports the addition of a point-based alternative phase-in option
available to manufacturers to use for determining compliance with the phase-in in lieu of the
annual percent-based compliance. The point-based system could utilize previous examples in
which the percentage of a manufacturers fleet that meets the standards is multiplied by a
declining annual value, with a minimum points requirement that must be achieved by a future
date. The exact function can be developed to ensure that the alternative point-based system
delivers consistent emissions reductions with the percent-based system. The opportunity to earn
higher points in earlier model years would incentivize early Tier-4 concepts, which could in turn
provide additional flexibility for concepts that may need to comply later either due to their
redesign cycle, or for concepts which may be having challenges with specific portions of the
Tier-4 package and simply need additional development time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637,
pp. 9-10]
4. In the default pathway, Porsche supports adding the opportunity for early, optional Tier-4
compliance for light-duty program vehicles over 6000 pounds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637,
pp. 10-11]
Porsche supports the position of the AFAI to include within the default compliance pathway
outlined in 86.1811- 27(b)(6)(ii) the ability for LDT3, LDT4, and MDPV vehicles (i.e., vehicles
over 6000 pounds) to optionally comply with Tier-4 requirements prior to the 2030 model year
requirement. These vehicles could be referred to as "Default Path Early Tier-4" vehicles which
could then be included within the Tier-4 phase-in percentages in 86.1811-27 for vehicles under
6000 pounds. The volumes used for determining compliance to the Tier-4 phase-in would
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include the projected volume for these Default Path Early Tier-4 vehicles and the compliance
percentages would be calculated accordingly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 10-11]
Porsche recognizes that some manufacturers may find that the default pathway better aligns
with their future product portfolio versus the alternative early pathway in 86.181 l-27(b)(6)(iii)
(i.e., including all vehicles under 8500 pounds vehicles together). Porsche appreciates that the
default pathway was defined to reflect the Clean Air Act minimum lead time for vehicles over
6000 pounds and thus reflects that there is no obligation for those vehicles to meet Tier-4
standards prior to model year 2030. This proposal for Default Path Early Tier-4 vehicles should
continue to align with the Clean Air Act in that manufacturers in the default pathway are not
required to choose to declare these vehicles as Default Path Early Tier-4s, but if they do, then the
vehicles could be counted in the Tier-4 phase-in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 10-11]
The option for over 6000 pounds vehicles to be included early could provide manufacturers
who have selected the default pathway with some additional flexibility for complying with the
Tier-4 phase-in, without having to fully reject the default pathway altogether. As noted by the
AFAI, future electric vehicles are likely to incorporate larger traction batteries to meet customer
demand for increasing range or utility. A manufacturer in the default pathway may find they are
at risk of compliance with the under 6000 pounds Tier-4 phase-in should an electric vehicle that
was intended to be part of the phase-in begin to approach the 6000 pounds threshold as product
teams demand more range or utility. By allowing over 6000 pounds vehicles to still be counted
in the Tier-4 phase-in, this flexibility would provide greater freedom to product teams balancing
phase-in compliance with increasing customer needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 10-
11]
Organization: South Coast Air Quality Management District
There are five key issues we request U.S. EPA address before finalizing the rule. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0659, p. 2]
1. Extend the phase-in period and adopt more stringent standards to align with California's
ACC II regulation. The proposed standards will be phased in over a six-year period from model
year (MY) 2027 through 2032 with increasing stringency each year. We recommend that the
phase-in period be extended to 2035 and later model years to better align with the ACC II
implementation schedule which extends out to MY 2035 and subsequent years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0659, p. 2]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Much like other topics regarding the proposed criteria pollutant program, EPA received
several comments regarding the phase-in of the revised standards. EPA received comments that
were both supportive of the proposed phase-in and recommended that the agency shorten the
window of time for vehicle manufacturers to comply with more stringent requirements and
comments that recommended that the agency provide more time and additional flexibility in
meeting new requirements.
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI) commented that the duration of the phase-in
might be appropriate had EPA adopted California's ACC II program in lieu of the proposed
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standards. AAI noted that, due to the differences in the two programs, manufacturers were more
likely to experience technical difficulties in meeting the EPA standards. Mercedes commented
similarly and stated that the ACC II criteria pollutant planning was the main driver in their
product development. Mercedes added that the current phase-in does not recognize vehicle
manufacturers product planning cycles. AAI made special note of EPA's proposal to eliminate
command enrichment and the potential for vehicle drivability issues as the result of eliminating
enrichment. AAI and Porsche also commented on the Tier 4 phase-in requirement by which the
EPA proposed that all vehicles brought into Tier 4 as part of the phase-in would be required to
meet all the Tier 4 provisions. AAI further noted that meeting all the provisions simultaneously
on a single vehicle may increase the risk to vehicle compliance. AAI recommended that EPA
allow provisions to be separated, similar to the CARB ACC II program. AAI and Porsche also
recommended that EPA allow credits for early compliance and an alternative phase-in of
25/50/75/100% for MY's 2027 through 2030.
AAI also commented on specific criteria pollutant provisions. Regarding the phase-in of PM
standards, AAI noted that manufacturers were already working on developing technical solutions
to meet the CARB ACC II PM standards. For PM, AAI recommended delaying revised federal
standards until after the ACC II program was fully phased-in. The specific recommendation as a
PM phase-in of 40/80/100%, starting in MY 2030 and ending in MY 2032. AAI also made
recommendations regarding the phase-in of enrichment and ORVR. AAI also suggested
clarifying that the NMOG+NOx phase-in proposed at 86.181 l-27(b)(6)(i) did not apply for the
NMOG+NOx standards for cold temperature testing.
Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE) commented in support of EPA's PM standards and
recommended a more rapid phase-in of the standards noting in the process ICCT's recent
assessment the PM emissions have been increasing in the United States since 2015. AVE
recommended a phase-in of 60/90/100% from MY 2027 through MY 2029. AVE emphasized the
need for PM reductions by noting the impact that PM has on disadvantaged neighborhoods and
the prolific application of gasoline particulate filters outside of the United States.
Cummins requested sufficient regulatory lead time and stability in order for manufacturers to
develop and implement the technologies needed to improve emissions and spread investments
over time to minimize cost to customers.
Ford Motor Company commented that they did not support the EPA programs extending
beyond MY 2032 and recommended that the revised PM standards should begin phasing in in
MY 2029.
Porsche Cars North America recommended a point-based phase-in in lieu of an annual
percentage-based phase-in and noted that previous criteria pollutant programs have adopted a
similar strategy for some pollutants.
South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) recommended that EPA extend the
phase-in period to MY 2035 to align with CARB's ACC II program.
Response:
EPA has carefully considered all the comments received regarding the phase-in for criteria
pollutant standards. As a result, the agency is finalizing a phase-in that is about a year slower
than proposed. Instead of the 40/80/100%) phase-in from MY's 2027 through 2029 that was
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proposed, EPA is finalizing a 20/40/60/100% phase-in that runs from MY 2027 through MY
2030 for vehicles <6,000 pounds GVWR, maintaining the 100% phase-in for vehicles >6,000
pounds GVWR, and adding one additional year for vehicles >6,000 pounds to meet the final
phase-in for criteria pollutant standards. For more information on phase-in see preamble Section
III.D.l.
EPA does not believe that creating separate and unique Tier 4 phase-ins for each program
provision is required or appropriate. Vehicle emissions control systems are designed and
deployed as a system. Changes made to support lower NMOG+NOx standards, certification to
lower emissions bins, elimination the SFTP and lower PM standards go together, and the agency
feels it is reasonable to expect vehicle manufacturers to design, develop and deploy systems
which are optimized to meet all of the criteria pollutant emission requirements simultaneously,
just as they are today. Separate phase-ins may result in vehicle manufacturers trading off one
pollutant for another to meet individual phase-in requirements.
As responded below, the EPA does not plan to finalize new restrictions on command
enrichment so concerns regarding the phase-in of enrichment requirements are no longer valid.
Regarding comments such as those from Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE) regarding a
faster phase-in, while it is true that tens of millions of gasoline particulate filters have been
deployed worldwide, very few are commercially available as original equipment on US sold
vehicles. Given that the United States has unique, and in many cases more stringent, criteria
pollutant emission standards as compared to the rest of the world, the agency believes that it is
reasonable to provide vehicle manufacturers with more lead-time to adapt PM control
technologies to existing vehicles and calibrations.
Cummins comments regarding standards stability and lead time with respect to their products
are entirely directed at vehicles with more than 6,000 pounds GVWR, which are regulatorily
defined as "heavy-duty" under the Clean Air Act. EPA's default compliance programs for heavy-
light-duty trucks above 6,000 pounds GVWR (e.g., LDT3, LDT4 and MDPV) and for MDV all
provide a minimum of 4 years of lead time and 3 years of standards stability, as required by the
Clean Air Act for heavy-duty vehicles.
On the other hand, both Ford and AAI recommended that EPA delay phase-in of the final PM
standards until after CARETs ACC II PM standards were fully phased in. As EPA's PM
standards are more stringent than CARB's this recommendation does not seem to be required or
necessary. Given the overlapping timeframe of the two rulemakings, and statements by vehicle
manufacturers that they are reducing focus on ICE powertrain development, we expect that
vehicle manufacturers will design their systems to meet the most stringent PM standards and will
not develop systems twice. Emission control systems that comply with EPA's final PM standards
will also be compliant with CARB's ACC II program.
EPA has chosen not to adopt Porsche's recommendation for a point-based phase-in as an
alternative to year over year percentage increases. The agency believes that extending the phase-
in addresses Porsche's request for additional flexibilities, as well as the ability to apply BEVs to
the phase-in requirements.
Regarding the SCAQMD comments regarding extending the phase-in until MY 2035 to better
align with the CARB ACC II program, EPA has decided to finalize the proposed rulemaking
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period that results in a fully phased in program in MY 2032. EPA will continue to monitor
technology progress as well as other related regulator actions as it considers potential standards
beyond the MY 2032 timeframe.
The final rule includes clarifying language to state that the NMOG+NOx phase-in
requirements of 40 CFR 86.181 l-27(b)(6)(i) apply for 25°C testing, and not for -7°C testing.
4.1.2 - NMOG+NOx
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Criteria Emission Standards
Automakers will spend $1.2 trillion by 2030 as a down payment on a net-zero future, but far
more will be needed. If we hope to succeed, automakers must focus resources on the EV
transformation rather than incremental changes to existing, very near-zero (criteria) emission
ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 5-6]
This should not be interpreted as automakers requesting no criteria emission reductions or
regulations. We support changes that can be made cost-effectively through software calibration
changes to the vehicle. For example, we support and recommend EPA adopt the criteria emission
standards California adopted under Advanced Clean Cars II (i.e., LEV IV). We worked with
California over several years to develop these standards that substantially reduce real- world
criteria pollutants (nonmethane organic gas (NMOG), nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate mater
(PM)), as rapidly as possible without stranding technology or diverting resources from
electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 5-6]
However, some of the changes proposed in the NPRM go far beyond California's LEV IV
program and would require large human and capital resources. For example, all-new engine
designs, retooling of engine and vehicle production facilities, new hardware on vehicles, and
additional testing laboratories are required at the same time the EPA expects 67% of new
vehicles to be BEVs. These simultaneous ICE-focused activities will distract from efforts to
electrify light-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 5-6]
NMOG + NOx Fleet Average
Unlike California, EPA proposes a performance-based standard that counts zero-emission
vehicles in the NMOG+NOx fleet average. While EPA calls this a performance-based standard,
it assumes a high BEV penetration rate for setting the standard (i.e., a light-duty vehicle at 12
mg/mi fleet average assumes 60% of the fleet are BEVs). This is more akin to a design
requirement. Regulating criteria emissions from vehicles with criteria emissions (i.e., excluding
ZEVs from the fleet and regulating that fleet at 30 mg/mile) is a more appropriate performance-
based method. Like EPA's proposed GHG requirements, it is unknown if market sales of BEVs
will achieve the specified targets. Making up for reduced BEV sales by reducing emissions from
ICE vehicles will take years of development and cannot be altered on an annual basis. To avoid
risk of an uncertain BEV market, major ICE investments and diverting resources from focused
electrification efforts, we recommend EPA adopt the California Air Resources Board's (CARB)
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stringent LEV IV regulatory framework that phases-out BEVs in the NMOG + NOx fleet
average. This will provide planning stability and an insurance policy from market conditions that
OEMs have no control over. Adopting CARB's requirements will ensure significant reductions
in tailpipe emissions while avoiding major ICE investments and maintaining the focus on
electrification that will have a great reduction in criteria emissions over time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 7]
Recommendation
GHG - Better align to President Biden's 2030 electrification goal [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 7-8]
To address the concerns identified above, Auto Innovators and our members recommend EPA
reevaluate the GHG standards and more closely align with President Biden's 2030 goal. Thus,
we recommend adopting requirements for 40 to 50% BEV, PHEV, and FCEVs in 2030 with
continued increases through 2032. These standards should be coupled with and connected to
regularly measured infrastructure deployment and battery critical mineral supply levels available
during this rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 7-8]
Criteria - Adopt California's LEV IV Standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 7-8]
For the Tier 4 criteria pollution standards, we recommend that EPA adopt California's LEV
IV exhaust and evaporative emission standards adopted just seven months ago and begin in
2026MY. LEV IV standards were adopted by California last year as an effective and appropriate
path forward to address the toughest in the nation air quality challenges. EPA should align with
this comprehensive strategy to enable a nationwide criteria emissions program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 7-8]
If EPA finalized the multi-pollutant regulations with these two recommendations, the final
regulations would still be the most aggressive and challenging in U.S. history, and they would
provide dramatic reductions in GHG and criteria emissions. However, EPA would reduce the
risk of potential harmful consequences to both the EV market, and the new vehicle market in
general, by forcing BEVs at a rate that outpaces the EV supply chain, infrastructure, critical
mineral supplies, and customer acceptance. Getting the pace right is critical to the success of the
automakers and to U.S. leadership and competitiveness. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 7-
8]
IV.Light-Duty Criteria and Toxic Pollutant Standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
141-142]
Automakers are committed to ultimately achieving net-zero transportation carbon emissions
and electrification of the light-duty vehicle fleet. However, this transformation requires massive
investment in EV technology and supporting mechanisms such as infrastructure, all involving
many stakeholders. To be successful, automakers must primarily focus resources on the
transformation rather than incremental changes to existing internal combustion engine (ICE)
vehicles, which are already very near zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-142]
The focus of EPA and the automakers is and should be on electrification. Thus, Auto
Innovators supports changes to traditional criteria emission (e.g., NMOG, NOx, and PM)
standards that measurably reduce emissions, but do not add substantial additional hardware or
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capital costs to ICE vehicles that will soon be retired. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-
142]
Unfortunately, EPA proposes to adopt new requirements that will divert resources from our
shared goal of widespread electrification. Prohibiting enrichment could require complete engine
redesigns and possibly larger displacement engines to provide customers with the capability they
demand. The proposed PM standards substantially increase costs and vehicle development
complexity in addition to adding testing requirements. Finally, in several cases, EPA provides
less flexibility and/or chooses not to align with ACC II. This lack of alignment is particularly
troubling as automakers and suppliers have already developed product plans and spent resources
toward meeting the ACC II regulations, and in some cases, EPA's proposal would require
substantial changes during the middle of ACC II regulatory phase-ins. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.141-142]
To reduce costs while still providing similar (and substantial) environmental benefits, the
EPA regulations should seek to align with criteria emissions regulations already adopted by
California in ACC II. We worked closely with the California Air Resources Board (CARB) and
with EPA staff in attendance and participating,25 5 for the past several years to develop standards
that substantially reduce real-world criteria emissions (including NMOG+NOx and PM), as
rapidly as possible without stranding technology or diverting resources from electrification.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-142]
255 At no time did EPA staff indicate a different or more stringent pathway was under development
federally, while the auto industry provided input, feedback, and technical data to CARB. The California
process provided an ideal forum for alignment, even if EPA could not commit to alignment at that stage.
We recommend that EPA adopt the ACC II criteria emission regulations in place of its
proposal. This adoption would provide substantial environmental benefits, streamline the
regulations, and allow automakers to focus resources on electrification rather than developing
and deploying changes to ICE vehicles specific to EPA's proposed new requirements. At a
minimum, EPA should align with ACC II through the end of the ACC II phase in periods; in
most cases, ACC II regulations are fully phased in by MY 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 141-142]
A. Consideration of the California ACC II Criteria Pollutant Regulation as an Alternative
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-142]
EPA failed to consider adopting various California ACC II criteria pollutant provisions, and
in so doing has also failed to demonstrate the incremental costs and benefits of its proposed
program relative to this existing and logical alternative. EPA has also failed to consider the
appropriate time to develop and deploy the additional ICE technologies to meet its proposal,
particularly in the context of an overlapping and different final state regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-142]
It is no defense to say that EPA has yet to approve a Clean Air Act waiver for these
provisions. EPA has yet to reject a waiver request from California, and included the California
ACC II program as a sensitivity case to the proposed greenhouse gas regulations. Unfortunately,
to the extent that the ACC II sensitivity case provides estimates of criteria emission benefits, it
has been challenging, if not impossible, to separate benefits associated with the GHG program
from those associated with the criteria pollutant program, and even more difficult to separate the
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impacts from individual components of the proposed criteria pollutant program. These
challenges have been exacerbated by the limited time available to comment on the NPRM.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-142]
If EPA proceeds with its own misaligned proposal to the logical alternative of California's
ACC II program, it should at a minimum demonstrate the incremental benefits and costs of each
of its unique program aspects relative to the ACC II program. In addition, if EPA proceeds with
its own proposal, EPA should also align with ACC II through the end of the ACC II phase in
periods before starting new requirements on top of those already under implementation. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-142]
C. NMOG+NOx Standards
We recommend that EPA align its regulations to the California ACC II program. To the
extent that EPA proceeds with its original proposal, we provide the following comments on the
proposed NMOG+NOx requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 145-147]
1 .Electric Vehicles in the FTP NMOG+NOx Fleet Average
a)ZEVs
EPA proposes to include ZEVs in the FTP NMOG+NOx fleet average calculations, and has
correspondingly proposed fleet average standards that decline to 12 mg/mile, well below the 30
mg/mile (with ZEVs phased out) fleet average in the California ACC II program. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 145-147]
Consistent with our broader recommendation that EPA align its regulations to the California
ACC II program, we recommend that EPA set the Tier 4 FTP NMOG+NOx fleet average
requirement at 30 mg/mile and phase-out ZEVs from the fleet average. In addition to our
concerns with EPA's projections for electric vehicles, highlighted in Section I of these
comments, we are also concerned that the NMOG+NOx fleet average is a second, separate
regulation that is generally premised on EV market share projections. With multiple overlapping
regulations (in terms of EV dependence) there may be unforeseen conflicts that could create
compliance difficulties or raise regulatory costs without providing additional benefits. Even the
lack of certainty of EV penetration prior to completion of a model year may cause difficulties.
Our suggested approach would remove the dependence on EV market share for compliance with
the FTP NMOG+NOx fleet average requirement, addressing these concerns. If EPA instead
proceeds with their proposed approach, it should ensure that compliance with the NMOG+NOx
fleet average standard is not overly reliant on the assumed penetration rates of electric vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 145-147]
a) PHEVs
If EPA decides to proceed with its proposed approach of including ZEVs in the FTP
NMOG+NOx fleet average, we believe that the criteria pollutant emissions of PHEVs should be
adjusted for the zero-emission portion of their operation. Such action would recognize the
emission benefits of these vehicles and would be consistent with EPA's treatment of BEVs for
the purposes of criteria emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 145-147]
2.High-Altitude FTP Bin Standards
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EPA is proposing to regulate high-altitude FTP emissions at the same stringency as the low-
altitude FTP requirement. EPA states that, "Modern engine management systems can use idle
speed, engine spark timing, valve timing, and other controls to offset the effect of lower air
density on exhaust catalyst performance at high altitudes."257 While this is true during warmed-
up conditions, cold start emissions are impacted by the lower air density at altitude that cannot be
overcome by "modern controls." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 145-147]
257 DRIA at 3-36.
- Reduced effectiveness of Catalyst Warm up Strategy: The lower air density at high altitude
makes it impossible to warm-up the catalyst as quickly as is done at low altitude. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 145-147]
- High Altitude Fuel Volatility: High altitude certification fuel has a lower vapor pressure. For
a given engine power, manifold pressure and other operating characteristics are the same, but the
fuel vaporization is not, which tends to result in combustion residues, which in turn impact
emissions during warm-up. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 145-147]
- Reduced Exhaust Gas Recirculation (EGR): The lower air density at high altitude reduces
the amount of EGR, resulting in higher NOx emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
145-147]
For the reasons described above, additional aftertreatment development will be necessary to
meet EPA's proposed standards. The proposed high-altitude standards will, as a result, require
improvements to the aftertreatment system (precious metal content, catalyst volume and
additional control devices). In addition, automakers would need to increase laboratory capacity,
possibly even building additional laboratories at a significant capital cost, for high-altitude
testing to develop these improved systems. These resources would be better applied to vehicle
electrification. At minimum, EPA should provide a specific assessment of the emissions benefit
of this added requirement, along with a full assessment of testing availability, capacity and
resources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 145-147]
We recommend that EPA adopt the high altitude NMOG+NOx standards recently adopted in
ACCII as shown in Figure 40 below.
Figure 40: Recommended High-AlDtude Standards
Bin
Low Altitude High Altitude
Standard (g/mi) Standard (g/mi)
BIN 160
160 160
BIN 125
125 160
BIN 70
70 105
BIN 60
60 90
BIN 50
50 70
BIN 40
40 60
BIN 30
30 50
BIN 25*
25 50
BIN 20
20 30
BIN 15*
15 30
BIN 10
10 20**
* Additional recommended bins - see comments elsewhere.
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** No LEV IV equivalent
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 145-147]
3. NMOG+NOx Cold FTP Fleet Average
EPA proposes to set a cold FTP NMOG+NOx fleet average requirement of 300 mg/mile,
excluding ZEVs.258 EPA requests comment on whether a 400 mg/mile vehicle cap should be
used instead of a fleet average.259 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
258 NPRM at 29262.
259 NPRM at 29262.
Auto Innovators prefers a fleet average requirement, but requests a value of 300mg/mi for
LDV+LDT1 and 400mg/mi for LDT2+HLTD+MDPV for the following reasons: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
At -7 °C, emission reduction right after engine start-up and during catalyst warm-up is the key
factor. Large displacement engines (V6, V8, etc.) inevitably have substantially higher emissions
at engine startup before the catalyst is warmed up. For downsized turbocharged engines, the
amount of heat supplied to the catalyst decreases due to the relationship between the recovery of
the exhaust energy by the turbocharger and the heat capacity of the turbocharger itself; thus, the
warm-up time tends to be longer than that of an engine without a turbocharger. During this
longer warm-up time when the catalyst is in a semi-active state, the heavier vehicle with a
turbocharger under high running load conditions has much higher emissions than other vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
According to the DRIA, EPA developed the proposal based on the test results of three models.
The results of these three models certainly meet 300 mg/mi. However, due to differences in
exhaust system layout (i.e., front catalyst distance from the engine) and engine control from
these models, there are some models that cannot achieve both emission reduction before catalyst
warm-up and early catalyst warm-up at a high level under -7 °C condition. There are also
vehicles that are heavier than the vehicles EPA tested. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
147-148]
Developing technology to adapt these vehicles to 300 mg/mi would require diverting
substantial resources from electrification:
1.For emission systems development and evaluation, update and/or increase of chassis
dynamometer system testing to make it possible to reproduce cold temperature condition is
necessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
2.Development of pistons and injectors for better combustion and designing arrangement of
emission purification devices are necessary. When changing the catalyst system (increase in the
amount of precious metals, increase in the number of cells), increase in costs occurs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
Regarding the 300 mg/mile fleet average, EPA proposes that the family emission limit (FEL)
be set to a resolution of 0.1 g/mile (100 mg/mile).260 An FEL set to only a single decimal place
(i.e., 0.x g/mile) provides very little flexibility among different vehicles. We recommend that
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EPA allow an FEL resolution to three decimal places (i.e., O.xxx g/mile). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
260 NPRM at 29436.
We also note that although EPA describes the 300 mg/mile fleet average as excluding ZEVs
in the preamble,261 the proposed 40 C.F.R. § 86.1811-27(c)(3)(i) regulatory text does not reflect
that exclusion.262 Auto Innovators agrees with the exclusion and recommends updating the
regulatory text accordingly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
261 NPRM at 29262.
262 NPRM at 29420.
F. Interim In-Use Standards
Auto Innovators recommends EPA provide interim in-use compliance standards for PM, early
drive-away, and US06 NMOG+NOx standards, consistent with the approach taken by CARB in
its LEV IV program.280 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 178]
280 See 13 C.C.R. § 1961.4(d)(2)(A)3., (2)(C)3., (3)(A)5.a., and (3)(A)5.b.
Notwithstanding our comments opposing EPA's proposed PM standards, we recommend that
test groups first certified to Tier 4 PM standards in the first four years of the program meet an in-
use standard 1 mg/mile higher than the certification standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
p. 178]
For early drive-away and US06 NMOG+NOx standards, we recommend that test groups first
certified to these Tier 4 standards in the first two years of the program meet an in-use standard
1.2 times their certification standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 178]
Vehicles will still certify to the new standards, but the interim in-use standards reduce the
jeopardy associated with new technology and more stringent standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, p. 178]
G. Tier 4 Emission certification Bins
For several decades, EPA and CARB have provided multiple emission certification bins -
from less stringent to more stringent. Automakers can certify vehicles to any bin but must meet a
sales-weighted fleet average. The use of bins provides automakers with flexibility to certify some
vehicles to higher bins and others to lower bins. At the same time, the fleet average provides
assurance of air quality benefits. The number of bins or emission levels associated with bins does
not have even a theoretical impact on air quality. In fact, we have recommended allowing
automakers to set family emission limits (FELs). Nonetheless, both EPA and CARB have
restricted the number of bins in the past. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 178-179]
As we approach zero emissions, flexibility becomes far more important. Unfortunately, as
shown below, the NPRM further restricts the number of bins to which vehicles can certify,
including eliminating bins allowed under ACC II, and not providing bins that were added under
ACC II. For example, ACC II allows Bin 125 through 2028. The inclusion of Bin 125 for a short
additional period minimizes the need for additional investments in vehicles that are approaching
end-of-life. As a result of fleet averaging, the number of bins has no impact on environmental
benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 178-179]
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We therefore recommend EPA align the bins in Tier 4 with those in ACC II. We agree with
the addition of Bin 10 (10 mg/mile) and plan to request CARB add this bin during their next
ACC II regulatory update. We would also recommend that both EPA and CARB consider adding
bins 35, 45, and 90 to provide manufacturers with greater flexibility while maintaining
environmental benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 178-179]
We also note that, unlike CARB, EPA does not allow a higher US06 standard for bins below
30 mg/mile. The emission variation associated with high-speed, high-load cycles on the US06
are particularly challenging at the very low emission levels (sub-30 mg/mile). Consequently, we
recommend EPA align Tier 4 with ACC II and set a 30 mg/mile standard for US06 for all bins
below bin 30. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 178-179]
[See original attachment for Figure 66: Comparison of EPA and CARB Bins] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 178-179]
K. Technical Issues with Proposed Tier 4 Regulatory Text
However, when evaluating the existing vehicles pulled into the new MDPV definition and
making conclusions that the proposed definition would not affect the classification of existing
Class 2b and 3 ICE vehicles, it does not appear that EPA considered the proposed 22,000-pound
limit to GCWR in the WF calculation, which is proposed to begin in MY 2030, in combination
with the 5,000-pound WF threshold. After the WF GCWR limit, many ICE work trucks in the
market today would be classified as MDPV in MY 2030 and beyond (see examples below).
Manufacturers encourage EPA to review compliance data submissions to reassess how the
proposed MDPV definition may interact with 2023MY and 2024MY ICE products. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 198-200]
[See original attachment for Figure 73: Sample ICE Work Trucks and Classifications]
307 Press Kit: 2023 Ram Heavy Duty, Towing specifications (Public "Base Weight Total" used for
example may vary from "EPA Curb" weight)
htps://media.stellantisnorthamerica.com/newsrelease.do?id=24053&mid=,
The consequences of shifting ICE work vehicles to the MDPV regulatory class are significant.
For criteria emissions, the MDPV NMOG+NOx targets are proposed to be 12 mg/mi in MY
2030 vs. 178 or 247 mg/mi for MDV in MY 2029 in the default compliance pathway308 (see
Figure 74 below), and the MDPV definition would preclude these work trucks from certifying to
proposed Bin 160 or Bin 125, which are reserved only for MDVs.309 The EPA NPRM analysis
does not appear to recognize that many ICE work trucks would switch to MDPV with the
proposed new MDPV definition, and no technology pathway is discussed to bring a 2029MY9
MDV work truck into a compliant light-duty averaging set. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 198-200]
308 NPRM at 29261, Table 41.
309 NPRM at 29261, Table 42.
[See original attachment for Figure 74: NPRM Table 41: LDV, LDT, MDPV and MDV Fleet
Average NMOG+NOx Standards Under the Default Compliance Pathway] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 198-200]
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With the proposed new MDPV definition, after the WF calculation adjustments beginning in
MY 2030, many ICE work trucks over 22,000 pounds GCWR would otherwise be required to
engine dyno cert if they were not MDPVs. The logic appears paradoxical and unintended. These
vehicles cannot be both so alike to passenger vehicles that they should be regulated as passenger
vehicles, and so alike to heavy-duty purpose-built work trucks that they should be regulated the
same as light-heavy engines. Many of these ICE vehicles pulled into the new MDPV definition
in MY 2030 today share engine hardware with vehicles that would be required to engine dyno
cert under Part 1036 in MY 2030 due to the 22,000-pound GCWR limit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, p. 200]
There is a stark difference between light-duty chassis dyno certification procedures, required
for MDPVs, and engine dyno certification procedures for vehicles over 22,000-pound GCWR.
Similar vehicles sharing parts and development resources today could be forced to pursue
different development paths based on the proposed MY 2030 class definitions and test
procedures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 200]
Complexity with the proposal is not limited to within the EPA program. Department of
Transportation, through the Corporate Average Fuel Economy program, may have different
regulatory class definitions for fuel consumption regulations than proposed by EPA. California
Air Resources Board, through Advanced Clean Cars II, has different NMOG+NOx Bins, and
different certification requirements than EPA proposes.310 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
200]
310 htps://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/2acciifrol961.4.pdf
F. MDV BINs
13. Background NMOG+NOx Bins
As noted above in Section III.F, EPA and CARB have provided different emission
certification bins - from less stringent to more stringent - for several decades. Automakers can
certify vehicles to any bin but must meet a sales-weighted fleet average. The use of bins provides
automakers substantial flexibility to certify some vehicles to higher bins and others to lower bins.
At the same time, the fleet average provides assurance of air quality benefits. The number of bins
or emission levels associated with bins does not have even a theoretical impact on air quality. In
fact, we have recommended allowing automakers to set family emission limits (FELs).
Nonetheless, both EPA and CARB have restricted the number of bins in the past. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 205-206]
Like LDVs, EPA has proposed Bins that do not align with the Bins in California's ACC II. As
shown in Figure 75 below, EPA prohibits virtually every bin that is allowed in California's ACC
II LEV IV regulations. At the same time, EPA proposes 60 mg/mile fleet average requirement
for MDVs, assuming it will be met using a blend of BEVs and ICE vehicles. While EPA does
propose additional bins in 10 mg/mile increments from Bin 70 to Bin 0, and we support
additional bins, these are unlikely to be used for Class 2b and 3 vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 205-206]
Combined with California's restriction against selling a vehicle in California with a higher
emission bin than the one sold federally (see 13 CCR 1961.4(c)(6), Equivalence of Federal
Standards), this effectively mandates that every Class 2b and 3 ICE vehicle certify to Bin 125 -
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the only common bin between California and EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 205-
206]
[See original attachment for Figure 75: MDV Category Bins Tier 4 vs ACC II] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 205-206]
14. Recommendations on MDV Bins and NMOG+NOx stringency
Manufacturers recommend that EPA align with California ACC II stringency for MDV NOx.
Manufacturers have plans for ICE vehicles to meet the Binl50 standards for gas, and Binl75 for
diesel MDV powertrains, including in use testing at high loads. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 206-207]
To the extent that EPA projects that manufacturers will use ZEVs to meet lower fleet
averages, EPA should carefully study which ZEVs would remain as MDVs, and be subject
neither to the MDPV definition, nor Part 1036 engine dyno certification requirements, nor
migrate to Class 4 to maintain current performance after accounting for the size and weight of
ZEV hardware (batteries, etc.). Manufacturers recommend that ZEVs no longer meeting the final
MDV definition not be included in the MDV averaging set when EPA sets standards. The
NMOG+NOx fleet averages likely need to be adjusted to account for the lower BEV volumes
resulting from either (or both) changes in the definitions and market projections for potential
BEV sales, similar to our concerns noted with the MDV GHG fleet targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 206-207]
We strongly recommend EPA align the bins in Tier 4 with those in ACC II, LEV IV.
Otherwise, Tier 4 will eliminate all flexibility associated with the bin system. Additional bins
simply provide flexibility for manufacturers to meet the fleet average emission standards in the
most cost-effective manner possible. They encourage incremental per vehicle improvements and
will provide for a more effective program as BEV technology ramps up and the fleet average
NMOG+NOx ramps down. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 206-207]
1. Reduce Refinery Gate and Downstream Sulfur Caps to 10 ppm
When EPA finalized the Tier 3 rules governing gasoline, it lowered the maximum average
sulfur level from 30 ppm to 10 ppm. This change was essential to enable advance emissions
control technology to achieve the lower tailpipe emissions standards that are part of the Tier 3
standards because, as EPA points out, "any amount of gasoline sulfur will deteriorate catalyst
efficiency."446 However, EPA continues to allow gasoline with 80 ppm sulfur at the refinery
gate and 95 ppm downstream. Auto Innovators continues to stand behind previous industry
comments on sulfur as detailed in the Auto Alliance Tier 3 comments.447 Refiners and the
distribution system have had many years to adjust to lower sulfur standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 274]
446 Control of Air Pollution from Motor Vehicles: Tier 3 Motor Vehicle Emission and Fuel Standards,
Proposed Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 29816, 29821 (May 21, 2013).
447 Supplemental Comments of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers on Market Gasoline Sulfur,
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Oct. 31, 2013), Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0135-4950.
If EPA pursues lower Tier 4 emissions standards in the NPRM, we urge EPA to reduce the
refinery gate cap to 10 ppm, perhaps with a phase-in period, and at the same time to develop a
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pathway toward a downstream retail cap of 10 ppm per gallon. The elimination of gasoline with
greater than 10 ppm sulfur will enable advanced emissions control technology and will reduce
the impact of sulfur on catalyst efficiency. This cap aligns with sulfur caps in the European
Union and many parts of Asia, including China. The lower sulfur cap also aligns with the lower
NMOG + NOx standards as proposed in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 274]
Organization: Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE)
Finally, AVE supports EPA's proposed stringency level for NMOG + NOx cap for cold
testing. The current proposal at 300 mg/mi is feasible and suppliers already manufacture the
technology to comply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 8]
Organization: American Lung Association (ALA) et al.
Better Control Fine Particles and Ozone-forming Air Pollutants from New Vehicles
EPA has taken an appropriate multi-pollutant approach to the standards to ensure the cleanup of
ozone-forming emissions. To maximize the benefits of the rule, EPA should consider eliminating
smog-forming certification levels for higher polluting light-medium vehicles over time. While
the proposals intend to push fleet averages of smog-forming emissions down by 60 percent or
more, there are still allowances for much higher emitting vehicles through the entirety of the
rulemaking. We also encourage EPA to phase out higher-emitting certification levels to drive
both fleet average and individual vehicle emissions lower over time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0745, pp. 2-3]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
ii. Criteria pollutants proposed stringency of requirements do not factor non-BEV
technologies.
EPA proposes to reduce30 the NMOG+NOx standard by 60% from the current 30 mg/mile
level to 12 mg/mile in 2032. We do not believe this reduction is justified either on a health
benefit or a cost-effectiveness basis. Furthermore, the criteria pollutant proposal for
NMOG+NOx is another example of setting a performance standard that can only be met by a
specific vehicle technology. EPA has not demonstrated a technically feasible path for OEMs to
meet NMOG+NOx standards with a mixed vehicle fleet comprised of large and small light-duty
vehicles with ICE technologies. The examples given in the DRIA (Table 3-14) for vehicles that
currently meet less than 15 mg/mile NMOG+NOx is limited to sedans and smaller SUVs, but do
not include pick-up trucks and full-size SUVs. Trucks and SUVs represent a significant portion
of OEM fleets.31 EPA instead anticipates and sets the standard to require the use of BEVs by
OEMs to sell large SUVs and trucks, instead of allowing for a choice of technology paths which
could include ICE vehicles in the fleet. This is arbitrary and capricious and could likely have
implications for consumers choice and costs. Moreover, only 19 vehicles were certified below 15
mg/mi that rely only on ICE technologies out of the approximately 299 carline models certified
by EPA in 2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 11-12]
30 In its recent Advanced Clean Cars II regulation, the California Air Resources Board has maintained a 30
mg/mile NMOG+NOx standard.
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31 Henry, J. (January 3, 2022). "Light Trucks Now Outselling Cars 3-to-l". Forbes.com. Retrieved June
30, 2023. https://www.forbes.com/wheels/news/light-trucks-now-outselling-cars/.
Organization: Aston Martin Lagonda (AML)
Understanding what SVMs are selling in the US
Neither with regard to criteria emissions nor GHG does EPA explain in the NPRM the paucity
(verging on absence) of Small OEM flexibility or additional lead-time. A misstatement in the
preamble may shed light on this: in the preamble (88 FR 29405) (May 5, 2023), EPA incorrectly
states (as does the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis) that the "proposed NMOG+NOx standards
should have no impact on the existing Small Business manufacturers, which currently produce
only electric vehicles." This is simply not so. There most certainly are SVMs that produce
internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles for the US market, AML being one of them. Nowhere
in the draft RIA does the term "small volume manufacturer" even appear, and the draft RIA thus
fails to address the SVM segment of the industry. Given that the EPA has consistently
recognised the SVM category, it is unusual that it would bring forward punitive regulations at
those companies less able to deal with heavy sanctions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 4]
B. THERE ARE FOUR SPECIFIC TOPICS IN THE NPRM THAT ARE OF DEEP
CONCERN TO SVMs
1. CRITERIA EMISSIONS
"Moving the goalpost" for MY 27 and 28 makes the trajectory exceptionally
challenging for SVMs therefore appropriate derogations are essential. Special accommodation
must be made for SVMs that took strategic decisions and made technological and financial
commitments more than 5 years ago and are unable to make rapid adjustments to adapt to new
regulation at pace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 6-7]
EPA proposes to abandon the MY 27 and 28 SVM NMOG+NOx standards set forth in Tier 3
( and on which SVMs have been rightfully relying), and to require SVMs to adhere to the Tier 4
large volume (and short) phase-in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 6-7]
This inequitably conflicts with the already established and in effect SVM phase-in set forth in
40 CFR 86.1811-17 (h)(1), as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 6-7]
SVM Fleet Average NMOG+NOx Standard (mg/mile)
Model year: 2027: In effect Tier 3: 51; In effect Tier 4: 22
Model year: 2028: In effect Tier 3: 30; In effect Tier 4: 20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566,
pp. 6-7]
The NPRM's proposed change means that in MY 27, SVMs would have to meet a fleet
average NMOG+NOx standard that is 57% more stringent than what they have been planning in
reliance on 40 CFR 86.1811 -17(hl(l). And then, for MY 28, they would have to meet a fleet
average NMOG+NOx standard that is 33% lower than what they have been planning in reliance
on 40 CFR 86.181 l-17(h)(l). This would be an unjust "moving the goalpost".[EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0566, pp.6-7]
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The proposed NMOG+NOx requirements are excessively stringent - too stringent, too
soon This is especially so considering Tier 3 levels and that the CARB ACCII rulemaking
appropriately maintained an SVM NMOG+NOx fleet standard of 51 mg/mi through MY 34, as
shown in the graph below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 6-7]
[See original comment for bar graph of SVM FTP NMOG+NOx LIMIT [g/mi]] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 6-7]
The Proposed Tier 4 NMOG+NOx fleet average is unrealistic for companies that
cannot make use of fleet averaging; SVMs should not have to rely on credit purchasing. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 6-7]
There is no recognition in the NPRM that an SVM may have only one or two ICE test groups,
neither of which meets the Tier 4 fleet NMOG+NOx average. The fleet average concept in such
a situation offers no flexibility; having nothing to "average", such an SVM would simply have no
ability to comply and would fall into a deficit situation. It was precisely to address this type of
scenario that the Tier 3 SVM flexibility provisions in 40 CFR 86.1811 -17(h) were promulgated.
The current rulemaking should follow suit and adopt comparable SVM flexibility. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 7]
As regards credit purchasing, we reiterate how it is unfair to force SVMs to rely on risky
credit purchasing (with unknown availability and at an unknown cost) to meet criteria emissions
requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, p. 7]
The Proposed Interim Tier 4 provision does not provide flexibility to SVMs [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
We note that one general flexibility concession in the NPRM — the category of "Interim Tier
4 vehicles" — does not provide relief to SVMs. As proposed, the Interim Tier 4 provision leaves
SVMs empty-handed because the benefits of Interim Tier 4 are restricted to OEMs who can
otherwise meet the 40% and 80% phase-in percentages with their full Tier 4 test groups (and thus
use the Interim Tier 4 category for the remaining 60% and 20% of their fleets during the phase
in}. Given that SVMs - particularly those with only one or two test groups — cannot meet the
phase-in percentages with full Tier 4 cars, EPA's proposal unfairly denies SVMs the ability to
make use of the benefits of the Interim Tier 4 category. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-
8]
In sum, as regards criteria emissions, EPA should:
follow CARB's ACCII rules and continue the availability of Bin 125 to SVMs through
MY 2034 and not require NMOG+NOx limits for cold testing.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0566, pp. 7-8]
2 EPA must justify imposing on SVMs the proposed new cold NMOG+NOx standard. Until EPA can
establish that the environmental benefits outweigh the burdens on SVMs, SVMs should be exempted.
• with regard to NMOG+NOx FTP and US06 standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0566, pp. 7-8]
In order to properly account for the problems facing SVMs with regard to
"fleet averaging,, and the risks of credit purchasing, as explained above, set the degree and
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frequency of SVM step-downs to reflect SVM realities — limited product lines, longer product
development and life cycles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
• MY 2027 — Maintain for all SVMs the already-in effect {86-1811-17{h} MY
27 Tier 3 SVM NMOG+NOx standard {51m g/mi} [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
• MY 2028 — Maintain for all SVMs the already-in effect MY 28 Tier 3 SVM
NMOG+NOx standard (30 g/mi) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
MY 2029-32 - continue the 30 mg/mi standard for SVMs given that the
environmental benefits of a more stringent standard have not been established and are vastly
outweighed by the potential burden on SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
• Make the Interim Tier 4 category more flexible and available [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0566, pp.7-8]
Add a new paragraph (e} to proposed 40 CFR 86.1811-27 to read as follows: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
(e) If meeting the standards set forth in this section 40 CFR 86.1811-27 would
cause severe economic hardship, small-volume manufacturers may ask us to approve an
extended compliance deadline under the provisions of 40 CFR 1068.250, except that the
solvency criterion does not apply and there is no maximum duration of the hardship relief [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
This provision would mirror the SVM relief made available under Tier 3 in 40 CFR 86.1811-
17. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
The above steps are necessary to comply with the Clean Air Act's section 202{a} mandate
that EPA provide sufficient lead-time "to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such [lead-time]."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 7-8]
Organization: BMW of North America, LLC (BMW NA)
BMW NA supports the comments filed by the Alliance of Auto Innovators to the EPA docket.
Our main concern is that a diverging approach in the United States between Federal regulations
and California's regulations will substantially increase the hurdles to fulfill fleet and vehicle
standards. BMW NA is aiming for one single US fleet and therefore would like to motivate EPA
to align the Tier 4 rules with LEV IV as much as possible. This is referring to the rules for the
NMOG+NOx fleet (bin structure and EV treatment) as well as to the vehicle standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 4]
The fleet regulation should be harmonized, so that the same fleet composition should lead to
compliance in both regulations. Other than the CARB approach, the Tier 4 fleet regulation is
heavily dependent on the BEV share. As mentioned above, there is a high uncertainty what BEV
share could be reached in each single year. From our perspective, the Tier 4 regulation should
focus on regulating pollutant emissions of ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 4]
There should be no additional burdens on top of CARB vehicle standards, which are leading
to additional substantial investments for a mature technology in its phase-out - e.g. for test labs
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or completely new after-treatment systems beyond the CARB standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0677, p. 4]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Criteria Air Pollutant Standards
CARB supports U.S. EPA's proposal to tighten criteria air pollutant emission standards,
particularly given the continued role that internal combustion engine vehicles will play in the
national fleet over the regulatory timeframe and beyond. Reducing exposure to harmful air
pollution is a key element of the proposed standards, and the proposals to tighten criteria air
pollutant emissions are needed to protect public health, especially in communities with
disproportionate exposure to air pollution. Because U.S. EPA's proposal does not require ZEV
sales, as California's rules do, the tightening of criteria air pollutant emission standards is even
more critical to ensure that the internal combustion engine vehicles that will continue to be sold
are becoming cleaner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 26-27]
As part of its ACC II rulemaking, CARB adopted its fourth iteration of its Low Emission
Vehicle (LEV) standards, referred to as LEV IV. CARB finds that U.S. EPA's proposals are
appropriate and largely consistent with the LEV IV standards. CARB has documented our
analysis and recommends strengthening the proposal to realize the greatest degree of emission
reductions achievable, considering cost and technology availability, to further protect public
health. As described further below, CARB recommends that U.S. EPA adopt its proposed
NMOG+NOx and PM standards, adopt elements of CARB's evaporative emission standards
program, and eliminate the use of commanded enrichment as proposed while collecting
additional information on the use of auxiliary emissions control devices to further improve
emission standards in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 26-27]
NMOG+NOx Emission Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles
CARB supports U.S. EPA's proposal to reduce the light-duty vehicle NMOG+NOx fleet
average standard to 12 milligrams per mile (mg/mi) with ZEVs eligible to be included in the
compliance calculation. The proposal assumes that non-ZEVs will reach a fleet average of 30
mg/mi, which is identical to CARB's LEV IV requirements for light-duty vehicles. Both
CARB's LEV III requirements and U.S. EPA's Tier 3 requirements previously determined that
30 mg/mi was technologically feasible without heavy reliance on ZEVs. 33 Accordingly, CARB
does not project the need for development or deployment of any new technologies but rather the
use of the technologies and rate of deployment previously analyzed and determined to be
feasible. Technologies relied upon in the LEV III analysis included larger volume catalysts,
greater catalyst precious metal loading, more optimized close-coupled catalysts, optimized
thermal management, low thermal mass turbochargers, double layer catalyst washcoats, and
improved fuel injection control; these technologies are described in more detail in the original
LEV III rulemaking package. 34 These are the same technologies that manufacturers have
largely deployed to date and can still utilize to convert current and future vehicles that, combined
with ZEVs, can meet U.S. EPA's proposed standards. CARB also notes that the ZEV penetration
that will help manufacturers comply with the proposed GHG standards also support compliance
with the criteria air pollutant standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 27]
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33 CARB. ACC IIISOR https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/isor.pdf and
Appendix H: ACC II LEV Technology Appendix. April 2022.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/apph.pdf.
34 CARB. LEV III ISOR. December 2011. https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2012/leviiighg2012/levisor.pdf.
NMOG+NOx Emission Standards for Medium-Duty Vehicles
As under the proposed medium-duty vehicle GHG standards, CARB supports U.S. EPA's
decision to better delineate the medium-duty vehicle class from heavy-duty vehicles to enable
application of the most rigorous and appropriate criteria air pollutant emission standards and
procedures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 27-28]
CARB supports U.S. EPA's proposal to reduce the medium-duty vehicle NMOG+NOx fleet
average standard to 60 mg/mi. As described in greater detail below, U.S. EPA's proposed
medium-duty fleet average standards are not directly comparable to CARB's recently adopted
LEV IV medium-duty standards for two reasons: first, CARB's standards exclude ZEVs from
the fleet average while U.S. EPA's do not, and second, U.S. EPA's proposed standards apply to a
different subset of medium-duty vehicles than CARB's standards. CARB has performed its own
analysis to compare California's effective stringency for medium-duty vehicles to U.S. EPA's
proposed standards and finds that both programs are targeting similar fleet-wide emission levels.
As such, CARB expects that manufacturers will be able to use the same technology solutions to
meet both the California and the proposed federal emission standards and concludes that the
proposed standards are technically feasible with the current technologies available and expected
ZEV penetration rates in this sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 27-28]
Analysis of CARB's LEV IV requirements relative to U.S. EPA's proposal
Differences in vehicles subject to CARB's LEV IV requirements relative to U.S. EPA's
proposal [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 28]
U.S. EPA proposes to apply a single NMOG+NOx fleet average standard to all medium-duty
vehicles at or under 22,000 lbs. gross combined weight rating (GCWR). 35 Based on U.S. EPA
certification data, the proposed fleet average standards would apply primarily to all vans and to
the gasoline-fueled trucks currently in the medium-duty classes. The proposed standards would
move diesel trucks to compliance with heavy-duty engine standards. In contrast, CARB's LEV
IV standard applies separate fleet average standards to Class 2b and Class 3 vehicles without
regard to their GCWR; therefore, the LEV IV standard applies to both gasoline and diesel
vehicles and both vans and trucks. Additionally, the LEV IV fleet average standards do not
include ZEVs in the calculation of the fleet average. Thus, the LEV IV medium-duty fleet
average standards apply to a different population of vehicles than U.S. EPA's proposed standards
and the numeric standards of the two programs cannot be directly compared. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, p. 28]
35 Medium-duty vehicles above this GCWR cutoff would separately be required to certify to U.S. EPA's
heavy-duty engine standards.
Developing estimated fleet averages to enable comparisons
Given the difference in vehicles covered by the two programs, assessing whether the two
regulations are targeting similar emission levels first requires aligning the vehicle populations.
CARB developed a compliance scenario to estimate the emissions from its medium-duty fleet
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under the LEV IV standards, then omitted diesel trucks to develop a gasoline-only fleet estimate
for comparisons to U.S. EPA's proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 28-32]
To create this compliance scenario, CARB adjusted the LEV IV fleet average standards by
combining the Class 2b and Class 3 fleet based on sales volumes and estimated the least stringent
emission "bins" 36 to which manufacturers would likely certify their vehicles to achieve
minimum compliance with the respective fleet averages (summarized in Table 3). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 28-32]
36 Manufacturers certify vehicles according to test groups for exhaust emission standards that meet discrete
categories or bins based on their emission rates. For instance, there is a bin at the SULEV 125 emission
rate, corresponding to 125 milligrams per mile (mg/mi) of NMOG+NOx. The numerical part of the
standard category, such as 125 in SULEV 125, refers to the emission standard, in thousandths of a gram per
mile of NMOG+NOx emissions on the FTP driving cycle. The highest bin effectively caps the worst-case
emissions that could come from some vehicles in a manufacturer's fleet certified to that bin.
Based on past trends and added complexities in diesel emission controls, the analysis
estimates that diesel Class 2b vehicles will use the dirtier emission bin of super-ultra-low-
emission vehicle (SULEV) 170 37 and gasoline Class 2b vehicles will use the SULEV 150 bin
38 and eventually phase into the SULEV 125 bin. CARB's EMFAC population of on-road
emission sources shows that the Class 2b category is made of 61 percent gasoline vehicles and
39 percent diesel vehicles. 39 Because the Class 2b category contains more gasoline vehicles,
they can remain in the SULEV 150 and 125 bins without needing to certify to lower emission
levels to offset the diesels in this class. For Class 3 vehicles, CARB assumes diesel vehicles will
certify to the SULEV 230 and 200 bins, 40 while the gasoline vehicles will have to phase into
the SULEV 175, 150, 125, and 100 bins. 41 CARB's EMFAC population shows the Class 3
population is made of 70 percent diesel and 30 percent gasoline vehicles, which means gasoline
vehicles will have to certify to the cleaner emission bins to offset the larger population of diesel
vehicles using the dirtier emission bins in the Class 3 category. Estimating these phase-in
percentages for the bin usage is necessary to estimate the likely emission levels for the subset of
medium-duty vehicles subject to both LEV IV and U.S. EPA's proposed standard. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 28-32]
37 CARB expects manufacturers to certify their diesel medium-duty vehicles to the dirtiest emission bins,
based on previous certification levels of diesel vehicles which regularly certify to the higher emission bins.
For LEV IV, the SULEV 170 bin will be the dirtiest bin available for Class 2b after the SULEV 250 and
SULEV 200 bins phase out. Therefore, CARB expects the diesel population of Class 2b vehicles to
primarily be certified to the SULEV 170 bin. While this analysis ultimately excludes diesel vehicles, these
vehicles are included in California's LEV IV fleet average standards, which means understanding the
potential emissions from diesel vehicles in California is necessary to determine the likely certification
levels for the gasoline vehicles that are included in the analysis.
38 CARB expects manufacturers to certify their gasoline medium-duty vehicles to cleaner emission bins
than their diesel vehicles. The analysis expects all the gasoline vehicles to use the next lowest bin, SULEV
150, from the SULEV 170 bin to offset the emissions from their diesel vehicles in the SULEV 170 bins.
For the 2029 MY, when the fleet average reduces to 150 mg/mi, manufacturers will have to additionally
rely on vehicles certified to the SULEV 125 bin if they want to continue certifying their diesel vehicles to
the SULEV 170 bin.
39 EMFAC is CARB's model that estimates the official emissions inventories of on-road mobile sources in
California. It is approved by U.S. EPA for planning required to meet the NAAQS. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 93.110,
93.111; 87 Fed. Reg. 68,483, Nov. 15, 2022. Available at: https://arb.ca.gov/emfac/
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40 Similar to the assumption CARB made about diesel Class 2b vehicles, CARB expects Class 3 diesel
vehicles to use the dirtiest emission bins available after the SULEV 400 and 270 bins phase out. Based on
previous certification levels, most Class 3 vehicles are at these expected levels.
41 Similar to the assumption CARB made about gasoline Class 2b vehicles, CARB expects Class 3
gasoline vehicles to use the next cleanest bins below those used to certify Class 3 diesel vehicles. With a
larger population of Class 3 diesel vehicles, the Class 3 gasoline population needs to become much cleaner
to offset manufacturers keeping their diesel vehicles certified to the higher emission standards.
[See original for table titled "Table 3. Certification Bin Assumptions for NMOG+NOx
Medium-Duty Vehicle Standard Comparison."] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 28-32]
After applying these assumptions and removing the diesel vehicles, CARB generated
estimated emission levels for the gasoline-only medium-duty fleet, shown as the blue line with
circles in Figure 3. CARB then developed a second estimated California LEV IV fleet that
includes ZEVs, using ZEV penetrations required by CARB's ACT and ACF regulations, shown
as the dashed grey line with circles in Figure 3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 28-32]
To estimate a version of U.S. EPA's proposed standard to compare to CARB's gasoline-only
fleet average, CARB removed the expected ZEV penetration rates from the proposed fleet
average and calculated the levels to which the remaining medium-duty vehicles would need to
certify to meet the proposed fleet average. This estimated standard is shown as the dark blue line
with triangles in Figure 3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 28-32]
[See original for graph titled "Figure 3. Comparison of Proposed Medium-Duty NMOG+NOx
Emission Standards to California's LEV IV Requirements."] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780,
pp. 28-32]
Comparison between estimated medium-duty vehicle fleet average emission levels under
LEV IV and U.S. EPA's proposed standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 28-32]
Figure 3 shows the two comparisons between U.S. EPA's proposed standards and CARB's
estimated LEV IV standards: one including ZEVs as U.S. EPA would apply their proposed Tier
4 standards and another without ZEVs as CARB would apply the LEV IV standards. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 28-32]
First, U.S. EPA's proposed fleet average (shown as the orange dashed line with triangle
markers), which is inclusive of ZEVs and Class 2b and Class 3 medium-duty vehicles, is
compared to the estimated comparable LEV IV fleet average with ZEVs (shown as the gray
dashed line with circle markers). Through the 2035 MY, the two curves follow similar
trajectories and reach identical end points for overall emission levels. Given that both U.S.
EPA's proposed standards and CARB's standards allow for averaging, banking, and trading of
fleet average credits and deficits for vehicle manufacturers to smooth out year-to-year changes,
CARB expects manufacturers could readily manage the small deviations between the two
programs while deploying identical vehicles in both markets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780,
pp. 28-32]
Figure 3 also compares the two emission standards for the estimated gasoline-only fleets. The
projected LEV IV gasoline-only fleet average (shown as the light blue solid line with circle
markers) and the estimated non-ZEV fleet average for U.S. EPA's proposed fleet average
(shown as the dark blue line with triangle markers) show similar, but not identical, trajectories
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through the 2031 MY. As noted above, manufacturers would be expected to manage slight
deviations across MYs through the flexibilities of the program such as averaging, banking, and
trading of credits and deficits relative to the fleet average. From the 2032 MY on, while the
projected fleet averages are slightly different, the analysis does not account for a few factors that
would likely minimize any such difference. As CARB noted in its Final Statement of Reasons
for the LEV IV standards, 42 staff expects that a portion of these medium-duty vehicles will also
be subject to CARB's heavy-duty in-use standards that make use of a portable emissions
measurement system (PEMS) and those standards will likely result in manufacturers meeting
more stringent emission levels than the fleet average would theoretically necessitate. When
combined with the uncertainty in what each manufacturers' actual ZEV sales share will be
(which also affects the resultant emission level their non-ZEVs would have to meet), CARB
finds that the proposed standards are similar enough to the LEV IV standards that manufacturers
would likely be able to deploy common emission control solutions to simultaneously meet both
requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 28-32]
42 CARB. ACC II Final Statement of Reasons. Appendix B: Summary of Comments to the Low-Emission
Vehicle Regulation and Agency Response. April 2022. p. 40.
https://ww2.arb. ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/fsorappb .pdf.
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
Finally, EPA should evaluate the risk of excess credit generation in the NMOG+NOx
program for medium-duty vehicles. Because Section 202(a)(3)(C) requires three years'
"stability" for NOx standards for "heavy-duty" vehicles (defined by statute to include some of
the vehicles EPA now classifies as medium-duty), but not for GHG standards, the proposed
medium-duty GHG standards require year-over-year reductions in model years that the medium-
duty NMOG+NOx standards hold constant. Id. at 29,243 (Table 32), 29,261 (Table 41). EPA
expects the industry to achieve compliance with the medium-duty GHG standards to a significant
extent through electrification, which likewise reduces NMOG+NOx emissions. Id. at 29,244,
29,331. Therefore, the medium-duty fleet will likely achieve NMOG+NOx reductions even in
those "stability" years. EPA should clarify whether this discrepancy poses any risk of excessive
credit generation and necessitates some action to prevent dilution of the MDV NMOG+NOx
standards, such as restricting credit generation under the NMOG+NOx program, 191 or
calibrating the model- year 2030 standards' stringency to account for such changes in the fleet,
see id. at 29,261 (Table 41). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 38]
191 For example, EPA could make credit generation dependent on manufacturers' participation in the
optional early compliance pathway. Id. at 29,260.
Organization: Cummins Inc
The tradeoff between oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and carbon dioxide (C02) reductions must be
considered when setting the stringency of standards. Also, linkage of criteria pollutant and GHG
certification and compliance protocols is important so that improvement in one type of pollutant
is not achieved at the expense of the other. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
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Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
B. Emissions of criteria pollutants from light- and medium-duty vehicles harm the public
health.
EPA's proposed reductions of non-methane organic gases ("NMOG") plus NOx, as well as
particulate matter, are crucial to protecting the public from harmful air pollutants. As EPA notes,
"[ejmission sources impacted by [its] proposal, including vehicles and power plants, emit
pollutants that contribute to ambient concentrations of ozone, PM, N02, S02, CO, and air
toxics."67 These pollutants are linked to premature death, respiratory illness (including
childhood asthma), cardiovascular problems, and other adverse health impacts. In particular,
NOx emissions increase levels of ozone, because ground-level ozone forms when there are high
concentrations of ambient NOx and VOCs, and when solar radiation is high.68 NOx emissions
also impact particulate matter by forming secondary particles through atmospheric chemical
reactions.69 Reductions in NOx emitted from LDVs will therefore result in reduced ambient
levels of ozone and PM and improved health and environmental outcomes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 17]
67 88 Fed. Reg. at 29211.
68 Am. Lung Ass'n, State of the Air 2023 Report (2023) at 26, https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-
6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf?ext=.pdf.
69 DRIA at 7-10.
F. EPA should strengthen the Tier 4 NMOG+NOX standards and finalize the proposed PM
requirements.
We now turn to EPA's proposed criteria pollutant standards for LDVs. As detailed below,
while the proposed PM2.5 requirements are appropriate, EPA should strengthen the
NMOG+NOX standards and consider ways to limit over-crediting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 53]
1. EPA should increase the stringency of the proposed NMOG+NOX standards.
a. EPA should strengthen the NMOG+NOx standards to better reflect available, feasible,
and cost-effective technologies.
EPA's 2014 Tier 3 emissions standards were set based on the deployment of technologies
applicable to combustion vehicles. The NMOG+NOx standards are meant to continuously phase
in from 2017-2025, ultimately reaching a fleet average of 30 mg/mile on the FTP and 50
mg/mile on the SFTP. However, over this time period, an increasing share of BEVs will be sold,
which are certified to 0 mg/mile NMOG+NOx. While the deployment of BEVs will not alter the
tailpipe emissions reductions anticipated under the Tier 3 program, the additional BEVs, counted
as 0 mg/mile, substantially reduce manufacturers' incentives to deploy the full extent of
technologies EPA identified in the Tier 3 rulemaking to their combustion vehicles. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 53]
Two responses are possible from manufacturers: they either (1) deploy the same suite of
internal combustion engine technologies to their combustion vehicle fleet, and therefore generate
a significant amount of overcompliance credits that can be used to reduce their compliance
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obligations under the Tier 4 standards EPA is now proposing; or (2) reduce the deployment of
technologies as EPA originally envisioned when setting the Tier 3 standards, leaving emissions
reductions for their combustion vehicle fleet on the table. Either response weakens compliance
with the standards. Strengthening the Tier 4 standards will help avoid these problems. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 53]
Therefore, EPA's proposed NMOG+NOx standards leave a significant gap between the
feasible deployment of zero-emission technologies (indicated by the share of BEVs modeled for
GHG compliance) and the feasible deployment of improvements to combustion vehicles
(indicated by the achievement of a Tier 3 fleet average standard without the deployment of
BEVs). Figure VI.F-1 illustrates, on the left, the implicit requirements on combustion vehicles
under the proposed NMOG+NOx standards with EPA's modeled adoption of BEVs under the
GHG standards; and, on the right, the implied share of BEVs required by the proposed Tier 4
standards if combustion vehicles achieve Tier 3 compliance. If BEVs are deployed at levels
modeled by the Agency to comply with its GHG Proposal, NMOG+NOx emissions from
combustion vehicles would remain about 30% higher than the Tier 3 requirement over the
timeframe of the rule. If, instead, the combustion vehicle fleet matches the Tier 3 requirements in
2027-2032, far fewer BEVs would need to be deployed to meet the Tier 4 proposed targets.These
scenarios demonstrate that numerous technological pathways are available to manufacturers to
comply with the Tier 4 standards and that stronger standards are entirely feasible. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 53]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure VI.F-1. Emissions performance and ZEV market
share implied by the combination of achieving the proposed GHG standards and Tier 3 /
Proposed Tier 4 NMOG+NOx standards
If manufacturers deploy ZEVs consistent with EPA's projection of compliance with the GHG
standards, tailpipe emissions performance from the remaining combustion vehicles will exceed
Tier 3 standards (left). If combustion vehicles instead achieve Tier 3 emissions standards, far
fewer ZEVs will be required to meet the proposed Tier 4 fleet average standards than are
modeled to comply with the GHG standards (right). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 54]
EPA should close this gap in relative stringency by setting a standard that reflects the full
emissions reductions of the combustion vehicle technologies it has already identified as feasible
(and which are readily available). Aligning the Agency's assessment of ZEV deployment and its
analysis (covered primarily in the Tier 3 rulemaking) of what is achievable to reduce
NMOG+NOx emissions from combustion vehicles would yield a 2032 target of 10 mg/mi, a
17% reduction from its Proposal. Interim targets would then be adjusted accordingly. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 54]
Such a standard for LDVs would still be technology-neutral: The target corresponds to the
lowest non-zero bin in the Proposal (Tier 4 Bin 10), 137 and the Agency has already identified
combustion vehicles that have certified FTP emissions below 10 mg/mi. 138 Moreover, we
expect that manufacturers seeking to comply with the multipollutant standards primarily through
combustion vehicle technologies would be investing in further emission-reduction technologies
from those vehicles, such as by ensuring their vehicles are more in line with the emissions
profiles of the industry-leading vehicles, including through deployment of hybridization and
other EPA-identified strategies to reduce tailpipe emissions. Alternatively, for manufacturers that
want to comply with the multipollutant standards through greater deployment of zero-emission
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technologies, this pathway would still allow flexibility for their combustion vehicle fleet to fall
short of the Tier 3 requirements, provided they sell ZEVs beyond EPA's modeled industry
average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 54-55]
137 88 Fed. Reg. at 29419.
138 DRIA at 3-41, Tbl. 3-14.
EPA has embarked on a multipollutant rulemaking precisely because technologies exist to
simultaneously achieve reductions in GHGs and criteria pollutants. 139 Reducing the stringency
of the final standards to 10 mg/mi NMOG+NOx better aligns with the feasible and cost-
appropriate technologies already identified by the Agency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
55]
139 88 Fed. Reg. at 29187.
b. EPA should consider ways to limit over-crediting.
Figure VI.F-1 (left side) shows a non-monotonic behavior—that is, the allowable emissions
profile of the combustion vehicles (green line) first increases significantly from 2026-2029, then
decreases. This is largely due to the delay in increasing stringency for LDT3, LDT4, and MDPV
classes (Class 2 light trucks), the result of EPA's interpretation of lead time requirements under
the Clean Air Act. 140 The Agency has offered an optional "early compliance" pathway for
manufacturers; however, this pathway increases the total stringency over the six years covered
by the proposal, reducing the likelihood of manufacturers choosing this path to
compliance. 141 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 55]
140 See id. at 29258.
141 If EPA sets a 10 mg/mile standard in 2032 as recommended in Section VI.F.l.a, and thus reduces the
step for Class 2 light trucks to 10 mg/mile, there would presumably be no such gap in stringency between
the early and default compliance pathways.
In an effort to induce manufacturers to align with the early compliance pathway and to
acknowledge the reduced emissions benefits of the stagnant standard for Class 2 light trucks
from 2025-2029 (a full five-year window corresponding to the lifetime of Tier 3 credits) under
the default compliance pathway, EPA should condition manufacturers' full utilization of credits
in this time period on their utilization of the early compliance pathway. For example, EPA could
set a limit on the amount of averaging, banking, and trading (ABT) credits that could be utilized
for compliance, in order to limit windfall credits from reductions in fleet emissions that occur
during the 4-year period of stagnation. This would also ensure that manufacturers do not
artificially prolong compliance through an overreliance on such credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 55]
B.EPA should strengthen the Tier 4 NMOG+NOX standards, finalize the proposed PM
requirements, and finalize the proposed change to criteria pollution requirements for MDVs with
a GCWR above 22,000 pounds, subject to appropriate monitoring. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 74]
Consistent with the recently finalized criteria pollutant emission standards for heavy-duty
engines (Classes 2b-8) and those that have been proposed for LDVs (Classes l-2a plus medium-
duty passenger vehicles) in this rulemaking, the Agency is proposing standards regulating
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tailpipe emissions of criteria pollutants from medium-duty vehicles. Under Clean Air Act
Section 202(a)(3)(A), these standards must "reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction
achievable through the application of technology which the Administrator determines will be
available for the model year to which such standards apply, giving appropriate consideration to
cost, energy, and safety factors associated with the application of such technology." 42 U.S.C. §
7521(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). As described below, EPA should strengthen the Tier 4
NMOG+NOx standards and enact guardrails to ensure that windfall credits earned during a
period of required lead time do not undercut the emissions gains possible in the 2027-2032
timeframe. We support the proposed PM2.5 requirements and the proposed change to criteria
pollution requirements for MDVs with a gross combined weight rating (GCWR) of more than
22,000 pounds, subject to appropriate monitoring to prevent manipulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 74]
1. EPA must improve the stringency of the Tier 4 NMOG+NOx standards for MDVs.
Because additional reductions in emissions of NMOG+NOx from MDVs are readily
achievable, EPA must strengthen the Proposed Standards to meet its statutory mandate. Figure
VIII.B-1 shows the distribution of certification data for MY 2022-2023 gasoline pickups,
affirming EPA's observation that the MDV fleet is already capable of achieving levels of
NMOG+NOx emissions far below the current standards. In fact, because these data are not sales-
weighted and include some share of gasoline pickups that would now be required to certify to the
heavy-duty engine standard under the Proposal, this table likely understates the capability of
manufacturers to readily achieve reductions of NMOG+NOx emissions from their MDV
combustion fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 74]
Figure VIII.B-1. Distribution of NMOG+NOx certification values for Class 2b-3 gasoline
pickups and vans
[See original attachment for Figure VIII.B-1.].
As in the case of the proposed light-duty NMOG+NOx standards (Section VI.F, supra),
EPA's Proposed Standards for MDVs are in tension with its modeling of GHG compliance
(Figure VIII.B-2). Here too, the Proposed Standards are well above the average emissions value
expected under the conditions that: (1) manufacturers' combustion vehicles achieve Tier 3
standards; and (2) ZEV sales consistent with EPA's GHG modeling are achieved. If EPA's
compliance modeling of ZEV sales is accurate and materializes in real-world sales, the
remaining combustion fleet would be able to backslide to as much as double the average
NMOG+NOx emissions allowed under Tier 3 (Figure VIII.B-2 (left)). Given the danger that
these pollutants cause to public health and welfare, including through localized effects, such
backsliding would be wholly inappropriate under Section 202. If instead the combustion fleet
achieves Tier 3 standards as expected, far fewer ZEVs would be needed to comply with the
proposed Tier 4 program or the early compliance pathway. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
75]
Figure VIII.B-2. Emissions performance and ZEV market share implied by the combination
of achieving the proposed MDV GHG standards and MDV Tier 3 / Proposed Tier 4
NMOG+NOx standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 76]
[See original attachment for Figure VIII.B-2.].
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If manufacturers deploy MD ZEVs consistent with EPA's projection of compliance with the
GHG standards, tailpipe NMOG+NOx emissions performance from the remaining combustion
vehicles will greatly exceed Tier 3 standards (left). If combustion vehicles instead achieve Tier 3
emissions standards, far fewer ZEVs will be required to meet the proposed Tier 4 fleet average
standards than are modeled to comply with the GHG standards (right). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 76]
210 The ZEV market share here appears significantly higher than in the GHG modeling because it excludes
combustion vehicles with a gross combined weight rating (GCWR) of more than 22,000 pounds. However,
ZEVs with a GCWR greater than 22,000 pounds are included in the MDV fleet in our analysis. This
proposed change is further discussed in Section VIII.B.3.
The relationship between the GHG Proposal and the Tier 4 proposal means that a significant
amount of NMOG+NOx reductions are left on the table, in conflict with EPA's statutory
mandate to achieve the "greatest degree of emission reduction achievable." 42 U.S.C. §
7521(a)(3)(A). As mentioned previously, combustion vehicles can readily reduce emissions
below Tier 3 levels, but at a bare minimum, EPA's final standards should reflect the emissions
levels that would be achieved by the combustion fleet achieving Tier 3 NMOG+NOx standards
with ZEVs deployed to the extent modeled to meet GHG standards. Under this more stringent
standard, manufacturers would retain flexibility to invest in greater ZEV deployment or to
instead apply existing, feasible, and cost-effective technologies within their combustion fleet.
These modifications would better ensure that the Tier 4 MDV standards are consistent with the
greatest degree of emissions reduction achievable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 76],
EPA should also take action to prevent the problems caused by a growing bank of emissions
credits. Even in the absence of a GHG rule, the expected market-driven deployment of ZEVs
would result in a significant bank of credits prior to 2030 under the proposed Tier 4 standard for
MDVs (Figure VIII.B-2, right). Those windfall credits would either be used to delay the
achievement of Tier 3 standards or to offset required reductions in the MY 2030-2032 period. In
an effort to mitigate the impact of the deployment of technology (electrification) that is not
required to meet the current standards, EPA should limit the use of credits generated through
overcompliance with Tier 3 standards. To encourage manufacturers to adopt the more stringent
early compliance pathway, the Agency could (for example) restrict the use of Tier 3 credits in
the 2027+ timeframe to only those manufacturers that have elected the early credit pathway. This
would be appropriate, since the Tier 3 standards fixed under the proposal through MY 2029 were
predicated on the deployment of a reduced suite of emissions reduction technologies. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 76-77]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
Passenger vehicles also emit harmful pollutants, including fine particulate matter (PM2.5) and
oxides of nitrogen (NOx). These pollutants contribute to the formation of soot and smog and
contribute to elevated concentrations of pollution near roadways, where millions of people live
and go to school, and people of color and people with low income are disproportionately exposed
to air pollution from vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 6]
Please see EDF's comments on the Proposed Rule, Revised 2023 and Later Model Year
Light- Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 43726 (August 10,
2021) dated September 27, 2021, and resubmitted to this docket, for a more thorough discussion
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of the substantial health and environmental harms associated with the pollution and GHG
emissions from passenger vehicles. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 6]
1 EDF's comments on the Proposed Rule, Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 43726 (August 10, 2021) dated September 27, 2021, at
4-6. Accessible at https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0208-0688. (Attachment A)
VII. Standards must continue to drive reductions from ICEVs and PHEVs.
EDF strongly supports EPA's proposed NMOG + NOX and PM2.5 standards. As our nation
transitions to a zero-emitting fleet it is imperative that gasoline and diesel vehicles continue to
reduce health-harming air pollutants to protect communities from the harms of vehicle
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 62]
A. EDF supports strong NMOG + NOx standards.
EDF supports light-duty vehicle and medium-duty vehicle fleet average FTP NMOG + NOX
standards that include both ICEVs and ZEVs in a manufacturer's compliance calculation. We
also support the proposed fleet average standards that decline from 2027-2032 in the early
compliance program, the elimination of higher certification bins, a requirement for the same fleet
average emissions standard to be met across four test cycles (25 °C FTP, HFET, US06, SC03),
and one fleet average NMOG + NOX standard in the -7 °C FTP test. These features are
important to ensure increasing ZEV deployment results in rigorous air pollution reductions and
likewise prevent any offsetting pollution increases from remaining internal combustion engine
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 62]
Organization: Ferrari N. V. and Ferrari North America, Inc.
a) NMOG+NOx Standards
EPA is proposing to remove any NMOG+NOx fleet-average flexibility for SVMs, requiring
an alignment to Large Volume Manufacturers (LVMs) targets starting with MY 2027,
unreasonably changing the current Tier 3 regulation that allows SVMs to comply with 51 mg/mi
standard until MY 2027, and therefore cutting their target by more than half (i.e. 22 mg/mi
compared to 51 mg/mi). For later years, EPA is requiring SVMs to comply with an overall 76%
standard reduction in just 5 model years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 5-6]
Ferrari strongly believes this approach is unfair, especially in light of the unexpected change
of the Tier 3 regulation and the huge implied percentage of BEVs that manufacturers responsible
of high performance vehicles shall include in their fleet. While most LVMs can benefit from a
wide range of models to compensate for the few vehicles that pollute the most, independent
SVMs like Ferrari have to deal with a huge and unfeasible BEV penetration in their car
portfolios since the beginning of the legislation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 5-6]
Ferrari acknowledges EPA's intention of aligning SVM targets to those of LVMs. However,
this sharp reduction in NMOG+NOx standards is not feasible in such a short amount of time. In
support of this, California recognized the impracticability of these manufacturers^ allowing
them to comply with a fleet-average standard of 51 mg/mi for the entire regulatory period. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 5-6]
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4 CARB ACCII Regulations Initial Statement of Reasons (April 12, 2022), chapter III, section C,
paragraph 7
Ferrari's commitment to reducing NMOG+NOx emissions is reflected on several of our
models (Ferrari Portofino M, Ferrari Roma, 296 GTB, Ferrari Purosangue) which are currently
certified as BIN 50. An even more remarkable result has been achieved with our Ferrari
Purosangue, the first and only V12 model certified as BIN 50 in the United States. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 5-6]
However, the current state of art does not allow high-performance vehicles with modern
passive heating systems to achieve a certification level below BIN 50, and therefore large
investments and time-consuming activities on active heating devices (e.g. burner, electric heating
catalyst) are required. In addition, the very limited demand of those devices due to mass market
focus on electrification will inevitably lead to ad hoc development with related huge costs and
times. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 5-6]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Tier 4 Criteria Emissions Program
Overview
Ford and Industry worked closely with CARB for several years to develop a tough but
achievable criteria emission program as part of the Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC2) and Low
Emission Vehicle IV (LEV4) rulemaking efforts. Ford believes those programs struck the right
balance between reducing high-priority ICE emissions while ensuring that resources were not
unduly directed away from the main goal of transitioning to zero-emissions vehicles. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 10-11]
In a departure from historical precedent, the proposed EPA Tier 4 program differs
fundamentally from LEV4, and Ford recommends that EPA reconsider this approach and attempt
to maximize alignment with the LEV4 program. The following comments outline our
recommendations if EPA does not adopt a program that is harmonized with LEV4. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 10-11]
Light-Duty NMOG+NOx Fleet Average
Ford does not believe the NMOG+NOx fleet average associated with the main proposal is
feasible. This is primarily a consequence of the direct relationship between the main GHG
proposal and the NMOG+NOx fleet average (i.e., we do not find the main GHG proposal to be
feasible, therefore the expected NMOG+NOx reductions that would come from such rapid
adoption of ZEVs will not be achievable). Ford believes that a revised NMOG+NOx fleet
average based on Alternative 3 could be feasible if derived with a sufficient "safety factor"
between projected EV volumes and resulting NMOG+NOx fleet average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0605, pp. 10-11]
NMOG+NOx Bin Structure
EPA has proposed several changes to the NMOG+NOx bin structure from existing Tier 3
bins, adding bins 60, 40 and 10, eliminating bins 160 and 125 for light-duty vehicles (LDVs),
and simplifying medium-duty vehicle (MDV) bin structure by aligning class 2b and class 3 bins
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with LDV bins (retaining bins 160 and 125 for MDVs). Ford supports the addition of these extra
bins but also requests several other bins be added at the upper and lower ends of this range.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 10-11]
For LDVs, Ford believes EPA's addition of bin 10 is appropriate given the range of 22 mg/mi
to 12 mg/mi of the proposed Tier 4 fleet-average standards. However, we also request that EPA
include bins 15 and 25, aligned with SULEV25 and SULEV15 categories in California's LEV4
LDV program. It is appropriate to include more bins in the range of the proposed standards to
allow manufacturers greater precision and flexibility in certifying their vehicles given the low
level of the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 10-11]
For MDVs, EPA has argued in the Multi-Pollutant Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA)
Chapter 3.2.1 that 100 mg/mi is a feasible capability for ICE MDVs. Despite this, no bins are
proposed near 100 mg/mi capability, only at 70 and 125 mg/mi. Ford requests the inclusion of a
bin 100 for MDVs, aligned with the LEV4 SULEV100 category for MDVs, as well as bins 85
and 75 for class 2b MDVs, again aligned with the LEV4 SULEV85 and SULEV75 categories for
class 2b MDVs. These additional bins are further supported by figure 3-11 in the DRIA, which
shows the current interquartile range of NMOG+NOx certification for gasoline MDVs as
roughly 70 to 120 mg/mi (diesel IQRs are higher, from 120 to 180 mg/mi depending on van or
pickup vehicle type). More bins in this range would encourage manufacturers to continue to
make incremental improvements to NMOG+NOx emissions from ICE vehicles by incentivizing
improvements that may be smaller than the 55 mg/mi step between bin 125 and bin 70. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 10-11]
[See original comment for Table 1: NMOG+NOx Bins for EPA Tier 4, CARB ACC II LEV 4
and Ford Proposal] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 10-11]
Organization: Green Diesel Engineering LLC
Alternative Emission Strategy Proposal
1. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has stated that the Clean Air Act (CAA) was
created in part "to protect and enhance quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote
public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population" and "to initiate and
accelerate a national research and development program to achieve the prevention and control of
air pollution." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, pp. 1-4]
- When the CAA was enacted in 1970, our nation had levels of excessive S02 and NOx
emissions. However, changes made to fuel and combustion technology, significantly reduced
those pollutants which left the air quality good by 1990. Since that time, the push to further
reduce NOx emissions to hundredths of the gram per mile, inevitably resulted in a detrimental
increase in C02 and N20 greenhouse gases. This catch-22 occurs in diesel combustion, because
there is a tradeoff. In order to reduce NOx (NO and N02), the burn cycle must become less
efficient and more fuel is needed for the same torque. Ironically, the more fuel that is burnt; the
more C02 is produced which seemingly defeats the purpose of reducing NOx. During the last 28
years our transportation fleet has created almost 20% more C02 yearly, in comparison to a
transportation fleet calibrated for minimum C02 and increased NO and N02. The US averages
1800 million metric tons of C02 formation from the transportation sector on a yearly basis. If the
US focused on minimum C02, we could realize a drop of 450 million metric tons of C02 per
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year from this sector, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, pp. 1-4]
- Controlling air pollution is vital in the US and the entire world. The long- term detriments of
increasing C02 on this planet, cannot be understated. C02 is a stable gas with a 300-year half-
life. Once C02 is made, it will stay in the atmosphere and continually warm the planet which
could lead to environmental problems and strains on our economic systems. NOx on the other
hand, is an unstable compound and has roughly a day half-life on this planet. Organically, it
breaks down into N and 02—both elements which are naturally found in our atmosphere. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, pp. 1-4]
2. A goal of CAA, is to align emission standards to "reflect the greatest degree of emission
reduction achievable through the application of [available] technology." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0457, pp. 1-4]
- In the transportation sector, we are not achieving the greatest degree of C02 reduction. The
entire fleet of diesel vehicles in the US could achieve a 20% reduction in C02 formation with
proper guidance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, pp. 1-4]
- The current technology is focused on minimizing NOx without regard to C02. These
technologies in Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) and Exhaust Gas Recirculation (EGR) are
problematic at best and increase the life cycle operating costs. As a result, this increase in "well
to wheels" emission levels must be considered in both the manufacturing and recycling
processes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, pp. 1-4]
- SCR has been on vehicles for 10-15 years. Though this technology does lower NOx
emissions, the by-products it generates include ammonia (NH3) and nitrous oxide (N20).
Ammonia is more detrimental for humans than NO or N02, and N20 is a strong greenhouse gas
which is roughly 300 times more potent than C02. In the long run, increasing these by-products
is not a good trade-off for the environment or those concerned about climate change. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0457, pp. 1-4]
3. NO and N02 (NOx) have been over-regulated for decades. Yet rather than gaining a better
understanding of the chemistry, properties and usefulness of NO and N02, issues are being
researched in an effort to stimulate further reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, pp. 1-4]
- NO and N02 are naturally forming compounds on this planet, primarily as a by-product of
lightning. NOx formation from lightning is greater than the entire transportation sector on a
yearly basis with an estimate of 8.6-34 million metric tons.
(https://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/nox_lightning.html) (https://www.epa.gov/report-
environment) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, pp. 1-4]
- NOx never accumulates on the Earth as it is constantly decomposing into Nitrogen and
Oxygen. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, pp. 1-4]
- NOx is produced endogenously by humans. This means our lungs produce NOx internally as
a by-product of breathing. Human NOx production varies based on food intake, activity level and
constituents in the air. More research should be focused here. (Thoraz 1999;54:947-952, Nasal
Nitric Oxide in Man, J Lundberg, E Weitzberg), (Integrated Science Assessment for Oxides of
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Nitrogen, EPA/600/R-15/068, January 2016. Pg. 351, 356, 360-361.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0457, pp. 1-4]
- Some research claims NOx leads to asthma; however, the correlation is weak and causation
is not apparent. The majority of asthma cases correlate strongly with seasonal mold and pollen
airborne allergens. Asthma is most prevalent in spring and fall months.
(https://data.web.health.state.mn.us/asthma-charts), (Integrated Science Assessment for Oxides
of Nitrogen, EPA/600/R-15/068, January 2016. Pg. 490-500.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457,
pp.1-4]
The graph above shows the significant reductions in N02 across the US in the last 40 years.
[See original attachment for graph of ambient annual nitrogen dioxide concentrations in the U.S.,
1980-2016] The US has been below the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
safety thresholds for decades, including the 1-hour threshold at 100 ppb. We solved the NOx
issue 40 years ago. NOx regulations for combustion engines should be reverted back to
acceptable levels to allow for 20% C02 reduction. Powertrains need to be calibrated for
minimum fuel consumption in all operating conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, pp. 1-
4]
The graph above is from a NASA satellite image which highlights the areas with NOx issues.
[See original comment for map of nitrogen dioxide levels throughout the Unites States] Since
these areas are predominantly urban vicinities or downstream of power plants, it would be more
beneficial to focus on localized efforts to reduce NOx. A good 70% of people live in the urban
areas and reducing NOx in these inner cities will provide the most focused assistance. Ideally,
most city transportation would be electric to eliminate emissions at source. Cities could build
large parking lots outside urban areas for combustion vehicles and mass electric transit into city
center. Keep in mind, electric vehicles do not reduce emissions, but rather change where those
emissions are produced (battery mining / manufacturing / recycling plants) and electric power-
distribution facilities. Moving the emissions away from where most people live would be
prudent. Electric transportation does not reduce C02 emissions over the vehicle life cycle due to
battery manufacturing, mining, recycling and charging. Electric vehicles will help reduce smog
in LA, Denver, etc. where there is poor airflow, however, they will not reduce carbon emissions
when battery recycling/lifespan is incorporated in the well to wheels analysis.
(https://climate.mit.edu/ask-mit/are-electric-vehicles-definitely-better- climate-gas-powered-
cars),(https://www.iea.org/data-and- statistics/charts/comparative-life-cycle-greenhouse-gas-
emissions-of-a-mid-size-bev- and-ice-vehicle),( https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/comparison-
your-car-vs-electric- vehicle),(
https://www. sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S 1361920921000614). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0457, p. 4]
Proposed Emission Standard Guidelines
- Modify the emission standards on gasoline and diesel with the primary emphasis to be on
minimizing C02. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
- Increase NOx limit for diesel engines to 3 gram/mile on EPA emission test cycles. This is
still cleaner than 1980 standards. With proper engine tuning, the smaller NOx increase allows for
a decrease of 100 gram/mile of C02. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
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- Maintain the theme of clean diesel and keep particulate filters to prevent PM (particulate
matter) emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
- Manufacturers could add GPS software to go into low NOx mode when near NOx abatement
zones. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
- Re-allocate tax incentives for urban residents to purchase BEV (battery electric vehicle)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
- Work with states on regional smog issues as these are very limited in geographical area.
The top cities are: Los Angeles, Denver, Miami, New York City, Houston, Atlanta, etc. Moving
to primarily electric vehicles in dense population zones eliminates point of use emissions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
- Work with bio-fuel producers, farmers, refineries as needed to promote plant- based fuels
that do not impact the food system. Hemp would be a good starting point as the entire plant can
be utilized. The seed oil produces bio-diesel and the stalk produces ethanol. A robust bio fuel
industry could reduce C02 up to 1000 million metric tons yearly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0457, p. 6]
- Re-calibrating vehicles in the field for low C02 will yield the quickest return on investment.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI)
HMG likewise provides comments regarding the Proposed Rule's proposal to apply the
standards equally at high altitude without compliance relief provisions from Tier 3 for
certification. HMG suggests removing the high-altitude requirement. If this is not possible, HMG
proposes the introduction of a low sales volume threshold as a viable alternative solution. This
could involve implementing waivers from high altitude testing for vehicles with sales below a
certain threshold. Similar relief provisions are already in place for 50 State/California
requirements, where low volume sales of a particular bin result in exemption from testing. This
approach would address the burden and cost associated with high altitude testing, while still
maintaining appropriate emissions control measures for vehicles sold at larger volumes. Finding
low sales volume test groups for testing is extremely challenging. Additionally, high altitude
testing is a costly and burdensome process for OEMs. With modem emission controls in place, it
is unnecessary and unreasonable to mandate high altitude testing, as acknowledged by the EPA.
Removing this requirement or implementing a sales volume threshold would provide relief to
manufacturers without compromising environmental standards, which would likewise result in
benefits to consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 8]
Organization: Interfaith Power & Light
Transportation is currently the single largest source of climate pollution in the United States.
In 2020, the national passenger vehicle fleet represented approximately 94% of the nation's on-
road vehicles and generated over one million tons of ozone- and particle-forming NOx
emissions, which create dangerous smog. In order for the U.S to meet our Paris Climate
Agreement goals we need the strongest possible long-term standards—beyond model year
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2026— that will put the country on a path to a 100% zero-emission new vehicle sales target by
2035. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0530, p. 1]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
CRITERIA POLLUTANT EMISSIONS
NMOG and NOx emissions
ICCT supports EPA's move to set more stringent NMOG + NOx emission limit for light-duty
vehicle bins and the fleet average. We have observed that these proposed standards are more
stringent than the Euro 7 emission regulations for cars and vans. The emission limit for all cars
and vans in Euro 7, converted from mg/km, is 206 mg/mile. Meanwhile, in EPA's proposal, Tier
4 emission limit for all LDVs is 70 mg/mile. More details on the difference in emission limits
between the two standards are show in Figure 11. Even if the SFTP early driveaway standard has
a higher NMOG + NOx emission limit at 82 mg/mile, it is more stringent than the Euro 7
emission limit at 206 mg/mile. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 44-45]
For NMOG + NOx fleet average standards, EPA provides two pathways for automakers:
default and early compliance. The default compliance pathway provides a full 4 years of lead
time and 3 years of standards stability for LDT3, LDT4, MDPV, MDV class 2b and 3 which are
defined as heavy-duty vehicles by the Clean Air Act. 113 However, automakers can opt for the
early compliance pathway, in which LDT3, LDT3, MDPV meet identical and declining fleet
averages like LDV, LDT1, and LDT2. MDV class 2b and 3 also has gradually declining
standards every model year. ICCT supports the option of the early compliance pathway that will
result in higher reduction in NMOG + NOx emissions and greater environmental and health
benefits. ICCT supports EPA encouraging automakers to adopt the early compliance pathway.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 44-45]
113 Emission standards for new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, 42 U.S. Code § 7521,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7521
EPA could consider even lower NMOG + NOx fleet average standards for light-duty vehicles.
EPA's standards are not as stringent as CARB's. CARB LEV IV phases out ZEV and PHEV in
fleet average calculation, at 100% in MY 2025, 60% in MY 2026, 30% in MY2027, 15% in
MY2028, to 0% by MY 2029. From MY2029+, the ICE vehicle fleet average is 30 mg/mile. The
NMOG + NOx fleet average emissions under Tier 4 in MY 2029 would be higher than 30
mg/mile. For example, the EPA projects BEV penetration rate of light-duty vehicle fleet at 55%
in 2029. Assuming the early compliance path, NMOG + NOx fleet average emission of ICE
vehicles in 2029 could be 40 mg/mile (18 mg/mile MY2029 standards divided by the ICE
vehicle penetration of 45%). Similarly, in 2032, the ICE fleet average emission could be 36
mg/mile (12 mg/mile divided by 33% ICE fleet penetration), still higher than CARB. EPA does
not include a PHEV projection in the proposal. If PHEVs that still have tail-pipe emissions are
included and the BEV penetration rate is lower than projected, the ICE vehicle NMOG + NOx
fleet average could be higher than these calculated values. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp.
44-45]
However, for MDVs, the ICE fleet average emission projection could be lower than CARB's
LEV IV standards for later MY 2030+. EPA projects BEV penetration rate at 46% in MY 2032.
Assuming the early compliance path, NMOG + NOx fleet average emission of ICE MDV
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vehicles in MY 2032 could be 111 mg/mile (60 mg/mile MY 2032 standard divided by the ICE
vehicle penetration of 54%), lower than CARB's fleet average of 150 mg/mile for class 2b and
175 mg/mile for class 3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 44-45]
International comparison on NMOG + NOx emission standards
Figure 11 compares the light-duty vehicle NMOG + NOx emission standards between three
authorities: European Union (Europe), CARB, and U.S. EPA. All purple markers represent
standards up until MY 2025, and green markers represent MY 2025+ standards. The yellow line
represents the Euro emission limits with purple circles illustrating Euro 6 standards that regulate
emissions from MY2014 to 2025 cars and vans and green circles for Euro 7. Euro 6 had three
separate standards for 3 categories of vehicle classes, based on vehicle weights. 114 The blue line
represents CARB LEV standards. LEV III had two separate standards, one for Passenger cars
and Light-duty truck class 1 (LDT1), and one for LDT 2,3,4 and MDPV.l 15 These LEV III
standards are illustrated by the purple triangles. Green triangles show LEV IV standards that are
the same for all LDV vehicle classes. The red line shows the U.S. EPA Tier standards. The
purple squares illustrate Tier 3 standards and the green squares Tier 4 standards. The figure also
shows that Tier 3 and LEV III share the same emission limit at 0.16 g/mile or 160mg/mile and is
lower than Euro 6 limits for all vehicle categories. Similarly, Tier 4 and LEV IV limits are lower
than Euro 7 limits, however, Tier 4 emission limit at 70 mg/mile is lower than LEV IV limit at
125 mg/mile. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 45-47]
114 Ml are vehicles that carry passengers and comprise of no more than 8 seats in addition to the driver
seats, M2 are vehicles similar to Ml and have a maximum mass not exceeding 5 tons. N1 vehicles are
constructed to carry goods with maximum mass not exceeding 1305 kg (class I), 1760 kg (class Ii) and
3,500 kg (class III)
115 LDV are passenger cars with 8,500 lbs GVWr maximum, LDT1 vehicles are trucks with 3,750 lbs
LVW maximum, LDT2 vehicles are trucks with 3,750 lbs LVW minimum, LDT3 vehicles are trucks with
more than 6,000 lbs GVWR and with an ALVW of 5,757 lbs or less, LDT4 vehicles are trucks with more
than 6,000 lbs GVWR and with an ALVW of more than 5,750 lbs. MDPVs are any passenger vehicles at or
below 14,000 lbs GVWR with a work factor at or below 5,000 lbs. MDPV also includes pickups with
GVWR below 9,900 lbs with an interior bed lengths less than 8 feet regardless of its work factor above
5,000 lbs. Pickups with GVWR between 9,900 and 14,000 lbs with a work factor above 5,000 lbs can be
included if the interior bed length is less than 6 feet.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 11. Light-duty vehicle NMOG + NOx emission
standard comparison between CARB, EPA, and Euro standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0569, pp. 45-47]
Notes:
1. EU Euro standards are max-per-vehicle or vehicle limit values that apply both in
laboratory testing and real-world emission, while CARB LEV and EPA Tier programs have both
limit values and fleet average values that are only laboratory test. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0569, pp. 45-47]
2. CARB LEV III, LEV IV and EPA Tier 3, Tier 4 set NMOG + NOx standards; EU
Euro standards are the summation of independent NOx standards and NMHC/NMOG standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 45-47]
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3. Starting MY 2029, LEV IV phase out ZEV+PHEV in the fleet average calculation,
while Tier 4 still includes them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 45-47]
4. Tier 4 LDT3,4 and MDPV standards are based on the early compliance pathway that
is similar to Tier 4 PC + LDT1,2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 45-47]
As mentioned in the previous section, Tier 4 standards include EV emissions in the NMOG +
NOx fleet average calculation, while LEV IV standards gradually phase out EVs in the
calculation by MY2029. As a result, even though the figure shows Tier 4 with a lower fleet
average value than LEV IV, the projected ICE vehicle fleet average under Tier 4, illustrated as
the dash red line, could be higher than LEV IV in MY 2029-2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0569, pp. 45-47]
Figure 12 compares the medium-duty vehicle NMOG + NOx emission standards between two
authorities: CARB and U.S. EPA. All purple markers represent standards up until MY 2025, and
green markers represent MY 2025+ standards. The blue lines represent CARB LEV standards,
and the red lines represent EPA Tier standards. Both Tier 3 and LEV III had the same emission
limit and fleet average for Class 2b and 3. However, starting with MY 2026, the Tier 4 emission
limit is the same for both Class 2b and 3 at 160 mg/mile and lower than LEV IV at 250 mg/mile
for Class 2b and 400 mg/mile for Class 3. Tier 4 MDV standards include EV emissions in the
NMOG + NOx fleet average calculation, while LEV IV standards do not. The figure also shows
that for MY 2030+, the projected ICE fleet average emissions shown as the dash red line could
be lower than for the LEV IV Class 2b standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 45-47]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 12. Medium-duty vehicle NMOG + NOx emission
standard comparison between CARB and EPA [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 45-47]
Evaporative emission
ICCT recommends EPA to set stronger running loss standards. The Tier 4 proposal allows
vehicles to continue to be subject to Tier 3 evaporative emission standards, which states running
loss may not exceed 0.05 g/mile. The running loss is reduced from 0.05 in LEV III to O.Olg/mile
in LEV IV. According to CARB's Initial statement of reasons, since 1990, when the LEV
emission standards were established, the 0.05 g/mile has not changed. The 2019 models'
certification data showed that 87% of vehicles were already emitting at or below 0.01 g/mile.
Thus, it is feasible for EPA to set more stringent running loss standards in alignment with
CARB. 116 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 45-47]
116 CARB. (2022). Initial Statement of Reasons, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/
files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/isor.pdf and https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/
files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/isor.pdf
Organization: Kia Corporation
Kia does not support a different approach than CARB, basing the standard on a ZEV and non-
ZEV fleet average, because of the testing complexity this will add. Further, predicting the
portion of ZEVs in the fleet will be difficult, as this will be determined by market conditions,
which industry has little control over. It would be impossible for an automaker to adjust its
NMOG+NOx fleet emissions if the portion of ZEVs in the fleet is less than predicted. It will also
be impossible for an automaker to adjust its NMOG+NOx fleet emissions. Separating ZEVs and
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non-ZEVs for NMOG+NOx standard will provide needed planning stability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0555, p.11]
Kia appreciates the agency's commitment to performance-based standards and remaining
technology neutral. However, Adopting CARB's ACC II will provide significant emissions
reductions from ICE vehicles while avoiding diverting major resources from EV investments.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 11]
Further, if EPA proceeds with its proposed approach, EPA must adjust the EV market share
carefully so that projections of the NMOG+NOx standard are not skewed based on unrealistic
EV penetration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 11]
Kia also recommends EPA adopt the high-altitude NMOG+NOx standards adopted through
ACC II. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 11]
Organization: Lucid Group, Inc.
Lucid Supports a Cleaner NMOG+NOx Standard
As mentioned above, tailpipe emissions contribute to adverse public health effects. EPA's
proposed rule points out that NOx exposure impairs lung function and plant health and available
technologies exist to further reduce NMOG+NOx emissions. For these reasons, Lucid strongly
supports EPA's proposal to use a maximum fleet average standard of 300 mg/mi for light duty
vehicles, light duty trucks, and medium duty passenger vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0664, p. 5]
Organization: Mclaren Automotive, McLaren Group
SVM Criteria Pollutant Standards
As outlined above, as a SVM we face unique challenges in meeting very stringent GHG
standards, particularly those that rely on electrification. This is also the case for criteria pollutant
standards which we are impacted by further, given the reduction in flexibilities proposed by the
EPA. The EPA proposes to abandon the MY 27 and 28 SVM NMOG+NOx standards set out in
Tier 3 (and on which we have been planning towards), and propose instead to increase stringency
and require SVMs to adhere to the primary Tier 4 NMOG+NOx standard. Under the EPA's
proposal, we would need to meet the same criteria pollutant and particulate matter emission
standards on the same schedule as large manufacturers, despite our much less frequent new
model platform introductions and lower fleet diversity, resulting in our corresponding limited
ability to utilise average provisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, p. 4]
Historically, EPA have provided additional flexibilities and provision to SVMs, recognising
the challenges we face. Furthermore, these flexibilities have been recognised and provided for in
CARB's ACC II LEV IV regulation. With limited engine families, SVMs like McLaren are
unable to utilise flexibilities with averaging, unlike mass market OEMs with many product lines.
In order to properly account for the unique challenges faced by SVMs with regard to fleet
averaging - based standards, it is important to set the degree and frequency of SVM step-downs
to reflect SVM realities — limited product lines, with longer product development and life cycles.
We would propose the following alternative to the EPA's proposal: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0748, p. 4]
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MY 2027 — Maintain for all SVMs the already-in effect MY 27 Tier 3 SVM
NMOG+NOx standard (51m g/mi)
MY 2028 — Maintain for all SVMs the already-in effect MY 28 Tier 3 SVM
NMOG+NOx standard (30 g/mi)
MY 2029-32 - continue the 30 mg/mi standard for SVMs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0748, p. 4]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
Stringent NMOG+NOx requirements will yield substantial air quality benefits.
Assuming roughly 15 million new vehicles are sold per year and EPA's electrification
estimates in the proposal, approximately 40 million light-duty ICE vehicles will be sold between
MY 2027 and MY 2032. Many of these will remain on the road until 2050. MECA agrees with
EPA's technology neutral regulatory approach that considers a combination of technologies from
electrification to improved emission controls on ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564,
pp. 4-5]
Our analysis of currently available certification data supports that vehicle manufacturers are
making substantial progress on the path to the SULEV30 fleet average level with only the
inclusion of a modest number of HEVs, PHEVs and BEVs. It has now been over twenty years
since the first vehicle was certified to the SULEV30 standard and seven years since the first
SULEV20. Advances in catalyst technology and honeycomb substrates have evolved to achieve
NMOG+NOx emission levels well below 20 mg/mile and supports both the introduction of
certification bins below the current lowest level as well as potential to achieve lower fleet
average emission levels. Furthermore, catalyst coating technology combined with targeted
precious metal placement has been successful in controlling costs in light of rising raw material
prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 4-5]
The use of existing engine, hybrid powertrains and exhaust emission control architectures
have also facilitated achieving the lowest SULEV20 and SULEV30 NMOG+NOx emission
levels and significant C02 reductions cost-effectively. Today, even larger SUVs and mini-vans
with conventional and hybrid powertrains are being certified to the SULEV30 limit while further
technology improvements continue to be incorporated into new production vehicles to enable
compliance with the declining NMOG+NOx fleet average. The introduction of the additional
bins as proposed by EPA will provide greater certification flexibilities to manufacturers that will
complement increasing sales of electric vehicles to achieve lower fleet average emission targets.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 4-5]
EPA should consider setting a cap of 300 mg/mi for the -7°FTP NMOG+NOx standard rather
than a fleet average at that level. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 4-5]
MECA commends EPA's proposal to replace the existing -7°FTP NMHC fleet average
standards with a single -7°FTP NMOG+NOx standard of 300 mg/mi for LDV, LDT1 through 4
and MDPVs. We agree with the provisions of not averaging EVs into this fleet average standard,
identical useful life coverage, and application of the same standard at high altitude. EPA
emissions testing of vehicles in the MY 2019-2021 range at -7°C FTP showed that a 300 mg/mi
standard is feasible with a large compliance margin for NMOG+NOx. Furthermore, a
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combination of revised calibration strategies and heating technologies, available to MY 2027 and
later vehicles, could provide additional margin below the 300 mg/mi fleet average. First, vehicles
designed for MY 2027 and later standards can incorporate targets based on a new cold
temperature standard into new engine calibrations. Second, vehicles could also employ
(separately or in tandem with engine calibration changes) electric heat in the exhaust stream via
an electric heater or directly to the three-way catalyst (electrically heated catalyst or EHC). For
these reasons, MECA suggests EPA consider finalizing a 300 mg/mi cap rather than a fleet
average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
The current EPA Tier 3 rule includes separate NMOG+NOx standards for operation at high
altitudes. CARB's LEV IV regulation also accounts for differences in testing at high altitude by
providing different emissions standards for higher altitudes. EPA's proposed rule eliminates this
allowance, calling for a constant emissions limit up to 1720 meters. EPA premises this decision
on the capabilities of modern engines, citing "[mjodern engine management systems can use idle
speed, engine spark timing, valve timing, and other controls to offset the effect of lower air
density on exhaust catalyst performance at high altitudes."8 EPA does not consider or assess that
modern engines are already designed to operate to the fullest extent, leaving little room for
additional calibration to address high altitude conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp.
8-10]
8 NPRM at 29262.
The below plot illustrates this difference with an example of the NMOG+ NOx standards for
SULEV/BIN 30 for light-duty vehicles. In this example, EPA Tier 3 and LEV IV both include a
standard of 30 mg/mile up to either 1520 or 1219 meters, respectively, and then a 50 mg/mile
standard above that altitude point. EPA's proposed rule includes a 30 mg/mile standard for all
altitudes up to 1720 meters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 8-10]
[See original for graphs on NMOG+ NOx standards for SULEV/BIN 30 for light-duty
vehicles] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 8-10]
Altitude-based standards are necessary to account for engine operation capabilities. The
difference between sea level operation and altitude operation continues to increase as altitude
increases. The following plots illustrate the impact of altitude on engine operation. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 8-10]
[See original for diagram on the impact of altitude on engine operation] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0623, pp. 8-10]
The figure above shows engine operation at sea level first and then altitude. When propulsion
power is held constant (shown in green), the air available for catalyst heating (shown in red)
must be reduced. Reducing the air used for catalyst heating does not allow the engine to operate
in an emission-optimal strategy, resulting in higher raw emissions that the catalytic converter
must be able to control. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 8-10]
The right figure shows a pair of plots again for sea level and altitude, but in this case, the
catalyst heating remains constant in order to preserve efficient engine operation. This can only be
accomplished by significantly reducing the power available to move the vehicle. Without an
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exception for altitude, the resulting situation is that both propulsion power and catalyst heating
must be significantly reduced. The results is that the vehicle may not have enough power to
drive. This control is physically limited, with little to no opportunity to improve engine
calibrations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 8-10]
To further detail the challenge to engine operation at altitude, note that the turbocharger is
only able to compensate for the low air density to a limited extent, especially during transient
driving. Using late ignition, the most important catalyst heating action cannot be fully
implemented due to the lack of boost pressure, which leads to low cylinder air filling. This
constraint results in an increase in raw emissions and slower heating of the catalyst. Additionally,
the extent at which optimum catalyst heating operation may be implemented at low atmospheric
pressure is limited to ensure combustion stability is sufficient to prevent engine stalling and
provide protection of the vehicle from damage or accident. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp.
10-11]
Finally, real-world data shows the number of miles driven at higher altitudes under these
challenging conditions are very limited. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 10-11]
Therefore, Mercedes-Benz recommends that the EPA align the requirements starting in 2027
MY with those in CARB's LEV IV rule, which provides a separate NMOG+NOx standard for
vehicle operation at altitude. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 10-11]
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
2. Treatment of Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs)
PHEVs offer many benefits and should be an integral part in implementing the proposed
Multi-Pollutant Emissions Rule. PHEVs provide environmental benefits and are a viable
alternative for vehicle buyers not yet ready or able to own or lease a BEV. PHEVs are a
steppingstone to BEV acceptance, teaching consumers the benefits of BEV ownership without
the drawbacks - range anxiety, charge anxiety, etc. PHEVs directly address better overall fuel
economy, and reduced GHG emissions compared to comparable gasoline-only models, while
offering similar utility, comfort, and convenience. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 3-4]
Additionally, PHEVs aid the transition from pure internal-combustion engines to full vehicle
electrification, especially during any period when limited battery critical minerals production
capacity would not be sufficient to meet the volumes necessary to supply the number of BEVs
assumed in EPA's proposal. PHEVs have smaller battery packs that enable clean, electric-only -
and, in our case, significant -driving, thereby using less critical minerals than comparable BEVs
with bigger battery packs. The All-Electric Range (AER) of today's PHEVs already exceed the
average daily commute mileage of most American drivers, and this will only increase in the
future. Consumers would also benefit by having less expensive, easier to install, lower amp,
home chargers installed to charge their PHEVs, rather than the more expensive, higher amp ones
needed to charge larger BEV battery packs. More electrified powertrain options, including
PHEVs, support the shift to electrification, reduce the demand for limited critical mineral supply,
and enable greater EV access to more consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 3-4]
Mitsubishi supports Auto Innovators' recommendation that EPA include PHEVs in its
modeling, as a substitute for some BEVs, so that PHEVs comprise at least 20% of the combined
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BEV+PHEV share, based on the availability and benefits of PHEVs and concerns with battery
critical minerals supply constraints. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 3-4]
Equally as importantly, we also ask EPA to consider our recommendations regarding the
PHEV NMOG+NOx Contribution Factor and the PHEV Utility Factor (UF) as discussed in other
sections of our comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 3-4]
6. Tier-4 criteria Pollutant Emissions
Mitsubishi echoes Auto Innovators' support for EPA's adoption of the California ACC II (i.e.,
LEV-IV) criteria test procedures and standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 9]
Mitsubishi supports cost-effective reductions in criterial pollutant emission from Internal
Combustion Engines (ICE). However, some of EPA's proposed changes to the criteria emission
standards - like the more stringent Particulate Mass (PM) and NMOG+NOx requirements and
the enrichment prohibition - go above and beyond those adopted by CARB in ACC II standards.
If finalized as proposed, these changes would require OEMs to divert large resources in time and
capital (resources that could otherwise be directed to accelerate EV technology deployment)
towards further ICE technology development and additional testing facilities. Mitsubishi believes
that allowing OEMs to focus their finite R&D investments on developing EV technologies,
rather than having to continue to invest in technology that is being phased out, is the most
effective way to reach our shared goal to transition to electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0682, p. 9]
NMOG+NOx Standards:
California LEV-IV regulation, 13CCR 1961.4 (d)(1)(A), phases out Zero Emission Vehicles
(ZEVs) from the NMOG+NOx fleet average calculation, reaching 0% inclusion of ZEVs in
MY29. The fleet average standard is maintained at 30 mg/mi for MY26 and subsequent model
year vehicles. California's approach yields significant environmental benefits while reducing
regulatory complexity. EPA's proposal, on the other hand, retains ZEVs in the fleet average and
increases NMOG+NOx fleet average stringency to 12 mg/mi in MY32. EPA's proposed
approach has significant drawbacks, including: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 9-10]
Increasing fleet average stringency to 12 mg/mi apparently led EPA to propose one
certification Bin below 12 mg/mi: Bin 10. A model certified to Bin 10, however, could not be
certified under the California LEV regulation. 13CCR 1961.4 (c)(6)(A) requires the California
Bin for a given model be equivalent to, or more stringent than, the federal Bin. Since California
has not adopted a Certification Bin equal to or less than 10, EPA's proposed Bin 10 is
impractical to implement, even if future technology is developed to make Bin 10 feasible. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 9-10]
While retaining ZEVs in the fleet average calculation, EPA overlooked the necessity
of including PHEV ZEV contribution in the fleet average calculation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0682, pp.9-10]
We support the California methodology of calculating PHEV contribution factor as detailed in
13 CCR (d)(4) namely:
PHEV NMOG+NOx Contribution Factor ... the PHEV NMOG+NOx contribution factors for
LDVs (in g/mi) are calculated as follows.
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PHEVfactor = Std - 0.005 x ZVMTF - 0.005 x US06RF; Where:
PHEVfactor = PHEV NMOG+NOx contribution factor, rounded to the nearest 0.001 g/mi.
Std = NMOG+NOx standard, in g/mi, of the FTP emission category the test group is
certified to in subsection (d)(2)(A).
ZVMTF = Zero vehicle miles traveled factor, calculated as follows. For purposes of this
calculation, the maximum allowable ZVMT F that may be used is 1.0.
ZVMTf = CertRV/100 + 0.2
CertRV = Certification Range Value as defined in title 13, CCR, section 1962.4(1).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 9-10]
US06RF = US06 range factor, which is either equal to 1.0 if US06 All-Electric Range
(AER) is at least 10 miles or to zero if US06 AER is less than 10 miles. The US06 AER is
defined in the "California Test Procedures for 2026 and Subsequent Model Year Zero-Emission
Vehicles and Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles, in the Passenger Car, Light-Duty Truck and
Medium-Duty Vehicle Classes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 9-10]
Although somewhat complex, the CARB methodology for adjusting PHEV NMOG+NOx
certification level reasonably characterizes the environmental benefit of PHEV ZEV capability
over conventional internal combustion engine only models. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682,
pp. 9-10]
Again, we strongly recommend EPA fully adopt the same NMOG+NOx fleet average
standard structure as California LEV-IV. However, if EPA decides to retain ZEVs in the
NMOG+NOx fleet average calculation, we recommend the above PHEV NMOG+NOx
Contribution Factor methodology be adopted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 9-10]
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
Criteria Pollutant Emission Standards and Related Issues [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559,
pp. 6-7]
For reasons cited above, NACAA strongly supports EPA's proposal of more protective
emission standards for non-methane organic gas (NMOG)+NOx and for PM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0559, pp.6-7]
The proposed 12-milligrams-per-mile (mg/mi) NMOG+NOx fleet average standard for
LDVs, to be phased in by MY 2032, will reduce emissions by 60 percent relative to the existing
30-mg/mi (Tier 3) MY 2025 standard set in 2014. The proposed 60-mg/mi NMOG+NOx fleet
average standard for MDVs, also to be phased in by MY 2032, will reduce emissions by 66 to 76
percent from the Tier 3 standards of 178 mg/mi for Class 2b vehicles and 247 mg/mi for Class 3
vehicles. EPA's proposed cold temperature (-7°C) NMOG+NOx standards will ensure that
emissions are controlled over a wide range of operating conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0559, pp. 6-7]
With respect to PM, EPA proposes a standard of 0.5 mg/mi for LDVs and MDVs, with a
requirement that this standard be met across three duty cycles, including a cold-temperature (-
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7°C) cycle. Such a standard will appropriately drive the use of gasoline particulate filters, which
are readily available. EPA projects that making these revisions to the standards set by the agency
in the 2014 Tier 3 rule would reduce PM emissions from ICE vehicles by more than 95 percent
and also yield reductions in toxic air pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 6-7]
NACAA also supports EPA's proposal to eliminate commanded enrichment as an auxiliary
emission control device on ICE engines used in LDVs and MDVs. Commanded enrichment is an
engine operation that overrides the engine management feedback control system by applying
extra fuel in order to provide additional power or protect engine or exhaust system components,
thereby producing very high levels of excess emissions. This strategy is deployed during normal
operation and use (e.g., vehicle speeds, grades of public roads and vehicle loading and towing
within manufacturer recommendations, even if the operation occurs infrequently). However, as
EPA explains in the proposal," Technologies exist that can prevent thermal damage of engine
and/or exhaust system components without the use of enrichment during normal operation and
use Modern vehicles have sufficient power without the use of enrichment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0559, pp.6-7]
The use of enrichment only has the potential to incrementally increase power but significantly
reduces the effectiveness of the catalytic aftertreatment system, resulting in a ten-fold or greater
increase of CO and HC emissions."27 NACAA recommends that in addition to eliminating
commanded enrichment EPA require that vehicle data related to enrichment be collected and
analyzed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 6-7]
27 Id at 29,277
Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
EPA also proposes non-methane organic gases plus nitrogen oxides (NMOG+NOx) standards
that represent a 60 percent reduction from the existing MY 2025 light-duty standards and a 66 to
76 percent reduction for medium-duty vehicles.7 And for both light- and medium-duty vehicles,
EPA's proposed standards project to reduce particulate matter emissions by more than 95
percent.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 2]
7 88 Fed. Reg. at 29197.
8 Id.
Organization: National Farmers Union (NFU)
V. Criteria Emissions
Air quality in the United States has improved substantially.31 EPA is proposing new
NMOG+NOx standards that are 60% stricter than the 2025 standards. "Data and observations
indicate ICE vehicle emissions may be approaching a ZEV-equivalent level... Future vehicle
emission- reduction efforts might be more profitably targeted on reducing the effect of gross
emitters, which represents 2-5% of the fleet but can produce up to half the emissions."32 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 13]
31 Timothy Wallington, et al., Vehicle Emissions and Urban Air Quality: 60 Years of Progress,
Atmosphere 2022, 13(5), 650, available at https://doi.org/10.3390/atmosl3050650.
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32 S.L. Winkler, et al., Vehicle criteria pollutant (PM, NOx, CO, HCs) emissions: how low should we go?,
Climate and Atmospheric Science (2018), available at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41612-018-0037-5.
Further tightening of criteria emissions standards on new vehicles may not be effective at
improving air quality, but it also discourages technologies that can help meet GHG emissions
reductions goals—and meet them today. For example, flexible fuel vehicles allow use of greater
ethanol blends, which provide increasing GHG emissions reductions. However, overly restrictive
criteria emissions standards make it more difficult to design engines, cold start strategies, and
catalytic aftertreatment which can handle the wide range of fuel properties required for flex- fuel
vehicles. Moreover, higher ethanol blends would reduce air toxic emissions that may be more
important to focus on with respect to light-duty and medium-duty vehicles that will continue to
use gasoline well into the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 13]
Organization: National Tribal Air Association (NTAA)
Criteria Pollutant Emissions Standards
Many residents in Indian country continue to be exposed to concentrations of ozone and
particulate matter that exceed current National Ambient Air Quality Standards. With a few
exceptions, the sources of this pollution are outside the jurisdiction and control of Tribal
governments. It is imperative that the EPA and applicable state and local authorities take all
necessary measures to return Tribal communities to healthy air quality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0504, p. 2]
The proposed emissions standards for new light-duty and medium-duty vehicles for non-
methane organic gases plus nitrogen oxides (NMOG+NOx) constitute one key step in reducing
the impacts from the largest source of these ozone-precursor pollutants. Concurrently, reduced
emissions of NMOG+NOx will reduce ambient air concentrations of particulate matter, and
PM2.5 more specifically. The NTAA supports the proposed standards for these pollutants across
the applicable vehicle categories and looks forward to healthier air quality in our many impacted
communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, p. 2]
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
The NESCAUM and OTC regions include the New York City (NYC) Combined Statistical
Area (CSA) with over 20 million people living across portions of Connecticut, New Jersey, New
York, and Pennsylvania. It is the largest CSA by population in the United States. The NYC
metropolitan area and surrounding regions continue to persistently exceed federal health-based
air quality standards for ground-level ozone. The chronically persistent high concentrations
compromise the health and welfare of the citizens living in the NYC CSA and throughout the
Northeast Corridor. While ozone is largely a summertime issue, NOx emissions are a year-round
problem. NOx emissions contribute to acid deposition, eutrophication, and visibility impairment
in the NESCAUM and OTC regions. During colder seasons, NOx emissions play a role in
producing secondary PM2.5 through the formation of nitrates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584,
p. 3]
B. Proposed LDV and MDV Criteria Pollutant Emissions Standards
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NESCAUM and the OTC also strongly support EPA's proposal to establish more stringent
emissions standards for criteria pollutants for both LDVs and MDVs for MYs 2027-2032. EPA
should adopt the standards proposed in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 9-10]
EPA is proposing non-methane organic gas (NMOG) plus NOx standards for LDVs that
would phase-down to a fleet average level of 12 mg/mi by MY 2032, representing a 60 percent
reduction from the existing standards for MY 2025 established in the Tier 3 rule in 2014. EPA is
proposing NMOG plus NOx standards for MDVs that would require a fleet average level of 60
mg/mi by MY 2032, representing a 66-76 percent reduction from the Tier 3 standards for Class
2b and Class 3 vehicles. EPA is proposing cold temperature NMOG plus NOx standards for
LDVs and MDVs to ensure robust emissions control over a broad range of operating conditions.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 9-10]
EPA's modeling shows that these proposed standards would reduce NOx emissions by 66,000
tons in 2055, representing a 41 percent reduction compared to the no action scenario. EPA also
estimates reductions of 220,000 tons of VOCs, representing a 50 percent reduction, and 12,000
tons of sulfur dioxide, representing a 42 percent reduction, compared to no action. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 9-10]
The NESCAUM and OTC jurisdictions need the greatest possible reductions in NOx
emissions from all sectors to meet federal air quality standards. Modeling conducted by
NESCAUM and the OTC has demonstrated that, even with a 90 percent reduction in emissions
of all regulated pollutants from all on-road mobile sources, the NYC CSA would still benefit
from additional NOx reduction strategies to achieve ozone reductions.25 NESCAUM and the
OTC believe substantial NOx reductions from transportation can be achieved through the
application of ZEV technologies. NESCAUM and the OTC believe EPA's proposed standards
are necessary and technologically feasible and we urge EPA to adopt them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0584, pp. 9-10]
25 See OTC, Modeling Committee Update for OTC and MANEVU Stakeholders Meeting at 10 (Apr. 21,
2023),
https://otcair.org/upload/Documents/Meeting%20Materials/3%2020230421%200TC_Modeling_Comm_fi
nal.pdf.
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
1. Porsche seeks to confirm NMOG+NOx fleet average credits continue to act as a single
averaging set. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 8-9]
Porsche seeks to confirm it's understanding of the NMOG+NOx credit flexibilities under the
default phase-in scenario for vehicles >6000 pounds defined in 86.181 l-27(b)(6)(ii). Under this
scenario, Porsche recognizes that all Tier-4 and Interim Tier-4 light-duty program vehicles
(LDV, LDT1, LDT2) below 6000 pounds would be averaged together to assess compliance with
the declining NMOG+NOx fleet average outlined in Table 3 of 86.181 l-27(b)(6)(ii) and that this
averaging set would only include vehicles below 6000 pounds. Porsche further understands that
the default scenario would create a second averaging set for Interim Tier-4 vehicles over 6000
pounds (LDT3, LDT4, and MDPVs) and that these vehicles would be assessed against the Tier-3
fleet average NMOG+NOx standard of 30mg for model years 2027-2029. Porsche recognizes
1046
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that EPA is not proposing changes to the credit operations outlined in 86.1861- 17(b)(l)(ii)
which states that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 8-9]
"Except as specified in paragraph (b)(l)(iii) of this section, LDV and LDT represent a single
averaging set with respect to all emission standards." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 8-9]
Because EPA is continuing to view the LDV and LDT as a single averaging set for
NMOG+NOx fleet average compliance, Porsche seeks to confirm that credits generated within a
model year (i.e., for MY2027-2029) in either the under 6000 pound or over 6000 pounds
averaging set can be used between the two averaging sets should manufacturers have a deficit in
either set. Furthermore, Porsche seeks to confirm that manufacturers can apply carry-forward
Tier-3 credits within both the under and over 6000 pounds averaging sets (setting aside the MDV
restriction) to also cover any deficits. Finally, Porsche seeks to confirm that any deficit in either
the over or under 6000 pounds averaging set would have to be covered with credits earned in the
same model year from the other averaging set prior to utilizing banked, carry- forward credits
from earlier model years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 8-9]
3. Porsche supports flexibility to include zero emission vehicles within NMOG+NOx fleet
averages as an option
As described within III.C.2.iii. of the preamble,2 EPA has proposed that the declining
NMOG+NOx fleet average should continue to include all vehicle types, including BEVs and
other Bin 0 powertrains. Consistent with comments from the AFIA, Porsche recognizes that
there is value in aligning the Tier-4 structure with CARB's LEV-IV, which excludes ZEVs from
the LEV-IV fleet average, but maintains a consisten annual target of 30mg/mile. Porsche
recommends that should EPA considering aligning the Tier-4 fleet average approach with
CARB, that EPA offer manufacturers the option to include BEVs within the fleet average and
use the declining annual targets similar to as it is proposed in the NPRM. The two options would
provide additional flexibility for manufacturers without disrupting the requested alignment with
LEV-IV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 10]
2 88 FR 29261
Organization: ReginaldModlin andB. ReidDetchon
3. In fact, EPA's Phase I testing results showed that NOx and PM "have significant
decreases in emissions as ethanol levels increase from E0 to E10" - and EPA then "decided to
drop the Phase 1 test fuels ... from the Phase 3 fuel matrix." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570,
p. 30]
150 Adam R.F. Gustafson, Boy den Gray & Associates, "EPA Emails Show the Agency Relied on the Oil
Industry to Design Anti-Ethanol Fuel Effects Study," memo to Urban Air Initiative, Nov. 4, 2016: pp. 15,
17: http://cleanfuelsdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/BGA-FOIA-EPA-EPact-Emails-Nov-4-2016.pdf
(accessed Sept. 14, 2021)
4. At a meeting in June 2015 with the Energy Future Coalition, EPA Administrator Gina
McCarthy erroneously asserted that her hands were tied on mid-level ethanol blends because
they would increase NOx - a comment probably based on the flawed tests and the MOVES
model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 30]
151 Reid Detchon, Energy Future Coalition, personal recollection.
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ii. Emissions tests by the U.S. Department of Energy have confirmed that "even though
ethanol is more catalytically reactive than other gasoline components, ethanol will likely neither
help nor hinder compliance with NOx, non-methane organic gases (NMOG), and CO regulations
in realistic fuel blends." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 30]
152 Daniel Gaspar, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, "Top Ten Blendstocks For Turbocharged
Gasoline Engines: Bioblendstocks With Potential to Deliver the Highest Engine Efficiency." PNNL-28713
(2019): p. 34: https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1567705 (accessed June 22, 2021).
iii. Despite repeated calls to fix this clear error, EPA has not done so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570, p. 30]
i. Automakers can readily adjust the engine's air-fuel ratio to keep NOx emissions within
permissible levels: A 2014 Ford study of a flexible fuel vehicle found that NOx emissions
decreased by approximately 50% as the ethanol content increased from zero to E30-E40. The
study pointed to the importance of engine calibration: "Upon sensing greater ethanol content in
the fuel, the calibration prescribed different engine operating conditions." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, p. 46]
253 Carolyn P. Hubbard et al., "Ethanol and Air Quality: Influence of Fuel Ethanol Content on Emissions
and Fuel Economy of Flexible Fuel Vehicles," Environmental Science & Technology (2014): 48(1): p. 865:
https://web.math.princeton.edu/~sswang/es404041v.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
ii. Aldehyde emissions can be controlled with a conventional oxidation catalyst. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 46]
254 Matthew Brusstar et al., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "High Efficiency and Low Emissions
from a Port-Injected Engine with Neat Alcohol Fuels" (2002): p. 6: "Earlier work at EPA with DI [direct-
injection] methanol engines demonstrated the ability to control [PM and aldehyde emissions] to very low
levels with a conventional oxidation catalyst." https://archive.epa.gov/otaq/technology/web/pdf/sae-2002-
01-2743-v2.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)
X. Criteria Pollutant Emissions
Sustained efforts to reduce emissions from vehicles and other sources have been highly
successful in improving the air quality of cities throughout the U.S., as shown below in plots
based on CARB and EPA data.42 Ambient levels of all major pollutants have gone down
dramatically, despite large increases in population and GDP. The average values (and in most
cases the 90th percentile values) now meet the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 19-20]
42 Wallington et al., "Vehicle Emissions and Urban Air Quality: 60 Years of Progress", Atmosphere 2022;
https://doi.org/10.3390/atmosl3050650.
EPA is proposing new NMOG+NOx standards that are 60% stricter than the 2025 standards.
However, vehicles meeting the 2025 standards are already so clean that they do not make any
meaningful contribution to air quality problems. Thus, additional reductions required beyond the
2025 levels are unlikely to yield significant air quality benefits but would come at an excessive
cost to automakers and ultimately consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 19-20]
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A Ford study concluded that "ICE vehicle emissions may be approaching a ZEV- equivalent
level...Future vehicle emission-reduction efforts might be more profitably targeted on reducing
the effect of gross emitters, which represents 2-5% of the fleet but can produce up to half the
emissions." 43 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 19-20]
43 Winkler et al., "Vehicle criteria pollutant (PM, NOx, CO, HCs) emissions: how low should we go?"
Climate and Atmospheric Science (2018); https://doi.org/10.1038/s41612-018-0037-5.
Further tightening of criteria emissions standards on new vehicles is not only ineffective at
improving air quality, it also potentially discourages changes that can help meet GHG emissions
reductions goals. For example, FFVs are a key enabler for allowing low-carbon E85 to displace
gasoline in some applications. But overly restrictive criteria emissions standards may make it
more difficult to design engines, cold start strategies, and catalytic aftertreatment that can handle
the wide range of fuel properties required for FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 19-
20]
Organization: Satya Consultores
Satya began its DEP work with the goal of solving the tradeoff between reducing diesel soot
and NOX emissions. At higher temperatures, diesel engines achieve more complete combustion,
and emit less soot and other fine particulate matter as a result. However, under these conditions
NOX emissions increase. In turn, lower engine temperatures result in lower NOX emissions but
cause soot emissions to increase. This tradeoff is well known among fuel scientists. 1 Both
pollutants have significant adverse environmental impacts and health effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0602, pp. 19-20]
Satya's DEP resolves this conundrum. We call the resulting fuel "Next Diesel."
1 See, e.g., Narayan et al., Combustion Monitoring in Engines Using Accelerometer Signals, J.
VIBROENGINEERING, Sep. 2019, at 4; Tie Li & Hideyuki Ogawa, Analysis of the Trade-Off between
Soot and Nitrogen Oxides in Diesel- Like Combustion by Chemical Kinetic Calculation.
In DEP, two proprietary additives are mixed into the diesel fuel. The first additive ("Al") is
an ethoxylated fatty acid ester, made with a mixture of stearic and palmitic acid esters of sorbitol
and its mono- and dianhydrides. The second additive ("A2") is a complex water-based blend of
aromatic solvents with methyl radicals mixed with ethoxylated phenol-derived surfactants.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 19-20]
Diesel fuel flows from a tank at the end of the refining process in a continuous stream through
piping to a Shock Wave Power Reactor. En route, Al is metered into the diesel fuel stream via a
Progressive Cavity Injection Pump, and the combination is blended using a static mixer. Once
the fuel/Al mixture is homogenous, A2 is metered in, and that combination is blended in a
second static mixer. The resulting diesel fuel/A 1/A2 mixture then flows into the Shock Wave
Power Reactor where it is subjected to controlled cavitation, a process which creates vapor
bubbles in the fuel mixture. As a liquid passes through the SPR it is subjected to "controlled
cavitation." The heart of the reactor is a specially designed rotor. The spinning action generates
hydrodynamic cavitation in the rotor cavities away from the rotor to prevent damage to metal
surfaces. As microscopic cavitation bubbles are produced and collapse, Shockwaves are given off
into the liquid which can heat and/or mix.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 19-20]
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2 Hydro Dynamics, Inc. (n.d.). Retrieved from Harnessing the Power of Cavitation:
https://www.hydrodynamics.com/cavitation-technology/.
The resulting diesel fuel exhibits improved properties, including significantly improved
ignition characteristics. Its electrical conductivity is more than 1,000 times greater than regular
diesel fuel, and the lubricity value is more than 100 times greater. These and other upgraded
properties of Next Diesel enable more complete fuel combustion, which in turn results in less
soot production and also reduces NOX emissions. The corresponding loss of fuel power, if any,
is negligible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 2-3]
The pilot- scale test results, which followed EPA-specified federal test procedures (or
"FTPs"), demonstrated significant reductions in soot with accompanying reductions in NOX
emissions. All Next Diesel emissions test results were compared to ultra-low sulfur diesel
("ULSD") emissions tests on the same engines. Only the fuels were changed; all other test
parameters were identical. All tests were "engine out;" there was no after-treatment or particulate
filtering. Combustion map parameters for both Next Diesel and ULSD were the same. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 3-5]
Satya and SwRI compared Next Diesel with ULSD in extensive tests. Two of the many test
results illustrate Next Diesel's potential. As illustrated in Figure 1 below, transient cycle tests on
a newer model diesel engine, the Navistar N13, documented a 14% reduction in soot emissions
and an 8.6% reduction in NOX: [See original attachment for Navistar N13 Transient Tests]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 3-5]
As shown in Figure 2, on an older model DDC Series 60 engine, the reductions in soot were
even more dramatic: a 29% reduction of soot, with no increase in NOX emissions. [See original
attachment for DDC Series 60 Transient Tests] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 3-5]
The modified fuels produced by this pilot-scale plant conform to physical, mechanical,
rheological, thermal, and chemical fuel standards promulgated by the American Society for
Testing and Materials ("ASTM"), including ASTM-D975. The fuel has been tested in real-scale
heavy duty certification engines. Based on the success of these evaluations, Satya has worked
with SwRI and other internationally recognized research organizations to design a production-
scale facility. The facility design meets ASTM and American National Standards Institute
("ANSI") standards and would be capable of processing 12,000 barrels of diesel fuel per day, or
150 million gallons per year. SwRI has concluded (Link: https://www.swri.org/press-
release/swri-engineers-help-develop-cleaner-burning-diesel-fuels) thatDEP and Next Diesel are
ready for commercial development. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 3-5]
All of the testing conducted to date by Satya and SwRI has been conducted with ultra- low
sulfur diesel ("ULSD") that meets current EPA fuel composition requirements. The introduction
of ULSD in 2006 has led to dramatic reductions in particulate matter and NOX emissions from
diesel engines, and the diesel engine requirements proposed by EPA in the current rulemaking
promise additional reductions. Satya's DEP demonstrates that even more air quality gains are
possible with additional diesel fuel controls. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, p. 5]
Emissions of pollutants like soot and NOX are generally highest immediately following a cold
engine start because after-treatment systems tend to be inefficient during and just after ignition.
Next Diesel reduces emissions during and after a cold engine start, and reductions continue to be
achieved even after the engine and after-treatment systems reach steady operating temperatures.
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Engine manufacturers may choose to modify or reprogram new engines to maximize benefits of
Next Diesel, but such modifications are not necessary. Next Diesel is an improved fuel that does
not require modification of any part of a new or existing engine. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0687, p. 5]
Organization: South Coast Air Quality Management District
There are five key issues we request U.S. EPA address before finalizing the rule.
1. Extend the phase-in period and adopt more stringent standards to align with California's
ACC II regulation. The proposed standards will be phased in over a six-year period from model
year (MY) 2027 through 2032 with increasing stringency each year. We recommend that the
phase-in period be extended to 2035 and later model years to better align with the ACC II
implementation schedule which extends out to MY 2035 and subsequent years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0659, p. 2]
In terms of stringency, the proposed non-methane organic gases plus nitrogen oxides
(NMOG+NOx) standard would phase down to 12 mg/mi by MY 2032 for light-duty vehicles
(LDVs), a 60 percent reduction from the Tier 3 standard of 30 mg/mi. For medium-duty vehicles
(MDVs), the NMOG+NOx standard would phase down to 60 mg/mi by MY 2032, representing
66 percent to 76 percent reduction from the Tier 3 standard of 178 mg/mi for Class 2b and 247
mg/mi for Class 3 vehicles, respectively. While these standards represent substantial progress,
we urge U.S. EPA to consider more stringent standards for C02 and criteria pollutants to help
our region achieve the national ambient air quality standards. We therefore support the adoption
of the Alternative 1 stringency level for greater reductions of emissions, including NOx (47,000
tons vs 44,000 tons in 2055) as well as a higher BEV (Battery Electric Vehicle) penetration rate
compared to the proposed standards (69% vs 67% in MY 2032). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0659, p. 2]
Furthermore, U.S. EPA should consider additional measures that are technically and
economically feasible. For example, the ACC II requires manufacturers to comply with an
annual zero emission vehicle (ZEV) sales percentage requirement that scales up from 35 percent
in MY 2026 to 100 percent by MY 2035 (including up to 20% PHEVs). CARB's analysis
supports this requirement to be both technically and economically feasible based on projected
technology advancements. In comparison, the projected 69 percent BEV penetration rate in MY
2032 for Alternative 1 falls short of the ACC II requirements. We understand the proposed
standards are performance-based without any mandate on ZEV sales percentages, however, U.S.
EPA should conduct an additional feasibility analysis for more stringent standards that will
achieve higher BEV penetration rates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0659, p. 2]
Organization: Stellantis
Structure of Fleet Average NMOG + NOx Standard Acting as De facto ZEV Mandate [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 16]
EPA is proposing increasingly stringent light-duty vehicle NMOG+NOx standards for the
sales weighted average inclusive of all LDV, LDT and MDPV. The proposed fleet average
standards are only feasible if aggressive BEV technology penetration rates are achieved, like
those discussed in the GHG section of our comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 16]
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This exposes the criteria emissions compliance to the same market feasibility risks discussed
earlier in the context of GHG compliance. Overly optimistic projected policy solutions lead to
unrealistic assumptions of BEV market acceptance, along with resource redeployment to
electrification and long lead times for ICE hardware changes, creating risk for compliance in the
criteria emissions space that is untenable. Additionally, EV technology significantly increases
the weight of electric models compared to their ICE counterparts which means that the emissions
benefits of EVs may be pushed into higher weight classes, and therefore we are prevented from
offsetting the emissions of comparable ICE models in lower weight classes. These issues were
discussed and addressed recently during development of ACC II LEV IV criteria emissions rules
established by CARB where the ICE fleet complies with criteria emissions requirements
independent of BEV sales, allowing manufacturers to maintain compliance regardless of BEV
penetration rates and weight class complexities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 16]
EPA should adopt CARB's ACC II LEV IV 30 mg/mi ICE fleet average with BEV phasing
out at declining rates, so that compliance is not dependent on BEV market penetration. In
addition, one method of compliance (both testing and fleet management) can achieve the same
(cleaner air) result and is more efficient. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 16]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Tesla supports the proposed Alternative 1 with added stringency so that the final performance
standards achieves a fleet BEV penetration rate greater than 69% in MY 2032.2 Alternative 1 is
estimated to provide greater C02 emissions reduction of -51% from no action by 2050 compared
to -46%) under EPA's proposal, and the additional stringency will result in even greater emission
reductions.3 Accordingly, Tesla asserts the EPA should amend its proposal with a more stringent
version of Alternative 1 and take, inter alia, the following additional steps to increase the
performance and overall stringency of the proposed standards: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792,
p. 2]
2 See, 88 Fed. Reg. 29332-33, Table 96.
3 Id., at 29348 (comparing Tables 135 and 136).
- Eliminate off-cycle crediting for all types of vehicles; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p.
2]
- Revisit the plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) utility factor to accurately reflect real
world emissions; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Amend the proposal to create parity in promoting motor vehicle air conditioning (MVAC)
efficiency adoption; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Maintain the existing zero emissions upstream approach for BEVs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0792, p. 2]
- Eliminate credit multipliers for all vehicles; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
- Ensure BEVs continue to be accounted for, and participate in, the NMOG + NOx reduction
standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 2]
BEVs Continue to Be the Most Effective NMOG+ NOx Emission Reduction Technology
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An overarching goal of the proposed emission standards regime should be to continue to
design them in a manner that incents, accelerates, and rewards the deployment of the best
performing vehicles. As noted previously, BEVs represent the best vehicle technology for
eliminating tailpipe criteria air pollutants. Tesla believes that the agency should continue to
recognize BEVs for this best- in-class performance and the emission reduction contributions.
Accordingly, Tesla supports EPA's decision to maintain ZEVs in the baseline of the NMOG +
NOx emissions standards. 182 Failure to continue this approach would unfairly penalize BEVs by
eliminating their NMOG credit generation and the incentive for ZEV adoption that averaging,
banking, and trading creates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 29]
182 88 Fed. Reg. at 29257.
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
Criteria Emissions
Volkswagen is in full agreement with AFAI's comments regarding Criteria Emissions,
harmonization between EPA regulations and California's Low Emission Vehicle (LEV)
regulation to enable manufactures to focus on a single technical solution for the U.S. market.
Volkswagen recommends harmonization of EPA regulation with the fully adopted California
LEV IV emission regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 6]
Harmonization of Bin Structure (Section III.C.2.i.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 6]
Volkswagen suggests inclusion of Bin 15 and Bin 25 stages as implemented in CARB's LEV
IV regulation. The NPRM Bin structure does not contain Bin 15 and Bin 25 stages. These
emission standards are relevant for the development of future concepts. Smaller increments
between Bin 30 and Bin 10 are required to provide manufacturers the flexibility to maximize
their fleet's emission performance. Incremental steps below Bin 30 could be implemented in a
quick and cost effective manner and will not cause serious challenges in the measurement
process at test sites. This suggestion would also solve the challenge of mutual recognition of Tier
and LEV certificates and avoid the requirement to certify to a Clean Air standard for the same
vehicle test group. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 6]
Bin 70 Bin 60 Bin 50 Bin 40 Bin 30 Bin 25 Bin 20 Bin 15 Bin 10 Bin 0
FTP (20-30°C) NMOG+NOx Fleet Average Standard [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 6]
Volkswagen supports the continuous reduction of the NMOG+NOx fleet average standard to
ensure the transition from combustion engines to electrification. The continuous reduction of
NMOG+NOx between MY2027 and MY2032 will promote increased offerings of electrified
vehicles. If the EPA does not fully adopt CARB's LEV IV for criteria pollutants, Volkswagen
recommends that the fleet average targets be adjusted to account for the final changes realized in
the GHGPEV final curve. The inclusion of PEV (BEV and PHEV) in the calculation is rational
and purposeful. Volkswagen further supports the flexibility to carry-over Tier 3 credits to the
Tier 4 program, as well as a Tier 3 credit lifetime of 5 years for all vehicle categories (LDV,
LDT1, LDT2, LDT3, LDT4, andMDPV). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 6]
FTP -7°C NMOG+NOx Fleet Average Standard (Section III.C.2.iii) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0669, p. 6]
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The EPA's proposed transition from -7°C NMHC to a NMOG+NOx fleet requirement will
lead to challenges related to measurement processes. The sensitivity of NOx to condensation is
very high under such low temperatures. Volkswagen has concerns over test validity due to
condensation. This being a cold soak test may significantly increase our testing burden.
Volkswagen requests this be taken into account as an increased burden to the manufacturers.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 6]
Please also note, if the FTP -7°C NMHC Fleet Average becomes NMOG+NOx requirement,
Volkswagen supports the 1:1 transfer of Tier 3 NMHC credits to Tier 4 NMOG+NOx credit
account. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 6]
Volkswagen agrees with AFAI comments and proposes taking the fleet average of 300 mg/mi
target for LDV/LDT1 and a fleet average of 400 gm/mi for LDT2/HLDT, and does not support a
400 mg/mi vehicle cap as EPA had requested comment on this alternative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0669, p. 6]
Organization: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
This rule is critical to improving Wisconsin's air quality. The on-road mobile sector is the
largest contributor of nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions in Wisconsin. The 2020 National
Emissions Inventory reported that the on-road mobile sector accounted for 41% of the total NOx
inventory in Wisconsin, with light- and medium-duty vehicles constituting at least 30% of those
emissions. Wisconsin continues to have multiple areas in nonattainment of the 2015 ozone
standard, with NOx emissions from passenger vehicles (especially in the larger metro areas)
being a significant contributor. Given limited state authority over this sector, Wisconsin relies
upon timely and impactful EPA action to reduce the effect vehicle emissions have on
nonattainment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 1]
However, as the emissions benefits from this rule will not begin to accrue until model year
2027, this proposal will not help Wisconsin meet its near-term (2023 and 2026) ozone attainment
dates for the 2015 ozone standard. While this rule will be critically important over the long term,
it does not relieve EPA of its responsibility as a co-regulator to ensure needed reductions in
emissions from the on-road mobile sector sooner. The WDNR expects EPA to take further action
to reduce on-road emissions in the next few years to support these upcoming ozone attainment
deadlines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 1]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
EPA received several comments regarding the proposed NMOG+NOx standards. The
comments fall into three broad categories: Comments that support the proposed standards and
program architecture, comments that oppose the proposed standards and architecture, and
comments which recommended specific changes to the NMOG+NOx program.
EPA received strong support for the proposed standards from the Alliance for Vehicle
Efficiency (AVE), the American Lung Association (ALA), California Air Resources Board
(CARB), Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Interfaith Power and Light, International Council
on Clean Transportation (ICCT), Lucid Group, Manufacturers of Emissions Controls (MECA),
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National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA), National Tribal Air Association
(NTAA), Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM), Energy
Innovation and Tesla. Both CARB and MECA noted the importance of strong criteria pollutant
emission standards in the absence of a ZEV mandate, while EDF commented that EPA should
adopt standards more stringent than proposed, based on the anticipated BEV penetrations.
CARB provided several focused comments regarding the NMOG+NOx program, stating the
proposed Tier 4 standards are appropriate and largely consistent with their recently adopted ACC
II program. CARB also commented that they did not anticipate the need for development or
deployment of any new technologies to meet the proposed standards and noted that ZEV
penetrations as the result of compliance with the California ACC II program would also help
contribute to a manufacturer's federal compliance. Overall, CARB commented that they
projected that LEV IV and Tier 4 would result in similar emissions reductions. CARB also
commented on air quality and human health impacts and noted NMOG and NOx contribute to
smog, especially near-roadways and disadvantaged neighborhoods. CARB asked the Agency to
clarify the risk of excessive MDV NMOG+NOx credit generation under the default MDV phase-
in that may require additional measures such as restricting credits or changing the stringency of
the standards.
Vehicle manufacturers provided a wide range of comments. AAI did voice support for
reductions in NMOG+NOx emissions that could be gained solely through software and
calibration changes. AAI also feels that the proposed program goes "far beyond [CARB's] LEV
IV" program. Both AAI and Stellantis commented that proposed NMOG+NOx standards assume
a high BEV penetration rate and Kia and Volkswagen, along with AAI and Stellantis,
recommended that the NMOG+NOx standards should better align with the Administration's
goals. AAI provided further comments with respect to the proposed NMOG+NOx program
saying that it represented substantial changes to the CARB ACC II program and that EPA had
failed to indicate to stakeholders that it intended to propose a program different from ACC II.
AAI also commented that EPA had failed to consider adopting ACC II in lieu of the proposed
program, the incremental benefits of adopting the proposal instead of the ACC II requirements
and had not considered the lead-time required to develop and deploy the technologies required to
meet the revised NMOG+NOx standards. AAI also commented on PHEV compliance
contributions and the potential impacts of the expanded MDPV definition on MDV criteria
pollutant compliance.
AAI also urged EPA to update sulfur limits for gasoline to provide a downstream retail cap of
10 ppm (versus the current limits of 10 ppm average with 95 ppm cap). They assert that this is
necessary to optimize catalyst efficiency and would align with sulfur caps in the European Union
and China.
Regarding the effects of electrification on NMOG+NOx standards, AAI recommended
removing BEV's from the fleet average while Porsche North America commented that they
support the inclusion of BEVs in the NMOG+NOx fleet average. Both AAI and Mitsubishi
recommended that EPA adopt a similar criteria pollutant strategy for PHEVs as that adopted by
CARB, where NMOG+NOx emissions are discounted using the PHEV utility factor.
AAI, Hyundai North America, Kia Corporation and Mercedes Benz all commented that the
proposed high altitude NMOG+NOx standards would require significant additional development
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and burden as compared to CARB ACC II. AAI recommended that EPA adopt the CARB ACC
II high altitude standards in lieu of the program proposed by EPA.
AAI also commented on a variety of related topics and recommended alternatives for the
NMOG+NOx cold FTP fleet average, interim standards for US06 NMOG+NOx, higher US06
standards for vehicles certified to Bin 30 and cleaner, and OBD thresholds aligned with ACC II.
Both BMW and Volkswagen commented that they supported the AAI comments overall.
Cummins comments regarding a tradeoff between oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and carbon
dioxide (C02) reductions may have been historically true prior to the introduction of catalytic
NOx controls, e.g., SCR, between 2007 and 2010, when the primary NOx controls relied on
combustion phasing and charge dilution. This tradeoff has decreased substantially as diesel
applications rely more upon catalytic controls for NOx emissions. In EPA's 2022 analysis of
modern dual-SCR systems and other technologies in support of 2027 and later heavy-duty
standards, we found that the combination of active and passive thermal management anticipated
for meeting the final 2027 and later heavy-duty standards can be designed and developed in a
manner that does not pose an additional burden for meeting heavy-duty engine GHG standards.
(U.S. EPA. Regulatory Impact Analysis: Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles:
Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards Regulatory Impact Analysis, December 2022, EPA-
420-R-22-035, https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1016A9N.pdf). Similarly, as
such technologies are applied to light- and medium-duty diesel applications to comply with 2027
and later standards, we do not anticipate any significant impact on GHG emissions from these
applications.
EPA also received comments on the proposed bin structure for both light and medium duty
vehicles. AAI recommended that EPA adopt the same bin structure as ACC II for both light and
medium duty vehicles and noted a lack of overlap between the EPA proposal and ACC II. The
SVM Ad Hoc group and Mitsubishi echoed a similar statement and commented that the proposed
bin structure was overly restrictive. The SVM Ad Hoc group also specifically recommended that
EPA retain Bin 125 throughout the phase-in applied to their standards.
The American Petroleum Institute (API) commented on the final NMOG+NOx fleet average
and noted that only a portion of the existing fleet is certified at or below 15 mg/mile. API also
commented that EPA had failed to demonstrate the technical feasibility of the final fleet average.
On a similar note, Ford Motor company also commented that the proposed NMOG+NOx
standards were not feasible and should include a "safety factor". The National Farmers Union
and Renewable Fuels Association (RFA) disagreed with the need or effectiveness of more
stringent NMOG+NOx standards. RFA commented further that more stringent NMOG+NOx
standards could discourage technologies that reduce CO2 emissions.
MECA made several comments regarding the proposed NMOG+NOx standards,
recommending that EPA adopt a 300 mg/mile cap at -7 degrees C instead of a fleet average.
They also noted that ICE-based vehicles could adopt electrically heated catalysts as a means of
meeting more stringent NMOG+NOx standards.
Modlin & Detchon, raised concerns with the data and modeling EPA uses to assess emission
impacts of ethanol blends, and suggested this has influenced EPA's willingness to promote
higher-octane or lower-carbon fuels in the market. This comment is very similar to another in
Section 12.5.1 of this RTC document, and we direct the reader there for a response.
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Green Diesel Engineering and Cummins recommended that EPA adopt less stringent NOx
standards for diesels as a means of reducing CO2 emissions.
Response:
EPA appreciates all the comments regarding the level of NMOG+NOx standards. As a result
of these comments and additional technical analysis performed by EPA to inform both the GHG
and criteria pollutant programs, EPA has made several changes to NMOG+NOx standards for
the FRM.
EPA is finalizing revised final NMOG+NOx standards for both light and medium duty
vehicles that are less stringent than those proposed. There are several factors and comments that
have contributed to EPA's decision. EPA received strong support from many commenters
recognizing the need and the feasibility of lower emissions standards. As a portion of the fleet
moves to zero emission vehicles the Agency believes it is important to also reduce the emissions
from the millions of ICE-based vehicles that will continue to be a significant portion of new
vehicles sold, and a majority of the on-road fleet, for decades to come. Recognizing that both the
GHG and criteria pollutant standards are performance-based, EPA has adjusted the final fleet
average NMOG+NOx standards to reflect the anticipated penetration of ICE-equipped and BEV
vehicles. The agency believes that the final NMOG+NOx standards strike the appropriate
balance between those commenters that noted the importance of strong NMOG+NOx standards
to protect human health and those commenters which expressed concern regarding the feasibility
of the final fleet average. For additional information regarding the final fleet average standards
refer to Sections III.D.2 and V of the preamble.
In finalizing a higher NMOG+NOx final fleet average of 15 mg/mile, EPA is also addressing
comments, such as those from Ford, that the proposed fleet average of 12 mg/mi is not feasible
and should include a safety margin. EPA, however, disagrees with API's comment that the
agency failed to demonstrate that the proposed standards are feasible. Both the NPRM and the
FRM note a number of vehicles that are already certified to 15 mg/mi or less NMOG+NOx. In
addition, the agency has described in detail technologies that are already being applied by
vehicle manufacturers to meet Tier 3 standards and can continue to be developed to result in
even lower emissions (see RIA Chapter 3.2.5). EPA's technical judgment is that OEMs can
comply with the NMOG+NOx standards using a variety of compliance pathways. The standards
are feasible for ICE-based vehicles without taking into consideration the possibility of averaging
with zero-emitting vehicles. However it is more likely that manufacturers will sell vehicles with
a variety of technologies, including some with improvements in ICE powertrains and at least
modest levels of BEVs, and the standards are certainly feasible for manufacturers with such a
strategy. AAI recommended that EPA adopt a provision to discount PHEV criteria pollutant
emissions based on the utility factor. EPA disagrees with this recommendation and provides the
technical basis for the Agency's decision in preamble Section III.D.2.
AAI commented that bin structure and OBD thresholds should align with ACC II. EPA is
finalizing a bin structure that is comprehensive of all the bins adopted by CARB in ACC II. The
response on OBD is available in RTC Chapter 5.
EPA has decided to not make changes in response to the comment from AAI, Hyundai North
America, Kia Corporation and Mercedes Benz regarding high altitude NMOG+NOx standards.
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EPA believes that vehicle manufacturers can meet the same standard at altitude. As a result, EPA
did not adopt the CARB ACC II high altitude standards in lieu of the program proposed by EPA.
EPA disagrees with AAI's comments regarding the effects on NMOG+NOx compliance of
the expanded MDPV definition. EPA is adopting the recommendations from AAI to adjust the
work factor and GVWR thresholds for the final MDVP definition. Most of the vehicles currently
captured by the final MDPV definition are light-duty EVs with utility that is not representative of
medium-duty vehicles. AAI also commented that EPA did not provide a technology pathway for
MDVs to comply with the final NMOG+NOx standards. EPA did provide a pathway based on an
anticipated growing penetration of electric cargo vans in the MDV fleet. Furthermore, given that
the MDV NMOG+NOx standards are performance based, vehicle manufacturers may decide
which technologies are best suited for their customers, which may mean improvements in ICE
emissions in lieu of electrification.
Regarding the issue of tighter gasoline sulfur limits, EPA believes the proposed emission
standards are feasible with current sulfur limits. Moreover, as discussed in RTC Section 19.1,
changes to fuels controls are beyond the scope of this rulemaking,
Finally, regarding Cummins and Green Diesel Engineering's recommendation that EPA adopt
less stringent NOx standards for diesels as a means of reducing CO2 emissions, EPA does not
believe that it is appropriate or necessary to trade off one pollutant for the other. Many
technologies exist in the market today which have low CO2 emissions and low NOx emissions.
With respect to CARB's comments regarding the potential for excessive MDV NMOG+NOx
credit generation, that concern was shared by the Agency during the development of the MDV
program and was taken into consideration for both the proposal and within the final rule. The
early compliance program finalized does not allow carry over of Class 2b and Class 3 Tier 3
NMOG+NOx credit into the new program unless a manufacturer chooses the optional early
compliance program for criteria pollutants. Manufacturers would not build large credit banks
under Tier 3 by opting for default phase-in since those credits would retire at the beginning of
the 2031 model year. The early compliance program does allow Tier 3 NMOG+NOx credits to be
used, but the program also begins to phase-in significantly more stringent standards beginning in
2027, and the declining NMOG+NOx standards within the early compliance program fully take
into consideration year-over-year increases in MDV BEV sales in order to meet MDV criteria
pollutant and GHG standards.
4.1.3 - Particulate matter (PM)
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Ad Hoc Small OEM Group
. PARTICULATE MATTER
-EPA's proposed PM reduction to 0.5mg/mi across FTP, US06 and Cold Testing goes too far
too soon for Small OEMs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 13-14]
EPA's proposed PM reduction to 0.5mg/mi across FTP, US06 and especially Cold Testing is
an enormous increase in stringency over a short period of time. This is a regulatory combination
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that Small OEMs simply cannot meet. We recognize that the regulation of PM is headed towards
necessitating the use of Gasoline Particulate Filters (GPF), but further research and development
is needed with respect to GPF aging and monitoring for purposes of California OBD. This issue
is not yet fully understood and requires more lead-time under the CAA section 202(a). [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 13-14]
In addition, there are also technical issues and costs associated with measuring PM emissions
below 1 mg/mile, and specialized, expensive test facilities may be needed to reliably measure
PM at such a low level. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 13-14]
It is thus unreasonable to impose the proposed PM standards and timetable on Small OEMs,
especially considering the minimal environmental benefit obtained together with how drastic the
proposed change is compared to existing Tier 3 levels and the CARB ACCII PM standards, as
shown in the graph below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 13-14]
[See original attachment for graph "Tailpipe PM Limit [mg/mi]] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0563, pp.13-14]
-In sum, as regards SVMs and PM, EPA should harmonize with the CARB ACCII SVM PM
approach as follows:
-FTP
- For MY 2027-2028 - 3 mg/mile.
-For MY 2029 and later — 1 mg/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 13-14]
-SFTP
- For 2027 - 2029 - 6 mg /mi
- For 2030 and later - 3 mg/mi [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 13-14]
-No Cold Testing for SVMs given that it is not yet fully understood what is needed to meet
the 0.5mg standard at 20F with high-performance engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp.
13-14]
We further note the above levels and timetable are consistent with the EU regulation of PM.
GPFs will be necessary on all European engines in 2030 with the implementation of EU7's
mandating PM measurement for both Port Fuel Injection Engines and Gasoline Direct Injection
Engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 13-14]
Organization: Ad Hoc Tier 4 Light-Duty Small Manufacturer Group
4. PARTICULATE MATTER
EPA's proposed PM reduction to 0.5mg/mi across the FTP and US06 and Cold Testing also
goes too far too soon [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 9-10]
EPA's proposed PM reduction to 0.5mg/mi across the FTP and US06 and Cold Testing is an
enormous increase in stringency over a short period of time. So much so that it is over-reach,
especially considering Tier 3 levels and that CARB has tightened PM standards without going to
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the extent that EPA proposes, as shown in the graph below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509,
pp. 9-10]
[See original attachment for "Tailpipe PM Limit [mg/mi]"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509,
pp. 9-10]
More and more stringent PM standards will lead to the need for Gasoline Particulate Filters
(GPFs) as an aftertreatment. One GPF issue which is not currently understood fully is GPF aging
and monitoring for purposes of OBD. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 9-10]
In addition, there are also technical issues and costs associated with measuring PM emissions
below 1 mg/mile, and specialized, expensive test facilities may be needed to reliably measure
PM at such a low level. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 9-10]
In sum, as regards PM, EPA should
- Follow the CARB ACCII SVM PM approach as follows:
-FTP
-For MY 2027 — 3 mg/mile.
-For MY 2029 and later—1 mg/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 9-10]
We note this is consistent with the EU approach to PM and GPFs: GPFs will be necessary on
all engines in 2030 with the implementation of EU7's mandating PM measurement for both Port
Fuel Injection Engines and Gasoline Direct Injection Engines [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509,
pp. 9-10]
-SFTP
-For MY 2027 - 2029 - 6mg /mi
-For MY 2030 and later - 3mg/mi [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 9-10]
-No Cold Testing - no PM standard for cold testing, or at a minimum an SVM exemption
(note that what will be needed to meet the 0.5mg standard at 20F has not yet been fully
understood). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 9-10]
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Criteria Emission Standards
Automakers will spend $1.2 trillion by 2030 as a down payment on a net-zero future, but far
more will be needed. If we hope to succeed, automakers must focus resources on the EV
transformation rather than incremental changes to existing, very near-zero (criteria) emission
ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 5-6]
This should not be interpreted as automakers requesting no criteria emission reductions or
regulations. We support changes that can be made cost-effectively through software calibration
changes to the vehicle. For example, we support and recommend EPA adopt the criteria emission
standards California adopted under Advanced Clean Cars II (i.e., LEV IV). We worked with
California over several years to develop these standards that substantially reduce real- world
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criteria pollutants (nonmethane organic gas (NMOG), nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate mater
(PM)), as rapidly as possible without stranding technology or diverting resources from
electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 5-6]
However, some of the changes proposed in the NPRM go far beyond California's LEV IV
program and would require large human and capital resources. For example, all-new engine
designs, retooling of engine and vehicle production facilities, new hardware on vehicles, and
additional testing laboratories are required at the same time the EPA expects 67% of new
vehicles to be BEVs. These simultaneous ICE-focused activities will distract from efforts to
electrify light-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 5-6]
PM Standards
Auto Innovators and our members understand the importance of particulate mater (PM)
standards. In fact, we've worked with both California and EPA to develop and adopt standards as
part of ACC II that result in a 90% reduction in PM emissions (from 10 mg/mile to 3 mg/mile to
just 1 mg/mile when fully phased in (2028 model year)). However, the NPRM proposes a new
standard of 0.5 mg/mile, which will effectively necessitate a gasoline particulate filter (GPF)
system with on-board monitoring that is unique to the U.S. on every ICE vehicle. This new
standard also takes place in the middle of the phase-in for California's new PM standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 6-7]
The NPRM rightly notes that GPFs are not new technology and have been used in China and
the EU. However, this is not an apples-to-apples comparison. China and EU PM standards are
based on particle count instead of mass. Their NMOG+NOx standards and on-board diagnostic
(OBD) requirements are also not as stringent as EPAs (or California's). Moreover, the GPF used
elsewhere cannot simply be pulled off the shelf and installed; rather capital resources would be
required for re-tooling, redesign, testing and other requirements, including inventing a new
sensing technology to address the proposed filtration efficiency monitor requirement and lab
testing capabilities at the proposed levels. The significant development time, resources and
investment required to meet the proposed PM standard will disrupt the focus on electrification,
particularly when adoption of California's LEV IV 1 mg/mile PM standard will provide
substantial nationwide benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 6-7]
IV. Light-Duty Criteria and Toxic Pollutant Standards
Automakers are committed to ultimately achieving net-zero transportation carbon emissions
and electrification of the light-duty vehicle fleet. However, this transformation requires massive
investment in EV technology and supporting mechanisms such as infrastructure, all involving
many stakeholders. To be successful, automakers must primarily focus resources on the
transformation rather than incremental changes to existing internal combustion engine (ICE)
vehicles, which are already very near zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-142]
The focus of EPA and the automakers is and should be on electrification. Thus, Auto
Innovators supports changes to traditional criteria emission (e.g., NMOG, NOx, and PM)
standards that measurably reduce emissions, but do not add substantial additional hardware or
capital costs to ICE vehicles that will soon be retired. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-
142]
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Unfortunately, EPA proposes to adopt new requirements that will divert resources from our
shared goal of widespread electrification. Prohibiting enrichment could require complete engine
redesigns and possibly larger displacement engines to provide customers with the capability they
demand. The proposed PM standards substantially increase costs and vehicle development
complexity in addition to adding testing requirements. Finally, in several cases, EPA provides
less flexibility and/or chooses not to align with ACC II. This lack of alignment is particularly
troubling as automakers and suppliers have already developed product plans and spent resources
toward meeting the ACC II regulations, and in some cases, EPA's proposal would require
substantial changes during the middle of ACC II regulatory phase-ins. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.141-142]
To reduce costs while still providing similar (and substantial) environmental benefits, the
EPA regulations should seek to align with criteria emissions regulations already adopted by
California in ACC II. We worked closely with the California Air Resources Board (CARB) and
with EPA staff in attendance and participating,25 5 for the past several years to develop standards
that substantially reduce real-world criteria emissions (including NMOG+NOx and PM), as
rapidly as possible without stranding technology or diverting resources from electrification.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-142]
255 At no time did EPA staff indicate a different or more stringent pathway was under development
federally, while the auto industry provided input, feedback, and technical data to CARB. The California
process provided an ideal forum for alignment, even if EPA could not commit to alignment at that stage.
We recommend that EPA adopt the ACC II criteria emission regulations in place of its
proposal. This adoption would provide substantial environmental benefits, streamline the
regulations, and allow automakers to focus resources on electrification rather than developing
and deploying changes to ICE vehicles specific to EPA's proposed new requirements. At a
minimum, EPA should align with ACC II through the end of the ACC II phase in periods; in
most cases, ACC II regulations are fully phased in by MY 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 141-142]
A. Consideration of the California ACC II Criteria Pollutant Regulation as an Alternative
EPA failed to consider adopting various California ACC II criteria pollutant provisions, and
in so doing has also failed to demonstrate the incremental costs and benefits of its proposed
program relative to this existing and logical alternative. EPA has also failed to consider the
appropriate time to develop and deploy the additional ICE technologies to meet its proposal,
particularly in the context of an overlapping and different final state regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-142]
It is no defense to say that EPA has yet to approve a Clean Air Act waiver for these
provisions. EPA has yet to reject a waiver request from California, and included the California
ACC II program as a sensitivity case to the proposed greenhouse gas regulations. Unfortunately,
to the extent that the ACC II sensitivity case provides estimates of criteria emission benefits, it
has been challenging, if not impossible, to separate benefits associated with the GHG program
from those associated with the criteria pollutant program, and even more difficult to separate the
impacts from individual components of the proposed criteria pollutant program. These
challenges have been exacerbated by the limited time available to comment on the NPRM.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-142]
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If EPA proceeds with its own misaligned proposal to the logical alternative of California's
ACC II program, it should at a minimum demonstrate the incremental benefits and costs of each
of its unique program aspects relative to the ACC II program. In addition, if EPA proceeds with
its own proposal, EPA should also align with ACC II through the end of the ACC II phase in
periods before starting new requirements on top of those already under implementation. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-142]
D. PM Standards
EPA is proposing PM standards that exceed the stringency of CARB's recently adopted PM
standards, to phase them in at the same time as CARB's standards are phased in (creating
conflicting state and federal requirements), and to apply them to additional test cycles. EPA's
proposed standards would add significant direct costs to vehicles for additional hardware,
laboratory test cells (and potential upgrades and/or new build outs), calibration, monitoring,
warranty, and customer repair and maintenance. Further, with additional test cycles, stringent
OBD requirements, and absence of consideration of additional implementation costs, EPA
inappropriately considers the technology additions as a drop-in with little to no cost. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 150-151]
EPA has inadequately considered the exceedingly low contribution of light-duty vehicles to
PM emission inventories, has failed to consider adoption of the California standards as an
alternative to its proposal, and has not fully assessed costs associated with upgrading laboratories
and laboratory practices to precisely and accurately measure PM emissions with statistical
certainty. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 150-15 l]In light of these significant issues, and
as described more fully below, we are concerned that EPA has fallen short of its rulemaking
obligations to engage in reasoned decision-making and articulate a "rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made"266 with regard to the Proposed Rule's PM standards.
"[W]hen an agency decides to rely on a cost-benefit analysis as part of its rulemaking, a serious
flaw undermining that analysis can render the rule unreasonable."267 Moreover, an agency must
undertake a "rational consideration of alternatives," and provide an "adequate explanation when
these alternatives are rejected."268 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 150-151]
266 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'nv. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 53 (1983); see also
Nat'l Ass'n of Clean Air Agencies v. E.P.A., 489 F.3d 1221, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
267 Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. E.P.A., 682 F.3d 1032, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also City of
Portland v. E.P.A., 607 F.3d 706, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that the D.C. Circuit "will [not] tolerate
rules based on arbitrary and capricious cost-benefit analyses").
268 Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also, e.g.,
Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc. v. F.C.C., 794 F.2d 737, n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The failure of an agency
to consider obvious alternatives has uniformly led to reversal.").
Here, based on the record, we believe that EPA has failed to adequately justify the Proposed
Rule's PM standards, failed to ensure that the relevant facts support this proposed standard, and
failed to ensure that it has considered all reasonable alternatives, including adoption of the
California standards as an alternative to its proposal. Moreover, we believe that the proposed PM
standards will impose an extremely high cost, but result in little corresponding air quality
benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 150-151]
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We encourage EPA to carefully evaluate its proposed PM standards and the evidence
underlying them, and to ensure that it is adequately accounting for the relevant costs and benefits
and fulfilling its statutory obligation to engage in reasoned, evidence-based decision-making.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 150-151]
2.PM Standard Concerns
Increasing stringency for 25 °C FTP will add additional cost and development work with
minimal air quality and will divert OEM resources from fleet electrification. The technical issues
are magnified for the US06 proposal because of the necessity of both reductions in engine out
emissions and the development of GPF designed for high temperature/high flow rate conditions.
In particular: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 153-154]
- Automakers must account for the higher engine out PM (soot) compared to FTP. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 153-154]
- US06 is high flow, and PM collection rate of GPF is lower than FTP. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.153-154]
- US06 is high temperature, and collected PM on GPF is lower. Therefore, the PM collection
rate of GPF is lower than FTP. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 153-154]
- US06 has many accelerations and decelerations, PM (SOF) tends to be larger than LA#4.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 153-154]
a) PM Development Burden
To balance both stringent emission level and PM regeneration, the following should be
considered: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 154]
- EPA has not designed a program that allows for GPF technology from other regions to be
simply "dropped in" and thus will require additional development and resources. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 154]
- To comply with PM 0.5 mg/mile standard, it takes long lead-time to develop the exhaust
system that includes a GPF to balance emission reductions and PM collection/regeneration. It
also takes a long lead time to design GPF location on the vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 154]
b) - The lead time for large pickup trucks will be even longer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 154]PM Recommendation
As EPA recognizes in the NPRM, the proposed PM standard will mandate a technology
response; namely, installation of a GPF. Effectively mandating a GPF on all gasoline vehicles
will require additional costs associated with development, testing, labs, monitoring, warranty,
and consumer repair, all of which divert resources away from electrification. Auto Innovators
recommends EPA adopt the PM standards in ACC II, shown below, using the ACC II phase-in
schedule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 154-155]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 44: Recommended PM Standards [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 154-155]
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California's LEV IV includes interim in-use compliance standards of 2 mg/mi for the first two
model years that a test group is certified to the LEV IV 25°C FTP standard. We recommend EPA
align with California. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 154-155]
3.PM Measurement Considerations
The following data from laboratories which are ISO 17025 accredited and fully compliant to
test procedure requirements and best practices defined in 40 C.F.R. §1066 demonstrates that
uncertainty in the PM measurement process can exceed the proposed 0.5 mg/mi standard. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 154-155]
We recommend eliminating the -7 °C FTP PM requirement, because it adds to test burden,
requires large investments / upgrades to test facilities, and reduces test validity rate. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 154-155]
a) We also recommend considering laboratory PM measurement variability and allowing re-
tests for exceedances during certification, confirmatory or in-use testing, especially for
vehicles equipped with diesel or gasoline particulate filters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 154-155]Challenges in PM Measurement at 0.5 mg/mile
The proposed Tier 4 PM standard of 0.5 mg/mile is a completely new venture beyond the
expectations of automotive manufacturers and was not anticipated in the design of their
emissions laboratories. The emission laboratories across the industry are still learning how to
accurately measure PM at the Tier 3 PM limit of 3 mg/mile due to the uncertainty involved in all
of the processes leading to final PM results in mg/mile. 40 C.F.R. Part 1065 and 1066 added
many new requirements and recommendations to improve measurement of PM and to reduce
variability. Even with all the Part 1065/1066 requirements and recommendations, the PM
gravimetric measurement technique at 0.5 mg/mile will still require further scrutiny and
refinement to further reduce measurement uncertainty and to improve measurement resolution as
the net mass on the filter will approach tunnel background levels especially with larger vehicles
that must run at higher constant volume sampler (CVS) flowrates. Test procedure updates may
be needed, such as the reference filter validity criteria of +/-10 micrograms, as we demonstrate
below is clearly not adequate at this low level. It may be adequate for heavy-duty vehicles, but
not for light- or medium-duty vehicles at the 0.5 mg/mile where the net mass on the filter will be
less than 10 |ig at larger CVS flow rates. The potential sources of variability which contribute to
the gravimetric measurement uncertainty include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 155-
156]
- Microbalance stability in weighing PM filters and artifacts at this level; [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 155-156]
- Static charge removal from filters at such low mass levels; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 155-156]
- Filter handling by the operators; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 155-156]
- Filter weight gain due to artifacts during transportation from weigh room to test cell; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 155-156]
- Tunnel contamination due to prior testing on the test cell and background correction; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 155-156]
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- Test to test and cell to cell variability; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 155-156]
- Laboratory to laboratory offset. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 155-156]
All these individual factors add to the uncertainty and the errors involved can either stack up
and lead to large errors or cancel each other and result in lower errors. Unfortunately,
manufacturers have no control over the direction of these errors and how they interact throughout
the measuring process. It is also noteworthy that even following EPA's regulations, these sources
of uncertainty will remain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 155-156]
In efforts to minimize the impact of these sources of variability, some countermeasures have
been identified to reduce the PM measurement uncertainty, but they are not sufficient to ensure
that vehicles will pass the proposed PM limit of 0.5 mg/mile with confidence, especially on the
US06 and the cold -7 °C FTP test on larger vehicles. Some of the countermeasures being pursued
to minimize the uncertainty include using robotic auto handlers to minimize filter handling by
the operators; segregating clean, dirty, and cold testing in dedicated test cells; using special lint
free laboratory coats; special powder-free gloves; using Polonium strips in the weighing
chambers of the microbalance and replacing them regularly every 6 months; and regular cleaning
of the weighing room and PM sampling system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 156-157]
At the 0.5 mg/mile level, the net mass of PM on the filter will be approaching tunnel
background levels especially on larger light-duty vehicles and light-duty trucks, which must
meet the same 0.5 mg/mile standard. These larger vehicles must run with higher CVS flow rates
to meet the C.F.R. dilution factor requirements between 7:1 and 20:1. These larger CVS
flowrates dictate large sample ratios which the net mass on the filter is then multiplied by. Any
error involved in the process of weighing the filter such as tunnel contamination, filter handling
or static charge removal is magnified a few hundred times by the sample ratio. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 156-157]
This will be even worse for medium-duty vehicles, which will need larger CVS flow rates
than light-duty vehicles (beyond 1,000 cubic feet per minute (CFM) or 30 m3/min). As a result,
medium-duty vehicles will have larger sample ratios, requiring the net mass on the filter to be
even lower in order to pass the proposed PM standard. This requires that medium-duty vehicles
only emit a few micrograms of PM when the artifact present in the tunnel by itself, when
multiplied by the high sample ratio, can exceed the 0.5 mg/mile standard. In this case, the tunnel
background might be higher than the net mass of PM on the filter. When net mass on the filter
and tunnel background are close in magnitude, the accuracy becomes very poor, making the
measurement method inadequate. Correction for tunnel background in this case may lead to
negative mass. At this low level, correction is not feasible, pushing the limits and going beyond
the capability of the gravimetric measurement technique. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
156-157]
b) Range of Net PM Mass on Filter at 0.5 mg/mile and lower
Figures 45 and 46 provide FTP PM data below 0.5 mg/mile from all test cells capable of PM
measurement at an OEM laboratory over four months. It is obvious that as the CVS flow rate
increases, the net PM mass on the filter decreases, approaching about 7.5 |ig or lower at 550
CFM. Minimal data is available above 550 CFM because the larger vehicles that require higher
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CVS flowrates typically exceed the proposed 0.5 mg/mile level. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 157-160]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 45: Net mass on PM filters for FTP tests with
results below 0.5 mg PM/mile at various flowrates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 157-
160]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 46: Relationship between net filter mass and CVS
flow rate for vehicles with less than 0.5 mg/mile FTP emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 157-160]
c)FTP PM Variability within the Same Laboratory (Test to Test and Cell to Cell)
Figure 47 presents weekly internal cross check data set for all PM measurement-capable test
cells within an OEM certification laboratory over a 10-week period. As shown, the overall
laboratory average for the tested vehicle is 0.2853 mg PM/mile, represented by the black dotted
line in the middle. The upper and lower red lines represent +/- 2 standard deviations around the
laboratory mean and the upper and lower pink doted lines represent +/- 3 standard deviations
around the laboratory mean. For this data set, 2-standard deviations is: 0.2677 mg/mile (0.553 -
0.2853 mg/mile), or 94% of the mean, which represents the variability with 95% confidence.
This is more than 53% of a 0.5 mg/mile standard. The data is corrected for the tunnel
background and the tunnels are cleaned regularly to minimize the tunnel background influence
with the data. There are also some other measures such as shutting out of intrusive particles by
maintenance of dilution air filter to minimize the tunnel background influence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 157-160]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 47: Intercell correlation of PM results for a singe
vehicle over a 10-week period at an OEM emissions laboratory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 157-160]
d)FTP PM Variability on Round Robin with Industry (Lab to Lab)
Figure 48, below, provides FTP PM data from the first quarter 2023 round robin correlation
program between light-duty automaker laboratories and EPA's National Vehicle and Fuel
Emissions Laboratory (NVFEL). Within the same laboratory, test-to-test variability seems to be
within a reasonable range, but the laboratory-to-laboratory offset is obviously large, ranging
from 2.877 to 4.445 mg/mile with a difference of 1.568 mg/mile, which is more than 50% of the
current 3 mg/mile standard. These are all certification laboratories that are 40 C.F.R. Part 1066
compliant and ISO 17025 accredited. These laboratories follow very rigorous test procedures and
quality checks as recommended by the C.F.R. These laboratories also often go beyond what the
C.F.R. recommends for quality assurance, for example by using robotic auto-handlers and
regular cleaning of dilution tunnels and sampling systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
157-160]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 48: PM data from the 1Q2023 automaker / EPA
interlaboratory correlation program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 157-160]
Below is PM data from another round robin program from 2022 run by the same certification
laboratories and EPA (Figure 49). The 2-standard deviation limit around the EPA mean is 0.56
mg/mile. The all-laboratory average 2-standard deviation is 0.48 mg/mile. The variability from
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laboratory to laboratory at a 95% confidence level is almost as high as the proposed FTP PM
standard of 0.5 mg/mile. The offset between the initial baseline tests' average and the
confirmatory tests' average is more 0.37 mg/mile, or more than 25% change within the same
laboratory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 160-164]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 49: FTP PM test results from a 2022
automaker/EPA interlaboratory correlation program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 160-
164]
Results from another recent interlaboratory round robin program from 2022 are shown in
Figure 50 for a vehicle with a FTP PM emission level below 1 mg/mile. The lab to lab offset is
evident here, which cannot be explained. The average 2-standard deviation from all labs is 0.065
mg/mile, or about 13% of the 0.5 mg/mile standard. The offset between Laboratory 2 and
Laboratory 1 confirmatory testing at the end is is 0.27 mg/mile, or 54% of a 0.5 mg/mile
standard. The offset between the initial baseline tests' average and the confirmatory tests'
average is about a 21% change within the same laboratory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
160-164]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 50: FTP PM test results from a 2022
automaker/EPA interlaboratory correlation program using a vehicle with less than 1 mg/mile PM
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 160-164]
e) US06 PM Testing at 0.5 mg/mile
The US06 test, being an aggressive high speed high load cycle, requires larger CVS flowrates
than the FTP to maintain the dilution factor between the required 7:1 and 20:1 ratio. In order to
meet the same 0.5 mg/mile standard on the US06, the net PM mass on the filter must be lower
than the net mass of PM with the FTP. Below, in Figures 51 and 52, are US06 PM data below
0.5 mg/mile from all PM measurement-capable test cells at an OEM laboratory over four
months. It is obvious that as the CVS flow rate increases (going from left to right on the figure
below), the net mass of PM on the filter decreases, approaching about 5 |ig at 1000 CFM where
larger light- duty vehicles and trucks will need to run. There is not much US06 data below 0.5
mg/mile available at CVS flow rates higher than 1000 CFM because the larger vehicles needing
those higher CVS flowrates generally have PM emissions higher than 0.5 mg/mile. The US06
data ranges from a CVS flowrate of 400 to 1000 CFM. Medium-duty vehicles, which are not
represented here because there is no data available and which must run at higher CVS flow rates
above 1000 CFM, will have lower net mass on the filter; lower than the tunnel background on
some vehicles, which will likely result in net negative calculated mass. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 160-164]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 51: Net mass on PM filters for FTP tests with
results below 0.5 mg PM/mile at various flowrates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 160-
164]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 52: Relationship between net filter mass and CVS
flow rate for vehicles with less than 0.5 mg/mile US06 emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 160-164]
f)Variability on US06 from Industry Round Robin (1st Quarter of 2022)
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Figure 53 presents PM data from a recent round robin program from 2022 with US06 testing.
Most of the laboratories' three-test average fell in between 0.6 and 0.95 mg/mile, except for one
laboratory which had two tests between 0.5 and 1.0 mg/mile and one very high test of 3.25
mg/mile. Previous round robin correlation programs have shown that almost all automaker and
government emission test laboratories occasionally experience this type of unusually high PM
results on US06 tests. The three-test US06 average at the laboratory with the high US06 results
was 1.6933 mg/mile and the 2-standard deviation was 2.6864 or 158% variability. The overall
laboratories' average was 0.913, the average 2-standard deviation between the labs was 0.862
mg/mile and the variability is 94% in this case. EPA should take this into consideration and
allow a re-test in the case when this occasional and exceedingly high US06 test PM result
happens during certification or confirmatory testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 160-
164]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 53: US06 PM test results from the 1Q2022
automaker/EPA interlaboratory correlation program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 160-
164]
g) Variability in Microbalance Filter Weighing
Figure 54, below, shows 25 repeat-weighing of a 100 mg metal mass by a microbalance using
a robotic auto-handler. The standard deviation is 0.4 jag and the range between the highest and
lowest measured values is 1.5 jag. The uncertainty due to microbalance instability in weighing
metal weights can be approximated as 0.8 |ig (2-standard deviations), assuming that effects of
ambient environmental conditions are negligible, the static charge effect is minimal since the
metal weight is made of stainless steel, and the Polonium strips within the weighing chamber are
effective at removing any static charge on the metal weight. Removing any static charge on the
metal weight is important, but there are ways other than the Polonium strips such as
neutralization by ionizer. Any operator handling is not relevant here since these are automatic
weight measurements performed by the robotic auto-handler independent of any operator
intervention. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 164-169]
A similar test was performed of 25 repeat measurements of the mass of a clean blank filter
(Figure 55). The filter was stationed inside the robotic auto-handler, did not leave the weighing
room, and was not handled by operators like is typically done on reference filters. The test
resulted in a 1.1 jag standard deviation and a range of 4.6 jag. The measurement of the clean PM
filter had almost three times the variability as the metal mass and almost three times the standard
deviation and range of measured values. This is evidence of the organic artifact compounds
present in ambient air which are adsorbed and desorbed by the filter and reported in many studies
by several researchers. The two-standard deviation in weighing a clean PTFE filter was 2.2 |ig.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 164-169]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 54: Repeated measurements of a 100 mg metal
weight. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 164-169]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 55: Repeated measurements of a clean PM
measurement filter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 164-169]
h) PM Testing at -7 °C
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The proposed Tier 4 PM standard of 0.5 mg/mile at -7 °C is unprecedented, and was not
considered in automaker emissions test laboratory designs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
164-169]
There are several complications in implementing PM testing at -7 degrees C; measuring PM
in an environmental test cell at -7 °C is not an easy task. This may require updated test
procedures to prevent condensing water vapor from depositing on the filter face, which can result
in high filter weight, leading to invalid tests. The number of invalid tests is expected to increase,
resulting in additional testing burden. In addition, -7 °C PM testing requires upgrades to testing
facilities to include full dilution tunnels, which were not designed for. In addition, these existing
test cells may not have enough space to add a full dilution tunnel, requiring major capital
upgrades to build new test cells. Also, commercially available PM samplers are not designed to
operate at below freezing temperatures, which will create another complication. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 164-169]
The following Figure 56 shows PM data from five -7 °C FTP tests, collected on a vehicle with
a new GPF. The error bar is based on two standard deviations, representing a 95% confidence
level. Variability is quite high in the testing, with the two standard deviation error exceeding the
average of the five tests. The two standard deviation error is equivalent to 114% of the five test
average, which is quite significant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 164-169]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 56: Results from five FTP tests at -7 °C for the
same vehicle with a new GPF. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 164-169]
In addition, five FTP tests at 25 °C and five US06 tests were also run on the same vehicle, in
the same test cell, and with the same driver as shown in Figures 57 (FTP) and 58 (US06), below.
On the FTP, the two standard deviation level is 48% of the five-test average, which is significant.
The US06 data shows a two standard deviation level equivalent to 90% of the five-test average.
It is obvious from the three sets of data that the -7 °C testing had the largest amount of variability
(114%>), followed by the US06 (90%) compared to their respect five-test averages. The data also
demonstrates that vehicles equipped with a GPF that pass the 25 °C FTP and US06 mg/mile
proposed PM standards are also likely to pass the same standard at -7 °C as shown in the NPRM.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 164-169]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 57: Results from five FTP tests at 25 °C for the
same vehicle, same driver, same test cell. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 164-169]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 58: Results from five US06 tests for the same
vehicle, same driver, same test cell. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 164-169]
Assuming the purpose of the proposed -7 °C FTP PM standard is to mandate the use of GPFs
to minimize PM emissions on all vehicles, vehicles passing the 0.5 mg/mile standard on the 25
°C FTP and US06 tests should also have PM emissions below 0.5 mg/mile on the -7 °C FTP test.
Requiring PM testing at -7 °C will add unnecessary and substantial testing burden on OEMs at a
time when industry resources are focused on the transitioning to electric vehicles. PM testing -7
°C is very demanding with a low validity rate, and would require most laboratories to undertake
expensive test cell upgrades. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 164-169]In summary,
- A -7 °C FTP PM standard will require major laboratory upgrades that EPA has not
considered in its proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 164-169]
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- A -7 °C FTP PM standard is not necessary and will not provide additional information or
emission reductions beyond what the 25 °C FTP and US06 provide. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 164-169]
- PM Testing at -7 °C has a high test-to-test variability and will significantly increase test
burden. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 164-169]
We recommend that EPA discard its proposed -7 °C FTP PM standard. If EPA decides to
adopt such a standard, we recommend that EPA exempt vehicles with GPFs from the standard.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 164-169]
i) Tunnel Blank Data
Tunnel blank particulate mass tests are performed in the laboratory without a vehicle to
characterize the background PM level of the test cell sampling systems as well as the variability
caused by artifacts weighed on the filter due to handling, static charge and other factors. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
Laboratories following 40 C.F.R. Part 1066 test procedures and PM best practices typically
observe average PM filter weight changes of less than 5 |ig for tunnel blank tests. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
The following Figure 59 shows the results from 836 tunnel blank particulate mass tests from
one ISO 17025 accredited laboratory following the 40 C.F.R. Part 1066 PM requirements and
best practice recommendations. The overall average tunnel blank filter weight change is 2.6 |ig.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
While 85% of the filter net weight change are less than 5 |ig, 12% were between 5 and 10 |ig
and 3% were between 10 and 20 |ig. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 59: Tunnel blank PM tests for a single laboratory,
Feb. 5, 2021 to Apr. 15, 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
Other automaker laboratories have similar trends of tunnel background, but with a higher
average and with backgrounds exceeding 25 |ig as shown in Figure 60, with each bar
representing one background test. The figure shows the range of variability of the tunnel
background. There are also a few background tests with negative mass which could be due to
filter handling by the operators, static charge removal or microbalance instability. The average
background is 6.63 |ig, and the standard deviation is 4.9 |ig which is quite high. The test cells run
different types of testing including gasoline, diesel, SC03 and OBD testing. It is clear whenever
there was a high background above 5 |ig followed by a lower one below 5 |ig, a tunnel cleaning
test was run in between and brought the background level down below 5 |ig. The buildup of PM
background may take a few vehicle tests or may reach very high value in a single test depending
on the test type and vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 60: Tunnel blank PM tests for another laboratory.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
j)Constant Volume Sampler (CVS) Flow by Test Weight and its Impact on PM Filter Net
Weight Change [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
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40 C.F.R. Part 1066 requires a CVS time-weighted dilution factor between 7:1 and 20:1 for
particulate mass sampling. The lower limit of 7:1 is required, in part, to prevent condensation in
the sampling system during testing. The upper limit of 20:1 is required to prevent over-dilution,
improving the signal to noise ratio for particulate mass measurements. In order to meet the Part
1066 requirements to prevent aqueous condensation and reduce the risk of invalid tests, a mid-
point dilution factor of ~ 14:1 is often targeted. The actual dilution factor for each test is
difficult to precisely control as it is impacted by many factors such as the actual exhaust flow
during the test, CVS flow rates available, CFV inlet temperature during the test and other factors.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
FTP test data at 20-30 °C demonstrates CVS flow rates can range from 200 CFM to 800 CFM
for light-duty vehicles and 300 CFM to 1100 CFM for medium-duty vehicles. (See Figure 61.) A
flowrate of 200 CFM is a typical minimum flow rate supported by laboratory systems. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 61: CVS Flow Rate Data for Light- and Medium-
Duty FTP Tests. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
CVS flow rates on US06 tests are higher than those of the FTP. Data at 20-30 °C
demonstrates CVS flow rates can range from 300 cfm to 1600 cfm for light-duty vehicles (Figure
62). There is limited US06 test data available for medium-duty vehicles
>############################ 10,000 lbs. These vehicles are currently required to perform
the LA92 cycle instead of the US06 cycle. By using US06 test data available through 9,000 lb.
ETW and extrapolating to 14,000 lbs. it is expected that CVS flow rates for medium-duty
vehicles on the US06 cycle may range from 600 cfm to over 2000 cfm. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 62: CVS Flow Rate Data for Light- and Medium-
Duty US06 Tests. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
The particulate filter net weight change at the 0.5 mg/mi standard decreases as the CVS flow
rate increases. The following Figure 63 illustrates the filter net weight change at the 0.5 mg/mi
standard for the FTP and US06 by CVS flow rate with the following assumptions: (1) for the
FTP test, the 40 C.F.R. Part 1066 single filter method with a filter face velocity during phase 2 of
135 cm/sec; (2) for the US06 test, a single particulate mass filter over the test with a filter face
velocity of 100 cm/sec. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
For the FTP test at the 0.5 mg/mi standard, the filter net weight can be as low as -13 |ig for
light-duty vehicles and below 10 jug for medium-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 169-175]
For the US06 test at the 0.5 mg/mi standard, the filter net weight can be as low as ~6 |ig for
light-duty vehicles and approaches 4 |ig for medium duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 169-175]
SEE ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT FOR Figure 63: Assessment of net PM filter weight
change by CVS flowrate at a 0.5 mg/mile standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-
175]
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The tunnel blank PM data above demonstrates that variability in the PM sampling, handling,
and weighing process without a vehicle can contribute up to, and periodically exceed, 20 |ig to
the PM filter. As shown in Figure 64, the tunnel blank PM net weight contribution alone at high
CVS flow rates can cause a compliant vehicle to exceed the 0.5 mg/mi standard. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 64: Overlay of tunnel blank PM testing and net
filter weight change at a 0.5 mg/mile standard for various by flowrate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 169-175]
K) Suggestions and Recommendations Based on Analysis of PM Measurement Capability
We recommend that that EPA adopt California LEV IV PM standards in whole. If EPA
proceeds with a different standard, then at a minimum, EPA should adopt 1 mg/mi until it is fully
phased in under LEV IV. In addition:
- EPA eliminate the requirement for PM testing at -7 °C. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 175-176]
- We recommend considering laboratory measurement variability and allowing re-tests for
exceedances during certification, confirmatory and in-use testing, especially for vehicles
equipped with diesel particulate filters or gasoline particulate filters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 175-176]
- Tunnel blank tests or background should be measured weekly. Dilution tunnel conditioning
and cleaning should be required to be performed whenever the tunnel blank or background
exceeds 5 |ig.276 Tunnel contamination and background will be very significant and can be
higher than the net mass of PM on the filter, which will affect the PM test results adding to the
uncertainty in measurement. Tunnel cleaning is typically a process of using high temperature
gasoline exhaust to remove PM entrained on the tunnel surfaces. For example, this can be
accomplished by operating a higher mass gasoline vehicle at steady state speeds (e.g., 80 mph)
for a period of time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 175-176]
276 Cleaning could entail running a low emission gasoline vehicle on repeated US06test cycles to heat the
tunnel, thereby removing entrained particulate matter.
- Tunnel Background correction should be required given the significant difference it can
make on test results, particularly at very low standard levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
p. 176]
- More appropriate reference filter limits should be required for light- and medium-duty
vehicles, for example +/- 5 |ig. The current Part 1065 reference filter validity limit of +/- 10 |ig
may be adequate for heavy-duty vehicles, but it is not adequate for testing at the 0.5 mg/mile
standard level for light- and medium-duty vehicles where the net mass on the filter can be less
than 10 |ig. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 176]
- Consider making Robotic auto handlers a requirement to minimize filter handling by
operators. This is important, particularly at independent laboratories that perform in- use testing.
Requirements should take effect after the appropriate lead time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 176]
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- Consider requiring single filter collection with flow weighing on the FTP to minimize the
impact of artifacts and to collect more mass on the filter. Requirements should take effect after
the appropriate lead time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 176]
- Finally, EPA should adopt interim in-use standards for the first two model years after a test
group certifies to a new EPA PM standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 176]4. PM
certification Test Requirements
EPA requests comment on whether pre-production PM certification testing should be
performed at the durability group level after lower PM standards are fully phased in.277 Auto
Innovators supports this proposal as a common-sense adjustment to test requirements following
demonstration of PM control at lower levels across the fleet during the phase-in. With the
increasing laboratory burden associated with testing electric vehicles, actions that reduce ICE
vehicle test burden while still ensuring emission control system efficacy are appreciated. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 176]
277 NPRM at 29269
F. Interim In-Use Standards
Auto Innovators recommends EPA provide interim in-use compliance standards for PM, early
drive-away, and US06 NMOG+NOx standards, consistent with the approach taken by CARB in
its LEV IV program.280 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 178]
280 See 13 C.C.R. § 1961.4(d)(2)(A)3., (2)(C)3., (3)(A)5.a., and (3)(A)5.b.
Notwithstanding our comments opposing EPA's proposed PM standards, we recommend that
test groups first certified to Tier 4 PM standards in the first four years of the program meet an in-
use standard 1 mg/mile higher than the certification standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
p. 178]
For early drive-away and US06 NMOG+NOx standards, we recommend that test groups first
certified to these Tier 4 standards in the first two years of the program meet an in-use standard
1.2 times their certification standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 178]
Vehicles will still certify to the new standards, but the interim in-use standards reduce the
jeopardy associated with new technology and more stringent standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, p. 178]
H. -7°C CO standard
EPA proposes a 10.0 mg/mi CO emissions cap for the -7°C FTP. This differs from the current
standards in that the same cap applies to all light-duty vehicles. For larger vehicles, CO emission
mass is larger and it takes more time to warm up the catalyst. Therefore, we request that EPA
maintain the current CO cap of 12.5 mg/mile for LDT2-4 and MDPV. We also note that there are
no CO non-attainment areas in the U.S., and vehicle CO emissions are declining.281 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 180]
281 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Green Book Carbon Monoxide (1971) area information.
htps ://www.epa.gov/green-book/green-book-carbon-monoxide-1971 -area-information.
C. Particulate Matter (PM) Requirement for MDVs
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4. Standard Alignment
Particulate mater requirements found in the Proposed Rule are misaligned and differ with
CARB Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC II) regulation both in standard level and required test
cycles. ACC II sets a particulate mater limit of 8 mg/mi and 10 mg/mi for Class 2b and Class 3
vehicles, respectively, on the FTP75 test cycle, whereas the proposed EPA standard is 0.5 mg/mi
across the same cycle. The jump in stringency from 8 mg/mi to 0.5 mg/mi represents a 16-20
times jump in stringency, depending on the weight category of vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.194-195]
Manufacturers have been developing products and product plans to meet the ACC II pPM
standard levels since that rulemaking process began in September of 2020. Investments and
development are already underway, and these costs should not be stranded. The lack of
alignment between standards will waste three years of development work, leaving it largely
abandoned. During a time of rapid industry transition, EPA's proposal would siphon funds away
from electrification efforts in the MDV segment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 194-195]
EPA should align the PM stringency for MDVs with the ACC II rules already promulgated by
California across the same timeframe of MY2027 to MY2032. This would provide for a
reasonable level of stringency in the requirements while allowing investment to continue to be
focused on increasing MDV electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 194-195]
Alternatively, if EPA chooses not to align with ACC II PM standards, an alternate standard is
needed, because the application of the same stringency level as LDVs for MDVs is neither
appropriate nor feasible. As documented in the PM Section above, EPA must recognize the lab
measurement limitations (lab-to-lab and test-to-test variability) for larger, heavier vehicles with
much higher exhaust flow rates is limited to 4 or 5 mg/mile for Class 2b and 3, respectively.
Because vehicles in the Medium-Duty segment are much heavier than LDV vehicles and are
used in different ways than their LDV counterparts, it makes sense to have a separate standard
level rather than apply one standard to every vehicle from a 2,000-pound subcompact passenger
car to a 7,000-pound Class 3 dually pickup truck with a 20,000-pound towing capacity. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 194-195]
5. Test Cycle Alignment
To minimize unnecessary test burden, EPA should align its test cycles with those of ACC II
and allow manufacturers to use US06 Bag 2 in place of the full US06 test for Particulate Mater
testing. This significantly reduces test burden without impacting environmental benefit. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 195]
2. IUMPR Systems with Active Regeneration
For active regeneration of a GPF, we believe that a special denominator is necessary. In
addition to the general denominator criteria, the denominator for monitors associated with active
regeneration of a GPF should only be incremented if, and only if, an active regeneration event is
commanded for a time greater than or equal to ten seconds, where "Active regeneration" of a
gasoline particulate filter is defined as the active control of the exhaust system (e.g., to increase
the exhaust system temperature) for the purpose of the regeneration of the particulate filter.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 249-250]
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Also, we would also like to work with EPA staff to clarify the de-greening process and the
starting mileage when the GPF is expected to achieve compliant filtration efficiency. The de-
greening of a GPF is directly linked to the clear definition of a proper regeneration (frequency)
and the proper detection of defective sensing systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
249-250]
3. GPF Monitoring Requirements
a) Detection Requirements
When developing a GPF monitor, manufacturers often target six-sigma separation between
worst performing acceptable (WPA or "good parts") and best performing unacceptable (BPU or
"bad parts"). To achieve this separation, there needs to be enough separation in systems that
meet the emission standard and those that should turn on the MIL for the OBD threshold. As the
emission standards decrease, the OBD threshold multiplier needs to increase to provide
necessary separation for a robust monitor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
We propose to revise the language found in (§ 86.1806-27 (h)(2)(i), to read: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
If there is no failure or deterioration of the PM filter that could cause a vehicle to exceed the
specified PM emission level, [Strikethrough: the system must detect a malfunction if the PM
filter allows free flow of exhaust through the PM filter assembly where 30 percent or less of the
normal filtration is occurring] [In Red: [Underline: the OBD II system shall detect a malfunction
when no detectable amount of PM filtering occurs . . .]] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
250-251]
This revision aligns with CARB's long-standing precedent for detection requirements and this
revision is the only option that is feasible with today's commercially available sensing
technology. Figure 81 below shows delta pressure curves as a function of exhaust flow from a
completely intact substrate and completely missing substrate. For a robust diagnostic,
manufacturers require at least six-sigma separation between these curves. At low exhaust flows
(of the Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP) or FTP drive cycle),
there is practically no separation between a fully intact substrate and a missing substrate. There is
more separation at higher exhaust flows, as shown, but most of the higher exhaust flows are off
cycle (i.e., higher exhaust flow than a US06). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
The below example data with a delta pressure sensor shows the lack separation between an
intact and missing substrate. Requiring detection of a filter flowing 30% of normal would further
reduce the limited separation between "intact substrate" and "missing substrate". Therefore,
robust detection with this sensing technology is not possible for any partial failure modes of the
GPF. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
As demonstrated in the graph below, the delta pressure versus exhaust flow curves also
illustrates the challenge for meeting In-Use Monitor Performance Ratio (IUMPR) minimum
ratios for missing substrate detection. One way to address this could be by defining a special
denominator for this monitor. Following previous and current examples from both CARB and
European Union (EU) regulations regarding monitoring of Diesel Particulate Filter (DPF), the
following special denominator criteria are needed to ensure that the IUMPR requirements can be
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met. We recommend that EPA add the following GPF special denominator criteria: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
- Minimum of 500 miles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
- High enough exhaust flow rate is achieved for a specified amount of time, and [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
- Alternate or additional denominator criteria, with Administrator approval. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
[See original for graph. "Figure 81: Delta Pressure vs Exhaust Flow Rate"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
c) Passive Regeneration
As it pertains to regeneration, if a manufacturer designs their GPF system to not require
periodic active regenerations (or to not have a "periodically active regenerating system"), then
the manufacturer should not be subject to § 86.1806-27(h)(2)(ii), (iii), or Infrequent
Regeneration Adjustment Factors (IRAF) during emission demonstration. Auto Innovators
proposes to add a definition of a "Periodically regenerating system" to be defined as a system
that requires active regeneration less frequently than 4,000 km/2,500 miles on a 25 deg C FTP.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 252-253]
Regen frequency monitoring is required for major monitors for diesel particulate filter (DPF)
systems due to infrequent active regeneration, or periodically regenerating system. Diesel
aftertreatment systems typically experience much lower exhaust gas temperatures, which limits
passive regeneration. GPF systems, on the other hand, often experience exhaust gas temperatures
of 600-650 deg C, which promotes passive regeneration. Passive regeneration is a physical
phenomenon, not a control strategy or design feature. Passive, or continuous, regeneration is
non-intrusive and occurs naturally due to operating conditions without any intervention from the
control system and has no emissions impact. This occurs when the temperature inside the GPF is
at or above 600C, which is not equal to the inlet temperature of the after-treatment system. As
shown in Figure 82 below, the catalytic process increases exhaust temperature so that values
greater than 600C commonly occur inside the after- treatment on all regulated driving cycles. In
OEMs' experience, significant passive regeneration occurs not just on the US06, but also on the
FTP (i.e., "on all regulated drive cycles"). GPF systems can be regenerated passively (without
active regeneration) for thousands of standard drive cycle miles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 252-253]
[See original for graph, "Figure 82: Exhaust Gas Temperature vs Speed"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 252-253]
Auto Innovators proposes that manufacturer systems without "periodic regeneration systems"
not be subject to § 86.1806-27 (h)(2)(ii) and (iii) since passive regeneration cannot be monitored
for too frequent occurrence or inefficiency because it is not intrusive and is not commanded by
the control strategy. Additionally, for (iii), because GPFs rely on passive regeneration without
intervention from the control system, GPF overloading or clogging is the result of vehicle
operation or some other fault, not the regeneration strategy failing to adequately regenerate the
filter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 252-253]
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For vehicles that use periodic regeneration, we recommend replacing the "1.5x the applicable
FTP standard" with the multipliers that vary based on the certification level (e.g., a Binl5 would
have a multiplier of 3.33x the FTP standard) consistent with CARB OBD II thresholds in 13
CCR 1968.2 which are shown in Figures 83-86 below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
252-253]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
As previously mentioned, EPA did not fully consider the impact of the rule on fleet turnover.
The Agency is aware that the higher purchase price of new ZEVs will keep older cars and trucks
on the road longer and that new ZEVs will increase particulate matter ("PM") emissions through
increased tire and road wear. In another example of EPA's biased analysis, EPA estimated the
value of health benefits from reductions in PM2.5 emissions by multiplying PM2.5-related
benefit- per-ton ("BPT") values by the annual reduction in tons of directly emitted PM2.5 and
PM2.5 precursor emissions (NOx and S02) from displaced ICEVs.206 However, EPA ignored
the fleet turnover benefit that would result from replacing older ICEVs with new, more efficient,
ICEVs. EPA also ignored its own National Emissions Inventory, which shows that roadway dust
contributes more PM2.5 emissions than the tailpipe. Roadway dust emissions, including particles
from tire wear, are correlated with vehicle weight, so increases in fleet average vehicle weight
would be expected to increase roadway dust PM2.5 emissions.207 Converting ICEs to ZEVs
under the Proposal would significantly increase the average vehicle weight on U.S. roadways,
which in turn would increase the entrained road dust emissions. Yet EPA did not include these
PM sources or increases in the analysis. There also exist overall medium-duty truck weight
restrictions, which could require a greater number of ZEVs to move the same tonnage of cargo,
thus increasing the number of vehicles needed to haul the same amount of freight, vehicle miles
traveled, and resulting PM emissions. EPA also ignores the GHG emissions associated with
manufacturing more, less dense, remotely located intermittent generation sources and battery
back-up, plus the need for more natural gas peaking capacity and massive transmission,
substation, and transformer investment to integrate these technologies into the power grid. Those
emissions are significant and may offset or eliminate the benefits that EPA calculates. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 45]
206 DRIA at 7-36.
207 EPA, "2020 National Emissions Inventory (NEI) Data," available at https://www.epa.gov/air-
emissions- inventories/2020-national-emissions-inventory-nei-data.
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
B. Particulate Matter Standards
One of the more surprising aspects of the NPRM is the deviation between proposed federal
criteria emissions standards and the C alifornia Air Resources Board's LEV IV emissions
standards finalized for the state of California just last year. While news coverage of the latter was
largely focused on the state's zero emission vehicle requirements, air quality advocates widely
hailed California's LEV IV program as a challenging but achievable set of new emissions
requirements. Notably, those included phased-in 25°C FTP 1.0 mg/mi particulate matter (PM)
standards from LEV III along with US06 3.0 mg/mi PM standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0652, p. 10]
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Automakers, including Honda, maintained strong dialogue with California regulators during
the development of LEV IV, and had a robust understanding of CARB's decision for
maintaining 25°C FTP 1.0 mg/mi PM standards. Given the ongoing open dialogue between
CARB and EPA technical staff, and traditional close coordination between the two agencies,
Honda believed it was reasonable to assume that federal PM emission standards would likely
align with CARB's latest program. Development activities for Honda's internal combustion
engine products were based on that assumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 10-11]
As it turns out, EPA proposed federal PM standards that far exceed even CARB's recently
adopted LEV IV requirements. As shown in Table 1 below, not only has the agency proposed a
standard that is nominally twice as stringent as California's, but moreover, EPA calls for that
stringency to be met under the 25°C FTP test and two additional significantly more challenging
test procedures - the US06 high-speed/high- load test cycle, and the -7°C FTP cold test. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 10-11]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table 1. Comparison of California and Federal PM
Standards, including EPA Proposal [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 10-11]
Note: The above table is a high-level comparison of PM emissions standards and test
procedures across regulatory programs. It should not be considered a comprehensive summary of
emissions requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 10-11]
Relative to the meaningful emissions improvements that could be driven by a nationwide
adoption of California's LEV IV PM requirements, EPA's proposed PM standards represent a
highly disruptive distraction to Honda as we seek to focus our resources on vehicle
electrification. Honda strongly urges the agency to reconsider its proposed federal PM
requirements, and instead align with California's LEV IV requirements [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0652, p. 11]
Difficulty of measuring 0.5 mg/mi using gravimetric filter-based techniques [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0652, pp.11-12]
The exceedingly low PM mass levels proposed by the agency in this rulemaking raise
significant concern over whether compliance with such requirements can even be meaningfully
ascertained, given the high potential for test-to-test variability. As noted in comments submitted
into this rulemaking Docket by our trade association, Auto Innovators, numerous possible
sources of variability exist that could contribute to increased measurement uncertainty,
including: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 11-12]
- Operator filter handling [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 11-12]
- Filter weight gain during movement from weigh room to test cell [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0652, pp.11-12]
- Tunnel contamination due to prior testing in the test cell [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652,
pp.11-12]
- Static charge removal from filters at extremely low mass levels [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0652, pp. 11-12]
- Cell-to-cell variability [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 11-12]
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-Lab-to-lab offsets [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 11-12]
- Vehicle variability [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 11-12]
- Driver variability [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 11-12]
-Fuel differences [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 11-12]
With respect to the final bullet above, the lack of a particulate matter index (PMI) standard for
certification fuel (see PMI discussion below) means EPA and OEM laboratories could each be
using a certification fuel with very different PM-forming propensities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0652, pp.11-12]
These concerns notwithstanding, the agency suggests that 0.5 mg/mi standards would not
represent a challenge from a measurement and repeatability standpoint: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0652, p. 12]
Current test procedures, as outlined in 40 CFR part 1066, allow robust gravimetric PM
measurements well below the proposed PM standard of 0.5 mg/mi. Repeat measurements in EPA
laboratories, at different levels of PM below 0.5 mg/mi, are shown in Figure 17. The size of the
error bars relative to the measurement averages at and below 0.5 mg/mi demonstrates that the
measurement methodology is sufficiently precise to support a 0.5 mg/mi standard. Other than
selecting test settings appropriate for quantifying low PM, no test procedure changes are
needed. 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 12]
18 88 Fed. Reg. 29268 (May 5, 2023)
The figure referenced in the above quote shows measurements as low as 0.1 mg/mi with
extremely tight standard deviations, though based on the agency's explanatory text, it is not even
clear an actual vehicle was tested. 19 In Honda's view, the agency downplays challenges
associated with PM measurement levels this low. An interlaboratory study (ILS) was conducted
in 2021 by ASTM under real- world conditions in multiple automaker labs, in which inter- and
intra-laboratory precision was investigated for the 1065/66 test methods.20 That is,
reproducibility (R) and repeatability (r) were determined. In virtually every instance, the R and r
values of the four tested vehicles greatly exceeded the proposed 0.5 mg/mi standard for both the
FTP75 and US06 test cycles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 12]
19 The title of Figure 17 suggests the chart may have been generated with tests using an aerosol generator,
as opposed to actual vehicle testing. No additional detail is provided by the agency.
20 ASTM, 2021. "Interlaboratory Study to Establish Precision Statements for ASTM D8108-21, Standard
Test Method for Determination of Particulate Matter Mass from Light Duty Mobile Sources (Gravimetric
Method)." Research Report: D22-2001.
Beyond measurement challenges, the agency's proposed PM standards also present a number
of practical challenges. While state-of-the-art research laboratories may be able to yield an
exceedingly low emissions measurement (setting aside the accuracy of that measurement), the
agency does not appear to recognize that industry labs must have the flexibility to test a range of
vehicles. Once dirtier vehicles are tested in a laboratory, the accuracy of any subsequent hyper-
stringent PM test would be called into question. The updating of all industry laboratories to
achieve such capabilities is unreasonable, particularly within the accelerated compliance timeline
proposed by the agency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 12-13]
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Similarly, it is unreasonable for EPA to assume that automakers could dedicate entire
laboratories solely to ultra-low PM measurement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 12-13]
The agency's proposed PM standard would prompt additional system on-cost and require
OBD for vehicles containing GPFs. This would require significant investment and coordination
with suppliers to achieve a product that meets OBD requirements of light duty vehicles during a
time when OEMs are reducing investment and workforce developing vehicles with ICE
powertrains. A specific technology is not required to meet 0.5 mg/mi, but it is well known in the
industry that GPFs would be required to meet this standard for the three test cycles proposed (-
7°C FTP, 25°C FTP, and US06). In addition, the cost analysis done by EPA does not appear to
include GPF post-warranty consumer costs, where the consumer may be responsible for an entire
GPF replacement later in a vehicle's life. Metallic ash builds up in a GPF (from engine oil, etc.)
and cannot be removed via regeneration. This cost may fall to subsequent owners of the vehicle,
including used vehicle purchasers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 14]
Further, the agency appears to have ignored many of the costs associated with GPF
application on vehicles. The process of applying a GPF to a vehicle for which it was previously
not designed requires far more than simply affixing a device on a car or truck. A re-examination
of the emissions system must be undertaken, including possible engine redesign, software
changes, OBD modifications, and even potential exhaust plumbing modifications, the latter of
which would potentially incur frame-related costs as well. Finally, the added exhaust back
pressure of adding a GPF will reduce engine output and degrade vehicle performance. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 14]
Recommendation: Honda respectfully requests the agency re-examine the full breadth of costs
and vehicle performance impacts associated with GPF application as part of its Final Rule.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 14]
Proposed federal PM standards would only marginally benefit non-attainment areas [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 15]
As noted in EPA's Proposed Reconsideration of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
for Particulate Matter (reproduced here as Figure 1), counties still needing reductions to meet
10/35 |ig/m3 levels reside almost exclusively in California.25 That state, of course, has an
implementation plan to address PM emissions, including the LEV IV emissions package and
aggressive electrification mandates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 15]
25 U.S. EPA, "2017 National Emissions Inventory: January 2021 Updated Release, Technical Support
Document," February 2021. Interactive data queries available online at https://www.epa.gov/air-emissions-
inventories/2017- national-emissions-inventory-nei-data
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 1. Counties that Still Need PM2.5 Emissions
Reductions for Proposed Alternative Standard Level of 10/35 |ig/m3. Source: EPA. The 2022
EPA Automotive Trends Report: Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Fuel Economy, and Technology
since 1975, p. 71. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 15]
Would a nationwide federal 0.5 mg/mi standard help California achieve its PM2.5 emissions
reductions needs? Mathematically, only marginally so: assuming industry compliance with
California's ZEV regulation, which calls for EVs to make up 50% of the state's new vehicle
sales by 2028, a shift of PM requirements in California from 1.0 mg/mi to 0.5 mg/mi for the
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remaining ICE fleet (600,000 units) would yield just 65 additional tons over the life of those
vehicles - less than 1% of the amount needed to address the state's PM2.5 emissions reduction
shortfall, as identified by EPA.26 27 Given the near ubiquitous PM2.5 attainment across the rest
of the nation, and the fact that LEV IV will already meaningfully help address PM2.5 emissions
in California and elsewhere, it is not clear why EPA is choosing to pursue this costly and highly
disruptive policy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 15]
26 EPA, 2023. Reconsideration of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter.
Available online at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-01-27/pdf/2023-00269.pdf
27 EPA, 20022. Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Reconsideration of the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, Table ES-4. Available online at
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-01/naaqs-pm_ria_proposed_2022-12.pdf
Marginal benefit of PM standards beyond LEV IV is exceedingly limited] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0652, p. 17]
Improving the PM performance of new vehicles from 1.0 mg/mi to 0.5 mg/mi would have a
limited, perhaps undetectable, marginal benefit on the PM inventory, which is largely impacted
by non-road sources. As shown in Figure 2 below, EPA's own data show that on-road non-diesel
light duty vehicles account for less than one percent of PM2.5 emissions in the United States, a
level dwarfed by other sources such as wildfires, agriculture and unpaved road dust.30 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 17]
30 U.S. EPA, "2017 National Emissions Inventory: January 2021 Updated Release, Technical Support
Document," February 2021. Interactive data queries available online at https://www.epa.gov/air-emissions-
inventories/2017- national-emissions-inventory-nei-data
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 2. 2017 National PM2.5 Emissions, by Source -
PM2.5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 17]
By our math, a decision to finalize PM standards as proposed, instead of setting a nationwide
standard aligned with California's LEV IV PM requirement, would further improve the PM2.5
inventory a mere 0.05% - even after full turnover of the vehicle fleet. In intervening years,
benefits would be even lower, as emissions standards only deliver an improvement on the
emissions performance of new vehicles subject to the updated standards. By contrast, a
nationwide standard aligned with California's LEV IV PM requirement would deliver reasonable
(albeit still modest) PM reductions from vehicles but do so in a far more efficient and less costly
manner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 17]
Recommendation: Honda strongly urges the agency to reconsider its decision regarding
federal PM stringency and the inclusion of a -7°C FTP PM test requirement, and instead align
federal PM emission standards and test procedures with existing California LEV IV
requirements. Doing so would deliver continued PM emissions reductions across the country
without forcing unnecessary ICE development and test cell upgrade costs upon manufacturers
that are seeking to more efficiently direct resources toward vehicle electrification [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 17-18]
-7°C FTP 0.5 mg/mi proposed limit [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 13-14]
As noted above, EPA proposes that OEMs comply with a 0.5 mg/mi standard not just under
the 25°C FTP test, but also under the high-speed US06 and cold -7°C FTP tests. With respect to
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the latter, there are presently only a modest number of laboratories with a cold chamber test cell
capable of testing vehicles at -7°C, and even fewer that are also able to test exceedingly low PM
levels. With EPA now proposing stringent PM measurement under these cold temperature test
conditions, the availability of those laboratories will be even more limited. Further restricting
testing resources is the question of whether such a lab is configured with the dilution tunnel
inside or outside the cold chamber. For labs with tunnels inside the chamber, significant
investment must be made to reconfigure/insulate/heat the dilution tunnel, and - if not already
configured in this manner for PM sampling - possibly add heating and dehumidification to the
dilution air to ensure condensation-free dilute exhaust. It does not appear that the agency has
quantified the costs associated with industry-wide laboratory and testing upgrades necessary to
meet its proposed cold -7°C FTP PM testing regimen. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 13-
14]
In order for an engine to have stable combustion at -7°C and avoid misfire, a calibration for
slightly rich operation during cold start is required. This is well understood by the agency, as
illustrated by the regulation requirements for this test to encompass evaluation of CO and
NMHC. During rich operation, particle mass (filter) measurements will include the excess fuel
and SVOCs from the cold engine start. This stands in contrast to the European Union's (EU)
process for measuring particle number (PN), in which SVOCs are first stripped off, prior to
measurement of PN using highly reproducible electronic instrumentation. Significantly, the
current (Euro 6d) standard for particle mass is 4.5 mg/km (7.2 mg/mi),21 using a filter method
similar to that used in the U.S. in which the SVOCs are not stripped off. As such, EPA's
proposal goes well beyond the EU regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 13-14]
21 Euro standards use the Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP), generally
regarded as less onerous than U.S. test procedures.
To be clear, the agency's inclusion of a -7°C FTP PM test amounts to a de facto gasoline
particulate filter (GPF) requirement; the proposed stringency, at that temperature, simply cannot
be met without such a device. It appears the agency is keenly aware of the presence of GPF
technology on vehicles elsewhere in the world and has proposed a testing regimen to force the
inclusion of GPFs in the United States as well. Indeed, in the proposal, EPA points to "GPF-
forcing" requirements of other countries' regulations: "All pure GDI vehicles in India also have
to meet similar GPF-forcing standards starting in 2023."22 Recognizing, as noted above, that
regulatory programs around the world have distinct structural and test procedure differences, the
presence (or lack) of a technology elsewhere should not be a basis upon which to set emissions
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 13-14]
22 88 Fed. Reg. 29268 (May 5, 2023)
Organization: American Lung Association (ALA) et al.
EPA has proposed important reductions in fine particles from new vehicles across various
testing cycle to better respond to — and control for — real-world driving conditions. The EPA
standards are estimated to result in widespread use of gasoline particle filters to meet the
standards. Filters are currently standard equipment on some vehicle models sold in European and
Chinese markets and should be the norm to control this carcinogenic pollutant on equivalent
models sold in American communities. We support EPA's robust approach to controlling fine
particle emissions from new engines and encourage EPA to consider accelerating the phase-in to
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require 100% of the new vehicle fleet in MY 2027 to use gasoline particle filters and set strong
assurances for ongoing function and maintenance of these critical emission controls. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0745, p. 3]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
EPA has also not demonstrated that a particulate matter (PM) 0.5 mg/mi limit is
technologically feasible on the basis of measurement capabilities and test procedure. EPA has
stated that the agency is not reopening the test procedures, nor does the agency believe that test
procedure changes are required, to PM for the proposed PM standards. The agency fails in
justifying this decision. The EPA needs to reconsider if it is possible to measure PM emissions
of 0.5 mg/mile accurately with current methods. The test set utilized in the NPRM to suggest that
test-to-test repeatability is sufficiently precise to support a 0.5 mg/mile standard was noted to use
an aerosol generator, presumably to generate PM. In contrast an actual engine will produce PM
with more composition and concentration variability, which could impact repeatability. Further,
FCA reported32 the challenges of measuring 1 mg/mile of PM. It can be assumed that these
uncertainties would only increase for a PM target of 0.5 mg/mile "[a]s the PM standard is
transitioning to 1 mg/mile, this study showed that the net PM mass on the filter will be
approaching tunnel ambient background levels. At these net filter PM mass levels, the sources of
errors in measurement are numerous. If these sources of errors are not mitigated, the uncertainty
can be substantial exceeding the PM limit of 1 mg/mile." It is important to highlight that the
2023 EPA certification vehicle test data shows that there were approximately 83 carline models
(out of approximately 376 carlines tested on US06) that achieved a certification level of
emissions of 0 gm/mile (and a rounded emission test results level below 0.5 mg/mile) of PM on
the US06 drive cycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 12]
32 Yassine, M., "Challenges in PM Measurement at 1 mg/mile and Tunnel Background Correction," SAE
Technical Paper 2023-01-0370, 2023, https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0370.
EPA fails to properly account for all of the cost increases associated with the enforcement of
gasoline particulate filter (GPF) technologies. The GPF cost model is described in DRIA Chapter
3.2 and GPF cost is included in the OMEGA model. The model anticipates the direct
manufacturing cost (DMC) for a bare downstream GPF, which ranges from $51 dollars for a 1.0-
liter engine using a relatively low GPF 249 volume to engine displacement ratio, up to $166
dollars for a 7.0 liter engine using a relatively high GPF volume to engine displacement ratio. In
the DRIA (page 3-60) GPF cost is based on the ICCT 2011 work, which is now over 10 years
old. Further, the EPA assumes that the GPFs that OEMs will utilize to meet more stringent PM
and GHG targets will be those new generation of MY 2022 GPFs with "high filtration
efficiencies generally over 95 percent" and low backpressure. The assumed costs for MY 2022
GPF with higher efficiency appear to be unreasonably low and caused the modeling to
overestimate feasibility. Furthermore, it is not clear if the associated equipment for effective
operation of the GPF such as associated sensors and controllers are included in the cost
assessment performed by EPA. The agency should reevaluate its assessment based on more
realistic efficiency levels to avoid arbitrary and capricious action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, p. 13]
Another issue with the proposed PM standards is related to the new testing requirement at -
7°C in the Federal Test Procedure (FTP) cycle. In the NPRM EPA states "as was the case for
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light-duty vehicles, the -7°C FTP cycle is crucial because it differentiates Tier 3 levels of PM
from GPF-level PM and because -7°C is an important real-world temperature that addresses
uncontrolled cold PM emissions in Tier 3." The temperature selection of -7°C (19.4°F) is
arbitrary and capricious because it is not a real-world temperature applicable to a large portion of
the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) data of winter temperature
averages for every state from 1971 to 2000 33 suggests that only Alaska, North Dakota,
Minnesota, Maine, Wisconsin and Vermont have average winter temperatures below -7°C. 34
The winter average of all 50 states is 0.1 °C (32. °F), which further suggests that a temperature of
-7°C is not a real-world temperature. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 12]
33 "Winter Temperature Averages for Every State": https://www.currentresults.com/Weather/US/average-
state- temperatures-in-winter.php.
34 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, these states account for less than 5% of the population of the
United States ("State Population Totals and Components of Change: 2020-2022":
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time- series/demo/popest/2020s-state-total.html).
Organization: Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ)
Additionally, given Arizona's climate, ADEQ is particularly interested in EPA's plans to adopt
proven technologies such as Gasoline Particulate Filters (GPF) as part of its proposed pathways
for industries. As Arizona has several particulate matter nonattainment areas, ADEQ supports
adoption of GPF technology that is proven to reduce combustion engine tail pipe particulate
emissions by over 95 percent.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0533, p. 1]
2 88 FR 29184, 29197 (May 5, 2023)
Organization: Aston Martin Lagonda (AML)
4. PARTICULATE MATTER
EPA's proposed PM reduction to 0.5 mg/mi across the FTP and US06 and Cold Testing goes
far beyond what SVMs are able to achieve in a short period of time [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0566, pp. 11-12]
EPA's proposed PM reduction to 0.5 mg/mi across the FTP and US06 and Cold Testing is an
enormous increase in stringency over a short period of time. This is a regulatory combination
that SVMs simply cannot meet. We recognize that the regulation of PM is headed towards
necessitating the use of Gasoline Particulate Filters (GPF), but further research and development
is needed with respect to GPF aging and monitoring for purposes of California OBD. This issue
is not yet fully understood and requires more lead-time under the CAA section 202(a). [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 11-12]
In addition, there are also technical issues and costs associated with measuring PM emissions
below 1 mg/mile, and specialized, expensive test facilities may be needed to reliably measure
PM at such a low level. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 11-12]
It is thus unreasonable to impose the proposed PM standards and timetable on SVMs,
especially considering the minimal environmental benefit obtained together with how drastic the
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proposed change is compared to existing Tier 3 levels and the CARB ACCIIPM standards, as
shown in the graph below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 11-12]
[See original attachment for bar graph of Tailpipe PM Limit [mg/mi]] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0566, pp.11-12]
In sum, as regards SVMs and PM, EPA should harmonize with the CARB ACC/1 SVM PM
approach as follows:
FTP
- For MY 2027-2028 - 3 mg/mile.
- For MY 2029 and later - 1 mg/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 11-12]
SFTP
- For MY 2027 - 2029 - 6 mg /mi
- For MY 2030 and later - 3 mg/mi [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 11-12]
No Cold Testing for SVMs given that it is not yet fully understood what is needed to
meet the 0.5mg standard at 20F with high-performance engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0566, pp. 11-12]
We further note the above levels and timetable are consistent with the EU regulation of PM.
GPFs will be necessary on all European engines in 2030 with the implementation of EU7's
mandating PM measurement for both Port Fuel Injection Engines and Gasoline Direct Injection
Engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 11-12]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Criteria Air Pollutant Standards
CARB supports U.S. EPA's proposal to tighten criteria air pollutant emission standards,
particularly given the continued role that internal combustion engine vehicles will play in the
national fleet over the regulatory timeframe and beyond. Reducing exposure to harmful air
pollution is a key element of the proposed standards, and the proposals to tighten criteria air
pollutant emissions are needed to protect public health, especially in communities with
disproportionate exposure to air pollution. Because U.S. EPA's proposal does not require ZEV
sales, as California's rules do, the tightening of criteria air pollutant emission standards is even
more critical to ensure that the internal combustion engine vehicles that will continue to be sold
are becoming cleaner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 26-27]
As part of its ACC II rulemaking, CARB adopted its fourth iteration of its Low Emission
Vehicle (LEV) standards, referred to as LEV IV. CARB finds that U.S. EPA's proposals are
appropriate and largely consistent with the LEV IV standards. CARB has documented our
analysis and recommends strengthening the proposal to realize the greatest degree of emission
reductions achievable, considering cost and technology availability, to further protect public
health. As described further below, CARB recommends that U.S. EPA adopt its proposed
NMOG+NOx and PM standards, adopt elements of CARB's evaporative emission standards
program, and eliminate the use of commanded enrichment as proposed while collecting
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additional information on the use of auxiliary emissions control devices to further improve
emission standards in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 26-27]
Particulate Matter Emission Standards
CARB supports U.S. EPA's proposal to lower the PM emission standards for light- and
medium-duty vehicles for all test cycles to ensure robust PM control under broad operating
conditions. CARB's ACC I PM standards are lower than U.S. EPA's Tier 3 standards for the
FTP cycle, and the ACC II regulations expanded lower PM standards to more test cycles to
achieve the same desired outcome of robust PM control. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp.
33-34]
At the time of CARB's original adoption of its standards in 2012, the gasoline particulate
filter technology that U.S. EPA is now relying on was not as well developed to support such
stringent levels. Since that time, however, the technology has matured and been deployed
industry-wide in the European vehicle fleet, confirming its technology readiness. But under the
ACC II regulations, the ZEV requirements necessarily reduce the fraction of conventional
vehicles at a pace that minimized the additional benefit from a further reduction in the PM FTP
standards in California. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 33-34]
On a national level, in contrast, CARB supports the proposed PM standards given that the
proposed standards as a whole do not have a parallel path to effectively eliminate emissions from
new vehicles. In the absence of this certainty of future zero-emission standards, the proposed PM
standards will ensure over the long term that PM emissions are reduced to the maximum extent
feasible from vehicles driven in California (and elsewhere, especially in cold climates) even if
they were not originally sold here. U.S. EPA's proposed PM standards are appropriate for
protecting public health and reducing exposure to PM, especially for residents of disadvantaged
communities that are in close proximity to busy roadways. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp.
33-34]
Further, on the issue of measurement capabilities of low levels of PM, CARB previously
addressed the technical feasibility as part of its LEV III MTR. 44 As a part of the MTR, staff
conducted a technical review to determine if the gravimetric PM mass measurement method was
appropriate for the 1 mg/mi standard. The technical review was conducted by CARB in
collaboration with U.S. EPA, industry, and other stakeholders. The review process included
extensive studies, testing, and laboratory evaluation of PM emissions at 1 mg/mi and below. The
results of the technical review of the PM standards were presented by staff to the Board in
October 2015. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 33-34]
44 CARB. ACC PM Measurement Feasibility. October 2015.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/board/books/2015/102215/15-8-9pres.pdf.
As a result of these studies, CARB concluded that the gravimetric method prescribed for the
FTP driving cycle, in conjunction with appropriate laboratory practices, has a measurement
precision of 0.1 mg/mi, even when measuring emission rates less than 1 mg/mi. This method can
precisely measure PM emissions to determine compliance with a standard of 0.5 mg/mi. 45 It
should also be noted that such analysis was conducted on low-PM-emitting vehicles that had a
higher level of vehicle test-to-test variability than what is observed in U.S. EPA's test data for
vehicles equipped with a gasoline particulate filter. As this technology is a mechanical wall-flow
filtering device with a high trapping efficiency, it inherently dampens variations in engine-out
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PM emissions and produces more consistent results at very low PM levels, thereby reducing one
element of concern regarding measurement precision at low PM levels. This further
demonstrates that the proposed PM standard is feasible and appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp. 33-34]
45 CARB. An Update on the Measurement of PM Emissions at LEV III Levels. October 2015. p. 23.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
01/lev_iii_pm_measurement_feasibility_tsd_20151008_ac.pdf
Organization: David Pedersen
I agree with and support the agency's objective of reducing air-pollutant emissions from
internal combustion engines in automobiles. Since there is no safe level of air pollution ("As the
author of the Clean Air Act, Senator Edmund Muskie, later admitted, "[o]ur public health
scientists and doctors have told us that there is no threshold, that any air pollution is harmful."
Susan E. Dudley and Marcus Peacock, "Improving Regulatory Science: A Case Study of the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards",
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/696956), it is critical that emissions from
automobiles be reduced as much as possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0518, p. 1]
However, I strongly disagree with the proposed standards that would require the use of
gasoline particulate filters (GPFs). Back around 2001, the agency promulgated particulate-matter
(PM) standards for compression-ignition (i.e. diesel) engines that essentially triggered the use of
diesel particulate filters (DPFs), which have been nothing short of disastrous. Independent
laboratory testing by Transport and Environment - a renowned European non-governmental
organization and environmental group - found that PM emissions from DPFs themselves exceed
legal limits by a factor of 1000 (see "New diesels' particle emissions spike to 1,000 times normal
levels in tests", https://www.transportenvironment.org/discover/new-diesels-particle-emissions-
spike- 1000-times-normal-levels-tests/, or see attachment "New-diesels-new-problems-
filters.png"). I myself experienced this firsthand when I was engulfed by a thick plume of smoke
from a regenerating particulate filter while walking home one day last year (see screenshot,
attachment "Screenshot 2023-06-20 at 16-43-08 Ford Transit 2013 DPF Regen part 2.png", for
example). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0518, p. 1]
Additionally, a 2023 study found that exhaust particulate filters don't remove ultrafine
particles (UFPs), which are far more hazardous than coarse, fine, and very-fine particulate matter
("Ultrafine particle concentrations remain in the "high" category as defined by WHO."
Damayanti et al., Limited impact of diesel particle filters on road traffic emissions of ultrafine
particles, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160412023001617). DPFs were
also found to increase MTT (3-(4,5-dimethylthiazol-2-yl)-2,5-diphenyltetrazolium bromide)
cytotoxicity compared to non-DPF sources
(https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0269749118332135) - see attachment
"CytotoxicityPAHsVariousSources.png". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0518, p. 1]
Multiple vehicle owners have also reported frequent breakdowns as a result of clogged or
otherwise-defective particulate filters, while others have experienced vehicle fires
(https://dieselnet.com/news/2011/10cleaire.php) and even explosion hazards
(https://www.worksafebc.com/en/resources/health-safety/risk-advisory/explosion-or-fire-from-
diesel-particulate-filter-dpf-systems?lang=en) as a result of them. This should trigger a
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prohibition on the use of such filters, as the Clean Air Act prohibits the EPA from considering
any control technologies that pose safety hazards; this rule may be struck down if such controls
are considered in light of their safety hazards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0518, p. 1]
It is also worth mentioning that exhaust filters do nothing to address emissions from tires,
which are not covered by this proposed rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0518, p. 1]
Once again, I reiterate my stance that while PM emissions can and must be reduced as much
as possible, the agency should NOT consider - let alone mandate - the use of exhaust particulate
filters on new internal-combustion engines. The agency should explore alternative methods for
reducing PM emissions instead, including mandatory electric-vehicle sales quotas and tire-design
requirements in future rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0518, p. 1]
Organization: District of Columbia Department of Energy and Environment (DOEE)
Ultimately, none of the proposed EPA standards are sufficiently protective to promote the
health and safety of District residents or achieve clean air in the District as there is no safe level
of exposure to vehicle emissions and particulate matter (PM). The Union of Concerned Scientists
(UCS) states that, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 2]
Passenger vehicles are a major pollution contributor, producing significant amounts of
nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and other pollution. In 2013, transportation contributed more
than half of the carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides, and almost a quarter of the hydrocarbons
emitted into our air. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 2]
1 Union of Concerned Scientists. Vehicles, Air Pollution, & Human Health.
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/vehicles-air- pollution-human-health
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
B. Emissions of criteria pollutants from light- and medium-duty vehicles harm the public
health.
EPA's proposed reductions of non-methane organic gases ("NMOG") plus NOx, as well as
particulate matter, are crucial to protecting the public from harmful air pollutants. As EPA notes,
"[ejmission sources impacted by [its] proposal, including vehicles and power plants, emit
pollutants that contribute to ambient concentrations of ozone, PM, N02, S02, CO, and air
toxics."67 These pollutants are linked to premature death, respiratory illness (including
childhood asthma), cardiovascular problems, and other adverse health impacts. In particular,
NOx emissions increase levels of ozone, because ground-level ozone forms when there are high
concentrations of ambient NOx and VOCs, and when solar radiation is high.68 NOx emissions
also impact particulate matter by forming secondary particles through atmospheric chemical
reactions.69 Reductions in NOx emitted from LDVs will therefore result in reduced ambient
levels of ozone and PM and improved health and environmental outcomes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 17]
67 88 Fed. Reg. at 29211.
68 Am. Lung Ass'n, State of the Air 2023 Report (2023) at 26, https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-
6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf?ext=.pdf.
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69 DRIA at 7-10.
Air pollution has become so significant that the public health burdens attributable to air
pollution are "now estimated to be on a par with other major global health risks such as
unhealthy diet and tobacco smoking, and air pollution is now recognized as the single biggest
environmental threat to human health."70 Researchers at the University of Chicago studied the
impact of air pollution on life expectancy and found that "the impact of particulate pollution on
life expectancy is comparable to that of smoking, more than three times that of alcohol and
unsafe water and sanitation, six times that of HIV/AIDS, and 89 times that of conflict and
terrorism."71 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 17]
70 World Health Organization (WHO), WHO Global Air Quality Guidelines (2021) at xiv,
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/345329/9789240034228-eng.pdf.
71 Michael Greenstone, Christa Hasenkopf, & Ken Lee, Air Quality Life Index Annual Update, Energy
Policy Institute at the University of Chicago (2022) at 6-7, https://aqli.epic.uchicago.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2022/06/AQLI_2022_Report-Global.pdf/.
There is consistent evidence showing the relationship between short-term exposure to PM and
mortality, particularly cardiovascular and respiratory mortality. Short- and long-term exposure to
PM2.5 can cause harmful health impacts such as heart attacks, strokes, worsened asthma, and
early death.72 In addition, short-term PM exposure has been linked to increases in infant
mortality, hospital admissions for cardiovascular disease, hospital admissions and emergency
visits for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and severity of asthma attacks and
hospitalization for asthma in children. Year-round exposure to PM is associated with elevated
risks of early death, primarily from cardiovascular and respiratory problems such as heart
disease, stroke, influenza, and pneumonia.73 These findings show the critical need for EPA to
minimize the harmful emissions from the transportation sector. Doing so will only improve
public health and the environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 17-18]
72 See EPA, Supplement to the 2019 Integrated Science Assessment for Particulate Matter (Final Report,
2022), atES-ii, 2-3, 2-4, https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/isa/recordisplay.cfm?deid=354490; EPA, Integrated
Science Assessment (ISA) for Particulate Matter (Dec. 2019),
https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/isa/recordisplay.cfm?deid=347534.
73 Am. Lung Ass'n, State of the Air 2023 Report (2023) at 25, https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-
6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf?ext=.pdf.
2. The proposed PM2.5 requirements are appropriate.
EPA is also proposing to set a limit on the allowable particulate matter (PM2.5) emissions
from all LDVs. This is an appropriate step under the Agency's authority and is well-grounded in
both the need for additional emissions reductions and technical feasibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 55]
Stoichiometric gasoline direct-injection is deployed in over half the new vehicle fleet in the
United States and supports the deployment of turbocharged, downsized engines as well as high-
compression ratio engines, both of which are key technologies to reduce GHG emissions. 142 At
the same time, moving from port-fuel injection to direct-injection leads to an increase in both the
amount of PM2.5 and the particle count. 143 Addressing PM2.5 emissions from the vehicles
deploying these technologies is critical as they become a larger share of the on-road fleet. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 56]
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142 See U.S. EPA, The 2022 Automotive Trends Report: Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Fuel Economy, and
Technology Since 1975, EPA-420-R-22-029 (Dec. 2022), Chapter 4, available at
https://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends/download-automotive-trends-report.
143 Omar I. Awad, et al, Particulate emissions from gasoline direct injection engines: A review of how
current emission regulations are being met by automobile manufacturers, Sci. Total Env. 718, 137302
(2020), at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.137302 (subscription required).
Gasoline particulate filters (GPFs) have been successfully deployed globally for years to
address these emissions, as EPA has documented in the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis
(DRIA).144 Additionally, in-cylinder strategies can help mitigate emissions, including through
the design of both the injector and the cylinder surface. 145 Aftertreatment design can also be
used to mitigate cold-start emissions, in particular. 146 All of the technology developments
described above are well-established, and many are analogous to technologies that have been
deployed to limit PM2.5 emissions from diesel engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 56]
144 DRIA, Section 3.2.5.
145 See Awad. et al. 2020 for a review.
146 Id.
As part of its Advanced Clean Cars program, California finalized a PM2.5 standard of 1
mg/mile, to begin phasing in with the 2025 model year. 147 As part of its review, the California
Air Resources Board (CARB) conducted tests demonstrating the feasibility of achieving this
standard, including data on particle count, GPF effectiveness, and the ability to measure sub-mg
quantities of PM2.5.148 While these standards have not gone into effect, the underlying data
support EPA's proposed PM2.5 program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 56]
147 Cal. Code of Regs. Tit. 13, § 1961.2(a)(2)(A).
148 For measurement capability, see CARB, An Update on the Measurement Of PM Emissions at LEV III
Levels, (2015), available at https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
01/lev_iii_pm_measurement_feasibility_tsd_20151008_ac.pdf. For additional tests on GPF capability, see
CARB, California[']s Advanced Clean Cars Midterm Review, Appendix K: PM Emission Testing Results
(Jan. 8, 2017), available at https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
01/appendix_k_pm_test_results_ac.pdf.
The benefits of the PM2.5 standards are significant—depending on the assumed rate of
deployment, EPA's Proposed Standards could cut tailpipe PM2.5 emissions by up to 90% by
2050.149 This could lead to cumulative health benefits of $85 to $160 billion over that same
timeframe, at a 3% discount rate. 150 Importantly, it could also lead to measurable improvements
in near-roadway air quality,151 which could be significant for the more than 41 million people
living within close proximity of high-traffic roadways. 152 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp.
56-57]
149 Oak Leaf Envtl., Impacts Analysis of a Revised Federal Light-Duty On-Road Particulate Matter
Standard, Prepared for the Manufacturers of Emissions Controls Association (MECA) (June 2023), at 20,
Fig. 7, available at https://www.meca.org/wp-
content/uploads/2023/06/LD V_PM_Standard_Final_Report_06272023.pdf.
150 Id. at 22-23, Figs. 9, 10 & "9" [Fig. 11 appears to be incorrectly labeled as Fig. 9],
151 Id. at 24, Tbl. 5.
152 88 Fed. Reg. at 26060.
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2.The proposed PM2.5 requirements are appropriate.
As discussed in Section VI.F.2, proven and cost-effective technology exists to reduce tailpipe
PM2.5 levels to the levels required by EPA's proposed standards. MDVs with GCWR over
22,000 pounds (see the section immediately below) will already be required to achieve similar
levels of reductions under EPA's proposal to certify these vehicles under the heavy-duty engine
requirements, and the data supporting the finalization of those standards include an assessment of
technology improvements for both compression-ignition and spark-ignition engines supporting a
technology neutral achievement of PM2.5 reductions.211 The test protocols and targets for
EPA's proposed PM2.5 standards are achievable, as discussed in Section VI.F.2, and will
provide significant health benefits. ). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 77]
211 U.S. EPA, Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle
Standards: Regulatory Impact Analysis, Sections 3.1 & 3.2, EPA-420-R-22-035 (Dec. 2022
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
Passenger vehicles also emit harmful pollutants, including fine particulate matter (PM2.5) and
oxides of nitrogen (NOx). These pollutants contribute to the formation of soot and smog and
contribute to elevated concentrations of pollution near roadways, where millions of people live
and go to school, and people of color and people with low income are disproportionately exposed
to air pollution from vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 6]
Please see EDF's comments on the Proposed Rule, Revised 2023 and Later Model Year
Light- Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 43726 (August 10,
2021) dated September 27, 2021, and resubmitted to this docket, for a more thorough discussion
of the substantial health and environmental harms associated with the pollution and GHG
emissions from passenger vehicles. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 6]
1 EDF's comments on the Proposed Rule, Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 43726 (August 10, 2021) dated September 27, 2021, at
4-6. Accessible at https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0208-0688. (Attachment A)
B. Standards that result in use of Gasoline Particulate Filters are vital.
EDF supports the proposed PM standard of 0.5 mg/mi for light-duty vehicles and medium-
duty vehicles that must be met across three test cycles (-7 °C FTP, 25 °C FTP, US06), a
requirement for PM certification tests at the test group level, and a requirement that every in-use
vehicle program (IUVP) test vehicle is tested for PM. EPA must ensure that the 0.5 mg/mi
standard is a per-vehicle cap, not a fleet average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 62-63]
EPA correctly relies on the availability of Gasoline Particulate Filters (GPFs) in setting its PM
standard. GPFs are a highly feasible demonstrated technology with a proven track record at
reducing pollution. They are already widely available, and are being put to use in other markets,
including the European Union, India and China, where more stringent emissions standards have
made them necessary. 173 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 62-63]
173 Corning, What Emissions Regulations and Standards are Currently in Place?,
https://www.corning.com/worldwide/en/products/environmental-technologies/emissions-control/emissions-
regulations.html.
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i. Additional reductions in PM pollution are urgently needed, especially in communities that
have long faced elevated pollution burdens.
Continuing to drive criteria pollutant reductions is particularly important for low-income
communities and communities of color, which have historically faced significant and elevated
harms from health-harming transportation pollution. As a result of housing discrimination and
other unjust policies, communities of color and low-income communities constitute a higher
percentage of the population near our roads and highways and therefore suffer disproportionately
from associated harmful pollution. 174 According to the American Lung Association's 2023
State of the Air report, people of color are almost four times more likely to breathe the most
polluted air when compared to white people. 175 A report by Moving Forward Network also
found that, on average, Asian and Black Americans are exposed to PM2.5 pollution that is 56
and 44 percent higher, respectively, than white Americans. 176 And an EDF analysis of the Bay
Area in California found that neighborhoods with higher percentages of residents of color
experienced double the rate of asthma from nitrogen dioxide (N02) -a pollutant often used as a
marker for transportation-related pollution. 177 Moreover, as described above, recent studies
have found light- duty vehicles, including light-duty trucks are responsible for a significant share
of pm- attributable premature mortalities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 63]
174 Gregory M. Rowangould, A Census of the US Near-Roadway Population: Public Health and
Environmental Justice Considerations, Transportation Research Part D 25, 59-67 (2013),
https://www.sciencedirect.eom/science/article/abs/pii/S1361920913001107.
175 American Lung Association, State of the Air Report 2023 (2023),
https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c- 6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf. (Attachment
C)
176 Jimmy O'dea, Zero-Emissions Technology for Freight: Heavy-Duty Trucks, Tools to Advocate for
Zero- Emissions Technology, Moving Forward Network (2020),
http://www.movingforwardnetwork.com/wp- content/uploads/2020/10/MFN_ZeroEmissionToolkit-l.pdf.
(Attachment X)
177 EDF, Air Pollution's Unequal Impacts in the Bay Area (2021),
https://www.edf.org/airqualitymaps/oakland/health-disparities.
Accordingly, finalizing the criteria standards EPA has proposed, including setting the PM
standard at a level that will encourage the use of GPFs, is critical to protecting health and
combatting environmental injustice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 63]
Organization: Ferrari N. V. and Ferrari North America, Inc.
b) Other Criteria Pollutant Standards
Under EPA's proposal, SVMs are no longer eligible for special provisions and must meet the
criteria emission standards of LVMs with the same phase-in. Ferrari is concerned about the
complete elimination of flexibilities granted in current US legislation (which has historically
expressed EPA's recognition of the SVM challenges), and the introduction of very demanding
PM standard limits. EPA is indeed proposing an 83% reduction in the PM standard (i.e. 0.5
mg/mi rather than 3 mg/mi), while also increasing the number of test procedures for which this
limit is applicable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, p. 6]
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Ferrari's commitment to reducing PM emissions dates back in 2019, when Ferrari included
the GPF (developed also to ensure compliance with European Regulation) in the US, gaining
leadership among other manufacturers in this regard. In support of this, the best GPF
technologies have already been implemented on our models, and innovative exhaust system
configurations are currently being developed to meet the 1 mg/mi PM requirement in MY 20285,
as required by California ACC II regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, p. 6]
5 as defined in CCR, Title 13, §1961.4(d)(2)(A)(2)(c)
However, we are deeply concerned about the effectiveness of this configuration with a stricter
0.5 mg/mi PM limit, also considering the short time provided by EPA's proposal. Moreover, the
measurement variabilities related to the current state of the art of certification testing
measurement equipment should also be taken into account. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, p.
6]
Therefore, Ferrari suggests that EPA aligns with the current California's emission standards
and related phase-in provisions for SVMs. These SVM specific flexibilities should include the
possibility for small volume manufacturers to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, p. 6]
- meet alternate fleet-average standards of 0.051 g/mi for model years 2027 through 2032;
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, p. 6]
- benefit from an alternative phase-in, which allows SVMs to defer 100% compliance with
regulatory requirements at the end of the phase-in period granted to LVMs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0572, p. 6]
- certify vehicles according to BIN 125 until MY 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, p.
6]
We strongly believe that an alignment with ACC II criteria emissions standards would allow
manufacturers to focus appropriate resources on zero emissions technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0572, p. 6]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Second, to ensure the final rule does not go too far and too fast, especially in 2027 - 2029, the
EPA should adjust two aspects of the proposal regarding criteria emissions: fuel enrichment and
particulate matter testing obligations. Although fuel enrichment can lead to higher emissions
during brief and infrequent conditions which are disclosed to the EPA, fuel enrichment has been
critical for overall emissions reductions. The practice enables automakers to downsize engines
while also meeting consumer needs for some of the toughest jobs, without compromising
powertrain durability. Removing fuel enrichment, as EPA has proposed, will directly impact
customers' acceptance of new products, especially trucks, and they may keep their existing
vehicle longer or opt for a larger (i.e., higher emitting) vehicle to be sure they can get the job
done. Major powertrain redesigns would be needed to recover this lost utility, and these are not
possible within the timeframe defined by the enrichment phase-out proposed by EPA. Next,
although Ford supports aspects of EPA's proposed particulate matter (PM) standards which will
necessitate the use of gasoline particulate filters, the proposed PM standard will challenge
current laboratory equipment and procedures. Ford requests that the EPA eliminate the need to
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measure PM on the -7°C FTP for vehicles that are equipped with gasoline particulate
filters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 3]
Light- and Medium-Duty PM Standards
Ford understands EPA's rationale in proposing a 0.5 mg/mi PM exhaust emission standard
across the light-duty and medium-duty vehicle classes that would require gasoline particulate
filters (GPFs). Ford does not oppose such a requirement if properly timed and implemented in a
way that avoids undue test burden and costs, particularly during the early years of the transition
to electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 13]
Ford does not support the newly proposed -7°C FTP PM testing requirement. Ford does not
believe that the real-world environmental benefits justify the added development and
certification test burden that accompanies such a requirement. Environmental test cells are
already a facility bottleneck for OEMs, are prohibitively expensive to construct, and are not
typically designed or instrumented to conduct gravimetric particulate matter testing. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 13]
Furthermore, Ford believes that the benefit of requiring such testing on vehicles equipped
with GPFs is de minimis given that the effectiveness of a given GPF technology will be
sufficiently demonstrated on the 25°C FTP and US06 test cycles. Therefore, Ford recommends
that EPA exempt GPF-equipped vehicles from the -7°C FTP testing requirement. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 13]
Additionally, the proposed EPA standard will be at the edge—if not beyond—the capability
of existing laboratory equipment and test processes capability. We recommend that EPA
consider instituting additional measures to mitigate laboratory measurement variability including
allowing re-tests for exceedances during certification, confirmatory and in-use testing. Ford
would also like to work with EPA to determine if there is a role for limited application of
particulate number measurements to help reduce the variability and test burden concerns related
to the new PM standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 13]
Finally, Ford recommends that EPA defer the phase-in requirement of the new PM standards
to starting in 2029MY, consistent with the Ford recommendation for the new fuel enrichment
requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 13]
Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI)
HMG emphasizes hardware changes will be necessary for the proposed 0.5mg/mi PM
standard, and there will be packaging modification of after-treatment hardware to allow the
addition of GPF and pressure sensors. Engine calibration will be required to account for
increased backpressure. In fact, HMG estimates that just the additional hardware (cc-GPF,
catalyst, sensors, valves, etc.) needed to comply with Tier 4 requirements will range from $500-
$800 USD per vehicle. This estimated increase solely accounts for material costs, and does not
include the additional costs involved with investments in technology development of the new
hardware. The resources required to develop Tier 4 compliant hardware for ICE vehicles will
unfortunately be moved away from ZEV development, and the vehicle cost increases caused by
these additional components will undoubtedly increase ICE vehicle prices and delay advances in
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ZEVs. This is a significant unintended negative consequence of the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 5]
Finally, HMG is concerned that the global GPF market will be unable to meet increased
demand for all original equipment manufacturers (OEMS) to meet this proposed PM
requirement, with downstream consequences not for just HMG and other manufacturers, but also
for customers and the market more broadly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 5]
Finally, the presence of accumulated PM in the vehicle exhaust system poses a significant
challenge in demonstrating regulatory compliance during in-use emission tests. HMG s thorough
investigations have revealed that PM deposits in the vehicle exhaust systems accumulate over
time and are subsequently released during aggressive in-use emission tests (US06 for example),
resulting in an appearance of a non compliance condition. In-use PM testing without pre-
conditioning will yield results that are not representative of the actual PM generated by
combustion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 8]
In order to meet the increasingly stringent Tier 4 PM regulations, we strongly recommend that
EPA incorporate an additional optional preparation driving mode, such as performing the US06
mode multiple times, prior to conducting the emission testing. This proposal is based on
extensive testing and repeated experiments that have consistently demonstrated a noteworthy
reduction in PM levels when this approach is implemented. By adopting this crucial change in
the testing procedure, we can mitigate inaccurate and unreliable results, thus better confirming
compliance with the regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 8]
HMG is concerned about the measurement accuracy and repeatability of the proposed 0.5
mg/mi for PM, and therefore opposes the PM requirements at -7°C conditions, or, in the
alternative, proposes that at a minimum, vehicles equipped with gasoline particulate filters (GPF)
should be exempt from the requirement. There is limited data available on the feasibility of
accurately and repeatedly measuring PM at less than 0.5 mg/mi. HMG's own study reveals a test-
to-test variation of up to 0.2 mg/mi in PM measurement repeatability, indicating that the
proposed standard of 0.5 mg/mi is overly strict. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 5]
Additionally, the environmental chamber needed for -7°C FTP testing
presents several challenges that will render complying with the proposed PM standard
extremely difficult. One major difficulty is that a test facility suitable for the -7°C FTP testing
requirements would not be ready before CY2025, one year after the start of development of
software and hardware that would comply with the new PM standard. Other issues related to the
-7°C FTP are: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 5]
Only a fraction of HMG's emission test cells are climate chambers capable of running the -
7°C FTP [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 5]
Under low-temperature conditions, phenomena such as condensation, freezing, and
contamination in the sample line and dilution tunnel can reduce accuracy and repeatability of PM
filter weighing capability . [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 5]
It is very difficult to measure PM reliably. Compared to the 25°C FTP, measuring PM on the -
7°C FTP test has greater test-to-test variability and will reduce dyno usage efficiency with
frequent cleaning to prevent PM accumulated in the equipment from biasing the vehicles '
results. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 5]
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Significant investment would be required to update measurement systems required to
determine compliance with the -7°C FTP testing, with extended lead-time required to complete
the changes that are not available given the Proposed Rule's current compliance schedule. Again,
these investments will also divert funds and chambers from electrification for little short-term
gain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 5]
Due to the higher exhaust temperatures in gasoline engines, HATCI expects active
regeneration frequency to be much lower than on diesel engines. As a result, the Infrequent
Regeneration Adjustment Factor (IRAF) will be insignificant relative to the baseline emissions.
EPA should provide exemption allowances with specific guidance on how to determine if
gasoline IRAF is needed and requirements for calculating it to ensure clarity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0554, p. 9]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
For particulate matter emissions, ICCT strongly support's EPA's proposed PM limit. Fine
particulate matter (PM2.5) emissions from vehicles are a major environmental health hazard, and
setting a more stringent PM emissions limit is critical for protecting public health. We support
EPA's proposed multipollutant rule that sets the PM limit at 0.5 mg/mile on all test cycles with
the addition of the cold temperature FTP test cycle, which would help to greatly reduce tailpipe
PM emissions from new gasoline vehicles. Based on our review of recent evidence of increasing
PM emissions from recent model year gasoline light-duty vehicles and trucks, we find an urgent
need to implement a stronger PM standard. Due to the urgent need to address the rise in PM
emissions with recent gasoline vehicles, we recommend EPA adopt the accelerated phase-in
pathway for the PM standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 5]
Particulate matter emission [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 47-50]
Recent trends in gasoline light-duty PM emissions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 47-
50]
ICCT strongly support's EPA's proposed PM limit. Fine particulate matter (PM2.5) emissions
from vehicles are a major environmental health hazard, and setting a more stringent PM
emissions limit is critical for protecting public health. EPA's proposed multipollutant rule sets
the PM limit at 0.5 mg/mile on all test cycles with the addition of the cold temperature FTP test
cycle, which would help to greatly reduce tailpipe PM emissions from new gasoline vehicles. In
this section, we review recent evidence of increases in PM emissions from recent model year
gasoline light-duty vehicles and trucks, highlighting the urgent need to implement a stronger PM
standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 47-50]
A recent ICCT analysis looking at remote sensing data shows that, for recent model years,
light- duty vehicles and trucks show an increase in UV smoke, a proxy for PM.l 17 While
gasoline light- duty vehicles' and trucks' tailpipe carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbons (HC),
and nitrogen oxides (NOx) measured by remote sensing show clear and consistent downwards
trends, UV smoke averages increase starting from model years 2015-2020 (Figure 13). For 2020
model year vehicles, the UV smoke fleet average is similar to that of 2005 model year vehicles,
compared to the other three pollutants, which show a 66%-86% decrease from 2005 to 2020
model year vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 47-50]
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117 Particulate matter mass emissions are not measured directly by remote sensing systems; instead, a
measurement of UV smoke is recorded as a ratio of exhaust plume opacity measured at a wavelength of
230nm to fuel burned. UV smoke measurements are then used as a proxy for PM emissions to assess long-
term relative trends. More detail is available in Meyer, M., Khan, T., Dallmann, T., Yang, Z. Particulate
matter emissions from U.S. gasoline light-duty vehicles and trucks: TRUE Initiative U.S. remote sensing
database case study. ICCT, June 2023. https://theicct.org/publication/true-pm-emissions-jun23/
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 13. Percent change in distance-specific emissions
for various pollutants by model year for LDV and LDT combined, compared to model year
2005. Shaded region shows the 95% confidence interval. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp.
47-50]
The observed increase in model year average UV smoke levels is connected to a shift in fuel
injection technologies. Gasoline Direct Injection (GDI) technology was first introduced to the
U.S. LDV market in 2008 and gained momentum relatively quickly, largely due to the higher
fuel efficiency and power compared to conventional port fuel injection (PFI) vehicles. 118 As of
2021, GDI vehicles represent approximately 53% of the US LDV market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 47-50]
118 U.S. EPA. (2022, December). The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report.
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-12/420r22029.pdf
Early GDI vehicles (model years 2008-2014) showed at least 2 times higher PM emissions
compared to PFI vehicles. 119 This issue of elevated PM emissions from GDI vehicles and the
need for more stringent regulation of PM emissions has been identified since before EPA
finalized its Tier 3 standards in 2014.120 Recent analysis of remote sensing data adds to this
evidence, showing that for 2015-2020 model year vehicles, the models showing UV smoke
levels above the fleet average are predominantly GDI vehicles. 121 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0569, pp. 47-50]
119 Georges Saliba et al Comparison of Gasoline Direct-Injection (GDI) and Port Fuel Injection (PFI)
Vehicle Emissions: Emission Certification Standards, Cold-Start, Secondary Organic Aerosol Formation
Potential, and Potential Climate Impacts. (2017).Environmental Science & Technology 51, no. 11: 6542-
52, https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.6b06509
120 Gladstein, Neandross & Associates. (2013). Ultrafine Particulate Matter and the Benefits of Reducing
Particle Numbers in the United States.
https://cdn.gladstein.org/pdfs/MECA_UFP_White_Paper_0713_Final.pdf.
121 Meyer, M., Khan, T., Dallmann, T., Yang, Z. (2023) Particulate matter emissions from U.S. gasoline
light-duty vehicles and trucks: TRUE Initiative U.S. remote sensing database case study. International
Council on Clean Transportation, https://www.trueinitiative.org/data/publications/particulate-matter-
emissions-from-us-gasoline-light- duty-vehicles-and-trucks
Additionally, chassis dynamometer measurements based on the U.S. EPA's certification tests
database 122 combined with information from the U.S. Department of Energy fuel economy test
databasel23 demonstrate that PM emissions from GDI vehicles are higher than the PFIs on FTP
cycle. An analysis by manufacturer for model years 2019-2023, shows that for most of the
manufacturers that have sales for both GDI and PFI vehicles, GDIs have significantly higher PM
emissions than PFIs on average (Table 9). On the FTP cycle, GDI vehicles emitted 62%-490%
higher average emissions than PFI vehicles of the same manufacturer; on the US06 cycle, GDI
vehicles emitted 16% lower to 130% higher average emissions than PFI vehicles of the same
manufacturer. 124 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 47-50]
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122 U.S. EPA. Annual Certification Data for Vehicles, Engines, and Equipment Data and Tools.
https://www.epa.gov/compliance-and-fuel-economy-data/annual-certification-data-vehicles-engines-and-
equipment
123 U.S. Department of Energy, Fuel Economy Guide Datafile. (2022)
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/download.shtml
124 Meyer, M., Khan, T., Dallmann, T., Yang, Z. (2023). Particulate matter emissions from U.S. gasoline
light-duty vehicles and trucks: TRUE Initiative U.S. remote sensing database case study. International
Council on Clean Transportation, https://www.trueinitiative.org/data/publications/particulate-matter-
emissions-from-us-gasoline-light- duty-vehicles-and-trucks
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table 9. Average PM emissions (mg/mile) for GDI and
non-GDI vehicles by manufacturer for 2019-2023 model year vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 47-50]
Additionally, an analysis of certification test data across all light-duty vehicles shows that PM
emissions from GDI vehicles have been reducing over the years; however, they still emit higher
PM than PFI vehicles on FTP cycle (Figure 14). For 2023 model year vehicles, GDI vehicles
emit on average about 3 times more PM emissions than the PFI vehicles on FTP cycle. For both
cycles, the trajectory of average PM emissions for GDI vehicles flattens out over the last few
years, suggesting that PM emissions from GDIs will not likely reduce substantially any further
without the adoption of more stringent emission standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp.
47-50]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 14. Trend of average PM emissions for US LDV
based on EPA certification database for GDI and PFI vehicles under the FTP and US06
regulatory cycles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 47-50]
Evaluation of proposed PM standard [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 50-53]
The real-world and laboratory test data analyses presented above show the issue of increased
PM emissions from GDI vehicles, highlighting the need for a more stringent standard than the
current Tier 3 standard to prevent a continued increase in PM emissions. EPA's proposal for PM
standards aligns with this finding; we strongly support the proposed stringency level of 0.5
mg/mile on all test cycles and the addition of the cold temperature FTP test cycle for regulating
PM emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 50-53]
Table 10 shows that EPA's proposed limit for PM emissions is more stringent than the
California's most recently enacted LEV IV standards and, also, numerically lower than the
proposed Euro 7 standards in EU and the existing standards in China and India. However, EU,
China, and India have the additional particle number (PN) standards to regulate the ultrafine
particulates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 50-53]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table 10. Existing or proposed particulate emissions
regulations across regions for gasoline vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 50-53]
125 Bui, A., Hall, D., and Searle, S. (2022). Advanced Clean Cars II: The next phase of California's Zero-
Emission Vehicle and Low-Emission Vehicle regulations. International Council on Clean Transportation.
https://theicct.org/publication/accii-zev-lez-reg-update-nov22/
126 Dornoff, J. (2023). How to make Euro 7 more effective: an analysis of the European Commission's
proposal for light- and heavy-duty vehicles. International Council on Clean Transportation.
https://theicct.org/publication/euro7-analysis-recommendations-jan23/
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127 TransportPolicy.net. China: Light-duty: Emissions, https://www.transportpolicy.net/standard/china-
light-duty- emissions/
128 TransportPolicy.net. India: Light-duty: Emissions, https://www.transportpolicy.net/standard/india-
light-duty- emissions/
The PN limits in the EU, China, and India regulations, combined with the particle mass limit,
effectively regulate both fine particulates (PM2.5) as well as ultrafine particulates (PM0.1).129
These particles, less than 100 nm in size, have been found to be even more dangerous to human
health than PM2.5, as they can be inhaled deeper into the lungs, increasing the chances of
particles to entering the bloodstream. 130 Part of the motivation for the stringent particulate
regulations in the EU and China has been the uptake of GDI vehicles, as GDIs have been found
to emit more ultrafine particulates down to a size of 23 nm and can emit even smaller particles
(sub 23 nm).131 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 50-53]
129 Felix Leach et al. (2021). A Review and Perspective on Particulate Matter Indices Linking Fuel
Composition to Particulate Emissions from Gasoline Engines. SAE International Journal of Fuels and
Lubricants 15, no. 1: 3-28 https://doi.org/10.4271/04-15-01-0001
130 https://doi.org/10.1038/sl2276-020-0403-3
131 Barouch Giechaskiel, Urbano Manfredi, and Giorgio Martini. (2014). Engine Exhaust Solid Sub-23
Nm Particles: I. Literature Survey," SAE International Journal of Fuels and Lubricants 7, no. 3: 950-64,
https://saemobilus.sae.org/content/2014-01-2834/ https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/6fd483af-5fla-lled-92ed-01aa75ed71al/language-en
While EPA's proposed standard does not include a particle number limit, the stringency of the
PM emission standard will help address both PM2.5 and PM0.1 through the implementation of
gasoline particulate filters (GPFs). EPA suggests that the proposed PM emissions limit,
particularly for the cold FTP test, will likely force the installation of gasoline particulate filters
(GPF).132 Studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of GPFs for reducing both PM and PN
emissions, showing that GPFs can reduce PM emissions by 97% to 100% and PN emissions by
80%) to 99% compared to vehicles without GPFs. 133 Other major vehicle markets, including the
EU and China, have already begun adopting GPFs to meet stringent particulate emission
standards, and the proposed standard would help the US vehicle market follow suit. The
European Commission (2022) reported that the Euro 6d standards, which has led to the near-
universal adoption of GPFs to meet the PN limits for GDI vehicles, reduced the real-world
emission factors of exhaust particles by about 86%> compared to Euro 5 compliant vehicles. 134
The assessment also reported a typical reduction level of PN emissions by 70%> to 80%> for a
Euro 6 GDI installed with a GPF and tested on the Real-Driving Emissions (RDE) test route.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 50-53]
132 Felix Leach et al. (2021). A Review and Perspective on Particulate Matter Indices Linking Fuel
Composition to Particulate Emissions from Gasoline EnginesSAE International Journal of Fuels and
Lubricants 15, no. 1: 3-28, https://doi.org/10.4271/04-15-01-0001
133 Felix Leach et al. (2021). A Review and Perspective on Particulate Matter Indices Linking Fuel
Composition to Particulate Emissions from Gasoline Engines," SAE International Journal of Fuels and
Lubricants 15, no. 1: 3-28, https://doi.org/10.4271/04-15-01-0001.; Jiacheng Yang et al. (2018). Gasoline
Particulate Filters as an Effective Tool to Reduce Particulate and Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon
Emissions from Gasoline Direct Injection (GDI) Vehicles: A Case Study with Two GDI Vehicles.
Environmental Science & Technology 52, no. 5: 3275-84. https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.7b05641
134 European Commission. (2022, October). Euro 6/VI evaluation study: Annexes 1-6.
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GPFs are cost-effective devices, with per vehicle manufacturing cost of $51—$166 based on
EPA estimates and $50-$ 184 based on other independent studies. 135 Based on the European
Commission's Euro 6/VI assessment, the incremental increase in technology cost per vehicle for
Euro 6 standards compared to Euro 5 was estimated at $92—$113 for the addition of GPF along
with lambda and pressure sensors (currency converted to U.S. dollars, 1 Euro =1.10 US$ as of
June 21, 2023).136 Thus, EPA's proposed PM standard would provide large health benefits
through reduced fine and ultrafine particulate matter emissions with a relatively low added
manufacturing cost. This is in line with the European Commission's finding that the Euro 6
benefits from PM and PN emissions reduction were significantly higher than the added cost for
GPF per vehicle. 137 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 50-53]
135 Minjares, R and Posada Sanchez, F. (2011). Estimated cost of gasoline particulate filters. International
Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/estimated-cost-of-gasoline-particulate-
filters/; Steininger. (2011). Particle number emission limits for Euro 6 positive ignition vehicles.
https://www.nanoparticles.ch/archive/201 l_Steininger_PR.pdf
136 European Commission. (2022, October). Euro 6/VI evaluation study: Annexes 1-6.
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/a9a2eadb-5fld-lled-92ed-01aa75ed71al/language-
en
137 ibid
Testing of recent European petrol cars provides evidence that the proposed PM limit is
achievable. Cars certified to recent Euro standards have showed PM levels close to the proposed
US 0.5 mg/mile limit. ADAC, a German automobile association, conducted laboratory tests,
which showed that out of 177 gasoline vehicles certified to Euro 6d-TEMP and Euro 6d
standards, 74 vehicles, or 42%, showed PM emissions below 0.5 mg/mile. 138 Additionally, the
UK Department for Transport conducted laboratory testing of five 2019 model year petrol
vehicles. 139 Under the hot start Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicles Test Cycle (WLTC)
test, the cars emitted 0.09-0.28 mg/km (0.14-0.45 mg/mile), all below 0.5 mg/mile. Under the
cold start WLTC test, the cars emitted 0.16-0.446 mg/km (0.26-0.72 mg/mile); two cars emitted
under 0.5 mg/mile, and the other three showed PM emissions of no more than 44% above 0.5
mg/mile. Although these results are not directly comparable to the US standard due to
differences in test cycles (WLTC instead of FTP and US06), this evidence demonstrates that
there already exist vehicles with PM emissions levels similar to the proposed US PM limit.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 50-53]
138 These results are based on averages of three tests: hot start Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicles
Test Cycle (WLTC), cold start WLTC, and BAB 130, which is ADAC's highway cycle. Data was kindly
provided by ADAC via email correspondence (2023).
139 Department for Transport. (2023). Vehicle Market Surveillance Unit: Results of the 2020 programme.
(London, UK), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/vehicle-market-surveillance-unit-programme-
results- 2020/vehicle-market-surveillance-unit-results-of-the-2020-programme#results-petrol-cars
We support the EPA's accelerated phase-in option for PM standards relative to other
pollutants, particularly considering evidence of rising gasoline light-duty vehicle and truck PM
levels. Analysis of remote sensing UV smoke measurements as a proxy for PM shows that
reductions since 2005 model year vehicles have been virtually eliminated due to an increase from
2015 to 2020 model year vehicles. Therefore, it is critical that a more stringent PM standard is
implemented as soon as possible to drive the uptake of GPFs. GPFs are at a mature phase and in
large-scale production in several vehicle markets and thus would be feasible to implement
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according to EPA's outlined accelerated timeline, which would phase-in the proposed PM
standards for 50% or 80% of the manufacturer's fleet by 2027 and 100% by 2028. Due to the
urgent need to address the rise in PM emissions with recent gasoline vehicles, we recommend
EPA to adopt the accelerated phase-in pathway for the PM standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 50-53]
Health benefits and environmental justice modeling recommendations [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 53-54]
In evaluating the health benefits of the proposed rule, it is critical to consider the evidence of
increases in PM from recent model year vehicles. The health benefits assessment included in
EPA's proposal uses emission factors from MOtor Vehicle Emission Simulator (MOVES),
which likely underestimates PM emissions from recent model year vehicles. Figure 15 shows a
comparison between EPA MOVES emission factors and remote sensing UV smoke averages by
model year, shown as a percent change from each sources respective model year 2005
averages.140 From model years 2006-2015, year-to-year changes, shown in the slopes of the
lines, are relatively consistent between EPA MOVES and remote sensing data. However, from
model year 2015 on, the trends diverge. For light-duty passenger trucks, the EPA MOVES PM
emission factors sharply decline while the remote sensing data show an increase in UV smoke
averages. 141 Though less significant, a similar trend is observed for passenger cars, with the
EPA MOVES PM emission factor continuing to decline after 2015 and remote sensing UV
smoke averages showing a slight increase. These findings suggest that the modeled air quality
and health benefits of the proposed rule may be underestimated when considering the large
benefits of replacing 2015-2020 model year vehicles with future vehicles meeting the proposed
PM emission limits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 53-54]
140 EPA MOVES emission factors are converted from fuel-specific to distance-specific emission factors
for this comparison. This is done using real-world fuel economy data from EPA Automotive Trends report,
the same source used to convert the remote sensing emissions from fuel-specific to distance-specific.
141 Light-duty passenger truck emission trends from EPA MOVES are compared to light-duty truck (LDT)
emission trends from remote sensing data. Similarly, passenger car emission trends from EPA MOVES are
compared to light-duty vehicle (LDV) emission trends from remote sensing data.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 15. Percent change in distance-specific PM
emission factor from EPA MOVES and remote sensing (RS) UV smoke measurements from
Colorado (CO) and Virginia (VA) sources by model year, compared to model year 2005. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 53-54]
Additionally, a full assessment of relative air quality and health benefits across demographics,
as done for the heavy-duty multi-pollutant rule, is recommended for this light-duty and medium-
duty multi-pollutant rule. It is widely understood that heavy-duty vehicles contribute to racial
disparities in exposure to air pollution, and EPA reported the projected air quality impacts across
demographics in their finalized heavy-duty multi-pollutant rule. Inequities in air pollution
exposure exist for light-duty vehicle emissions as well. One study finds that on a national level,
people of color are exposed to 46% more ambient PM2.5 from light-duty gasoline vehicles than
White people. 142 This is a greater disparity than that of HDVs; the same study finds that people
of color exposed to 35% higher ambient PM2.5 levels from heavy-duty diesel vehicles compared
to White people. Additionally, the health benefits from the heavy-duty multipollutant rule, as
projected by the EPA, are on similar scales to that of the proposed light-duty and medium-duty
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vehicle rule. 143 Thus, as the environmental justice and health implications of the light-duty and
medium-duty vehicle rule are significant, a full assessment of the projected distribution of
changes in PM2.5 and ozone concentrations by geography, race/ethnicity, and income is
recommended for the finalized rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 53-54]
142 Tessum, C et al. (2021). PM2.5 Polluters Disproportionately and Systemically Affect People of Color
in the United States," Science Advances 7, no. 18: eabf4491, https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abf4491.
143 EPA's proposed light-duty and medium-duty rule is estimated to result in $63 billion and $280 billion
(for 7% and 3% discount rates, respectively) in total monetized health benefits from 2027 to 2055. EPA's
finalized heavy-duty multipollutant rule is projected to result in $53-150 billion and $91-260 billion (for
7% and 3% discount rates, respectively) in total monetized health benefits from 2027 to 2045.
Organization: John Graham
The heavier weight of BEVs not only increases cost, but also generates higher tire wear and
brake wear particulate emissions. These impacts were not considered in the proposed rule.32
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 21]
32 DRIA Section 9.6 page 9-26 states only, "Using the miles traveled (for tailpipe, tire wear and brake
wear emissions) and liquid fuel consumed (for evaporative and fuel spillage emissions), we can then
generate sets of emission rates for use in OMEGA." This suggests that weight was not a factor in
evaluating tire wear and brake wear emissions.
Organization: Kia Corporation
Kia Urges PM Standards to Align with CARB's PM Emissions Standards Under ACC II
Kia does not support a more stringent PM standard of 0.5 mg/mi that must be met across three
test cycles (25 °C Federal Test Procedure (FTP), US06, -7 °C FTP) and is required to be met as a
per-vehicle cap, not a fleet average. 17 EPA's proposal of 0.5 mg/mi per-vehicle cap will require
a gasoline particulate filter (GPF) on every vehicle. Because GPF technology will be necessary
for meeting the proposed PM standard, OBD monitoring of the GPF system will be required to
detect GPF malfunctions, store trouble codes, and alert operators. 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0555, pp. 10-11]
17 88 Fed. Reg. 29,264.
18 88 Fed. Reg. 29,269.
Kia strongly urges EPA to align with CARB's PM standards adopted under the ACC II (i.e.,
LEV program. Kia recommends eliminating the -7°C FTP requirement because it unnecessarily
adds to automakers' testing burden, requires large investments, and upgrades, and reduces test
validity rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 10-11]
Kia understands the importance of PM standards and has invested significantly over the years
to ensure our vehicles meet the PM standards that result in 90 percent reduction in PM emissions
- from 10 mg/mi to just 1 mg/mi in MY2028. CARB evaluated for years increasing the
stringency of their PM standard but decided against it when finalizing a PM standard for ACC II.
EPA's proposed PM standard of 0.5 mg/mile is beyond expectation for automotive
manufacturers and emissions labs. The emissions labs across the industry are still learning how
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to accurately measure PM at the 3 mg/mile standard due to the uncertainty involved in all the
processes leading to final PM results in mg/mile. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 10-11]
Kia is concerned about the feasibility and repeatability of the measurement accuracy of the
proposed 0.5 mg/mi standard. Because of these challenges there will also be challenges and
additional cost of OBD-II diagnostic development, implementation, and calibration for meeting
the standards. Consequently, Kia recommends considering laboratory PM measurement
variability and allowing re-test for exceedances during certification, confirmatory or in-use
testing, especially for vehicles equipped with Diesel or GPFs. We urge EPA to finalize
reasonable PM standards to allow automakers to focus new capital investments on the transition
to vehicle electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 10-11]
Kia urges EPA to adopt CARB's criteria emission standards under the ACC II (i.e., LEV IV)
and, similarly, to fully harmonize its OBD-II requirements with CARB's OBD-II requirements.
It is critical that the criteria emissions regulatory framework is streamlined. Again, since EPA is
requiring a 10-fold increase in EV sales, EPA needs to harmonize and streamline its criteria
pollutants standards as much as possible. Resources should not be diverted away from the
ultimate goal - transitioning successfully to electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p.
15]
Organization: Marathon Petroleum Corporation (MPC)
EPA should better understand Particulate Matter Index (PMI) correlation by fully researching
fuel distillation properties of gasolines available today to consumers. If EPA were to proceed
with changes to gasoline distillation properties, this change will limit gasoline production
resulting in financial impacts to consumers and refiners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, p. 2]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
Criteria
Mazda anticipated some changes to EPA's light duty vehicle criteria emissions (i.e., NMOG,
CO, NOx, PM) requirements, particularly to align with the new changes in the California Air
Resources Board's (CARB) recent Advanced Clean Cars II regulation. However, we did not
expect two of the new requirements included in the proposal: the reduction of the PM standard to
0.5 mg/mile, and the ban of enrichment during normal engine operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0595, p. 3]
Reducing the PM standard to 0.5 mg/mile is excessive. There was already considerable
difficulty and effort put into meeting CARB's planned lmg/mile PM standard, and there is still
uncertainty that the 0.5 mg/mile standard will be measurable using current laboratory
technology. It will also make it necessary to have all vehicles equipped with Gasoline Particulate
Filters (GPF) and the resulting cost and development resources that come with new hardware.
CARB evaluated the PM standards in its ACC II regulation and only reduced them to 1 mg/mile
for the US06 cycle. While GPFs are required in some other markets, CARB set the standards
with the intention that they would only be necessary for some limited cases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0595, p.3]
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The enrichment ban will significantly impact the power and robustness of current internal
combustion engines and Mazda strongly opposes it. This could force manufacturers such as
Mazda to develop new engine designs, or to eliminate certain powertrain or vehicle designs
entirely, making it even more difficult to remain profitable at a time when exceptional
investment is needed to fuel the transition to EVs and to satisfy consumer needs. Controlling
unnecessary or excessive enrichment is already sufficiently covered by EPA's existing AECD
certification processes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, p. 3]
For these reasons, Mazda feels that the best course is for EPA to adopt CARB's current LEV
IV requirements. Long a leader in regulations that reduce tailpipe emissions, CARB's regulation
is challenging on its own and will lead to further improvements in the vehicle fleet. Taking this
course will also better align EPA's regulations with CARB's. Since CARB regulations already
impact about 40% of nationwide sales, this will also create economies by Mazda having to
develop vehicles to only one standard for criteria emissions. In this way, more resources can be
focused on the development of EV and PHEV products. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, p. 3]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
PM requirements should be implemented at a faster pace based on the combination of the
predicted rate of electrification alongside a feasible rate of PM emission control technology
implementation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 5-11]
On January 6, 2023, EPA announced its proposed decision to revise the primary (health-
based) annual PM2.5 standard from its current level of 12.0 |ig/m3 to within the range of 9.0 to
10.0 |ig/m3. In September 2021, both the United Nations World Health Organization2 (WHO)
and the Health Effects Institute (HEI) concluded that there is no identified safe threshold for
PM2.5 or black carbon, at which no damage to health is observed. In particular, the HEI
announced3 that a recent European study using state-of- the-art exposure methods and large
cohorts in high income countries found that health impact risks were still evident at levels lower
than current ambient standards for PM2.5, N02 and 03. In particular, the study reported that the
hazard ratios for natural-cause mortality remained elevated and significant for PM2.5 even when
the analyses were restricted to observations below 12 |ig/m,3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564,
pp. 5-11]
2 World Health Organization. (2021). WHO global air quality guidelines: particulate matter (PM2.5 and
PM10), ozone, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide and carbon monoxide. World Health Organization.
https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/345329.
3 https://www.healtheffects.org/announcements/hei-study-europe-finds-evidence-health-effects-lower-
levels-air-pollution
University researchers in the U.S. have reported that light duty gasoline vehicle emissions
remain prominent amongst the emission source sectors that cause the largest absolute disparities
for persons of color communities (POCs include Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians).4 These latest
developments highlight the importance of continued tightening of the PM2.5 standards to further
reduce exposure and the impacts of the remaining light duty gasoline fueled vehicles on
underserved communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 5-11]
4 https ://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abf4491.
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To meet tightening particulate standards in other global regions, including Europe, China and
India, fuel injection and gasoline particulate filter (GPF) suppliers have continued to improve
their commercially available technologies. In fact, nearly every European GDI engine car is
currently certified with a GPF, and LDVs in Europe have been required to meet the approximate
equivalent of a 0.5 mg/mile standard since 2017 due to the implementation of a particle number
standard. This standard applies to nearly all driving conditions and cycles. China has gone as far
as requiring all diesel and gasoline cars to be equipped with the best available control
technology, based on wall flow filters, that diesels have used in the US since 2007. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 5-11]
By 2023, four years ahead of the start of EPA's proposed PM limit implementation phase-in,
two-thirds of the major automotive producing regions of the world will be meeting tighter PM
emission standards similar to those now proposed by EPA. Recent in- use particle mass
measurements made from four equivalent vehicle pairs compliant with current U.S. and U.K.
standards5 illustrate the potential particulate mass reductions that could be obtained from
adopting equally protective standards as those in Europe, China and India (Figure 1) [See
original comment for Figure 1. In-use Particle Mass Comparison from four equivalent vehicle
pairs compliant with current U.S. and U.K.], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 5-11]
5 https://www.emissionsanalytics.com/news/the-septillion-particle-problem-literally
In addition, future Euro 7 standards are expected to further tighten the particle number limit to
lxlOAl 1 per km (ca. <0.5 mg/mile) and regulate solid ultrafine particles down to 10 nm in
diameter7 to reflect the feasibility of the control technologies. Euro 7 regulations will likely also
expand the operating window to include lower temperature operation, higher altitude and towing.
In anticipation of these tighter limits over extended duty operation, suppliers have improved fuel
injection6,7 as well as diesel and gasoline particulate filters8 and some OEMs are already
achieving these tighter limits in Europe as presented by the CLOVE consortium to the Advisory
Group on Vehicle Emission Standards in 2020.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 5-11]
6 Yamaguchi, A., Dillner, J., Helmantel, A., Koopmans, L. et al., SAE 2023-01-0239.
7 LOW-KAME, J., Oung, R., Meissonnier, G., Da Graca, M. et al., SAE 2023-01-0284.
8 Obata, S., Furuta, Y., Ohashi, T., and Aoki, T., SAE 2023-01-0394.
9 https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/a/fdd70a2d-b50a-4d0b-a92a-
e64d41d0e947/CLOVE%20test%201imits%20AGVES%202020-10-27%20final%20vs2.pdf
To highlight the air quality benefits of more stringent PM requirements, MECA funded a
studylO to model the benefits of a national 0.5 mg/mile PM standard that is approximately
equivalent in mass to the particle number standard in other global regions. The environmental
impact of the modeled standards was evaluated for the 49-state plus District of Columbia
modeling domain using EPA references and tools. The domain was divided into separate
certification regions of seventeen Section 177 states (i.e., those that have adopted California
standards) and thirty-two states plus DC11 subject solely to federal certification requirements.
Importantly, the magnitude of the emission inventory impact of the modeled standards is
significantly influenced by the degree to which the light-duty fleet becomes electrified. The rate
of future-year electrification, an uncertain modeling variable, was handled as a range by defining
the following 3 scenarios. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 5-11]
1106
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10 https://www.meca.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/LDV_PM_Standard_Final_Report_06272023.pdf
11 DC enacted California standards by December 2022, after the impact assessment had commenced.
Low range electrification was defined by the electrification forecast of new vehicle
sales as completed in the Energy Information Agency (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook 2022
(AEO2022). This represents approximately 17% new vehicle sales in 2050. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0564, pp. 5-11]
Mid range electrification was defined by a 10 to 15-year delay in achieving the high
range scenario targets (by sector) with 100% electrification of all on-road sales by model year
2060. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 5-11]
High range electrification was defined by the electrification rate if all California zero
emission vehicle regulations as well as all federal executive orders and memoranda of
understanding were achieved. This scenario achieves 100% electrification of all on-road sales by
model year 2050 with key sector sales becoming fully electrified as early as model year 2035
(i.e., light-duty vehicles sold in the California certification region). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0564, pp. 5-11]
Figure 2 [See original comment for Figure 2. Annual Emission Inventory Impact] summarizes
the annual PM2.5 and BC inventory impacts for the modeling domain for the years 2025 to 2060.
Up to an estimated 7 and 10 thousand tons/year of BC and PM2.5 exhaust from internal
combustion engine (ICE) vehicles would be eliminated in each year. In the fully phased-in fleet
(i.e., CY2060), the pollutant benefits are equal to reductions in the light-duty fleet of 91 and 85%
for exhaust BC and PM2.5, respectively. Moreover, the continuation of benefits to CY2060
results indicate that the environmental impact of emission controls on internal combustion
engines will be significant well into the future - independent of the electrification rate scenario.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 5-11]
Cumulative heath impact valuations, based on recently updated EPA data from the 2012 PM
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) revision, are summarized in Figures 3, 4 and
5 [See original comment for Figure 3: Cumulative Impact, Low Range Electrification; Figure 4:
Cumulative Impact, Mid Range Electrification; and Figure 5: Cumulative Impact, High Range
Electrification] for the low, mid and high electrification scenarios, respectively. The total health
valuation, due to the reduced frequency of health incidences under the modeled regulatory case,
results in estimated health cost savings of between 18 billion and 163 billion dollars (cumulative
through 2050). The range in total valuation is due to (1) incidence rates defined as a range, (2)
the discount rate defined as a range, (3) monetary benefits by incidence defined as a range, and
(4) the range in PM2.5 benefit realized by electrification rate scenario. These health cost savings
come from the estimated 58 to 112 thousand tons of cumulative PM2.5 benefits under the
modeled regulatory case. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 5-11]
Within these PM2.5 benefits, an estimated 42 to 81 thousand tons of black carbon would be
eliminated. Another way to look at the comparative cumulative benefits presented in Figures 2
and 4 suggests that deploying a regulatory control strategy that includes a combination of electric
vehicle penetration and best available exhaust controls on the remaining combustion vehicles
approximately doubles the PM2.5 reductions achievable by electrification alone (112 versus 58
thousand tons of PM2.5 or 81 versus 42 thousand tons of BC). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564,
pp. 5-11]
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Given the majority of the global vehicle market has, for many years, been deploying
commercially available technologies to achieve PM standards more stringent than those
proposed by EPA, MECA recommends a more rapid phase-in schedule than EPA's proposed rate
of 40%/80%/100% in MY 2027/2028/2029. Rather, we support a schedule of 60% in MY 2027,
90% in MY 2028 and 100% in MY 2029. The basis for this phase in rate is a combination of
EPA's assumed rate of electric vehicle penetration and EPA's proposed phase-in rate for the
remainder of the ICE sales fleet. In MY 2027, EPA assumes 37% BEV sales. If the remaining
ICE vehicle share (63%) is multiplied by the 40% phase-in and added to the 37% BEV share, the
total feasible rate of PM standard phase-in is 62.2%. In MY 2028, EPA assumes 45% BEV sales.
If the remaining ICE vehicle share (55%) is multiplied by the 80% phase-in and added to the
45%) BEV share, the total feasible rate of PM standard phase-in is 89%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0564, pp. 5-11]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
EPA has proposed to issue a near-zero Particulate Matter ("PM") standard of 0.5 mg/mile.
This standard goes beyond the already challenging CARB ACCII rule which phases-in to 1.0
mg/mile. A requirement set at this level would force the incorporation of Gas Particulate Filters
("GPFs") in all vehicles, as well as required On-Board Diagnostic ("OBD") GPF monitoring.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 4]
Mercedes-Benz is already developing vehicles that will meet the CARB 1.0 mg/mile PM
standard and will need to pivot to design to the 0.5 mg/mile standard. Mercedes-Benz recognizes
and supports EPA's goal for emissions reductions but are concerned EPA's proposed PM
standard will draw funding and attention away from the electrification of our fleet. In particular,
it does not allow for a GPF drop-in solution, as EPA suggests, because EPA's proposed standard,
OBD requirements, and new testing requirements will require new and additional research and
development in order to comply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 4]
Beyond the additional effort needed to incorporate this new GPF hardware on vehicles, there
is also a challenge presented from the measurement uncertainty for PM readings during test
cycles. It is also worth noting that it is difficult if not impossible to replicate EPA's test
conditions, because our dynamometers and test facilities are under high usage, for multiple
scenarios (i.e., development, compliance and in-use). The following diagram illustrates this
difficulty with PM readings and design thresholds. The figure on the left shows constraints on
vehicles' emissions under the CARB ACCII 1.0 mg/mile standard. The background noise and
measurement uncertainty take up 0.19 mg/mile at the bottom of the figure while a necessary 30%
engineering buffer to the standard claims another 0.3 mg/mile from the top. This leaves just 0.51
mg/mile PM that the vehicle can emit and still confidently comply with a 1.0 mg/mile standard.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 4-5]
The diagram on the right shows how this challenge is magnified under EPA's proposed 0.5
mg/mile standard. The 0.19 mg/mile variability and 30% buffer remain, but the vehicle is now
left with only 0.16 mg/mile PM that it can emit and still confidently comply with the standard.
Even with application of a GPF that significantly lowers PM emissions, the variability and
capabilities of our laboratories to measure to 0.16 mg/mi is likely problematic without significant
investments in laboratory facilities, and even new test cells. This type of investment is counter to
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EPA's goals to encourage electric vehicles or the intent to provide a drop-in technology. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 4-5]
[See original for graphic on the impact of EPA's 0.5mg/mile standard on vehicles] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 4-5]
Given the difficulty of designing and testing to such a low standard, Mercedes-Benz
recommends the EPA align with the CARB ACCII standards for light-duty vehicles. The LEV
IV LDV PM standard provides regulatory uniformity between the agencies and aligns with
industry efforts, and investments already underway to develop to this standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0623, pp. 4-5]
At such a low standard level, high dynamics of some tests and the resulting high exhaust gas
mass flow can lead to other particles, such as humidity, diesel exhaust fluid (DEF), and
hydrocarbon particles, collecting on the filter plate in addition to soot particles. Due to the
amorphous property of soot, the highly volatile particles do not outgas during conditioning. EPA
should not apply the -7°C test, which significantly increases test burden and introduces concerns
with the influence of humidity on particulate matter detection. Also, this requirement does not
provide any additional emissions benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 18-19]
Finally, EPA should not apply the -7°C test, which significantly increases test burden but does
not additional emissions benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 5-6]
EPA should adopt the PM limits already established by CARB during their ACCII
rulemaking. This adoption would align with research and development dollars already committed
in this space, ensure inclusion of all MDV powertrains, and provide real and significant PM
reductions in the MDV segment. As importantly, this alignment would also ensure MDV funding
for electric vehicle development is not diverted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 18-19]
If the agency still pursues a GPF requirement, then additional flexibility with the standard
level and testing conditions is needed. First, the agency should allow manufacturers to optionally
perform multiple tests to determine compliance. For example, using statistical confidence a
manufacturer might run five certification tests. If the average of these five tests is below the 0.5
mg/mile standard then the vehicle is considered compliant. Outlier tests may be rejected,
considered resulting from the high variability of this testing and measurement process. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 5-6]
Second, EPA should reconsider the level of the standard, taking into consideration testing
variability and necessary compliance margins. The agency could also consider incorporating a
Conformity Factor ("CF") into the regulation to provide flexibility accounting for the
background emissions and variability in testing. As seen in the figure below, the background
contamination and inherent process variability could be added to the standard, bringing the
requirement up from 0.5 mg/mile + 0.19 mg/mile to ~ 0.7 mg/mile. This adjustment would
provide critical compliance room in the standard, avoid costly laboratory upgrades, and more
closely align to the drop-in technology solution EPA envisions. At the same, this requirement
will still push GPF technologies into the U.S. market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 5-6]
[See original for graphic on the proposed revisions to the rule] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0623, pp. 5-6]
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Vehicles produce extra emissions during a regeneration as the filter is being purged, but this
regeneration process does not occur every time a vehicle is driven. For vehicles with infrequent
regeneration events, the EPA provides for the use of an Infrequent Regeneration Adjustment
Factor ("IRAF"). This factor is calculated by determining the vehicle regeneration interval, or
average miles driven between regenerations, and the amount of additional emissions produced
during a regeneration event. Those additional emissions are then distributed across the
regeneration interval to develop an emissions result for certification purposes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0623, pp.11-12]
The situation is more challenging for GPFs. The majority of PM emissions are produced
during the cold start portions of testing. And in systems with close-coupled catalysts, the filter
temperature is high enough to allow passive regeneration during fuel cut-off. Putting these two
conditions together, a standard road cycle can result in negative soot accumulation instead of
positive. Negative soot accumulation makes regenerations very rare, and thereby makes it
particularly challenging to perform OBD regeneration diagnostics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0623, pp.11-12]
Mercedes-Benz requests the agency provide an exemption from both the regeneration
diagnostic requirement, as well as the Additive Adjustment Factor ("AAF") for vehicles with
passive infrequent regenerations. The EPA might consider reviewing the EU Commission
Regulation 2017/1151,9 which exempts vehicles with regeneration intervals exceeding 4000 km
from providing an AAF. It is important to note that this European requirement allows for an
attestation up to 4000 km. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 11-12]
9 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02017R1151-20200125.
EPA should define IRAF for infrequently regenerating gasoline systems. This definition is
critical to recognizing GPF technology functionality and providing clear direction for OBD
implementation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 12]
-The agency should also provide clear definitions for both passive and active regeneration for
gasoline systems, and details on how to distinguish the two. Mercedes-Benz is currently
developing suggested language to provide at a later time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p.
12]
-While a denominator for regeneration is not needed for gasoline engines, the agency should
include one for diesel engines. We suggest the agency include a 500-mile denominator for diesel
engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 12]
-EPA should provide a definition of the difference between periodically regenerating and
infrequently regenerating systems, whether this be in number of miles or number of FTPs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 12]
Leaving the testing procedures to each manufacturer to define adds unnecessary complexity
and may result in an unlevel playing field if different manufacturers' processes diverge.
Therefore, clear definitions and procedures are essential. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p.
12]
1110
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Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
6. Tier-4 criteria Pollutant Emissions
Mitsubishi echoes Auto Innovators' support for EPA's adoption of the California ACC II (i.e.,
LEV-IV) criteria test procedures and standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 9]
Mitsubishi supports cost-effective reductions in criterial pollutant emission from Internal
Combustion Engines (ICE). However, some of EPA's proposed changes to the criteria emission
standards - like the more stringent Particulate Mass (PM) and NMOG+NOx requirements and
the enrichment prohibition - go above and beyond those adopted by CARB in ACC II standards.
If finalized as proposed, these changes would require OEMs to divert large resources in time and
capital (resources that could otherwise be directed to accelerate EV technology deployment)
towards further ICE technology development and additional testing facilities. Mitsubishi believes
that allowing OEMs to focus their finite R&D investments on developing EV technologies,
rather than having to continue to invest in technology that is being phased out, is the most
effective way to reach our shared goal to transition to electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0682, p. 9]
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
Criteria Pollutant Emission Standards and Related Issues
For reasons cited above, NACAA strongly supports EPA's proposal of more protective
emission standards for non-methane organic gas (NMOG)+NOx and for PM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0559, pp.6-7]
With respect to PM, EPA proposes a standard of 0.5 mg/mi for LDVs and MDVs, with a
requirement that this standard be met across three duty cycles, including a cold-temperature (-
7°C) cycle. Such a standard will appropriately drive the use of gasoline particulate filters, which
are readily available. EPA projects that making these revisions to the standards set by the agency
in the 2014 Tier 3 rule would reduce PM emissions from ICE vehicles by more than 95 percent
and also yield reductions in toxic air pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 6-7]
Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
EPA also proposes non-methane organic gases plus nitrogen oxides (NMOG+NOx) standards
that represent a 60 percent reduction from the existing MY 2025 light-duty standards and a 66 to
76 percent reduction for medium-duty vehicles.7 And for both light- and medium-duty vehicles,
EPA's proposed standards project to reduce particulate matter emissions by more than 95
percent.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 2]
7 88 Fed. Reg. at 29197.
8 Id.
Organization: National Tribal Air Association (NTAA)
Criteria Pollutant Emissions Standards
1111
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Many residents in Indian country continue to be exposed to concentrations of ozone and
particulate matter that exceed current National Ambient Air Quality Standards. With a few
exceptions, the sources of this pollution are outside the jurisdiction and control of Tribal
governments. It is imperative that the EPA and applicable state and local authorities take all
necessary measures to return Tribal communities to healthy air quality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0504, p. 2]
The proposed emissions standards for new light-duty and medium-duty vehicles for non-
methane organic gases plus nitrogen oxides (NMOG+NOx) constitute one key step in reducing
the impacts from the largest source of these ozone-precursor pollutants. Concurrently, reduced
emissions of NMOG+NOx will reduce ambient air concentrations of particulate matter, and
PM2.5 more specifically. The NTAA supports the proposed standards for these pollutants across
the applicable vehicle categories and looks forward to healthier air quality in our many impacted
communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, p. 2]
Organization: North American Subaru, Inc.
On criteria pollutants, the agency proposes changes to emissions standards that could be better
addressed through alignment with the California Advanced Clean Cars II (i.e., LEV IV)
program. Of note is the NPRM's requirement to add new gasoline particulate filters starting in
MY27. CARB's regulations still call for challenging reductions in PM emissions while not
requiring a particulate filter for gasoline vehicles. The NPRM requirement to install new
technology (including on-board diagnostic sensors, hardware, vehicle testing) would add cost to
the vehicle for minimal gain in already low emission vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0576,
p. 2]
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
Decades of research confirms that exposure to criteria pollutant emissions from motor
vehicles, including NOx, PM2.5, and air toxics, worsens asthma and other cardio-respiratory
illnesses, especially in children and older adults, leading to additional trips to doctors and
emergency rooms, missed days of school and work, and thousands of premature deaths each
year. Exposure to PM2.5 can trigger heart attacks and strokes, exacerbate obesity and diabetes,
and contribute to cognitive challenges.8 This air pollution affects people nationwide, but
especially those who live or work near transportation hubs and corridors, often residents of low-
income communities and communities of color affected by decades of cumulative impacts of air
pollution from mobile and other sources.9 EPA estimates that, in 2023, LDVs and MDVs will
account for approximately 20 percent of NOx emissions, 19 percent of direct PM2.5 emissions,
and 41 percent of VOC emissions in the United States. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 3]
8 See, e.g., American Lung Association, State of the Air 2023 (2023), https://www.lung.org/research/sota;
Health Effects Institute, Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Selected Health Effects of Long-Term
Exposure to Traffic- Related Air Pollution, Special Report 23 (2022),
https://www.healtheffects.org/system/files/hei-special-report-23_l.pdf; G. Thurston, etal., Outdoor Air
Pollution and New Onset Airway Disease. An Official American Thoracic Society Workshop Report,
Annals of the American Thoracic Society, Vol. 17, No. 4 (2020),
https://www.atsjournals.org/doi/full/10.1513/AnnalsATS.202001-046ST; R. Sheer and D. Moss, Breathe
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Wheezy: Traffic Pollution Not Only Worsens Asthma, but May Cause It, Scientific American (2013),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/traffic-pollution-and-asthma/.
9 D. Reichmuth, Air Pollution from Cars, Trucks, and Buses in the US: Everyone is Exposed, But the
Burdens are not Equally Shared, Union of Concerned Scientists (2019), https://blog.ucsusa.org/dave-
reichmuth/air-pollution- from-cars-trucks-and-buses-in-the-u-s-everyone-is-exposed-but-the-burdens-are-
not-equally-shared/; see also A. Jbaily, et al., Air Pollution Exposure Disparities Across U.S. Population
and Income Groups, Nature (2022), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-04190-y.
10 NPRM, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29186.
EPA is proposing particulate matter (PM) standards for both LDVs and MDVs of 0.5 mg/mi
for three test cycles, including cold temperature. EPA projects the new standards will reduce
PM2.5 emissions from ICE vehicles by 95 percent and substantially reduce emissions of air
toxics. As discussed in the NPRM, the technology needed to achieve these standards is readily
available. The NPRM demonstrates both that PM can be controlled down to near zero levels, and
also that emissions well below the proposed limit of 0.5 mg/mi can be measured with existing
certification procedures.26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 10]
26 As noted in the NPRM, the majority of the global vehicle market outside of the U.S. is subject to more
stringent PM standards. Gasoline passenger cars have been regulated on the number of particles they emit
since 2015 in Europe and since 2020 in China and India. As a result, the best available PM emission control
technologies like gasoline particulate filters (GPF) and high-pressure fuel injectors have been incorporated
into vehicles sold in these regions for several years. In fact, nearly identical vehicles produced in the U.S.
without a GPF and shipped to Europe can be sold only after a GPF is installed.
We support EPA's inclusion of both standard and cold temperature testing for criteria
pollutants across all vehicle categories, as these tests better represent real world operation across
much of the United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 10]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
8. No projected need for Infrequent Regeneration Adjustment Factor (IRAF) for gasoline
particulate filters
Within the DRIA, EPA made mention of adopting IRAF for gasoline combustion GPF
equipped vehicles like what is currently required for diesel vehicles. Porsche does not believe at
this time that an IRAF is necessary due to the unique characteristics of gasoline versus diesel and
the higher control of soot through passive regeneration. Due to the higher exhaust temperature of
gasoline otto-cycle engines, the anticipated frequency of active regenerations for gasoline
particulate filter (GPF) equipped vehicles is significantly less than diesel fueled compression
engines equipped with diesel particulate filters (DPF). Porsche provides confidential test data in
Appendix-B to demonstrate anticipated soot loading and burn off over a variety of test cycles for
an example GPF equipped vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 15]
Porsche anticipates that active regeneration for gasoline GPF equipped vehicles will be very
infrequent, and through vehicle operation on highways and with potential staged regeneration
strategies, Porsche does not believe that the heightened emissions released during an active
regeneration will occur sufficiently to warrant the need for gasoline GPF IRAF. Porsche
recommends EPA continue to monitor the topic as more GPF equipped vehicles enter the US
market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 15]
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Organization: ReginaldModlin andB. ReidDetchon
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 required control of toxic emissions from motor
vehicles. EPA responded in 2001 with standards based on the technologies and understanding of
health effects at that time. However, time and science have moved on. Vehicle engine
technologies have advanced, the composition of gasoline has changed, and the public health
effects of aromatics have become better understood: Carburetors and port fuel injection have
largely been replaced by gasoline direct injection (GDI) technology. More than half of the
vehicles entering the market use this technology to enhance fuel economy
performance. Unfortunately, GDI technology greatly increases emissions of ultrafine particles
when using today's gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 5]
It doesn't have to be this way. Technologies and products have come together to define a new
solution for what the Clean Air Act requires: "the greatest degree of emission reduction
achievable through the application of technology which will be available." Along with a rapid
transition to electric vehicles, a complementary program should include adoption of higher
ethanol blends, which have been shown by U.S. National Laboratories to enable higher fuel
economy and vehicle performance. Such blends would enable a 40% reduction in the use of
toxic aromatics in gasoline. An important recent study, co-authored by the Nobel Prize winner
Mario Molina, concluded that reducing the smallest (ultrafine) particles "without simultaneously
limiting organics from automobile emissions is ineffective and can even exacerbate this
problem." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 5]
I. Emissions from the use of toxic chemicals in gasoline - aromatic hydrocarbons - are
causing thousands of premature deaths annually in the United States and harming the cognitive
development of children. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 6-7]
1. The effect on public health in brief [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 6-7]
a. Incomplete combustion of the aromatics in gasoline (comprising 20% of every gallon)
results in tailpipe emissions of fine particles. Inhalation of fine particles from fossil fuel
combustion is the leading cause of premature death in the world, killing more than 8 million
people annually. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 6-7]
1 Karn Vohra et al., "Global mortality from outdoor fine particle pollution generated by fossil fuel
combustion: Results from GEOS-Chem," Environmental Research (2021): 195(110754):
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0013935121000487 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
b. A recent study found that reducing the smallest (ultrafine) particles without
simultaneously limiting organics from automobile emissions "is ineffective and can even
exacerbate the problem." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 6-7]
2 Song Guo et al., "Remarkable nucleation and growth of ultrafine particles from vehicular exhaust,"
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (2020): 117(7): pp.
3427-32: https://www.pnas.Org/content/117/7/3427 (accessed June 11, 2021).
c. Once inhaled, ultrafine particles reach the deepest part of the lungs and enter the
bloodstream, where they can cross biological membranes, even the placental barrier, and reach
the brain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 6-7]
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3 C. Vyvyan Howard, "Particulate Emissions and Health" (2009): pp. 13-16:
http://www.durhamenvironmentwatch.org/Incinerator%20Health/CVHRingaskiddyEvidenceFinall.pdf
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
4 Russell A. Morales-Rubio et al., "In utero exposure to ultrafine particles promotes placental stress-
induced programming of renin-angiotensin system-related elements in the offspring results in altered blood
pressure in adult mice," Particle and Fibre Toxicology (2019): 16(7):
https://particleandfibretoxicology.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/sl2989-019-0289-l (accessed Feb.
24, 2021).
5 Dean E. Schraufnagel, "The health effects of ultrafine particles," Experimental & Molecular Medicine
(2020): 52: pp. 311-17: https://www.nature.com/articles/sl2276-020-0403-3 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
d. Not all particles are alike - some may be benign, while others are clearly toxic. Among
the worst are polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), which mix and combine with other
gasoline emissions to persist over longer times and distances than previously thought possible.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 6-7]
6 Alia Zelenyuk et al., "The Effect of Gas-Phase Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons on the Formation and
Properties of Biogenic Secondary Organic Aerosol Particles," Faraday Discussions (2017): 200: pp. 143-
164: https://pubs.rsc.Org/en/content/articlelanding/2017/FD/C7FD00032D#ldivAbstract (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
e. Fetal exposure to extremely low levels of PAHs - levels that are common in dense urban
areas - has been associated with developmental delay at age 3 years and reduced IQ at age 5
years, similar to the effects reported for children with elevated concentrations of lead in their
blood. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 6-7]
7 Frederica P. Perera et al., "Prenatal Airborne Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon Exposure and Child IQ at
Age 5 Years," Pediatrics (2009): 124(2): pp. el95-e202:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2864932/ (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
g. EPA has determined that, for vehicles from model year 2001 on, "El5 will not cause or
contribute to a failure to achieve compliance with the emissions standards to which these
vehicles were certified over their useful lives." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 34]
178 U.S. EPA, "Modifications to Fuel Regulations To Provide Flexibility forE15," op. cit., supra note 173:
pp. 26989-90.
2. Aromatics
a. Aromatics are hydrocarbons built around one or more benzene rings. Often referred to by
the acronym BTEX, they include not just benzene itself, a known carcinogen, but also toluene,
ethylbenzene, xylenes, and other compounds similar to benzene in their behavior in the
environment. People are exposed to BTEX primarily through emissions from motor vehicles and
cigarette smoke. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
8 Emma P. Popek, "Environmental Chemical Pollutants" in Sampling and Analysis of Environmental
Chemical Pollutants (second edition), Elsevier (2018), p. 36:
https://www.sciencedirect.coni/science/article/pii/B9780128032022000021 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
9 Queensland (Australia) Department of Environment and Science, "BTEX chemicals":
https://environment.des.qld.gov.au/management/activities/non-mining/fraccing/btex-chemicals (accessed
Feb. 24, 2021).
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b. Aromatics are derived from petroleum during the refining process and blended into
gasoline to increase octane. Their use increased dramatically during the 1980s when the
previously used additive, tetraethyl lead, was phased out due to health concerns. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
10 Francesca Lyman, "The Gassing of America," in The Washington Post, April 13, 1990:
https://www.washingtonpost.eom/archive/lifestyle/1990/04/13/the-gassing-of-america/bce94f4d-c8al-
47e5-8c9c-d0a6befd8b80/ (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
11 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Examples of Successful Lead Phaseouts: United States," in
Implementer's Guide to Phasing Out Lead in Gasoline (1999), pp. 10-11:
https://archive.epa.gov/international/air/web/pdf/epa_phase_out.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. Octane is needed in gasoline to prevent premature combustion of the fuel mixture
("knock"), which can damage engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
12 "Engine knocking," in Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engine_knocking (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
ii. The level of aromatics in gasoline is capped at 25% in regions required to use
reformulated gasoline (areas that have high levels of ozone pollution, roughly 30% of the U.S.
market). On average, aromatics comprise 20% of the gasoline sold in the U.S. Levels elsewhere
(e.g., in Europe and China) have been as high as 40%, worsening air pollution and public health
in those regions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
13 42 U.S. Code, sec.77545, "Regulation of fuels," at (k)(3)(A)(ii): P.L. 101-549, sec. 219, enacted Nov.
15, 1990: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7545 (accessed June 17, 2021).
14 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Fuel Trends Report: Gasoline 2006 - 2016" (2017), Table 6:
Summary of Annual Average Gasoline Properties Between 1997 and 2016: EPA-420-R-17-005: p. 27:
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100T5J6.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
15 Guiqian Tang et al., "Organic composition of gasoline and its potential effects on air pollution in North
China," Science China: Chemistry (2015): 58(9): pp. 1416-25:
http://engine.scichina.eom/publisher/scp/journal/SCC/58/9/10.1007/sll426-015-5464-0?slug=abstract
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
iii. In the decade from 1997 to 2006, aromatics made up roughly 25% of the U.S. gasoline
pool. That level fell to 20% over the next 10 years as ethanol's share of the market rose from 3%
to nearly 10%. This 20% level equates to 25.3 billion gallons of aromatics used in cars and light
trucks per year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
16 U.S. EPA, "Fuel Trends Report," op. cit., supra note 14.
17 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Gasoline explained - use of gasoline", online fact sheet:
"Light-duty vehicles (cars, sport utility vehicles, and small trucks) account for about 92% of all gasoline
consumption in the United States": https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/gasoline/use-of-gasoline.php
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021). EIA projects gasoline use in 2021 to total 137.5 billion gallons, or 126.5 billion
gallons for light-duty vehicles: U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Annual Energy Outlook 2021,"
Table 11. Petroleum and Other Liquids Supply and Disposition (Reference case):
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=ll-AE02021®ion=0-
0&cases=ref2021&start=2019&end=2050&f= A&linechart=ref2021 -dl 13020a. 3 -11 -
AE02021&chartindexed=0&sourcekey=0 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
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iv. Aromatics have a much higher ratio of carbon to hydrogen than other typical
hydrocarbons do, driving up the carbon content of gasoline and producing higher greenhouse gas
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
18 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 1987-
1994" (1995), DOE/EIA-0573(87-94), p. 77: https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/122288 (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
v. Aromatics contribute about 10% of global anthropogenic emissions of non-methane
organic gases (NMOG), the major source being car exhaust from gasoline-powered vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
19 I. Barnes and K.H. Becker, "Aromatic Hydrocarbons," in Tropospheric Chemistry and Composition,
Encyclopedia of Atmospheric Sciences (2003): p. 2376:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0122270908004243 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
vi. Aromatics are also responsible for an estimated 30-40% of the ozone and other
photooxidants in urban atmospheres, making them the most important class of hydrocarbons
with regard to photochemical ozone formation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
20 Ibid
c. The BTEX chemicals are characterized as hazardous air pollutants "known or suspected
to cause cancer or other serious health or environmental effects." They are identified as mobile
source air toxics and formed in four ways, of which the first two are most pertinent. According to
EPA: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 8-9]
21 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "What are Hazardous Air Pollutants?", online fact sheet:
https://www.epa.gov/haps/what-are-hazardous-air-pollutants (accessed Aug. 29, 2021).
22 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Control of Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile
Sources; Final Rule," Federal Register (2001): 66(61): pp. 17235-39:
https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/FR-2001-03-29/pdf/01-37.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. "First, some air toxics are present in fuel and are emitted to the air when it evaporates or
passes through the engine as unburned fuel. Benzene, for example, is a component of gasoline.
Cars emit small quantities of benzene in unburned fuel, or as vapor when gasoline evaporates.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 8-9]
ii. "Second, mobile source air toxics are formed through engine combustion processes. A
significant amount of automotive benzene comes from the incomplete combustion of compounds
in gasoline such as toluene and xylene that are chemically very similar to benzene." (emphasis
added) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 8-9]
d. According to a review of the literature by a Health Effects Institute panel, "It is estimated
that about 50% of the benzene produced in the exhaust is the result of decomposition of aromatic
hydrocarbons in the fuel. ... [Two] studies showed that lowering aromatic levels in gasoline
significantly reduces toxic benzene emissions from vehicle exhausts." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 8-9]
23 Health Effects Institute, Panel on the Health Effects of Traffic-Related Air Pollution, "Traffic-Related
Air Pollution: A Critical Review of the Literature on Emissions, Exposure, and Health Effects" (Special
Report 17): Chapter 2, "Emissions from Motor Vehicles," Appendix B: "Fuel Composition Changes
Related To Emission Controls" (2010): pp. 3-4:
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https://www.healtheffects.org/system/files/SR17TrafficReviewChapter2AppendixB.pdf (accessed Aug. 24,
2021).
e. Gasoline-powered vehicles accounted for 69% of all U.S. emissions of single-ring
aromatic hydrocarbons, based on source-specific speciation in the 2005 National Emissions
Inventory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 8-9]
24 Katherine von Stackelberg et al., "Public health impacts of secondary particulate formation from
aromatic hydrocarbons in gasoline," Table 3, National emissions inventory of single-ring aromatic
hydrocarbons, Environmental Health (2013): 12(19):
https://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1476-069X-12-19/tables/3 in
https://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1476-069X-12-19 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
3. Emissions from aromatics: Particulate matter (PM) and ultrafine particles (UFPs) [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 9-10]
a. When a fuel is burned in a vehicle, its molecules break apart and create particulate matter
(PM). PM is usually characterized according to its size - in three categories: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570, pp.9-10]
25 Mohsin Raza et al., "A Review of Particulate Number (PN) Emissions from Gasoline Direct Injection
(GDI) Engines and Their Control Techniques," Energies (2018): 11(6), 1417: p. 3:
https://www.mdpi.eom/1996-1073/ll/6/1417/htm (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. Some particles, such as dust, dirt, soot, or smoke, are large or dark enough to be seen
with the naked eye. These larger particles (2.5 to 10 micrometers in diameter) are called PM10
and are mostly derived from soil and sea salts. Fine particles (PM2.5, 0.1 to 2.5 micrometers in
diameter) and ultrafine particles (UFPs, less than 0.1 micrometer) are predominantly derived
from combustion of fossil fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 9-10]
26 Andre Nel, "Air Pollution-Related Illness: Effects of Particles," Science (2005): 308(5723): pp. 804-06:
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/308/5723/804 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
ii. Exposure to PM2.5 from fossil fuel combustion was recently shown to be the leading
cause of premature death in the world, killing more than 8 million people annually - double the
previous estimate - based on a new risk assessment model that found a higher mortality rate for
long-term exposure to fossil fuel emissions, including at lower concentrations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570, pp.9-10]
27 Vohra, op. cit., supra note 1, updating Dean E. Schraufnagel et al., "Air Pollution and
Noncommunicable Diseases - A Review by the Forum of International Respiratory Societies'
Environmental Committee, Part 1: The Damaging Effects of Air Pollution," CHEST Journal (2019):
155(2): pp. 409-16: https://journal.chestnet.org/article/S0012-3692(18)32723-5/pdf (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
28 Leah Burrows, "Deaths from fossil fuel emissions higher than previously thought," news release,
Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Feb. 9, 2021:
https://www.seas.harvard.edu/news/2021/02/deaths-fossil-fuel-emissions-higher-previously-thought
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
iii. EPA recently announced that it will reconsider its national standards for PM2.5, stating:
"The strong body of scientific evidence shows that long- and short-term exposures to fine
particles (PM2.5) can harm people's health, leading to heart attacks, asthma attacks, and
premature death. Large segments of the U.S. population, including children, people with heart or
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lung conditions, and people of color, are at risk of health effects from PM2.5." [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570, pp.9-10]
29 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "EPA to Reexamine Health Standards for Harmful Soot that
Previous Administration Left Unchanged," news release, June 10, 2021:
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-reexamine-health-standards-harmful-soot-previous-administration-
left-unchanged (accessed June 11, 2021).
1. Children's exposure to air pollution is of special concern because their immune system
and lungs are not fully developed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 10]
30 Joel Schwartz, "Air Pollution and Children's Health," Pediatrics (2004): 113(4): pp. 1037-43:
https://pediatrics.aappublications.Org/content/pediatrics/l 13/Supplement_3/1037.full.pdf (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
2. Long-term exposure to PM2.5 has also been associated with a large increase in the
COVID-19 death rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 10]
31 Xiao Wu et al., "Exposure to air pollution and COVID-19 mortality in the United States: A nationwide
cross-sectional study," medRxiv preprint (2020):
https://www.medrxiv.Org/content/10.1101/2020.04.05.20054502v2 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
iv. As EPA notes, "While some PM is emitted directly from sources such as construction
sites, unpaved roads, fields, smokestacks or fires, most particles form in the atmosphere as a
result of complex reactions of chemicals such as sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, which are
pollutants emitted from power plants, industrial facilities and vehicles." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, p. 10]
32 U.S. EPA, "EPA to Reexamine Health Standards for Harmful Soot," op. cit., supra note 29.
1. A recent General Motors study found that nearly 96% of the PM emissions from gasoline
are caused by the aromatics in the fuel. Due to an increase in heavy aromatics in the U.S.
gasoline pool in the last three years, the gasoline particulate index has increased by more than
30% since 2016 and now is worse than in the EU and China. The authors observed: "Fuel quality
improvements are not only important for new vehicles, which are designed for it, but also will
benefit the whole fleet of legacy vehicles in the market and off-highway engines." [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 10-12]
33 Elana Chapman et al., "Global Market Gasoline Quality Review: Five Year Trends in Particulate
Emission Indices," SAE International (2021): SAE Technical Paper 2021-01-0623:
https://saemobilus.sae.org/content/2021-01-0623/ (accessed June 17, 2021).
v. Ultrafine particles (UFPs) are so small that they can only be detected with an electron
microscope, and they are more usefully measured by particle number, not mass. They comprise
more than 80% of the particles in urban air but are a negligible fraction of PM2.5 mass. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 10-12]
34 Christina H. Fuller et al., "Indoor and outdoor measurements of particle number concentration in near-
highway homes," Journal of Exposure Science and Environmental Epidemiology (2013): 23: p. 506:
https://www.nature.com/articles/jes2012116.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
1. Studies have shown associations between UFPs and increased asthma symptoms,
cardiovascular disease markers, and decreased cognitive function. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0570, pp. 10-12]
1119
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35 Ibid.
~. In a recent U.S. study, prenatal UFP exposure was linked to asthma development in
children: Children whose mothers were exposed to high levels of UFPs during pregnancy were
four times more likely to develop asthma than those whose mothers were exposed to lower levels
- roughly the difference between a quiet street and a busy road. Most of the diagnoses occurred
just after three years of age, and overall 18% of the infants developed asthma. The researchers
took account of other factors, including the age of the mothers and obesity, as well as other air
pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 10-12]
36 Rosalind J. Wright et al., "Prenatal Ambient Ultrafine Particle Exposure and Childhood Asthma in the
Northeastern United States," American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine (2021):
https://www.atsjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1164/rccm.202010-37430C (accessed June 11, 2021).
37 Damian Carrington, "Asthma in toddlers linked to in-utero exposure to air pollution, study finds," The
Guardian (May 21, 2021): https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/may/21/asthma-in-toddlers-
linked-to-in-utero-exposure-to-air-pollution-ufps-study-finds (accessed June 11, 2021).
2. UFPs contain large amounts of toxic components, and their adverse health effects
potential would not be predicted from their mass alone. Particle number, surface area, and
chemical composition are more important than mass as a health-relevant metric. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 10-12]
38 Paul A. Solomon, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "An Overview of Ultrafine Particles in
Ambient Air," EM: The Magazine for Environmental Managers (2012): 5: pp. 20-21:
https://cfpub.epa.gov/si/si_public_record_report.cfm?Lab=NERL&dirEntryId=241266 (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
3. There is a growing concern in the public health community about the contribution of
UFPs to human health. Despite their modest mass and size, they dominate in terms of the number
of particles in the ambient air. A particular concern about UFPs is their ability to reach the most
distal lung regions (alveoli) and circumvent primary airway defenses. Moreover, UFPs have a
high surface area and a capacity to adsorb a substantial amount of toxic organic compounds.
Harmful systemic health effects of PM10 or PM2.5 are often due to the UFP fraction. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 10-12]
39 Hyouk-Soo Kwon et al., "Ultrafine particles: unique physicochemical properties relevant to health and
disease," Experimental & Molecular Medicine (2020): 52: pp. 318-28:
https://www.nature.com/articles/sl2276-020-0405-l.pdf (accessed June 11, 2021).
5. The ability of inhaled particles to be captured within the human body, called the
deposition efficiency, is a function of particle size, with the particle deposition efficiency rapidly
increasing as the particles become smaller and smaller. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp.
10-12]
40 Felipe Rodriguez et al., "Recommendations for Post-Euro 6 Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles in the
EU" (2019), International Council on Clean Transportation, p. 8:
https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/Post_Euro6_standards_report_20191003.pdf (accessed
June 11,2021).
~. UFPs can cross biological membranes, and their mobility within the body is thought to
be high. There is considerable evidence to show that inhaled UFPs can gain access to the
bloodstream and are then distributed to other organs in the body. They can even cross the
placental barrier. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 10-12]
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41 Howard, op. cit., supra note 3, pp. 12-15.
7. UFPs have been shown to directly translocate to the brain along the olfactory nerves. In
addition, they can pass intact into cells, where they can have direct access to cytoplasmic
proteins and organelles - for example, the mitochondria impacting the respiratory chain and
DNA in the nucleus - enhancing the toxic potential of these particles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 12-13]
42 Solomon, op. cit., supra note 38, p. 21.
8. Results indicating that particles may contribute to the overall oxidative stress burden of
the brain are particularly troublesome, as these long-term health effects may accumulate over
decades. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 12-13]
43 Annette Peters et al., "Translocation and potential neurological effects of fine and ultrafine particles a
critical update," Particle and Fibre Toxicology (2006): 3(13): https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16961926/
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
vi. Research also suggests that the introduction of excessive UFPs into the atmosphere
results in surprising side effects, such as changes in the distribution and intensity of rainfall,
causing either drought or flooding in extreme cases. Such drastic climate change affects the
global hydrological cycle and thereby affects global public health both directly and indirectly.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 12-13]
44 Kwon et al., op. cit., supra note 39.
vii. In most urban areas, on-road vehicles are the primary source of UFP emissions. These
areas observe a peak in UFPs in the morning during rush hour associated with motor vehicle
emissions and a second peak during the afternoon, enhanced during the summer, associated with
photochemistry, or one slightly later in the afternoon due to rush hour traffic that is enhanced
during cooler conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 12-13]
45 Ibid.
46 Solomon, op. cit., supra note 38, p. 19.
viii.. An important recent study co-authored by Nobel Prize winner Mario Molina found
"remarkable formation of UFPs from urban traffic emissions": [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570,
pp. 12-13]
47 Guo et al., op. cit., supra note 2.
1. Photooxidation of vehicular exhaust yields abundant UFP precursors, and organics
dominate formation of UFPs under urban conditions. Measurements of gaseous species inside
the chamber showed high levels of aromatics, including toluene and C8 and C9 aromatics. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 12-13]
48 Ibid.
2. The authors concluded: "Recognition of this source of UFPs is essential to assessing
their impacts and developing mitigation policies. Our results imply that reduction of primary
particles or removal of existing particles without simultaneously limiting organics from
automobile emissions is ineffective and can even exacerbate this problem." (emphasis added)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 12-13]
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49 Ibid.
b. The newest generation of efficient engine technology, gasoline direct injection (GDI),
increases public exposure to gasoline PM, and thus to UFPs, including PAHs. Uncontrolled GDI
engines have been found to emit 10 times more particles (by mass) than previous engines and
more than 100 times the number of particles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 13-14]
50 John M. Storey et al., Oak Ridge National Laboratory, "Novel Characterization of GDI Engine Exhaust
for Gasoline and Mid-Level Gasoline-Alcohol Blends," SAE International Journal of Fuels and Lubricants
(2014): 7(2): pp. 571-79: https://www.eenews.net/assets/2014/10/02/document_cw_01.pdf (accessed Feb.
24, 2021).
51 Transport & Environment, "Gasoline particulate emissions: The next auto scandal?" (2016), p. 2:
https://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/publications/2016_10_Gasoline_particulate_emissions_
briefing_0.pdf, citing the European Commission's Joint Research Centre: A. Mamakos et al., "Assessment
of particle number limits for petrol vehicles" (2012):
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC76849 (accessed Aug. 18, 2021).
i. Vehicle exhaust, in particular that of gasoline direct injection (GDI) engines, contains
copious amounts of particles in the size ranges with high deposition efficiency. GDI engines
emit UFPs and PM at levels comparable to diesel engines that do not use diesel particulate
filters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 13-14]
52 Rodriguez et al., op. cit., supra note 40.
53 Rich Kassel et al., Gladstein, Neandross & Associates, "Ultrafine Particulate Matter and the Benefits of
Reducing Particle Numbers in the United States," A Report to the Manufacturers of Emission Controls
Association (MECA) (2013): p. 8: http://www.meca.org/resources/meca_ulip_white_paper_0713_final.pdf
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
54 Kwon et al., op. cit., supra note 39.
1. Unlike conventional port fuel injection engines, which mix fuel and air prior to injection
into the engine cylinders, GDI technology involves spraying the fuel directly into the cylinders,
allowing for higher compression ratios - which enable higher combustion efficiencies, enhanced
fuel economy and reduced C02 emissions. However, similar to diesel engines, the direct
injection of fuel in GDI engines creates fuel-rich pockets near the injection zone, conducive to
formation of carbonaceous PM, especially black carbon. GDI engines emit larger amounts of
black carbon than conventional engines, as has been confirmed by several laboratory studies
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 14-15]
55 Soroush E. Neyestani et al., "Direct Radiative Effect and Public Health Implications of Aerosol
Emissions Associated with Shifting to Gasoline Direct Injection (GDI) Technologies in Light-Duty
Vehicles in the United States," Environmental Science & Technology (2020): 54(2): pp. 687-96:
https://pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/acs.est.9b04115 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021), quoted in Green Car
Congress, "UGA study finds black carbon aerosols from GDI engines will worsen public health, climate;
need for GPFs": https://www.greencarcongress.com/2020/01/20200125-uga.html (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
ii. GDI was used in fewer than 3% of vehicles as recently as model year 2008 but was
projected to be used in more than 55% of vehicles in model year 2020. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 14-15]
56 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Manufacturers continue to adopt a wide array of advanced
technologies," in "Highlights of the Automotive Trends Report," online fact sheet:
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https://www.epa.gOv/automotive-trends/highlights-automotive-trends-report#Highlight5 (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
This shift to GDI engines is predicted to nearly double annual deaths in the U.S. from
gasoline-vehicle particulate emissions - according to one estimate, from 855 to 1,599 deaths a
year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 14-15]
57 Raza et al., op. cit., supra note 25: p. 5.
iii. Emissions from GDI engines can be mitigated by changes in operating parameters, by
the addition of gasoline particulate filters (both with potential costs to vehicle efficiency), or by
a reduction in aromatic content. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 14-15]
59 Xin He et al., "Effects of Gasoline Direct Injection Engine Operating Parameters on Particle Number
Emissions," Energy & Fuels (2012): 26(4): pp. 2014-27: https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/ef201917p
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
59 Ray J Minjares and Francisco Posada Sanchez, The International Council on Clean Transportation,
"Estimated Cost of Gasoline Particulate Filters" (2011): p. 1:
https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/GFPworkingpaper201 l.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
c. There is a strong link between PM emissions from GDI engines and the composition and
properties of the gasoline, chiefly the aromatic content of the fuel: High levels of aromatics lead
to a higher level of PM emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 15]
60 Raza et al., op. cit., supra note 25: p. 13.
i. Aromatic compounds are harder to evaporate and slower to decompose than other
hydrocarbons. Aromatics also may decompose into compounds such as acetylenes which serve
as precursors for the formation of a benzene ring. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 15]
61 Mohammad Fatouraie et al., "Investigation of the Impact of Fuel Properties on Particulate Number
Emission of a Modern Gasoline Direct Injection Engine," SAE Technical Paper 2018-01-0358 (2018), p. 9:
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/Iyl8osti/71483.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
ii. High levels of aromatic components in fuel have been conclusively shown to increase
PM emissions measured by particle number, an aromatic ring being an early stage of the
fundamental particulate formation process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 15]
62 Raza et al., op. cit., supra note 25: p. 18.
4. Emissions from aromatics: Secondary organic aerosol (SOA)
a. Organic aerosol is a major component of fine particle pollution. Primary organic aerosol
(POA) is directly emitted from fossil fuel combustion and other sources, while secondary organic
aerosol (SOA) is formed from the oxidation of these emissions in the air. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, p. 15]
63 J. L. Jiminez et al., "Evolution of Organic Aerosols in the Atmosphere," Science (2009): 326(5959): pp.
1525-29: https://science.sciencemag.org/content/326/5959/1525 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. Tailpipe emissions from on-road gasoline vehicles are an important source of SOA in
urban environments, where SOA concentrations often exceed POA levels. For most vehicles,
SOA formation exceeds POA emissions after a few hours of atmospheric oxidation. Controlling
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SOA precursor emissions is necessary to reduce human exposure to fine particulate matter.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 15]
64 Yunliang Zhao et al., "Reducing secondary organic aerosol formation from gasoline vehicle exhaust,"
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (2017): 114(27): pp.
6984-89: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5502599/ (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
ii. A study of SOA formation during a severe photochemical smog event in Los Angeles
found that exhaust from gasoline engines represented the single-largest anthropogenic source of
SOA, and SOA in turn has been shown to be a large fraction, if not the largest, of gasoline
vehicular PM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 15]
65 Michael J. Kleeman et al., "Source apportionment of secondary organic aerosol during a severe
photochemical smog episode," Atmospheric Environment (2007): 41(3): pp. 576-91:
https://www.sciencedirect.eom/science/article/abs/pii/S 1352231006008582?via%3Dihub (accessed Feb.
24, 2021).
b. According to EPA's 2011 National Air Toxics Assessment,: secondary formation is the
largest contributor to cancer risks nationwide, accounting for 47% of the risk. On-road mobile
sources contribute the most cancer risk from directly emitted pollutants (about 18%) and the
most to non-cancer risks (34%). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 15-16]
66 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Overview of EPA's 2011 National Air Toxics Assessment,"
online fact sheet (2015): https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-12/documents/2011-nata-fact-
sheet.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. A recent study found higher toxicity in combustion aerosols than non-combustion
aerosols, with emissions from vehicle engine exhaust scoring higher on overall toxicity than even
those from coal combustion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 15-16]
67 Minhan Park et al., "Differential toxicities of fine particulate matters from various sources," Nature,
Scientific Reports (2018): 8(17007): https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-35398-0 (accessed Feb.
24, 2021).
b. In the 30 years since the law was enacted, EPA has issued specific regulations on the
subject of mobile source air toxics (MSATs) only twice - putting modest limits on benzene
emissions in 2001 and on the benzene content of gasoline in 2007, but largely deferring action on
the others. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 25-26]
i. The 2001 rule did list the BTEX aromatics as mobile source air toxics and noted that
mobile sources accounted for more than 75% of total national emissions in each instance. Also
listed was polycyclic organic matter: A group of seven PAHs, "which have been identified by
EPA as probable human carcinogens" - including BaP - were used as surrogates for the larger
group of POM compounds. Mobile sources were said to account for only 6% of total national
emissions - but as measured by mass, not particle number. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp.
25-26]
129 U.S. EPA, "Control of Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources" (2001), op. cit.,
supra note 22.
c. Congress reiterated its 1990 mandate in the Energy Policy Act of 2005: "Not later than
July 1, 2007, the [EPA] Administrator shall promulgate final regulations to control hazardous air
pollutants from motor vehicles and motor vehicles fuels ... as authorized under section 202(1) of
the Clean Air Act." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 25-26]
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130 Energy Policy Act of 2005, P.L. 109-58, "Elimination Of Oxygen Content Requirement For
Reformulated Gasoline," sec. 1504(b)(l)(vi): https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ58/PLAW-
109publ58.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021). Codified at 42 U.S. Code, sec.?7545(k)(l)(B)(vi), "Regulation of
fuels": https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7545 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. EPA issued its 2007 mobile-source rule in response to this congressional directive. It
acknowledged that "Recent studies have found that maternal exposures to PAHs in a population
of pregnant women were associated with several adverse birth outcomes, including low birth
weight and reduced length at birth, as well as impaired cognitive development at age three."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 25-26]
131 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Mobile Sources;
Final Rule," Federal Register (2007): 72(37): p. 8439: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2007-02-
26/pdf/E7-2667.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
1. But EPA took no action, saying that, according to its model, emissions of polycyclic
organic matter "correlate directly with VOC emissions" and thus would decline as VOC
emissions decline - failing to anticipate the contrary effect of new GDI engine technology,
noted above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 25-26]
132 Ibid., p. 8478.
ii. In proposing the rule, the agency also acknowledged "limited data that suggest that
aromatic compounds (toluene, xylene, and benzene) react photochemically in the atmosphere to
form secondary particulate matter (in the form of secondary organic aerosol (SOA)), although
our current modeling tools do not fully reflect this" (emphasis added) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 25-26]
133 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Mobile Sources;
Proposed Rule," Federal Register (2006): 71(60): p. 15864: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
2006-03-29/pdf/06-2315.pdf#page=62 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
1. The rule's Regulatory Impact Analysis said: "The issue of SOA formation from aromatic
precursors is an important one to which EPA and others are paying significant attention. Due to
the large contribution of mobile source emissions to overall aromatic levels in the atmosphere,
this issue is a crucial one for assessing what further reductions are possible in mobile source
PM." (emphasis added) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 26-28]
134 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources:
Regulatory Impact Analysis" (2007): p. 1-29:
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPdf.cgi?Dockey=P1004LNN.PDF (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
iii. In the final rule, EPA said: "There may be compelling reasons to consider aromatics
control in the future, especially regarding reduction in secondary PM2.5 emissions, to the extent
that evidence supports a role for aromatics in secondary PM2.5 formation. Unfortunately, there
are limitations in both primary and secondary PM science and modeling tools that limit our
present ability to quantitatively predict what would happen for a given fuel control. ... [M]ore
work is underway on how fuel aromatics, including toluene, affect secondary PM formation, and
how aromatics control should be incorporated into air quality predictive models. ... Thus, we
have concluded that additional aromatics control for MSAT purposes is not warranted at this
time." (emphasis added) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 26-28]
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135 U.S. EPA, "Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Mobile Sources" (2007), op. cit., supra note
131: p. 8479.
1. The final rule stated, in summary: "EPA believes that the emission reductions from the
standards finalized today for motor vehicles and their fuels, combined with the standards
currently in place, represent the maximum achievable reductions of emissions from motor
vehicles through the application of technology that will be available, considering costs and the
other factors listed in section 202(1)(2)." (emphasis added) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570,
pp. 26-28]
136 Ibid., p. 8460.
- Note: EPA's conclusion that it had required "the maximum achievable reductions" was
wrong then and is even more clearly wrong today, as shown in Section III, below. Additionally,
more than 13 years after issuing the 2007 rule, EPA has still not taken action on "assessing what
further reductions are possible in mobile source PM" or on "how aromatics control should be
incorporated into air quality predictive models." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 26-28]
d. EPA missed another opportunity to act in 2014, in its rule on Tier 3 Motor Vehicle
Emission and Fuel Standards, which it said would result in "significant reductions in pollutants
such as ozone, particulate matter, and air toxics." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 26-28]
137 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Control of Air Pollution From Motor Vehicles: Tier 3 Motor
Vehicle Emission and Fuel Standards," Federal Register (2014): 79(81): p. 23414:
https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/FR-2014-04-28/pdf/2014-06954.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. EPA acknowledged that "the majority of Americans continue to be exposed to ambient
concentrations of air toxics at levels which have the potential to cause adverse health effects. ...
According to the National Air Toxics Assessment (NATA) for 2005, mobile sources were
responsible for 43% of outdoor toxic emissions and over 50% of the cancer risk and noncancer
hazard associated with primary emissions. Mobile sources are also large contributors to
precursor emissions which react to form secondary concentrations of air toxics." [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 26-28]
138 Ibid., p. 23437.
ii. Yet the agency took no direct action to reduce air toxics or even to estimate the benefits
of the action it did take: "While there would be impacts associated with reductions in air toxic
pollutant emissions that result from the final standards, we do not attempt to quantify and
monetize those impacts.... This is primarily because currently available tools and methods to
assess air toxics risk from mobile sources at the national scale are not adequate for extrapolation
to incidence estimations or benefits assessment." (emphasis added) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0570, pp. 26-28]
139 Ibid., p. 23608.
iii. The Tier 3 rule lowered the maximum sulfur content in gasoline to avoid the poisoning
of emissions catalysts and make emission control systems more effective, but the sulfur
reduction produced no benefit for PM emissions: "Unlike the gaseous pollutants, there was no
effect of sulfur level found for PM. ... As a result, sulfur would not be expected to have a
significant effect on directly-emitted PM (other than very small amounts of sulfate)" [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 26-28]
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140 Ibid., pp. 23420, 23441.
141 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Fuel Effects on Exhaust Emissions from On-road Vehicles in
MOVES2014: Final Report" (2016): p. 47:
https://nepis.epa. gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P10005W2.PDF?Dockey=P10005W2.PDF (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
1. In fact, the rule may have had a contrary consequence: For many refiners, operating
strategies that reduce sulfur also reduce octane. According to one analysis, "the majority of
refiners are meeting the regulations by increasing hydrotreating severity," which negatively
impacts octane - potentially leading to increased use of aromatics to compensate. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 26-28]
142 Andy Huang et al., Grace Catalysts Technologies, "Driving Octane in an Ultra?Low Sulfur Gasoline
Market," AFPM 17775 (2017), summarized at https://www.catalystgrp.com/driving-octane-
ultra%E2%80%901ow-sulfur-gasoline-market/ (accessed Aug. 23, 2021).
e. In December 2020 EPA issued a "Fuels Regulatory Streamlining" rule that relieved
refineries of their responsibility to report regularly on the aromatics levels in reformulated
gasoline (approximately 30% of the national gasoline pool). An industry-led annual sampling
program will be used instead. Refineries also are no longer required to estimate emissions of air
toxics, including polycyclic organic matter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 28-29]
143 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Fuels Regulatory Streamlining," Federal Register (2020):
85(234), "Program Design," p. 78414, and "Key Differences Between Part 1090 and Part 80," p. 78436:
https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/FR-2020-12-04/pdf/2020-23164.pdf (accessed June 17, 2021).
f. In August 2021, EPA proposed revised greenhouse gas emissions standards for new cars
that again failed to address the importance of vehicle fuels. EPA noted only that "in addition to
substantially reducing GHG emissions, a longer-term rulemaking could also address criteria
pollutant and air toxics emissions from the new light-duty vehicle fleet - especially important
considerations during the transition to zero-emission vehicles." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0570, pp. 28-29]
144 U.S. EPA, "Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards," op. cit., supra note 128: p. 43730.
i. Indeed, the very basis on which EPA proceeded, according to the Proposed Rule, was the
requirement in Section 202(a) "to establish standards for emissions of air pollutants from new
motor vehicles which, in the Administrator's judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." The requirements of
Section 202(1)(2), cited above, were enacted concurrently and explicitly based on that same
provision of Section 202(a). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 28-29]
145 Ibid., p. 43728.
146 42 U.S. Code, sec.77521, op.cit.,supra note 125.
Organization: Stellantis
Particulate Matter Standards Should Not Drive All New GPF Systems and Diagnostics
The proposed 0.5 mg/mi particulate matter (PM) standard is twice as stringent as California's
recently adopted ACCII LEV IV requirement - a state with the largest number of nonattainment
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areas for PM 2.5 in the U.S.6 EPA's proposal will force gasoline particulate filters (GPF),
driving significant investments in vehicle/engine assembly plants and increasing the cost of
vehicles. This incredibly expensive proposal only offers modest reductions in PM compared to
the gains that will be achieved with market transition to electrification. The proposed Cold FTP
standard will require all new test cells to robustly measure PM at the required low levels. Since
the FTP and US06 will already force GPF, the Cold FTP PM standard becomes a very costly
requirement that essentially delivers no environmental gain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678,
pp.15-16]
6 Counties Designated Nonattainment for PM-2.5 (1997), PM-2.5 (2006), and/or PM-2.5 (2012) | Green
Book | US EPA, accessed 06/26/2023
EPA also adds a diagnostic requirement that goes beyond the industry standard detection of a
"missing GPF" to solve a theoretical tampering concern. This filtering efficiency requirement
will drive sensing technology that does not exist in the market today and will require years to
develop. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 15-16]
In lieu of this costly proposal, we recommend that the EPA adopt the PM standards and
phase-in schedule that CARB promulgated with the ACC II LEV IV rule. As described in Auto
Innovators' comments, PM emissions reductions of 90% will be achieved (from 10 mg/mi to 1
mg/mi) by 2028MY under ACC II LEV IV. In sum, CARB's ACC II LEV IV requirements
provide a significant emissions reduction without driving the need for ongoing investments in a
shrinking ICE fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 15-16]
Adopt a more realistic PM standard that does not drive invention and development of all- new
GPF systems, diagnostics and test requirements that cannot be certified without new facilities
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 24-25]
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
Particulate Matter (PM) 0.5 mg/mi standard (Section III.C.l)
EPA is proposing a 0.5 mg/mile standard for light-duty vehicles that must be met across three
test cycles (-7°C FTP, 25°C FTP, US06), a requirement for PM certification tests at the test
group level, and a requirement that every in- use vehicle program (IUVP) test vehicle is tested
for PM. The 0.5 mg/mile standard is a per-vehicle cap, not a fleet average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
In alignment with AFAI, Volkswagen requests EPA adopt CARB's LEV IV PM Standards.
AFAI comments include a significant body of work, from multiple manufacturers, which
supports the high variability and sensitivities of gravimetric filter measurement systems.
Volkswagen agrees with the AFAI statement, "PM measurement at 0.5 mg/mile is approaching
noise levels and will not be feasible or technically sound to give reliable PM results with high
confidence". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
Particulate Matter (PM) Lab Comparisons
Volkswagen produced data on 3 mg/mile FTP75 compliant GPF equipped vehicles at four
separate ISO 17025 accredited and fully compliant to test procedure requirements defined in 40
C.F.R. § 1065/§ 1066 compliant test labs. The data represents over 200 vehicle tests and
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demonstrates our concern over repeatability. This overall variation will likely increase when
applied to the US06 test cycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
Laboratory location: Volkswagen (Wolfsburg)
Standard deviation [mg/mi]: 0.117
2g Repeatability as described in §1065.305: 0.234 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-
10]
Laboratory location: Audi (Ingolstadt)
Standard deviation [mg/mi]: 0.125
2g Repeatability as described in §1065.305: 0.250 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-
10]
Laboratory location: Audi (Neckarsulm)
Standard deviation [mg/mi]: 0.146
2g Repeatability as described in §1065.305: 0.297 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-
10]
Laboratory location: Porsche (Weissach)
Standard deviation [mg/mi]: 0.133
2g Repeatability as described in §1065.305: 0.266 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-
10]
The average standard deviation (g) was determined to be approximately 0.15 mg/mile for the
Volkswagen's labs. For a vehicle to comply with the limit of 0.5 mg/mile, it is not to emit more
than 0.2 mg/mile due to the uncertainty analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
The detection sensitivity of the PM measuring technique is close to the proposed limit of
0.5mg/mile (FTP75). To guarantee (> 95% confidence level) vehicle compliance at 0.5mg/mile,
the test result needs to be 2g below the limit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
The average standard deviation (g) was determined to be 0.15 mg/mile for the Volkswagen
Group's labs. For a vehicle to comply with the limit of 0.5 mg/mi, it is not to emit more than 0.2
mg/mile due to the uncertainty analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR GRAPH [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
EPA anticipates that the PM standards in the NPRM will require the application of a GPF.
Volkswagen believes that CARET s LEV IV US06 3 mg/mile PM Standard already implies a GPF
requirement. Volkswagen requests EPA to adopt CARET s LEV IV PM Standards and
furthermore allow use of a compliance statement for all cycles, not just for FTP75 (20-30°C) and
US06 if ICE vehicles are equipped with a GPF. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
Particulate Number (PN) and Particulate Matter (PM) Data Comparison [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
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Volkswagen performed six FTP75 tests at 73°F under standard lab test conditions on a
conventional combustion vehicle equipped with GPF to fulfill LEV IV requirements. The vehicle
was LEV IV compliant to the 1.0 mg/mile standard. Data results show wide variability with
respect to the particulate mass (up to 50%) while PN integration data shows high correlation and
high repeatability. C02 results were repeatable for the six tests in a range of ± 1%.[EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR BAR GRAPH Of MY25 NAR project (development test
results) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
GPF Infrequent Regeneration Adjustment Factor (IRAF) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669,
pp. 8-10]
Volkswagen supports AFAI's position with respect to the infrequent regeneration adjustment
factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
Volkswagen believes that lower stage active regeneration modes will not result in non-
compliance on any prescribed test cycle. Volkswagen supports the adoption of the European "Ki-
Factor approach" for IRAF determination. If soot accumulation over a 2485 miles (4000 km)
does not trigger a fully active regeneration, the standard "SI-IRAF" of 1 (multiplicative factor) is
assigned (reference European regulation: « VO (EU) 2017/1151 in current version VO (EU)
2023/443 Article 2 », Annex XXI, Sub-annex 6, Appendix 1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669,
pp. 8-10]
Volkswagen requests use of waiver statement: "Based on our GPF passive regeneration
strategies, we attest that no fully active regeneration will take place within 2485 miles (4000 km)
during normal vehicle operation based on good engineering judgement. Exemptions will be
listed on the AECD document." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
OBD Monitoring Requirements [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
Volkswagen supports the AFAI's recommendation for EPA to harmonize with CARB on
OBD Gasoline and Diesel monitor thresholds as written in 13 CCR 1968.2, by revising the
86.1807-27 (a) to reference CARB LEV IV (version November 30, 2022). AFAI recommends
that EPA adopt the CARB OBD emission thresholds that allow robust detection while allowing
IUMPR requirements to be met. Due to uncertainty about how lower level standards will be
affected by OBD monitoring capability, AFAI recommends that EPA include the interim OBD
threshold multipliers forBin20 and below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
With respect to PM monitoring, Volkswagen believes that a PM diagnostic of 30% filtration
efficiency threshold is not technically feasible with current technology. Diagnosis of a missing
substrate has been demonstrated to be feasible by Volkswagen in other markets. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 8-10]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
7. Porsche recommends aligning with the PM standards of California's Advanced Clean Cars
I and II regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 13-15]
Porsche does not support the adoption of EPA's proposal for 0.5mg PM standard starting in
MY2027. As outlined in AFAI comments, Porsche does not understand the basis for this
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acceleration in Federal PM policy especially given California's recent LEV-IV rulemaking
which reaffirmed and retained California's previously adopted LEV-III PM roadmap of l.Omg.
Relative to the potential costs and implementation challenges that this all-new proposal could
create, it is unclear of the incremental value that EPA's proposal seeks to achieve by surpassing
standards that California confirmed as being effective and appropriate in reducing PM. This is
especially important considering California being the state which has the most prevalent
challenges with PM emissions nationwide. Considering the overall transition towards
electrification, the long-standing l.Omg policy of California, the uncertainty regarding
measurement and certification reliability, and in the minority role that new light-duty vehicles
play in the overall PM inventory, Porsche is not supportive of EPA's PM proposal. Instead,
Porsche recommends EPA transition to adopt the LEV-III l.Omg in the timing and context of
Tier-4. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 13-15]
As shown in Figure 8.1 of the DRIA (captured below in Figure 1), EPA illustrates the
counties which are in nonattainment with the variety of PM standards. EPA makes note of the
estimated populations that live within these various counties, however as shown in in the
illustration below, the vast majority of that population likely reside in California and in several
States that already follow California motor vehicle emissions regulations (i.e., Pennsylvania,
Oregon, Washington State). Very few of the states with counties highlighted below are in
Federal emissions states. As noted previously, the states who are shown in this figure as having
the highest proportion of challenges with PM attainment, were the States who maintained the
l.Omg PM roadmap in LEV-III. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 13-15]
[See original attachment for Figure 1 EPA designated PM nonattainment zones (From Section
8 DRIA)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 13-15]
Over 10 years ago, CARB finalized their landmark Advanced Clean Cars I regulation which
included an all-new PM reduction update for light-duty vehicles. The l.Omg standard was
approved by the Board and waived by EPA, thus establishing the l.Omg roadmap with a
2025MY start date. The timing for the standard was again reviewed as part of a technical
assessment by CARB to determine if an accelerated timeline was appropriate. CARB maintained
the 2025MY start date and phase-in to provide additional, cost-effective opportunities to develop
PM control technologies. In 2022, CARB finalized their Advanced Clean Cars II regulation and
once again the l.Omg PM standard was maintained as being an appropriate balance of air quality
improvement, cost and feasibility especially in light of the States roadmap towards
electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 13-15]
Considering CARBs leadership and stability in PM requirements for the US, Porsche created
a PM control technology roadmap that incorporated CARB's requirements together in
consideration with other global PM requirements. CARB's regulatory timeline has influenced the
product development timelines for PM control. This is important in light of EPA's previous Tier-
3 rulemaking where EPA specifically did not adopt the CARB l.Omg FTP PM standard at that
time. While EPA concluded Tier-3 with the 3.0mg standard, the agency provided clear indication
that future work would continue to assess lower standards. EPA concluded that looking ahead
"We will continue to work closely with CARB in this area."4 As such, Porsche recommends that
EPA can best deliver on the stated intention to "work closely with CARB" by fully align with
CARB on a nationwide implementation of the l.Omg FTP standard for PM. This alignment
would maintain the established PM control roadmaps and provide meaningful, cost-effective PM
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control for the portions of the US who continue to face challenges with PM inventories. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 13-15]
4 79 FR 23454 Tier-3 Final Rule
When looking across the sources of PM emissions within the total inventory, light duty
vehicles are by far a minority contributor. As both EPA and CARB have noted in previous
rulemakings, achieving broad reductions of PM inventory requires a vast collection of policies
aimed at reducing PM emissions from other mobile sources (e.g., heavy-duty and I/M programs)
and from non-transportation sectors, such as agriculture. CARB has implemented a broad suite
of policies aimed at reducing PM emissions within their state and for light-duty vehicles,
recognizes that beyond the lmg standard from LEV-III, most additional PM reductions will be
derived from their aggressive electrification policy. Given that EPA's MPR proposal generally
follows California's electrification ambitions, it would make sense for EPA to align on
California's lmg roadmap in the final rule for the MPR. Even if EPA were to finalize lower
levels of electrification, the lmg roadmap continues to make sense given that most of the PM
non-attainment areas are in California. EPA does not appear to have provided sufficient evidence
that aiming for reductions on a Nationwide basis beyond the reductions sought in California, is
cost effective and practicable, and whether after ten years of PM regulatory stability in LEV-III
and LEV-IV, that it now makes sense to disrupt the implementation pathway that industry has
been aiming for. This sudden acceleration from EPA creates significant compliance risk with
many measurement and test repeatability issues still being questioned. California has determined
that the lmg standard, combined with growth in electrification, reflects a good balance in PM air
quality improvements and cost-effective control. Porsche recommends EPA align with CARB.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 13-15]
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
VCC estimates that our current product plan likely complies with the GHG stringency
requirements proposed in this NPRM. However, the NPRM's proposed requirement on
particulate matter could negatively impact our electrification plans. Some of the proposed
requirements are extremely challenging and could impact our electrification plans for the USA.
VCC is especially concerned about the potential negative impact to our US plant in South
Carolina (our only all electric plant globally). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, p. 2]
Particulate Matter (PM)
For several reasons, VCC is opposed to EPA's proposal on particulate matter. Implementing
the PM requirements as proposed in the NPRM is just not feasible. The EPA proposal differs
from the CARB approach on PM and it is also more stringent than ACCII. Therefore, it will
cause a lot of additional burden on manufacturers that are spending most of their resources on
electrification. It is not just a matter of adding the gasoline particulate filter, rather it includes
substantial development and investments. Such massive hardware changes are just not possible
by 2027MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
If CARB and EPA are not harmonized then VCC would need to have two sets of hardware in
the US market, one Federal and one California + S177 states. This would be very costly for a
small OEM like VCC. In 2027MY VCC will only have few engine families in production
according to our current plan, but this approach would mean VCC needs to double its engine
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programs. In addition, VCC has already decided on a hardware technical solution that meets
CARB ACCII for 2026 MY and beyond but a final EPA rule is not expected until spring 2024.
So it will be very difficult to implement an EPA specific hardware technical solution in time for
the 2027 MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
VCC's recommendation is that EPA align with CARB with regards to PM. EPA should
follow the CARB ACCII PM-regulations and the CARB phase-in plan that is already in effect.
This is fully consistent with the way that CARB ACC1 (LEV III) and EPA Tier3 was
synchronized in the prior set of regulations. So, there is a precedent for this approach, and given
that California and 177 states make up over 40% of the US car market, this approach is efficient
and consistent with those regulations already in place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
EPA's proposal on particulate matter would create a stringent standard that requires additional
hardware which is much worse for a small OEM like VCC due to our small fleets. This means
investment costs need to be split on much smaller fleets. In addition, there are major
development costs which would put VCC at a significant disadvantage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
VCC has invested substantially to upgrade our dynos used for US certification testing to the
latest 1066 standard. VCC did not anticipate any further upgrades to these dynos because VCC
will be all electric in 2030MY. Therefore, the EPA proposal would require upgrades for one
market (USA) for only 3 model years and then VCC would discontinue the whole emission
measurement system in 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
The proposal would also necessitate additional test capacity and different separate tests for
EPA and CARB. So, it would mean doubling the number of the tests and this would create
additional administrative burden in order to implement. Increasing test cells does not happen
overnight and it would likely not be feasible for VCC to get the additional test cells needed for
MY 2027 testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
In addition to separate tests, the EPA proposal differs from CARB requirements on emission
and OBD certifications. If CARB and EPA are not harmonized VCC must submit two OBD
applications for each engine, one for CARB and one for EPA. Many OEMs are likely in a similar
position, but the implication to small volume manufacturers is much more significant than it is to
the larger OEMs. VCC encourages EPA to harmonize with CARB and not require separate EPA
certifications. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
New certification and compliance programs will likely be costly, especially with new
tightened criteria that is proposed. VCC believes measurement accuracy is a concern at this low
level. See the section on tunnel blank PM testing contained in the Alliance for Auto Innovation
comments. In addition, it is not feasible with current existing sensor technology to monitor and
detect the proposed requirement of 30% efficiency (See appendix for technical comments on the
OBD proposal). It is also important to note that active regeneration is very infrequent on petrol
engines and happens only during extreme conditions. This would make it problematic to
consistently detect frequent or incomplete regeneration (See appendix for technical comments on
the OBD proposal). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
The NPRM proposed PM standard alone would mean the few remaining HEVs in Volvo
Cars' cycle plan 2027MY-2029MY would likely need new hardware to accommodate a new
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gasoline particulate filter (GPF). For a small manufacturer like VCC, this would be necessary for
3 years only for vehicles with short life span and it would be challenging and costly. It would
result in very little environmental benefit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
EPA should consider requiring more stringent fuel requirements which would have a
more significant environmental impact at a lower cost. Although changes to fuel standards are
outside the scope of this NPRM, VCC believes that fuels which contain reduced particulate
formation can be utilized in today's vehicles and future vehicle fleets. This would have faster and
greater environmental benefit without all the burden and investment of PM filters which would
be utilized for future vehicles only. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
Rather than the EPA proposed particulate matter requirements in the NPRM, VCC strongly
encourages EPA adopt the CARB PM1 Regulation and allow for a Phase-In for these
requirements. This is best pathway for harmonization and will deliver environmental benefits
without unnecessary additional costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 2-4]
Other Concerns and Uncertainties
Given the short lead time until 2027 model year, we urge EPA to include an alternate phase-in
or interim standards, etc. An alternate phase-in for light duty vehicles should allow for PM In-
use interim standards for the first year. This was done for Tier3 so there is precedent for setting
interim standards at the outset. Given that the alternate in-use FTP standard for PM is 0.006
g/mile for 2021 and earlier model years, VCC encourages EPA to adopt an alternate in use FTP
standard for PM of 0.001 g/mile for 2029 and earlier models. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624,
p. 4]
Organization: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
EPA estimates that these standards will result in approximately a 95% reduction in particulate
matter (PM) emissions from the covered vehicles. This is significant, and will help states attain
and maintain both the current PM standard as well as any revised, more stringent standard EPA
may set in the future. It will also help states address near-road PM emissions, which will mitigate
localized impacts, improve the air quality in near-road communities, and assist agencies with
satisfying transportation conformity regulatory requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507,
p. 1]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary of Particulate Matter Comments
The proposed PM standard for LDV and MDV is the subject of myriad supportive, adverse,
and nuanced comments from many stakeholders. Stakeholder comments are broadly grouped
into four areas: 1) Comments that reference the CARB ACC II PM standard, 2) Comments about
the justification of the EPA PM standard including costs and benefits, 3) Comments about
technical issues of the EPA PM standard, and 4) Comments about lead time and phase-in of the
EPA PM standard.
1) Comments that reference the CARB ACC II PM standard
AAI commented that EPA failed to consider adopting the CARB ACC II PM standard or
other alternatives to the EPA PM standard and a number of commentors, including AAI,
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Stellantis, VW, Mercedes-Benz, Toyota, Honda, AML, Ferrari, and others, recommended that
EPA adopt the ACC IIPM standard instead. AAI asserted that the EPA PM standard would
create conflicting state and federal requirements.
CARB provided strong support for the EPA's federal PM standard, commenting that EPA's
proposals are appropriate and largely consistent with the overall CARB standards. CARB
pointed out that EPA's rulemaking does not require ZEV sales, as California's rules do, so the
tightening of federal PM standards is critical to ensure that internal combustion engine vehicles
that will continue to be sold, become cleaner.
Several manufacturers raised concerns that EPA's PM standard is more stringent than
CARB's ACC II standard. CARB pointed out that at the time of CARB's original adoption of its
standards in 2012, the gasoline particulate filter technology that EPA is now relying on was not
as well developed to support such stringent levels. Since that time, however, the technology has
matured and been deployed industry-wide in the European vehicle fleet, confirming its
technology readiness. Under ACC II regulations, the ZEV requirements necessarily reduce the
fraction of conventional vehicles at a pace that minimize the additional benefit from a further
reduction in the PM FTP standards in California.
CARB supported the proposed PM standards because EPA's proposed standards as a whole
do not have a parallel path to effectively eliminate emissions from new vehicles. "In the absence
of this certainty of future zero-emission standards, the proposed PM standards will ensure over
the long term that PM emissions are reduced to the maximum extent feasible from vehicles
driven in California (and elsewhere, especially in cold climates) even if they were not originally
sold here. U.S. EPA's proposed PM standards are appropriate for protecting public health and
reducing exposure to PM, especially for residents of disadvantaged communities that are in close
proximity to busy roadways." CARB comments that EPA's PM standard is needed to protect
public health, especially in communities with disproportionate exposure to air pollution.
2) Comments about the justification of the EPA PM standard including costs and benefits
EPA received strong support for the PM standard from ALA, ADEQ, CARB, EDF, ICCT,
MECA, NACAA, NTAA, NESCAUM and OTA, and the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources. These commenters stressed the importance of the PM standard to human health, and
some discussed the need for a strong PM standard since the EPA rule lacks a ZEV mandate,
which CARB uses to greatly reduce PM standards.
For example, ALA commented that filters like GPFs should be the norm to control fine
particulate, a carcinogenic pollutant, on vehicles sold in American communities. ADEQ
commented that Arizona has several PM nonattainment areas and ADEQ supports the adoption
of GPF technology that is proven to reduce combustion engine tailpipe emissions by over 95
percent. EDF supported the PM standard as proposed: a 0.5 mg/mi cap for light-duty vehicles
and MDV across three test cycles (-7°C FTP, 25°C FTP, US06), PM certification tests at the test
group level, and every in-use vehicle should be tested for PM.
ICCT supported the PM standard including the -7°C FTP test. ICCT described a recent
remote sensing study performed by ICCT that shows that for recent model years, light-duty
vehicles and trucks show an increase in UV smoke, a proxy for PM. While gasoline light-duty
vehicle and truck tailpipe CO, HC, and NOx measured by remote sensing show clear and
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consistent downwards trends, UV smoke averages increase starting from model years 2015-
2020. For 2020 model year vehicles, the UV smoke fleet average is similar to that of 2005 model
year vehicles, compared to the other three pollutants, which show a 66%-86% decrease from
2005 to 2020 model year vehicles. Further analysis shows the increase is due to increased market
fraction of GDI vehicles, which tend to emit more PM than PFI vehicles. An analysis of
certification test data shows that PM emissions from GDI vehicles have been reducing over the
years; however, they still emit higher PM than PFI vehicles on FTP cycle. For 2023 model year
vehicles, GDI vehicles emit on average about 3 times more PM emissions than the PFI vehicles
on FTP cycle. For both cycles, the trajectory of average PM emissions for GDI vehicles flattens
out over the last few years, suggesting that PM emissions from GDIs will not likely reduce
substantially any further without the adoption of more stringent emission standards.
ICCT further comments that while EPA's proposed standard does not include a particle
number limit, the stringency of the PM emission standard will address both PM2.5 and PM0.1
through the implementation of GPFs, which can reduce PM emissions by 97% to 100% and PN
emissions by 80% to 99%. ICCT also comments that remote sensing data suggest the EPA
MOVES model underestimates PM emissions and if the model were improved, the benefits of
the rule would increase.
MECA commented that in 2021 the WHO and HEI concluded that there is no identified safe
threshold for PM2.5 or black carbon, at which no damage to health is observed; EPA is poised to
revise the primary annual PM2.5 standard from 12.0 to within the range of 9.0 to 10.0 |ig/m3;
and that a recent European study using state-of- the-art exposure methods and large cohorts
found that health impact risks were still evident at PM levels lower than current ambient
standards for PM2.5. In particular, the study reported that the hazard ratios for natural-cause
mortality remained elevated and significant for PM2.5 even when the analyses were restricted to
observations below 12 |ig/m, A MECA study found that deploying a PM regulatory control
strategy that includes a combination of electric vehicle penetration and best available exhaust
controls on the remaining combustion vehicles approximately doubles the PM2.5 reductions
achievable by electrification alone, and cumulative health cost savings from PM2.5 reduction
would be between 18 and 163 billion dollars through 2050.
NESCAUM and OTA commented that PM2.5 exposure can trigger heart attacks and strokes,
exacerbate obesity and diabetes, and contribute to cognitive challenges.
CARB, EDF, ICCT, MECA, NT A A, NESCAUM and OTA, and the Wisconsin Department
of Natural Resources commented on the importance of the PM standard for low-income
communities, communities of color, and people that live or work near transportation hubs and
corridors. These commenters note that these groups have historically faced significant and
elevated harms from transportation pollution and recent studies found that light-duty vehicles
and light-duty trucks are responsible for a significant share of PM-attributable premature
mortalities. MECA comments that university researchers in the U.S. have reported that light duty
gasoline vehicle emissions remain prominent amongst the emission source sectors that cause the
largest absolute disparities for persons of color communities. NTAA comments that many
residents in Indian country continue to be exposed to concentrations of PM that exceed current
National Ambient Air Quality Standards. With a few exceptions, the sources of this pollution are
outside the jurisdiction and control of Tribal governments.
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ICCT commented on the cost of GPF technology asserting that GPFs are cost-effective
devices, with per vehicle manufacturing cost of $51—$166 based on EPA estimates and $50-
$184 based on other independent studies. Based on the European Commission's Euro 6/VI
assessment, the incremental increase in technology cost per vehicle for Euro 6 standards
compared to Euro 5 was estimated at $92—$113 for the addition of GPF along with lambda and
pressure sensors. ICCT concludes that EPA's proposed PM standard will provide large health
benefits through reduced fine and ultrafine particulate matter emissions with a relatively low
added manufacturing cost.
AAI commented that EPA failed to adequately justify the PM standard and failed to ensure
that relevant facts support the standard. AAI, Stellantis, Hyundia and AML asserted the PM
standard will impose high cost and several of these commentors stated the standard will result in
little corresponding air quality benefits. API commented that EPA did not use the most recent
cost estimates for GPF technology and questioned whether EPA's cost estimates include
associated sensors and controllers. AAI states that the PM standard will add development work,
cost, and divert OEM resources from fleet electrification. Mercedes-Benz also commented that
the PM standard and proposed OBD requirements would divert resources from fleet
electrification. AAI encouraged EPA to adequately account for the relevant costs and benefits to
fulfill its statutory obligation to engage in reasoned, evidence-based decision-making. Stellantis
and an SVM manufacturer group commented that expensive test facilities will be needed to
measure PM for the standard. Stellantis commented that the PM standard offers only modest
reductions in PM compared to the gains that will be achieved with market transition to
electrification.
3) Comments about technical issues of the EPA PM standard
Many comments focused on technical issues of the EPA PM standard. These comments
discuss challenges of PM testing using -7°C FTP and US06 test cycles, the need for the -7°C
FTP standard, concern that the PM standard may not allow manufacturers to "drop-in" GPF
technology used in other markets, measurement challenges, challenges of OBD monitoring of
GPF technology, and challenges of certification test requirements.
CARB, ICCT, NESCAUM and OTA commented on the importance of requiring 0.5 mg/mi
PM over three test cycles, including the -7°C FTP but AAI and Ford commented that applying
the PM standard to the -7°C FTP adds to test burden and may requires upgrades or investments
to test facilities. AAI provided examples which it says may complicate implementing PM testing
in the -7°C FTP, like water condensing on the sample filter face or increased variability. An
SVM manufacturer group asserted there are technical issues associated with measuring PM
below 1 mg/mi and EPA should not require cold testing or exempt SVMs from cold temperature
testing. AML commented that it is not yet fully understood what is needed to meet the 0.5 mg
standard at -7°C with high-performance engines.
Ford commented that the benefit of requiring the PM standard in the -7°C FTP is de minimis
given that GPF technology will be demonstrated on the 25°C FTP and US06 test cycles, and
recommends that GPF-equipped vehicles be exempt from the -7°C FTP. Mercedes-Benz
commented on the test burden and justification of the -7°C FTP. Stellantis asserted that the 25°C
FTP and US06 test cycles will force GPF adoption without needing the -7°C FTP test. API
commented that only six states have average winter temperatures below -7°C.
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AAI commented that applying the PM standard to the US06 test cycle may require both
engine-out emissions reductions and development of GPF technology for high temperature and
flow conditions. AAI suggested that EPA should align its test cycles with those of ACC II and
allow manufacturers to use US06 bag 2 in place of the full US06 test for PM testing of MDV to
reduce test burden.
AAI and Mercedes-Benz commented that EPA has not designed a program that allows GPF
technology from other regions to be "dropped in" and this difference to other regions requires
additional development and resources. Mercedes-Benz also noted the challenge of the proposed
GPF OBD requirements. Stellantis asserted that the PM standard will require all new GPF
systems. Industry commenters pointed to challenges of some current vehicle models not having
sufficient room to package GPFs today. Ferrari expressed concern about the effectiveness of
their existing GPF configuration that was designed to meet the CARB 1 mg/mi standard in
meeting the more stringent EPA 0.5 mg/mi standard considering the proposed lead time.
Numerous comments were submitted on the topic of measurement challenges. AAI, Ford,
VW, Mercedes-Benz, Honda, API, an SVM small manufacturer group and others wrote that
uncertainty in the PM measurement process is too large and AAI explains how measurement
challenges increase for large vehicles. Ferrari comments that measurement variabilities should be
considered. AAI and Ford recommend allowing re-tests for exceedances during certification,
confirmatory or in-use testing, especially for vehicles equipped with diesel or gasoline
particulate filters and Mercedes-Benz suggests that EPA allow averaging of PM measurements
and including a conformity factor. AAI provides example data from a laboratory where a US06
test resulted in a PM result that was several times higher than other testing in that lab and other
labs. AAI also provided data showing greater variability in repeat robot weighings of a clean
blank filter to a stainless steel weight of similar mass. Ford commented it would like to work
with EPA to determine if there is a role for limited application of PN measurements to help
reduce variability and test burden.
CARB commented that it has previously addressed the technical feasibility of gravimetric PM
mass measurement at 1 mg/mi and below with a technical review presentation to the Board in
October 2015. CARB concluded that the gravimetric method prescribed for the FTP driving
cycle, in conjunction with appropriate laboratory practices, has a measurement precision of 0.1
mg/mi, even when measuring emission rates less than 1 mg/mi. The method can precisely
measure PM emissions to determine compliance with a standard of 0.5 mg/mi. It should also be
noted that such analysis was conducted on low-PM-emitting vehicles that had a higher level of
vehicle test-to-test variability than what is observed in U.S. EPA's test data for vehicles equipped
with a gasoline particulate filter. As this technology is a mechanical wall-flow filtering device
with a high trapping efficiency, it inherently dampens variations in PM emissions and produces
more consistent results at very low PM levels, thereby reducing one element of concern
regarding measurement precision at low PM levels.
AAI recommended that EPA require that all labs adopt certain test procedure changes to
support measuring PM below 0.5 mg/mi. EPA should require tunnel blanks to be measured
weekly. EPA should require that runnel conditioning/cleaning be performed when tunnel
background exceeds 5 |ig. EPA should require tunnel background correction given the
significant difference it can have on test results at low levels of PM. EPA should require the limit
of reference filter validity be reduced from 10 to 5 |ig. EPA should require that robotic auto
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handlers should be required especially at independent laboratories that perform in-use testing.
EPA should require that single filter collection with flow weighting be used in FTP testing.
Some commenters requested that EPA continue to cooperate with industry to affirm and
improve best practices that are not overly burdensome.
ALA commented on the importance ensuring that critical emission controls like GPFs exhibit
ongoing functionality. While not disputing the importance of ensuring ongoing functionality,
VW, Stellanis and other commenters expressed concern that proposed GPF OBD requirements
would be difficult to achieve with currently available sensing technology. An SVM manufacturer
group and AML commented that GPF aging and monitoring for OBD purposes is not currently
fully understood.
AAI supports pre-production PM certification testing reverting to the durability group level
after the lower PM standard is fully phased in, as a common-sense adjustment that would reduce
test burden.
4) Comments about lead time and phase-in of the EPA PM standard
Commenters expressed opposing views on the phase-in of the PM standard. ALA encouraged
EPA to accelerate the phase-in of the PM standard to require all new vehicles to use GPFs in MY
2027 for the health benefits that this would provide. ICCT recommended that EPA adopt an
accelerated phase-in of the PM standard that EPA requested comment on (50 or 80% in 2027 and
100% in 2028 for vehicles at or below 6000 lb GVWR) because GPF is a mature technology in
widespread use in other markets. MECA commented that the PM standard should be
implemented at a faster pace than proposed based on the combination of the predicted rate of
electrification (BEVs count toward compliance) alongside a feasible rate of PM emission control
technology implementation. MECA recommended a phase-in for vehicles at or below 6000 lb
GVWR of 60/90/100% in 2027/2028/2029.
Other commenters urged EPA to adopt a phase-in that is slower than what was proposed.
AAI commented that long lead-time is necessary to develop exhaust systems that include a GPF
and that balance emissions reduction and PM collection/regeneration. Ford and other industry
commenters requested more time to apply GPF technology across all ICE models than the
40/80/100 percent phase in that was proposed. An SVM small manufacturer group, AML and
Ferrari commented that the proposed PM standard goes too far too soon, going farther than the
CARB ACC II PM standard and not providing additional lead time for SVMs. The SVM group
suggested a phase-in approach that is consistent with Euro 7. AAI recommended that EPA adopt
an interim in-use standard for the first two model years after a test group certifies to a new PM
standard.
5) Comments about the role of gasoline aromatics in particulate formation
Modlin and Detchon describe how aromatics in gasoline are known air toxics as well as major
drivers of direct PM emissions and formation of secondary PM in the atmosphere. They suggest
EPA should phase down aromatic content in gasoline, with the expectation that aromatics can be
replaced with additional ethanol. They also discuss ultrafine particles and PAHs, noting that
GDI-powered vehicles produce much higher levels of these than older technology vehicles, and
that these pollutants in combination pose a serious danger to public health. They suggest that
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reducing gasoline aromatics content and requiring particulate filters on new vehicles will be
important mitigation strategies.
Summary of Particulate Matter Responses
1) Responses to comments that reference the CARB ACCIIPMstandard
EPA carefully considered adopting alternatives to the PM standard, including CARB
standards, European standards, and other alternatives not proposed. The CARB ACC II program
provides PM reductions relative to Tier 3 through a more stringent PM standard from ICE-based
vehicles and very significantly, PM reductions from a ZEV mandate. As noted in RTC Section
4.1, EPA is not adopting a ZEV mandate, as the CARB standards use, and instead allows
manufacturers greater flexibilities in the types of vehicles they may produce. Therefore it is
important and appropriate for EPA to finalize a PM standard that is aligned with a performance-
based standard, i.e., the EPA performance-based standard requires a more protective PM
standards, consistent with our expectations that vehicles with ICE will be the majority of the fleet
for decades to come. Areas outside of California will likely have many more ICE vehicles than
California will, and therefore greater PM control from ICE vehicles is very important. As
compared to the CARB PM standard, the EPA PM standard covers more operating conditions
(e.g., the CARB standard does not have PM requirements for cold temperatures like -7°C, which
is common in many regions). Colder temperatures are common is many regions outside of
California and new GPF technology enables effective PM control under all operating conditions,
including high load and cold temperatures, as explained in preamble Section III.D.3.iii. As
described in RIA Chapter 3.2.6.2, typical reductions in tailpipe emissions from MY 2022 GPF
technology are greater than 95% reduction in PM, greater than 98% reduction in EC (elemental
carbon), and greater than 99% reduction in filter-collected PAH.
EPA agrees with CARB's comment that EPA's proposals are appropriate and largely
consistent with overall CARB standards. CARB pointed out that EPA's rulemaking does not
require ZEV sales, as California's rules do, so the tightening of federal PM standards is critical to
ensuring that internal combustion engine vehicles that will continue to be sold, become cleaner.
Several manufacturers raised concerns that EPA's PM standard is more stringent than
CARB's ACC II standard. EPA agrees with CARB's point that at the time of CARB's original
standards adoption in 2012, the gasoline particulate filter technology that EPA is now relying on
was not as well developed to support such stringent levels. Since that time, however, the
technology has matured and been deployed industry-wide in the European vehicle fleet,
confirming its technology readiness. Under ACC II regulations, ZEV requirements necessarily
reduce the fraction of conventional vehicles at a pace that minimizes the additional benefit from
further reduction in the PM FTP standards in California.
EPA agrees with CARB's comment that because EPA's proposed standards as a whole do not
have a parallel path to effectively eliminate emissions from new vehicles, a more protective PM
standard is necessary. In the absence of this certainty of future zero-emission standards, EPA's
proposed PM standards ensure over the long term that PM emissions are reduced to the
maximum extent feasible from vehicles driven in California even if they were not originally sold
there. EPA also agrees with CARB's comment that EPA's proposed PM standards are
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appropriate for protecting public health and reducing exposure to PM, especially for residents of
disadvantaged communities that are in close proximity to busy roadways.
After considering submitted comments referencing CARB ACC II PM standard and
performing additional analysis, EPA has decided not to finalize the ACC II PM standard, and is
finalizing the 0.5 mg/mile PM standard described in the Preamble. EPA believes that the 0.5
mg/mi standard is feasible, both technologically and with respect to measurement. The 0.5
mg/mi standard applied to the FTP, -7°C FTP and US06 test cycles will ensure low PM
emissions over the broadest range of environmental and operating conditions. In addition, a
mass-based standard is appropriate both because the measurement technology is well-
demonstrated and because it will help areas attain and maintain the mass-based PM NAAQS.
EPA disagrees with AAI's suggestion that adopting this standard will create a conflict with
state (i.e., CARB) requirements. It is true that this standard is more stringent than the current
CARB standard, for the reasons described above, but EPA does not find that in itself creates a
conflict. Any vehicle which satisfies EPA's PM standard will also satisfy California's PM
standard.
2) Responses to comments about the justification of the EPA PM standard including costs and
benefits
EPA is setting standards for vehicles under 6,000 lb GVWR pursuant to CAA section
202(a)(l)-(2), and is subject to the requirements of CAA 202(a)(3) for heavier vehicles,
including the requirement that standards reflect the greatest degree of emissions reduction
achievable, giving appropriate consideration to cost, energy and safety and requirements for lead
time and stability. As discussed in Section V of the preamble, EPA finds these standards are
appropriate and consistent with these requirements, and will reduce PM emissions over the
broadest range of vehicle operating and environmental conditions.
In the Preamble and RIA, EPA documents strong technical support for the PM standard,
including feasibility of the standard and comprehensive analyses of benefits, and costs. EPA
updated the GPF direct manufacturing cost model for the FRM using the latest information. As
described in the RIA, the cost model considers the GPF substrate, housing, accessories, pressure
sensor, labor and overhead, machinery, and warranty costs. The updated model uses a larger GPF
swept volume ratio (GPF volume to engine displacement volume) of 0.80 instead of 0.55 in the
NPRM, and uses 2022 dollars instead of 2021 dollars. The larger swept volume ratio is based on
an expanded GPF/vehicle database, input from a GPF supplier, and an ICCT PM/GPF fact sheet
released in November 2023.
EPA performed years of vehicle testing with various GPF installations, including PM, EC,
PN, filter-collected and gas-phase PAH emissions and documented that in the Preamble, RIA,
and publications. EPA performed inventory and air quality modeling. EPA also engaged with
stakeholders, suppliers, and reviewing the literature. EPA considered cost, flexibility to
manufacturers, public health, and legal requirements of the Clean Air Act. The EPA PM standard
is expected to result in more than a 95% reduction in tailpipe PM from over 100 million vehicles
and will bring US PM emissions closer to those that have already been established in other areas
of the world such as Europe (2017), China (2020), and India (2023).
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EPA accounts for relevant benefits and costs of the PM standard and is fulfilling its statutory
obligation to protect human health and the environment in a reasoned, evidence-based approach,
as documented in the Preamble and RIA.
EPA's justification of the PM standard is bolstered by comments and analyses by ALA,
ADEQ, CARB, EDF, ICCT, MECA, NACAA, NT A A, NESCAUM and OTA, and the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, who comment on the need for the PM standard
with respect to health benefits for all Americans and especially for low-income communities,
communities of color, and people that live or work near transportation hubs and corridors and in
nonattainment areas, and on the attractive benefit to cost ratio of the standard.
In response to comments from manufacturers about the challenges of integrating GPFs into
vehicle designs, EPA recognizes that GPFs are not a drop-in technology and that the PM
standard may require some labs to change test practices that were previously sufficient for
measuring higher levels of PM. Manufacturers require lead time to adopt GPF technology across
U.S. applications and make changes to testing practices and so EPA has lengthened the phase-in
schedule for PM and other criteria pollutants as described in preamble Section III.D.3 .ii and
more generally in preamble Section III.D.l, as compared to our proposal.
The PM standard will deliver large benefits and a high benefit to cost ratio, which justify
manufacturers' expending development resources. As described in RIA Chapter 3.2.6.2, typical
reductions in tailpipe emissions are greater than 95% reduction in PM, greater than 98%
reduction in EC (elemental carbon), and greater than 99% reduction in filter-collected PAH. New
GPF technology enables such reductions under all operating conditions and temperatures. These
reductions directly benefit drivers using roadways or living near roadways. Reductions total
annual PM emissions resulting from the LMDV rule are shown in preamble Section VILA and
decreases in annual average PM2.5 concentrations and population-weighted average annual
PM2.5 concentrations are shown in preamble Section VII.B.l. As discussed in Preamble Section
V, the cost of GPF technology, which is explained in preamble Section III.D.3.viii and RIA
Chapter 3.2.6.4, is justified by the benefits to public health and welfare. Similarly, for those
vehicles with GVWR over 6,000 lbs, EPA finds that the final standards based on GPF
technology are appropriate because they reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction
achievable through the application of technology which the Administrator has determined will be
available for the model year to which such standards apply, giving appropriate consideration to
cost, energy, and safety factors associated with the application of such technology.
Stellantis and an SVM manufacturer group commented that expensive test facilities will be
needed to measure PM for the standard. EPA did not propose any changes to PM test procedures
because the Agency does not believe that test procedure changes are required to measure PM at
the final PM standard. Current test procedures outlined in 40 CFR parts 1066 and 1065 allow
robust gravimetric PM measurements well below the PM standard of 0.5 mg/mi, as demonstrated
by EPA and other laboratories and described in Preamble Section III.D.3.iv-v and RIA Chapter
3.2.6.2. Although changes to Part 1065 and 1066 procedures are not required, it is important to
use good engineering judgment when transitioning to measuring PM below 0.5 mg/mi. This
includes consideration of filter media selection, effective removal of static charge from filter
media, dilution factor, filter media flow rate, using a single filter for all phases of a test cycle,
robotic weighing, and minimizing contamination from filter handling, filter screens and
cassettes. EPA appreciates that changes to test practices may be needed, that PM sampling
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equipment may need to be installed in some cold test facilities, but EPA does not anticipate that
the new PM standards will require manufacturers to build entirely new test facilities. We note
that many manufacturers have submitted, and certified the validity of, PM test data below 0.5
g/mile to date. Over 20 percent of MY 2021-2024 light-duty vehicle federal PM certification test
results are below 0.5 mg/mi. We recognize that test-to-test variability may be of greater concern
to manufacturers for the revised standard, but based on our round robin test results we conclude
that should not be a significant issue for certification. EPA has provided additional lead-time for
SVMs to transition to PM lower measurements with the phase in schedules described in
preamble Section III.D.l.
EPA disagrees with Stellantis' assertion that the PM standard only offers modest reductions in
PM compared to gains achieved with only a market transition to electrification. Over 100 million
ICE-powered vehicles are expected to be sold during the transition to more BEVs, even with new
EPA standards requiring strong reductions in GHG emissions. EPA expects that even in 2055 a
majority of the light- and medium-duty fleet will have internal combustion engines. An analysis
by the Manufacturers of Emissions Control Association (MECA) shows that a regulatory control
strategy that includes a combination of electric vehicle penetration and best available exhaust
controls for PM (i.e., GPF) on the remaining ICE vehicles results in approximately double the
PM2.5 reduction achievable the electrification alone, during the period from 2025 to 2060.
3) Responses to comments about technical issues of the EPA PM standard
AAI, Ford, Stellantis, Mercedes-Benz and API commented on the need for the -7°C FTP test
cycle. Specifically, Ford stated it believes the benefit of the -7°C FTP PM standard is de minimis
considering the effectiveness of GPF technology will be sufficiently demonstrated in the 25°C
FTP and US06 test cycles. Stellantis asserted that the 25°C FTP and US06 test cycles will force
GPF adoption without needing the -7°C FTP test. EPA disagrees with these assertions and
CARB, ICCT, NESCAUM and OTA specifically commented on the importance of requiring all
three PM test cycles (-7°C FTP, 25°C FTP, and US06). The -7°C FTP test cycle is crucial to the
final PM standard because it addresses high and uncontrolled cold PM emissions from vehicle
operation at cold temperatures. Tier 3 PM standards for both the FTP and US06 are only for
25°C. Absent the -7°C FTP test, vehicles would not achieve PM reductions commensurate with
GPF technology across the widest range of environmental and vehicle operating conditions. As
demonstrated in Preamble III.D.3.iii, some vehicles without GPFs satisfy the 0.5 mg/mile
standard in the 25°C FTP and US06 cycles but exhibit dramatically higher PM emissions at -7°C
(an important real-world temperature), with the same being true at other important off-cycle
vehicle operating points. Without the -7°C FTP test cycle, vehicles would not be required to have
low PM emissions under all operating conditions.
For many years, manufacturers have been certifying vehicles at -7°C for the FTP test cycle for
NMHC and CO standards. The final PM standard requires vehicle manufacturers to measure PM
in the same existing test cycle. EPA anticipates that some vehicle manufacturers will require
installation of PM sampling equipment into their cold facilities, although some of the required
measurement equipment, such as dilution tunnel, should already be in place. Manufacturers also
have the option to use a contract lab to perform cold PM testing.
In response to the API comment that only six states have average winter temperatures that are
below -7°C, EPA notes that vehicles are often started in the morning, when the temperatures are
often below the average temperature of the day, and that some days are colder than the average
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winter temperature. -7°C is not an extreme temperature in much of the United States and has
been used for CO and NMHC standards for some time.
Several commenters noted concern with increased test to test variability with a more stringent
PM standard. The PM standard being finalized requires PM emissions to be at or below 0.5
mg/mi. Manufacturers typically design their vehicles to have emissions below a standard to
protect for test and vehicle variability. High test-to-test variability normalized by the testing
mean is not a concern for certification if the mean plus variability is low enough. For example,
0.1 mg/mi with a standard deviation of 0.1 mg/mi has high normalized variability yet provides
high confidence of resulting in a measurement below 0.5 mg/mi on any given test. In conducting
testing to support the feasibility of the final standard, EPA, and the labs with which we
collaborated, demonstrated reduced test to test variability with good measurement practices.
CARB submitted comments supporting the technical feasibility of low PM gravimetric
measurements. CARB explains that it has previously addressed the technical feasibility of
gravimetric PM mass measurement at 1 mg/mi and below with a technical review presentation to
the Board in October 2015. CARB concluded that the gravimetric method prescribed for the FTP
driving cycle, in conjunction with appropriate laboratory practices, has a measurement precision
of 0.1 mg/mi, even when measuring emission rates less than 1 mg/mi. The method can precisely
measure PM emissions to determine compliance with a standard of 0.5 mg/mi. It should also be
noted that such analysis was conducted on low-PM-emitting vehicles that had a higher level of
vehicle test-to-test variability than what is observed in U.S. EPA's test data for vehicles equipped
with a gasoline particulate filter. As this technology is a mechanical wall-flow filtering device
with a high trapping efficiency, it inherently dampens variations in PM emissions and produces
more consistent results at very low PM levels, thereby reducing one element of concern
regarding measurement precision at low PM levels. EPA own experience corroborates these
comments and EPA agrees with these conclusions.
There should not be any special concern about designing vehicles to the -7°C FTP standard
for vehicles produced by SVMs or for vehicles with high-performance engines. GPF suppliers
work with SVMs and large manufacturers to design GPFs for mass produced vehicles and
vehicles that are produced in small numbers. At least one SVM is already selling GPF-equipped
vehicles in the United States. Large manufacturers build some vehicles with high-performance
engines as well, and GPFs have been successfully applied to those applications.
Based on comments from manufacturers, EPA is providing test burden reduction by finalizing
an option for manufacturers to attest to meeting the -7°C FTP PM standard for MY 2027 and
MY 2028 vehicles. This option applies to vehicles at or below 6000 lb GVWR, early phase-in
schedule vehicles between 6001-8500 lb GVWR, and early phase-in schedule vehicles between
8,501-14,000 lb GVWR, and provides manufacturers with extra time to integrate PM samplers
into their cold test cells if they do not already have them. Manufacturers are still responsible for
ensuring that vehicles comply with the -7°C FTP PM standard, and EPA may conduct testing to
confirm whether vehicles meet the standard, so manufacturers must have confidence in their
attestation.
A round robin test program spanning three organization and five test cells showed meeting the
-7°C FTP PM standard is feasible with MY 2022 GPF technology and the test procedures
described in detail in preamble Section III.D.3.iii-iv and RIA Chapter 3.2.6, with an excellent
test validity rate. EPA has the same requirements on dilution factor, filter face velocity, filter
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sampling temperature, and filter conditioning and weighing in the -7°C FTP, as in other test
cycles. As required by the CFR, sample filters must be maintained between 47 and 52°C to avoid
or greatly minimize water condensation on the sample filter face and as shown in the Preamble
and RIA, test to test variability was sufficiently low.
In response to the comment from the SVM manufacturer group about there being technical
issues associated with measuring PM below 1 mg/mi and EPA should not require cold testing or
exempt SVMs from it, EPA did not propose any changes to PM test procedures because the
Agency does not believe that test procedure changes are required to measure PM at the final PM
standard. Current test procedures outlined in 40 CFR parts 1066 and 1065 allow robust
gravimetric PM measurements well below the PM standard of 0.5 mg/mi, as demonstrated by
EPA and other laboratories and described in preamble Section III.D.3.iv-v and RIA Chapter
3.2.6.2. Although changes to Part 1066 procedures are not required, it is important to use good
engineering judgment when transitioning to measuring PM below 0.5 mg/mi. This includes
consideration of filter media selection, removal of static charge from filter media, dilution factor,
filter media flow rate, using a single filter for all phases of a test cycle, robotic weighing, and
minimizing contamination from filter handling, filter screens and cassettes. EPA is finalizing
additional time for SVMs to transition to PM lower measurements with the phase in schedules
described in preamble Section III.D.l.
After consideration, EPA is requiring that SVMs meet the PM standard in -7°C FTP test cycle
because as explained above, the -7°C FTP is crucial to the final PM standard in that it addresses
uncontrolled cold PM emissions in Tier 3, and absent the -7°C FTP test, vehicles would not
achieve PM reductions commensurate with what GPF technology offers across a wide range of
operating conditions. SVMs may perform -7°C FTP testing themselves or work with a
contracting lab to do the testing. SVMs currently certify CO and NMHC in the same -7°C FTP
test cycle and Euro 6 includes RDE solid PN standards down to -7°C.
EPA agrees that meeting the PM standard in the US06 on ICE-powered vehicles typically
requires attention to both engine-out emissions and GPF designs that possess good filtration
under normal conditions and high temperature, high flow conditions. Good engine controls must
be used to avoid high engine-out SVOC that may contribute to PM emissions. GPFs must be
used that have high filtration even without the benefit of soot loading, such as during or
immediately after a GPF regeneration. However, newer GPF technology (e.g., the MY 2022
GPFs tested in round robin testing, preamble Section III.D.3.iii and RIA Chapter 3.2.6) has very
high filtration even during and immediately after a GPF regeneration, and easily meets the final
PM standard in the US06 as shown in preamble Section III.D.3.iii and RIA Chapter 3.2.6, for all
of the test vehicles including turbocharged pickup trucks and a Class 2b truck. Even the oldest
test vehicle, a 2011 F150 3.5L Ecoboost, which has high engine-out PM, uses a turbocharged
downsized engine that is more likely to use enrichment, and was tested with a somewhat
undersized GPF, easily met the 0.5 mg/mi standard.
AAI suggested that EPA should allow manufacturers to use US06 bag 2 in place of the full
US06 test for PM testing of MDV to reduce test burden. EPA considered this suggestion but is
finalizing the requirement to use the full US06, as was proposed, because only using only bag 2
of the US06 would mean that only high load highway driving would be represented, ignoring
high load city driving, which all vehicles experience. The high load city driving portion of the
US06 has some of the highest rates of vehicle acceleration of the US06, leading to significant
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passive GPF regeneration on GPF-equipped vehicles. Using the full US06 ensures good PM
control even during and immediately after GPF regenerations.
The US06 test results in higher tunnel flow rates and temperatures than other cycles. If
vehicles with high emissions were previously tested in that lab or if a great deal of low load
operation occurred, the US06 may cause a release of stored emissions from prior use. EPA
recommends that if a lab notices this in their testing, they consider running a high load
conditioning test before performing a US06 test with low PM.
Regarding AAI and Mercedes-Benz' comments that the PM standard was not designed to
allow GPF technology from other regions to be "dropped in" and Stellantis' comment that the
PM standard requires all-new GPF systems, we appreciate that existing GPFs cannot simply be
bolted onto vehicles. Applying GPFs to a vehicle is not trivial and does require development and
resources. In recognition of this, EPA is finalizing a more gradual phase-in and is providing
other concessions to give industry additional time for development. We judge the additional time
provides manufacturers with sufficient time for GPF sizing, packaging, OBD monitoring, GPF
regeneration control, and durability. Packaging GPFs into small vehicles poses challenges due to
there being less space, but all manufacturers have been applying GPFs to vehicles in Europe and
China for some time (approximately 100 million vehicles have already been sold with GPFs).
Some large vehicles sold in the U.S. are not sold overseas so there may be fewer examples to use
in the design process, but large vehicles tend to have more packaging space, which somewhat
mitigates this challenge. However, in developing the feasibility of a more stringent PM standard,
EPA retrofit several vehicles with MY 2022 GPFs currently in mass production in Europe. The
measured PM emissions were well below 0.5 mg/mi across three test cycles, three test facilities
and five test cells. Details are provided in preamble Section III.D.3.iii and RIA Chapter 3.2.6.
Current MY 2022 GPFs are being used to meet current European particle number (PN)
standards, but they were also more than sufficient in meeting EPA's 0.5 mg/mi PM standard.
Ferrari expressed concern about the effectiveness of their existing GPF configuration
designed to meet the CARB 1 mg/mi standard in meeting the more stringent EPA 0.5 mg/mi
standard considering the proposed lead time. In response to Ferrari's concern and comments
from other SVMs, EPA is finalizing a criteria pollutant phase-in that provides SVMs with
significantly more time, until 2032, to update vehicle GPF configurations and meet the PM
standard. The round robin GPF program described in preamble Section III.D.iii and RIA Chapter
3.2.6 demonstrates that MY 2022 GPFs are able to meet the EPA 0.5 mg/mi PM standard with
large compliance margins.
Various comments were submitted regarding measurement challenges. AAI, Ford, VW and
Mercedes-Benz commented that uncertainty in PM measurements is too large and AAI
commented that measurement challenges increase for large vehicles. As described in Preamble
Section III.D.3.iii-if and RIA Chapter 3.2.6.2, EPA has shown that current test procedures
outlined in 40 CFR Parts 1066 and 1065 allow robust gravimetric PM measurement well below
0.5 mg/mi across a range of vehicle sizes from passenger cars to Class 2b/3 trucks, across three
organizations and five test cells. EPA also notes MECA's comment that based on over 15 years
of experience with diesel emission controls, medium-duty diesel vehicles that implement DPFs
will be able to meet the stringent PM requirements proposed in this rule. EPA acknowledges that
minimal compliance with 40 CFR parts 1066 and 1065 does not guarantee success in measuring
PM below 0.5 mg/mi and vehicle manufacturers and laboratories must still use good engineering
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judgement and robust measurement techniques to achieve consistent results. EPA appreciates
that laboratories may have to change current practices that were sufficient for measuring PM
below 3 and 6 mg/mi to reliably measure PM below 0.5 mg/mi. EPA also acknowledges that the
0.5 mg/mi standard is different from how Europe, China and India control PM emissions to a
level that has driven GPFs onto vehicles, primarily with particle number (PN) standards. When
any emissions standard is reduced, manufacturers must re-evaluate their current practices, and
changes may have to be made. In response to these considerations, EPA is providing a more
gradual phase-in, temporary relief on the criteria that trigger an IUCP, and that manufacturers
may attest to meeting the -7°C FTP PM standard for MY 2027 and MY 2028 to provide
manufacturers with additional time to make measurement procedure changes to achieve the
ability to measure below 0.5 mg/mi. EPA has detailed the procedures used by the round robin
laboratories, has met repeatedly with many manufacturers to discuss measurement practices
during the rulemaking, and is willing to continue to do so to help manufacturers improve their
PM measurement capability.
AAI identified several important aspects of PM measurement below 0.5 mg/mi, which along
with what EPA describes in preamble Sections III.D.3.iii-iv and RIA Chapter 3.2.6.2, should be
helpful to manufacturers in measuring below the 0.5 mg/mi standard. Measuring PM below 0.5
mg/mi begins with simple practices like requiring operators in PM measurement clean-rooms to
use power-free gloves, avoiding clothing that sheds lint or dust, not leaning over exposed filters
on workbenches, using sticky pads in clean room entranceways, wearing shoe covers to reduce
dirt being tracked into the clean room, and regular clean room cleaning. Other elements may be
less obvious, like grounding technicians while they handle filters, grounding work benches, etc.
These practices are important not just in the PM clean room, but anywhere that filters are
handled, such as when they are loaded and unloaded into PM sampling equipment.
Some important elements that EPA-manufacturer discussions have focused on include using
PTFE membrane filters with PMP or similar support rings to minimize gas-phase artifact (Part
1065.170) and using sufficient static charge removal before and during filter weighing using, for
example, alpha-emitter static charge removal (Part 1065.190). Discussions included improving
signal-to-noise ratio by using the lower half of the allowable dilution factor range (Part
1066.110), elevating filter face velocity (FFV) to a velocity approaching the maximum allowable
140 cm/s and loading one filter per test instead of one filter per phase (Part 1066.815). Further
elements of good measurement procedure include control of temperature, dewpoint, grounding,
using HEPA-filtered dilution air, using an effective coarse particle separator (Part 1065.145) and
good filter handing procedures (Part 1065.140/190). Laboratories may also consider using
robotic auto-handling for weighing (Part 1065.190) and background correction (Part 1066.110),
although the tests demonstrating the ability to measure below 0.5 mg/mile in the test program
summarized in preamble Section III.D.3 .iii did not use background correction and only one of
three organizations used robotic auto-handling.
AAI comments that large vehicles with high exhaust flows must be tested with higher CVS
flowrates (to maintain dilution factor requirements) than small vehicles with small exhaust flows.
That means that tunnel contamination, filter handling contamination, and filter static charge may
be magnified more for large vehicles, when converted to a mg/mi basis, than for small vehicles,
due to larger vehicles using larger sample ratios. This observation applies not only to PM, but
also to gaseous pollutants including NMOG, NOx and CO, when two vehicles with different
exhaust flow rates must meet the same standard. LDV, LDT1-4, and MDPV had to meet the
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same PM standard in Tier 3, and this observation applies there as well. That is the nature of using
a dilution tunnel instead of undilute (raw) tailpipe measurements. The 0.5 mg/mi PM standard
now applies to light-duty vehicles and MDV, which extends this effect across a greater range of
vehicle sizes than before. However, testing an MDV at EPA showed it to have PM emissions
well below the 0.5 mg/mi standard, with very low variability, even without background
subtraction, which is allowed by the CFR. Results and test procedures are detailed in preamble
Section III.D.3.iii and RIA Chapter 3.2.6.2.3. Based on these data, we consider the 0.5 mg/mi
standard to be feasible for MDV and, particularly considering the above-described sample ratio
effect.
AAI comments that at the 0.5 mg/mi level, net mass on the sample filter approaches tunnel
background levels. For certification purposes, this does not signify a problem so long as vehicle
PM is below the 0.5 mg/mi standard. While tunnel background measurements are a useful metric
to track, a tunnel background measurement is different from a vehicle measurement in a variety
of ways because tunnel background measurements lack the temperature increase provided by
vehicle exhaust and lack the water and hydrocarbon content of vehicle exhaust. The dry, clean
gas flowing through the dilution tunnel during a background measurement may draw material
from tunnel walls that was deposited during prior testing. During a vehicle test, the material on
tunnel walls may be in more of an equilibrium state with the gas flowing through the tunnel.
Thus, it is possible that tunnel blanks are artificially high. What really matters is the result from
the vehicle test.
AAI provides data from a manufacturer that shows that when a vehicle was tested across
different test cells at the manufacturer, it resulted in an average PM of 0.2853 mg/mi and two
standard deviations of 0.2677 mg/mi. From the description, it isn't clear what the test cycles
were, what vehicle was tested, whether it used a GPF, what GPF technology was used if the
vehicle used a GPF, and what measurement procedures were followed. Thus, EPA is unable to
consider what, if any, specific difficulties this example illustrates with respect to measuring GPF
performance below 0.5 mg/mi. EPA has demonstrated ability to measure well below 0.5 mg/mi
with low variability across multiple test cells using the procedures described in the Preamble and
RIA, and is happy to continue engaging with manufacturers to work toward improved practices
in measuring PM.
AAI also provides data from several round robin programs, including EPA NVFEL, at PM
levels at, above, and below Tier 3 levels and points to high lab-to-lab variability. EPA suggests
that data from vehicles equipped with MY 2022 or newer vehicles is used, and that the
measurement procedure issues discussed above be applied. Another issue to consider is how the
dilution tunnel was used before low PM testing. If vehicles with high emissions were tested, or if
prolonged operation at low load was tested, running a high load cycle may help.
While recognizing that some manufacturer labs will have to make changes, these changes are
reasonable, as demonstrated by that in 2023, all five test cells included in the round robin test
program detailed in preamble Section III.D.3.iii and RIA Chapter 3.2.6 had no problem
measuring PM to well below 0.5 mg/mi in any of the test cycles, and EPA had no problem
measuring PM to well below 0.5 mg/mi using a Class 2b truck. The PM standard begins to phase
in in 2027 for LDV (20% of vehicles, including BEVs), and manufacturers have until 2030 under
the default phase-in schedule for LDT3-4 and MDPV, and have until 2031 under the default
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phase-in schedule for MDV. EPA is happy to continue to engage with manufacturer labs to share
best practices and help improve PM measurement capability.
In response to API's question about whether the test-to-test repeatability demonstrated by
EPA only used an aerosol generator to produce PM, the first figure in Preamble Section
III.D.3.iv now shows which measurements used a vehicle and which measurements used an
aerosol generator. EPA notes that only one example used an aerosol generator and the lowest
bars were all from GPF-equipped vehicles.
AAI and Ford commented about allowing PM re-tests and Mercedes-Benz commented on
averaging PM tests and allowing for a conformity factor. EPA already allows certification,
confirmatory or in-use tests to be designated void and the test re-run if the test is determined to
be invalid, e.g., the vehicle was incorrectly fueled or a loaded PM sample filter was dropped onto
the floor. EPA regulations currently allow re-tests during manufacturer and EPA conducted
certification and confirmatory testing if an emission data vehicle fails an emission standard,
including PM. EPA does not allow re-tests for in-use testing unless the test is determined to be
invalid, but in-use compliance is determined based on a statistical sample of vehicles. To reduce
PM outliers, labs should use best practices described in Preamble III.D.3.iv. Labs may perform
triplicate filter sampling (from the same test) and average the results. EPA is providing
temporary relief on the criteria that trigger an IUCP, temporarily raising the failure rate that
triggers an IUCP to 80 percent of vehicles in a test group. EPA considered laboratory PM
measurement variability in developing the 0.5 mg/mi PM standard. RIA Chapter 3.2.6.2.4
quantifies test-to-test and lab-to-lab variability for two vehicles tested repeatedly across three
organizations. The vehicle equipped with a MY 2022 GPF produced PM measurements well
below the 0.5 mg/mi standard in all three test cycles with low variability.
AAI provided data showing more variability in repeat robot weighings of a clean blank filter
as compared to a stainless-steel weight of similar mass. EPA thanks AAI for sharing these data.
It is not clear to EPA which type of filter was used. PTFE membrane filters tend to have less
susceptibility to organic artifact than glass fiber filters coated in PTFE. Unfortunately, there will
generally be more variability in a filter than a metal weight. Labs should use best practices like
using PTFE membrane filters, good static charge removal, good control of temperature and
humidity, buoyancy correction, and robotic weighing to minimize variability as much as
possible. AAI attributes the greater variability in filter weight to organic artifact. EPA agrees this
may be part of the variability, but static charge may also play a role.
Ford commented it would like to work with EPA to determine if there is a role for limited
application of PN measurements to help reduce variability and test burden. After considering
alternatives to a PM mass standard, EPA decided to continue regulating based on PM mass in
this rulemaking. However, EPA is willing to discuss the use of PN as a future regulatory
measurement with Ford and others.
AAI recommended that EPA require all labs to adopt certain test procedure changes to
support measuring PM below 0.5 mg/mi. EPA agrees that it is good practice to monitoring tunnel
blanks weekly and to perform tunnel conditioning/cleaning when tunnel background becomes
elevated (perhaps above 5 |ig) or whenever switching from running low load for many tests or
running tests at high emissions levels to running tests with GPF-equipped vehicles. At this time,
however, EPA is providing laboratories with flexibility to ensure they are collecting quality data
in a way that is best for that organization. If a lab has confidence that it can collect quality PM
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data without weekly blank tests for example (e.g., it may rely on another type of reference test),
then EPA does not want to require that the lab perform weekly tunnel blanks. EPA will continue
to participate in measurement procedure discussions to continue to affirm and improve best
practices that are not overly burdensome and will adjust measurement requirements as needed.
In Tier 3, EPA allows but does not require tunnel background correction. EPA did not
propose to make tunnel background correction mandatory and results from internal test programs
and the round robin PM test program described in the Preamble and RIA indicate that tunnel
background correction is not required for the 0.5 mg/mi standard being finalized. EPA will
continue to participate in measurement procedure discussions and is open to adjusting
requirements as needed in the future.
EPA agrees that labs should consider reducing their reference filter validity limit from 10 |ig
in light of the significantly lower PM limit. At this time, however, EPA is providing laboratories
the flexibility as they determine what measures are needed to reliably measure PM below 0.5
mg/mi. EPA is happy to continue participating in measurement procedure discussions, including
new requirements on reference filter validity limit.
EPA agrees that robotic autohandlers are one way to reduce PM measurement variability in
that they reduce human handling of filters and associated issues with contamination and static
charge. However, after consideration, EPA is not mandating that any labs use robotic
autohandlers in this rulemaking. Two of the three labs used in the round robin testing described
in the Preamble and RIA did not use robotic handling and achieved PM results that are adequate
for measuring PM well below 0.5 mg/mi, including very low test-to-test variability. Human
weighing of filters, if proper procedures are followed, can be perfectly satisfactory. While
autohandlers can save time and reduce variability, they are costly to purchase and install, and
EPA does not find it necessary to require their use to support the PM standard being finalized.
EPA agrees that in the 25°C FTP and -7°C FTP, collecting PM onto a single filter with flow
weighting increases filter loading relative to sampling PM onto one filter per phase, and the
higher filter loading can reduce signal to noise ratio and improve the measurement. This is
discussed in preamble Section III.D.3.iv and has been an option in 40 CFR Part 1066.815.
However, the largest amount of PM in an FTP is typically from the cold engine start at the
beginning of Phase 1, meaning the amount of PM on the sample filter is only moderately
increased by using one filter for all phases. After consideration, EPA has decided not to change
test procedure requirements at this time to allow labs flexibility in their procedures.
ALA commented on the importance ensuring that critical emission controls like GPFs exhibit
ongoing functionality. While not disputing the importance of ensuring ongoing functionality,
VW, Stellantis, Mercedes-Benz and other commenters expressed concern that proposed GPF
OBD requirements would be difficult to achieve with current sensing technology or would
require additional development. In response to these comments, EPA is not finalizing the
proposed GPF OBD requirements and is instead finalizing that manufacturers follow the latest
CARB OBD requirements. Presently that means that manufacturers propose GPF OBD plans and
CARB reviews the manufacturer plans on a case-by-case basis. Some manufacturers have
already certified GPF diagnostics with CARB. Harmonizing with CARB's current requirements
resolves potential conflicts of having two sets of GPF OBD requirements and addresses
manufacturer concerns about the difficulty of achieving the EPA-proposed diagnostics. Further
discussion is provided in preamble Sections III.D.3.vii and III.H.
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An SVM manufacturer group raised concern that GPF aging and monitoring for OBD
purposes is not currently fully understood. In response to this, EPA notes that GPFs have been in
widespread use in other markets for some time (2017 in Europe, 2020 in China, 2023 in India)
and manufacturers and suppliers already have significant experience with the technology,
including GPF aging and monitoring. Also, at least one SVM already uses GPFs in the U.S.
GPFs accumulate ash throughout the vehicle's life and ash improves GPF filtration, but GPFs
must be sized to accommodate the accumulated ash. SVMs have until 2032 to meet the final PM
standard on light-duty vehicles and MDPVs, which is more than a decade after their introduction
into mass production in Europe.
EPA solicited comment on whether to revert to pre-production PM certification at the
durability group level after PM control technologies have been demonstrated across a range of
ICE technology and AAI was supportive of this concept. EPA thanks AAI for their input but
after consideration, EPA decided that it would be appropriate to review PM certification relief if
it were part of a comprehensive review of certification test burden for all criteria pollutants. Such
a review in the future would appropriately consider how to select worst-case vehicles for
certification testing if manufacturers demonstrate compliance based on testing vehicles from
every test group for some standards and testing vehicles only based on the durability group for
other standards.
4) Responses to comments about lead time and phase-in of the EPA PM standard
Commenters expressed opposing views on the phase-in of the PM standard. ALA encouraged
EPA to accelerate the phase-in of the PM standard to require all new vehicles to use GPFs in MY
2027 for the health benefits that this would provide. ICCT recommended that EPA adopt an
accelerated phase-in of the PM standard that EPA requested comment on (50 or 80% in 2027 and
100% in 2028 for vehicles at or below 6000 lb GVWR) because GPFs are a mature technology
in widespread use in other markets. MECA commented that the PM standard should be
implemented at a faster pace than proposed based on the combination of the predicted rate of
electrification (BEVs count toward compliance) alongside a feasible rate of PM emission control
technology implementation. MECA recommended a phase-in for vehicles at or below 6000 lb
GVWR of 60/90/100% in 2027/2028/2029.
Other commenters urged EPA to adopt a slower phase-in. AAI commented that it takes time
and resources to design exhaust systems that incorporate a GPF that address gaseous emissions
reduction and also control PM and enable GPF regeneration. Ford and other industry
commenters requested more time to apply GPF technology across all ICE models than the
40/80/100 percent phase in that was proposed. EPA appreciates that incorporating GPFs into
exhaust systems is not as simple as bolting on an additional part. Vehicles must meet CO2
standards, gaseous criteria pollutants, and the PM standard. In some applications, manufacturers
may find it best to use a close-coupled catalyzed GPF. This approach can use the same number
of substrates and aftertreatment cans but may be more challenging from a packaging perspective.
The GPF washcoat may not warm up as quicky as it would on a TWC with lower thermal mass.
In other applications, an underfloor bare GPF may work best. This requires an additional
substrate but leaves all of the washcoat on TWCs and may relieve packaging challenges on some
applications. Current GPF-equipped vehicles sold in Europe, China and India use a variety of
configurations and EPA expects that to continue in the near term in the U.S. In recognition of
these challenges, EPA is finalizing a more gradual phase-in, temporary relief on the criteria that
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trigger an IUCP, and an allowance to attest to meeting the -7°C FTP PM standard for MY 2027
and MY 2028 vehicles. These measures provide manufacturers with additional time for
designing, manufacturing, and certifying vehicles with GPF-equipped exhaust systems, or
convert more vehicles to BEVs.
An SVM small manufacturer group, AML and Ferrari commented that the proposed PM
standard goes too far too soon, faster than the CARB ACC II PM standard and not providing
additional lead time for SVMs. The SVM group suggested a phase-in approach consistent with
Euro 7. EPA considered the SVM group's comments and in response, is finalizing a criteria
pollutant phase-in schedule for SVMs, including for PM, that ends in the same place as for large
manufacturers but provides SVMs with significantly more time. For example, the phase in for
SVM LDV, LDT1-4 and MDPV steps from 0 to 100 percent in MY 2032 instead of the proposed
40/80/100 percent phase in for MY 2027/2028/2029 for LDV and LDT1-2. Details are provided
in preamble Section III.D.l. This phase in provides SVMs with more time than the SVM small
manufacturer group's characterization of Euro 7 PM phase-in and provides SVMs with ample
time to apply GPFs to ICE-powered vehicles and transition some vehicles to BEVs. GPF
technology is mature and has been in widespread use in other markets since 2017 and can be
readily applied to SVM vehicles as well. A major GPF supplier indicated to EPA that they work
with SVMs and are happy to provide GPFs that meet EPA's PM standard. Further details are
provided in preamble Section III.D.3 and RIA Chapter 3.2.6.
EPA considered AAI's recommendation for an interim in-use standard for the first two
model years after a test group certifies to the 0.5 mg/mi standard but ultimately decided against
an interim standard because the PM standard can be met with existing MY 2022 GPF technology
and manufacturers and suppliers have extensive experience in applying GPFs to vehicles in the
European market since 2017, in China since 2020, and India since 2023. Application of these
GPFs has gone very smoothly without major failures, recalls, deteriorating performance, or other
issues. Since measuring PM below 0.5 mg/mile may require measurement procedure adjustments
in some laboratories, EPA is finalizing a temporary increase in the criteria that trigger an IUCP
(in-use confirmatory testing program). The temporary increase in the IUCP criteria is described
in preamble Section III.G.5.ii.
5) Responses to comments about gasoline aromatics and particulate formation
We are finalizing stringent PM standards for gasoline vehicles covering a range of operating
conditions, including wintertime temperatures. We expect these standards to result in widespread
adoption of particulate filters (GPFs) on new light-duty vehicles by 2030 and on medium-duty
vehicles by 2031.
Modlin and Detchon cite the requirements for mobile source air toxics standards issued under
Section 202(1) to reflect the greatest degree of emissions reduction achievable (taking into
account several factors specified in the statute) as support for more stringent PAH controls. As
discussed in Section III.D.3 of the preamble, emission characterization of GPF-equipped vehicles
meeting the PM standards found that filter-based PAHs were reduced by more than 99%. As
such, the PM standards are expected to also reduce PAH and other toxics very well. More
detailed characterization of GPF benefits is described in Chapter 3.2.6.2 of the RIA.
Furthermore, air quality modeling representing the net impacts of the standards on air toxics
show average net reductions in all air toxics modeled.
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In light of the fact that EPA did not propose PAH standards and EPA anticipates that the PM
standards will result in very effective control of PAHs, EPA finds that it would not be
appropriate to finalize PAH standards in this rulemaking. However, EPA will continue to
consider the need for, and appropriate means of, further reductions in PAH by continuing to
investigate costs and benefits of updated standards for market gasoline that would reduce the
content of heavy aromatic compounds (including PAHs) that contribute most potently to PM and
PAH emissions.
Modlin and Detchon also suggest that EPA could achieve emissions reductions by requiring
changes to fuel composition that displace aromatics with additional ethanol. Imposing limits on
gasoline aromatics content would force refiners to reformulate their gasoline to use other high-
octane components. Understanding the impact of such reformulations on overall air quality
would necessarily include changes in a broad range of vehicle emissions (including refueling and
evaporative processes), as well as changes in petroleum refining and increases in ethanol
production and agricultural intensity. These changes may reduce the overall air quality benefits
significantly. We are not aware of any analyses integrating all these pieces at this time, and such
work is beyond the scope of this final rule. The CAA imposes a significantly different regulatory
regime for regulating fuels under 211(c), and as a result EPA solicited comment on potential
changes to fuels regulations but did not propose changes. Comments in response to EPA's
request for comment on potential future fuel controls are contained in Appendix D to this
document and will be further considered for a potential future rulemaking. Additional comments
related to fuels issues can be found in section 19 of this document.
4.1.4 - Carbon monoxide (CO) and formaldehyde (HCHO)
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
E. US06 CO Standards
Similar to CARB's LEV IV rule, EPA is proposing to revise the SFTP CO requirement from
a composite to a stand-alone standard for Tier 4. However, unlike the CARB LEV IV rule, EPA
is proposing to use the 25°C FTP CO cap of 1.7 g/mi for LDV and 3.4 g/mi for MDV for the
US06 requirement. In Table 139 in section VII of the NPRM, EPA uses the OMEGA model to
estimate criteria emission impacts of the proposed standards relative to the No Action scenario,
light- duty and medium-duty in tons/day. While this is an interesting mathematical exercise,
what is important is whether the Proposed Rule is needed for air quality attainment. Such a
drastic increase in stringency would have a big impact on engine design in a similar manner as
the proposed enrichment prohibition, but this change does not have any basis in air quality
attainment as noted in section 8.1.5 of the DRIA.278 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 177-
178]
278 There are two primary NAAQS for CO: an 8-hour standard (9 ppm) and a 1-hour standard (35 ppm).
There are currently no CO nonattainment areas; as of September 27, 2010, all CO nonattainment areas had
been redesignated to attainment."
- difficulty in the high-load region of US06: There is more variability in US06 emission
results associated with differences in driving at high-load. Consequently, the standard must be
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adjusted to account for this difference. (Even with the same vehicle speed tolerance as
FTP±2mph@± lsec, the increase in workload when running at the upper and lower tolerance
limits is large. The increase in the amount of intake air also increases, and the emission impact is
large). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 177-178]
- Heavy development Burden: To meet the proposed US06 CO standard, automakers would
need to expand the X=1 region. This would result in redesign to increase the heat resistance of
exhaust system parts including, but not limited to air/fuel sensors, catalysts, and turbochargers.
Engine changes would also likely be needed to lower combustion temperatures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 177-178]
- Reduction in Engine Output: EPA's proposal may require limiting engine power under high
loads to protect the engine. This will impact marketability, especially for vehicles needing
towing capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 177-178]
Furthermore, there is no need for additional reductions in CO emissions since the entire
country is in attainment with National Ambient Air Quality CO standards.279 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 177-178]
279 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Green Book Carbon Monoxide (1971) Area Information.
htps://www.epa.gov/green-book/green-book-carbon-monoxide-1971-area-information. ("As of September
27, 2010, all Carbon Monoxide areas have been redesignated to maintenance.")
Auto Innovators recommends EPA align with ACC II LEV IV requirements as shown in
below, which provide reductions in CO emissions, but without requiring substantial development
effort, which would unnecessarily divert resources away from electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 177-178]
[See original attachment for Figure 65: US06 CO Recommendation] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.177-178]
Organization: Kia Corporation
Kia Recommends EPA Align with CARB's Carbon Monoxide (CO) US06 Standard [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 11-12]
Similar to CARB's LEV IV rule (in ACC II), EPA is proposing to revise the Standard Federal
Testing Procedure (SFTP) US06 CO requirement from a composite to a stand-alone standard for
Tier 4. However, unlike the CARB LEV IV rule, EPA is proposing that the CO cap for the US06
test cycle match the CO cap for the 25°C FTP of 1.7 g/mi for light-duty vehicles. This change
has no basis in air quality attainment as noted in section 8.1.5 of the Draft Regulatory Impact
Analysis, 19 as of September 27, 2010, all CO nonattainment areas had been redesignated to
attainment." Kia recommends that EPA follow CARB's LEV IV rule for CO US06 that sets a
standard of 9.6 g/mi cap, which delivers a meaningful reduction without substantial ICE
investment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 11-12]
19 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA).
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Organization: Lucid Group, Inc
Under section 202 of the Clean Air Act, EPA has clear authority to regulate sources of air
pollutants from all mobile sources, including carbon dioxide (C02), non- methane organic gases
(NMOG) plus oxides of nitrogen (NOx) or NMOG+NOx, particulate matter (PM), carbon
monoxide (CO), and formaldehyde (HCHO) from vehicle tailpipes. Lucid applauds EPA's
continued efforts under this authority to improve the nation's air quality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0664, p. 2]
Organization: MCS Referral & Resources (MCSRR)
In the Executive Summary at A.2.i regarding the
"Need for Continued Emissions Reductions Under 202(a) of the Clean Air Act," EPA claims:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, pp. 1-2]
"Addressing the public health impacts of criteria pollutants (including particulate matter
(PM), ozone, nitrogen oxides (NOX), and carbon monoxide (CO)) will require continued
reductions in these pollutants from the transportation sector." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615,
pp.1-2]
But EPA acknowledges in section II.B.5 that: "There are currently no CO nonattainment
areas; as of September 27, 2010, all CO nonattainment areas have been redesignated to
attainment." And this is despite EPA requiring since 2011 that CO monitors "be operated near
roads in Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs) of 1 million or more persons." [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0615, pp.1-2]
So given that:
1) EPA has not identified any non-attainment areas for CO in over 12 years; [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0615, pp. 1-2]
2) ambient CO levels in all US monitoring areas average less than 10% of the EPA
NAAQS 1-hour and 8-hour average limits for CO of 35 and 9 ppm, respectively; [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0615, pp. 1-2]
3) none of the health benefits that EPA estimates will result from the adoption of this
rule are based on estimated reductions in CO emissions, but only on estimated reductions in
particulate matter emissions; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, pp. 1-2]
4) the EPA Administrator decided in the last CO NAAQS review in 2011, based on the
same Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) on CO that EPA now cites in this proposed rule at
II.C.5 as the justification for lowering current CO emission limits by more than half, that no
changes were needed in either of the two primary CO standards to further protect the public from
any of the health effects associated with CO emissions from any sources; it appears there are no
compelling regulatory or health reasons for EPA to lower the maximum allowed CO emissions
of light duty gasoline vehicles and trucks in the FTP test by more than 60%, from up to 4.2 to 1.7
g/mile, or those of heavier medium duty vehicles from 7.3 to 3.2 g/mi, while leaving the SFTP
limits for CO emissions unchanged at 4.2 g/mile. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, pp. 1-2]
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We note that EPA first committed to studying these lower CO limits in the 1990 revisions to
the Clean Air Act. Congress at the time gave the EPA until June 1, 1997, to prepare a report on
this option and until December 31, 1999 to propose a rule that would lower the CO limit to 1.7
g/mile starting in model year 2006. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, pp. 1-2]
But EPA missed these deadlines and left in place higher Phase 1 CO limits that EPA first
required in model year 1996. These limited CO emissions to 3.4 g/mile at 50,000 miles and 4.2
g/mile at 100,000 miles, as shown below in Tables 3, G, and H (reprinted from the 2013 edition
of 42 CFR 85 §7521.i.3.A, online at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2013-
title42/html/USCODE-2013-title42-chap85-subchapII- partA-sec7521 .htm) [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0615, pp.1-2]
EPA had another opportunity to lower CO emissions when it adopted Phase 2 limits for light-
duty vehicles and trucks that took effect in model year 2001. But the EPA Administrator chose to
keep the Phase 1 CO limits unchanged. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, pp. 1-2]
Unless EPA can now show some need to reduce CO emissions to protect public health and/or
welfare, or to reduce greenhouse gases, it should not require vehicle manufacturers to lower CO
emissions any further. With US monitoring stations now reporting 8-hour ambient CO averages
below 1 ppm or at most 2 ppm, no further clinically relevant reductions in CO emissions are
possible or needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, pp. 1-2]
[See original for Table 3 - Pending Emission Standards for Gasoline and Diesel Fueled Light-
Duty Vehicles and Light-Duty Trucks 3,750 LBs, LVW or Less] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0615, pp. 1-2]
At III.C.4.ii, EPA proposes a "CO emissions cap for the -7 °C FTP" of 10.0 g/mi. But in the
same section, EPA acknowledges that "Testing of a 2022 F250 7.3L in the -7 °C FTP at EPA
showed average CO emissions of 2.7 g/mi CO." Although EPA concluded that this result
demonstrates that a 10.0 g/mi standard is feasible for MDVs, this result also demonstrates that a
separate standard for cold starts is not necessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, p. 3]
The test vehicle was able to meet the lower 3.4 g/mi limit proposed for other (non-cold) CO
tests of MDVs, as well as the 4.3 g/mi allowed under SFTP conditions. For comparison, EPA
should have reported the average CO emissions of an LDV during a similarly cold start at -7 °C.
If the average CO level that LDVs emit from a cold start is already below the 4.3 g/mile that
EPA allows under SFTP conditions, there is no need for a separate cold start limit of 10 g/mi.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, p. 3]
That said, if EPA decides to include a cold temperature CO emission standard in section
86.1811, it should apply for a useful life of "10 years or 120,000 miles" (like the NHMC limits
in the same section), not for only "5 years or 50,000 miles." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, p.
3]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary of Carbon Monoxide Comments
EPA received a number of comments regarding the proposed carbon monoxide standards. The
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI), Kia and MCSRR noted that there are currently no
CO non-attainment areas in the United States. AAI went on to note that some vehicles would
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require significant engineering changes to meet the proposed standards and that some of the
changes may result in reduced engine power. AAI also commented that many vehicles
demonstrate more variability in US06 emission as the result of driving at higher speed and load.
MCSRR noted that there is no need for a -7°C FTP standard that is separate from other non-
cold CO standards for MDV. MCSRR also commented that if EPA decides to set a -7°C FTP
MDV CO standard that is higher than the 25°C CO standard, it should apply for a useful life of
10 years or 120,000 miles, not for only 5 years or 50,000 miles.
Summary of Carbon Monoxide Responses
EPA considered submitted comments and our own analysis in setting the appropriate US06
CO standards and the environmental benefits of finalizing a standard that is lower than the Tier 3
US06 CO. We also considered the CARB US06 CO standards in the context of current vehicle
performance. The environmental benefits are specifically addressed in RTC Sections 7 and 8. In
response to the comments received and as the result of the technical analysis performed by EPA,
EPA is finalizing US06 standards for both LDVs and MDVs 9.6 g/mi and 25 g/mi, respectively.
Refer to preamble Section II.D.4 for a detailed discussion of our rationale.
After consideration, EPA disagrees with MCSRR's comment that there is no need for a -7°C
FTP standard that is separate from other non-cold CO standards for MDV. Without a separate
standard at -7°C, the final standard of 6.4 g/mi would apply at -7°C, and that would be
significantly lower than the new standard of 10.0 g/mi for -7°C FTP MDV. While a MY 2022
F250 7.3L vehicle tested by EPA showed average CO emissions of 2.7 g/mi, other MDVs emit at
higher rates and EPA has not performed a comprehensive study of the feasibility of setting the
same standard at -7°C and 25C for CO. The 10.0 g/mi standard is the first -7°C FTP standard or
cold test standard of any kind for MDV and our intent at this time is just to set an upper bound
on what MDV may emit at this cold temperature that is common during winter months across
much of the United States. Because cold CO standards have not previously been applied to
MDV, we do not have certification data on cold CO emissions, which would include data from a
broad range of MDV applications. Once cold CO standards are implemented for MDV, we will
continue to monitor their emissions from certification testing and we will also continue monitor
technologies for improving cold CO emissions in order to inform future decision making.
MCSRR commented that EPA should set an MDV -7°C FTP CO useful life of 10 years or
120,000 miles, not just 5 years or 50,000 miles. EPA is finalizing an MDV -7°C FTP CO useful
life of 15 years or 150,000 miles and thus is consistent with the useful life that we have finalized
for other criteria pollutants for both MDV and LDVs over 6,000 pounds GVWR. EPA is
finalizing the same useful life for MDV -7°C FTP NMOG+NOX and PM. Final useful life
standards for light-duty vehicles and MDV are described in 40 CFR 86.1805-17.
EPA appreciates Lucid for acknowledging EPA's CAA authority to regulate CO.
4.1.5 - Refueling incomplete spark-ignition vehicles
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Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE)
AVE supports EPA's proposal to extend On-board Refueling Vapor Recovery (ORVR)
requirements to all incomplete light-duty and medium-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0631, p. 9]
AVE supports the proposed extension of the requirements for control of refueling emissions
to all incomplete spark-ignition light-duty and medium-duty vehicles for the 2030 model year.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 9]
Cost-effective ORVR technology is available to control refueling emissions for all new
incomplete vehicles at the proposed emission standard of 0.20 grams per gallon, supported by the
EPA's draft regulatory impact analysis for this proposed rule. ORVR is an available and proven
technology to significantly reduce evaporative and refueling emissions, resulting in meaningful
emission reductions of volatile organic compounds that lead to the formation of ozone and
secondary particulate matter (PM2.5), as well as emissions of hazardous air pollutants. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 9]
With regulatory developments since ORVR technology was first introduced in 1994, primary
and secondary manufacturers have gained significant experience with ORVR technology on all
categories of complete gasoline vehicles, including light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles.
The recent 2027 heavy-duty final rule added a refueling standard (ORVR) for incomplete
vehicles over 14,000 pounds Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR), leaving incomplete light-
and medium-duty gasoline vehicles as the only remaining class of vehicles currently not required
to meet refueling standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 9]
AVE believes that the refueling emission control technologies used for the complete versions
of light- and medium-duty vehicles are equally applicable to their corresponding incomplete
versions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 9]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Refueling Emission Standards for Incomplete Vehicles
U.S. EPA's proposed standards would newly apply onboard refueling emission standards to
incomplete medium-duty vehicles, which CARB supports. U.S. EPA requested comment
regarding whether it would be cost-effective, feasible, and appropriate to also apply the proposed
refueling emission standard to incomplete light-duty vehicles. Like U.S. EPA's assessment of
incomplete medium-duty vehicles in the proposal, CARB anticipates that any future incomplete
light-duty vehicle would be configurable to feasibly meet the refueling emission standard. One
manufacturer already makes incomplete light-duty vehicles that have been certified in California
to the refueling emission standard that U.S. EPA has proposed. 48, 49 To meet the refueling
emission standard in this class of vehicle, manufacturers would be expected to use the existing
design practices for controlling refueling emissions as outlined in the proposal, including
optimizing fuel vapor line routing, fill pipe orientation, and position. Including incomplete light-
duty vehicles in the refueling standard will help ensure that this requirement is applied evenly
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across all classes of vehicles that have the capability to generate refueling emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 36-37]
48 General Motor's Document for Incomplete Vehicle, Applicable to the 2023 MODEL YEAR Cadillac
XT5 B9Q - Funeral Coach, OR V4U - Limousine https://www.gmupfitter.com/wp-
content/uploads/2022/10/I VD_2023_ClUL_85116239-XT5.pdf.
49 CARB. Executive Order A-006-2337.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/classic/msprog/nvepb/executive_orders/EO%20Web%20Files/PC
- LDT-MDV/2023/0001/pc-ldt-mdv_ldt_a-6-2337 sdt-20220324.pdf.
Organization: Ingevity Corporation
Response to specific requests for comments:
14. Extension of the requirements for control of refueling emissions to incomplete SI
MDVs and to other gasoline-fueled incompletes (LDV/LDT/MDPV) [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 3-4]
Ingevity fully supports the proposed extension of the requirements for control of refueling
emissions to incomplete SI MDVs (i.e., 8,501-14,000 lb. GVWR) for the 2030 model year (MY).
The proposed emission standard is 0.20 g/gal for a certification useful life of 15yrs./l 50,000
miles using the provisions of 40 CFR 86 Subpart B. Control of refueling emissions from
complete versions of vehicles in this proposed sub-category of HDVs was required for the 2006
MY; for MDPVs and complete vehicles of 8,501-10,000 lbs., GVWR phasing for 80% in 2005
and 100% in 2006 and in the 2018 MY for vehicles of 10,001-14,000 lbs. GVWR. We believe
that the refueling emission control technologies used for the complete versions of the vehicles in
these GVWR weight categories are equally applicable to their corresponding incomplete
versions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 3-4]
Technically, the current ORVR requirements do not cover "incomplete" LDVs, LDTs, and
MDPVs. The EPA's NPRM (p. 29275) would extend the ORVR requirement to any or all
incomplete gasoline- powered LDVs, LDTs, and MDPVs not covered by the past rulemakings.
Ingevity supports this portion of the proposal and sees no issues with technical feasibility, cost,
in-use effectiveness, or safety. Very similar vehicles have incorporated ORVR starting in the
1998 MY. The NPRM did not specify elements related to items such as test procedure, the
refueling emission standard, certification useful life, other certification requirements and model
year. It seems clear that the test procedures of Subpart B and the emission standards and other
requirements for certification from Subpart S would apply. To avoid complications and the
creation of inequities among the manufacturers due to the differences in their product lines, we
recommend that these lighter vehicles be grouped within the certifications for their similar
complete vehicles rather than providing them the option to be grouped in with incomplete MDVs
and incomplete HDVs. Toward that end, EPA needs to specify the applicable model year. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 3-4]
Model Year:
We note that the NPRM proposes control for the 2030 MY, citing the need for four MY years
lead time as called for in section 202(a)(3)(C) of the Clean Air Act. At this time the
promulgation date for a final rule is not known. However, since the MY for heavy-duty vehicles
coincides with the calendar year, we expect that a start year of MY 2028 or MY 2029 is possible
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and thus a revision of this mandatory start year should be considered. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0545, pp. 3-4]
Optional Phase-in with Other Incomplete SI HDVs:
We support providing the certifying manufacturers the flexibility of combining the sales of
their incomplete SI MDVs and heavier incomplete SI HDVs for purposes of meeting the sales
requirements in the alternative phase-in provided in the recently promulgated heavy-duty final
rule which included an ORVR requirement for incomplete SI HDVs with a GVWR over 14,000
lbs.2 Under a provision of that rule, the certifying manufacturers can phase-in controls using the
schedule of 40% for the 2026& 2027 MYs, 80% for the 2028 & 2029 MYs, and 100% for the
2030 MY in lieu of 100% in the 2027 MY.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 3-4]
2 US EPA, "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle
Standards," 88 FR 4296, January 24, 2023.
3 Note that page 29272 of the NPRM preamble discusses the option to group incomplete SI MDVs and
incomplete SI HDVs for sales purposes of meeting the alternative phase-in schedule of §86.1813-17
(b)(l)(iii). The preamble should say 2026-2030, not 2027-2030.
2. The cost, feasibility, and appropriateness of the proposed refueling emission standard
for all incomplete LDVs and MDVs
Primary/Secondary Manufacturers:
We agree with EPA that any concerns of the past regarding the relative roles and
responsibilities of the primary manufacturers (OEMs) and secondary manufacturers with regard
to certification and completion of the fuel/emission control systems on incomplete vehicles
(those involving multi-stage manufacturing) have long been resolved. Evaporative emission
controls were first required on these vehicles in the 1985 MY (earlier in California) and the
techniques used for these earlier evaporative emissions control, and subsequently refined over
several sets of more stringent and comprehensive requirements since that time, are equally
applicable for refueling emissions control through ORVR for incomplete SI MDVs.4. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 4-5]
4 US EPA, "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle Engines;
Evaporative Emission Regulation and Test Procedure for 1985 and Later Model Year Gasoline- Fueled
Heavy-Duty Vehicles," 48 FR 1429, January 12, 1983.
Refueling Emission Families for Certification:
Incomplete SI MDVs are to be certified to the refueling emission standards using the
requirements of 40 CFR §86 Subpart B. The same is true for complete SI MDVs which have
been subject to the requirements since the 2018 MY. Refueling emission family language in 40
CFR §86.1821-01 requires that the certifying manufacturer use good engineering judgement for
grouping vehicle models for purposes of emission testing for certification based on similar
evaporative and/or refueling emission characteristics throughout their useful life. Provided that
the manufacturers use good engineering judgment in the creation of families, there should be no
up-front restriction on combining complete and incomplete SI MDVs in families. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 4-5]
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Conversely, heavier complete and incomplete SI HDVs (>## 14,000 lbs. GVWR) are subject
to the provisions of 40 CFR §1037.103 for purposes of evaporative/refueling emission
certification and should not be grouped into families with complete and/or incomplete SI MDVs
certified under 40 CFR§86 Subpart B. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 4-5]
Scope of Applicability:
In the preamble to the final rule, EPA should indicate that the refueling emission control
requirements for incomplete SI MDVs are applicable in all 50 states. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0545, pp. 4-5]
Technical Feasibility and Cost:
Ingevity believes that the control of vehicle refueling emissions for incomplete SI MDVs is
technically feasible. As mentioned above, ORVR has been used to control refueling emissions on
all complete MDPVs and Class 2b SI HDVs since the 2006 MY and since 2018 MY for
complete Class 3 SI HDVs. With appropriate lead time, the application of good engineering
practice, and proper coordination with secondary manufacturers, it seems clear that ORVR can
be applied to incomplete SI MDVs effectively and safely. In fact, it may well be that ORVR is
already installed on many of these vehicles since both complete and incomplete SI MDVs
already meet Tier 3 evaporative emission requirements and the annual SI MDV vehicle sales are
in some cases not large enough to justify a multiple fuel system design. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0545, pp. 4-5]
EPA's system description and cost analysis as presented in the preamble to the NPRM and
draft RIA are reasonable and consistent with previous analyses for similar vehicles. Note that
this portion of the NPRM provides a cost estimate of $17-21 per vehicle but does not address
markups. Elsewhere in the draft RIA a Retail Price Equivalent (RPE) markup of 1.5 is used for
other components and component systems which if applied to ORVR would give an RPE cost
range of $26-32 per vehicle. In regulatory analyses it is common to assess the cost effectiveness
of control in at least the terms of $/ton per vehicle over its average life. To do so, information on
vehicle operating characteristics is needed to calculate emission reductions, future fuel price, and
fuel recovery credits. Using values derived from the current and a recent EPA RIA,5,6 for a 2030
model year incomplete MDV, the Net Present Value (NPV) of the fuel recovery credits for
ORVR over a 30-year survival-weighted lifetime of 182,777 miles at 14.5 mpg7 is about $63
(3% discount) and $53 (7% discount). The NPV of the fuel recovery credits at both 3% and 7%
exceed the projected ORVR cost, so the per vehicle cost effectiveness value in $/ton is a negative
value and thus a net savings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 4-5]
14 Information on projected gasoline costs for 2030 and later and on survival fractions by age was taken
from Tables 2-47 and 2-34, respectively, of the draft RIA for this rulemaking.
14 Information on Class 2b/3 mileage accrual by age was derived using the depiction in Figure 10-4 of
the EPA report "Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-
Duty Engines and Vehicles - Phase 2 Regulatory Impact Analysis." August, 1016, EPA420-R-16-
900..
7 The 14.5 mpg value is taken from page 8-18 of the EPA/DoT-NHTSA Joint Final RIA for the HDGHG
Phase 2 rule: "Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty
Engines and Vehicles - Phase 2, Regulatory Impact Analysis," EPA-420-R-16-900, August 2016. This also
includes an upward adjustment for the energy content of butane and pentane vapor which are the dominant
species in refueling vapor to the energy content of E10 whole gasoline vapor.
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Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
EPA should extend the refueling emission requirements to all incomplete SI vehicles as
proposed.
EPA's regulatory framework offers the most comprehensive evaporative/refueling control
program in the world for chassis certified vehicles. To meet the refueling emission limits,
Onboard Refueling Vapor Recovery (ORVR) has been successfully implemented in the U.S. and
Canada for over 25 years, and most recently has been implemented in China and Brazil. Within
EPA's IUVP program, there have been over 4500 tests conducted on in-use vehicles equipped
with ORVR with an average reduction efficiency of 98%. 13 The odometer readings on a large
fraction of these vehicles exceeded 100,000 miles. U.S. Tier 2 or California LEV II have reduced
evaporative emissions by 90%, and U.S. Tier 3 or California LEV III are 98% effective in
reducing evaporative VOC emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-13]
13 G. Passavant, "Summary and Analysis of 2000-2015 Model Year IUVP Evaporative and Refueling
Emission Data," 2017.
Consistent with EPA's proposal, MECA supports extending the refueling emission
requirements to all incomplete medium-duty vehicles at a refueling emission standard of 0.20
grams hydrocarbon per gallon of liquid fuel dispensed as now applies to complete LDVs, LDTs,
MDPVs, LHDGVs, and HHDGVs. Furthermore, in response to EPA's specific request to
comment, MECA suggests EPA extend this requirement to include all incomplete light-duty
vehicles in order to prevent any future removal of ORVR from any liquid fueled vehicles. The
OEMs have twenty-five model years of experience with the design and certification of ORVR
systems, which together with the EPA IUVP data mentioned above, clearly demonstrate the
feasibility. MECA believes that the refueling emission control technologies used for the
complete version of all vehicles are equally applicable to their corresponding incomplete
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-13]
Consistent with the current requirements for evaporative emission and refueling emission
controls for all lighter weight vehicles, MECA supports EPA's proposal to apply a useful life of
15 years/150,000 miles to the MDV refueling emission standard, consistent with existing
evaporative emission standards for these vehicles and for complete versions. Given that
integrated ORVR/evaporative control system designs share hardware such as the activated
carbon canister and purge valve and functions such as vapor transport and canister purge, a
common requirement for evaporative and refueling emission standard useful life is logical and
necessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-13]
MECA believes the implementation of ORVR is feasible and practical for primary and
secondary manufacturers. OEMs and secondary manufacturers now have decades of experience
in working together on measures to ensure that any actions taken by the secondary manufacturer
to complete the vehicle do not violate the certificate of conformity or create in-use issues for on-
vehicle fuel vapor control systems. In addition, there are now several regulatory provisions
within 40 CFR §1037 which provide guidelines on how OEMs and secondary manufacturers
may work together under EPA's certification programs. 14 This extensive experience together
with these recent regulatory provisions suggest that any concerns have been addressed and there
is no need for added regulatory measures. Regarding testing for refueling emissions certification,
the ORVR test procedures promulgated in 1994 are fully fit for purpose and, perhaps with minor
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changes or clarifications, should be applied to medium-duty gasoline vehicles using the driving
cycles and SHED-test procedures currently specified in 40 CFR Part 86 Subpart B. MECA
supports a compliance demonstration through a full vehicle emission testing and certification as
contained in Subpart B plus continuation of the manufacturers' certification option using the
compliance demonstration flexibility provided in 40 CFR §1037.103©. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0564, pp. 12-13]
14 40 CFR Part 1037.130, 1037.621, 1037.622.
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
EPA also proposes some changes related to evaporative emissions, including eliminating the
exemption of MDV incomplete vehicles from onboard refueling vapor recovery requirements.
NACAA supports the proposed changes and recommends that EPA also eliminate this exemption
for incomplete LDVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 6-7]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
AVE believes that refueling emission control technologies used for complete vehicles are
equally applicable to corresponding incomplete vehicles, and accordingly supports applying the
proposed refueling standards to all incomplete spark-ignition light-duty and medium-duty
vehicles starting with model year 2030.
CARB, MECA, and NACAA also support applying the proposed refueling standards to
incomplete light-duty and medium-duty incomplete vehicles. CARB, MECA, and NACAA
further emphasized that incomplete light-duty vehicles needed no separate treatment relative to
refueling emission standards.
MECA further supported applying a useful life of 15 years or 150,000 miles for the new
refueling standards to align with existing evaporative and refueling emission standards that apply
for other complete light-duty and medium-duty vehicles, and applying the same SHED-based
testing procedures that apply under 40 CFR part 86, subpart B. MECA also supported applying
the design-based option to demonstrate compliance with emission standards from 40 CFR
1037.103©.
Ingevity fully supports the proposed extension of the requirements for control of refueling
emissions to incomplete SI MDVs (i.e., 8,501-14,000 lb. GVWR) for the 2030 model year (MY),
but also suggests that EPA consider applying the ORVR standards for medium-duty vehicles
starting in model year 2028 or 2029 (based on the need to allow four years of lead time).
Ingevity supports keeping the option of a combined phase-in for medium-duty vehicles and
heavy-duty vehicles (above 14,000 pounds GVWR). Ingevity supports applying ORVR
standards to incomplete light-duty program vehicles and sees no issues with technical feasibility,
cost, in-use effectiveness, or safety. To avoid complications and the creation of inequities among
the manufacturers due to the differences in their product lines, Ingevity recommends that these
lighter vehicles be grouped within the certifications for their similar complete vehicles rather
than providing them the option to be grouped in with incomplete MDVs and incomplete HDVs
And accordingly specify the applicable model year. Ingevity stated that there should be no up-
front restriction on combining complete and incomplete SI MDVs in families, as long as
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manufacturers use good engineering judgment in creating families. At the same time, Ingevity
recognized that complete and incomplete SI HDV above 14,000 lbs. GVWR should not be
grouped into families with MDV. Ingevity recommends that EPA indicate in the preamble to the
final rule that refueling emission control requirements for incomplete SI MDVs apply in all 50
states.
Ingevity commented that EPA's system description and cost analysis is reasonable and
consistent with previous analyses for similar vehicles. Ingevity noted that the cost estimated did
not include markups that would allow for presenting costs as Retail Price Equivalent. Ingevity
also observed that fuel savings from containing refueling vapors would lead to a cost savings
from reduced fuel consumption, which would more than offset the up-front costs for an overall
net savings resulting from the new standards.
Response:
EPA appreciates the broad affirmation of the proposal to adopt refueling standards for
incomplete medium-duty vehicles. We are accordingly finalizing the standards as proposed,
including the specifications for useful life and test procedures.
We note that the design-based certification provisions in 40 CFR 1037.103© are limited to
vehicles above 14,000 pounds GVWR based on the limited facilities available to test those larger
vehicles. As a result, we are not applying that certification option for the vehicles at or below
14,000 pounds GVWR that are subject to the refueling standards in this final rule.
We proposed to apply the refueling standard starting in model year 2030 to meet the four-year
lead time requirement in the Clean Air Act. As we most commonly do, we proposed to apply the
new standards for the first full model year following that four-year reference point. Model year
2029 may start as early as January 2, 2028. Given that this rule is finalized in spring 2024, the
first full model year for setting standards is 2030. We are therefore finalizing, as proposed, the
requirement to meet the new refueling standards starting with model year 2030. We are
additionally finalizing, as proposed the alternative phase-in schedule based on combined
implementation for vehicles above and below 14,000 pounds GVWR.
As noted in the comments, the proposed rule included a request for comment on applying
refueling standards to incomplete light-duty vehicles and light-duty trucks. After more carefully
reviewing of the regulations, it became clear that refueling standards have applied for those
vehicles for many years. The regulatory text as adopted in the Tier 3 rulemaking stated: "Light-
duty vehicles, light-duty trucks, and complete heavy-duty vehicles must meet the refueling
emission standards in this paragraph (b) when measured over the procedure specified in
§ 86.150." (79 FR 23719, April 28, 2014) This establishes that the complete vs. incomplete
vehicle distinction applies only for heavy-duty vehicles. As a result, we are clarifying the
regulatory text in this final rule to describe the phase-in of the new refueling standards as
applying only for incomplete heavy-duty vehicles. The Tier 3 refueling requirements for
incomplete light-duty vehicles and light-duty trucks remain in place.
The provisions of 40 CFR 86.1821-01 describe how to divide vehicles into families based on
the characteristics of evaporative canister and other vehicle characteristics. There is no reference
to complete or incomplete vehicles, so that has not been and will not be relevant for combining
vehicles into families. Since complete and incomplete vehicles of any size would presumably
have the same or very similar emission control hardware and settings, those vehicles can be
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expected to be certified together in a single family. We modified those evaporative/refueling
family provisions recently to state clearly that vehicles above and below 14,000 pounds GVWR
should never be in the same family, regardless of any similarity in emission control hardware or
settings (88 FR 4479, January 24, 2023). EPA did not reopen this issue in this rulemaking, and
the existing requirements remain in place.
We expect all manufacturers to meet the new refueling standards and all requirements for
EPA certification for vehicles sold in all 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia and the
five U.S. territories named in the definition of "United States" in 40 CFR 1068.30.
EPA recognizes and appreciates the additional cost information provided by Ingevity. We
have adjusted the cost discussion in RIA Chapter 3.2.7 to indicate that the tabulated values do
not include a markup representative of Retail Price Equivalent values.
4.1.6 - Enrichment for power or component protection
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Ad Hoc Small OEM Group
3. COMMANDED ENRICHMENT AECD
EPA is proposing to eliminate the use of commanded enrichment as an AECD on engines
used in light-duty vehicles for either power or component protection during normal operation
and use. Normal operation is defined at 40 CFR 86.1803-01 to include vehicle speeds and grades
of public roads, and vehicle loading and towing within manufacturer recommendations, even if
the operation occurs infrequently. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 11-12]
EPA requests comment on the proposed prohibition of commanded enrichment including
benefits and costs, and additional exceptions where brief rich operation should be allowed. In
response, the Ad Hoc Group states as follows:
-Commanded enrichment should continue to be permitted for Small OEMs in high-
performance engines [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 11-12]
Small OEMs urge EPA to continue to allow commanded enrichment in high-performance
Small OEM engines beyond the limited, brief permissible circumstances permitted in the NPRM
based on the following considerations: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 11-12]
-Small OEM high-performance engines primarily use enrichment as a failure avoidance
strategy and it is not employed during 97% of normal driving (and remember that the number of
miles travelled during normal driving by Small OEM vehicles is drastically lower than the VMT
by the vehicles of large volume manufacturers). We emphasize that enrichment is essential to
protecting Small OEM high-performance engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 11-12]
-At present, there are no viable technical alternatives to enrichment for high-performance
engines (i.e., alternatives that are reasonable in cost and timeframe). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0563, pp.11-12]
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-Enrichment allows high-performance engines to be downsized and thereby made more
efficient [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 11-12]
-In sum, as regards Commanded Enrichment EPA should [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563,
pp.11-12]
-At a minimum, allow commanded enrichment on Small OEM vehicles meeting both of the
following two criteria: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 11-12]
-having a power-to-weight (mass) ratio clearly indicative of high-performance (e.g., > 200
kW/ton (based on curb weight)6, and also [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 11-12]
-using high-power output engines (e.g., engines > 100 ps (pferdestarke) per liter or > 600
hp).7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0563, pp. 11-12]
6 Determine a vehicle's power-to-weight ratio by dividing the engine's rated power by the vehicle's GVWR
(in hp/pound). If a test group includes multiple configurations, use the vehicle with the highest power-to-
weight ratio to characterize the test group
7 We also note that CARB does not have commanded enrichment rules like those proposed in the NPRM.
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Enrichment Prohibition Outright and Using US06 CO Standards
Automakers use enrichment only as needed, and its use must be reported as an auxiliary
emissions control device (AECD) during certification. EPA proposes to eliminate enrichment
both outright and by setting such stringent US06 CO standards that no vehicle could use
enrichment and meet the US06 CO standards even if allowed. Both changes lead to the same end
- elimination of enrichment. EPA errs in stating that it is no longer needed for component
protection. Under limited circumstances, enrichment is needed for component protection. The
alternative is to derate the engine and reduce the vehicle's capability, not by a small amount as
asserted by EPA, but by a large amount, which would have a profound impact on consumers.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 6]
EPA's enrichment proposal effectively prohibits modern, high specific output engines. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 6]
Manufacturers would need to either build a larger displacement engine that could provide the
capability needed by the vehicle, or the customer could just opt for a larger engine (if available).
Both cases result in higher overall GHG and criteria emissions to prevent minimal NMOG+NOx
and CO emission increases in limited circumstances. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 6]
I. Enrichment
EPA proposes to "eliminate commanded enrichment for ICE-powered vehicles for power and
component protection." 282 The proposed fuel enrichment restriction would apply to all Tier 4
certified gasoline spark ignition ICE vehicle applications. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
180-181]
282 NPRM at 29197. EPA asserts that during enrichment events, aftertreatment conversion efficiency
drops and hydrocarbon (HC) and carbon monoxide (CO) emissions can increase by 10-fold, or greater.283
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283 NPRM at 29277.
EPA claims:
Modern vehicles have sufficient power without the use of enrichment. . . The use of
enrichment only has the potential to incrementally increase power . . . [and] Technologies exist
that can prevent thermal damage of engine and/or exhaust system components without the use of
enrichment during normal operation and use.284 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 180-181]
284 NPRM at 29277.
And,
Modern engines have also added technologies such as VVT, cylinder deactivation, turbo
boost control and other technologies that effectively allow the manufacturer designed controls,
when used in conjunction with electronic throttle and transmission control to operate the engine
in nearly any manner they determine to be optimal for the customer and manufacturer drivability
expectations and durability goals. The agency believes that these same technologies, only
available in recent years, could also be used for limiting operation in areas described previously
as requiring enrichment that result in substantial increases in emission levels in normal operation
including high acceleration rates, high loads. The reasons for the original allowances for
enrichment discussed in the SFTP FRM can easily be addressed in modern engine and
transmissions by utilizing existing controls to limit or avoid operation in areas that require
enrichment for any normal vehicle operation.285 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 180-181]
285 DRIA at 3-45
Automakers use enrichment only as needed, and its use must be reported as an auxiliary
emissions control device (AECD) during certification. EPA errs in stating that it is no longer
needed for component protection. Under limited circumstances, enrichment is needed for
component protection. The alternative is to derate the engine and reduce the vehicle's capability,
not by a small amount as asserted by EPA, but by a large amount. EPA's enrichment proposal
effectively prohibits modern, high specific output engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
181]
Alternatively, manufacturers would need to either build a larger displacement engine that
could provide the capability needed by the vehicle, or the customer could just opt for a larger
engine (if available). Both cases result in higher GHG and criteria emissions all of the time to
prevent minimal NMOG + NOx emission increases in limited circumstances. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 181]
1. Concerns with EPA's Enrichment Proposal
a) Necessity of Enrichment for Modern High Specific Output Engines
EPA's assertion that modern vehicle design makes enrichment unnecessary is in error.
Although EPA describes several technologies that it believes can enable modern engines to
operate without enrichment, it provides no further technical basis for these claims besides its
general beliefs. These unsupported claims are particularly concerning given the broad range of
operation that EPA proposes to define as "normal"286 during which it proposes to generally
prohibit enrichment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 181]
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286 NPRM at 29415. (Proposed definition of normal operation to include "any operator demand that is
allowable for engine and vehicle calibrations that are available to the operator for vehicle operation within
the manufacturer's specifications fuel and load (GVWR and GCWR).
For naturally aspirated engines that are not thermally constrained, enrichment only
incrementally increases maximum torque and power by about 5%. However, most naturally
aspirated engines are thermally constrained and require enrichment for component protection due
to their high specific output. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 181]
Moreover, manufacturers have generally responded to the increasing stringency of GHG and
CAFE regulations by adopting downsized and boosted engines to reduce pumping losses at part
load. These improvements are achieved by operating an engine at very high specific output, and
thus rely on enrichment to control exhaust temperatures and protect engine and exhaust system
components from damage. Additionally, in these modern engines, enrichment is necessary to
cool the combustion chamber and control abnormal combustion such as knock and pre-ignition.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 181-182]
EPA describes that the powertrain control system can be used to limit or avoid operation that
requires enrichment during any normal vehicle operation. While it is true that the powertrain
control system determines the operating state of an engine, it is only in response to the driver
demand (accelerator pedal). If the driver floors the pedal, then the driver is demanding the
maximum power output from the engine. As the exhaust heats up during this maneuver, it
reaches a thermal limit due to material durability of various components, and enrichment is used
to maintain the exhaust temperature at the thermal limit. The risk of knock or pre-ignition also
increases under these conditions. Without enrichment, the engine control system would have to
reduce mass flow through a reduction in boost and/or by closing the throttle to control the
exhaust temperature to avoid damaging components. Reducing boost and/or closing the throttle
reduces the power output of the engine. Knock and pre-ignition are controlled by retarding spark
advance, which also decreases power output and has the additional effect of adding even more
heat to the exhaust system. Due to these factors, high specific output engines without enrichment
would experience 30-50% power loss when controlling exhaust temperatures. Such a large
power reduction would not satisfy customer requirements, and could potentially impact safety in
real-world driving situations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 181-182]
EPA bases its claims of enrichment's minimal impact on power and torque on the study of
one large, 6.4 liter heavy-duty naturally aspirated engine.287 EPA has not provided data on any
modern, downsized and boosted engines to support its contention that enrichment only
incrementally increases torque / power by 5%. The projected 5% impact on power does not
reflect the potential loss of power for these types of engines, which could far exceed 5%.[EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 182]
287 DRIA at 3-47.
b) Market Concerns
The premise that "Modern vehicles have sufficient power without the use of enrichment"288
is highly subjective and ultimately decided by the customer and their increasing demand for
vehicle utility. Such a broad declaration gives the impression that EPA believes that vehicle
utility has reached a practical zenith or that any incremental utility can and should now be
capped in order to facilitate a new, narrow emissions reduction strategy through the elimination
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of enrichment. This is in contrast with EPA's historical practice of setting performance-based
standards that generally assume at least maintaining current levels of performance (i.e., not
negatively affecting a vehicle's utility). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 182-183]
288 NPRM at 68.
New vehicle purchasers generally desire increased vehicle features, including power, not less.
Power, and the enhanced utility and driving dynamics it enables, are core customer-demanded
functional attributes of a vehicle and engine combination. The preference of customers for
improved features transcends all price points and vehicle segments. New vehicle purchasers
consistently raise the bar on what they decide to be sufficient. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 182-183]
In the past, customers who sought greater vehicle utility or higher performance did so through
selection of optional engines with greater displacement. However, industry, driven in part by
GHG and fuel economy regulations, has developed entire families of downsized engines that
have proven capable of meeting customer demands for power while simultaneously increasing
efficiency and lowering GHG emissions. This is exactly the strategy that EPA previously
identified as the technological pathway to meeting increasingly stringent GHG emissions
regulations while maintaining existing performance levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
183]
Enrichment is a critical strategy that has enabled this technological shift to lower
displacement engines, ensuring their safe and durable operation in transient high-power demand
situations. Manufacturers use enrichment to ensure that when customers demand high power,
they can do so without the risk of costly damage or interrupted performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 183]
Customer needs for power include, but are not limited to, the ability to tow a large trailer up
an occasional steep grade, to operate the vehicle with a full load of passengers and cargo, and to
rapidly accelerate on a short freeway entrance ramp to safely merge into traffic. Other customers,
for example those purchasing supercars, expect superior performance and racetrack i. In each
case, the power requirement from the engine depends on the customer's usage, and if its
"sufficient power" is inadequate to accomplish their task, then the customer may be exposed to
potentially unsafe and inadequate operation and will be dissatisfied with their vehicle's utility. A
sudden reduction or interruption of power in the midst of a driving maneuver (e.g., passing on a
grade) could be disruptive to the driver and confusing to other drivers. In some cases, this may
create an unsafe traffic condition if the vehicle suddenly loses power, forcing other drivers to
take evasive actions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 183]
Customers who seek specific power levels and are dissatisfied with the reduced power of
downsized engines due to prohibitions on enrichment would likely revert to seeking out higher
displacement engines or shift into larger vehicle segments. Worse yet, customers may simply
reject new offerings and remain in older vehicles longer, further increasing the rising average age
of vehicles on the road and delaying rollouts of other technologies. Any of these outcomes would
detract from achieving the agency's overall goals of reduced emissions and improved fuel
economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 183]
c) De Minimis Emissions Impact of Enrichment
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Although CO emissions increase during fuel enrichment due to the physics of three-way
catalyst chemistry, this operation is infrequent and only occurs when high load capability is
needed. (For example, maintaining minimum safe speeds when towing up steep grades to avoid
damaging components.) These events make up a relatively small portion of on-road use and are
typically short in duration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 184-185]
EPA has not provided any event and time-weighted analysis of the overall emissions impact
of generally prohibiting enrichment to justify its proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
184-185]
The following data in Figure 67 provides a sample for real-world driving conditions from a
limited test program conducted by a member company on a set of European vehicles operating
under a mix of normal driving conditions, including high-speed highway operation and
occasional towing. The data, details of which will be provided by the member company under
confidential submission, provides estimated cumulative duration of travel at different engine
operating conditions. This sample data indicates that for the vast majority of conditions
encountered in on-road use, enrichment is used infrequently and for only a short duration. This
sample dataset indicates that the cumulative time in the operating zone of this particular vehicle
where enrichment may occur is much less than 0.1% in total. This specific example included
over 4500 instrumented vehicles and over 370,000 individual trips. While representative of
European driving conditions, Auto Innovators contends that a similar pattern would likely be
exhibited in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 184-185]
[See original attachment for Figure 67: Example of limited use of enrichment in on-road
operation.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 184-185]
Also, in general, carbon monoxide emissions are no longer the concern that they once were.
There are currently no areas in non-attainment with National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
CO.289 This is, in part, a testament to the efficacy of modern vehicle emission control systems
including when enrichment is allowed as an auxiliary emission control device. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 184-185]
289 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Green Book Carbon Monoxide (1971) Area Information,
available at https://www.epa.gov/green-book/green-book-carbon-monoxide-1971-area-information
(retrieved June 1, 2023).
2. Recommendations on Enrichment
Auto Innovators opposes the proposal to broadly eliminate enrichment and believes that
EPA's proposal could reverse the holistic environmental and energy success we have achieved in
customer adoption of downsized engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 185-186]
As noted throughout these comments, the projected increases in vehicle electrification will
deliver the bulk of the pollutant reductions being sought by EPA. The majority of the benefits
achieved will be from the phasedown of ICE vehicles. Enrichment may appear to provide a
narrow pathway for incremental gains, but as Auto Innovators has outlined above, these potential
gains may disrupt other holistic gains from downsized engines overall. Benefits would likely be
very small relative to the disruption this could pose in the phasedown of ICE powertrains. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 185-186]
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Auto Innovators recommends that EPA leverage the existing AECD process to continue the
dialogue with OEMs on concerns with enrichment. The AECD process already includes agency
review of the need for controls such as commanded power and thermal protection enrichment.
We recommend that EPA continue to use the existing AECD process to review strategies with
OEMs and that EPA not finalize the elimination of enrichment as proposed in the NPRM. In
order for enrichment to be managed through the AECD process, the proposed CO standards will
also require adjustment as they also serve as a de facto enrichment ban. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.185-186]
To the extent that additional data could be helpful in informing EPA it of enrichment in the
future, we recommend EPA convene a stakeholder group to review options that could be used to
gather data. Data on a broad range of vehicles could be used to better understand the actual real-
world impact of enrichment on emissions, including the frequency of AECD commanded fuel
enrichment. This process, conducted over a range of driving conditions and engine types, could
serve as a basis for a future proposal. Once the data is collected and analyzed, then EPA could
better determine if there is a need (or not) to address enrichment in a future regulatory
rulemaking. Without such data, it is difficult to understand the opportunity for reduction that can
then be weighed against the implementation challenges. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
185-186]
Auto Innovators wants to ensure that while the transition to electric vehicles is ongoing,
customers of ICE vehicles continue to experience the benefits of high specific power engines and
not be forced to reconsider their purchase decisions should future options no longer meet their
utility needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 185-186]
3. Recommendations on the Definition of "Normal Operation"
Auto Innovators has significant reservations about EPA's proposal to generally prohibit
enrichment. However, if EPA does finalize such provisions, it should revise the definition of
"normal operation" to be workable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 185-186]
The text at the proposed 40 C.F.R. § 86.1809-12(d)(l) defines "normal operation" to include
all operating conditions of a vehicle such as trailer tow, altitude and ambient conditions. Also,
the proposal requires similar effectiveness in emission control compared to the levels
demonstrated in the test cycles (or that the vehicle design does not incorporate strategies that
unnecessarily reduce emission control effectiveness exhibited during the certification test
procedures). This is not feasible because the demonstrated test cycle conditions operate at
different mass flow and temperatures which affects the space velocity or residence time of the
species in the converter which in turn affects the conversion efficiency or effectiveness of the
emission control system. Hence, maintaining similar effectiveness under all operating conditions
is not practical from an emissions control perspective. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
185-186]
We recommend that EPA modify the proposed 40 C.F.R. § 86.1809-12(d)(l) text as follows:
The manufacturer must show to EPA's satisfaction that the vehicle design does not
incorporate strategies that unnecessarily reduce emission control effectiveness exhibited during
the certification test procedures specified in this subpart, the fuel economy test procedures in 40
CFR part 600, or the air conditioning efficiency test in 40 CFR 1066.845, when the vehicle is
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operated under conditions that may reasonably be expected to be encountered in normal
operation and use, unless allowed as an AECD. During normal operation, operating at
stoichiometry or near stoichiometric conditions should not be considered as reducing the
effectiveness of the emissions control system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 186-187]
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Further, there appears to be a disconnect between the agency's position on PM stringency and
commanded enrichment. GPF regeneration will be necessary to avoid damage to the engine and
exhaust system. While passive regeneration can occur under certain high load conditions, in
many cases it will not occur under lighter load operation. The agency itself acknowledges that no
significant passive regeneration would occur during -7°C FTP and 25°C FTP cycles, and that a
US06 test cycle would be required to reach the necessary 600°C temperature needed for passive
regeneration.23 Consumers who generally operate their vehicles under lighter load conditions
would likely need some degree of active regeneration. Unfortunately, by proposing to disallow
commanded enrichment for the purpose of engine and aftertreatment protection, the agency has
effectively prohibited active regeneration. Other potential strategies such as spark retard and air
fuel ratio modulation have been examined as potential solutions, but the technical effectiveness
of those approaches remains inadequate.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 14-15]
23 88 Fed. Reg. 29267 (May 5, 2023)
24 Van Nieuwstadt, et al., 2019. Regeneration Strategies for Gasoline Particulate Filters. SAE 2019-01-
0969.
D. Enrichment
One of the more surprising elements included in the NPRM is the agency's proposed
elimination of commanded enrichment for ICE-powered vehicles for power and component
protection. By our read, three high-level arguments are posited by the agency in support of this
position:
1. "Technologies exist that can prevent thermal damage of engine and/or exhaust system
components without the use of enrichment during normal operation and use" [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0652, pp. 19-20]
2. "The use of enrichment only has the potential to incrementally increase power" [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 19-20]
3. "Modern vehicles have sufficient power without the use of enrichment"37 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 19-20]
37 88 Fed. Reg. 29277 (May 5, 2023).
While Honda respects the agency's desire to minimize excess criteria emissions, we believe
the arguments put forth by the agency on this topic are not sufficiently supported. As such, we
believe the enrichment-related aspect of the proposal should be omitted from the Final Rule and
reconsidered at a future date pending additional supporting evidence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0652, pp. 19-20]
Argument #1. Technologies exist that prevent the need for such enrichment [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0652, p. 20]
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EPA addresses this point in the Draft RIA:
Technologies exist today which can prevent thermal damage of exhaust system components
without the use of commanded enrichment during normal operation and use, and modern
vehicles have sufficient power without the use of commanded enrichment. The use of
commanded enrichment only has the potential to increase power by approximately 5 percent on
a naturally aspirated engine but significantly reduces the effectiveness of three-way catalytic
converter systems, resulting in increases of NMOG, CO and air toxics, in some cases by orders
of magnitude.3 8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 20]
38 EPA, 2023. Draft RIA, p. 3-46. Available online at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
The agency's subsequent elaboration on these technologies, however, simply points to
"modern engine technologies" and cites examples such as VVT and cylinder deactivation as
providing sufficient control "to limit or avoid operation in areas that require enrichment for any
normal vehicle operation"39: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 20]
39 EPA, 2023. Draft RIA, p. 3-45. Available online at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
Modern engines have also added technologies such as VVT, cylinder deactivation, turbo
boost control and other technologies that effectively allow the manufacturer designed controls,
when used in conjunction with electronic throttle and transmission control to operate the engine
in nearly any manner they determine to be optimal for the customer and manufacturer drivability
expectations and durability goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 20]
The agency believes that these same technologies, only available in recent years, could also
be used for limiting operation in areas described previously as requiring enrichment that result in
substantial increases in emission levels in normal operation including high acceleration rates,
high loads. The reasons for the original allowances for enrichment discussed in the SFTP
FRM can easily be addressed in modern engine and transmissions by utilizing existing controls
to limit or avoid operation in areas that require enrichment for any normal vehicle operation.
Vehicles can "drive" through these areas but quickly exit by changing the engine airflow control,
ignition timing, valvetrain settings, speed, or other parameters that would avoid this unnecessary
increase in emissions.40 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 20]
40 EPA, 2023. Draft RIA, p. 3-45. Available online at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
The agency provides no technical research or real-world examples to support the position that
customer and manufacturer drivability expectations and durability goals can be maintained while
"driving through" problematic areas of the engine map. Automakers have spent years refining
and finessing internal combustion engine performance to deliver today's drivers a satisfying and
compelling product; the insinuation that automakers have willfully been eschewing potential
emissions reductions and fuel savings is illogical and wholly inconsistent with our commitment
to the customer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 20-21]
As an example, Honda's cylinder deactivation systems can only activate in conditions with
reduced engine output demand, due to having fewer firing cylinders. Enrichment during high
load is used during conditions when the vehicle requests higher engine output demand. It is
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therefore impossible to use cylinder deactivation to operate in the same conditions as when
enrichment is demanded. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 20-21]
Additionally, Honda's cylinder deactivation may or may not reduce the catalytic converter
temperatures, depending on the engine operating conditions. It is therefore not a robust method
to control exhaust temperatures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 20-21]
Argument #2. The use of enrichment only has the potential to incrementally increase power
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 21]
The agency claims that "the use of commanded enrichment only has the potential to increase
power by approximately 5 percent on a naturally aspirated engine,"41 citing, as proof, an
analysis conducted for the recently finalized 2027 and later heavy-duty vehicle and engine
standards. As we understand it, that analysis utilized a single 6.4L heavy duty engine, hardly
representative of today's passenger car and light duty truck fleet as a whole. To our knowledge,
EPA did not examine the peak power loss that would occur in smaller naturally aspirated and/or
downsized turbocharged designs that are more reflective of today's passenger car and light truck
market. As noted in comments submitted to this Docket by our trade association, today's engines
could lose roughly 30-50% of peak power as a result of enrichment elimination. While results
would of course vary, the range provided by Auto Innovators is generally consistent with our
engineering understanding. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 21]
41 EPA, 2023. Draft RIA, p. 3-45. Available online at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
Argument #3. Modern vehicles have sufficient power without the use of enrichment [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 21-22]
The definition of "sufficient" is highly subjective and, as such, is difficult to either prove or
disprove. In our view, the agency's rationale supporting Argument #3 is lacking. Although
commanded enrichment for the purpose of power and component protection occurs relatively
infrequently on Honda products, it does occur and therefore reflects a genuine need for at least a
portion of our customers - be it power for towing, a temporary need for urgent acceleration, or
other customer applications. Honda has taken great care in right-sizing our powertrains to
provide the best balance of efficiency, customer drivability expectations/requirements and
regulatory compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 21-22]
Should commanded enrichment be eliminated as proposed, a paradoxical but logical outcome
of that decision could be that - to ensure continued performance associated with those
customers' needs - application of a larger, less efficient internal combustion engine is deemed
warranted. The agency's proposed handling of enrichment is unnecessarily disruptive and, as
such, we recommend that EPA maintain the current AECD process to ensure emissions system
effectiveness, durability and fundamental vehicle utility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp.
21-22]
Recommendation: Omit proposed changes regarding commanded enrichment from the Final
Rule and reconsider them at a future date pending additional supporting evidence. Maintain the
current AECD process to ensure emissions system durability and fundamental vehicle
utility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 22]
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Organization: Aston Martin Lagonda (AML)
3. COMMANDED ENRICHMENT AECD
EPA is proposing to eliminate the use of commanded enrichment as an AECD on engines
used in light-duty vehicles for either power or component protection during normal operation
and use. Normal operation is defined at 40 CFR 86.1803-01 to include vehicle speeds and grades
of public roads, and vehicle loading and towing within manufacturer recommendations, even if
the operation occurs infrequently. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 10-11]
EPA requests comment on the proposed prohibition of commanded enrichment including
benefits and costs, and additional exceptions where brief rich operation should be allowed.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 10-11]
Commanded enrichment should continue to be permitted for SVMs in high
performance engines We urge EPA to continue to allow commanded enrichment in high
performance SVM engines beyond the limited, brief permissible circumstances permitted in the
NPRM based on the following considerations: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 10-11]
Aston Martin high performance engines use enrichment as a failure avoidance
strategy and it is therefore employed only in extreme circumstances, accounting for as little as
3% of all normal driving. Aston Martin can provide its EU findings on the subject of enrichment
to EPA, if required. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 10-11]
At present, there are no viable technical solutions for alternatives to
enrichment for high performance engines (i.e., alternatives that are reasonable in cost and
timeframe). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 10-11]
Enrichment allows high-performance engines to be downsized and thereby
made more efficient. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 10-11]
To conclude, as regards Commanded Enrichment EPA should: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0566, pp. 10-11]
• At a minimum, allow commanded enrichment on SVM vehicles meeting both of the
following two criteria: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 10-11]
having a power-to-weight (mass) ratio clearly indicative of high-performance
(e.g.,> 200 kW/tonne (based on curb weight),3 and also [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp.
10-11]
using high-power output engines (e.g., engines> 100 hp per liter or> 600 hp).4
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566, pp. 10-11]
3 Determine a vehicle's power-to-weight ratio by dividing the engine's rated power by the vehicle's GVWR
(in hp/pound). If a test group includes multiple configurations, use the vehicle with the highest power-to-
weight ratio to characterize the test group
4 We also note that CARB does not have commanded enrichment rules like those proposed in the NPRM
[See original attachment for table of engine descriptions] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0566,
pp. 10-11]
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Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Criteria Air Pollutant Standards
CARB supports U.S. EPA's proposal to tighten criteria air pollutant emission standards,
particularly given the continued role that internal combustion engine vehicles will play in the
national fleet over the regulatory timeframe and beyond. Reducing exposure to harmful air
pollution is a key element of the proposed standards, and the proposals to tighten criteria air
pollutant emissions are needed to protect public health, especially in communities with
disproportionate exposure to air pollution. Because U.S. EPA's proposal does not require ZEV
sales, as California's rules do, the tightening of criteria air pollutant emission standards is even
more critical to ensure that the internal combustion engine vehicles that will continue to be sold
are becoming cleaner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 26-27]
As part of its ACC II rulemaking, CARB adopted its fourth iteration of its Low Emission
Vehicle (LEV) standards, referred to as LEV IV. CARB finds that U.S. EPA's proposals are
appropriate and largely consistent with the LEV IV standards. CARB has documented our
analysis and recommends strengthening the proposal to realize the greatest degree of emission
reductions achievable, considering cost and technology availability, to further protect public
health. As described further below, CARB recommends that U.S. EPA adopt its proposed
NMOG+NOx and PM standards, adopt elements of CARB's evaporative emission standards
program, and eliminate the use of commanded enrichment as proposed while collecting
additional information on the use of auxiliary emissions control devices to further improve
emission standards in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 26-27]
Commanded Enrichment
U.S. EPA requested comment on eliminating commanded enrichment for vehicles with
engines for power and component protection. Commanded enrichment involves control of the
fuel system to achieve a richer air fuel ratio mixture during combustion and in the exhaust stream
for various desired outcomes that may include increased engine output power, decreased exhaust
temperature, or a different composition of unburned fuel or oxygen in the exhaust stream. Most
current vehicles incorporate auxiliary emission control devices (AECD) that utilize enrichment
for the purpose of protecting components in the exhaust system from thermal damage during
specific driving and ambient conditions that can occur in some routinely encountered in-use
conditions. Some vehicles incorporate similar strategies for the purpose of increasing the power
output of the engine under specific driving conditions. Such strategies significantly reduce the
effectiveness of the aftertreatment system during their operation and cause significantly
increased tailpipe emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 37-38]
CARB agrees with U.S. EPA's findings that the need for enrichment to temporarily boost
engine power levels is no longer necessary given the state of electronic controls and advanced
powertrains such as turbocharged engines, variable valve timing and lift systems, and advanced
multi-speed transmissions that have allowed manufacturers to introduce vehicles with higher
power levels and performance than ever before. CARB also agrees the elimination of enrichment
for engine component protection would better ensure that manufacturers, despite U.S. EPA and
CARB prohibitions, are not using such strategies to protect frail designs in lieu of using more
robust components that can better withstand the temperatures and exhaust environment. Even
with full disclosure by manufacturers at the time of certification, AECDs that result in
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enrichment can utilize a complex set of enabling criteria that make it difficult to review and
assess the likely frequency and duration of activation during in-use vehicle operation. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 37-38]
CARB supports U.S. EPA's proposal to eliminate the allowance of the use of commanded
enrichment as an AECD on spark ignition engines used in light- and medium-duty vehicles for
either power or component protection during normal operation and use. CARB also agrees with
U.S. EPA that the use of frequent or prolonged enrichment can significantly increase tailpipe
emissions to levels far above the emission standards and the current approach of relying on U.S.
EPA (and CARB) staff review to identify strategies that are being used in lieu of appropriate
robust emission controls is insufficient to catch all of the inappropriate implementations.
Because of this issue, CARB recommends that U.S. EPA require standardized data to be stored
onboard vehicles to track AECD activation that adversely impacts emissions so that the agency
will be better informed as to the frequency, duration, and cumulative emission impact of such
strategies even beyond those that trigger enrichment for component protection. Manufacturer-
required collection and reporting of such data to the agency could also better ensure that all
manufacturers are being held to a more consistent implementation and enable U.S. EPA to
consider alternative regulatory approaches in the future such as setting maximum allowable
activation limits for AECDs of concern. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 37-38]
Organization: Ferrari N. V. and Ferrari North America, Inc.
FERRARI POSITION
Among the new requirements introduced in EPA's proposal, Ferrari identified the following
main challenges. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 4-5]
Fuel Enrichment Ban
EPA proposes to eliminate commanded enrichment for ICE-powered vehicles for component
protection or power increase in any driving condition, considering it unnecessary for modern
vehicles. However, Ferrari is deeply concerned by this statement, especially given the wide range
of operation that EPA proposes to define as "normal". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 4-5]
The necessity of the enrichment strategy is strictly dependent on the driver power demand
(e.g. towing conditions, rapid acceleration for safety purpose), aggressiveness of the driver (e.g.
aggressive acceleration) and vehicle capabilities. Moreover, to address stricter GHG and CAFE
Regulations, there has been a trend over the years to downsize and boost engines to reduce
pumping losses. These improvements are achieved by operating an engine at very high specific
output, relying on enrichment to control exhaust temperatures and protect engine and exhaust
system components from damage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 4-5]
This is even more true for high-performance vehicles with track capabilities. Our vehicles are
designed to reach clients racetrack expectations to preserve Ferrari DNA, resulting in a very
limited use well beyond the restrictions of the US Highway Code. Under these circumstances,
the proposed ban of enrichment as protection strategy would inevitably lead to increased exhaust
gas temperatures that would severely damage and compromise the engine and related emission
control system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 4-5]
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Therefore, Ferrari suggests maintaining the current Auxiliary Emission Control Device
(AECD) approach that leaves room for discussion on the need for enrichment as protection
strategy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Second, to ensure the final rule does not go too far and too fast, especially in 2027 - 2029, the
EPA should adjust two aspects of the proposal regarding criteria emissions: fuel enrichment and
particulate matter testing obligations. Although fuel enrichment can lead to higher emissions
during brief and infrequent conditions which are disclosed to the EPA, fuel enrichment has been
critical for overall emissions reductions. The practice enables automakers to downsize engines
while also meeting consumer needs for some of the toughest jobs, without compromising
powertrain durability. Removing fuel enrichment, as EPA has proposed, will directly impact
customers' acceptance of new products, especially trucks, and they may keep their existing
vehicle longer or opt for a larger (i.e., higher emitting) vehicle to be sure they can get the job
done. Major powertrain redesigns would be needed to recover this lost utility, and these are not
possible within the timeframe defined by the enrichment phase-out proposed by EPA. Next,
although Ford supports aspects of EPA's proposed particulate matter (PM) standards which will
necessitate the use of gasoline particulate filters, the proposed PM standard will challenge
current laboratory equipment and procedures. Ford requests that the EPA eliminate the need to
measure PM on the -7°C FTP for vehicles that are equipped with gasoline particulate
filters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 3]
Light- and Medium-Duty Fuel Enrichment [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 12-13]
EPA is proposing to eliminate commanded enrichment for ICE-powered vehicles for power
and component protection. Fuel enrichment protects engine components during infrequent and/or
short duration high-power demand events, such as freeway on-ramps or towing on steep grades.
The ability to employ limited commanded enrichment has allowed downsized engines to meet
customer performance demands across a broad range of real-world driving condition, resulting in
considerable C02 savings. If left unmitigated, the elimination of commanded enrichment would
result in performance degradations that would be unacceptable to most customers, forcing many
to retain older models or to upgrade to larger, more capable vehicle classes. Either result would
run counter to EPA's intention to reduce on-road emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605,
pp. 12-13]
In order to meet customer needs without enrichment, Ford will need to implement expensive,
long-lead time engine development actions, such as increasing component sizes (turbos and heat
exchangers) and adding more expensive engine and manifold materials. Under the EPA proposal,
this would need to be accomplished and during a timeframe when we are already stretching our
capital and engineering resources to their limits in order to transition to electrification. The
proposal would also not provide the lead-time needed to undertake such engine redesign
programs. For these reasons, Ford does not consider the proposed phase-in for the enrichment
prohibition to be feasible. For recommends that EPA shift the phase-in requirements to at least
2029MY for vehicles below 6,0001b GVWR. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 12-13]
[See original comment for Table 2: Ford Recommended Enrichment Phase-in] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 12-13]
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Regarding EPA's proposed enrichment exception allowances under 40 CFR 86.1811-
17(d)(2), Ford requests that EPA include the following additional conditions to account for
sporadic pre- ignition and other potential future technologies that may be deemed acceptable for
agency approval through the AECD review process: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 12-
13]
- Temporary and infrequent enrichment following sporadic pre-ignition events (used to
prevent follow-on events which are prone to causing engine damage), [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0605, pp.12-13]
- Enrichment conditions substantially demonstrated during emissions testing, or [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 12-13]
- Enrichment conditions otherwise approved by the EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605,
pp. 12-13]
Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI)
HMG opposes removal of commanded enrichment as an AECD [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0554, p. 3]
EPA is proposing to eliminate the allowance of commanded enrichment as an AECD on spark
ignition engines used in light-duty vehicles (LDV) and medium-duty vehicles (MDV) for either
power or component protection during normal operation and use. Normal operation is defined at
40 CFR § 86.1803-01 to include vehicle speeds and grades of public roads and vehicle loading
and towing within manufacturer recommendations, even if the operation occurs infrequently.
Commanded enrichment includes lean best torque enrichment. EPA requested comment on the
proposed prohibition of commanded enrichment as an AECD, including analyses of benefits and
costs, and additional exceptions where brief rich operation should be allowed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0554, p.3]
HMG supports AFAI's public comment position to oppose enrichment prohibitions in the
Proposed Rule. HMG appreciates the current Tier 3 enrichment exceptions allowed by the EPA
and asks that all be included in the final rule. HMG believes EPA's proposed enrichment
prohibitions will require the diversion of resources and time that would be better invested in the
long-term goal of deploying 100% ZEVs in exchange for little short-term gain [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0554, p.3]
HMG believes exceptions for enrichment are needed for consumer-requested performance
and vehicle component protection because excessive exhaust temperatures quickly damage the
after-treatment system. The catalyst and sensors are critical for maintaining effective emission
control shift conditions , pre ignition conditions, and excessive ignition timing retarding due to
fuel condition. The shift conditions mentioned earlier refer to specific safety and performance
conditions, including terrain, snow, towing, and climbing grades. During shifting and engine
torque reduction, there is a concern about a rapid increase in exhaust temperature by retarding
the ignition timing. Accordingly, HMG recommends the following specific exceptions: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 3]
For the shift conditions, engine torque should be adjusted to reduce shift shock. In this case,
ignition timing is retarded/adjusted to around 20-25 degrees for a fast response. The exhaust
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temperature rises by this control, and in order to prevent this, there is more fuel injected when
the ignition timing is over delayed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 3]
Pre-ignition can damage an engine very quickly. When the knock sensor detects vibrations
caused by pre ignition, additional fuel is injected as a countermeasure. This enrichment lowers
temperature in the combustion chamber and stops the pre-ignition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0554, p. 3]
The vehicle monitors for low-quality and low-octane fuel because it can easily cause
knocking across the engine operating range. To prevent this, the timing is retarded, which
increases exhaust temperature. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 3]
Enrichment is used to counteract the rising temperature [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p.
3]
The EU has several upcoming regulations with enrichment provisions to be passed within the
next few years, including Euro-6e (2024) and Euro 7 (2025). Euro-6e limits enrichment but
allows for several exceptions including towing, uphill, and at very high speeds. Euro-7
eliminates enrichment completely with no exceptions, which more closely aligns with Tier-4.
HMG is currently focused on meeting Euro- 6e. Further, compliance with EU regulations cannot
be directly compared to Tier 4 given the difference between the EU and U.S. markets . R&D
efforts and cost spent to meet Euro-6e or 7 cannot be used to justify Tier 4's elimination of
enrichment because the Euro-6e engines being developed more closely align with Tier 3
requirements for enrichment, and thus would not be compliant with Tier 4. The Euro-7 engines
to be developed will also not be transferable as the European market does not have the larger
engines demanded by the U.S. market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, pp. 3-4]
The Tier 4 proposed elimination of enrichment would also require a large amount of R&D,
specific to the U.S. market and ICE vehicles. These added costs and resources will only result in
potential short-term gain given the overall drive to ZEV development, and deployment and will
undoubtedly impact the funding and resources available for ZEV development. HMG's goal is to
prioritize ZEV development, but the proposed Tier 4 requirements will require sharing resources
and funding between ICE and ZEVs, which will slow the ability to develop the long-term
technologies necessary to fully transition to ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, pp. 3-4]
Additionally, if the enrichment prohibitions are finalized, Tier 4's proposed durability
requirements will be difficult to meet because enrichment is an important part of component
protection. The Tier 4 proposed durability requirements for electric powertrain components and
major emission control components is 8 years/100,000 miles. Component protection is needed to
maintain integrity of after treatment hardware. Indeed, this is one of the main benefits of
enrichment. Without additional enrichment exceptions, there are certain situations that will
damage the catalyst, making it difficult for the vehicle to reach 100,000 miles before there are
unnecessary costs associated with repairs and warranty claims. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0554, p. 4]
HMG supports AFAl's public comment position to oppose new enrichment prohibitions.
HMG believes the proposed enrichment prohibitions would necessitate a large manufacturing
investment, completely re-organizing new engine development, and result in rising costs that are
not beneficial to our customers or the ultimate goal of 100% ZEV deployment. HMG also
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supports AFAl's recommendation to maintain the current AECD process to ensure emissions
system durability, safe vehicle operation, and fundamental vehicle utility demanded by
customers . HMG agrees with AFAl's recommendation that EPA gather data across a broad
range of vehicles covered by this regulation to better understand the actual real-world impact on
emissions and purported benefits, including the frequency of AECD commanded fuel
enrichment. In addition, HMG believes it is necessary to set clear criteria for detailed test
conditions about enrichment restriction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 4]
Organization: Kia Corporation
- Kia supports EPA continuing to allow Auxiliary Emission Control Devices (AECDs) for
enrichment to satisfy our customers' requirements and maintain vehicle utility.4 Kia does not
support EPA's proposal to eliminate commanded enrichment for ICE-powered vehicles for
power and component protection. Elimination of enrichment will require a large amount of
research and development specific to ICE vehicles in the U.S. market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0555, p. 3]
4 88 Fed. Reg. 29,258.
Kia Supports Continuing to Allow Auxiliary Emission Control Devices
Kia does not support EPA's proposal to eliminate commanded enrichment for ICE-powered
vehicles for power and component protection. Elimination of enrichment will require a large
amount of research and development specific to ICE vehicles in the U.S. market. EPA must
allow automakers to focus resources on the transition to EVs, not incremental emissions
improvement to ICE vehicles. Kia proposes that the EPA continue to allow Auxiliary Emission
Control Devices (AECDs) for enrichment to satisfy our customers' requirements and maintain
vehicle utility.20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 12]
20 88 Fed. Reg. 29,258.
There are specific driving circumstances that enrichment is still needed for component
protection such as challenging terrain or snow mode operation, automakers use enrichment only
as needed and it is always reported as an AECD during certification. The conflicting need for
higher efficiency and lower emissions comes as consumer demand for towing remains
unchanged. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 12]
Kia is concerned that derating the engine's performance in high load operations will prolong
the use of older, less efficient, and higher emitting GHG and criteria emissions vehicles. Further,
EPA's proposed prohibition on enrichment would encourage automakers to build larger
displacement engines that could provide the capability needed by the vehicle, or the customer
could just opt for a larger engine. This would be counterproductive as it could increase GHG and
criteria emissions just to prevent minimal NMOG+NOx emission increases in limited
circumstances. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 12]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
Criteria
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Mazda anticipated some changes to EPA's light duty vehicle criteria emissions (i.e., NMOG,
CO, NOx, PM) requirements, particularly to align with the new changes in the California Air
Resources Board's (CARB) recent Advanced Clean Cars II regulation. However, we did not
expect two of the new requirements included in the proposal: the reduction of the PM standard to
0.5 mg/mile, and the ban of enrichment during normal engine operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0595, p. 3]
Reducing the PM standard to 0.5 mg/mile is excessive. There was already considerable
difficulty and effort put into meeting CARB's planned lmg/mile PM standard, and there is still
uncertainty that the 0.5 mg/mile standard will be measurable using current laboratory
technology. It will also make it necessary to have all vehicles equipped with Gasoline Particulate
Filters (GPF) and the resulting cost and development resources that come with new hardware.
CARB evaluated the PM standards in its ACC II regulation and only reduced them to 1 mg/mile
for the US06 cycle. While GPFs are required in some other markets, CARB set the standards
with the intention that they would only be necessary for some limited cases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0595, p.3]
The enrichment ban will significantly impact the power and robustness of current internal
combustion engines and Mazda strongly opposes it. This could force manufacturers such as
Mazda to develop new engine designs, or to eliminate certain powertrain or vehicle designs
entirely, making it even more difficult to remain profitable at a time when exceptional
investment is needed to fuel the transition to EVs and to satisfy consumer needs. Controlling
unnecessary or excessive enrichment is already sufficiently covered by EPA's existing AECD
certification processes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, p. 3]
Organization: Mclaren Automotive, McLaren Group
Enrichment
EPA is proposing to eliminate the use of commanded enrichment as an AECD on engines
used in light-duty vehicles for either power or component protection during normal operation
and use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, pp. 4-5]
We appreciated the EPA requesting comment on the proposed prohibition of commanded
enrichment including benefits and costs, and additional exceptions where brief rich operation
should be allowed. As we have already outlined, our vehicles have exceptionally low mileage
and that mileage is often not driven on public roads. Use cases of our vehicles compared to mass
market is very different, given the high-performance nature of our cars that are often driven on
private racetracks where they are driven outside of'normal operation'. Enrichment in McLaren
vehicles for power or component protection is a rare/exceptional occurrence which we do not
expect to occur in normal driving conditions. Enrichment is essential in to protecting our high-
performance engines in the exceptional limited circumstances in normal operation. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0748, pp. 4-5]
It should also be noted that supercars typically have a relatively small difference between curb
weight and maximum gross weight, given that they are usually two-seaters, with very limited
luggage capacity. As such, McLaren vehicles do not exhibit any significant difference in
emissions control when in fully laden weight condition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, pp. 4-
5]
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In addition, at present there are no viable technical alternatives to enrichment for deployment
in lightweight high-performance supercars. Enrichment has enabled high-performance supercar
engines to be downsized making them more efficient and emitting lower C02. We believe that
command enrichment should be allowed in high-performance supercars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0748, p. 5]
We understand the concerns of the EPA and would therefore recommend that enrichment
should be allowed in the following:
having a power-to-weight (mass) ratio clearly indicative of high-performance (e.g.,
>## 250 bhp/ ton (based on curb weight) 2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0748, p. 5]
2 Determine a vehicle's power-to-weight ratio by dividing the engine's rated power by the vehicle's GVWR
(in hp/pound). If a test group includes multiple configurations, use the vehicle with the highest power-to-
weight ratio to characterize the test group
Organization: MCS Referral & Resources (MCSRR)
At III.C.8, EPA "requests comment on the proposed prohibition of commanded enrichment as
an AECD, including analyses of benefits and costs, and additional exceptions where brief rich
operation should be allowed." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, p. 3]
EPA says it is "proposing to eliminate the allowance of the use of commanded enrichment as
an AECD on SI engines used in light-duty vehicles and MDV for either power or component
protection during normal operation and use. Normal operation is defined at 40 CFR 86.1803-01
to include vehicle speeds and grades of public roads, and vehicle loading and towing within
manufacturer recommendations, even if the operation occurs infrequently." [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0615, p. 3]
Regardless of whether EPA lowers the limits for CO emissions, the proposed prohibition of
command enrichment as an AECD for power or component protection is appropriate and should
be adopted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, p. 3]
When AECDs are used during routine accelerations, they typically allow vehicles to release
10s to 100s of times more CO than when not in use. These CO emissions pose little risk to
vehicle occupants, but in urban traffic, pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorcyclists may be
repeatedly exposed to CO concentrations coming from the tailpipes of accelerating vehicles in
the range of 100 to 1000 ppm, which is much higher than considered safe by the US EPA (9
ppm), US NIOSH (35 ppm), US OSHA (50 ppm), and US CPSC (70 ppm). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0615, p. 3]
Since "normal operation" is not actually defined at 40 CFR 86.1803-01, WE recommend that
EPA define normal operation in this rule to include cold starts. Cold starts are expected,
predictable, and common since they occur at least once every day that a non-EV vehicle is
started. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, p. 3]
CO data from cold starts published by 3DATX in 2022 from a PEMS study of various makes
of light-duty petrol and diesel vehicles tested in Sweden show several manufacturers are already
making at least one model that achieves low CO emissions-under 500 ppm—throughout the
entire cold start phase. These data are online at https://3datx.com/wp-
content/uploads/3DATX_Enhanced-PTI-Pilot_Opus-Sweden_TimeSeries_221014.pdf. There is
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thus no technical need for EPA to exempt cold starts from CO emission limits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0615, p. 3]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
Commanded enrichment should be phased-out for all MDVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0564, pp. 25-26]
MECA supports the elimination of commanded enrichment for all MDVs under the phased
schedule proposed by EPA. Heavier medium-duty and heavy-duty gasoline vehicles can operate
at higher loads and exhaust temperatures (i.e., due to towing) which can impact catalyst
durability. Moving the catalytic converter closer to the exhaust manifold to improve cold start
performance can result in increasing the time it is exposed to higher temperatures under higher
load conditions. Manufacturers may use fuel enrichment modes to ensure cylinder head, exhaust
manifold and catalyst temperatures are maintained below design durability thresholds. Using fuel
enrichment to control catalyst temperature while effective, can cause significant increases in both
criteria pollutant emissions and fuel consumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 25-26]
Catalyst manufacturers have continued to improve the thermal stability of supporting catalyst
washcoats and performance of precious metal catalysts under higher exhaust temperatures that
occur when converters are close coupled to reduce the need to employ fuel enrichment modes.
Modern gasoline engines also have several design, calibration and advanced technologies that
could be used to reduce the occurrence of higher exhaust temperatures by modifying combustion
or load characteristics. Examples of engine-based technologies include exhaust gas recirculation
(EGR), modified valve timing, electronic throttle airflow, cylinder heads with improved cooling
and exhaust manifolds which are partially integrated into the cylinder head, and cooled exhaust
manifolds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 25-26]
In addition, engine down-speeding or governing of the engine operating range can reduce
exhaust temperatures and the need to employ enrichment for thermal protection. This strategy
will allow the emission controls to remain in stoichiometric air-fuel control (i.e. closed loop)
where the catalysts can maintain peak emissions reduction efficiency for a broader range of
operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 25-26]
Finally, it is possible to replace a close-coupled catalyst with an electrically heated three-way
catalyst (EHC) or electric heater located in front of a three-way catalyst in a downstream location
farther from the engine in order to protect it from thermal exposure during times of high engine
load. These commercially-available technologies employ electrically generated heat to improve
catalyst light-off, especially at cold start and times of low exhaust temperature. This
configuration is further enabled by 48-volt system architectures described in more detail above.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 25-26]
In 2005, MECA applied some of the above-mentioned strategies to two full-sized 2004 pick-
up trucks equipped with a 5.4L and 6.0L engine.35 The aftertreatment systems were packaged
with dual-wall insulated exhaust systems and fully aged to represent 120,000 miles of real-world
operation. Even with 15-year-old engine technology and limited engine calibration on one of the
vehicles, both vehicles achieved FTP NMHC+NOx emissions of 60-70 mg/mile. Although the
cast-iron exhaust manifolds on these vehicles were retained, an OEM likely would take
advantage of such cost effective passive thermal management strategies, including dual-wall
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insulated exhaust or integrated exhaust manifolds, to further reduce cold-start emissions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 25-26]
35 J. W. Anthony and J. E. Kubsh, SAE 2007-01-1261, 2007.
MECA would like to note that although the technology (described above) is ready, we support
a phase-in of this requirement as many engine applications require component modifications that
take time to industrialize and apply to market, including full consideration of durability and
emission development. Therefore, retention of a phased approach consistent with the phase-in of
other new requirements is appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 25-26]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
EPA is proposing "to eliminate the allowance of the use of commanded enrichment as an
AECD [Auxiliary Emissions Control Device] on SI [Spark Ignition] engines used in light-duty
vehicles and MDV [Medium-Duty Vehicles] for either power or component protection during
normal operation and use."3 The EPA states that current vehicles use enrichment for component
protection and to increase engine power, and that enrichment is no longer needed, because
"[technologies exist that can prevent thermal damage of engine and/or exhaust system
components without the use of enrichment during normal operation and use (see DRIA Chapter 3
for technology discussion). Modern vehicles have sufficient power without the use of
enrichment."4 While today's engines have made vast improvements, these assertions overstate
the situation, and at the same time, lack important detail to ensure a level-playing field if this
provision is finalized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 6-7]
3 NPRM at 29197.
4 NPRM at 29277.
The EPA is proposing to allow enrichment only in a few select circumstances, namely:
1) engine start, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 6-7]
2) lambda dithering or slight lambda biasing to achieve optimal three-way catalyst (TWC)
conversion efficiency of criteria emissions, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 6-7]
3) catalyst re-wetting after deceleration fuel cut off (DFCO), [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0623, pp. 6-7]
4) brief lambda excursions during engine transients, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 6-
7]
5) intrusive OBD monitoring of aftertreatment, evaporative canister purge valve, etc.,
and[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 6-7]
6) in vehicle "limp-home" operation where the malfunction indicator light (MIL, commonly
known as the "check engine light") or other warning systems are triggered. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0623, pp. 6-7]
The agency should clarify these intended exceptions and also expand the list of allowable
circumstances for the use of enrichment to include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 6-7]
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7) Confirm that lambda biasing in general is allowed for optimum emissions control,
particularly before the catalyst has reached 400 deg F, and for engine operation at cold ambient
temperatures below -15 deg F for stable combustion [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 6-7]
8) Confirm that OBD-related enrichment is allowed, for example to account for the parallel
diagnostic which checks for proper catalyst function and oxygen storage levels by running rich
and lean briefly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 6-7]
9) Extend allowable enrichment circumstances to allow for prevention of continued low speed
pre-ignition that leads to severe knocking conditions that will result in catastrophic engine
failures [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 6-7]
These confirmations and additional allowance would permit calibrations for optimal
emissions controls and component protection. They also ensure that allowable uses are more
clearly defined and therefore provide more certainty when designing new engines to meet this
provision; it is unlikely that current engines can or will meet this requirement without redesign.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 6-7]
Under EPA's proposed enrichment restrictions, many engines will need to reduce power as
soon as the temperature in the exhaust system is too high. Certification of power is currently
voluntary in the United States. As a result, the question arises: how should net power be
measured in the future? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 7-8]
A uniform measurement method is critical for net power determination:
- Ensures comparability for the customer [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 7-8]
- Power of the engine influences pricing [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 7-8]
- Provides a level-playing for automakers [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 7-8]
European regulations currently require testing to the UN-R 85 6 steady-state test to determine
the net engine power. There is a similar procedure, SAE J1349 7, which could provide the same
level-playing field in the US. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 7-8]
SAE J1349 steady-state testing requires torque, speed and temperatures to be held
substantially constant at multiple, different levels for at least one minute each. The diagram
below depicts an example of how the test operates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 7-8]
6 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/44471446-bc46-44f0-bc97-
0de997bl8106/language- en.
7 https://www.sae.org/standards/content/jl349_201109/.
[See original for diagram on how the test operates] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 7-8]
If EPA adopts its proposal to eliminate enrichment, the agency should also add a requirement
to test all internal combustion engine vehicles to SAE J1349 steady-state for declaration of net
engine power. Any such requirement would, of course, add to testing burden across the entire
industry and therefore be appropriately considered in any updated costs associated with this
rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 7-8]
§ 86.1809-12 Prohibition of Defeat Devices
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As mentioned in the Enrichment section, EPA proposes to allow commanded engine
enrichment in limp-home operation mode when the check engine light is on. This language
forces a 1 -trip failure, while OBD typically uses 2-trip Malfunction Indicator Light ("MILs").
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 12]
Mercedes-Benz requests that EPA align their language with CARB OBD and change the
requirement from "when check engine light is on" to "when OBD failure is present". This
change will align with the OBD standard of a 2-trip MIL. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p.
12]
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
6. Tier-4 criteria Pollutant Emissions
Mitsubishi echoes Auto Innovators' support for EPA's adoption of the California ACC II (i.e.,
LEV-IV) criteria test procedures and standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 9]
Mitsubishi supports cost-effective reductions in criterial pollutant emission from Internal
Combustion Engines (ICE). However, some of EPA's proposed changes to the criteria emission
standards - like the more stringent Particulate Mass (PM) and NMOG+NOx requirements and
the enrichment prohibition - go above and beyond those adopted by CARB in ACC II standards.
If finalized as proposed, these changes would require OEMs to divert large resources in time and
capital (resources that could otherwise be directed to accelerate EV technology deployment)
towards further ICE technology development and additional testing facilities. Mitsubishi believes
that allowing OEMs to focus their finite R&D investments on developing EV technologies,
rather than having to continue to invest in technology that is being phased out, is the most
effective way to reach our shared goal to transition to electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0682, p. 9]
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
Criteria Pollutant Emission Standards and Related Issues
For reasons cited above, NACAA strongly supports EPA's proposal of more protective
emission standards for non-methane organic gas (NMOG)+NOx and for PM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0559, pp.6-7]
The proposed 12-milligrams-per-mile (mg/mi) NMOG+NOx fleet average standard for
LDVs, to be phased in by MY 2032, will reduce emissions by 60 percent relative to the existing
30-mg/mi (Tier 3) MY 2025 standard set in 2014. The proposed 60-mg/mi NMOG+NOx fleet
average standard for MDVs, also to be phased in by MY 2032, will reduce emissions by 66 to 76
percent from the Tier 3 standards of 178 mg/mi for Class 2b vehicles and 247 mg/mi for Class 3
vehicles. EPA's proposed cold temperature (-7°C) NMOG+NOx standards will ensure that
emissions are controlled over a wide range of operating conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0559, pp. 6-7]
With respect to PM, EPA proposes a standard of 0.5 mg/mi for LDVs and MDVs, with a
requirement that this standard be met across three duty cycles, including a cold-temperature (-
7°C) cycle. Such a standard will appropriately drive the use of gasoline particulate filters, which
are readily available. EPA projects that making these revisions to the standards set by the agency
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in the 2014 Tier 3 rule would reduce PM emissions from ICE vehicles by more than 95 percent
and also yield reductions in toxic air pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 6-7]
NACAA also supports EPA's proposal to eliminate commanded enrichment as an auxiliary
emission control device on ICE engines used in LDVs and MDVs. Commanded enrichment is an
engine operation that overrides the engine management feedback control system by applying
extra fuel in order to provide additional power or protect engine or exhaust system components,
thereby producing very high levels of excess emissions. This strategy is deployed during normal
operation and use (e.g., vehicle speeds, grades of public roads and vehicle loading and towing
within manufacturer recommendations, even if the operation occurs infrequently). However, as
EPA explains in the proposal," Technologies exist that can prevent thermal damage of engine
and/or exhaust system components without the use of enrichment during normal operation and
use Modern vehicles have sufficient power without the use of enrichment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0559, pp.6-7]
The use of enrichment only has the potential to incrementally increase power but significantly
reduces the effectiveness of the catalytic aftertreatment system, resulting in a ten-fold or greater
increase of CO and HC emissions."27 NACAA recommends that in addition to eliminating
commanded enrichment EPA require that vehicle data related to enrichment be collected and
analyzed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 6-7]
27 Id at 29,277
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
Eliminating the commanded enrichment allowance for component protection will require new
engine development without sufficient lead time. Automakers already understand the importance
of minimizing the use of such commanded enrichment strategies and report the use of these
strategies as part of their certification documentation. While the need for such strategies may be
narrower, there are still legitimate circumstances in which enrichment is needed for component
protection, particularly to maintain safe operation during high capacity use. To avoid significant
engine de-rating without such strategies, a larger capacity engine would be needed. As a result,
eliminating the narrow use of commanded enrichment for component protection could indirectly
result in GHG and criteria pollutant emissions increases as larger engines would be needed to
compensate. EPA should continue to allow manufacturers to use commanded enrichment for
narrow component protection purposes so long as such use is disclosed in corresponding
certification documentation, which is subject to EPA review. Nissan requests that EPA align
with California's LEV IV exhaust and evaporative emission standards, allowing the industry to
work towards a cohesive set of standards. Nissan also requests that EPA consider prioritization
of the ultimate goal of electrification of the US fleet, allowing manufacturers to focus their
resources on developing and rolling out safe, reliable, and affordable EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0594, p. 7]
Organization: North American Subaru, Inc.
The NPRM also proposes to "eliminate commanded enrichment for ICE-powered vehicles for
power and component protection." Enrichment is an infrequently occurring engine strategy to
help improve engine performance at critical times when demanded by the driver and protects the
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engine from emission control degradation and/or component damage. The Proposed Rule
suggests that enrichment is unnecessary and vehicles already have the capabilities to overcome
the need for commanded enrichment. As noted In Auto Innovators comments, this is incorrect.
Modern light-duty engines would require significant investment and development time to
achieve EPA's proposal. Considering the transition away from ICE through heavy investment in
EV production, this proposal is counter to the Administration intended, long-term goals. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0576, p. 2]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
5. Porsche recommends continuity for current enrichment strategies.
Porsche recommends that EPA not adopt the proposal to broadly eliminate enrichment for
Tier-4 vehicles. Porsche maintains the current approach used by industry and the agency to
consider enrichment strategies within current certification processes should continue to be
sufficient to provide the opportunity to review the appropriateness of commanded enrichment.
Porsche, like many manufacturers, has evolved its powertrain offerings in response to
greenhouse gas and fuel economy goals to adopt a range of highly charged, downsized engines
that provide increased efficiency and customer demanded power. These highly charged,
downsized motors continue to utilize enrichment to limit the potential for thermal damage from
elevated exhaust temperatures. In addition, customers continue to demand increasing levels of
performance and enrichment can enable customers to have their needs met with an efficient
downsized engine rather than otherwise having to revert to larger, less efficient engines. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 11-12]
Porsche supports comments from the AFAI specific to this topic and provides additional
information, found in Appendix- A (section marked confidential). This data illustrates that the
potential opportunity for overall emissions reductions from eliminating enrichment may be very
narrow given that the cumulative operation of sample vehicles driving under real- world
conditions in which enrichment may be triggered is infrequent. Porsche recognizes that the data
set is limited in the range of models and total trips and that the vehicles that were instrumented
reflect European driving conditions. However, Porsche contends that the variation in overall
driving conditions is not that significant, and that this data provides a reasonable proxy for
expected US conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 11-12]
Porsche recommends that EPA convene a test program to instrument vehicles in the US to
gather similar data across a wider range of vehicle types, powertrains, and driving environments.
The benefits of this broad data program would be to provide estimates on the overall opportunity
for emissions reductions and to weigh this against the impacts of eliminating enrichment.
Porsche contends that without such US specific data, it is unclear what the potential benefits may
be against the potential negative side effects of increased cost, reduced power, and possible
consumer backsliding on the adoption of downsized engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637,
pp.11-12]
Porsche supports the position outlined in the AFAI comments regarding EPA's arbitrary
declaration that "Modern vehicles have sufficient power without the use of enrichment". Most
Porsche models marketed in the US are made available with an assortment of engines spanning a
wide range of power options that customers can choose from. Porsche has been successful in the
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past several years in expanding the offering of high power, downsized engine options for our
customers. These downsized engines are becoming increasingly prevalent within the overall
sales mix as customers have responded positively to the balance of power and improved fuel
economy. This trend has also been positive in contributing to improved greenhouse gas
emissions and aligns with previous agency analysis that projected the benefits of highly charged
downsized engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 11-12]
Porsche, like many manufacturers, is in the midst of a broad shift towards electrification.
Developing new engineering solutions to achieve the goal of this proposal from EPA would be
difficult to implement and not deliver significant emissions reductions relative to the cost and
complexity. Porsche is concerned that consumers who continue to seek out combustion vehicles
would reduce their consideration of downsized engine options if those engines are unable to meet
the customers desired power level. The elimination of enrichment and the infrequent emissions
benefits may outweigh the daily benefits of reduced GHG emissions and improved fuel economy
from downsized engines if customers end up shifting back into larger displacement options.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 11-12]
6. Porsche seeks to clarify the intended scope of the proposed definition for "Normal
Operation" to reflect expected operation on US public roads.
Within the NPRM, EPA proposes to add the definition of "Normal Operation" to 86.1803-01.
Porsche seeks to clarify the intended scope of this definition with respect to the conditions
expected to be seen in US operation on public roads. In the preamble for the NPRM,3 EPA
describes their intent to eliminate the use of commanded enrichment "during normal operation
and use". EPA then describes normal operation ".. .to include vehicle speeds and grades of
public roads, and vehicle loading and towing within manufacturer recommendations, even if the
operation occurs infrequently". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 12-13]
3 88 FR 29277
Given the focus on enrichment, Porsche understands the reasoning from EPA to define more
clearly the term "Normal Operation". Porsche supports the term reflecting operation that can
reasonably be expected on public roadways in the United States as described in the preamble.
Specific to acceleration, Porsche recognizes that certain models may have acceleration
capabilities that very quickly will approach speed limits for most US roadways. Porsche also
recognizes that the maximum vehicle velocity for many models far exceeds the legal limits on
most US highways. Many of the high acceleration and high-speed operation may only be used by
customers on closed tracks or off-highway events. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 12-13]
Porsche seeks to clarify that the definition proposed for "Normal Operation" in 86.1803-01 is
intended to reflect "vehicle speeds and grades of public roads", meaning that the range of speeds
and grades of US roadways would generally define boundary conditions on the new definition.
The purpose for this clarification is related to the DRIA which seems to indicate a more
expansive view than what is expressed by EPA in the preamble. In the DRIA, EPA states that the
agency "... considers normal operation and use to include ... driving at sustained high speeds,
maximum acceleration at wide open throttle". For example, Porsche would view the term
"sustained high speeds" as referenced in the DRIA as indicating sustained high speeds on US
roadways, not for example extreme speeds far in excess of legal limits that would likely only
ever be seen on closed racing tracks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 12-13]
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To help with clarity, Porsche recommends that EPA modify the proposed definition for
Normal Operation in 86.1811- 03 to include the following amendment to (3). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0637, pp. 12-13]
Normal operation means any vehicle operating modes meeting all the following conditions:
(3) Any ambient conditions during any season for operation at allowable vehicle speeds and
grades commonly found on public roads in the United States [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637,
pp. 12-13]
Organization: Stellantis
EPA Should Not Ban Enrichment or Set CO Standards Resulting in a Ban on Enrichment
Thermal enrichment is a necessary strategy to maintain the utility and safe operation of nearly all
ICE vehicles currently being sold today. This critical control strategy has also enabled the
proliferation of more efficient (lower emitting) down-sized turbocharged engines in applications
that have typically been dominated by large displacement powertrains - a technology transition
EPA itself has driven and supports. An enrichment strategy enables as much as a 50% increase in
engine output, enabling a much lower displacement engine with much greater efficiency to meet
the needs of a vehicle typically equipped with a large displacement, lower efficiency V8. This
strategy allows for significant emissions savings during every-day driving where the down-sized
engine can meet driving demands easily, relying on enrichment only for the infrequent times
significantly more capability is needed by the customer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 15]
Similarly, EPA proposes an infeasible US06 CO standard which is effectively a secondary
ban on enrichment, as this CO standard can likely only be met at stoichiometric operation. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 15]
By banning enrichment outright (and setting an overly stringent US06 CO standard), EPA is
eliminating the feasibility of using highly efficient down-sized turbocharged engines in these
larger, more capable vehicle applications and markets. This forces OEMs to either invent new
technology or revert back to larger displacement, less efficient engines that cannot use
enrichment for peak output. Due to GHG requirements, reverting to larger displacement naturally
aspirated engines is not possible. EPA should continue to allow enrichment enabled by the
existing and robust AECD process and collect data to better understand if and where further
emissions benefits could be gained by constraining (vs. banning) enrichment without
compromising the progress industry has made, with any future changes being phased in over an
adequate lead time to industry. We agree with Auto Innovators that the proposed prohibition on
commanded enrichment is inappropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 15]
EPA Should Adopt Stringent CARB ACCII LEV IV Criteria Emissions Standards
Stellantis fully supports AAI's comments and the recommendation to align to CARB ACC II
LEV IV criteria emissions requirements. EPA should either adopt or align with California's
stringent ACCII LEV IV criteria requirements, avoiding the unnecessary development of all new
technology to apply to a shrinking ICE fleet (distracting from EV focus). As highlighted in the
examples above, the California standards still provide significant improvements over EPA's Tier
3 standards. EPA must also continue to allow enrichment for component protection which is
critically needed for continued use of highly efficient downsized turbocharged powertrains and
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avoid PM requirements that mandate development of all-new GPF systems and/or extraneous
new testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 16-17]
Avoid a wholesale prohibition on enrichment - whether by design requirement or unrealistic
CO threshold - and continue to allow infrequent enrichment that enables proliferation of highly
efficient down-sized engines to displace larger and much less efficient powertrains (a GHG and
emission reduction strategy endorsed by the EPA) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 24-25]
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
Enrichment (Section III.C.8)
Normal Operation Definition: "normal operation" in 40 CFR §86.1803-01 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0669, pp. 6-8]
It is Volkswagen's concern that the NPRM recognizes an implied definition for normal
vehicle operation. The NPRM states that normal operation is defined in 40 CFR 86.1803-01 and
is further described to include vehicle speeds and grades of public roads, and vehicle loading and
towing within manufacturer recommendations, even if the operation occurs infrequently. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 6-8]
EPA's proposed definition of "normal" operation drastically changes the calibration and
engine design requirements for manufacturers. As shown in the 4-cylinder Small Compact,
Compact and Midsize SUV engine maps, the vehicles already use their maximum potential in
terms of power output to meet customer demands and GHG requirements at the same time.
Broadening the definition of "normal" to include infrequent operation with elimination of fuel
enrichment will result in engine power loss and loss of vehicle utility to the customer. As noted
in the AFAI comments, this could potentially require larger engine displacements, which is
counterproductive to the goal of reduced emissions and GHG. Based on recent measurements on
Portable Emission Measurement Systems (PEMS) including test routes in LA (city, highway,
and hard effort Mount Baldy), the graphs below represent the findings and use of enrichment on
production vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 6-8]
Small Compact SUV
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Cumulative run duration to total duration (%)
Compact SUV
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Cumulative run duration to total duration (%)
Mid-Size SUV
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Cumulative run duration to total duration (%) [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 6-8]
As referenced by the EPA DRIA, a light-heavy duty gasoline spark-ignited (SI) engine
operating over the Supplemental Engine Test had shown only a 4% reduction in power when
enrichment was disabled. This is not the same when compared to a light-duty downsized
turbocharged vehicle. Light-duty vehicle utility will be greatly affected and may realize up to a
20% power reduction in some cases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 6-8]
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The popularity of SUVs as all-purpose family vehicles, which are typically used for daily
commuting, results in infrequent heavy-load towing operational use. Most families do not have
the resources to own a specialized vehicle for occasional heavy-load towing. Decreased engine
power on smaller displacement engine vehicles would decrease vehicle utility (e.g., trailer
towing) in a way that customers would either keep driving their old cars as long as possible or
upgrade to a larger, but less fuel efficient, displacement engine. Neither option benefits the
environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 6-8]
Enrichment for Smaller-Volume Vehicles
Volkswagen consists of iconic brands, which span from our popular utility "People's Car" to
the exotic supercars featured by brands Audi, Lamborghini, Bentley and Bugatti. These
supercars are fully compliant to the requirements for on-road use; however, the enthusiast
customer base may utilize these vehicles in a track environment. Datasets show that while
catalyst protection and power enrichment is not demonstrated on regulated cycles and normal
driving, extreme off-road/track usage results in significant need to protect the catalysts for
compliance when re- entering the roadways. The removal of the enrichment zones for these
vehicles would require technologies, which have yet to be demonstrated for production use and
may require more adjustable parameters (e.g., water injection) than currently productionized.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 6-8]
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
Enrichment
VCC supports the EPA proposal to prohibit fuel enrichment for any type of performance
increase or component protection. This prohibition will eliminate any unnecessary pollution
where the catalyst will be unable to operate at its best due to unnecessary rich air/fuel ratio. And,
there is available technology to achieve the EPA proposed enrichment requirements. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0624, p. 2]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
EPA received many comments regarding the proposed elimination of command enrichment.
Most vehicle manufacturers commented in opposition to the proposal and noted the significant
impact that the elimination of enrichment might have on the designs of their existing
powertrains. CARB, NACAA, and MECA all commented in support of the proposed elimination
of enrichment.
Vehicle manufacturers commented that enrichment is used judiciously and within the bounds
of the current AECD provisions. They also commented that there are no alternatives to
enrichment in many current powertrain designs. Manufacturers also noted that one alternative to
enrichment would be to increase engine displacement which could potentially increase C02
emissions. Honda commented that EPA's proposal would create a conflict between our proposed
PM standards and the elimination of enrichment, noting that enrichment would be required under
some circumstances to regenerate gasoline particulate filters. Several manufacturers also
commented on EPA's definition of "normal operation" and provided recommendations regarding
how normal operation should be defined.
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One vehicle manufacturer, Volvo Car Corporation, supported EPA's proposal to eliminate
command enrichment and noted, "This prohibition will eliminate any unnecessary pollution
where the catalyst will be unable to operate at its best due to unnecessary rich air/fuel ratio. And,
there is available technology to achieve the EPA proposed enrichment requirements."
Comments from Mercedes-Benz AG noted, "While today's engines have made vast
improvements, these assertions overstate the situation, and at the same time, lack important detail
to ensure a level-playing field if this provision is finalized." Mercedes included comments
regarding the specific conditions for when rich operation might be allowed, even within a
broader prohibition and made recommendations on how a level playing field might be achieved
within the industry.
CARB commented in support of the elimination of command enrichment and supported
EPA's conclusion that control technologies do exist that would eliminate the need for enrichment
as a means of protecting powertrain components. CARB also noted that vehicle manufacturers
could make different design decisions when developing powertrains: "CARB also agrees the
elimination of enrichment for engine component protection would better ensure that
manufacturers, despite U.S. EPA and CARB prohibitions, are not using such strategies to protect
frail designs in lieu of using more robust components that can better withstand the temperatures
and exhaust environment." CARB also agreed with EPA that enrichment does result in
significantly higher emissions and "can occur in some routinely encountered in-use conditions."
CARB recommended that"... U.S. EPA require standardized data to be stored onboard vehicles
to track AECD activation that adversely impacts emissions so that the agency will be better
informed as to the frequency, duration, and cumulative emission impact of such strategies even
beyond those that trigger enrichment for component protection."
NACAA commented similarly to CARB in its support for the elimination of command
enrichment. They stated, "The use of enrichment only has the potential to incrementally increase
power but significantly reduces the effectiveness of the catalytic aftertreatment system, resulting
in a ten-fold or greater increase of CO and HC emissions. NACAA recommends that in addition
to eliminating commanded enrichment EPA require that vehicle data related to enrichment be
collected and analyzed."
MECA also commented in support of the elimination of enrichment and confirmed EPA's
conclusions that "Examples of engine-based technologies include exhaust gas recirculation
(EGR), modified valve timing, electronic throttle airflow, cylinder heads with improved cooling
and exhaust manifolds which are partially integrated into the cylinder head, and cooled exhaust
manifolds."
Response:
EPA thanks all the commenters that provided their relative positions in support of and in
opposition to the proposed restrictions on command enrichment. EPA recognizes both the
potential substantial environmental benefits of reducing or eliminating enrichment as well as the
substantial level of effort that would be required by vehicle manufacturers to eliminate
enrichment in many of their current powertrain designs. While EPA stands by its initial
assessment that there are many more options available to vehicle manufacturers other than
enrichment to protect powertrain components, we also recognize that these control alternatives
could potentially result in a reduction in available engine power and/or a deterioration in vehicle
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drivability in certain current vehicle designs. In their efforts to reduce CO2 emissions, vehicle
manufacturers have made design decisions in their ICE powertrains that have resulted in the need
for command enrichment for component protection, with CARB noting that vehicle
manufacturers have adopted designs that require "strategies to protect frail designs in lieu of
using more robust components that can better withstand the temperatures and exhaust
environment." Comments from MECA and Volvo also confirm EPA's initial assessment. The
comments from Mercedes further show that enrichment can be reduced or even eliminated with
additional collaboration between vehicle manufacturers and EPA. Despite the potential for
significant emission reductions as the result of eliminating enrichment, EPA has decided not to
finalize any new provisions for the control of enrichment as part of this final rule. At this time
the agency will continue to rely on existing requirements for Auxiliary Emission Control
Devices (AECD) to ensure that vehicle manufacturers use AECD in a manner dictated by the
existing AECD process.
EPA plans to revisit this issue, potentially in a future rulemaking, as outlined in Preamble
III.D.8. EPA recognizes the value of tracking AECD usage, as recommended by both CARB and
NACAA, and will consider a monitoring provision as we consider potential future controls on
enrichment.
4.1.7 - Averaging, banking, and trading provisions
Comments by Organizations
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
And even for criteria pollutants emitted from ICEVs, the Clean Air Act says nothing about
averaging across fleets or banking and trading credits across different model years, different
vehicle classes, and OEMs. While EPA previously adopted fleetwide averaging, it has also
acknowledged that "Congress did not specifically contemplate an averaging program when it
enacted the Clean Air Act."91 And "[jjust as the statute does not explicitly address EPA's
authority to allow averaging, it does not address the Agency's authority to permit banking and
trading."92 By definition, then, the Act does not address—let alone clearly authorize—the use of
averaging, banking, and trading in a manner that mandates electrification of the national vehicle
fleet of motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines. Instead, as EPA acknowledges, even if its
authority to use averaging, banking, and trading could be inferred, such programs are limited to
compliance flexibilities rather than setting the standards with which vehicles must comply or
phasing out ICEVs on a national scale.93 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 23]
91 48 Fed. Reg. 33,456, 33,458 (July 21, 1983)
92 54 Fed. Reg. 22,652, 22,665 (May 25, 1989); see 55 Fed. Reg. 30,584, 30,593 (July 26, 1990) (same).
93 Proposed Rule at 29,196-97 (describing averaging, banking, and trading provisions as "help[ing]
manufacturers to employ a wide range of compliance paths").
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
a) The statutory structure confirms EPA lacks statutory authority to use fleetwide averaging
to mandate ZEVs.
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EPA's proposal would require electrification by setting average emission standards for
manufacturers' nationwide fleets and "averaging" in more and more zeros to represent the
electric vehicles it wants to see in future years. Manufacturers that exceed the standards may
bank credits and trade them to other manufacturers that fall short. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 78-80]
EPA relies on NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986), for the proposition that it is
authorized to average vehicles. That case found EPA could average a manufacturer's different
engine families. Id. at 425. It did so, however, with some caveats. First, its reasoning was based
on a deference to EPA's interpretation of the statute "in the absence of clear evidence Congress
meant to prohibit averaging." This standard, of course, is directly contrary to the standard
applicable in this case in which EPA is proposing regulations that affect a major question—clear
Congressional authority to permit averaging to mandate electric vehicles. Second, the parties
failed to raise a textual argument against averaging. Id. at n.24 ("Although it was not raised by
any party before the agency, and accordingly cannot be dispositive here ... there is an additional
argument against emissions averaging. The Act's testing and certification provision, 42 U.S.C. §
7525 [Link:
https://l.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=42
USCAS7525&originatingDoc=I80714eef94d31 ld9a707f4371c9c34f0&refType=LQ&originatio
nContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=0591cc222593448083058c4608d3
c583&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)], speaks of'any,' 'a,' or 'such' motor vehicle or
engine being tested and certified. With averaging, some vehicles or engines would not be
required to comply with the standards and would not be subject to NCPs for failing to so comply.
This practice appears inconsistent with the requirement that 'any,' 'a,' or 'such' vehicle or
engine be tested and required to comply with emissions standards."). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
On the other hand, EPA has previously acknowledged that the Act is silent on the
mechanisms of averaging, banking, and trading (ABT). When EPA first adopted fleetwide
averaging, it recognized that "Congress did not specifically contemplate an averaging program
when it enacted the Clean Air Act." 48 Fed. Reg. 33,456, 33,458 (July 21, 1983). And "[j]ust as
the statute does not explicitly address EPA's authority to allow averaging, it does not address the
Agency's authority to permit banking and trading." 54 Fed. Reg. 22,652, 22,665 (May 25, 1989);
see 55 Fed. Reg. 30,584, 30,593 (July 26, 1990) (same). By definition, then, the Act does not
address—let alone clearly authorize—the use of averaging, banking, and trading to electrify the
Nation's vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
That should be the end of the analysis. Section 202 of the Clean Air Act does not itself "direct
[conventional vehicles] to effectively cease to exist." West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2612 n.3. EPA
has instead relied on mechanisms that are not themselves spelled out in the statute and that have
never before been used to mandate LD and MD electric vehicles. Just as in West Virginia, EPA
has nothing "close to the sort of clear authorization" necessary for such a transformational policy
shift. 142 S. Ct. at 2614. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
But in truth, the problem is far worse for EPA than that. As explained below, the Act
unambiguously precludes fleetwide-average emission standards under Section 202(a). And even
if the statute permitted some fleetwide averaging, it does not allow EPA to take the additional
step of incorporating non-emitting vehicles into emission averages and thus forcing the market
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toward electric vehicles. The proposal is not merely stretching vague statutory language. It is
defying clear statutory text. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
The text and structure of Section 202, and of Title II more broadly, unambiguously require
that emission standards under Section 202(a) apply to individual vehicles, not manufacturers'
fleets on average. EPA claims to find authority for fleetwide averaging in Section 202(a), which
authorizes EPA to issue "standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class
or classes of new motor vehicles ... which in [its] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
On its face, that provision authorizes EPA to set standards for vehicles that emit harmful air
pollutants. It says nothing about averaging across fleets. As noted, when EPA first adopted
fleetwide averaging, it acknowledged that "Congress did not specifically contemplate an
averaging program when it enacted the Clean Air Act." 48 Fed. Reg. at 33,458. EPA claimed to
have the authority because the Act "does not explicitly preclude standards" based on averaging.
54 Fed. Reg. at 22,666 (emphasis added). EPA was wrong. "[T]he broader context of the statute
as a whole," Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997), makes clear that Section
202(a) does not permit fleetwide averaging. And, even if EPA could somehow show that the
statute tacitly or implicitly allows (or does not expressly preclude) averaging, that would still be
insufficient to meet the necessary clear congressional authority to use fleetwide averaging as a
means to force a transition from internal-combustion engines to ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 78-80]
a. Other provisions in Section 202 demonstrate that emission standards may not be based
on averaging.
Title II is replete with provisions that necessarily apply to vehicles individually, not to fleets
on average. That is evident first in the emission standards prescribed by Section 202 itself. For
example, in Section 202(b), the Act sets forth specific light-duty vehicle emission standards that
EPA must promulgate in "regulations under" Section 202(a). 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b). For vehicles
in model years 1977 to 1979, the standards must provide that "emissions from such vehicles and
engines may not exceed 1.5 grams per vehicle mile of hydrocarbons and 15.0 grams per vehicle
mile of carbon monoxide." Id. § 7521(b)(1)(A). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
Those provisions require that the "regulations under [Section 202(a)]" apply to "vehicles and
engines," not "vehicles and engines on an average basis across a fleet." Construing those
provisions to allow averaging would, in effect, add words to the statute that change its meaning.
Neither courts nor agencies may "supply words ... that have been omitted." Antonin Scalia &
Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (2012); accord Rotkiske.v.
Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360-361 (2019). And supplying the extra words "on average" would
have a significant substantive effect: "roller coaster riders must be 48 inches tall" means
something very different from "roller coaster riders must be 48 inches tall on average." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
The testing requirements accompanying the Section 202(b) standards confirm that those
standards apply to all vehicles. In particular, EPA must "test any emission control system
incorporated in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine ... to determine whether such system
enables such vehicle or engine to conform to the standards required to be prescribed under
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[Section 202(b) of the Act]." 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(2). If the system complies, EPA must issue a
"verification of compliance with emission standards for such system." Id. Those requirements
plainly contemplate standards that apply to individual vehicles and their emission-control
systems. Not only does the statutory text frame the inquiry as whether an individual "vehicle" or
"engine" conforms to the emission standards, but the provision's foundational premise-that an
emission-control system can enable a vehicle to meet emission standards depends on individually
applied standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
Other parts of Section 202 further demonstrate that emission standards under Section 202(a)
cannot rely on averaging. Section 202(b)(3), for example, authorizes EPA to grant waivers from
certain nitrogen-oxide emission standards—which, again, are standards "under" Section 202(a),
see 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(B)—for no "more than 5 percent of [a] manufacturer's production or
more than fifty thousand vehicles or engines, whichever is greater." Id. § 7521(b)(3). This
provision would be nonsensical under a fleetwide-averaging regime. It contemplates a default
under which every vehicle meets a standard, then gives manufacturers a waiver from that default
for up to 5% of the fleet. But under fleetwide averaging, no waiver is needed. Instead, a vast
proportion of a manufacturer's fleet—perhaps 50% or more— effectively has a "waiver" so long
as a sufficient number of vehicles outperform the standard. Likewise, Section 202(g), which
specifies an increasing "percentage of each manufacturer's sales volume" of each model year's
vehicles that must comply with specified emission standards, is fundamentally incompatible with
averaging. Id. § 7521(g)(1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
Similarly, under Section 202(m), EPA must require manufacturers to install on "all" new
light-duty vehicles and trucks "diagnostic systems" capable of identifying malfunctions that
"could cause or result in failure of the vehicles to comply with emission standards established
under this section." Id. § 7521(m)(l). As this requirement makes clear, individual vehicles must
"comply with emissions standards established under [Section 202]." Id. Otherwise, requiring
diagnostic equipment on "all" vehicles makes no sense. In a fleetwide-averaging regime, this
requirement would be pointless, as the deterioration or malfunction of an individual vehicle's
emission-related systems would provide virtually no information about whether the fleet as a
whole is compliant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 80-81]
b. Title II's compliance and enforcement provisions for emission standards confirm that
EPA cannot use fleetwide averaging.
Fleetwide averaging also clashes with "the design and structure of [Title II] as a whole."
Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 321 (citation omitted). Title II sets forth a comprehensive, interlocking
scheme for enforcing emission standards through testing, certification, warranties, remediation,
and penalties. Fleetwide-average standards are incompatible with these provisions, which are
"designed to apply to" individual vehicles and "cannot rationally be extended" to fleets. Id. at
322. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 81-82]
Testing and Certification. Under Title II, EPA must "test, or require to be tested in such
manner as [it] deems appropriate, any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine submitted
by a manufacturer to determine whether such vehicle or engine conforms with the regulations
prescribed under [Section 202]." 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1). If the "vehicle or engine conforms to
such regulations," EPA must issue the manufacturer a "certificate of conformity." Id. EPA may
later test a manufacturer's vehicles and engines, and if "such vehicle or engine does not conform
with such regulations and requirements, [EPA] may suspend or revoke such certificate insofar as
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it applies to such vehicle or engine." Id. § 7525(b)(2)(A)(ii). A manufacturer may not sell a
vehicle or engine not "covered by a certificate of conformity." Id. § 7522(a)(1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 81-82]
Fleetwide averaging is incompatible with these requirements in at least two respects. First, by
using the singular terms "vehicle" and "engine," along with "any" and "such," the statute
contemplates that individual vehicles may be tested, determined to "not conform" with the
standards, and have their certificates of conformity suspended or revoked. In a fleetwide-
averaging regime, testing an individual vehicle or engine does not enable EPA to determine
whether it "conforms with the regulations prescribed under [Section 202]," 42 U.S.C. §
7525(a)(1), because conformity turns not on an individual vehicle's emissions but on the fleet's
average performance overall. Second, fleetwide averaging also makes it impossible to determine
compliance with applicable emission standards before a vehicle is sold, as required to obtain the
certificate of conformity needed for a sale. See 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1). Under fleetwide-average
standards, a vehicle's "conformity] with the regulations prescribed under [Section 202]" cannot
be determined until the manufacturer calculates its production-weighted average at "the end of
each model year," when the manufacturer knows the quantity and model of "vehicles produced
and delivered for sale." 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.1818-12(c)(2)(2), 86.1865-12(i)(l), (j)(3). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 81-82]
For similar reasons, fleetwide averaging is inconsistent with the statutory definition of an
"emission standard," which "limits the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air
pollutants on a continuous basis." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k). It is impossible to know on a "continuous
basis" whether a manufacturer's fleet complies with EPA's proposed average standards, because
a manufacturer cannot calculate its production-weighted average until the end of the year.
Simply put, an after-the-fact compliance regime is incompatible with the Act's testing and
certification scheme. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 81-82]
c. The broader text and history of Title II confirm that the rule exceeds EPA's authority
through fleetwide averaging.
Other indicia of statutory meaning demonstrate that the proposed rule exceeds EPA's statutory
authority under Section 202(a). Elsewhere in Title II, Congress showed that it knew how to
legislate with respect to "average annual aggregate emissions." 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(l)(B)(v)(II)
(directing EPA to take certain actions if "the reduction of the average annual aggregate emissions
of toxic air pollutants in a [designated district] fails to meet" certain standards). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 83-84]
Thus, "if Congress had wanted to adopt an [averaging] approach" for motor vehicle standards
under Section 202(a), "it knew how to do so." SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1351
(2018); see Rotkiske, 140 S. Ct. at 360-361 ("Atextual judicial supplementation is particularly
inappropriate when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted
language or provision."). It did not choose that approach in Section 202(a). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 83-84]
The Energy Policy Conservation Act, enacted just two years before the 1977 Clean Air Act
amendments, reinforces that conclusion. There, Congress directed the Secretary of
Transportation to issue regulations setting "average fuel economy standards for automobiles
manufactured by a manufacturer" in a given model year. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a). That Congress
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has not used similar language in Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act is a "telling clue" that the
Act does not permit fleetwide averaging. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1626 (2018).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 83-84]
The Clean Air Act's history also reflects Congress's understanding that emission standards
would apply to all vehicles individually. Congress was so focused on reducing emissions at the
level of the individual vehicle that, in the 1970 amendments, Congress permitted EPA to test any
individual vehicle as it comes off the assembly line. See Pub. L. No. 91-601, § 8, 84 Stat. 1676,
1694-1696. Such a vehicle-by-vehicle test was meant to supplement the pre-1970 testing of
prototypes. Congress explained that while testing of prototypes "will continue," "tests should
require each prototype rather than the average of prototypes to comply with regulations
establishing emission standards." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, at 6 (1970). And if Congress forbade
averaging across prototypes, it certainly did not permit averaging across entire fleets. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 83-84]
d. Related provisions confirm that Section 202(a) does not authorize averaging of non-
emitting electric vehicles.
Other provisions of the Clean Air Act drive home the lack of statutory authorization to
mandate electrification as well. In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress spoke
directly to the phase-in of electric vehicles on America's roads. Congress instructed EPA to
establish standards for "clean-fuel vehicles" operating on "clean alternative fuel," including
"electricity." Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 229, 104 Stat. 2399, 2513 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
7581(2), (7), 7582(a)). Congress required that certain areas of the country with the worst
pollution would have to "phase-in" a "specified percentage" of "clean-fuel vehicles" using "clean
alternative fuels" (defined to include "electricity") in certain fleets. 42 U.S.C. § 7586; see id. §
7581(a). The 1990 amendments highlight that Congress knows how to clearly establish standards
that apply to electric vehicles, and to directly require that such vehicles be phased into a
particular fleet. But Congress chose to do so only on a targeted, regional basis. The contrast
between the 1990 amendments and Section 202(a) highlights the absence of any statutory
authority for EPA's rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 84]
Other related statutes also suggest the same. In the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress
directed NHTSA to set fuel-economy standards based on averages, but prohibited NHTSA from
setting fuel-economy standards that average in the fuel economy of electric vehicles. See Pub. L.
No. 102-486 §§ 302, 403, 106 Stat. 2776, 2870-2871, 2876 (later codified at 49 U.S.C. §
32902(h)). This prohibition bars NHTSA from doing exactly what EPA is doing here: misusing
its regulatory authority to force a transition from conventional vehicles to electric vehicles by
artificially tightening the "average" standard a fleet must meet. Of course, when Congress
finalized the language of Section 202(a)(1) in 1977, it had no need to explicitly block EPA from
considering electric vehicles, because it did not contemplate that EPA would set emission
standards using averaging in the first place (or that EPA would be setting standards for
greenhouse gases). The prohibition on NHTSA nevertheless underscores just how far EPA is
reaching here: it is straining statutory language to seize a power that Congress expressly denied
to a sister agency that actually has authority to promulgate fleetwide-average standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 84]
e. EPA's lack of authority for a credit-trading scheme further confirms its lack of
authority to set fleetwide averages.
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The proposal's credit banking and trading program is critical to EPA's electrification mandate.
But the agency also lacks authority under Title II to establish a credit scheme as part of its
emission standards under Section 202(a). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
As with fleetwide averaging, EPA has previously acknowledged that Title II says nothing
about banking and trading credits in connection with motor-vehicle emission standards. See 54
Fed. Reg. at 22,665. What EPA has ignored, however, is that Title II is not silent regarding
banking and trading in other contexts. Indeed, in multiple other provisions under Title II,
Congress expressly authorized the use of bankable and tradable credits. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
7545(k)(7) (reformulated gasoline credits); § 7545(o)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(cc), (5)(A)(i) (renewable fuel
credits); id. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(cc), (5)(A)(ii) (biodiesel credits); id. §
7545(o)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(cc), (5)(A)(iii) (small refineries credits); id. § 7586(f) (clean- fuel fleet-
operator credits); id. § 7589(d) (California pilot test program's clean-fuel vehicle manufacturer
credit). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
Under EPA's proposed approach, those provisions would all be superfluous, because EPA
already had the discretion to adopt a credit-trading regime for any program. If Congress had
wanted to permit credits in connection with emission standards under Section 202(a), it knew
how to and would have done so expressly. See SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1351. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
For all these reasons, courts have cast substantial doubt on EPA's authority to set fleetwide-
average emission standards. As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained in NRDC v.
Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the "engine specific thrust" of Title II's "testing and
compliance provisions" is evident both in Congress's choice to "spea[k] of'any,' 'a,' or 'such'
motor vehicle or engine" in the text of the statute and in the "troubling" legislative history
recounted above. Id. at 425 n.24. The arguments were not dispositive in Thomas only because
the parties there had failed to present them. Id. But the Court nevertheless recognized that the
arguments were relevant to "future proceedings." Id.. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-
86]
f. At a minimum, EPA may not use fleetwide averaging to require electrification.
Despite the absence of statutory authorization for fleetwide averaging, EPA has long
employed that mechanism without significant industry pushback. That is likely because fleetwide
averaging has generally been offered as an accommodation to regulated parties, allowing them
flexibility that the statute does not in fact permit. In its current proposal, however, EPA is not
offering an extrastatutory accommodation. It is taking an additional step away from the statutory
text by using fleetwide averaging to mandate electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
pp. 84-86]
To be clear, in prior rules EPA set an average emission standard and allowed manufacturers to
make some vehicles that emitted more and some that emitted less. Here, EPA has set tailpipe
emission standards at a level so stringent that manufacturers must incorporate an increasing
percentage of LD and MD electric vehicles—which EPA treats as zero-emission vehicles—into
their averages in order to comply with the "standards." See p. 13, supra. Put differently, the
agency is proposing an emission standard that is artificially low because it incorporates electric
vehicles, which EPA treats as emitting zero pollutants for averaging purposes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
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Whatever the permissibility of fleetwide averaging, the text and structure of Title II make
plain that EPA cannot manipulate averaging as a means to force production of an increasing
market share of electric vehicles. Section 202 does not grant EPA the power to make the
internal-combustion engine go the way of the horse and carriage. At the very least, Section 202 is
hardly clear in granting that awesome power—which is what matters under West Virginia. For
automobiles as for power plants, EPA has purported to discover in the Clean Air Act the
authority to "forc[e]" manufacturers to "cease making" a particular type of energy "altogether."
142 S. Ct. at 2612. We have seen that play recently before, and it should end the same way.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 84-86]
Penalties. Finally, EPA s fleetwide-averaging regime is inconsistent with the statute's penalty
provision. Under Section 205, any violation "shall constitute a separate offense with respect to
each motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine," with each offense subject to its own civil penalty of
up to $25,000. 42 U.S.C. § 7524(a) (emphasis added). Under EPA's approach, however, no
individual vehicle or engine violates the applicable standard, only the fleet as a whole. The
statute provides no method for calculating penalties when a fleet fails to meet its fleetwide-
average standard-because it does not authorize fleetwide-average standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, p. 83]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
EPA received a number of comments regarding EPA's authority to adopt standards with
averaging, banking and trading (ABT) from stakeholders including the American Fuel and
Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) and Valero Energy Corporation.
Response:
For EPA's complete response on EPA's authority to adopt standards with ABT, refer to
Section 2 of this document.
4.1.8 - MDV criteria emissions certification requirements
Comments by Organizations
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Feasibility of Proposed Medium-duty Vehicle Emission Levels
Based on U.S. EPA's analysis, medium-duty vehicles under 22,000 lbs. GCWR consist
mainly of vans and gasoline trucks, and U.S. EPA certification data shows that 75 percent of
2022 and 2023 MY gasoline vehicles were already below 120 mg/mi. For CARB's ACC II
regulations, as part of the Initial Statement of Reasons, Appendix H, ACC II LEV Technology
Appendix, CARB had shown FTP NMOG+NOx certification data for the 2021 MY medium-
duty vehicles in both classes. 43 CARB's assessment is similar to U.S. EPA's analysis, which
shows many gasoline medium-duty vans have emission levels under 120 mg/mi. Because many
gasoline medium-duty vehicles are already at levels close to meeting both standards and many
light-duty vehicles, some of which use similar or the same engines, are also at or below these
levels, it is clear that the technology exists for manufacturers to clean up their higher emitting
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vehicles and bring their emission levels closer to the lower emitting vehicles. Additionally, as the
fleet average emission standard declines over time, it will likely allow manufacturers to
introduce improvements across their conventional fleet concurrent with scheduled redesigns or
updates to their models in a resource-efficient manner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 32]
43 CARB. ACC IIISOR. Appendix H: ACCII LEV Technology Appendix, p. H-44. Available at:
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/apph.pdf.
Conclusion
While CARB's LEV IV fleet average standard and U.S. EPA's proposed standards are
structured differently, precluding side-by-side comparisons, CARB has determined based on the
above analysis that the proposed standards are similar in stringency for the same category of
conventional vehicles. Because these vehicles are required to meet similar emission levels in
both programs, manufacturers would be able to use the same technologies to meet both
standards. Additionally, many gasoline medium-duty vehicle test groups are close to or already
emitting under 120 mg/mi, which allows manufacturers to make minimal changes to their
gasoline fleets while focusing on increasing deployment of zero-emission technology in their
fleets to meet both CARB and U.S. EPA requirements. As discussed previously, CARB also
notes that the requirements under CARB's ACT and ACF regulations are promoting
technological advancement of medium-duty ZEVs, providing a strong foundation for U.S. EPA's
ZEV projections. CARB supports U.S. EPA's proposed standard, which will ensure conventional
medium-duty vehicles continue to make modest improvements to their emission control systems
and rely on ZEVs in combination with their cleaner conventional medium-duty vehicles to meet
the proposed fleet average standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 32-33]
Organization: Cummins Inc.
Tier 3 credits from high GCWR MDV should carry over into the HD engine program
In contrast to the proposals for averaging, banking, and trading (ABT) for light-duty vehicles
and low GCWR MDV, EPA has not proposed any opportunities for transferring non-methane
organic gases (NMOG) + NOx credits (or debits) from the Tier 3 program into the HD engine
program for high GCWR MDV vehicles. Manufacturers already certifying in the HD engine
program likely have developed their engine compliance strategies, including use of ABT, for
MY 2027 and later HD engines without knowledge of EPA's proposal to move high GCWR
MDV into the same program. With no mechanism to carry pre-existing Tier 3 credits rightfully
earned by high GCWR MDV into the engine program, and no mechanism to earn early credits
on engine-dynamometer certified high GWCR MDV, manufacturers looking to smooth the
transition to new standards may be forced to use engine credits already earmarked for other HD
engines. There is also a level playing field concern where manufacturers with a broader product
line which includes both high and low GCWR MDV would still get the benefit of using their
Tier 3 high GCWR MDV credits for Tier 4 early compliance of their low GCWR MDV, but for
manufacturers whose product line consists of only high GCWR MDV, those Tier 3 credits would
be forfeited. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 8-9]
There are precedents in past regulations which could inform the conversion of Tier 3 credits
into credits for the HD engine program, such as converting non-methane hydrocarbons (NMHC)
+ NOx credits to NOx credits via a discount factor and adjusting for different emissions useful
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life periods. EPA should consider this history and create a pathway for Tier 3 credits from high
GCWRMDV to transfer into the HD engine program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 8-
9]
Cummins supports fungibility of high GCWR MDV NOx credits in the appropriate HD
engine averaging set.
If EPA finalizes the requirement for high GCWR MDV to certify criteria pollutant emissions
in the HD engine program, Cummins supports allowing those engines to participate in the 40
CFR Part 1036 ABT program within the appropriate averaging set with other HD engines. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 8-9]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations (EPHO)
VIII. Stronger GHG and Criteria Pollutant Standards for Medium-Duty Vehicles Are
Feasible.
We now turn to EPA's proposed emission standards for medium-duty vehicles. Below, we
examine the combustion vehicle and zero-emission technologies that can further reduce GHG
emissions from the medium-duty fleet, comment on EPA's modeling, address economic
considerations, and make suggestions on certain aspects of EPA's regulatory program. We also
offer recommendations for the Tier 4 NMOG+NOx standards and PM requirements. As detailed
below, strong GHG and criteria pollutant emission standards for MDVs are feasible and cost-
reasonable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 64]
3.EPA's proposed change to criteria pollution requirements for MDVs with a gross combined
weight rating of more than 22,000 pounds is likely appropriate, but should be monitored for
manipulation and efficacy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 77]
EPA is proposing to require that vehicles with a GCWR greater than 22,000 pounds be
certified to the heavy-duty engine standards, rather than to the proposed MDV standards.212
EPA's logic here is sound: these vehicles' powertrains are often more powerful than the Class 4
and Class 5 vehicles in which related engines may be deployed, and they have a GCWR
comparable to vehicles currently covered by the heavy-duty engine rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 77]
212 88 Fed. Reg. at 29257.
Table VIII.B-1. Market share of MDVs above and below the 22,000-pound gross combined
weight rating213 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 77]
[See original attachment for Table VIII.B-1.].
213 Taken from EPA OMEGA2 modeling inputs: vehicles_mdv_20230208.csv (MY 2020 MDV fleet).
MY 2020 data indicates that this change could require more than half of the MDV fleet to
certify to the heavy-duty engine standards (Table VIII.B-1).214 Based on the emissions and
warranty requirements for such engines, certifying the engines in these MDVs to such standards
will likely yield emissions reductions at least as strong as if they were instead required to meet
the proposed MDV standards. However, these standards apply solely to combustion engines and
are not influenced by the share of deployed ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 78]
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214 In the Proposal, EPA notes: "Based on an analysis of the MY 2022 and MY 2023 emissions
certification data, most MDV complete and incomplete diesel pickup trucks would be required to switch to
engine dynamometer certification; MY 2022 vans would not be required to use engine dynamometer
certification; and only a small number of gasoline pickup trucks would be required to switch to engine
certification." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29270. However, the data are not provided.
In contrast, ZEV deployment affects the required emissions reductions for medium-duty
combustion vehicles with a GCWR less than or equal to 22,000 pounds, as illustrated above in
Section VIII.B. 1. It is possible that manufacturers could try to shift more of their sales to
vehicles with a GCWR over 22,000 pounds in order to reduce the required improvements to their
remaining combustion fleet. If this change is finalized, the Agency should monitor future data
from the MDV and heavy-duty engine in-use testing program to assess the nature of any
difference between the emissions performance of MDVs above and below the 22,000-pound
GCWR, and should commit to releasing a report on its findings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 78]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility (MECA)
Commercially Available Technologies Support Tighter Medium Duty Standards
Both gasoline and diesel engines feature prominently amongst medium duty vehicles which
often share many attributes and powertrain platforms also certified as light- duty trucks or
medium duty passenger vehicles. MECA would highlight that the proposed MDV Class 2b and
Class 3 NMOG+NOx fleet averages of SULEV150 (Class 2b: 8500 to 10,0001bs) and
SULEV175 (Class 3: 10,000 to 14,0001bs) still reflect fleet averages of 5 to almost 6 times
higher than that proposed for light duty trucks and SUVs <8 5 001b s, as well as medium duty
passenger vehicles. This despite the fact that Class 2b and 3 vehicles have gross vehicle weights
that are equivalent to no more than 18% to 65% heavier. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp.
12-24]
Regarding Class 2b and 3 gasoline-fueled vehicles, MECA's review of available EPA FTP
NMOG+NOx certification data, 17 shown in Table 2, [See original comment for Table 2. EPA
Certified Levels of Class 2b and 3 Medium-Duty Vehicles] indicates ranges in certification level
value (corresponding to the actual test results combined with the deterioration factors) of 9 to
192 mg/mile (average ca. 92 mg/mile) for Class 2b and 74 to 120 mg/mile (average ca. 102
mg/mile) for Class 3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
17 US EPA Light-Duty Vehicle Certification Database, https://www.epa.gov/compliance-and-fuel-
economy- data/annual-certification-data-vehicles-engines-and-equipment
Our review of available EPA FTP certification data for Class 2b and 3 diesel-fueled vehicles
finds current reported ranges in certification level value (corresponding to the actual test results
combined with the deterioration factors) of 113 to 180 mg/mile (average ca. 147 mg/mile) for
Class 2b and 136 to 190 mg/mile (average ca. 163 mg/mile) for Class 3 vehicles. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
Given the proportional vehicle weights, reported NMOG+NOx certification values of best-in-
class performers, as well as the need to provide further air quality benefits, MECA believes
gasoline and diesel fueled medium-duty vehicles are capable of complying with the lower
NMOG+NOx standards proposed by EPA. Furthermore, the removal of the highest certification
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bins (i.e., >160 mg/mile NMOG+NOx) will provide significant emission benefits by removing
the highest emitting vehicles from the fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
With respect to proposed PM standards for medium-duty vehicles, MECA supports EPA's
proposed limits that match light-duty vehicles. The combination of advanced fuel injection and
gasoline particulate filters on medium-duty gasoline vehicles can enable compliance with
proposed standards. Based on over 15 years of experience with diesel emission controls,
medium-duty diesel vehicles that implement DPFs will be able to meet the stringent PM
requirements proposed in this rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
Medium-duty vehicles with Gasoline Engines
Historically, spark-ignition engine FTP tests have shown that the majority of NMHC, CO, and
NOx emissions occur during the cold start phase; however, emissions during warmed-up and hot
operation, specifically during high-load operation, can also significantly contribute to emissions,
especially with heavier MD and HD vehicles. There are a variety of measures that can be utilized
on spark-ignition gasoline engines to further reduce emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0564, pp. 12-24]
Engine Mapping and Calibration
In order to comply with lower NMOG+NOX and PM emissions standards over certification
cycles such as the FTP, US06, SC03, and LA92, manufacturers will employ improved engine
maps and calibration strategies of existing engines and emission control related systems. Other
design changes to system architecture can be deployed to manage engine-out emissions and
exhaust flows, reduce catalyst light-off times, increase exhaust temperatures during periods of
low-load or idle and reduce excessive warmed-up and hot running emissions to protect engine
and emission control components which are susceptible to deterioration from extended exposure
to severe exhaust temperatures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
Exhaust Emission Control Technologies
Several emission control choices can be made to improve and optimize emission control
performance. For gasoline engines, the technology base of advanced three-way catalysts
deposited on high cell density (as high as 1200 cells/in2), thin-walled substrates (approaching
0.05mm) have evolved dramatically for light- and medium-duty chassis certified vehicles to
comply with Tier 3/LEV 3 standards. Recent advances have yielded high porosity, low thermal
mass substrates with narrow pore size distributions, which enable high emission reduction
efficiency with less precious metal loading. 18,19 Catalyst manufacturers have also developed
coating techniques based on layered or zoned architectures to strategically deposit precious
metals in ways that optimizes their performance and cost. These advanced catalysts are then
packaged using specially designed matting materials and passive thermal management strategies
which can be used to allow chassis certified medium-duty trucks to meet the stringent Tier 3
emission fleet average limit of 30 mg/mile or approximately 100 mg/bhp-hr. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
18 T. Asako, D. Saito, T. Hirao and E. Popp, SAE 2022-01-0543.
19 J. Warkins, T. Tao, M. Shen and S. Lyu, SAE 2020-01-0652.
Reducing Cold Start Emissions
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Close-coupled catalyst exhaust architectures (with or without a secondary underfloor
converter) have been used on light-duty vehicles starting with Tier 2 LDV standards and are an
effective strategy for addressing cold-start or low-load operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0564, pp. 12-24]
Secondary air injection can also be used to accelerate catalyst activation under cold-start
conditions in spark ignition engines. Using a richer air/fuel ratio via intake air throttling,
retarding fuel injection, or post combustion in-cylinder fuel additions during the exhaust stroke
while injecting air directly into the exhaust port of the engine, results in excess fuel combustion
within the exhaust manifold, creating additional heat that results in increasing catalyst
temperatures to achieve faster catalyst light-off These strategies can also be coupled with
exhaust gas recirculation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
Spark-ignition engines that employ a richer cold start calibration used in combination with a
secondary air injection system experience improved combustion stability. In addition, the richer
calibration is less sensitive to variations in fuel volatility since less volatile fuels may lead to
poor start and idle performance on engines calibrated to run lean during cold operation20,21
(Serrano, et al., 2009) (Lee & Heywood, 2010). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
20 Serrano, D., Lavy, J., Kleeman, A., Zinola, S., Dumas, J., Le Mirronet, S., & Heitz, D., SAE 2009-01-
2706.
21 Lee, D., & Heywood, J., SAE 2010-01-2124.
In support of the Tier 3 light-duty regulation,22 EPA tested a 2011 LDT4 pick-up truck with a
5.3L V8 engine that included a MECA supplied aftertreatment system. The aftertreatment
package consisted of advanced catalyst coating on 900 cpsi substrates in the close-coupled
location as well as underfloor catalysts and was aged to 150,000 miles. The system was
combined with cylinder deactivation and achieved an FTP NMHC+NOx level of 18 mg/mile.
We believe that these same technology approaches can be deployed on medium-duty gasoline
engines to meet more stringent emission levels than those being currently proposed. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
22 https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/proposed-rule-and-related-materials-
control-air-pollution
Medium-duty Vehicles with Diesel Engines
With regards to diesel engine emissions, MECA members have been developing and
commercializing a full suite of technologies to help medium and heavy-duty engine
manufacturers to comply with the MY 2027 heavy-duty engine standards and these technologies
can be readily applied to medium-duty chassis certified vehicles as well. Exhaust and emission
control technologies include next generation close coupled and under chassis selective catalytic
reduction (SCR), oxidation and diesel soot ignition catalysts with high porosity, low thermal
mass substrates with heated catalyst and urea dosing strategies. These can be combined with
engine thermal management strategies such as cylinder deactivation and advanced forms of
turbocharging and EGR. These technologies already exist on some passenger car applications in
Europe where real driving emission test procedures demand them. We further elaborate on these
technologies below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
Cylinder Deactivation and Variable Valve Actuation
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Cylinder deactivation (CDA) is an established technology on light-duty gasoline vehicles,
with the primary objective of reducing fuel consumption and C02 emissions. This technology
combines hardware and software computing power to, in effect, "shut down" some of an
engine's cylinders, based on the power demand, and keep the effective cylinder load in an
efficient portion of the engine map without burning more fuel. Based on decades of experience
with CDA on gasoline passenger cars and trucks, CDA is now being adapted for diesel engines.
On a diesel engine, CDA is programmed to operate differently than on gasoline engines, with the
goal of the diesel engine running hotter in low-load situations by having the pistons that are
firing do more work. This programming is particularly important for vehicles that spend a lot of
time in creep and idle operation modes. During low-load operation, CDA has resulted in exhaust
temperatures increasing by 50°C to 100°C when it is most needed to maintain effective
conversion of NOx in the selective catalytic reduction (SCR) catalyst bed. In some
demonstrations, CDA has been combined with a 48V mild hybrid motor with launch and sailing
capability to extend the range of CDA operation over the engine, and this may deliver
multiplicative C02 reductions from these synergistic technologies.23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0564, pp.12-24]
23 https://www.meca.org/wp-
content/uploads/resources/MECA_2027_Low_NOx_White_Paper_FINAL.pdf
The use of variable valve actuation (VVA) is another approach for active thermal
management. VVA approaches include: early exhaust valve opening (EEVO), early intake valve
closing (EIVC) or late intake valve closing (LIVC), all considered active thermal management
strategies. Both EIVC and LIVC reduce the amount of air trapped at valve closing. Both methods
reduce the effective compression ratio and volumetric efficiency, resulting in lower NOx
emissions and reduced air-fuel ratio, and in turn, hotter exhaust temperature. EEVO results in
hotter exhaust gas to heat-up aftertreatment; however, more fueling is needed to maintain brake
power output. This results in a C02 emissions penalty that must be accounted for in calibrating
for better fuel economy and higher engine-out NOx during hot operation when the SCR can be
used to remediate NOx emissions. VVA offers some potential cost savings and is therefore used
in some medium- duty applications as a fast heat-up strategy. OEMs will have multiple pathways
at varying costs to achieve their thermal management objectives and achieve ultra-low NOx
emissions in low-load and low-speed operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
Modern Turbochargers
Modern turbochargers have a variety of available design options enabling lower C02
emissions by improving thermal management capability, such as: i) state of the art
aerodynamics, ii) electrically-actuated wastegates that allow exhaust gases to by-pass the
turbocharger to increase the temperature in the aftertreatment, and iii) advanced ball bearings to
improve transient boost response. These and other technologies are available to support further
reductions in C02 and other emissions. More advanced turbochargers are designed with a
variable nozzle that adjusts with exhaust flow to provide more control of intake pressure and
optimization of the air-to-fuel ratio for improved performance (e.g., improved torque at lower
speeds) and fuel economy. These variable geometry turbochargers (VGT), also known as
variable nozzle turbines (VNT) and variable turbine geometry (VTG), also enable lower C02
emissions through improved thermal management capability to enhance aftertreatment light-off
Finally, modern turbochargers have enabled engine and vehicle manufacturers the ability to
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downsize engines, resulting in fuel savings without sacrificing power and/or performance. The
latest high-efficiency turbochargers are one of the more effective tools demonstrated in the DOE
SuperTruck program.24 In addition to affecting the power density of the engine, turbochargers
play a significant role in NOx and C02 regulations compliance. Continuous improvement in
turbocharger technology is making it possible to run very lean combustion (high air/fuel ratios),
which increases efficiency. This improvement allows for very low particulate generation and
even lower engine-out NOx. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
24 Navistar, "Final Scientific/Technical Report for SuperTruck Project: Development and Demonstration
of a Fuel-Efficient, Class 8 Tractor & Trailer Engine System," 2016.
Turbo-compounding
Turbo-compounding is a variant of turbocharger technology that allows for the energy from
the exhaust gas to be extracted, converted to mechanical or electrical energy and either
mechanically added to the engine crankshaft through a transmission or stored electrically for
opportunistic use in other driving conditions. Mechanical turbo- compounding has been
employed on some commercial diesel engines, and EPA estimated penetration to reach 10% in
the U.S. by the time the Phase 2 GHG Regulation is fully implemented in 2027.25 An early 2014
version of a turbo-compound-equipped engine was used during the first stage of testing at SwRI
under the HD Low NOx Test Program, and the results from this engine with advanced
aftertreatment have been summarized in several SAE technical papers.26,27,28 While turbo-
compounding has the potential to reduce fuel consumption, it can result in lower exhaust
temperatures that can challenge aftertreatment performance. Therefore, it is important to
consider turbo-compound designs that incorporate bypass systems during cold start and low load
operation or electrically driven turbo-compounding systems where the unit can be placed after
the aftertreatment system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
25 U.S. EPA, "Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty
Engines and Vehicles ~ Phase 2," Federal Register, pp. 73478-74274, 25 October 2016.
26 C. Sharp, C. C. Webb, G. Neely, J. V. Sarlashkar, S. B. Rengarajan, S. Yoon, C. Henry and B. Zavala,
SAE 2017-01-0958.
27 C. Sharp, C. C. Webb, G. Neely, M. Carter, S. Yoon and C. Hemy, SAE 2017-01-0954.
28 C. Sharp, C. C. Webb, S. Yoon, M. Carter and C. Hemy, SAE 2017-01-0956.
Driven Turbochargers
Driven turbochargers can be used to control the speed of the turbomachinery independently of
the engine's exhaust flow and vary the relative ratio between engine speed and turbo speed.
Driven turbochargers may be utilized for several reasons, including performance, efficiency, and
emissions. Considered an 'on-demand' air device, a driven turbocharger also receives transient
power from its turbine. During transient operation, a driven turbocharger will behave like a
supercharger and consume mechanical or electrical energy to accelerate the turbomachinery for
improved engine response. At high-speed operation, the driven turbocharger will return
mechanical or electrical power to the engine in the form of turbo-compounding, which recovers
excess exhaust power to improve efficiency. This cumulative effect lets a driven turbocharger
perform all the functions of a supercharger, turbocharger, and turbo-compounder. NOx emission
control uniquely benefits from the application of driven turbochargers in several ways, including
the ability to decouple EGR from boost pressure, reduce transient engine-out NOx, and improve
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aftertreatment temperatures during cold start and low load operation. Bypassing a driven turbine
can provide quick temperature rises for the aftertreatment while still delivering the necessary
boost pressure to the engine through supercharging, which also increases the gross load on the
engine to help increase exhaust temperature.29 Testing has shown that routing engine exhaust to
the aftertreatment by bypassing a turbocharger is one of the most effective methods to heat up
the aftertreatment.30 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
29 J. Brin, J. Keim, E. Christensen, S. Holman and T. Waldron, SAE 02-14-03-0032.
30 Navistar, "Final Scientific/Technical Report for SuperTruck Project: Development and Demonstration
of a Fuel-Efficient, Class 8 Tractor & Trailer Engine System," 2016.
Hybridization
Mild Hybridization
48-volt mild hybrid electrical systems and components are expected to make their way onto
commercial diesel vehicles in the near future. These 48-volt systems can be found on many light-
duty vehicle models (primarily in Europe) from Mercedes, Audi, VW, Renault and PSA. In the
U.S., Stellantis is offering a 48-volt system on the RAM 1500 pick- up and the Jeep Wrangler
under the eTorque trademark. Because the safe voltage threshold is 60 volts, which is especially
important when technicians perform maintenance on the electrical system, 48-volt systems are
advantageous from an implementation standpoint. From a cost perspective, 48-volt systems
include smaller starter and wire gauge requirements, offering cost savings from a high voltage
architecture of a full hybrid. The U.S. Department of Energy's SuperTruck II program teams
employed 48-volt technologies on their vehicles to demonstrate trucks with greater than 55%
brake thermal efficiency. A recent study demonstrated through model-based simulations that a
48-volt technology package combined with advanced aftertreatment can achieve a composite
FTP emission level of 0.015 g/bhp-hr.31 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
31 F. Dhanraj, M. Dahodwala, S. Joshi, E. Koehler, M. Franke and D. Tomazic, 2022-01-0555.
Similar to the passenger car fleet, truck OEMs are considering replacing traditionally
mechanically-driven components with electric versions to gain efficiency. Running accessories
off 48-volt electricity rather than 12-volts is more efficient due to reduced electrical losses and
because components that draw more power, such as pumps and fans, have increased efficiency
when operating at higher voltages. The types of components that may be electrified include,
electric turbos, electronic EGR pumps, AC compressors, electrically heated catalysts, electric
cooling fans, oil pumps and coolant pumps, among others. Another technology that 48-volt
systems could enable is electric power take-offs rather than using an engine powered auxiliary
power unit or idling the main engine during hoteling while the driver rests. MECA members
supplying commercial 48 V components for commercial vehicles believe that the technology may
be feasible to apply to a limited number of engine families by 2024, and it is likely to see greater
penetration by 2027, especially on Class 8 line-haul where full hybridization is less practical.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
Mild hybridization covers a range of configurations, but a promising one includes an electric
motor/generator, regenerative braking, electric boost and advanced batteries. Stop/start
deployment also provides a thermal management benefit to the aftertreatment by preventing
cooling airflow through the aftertreatment during hot idle conditions. In this way, 48-volt mild
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hybridization is complementary technology to CDA and start-stop capability, allowing the
combination of multiple technologies on a vehicle to yield synergistic benefits and justify the
cost. By shutting off the engine at idle or motoring using start/stop, micro hybrid technology can
help to maintain aftertreatment temperature by avoiding the pumping of cold air through the
exhaust. Capturing braking energy and storing it in a small battery for running auxiliary
components when the engine is off offers another C02 reducing strategy for OEMs to deploy.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
In lighter medium-duty applications, advanced start-stop systems have been developed that
use an induction motor in a 48-volt belt-driven starter-generator (BSG). When the engine is
running, the motor, acting as a generator, will charge a separate battery. When the engine needs
to be started, the motor then applies its torque via the accessory belt and cranks the engine
instead of using the starter motor. The separate battery can also be recharged via a regenerative
braking system. In addition to the start- stop function, a BSG system can enhance fuel economy
even during highway driving by cutting off the fuel supply when cruising or decelerating. Such
systems can also be designed to deliver a short power boost to the drivetrain. This boost is
typically 10 to 20 kW and is limited by the capacity of the 48 V battery and accessory belt linking
the motor to the crankshaft. New designs are linking the BSG directly to the crankshaft and
allowing additional power boost of up to 30kW to be delivered, giving greater benefits to light
and medium commercial vehicles.32 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
32 https://www.meca.org/wp-
content/uploads/resources/MECA_2027_Low_NOx_White_Paper_FINAL.pdf
Full hybridization and plug-in hybrids
Full hybrid configurations are currently found on several models of light-duty passenger cars
and light trucks in the U.S. and a limited number of medium-duty trucks. These include PHEV
models that can also be plugged-in to enable all-electric operation over a defined all-electric
range (AER). A full hybrid can enable electrification of many of the components described
above for mild hybrid vehicles, but the higher voltages allow for more parts to be electrified and
to a larger degree of efficiency. Full hybrids implementing larger electric motors and batteries,
can also support greater acceleration capability and regenerative braking power. Full hybrid
vehicles have made the highest penetration into parcel delivery, beverage delivery and food
distribution vehicles because they can take advantage of regenerative braking in urban driving.33
We expect to see some application of full hybrids combined with low NOx engines to reduce
C02 emissions in several vocational and local delivery applications. Integrated electric drivetrain
systems, consisting of a fully qualified transmission, motor and power electronics controller, are
now commercially available. With power levels of over 160kW and the ability to meet high
torque requirements, these systems enable electrification of medium-duty commercial vehicles.
There is also an increasing number of electric drivetrain solutions up to 300kW that are suitable
for medium and heavy-duty vehicles that can be used with either battery or fuel cell power
sources.30 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
33 CARB, "Draft Technology Assessment: Heavy-Duty Hybrid Vehicles," 2015.
30 Navistar, "Final Scientific/Technical Report for SuperTruck Project: Development and Demonstration
of a Fuel-Efficient, Class 8 Tractor & Trailer Engine System," 2016.
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Plug-in hybrids (PHEVs) can be practical for light and medium- duty trucks (e.g., Classl
through 3) that do not travel long distances or operate for long periods of time without returning
to a central location. In addition, serial plug-in hybrids which employ an engine operating only
as a generator to charge the traction battery to extend range, offer operational flexibility for
commercial vehicles while full electric vehicles and their needed infrastructure are established. It
is worth noting that both HEVs and PHEVs are able to achieve significant GHG benefits
compared to their conventional vehicle counterparts by employing relatively low-capacity
batteries. Further discussion on efficient use of battery critical materials is presented below and
displayed in Table 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG (M-B)
Diesel-Powered MDVs Are Not Considered in EPA's NPRM PM Feasibility Analysis [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 17]
Decarbonization of the Medium Duty segment is not an easy path and requires huge
investments in development, manufacturing, supply chains, and infrastructure - for customers,
the public, and for industry. The adjustment proposed to the emission limits should remain
feasible and obtainable for diesel-powered vehicles to avoid negative economic impacts to the
MDV segment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 17]
Today's Mercedes-Benz diesel-powered Sprinters form the benchmark for C02 emissions
when compared to other MDVs. A diesel Sprinter van has between a 23%-27% MPG advantage
when compared to a competitor vehicle in terms of fuel economy, and C02 emissions can be up
to 20% lower based on the efficiency of a diesel powertrain: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623,
p. 17]
[See original for graph on C02 Comparison Between MDVs in Class 2b Segment (g/mi)]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 17]
These benefits, however, must be balanced with other portions of EPA's proposal for criteria
emissions. Regarding EPA's proposed PM standards, existing ACCII standards have formed the
basis of development work and internal goals since the beginning of CARB engagement in 2020.
Significant work and investment is already underway to design to CARB's LEV IV PM
standards for MDVs. In stark contrast to the already finalized CARB LEV IV standards, EPA's
proposed PM standards are 16-20x more stringent than EPA's current MDV PM standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 17]
In proposing these aggressive PM standards, EPA's rationale is focused on MDV gasoline
engines, with the potential to match the capabilities of light-duty vehicle emissions levels once
GPFs are applied. This logic is problematic, but our main concern is that EPA has not considered
diesel specifications or technical limits as part of its analysis, leaving out a notable technology
pathway in this segment. The chart below depicts the significantly higher reduction burden EPA
proposes to apply to MDV, when compared to the proposed reduction in the light-duty segment.
Also illustrated below is the discrepancy in stringency between the NPRM proposed PM
standard and the PM standard adopted by EPA in December of 2022 in their Heavy-Duty Engine
Rule. The proposed PM limit of 0.5mg/mi is from 8 to 18 times more stringent than EPA's rule
promulgated just last year, after conversion from mg/bhp-hr standards to mg/mi across a typical
Class 2b/3 MDV vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 17-18]
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[See original for graph on Existing PM vs New PM Stringency Comparison (mg/mi)] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 17-18]
EPA's proposed jump in PM stringency in the MDV segment will pose a challenge for
MDVs, including diesel powertrains. Cutting edge technology and the best-known methodology
is already in use, in diesel-powered MDVs on the road today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623,
pp. 17-18]
Additional MDV Criteria Emissions Considerations
Mercedes-Benz is also concerned with the overall Tier 4 criteria emissions requirements for
MDVs. As such, our primary recommendation is that EPA align to CARB's ACCII LEV IV
requirements for MDVs, including but not limited to additional emissions bins, decoupling BEV
from the fleet average, and application of US06 testing. The emissions bins are necessary to
assist with reduction of burden and complications from the two differing approaches. They are
also useful for providing flexibility while Mercedes begins electrifying MDVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0623, p. 19]
Decoupling BEVs from the NMOG+NOx fleet average simplifies compliance planning, but if
EPA does not apply this approach then the fleet average standards need to be adjusted (or at least
adjustable) to account for potential changes in BEV projections during the time this rule is in
effect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 19]
Organization: North Dakota Farmers Union (NDFU)
Criteria Emissions
Further tightening criteria emissions standards on new vehicles may not be effective at
improving air quality, and it also discourages technologies that can help meet GHG emissions
reductions goals - and meet them today. For example, flexible fuel vehicles allow use of greater
ethanol blends, which provide increasing GHG emissions reductions. However, overly restrictive
criteria emissions standards make it more difficult to design engines, cold start strategies, and
catalytic aftertreatment which can handle the wide range of fuel properties required for flex-fuel
vehicles. Moreover, higher ethanol blends would reduce air toxic emissions that may be more
important to focus on with respect to light-duty and medium-duty vehicles that will continue to
use gasoline well into the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 6]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
CARB, MECA, and EPHO were generally supportive of our proposed MDV criteria pollutant
emissions standards. CARB referenced their analysis of certification emissions data which was
consistent with EPA's certification emissions data for MDV. The LEV IV fleet average
standards and U.S. EPA's proposed standards, while structured differently, were determined to
be of similar stringency for the same category of conventional ICE MDV, and because the
vehicles are required to meet similar emission levels in both programs, manufacturers would be
able to use the same technologies to meet both federal and California standards. EPHO
characterized the proposed MDV criteria pollutant standards as ".. .feasible and cost-reasonable."
EPHO characterized the proposed requirement for engine-certification of high-GCWR MDV as
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"...likely appropriate, but should be monitored for manipulation and efficacy." EPHO also asked
the Agency to monitor future data from MDV and from the heavy-duty engine in-use testing
program in order to assess emissions differences between high-GCWR MDVs and other MDVs,
and requested that the Agency commit to releasing a report any pertinent findings.
MECA provided a significant level of detail regarding specific technologies that are already
commercially available for reducing NMOG+NOx emissions. These included a description of
technologies similar to those currently used for light-duty truck applications, including both
passive (system design) and active (engine controls) thermal management of exhaust catalyst
systems; new, more advanced three-way catalyst coatings and substrate designs; and close-
coupling and use of secondary air injection for cold-start emissions control. MECA referenced a
report submitted to the docket for this rule detailing an integrated approach to criteria pollutant
emissions control applied to a gasoline/spark-ignition pickup truck. With respect to diesel
criteria pollutant and GHG emissions control, MECA referenced work from the U.S. DOE
Supertruck II program, in particular achieving FTP NOx emissions of 0.015 g/bhp-hr. MECA
commented that based on over 15 years of experience with diesel emission controls, medium-
duty diesel vehicles that implement DPFs will be able to meet the stringent PM requirements
proposed in this rule.
Cummins submitted comments regarding the lack of program to carry Tier 3 MDV
NMOG+NOx credit into the new program for certifying engines installed in high-GCWR
engines under part 1036. Cummins also supported fungibility of engine-certified high GCWR
MDV NOx credits within the heavy-duty ABT program.
M-B expressed concern that the Agency's assessment of the feasibility of the proposed MDV
PM standards was focused solely on spark-ignition gasoline engines equipped with GPF. M-B
asserted that the EPA "... has not considered diesel specifications or technical limits as part of its
analysis..." for the proposed rule. Similar to comments received with respect to our light-duty
criteria pollutant standards, M-B requested alignment with California ACCII LEV IV standards
including the decoupling of BEVs from NMOG+NOx fleet average standards, the approach to
US06 testing and standards, and additional emissions certification bins.
NDFU expressed a concern that tightening criteria emissions standards on new vehicles may
not improve air quality and that such standards would discourage technologies, such as flexible
fuel vehicles, that help meet GHG emissions reductions goals. In particular, they were concerned
that more stringent emissions standards would make it more difficult to design engines, cold start
strategies, and catalytic aftertreatment for flex-fuel vehicles. NDFU also asserted that reducing
air toxic emission by using higher ethanol blends may be more important for medium-duty
vehicles than reducing criteria pollutant emissions.
Response:
EPA agrees with CARB that LEV IV fleet average standards366 and U.S. EPA's final
standards, while structured differently, are of similar stringency for the same category of
conventional ICE MDVs. The emissions standards applicable to MDV are of comparable levels
of stringency in California programs and under the Federal program, and manufacturers would
thus be able to use the same MDV technologies to meet both Federal and California standards.
366 EPA has not at this time approved the waiver that would allow California to follow the ACCII program,
including the LEV IV requirements.
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With respect to EPHO's comments regarding high-GCWR MDV, EPA has not finalized a
requirement for engine dynamometer certification. Instead, EPA has finalized in-use standards
for high-GCWR MDV comparable to the California ACC II in-use standards for MDV with
GCWR above 14,000 pounds. Please refer to § III.D.5 "Requirements for Medium-Duty
Vehicles With High GCWR" within the preamble to this rule. With respect to EPHO's concern
that EPA monitor MDV and LHDE emissions, it should be noted EPA regularly conducts
confirmatory testing and other compliance testing, including surveillance testing, to ensure
manufacturer's full compliance with Federal emissions standards. The Agency also periodically
issues progress reports on vehicle and engine compliance activities. The latest report covering
the 2014-2017 model years was issued in April of 2019 (https://www.epa.gov/ve-
certification/compliance-activity-reports-vehicles-and-engines).
We greatly appreciate the level of detail provided by MECA regarding criteria pollutant
emissions control technologies for both spark-ignition and compression-ignition MDV.
MECA's detailed comments on MDV criteria pollutant emissions control technologies is broadly
consistent with EPA's analysis of MDV criteria pollutant emissions, emissions controls and
feasibility within Chapter 3.2 of the RIA.
Regarding Cummins comments about Tier 3 NMOG+NOx credit carry over, the Agency did
not finalize a requirement for high GCWR MDV engine certification, although engine
certification is still available as an option for high GCWR MDV (see Preamble § III.D.5 and
Response to Comments § 6.4). Chassis-certified high GCWR MDV may optionally choose early
compliance with the MDV criteria pollutant standards. Manufacturers choosing early
compliance may carry over Tier 3 Class 2b and Class 3 NMOG+NOx credits subject to the limits
for carrying forward NMOG+NOx credit within the Tier 3 program. With respect to Cummins
comments regarding averaging, banking and trading and fungibility of engine-certified MDV
NOx credit within the HD program, manufacturers opting to engine-certify high GCWR MDV to
LHD engine criteria pollutant standards under 40 CFR part 1036 would be fully eligible to
participate in averaging, banking and trading, including fully exchanging credits with other
engine families certified under 40 CFR part 1036, subject to the various credit provisions that
apply under 40 CFR part 1036, subpart H. Credits earned under 40 CFR part 86, subpart S,
before model year 2027 are not available for certifying engines under 40 CFR part 1036 for the
same reasons that 40 CFR part 1036 restricts the transfer of banked engine credits for certifying
model year 2027 and later engines. For example, engines installed in vehicles certified under 40
CFR part 1036, subpart S, have not been designed to control emissions for towing heavy
payloads, for low-load operation, or for other off-cycle operation. As such, allowing the
suggested use of credits would overstate the value of credits earned under 40 CFR part 86,
subpart S, and accordingly reduce the environmental benefits associated with the standards
adopted under 40 CFR part 1036.
In response to M-B comments regarding the feasibility of the proposed diesel PM standards,
EPA conducted a statistical analysis of composite FTP test results from 32 distinct MY 2022
through MY 2024 MDV test groups certifying to Federal Tier 3 emissions standards.
Composite FTP PM test results are shown using a box plot within the figure below. The
horizontal line represents the median MDV PM emissions test results (approximately 0.35
mg/mi). The "x" within the box represents mean MDV PM emissions test results (approximately
0.5 mg/mi). The upper and lower bounds of the box represent the first through third quartile of
MDV PM emissions test results. The "whiskers" above and below the box represent 1.5 times
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the interquartile range (IQR). Of the test groups above 1 mg/mi, 4 were MY 2022 M-B Class 2b
and Class 3 test groups and one was a MY 2024 GM test group. All of the MY 2022 M-B test
groups had PM emissions test results above the median and mean for all MDV and ranged from
0.6 to 1.1 mg/mi. It is notable, however, that the M-B test results for MY 2023 and MY 2024
were considerably lower, with all test groups having PM test results at or below the mean and 4
of the 5 test groups having PM test results lower than the median for all MDV test groups. M-B
introduced both engine changes and exhaust aftertreatment changes for MY 2023 that likely
resulted in the considerable PM emissions reductions observed within FTP certification test
results.
In following with the analysis outlined below, the agency believes that the final PM standard
for diesel MDVs of 0.5 mg/mi is feasible. The analysis of recent model year MDV diesel PM
emissions shows that the average manufacturer reported PM emissions for this segment is
already at the 0.5 mg/mi standard, and the median PM emissions is 0.35 mg/mi, which is below
the final standard. In other words, half of the reported values are below the final MDV PM
standard with a compliance margin. However, EPA recognizes that vehicles within this
regulatory class may not undergo redesigns as often as light-duty vehicles and the powertrains
with which they are equipped may have an equally long design life. As such, the agency has
decided to provide an additional year of lead-time relative to the proposal, for both the default
and early compliance. However, this additional lead-time is not reflective of the agencies
assessment of the feasibility of the 0.5 mg/mi standard for diesel MDVs, but rather the
recognition of the requisite redesign cycles for this regulatory class. In light of the above,
including this leadtime consideration, as well as our consideration of the statutory and other
relevant factors as described in sections III and V of the preamble, we find that the MDV PM
standard reflects "the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the application of
technology which the Administrator determines will be available for the model year to which
such standards apply." CAA section 202(a)(3)(A)(i).
•
Howe
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1.0
1 0.9
0.8
°-7
w 0.6
5
t 0-5
t
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Figure 1: Box plot of FTP composite PM emissions test results for 32 MY 2022 through MY
2024 MDV test groups.
EPA also notes MECA's comment that based on over 15 years of experience with diesel
emission controls, medium-duty diesel vehicles that implement DPFs will be able to meet the
stringent PM requirements proposed in this rule.
M-B's comment requesting decoupling MDV BEVs from the MDV NMOG+NOx fleet
average and adoption of California ACC II LEV IV MDV criteria pollutant standards is similar
to comments received by the Agency with respect to light-duty criteria pollutant emissions
standards. EPA is not finalizing a wholesale adoption of the California ACC II LEV IV
program. The ACC II program includes synergistic elements for both greenhouse gas and criteria
pollutant emissions, with the foundation of the ACC II program being a ZEV sales requirement.
M-B did not recommend adopting the ZEV standards provisions of ACC II and instead
recommended that EPA only adopt the criteria pollutant elements of ACC II. This ala carte
approach to emissions standards fails to consider the synergistic nature of California's ACC II
program. The treatment of ICE-based vehicles under ACC II is premised on an increasing
penetration of ZEVs and their associated emission reductions. EPA's 2027 and later MDV
program, being performance-based for both GHG and criteria pollutant emissions, relies on
increasingly stringent performance-based standards to achieve substantial emissions reductions
nationwide. EPA is, however, finalizing additional provisions in the FRM which are responsive
to requests for greater alignment with ACC II. These include:
• Alignment with all ACC II MDV NMOG+NOx emissions bins at or below Bin 170
• Adoption of in-use standards for high-GCWR MDV comparable to California ACC II
in-use standards for MDV above 14,000 pounds GCWR
• Alignment with California MDV OBD
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4.1.9 - Small volume manufacturer alternative criteria standards
EPA addresses comments related to small volume manufacturers for both GHG and criteria
emissions in Section 3.1.7 of this document.
4.1.10 - CARB's ACC II supplemental NMOG+NOx standards
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
4. Mid-Temperature Intermediate Soak Standard
In the NPRM, EPA describes that manufacturers are required to submit data for three separate
standards: 9-11 minutes for the 10-minute requirement, 39-41 minutes for the 40-minute
requirement, and 5-7 hours for the 3-12 hour requirement.263 Conversely, CARB's ACC II
regulations allow for manufacturers to use attestation to meet the respective requirement.264
Therefore, we request that EPA align with California's approach and allow attestation to meet
the mid-temperature intermediate soak requirement. Laboratory test burden will be significantly
reduced by omitting the requirement for manufacturers to provide test data at three different soak
times. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 148-149]
263 NPRM at 29276.
264 13 C.C.R. § 1961.4(d)(2)(B).
5. Early Drive-Away
a) Early Drive-Away Attestation
We request that EPA allow attestation to meet the quick drive-away requirement. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 149]
b) Early Drive-Away Speed Tolerance specification [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
149]
Due to the sensitivity of the early drive-away standard to variation and transients during the
initial part of the test cycle, Auto Innovators recommends a tighter speed trace tolerance for the
first seven seconds of the test to ensure the vehicle is fully stopped while the transmission is
placed in drive mode. A 0.3 mile per hour tolerance was proposed to CARB during the ACC2
rulemaking, but CARB did not incorporate the change due to lack of precedence for tolerance
variation in the other test cycles. Auto Innovators encourages EPA to fully evaluate the necessity
of a 0.3 mile per hour speed tolerance, and to adopt this change for the first seven seconds of the
cycle to address the unique nature and stringency of this requirement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, p. 149]
6.PHEV High-Power Cold Start Standard
EPA is proposing to implement the CARB LEV IV high-power cold start (HPCS) standard
for light- and medium-duty vehicles. "EPA requests comment on Step 2 of the PHEV HPCS
standard, Specifically whether the Step 2 standard should 1) be finalized as proposed, 2) have a
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start date later than MY 2029, 3) have an alternative stringency, either for all light-duty vehicles
or just for LDT3 and LDT4, or 4) should be removed, leaving Step 1 to apply indefinitely."265
Auto Innovators believes that for larger vehicles, especially those needing large towing capacity,
Step 1 of the PHEV HPCS standard should be extended through the end of the Tier 4 rule period.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 149-150]
265 NPRM at 29276.
PHEVs will be an especially important technology for use cases in which charging or
hydrogen refueling infrastructure isn't readily available, in particular for larger body-on-frame
vehicles that are designed for towing large loads. Due to the nature of these vehicles, the amount
of battery needed to meet the Step 2 provisions is difficult to achieve for the foreseeable future.
In addition, larger vehicles such as P/U and large SUVs tend to have a longer model life, making
it very expensive to modify if it needs to be done mid-model life. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 149-150]
Therefore, we believe that for GVWR > 6,000 lbs, extending the Step 1 provision through
MY 2032 is important to allow those vehicles time for market development. EPA should extend
Step 1 HPCS provision for GVWR > 6,000 lbs through 2032MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 149-150]
Finally, we recommend EPA allow OEMs to certify to this standard using attestation. The
vehicles would meet the standards, and be held to the standard, this would simply reduce the
upfront certification test. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 149-150]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Adoption of CARB ACC2 NMOG+NOx Provisions
The EPA has proposed adoption of three NMOG+NOx provisions for light-duty vehicles
aligned with the CARB ACC2 program (PHEV High Power Cold Starts, Early Driveaway and
Intermediate Soak Mid-Temperature Starts). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 14]
Ford supports EPA adopting these requirements using the existing CARB ACC2 bin-specific
standards. EPA's proposed alterations to the California requirements, including applying a
different bin structure, are unnecessary and add unwarranted complexity. In addition, Ford seeks
confirmation that the PHEV High Power Cold Starts mileage exemption requirement is tied to
the unadjusted all-electric range on the cold-start US06 driving cycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0605, p. 14]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
ICCT supports EPA's inclusion of the new provisions on vehicles' operating conditions for
light- duty vehicles that align with the CARB ACC II program. The additional operating
conditions include high power cold starts in plug-in hybrid vehicles, SFTP early drive-away, and
SFTP intermediate soak mid-temperature starts (called partial soak standard in ACC II). The bin-
specific standards are mostly congruent with those in the ACC II program with some slight
difference. Instead of having Bin 125, 25 or 15, the proposal includes Bin 10 which has more
stringent NMOG + NOx standards compared to CARB's. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp.
44-45]
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Organization: Kia Corporation
Kia Urges EPA's NMOG+NOx Emissions Standards Align with ACC II
EPA proposes adoption of a NMOG+NOx standard of 12 mg/mi by 2032 over four operating
conditions. These three conditions are not currently captured in test procedures and could result
in significant criteria pollutant emissions: high power cold starts in plug-in hybrid vehicles
(HPCS), cold FTP, and mid-temperature intermediate soak starts. The proposal represents a 60
percent reduction for light-duty vehicles that include a fleet average that declines from MYs
2027 - 2032, the elimination of higher certification bins, and a requirement for the same fleet
average emissions standard to be met across four test cycles (FTP, HFET, US06, SC03).
However, EPA proposes to keep all ZEV and non-ZEV vehicles in the fleet average. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 11]
Kia urges EPA to align its criteria pollutant regulation with the California ACC II program.
Kia supports EPA's proposal of requiring automakers to attest to meeting the three specific
CARB- defined test procedures: HPCS, cold FTP, and mid-temperature intermediate soak starts.
However, because California's ACC II NMOG+NOx fleet averaging standard applies to a non-
ZEV fleet average (in a phasing out ZEVs in the average), Kia does not support keeping all
ZEVs and non-ZEVs in one fleet average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 11]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
EPA should align with CARB's ACC II requirements for PHEV high power cold starts, early
drive-away, and mid-temperature engine starts. Similar to CARB, EPA should allow PHEVs
with all electric range greater than or equal to 40 miles to be exempt from the high-power cold
start requirement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 26-29]
MECA supports EPA's proposed alignment with CARB ACC II provisions to address
emissions from operation previously not considered by certification testing, including high
power cold starts of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, shortened idle and early drive-away after
start-up, and short to intermediate soak times in between engine starts. MECA believes that
emissions after engines are restarted after intermediate soak time, between three and eight hours,
can be readily addressed with engine calibration revisions without the need for additional
technology, and this is a cost-effective way to reduce these off- cycle emissions that are found
during real world operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 26-29]
Regarding drive-away emissions, we believe that faster system warm-up can be achieved
through improvements in calibration as well as the use of commercially available engine
technologies, such as turbochargers, exhaust gas recirculation (EGR), and cylinder deactivation
(CD A). Extensive engine calibration and combustion strategies, such as the use of variable valve
timing (VVT), have been developed to enable faster exhaust heat-up in order to increase catalyst
performance. Higher voltage hybrid architectures ranging from 48V mild to full hybrids also
create opportunities to incorporate electrically-heated catalysts (EHCs) to address these shorter
cold-start idle times. Additional aftertreatment efficiency gains have been and continue to be
developed through improvements in catalyst materials to enable higher performance at lower
exhaust temperatures. Furthermore, new system architectures, more robust thermal management
controls and advanced thermal insulation materials facilitate faster heat-up and heat retention
during real world operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 26-29]
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MECA acknowledges the need to better control PHEV high power demand engine cold start
emissions. In particular, MECA is aware of published work highlighting the use of engine and
exhaust emission control strategies to address high power starting emissions used in other
electrified hybrid powertrains.36 Several of the technologies and strategies listed above to
address "quick drive-away" emissions can also be employed to address emissions from off-cycle
high power starts. MECA believes that the proposed PHEV minimum requirements in CARB
ACC II address the shortcomings of some earlier generation PHEVs. To that end, EPA should be
finalized as proposed to harmonize with CARB ACC II on the Step 2 PHEV high power cold
start standard that exempts PHEVs with a cold start US06 all electric range of at least 40 miles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 26-29]
36 Kawaguchi, B., Umemoto, K., Misawa, S., Hirooka, S. et al., SAE 2019-01-2217.
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
Intermediate Soak Mid-Temperature Starts
EPA's proposal states that manufacturers are required to submit data for three separate
standards:
1. 9-11 minutes for the 10-minute requirement [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 15]
2. 39-41 minutes for the 40-minute requirement, and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 15]
3. 5-7 hours for the 3-12 hour requirement [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 15]
Testing at three different points triples the amount of testing required for each vehicle group.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 15]
In contrast, CARB's ACCII LEV IV regulation allows for manufacturer attestations under
Section 1961.4(d)(2)(B). This attestation provides testing relief and reduces the cost of
implementation, without any impact on emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 15]
Mercedes-Benz requests that EPA align with CARB ACC II LEV IV and allow attestation to
meet this requirement. Lab test burden and certification time will be significantly reduced by
omitting the requirement for manufacturers to provide test data at three different soak times.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 15]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary
EPA received comments on the proposed light-duty vehicle standards aligned with the
CARB ACC II program that range from supportive to those recommending changes to specific
parts of the program. Comments and EPA's responses for each of the three provisions are
provided below.
1) PHEV High Power Cold Starts
ICCT and MECA supported the high power cold starts (HPCS) provision. MECA noted that
emissions from HPCS were not previously considered by certification testing and describes
commercially available technologies that can be employed to address these emissions, including
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technologies described in published work. MECA recommends that EPA finalize the HPCS
provision, including exempting PHEVs with a cold start US06 all electric range of at least 40
miles in Step 2 of the program. Ford requested confirmation that the all-electric range exemption
is tied to the unadjusted all-electric range on the cold-start US06 driving cycle.
Ford commented that it supports EPA adopting the light-duty provisions aligned with the
ACC II program using CARB's ACC II bin structure, not the different structure proposed by
EPA, to avoid unnecessary complexity. Manufacturers requested that EPA should finalize more
bins to provide additional resolution in certifying test groups. AAI and Kia recommended that
manufacturers be allowed to attest to the standard to reduce test burden.
AAI commented that for larger vehicles, especially those needing large towing capacity, Step
1 of the PHEV HPCS standard should be extended through the end of the Tier 4 rule period and
Step 2 should not be adopted. A major manufacturer also requested that EPA not adopt Step 2 for
vehicles above 6000 lb GVWR.
2) Early Driveaway
ICCT and MECA submitted supportive comments for the early driveaway provision. MECA
noted that emissions from early driveaway were not previously considered by certification
testing and describes calibration strategies and several commercially available technologies that
can reduce early driveaway emissions.
Ford supported EPA adopting the early driveaway standard using CARB's ACC II bin
structure, not the different structure proposed by EPA, to avoid unnecessary complexity.
Manufacturers commented that EPA should finalize more bins to provide additional resolution in
certifying test groups. AAI and Kia recommended that manufacturers be allowed to attest to the
standard to reduce test burden.
AAI recommended a tighter speed tolerance for the first seven seconds of the early
driveaway test to ensure a test driver does not drive off much before 8 seconds.
3) Intermediate Soak Mid-Temperature Starts
ICCT and MECA submitted supportive comments for the intermediate soak mid-temperature
start provision. MECA identified that emissions from intermediate soak times were not
previously covered by certification testing and comments that elevated emissions from
intermediate soak times can be readily addressed with engine calibration revisions without the
need for additional technology.
Ford commented that to avoid unnecessary complexity, EPA should adopt CARB's ACC II
bin structure for the intermediate soak mid-temperature start provision. Manufacturers
commented that EPA should finalize more bins to provide additional resolution in certifying test
groups. AAI, Kia and Mercedes-Benz requested that manufacturers be allowed to attest to the
standard to reduce laboratory test burden.
Response
1) PHEV High Power Cold Starts
After considering the comments on HPCS, EPA is finalizing Step 1 and Step 2 of the HPCS
standard and is requiring manufacturers to provide data demonstrating compliance (instead of
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entirely relying on attestation) because according to EPA's modeling of the future fleet and input
from AAI and manufacturers, PHEVs may play a significant role in the future vehicle fleet and
that would make PHEV HPCS an significant operating mode.
EPA agrees with MECA that technologies can be employed to meet the HPCS standards but
also recognizes that manufacturers need time to implement these design changes, especially on
some models. To address that concern, the Agency is providing manufacturers with an extra year
to comply with Step 1 and Step 2, relative to the CARB program, to give manufacturers more
time to comply. The criteria pollutant phase in schedules described in preamble Section III.D.l.i
also provide additional lead time. EPA is finalizing the exemptions to Step 1 and Step 2 of the
standard as proposed.
In response to requests from Ford and other manufacturers for EPA to not adopt a bin
structure different from CARB's ACC II bin structure and to add more bins for additional
resolution, EPA is finalizing a bin structure that includes all CARB ACC II bins except Bin 125
and includes bins from 0 to 70 in increments of 5. EPA is not finalizing Bin 125 because EPA is
eliminating this bin from the list of bins available to light-duty vehicles (Preamble Section
III.D.2.i). The inclusion of bins from 0 to 70 is to provide manufacturers with additional
resolution in certifying test groups to meet the standard.
As noted in CARB's ACC II requirements, PHEVs with a minimum US06 all-electric range
value greater than 40 miles are exempt from the High Power Cold Start Standards for Plug-in
Hybrid Electric Vehicles. PHEVs achieving this minimum all electric range on a charge-
depleting cold start US06 test qualify for the exemption. The California regulations do not
specify applying any adjustments to the charge depleting US06 result when determining the all-
electric US06 range value. As EPA is adopting the California exemption from the High Power
Cold Start requirements for PHEVs with a minimum US06 all-electric range, EPA will also use
the unadjusted cold start US06 all-electric range for this determination.
2) Early Driveaway
EPA considered the submitted comments on early driveaway and is finalizing an early
driveaway standard with several changes from what was proposed. EPA is finalizing an early
driveaway standard and is requiring manufacturers to provide data (instead of relying on
attestation) demonstrating compliance. Field data indicates that there is a propensity of drivers to
drive off sooner than the delay represented in the FTP, making early driveaway a significant
operating mode. In addition, there are commercially available technologies that can reduce early
driveaway emissions and vehicle manufacturers have demonstrated that they are able to reduce
the emissions associated with this event.
EPA is finalizing a bin structure that includes all CARB ACC II bins except Bin 125 and
includes bins from 0 to 70 in increments of 5. EPA is not finalizing Bin 125 because EPA is
eliminating this bin from the list of bins available to light-duty vehicles (preamble Section
III.D.2.i). The inclusion of bins from 0 to 70 is to provide manufacturers with additional
resolution in certifying test groups to meet the standard.
In response to AAI's request for a tighter speed tolerance for the first seven seconds of the
early driveaway test, EPA is finalizing an early driveaway test in which vehicle speed may not
exceed 0.0 mph until 7.0 seconds and vehicle speed between 7.0 and 7.9 seconds may not exceed
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2.0 mph. This reduces the possibility of a test driver driving off significantly earlier than 8
seconds without setting unrealistic requirements on the test driver and doesn't significantly skew
the trace to drive-off times larger than 8 seconds. Details are provided in Preamble Section
III.D.7.ii.
3) Intermediate Soak Mid-Temperature Starts
EPA is finalizing an intermediate soak mid-temperature starts standard similar to what was
proposed but with several changes. EPA is finalizing an intermediate soak mid-temperature starts
standard because many current vehicles emit at elevated levels after an intermediate soak start,
intermediate soak starts occur frequently, and the issue can be readily addressed with engine
calibration revisions without the need for additional technology.
In response to comments from Ford and other manufacturers, EPA is finalizing a bin
structure that includes all CARB ACC II bins except Bin 125 and includes bins from 0 to 70 in
increments of 5. EPA is not finalizing Bin 125 because EPA is eliminating this bin from the list
of bins available to light-duty vehicles (preamble Section III.D.2.i). The inclusion of bins from 0
to 70 is to provide manufacturers with additional resolution in certifying test groups to meet the
standard.
EPA proposed that manufacturers provide certification test data at three intermediate soak
times and attest to meeting the standard at all other times between 10 minutes and 12 hours. The
purpose of manufacturers supplying test data is to ensure compliance with the standard. EPA
considered requests from AAI, Kia and Mercedes-Benz to allow attestation to the standard at all
soak times and appreciates that intermediate soak testing takes time. To achieve a balance
between high confidence in compliance and minimizing test burden, EPA is finalizing that
manufacturers submit certification test data at a minimum of one intermediate soak time
(between 39 and 41 minutes) and attest to meeting the standard at other times between 10
minutes and 12 hours.
5 - On board diagnostics (OBD)
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
IX. OBD
A. Gasoline Particulate Filter (GPF) § 86.1806-27 Onboard diagnostics. Section (h)
1. PM Filter Threshold
EPA proposes adding monitoring requirements for GPFs installed on vehicles with spark-
ignition engines in §86.186-27(h). These are new requirements for GPFs that do not exist in
either California's OBD II regulations (see 13 CCR §1968.2) or EPA's regulations. The
proposed regulation requires the OBD system to detect a malfunction before any of the following
thresholds are exceeded (§86.1806-27(h)(2): [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 249]
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- (i) Filtering decreases to the point that PM exceeds 10 mg/mile. If no malfunction of the
GPF can cause emissions to exceed 10 mg/mile, the OBD system must detect when free flow
through the filter such that 30% of less of the normal filtration is occurring. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 249]
- (ii) When excessive GPF regeneration frequency would cause HC, CO, or NOx to exceed
1.5x the applicable FTP standard. If no malfunction could cause emissions to exceed 1.5x the
applicable standard, the OBD system must detect when PM filter regeneration exceeds the design
limits for allowable regeneration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 249]
- (iii) When regeneration does not restore the GPF when regeneration is designed to occur.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 249]
With respect to the 10 mg/mile standard, we note the California OBD threshold for diesel
particulate filters is 17.5 mg/mile though MY28, and while the California diesel PM threshold
drops to 10 mg/mile starting in MY29, no vehicles have currently certified to a 10 mg/mile
threshold. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 249]
We would also like to work with EPA to clarify whether EPA intends to apply the 10 mg/mi
standard to every emission correlated major monitor, or only for GPF monitoring. We
recommend a GPF monitoring threshold of 10 mg/mi or higher and harmonizing all other
monitors with CARB OBD requirements of 17.5 mg/mi. See Section VIII.C. (Figures 83-85)
below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 249]
3. GPF Monitoring Requirements
a) Detection Requirements
When developing a GPF monitor, manufacturers often target six-sigma separation between
worst performing acceptable (WPA or "good parts") and best performing unacceptable (BPU or
"bad parts"). To achieve this separation, there needs to be enough separation in systems that
meet the emission standard and those that should turn on the MIL for the OBD threshold. As the
emission standards decrease, the OBD threshold multiplier needs to increase to provide
necessary separation for a robust monitor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
We propose to revise the language found in (§ 86.1806-27 (h)(2)(i), to read:
If there is no failure or deterioration of the PM filter that could cause a vehicle to exceed the
specified PM emission level, [Strikethrough: the system must detect a malfunction if the PM
filter allows free flow of exhaust through the PM filter assembly where 30 percent or less of the
normal filtration is occurring] [In Red: [Underline: the OBD II system shall detect a malfunction
when no detectable amount of PM filtering occurs . . .]] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
250-251]
This revision aligns with CARB's long-standing precedent for detection requirements and this
revision is the only option that is feasible with today's commercially available sensing
technology. Figure 81 below shows delta pressure curves as a function of exhaust flow from a
completely intact substrate and completely missing substrate. For a robust diagnostic,
manufacturers require at least six-sigma separation between these curves. At low exhaust flows
(of the Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP) or FTP drive cycle),
there is practically no separation between a fully intact substrate and a missing substrate. There is
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more separation at higher exhaust flows, as shown, but most of the higher exhaust flows are off
cycle (i.e., higher exhaust flow than a US06). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
The below example data with a delta pressure sensor shows the lack separation between an
intact and missing substrate. Requiring detection of a filter flowing 30% of normal would further
reduce the limited separation between "intact substrate" and "missing substrate". Therefore,
robust detection with this sensing technology is not possible for any partial failure modes of the
GPF. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
As demonstrated in the graph below, the delta pressure versus exhaust flow curves also
illustrates the challenge for meeting In-Use Monitor Performance Ratio (IUMPR) minimum
ratios for missing substrate detection. One way to address this could be by defining a special
denominator for this monitor. Following previous and current examples from both CARB and
European Union (EU) regulations regarding monitoring of Diesel Particulate Filter (DPF), the
following special denominator criteria are needed to ensure that the IUMPR requirements can be
met. We recommend that EPA add the following GPF special denominator criteria: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
- Minimum of 500 miles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
- High enough exhaust flow rate is achieved for a specified amount of time, and [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
- Alternate or additional denominator criteria, with Administrator approval. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
[See original for graph. "Figure 81: Delta Pressure vs Exhaust Flow Rate"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 250-251]
b) Thresholds for Detection
Additionally, we request that EPA harmonize with CARB as it pertains to (h)(2)(ii). EPA and
CARB should harmonize on GPF monitoring requirements to allow manufacturers to have one
OBD system for all 50 states. For the 1.5x multiplier for the regeneration frequency requirement
(§ 86.1806-27 (h)(2)(ii)), EPA should harmonize with CARB's OBD II Gasoline Thresholds,
which allow higher multipliers of the vehicles certifying to lower emission standards. For
example, as noted below in Figure 83, the SULEV30 OBD multiplier is 2.5x rather than 1.5x.
Industry and CARB agreed to these higher multipliers at lower standards to allow for robust
detection (i.e., no false passing or false failing) while still achieving the required In-Use Monitor
Performance Ratio minimums. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 251-252]
Auto Innovators agrees with EPA's proposal which harmonizes with CARB's gasoline three-
way catalyst requirements that allow partial volume monitoring such that the rear brick is
unmonitored. For systems that employ a catalyzed rear GPF, harmonization with CARB OBD II
requirements would only require PM emission correlation (not NMHC, NOx, and CO). Auto
Innovators' understanding of the proposal in (h)(2)(i) aligns with this recommended
harmonization, but we would like to confirm EPA's intention. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 251-252]
B. Incorporation by Reference
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Section 86.1806-27 (a) references CARB's OBD-II regulation (13 CCR 1968.2) dated
November 22, 2022. However, 86.1(d)(2) Incorporation by Reference (d)(2) refers to 13 CCR
1968.2 dated November 30, 2002. Auto Innovators recommends revising the 86.1806-27 (a) to
reference the November 30, 2022 version of the regulation, as that version incorporates revisions
specific to LEV IV. Auto Innovators recommends revising the language as follows: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 253-254]
(a) Vehicles must comply with the 2022 OBD requirements adopted for California as
described in this paragraph (a). California's 2022 OBD-II requirements are part of Title 13,
section 1968.2 of the California Code of Regulations, approved on November 3022, 2022
(incorporated by reference, see § 86.1). We may approve your request to certify an OBD system
meeting a later version of California's OBD requirements if you demonstrate that it complies
with the intent of this section. The following clarifications and exceptions apply for vehicles
certified under this subpart: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 253-254]
C. OBD Monitor Thresholds
Auto Innovators recommends EPA harmonize with CARB on OBD Gasoline and Diesel
monitor thresholds as written in 13 CCR 1968.2. OEMs and CARB worked together to develop
OBD emission thresholds that will allow robust detection while allowing IUMPR requirements
to be met. OBD systems require separation between WPA and BPU systems for robustness.
False MILs are a burden to all stakeholders, from the government agency to the customer and
auto repair shops. Therefore, separation between WPA and BPU is needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 254-258]
86.1806-27 (a)(8) says "for Tier 4 standards that have no corresponding bin standards from
the California LEV III program, use the next highest LEV III bin." Applying the SULEV15
multipliers to Bin 10 would require manufacturers to detect faults when NMOG+NOx exceeds
0.033 grams/mile which is much more stringent than what is required for LEV IV.
Manufacturers do not have experience with certifying vehicles at this emission standard and have
not demonstrated capability of detecting malfunctions robustly at this malfunction threshold.
Auto Innovators recommends that EPA adopt the same strategy CARB used for SULEV20 and
SULEV15 for the Tier 4 Bin 10 category. Due to uncertainty about how the lower standards will
affect OBD monitoring capability, this strategy includes interim OBD threshold multipliers for
the first 3 model years that SULEV20 and SULEV15 vehicles are introduced by manufacturers
(no later than 2030 model year). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 254-258]
SULEV20 and SULEV15 interim threshold multipliers are defined to correspond to detection
of malfunctions before emissions exceed 0.065 g/mi NMOG+NOx. Final thresholds are defined
at 0.050 g/mi NMOG+NOx. We recommend EPA adopt this same strategy and define an interim
NMOG+NOx monitor threshold multiplier for Tier 4 Bin 10 of 6.50 (for first three model years a
vehicle is certified to Bin 10, no later than 2030MY) and a final multiplier of 5.00. Figures 83
and 86below show the recommended thresholds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 254-258]
CARB has provisions in 13 CCR 1968.2 (e)(17.1.6)(B)(i) and (f)((17.1.8)(B)(i) that define
alternate malfunction criteria for engine cooling system thermostat monitor for LEV IV vehicles.
Therefore, we recommend that EPA allow the same alternative malfunction criteria for Tier 4
Bin 10 as is applied to the LEV IV SULEV15 category. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
254-258]
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Similarly, CARB has provisions in 13 CCR 1968.2 (e)(17.1.6)(C)(i) and (f)((17.1.8)(C)(i) that
define alternate test-out criteria for LEV IV vehicles. Auto Innovators recommends that EPA
allow the same test-out provisions for Tier 4 Bin 10 as is applied to the LEV IV SULEV15
category. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 254-258]
[See original for table, "Figure 83: Recommended Thresholds Passenger Cars and Light-Duty
Trucks"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 254-258]
[See original for table, "Figure 84: Gasoline Chassis-certified MDVs with GVWR < 10,000
lbs"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 254-258]
[See original for table, "Figure 85: Gasoline Chassis-certified MDVs with GVWR between
10,000 lbs and 14,000 lbs"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 254-258]
[See original for table, Figure 86: Diesel Passenger Cars, Light-duty Trucks, and Chassis-
certified MDPV's] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 254-258]
D. Vehicle Compliance
In the NPRM, § 86.1806-27 Onboard diagnostics it states that, "Vehicles may optionally
comply with the requirements of this section instead of the requirements of § 86.1806-17 before
model year 2027." Auto Innovators proposes EPA amend the language to harmonize with
1036.110 by adding the words "any or all" to the above language. Reference 1036.110, "You
may optionally comply with any or all of the requirements of this section instead of 40 CFR
86.010-18 in earlier model years." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 258-259]
The resulting language in 86.1806-27 would be written, "Vehicles may optionally comply
with any or all the requirements of this section instead of the requirements of § 86.1806-17
before model year 2027." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 258-259]
Organization: Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE)
AVE is also asking EPA to provide more clarity to its Proposed On-Board Diagnostics (OBD)
Program. Current OBD sensors can determine if a GPF has been removed from a vehicle and we
support this requirement. AVE also supports requiring OBD systems that can detect emissions
above lOmg/mi or a limit that is found measurable by current PM sensor technology. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 8]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Onboard Diagnostics
CARB's current onboard diagnostic requirements ensure that emerging emission control
technologies such as PM filters must be monitored and to date, a few manufacturers have already
certified vehicles so equipped for sale in California. U.S. EPA's proposed monitoring
requirements are consistent with the type of failure modes CARB already requires to be
monitored and CARB expects manufacturers would readily be able to meet CARB's
requirements with diagnostics developed to meet the proposed requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, p. 34]
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Further, due to the likely widespread use of PM filters across industry to comply with EPA's
proposed PM standards, CARB agrees that onboard diagnostic requirements should be amended
to explicitly address this technology. However, CARB suggests some modifications to the
proposed regulatory requirements. Specifically, in 40 CFR section 86.1806-27(h)(2)(ii), CARB
recommends replacing the phrase "HC, CO, or NOx emissions" with "NMOG+NOx or CO
emission" to align with how the applicable FTP standards are defined. Additionally, in this same
section, CARB recommends adding the PM emission criterion as "PM emissions exceed 2.0
times the applicable FTP standard" as PM emissions will increase if PM filter regeneration
frequency increases and a multiplier of 2.0 is consistent with the monitoring thresholds for PM
emissions within the onboard diagnostics program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 34]
In 40 CFR section 86.1806-27(h)(2)(iii), CARB recommends replacing the phrase "if
regeneration does not properly restore the PM filter when regeneration is designed to occur based
on the manufacturer's specified conditions" with "when the PM filter does not properly
regenerate under manufacturer-defined conditions where regeneration is designed to occur." The
phrase "regeneration does not properly restore the PM filter" lacks clarity unless "properly
restore the PM filter" is also separately defined. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 34-35]
Lastly, in 40 CFR section 86.1806-27(h)(3), CARB recommends two clarifications. First,
CARB recommends replacing the phrase, "The required minimum ratio for gasoline particulate
filters is 0.150" with, "The required minimum ratio for PM filter filtering performance monitors
(section (h)(2)(i)) is 0.150." This will clarify the in-use monitoring performance ratio
requirement applies to the filtering performance monitors of the PM filter. Second, CARB
recommends replacing the sentence, "Manufacturers must track and report the in-use
performance of PM filter monitors in accordance with 13 CCR 1968.2(d)(3.2.2)" with,
"Manufacturers must track and report the in-use performance of PM filter monitors under
paragraph (h)(2)(i) and (ii) in accordance with 13 CCR 1968.2(d)(3.2.2) " This will more
explicitly identify that the tracking and reporting requirements apply to filtering performance and
frequent regeneration monitors of the PM filter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 35]
Serviceability
Vehicle serviceability is the ability for a driver to be able to repair their vehicle at any repair
shop of their choosing and is key to sustaining driver use and maintaining emission benefits from
ZEVs. If consumers cannot find suitable repair shops for their ZEVs, there is a risk that they will
revert to conventional vehicles, limiting the emission benefits. To service vehicles, repair shops
need access to on-board vehicle data and service information defining how to diagnose, repair,
and maintain the vehicle, which not only requires some data standardization but also a way to
access the data on the vehicle through a standardized means, such as the SAE J1962 compliant
diagnostic connector. With the ACC II regulations, CARB added ZEVs to its service information
regulation 56 to require the same access and disclosure of repair information and tooling, as well
as the requirement that each vehicle be equipped with a standardized data set and equipped with
a SAE J1962 diagnostic connector. 57 This regulation requires manufacturers to provide the
same information to independent repair shops as they provide to their dealerships as is done for
internal combustion engine vehicles today. 58 CARB strongly recommends that U.S. EPA
include serviceability requirements for ZEVs in its proposal and, at minimum, a way to access
that data through a standardized SAE J1962 compliant diagnostic connector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, p. 42]
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56 Cal. Code Regs., title 13, section 1969.
57 Cal. Code Regs., title 13, section 1962.5.
58 For additional background on CARB's inclusion of ZEVs in the service information regulation as part
of ACCII, see ACCII Final Statement of Reasons for Rulemaking (FSOR), Including Summary of
Comments and Agency Response Appendix D Summary of Comments to ZEV Assurance Measures and
Agency Response, pp. 59 - 65
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/fsorappd.pdf and ACC IIISOR, Appendix
F-7, pp. 1, 10-13, 16.
Organization: Cummins Inc.
VII. Onboard Diagnostics
9. Cummins suggests revisions to the proposed LD and MDV onboard diagnostics
requirements for consistency with the HD OBD requirements in 40 CFR Part 1036
Cummins requests the following revisions to the proposed onboard diagnostics regulatory
language in 40 CFR 86.1806-27: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 10-11]
Cummins requests to revise the last sentence of the opening paragraph as follows:
"Vehicles may optionally comply with any or all of the requirements of this section instead of
the requirements of § 86.1806-17 before model year 2027." The addition of "any or all" would
align OBD for LD and MDV with the same flexibility given to manufacturers in 40 CFR
1036.110 to optionally pull ahead EPA 2027 HD OBD requirements before MY 2027. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 10-11]
To facilitate 50-state certification and avoid the potential for doubling the OBD
demonstration testing for manufacturers (i.e., demonstration to engine OBD thresholds for EPA
plus demonstration to chassis OBD thresholds for CARB), Cummins requests to add a new
paragraph (a)(10) similar to 40 CFR 1036.110(b)(l 1) and (i)-(iii), plus the underlined text: "If
you have an approved Executive order from the California Air Resources Board for a given
engine family, we may rely on that Executive order to evaluate whether you meet federal OBD
requirements for that same engine family or an equivalent engine family. Engine families are
equivalent if they are identical in all aspects material to emission characteristics; for example, we
would consider different inducement strategies, different OBD demonstration test
procedures/cycles, and different warranties not to be material to emission characteristics relevant
to these OBD testing requirements..." This addition would confirm that EPA would accept
CARB OBD certification for an equivalent family, including with different OBD demonstration
test cycles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 10-11]
Cummins requests to add a new paragraph (a)(l 1), aligned with EPA 2027 HD OBD
requirements in 40 CFR 1036.110(b)(6) to remove the in-use compliance/production vehicle
evaluation (PVE) requirements as applicable. Note the new paragraph (a)(10) described above
would align with the EPA 2027 HD OBD requirement for manufacturers to submit to EPA any
PVE test results executed on an equivalent CARB family. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp.
10-11]
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Organization: Ferrari N. V. and Ferrari North America, Inc.
On-Board Diagnostic Requirements
EPA is requiring new monitoring requirements for Gasoline Particulate Filters (GPFs)
assuming that CARB OBD II Regulation does not have a requirement for GPF diagnostic.
However, according to CCR §1968.2 (d) (7.2), CARB is already requiring GPFs to meet
malfunction requirements of sections (f) (9) (i.e. diesel PM filter) and (e) (1.2.1) (B) (i.e. catalyst
partial volume monitoring), which includes filtering performance, frequent regeneration,
Incomplete regeneration and catalyst function. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 6-7]
We already implemented all the GPF diagnostics required by CCR 1968.2 to obtain CARB
approval back in 2019, when we integrated GPF technology on US vehicles, gaining the
leadership among other manufacturers. In support of our commitment to CARB monitoring
requirements, the best technologies compatible with our applications have already been
implemented (e.g. pressure sensors). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 6-7]
Moreover, as stated in §86.1806-27 (h) (2) (i), EPA is proposing a different GPF monitoring
approach compared to CARB OBD II regulation. On the counter side, California requires OBD
systems to detect a malfunction only when no detectable amount of PM filtering occurs. In this
regards, the only technology commercially available for GPF monitoring consists in a couple of
pressure sensors, which sensing capabilities do not allow to fulfill EPA's proposal requirements.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 6-7]
Therefore, Ferrari suggests that EPA align with CARB's OBD II requirements for GPF
monitoring to avoid different OBD system architectures across the United States. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0572, pp. 6-7]
Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI)
HMG further recognizes there will be an additional cost of OBD-II diagnostic development,
implementation , calibration, and validation required to meet the proposed the PM standard.
Moreover, new engine hardware development would be required to meet the PM target without
GPF. For example, engines would require increased tumble, central mount injector, and high-
pressure fuel systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 5]
HMG has a number of additional comments. Regarding the lOmg/mi OBD emission limit,
there might be real-world driving maneuvers that generate higher PM at the diagnostic threshold;
further research is needed to ascertain their prevalence and impact. However, HMG suggests that
EPA conduct comprehensive studies to understand the prevalence and significance of these
driving maneuvers which would contribute to a more robust and well-informed decision-making
process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, pp. 9-10]
HATCI further believes the EPA's assumption that every manufacturer will utilize a pressure
sensor and be capable of monitoring the 30% functional threshold is inappropriate. Temperature
sensors are an effective method for satisfying emission and diagnostic requirements in Europe
and China. They can only be effective at detecting failures such as missing, cracked, or tampered
with GPFs. Even with switching to a pressure sensor, conditions such as ash buildup can make
diagnosing 30% GPF efficiency infeasible due to a high risk of false-fail or false-pass outcomes.
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Fault threshold requirements for GPF would ensure consistency and avoid unnecessary
complexity in the regulatory framework. HMG suggests that instead of 30% efficiency EPA use
the CARB wording for diagnostics where no malfunction exceeds the OBD emission threshold,
i.e. set a GPF malfunction when the system has no detectable amount of PM filtering capability.
Linking the threshold to the sensing capability of the system will reduce false-failure. It is
essential to consider these practical challenges and explore alternative approaches to ensure
accurate and reliable diagnostics. Collaborative efforts between manufacturers and regulatory
bodies can help identify innovative solutions that address the limitations associated with pressure
sensors and improve the overall effectiveness of OBD diagnostics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0554, pp. 9-10]
Like other diagnostics, TIJMPR performance depends on customer driving styles,
necessitating further evaluation. Conducting thorough data analysis, including studying customer
driving styles and their impact on the TIJMPR, would provide valuable insights into the
feasibility of this proposal. Including additional denominator conditions to the ratio, with
approval, for minimum exhaust flow or vehicle soak time can help to reduce concerns with
feasibility. Delta pressure diagnostics usually struggle with robust monitoring at exhaust flow
levels found on the FTP. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, pp. 9-10]
HMG also shares industry concerns regarding uncertainty surrounding the impact of the
Proposed Rule on the OBD approval process. It remains unclear whether OEMs must obtain
separate CARB OBD approval before undergoing another OBD review by the EPA for GPF
alone . Clear and unambiguous guidelines regarding the impact to the OBD approval process and
the interplay between CARB and EPA requirements would eliminate confusion and ensure a
smoother certification process for manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, pp. 9-10]
Finally, HMG shares concerns with industry regarding the proposed IUMPR value, which
mirrors the one set for Diesel Particulate Filter (DPF) in the existing CARB OBD diesel
regulation. Meeting this value has proven challenging for manufacturers in the past, underscoring
the need for a thorough assessment and potential adjustments to the Proposed Rule . Conducting
a comprehensive assessment of the feasibility and impact of the proposed IUMPR value for GPF,
accounting for the challenges faced by manufacturers in meeting the IUMPR value, would help
determine an appropriate and realistic parameter for GPF. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, pp.
9-10]
Organization: Kia Corporation
Kia does not support a more stringent PM standard of 0.5 mg/mi that must be met across three
test cycles (25 °C Federal Test Procedure (FTP), US06, -7 °C FTP) and is required to be met as a
per-vehicle cap, not a fleet average. 17 EPA's proposal of 0.5 mg/mi per-vehicle cap will require
a gasoline particulate filter (GPF) on every vehicle. Because GPF technology will be necessary
for meeting the proposed PM standard, OBD monitoring of the GPF system will be required to
detect GPF malfunctions, store trouble codes, and alert operators. 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0555, pp. 10-11]
17 88 Fed. Reg. 29,264.
18 88 Fed. Reg. 29,269.
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Kia is concerned about the feasibility and repeatability of the measurement accuracy of the
proposed 0.5 mg/mi standard. Because of these challenges there will also be challenges and
additional cost of OBD-II diagnostic development, implementation, and calibration for meeting
the standards. Consequently, Kia recommends considering laboratory PM measurement
variability and allowing re-test for exceedances during certification, confirmatory or in-use
testing, especially for vehicles equipped with Diesel or GPFs. We urge EPA to finalize
reasonable PM standards to allow automakers to focus new capital investments on the transition
to vehicle electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 10-11]
Kia Supports Harmonized On-Board Diagnostics Requirements with California
EPA proposes to adopt California's OBD-II standards CARB approved in November 2022
and proposes to put in a few more requirements that are not included in the 2022 CARB
regulation. EPA will add a new monitoring requirement for GPFs.27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0555, p. 15]
27 88 Fed. Reg. 29,293.
Kia urges EPA to adopt CARB's criteria emission standards under the ACC II (i.e., LEV IV)
and, similarly, to fully harmonize its OBD-II requirements with CARB's OBD-II requirements.
It is critical that the criteria emissions regulatory framework is streamlined. Again, since EPA is
requiring a 10-fold increase in EV sales, EPA needs to harmonize and streamline its criteria
pollutants standards as much as possible. Resources should not be diverted away from the
ultimate goal - transitioning successfully to electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p.
15]
EPA's proposed 10 mg/mi OBD emission limit seems reasonable for PM and NMOG+NOx,
but further research is needed on stringent PM emissions scenarios.28 Kia also recommends EPA
clarify in the final rule the OBD approval process and differing mission thresholds between
CARB and EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 15]
28 88 Fed. Reg. 29,417.
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
MECA supports technologically feasible OBD requirements that enable monitoring of
technologies for achieving EPA's proposed PM standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp.
11-12]
MECA supports EPA's on-board diagnostic (OBD) concepts, with some suggested changes,
related to GPF monitoring in response to the likely increase in implementation of PM emission
control technologies to meet the more stringent proposed PM standards. OBD is an essential part
of emission standards and provides vital information to drivers when repairs are needed in order
to maintain vehicle emission performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 11-12]
EPA has proposed that for vehicles with engine-out emissions that never exceed 10 mg/mile
and which use a GPF, the OBD system must monitor and alert if filtration performance drops
below 30% of "normal" filtration. MECA requests that EPA define the term "normal" for these
purposes and conduct testing with currently available PM sensors, including those that employ
pressure drop, resistive and electrostatic mechanisms for sensing, to set a level to be monitored.
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At a minimum, the OBD system should detect if a filter has been removed from the vehicle,
which is possible to monitor via currently available sensors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564,
pp.11-12]
EPA has proposed that for vehicles with engine out emissions that exceed 10 mg/mile and use
a GPF, the OBD system must monitor and alert if emissions exceed 10 mg/mile on the FTP. We
support this requirement and believe that advanced electrostatic PM sensors being
commercialized are able to meet these requirements. Furthermore, we support EPA working with
CARB to continually review the OBD monitoring requirements and determine where thresholds
may be lowered as sensor technology develops. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 11-12]
Sensor technology commercialization has a long cycle, including testing, design and real-
world deployment across many vehicles in the field to make sure sensors are reliable and
durable. This cycle is why stringent and predictable standards are an important signal to industry
to make investments today for technologies that will be needed in the future. Subsequently
reversing adopted standards leaves technology and investments stranded and creates a level of
uncertainty in the need for technology innovation. MECA members are engaged in developing a
portfolio of sensor options that can be installed on a vehicle to monitor emission performance.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 11-12]
Specifically related to this proposal on GPF monitoring, several advancements in PM sensor
technology have been demonstrated in the past few years. Some of this work was completed
(unpublished data) as part of the ongoing Particle Sensor Performance and Durability
Consortium (https://www.swri.org/consortia/particle-sensor-performance- durability-pspd-
consortium) managed by Southwest Research Institute. In addition, a 2020 study. 12 highlights
the potential of PM sensors to yield more data and greater sensitivity measurement as low as 1
mg/mA3. These advanced sensors have ben designed to help OEMs comply with the current
IUMPR and thresholds adopted by CARB. We encourage EPA and CARB to periodically review
the OBD monitoring requirements as PM sensor technologies evolve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0564, pp.11-12]
12 SAE 2020-01-0385
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
Gasoline Particulate Filter (GPF) and On-Board Diagnostics (OBD)
In the proposed rule, the agency calls for the diagnostic requirement to monitor for a removed,
missing, or damaged GPF causing the PM value to go above 10 mg/mi over the Federal Test
Procedure (FTP). Based on industry experience, even with a removed, non- existent or a strongly
damaged GPF, the gasoline vehicle PM-emissions are below 10 mg/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0644, pp. 10-11]
Considering the proposal for filtration efficiency monitoring below <30% efficiency, the
current available technology (based on a differential pressure [AP] sensor) is not sufficiently
accurate to detect the set threshold for filtration efficiency. Therefore, correctly identifying parts
a with filtration efficiency of < 30 % would lead to identifying components which still having a
significantly higher filtration efficiency as "Bad" (False Fail). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644,
pp. 10-11]
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The proposal puts a restriction on "frequent regeneration" of the GPF. However, the specific
tolerance for regeneration frequency is not mentioned. The limit for allowable regeneration
frequency is not adequately defined and is expected to be sensitive to the application. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 10-11]
Monitoring incomplete regeneration of the GPF would be very difficult due to part/part-
dispersion in a fresh state and increasing GPF differential pressure owing to ash loading over
lifetime as well as other related issues. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 10-11]
MEM A urges:
EPA to align with the CARB On Board Diagnostic (OBD) II requirements according to
current regulation 13CCR1968.2 listed below and as announced by CARB during the SAE OBD
Symposia during March 14th to 16th this year in Prague, Czech Republic: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0644, pp. 10-11]
• Filtering Performance: "the OBD II system shall detect a malfunction when no detectable
amount of PM filtering occurs".[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 10-11]
• Regeneration: Limitation of any regeneration monitoring requirement to active
regenerations, while passive regenerations do not need any monitoring. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0644, pp. 10-11]
• Infrequent Regeneration: Required to be monitored only for sensor-based regenerations,
but not for soot-load model-based regenerations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 10-11]
• Incomplete Regeneration: Postpone requirement until enough data is collected to clarify
details of active regeneration, including frequency of active regenerations which is expected to
below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 10-11]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
Mercedes-Benz is requesting EPA align with CARB's ACCII approach; EPA should
harmonize its OBD emissions threshold criteria with CARB's. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623,
p. 11]
In regard to the Regeneration ("regen") Frequency OBD Requirements, current OBD
emission threshold criteria evaluates NMOG and NOx as a combined threshold (i.e.,
NMOG+NOx). However, EPA's NPRM is proposing to include individual multipliers for HC,
NOx and CO. Since the OBD threshold multipliers are designed to work in concert with
emissions standards themselves, it is important to harmonize threshold multipliers to emissions
standard constituents (i.e., NMOG+NOx, CO, PM, etc.). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p.
11]
In addition, an OBD emissions threshold is proposed to detect a malfunction when emissions
exceed
1.5 times the applicable FTP standard for all emission Bins. CARB OBD regulations have
allowed higher multipliers as the emission standards become more stringent. Mercedes proposes
EPA adopt a similar approach for Regen Frequency OBD as other OBD monitors (e.g., provide
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2.5 times multiplier for Bin30/SULEV30 instead of 1.5 times). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0623, p. 11]
A vehicle will regenerate, or purge, the particulate filter when the soot accumulation reaches a
certain level. This regeneration process has been historically used for diesel vehicles which
utilize Diesel Particulate Filters ("DPFs"). As discussed above, EPA's proposed PM standards
will force the incorporation of GPFs for many gasoline vehicles. GPFs behave differently than
DPFs, and the EPA should incorporate language in the final rule that provides clear direction for
OBD test procedures and definitions related to GPFs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 11]
The EPA adoption of CARB OBD revealed some gaps in CARB's OBD definitions. While
EPA should address these gaps in the final rule, it is equally important that EPA work with
CARB, and the auto industry, to ensure CARB will also adopt the provisions as finalized [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 12]
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
Appendix- Technical comments on the OBD proposal.
1. GPF Monitoring Requirements
§ 86.1806-27, section (h)(2)(i) in the NPRM proposal requires the OBD system to "detect a
malfunction if the PM filter allows free flow of exhaust through the PM filter assembly where 30
percent or less of the normal filtration is occurring" [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 7-10]
OBD systems require separation between worst performing acceptable (WPA or "good parts")
and best performing unacceptable (BPU or "bad parts") systems. Manufacturers often target six-
sigma separation between WPA and BPU for robustness. False MILs are a burden to all
stakeholders, from the government agency to the customer and workshop. Therefore, separation
between WPA and BPU is needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 7-10]
Today, monitoring detection of a "removed GPF" (empty can or straight pipe) is challenging
with existing sensor technology. See GPF test results below utilizing a delta pressure sensor.
This illustrates that separation between an intact and missing substrate is challenging. The data
also shows that requiring detection of a filter flowing 30% of normal would even further reduce
the limited separation between a normal system and "removed GPF". Separation between an
intact and a partial GPF failure is not feasible, and the data illustrates that robust detection with
existing sensing technology is not possible for any partial failure modes of the GPF. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 7-10]
[See original for graph on GPF test results FTP75] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 7-
10]
[See original for graph on GPF test results FTP75 - trendline] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0624, pp. 7-10]
[See original for graph on GPF test results FTP75+UC cycle] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0624, pp. 7-10]
[See original for graph on GPF test results FTP75 + UC cycle - trendline] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0624, pp. 7-10]
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[See original for pictures on delta pressure curves as a function of exhaust flow from an intact
substrate, completely missing substrate, unplugged rear surface, drilled 20mm and drilled
50mm.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 7-10]
The pictures above show delta pressure curves as a function of exhaust flow from an intact
substrate (base line 100% normal filtration), completely missing substrate, unplugged rear
surface (30% of normal filtration), drilled 20mm (88% of normal filtration) and drilled 50mm
(43% of normal filtration). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 7-10]
a. VCC proposes revising the language found in (§ 86.1806-27 (h)(2)(i), to only require
detection "if the PM filter substrate is completely destroyed, removed, or missing, or if the PM
filter assembly is replaced with a muffler or straight pipe". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp.
7-10]
b. Another option would be to revise the EPA language to be consistent with the CARB
language for PM filtering performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 7-10]
"If there is no failure or deterioration of the PM filter that could cause a vehicle to exceed the
specified PM emission level, the OBD II system shall detect a malfunction when no detectable
amount of PM filtering occurs" [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 7-10]
The CARB language is not defining a specific amount of flow and it considers the monitoring
technology by referring to the minimum detectable flow the system can detect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0624, pp. 7-10]
The proposed revisions a. and b. are believed to be the only options that are feasible with
today's commercially available sensing technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 7-10]
c. The PM filtering performance monitoring is more robust at higher exhaust flow. There is
more separation at higher exhaust flows, as shown, but most of the higher exhaust flows are off
cycle. This would also be a challenge for meeting In-Use Monitor Performance Ratio (IUMPR)
minimum ratios for PM filtering performance monitoring. To address this, VCC proposes
defining a special denominator for the monitor. In addition, VCC recommends referencing the
exhaust flow rate to the special denominator and only allowing it to increment if a high enough
exhaust flow rate is achieved for a specified amount of time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624,
pp. 7-10]
VCC respectfully requests feedback from EPA on proposal la.,lb and lc. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0624, pp. 7-10]
2. Active regeneration requirements
§ 86.1806-27, section (h)(2)(ii) and section (h)(2)(iii) in the NPRM proposal requires the
OBD system to monitor too frequent and incomplete regeneration, respectively. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0624, pp. 10-11]
Active regeneration is very infrequent on petrol engines and happens only during extreme
conditions. For most systems it never happens on a legislative drive cycle (e.g., FTP, UC). This
would make it problematic to detect too frequent or incomplete regeneration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0624, pp. 10-11]
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At a meeting between EPA and Volvo, EPA staff indicated that active regen would probably
never be needed on a vehicle with a close coupled GPF or would only be needed very
infrequently for an under floor GPF application. However, the OBD system should identify
active regenerations and access if they are not working properly by the manufacturer's own
specifications. In principle the vehicle should monitor the regeneration and make sure that it is
happening correctly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 10-11]
a. If a manufacturer designs their GPF system without a "periodically active regenerating
system", then the manufacturer should not be subject to § 86.1806-27 (h)(2)(ii) or (iii). VCC
proposes adding a definition of a "Periodically active regenerating system" which is as a system
that requires active regeneration in less than 4,000 km/ 2,500 miles on a 25 deg C FTP. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 10-11]
b. VCC has a concern with requiring OEMs to monitor infrequent events. If such monitors are
required by EPA, Volvo would need additional insight and clarification on how the monitors
shall meet IUMPR requirements, and when to report monitor "pass" and "readiness". All this
would be important for the service technician and the customer to be able to pass the I/M
stations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 10-11]
c. A third proposal would be to skip the monitoring and have active regen in the AECD
description. If required, the manufacturer could provide a run time tracker (PID $8B). At the last
SAE OBD Symposium in March 2023, CARB indicated similar thoughts. Currently, CARB is
contemplating not requiring active regeneration monitors (only tracking through PID $8B).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 10-11]
VCC requests feedback from EPA on 2a, 2b and 2c. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp.
10-11]
EPA Summary and Response
EPA received OBD comments on several topics including the proposed GPF diagnostic,
monitoring thresholds, suggested regulation language changes, and accepting California
Executive Order chassis approval for vehicles using the same powertrains that are dyno certified
for Federal use.
EPA received many comments on its GPF monitoring requirement. Some comments
supported EPA's proposed GPF monitoring provisions. Other comments recommended that we
remove these requirements altogether. Additional comments suggested either specific changes to
regulator text and/or changes to specific requirements. Some manufacturers commented that
since they had already certified GPF's with CARB using the CARB OBD regulation, they
believed the CARB OBD requirement was sufficient to create a diagnostic. Commentors were
also concerned that EPA's separate OBD requirement would add significant certification burden,
requiring them to deal with both agencies for OBD approval. In response, EPA decided based on
the comments received to not finalize a separate federal GPF requirement and instead rely on the
CARB regulation for the needed GPF monitoring requirements. After working with stakeholders
who have created diagnostics using CARB's OBD regulation, EPA believes the CARB
provisions are sufficient to verify the integrity of the GPF system to ensure the federal emissions
standards.
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EPA received comments that based on the NMOG+NOx bin structure it was not clear what
the correct OBD thresholds for each bin would be. Based on the comments received EPA has
expanded the bins and added to the regulatory text clarifying language regarding what OBD
thresholds apply.
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation commented that we had incorrect dates for the
CARB OBD regulations incorporation by reference (IBR). EPA has corrected the IBR dates to
match the CARB regulation releases.
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation and Cummins both requested that EPA revise the
regulations to accept "any or all" of provisions of 40 CFR 86.1806-27 for vehicles certified prior
to MY 2027. In response, EPA disagrees with this change since the regulations of § 86.1806-17
already allow for manufacturers to request approval of new versions of the California OBD
regulations. If a manufacturer makes a request for such approval, a manufacturer must comply
with the new version in its entirety. EPA does not agree that it is appropriate to mix and match
different versions of the California OBD.
Cummins commented that there could be engine families that would be required to
demonstrate compliance to engine-based OBD thresholds for EPA plus demonstration to chassis-
based OBD thresholds for CARB, doubling the OBD demonstration work required of
manufacturers. Cummins requested to add a new paragraph (a)(10) to 40 CFR 86.1806-27
similar to 40 CFR 1036.110(b)(l 1) and (i)-(iii) to facilitate 50-state certification and avoid the
potential for doubling the OBD demonstration. EPA is not finalizing the proposal to require
vehicles with GCWR greater than 22,000 lbs to comply with engine-dynamometer-based criteria
pollutant emissions standards under the heavy-duty engine program. However, engine-
dynamometer-based certification will be optional for such vehicles. EPA disagrees that a 50-state
engine family (i.e., an engine family certified to engine dyno standards for both EPA and CARB)
would be subject to engine OBD demonstration for EPA and chassis OBD demonstration for
CARB.
However, EPA agrees that a 50-state engine family which fully complies with the CARB
OBD requirements and has received an Executive order from CARB should not require a
separate OBD demonstration for EPA certification. EPA added a reference to 40 CFR
1036.110(b)(l 1) in 40 CFR 86.1806-27 for the final rule to make it clear that these provisions
apply to engine families intended to be installed in heavy-duty vehicles at or below 14,000
pounds GVWR.
Cummins also requested EPA align with EPA 2027 HD OBD requirements in 40 CFR
1036.110(b)(6) to remove the in-use compliance/production vehicle evaluation (PVE)
requirements as applicable. EPA agrees with this comment and has added the appropriate
reference to 40 CFR 1036.110(b)(6) in 40 CFR 86.1806-27.
EPA received comments from CARB's requesting it add serviceability requirements for ZEVs
similar to ACCII. EPA did not propose or solicit comment on this change, and thus it is out of
scope for this rulemaking.
6 - Test procedures
6.1 - EV test procedures
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Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
VIII. Certification and Compliance Procedures
A. Electric Vehicle Test Procedures
As a result of the proposed battery durability and warranty requirements referenced in
section III.F.2 and section III.F.3, [323] EPA is proposing to update their BEV and PHEV testing
requirements outlined in section III.F.l of the NPRM. Based on what is outlined in this section,
we have a number of concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 215-216]
323 NPRM at 29286
1. BEV (SAE J1634) and PHEV (SAE J1711) Test Procedures
Our first concern relates to EPA's reference of the 2010 version of SAE J1711 for
determining UBE in PHEVs, as well as the 2017 version of SAE J1634 for determining Usable
Battery Energy (UBE) for class 2b and 3 BEVs. There currently are more recent versions of both
standards available - SAE J1711-2023 and J1634-2021. Under EPA's most recent Heavy-Duty
NPRM - "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle
Standards," Auto Innovators proposed to adopt the 2021 version of SAE J1634. EPA rejected
this due to concerns with the SMCT and SMCT+ tests enabled by the 2021 version. We continue
to encourage EPA to adopt the most recent versions of both SAE J1711 and SAE J1634. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 215-216]
Auto Innovators recently outlined our strong support for the adoption of SMCT/SMCT+
testing and harmonization with CARB under EPA's most recent heavy-duty NPRM. In those
comments, we said the following:
"We request the option to allow use of the Short Multi-Cycle Test (sMCT) and the Short
Multi-Cycle Test Plus Steady State (sMCT+) procedures. Allowing these procedures would also
harmonize with the CARB proposed test procedures and significantly reduce laboratory test
burden associated with BEV testing while providing equivalent test results. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 215-216]
EPA's current proposal prohibits manufacturers from using thermal conditioning during cold
soak periods. Unlike vehicles with internal combustion engines, managing battery temperature in
BEV vehicles is critical to battery durability, vehicle performance, and energy efficiency.
Thermal conditioning of the BEV propulsion battery can provide real-world benefits in these
areas. We would like to request for EPA to remove requirements explicitly prohibiting thermal
conditioning in order to not restrict emerging technologies that could improve real-world
performance and efficiency, for example under extreme cold start conditions during short trip
city driving. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 215-216]
We would also request for the use of thermal conditioning to be considered as part of the 5-
cycle test procedure approval process. Keeping in mind that the industry is still learning about
customer behavior related to BEV thermal conditioning, and any allowance of thermal
conditioning should be customer representative, either by default operation, manufacturer
instruction, or demonstrated real-word usage, we urge the EPA to allow manufacturers to
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incorporate new technologies such as this one, when sufficient justification is provided." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 215-216]
We stand by these comments and continue to argue for the adoption of SMCT/SMCT+
testing, as well as the allowance of thermal conditioning during cold soak periods, and to be
considered as a part of the 5-cycle test procedure approval process. Additionally, we would like
to request additional flexibility to allow EPA to run confirmatory tests to verify accuracy of any
of the three tests (MCT, SMCT, SMCT+) that it so chooses. That would eliminate any
uncertainty from EPA regarding the accuracy of the new SMCT/SMCT+ testing. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 215-216]
Finally, the test procedure such as the MCT for BEVs will create extremely long test duration,
especially for longer electric range vehicles, as well as other complications. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 219-220]
CREE Requirements
The Environmental Protection Agency has proposed to adopt battery durability requirements
for battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. The proposal includes
measurement of usable battery energy for PHEVs during charge-depleting (CD) operation to
ensure battery durability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 222]
However, EPA regulations already include a requirement for PHEVs to calculate carbon
related exhaust emissions (CREE) using fleet utility factors (FUFs) based on CD range per 40
CFR Part 600.116-12. In-use CREE must be considered with the in-use vehicle's CD range.
Furthermore, per 40 CFR Part 86.1823-08, PHEVs must also include a deterioration factor (DF)
for C02 or test with aged batteries to reflect the battery deterioration impact. This is in contrast
to BEVs, which will have a CREE/C02 value of Og/mi regardless of battery deterioration and the
change in UBE. The proposed UBE requirements for PHEVs would be in addition to the existing
requirements for CREE and DF. We recommend that EPA remove the requirement for PHEVs to
calculate CREE/C02 based on aged batteries, and instead align with BEV requirements to ensure
battery durability via the newly proposed UBE requirements. We believe that this approach
would be an effective method to ensure the durability of PHEV batteries in a manner consistent
with the proposed regulatory framework for BEVs. This would ensure technology neutrality and
equitable treatment to PHEVs. Alternatively, if EPA decides to only require the impact of battery
deterioration to be included in the C02 values for PHEVs, we recommend that EPA remove the
UBE requirement for PHEVs altogether, as battery deterioration is already accounted for via the
in-use CREE requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 222]
6. Calculation of UBE
Under this NPRM, EPA is also proposing changes to 40 CFR § 600.116-12.331 The proposed
methodology for calculating UBE as stated in 600.116-12(1 l)(ii) indicates the necessity to
calculate the Fleet Utility Factor (FUF). However, the FUF calculation is used to calculate the
ratio of Charge Depleting (CD) and Charge Sustaining (CS) driving. This ratio is unnecessary
when calculating UBE because it is trying to find the DC discharge energy during charge
depletion, and the ratio of CD/CS operation is unnecessary. As such we would recommend
deleting 600.116-12(1 l)(ii). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 223]
331 NPRM at 29421.
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Additionally, the proposed language in 600.116-12(1 l)(iii) instructs to use an average of the
RESS voltage during FCT, either by averaging continuous measurement or averaging the initial
and final voltage measurements. This average voltage is then used in (iv) to calculate the DC
discharge energy by multiplying the change in SOC per cycle to the average voltage per cycle.
For PHEVs or EVs, voltage can vary during dynamic driving conditions. Voltage should be
continuously integrated with current value to ensure accurate DC energy during cycle. The use of
average voltage value is appropriate for HEV, but for PHEV and BEV can result in inaccurate
DC energy values. Thus, as it pertains to both BEVs and PHEVs, we believe that DC energy
should be measured via a continuous integration of current and voltage. If a method to calculate
DC energy that allows use of average voltage in a cycle, it should be the average of a continuous
voltage measurement during each cycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 223]
Organization: BMW of North America, LLC (BMW NA)
BMW NA strongly believes that hydrogen technology will play a key role on the path to
climate neutrality across all industries and has great potential, particularly for individual
mobility. The pilot series of the BMW iX5 Hydrogen, which is currently being presented to the
public during various events all around the globe, highlights the possibilities of hydrogen
technology in this context. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 3]
BMW NA would like to encourage EPA to extend the regulatory guidance for FCEVs by the
means of incorporating an official test procedure (e.g., incorporation of SAE J2572). We believe
that this will benefit the automotive industry to better evaluate the technology's potential
compared to BEV and quantify its contribution to the overall electrification goals. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 3]
Furthermore, an additional, maybe time-limited incentive through ATV multipliers - a
concept which has shown its effectiveness on EVs in the past - would encourage the industry to
go further down this pathway. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 3]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Improved Electric Driving Range Information
Currently, the existing BEV label highlights vehicle efficiency in units of miles per gallons of
gas equivalent (MPGe) based on testing across five defined drive cycles. The current label also
uses this efficiency for the reported electric vehicle driving range. However, driving range based
on city cycle usage or the combined cycle usage is not relevant to drivers who are primarily
concerned about range for long distance travel which, by definition, is typically conducted at
highway-like speeds. CARB notes that some third parties (including AAA, 75 InsideEVs, 76 and
a recent SAE paper 77) have also previously assessed BEV range and noted a mismatch between
label reported range and what a typical driver would likely experience in-use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, pp. 46-47]
75 American Automobile Association, Inc. "AAA Electric Vehicle Range Testing." NewsRoom.AAA.com.
February 2019. AAA-Electric-Vehicle-Range-Testing-Report.pdf.
76 Moloughney, T., "What's The Real World Highway Range Of Today's Electric Cars? We Test To Find
Out." InsideEVs.com. April 22, 2023. https://insideevs.com/reviews/443791/ev-range-test-results/.
Accessed June 15, 2023.
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77 Pannone, G. and VanderWerp, D., "Comparison of On-Road Highway Fuel Economy and All-Electric
Range to Label Values: Are the Current Label Procedures Appropriate for Battery Electric Vehicles?," SAE
Technical Paper 2023-01-0349, 2023, https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0349.
CARB recommends that U.S. EPA require manufacturers to collect and report some higher
speed highway relevant energy consumption information during ZEV certification to supplement
the highway drive cycle information currently submitted. To minimize added test burden to
vehicle manufacturers, this data could be collected during the constant speed cycle portion of the
already required SAE J1634 certification testing procedure to capture energy consumption rates
at 65 mph and perhaps 75 mph to sufficiently bracket expected usage and ensure sufficient data
exists to inform a future label. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 46-47]
Additionally, based on experience to date as to information consumers are seeking, CARB
recommends U.S. EPA require collection and reporting of additional data to enable calculation
of range under cold and hot weather conditions. As an example, collection of both highway-
speed energy consumption and total usable battery energy while carrying out required testing for
the 20-degree Fahrenheit cold temperature cycle could provide sufficient information to derive a
consistent cold temperature estimated driving range. Likewise, during the required supplemental
test known as SC03 that represents hot weather driving with high solar load and air conditioning
usage, collection of this data could provide the necessary information to allow a more
meaningful future label that transparently presents range information to a consumer. Many
consumers are aware of battery limitations in cold or hot weather but lack accurate information
when making purchase decisions as to the likely magnitude of that impact on any particular
vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 46-47]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) and Plug-In Hybrid Electric (PHEV) Battery Durability and
Testing
Adoption of efficient, harmonized test methods and standards will be critical as we rapidly
transition to electrified vehicles. Ford requests that EPA consider the following
recommendations to streamline and clarify the ever-increasing BEV testing workload. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 15-16]
-The latest versions of SAE J1634 (2021) and J1711 (2023) should be adopted for BEV and
hybrid testing across light-duty, class 2b and 3 vehicles. We are aligned on utilizing the loaded
vehicle weight (LVW) with these procedures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 15-16]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
Battery Electric Vehicle ("BEV") Testing
It currently takes about six hours of lab time to conduct a traditional ICE vehicle 5-cycle
certification test sequence. In contrast, 5-cycle testing for a BEV takes more than 30 hours.
While this test time will drop to 16 hours starting in 2025 Model Year ("MY"), this is still a
significant increase over the time requirements for ICE testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0623, pp.14-15]
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There is a solution, a way to significantly reduce testing time and save lab resources while
still providing accurate vehicle test results. In EPA's "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor
Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards" 11 Final Rule, EPA updated from the the
2012 to the 2017 version of SAE J1634. The agency, however, chose not to adopt the most
recent 2021 version of this test procedure which includes allowances for the use of the Short
Multi-Cycle Test ("SMCT") and SMCT+. These two procedures both significantly reduce testing
time, while providing accurate BEV testing results. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 14-15]
11 Final Rule and Related Materials for Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty
Engine and Vehicle Standards, govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-01-24/pdf/2022-27957.pdf.
In light of the significantly increasing number of BEV tests that will need to occur under this
2027 to 2032 MY rule, Mercedes-Benz requests the agency adopt the 2022 version of SAE
J1634 test procedure in this final rule, and allow for early and immediate implementation. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 14-15]
The EPA HD rule also includes an explicit prohibition of thermal conditioning. This
prohibition is problematic for innovation of technological strategies that could improve battery
durability and performance in cold start conditions. Mercedes-Benz requests allowance of
thermal heating during certification in accordance with customer behavior [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0623, p. 15]
Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
EV Test Procedures
Rivian generally supports EPA's proposed approach to EV test procedures, including the
proposed use of the 2017 version of SAE J1634 for determining UBE for Class 2b-3 BEVs and
testing Class 2b-3 BEVs at adjusted loaded vehicle weight ("ALVW"). Since the start of
production of Rivian's Class 2b-3 electric delivery van, we have used ALVW for testing
purposes as opposed to loaded vehicle weight. The EDV carries packages and the range and
efficiency estimates generated by testing at ALVW are more representative of real-world driving
and the use case for these vehicles. We believe similar logic applies to the full spectrum of Class
2b-3 vehicles, which are overwhelmingly used in utility applications to tow, haul, carry goods
for delivery, and so on. Charge-depleting tests should be performed at ALVW across all
manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, p. 13]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
EPA received comments from the Alliance for Automotive Innovation, BMW NA, the
California Air Resources Board, Ford Motor Company, Mercedes Benz AG, and Rivian
Automotive regarding electric vehicle test procedures.
A majority of comments addressed the proposed BEV and PHEV test procedure updates for
determining useable battery energy. BMW NA submitted comments encouraging the Agency to
adopt test procedures for hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles. BMW believes hydrogen FCEVs
will be a key technology for achieving climate neutrality. BMW requested EPA adopt SAE
technical standard J2572, Recommended Practice for Measuring Fuel Consumption and Range
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of Fuel Cell and Hybrid Fuel Cell Vehicles Fueled by Compressed Gaseous Hydrogen, which
defines a procedure for testing FCEVs and possibly adopting a time-limited advanced technology
vehicle credit multiplier for hydrogen FCEVs.
The Alliance, Ford Motor Company, Mercedes Benz AG, and Rivian Automotive all provided
comments regarding SAE technical standard J1634, Battery Electric Vehicle Energy
Consumption and Range Test Procedure. Rivian is supportive of the proposed use of the 2017
version of J1634 for determining useable battery energy for Class 2b and Class 3 BEVs. Rivian
also commented that Class 2b and Class 3 BEVs should be tested at adjusted loaded vehicle
weight which is the average of a vehicle's curb weight and the vehicle's gross vehicle weight
rating.
The Alliance, Ford Motor Company and Mercedes Benz encouraged EPA to adopt the most
recent version (2021) of SAE technical standard J1634 for testing BEVs. The Alliance, Ford
Motor Company and Mercedes Benz requested EPA adopt the most recent version which
includes two new test procedures, the shortened multicycle test (SMCT) and the shortened
multicycle plus test (SMCT+), for determining useable battery energy. Both the Alliance and
Mercedes Benz noted that the additional tests, the SMCT and SMCT+, reduce testing time and
Mercedes Benz also noted the new tests provide accurate BEV testing results. The Alliance also
noted that adopting the 2021 version of J1634 would harmonize EPA and California's BEV
testing regulations as California has adopted the 2021 version of J1634. The Alliance also
commented that adopting the 2021 version of J1634 would provide EPA with an opportunity to
verify the accuracy of any of the test procedures, the MCT, SMCT and SMCT+, for determining
useable battery energy. The Alliance and Mercedes Benz both commented that they had made
similar requests to the Agency when the Agency proposed updating the reference version of
J1634 from the 2012 version to the 2017 version as part of the revisions proposed with EPA's
notice of proposed rulemaking - "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-
Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards". 87 FR 17414 (Mar. 28, 2022).
The Alliance and Mercedes Benz requested EPA adopt the 2021 version of SAE J1634 to
allow for BEV battery and cabin pre-heating during testing used for generating BEV 5-cycle data
used to determine the 5-cycle adjustment factor for fuel economy labeling. The Multi-Pollutant
Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles
NPRM, 88 FR 29184 (May 5, 2023), notice of proposed rulemaking did not include any
provisions to make revisions to EPA's existing BEV 5-cycle test procedures which were
previously updated in the final rulemaking for Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicle Standards. 88
FR 4296, (Jan. 24, 2023).
The Alliance and Ford Motor Company encouraged EPA to adopt the most recent (2023)
version of SAE J1711, Recommended Practice for Measuring the Exhaust Emissions and Fuel
Economy of Hybrid-Electric Vehicles, including Plug-In Hybrid Vehicles. The Alliance also
stated that when determining the useable battery energy for a PHEV the voltage measurement
should be continuously integrated with current to ensure accurate measurements of DC discharge
energy during testing; and, if the Agency allows the use of average voltage in the cycle it should
be the average of a continuous measurement during each cycle. The Alliance also noted the
proposed regulations for determining PHEV useable battery energy required a calculation to
determine the fleet utility factor. The Alliance noted the fleet utility factor is not necessary for
determining PHEV useable battery energy and recommended deleting § 600.116-12(1 l)(ii).
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The Alliance also noted that EPA currently has regulatory requirements for PHEVs requiring
manufacturers to account for battery durability when determining the in-use CREE standard. The
Alliance requests that EPA drop the requirement for PHEVs use aged batteries when accounting
for the impact of battery deterioration on weighted CREE emissions with the adoption of the
battery durability requirement. The Alliance noted that EPA should drop the PHEV battery
durability requirement if EPA keeps the requirement to account for battery deterioration when
estimating the weighted PHEV CREE emissions.
The California Air Resources Board recommends that U.S. EPA gather additional information
during manufacturer testing of fuel economy data vehicles to supplement drive cycle information
currently submitted by manufacturers to U.S. EPA. California suggests collecting data during the
constant speed cycle of the multi-cycle test and capture energy consumption data at 65 mph and
perhaps at 75 mph with intent of using these data to inform a future fuel economy label.
California also recommends EPA collect and report additional data to enable calculation of range
under cold and hot weather conditions. Collecting additional data during 20°F testing, including
highway speed energy consumption and useable battery energy could also be beneficial for
deriving a cold temperature driving range. California also recommends collection of similar data
during the SC03 test (representative of high ambient temperature with high solar load conditions)
to allow a more meaningful future fuel economy label which transparently present range
information under different load and ambient conditions to consumers.
Response:
EPA has considered BMW's comment encouraging the Agency to propose a specific test
procedure for hydrogen FCEVs by adopting SAE technical standard J2572. This is beyond the
scope of our proposal as the Agency did not address test procedures for fuel cell vehicles or seek
comments regarding testing of fuel cell vehicles in the NPRM. We note, however, that
manufacturers producing hydrogen FCEVs are eligible to propose special test procedures
according to the existing provisions of 40 CFR 1065.10(c)(2). BMW and other hydrogen FCEV
manufacturers are eligible to request approval to use SAE J2572 for testing. The request to use
the special procedure needs to be made prior to the manufacturer beginning the test program.
Rivian Automotive's comments addressing the use of the 2017 version of SAE J1634 for
testing Class 2b and Class 3 vehicles along with performing these tests at the adjusted loaded
vehicle weight are supportive of the Agency's proposal and adopted regulations. With the
issuance of the final rule, the Agency has adopted using the 2017 version of J1634 for testing
Class 2b and Class 3 BEVs and performing these tests at the adjusted loaded vehicle weight.
The Alliance, Ford Motor Company and Mercedes Benz suggested that EPA adopt the 2021
version of SAE J1634 which would allow manufacturers to perform the SMCT and SMCT+ in
addition to the MCT. The Alliance and Mercedes Benz both noted they had submitted similar
comments in a prior rulemaking, "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-
Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards," 87 FR 17414. EPA previously responded to these prior
comments requesting use of the SMCT and SMCT+ in the Final Rulemaking for the Heavy-Duty
Engine and Vehicle Standards, 89 FR 4296, and the Response to Comments Document, EPA-
420-R-22-036, December 2022. The Agency is not prepared to adopt the 2021 version of SAE
J1634. The Agency is continuing its evaluation of the new test procedures to determine if these
procedures produce results equivalent to those generated using the existing single cycle tests and
MCT test procedures. The Agency is aware that there continues to be minimal publicly available
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test data that could be used to conclude the procedures produce equivalent test results. The
Alliance recommended the Agency adopt the 2021 version of SAE J1634 and use the Agency's
confirmatory testing program to generate data which would be used to evaluate the newer
procedures to determine their equivalence with the existing single cycle tests and MCT results.
The Agency's confirmatory test program tests around 15 percent of all BEV tests submitted to
the Agency for fuel economy labeling. The goal of the confirmatory test program is to randomly
evaluate the test results provided by manufacturers to ensure the data being generated are
representative and appropriate. The Agency does not believe it would be appropriate to adopt
these procedures without sufficient data demonstrating equivalence with existing test procedures
while using the Agency confirmatory test program to evaluate the equivalence of these
procedures.
The Alliance and Mercedes Benz suggested that EPA adopt the 2021 version of SAE J1634
specifically to allow for the use of thermal conditioning when performing BEV 5-cycle test
procedures used for determining the 5-cycle fuel economy adjustment factor for fuel economy
labeling. The Alliance and Mercedes Benz both noted they had submitted similar comments in a
prior rulemaking, "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and
Vehicle Standards," 87 FR 17414. EPA previously responded to these prior comments requesting
the use of thermal conditioning in the Final Rulemaking for the Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle
Standards, 88 FR 4296, and the Response to Comments Document, EPA-420-R-22-036,
December 2022. The Agency is not prepared to adopt the 2021 version of SAE J1634 to allow
thermal conditioning of the battery and cabin prior to 5-cycle adjustment factor testing. EPA
understands managing propulsion battery temperature is important for battery durability, vehicle
performance, and energy efficiency. Current EPA regulations and the 2017 version of SAE
J1634 do not allow for the use of thermal conditioning during cold soak periods of EPA test
procedures. The function of the cold soak period is to stabilize the vehicle and its components at
the desired test procedure ambient temperature prior to beginning the driving portion of the test.
While BEVs have technology and operating modes designed to precondition the battery and
cabin while the vehicle is soaking, for this technology to function the vehicle must have access to
a dedicated EVSE and the operator must enable this operation. The Agency does not expect that
a predominance of BEVs will have access to a dedicated EVSE while the vehicle is cold soaking
prior to many cold starts and the operator will also have enabled the preconditioning mode.
Therefore, the Agency is not prepared to adopt the 2021 version of SAE J1634 to allow for
preconditioning of the battery and cabin during the cold soak.
The Alliance and Ford Motor Company encouraged EPA to adopt the most recent version of
SAE J1711, Recommended Practice for Measuring the Exhaust Emissions and Fuel Economy of
Hybrid-Electric Vehicles, Including Plug-In Hybrid Vehicles. Having reviewed the updates to
the 2023 version of SAE J1711, EPA agrees with the Alliance and Ford Motor Company and is
updating the reference from the 2010 to the 2023 version of SAE J1711. Updating this reference
provides a couple of improvements related to determining the DC discharge energy when
performing charge depletion testing on a PHEV. It updates the voltage measurement method to
allow for a continuously integrated voltage measurement during each test cycle. In addition, the
EPA regulations allow for manufacturers to both integrate voltage and current during each test
cycle and calculate DC discharge energy during each cycle.
EPA also agrees with the Alliance's suggestion to delete 40 CFR 600.116-12(1 l)(ii). EPA
concurs that there is no necessity for calculating the fleet utility factor when measuring the
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useable battery energy of a PHEV during charge depletion testing. Therefore, for the final
regulations, paragraph § 600.116-12(1 l)(ii) from the proposed regulations has been deleted.
EPA does not agree with the recommendation by the Alliance that the Agency should not
require PHEVs meet the battery durability requirement if the Agency keeps the requirement to
include deterioration when determining weighted PHEV CREE emissions at certification. As
noted in the comment, PHEV weighted CREE emissions are a combination of charge depleting
CREE and charge sustaining CREE emissions. As the PHEV battery degrades the vehicle will
spend more time in charge depletion operation with the engine running. This will lead to
increases in CREE emissions which are accounted for at the time of certification either by using
a CREE deterioration factor or testing with an aged battery. This increase will occur even with a
battery which has degraded yet still meets the battery durability criteria. This accounting is no
different than the Agency requiring manufacturers account for the deterioration in the efficiency
of catalyst aftertreatment systems at the time of certification. This loss of performance is
included in the determination the vehicle will meet the standard as it normally degrades. At this
time the Agency believes it is appropriate to maintain the existing PHEV CREE durability
requirements in addition to the battery durability requirements being adopted with this
rulemaking.
The California Air Resources Board made several recommendations related to gathering
additional data for informing a future update to the fuel economy labeling requirements for
BEVs. As part of the NPRM, EPA did not make any proposals to revise or solicit comment on
revising test procedures or update the fuel economy label values for BEVs, such that this issue is
beyond the scope of the rulemaking. EPA concurs with California that the range value listed on
the fuel economy label, which is a combined city /highway range value weighted to represent
nominal vehicle operation under a variety of city and highway operation at varying speed and
accelerations along with different ambient conditions, is not representative of sustained high-
speed highway driving during either cold or hot temperature ambient conditions. EPA developed
the fuel economy label regulations almost 15 years ago when few electric vehicles in the U.S.
market were capable of a combined range in EPA testing approaching 100 miles. The utility of
BEVs has improved significantly since the Agency developed the fuel economy label
requirements for BEVs. At this time, EPA has not proposed and is not seeking to revise the BEV
fuel economy label or to gather additional data or require additional tests to collect data which
could be applicable to revising the label at some future date.
6.2 - Testing and certification related to battery durability program
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
a) On-Board Measurement of Current
SAE J1634 and J1711 [324] allow voltage to be read from the vehicle on-board controller
instead of instrumenting vehicles with direct voltage measurements. This allowance is used to
reduce test burden by not requiring the installation of direct voltage taps and to improve safety
by not exposing test personnel to high voltages. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 216-217]
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324 2021 SAE J1634 and 2023 J1711.
We propose allowing the use of vehicle on-board current readings (in addition to on-board
voltage readings) for laboratory testing after equivalency is demonstrated by the manufacturer.
The use of on-board current data will be especially important for in-use vehicles as it allows for
laboratory testing without installing intrusive current sensors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 216-217]
In order to meet the accuracy of EPA's and CARB's requirements for battery state of health
(SOH) monitoring, vehicle on-board current sensors are required to be accurate. The following
plot from one manufacturer includes energy (wat-hours) calculated over 712 individual test
phases. This data demonstrates that energy calculated using on-board current readings at 10Hz
can correlate extremely well with Hioki current measurements integrated at >## 20Hz. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 216-217]
[See original attachment for Figure 80: DC Energy Wat-Hour Comparison] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 216-217]
b) Continuous Voltage Measurement
To calculate UBE for PHEVs, we recommend adopting the latest revision of SAE J1711 FEB
2023.325 The most recent versions of J1634 and J1711 allow the acquisition of voltage from the
vehicle network (which we believe is appropriate), but on-board current measurements should
also be allowed based on demonstrating equivalence between off-board (i.e. Hioki Power Meter)
and on-board current measurements. This is especially important for in-use testing, where it is
difficult to instrument customer vehicles to measure the voltage and current without intrusive
vehicle modifications. We also recommend that the average cycle voltage be the average of
continuous readings over the cycle, or calculated discharge energy by using an integrated
measurement of the continuous voltage and current readings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 216-217]
325 Id.
Additionally, there is a safety concern when breaking out wiring and measuring high voltage
DC systems of these electrified vehicles. Therefore, we propose using on-board current and
voltage data within our laboratories instead of external testing setups after equivalency is proven.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 216-217]
4. UBE Determination in BEVs and PHEVs
EPA is requesting comment on all aspects of the proposed battery durability standards,
particularly with respect to minimum performance requirements, the testing and compliance
requirements for Part A and Part B, and the possibility of adopting more stringent or less
stringent battery durability standards. Outlined in Section III.F. 1,330 EPA is proposing to
incorporate SAE Standard J1634 and J1711 as testing methods to determine Usable Battery
Energy for both BEVs and PHEVs respectively. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 221-222]
330 NPRM at 29282.
While we support the incorporation of J1634 and J1711 as testing methods to determine UBE
for both BEVs and PHEVs respectively, we have major concerns over the versions referenced
within the NPRM. Outlined in the NPRM, EPA references the 2017 version of J1634 regarding
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BEVs and the 2010 version for PHEVs as the basis for UBE testing methods. As EPA is aware,
there is a 2021 version of J1634, as well as a 2023 version of J1711. We believe it is imperative
that EPA adopt the most recent versions of both. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 221-222]
When it comes to BEVs, the 2021 J1634 version utilized the most up-to-date testing methods,
including the use of SMCT and SMCT+ testing methods. As we have already mentioned in our
comments, we support including the alternative testing methods of SMCT/SMCT+. MCT
contains a variable length drive cycle while conducting the test with two constant speed sections.
This results in having the middle section to be adapted to start the constant speed section at about
20% State of Charge (SOC). With MCT, building adaptive cycles to specific vehicles is overly
burdensome for both OEMs and for regulators. Testing with SMCT/SMCT+ procedures does not
require the building of specific test cycles, and also reduces labor burdens associated with
conducting these tests. We understand that EPA was involved in the development of the 2021
SAE J1635 version, and respectfully request that it implement the updated version. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 221-222]
Additionally, as mentioned above, we are in support of incorporating the 2023 version of
J1711 as it pertains to PHEV testing to determine UBE. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
221-222]
EPA proposes to allow manufacturers to utilize any sampling technique to accurately collect
data from the number of vehicles mandated in GTRNo. 22. [332] For example, manufacturers
may choose to physically connect to the required number of vehicles and read the SOCE values
directly in lieu of a remote, telematics-based data collection. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
p. 224]
332 NPRM at 29421
We have concerns regarding the requirements proposed in this section as it pertains to test
sampling criteria. As is currently written, EPA is proposing test sample requirements mandating
that OEMs must test 500 vehicles annually under their IUVP program. Out of those 500 test
samples, the vehicles' registration must cover at least 10 states, with no particular region making
up over 20% of the test sample. While we recognize the importance of achieving a broad test
sample representative of the U.S. market, the current proposed thresholds are unrealistic. There
are disproportionate EV penetration rates that vary by state, which poses challenges to procure
the proposed required amount of vehicles. Therefore, we propose to keep the current 500 test
sample size; however, requiring that no more than 50% of vehicles be registered in the same
region. This will give manufacturers needed flexibility when it comes to finding, selecting and
procuring these in-use test vehicles, thus ensuring that an adequate sample size is attainable.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 224]
D. BEV / PHEV Test Groups
Under Section III.F.4, [340] EPA is proposing to introduce a new set of regulations as it
pertains to establishing new test group families for BEVs and PHEVs. This proposed section
creates both a monitor family, as well as a battery durability family, replacing the current
regulatory requirement to define BEV test and durability groups. Additionally, in order to
support the proposed monitor accuracy requirement outlined in Section III.F.2, EPA is proposing
that OEMs install a battery State of Health (SOH) monitor to estimate, monitor and communicate
the State of Certified Energy (SOCE) at the current point in the vehicle's lifetime. Under this
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section, manufacturers will also be required to evaluate the accuracy of the monitor through in-
use testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 227-228]
340 NPRM at 29287.
We understand that the use of SOCE data to monitor battery durability is an important part of
EPA's approach to determining test groups for application submission under this Proposed Rule.
This allows EPA to ensure that each test group is representative of a range of vehicles with
similar monitoring strategies and battery durability characteristics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 227-228]
However, Auto Innovators has serious concerns with EPA's current proposal on the
determination of test groups and the incorporation of GTR-22 as a guiding document for
establishing monitoring and battery durability families. After careful review, Auto Innovators
has been unable to fully understand the details of the methods laid out in this proposal as it
pertains to test group determination. We are concerned that these new requirements are different
from the method that CARB uses to group their vehicles. Differing requirements for test group
determination between EPA and CARB create a large burden for manufacturers and essentially
double the work when trying to certify vehicles. In addition to the extra work associated with
two requirements, the proposed EPA requirements for battery durability grouping may result in
the creation of an increasing amount of test groups, with related administrative and testing
burden. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 227-228]
In response to this proposal, Auto Innovators first requests that EPA be open to a meeting
with CARB and Auto Innovators. We have made many attempts to meet with EPA to discuss
this current proposal, to no avail. Our overall goal is to achieve a singular standard when it
comes to criteria determining test groups for both BEVs and PHEVs. Meeting with all three
organizations will allow us to openly discuss ideas in the interest of developing one consistent
standard. In addition to a singular standard, as a general principle we support the use of vehicle
platforms with similar monitoring and battery durability characteristics to serve as the basis for
determining test groups. With this current proposal, as well as CARB's anticipated future CARB
GHG rulemaking, we believe this is an opportune time to work together to establish a national
standard for BEV and PHEV test group determination. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
227-228]
1. Monitor Families
As is stated in the current NPRM, the SOCE monitoring algorithm needs to utilize the same
logic and have the same value for all calibration variables used in the algorithm.341
Additionally, the algorithm used to determine UBE needs to utilize the same sampling and
integration periods and the same integration technique; the locations of the sensor(s) (i.e. at the
pack, module, or battery cell level) for monitoring DC discharge energy need to be the same; and
the accuracy of the sensor(s) and the tolerance of the sensor(s) accuracy used for monitoring
energy and range need to be the same. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 228-229]
Based on what is presented in this NPRM, we believe that it is overly strict to define different
monitor families based on different sensor positions. Therefore, if the performance at differing
location (ex: pack level vs cell level) can be shown to be equivalent, then we respectfully request
that manufacturers should be allowed to define them as the same monitor family. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 228-229]
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2. Definitions of Durability Group, Monitor Family and Battery Durability Family
The EPA proposes in section F.4.iii. Proposed Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement
Provisions; Definitions of Durability Group, Monitor Family, and Battery Durability Family;
BEV and PHEV Battery Durability Family that "The following powertrain characteristics and
design features would be used to determine battery durability families: Maximum specified
charging power, method of battery thermal management, battery capacity, battery (cathode)
chemistry, and the net power of the electrical machines."342 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 229-230]
342 NPRM at 29288.
Auto Innovators proposes the following. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 229-230]
The powertrain characteristics and design features that would be used to determine battery
durability families are: method of battery thermal management, battery capacity within 20% of
the highest capacity within the family, battery chemistry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
229-230]
However, clarification is required as to what defines "battery chemistry," particularly at what
level they need to be separated. Auto Innovators proposes that EPA specify that "Li-Ion"
(Lithium-Ion) is a sufficient separator for a battery durability family group, and it is possible to
group all Li-Ion batteries in the same battery durability family. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 229-230]
The entire concept of "grouping" for certification and compliance testing is built around
efficiency: logically grouping "like" systems that can be placed together and tested instead of
evaluating every single permutation of a technology for very marginal benefits. The grouping
criteria suggested by the EPA, containing four criteria that could each have many variants, would
potentially lead to a large amount of complexity for durability testing - OEMs would be forced
to test potentially hundreds of different combinations resulting in drastically increased workload
and data generation for this new regulation. This is especially important considering the rapid
technological developments (and associated uncertainty) in next-generation battery chemistries,
even within a single nameplate's EV's 6- to 7-year product lifecycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 229-230]
With this in mind, Auto Innovators recommends simplifying the battery durability grouping
criteria to the following characteristics and design features: 1) method of battery thermal
management, 2) battery capacity within 20% of the highest capacity within the family (analogous
to ICE analytical derivation criteria), and 3) battery chemistry. And by "battery chemistry, Auto
Innovators proposes that EPA specify that "Li-Ion" (Lithium-Ion) is a sufficient separator for a
battery durability family group, meaning it is possible to group all Li-Ion traction batteries in the
same battery durability group. Even if EPA proposes to go "one level down and specify 'high
level' chemistries (currently many permutations of NMC, LFP, LMO blends, etc.), given the
uncertainty of proliferation of these chemistries in future vehicles, this single criterion could
potentially lead to dozens more in-use tests per nameplate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
229-230]
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In addition, the measurement of battery durability should be limited to the usable battery
energy made available for propulsion; thus, this grouping should be done at the battery pack and
not propulsion system level. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 229-230]
We believe that maximum specified charging power should not be a pre-defined separator of
a unique battery durability family since its influence on battery durability is not significant. We
also believe net power of the electrical machines should not be a pre-defined separator of a
unique battery durability family since its influence on battery durability is not significant. For
example, electric machine net power variations for AWD, FWD, and RWD driveline
configurations are not expected to influence the inherent battery durability characteristics
significantly (even though the battery usage profile may be impacted). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 229-230]
Auto Innovators instead proposes that a vehicle platform with batteries of similar capacity
should be possible to place in the same battery durability family, similar to the grouping statistics
of the current durability group determination according to §86.1820-01. We therefore propose
"within 20% of the highest battery capacity in the family should be eligible to group into the
same battery durability family." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 229-230]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) and Plug-In Hybrid Electric (PHEV) Battery Durability and
Testing
-In the NPRM's redline of regulatory text for 40 CFR 86.1844-01(d)(19)(2), EPA proposes
that OEMs will need certified Usable Battery Energy (UBE) for each battery durability family
for certification. We request confirmation that EV data from fuel economy testing can be fulfill
this data requirement in EV certification applications. In the past, Ford has not been able to
generate a single dataset for EV certification and FE labels due to timing differences in the
processes. Using the provisions in section 86.1829-15(f), we believe that we can submit
certification applications without data and supplement the required UBE data after FE testing is
complete. This is not only beneficial to test reduction, but we believe using FE data for UBE
declaration is more aligned to the intent of the regulation, because the certification framework of
EVs is diverting from the ICE framework. Traditionally, certification testing has been done using
Emission Data Vehicles (EDVs) as selected using the requirements in section 86.1828-01 (worst-
case configuration). Now that EVs will not be certified in test groups, it is apparent that the EDV
selection requirements in this section do not apply. That leaves a gap in the proposed regulation
of test vehicle selection within a durability family for EV certification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0605, pp.15-16]
-Ford does not believe that incorporating GTR No. 22 by reference adequately addresses
battery-related requirements for EVs and PHEVs. A most stringent interpretation of GTR No.22
would significantly increase the number of certification fleets (tied to sensor location, weight,
trim package, tires, performance packages, driveline configuration etc.), and potentially provide
different test group definitions for vehicles certified to CARB's ACC2 standards. This would
increase certification workload and potentially create customer confusion. We would like to
avoid a situation where OEMs are required to negotiate EV test group definition with both EPA
and CARB, which will result in level-playing field issues. EPA could avoid this situation by
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aligning with CARB on test group definitions and provide clear and concise parameters for EV
test groupings. For example, there are already issues with OEMs receiving agency approval for
grouping RWD and AWD EV configurations in a single test group (which we think is
appropriate), while other OEMs are unaware that this is a possibility based on regulatory
language. We strongly request the EPA to provide concise guidance on the certification groups
to prevent these issues. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 15-16]
-With proposed Tier IV requirements to test additional electric vehicles in-use and during
certification, Ford fully supports the Auto Innovator's proposal to adopt Analytically Derived
Fuel Economy (ADFE) for hybrid and xEV products. With additional electric vehicle
range/energy consumption data being produced for a variety of new models, Ford is confident
that analytical methods to produce FE/Range/Energy Consumption values will meet existing
accuracy requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 15-16]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
Geographic Constraints in IUVP Program
The EPA proposes manufacturers procure 500 vehicles annual and from across at least 10
different states with no more than 20% of the test sample coming from any particular region.
This is expected to be more challenging for electric vehicle programs than it is for traditional
internal combustion engine ("ICE") programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 14]
The current distribution of electric vehicles across the country is not uniform and is impacted
by many factors, such as state EV sales incentives, the availability of charging infrastructure, and
customer interest. Therefore, obtaining an even distribution of electric vehicles across all states
for IUVP testing is not feasible at this time. Compliance with this requirement will become more
workable as the electric vehicle rollout continues across all states in the US. In the meantime,
Mercedes-Benz recommends that EPA provide criteria, at least through 2030, that allows for
regional procurement or alternative strategies to procure representative vehicles (but not state-
by-state) across the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 14]
Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
Test Grouping and Durability/Monitor Families
Rivian requests clarity on proposed changes to BEV test groupings. EPA proposes that for
BEVs, "the new monitor family and new battery durability family would replace the current
regulatory requirement to define BEV test and durability groups."43 However, given recent
information from the agency that multiple battery chemistries and types have been allowed in the
same test group, Rivian requests additional detail on the inputs used to determine the test group
(for example, number and type of electric motors). This new approach to defining BEV test and
durability groups could also have implications for fuel economy labeling requirements. More
detail and discussion by EPA are needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 14-15]
43 Id. at 29,287.
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Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Tesla believes the proposed minimum performance requirement (MPR) for the SOH are set at
reasonable and achievable levels. 171 Further, the decision not to implement a MPR for Class 2b
and 3 will facilitate greater early adoption in those segments. For testing purposes, defining the
battery family definition is best served by allowing manufacturers to utilize the criteria
mentioned in the proposed regulation such as maximum specified charging power, method of
battery thermal management, battery (cathode) chemistry and the net power of the electrical
machines. 172 This is far preferred over defining the families based on battery capacity which
would create multiple families for the same vehicles with the same battery types and chemistry
but different battery capacity. While establishing a 90 percent pass requirement for battery
family monitor exceed the passage rates set in the ACC II durability provisions, Tesla agrees
with the agency's flexible approach allowing manufacturer to use good engineering judgment in
determining the statistically adequate and representative in-use vehicle data for testing. 173
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 27]
171 88 Fed. Reg. at 29285, Table 64.
172 Id., at 29288. Tesla notes EPA should provide further guidance of the definition of "net power of
electrical machines."
173 See 13 CCR § 1962.4 (d).
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
BEV/PHEV Test Groups and Durability Families (Section III.F.4)
Volkswagen aligns and supports AFAI's comments and desire for an industry-wide common
solution with respect to PHEV and BEV test groups. We agree with the AFAI comments that an
industry solution and clear grouping metrics, similar as those used with ICE grouping statistics,
to determine durability families should be developed using good engineering basis. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 11-12]
Based on our understanding of the battery durability group definition found within the
NPRM, Volkswagen believes the number of Test Groups may drastically increase. As such,
Volkswagen support the EPA's decision to allow requests for alternative groupings of monitors
and batteries accompanied by appropriate technical justification. This provision would promote
flexibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 11-12]
Volkswagen is very familiar with the UN GTR-22 provisions and would be part of the AFAI
industry group in collaboration with EPA and CARB in determining an industry-wide solution
for PHEV and BEV test group determination. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 11-12]
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
In the NPRM, EPA states that powertrain characteristics and design features be used to
determine battery durability families. The NPRM lists the following characteristics: maximum
specified charging power, method of battery thermal management, battery capacity, battery
(cathode) chemistry, and the net power of the electrical machines. VCC believes that maximum
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specified charging power and net power of the electrical machines should not determine and
define a unique battery durability family because their impact on battery durability is not
significant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 4-5]
VCC believes that it is logical for a vehicle platform with similar batteries and comparable
battery capacity be put into the same battery durability family. This is consistent with the
grouping statistics of the current durability group determination according to §86.1820-01. VCC
believes that EPA should state that "within 20% of the highest battery capacity in the Family
should be eligible to group into the same battery durability family". In addition, EPA should
provide guidance on battery (cathode chemistry). Specifically, VCC has questions regarding how
to determine separation. For Example: Is "NMC (Nickel Manganese Cobalt)" sufficient separator
for a Battery Durability Group where all NMC batteries would be possible to group within the
same Battery Durability Family? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 4-5]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
EPA received comments from the Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI),Ford Motor
Company, Mercedes Benz, Rivian Automotive, Tesla, Volkswagen Group of America, and
Volvo Car Corporation on aspects of test and certification procedures related to battery
monitoring and battery durability requirements.
AAI proposed EPA allow the use of on-board current readings for laboratory testing once
equivalency is established by the manufacturer between the on-board current reading and an
independent measurement of battery discharge current. The Alliance believes this is important
for in-use vehicles as part of the battery monitor accuracy testing program as it will allow for
laboratory testing without the need for physical current sensors which are difficult to install.
AAI and Mercedes Benz proposed revisions to the procurement criteria the Agency identified
for checking the in-use state-of-certified-energy sampling requirements. The Alliance proposes
to maintain the current 500 test sample size, however the Alliance proposes requiring that no
more than 50 percent of vehicles be registered in the same region. Mercedes Benz indicates it is
not feasible at this time to obtain an even distribution of electric vehicles across all states for
gathering SOCE data. Mercedes Benz recommends EPA provide criteria, at least through 2030,
that allows for regional procurement or alternative strategies to procure representative vehicles
across the United States.
AAI, Rivian Automotive Volkswagen Group of America, and Volvo Car Corporation have
concerns with replacing the existing BEV test and durability group definitions with the battery
monitor and battery durability families. The Alliance believes it is overly strict to define different
monitor families based on different sensor positions. The Alliance requests manufacturers be
allowed to define them as the same monitor family if the performance of sensors at different
locations can be shown to be equivalent. Rivian is concerned the new battery monitory and
durability family could have implications for fuel economy labeling. Rivian requests additional
detail regarding the updates to BEV battery monitor and battery durability families. Volkswagen
supports the Alliance's comments and desire for an industry-wide common solution with respect
to PHEV and BEV test groups. Volkswagen supports EPA's decision to allow alternative
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groupings of monitors and durability families based on appropriate technical justification. Volvo
does not believe that maximum charging power and the maximum net power of the electrical
machines are appropriate criteria for differentiating battery durability families since their impact
on battery durability is not significant. Volvo believes EPA should allow batteries with capacities
within 20 percent of the highest capacity be included in the same battery durability family. Volvo
also believes EPA should provide guidance on the battery cathode chemistry and how it would
differentiate durability families.
AAI proposes using the following powertrain characteristics and design features be used to
determine battery durability family: method of battery thermal management, battery capacity
within 20 percent of the highest capacity within the family, and battery chemistry. With respect
to battery chemistry, the Alliance proposes grouping all lithium-ion batteries in the same battery
durability family, independent of cathode chemistry. The Alliance does not believe maximum
charging power and net power of the electrical machines should be separators for unique battery
durability families as their influence on battery durability is not significant.
Ford Motor Company commented on the proposed regulations in the NPRM that require
manufacturers to include BEV UBE data in the application for certification. Ford noted typically
fuel economy data vehicle testing does not align with emission data vehicle testing for
certification and the capturing of UBE data for different battery durability families is best aligned
with fuel economy testing. Ford is also concerned about the adoption of GTR No. 22 and the
disconnect between California's ACC II BEV durability program and GTR No. 22. Ford has
concerns about additional testing required for the California program based on the California
BEV test group definition and the new battery monitor and battery durability family definitions
in GTR No. 22. Ford requests EPA provide concise guidance on certification groups to prevent
significant divisions between California and Federal requirements creating possible market
confusion and increasing unnecessary additional testing. Ford also supports the Alliance's
proposal to develop analytically derived fuel economy (ADFE) calculations for hybrids and
electrified vehicles.
Tesla believes the flexibility provided in the monitoring family definition provides assurances
to manufacturers that deployment of similar monitors across different vehicle lines does not
create any undue or repetitive state of certified energy testing burden and costs. Tesla comments
that for testing purposes, defining the battery family definition is best served by allowing
manufacturers to utilize the criteria in the proposed regulation such as maximum charging power,
method of battery thermal management, battery cathode chemistry, and net power of the
electrical machines. In a footnote to their comments Tesla notes that EPA should provide further
guidance for the definition of "net power of electrical machines."
Response:
AAI requested allowing the use of both on-board current and on-board voltage measurements
to be used to determine the useable battery energy during laboratory testing to evaluate the state
of certified energy monitor. The Alliance proposed that this option be allowed once a
manufacturer had demonstrated the on-board current measurement was determined to be
equivalent with the independent measurement of battery discharge current.
EPA believes it is difficult to install current probes on production vehicles to independently
monitor the DC discharge current during laboratory testing. SAE J1634 specifies criteria for the
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instrumentation and the sampling interval to ensure the DC discharge current is accurately
measured. Determining equivalence during a specific test or tests does not ensure equivalence for
future tests. Allowing the vehicle to report the DC discharge energy is not an independent
measurement of the vehicle's performance as the vehicle is self-reporting with no independent
verification of the measurement or ability to determine the measurement meets the criteria for
current measurement in the 2017 version of J1634. The function of the test procedure is to
evaluate the ability of the vehicle to reasonably determine the state of certified energy and to
allow this determination to be made without an independent measurement of discharge current
does not seem appropriate to EPA. Therefore, the Agency is not willing to allow the use of the
on-board current measurement to be used for determining the state of certified energy of the
vehicle as proposed by AAI.
Regarding the durability test sample of at least 500 vehicles under Part B of the EPA program,
AAI and Mercedes-Benz noted that distribution of some durability groups of PEVs across the
U.S. may be insufficient to support the proposed sample characteristics. AAI proposed to keep
the current sample size of 500 vehicles, but require that no more than 50 percent of the vehicles
in the sample be registered in the same region. EPA agrees that, particularly in the early years of
the program, some durability groups may be unevenly distributed across the U.S. and is
modifying the sample requirements per this suggestion.
AAI, Rivian Automotive Volkswagen Group of America, and Volvo Car Corporation have
concerns with replacing the existing BEV test and durability group definitions with the battery
monitor and battery durability families. As noted in preamble section III.G.2, EPA will accept
manufacturer compliance with the entirety of the CARB ACC II battery durability program in
lieu of the EPA battery durability program. This has led the Agency to reconsider our proposal to
define BEV families solely by battery monitor family and battery durability family. The Agency
has determined that all BEVs will continue to be grouped using the existing battery test group
definition and if the BEV meets EPA's battery durability criteria the manufacturer will also need
to define a battery monitor family and battery durability family for the vehicles within the test
group. Section III.G.3 of the preamble includes additional information regarding the revisions to
the test group, durability group, battery monitor family, and battery durability family for BEVs
and PHEVs.
AAI is requesting the Agency allow vehicles with sensors in different monitoring locations to
be included in the same monitor family with data demonstrating the performance of the monitor
with the sensors in different locations is equivalent. EPA has adopted the monitor family
definition based on the monitor family criteria described in GTR No. 22. As noted in the GTR
and in the EPA regulations the Agency will allow manufacturers to request including vehicles
with sensors in different locations to be included in the same monitor family with appropriate
data and technical justification.
AAI, Ford, Mercedes Benz, Rivian, Volkswagen and Volvo all recommended removing or
revising a number of battery durability family criteria listed in GTR No. 22 when defining
battery durability families. At this time, the Agency does not have sufficient information to
conclude the suggested revisions will ensure that all vehicles within a durability family would be
expected to degrade in the same manner. As noted in GTR No. 22 and the EPA regulations, EPA
is providing manufacturers with the option to include in the same durability family vehicles for
which these characteristics would not otherwise allow them to be in the same battery durability
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family. To include vehicles with characteristics noted in GTR No. 22 that would not be allowed
in the same durability family, the manufacturer needs to provide data demonstrating the vehicle
differences being included in the same durability family will age similarly and will degrade in an
equivalent manner. Section III.G.3 .iii of the preamble (BEV and PHEV Battery Durability
Family) contains additional response and outlines how the manufacturer can request specific
groupings when supported by appropriate data. Specifically in response to comments that all
lithium-ion chemistries regardless of sub-chemistry should be eligible to be placed within the
same group, EPA clarifies that placement in the same battery durability family is not indicated
when chemistry differences exist that would be expected to influence durability. Chemistry
differences may include differences such as proportional metal composition of the cathode (for
example, NMC811, NMC622, NMC333, etc.), composition of the anode (for example, graphite,
graphite with silicon, other forms of carbon), differences in particle size or morphology of
cathode or anode active materials, or any other differences that would be expected to influence
durability, unless data is provided otherwise as described above.
Ford commented on the requirement for including in the certification application battery UBE
test results. This requirement is similar to updating applications as the manufacturer implements
a running change during the model year. Manufacturers are allowed to update their applications
as needed. There is no change needed to EPA's regulations to allow this current practice to
continue. Ford also noted their concern about disconnects between California's ACC II test
groupings and EPA's durability test groupings based on GTR No. 22. As described in section 16
of this RTC document and in section III.G of the preamble, EPA will accept compliance with
California's ACC II durability program in lieu of the EPA durability program. By this means
manufacturers now have the option of developing and offering for sale nationally vehicles
complying with the ACC II battery durability requirements. Regarding comments related to
analytically derived fuel economy (ADFE) calculations for hybrids and electrified vehicles, at
this time the Agency is not proposing to develop analytically derived fuel economy calculations
for hybrids and electrified vehicles. This request is beyond the scope of the proposal.
Tesla provided comments generally supportive of the EPA battery durability program and in-
use testing to demonstrate compliance with the durability requirements. These comments are
addressed in RTC section 16. Tesla did provide a comment in their footnotes seeking additional
guidance regarding the definition of the net power of the electrical machines. At this time EPA
believes the appropriate value for the net power of the electrical machines is the combined peak
power of all the electrical machines used to power the vehicle.
Responses to comments relating to other topics of battery durability and warranty are covered
in section 16 this document.
6.3 - Fuel economy testing
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
5. Test Cycle Basis
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We support EPA's intent to continue using the city (Federal Test Procedure or "FTP") and
highway (HFET) test cycles as the basis for measuring greenhouse gas emissions. If EPA were to
modify or add test cycles, the footprint-based targets would need to be modified to account for
such a change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. Ill]
Although other approaches (for example 5-cycle tests) may yield a result closer to on-road
values, it is important to recognize that reductions based on 2-cycle testing also translate to on-
road reductions. Therefore, maintaining a consistent "measuring stick" does not detract from the
improvements required by the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. Ill]
G.GHG / Fuel Economy Test Fuel
EPA acknowledges that it did not finalize the 2020 proposed rule238 for Tier 3 Test
Procedure Adjustment.239 We look forward to working with the agency to ensure that regulatory
text properly addresses necessary changes that were proposed in 2020. We reiterate comments
that we submitted on the Tier 3 Test Procedure Adjustment proposed rule in 2020.240 In
addition to relevant comments on the NPRM, previously submitted comments are summarized
below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 130-132]
238 85 FR 28564, May 13, 2020
239 NPRM at 29240
240 https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0604-0087
1.Do Not Adjust the Tailpipe C02 Value for E10
We appreciate EPA's decision to incorporate the change of GHG test fuel into the GHG
standards, rather than pursuing a standalone test procedure adjustment for MY2027 and beyond.
However, this approach creates a never-ending cycle of adjustments to GHG standards when a
lower carbon certification fuel is established (e.g., El5 cert fuel). In addition, EPA has proposed
an adjustment for use of Tier 3 test fuel of 1.0166 if the fuel is used to certify before MY2027.
Adjusting measured GHG emissions will disincentivize OEMs from switching to Tier 3 early
and will penalize the benefits of low carbon fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 130-
132]
The proposed action would artificially increase the measured tailpipe C02 emissions on Tier
3 E10 test fuel before MY2027 vehicles by 1.0166. Adding C02 emissions that are not emitted
by the vehicle for the purposes of calculating an adjusted compliance level for vehicles is counter
to the goal of reducing carbon emissions from the transportation sector. We recommend that if
OEMs use Tier 3 E10 test fuel before MY2027, no adjustments be applied to incentivize OEMs
to switch and to recognize the benefits of lower carbon fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 130-132]
2. Set R-Factor Equal to 1.0 for CAFE Performance on E10
In contrast to GHG emissions, for the purposes of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE),
EPA is required by statute to use test procedures that provide comparable results to those used
for MY 1975.241 Also, unlike C02, fuel economy is a calculated quantity; it is not directly
measured. However, EPA's proposed actions in the 2020 proposal fall short in making the
statutorily required adjustments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 130-132]
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241 49 U.S.C. § 32904(c).
One component of the fuel economy calculation is the "R-factor."242 In simple terms, an It-
factor of 1.0 implies that the impact of the energy content of a test fuel relative to that of the
1975 baseline fuel is fully observed in the test results and adjusted for. An R-factor of less than
implies that a test vehicle does not fully realize the impact of fuel energy content changes and
results in a lower calculated fuel economy for fuels with lower energy content. In the NPRM,
EPA proposes a new R-factor of 0.81, an increase from the prior value of 0.6. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 130-132]
242 In this NPRM, EPA proposes to replace R-factor with Ra for E10. In our comments, Auto Innovators
will explain that these terms are equivalent. The use of the terms R-factor and Ra are largely
interchangeable in the context of our comments.
Previous studies and theoretical principles regarding ethanol fuel combustion support a
conclusion that the new R-factor should be 1.0. These studies are described in greater detail in
our previously submitted comments. EPA's proposal for an R-factor of 0.81 is based solely on its
data from a January 2018 study of ten vehicles. In our comments, Auto Innovators identified a
number of limitations to the EPA test program, the largest of which are inherent variability
issues. Although the EPA study attempted to address emission measurement variability, it did
not consider significant variability attributable to laboratory testing procedures for analyzing fuel
properties, a key factor in the computation of an appropriate R-factor. Additionally, the
measurement of R-factor has also been shown to be highly variable on a vehicle-to-vehicle basis;
the average R-factor could have differed considerably had a slightly different mix of vehicles
been tested. For example, in EPA's test program, by replacing one vehicle that should have been
excluded with a vehicle that was inappropriately excluded, the R-factor calculated based on
EPA's limited test program would rise from 0.81 to 0.90. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
130-132]
A much larger test fleet, preferably of the newest vehicles, is needed to reasonably
approximate a representative "average R" applicable to the wide variety of vehicles and
technologies that will be included in manufacturers' fleets. In support of a much larger test fleet,
in our comments on the Tier 3 Test Procedure Adjustment proposed rule in 2020,243 Auto
Innovators prepared a large and newer vehicle dataset comparing tailpipe emission test results on
E0 and E10 test fuel. The industry-paired compliance dataset supports an R-factor close to 1.0.
Industry compliance data represents the variability that manufacturers have to manage, and the
results of EPA's analysis demonstrate that many vehicles will be penalized if the R-factor is
adjusted based solely on EPA's ten vehicle test program. The 2020 NPRM underestimates the
care that is taken in certification testing. Manufacturers take care both to supply good data to the
Agency and to be able to track laboratory and model performance. We urge EPA to utilize this
new larger dataset and finalize an R-factor of 1.0. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 130-
132]
243 htps://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0604-0087
There are additional practical reasons to set an R-factor of 1.0. This approach would obviate
the need for future test programs when the test fuel is changed. With a non-unity R-factor, any
future test fuel (e.g., El5) or fleet (with improved fuel economy technologies) would require
additional updates to the R-factor, resulting in a need to continue updating the R-factor. The R-
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factor at 1.0 would eliminate the necessity to reassess the R-factor in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 130-132]
3. Allow Carry-Over Throughout the Duration of the Rule
The NPRM allows a three-year phase in from MY 2027 through MY 2029, but that phase-in
is too quick of a transition. Auto Innovators recommends the use of carry-over throughout the
duration of the rule. Requiring new data, for a vehicle that is carryover, for MY2030 and beyond
adds unnecessary testng burden. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 132]
4. Address the Impact of the E10 Transition on 5-Cycle Testing and Litmus Test
The fuel economy label "litmus test" determines whether a manufacturer must test a vehicle
model using the full 5-cycle test procedure, or whether it can apply a simplified calculation that
only requires two test cycles. In this 2020 NPRM, EPA proposes to move all litmus testing to
E10 without determining the impact of using E10 tests in an empirical system founded on E0
testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 132-134]
EPA analysis shows that R-factor or Ra is cycle-specific, yet no analysis was conducted for
the Cold CO, SC03 or US06 test cycles, all of which are used to determine 5-cycle fuel economy
values for use on the consumer-based fuel economy label and to conduct the litmus assessment.
Auto Innovators believes requiring the use of E0 regressions and litmus limits for vehicles tested
on E10 is inappropriate. Further, this approach can be expected to result in unwarranted litmus
failures, causing additional test burden and competitive fuel economy label disadvantages for
vehicles that are otherwise very similar to each other. Auto Innovators requests that EPA
continue to allow automakers the option to retest on E0 for litmus assessment until the
implications of the new E10 test fuel on the complex 5-cycle and litmus methodology can be
fully examined and addressed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 132-134]
5.Consider Fuel Economy and Environmental Performance Labeling Impacts
Auto Innovators believes that continued use of the existing derived fuel economy values is
warranted for labeling purposes until proper E10 adjustments are developed. This reasoning does
not hold for litmus test, however, since relatively small shifts in the cycle relationships can cause
undue litmus failure and a lower label fuel economy for an affected vehicle model. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 132-134]
In Table 30 of the NPRM, EPA includes an adjustment for Fuel Economy and Environment
Label Values. We believe that this was an error in drawing, as there should not be an adjustment
for C02 for fuel economy and environment label values. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
132-134]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 39: NPRM Table 30: Proposed fuel-related testing
and certification requirements.6. Allow Use of California LEV III Test Fuel [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 132-134]
EPA should allow use of California LEV III El0 test fuel for GHG and fuel economy testing.
To reduce complexity and streamline operations allow OEMs, who may choose, to use
California LEV III test fuel as acceptable fuel alternative to the Tier 3 test fuel. In our 2020
comments and below, we provide carbon weight fraction and net heat of combustion calculations
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that will enable use of LEV III test fuel in compliance calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 132-134]
7.Net Heating of Combustion (NHC) and Carbon Weight Fraction (CWF) Equations
There are equation issues found in the 2020 NPRM that still must be resolved. Those issues
are reiterated below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
a)ASTM D240, ASTM D4809, and ASTM D5291 should not be used in the calculation of
fuel economy and other ASTM test method corrections.
EPA previously requested feedback regarding analytical methods ASTM D5291 for Carbon
Weight Fraction (CWF) and ASTM D4809 for Net Heat of Combustion (NHC). These test
methods should not be employed for determining CWF and NHC used in the calculation of fuel
economy. These test methods have a bias relative to the original test methods, which were used
to establish the CWF and NHC of the 1975 baseline fuel. The biases in these test methods will
introduce errors in the fuel economy results. In addition, these test methods have higher
variability and will introduce unwanted variation into the calculated fuel economy results. Auto
Innovators supports using ASTM D3338 and D3343 with modifications for E10 in the
calculation of fuel economy. The two legacy trade associations submitted a joint letter to EPA on
April 4, 2018, expressing support for using modified ASTM D3338 and D3343 test methods.
The letter was included as Appendix D of Auto Innovators' submitted comments on the Tier 3
Test Procedure Adjustment proposed rule in 2020.244 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
134-137]
244 htps://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0604-0087
Corrections are also needed to the list of ASTM procedures adopted by reference in §600.011:
modified D3338 replaces D240 and D4809 for NHC in §600.113-12(f)(l), and D5580 aromatic
content of LEV III fuel should be added to §600.113-12(f)(l) and the list in §600.011. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
Auto Innovators agrees with several of the Agency's proposed revisions to §600.113-12. The
exception being that fuel sulfur content, water, and aromatic content should also be included in
the calculations. For the aromatic content used to determine the NHC and CWF for use in the
fuel economy equation when using LEV III fuel, a second alternative method, ASTM D5580-15,
can be used as long as the result is first bias-corrected as described in D5580-15 to ASTM
D5769-20 and is then bias-corrected as described in ASTM D1319. This second alternative
method for bias correcting the aromatic content of LEV III should be added to §600.113-12.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
Additional details were provided in Appendix E of Auto Innovators' submitted comments on
the Tier 3 Test Procedure Adjustment proposed rule in 2020.245 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 134-137]
245 htps://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0604-0087
b) Implement consistent units and rounding procedures for Net Heat of Combustion and other
technical amendments.
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Paragraph §600.113-12(f)( 1 )(iii) of the previous NPRM contained inconsistencies of units and
rounding instructions. To resolve the inconsistencies, changes are needed and must be made
regardless of whether units are going to be retained as MJ/kg or changed to BTU/lb. We request
that EPA take the approach of changing to consistent use of BTU/lb rounded to the nearest whole
number for both E0 and E10 NHC. Additional details were provided in Appendix F of Auto
Innovators' submitted comments on the Tier 3 Test Procedure Adjustment proposed rule in
2020.246 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
246 htps://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0604-0087
There are also additional changes needed to 600.113-12(f)(l) not related to units:
- NHV and CWF are used in the E0 equation in 600.113-12(h), which is the existing
paragraph that addresses computation of mpg for tests still run on E0. This paragraph says to go
to 600.113-12(f)(l) to obtain "NHV" and "CWF" for the E0 test fuel. But (f)(1) terminology has
been changed from NHV and CWF to NHC and CMF. While this is just a terminology change,
the regulations should be clarified such that they mean the same thing with regard to what values
are obtained from (f)(1) for use in the equation in (h). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-
137]
- The term vFe needs to be defined as volume fraction of ethanol which is vPe/100. vPe is
defined as volume percentage, but steps in the calculations leap directly to use of vFe without
definition or explanation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
- The typo should be fixed where it says NHCf = net neat of combustion of test fuel = NHGH
• (1 - mFe) + NHCe mFe. NHGH should be NHCh. This was shown correctly in the "signature
package" version of the NPRM and then the typo appeared in the FR version. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
A clarification is also needed in 600.101(c) to avoid additional test burden and unnecessary
confusion to customers due to fuel economy value fluctuations, which are not essential, such as
measurement variations. Additionally, the paragraph refers to criteria emission standards, but we
believe E10 optional tests for EDV configuration is already allowed. Therefore, this sentence
should be revised to refer to fuel economy as follows. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
134-137]
600.101(c)
"... This requirement starts in model year XX for all fuel economy and certification testing in
new test groups that do not use carryover data for criteria emission standards fuel
economy..."[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
5.3.Do not remove sulfur corrections and water correction to modified ASTM
D3338 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
EPA is requesting feedback regarding removing the sulfur correction from the modified
D3338 method for determining Net Heat of Combustion (NHC). The sulfur adjustment in ASTM
D3338 lowers the calculated NHC. Eliminating the sulfur adjustment will result in a higher
calculated NHC and lower calculated CAFE resulting in an increase in stringency. While the
sulfur content in Tier 3 test fuel is very low and the adjustment is small, in some cases the sulfur
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adjustment will cause the NHC value to round up instead of down. Sulfur is a required parameter
for the Tier 3 test fuel and the sulfur value is already known for the test fuel. Eliminating the
sulfur adjustment does not reduce burden. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
EPA is also requesting feedback regarding omitting the water adjustments from the modified
D3338 method for determining NHC. The water adjustment in ASTM D3338 lowers the
calculated NHC. Eliminating the water adjustment will result in a higher calculated NHC and
lower calculated CAFE resulting in an increase in stringency. While the water content in Tier 3
and LEV III test fuel is very low and the adjustment is small, in some cases the water adjustment
will cause the NHC value to round up instead of down. Water is typically reported in Tier 3 and
LEV III certification fuel analyses. Omitting the water adjustment does not reduce burden.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
The required adjustments to include sulfur and water in the various equations follow. Include
after (f) (1) (i)
- Water. Determine water using ASTM E1064. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-
137]
- Sulfur. Determine Sulfur using ASTM D2622 or ASTM D5453. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.134-137]
Change (f) (1) (ii)(A) by including the sulfur term in the E0 CMF determination:
- CMF = 1 - 0.01 x hydrogen mass percent - 0.01 x sulfur mass percent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
Change (f) (1) (ii) (B) by including the water term in the Carbon Mass Fraction:
- CMFf = carbon mass fraction of test fuel = CMFh x (1 - MFH20 - mFe) + CMFe x mFe.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
Change (f) (1) (ii) (B) by including the water term in the aromatic content of the hydrocarbon
fraction:
- ?? = aromatic content of the hydrocarbon fraction = vParo,f / (1 - vFe - VFH20) [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
Change (f) (1) (ii) (B) by including ASTM D5580 as an alternative method for determining
aromatic content as long as it is corrected to ASTM D1319. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 134-137]
- vParo,f = volume percent aromatics in the test fuel as determined by ASTM D1319-15
(incorporated by reference in §600.011). An acceptable alternative method is ASTM D5769-10
(incorporated by reference in §600.011), as long as the result is bias-corrected as described in
ASTM D1319. An acceptable alternative method is ASTM D5580-15 (incorporated by reference
in §600.011), as long as the result is bias-corrected to ASTM D5769-10 and then bias corrected
again to ASTM D1319-15. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
Change (f) (1) (ii) (B) by including the water term in the specific gravity of the hydrocarbon
fraction:
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- SGh = specific gravity of the hydrocarbon fraction = (SGf- sGe x vFe - SGH20 x
VFH20) / (1 - vFe - VFH20) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
Change (f) (1) (iii) (B) by including the water terms in the net heat of combustion of the test
fuel:
- NHCf = net heat of combustion of test fuel = NHCh x (1 - mFe - MFH20) + NHCe x mFe
MFH20 x NHV60, H20
- NHV60, H20 = net heat of vaporization of water at 60F = 1059 BTU/lb [EP A-HQ-0 AR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
Change (f) (1) (iii) (B) by including the water term in the aromatic content of the hydrocarbon
fraction:
- ? = aromatics content of the hydrocarbon fraction = vParo,f / (1 - vFe - VFH20) [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
Change (f) (1) (iii) (B) by including the water term in the specific gravity of the hydrocarbon
fraction:
- SGh = specific gravity of the hydrocarbon fraction = (SGf - sGe x vFe - SGH20 x
VFH20) / (1 - vFe - VFH20) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 134-137]
Organization: American Coalition for Ethanol (ACE)
Vehicle incentives/credits are not the only area in which EPA seems to penalize technologies
designed to operate efficiently on ethanol-blended fuel, indeed another inequity exists with the
Agency's outdated fuel economy formula. In previous statements, EPA has acknowledged part
of the fuel economy formula (the R-factor) unfairly penalizes fuel containing ethanol.
Consequently, EPA is discouraging automakers from developing efficient engines that require
higher octane ratings and higher ethanol content. EPA has previously said the 0.6 R-factor is
erroneous and fails to achieve the statutory purpose of evaluating the fuel economy of fuels
containing ethanol. The auto industry has asked EPA for an R-factor of 1.0. In response, EPA
has suggested the correct value may lie "between 0.8 and 0.9." ACE supports an R-factor of 1.0.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0613, p. 5]
Section 202(a)(3)(A)(ii) of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to look beyond the basic engine
to set its engine or vehicle emission standards. Specifically, the statute says "in establishing
classes or categories of vehicles or engines for purposes of regulations under this paragraph, the
Administrator may base such classes or categories on gross vehicle weight, horsepower, type of
fuel used, or other appropriate factors (emphasis added)." To account for the "type of fuel used"
EPA needs to conduct a full lifecycle GHG emissions analysis. [EP A-HQ-0 AR-2022-0829-
0613, p. 5]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
VI. The Proposed Rule Should Fix the Problems with Fuel-Related Testing and Certification
Requirements.
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The proposed rule would also implement several changes to test fuel requirements, including
requiring that model year 2027 and later vehicle compliance be demonstrated on Tier 3 test fuel.
88 Fed. Reg. 29,240. EPA explains that "Tier 3 test fuel more closely represents the typical
market fuel available to consumers in that it contains 10 percent ethanol" and so EPA is
reproposing an adjustment factor to allow demonstration of compliance with the existing
standards using Tier 3 test fuel. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 45]
Requiring manufacturers to test on Tier 3 fuel and use the resultant tailpipe emissions directly
in compliance calculation is a good step towards regulatory realism. But EPA's proposed
approach does not fix many of the problems that have been identified in previous rulemakings.
Some commentors here provided a full analysis of EPA's 2020 proposal to adjust vehicle test
procedures for Tier 3 test fuel in comment submitted on that rulemaking docket. These previous
comments should be considered comments on the agency's renewed attempt to finalize this
proposal and are thus attached in an appendix to this comment. See Appendix B. EPA states that
it "will be reevaluating comments received on the 2020 proposal as well as the comments for this
proposal and considering if any corrections and adjustments are required, with any appropriate
modifications based on the comments received and on the changing circumstances reflected in
the current proposed rule for setting new standards for MY 2027 and later vehicles." 88 Fed Reg.
29,241 (emphasis added). Commentors reiterate that all issues raised in their previous comments
apply to EPA's current revival of these same issues here. That the current proposal switches the
1.0166 factor from a multiplier applied to Tier 3 to test results to a divisor applied to Indolene
test results does nothing to change the applicability of those comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0712, p. 45]
There are two primary issues with the proposed test fuel changes. First, the proposed rule's
adjustment factor for carbon-dioxide emissions artificially inflates the carbon-related exhaust
emissions for vehicles certified on the Tier 3 E10 test fuel. As a result, the rule penalizes low-
carbon fuels like E10 by eliminating their natural advantage as a lower carbon solution. The
Clean Air Act does not allow EPA to adjust test procedures to artificially distort C02 emissions
from vehicles. Maintaining the 1.0166 factor for pre-model year 2027 artificially inflates the
C02 emissions of vehicles certified on Tier 3 test fuels by making their C02 emissions appear
1.66% higher than they are. Similarly, dividing test results for Indolene by 1.0166 for MYs
2027-29 makes those vehicles' C02 emissions appear lower than they are. And maintaining a
C02 factor at all sets up barriers to future higher ethanol blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, pp. 45-46]
Second, EPA's proposed R-factor of 0.81 is too low and a more accurate R-factor is closer to
1. The proposed R-factor is flawed because it is based on a test program that EPA has admitted is
flawed. This test program did not use representative Tier 3 vehicles or test enough vehicles.
Further EPA's analysis of the Tier 3 test program data was flawed because it systematically
elected to included unreliable and unrepresentative data. Finally, EPA's conclusions are
inconsistent with the results of its own prior studies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 45-
46]
A. The Clean Air Act does not allow EPA to adjust test procedures to artificially distort C02
emissions.
While EPA has discretion under the Clean Air Act to define and execute appropriate
emissions test procedures, EPA's proposed C02 adjustment, which artificially distorts the C02
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emissions measured on vehicles certified using Tier 3 test fuel, exceeds that discretion. Section
202 directs EPA to "prescribe. . . standards applicable to the emission[s] . . . from any class or
classes of new motor vehicles," including C02 emissions. 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(l); Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007). To establish compliance with the prescribed emission
standards, Section 206 authorizes EPA to test, or require manufacturers to test, vehicles "in such
manner as [the agency] deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. §§ 7525(a)(1), (a)(3)(B). EPA can further
revise those tests "[f]rom time to time ... as deem[ed] appropriate." 42 U.S.C. §7525(a)(4)(B).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 46]
But EPA's authority to adjust emissions test procedures under Section 206 is not unbounded.
Congress unequivocally indicated its desire that test procedures reflect actual vehicle emissions,
directing EPA to "review and revise" test procedures "to insure that vehicles are tested under
circumstances which reflect the actual current driving conditions under which motor vehicles are
used, including conditions relating to fuel, temperature, acceleration, and altitude. 42 U.S.C. §
7525(h) (emphasis added); see also Energy Future Coalition v. EPA, 793 F.3d 141, 147 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) ("[T]he Clean Air Act provides that EPA's test fuel regulations must 'reflect the
actual current driving conditions under which motor vehicles are used, including conditions
relating to fuel.'")." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 46]
And Section 206 limits EPA to defining test procedures that are "appropriate... to determine
whether [a vehicle] conforms with" the emissions standards set under Section 202(a). 42 U.S.C.
§ 7525(a)(1) (emphasis added). While the term "appropriate" may "leave[] agencies with [some]
flexibility," the term still must be "[r]ead naturally in the [] context" of the statute. Michigan v.
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997)
(legislation is "appropriate" if it is "adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in
view") (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879)). The most natural
understanding of the term "appropriate" in the context of Section 206 is that test procedures
should reflect accurate, actual, real-world vehicle emissions. It is not appropriate to distort
measured emissions simply to maintain stringency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 46-47]
Indeed, EPA itself has historically interpreted its authority to set test procedures as requiring
test procedures that reflect actual, not scaled, tailpipe C02 emissions. For each test fuel that EPA
currently allows in certification—gasoline, diesel, methanol, natural gas, ethanol, liquified
petroleum gas, and related fuel blends— EPA's procedures for determining CREE reflect the
actual—not "adjusted"—vehicle C02 emissions. See 40 C.F.R. § 600.113-12(h)-(m). EPA's
proposed C02 adjustment, which artificially adjusts C02 emissions of vehicles by 1.66%, would
be unprecedented. It would single out an individual test fuel and perversely penalize it alone for
its lower carbon output. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 46-47]
Under the Clean Air Act, changes in vehicle emissions due to changes in test fuels are
properly addressed by adjusting emission standards, not by changing test procedures. EPA's
contrary arguments in the Tier 3 proposed rulemaking are unpersuasive. In the preamble to that
proposed rule, EPA claims, without support, "that for testing for C02 emissions compliance
under the Clean Air Act, the statute allows, but does not require [C02 emissions] adjustments
back to 1975 test procedures, including for changes in test fuel properties." 85 Fed. Reg. 28,567.
The relevant provisions, however, make no reference to scaling vehicle emissions test procedures
to align with decades-old test procedures. Indeed, as C02 emissions were first regulated in
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model year 2012, 40 C.F.R. § 86.1818-12(c), EPA's theory is a pure anachronism: There are no
1975 C02 test procedures EPA could adjust to. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 47-48]
EPA nevertheless claimed that the C02 adjustment is necessary "to produce the expected
C02 performance had the vehicle been tested over the same test cycles while operating on Tier 2
fuel." 85 Fed. Reg. 28,573. However, unlike EPCA, which expressly states that compliance with
fuel economy standards is tied to the 1975 test fuel, 49 U.S.C. § 32904(c), the Clean Air Act
nowhere suggests that the greenhouse gas vehicle emissions used for compliance purposes are
tied to a particular (i.e., Tier 2) baseline. Instead, the most natural reading of Section 202's
requirement that "emission[s] . . . from any . . . new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines" must meet prescribed standards is that actual emissions—not some scaled version of
them—must meet the imposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 47-48]
Had Congress intended EPA to develop test procedures that scale emissions tailpipe
measurements to align with some predetermined model year baseline, it could have said so—as it
did in the EPCA. The absence of any such language in the Clean Air Act suggests that Congress
meant exactly what it said: that emissions test procedures should "reflect the actual current
driving conditions under which motor vehicles are used, including conditions relating to fuel,"
42 U.S.C. § 7525(h) (emphasis added), meaning the procedures reflect the actual C02 emissions
generated by tested vehicles using a particular test fuel that is representative of market fuel.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 48]
Furthermore, the proposed adjustment is based on a fundamental misconception of EPA's
statutory role under Section 202(a). EPA asserted that its C02 adjustment is "predicated on a
view of [greenhouse gas] . . . stringency as relating to vehicle efficiency rather than tailpipe
emissions in a market representative fuel mix." 85 Fed. Reg. at 28,566; id. at 28,570 (claiming
the proposed C02 adjustment is "necessary to realign test results to maintain efficiency controls
at the vehicle manufacturer level."). But unlike with CAFE, the purpose of C02 regulation is not
improving vehicle "efficiency," but protecting the health and welfare of the people of the United
States. As the Supreme Court observed in Massachusetts v. EPA, "EPA has been charged with
protecting the public's 'health' and 'welfare,' a statutory obligation wholly independent of
DOT's mandate to promote energy efficiency." 549 U.S. at 532 (citation omitted). Yet the
proposed C02 adjustment is unlawfully predicated on the notion that Section 202(a) is an
energy-efficiency mandate no different from DOT's obligation to increase fuel economy, in
contravention of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, p. 48]
Finally, EPA's interpretation of the scope of Section 206 has no principled limitation. If EPA
may conjure up fake carbon molecules to the emissions of E10 simply to "maintain stringency,"
EPA would also be able to make measured carbon molecules disappear if regulatory changes or
other factual circumstances make the standards more difficult to achieve than initially planned.
This kind of hocus-pocus has no basis in the statute. EPA has no discretion to bias the test
procedures against a test fuel to adjust the stringency of the C02 standards. It should abandon its
novel and flawed view of the Clean Air Act and adopt test procedures that measure real C02
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 48]
B. The proposed C02 adjustment is an arbitrary and capricious departure from the agency's
policy of fuel neutrality.
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EPA's proposed C02 adjustment is also an arbitrary and capricious departure from the
agency's policy of fuel neutrality. When it departs from precedent, an "agency must at least
'display awareness that it is changing position' and 'show that there are good reasons for the new
policy.'" Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (quoting FCC, 556
U.S. at 515). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 48-49]
By singling out a single test fuel for a C02 penalty, EPA departs from its historic approach of
applying emissions standards and related test procedures in a way that is "fuel neutral," so that
"vehicles certified to operate on any fuel (e.g., gasoline, diesel fuel, ethanol blends, compressed
natural gas, liquefied natural gas, hydrogen, and methanol) are all subject to the same standards."
Cong. Research Serv., Tier 3 Motor Vehicle Emission and Fuel Standards 4 (Apr. 28, 2014); see
also Tier 3 Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 23,558 ("Consistent with the Tier 2 principle of vehicle and fuel
neutrality, the same Tier 3 standards apply to all LDVs, LDTs, or MDPVs, regardless of the fuel
they use, as proposed. That is, vehicles certified to operate on any fuel (e.g., gasoline, diesel fuel,
E85, CNG, LNG, hydrogen, and methanol) are all subject to the same standards."). In doing so,
it eliminates the natural advantage of low-carbon test fuels in the certification process and wipes
out the incentive to develop and adopt cleaner, lower-carbon fuels and technologies, cutting-off a
promising pathway for achieving lower emissions and lower cost vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, pp. 48-49]
EPA's proposed rule effectively places a thumb on the scale in favor of electrification and
against clean, low-carbon fuels, ultimately harming both the environment and the consumer.
Moreover, by discouraging adoption of low-carbon fuels like high-octane mid-level ethanol
blends as an option to reduce C02 emissions, EPA's approach only endangers the public health
and welfare, contrary to EPA's statutory duty. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). To advance its mandate,
EPA should encourage all fuel and vehicle low-carbon solutions, not pick winners and losers by
erecting barriers to particular fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 48-49]
C. The proposed R-factor exceeds EPA's authority to adjust fuel economy test procedures.
Under the existing statutory framework, Congress granted exclusive authority to DOT to
"prescribe by regulation average fuel economy standards for automobiles." 49 U.S.C. §
32902(a). EPA has no authority to change the stringency of standards set by DOT. Rather, EPA
is limited to prescribing fuel economy test procedures that give "comparable results" to the
procedures used for model year 1975. 49 U.S.C. § 32904(c). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712,
pp. 49-50]
There is ample evidence that EPA's proposed R-factor of 0.81 is too low and that an accurate
R-factor is closer to 1. See Appendix B; see also C. Scott Sluder et al., Determination of the R-
factor for Fuel Economy Calculations Using Ethanol-Blended Fuels over Two Test Cycles, SAE
Tech. Paper 2014-01-1572. Imposing an R-factor that is too low yields adjusted Tier 3 fuel
economy results that are too low compared to the results that would be generated under 1975
vehicle test procedures, violating the comparability requirement. Moreover, EPA's improperly
low proposed R-factor makes the fuel economy standards harder to meet, effectively raising their
stringency and exceeding EPA's limited authority to adjust fuel economy test procedures. See id.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 49-50]
A simple example illustrates this increase in stringency: if the accurate R-factor is 1—a value
that is close to values suggested by previous studies—EPA's proposed value of 0.81 results in an
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adjusted Tier 3 fuel economy that is 0.52% lower than the accurate adjusted fuel economy,
effectively increasing the standard that a vehicle certified with a Tier 3 test fuel must meet by the
same amount. EPA undertakes no such cost-benefit analysis or consideration of alternatives in its
notice of proposed rulemaking, and regardless, EPA has no authority to make any such change.
Only DOT has legal authority to promulgate regulations that increase the stringency of fuel
economy standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 50]
EPA's authority in this instance is limited to promulgating an R-factor that gives "comparable
results" to the test procedures used for model year 1975. 49 U.S.C.§ 32904(c). Because EPA's
proposed R-factor of 0.81 is erroneous, the proposed rule changes fuel economy standards and
thus it exceeds EPA's statutory authority to adjust test procedures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, p. 50]
D. EPA's analysis of the test program data was flawed and inconsistent with previous EPA
studies.
EPA's analysis of the limited data it had from the test program is also flawed. Specifically,
EPA systematically includes outlier data and data from unrepresentative vehicles that lowers the
determined R-factor, while needlessly excluding other vehicle data that would increase the R-
factor. As documented in Appendix B, the analysis inappropriately includes unreliable, outlier
results from a faulty 2013 Chevrolet Malibu test vehicle, which significantly skews EPA's
calculations and leads to a proposed R-factor that is far too low. At the same time, EPA
arbitrarily excluded from its analysis results from the 2016 Acura ILX test vehicle simply
because they were "unexpected." By excluding the Acura results, EPA's determined R-factor
was lower than it would have been had it included all Test Program vehicles in its analysis.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 50-51]
EPA's analysis is also questionable because its determined R-factor is inconsistent with the
results of numerous other recent EPA studies that have determined R factors much closer to 1.
Within the past decade, EPA has sponsored or participated in at least three studies that have
generated the data necessary to determine the R factor for vehicles operating using gasoline-
ethanol fuel blends: the DOE Immediate Ethanol Effects Study, the EPAct/V2/E-89 Study, and
the DOE Catalyst Durability Study. These studies included vehicles spanning model years 1999
to 2009. C. Scott Sluder et al., Determination of the R-factor for Fuel Economy Calculations
Using Ethanol-Blended Fuels over Two Test Cycles, SAE Tech. Paper 2014-01-1572. While
these studies were not designed specifically to measure R factor, the data they generated is
nonetheless appropriate for doing so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 50-51]
These previous EPA studies also have a significant advantage over the Tier 3 Test Program in
that they evaluated a considerably larger number of vehicles and fuel blends, allowing
determination of an R-factor with much greater certainty than EPA is able to do based on the
Tier 3 Test Program data.25 So, while the vehicle selection and test method varied slightly
compared to the Tier 3 Test Program, the results from these studies still provide a valuable
reference point for corroborating EPA's conclusions from its Tier 3 Test Program. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 51]
25 The Immediate Ethanol Effects Study included measurements on sixteen vehicle models and four fuel
blends; the EPAct Study included measurements on fifteen vehicle models and a set of twenty- seven fuels;
and the Catalyst Durability Study included 18 matched sets of vehicle models and four test fuels that
produced data appropriate for R-factor analysis. The estimated uncertainties (95% confidence) for the R-
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factor determinations from these studies ranges from 0.010 to 0.075, significantly smaller than the
uncertainty in EPA's analysis for the proposed rule. See Appendix B.
These three previous studies uniformly found higher average R-factors than EPA's proposed
R-factor of 0.81. Analysis of the Immediate Ethanol Effects Study results yielded an R-factor
ranging from 0.86 to 0.89, the EPAct Study yielded an R- factor of 0.92, and the Catalyst
Durability Study yielded an R factor of 0.94 to 0.96. All these studies had significantly lower
uncertainties in their determined R-factors than EPA has in its proposed R-factor: the maximum
R-factor uncertainty among the three studies of ±0.087, compared to an uncertainty of ±0.39 in
EPA's proposal. The R-factor derived from these studies can be compared directly to EPA's
proposal, and their uniformly higher values confirm that EPA's Tier 3 Test Program analysis
underestimates R. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 51]
As a result, the adjustment factors calculated by EPA are arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 51]
For all the reasons detailed above, EPA should withdraw the proposed rulemaking and issue
another proposed rulemaking that complies with the agency's statutory obligations. To satisfy its
obligations under the Clean Air Act, EPA should reconsider its proposed Tier 3 Test Fuel
adjustments and instead finalize a rule that eliminates the proposed CO2 adjustment and that
includes an R-factor of not less than 0.95. Commentors strongly urge EPA to use its Section 202
powers effectively and consider the ways in which ethanol and other renewable fuels can
improve our nation's light- and medium-duty fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 51-52]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
XIII. EPA Should Finalize the Proposed Test Fuel Change for GHG and Fuel Economy
Certification But Not for Labeling Purposes, and It Should Require the Use of Adjustment
Factors in Appropriate Circumstances. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 96]
We support EPA's proposal to require gasoline-powered vehicles to demonstrate compliance
with the MY 2027-2032 GHG standards using Tier 3 test fuel, as well as its proposal to require
the use of adjustment factors in certain situations. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29240-42 & Tbl. 30. In
addition to the points made below, we urge EPA to consider the comment letter that many of the
undersigned organizations submitted to EPA in August 2020 regarding its related proposal on
Tier 3 test fuel (which was never finalized).230 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 96]
230 Comment Letter re: EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0604, Vehicle Test Procedure Adjustments for Tier 3
Certification Test Fuel (Aug. 14, 2020), at https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-
0604-0081.
In the 2014 Tier 3 Rule, EPA appropriately decided to transition away from Indolene (also
known as "Tier 2") test fuel, which no consumer can purchase, to a test fuel ("Tier 3," which
contains 10% ethanol) that represents what consumers can actually purchase at the pump. 79
Fed. Reg. at 23525-26. As part of the Tier 3 rulemaking, EPA committed to assessing the impact
of the test fuel change on the GHG emissions and fuel usage of the new vehicle fleet. Id. at
23531-32. The results of the Agency's subsequent research study were conclusive: switching
from Indolene to Tier 3 test fuel reduces fuel economy and tailpipe emissions of carbon
dioxide.231 As EPA rightly concludes, the "difference in GHG emissions between the two fuels
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is significant in the context of measuring compliance" with GHG standards. 88 Fed. Reg. at
29241. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 96-97]
231 See U.S. EPA, Tier 3 Certification Fuel Impacts Test Program, EPA-420-R-18-004 (Jan. 2018), at 2,
available at https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0604-0003.
Because EPA has based the proposed MY 2027-2032 GHG standards on the use of Tier 3 test
fuel instead of Indolene, id. at 29240-41, requiring manufacturers to use Tier 3 test fuel to
demonstrate compliance in MY 2027 and beyond is appropriate. We agree that compliance
testing using Tier 3 fuel in MY 2027-2032 does not require an adjustment factor. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 97]
We also agree with EPA's proposal that any manufacturers that use Tier 3 test fuel to certify
compliance with pre-MY 2027 GHG standards must apply an adjustment factor of 1.0166. 88
Fed. Reg. at 29241 & Tbl. 30. Since the existing (pre-MY 2027) GHG standards are based on
Indolene test fuel, using this adjustment factor is necessary to avoid arbitrarily crediting vehicles
tested with Indolene with artificial reductions in GHG emissions. As EPA has recognized, not
applying an adjustment factor would effectively (and inappropriately) reduce the stringency of
the existing GHG standards. U.S. EPA, Vehicle Test Procedure Adjustments for Tier 3
Certification Test Fuel, 85 Fed. Reg. 28564, 28566 (May 13, 2020) (proposed, never-finalized
rule regarding Tier 3 test fuel change). Failing to require an adjustment factor would also impose
unwarranted additional costs on consumers at the gas pump. To avoid unnecessary and harmful
delays in manufacturers applying the adjustment factor to pre-MY 2027 vehicles tested on
Indolene, EPA should also clarify that this provision takes effect 60 days after the rule becomes
final. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 97]
EPA's approach to adjusting the fuel economy and GHG certification values based on the
certified fuel as outlined in Table 30 of the Proposal is appropriate. However, the Agency should
begin requiring Tier 3 fuel used for certification for all non-carryover vehicles beginning with
the first complete model year following finalization of the rule, in order to avoid manufacturers
trying to exploit relative Indolene vs. Tier 3 performance different than the average adjustment
factor. Manufacturers already certify vehicles on Tier 3 fuel and are aware of any potential
discrepancies that could be used to their advantage, so the Agency should eliminate any
opportunity for manipulation of certification results as soon as possible, with no phase in period.
Allowing carryover is a sufficient compromise to minimize testing burden. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 97]
We do not support EPA's proposal to adjust certification test fuel requirements for purposes
of fuel economy and emissions labels. The use of Tier 3 fuel for certification was justified
because this fuel more closely aligns with the fuel available to consumers at the pump.232 Thus,
Tier 3 fuel is more representative of the fuel a consumer would use to judge their own fuel
economy. In contrast, the data collected to support the latest iteration of the fuel economy label
was collected in 2004-2005,233 prior to the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2) taking effect.
Ethanol content in fuel in 2004-2005 was just 2%, on average; MTBE was the more popular
oxygenate; and gasoline's oxygen content averaged just over 1%, as opposed to 2014, when Tier
3 (E10) fuel was defined to reflect the 10% ethanol content of the reformulated gasoline
available to consumers and oxygen content nearly doubled.234 While Indolene has never been
available at the gas pump, many of the average properties for 2004 pump fuel are directionally
more similar to Indolene than to Tier 3 fuel: lower gravity, lower ethanol content, lower oxygen,
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and higher aromatics.235 Thus, the fuel economy labeling tests were, to first order, based on the
pump fuel at the time, and now such tests should reflect the updated fuel more representative of
today's current pump fuel. Therefore, rather than applying the adjustment factor to Tier 3-
certified vehicles, as EPA proposes, it would be more appropriate to apply the inverse adjustment
factor to Indolene-certified vehicles. While we appreciate the point made by EPA that "a
comprehensive assessment of real world fuel economy is the best process to ensure that all real-
world effects are reflected," 85 Fed. Reg. at 28579, such an assessment is a resource-intensive
undertaking that has not been attempted in nearly 20 years, and EPA has sufficient data based on
its Tier 2/Tier 3 program to account for a shift in the available pump fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, pp.97-98]
232 "E10 most appropriately reflects in-use gasoline around the country today and into the foreseeable
future, and thus we are finalizing E10 for the test fuel." 79 Fed. Reg. at 23450.
233 U.S. EPA, Final Technical Support Document-Fuel Economy Labeling of Motor Vehicles: Revisions
to Improve Calculation of Fuel Economy Estimates, EPA-420-R-06-017 (Dec. 2006), at Appendix A,
available at http://nepis.epa.gOv/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P 1004F41 ,PDF?Dockey=P1004F41 .PDF.
234 U.S. EPA, Fuel Trends Report: 2006-2016, EPA-420-R-17-005 (2017), at 27, Tbl. 6, available at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100T5J6.pdf.
235 Compare id. Tbl. 6 with U.S. EPA, Tier 3 Certification Fuel Impacts Test Program, EPA-420-R-18-
004 (Jan. 2018), at 5, Tbl. 3.1.
Organization: Ford Motor Company
E10 Fuel Economy & GHG Testing Transition
Ford generally supports EPA's proposal to transition to E10 test fuel for GHG and fuel
economy testing. Specifically, we support the ability to conduct E10 testing before 2027MY with
appropriate adjustments, and the application of 1.0166 divisor to E0 testing conducted after
2026MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 9]
Ford also recommends the following clarifications/adjustments to the proposed E10
provisions: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 9]
- To ease test burden and provide greater flexibility, E0 carry-over testing should be extended
through 2030MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 9]
- Clarify that re-testing on E0 for 5-cycle litmus determination be permitted until updated
derived 5-cycle regression equations are developed using regular-grade octane E10 fuel. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 9]
Ford looks forward to working with EPA to help develop the provisions, test procedures and
regulatory text related to this test fuel transition that are needed for the final rule. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 9]
Organization: Minnesota Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
Update Fuel Related Testing and Certification Requirements
As NCGA recommended to EPA in 2020 comments on Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0604,
actual tailpipe carbon emissions, regardless of the test fuel, must continue to be the only measure
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of vehicle emissions performance in vehicle testing. C02 test adjustments would needlessly
complicate vehicle test procedures. Relying solely on test results eliminates uncertainty,
averaging and potential for inaccuracies in procedures to adjust emission test results for the
fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 12]
Correct the fuel economy formula by updating the R-Factor to 1.0 to reflect documented
operation of modern engine technology.
Correcting the R-Factor in the fuel economy formula would support automakers developing
high efficiency engines that require higher octane ratings and a higher ethanol content. EPA has
acknowledged that the current EPA- mandated R-Factor of 0.6, originally established in the
1980s, is outdated and fails to achieve the statutory purpose of making fuel economy testing on
today's fuel equivalent to fuel economy testing in 1975. An update to 1 from 0.6 would reflect
results of analysis by the Department of Energy and EPA using modern engines and fulfill
previous observations and commitments from EPA to address this issue. Published studies have
shown that R for modern vehicles should be around 0.93 to 0.96.31 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0612, p. 12]
31 Sluder, C., West, B., Butler, A., Mitcham, A. et al. 2014. Determination of the R Factor for Fuel
Economy Calculations Using Ethanol-Blended Fuels over Two Test Cycles. SAE Int. J. Fuels Lubr.
7(2):2014, doi: 10.4271/2014-01-1572.
Setting the R-factor to 1.0 sets fuel economy results on an energy basis. In application, the R
factor equation is a "fuel response factor," adjusting for more than just energy density. An R of
1.0 essentially converts fuel economy to mile per gallon gasoline equivalent (MPGge), which is
how other alternative fuels such as propane, natural gas, and electricity have been compared to
their gasoline counterparts for decades. Setting R to 1.0 provides equitable treatment to
renewable ethanol that other alternative fuels already receive. This change could help speed the
transition to certification with Tier 3 fuel as well as encourage vehicle manufacturers to seek
certification for even higher ethanol blends, such as El5 or the high octane E30 EPA suggested
in its Tier 3 proposal several years ago. Manufacturers are not incentivized to build dedicated
high-octane vehicles that reduce GHG emissions when those low carbon benefits are penalized
by a low R factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 12]
Lower GHG emissions from vehicles benefit consumers, our environment, and our energy
security. Just as updating the test fuel from E0 to E10 reduced GHG emissions by blending
cleaner, renewable ethanol with gasoline, El5 and future clean, high-octane fuels that blend
more ethanol will further reduce emissions and improve fuel economy when used with optimized
engines. Vehicle test procedures for Tier 3 fuel, or any future certification fuel, must not create
impediments to low carbon fuels such as El 5 and higher blends and the vehicle technologies that
help reach our mutual goal of lower GHG emissions. Stringency of the standards is best
maintained through the Administrator's authority to adjust the standards, as EPA is using in this
proposal, not by adjusting emission test results. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 12-13]
Update the F-factor in the fuel economy formula to a forward-looking F-factor of at least
0.2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 13]
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Organization: National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)
As NCGA recommended to EPA in 2020 comments on Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0604,
actual tailpipe carbon emissions, regardless of the test fuel, must continue to be the only measure
of vehicle emissions performance in vehicle testing. C02 test adjustments would needlessly
complicate vehicle test procedures. Relying solely on test results eliminates uncertainty,
averaging and potential for inaccuracies in procedures to adjust emission test results for the fuel.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 10]
Lower GHG emissions from vehicles benefit consumers, our environment, and our energy
security. Just as updating the test fuel from E0 to E10 reduced GHG emissions by blending
cleaner, renewable ethanol with gasoline, El5 and future clean, high-octane fuels that blend
more ethanol will further reduce emissions and improve fuel economy when used with optimized
engines. Vehicle test procedures for Tier 3 fuel, or any future certification fuel, must not create
impediments to low carbon fuels such as El 5 and higher blends and the vehicle technologies that
help reach our mutual goal of lower GHG emissions. Stringency of the standards is best
maintained through the Administrator's authority to adjust the standards, as EPA is using in this
proposal, not by adjusting emission test results. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 10]
Organization: POET, LLC
A. An R-factor of 1.0 Should Be Used by EPA for Fuel Economy Calculations on E10.
POET supports an R-factor equal to 1.0 for EPA's calculation fuel economy performance on
E10, as broadly supported by commenters such as the Alliance for Automotive Innovation and
Growth Energy. An R-factor of 1.0 implies energy content impact of a test fuel relative to that of
the 1975 baseline fuel is fully observed in test results and adjusted for. An R-factor of less than
1.0 implies a test vehicle does not fully realize the impact of fuel energy content changes and
results in a lower calculated fuel economy for fuels with lower energy content. In the 2020
NPRM, EPA inappropriately proposed an R-factor of 0.81. For reasons including those outlined
by the Alliance for Automotive Innovation and Growth Energy, including the use of more
representative data, POET supports an R-factor of 1.0 for an E10 test fuel. 129 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, p. 28]
129 See Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Comments on Vehicle Test Procedure Adjustments for Tier 3
Certification Test Fuel; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (August 14, 2020), pp. 5-6, available at
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0604-0087. See also, Growth Energy, Vehicle
Test Procedure Adjustments for Tier 3 Test Fuel (August 14, 2020)(supporting an R-factor of 1.0 and
noting that EPA's lower proposed R-factor "fails to reflect real-world numbers or recognize the myriad of
advancements in technology and the wealth of research in this area by national laboratories and others"),
p.l, available at https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0604-0079.
B. EPA Must Not Use a Carbon Adjustment Factor That Disincentives Using Low- Carbon
Fuels.
EPA must not use a "C02 adjustment" to GHG emission test results to arbitrarily and
capriciously eliminate incentives for low carbon fuels. The Proposed Rule suggests use of a
"C02 adjustment" factor of 1.0166 for GHG standards "to demonstrate compliance with a GHG
standard referenced to Indolene test fuel" and regarding "fuel economy and environment label
values."130 However, the Proposed Rule also states, when determining compliance based on
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Tier 3 Test Fuel, that "[t]his proposal does not include an adjustment factor for tailpipe GHG
emissions but rather requires manufacturers to test on Tier 3 test fuel and use the resultant
tailpipe emissions directly in their compliance calculation." 131 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, p. 29]
130 88 Fed. Reg. at 29241 (emphasis added).
13188 Fed. Reg. at 29240.
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation noted in comments on EPA's 2020 proposed rule
that "Adding C02 emissions that are not emitted by the vehicle for the purposes of calculating an
adjusted compliance level for vehicles is counter to the goal of reducing carbon emissions from
the transportation sector" and "will have the unintended consequence of undermining the large
potential GHG reduction opportunities low carbon fuels." 132 Similarly, Growth Energy noted
EPA's C02 adjustment factor in the 2020 proposal would "unnecessarily penalize automakers
for the use of low carbon fuels" and the "use of low-carbon biofuels, such as ethanol, should be
strongly encouraged given the benefits toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving
air quality." POET agrees that no C02 adjustment factor should be used that disincentives the
use of low carbon fuels. 133 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 29]
132 August 14, 2020 comments of Alliance for Automotive Innovation, supra, at 3.
133 August 14, 2020 comments of, supra at pp. 1-2.
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
The Alliance commented on the following items:
1. Do Not Adjust the Tailpipe CO2 Value for E10
2. Set R-Factor Equal to 1.0 for CAFE Performance on E10
3. Delay E10 Phase-in, Allow Optional E0 Testing and Carryover of E0 Data
4. Address the Impact of the E10 Transition on 5-Cycle Testing and Litmus Test
5. Consider Fuel Economy and Environmental Performance Labeling Impacts
Several commenters advised that adjusting CO2 measurements from Tier 3 test fuel upward
by 1.6% is improper since E10 test fuel represents market fuel. (For example, a commenter states
that "It is not appropriate to distort measured emissions simply to maintain stringency.") They
also suggest that the proposed adjusted R-value of 0.81 is too low, stating that values around 0.9
or higher have been published in recent literature, and that a value of 1.0 would be optimal as it
avoids penalizing ethanol blends. One commenter took issue with the choice of test vehicles
retained in the dataset used to compute the updated R-factor, specifically that the 2013 Malibu
was included while the Acura was excluded. Another commenter explained that the computation
of the test fuel's heating value and carbon mass fraction should be done using the original ASTM
methods used in characterizing the historical reference fuel rather than updated methods we
proposed, and that the values should account for sulfur and water content. It was also suggested
that the PM Index and/or heavy aromatics content of Tier 3 certification test gasoline should be
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adjusted to better match current market gasoline, pointing to a downward shift since the original
specification was set.
Some commentors mentioned that they believed EPA was penalizing technologies designed to
operate efficiently on ethanol-blended fuel and discouraging automakers from developing
efficient engines that require higher octane ratings and higher ethanol content. This
disincentivizes the use of low carbon fuels with ethanol.
A commentor suggested that the proposed CO2 adjustment is an arbitrary and capricious
departure from the agency's policy of fuel neutrality. The commenter also stated the Clean Air
Act does not allow EPA to adjust test procedures to artificially distort CO2 emissions, or that it
would unnecessarily complicate the compliance calculations.
Another commenter voiced support for the proposed adjustments to CO2 and fuel economy
measurements used for compliance, but opposed the adjustments to Tier 3 fuel results for vehicle
labels on the basis that Tier 3 fuel is a reasonably good representation of market fuel.
Response:
The responses to the Alliance's list are available in Section III.C.2.iv.e of the preamble.
We are finalizing GHG standards the stringency of which accounts for E10 test fuel, therefore
the 1.6% adjustment is no longer required in most situations. This would have been appropriate
broadly when the standards were based on EO test fuel since that fuel produces higher CO2
emissions for the same vehicle and test conditions. Adjustments are reasonable when the current
test fuel is different from the original test fuel for which the standards were set, but that is not the
case with this rule's final GHG standards.
However, we are retaining the updated Ra-factor of 0.81 to represent equivalent fuel economy
performance within the CAFE program. This factor was generated from a study carefully
designed and rigorously conducted at EPA's lab. The decision to include data from the 2013
Malibu was based on its performance being within the expected range.
In addition, we want to clarify that R-factor values in the literature (e.g., in Sluder, et al.) are
generally intended to isolate the actual sensitivity of fuel economy to fuel energy content, while
the Ra factor here rolls up multiple impacts related to this specific pair of test fuels that include
the energy content difference, additional charge cooling due to ethanol's heat of vaporization,
and potentially some marginal impacts of the octane change. Thus, we wouldn't expect this Ra
value to precisely match other R-factors found in the literature.
We have revised the fuel economy calculations to use ASTM methods D3338 and D3343
with appropriate accommodations for E10 blends and have addressed the inconsistency in
heating value units. We did not incorporate water and sulfur adjustments to heating value and
carbon content of test fuels. Since the updated R-factor was empirically derived from a study
where the test fuels contained typical levels of water and sulfur, the results effectively
incorporate impacts of those contaminates on fuel economy. Additional corrections should then
be very small if applied as a deviation from our study fuels, or redundant if accounted for in full
measure.
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We are not adjusting the aromatics content specifications for certification test gasoline at this
time, as we did not include any updated ranges in the proposal. We will consider this issue as
part of our assessment of a potential heavy aromatic content standard for market gasoline.
A commentor suggested that the proposed CO2 adjustment is an arbitrary and capricious
departure from a policy of fuel neutrality and that the Clean Air Act does not allow EPA to
adjust test procedures to artificially distort CO2 emissions. Another commenter suggests that the
adjustment will unnecessarily complicate the compliance calculations. EPA disagrees. The
statute confers on the Administrator discretion to promulgate appropriate testing requirements.
The commenters fundamentally misunderstand the purpose of the adjustment, which is not meant
to artificially distort CO2 emissions, but rather to account for the effects of different test fuels
and accurately represent CO2 emissions for purposes of compliance with the GHG standards.
The adjustments are necessary to produce equivalent stringency of standards between testing that
used Tier 2 versus Tier 3 fuels. Having no adjustment would effectively reduce the stringency of
the earlier standards when Tier 3 fuel is used. Without this adjustment, manufacturers could
reduce the CO2 emissions of a given vehicle model by simply changing which test fuel was used
during GHG certification testing. In any case, the CO2 adjustment for Tier 3 test fuel is only
required through model-year 2026 vehicles. In addition, the exact value of the adjustments are
the result of a carefully executed test program using a variety of technologies with a wide cross
section of vehicle types represented.
In response to comments opposing the CO2 adjustments to Tier 3 fuel results for vehicle
labels (on the basis that Tier 3 fuel is a reasonably good representation of market fuel), we assert
that the adjustment is appropriate because the label calculations, being based on Tier 2 E0 fuel,
already apply an adjustment to account for market fuel being E10. Therefore, using the Tier 3
test fuel value directly would effectively be double-counting for the ethanol content.
In response to the comments on penalizing technologies, the revised R-factor and CO2
adjustments apply only to existing vehicle designs using E10 test fuel. Test fuels and procedures
allowing manufacturers to certify vehicles at higher ethanol blend levels do not yet exist (with
the exception of E85 fuel, which does not use these adjustment factors).
6.4 - Engine certification for high-GCWR vehicles
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Alliance)
E. MDV Certification (Chassis vs Engine Dynamometer)
10. Background on Chassis vs. Engine Dynamometer Certification
Today, emission testing of trucks typically happens on either a chassis dynamometer or an
engine dynamometer. Class 2b and 3 complete vehicles are required to test tailpipe emissions on
a chassis dynamometer, while Class 4 and above vehicles test the performance of the engine
itself. The two test procedures are very different in terms of laboratory hardware and test cycles.
EPA is proposing that many MDVs will retain chassis dynamometer testing for GHG emissions
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and have the additional, new requirements for engine dynamometer testing for criteria emissions
beginning in MY 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 203-205]
Engine dynamometers are useful to assess the performance of engines across a wide range of
loads and engine speeds. Emissions typically vary by operating conditions, or set points, and lab
measurements across a range of set points can help predict emissions performance across a wide
range of engine use cases where engine speed and engine load may vary significantly. In the
heavy-duty industry, one engine family may be installed in diverse applications, like school
buses, bucket trucks, garbage trucks, and class 8 long haul tractors. For very large vehicles,
testing the entire vehicle on a chassis dynamometer is not practical, as there would be size and
safety constraints, and many vehicle applications for an engine may be produced in very low
volume. Regulators and industry have settled on engine dynamometer testing and engine specific
criteria emissions standards for Class 4-8 vehicles, and GHG emissions standards set at the
vehicle level, with vehicle GHG performance estimated with computer simulation and
representative inputs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 203-205]
Chassis dynamometers are used to test tailpipe emissions of complete vehicles. Laboratories
run vehicles along predetermined speed cycles and measure the quantity and composition of
exhaust mater. Regulators and manufacturers commonly use chassis dynamometers to define
standards for emissions test procedures and to measure vehicle performance against emissions
standards. Chassis dynamometers are frequently used to test passenger cars, light trucks, and
Class 2b and 3 complete vehicles. These vehicles are typically produced in high volume, and test
cycles with vehicle speeds over time are broadly representative of real-world use of automotive
products. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 203-205]
11. Proposed New Engine Dynamometer Testing and Standards
Beginning in MY 2030, EPA proposes to require manufacturers to meet engine dynamometer
standards (Part 1036) to certify the criteria emissions performance of capable Class 2b and 3
vehicles. EPA proposes that vehicles with a GCWR above 22,000 pounds will be subject to the
Part 1036 requirements. The Part 1036 requirements have different useful life and testing
requirements than chassis dynamometer standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 203-
205]
Requiring these Class 2b and 3 MDVs to engine certify increases testing resources and
aftertreatment development as duplicate testing on vehicles. CARB (and EPA today) require
certification on a chassis dynamometer, while the NPRM proposes to shift these vehicles to an
engine dynamometer certification. This unnecessarily drives costs up as different engine and
aftertreatment hardware and separate calibration efforts are needed to meet the disparate
requirements (standards, useful life, OBD, etc.). EPA is presumably doing this is to address CO
concerns on SI engines, but it is unnecessary since every area in the U.S. reached attainment for
CO almost 13 years ago (September 27,2010).311 Since then, automakers have continued
reducing CO emissions from SI engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 203-205]
311 U.S. EPA, September 21, 2022, Green Book Carbon Monoxide (1971) Area Information, retrieved
from htps://www.epa.gov/green-book/green-book-carbon-monoxide-1971-area-information, on June 26,
2023.
12. Recommendations on Class 2b-3 Engine Dynamometer Testing and Standards
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Auto Innovators recommends that EPA continue with current MDV testing, namely,
continuing to have Class 2b and Class 3 trucks chassis certify, which will provide one common
hardware development, testing, and certification method for OEMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 203-205]
EPA requested comment on alternative for high GCWR MDV criteria pollutant emissions
standards:312 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 203-205]
312 NPRM at 29271
(1) MDV above 22,000 pounds GCWR would comply with the MDV chassis dynamometer
standards proposed in Section III.C with the introduction of additional engine dynamometer-
based standards over the Supplemental Emissions Test as finalized within the Heavy-duty 2027
and later standards; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 203-205]
(2) MDV above 22,000 pounds GCWR would comply with the MDV chassis dynamometer
standards proposed in Section III.C with additional in-use testing and standards comparable to
those used within the California ACC II; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 203-205]
(3) Introduction of other test procedures for demonstration of effective criteria pollutant
emissions control under the sustained high-load conditions encountered during operation above
22,000 pounds GCWR. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 203-205]
Class 2b-3 vehicles can achieve low emissions targets across a range of operating conditions
beyond the chassis test cycle, including those at high load, and EPA can confirm this with test
procedures adopted by California ACC II. Manufacturers recommend EPA adopt the California
ACC II test procedure for in-use testing and standards (Option "2"). Procedurally, this allows
manufacturers to continue chassis certification, minimizing disruptions to lab processes, and
manufacturers already have hardware designed to meet stringent emissions standards, even in
high load in-use requirements. The chassis certification test cycle also aligns well with common
use cases for Class 2b-3 vehicles, whereas the engine dyno certification process places much
higher emphasis on high load conditions, and places lower emphasis on low load performance.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 203-205]
E. Engine Dynamometer Certification
If EPA finalizes its proposal (outside of OBD requirements) to require Class 2b and 3 vehicles
to certify via engine dynamometer certification, Auto Innovators proposes that EPA allow
product that is certified by CARB, using chassis certification method, to meet EPA's OBD
requirements. We recommend EPA use the language below from HD OBD § 1036.110(b)(l 1) in
§ 86.1806-27: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 259]
(11) If you have an approved Executive order from the California Air Resources Board for
a given engine family, we may rely on that Executive order to evaluate whether you meet
federal OBD requirements for that same engine family or an equivalent engine family. Engine
families are equivalent if they are identical in all aspects material to emission characteristics;
for example, we would consider different inducement strategies and different warranties not
to be material to emission characteristics relevant to these OBD testing requirements. EPA
would count two equivalent engine families as one for the purposes of determining OBD
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demonstration testing requirements. Send us the following information: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 259]
(i) You must submit additional information as needed to demonstrate that you meet the
requirements of this section that are not covered by the California Executive order. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 259]
(ii) Send us results from any testing you performed for certifying engine families
(including equivalent engine families) with the California Air Resources Board, including the
results of any testing performed under 13 CCR 1971.1(1) for verification of in-use compliance
and 13 CCR 1971.5(c) for manufacturer self- testing within the deadlines set out in 13 CCR
1971.1. (iii) We may require that you send us additional information if we need it to evaluate
whether you meet the requirements of this Paragraph (b)(l 1). This may involve sending us
copies of documents you send to the California Air Resources Board. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, p. 259]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB)
CARB also supports U.S. EPA's proposal to change to chassis certification for medium-duty
vehicles for GHG emissions, which is a more robust method of determining compliance than the
existing process, which combines engine testing with other modeling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, p. 17]
Organization: Cummins Inc.
III. High GCWR MDV Certification
1. Mandatory engine-dynamometer certification of high GCWR MDV for criteria
pollutants causes regulatory misalignment, regulatory uncertainty, and increased regulatory
burden [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 3-4]
In the Multi-Pollutant Proposal, EPA defines a new category called medium-duty vehicles, or
MDV, for vehicles with 8,501-14,000 lbs GVWR which are not Medium-Duty Passenger
Vehicles (MDPV), and further divides those MDV based on their gross combined weight rating
(GCWR), which is an indication of the towing capability of a vehicle. MDV with GCWR
>22,000 lbs are considered high GCWR vehicles, and MDV with GCWR <22,000 lbs are
considered low GCWR vehicles. EPA proposes significant changes to certification protocols for
high GCWR vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 3-4]
Class 2b and 3 complete vehicles such as HD pickup trucks are currently chassis-
dynamometer certified for both criteria pollutant and GHG emissions. Per EPA's proposal at 88
FR 29270, high GCWR vehicles would no longer be allowed to use chassis-dynamometer
certification for criteria pollutant emissions and would instead be forced into mandatory engine-
dynamometer certification and subject to EPA's recently finalized HD engine 2027 NOx
standards and other new HD engine program requirements in 40 CFR Part 1036. However, for
GHG emissions, high GCWR complete vehicles would remain subject to chassis-dynamometer
certification to 40 CFR Part 86 standards and requirements. This would result in complete high
GCWR vehicles such as HD pickup trucks certifying with different test cycles (e.g., the HD
Federal Test Procedure, or FTP, vs. the LD FTP, or FTP 75) and different emissions metrics
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(e.g., brake- specific grams per horsepower-hour NOx standards vs. distance-specific grams/mile
C02 standards) for criteria pollutants vs. GHG emissions, respectively. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0645, pp.3-4]
While EPA has optionally allowed such dual protocols for limited cases in the past, the Multi-
Pollutant Proposal would force it upon some MDV but not others. EPA estimates that based on
model year (MY) 2022 and 2023 certification data, "most MDV complete and incomplete diesel
pickup trucks would be required to switch to engine dynamometer certification; MY 2022 vans
would not be required to use engine dynamometer certification; and only a small number of
gasoline pickup trucks would be required to switch to engine certification." Requiring dual
certification protocols for high GCWR MDV could lead to misalignment between optimization
of criteria pollutant and GHG emissions controls. With different certification cycles covering
different engine operating speeds and loads, manufacturers could trade-off GHG improvements
at the expense of NOx control, undermining the goals of the regulation. In contrast, using the
same protocols for criteria pollutants and GHG ensures linkage across all pollutants and forces
manufacturers to address each of them when optimizing engine performance and emissions.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 3-4]
Dual certification and compliance requirements also have the potential to cause lack of clarity
and regulatory uncertainty for manufacturers. For example, proposed 40 CFR 85.2101 applies to
vehicles subject to the standards of 40 CFR Part 86 Subpart S, which would include high GCWR
MDV certified to GHG standards under 40 CFR Part 86 Subpart S, and proposed 40 CFR
85.2103(f) specifies MDV emissions warranty periods for major emission control components,
many of which are used to control criteria pollutant emissions. Yet high GCWR MDV certified
in the HD engine program for criteria pollutants are subject to the criteria pollutant emissions
warranty periods of 40 CFR Part 1036, based upon EPA's intent described in the Preamble at 88
FR 29270. There are likely other similar examples in the proposal where EPA will need to
provide better clarity for manufacturers as to which aspects of requirements apply to which
pollutants for which categories of vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 3-4]
Additionally, dual certification and compliance requirements will increase regulatory burden
on manufacturers. Manufacturers will need to run the variety of tests required as part of
certification (not only certification cycles but deterioration factor (DF) testing, infrequent
regeneration adjustment factor testing, onboard diagnostics (OBD) testing, etc.) using two
different types of equipment/facilities (chassis dynamometer and engine dynamometer), on two
different test articles (vehicle and engine), for certification by two different divisions at EPA
(HD and LD), instead of one. For compliance, EPA may require the existing In-Use Verification
Program (IUVP) for GHG, while adding the possibility of Heavy- Duty In-Use Testing (HDIUT)
for criteria pollutants associated with the HD engine program. For IUVP, manufacturers would
be required to procure customer vehicles at low and high mileages for chassis- dynamometer
testing to demonstrate GHG compliance. For HDIUT, manufacturers would be required to
procure customer vehicles, equip them with Portable Emissions Measurement Systems (PEMS),
and measure emissions during customer operation of the vehicles along their normal routes to
demonstrate criteria pollutant compliance. Given the different types of testing for IUVP vs.
HDIUT, there is no opportunity to combine testing for GHG and criteria pollutants. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 3-4]
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If EPA proceeds with finalizing mandatory engine-dynamometer certification of criteria
pollutants for high GCWR MDV despite the concerns raised above, additional significant
changes are needed in the proposal, as outlined below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 3-
4]
2. Engine-dynamometer certification cycles are not representative of real-world duty
cycles for high GCWR MDV and should be modified [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 4-7]
EPA's purpose in forcing high GCWR MDV into engine-dynamometer certification for
criteria pollutants is "to ensure that criteria pollutant emissions are controlled under the sustained
high load conditions that many of these vehicles encounter, particularly during heavy towing
operation." See 88 FR 29270. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 4-7]
EPA considers high GCWR MDV to be work vehicles and finds it more appropriate for them
to be tested as HD engines due to their capabilities and use which EPA believes is more closely
aligned with Class 4 and above heavy-duty applications than with light-duty trucks. While EPA
did not provide any data characterizing the duty cycles of high GCWR MDV in the Multi-
Pollutant Proposal, Cummins offers the data shown in Figures 1 and 2 collected from tens of
thousands of Class 2b and 3 high GCWR diesel pickups for EPA's consideration. A duty cycle
monitor within the engine's electronic control module (ECM) logs 1 Hz data for engine speed
and load which is downloaded during service events at the dealer. The data is plotted as percent
of time spent in various bins of engine speed and percent of full load. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0645, pp. 4-7]
Under EPA's proposal for mandatory engine-dynamometer certification for criteria pollutants,
the Supplemental Emissions Test (SET) would be one of the applicable certification cycles. The
SET is a continuous cycle with ramped transitions between 13 steady-state modes of operation
including 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% engine loads at each of 3 engine speeds designated as A,
B, and C speeds, plus idle. The SET non-idle speeds and loads are calculated from the engine's
full load torque curve. The specified amount of time spent in each of the 13 modes determines its
weighting within the overall SET cycle results. For example, the 100% load modes are weighted
at 9%>, 9%>, and 2% respectively for A, B, and C speeds. The combined weightings of all the
modes at A, B, and C speeds are 45%, 38%, and 5% respectively. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0645, pp. 4-7]
For Figures 1 and 2, we have roughly overlaid the calculated A, B, and C speeds, shown as
red lines, and the four % load points, shown as black rectangles, for the SET on the duty cycle
data. There is a significant mismatch between the SET certification cycle and the vehicles' duty
cycle data, with very little time spent (typically <##2%) operating in the real world near each of
the 75%) and 100% engine load modes of the SET. The time spent by the real-world vehicles in
operation corresponding to the 12 non-idle modes, contained within the blue boxes, does not
approach the total combined 88% weighting of the A, B, and C speed points in the SET cycle.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 4-7]
Modifications will be needed to the SET cycle to better represent the real-world duty cycles of
high GCWR MDV. Since the HD FTP, another engine certification cycle, also contains
significant operation at high engine speeds and loads, it will need modifications as well. Per 40
CFR 1065.10(c)(1), manufacturers must notify EPA if good engineering judgment indicates the
specified procedures cause unrepresentative emission measurements, and EPA will cooperate
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with manufacturers to establish whether and how the procedures should be changed to be more
representative. EPA would generally make the changes applicable through a rulemaking process.
Cummins commits to working with EPA through this Multi-Pollutant rulemaking to identify the
necessary changes to the HD engine certification cycles. Possible changes could include different
torque curve denormalization for the SET and/or FTP, reweighting of SET modes, recalculation
of SET speed and load modes, etc. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 4-7]
[See original for table titled "Figure 1 - Duty Cycle Data for Class 2b High GCWR Diesel
Pickup Trucks with SET Modes Overlaid"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 4-7]
[See original for table titled "Figure 2 - Duty Cycle Data for Class 3 High GCWR Diesel
Pickup Trucks with SET Modes Overlaid"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 4-7]
EPA requests comment on several alternatives for high GCWR criteria pollutant emissions
standards: 1) complying with EPA's proposed low GCWR MDV chassis-certification standards
combined with the SET engine-certification standards recently finalized by EPA, 2) complying
with EPA's proposed low GCWR MDV chassis-certification standards combined with in-use
testing and standards comparable to CARB's Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC II) regulation, and
3) other test procedures for demonstrating effective criteria pollutant emissions control under
sustained high load conditions above 22,000 lbs combined vehicle weight. Per EPA's Draft
Regulatory Impact Assessment in Chapter 3.2.1.3, diesel-powered high GCWR MDV were not
considered in setting the MDV chassis-certification standards mentioned in alternatives #1 and
#2, so EPA would need to do additional work to determine proposed chassis- certification
standards appropriate for high GCWR MDV. Adding SET engine-certification standards as in
alternative #1 would face the same need already discussed above for modifying the cycle itself to
be more representative of real-world operation. Adding CARB's ACC II in-use PEMS testing
requirements based on CARB's 20 mg/hp-hr NOx standard as in alternative #2 is not
recommended as EPA already determined in its recently finalized HD engine 2027 NOx rule that
a 35 mg/hp-hr NOx standard provides the maximum feasible NOx reduction for MY 2027. See
88 FR 4333. Cummins raised additional concerns with CARB's ACC II in-use testing approach
in our comments to CARB's rulemaking.4 Finally, Cummins supports the development of other
test procedures as suggested in alternative #3, or similarly supports modifications to existing test
procedures, to address criteria pollutant emissions control under sustained high load conditions
but requests EPA to provide duty cycle data highlighting the operation of concern to support
further investigation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 4-7]
4 See https://www.arb.ca.gov/lists/com-attach/396-accii2022-UDMBcl0xVWsAbwNt.pdf (last accessed
June 27, 2023).
3. The MDV work factor should continue to account for high towing capacity in setting
C02 targets
Phase 1 and 2 GHG standards for HD pickup trucks and vans, the same vehicles considered as
MDV for this rulemaking, use a work factor (WF) attribute to set vehicle C02 targets. The work
factor accounts for payload, towing, and four-wheel drive equipment and is calculated as
follows:
WF = 0.75 x [Payload Capacity + xwd] + 0.25 x Towing Capacity, where Payload Capacity =
GVWR (lbs) - Curb Weight (lbs)
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xwd = 500 lbs if equipped with 4-wheel-drive, otherwise 0 lbs Towing Capacity = GCWR (lbs) -
GVWR (lbs) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 7-8]
C02 targets in grams/mile are then calculated as [a x WF] + b, where a and b coefficients are
specified in the regulations. In the Phase 1 GHG Final Rule, EPA noted that, "Based on analysis
of how C02 emissions and fuel consumption correlate to work factor, we believe that a straight
line correlation is appropriate across the spectrum of possible HD pickups and vans..See 76
FR 57162. EPA's 2010 analysis of vehicle C02 data and the correlation to work factor is
available in the Phase 1 rulemaking docket. 5 Cummins continues to support the work factor
approach to setting standards as necessary for recognizing the work capacity of MDV to haul and
tow goods and provide services. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 7-8]
5 See https://www.regulations.gOv/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0162-0334 (last accessed June 27,
2023).
In this rulemaking, EPA proposes to cap the GCWR input to the work factor calculation at
22,000 lbs, citing concerns that chassis-dynamometer GHG testing does not capture GCWR-
related loads directly and the higher C02 targets may generate windfall credits for high GCWR
vehicle configurations. This proposed change by itself has the effect of increasing the stringency
of the C02 targets. In one example case of a Class 3 diesel pickup with 42,000 lbs GCWR, the
stringency of its 2027 C02 target would increase by 27% just due to GCWR being capped to
22,000 lbs, even though the C02 target coefficients themselves are not proposed to change for
diesels in 2027. Additionally, the annual decrease in the "a" coefficient in the C02 targets after
2027 already has the effect of "flattening" the C02 vs. work factor relationship, lessening the
recognition of towing capacity in the C02 targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 7-8]
Cummins does not agree with changing the WF by arbitrarily capping GCWR. For GHG
certification, EPA's proposal would ignore the towing capacity of high GCWR vehicles, which
is inconsistent with EPA's proposed criteria pollutant approach of treating high GCWR MDV as
HD work vehicles due to their towing capacity. EPA's 2010 analysis found GCWR to be an
important attribute in characterizing the work and C02 emissions of MDV and confirmed the
linear nature of C02 vs. work factor well beyond the 5,500 lbs WF level EPA approximately
associates with capping GCWR at 22,000 lbs. EPA's proposed change to work factor
determination has not been accompanied by an updated analysis of current vehicles or any
quantification of the expected windfall credits EPA is attempting to prevent. The MDV work
factor should continue to account for high towing capacity in setting C02 targets. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 7-8]
Without changes to the proposed certification cycles and proposed work factor cap to better
account for the real-world duty cycles and usage of high GCWR MDV, the issues highlighted
above could lead to unintended outcomes. For example, if manufacturers are forced to limit
ratings or towing capacity to meet the proposed standards, customers who need that towing
capability to carry out their daily work may be inclined to keep older vehicles longer or to use
larger trucks to do the same work, and the emissions reductions envisioned for the proposal
would not be achieved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 7-8]
IV. Emissions Useful Life and Warranty Periods
4. More representative MDV-specific emissions useful life and warranty periods are
needed for criteria pollutants
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Moving high GCWR MDV into the HD engine program would drastically increase the
emissions useful life and emissions warranty periods for criteria pollutants compared to today's
requirements. For example, for a high GCWR MDV diesel engine certified in the light heavy-
duty (LHD) diesel engine primary intended service class, the emissions useful life would become
15 years / 270,000 miles / 13,000 hours (whichever occurs first) compared to 15 years / 150,000
miles today. Emissions warranty would become 10 years / 210,000 miles / 10,000 hours
compared to 5 years / 50,000 miles today. Increases such as these could have significant impacts
on development costs and leadtime due to longer testing associated with DF aging, OBD aging,
and mechanical validation, as well as increasing component costs which manufacturers would
pass on to the purchasers of these vehicles, but EPA has not provided any analysis to show the
HD engine program requirements are appropriate for MDV operational life and applications.
EPA should perform an analysis of MDV operational life, and if increases are justified, consider
data-based MDV-specific emissions useful life and warranty periods. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0645, p. 8]
VI. Off-Cycle Standards and In-Use Testing
7. 2B-MAW emissions calculations need to be revised for high GCWR MDV since no
engine C02 FTP FCL will be available for GHG chassis-certification
If EPA finalizes mandatory engine-dynamometer certification of criteria pollutants for high-
GCWR MDV, the engines will be subject to the off-cycle standards and in-use testing
requirements of the HD engine program in 40 CFR Part 1036. HD off-cycle emissions testing
uses the Two-Bin Moving Average Window (2B-MAW) protocol (or B-MAW for spark-ignition
engines), which uses the engine C02 FTP Family Certification Level (FCL) determined from
engine-dynamometer GHG certification. The engine C02 FTP FCL is used to normalize C02
emissions for determining placement of windows into the appropriate bin and for calculating
brake-specific emissions. Since high GCWR MDV will be chassis-dynamometer certified for
GHG rather than engine-dynamometer certified, there will be no corresponding engine C02 FTP
FCL available to use in the 2B-MAW calculations. The 2B-MAW calculations will need to be
revised for use on high GCWR MDV. As discussed next, Cummins recommends the use of
engine broadcasted parameters, which EPA has separately proposed for off-cycle testing of
engines using non-carbon- containing fuels, instead of determining an FCL outside of
certification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 9-10]
8. Manufacturers should be allowed to use engine broadcasted torque and speed to
determine power in 2B-MAW calculations instead of using C02 as a surrogate
In EPA's recent HD Phase 3 GHG proposal at 88 FR 26021 and in 40 CFR 1036.530(j), EPA
is proposing that for off-cycle testing in the field on engines using at least one fuel that is not
carbon-containing, manufacturers can use engine broadcasted speed and torque to calculate
power in lieu of using C02 as a surrogate for power. This is because for fuels other than carbon-
containing fuels, there will be no fuel- related C02 emissions to correlate to power. Cummins
supports this same approach of using engine broadcasted parameters in lieu of C02 for off-cycle
testing of engines in high GCWR MDV. Although high GCWR MDV running on carbon-
containing fuels would emit C02, and a value analogous to the C02 FTP FCL could be
determined through means other than certification, Cummins shared confidential data with EPA
in June 2020 showing inaccuracies between C02 and power. C02 does not always correlate well
to power produced, such as when excess fuel is burned for thermal management, or for hybrid
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operation when the battery/motor assists the engine and less or no fuel is burned. Allowing the
use of engine broadcasted speed and torque would eliminate the need to use the C02 FTP FCL
to normalize measured C02 in the 2B-MAW calculations which are used for placing windows
into bins and for determining the brake-specific emissions for a bin. The C02 FTP FCL is not
always representative of engine thermal efficiency on other duty cycles such as those
encountered during off-cycle testing. Additionally, using the C02 FTP FCL results in higher
emissions calculated for more efficient duty cycles, which penalizes manufacturers with more
efficient engines. Cummins supports the use of engine broadcasted parameters such as speed and
torque to provide more accurate off-cycle emissions calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0645, pp. 9-10]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations (EPHO
3.EPA's proposed change to criteria pollution requirements for MDVs with a gross combined
weight rating of more than 22,000 pounds is likely appropriate, but should be monitored for
manipulation and efficacy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 77]
EPA is proposing to require that vehicles with a GCWR greater than 22,000 pounds be
certified to the heavy-duty engine standards, rather than to the proposed MDV standards.212
EPA's logic here is sound: these vehicles' powertrains are often more powerful than the Class 4
and Class 5 vehicles in which related engines may be deployed, and they have a GCWR
comparable to vehicles currently covered by the heavy-duty engine rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 77]
212 88 Fed. Reg. at 29257.
Table VIII.B-1. Market share of MDVs above and below the 22,000-pound gross combined
weight rating213 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 77]
[See original attachment for Table VIII.B-1.].
213 Taken from EPA OMEGA2 modeling inputs: vehicles_mdv_20230208.csv (MY 2020 MDV fleet).
MY 2020 data indicates that this change could require more than half of the MDV fleet to
certify to the heavy-duty engine standards (Table VIII.B-1).214 Based on the emissions and
warranty requirements for such engines, certifying the engines in these MDVs to such standards
will likely yield emissions reductions at least as strong as if they were instead required to meet
the proposed MDV standards. However, these standards apply solely to combustion engines and
are not influenced by the share of deployed ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 78]
214 In the Proposal, EPA notes: "Based on an analysis of the MY 2022 and MY 2023 emissions
certification data, most MDV complete and incomplete diesel pickup trucks would be required to switch to
engine dynamometer certification; MY 2022 vans would not be required to use engine dynamometer
certification; and only a small number of gasoline pickup trucks would be required to switch to engine
certification." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29270. However, the data are not provided.
In contrast, ZEV deployment affects the required emissions reductions for medium-duty
combustion vehicles with a GCWR less than or equal to 22,000 pounds, as illustrated above in
Section VIII.B. 1. It is possible that manufacturers could try to shift more of their sales to
vehicles with a GCWR over 22,000 pounds in order to reduce the required improvements to their
remaining combustion fleet. If this change is finalized, the Agency should monitor future data
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from the MDV and heavy-duty engine in-use testing program to assess the nature of any
difference between the emissions performance of MDVs above and below the 22,000-pound
GCWR, and should commit to releasing a report on its findings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 78]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
EPA should finalize provisions for all MD engines in MDVs with GCWR > 22,000 lbs to
meet MY 2027 heavy-duty engine certification requirements, and compliance should be in
accordance with the heavy-duty standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
MECA supports EPA's proposal that medium-duty engines in chassis certified medium duty
vehicles (MDVs) should be required to meet the same requirements as those EPA finalized in
December 2022 for MY 2027 and later heavy-duty engines. We agree with the agency that this is
a viable way to address the current disparities between chassis and engine-based standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 24-25]
Results from the SwRI Heavy Duty Low NOx demonstration program, included diesel
exhaust emission control components that were aged to current (435,000 miles) and future
(650,000/750,000 miles) heavy heavy-duty durability requirements and then tested over several
field duty cycles and in-use compliance results calculated with the new two bin moving average
window (3B-MAW) methodology. Given durability requirements for the light heavy-duty
classes are due to increase to 270,000 miles, the results from 435,000 mile aged heavy-heavy
duty parts could be used to extrapolate for MY 2027 and later medium-duty engines. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 24-25]
Even in the short time since the latest emission control system was provided to SwRI for the
demonstration program, improvements have continued to substrates and catalysts. For example, a
recent paper published at the 2022 SAE WCX conference describes development of high-
porosity honeycomb substrates with thinner wall thickness and high cell density that can be
coated with SCR catalyst. The combination of developments on this substrate enables higher
surface area and lower thermal mass, which improves coating efficiency, reduces catalyst heat-
up time, and reduces pressure drop. These result in performance improvements that are
especially prominent at low temperature operation. At engine exhaust temperatures of 175?, the
NOx conversion efficiency improved by 14% compared to earlier generation substrates34 (Ido,
et al., 2022). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 24-25]
34 Ido, Y., Kinoshita, K., Goto, C., Toyoshima, H., Hirose, S., Ohara, E., et al., SAE 2022-01-0550.
Catalyst suppliers have already developed a next generation of SCR catalysts with higher
NOx reduction efficiency and better durability compared to the Stage 3 parts tested in the SwRI
demonstration program. Through the use of sophisticated models that incorporate the latest
learnings on both thermal and chemical aging effects, it is possible to project the gains in
efficiency provided by these new materials. A similar methodology was used to that discussed in
the MECA 2027 white paper, incorporating exhaust information from the latest engine
calibration from SwRI and an optimized dosing calibration for the new downstream SCR
catalyst. The catalysts were laboratory aged both thermally and chemically using sulfur
containing simulated exhaust gas to represent 435,000 miles of equivalent engine aging. The
catalysts were modeled over the FTP, RMC and LLC certification cycles and demonstrated
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lower emissions than the Stage 3 system at SwRI. The not yet published results suggest that the
latest generation SCR catalyst would provide OEMs with additional margin to a 0.02 g/bhp-hr
standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 24-25]
This example of continual improvement and optimization is a testament to the ongoing
innovative technology development occurring in the industry between suppliers and their OEM
customers. Each time a test is run, new information is obtained and applied to the next iteration.
This has been going on continually over the past 15 years of advanced emission controls on
trucks. In fact, over the life of the SwRI program, catalyst suppliers have deployed new catalyst
formulations and coating techniques to continually improve the durability and performance of
the SCR system in order to build greater compliance margin relative to the program targets. Our
industry has seen a tremendous amount of innovation on both engines and aftertreatment since
the U.S. 2010 on-road diesel standards were implemented. This learning has been applied to
improve manufacturing and reduce variability that has allowed systems to be downsized by
about 60% and reducing their costs by about 30%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 24-25]
Organization: Stellantis
Also, vehicles over 22,000 lb. GCWR will be forced to certify on an engine dyno for criteria
emissions. Because this is misaligned with California's ACC II LEV IV rules, it forces dual
certification efforts, different hardware and uncertain impacts on GHG performance. Stellantis
believes the 22,000 lb. GCWR proposed requirement should not be implemented for
determination of criteria emissions standards, nor should it be used to alter the GHG stringency.
To address EPA concerns, criteria emissions standards should be aligned with CARET s ACC II
LEV IV rules instead. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 19]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
CARB, MECA, and EPHO were supportive of the proposal to move high GCWR MDV to
engine-certification. CARB found engine dynamometer certification to be a more robust
methodology for determining high GCWR MDV compliance. MECA agreed with the Agency's
proposal that such an approach would ".. .address the current disparities between chassis and
engine-based standards." EPHO characterized the proposed requirement for engine-certification
of high-GCWR MDV as "...likely appropriate, but should be monitored for manipulation and
efficacy." EPHO also asked the Agency to monitor future data from MDV and from the heavy-
duty engine in-use testing program in order to assess emissions differences between high-GCWR
MDVs and other MDVs, and requested that the Agency commit to releasing a report on any
pertinent findings.
The Alliance, Cummins, and Stellantis were all opposed to the Agency proposal to move high
GCWR MDV to engine-certification. The Alliance specifically supported high GCWR MDV
Option 2 from the proposal and further requested alignment of Federal OBD requirements for
OBD with California OBD requirements. Cummins specifically supported high GCWR MDV
"Option 3" from the proposal and stated that EPA would ".. .need to do additional work to
determine proposed chassis-certification standards appropriate for high GCWR MDV." Stellantis
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asked that Agency concerns regarding high GCWR criteria pollutant emissions be addressed via
alignment with California ACC II LEV IV standards.
Response:
In response to comments received from the Alliance, Cummins, and Stellantis, the Agency
did not finalize the proposed requirements for high GCWR MDV engine certification. Upon
further consideration of the public comments, EPA agrees with the Alliance that our specific
concerns regarding high GCWR MDV emissions at high loads would be fully addressed by
finalizing high GCWR MDV Alternative 2:
• MDV above 22,000 pounds GCWR would comply with the MDV chassis
dynamometer standards with additional in-use testing and standards comparable to
those used within the California ACC II.
The agency has finalized in-use moving average window standards for high-GCWR MDV
(see Section III.D.5 of the preamble). The agency will also allow manufacturers to engine-certify
high GCWR MDV as an option. We believe that this is also partially responsive to the request
from Stellantis for alignment with ACC II LEV IV standards. The Agency has received
numerous comments from both light-duty and MDV manufacturers requesting wholesale
adoption of California ACC II LEV IV criteria pollutant emissions standards. As stated
elsewhere in Sections 3 and 4 of the RTC, EPA is not finalizing a wholesale adoption of the
California ACC II LEV IV program. The ACC II program includes synergistic elements for both
greenhouse gas and criteria pollutant emissions, with the foundation of the ACC II program
being a ZEV mandate. Stellantis did not recommend adopting the ZEV mandate provisions of
ACC II and instead seems to recommend that EPA only adopt the criteria pollutant elements of
ACC II. This a la carte approach to emissions standards fails to consider the synergistic nature of
California's ACC II program. The treatment of ICE-based vehicles under ACC II is premised on
an increasing penetration of ZEVs and their associated emission reductions. EPA's 2027 and
later MDV program, being performance-based for both GHG and criteria pollutant emissions,
relies on increasingly stringent performance-based standards to achieve emissions reductions.
EPA is, however, finalizing additional provisions in the FRM which are responsive to Stellantis
and Cummins requests for greater alignment with ACC II. These include:
• Alignment with all ACC II MDV NMOG+NOx emissions bins at or below Bin 170
(see Section III.D.2.i of the preamble);
• Adoption of in-use standards for high GCWR MDV comparable to California ACC II
in-use standards for MDV above 14,000 pounds GCWR (see Section III.D.5 of the
preamble);
• Alignment with California MDV OBD (see Section III.H of the preamble).
With respect to Cummins concerns regarding the appropriateness of the proposed chassis-
certification standards high GCWR MDV, our understanding of Cummins's concern is that it
refers to high GCWR MDV with compression-ignition (diesel) engines in MDV pickup trucks,
since these are applications for which Cummins holds certificates of conformity. As discussed
within Chapter 3.2.5 of the RIA, the final standards are feasible for high GCWR MDV, including
MDV pickup trucks and other MDVs using compression ignition engines. The following factors
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all play a role in the Agency's determination that the NMOG+NOx and other criteria pollutant
standards are feasible for high GCWR MDV with compression ignition engines:
• 75% of diesel MDV engine families are certifying to NMOG+NOx emissions below
160 mg/mi, with median NMOG+NOx emissions below 140 mg/mi.
• MDV diesels can adopt dual-SCR NOx emission control systems, passive thermal
management, and active thermal management comparable to those under development
for Class 4/light-heavy-duty compression-ignition applications (see Chapter 3.2.5 of
the RIA), which would result in NMOG+NOx emissions comparable to spark-ignition
MDV.
• The Agency has finalized NMOG+ NOx fleet average standards that are less stringent
than originally proposed (see Section III.D.2.iv of the preamble) and that allow an
additional year of lead time compared to the proposal (see Section III.D.2.ii of the
preamble).
• The NMOG+ NOx standards are fleet average performance-based standards that can
be met through various control technologies, including technologies applicable to
spark-ignition and compression ignition vehicles, and BEV MDV. Our analysis
projects BEV MDV sales of approximately 30% in 2031 and 32% in 2032 (see
Chapter 12.2.3 of the RIA).
• The Agency has finalized a regulatory schedule that includes additional lead time for
compliance with MDV NMOG+ NOx fleet average standards (see Section III.D.2.ii of
the preamble).
• The Agency has finalized a flexibility to allow vehicle manufacturers to transfer
credits earned on BEV MDPVs to their MDV compliance.
• The Agency has finalized optional engine-certification for high GCWR MDVs (see
Section III.D.5.iv of the preamble).
With respect to Cummins's preference for Alternative 3, within the proposed rule the Agency
requested comment on three alternatives to high GCWR MDV engine-certification:
1. MDV above 22,000 pounds GCWR would comply with the MDV chassis
dynamometer standards with the introduction of additional engine-dynamometer-
based standards over the Supplemental Emissions Test as finalized within the Heavy-
duty 2027 and later standards;
2. MDV above 22,000 pounds GCWR would comply with the MDV chassis
dynamometer standards with additional in-use testing and standards comparable to
those used within the California ACC II;
3. Introduction of other test procedures for demonstration of effective criteria pollutant
emissions control under the sustained high-load conditions encountered during
operation above 22,000 pounds GCWR.
The intent of requesting comment on Alternative 3 was to provide an opportunity for
stakeholders to comment on specific test procedures that could address the Agency's stated
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concerns regarding high levels of in-use emissions during operation that included heavy-trailer
towing and other sustained high-load conditions encountered during operation above 22,000
pounds GCWR. While stating a preference for Alternative 3, Cummins did not provide any
specific recommendations for test procedures and/or standards that would demonstrate effective
criterial pollutant emissions control under the sustained high-load conditions encountered during
operation above 22,000 pounds GCWR.
6.5 - Durability test requirements for certification
EPA addresses comments related to durability test requirements for certification in Sections
4.13 and 4.2.3 of this document.
6.6 - Test fuel for PM measurement
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
8. Emissions Certification Fuel
U.S. emissions certification fuel was designed to represent market fuel characteristics. On this
basis, there is justification to adjust the composition of certification fuel today to reduce its PM-
forming tendency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 271-273]
EPA recognizes that U.S. market fuels have slowly been improving in their tendency to form
PM since the Tier 3 regulations were enacted and the Tier 3 emissions certification fuel was
defined.443 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 271-273]
443 NPRM Figures 40 at 29399 and Figure 42 at 29401.
[See original for graph titled "Figure 91: PM Index distribution in U.S. gasoline in 2008-12
and 2021-22 (NPRM Figure 42)"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 271-273]
Figure 42 of the NPRM (shown above) indicates the median PMI of U.S. gasoline was
approximately 1.5-1.6 in 2021-2022, whereas EPA notes in the NPRM that Tier 3 certification
fuel is expected to have a PMI of 1.6-1.7. In practice, Tier 3 regular grade certification fuels
from the two major certification fuel suppliers in the U.S. generally have PMI values in the range
of 1.48. to 2.58 for Tier 3 regular grade, as shown in Figure 92. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 271-273]
Figure 92: Tier 3 Regular Grade Certification Gasoline [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
271-273]
Tier 3 Regular Grade Certification Gasoline
Average Min Max
Mfr A 1.90 1.48 2.26
MfrB 2.19 2.05 2.58
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Mfr C 2.10 2.10 2.10
Totals 2.03 1.48 2.58 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 271-273]
In addition, survey of U.S. market E10 gasoline in 2018/2019 found the following PMI
values:444 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 271-273]
444 EPA-420-R-23-008 Figure 2.1 and 2.2
Figure 93: 2018 and 2019 Summer Market Gasoline PMI
PMI average Regular E10 Premium E10
2018 Market - Summer 1.65 1.55
2019 Market - Summer 1.44 1.51 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 271-273]
The study also showed that the aromatics in U.S. market fuels have lower C10+ content as
compared to the requirements in Tier 3 certification fuels:
Figure 94: Aromatic Content of U.S. Market Fuels versus Tier 3 Certification Fuels [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 271-273]
Tier 3 RUL Spec. Tier 3 PUL Spec. 2018/29
Aromatics, volume%, max Mean (Vol%)
C6 Aromatics (Benzene) 0.5-0.7 0.5-0.7 no data
C7 Aromatics (Toluene) 5.2-6.4 5.2-6.4 6.2
C8 5.2-6.4 5.2-6.4 7.4
C9 5.2-6.4 5.2-6.4 5.5
C10 4.4-5.6 4.4-5.6 2.7
C10+ 4.4-5.6 4.4-5.6 1.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 271-273]
Based on this, we suggest a revision of Tier 3 certification fuel specifications to reduce the
C10+ aromatics content to a range of 3.2 to 4.2 vol% (from the current 4.4-5.6 vol %) to be more
representative of U.S. market fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 271-273]
After discussing a potential market fuel rulemaking around PM formation tendency, EPA
notes that "Depending on the level of a potential limit on heavy material or PMI, the
specifications for certification gasoline may or may not need to be adjusted."445 We agree that
any regulation to reduce heavy aromatics in market gasoline should be preceded by or
accompanied by an updating of the specification for emissions certification gasoline that yields a
lower PM-forming tendency. The rationale for lowering the PM forming tendency before the
market fuel rulemaking is that the new vehicles certified with this fuel will be on the road for the
next 10-20 years and will see that new market fuel over the majority of their useful life. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 271-273]
445 NPRM at 29401
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As part of this NPRM, EPA should adjust Tier 3 certification fuel specifications to align with
current market fuel composition and enable fuel suppliers to target a PMI value in the range of
1.5-1.6. This can be accomplished by reducing the CIO and higher aromatics specification. We
would be happy to work with EPA to determine a set of specifications for Tier 3 certification
fuel that is consistent with market fuel composition, certification fuel supplier blending practices,
and EPA's intentions prior to issuing a final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 271-273]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Comments from the Alliance for Automotive Innovation describe a mismatch between the
PM Index values of market fuel and Tier 3 test (or cert) fuel and provide data on the ranges
found in recent market fuel and cert fuel samples. They suggest EPA should adjust the heavy
aromatics specifications for cert fuel to better align with market fuel (which has shifted since the
specs for Tier 3 cert fuel were originally set).
Response:
We appreciate presentation of the fuel property data and recognize that the average PM Index
of market fuel has shifted downward since the Tier 3 rulemaking was finalized. However, we
believe that a test fuel with market-representative PM Index can still be produced within the
existing specs, so we did not propose revisions and thus are not revising them at this time. As
described in the NPRM, we are continuing to assess options for a heavy aromatics standard for
market fuel, a potential future action that would provide another opportunity to adjust cert fuel
specs.
6.7 - Class 3 test cycle
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
EPA should also adopt the test cycles promulgated by ACCII LEV IV for the US06 Bag 2 and
UDC cycle for heavier Class 3 vehicles. These test cycles are better aligned with how these
vehicles are driven in the real world and will provide additional emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 19]
EPA Summary and Response
Response:
The -7°C FTP test cycle is crucial to the final PM standard for MDV including Class 3
vehicles because it addresses uncontrolled cold PM emissions in Tier 3. As EPA explains in
preamble Section III, there exists technology (e.g., MY 2022 GPF) that can achieve significant
PM reductions in a wide range of operating conditions, including in cold conditions. The -7°C
FTP test assures that MDVs are actually achieving these feasible emissions reductions across a
wide range of operating conditions, including in cold conditions.
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The full US06 cycle is a similarly crucial part of the PM standard. High load operation, which
is common on MDVs, induces passive GPF regeneration and GPF regeneration can cause
elevated emissions. As EPA explains in preamble Section III, there exists technology (e.g., MY
2022 GPF) that can achieve significant PM reductions notwithstanding high load operation and
GPF regeneration. The US06 cycle results in GPF regeneration across different vehicle-GPF
combinations, and it thus assures that MDVs are achieving feasible emissions reductions
notwithstanding high load operation and GPF regeneration. The LA-92 usually does not induce
GPF regeneration, and for this reason the US06 cycle is required for all light-duty vehicles and
MDV in the final PM standard. Section III.D.3 .iii of the preamble shows measurements
indicating that the LA-92 does not cause substantial regeneration of an underfloor GPF on a
Class 3 test vehicle.
Class 2b vehicles with power-to-weight ratios at or below 0.024 hp/pound will no longer
replace the full US06 component of the SFTP with the second of three phases of the US06 for
PM certification. Class 2b vehicles with low power-to-weight ratios will now use the full US06
test cycle. If a vehicle is unable to follow the trace, it should use maximum accelerator command
to follow the trace as best it can, and doing so will not result in a voided test. This procedure
mimics how vehicles with low power-to-weight tend to be driven in the real world.
7 - Regulatory amendments/additional changes to the
regulatory language
7.1 - Voiding certificates and recall
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
4. GHGIUVP / IUCP
a) Lack of Legal Authority for Certification Enforcement Programs and In-Use Remedies
Separate from the proposed MY 2027 and later multi-pollutant emissions standards, the
NPRM proposes extensive and significant revisions to EPA's regulations used to enforce vehicle
certification requirements and in-use standards. The NPRM sometimes does not even appear to
recognize the significance of the substantive changes it would make to the current regulations
and instead purports to merely "clarify" current regulations or restate the Agency's
"understanding" of its authority.345 Those changes would expand EPA's current regulatory
provisions for use of the void-ab-initio sanction from circumstances that generally involve
intentional or reckless noncompliance to nearly any type of noncompliance, including situations
involving good-faith error or honest disagreement about how to apply "good engineering
judgment" in a specific technical context.346 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 232-234]
345 See, e.g., 88 Fed. Reg. 29184, 29,197, 29289 (May 5, 2023).
346 Auto Innovators does not believe that EPA has adequately explained why these changes are necessary.
Section 307(d) of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to provide "a statement of its basis and purpose" for new
or revised regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3). More exacting than the Administrative Procedure Act,
section 307(d) "requires EPA to give a detailed explanation of its reasoning at the 'proposed rule' stage" as
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well as in the preamble of a final rule. Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506,
519 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(apart from section 307(d), EPA is also expected to "satisfy the fundamental requirement of nonarbitrary
administrative decisionmaking: that an agency set forth the reasons for its actions"); Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In particular, Section 307(d) requires that the NPRM
provide "the major legal interpretations and policy considerations underlying the proposed rule." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(d)(3)(A), (C). Failure to provide such a rationale thwarts full and effective public participation in
the rulemaking and will trigger remand and possibly vacatur. See, e.g., Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth., 358
F.3d at 950.
i). Current Certification Enforcement Regulations
The proposal marks a significant change from the way EPA has historically handled
certification enforcement. Congress established the basic framework for enforcing EPA's
certification regulations almost 40 years ago. The 1970 Clean Air Amendments required new-
vehicle certification of compliance with the emissions standards contained either in those
Amendments or to be established by EPA, replacing prior provisions for voluntary certification
of compliance with emissions limits.347 EPA sought to assist the auto industry in the transition
from an earlier voluntary certification program to mandatory testing and certification by issuing
"conditional" certificates of conformity, contingent on the successful completion of all required
testing.348 In the same early days of implementing the 1970 Amendments the EPA General
Counsel recommended that "vehicle[s] that did not conform to [the] description [in a
certification application] would be considered uncertified."349 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 232-234]
347 See Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 7-8, 84 Stat. 1676, 1693-96 (prohibiting, among other things, distribution
or sale of new motor vehicles "unless such vehicle[s] ... [are] covered by a certificate of conformity" and
authorizing EPA to issue such certificates based on a review of manufacturers' applications and on test
results).
348 See 48 Fed. Reg. 33456, 33459 (July 21, 1983) (recounting issuance of conditional certificates in early
years of post-1970 program "in an effort to avoid delays in product introduction dates where durability
testing would not be completed on schedule").
349 EPA offce of Gen. Couns., 1 A Collection of Legal Opinions: December 1970 - December 1973 185
(1973).
EPA also took steps to ensure compliance with the Agency's nascent certification program.
Early EPA regulations provided that the Agency would "deem void ab initio a certificate issued
in reliance on information or data submitted by the manufacturer and known by him to be false,
incomplete, inaccurate, or invalid."350 Failure to permit inspection of test facilities and records
would likewise provide a basis to revoke or suspend a certificate ab initio, as would any action
by a manufacturer that "render[ed] inaccurate or invalid any test data ... or otherwise
circumvent[ed] the intent of the [Clean Air] Act or of this subpart" of EPA's regulations, i.e., its
new-vehicle regulations.351 In other cases in which certificates were to be suspended or
revoked, the certification regulations provided that the suspension or revocation was to "[e]xtend
no further than to forbid the introduction into commerce of vehicles previously covered by the
certification which are still in the hands of the manufacturer."3 52 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 232-234]
350 39 Fed. Reg. 7545, 7545 (Feb. 27, 1974).
351 Id. at 7568.
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352 Id. at 7551; see also 40 Fed. Reg. 27590, 27610 (June 30, 1975).
The early rulemakings never explained the origin or basis for EPA's claimed authority to
suspend or revoke certificates ab initio—despite the requirements of section 307(d) and bedrock
principles of administrative procedure.353 Indeed, it could not have done; such a claim is
foreclosed by the text of the Clean Air Act. Section 206, as enacted in 1970 and today, provides
that a certificate of conformity has a limited duration ("not in excess of one year"354), and the
sole relevant purpose of the certificate is to permit the initial transaction in a vehicle or engine by
the manufacturer with another person.355 Congress made no provision for suspending, revoking
or voiding a certificate after it has served their purpose. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
232-234]
353 The 1973-1974 rulemaking includes in the final rule preamble a discussion of EPA's claimed authority
to suspend or revoke certificates, see 39 Fed. Reg. at 7545-48, but nothing specific on suspension or
revocation of certificates ab initio.
354 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1).
355 See id. § 7522(a)(1).
Later revisions to the certification enforcement regulations neither provided an adequate
rationale for certificate action reaching back past the year in which the certificate was effective,
nor expanded the general circumstances under which EPA claimed authority to void certificates
ab initio (with one exception noted below). That said, when EPA has adopted the void-ab-initio
enforcement mechanism, the Agency has usually also indicated that its use would be limited to
unusual, "egregious" situations.356 In addition, EPA's GHG regulations make the void-ab-initio
sanction available when a manufacturer fails to cover a GHG fleet-average emissions deficit in
the manner permitted by the regulations.357 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 232-234]
356 See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg., 926, 960 (Jan. 7, 1998) (stating in preamble to National Low-Emission Vehicle
proposed rule that for violations of record-keeping and reporting requirements, "EPA would only void a
certificate ab initio for the most egregious ... violations, where a manufacturer's records or reporting are so
substantially incomplete that EPA cannot determine compliance with the fleet average NMOG standard or
other requirements").
357 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 86.1865-12(k)(7)(ii). In such a situation, a manufacturer would have had to
decide not to comply with any of section 86.1865(k)'s provisions for covering shortfalls. Similar provisions
had been included in earlier rulemakings for programs that permitted or required fleet averaging to
demonstrate compliance with emissions standards, or that relied upon the phase-in on a multi-model-year
basis of new or increasingly stringent emissions standards. For example, in the program for control of PM
emissions from MY 1985 and later light-duty diesel vehicles, EPA's regulations provided for the voluntary
use of fleet averaging to demonstrate compliance, which could be enforced (according to EPA) by voiding
the certificates ab initio of vehicles that triggered noncompliance with fleet-average standards. See 48 Fed.
Reg. at 33456, 33460; see also 54 Fed. Reg. 14426, 14490 (Apr. 11, 1989) (similar provision for "NOx
averaging program" for methanol-fueled vehicles); 57 Fed. Reg. 31888, 31890 (July 17, 1992) (similar
provision for phase-in of cold CO standards under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments); 56 Fed. Reg.
25724, 25734 (June 5, 1991) (similar provision for phase-in of "Tier 1" exhaust emissions standards under
the 1990 Amendments); 65 Fed. Reg. 6698, 6714 (Feb. 10, 2000) (similar provision for "Tier 2" emissions
standards).
Perhaps the closest that EPA came to offering a rationale for its claimed authority to void
certificates ab initio occurred in the 1991 rulemaking to implement the "Tier 1" standards. There,
the Agency maintained that "such actions are authorized where, pursuant to EPA's authority
under Section 206(a) of the Act to condition certificates upon such terms as the Administrator
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'may prescribe', EPA has placed a condition in the certificate."358 Of course, accepting the
general notion that the Agency can include some conditions in a certification of conformity does
itself not provide a basis for placing arbitrary or capricious conditions on certification, nor does
that proposition support a rule that is contrary to the text and structure of sections 203 and 206 of
the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 232-234]
358 56 Fed. Reg. at 25734.
During the CAP 2000 rulemaking, EPA explained in its notice of proposed rulemaking its
intended approach to an "explicit requirement that manufacturers exercise good engineering
judgment in making decisions under the [CAP 2000] regulations" as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 234-247]
Failure to apply good engineering judgment may result in EPA overruling the manufacturer's
decision. As long as manufacturers do not deliberately overlook information, use incorrect
information, or make decisions without using a rational decision process, EPA is limiting the
consequences of making incorrect good engineering judgments to future corresponding
decisions. Also, the Agency is proposing that such overruled decisions be applied as soon as
practicable. ... The Agency is proposing harsher remedies for intentional and deliberate acts or
decisions made without a rational basis. Intentional disregard for good engineering judgment
could result in voiding certificates ab initio, with provisions for an administrative hearing, in
addition to any civil or criminal enforcement actions which may result.359 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 234-247]
359 Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles; Compliance Programs for New Light-Duty
Vehicles and Light- Duty Trucks, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 63 Fed. Reg. 39654, 39678 (July 23,
1998).
The CAP 2000 final rule followed through on the Agency's stated intent in new section
86.1850- 01 of the certification regulations: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 234-247]
§ 86.1851-01 Application of good engineering judgment to manufacturers' decisions.
(a) The manufacturer shall exercise good engineering judgment in making all decisions called
for under this subpart, including but not limited to selections, categorizations, determinations,
and applications of the requirements of the subpart.
(b) Upon written request by the Administrator, the manufacturer shall provide within 15
working days (or such longer period as may be allowed by the Administrator) a written
description of the engineering judgment in question.
(c) The Administrator may reject any such decision by a manufacturer if it is not based on
good engineering judgment, or is otherwise inconsistent with the requirements of this subpart.
(d) If the Administrator rejects a decision by a manufacturer with respect to the exercise of
good engineering judgment, the following provisions shall apply:
(1) If the Administrator determines that incorrect information was deliberately used in the
decision process, that important information was deliberately overlooked, that the decision was
not made in good faith, or that the decision was not made with a rational basis, the Administrator
may suspend or void ab initio a certificate of conformity.
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(2) If the Administrator determines that the manufacturer's decision does not meet the
provisions of paragraph(d)(l) of this section, but that a different decision would reflect a better
exercise of good engineering judgment, then the Administrator will notify the manufacturer of
this concern and the basis thereof.
(i) The manufacturer shall have at least 30 days to respond to this notice. The Administrator
may extend this response period upon request from the manufacturer if it is necessary to generate
additional data for the manufacturer's response.
(ii) The Administrator shall make the final ruling after considering the information provided
by the manufacturer during the response period. If the Administrator determines that the
manufacturer's decision was not made using good engineering judgment, he/she may reject that
decision and apply the new ruling to future corresponding decisions as soon as practicable.
(e) The Administrator shall notify the manufacturer in writing regarding any decision reached
under paragraph (d)(1) or (2) of this section. The Administrator shall include in this notification
the basis for reaching the determination.360
360 Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles; Compliance Programs for New Light-Duty
Vehicles and Light- Duty Trucks, 64 Fed. Reg. 23906. 23971 (May 4, 1999) (emphasis added).
Thus, as indicated in the italicized text, the regulations provide for voiding a certificate of
conformity ab initio only when "important information was deliberately overlooked," or a
decision "was not made in good faith" or lacked "a rational basis."361 By contrast, when EPA
concludes through a final ruling only that "a different decision would reflect a better exercise of
good engineering judgment," its ruling takes effect in "future corresponding decisions as soon as
practicable," with no effect on a current certificate.362 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
234-247]
361 40 C.F.R. § 86.1851-01(d)(l).
362 Id. § 86.1851 -01 (d)(2)(ii).
In sum, EPA's prior regulations have generally recognized a distinction between willful or
reckless error and misconduct (which can trigger ab initio voiding of certificates of conformity),
and good-faith error or honest disagreement (which cannot). While the Agency has never
provided a plausible rationale for any retroactive impacts on existing certificates, or explained
how such an approach is consistent with sections 203 and 206, at least it adopted a bright- line
rule that cabined the void-ab-initio sanction to a limited category of cases.363 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 234-247]
363 Failure to comply with fleet average standards and phase-in requirements, which could trigger the
retroactive voiding of certificates for vehicles whose sale caused the exceedances (and not entire engine
families or test groups), did not fit the general model, as such exceedances could have resulted from honest
error. But such violations could easily be identified and were not likely to be in dispute. Up until the current
rulemaking for MY 2027 and later vehicles, only those easily identified violations of conditions of
certification, or acts or omissions involving scienter or recklessness, fell into the general category of
conditions of certification that could lead to the voiding of certificates ab initio.
ii) The Proposed Revisions to the Certification Enforcement Regulations
The existing panoply of conditions for issuing new-vehicle certificates of conformity are
contained in 40 C.F.R. §86.1848-10(c). Under the current version of section 86.1848-10(c), the
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only certificate conditions that can be enforced by deeming vehicles "not... covered by the
certificate" are those requiring (i) compliance with sales-based implementation schedules or
fleet-average and phase-in regulations; 364 (ii) compliance with in-use testing and reporting
requirements; 365 and (iii) conformity "in all material respects" with the contents of the
certification application. 366 The NPRM here proposes to make failure to comply with any of
the conditions listed in section 86.1848- 10(c)-including run-of-the-mill failures to meet in-use
emissions standards, a basis for determining that "any affected vehicles are not covered by the
certificate" that authorized their introduction into commerce. 367 As a result, any such failure to
comply with in-use standards, even by vehicles that would not be subject to recall under CAA
section 207(c)(1), would create per-vehicle penalty liability. 368 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 237-239]
363 Failure to comply with fleet average standards and phase-in requirements, which could trigger the
retroactive voiding of certificates for vehicles whose sale caused the exceedances (and not entire engine
families or test groups), did not fit the general model, as such exceedances could have resulted from honest
error. But such violations could easily be identified and were not likely to be in dispute. Up until the current
rulemaking for MY 2027 and later vehicles, only those easily identified violations of conditions of
certification, or acts or omissions involving scienter or recklessness, fell into the general category of
conditions of certification that could lead to the voiding of certificates ab initio.
364 40 C.F.R. § 86.1848-10(c)(3), (7), (8), (9).
365 See id. § 86.1848-10(c)(5)).
366 See id. § 86.1848-10(c)(6)).
367 NPRM at 29434. Each of the proposed revisions to section 86.1848-10(c), and those to 40 C.F.R §
86.1850-01 identified in the next paragraph of these comments, is conveniently shown in what EPA staff
calls a "Redline Version" of all the proposed changes in regulatory text in the NPRM placed on the docket
by EPA. See EPA-HQ- OAR-2022-0829-0314 at 1, 91-96.
368 As explained elsewhere in these comments, the statute limits mandatory recall to situations in which a
substantial number of vehicles in a properly defined class or category do not conform with EPA's
regulations and can be brought into compliance by repair.
The NPRM also proposes three important changes in current section 86.1850-01. First, it
would delete the requirement in section 86.1850-01 that only "substantial" infractions of
regulations can trigger suspension or revocation of a certificate, 369 Second, it would delete the
current provision in section 86.1850-01 providing that in the absence of willful or reckless error,
"[a]ny suspension or revocation of a certificate of conformity shall extend no further than to
forbid the introduction into commerce of vehicles previously covered by the certificate which are
still in the possession of the manufacturer."370 Third, it would add to section 86.1850-01 a
provision giving EPA authority to "void" ab initio, as well as to suspend or revoke, certificates of
conformity.371 The upshot of all this would be that any infraction of the certification regulation
could result in per-vehicle penalties, no matter how insubstantial.372 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 237-239]
369 See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29435.
370 40 C.F.R. § 86.1850-01(f).
371 See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29435; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1068.30 ("void" means "to invalidate a certificate ... ab
initio").
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372 This, of course, assumes that EPA's theory of CAA section 203(a)(1) penalty liability based on
retroactive invalidation is credible.
The NPRM's explanation for these proposed changes in sections 86.1848-10 and 86.1850-01
appears in a single paragraph in the NPRM, which melds discussion of the enforcement of fleet-
average GHG requirements with other topics: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 237-239]
The overarching principle of compliance to the fleet average standards is that the calculated
fleet average in the GHG report must accurately represent the actual fleet of vehicles a
manufacture produced. If a manufacturer provides false, inaccurate, or unrepresentative data as
part of their GHG report, the manufacturer may be subject to enforcement and EPA may void ab
initio the certificates of conformity which relied on that data. Vehicles are covered by a
certificate of conformity only if they are in all material respects as described in the
manufacturer's application for certification (Part I and Part II) including the GHG report. If
vehicles generate substantially more C02 emissions in actual use than what was reported, those
vehicles are not covered by the certificate of conformity. EPA is proposing two changes to the
regulatory language that are designed to clarify the Agency's understanding of its authority to
void certificates and/or find that vehicles were sold in violation of a condition of a certificate.
Currently 40 CFR 86.1850 states that if a manufacturer submits false or incomplete information
or renders inaccurate any test data which it submits, or fails to make a good engineering
judgment, EPA may deny issuance of, suspend, or revoke a previously issued certificate of
conformity. However, suspension or revocation of a certificate of conformity shall extend no
further than to forbid the introduction into commerce of vehicles previously covered by the
certificate which are still in the possession of the manufacturer. Since the GHG report is not
required to be submitted until May 1 of the calendar year after the model year has ended,
suspending or revoking a certificate is no longer a relevant remedy. Therefore, because of
situations where certificate suspension or revocation is no longer relevant, EPA is proposing to
allow the Agency to void ab initio a previously issued certificate of conformity in the list of
possible actions the agency may take if a manufacturer commits any of the infractions listed in
40 CFR 86.1850(b). In addition, EPA is proposing edits to 40 CFR 86.1848 to make it clearer
that any vehicles sold that fail to meet any condition upon which the certificate was issued are
not covered by the certificate and thus were sold in violation of CAA 203(a)(1).373 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 237-239]
373 NPRM at 29289 (emphasis added).
This purported justification is objectionable on several fronts. First, the Agency's explanation
does not even correctly identify the actual regulatory changes wrought by the proposed
regulation. For instance, it states that the submission of "unrepresentative data" may be a ground
for voiding a certificate, even though the proposed regulation itself only mentions "false" or
"inaccurate" data. The submission of "unrepresentative" data is not covered by the regulations
for enforcement or reporting of GHG fleet-average performance, and the NPRM does not define
what the term means, apart from "inaccurate." In any event, statements in preambles cannot be
used to alter the meaning of clear regulations. 374 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 237-
239]
374 See, e.g., Natl. Wildlife Fed'nv. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 569-70 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (preambles cannot
"enlarge or confer powers on administrative agencies or offcers").
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Second, the timing of GHG reports provides no genuine basis for the Agency to expand the
role of the void-ab-initio remedy. That a GHG report is not required until after the end of a
model year is nothing new or unique to MY 2027 and later GHG regulations. If the timing of
GHG reports were a valid rationale for voiding certificates ab initio, the rationale would have
applied to any of the prior GHG regulations and EPA presents no concrete evidence of any
newly emergent problems occasioned by the timing of a GHG report. In all events, the timing of
a GHG report does not provide a rational basis for expanding section 86.1850-0l's use of
voiding- ab-initio to cover "any of the infractions listed in 40 CFR 86.1850 (b)."375 The NPRM
provides no reason why good-faith differences between a manufacturer and EPA should not be
remedied prospectively, without per-vehicle penalty liability. Prospective remedies are
particularly appropriate in that context because EPA has offered no useful general definition of
what it would consider to be "good engineering judgment." The definition of the term in Part
1068 refers generally to "judgments made consistent with generally accepted scientific and
engineering principles and all available relevant information. "376 Except in cases of willful error
or recklessness, it is impossible to imagine a priori a decision on an engineering issue that would
not meet that standard. Tellingly, the NRPM offers no examples of emerging problems with the
current program that need to be addressed. It is black-letter administrative law that regulated
parties must have "fair warning of [EPA's] interpretation of [its] regulations."377 The NRPM
falls far short of complying with that principle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 239-240]
375 NPRM at 29289 (emphasis added).
376 40 C.F.R. § 1068.30.
377 Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1995); accord United States v. Chrysler Corp.,
158 F.3d 1350, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1998); cf. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231-33 (1974) (one purpose of the
APA is "to avoid ... inherently arbitrary ... unpublished ad hoc determinations" of rights and duties); see
also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 306 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (EPA failed to properly exercise its
rulemaking authority in section 206(d) by establishing a framework to determine regulatory compliance
rather than specific methods to determine compliance).
Third, the NPRM's one-sentence assertion that the proposed changes in section 86.1848-10
are merely designed to make the existing regulation "clearer" is wholly unconvincing. Unlike the
current text of section 86.1848-10, the new text would provide that "any vehicles sold that fail to
meet any condition upon which the certificate was issued are not covered by the certificate," as
the NPRM preamble itself concedes. 378 In failing to even recognize that it is proposing a
substantive change in section 86.1848-10, the NPRM surely fails to justify that proposed change.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 240-241]
378 NPRM at 29289.
The NPRM's failure to set forth a plausible rationale for the proposed changes to the
certification enforcement regulations contravenes section 307(d)(3). If the Agency tried to move
forward with those changes and if a petition for review was filed, section 307(d) would therefore
"require" remand for further consideration of the proposed changes. 379 Additionally, because
no such rationale for several of these changes is at all evident, it is far from clear whether EPA
could adequately explain its reasons for the proposed changes, so as to avoid vacatur. Indeed,
vacatur appears to be the most likely result-given that there isn't any evidence that vacatur would
be "quite disruptive" to EPA's plans to set new multi-pollutant standards. 380 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 240-241]
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379 See Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth., 358 F.3d at 949-50.
380 See id. (quoting Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Nuclear Regul. Comm'n, 988 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
That said, because the NPRM's proposed changes to the emissions standards themselves are
not inextricably tied to the enforcement-related amendments, the main portion of EPA's
regulatory effort likely could proceed with the deficient amendments to the enforcement
regulations severed. That would allow EPA and stakeholders to focus energies on the new
standards and give them time to discuss and to try to reach agreements on changes to the
certification enforcement regulations. Moreover, EPA should not consider any aspect of the
void-ab-initio mechanism to be beyond judicial scrutiny. The sweeping changes the NPRM
proposes to the Agency's certification enforcement regulations has reopened those issues, and
EPA must explain not only its full rationale for including the conditions listed in section
86.1848- 10(c) in its regulations, but also its general endorsement of the entire void-ab-initio
concept. After it has done so, EPA must reopen the docket and allow for public comment; failure
to do so would, at minimum, not comply with section 307(d)(3).381 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 240-241]
381 See Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Dep't of the Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1213-15 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(explaining doctrine of "constructive[]" reopener); see also Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F3d 1, 16
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (reopener "is dependent upon the entire context of the rulemaking" (cleaned up)).
iii) In-Use Remedies
The NPRM also includes a proposal to create new regulatory text concerning "recall
order[s]." Specifically, the NPRM would add the following text to 40 C.F.R. § 86.1865-12:
(j)(3) EPA will issue a recall order as described in 40 CFR part 85, subpart S, if EPA or the
manufacturer determines that a substantial number of a class or category of vehicles produced by
that manufacturer, although properly maintained and used, do not conform to in-use C02
emission standards, or do not conform to the monitor accuracy requirements in § 86.1815. The
recall would be intended to remedy repairable problems to bring the vehicle into compliance;
however, if there is no demonstrable, repairable problem that could be remedied to bring the
vehicles into compliance, the manufacturer must submit an alternative plan for to address the
noncompliance. For example, manufacturers may need to calculate a correction to its emission
credit balance based on the GHG emissions of the actual number of vehicles produced. EPA may
void credits originally calculated from noncompliant vehicles, unless traded, and will adjust
debits. In the case of traded credits, EPA will adjust the selling manufacturer's credit balance to
reflect the sale of such credits and any resulting credit deficit. Manufacturers may voluntarily
recall vehicles to remedy such a noncompliance and submit a voluntary recall report as described
in 40 CFR part 85, subpart T.382 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 241-245]
382 NPRM at 29438.
This new provision, however, stands in serious tension with longstanding, statutorily
embodied principles for recalls. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 241-245]
In language unchanged by Congress since the 1970 Amendments, CAA section 207(c)(1)
provides for mandatory recalls only when EPA determines that "a substantial number of any
class or category of vehicles, although properly maintained and used," do not "conform with
regulations prescribed under section 202, when in actual use" during their specified useful
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life.383 "[SJection 207(c) provides for classwide remedies of classwide defects."384 Since the
1980s, EPA has apparently not needed to compel an emissions recall. Yet, tens of thousands of
vehicles have nevertheless been recalled voluntarily since that time. That is because the
governing principles for recalls pursuant to section 207(c) have been clear for decades. Three
such principles are important and relevant in the current rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.241-245]
383 42 U.S.C. § 7541(c)(1).
384 General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (enbanc).
First, while inferences about emissions control performance from a sample of test vehicles is
permitted, the test sample must be statistically robust in showing that the class of vehicles under
investigation does not conform with the section 202 emissions standards. As Senator Muskie, the
lead author of much of the 1970 Amendments, described the recall provision in section 207,
"[t]he Administrator can test cars on the road, and can require recall if a representative sample
fails the test."385 Because the nonconformity must exist in a "substantial number" of vehicles, it
is imperative for EPA to define the investigatory class no more broadly than the data permit.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 241-245]
385 Summary of the Provisions of Conference Agreement on the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,
reprinted in 116 Cong. Rec. 42,384 (1970) (emphasis added).
Second, a classwide defect subject to recall can be exhibited only in "properly maintained and
used" vehicles. In that language, Congress correctly recognized that manufacturers cannot design
and provide at reasonable cost to a retail purchaser a vehicle that could meet emissions standards
no matter how poor its maintenance and regardless of how it has been operated. "Unless the
cause of the nonconformity is within the manufacturer's control, an imposition of liability would
be an unwarranted financial burden on the manufacturers, unrelated to the strategy of forcing
technological progress."386 In fact, attempts to amend section 207(c)(1) to trigger recall liability
based on "normal," rather than "proper[]," maintenance and use, were rejected in the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments. 3 87 Because of this statutory requirement, for recall testing, EPA is
obliged to follow test-vehicle procurement protocol procedures aimed to limit testing to vehicles
that could be demonstrated to have been "properly maintained and used." During the CAP 2000
rulemaking, EPA acknowledged that "[s]ection 207(c) specifies the determination that EPA must
make to issue a recall order," and made it clear that the primary purpose of IUVP testing was "to
obtain a randomly procured sample of in-[use] vehicles, not a sample on which to base a recall
determination "388 In IUVP testing, EPA explained, "sample vehicles would be eliminated only
if they are found to be obviously tampered, were used for "severe duty (racing, snow plowing
etc.), have experienced extensive collision damage, require repairs which to allow the vehicles to
be tested would be excessively costly, or are found to be unsafe to test."389 By contrast, "the
purpose of the confirmatory test programs," (i.e., IUCP) testing, "is to provide data upon which
the agency can base a 209(c) recall determination," which entails a "statutory requirement that
such determinations address whether properly maintained and used vehicles conform" with
emissions standards.390 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 241-245]
386 Chrysler Corp. v. EPA, 631 F.2d 865, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also id. ("[I]t would make little sense
to impose liability on manufacturers for conditions of nonconformity caused by actions of vehicle owners
or mechanics."); Automotive Parts Rebuilders Ass'n v. EPA, 720 F.2d 142, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (agency
lacks power to make manufacturer responsible for nonconformities beyond its control). EPA regulations
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themselves also acknowledge that in-use compliance with emissions standards depends in part on
performance of proper maintenance by vehicle owners. Manufacturers provide instructions on vehicle
maintenance to new-vehicle purchasers, and they are required to justify those instructions to EPA in the
certification process as necessary, including a demonstration, if needed, that any scheduled maintenance
"must have a reasonable likelihood of being performed in-use." 40 C.F.R. § 86.1834-0 l(b)(6)(ii).
387 Work on what became the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 began in 1987. Representative Henry
Waxman introduced H.R. 3054, which sought to change "properly" to "normally" in the text of section
207(c)(1). Clean Air Act Amendments of 1987, H.R. 3054, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 207(d)(1) (1987) 43.
The bill was the subject of hearings and went into markup but was not reported. In 1989, Representative
Waxman introduced H.R. 2323 which contained the same amendment to section 207(c)(1). Clean Air
Restoration Act of 1989, H.R. 2323, 101st Cong., § 505(b)(1) 1st Sess. (1989) 99. H.R. 2323 was replaced
by H.R. 3030, which did not contain the same amendment and which, following Conference, provided the
text for what became the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The 1990 Amendments were the last major
revisions to the statute. Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, P.L. 101-549, U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO), digitized on Westlaw, 100th Congress, H.R. 3054; 101st
Congress, H.R. 2323.
388 EPA, Response to Comments, CAP 2000 Final Rule, Mar. 15, 1999, EPA Air Docket No. A-96-50. V-
C-01 19-20 (hereinafter "CAP 2000 RPC").
389 CAP 2000 RPC at 20; see 40 C.F.R. Pt. 86, Subpt. S App. II.
390 CAP 2000 RPC at 21. In a decision concerning state-law remedies, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California commented in dicta that, "If a manufacturer's vehicles do not pass these
[IUVP] tests, or if EPA otherwise determines that 'a substantial number of any class or category of vehicles
or engines, although properly maintained and used, do not conform to the regulations prescribed,' EPA has
authority to recall those vehicles.." In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Mktg., Sales Pracs., and Prods. Liab.
Litig., 310 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7541(c)(1)), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 959 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2020). But the court did not address the distinction between IUVP and IUCP
testing, and if taken literally, its dicta would confuse the two types of testing. If EPA takes a different view
of the matter than does Auto Innovators, the Agency should explain fully why it does.
Third, the only remedy for in-use nonconformity permitted by section 207(c)(1) is recall,
which has two fundamental components: notice to vehicle owners, and performance of a remedy
(adjustment or replacement of a part or assembly, or recalibration of powertrain or emissions
controls). EPA's recall regulations have properly implemented the statute. Those regulations
make it clear that a "plan to remedy" the nonconformity must contain the "description of the
proper maintenance and use" on which the manufacturer proposes to condition "eligibility for
repair "391 As one court noted, "EPA's regulations ... nowhere suggest that any remedy other
than recall might be appropriate."392 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 241-245]
391 40 C.F.R. §§ 85.1802(a), 85.1803(a)(4) (emphasis added). EPA properly will not approve remedies
that would degrade drivability, which would invite widespread tampering and likely reduce the vehicle
capture rate.
392 Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, Circuit Judge). See also
Gen. Motors Corp., 742 F.2d at 1568 (referring to section 207(c) as the "recall provision" and the "recall
scheme"); accord In re Caterpillar, Inc., C13 & C15 Engine Products Liab. Litig., No. 1:14-CV-3722 JBS-
JS, 2015 WL 4591236, at *8 (D.N.J. July 29, 2015); Navistar, Inc. v. Jackson, 840 F. Supp. 2d 357, 359
(D.D.C. 2012). Under the rule in Center for Auto Safety, the Administrator can stop short of making a
nonconformity determination—a determination which would require him to order a recall—if the Agency
and the manufacturer agreed on another method of addressing the nonconformity. The D.C. Circuit
acknowledged such an alternative might be "best calculated to achieve the ends sought by Congress and to
allocate [EPA's] available funds and personnel in such a way as to execute its policy efficiently and
economically." 747 F.2d at 6 (quotation marks and citation omitted). But recall is the "exclusive"
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mandatory remedy allowed by the statute, see id., and EPA's regulations permit no alternative to recall and
repair.
The proposal in the NPRM concerning the recall remedy is entirely inconsistent with this
history and precedent. The first problem with the NPRM's proposal is that the alternative remedy
it proposes is disconnected from section 207(c)(1). Despite its good intention, the proposal rests
on a "misinterpretation of the statute" because the "recall order" it contemplates would not
include or depend upon notice to vehicle owners or any modification of the vehicle. 393 To be
sure, EPA is entitled to propose solutions to address exceedances of C02 emission standards
when there is no "demonstrable, repairable problem." But that solution cannot be shoehorned
within the Agency's limited authority to conduct recalls, and indeed, when there is no
"demonstrable, repairable problem" there is not even a nonconformity within the meaning of
section 207(c)(1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 241-245]
393 See Ctr. for Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 6.
Therefore, if EPA has authority to require a correction of a GHG emissions credit balance, it
cannot arise under section 207(c)(1). Certainly, the regulation that the NPRM is proposing is not
an exercise of the Agency's rulemaking power under section 206(d) of the statute, which
requires regulations to "establish methods and procedures for making tests," nor under sections
206(a)(4)(A)&(B) or 206(h), which similarly are concerned with test procedures.394 Nor,
looking outside Title II, could EPA rely upon section 301, which is only "a source of procedural
not substantive authority—it lets the agency pass rules to carry out powers granted by other
provisions of the statute "395 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 241-245]
394 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7525(a)(4)(A)&(B), (h).
395 Heating, Air Cond. & Refrig. Dist. Int'l v. EPA, No. 21-1251, 2023 WL4067167 at *5 (D.C. Cir. June
20, 2023).
That said, Auto Innovators believe that the solution to some exceedances of in-use C02
emission standards that EPA has suggested is sensible, because it will protect the environment
and is unlikely to engender unnecessary disputes with vehicle manufacturers. Even if EPA does
not have authority to establish such a GHG-emissions-credit-adjustment mechanism through a
legislative rule, it can presumably issue an interpretative rule or policy statement to establish this
useful mechanism to address imbalances between GHG emissions control performance
demonstrated during certification compared with in-use emissions test results. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 241-245]
The second issue with the proposed amendment to section 86.1865(j) is that it leaves open the
possibility that an EPA "recall order" might not even take the reasonable approach suggested in
its text: the credit-balance correction is offered only as an "example" of what EPA might require.
That open-ended deviation from the clear strictures of section 207(c)(1) is objectionable and
should be removed. Relatedly, the Agency cannot properly proceed with the proposed revision in
section 86.1848-10(c)(2) that would treat as "not covered by the certificate" vehicles that do not
comply with any of the "in-use emissions standards contained in subpart S "396 Apart from the
lack of any reasoned explanation for the change, see supra pp. [12-15], again, the exclusive
remedy for nonconformity of an in-use emissions standard is recall (ordered or voluntary) as
provided in section 207(c)(l).397 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 241-245]
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396 See NPRM at 29434. A reasonable, and indeed the only sensible, understanding of "comply" in the
current version of § 86.1848-10(c)(2) has been that manufacturers must respond to lawful recall orders to
bring their vehicles into compliance with applicable emission standards. To "comply" cannot be read to
make a certificate conditional on never exceeding an in-use emissions standard in testing such as IUVP
testing; such a reading could mean that a single failure by a vehicle inducted into IUVP testing, regardless
of whether the vehicle had been properly maintained and used, would violate a condition of certification.
397 See Heating, Air Cond. & Refrig. Dist. Int'l, 2023 WL4067167 at *5.
iv) The IUCP Path to Recall
Finally, the NPRM's proposal to add in-use C02 emission standards to the In-Use
Confirmatory Test Program (IUCP) 398 contains significant ambiguities and does not adequately
justify the decision to exclude a threshold such as the 1.3 factor used for criteria pollutants in
combination with the 50% trigger for IUCP testing. In particular, it is unclear whether the 50%
trigger would apply on a subconfiguration basis for a model year, or across all subconfigurations
that used the same carryover data. We assume the former, and if not, EPA should clarify and
permit comment after a reasonable period of time. We also assume that any recall based on IUCP
testing would only apply to the subconfiguration and model year actually tested in the IUCP,
because, for example, in-use factors can affect test results for specific subconfigurations
differently. This is consistent with the relevant regulation at 40 C.F.R. § 1818-12(d) that
establishes the in-use C02 exhaust emission standard on a subconfiguration basis. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 245-246]
398 See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,288-90.
We further assume that a recall could only be compelled based on the results of IUCP tests on
a significant number of vehicles in the relevant subconfiguration for in-use C02 emissions in a
given model year, because the statute only allows recalls when the data permit a robust statistical
inference. EPA previously determined that testing at least 10 vehicles in an Agency- designated
subset (such as the subconfiguration grouping designated by EPA under 40 C.F.R. § 1818-12(d))
is sufficient to meet the testing adequacy requirement, 399 and we assume the same would be
applied to any new IUCP program. If those assumptions are mistaken, EPA should so advise, and
permit further comment in light of its corrections to those assumptions.400 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 245-246]
399 See 40 C.F.R. § 86.1846-01(d)
400 EPA's IUCP regulations assess criteria emissions test results on an emissions test group basis, but
would not do so for C02 emissions, presumably for physics-based reasons underlying the establishment of
the C02 emission in- use margin at 40 C.F.R. § 1818-12(d).
Organization: Stellantis
Certification Enforcement Programs and In-Use Remedies
Finally, separate from the issues raised regarding the proposed GHG and criteria pollutant
standards, Stellantis agrees with the concerns discussed in the Auto Innovators' comments on
EPA's proposed revisions to enforce vehicle certification and in-use standards. As detailed by
Auto Innovators, EPA has not provided a plausible rationale for its proposed retroactive impacts
on existing certificates and other proposed "clarifications." Similarly, it is unclear that EPA has
the authority to add the proposed in-use "recall order" regarding C02 emission
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standards/monitor accuracy requirements or C02 emission standards to the In-Use Confirmatory
Test Program. Based on these shortcomings, EPA should not carry forward into the final rule the
proposed "clarifications" or revisions to the enforcement programs and in-use remedies. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 23]
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
In-Use Program - Fuel Economy and In-Use Verification Test Procedure Streamlining
(Section III.F.5.iv) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 11]
Volkswagen is in alignment with AFAI's GHGIUVP/IUCP comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0669, p. 11]
Volkswagen requests clarification in the language proposed in the NPRM to use its authority
to make GHG credit adjustments based on IUVP C02 results. "EPA may use its authority to
correct a manufacturer's greenhouse gas credit balance to ensure the manufacturer's GHG fleet
average is representative of the actual vehicles it produces." Volkswagen feels this would be
appropriately handled at the discretion of the regulator; however, future guidance on this topic
would be desired to ensure a common understanding for all manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0669, p. 11]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
The Auto Alliance commented that EPA has never provided a legal basis for voiding
certificates. The Alliance states that CAA 206 creates a narrow purpose for certification, which is
to facilitate introduction into commerce of qualified vehicles; it believes that the CAA does not
authorize suspending, revoking, or voiding certificates after the certification has served its
intended purpose. The Alliance further believes EPA implementation has historically limited
voiding certificates to "egregious" cases, and it believes that while EPA's Tier 1 rule included a
statement supporting voided certificates based on CAA 206(a) allowing EPA to prescribe
conditions on certificates, such an argument is contrary to the text and structure of CAA 203 and
206.
The Auto Alliance commented that the CAP 2000 rule added good-engineering-judgment
provisions that reinforce an approach that limits voiding certificates to egregious circumstances,
such as deliberately overlooking important information, not operating in good faith, or lacking a
rational basis. The Alliance claims that this approach still lacks a legal basis, but it at least limits
voiding to a limited category of cases.
The Auto Alliance commented that 40 CFR 86.1848-10(c) currently defines specific
conditions on certificates, whereas the proposal expands that to cover every emission result and
any case of a vehicle not being covered by a certificate. It states that § 86.1850 similarly expands
the scope of what may justify voiding certificates.
The Auto Alliance commented that the preamble improperly references "unrepresentative
data" rather than the more specific "false or inaccurate data" in the regulation.
The Auto Alliance commented that the timing of a GHG report does not provide a rational
basis for voiding certificates. The Alliance believes the NPRM provides no reason why good-
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faith differences between a manufacturer and EPA should not be remedied prospectively,
without per-vehicle penalty liability. It further asserts that, with no examples of emerging
problems that need to be addressed, EPA fails to meet the legal standard for giving fair warning
of how it interprets its regulations.
The Auto Alliance commented that the preamble claims that the changes are for clarity,
without even recognizing the changes are substantive. The NPRM's failure to set forth a
plausible rationale for changing the certification enforcement contravenes CAA 307(d)(3).
The Auto Alliance commented that the proposed changes have reopened the general issue of
voiding certificates, so the final rule needs to give a rationale both for any specific amendments
and for voiding certificates generally. CAA 307(d)(3) would require reopening the docket for
public comment.
The Auto Alliance commented that CAA 207(c) relies on several principles, among them: (1)
test sample must be statistically robust to show that a substantial number of vehicles do not
conform to the regulation; (2) defects for a recall determination must be based on properly
maintained and used vehicles (in CAP 2000, EPA recognized that IUVP testing was intended to
test vehicles without screening for proper maintenance and use, which leaves IUCP to provide
information needed to make recall determinations); and (3) the only remedy for in-use
noncompliance under CAA 207(c) is recall, which fundamentally requires notice to vehicle
owners and performance of a remedy (the remedy (repair) depends on the manufacturer
identifying how to qualify eligible vehicles for repair based on proper maintenance and use).
The Auto Alliance also commented that the changes to EPA's compliance and enforcement
programs are severable from the remainder of the proposed rule, including changes EPA is
making to the GHG and criteria pollutant standards.
Stellantis and Volkswagen stated that they supported the comments from the Auto Alliance as
summarized in the preceding paragraphs. Stellantis concluded that EPA should not finalize the
proposed "clarifications" or revisions to the enforcement programs and in-use remedies.
Volkswagen further requested clarification to ensure a common understanding among
manufacturers regarding the reference in the proposed rule for EPA to use its authority to make
GHG credit adjustments based on IUVP C02 results.
Response:
Without taking a position on the substance of the comments regarding voiding, EPA has
decided not to finalize the changes to 40 CFR 86.1850 as proposed.
The Auto Alliance also claims that prior agency rulemakings, including those promulgated as
early as 1974, 39 FR 7545, failed to provide a sufficient statutory basis for the agency's voiding
authority. Statutory authority challenges to prior agency rulemakings are beyond the scope of the
current rulemaking. In any event, the proposed rule here did not reopen EPA's general authority
to void certificates, but rather proposed only discrete changes to characterize EPA decision-
making with respect to such authority, changes which the agency is not finalizing.
The Auto Alliance commented that the preamble claims that changes to § 86.1848 are for
clarity, without recognizing the changes are substantive. It also stated that the NPRM failed to
set forth a plausible rationale for these proposed changes. EPA disagrees with these comments.
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As explained in the preamble, these changes are simply for clarification. EPA interprets the
regulations in § 86.1848 to have the same meaning with or without these changes.
Section 86.1848-01 has appeared in EPA's regulations and contained numerous conditions on
certification since the CAP-2000 rule.367 Additional conditions were added in the 2010 rule for
LD GHG standards and codified in § 86.1848-10. The concept that certificates are granted only
with certain conditions has been an integral component of EPA's compliance program since the
1970s.368 The only plausible consequence for a particular vehicle that does not comply with an
explicit condition of its certification is that such vehicle is a "misbuild"—it was not built under
the terms of the certificate, and thus is not covered by that certificate. This is particularly true
when the condition at issue cannot be tested until after many or all of the vehicles produced
under that certificate had been sold, such as violations of the in-use standard.
EPA acknowledges that the text of § 86.1848-10 as promulgated in the 2010 rule might cause
some confusion, given that certain conditions might have appeared to have explicit consequences
while the consequences for others were not as specific. EPA's changes to § 86.1848-10 in the
FRM are designed to allay any potential confusion and clarify that consequence for violating any
of the conditions of certification is that violating vehicles will not be covered by the certificate. It
is important to note that EPA did not propose and is not finalizing any changes to the conditions
themselves.
The Auto Alliance commented that "the NPRM here proposed to make failure to comply with
any of the conditions listed in § 86.1848-10(c) a basis for determining that" violating vehicles are
not covered by the certificate. That is an accurate description of the compliance regime already
applicable to certified vehicles before the finalization of the rule today, but overstates the impact
of this action. The Auto Alliance's interpretation of EPA's current regulations would essentially
read certain certificate conditions (which have appeared in EPA's regulations since at least 2000)
completely out of the regulations. If the Auto Alliance were correct, EPA would not have been
able to enforce any certificate conditions that did not have an explicit enforcement mechanism
attached to them. Such an interpretation would also ignore the basic definition of a condition: "a
provision making the effect of a legal instrument contingent upon an uncertain event."369 For
each vehicle sold by the manufacturer, a certificate is granted, contingent upon that vehicle
meeting each of the conditions listed in § 86.1848. The logical conclusion is that if such vehicle
does not meet one of the conditions, that vehicle was not covered by the certificate. The Auto
Alliance does not present any alternative consequence for the violation of a condition.
The Auto Alliance also commented specifically that the Agency cannot properly proceed with
the proposed revision in § 86.1848-10(c)(2) that would treat as "not covered by the certificate"
vehicles that do not comply with any of the "in-use emissions standards contained in subpart S."
The Auto Alliance also stated that the exclusive remedy for nonconformity of an in-use
emissions standard is recall (ordered or voluntary) as provided in CAA section 207(c)(1). EPA
367 64 FR 2306, May 4, 1999.
368 See, e.g., 39 FR 7545, 7546-7547 (Feb. 27, 1974); EPA Office of Gen. Couns ,,A Collection of Legal Opinions:
December 19 70-1973 185 (1973) (recommending regulations that would require that a "vehicle that did not conform
to [the] description [in its certification application] would be considered uncertified.").
369 Condition, Merriam-Webster.com/dictionary/condition, last accessed November 22, 2023.
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disagrees with this assertion, based on both the structure of the statute and decades of EPA
compliance and enforcement practice.
Beginning with section 207(c)(1), nothing in that section indicates it is an exclusive remedy
for violation of in-use emissions standards. By contrast, section 203 broadly defines prohibited
acts. For example, section 203(a)(1) prohibits manufacturers from introducing into commerce
"any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine, manufactured after the effective date of
regulations under this part which are applicable to such vehicle or engine unless such vehicle or
engine is covered by a certificate of conformity issued (and in effect) under regulations
prescribed under this part." The prohibition thus relates to "regulations under this part," that is
part A of the statute, section 202-219, which includes the statutory authority for promulgating in-
use standards, e.g., section 202(a), (d). To take another example, section 203(a)(3)(A) makes it a
prohibited act for "any person to remove or render inoperative any device or element of design
installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine in compliance with regulations under
this subchapter prior to its sale and delivery to the ultimate purchaser, or for any person
knowingly to remove or render inoperative any such device or element of design after such sale
and delivery to the ultimate purchaser." In other words, the statute expressly prohibits tampering
with a vehicle that was "in compliance with regulations under this subchapter." An obvious
example of this is a vehicle that met all the requirements for certification but then was tampered
such that it only no longer meets the standards in-use. Thus, we think that section 203
unambiguously covers violations of the in-use standards.
More concretely, there are numerous examples of situations where EPA could proceed either
under its 203 or 207 authority, including the below:
1) A manufacturer uses a vehicle with a defeat device in its certification testing; as such, all
vehicles using that certification test (some portion of the test group/vehicle model) are producing
significantly more emissions in-use than their certification value, violating the in-use standard. In
this situation, EPA could (and likely would) begin an enforcement action under 203(a)(3)(A).
However, EPA also has the clear authority to issue a notice of nonconformity under section
207(c)(1).
2) A manufacturer builds vehicles without installing the catalytic converters with which they
were certified, causing the vehicles to fail their in-use standard. The vehicles would violate a
condition of the certificate listed in § 86.1848-10(c)(6), which means they are explicitly not
covered by the certificate. EPA can and has used its authority to prosecute violations of CAA
section 203(a)(1) in such misbuild cases; EPA also could also use its authority under section
207(c) to require a recall.
3) A manufacturer produces vehicles with higher weight or greater road-load than that to
which they were certified, and so the vehicles exceed the in-use GHG emissions standard. Such
vehicles would not be covered by the certificate as stated in § 86.1848-10(c)(6), and may
separately be susceptible to recall under CAA section 207(c).
EPA disagrees with the Auto Alliance's comment that EPA's proposed changes to § 86.1865
to make it clear that EPA will use recall authority to remedy GHG non-compliance stands in
tension with longstanding, statutorily embodied principles for recalls.
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To begin with, despite the Alliance's assertion that EPA is acting in tension with longstanding
principles, the final rule is entirely consistent with the agency's position since the beginning of
the LD GHG program in 2010. In that rule, the agency asserted authority to remedy GHG non-
compliance including through credit adjustments. While stakeholders submitted many comments
relating to the in-use standards and remedies for non-compliance, they did not raise any
objections to the possible remedy of a credit balance adjustment. See 2010 LD RTC 5-344
("Remedies for Noncompliance with In-Use Standards"). By contrast, stakeholders then
expressed concern with the possibility a recall, noting that there may be no effective repair
remedy in many cases. EPA noted, among other things, that "The CAA requires a vehicle to
comply with emission standards over its regulatory useful life and affords EPA broad authority
for the implementation of this requirement. As such, EPA has authority to require a manufacturer
to remedy any noncompliance issues. The remedy can range from adjusting a manufacturer's
credit balance to the voluntary or mandatory recall of noncompliant vehicles." 75 FR 25324 and
25474 (May 7, 2010). The final rule maintains this policy and further clarifies the agency's
authority in this area and aligns the regulations with EPA's expressed intent in the 2010 rule.
In any event, we think the Alliance's specific allegations of tension are misplaced. The Auto
Alliance stated that while inferences about emissions control performance from a sample of test
vehicles is permitted, the test sample must be statistically robust to show that a substantial
number of vehicles do not conform to the regulation. EPA agrees that a determination of non-
compliance can be made based on a sampling of test vehicles, and that sample should be
statistically robust. EPA has a longstanding practice to test a sample of 10 vehicle within a class
or category of vehicles. For example, when EPA promulgated the CAP 2000 rule in 1999, EPA
established the In Use Confirmatory Program (IUCP), which specifies a sample of 10 vehicles be
tested when a certain number of vehicles in the In Use Verification Program (IUVP) exceed the
applicable emissions standards. EPA does not see any reason for this longstanding practice to
change when it comes to GHG non-compliance.
The Auto Alliance also stated that a classwide defect subject to recall can be exhibited only in
"properly maintained and used" vehicles. Once again, EPA agrees with the Auto Alliance that a
determination of non-compliance must be made based on "properly maintained and used"
vehicles. The Auto Alliance further pointed out that in CAP 2000, EPA recognized that IUVP
testing was intended to test vehicles without screening for proper maintenance and use, which
leaves IUCP to provide information needed to make recall determinations. In this rulemaking,
EPA proposed to set IUCP criteria based on the GHG in-use standards. While IUCP is not the
only source of data that can be used for determining whether a substantial number of vehicles do
not conform to the regulation, EPA agrees that is a useful process to gather such data. Again,
EPA does not agree that there is any tension between the final rule and this longstanding
principle.
Finally, the Auto Alliance stated that the only remedy for in-use noncompliance under CAA
207(c) is recall, which has two fundamental components: notice to vehicle owners, and
performance of a remedy (adjustment or replacement of a part or assembly, or recalibration of
powertrain or emissions controls). EPA does not see tension with the requirement to notify
owners of a non-compliance issue. In fact, EPA sees the requirement to notify owners as an
integral part of a remedy for a GHG non-compliance, and so such a requirement continues to
exist in the regulations (albeit with certain modifications for practicality in the credit retirement
context) regardless of the form of remedy. EPA believes that vehicle owners and the public in
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general have a right to know about such non-compliance. The regulations in 40 CFR part 85,
subpart S, specify that the notice can be made by such means as approved by the Administrator,
so the notification does not necessarily need to be in the form of a letter to each owner.
The Alliance stated that the only remedy for in-use noncompliance under CAA 207(c) is
recall which, in the Alliance's view, fundamentally requires a repair to each vehicle. EPA
disagrees that the language of CAA section 207(c) requires that a physical repair to each vehicle
is the only form of a recall permissible to remedy a non-compliance under that section. The
proposed credit-adjustment method would also remedy a GHG non-compliance for each vehicle
involved. The Auto Alliance incorrectly asserted that the regulations in 40 CFR part 85, subpart
S, require a "plan to remedy" the nonconformity which must contain the "description of the
proper maintenance and use" on which the manufacturer proposes to condition "eligibility for
repair." The regulation in 40 CFR part 85, subpart S, clearly states "[a] description of the proper
maintenance or use, if any, upon which the manufacturer conditions eligibility for repair under
the remedial plan" (emphasis added) and "[n]o maintenance or use condition may be imposed
unless it is, in the judgement of the Administrator, demonstrably related to preventing the
nonconformity." In other words, a manufacturer may condition the remedy based on proper
maintenance or use but only when necessary, but is not obligated to place any such conditions on
the remedy.
The Auto Alliance extensively cites Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), as support for its interpretation of the statute. While that case is relevant, it is not
dispositive, and its reasoning is consistent with EPA's regulatory changes. The D.C. Circuit held
that EPA could not approve a mandatory recall plan submitted by General Motors that, rather
than remedying the nonconformities on the violating vehicles, would instead have required
General Motors to over comply with the standard in the future to offset those nonconformities.
First, the case is based on a simultaneous reading of the statute and EPA's regulations in place at
the time ("the regulations.. .nowhere suggest that any remedy other than recall might be
appropriate", id. at 5-6). Here, EPA is not attempting to agree to a novel remedy that does not
comply with its own regulations; in fact, EPA is changing the regulations to allow for this
remedy.
Second, EPA's interpretation that the statute allows for a remedy that does not explicitly
require repair of the affected vehicles directly follows the logic of the case. "Absent evidence of
contrary intent, the words in the statute must be presumed to bear their normal meaning of
eliminating, rather than merely providing compensation for the effects of, the condition that is to
be 'remedied.' Here that means eliminating the nonconformity of the . . . vehicles or engines."
Id. at 4. And that is exactly what EPA's new regulations would do: eliminate the nonconformity
of the specific violating vehicles, not other vehicles in the future. The "nonconformity" is that
the vehicles do not comply with their in-use GHG standard, which means that the manufacturer
of those vehicles earned more credits than they were due. EPA's remedy is to adjust the credit
balances so that they reflect the actual GHG emissions of the vehicles the manufacturers are
putting on the road.
It is true that the court's stated conclusion is written more broadly: that CAA section "207(c)
requires recall and repair as the only statutory remedy for nonconformity." Id. at 6. However, the
court reached that result under a different regulatory scheme and different facts. Again, the
nature of the conformity here—vehicles not complying with their in-use GHG standard and thus
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erroneously earning more credits—is specifically addressed by the remedy of a credit balance
adjustment. The remedy finalized today by EPA entirely "eliminate[s] the nonconformity of the
[violating] vehicles or engines" and thus is consistent with both the statute and D.C. Circuit
precedent.
If EPA's interpretations are challenged and a court rules that the Auto Alliance is correct that
a vehicle repair is the only remedy for in-use nonconformity permitted by section 207(c)(1), that
does not change EPA's authority or EPA's intention to use such authority to remedy GHG non-
compliances. It would only change the remedy the manufacturer would need to implement. If
under the Auto Alliance's interpretation, a manufacturer with substantial GHG in-use
nonconformities is unable or unwilling to repair vehicles to bring them into compliance, then
they may be required to buy the vehicles back and remove them from the fleet and/or pay civil
penalties, as VW did as a result of the diesel consent decree. See Case No: MDL No. 2672 CRB
(JSC) partial consent decree.
The Auto Alliance stated that the second issue with the proposed amendment to section
86.1865(j) is that it leaves open the possibility that an EPA "recall order" might not even take the
reasonable approach suggested in its text: the credit-balance correction is offered only as an
"example" of what EPA might require. In a strange turn, the Auto Alliance, who first stated that
EPA does not have the authority to establish a GHG-emissions-credit-adjustment mechanism and
the only possible remedy under section 207(c) is a recall with repair, is now concerned that EPA
might actually "require" such a recall. They state that the open-ended deviation from the clear
strictures of section 207(c)(1) should be removed. EPA disagrees with the comment. As stated in
the proposal, EPA is simply making the intent of the 2010 rule clearer in the regulations. The
2010 rule stated, "The CAA requires a vehicle to comply with emission standards over its
regulatory useful life and affords EPA broad authority for the implementation of this
requirement. As such, EPA has authority to require a manufacturer to remedy any
noncompliance issues. The remedy can range from adjusting a manufacturer's credit balance to
the voluntary or mandatory recall of noncompliant vehicles." 75 FR 25324 and 25474 (May 7,
2010). As explained in the 2010 rule and in this rule, EPA anticipated the possibility that
vehicles may exceed the GHG emissions standards when there is no obvious repairable cause of
the exceedance. EPA explained that the Agency was not likely to pursue a recall unless there is a
repairable cause of the exceedance. However, EPA anticipated scenarios where there may be
repairable causes of exceedances, e.g., a defective oxygen sensor that causes a vehicle to burn
excessive fuel. In such cases, EPA could pursue a recall. That said, EPA recall orders do not
require a particular remedy, only that the manufacturer submit a plan. EPA has laid out two
potential remedies that manufacturers could use to comply, depending on whether repair is
appropriate.
The Auto Alliance also commented that the proposal did not adequately justify the decision to
exclude a threshold such as the 1.3 factor used for criteria pollutants in combination with the
50% trigger for IUCP testing. EPA disagrees. EPA explained in detail the reasons why the 1.3
factor used for criteria pollutants was not adopted for GHG emissions. In any case, there is no
statutory requirement to provide such a factor in setting the IUCP trigger. The Auto Alliance
stated that is unclear whether the 50% trigger would apply on a subconfiguration basis for a
model year, or across all subconfigurations that used the same carryover data. EPA disagrees; the
proposal was clear that the 50% trigger applies to the vehicles tested within a test group. The
Auto Alliance requested more time to comment. EPA does not agree that more time to comment
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is needed; indeed, the Alliance has sufficient time to submit very detailed comments on these
issues. The Auto Alliance also stated that they assume that any recall based on IUCP testing
would only apply to the subconfiguration and model year actually tested in the IUCP. This
assumption will not always be correct. First, prior to beginning an IUCP, EPA may designate a
subset of the test group for testing under this section in lieu of testing the entire test group under
the proposed regulations in § 86.1846(j). EPA may designate a single subconfiguration if the
data supports the decision to do so. Otherwise, the entire test group would be tested. Second, if a
recall is needed, EPA determines the class or category of vehicles to be included in the recall.
See § 85.1802. Generally, EPA works with the manufacturer to identify the root cause of the
noncompliance and the affected vehicle population. The class or category of vehicles to be
included in the recall is generally the population of vehicle affected by the cause of the failure.
For example, if the cause of the non-compliance is a defective catalytic converter and that
defective catalytic converter is used on multiple test groups over multiple model years, the
affected vehicle population and therefore the class or category of vehicles to be included in the
recall would be the vehicles which utilize the defective catalytic converter. The same principles
would apply to a recall for a GHG non-compliance, so the category of vehicles to be included in
the recall would not necessarily be limited to the subconfiguration and model year actually tested
in the IUCP.
Stellantis commented that EPA should not carry forward into the final rule the proposed
"clarifications" or revisions to the enforcement programs and in-use remedies based largely on
the comments from the Auto Alliance. As stated above, EPA largely disagrees with the
comments from the Auto Alliance and is finalizing many of the elements of the proposal as
discussed above.
EPA agrees with the commenters that the changes to EPA's regulations relating to compliance
and enforcement of EPA's GHG and criteria pollutant standards in this final rule are severable
from the remainder of the rule, including the changes to GHG and criteria pollutant standards
themselves. EPA has independently considered and adopted each of these portions of the final
rule and each is severable should there be judicial review. If a court were to invalidate any one of
these elements of the final rule, we intend the remainder of this action to remain effective, as we
have designed the program to function sensibly and find each portion appropriate even if one or
more other parts of the rule has been set aside. See Section IX.M of the preamble for further
discussion of severability.
7.2 - Warranty
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
3. Language Clarification on Emission Performance Warranty Section
Auto Innovators requests rewording of § 85.2107(e) and (f) in order to achieve more clarity
on what this section is requiring. We recommend the following changes in § 85.2107(e):
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(e) A warranty period of two years or 24,000 miles shall apply for light-duty vehicles,
light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 226-227]
(1) Except for the following specified major emission control components, which have a
warranty period of eight years or 80,000 miles: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
226-227]
Additionally, for § 85.2103(f), we propose the following language:
(f) A warranty period of five years or 50,000 miles shall apply for medium-duty vehicles:
(1) Except for the major emission control components identified in paragraph (e)(1) of
this section, which have a warranty period of eight years or 80,000 miles. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 226-227]
Finally, the language in § 85.2103(c)(2) should be clarified such that the warranty minimum
performance requirements are at the discretion of the vehicle manufacturer. We propose the
modification below:
(2) An electric vehicle or plug-in hybrid electric vehicle fails to meet the manufacturer-
defined minimum performance requirement for useable bater energy for the specified
period as determined by the vehicle's State of Health monitor, if applicable. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 226-227]
Lastly, § 85.2103(c) states,
".. .of this section throughout the warranty period specified in §85.2108 at no cost to the
owner if such nonconformity results or will result in the vehicle owner having to bear any
penalty or other sanction (including the denial of the right to use the vehicle. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 226-227]
We believe that the reference of §85.2108 was an error. We recommend EPA revise the
referred section to §85.2107. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 226-227]
EPA Summary and Response
The Auto Alliance suggested several changes to the regulatory text to achieve more clarity.
EPA agrees with the recommended clarifications and has incorporated them into the regulations.
The Auto Alliance also suggested changing the proposed approach of basing the warranty
period for battery-related issues on the Minimum Performance Requirement to instead allowing
manufacturers to have the discretion to name their own warranty period. The proposed approach
was to identify a failure to achieve the specified Minimum Performance Requirement as being
covered by the performance warranty. We recognize that the performance warranty is
appropriately associated with failing to meet emission standards and have therefore revised the
warranty specifications related to battery durability to apply as a matter for the defect warranty.
The defect warranty applies broadly for emission-related components, in most cases without any
specification in the regulation to define what qualifies a component as being defective. Many
times a defective part simply fails to function, but there are also many cases where a part
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becomes defective as a result of gradual or continuous aging. The final rule accordingly treats
battery durability on the same basis as our approach for the defect warranty for other
components, without defining an exact threshold for establishing a part as being defective.
Market forces create a strong incentive for manufacturers to set a warranty threshold for battery
durability that corresponds to what they need to do to conform to standards and requirements for
certifying their vehicles. As such, we agree that manufacturers can use their declared values to
identify when batteries become defective for purposes of applying warranty requirements.
The declared values apply as described above relative to State of Certified Energy. The
warranty period in years is governed by statutory provisions as with all other components. We
are therefore not changing the proposed warranty periods for battery durability.
7.3 - IUVP/IUCP/FEDV testing
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
E. IUVP / FEDV Testing Requirements
1. Evaporative
a) Canister Base Load
As EPA states in this current NPRM, there are some potential issues that may arise when
dealing with Non-Integrated Refueling Canister Only Systems (NIRCOS) fuel vapor handling
designs.343 EPA goes on further to explain that NIRCOS systems initially release any tank
vapors into the canister before the cap removal, and therefore the pressure must be released
before the fuel cap is removed during refueling events. It was discovered that the ORVR test
procedure does not account for the extra fuel vapor loading prior to the refueling event. As a
result, we would like to request that EPA eliminate the requirement of refueling the base load of
a canister for both IUVP and FEDV testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 230-231]
343 NPRM at 29275
Under the recent ACC II rulemaking by CARB, a design requirement was Specifically
included within the regulation to address NIRCOS.344 The rule specifies an updated formula to
calculate minimum canister size for vehicles with a NIRCOS fuel system of, as well as other
vehicles that have fuel tank pressure exceeding a certain threshold. We therefore request that
EPA harmonize with CARB as it pertains to IUVP and FEDV testing procedures, and to
eliminate the requirement of refueling the base load of a canister for both IUVP and FEDV
testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 230-231]
344 htps://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/clean_acciifro_orvr_tps_2001%2Bfinal_2_24_23.pdf
b) Canister Load and Purge
Auto Innovators appreciates EPA's proposal to remove the canister loading and purging steps
from the preconditioning for FEDVs to reduce butane consumption, time to run the tests, and
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ultimately the cost of running a test and improvement in fuel economy measurement accuracy.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0701, p. 231]
We request that EPA also remove the canister loading step from IUVP tailpipe emissions
testing as an option while retaining canister loading for IUVP 2-Day evaporative and ORVR
tests to demonstrate compliance. Due to a much larger number of IUVP test vehicles than
FEDVs tested per year, an even more significant amount of butane consumption and time to run
the tests could be reduced with this proposal. In addition, the canister loading process for IUVP
vehicles is quite intrusive compared to a certification vehicle where quick disconnect lines can be
pre- installed before or during vehicle build. Thus, the elimination of the canister loading step
from IUVP tailpipe emissions also reduces cost from potential damage to customer vehicles due
to accessing the canister. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 231]
2. High Altitude IUVP
Additionally, in response to § 86.1845, we support eliminating the high-altitude testing for
high mileage vehicles. Modern vehicles are all tuned to perform consistently and efficiently at all
altitudes with appropriately set standards. Therefore, the need to conduct high altitude testing
creates an undue and unnecessary burden on auto makers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
231-232]
3. High Mileage IUVP
Likewise, we also request that EPA eliminate the testing of the full useful life of IUVP
vehicles. It has become increasingly difficult to locate applicable high mileage vehicles with over
105k that can be used for IUVP testing. This creates another unnecessary burden and as a result,
we respectfully request that this requirement be removed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
231-232]
b) Technical Recommendations Concerning GHG IUVP / IUCP
In the event that EPA disagrees with the significant legal concerns set forth above, Auto
Innovators offers the following technical comments on the GHG certification and IUVP / IUCP
proposals in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 246]
EPA requests comment on whether it should eliminate the 10% compliance factor adjustment
for in-use CO2.401 The 10% compliance factor adjustment should not be eliminated. We agree
with the agency's conclusion in the 2010 rulemaking that the factor accounts for test-to-test or
production variability within a subconfiguration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 246]
401 NPRM at 29289.
We agree with the agency that reported C02 values should be representative of a vehicle's
performance over its useful life. However, the agency is suggesting a specific vehicle
subconfiguration should be held to a "do not exceed" threshold established from model type
average C02 emissions. While aligned to criteria emissions requirements, we do not believe
comparing an individual vehicle to an overall population average is appropriate for determining a
pass/fail condition. By definition, a population average is a single value calculated using a
population's individual values that are both higher and lower than the resultant average value.
Therefore, comparing a single individual vehicle value to the population average could result in a
violation simply because the specific subconfiguration procured for IUVP testing happens to fall
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above the population average by more than 10% by design. We don't believe that this indicates
the model type average C02 is unrepresentative, as sales weighting addresses these concerns.
We simply believe that comparing an individual vehicle to a population average for the purposes
of determining a violation would be inappropriate. For model types with high complexity, it is
possible for the best to worst variant to have more than 10% C02 difference. Even when the best
and worst variants are tested, it is possible that the second-worst (untested for GHG) vehicle
could fail the in-use model type average C02 requirement even with normal/expected C02
simply due to sales weighting. If model type average GHG includes an in- use "do not exceed"
provision applicable to untested subconfiguration-specific GHG emissions with automatic IUCP
escalation and GHG penalties, then the minimum data requirements and therefore overall
stringency of the rule must be re-envisioned. We do not believe this is in the best interest of the
industry, agency, or consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 246]
Further, EPA proposes two options to address their concern:
- Option 1: Maintain the 10% allowance on in-use CREE standards, and set IUCP threshold to
be 50% or more of the vehicles for a test group exceed the in-use standard; or [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 247]
- Option 2: Set in-use standards at the vehicle-level emissions test results or model-type
average value (for untested subconfigurations) and set IUCP threshold to be 50% of the test
vehicles for the test group exceed the relevant in-use C02 standard by at least 10%. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 247]
Auto Innovators opposes the second of the two options, as it initially determines that any
subconfiguration C02 that exceeds original certification values is a failure. With perfect IUVP
performance to certification levels, we would expect 50% of vehicles to exceed the original
certification test simply due to test-to-test variation. Granted, most test groups would avoid IUCP
given the threshold of 10% exceedance for 50% of the tested vehicles. However, it is not
productive to have 50% of all initial tests be identified as failures. Rather, the IUVP program
should be designed to find exceptions to expected performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 247]
Instead, Auto Innovators supports the first of the two options that maintains the 10%
allowance. We believe one enhancement is needed, though. Rather than subjecting an untested
subconfiguration to a standard that is 110% of the model type C02, we believe it would be more
appropriate to compare the IUVP result of an untested subconfiguration to 110% of its
theoretical performance generated using an analytically derived C02 value (ADC02). This
would result in a more useful comparison of performance and would still be conservative since
the ADC02 method includes confidence factors intended to ensure ADC02 results produce
higher C02 values than actual testing. This would also be more similar to the method used to
assess tested subconfigurations. Also, we agree that the proposed 50% failure rate is a reasonable
threshold for escalation to IUCP, and that EPA adjustments to a manufacturer's GHG credit
balance to account for failures is one appropriate resolution given that OEMs likely could not
resolve a difference via recall. Another option that should be available is for an OEM to take on
an emissions-reducing project that offsets the shortfall. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 247]
5. IUCP Trigger 40 CFR 1846-01(b)(1)
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After careful review, Auto Innovators does not fully understand what EPA is proposing in this
section. The language in the proposed NPRM is not clear if the mean is calculated for the entire
test group or only for 50% + of vehicles. That would result in a change in the criteria if one were
to exclude up to 50% of vehicles that did not exceed the standard. It is also unclear how OEMs
are to pick which vehicles are included in the 50%. As a result, we propose the following
language changes: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 247-248]
"... show mean exhaust emissions of any criteria pollutant for that test group to be at or above
1.30 times the applicable in-use [Strikethrough: standard for at least 50 percent of vehicles tested
from the test group] [In red: when for at least 50 percent of vehicles tested from the test group
exceed that standard],"402 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 247-248]
402 NPRM at 29433.
Organization: BMW of North America, LLC (BMW NA)
EPA has proposed to clarify and update the existing provisions related to in-use C02
compliance to better meet the intention of the 2010 light-duty vehicle GHG rule and has
proposed two regulatory options to align with that intent: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, pp.
4-5]
- Option 1: Maintain the 10% allowance on in-use CREE standards, and set IUCP threshold to
be 50% or more of the vehicles for a test group exceed the in-use standard; or [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0677, pp.4-5]
- Option 2: Set in-use standards at the vehicle-level emissions test results or model-type
average value (for untested subconfigurations) and set IUCP threshold to be 50% of the test
vehicles for the test group exceed the relevant in-use C02 standard by at least 10%.[EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0677, pp. 4-5]
For both above options, EPA proposes to clarify the regulation such that EPA has the
authority to correct a manufacturer's GHG credit balance based on C02 in-use test results that
are consistently higher than the reported C02 values in the fleet average report. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0677, pp.4-5]
BMW NA understands and supports EPA in its proposal to align with the intent of the 2010
light duty GHG rule and is in favor of the "Option 1" approach listed above. Implementation of
"Option 2" would lead to a high percentage of failure notifications reported to the agency even in
a scenario where the average in-use test result is exactly in line with the reported C02 value as
some results are expected to be slightly higher and slightly lower. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0677, pp. 4-5]
Furthermore, BMW NA does not agree that the goal of EPA's proposal should be to maintain
consistency between the GHG ABT program and other ABT programs. As EPA states in its
proposal, Family Emission Limits (FEL) are determined such that manufacturers can establish a
compliance margin to certify to a specific bin limit for criteria pollutant standards, but C02
values for fleet average GHG are calculated on a model type basis and not a bin level and the
intent is to determine an accurate C02 value on a model type granularity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0677, p. 5]
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As stated above, BMW NA supports "Option 1" but also requests that EPA updates the
proposal to clarify what is meant by "consistently higher" results with respect to GHG balance
correction. BMW NA agrees that a 10% allowance to establish an in-use CREE standard is
required to account for vehicle variation within a sub-configuration and test-to-test variability
and that a 50% failure of the CREE standard is a reasonable condition to initiate an IUCP. This
criteria is also reasonable to determine "consistently higher" C02 in-use results and, therefore,
correction of GHG credit balance should be tied to IUCP criteria and not broadly defined by non-
descriptive language. By failing to define criteria for "consistently higher" C02, EPA creates
potential for GHG credit balance correction because of random vehicle selection with a high
percentage of customer vehicles which may be worse than the reported C02 but not exceeding
the failure threshold. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 5]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
B. EPA should eliminate the 10-percent compliance factor adjustment.
While EPA's proposed clarifications will help ensure that its regulations better reflect in-use
emissions performance, they also illustrate that the current in-use compliance margin is far too
high. For EPA to detect systematic deviations in in-use emissions compared to certification, a
manufacturer would have to be assured that variability is low enough that its vehicles would not
emit above the 10% thresholds, despite certifying to an artificially low emissions level. This
inherently means that the test-to-test variability and production variability within a
subconfiguration or model type for which the 10% is supposed to account225 is actually much
less than 10%.[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 93]
225 88 Fed. Reg. at 29288-9.
A 10%) margin for error in in-use testing is quite high, particularly when considered in the
context of the levels of improvement required under the standards: the average 2-cycle tailpipe
certification value for a passenger car has decreased by just 19% from 2012-2021 and, for light
trucks, just 18%). To put the 10%> margin in perspective, take the example of the breadth of
configurations of the Ford F-150: it is available in 3 body types, in rear- or four-wheel-drive, in
trucks that vary in curb weight by 1600 pounds, with six different engines (including a hybrid),
and additional high-payload and high-towing packages. And yet, the certified emissions levels
from this vehicle span just 40%. The necessity of a 10% margin for a narrow slice of that
spectrum (for one drivetrain, one engine, and one payload package) is implausibly high. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 93]
We support EPA eliminating the 10% in-use compliance allowance as part of this rule.226 It
is particularly relevant when considering EPA's clarifications around manufacturers' voluntary
adjustments to certification, which would eliminate the need for such allowance. Shifting to a
threshold for which additional testing is required supports the original intent of the allowance (to
recognize testing variability) without undermining in-use emissions from vehicles regulated
under the light-duty GHG program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 93]
226 Id. at 29289.
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Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI)
HMG offers several suggested modifications to the Proposed Rule's in-use requirements
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 8]
HMG agrees with the AFAI comments regarding proposed in-use requirements. Furthermore,
HMG provides additional input focusing on modifications to the Proposed Rule that will increase
the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of compliance without negating the Proposed Rule's
sought-after environmental benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 8]
First, HMG proposes that EPA lower the 20% response rate requirement outlined in 40 CFR
Appendix-I to-Subpart-S-of-Part-86 II. By reducing this requirement, testing can commence
earlier, reducing mailing burdens and the consumption of ink and paper. We believe this change
would contribute to a more streamlined and efficient compliance process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0554, p. 8]
Second, HMG draws EPA's attention to 40 CFR 86.1845-04(c)(2). EPA should consider
reducing the mileage requirements for useful life vehicles. Finding adequate vehicles for testing
with mileage of 105,000 or higher poses challenges, and adjusting this requirement would help
ensure a more practical, realistic, efficient, and cost-effective testing process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0554, p. 8]
Organization: Kia Corporation
Kia Supports Keeping the 10 Percent In-Use Standard Variability
Kia does not support the Agency's proposal to eliminate the 10-percent compliance factor
adjustment for the in-use standard. EPA explains that there is an expectation that in-use vehicles
should be designed to perform consistent with the values used to calculate the year end fleet
average.25 Keeping this 10-percent variability, a standard that has been allowed for the last
decade, is critical as EPA increases the stringency of criteria pollutants and GHG emissions 10-
fold. EPA must allow automakers to focus resources on the full transformation to electric
vehicles - an expensive and monumental task, not on incremental changes. Further, Kia urges
EPA to consider removing the high-altitude requirement from in-use testing or allow a low sales
volume threshold as an alternative.26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 15]
25 88 Fed. Reg. 29,289.
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
Testing Standards (Section III.C.5.iv)
Volkswagen supports the AFAI comments regarding the removal of carbon canister
preconditioning and the second fuel drain/refill procedure for FEDVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0669, pp. 10-11]
Volkswagen would like to request, based on good engineering judgement, the optional
removal of the 6-hour minimum duration between first fuel drain and fill and starting the fuel
economy tests. Volkswagen cannot determine a historical reference for the 6-hour minimum
between the first drain/fill and the start of the FE test. Volkswagen can theorize on certain
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evaporative effects that could be mitigated by the 6-hour soak, however, dyno road load
adjustment is already completed and the 12-36 hour regular soak time exists to ensure the vehicle
temperatures are thermally stable. Proposing this as optional removal, EPA has the option to
confirm test results using the 6-hour minimum soak time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp.
10-11]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 1 of Section 1066.801-FTP test sequence [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 10-11]
EPA Summary and Response
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation commented to EPA's concern that there are some
potential issues that may arise when dealing with Non-Integrated Refueling Canister Only
Systems (NIRCOS) fuel vapor handling designs with regard to fuel vapors which are released
into the canister before the cap removal. The Auto Alliance also pointed out that CARB
implemented a design requirement under the recent ACC II rulemaking to address NIRCOS.
They requested that EPA harmonize with CARB as it pertains to IUVP and FEDV testing
procedures, and to eliminate the requirement of refueling the base load of a canister for both
IUVP and FEDV testing. We address amendments related to puff losses in Section 7.4 of the
responses to comments; there is no need to make any corresponding changes to measurement
procedures for IUVP or FEDV testing.
The Auto Alliance also requested EPA remove the canister loading step from IUVP tailpipe
emissions testing as an option while retaining canister loading for IUVP 2-Day evaporative and
ORVR tests to demonstrate compliance. They pointed out that there is a much larger number of
IUVP test vehicles than FEDVs tested per year and the canister loading process for IUVP
vehicles is quite intrusive. These requests are beyond the scope of the rulemaking as EPA did not
propose or otherwise reopen the issue of eliminating the canister loading step for the EDVs or
IUVP test vehicles in this rule. These requests can be considered in the future. However, EPA
notes at this time that the primary purpose of IUVP testing is to confirm emissions compliance of
in-use vehicles, so these tests should be conducted in the same manner as the emissions data
vehicles (EDV).
The Auto Alliance also requested EPA eliminate the high-altitude testing for high mileage
vehicles and eliminate the testing of the full useful life of IUVP vehicles (EPA understands this
request to refer to the requirement to test one vehicle of each test group at the odometer mileage
of 105,000 miles or 75 percent of the full useful life mileage, whichever is less). These requests
are beyond the scope of the rulemaking as EPA did not propose or otherwise reopen the issue of
eliminating the high-altitude testing requirement for high mileage vehicles or eliminating the
testing of one vehicle of each test group at 75 percent of the full useful life during IUVP. These
requests can be considered in the future.
Volkswagen commented that they support the AFAI comments regarding the removal of
carbon canister preconditioning and the second fuel drain/refill procedure for FEDVs.
Volkswagen also requested that, based on good engineering judgment, the option to remove
the 6-hour minimum duration between first fuel drain and fill and starting the fuel economy tests.
This request is beyond the scope of the rulemaking as EPA did not propose or otherwise reopen
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the issue of eliminating the 6-hour minimum duration between first fuel drain and fill and
starting the fuel economy tests. These requests can be considered in the future.
EPA requested comment on whether it should maintain the 10% allowance on in-use CREE
standards, and set IUCP threshold to be 50% or more of the vehicles for a test group that exceed
the in-use standard (option 1); or set in-use standards at the vehicle-level emissions test results
(eliminating the 10% allowance on the in-use standard) or model-type average value (for
untested subconfigurations) and set IUCP threshold to be 50% of the test vehicles for the test
group that exceed the relevant in-use C02 standard by at least 10% (option 2).
Environmental, and Public Health Organizations commented that they support eliminating the
10%) in-use compliance allowance.
The Auto Alliance stated that they agree with the agency that reported C02 values should be
representative of a vehicle's performance over its useful life however they oppose the second of
the two options. They expect under this option 50% of vehicles to exceed the original
certification test simply due to test-to-test variation. They acknowledge that most test groups
would avoid IUCP given the threshold of 10% exceedance for 50% of the tested vehicles. EPA
does not agree with the Auto Alliance's conclusion that 50% of vehicles would necessarily be
identified as failures because the Auto Alliance failed to consider EPA's proposal to allow
manufacturers to establish a compliance margin by voluntarily raising the GHG values submitted
in the GHG report much like they do when they set a Family Emissions Limit (FEL) for other
fleet average emissions standards.
BMW NA commented that implementation of "Option 2" would lead to a high percentage of
failure notifications reported to the agency even in a scenario where the average in-use test result
is exactly in line with the reported C02 value as some results are expected to be slightly higher
and slightly lower. They also stated that BMW NA does not agree that the goal of EPA's
proposal should be to maintain consistency between the GHG ABT program and other ABT
programs. They pointed out that C02 values for fleet average GHG are calculated on a model
type basis and not a bin level and the intent is to determine an accurate C02 value on a model
type granularity. EPA does not agree that "Option 2" would necessarily lead to a high percentage
of failure notifications reported to the agency because EPA's proposal would allow
manufacturers to establish a compliance margin by voluntarily raising the GHG values submitted
in the GHG report. EPA does not agree that the additional compliance margin would be less
granular than a model type. In fact, manufacturers would have the opportunity to make the
compliance margin much more granular than a model type level under EPA's proposal. EPA did
not propose to establish bin levels for the GHG in-use standard. EPA proposed allowing
manufacturers to set additional compliance margin at the subconfiguration level.
Kia commented that keeping the 10-percent in-use standard is critical as EPA increases the
stringency of criteria pollutants and GHG emissions 10-fold.
EPA is not finalizing option 2. If EPA determines that manufacturers are exploiting the 10%
allowance for the in-use standard to design and produce vehicles which consistently emit up to
10%) more C02 that accounted for in the fleet average calculations, EPA may revisit this option
in the future.
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The Alliance for Automotive Innovation commented that they support the first of the two
options that maintains the 10% allowance. However, they state that they believe an enhancement
is needed to compare the IUVP result of an untested subconfiguration to 110% of its theoretical
performance generated using an analytically derived C02 value (ADC02) rather than the 110%
of the model type C02.
The Alliance's proposed enhancement was not considered during this proposal. The basis for
the in-use standard for untested subconfigurations as being 110% of the model type C02 was
specified in the 2010 rule. EPA did not propose to change the basis for the 10% margin in this
rule, only whether it should be applied to the in-use standard or the IUCP criteria. In the 2010
rule, the 10% margin was established in part to account for the variability within a model type.
The Alliance's proposal could have been a viable alternative, however since the variability within
a model type would essentially be removed and only the test-to-test variability would remain, the
10%) margin would have needed reevaluation. At this point, if the process allowed the use of
ADC02 to establish the in-use standard for untested subconfigurations with the 10% margin
applied, the result would be effectively to raise the in-use standard for those vehicles.
BMW NA commented that they understand and support EPA in its proposal to align with the
intent of the 2010 light-duty GHG rule and are in favor of the "Option 1." However, they
requested that EPA update the proposal to clarify what is meant by "consistently higher" results
with respect to GHG balance correction.
EPA is finalizing option 1 and has clarified that by "consistently higher" results, EPA meant
that a substantial number of vehicles in a class or category of vehicles fail to comply with the in-
use GHG standards.
Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI) proposed that EPA lower the 20%
response rate requirement outlined in Appendix I to Subpart S of 40 CFR part 86 and reduce the
mileage requirements for useful life vehicles. This request is beyond the scope of the rulemaking
as EPA did not propose or otherwise reopen this issue. These requests can be considered in the
future.
7.4 - Puff losses
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
J. Evaporative Standards
1. NIRCOS System Design
EPA requests comment on the need to establish engineering design requirements on NIRCOS
evaporative systems in place of modifying ORVR test procedures, to ensure that initial
pressurized vapor loads are captured while leaving sufficient capacity to handle refueling
vapors.290 Auto Innovators supports aligning with the CARB design-based requirement if EPA
decides to act in this area. We also recommend against modifying the ORVR test procedure at
this time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 187-188]
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290 NPRM at 29275.
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
As described further below, CARB recommends that U.S. EPA adopt elements of CARB's
evaporative emission standards program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 27]
Evaporative Emission Standards
U.S. EPA has rightly recognized opportunities to achieve reductions from conventional
vehicle evaporative emissions. Evaporative emissions, which result from fuel vapors escaping
from the vehicle rather than tailpipe emissions from engine combustion, consist primarily of
hydrocarbons that contribute to the formation of ozone and contain benzene, a toxic air
contaminant. CARB supports U.S. EPA's efforts to adopt more stringent evaporative emission
standards and recommends U.S. EPA adopt the following recommendations as it finalizes its
proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 35]
Minimum Canister Size Requirement
U.S. EPA requested comment on the need for an engineering requirement for canister
working capacity for vehicles with Non-Integrated Refueling Canister Only Systems (NIRCOS).
California adopted this type of requirement in ACC II to compensate for a small shortcoming in
the onboard refueling vapor recovery (ORVR) test procedure, which does not account for the
extra fuel vapor loading that can occur with NIRCOS-equipped vehicles prior to the refueling
event. CARB estimated that its canister size requirement will likely impact only about 6 percent
of new vehicles, primarily PHEVs, and many of those already have canisters of sufficient
capacity. 47 CARB expects manufacturers to readily be able to meet these minimum design
requirements because all vehicles with combustion engines already have a canister and
moderately increasing the size or capacity of this canister requires only minor modifications to
existing designs. Rather than revising the ORVR test procedure, which would be a lengthy and
complex process, establishing an engineering requirement for canister working capacity is a
feasible, cost-effective approach to address the minor shortcoming in the ORVR test procedure.
CARB therefore recommends that U.S. EPA adopt CARB's minimum canister size requirement.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 36]
47 CARB. Second Notice of Public Availability of Additional Documents, Proposed ACC II Regulations.
Estimate of percentage of new vehicles sold in the California which have a Non-Integrated Refueling
Canister Only System (NIRCOS), CARB 2022www. August 2022.
https://ww2.arb. ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/2nd 15day notice .pdf.
Organization: Glenn Passavant
Based on the regulatory language in 40 CFR §86 Subpart B, puff loss control has been
required for all gasoline-powered LDVs, LDTs, MDPVs, and HDVs with operating fuel tank
pressures equal to or greater than 2.5 kPa since the end of the allowed phase-in period (i.e., the
1999 model year). The value of puff loss control is expressed by the grams HC/gallon of fuel
system void volume emitted to the atmosphere as shown in the Ingevity presentation to EPA on
July 24, 2023 and in the Ingevity written comments. What may not be clear is that these grams of
HC are basically uncontrolled fuel tank headspace emissions. While these are mostly isomers of
butane and pentane, they also contain benzene compounds which would be considered air toxics
1327
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and many other HC compounds which are highly photochemically reactive in the creation of
ozone according to its Carter Maximum Incremental Reactivity (MIR) value (see attached).
These other compounds often are more reactive than the butanes and pentanes which remain for
vehicles meeting Tier 3 evaporative and ORVR requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1136,
p. 1]
To illustrate the point, I have attached two different EPA reports which provide HC speciation
data for a fuel tank headspace. The reports both use the same title "Hydrocarbon Composition of
Gasoline Vapor Emissions from Enclosed Fuel Tanks," (EPA-420-D-10-001, January 2010 and
EPA-420-R- 11-018, December 2011), but the data is different in each report and the HC
speciation data from both reports is useful. The speciation profiles show the fraction of the
various HC compounds in the headspace for the fuels analyzed (E0, E10, E15) and consideration
of these individual HC speciation values shows the value of puff loss control in reducing air
toxics and photochemically reactive HC based on the MIR values for the various HC
compounds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1136, p. 1]
Organization: Ingevity Corporation
3. The need for an engineering requirement related to the canister working capacity of
Non-Integrated Refueling Canister Only Systems (NIRCOS) for management of fuel vapors
from fuel cap removal and refueling (also commonly referred to as puff losses) [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
On page 29275 of the NPRM, EPA discussed the issue of the impact of cap removal
emissions on NIRCOS canister capacity and asked for comment on "the need for an engineering
requirement related to the canister working capacity that would provide an increase in the
capacity in order to properly capture this initial pressurized vapor load and still have the needed
capacity to handle the vapors generated during the refueling event." Generally, Ingevity supports
the need for a requirement to help ensure that ORVR canisters have the capacity to handle a
refueling emission load immediately after the canister has absorbed a puff loss load just prior to
fuel cap removal8. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
8 Note that section 202(k) of the Clean Air Act calls for evaporative emission standards to provide the
"greatest degree of emission reduction achievable" The mass values for puff losses discussed in this section
are not insignificant.
While the NPRM presents puff loss control as a new issue, the first steps in the consideration
of the control of puff losses date back to prior to the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act.
EPA Identified cap removal emissions (also referred to as "puff losses") as an issue in the mid-
1980s, estimating a value in the range of 3-5 grams per refueling based on the fuel RVP, EPA
evaporative emission test procedures, and the low fuel tank pressures at that time.9 EPA
proposed a specific test procedure in the Enhanced Evaporative NPRM in Jan 1990.10 The
March 1993 EPA Enhanced Evaporative Emissions final rule deferred action on puff loss
control, but included language similar to that adopted by the California Air Resources Board
(CARB) in 1990 which read: "Fuel tank pressure during the running loss test may not exceed 10
inches of water (2.5 kPa), unless manufacturer shows that fuel vapors, other than refueling
emissions, are vented to the evaporative canister when the fuel cap is removed." 11 There were
no concrete provisions in terms of specific test procedures or standards to assess effectiveness of
implementation of this requirement. A follow-on specific proposal and workshop was promised
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to address pressurized systems. EPA proposed a specific test requirement for cap removal
emission (puff losses) in a May 1993 ORVR Supplemental NPRM.12 This would have involved
cap removal after the ORVR preconditioning drive but before refueling test. This was not
finalized, but action was promised as part of the workshop discussed in the Enhanced
Evaporative rule mentioned above. It seems that successful rollout of Enhanced Evaporative and
ORVR programs was more important at the time, and pressurized tanks were disappearing — so
future work on puff loss did not occur. The issue once again became important in the 2010 and
later timeframe as some HEVs and PHEVs began to use sealed fuel systems (with higher fuel
tank operating pressures) to help manage evaporative emissions generation in the fuel tank.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
9 EPA memorandum: "Significance of 'Popping and Hissing' Emissions from an LDV Gasoline Tank,
"Daniel P. Heiser, April 1984. public docket A-84-07, item I-B-19.
10 US EPA, Proposed Rule, "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines: Evaporative Emission Regulations for Gasoline and Methanol-Fueled Light-Duty Vehicles, Light-
Duty Trucks, and Heavy-Duty Vehicles," 55 FR 1913, January 19, 1990.
11 US EPA, Final Rule, "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines: Evaporative Emission Regulations for Gasoline and Methanol-Fueled Light-Duty Vehicles, Light-
Duty Trucks, and Heavy-Duty Vehicles," 58 FR 16001, March 24, 1993.
12 US EPA, "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle Engines;
Refueling Emission Regulations for Light-Duty Vehicles and Trucks and Heavy-Duty Vehicles,"
Supplemental Proposal. NPRM, 58 FR 30731, May 27, 1993.
Regarding puff losses, Ingevity notes the following issues:
First, EPA is seeking comment on puff loss control for NIRCOS which use sealed fuel
systems (nominally >####18.6 kPa absolute), even though the provision for puff loss control by
venting to the canister dates back to the EPA's enhanced evaporative rule in 1993. This calls for
control if the tank pressure equals or exceeds 2.5kPa.l3 We recommend that in the final rule the
threshold for applicability needs to be set at tank pressure >#### 2.5 kPa gauge even if the fuel
system design is not a NIRCOS. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
13 The current CARB regulations at III. D. 8.1.10 or 8.2.5 within California Evaporative Emission
Standards and Test Procedures for 2026 and Subsequent Model Year Passenger Cars, Light-Duty Trucks,
Medium-Duty Vehicles, and Heavy-Duty Vehicles reads as follows "Manufacturer shall demonstrate in a
separate test or an engineering evaluation that vapor would not be vented to the atmosphere if the fuel fill
pipe cap was removed at the end of the test."
There is a second issue related to a lack of a provision which specifies how to demonstrate
that puff losses are in fact fully vented to the canister and not even in part to the atmosphere.
These provisions should require that the manufacturer demonstrate that puff loss emissions are
completely and fully vented to the canister when the fuel cap is removed and that the canister has
capacity to control a puff loss and emissions from a refueling event from 10-100%. Such
provisions were never adopted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
The third issue relates to a useful quantification of the puff loss mass if uncontrolled. There is
modeling and measurement data available. With regard to modeling, we would refer EPA to
work conducted by Sam Reddy. He developed the equation below regarding evaporative and
refueling controls. 14 Varying the parameters in the equation using values expected in use, the
puff loss mass values in grams range from 3.3 to 23 grams at low altitude to 3.4 to 24.9 grams at
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high altitude. See attached graphic plots for low and high altitude for a full display of
sensitivities. Note that the biggest sensitivities are to tank Ap, fuel temperature, tank volume, and
tank fill fraction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
14 "Evaporative and Refueling Emission Control Training/Workshop Manual," Sam R. Reddy, Ph.D., P.E.
Evap Consulting, Inc, Version 8, November 2013.
Sam Reddy Equation: grams HC cap removal = ((Tv+U-F) *(Pt/Pa)-(TV+U-F))
*(Pt/Pa)*(ER); where
ER = [(vapor MW)(25.61)(Tt)(RVP)/(0.3187)(Tt)][exp(-2798.78/Tt)]
Tv = tank capacity (gallons) U = tank ullage (gallons)
F = tank fill fraction at cap removal
Pt = tank pressure (psi); based on tank pressure at cap removal; calculated as Pa + tank AP, Pa
= atmospheric pressure (psi)
ER=emission rate (g/gal)
MW = vapor molecular weight for certification fuel at tank fuel temperature (Tt) prior to cap
removal (g/mole)
Tt = fuel temperature in tank (K)
RVP = tank fuel vapor RVP for certification fuel (psi) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp.
5-9]
Vehicle measurements conducted in Japan in 2019 and 2020 show puff loss values at the
lower end of the ranges presented in the attached graphics for the vehicle, temperatures and fuels
evaluated in these experiments. 15 This testing involved only one vehicle over several seasons
with varying fuels but did not fully assess the impact of variations in the key parameters
identified in the Reddy equation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
15 Hataa, Hiro, et al, "Evaluation of Gasoline Evaporative Emissions from Fuel-Cap Removal after a Real-
World Driving Event," Atmosphere, 2020, 11, 1110.
Control of puff loss emissions:
Generally, there are two means to address control of puff loss emissions. Each has advantages
and disadvantages. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
First, since puff loss emissions are normally associated with a refueling event (the fuel cap is
most commonly opened prior to refueling), it would be ideal to assess the performance of a puff
loss control system in a SHED as part of a refueling emissions test. Under this approach, any
puff loss emissions not captured in the canister would be captured in the SHED and a lack of
capacity in the canister could result in a higher level of refueling emissions in the SHED
measurement. This approach would inherently address the need for a provision which specifies
how to demonstrate that puff losses are controlled that has been lacking since 1996. However,
there are two complications with this approach, both related to the current U.S. EPA test
procedure. The first is that the procedures for traditional fuel system vehicles and NIRCOS
would need to be revised to require removal of the fuel cap after the SHED door is closed and
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initial HC readings in the SHED are taken. This is doable as it is now required in the China 6
refueling test procedure for NIRCOS. The second complication is that the mass of puff loss
emissions anticipated in the current refueling emission test procedure is small. The current U.S.
EPA test procedure calls for a drain and 10% fill after the vehicle preconditioning drive followed
by a vehicle soak at 80°F for 6-24 hours. Under these conditions only a small amount of puff loss
would be expected since the tank Ap would be small. 16 This shortcoming could be addressed by
modifications to the refueling test procedure. However, it is recognized this approach would
involve significant perturbations to otherwise stable and well-established test procedures with
potential requirements for vehicle recertification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
16 US EPA memorandum, "Cap Removal Emissions," Gary Holladay, November 22,1985 public docket
A-84-07, item I-A-97.
Second, is an engineering evaluation approach designed to determine if a canister would have
the capacity to control a puff loss and a refueling emission load. CARB recently adopted such an
approach in their ACC II final rule based on the equation presented at paragraph D. 14 of those
test procedures. 17 This takes effect for the 2026 MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
17 California Evaporative Emission Standards and Test Procedures for 2026 and Subsequent Model Year
Passenger Cars, Light-duty Trucks, Medium-duty Vehicles and Heavy-duty Vehicles., August 25, 2022.
The equation adopted by CARB is:
Minimum Canister nominal working capacity (grams) =
1.08 x 1.3 x [5.8 x 14.7/Ptvs x ((Ptvs x Vtvs)/14.7 - Vtvs) + Grefuel x 0.88 x Vfuelcap] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
Where:
Nominal working capacity is as defined in section III.D.3.3.4 of the CARB evaporative
emission regulation [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
Vtvs is vapor space volume. This is 90% of the total geometric volume of the fuel tank.
Geometric volume is the sum of the fuel tank capacity and vapor space (gallons). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
Vfuelcap is the nominal fuel tank capacity, which means the volume of the fuel tank(s),
specified by the manufacturer to the nearest tenth of a U.S. gallon, which may be filled with fuel
from the fuel tank filler inlet (gallons). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
Grefuel is the vapor generation during refueling (grams/gallon); use 5 grams/gallon as default.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
Ptvs is fuel tank's maximum pressure in-use (absolute pressure in psi) 19 psia is the default
pressure to use for Ptvs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
If EPA is to consider using this equation, we recommend two changes. First, the 0.88 value
should be 0.90. That is the nominal fill from 10%-100% in a refueling to automatic shut-off as
occurs in the EPA refueling emission test. Second, we believe that the definition for Vtvs
adopted by CARB (shown above) underestimates the volume which could hold vapor which
would be vented upon cap removal. It seems not to include all of the open fuel tank volume, all
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of the ullage, the volume of the fill pipe, and any vapor lines of the evaporative control system
which may contain vapor when the tank is 10% full. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
Specifically, in addition to the change of the 0.88 in CARBs equation to 0.90 we recommend
that the definition of Vtvs be revised to read:
Vtvs is vapor space volume. This is 90% of the total geometric volume of the fuel tank, 100%
of the tank ullage and 100% of the volume of the fill pipe, the fill pipe external vent line, and any
other vent lines between the tank outlet and the canister or the tank outlet and the tank pressure
control valve located between the fuel tank and canister. These volumes are to be determined and
reported by the manufacturer as part of certification. As a simplification, EPA could offer a
default value of 7 percent of Vfuelcap to add to the Vtvs value in the equation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
With these two changes and assuming the use of the 7 percent adjustment the revised equation
would read:
Minimum Canister nominal working capacity (grams) =
1.08 x 1.3 x [5.8 x 14.7/Ptvs x ((Ptvs x 1.07 x Vfuelcap)/14.7 - 1.07 x Vfuelcap) + Grefuel x
0.90 x Vfuelcap] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
We recommend that the final regulations specify that compliance with this minimum
requirement be demonstrated using the tests prescribed at 40 CFR §86.132-96 (h)(l)(iv)(A)-(B).
That is, the canister's nominal working capacity measured using those tests must exceed the
minimum calculated using the equation for it to be considered as compliant with the requirement.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-9]
Finally, if EPA adopts control for puff losses, the regulatory text needs to address the scope of
applicability (vehicle classes and fuels), the MY of applicability, and reporting requirements for
certification. We recommend that the scope of applicability be the same as for all current
evaporative/refueling emission standards after this final rule is promulgated. While the
engineering evaluation approach would be more of a design standard than an emission standard,
it would be reasonable to provide 3-4 MYs lead time since the use of canister models (of varying
designs and capacities) across vehicle models in the various vehicle classes is common practice.
Finally, as part of the information required for certification, the regulations should specify that
the certifying manufacturer provide data on all of the values used in calculating the minimum
canister capacity for each evaporative/refueling family. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 5-
9]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
EPA should consider adopting additional requirements for SI vehicles with pressurized fuel
systems for management of fuel vapors from fuel cap removal and refueling (also commonly
referred to as puff losses). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
With respect to Non-Integrated Refueling Canister Only Systems (NIRCOS), or any vehicle
with a fuel tank pressure exceeding 2.5 kPa, MECA agrees with the EPA objective to continue to
reduce evaporative emissions through adding a requirement designed to control for the release of
fuel vapors from fuel cap removal and refueling (also commonly referred to as puff losses). We
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believe that the most effective way to control puff loss emissions is to set a performance-based
test procedure to include the measurement of both "puff and re-fueling emissions to ensure that
the canister capacity is sufficient and that the entire system operates effectively under elevated
ambient temperatures. Since puff loss emissions are normally associated with a refueling event
(the fuel cap is most commonly opened prior to refueling), it would be ideal to assess the
performance of a puff loss control system in a SHED as part of a refueling emissions test. A
testing procedure approach has been used by EPA for all other evaporative emission standards
going back to the 1970 model year. In addition, standards based on test procedures are more
readily enforceable in-use over a certified vehicle's useful life. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0564, pp. 12-24]
Other major automotive regions have taken initial steps to control puff emissions, and we
recommend, at a minimum, that EPA adopt the same approach as is used in the China 6 test
procedures for NIRCOS, which is also currently under consideration for incorporation into Euro
7. This procedure includes the fuel cap opening as part of the refueling test in the SHED. Under
this approach, any puff loss emissions not captured in the canister would be captured in the
SHED and a lack of capacity in the canister could result in a higher level of refueling emissions
in the SHED measurement. It ensures the canister is appropriately sized because if the puff goes
to the canister and then the vehicle is refueled, the canister must be sized for both the puff loss
load and refueling load; otherwise there will be emissions from the canister after it's saturated
that the SHED will capture. A key limitation of this approach is that the amount of the puff loss
loading is expected to be small under the conditions of the EPA refueling test (80°F soak
temperature) and thus may not be representative of the higher puff loss loadings expected in-use
(such as a refueling event after a long drive where the fuel system temperatures may be greater
than 100°F). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
CARB finalized in ACC II a design-based approach that uses an equation to define the
minimum evaporative canister capacity for vehicles with sealed fuel tanks. While MECA
supported the intent of CARB to control for puff losses, MECA reviewed the terms of the
equation and provided written comments to CARB staff noting the deficiencies in this design-
based approach. 15 To evaluate the CARB design-based equation approach, MECA analyzed the
U.S. EPA certification databasel6 to obtain the EPA certified canister capacities for 10 currently
certified PHEV/NIRCOS models, including the most popular and top selling models for 2021
and 2022. The EPA certified canister capacities (as retrieved from the evaporative family name
codes) of the PHEV/NICROS models were then compared with the predicted minimum canister
capacity from the CARB equation using the manufacturer reported tank volume and the
recommended default CARB inputs to the equations. Table 1 [See original comment for Table 1:
EPA Certified Evaporative Canister Capacities Compared to Results Determined by the CARB
Final Design-Based Equation] shows the calculated results from the equation compared to the
currently certified canister capacities of PHEV models using sealed fuel tanks. Based on the data,
MECA believes the design-based equation approach may lead to back sliding on canister
volumes and that it does not provide a method to ensure puff losses are effectively controlled in-
use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
15 https://www.meca.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/MECA-ACC-II-Comments-06092022-FINAL.pdf
16 US EPA Light-Duty Vehicle Certification Database, https://www.epa.gov/compliance-and-
fueleconomy- data/annual-certification-data-vehicles-engines-and-equipment
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If EPA is to consider using a design-based approach such as the CARB equation, MECA
recommends EPA review the terms of the CARB equation to ensure that the application of the
equation would efficiently control puff losses under conditions expected in-use while also not
leading to back sliding on canister volumes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 12-24]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
Non-Integrated Refueling Canister Only Systems ("NIRCOS")
EPA's NPRM states there are some potential issues that may arise when dealing with
NIRCOS designed fuel vapor handling designs. 10 EPA further explains that NIRCOS systems
initially release any tank vapors into the canister before the cap removal, and therefore, the
pressure must be released before the fuel cap is removed during refueling events. It was
discovered that the Onboard Refueling Vapor Recovery ("ORVR") test procedure does not
account for the extra fuel vapor loading prior to the refueling event. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0623, p. 14]
10 NPRM at 29275.
CARB ACCII specifically included a design requirement within the regulation to address
NIRCOS. The rule specifies an updated formula to calculate minimum canister size for vehicles
with a NIRCOS fuel system, as well as other vehicles that have fuel tank pressure exceeding a
certain threshold. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 14]
Mercedes-Benz requests EPA harmonize with CARB for NIRCOS, in particular as it pertains
to In-Use Verification Program ("IUVP") and Fuel Economy Data Vehicle ("FEDV") testing
procedures and the elimination of refueling the base load of a canister for both IUVP and FEDV
testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 14]
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
In response to EPA's request for comment on canisters, NACAA recommends that EPA add a
minimum canister size requirement to control "puff emissions from sealed fuel systems (which
exist mostly on plug-in hybrid electric vehicles) during refueling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0559, pp. 6-7]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation supported aligning with the CARB design-based
requirement if EPA decides to act in this area, and recommended against modifying the ORVR
test procedure.
Mercedes Benz requested that EPA harmonize with the CARB design-based requirement,
especially as it relates to IUVP and FEDV testing.
NACAA recommended that EPA add a minimum canister size requirement to control puff
losses from sealed fuel systems during refueling.
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CARB recommended that EPA adopt CARB's minimum canister size requirement for
vehicles with nonintegrated refueling canister-only systems to account for fuel vapors that may
be released to the canister before refueling (puff losses). CARB estimated that about six percent
of new vehicles, primarily PHEV, would be affected, and suggested that all those vehicles could
modestly increase canister capacity to account for the design requirement to account for the
added vapor load. CARB recommended adopting their design requirement instead of accounting
for the added vapor load by revising the test procedure.
MECA recommended that EPA add a testing requirement designed to ensure sufficient
canister capacity to control puff losses from vehicles with fuel tank pressure exceeding 2.5 kPa,
even at elevated ambient temperatures. MECA believed that controlling puff losses with an
improved test procedure would create a requirement that is more readily enforceable in-use over
a certified vehicle's useful life. MECA recommended adopting the procedure from China 6,
which involves removing the fuel cap in the SHED as part of measuring refueling emissions.
MECA recognized that the test condition at a nominal ambient temperature of 80 °F may
underrepresent in-use puff-loss loading to canisters, such as may occur after long drives with fuel
temperatures exceeding 100 °F.
MECA recognized that CARB has adopted a design-based approach to ensure that canister
capacity is sufficient to account for puff losses. MECA recommended that if EPA takes that
same approach, EPA should review the terms of the CARB equation to ensure that it would
efficiently control puff losses under conditions expected in-use while also not leading to
backsliding on canister volumes. MECA supported this concern with an analysis of EPA
certification data from ten PHEV models, which led them to conclude that CARB's equation
may lead to backsliding on canister volumes and that CARB's equation does not provide a
method to ensure puff losses are effectively controlled in-use.
Ingevity generally supported requiring sufficient canister capacity to control puff losses, and
believed the mass values for puff losses are not insignificant. Ingevity recounted EPA's history
of considering control of puff losses as follows:
• EPA identified puff losses as an issue in the mid-1980s, estimating an emission rate of
3-5 grams per refueling event based on current test procedures and estimated in-use
fuel tank pressures. EPA proposed a specific test procedure in January 1990, but in the
corresponding final rule in March 1993 deferred action on puff loss control. The
March 1993 final rule included a requirement to vent puff losses to the evaporative
canister as follows: "Fuel tank pressure during the running loss test may not exceed 10
inches of water (2.5 kPa), unless manufacturer shows that fuel vapors, other than
refueling emissions, are vented to the evaporative canister when the fuel cap is
removed." This requirement included no concrete provisions for compliance
assessment. EPA proposed in May 1993 to adopt a test requirement to remove the fuel
cap after the ORVR preconditioning drive but before refueling test to address puff
losses, but did not finalize this requirement, perhaps because pressurized fuel systems
were becoming less common.12 The issue became important again in the 2010 and
later timeframe as some HEVs and PHEVs began to use sealed fuel systems with
higher fuel tank pressure to comply with evaporative emission standards.
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12 US EPA, "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle Engines;
Refueling Emission Regulations for Light-Duty Vehicles and Trucks and Heavy-Duty Vehicles,"
Supplemental Proposal. NPRM, 58 FR 30731, May 27, 1993.
Ingevity noted the following issues: (1) The proposed rule identified puff losses as an issue
for NIRCOS, which typically have tank pressure exceeding 18.6 kPa absolute, even though puff
losses as a phenomenon were recognized back in 1993 as an issue for systems with tank pressure
exceeding 2.5 kPa. Ingevity recommended adopting puff-loss requirements for any vehicle with
tank pressure exceeding a gauge pressure of 2.5 kPa. (2) Ingevity recommended adopting
provisions that require the manufacturer to demonstrate both that puff loss emissions are vented
only to the canister when the fuel cap is removed and that the canister has capacity to control
puff losses from a complete refueling event. (3) Ingevity shared the results of computer modeling
to estimate puff loss emissions. Estimated values ranged from 3 to 25 grams per refueling event,
with variability attributed mainly to altitude, tank pressure, fuel temperature, tank volume, and
tank fill fraction. Ingevity also shared the observation that vehicle testing in 2019 and 2020 show
puff loss values at the lower end of the modeled range, but they also observed that testing did not
fully assess the impact of variations in the key parameters.
Ingevity considered it to be ideal to assess the performance of a puff loss control system in a
SHED as part of a refueling emission test. Such a measurement would ensure that vapors are
routed only to the canister, and that canister capacity is sufficient to account for puff losses.
Ingevity recognized the complication of modifying the test procedure to remove the fuel cap
from the vehicle in the SHED after testing has started, but notes that the China 6 procedure has
adopted this as a testing requirement. Ingevity also recognized the complication that the current
test includes at least six hours of vehicle soaking at 80 °F after the preconditioning drive, which
would involve only a small mass of puff-loss emissions. Ingevity suggested that a modified
refueling test could better address puff-loss emissions, but acknowledged that this approach
would involve significant perturbations to otherwise stable and well-established test procedures.
If EPA adopts CARB's approach of requiring manufacturers to make a design demonstration
that canister capacity is sufficient for puff losses, Ingevity recommended that the final
regulations specify that compliance with this minimum requirement be demonstrated using the
tests prescribed at 40 CFR 86.132-96(h)(l)(iv)(A)-(B); specifically, the canister's nominal
working capacity measured using those tests must exceed the minimum calculated using the
equation for it to be considered as compliant with the requirement. Ingevity further
recommended making two changes to CARB's formula for calculating canister capacity. First,
the constant 0.88 should instead be 0.90 to represent refueling a vehicle from 10 percent to 100
percent full. Second, the vapor volume should be increased to account for the whole ullage, the
volume of the fill pipe, and any vapor lines of the evaporative control system that may contain
vapor when the tank is 10% full.
Ingevity included additional comments on implementing new requirements for controlling
puff losses: (1) puff loss requirements should apply for all vehicle classes and fuels that are
subject to evaporative and refueling emission standards; (2) tt would be reasonable to allow 3-4
years of lead time for meeting new requirements; and (3) the regulation should require
manufacturers to provide data on all the values used in calculating the minimum canister
capacity for each evaporative/refueling family.
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Glenn Passavant stated that puff loss control has been required under part 86 since 1999, and
that the chemical composition of puff loss emissions is generally representative of gasoline
vapors in the tank headspace, which includes benzene and other toxic compounds with high
photochemical reactivity in addition to butane and pentane isomers.
Response:
The existing refueling test procedures require vehicle stabilization with no fuel tank pressure
before the vehicle enters the SHED for emission measurement. The fuel cap is removed before
canister preconditioning, which means that any vapors from relieving fuel tank pressure are not
represented in the refueling test. In contrast, the regulation includes a partial refueling test in
which EPA may test a vehicle using a streamlined procedure. The partial refueling test requires
driving followed by stabilizing the vehicle for one to six hours before the refueling test, without
removing the fuel cap. The partial refueling test calls for the fuel cap removal (and tank
depressurizing, as applicable) within two minutes of sealing the SHED for the refueling test. This
approach includes the canister loading from puff losses, though it does not include SHED
measurement to ensure that vapors from depressurizing are vented to the canister. Nevertheless,
EPA testing using the existing partial refueling test can confirm with testing that refueling
canisters are properly sized to control refueling emissions from vehicles with pressurized fuel
tanks. This existing test accounts for puff losses, but that does not apply for manufacturers'
testing for certification.
To address the disconnect between the two measurement procedures, we are adopting a
requirement for manufacturers to attest in their application for certification that their vehicles
with pressurized fuel tanks will meet emission standards when tested over the partial refueling
emission test. We would expect manufacturers to use their engineering analysis from certifying
their vehicles for CARB rules to meet this requirement. However, we are stopping short of
adopting the specific requirement to follow the modeling and calculations that CARB specifies
for ensuring adequate canister capacity. This approach allows us to accommodate any
adjustments CARB makes to its requirements based on the several changes suggested in the
comments. The result is an EPA policy conclusion that aligns with CARB regulations for all
aspects of certification and testing.
The new attestation requirement related to puff losses applies for all vehicles exceeding the
pressure threshold specified for the running loss test in 40 CFR 86.134. That threshold is 10
inches of water or 2.5 kPa. This aligns with the comment from Ingevity. We recognize Ingevity's
observation that modifying the refueling test to account for puff losses would add significant
complexity. We do not find that the incremental improvement from modifying the refueling test
justifies that additional cost and complexity.
We recognize that controlling puff loss emissions is effective for controlling benzene and
other toxic compounds in addition to butanes and pentanes, and expect the combination of
emission standards, test procedures, and certification requirements work together to
appropriately control these emissions.
7.5 - Evaporative emissions
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Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
2. General Carry-Over of Tier 3 Evaporative Requirements and Unintended Impact of
Redefining Light-duty Truck
Auto Innovators supports EPA's intent to continue use of Tier 3 evaporative emission
requirements. However, the proposed redefinition of a light-duty truck and medium-duty
passenger vehicle per § 86.1803-01 for Tier 4 tailpipe emissions, will have significant impacts to
Tier 3 diurnal plus hot soak emission requirements. This definition change will cause some
vehicles, currently classified as LDT2 and higher, to be considered passenger cars or medium-
duty passenger vehicles with a corresponding lower standard that will require significant
redesign. The light-duty truck and medium-duty passenger vehicles reclassifications for
evaporative emissions compliance could result in the reduction of FWD penetrations and
increased vehicle mass and ground clearances. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 187-188]
We don't believe it was EPA's intention to impact evaporative emissions standards or vehicle
programs in this manner. We request that the evaporative standards, light-duty truck and
medium-duty passenger vehicle definitions used under the Tier 3 evaporative emissions program
apply without modification under Tier 4 for evaporative emission requirements. We would be
happy to work with EPA to resolve issues of redefining light-duty truck or medium- duty
passenger vehicle and their impact to evaporative emissions standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 187-188]
3. Test Fuel for Flex-Fueled Vehicle ORVR Testing
In the preamble for the Tier 3 rulemaking, EPA indicated that the test fuel for flex-fueled
vehicle ORVR testing should be Tier 2 E0 fuel splash blended with 10% ethanol.291 In EPA's
recent heavy-duty criteria pollutant rule,292 it is unclear if the splash blended test fuel or Tier 3
test fuel is required for heavy-duty incomplete vehicle ORVR testing. Clarification is requested
regarding the test fuel for incomplete heavy-duty flex-fueled vehicle ORVR testing. We also
recommend that Tier 3 test fuel be specified for all flex-fueled and non-flexed fueled ORVR
certification testing regardless of the vehicle classification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
188]
291 81 Fed. Reg. 23509 (Apr. 28, 2014).
292 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Heavy
Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards, Final Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 4296 (Jan. 24, 2023).
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Evaporative Family Definition Change to Exclude High Altitude Standards from Splitting
Evaporative Families [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 14-15]
In discussions with EPA staff in 2019, EPA agreed that revisions to the Evaporative Family
definition (located in 40 CFR 86.1821-01 (b)(l0)) were necessary to clarify that manufacturers do
not need to split Evaporative Families based on differences in the high-altitude evaporative
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emissions standards (which have different vehicle category groupings than the low altitude
evaporative emissions standards). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 14-15]
Ford requests EPA make this change as part of this rulemaking action, and that the EPA
further modify 40 CFR 86.1821-01 (b)(l0) to correct the following regulatory text: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 14-15]
- Current text: "Evaporative emission standard or family emission limit (FEL)." [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 14-15]
- Revised text: "Low altitude evaporative emission standard or family emission limit (FEL)."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 14-15]
EPA Proposal to revise Light Duty Truck Definition to align with the GHG LDT Definition
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 14-15]
The EPA has proposed to revise the LDT definition to align with the GHG regulations. Some
vehicles greater than 60001b GVWR would be reclassified as Passenger Cars using the proposed
GHG LDT definition. This would result in a decrease in whole vehicle, sea level evaporative
emissions standards from 500mg to 300mg. Ford does not believe that it was EPA's intention to
change the evaporative emissions standards as part of this rulemaking; therefore, Ford requests
additional discussion about this concern. If EPA proceeds with the LDT definition change, we
would request that the proposed regulatory language clarify that programs greater than 60001b
GVWR LDT which would be reclassified as Passenger Cars under the GHG definitions are
provided the same 4-year lead time which was referenced with the re-definition of MDPVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 14-15]
Ford also request the addition of an allowance for emergency vehicles to remain in the same
vehicle classification as the base program upon which the emergency vehicle is based. An
example would be a greater than 60001b GVWR SUV which is classified as a LDT based on
standard 3 row seating; however, the emergency vehicle based on the SUV only includes two
rows of seating. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 14-15]
Organization: Ingevity Corporation
4. Additional Considerations:
Fuel cap requirement for vehicle soaks and storage:
The NPRM language at §86.132-96 (a) requires that for future testing that the fuel cap always
be in place when the vehicle is in soak or otherwise awaiting testing. We have no objection to
this change and suggest that it apply to all evaporative and refueling emission testing covered in
the vehicle regulations. EPA needs to specify a model year of applicability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0545, pp. 10-11]
Removal of drain and fill after preconditioning UDDS drive:
The current evaporative emission test procedure at 40 CFR §86 132-96 calls for a drain and
40% fill of the fuel tank after the preconditioning drive (UDDS) at §86.132-96 (c). Instead, under
this proposal, after the preconditioning drive, the vehicle would be driven and parked for the 12-
36-hour soak before the canister preconditioning. This proposal would apply to diesel and
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gaseous-fueled vehicles (CNG/LPG), fuel economy data vehicles, and IUVP vehicles (not
IUCP). This does not seem to apply for certification testing for evaporative or refueling
emissions. This streamlining seems acceptable provided that it is clear that the full 40 CFR §86
Subpart B test procedure remains the primary test which could be used by EPA at its discretion.
Perhaps it would be better to provide this as an option. EPA needs to specify a model year of
applicability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 10-11]
Canister preconditioning for fuel economy data vehicles and IUVP:
At the proposed §86.132-96 (h) and (j), EPA is proposing to remove the canister
preconditioning step at 40 CFR §86 130.96 (for 3-day and 2-day) for fuel economy and IUVP
tests. Once again, this streamlining seems acceptable provided that it is clear that the full 40 CFR
§86 Subpart B test procedure remains the primary test which could be used by EPA at its
discretion. Perhaps it would be better to provide this as an option. EPA needs to specify a model
year of applicability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0545, pp. 10-11]
Organization: Kia Corporation
Kia Supports Tier 3 Evaporative Emissions Standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp.
11-12]
Kia supports EPA's intent to continue use of Tier 3 evaporative emissions requirements.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 11-12]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Several commenters noted that the proposed changes to definitions for "light-duty truck" and
"medium-duty passenger vehicle" would cause an increase in stringency of evaporative emission
standards. The Automotive Alliance requested that we include regulatory language to prevent
any change in evaporative emission standards. Ford requested that we include regulatory
language to allow four years of lead time for meeting any change in standards resulting from the
change in definitions.
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation requested that we address an ambiguity regarding the
fuel specifications for refueling tests with flexible fuel vehicles, for both medium-duty vehicles
and heavy-duty vehicles above 14,000 pounds GVWR. They also suggested that we amend the
regulation to specify Tier 3 El0 as the fuel for the refueling test for all vehicle types.
Ford's comment included a request to modify the regulation to acknowledge that
manufacturers do not need to split evaporative families based on differences in the high-altitude
evaporative emissions standards.
Ford also requested that emergency vehicles retain their vehicle classification even if they are
modified for emergency purposes in a way that causes them to fall into a different vehicle
classification. The specific case was for light trucks that would qualify as passenger automobiles
or light-duty vehicles in the emergency-vehicle configuration.
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Ingevity had no objection to the change in vehicle handling before tests as specified in 40
CFR 86.132-96(a), but suggested that we apply it to all evaporative and refueling emission
testing, and that we specify a model year of applicability.
Ingevity found the proposed omission of both the second refueling event and the canister
preconditioning for fuel economy and IUVP testing to be acceptable, provided that EPA could
perform testing with the full procedure to evaluate compliance. Ingevity suggested that it may be
better to make those omissions optional, and that we should identify when the amendments start
to apply.
Kia supports EPA's intent to continue use of Tier 3 requirements for evaporative emissions.
Response:
We agree with commenters observing that the changes to vehicle category definitions were
not intended to achieve an increase in stringency for evaporative emission standards. At the same
time, we are aware that the less stringent standards for light-duty trucks were originally intended
to reflect differences in fuel tank volumes and other vehicle characteristics related to controlling
evaporative emissions. It is apparent that vehicles affected by the changing definition of "light-
duty truck" are not differentiated from light-duty vehicles based on such vehicle parameters
related to evaporative emission control. From that perspective, the revised definition is likely to
have the effect of accomplishing the original intent of applying standards corresponding to
vehicles with expected evaporative-related characteristics for light-duty vehicles.
To address the concern for the incidental change in stringency, we are adding a provision to
allow manufacturers to continue to meet the evaporative emission standards for light-duty trucks
or medium-duty passenger vehicles even if their vehicles are recategorized based on the changed
definitions, provided that those vehicle models continue to qualify for carryover certification.
With this approach, manufacturers would do new testing to meet the more stringent standard
only if they already need to do new testing to certify to the evaporative emission standards. To
avoid extending this provision indefinitely, we are including a requirement for manufacturers to
meet the more stringent evaporative emission standards for such vehicles starting in model year
2032, even if they would otherwise qualify for carryover certification. Meeting the more
stringent standards will likely involve modestly increasing canister volume and upgrading
various design features and parameters in line with the technology solutions used for other light-
duty vehicles. The several years of lead time will allow manufacturers to plan for making those
changes.
We recognize Ford's concern for emergency vehicles and have modified the definition of
"light-duty truck" for the final rule to allow emergency vehicles to qualify as light-duty trucks if
they are derived from vehicles that are light-duty trucks, even if they have been modified in a
way that prevents them from meeting the criteria for light trucks in 40 CFR 600.002.
We recognize that flexible fuel vehicles today will be refueled with some combination of E10
gasoline and a high-level ethanol fuel. The scenario of splash blending ethanol with an E0 fuel is
no longer something that in-use vehicles will experience. We are therefore revising the refueling
test fuel specification for flexible fuel vehicles to align with the test fuel specification for
evaporative emission testing under 40 CFR 86.1810-17(h). The refueling test fuel will instead be
based on testing with a worst-case fuel that is either the high-level ethanol test fuel in 40 CFR
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1065.725 or a blend of that fuel with Tier 3 gasoline (E10 with 9 psi RVP). This same conclusion
applies for refueling tests with heavy-duty vehicles subject to standards under 40 CFR 1037.103.
We agree with Ford that it is appropriate to amend the regulation to reflect the current policy
allowing manufacturers to include vehicles in the same evaporative family if they are subject to
the same low-altitude standards even if they are subject to different high-altitude standards.
The amendment describing how to treat vehicles before testing was intended to provide a
broader good-practice description for handling vehicles before evaporative testing. This involves
replacing the instruction for removing fuel caps for outdoor parking with an instruction to
prevent fuel contamination and preserve fuel-system integrity. It would not be appropriate to
allow lead time for following this good-practice instruction. Also, evaporative and refueling tests
are typically performed together. As a result, this single instruction already applies for all
evaporative and refueling emission testing.
The evaporative testing amendments for omission of the second refueling event and canister
preconditioning are both optional in the final rule. As a result, there is no need to allow lead time
for those amendments. EPA testing would generally not include these optional steps if
manufacturers do not include those steps for their testing.
We appreciate Kia's support for continuing to apply the Tier 3 evaporative emission
standards.
7.6 - Miscellaneous amendments
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
I. Related Guidance / Regulatory Needs
1. Analytical Derivation Guidance / Regulation
EPA regulations allow a manufacturer to provide fuel economy, CO2 emissions, and carbon-
related exhaust emissions values derived from analytical expressions approved by the
Administrator.249 These are generally referred to as "analytical derivations". [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 139-140]
249 40 C.F.R. § 600.006.
EPA has provided guidance on analytical derivations multiple times, starting in 1983, and
revising or providing new guidance in 1995, 2000, 2004, and in 2012.250 EPA also provided an
analytical expression for chassis-certified medium-duty vehicles in regulation.251 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 139-140]
250 EPA Advisory Circular 83A (1984), Guidance CD-95-08 (1995), Guidance CD-00-04 (2000),
Guidance CCD-04-06 (2004), and Guidance CD-12-03).
251 40 C.F.R. § 86.1819-14(g).
EPA guidance on analytical derivations has not been updated in over a decade. Auto
Innovators suggests that it is timely now to update the guidance again, and/or to update the
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governing regulation as might be needed. There are two areas that we propose EPA should
update: expanding analytical derivations to battery electric vehicles and expanding derivations to
strong hybrid electric vehicles. Auto Innovators has provided supporting data and analyses to
EPA to support these updates. If EPA would find it helpful, we would be happy to update our
analyses again and share them with EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 139-140]
Range and energy consumption testing of battery electric vehicles can be extremely time-
consuming. While recent updates to SAE test procedures provide improved procedures to reduce
some of this burden, the number of battery electric models continues to grow, challenging
laboratory resources. As discussed elsewhere in these comments, EPA has not yet adopted the
most recent SAE test procedures for battery electric vehicles and continues to use older
procedures. Providing an approved means to analytically derive BEV range and energy
consumption would reduce testing burden. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 139-140]
Guidance on analytical derivations for strong hybrid electric vehicles would also be helpful.
When analytical derivation guidance was last updated, there were relatively few strong hybrid
models available. While strong hybrids remain a relatively small part of the fleet, there are now
significantly more models available to base a statistical analysis on. We suggest that EPA update
analytical derivation guidance to include strong hybrids with conventional internal combustion
engine vehicles, or to provide a separate equation for them, if needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.139-140]
Guidance for conventional ICE vehicles could also be updated concurrent with the above
changes, but this is not a high priority for auto manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 139-140]
2.High-Fuel Economy / Low-GHG Confirmatory Test Guidance
Manufacturers are required to perform confirmatory testing under a number of circumstances,
including when the fuel economy on the FTP or HFET test is higher (or the C02 emissions are
lower) "than expected," and when the fuel economy is a "potential" fuel economy leader for a
class of vehicles.252 EPA has historically provided and updated guidance on cut-points that
trigger the need for a confirmatory test.253
252 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.1835-0l(b)(l)(iii), (v), and (vi); and 600.008(b)(l)(iii) and (v).
253 See EPA guidance documents CD-15-22 and CD-99-06.
Updates to this guidance are particularly important at times when fuel economy of individual
vehicles is rapidly improving, such as since roughly 2010. The cut-points are absolute numbers
based on statistical analysis of a historical fleet's test results. Thus, as fuel economy is improved,
an increasing number of models exceed the statistical threshold for high fuel economy (or low
C02 emissions). This increases the number of confirmatory tests required, consuming laboratory
resources.
Setting aside temporary guidance that provided laboratory relief in response to the COVID-19
pandemic (which have since expired),254 guidance on confirmatory testing was last updated in
2015, eight years ago. Again, an increasing number of models are exceeding the given
thresholds, resulting in additional confirmatory testing of vehicles that have high, but not
statistically unusual fuel economy.
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254 See EPA guidance documents CD-2021-02 and CD-2020-07.
Auto Innovators believes it is timely now to again update confirmatory test guidance. We
would be happy to provide an updated analysis based on a recent model year if EPA would find
that helpful to moving forward with this needed update. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
140-141]
F. Compliance With Fleet Average CO2 Standards
EPA proposes to revise 40 C.F.R. § 86.1865-12(i)(l) and (2) introductory text to specify their
applicability to model years through 2026. These paragraphs pertain to requirements to calculate
separate fleet average carbon-related exhaust emissions for the passenger car and light truck
fleets. It is unclear what EPA intends for manufacturers to do after model year 2026, and we
could not identify any description of, or reasoning for this proposed change in the preamble.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 248]
G. Electronic Vehicle Documents
Under this NPRM, EPA is also proposing changes to 40 CFR 86.1844-01(e) "Part 2
Application" clarifying that the "the part 2 application must include the part numbers and
descriptions of the GHG emissions related parts, components, systems, software or elements of
design, and AECDs including those used to qualify for GHG credits (e.g., air conditioning
credits, off cycle credits, advanced technology vehicle credits) as previously specified in EPA
guidance letter CD-14-19." We also understand that EPA is proposing changes to 40 CFR
86.1844-01(e) "Part 2 Application" and 40 CFR 85.2110 to establishing that paper copies of
service manuals, owner's manuals, warranty booklets, and Technical Service Bulletins (TSBs)
will no longer be accepted. Instead, the aforementioned documents will all need to be digitally
accessed. We request that EPA allow the use of submitting a web address to view the required
documents. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 248]
Organization: Cummins Inc.
VIII. Inducements
10. EPA should allow manufacturers the option to use the new Selective Catalytic
Reduction inducements in 40 CFR Part 1036 for chassis-certified vehicles
EPA recently finalized new requirements for selective catalytic reduction (SCR) inducements
for HD engines in 40 CFR 1036.111. Cummins requests EPA to add an option allowing
manufacturers who wish to harmonize SCR inducements across their product offerings to use 40
CFR 1036.111 inducements for chassis-certified LD and MDV as well. Such an option should
recognize there may need to be differences in the inducement triggering conditions between HD
andLD/MDV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, p. 11]
Cummins also encourages EPA to continue work with industry and CARB to harmonize on
SCR inducement strategies that reflect the inducement principles developed by EPA for the HD
2027 NOx proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, p. 11]
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Organization: General Motors, LLC (GM)
The following appendices provide further detailed regulatory and technical comments.
Appendix A provides recommended edits to EPA's proposed regulatory text to clarify various
parts of the regulatory language to ensure a successful and aligned set of EPA regulatory
requirements. The other appendices provide confidential business information to help inform
various technical aspects of the criteria emission and GHG standards. In many cases, an EPA
final rule aligned with CARB's LEV IV in internal combustion engine criteria emission
stringency and the associated test and certification procedures will help GM achieve significant
emissions reductions for internal combustion engine products as soon as MY 2027 despite
limited lead time, while continuing to transition to zero-emission vehicle technologies. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 6]
[See original attachment for April 7, 2023 EPA Memorandum with subject: Redline Version
of EPA's Proposed Regulations to Adopt New Standards for Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicle Standards"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 6]
[See original attachment containing redacted confidential comments titled, "Summary of GM
Technical Comments and Recommendations in Response to Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for
Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles (Tier IV)" [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0700, p. 6]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
9. Porsche recommends maintaining the current definitions for Light-Duty Truck (LDT)
Porsche does not support EPA's proposal to amend the definition of Light-Duty Truck in
86.1803-01 to include the provision that for Tier-4 (i.e., starting in MY2027), light-duty truck
should use the definition in Part 600.002. The definition in Part 600 reflects the definition used
within the NHTSA's CAFE regulation for non-passenger automobiles under that regulation's
vehicle classification terms. Vehicle classification under CAFE has a long statutory history
reflecting the congressional requirement for non-passenger automobiles (otherwise referred to as
"light trucks") to have unique fuel economy requirements specific to that category of automobile.
This statutory history reflects energy related policies specific to CAFE. Over the past several
decades, NHTSA has updated their regulatory definition and policy interpretation of non-
passenger automobile to reflect changes in vehicle designs and ongoing considerations of
industry usage of the classification for determining fuel economy compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0637, pp. 15-16]
NHTSA's CAFE regulation has a long-standing history that reflects a much higher degree of
differential in the fuel economy targets between passenger automobiles and non-passenger
automobiles. As such, NHTSA has been careful to consider vehicle classification throughout the
regulatory history of their program and in changing how the agency views the applicability of the
class by industry. Even during the most recent updates to CAFE, NHTSA continues to discuss
future changes to the definition and such topics as physical measurement validations,
applicability to accessories and build tolerance variation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp.
15-16]
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NHTSA's policy can result in manufacturers having to split individual vehicles within a
model type into passenger and non-passenger versions based on issues such as having to account
for dealer installed accessories. For example, under recent NHTSA rulemaking discussions, the
agency clarified that a non-passenger automobile that had an optional tow- hitch installed would
have to be reclassified as a passenger automobile if the hitch violated the ground clearance
requirements. While this reclassification may impact end of year CAFE compliance accounting,
these vehicles would otherwise need no updates that would affect certification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0637, pp. 15-16]
However, EPA's emissions certification program needs more stability in the determination of
vehicle classification. For example, if EPA were to abdicate vehicle classification for Light-Duty
Truck to NHTSA, the vehicle that had to change from non-passenger automobile to passenger
automobile for CAFE, and thus from Light-Duty Truck (LDT) to Light-Duty Vehicle (LDV) for
emissions would face certification challenges. One example would be that this unique vehicle
would require a new under hood VECI label. This would mean that the installation of an optional
part could trigger relabeling for the vehicle or a whole new certification application. These types
of sudden changes in classification could disrupt processes and, given that the emissions
programs now have minimal differences in technical standards, would have no effect on
environmental outcomes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 15-16]
EPA's definition has provided industry and the agency with a stable, consistent basis for
vehicle classification for several decades. Porsche sees no value in EPA now handing over their
authority for vehicle classification for systems to NHTSA, especially as the difference between
light duty vehicle and light-duty truck requirements continue to converge. NHTSA has already
signaled that they will seek further changes to classification, both in regulatory updates, test
procedures and policy interpretation. NHTSA will pursue these with regards to their statutory
fuel economy policy and would be unaware, and not responsible for, any disruptions this might
create for exhaust and evaporative emissions compliance. While it may appear convenient to
harmonize definitions, in this instance, given the unique statutory goals specific to fuel economy,
Porsche recommends EPA stay the course with their existing LDT definition. Porsche sees no
added value specific to EPA's air quality program in changing definitions, and to avoid any
complications, proposes that EPA continue to utilize their existing definition and industry
practice in Part 86. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, pp. 15-16]
10. Porsche recommends streamlining the FTP test procedure to remove the initial 6-hour
minimum vehicle soak. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 17]
In identifying further opportunities for test streamlining, Porsche reviewed the FTP test
procedure flow-chart illustrated in 1066.801(e) and analyzed the relevancy of the initial 6-hour
minimum soak period that follows the initial drain-and- fill. Porsche understands that the specific
role of this initial 6-hour minimum soak period may have been to account for the possibility that
fuel added to the vehicle could have been stored at different temperatures than the vehicle, for
example if the fuel was in an underground tank. Or if the vehicle itself was stored at a
temperature outside of the lab temperature and needed time to stabilize prior to preconditioning.
In situations where the vehicle and fuel are otherwise already stabilized, it is unclear if this initial
soak is relevant. Porsche recommends that EPA provide flexibility to manufacturers to use good
engineering judgement to determine if the initial 6-hour minimum soak period can be skipped in
order to help improve test facility efficiencies. Porsche recognizes that EPA, specific to
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confirmatory testing, would continue to use the 6-hour minimum soak period in order to have a
consistent confirmatory process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 17]
[See original comment for Figure 2 EPA FTP test procedure flow-chart from 1066.801]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 17]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
The Auto Alliance recommended updating the guidance and/or updating the governing
regulation as might be needed regarding analytical derivations for fuel economy, CO2 emissions,
and carbon-related exhaust emissions values. They specifically recommended updating the
provisions to expand analytical derivations to battery electric vehicles and derivations to strong
hybrid electric vehicles.
The Auto Alliance also suggested updating guidance related to confirmatory testing
requirements under 40 CFR 600.008.
The Auto Alliance asked how to understand the regulatory instruction for calculating fleet
average CREE values after 2026 in § 86.1865-12, based on the proposed amendment to
discontinue those provisions starting in 2027.
The Auto Alliance requested that EPA allow manufacturers to meet requirements for
submitting electronic records by identifying a web address with the required information.
Cummins requested that EPA allow manufacturers the option to use the new Selective
Catalytic Reduction inducements in 40 CFR 1036. Ill for chassis-certified vehicles under 40
CFR part 86, subpart S, perhaps allowing for differences in the inducement triggering conditions
between HD and LD/MDV.
General Motors included a scattering of suggested changes to the proposed regulation
language in an appendix to their comments.
Porsche recommends not finalizing the proposed change to the light-duty truck definition to
align with NHTSA definitions, because NHTSA decision-making creates an unstable
categorization for purposes of meeting EPA emission standards.
Porsche recommended that EPA allow manufacturers to omit the 6-hour minimum soak
period at the start of vehicle testing to help improve test facility efficiencies. Porsche recognized
that manufacturers would still need to use good engineering judgment, for example, to ensure
that the test fuel and the test vehicles as a whole would need to be temperature-stabilized before
starting the test. Porsche also recognized that EPA testing should continue to use the 6-hour
minimum soak period to ensure a consistent process for confirmatory testing.
Response:
We have amended the regulation to reference the latest version of SAE J1711 for the final
rule, as suggested by the Auto Innovators. We will be mindful of the need and benefit for
updating the guidance on analytically derived values after finalizing the rule.
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We recognize that the instructions requiring manufacturers to perform additional confirmatory
tests based on fuel economy test results is no longer necessary. The final rule therefore removes
40 CFR 600.008(b)(2)(iii)-(v).
We recognize the ambiguity of the proposed change to 40 CFR 86.1865-12(i)(l) and (2) and
are revising the final rule to remove the proposed amendment.
Public websites are subject to change without notice. As a result, submitting a web address is
not sufficient for meeting information submission requirements. However, manufacturers can
create an electronic file from a website and submit the information as posted at that time.
We recognize that Cummins's suggestion to revisit the guidance related to inducement
provisions for diesel vehicles certified under 40 CFR part 86, subpart S. At the same time, there
is significant complexity to consider in the regulatory provisions from 40 CFR 1036.Ill, and
some significant differences in vehicle design and operation for the mostly personal-use
medium-duty vehicles certified under 40 CFR part 86, subpart S. We expect to revisit the
existing inducement guidance for medium-duty vehicles to consider whether or how to expand
that guidance to allow for inducement algorithms based on what we adopted for heavy-duty
engines and vehicles in 40 CFR 1036.111.
The General Motors appendix with possible amendments to the regulation included no
description or rationale. Many of their suggested changes overlap with their comments, and with
the comments submitted by the Auto Alliance. We are therefore not addressing the amendments
in their appendix file except as those are included in the text of written comments.
With respect to the proposed change to the definition of Light-duty truck, the proposed rule
described our focus on the inconsistency with NHTSA definitions causing a single vehicle to
qualify under EPA programs as a light-duty vehicle for GHG emission standards and as a light-
duty truck for criteria emission standards. We are also aware that EPA's historical definition of
Light-duty truck included ambiguity that creates too much flexibility for manufacturers to select
vehicle categories to gain an advantage in reduced stringency of emission standards. We
recognize that NHTSA's ongoing decision-making can cause manufacturers to be subject to
different emission standards; however, we note that this circumstance has already applied for
many years relative to GHG standards and certification. We also recognize that the Tier 4
standards substantially remove differences in exhaust emission standards between light-duty
vehicles and light-duty trucks. As such, this reduces the impact on manufacturers of vehicles
changing to a different type of vehicle. An exception applies for evaporative emission standards,
which we address in RTC Section 7.4.
As described in RTC Section 7.3 in response to a similar comment, we are not amending the
final rule to allow manufacturers to eliminate the six-hour soak at the start of the test procedure.
8 - Benefit cost analysis (BCA)
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Comments by Organizations
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
2. The Proposal's costs are vastly understated
EPA estimates that the Proposed Rule will cost $26 billion dollars but will produce between
$200-$220 billion in net discounted benefits.221 EPA's conclusion is built on a shaky
foundation of understated and hidden costs that when properly accounted for reveal that the costs
of the Proposed Rule far exceed its benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 48-49]
221 Proposed Rule at 29,361-62.
EPA assumes that significant ZEV sales would occur in the absence of the Proposed Rule but
fails to acknowledge that the aggressive level of OEM investments are being bade in direct
response to anticipated increases in fuel economy requirements.222, EPA excludes the vehicle
costs associated with these ambitious automaker commitments that are linked to EPA standards.
This is improper. In conducting the cost-benefit analysis EPA estimates that the rule will result in
a 67 percent ZEV penetration rate and incorporates the emissions reductions associated with
each of these vehicles. EPA cannot include the benefits of these ZEVs and exclude their costs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 48-49]
222 ALLIANCE FOR AUTOMOTIVE INNOVATION "Auto Innovators Statement on Final EPA GHG
Rule" (December 20,2021 available at https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/press-release/statement-final-
epa- ghg-rule
While we have not had sufficient time to fully analyze EPA's cost analyses, we have been
able to identify several significant deficiencies, each of which understates the true costs of the
Proposal: (1) EPA significantly understated the costs of batteries required by the rule; (2) EPA
understated the costs of ZEVs by focusing only on their purchase price and ignoring the impacts
of manufacturers' emissions trading and cross-subsidization strategies; (3) EPA's analysis of
operating costs and other costs of ownership is incomplete; and (4) EPA misstates the costs of
EVSEs and completely ignores the costs of grid upgrades that will be necessitated under the
Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 48-49]
Organization: Governing for Impact and Evergreen Action (GFI)
Perhaps most importantly, the Proposed Rule's projected compliance costs fall well-within
the historical norms for 202(a) GHG standards. The EPA estimates that the Proposed Rule will
cost automakers approximately $15 billion on an annualized basis.81 Those costs closely track
the annualized automaker costs of the 2021 GHG tailpipe rule, which fall between $13.5-14.6
billion (adjusted for inflation).82 An apples-to- apples comparison with the agency's 2010 and
2012 GHG rules is difficult because those regulatory impact analyses report cost estimates
differently; still, a rough-hewn sense of the 2012 rule's compliance burden can be drawn from
the agency's overall cost estimates on an annualized basis, between $7.7-12.9 billion (adjusted
for inflation).83 Finally, as the following table shows, the Proposed Rule's projected industry
average per vehicle cost increase actually falls below similar estimates from past GHG rules.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 10-11]
81 Proposed Rule RIA at xlvii, Table 5.
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82 2021 Final Rule RIA at 6-2, Table 6-1.
83 2012 Final Rule RIA at ii, Table 1. The 2010 rule's regulatory impact analysis does not appear to report
either total or vehicle technology cost estimates on an annualized basis.
Note that previous GHG rules only encompassed carbon emissions (the Proposed Rule
additionally sets criteria pollutant standards) and targeted a narrower class of vehicles (light-
duty, whereas the Proposed Rule also targets medium-duty vehicles). That a multi-pollutant rule
like the Proposed Rule nonetheless manages to closely track previous compliance cost figures
suggests the EPA — far from charting a newly ambitious course — is diligently attempting to
meet its statutory obligations without straying from its historical approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0621, pp. 10-11]
[Table:
Column "CAA §202(a) passenger vehicles GHG emissions rules.84": Row "2023 Proposed
Rule.87"; Column "Vehicle technology costs, equivalent annualized values (2020 dollars).85":
Row "$15 billion.88"; Column "Annual industry average per vehicle cost increase (2020
dollars).86": Row "$1,164 in 2032.89" [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 10-11]
Column "CAA §202(a) passenger vehicles GHG emissions rules.84": Row "2021 GHG Final
Rule.90"; Column "Vehicle technology costs, equivalent annualized values (2020 dollars).85":
Row " $13.5-14.6 billion.91"; Column "Annual industry average per vehicle cost increase (2020
dollars).86": Row "$1,207 in 2026.92" [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 10-11]
Column "CAA §202(a) passenger vehicles GHG emissions rules.84": Row "2012 GHG Final
Rule.93"; Column "Vehicle technology costs, equivalent annualized values (2020 dollars).85":
Row "-94"; Column "Annual industry average per vehicle cost increase (2020 dollars).86": Row
"$2,535 in 2025.95" [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 10-11]
Column "CAA §202(a) passenger vehicles GHG emissions rules.84": Row "2010 GHG Final
Rule.96"; Column "Vehicle technology costs, equivalent annualized values (2020 dollars).85":
Row "-97"; Column "Annual industry average per vehicle cost increase (2020 dollars).86": Row
"$1,401 in 2016.98"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 10-11]
84 The table does not include deregulatory GHG rules, namely "The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient
(SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks," 85 Fed. Reg. 24174
(April 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-04-30/pdf/2020-06967.pdf, which the EPA
has since rescinded. Because the SAFE Rule would have relaxed emissions standards, it would have
reduced automaker compliance costs. NHTSA-EPA, "Final Regulatory Impact Analysis: The Safer
Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Year 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light
Trucks," 9 (March 2020),
https://www.nhtsa.gOv/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/final_safe_fria_web_version_200701.pdf.
85 To facilitate comparison across rules, we have adjusted figures from past rules for inflation.
86 To facilitate comparison across rules, we have adjusted figures from past rules for inflation.
87 88 Fed. Reg. 29184 (April 2023).
88 Proposed Rule RIA at 10-1, Table 10-1.
89 Proposed Rule RIA at xlviii, Table 6; 13-25, Table 13-45 (cars and trucks).
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90 "Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards," 86
Fed. Reg. 74434 (Dec. 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/12/30/2021-27854/revised-
2023-and-later-model-year- light-duty-vehicle-greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards.
91 2021 Final Rule RIA at 6-2, Table 6-1.
92 86 Fed. Reg. at 74483 (tbl. 30).
93 "Final Rule for Model Year 2017 and Later Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards," 77 Fed. Reg. 62623 (Oct. 2012),
https://www.federalregister.gOv/documents/2012/10/15/2012-21972/2017-and-later-model-year-light-duty-
vehicle- greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-corporate-average-fuel.
94 See supra at fn. 83 and preceding text.
95 77 Fed. Reg. at 62865 (tbl. 111-34).
96 "Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards; Final Rule," 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 2010), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2010-
05-07/pdf/2010-8159.pdf.
97 See supra at fn. 83 and preceding text.
98 75 Fed. Reg. at 25463 (tbl. III.D.6-4).
Organization: Travis Fisher
Specifically, the EPA's DRIA regarding the impact of the Proposed Rule on the cost and
reliability of electricity in the U.S. is gravely flawed. It should be redrafted to enable the EPA
Administrator to give appropriate consideration to the cost and safety factors of the Proposed
Rule, as required by section 202 of the Clean Air Act. 1 Further, the DRIA should address the
interactions between the Proposed Rule and other EPA rules—including the recently proposed
rule on greenhouse gas emissions from power plants2—as required by Executive Order 12866.3
As written, the Proposed Rule: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 1]
1 42 U.S.C. § 7521, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7521.
2 New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions From Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean
Energy Rule, 88 FR 33240; May 23, 2023. Available at:
https://www.federalregister.gOv/documents/2023/05/23/2023-10141/new-source- performance-standards-
for-greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-new-modified-and-reconstructed (accessed July 2, 2023).
3 Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 FR 51735; October 4, 1993. Available at:
https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf (accessed July 2, 2023).
1. Violates section 202 of the Clean Air Act by failing to adequately consider:
A. Impaired bulk power system reliability and
B. Increased retail electricity prices;
2. Does not comply with Executive Order 12866; and
3. Violates the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 1]
CONCLUSION
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Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Proposed Rule. For the foregoing reasons,
the EPA should not move forward with this rule without first correcting the many dire flaws in
the Proposed Rule: its violation of section 202 of the Clean Air Act and Executive Order 12866,
its faulty cost-benefit analysis, and its woeful misunderstanding of the U.S. electricity sector as
reflected in the DRIA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 10]
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
The Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Rule is Flawed
There are numerous problems with the cost-benefit analysis in the tailpipe rule. These include
misinterpretation of vehicle ownership costs; miscalculated fuel savings; miscalculated losses
from refueling time; calculation of transfers and tax credits; overestimation of light duty vehicle
sales; overstatement of environmental benefits; overstatement of security benefits; and low
discount rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 11-12]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
The American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers commented that we had understated
costs, particularly for batteries, and that the costs of the proposal would far exceed its benefits.
They also commented that we had excluded costs of ZEVs in the no action case while
simultaneously including the benefits provided by those ZEVs. They also argued that we focused
on ZEV purchase price while ignoring emissions trading and cross-subsidization strategies. They
also commented that our cost of ownership analysis was incomplete and that we had failed to
fully consider costs of EVSEs, in particular costs of grid upgrades.
GFI commented in support of our benefit cost analysis, arguing that it fell within historical
norms for 202(a) GHG standards.
Travis Fisher commented that benefit-cost analysis was fundamentally flawed and violated
section 202 of the Clean Air Act and Executive Order 12866.
The Heritage Foundation commented that our benefit cost analysis had numerous problems
including miscalculated costs and fuel savings and overstatement of security benefits and use of
a low discount rate.
Response:
We disagree with comments that we have underestimated costs, specifically battery costs, in
the final rule. The final rule analysis makes use of updated battery costs, based on the best
available data and developed along with experts at the Department of Energy and the Argonne
National Laboratory. Those battery costs are somewhat higher than the costs we estimated at
proposal and are in general agreement with projections of battery costs by independent third
parties (see section 12.2.1 of this RTC and Chapter 2.5 of the final RIA). Even with these higher
battery costs, the monetized benefits of the rule substantially exceed the costs.
The American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers assert that the proposal's No Action
case includes ZEV costs that are themselves the result of automaker anticipation of what at the
time were yet-to-be proposed standards. While EPA agrees that manufacture announced plans
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may, in general, reflect future regulations, the basis for the proposal's No Action case was
informed using a range of third-party projections that preceded this rulemaking process. Such
projections therefore provide a reasonable basis for a No Action case, since they consider a range
of factors - including for this final rulemaking the effect of IRA incentives - but not the
additional requirements of these standards through MY 2032. The comment also indicates some
confusion over the focus on BEV purchase price while ignoring the impacts of manufacturers'
emissions trading and cross-subsidization strategies. In our OMEGA compliance modeling, we
do include estimates of cross-subsidization and emission trading (see Chapters 2 and 4 of the
final RIA). Summarizing briefly here, EPA's compliance modeling assumes that manufacturers
may choose to apply more technology or less technology than is needed to meet the GHG targets
depending on whether it is most cost effective to reach full compliance using credits to sell,
purchase, or not at all. Therefore, the purchase price used when estimating consumer demand for
a vehicle is influenced by the cross-subsidy, credit trading, and technology application decisions
made by the manufacturer, as well as by the incentives made available by the IRA. EPA notes
that we do not use purchase price when reporting manufacturer costs. As such, while the
consumer might consider that purchase incentive made available by the IRA, the manufacturer's
cost would not reflect that incentive since that incentive goes to the consumer, not the
manufacturer. This comment also suggests that the analysis of operating costs and other costs of
ownership is incomplete. One argument made suggests that EPA compares the real world fuel
economy of ICE vehicles while not considering the real world energy consumption of BEVs.
This claim is erroneous as the analysis does consider the real world energy consumption of both
ICE vehicles and BEVs and PHEVs and does so on an equal basis. Another argument made is
that EPA's analysis failed to consider excise taxes and insurance costs. The final analysis
includes insurance costs since they can be significantly higher for vehicles with higher value.
Regarding excise taxes, i.e., taxes or fees meant to recover foregone fuel tax revenues, EPA has
not included these in our benefit-cost analysis of program social costs and social benefits
(although we do show these as part of our consumer ownership experience discussion in Chapter
4.2 of the final RIA) because of the wide variety of such taxes across the nation and because
many states have yet to determine the approach they will take (e.g., additional registration fees
applied to BEVs or road-use fees applied to all vehicles). If those taxes and fees were included,
they would increase operating costs associated with BEVs and, perhaps, HEVs and PHEVs,
although we would not expect the impact to result in higher operating costs than ICE vehicles.
Importantly, these taxes or fees would not factor into our benefit cost analysis as they represent
transfers and not social costs of the rule. Regarding costs of EVSE and grid updates, we have
updated the analysis for the final rule and respond to related comments in Sections 17 and 18 of
this document.
EPA agrees with the comments from Governing for Impact and Evergreen Action (GFI),
specifically that "EPA — far from charting a newly ambitious course — is diligently attempting
to meet its statutory obligations without straying from its historical approach."
EPA disagrees with the comments provided by Travis Fisher. EPA notes that, consistent with
CAA section 202, in evaluating potential standards we carefully weighed the statutory factors,
including the emissions impacts of the standards, and the feasibility of the standards (including
cost of compliance in light of available lead time). We monetize benefits of the standards and
evaluate other costs in part to enable a comparison of costs and benefits pursuant to E.O. 12866,
but we recognize there are benefits that we are currently unable to fully quantify. EPA's practice
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has been to set standards to achieve improved air quality consistent with CAA section 202, and
not to rely on cost-benefit calculations, with their uncertainties and limitations, as identifying the
appropriate standards. Nonetheless, our estimated benefits, which exceed the estimated costs of
the final program, reinforce our view that the final standards represent an appropriate weighing
of the statutory factors and other relevant considerations. More specifically, for this rule our
assessment that the rule has positive net monetized benefits, regardless of the magnitude of those
positive net benefits, supports our view that the final standards represent an appropriate weighing
of the statutory factors and other relevant considerations. EPA also notes that the analysis
includes expected impacts of other federal rules that are final rules while not considering those
that are proposed. This is consistent with past EPA practice and direction from the Office of
Management and Budget. However, recognizing that EPA is undertaking multiple rules at this
time that may have an impact on the electricity grid, EPA has evaluated, to the extent possible,
the potential cumulative impact of these rules. EPA's evaluation of the potential impact of these
rules on the power system can be found in Chapter 5 of the RIA, Section 18 of this RTC, and the
Technical Memorandum for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for
Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3. EPA judges that this rule, even considered together with the
heavy-duty rule and several recent proposed rules regulating the EGU sector, as well as the IRA,
will not result in significant increases in retail electricity prices (and there is no reason to expect
that any increases in retail electric prices would offset all of the net total benefits for the rule).
Please see Sections 21 and 23 of this document for more detailed responses on these issues. Note
that our final analysis includes the results of the modeling efforts reflecting both the light- and
medium-duty final rule and the heavy-duty phase 3 final rule. Further, we note that we will
conduct comprehensive power sector modeling for the proposed rules regulating the EGU sector
if and when they are finalized, and that the modeling of subsequent rules will account for prior
rules, including this rule, in the baseline.
We disagree with the Heritage Foundation that the analysis is flawed. EPA has very carefully
considered the costs and benefits associated with the final rule using the best available
information at our disposal. For these reasons, we consider the analysis to be technically sound
and appropriate. Moreover, EPA notes that we did not rely on the benefits and costs analysis in
identifying the appropriate standards, but we find that these factors further support the
reasonableness of this rule, as further discussed in Sections V and VIII of the preamble to this
rule.
8.1 - General approach
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
XI. Additional Comments on EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis
At the outset, Auto Innovators would like to commend EPA staff for the tremendous amount
of work that went into preparing the Draft RIA. Auto Innovators particularly appreciates the
efforts put into generating several analytic baselines and several regulatory alternatives for the
proposed C02 standards. The Alliance comments begin with the overall structure of the RIA and
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then proceed to specific technical concerns and suggestions that EPA should consider between
now and the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 279]
A. Structure of the Analysis
The preamble to the NPRM highlights the fact that the multi-pollutant rulemaking contains
several distinct sets of regulatory programs and amendments: (1) new C02 standards for model
year 2027 to 2032 light-duty vehicles, (2) new C02 standards for model year 2027 to 2032
medium-duty standards, (3) new criteria-pollutant standards for model year 2027 to 2032
vehicles, (4) new criteria pollutant standards for model year 2027 to 2032 medium-duty
standards, (5) new battery durability and warranty requirements, and (6) new light-duty vehicle
testing and certification improvements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 279]
B. Each Set of Regulatory Programs/Amendments Should Have its Own benefit- Cost
Analysis Unless EPA Can Show that a Particular Requirement is Not a significant Change.
The DRIA presents separate benefit-cost analyses for the light- and medium-duty vehicle
standards for C02. However, Auto Innovators could not find in the DRIA separate benefit-cost
analyses for each of the other regulatory programs and amendments that are embedded in the
multi-pollutant rulemaking. Most of the Auto Innovators comments focus on the new C02
standards because the agency did not prepare much analysis to support the other regulatory
programs and amendments. OMB Circular A-4 specifically instructs agencies to go beyond an
analysis of an entire rulemaking and prepare separate benefit-cost analyses of each program
within a rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 279-280]
C. A market-failure analysis should be provided to support each set of regulatory programs
and amendments.
OMB Circular A-4, following textbook principles of benefit-cost analysis, instructs agencies
to present a market failure analysis in support of each new regulatory requirement or
amendment. Auto Innovators did not find any market-failure analysis in the DRIA. Without
demonstrating a market failure, the agency does not have a solid justification for moving forward
to a final rule. Auto Innovators believes this omission is especially glaring in the case of the
battery durability and warranty requirements. It is also important in the case of the C02
standards, since the agency is claiming that private benefits to motorists (fuel savings and
maintenance/repair savings) are more than enough to pay for the private costs of the C02
standards. If the agency's calculations are correct, why would not manufacturers, driven by
consumer behavior, supply the BEV deployment and other technology improvements without
EPA's proposed standards? The answer to this question requires a market-failure analysis. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 279-280]
D. Global vs. Domestic Impacts
The agency needs to decide whether the benefits and costs of the C02 standards will include
global impacts or only impacts in the United States, or whether separate analyses shall be
prepared from global and U.S. perspectives. Once that decision is made, the regulatory impact
analysis should adhere to that decision on a consistent basis on both the benefit and cost side of
the ledger. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 280]
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As currently drafted, the regulatory impact analysis is inconsistent: it counts the global
benefits of the C02 standards due to reduced tailpipe emissions from U.S. vehicles but does not
even consider the environmental damages that may occur around the world due to the rapid
expansion of the supply chains for battery-electric vehicles to meet U.S. needs under the multi-
pollutant rule. Examples of possible environmental damages include consumption of scarce
water supplies in water-stressed areas of South America in the process of mining lithium, water
pollution in China from the processing of mined materials for cathode makers, particulate air
emissions at hard-rock mining sites in Australia, and carbon dioxide emissions throughout the
global supply chain for battery-electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 280]
We already know, from unfortunate historical experiences in the U.S. and abroad, that the
expansion of the global supply chain for electric motors and lithium ion batteries will not be risk
free. The agency should make a careful assessment of these environmental damages and weigh
them against the global environmental benefits of C02 control. To help get the agency started,
here are some selected case studies of the environmental damages in the BEV supply chain.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 280]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
Similar flaws mar the remainder of EPA's analysis. In comparing the rule's purported benefits
with its costs, EPA unreasonably elides many costs by refusing to quantify them at all. And the
costs and benefits that the agency does quantify rest largely on unreliable data, assumptions, or
both. EPA also failed to meaningfully consider alternative approaches. It considered only slight
vari- ations on the same theme, comparing new emissions standards of various levels of
stringency, without exploring other solutions, such as the benefits available from renewable
fuels. Only by considering its preferred proposal in a vacuum could EPA conclude that it is the
optimal approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 5]
EPA's Cost-Benefit Analysis Is Seriously Flawed In Several Respects
EPA estimates that the proposed rule will have vast net benefits of approx- imately $1.6
trillion, assuming a 3 percent discount rate. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,362. This figure is the net of an
estimated $487 billion in costs and $2.1 trillion in benefits. Id. Yet EPA's process for arriving at
these amounts contains several serious flaws, detailed below, that unduly inflate the rule's
purported benefits and depress its costs. Where an agency conducts a cost-benefit analysis as part
of the justification for a proposed rule, as EPA has here, serious flaws like these render the rule
arbitrary and capricious. SeeNat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1040 (D.C.
Cir. 2012). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 61]
Fourth, when calculating the climate benefits that the proposed rule would generate, EPA
relied on estimates from the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse
Gases. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,371-79. This intro- duced two additional flaws into EPA's cost-
benefit analysis. To start, it ren- dered the analysis internally inconsistent as to the discount rates
used. For every other cost and benefit in the proposed rule, EPA followed OMB's guid- ance and
used discount rates of 3 and 7 percent to calculate present values. See id. at 29,362. But the
Interagency Working Group discounted its estimates at 2.5, 3, and 5 percent discount rates. Id. at
29,372. As a result, aside from its 3- percent scenarios, EPA was irrationally comparing costs
and benefits valued using distinct discount rates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 64]
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Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
The purported benefits in terms of reductions in cost, greenhouse gas emissions, and
environmental impacts are based on flawed analyses and will not be realized by consumers.
EPA's tailpipe-only approach is flawed, and the Agency needs to evaluate light- and medium-
duty vehicles on a full lifecycle basis, regardless of whether those emissions result from
electricity generation, battery production, or the combustion of liquid or gaseous fuels.
Consumer benefits from the proposal are exaggerated by assuming an unrealistic baseline rate of
ZEV-adoption, and inadequate assessments of ZEV purchase and ownership costs, charging
costs, and road infrastructure costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 3]
EPA's Proposed Rule here presents an analogous situation, albeit one with substantially
greater costs. Mandating a rapid shift from ICEV to ZEV will reshape the American automotive
market with profound collateral effects, making clear that EPA is encroaching upon an issue of
"vast economic and political significance." As further discussed herein, the Proposal's direct
compliance costs are enormous—even in the face of numerous errors and oversights in its
analysis that materially understate these costs. EPA estimates that the cost of vehicle technology
(not including the vehicle or battery tax credits) would be approximately $180 billion-$280
billion in addition to greater than $7 billion in electric vehicle supply equipment ("EVSE") costs
through 2055. These figures do not include the transformation of the electric power sector and
grid updates needed to meet the electricity demand created by the Proposed Rule, which is
estimated to cost trillions of dollars.66 EPA acknowledges that auto manufacturers are spending
over a trillion dollars by 2030, mainly for manufacturing facilities. By setting emissions
standards requiring production of a different product, the Proposed Rule undoubtedly forces
OEMs to meet production deadlines that would not exist but for EPA's new ZEV mandate.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 18-19]
66 Dan Shreve and Wade Schauer, Deep decarbonization requires deep pockets (June 2019),
https://www.decarbonisation.think.woodmac.com/ (The U.S. needs to invest $4.5 trillion to fully transition
the U.S. power grid to renewables during the next 10-20 years, annual investments exceeding the U.S.
defense budget).
E. EPA's cost benefit analysis is impermissibly inadequate
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act does not mandate that EPA set standards to drive
pollutant emissions down to zero. Rather, CAA section 202(a)(1) only requires that standards be
promulgated for air pollutants which "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare." And in promulgating regulations, EPA must balance benefits to health and welfare
against the time necessary to allow for the development and application of the requisite
technology as well as costs of compliance.202 With regard to heavy duty vehicles or engines,
including the MDVs subject to the Proposed Rule, EPA standards are to reflect "the greatest
degree of emission reduction achievable through the application of technology which the [EPA]
determines will be available" during the relevant model year.203 Rather than update ICEV
standards, the Proposed Rule unlawfully forces a transition from ICEVs to ZEVs in the MY27-
32 timeframe without properly evaluating all cost-effective means to address policy objectives
and the time necessary for the development and application of requisite technology. EPA has not
demonstrated that such a transition is feasible, let alone necessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, p. 44]
202 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2).
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203 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i).
EPA ignores this real-world regulatory compliance pricing scheme. EPA should quantify and
explain this issue of central relevance to the Proposed Rule even if it may undermine the
Administration's stated goal of electrifying the transportation fleet. As noted above, E.O. 12866
requires EPA to be a neutral decisionmaker and to fairly assess the costs and benefits of this
Proposal. The Agency has not met its obligations under relevant Executive Orders, the
Administrative Procedure Act, or CAA section 202(a), which requires "appropriate consideration
to the cost of compliance." EPA has instead understated the costs of this Proposal. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 54]
vii. Costs to maintain road infrastructure
EPA fails to account for infrastructure impacts from increased operation of heavier ZEVs on
the road including road and bridge deterioration and commensurate reduced funding for
infrastructure from fuel tax collections. These excluded costs are known to EPA and must be
included in EPA's analysis—another example of EPA's failure to address a major aspect of the
proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 60-61]
EPA must, therefore, conduct a full cost analysis to compare all costs that must be incurred in
order to achieve the environmental benefits EPA is claiming in the Proposal. EPA
cannot rationally claim an environmental benefit from its Proposal without also accounting for
all the costs needed to bring about those environmental benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, pp. 60-61]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
EPA fails to properly account for all of the cost increases associated with the enforcement of
gasoline particulate filter (GPF) technologies. The GPF cost model is described in DRIA Chapter
3.2 and GPF cost is included in the OMEGA model. The model anticipates the direct
manufacturing cost (DMC) for a bare downstream GPF, which ranges from $51 dollars for a 1.0-
liter engine using a relatively low GPF 249 volume to engine displacement ratio, up to $166
dollars for a 7.0 liter engine using a relatively high GPF volume to engine displacement ratio. In
the DRIA (page 3-60) GPF cost is based on the ICCT 2011 work, which is now over 10 years
old. Further, the EPA assumes that the GPFs that OEMs will utilize to meet more stringent PM
and GHG targets will be those new generation of MY 2022 GPFs with "high filtration
efficiencies generally over 95 percent" and low backpressure. The assumed costs for MY 2022
GPF with higher efficiency appear to be unreasonably low and caused the modeling to
overestimate feasibility. Furthermore, it is not clear if the associated equipment for effective
operation of the GPF such as associated sensors and controllers are included in the cost
assessment performed by EPA. The agency should reevaluate its assessment based on more
realistic efficiency levels to avoid arbitrary and capricious action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, p. 13]
Appendix B:
Detailed Look at the Assumptions Used in the EPA Analysis in the NPRM and the DRIA -
Assessment Prepared by Martec
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EPA referred to the proposed rulel 11 as "the most ambitious pollution standards ever for cars
and trucks," while also saving the "average consumer $12,000 over the lifetime of a light- duty
vehicle." EPA has also estimated that the benefits of the proposed standards would exceed costs
by at least $1 trillion. In reaching its conclusions, the agency also expects the proposed
regulations would require "67% of new light-duty sales" to be solely powered by batteries and
new power generation facilities to "fuel" these new BEVs. These changes would require
significant changes in the way vehicles are designed, built, and fueled. However, as these
changes occur, the agency has promised large savings to the consumer and a net positive impact
on the U.S. economy. The following is a detailed look at the assumptions used in the EPA
analysis in the NPRM and the DRIA to determine if the claims made are valid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0641, p. 42]
111 https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/proposed-rule-multi-pollutant-
emissions- standards-model.
EPA has failed to adequately explain several aspects of their analysis. In order to provide the
public with meaningful ability to comment there are several aspects that need further
clarification:
The cost reduction model used in the analysis seems to be based on a model used for
part cost reductions driven by improved economies of scale on fixed capital equipment. Given
that raw materials make up a significant portion of battery costs, EPA should also use a raw
material supply cost model that considers the increasing costs for raw materials with increased
supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 42]
Cost and price are concepts that the agency uses interchangeably in the regulation.
The true cost of the regulation is not fully calculated since the portion of the consumer- facing
price is paid for by the government. The agency should fully account for the technical feasibility
of any C02-reducing technology on a cost basis as defined in the CAA regardless of
governmental taxation breaks for electric vehicle technology production and sale. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 42]
The cost impact of "fueling" the significant number of electric vehicles assumed in
the regulation (67% implied EV share by 2032) is not fully calculated or considered as part of
the technical feasibility analysis and cost for the technology. The costs of adding additional solar,
wind, and hydropower plants should be considered in the regulation as they are a necessary part
of bringing electric vehicles to market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 42]
13.1.2.1 Proposed GHG Standards
Incremental Costs per vehicle for the proposed standards (compared to the No Action case)
are summarized by regulatory class in Table 13-45 and by body style in Table 13-46 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 49-50]
Table 13-45: Projected Manufacturing Costs Per Vehicle, Proposed Standards
2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
Cars $249 $102 $32 $100 $527 $844
Trucks $891 $767 $653 $821 $1,100 $1,385
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Total $633 $497 $401 $526 $866 $1,164 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 49-50]
We question the rationale for requiring 67% BEV sales for compliance by 2032 but not
accounting for the cost of these BEVs over the existing regulation as part of the regulatory
impact analysis. Using Argonne's battery cost values from BatPaC we would expect an average
cost of-$12,000 for the battery system to be accounted for in the analysis. Additionally, the
agency also assumes a cost of ~$3,500 for electric drive units, inverters, and charging systems.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 49-50]
Removing the cost of the ICE powertrain and components from the vehicle would leave
~$7,500 to be accounted for in the regulation. With a 67% BEV market share assumption, this
would be ~$5,000 compliance cost, not $1,164 as shown in the DRIA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, pp. 49-50]
The agency needs to fully account for the costs of the regulation requiring 67% of BEVs to be
sold by 2032 and not use incremental costs above the assumed volume of BEVs by the
automakers themselves. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 49-50]
Required Updates
EPA must accurately assess the financial costs the proposed regulation would impart on the
U.S. consumer. Accordingly, EPA should:
Use a raw material supply cost model that considers the increasing costs for raw
materials with increased supply. Automotive battery costs are largely driven by raw materials
(63%) of total cost) and sources for these raw materials are becoming increasingly more
expensive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 51]
Include the cost of all vehicles that are needed to meet the regulation not merely the
additional volume of vehicles needed to meet the regulation over the assumed electric vehicle
volumes of the automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 51]
Fully account for the technical feasibility of any C02-reducing technology on a cost
basis as defined in the CAA regardless of governmental taxation breaks for electric vehicle
technology production and sale. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 51]
Consider the costs of adding additional solar, wind, and hydropower plants in the
regulation as they are a necessary part of bringing electric vehicles to market as described by
EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 51]
Failure to do so would be arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 51]
Organization: Anonymous
3. EPA incorrectly models its baseline
EPA's analysis shows that the proposed standards will reduce the compliance cost to certain
manufacturers. For example, Honda could save over a $1,000 per vehicle in 2027 and 2028 if it
chose the compliance pathway selected by EPA. This makes no sense from a cost-benefit
analysis. The takeaway here is that manufacturers are choosing to forgo reducing costs to sell the
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same or less vehicles, meaning vehicle manufacturers are acting irrationally. A proper baseline
should assume that manufacturers will act rationally and will produce vehicles that maximize
profits (either through reduced costs or increased sales). EPA's analysis fails this very basic
tenet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, pp. 3-4]
One justification that EPA proffers for this irregularity is how it employs learning curves.
EPA assumes that technologies will become cheaper over time as manufacturers learn to produce
vehicles. While this is generally an accepted fact of new technologies, EPA doesn't clarify why
Ford producing more battery electric vehicles in 2027 because of EPA's proposed standards will
reduce the cost to Honda and Tesla. In essence, EPA takes a very generalized concept of learning
over a long-period of time across industry to incorrectly reduce the costs at a firm level. For this
to actually happen, some manufacturer like Ford would have to inform other manufacturers
about how they improved their battery production process and for that new process to have the
same effect on another manufacturer AND that other manufacturer being able to employ that
new technique within the same model year. All of these assumptions are ludicrous and do not
reflect how competing firms protect their trade secrets or how long it takes to design or change a
vehicle line. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, pp. 3-4]
Organization: Arizona State Legislature
2. The proposed rule fails to rely on a cost-benefit analysis. EPA did not rely on a cost-
benefit analysis to select the standards in the proposed rule, in contravention of statutory and
case-law requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 2]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB)
Regulatory Impact Analysis
CARB has reviewed U.S. EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA) and finds that
U.S. EPA's estimates of the costs and benefits associated with the proposed standards are
appropriate and broadly consistent, where applicable, with comparable assumptions California
used in its rulemaking. In general, CARB finds that U.S. EPA has taken a conservative approach
to estimating net benefits. Despite this conservative approach, there are dramatic net benefits
from even the most stringent alternative. CARB has identified three specific areas where U.S.
EPA is likely underestimating net benefits, explained below, although these are not intended to
represent an exhaustive list. While CARB does not necessarily recommend that U.S. EPA revise
its analysis based on these comments, these findings suggest that directionally the net benefits of
the proposed standards are even greater than what U.S. EPA has assessed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, p. 48]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
Our States and Cities add three observations to EPA's analysis of costs and lead time. First,
EPA's projected costs likely overstate the actual costs attributable to reaching the standards in
the allotted lead time, due to conservative assumptions in EPA's no-action case that omit the
myriad state and local actions to promote electric vehicle adoption. See supra 18-21; CARB
Comment at 16. Second, state and local agencies are implementing ambitious programs to ready
power grids and charging infrastructure for the increased adoption of electric vehicles and the
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associated increase in electricity demand, which further supports EPA's feasibility analysis.
Third, although internal-combustion-engine vehicles will make up a smaller portion of the
national fleet, it is imperative that EPA's standards continue to encourage the application of
feasible, cost-effective emission-reduction technologies to these vehicles, as they still represent a
significant source of GHG, criteria, and toxic pollutant emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0746, p. 33]
First, while we agree with EPA's decision to project the proposed standards' technology costs
out to 2055, to promote a robust comparison with the benefits also projected for the same period,
id. at 29,364-5, EPA should enhance the public's understanding of this rule's costs by providing
more context for these numbers. Because the automotive industry's light- and medium-duty
fleets are so large, the technology costs projected through 2055 are relatively modest when
distributed over the number of vehicles they cover: more than 400 million vehicles sold over
almost three decades. EPA should consider disclosing the aggregate technology costs in Table
160 as per-vehicle costs, as it has done in other parts of the Proposal. See id. Per-vehicle cost
figures are particularly informative, because auto manufacturers are likely to pass at least a
portion of these costs down to consumers, who will more than recoup any such price increases
through reduced operating and ownership costs. Id. at 29,328. And, in the same spirit that EPA
explored sensitivities to ACCII coming into effect, id. at 29,335, EPA should disclose to what
extent the proposed standards' projected costs through 2055 would be reduced if ACCII were
included in the no-action scenario. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 36]
Second, the auto industry has already invested hundreds of billions of dollars in transitioning
to electric vehicles. 189 These investments cover many of the technology costs that EPA
anticipates the industry will expend to comply with the proposed standards. While it may be
difficult to parse to what extent this investment responds to consumer demand, business strategy,
or state policies and to what extent this investment anticipates federal regulation, EPA should
note that the auto industry has committed at least some of the technology costs projected in Table
160 long before these standards were proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 37]
189 Noah Gabriel, $210 Billion of Announced Investments in Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Headed for
the U.S., Atlas EVHub (Jan. 12, 2023), available at https://www.atlasevhub.com/data_story/210-billion-
of-announced-investments-in-electric-vehicle-manufacturing-headed-for-the-u-s/ ("Vehicle manufacturers
and battery makers plan to invest $860 billion globally by 2030 in the transition to EVs. Nearly a quarter,
$210 billion, is expected to be invested in the United States, more than in any other country.").
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
The agency's proposal is audacious. Racing past the Biden administration's goal "to make
half of all new vehicles sold in 2030 zero-emissions vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in
hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles," 1 EPA has proposed that 60 percent of new light-
duty vehicles be battery electric by 2030, and 67 percent by 2032. This electrification mandate is
nominally in service of reducing greenhouse-gas emissions from the transportation sector. But
EPA has chosen a staggeringly cost-ineffective way to achieve this end. By the agency's own
math, the pro- posed rule would reduce C02 emissions from the baseline by 232 million metric
tons at cost of $86 billion during the compliance years of 2027 to 2032: roughly $370 per ton of
C02.2 That is a very bad deal. By way of comparison, reducing emissions by investing in nearly
any other energy efficiency or renewable energy technology would be at least four times
cheaper. See Kenneth Gillingham, The True Cost of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
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International Monetary Fund, Finance & Development (Dec. 2019),
https://www.imf.org/external/chinese/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/12/pdf/the true-cost-of-reducing-
greenhouse-gas-emissions-gillingham.pdf. Given this, the proposal is illogical, unless it is EPA's
intent to squander limited financial resources on the most expensive emission reductions, thus
effectively increasing net emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 1-2]
1 FACT SHEET: President Biden Announces Steps to Drive American Leadership Forward on Clean Cars
and Trucks, White House Briefing Room (Aug. 5, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/brief- ing-
room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-ameri- can-
leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/.
2 Emissions reductions are from Table 135, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,348. Costs include EPA's calculated vehicle
technology costs, Table 160, id. at 29,364-65 , Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) costs, Table
165, id. at 29,367, and refueling costs, Table 166, id. at 29, 367-68.
- Taxpayer subsidies: Taxpayers subsidize the sales of electric vehicles, charging
infrastructure, roads, and the electricity generation, transmission, and distribution required to
power these vehicles. The proposal currently ignores these costs, counting them instead as
"transfers."5 88 Fed. Reg. 29,369. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 6-7]
5 As described below, the many direct subsidies (federal and state electric vehicle credits, charging credits,
etc.) and regulatory subsidies (EPA multiplier credits, NHTSA multiplier credits, state ZEV credits, etc.)
result in real costs to taxpayers and the consumers of the many products that cross-subsidize these
"preferred" products. These costs cannot be treated as "transfers" that are cost-free, and they absolutely
cannot be treated as "transfers" to circumvent the economic significance prong of the major questions
doctrine.
C. The proposal manipulates timelines to inflate the benefits of the rule.
Finally, EPA's cost-benefit calculations are arbitrary because it extends its calculations to
2055. Thirty years into the future is far past the date when EPA can make reasonable projections.
The agency only chose this time frame because it provides enough time for abstract and
speculative benefits to "accrue," while very high initial costs of the proposal are averaged out or
ameliorated by future adoption of currently nonexistent technologies, efficiencies, and
improvements. This is all the more absurd when one considers that the social cost of carbon
inputs rely on projections about costs and benefits 300 years in the future. This is the time
horizon of science fiction and futurism, not technocratic policymaking under the Clean Air Act.
In the long run, no doubt, the accounts all balance out, but only because "[i]n the long run we are
all dead." J. Keynes, Tract on Monetary Reform 88 (1924) (emphasis omitted). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, pp. 22-23]
E. The sum of these miscalculations means that vehicle technology costs will be much
higher than the agency projects.
Taken together, each of EPA's unreasonable projections dramatically reduced projected
vehicle technology costs. Adding the additional costs missed by ignoring current cross
subsidization, underestimated battery costs, and the limited availability of Clean Vehicle tax
credits to the proposal's projected vehicle technology costs raises those costs from a total of
$59.6 billion between 2027 and 2032 to between $339 billion and $1.09 trillion during the same
span. See Figure 6. This is a cost of between $22,000 and $72,000 per electric vehicle sold. It
would be impossible for automakers to sell more than a tiny share of electric vehicles if those
vehicles were priced accordingly. Failing to account for the "cost of compliance" in this way
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violates the agency's statutory obligations and at the very least renders the rule arbitrary and
capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 24-25]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 6: Projected vehicle technology costs accounting
for cross subsidies, increased battery costs, and decreased availability of the Clean Vehicle
Credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 24-25]
IV. The Proposed Rule Fails to Adequately Consider Other Costs.
When an agency relies "on a cost-benefit analysis as part of its rulemaking, a serious flaw
undermining that analysis can render the rule unreasonable." National Ass'n of Home Builders v.
EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2012). EPA's cost- benefit analysis suffers from "serious
flaw[s]" on both sides of the ledger. First, as detailed at length above, the proposal dramatically
underestimates the vehicle costs. But the proposal also engages in an unreasonable cost-benefit
analysis in several other ways. The proposal underestimates the costs of charging infrastructure
while inflating the benefits of the rule: ignoring emissions when convenient, relying on
outrageous social costs of carbon calculations that rely on projections of benefits hundreds of
years in advance to inflate the present benefit, and gerrymandering vehicle class and compliance
timelines to obscure the real impacts of the rule. These flaws render the proposed rule
unreasonable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 32-33]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
Alternative 1 also provides greater pollution reductions and societal benefits than the
Proposed Standards. Under EPA's modeling, Alternative 1 would avoid 8,100 million metric
tons (MMT) of C02 emissions through 2055 relative to the No Action scenario, id. at 29203, tbl.
14, in contrast to the 7,300 MMT avoided under the Proposed Standards, id. at 29198, tbl. 3.
Alternative 1 also provides greater reductions in criteria pollutants and air toxics. Compare id. at
29198-99, tbls. 4 and 5, to id. at 29203-05, tbls. 13-16. In addition, Alternative 1 has greater
societal net benefits: ranging from $1,500-2,500 billion through 2055, id. at 29205-06, tbl. 17
(3% discount rate), depending on the values used for the GHG emission reductions, versus a
range of $1,400-2,300 billion under the Proposed Standards. Id. at 29200, tbl. 6. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 25]
V. Outside Analysis Demonstrates the Significant Benefits of Stronger Emission Standards,
Particularly Alternative 1 with a Steeper Increase in Stringency After 2030.
Outside analysis also shows the benefits of adopting final standards stronger than EPA
proposed. Environmental Resources Management, Inc (ERM), one of the largest sustainability
consultancies globally, was commissioned by NRDC to provide an independent, third-party
analysis of EPA's proposed standards and alternative proposals, as well as a recommended
approach. ERM's methodology, assumptions, and results are described throughout this section,
and the ERM report is attached to this comment letter. 104 ERM's analysis shows that
Alternative 1 with a steeper increase in stringency after 2030 would produce significant societal
benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 26]
104 Dave Seamonds, et al., ERM, Impacts of EPA Light-& Medium-Duty Multi-Pollutant Standards:
National Scenario Results, June 2023 [hereinafter ERM, Impacts Report] (attached to this comment letter).
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ERM's analysis employed a modeling framework that leveraged EPA's tools to inform and
develop inputs to ERM's Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) framework. It is important to note that
while this analysis is based on EPA's "baseline" scenario, we believe this "baseline" is
ultimately not an accurate reflection of a "No Action" scenario, as it is overly conservative. We
explore this further in Section XV, but ultimately the most relevant of the analyses that EPA
considered supports baseline ZEV sales greater than the baseline levels projected in the "EPA No
Action" scenario. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 26]
Where possible, ERM mirrored EPA's methodology to keep its analytical approach and
resultant comparisons consistent with EPA's approach in the Proposal, and to allow for an
apples-to-apples comparison. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 26]
ERM utilized EPA's CO-Benefits Risk Assessment (COBRA) Health Impacts Screening and
Mapping Tool to assess the public health benefits of the scenarios. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 28]
ERM conducted five interconnected analyses as part of this BCA:
- Fuel Use and Emissions: Specifically, ERM assessed changes in fuel consumption (for
diesel, gasoline, and electricity) and the tailpipe and upstream emissions associated with each
fuel change for GHGs (C02, CH4, N20) and criteria pollutants (NOx and PM) for the various
policy scenarios. Reductions in emissions are then monetized using EPA's COBRA model and
EPA's Social Cost of GHGs. 107 Because EPA's analysis (which this is intended to mirror)
neither reflects any policies to clean up the grid nor a future grid consistent with the
administration's climate goals, this likely understates disparities between scenarios with differing
electric car/light-truck deployment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 28]
107 ERM utilized the interim social cost of GHG values presented by EPA in DRIA Tables 10-13, 10-14,
and 10-15 (3 percent discount rate). Costs were escalated to 2021$ to be consistent with other costs in the
ERM model.
- Health Impacts: This analysis assumes reductions in NOx and PM under the various policy
scenarios to understand the resulting public health implications associated with reducing these
emissions and calculates changes in premature deaths, hospital visits, and lost workdays. The
analysis also monetizes these net health benefits. As above, these impacts are inherently
understated in an effort to mirror EPA's work. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 29]
- Economic Analysis: ERM assessed changes in consumer purchasing behaviors and vehicle
costs, fuel costs, and maintenance practices, and how these factors could change in a more
electrified fleet. This analysis also examines capital expenditures for charging infrastructure
investments (i.e., purchase, installation, and maintenance). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
29]
- Utility Impacts Analysis: ERM assessed impacts on utilities and their customers, including
an analysis of electricity used to charge vehicles and the incremental load to the grid. The
analysis also calculates utility net revenue (revenue minus costs) and potential reduction in
electric bills for all utility customers that results from this net revenue. The gap analysis shows
the infrastructure needs and associated costs under the different policy scenarios. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 29]
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Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law
C. EPA Should Better Contextualize the Proposed Rule's Economic Significance, in
Both Relative and Absolute Terms
EPA could better insulate the Proposed Rule from a future major questions challenge by
providing a more nuanced discussion of economic effects, both as compared to prior EPA
tailpipe rules and in absolute terms.64 In terms of relative costs, the Proposed Rule already notes
that the estimated average cost to manufacturers per vehicle is within the range of costs projected
in prior tailpipe rules.65 EPA could strengthen this point by also providing a table that
comprehensively describes annualized costs of prior tailpipe rules updated for inflation.66 This
table would bolster EPA's conclusion that the costs of the Proposed Rule are not exceptional.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 10-12]
64 EPA does make clear that the projected BEV penetration rate of 67% by 2032 should be compared to
the projected 39% penetration under the No Action case, not today's penetration rate. Compare Proposed
Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,329 tbl. 80, with id. tbl. 81.
65 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,343.
66 Governing for Impact & Evergreen Action, Comment Regarding NPRM "Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles" 10-12 (July 5, 2023).
EPA should further underscore this point by explaining that this cost similarity with prior
regulations obtains even though the Proposed Rule would simultaneously establish GHG and
criteria pollutant standards, instead of only one or the other. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601,
pp. 10-12]
In terms of absolute economic significance, EPA discusses BEV adoption primarily in terms
of the annual percentage of new vehicle sales,67 but an even more useful statistic would be the
percentage of BEVs out of all the vehicles on the road at a given time. First and foremost, doing
so would help the public better comprehend the rule's anticipated effects. It may be easier to
conceptualize increased vehicle electrification in terms of the percentage of vehicles on the road,
rather than the percentage of new sales. Presenting the data in this way would also help the
public to better understand how the Proposed Rule would affect transportation emissions, the
need for charging infrastructure, the demand for gasoline, and the demand for vehicle repair and
maintenance services. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 10-12]
67 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,329 tbl.80.
In terms of the major questions doctrine, reporting such data would provide compelling
context regarding economic significance. For example, under the proposed program, in 2032,
new vehicle sales would be 67% BEVs compared to 39% under the No Action case.68 But BEVs
would comprise only 21.2% of the total fleet compared to 15% for the No Action case.69 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 10-12]
68 Id. & id. at 29,329 tbl.81.
69 This presentation would also enable a more apt comparison to the stock numbers of electricity
generation that the Supreme Court noted in West Virginia's background section. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct.
at 2593.
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The RIA provides two figures that relate to this issue: Figure 9-1 depicts the total number of
internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles on the road every year under the proposed program,
and Figure 9-2 does the same for BEVs.70 Using EPA's data underlying these two figures,71
Policy Integrity generated the table below showing percentage rates by year for the No Action
case, EPA's proposed program, and Alternative 1. (For brevity, this table provides figures
annually from 2027-2032, and then every five years beginning in 2035.) EPA should provide
such a table or similar information in the regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 10-
12]
70 RIA at 9-2 tbls. 9-1, 9-2.
71 Optimization Model for Reducing Emissions of Greenhouse Gases from Automobiles, EPA (Apr.
2023), https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/optimization-model-reducing-
emissions- greenhouse-gases (download "Light- and medium-duty effects (zip); select
"20230315_091353_effects_central"; select "20230315_091353_cost_effects_annual.csv"; refer to
"registeredcount").
Table 1: Share of BEVs in U.S. Fleet by Year
Year No Action BEV % Proposed Program BEV % Alt. 1 BEV %
2027 5.2% 5.7% 5.7%
2028 6.9% 8.1% 8.3%
2029 8.9% 11.1% 11.2%
2030 11.0% 14.3% 14.6%
2031 13.1% 17.7% 18.0%
2032 15.0% 21.2% 21.6% [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 10-12]
2035
19.2%
30.8%
31.7%
2040
24.6%
44.1%
46.0%
2045
27.4%
52.6%
55.3%
2050
28.4%
56.6%
59.8%
2055
29.2%
58.1%
61.5%
61.5% [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 10-12]
As Table 1 illustrates, under both the proposed program and Alternative 1, the share of BEVs
out of all cars in the U.S. vehicle fleet compared to the No Action case increases gradually,
reaching less than seven percentage points higher than the No Action case by 2032. This
difference increases in later years. This relatively slow growth—particularly when viewed in
comparison to the share of all vehicles sold per year, which EPA provides in the Proposed
Rule—is not surprising given that cars remain on the road for many years, and the new cars sold
in a single year reflect a small percentage of vehicles on the road at that time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0601, pp. 10-12]
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B. EPA Should Conduct Additional Analysis Using the Discounting Approach Laid Out
in the Draft Update to Circular A-4
In economics, a discount rate translates impacts that occur at different times into a common
present value—the higher the annual discount rate, the less impacts further into the future are
valued relative to impacts closer to the present. In the Proposed Rule, EPA generally follows the
default approach to discounting laid out in the Office of Management and Budget's Circular A-4
by applying annual discount rates of 3% and 7%.84 While it is reasonable for EPA to rely on the
discount rates provided by federal guidance, it is now widely recognized that Circular A-4's
discount rates are outdated and too high.85 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 14-15]
84 OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS 33-34 (2003).
85 See, e.g., Peter H. Howard et al., U.S. Benefit-Cost Analysis Requires Revision, 380 SCIENCE 803
(2023); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, DISCOUNTING FOR PUBLIC POLICY: THEORY AND
RECENT EVIDENCE ON THE MERITS OF UPDATING THE DISCOUNT RATE.
In April, the Office of Management and Budget published a draft update to Circular A-4 that,
among other revisions, called for extensive changes in discounting to ensure that long-term
benefits and costs receive proper consideration in regulatory impact analysis ("Draft Circular A-
4 Update").86 Specifically, the Draft Circular A-4 Update proposes to lower the default, risk-free
consumption discount rate used in regulatory impact analysis from the current 3% to 1.7%, based
on updated data and extensive economic scholarship.87 Also reflecting current economic
literature, the update would eliminate the use of the opportunity cost of capital discount rate
(currently estimated at 7%) and replace it with the shadow price of capital approach.88 These
updates are consistent with the best available evidence and widely supported by the field's
leading experts.89 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 14-15]
86 OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4: DRAFT FOR PUBLIC REVIEW 9-11 (Apr. 6,
2023) [hereinafter DraftvCircular A-4 Update].
87 Id. at 75-76.
88 Id. at 78-80.
89 Howard et al., supra note 85.
EPA should apply the discounting approach from the Draft Circular A-4 Update in sensitivity
analysis if it finalizes this regulation before OMB finalizes that update, and consider applying
that approach in its primary analysis should OMB finalize the Circular A-4 Update before this
rule is finalized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 14-15]
Table 3 shows the net benefits of the Proposed Rule and Alternative 1 using the 1.7%
discount rate from the Draft Circular A-4 Update (except for climate benefits), which Policy
Integrity generated using OMEGA and inputting the 1.7% discount rate. A full result table with
all rows from EPA's benefit-cost tables is presented below in the Appendix, as Table A-l. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 14-15]
Table 3: Net Benefits Using 1.7% Social Discount Rate (2020$ Billion)
Proposed
Program Alternative 1
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3% discount rate, 3% average SC-GHG from Interagency Working
Group 1600 1800
3% discount rate, 2% average SC-GHG from EPA's 2022 Draft
Update 2500 2800
I.7% discount rate, 2% average SC-GHG from EPA's 2022 Draft
Update 3200 3500 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 14-15]
As Table 3 illustrates, the net benefits of both the proposed program and Alternate 1 roughly
double when a 1.7% social discount rate is applied (with a 2% near-term discount rate applied to
climate impacts consistent with EPA's draft SC-GHG update). As these updated discount rates
are used, the net benefits of Alternate 1 relative to the proposed program also increase. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 14-15]
II. Extensive Justification Supports EPA's Decisions to Omit a 7% Discount Rate and To
Discount Long-Term Climate Impacts at a Lower Range of Discount Rates than the Proposed
Rule's Shorter-Term Impacts
EPA applies the social cost of greenhouse gases estimates calculated at discount rates of
2.5%), 3%>, and 5%>,111 consistent with the Working Group's current recommendations, and
justifies its decision to return to its prior conclusion that a 7%> capital-based discount rate is
inappropriate for climate effects. EPA's return to a reasonable range of discount rates to assess
climate impacts is well supported—in fact, as recognized by both the Working Group in its 2021
updatel 12 and EPA in the Draft SC-GHG Update, 113 discount rates of 2%> or lower are
appropriate for valuing climate damages. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 17]
111 Note that just as there is growing evidence that the discount rate should be below 2%, there is growing
evidence that 5% is much too high a discount rate. The values at 5% should be considered a very
conservative lower bound.
112 2021 TSD, supra note 4, at 16-22 (offering extensive evidence for the use of lower discount rates and
recommending that agencies "consider discount rates below 2.5 percent" for valuing the social cost of
greenhouse gases); see also id. at 4 ("Consistent with the guidance in E.O. 13990 for the IWG to ensure
that the SC-GHG reflect the interests of future generations, the latest scientific and economic understanding
of discount rates discussed in this TSD, and the recommendation from OMB's Circular A-4 to include
sensitivity analysis with lower discount rates when a rule has important intergenerational benefits or costs,
agencies may consider conducting additional sensitivity analysis using discount rates below 2.5 percent.").
113 In the Draft SC-GHG Update, EPA applies a central near-term discount rate of 2%, with additional
valuations using near-term discount rates of 1.5% and 2.5%. The discount rates in the Draft SC-GHG
Update also decline over time. See Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 9, at 3 tbl.ES-1; id. at 52-61
(explaining discounting module).
The RIA cites the Working Group's arguments that, for long-term policies with
intergenerational effects, uncertainty and ethical considerations make a 7%> capital-based
discount rate inappropriate. 114 These arguments provide sufficient reason for EPA's approach to
discount rates. Moreover, additional justifications support EPA's discounting choices. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 17]
114 RIA at 10-11 to 10-12.
First, there is widespread consensus that the consumption rate of interest (which the 3%> rate
in the current Circular A-4 represents, and the Draft Circular A-4 Update pegs at 1.7%) supplies
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the correct framework for the analysis of climate effects—not the opportunity cost of capital.
While the current Circular A-4 suggests that 7% should be a "default position" that reflects
regulations that primarily displace capital investments, it also explains that "[w]hen regulation
primarily and directly affects private consumption ... a lower discount rate is appropriate." 116
The 7% discount rate is based on a private sector rate of return on capital, as private market
participants typically have short time horizons. By contrast, climate change concerns the public
well-being broadly rather than market participants narrowly. Indeed, the Draft Circular A-4
Update acknowledges this consensus, providing an updated consumption rate of interest as the
default risk-free discount rate and eliminating the use of the opportunity cost of capital approach
in regulatory impact analysis. 117 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 18]
116 Id. at 33.
117 Draft Circular A-4 Update, supra note 10, at 75-76, 78-80.
Third, a 7% discount rate also ignores catastrophic risks and the welfare of future generations.
As EPA showed in a recent cost-benefit analysis, the 7% rate truncates the long right-hand tail of
social costs relative to the 3% rate's distribution. 124 The long right-hand tail represents the
possibility of catastrophic damages. Thus, the 7% discount rate effectively assumes that present-
day Americans are barely willing to pay anything at all to prevent medium- to long-term
catastrophes. Given that Congress expressed its goal for the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
to "[ejnsure the protection of the public health and the environment, both of this and future
generations," it would not be reasonable for EPA to discount climate impacts at such a high rate
as to effectively ignore the welfare of future generations. 125 Moreover, as noted above, NEPA
requires agencies to consider the "long-range character of environmental problems," 126 and
citing this statutory requirement, the Council on Environmental Quality has advised agencies to
apply climate-damage valuations that "discount future effects at rates that consider future
generations." 127 The 7% discount rate simply does not meet that standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0743, p. 19]
124 EPA, Benefit and Cost Analysis for Revisions to Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the
Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, at 1-4 fig. 1-1 (showing the 7% discount rate
distribution).
125 H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, 34, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1112.
126 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(F).
127 Council on Env't Quality, National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change, 88 Fed. Reg. 1196, 1203 (Jan. 9, 2023).
Fourth, long-term time horizons counsel particularly strongly against applying a capital-
based rate. For instance, recent scholarship from Dr. Qingran Li and Dr. William Pizer finds that,
given their best estimate of the shadow price of capital, the appropriate social discount rate
collapses to the consumption-based rate within just several decades. Consequently, the longer the
time horizon of analysis, the less the capital-based rate is applicable— making the opportunity
cost of capital approach entirely inappropriate for long-term effects like climate change. 128
Citing this scholarship, OMB's Draft Circular A-4 Update centralizes the consumption-based
discount rate, which it estimates at 1.7%, as the appropriate risk-free social discount rate for
regulatory analysis. 129 Particularly given the long time horizon that analysis of climate policies
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demands, therefore, the capital-based rate is inapplicable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p.
19]
128 Qingran Li & William A. Pizer, Use of the Consumption Discount Rate for Public Policy Over the
Distant Future, 107 J. ENV'T ECON. & MGMT. 1 (2021); Qingran Li & William A. Pizer, Discounting
for Public Benefit- Cost Analysis, RES. FOR THE FUTURE 3 (2021).
129 Draft Circular A-4 Update, supra note 10, at 76.
Sixth, a 7% discount rate is inappropriate because it is based on outdated data and diverges
from the current economic consensus. Circular A-4's default assumption of a 7% discount rate
was published twenty years ago and was based on data from even earlier. 132 As OMB's Draft
Circular A-4 Update reflects, the economic consensus now supports the use of much lower
discount rates. In fact, that update drops the opportunity cost of capital approach altogether and
endorses a default, risk-free discount rate of 1.7% for all regulatory impact analyses. 133 In a
recent article in Science, nearly 20 experts expressed strong support for OMB's proposed
discounting update, explaining that the proposal is consistent with the leading scholarship in the
field. 134 Likewise, the Council of Economic Advisers has called for the use of lower discount
rates in regulatory analysis dating back to 2017.135 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 20]
132 The 7% rate was based on a 1992 report; the 3% rate was based on data from the 30 years preceding
the publication of Circular A-4 in 2003. Id. at 33-34.
133 Draft Circular A-4 Update, supra note 10, at 76.
134 Peter H. Howard et al., U.S. Benefit-Cost Analysis Requires Revision, 380 SCIENCE 803 (2023). Dr.
Howard and Max Sarinsky, the other corresponding author of the Science letter, are signatories on this
comment.
135 CEA Issue Brief, supra note 121, at 1; see also id. at 3 ("In general the evidence supports lowering
these discount rates, with a plausible best guess based on the available information being that the lower
discount rate should be at most 2 percent while the upper discount rate should also likely be reduced.").
Seventh and finally, a 7% rate is inappropriate because it is now widely recognized that social
discount rates reflecting the opportunity cost of capital, even when appropriate, are far below
7%. The 7% opportunity cost of capital rate reflects numerous factors that do not reflect social
returns including a private risk premium, land and resource rents, private returns to social
externalities, and market power. 136 Recent scholarship from Newell et al. adjusts for these
factors and finds an opportunity cost of capital discount rate below 3%. 137 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0743, p. 20]
136 Peter Howard & Jason Schwartz, Valuing the Future: Legal and Economic Considerations for
Updating Discount Rates, 39 YALE. J. ON REG. 595, 619-20.
137 Richard G. Newell, Brian C. Prest & William Pizer, The Shadow Price of Capital: Accounting for
Capital Displacement in Benefit-Cost Analysis, RES. FOR THE FUTURE (2023)..
C. EPA Should Update the Baseline to Ensure Full Consideration of the Inflation
Reduction Act
In regulatory impact analysis, the baseline refers to "the best assessment of the way the world
would look absent the proposed action."90 Developing an accurate baseline is important for
conducting benefit-cost analysis, but challenging when baseline conditions are in flux. That is
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the case here given last year's passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0601, pp. 15-16]
90 Circular A-4, supra note 86, at 15.
To model the baseline for the Proposed Rule, EPA adopts key variables from the Annual
Energy Outlook 2021 (AEO 2021), such as fleet size, new vehicle sales shares, fuel prices,
electricity prices, and vehicles miles traveled.91 However, AEO 2021 was developed before the
IRA's passage and thus does not include the effects of that law. While it was reasonable for EPA
to rely on AEO 2021 in this proposal, it should consider adjusting the baseline in the final rule to
fully incorporate the IRA's impacts. In particular, according to the 2023 version of Annual
Energy Outlook (AEO 2023), the IRA will decrease both short-run and long-run electricity
prices relative to the no-IRA case.92 AEO 2023 also projects that the IRA will decrease long-run
gas prices, with a minimal short-run impact.93 Gasoline and electricity prices are important
modeling inputs, as they affect the relative cost of ownership between ICE vehicles and BEVs
and thereby influence the sales of these vehicles. These prices also affect the fuel-cost savings,
the rebound effect, and related environmental impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 15-
16]
91 See RIA at 9-1.
92 See infra p. 30 fig.2 (difference between AEO 2023 with IRA (solid-blue line) and AEO 2023's "No
IRA" case (dotted-blue line)).
93 See infra p. 30 fig.l (difference between AEO 2023 with IRA (solid-blue line) and AEO 2023's "No
IRA" case (dotted-blue line)).
There are several potential options for EPA to consistently account for the IRA across
modeling inputs. One option is for EPA to adopt AEO 2023 for parameters where it currently
uses AEO 2021. This would presumably also entail updating future BEV penetration, which,
although EPA models separately, is based in part on parameters from AEO 2021. If EPA updates
its baseline to incorporate AEO 2023, it should beware that AEO 2023 models only certain
aspects of the IRA but does not include the producer-side battery tax credit.94 To blunt the
resulting potential underestimate of the IRA's full impact, EPA should consider using the "High
uptake of the IRA" sensitivity case provided in AEO 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601,
pp.15-16]
94 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Transportation Demand Module Assumptions 26 (Mar. 2023),
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/assumptions/pdf/TDM_Assumptions.pdf.
If updating the baseline to AEO 2023 is infeasible, a more feasible alternative may be for
EPA to continue to use AEO 2021 as its baseline and then add the IRA's impact on other
parameters on top of that. Data within AEO 2023 enables this type of assessment, as AEO 2023
provides sensitivity analysis in which it models the world with and without the IRA.95 This
enables a direct comparison to assess the IRA's effect on key parameters, including electricity
prices and gas prices. 96 As noted above, EPA should consider adopting the "High uptake of the
IRA" sensitivity case in AEO 2023 for comparison purposes.97 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0601, pp. 15-16]
95 See Projection Tables for Side Cases, Annual Energy Outlook 2023,
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/tables_side_xls.php (providing tables for "No IRA" case).
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96 EPA acknowledges that it has estimates of future retail electricity prices that account for the IRA and
that these estimates exhibit lower prices compared to a scenario without the IRA. But due to the absence of
corresponding information on gasoline price estimates under the IRA and a desire for consistency across
variables and model components, EPA opts not to use these estimates. RIA at 2-84.
97 See Projection Tables for Side Cases, supra note 95 (providing tables for "High uptake of the IRA"
case).
This modeling adjustment could have meaningful effects (though it's unclear whether this
would increase or decrease net benefits overall, and it would almost certainly not change the sign
or ordering of net benefits). According to projections from AEO 2023, the retail electricity price
for transportation could be lower by an average of 0.45 cents per kWh from 2027 to 2032 under
a high-IRA uptake scenario compared to a scenario without the IRA. This could translate to a
decrease of about $50 in the "generalized cost," 98 i.e. the purchase price net of vehicle
ownership and operation costs.99 The lower cost of operating an electric vehicle would translate
to greater BEV uptake than EPA projects in its baseline fleet. This suggests, among other
implications, that the Proposed Rule's compliance costs may be lower than EPA projects, since
automakers may already be closer to complying with the proposed standards under the baseline
than EPA recognizes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 15-16]
98 Considering the average EV efficiency at 3 miles per kWh, a reduction of 0.45 cent per kWh equates to
a savings of 0.15 cents per mile. Incorporating EPA's assumptions for consumer fuel-cost calculations in
their purchase decision—with an annual mileage of 12,000 miles, a 2.5-year fuel-cost valuation period, and
a fueling efficiency factor of 0.9—this saving translates to around $50 = 2.5(years)
x {0.15(0/mile) x 12,000(miles/year)-100(0/$) }-K). 9.
99 Both producers and consumers use this metric in their decisionmaking processes. See RIA at 4-2 to 4-4.
The Appendix below includes four figures illustrating the data presented in this section.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 15-16]
In addition to EPA's consideration of international reciprocity and cooperation in prior
rulemakings, agencies have also considered transboundary spillover effects in making key
decisions. As one example, when considering the "public interest" in the certification of natural
gas exports under the Natural Gas Act, 102 the Department of Energy routinely "considers]
international trade policy, foreign policy, and national security interests." 103 As another
example, the Food and Drug Administration also frequently considers international effects as
part of its regulatory decision making, and has recognized that such costs are particularly
relevant because "a portion of foreign costs could be passed on to domestic consumers." 104
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 16-17]
102 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a).
103 New Policy Guidelines and Delegation Orders from Secretary of Energy to Economic Regulatory
Administration and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Relating to the Regulation of Imported Natural
Gas, 49 Fed. Reg. 6684, 6688 (Feb. 22, 1984).
104 Requirements for Additional Traceability Records for Certain Foods, 87 Fed. Reg. 70,910, 71,071
tbl.2 (Nov. 21, 2022).
Courts have confirmed that agencies may—and, in some cases, must—take into account
international spillover effects. In 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management approval of an offshore oil drilling and production facility
after the agency concluded that domestic extraction would not affect international fossil-fuel
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supply and consumption. 105 As the court explained, because domestic production causes
"foreign consumers [to] buy and consume more oil"—and because that consumption "can be
translated into estimates of greenhouse gas emissions" that harms the United States—the agency
had an obligation to consider those increased foreign emissions resulting from domestic
action. 106 Two subsequent district court opinions similarly faulted Department of Interior
analyses for omitting the effects of domestic production on foreign demand and
consumption. 107 The fact that courts have required agencies to consider the spillover impacts
from foreign greenhouse gas emissions provides strong support for EPA's consideration of
spillovers from domestic emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 16-17]
105 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt, 982 F.3d 723, 738 (9th Cir. 2020).
106 Id.
107 Sovereign Inupiat for a Living Arctic v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 555 F. Supp. 3d 739, 764-67 (D.
Alaska 2021); citing Friends of the Earth v. Haaland, No. CV 21-2317 (RC), 2022 WL 254526, at
[Star] 14-15 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 2022).
Consistent with these examples, the Draft Circular A-4 Update recognizes that relevant
benefits and costs to consider in regulatory impact analysis include both effects that "result
directly from a regulation's domestic applicability" and those that result "indirectly from a
regulation's impact on foreign entities." 108 With regard to the latter category, the Draft Circular
A-4 Update explains that relevant impacts "include the effects of a regulation on U.S. strategic
interests, including the potential for inducing strategic reciprocity or other policy changes from
actors abroad or effects on U.S. government assets located abroad," which "are particularly
likely to occur when [a] regulation bears on a global commons or a public good." 109
Additionally, the Draft Circular A-4 Update states that relevant impacts include "those that occur
entirely outside the United States when they affect U.S. citizens and residents." 110 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 16-17]
108 Draft Circular A-4 Update, supra note 10, at 9.
109 Id.
110 Id.
As all of these examples illustrate, EPA's consideration of climate damages on a global scale
is consistent with how EPA and other agencies have exercised regulatory authority in numerous
contexts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 16-17]
A. EPA Is Required to Value Climate Damages, and Doing So Provides Balance to
EPA's Cost-Benefit Analysis
One objection to agency usage of the Working Group's estimates is that Congress, not the
executive branch, should set policy with respect to climate change. But EPA has broad authority
to assess climate impacts, and judicial precedent suggests that it must value climate- change
impacts as part of its regulatory impact analysis. In fact, assessing climate damages as part of its
regulatory impact analysis provides rationality and balance to EPA's approach—and does not, as
critics have suggested, inappropriately skew the analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p.
22]
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Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
The total benefits of the proposal exceed the total cost. Per EPA's estimate, the overall
technology cost of the proposal ranges from $180 billion to $280 billion for automakers (in 2020
dollars) through 2055. However, the consumers will benefit from the pre-tax fuel savings that
range from $450 to $890 billion, and repair and maintenance savings from $280 to $580 billion.
In addition, the social benefits include $330 billion in climate benefits and between $63 and $280
billion in criteria pollutant reduction benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 55]
The proposal states that the estimated average costs for automakers to meet the proposed
standards would range from $200 to $1,600 (in 2020 dollars) per vehicle in MY 2032, across the
range of sensitivities. Per EPA's analysis, this estimated MY 2032 average costs of $1,200
represent under three percent of the average cost of a new vehicle today (about $46,000 in 2022).
This cost resonates with previous 2012 and 2021 rules which estimated that the cost to meet
standards were about $1,800 (2010 dollars) and $1,000 (2018 dollars) per vehicle. Similarly,
previous ICCT analysis shows that the cost for an ICE vehicle to meet the 2012 rules or Tier 2
standards would range from $405 to $690,145. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 55]
145 Sanchez, F., Bandivadekar, A., and German, J. (2012). Estimated cost of emission reduction
technologies for Light-Duty vehicles. International Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/wp-
content/uploads/202 l/06/ICCT_LDVcostsreport_2012.pdf
Organization: Jack Spencer
The proposed rule's impact on low-income Americans is vastly under analyzed in the
proposed rule's publication in the Federal Register and the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0681, pp. 1-2]
Fully Monetize the Proposed Rule's Impact on Low-Income Households [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0681, pp.1-2]
Though the proposed rule acknowledges "that increases in upfront purchase costs are likely to
be of particular concern to low-income households," it goes on to state on page 29368 that "we
look more closely into, but do not monetize, the effects of the standards on low-income
households and on consumers of low priced new vehicles and used vehicles." [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0681, pp.1-2]
Neglecting to fully account for the monetized impact of a proposed rule on disproportionately
impacted populations is an inexcusable oversight and matter of gross negligence. Academic
research has long demonstrated that environmental regulations impose a higher cost on low-
income Americans as compared to the population generally.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0681,
pp.1-2]
2 Graham, John D., "Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics," University of
Pennsylvania Law Review," P. 521, 2008-2009,
(https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blog/grahaml57upalrev3952008pdf.pdf)
The reality is that environmental regulations increase vehicle costs substantially. One
academic study investigated the combined costs of all National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, and California Air Resources Board light
duty-regulations and found that they increased vehicle prices by $6,000 to $7,000. Put another
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way, environmental regulation increases the purchase price of most vehicles by 15-20 percent.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0681, pp. 1-2]
Given that 12.8 percent of Americans live in poverty3 and that the mean income for the
lowest two quintiles of American incomes is $13,165 and $34,7674, respectively, low-income
Americans are already being financially disadvantaged by environmental regulation. According
to Kelly Blue Book, the five least expensive sedans available in 2023 cost between $16,490 and
$18,500.5 At current prices, a new car is already beyond the reach of most low-income
Americans, which is one reason why only around 17 percent of low-income households purchase
new cars.6 Given that, according to Cars.com, the top five least expensive electric vehicles (EVs)
range from $27,495 to $35,4857, the proposed rule will undoubtedly make new vehicles
unaffordable for nearly all low- income Americans and make purchasing even used vehicles
more difficult, if not impossible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0681, pp. 1-2]
3 Benson, Craig, United States Census Bureau, "Poverty Rate of Children Higher Than National Rate,
Lower for Older Populations," October 4, 2022, (https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2022/10/poverty-
rate-varies-by-age- groups.html).
4 Bureau of Labor and Statistics, "Table 1101. Quintiles of Income Before Taxes: Annual Expenditure
Means, Shares, Standard Errors, and Coefficients of Variation, Consumer Expenditure Surveys, 2021,"
(https://www.bls.gov/cex/tables/calendar-year/mean-item-share-average-standard-error/cu-income-
quintiles-before- taxes-2021.pdf).
5 "Cheapest Sedans of 2023 & 2024," Kelly Blue Book, (https://www.kbb.com/cheapest-cars/cheapest-
sedans/).
6 Klein, Nicholas J., Basu, Rounaq, and Smart, Michael J., "In the Driver's Seat: Pathway to Automobile
Ownership for Lower-Income Households in the United States," Transportation Research Interdisciplinary
Perspectives 18, p. 4, " 2023,
(https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590198223000349#:~:text=The%20Survey%20of%2
OHouseh old%20Economics,compared%20with%2013%20%25%20of%20households).
7 "Here are the 11 Cheapest Electric Vehicles You Can Buy," Cars.com, June 23, 2023,
(https://www.cars.com/articles/here-are-the-ll-cheapest-electric-vehicles-you-can-buy-439849/).
This is an unacceptable outcome for any regulation as research firmly establishes that access
to a car comes with a litany of positive social benefits including upward economic mobility,
public safety benefits, and healthcare and education opportunities.8 Any public policy that could
threaten access to autos for low-income households should be a nonstarter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0681, pp.1-2]
8 Klein, N. J., "Subsidizing Car Ownership for Low-Income Individuals and Households," Journal of
Planning Education and Research, 2020, (https://doi.org/10.1177/0739456X20950428).
Conclusion
Research shows that low-income Americans too often carry the disproportionate financial
burden of environmental regulation. That is bad enough but this regulation goes further by
making car ownership more expensive and putting it out of reach of more people. Given that car
ownership is a key component for many Americans to lift themselves out of poverty, any
regulation that threatens such should be a nonstarter. Though ceasing any action on this
regulation would be the best outcome, I implore you to at the very least, take the time to fully
monetize and account for the financial burdens you are asking America's low-income families to
endure [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0681, p. 3]
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Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
The Agency's cost-benefit assessment is wrong, too, in large part because it leans so heavily
on the shaky "social cost of greenhouse gases" metric. And in EPA's rush to press forward "with
haste and ambition" to tackle climate change, Timothy Puko, Biden to remake U.S. auto industry
with toughest emissions limits ever, Wash. Post (April 12, 2023), https://bit.ly/3qBALKe, EPA
blows past red flags about the very possibility of achieving the Proposed Rule's aims—as well as
the serious consequences along the way. A more careful look at these issues shows why the
Proposed Rule, if left uncorrected, would damage our economy, tax our electrical grids and the
families and businesses who depend on them, and threaten our national security. For these and
other reasons explained below, the undersigned Attorneys General urge EPA to reconsider the
Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 3]
Organization: Office of Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon
The University of Wyoming, School of Energy Resources' Center for Energy Regulation and
Policy Analysis published a briefing paper on the proposed rule which analyzes the estimated
economic impact of the rule in its current form. There is a drastic difference in the EPA's claimed
economic benefits and the reality of the available data. I ask that the EPA take a hard look at the
valid disparities listed, and adjust their claims accordingly. If the EPA is pushing for mandated
EV technology, the full picture should be available for public examination. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0675, p.1]
Organization: Our Children's Trust (OCT)
We also ask that the EPA revise its Draft Regulatory Impacts Analysis so that it reflects the
true costs of climate change, the true benefits of more swiftly electrifying the transportation
sector, and utilizes no discount rate or a discount rate that does not discriminate against children
and future generations. EPA must align its rulemaking with the best available science to protect
children. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 1]
Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) claims that the benefits outweigh the costs for
their proposed Electric Vehicle (EV) Rule and purport $1.6 trillion ($1,600 billion) in "net
benefits" through 2055 (3% discount rate, with 3% SC-GHG). After reading through the 263
pages of the EPA's proposed rulel and the accompanying 688 pages of their Draft Regulatory
Impact Analysis (RIA)2, the EPA bases its $1.6 trillion "estimated benefits" on faulty premises,
biased data, and narrow economic snapshots. When updating the EPA's assumptions to realistic
values based on sound economics and real consumer data, their arguments hold no water and
their claimed "$1.6 trillion in net benefits" is reduced by nearly $3 trillion dollars and becomes a
realistic net $1,376 billion loss, as shown in Table 1 below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p.
2]
1 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-05-05/pdf/2023-07974.pdf
2 https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P 10175J2.pdf
Estimated Impact of EPA's EV Rule ($ billions)
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Cost
Category EPA Realistic Difference of
EPA vs Realistic
Pre-Tax Fuel Saving: $890 ($108) EPA
underestimated $998 billion
Vehicle Technology Costs ($280) ($1,228) EPA
underestimated $948 billion
Maintenance Savings $410 $72 EPA
underestimated $338 billion
Climate Benefit (3% SC-GHG) $330 $22 EPA
underestimated $308 billion
EVSE Port Costs (charging stations) + Grid Upgrades ($120) ($330) EPA
underestimated $210 billion
Repair Savings $170 ($4) EPA
underestimated $174 billion
Energy Security Benefits $41 $41 Did
not quantify
Air Pollutant Benefits $249 $249 Did
not quantify
Increased Refueling Time & Misc. Costs ($90) ($90) Did not
quantify
Estimated Net Impact $1,600 ($1,376) The
EPA's EV rule would cost the US economy $1,376 billion, an underestimation of $2,976 billion
from the EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 2]
Table 1 - The estimated impacts of the EPA's EV Rule for both the EPA assumptions and
realistic assumptions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 2]
Vehicle Technology Costs
The EPA vastly underestimates the added cost of EVs compared to their internal combustion
engine (ICE) counterparts. The EPA attempts to deceive the American people by using
manufacture-EV costs instead of consumer-EV costs that owners pay when purchasing their
vehicle. Correcting these EPA half-truths results in a more realistic "vehicle technology cost" of
$1,228 billion, a $948 billion cost increase from the EPA's calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0551, p. 3]
EPA Claimed Costs: $280 billion
Realistic Costs: $1,228 billion [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 5]
The EPA admits their proposed rule will increase the cost of building EVs. They claim the
rule will increase costs by an average of $1,200 per vehicle resulting in $280 billion (present
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value at 3 percent discount rate). However, they are not upfront about their claim, and the true
cost to the American economy is more than 4X greater. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 5]
The EPA is not comparing apples to oranges with their "vehicle technology costs." Notice the
other categories in their analysis such as "repair" or "maintenance" are costs paid by the
consumer, aka the owners of the EVs. However, for "vehicle technology costs" the EPA chooses
to use the costs paid by the manufacturers, which is far less than the costs paid by consumers,
and EPA gives no justification or acknowledgment of their inconstancy. The EPA's rule states
"These projected vehicle technology costs represent the incremental costs to manufacturers" 14
[1] and the EPA's RIA states "The costs in this section represent compliance costs to the industry
and are not necessarily the same as the costs experienced by the consumer when purchasing a
new vehicle" 15. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 5]
To find the true cost paid by consumers, one does not have to look for third-party
information... .the EPA themselves provide the purchase prices of new EV and ICE vehicles in
their analysis on page 296 of the RIA. The EPA shows that:
An EV sedan/wagon will cost $5,200 more than an equivalent ICE vehicle,
An EV CUV/SUV will cost $7,100 more than an equivalent ICE vehicle, and
An EV pickup will cost $3,500 more than an equivalent ICE vehicle.
This average is $5,266 more that an ICE owner can expect to pay for their new vehicle, 338%
more than the $1,200 claimed by the EPA. Scaling the EPA's costs up by 338% increases the
estimated "vehicle technology costs" from $280 billion to $1,228 billion ($1,288 trillion). This
lone category nearly wipes out the entire "net benefit" of $1.6 trillion claimed by the EPA.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 5]
14 Page 182 of EPA's Rule - https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-05-05/pdf/2023-07974.pdf
15 Page 657 of EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis -
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
Second, I will explain how the EPA has failed adequately to acknowledge and con- sider the
true scope of the colossal costs and burdens these proposals, if finalized, would impose on
American families, the U.S. economy, and our nation's security, and how, at the same time, the
Agency has wildly overestimated the benefits it claims will result from these proposed rules.
Because the key analyses and assumptions on which these proposals are based are so faulty and
ill-considered, if the rules were finalized in the form proposed, they would be arbitrary and
capricious in violation of the APA.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 2-3]
7 See id. § 706(2)(A) (providing that the reviewing court shall strike down a final rule found to be
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
This miracle of regulatory cost-benefit accounting cannot hold up under scrutiny. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 11-12]
EPA's consideration of direct cost factors is inadequate and incomplete. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp.11-12]
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EPA estimates that the light- and medium-duty rule will impose an additional technology cost
on automakers of between $180 billion and $280 billion,25 which EPA asserts will translate into
an average increase of $1,200 in the purchase price of a typical vehicle, an increase EPA
considers modest.26 The derivation of these cost estimates is murky and fundamentally not
credible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 11-12]
25 88 FR at 29200.
26 Id. at 29201.
EPA's estimates assume that in the "no-action world" (the future world as it would exist
without the proposed rules), battery-electric vehicle sales would ramp up rapidly from today's
levels and would plateau at around 40 percent of total U.S. light-duty vehicle sales by model year
2030, remaining at 39 percent through model year 2032.27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp.
11-12]
27 See id. at 29296-97, Figure 20.
This assumption depends on full implementation of the Agency's own prior carbon dioxide
emissions rule from 2021 (covering model years 2023 through 2026),28 which is currently
facing legal challenge in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. It also appears to depend
on implementation of CARB's previously finalized ZEV mandates and carbon dioxide emissions
restrictions (those that preceded CARB's Advanced Clean Car II proposals).29 Once again, these
CARB rules are only in effect because EPA approved them in a special waiver for California,
another EPA action under challenge in the D.C. Circuit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp.
11-12]
28 See id. at 29296.
29 See id. at 29296-97.
The combined effects of all three sets of regulatory edicts—the current proposals, EPA's 2021
rule, and the CARB rules—are closely interrelated and flow from the same policy choices of the
Biden administration. An accurate accounting of cost would recognize that these three regulatory
actions are part of a single integrated policy implemented through EPA. They are intended to
build upon each other, and in fact they do. EPA is presenting a deceptively compartmented
picture of the regulatory costs of its actions by treating the effects of its own 2021 rule and the
CARB rules that it authorized through its waiver decision as if they were exogenous background
facts. They are not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 11-12]
EPA's benefits analysis is flawed and arbitrary.
On the benefits side of the ledger, EPA claims sky-high monetized benefits from the asserted
reductions in carbon dioxide emissions—to the tune of upwards of a trillion dollars.64 These
estimates are based on predicted reductions in the amount of gasoline and diesel fuel that would
be burned if the U.S. auto fleet converts to EVs at the rates projected by EPA. But they
completely ignore the very large increase in carbon dioxide emissions that would necessarily
occur from the projected expansion in the production of EV batteries. They also ignore the
upstream emissions of carbon dioxide from the increased electricity generation that would be
needed to charge the projected fleet of EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 22-23]
64 See id. at 29200, 29344.
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EPA's refusal to account for these huge offsetting emissions of carbon dioxide fundamentally
distorts its analysis of net benefits in a manner that arbitrarily favors the Agency's preferred
regulatory outcome. It is, in fact, false and misleading to label EVs "zero-emission vehicles"
when the production of EV batteries and the charging of the batteries over the life of the vehicles
both generate enormous amounts of carbon dioxide. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 22-
23]
EPA's projections of benefits from carbon dioxide reductions are primarily based on the so-
called "social cost of carbon" models. However, as summarized in analyses pub- lished by my
colleague from The Heritage Foundation, Kevin Dayaratna, these models are deeply flawed and
unreliable. Among other things, they depend on outdated assumptions and fail to account for the
positive agricultural effects of higher carbon dioxide levels. Using more appropriate
assumptions, these models would show a social cost of carbon dioxide emissions that effectively
approaches zero.65 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 22-23]
65 See Kevin D. Dayaratna, "Climate Change, Part IV: Moving Toward a Sustainable Future," Testimony
before Subcommittee on Environment Committee on Oversight and Reform, U.S. House of
Representatives, September 24, 2020; Kevin Dayaratna and David Kreutzer, Loaded DICE: An EPA Model
Not Ready for the Big Game, Backgrounder No. 2860, The Heritage Foundation, November 21, 2013,
https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/loaded-dice-epa-model-not-ready-the-big-game;
Kevin Dayaratna and David Kreutzer, "Unfounded FUND: Yet Another EPA Model Not Ready for the Big
Game," Backgrounder No. 2897, April 29, 2014,
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/BG2897.pdf; Kevin Dayaratna, Ross McKitrick, and David
Kreutzer, "Empirically Constrained Climate Sensitivity and the Social Cost of Carbon," Climate Change
Economics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2017), pp. 1750006-1-1750006-12,
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S2010007817500063; and Kevin Dayaratna, Ross
McKitrick, and Patrick Michaels, "Climate sensitivity, agricultural productivity and the social cost of
carbon in FUND," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 22: 433-448 (2020),
https://link.springer.eom/article/10.1007/sl0018-020-00263-w.
Furthermore, EPA's proposal to count the purported benefits of carbon dioxide reduc- tions
on a global basis, as opposed to confining its estimates to domestic U.S. effects, is flawed and
inappropriate. Even if they were accurately estimated, which they are not, these global benefit
forecasts could not properly and reasonably justify the regulatory costs that the proposed rules
would impose on businesses and individuals in the U.S. It is more appro- priate and consistent
with the purposes of regulatory cost-benefit analyses for federal agen- cies to consider only the
estimated benefits that a proposed rule is expected to have domes- tically on the U.S. economy
and on persons in the United States.67 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 23-24]
67 Generally, federal agencies are authorized only to promulgate rules that apply domestically, unless the
federal statute under which the agency is acting clearly and expressly authorizes the agency to issue rules to
achieve benefits outside the territorial reach of the United States. Correspondingly, absent such a clear
statutory mandate, the requirement of a regulatory cost-benefit analysis imposed under Executive Order
12,866 and administered by OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is properly
limited to considering only the benefits the rule is expected to produce for the American people in the U.S.
These estimated values are the EPA's main focus in evaluating the claimed benefits of carbon
dioxide reduction. EPA pointedly avoids claiming that its proposed rules will achieve any
specific reduction in global temperatures. That is not surprising. Apparently, EPA wishes to save
itself the embarrassment of predicting a vanishingly small effect. Using the UN Climate Panel's
model for global average temperature effects, Bjorn Lomborg has shown that if every country in
the world achieved its stated EV targets by 2030, the total savings in carbon dioxide emissions
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would be expected to reduce global temperature by only 0.0002 degree Fahrenheit by the year
2100.68 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 23-24]
68 See Bjorn Lomborg, "If Electric Vehicles Are So Great, Why Mandate Them?," Wall Street Journal,
September 10, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/policies-pushing-electric-vehicles-show-why-few-
people-want-one-cars-clean-energy-gasoline-emissions-co2-carbon-electricity-l 1662746452.
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
Transfers and tax credits should be calculated as negative costs rather than positive benefits
Incorrectly, the study treats government subsidies and taxes as positive benefits rather than costs.
(See Tables 167 - 169.) These transfers are costs that the federal government incurs for the
purpose of altering consumer behavior. These transfer costs are not benefits to consumers but
instead are costs that taxpayers incur. The study incorrectly treats them as benefit. All of the
numbers in these tables, even if otherwise correctly calculated, should be negative, not
positive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 13]
Low discount rate
The study uses two discount rates, 3% and 7%. The 3% discount rate is below current federal
standards, and below rates used by private businesses in making business decisions, and below
rates used by private households in making household decisions. More realistic rates would be
7% and 10%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 14-15]
Organization: U.S. Chamber of Commerce
If these assumptions are indeed overly optimistic, then the ultimate costs of the rule could be
underestimated by tens of billions of dollars. This could in turn negatively impact not only sales
and auto sector employment, but it would also undermine the rule's potential emissions
reductions, as lack of affordability drives consumers to drive older, more polluting cars for
longer. In order to address this potentially major issue and better inform stakeholders and the
public of the rule's potential ramifications, the Chamber urges EPA to conduct sensitivity
analyses modeling sales and emissions reductions under a range of tax credit eligibility, income
limitations, and technology cost assumptions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0604, p. 3]
In addition, the Chamber is concerned that EPA projections regarding a number of subjective
and uncertain assumptions impacting vehicle technology costs and sales may be unrealistic. For
example, we have concerns with EPA's conclusion that it's standards will only increase vehicle
technology costs by an average of $1,200 per vehicle. This forecast is dependent on a number of
optimistic assumptions regarding technology progress, critical material input costs and
availability, as well as vehicle tax credit eligibility and individual MSRP restrictions. There are
similar questions related to total vehicle ownership savings stemming from charging costs,
vehicle maintenance, repair, insurance, etc. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0604, p. 3]
- Impacts on grid reliability and resiliency. The electric grid will be called upon to handle
increased demand during its own period of transition. By EPA's own estimates, deployment of
EVs as envisioned by the proposed rule would increase power demand by 114 terawatt-hours
(2.25 percent) nationwide by 2035. Some geographic regions and subregions will experience
higher changes on a percentage basis, and as EPA notes in the proposed rule, EV charging will
result in "large and abrupt electricity demand peaks" during certain periods of the day. This
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presents a major challenge for an electricity system that is now facing its most difficult reliability
challenges in decades, and in which an already accelerated loss of existing dispatchable
generating capacity could be exacerbated by EPA's concurrently proposed rule targeting these
same types of electric generating facilities. The Chamber urges EPA to undertake thorough
analysis of the impact of recent and forthcoming regulations and other policies on the cost and
feasibility of this proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0604, p. 3]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
D. EPA fails to adequately consider economic impacts of the proposed rule.
1. EPA's consideration of program costs is limited to manufacturers and purchasers.
EPA claims it is required to consider the costs only to the motor vehicle industry to come into
compliance with the new emissions standards. That is incorrect, at least with regard to these rules
that transform the vehicle market and are designed to address social policy. The cases EPA relies
upon—Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association Inc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1118 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) and Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 120, 128 (D.C. Cir.
2012)—are inapposite because they were not addressing "social cost" and were not creating
transformative changes to force a change from traditional combustion vehicles to ZEVs that
require wholly different manufacturing and fueling sources, consumer choices, and changes to
vehicle infrastructure. EPA must consider all the costs of compliance that are substantially
affected by its new standards, including costs on the manufacturers of the vehicles,
manufacturers of the batteries (including miners, refiners, and manufacturers of the battery
source materials) and other component parts of traditional combustion engines, manufacturers
and sellers of the fuels (whether electric or liquid fuels), consumers who must change their types
of vehicles and fuels, and any others who will be substantially impacted by these new mandates.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 31-33]
EPA has not quantified the following program costs:
Costs to utilities for upgrades of local electrical distribution systems to accommodate
increased PEV charging;" [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 31-33]
Costs to utilities for actively managing charging behavior to mitigate potential risks to
the electrical grid;156 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 31-33]
156 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29312 and DRIA at 5-37, 11-16.
Costs to ratepayers, especially economically-disadvantaged communities, who lack
the flexibility to charge off-hours and may incur higher electricity costs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 31-33]
Costs to states and communities relating to road wear by heavier vehicles, which
cannot necessarily be recouped via EV registration fees; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
31-33]
Lost state revenue due to loss of gas tax, which cannot necessarily be recouped via EV
registration fees; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 31-33]
Full impacts to drivers, including:
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o Loss of flexibility due to charging "dwell time;"
• Accounting for impacts to vehicles operating in remote areas, where higher
daily VMT are needed;
• o Accounting for impacts to drivers operating in areas with higher
electricity rates;
• o Loss of value in the secondary LMDV market; and
• o Costs associated with battery replacements;
• o Higher auto insurance premiums; and
• • Impacts to taxpayers footing the bill for BIL and IRA tax credits.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 31-33]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
We are concerned that EPA relies on MY 2019 as the base year fleet for its analysisl31 The
auto industry is in a period of rapid change. For example, the EV sales share grew from just 1.7
percent in MY 2019 to 4.4 percent in MY 2021132 Preliminary data show the sales share
roughly doubling in MY 2022 to approximately 8 percent. 133 In previous regulatory actions, the
agency stated that the vintage of the base year will "not normally have a significant impact" but
that certain broad shifts in the market, such as the average vehicle power-to-weight ratio, can
affect the incremental cost-effectiveness of technology application in the modeling. 134 The
significant growth in the EV market in recent years—a trend not yet visible in the MY 2019
data—would seem to constitute a "broad market shift" with potential impacts on agency
compliance modeling. For example, greater BEV volumes in the base year fleet could affect
credit-trading and technology application decisions in the model. If nothing else, greater EV
volumes in the base year fleet would imply greater growth potential and higher penetrations of
this technology by the end of the timeframe covered by the proposed standards and could support
greater stringency than the agency currently proposes. We encourage incorporation of the most
recent base year data available for the final rule in accordance with typical practice. 135 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 27]
131 See DRIA at 9-1
132 "Explore Trends Detailed Data," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, accessed June 30, 2023
https://www.epa.gOv/automotive-trends/explore-automotive-trends-data#DetailedData
133 See DRIA at 3-5
134 Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86
Fed. Reg. 151, 43,769 - 43,770 (Aug. 10, 2021)
135 EPA "will often attempt to utilize the most recent base year data," per Revised 2023 and Later Model
Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 151, 43,769 (Aug. 10, 2021)
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EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation commented that EPA must conduct a separate
benefit-cost analysis for each regulatory program and amendments that are embedded in the
multi-pollutant rulemaking, stating that Circular A-4 specifically instructs agencies to do so. The
Alliance also comments that a market failure analysis should be done to show why
manufacturers are not providing what consumer behavior should be demanding based on the
savings versus costs as presented in the NPRM. The Alliance also suggested that EPA must
decide whether to consider global or domestic climate impacts. The Alliance suggests that the
analysis is flawed since it considers global climate benefits but fails to consider environmental
damages that may occur due to the rapid expansion of supply chains for batteries.
AmFree commented that EPA had failed to properly consider the benefits of all possible
approaches to control, such as renewable fuels. AmFree also pointed out the inconsistency
between discount rates used for estimating program costs and benefits and those used for
estimating some of the climate benefits.
The American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers argued that EPA must conduct a full life-
cycle analysis. They also suggested that EPA was mandating a rapid shift from ICE to ZEV
thereby reshaping the American automotive market. They argued that the EPA was mandating a
transition from ICE to BEV without properly considering the availability of the technology in the
given timeframe and without considering all possible means of addressing policy objectives.
This commenter suggested that EPA had underestimated the costs of the rule. This commenter
also expressed concern over road wear and bridge deterioration caused by BEVs that are heavier
than ICE vehicles and lost tax revenues for road and bridge repair due to reduced gasoline
consumption.
The American Petroleum Institute (API) had several comments about GPF costs and
feasibility. API also commented that the cost reduction model used in battery cost estimation
seems to be based on a model used for part cost reductions driven by improved economies of
scale on fixed capital equipment. API suggests that raw material costs tend to increase with
increased supply. API also argues that EPA uses the concept of cost and price interchangeably
and that EPA should consider technical feasibility based on manufacturer costs regardless of
governmental taxation breaks for electric vehicles. API also argues that EPA should consider the
costs of additional solar, wind and hydropower plants since they are a necessary part of bringing
BEVs to market. API also seems to suggest that EPA consider the total costs of the rule, not only
the incremental costs of the rule over a no action future.
An anonymous commenter said that EPA's analysis suggests that manufacturers are acting
irrationally since some manufacturers have negative compliance costs in some years. This
commenter also suggested that EPA's learning curves imply that some manufacturers will share
trade secrets with other manufacturers since learning is applied across the industry rather than at
a firm level.
The Arizona State Legislature commented that the proposed rule failed to rely on a cost-
benefit analysis in contravention of statutory and case-law requirements.
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The California Air Resources Board (CARB) identified three specific areas where EPA is
likely underestimating net benefits: 1) use of the interim SC-GHG values; 2) vehicle demand
elasticity too high in absolute magnitude thereby overstating the effects of vehicle price
increases; and, 3) not properly considering possible lower cost residential charging in the EVSE
infrastructure cost estimates.
The California Attorney General's Office, et al., commented that EPA's analysis had
overstated costs by not considering state programs to promote electric vehicle adoption. This
commenter also argued for standards that would encourage the application of feasible, cost-
effective emission-reduction technologies on ICE vehicles given that they will continue to
represent a significant source of GHG, criteria, and toxic pollutant emissions. This commenter
also suggested that EPA present aggregate costs on a per vehicle basis and that EPA
acknowledge that much of the investment in electrification estimated in the NPRM has already
been incurred by auto makers and much of that was done, perhaps, for market reasons and not
regulatory requirements.
The Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al. commented that the proposal was racing past
the Biden administration's goal of 50 percent BEV sales by 2030. The commenter also appears
to consider the C02 reductions during 2027 through 2032 and compares those to the costs in
2027 through 2032 and suggests that the cost effectiveness of that C02 control is a "very bad
deal." This commenter also suggested that taxpayers subsidize the sale of electric vehicles,
charging infrastructure, etc., and the proposal ignores these costs and instead counts them as
"transfers." This commenter also accuses EPA of manipulating timelines to inflate the benefits of
the rule by extending calculations to 2055.
Environmental and Public Health Organizations commented in support of more stringent
standards on the basis that the benefits would be even greater.
The Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law suggested that EPA
provide a table that comprehensively describes annualized costs of prior tailpipe rules updated
for inflation to bolster the conclusion that the costs of the Proposal Rule and not exceptional.
They also commented that EPA should present not only the share of new sales that are BEV but
also the share of vehicles on the road that are BEV to better inform the public about the effects of
the rule. This commenter also suggested that EPA use discounting practices laid out by the
Office of Management and Budget in a draft update to Circular A-4 and suggested that EPA use
a discount rate of 1.7 percent and eliminate use of 7 percent. They also expressed support for
valuing the global impacts of climate benefits. They also suggested an update to the baseline by
moving away from use of AEO 2021 in favor of AEO 2023 to better reflect impacts of the IRA
on fuel and electricity and how those impact the effects of the rule. Further, the commenter
suggests that EPA use the high uptake sensitivity provided in AEO 2023 to better reflect the
producer-side battery tax credit of the IRA. This commenter also suggested that EPA consider
spillover impacts from domestic action on foreign oil consumption and emissions noting that the
Draft Circular A-4 Update recognizes that relevant benefits and costs to consider in regulatory
impact analysis include both effects that "result directly from a regulation's domestic
applicability" and those that result "indirectly from a regulation's impact on foreign entities.
With regard to the latter category, the Draft Circular A-4 update explains that relevant impacts
"include the effects of a regulation on U.S. strategic interests, including the potential for
inducing strategic reciprocity or other policy changes from actors abroad or effects on U.S.
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government assets located abroad," which "are particularly likely to occur when [a] regulation
bears on a global commons or a public good." Additionally, the Draft Circular A-4 Update states
that relevant impacts include "those that occur entirely outside the United States when they affect
U.S. citizens and residents."
Our Children's Trust commented that EPA should revise the analysis so that it utilizes either
no discount rate, or a discount rate that does not discriminate against children and future
generations, to reflect the true costs of climate change and benefits of electrifying the
transportation sector.
Jack Spencer commented that EPA did not fully account for the monetized impact of a
proposed rule on disproportionately impacted populations, and that the proposed rule will make
new vehicles unaffordable for nearly all low-income Americans and make purchasing even used
vehicles more difficult, if not impossible. This commenter encourages EPA to fully monetize and
account for the financial burdens to America's low-income families.
The Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al., echoed by Steven G. Bradbury,
commented that the cost-benefit assessment is wrong in large part because it leans so heavily on
the climate benefits and that the rule would damage our economy, tax our electrical grids and the
families and businesses who depend on them while also threatening our national security. The
commenter encouraged EPA to reconsider the Proposed Rule.
The Office of Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon pointed to a briefing paper submitted by
Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine at the University of Wyoming that estimated the economic
impact of the NPRM which showed a drastic difference in economic benefits compared to EPA's
analysis. Governor Gordon also suggested that EPA is pushing for a mandated EV technology
and suggested that the full picture should be available for public examination.
Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine commented that EPA's estimated benefits were based on
faulty premises, biased data, and narrow economic snapshots. Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
also commented with respect to EPA's vehicle technology costs claiming that EPA had
misrepresented our own costs in the presentation of our analysis.
Steven Bradbury commented that EPA had failed to adequately estimate the costs of the rule
since it built on the combined effects of three sets of regulatory edicts by CARB and EPA and
treated the effects of those edicts as if they were exogenous background facts which, in the
commenter's opinion, they are not. This commenter also argued that EPA ignored the increase in
carbon dioxide emissions that would occur from the expansion in production of EV batteries and
that EPA ignored the carbon dioxide emissions from the increased electricity generation needed
to charge BEVs. This commenter also commented that the social cost of carbon models failed to
account for the positive agricultural effects of higher carbon dioxide levels. This commenter also
commented that it is inappropriate for EPA to consider the global climate effects rather than
limiting the effects to domestic impacts.
The Heritage Foundation commented that EPA had incorrectly characterized the transfers
(i.e., IRA tax credits) by showing them as benefits rather than costs incurred by taxpayers. This
commenter also took exception to our use of a 3 percent discount rate as being below federal
standards and below rates used by private businesses and households. The commenter suggested
more realistic rates of 7 percent and 10 percent.
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The U.S. Chamber of Commerce suggested EPA conduct additional sensitivities to assess
sales and emissions reductions under a range of tax credit eligibility, income limitations, and
technology cost assumptions. This commenter also expressed concern over grid reliability.
Valero commented that EPA had failed to adequately consider all costs associated with the
transformation of the fleet to BEVs. The commenter also incorrectly suggested that the rule was
a mandate for BEVs. The commenter also stated that we have failed to consider costs associated
with road wear from heavy BEVs, charging "dwell time," electric utility and distribution costs,
loss of value in the secondary LMDV market, battery replacements, insurance and cost for
taxpayers footing the bill for BIL and IRA tax credits.
The Zero Emission Transportation Associated (ZETA) expressed concern that we were using
a MY 2019 base year fleet which has too few BEVs thus impacting available compliance credits
in the OMEGA modeling.
Response:
Regarding comments about vehicle demand elasticity, we respond to such comments in
Section 14 of this document.
Regarding comments from the Alliance, EPA disagrees that OMB Circular A-4 requires
federal agencies to conduct a benefit-cost analysis for each regulatory program and amendments
in the rule. OMB Circular A-4 (2003) is guidance designed to assist regulatory agencies by
defining and standardizing regulatory analysis. The guidance itself acknowledges that, "You will
find that you cannot conduct a good regulatory analysis according to a formula. Conducting
high-quality analysis requires competent professional judgment. Different regulations may call
for different emphases in the analysis, depending on the nature and complexity of the regulatory
issues and the sensitivity of the benefit and cost estimates to the key assumptions." An analysis
such as that suggested by the commenter would require a large number of assumptions about
how to allocate costs and benefits among various program elements and would not affect our
consideration of the final standards. EPA's benefit-cost analysis considers the entirety of the sets
of emissions standards and provisions included in this final rule, and EPA consulted with the
Office of Management and Budget during interagency review in developing the proposal and
again before finalizing this rule.
Regarding the claim that a market failure analysis should be conducted, EPA disagrees with
this comment since it implies that the action is being taken to provide consumers with operating
cost savings through lower fuel, repair and maintenance costs. This is not the goal nor purpose of
the action - we are issuing these standards under EPA's specific authority under the Clean Air
Act section 202, as described in Section III of the preamble for the final rule. As described by
OMB Circular A-4 (2003), "Before recommending Federal regulatory action, an agency must
demonstrate that the proposed action is necessary. If the regulatory intervention results from a
statutory or judicial directive, you should describe the specific authority for your action, the
extent of discretion available to you, and the regulatory instruments you might use." Under
EPA's authority to protect human health and welfare in the Clean Air Act section 202, the final
standards will address the market failure of air pollution, which is an environmental externality
borne by the public and not by the regulated entities. While the action is expected to provide
savings to consumers, those effects are ancillary to the purpose of the rule in reducing harmful
air pollutants. Market failures, however, do also help to explain why this rule is expected to
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result in savings to consumers and are discussed as they relate to vehicle sales in RIA Chapter
4.4, which accompanies this final rule.
Regarding the lack of consideration of environmental impacts associated with the battery
supply chain, see Section 19.1 of this document for more detailed responses regarding life cycle
analysis. It should be noted that in addition to vehicle emissions we also assessed the upstream
emissions impacts of EGUs and refineries, as discussed in Sections VI and VIII of the preamble
to this final rule.
Regarding the AmFree comment that EPA should have considered renewable fuels, EPA
responds to such comments in Section 19 of this document. As discussed in Section X of the
NPRM, section 211(c) requires a different regulatory framework and process for reducing
emissions through fuels standards and this rule was adopted under section 202(a) not 211(c).
Nothing in this rule precludes consumers from being free to purchase renewable fuels where
available or retailers from selling such fuels, and EPA continues to require increased use of
renewable fuels through the RFS program. See 88 FR 44468 (July 12, 2023). We note that our
modeled compliance paths are not required nor necessarily intended to show an "optimal
approach." Instead, our analysis is meant to show possible approaches that manufacturers could
choose to take in meeting this rule's performance-based standards, and the costs and benefits
associated with those potential approaches. In the final rule, we included analysis of several
possible pathways that could lead to compliance, including one pathway that considered a
possible future with no more BEVs than exist today (see Section IV.G of the preamble).
Manufacturers are free to adopt any of these pathways, or entirely different pathways, in
developing compliance strategies.
Regarding comments from the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, we disagree
that our analysis should be done on a life-cycle basis. Please see Section 19.1 of this document
for more responses related to life-cycle analysis. Also, EPA disagrees that the rule is a mandated
transition from ICE to BEV technology. Please see Section 2 of this document for more
responses noting that the rule is not a mandate. Regarding road wear, we respond to this
comment in our response to Valero here in Section 8.1 of this document. Regarding foregone
fuel tax revenues, we present those in our discussion of transfers in Section VIII of the preamble
and Chapter 9 of the RIA. We also present there the estimated impacts on state sales tax
revenues.
Regarding API's comments surrounding GPF costs and feasibility, please see Sections 4 and
12.3 of this document for responses related to this issue. API incorrectly states that EPA's "cost
reduction model" is used for cost reductions driven by economies of scale. It is not meant to do
so and instead is meant to reflect cost reductions from learning-by-doing. Regarding the
suggestion that costs for raw materials increase with increasing supply, please refer to Section 15
of this document for comments related to raw materials. Regarding cost and price being used
interchangeably, we have made every effort not to do so. Importantly, EPA does fully account
for the cost of technology independent of the purchase tax credit which is considered by
consumers in determining the demand for BEVs and PHEVs but not by manufacturers in
calculating their costs. In EPA's analysis, the battery tax credit is considered as part of the
manufacturer's costs, which we believe is appropriate since that tax credit serves to reduce costs
incurred by manufacturers. The Clean Air Act stipulates that EPA consider the costs to
manufacturers, among other factors, in determining the appropriate standards, and we believe it
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is most appropriate to consider not only the costs of the technologies themselves, but the fuller
picture of manufacturer costs which also encompasses the manufacturer incentives under the
Inflation Reduction Act. The purpose of these IRA provisions is to incentivize particular actions
by manufacturers, and we consider that disregarding these provisions would make our modeling
less useful in projecting what options are available to manufacturers. Regarding the API
comments that costs associated with additional wind and solar and hydropower should be
included in our analysis, we note that the IPM and Retail Price Modeling that was done in
support of the final rule includes consideration of all expected future power sources—
renewables, coal and natural gas. How those costs would be reflected in electricity prices is
included in our estimates. Regarding API's suggestion that EPA consider total costs rather than
incremental costs, EPA's benefit-cost analysis follows guidance from OMB Circular A-4
regarding the establishment of a reference, or "No Action," case against which to compare the
effects of the regulatory action.
Regarding comments from an anonymous commenter related to compliance costs, we respond
to such comments in Section 12 of this document. Regarding comments related to our learning
effects being applied industry-wide rather than by firm, we have done so because most
automotive parts and the costs for those parts, i.e., those to which we refer to as "direct
manufacturing costs," are purchased by automakers from suppliers. In the context of our
analysis, the learning that results in reductions to, for example, battery costs occurs not at the
vehicle manufacturer but rather at the relatively few battery suppliers to those vehicle
manufacturers. Furthermore, we account for the need for automakers to undertake continuing
R&D into batteries and other topics via our retail price equivalent (RPE) markups which account
for R&D at the individual firm.
Regarding comments from the Arizona State Legislature, as also explained in Section 2 of the
RTC, EPA disagrees that our standard setting must rely on cost-benefit analysis. Consistent with
CAA section 202, in evaluating potential standards we carefully weighed the statutory factors,
including the emissions impacts of the standards, and the feasibility of the standards (including
cost of compliance in light of available lead time). We monetize benefits of the standards and
evaluate other costs in part to enable a comparison of costs and benefits pursuant to E.O. 12866,
but we recognize there are benefits that we are currently unable to fully quantify. EPA's practice
has been to set standards to achieve improved air quality consistent with CAA section 202, and
not to rely on cost-benefit calculations, with their uncertainties and limitations, as identifying the
appropriate standards. Nonetheless, our conclusion that the estimated benefits exceed the
estimated costs of the final program reinforces our view that the standards are appropriate under
section 202(a).
Regarding comments from CARB, we note that we have updated our SC-GHG values (see
Chapter 9 of the final RIA for details). Regarding the vehicle price elasticity, please see RTC
Section 14. Regarding our EVSE cost estimates, we respond to such comments in Section 17 of
this document.
The California Attorney General's office commented that EPA should consider state
programs that encourage BEV adoption. EPA has conducted a sensitivity analysis considering
the Advanced Clean Car II (ACC II) program adopted by California and Section 177 states as
part of the No Action case. (See Section IV.F.l of the preamble). We have not included the ACC
II program in our central analysis for the rule because an EPA waiver for that program has not
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yet been issued. See Section 2 of the RTC for further discussion. We note that while costs of the
EPA program would be reduced by inclusion of the ACC II program in the No Action case, so
too would the benefits of the EPA program (see Section IV.F. 1 of the preamble). This
commenter also suggested that EPA's program should encourage more emission control of ICE
vehicles. The final program is expected to provide significant reductions in GHG and criteria
pollutant emissions from the light- and medium-duty fleet via a set of performance standards that
allow for several different pathways toward compliance. This is the traditional method taken by
EPA for mobile source emissions and allows for auto makers to choose which set of technologies
is best suited for their fleets to meet the standards, which could include a focus on reducing
emissions from ICE technologies.
Regarding comments that EPA present aggregate costs on a per vehicle basis, we do this
through 2032, the final year of new standards, which is consistent with our past practice. This
commenter also suggested that EPA acknowledge that much of the investment needed for the
transition to electrified powertrains has already been made or that EPA otherwise attempt to
parse the auto industry investment into electrification for market purposes from that done for
regulatory purposes. We note that the cost estimation approach we have taken—estimating
indirect costs including R&D and other such investment—via a retail price equivalent markup
requires that all products sold into the market carry its share of that indirect cost burden. As such,
arguing that some or much of the investment has been made, thereby reducing the need for
investment going forward, would be inconsistent with the approach of the analysis. The analysis
essentially assumes that product sales are funding ongoing operations and that future sales must
do the same.
Regarding the cost-effectiveness calculation done by the Clean Fuels Development Coalition
et al., we note that it is highly inappropriate to consider the costs of vehicles sold during the
years 2027 through 2032 and compare those costs to the emissions reductions of those vehicles
during those same years when, in fact, most of those vehicles will continue to operate and
provide emission reductions relative to their No Action emissions for another 25 or more years.
The commenters' approach includes the full cost of the technology but only a small fraction of
the benefits. Furthermore, we note that if the cost-effectiveness calculation included cost-savings
in the numerator, the cost-effectiveness measure would actually be a measure of the net savings
to consumers per ton of CO2 reduced, which provides an unusually favorable calculation.
Regarding taxpayers paying for portions of the rule via tax credits, we disagree that we have
ignored these costs. We present them in full transparency in Table 210, Section VIII.G of the
preamble. However, since these tax credits do not represent new taxes but rather new uses of
taxpayer dollars, they do in fact represent transfers and should not be included as social costs of
the rule. Regarding assertions that EPA manipulated timelines, we disagree. EPA has followed
long-standing practice for mobile source rules of conducting our analysis far enough into the
future such that the majority of the on-road fleet can be reasonably expected to be "turned over"
to vehicles meeting the revised emissions standards. In this case, we selected an analysis year of
2055, which is 23 years in advance of the final year of phase-in of the revised standards, 2032.
Because new vehicles tend to continue operating in the fleet for over 23 years, it is likely that the
light-duty fleet will not be fully "turned over" by 2055, meaning that EPA's analysis is
somewhat conservative and not capturing the fullest representation of emissions reductions under
the final standards. This practice is also consistent with OMB Circular A-4 guidance that states
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. .the time frame for your analysis should cover a period long enough to encompass all the
important benefits and costs likely to result from the rule."
EPA agrees with Environmental and Public Health Organizations that more stringent
standards would provide greater benefits. However, EPA must balance factors under the Clean
Air Act, and while we did consider the greater emission reductions of more stringent standards,
we also considered factors such as costs and lead time for the manufacturers, as required
considerations under the Clean Air Act. EPA's consideration of this balancing of factors to arrive
at the final standards is discussed in detail in Section V of the preamble. We note that, while our
analysis does not reflect EPA policies that are not yet set forth via final regulation, the analysis
does reflect projections that the Inflation Reduction Act incentives will result in a cleaner electric
grid.
Regarding comments from the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of
Law, we note that we have added some context regarding the final rule and how it compares to
past rules in the preamble (e.g., Section V of the preamble) and elsewhere in this RTC. We note
also that we have added a presentation of BEV and PHEV vehicles as part of the stock of
vehicles in the fleet, in addition to sales, to better inform the public of the rate of transition to
electrification within the fleet (see Chapter 8 of the final RIA). EPA agrees that the global
valuation of climate benefits is appropriate, and we respond to issues surrounding the SC-GHG
values in Section 8.4 of this document. Regarding suggestions to update the baseline by moving
toward AEO 2023, EPA agrees and AEO 2023 is in fact being used in the final analysis.
Regarding foreign spillover effects resulting from this domestic action, we respond to related
comments in Section 8.4 of this document.
In response to commenters who suggested that EPA use a discount rate lower than 3 and 7
percent, or no discount rate whatsoever, we note that we have applied a 2 percent discount rate in
the benefit cost analysis to accompany discount rates of 3 and 7 percent. While we were
conducting the analysis for the final rule, OMB finalized an update to Circular A-4, in which it
recommended the general application of a 2 percent discount rate to costs and benefits. The
effective date of the updated Circular A-4 guidance does not apply to the final rule; however, we
updated the analysis to reflect the updated discount rate guidance and to be consistent with
discount rate assumptions used to estimate the updated SC-GHGs (see Section 8.4 of this RTC
document). The application of a lower discount rate did not affect our consideration of the final
standards, nor did it change our conclusion that the total benefits of both the proposal and the
final rule far outweigh the total costs and therefore result in positive net benefits. Current
guidance does not recommend that federal agencies utilize a discount rate of zero in their
benefit-cost analyses.
Regarding comments from Jack Spencer and the rule's impacts on low-income Americans, we
respond to such comments in Section 13 of this document.
Regarding comments from the Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al., that the analysis is
wrong because it leans so heavily on the SC-GHG metric, we note that the rule is net beneficial
even before considering the climate benefits. The climate benefits only make it more so. As
discussed in Section V of the preamble, EPA is, consistent with its consistent past practice,
setting standards to achieve improved air quality consistent with CAA section 202 and is not
relying on cost-benefit calculations, with their uncertainties and limitations, in identifying the
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appropriate standards. Nonetheless, our estimated benefits, which exceed the estimated costs of
the final program, reinforce our view that the final standards represent an appropriate weighing
of the statutory factors and other relevant considerations. More specifically, for this rule our
assessment that the rule has positive net monetized benefits, regardless of the magnitude of those
positive net benefits, supports our view that the final standards represent an appropriate weighing
of the statutory factors and other relevant considerations. Thus, EPA disagrees that it is leaning
heavily on the SC-GHG metric, because regardless of the method used in quantifying the
monetized benefits of GHG reductions for purposes of this rulemaking, EPA would still find the
emissions reductions, in light of the cost of compliance, available lead time and other factors,
would justify adoption of these standards.
EPA disagrees that the rule would damage our economy. On the contrary, this rule will be
beneficial for U.S. competitiveness; automakers compete in a global economy and the rest of the
world also is transitioning toward cleaner transportation technologies. EPA also disagrees that
the rule will adversely affect our electrical grid and the families and businesses who depend on
them (see Section 18 of this document for our responses to grid reliability issues). Lastly, we
disagree that the rule will threaten our national security. In fact, as our reliance on foreign
sources of energy is reduced, we see benefits associated with energy security (see Section 21 of
this document for comment responses related to energy security).
Regarding comments from the Governor of Wyoming, we note first that we respond to the
Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine comments directly below. EPA also notes that the final rule is
not a BEV mandate but rather a set of performance standards under which manufacturers choose
the technologies they believe are best suited for their fleets, and that can be met via several
different pathways. We make this clear in Section IV of the preamble where we show
compliance with the standards via several technology pathways including one pathway that
involves no more BEVs than exist in the fleet today.
Regarding comments from Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine, EPA disagrees with the assertion
that our analysis is based on faulty premises, biased data, and narrow economic snapshots. EPA
has relied on the best available information in the public record, including consideration of
updated data submitted by commenters, in the final rule analysis, including the benefit-cost
analysis. The commenters provided more detailed comments regarding the line items in the table
included in the comment excerpt above and we respond to those comments elsewhere in this
document. For example, we respond to comments regarding vehicle technology costs in Section
12 of this document, fuel savings in RTC Section 8.3, maintenance and repair in RTC Section
8.2, climate in RTC Section 8.4, and air pollutant benefits in RTC Section 8.5.
Regarding vehicle technology cost comments from Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine, the
commenter asserts that EPA has underestimated new vehicle purchase prices. The commenter
points to EPA's own numbers of $5,200, $7,100 and $3,500 for a new sedan/wagon, CUV/SUV
and pickup, respectively. The commenter then does a straight average of these three values (i.e.,
not a sales-weighted average) to arrive at a result of $5,266 as the average price increase per
vehicle. The commenter notes that this amount is in sharp contrast to the $1,200 increase cited by
EPA. The commenter then incorrectly argues that EPA has reduced the price paid by consumers
to arrive at the $1,200 value by assuming the full $7,500 purchase tax credit available via the
Inflation Reduction Act. First, EPA did not in the proposal and still does not in this final rule
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assume the full $7,500 purchase tax credit would be realized on all BEV sales. The NPRM
analysis applied an average level of purchase tax credit to all BEV sales meaning that, while
some BEVs might receive the full credit others might receive less. The result in the NPRM
analysis being an average credit of $3,750 in 2023 ramping up to $6,000 in 2032 with a value of
$7,500 never reached, on average.
Importantly, Bonifas and Considine are mixing and matching numbers in the EPA analysis.
First, the $1,200 value reported by EPA was the average incremental cost for a new vehicle
under the proposed standards relative to the cost of a new vehicle under the No Action scenario.
In contrast, the $5200/$7100/$3500 values noted by the commenter and reported by EPA in
Table 4-7 of the draft RIA, were estimated prices of ICE vehicles versus BEVs under the
proposed standards. Comparing these numbers, the $1,200 to the $5200/$7100/$3500 is not
consistent since the $5200/$7100/$3500 values are not relative to a No Action scenario but are
instead comparisons of one powertrain to another within a scenario. This makes moot the scaling
of EPA's technology costs upward by 338% as suggested by the commenter. The commenter
also argues that the purchase tax incentive is paid by taxpayers and, therefore, does not increase
nor decrease the "net benefit" to the US economy. EPA agrees and that is why we do not include
the purchase tax credit as part of our net benefits calculation. EPA regrets that the commenter
may have misunderstood the point of the analysis presented in Table 4-7 of the draft RIA. It was
not meant to reflect the incremental costs of the proposal, nor was it meant to reflect the Benefit
Cost Analysis or net benefits of the proposal. Instead, it was meant to inform the public of the
out-of-pocket expenses that might occur for future buyers considering a BEV versus an ICE
purchase under the proposed standards.
Regarding comments from Steven Bradbury that we had failed to account for three CARB
and EPA edicts that were built into our analysis reference case, we note that those past programs
are final rules and final EPA actions which should not be considered in the cost or benefit
accounting of this action but rather, as we have done, as the reference case (No Action case)
from which this action should be measured. We disagree with the commenter that we are in error
on this issue. We also disagree that we have ignored power sector emissions that are expected to
charge the electrified vehicles we project under this rule. EPA has in fact considered these power
section emissions; please see Chapter 8 of the final RIA for an accounting of those emissions.
We acknowledge that we have not considered the emissions that would occur from the
manufacture of batteries while also noting that we do not consider the emissions that occur, or
any reduction that might occur, from manufacturing ICE vehicles and engines. See Section 19.1
of this RTC for additional discussion of life cycle emissions. As for the global vs. domestic
accounting of climate benefits, we respond to such comments in Section 8.4 of this document.
The commenter is correct that we have not estimated temperature impacts for many reasons, as
discussed in RTC Section 8.4.
Regarding the Heritage Foundation comments regarding transfers being shown as benefits, we
disagree with the assertion. The sign used in the table, positive rather than negative as suggested
by the commenter, was not meant to reflect benefit or cost. Instead, the mentioned tables simply
present the magnitude of the transfers. In the final rule, we have included state sales taxes so now
we present some transfers with positive and some with negative signs and make clear the nature
of the signs used. Further, while taxpayers do in fact provide the government with the money
necessary to pay those transfers, those payments by taxpayers do not reflect new costs. Instead,
this is money already paid by taxpayers and being used as appropriated by Congress. We
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consider them neither a cost nor a benefit and, instead, a transfer. Regarding discount rates, we
follow the guidance set forth in OMB Circular A-4.
Regarding the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, EPA has conducted additional sensitivities in the
final analysis although not necessarily those suggested. For example, we believe our sensitivities
regarding faster and slower BEV adoption and higher and lower battery costs generally address
the commenters' concerns about assessing a range of technology cost assumptions and a range of
eligibility for tax credits. We believe that we have conducted a sufficient set of multiple
sensitivity analyses to show that the final rule is reasonable and achievable. As for grid
reliability, we respond to such comments in Section 18 of this document.
Regarding comments from Valero, we disagree that section 202(a) should be interpreted
differently for this rulemaking than for prior rulemakings under section 202(a). EPA is engaged
in the exact same exercise, pursuant to the same grant of authority from Congress, as in prior
rulemakings. EPA is tasked with assessing what standards are appropriate in order to reduce
harmful air pollution, taking into consideration the "cost of compliance" with the available lead
time. It is well-established in case law, as the commenter notes, that "cost of compliance" here
refers to costs to the automakers. EPA disagrees that these rules are transforming the vehicle
market—as discussed in the preamble EPA is reflecting a significant shift in the vehicle market
but that shift is largely occurring due a broader set of factors, including Congressional action,
international markets, and automaker investments and business strategies. However, even if these
rules are contributing to that shift, there is no basis for altering the meaning of section 202(a).
Moreover, EPA notes that we have, consistent with our prior practice, considered a full range of
social costs, for purposes of the benefit-cost analysis, that go well beyond the costs to
automakers and encompass many of the topics identified by the commenter.
Thus, we have fully considered the costs associated with the BEV and PHEV technologies
relative to ICE technologies. We note that we are not requiring any consumers to change their
types of vehicles and fuels. In fact, we expect that under the final rule there will be a diversity of
vehicles for consumers to choose from, according to their preferences and needs. We fully expect
that ICE vehicles and hybrids will continue to be sold and that some consumers will choose
PHEV technologies. We respond to comments regarding EVSE charging and the grid in Sections
17 and 18 of this document. We acknowledge that we have not quantified road wear costs from
BEVs. We disagree with the commenter that there is evidence that the increased weight of
BEVs attributable to this rule will result in a significant impact on road or bridge degradation.370
At this time, we have not seen data to indicate that EVs will increase degradation of roads or
bridges, and we are not aware of any attempts to quantify the associated potential costs. (See
Section 11.1 of this RTC for more discussion of road wear and vehicle weight.) We have indeed
considered the costs of driver "dwell time" during charging. Please see Chapter 4.3.5 of the final
RIA. We have not considered loss of value in the secondary market because at this time we have
not seen data to indicate this is a valid concern. We have not considered costs of battery
replacements because we do not believe that is a concern for the light/medium-duty vehicle
market (see Chapter 1 of the final RIA and Section 12.2.5 of this RTC). For the final rule, we
370 We note that, as shown in Table 8-5 of the RIA, the projected increase in weight within vehicle classes is small
and is dwarfed by the increase in weight due from the shift from cars to light trucks and SUVs, which is unrelated to
the increased sale of BEVs.
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have included insurance costs for all vehicles in our benefit cost analysis. Regarding taxpayers
and tax credits, see our response above to the Heritage Foundation.
Regarding comments from ZETA, we agree that the base year fleet should be updated, if
possible, to reflect the most recent data available. As such, we have updated the base year fleet
for the final analysis and are now using a MY 2022 vehicle base year fleet.
8.2 - Non-emission costs and benefits
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Consumers (AFC)
Most notably, while "EPA projects lower maintenance and repair costs for several advanced
technologies (e.g., battery electric vehicles)," EPA has failed to properly consider the likelihood,
frequency, or expense of repairing or replacing a light-duty or medium-duty vehicle's battery due
to wear, accident, or malfunction; a repair or replacement of a battery for an electric vehicle
could potentially undo any cost savings projected by EPA in terms of "lower maintenance and
repair costs" for "battery electric vehicles." Indeed, as some sources have pointed out: "[tjhere
will be scenarios in which a new EV battery will cost more than the vehicle's value." Ronald
Montoya, Electric Car Battery Replacement Costs, Edmunds.com, May 2, 2023; see also id.
("On one hand, [battery replacement] costs might be cheaper than buying a new EV, but
spending $15,000 on a new pack for a car that might be worth $10,000 is a tough sell.").2 EPA
has failed to properly consider this aspect of the problem. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, p.
4]
2 Available at https://www.edmunds.com/electric-car/articles/electric-car-battery- replacement-costs.html.
Failure To Adequately Consider All Aspects Of The Problem
An agency rule is arbitrary and capricious if "the agency has relied on factors which Congress
has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, p. 4]
Here, EPA has failed to adequately consider all aspects of the problem and adequately address
crucial consideration that go to the validity of the proposal. This includes failure to properly
consider the rising price of electric vehicles in the wake of the Inflation Reduction Act, the limits
on credits and subsidies that have resulted from this surge in electric vehicle pricing, and the true
cost of repairing electric vehicles over a relevant time horizon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534,
p. 4]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
Shockingly, EPA provides no analysis of the impact of this rule on the U.S. biofuels or
agricultural industries. The U.S. is the world's largest biofuels producer, yet a search of the
DRIA reveals that the only mention of biofuels comes in a footnote describing the contents of an
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EIA Annual Energy Outlook table. Considering the implications for the biofuels industry, as well
as the significant impact it will have on the agricultural producers that supply the industry, this
glaring omission underscores the arbitrary nature of this rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 10-11]
The DRIA also relies on out-of-date cases from EIA's AEO 2021. In EIA's AEO 2023
released earlier this year, U.S. crude production is higher, as are U.S. net exports of petroleum
products, petroleum consumption is lower and U.S. refining capacity is lower. These changes
call into question the validity of EPA's estimate of the reduction in U.S. imports of crude oil that
result from the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 10-11]
Finally, EPA used a Low Economic Growth case from AEO 2021 to estimate the impact of
the proposed rule on oil imports, rather than carrying out an analysis specific to the changes in
demand that EPA projects to result from the proposed rule. Although demand in the Low
Economic Growth Case is lower than in the Reference Case, the oil demand decreases in the
Low Economic Growth case differ from the oil demand decreases EPA projects in Table 9-42
and there is no consideration of how those differences affect the oil security analysis. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 10-11]
Second, EPA concludes that the costs of the proposed rule would be offset by a $580 billion
reduction—which EPA counts as a "benefit"—in "mainte-nance and repair costs" that it expects
consumers to realize by shifting to elec-tric vehicles. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,372, 29,385. As support
for this enormous sum, EPA points to a single study suggesting that lifetime repair-and-
maintenance costs for electric vehicles will be less than for combustion-engine vehicles. See
Draft RIA at 4-32. In so doing, the agency unreasonably ignores countervailing sources
suggesting the opposite. For instance, Consumer Reports has found that consumers report more
problems with electric vehicles than combustion-engine vehicles—including issues with battery
packs, charging, electric drive motors, and heating and cooling systems unique to electric
vehicles. Jake Fisher, Tesla and Nissan Make the Most Reliable Electric Vehicles, Consumer
Reps. (Dec. 14, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/mryx9z6c. It also takes longer, and costs more, for
problems with electric vehicles to get resolved. Charette, Convincing Consumers. And there are
fewer qualified technicians to resolve them: out of 229,000 auto-repair technicians in the United
States, only 3,100 are certified for electric vehicles. Id. Moreover, if a manufacturer goes out of
business (much more common in the nascent electric-vehicle industry), purchasers of that com-
pany's vehicles will be on their own in seeking to repair the vehicles, without standard
manufacturer-servicing support. Beia Spiller et al., Medium-and Heavy-Duty Vehicle
Electrification: Challenges, Policy Solutions, and Open Research Questions, Res. for the Future,
at 13 (May 2023). Any final rule must explain why EPA's fuel-savings figures are realistic in the
face of this contrary evidence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 62-63]
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Organization: Anonymous
As explained below, EPA has placed its thumb on the scale to make it appear that BEVs are
perfect vehicles with no drawbacks, and that their proposal will increase the prevalence of these
magic vehicles at no costs to the American public. While BEVs are necessary to help address
climate change, EPA's analysis goes from neutral observer to biased participant. EPA should
revise its analysis to more holistic to the costs and benefits of BEVs and give the public an
opportunity to comment on these changes before finalizing any standards given that EPA has 4
years before the first year of their proposed standards are set to take effect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0565, pp.1-3]
1. Repair and Maintenance
EPA uses a non-rigorous, unscientific DOE study to selectively calculate maintenance and
repair benefits that favor their proposed action, which leads to inflating the projected net benefits
by half a trillion. EPA should not be estimating such a large and important factor using an
unscientific methodology, and if they are attempting to measure maintenance and repair costs,
they need to do so more comprehensively rather than just estimating the costs of maintaining and
repairing ICE engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, pp. 1-3]
For maintenance, EPA uses DOE's service schedule to estimate the differences in routine
maintenance between powertrains. In constructing the schedule, DOE admitted "[t]here was a
lack of publicly available real-world data" to directly estimate maintenance costs; instead, DOE
created schedules by looking at manufacturer recommended service intervals of 15 vehicles
(Comprehensive Total Ownership Report, Burnham, Gohlke, et al. 2021, 81). However, instead
of just sticking to what manufacturers' advised best practices, the authors augmented the
schedules by including more maintenance items based on "guidance from several experts". DOE
does not explain which services and mileages were derived from manuals and which were
derived from 'experts', but just generally cites to three sources. (The first source is from another
DOE report from 2012 (Vyas 2012); the Comprehensive Total Ownership Report notes that
maintenance costs decrease overtime on a per mile basis (72), which begs the question whether a
report, which isn't even based on data, from over a decade ago is still a valid 'estimate'). DOE
also excluded or misrepresented some obvious items. For example, manufacturers generally
recommend BEVs have a battery maintenance check every 6months to 2 years (see
https://www.quirkchevy.com/electric-vehicle-service-maintenance-best-
practices/#:~:text=Like%20every%20other%20car%2C%20truck,how%20your%20battery%20is
%20performing and https://lucidmotors.com/media/document/Owner's+Manual+-+Lucid+Air-
enUS_2022_30_l.pdf). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, pp. 1-3]
Another issue with DOE's report is the assumption that maintenance schedules are based
exclusively on how much a vehicle is driven rather than time. EPA's maintenance estimate fails
to consider that maintenance is also a function of an environment, rather than just use. For
example, EPA assumes that brake calipers will last 50% longer on BEVs than Ice vehicles
because of regenerative braking. But this assumption ignores that calipers can rust and erode in
the presence of salt, which would indicate that the lifetime is a measurement of time and
exposure to the elements, (see https://www.wagnerbrake.com/technical/parts-matter/automotive-
repair-and-maintenance/why-rust-on-my-
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brakes.html#:~:text=For%20those%20that%201ive%20in,that%20can%20corrode%20brake%20
components.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, pp. 1-3]
In general, the DOE and EPA approach is tilted towards BEVs from a methodological
approach. EPA assumes that the owner of an ICE or hybrid vehicle will maintain their vehicle in
perfect condition through the first 15 years of its life, while owners of electrified vehicles will
not maintain their vehicle's battery or other BEV specific parts, nor experience any
corresponding decrease in utility due to diminished capacity, such as battery range reducing over
time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, pp. 1-3]
The repair estimates contained in the DOE report that EPA relies upon are even more
egregious. The single DOE study that EPA relies upon, extrapolates repair estimates based on 3
BEV models: BMW i3, Fiat 500e, and the Soul Electric. The DOE study also assumes that these
three vehicles are comparable to the BMW 3 series, Fiat 500, and the Kia Soul, respectively.
Besides the extremely limited amount of observations which cannot produce statistically
significant results and prone to large errors, DOE's assumption that those vehicles are
comparable is misguided. For example, the BMW i3 was not built on the same chassis as the 3
series (https://www.klipnik.com/best-used-cars/bmw-i3-model-history-and-buyers-guide/), is a
different body type (the i3 is a hatchback while the 3 series is a sedan), and assumes that the
performance and style of the two vehicles are comparable despite the i3 being less stylish with
less interior room and slower acceleration (compare, for example, the 2021 i3
https://www.caranddriver.com/bmw/i3 with the 2021 3 series
https://www.caranddriver.com/bmw/3-series-2021). Perhaps the largest difference is how a
consumer would use an i3 compared to a 3 series. The i3 consistently had less than a 100 mile
range. It is absurd to expect that the i3 had the same consumer base and usage patterns that
would make it a strong data point to compare the maintenance and repair cost differential
between ICE and BEVs, and leads to a clear underestimation of how much an electric 3-series
would actually cost to repair (and maintain). DOE used those 3 similar-dissimilar BEV-ICE
vehicles to determine that BEVs have a 33% lower repair cost. This was not derived from any
statistically significant review of repair costs, and it's unclear how much VMT was driven in the
BEVs over the same time period as their ICE counterparts. Lower VMT could obscure the fact
that on a per mile basis, BEVs are costlier to repair. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, pp. 1-3]
The 'statistical methodology' portion of DOE's analysis is just as wanting. DOE uses MSRP
as a proxy instead of directly estimating repair costs and discounts based on the differences
observed in the three BEV/Ice vehicle pairings noted in the previous paragraph. This
methodology implicitly assumes that the most expensive ICE vehicles have comparable BEV
vehicles which are also included in the analysis, which in 2019 and earlier, is baseless. Hence
DOE implicitly compares the costs to repair and maintain a small, affordable BEV like the leaf
to something like a GM Hummer. A similar absurd analysis would be to look at the Toyota Prius
compared to the eHummer and assume that ICE vehicles on par use less energy to operate, are
cheaper to buy, and cheaper to maintain and replace than BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0565, pp. 1-3]
Perhaps the largest omission in EPA's analysis is considering what happens if BEV needs a
battery replaced. Battery replacements can cost well into the tens of thousands
(https://www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-guides/how-often-do-tesla-batteries-need-to-be-
replaced), and there's some evidence that some BEVs are 'totaled' even with minor damage
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because it doesn't make sense to repair and replace the battery pack (for example,
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a42709679/tesla-insurance-fixes-expense/). however, this
consideration is not included in EPA's analysis of repair and maintenance nor elsewhere in the
rule. This unaccounted for cost obscures the true cost of ownership, and if included, could flip
the estimated cost per mile of repair and maintenance costs from BEVs being net positive
compared to ICE vehicles to net negative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, pp. 1-3]
The DOE study that EPA relies upon also declines to estimate the maintenance costs of other
GHG reducing technologies, such as mass reduction, as they assume the cost would be
equivalent across powertrains; that assumption, however, can't be applied to the delta between
EPA's baseline and alternatives as those technologies will be applied in response to their
proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, pp. 1-3]
An ancillary maintenance and repair item excluded from EPA's analysis is the impacts of
BEVs on road maintenance, https://www.energylivenews.eom/2023/06/27/evs-cause-twice-the-
road-damage-of-petrol-vehicles-study-reveals/. BEVs are generally heavier than their ICE
counterparts, which causes more wear and tear on roads. If EPA is using a per VMT maintenance
cost, they can also easily include the increase in road maintenance costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0565, pp.1-3]
If EPA wants to include an estimate of maintenance and repair costs that shows 500 billion in
savings, it needs to be based on a scientific, rigorous and transparent process, and should be
derived from data that is statistically significant, otherwise, EPA is inflating the net benefits
based of imprecise estimates that have less than a 40 cents difference on a per mile basis. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, pp. 1-3]
Organization: Arizona State Legislature
6. The proposed rule relies on speculative and erroneous estimates for repair and
maintenance. EPA's assumption that electric vehicles will have lower maintenance and repair
costs than fossil fuel-powered vehicles is contradicted by data for service and repair visits and
insurance claims. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 2]
VI. The proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious because it relies on speculative and
erroneous estimates for repair and maintenance.
EPA believes "lower maintenance and repair costs for several advanced technologies (e.g.,
battery electric vehicles)" from the proposed rule "would result in significant savings for
consumers." 88 Fed. Reg. 29,199, 29,201. EPA relies on a single government-funded study,
which includes significant assumptions and data limitations. Id. at 29,384 n.794. Based on this
sole study, EPA calculates the proposed rule will save a staggering $75 billion in combined
repair and maintenance costs. Id. at 29,362. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 23-24]
EPA's conclusions are contradicted by widely available data. An analysis of the service and
repair visits for about 19 million vehicles between the 2016 and 2021 model years found that
electric vehicles cost more to repair than gas-powered vehicles.24 The study found that electric
vehicles were 2.3 times more expensive than gas-powered vehicles to service in the first three
months of ownership, and 1.6 times more expensive at the twelve-month mark.25 The study
blamed the increased time that technicians spent as well as the fewer number of technicians that
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could work on electric vehicles charging a higher hourly rate.26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0537, pp. 23-24]
24 Sean Tucker, Study: EVs Cost More to Repair, Less to Maintain, KELLEY BLUE BOOK, Aug. 17,
2021, available at https://www.kbb.com/car-news/study-evs-cost-more-to-repair-less-to-maintain/.
25 Id.
26 Id.
Insurance claims data includes similar findings. A study found repairing mid-size and luxury-
brand SUVs cost 53% more for electric vehicles than comparable gas-powered vehicles, and
27% more for small, non-luxury electric vehicles.27 The study found that electric vehicles had
more expensive driver assistance system sensors that were more likely to be damaged in a
collision, heavier battery packs that resulted in collisions with greater momentum as well as
more expensive materials to offset battery weight, and battery pack removal and reinstallation in
order to spray paint. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 23-24]
27 Jim Henry, Repairing an Electric Vehicle Could Cost More Than Gasoline Cars: A New Kind of Sticker
Shock, FORBES, July 25, 2022, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/jimhenry/2022/07/25/repairing-
an-electric-vehicle- could-cost-more-than-gasoline-cars-a-new-kind-of-sticker-shock/?sh=17c649ff5eee.
28 Id.
EPA also does not calculate the frequency or likelihood that a light-duty or medium-duty
vehicle will need to replace its battery due to wear or accident. Nor does EPA calculate the cost
of battery replacement. Battery replacement for a passenger vehicle can cost between $5,000 and
$15,000.29 One battery replacement could obviate any cost savings estimated by EPA for that
vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 24]
29 Devin Pratt, What Happens to the Old Batteries in Electric Cars, CONSUMER REPORTS, Feb. 23,
2022, available at https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/hybrids-evs/what-happens-to-the-old-batteries-in-
electric-cars-al091429417/.
EPA's failure to adequately consider repair and maintenance costs is arbitrary and capricious.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 24]
Organization: Betsy Cooper
VI. The proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious because it relies on speculative and erroneous
estimates for repair and maintenance.
EPA believes "lower maintenance and repair costs for several advanced technologies (e.g.,
battery electric vehicles)" from the proposed rule "would result in significant savings for
consumers." 88 Fed. Reg. 29,199, 29,201. EPA relies on a single government-funded study,
which includes significant assumptions and data limitations. Id. at 29,384 n.794. Based on this
sole study, EPA calculates the proposed rule will save a staggering $75 billion in combined
repair and maintenance costs. Id. at 29,362. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 23-24]
EPA's conclusions are contradicted by widely available data. An analysis of the service and
repair visits for about 19 million vehicles between the 2016 and 2021 model years found that
electric vehicles cost more to repair than gas-powered vehicles.24 The study found that electric
vehicles were 2.3 times more expensive than gas-powered vehicles to service in the first three
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months of ownership, and 1.6 times more expensive at the twelve-month mark.25 The study
blamed the increased time that technicians spent as well as the fewer number of technicians that
could work on electric vehicles charging a higher hourly rate.26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0537, pp. 23-24]
24 Sean Tucker, Study: EVs Cost More to Repair, Less to Maintain, KELLEY BLUE BOOK, Aug. 17,
2021, available at https://www.kbb.com/car-news/study-evs-cost-more-to-repair-less-to-maintain/.
25 Id.
26 Id.
Insurance claims data includes similar findings. A study found repairing mid-size and luxury-
brand SUVs cost 53% more for electric vehicles than comparable gas-powered vehicles, and
27% more for small, non-luxury electric vehicles.27 The study found that electric vehicles had
more expensive driver assistance system sensors that were more likely to be damaged in a
collision, heavier battery packs that resulted in collisions with greater momentum as well as
more expensive materials to offset battery weight, and battery pack removal and reinstallation in
order to spray paint. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 23-24]
27 Jim Henry, Repairing an Electric Vehicle Could Cost More Than Gasoline Cars: A New Kind of Sticker
Shock, FORBES, July 25, 2022, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/jimhenry/2022/07/25/repairing-
an-electric-vehicle-could-cost-more-than-gasoline-cars-a-new-kind-of-sticker-shock/?sh=17c649ff5eee.
28 Id.
Organization: Charles Forsberg
We conducted a series of workshops and wrote multiple papers on replacing all crude oil-
domestically and internationally. By definition, this includes everything covered in the proposed
EPA rule and all other uses of oil-based products. Based on those studies, the likely
consequences of the proposed EPA rulemaking are much higher costs for light vehicles, failure
to meet greenhouse gas reduction goals by decades, significant reductions in life expectancy and
major reductions in incomes of the bottom 60% of the U.S. population. A summary of the basis
for those conclusions and recommendations for EPA is provided herein. The recently published
open-access paper (below) provides more detail and includes references to support these
conclusions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, p. 1]
C. W. Forsberg, "What is the Long-Term Demand for Liquid Hydrocarbon Fuels and
Feedstocks?" Applied Energy, 341, 121104 (2023)
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2023.121104 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, p. 1]
Organization: Chevron
4. Feasibility and implementation.
Chevron is concerned that the rapid increases in forecasted BEV sales rate are optimistic and
may overstate the benefits of the proposals. The proposals may limit choices and increase costs
for consumers, including those in economically disadvantaged groups and smaller businesses.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, p. 6]
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BEV sales forecasts may rely on optimistic expectations for increased electricity generation
and charging infrastructure. EPA should conduct an assessment to account for the costs and
timing associated with upgrades to the nation's grid infrastructure, including new and upgraded
generation, transmission, and distribution, and the costs associated with the installation of public
and private electric vehicle chargers. If it is not feasible to complete expansion and
improvements for the current grid, it may not be possible to meet the additional demand created
by the proposed regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, p. 6]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
These aggregate costs include:
- Vehicle maintenance and repair costs. EPA underestimates maintenance costs in several
ways, not the least of which is by ignoring the massive expense of replacing an electric vehicles
battery. For example, a Tesla battery typically costs between $12,000 and $20,000 to replace and
is out of warranty after only 8 years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 5-6]
- Insurance costs. Electric vehicles are more costly to insure than conventional vehicles both
because they have a higher upfront sticker cost and "because of higher repair and replacement
costs for damaged parts." Mark Rosanes, Do Electric Vehicles Cost More to Insure Than
Gasoline Powered Cars?, Insurance Business (Oct. 28, 2022), https://www.insurancebusiness-
mag.com/us/news/auto-motor/do-electric-vehicles-cost-more-to-insure- than-gasolinepowered-
cars-42563 l.aspx; see also Benjamin Preston, Electric Vehicles May Cost More to Insure Than
Gasoline-Powered Cars, Consumer Reports (Apr. 27, 2023), https://www.consumerre-
ports.org/money/car-insurance/electric-vehicles-cost-more-to-insure-than- gasoline-powered-
a6372607024. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 6]
Organization: Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA)
Struggling with access to affordable transportation, however, is just one of the equity impacts
that has not been addressed by the U.S. EPA How will U.S. EPA address the systemic inequity
and energy injustice issues embedded in this rule beyond the financial burden that will be
caused? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp. 3-4]
For example, the practical use of EVs benefit wealthier users as well. Charging infrastructure
Is a critical component for EV usage, with access to chargers (and specifically fast chargers) a
major consideration in purchasing an EV. Wealthier users are far more likely to live In single
family homes where installation of a fast charger costing thousands of dollars is simply a matter
of fact. Lower income families who are more likely to reside in apartments or rented properties
do not have the option of installing their own personal dedicated fast chargers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0788, pp.3-4]
Even the location of charging infrastructure tends to benefit the wealthier, whiter, male
demographic that makes up 75% of the individuals who purchase EVs. A recent MIT study on
EVs and equity noted7:
"According to Hsu and Fingerman (43], Black and Hispanic neighborhoods only had 0.7
times the access to public chargers as the no-majority reference group in California. They also
determined that even when income, proximity to the nearest highway, and multi-family housing
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were controlled for, White-majority census block groups were 1.5 times more likely to have
access to public charging stations compared to Black- and Latino-majority census block groups."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp. 3-4]
7 sciencepolicvreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-electric-vehicles/
They also noted that public charging, when available to lower income communities, typically
costs more than home charging stating:
"This higher cost would disproportionately affect low-income households who already pay a
higher proportion of their income towards transportation." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp.
3-4]
By creating disparities in access to the "fuel" through charging network realities this further
exacerbates the differences in transportation equity between rich and poor. Combine that with
what is sure to be higher electricity prices from the requisite generation, distribution and
transmission infrastructure buildout required to meet growing electricity demand as is often the
case the poor will just keep getting poorer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp. 3-4]
Organization: Consumer Reports (CR)
3. The Proposed Standards Will Save Consumers Money
Over the past two decades, clean car standards such as EPA's GHG Standards for Model
Years 2023-2026, harmonized with the Department of Transportation (DOT) National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards,
have delivered $7,000 in lifetime fuel savings and a 30% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
from the average new vehicle over the last two decades. 11 At the same time, vehicles have
become safer, larger, and more powerful; but, most impressively, all of those improvements were
delivered with no (inflation-adjusted) increase in vehicle prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0728, pp. 8-10]
11 Vehicle Price Trends: Fuel Economy and Safety Improvements Come Standard, Consumer Reports,
February 21, 2023, https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/CR-Vehicle-Price-
Trends-Feb-21-202 3.pdf.
EPA estimates that its latest proposed standards for MY27+ will save consumers over $1
trillion through 2055 while reducing GHG emissions by over 7 gigatons. This result is consistent
with CR's analysis from 2021 which found that reducing emissions from new vehicles by 60%
by 2030 would save consumers $1.6 trillion through 2050.12 This proposal, when combined with
EPA's previous rule for model years 2023 to 2026, is consistent with that trajectory of 60%
reduction in emissions by 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 8-10]
12 Meeting Emissions Goals Will Save Consumers A Lot of Money, Consumer Reports, March 2021,
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Consumer-Reports-Vehicle-Emissions-
Standards-Fact-Sheet-3.22.21 -FINAL .pdf.
CR analysis shows that at an average gas price of $3.50/gallon, close to the national average
gas price in June 2023, an electric SUV would deliver an average of $1,700 in fuel and
maintenance savings every year. 13 A 2020 analysis by CR found that the most popular EVs were
already cheaper to own than the most popular and highest-rated gasoline vehicles in their class,
even factoring in the higher purchase prices of EVs. 14 That analysis has been updated for 2023
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in Section 5 of this comment letter. The findings are consistent with the previous analysis;
however now all 6 EVs analyzed show consumer savings in the very first year of ownership
when financed. This means that the average American buying a new, mainstream vehicle doesn't
have to wait for some point in the future to start saving money with an EV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0728, pp. 8-10]
13 New Consumer Reports analysis shows rising gas prices ramp up savings for EV owners, Consumer
Reports, March 10, 2022, https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/press_release/new-consumer-reports-
analysis-shows-rising-gas-pri ces-ramp-up-savings-for-ev-owners/.
14 New analysis from CR finds that the most popular electric vehicles cost less to own than the best-selling
gas-powered vehicles in their class, Consumer Reports, October 8, 2020,
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/press_release/new-analysis-from-cr-finds-that-the-most-popular-ele
ctric-vehicles-cost-less-to-own-than-the-best-selling-gas-powered-vehicles-in-their-class/.
Overall, EVs save an average of 60% on fuel and 50% on repairs and maintenance compared
to comparable gasoline vehicles. 15 Importantly, the 2020 study found that while EVs were
usually cheaper to own for a first owner who drove the vehicle for the first seven years, the
largest chunk of the savings flowed to a second owner who purchased the vehicle used. This is
because used vehicle buyers will pay less of a premium to purchase an EV, but will encounter
similar fuel savings, and even greater maintenance cost savings due to increasing maintenance
requirements for older ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 8-10]
15 Id.
Additionally, recent federal investments give consumers even more options to save on the
initial purchase or lease of an EV. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) offers tax credits of up to
$7,500 for the purchase of new EVs that meet certain manufacturing, vehicle pricing, buyer
income, and critical minerals requirements. A 2023 study from the International Council on
Clean Transportation estimated that these tax credits would make the average new qualifying EV
cheaper to purchase than the average new conventional vehicle by 2025, resulting in a large
boost in EV demand. 16 The IRA also includes tax credits of up to $4,000 for the purchase of
used EVs subject to certain income and vehicle price limits, helping to make EV's more
accessible to consumers who buy used vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 8-10]
16 Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act on Electric Vehicles Uptake in the United States,
The International Council on Clean Transportation, January 2023, https://theicct.org/wp-
content/uploads/2023/01/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23-2.pdf.
6.6. Inclusion of Maintenance and Repair Savings in Cost Benefit Analysis
CR supports EPA including maintenance and repair savings in their cost benefit analysis.
CR's research has found that in real world operations BEVs and PHEVs can both deliver around
50% savings compared to conventional gasoline powered vehicles.47 CR is in the process of
updating this analysis with more recent data and will share the results with EPA once it is
complete. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, p. 23]
47 New analysis from CR finds that the most popular electric vehicles cost less to own than the best-selling
gas-powered vehicles in their class, Consumer Reports, October 8, 2020,
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/press_release/new-analysis-from-cr-finds-that-the-most-popular-ele
ctric-vehicles-cost-less-to-own-than-the-best-selling-gas-powered-vehicles-in-their-class/.
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Organization: Daniel Hellebuyck
Weight: An EV can weigh up to 1 V2 times a comparable internal combustion engine (ICE)
vehicle. This creates more safety issues in a collision and more weight that our crumbling
infrastructure has to absorb. Furthermore, insurance companies may be charging higher
premiums to all customers to pay for the increased risk of injury and the larger costs involved in
repairing EVs versus and ICE vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0526, p. 1]
Organization: Delek US Holdings, Inc.
V. The Proposed Rule Severely Underestimates the Costs of BEVs
EPA claims that the Proposed Rule will somehow result in $200 to $220 billion in net benefits
for calendar year 2055, which represents less than the cost of vehicle technology and associated
electric vehicle supply equipment ("ESVE") required to meet the associated standards.30 As
industry experts have asserted, "the derivation of these cost estimates is murky and
fundamentally not credible," especially as EPA's estimate of the no-action alternative from
which all other proposals are compared to deceptively ignores the regulatory costs of the
Administration's current efforts to rapidly escalate electrification and automatically assumes that
"American car buyers will suddenly drop their resistance to EVs."31 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0527, p. 7]
30 Proposed Rule at 29,200 (based on present value (PV) of net benefits for calendar years 2027 through
2055, with discounting to 2027 using a 3 percent discount rate).
31 Steven G. Bradbury, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Prepared Statement for the hearing entitled
"Driving Bad Policy: Examining EPA's Tailpipe Emissions Rules and the Realities of a Rapid Electric
Vehicle Transition," before the Subcommittee on Economic Grown, Energy Policy, and Regulatory Affairs
of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Accountability, at 10 (May 17, 2023)
available at https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Bradbury-Prepared-Statement-for-17-
May-2023-Oversight-Hearing.pdf.
Despite the substantial price differences between ZEV and ICE vehicles, EPA's cost analysis
concludes—with little to no concrete support—that "the proposal would result in significant
savings for consumers from fuel savings and reduced vehicle repair and maintenance" and that
"[tjhese lower operating costs would offset the upfront vehicle costs."32 Instead of fully
accounting for these obvious costs, EPA relies heavily on incentives under the IRA, which apply
to a limited number and type of vehicles and taxpayers, and ignores the fact that incentives from
the IRA are still a "cost" to tax-paying consumers.33,34 EPA oddly accounts for potential
purchase incentives from the IRA for net consumer prices in its analysis, once again despite the
fact that this cushion is limited.35 Beyond the direct costs to the consumer, EPA fails to account
for costs associated with infrastructure impacts from increased operation of increased driving it
anticipates, including road and bridge deterioration and commensurate reduced funding for
infrastructure from fuel tax collections. Finally, EPA's failure to quantitatively analyze these
costs is fatal to its analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 7]
32 DRIA at xlviii.
33 See, e.g., DRIA at 2-86-87; Proposed Rule at 29,328.
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34 See, e.g., IRS, "Credits for New Clean Vehicles Purchased in 2023 or After" (Apr. 17, 2023), available
at https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/credits-for-new-clean-vehicles-purchased-in-2023-or-after (citing
IRA, § 30D).
35 Proposed Rule at 29,371.
b. BEV charging consumes significantly more time than refueling ICE-powered vehicles.
The Proposed Rule fails to consider the impact that increased charging times will have on
consumer adoption rates and whether end users will be willing to such disruptions to daily travel
in addition to the increased prices and upfront costs. According to DOT, Level 1 EVSE, which
provides charging through a 120-volt AC outlet, can take 40-50+ hours to fully charge (80%) a
BEV from empty; Level 2 EVSE, which offers a higher-rate AC charging and is typically used
for home, workplace and public charging, can take 4-10 hours to fully charge a BEV from
empty; and direct current fast charging EVSE, which provides rapid charging along heavy-traffic
corridors where already installed, can take up to an hour to fully charge a BEV from empty.42
Regardless of fast charging, most PHEVs currently on the market do not work with the DCFC
equipment.43 But under any scenario, these ZEVs will incur additional downtime for more
frequent, and longer, charging times as compared to the equivalent ICE. And faster charging
infrastructure is larger and more expensive, making it difficult for the average consumer to
comfortably travel unless there is sufficient access to fast and convenient charging. Yet the
Proposed Rule fails to consider whether, in light of these impacts, consumers will purchase
ZEVs at the rate necessary to meet EPA's targets regardless of whether a manufacturer can
produce them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 9]
42 DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, "Charger Types and Speeds" (May 4, 2023), available at
https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-basics/charging-
speeds#:~:text=EVs%20can%20be%20charged%20using,6%20hours%20for%20a%20PHEV.
43 Id.
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
A. Feasibility, cost, and lead time support final Class 2b and 3 standards at least as protective
as the proposal.
i. Costs for Class 2b and 3 ZEVs are rapidly declining.
Like light-duty passenger vehicles, the costs of zero-emitting medium-duty passenger vehicles
(Class 2b and Class 3) are rapidly declining. A recent study by Roush analyzed the upfront cost
and TCO of MY 2027 and MY 2030 Class 2b and 3 BEVs compared to their ICEV
counterparts. 115 The study also looked at the effect of IRA credits on BEV and charger purchase
price and TCO in the 2023 and 2027 timeframes. Roush assumed three different scenarios that
reflect increasing levels of cost: 1) the cost of electrification when migrating from a high-cost
ICEV to a low-cost BEV (lowest incremental cost); 2) the cost of electrification when migrating
from a medium-cost ICEV to a medium-cost BEV; and 3) the cost of electrification when
migrating from a low-cost ICEV to a high-cost BEV (highest incremental cost). Gasoline price
projections from the EIA's high oil price sensitivity case are used in Scenario 1, reference case
gasoline prices are used in Scenario 2, and gasoline prices from the low oil price case are used in
Scenario 3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 45-46]
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115 H. Saxena, V. Nair, and S. Pillai, "Electrification Cost Evaluation of Class 2b and Class 3 Vehicles in
2027-2030," May 2023. Roush. (Attachment T)
Figure 13 illustrates the incremental cost of electrifying Class 2b-3 vehicles under Scenarios
1, 2, and 3, without considering the impacts of the IRA. In Scenario 1 (the lowest incremental
cost of electrification), the powertrain cost of all BEVs analyzed is less than the equivalent ICEV
in the 2027-2030 timeframe, except in the case of the Class 3 pickup BEV300 (only MY 2027)
and BEV400. And in all scenarios (except for Class 3 pickup and delivery (P&D) trucks and
Class 3 vans in Scenario 3 in 2027), the powertrain cost of a BEV150 is less than the equivalent
ICEV. However, in Scenarios 2 and 3, BEVs with a 250-mile or greater range in all Class 2b-3
vehicle types have more expensive powertrains than a comparable ICEV in MY 2027 and MY
2030. In the case of the Class 3 pickup truck, introducing a longer-range BEV (300 and 400
miles) necessitates a heavier, costlier battery pack, motor and power electronics, resulting in a
more expensive electric vehicle. However, these costs are based on NMC811 battery technology,
and several technologies that are currently being developed to support higher efficiency and
lower production costs are expected to be available in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0786, pp. 45-46]
[See original attachment for Figure 13: Projected incremental cost of BEV over ICE
powertrain in 2027 and 2030 for Class 2b and 3] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 45-46]
Source: Roush, Electrification Cost Evaluation of Class 2b and Class 3 Vehicles in 2027-2030
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 45-46]
While the upfront cost of some medium-duty BEVs is higher than the ICEV counterpart, this
study concludes that over the life of ownership of all Class 2b-3 vehicles, BEVs are almost
universally less expensive to own and operate than comparable ICEVs, as shown in Figure 14.
Across the vehicle types and three cost scenarios considered by Roush, the TCO of BEVs
averages $0,334 per mile (ranging from $0,291 per mile to $0.39 per mile) while the TCO of
ICEVs averages $0,428 per mile (ranging from $0,336 per mile to $0,574 per mile). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 46-48]
[See original attachment for Figure 14: Projected range of total TCO per mile for Class 2b and
3 BEVs and ICEVs in 2027 and 2030]
Source: Roush, Electrification Cost Evaluation of Class 2b and Class 3 Vehicles in 2027-2030
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 46-48]
As shown in Figure 15 below, BEVs produce significant cumulative net savings compared to
ICEVs over their assumed lifetime of 12 years. Scenario 1 has the highest savings and Scenario 3
has the lowest savings. With the exception of certain vehicle types in Scenario 3 in 2027, all
BEVs across the three scenarios produce considerable savings compared to ICEV ownership. On
average, this study shows that consumers and fleets who switch to BEVs can save about $20,000
for a MY 2027 purchase and $25,000 for a MY 2030 purchase over the lifetime of the vehicle.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 46-48]
[See original attachment for Figure 15: Projected cumulative net savings of BEVs over ICEVs
over their lifetime] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 46-48]
Source: Roush, Electrification Cost Evaluation of Class 2b and Class 3 Vehicles in 2027-2030
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 46-48]
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Roush's study also evaluated the time it would take for BEVs purchased in MY 2027 and MY
2030 to achieve TCO parity with equivalent ICEVs. Table 13 below shows that under Scenario
1, all vehicles purchased in 2027 and 2030 achieve TCO parity within the first year of
ownership, except the BEV400 pickup, which achieves parity after the first year. Under
Scenarios 2 and 3, longer range BEVs take additional time to reach TCO parity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 48-50]
[See original attachment for Table 13: Time (in years) for BEVs to achieve TCO parity with
comparable ICEVs purchased in 2027 and 2030] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 48-50]
Source: Roush, Electrification Cost Evaluation of Class 2b and Class 3 Vehicles in 2027-2030
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 48-50]
To estimate the sensitivity of the TCO of ICEVs to recent high fuel prices, a sensitivity
analysis was performed using summer 2022 fuel prices. With ongoing geopolitical crises and
volatility in the oil and gas sector, per the EIA, the price of retail gasoline reached an all-time
high in 2022. Such high fuel prices have a direct impact on ICEV's operating expenses and TCO.
Using 2022 peak fuel prices, even the class 3 BEV400 pickup achieved TCO parity within 1-2
years of ownership. These results make a compelling case, especially from a consumer and fleet
savings standpoint, to electrify the class 2b-3 segment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp.
48-50]
Roush's study also examined the potential impacts of the IRA on Class 2b-3 BEV costs in the
near term (MY 2023) and the long term (MY 2027). They assumed economies of scale and
sufficient raw material supply to meet demands in the production of MY 2023 BEVs. The study
found that the incentives made available by the IRA will have a profound positive impact on the
cost of MYs 2023 and 2027 Class 2b-3 BEVs, helping to offset higher purchase prices of BEVs.
The results of this IRA impact analysis show acceleration of purchase price and TCO parity
across all vehicle types purchased in 2023 and 2027 under Scenario 1. In 2027, purchase parity
and TCO parity accelerate across all vehicle types and all scenarios. All BEVs achieve parity
within the first year of ownership upon purchase, except for the Class 3 pickup truck BEV400,
which achieves parity within 2 years of purchase. With clean vehicle credits (§30D) and charger
credits, BEVs' cumulative net TCO savings in MYs 2023 and 2027 average about $5,000 and
$27,000, respectively. And with qualified commercial clean vehicles (§45W) and charger credits,
BEVs' cumulative net TCO savings in MYs 2023 and 2027 average about $6,000 and $23,000,
respectively. Roush concludes that the purchase credit (§30D) and advanced manufacturing
production credit (§45X) can provide OEMs with a financial buffer against potential market
disruptions while also enabling them to produce BEVs at a competitive cost. On average, battery
pack costs could reach as high as $218/kWh, almost 187% more than the estimated pack cost of
$76/kWh, and still allow for purchase price parity within the first year of BEV ownership in MY
2027. Expected advancements in battery technology will further reduce battery costs and drive
down the TCO of BEVs even below the estimates developed in the analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 48-50]
Roush conducted a second study for EDF which expanded this analysis to PHEVs. 116 As
described in Figure 16 (Figure 6 from the Roush report), Roush projects that PHEV50s in the
Class 2b-3 segment will be very cost competitive with BEVs. Therefore, we encourage EPA to
include PHEV technology pathways in its analysis of GHG emission control from Class 2b-3
vehicles in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 48-50]
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116 H. Saxena, V. Nair, and S. Pillai, "Technical Review of: Alternative Powertrain Pathways for Light-
Duty and Class 3 Vehicles to Meet Future C02 Emission Targets," 13 March 2023. Roush for EDF.
See original attachment for Figure 16: Impact of the Clean Vehicle Credits on Class 3
vehicles in MYs 2024 and 2027] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 48-50]
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at NYU School of Law et al.
E. EPA Should Consider a Range of Rebound Effect Assumptions for BEVs While
Upholding Its Current Assumption for ICE Vehicles EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 18-20]
The "rebound effect" refers to "the additional energy consumption that may arise from the
introduction of a more efficient, lower cost energy service." 118 In the Proposed Rule, EPA
reasonably, and consistently with prior rules, assumes 10% rebound for ICE vehiclesl 19—
meaning that for every 1% improvement in fuel efficiency, there is a 0.9% drop in total fuel use
and a corresponding increase in vehicle miles traveled. EPA's adoption of a 10% rebound rate
for ICE vehicles is consistent with the literature. 120 EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 18-20]
118 RIA at 4-13.
119 Id. at 4-16.
120 See generally Inst, for Pol'y Integrity, Comments on Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards (Sep. 27, 2021),
While a wealth of economic literature supports a small rebound effect for ICE vehicles, there
is comparatively little economic research on the rebound effect for BEVs. Based on the research
available, EPA assumes a rebound effect of 0% for BEVs. 121 This rebound assumption has two
implications. First, it assumes that drivers do not switch their driving behavior when they switch
from an ICE vehicle to a BEV, 122 despite cost differences. 123 Second, it assumes that any
change in per-mile cost for BEVs, including from the introduction of more efficient BEVs or
fluctuations in electricity prices, does not affect driving behavior. In effect, EPA's projection of
no rebound for BEVs over the long term presumes that there is something fundamentally
different about consumer perceptions of BEVs compared to ICE vehicles, and not simply an
issue of familiarity or technological constraints that will be overcome in the future. EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 18-20]
121 RIA at 4-16.
122 Id. at 4-17 (stating that "BEVs are not driven more than ICE vehicles").
123 According to predictions from OMEGA, under the Proposed Rule, the average per-mile fuel cost of
BEVs is projected to be approximately 62% lower than that of ICE vehicles between 2022 and 2055. This
data is sourced from the '20230315_091353_MY_period_costs.csv' file in the
'20230315_091353_effects_central' folder, downloadable from the 'Light-and medium-duty effects'
section on EPA's website: https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/optimization-
model-reducing-emissions-greenhouse-gases
EPA's assumption of no rebound effect for BEVs relies on the empirical evidence available,
namely Chakraborty et al. (2022) and Nehiba (2022). 124 Although insightful, these studies leave
reason for uncertainty. For instance, both studies employ cross-sectional data and do not fully
address the endogeneity between vehicle choices and usage, which is discussed further below.
This correlation between consumer vehicle choices and usage could significantly vary between
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early adopters of BEVs and average ICE vehicle owners, thereby impacting the study
conclusions. While these studies contribute to the emerging body of research in this field, their
findings should thus be interpreted with some caution. Beyond Chakraborty et al. (2022) and
Nehiba (2022), we are aware of several other studies that purport to use better data and
identifying assumptions and also find zero rebound for electric vehicles (but do not yet have
working papers available). 125 EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 18-20]
124 RIA at 4-14.
125 Wendan Zhang et al., Brookings Institution Electric Vehicle Adoption and Combustion Mile
Displacement Across Demographics: Short Run Evidence and Implications For Policy, 2023 AERE
Presentation (finding a negative rebound effect for electric vehicles.); Beia Spiller, Kenneth Gillingham &
Marta Talevi. The Electric Vehicle Rebound Effect, 2023 AEA Conference.
While the available research provides some support for a 0% rebound rate for BEVs based on
historical evidence, there is reason to believe that effect may not hold in the future. One potential
explanation for the current BEV rebound findings is that "[cjonsumers are quite price inelastic,
because they are inattentive." 126 With the costs of BEV charging often consolidated into
electricity bills, this alteration in cost perception could augment price inelasticity, rendering BEV
owners less sensitive to per-mile cost variations. 127 But this effect may become less pronounced
as BEVs become more common. In particular, as infrastructure grows, electricity price salience
may increase as gas stations convert to charging stations and prominently display electricity
prices. Relatedly, the current literature could be shaped by the demographic profile of past and
current BEV owners—predominantly early adopters—who may not reflect the population that
purchases BEVs in the future. 128 As BEV penetration accelerates, the associated rebound effect
could potentially deviate from current estimates: Outside the vehicle context, economic literature
documents a small rebound effect as electrical appliances become more efficient, 129 which
could hint at similar patterns in the future for BEVs. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 18-20]
126 Xavier Gabaix, Behavioral Inattention at 311, in 2 Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications
and Foundations (2019).
127 See generally Ben Gilbert & Joshua Graff Zivin, Dynamic Salience with Intermittent Billing: Evidence
from Smart Electricity Meters, 107 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 176 (2014) (finding that households
tend to decrease their consumption in response to billing information—an effect that wanes as the bill's
salience fades); Steven Sexton, Automatic Bill Payment and Salience Effects: Evidence from Electricity
Consumption, 97 REV. ECON. & STAT. 229 (2015) (finding that automatic bill payments decreases price
responsiveness).
128 RIA at 4-14 (acknowledging that the available data is "not likely representative of the current and
future general population of car buyers and their driving behavior").
129 Kenneth Gillingham et al., The Rebound Effect is Overplayed, 493 NATURE 475, 476 (2013) (finding
a 10% rebound effect). Later, Gillingham et al. (2016) also highlight that the rebound effect for both
gasoline and electricity generally falls within a range of 5% to 40%, with the majority of studies suggesting
a rebound effect between 5% and 25%. Kenneth Gillingham et al., The Rebound Effect and Energy
Efficiency Policy, 10 REV. ENV'T ECON. & POL'Y 68, 75 (2016).
In light of these complexities and uncertainties, EPA should consider exploring a range of
possible rebound estimates for BEVs, including the same 10% assumption used for ICE vehicles.
EPA should conduct sensitivity analysis to assess the implications of a range of rebound effects
between 0% and 10%. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 18-20]
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Notably, such an analysis would have a very limited impact on EPA's assessment of net benefit. Policy
Integrity reran OMEGA using a 10% rebound rate for BEVs and found that this change decreased total net
benefits by just 0.43-0.71%, leaving the rule highly net beneficial overall. In fact, when total net benefits
were rounded to two significant figures, as EPA does in the Proposed Rule and RIA, they appeared
unchanged. (See Table A-l in the appendix below for full results.) This is likely because additional BEVs
resulting from the Proposed Rule make up a small share of the total fleet, particularly in the earlier years in
the analysis that are weighted more as a result of discounting. In future standards, the BEV rebound effect
could become more significant as BEVs make up a larger share of the vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0601, pp. 18-20]
Organization: John Graham
The DRIA does include an assessment of maintenance and repair costs for different
propulsion systems. The underlying study relied upon by EPA finds that the HEV has lower
maintenance and repair costs than ICEs. The BEV assessment is based on three low-volume
BEVs that are not representative of the BEV market. The assessment is tilted to favor BEVs by
omitting two significant impacts on maintenance and repair costs for BEVs; BEV weight and
long-term battery durability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 19]
The higher weight of BEVs will cause tires and brakes to wear out faster and the instant
torque response of BEVs may also increase tire wear, increasing BEV maintenance costs
compared with hybrids. However, the proposed rule states, "Specific to tires and tire
replacement, an issue often cited with respect to BEVs versus ICE vehicles, the authors noted
that their analysis assumed that tire life and replacement costs are the same for all powertrains."
(DRIA page 4-33). In reaching this conclusion the authors discussed irrelevant factors such as
tire rolling resistance, instead of acknowledging the impact of the higher BEV weight and instant
torque response - factors that clearly underpin the Goodyear claim "that traditional tires wear 30
percent faster when installed on BEVs" (Burnham, Gohlke, et al. 2021, 83). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0585, p. 19]
The DRIA page 4-33 also states, "the authors assumed that brake pad, rotor, and caliper
replacement intervals could be extended by 33% for HEVs and by 50% for PHEVs and BEVs,
relative to ICE vehicles". When considering only regenerative brake effects this is likely
accurate, but it does not account for the impact of the higher weight of the BEV on brake life.
When weight is also considered, the brake replacement intervals are likely to be similar for
BEVs and HEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 20]
Of course, the impact of increased BEV weight on tire and brake replacement intervals can be
addressed by installing larger tires and brakes, but this would both increase new vehicle cost and
would make replacement tires and brake parts more expensive. In either case, the impact of
higher BEV weight on tire and brake costs must be included in the Final Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0585, p. 20]
The Repair Costs Section 4.3.6.2 (DRIA pages 4-35 to 4-37) does not specify how - or even
if - battery replacements were included in BEV repair costs. Given the 30+-year vehicle lifetime
in OMEGA used for assessing repair costs (Figure 4-9), it is indefensible to assume zero battery
replacement costs for BEVs, especially for BEVs more than 10 years old. Given the extreme cost
of BEV battery repair/replacement, the repair cost curves in Figure 4-9 are likely to significantly
understate the repair cost for older batteries in BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 20]
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The BEV model with the longest run of real-world experience, the Nissan Leaf, has
experienced troublesome rates of battery degradation within the first half of the Leafs expected
life (Graham, 2021). It is instructive that most battery warranties for BEVs do not extend beyond
8 years or 100,000 miles of vehicle life.26 The NPRM refers to a claim that BEV batteries will
last longer than the life of the vehicle but, as noted by NAS in 2021, that claim is based on
laboratory tests. Real-world driving conditions are much more diverse (e.g., extreme temperature
conditions, extreme uses of batteries and so forth) and may contribute to battery degradation in
ways that lab tests do not cover.27 One specific concern with laboratory tests is that they can
only simulate cycle life, not battery life, and real-world experience with battery life beyond about
10 years is completely lacking. Since battery replacement costs are so large, they must be
addressed in the Final Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 20]
26 For data on the Leaf's rate of battery degradation and battery warranty policies, see John D. Graham.
The Global Rise of the Modern Plug-In Electric Vehicle: Public Policy, Innovation, and Strategy. Elgar
House Publishing, UK, 2021, 44-46.
27 National Academy of Sciences. Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy: 2025 to 2035. National
Academies Press. Washington, DC., 2021, 115.
It is worth noting here that the smaller batteries in HEVs do tend to last at least as long as the
life of the vehicle. However, that is due to the HEV's battery management system, which
restricts the range of the battery charge level, usually between 30% and 70% of a full charge.
BEVs require deeper charging cycles to accomplish the driving ranges that customers demand. It
is well known that deeper charging cycles contribute to the rate of battery degradation. Unlike
HEVs,28 BEVs also need to be designed to recharge as fast as possible, which also increases the
rate of battery degradation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 20]
28 JohnD. Graham. 2021, 154 (see footnote 26 above for full reference).
Another factor that has previously been ignored is vehicle insurance costs. "For many electric
vehicles, there is no way to repair or assess even slightly damaged battery packs after accidents,
forcing insurance companies to write off cars with few miles - leading to higher premiums and
undercutting gains from going electric."29 "According to online brokerage Policygenius, the
average U.S. monthly EV insurance payment in 2023 is $206, 27% more than for a combustion-
engine model."30 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 21]
29 Scratched EV battery? Your insurer may have to junk the whole car, Reuters March 20, 2023;
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/scratched-ev-battery-your-insurer-may-have-junk-
whole-car- 2023-03-20/?utm_source=CAR+General+Mailing+List&utm_campaign=afebc6e55f-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2023_02_08_09_40_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_-59328f5e21-
%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D.
30 ibid.
Compounding the problem, part of the forecasted future reduction in battery cost is
integration of the battery pack into the vehicle structure to reduce manufacturing cost. However,
this will just make the insurance problem worse:
"Sandy Munro, head of Michigan-based Munro & Associates, which tears down vehicles and
advises automakers on how to improve them, said the Model Y battery pack has "zero
repairability." "A Tesla structural battery pack is going straight to the grinder," Munro said."31
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 21]
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31 ibid.
The repairability problem can be improved, although not eliminated, by making batteries in
smaller sections, or modules, that are easier to fix, but this will increase battery pack costs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 21]
Given the high amount of embedded GHG emissions during battery manufacturing, the
repairability problem will also significantly reduce the GHG benefit of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0585, p. 21]
The intertwined issues of repairability, insurance cost, battery cost, and impacts on GHG
benefits should be incorporated into the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 21]
Organization: Missouri Farm Bureau (MOFB)
Similar to EPA's proposed HD rule, this proposal picks winners and losers by doubling-down
on electric vehicle (EV) technology, while increasing in adoption in the light-duty sector, only
represents 8.4 percent of light-duty production in MY 2022.2 While the proposed rule cites a
reduced total cost of ownership, EPA estimates it will raise "average upfront per-vehicle costs to
meet the proposed standards to be approximately $1,200 in MY 2032, as estimated using 2020
dollars."3 The proposed rule estimates that in order for automakers to comply with the emissions
standards, Battery Electric Vehicles (BEVs) will comprise up to 67 percent of new passenger
vehicle sales by 2032 and up to 46 percent of medium-duty vehicle sales.4 In addition to
increased purchase costs for EVs, MOFB is concerned about the lack of available public
charging stations to accommodate the vast number of EVs mandated by this rule, especially in
rural Missouri where most of our members live and work. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0590, pp.
1-2]
2 U.S. EPA Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and
Medium-Duty Vehicles, Vol. 88, Fed. Reg. 29184, p. 29189 (May 5, 2023) (to be codified at 40 CFR pts.
85, 86, 600, 1036, 1037 & 1066).
3 Ibid., 29201.
4 Ibid., 29189, 29331.
Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
EPA forecasts that the average marginal per-vehicle cost for regulated manufacturers (OEMs)
to comply with its proposed light-duty mandates will rise from $633 in MY 2027 to $944 in MY
2031, and projects that the marginal per vehicle cost of compliance will jump to approximately
$1,200 in MY 2032.12 For medium-duty vehicles, EPA's estimated average marginal per vehicle
OEM cost of compliance ranges from $364 in MY 2027 to approximately $1,800 in MY 2032.13
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 3]
12 88 Fed. Reg. at 29201, 29328, 29343; See also EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA) at 1
(able 11), 4-17, 13-25 (Table 13-45).
13 88 Fed. Reg. at 29328; DRIA at 13-52 (Table 13-127).
Importantly, these costs are in addition to those imposed by EPA in prior rules, which are
necessarily built into the cost of MY 2027 and later vehicles. EPA asserts, however, that higher
1414
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light- and medium-duty costs will be offset by purchase incentives arising from the Inflation
Reduction Act (IRA), and by lower EV operating costs. 14 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p.
3]
14 88 Fed. Reg. at 29201, 29328-29, 29344, 29364.
Organization: Nebraska Farm Bureau Federation (NEFB)
NEFB is Nebraska's largest farm and ranch organization representing all sectors of Nebraska
agriculture. Without a doubt, renewable fuels and the renewable fuels industry have been a
tremendous success story for the country and the rural economy. Nebraska's ethanol industry
alone contributes over $4.5 billion per year to Nebraska's economy according to a study
conducted by the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0660, p. 1]
Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
Maintenance savings: The EPA relies on unrealistic maintenance schedules pushed by car
salesmen and manufacturers instead of real data. This is an example of government bureaucrats
ignoring the simple real-world consumer data to sell a narrative to citizens. The myth that EVs
don't require maintenance is false, and because most mechanics have neither the training nor the
technology to work on EVs, EV maintenance commands a price premium. When switching to
realistic and reliable consumer maintenance cost information from Kelley Blue Book, the
maintenance savings decrease from the EPA's claimed $410 billion to a realistic $72 billion, a
$338 billion savings decrease from the EPA's calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p.
3]
Repair Savings: Like their maintenance calculations, instead of using real-world consumer
data, the EPA relied on elaborate multi-variable mathematical equations that include a
"multiplier" that inherently makes ICE vehicles -50% more expensive to repair than EVs.
Though EVs are supposedly in the shop less frequently, they're more expensive to repair when
they do go in5. This is in part due to the battery costs, which can be up to 50% of the entire EV's
cost. The battery health of an EV's contributes significantly to its depreciation and replacement
costs. Scaling the EPA's repair estimates using realistic and reliable consumer repair cost
information from Kelley Blue Book, the repair "savings" decrease from the EPA's claimed $170
billion to a realistic NEGATIVE $4 billion, a $174 billion savings decrease from the EPA's
calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 3]
5 https://www.gobankingrates.com/saving-money/car/experts-factors-to-consider-before-switching-to-ev-
electric- car/
Maintenance Savings
EPA Claimed Savings: $410 billion
Realistic Savings: $72 billion [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 6]
The EPA overestimates the maintenance cost savings in their proposed rule. They support
their maintenance cost estimates for the 15-year life of a vehicle (15,000 miles driven, per year)
from Argonne National Laboratory's study from 2021 17. The EPA claims a lifetime
maintenance cost for an Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicle of $20,050 compared to
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$12,675 for a Battery Electric Vehicle (EV)18. This corresponds to a maintenance cost for the
first-five-years of ownership of $3,710 for an ICE vehicle and $2,555 for an EV, a supposed
45% cost increase for ICE vehicles... [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 6]
17 https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1780970
18 Page 310 of EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis -
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
However, the EPA and Argonne base their calculations on "factory-recommended actions at
periodic mileage or calendar intervals." These maintenance schedules are unilaterally set by
automobile manufacturers and dealerships who are incentivized to boost their bottom line with
after-purchase services and don't necessarily have the best interest of the consumer in mind.
NAD A, the National Automobile Dealers Association, reports that 49.6% of dealerships' profits
come from the service and parts departments compared to only 26% profit from the sale of new
vehiclesl9. The question is: how many people follow the exact schedule of recommended
maintenance for their vehicle? The EPA admits this oversight by writing "in practice, not
everyone follows the recommended service intervals", yet they choose to ignore it in their
maintenance cost estimates and follow the biased, inaccurate schedule of car salesmen. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 6-7]
19 https://www.edmunds.com/car-buying/where-does-the-car-dealer-make-money.html
In contrast, the widely trusted Kelley Blue Book (KBB) company provides a "5-year cost to
own" figure20 based on continuously updated real-world consumer data instead of "factory-
recommended actions." KBB reports that ICE owners spend $4,583 and EV owners spend
$4,246 on maintenance during the first five years, only an 8% difference21. Compare that to
EPA's claimed 45% increase from EV to ICE and it is clear the EPA severely overestimated the
maintenance savings associated with their proposed rule. Scaling the EPA's maintenance cost
saving down from 45% to 8% dramatically reduces the estimated maintenance benefit from $410
billion to $72 billion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 6-7]
20 https://www.kbb.com/new-cars/total-cost-of-ownership/
21 https://www.nada.org/nada/nada-headlines/beyond-sticker-price-cost-ownership-evs-v-ice-vehicles
The EPA has many holes in its maintenance analysis, the largest bein g that they are not using
real-world consumer data. Furthermore, they are purposefully ignoring differences in EVs that
they are aware of, namely the EV tire problem. EV tires are more expensive and more advanced
because of the heavy battery weight of EVs and their faster initial acceleration, and their need for
noise reduction22. The EPA states "Specific to tires and tire replacement..., the authors noted
that their analysis assumed that tire life and replacement costs are the same for all powertrains...
Some BEVs are equipped with tires that differ from those on typical ICE vehicles to address
tread wear and the instant torque of BEVs making the issue raised by the authors a valid issue for
consideration... The authors did reiterate a Goodyear claim that traditional tires wear 30 percent
faster when installed on BEVs"23. Therefore, though the EPA is aware of the increased
maintenance cost for tires on EVs, they do NOT include that in their analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0551, p. 7]
22 https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-differences-between-gas-and-electric-vehicles-maintenance-
2020-4
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23 Page 309 of EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis -
https://nepis.epa. gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
Though there are relatively fewer moving parts in an EV than in an ICE vehicle, EVs still
require maintenance. Most mechanics do not have the training or the technology to work on EVs,
causing a supply constraint on EV mechanics for maintenance. Because of the lack of options,
mechanics that provide EV maintenance tend to charge a price premium, have long wait-times,
and are not located within proximity of all EV owners24. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 7]
24 https://www.gobankingrates.com/money/financial-planning/hidden-costs-of-electric-vehicles/
For these reasons and more, overall EV owner customer service satisfaction is 42 points lower
than ICE owner satisfaction. Automotive News reports that recall rates are double among EVs
and a lack of service advisor knowledge contributes to the lower satisfaction rating25. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 7]
25 https://www.autonews.com/service-and-parts/lexus-bright-spot-disappointing-jd-power-service-survey
The National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) also agrees, stating that contrary to
popular belief, EV owners pay more for repairs than their ICE counterparts. Though EVs are in
the shop less frequently, they're more expensive to repair when they do go in39. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 10]
39 https://www.gobankingrates.com/saving-money/car/experts-factors-to-consider-before-switching-to-ev-
electric- car/
Generally, mechanics do not have the training or the technology to work on EVs, causing a
supply constraint on EV mechanics for repairs. Because of the lack of options, mechanics that do
repair EVs have long wait-times and high prices, as the consumers have no alternative choices. It
may also lead to needing to travel for hours to reach a mechanic capable of repairing an EV
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 10]
Though the number of miles on an ICE engine is a good indicator of the health of the vehicle,
the same cannot be said for EVs. Instead, the conditions an EV battery was subjected to have a
significant impact on its future life. Things that degrade a battery include an EV being exposed
to cold weather, or being exposed to hot weather, or if it was fast-charged, or if it was left on
low-battery, or charged above 90%43. Because up to 50% of an EV's value is the health of its
battery, there is significant depreciation and replacement costs associated with battery status.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 11]
43 https://www.businessinsider.com/electric-car-vehicle-resale-value-mystery-tesla-2023-l
Also, because the average price-tag of EVs is 23% more than their ICE counterpart, repair
costs in case of collisions are also more expensive44. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 11]
44 https://www.gobankingrates.com/money/financial-planning/hidden-costs-of-electric-vehicles/
Likewise, among the many things the EPA doesn't consider in its analysis is how EV
suspensions are likely to wear out sooner due to EVs higher weights thanks to their hefty
batteries45. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 11]
45 https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-differences-between-gas-and-electric-vehicles-maintenance-
2020-4
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Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
EPA's cost estimate does not include battery replacement.37 With the proposed standards
taking effect in 2027, and some of the cost and savings estimates being extrapolated out through
2055, even if Tesla can be the first EV manufacturer to achieve a battery that lasts 20 years, a
replacement will be a requirement. Based on the EPA's chosen 100 kWh capacity and the
Department of Energy's 2022 estimated cost of manufacturing of $153/kWh, a new battery
without labor, disposal fees, and other associated expenses would cost the consumer $15,300.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 10]
37 "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles." EPA, Apr. 2023, www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-12/420d22003.pdf (accessed 5
July 2023).
Table 4-5, which outlines the studies used to justify the proposal, shows that all but one study
either came from California or New York. The claimed national study only contained 862
vehicles and therefore poses insignificant statistical relevance. It also shows that the entirety of
the country is not represented. While the Census Bureau splits the United States at 80% urban
and 20% rural living, New York and California cannot be considered as viable representations of
the county's entire population. Due to differences in infrastructure, state-imposed regulations and
laws, population density, and other factors, it is likely that differences could be found even
between major cities throughout the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 10]
On page 4-34, when referring to maintenance costs over the 225,000-mile life of a vehicle,
EPA does not mention the need for battery replacement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 10]
Misinterpretation of vehicle ownership costs
"Vehicle Technology Costs"—the costs of purchasing and maintaining a vehicle excluding
fuel costs—are assumed to be lower (a benefit) under the proposed rule than absent the rule. (See
Table 160.) This result makes no sense, and the value should be negative, a cost to American
households. Empirically, we observe that the vast majority of vehicles sold in America—even
with substantial tax credit incentives—are not electric vehicles. American consumers are
rational, not irrational. If purchasing an electric vehicle led to lower ownership costs of purchase,
maintenance, and repair, then most purchases today would be for electric vehicles, particularly
given the substantial tax benefits. Americans make a different choice with their hard-earned
dollars. Consequently, the vehicle technology costs presented in Table 160 should all be
negative, not positive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 12]
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
2.5. Conclusion
A deeper analysis of global and IRA-compliant critical mineral supply and demand is needed
to support the Final Rule. The proposal's cursory assessment results in erroneous conclusions
that "critical battery mineral supply is likely to be adequate to meet anticipated demand, in some
cases by a significant margin."9 The proposal lacks the evidence to support this finding. Demand
for critical minerals are higher today than in the years referenced in the proposal due to new
government policies and automaker targets. Future demand growth for PEVs is unclear given the
uncertain geo-political considerations and supply chain operations beyond the control of
1418
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manufacturers and EPA. It is highly plausible the tight supply-demand for lithium and graphite
will lead to volatile prices. The proposal fails to consider how this could suppress demand and
annual PEV market share. The Final Rule must include a significantly more robust and clear-
eyed analysis based on a boarder array of sources. It must also reconsider how the global supply
chain for mineral mining, refining, cell production, and battery production are most likely to
evolve in order to better understand the extent to which IRA or other financial incentive can be
considered in the cost analysis supporting the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 14]
9 DRIA at 3-23.
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
b) EPA does not adequately quantify vehicle maintenance and repair costs.
In its analysis of maintenance and repair costs, EPA relies on data gathered and summarized
by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) in their evaluation of TCO for vehicles of various sizes
and powertrains. 176 However, the BEV models relied upon in ANL's and EPA's analyses - the
BWM i3, Fiat 500e and Kia Soul Electricl77 - are limited in breadth and not representative of
new light-duty and medium-duty BEV sales in the U.S.: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
35-38]
176 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29384 (Burnham et al., Comprehensive Total Cost of Ownership
Quantification for Vehicles with Different Size Classes and Powertrains, Argonne National Laboratory.
ANL/ESD-21/4. April 2021).
177 EPA DRIA at 4-32 and Burnham et al at 69.
In 2022, the BMW i3 held a 0.0 percent market share in the U.S. with 9 total salesl78
and has since been discontinued; 179
The Fiat 500e is not currently available for sale in the U.S.; 180 and
• The Kia Soul EV will be discontinued after the 2023 model year. 181 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 35-38]
178 Kelley Blue Book, "Electric Vehicle Sales Report - Q4 2022", January 16, 2023,
https://www.coxautoinc.com/wp- content/uploads/2023/01/Kelley-Blue-Book-EV-Sales-and-Data-Report-
for-Q4-2022.pdf.
179 See https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-12-12/bmw-s-discontinued-i3-is-already-an-ev-
cult-
classic#:~:text=By%202021%20the%20company%20was,like%20the%20brand%27s%20other%20models
180 See https://insideevs.com/news/621727/fiat-500e-confirmed-us-debut-2024/.
181 See https://www.guideautoweb.com/en/articles/70428/r-i.p-kia-soul-ev-another-small-electric-car-
bows- out/#:~:text=Another%20small%20electric%20car%20is,of%20the%202023%20model%20year.
Furthermore, all three BEV models are subcompact cars and SUVs, not at all representative of
EPA's projections for model year 2027 to 2032 sales. 182 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
35-38]
182 DRIA at 1-4 and 1-5.
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In addition to the questionable nature of the input data for EPA's application in this
rulemaking, EPA diverges from ANL's approach (and from any of the other above-referenced
peer-review sources) in its establishment of maintenance costs curves on a per-mile basis. 183
Not only is EPA's approach to establishing maintenance cost curves lacking in independent peer
review - it is also illogical. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 35-38]
183 DRIA at 4-34 and 4-35.
EPA cites the following example outcome of its maintenance costs curves:
"For example, an ICE vehicle having an odometer reading of 120,000 miles would have a
maintenance cost per mile of $0.10 []. If that vehicle travels 10,000 miles in the given year, then
its estimated maintenance costs would be $1,000 in that year. If that vehicle were to instead
travel 15,000 miles in that year, its estimated maintenance costs would be $1,500."184 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 35-38]
184 DRIA at 4-35.
This simply does not comport with logical projections using the input data that EPA adopts
from ANL. 185 As demonstrated below in Tables 4 and 5, if the ICE vehicle referenced by EPA
having an odometer reading of 120,000 miles travels 10,000 miles in the given year, its projected
maintenance costs would be $315. And if that vehicle travels 15,000 miles in the given year, its
projected maintenance costs would be $505. EPA's approach to establishing constant-slope
maintenance cost per mile curves produces flawed results that contradict the conclusions of the
literature sources upon which EPA relies and to which it cites. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
pp. 35-38]
185 DRIA at 4-34 and Burnham et al at 85.
Table 4 - Projected ICEV maintenance costs between 120,000 and 130,000 miles [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 35-38]
Service
Miles per Event ICE186
Cost per Event (2019 dollars) 187
Number of events incurred by ICEV
Number of events incurred by ICEV
Maintenance costs incurred between
Engine Oil 7,500
Oil Filter 7,500
Tire Rotation 7,500
Wiper Blades 15,000
Cabin Air Filter 20,000
Multi-Point Inspection 20,000
at 120,000 milesl88
at 130,000 milesl89
120,000 and 130,000 milesl90
$65
16
17
$6
$20
16
17
$20
$50
16
17
$50
$45
8
8
$0
$50
6
6
$0
$110
6
6
$0
1420
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Engine Air Filter
30,000
$40
4
4
$0
Brake Fluid
37,500
$150
3
3
$0
Tires Replaced
07, pp. 35-38]
50,000
$525
2
2
$0 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829
Brake Pads
50,000
$350
2
2
$0
Starter Battery
50,000
$175
2
2
$0
Spark Plugs
60,000
$225
2
2
$0
Oxygen Sensor
80,000
$350
1
1
$0
Headlight Bulbs
80,000
$90
1
1
$0
Transmission Service
90,000
$200
1
1
$0
Timing Belt
90,000
$750
1
1
$0
Accessory Drive Belt
90,000
$165
1
1
$0
HVAC Service
100,000
$50
1
1
$0
Brake Rotors
100,000
$500
1
1
$0
Shocks and Struts
100,000
$1,000 1
1
$0
Engine Coolant
125,000
$190
0
1
$190
EV Battery Coolant
n/a
$210
-
-
-
Fuel Filter
150,000
$110
0
0
$0
Brake Calipers
150,000
$1,000 0
0
$0
Total cost of maintenance between 120,000 and 130,000 miles $325 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 35-38]
186 DRIA at 4-34.
187 DRIA at 4-34.
188 Calculated as 120,000 miles divided by the service interval specified by EPA (e.g., 7,500 miles),
rounded down to the nearest integer.
189 Calculated as 130,000 miles divided by the service interval specified by EPA (e.g., 7,500 miles),
rounded down to the nearest integer.
190 Calculated as the difference in the number of maintenance events incurred at 130,000 miles versus
120,000 miles (e.g., 17-16=1 engine oil service event), multiplied by the cost per event specified by
EPA.
Table 5 - Projected ICEV maintenance costs between 120,000 and 135,000 miles [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 35-38]
Service
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Miles per Event ICE191
Cost per Event (2019 dollars) 192
Number of events incurred by ICEV at 120,000 milesl93
Number of events incurred by ICEV at 135,000 miles 194
Maintenance costs incurred between 120,000 and 135,000 milesl95 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 35-38]
Engine Oil
7,500
$65
16
18
$130
Oil Filter
7,500
$20
16
18
$40
Tire Rotation
7,500
$50
16
18
$100
Wiper Blades
15,000
$45
8
9
$45
Cabin Air Filter
20,000
$50
6
6
$0
Multi-Point Inspection
20,000
$110
6
6
$0
Engine Air Filter
30,000
$40
4
4
$0
Brake Fluid
37,500
$150
3
3
$0
Tires Replaced
50,000
$525
2
2
$0
Brake Pads
50,000
$350
2
2
$0
Starter Battery
50,000
$175
2
2
$0
Spark Plugs
60,000
$225
2
2
$0
Oxygen Sensor
80,000
$350
1
1
$0
Headlight Bulbs
80,000
$90
1
1
$0
Transmission Service
90,000
$200
1
1
$0
Timing Belt
90,000
$750
1
1
$0
Accessory Drive Belt
90,000
$165
1
1
$0
HVAC Service
100,000
$50
1
1
$0
Brake Rotors
100,000
$500
1
1
$0
Shocks and Struts
100,000
$1,000 1
1
$0
Engine Coolant
125,000
$190
0
1
$190
EV Battery Coolant
n/a
$210
-
-
-
Fuel Filter
150,000
$110
0
0
$0
Brake Calipers
150,000
$1,000 0
0
$0
1422
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Total cost of maintenance between 120,000 and 135,000 miles $505 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 35-38]
191 DRIA at 4-34.
192 DRIA at 4-34.
193 Calculated as 120,000 miles divided by the service interval specified by EPA (e.g., 7,500 miles),
rounded down to the nearest integer.
194 Calculated as 135,000 miles divided by the service interval specified by EPA (e.g., 7,500 miles),
rounded down to the nearest integer.
195 Calculated as the difference in the number of maintenance events incurred at 135,000 miles versus
120,000 miles (e.g., 18-16 = 2 engine oil service events), multiplied by the cost per event specified by
EPA.
e) EPA omits the costs of unrepairable battery packs.
In the evolution of EV design, battery packs that were once organized into modules are being
replaced by a single large battery packs that are integrated into the structure of the vehicle.219,
220 With a modular design, if a single battery cell is damaged, the specific module can be
replaced without incurring the cost of replacing the entire battery pack.221 If an integrated
battery pack is damaged, there is no way to access and repair the damaged pack - as a result, the
Tesla Model Y has been characterized as having "zero repairability", and reports also indicate
repairability problems with EVs from Nissan, Hyundai, Stellantis and BMW.222 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 41]
219 Kyle Field, ElonMusk Shares History Of Tesla Battery Modules & Why They Are Going Away,
CLEANTECHNICA, Feb. 2, 2020, https://cleantechnica.com/2020/02/02/elon-musk-shares-history-of-
tesla-battery-modules-why-they- are-going-away/
220 Nick Carey et al., Insight: Scratched EV battery? Your insurer may have to junk the whole car,
REUTERS, Mar. 20, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/scratched-ev-battery-
your-insurer-may-have-junk- whole-car-2023 -03 -20/
221 Id.
222 Id.
The integrated design has created unexpected problems for motorists and insurers. Following
an accident in which some of the battery cells in a pack are damaged, insurers are forced to write
off the EV or pay the cost of a complete battery replacement, potentially at costs exceeding
$20,000,223 Yet EPA's analysis of repair costs assumes that EVs have lower repair cost per mile
than ICEVs, at a ratio of 0.91 for HEVs, 0.86 for PHEVs, and 0.67 for BEVs and FCEVs.224
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 41]
223 Brengt Halvorson, EVs still cost much more than gas cars to insure—even hybrids, GREEN CAR
REPORTS, Apr. 27, 2023, https://www.greencarreports.com/news/1139493_evs-still-cost-much-more-
than-gas-cars-to-insure-even- hybrids
224 DRIA at 4-36.
Unsurprisingly, insurance premiums for EVs have increased to reflect their inability to be
repaired; the online brokerage Policygenius estimates that the average monthly insurance
payment for a U.S. EV is $206, 27% more than for an average ICEV.225 EPA relies on outdated
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data in its analysis, finding that insurance costs are roughly the same for BEVs and ICEVs and
making no adjustments for insurance premium differences.226 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, p. 41]
225 Nick Carey et al., Insight: Scratched EV battery? Your insurer may have to junk the whole car,
REUTERS, Mar. 20, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/scratched-ev-battery-
your-insurer-may-have-junk- whole-car-2023 -03 -20/
226 DRIA at 4-22.
I. EPA fails to adequately consider the environmental justice impacts of the proposed
rule.
Disadvantaged communities already face significant access barriers to electric vehicles, such
as: higher upfront costs to electric vehicle ownership; a lack of existing charging infrastructure
available to them in low-income, minority populated, and rural areas; and costlier and time-
intensive charging due to a greater reliance on public charging infrastructure, particularly for
individuals living in multi-family housing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 55]
EPA's EJ analysis must be thorough and inclusive of factors that may impact the price of
transported goods, such as ZEV affordability, the availability of public charging, reasonable
charging practices, and a lifecycle analysis of electric vehicles and power generation emissions.
Without doing so, EPA runs the risk of intensifying price disparities and access to transport
relative to the baseline for EJ communities. EPA's EJ analysis must be thorough and inclusive of
electric vehicle affordability, the availability of public charging, reasonable charging practices,
and a lifecycle analysis of electric vehicles and power generation emissions. Without doing so,
EPA runs the risk of intensifying price disparities and access to transport relative to the baseline
for EJ communities. These impacts can be both quantitively and qualitatively characterized.300
EPA's silence on these disparities is especially worrisome given EPA's prior binding
commitments to EJ analysis for the benefit of disadvantaged and low-income communities.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 55]
300 See, i.e., supra.
To date, the target electric vehicle customer base for OEMs consists of "mostly male, high-
income, highly educated, homeowners, who have multiple vehicles in their household and have
access to charging at home."301 Additionally, according to the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), "the rate of EV adoption in rural areas is roughly 40% lower than it is in
urban areas, and EV charging infrastructure expansion has mostly been concentrated in cities and
along major highways".302As a result, electric vehicle ownership remains primarily
concentrated in affluent, large metropolitan and urban areas.303 By contrast, the supporting
electricity generation necessary to support EPA's proposal is predominantly located in more
remote, rural regions that are geographically isolated from urban centers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 55-56]
301 Scott Hardman*, Kelly L. Fleming, Eesha Khare, and Mahmoud M. Ramadan, A perspective on equity
in the transition to electric vehicles, MIT SCIENCE POLICY REVIEW (Aug. 30, 2021) available at
https://sciencepolicyreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-electric-vehicles/.
302 U.S. Department of Transportation, Community Benefits of Rural Vehicle Electrification (last updated
February 2, 2022), available at https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-benefits-and-
challenges/community- benefits.
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303 See, i.e., Shuocheng Guo, Eleftheria Kontou, Disparities and equity issues in electric vehicles rebate
allocation, Energy Policy, Volume 154, 2021, 112291, ISSN 0301-4215, available at
https ://doi. org/10.1016/j. enpol.2021.112291.
EPA's proposal directly impacts EJ communities by contributing to additional, local
emissions to meet electric vehicle charging demand. Consequently, in theory, EJ communities
incur an incremental burden in exchange for the subsidization of electric vehicles for more
affluent consumers. And this subsidy occurs at expense of our most vulnerable communities
burdened by emissions as a direct result of the proposal, with no corresponding benefit, since
electric vehicles are likely to remain concentrated in affluent areas. Further, these communities
remain unable to afford EPA's chosen mode of transport and are particularly vulnerable to rising
electricity costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 55-56]
Notwithstanding EPA's hope that its proposal may serve to incentivize the purchases of
electric vehicles, these vehicles are significantly more expensive on average than their ICE
vehicle counterparts and unaffordable for many households. These are costs are also likely
understated as each electric vehicle already enjoys thousands of dollars' worth of Federal and
state subsidies, which are ultimately funded by taxpayers. Additionally, an automakers' ability to
sell electric vehicles to consumers depends on substantial price subsidies in the form of credit
support. EPA ignores the reality that many EJ stakeholders are currently unable to afford the
upfront costs of purchasing an electric vehicle in the first place. With the cost of transition
minerals expected to escalate exponentially in the coming years as a function of limited supply
and increasing demand, the costs to manufacture and purchase electric vehicles will likely
rise. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 56]
EPA should also consider the effects of the proposal on electricity prices, as low-income
populations often spend a larger percentage of their earnings on essential utilities compared to
the rest of the United States. Reliance on electric vehicles has been shown to spur increases in
load and demand during peak periods, which impact electricity prices. Because EPA lacks
expertise in the area of electrical grid management and economics, EPA should consult with
other agencies and credible experts in these areas in order to adequately evaluate these
impacts.304 EPA should ensure that the proposal meets reliability and affordability criteria and
helps EJ communities make informed decisions about their own energy needs. Additionally,
EPA's EJ assessment fails to acknowledge the likelihood that many owners will lack access to
residential charging, which will substantially increase their operating expenses. Consistent
reliance on fast charging also shortens electric vehicle battery life, resulting in a need to replace
the battery and/or the vehicle more frequently. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
304 See, West Virginia, 142 S.Ct. at 2612-13 (stating that EPA admitted that opining on trends in
electricity transmission, distribution, and storage requires technical and policy expertise not traditionally
needed in EPA regulatory development and finding that there is little reason to think Congress assigned
such decisions to the EPA).
If EJ is truly a commitment for EPA, it should carefully consider criticisms like those leveled
by The Two Hundred, which point out the disproportionate impacts to working and minority
communities as a result of California's climate approach regarding electrified transport; those
impacts and concerns remain true, and indeed are magnified under the proposed standards.305
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
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305 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, The Two Hundred for Homeownership, et al. v. California Air Resources
Board, et al., No. 1:22-CV-01474.
It is critical from the outset to design standards to minimize the potential for price shocks and
supply disruptions. As written, the proposal ultimately benefits electric vehicle manufacturers at
the expense of disadvantaged communities by subsidizing unaffordable transportation that is not
fit for the purposes of commuting to and from EJ communities. At minimum, EPA should
perform a thorough EJ assessment specific to its LDV proposal that is comprehensive of both
transport challenges and impacts faced by EJ stakeholders and the government-wide Justice40
Initiative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
The average purchase price of EV cars in 2022 was approximately $65,000, which is more
than what 46 percent of American households earn in income in a year.306 While the average
"used" EV sold for $42,895 in March of 2023.307 While EPA's DRIA anecdotally indicates that
"emerging consensus suggests that purchase price parity is likely to occur by the mid-2020's for
some vehicle segments and models"308, Ford CEO Jim Farley told attendees at its 2023 Capital
Markets Days that EV cost parity may not come until after 2030.309 Moreover US auto makers
are focusing their efforts on producing higher priced electric SUVs and trucks, including Fords
$100,000 F150 Lightening Platinum310 and GM's announcement that its luxury brands, Cadillac
and Buick, will be its first all-electric product lineups.311 While smaller EV's like the Chevy
Bolt, touted by the Biden Administration as being affordable alternatives, are being
discontinued.312 The reality is that most middle- and lower-income families simply cannot
afford to purchase a new or used EV, even when taking into account available tax incentives and
rebates. In fact, middle - and lower -income families are more likely to purchase older used
vehicle, due to their lower upfront costs, and to hold onto those vehicles for longer periods.313
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
306 Kelly Blue Book and Cox Automotive Average Transaction Prices Reports; and Average, Median, Top
1% and all United States Household Income Percentiles, DQYJD
307 What to know about buying a used electric vehicle as more hit the auto sale market, CNBC, May 21,
2023
308 EPA DRIA, 3.1.3.1,4-15
309 Ford CEO says EV cost parity may not come until after 2030, Reuters, May 31, 2023
310 https://www.ford.com/trucks/fl50/fl50-lightning/models/
311 Cadillac and Buick will be GM's first all-EV brands, Automotive News, July 1, 2022
312 GM Killed the Chevy Bolt- and the dream of a small, affordable EV, The Verge, April 26, 2023
313 Supporting Lower-Income Households' Purchase of Clean Vehicles: Implications From California-
wide Survey Results, UCLA Luskin Center for Innovation, 2020
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Regarding maintenance and repair costs:
Commenters expressed dissatisfaction with EPA's use of the Argonne National Lab Total
Cost of Ownership study as the basis for the maintenance cost analysis (American Fuel &
Petrochemical Manufacturers, Betsy Cooper, Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine). Commenters
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also argued that EPA had failed to consider routine battery maintenance checks that auto makers
recommend every 6 months to 2 years and that the analysis is tilted in favor of BEVs by ignoring
factors such as environmental impacts on BEV brakes and diminished BEV battery capacity
(Anonymous), and by omitting impacts of BEV weight and battery durability (John Graham).
Other commenters, in support of EPA's inclusion of repair and maintenance costs and savings in
the benefit cost analysis, stated their finding that BEVs and PHEVs can deliver around 50
percent savings compared to conventional gasoline vehicles (Consumer Reports).
Commenters asserted that the higher weight of BEVs will cause tires and brakes to wear out
faster and the instant torque response may increase tire wear (John Graham).
Commenters expressed concerns regarding the use of the ANL study to support the EPA
repair cost estimates (Anonymous, Arizona State Legislature). Commenters pointed out the
different types of vehicles considered by ANL and noted that the BEVs were not comparable to
the ICE vehicles and that EPA's repair and maintenance costs failed to consider road
maintenance costs associated with heavier BEV vehicles (Anonymous, Valero).
Some commenters provided considerable detail regarding repair and maintenance costs
suggested that EPA had overestimated repair and maintenance savings (Paul Bonifas and Tim
Considine). They argued that the maintenance savings should be $72 billion rather than EPA's
calculated $410 billion and that repair savings should be negative $4 billion (i.e., a cost, not a
savings) compared to EPA's estimated $170 billion.
Other comments took exception to EPA's approach of generating a cost curve for
maintenance costs rather than using a constant cost per mile value (Valero).
Commenters expressed concern over the cost of battery repairs (Alliance for Consumers) and
higher insurance costs due to those repairs and possible battery replacements (Clean Fuels
Development Coalition et al., John Graham). Other commenters asserted that is was indefensible
not to include battery replacement costs in the analysis (John Graham).
Regarding biofuels and agriculture:
Commenters expressed concern that EPA had not considered the impact of the rule on the
U.S. biofuels or agriculture industries (American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, Charles
Forsberg).
Regarding crude oil import impacts:
Commenters noted EPA's use of AEO 2021 in the rule's analysis thus calling into question
the validity of EPA's estimates of reductions in crude oil imports resulting from the rule
(American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers).
Commenters expressed dissatisfaction with EPA's use of the Low Economic Growth case
from AEO 2021 to estimate the impact of the proposed rule on oil imports (American Fuel &
Petrochemical Manufacturers).
Regarding the electric grid and infrastructure:
Commenters encouraged EPA to conduct an assessment to account for the costs associated
with upgrades to the nation's grid infrastructure including upgraded generation, transmission,
and distribution, and installation of public and private chargers (Chevron). Other commenters
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expressed concern over charging availability (Missouri Farm Bureau). Other comments argued
that EPA had failed to consider annual operating and maintenance costs for EVSE (Valero).
Regarding consumer savings:
Commenters noted that past EPA rules have delivered savings while, at the same time,
vehicles have become safer, larger, and more powerful with no (inflation-adjusted) increase in
vehicle prices (Consumer Reports).
Regarding IRA incentives and consumer costs:
Commenters argued that EPA was not fully accounting for costs by relying on incentives
under the IRA and that EPA oddly accounts for potential purchase incentives for net consumer
prices (Delek US Holdings, Inc.).
Regarding medium-duty vehicles:
Commenters provided detailed analysis of medium-duty electrification costs, ownership costs
along with supporting information regarding PHEVs to support the stringency of the medium-
duty standards (Environmental Defense Fund).
Regarding time spent refueling BEVs:
Commenters argued that BEVs take more time to refuel than ICE vehicles, noting that
recharging with a level 1 charger can take 40 to 50 hours to fully charge while level 2 charging
can take 4 to 10 hours (Delek US Holding, Inc.). Commenters also noted that most PHEVs do
not work with DC fast chargers (Delek US Holding, Inc.).
Regarding vehicle weight and insurance costs:
Commenters argued BEVs, being heavier than comparable ICE vehicles, create more safety
issues in a collision and more weight that our crumbling infrastructure has to
absorb. Furthermore, insurance companies may be charging higher premiums to all customers to
pay for the increased risk of injury and the larger costs involved in repairing EVs versus and ICE
vehicle (Daniel Hellebuyck).
Response:
Regarding certain comments presented in this Section 8.2, we respond to specific comments
regarding environmental justice and equity in Section 9 and 13 of this document, consumer
impacts in Section 13 of this document, critical minerals in Section 15 of this document, battery
replacement and battery replacement costs in Section 16 of this document, and grid reliability in
Section 18 of this document.
The Arizona State Legislature pointed to a story by Sean Tucker of Kelly Blue Book showing
BEV repair costs exceeding ICE repair costs in the first 12 months of ownership. The Sean
Tucker story was actually quoting a study done by a predictive analytics organization called "We
Predict." Not surprisingly, the Sean Tucker story pointed to labor as the source of the higher
repair costs. The story states, "EV repair is a specialized service at the moment. But it won't
remain a rare specialty forever." The story also states, "The newness of EVs also means there are
few older EVs to study. But We Predict believes that EVs may prove less expensive in the long
run. 'The cost of keeping the vehicle in service for the EV, even as the EV gets older, becomes
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smaller and smaller and actually less than keeping an ICE [internal combustion engine] vehicle
on the road,' We Predict CEO James Davies told reporters. 'That's not just maintenance costs,
but all service costs.'" The story referenced by the Arizona State Legislature appears to be more
supportive of the ANL study and EPA's use of the ANL study than of the position taken by the
commenter. The Arizona State Legislature also pointed to a Forbes story that showed higher
repair costs for BEVs than for ICE vehicles. The Forbes story notes that, "However, those results
come with a string of asterisks. The short version is, sample sizes may be too small, and the
growth in EV share may be too new, to draw lasting conclusions from the data that's available so
far, said Susanna Gotsch, director and Industry Analyst at CCC." The Forbes story also notes
that, "EV repairs can take longer, until technicians get accustomed to the new routines."
Regarding the maintenance and repair savings estimated in the final analysis, EPA continues
to make use of the ANL study as a reasonable source of repair and maintenance data despite the
issues noted by the commenter that some of the vehicles had low market shares, and we are not
aware of other sources of repair data that are any more complete or reliable. EPA notes that,
while the maintenance and repair savings are significant, the final rule is net beneficial even
without consideration of the maintenance and repair savings we have estimated. Regarding the
repair and maintenance cost/savings analysis conducted by Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine, the
commenters used a different source for their estimates (a story from NAD A371 which the
commenters suggested used Kelley Blue Book data but this is not clear in the NADA story)
which showed maintenance costs for ICE vehicles of $4,583 and for BEVs $4,246 which
represents a lower savings for BEVs than estimated by the ANL study and EPA. As noted, it is
not clear where the NADA estimates came from and, although we recognize that not everyone
follows the exact schedule of recommended maintenance, EPA believes most people do follow
automaker recommendations for proper maintenance and it is reasonable to base maintenance
costs on manufacturer-recommended maintenance actions as ANL and EPA have done.
Importantly, the commenters' analysis still suggested a $68 billion net savings to consumers. We
also note that, while we have not estimated battery replacement costs (because we do not believe
it is necessary or appropriate to do so as further discussed in Section 12.2.5 of this RTC), we
have similarly not estimated the savings associated with the reduced number of transmission
replacements and overhauls, catalyst replacements, etc.
EPA appreciates the comments from Consumers Reports and agrees that BEVs and PHEVs
can provide repair and maintenance savings relative to traditional ICE vehicles, as we have
included in our analysis (see Section VIII.B.3 of the preamble).
Regarding the detailed maintenance costs submitted by Valero, it appears that the commenter
understands the approach used by EPA but takes exception to the example provided in the
NPRM which stated that, "If that vehicle has a maintenance cost of $0.10 per mile and travels
10,000 miles in the given year, then its estimated maintenance costs would be $1,000 in that
year. If that vehicle were to instead travel 15,000 miles in that year, its estimated maintenance
costs would be $1,500." This was simply meant to be an example of the way maintenance costs
are dependent on maintenance costs per mile and the number of miles driven, not an actual
calculation within OMEGA. OMEGA works exactly as the commenter laid out in its tables and
the example has been removed from the final RIA to avoid confusion. We believe the source
371 https://www.nada.org/nada/nada-headlines/beYond-sticker-price-cost-ownership-evs-v-ice-vehicles. accessed
February 5, 2024.
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study is consistent with the literature on which we base our estimates and is the most appropriate
approach for our analysis.
Regarding brake and tire wear, we respond to such comments in Section 11.1 of this
document.
Regarding IRA incentives and the impact on net consumer prices, we note an apparent
misunderstanding of our analysis by commenters. While we do consider the IRA incentives in
the consumer choice elements of the compliance modeling—that is, when consumers consider
purchase prices and out-of-pocket expenses along with potential operating savings and how that
might impact product offerings by auto makers—we do not include the IRA purchase incentives
when calculating the social costs and benefits of the rule. So, while the consumer choice decision
might reflect a vehicle purchase of $40,000 less an IRA incentive such that the purchase is
something less than $40,000, the cost would include the full $40,000 value. As such, the analysis
does not fail to account for the costs to society of that vehicle purchase. Note that we present
transfers, including the purchase incentives, in Section VIII.G of the preamble.
Regarding medium-duty vehicle standards and costs, we appreciate the work of commenters
and have considered these comments in updating our final rule analysis. We have updated our
medium-duty technology costs along with most of our technology costs.
Regarding BEV weight and safety and impacts on insurance costs, as noted in our earlier
responses in this section, we have included insurance costs for all vehicles with that cost
incumbent on the value of the vehicle (price less depreciation). Given that BEVs are higher value
vehicles, at least in their early years, we have included the higher insurance costs for them (see
Section VIII.B.2 of the preamble).
Regarding time spent refueling (or recharging) BEVs, the analysis is meant to reflect only
mid-trip refueling events, those that occur as a necessity to continue with a given trip. Such trips
happen routinely with ICE vehicles, HEVs and PHEVs. However, for BEVs, they tend to occur
only on occasion since most BEV charging is expected to occur over night or during work hours
or while shopping, etc. As such, mid-trip BEV recharging is not expected to occur at level 1
chargers or even many level 2 chargers in the future and will instead occur at DC fast chargers
that recharge at rates up to and exceeding 400 miles per hour of charging. This may take longer
than a typical ICE vehicle refueling event, but is expected to occur at a lower frequency than a
typical ICE vehicle refueling event. As for PHEVs not being able to recharge at a DC fast
charger, we would not expect that to be an issue since the PHEV can refuel with liquid-fuel. We
recognize that while BEVs ability to charge at home is an advantage over ICE vehicles, the
additional time to charge on longer road trip is a disadvantage. We have considered whether
insufficient charging infrastructure will adversely affect consumer acceptance of BEVs and for
the reasons discussed elsewhere we have concluded that charging infrastructure will be sufficient
and will not adversely affect BEV adoption. However, we also note that our central analysis is
only one of many possible ways in which manufacturers could comply with the standards, and as
illustrated by our sensitivity analyses, the standards are feasible even with significantly lower
rates of BEV adoption.
8.3 - Fueling impacts
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Comments by Organizations
Organization: American Enterprise Institute
I. Fuel Savings Are Not an Appropriate Economic Benefit of the Proposed Rule
The conceptual purpose of any proposed regulation is the correction of some set of purported
inefficiencies inherent in market allocational outcomes, usually assumed to result from some
social resource or other cost not reflected in market prices. This is the standard definition of an
externality.2 The value of fuel savings measured as a function of market prices represents no
such divergence between market prices and resource costs apart from the climate effects
(discussed below); other such assumed impacts not reflected in market prices already are
regulated under different provisions of the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp.
3-4]
2 I shunt aside here the issue of whether government can be predicted to adopt policies yielding systematic
allocational improvement. See section IV at https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Zycher-
comment- OMB-Proposed-Circular-A-4-Regulatory-Analysis-June-2023.docx.pdf.
Accordingly, fuel savings per se are not relevant analytically. The inclusion of fuel savings is
illegitimate as a component of the "benefits" of the proposed rule because the economic benefits
of fuel savings are captured fully by consumers of fuels. There is no "externality" attendant upon
fuel consumption per se, and if "fuel savings" are to be considered relevant for purposes of
benefit/cost analysis, then the adverse effects or costs of a (forced) reduction in fuel consumption
in terms of the quality of transportation services must be included in the analysis. The EPA
claims that the fuel savings attendant upon implementation of the proposed rule would yield
benefits in present value terms of $380-$770 billion (net of EVSE port costs), depending on the
choice of discount rate. 3 Those figures are much greater than any other of the asserted benefits
from the proposed rule, except for the purported climate benefits, which, as discussed in section
II, are wholly artificial constructs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 3-4]
3 See the proposed rule at Table 6.
That the proposed rule would force consumers of fuels to change their consumption patterns
in ways that would not be observed without the proposed rule demonstrates that the "fuel
savings," even if we accept the underlying calculations, must be accompanied by some explicit
or implicit costs in terms of forgone quality dimensions of transportation services, which in turn
must be greater than the value of the purported fuel savings. That obviously is why we do not
observe the allocational outcomes envisioned in the proposed rule as a result of market forces.
Why does market behavior not yield fuel consumption for the vehicle fleet envisioned in the
proposed rule? Or does EPA believe that consumers of motorized transportation services
powered with conventional fuel simply are stupid? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 3-4]
In order to see this clearly, suppose that the proposed rule were simply to outlaw entirely the
use of motor fuels by cars and light trucks, forcing consumers massively to use bicycles, horse-
drawn carts, and similar substitutes technologically backward. It is no answer to say that electric
vehicles and the like would be substituted without loss of value in terms of the quality of
transportation services; the fact that such technologies have not been adopted by markets in the
aggregate, even given the subsidies embedded in current policies, demonstrates that these
technologies must impose some set of disadvantages in terms of costs and/or performance. The
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data reported by the Energy Information Administration show that in 2021 expenditures on
motor gasoline alone in the transportation sector were about $386.9 billion.4 Under the EPA
methodology, that "fuel saving" in total would be an annual benefit of such a hypothetical rule
outlawing the use of motor fuels, and the disadvantages of bicycles, horse-drawn carts, and the
like — the marginal benefits of using motor vehicles — would be irrelevant. Under the
methodology underlying the proposed rule, the more stringent the constraint imposed upon fuel
use, the greater the purported benefit from "fuel savings." In other words, the market spends
scarce resources on the consumption of transportation fuels without any offsetting benefits at all!
Amazingly, this implicitly is the analytic framework underlying this part of the estimated
benefits asserted in the proposed rule. It is not to be taken seriously. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0571, pp. 3-4]
4 See https://www.eia.gov/state/seds/sep_sum/html/pdf/sum_ex_tra.pdf.
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
EPA incorrectly assumes that ZEV owners will pay the national average residential electricity
price to charge their vehicles. EPA fails to consider that the majority of ZEVs in the U.S. are
located in utility service territories with some of the highest electricity rates in the country and
that the average EV owner currently pays a much higher price to charge their ZEV at home than
the national average residential electricity rate. Given that EV penetration has varied widely
across the U.S., it would be arbitrary to assume that EVs will, unlike in the past, penetrate
uniformly across the U.S. and thus that the average electricity price would be representative of
the actual cost electricity. For example, California, which has roughly 40 percent of all registered
ZEVs in the U.S., has a residential electricity rate that is roughly double the national average.
Considering that EPA is modeling its rule after a California-like approach to mandate ZEVs, it
would be more appropriate for EPA to assume similar real-world costs (at a minimum, given
California's temperate climate). Moreover, EPA fails to consider that mandating such a high
ZEV sales rate will necessarily require exponential increases in commercial ZEV charging at
rates that are currently three, four or five times higher than the current national average
residential electricity rate, depending on location and charging speed. Those customers who are
not homeowners and not able to install their own charging stations and take advantage of
charging at low-cost times will be adversely impacted. Instead, EPA uses a residential rate for
electricity and does not consider peak power or time of use charges. California electric prices
rose 42 percent - 78 percent between 2010 and 2020 and are projected to rise an additional 50
percent by 2030 as shown in Figure 9. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Historic and Forecasted Residential Average Rates Based
on Most Recent 5-year Average Rate Increase. Figure 9:
Source: Michael Shellenberger, Twitter (citing California Public Advocate's Office data),
April 27, 2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
Heaping additional demand for EV charging into this market could exacerbate already high
electricity prices. This will be especially impactful to lower-income homeowners who may not
be able to install dedicated charging units, forcing them to pay more out of pocket for charging
during peak demand periods.265 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
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265 Hardman, Scott, et al., "A Perspective on Equity in the Transition to Electric Vehicles." MIT Science
Policy Review, (Aug. 20 2021), available at https://sciencepolicyreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-
electric-vehicles/ (accessed June 29, 2023).
EPA must revise its analysis to account for realistic electricity prices. The proposed ZEV
mandate will require an enormous investment in power generation and distribution, resulting in
nationwide increases in electricity bills that EPA has not considered. Of course, considering the
additional trillions of dollars in costs would paint a clear picture that the costs of forced
electrification far exceed even the inflated benefits EPA presented in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
Third, EPA asserts that consumers will receive $890 billion in fuel savings— in other words,
that operating electric vehicles will be cheaper than operating combustion-engine vehicles
because consumers will no longer need to purchase fuel directly. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,362. But
this figure depends on consumers' choosing to switch from their familiar combustion-engine
vehicles to electric vehicles in overwhelming numbers. Even if all of the obstacles to
manufacturing and charging electric vehicles discussed above could be overcome, the fuel
savings EPA posits still would not materialize unless individuals decide to pur-chase those
vehicles. For the reasons already noted, there is ample reason to doubt that consumers would do
so, including based on concerns about electric vehicles' higher up-front costs and perceptions
that charging and maintenance facilities are inadequate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp.
63-64]
To the extent EPA believes that the prospect of fuel and other operational savings itself would
motivate consumers to adopt electric vehicles in sufficient numbers, experience thus far indicates
otherwise. As EPA acknowledges, if abandoning combustion-engine vehicles in favor of electric
vehicles actually resulted in net operating savings, rational users of combustion-engine vehicles
would likely already be switching to electric vehicles in much greater numbers than they are
today. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,397; Draft RIA at 4-38-39 (noting that "[conventional economic
principles" would lead "people [to] buy [electric vehicles]"). The fact that consumers are not
doing so—but instead currently "tend to favor [combustion-engine] vehicles over" the electric
vehicles that are available now even "when two vehicles are comparable in cost and capability,"
88 Fed. Reg. at 29,342—is a strong indication that EPA's asserted savings do not in reality
outweigh the costs of switching to electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 63-
64]
EPA attempts to sidestep this problem by invoking a supposed "energy efficiency gap,"
positing a market failure that is responsible for skewing consumers' decisions away from
purchasing electric vehicles. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,397. But EPA provides no evidence
demonstrating that low adoption of electric vehicles is actually the result of any such market
failure, as opposed to well-founded concerns about the drawbacks of the technology. EPA offers
only a hope that nothing "immutable within consumers or inherent to" electric vehicles will
"irremediably obstruct[] acceptance." Id. at 29,312. But in light of the gap between the data and
consumer behavior on the one hand, and EPA's rosy savings estimates on the other, any final
rule must explain why EPA's fuel-savings figure is realistic and why it is an appropriate offset
for the rule's costs. See Am. Pub. Gas Ass'n v. DOE, 22 F.4th 1018, 1027-28 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
EPA cannot justify an economy-altering rule by invoking an ill-defined, unsubstantiated market
failure of its own imagining. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 63-64]
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Organization: American Highway Users Alliance
The proposed rule would also place downward pressure on sorely needed highway investment
by triggering a reduction in revenue into the Federal Highway Trust Fund (HTF) as, unlike
internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles, EVs do not generate payment of fuel taxes into the
HTF. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, p. 2]
Further, the two lengthy NPRMs and the lengthy draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for
each of them do not appear to include any consideration of the adverse impacts of the proposal
on revenues flowing to the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) and resulting Federal highway
infrastructure investment. The proposed rules in the two dockets seek to accelerate a shift from
the public's use of ICE vehicles to EVs. A substantial erosion of revenue into the HTF would
result,3 placing major downward pressure on needed highway and bridge investment, which
already faces an investment backlog of $786 billion per USDOT's latest "Conditions and
Performance Report." Moreover, that $786 billion estimate was developed before recent
significant inflation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 3-4]
3 The draft RIA for the heavy-duty vehicle NPRM includes a brief reference (page 429) that, under the
proposed rule, fuel consumption would be "reduced." Fuel sales, which are subject to a Federal excise tax,
generate the largest share of HTF revenue.
Failure to Consider Adverse Impact on Highway Investment
As noted earlier, the lengthy NPRM and its draft Regulatory Impact Analysis in this docket
and in the heavy-duty vehicle Phase 3 docket do not evidence any consideration of the adverse
impacts of the proposals on revenues flowing to the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) and resulting
Federal highway infrastructure investment. For decades, the largest source of Federal
transportation infrastructure funding has been the HTF, which is largely dedicated to highway
funding distributed to states. The proposed rules in this docket, and in the heavy-duty vehicle
Phase 3 NPRM, seek to massively accelerate a shift from the public's use of ICE vehicles to
EVs. A substantial erosion of revenue into the HTF would result, placing major downward
pressure on needed highway investment, which already faces an investment backlog of $786
billion per USDOT's latest "Conditions and Performance Report." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0696, pp. 5-6]
Moreover, that backlog estimate was developed before recent inflation of 50% or more just
from Q1 2021 to Q3 2022 in the Federal Highway Administration's national highway
construction cost index. That index also shows significant inflation from 2017 through the third
quarter of 2022 -approximately 72%.6 EPA must reconsider what it proposes after seriously
weighing, among other issues noted, the impact of the proposal on the HTF and highway
investment, particularly given all of the benefits from those investments for highway safety and
the economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 5-6]
6 For the NHCCI see -
https://explore.dot. gov/views/NHIInflationDashboard/NHCCI?%3Aiid=l&%3Aembed=y&%3AisGuestRe
directFromVizp ortal=y&%3 Adisplay_count=n&%3 Ashow VizHome=n&%3 Aorigin=viz_share_link The
last entry for 2022 is an index reading of 2.786 (with 2003 as 1.000), while the index was at 1.62 at the start
of 2017 (thus, an increase of 72% since the start of 2017).
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Organization: Chevron
EPA should also consider the impacts associated with the loss of revenue for the highway
trust fund resulting from increased sales of BEVs. Reductions in excise taxes and local sales
taxes on gasoline will impair the ability of state and local governments to maintain and improve
roadways, resulting in more traffic congestion, longer travel times, and added depreciation and
repair costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, p. 6]
Organization: Departments of Transportation of Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota
and Wyoming
The proposed rule would, among other actions, set standards that would exponentially reduce
the permissible level of tailpipe emissions of various substances, including but not limited to
C02 and other greenhouse gases (GHGs), from newly manufactured light-duty and medium-duty
vehicles. The reductions would be phased in over model years (MYs) 2027-32. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0525, p.1]
A major erosion of revenue into the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) would result from such
drastic changes, as the new EVs encouraged by the proposed rule would generate wear and tear
on the highways without paying fuel taxes into the HTF. This would place significant downward
pressure on highway and bridge investment, which already faces an investment backlog of $786
billion per U.S. Department of Transportation's latest "Conditions and Performance Report" for
highways, bridges and transit. Moreover, that backlog estimate was developed before recent
inflation of approximately 50% from Q1 2021 to Q3 2022 in the Federal Highway
Administration's (FHWA's) highway construction cost index. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0525,
p. 1]
1 For the NHCCI see -
https://explore.dot. gov/views/NHIInflationDashboard/NHCCI?%3Aiid=l&%3Aembed=y&%3AisGuestRe
directFromVizpor tal=y&%3 Adisplay_count=n&%3 Ashow VizHome=n&%3 Aorigin=viz_share_link
Further, the HTF is the main funding source for investment to maintain and improve our
states' highways and bridges. A transportation network in good condition is essential for people
and business. It enables safe and reliable access to markets, schools, health services and other
important destinations. Proposed policies that would seriously weaken the flow of revenue into
the HTF place downward pressure on our ability to maintain and improve the transportation
network. That, in turn has adverse impacts on access to markets and the ability of people and
business to access essential services, including schools, work, food and other basic shopping,
health services and more. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0525, p. 1]
Summary and Conclusion
While there are many issues raised by the NPRM, we emphasize here that EPA must
reconsider what it has proposed after seriously considering the impact of the proposal on the
HTF and highway investment, particularly given the many benefits from those investments for
highway safety, the economy, and personal mobility. After reconsidering, EPA should pivot to a
much more gradual approach to reducing tailpipe emissions that is not singularly focused on
favoring EVs. A more gradual approach would provide policymakers more time to consider and
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find ways to make up for HTF revenue loss caused by EPA tailpipe emission rules so as to better
fund needed highway investments that provide so much public benefit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0525, p. 2]
Significantly, at the same time that EPA has issued this NPRM, it has also issued a separate
proposed rule calling for reduced tailpipe emissions of C02, other GHGs, and other substances
from heavy-duty vehicles. See 88 Fed. Reg. 25926 (April 27, 2023). That proposal would
accelerate growth in EVs as a percentage of new heavy-duty vehicles and erode revenue into the
HTF. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0525, p. 2]
However, even though these proposed tailpipe emission rules are high profile initiatives, and
the HTF and the programs it supports are high profile programs, the lengthy NPRM in this
docket and its lengthy draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) do not appear to include any
consideration of the adverse impacts of the proposal on revenues flowing to the Highway Trust
Fund (HTF) and on highway investment - again, as the new EVs encouraged by the proposed
rule would generate wear and tear on the highways without paying fuel taxes into the HTF. As
the HTF has been, for decades, the Federal Government's largest source of funds for highway
investment, proposed policies that would greatly erode revenue into the HTF raise important
concerns that must be seriously considered by regulatory agencies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0525, p. 2]
Organization: Donn Viviani
2) Errors/omissions in the proposal and the RIA.
Not addressed in the RIA is the effect the IRA incentivizing carbon capture and sequestration
(CCS) used for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) will have on fuel prices . Setting aside the unsettled
question of how much net car- bon is sequestrated after the oil produced in turn emits additional
C02, as not germane to the EV rule. 15 What is germane is that the oil will be produced at
marginally lower cost. While the rebound effect is taken into con- sideration in the RIA based on
increased vehicle milage efficiency, the de- creased cost of fuel from EOR is not. Cheaper fuel
will also have a re- bound effect, encouraging more driving, and reducing the pressure to
transition to a BEV. 16 This effect needs to be reflected in the RIA, otherwise the RIA is
incomplete and presents a distorted projection. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0697, p. 5]
15 It's estimated a ton of injected C02 will produce about 2 barrels of oil which when combust- ed, will
emit about a ton of C02
16 Small, K., and Hymel Kent. "The rebound effect from fuel effciency standards: measurement and
projection to 2035." Prepared for US EPA, Washington, DC (2011)
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
B. Even the 10% rebound effect is too high, and EPA should consider using a rebound
effect of a lesser magnitude.
The two most reliable rebound estimates based on U.S. national data from EPA's preferred
studies are 10% (Greene (2012)) and around 4% (Hymel and Small (2015)).621 Hymel and
Small (2015) noted that their data indicated that fuel economy rebound could be lower than fuel
price rebound, meaning that even the 4.0% and 4.2% values could be too high.622 Moreover,
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another paper in the list of EPA's seven preferred studies, Gillingham et al. (2015), estimates the
rebound effect at 10%. But the study also found that "a high percentage of vehicles are almost
entirely inelastic in response to gasoline price changes" and that "the lowest fuel economy
vehicles in the fleet drive the responsiveness, with higher fuel economy vehicles highly inelastic
with respect to gasoline price changes."623 While Gillingham et al. (2015) does not offer an
alternative best rebound estimate for higher fuel economy vehicles, it is fair to assume that the
10% estimate is at the high end of reasonable estimates for the vehicles impacted by this
rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 191]
621 See Kenneth A. Small, Comment Letter on Proposed MY 2021-2026 Standards, NHTSA-2018-0067-
7789, at 1 (Sept. 14, 2018) ("A better characterization of the most recent study would be that it finds a
long-run rebound effect of 4.0 percent or 4.2 percent under two more realistic models that are supported by
the data.").
622 Hymel K. & K. Small, The Rebound Effect for Automobile Travel: Asymmetric Response to Price
Changes and Novel Features of the 2000s, 49 Energy Econ. 93, 97 (2015); see also Greene, D., Rebound
2007: Analysis of U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle Travel Statistics, 41 Energy Pol'y 14 (2012) (although fuel
prices "had a statistically significant impact on VMT,. . . fuel efficiency did not.").
623 Kenneth Gillingham et al., Heterogeneity in the Response to Gasoline Prices: Evidence from
Pennsylvania and Implications for the Rebound Effect, 52 Energy Economics S41-S52 (2015).
Other factors would also suggest that even the best and most relevant existing studies could
lead to a rebound estimate that is too large. For example, the rebound effect's magnitude
diminishes over time, largely due to increasing income and decreasing driving costs, a fact that
EPA has historically understood.624 As incomes rise over time, any fuel efficiency improvement
will have less of an effect on the total vehicle miles traveled, and thus the rebound effect will
decline. In both 2010 and 2012, EPA chose to use a 10% rebound effect as "a reasonable
compromise between historical estimates and projected future estimates."625 The 2012 Final
Rule noted, however, that several high-quality studies indicated that the rebound effect's
magnitude is significantly diminishing over time as incomes rise.626 This income effect on
rebound makes clear that the projected future estimates are in fact much more accurate than
historical estimates. Moreover, more than 15 years will have passed since the 2010 Final Rule
found a 10% rebound effect to be a good compromise and the implementation of the Proposed
Standards, and income has continued to grow since that time, supporting a substantially
diminished rebound effect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 192]
624 See, e.g., 2016 Draft TAR at 10-14 and 10-20; 77 Fed. Reg. at 62924, 62995; accord Small K. & K.
Van Dender, Fuel Efficiency and Motor Vehicle Travel: The Declining Rebound Effect, 28 Energy J. 25
(2007); Hymel, K. et al., Induced Demand and Rebound Effects in Road Transport, 44 Transp. Rsch. Part B
1220 (2010).
625 77 Fed. Reg. at 62924.
626 NHTSA, Corporate Average Fuel Economy for MY 2017-MY 2025 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks:
Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, at 851-52 (2012) (citing Small & Van Dender (2007) (finding average
rebound to be 22% for 1966-2001, but declining to 11% when looking at only 1997-2001); Hymel et al.
(2010) (finding that average rebound for 1966 through 2004 was 24%, but rebound by 2004 was only
13%); Greene, D., Rebound 2007: Analysis of Light-Duty Vehicle Travel Statistics (Mar. 2010) (internal
EPA research) (estimating the rebound effect would be 10% in 2010 and 8% in 2030, using 1966-2007
data); see also Greene (2012) (same)).
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EPA should give more weight to the fact that the rebound effect varies with income over time.
In the 2021 rule, the agency cited Gillingham (2014) to assert that the evidence of how the
rebound effect varies with income is "mixed," but then also correctly excluded that study from
its list of preferred studies. Gillingham (2014) specifically considers the response to the 2008
gasoline price shock in California. EPA is correct to conclude that this was "an unusual period
when gasoline prices were particularly salient to consumers." 2021 RIA at 3-6 to 3-7. As EPA
noted, Gillingham explained in a follow-up paper in 2020 that the Gillingham (2014) results
should not be used for developing an estimate of the VMT rebound effect for fuel economy or
GHG standards. 2021 RIA at 3-7. The Gillingham (2014) paper is equally irrelevant to the
question of the income effect on rebound. Various papers have confirmed that the rebound effect
is declining over time and one study certainly should not be used as the basis for giving this
factor "less weight," especially a study whose own author acknowledges its irrelevance to this
rulemaking context and to which EPA gives little to no weight otherwise. Because of this, EPA
should more fully consider the impacts of the income effect on rebound, and in doing so, could
support a rebound effect of a magnitude lower than 10%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
192]
In fact, the income effect on rebound is particularly important in the context of setting LDV
GHG emissions regulations for two reasons. First, even the most recent relevant studies on which
rebound estimates are based consider data only from 2013 and earlier. The historical growth rate
of per capita personal income was 1.4% between 2001 and 2019,627 and thus income growth
since 2013 would indicate a declining rebound effect even in the time since the most recent data
utilized were collected. Second, EPA's final standards will affect the fuel efficiency—and
therefore the rebound effect—for vehicles for the next 30 years or more. Private forecasts have
estimated approximately 1.6% growth in real personal income per year over the next 30 years,
see 85 Fed. Reg. at 24675 n. 1763, meaning that when most vehicles subject to the regulations are
retired, incomes will be at least 61% higher than they are today (which are already higher than
during the time periods in which the available rebound studies were conducted).628 More recent
projections in AEO 2023 anticipate incomes rising even more than prior estimates—an average
of 2.4%) per year through 2050.629 This income growth would be expected to cause a large
reduction in the magnitude of the rebound effect, supporting a rebound effect for the vehicles
subject to EPA's final standards of a magnitude well below 10%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, pp. 192-193]
627 See Amicus Brief of Economists at 16 for calculation of 1.4% growth rate.
628 Amicus Brief of Economists at 16.
629 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2023, Table 20: Macroeconomic
Indicators, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=18-
AEO2023&cases=ref2023&sourcekey=0.
Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
2. EPA's Fuel Savings Analysis Is Unclear and Incomplete.
Despite acknowledging that its proposed mandates will result in increased electricity
consumption and expenditures, EPA claims that consumers will nevertheless experience fuel
savings that will help offset higher upfront EV purchasing costs.40 EPA appears to have
premised its conclusion on the modeling of liquid fuel and electricity consumption levels. EPA
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does not explain how it converted modeled consumption levels into monetary values to show
actual consumer savings, and it makes no comparison of fueling costs and electricity rates based
on modeled consumption levels. Nor is information provided on individual consumer savings.
Thus, the basis for EPA's consumer fuel savings conclusion is unclear, at best. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0656, pp. 8-9]
40 88 Fed. Reg. at 29365-66.
EPA's savings assertion seems questionable. Conceivably, liquid fuel costs could decrease
more than electricity costs increase if the proposal is adopted, but even then, EPA's analysis
seems to overstate the fuel savings from switching to EVs. According to the Energy Information
Agency (EIA), the average American household uses 886 kilowatt hours of electricity per
month,41 and EPA reports that the average EV consumes 36 kilowatt hours of electricity per 100
miles driven.42 If the average household drives an EV 15,000 miles per year, or 1,250 miles per
month, and the EV is charged at home to the tune of 450 kilowatt hours of electricity per month,
the household's electricity bill will increase by around 50 percent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0656, pp. 8-9]
41 See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
42 See Comparison: Your Car vs. an Electric Vehicle | US EPA.
Moreover, as EV sales increase, electricity rates are likely to rise due to increased power
demands. Higher electricity prices will also reflect the cost of increased transmission and
generation infrastructure, which some estimates indicate will need to increase 60 percent by
2030, and even more over the following two decades.43 EPA must account for these higher
electricity costs when determining accurately whether, and to what extent, commercial and
noncommercial purchasers/lessees operating EVs will benefit from any fuel savings. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 8-9]
43 See Queued Up... But in Need of Transmission | Department of Energy.
Organization: Office of Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon
There is also concern among the Department of Transportations in western and rural states
about this rule's impact on the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). States look to lose hundreds of
billions of dollars that maintain our nation's infrastructure by removing the HTF's main source of
funding. There is no consideration in the proposed rule on the effects of mandating the removal
of gasoline powered vehicles to the current structure of highway funding. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0675, pp.1-2]
My office, along with Wyoming's state agencies, look forward to working with the EPA in a
meaningful collaborative and cooperative manner. In addition to these comments, attached are
comment letters from the University of Wyoming, School of Energy Resources' Center for
Energy Regulation and Policy Analysis and Wyoming Department of Transportation's joint
comments along with Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0675, pp.1-2]
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Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
Fuel cost "savings": The EPA claims gasoline prices will increase when demand for gasoline
decreases, even though that directly contradicts basic economic theory and real-world examples;
when government restrictions forced less drivers on the road during the COVID pandemic,
demand for gasoline dropped, plummeting the prices of oil and retail gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0551, p. 2]
Pre-Tax Fuel Savings
EPA Claimed Savings: $890 billion
Realistic Savings: NEGATIVE $108 billion [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 4]
The EPA vastly overestimates the savings in fuel costs from their proposed rule. They define
fuel cost savings as the difference between higher electricity costs associated with charging EVs
less the avoided costs of liquid fuel consumption. They underestimate electricity costs and
overestimate savings in liquid fuel costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 4]
Under their rule, EPA estimates that eventually annual liquid fuel consumption would be 49
billion gallons lower, or 3.2 million barrels lower per day7. This significant reduction in liquid
fuel demand would lower equilibrium prices for liquid fuels by about 50%, assuming an oil
supply elasticity of 0.6 8, thereby reducing their liquid fuel cost savings from $1.3 trillion to
$620 billion. During the COVID pandemic, liquid fuel demand also dropped significantly and, as
a result, so did oil prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 4]
7 Page 182 of EPA's Rule - https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-05-05/pdf/2023-07974.pdf
8 Considine, T.J. (2006) "Is the strategic petroleum reserve our ace in the hole?" The Energy Journal, 27, 3,
91-112.
EPA also assumed unrealistically low electricity rates. Not all households have access to
home charging ports. The average rate for charging at a Tesla super-charger is 25 cents per
kilowatt hour (Kwh)9. In contrast, EPA assumes electricity rates for EV charging are 10.3 cents
per kwh in 2027 and fall to 9.3 cents per kwh by 205510. 63 percent of households in the US
have garages or car ports, which provides an upper bound for home chargingl 1. Accordingly, 47
percent of households would be paying much higher commercial rates for EV charging. If we
assume Tesla's price, this implies that EPA underestimated electricity rates paid for EV charging
by 55%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 4]
9 https://www.leafscore.com/tesla/how-much-does-it-cost-to-charge-a-tesla
10 Page 168 of EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis -
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
11 https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/fact-958-january-2-2017-sixty-three-percent-all-housing-units-
have- garage-or-carport
Moreover, the EPA did not factor in the impact on electricity rates from their recent power
plant rule that would essentially force all remaining coal and natural gas power plants to cut
emissions by 90%12. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 4]
12 https://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/biden-administrations-power-plant-rules-underscore-
reality- epa-limits-rcna84201
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This rule is like the Clean Power Plan proposed by the Biden Administration. The US Energy
Information Administration conducted a study of the Clean Power Plan and found that average
retail electricity rates would increase upwards of 3-7%. 13 Taking the mid-range of this price
increase, or 5%, the proposed rule would raise the previous electric rate increase of 55% to 58%
and increase electricity costs for EV charging from EPA's estimate of $460 billion to $728
billion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 5]
13 https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/powerplants/cleanplan/
This $728 billion in higher electricity expenditures more than offsets the savings in reduced
liquid fuel spending of $620. On balance, the fuel cost savings are a NEGATIVE $108 billion in
contrast to EPA's estimated pre-tax fuel savings of $890 billion. This is a nearly $1 trillion
difference. So, under rather conservative but realistic assumptions and elementary economic
analysis, the proposed EV rule will not save consumers money but instead will lead to higher
electricity costs, especially for poor and lower to middle class households living in rental units.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 5]
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
The last detrimental aspect of this arbitrary benchmark is that part of the cost analysis done by
EPA included refueling time. With larger batteries come longer recharge times, which again add
to the cost. While EPA might argue that the high-speed chargers will make up for that, EPA does
not want to address the fact that rapid charge or discharge of a battery accelerates its lifecycle.
Every time a consumer inputs or draws large amounts of power from a battery, it damages it
more than a slower input or draw, thereby decreasing the timeline for the battery's replacement
and moving that expense up sooner in the timeline of EV ownership. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0674, p. 9]
Miscalculated fuel savings [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 12-13]
The study finds substantial fuel savings costs from the rule. (See Tables 163 and 164.)
Curiously, these values increase nearly 100-fold from 2027 to 2055. The retail fuel savings are
approximately $1 billion in 2027, or approximately $7.50 for each of the 130 million households
in the United States in 2022. There will doubtlessly be more households in 2027, and
consequently the per-household benefit will be less. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 12-
13]
By 2055, the total benefit is predicted to be closer to $100 billion, or approximately $750 per
household, a consequential amount. The Net Present Value (NPV) in either the 3% case or the
7%> from fuel savings account for over half of the total net benefits recorded in the summary in
Table 156 ($1.1 trillion out of $1.4 trillion in the 3% discount rate case and $550 billion out of
$610 billion in the 7% discount rate case.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 12-13]
But the numbers on fuel savings are almost certainly wrong. They appear to presume a
substantial increase in gasoline prices and a constant electricity price. These assumptions ignore
two market realities. First, gasoline prices are set in a global petroleum market, not by federal
policy. Global petroleum markets have had fairly predictable prices in a range of $40-$ 100 barrel
for the past two decades or more. Federal policy can raise those prices artificially, but those
policies are unlikely to remain steadily increasing over the next 30 years, as the study assumes. If
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their analysis is correct, then EVs will significantly crowd out ICE autos, which will result in a
drastic reduction in demand, which should also result in lower gasoline prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0674, pp. 12-13]
Second, electricity prices are very much affected by domestic policies. Current
Administration policy is to substantially reduce electricity generation capacity with new capacity
limited to high-cost renewable sources. While future Administrations may reverse these policies,
new generation capacity takes many years to bring online, and rational electric utilities will be
reluctant to invest in efficient electricity generation that may be outlawed every few years. The
net result is that electricity prices, unlike gasoline prices, will predictably increase over the next
few decades under most plausible policy scenarios. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 12-13]
Consequently, the assumptions in the study that fuel costs under the proposed rule will
decrease substantially are almost certainly incorrect in magnitude, and quite likely in direction as
well. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 12-13]
Miscalculated costs of increased refueling times
The study correctly finds increased refueling times with electricity vehicles. (See Table 166.)
But the magnitude of the costs of such increased refueling times are trivially small. In 2027,
increased refueling times are estimated to cost -$0.1 billion, or $0.75 per household. Those
refueling time costs are predicted to increase to $8.2 billion in 2055, or approximately $63 per
household, assuming the number of households does not increase. If average wages are around
$30/hour, this means that a median household is expected to lose approximately an additional 2
hours waiting to refuel in the entire year 2055 under the proposed rule relative to the non-rule
case. If a vehicle is refueled even once every two weeks, this means that each refueling is
predicted to take no more than additional five minutes or so. (120 minutes/26 refueling). This
seems implausible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 13]
Organization: U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Finally, it is incumbent upon EPA and its federal partners to analyze and address the spillover
impacts of this rulemaking on the quality of America's roadways. Since 1956, federal highway
projects have been funded by the Highway Trust Fund, designed to be a self-sustaining source of
funding that is refilled regularly by revenues from a series of dedicated taxes, primarily the gas
and diesel fuel tax. While this revenue source has successfully funded projects for decades, the
balance of the trust fund has declined in recent years, becoming insolvent for the first time in
2008. As a result of declining revenues, for eight of the last ten years Congress has had to
transfer funds from the general fund to the Trust Fund to ensure continued funding of highway
projects. The most significant reason for the reduction in contributions is decreased fuel tax
revenue as fuel economy standards change and more customers purchase electric vehicles that do
not contribute to the Trust Fund, despite benefiting from the infrastructure Trust Fund revenue
provides. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0604, pp. 3-4]
According to the proposed rule, fuel sales would be reduced by 21 billion gallons in 2035,
rising to 34 and 48 billion gallons in 2040 and 2050, respectively. This equates to lost Trust Fund
revenues of $3.9B in 2035, $6.3B in 2040, and $165B through 2055. Absent a plan to replace
these revenues, the adverse impacts of a rapid EV transition proposed in the rule stand to
exacerbate this depletion as the number of vehicles contributing to the Trust Fund decreases with
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no alterative revenue stream to take the place of ICE vehicle contributions. A high-quality
transportation network is vital for American businesses and consumers, and a sharp reduction in
contributions over the next several years as a result of this rule would result in significant
degradation of our nation's roads and bridges. Record high inflation is already reducing buying
power under recently passed laws such as the Infrastructure Investment and Job Act, further
degradation to reduced Trust Fund contributions would adversely impact access to medical
facilities, schools, employers, grocery stores, and other basic needs necessary for the American
public. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0604, pp. 3-4]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
9. EPA fails to account for the rising cost of electricity over the regulatory period. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 10]
EPA estimates future pre-tax and retail gasoline, diesel, and electricity prices based on the
"reference case" projections in the Energy Information Administration's (EIA's) Annual Energy
Outlook 2021 (AEO2021).46 However, the AEO2021 Reference case assumes:
46 DRIA at 2-85.
Current laws and regulations as of September 2020 remain unchanged,47 and
Gasoline and flex fuel vehicles will account for 79% of new-LDV sales by 2050.48
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 10]
47 U.S. EIA "AEO2021 Press Presentation" at 5,
https://www.eia.gov/pressroom/presentations/AEO2021_Release_Presentation.pdf.
48 U.S. EIA "AEO2021" at page 24,
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/archive/aeo21/pdf/AEO_Narrative_2021.pdf.
In its projection of future electricity prices, EPA fails to account for the impacts of mass
electrification (increased electricity demand), the transmission infrastructure upgrades and
battery storage that will be needed to support a transition to renewable generation sources, and
the potential impacts to electrical grid costs and reliability from EPA's recently proposed New
Source Performance Standards for GHG emissions from power plants.49 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, p. 10]
49 88 Fed. Reg. 33240 (May 23, 2023).
EPA also fails to account for the fact that most EV ownership and charging occurs in parts of
the country where electricity prices are well above U.S. average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, p. 10]
EPA projects home charging to account for -77% of total charging demand in 2028, declining
to ~6P/o of total charging demand in 2055.50 Most of the non-residential charging is projected
by EPA to occur at level 2 and DCFC public chargers;51 however, EPA does not account for the
increased electricity fuel costs associated with public charging, which are around $0.30/kWh for
Level 2 and $0.40/kWh for DC fast charging.52 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 10]
50 DRIA at 5-29.
51 DRIA at 5-29.
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52 https://driveclean.ca.gov/electric-car-charging.
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
Refueling Time: EPA makes the unfounded claim that the benefits of the rule will include,
".. .the value of reduced refueling time needed to refuel vehicles" (p. 29199) Assuming ".. .time
spent refueling vehicles would be reduced due to the lower fuel consumption of new vehicles,
(p. 29200) is simply absurd. EPA seems to be willfully twisting the well-know disadvantage of
long EV charging times. Whereas an ICEV takes a matter of minutes to refuel, charging times
can be over an hour. Even fast charging stations, if available without a long wait due to their
scarcity, require 30 minutes for 125 miles and an hour for 250 miles, well in excess of ICEV
refueling times but with vastly less range.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 5-6]
9 "How Long Does It Take to Charge an Electric Car?", J.D. Power, March 26, 2020.
Limited charging infrastructure could drag refueling times to hours beyond what is needed by
the driver. Further, were EPA's projection that 67% of new sales of light-duty and 46% of
medium-duty vehicles will be EVs by 2032 attained, the strain on the grid would mean
governments and utilities would likely enforce refueling times after hours, well past when a
driver would need. Californians, just days after learning of the state's ban on ICEVs by 2035,
were asked not to charge their EVs during the peak hours of 4 - 9pm because of the strain on the
grid. 10 Rather than being a benefit, EPA should consider how this rule would limit Americans
mobility, as limited electricity capacity would cause drivers to run out of fuel when they need it
for vital activities such as driving to work and school while making long roadtrips impractical.
Even though EPA finds a net cost regarding refueling times, the value for that cost is likely much
lower, given the assumptions EPA makes in the analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp.
5-6]
10 "California asks residents not to charge electric vehicles, days after announcing gas car ban," John
Clark, August 31, 2022.
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Commenters argued that fuel savings were not an appropriate economic benefit of the rule
(American Enterprise Institute, American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers). The commenter
argued that the inclusion of fuel savings is illegitimate as a component of the "benefits" of the
proposed rule because the economic benefits of fuel savings are captured fully by consumers of
fuels. There is no "externality" attendant upon fuel consumption per se, and if "fuel savings" are
to be considered relevant for purposes of benefit/cost analysis, the commenter believes then the
adverse effects or costs of a (forced) reduction in fuel consumption in terms of the quality of
transportation services must be included in the analysis (American Enterprise Institute).
Similarly, commenters asked, "Why does market behavior not yield fuel consumption for the
vehicle fleet envisioned in the proposed rule (American Enterprise Institute)
Commenters suggested that EPA should revise its analysis concerning charging time and
continue with promulgating a final rule for future emissions standards that accounts for the
reality of today's automotive market and not the public pronouncements of the automotive
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industry, a single state or group of states, or other unsupported estimates of future market growth
(American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers).
Commenters expressed concern over lost fuel tax revenues and the impact that would have on
the Highway Trust Fund and Federal highway infrastructure investment (American Highway
Users Alliance, Chevron, Departments of Transportation of Idaho, Montana, North Dakota,
South Dakota and Wyoming, Office of Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).
Commenters suggested that EPA reflect the effect on fuel prices of the IRA on incentivizing
carbon capture and sequestration used for enhanced oil recovery (Donn Viviani). The commenter
suggests that such incentives would reduce fuel prices which in turn could slow the transition to
BEVs.
Commenters suggested that EPA's use of a 10 percent rebound effect was too high and a
value well below that would be more appropriate (Environmental. And Public Health
Organizations).
Commenters argued that EPA's fuel savings analysis was unclear and incomplete (NADA).
This commenter also argues that EPA appears to have premised its conclusion on the modeling
of liquid fuel and electricity consumption levels. This commenter believes that EPA does not
explain how it converted modeled fuel consumption levels into monetary values to show actual
consumer savings, and that we did not compare fueling costs and electricity rates based on
modeled consumption levels. The commenter also believes EPA did not provide information on
individual consumer savings. Thus, NADA believes the basis for EPA's consumer fuel savings
conclusion is unclear. This commenter also states that, if the average household drives an EV
15,000 miles per year, or 1,250 miles per month, and the EV is charged at home to the tune of
450 kilowatt hours of electricity per month, the household's electricity bill will increase by
around 50 percent and electricity prices are likely to rise with increasing demand.
Commenters argued that EPA's fuel savings were incorrect because they did not consider the
impact of lower gasoline demand on lower gasoline prices and simultaneously ignoring the
impact on electricity prices associated with increased demand (Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine,
The Heritage Foundation, Valero). Commenters argued that the BEV refueling times and
associated costs are underestimated suggesting that they equate to an additional five minutes of
refueling time for recharging once every two weeks (The Heritage Foundation).
Response:
We respond to comments related to the rebound effect in Section 13 of this document, to
EVSE charging infrastructure in Section 17 of this document, the grid and infrastructure
upgrades in Section 18 of this document.
Regarding fuel savings being included as a benefit of the rule, this is a mischaracterization of
EPA's consideration of fuel savings. EPA considers the fuel savings to be a cost of the rule, a
cost which happens to be negative and therefore a savings to vehicle drivers. Fuel savings factor
into net benefits since net benefits are monetized benefits less costs. The commenter suggests
that, if EPA continues to calculate fuel savings and include them in net benefits, that the "costs
of a (forced) reduction in fuel consumption in terms of the quality of transportation services must
be included in the analysis." EPA disagrees that there are costs associated with a reduction in
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fuel consumption because there is no reason to believe that there will be an impact on the quality
of transportation services. Presumably the commenter believes, without having provided
supporting data, that drivers of BEVs will experience less quality in their transportation. This is
an unfounded belief given that the literature indicates that BEV drivers to date appear to be
happy with their decision to purchase a BEV.372 Further, studies show that the more consumers
are exposed to BEVs the more interested in BEVs they become.373
Regarding assertions that the market will provide all the fuel savings customers desire, the
issue here is one referred to as the "energy paradox" and EPA has addressed this issue in past
rules (see 75 FR 25510 and 77 FR 62914) and again in this rule (Section VIII.K.l of the
preamble).
Regarding comments from Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine concerning fuel prices and those
from the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers regarding electricity prices, our liquid
fuel price projections in the final analysis are not EPA's projections, but instead are based on
AEO 2023, the best available projections developed by the recognized experts in the Energy
Information Administration. Regarding electricity prices, we have updated the electricity prices
used for EV charging estimates and the EVSE port costs used in our benefit cost analysis and
respond to related comments in Section 17 of this document.
Regarding the impact of lower liquid fuel demand on liquid fuel prices, Paul Bonifas and Tim
Considine assert that the significant reduction in liquid fuel demand would lower equilibrium
prices for liquid fuels by about 50 percent, assuming an oil supply elasticity of 0.6, thereby
reducing EPA's estimated liquid fuel savings from $1.3 trillion to $620 billion. The commenter's
source for the suggested oil supply elasticity of 0.6 is the one of the authors of this comment in a
study looking at the impacts of increasing supply to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as opposed
to releasing that supply to lower liquid fuel prices.
The impact of lower gasoline demand on gasoline prices is likely two-fold: 1) reduction of
crude oil demand, which lowers crude oil prices and then lowers the cost of producing gasoline
and other refined products and 2) lower demand for gasoline in refineries would impact the cost
of producing gasoline as gasoline production at refineries decreases.
With respect to #1, one would expect that reducing crude oil demand would reduce crude oil
prices, however, swing producers such as Saudi Arabia could then turn around and lower crude
oil production to send crude oil prices back up again.374 At the same time, crude oil production is
changing with many crude oil wells in decline while new oil fields are being developed. Those
which are in decline producing crude oil at, for example, $30/bbl could add tertiary crude oil
recovery (carbon dioxide flood) and then their marginal production cost could rise to $70/bbl.
372 Youngs, Jeff, "First-Time EV Owners Satisfied with their Choice," J.D. Power, January 31, 2022,
https://www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-guides/study-first-time-ev-owners-satisfied-with-their-choice, accessed
January 30, 2024.
373 Lundin, Ben, "More BEV Exposure Leads to Higher BEV Purchase Intent," Escalent, December 20, 2022,
https://escalent.co/blog/more-bev-exposure-leads-to-higher-bev-purchase-
intent/#:~:text=Almost%2070%25%20of%20Heavy%20EV,a%20gas%20or%20diesel%20vehicle., accessed
January 30, 2024.
374 What drives crude oil prices: Supply OPEC; Energy and Financial Markets; Energy Information Administration;
last updated 1/9/2024.
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Predicting the economics of producing crude oil over the next 30 years is extremely challenging
at best.
With respect to #2, reducing gasoline production at refineries would likely lower refining
costs. However, as gasoline demand decreases, refineries close and the system returns to the
same point of the cost curve for producing gasoline. The refining costs for gasoline would,
though, likely change if gasoline demand is decreasing faster than other refined products which
is possible.
Because there are so many confounding factors at play when and if liquid fuel demand
decreases and how that may or may not impact liquid fuel prices, EPA has chosen not to attempt
to reflect such relationships in its analysis using a single elasticity parameter applied to demand
as suggested by the commenter. Any attempt at reflecting such relationships are best handled by
large scale economic models such as the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) which
considers all such factors simultaneously.
Regarding the comment that EPA used the residential electricity price ($/kWh) in estimating
electricity expenditures to charge BEVs, this was true in the proposed rule. For the proposal,
EPA used the value reported in the Annual Energy Outlook and used that value to be consistent
with the AEO liquid fuel prices used in the EPA analysis. We acknowledge the use of this
electricity price as a shortcoming of the NPRM's analysis. In the final rulemaking analysis, we
are using estimated electricity prices from the Integrated Planning Model runs done in support of
the electric generating unit emission inventory and charge demand estimates. Further, we have
added additional factors to reflect the share of BEV charging done at public versus private
sources and the different prices projected to be paid at those sources. We respond to comments
regarding our electricity charging prices in Section 17 of this document.
Regarding refueling time, we have updated our estimates of refueling time by including a
charge rate of 400 miles per hour of charging compared to the 100 miles per hour of charging
that was used in the NPRM (see Chapter 4 of the final RIA). We note that the refueling time
associated with BEVs is meant to reflect mid-trip charging only, not routine charging done
overnight at home, while purchasing groceries or other goods, or while working. We would not
expect mid-trip charging to take place once every two weeks. In fact, our OMEGA analysis
estimates a mid-trip charging event every 3,600 to 5,200 miles, depending on the vehicle body
style (car, van/suv, pickup). This would suggest just 2 to 5 events per year for 10,000 to 15,000
miles of driving in the year.
Regarding comments that the fuel savings analysis was unclear and incomplete, based on the
level of detailed observations relayed in this comment, it appears that EPA's analysis was quite
clear to the commenter. The commenter also provides an estimate of a 50 percent increase in
home electricity consumption associated with in-home BEV charging. Without assessing the
accuracy of that estimate, 450 kWh/month of charging at a $0.20/kWh would cost $90/month. A
gasoline vehicle driving 1,250 miles/month at 30 miles/gallon and fueled with $3.00/gallon
gasoline would be $125/month. Therefore, in this rough back-of-the-envelope calculation that
might be typical of a consumer considering a new vehicle purchase, the BEV provides a $35
savings every month or $420/year. If that consumer purchasers a level 2 home charger for $1,280
(see Table 5-12 of the final RIA, single-family home (SFH) L2), that charger would be paid for
after 3 years and the $420/year savings would be available for other needs. And this ignores
other expected operating savings. Thus, contrary to the implication in this comment, EPA's
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analysis indicates that ownership costs for BEVs are lower than those for ICE vehicles, on
average over time.
8.4 - Social cost of GHGs
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Once the agency fixes the modeling of C02 emissions with and without the new 2027-2032
standards, it should revisit its decision about how to monetize the C02 emissions benefits. A
good case can be made that one set of benefit calculations should make use of a global measure
of the social cost of carbon, as use of a global measure may encourage other countries to control
C02 emissions through deployment of BEVs and cleaner electricity systems. EPA has taken this
position in the DRIA. However, once again, the agency's analysis should not engage in wishful
thinking, as it is well known that most countries are not meeting their pledged commitments
under the 2015 Paris accords. It also makes sense to disclose to Congress and the public the
climate benefits of the rule, measured with a domestic cost of carbon. This measure would
account for the fact that most of the climate benefits of the 2027-2032 rule will occur outside the
United States, as greenhouse gases are globally mixing pollutants. Presentation of both global
and domestic estimates of climate benefits will ensure that the RIA is seen as an objective
analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 291-292]
Overall, Auto Innovators believes that a more modest, measured claim of climate-control
benefits in the final rule would make the rule more defensible. As the DRIA stands now, the
climate-benefits analysis could be vulnerable to technical criticism. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 291-292]
Organization: American Enterprise Institute
II. The Purported Climate Benefits of the Proposed Rule Are Illusory and the Social Cost of
Carbon Parameters Are Fundamentally Flawed
EPA asserts in the proposed rule that it would yield cumulative reductions in greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions of between 7.3 billion and 8.0 billion metric tons through 2055.5 Using
the higher figure, that is an annual average reduction of about 276 million metric tons. U.S.
emissions of GHG in 2021 were about 6.3 billion metric tons on a C02-equivalent basis.6 The
Biden administration policy goal is net-zero emissions by 2050.7 If we use the EPA climate
model in order to estimate the prospective temperature effect of the entire Biden administration
policy, under a set of assumptions that exaggerate the temperature effects of reduced emissions,
that policy would yield a global temperature reduction of 0.062°C by 2050, and 0.173°C by
2100.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 4-5]
5 See the proposed rule at Table 3.
6 See https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-
sinks#:~:text=In%202021%2C%20U.S.%20greenhouse%20gas,sequestration%20from%20the%201and%2
Osector. U.S. GHG emissions in 2005 on a C02-equivalent basis were about 7.5 billion metric tons; see
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Table ES-2 at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/US-GHG-Inventory-2023-Chapter-
Executive-Summary.pdf.
7 See https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/20/fact-sheet-president-
biden-to- catalyze-global-climate-action-through-the-major-economies-forum-on-energy-and-
climate/#:~:text=President%20Biden%20has%20set%20an,by%20no%201ater%20than%202050.
8 Author computations using Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change
(MAGICC), version 7.0, at https://magicc.org/. Assumes equilibrium sensitivity of the climate system at
4.5°, with global baseline emissions path A1B from the IPCC 4th Assessment Report.
The cumulative reduction in U.S. emissions under the net-zero policy, from 6.3 billion metric
tons in 2021 to net zero by 2050, would total about 88.2 billion metric tons. For the 2027- 2050
time period relevant in the proposed rule, the cumulative reduction would be about 60 billion
tons. Accordingly, the cumulative emissions reduction of 8.0 billion metric tons asserted in the
proposed rule would be about 13.3 percent of the total envisioned in the Biden net-zero policy,
which as just noted, would yield a reduction in global temperatures of 0.173°C by 2100. A
linearity assumption is not strictly correct, but it is wholly appropriate for purposes of close
approximation. The "climate benefit" of the proposed rule, under the explicit EPA assumptions
and estimates, would be about 0.023°C by 2100. Because the standard deviation of the surface
temperature record is 0.11°C, that effect would not be detectable.9 Accordingly, the monetized
climate benefits of the proposed rule asserted by EPA are an illusion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0571, pp. 4-5]
9 See https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1029/1999JD900835.
EPA attempts to circumvent this obvious problem by substituting in place of any such
analysis an application of the "social cost of carbon" (SC-GHG) to the asserted reductions in
GHG emissions attendant upon implementation of the proposed rule, as estimated on an interim
basis by the Biden Administration Interagency Working Group. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0571, pp. 4-5]
10 The interim estimates are at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/TechnicalSupportDocument_SocialCostofCarbonMethaneNitrousOxide.pdf.
EPA estimated the climate benefits for the final standards using measures of the social cost of
three GHGs: Carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide. The social cost of each gas (i.e., the social cost
of carbon (SC-C02), methane (SC- CH4), and nitrous oxide (SC-N20)) is the monetary value
of the net harm to society associated with a marginal increase in emissions in a given year, or the
benefit of avoiding that increase. Collectively, these values are referenced as the "social cost of
greenhouse gases" (SC-GHG). 11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 4-5]
11 See the proposed rule at 29371.
The interim IWG estimates are deeply flawed, in that they (1) distort the actual economic
growth predictions produced by the integrated assessment models, (2) base predictions of future
climate phenomena on climate models that cannot predict the past or the present, (3)
incorporate "co-benefits" in the form of a reduction in the emissions of other criteria and
hazardous air pollutants already regulated under different provisions of the Clean Air Act, (4)
incorporate the asserted benefits of GHG reductions on a global basis, and (5) employ discount
rates that are inconsistent and inappropriate. 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 5-8]
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12 See Benjamin Zycher at
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1154&context=lawreview. The issue of
discount rates is addressed in section III.
The available analysis suggests that the prospective economic growth risks of anthropogenic
climate change, at least in the aggregate, are much smaller than many assert. Consider the
predictions from the integrated assessment models, a central one of which is the Dynamic
Integrated Climate and Economy Model, for which William D. Nordhaus won the Nobel Prize in
Economics in 2018.13 Under DICE, global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2100 varies by
about 3 percent across policy scenarios, including no climate policies at all, a figure that is both
very small and almost certainly not statistically significant given the vagaries of economic
forecasting and the number of years remaining before the end of this century. (I exclude here
Nordhaus' "Stern discounting" policy scenario, as it assumes a discount rate effectively equal to
zero, a fundamental analytic error. 14) Per capita consumption varies only by about 1.3 percent
across policy scenarios, also a very small number and almost certain not to be statistically
significant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 5-8]
13 See William Nordhaus and Paul Sztorc, "DICE 2013R: Introduction and User's Manual," Yale
University, Department of Economics, October 2013, Figure 4 and Table 1,
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/homepage/documents/DICE_Manual_100413rl.pdf. See
also Benjamin Zycher, "The Climate Left Attacks Nobel Laureate WillianD. Nordhaus," monograph,
American Enterprise Institute, July 2020, at https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/The-Climate-
Left-Attacks- Nobel-Laureate-William-D.-Nordhaus.pdf.
14 See Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, January 2007), https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/earth-and-
environmental- science/climatology-and-climate-change/economics-climate-change-stern-
review?format=PB. On the contrast between the climate predictions made by the Stern model and the
actual record, see https://rogerpielkejr.substack.com/p/off-target-an-evaluation-of-the-
stern?utm_source=substack&publication_id=119454&post_id=104480671&utm_medium=email&utm_con
tent=sha re&triggerShare=true&isFreemail=true. See also David Kreutzer, "Discounting Climate Costs,"
Heritage Foundation, June 16, 2016, at https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/discounting-climate-
costs.
The IPCC — even in its most alarmist analyses — arrives at a conclusion very close to that
reported in the DICE analysis. In its "1.5 Degree C" report, it finds that the damage from
anthropogenic climate change unmitigated by policy initiatives will reduce global GDP by 2.6
percent by 2100.15 By that year, IPCC projects that individual incomes on average will be at
least 400 percent greater than is the case today. 16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 5-8]
15 See Marco Bindi, et. al., "Impacts of 1.5°C of Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems," at
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Chapter3_Low_Res.pdf, Chapter 3 of
Valerie Masson-Delmotte, et. al., eds., IPCC Special Report, Global Warming of 1.5°C, at
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pdf.
16 This implies average annual growth in per capita GDP of less than 1.5 percent for the rest of this
century.
The interim estimates of the SCC are driven by damage functions predicted by the various
climate models — the EPA model in particular — the track records of which are poor. 17
McKitrick and Christy summarize the contrast between their predictions and the actual satellite
record as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 5-8]
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17 The specifics of the CMIP5 and CMIP6 models, respectively, can be found at
https://pcmdi.llnl.gov/mips/cmip5/ and https://pcmdi.llnl.gov/CMIP6/.
The tendency of climate models to overstate warming in the tropical troposphere has long
been noted. Here we examine individual runs from 38 newly released Coupled Model
Intercomparison Project Version 6 (CMIP6) models and show that the warm bias is now
observable globally as well. We compare CMIP6 runs against observational series drawn from
satellites, weather balloons, and reanalysis products. We focus on the 1979-2014 interval, the
maximum span for which all observational products are available and for which models were run
using historically observed forcings. For lower-troposphere and midtroposphere layers both
globally and in the tropics, all 38 models overpredict warming in every target observational
analog, in most cases significantly so, and the average differences between models and
observations are statistically significant. We present evidence that consistency with observed
warming would require lower model Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS) values. 18 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 5-8]
18 See https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.eom/doi/full/10.1029/2020EA001281.
OMB Circular A-4 directs federal agencies conducting benefit/cost analysis of regulatory
measures as follows: "Your analysis should focus on benefits and costs that accrue to citizens
and residents of the United States. Where you choose to evaluate a regulation that is likely to
have effects beyond the borders of the United States, these effects should be reported
separately."23 The IWG analysis incorporates explicitly in its benefit/cost calculation the
purported global climate benefits from reductions in U.S. GHG emissions, presumably on the
grounds that the assumed GHG externality is global in nature. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571,
p. 8]
23 See OMB Circular A-4, "Regulatory Analysis," September 17, 2003, at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/.
This argument is fundamentally flawed, in substantial part because the global climate effect of
all U.S. GHG emissions is very close to zero, as discussed above. Accordingly, the global
"benefits" of U.S. GHG emissions reductions would be effectively zero. Neither the IWG nor
EPA can dispute this because it is the EPA climate model used directly or indirectly through the
IAMs applied to the analysis of the SCC. More generally, it is the EPA climate model that is
used throughout the federal government for analysis of climate and energy policies.24 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, p. 8]
24 See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Transportation, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration proposed rule, "Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards
for Medium- and Heavy- Duty Engines and Vehicles — Phase 2," July 12, 2015, at
https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR- 2014-0827-0002.
Furthermore, the inclusion of purported global benefits in the benefit/cost analysis of U.S.
GHG policies would create a very large distortion in terms of an efficient international adoption
of climate policies. An efficient promulgation of climate policies internationally would attempt
to achieve both an equation of the global marginal benefits and costs of GHG emission
reductions, and an allocation of emissions reductions that equates the marginal cost of such
reductions across economies. If the U.S. is to promulgate domestic policies that equate domestic
marginal costs with global marginal benefits, then other countries would have powerful
incentives to obtain free rides on U.S. efforts. Given that the marginal cost function for
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reductions in GHG emissions almost certainly is upward sloping — the marginal cost of GHG
reductions rises as such reductions increase — the outcome would be a global effort to reduce
GHG emissions more costly than an international effort equating marginal costs across
economies.25 That is the central implication of the imperative incorporated in the IWG analysis
of the SCC: Under any assumption about the global benefits of reduced GHG emissions, that
cannot be an efficient outcome unless the U.S. is the low-cost source of all reductions in GHG
emissions, an assumption that simply is not plausible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, p. 8]
25 This is true whether the marginal cost functions across economies are identical or differ, although the
latter is far more plausible.
With respect to the issue of the choice among discount rates, "climate policy" by definition is
the allocation of resources away from current consumption and from productive activities that
yield consumption goods during the current time period, in favor of a reduction in GHG
emissions/concentrations that purportedly would increase the production of consumption goods
during some series of future time periods. That is why EPA asserts that the proposed rule would
yield positive net benefits in present value terms, that is, increase the present value of the
consumption stream. Accordingly, that use of resources during the current time period — again,
by definition — is an investment, and it must be evaluated in comparison with the social return
to alternative investments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 8-10]
Therefore, it is the opportunity of cost of capital that is the appropriate discount rate to be
applied to the evaluation of the proposed rule, because the allocation — the investment — of
resources to such endeavors imposes an opportunity cost in the form of other forgone
investments. Because the use of scarce resources for reductions in GHG emissions is an
investment, whether promising returns low or high, the appropriate discount rate is the
opportunity cost of capital for the economy as a whole. For the period 1928-2020, the average
annual before-tax return to investment in the Standard and Poor 500, in real (inflation-adjusted)
terms was 8.5 percent.26 For the period 1960-2020, the figure was 7.61 percent. Such long-run
historical figures are consistent with the directive in OMB Circular A-4 that a discount rate of 7
percent be the baseline parameter applied to regulatory analysis by the federal government.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 8-10]
26 The data on annual returns for several investment alternatives are reported by the Stern School of
Management, New York University, at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/histretSP.xls.
EPA in previous analyses has justified a "consumption rate of interest" defined alternatively
at 2.5 percent, 3 percent, or 5 percent, as follows.27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 8-10]
27 See the regulatory impact analysis for https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-08-10/pdf/2021-
16582.pdf.
Second, the IWG found that the use of the social rate of return on capital (7 percent under
current OMB Circular A-4 guidance) to discount the future benefits of reducing GHG emissions
inappropriately underestimates the impacts of climate change for the purposes of estimating the
SC-GHG. Consistent with the findings of the National Academies and the economic literature,
the IWG continued to conclude that the consumption rate of interest is the theoretically
appropriate discount rate in an intergenerational context... and recommended that discount rate
uncertainty and relevant aspects of intergenerational ethical considerations be accounted for in
selecting future discount rates. As a member of the IWG involved in the development of the
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February 2021 TSD, EPA agrees with this assessment and will continue to follow developments
in the literature pertaining to this issue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 8-10]
That analytic argument is fundamentally flawed. First: The "consumption rate of interest" is
not the correct conceptual discount rate for analysis of the proposed rule because the use of
resources for purposes of reductions in GHG emissions is obviously an investment, the
opportunity cost of which is the marginal social return to investment. Even if we assume that the
"consumption rate of interest" conceptually is the correct parameter for discounting purposes, the
relevant metric is the real market rate of interest on intertemporal consumption shifts, one crude
measure of which is the market rate of interest on unsecured consumer loans. Even given the
recent years of low interest rates maintained by the Federal Reserve, that market rate appears to
be over 7 percent in real terms.28 For secured loans (new autos), the real interest rate appears to
be at least 3 percent,29 but that is not the correct parameter because there is no collateral insuring
against the possibility that government policies mandating reductions in GHG emissions will
prove uneconomic. The EPA discount rate argument is fundamentally flawed analytically, and is
inconsistent with the data for the U.S. credit market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 8-10]
28 See the data reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis at
https ://fred. stlouisfed. org/series/TERMCBPER24N S.
29 See https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RIFLPBCIANM60NM.
Note also that the use of a (low) "consumption rate of interest" for the evaluation of climate
policy only would introduce an important bias in the allocation of resources among government
policies and between government and private-sector resource use. EPA does not argue that the
"consumption rate of interest" should be applied to the benefit/cost analysis of all government
investment and regulatory activity; only climate policies are to be so treated, on the grounds of
"intergenerational equity," discussed below. Nor would the private sector choose to use an
artificially-low discount rate for the evaluation of alternative resource uses. If it is only the
climate dimension of investment and consumption choice dynamics that is to be shaped by the
use of a low "consumption rate of interest," it is obvious that important distortions would be the
central outcome, with a smaller capital stock resulting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 8-
10]
Second: The implicit premise in the EPA discussion of intergenerational analysis and the
discount rate is straightforward: Future generations prefer to avoid the damages that they
ostensibly will bear because of the climate effects of resource allocation decisions made by the
current generation, and because future generations cannot vote during the current time period, it
is equitable to force the current generation to bear the costs of anthropogenic climate change that
otherwise would be inflicted upon future generations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 8-
10]
However seemingly straightforward, that argument is not correct. Future generations prefer to
receive a bequest of an aggregate capital stock more- rather than less valuable, an objective very
different from a maximization of the value of one dimension — climate phenomena — of that
aggregate capital stock. This requires efficient resource allocation by the current generation, and
therefore the application of the correct discount rate. Consider a homo sapiens baby borne in a
cave some 50,000 years ago. Despite the fact that at birth that child would have enjoyed
environmental quality effectively unaffected by mankind, and a fortiori climate phenomena
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determined by natural processes only, the baby at birth would have had a life expectancy of only
about ten years.30 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 8-10]
30 This life expectancy observation was provided by Professor Gail Kennedy, Department of
Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles, during a telephone interview conducted February 16,
2011.
Accordingly, it is obvious that given the opportunity to choose, that child would opt for less
environmental quality and greater climate risk in exchange for a longer life expectancy
engendered by a more valuable aggregate capital stock yielding improved shelter, expanded food
supplies, a cleaner water supply, better medical care, ad infinitum. Greater wealth is the central
objective of any generation, a reality shunted aside by the focus in the RIA upon only the climate
dimension of the aggregate capital stock to be bequeathed to future generations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0571, pp. 8-10]
In short: EPA uses the SCC as a substitute for estimation of the actual prospective climate
impacts of its proposed rule because the latter cannot be asserted to be greater than zero
operationally or as a matter of statistical significance. But the SCC is fundamentally flawed for
the reasons summarized above, and is inconsistent with the evidence on climate phenomena and
with the prospective effectives of climate policies in the EPA climate model.31 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0571, pp. 8-10]
31 See https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dr.%20Benjamin%20Zycher%20-
%20Testimony%20-%20Senate%20Budget%20Committee.pdf.
Organization: Arizona State Legislature
4. The proposed rule relies on unlawful and faulty calculations for the Social Cost of
Greenhouse Gases. The Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases calculations relied upon by EPA in its
post-hoc cost-benefit analysis violate the separation of powers and suffer from glaring
methodological deficiencies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 2]
IV. EPA's Calculation of the "Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases" Is Unlawful,
Unconstitutional, Arbitrary and Capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 9-10]
As noted above, EPA claims that it need not engage in any cost-benefit analysis to justify the
proposed rule. Yet, in Section VIII, to comply with Executive Order 12866, EPA gives a clear
indication of what such a cost-benefit analysis would look like if EPA admitted that it were
required to conduct one. That cost-benefit analysis rests heavily on the so-called "Social-Cost of
Greenhouse Gases." If adopted by EPA as justification for the proposed rule, it is equally
unlawful, unconstitutional, arbitrary, and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 9-10]
EPA's calculation of the so-called "Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases" ("SC-GHG") plays a
pivotal role in the analysis conducted in Section VIII. See 88 Fed. Reg. 29,371-379. Avoiding
the supposed "social costs" of greenhouse gases is the first and principal benefit of the new
emissions standards proposed by EPA. See id. Indeed, it is clear that reducing greenhouse gas
emissions is the driving force behind the proposal. See id. But EPA's approach is baseless.
EPA's continued reliance on the "social cost of greenhouse gases" metric, as calculated by the
"Interagency Working Group" convened by Executive Order 13990, to predict future climate
damages is unlawful, unconstitutional, arbitrary and capricious. It violates the separation of
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powers and thPAe Major Questions Doctrine, and suffers from glaring methodological
deficiencies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 9-10]
A. EPA uncritically adopts the Interagency Working Group's values for the SC- GHG, as it
was instructed to do by Section 5(b) of E.O. 13990.
In its Section VIII discussion, EPA uncritically adopts the values for the SC-GHG provided
by the Interagency Working Group convened by Executive Order 13990. EPA states: "We
estimate the global social benefits of C02, CH4, and N20 emission reductions expected from the
proposed rule using the SC-GHG estimates presented in the February 2021 Technical Support
Document (TSD): Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide Interim Estimates under
E.O. 13990 (IWG 2021)." 88 Fed. Reg. 29,372 (emphasis added). EPA claims that "[w]e have
evaluated the SC-GHG estimates in the TSD and have determined that these estimates are
appropriate for use in estimating the global social benefits of C02, CH4, and N20 emission
reductions expected from this proposed rule." Id. However, EPA's substantive discussion of the
Interagency Working Group's values includes only statements recognizing their "limitations."
See id. For example, EPA states that "these interim SC-GHG estimates have a number of
limitations, including that the models used to produce them do not include all of the important
physical, ecological, and economic impacts of climate change recognized in the climate-change
literature and that several modeling input assumptions are outdated." Id. Further, EPA admits
that "more robust methodologies for estimating damages from [greenhouse gas] emissions" are
available, and that there is room to "further improve SC-GHG estimation going forward." Id.
Nevertheless, with scant analysis, EPA uncritically adopts the Interagency Working Group's
values for the "Social Costs" of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0537, p.10]
Table 172 through Table 175 show the benefits of reduced C02, CH4, N20 and GHG
emissions, respectively, and consequently the annual quantified benefits (i.e., total GHG
benefits), for each of the four interim social cost of GHG (SC-GHG) values estimated by the
interagency working group. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 10-11]
Id. (emphasis added).
Why so? Why does EPA adopt SC-GHG values that it admits are subject to numerous
"limitations," are based on "outdated" modeling assumptions, and compare poorly with "more
robust methodologies"? Id. Moreover, why does it appear that every other federal agency to
quantify the "social costs" of carbon dioxide, methane, and/or nitrous oxide since February 2021
used the Interagency Working Group's "interim estimates"? 16 What explains the astonishing,
persistent persuasive power of these admittedly flawed numbers? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0537, pp. 10-11]
16 At least twelve agency actions have expressly used the Working Group's "interim estimates" from the
2021 TSD since it was published in February 2021. See, e.g., Doc. 98, Louisiana v. Biden, Case No. 2:21-
cv-01074, at 16-18 (W.D. La. Feb. 11, 2022) (citing nine such agency actions, including action by EPA,
DOE, BLM, FAR, CEQ, NHTSA, and DOI, addressing issues such as light-duty vehicle emissions
standards, general service lamps, oil and gas new and modified sources, fossil fuel leasing, and
manufactured housing, among others); see also, e.g., Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy,
Department of Energy, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for General Service
Lamps, Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. 27,439 (May 9, 2022), at 27,456/1 ("DOE used the estimates for the SC-
GHG from the most recent update of the IWG in its February 2021 TSD."); Office of Energy Efficiency
and Renewable Energy, Department of Energy, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation
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Standards for Manufactured Housing, Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. 32,728 (May 31, 2022), at 32,733/1-2
("DOE used interim SC-GHG values developed by an Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of
Greenhouse Gases (IWG)."); National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Department of
Transportation, Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years 2024-2026 Passenger Cars
and Light Trucks, Final Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. 25,710 (May 2, 2022), id. at 25,724/1 ("In this final rule,
NHTSA employed the SC-GHG values from the Interim Revised Estimates developed by the Interagency
Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (IWG), and discounted it at values recommended
by the IWG for its main analysis."). By contrast, commenters are not aware of any agencies that are not
independent of the President that have declined to adopt the Interagency Working Group's 2021
recommendations on this point.
The answer to this question is obvious: EPA and the other federal agencies use the
Interagency Working Group's "Interim Estimates" because they have been ordered to do so by
the President. Section 5 of Executive Order 13990 directs that the "Working Group shall
.. .publish an interim SCC, SCN, and SCM within 30 days of the date of this order, which
agencies shall use when monetizing the value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions resulting
from regulations and other relevant agency actions until final values are published." E.O. 13990,
§ 5(b)(ii)(A), 86 Fed. Reg. 7040 (emphasis added). The Executive Order is not ambiguous: It
provides that "agencies shall use" the Interagency Working Group's values "until final values are
published," id. (emphasis added)—which, as EPA concedes, has never happened and is now long
overdue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 10-11]
The meaning of the word "shall" in this context is perfectly plain—it is an auxiliary verb
"used to express a command or exhortation." Shall, Merriam-Webster Online, at
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/shall (defining "shall" as "used to express a
command or exhortation"); see also, e.g., Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 579
U.S. 162, 171 (2016) ("Unlike the word 'may,' which implies discretion, the word 'shall' usually
connotes a requirement."); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S.
26, 35 (1998) (recognizing that "shall" is "mandatory" and "normally creates an obligation
impervious to judicial discretion"). The President "used the word 'shall' in" E.O. 13990, and that
functions "as a command." Kingdomware, 579 U.S. at 172. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537,
pp.11-12]
Thus, in Executive Order 13990, the President gave a command to the agencies—a binding
directive that they "shall" use the Interagency Working Group's interim values (and, later, its
final values, if they are ever published) in any "regulations and other relevant agency actions"
that involve the calculation of SC-GHG. See E.O. 13990, § 5(b)(ii)(A), 86 Fed. Reg. 7040. And
every federal agency since then has interpreted it as a command—acting in lockstep with each
other in adopting the Interagency Working Group's interim estimates whenever they quantify the
benefits of reducing emissions of C02, CH4, and N20. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp.
11-12]
This situation is unlawful, for at least three reasons. First, it involves an unconstitutional
arrogation of legislative power to the Working Group, in violation of the separation of powers.
Second, it violates the Major Questions Doctrine. Third, the Interagency Working Group's
methodology is profoundly flawed, such that any reliance on its numbers is inherently arbitrary
and capricious—as EPA all but concedes by recognizing that its numbers are "outdated" and
fraught with "limitations." 88 Fed. Reg. 29,372. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 11-12]
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B. The Interagency Working Group's promulgation of binding values for the SC- GHG
violates the separation of powers and Major Questions Doctrine.
In litigation about the status of the Interagency Working Group, the U.S. Department of
Justice admitted: "No statute establishes it, nor delegates it any legislative authority." Doc. 28,
Missouri v. Biden, No. 4:21-cv-00287-AGF (E.D. Mo.), at 54. This is undeniably true. There is
no statute that either creates or delegates power to an "Interagency Working Group on Social
Cost of Greenhouse Gases"—it is purely a creature of E.O. 13990. Yet, pursuant to the plain
terms of E.O. 13990, the Working Group purports to exercise legislative authority—the authority
to dictate to all federal agencies the specific values that they must use when they monetize the
costs of future greenhouse-gas emissions. This is quintessentially legislative power, exercised
without any delegation from Congress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 12]
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution provides: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives." U.S. Const, art. I, § 1. The Interagency Working Group's interim estimates in
the 2021 Technical Support Document constitute specific, mandatory numerical values on a
policy question of great import, which federal agencies are bound to use in "regulations and
other relevant agency actions" under the plain terms of E.O. 13990. E.O. 13990, § 5(b)(ii)(A), 86
Fed. Reg. 7040; see also Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases,
United States Government, Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and
Nitrous Oxide Interim Estimates Under Executive Order 13990 (Feb. 2021), at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/TechnicalSupportDocument_SocialCostofCarbonMethaneNitrousOxide
.pdf ("2021 TSD"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 12]
This is legislation, plain and simple. "[W]hen an agency wants to state a principle 'in
numerical terms,' terms that cannot be derived from a particular record, the agency is legislating
and should act through rulemaking." Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius, 617 F.3d 490, 495
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Watchman, What of the Night?, BENCHMARKS
144- 45 (1967)). As Judge Posner wrote, adopting "[a] rule that turns on a number" is a
"legislative function." Hoctor v. USD A, 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996). "Legislators have the
democratic legitimacy to make choices among value judgments, choices based on hunch or
guesswork or even the toss of a coin, and other arbitrary choices. When agencies base rules on
arbitrary choices they are legislating, and so these rules are legislative...." Id. When it adopts
specific numbers for the so-called "social costs" of gases, the Interagency Working Group is
"legislating." Id. The Working Group adopts specific numbers, set forth in tables, for SC-GHG at
four specific discount rates. 2021 TSD, at 4-6. It is unquestionable that the Working Group's
adoption of these specific numbers as binding estimates is "legislative." Id. The calculations do
not involve the application of simple arithmetic; rather, they involve (as the Working Group
admits) "issues of uncertainty and ethics," and "highly contested and exceedingly difficult
questions of science, economics, ethics, and law." 2021 TSD, at 17, 21. "[T]he range of discount
rates reflects both uncertainty and, at least in part, different policy or value judgments." Id. at 27
(emphasis added). And, as EPA admits here, they involve "outdated" assumptions, inputs with
significant "limitations," and the use of a less "robust methodology" than even EPA admits is
available. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 12-13]
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Thus, the adoption of specific values against a wide range of possibilities, based on
assumptions that involve widely disputed scientific methodologies and value judgments at the
intersection of "politics" and "ethics," is a legislative action. But no Executive agency may
exercise legislative authority without a delegation from Congress. "It is axiomatic that an
administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority
delegated by Congress." Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). So when
"there is no statute conferring authority, a federal agency has none." Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d
1075, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Here, the Working Group is purely a creature of Executive
authority—it was created solely by Executive Order, not by Congress, and it exercises no
delegated authority. The President lacks any independent legislative authority to bestow on the
Working Group. See U.S. Const, art. I, § 2 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America."). Therefore, it has none, and its exercise of legislative power
encroaches on the exclusive authority of Congress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 12-13]
This violates the separation of powers, the most fundamental structural guarantee of liberty.
As the Supreme Court has held for decades, "[t]he President's power, if any, to issue [an] order
must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself." Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). Where "[t]here is no statute that expressly
authorizes the President to take" an action, "[n]or is there any act of Congress ... from which
such a power can fairly be implied," the action is not authorized by an act of Congress. Id. In the
absence of such an express or implied authorization by act of Congress, "if the President had
authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution." Id. at
587. But the vesting Clauses of Article I and Article II reflect a careful separation of the
Legislative and Executive Branches into their respective spheres. There is no provision of the
Constitution that confers purely legislative authority—of the sort exercised by the Interagency
Working Group—on the President. For the Executive Branch to exercise such authority, it must
be delegated by Congress. Congress has not done so here. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp.
12-13]
The separation of powers is the most fundamental and profound feature of our unique
structure of government. The vesting clauses of Article I and Article II reflect the Founders'
insights that "the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and
distinct," and that this separation is an "essential precaution in favor of liberty." The Federalist
No. 47 (Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), p. 301. As James Madison stated, "[n]o political truth
is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened
patrons of liberty." Id. "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0537, pp.13-14]
This principle of separation of powers is the most crucial safeguard of liberty. "It is the proud
boast of our democracy that we have 'a government of laws, and not of men.'" Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). "The Framers of the Federal
Constitution . . . viewed the principle of separation of powers as the absolutely central guarantee
of a just Government." Id. "Without a secure structure of separated powers, our Bill of Rights
would be worthless, as are the bills of rights of many nations of the world that have adopted, or
even improved upon, the mere words of ours." Id. "The purpose of the separation and
equilibration of powers in general . . . was not merely to assure effective government but to
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preserve individual freedom." Id. at 727. "While the separation of powers may prevent us from
righting every wrong, it does so in order to ensure that we do not lose liberty." Id. at 710. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 13-14]
The Working Group created by EO 13990, therefore, reflects the Executive Branch's naked
arrogation of legislative power to itself. "Frequently," a threat to the separation of powers "will
come ... clad, so to speak, in sheep's clothing.... But this wolf comes as a wolf." Id. at 699.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 13-14]
Furthermore, for similar reasons, the Working Group's promulgation of binding values for the
so-called "Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases" violates the Major Questions Doctrine. As noted
above, the Major Questions Doctrine requires "clear congressional authorization" for federal
agencies to make decisions on questions of major political, social, and economic significance.
West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609. Here, dictating binding values for the "social costs" of gases
that apply to all federal agencies making all "regulations and other relevant agency actions,"
E.O. 13990, § 5(b)(ii)(A), 86 Fed. Reg. 7040, decides a matter of enormous economic and
political significance, all at one stroke. Cass Sunstein, one of the architects of the "social cost of
carbon" analysis in the Obama Administration, describes the SC-GHG as "the most important
number you've never heard of." Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Climate Change (Aug. 18,
2021), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3906854. This
description is apt because "within the executive branch, the stringency of regulation of
greenhouse gases emissions often depends on that number." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0537, p. 14]
In fact, the "social cost of carbon" was cited in regulatory decisions at least eighty-three times
during the Obama Administration alone. Howard & Schwartz, Think Global: International
Reciprocity as Justification for a Global Social Cost of Carbon, 42: S COLUM. J. ENVT'L LAW
203, 219-20 & appx. A (2017). This included a wide array of agencies—including, but not
limited to, EPA, DOE, DOT, DOI, and USD A, see id.—that applied the predecessor Working
Group's analysis to formulate federal regulations, policies, and regulatory actions related to
vending machines, light trucks, dishwashers, dehumidifiers, microwave ovens, kitchen stoves,
clothes washers, small electric motors, residential water heaters, ozone standards, residential
refrigerators and freezers, sewage guidelines, medium and heavy-duty vehicles, mercury
emissions, industrial boilers, solid waste incineration units, fluorescent lamps, residential clothes
dryers, room air conditioners, residential furnaces, residential central air conditioners, battery
chargers, dishwashers, petroleum refineries, halide lamps, walk-in coolers and freezers,
commercial refrigeration units, commercial clothes washers, commercial ice makers, and heat
pumps. See id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 14]
The ability to decide this set of numbers for all federal agencies engaged in all such regulatory
actions is a matter of enormous political and economic significance, which requires clear
authorization from Congress. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609. But here, not only is there no
"clear" delegation from Congress, there is no delegation at all—as the U.S. Department of
Justice admits, when it comes to the Interagency Working Group, "[n]o statute establishes it, nor
delegates it any legislative authority." Doc. 28, Missouri v. Biden, No. 4:21-cv-00287-AGF
(E D. Mo.), at 54. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 14-15]
C. The Interagency Working Group's promulgation of so-called "interim" estimates for SC-
GHG violated the APA.
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For similar reasons, the Working Group's promulgation of the so-called "interim" estimates—
which have served as the definitive values for all federal agencies for two and a half years, with
no end in sight—violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it was arbitrary, capricious,
contrary to law, unconstitutional, and adopted without agency procedures required by law. See 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 15]
First, just as the Interim Estimates constitute a de facto exercise of binding legislative
authority, they constitute "legislative rules" under the APA, which can only be promulgated
through observance of notice-and-comment procedures. As Judge Posner wrote in Hoctor,
"[pjrovided that a rule promulgated pursuant to such a delegation is intended to bind, ... the rule
would be the clearest possible example of a legislative rule, as to which the notice and comment
procedure not followed here is mandatory...." Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 169. "When agencies base rules
on arbitrary choices they are legislating, and so these rules are legislative or substantive and
require notice and comment rulemaking, a procedure that is analogous to the procedure
employed by legislatures in making statutes." Id. at 170-71. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p.
15]
"Notice of a proposed rule must include sufficient detail on its content and basis in law and
evidence to allow for meaningful and informed comment." Am. Med. Ass'n v. Reno, 57 F.3d
1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1995). "The purpose of the comment period is to allow interested
members of the public to communicate information, concerns, and criticisms to the agency
during the rule-making process." Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regul. Comm'n,
673 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Interagency Working Group, however, did not seek any
public comment before issuing the 2021 SC-GHG estimates. Instead, it provided notice and
comment for not-yet-promulgated SC-GHG estimates for future use—preventing the public from
commenting on the 2021 SC-GHG estimates that federal agencies currently use. Thus, the
Interim Estimates were adopted "without observance of procedure required by law," 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(D), and they violate the APA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 15]
Likewise, the Working Group's Interim Estimates are "not in accordance with law," "contrary
to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity," and "in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (B), (C). They are unconstitutional and unlawful
because they violate the separation of powers and constitute legislative rules that were adopted
without notice and comment. And they are in excess of statutory authority because the Working
Group has no statutory authority whatsoever—least of all, authority to promulgate binding
legislative rules that apply to all federal agencies on a hotly disputed policy question that has
enormous practical consequences. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 15]
D. The Interim Estimates are substantively arbitrary and capricious.
The Interagency Working Group's Interim Estimates in the 2021 TSD are also substantively
arbitrary and capricious because they ignore important aspects of the problem, they decline to
consider relevant data, they violate longstanding principles of statutory interpretation, they suffer
from glaring methodological flaws, they lack scientific rigor, and they are irredeemably
speculative. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. Moreover, all these errors work in the same
direction—to inflate estimated future climate damages. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp.
15-16]
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As an initial matter, the Integrated Assessment Models ("IAMs") employed by the Working
Group claim a predictive power that is staggering in scope. They purport to predict the global
impact of human migrations, wars, natural disasters, agricultural capacities, technological
developments, worldwide mitigation efforts, and other unknowable future developments for the
next 300 years—i.e., "the value of all climate change impacts, including (but not limited to)
changes in net agricultural productivity, human health effects, property damage from increased
flood risk natural disasters, disruption of energy systems, risk of conflict, environmental
migration, and the value of ecosystem services," until the year 2300. 2021 TSD, at 2. According
to the 2021 TSD, "[ejxamples of affected interests include: direct effects on U.S. citizens and
assets located abroad, international trade, tourism, and spillover pathways such as economic and
political destabilization and global migration." Id. at 3. The Working Group admits that proper
calculations would require predicting "mitigation activities by other countries," and
"international mitigation actions." Id. In short, the Working Group's calculations purport to
predict the arc of human and ecological history for the next three centuries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0537, pp.15-16]
The Interagency Working Group convened by E.O. 13990 lacks adequate tools to make such
impossible predictions with anything like scientific rigor. On the contrary, its attempts are
hampered by hopelessly outdated assumptions and glaring methodological flaws, as discussed
further below. EPA candidly acknowledges that the IAMs suffer from such methodological
shortcomings and outdated assumptions. As noted above, EPA admits that the three "Integrated
Assessment Models" ("IAMs") on which the 2021 values are based suffer from grievous
methodological flaws, including "outdated" assumptions and what EPA euphemistically calls
"limitations." 88 Fed. Reg. 29,372. EPA does not bother to elucidate these flaws and limitations,
but an analysis of the IAMs and their application reveals that they are inherently speculative,
fundamentally non-scientific, lacking in methodological rigor, based on false assumptions, and
subject to virtually limitless user manipulation. Five examples illustrate these shortcomings: (1)
the selection of the discount rate, (2) the selection of the time horizon over which damages are
calculated, (3) the estimate of the Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity factor, (4) the treatment of
anticipated benefits of moderate warming, and (5) the geographic scope of anticipated damages.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 16]
Dr. Kevin Dayaratna aptly summarizes these shortcomings: "[L]ike its predecessors, the 2021
TSD is predicated on faulty models that are prone to user-selected manipulation. Each model is
highly sensitive, or produces a vastly disparate range of results, based on the user assumptions.
Essentially the assumptions, and not quantifiable data, drive the results—garbage in, garbage
out." Statement of Kevin D. Dayartna 15 ("Ex. A") (attached as Exhibit A). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0537, p.16]
Selection of the discount rate. First, the selection of the discount rate plays an outsized role in
the IAMs' damage calculations. The Interagency Working Group describes the "discount rate" as
follows: "[I]n calculating the SC-GHG, the stream of future damages to agriculture, human
health, and other market and non-market sectors from an additional unit of emissions are
estimated in terms of reduced consumption (or consumption equivalents). Then that stream of
future damages is discounted to its present value in the year when the additional unit of
emissions was released." 2021 TSD, at 17. Dr. Dayaratna describes this process as follows:
"Discounting future benefits of averting climate damage compares the rate of return from C02
reduction to the rate of return that could be expected from other investments. In principle,
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discounting runs the compound rate of return exercise backwards, calculating how much would
need to be invested at a reasonably expected interest rate today to result in the value of the
averted future climate damage." Ex. A, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 16-17]
18. A lower discount rate entails a higher calculation of anticipated damages from climate
change, and thus a higher "social cost" for each greenhouse gas. "The present value of a future
benefit or cost is the amount you would have to invest today that would grow in value to match
that benefit or cost at the specified time in the future. The discount rate represents the rate of
return of this investment and should reflect the real rates of return to capital." Id. 19. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 16-17]
As the Working Group admits, the selection of a discount rate "has a large influence on the
present value of future damages." 2021 TSD, at 17. As the analysis of Dr. Dayaratna
demonstrates, this is an understatement—the selection of discount rate has an enormous
influence on outcomes. But, as the Working Group also admits, the selection of the discount rate
is an exercise in value judgment, not scientific calculation: "the choice of a discount rate ...
raises highly contested and exceedingly difficult questions of science, economics, ethics, and
law." 2021 TSD, at 17. As the Working Group admits, the selection of a discount rate ultimately
rests on "different policy or value judgments." Id. at 27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 17]
Before the 2021 TSD, the discount rate was calculated using OMB's peer-reviewed Circular
A-4, which provided for a 7 percent discount rate based on the long-term return on investment
capital to be used in cost-benefit analyses. Dayaratna Statement 20. The 2021 TSD abandons the
longstanding, peer-reviewed approach to the discount rate in favor of a range of much lower
discount rates, which yield much higher "social cost" calculations: 2.5 percent, 3 percent, 5
percent, and the 95th percentile probability distribution at the 3 percent discount rate. 2021 TSD,
at 5-8. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 17]
The Working Group admits that there are "disagreements in the literature on the appropriate
discount rate to use in this context, and uncertainty about how rates may change over time." Id.
at 17. Rather than grappling with this uncertainty and disagreement, the Working Group simply
selects a range of low values that (it states) "span a plausible range of certainty-equivalent
constant consumption discount rates." Id. The Working Group rejects OMB Circular A-4's peer-
reviewed approach, concluding that "the social rate of return to capital, estimated to be 7 percent
in OMB's Circular A-4, is not appropriate for use in calculating the SC-GHG," and opts for a
range of much lower discount rates based on consumption equivalents instead of investment
equivalents instead—yielding much higher "social costs" for each gas. Id. Thus, "the IWG is
returning to the approach of calculating the SC-GHG based on the consumption rate of interest,"
which is much lower than the expected rate of return on investment. Id. at 18. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0537, pp.17-18]
As Dr. Dayaratna discussed, this decision—which purports to resolve "exceedingly difficult
questions of science, economics, ethics, and law," id. at 17—results in a dramatic inflation of the
"social cost" values on all three of the IAMs—DICE, FUND, and PAGE. Ex. A, 21-27. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 17-18]
For example, using the FUND model, "the choice in the discount rate can cause the social
cost of carbon to drop by as much as 80 percent or more." Id. 24. The other models yield similar
results. "These figures show that the discount rate an agency picks have a drastic effect on the
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cost estimates, and the lower the discount rate, the greater the damages." Id. 27. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0537, pp.17-18]
Time horizon selected. The time horizon selected for expected damages is another arbitrary
choice that has a strong influence on the IAMs' results. "Closely related to the choice of discount
rate, the time horizon that the agencies choose to use to calculate damages has an outsized
impact on the social cost of greenhouse gases." Ex. A, 28. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p.
18]
Quite obviously, purporting to predict climate damages centuries into the future is an
irreducibly speculative task. "It is essentially impossible to forecast technological changes
decades, let alone centuries, into the future. In particular, many commonplace technological
innovations such as internet, smartphones and GPS technology were mere science fiction 300
years ago." Id. 29. "Yet, in every TSD to date, including the 2021 TSD, the IAMs have
calculated damages based on projections ending in 2300—nearly 300 years into the future." Id.
Asking the models to predict technological changes and other developments for 300 years is
speculative to the point of absurdity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 18]
Suggesting that the IAMs can make reliable predictions across a 300-year time frame for all
of global economic and technological history is pure speculation. It is akin to asking the soldiers
of the First Crusade to predict Columbus's discovery of America, Queen Anne of England to
predict the election of Donald Trump, the signers of the Peace of Westphalia to predict the
invention of nuclear weapons, and the court of King Louis XIV to predict the invention of
smartphones and the internet—all rolled into one, and compounded thousands of times over.
This is not science. It is naked speculation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 18]
Yet this naked speculation is an important driver of the Working Group's calculations— and
it drives uniformly them in one direction: upward. "Extending the time horizon in such a manner
increases the SCC estimates, thus enabling the IWG to claim larger economic damages
associated with C02 emissions." Ex. A, 29. As Dr. Dayaratna recounts, the IAMs leverage the
wild uncertainty inherent in 300-year projections of global history by concealing key
assumptions. "[T]he IWG's estimates of the SCC are based on climate scenarios 'that are not just
badly out of date, but reflecting a set of fictional worlds.'" Ex. A, 31 (quoting Roger Pielke Jr.,
The Biden Administration Just Failed its First Science Integrity Test (Feb. 28, 2021), at
https://rogerpielkejr.substack.eom/p/the-biden-administration-just-failed). "The IWG originally
estimated the SCC in 2010 based on eight different scenarios of the future of the climate,
developed over a decade ago. Four of these scenarios were to represent different trajectories of
the future, sans climate policies and thus referred to as 'business as usual'..." Id. (emphasis
added). "Four others were combined into a single scenario to reflect a future with climate policy.
These five scenarios initially projected out to 2100, and the IWG extended the scenarios to 2300
using a range of assumptions." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 18]
"[T]hese BAU scenarios are over a decade old and thus badly outdated and unrealistic." Id.
33. "In fact, they fail to take into account recent transitions toward less C02 intensive forms of
energy such as natural gas—assuming instead [that] ... the 'world would have to make it a policy
goal to burn as much coal as possible over the coming centuries.'" Id. (quoting Pielke, supra). "If
fossil fuels are not burned at the levels described in the scenarios above, then the IWG's
estimates of the SCC that they constitute the basis for are therefore wrong, unfounded, and
nonsensical." Id. Thus, the IAMs take an implausible worst-case scenario—in fact, one that is
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not just implausible, but has already been falsified by recent events—and project that worst-case
scenario 300 years into the future. Needless to say, this approach "continues to unrealistically
increase damages" calculated using the "social cost" rubric. Id. 37. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0537, pp. 18-19]
Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity assumptions. Each IAM includes assumptions about
"Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity" ("ECS") in its calculation of future climate damages. See
2021 TSD, at 2 ("The three IAMs were run suing a common set of input assumptions in each
model for... equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) - a measure of globally averaged temperature
response to increased atmospheric C02 concentrations"). "The ECS is a distribution that
probabilistically quantifies the earth's temperature response to a doubling of carbon dioxide
concentrations. Simply put, it is one of the most fundamental measures within an IAM of C02
impacts on climate. Other effects, such as sea-level rise, all depend on a reliable ECS." Ex. A,
39. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 18-19]
The IAMs used by the Working Group employ outdated ECS assumptions that date to 2007
and have been rendered obsolete by subsequent research. "All the TSDs ... since ... 2013,"
including the 2021 TSD, "have relied on the Roe & Baker article 'Why is Climate Sensitivity So
Unpredictable' published in Science in October 2007." Id. 40. "[T]his [2007] distribution vastly
overstates the probability of high-end global warming compared to more recent distributions."
Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 18-19]
The Working Group, like EPA itself, admits that its assumptions are outdated on this point. It
admits that "the versions of the three models used in the 2013 and 2016 TSDs," which the 2021
TSD nevertheless adopts, "do not reflect the tremendous increase in the scientific and economic
understanding of climate-related damages that has occurred in the past decade." 2021 TSD, at
22. In fact, "[t]here are several newer and more up-to-date distributions suggested in the peer-
reviewed literature, and many of those suggest lower probabilities of extreme global warming in
response to C02 concentrations." Ex. A, 41. In fact, using ECS assumptions current based on
peer- reviewed research in 2015—which is "preferable to Roe Baker (2007) because its
estimation controlled for observed ocean heat uptake efficiency, thus yielding an empirically
constrained sensitivity distribution, id. 42—yields "a reduction of over 45% with respect to the
IWG's estimates" for the DICE model, id. 44. Updating the ECS factor likewise yields "a
reduction of over 80% with respect to the IWG's estimates" for the FUND model. Id. 45. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 18-19]
Agricultural benefits of warming. "Another policy assumption that is made by the IWG in its
modeling choices is that it does not fairly account for agricultural benefits by increased C02
concentration." Id. 47. "For example, it is a well-established fact that increases in C02
concentration enhance plant growth by increasing their internal water use efficiency as well as
raising the rate of net photosynthesis." Id. Thus, increasing temperature results in an increase in
net agricultural productivity—a benefit of warming. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp.
19-20]
Some models used by the Working Group, such as the DICE model, simply ignore the
potential benefits of warming and do not include them in their calculations. "[T]he DICE model
as utilized by the IWG explicitly presumes that only damages will result from more C02 in the
atmosphere." Id. 52. By contrast, "[t]he FUND model attempts to quantify these benefits, and
when the benefits of C02 emissions outweigh costs, the SCC is negative." Id. 48. For example,
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if one corrects the admittedly "outdated" ECS assumption with more current 2015 figures under
the FUND model, accounting for the benefits of warming results in negative mean estimates for
social costs in 2020, 2030, 2040, and 2050: "Using the empirically estimated Lewis and Curry
distribution (2015), the mean estimate of the SCC is negative $1.10 in 2020, negative $1.01 in
2030, negative $0.82 in 2040, and negative $0.53 in 2050 in 2007 dollars." Id. So also, under the
other models, "under reasonable updates to the agricultural productivity component, the mean
SCC estimate may be zero or negative and that there are substantial probabilities of negative
SCC under very reasonable assumptions." Id. 53. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 19-20]
A negative "social cost" means that emitting a metric ton of carbon dioxide is beneficial to
society, and thus should be encouraged. See id. 54 ("One policy implication of a negative SCC is
that the emission of an additional ton of a greenhouse gas should be encouraged, rather than
avoided."). This result effectively discredits the IAMs as tools of rational policymaking: "The
fact that, under very reasonable assumptions, the model can elicit SCC estimates of either sign
[positive or negative] suggests that it is highly prone to user manipulation, and thus ... the model
is unreliable and should not be used by lawmakers and regulators." Id. 55. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0537, p. 20]
Global damages. The 2021 Working Group departed from recent practice by considering not
just domestic harms, but global anticipated climate damages in its analysis. 2021 TSD, at 3. The
decision to consider not just damages to the United States of America, but all other countries
potentially impacted by climate change, is not a scientific decision—it is a political decision. In
fact, the Working Group did not make this decision—in E.O. 13990, the President commanded it
to consider global damages. See E.O. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7040; 2021 TSD, at 3 (acknowledging
that "[t]he IWG was tasked with" publishing estimates that "tak[e] global damages into
account"). The Working Group concedes that this is a policy decision, involving considerations
of "climate risk, environmental justice, and intergenerational equity." 2021 TSD, at 3. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 20]
In doing so, the Working Group departed from black-letter Supreme Court law, without
lawful justification. Unlike the Working Group—which claims to be constrained by no statute—
the federal agencies that must rely on the Working Group's calculations in "regulations and other
relevant agency actions," E.O. 13990, § 5(b)(ii)(A), 86 Fed. Reg. 7040, are exercising delegated
authority from Congress, pursuant to statutory delegations of authority. There is a black-letter
presumption applicable to each of those statutes, that they do not authorize the federal agency to
consider global effects when calculating "social costs." When interpreting federal statutes, the
Supreme Court has long recognized "the presumption against extraterritorial application," which
provides that "when a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has
none." Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013) (quoting Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010)). This presumption reflects the
"presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world." Id.
(quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0537, pp. 20-21]
The Working Group justified its decision to consider global damages, instead of domestic
impacts, by arguing that "climate impacts occurring outside U.S. borders can directly and
indirectly affect the welfare of U.S. citizens" through "spillover pathways." 2021 TSD, at 3. But
that argument, if true, merely calls for the calculation of additional harms to domestic citizens
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and the domestic economy—it does not argue that "social costs" include harms to foreign
citizens and nations. Arguing that domestic actors are harmed through foreign pathways is not
the same as arguing that domestic cost-benefit analysis should consider harms to foreign actors.
Absent a "clear indication" from Congress in the statute—and none is identified here—there is
no statutory authorization to consider such effects. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0537, pp. 20-21]
The 2021 TSD does not "likely underestimate" climate damages. Parroting the Interagency
Working Group, see 2021 TSD, at 4, 31, 35, EPA suggests with scant analysis that the 2021
TSD's "limitations suggest that these SCGHG estimates likely underestimate the damages from
GHG emissions." 88 Fed. Reg. 29,372. This ipse dixit is unsupportable. As discussed above,
virtually every error in the Working Group's analysis points in the same direction—toward
overstating likely damages, not "underestimating" them. The selection of discount rates well
below 7 percent massively inflates damage calculations. The adoption of a 300-year time horizon
massively inflates damage calculations. The continued use of the obsolete 2007 ECS values
massively inflates damage calculations. The complete disregard of countervailing benefits
massively inflates damage calculations. The unlawful expansion of damages to include foreign
as well as domestic anticipated harms massively inflates damage calculations. These errors are
not randomly distributed. They all point in the same direction: jacking the calculation of costs
upward. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 21]
For all these reasons, the IAMs and their "social cost" calculations are inherently arbitrary,
capricious, and unreliable. For very similar reasons, a federal agency has previously declined "to
use 'social cost of carbon' analysis or a similar analytical tool to analyze the environmental
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions from the construction and operation of the converted
[natural gas] facilities." EarthReports, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm'n, 828 F.3d 949, 956
(D.C. Cir. 2016). In that instance, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rejected
"social cost" calculations because of three factors: (1) "the lack of consensus on the appropriate
discount rate leads to significant variation in output," (2) the SCC "tool does not measure the
actual incremental impacts of a project on the environment," and (3) "there are no established
criteria identifying the monetized values that are to be considered significant for NEPA
purposes." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). FERC noted that "there is no standard
methodology to determine how a project's incremental contribution to [greenhouse gas
emissions] would result in physical effects on the environment, either locally or globally." Id. All
these concerns remain true today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 21-22]
Robert Pindyck, the MIT economist, writes that "an IAM-based analysis suggests a level of
knowledge and precision that is nonexistent, and allows the modeler to obtain almost any desired
result because key inputs can be chosen arbitrarily." Robert S. Pindyck, Climate Change Policy:
What do the Models Tell Us?, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 19244, at
16 (2013), at https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/wl9244/wl9244.pdf (emphasis
added). The IAMs "have crucial flaws that make them close to useless as tools for policy
analysis: certain inputs (e.g. the discount rate) are arbitrary, but have huge effects on the SCC
estimates the models produce; the models' descriptions of the impact of climate change are
completely ad hoc, with no theoretical or empirical foundation; and the models can tell us
nothing about the most important driver of the SCC, the possibility of a catastrophic climate
outcome." Id. at ii. "IAM-based analyses of climate policy create a perception of knowledge and
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precision, but that perception is illusory and misleading." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537,
pp. 21-22]
The EPA should jettison its serial reliance on the so-called "interim estimates" for the "Social
Cost of Greenhouse Gases" adopted by the unconstitutional Interagency Working Group in the
2021 TSD, as unlawful, unconstitutional, arbitrary, and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0537, pp. 21-22]
VIII. The proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious because it relies on non-final reports.
On at least two occasions, EPA identifies reports that are not yet final because they are
undergoing peer review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 26]
First, EPA reports that it "commissioned a new full-vehicle teardown study" to compare
manufacturing cost and assembly requirements between gas-powered and electric-powered
vehicles. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,303. "The report was delivered to EPA in February 2023 and will
undergo a contractor-managed peer review process to be completed by mid-2023." Id. EPA even
plans to rely on the report for the final rule: "The results of this study will be used to inform the
analysis for the final rulemaking where appropriate." Id. EPA later admits, "We hope to use this
information in additional analytical discussions in the final rule." Id. at 29,391. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0537, p. 26]
Second, as discussed in Section IV, significant issues exist with EPA's current social cost of
greenhouse gas methodology. However, EPA apparently is working on an update: "Most
recently, EPA has developed a draft updated SC-GHG methodology within a sensitivity analysis
in the regulatory impact analysis of EPA's November 2022 supplemental proposal for oil and gas
standards that is currently undergoing external peer review and a public comment process." After
it published the proposed rule, on May 11, 2023, EPA announced that it had received the peer
review and was "taking the peer reviewers' recommendations under advisement "38 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 26]
38 U.S. EPA, Peer Review of EPA's Draft 'Report on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases: Estimates
Incorporating Recent Scientific Advances' Concludes, May 11, 2023, available at
https://www.epa.gov/environmental- economics/scghg-tsd-peer-review.
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Social Cost of Carbon
As noted in the DRIA, there has been considerable progress in the state of science in valuation
of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) since the Interim SCC values were developed based on the
Interagency Working Group report in 2007. To better reflect this progress in its analysis, CARB
recommends that U.S. EPA include a sensitivity analysis with the draft updated SC-GHG
methodology that follows what was provided in U.S. EPA's November 2022 supplemental
proposal for oil and gas standards. 78 The estimates from the draft updated SC-GHG
methodology of the climate benefits of reducing emissions predict that the benefit per metric ton
of C02 (MTC02) reduced is over 50 percent greater by 2030 ($51/MTC02) and over 70 percent
greater by 2050 ($84/MTC02) than the interim values. 79 This shows the estimated net benefits
of the proposal may be substantially more than the DRIA estimates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0780, pp. 48-49]
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78 U.S. EPA. Supplementary Material for the Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Supplemental Proposed
Rulemaking. Standards of Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources and Emissions
Guidelines for Existing sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate Review. September 2022.
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-ll/epa_scghg_report_draft_0.pdf
79 At a 2.5 percent discount rate.
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
Third, although the projected benefits through 2055 already outweigh the costs by an
impressive degree, even these benefits are understated. As EPA recognizes, the social cost of
greenhouse gases ("SC-GHG") metric does not fully capture the harms from climate change. 88
Fed. Reg. at 29,372. In recent comments on EPA's proposed GHG standards for heavy-duty
vehicles, a group of states and cities (many of whom are signatories to this comment) set out
several ways in which the SC-GHG metric significantly underestimates the climate benefits of
reducing GHG emissions, particularly in terms of unquantified climate damages (such as
wildfires and loss of cultural and historical resources) and its utilization of overly high discount
rates. We attach those comments here for reference. 190 Moreover, as EPA states, monetized
benefits for reduced criteria and air toxics pollution are only a fraction of the total benefits,
representing only the value attributable to reducing PM2.5. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,372, 29,379-83.
Although the Administrator did not rely on the exact size of the proposed standards' projected
benefits or the amount by which they exceed projected costs, id. at 29,198, the public's
understanding of the Proposal will benefit from EPA underscoring the degree to which projected
benefits are underestimated, and projected costs overestimated. See CARB Comment at 69-74.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 37]
190 Comments Of States and Cities Supporting EPA's Proposed Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards For
Heavy-Duty Vehicles—Phase 3 (Jun. 16, 2023), at 39-44, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985-1423.
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
D. The calculations of the social cost of carbon are incorrect.
The calculations of the social cost of carbon are incorrect or highly variable. See DRIA 10-14,
15, 16 ("The distribution of the SC-C02 estimate reflects uncertainty in key model parameters
such as the equilibrium climate sensitivity, as well as uncertainty in other parameters."). Social
cost of carbon estimates are nothing new, but those used here are illegal. Relying on such
estimates in the proposal exceeds EPA's statutory authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p.
36]
Executive Order 13990 directs that agencies "shall use" the SC-GHG Esti mates "when
monetizing the value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions resulting from regulations and
other relevant agency actions." 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037, 7,040 (Jan. 25, 2021). Consistent with this
order, the Biden Administration has been applying the SC-GHG estimates throughout its
rulemakings, often to large effect. But the proposal—or indeed any other action undertaken by
the Biden Administration—provides no statutory authority for its estimates. Further, these
estimates, which are made binding through the dozens of rulemakings and adjudications they are
incorporated in, have never undergone notice and comment rulemaking procedure. Because such
estimates were made without statutory authority and in violation of the Administrative Procedure
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Act, their incorporation into the proposal would be unlawful. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712,
p. 36]
Organization: Delek US Holdings, Inc.
IV. The Proposed Rule Overstates the Benefits of Transitioning to BEVs
The economic benefits of EPA's proposal are based on the flawed, inflated interim social cost
of three greenhouse gas estimates (carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide) or "SC- GHGs,"
including estimates of the "social cost of carbon" or "SCC."24 EPA should refrain from relying
on the Interagency Working Group's ("IWG") SC-GHGs Interim Estimates, which suffer from
major procedural defects.25 The interim estimates are not the product of a full and legally
adequate administrative process, including a robust and independent peer review. While the
administration provided an opportunity for public comment on the SC-GHGs in 2021, the
interim estimates EPA relies upon in the Proposed Rule were released without any prior notice or
public comment period.26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 6]
24 Proposed Rule at 29,371-72 (citing the February 2021 Technical Support Document (TSD): Social Cost
of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide Interim Estimates under E.O. 13990 (Interagency Working Group
on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases ("IWG"))).
25 Id.
26 Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Notice of Availability and Request for Comment on the "Technical Support
Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide Interim Estimates Under Executive Order
13990," 86 Fed. Reg. 24,669 (May 7, 2021).
Further, the interim estimates failed to account for the recommendations of the National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine ("NAS"), which called for a new IWG
framework and changes to the methodologies used to calculate the underlying SCC estimates.27
Consideration of the recommendations of the NAS is critical for any robust social cost
analysis—and is in fact mandated by President Biden's Executive Order 13990 that directed the
IWG to develop interim SC-GHG estimates.28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 6]
27 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Valuing Climate Damages:
Updating Estimation of the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide. Washington, DC: The National Academies
Press.
28 Exec. Order 13990 of Jan. 20, 2021, Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring
Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037, 7,041 (Jan. 25, 2021) (Sec. 5 (iii) Methodology
states: "In carrying out its activities, the Working Group shall consider the recommendations of the
National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine as reported in Valuing Climate Damages:
Updating Estimation of the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide (2017)."
The interim estimates also conflict with longstanding White House Office of Management
and Budget ("OMB") guidance on information quality, which requires rigorous independent peer
review and heightened transparency for such "influential scientific information" as the SC-GHG
estimates.29 For these and other reasons, EPA should not rely upon the interim SC-GHG
estimates in this rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 6]
29 Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and
Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 8,452 (Feb. 22, 2002); Section
515 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-
554.
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Here, EPA's reliance on these SC-GHG estimates result in overstated benefits in terms of
potential GHG emissions reductions achieved domestically while ignoring the increased GHG
emissions elsewhere and how those global GHG emissions are distributed amongst a domestic
ZEV fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, pp. 6-7]
Organization: Energy Innovation
I. The U.S. must transition LDVs and MDVs to zero-emission technologies [i] quickly to
reduce their emissions, which contribute to climate change and air pollution—both of which
endanger public health and welfare. Adoption of the most stringent tailpipe standards for new
vehicles is the most effective tool to achieve this goal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 1-
2]
i This includes technologies that eliminate tailpipe GHG emissions and other pollutants, namely battery
electric vehicles for LDVs and MDVs.
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at NYU School of Law et al.
The Proposed Rule appropriately applies the climate-damage estimates from the Interagency
Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (Working Group) and rejects the faulty
numbers that EPA applied from 2017 until early 2021. The Working Group developed its
climate-damage estimates through a rigorous and transparent process incorporating the best
available science available at the time. Those values—though widely agreed to underestimate the
full social costs of greenhouse gas emissions4—are appropriate to use for now as conservative
underestimates. They have been applied in dozens of previous rulemakings5 and upheld in
federal court.6 In contrast, the estimates that EPA applied during the Trump administration
disregarded the best available science and their use was deemed arbitrary and capricious by a
federal court.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 1]
4 Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Technical Support Document:
Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide - Interim Estimates Under Executive Order 13,990 at 4
(2021) [hereinafter "2021 TSD"] (acknowledging that current social cost valuations "likely underestimate
societal damages from [greenhouse gas] emissions"). Richard L. Revesz et al., Global Warming: Improve
Economic Models of Climate Change, 508 NATURE 173 (2014) (explaining that the Working Group's
values, though methodically rigorous and highly useful, are very likely underestimates) (co-authored with
Nobel Prize-winning economist Kenneth Arrow).
5 Peter Howard & Jason A. Schwartz, Think Global: International Reciprocity as Justification for a Global
Social Cost of Carbon, 42 COLUM. J. ENV'T L. 203, 270-84 (2017) (listing all uses through mid-2016).
6 Zero Zone v. Dept. of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 679 (7th Cir. 2016).
7 California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573, 613 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
EPA provides compelling justifications for readopting the Working Group's climate-damage
estimates,8 and in fact many additional justifications support this choice. In particular, further
justifications support EPA's decision to adopt a global damages valuation and the range of
discount rates it applies to climate effects. As detailed herein, there are many additional legal,
economic, and policy justifications for such methodological decisions that further bolster EPA's
support for these choices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 1-2]
8 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,371-72; RIA at 10-8 to 10-13.
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While the Working Group's climate-damage valuations represent a marked improvement over
the arbitrary values that EPA adopted during the Trump administration, they remain
underestimates. In November 2022, EPA released a draft update to the social cost of greenhouse
gases that faithfully implements the roadmap laid out in 2017 by the National Academies of
Sciences and applies recent advances in the science and economics on the costs of climate
change (Draft SC-GHG Update).9 These updated valuations more robustly capture the
incremental benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and further confirm that the Working
Group's climate-damage values represent conservative underestimates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0743, pp.1-2]
9 EPA External Review Draft of Report on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (Sept. 2022) (Docket No.
EPA- HQ-0AR-2021-0317) ("Draft SC-GHG Update").
These comments are organized into four sections. Section I offers additional justification for
adopting a global framework for valuing climate impacts. These include legal justifications
based on the Clean Air Act, the National Environmental Policy Act's broad government-wide
policy mandates, the Administrative Procedure Act's requirement to consider all important
factors, and executive orders and international agreements. This section also provides extensive
regulatory precedent outside the climate context supporting EPA's global approach, including
the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) draft update to Circular A-4 (Draft Circular A-4
Update). 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 2]
10 OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4: DRAFT FOR PUBLIC REVIEW 9-11 (Apr. 6,
2023) ("Draft Circular A-4 Update").
Section II offers additional justification for adopting the range of discount rates endorsed by
the Working Group and for declining to apply a 7% capital-based discount rate for climate
impacts. In particular, this section provides additional justification for combining climate effects
discounted at an appropriate consumption-based rate with other costs and benefits discounted at
a capital-based rate. Besides climate effects presenting special legal, economic, and policy
considerations for the discount rate, it is appropriate generally for EPA to focus its analysis of
this rule on consumption-based rates given that most costs and benefits are projected to fall to
consumption rather than to capital investments. This is also confirmed by the Draft Circular A-4
Update. 11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 2]
11 Id. at 78-80.
Section III offers extensive justification for relying on the Working Group's other
methodological choices, including the fact that the Working Group applied a transparent and
rigorous process that relied upon the best-available and most widely-cited models for monetizing
climate damages that existed at the time of their development. This section also provides detailed
rebuttals to criticisms of the Working Group's methodology from opponents of climate
regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 2-3]
Finally, Section IV recommends that EPA apply the revised climate-damage valuations from
the Draft SC-GHG Update—either in sensitivity analysis or as part of the main analysis if this
regulation is finalized after the Draft SC-GHG Update is finalized. This section also suggests
that EPA conduct additional analysis using the updated approach to discounting in the Draft
Circular A-4 Update. The section provides modeling results showing a substantial increase under
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this approach in net benefits for the proposed program and its alternatives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0743, pp. 2-3]
I. Extensive Justification Supports EPA's Reliance on Global Climate Damage
Valuations
In the Proposed Rule, EPA appropriately focuses on a global estimate of climate benefits,
continuing its historical approach and once again rejecting its temporary and arbitrary practice
during the Trump administration of disregarding all climate effects that occur outside the
physical borders of the United States. While EPA offers persuasive justifications for this
decision, many additional justifications—some of which EPA itself provides in the Draft SC-
GHG Updatel2—further support this approach. 13 In particular, EPA could emphasize the
concern for the impacts of U.S. pollution on foreign welfare in the Clean Air Act and other
sources of law, further highlight the significance of U.S. strategic interests and reciprocity,
further emphasize the importance of extraterritorial impacts and spillovers, and highlight the
inconsistency that would occur if the agency considered only domestic benefits while focusing
on global costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 3]
12 Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 9, at 10-15.
13 See generally Jason A. Schwartz, Inst, for Pol'y Integrity, Strategically Estimating Climate Pollution
Costs in a Global Environment (2021),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Strategically_Estimating_Climate_Pollution_Costs_in_a_Glob
alEnvir onment.pdf.
A. Relevant Statutes and Executive Orders Compel, and Certainly Permit, a Global
Perspective on Climate Damages
The Clean Air Act, National Environmental Policy Act, Administrative Procedure Act, and
other key sources of law not only permit, but in fact require, EPA to consider international
effects. EPA should highlight these legal requirements as justification for its focus on global
climate impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 3-4]
Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, under which EPA issues the Proposed Rule, charges EPA
with regulating "air pollutant[s] which may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare," 14 where "welfare" is defined to include "effects on . . . weather . . . and climate." 15
When interpreting Section 202, the Supreme Court found "there is nothing counterintuitive to the
notion that EPA can curtail the emission of substances that are putting the global climate out of
kilter "16 And when industry challenged another EPA climate program under Title I of the Clean
Air Act by arguing that the statute "was concerned about local, not global effects," the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had "little trouble disposing of Industry Petitioners'
argument that the [Clean Air Act's prevention of significant deterioration] program is
specifically focused solely on localized air pollution," finding instead that the statute was "meant
to address a much broader range of harms," including "precisely the types of harms caused by
greenhouse gases."17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 3-4]
14 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
15 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1447 (2007).
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16 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1461 (emphasis added). This case concerned Section 202 of the Clean Air
Act, which similarly permits EPA to regulate "any air pollutant. . . which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare." Id. at 1454 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)).
17 Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 137-38 (D.C. Cir. 2012), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
And under the Administrative Procedure Act, it is arbitrary and capricious for agencies to
"entirely fail[] to consider an important aspect of the problem"30—an obligation that a federal
court held requires federal agencies to consider transboundary climate impacts. Specifically, a
recent ruling from the U.S. Court for the Northern District of California struck down as arbitrary
the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) rescission of the Waste Prevention Rule in part
because the agency had abandoned the Working Group's peer-reviewed, global estimates of the
social cost of greenhouse gases in favor of flawed estimates (the same estimates that EPA
applied under the Trump administration) that looked narrowly at effects within the U.S.
borders.31 The court found that the global values developed by the Working Group reflected
"the best available science about monetizing the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions,"32
whereas "focusing solely on domestic effects has been soundly rejected by economists as
improper and unsupported by science."33 The court reminded BLM that relevant executive
orders, including Executive Order 12,866, require consideration of "all" costs and benefits, based
on the "best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and other information," and
concluded that "no[] . . . regulatory rules or orders require exclusion of global impacts."34 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 5-6]
30 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-43 (1983).
31 Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 613.
32 Id. at 611.
33 Id. at 613.
34 Id. at 611-12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
More recently, Executive Order 13,990 instructs agencies to "tak[e] global damages into
account," because "[d]oing so facilitates sound decision-making, recognizes the breadth of
climate impacts, and support the international leadership of the United States on climate
issues."35 This language again reinforces the instructions from NEPA that, whenever not
precluded by statute from doing so, agencies should account for the environmental impacts of
their actions on foreign nations and global commons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 6]
35 Exec. Order No. 13,990 § 5(a), 86 Fed. Reg. 7037, 7040 (Jan. 20, 2021).
EPA should draw upon these legal authorities in justifying its reliance on global climate-
damage valuations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 6]
The Biden Administration has made such a strategic choice, to adopt a global valuation of
climate damages as part of its diplomatic strategy. Executive Order 13,990 unequivocally states
that "[i]t is essential that agencies capture the full costs of greenhouse gas emissions as
accurately as possible, including by taking global damages into account. . . [to] support the
international leadership of the United States on climate issues."41 The Order later elaborates:
"Our domestic efforts must go hand in hand with U.S. diplomatic engagement. Because most
greenhouse gas emissions originate beyond our borders, such engagement is more necessary and
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urgent than ever. The United States must be in a position to exercise vigorous climate leadership
to achieve a significant increase in global climate action and put the world on a sustainable
climate pathway."42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 7]
41 Exec. Order No 13,990 § 5(a).
42 Id. § 6(d). Though this subsection takes action on the Keystone XL Pipeline permit, its statement of
diplomatic goals has much broader relevance.
The current Circular A-4 requires agencies to count all significant costs and benefits,
including "use" values as well as "non-use" values like bequest and existence values.74 Circular
A-4 cautions that "ignoring these values" may cause analyses to "significantly understate the
benefits and/or costs" involved.75 Similarly, Circular A-4 recognizes that U.S. citizens may have
"altruism for the health and welfare of others," and instructs agencies that when "there is
evidence of selective altruism, it needs to be considered specifically in both benefits and
costs."76 U.S. citizens will experience costs because of their use values, non-use values, and
altruistic values attached to climate effects occurring outside the U.S. borders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0743, p. 12]
74 A bequest value captures willingness to pay to preserve a resource for a future generation. Existence
value captures willingness to pay to preserve a resource even with no intention to ever use or bequeath the
resource. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-4: Regulatory Analysis 22 (2003).
75 Id.
76 Id.
Such non-use and altruistic values take many forms. For one, the United States and its citizens
have a willingness to pay—as well as a legal obligation—to protect the global commons of the
oceans and Antarctica from climate damage. Furthermore, a quarter of the U.S. population
consists of either foreign-born immigrants or second-generation residents,77 and subsequent
generations of Americans retain significant familial, cultural, economic, and religious ties to
their ancestors' home nations across the world.78 U.S. citizens and residents have a significant
willingness to pay to protect their relatives, ancestral homes, and cultural and religious sites
located abroad.79 Similarly, U.S. citizens value natural resources and plant and animal lives
abroad—even if they never see or use those resources—and care about the health and welfare of
unrelated foreign citizens80 and cultural and world heritage sites threatened by climate
change.81 This altruism is "selective altruism," consistent with Circular A-4, because the United
States is directly responsible for a huge amount of the historic emissions contributing to climate
change.82 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 12-13]
77 U.S. Census Bureau, Characteristics of the U.S. Population by Generational Status: 2013 at 3 (2016),
https://perma.cc/AS3H-BCWK; see also Pew Res. Ctr., First- and second-generation share of the
population, 1900- 2017, June 3, 2019, https://perma.cc/Y9WT-75R4 (showing a growing percentage in
recent years); see also Pew Res. Ctr., Key Findings About U.S. Immigration, Aug. 20, 2020,
https://perma.cc/8JEK-Y88S (showing that 77% of the U.S. foreign-born population are naturalized U.S.
citizens or permanent/temporary U.S. residents).
78 Over $100 billion is sent from the United States to other countries in remittances every year. See Pew
Res. Ctr., Remittance Flows Worldwide in 2017, Apr. 3, 2019, https://perma.cc/D684-7ZA8.
79 Many cultural sites are located near water because of how civilization developed, Yu Fang & James W.
Jawitz, The evolution of human population distance to water in the USA from 1790 to 2010, 10 NATURE
COMMUNICATIONS 1 (2019), and so such sites may be especially vulnerable to climate change, see Lee
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Bosher et al., Dealing with multiple hazards and threats on cultural heritage sites: an assessment of 80 case
studies, 29 DISASTER PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 109
(2019). More broadly, there are clear cultural costs of climate change, W. Neil Adger et al., Cultural
dimensions of climate change impacts and adaptation, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 112 (2013), and a
willingness to pay to protect culture, Ali Ardeshiri et al., Conservation or Deterioration in Heritage Sites?
Estimating Willingness To Pay for Preservation (Working Paper, 2019).
80 See ArdenRowell, Foreign Impacts and Climate Change, 39 HARV. ENV'T L. REV. 371 (2015);
Dana, supra note 71 (discussing U.S. charitable giving abroad and foreign aid, and how those metrics likely
severely underestimate true U.S. willingness to pay to protect foreign welfare).
81 See UNESCO, Climate Change Now Top Threat to Natural World Heritage, Dec. 2, 2020,
https: //perma. cc/K9 S W-XQDM.
82 Datablog, A History of C02 Emissions, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2009) (from 1900-2004, the United
States emitted 314,772.1 million metric tons of carbon dioxide; Russia and China follow, with only around
89,000 million metric tons each).
Indeed, OMB's Draft Circular A-4 Update is even more explicit than the current guidance on
the need to consider direct and indirect transboundary impacts on U.S. citizens. As the Draft
Circular A-4 Update explains, effects that occur entirely outside the United States are relevant to
consider in a regulatory impact analysis "when they affect U.S. citizens and residents, such as
effects experienced by citizens residing abroad"; when "assessing effects on noncitizens residing
abroad provides a useful proxy for effects on U.S. citizens and residents that are difficult to
otherwise estimate"; and when "assessing effects on noncitizens residing abroad provides a
useful proxy for effects on U.S. national interests that are not otherwise fully captured by effects
experienced by particular U.S. citizens and residents "83 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p.
13]
83 Draft Circular A-4 Update, supra note 10, at 9-10.
C. Focusing on Global Climate Damages Is Consistent With EPA's Consideration of
Global Costs
EPA can further justify its focus on global climate benefits as necessary for consistency with
the rest of its analysis. To begin, EPA treated monopsony impacts as an international transfer
payment, rather than as potential benefits to U.S. consumers at the expense of foreign oil
producers.84 As Circular A-4 suggests, an analysis adopts a global rather than U.S.-centered
perspective when it treats such international flows as transfers rather than as costs or benefits.85
EPA's global perspective on monopsony effects is consistent with it adopting a global
perspective on climate effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 13-14]
84 RIA at 11-27; 86 Fed. Reg. at 43,792.
85 Circular A-4 at 38 (stating that if "the analysis is conducted from the United States perspective," then
"transfers from the United States to other nations should be included as costs, and transfers from other
nations to the United States as benefits").
More broadly, EPA's analysis implicitly takes a global perspective on compliance costs, and
so—as OMB's Draft Circular A-4 Update emphasizes86—it would be arbitrary not to similarly
take a global perspective on climate effects. All industry compliance costs ultimately fall on the
owners, employees, or customers of regulated and affected firms. Whether the Proposed Rule's
compliance costs are passed to consumers or investors, or some combination thereof, a
significant portion of the Proposed Rule's alleged compliance costs will ultimately accrue to
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foreign customers or foreign investors. Regulated manufacturers include major corporations that
are headquartered abroad: In fact, many of the country's largest automakers— Toyota, BMW,
Nissan, Mercedes, Stellantis (Fiat Chrysler), Volkswagen, and others—are headquartered abroad.
The rule's compliance costs will therefore fall partly on foreign actors, but EPA did not break
out these "global" costs separately from "domestic" costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp.
13-14]
86 Id. at 10 ("You should be consistent in your treatment of noncitizens residing abroad in your benefit
and cost estimates. If you include some effects experienced by such noncitizens in your primary analysis,
consistency generally requires also including countervailing effects on similar noncitizens in your primary
analysis. For example, if benefits that are experienced by noncitizens residing abroad are included in your
analysis, compliance costs borne by noncitizens residing abroad should generally be included in your
analysis as well, and vice versa.").
Furthermore, even the domestically-based automakers regulated under this rule are publicly
traded with investors across the globe. In general, about 29% of U.S. corporate debt and 14% of
equities are foreign-owned,87 and adding foreign direct investment to portfolio stock ownership
suggests that foreigners own about 40% of U.S. corporate equity.88 Thus, a significant share of
the Proposed Rule's compliance costs are likely to fall on foreign entities, but EPA never
distinguishes between those costs that would accrue to foreign entities as opposed to U.S.
citizens or U.S. entities. Thus, the agency's calculations of cost implicitly include all global
effects. Considering global climate benefits is consistent with that approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0743, p. 14]
87 Dept. of Treasury et al., Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities at B-3 (2020),
https://perma.cc/6VP6- PPG6.
88 Steve Rosenthal & Theo Burke, Who's Left to Tax? U.S. Taxation of Corporations and Their
Shareholders at 2 (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Working Paper, 2020), https://perma.cc/YMR2-
XREM.
In a few recent analyses, agencies including EPA have admitted that some portion of the costs
or cost savings calculated for publicly-traded corporations will "accru[e] to entities outside U.S.
borders" through foreign ownership, employment, or consumption.89 Yet much like in the
Proposed Rule, these analyses do not attempt to separate such effects to foreign interests, nor
attempt to exclude such effects from consideration altogether. Indeed, splitting corporate effects
into subparts based on ultimate ownership—much like separating climate benefits
geographically—could be extremely complicated.90 Thus, as a practical matter, agencies
typically count all costs or benefits to corporations, no matter how those effects may be passed
through to foreign owners, foreign employees, or foreign customers. As the Draft Circular A-4
Update explains, this practice requires consistent treatment for benefits.91 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0743, p. 14]
89 See, e.g., EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Reconsideration of the Oil and Natural Gas
Sector Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources at 3-13 (2018); EPA, Regulatory
Impact Analysis for the Proposed Revised Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) Update for the 2008
Ozone NAAQS at 5-5 (2020).
90 See, e.g., EPA, Draft Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses: Review Copy prepare forEPA's
Science Advisory Board at 5-2 (2020), https://perma.cc/3K86-M7AH ("Limiting standing to citizens and
residents of the United States can be complicated to operationalize in practical terms (e.g., how should
multi-national firms with plants in the United States but shareholders elsewhere be treated?).").
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91 Draft Circular A-4 Update, supra note 10, at 10.
Since EPA analyzes the Proposed Rule's costs globally—without distinguishing between U.S.
and foreign effects—it would be inconsistent and arbitrary for the agency to attempt to separate
and disregard climate benefits that occur abroad, as doing so would "put a thumb on the scale"
by treating costs globally but benefits domestically.92 EPA can therefore highlight its consistent
treatment of costs and benefits as further justification for assessing climate damages from a
global perspective. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 14-15]
92 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1198.
D. Considering Extraterritorial Climate Effects Is Consistent With Administrative
Precedent Outside the Climate Context
While EPA offers extensive justification for its focus on global damage estimates, it can
provide additional regulatory precedent supporting that approach. Agencies often consider the
extraterritorial effects of their actions—including effects on international reciprocity,
international cooperation, and transboundary spillovers—when administering their statutory
authority. And on numerous occasions, courts have endorsed this practice. Indeed, as the
Supreme Court has acknowledged, agency decisions "are routinely informed by . . . foreign
relations and national security concerns."93 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 15]
93 Dep't of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019).
For one, as noted above, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires agencies to
administer and interpret the nation's law to "recognize the worldwide and long-range character
of environmental problems" and to "lend appropriate support" to help "maximize international
cooperation."94 Numerous court decisions—including one from the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit—have held that reasonably foreseeable transboundary effects must appear in
NEPA analyses.95 And consistent with those decisions, agencies have assessed transboundary
impacts under NEPA for over 40 years under Executive Order 12,114, which instructs agencies
to "take into consideration in making decisions" effects of their actions on the "environment of a
foreign nation" and "the global commons."96 EPA's consideration of extraterritorial
environmental impacts is thus consistent with decades of agency practice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0743, p. 15]
94 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(I) (cited at Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 9, at 15 n.37, as § 4332(2)(F)).
95 E.g. Env'tDef. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Gov't of Man. v. Salazar, 691 F.
Supp. 2d 37, 51 (D.D.C. 2010).
96 See Exec. Order No. 12,114 § 2-3, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (Jan. 4, 1979).
Executive Order 13,990 instructs agencies to ensure that the social cost of greenhouse gas
values adequately account for "intergenerational equity." 138 A 7% rate ignores much of future
generations' welfare and so would be inconsistent with that mandate. Notably, even when using
high discount rates for climate damages in 2020, EPA explained that the 7% capital rate did not
adequately account for "tradeoffs between improving the welfare of current and future
generations."139 Accordingly, EPA's decision not to apply that discount rate for assessing
climate damages is entirely justified. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 20]
138 Exec. Order § 13,990 5(b)(ii)(E).
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139 85 Fed. Reg. at 24,735 (explaining that the central analysis focused on a 3% rate, and the 7% rate was
used only for sensitivity analysis).
B. Focusing on Global Climate Damages Furthers U.S. Strategic Interests by Facilitating
Reciprocity, Mitigating International Spillover Effects, and Protecting U.S. Extraterritorial
Interests
EPA explains in both the regulatory impact analysis36 and the Draft SC-GHG Update37 that
it is appropriate to value climate damages on a global scale because climate impacts occurring
outside U.S. borders can directly and indirectly affect U.S. welfare through spillovers and
foreign reciprocity. Indeed, the theory and evidence for reciprocity on their own justify a focus
on the full global values, and additional strategic and practical justifications provide further
support for EPA's approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 6]
36 RIA at 10-11.
37 Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 9, at 10-15.
1. Use of the Global Values Facilitates International Reciprocity
Because the world's climate is a single interconnected system, the United States benefits
greatly when foreign countries consider the global externalities of their greenhouse gas pollution
and cut emissions accordingly. It therefore promotes the strategic interests of the United States to
encourage all other countries to think globally in setting their climate policies. The United States
can advance this objective by itself adopting the full global social cost of greenhouse gases—as
numerous leading climate economists and experts have explained.38 Indeed, basic economic
principles demonstrate that the United States stands to benefit greatly if all countries apply global
social cost of greenhouse gas values in their regulatory decisions and project reviews39—likely
trillions of dollars in direct benefits from foreign action to combat climate change.40 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 6-7]
38 Most generally, it is individually rational for a country to fully internalize the global social cost of
greenhouse gases "if a country expects a decrease in its own emissions to decrease that of all others in
proportion to the ratio of its external cost of emissions to its internal costs." Matthew J. Kotchen, Which
Social Cost of Carbon? A Theoretical Perspective, 5 J. ASSOC. ENV'T & RES. ECON. 673, 683 (2017).
Other economists have justified use of the global social cost estimates on more intuitive grounds. See, e.g.,
Tamma Carleton & Michael Greenstone, Updating the United States Government's Social Cost of Carbon
at 26-27 (Becker Friedman Institute Working Paper 2021-04, Jan. 2021), https://perma.cc/H9EU-XWBX
("The global SCC ... is an ingredient in efforts to procure the necessary international action. . . . Even if
policymakers decide that the effects of regulations on U.S. citizens are what matter (in terms of both law
and policy), it would make sense to use the global measure, as it would protect U.S. citizens against a range
of adverse effects from unmitigated climate change."); William Pizer et al., Using and Improving the Social
Cost of Carbon, 346 SCIENCE 1189, 1190 (2014) (explaining that the "potential to leverage foreign
mitigation," combined with moral, ethical, and security issues, provide "compelling reasons to focus on a
global SCC but, more important, to make a strategic choice."); Robert S. Pindyck, Comments on Proposed
Rule and Regulatory Impact Analysis on the Delay and Suspension of Certain Requirements for Waste
Prevention and Resource Conservation, Nov. 6, 2017, https://perma.cc/HG8Q-MT6H ("[W]hat treatment of
international damages is in the United States' self-interest? . . . The simplest answer is to find the value of
the [social cost of carbon] that maximizes global welfare. I continue to think that the global value is the
appropriate provisional value for use as research on this topic continues.").
39 See Kotchen, supra note 38, at 678 (providing formulas for the "efficiency argument in support of all
countries internalizing the GSCC [global social cost of carbon] for domestic policy").
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40 Inst, for Pol'y Integrity, Foreign Action, Domestic Windfall: The U.S. Economy Stands to Gain
Trillions from Foreign Climate Action (2015), https://perma.cc/T3WN-H42U.
The Biden Administration has made such a strategic choice, to adopt a global valuation of
climate damages as part of its diplomatic strategy. Executive Order 13,990 unequivocally states
that "[i]t is essential that agencies capture the full costs of greenhouse gas emissions as
accurately as possible, including by taking global damages into account. . . [to] support the
international leadership of the United States on climate issues."41 The Order later elaborates:
"Our domestic efforts must go hand in hand with U.S. diplomatic engagement. Because most
greenhouse gas emissions originate beyond our borders, such engagement is more necessary and
urgent than ever. The United States must be in a position to exercise vigorous climate leadership
to achieve a significant increase in global climate action and put the world on a sustainable
climate pathway."42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 7]
41 Exec. Order No 13,990 § 5(a).
42 Id. § 6(d). Though this subsection takes action on the Keystone XL Pipeline permit, its statement of
diplomatic goals has much broader relevance.
There is already evidence that the U.S. strategy of combining its domestic efforts— including
the global valuation of climate damages—with its diplomatic engagement is spurring foreign
reciprocity. As EPA explained in the Draft SC-GHG Update, "[m]any countries and international
institutions have either already explicitly adapted the IWG's estimates of global damages in their
domestic analyses . . . [or] developed their own estimates of global damages" following the U.S.
approach.43 Earlier this year, in fact, Canada adopted the climate-damage valuations from
EPA's Draft SC-GHG Update as its official estimates.44 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 7]
43 Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 9, at 14.
44 Social Cost of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Government of Canada (last modified Apr. 20, 2023),
https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/science-research-
data/social-cost- ghg.html.
In January 2021, Trevor Houser and Kate Larsen published a conservative estimate of the
number of tons of greenhouse gases that the rest of the world had committed to reduce for each
ton that the United States has pledged to reduce: a figure they call the "Climate Reciprocity
Ratio."49 Using only the quantifiable, unconditional pledges that 51 countries had made since
2014 to cut emissions through 2030, Houser and Larsen conservatively estimate that for every
ton the United States pledged to reduce, these other countries had collectively pledged to
reduce 6.1-6.8 tons in return.50 While implementation of all these foreign policies is not
guaranteed, and while these estimates reflect pledges that may now be outdated, Houser and
Larsen cite evidence that several large emitters are on track to meet their goals, and that the ratio
should grow over time as the U.S. share of global emissions falls.51 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0743, pp. 8-9]
49 Trevor Houser & Kate Larsen, Rhodium Grp., Calculating the Climate Reciprocity Ratio for the U.S.
(2021), https://perma.cc/7MJ8-DN23 (calling their estimate "deliberately conservative").
50 The estimate is conservative because it omits any conditional pledges, any pledges that are not readily
quantified into specific reductions, any actions from countries that have not formally submitted Nationally
Determined Contributions to the United Nations, any reductions occurring after 2030, and any foreign
actions already achieved before 2014 that may have motivated U.S. pledges in the first place. Id.
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51 Id.
In short, both empirical evidence and economic theory strongly support a strategic choice for
U.S. agencies to adopt the full global estimates of the social cost of greenhouse gases, as this
facilitates international reductions in greenhouse gas pollution that directly benefits the United
States. Notably, OMB's Draft Circular A-4 Update specifically recognizes that "the potential for
inducing strategic reciprocity or other policy changes from actors abroad" offers a basis for
considering regulatory impacts on a global basis.52 Accordingly, EPA should provide evidence
of foreign reciprocity to further support its focus on the full global valuations of the social cost of
greenhouse gases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 8-9]
52 Draft Circular A-4 Update, supra note 10, at 9.
Experts on the social cost of greenhouse gases have therefore concluded that, because the
integrated assessment models that underlie the Working Group's social cost valuations currently
do not capture many of these key inter-regional costs, the use of the global values can be further
justified as a proxy for capturing all spillover effects.67 Though not all climate damages will
spill back to affect the United States, many will, and together with other justifications, the
likelihood of significant spillovers makes a global valuation the better, more transparent
accounting of the full range of costs and benefits that matter to U.S. policymakers and the public.
EPA can therefore highlight spillover impacts as further justification for relying on global social
cost valuations. In addition to the spillover effects that EPA already mentions,68 EPA should
further argue that transboundary spillovers, feedback loops, information spillovers, and other
effects justify a focus on the full global values, either independently or in combination with other
strategic and ethical considerations.69 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 10-11]
67 Robert E. Kopp & Bryan K. Mignone, Circumspection, Reciprocity, and Optimal Carbon Prices, 120
CLIMATE CHANGE 831, 833 (2013) (2013) (explaining that the principle of "circumspection" can
account for spillover effects and can then be used to justify a global SC-GHG value).
Globalization and the many avenues by which the fortunes of countries are linked mean that a
high CSCC in one place may result in costs as the global climate changes even in places where
the CSCC is nominally negative. For many countries, the effects of climate change may be felt
more greatly through transboundary effects, such as trade disruptions, large-scale migration, or
liability exposure than through local climate damage.. .These considerations suggest that
country-level interests may be more closely aligned to global interests than indicated by
contemporary country-level contributions to the SCC... [A] host of other strategic and ethical
considerations factor into the international relations of climate change mitigation... We make no
claim here regarding the utility of the CSCC in setting climate policies. C02 emissions are a
global externality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 11]
Id. at 899 (emphases added). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 11]
68 RIA at 10-11 (citing trade, tourism, economic spillovers, political destabilization, and global migration).
69 See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 26; id. at 12 (on information spillovers).
3. Use of the Global Values Preserves Extraterritorial Interests
The RIA highlights direct and indirect impacts on U.S. citizens and assets located abroad as a
justification for a global valuation,70 but U.S. extraterritorial interests are even more extensive
and significant. A domestic-only estimate of the social cost of greenhouse gases based on some
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rigid conception of geographic borders or U.S. share of world GDP will fail to capture all the
climate-related costs and benefits that matter to U.S. citizens, including impacts to significant
U.S. ownership interests in foreign businesses, properties, and other assets, as well as U.S.
consumption abroad including tourism,71 and even effects to the millions of Americans living
abroad.72 The United States also has military personnel and assets located in almost every nation
across the globe, and many if not all installations abroad—including those with high replacement
costs or irreplaceable strategic value—face imminent climate risks.73 Because no methodology
for estimating a "domestic-only" value would capture these impacts to extra- territorial interests,
focusing on the global values can be further justified in part as a proxy for these important
considerations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 11]
70 RIA at 10-11.
71 "U. S. residents spend millions each year on foreign travel, including travel to places that are at
substantial risk from climate change, such as European cities like Venice and tropical destinations like the
Caribbean islands." David A. Dana, Valuing Foreign Lives and Civilizations in Cost-Benefit Analysis: The
Case of the United States and Climate Change Policy 10 (Northwestern Faculty Working Paper 196, 2009),
https://perma.cc/EW3B-NKYC.
72 2021 TSD, supra note 4, at 15 (citing a 2016 figure from Bureau of Consular Affairs, Dept. of State);
see also Dept. of State, Consular Affairs by the Numbers (2020), https://perma.cc/F3M8-EFSJ.
73 Ctr. for Climate & Sec., Military Expert Panel Report: Sea Level Rise and the U.S. Military's Mission 7
(2d ed. 2018), https://perma.cc/ZM4R-ED89.
Both strategic considerations and the need to account for spillovers already provide
independent justifications for focusing on the full global social cost of greenhouse gas estimates.
But the global values can also be at least partly justified as a proxy for these extra-territorial
interests that otherwise would be overlooked using a domestic-only damage estimate. EPA can
therefore further highlight U.S. extraterritorial interests as additional justification for relying on
global social cost valuations, and can specifically call attention to climate-vulnerable U.S.
military installations abroad with high replacement costs or irreplaceable strategic value, U.S.
willingness to pay to protect relatives, ancestral homes, cultural and religious sites, and natural
resources located abroad, and U.S. altruism toward the people, animals, and natural habitats
across the globe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 13]
Beyond NEPA, and outside the climate context, agencies have considered key effects on
international reciprocity in their regulatory cost-benefit analyses and decision making. Perhaps
the best antecedent on this front is EPA's 1988 regulations to protect stratospheric ozone—
another problem that, like greenhouse gases, requires international cooperation to effectively
mitigate. In issuing those regulations, EPA recognized that it could "consider other countries'
willingness to take regulatory action" in "deciding whether and how to regulate."97 EPA also
took "[consideration of the international ramifications of United States action" into account
when "analyzing the cost and feasibility of controls."98 And in its regulatory impact analysis,
EPA modeled alternative regulatory stringency levels based on potential international
participation rates and the influence that EPA regulation would have on reciprocal international
actions.99 By adopting a global approach to the social cost of greenhouse gases, EPA therefore
draws upon the approach that it took for stratospheric ozone under the Reagan administration.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 15]
97 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566, 30,569 (Aug. 12, 1988).
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98 Id. ("Certainly other nations' ozone-depleting emissions or control of emissions affect the cost of
United States' controls, and the need for other nations to limit their emissions may make appropriate United
States action that encourages, or does not discourage, other nations to agree to such limits.").
99 Env't Prot. Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Protection of Stratospheric Ozone (1988).
In addition to EPA's consideration of international reciprocity and cooperation in prior
rulemakings, agencies have also considered transboundary spillover effects in making key
decisions. As one example, when considering the "public interest" in the certification of natural
gas exports under the Natural Gas Act, 102 the Department of Energy routinely "considers]
international trade policy, foreign policy, and national security interests." 103 As another
example, the Food and Drug Administration also frequently considers international effects as
part of its regulatory decision making, and has recognized that such costs are particularly
relevant because "a portion of foreign costs could be passed on to domestic consumers." 104
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 16-17]
102 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a).
103 New Policy Guidelines and Delegation Orders from Secretary of Energy to Economic Regulatory
Administration and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Relating to the Regulation of Imported Natural
Gas, 49 Fed. Reg. 6684, 6688 (Feb. 22, 1984).
104 Requirements for Additional Traceability Records for Certain Foods, 87 Fed. Reg. 70,910, 71,071
tbl.2 (Nov. 21, 2022).
Courts have confirmed that agencies may—and, in some cases, must—take into account
international spillover effects. In 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management approval of an offshore oil drilling and production facility
after the agency concluded that domestic extraction would not affect international fossil-fuel
supply and consumption. 105 As the court explained, because domestic production causes
"foreign consumers [to] buy and consume more oil"—and because that consumption "can be
translated into estimates of greenhouse gas emissions" that harms the United States—the agency
had an obligation to consider those increased foreign emissions resulting from domestic
action. 106 Two subsequent district court opinions similarly faulted Department of Interior
analyses for omitting the effects of domestic production on foreign demand and
consumption. 107 The fact that courts have required agencies to consider the spillover impacts
from foreign greenhouse gas emissions provides strong support for EPA's consideration of
spillovers from domestic emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 16-17]
105 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt, 982 F.3d 723, 738 (9th Cir. 2020).
106 Id.
107 Sovereign Inupiat for a Living Arctic v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 555 F. Supp. 3d 739, 764-67 (D.
Alaska 2021); citing Friends of the Earth v. Haaland, No. CV 21-2317 (RC), 2022 WL 254526, at
[Star] 14-15 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 2022).
Consistent with these examples, the Draft Circular A-4 Update recognizes that relevant
benefits and costs to consider in regulatory impact analysis include both effects that "result
directly from a regulation's domestic applicability" and those that result "indirectly from a
regulation's impact on foreign entities." 108 With regard to the latter category, the Draft Circular
A-4 Update explains that relevant impacts "include the effects of a regulation on U.S. strategic
interests, including the potential for inducing strategic reciprocity or other policy changes from
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actors abroad or effects on U.S. government assets located abroad," which "are particularly
likely to occur when [a] regulation bears on a global commons or a public good." 109
Additionally, the Draft Circular A-4 Update states that relevant impacts include "those that occur
entirely outside the United States when they affect U.S. citizens and residents." 110 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 16-17]
108 Draft Circular A-4 Update, supra note 10, at 9.
109 Id.
110 Id.
As all of these examples illustrate, EPA's consideration of climate damages on a global scale
is consistent with how EPA and other agencies have exercised regulatory authority in numerous
contexts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 16-17]
II. Extensive Justification Supports EPA's Decisions to Omit a 7% Discount Rate and To
Discount Long-Term Climate Impacts at a Lower Range of Discount Rates than the Proposed
Rule's Shorter-Term Impacts
EPA applies the social cost of greenhouse gases estimates calculated at discount rates of
2.5%, 3%, and 5%, 111 consistent with the Working Group's current recommendations, and
justifies its decision to return to its prior conclusion that a 7% capital-based discount rate is
inappropriate for climate effects. EPA's return to a reasonable range of discount rates to assess
climate impacts is well supported—in fact, as recognized by both the Working Group in its 2021
updatel 12 and EPA in the Draft SC-GHG Update,113 discount rates of 2% or lower are
appropriate for valuing climate damages. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 17]
111 Note that just as there is growing evidence that the discount rate should be below 2%, there is growing
evidence that 5% is much too high a discount rate. The values at 5% should be considered a very
conservative lower bound.
112 2021 TSD, supra note 4, at 16-22 (offering extensive evidence for the use of lower discount rates and
recommending that agencies "consider discount rates below 2.5 percent" for valuing the social cost of
greenhouse gases); see also id. at 4 ("Consistent with the guidance in E.O. 13990 for the IWG to ensure
that the SC-GHG reflect the interests of future generations, the latest scientific and economic understanding
of discount rates discussed in this TSD, and the recommendation from OMB's Circular A-4 to include
sensitivity analysis with lower discount rates when a rule has important intergenerational benefits or costs,
agencies may consider conducting additional sensitivity analysis using discount rates below 2.5 percent.").
113 In the Draft SC-GHG Update, EPA applies a central near-term discount rate of 2%, with additional
valuations using near-term discount rates of 1.5% and 2.5%. The discount rates in the Draft SC-GHG
Update also decline over time. See Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 9, at 3 tbl.ES-1; id. at 52-61
(explaining discounting module).
The RIA cites the Working Group's arguments that, for long-term policies with
intergenerational effects, uncertainty and ethical considerations make a 7% capital-based
discount rate inappropriate. 114 These arguments provide sufficient reason for EPA's approach to
discount rates. Moreover, additional justifications support EPA's discounting choices. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 17]
114 RIA at 10-11 to 10-12.
A. For Numerous Reasons, the 7% Discount Rate Is Inappropriate for Climate Effects
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There is no support in the economics literature for applying a 7% discount rate to long- term
impacts such as climate damage. The suggestion that EPA must apply a 7% discount rate to
climate impacts—which is based exclusively on a narrow reading of two pages of the current
Circular A-4 that OMB has proposed to substantially revise—is utterly inconsistent with
economic practice and theory. 115 There are in fact numerous reasons why applying a 7%
discount rate to climate effects that occur over a 300-year time horizon would be unjustifiable—
and that discount rates of 2% or lower are appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 17-
18]
115 Although the current Circular A-4 provides discount rates of 3% and 7% as a default assumption, it
also requires agency analysts to do more than rigidly apply default assumptions. Circular A-4, supra note
74, at 3 ("You cannot conduct a good regulatory analysis according to a formula. Conducting high-quality
analysis requires competent professional judgment."). As such, analysis must be "based on the best
reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, and economic information available," id. at 17, and agencies
must "[u]se sound and defensible values or procedures to monetize benefits and costs, and ensure that key
analytical assumptions are defensible," id. at 27.
Fifth, several standard justifications for capital-based discount rates break down given the
particular threats of climate change. For example, one argument for capital-based discount rates
is that spending capital on climate-abatement policies has opportunity costs and so, in policy
analysis, future costs and benefits should be discounted at the rate of return to capital. However,
the irreversible, uncertain, and catastrophic risks of climate change may disrupt this "opportunity
cost" rationale: while it may seem, for instance, that future, wealthier generations might
have better opportunities to address climate change for themselves, irreversible or catastrophic
damages could arise that make future mitigation efforts more expensive or impossible. 130
Similarly, if climate damages are "non-marginal," such that climate change significantly affects
the very natural resources needed to drive economic growth, then growth could plummet or even
turn negative. 131 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 19-20]
130 Richard L. Revesz & Matthew R. Shahabian, Climate Change and Future Generations, 84 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1097, 1149-52 (2011).
131 Id. at 1153 & n.246 (citing Heal's observation that estimates of productivity growth based on historical
records omit depletion of natural resources, and thus bias discount rates upwards).
Executive Order 13,990 instructs agencies to ensure that the social cost of greenhouse gas
values adequately account for "intergenerational equity." 138 A 7% rate ignores much of future
generations' welfare and so would be inconsistent with that mandate. Notably, even when using
high discount rates for climate damages in 2020, EPA explained that the 7% capital rate did not
adequately account for "tradeoffs between improving the welfare of current and future
generations."139 Accordingly, EPA's decision not to apply that discount rate for assessing
climate damages is entirely justified. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 20]
138 Exec. Order § 13,990 5(b)(ii)(E).
139 85 Fed. Reg. at 24,735 (explaining that the central analysis focused on a 3% rate, and the 7% rate was
used only for sensitivity analysis).
B. Extensive Justification Supports EPA's Distinct Approach to Discounting Climate
Effects Relative to Other Costs and Benefits
As explained above, EPA's choice to use the social cost of greenhouse gases values calculated
with consumption-based discount rates is fully justified. But this choice also means EPA is
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calculating the present value of reduced greenhouse gas emissions differently than the present
value of other costs and benefits (which, per Circular A-4's default recommendations, it
calculates using 3%and 7% discount rates). Extensive justification supports this distinct
treatment of climate impacts relative to other costs and benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0743, p. 21]
For one, given the nature of the Proposed Rule's costs and benefits and in light of the Draft
Circular A-4 Update, it is more appropriate to discount all effects using consumption-based rates,
and so the present value calculations that include some costs and benefits discounted at a 7% rate
can be viewed as lower-bound sensitivity analyses. The capital-based discount rate theoretically
assesses whether the net benefits from government action will exceed the returns that society
could earn by instead investing the same resources in the private sector. But this framework for
discounting and comparing benefits and costs makes sense only under the "extreme" assumption
that all the costs of government action would "fully displace" (i.e., crowd out) private
investment. 140 In this way, the capital-based rate "at best creat[es] a lower bound on the
estimate of net benefits," by applying a maximum discount rate that reflects an extreme case not
likely to apply to many government actions. 141 As Li and Pizer explain, a capital-based
approach does not provide "a suitable discount rate" for regulatory cost-benefit analysis, in large
part because the benefits of regulation—and not just the costs—may fall on capital as well. 142
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 21]
140 2021 TSD, supra note 4, at 18-19.
141 Id.
142 Qingran Li & William A. Pizer, Discounting for Public Benefit-Cost Analysis, RES. FOR THE
FUTURE 3 (July 2021), https://www.rff.org/publications/issue-briefs/discounting-for-public-benefit-cost-
analysis/.
Moreover, apart from the widespread support for consumption- over capital-based rates, 143
special legal, economic, and policy considerations justify a distinct approach to discounting
climate effects. While effects like compliance costs will play out over the next several decades,
the climate effects of this rule are much longer term, affecting the welfare of future generations
over centuries. Therefore, the arguments in favor of lower consumption-based discount rates—
based on long-term uncertainty, ethics, declining economic growth, inapplicable market data,
and other considerations—apply much more strongly to climate effects than to other costs and
benefits. And because a high capital-based rate, like 7%, will effectively ignore the welfare of
future generations (e.g., over the course of just 80 years, a 7% rate discounts away 99.5% of a
future effect's value 144) legal requirements to consider the welfare of future generations caution
much more strongly against the application of a 7% rate to long-term climate effects than to
other costs and benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 21]
143 See Howard et al., supra note 134 ("Recent economic literature strongly supports the use of a
consumption discount rate over a capital rate of return over longer time horizons").
144 The discount factor is l/(l+r)t; 1/(1+0.07)80 = 0.0045 = 0.45%.
Consequently, as the National Academies of Sciences has recognized, differences in the
application of discount rates may be warranted "when only some categories [of costs and
benefits] have an intergenerational component." 145 The National Academies has offered
recommendations for how agencies can best apply different annualized discount rates to climate
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impacts versus other costs and benefits, 146 and EPA can rely on the National Academies'
guidance to support its approach to discounting here. Likewise, as noted above, both the current
Circular A-4147 and Draft Circular A-4 Update also recognize that intergenerational effects
merit lower discount rates than intragenerational costs and benefits. 148 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0743, p. 21]
145 NAS 2017 Report, supra note 122, at 182.
146 Id.
147 Circular A-4, supra note 74, at 35-36.
148 Draft Circular A-4 Update, supra note 10, at 80-82.
Case law on the social cost of greenhouse gases also offers support for EPA's discounting
approach. Specifically, in Zero Zone v. Department of Energy, the plaintiffs argued that the
Department of Energy had arbitrarily considered hundreds of years of climate benefits while
limiting its assessment of employment impacts and other effects to just a thirty-year time
horizon. The court upheld the regulatory analysis, concluding that the difference in time horizons
was justified because the rule "would have long-term effects on the environment but. . . would
not have long-term effects on employment." 149 The choice of time horizons is related to the
choice of discount rate: any cost or benefit occurring beyond the end of the analytical time
horizon is effectively discounted at a 100 percent rate. 150 Analogizing from this precedent, a
court may similarly defer to an agency's finding that the long time horizon of climate change
justifies a lower discount rate than the rate applied to shorter-term costs and benefits. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 22]
149 Zero Zone, 832 F.3d at 679.
150 See Arden Rowell, Time in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1215, 1237-38 (2014)
(noting time inconsistencies in different regulatory analyses and advising agencies to identify a temporal
break-even point by which a proposed policy will pay for itself).
III. Common Criticisms of the Working Group's Methodology from Opponents of
Climate Regulation Lack Merit
While the Working Group developed its social cost valuations through a rigorous process that
incorporated the best scientific and economic modeling available at the time, its assumptions
have sometimes been criticized by opponents of climate regulation. Such objections lack merit
and do not supply bases for EPA to reject the Working Group's expert valuations. This section
offers responses to criticisms from opponents of sensible climate policy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0743, p. 22]
1. EPA Must Monetize Climate Impacts as Part of Its Analysis
It is widely established that federal agencies may—and often must—consider effects on
climate change when those effects flow from the agency's actions. With EPA, this is especially
well-established. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that greenhouse gas
emissions qualify as an "air pollutant" for regulation under the Clean Air Act. 151 Because one of
the Proposed Rule's aims is to regulate greenhouse gas pollution as an "air pollutant" under
Section 202 of the Clean Air Act—following the Massachusetts precedent—EPA should
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obviously consider impacts on climate when deciding upon the stringency of its regulation.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 22-23]
151 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
Monetizing climate impacts is a natural and rational option to account for those impacts.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 22-23]
Indeed, it is well accepted in regulatory practice and precedent that agencies should monetize
regulatory impacts to the extent feasible, to compare costs and benefits along a common
metric. 152 EPA has long monetized climate damages in vehicles regulations promulgated under
the Obama, Trump, andBiden administrations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 22-23]
152 Circular A-4, supra note 74, at 2 ("Benefit-cost analysis is a primary tool used for regulatory analysis.2
Where all benefits and costs can be quantified and expressed in monetary units, benefit-cost analysis
provides decision makers with a clear indication of the most efficient alternative, that is, the alternative that
generates the largest net benefits to society (ignoring distributional effects).").
Monetizing climate impacts may also be legally required. In 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that the federal government must monetize climate impacts when it
conducts a cost-benefit analysis. In Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, the Ninth Circuit remanded a fuel economy rule to the Department of
Transportation (DOT) for failing to monetize the benefits of carbon dioxide reductions in its
regulatory analysis. 153 The Court recognized the presence of uncertainty in the valuation of
climate damages, but explained that "the value of carbon emissions reduction is certainly not
zero." 154 By failing to value the benefit of greenhouse gas emission reductions in its analysis,
the Court continued, DOT effectively ignored the adverse impacts of greenhouse gas emissions
and thus "put a thumb on the scale by undervaluing the benefits ... of more stringent
standards." 155 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 23]
153 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1198-1203 (9th Cir. 2008).
154 Id. at 1200.
155 Id. at 1198.
2. Monetizing Climate Benefits Does Not Skew the Analysis, but Rather Provides
Balance Since EPA Also Monetizes Costs
Another objection to the use of the social cost of greenhouse gases from critics of climate
action is that these valuations account only for the damages from climate change, but do not take
account of the alleged economic benefits from fossil-fuel production and usage. But this
argument is unpersuasive for two key reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 23-24]
First, the economic benefits of fossil-fuel extraction are far more limited than its proponents
suggest, since the broader benefits that society derives from power and electricity are attributable
to energy production in general and are not unique to fossil fuels. 156 Accordingly, controls on
fossil fuels will have limited net economic impacts. 157 Second, while there are of course some
economic impacts from reductions in fossil-fuel production and usage, those impacts should not
be included in any calculation of climate damages, but rather considered separately by regulators
on the costs side of the ledger in individual determinations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743,
pp. 23-24]
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156 Renewable energy, like fossil fuels, generates revenue, supports jobs, and vitalizes local economies.
See, e.g., Katie Siegner et al., Rocky Mtn. Inst., Seeds of Opportunity: How Rural America Is Reaping
Economic Development Benefits from the Growth of Renewables 6-16 (2021), https://perma.cc/DWH9-
D4L7.
157 Environmental regulation typically has limited impacts on total employment or other macroeconomic
indicators, but rather shifts production from one sector to another. See Inst, for Pol'y Integrity, Does
Environmental Regulation Kill or Create Jobs (2017),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/media/Jobs_and_Regulation_Factsheet.pdf. Meanwhile, the sharp decline in
the cost renewable energy is already expected to crowd out the demand for gas-fuel electricity in the
coming years and decades. See, e.g. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2021 Narrative 18 tbl.
11 (projecting doubling of renewables as a share of domestic energy consumption—from 21% to 42%—by
2050 under reference case, while share of coal and natural gas declines); Charles Teplin et al., ROCKY
MTN. INST., The Growing Market for Clean Energy Portfolios 8 fig. ES-2 (2019), https://perma.cc/P5YJ-
WARJ (showing precipitous decline in cost of clean energy to being cheaper than fossil fuels).
In the Proposed Rule, EPA monetizes not only the expected benefits of the proposal but also
the expected compliance costs from industry. EPA then compares quantified cost and benefit
estimates in determining whether and how to regulate, as instructed by federal guidance and
executive order. 158 Capturing climate benefits is thus essential to ensuring a balanced analysis.
As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, "failure to monetize the most significant benefit of more
stringent standards: reduction in carbon emissions"—while continuing to value estimated
compliance costs—would "put a thumb on the scale by undervaluing the benefits and
overvaluing the costs of more stringent standards." 159 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 24]
158 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (directing that "in choosing among
alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits").
159 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1198-99.
B. Other Common Criticisms of the Working Group's Methodology from Opponents of
Climate Policy Lack Merit
EPA should also provide responses to any objections to the Working Group's methodology
and valuations raised during this comment period. The Working Group, of course, has already
responded to criticisms of its methodology that were offered during the public comment period
that it held in 2013,160 and EPA should draw from that document where relevant in responding
to objections offered through this notice-and-comment process. But some objections are now
being raised that were not offered during the 2013 comment period, while some of the responses
that the Working Group provided can be supplemented with more recent information. Below, we
provide brief responses to common objections that are now being presented by opponents of
climate reforms. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 24]
160 Response to Comments, supra note 118.
1. The Social Cost Valuations Are Not Too Uncertain to Apply
While critics sometimes argue that there is too much uncertainty to rely on the Working
Group's social cost valuations, this argument is incorrect on multiple levels. As a legal matter,
the presence of some uncertainty in the social cost valuations should not preclude agencies from
using available valuations. And as a factual matter, the Working Group rigorously considered
uncertainty and accounted for it in numerous ways. Moreover, the presence of continued
uncertainty suggests that the social cost valuations should be higher than presently valued—not
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that climate damages should be ignored. This is confirmed by EPA's Draft SC-GHG Update,
which incorporates the latest available research and produces substantially higher climate-
damage valuations than those the Working Group previously developed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0743, pp. 24-25]
Federal courts have repeatedly recognized that agency analysis necessitates making predictive
judgments under uncertain conditions, explaining that "[regulators by nature work under
conditions of serious uncertainty" 161 and "are often called upon to confront difficult
administrative problems armed with imperfect data." 162 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, "the
proper response" to the problem of uncertain information is not for the agency to ignore the issue
but rather "for the [agency] to do the best it can with the data it has." 163 Courts generally grant
broad deference to agencies' analytical methodologies and predictive judgments so long as they
are reasonable and do not require agencies to act with complete certainty. 164 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0743, pp. 24-25]
161 Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 1209, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
162 Mont. Wilderness Ass'nv. McAllister, 666 F.3d 549, 559 (9th Cir. 2011).
163 Id.
164 See Wis. Pub. Power, Inc. v. FERC, 493 F.3d 239, 260 (D.C.Cir.2007) ("It is well established that an
agency's predictive judgments about areas that are within the agency's field of discretion and expertise are
entitled to particularly deferential review, so long as they are reasonable.").
The Working Group rigorously considered various sources of long-term uncertainty "through
a combination of a multi-model ensemble, probabilistic analysis, and scenario analysis." 165 As
the Working Group explained, the three reduced-form integrated assessment models (IAMs)
account for uncertainty themselves by spanning a range of economic and ecological
outcomes. 166 Additionally, the use of three separate models—all developed by different experts
spanning a range of views—accounts for uncertainty by integrating a diversity of viewpoints and
structural and analytical considerations. 167 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 25]
165 2021 TSD, supra note 4, at 26.
166 See id.
167 See id.
In addition to the use of three distinct damage models with different inputs and assumptions,
the Working Group integrated various sources of uncertainty into its damage valuations. For
instance, the Working Group applied an equilibrium climate sensitivity—that is, an estimate of
how much an increase in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations affects global
temperatures—that reflects a broad distribution of possible outcomes. 168 The Working Group
also applied five different socioeconomic and emissions trajectories from the published literature
reflecting a range of possible outcomes for future population growth, global gross domestic
product, and greenhouse gas emission baselines—all important inputs that affect long- term
climate damage estimates. 169 The Working Group ran each integrated assessment model 10,000
times per scenario (and per greenhouse gas) for a total of 150,000 draws per greenhouse gas and
then averaged across those results to develop its recommended estimates. 170 In addition to
reporting the average valuations, the Working Group published the results of each model run
under each scenario. 171 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 25]
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168 Id. at 13 tbl.l (showing 5th-95th probability range of distributions in the chosen Roe & Baker model
from 1.72°C from a doubling of atmospheric reenhouse gas concentrations to 7.14°C(.
169 Id. at 15-17 & tbl.2.
170 Id. at 28; see also 2021 TSD, supra note 4, at 26-27 (providing additional detail).
171 Interagency Working Group, Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory
Impact Analysis 26 tbl.3 (2010) ["2010 TSD"].
Moreover, experts broadly agree—and EPA's Draft SC-GHG Update confirms—that the
presence of uncertainty in the social cost valuations counsels for more stringent climate
regulation, not less. 172 This is due to various factors including risk aversion, the informational
value of delaying climate change impacts, and the possibility of irreversible climate tipping
points that cause catastrophic damage. 173 In fact, as discussed above and emphasized in EPA's
Draft SC-GHG Update, uncertainty is a factor justifying lowering the discount rate, particularly
in intergenerational settings. 174 Furthermore, the current omission of key effects of climate
change—such as catastrophic damages, wildfires and certain cross-regional spillover effects—
also suggests that the true social cost values are likely higher than the Working Group's current
estimates. 175 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 25-26]
172 See, e.g., Alexander Golub et al., Uncertainty in Integrated Assessment Models of Climate Change:
Alternative Analytical Approaches, 19 ENV'T MODELING & ASSESSMENT 99 (2014) ("The most
important general policy implication from the literature is that despite a wide variety of analytical
approaches addressing different types of climate change uncertainty, none of those studies supports the
argument that no action against climate change should be taken until uncertainty is resolved. On the
contrary, uncertainty despite its resolution in the future is often found to favor a stricter policy.").
173 The undersigned organizations have filed comments in numerous regulatory proceedings highlighting
the various forms of uncertainty that increase the social cost of greenhouse gases, and providing numerous
references. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund et al., Improper Valuation of Climate Effects in the
Proposed Revised Cross- State Air Pollution Rule Update for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS, Technical App'x:
Uncertainty (Dec. 14, 2020),
https://policyintegrity.org/documents/Joint_SCC_comments_EPA_revised_CSAPR_Ozone_NAAQS_2020
.12.14.pdf.
174 Peter Howard & Jason A. Schwartz, Inst, for Pol'y Integrity, About Time: Recalibrating the Discount
Rate for the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases 13- 25 (2021).
175 Interagency Working Group, Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory
Impact Analysis 21 (2016) ["2016 TSD"] (recognizing that "these limitations suggest that the [social cost
of greenhouse gases] estimates are likely conservative").
2. The Working Group Did Not Bias Its Estimates by Ignoring Positive Impacts of
Climate Change
Critics sometimes claim that the Working Group's social cost values ignore important
positive impacts of a warming climate. Examples that have been offered to support this argument
include alleged agricultural benefits from higher temperatures and decreased wintertime
mortality. But these arguments are legally and factually dubious, and miss the forest for the trees.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 26-27]
Mere omission of some impacts does not counsel for abandoning the social cost estimates,
particularly since independent experts—and EPA's Draft SC-GHG Update—widely agree that
those estimates likely undervalue true climate damages because they omit far more negative
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effects than positive ones. For instance, the Working Group has explained that several of the
underlying economic models omit certain major damage categories such as catastrophic damages
and certain cross-regional spillover effects. 176 These effects can be massive: One paper, for
instance, finds that the inclusion of tipping points doubles the social cost estimates, 177 with
another paper concluding that the effect is even greater and thus the Working Group's existing
values "may be significantly underestimating the needs for controlling climate change." 178 The
current consensus of experts puts damages for a 3°C increase at roughly 5% to 10% of gross
domestic product, 179 which is substantially higher than the damages estimated by the IAMs. 180
And as the Ninth Circuit has explained, the presence of some omitted damages does not provide
a legal basis to ignore established methodologies to monetize climate damages, since while
"there is a range of [plausible] values, the value of carbon emissions reduction is certainly not
zero."181 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 26-27]
176 2010 TSD, supra note 171, at 26, 32.
177 Derek Lemoine & Christian P. Traeger, Economics of Tipping the Climate Dominoes. 6 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 514 (2016).
178 Yongyang Cai et al., Environmental Tipping Points Significantly Affect the Cost-Benefit Assessment
of Climate Policies, 112 PROCS. NAT'L ACADS. SCIS. 4606 (2015).
179 See, e.g., Peter Howard & Derek Sylvan, Inst. forPol'y Integrity, Gauging Economic Consensus on
Climate Change 25 (2021) (reporting mean estimate of 8.5% GPD loss and median estimate of 5% loss,
based on elicitation of over 700 climate-policy experts).
180 2010 TSD, supra note 171, at 9 fig.lA (showing range of GDP loss below 5% for 3°C temperature
increase).
181 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 38 F.3d at 1200.
In addition to its legal shortcomings, arguments about the impact of positive externalities are
also factually suspect. For instance, while agricultural benefits have become a flashpoint in this
debate, the IAMs in fact do account for the potential agricultural benefits of carbon dioxide
fertilization from a warming planet. 182 And evidence suggests that, if anything, these models
likely overvalue agricultural benefits from a warming planet—and thus undervalue the social
cost of greenhouse gases. 183 One paper, for instance, concludes that estimates of net agricultural
impacts produced an undervaluation of the social cost values by more than 50%, explaining that
"new damage functions reveal far more adverse agricultural impacts than currently represented"
in the IAMs used by the Working Group. 184 And a comprehensive investigation of the impacts
of climate change on agriculture has rejected the hypothesis "that agricultural damages over the
next century will be minimal and indeed that a few degrees Celsius of global warming would be
beneficial for world agriculture," concluding that climate change "will have at least a modest
negative impact on global agriculture in the aggregate." 185 This conclusion is confirmed by the
Draft SC-GHG Update, which finds that climate change on net will harm, not benefit, the
agricultural sector. 186 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 27]
182 See Peter Howard, Omitted Damages: What's Missing from the Social Cost of Carbon 6 (2014),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Omitted_Damages_Whats_Missing_From_the_Social_Cost_of
Carbon, pdf. See also Inst, for Pol'y Integrity, A Lower Bound: Why the Social Cost of Carbon Does Not
Capture Critical Climate Damages and What That Means for Policymakers 5 (2019),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Lower_Bound_Issue_Brief.pdf; Climate Impacts Reflected in
the SCC Estimates, Cost of Carbon Project, https://costofcarbon.org/scc-climate-impacts.
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183 See, e.g., Frances C. Moore et al., Economic Impacts of Climate Change on Agriculture: A
Comparison of Process-Based and Statistical Yield Models, 12 ENV'T RES. LTRS., 65008 ("[W]e find
little evidence for differences in the yield response to warming. The magnitude of C02 fertilization is
instead a much larger source of uncertainty. Based on this set of impact results, we find a very limited
potential for on-farm adaptation to reduce yield impacts.").
184 Frances C. Moore et al., New Science of Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture Implies Higher
Social Cost of Carbon, 8 NATURE COMMUNS. 1607 (2017).
185 WILLIAM R. CLINE, GLOBAL WARMING AND AGRICULTURE: IMPACT ESTIMATES BY
COUNTRY 1-2 (2007).
186 Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 9, at 70 tbl.3.1.4 (breaking down damage estimates by
sector/category).
Other arguments focusing on omitted positive impacts are equally misguided. For example,
while some critics of the Working Group's methodology misleadingly point out that one of the
models, DICE, focuses on increased heat-related mortality and does not account for reductions in
wintertime mortality, consideration of the many damages omitted from the IAMs (such as
particulate matter from wildfires, deaths from flooding, Lyme and other tick-based diseases),
including certain mortality effects, consistently point toward a higher social cost value. 187 One
recent study concludes that the IAMs, on net, undervalue mortality from climate change. 188
Focusing on the omission of reductions in wintertime mortality thus misses the forest for the
trees, and does not supply a basis to disregard the Working Group's valuations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0743, p. 27]
187 See, e.g., Howard, supra note 182; see also 2016 TSD, supra note 175, at 21.
188 See Tamma A. Carleton et al., Valuing the Global Mortality Consequences of Climate Change
Accounting for Adaptation Costs and Benefits (U. Chicago, Becker Friedman Inst, for Econ. Working
Paper No. 2018-51) (Jul. 31, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3224365 (finding
that new empirical estimates suggest that the increase in morality risk from climate change is valued at
approximately 3.2% of global GDP in 2100).
3. The Working Group Did Not Overstate the Pace of Climate Change
Critics sometimes allege that the chosen Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS) distribution—
that is, the amount of warming that is expected to result from a doubling of the atmospheric
carbon dioxide concentration—is outdated and fails to account for recent evidence showing that
sensitivity to be lower than previously believed. But these arguments rely on cherry-picked data
and ignore the scientific consensus. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 28]
In 2016, the National Academies of Sciences dedicated an entire report to whether the
Working Group should update the social cost metrics to reflect more recent science on the ECS.
The National Academies decided that such an update was unnecessary, "recommend[ing] against
a near-term change in the distributional form of the ECS" and explaining that any reasonable
revisions on this front would "have a minimal impact on estimates of the [social cost of
greenhouse gases] "189 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 28]
189 Nat'l Acad. Scis., Eng'g & Med., Assessment of Approaches to Updating the Social Cost of Carbon:
Phase 1 Report on a Near-Term Update 34, 46 (2016), https://perma.cc/TJM6-XE65 [hereinafter "NAS
2016 Report"].
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On top of the National Academies' rejection of this argument, there is little support for the
claim that the Working Group overstated the pace of climate change. The most recent estimate
from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—which reflects consensus
estimates from the worldwide scientific community—projects an ECS range from 2.5°C to 4°C,
with 3°C as a "best estimate." 190 This is consistent with the range applied by the Working
Group—based off of Roe & Baker—which uses 3°C as its median and 3.5 °C as its mean ECS
value. 191 In evaluating the ECS, the Working Group assessed estimates from a wide range of
experts and selected consensus values. In fact, as the Working Group acknowledged, some ECS
estimate ranges go as high as 10° C, making its selected ECS distribution substantially lower
than these high-end estimates and a reasonable middle range. 192 The Draft SC-GHG Update
confirms this approach by applying a similar ECS value using the FaIR model. 193 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 28]
190 IPCC, AR6 Synthesis Report SPM-14 (2021).
191 2010 TSD, supra note 171, at 13 tbl.l.
192 Id. at 14 fig. 2.
193 Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 9, at 28-29 & 29 tbl.2.2.1.
In previous dockets, opponents of the Working Group's estimates have cited Lewis & Curry
(2015)—which estimates a median ECS of 1.64 °C with an uncertainty range (5-95%) of 1.05-
4.05 °C—to suggest that the Working Group applied an inappropriately high ECS range. 194 But
in light of the consensus estimates discussed above, that paper is a severe outlier. Since its
publication, Lewis & Curry (2015) has been criticized by other climate scientists for
methodological deficiencies that may cause it to underestimate the ECS. 195 And as noted above,
the National Academies did not think that Lewis & Curry (2015) merited an update to the
Working Group's valuations to revise the ECS estimates. 196 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743,
pp. 28-29]
194 Nicholas Lewis & Judith A. Curry, The Implications for Climate Sensitivity of AR5 Forcing and Heat
Uptake Estimates, 45 Climate Dynamics 1009 (2015).
195 See, e.g., Kate Marvel et al., Internal Variability and Disequilibrium Confound Estimates of Climate
Sensitivity from Observations, 45 GEOPHYS. RES. LTRS. 1595 (2018) ("[A] range of recent work ...
suggests that [Lewis & Curry (2015)] may underestimate equilibrium warming."); Timothy Andrews et al.,
Accounting for Temperature Patterns Increases Historical Estimates of Climate Sensitivity, 45 GEOPHYS.
RES. LTRS. 8490 (2018) (explaining that Lewis and Curry disregard "the impact from non?C02 forcings
and unforced climate variability that could have had a significant impact on the pattern of historical
temperature change").
196 NAS 2016 Report, supra note 189.
Critics further argue that the ECS distribution applied by the Working Group inappropriately
skews rightward, meaning that its mean ECS value exceeds the median value of 3° C that the
IPCC has indicated. But that decision is a feature, not a bug. As the National Academies
explained, the IPCC has found that there is a "positively skewed distributional form for [the
ECS] parameter" similar to the ECS distribution applied by the Working Group. 197 (This too is
confirmed in EPA's Draft SC-GHG Update. 198) In other words, the mean ECS value should be
higher than the median ECS value, and the Working Group applied an appropriate distribution.
Criticisms to the contrary are meritless. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 28-29]
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197 Id. at 25.
198 Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 9, at 29 tbl.2.2.1 (reporting mean ECS of 3.18 °C and median of
2.95 °C).
4. The Working Group Applied a Reasonable Range of Emission Baselines
Critics sometimes argue that the Working Group's valuations are an overestimate because
they apply outdated emission scenarios that exaggerate the baseline level of atmospheric
greenhouse gas levels. Using a higher baseline level of emissions raises the social cost estimates
because the harm from an additional unit of emissions increases with the baseline atmospheric
emissions level. However, the Working Group used a reasonable emissions baseline that reflects
different possible mitigation scenarios. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 29]
While the Working Group assumed a baseline emissions range of 13-118 gigatons of carbon
dioxide emitted per year by 2100,199 recent projections from the Climate Action Tracker
indicate that baseline emissions will reach between 14-175 gigatons of carbon dioxide by 2100
under a range of scenarios reflecting different levels of mitigation.200 Thus, the baselines used
by the Working Group potentially understate baseline emissions rather than overvalue them as
opponents argue. Several of the Working Group's supposedly "business-as-usual" scenarios are
actually more consistent with baseline estimates reflecting policy projections.201 Accordingly,
the criticism that the Working Group overestimated future greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere falls flat. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 29]
199 2010 TSD, supra note 171, at 16 tbl.2.
200 Climate Action Tracker, Global Emissions Time Series (Dec. 1, 2020),
https://perma.cc/B4X2- RAWA.
201 Compare id. (projecting 35-48 gigatons of emissions in 2100 under "current policy projections"
scenarios and 83-175 gigatons under business-as-usual scenario) with 2010 TSD, supra note 171, at 16 tbl.2
(incorporating supposedly business-as-usual scenarios of 42.7 and 60.1 gigatons in 2100).
Moreover, this choice does not particularly affect the social cost valuations. In comparison to
the Working Group's central social cost of carbon estimate in 2020 of $51 per ton, the average
social cost of carbon under the Working Group's supposed business-as-usual emissions scenarios
is $53 per ton and $41 per ton under the emissions scenario that is consistent with sustained and
widespread mitigatory action.202 While relying less on the Working Group's supposed business-
as-usual scenarios would therefore modestly decrease the interim social cost valuations in a
vacuum, more holistic updates to the metrics as recommended by the National Academies of
Sciences would very likely increase the social cost valuations overall—as confirmed by EPA's
Draft SC-GHG Update—due to the omitted damages discussed above and recent evidence
regarding intergenerational discount rates.203 At best, therefore, this argument makes a
mountain out of a molehill. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 29-30]
202 See Peter Howard et al., Option Value and the Social Cost of Carbon: What Are We Waiting For?
(Inst. forPol'y Integrity Working Paper No. 2020/1) at 16 tbl.l (2020),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Working_paper_06.22.20.pdf.
203 See 2021 TSD, supra note 4, at 4 (Working Group acknowledging that its current social cost valuations
"likely underestimate societal damages from [greenhouse gas] emissions").
5. The Working Group Applied Scientifically-Based Damage Models
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Critics sometimes claim that the IAMs—the damage functions for translating climate impacts
into economic losses—are flawed and arbitrary. While newer data has enabled the development
of updated damage models that EPA applies in the Draft SC-GHG Update, the Working Group's
damage functions nonetheless are based on reasonable assumptions made by a range of
experts.204 They have also withstood scientific scrutiny, and while opponents of climate reform
frequently highlight criticism of the damage functions by a notable economist, they take this
criticism out of context. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 30]
204 Response to Comments, supra note 118, at 8 ("While the development of the DICE, FUND and PAGE
models necessarily involved assumptions and judgments on the part of the modelers, the damage functions
are not simply arbitrary representations of the modelers' opinions about climate damages.").
The Working Group selected three models of climate damages that, when the Working Group
selected them in 2010, were the most widely used and cited models in the economics literature
linking physical climate impacts to economic damages205: the DICE, FUND, and PAGE
models.206 These models were developed by outside experts, published in peer-reviewed
economic literature,207 and the product of extensive scholarship and expertise. One of the
models, DICE, was developed by William Nordhaus, an economics professor and former provost
of Yale University who won a Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for developing the
model. And PAGE's developer, Chris Hope, was a lead author and review editor for the Third
and Fourth Assessment Reports of the IPCC, which shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 with
former U.S. Vice President A1 Gore.208 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 30]
205 Response to Comments, supra note 118, at 4 (stating the models "remain the most widely cited"), 8
(quoting the National Academies of Sciences for recognizing that the chosen models represent "the most
widely used impact assessment models" available).
206 2010 TSD, supra note 171, at 5.
207 Response to Comments, supra note supra note 118, at 4.
208 See Chris Hope faculty bio page, University of Cambridge Judge Business
School, https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/faculty-research/research-teaching-staff/chris-hope/.
The three models reflect a wide diversity of methodological assumptions about a range of key
parameters and inputs.209 This reflects, in part, different judgments about the experts who
developed the models. For instance, Richard Tol, who developed the FUND model, has stated
that "[t]he impact of climate change is relatively small," and dismissed much of the research
behind climate change as "scaremongering" rather than "sound science."210 Unsurprisingly, his
model produces the lowest damage estimates of the three models incorporated by the Working
Group.211 William Nordhaus, who developed the DICE model, is widely credited with
popularizing the goal that global temperatures increase no more than 2° Celsius (or 3.6°
Fahrenheit) above pre-industrial levels212—a goal now considered conservative by the global
community.213 His model produces higher damage estimates that are close to the Working
Group's average damage valuations.214 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 30-31]
209 See 2010 TSD, supra note 171, at 6 (discussing how "[t]he parameters and assumptions embedded in
the three models vary widely").
210 Richard S.J. Tol, Why Worry About Climate Change?, ESRI Research Bulletin 2009/1/1, at 3, 5
(2009).
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211 See 2010 TSD, supra note 171, at 50 tbl.A5 (reporting that FUND model has the lowest mean estimate
of the three models at all discount rates, including a negative social cost of carbon estimate at a 5%
discount rate).
212 The 2° C Limit on Global Warming, The Economist (Dec. 6, 2015), https://www.economist.com/the-
economist-explains/2015/12/06/the-2degc-limit-on-global-warming.
213 For instance, the Paris Agreement calls for governments to "hold[] the increase in the global average
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursu[e] efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and
impacts of climate change." Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Art. 2(l)(a), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
214 Compare 2010 TSD, supra note 171, at 50 tbl.A5 with id. at 1.
Opponents of climate mitigation policy sometimes point to criticisms from Robert S. Pindyck,
a noted climate economist who has been critical of the Working Group's choice of damage
functions. But as Professor Pindyck has himself stated, his "writings continue to be taken out of
context by some to unfairly attack the Interagency Working Group's methodology and its interim
estimates."215 While Professor Pindyck has questioned the shape of the models' damage
functions,216 he has acknowledged that the damage functions reflect "common beliefs" about
the effects of two or three degrees of warming. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 31]
215 Robert S. Pindyck, Comments on "Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and
Nitrous Oxide Interim Estimates Under Executive Order 13990" at 1 (June 15, 2021),
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/OMB-2021-0006-0012.
216 Robert S. Pindyck, Climate Change Policy: What do the Models Tell Us? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 19244) 16 (2013), https://perma.cc/G25M-MA7W.
And Pindyck states that uncertainty about the social cost estimates, including the damage
functions, "does not imply that [their] value should be set to zero until the uncertainty is
resolved "217 In fact, he actually advocates for an even higher social cost value than that
produced by the Working Group218 and declared in 2017 (prior to the release of the Draft SC-
GHG Update) that "the federal government should continue to use the [Working Group's]
interim estimates ... as lower bound estimates "219 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 31]
217 Robert S. Pindyck, Comments to Ms. Catherine Cook, Bureau of Land Management, on Proposed Rule
and Regulatory Impact Analysis on Delay and Suspension of Certain Requirements for Waste Prevention
and Resource Conservation 3 (Nov. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/8MY5-58P5; see also Pindyck, supra note
216, at 16 (My criticism of IAMs should not be taken to imply that because we know so little, nothing
should be done about climate change right now, and instead we should wait until we learn more. Quite the
contrary.").
218 Pindyck, supra note 215, at 1 ("My work instead strongly suggests that the estimates of the social cost
of greenhouse gases should be higher than the February 2021 interim estimates[.]") In 2019, Pindyck's own
estimate of the average social cost of carbon dioxide was between $80 to $100, with plausible values going
up to $200. Robert S. Pindyck, The Social Cost of Carbon Revisited, 94 J. ENV'T ECON. & MGMT. 140,
140, 154-55 (2019). This is far higher than the Working Group's current central estimate of $51.
219 Pindyck, supra note 215, at 1.
In other words, the best critic of the Working Group's methodology that opponents could find
supports the continued use of the Working Group's estimates and considers them to be
conservative underestimates of the true cost to society of greenhouse gas emissions. His
conclusion is supported by EPA's Draft SC-GHG Update, which provides conclusive evidence
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that the Working Group's climate-damage valuations are underestimates. Accordingly, criticisms
of the Working Group's valuations from opponents of sensible climate policy are
groundless. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 31]
IV. EPA Should Conduct Additional Analysis Using the Climate-Damage Estimates from
the Draft SC-GHG Update and the Discounting Approach from the Draft Circular A-4 Update
While EPA's application of the Working Group's climate-damage valuations as conservative
underestimates is legally justified, the agency should conduct additional analysis using the draft
climate-damage valuations that EPA recently published.220 EPA's draft valuations faithfully
implement the roadmap laid out in 2017 by the National Academies of Sciences for updating the
social cost of greenhouse gases221 and apply recent advances in the science and economics on
the costs of climate change. EPA's methodology and valuations are consistent with those applied
by a range of expert independent researchers. And while EPA's draft valuations remain
underestimates,222 they more fully account for the costs of climate change by incorporating the
latest available research on climate science, damages, and discount rates. While EPA should
apply the Draft SC-GHG Update in sensitivity analysis if it finalizes this regulation prior to its
finalization of that update, it should consider applying those valuations in its primary analysis
(with the Working Group's estimates in sensitivity analysis) should it finalize the SC- GHG
Update before this rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 32]
220 Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 9.
221 Nat'l Acads. Sci., Engineering & Med., Valuing Climate Damages: Updating Estimation of the Social
Cost of Carbon Dioxide (2017).
222 Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 9, at 4 ("[BJecause of data and modeling limitations . . . estimates of
the SC- GHG are a partial accounting of climate change impacts and, as such, lead to underestimates of the
marginal benefits of abatement."); id. at 72.
Likewise, EPA should also conduct additional analysis using the discounting approach from
the Draft Circular A-4 Update. The Draft Circular A-4 Update would ensure that long-term
benefits and costs receive proper consideration in regulatory impact analysis. Specifically, the
Draft Circular A-4 Update proposes to lower the default, risk-free consumption discount rate
used in regulatory impact analysis from the current 3% to 1.7%, based on updated data and
extensive economic scholarship.223 Also reflecting current economic literature, the update
would eliminate the use of the opportunity cost of capital discount rate (i.e., the 7% rate in the
current Circular A-4) and replace it with the shadow price of capital approach.224 These updates
are consistent with the best available evidence and widely supported by the leading experts in the
field.225 Once again, EPA should apply the discounting approach from the Draft Circular A-4
Update in sensitivity analysis if it finalizes this regulation prior to OMB's finalization of that
update, and consider applying that approach in its primary analysis should OMB finalize the
Circular A-4 Update before this rule is finalized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 32]
223 Draft Circular A-4 Update, supra note 10, at 75-76.
224 Id. at 78-80.
225 Howard et al., supra note 134.
Table 1 shows the climate benefits of the Proposed Rule and Alternative 1 (the proposal's
more stringent alternative) using EPA's "central" certainty-equivalent near-term discount rate of
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2%.226 For comparison, the table presents those estimates alongside the four estimates from the
Working Group that EPA provides in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p.
32]
226 Id. at 9 (describing 2% as the "central" rate).
Table 1: Climate Benefits Using Draft SC-GHG Update (2020$ Billion)
Working Group 5% Average: Proposed Program: 82; Alternative 1: 91
Working Group 3% Average: Proposed Program: 330; Alternative 1: 360
Working Group 2.5% Average: Proposed Program: 500; Alternative 1: 560
Working Group 3% 95th percentile: Proposed Program: 1000; Alternative 1: 1100
Draft Update (2% discount)227: Proposed Program: 1200; Alternative 1: 1300 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 32]
227 Emissions in future years are discounted back to present value using a 3% discount rate. This is
consistent with EPA's approach to the climate-damage valuations using non-standard discount rates of
2.5% and 5%.
Table 2 shows the net benefits of the Proposed Rule and Alternative 1 using the 1.7%
discount rate from the Draft Circular A-4 Update (except for climate benefits, which are
discounted starting at a near-term rate of 2% per the Draft SC-GHG Update).
Table 2: Net Benefits Using 1.7% Social Discount Rate (2020$ Billion)
3% discount rate, 3% average SC-GHG from Interagency Working Group: Proposed
Program: 1600; Alternative 1: 1800
3% discount rate, 2% average SC-GHG from EPA's 2022 Draft Update: Proposed Program:
2500; Alternative 1: 2800
1.7% discount rate, 2% average SC-GHG from EPA's 2022 Draft Update: Proposed Program:
3200; Alternative 1: 3500 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 33]
As Table 2 illustrates, the net benefits of both of the proposed program and Alternative 1
increase when a 1.7% social discount rate is applied (with a 2% near-term discount rate applied
to climate impacts consistent with the Draft SC-GHG update). As these updated discount rates
are used, the net benefits of Alternative 1 relative to the proposed program also increase. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 33]
By applying the latest available science and evidence on both discounting and valuing climate
damages, EPA will ensure a more complete presentation and analysis of the benefits and costs of
the Proposed Rule and any alternatives that it considers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 33]
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is appropriate for EPA to continue to apply the Working Group's
valuations of the social cost of greenhouse gases in the Proposed Rule as conservatives
underestimates. Nonetheless, to bolster its assessment of the costs and benefits of the Proposed
Rule and potential alternatives, EPA should conduct additional analysis using the climate-
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damage estimates from the Draft SC-GHG Update and the discounting approach from the Draft
Circular A-4 Update. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 33]
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
B. The cost-benefit analysis supporting the Proposed Rule is flawed.
The Agency relies on the flawed social cost of carbon metric to measure the alleged benefits
of the Proposed Rule. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis:
Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-
Duty Vehicles (April, 2022) at 560 ("DRIA") (EPA "estimate[s] the social benefits of GHG
reductions expected to occur as a result of the proposed and alternative standards using estimates
of the social cost of greenhouse gases (SC-GHG)."). The SC-GHG allegedly represents "the
monetary value of the net harm to society associated with a marginal increase in emissions ... in
a given year." Id. EPA asserts that "the SC-GHG includes the value of all climate change
impacts (both negative and positive), including (but not limited to) changes in net agricultural
productivity, human health effects, property damage from increased flood risk and natural
disasters, disruption of energy systems, risk of conflict, environmental migration, and the value
of ecosystem services." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 9-10]
This cost-benefit analysis suffers from serious flaws. And when an agency relies "on a cost
benefit analysis as part of its rule-making, a serious flaw undermining that analysis can render
the rule unreasonable." National Ass'n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1040 (D.C.
Cir. 2012). Specifically, EPA's SC-GHG analysis dramatically and unjustifiably inflates the
alleged benefits of the Proposed Rule in relation to its costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649,
pp. 9-10]
For example, the Proposed Rule uses a discount rate much lower than the normal 7%. A lower
discount rate ensures that the putative benefits of regulation always outweigh the costs.
Longstanding guidance from the Office of Management and Budget's Circular A-4 stipulates a
7% discount rate for rules that primarily affect capital investment. Here, EPA specifically rejects
that guidance. "EPA concludes that a 7 percent discount rate is not appropriate to apply to value
the social cost of greenhouse gases ..." DRIA at 564. Instead, the Proposed Rule utilizes a 3%
discount rate—a decrease of 57%. The Proposed Rule settles on the 3% discount rate "for
simplicity in presentation" and because 3% "is the rate used in past GHG rules[.]" 88 Fed. Reg.
29,199. But mere convenience has never been recognized as a reason to short-circuit adequate
cost-benefit analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 9-10]
The Agency argues that "to discount the future benefits of reducing GHG emissions
inappropriately underestimates the impacts of climate change for the purposes of estimating the
SC-GHG." DRIA at 563. EPA is wrong, and its conclusory, normative statement appears to
misunderstand the basic economic function of a discount rate. Its lower discount rate is simply a
ruse to help the Agency arrive at its preferred, but not accurate, cost-benefit analysis. Though the
Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") is in the process of amending Circular A-4—a
proposal that has its own flaws—OMB specifically indicated that the version requiring
utilization of a 7% discount rate "remains in effect." Draft OMB Circular A-4 (April 6, 2023),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/DraftCircularA-4.pdf. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 9-10]
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Additionally, the Proposed Rule considers global climate impacts instead of focusing on
domestic impacts. DRIA at 563. According to EPA, "[t]he only way to achieve an efficient
allocation of resources for emissions reductions on a global basis ... is for all countries to base
their policies on global estimates of damages." Id. But Congress did not authorize the Agency to
address international pollution through tailpipe emissions regulation. And under the presumption
against extra-territoriality, courts generally limit the application of statutes to domestic
applications. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty, 579 U.S. 325, 335, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016)
("When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none." (citation
omitted)). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 9-10]
The effect of these errors is significant. EPA estimates the value of the Proposed Rule's
benefit at between "$83 billion and $1.0 trillion across a range of discount rates and values for
the social cost of carbon." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,344. The range of these supposed benefits
illustrates their arbitrary and capricious nature. When EPA irrationally and arbitrarily stacks the
benefit side of the cost-benefit deck, it negates the usefulness of that analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0649, pp. 9-10]
Organization: Landmark Legal Foundation
When performing the legally required analysis to calculate the costs and benefits of the
Proposed Rule, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") uses a metric calculated by an
entity with no statutory or constitutional authority. Costs and benefits in the Proposed Rule are
calculated based on values called the "social cost" of carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide
emissions, collectively known as Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases ("SC-GHGs"). These metrics
measure the predicted cost of each ton of greenhouse gas released into the atmosphere. An SC-
GHG valuation "in principle includes the value of all climate change impacts." 88 Fed. Reg.
29199nl30 (May 5, 2023). The valuations generally are used to estimate the benefit of imposing
policy that regulates sources of greenhouse gas production, or the climate cost of permitting
projects that increase greenhouse gas emissions. Since 2008, the federal government has used
Social Cost of Carbon valuations when considering regulatory actions. Jane A. Leggett, Federal
Citations to the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Congressional Research Service, March 21,
2017, available at https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44657.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2023). By 2017,
there were at least 160 regulatory actions that cited SC-GHG valuations in their calculations. Id.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 2-3]
SC-GHG valuations, however, may be used to manipulate regulatory cost-benefit analyses to
support otherwise unjustifiable proposed rules. For example, this Proposed Rule purports that its
benefits come from the greenhouse gases it will prevent from being emitted. According to the
proposed rule and its SC-GHG estimates, the benefits of the new standards would equate to "$83
billion to $1.0 trillion across a range of discount rates and values for the social cost of carbon..."
88 Fed Reg 29344 (May 5, 2023). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 2-3]
As rosy as these outcomes appear, the Proposed Rule is illegitimate because its cost benefit
analysis is based on improperly established SC-GHG valuation standards. Shortly after entering
office, President Biden issued Executive Order 13990 ("EO 13990" or "the Order"), creating the
IWG. The IWG was formed with the express purpose of issuing a monetary valuation to be used
by every government agency in calculating the costs of emitting certain greenhouse gases. The
SC-GHGs that underlie the justification for the proposed rule are based upon valuations
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promulgated by this group. The IWG, however, is not vested with any constitutional or statutory
authority to institute such a policy. Thus, the creation of the IWG and the use of its published
SC-GHG valuations violate the federal rulemaking process and the Constitution's separation of
powers. For this reason, the proposed rule is unlawful. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, p. 3]
The IWG is not vested with any statutory authority to act as an agency. Lacking a clear
statement of congressional intent, the President did not have the authority to implement the IWG
in the first place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 3-4]
No statute vests the IWG with any authority and President Biden's Order establishing it does
not cite any statutes. He claims that "the authority vested in [him] as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America" allows him to issue the Order. Exec.
Order 13990 (January 20, 2021). But this purported authority resides neither in the law nor in the
Constitution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 3-4]
The IWG provisions of EO 13990 differ significantly from other Executive Orders issued
around the same time. For example, contrast the vague assertion of statutory authority in EO
13990 with the operative language in EO 14054. In EO 14054, President Biden states that his
authority to terminate a declaration of an emergency comes from "the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act....the National Emergencies Act. section 212 (f) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952. , and section 301 of title 3, United States Code." Exec. Order No.
14054 (Nov. 18, 2021). Similarly, Section 3 of EO 13990 specifically cites "the Antiquities Act,
54 U.S.C. 320301, et seq." to establish the statutory authority to direct the Secretary of the
Interior to review monument boundaries and conditions. 86 Fed. Reg. 7039 (Jan. 25, 2021).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 3-4]
The Presidential power that underpins executive orders "must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952). This requirement for clear statutory authorizations is essential to maintain the
separation of powers and to prevent overreach of executive power. In this case, EO 13990
creates a body with quasi-legislative authority without a Congressional grant to do so. This EO
therefore violates the Constitution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 3-4]
For the IWG to legally behave like an agency, as it has by creating the SC-GHG rules,
Congress must enact a statute granting that power. The President does not have, nor has he even
claimed to have, specific statutory or constitutional authority to create such an agency. Only the
legislature retains such privileges. And because the legislature has not exercised that power here,
the President may not vest the IWG with the authority to issue regulatory actions carrying the
full force of law. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 3-4]
Organization: Landmark Legal Foundation
The Proposed Rule uses a metric established by an entity with no constitutional or statutory
authority. The Interagency-Working Group ("IWG") is not vested with any statutory authority to
act as an executive agency. Therefore, the President did not have the authority to implement the
IWG in the first place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 1-2]
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2. The IWG nonetheless acts as an agency and is therefore subject to the Administrative
Procedures Act ("APA"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 1-2]
3. The APA requires agencies to follow a proscribed rulemaking process that provides
opportunities for the public to comment on agency actions. The IWG bypassed this process when
it established new metrics for the Social Costs of Greenhouse Gas ("SC- GHG"). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 1-2]
As rosy as these outcomes appear, the Proposed Rule is illegitimate because its cost benefit
analysis is based on improperly established SC-GHG valuation standards. Shortly after entering
office, President Biden issued Executive Order 13990 ("EO 13990" or "the Order"), creating the
IWG. The IWG was formed with the express purpose of issuing a monetary valuation to be used
by every government agency in calculating the costs of emitting certain greenhouse gases. The
SC-GHGs that underlie the justification for the proposed rule are based upon valuations
promulgated by this group. The IWG, however, is not vested with any constitutional or statutory
authority to institute such a policy. Thus, the creation of the IWG and the use of its published
SC-GHG valuations violate the federal rulemaking process and the Constitution's separation of
powers. For this reason, the proposed rule is unlawful. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, p. 3]
The IWG is not vested with any statutory authority to act as an agency. Lacking a clear
statement of congressional intent, the President did not have the authority to implement the IWG
in the first place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 3-4]
No statute vests the IWG with any authority and President Biden's Order establishing it does
not cite any statutes. He claims that "the authority vested in [him] as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America" allows him to issue the Order. Exec.
Order 13990 (January 20, 2021). But this purported authority resides neither in the law nor in the
Constitution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 3-4]
The IWG provisions of EO 13990 differ significantly from other Executive Orders issued
around the same time. For example, contrast the vague assertion of statutory authority in EO
13990 with the operative language in EO 14054. In EO 14054, President Biden states that his
authority to terminate a declaration of an emergency comes from "the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act....the National Emergencies Act. section 212 (f) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952. , and section 301 of title 3, United States Code." Exec. Order No.
14054 (Nov. 18, 2021). Similarly, Section 3 of EO 13990 specifically cites "the Antiquities Act,
54 U.S.C. 320301, et seq." to establish the statutory authority to direct the Secretary of the
Interior to review monument boundaries and conditions. 86 Fed. Reg. 7039 (Jan. 25, 2021).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 3-4]
The Presidential power that underpins executive orders "must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952). This requirement for clear statutory authorizations is essential to maintain the
separation of powers and to prevent overreach of executive power. In this case, EO 13990
creates a body with quasi-legislative authority without a Congressional grant to do so. This EO
therefore violates the Constitution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 3-4]
For the IWG to legally behave like an agency, as it has by creating the SC-GHG rules,
Congress must enact a statute granting that power. The President does not have, nor has he even
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claimed to have, specific statutory or constitutional authority to create such an agency. Only the
legislature retains such privileges. And because the legislature has not exercised that power here,
the President may not vest the IWG with the authority to issue regulatory actions carrying the
full force of law. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 3-4]
The IWG acts as an agency and is therefore subject to the APA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0547, pp. 5-6]
The President is within his power to create advisory boards to advise him on policy
recommendations. Congress, however, "under its legislative power is given the establishment of
offices [read: agencies], the determination of their functions and jurisdiction..." Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 5-6]
The IWG's role as a promulgator of binding SC-GHG valuations goes beyond a legal
advisory role, and instead makes it an agency. In EO 13990 § 5(b)(ii), which describes the
"Mission and Work" of the IWG, the Order charges the IWG with the duties of an agency. The
Order states that the Working Group will publish their binding valuations of SC-GHGs "as
appropriate and consistent with applicable law." 86 Fed. Reg. 7040 (Jan. 25, 2021). The Order
also tasks the IWG to "publish an interim SCC, SCN, and SCM " 86 Fed. Reg. 7040 (Jan. 25,
2021). Moreover, the Order tasks the IWG with publishing a final valuation of SC-GHGs "by no
later than January 2022." Id. Those numbers are what "agencies shall use when monetizing the
value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions..." (emphasis added). Id. In other words, the
valuations published by the IWG are binding to other government agencies and are not simply
figures produced to advise the President on relevant climate issues. The SC-GHG valuations the
working group produces therefore constitute technical guidelines that are implemented in further
governmental policy and action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 5-6]
Given these substantial agency activities, the IWG is subject to the requirements of the APA.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 5-6]
The APA dictates a stringent rulemaking process, which is essential for public input.
Nonetheless, the IWG bypassed this process completely. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp.
6-7]
The APA defines a regulation as "the whole or part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy." 5 U.S.C. § 551. According to this statue, the binding prescriptive and implementary
nature of the valuations used in the Proposed Rule makes them regulations. Regulations
encompassed by the APA, but which have not been implemented according to the APA
rulemaking process, are built upon unauthorized and improper legal grounds. The Proposed
Rule, derived from such unlawful regulations in EO 13990 and the subsequent IWG valuation, is
also unauthorized and improper under the APA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 6-7]
The APA requires that, for an agency to create a new rule, an agency must follow the steps of
the rulemaking process, which consists of posting a proposed rule, receiving and responding to
public comments, and then posting the final rule. This all takes place on the public Federal
Register website, ensuring that the American public, and all other interested parties, can provide
meaningful input before a rule takes on the full force and effect of law. EO 13990 circumvents
this process by skipping notice and comment altogether and implementing the SC- GHG
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valuations directly. This end-run of the rulemaking process violates the APA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0547, pp. 6-7]
The very purpose of the APA is to allow notice-and-comment, public discourse, open
criticism, and abridgements to be part of the regulatory process. It is especially critical when
certain regulations will have prominent effects on individual Americans or vast swaths of the
American economy. The APA was not passed by Congress simply as a procedural formality, but
rather as a direct response to the actions of President Roosevelt, who massively increased the
size and centralization of the executive branch. Hall, D: Administrative Law Bureaucracy in a
Democracy 4th Ed., page 2. Pearson, 2009. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 6-7]
The APA is meant to protect the separation of powers in our government. It is unacceptable
for the Biden administration to circumvent this check on power through the fiat of Executive
Order. This intrusion must be rectified. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0547, pp. 6-7]
The federal rulemaking process is supposed to create regulations that allow federal agencies
to effectively enforce congressional statutes. Without adherence to Notice and Comment, the
administrative state could legislate on its own, without oversight from the public. Circumvention
of Notice and Comment is antithetical to Article I, Section I of the US Constitution, which vests
the legislative power solely in the people's immediate representatives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0547, p. 8]
With this EPA tailpipe regulation, based on the inclusion of unlawful SC-GHG metrics
produced by the IWG, the public has not been afforded the proper Notice and Comment period.
Since this method was created without going through the formal rulemaking process, the
valuations are invalid, and the Proposed Rule itself is unlawful. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0547, p. 8]
Organization: Our Children's Trust (OCT)
As an example, transitioning Montana to 100% wind-water-solar for all energy purposes
reduces Montana's 2050 annual energy costs by 69.6% or $6.3 billion per year, saves another
$1.7 billion per year in health costs and an additional $21.1 billion per year in avoided global
climate damages. Electric transportation uses less energy than ICE engine transportation, with
the Ford F150 EV 3.9 times more efficient than the gas/E85 F150. The efficiencies in EVs and
cost savings are true across all states. See Expert Report of Dr. Jacobson and Trial Testimony
and Demonstratives in Held v. Montana. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 2]
Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
Climate Benefit: The EPA bases their climate benefit on an $80 per ton price of carbon, which
reflects the global cost of carbon instead of the domestic cost. When correcting for that error, the
domestic social cost of carbon for the United States is between $3 and $8 dollars per ton
according to the Institute for Energy Research4. This results in a more realistic climate benefit of
$22 billion, a $308 billion benefit decrease from the EPA's calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0551, p. 3]
4 Institute for Energy Analysis (2017) "Explaining IERs position on the social cost of carbon,"
https://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/clarifying-iers-position-social-cost-carbon/
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Climate Benefit
EPA Claimed Benefit: $330 billion
Realistic Benefit: $22 billion [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 7-8]
EPA estimates $330 billion in climate benefits. Most of these benefits, however, accrue to the
global community. The social cost of carbon used in the EPA Regulatory Impact Analysis
reflects this global focus but not the domestic social cost of carbon, which is far lower, in
contrast to the $80 per ton estimate used by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 7-8]
For a 3% discount rate, the domestic social cost of carbon for the United States is between $3
and $8 dollars per ton according to the Institute for Energy Research26. The Office of
Management and Budget provides guidelines for project evaluation and states: "Your analysis
should focus on benefits and costs that accrue to citizens and residents of the United States,"27.
Hence, US domestic consumers would realize only $22 billion in net climate benefits with the
remaining benefits accruing to consumers outside the US. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp.
7-8]
26 Institute for Energy Analysis (2017) "Explaining IERs position on the social cost of carbon,"
https://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/clarifying-iers-position-social-cost-carbon/
27 Office of Management and Budget (2003) "Circular A4,"
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf
The social cost of carbon is estimated from integrated assessment models (IAM). These
models project future emissions and atmospheric concentrations of C02, average global
temperatures, the economic impacts from these temperature changes, the costs of abating
greenhouse gas emissions, and the trade- offs from cutting pollution today to avoid
environmental damages in the future. Each IAM is different depending on assumptions made
about abatement costs, damage costs, and many other parameters. As a result, various IAM
studies have strikingly different estimates for the social cost of carbon so that Pindyck28 notes:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 8]
28 Pindyck, Robert S. (2013) "Climate change policy: What do the models tell us?" Journal of Economic
Literature, 51, 3, 860- 872. (Robert Pindyck is the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Professor of Economics and
Finance at Sloan School of Management at Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
"And here we see a major problem with IAM-based climate policy analysis: the modeler has a
great deal of freedom in choosing functional forms, parameter values, and other inputs, and
different choices can give wildly different estimates of the SCC and the optimal amount of
abatement. You might think that some input choices are more reasonable or defensible than
others, but no, "reasonable" is very much in the eye of the modeler. Thus, these models can be
used to obtain almost any result one desires." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 8]
Organization: ReginaldModlin andB. ReidDetchon
1. Valuing the social cost of those avoided emissions at $25 per ton would imply a benefit
of more than $3 billion per year. Using the "interim" rate of $51 per ton put forward by the
Biden administration in 2021, the benefits would come to more than $6 billion per year. At the
rate of $76 per ton used in the administration's proposed Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, the benefits exceed $9 billion per year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 39-40]
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212 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, United States Government,
"Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide Interim Estimates
under Executive Order 13990" (2021): Figure ES-1: Frequency Distribution of SC-C02 Estimates for
2020, p. 5: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/TechnicalSupportDocument_SocialCostofCarbonMethaneNitrousOxide.pdf
(accessed Mar. 1, 2021)
213 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, op. cit., supra note 176.
Organization: Senator Shelley Moore Capito et al.
Lastly, both rules rely on a questionable cost metric, known as the Social Cost of Greenhouse
Gases (SC-GHG), to inflate the rules' projected benefits and skew its overall cost-benefit
analysis. The EPA's use of SC-GHG in its cost estimate relies upon an economic modeling
sleight of hand in the form of "discount rates" to exaggerate potential costs associated with the
status quo and the benefits of transitioning to BEV s. The estimate also emphasizes theoretical
future costs in foreign countries to justify imposing the rules' real costs and job losses on
American families today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5083, p. 5]
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
Regrettably, the EPA is not likely to adjust its "social cost of carbon" benefits esti- mates
downward at all. In fact, the Agency may be planning to dial them way up—perhaps to as high
as $3 trillion to $5 trillion—when it finalizes these rules. The proposals rely on the usual
discount rates of 3 and 7 percent traditionally used by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) when estimating the present value of benefits expected to accrue in the distant future. But
the Biden OMB has recently proposed to amend its Circular A-4 (gov- erning such calculations)
to encourage agencies to use lower discount rates (such as the 1.7 percent rate generally
applicable to interest on long-term Treasury bonds) in assessing the value of long-term or so-
called "intergenerational" benefits.66 The use of the lower rate will increase the monetized
present value of claimed benefits considerably. In these pro- posed rules, EPA has labeled its
benefits calculations "interim," signaling that it may choose to recalculate the benefits using a
lower discount rate, should OMB finalize the proposed amendments to A-4. Doing so would
only exacerbate the arbitrary nature of the Agency's inflated benefit estimates for the proposed
rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 23]
66 See https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/DraftCircularA-4.pdf.
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
Rule is Predicated on Flawed Modeling of the Social Cost of Carbon
The proposed rule claims purported climate benefits in terms of carbon dioxide emissions.
Specifically, p. 29344 of the proposed rule states: "The present value of climate benefits
attributable to the proposed standards are estimated at $83 billion to $1.0 trillion across a range
of discount rates and values for the social cost of carbon (present values in 2027 for GHG
reductions through 2055)" In engaging in this type of cost/benefit analysis one must assess the
robustness of the social cost of carbon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 15]
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The tremendous uncertainty associated with the SCC is relevant for this question.40 The SCC
is an estimate in dollars of the cumulative long-term damage caused by one C02 emitted in a
specific year. That number also represents an estimate of the benefit of avoiding or reducing one
ton of C02 emissions. The SCC is estimated by Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), which
have been used in the past by the federal government as a basis for regulatory policy. For
example, the Obama administration's Interagency Working Group (IWG) had drawn upon three
models - abbreviated as DICE, FUND, and PAGE—to estimate the SCC.41,42 The Biden
administration appears to be using other models as well.43 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p.
15]
40 Some of the remarks in this comment was also utilized in a separate regulatory comment. See Patrick
Michaels, Kevin Dayaratna, Mario Lewis. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Notice Inviting
Technical Conference Comments, 86 FR 66293." https://cei.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/CEI-
Comments-Michaels-Dayaratna-Lewis- Docket-No-PL21 -3 -000-January-7-2022.pdf
41 IWG, Technical Support Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory
Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866, August 2016, p. 4,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016- 12/documents/sc_co2_tsd_august_2016.pdf (hereafter IWG,
TSD 2016).
42 For the DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate and Economy) model, see William D. Nordhaus,
"DICE/RICE Models," https://williamnordhaus.com/dicerice-models. For the FUND (Framework for
Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution) model, see "FUND Model, http://fund-model.org (accessed
September 15, 2021). For the PAGE (Policy Analysis for the Greenhouse Effect) model, see Climate
CoLab, "PAGE," https://www.climatecolab.org/wiki/PAGE
43 Interagency Working Group, "Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and
Nitrous Oxide Interim Estimates under Executive Order 13990" https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/TechnicalSupportDocument_SocialCostofCarbonMethaneNitrousOxide.pdf
(hereafter IWG, TSD 2021) and United States Environmental Protection Agency, "EPA External Review
Draft of "Report on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases: Estimates Incorporating Recent Scientific
Advances," November 11, 2022, https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/scghg
As any model is as good as the assumptions from which it is composed, we took these IAMs
in house at The Heritage Foundation and tested their sensitivity to a variety of important and
reasonable assumptions. We have found that under very reasonable assumptions they can offer a
plethora of different estimates of the SCC, ranging from extreme damages to overall benefits.
Therefore, the vast potential estimates of the SCC suggest that the economic impact of climate
change is highly questionable, and therefore understanding of climate-related risks is quite
uncertain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 15-16]
Among others, SCC estimates are highly sensitive to:
- Discount rates chosen to calculate the present value of future emissions and reductions.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 15-16]
- Estimated climate sensitivities chosen to estimate the warming impact of projected increases
in atmospheric GHG concentration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 15-16]
- Timespan chosen to estimate cumulative damages from rising GHG concentration. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 15-16]
- Assumptions regarding agricultural benefits [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 15-16]
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We find the economic impact of climate change (even if it exists) is quite uncertain depending
on assumptions made and that the EPA should take note accordingly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0674, pp.15-16]
How Discount Rates Affect the SCC44 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 16-17]
44 Sections 3-6 draw upon Kevin Dayaratna's testimony on "Climate Change, Part IV: Moving Toward a
Sustainable Future," before the House Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on the Environment,
September 24,
2020, https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Dayaratna%20Testimony%2C
%20updated%2 0for%20Sept%2024%20hearing.pdf.
Models used to estimate the SCC rely on the specification of a discount rate. Discounting is
essential in benefit-cost analysis because compliance costs are best viewed as investments
intended to yield benefits in the future. Applying discount rates enables agencies to compare the
projected rate of return from C02-reduction expenditures to the rates of return from other
potential investments in the economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 16-17]
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance in Circular A-4 specifically stipulates
that agencies discount the future costs and benefits of regulations using both 3.0% and 7.0%
discount rates.45 The Obama and Biden administrations have suggested that a 7% discount rate
is an affront to intergenerational equity, apparently on the theory that discount rates higher than
1% to 2% imply that people living today are more valuable than people living decades or
centuries from now.46 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 16-17]
45 Office of Management and Budget, "Circular A-4," Obama White House, February 22, 2017,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/ (accessed September 27, 2021).
46 IWG, TSD 2021, pp. 17-19.
We respectfully disagree. The point of discounting is not to rank the worth of different
generations but to have a consistent basis for comparing alternate investments. Only then can
policymakers determine which investments are most likely to transmit the most valuable capital
stock to future generations. In other words, discounting clarifies the opportunity cost of investing
in climate mitigation, for example, rather than medical research, national defense, or trade
liberalization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 16-17]
Not only is it reasonable to include a 7% discount rate in SCC estimation, it is arguably the
best option because 7% is the rate of return of the New York Stock Exchange over the last
hundred and twenty-five years and thus particularly pertinent to the financial institutions
impacted by this rule.47 Only by using a 7% discount rate can policymakers assess the wealth
foregone when government spends funds on GHG reduction rather than other policy objectives
or simply allows companies and households to invest more of their dollars as they see fit. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 17]
47 D. W. Kreutzer, "Discounting Climate Costs," Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4575, June 16,
2016, https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/discounting-climate-costs; Kevin Dayaratna, Rachel
Greszler and Patrick Tyrrell, "Is Social Security Worth Its Cost?" Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.
3324, July 10, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/report/social-security-worth-its-cost.
It is hard to shake the suspicion that the IWG declines to use a 7% discount rate, even as a
sensitivity case analysis, because doing so would spotlight the comparatively low rates of return
of GHG-reduction policies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 17]
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If any government agency is going to use SCC analysis, it should include SCC discounted at
7% as part of its benefit-cost analysis, because only on that basis can the public compare climate
policy "investments" to other capital expenditures. And only through such comparisons can
policymakers reasonably assess which investments will best position future generations to inherit
the most productive capital stock. Furthermore, as the above analysis illustrates, under a 7%
discount rate, the SCC is essentially zero and might even be negative at times, suggesting overall
net benefits to climate change [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 18]
Substitution of gas-fired combustion for coal firing reduces net greenhouse gas emissions by
nearly 60%. Supercritical natural-gas fired turbine technology can actually reduce net emissions
to zero in an experimental plant,51 though a much-anticipated commercial-grade upscaling has
yet to be achieved. These developments only serve to emphasize how foolhardy it is to use, as
the IWG does, a 300-year period (2000-2300). Dayaratna and his former Heritage Foundation
colleague David Kreutzer ran the DICE model with a significantly shorter, albeit still unrealistic,
time horizon of 150 years into the future.52 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 19-20]
51 See for example Sonia Patel, "Breakthrough: NET Power's Allam Cycle Test Facility Delivers First
Power to ERCOT Grid," Power, November 18, 2021, https://www.powermag.com/breakthrough-net-
powers-allam-cycle-test- facility-delivers-first-power-to-ercot-grid/
52 Dayaratna and Kreutzer, Loaded DICE: An EPA Model Not Ready for the Big Game, Backgrounder
No. 2860, The Heritage Foundation, November 21, 2013,
https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/loaded-dice-epa-model-not- ready-the-big-game.
Here are the DICE-estimated SCC values with a baseline ending in 2300:
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Average SCC Baseline, End Year 2300 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0674, pp. 19-20]
Here are the results with a baseline ending in 2150:
SEE ORIGINAL CMMENT FOR TABLE Average SCC, End Year 2150 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0674, pp. 19-20]
The SCC estimates drop substantially—in some cases by more than 25%—as a result of
ending the SCC estimation period in 2150. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 19-20]
How the Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS) Distribution Affects the SCC
The key climate specification used in estimating the SCC is the equilibrium climate sensitivity
(ECS) distribution. Such distributions probabilistically quantify the earth's temperature response
to a doubling of C02 concentrations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 20-21]
ECS distributions are derived from general circulation models (GCMs) or more
comprehensive earth system models (ESMs), which attempt to represent physical processes in
the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere and land surface. The IWG used the ECS distribution from a
study by Gerard Roe and Marcia Baker published 15 years ago in the journal Science.53 This
non-empirical distribution, calibrated by the IWG based on assumptions it selected in
conjunction with past Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changes (IPCC) recommendations,54
is no longer scientifically defensible.55 In particular, since 2011, a variety of newer and
empirically-constrained distributions have been published in the peer-reviewed literature. Many
of those distributions suggest lower probabilities of extreme global warming in response to C02
1509
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concentrations. Figure 1 are three such distributions:56 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp.
20-21]
53 Gerard H. Roe and Marcia B. Baker. 2007. Why Is Climate Sensitivity So Unpredictable? Science, Vol.
318, No. 5850, pp. 629-632, https://science.sciencemag.org/content/318/5850/629.
54 IWG, Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under
Executive Order 12866, February 2010, pp. 13-14, https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-
12/documents/scc_tsd_2010.pdf (hereafter IWG, TSD 2010).
55 Patrick J. Michaels, "An Analysis of the Obama Administration's Social Cost of Carbon," testimony
before the Committee on Natural Resources, U.S. House of Representatives, July 22, 2015,
https://www.cato.org/publications/testimony/analysis-obama-administrations-social-cost-carbon.
56 Nicholas Lewis, "An Objective Bayesian Improved Approach for Applying Optimal Fingerprint
Techniques to Estimate Climate Sensitivity," Journal of Climate, Vol. 26, No. 19 (October 2013), pp.
7414-7429, https://journals.ametsoc.org/view/journals/clim/26/19/jcli-d-12-00473.Lxml; Alexander Otto
et al., "Energy Budget Constraints on Climate Response," Nature Geoscience, Vol. 6, No. 6 (June 2013),
pp. 415-416, https://www.nature.com/articles/ngeol836; Nicholas Lewis and Judith A. Curry, "The
Implications for Climate Sensitivity of AR5 Forcing and Heat Uptake Estimates," Climate Dynamics, Vol.
45, No. 3, pp. 1009-1923, http://link.springer.eom/article/10.1007/s00382-014-2342-y.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Outdated Roe Baker (2007) and More Recent ECS
Distributions. Figure 1: A variety of equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) distributions
The areas under the curves between two temperature points represent the probability that the
earth's temperature will increase between those amounts in response to a doubling of C02
concentration. For example, the area under the curve from 4°C onwards (known as right-hand
"tail probability") represents the probability that the earth's temperature will warm by more than
4°C in response to a doubling of C02 concentrations. Note that the more up-to-date ECS
distributions (Otto et al., 2013; Lewis, 2013; Lewis and Curry, 2015) have significantly lower
tail probabilities than the outdated Roe-Baker (2007) distribution used by the IWG.
Here, again, is the IWG's 2016 SCC estimates for 2020-2050:
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table ES— 1: Social Cost of C02, 2010-2050(in 2007
dollars per metric ton of C02) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 21-22]
In Climate Change Economics, Dayaratna and colleagues re-estimated the DICE and FUND
models' SCC values using the more up-to-date ECS distributions and obtained the following
results:57 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 21-22]
57 Dayaratna, McKitrick, and Kreutzer, "Empirically Constrained Climate Sensitivity and the Social Cost
of Carbon."
DICE Model Average SCC - ECS Distribution Updated in Accordance with Lewis and Curry
(2015), End Year 2300
Year: 2020
Discount Rate - 2.5%:$28.92
Discount Rate - 3.0%:$19.66
Discount Rate - 5.0%:$6.86
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Discount Rate - 7.0%:$3.57 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 21-22]
Year:2030
Discount Rate - 2.5%:$33.95
Discount Rate - 3.0%:$23.56
Discount Rate - 5.0%:$8.67
Discount Rate - 7.0%:$4.65 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 21-22]
Year: 2040
Discount Rate - 2.5%:$39.47
Discount Rate - 3.0%:$27.88
Discount Rate - 5.0%:$10.74
Discount Rate - 7.0%:$5.91 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 21-22]
Year:2050
Discount Rate - 2.5%:$45.34
Discount Rate - 3.0%:$32.51
Discount Rate - 5.0%:$13.03
Discount Rate - 7.0%:$7.32 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 21-22]
FUND Model Average SCC - ECS Distribution Updated in Accordance with Lewis and
Curry (2015), End Year 2300 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 21-22]
Year: 2020
Discount Rate - 2.5%:$5.86
Discount Rate - 3.0%:$3.33
Discount Rate - 5.0%:-$0.47
Discount Rate - 7.0%:-$l. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 21-22]
Year: 2030
Discount Rate - 2.5%:$6.45
Discount Rate - 3.0%:$3.90
Discount Rate - 5.0%:—$0.19
Discount Rate - 7.0%:-$l.01 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 21-22]
Year: 2040
Discount Rate - 2.5%:$7.02
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Discount Rate - 3.0%:$4.49
Discount Rate - 5.0%:-$0.18
Discount Rate - 7.0%:-$0.82 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 21-22]
Year: 2050
Discount Rate - 2.5%:$7.53
Discount Rate - 3.0%:$5.09
Discount Rate - 5.0%:$0.64
Discount Rate - 7.0%:-$0.53 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 21-22]
Using the more up-to-date ECS distributions dramatically lowers SCC estimates. The IWG's
outdated assumptions overstate the probabilities of extreme global warming, which artificially
inflates their SCC estimates. In its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), the IPCC used the Coupled
Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) models to project future warming and the
associated climate impacts.58 Figure 2 compares predicted and observed average tropospheric
temperature over the tropics.59 The observations come from satellites, weather balloons, and
reanalyses.60 A careful look analysis reveals that only one of the 102 model runs correctly
simulates what has been observed. This is the Russian climate model INM-CM4, which also has
the least prospective warming of all of them, with an ECS of 2.05°C, compared to the CMIP5
average of 3.2°C. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 21-22]
58 Program for Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison, CMIP5 - Coupled Model Intercomparison
Project Phase 5 - Overview, https://pcmdi.llnl.gov/mips/cmip5/.
59 The CMIP5 predictions are available at https://climexp.knmi.nl/start.cgi.
60 Climate reanalyses produces synthetic histories of recent climate and weather using all available
observations, a consistent data assimilation system, and mathematical modeling to fill in data gaps. See
National Center for Atmospheric Research, Atmospheric Reanalysis: Overview & Comparison,
https://climatedataguide.ucar.edu/climate-data/atmospheric-reanalysis-overview-comparison-tables and
ECMWF, Climate Reanalysis, https://www.ecmwf.int/en/research/climate-reanalysis
Altogether, faulty assumptions regarding climate sensitivity have been manifested in the SCC
and associated regulatory policy, and more realistic assumptions inject significant uncertainty
into the potential long-term impact of climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 25]
-Negative SCC Values
Policymakers and the media often assume carbon dioxide emissions have only harmful
impacts on society. However, C02 emissions have enormous direct agricultural67 and ecological
benefits,68 global warming lengthens growing seasons,69 and warming potentially also
alleviates cold-related mortality, which may exceed heat-related mortality by 20 to 1.70 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 25]
67 Literally hundreds of peer-reviewed studies document significant%age increases in food crop
photosynthesis, dry- weight biomass, and water-use efficiency due to elevated C02 concentrations. See the
Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change's Plant-Growth Database:
http://co2science.org/data/plant_growth/plantgrowth.php
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68 See, for example, Randall J. Donahue et al. 2013. Impact of C02 fertilization on maximum foliage
cover across the globe's warm, arid environments. Geophysical Research Letters Vol. 40, 1-5,
https://friendsofscience.org/assets/documents/C02_Fertilization_grl_Donohue.pdf; ZaichunZhu et al. The
Greening of the Earth and Its Drivers. 2016. Nature Climate Change 6, 791-795,
https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate3004; and J.E. Campbell et al. 2017. Large historical growth in
global gross primary production. Nature 544, 84-87, https://www.nature.com/articles/nature22030.
69 EPA, Climate Change Indicators: Length of Growing Season, https://www.epa.gov/climate-
indicators/climate- change-indicators-length-growing-season.
70 Antonio Gasparrini et al. 2015. Mortality risk attributable to high and low ambient temperature: a
multicountry observational study, The Lancet, Volume 386, Issue 9991,
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(14)62114-0/fulltext.
Of the three IAMs used by the IWG, only the FUND model estimates C02 fertilization
benefits. Dayaratna and colleagues investigated whether a model with C02 fertilization benefits
could produce negative SCC estimates. A negative SCC means that each incremental ton of C02
emissions produces a net benefit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 25]
The researchers calculated the probability of a negative SCC under a variety of assumptions.
Below are some of the results published both at the Heritage Foundation as well as in the peer-
reviewed journal Climate Change Economics:71 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
71 Dayaratna and Kreutzer, "Unfounded FUND: Yet Another EPA Model Not Ready for the Big Game,"
Backgrounder No. 2897, April 29, 2014, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/BG2897.pdf; and
Dayaratna et al. (2017).
FUND Model Probability of Negative SCC - ECS Distribution Based on Outdated Roe-
Baker (2007) Distribution, End Year 2300
Year: 2020
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.084
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.115
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.344
Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.601 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
Year: 2030
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.080
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.108
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.312
Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.555 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
Year: 2040
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.075
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.101
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.282
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Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.507 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
Year: 2050
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.071
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.093
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.251
Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.455 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
FUND Model Probability of Negative SCC - ECS Distribution Updated in Accordance with
Otto et al. (2013), End Year 2300 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
Year: 2020
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.268
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.306
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.496
Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.661 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
Year: 2030
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.255
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.291
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.461
Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.619 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
Year: 2040
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.244
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.274
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.425
Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.571 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
Year: 2050
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.228
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.256
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.386
Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.517 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
FUND Model Probability of Negative SCC - ECS Distribution Updated in Accordance with
Lewis (2013), End Year 2300 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
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Year: 2020
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.375
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.411
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.565
Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.685 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
Year: 2030
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.361
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.392
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.530
Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.645 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
Year: 2040
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.344
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.371
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.491
Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.598 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
Year: 2050
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.326
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.349
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.449
Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.545 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
FUND Model Probability of Negative SCC - ECS Distribution Updated in Accordance with
Lewis and Curry (2015), End Year 2300 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
Year: 2020
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.402
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.432
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.570
Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.690 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
Year: 2030
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.388
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.414
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Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.536
Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.646 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
Year: 2040
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.371
Discount Rate - 3.0%:0.394
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.496
Discount Rate - 7.0%:0.597 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
Year: 2050
Discount Rate - 2.5%:0.354
Discount Rate - 3.0%: 0.372
Discount Rate - 5.0%:0.456
Discount Rate - 7.0%: 0.542 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-27]
As the above statistics illustrate, under a variety of reasonable assumptions, the SCC has a
substantial probability of being negative. In fact, in some cases, the SCC is more likely to be
negative than positive, which implies—if one adopts the perspective of a central planner—that
the EPA should, in fact, subsidize (not limit) C02 emissions. We, of course, oppose such
interventionism. Our purpose here is to illustrate the extreme sensitivity of these models to
reasonable changes in assumptions as well as to point out that the probabilities of negative SCC
value are non-trivial and potentially quite substantial. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 25-
27]
Updated Agricultural Benefits and Benefit-Cost Analysis
It is a well-established fact that increases in C02 concentration enhance plant growth by
increasing their internal water use efficiency as well as raising the rate of net photosynthesis.72
As discussed in the previous section, the FUND model attempts to incorporate those benefits;
however, this aspect of the model is grounded on research that is one-to-two decades old. Even
so, as discussed in the preceding section, Dayaratna et al. (2017) found substantial probabilities
of negative SCC using the outdated assumptions in FUND. Dayaratna et al. (2020) summarized
more recent C02 fertilization research in a peer-reviewed study published in Environmental
Economics and Policy Studies and re-estimated the FUND model's SCC values upon updating
those assumptions.73 To facilitate the EPA's review of that research, we excerpt several
paragraphs from Dayaratna et al. (2020): [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 27-28]
72 K.E. Idso and S.B. Idso. 1994. Plant responses to atmospheric C02 enrichment in the face of
environmental constraints: A review of the past 10 years' research. Agricultural and Forest Meteorology,
69, 153-203, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0168192394900256; Jennifer Cuniff et
al. 2008. Response of wild C4 crop progenitors to subambient C02 highlights a possible role in the origin
of agriculture. Global Change Biology 14: 576-587,
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10. Ill 1/j. 1365-2486.2007.01515.x.
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73 Kevin Dayaratna, Ross McKitrick, and Patrick Michaels. 2020. Climate sensitivity, agricultural
productivity and the social cost of carbon in FUND. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 22: 433-
448, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s 10018-020-00263-w.
Three forms of evidence gained since then indicates that the C02 fertilization effects in
FUND may be too low. First, rice yields have been shown to exhibit strong positive responses to
enhanced ambient C02 levels. Kimball (2016) surveyed results from Free-Air C02 Enrichment
(FACE) experiments, and drew particular attention to the large yield responses (about 34%) of
hybrid rice in C02 doubling experiments, describing these as "the most exciting and important
advances" in the field. FACE experiments in both Japan and China showed that available
cultivars respond very favorably to elevated ambient C02. Furthermore, Challinor et al. (2014),
Zhu et al. (2015) and Wu et al. (2018) all report evidence that hybrid rice varietals exist that are
more heat-tolerant and therefore able to take advantage of C02 enrichment even under warming
conditions. Collectively, this research thus indicates that the rice parameterization in FUND is
overly pessimistic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 27-28]
Second, satellite-based studies have yielded compelling evidence of stronger general growth
effects than were anticipated in the 1990s. Zhu et al. (2016) published a comprehensive study on
greening and human activity from 1982 to 2009. The ratio of land areas that became greener, as
opposed to browner, was approximately 9 to 1. The increase in atmospheric C02 was just under
15% over the interval but was found to be responsible for approximately 70% of the observed
greening, followed by the deposition of airborne nitrogen compounds (9%) from the combustion
of coal and deflation of nitrate-containing agricultural fertilizers, lengthening growing seasons
(8%>) and land cover changes (4%), mainly reforestation of regions such as southeastern North
America. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 27-28]
Munier et al. (2018) likewise found a remarkable increase in the yield of grasslands. In a 17-
year (1999-2015) analysis of satellite-sensed LAI, during which time the atmospheric C02 level
rose by about 10%, there was an average LAI increase of 85%. A full 31% of earth's continental
land outside of Antarctica is covered by grassland, the largest of the three agricultural land types
they classified. Also, for summer crops, such as maize (corn) and soybeans, greening increased
an average of 52%, while for winter crops, whose area is relatively small compared to those for
summer, the increase was 31%. If 70% of the yield gain is attributable to increased C02, the
results from Zhu et al (2016) imply gains of 60%, 36%, and 22% over the 17-year period for,
respectively, grasslands, summer crops and winter crops, associated with only a 10% increase in
C02, compared to parameterized yield gains in the range of 20% to 30% for C02 doubling in
FUND. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 27-28]
Third, there has been an extensive amount of research since Tsingas et al. (1997) on adaptive
agricultural practices under simultaneous warming and C02 enrichment. Challinor et al. (2014)
surveyed a large number of studies that examined responses to combinations of increased
temperature, C02 and precipitation, with and without adaptation. In their metanalysis, average
yield gains increased 0.06% per ppm increase in C02 and 0.5% per percentage point increase in
precipitation, and adaptation added a further 7.2% yield gain, but warming decreased it by 4.9%
per degree C. In FUND, 3°C warming negates the yield gains due to C02 enrichment. However,
based on Challinor et al.'s (2014) regression analysis, doubling C02 from 400 to 800 pm, while
allowing temperatures to rise by 3°C and precipitation to increase by 2%, would imply an
average% yield increase ranging from 2.1 to 12.1% increase, indicating the productivity increase
in FUND is likely too small. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 27-28]
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EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
We have grouped the comments related to the SC-GHG into four distinct themes, the use of
discount rates, global versus domestic calculations, fundamental modeling of the SC-GHG, and
process level comments related to the SC-GHG. Below is a summary of each theme and EPA's
response.
A few commenters expressed concern with how discount rates are applied within the
proposed regulation's analyses. For example, the Kentucky Office of the Attorney General
expressed concern that the proposed rule uses a discount rate much lower than what they
characterize as the normal 7%, which they assert ensures that the putative benefits always
outweigh the costs. The Heritage Foundation also expressed concern over the discount rates used
within this rule, "It is hard to shake the suspicion that the IWG declines to use a 7% discount
rate, even as a sensitivity case analysis, because doing so would spotlight the comparatively low
rates of return of GHG-reduction policies." However, the Institute for Policy Integrity wrote at
length supporting EPA's choice of discount rate, including support for omitting the 7% discount
rate and EPA's choice to use the SC-GHG values calculated with consumption-based discount
rates.
American Enterprise Institute, Arizona State Legislature, Kentucky Office of the Attorney
General, Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine, and Senator Shelley Moore Capito all express
concerns with the use of global SC-GHG values, arguing that future damages in foreign
countries should not justify domestic costs to Americans today and citing OMB guidance
regarding focusing on domestic benefits and costs. However, the Institute for Policy Integrity
supports EPA's use of global values within the proposed rule, arguing that this global approach
is justified because the impacts of GHGs are global, because there are spillover effects from
global impacts to the U.S., because of extraterritorial interests of the U.S., because of
administrative precedent, because relevant statutes and Executive Orders compel or at least
permit it, and in order to facilitate international reciprocity, among other arguments. The Alliance
for Automotive Innovation supports the presentation of both global and domestic estimates of
climate benefits will ensure that the RIA is seen as an objective analysis.
American Enterprise Institute, Arizona State Legislature, Kentucky Office of the Attorney
General, Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine and The Heritage Foundation all criticized the EPA's
approach to calculating the SC-GHG. The main comments were related to criticizing the
Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) used for estimating climate damages as incapable of
projecting conditions 300 years into the future, the use of purported unrealistic Business as Usual
(BAU) scenarios, the use of purported outdated estimates of climate sensitivity, and not
including sufficient benefits to agriculture resulting from higher C02 concentrations. The Clean
Fuels Development Coalition stated that the calculations of the social cost of carbon are
incorrect, and that relying on such estimates in the proposal exceeds EPA's statutory authority.
In contrast, the Institute for Policy Integrity defended EPA's process and results against many
common criticisms, such as too much uncertainty, ignoring positive climate impacts, too high
climate sensitivities, too high emission baselines, or flawed IAMs. The Institute for Policy
Integrity urged EPA to update the SC-GHG approach to include advances consistent with the
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draft SC-GHG update from the Oil and Gas rule (2023). They argued that the interim SC-GHG
underestimates climate damages by omitting key damage sectors.
Lastly, a few commenters (The Arizona State Legislature, the Clean Fuels Development
Coalition, Delek US Holdings, Kentucky Office of the Attorney General and Landmark Legal
Foundation) criticized the use of the interim SC-GHG for what they claim are violations of
administrative process requirements. Arizona claims that the adoption of the IWG estimate for
the SC-GHG was based solely on the instruction from EO 13990, that it violates the major
questions doctrine and the separation of powers, that it never was subject to public comment, and
that it is therefore unlawful, unconstitutional, arbitrary, and capricious. Moreover, they claim that
it suffers from glaring methodological deficiencies. The Clean Fuels Development Coalition (et
al.) similarly argues that the SC-GHG estimates have never undergone notice and comment
rulemaking procedure, that there is no statutory authority for the IWG interim estimates, and that
they are in violation of the APA. Finally, Delek US Holdings, Inc. also highlight a claimed lack
of public comment, and also criticize the SC-GHG for not incorporating the recommendations of
the NAS to update the SC-GHG.
In contrast, California Air Resources Board and Institute for Policy Integrity at NYU School
of Law support the use of the "draft updated SC-GHG methodology that follows what was
provided in U.S. EPA's November 2022 supplemental proposal for oil and gas standards".
Response:
Regarding the discount rate used within the SC-GHG, consistent with the recent scientific
literature, the recommendations of the National Academies, and the recent update of OMB
Circular A-4, the SC-GHG now relies on the use of a dynamic discount rate. This discount rate is
calibrated to observed market interest rates in the near term and uses a Ramsey approach to
dynamically update the discount rate over the long-term. See the preamble of this rule and the
2023 Final Oil and Gas NSPS RIA for more details. Within the RIA for this final rule, EPA uses
updated SC-GHG estimates that EPA believes represents the latest available science and follows
the recommendations of the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine. Please
refer to the supplementary material to the Final RIA for the Oil and Gas NSPS, "Report on the
Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases: Estimates Incorporating Recent Scientific Advances," and the
Response to Comments document for the Oil and Gas NSPS for detailed responses pertaining to
the rigor of the updated methodology, including the discounting approach.
Note that the EPA presented these updated discount rate estimates in a sensitivity analysis in
the December 2022 Supplemental RIA for the Oil and Gas Rulemaking that address
recommendations of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017),
and invited public comment on the sensitivity analysis and on the technical report, titled
"External Review Draft: Report on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases: Estimates
Incorporating Recent Scientific Advances," explaining the methodological updates that was
included as Supplementary Material to the Oil and Gas Supplemental Proposal RIA. The EPA
published and used these estimates in the main analysis of the RIA for the December 2023 Final
Oil and Gas NSPS/EG Rulemaking, "Standards of Performance for New, Reconstructed, and
Modified Sources and Emissions Guidelines for Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector
Climate Review" and responded to public comments received on the new estimates in the
Response to Comments document for the Final Oil and Gas Rulemaking.
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As also discussed in preamble Section VIII, we monetize benefits of the final CO2 standards and
evaluate other costs in part to better enable a comparison of costs and benefits pursuant to E.O.
12866, but we recognize that there are benefits we are unable to fully quantify. EPA's consistent
practice has been to set standards to achieve improved air quality consistent with CAA section
202 and not to rely on cost-benefit calculations, with their uncertainties and limitations, in
identifying the appropriate standards. Regarding commenters' assertions that EPA has
improperly inflated the climate benefits of the rule, and one commenter's (Steven Bradbury)
assertion that the SC-GHG "effectively approaches zero," EPA disagrees with these
commenters' contentions. As we explain in preamble Section VIII.E and RIA Chapter 6.2, the
SC-GHG is based on a voluminous record, significant public process, and an external expert peer
review. EPA's use of SC-GHG for purposes of assessing the monetized climate benefits of this
rulemaking is clearly reasonable. While we strongly disagree with commenter Steven Bradbury
about monetized climate benefits, solely for purposes of this argument we note that even without
the monetized benefits from the SC-GHG the rule would be net beneficial. As further explained
in Section VIII.E of the preamble, to the extent that EPA considers the positive monetized net
benefits as supportive of the final standards (regardless of magnitude of the net benefits), this
illustrative hypothetical shows that the positive monetized net benefits do not depend on either
the final rule's SC-GHG estimates or the IWG SC-GHG estimates (see RIA Appendix to Chapter
9 for the latter in the final rule); EPA would still find the emissions reductions, in light of the
cost of compliance, available lead time and other factors, justify adoption of these standards. In
sum, while the positive net benefits figure supports EPA's final standards, we do not consider it
necessary to the justification. EPA finds that this approach, of placing weight on judging the
appropriate level of emissions reductions, in light of the costs of compliance and lead time, while
still evaluating and considering total social costs and benefits, is consistent with both the
Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v EPA, 576 US 743 (2015) and with section 202 of the
CAA.
EPA follows applicable guidance and best practices when conducting its benefit-cost
analyses, including OMB Circular A-4 and EPA's Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses.
We therefore consider our analysis methodologically rigorous, and a best estimate of the
projected benefits and costs associated with the final rule.
With respect to the social cost of greenhouse gases (SC-GHG), as more fully discussed in
preamble Section VIII.E and RIA Chapter 6.2, EPA has updated its approach in the final rule and
the final approach uses updated estimates of the SC-GHG that reflect recent advances in the
scientific literature on climate change and its economic impacts and incorporate
recommendations made by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine375.
The EPA published and used these estimates in the RIA for the December 2023 Final Oil and
Gas NSPS/EG Rulemaking, "Standards of Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified
Sources and Emissions Guidelines for Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate
Review." As we explain in preamble Section VIII.E and RIA Chapter 6.2, EPA's updated SC-
GHG estimates are based on a voluminous record, significant public process, and expert peer
review. EPA's use of SC-GHG for purposes of assessing the climate benefits of this rulemaking
is clearly reasonable.
375 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (National Academies). 2017. Valuing Climate
Damages: Updating Estimation of the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide. National Academies Press.
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An updated discussion of the reasons for focusing on the global impacts of GHGs when
calculating the SC-GHG can be found in the preamble for this final rule, as well as the RIA and
RTC for the December 2023 Final Oil and Gas NSPS/EG Rulemaking, "Standards of
Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources and Emissions Guidelines for
Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate Review." We incorporate and rely on
those reasons for this rulemaking as well. Within the RIA for this final rule, EPA used updated
SC-GHG estimates that EPA believes represents the latest available science and follows the
recommendations of the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine. Please
refer to the supplement to the 2023 Final Oil and Gas RIA, "Report on the Social Cost of
Greenhouse Gases: Estimates Incorporating Recent Scientific Advances" for detailed responses
pertaining to the rigor of the updated methodology and responses pertaining to the global focus
of the SC-GHG estimates. EPA notes that when the Agency is directed to consider costs under
the CAA, it does not consider costs on a nationality basis but rather, typically, cost is considered
at the facility or firm level without respect to which entity owns or operates the facility(s) or
firm(s). Further, EPA's cost estimates in RIAs, including the cost estimates contained in the
Final RIA for this rule, regularly do not differentiate between compliance costs expected to
accrue to U.S. firms versus foreign interests.376
Note that the EPA presented these updated estimates in a sensitivity analysis in the December
2022 Oil and Gas Supplemental RIA that address recommendations of the National Academies
of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017), and invited public comment on the sensitivity
analysis and on the technical report, titled External Review Draft: Report on the Social Cost of
Greenhouse Gases: Estimates Incorporating Recent Scientific Advances, explaining the
methodological updates that was included as Supplementary Material to the Oil and Gas
Supplemental Proposal RIA. The EPA published and used these estimates in the main analysis of
the RIA for the December 2023 Final Oil and Gas NSPS/EG Rulemaking, "Standards of
Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources and Emissions Guidelines for
Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate Review" and responded to public
comments received on the new estimates in the Response to Comments document for the Final
Oil and Gas Rulemaking.
As discussed in preamble Section VIII.E and RIA Chapter 6.2, EPA has updated its approach
and now uses estimates of the SC-GHG that reflect recent advances in the scientific literature on
climate change and its economic impacts and incorporate recommendations made by the
National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine377. The EPA presented these updated
estimates in a sensitivity analysis in the December 2022 Oil and Gas Supplemental RIA that
address recommendations of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
(2017), and invited public comment on the sensitivity analysis and on the technical report, titled
376 For example, in the RIA for the 2018 Proposed Reconsideration of the Oil and Natural Gas Sector Emission
Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, the EPA acknowledged that some portion of regulatory
costs will likely "accru[e] to entities outside U.S. borders" through foreign ownership, employment, or consumption
(https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2018-
09/documents/oil_and_natural_gas_nsps_reconsideration_proposal_ria.pdf, p. 3-13, accessed 03/05/2024).
Similarly, some portion of the regulatory costs of this rule will fall on foreign vehicle manufacturers and on
companies who import components or entire vehicles made in other countries for sale in the U.S. In general, a
significant share of U.S. corporate debt and equities are foreign-owned.
377 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (National Academies). 2017. Valuing Climate
Damages: Updating Estimation of the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide. National Academies Press.
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External Review Draft: Report on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases: Estimates Incorporating
Recent Scientific Advances, explaining the methodological updates that was included as
Supplementary Material to the Oil and Gas Supplemental Proposal RIA. The EPA published and
used these estimates in the main analysis of the RIA for the December 2023 Final Oil and Gas
NSPS/EG Rulemaking, "Standards of Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified
Sources and Emissions Guidelines for Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate
Review" and responded to public comments received on the new estimates in the Response to
Comments document for the Final Oil and Gas Rulemaking. These estimates have taken on the
latest and most up to date science, including updates to the climate model, the socioeconomic,
and the damage estimation components. With respect to climate sensitivity, EPA's updated
modeling approach includes representation of climate sensitivity uncertainty consistent with the
most recent IPCC assessment, addressing that concern from Arizona. Regarding the comments
about emissions projections and time horizon of analysis, EPA's updated modeling is now
relying on socioeconomic and emissions projections developed under the Resources for the
Future (RFF) Social Cost of Carbon Initiative (referred to as the RFF-SPs). As described in the
"Report on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases: Estimates Incorporating Recent Scientific
Advances" (included as a supplement to the 2023 Final Oil and Gas rule) the RFF-SPs are a set
of probabilistic projections of population, GDP, and GHG emissions (CO2, CH4, and N2O) to
2300. Consistent with the National Academies' recommendation, the RFF-SPs were developed
using a mix of statistical and expert elicitation techniques to capture uncertainty in a single
probabilistic approach, taking into account the likelihood of future emissions mitigation policies
and technological developments, and unlike other sources of projections, they provide inputs for
estimation out to 2300 without further extrapolation assumptions. This is a suitable time horizon
consistent with the National Academies' recommendation378 and OMB Circular A-4 (2003)
guidance379, since in the modeling conducted for this report 2300 is far enough in the future to
capture the majority of discounted climate damages. See Section 2.1 and 3 of the "Report on the
Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases" from the Final Oil and Gas rule for more discussion. The
approach to estimating damages has also advanced - see the "Report on the Social Cost of
Greenhouse Gases" for more discussion on the damage modules and the approach to accounting
for carbon fertilization.
As we explain in preamble Section VIII.E and RIA Chapter 6.2, the SC-GHG estimates are
based on a voluminous record, significant public process, an external expert peer review, as well
as being responsive to the recommendation from the National Academy of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine (NAS, 2017). EPA's use of SC-GHG for purposes of assessing the
climate benefits of this rulemaking is clearly reasonable.
We disagree with commenters, such as Arizona, Clean Fuels Development Coalition, and
Delek US Holdings that the Interagency Working Group (IWG) was required to undertake notice
and comment rulemaking in order to recommend values for SC-GHG to EPA. The IWG is not
378 The National Academies (2017) recommended that socioeconomic scenarios used to estimate the SC-GHG
should: "extend far enough in the future to provide inputs for estimation of the vast majority of discounted climate
damages".
379 Regarding the analytic time horizon for regulatory benefit-cost analysis, OMB Circular A-4 (2003) advises "The
ending point should be far enough in the future to encompass all the significant benefits and costs likely to result
from the rule" (OMB 2003). OMB Circular A-4 (2023) similarly advises "The ending point for your analysis should
be far enough in the future to encompass, to the extent feasible, all the important benefits and costs likely to result
from all regulatory alternatives being assessed" (OMB 2023).
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an "agency" for purposes of the APA, and it does not violate the separation of powers for the
President to provide guidance to agencies on how to perform benefit-cost analyses when
appropriate and consistent with applicable law. Commenters are free, as demonstrated by the
docket for this rulemaking, to comment on EPA's approach to estimating SC-GHG and the role
those estimates should play in EPA's decisionmaking about the final standards adopted in this
rule. However, EPA notes that it did not primarily use the IWG estimates in this final rule
(though they are included as an appendix to RIA Chapter 9), because EPA concluded it would be
more appropriate to use estimates of the SC-GHG that reflect recent advances in the scientific
literature on climate change and its economic impacts and incorporate recommendations made
by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine. EPA also notes, as explained
above, that the benefit-cost analysis for this rule played a very limited role in decision-making
for the standards. EPA did not rely on benefit-cost analysis to identify the appropriate standards.
That is, EPA did not seek to select standards that would maximize net benefits as calculated by
the benefit-cost analysis. Based on the RIA and the range of scenarios we evaluated, we
anticipate such an approach would have required significantly more stringent standards, which
would, in EPA's judgment, be inconsistent with the statutory requirement to give appropriate
consideration to costs of compliance and lead time. As described in section V of the preamble,
and explained above in responding to Stephen Bradbury's comment, the selection of the final
standards was made based on judgments about the feasibility of further emissions reductions, in
light of the cost of compliance, available lead time and other factors, and not specifically on
estimates of the SC-GHG380
EPA considers its use of estimates of the SC-GHG entirely consistent with its authority under
the CAA 202(a) to establish standards, and has fully complied with applicable requirements,
including Section 307(d) of the Clean Air Act in this rulemaking. Unless a statute requires a
different approach, it is entirely permissible for agencies to consider costs and benefits when
deciding whether or how to regulate. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208, 226
(2009). The costs and benefits of these final standards plainly include the effects of the
standards on emissions of GHG. Any attempt to consider monetized net benefits of this
rulemaking must at least attempt to monetize the effect of GHG emissions such as through
estimates of SC-GHG. Indeed, courts have held that it may be arbitrary and capricious for
agencies not to use SC-GHG in their benefit-cost analyses (see the 2023 Final Oil and Gas
NSPS RIA for a more complete history of government use of the SC-GHG).
As discussed in preamble Section VIII.E and RIA Chapter 6.2, EPA has updated its approach
and now uses estimates of the SC-GHG that reflect recent advances in the scientific literature on
climate change and its economic impacts and incorporate recommendations made by the
National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine381. The EPA published and used
these estimates in the RIA for the December 2023 Final Oil and Gas NSPS/EG Rulemaking,
"Standards of Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources and Emissions
Guidelines for Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate Review." This directly
addressed the comment by Delek US Holdings suggesting that the EPA follow the NAS
380 For example, EPA would have adopted the same standards had it considered the IWG estimates to be more
appropriate. EPA presents IWG estimates of the SC-GHG for the final standards in an appendix to the RIA. Indeed,
as explained above, the rule would be net beneficial even if no monetized climate benefits were included.
381 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (National Academies). 2017. Valuing Climate
Damages: Updating Estimation of the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide. National Academies Press.
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recommendations and makes a number of the comments by Arizona and the Clean Fuels
Development Coalition moot, as there was an opportunity to provide comment on these new
values during the Oil and Gas NSPS/EG Rulemaking process. The EPA gave notice in the
proposal for this rule that these updated SC-GHG values were under consideration.
8.5 - Criteria air pollutant benefits
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
E. Comments on Estimated Social benefits of the C02 Standards
In this section, Auto Innovators comments on the major categories of estimated social benefits
for the C02 performance standards for model years 2027-2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 285-288]
1. Local/Regional Air Quality benefits from Control of Criteria Air Pollutants
The DRIA estimates that the present value of the quantified health benefits from criteria air
pollution control range from $64 billion to $290 billion, depending on the discount rate and the
dose-response study used for PM2.5 and mortality. This range is so large that it overlaps the
lower agency estimate of the Proposed Rule's climate benefits ($83 billion to $1 trillion). Auto
Innovators believes that the agency's estimates are not consistent with the findings in the peer-
reviewed scientific literature and are exaggerated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-
288]
In any event, any net reductions in PM2.5 emissions (primary or PM2.5 precursors)
accomplished by the revised C02 standards will not provide public health benefits that are
additive to the emissions reductions accomplished by EPA's other mobile-source and stationary-
source programs for criteria air pollutants. The public health benefits are not additive, as we
explain below, because of the way Congress designed the Clean Air Act, structured state
implementation plans, and the way EPA defined emissions limits and nonattainment on a
community-by-community basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
Specifically, reductions in vehicle emissions do not provide additive benefits to public health
because the structure of the Clean Air Act allows the states to include national changes in mobile
source emissions in their state emissions inventories and implementation plans for attainment of
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. In nonattainment areas and areas close to
nonattainment, states and localities are disinclined to impose any more limits on stationary
source emissions than is necessary to meet EPA's air-quality standards. If state and local limits
are unduly strict, new factories may be built in other states and localities where the state
implementation plans are not as strict on new stationary sources. (In attainment areas, where
PM2.5 health benefits might also be considered, there is the complication of the Prevention of
significant Deterioration (PSD) doctrine that needs to be evaluated). Thus, the practical impact of
diminished mobile source emissions, at the margin, is somewhat less pressure on stationary
sources to meet the requirements described in state implementation plans. Thus, there are
benefits from further reductions in mobile source emissions under the Proposed Rule, but they
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are likely to be realized in reduced compliance costs for stationary sources rather than as public
health benefits from reduced overall exposures to PM2.5. The magnitude of the compliance cost
savings is likely to be a small fraction of the estimated public health benefits that the agency has
claimed, given EPA estimates that the benefits of PM control vastly exceed costs in the
stationary source arena. At a minimum, Auto Innovators suggests presentation of two alternative
approaches for calculating the benefits of PM2.5 control: one where the benefits are expressed as
compliance-cost savings for stationary sources and one - as developed in the DRIA - where the
benefits of PM2.5 control are expressed as public health gains. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 285-288]
Auto Innovators made a similar public comment on the DRIA supporting the 2023-2026
rules. In the final rule, Auto Innovators' comment was ignored in the agency's "Response to
Comment" document. (This was unusual, as many of the other Auto Innovators comments were
handled very carefully in the Response to Comment document). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 285-288]
In this rulemaking alone, new criteria pollutant controls are expected to reduce direct PM2.5
emissions from gasoline vehicles by roughly 90%, so those same PM2.5 control benefits should
not also be counted as benefits of the C02 standards and BEVs. Auto Innovators suggests the
EPA focus on the potential benefits of a successful transformation to electric vehicles rather than
incremental benefits of adding additional PM control beyond the California ACC II
requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
The final regulatory impact analysis should acknowledge that the peer-reviewed scientific
literature does not generally support the agency's claim that a shift from ICEs to BEVs in the
light-duty sector will reduce criteria air pollution across the country. In 2021, Burnham et al. of
Argonne National Laboratory (DOE) presented a regional U.S. lifecycle analysis of the impact of
BEVs through 2050, accounting for upstream emissions of criteria air pollutants at the
powerplant. The abstract of their paper concludes as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp.285-288]
We generated state-level emission factors using a projection from 2020 to 2050 for three
light-duty vehicle types. We found that BEVs currently provide GHG benefits in nearly every
state, with the median state's benefit being between approximately 50% to 60% lower than
gasoline counterparts. However, gasoline vehicles currently have lower total NOx, urban NOx,
total PM2.5, and urban PM2.5 in 33%; 15%; 70%; and 10% of states, respectively. BEV
emissions will decrease in 2050 due to a cleaner grid, but the relative benefits when compared to
gasoline vehicles do not change significantly, as gasoline vehicles are also improving over this
time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
The results of this study concerning total PM2.5 are especially concerning because the
agency's quantified criteria-pollutant benefits in this rulemaking are dominated by an alleged
advantage of BEVs with respect to PM2.5 control. Moreover, the lifecycle analysis by Burnham
et al. (2021) is published in the peer-reviewed literature, while the agency's lifecycle inputs and
analysis have not been peer reviewed by qualified experts. For the final rule, Auto Innovators
believes it is unwise for the agency to rely on its lifecycle analysis of criteria air pollutant control
as a primary rationale for the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
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Insofar as criteria air pollution control is considered a primary rationale for a rule that
regulates C02 emissions, we recommend that the agency go beyond an analysis of average ICE
emissions and consider "best-in-class" vehicle emissions in the baseline. For example, in a peer-
reviewed contribution, Winker et al. (2018) compared HEVs and BEVs in terms of criteria air
pollution emissions. When the upstream emissions from BEVs are included, they find that BEV
emissions are 0.06 grams per mile (NOx) while average HEV emissions are 0.004 grams per
mile (NOx and HC). The results of Winkler et al. are consistent with an earlier paper by
Michalek et al. (2011), which found that HEVs and PHEVs, with small battery packs, are
environmentally and economically superior to BEVs. Thus, HEVs may be a superior
technological option for criteria air pollution control than BEVs, at least in some regions of the
country and until the upstream and manufacturing emissions of BEVs are controlled. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
Sources: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
1. Andrew Burnham, Zifeng Lu, Michael Wang, Amgad Elgowainy. Regional Emissions
Analysis of Light-Duty Battery-Electric Vehicles. Atmosphere. 12(11). 2021, 1482.
2. S.L. Winkler, J.E. Anderson, L. Garza, W.C. Ruona, R. Vogt, T.J. Wellington. Vehicle
Criteria Pollutant (PM, NOx, CO and HCx) Emissions: How Low Should We Go? Climate and
Atmospheric Science. 1. 2018, 26.
3. Jeremy J. Michalek, Mikhail Chester, Paulina Jaramillo, Lester B. Lave. Valuation of Plug-
In Vehicle Life-Cycle Air Emissions and Oil Displacement Benefits. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences. 108(40). 2011, 16554-16558. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-
288]
Organization: American Enterprise Institute
Because no policy to reduce GHG emissions can satisfy any plausible benefit/cost test —
their attendant future climate effects for the most part would approach zero — federal agencies
often have included purported "co-benefits," that is, the benefits of reductions in other pollutants,
as factors to be considered in the evaluation of proposed regulations and projects. This is
particularly the case for the asserted health benefits of reductions in the emissions of fine
particulates (PM2.5). 19 Like many of the other pollutants included in the co-benefits
methodology, fine particulates are a "criteria" pollutant,20 as distinct from "hazardous air
pollutants (HAP) " EPA already limits ambient levels of PM2.5 in a separate regulation, and is
required under the CAA to determine every five years whether that standard "accurately reflects
the latest scientific knowledge" on the health effects of exposure to particulates.21 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 5-8]
19 The EPA discussion of particulate matter regulatory actions is at https://www.epa.gov/pm-
pollution/particulate- matter-pm-implementation-regulatory-actions. For sharp critiques of the EPA
analysis of the mortality and morbidity effects of fine particulate matter, see
https://www.regulations.gOv/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2015-0072- 0260 and
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0273230017301538. See also
https://junkscience.com/2023/06/milloy-sets-off-greens-responds-to-politifact-inquiry-on-wildfire-
smoke/#more- 108474.
20 See the EPA summary discussion at https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants.
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21 See the EPA requirements for fine particulates at https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/implementation-
national- ambient-air-quality-standards-naaqs-fine-particulate-matter. The CAA sections are at
https://www.epa.gov/clean-air- act-overview/clean-air-act-title-i-air-pollution-prevention-and-control-parts-
through-d#ia.
The Clean Air Act explicitly requires the EPA, upon finding that a given criteria pollutant
endangers the public health, to promulgate a "national ambient air quality standard" (NAAQS)
that "protects the public health" with "an adequate margin of safety."22 The CAA also
empowers the EPA to regulate emissions of HAP. The law mandates that costs not be considered
in the establishment of the NAAQS; this means that those standards are likely to be too stringent
in a benefit/cost sense. Lowering the emissions of those pollutants even more through insertion
of a co-benefits calculation in a new regulation aimed at an entirely different type of emission
means that the excess net costs of the regulation are likely to be driven up even more. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 5-8]
22 See §7409 (b)(1), "National primary and secondary ambient air quality standards" at
https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/USCODE-2013-title42/html/USCODE-2013-title42-
chap85-subchapI-partA- sec7409.htm.
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
In another example of EPA's biased analysis, EPA estimated the value of health benefits from
reductions in PM2.5 emissions by multiplying PM2.5-related benefit- per-ton ("BPT") values by
the annual reduction in tons of directly emitted PM2.5 and PM2.5 precursor emissions (NOx and
S02) from displaced ICEVs.206 However, EPA ignored the fleet turnover benefit that would
result from replacing older ICEVs with new, more efficient, ICEVs.
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Health Impact Analysis
Morbidity Health Endpoints and Ozone Impacts
U.S. EPA's health analysis of the proposed rule focused solely on evaluating mortality,
excluding other morbidity health effects associated with fine particulate matter (PM2.5) emission
reductions. Reporting morbidity endpoints such as asthma would highlight the importance of this
proposed rule, particularly on children and other vulnerable populations. For instance, CARB
suggests including additional studies, such as those that show the increased susceptibility of the
development of asthma in children due to air pollution. 87, 88 Also, the analysis of the proposed
rule only provides the total valuation and does not report the number of health outcomes
themselves (e.g., mortality cases). While the economic assessment is important, providing the
quantification of the health effects would be valuable in informing the public about the wide
range of health implications. Additionally, adding a quantification of ozone impacts would
strengthen this analysis and provide a more comprehensive quantitative assessment of the effects
of criteria pollutants on health. CARB recommends that U.S. EPA report the number of health
cases and quantify the morbidity health effects, providing a more comprehensive understanding
of the potential benefits of reducing PM2.5 exposure. Also, we recommend that U.S. EPA
similarly include the quantified health impacts of ozone. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p.
52]
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87 McConnell R, Berhane K, Yao L, Jerrett M, Lurmann F, Gilliland F, Ktinzli N, Gauderman J, Avol E,
Thomas D, Peters J. Traffic, susceptibility, and childhood asthma. Environ Health Perspect. 2006
May;114(5):766-72.
88 McConnell R, Islam T, Shankardass K, Jerrett M, Lurmann F, Gilliland F, Gauderman J, Avol E, Ktinzli
N, Yao L, Peters J, Berhane K. Childhood incident asthma and traffic-related air pollution at home and
school. Environ Health Perspect. 2010 Jul;118(7):1021-6.
Health Impacts at Low Levels of PM2.5 and Ozone
CARB recommends that U.S. EPA also include a discussion of the research showing health
impacts at low levels of air pollution, particularly PM2.5 and ozone. Strong associations have
been found between PM2.5 levels below the current NAAQS (12 |ig/m3) 89 and premature
mortality in key multi-city epidemiological studies in the U.S. and Canada. For instance, as
included in U.S. EPA's 2022 Supplement to the 2019 Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) for
PM, 90 a study by Bennett et al. (2019) found that long-term exposure in excess of very low
PM2.5 levels (3 (J,g/m3) may still lead to lower life expectancy for both men and women. 91 This
study is representative of the research studies that show that mortality and morbidity impacts still
occur atPM2.5 levels below the current standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 52-53]
89 As finalized in the Federal Register 78 No. 10. January 15, 2013.
https ://www. govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR- 2013-01-15/pdf/2012-30946.pdf
90 U.S. EPA. Supplement to the 2019 Integrated Science Assessment for Particulate Matter (Final Report,
2022). U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, EPA/635/R-22/028, 2022.
91 Bennett JE, Tamura-Wicks H, Parks RM, Burnett RT, Pope CA 3rd, Bechle MJ, Marshall JD, Danaei G,
Ezzati M. Particulate matter air pollution and national and county life expectancy loss in the USA: A
spatiotemporal analysis. PLoS Med. 2019 Jul 23;16(7):el002856. doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.l002856.
PMID: 31335874; PMCID: PMC6650052.
Similarly, research has demonstrated significant adverse health impacts at ozone levels below
the current NAAQS (70 ppb). 92 As described in U.S. EPA's 2020 Ozone ISA, 93 multiple
epidemiological studies showed that both short- and long-term exposures to ozone with median
or average levels near or below the current 8-hour NAAQS were associated with adverse health
outcomes, including lung function decline, increases in childhood asthma onset, preterm births,
increased emergency room visits, and premature mortality. CARB therefore recommends that
U.S. EPA include and discuss the evidence showing that health impacts still occur at low air
pollution levels, as described in U.S. EPA's 2019 PM ISA, 94 2020 Ozone ISAs, and the 2022
Supplement to the PM ISA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 52-53]
92 As finalized in the Federal Register 80 No. 206 January 15, 2015
https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/FR-2015-10-26/pdf/2015-26594.pdf and retained in the Federal
Register 85 No. 251 December 31 2020 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-12-31/pdf/2020-
28871.pdf.
93 U.S. EPA. Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) for Ozone and Related Photochemical Oxidants (Final
Report). U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, EPA/600/R-20/012, 2020.
94 U.S. EPA. Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) for Particulate Matter (Final Report, 2019). U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, EPA/600/R-19/188, 2019.
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
F. Comparison of Criteria Emissions and Possible Health Benefits
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For this part of the analysis, ERM utilized EPA's COBRA model to estimate the public health
benefits associated with all the policy scenarios. ERM's analysis shows that stricter standards
and increased deployment of clean L/MD vehicles results in greater gains in terms of consumer
savings and avoided public health impacts (such as premature death, hospital admissions and
emergency room visits, respiratory symptoms, and reduced activity and lost workdays). The
policy scenario reflective of our Alternative 1+ recommended approach achieves the most
reductions: nearly an 80% reduction in NOx and a 60% reduction in PM in 2040 compared to
2026 levels. An Alternative 1+ approach is also projected to achieve almost $42 billion in
monetized value of reductions: nearly $8.5 billion more in monetized value than would occur
under EPA's Main Proposal and preferred approach (as shown in Figure V.F-1). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 31-32]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table V.F-1: Comparison of Possible Health Benefitsl 14
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 31]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure V.F-1: Comparison of Possible Health
Benefitsl 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 32]
112 Id. at 12
ERM's analysis incorporates: EPA's assumed changes in tailpipe emission reductions, EPA's
upstream assumptions that rely upon the Integrated Planning Model (IPM) for electricity
generated units, and ERM assumptions on changes from reduced demand on refining of finished
products for diesel (and gasoline) based on the use of Argonne National Laboratory's
Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Technologies (GREET) model.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 32]
The benefits associated with the Alternative 1+ approach are further depicted in Table V.F-1,
which shows the various scenario criteria emissions (NOx and PM) aggregated from 2026-2040
for each of the policy scenarios, as well as possible reduced health incidents, and the monetized
value of these reductions (if realized) compared to EPA's No Action scenario. 113 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 32]
113 ERM's analysis results in slightly lower cumulative reductions of NOx and PM compared with EPA's
net air pollutant impacts for the EPA Main Proposal, Alternative 1, and Alternative 3 policy scenarios
(Tables 9-37, 9-38 and 9-40 of the DRIA). However, despite the difference, Alternative 1+ would
correspond with approximately a 25% increase in benefits relative to the EPA Main Proposal and a similar
increase would be expected under EPA's methodology.
114 ERM, Impacts Report at 12.
1. Comparison of Overall Societal Benefits
The results from ERM's analysis (depicted in Figure V.I-1) show that on a net societal basis-
-inclusive of the costs to fleets as well as air quality benefits, climate benefits, and reduced
utility bills—the greatest benefits are seen with Alternative 1+ at about $125.7 billion through
the 2040 timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 35]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure V.I-1: Comparison of Possible Annual Net
Societal Benefitsl 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 36]
119 Id. at 15.
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This figure depicts net annual societal benefits (which incorporates net incremental fleet cost
savings, climate benefits, air quality benefits, and reduced utility bills). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 36]
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
EPA's technical analysis finds that 15,000 tons of PM2.5 would be reduced in 2055 as a result
of the proposed LDV and MDV standards. EPA estimates the cumulative monetized benefits of
the standards through 2055 to be between $63 and $280 billion (2020 $US) depending on the
selected discount rate.27 Other analyses have also demonstrated the substantial health and air
quality benefits that can be expected from stringent particulate emission standards. For example,
the Manufactures of Emission Controls Association (MECA) conducted a study to model the
benefits of a national 0.5 mg/mi PM standard. The study found that implementation of a
national 0.5 mg/mi PM standard would result in health cost savings ranging from $18 to $163
billion (2020 $US) depending on the pace of electrification and selected discount rate.28
NESCAUM and the OTC urge EPA to finalize the standards as proposed for all three test cycles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 10-11]
27 See EPA, DRIA, EPA-420-D-23-003 (Apr. 14, 2023), https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-
OAR- 2022-0829-0360. As EPA notes in the DRIA, these monetized benefits do not reflect benefits
associated with reducing ambient concentrations of ozone, direct exposure to nitrogen dioxide, or exposure
to mobile source air toxics, nor do they account for improved ecosystem effects or visibility. The estimated
benefits of the proposal would be larger if these unqualified benefits were monetized.
28 MECA, Impacts Analysis of a Revised Federal Light-Duty On-Road Particulate Matter Standard (June
2023), LDV_PM_Standard_Final_Report_06272023.pdf (meca.org).
Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
The air pollutant benefit calculations have serious limitations, including lacking direct
measures of individual lifetime pollution exposures and facing the potential for the confounding
of effects from the omission of unknown, unmeasured, or inadequately-controlled-for mortality
risk factors. With improved pollution controls on internal combustion engines, exposure rates are
much lower than in the past and continue to decline as new vehicles replace older models. This
suggests that EPAs estimated benefits from reduced criteria air pollutants also may be over-
estimated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 4]
The EPA's "benefits" for both Energy Security & Air Pollutant are unchanged in this realistic
analysis because it would require a thorough quantitative investigation. However, even with
these likely overstated benefits staying consistent, the overall cost of the EPA's rule is still
overwhelmingly negative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 4]
Air Pollutant Benefits
The EPA also estimates that their proposed rule could generate between $140 and $280
billion in benefits from reduced criteria air pollutants citing two studies. 52 Like the modeling-
based social cost of carbon, which is not observable, these studies also have serious limitations,
lacking direct measures of individual lifetime pollution exposures and facing the potential for the
confounding of effects from the omission of unknown, unmeasured, or inadequately-controlled-
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for mortality risk factors. With improved pollution controls on internal combustion engines,
exposure rates are much lower than in the past and continue to decline as new vehicles replace
older models. This suggests that EPAs estimated benefits from reduced criteria air pollutants also
may be over-estimated. Even if keeping the EPA's estimate of air pollution benefits untouched,
the overall economic impact of this rule is still overwhelmingly negative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0551, p. 12]
52 Wu et al., X, Braun, D, Schwartz, J, Kioumourtzoglou, M and Dominici, F. 2020. "Evaluating the
impact of long-term exposure to fine particulate matter on mortality among the elderly." Science Advances
6 (29): eaba5692. Pope III et al., CA, Lefler, JS, Ezzati, M, Higbee, JD, Marshall, JD, Kim, S-Y, Bechle,
M, Gilliat, KS, Vernon, SE and Robinson, AL. 2019. "Mortality risk and fine particulate air pollution in a
large, representative cohort of US adults." Environmental Health Perspectives 127 (7): 077007.
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
One commenter stated that the benefits of controlling emissions from light- and medium-duty
vehicles far outweigh the costs. Another commenter provided a benefits analysis of different and
more stringent standards.
Another commenter claimed that the criteria pollutant benefits analysis was flawed,
suggesting that the criteria pollutant benefits of the proposal: (1) are exaggerated; (2) are not
additive to the benefits attributable to emissions reductions accomplished by EPA's other
mobile-source and stationary-source programs for criteria air pollutants ("because of the way
Congress designed the Clean Air Act, structured state implementation plans, and the way EPA
defined emissions limits and nonattainment on a community-by-community basis"); and, (3)
should be estimated using alternative approaches for calculating the benefits of PM2.5 control.
The same commenter suggested that direct PM2.5 emission reductions from new criteria pollutant
controls should not be counted as benefits of the CO2 standards and BEVs. We also received
comment that EPA overestimated PIvfc.s-related benefits due to "the inherent unsupported
assumption that the derived C-R relationships continue to hold fully, well below the ranges of
exposure observations on which those C-R relationships were based." This commenter suggested
benefits from reduced air pollution may be overestimated because exposure rates will be lower in
the future and asserted that the benefit calculations have limitations because they lack direct
measures of individual lifetime exposures and face potential confounding of effects from the
omission of various mortality risk factors.
EPA also received comment that, "The interim IWG estimates are deeply flawed, in that they
... incorporate 'co-benefits' in the form of a reduction in the emissions of other criteria and
hazardous air pollutants already regulated under different provisions of the Clean Air Act."
One commenter claimed that, when applying the BPT approach to monetizing PM-related
health benefits, EPA ignored the fleet turnover benefit that would result from replacing older
ICEVs with new, more efficient, ICEVs.
EPA also received comment suggesting we did not monetize non-fatal illnesses in the
proposal and that EPA should include a discussion of the research showing health impacts at low
levels of air pollution, particularly PM2.5 and ozone.
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Response:
In this RTC section's response, EPA is focusing on addressing comments related to the health
benefits associated with the criteria pollutant impacts of the rule. To the extent that these
commenters raise other issues, those issues are addressed elsewhere in this RTC or in the final
rule's preamble for this action.
EPA notes that, consistent with CAA section 202, in evaluating potential standards we
carefully weighed the statutory factors, including the emissions impacts of the standards, and the
feasibility of the standards (including cost of compliance in light of available lead time). We
monetize benefits of the standards and evaluate other costs in part to enable a comparison of
costs and benefits pursuant to E.O. 12866, but we recognize there are benefits that we are
currently unable to fully quantify. EPA's practice has been to set standards to achieve improved
air quality consistent with CAA section 202, and not to rely on cost-benefit calculations, with
their uncertainties and limitations, as identifying the appropriate standards. Nonetheless, our
conclusion that the estimated benefits exceed the estimated costs of the final program reinforces
our view that the standards are appropriate under section 202(a). More specifically, for this rule
our benefits assessment indicates that the rule has positive net monetized benefits under any of
the alternative discount rates. To the extent that EPA considers the positive monetized net
benefits as supportive of the final standards (regardless of the magnitude of those positive
benefits), net benefits are positive regardless of which stream of PM2.5 health benefits are used;
EPA would still find the emissions reductions, in light of the cost of compliance, available lead
time and other factors, justify adoption of these standards.
After consideration of comments, for the final rule we did not fundamentally alter our
approach to estimating criteria air pollutant benefits from that used in the proposal. However, we
did conduct air quality modeling of the regulatory program's impacts in 2055 and used the
ambient PM2.5 and ozone concentration data as inputs to a full analysis of the health benefits
(including avoided deaths and avoided non-fatal illnesses) attributable to the rule in 2055. This
additional analysis is responsive to comments suggesting EPA include in its analysis ozone-
related benefits and quantified estimates of specific health endpoint incidence. We also estimated
the present and annualized value of costs and benefits using a 2 percent discount rate, in addition
to a 3 and 7 percent discount rate, and we used updated Social Cost of Greenhouse Gas (SC-
GHG) values to monetize climate benefits. Both of these updates are responsive to comments
requesting the EPA to use a lower range of discount rates than those used in the proposal.
Responses to comments related to the SC-GHGs and benefits related to reductions of GHG
emissions can be found in Section 8.4 of the RTC. We expand our response to comments about
the discount rate later in this section.
EPA agrees with the commenter who stated that the benefits of controlling emissions from
light- and medium-duty vehicles far outweigh the costs. Another commenter provided a benefits
analysis of different and more stringent standards. To the extent that the information introduced
by this commenter was intended to advocate for more stringent standards, we refer the reader to
Sections 3.2 and 4 of this RTC document, and Section V of the preamble.
We generally respond to commenters who claimed that the criteria pollutant benefits analysis
was flawed by noting that the benefits analyses of the proposed and final rulemakings follow all
appropriate best practices, and our methods are described and supported, in detail, in the
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preamble and RIA that accompany the final rule. EPA's analysis is consistent with applicable
guidance and best practices for conducting benefit-cost analyses, including OMB Circular A-4
and EPA's Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses. We consider our analysis consistent
with the guidance, methodologically rigorous, and a best estimate of the projected societal
benefits and costs associated with the final program.
The Agency disagrees with the commenter who claimed that the criteria pollutant benefits of
the rule: (1) are exaggerated; (2) are not additive to the benefits attributable to emissions
reductions accomplished by EPA's other mobile-source and stationary-source programs for
criteria air pollutants ("because of the way Congress designed the Clean Air Act, structured state
implementation plans, and the way EPA defined emissions limits and nonattainment on a
community-by-community basis"); and, (3) should be estimated using alternative approaches for
calculating the benefits of PM2.5 control. As noted above, we consider our criteria pollutant
benefits a best and credible estimate of those associated with the rule. The improvements in air
quality related to the rule are incremental to all other rulemakings that are currently "on the
books," and we account for the full suite of already-promulgated rulemakings (for both mobile
and stationary sources) in our baseline ("business as usual") scenario to which we compare the
changes in air quality once the light- and medium-duty standards are in place. These benefits are
also additive to benefits achieved by other regulations, since they will achieve unique emissions
reductions attributed specifically to this rulemaking. Furthermore, the regulatory authority under
which we promulgate mobile source regulations is distinct from, and independent of, the
NAAQS standard-setting process. Regardless of an area's attainment/nonattainment
determination status, the light- and medium-duty vehicle standards will apply nationally, and the
health benefits associated with the standards will accrue to those who experience reductions in
pollution exposure. Any consideration of how these standards might affect decisions related to
the NAAQS attainment/nonattainment process is beyond the scope of this rulemaking, and we
therefore also reject the suggestion that PM benefits be expressed as compliance-cost savings
associated with theoretical (and unsupported) relaxation of stationary source regulations in the
future. We further note that state agencies have expressed the view in comments that the
emissions reductions of this rule are essential to enabling states to attain and maintain the
NAAQS, particularly in light of the CAA's constraints on state regulation of mobile sources.
See, e.g., EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 2-3. Thus, we disagree that these reductions
should be treated as displacing other reductions.
The same commenter suggested that direct PM2.5 emission reductions from new criteria
pollutant controls should not be counted as benefits of the CO2 standards and BEVs. We respond
that we do not double count PM2.5 reductions associated with the standards. As discussed above,
we are not taking credit for the same PM2.5 reductions from the criteria pollutant controls and the
GHG standards; the PM reductions from both programs are incremental to each other and
additive. We therefore consider it appropriate to assess the benefits of the entire program.
In response to the comment mentioning EPA's monetization of "co-benefits" (benefits related
to pollutants other than GHGs such as criteria pollutant benefits), we note that benefits from
criteria pollutant reductions are directly related to the criteria pollutant standards being finalized
and are a co-controlled pollutant related to the GHG standards. As noted above, the emissions
benefits attributable to the GHG and criteria pollutant standards are additive and are not double
counted, and their inclusion in the benefit-cost analysis is consistent with OMB Circular A-4
guidance, which states that Agencies should attempt to monetize all of the benefits attributable to
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a rulemaking in its regulatory impact analyses. Furthermore, we reject the commenter's assertion
that somehow the IWG SC-GHG estimates are flawed because they "incorporate 'co-benefits' in
the form of a reduction in the emissions of other criteria and hazardous air pollutants already
regulated under different provisions of the Clean Air Act." If we interpret this comment to mean
that pollution reduction benefits associated with the standards are inflated because they include
criteria pollutant benefits that might already be controlled by other regulations, such as the PM
NAAQS (PM2.5 is the only monetized criteria pollutant benefit in the benefit-cost analysis of the
standards; we did not monetize HAP pollutant benefits), this is incorrect. The NAAQS and their
associated RIAs illustrate, but do not predict, the benefits and costs of possible emissions control
strategies to attain a revised NAAQS; these costs and benefits are illustrative and cannot be
added to, nor are they a substitute for, the costs and benefits of policies that prescribe specific
emission control measures, such as those associated with the specific mobile source emissions
control measures reflected in the benefit-cost analysis of the proposed and final standards.
We respond to comments about fleet turnover in Section 12.1.3 of this RTC document and to
the issue of ICE vehicle "backsliding" in Section 12.3 of this document. We respond to the
comment regarding criteria pollutants attributable to the shift from ICEs to BEVs in the light-
duty sector in Section 19.2 of this RTC document.
In response to the commenter who suggested we did not monetize non-fatal illnesses in the
proposal, this is incorrect. For the analysis of both the proposed and final standards, we use a
reduced-form "benefit-per-ton" (BPT) approach to estimate the monetized PM2.5-related health
benefits of the final standards. As described in RIA Chapter 6.5, the BPT approach monetizes
avoided premature deaths and illnesses that are expected to occur as a result of reductions in
directly-emitted PM2.5 and PM2.5 precursors attributable to the standards. The commenter was
correct in noting that the BPT approach does not monetize ozone (and other air pollutant)
benefits, nor does the BPT approach allow us to report on individual health endpoint incidence.
The estimated benefits of the standards would be larger if the BPT approach were able to
estimate those omitted health benefits. However, as mentioned earlier in this response, EPA
conducted full-scale photochemical air quality modeling of the final rule's impacts in 2055.
Using the ambient PM2.5 and ozone concentration data, we conducted a full benefits analysis that
quantifies and monetizes the PM2.5- and ozone-related benefits attributable to the rule in 2055.
This analysis complements the BPT approach, which we use to monetize PM2.5-related benefits
in the benefit-cost analysis. See RIA Chapter 7 for more information about the air quality
modeling and health benefits analyses.
The same commenter also suggested that EPA include a discussion of the research showing
health impacts at low levels of air pollution, particularly PM2.5 and ozone, and cited EPA's PM
and ozone IS As as evidence. Drawing from the same robust body of literature, we agree that
there are health impacts at low levels of air pollution and that there is no evidence of a threshold
below which exposure to PM2.5 and ozone yields no health response. In our discussion of criteria
pollutant benefits in both the preamble and RIA for this rulemaking, we refer to the health
benefits Technical Support Document (Benefits TSD) that accompanied the 2023 PM NAAQS
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Proposal, which details the approach used to estimate PM2.5- and ozone-related benefits.382 In
that TSD, we summarize some of this research and how it applies to the benefits analysis.
Regarding the comment that EPA has overestimated PIvfc.s-related benefits due to "the
inherent unsupported assumption that the derived C-R relationships continue to hold fully, well
below the ranges of exposure observations on which those C-R relationships were based," we
reject this premise. As detailed in the 2019 PM ISA and previous assessments in support of the
PM NAAQS, EPA's review of the science has consistently found no evidence of a threshold
below which exposure to PM2.5 yields no health response. Specifically, the 2019 PM ISA found
that "extensive analyses across health effects continues to support a linear, no-threshold
concentration-response (C-R) relationship." This conclusion in the 2019 PM ISA is supported by
the more recent evaluation of the health effects evidence detailed in the recently released
Supplement to the PM ISA which found "continued evidence of a linear, no-threshold
concentration-response (C-R) relationship."
As noted above, based on the evidence and lack of nonlinear relationships between long-term
PM2.5 exposure and health impacts, we assume a linear, no-threshold relationship and find that
health impacts are associated with exposures from low levels of air pollution. The commenter
who suggests benefits from reduced air pollution may be overestimated because exposure rates
will be lower in the future provides no evidence to support this assertion, which is contrary to the
weight of evidence in the literature that supports such impacts. The commenter also asserted that
the benefit calculations have limitations because they lack direct measures of individual lifetime
exposures and face potential confounding of effects from the omission of various mortality risk
factors. EPA agrees that there are uncertainties associated with the estimation and assignment of
exposure in epidemiological studies, and that confounding is also a potential source of
uncertainty, both of which are discussed in the Benefits TSD cited above. However, we disagree
that the potential uncertainty is a limitation. We follow a systematic approach to identifying the
studies and risk estimates most appropriate to inform a PM2.5 and ozone health benefits analysis
for an RIA, and we take into consideration a number of minimum and preferred study attributes
that include whether specified models from individual studies are single- or multi-pollutant,
among many other factors.383 Clearly specifying criteria for identifying such studies helps ensure
EPA transparently specifies its scientific judgement. These criteria are similar to those applied in
previous EPA RIAs with the primary goal of identifying risk estimates that best characterize risk
from PM2.5 and ozone exposure among the total population located throughout the U.S.
9 - Environmental justice
382U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2023. Estimating PM25- and Ozone-Attributable Health
Benefits. Technical Support Document (TSD) for the PM NAAQS Reconsideration Proposal RIA. EPA-HQ-OAR-
2019-0587.
383 Such attributes include estimated risks of population exposure to one or more pollutants across a variety of
geographic locations, age groups, population attributes, methods for estimating exposure, PM2 5 concentrations, time
periods, study sizes, follow-up durations, as well as other attributes. See the following for full details regarding
EPA's study selection criteria and benefits analysis methods: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA).
2023. Estimating PM2 5- and Ozone-Attributable Health Benefits. Technical Support Document (TSD) for the PM
NAAQS Reconsideration Proposal RIA. EPA-HQ-OAR-2019-0587.
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Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
7. Environmental Justice Considerations
We agree with EPA that a reduction in heavy aromatics in gasoline will produce beneficial
reductions in PM emissions that will further national environmental justice goals. EPA notes in
the NPRM that people living and working near roadways will benefit from fuel improvements
that reduce PM formation, that those individuals are more likely to be people of color and/or
have a low socioeconomic status (SES), and that lower-SES neighborhoods are likely to have
more vehicles with higher emissions than higher-SES neighborhoods.442 A fuel-based
regulation to reduce PM emissions would do so for all vehicles in the on-road fleet. Importantly,
the greatest absolute emissions reductions will occur in and benefit lower-SES communities, as
those communities are more likely to have the highest-emitting vehicles, i.e., a higher proportion
of older vehicles with the highest emissions levels (due to their vehicle's age). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 270-271]
442 NPRM at 29393
EPA also uses this same rationale (proximity of low-SES communities to roadways) in
support of a proposed lower tailpipe PM emissions limit, but the distribution of ages of vehicles
on roadways is not discussed. The emissions reductions from the proposed tailpipe emissions
rule will only reduce emissions for the newest vehicles, which in the near-term benefits higher-
SES communities more than lower-SES communities. Moreover, these new vehicles will tend to
replace vehicles of more recent vintage that already adhere to the newest, most stringent PM
emissions limits. A fuel-based regulation targets all vehicles and is the only approach that
immediately reduces emissions from older, higher-emitting vehicles more often found in low-
SES communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 270-271]
Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
The U.S. needs the strongest vehicle standards
The United States will need to greatly reduce light-duty vehicle (LDV) greenhouse gas
emissions if it is to have any chance of meeting the Biden Administration's economy-wide
emissions reduction goal of 50% by 2030 and stave off the worst impacts of climate change.
Transportation is now the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States and the
light-duty sector makes up 58% of those emissions. 1 Reducing carbon emissions is critical to
tackling climate change but increasing LDV efficiency will also have significant benefits to air
quality and will reduce driver fueling costs. Vehicles are a significant contributor to local air
pollution and the associated health impacts, leading to increased rates of asthma, increased risk
of heart attacks, strokes, and lung cancer.2 These impacts are particularly bad in low-income
communities and communities of color, which bear a disproportionate air pollution burden.3
Greater efficiency can also provide significant cost savings for drivers when they refuel their
vehicles. Low-income households are especially burdened by fueling costs, paying three times
more than their higher-income counterparts on gasoline, as a percent of their total income.4
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 1-2]
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1 https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/fast-facts-transportation-greenhouse-gas-emissions
2 https://www.consumerreports.org/emissions/how-your-car-can-make-the-air-cleaner/
3 https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/who-is-at-risk/disparities
4 https://www.aceee.org/white-paper/2021/05/understanding-transportation-energy-burdens
Organization: American Lung Association (ALA) et al.
The American Lung Association's most recent "State of the Air" report noted that
approximately 120 million Americans live in communities impacted by unhealthy levels of
ozone and/or particle pollution. 1 Exposure to air pollution can contribute to asthma attacks, heart
attacks and stroke, lung cancer, low birthweight and premature birth, premature death and other
health risks. Traffic pollution specifically is associated with premature death due to
cardiovascular disease, lung cancer death, asthma onset in children and adults and other negative
outcomes.2 The burdens of air pollution are not equally shared: people of color make up the
majority of those living in the communities with unhealthy air and a person of color in the
United States is 3.7 times more likely to live in a community with the worst air pollution in the
nation than a white person. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0745, p. 1]
1 American Lung Association. State of the Air 2023. April 2023. www.lung.org/sota
2 Health Effects Institute. "Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Selected Health Effects of Long-Term
Exposure to Traffic-Related Air Pollution." Special Report 23: 2022.
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Introduction
Reducing emissions from motor vehicles is urgently needed to combat climate change and
reduce exposure to harmful air pollution, especially in the nation's most vulnerable communities.
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) commends the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (U.S. EPA) for proposing to adopt multi-pollutant emissions standards for the 2027 and
later model years (MY) for light- and medium-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780,
p. 7]
The science could not be clearer. We must act now to reduce pollution to stabilize the climate
and avoid the most serious consequences of climate change. In California and many other states,
the changing climate is already increasing the frequency and severity of drought, wildfires, and
extreme weather events like heat waves, jeopardizing public health and economic stability. We
likewise must continue to urgently pursue efforts to improve air quality and reduce toxic
emissions and reduce the disparate impacts that have persisted for decades. In California and
across the U.S., many low-income communities and communities of color are exposed to
disproportionate levels of pollution from on-road vehicle emissions, which contributes to
respiratory illness, cardiovascular disease, cancer, and premature death. These impacts are often
compounded by the congregation of nearby industrial sources, including upstream, midstream,
and downstream fuel production sources. Furthermore, many of these same communities are
especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change, as the most severe harms from climate
change fall disproportionately on these underserved communities who are least able to prepare
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for and recover from associated impacts. U.S. EPA's proposed standards are urgently needed to
help address these issues. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 7]
Despite significant progress reducing air pollution, California experiences some of the
nation's poorest air quality, with more than 21 million Californians living in areas that exceed
federal ozone standards. 3 Within these areas, there are many low-income and disadvantaged
communities that are exposed to not only ozone, but also to particulate and toxic pollutant levels
that are significantly higher than applicable federal standards and which have immediate and
detrimental health effects. With new research demonstrating adverse health impacts even below
NAAQS levels, it remains critically important to continue to reduce emissions wherever feasible.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 8]
3 California Air Resources Board (CARB). 2022 State Strategy for the State Implementation Plan. October
2021. https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/2022-08/2022_State_SIP_Strategy.pdf
4 CARB. 2022 Scoping Plan for Achieving Carbon Neutrality. December 2022.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/2022-sp.pdf.
The above impacts especially apply to tribal communities. Due to land dispossession and
forced migration, tribal communities are more exposed to extreme heat and more likely to rely
on local water sources that are less resilient to drought and more contaminated.69 Beyond those
impacts, tribal communities also suffer cultural harms from the decimation or harm to local
ecosystems and species of particular meaning to cultural practices.70 These cultural resources
have intrinsic value, and they are also critical to tribal community identity and group cohesion,
which translates into direct health benefits.71 Moreover, degradation of these cultural resources
threatens traditional ecological knowledge, such as particularized understanding of local
ecosystems, agriculture, and sustainable practices, that can help limit the impacts of climate
change.72 Tribal communities with sovereign land holdings are also more vulnerable to climate
impacts because they are unable to relocate.73 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 10-11]
69 Justin Farnell, et al., Effects of land dispossession and forced migration on Indigenous peoples in North
America, Science (2021), at 374; USGCRP Study, supra n. 61, at 254.
70 Ron Goode et al., California Energy Commission, California's Fourth Climate Change Assessment:
Summary Report from Tribal and Indigenous Communities within California (2018), at 19, available at
https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-ll/Statewide_Reports-SUM-CCCA4-2018-
010_TribalCommunitySummary_ADA.pdf.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 13-16;
73 Farnell et al., supra n. 69.
Furthermore, environmental justice communities, including tribal communities, are
environmentally overburdened due to greater existing pollution exposure.74 This disadvantage
manifests in higher rates of chronic disease, premature death, and other adverse public health
outcomes.75 Compounding these disparities, residents of environmental justice communities
also have less access to health care—they are less likely to have health insurance and less likely
to be able to afford necessary tests and procedures, and health care facilities are poorly staffed
and equipped.76 Consequently, residents of environmental justice communities are less able to
withstand climate impacts that further damage their health, such as increased local smog
conditions.77 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 10-11]
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74 California Climate Justice Report, supra n.61, at 40-41.
75 Id.; USGCRP Study, supra n. 61, at 253.
76 Samantha Artiga et al., Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Coverage by Race and Ethnicity, 2010-2021
(2022), available at https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/health-coverage-by-
race-and-ethnicity/; Benjamin Sommers, et al., Beyond Health Insurance: Remaining Disparities in US
Health Care in the Post-ACA Era, 95 THE MILBANK QUARTERLY 1 (2017).
77 California Climate Justice Report, supra n.61, at 40-43.
In addition to being more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, environmental justice
communities endure structural disadvantages that blunt their ability to adapt to a changing
climate. Environmental justice communities have less access to financial resources, such as
income and wealth, that are critical to climate resilience.78 More financial resources equate to
more mobility, more ability to spend (on utilities, health care, home adaptation, etc.) to reduce
climate harms, and more safeguards (such as insurance) in the event of extreme climate
events.79 Environmental justice communities have higher rates of limited English proficiency,
which can reduce access to climate resilience programs and increase vulnerability in extreme
climate events due to an inability to understand public health information.80 Social capital in the
political process is critical to ensure environmental justice communities receive resources to
increase climate resilience and to prevent further entrenching existing inequities. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 10-11]
78 Id. at 39.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 43; USGCRP Study, supra n.61, at 106.
Environmental Health Equity and Environmental Justice
Scientific Evidence on Environmental Health Equity
CARB commends U.S. EPA for its thorough review of the environmental justice literature on
the effects of GHG and criteria pollutants and air toxics across different populations. The
documentation for the proposed rule highlights the disproportionate climate impacts and
exposure to traffic-related air pollution (TRAP) among vulnerable groups, such as people of
color, low-income populations, children, and outdoor workers. However, this analysis could be
strengthened by additional discussions on cumulative impacts and climate change, health co-
benefits of climate actions, and additional research on disproportionate exposure to TRAP.
Inclusion of these topics would enhance the description of the evidence base for persistent health
disparities affecting marginalized populations, which further illustrates why the proposed
standards are so urgently needed to advance and attain health equity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, p. 54]
Disproportionate impact of exposure to Traffic-Related Air Pollution (TRAP)
While U.S. EPA conducted an extensive literature review on disparities in exposure to TRAP
across U.S. populations, CARB has identified several national studies and a series of California
studies that enrich the existing literature already documented by U.S. EPA for the proposed
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 56-57]
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A recent nationwide study reported that people of color experience disproportionate exposures
to PM2.5. 103 The study found that the systemic PM2.5 exposure disparity experienced by
people of color is related to emission sources from almost all major emission categories. The
largest sources of the disparities are industry, light-duty gasoline vehicles, construction, and
heavy-duty diesel vehicles. Moreover, the disproportionate exposures have been seen in
individual U.S. states, in individual urban and rural areas, across incomes, and across exposure
levels. Another national study showed that zip codes with more White and Native American
populations have lower average PM2.5 levels than ZIP codes with more Black, Asian, and
Hispanic or Latino populations. 104 The disparities in PM2.5 exposure is also shown in zip
codes with low-income populations compared to zip codes with high-income populations.
Moreover, people of color in the U.S. not only face longer-term PM2.5 exposure but also short-
term PM2.5 exposure (e.g., more days with PM2.5 concentrations above the thresholds) than
non-Hispanic Whites. 105 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 56-57]
103 Tessum CW, PaolellaDA, Chambliss SE, Apte JS, Hill JD, Marshall JD. PM2.5 polluters
disproportionately and systemically affect people of color in the United States. Sci Adv. 2021 Apr
28;7(18):eabf4491.
104 Jbaily A, Zhou X, Liu J, Lee TH, Kamareddine L, Verguet S, Dominici F. Air pollution exposure
disparities across US population and income groups. Nature. 2022 Jan;601(7892):228-233.
105 Collins TW, Grineski SE. Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Short-Term PM2.5 Air Pollution Exposures in
the United States. Environ Health Perspect. 2022 Aug;130(8):87701.
Environmental pollutants affect children more than adults, and children in low-income and
urban areas near industrial, rail, and traffic sources face particularly high health risks. Results
from CARB's groundbreaking, long-term children's health study in Southern California
demonstrated that particle pollution may significantly reduce lung function growth in children
106, 107, 108 and indicates these effects are likely permanent. 109 Additionally, increased
exposure to vehicular traffic pollution was associated with adverse childhood health impacts,
including slower lung development, 110 increased symptoms and medication use in asthmatic
children, 111, 112 and increases in the development of asthma in children. 113 Compared with
non-Hispanic White children, the cohort's Hispanic White children, especially those with more
Native American ancestry, tended to live closer to a freeway or a major nonfreeway road.
Furthermore, a higher percentage of asthma was observed among the Hispanic White children
with more than 50 percent Native American ancestry who lived near a major nonfreeway road
compared to those who lived farther away. 114 CARB is submitting these studies to U.S. EPA to
further demonstrate the increased impacts on vulnerable populations from TRAP, pointing to the
urgent need to adopt more stringent emission standards to protect these groups. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, pp. 56-57]
106 Peters JM, Avol E, Gauderman WJ, Linn WS, Navidi W, London SJ, Margolis H, Rappaport E, Vora
H, Gong H Jr, Thomas DC. A study of twelve Southern California communities with differing levels and
types of air pollution. II. Effects on pulmonary function. Am J Respir Crit Care Med. 1999
Mar;159(3):768-75.
107 Avol EL, Gauderman WJ, Tan SM, London SJ, Peters JM. Respiratory effects of relocating to areas of
differing air pollution levels. Am J Respir Crit Care Med. 2001 Dec l;164(ll):2067-72.
108 Gauderman WJ, Gilliland GF, Vora H, Avol E, Stram D, McConnell R, Thomas D, Lurmann F,
Margolis HG, Rappaport EB, Berhane K, Peters JM. Association between air pollution and lung function
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growth in southern California children: results from a second cohort. Am J Respir Crit Care Med. 2002 Jul
l;166(l):76-84.
109 Gauderman WJ, Avol E, Gilliland F, Vora H, Thomas D, Berhane K, McConnell R, Kuenzli N,
Lurmann F, Rappaport E, Margolis H, Bates D, Peters J. The effect of air pollution on lung development
from 10 to 18 years of age. N Engl J Med. 2004 Sep 9;351(11): 1057-67.
110 Gauderman WJ, Vora H, McConnell R, Berhane K, Gilliland F, Thomas D, Lurmann F, Avol E,
Kunzli N, Jerrett M, Peters J. Effect of exposure to traffic on lung development from 10 to 18 years of age:
a cohort study. Lancet. 2007 Feb 17;369(9561):571-7.
111 Gauderman WJ, Avol E, Lurmann F, Kuenzli N, Gilliland F, Peters J, McConnell R. Childhood asthma
and exposure to traffic and nitrogen dioxide. Epidemiology. 2005 Nov;16(6):737-43.
112 See McConnell et al. 2006
113 See McConnell et al. 2010
114 Weaver GM, Gauderman WJ. Traffic-Related Pollutants: Exposure and Health Effects Among
Hispanic Children. Am J Epidemiol. 2018 Jan l;187(l):45-52.
Disproportionate Exposure to Air Pollution at the Community Scale
In addition to research studies documenting disparate health impacts from exposure to air
pollution, CARB illustrates these disproportionate impacts for one California community. This
example points to the urgent need to address these emission sources for communities that face
similar exposures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 57-59]
The benefits of U.S. EPA's proposal for on-road vehicles are especially critical from a
community perspective in disadvantaged communities along heavily traveled roads. In these
communities, the pollution and public health impacts from on-road vehicle emissions are
especially significant and greater than in other communities. In California, East Los Angles,
Boyle Heights, and West Commerce is one such community. Selected under CARB's
Community Air Protection Program to develop a community air monitoring plan and a
community emissions reduction program, this community has more than 30 miles of freeways
within its approximately 26 square mile emissions study boundary area (Figure 4). 115
Emissions from on-road vehicles are a significant contributor to the community's air pollution
exposure, and its population shows a greater degree of health impacts from air pollution. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 57-59]
The community has a high cumulative air pollution exposure burden, a significant number of
sensitive receptors, and includes census tracts that have been designated as disadvantaged
communities by California law. 116 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 57-59]
115 For more information on this community and CARB's Community Air Protection Program, see:
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/community-air-protection-program/communities/east-los-
angeles- boyle-heights-west.
116 Disadvantaged community designations per Senate Bill 535 (De Leon, Chapter 830, Statutes of 2012).
[See original for graphic titled "Figure 4. East LA/Boyle Heights/West Commerce
Community Boundary"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 57-59]
Based on the 2019 American Community Survey (ACS) data from the Census Bureau, 117
more than 227,000 people live within the East LA/Boyle Heights/West Commerce community.
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Major freeways bisecting the community include Highways 101 and 60, and Interstates 5, 10,
and 710, resulting in four freeway junctions and increased pollution exposures for the
populations living and working in this community as compared to Los Angeles County as a
whole. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 57-59]
117 U.S. Census Bureau, 2015-2019 American Community Survey 5-year Estimates.
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/
Approximately 95 percent of the population in this community is Latino, nearly 14 percent are
children under the age of 10 years, and 11 percent of the population is elderly (over the age of 65
years). These population characteristics are important indicators of disparities in existing
pollution burden, exposure to air pollution, and health vulnerabilities—especially for children
and the elderly. 118 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 57-59]
118 The metrics presented here are the same as the data presented in the 2019 Community Emissions
Reduction Plan for East Los Angeles, Boyle Heights, West Commerce, but have been updated to include
the latest Census ACS 5-year estimates (2015-2019) for the community boundary. South Coast Air Quality
Management District, Assembly Bill (AB) 617 Community Air Initiatives, Community Emissions
Reduction Plan for East Los Angeles, Boyle Heights, West Commerce, September 2019,
http://www.aqmd.gov/docs/default-source/ab-617-ab- 134/steering-committees/east-la/cerp/carb-
submittal/final-cerp.pdf?sfvrsn=8
Certain groups of the general population are more vulnerable to air pollution by virtue of their
age and health, including children, elderly, pregnant women, and health compromised
individuals. Places where these sensitive populations gather, called sensitive receptor locations,
can include schools, day-care providers, hospitals, nursing homes, and senior care facilities.
There are numerous sensitive receptor locations in the East LA/Boyle Heights/West Commerce
community, including 80 schools, 79 day-care providers, and 36 health care facilities including
hospitals, nursing homes and dialysis clinics (Figure 5). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp.
57-59]
[See original for graphic titled "Figure 5. Sensitive Receptors in East LA/Boyle Heights/West
Commerce Community"] 119 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 57-59]
119 The metrics presented here are the same as the data presented in the 2019 Community Emissions
Reduction Plan for East Los Angeles, Boyle Heights, West Commerce, but have been updated to include
the latest Census ACS 5-year estimates (2015-2019) for the community boundary. South Coast Air Quality
Management District, Assembly Bill (AB) 617 Community Air Initiatives, Community Emissions
Reduction Plan for East Los Angeles, Boyle Heights, West Commerce, September 2019,
http://www.aqmd.gov/docs/default-source/ab-617-ab- 134/steering-committees/east-la/cerp/carb-
submittal/final-cerp.pdf?sfvrsn=8
CalEnviroScreen 4.0 is a screening tool developed by the California Office of Environmental
Health Hazard Assessment to help identify California communities that are disproportionately
burdened by multiple sources of pollution and socioeconomic indicators. Approximately 95
percent of the census tracts in this community are in the top 25 percent (75-100th percentile) of
the CalEnviroScreen 4.0 120 (CES) scores within the State. The maximum overall CES score for
any census tract in the community is the 99th percentile, which means that people living in that
census tract are in the top 1 percent of the most impacted census tracts in the State. Most of the
census tracts in this community are considered disadvantaged under California law. 121 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 57-59]
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120 The Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) released the California
Communities Environmental Health Screening Tool: CalEnviroScreen 4.0 in October 2021.
https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/calenviroscreen/report/calenviroscreen40reportf2021.pdf
121 Disadvantaged community designations per Senate Bill (SB) 535 (De Leon, Chapter 830, Statutes of
2012).
Table 4 and Table 5 present the number of census tracts in the community that are in the top
25 percent (75-100th percentile) of impacted tracts in the State, as well as the maximum
percentile for exposure (e.g., ozone, PM2.5, diesel PM, traffic impacts), health status (asthma,
cardiovascular disease, low birth weight), and socio-economic (education, linguistic isolation,
poverty, unemployment, and housing burden) indicators for the census tracts in this community.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 57-59]
Table 4. CalEnviroScreen (CES) 4.0 Overall Score in the East LA/Boyle Heights/West
Commerce Community [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
CES 4.0 Overall Score: CES Score
Number of Census Tracts with Highest CES Scores (Top 25%, 75-100th Percentile): 51
Percent of Census Tracts with Highest CES Scores (Top 25%, 75-100th Percentile) 122: 91%
Maximum Percentile in Community: 99.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
122 The percentages for the overall CES 4.0 score represent the number of census tracts in this community
that are considered "disadvantaged" per SB 535 (75th percentile or top 25% of all census tracts in the State)
[See original for table titled "Table 5. CalEnviroScreen (CES) 4.0 Scores for Key Exposure,
Health, and Socio-Economic Indicators in the East LA/Boyle Heights/West Commerce
Community"] 123 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
123 The percentages for the individual CES 4.0 metrics present the number of census tracts in the
community that are in the top 25 percent of census tracts for a given indicator.
Figure 6 compares the average scores for exposure (e.g., ozone, PM2.5 concentrations, diesel
PM emissions, traffic impacts), health status (asthma, cardiovascular disease, low birth weight),
and socio-economic (education, linguistic isolation, poverty, unemployment, and housing
burden) indicators in the community against statewide averages—the community scores for these
key indicators are generally higher compared to the statewide averages. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
[See original for graph titled "Figure 6. CalEnviroScreen 4.0 Scores for Key Indicators in the
East LA/Boyle Heights/West Commerce Community Relative to Statewide Averages"] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
The indicators discussed above also explain the disparate effects of air pollution faced by
other communities in California, which extends to numerous other communities across the
nation. Figure 7 presents the average scores for PM2.5 concentrations and diesel PM emissions
relative to statewide averages for a few communities across the State; vehicle emissions
contribute predominantly to the particulate matter and diesel PM impacts in these communities.
The chart includes asthma-related emergency room visits and linguistic isolation (i.e., limited
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English speaking) as proxies for demographic and socio-economic disadvantages faced by these
communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
[See original for graph titled "Figure 7. CalEnviroScreen 4.0 Scores for PM2.5 Concentration,
Diesel PM Emissions, and Socio-economic Indicators in California Communities"] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
Many California communities experience significantly higher levels of both regional and
near-source air pollution, and the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of these
communities exacerbate their susceptibility and vulnerability to the adverse effects of air
pollution. A 2019 CARB research study revealed on-road vehicles and industrial activity to be
the top two sources of exposure in California, each contributing to 24 percent of the total PM2.5
exposure, and disproportionately impacting non-white and low-income populations. 124 Existing
scientific literature conclusively links air pollution to adverse health outcomes, including pre-
mature mortality, and the disproportionate pollution and health burden on poor and socially
disadvantaged communities. OEHHA's CES 4.0 report provides an exhaustive review of existing
literature connecting each of the indicators used in the CES method to pollution burden and
population sensitivities. 125 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
124 Apte J. et al (2019). A Method to Prioritize Sources for Reducing High PM2.5 Exposures in
Environmental Justice Communities in California. CARB Research Contract Number 17RD006.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/classic//research/apr/past/17rd006.pdf
125 OEHHA CES 4.0 Report. October 2021. pp. 29-197.
https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/calenviroscreen/report/calenviroscreen40reportf2021.pdf
The East LA, Boyle Heights, West Commerce community is just one example of many such
communities across the nation that bear the consequences of near-roadway emissions, in addition
to impacts from other sources of air pollution in their neighborhoods. For these communities,
reducing emissions from on-road vehicles is a priority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-
64]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
Strong emissions standards are necessary now to stave off the worst impacts of human-
induced climate change and to confront inequitably distributed threats to public health and the
environment from climate change as well as other forms of pollution. From extreme heat to
wildfires to drought, our States and Cities are already experiencing the devastating impacts of
climate change, which will continue to mount and compound with rising concentrations of GHGs
in the atmosphere. Moreover, vehicle emissions of oxides of nitrogen (NOx), particulate matter
(PM), and other criteria pollutants continue to endanger the health and welfare of our
residents. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 1]
4. Environmental Justice Communities Disproportionately Bear the Burden of Climate
Change Impacts
Climate change's impacts will continue to disproportionately fall on environmental justice
communities.55 Environmental justice communities experience more severe climate impacts and
are more vulnerable as the climate crisis worsens. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 8-10]
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55 "Environmental justice" is defined by EPA as the "fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all
people regardless of race, color, national origin or income with respect to development, implementation,
and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies." EPA, EJ 2020 Action Agenda: The U.S.
EPA's Environmental Justice Strategic Plan for 2016-2020, EPA-300-B-1-6004, at 1 (Oct. 2016). For the
purpose of this comment, the term "environmental justice community" refers to a community of color or
community experiencing high rates of poverty that, due to past and/or current unfair and inequitable
treatment, is overburdened by environmental pollution, and the accompanying harms and risks from
exposure to that pollution because of past or current unfair treatment.
Severe climate harms are already a reality for many environmental justice communities.
Globally, the last nine years have been the nine hottest on record, and that trend is expected to
continue.56 Members of environmental justice communities tend to work in occupations with
increased exposure to extreme heat, such as the agricultural, construction, and delivery
industries.57 Farmworkers die of heat-related causes at 20 times the rate of the rest of the U.S.
civilian workforce. 58 Since 2005, the first year California began tracking the number of heat-
related fatalities, 36% of California's heat-related worker deaths have been of farm workers. 5 9
Similarly, although construction workers comprise only 6% of the national workforce, they
account for 36% of heat-related deaths.60 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 8-10]
56 NASA, NASA Says 2022 Fifth Warmest Year on Record, Warming Trend Continues, supra n. 3;
Masson-Delmotte et al., supra n. 6, at 10.
57 See, e.g., Juley Fulcher, Boiling Point: OSHA Must Act Immediately to Protect Workers From Deadly
Temperatures, Public Citizen (Jun. 28, 2022), available at https://www.citizen.org/article/boiling-point/;
Union of Concerned Scientists, Too Hot to Work: Assessing the Threats Climate Change Poses to Outdoor
Workers (2021), at 3, available at https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/Too-Hot-to-Work_9-
7.pdf; Ariel Wittenberg, OSHA Targets Heat Threats Heightened by Climate Change, E&E News (Oct. 26,
2021), available at https://www.eenews.net/articles/osha-targets-heaththreats-heightened-by-climate-
change/.
58 See Union of Concerned Scientists, Farmworkers at Risk: The Growing Dangers of Pesticides and Heat
(2019) at 4, available at https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-12/farmworkers-at-risk-report-
2019-web.pdf (citing Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Heat-Related Deaths Among Crop
Workers—United States, 1992-2006, available at
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5724al.htm (last updated June 19, 2008)).
59 Teniope Adewumi-Gunn & Juanita Constible, Natural Resources Defense Council, Feeling the Heat:
How California's Workplace Heat Standards Can Inform Stronger Protections Nationwide (2022),
available at https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/feeling-heat-ca-workplace-heat-standards-report.pdf.
60 Xiuwen Sue Dong et al., Heat-Related Deaths Among Construction Workers in the United States, 62
AM. J. INDUS. MED. (2019), at 1047-57.
At home, environmental justice communities suffer disproportionate impacts from extreme
heat because they are more likely to lack air conditioning, tree canopy, and greenspace.
Environmental justice communities have less access to air conditioning to cool down, and are
less able to pay the utility bills required to run air conditioning units or fans.61 In urbanized
environments, pavement, cement, and other non-vegetated areas contribute to the heat island
effect, in which built environments retain heat, causing daytime temperatures to be from 1 °F to
6 °F hotter than suburban and rural areas and nighttime temperatures to be as much as 22 °F
hotter.62 The heat island effect is inequitably distributed—it is most extreme in lower-income
communities and communities of color.63 Contributing to this effect is the lack of tree canopy
and greenspace in environmental justice communities, often due to lower historical and ongoing
investment. Indeed, tree canopy and greenspace is highly correlated with historical redlining
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practices, in which federal housing policy directed investment away from lower-income
communities, and especially communities of color, characterized as "risky" for loan servicing.64
Moreover, an EPA report found that individuals with lower incomes and individuals of color are
respectively 11% to 16% and 8% to 14% more likely to live in areas with the highest projected
increases in premature mortality from extreme heat.65 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 8-
10]
61 Michelle Roos et al., California Energy Commission, California's Fourth Climate Change Assessment:
Climate Justice Report, (2018), at 39-40, 45, available at https://resourceslegacyfund.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/Climate-Justice-Report-4CCCA-v.4-00455673xAlC15.pdf ("California Climate
Justice Report"); Allison Crimmins, et al., The Impacts of Climate Change on Human Health in the United
States: A Scientific Assessment, U.S. Global Change Research Program (2016), at 252, available at
https://health2016.globalchange.gov/low/ClimateHealth2016_FullReport_small.pdf ("USGCRP Study").
62 See EPA, Heat Island Effect, available at https://www.epa.gov/heatislands (last updated May 1, 2023);
California Environmental Protection Agency, Understanding the Urban Heat Island Index, available at
https://calepa.ca.gov/climate/urban-heat-island-index-for-california/understanding-the-urban-heat-island-
index/ (last visited May 24, 2023).
63 EPA, Heat Islands and Equity, available at https://www.epa.gov/heatislands/heat-islands-and-equity
(last updated Dec. 12, 2022); USGCRP Study, supra n. 61, at 252.
64 Dexter Locke et al., Residential Housing Segregation and Urban Tree Canopy in 37 US Cities, 1 NPJ
URBAN SU STAIN ABILITY 15 (2020), at 3-4; Ian Leahy & Yaiyna Serkez, Since When Have Trees
Existed Only for Rich Americans?, The New York Times (Jul. 4, 2021), available at
https://www.nytimes.eom/interactive/2021/06/30/opinion/environmental-inequity-trees-critical-
infrastructure.html.
65 EPA, Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States: A Focus on Six Impacts (2021), at
36, available at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-09/climate-vulnerability_september-
2021_508.pdf.
In addition, flooding and drought from extreme weather events disproportionately affect
environmental justice communities, and the inequity will grow as climate impacts worsen. Due
to disinvestment, environmental justice communities often lack sufficient infrastructure to
control flooding or ensure steady water supplies.66 They also suffer from more severe impacts,
such as contaminated water from pollutant flows during floods and increased concentration of
contaminants during droughts.67 EPA has also determined that individuals with lower incomes
are more likely to live in areas with the highest projected land losses from sea level rise
inundation and are more likely to face substantial traffic delays due to climate-driven changes in
high-tide flooding.68 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 8-10]
66 Lily Katz, A Racist Past, a Flooded Future: Formerly Redlined Areas Have $107 Billion Worth of
Homes Facing High Flood Risk—25% More Than Non-Redlined Areas, Redfin (2021), available at
https://www.redfin.com/news/redlining-flood-risk/; California Climate Justice Report, supra n. 61, at 41-
42; USGCRP Study, supra n. 61, at 253-54.
67 USGCRP Study, supra n. 61, at 158-74.
68 EPA, Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States: A Focus on Six Impacts, supra n.
65, at 49, 59.
3. Criteria Pollutant and Air Toxics Emissions from Light- and Medium-Duty Vehicles
Disproportionately Impact Environmental Justice Communities
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Criteria pollutant emissions from light- and medium-duty vehicles disproportionately
endanger residents of environmental justice communities by exposing them to harmful air
pollution that causes significant health impacts. Light- and medium-duty vehicles' emissions are
concentrated along transportation corridors. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,396. Aggravating historical
injustices, decision-makers disproportionately site highways and other transportation
infrastructure in lower-income communities and communities of color. The burden of vehicle
emissions therefore falls inequitably on environmental justice communities, which also face
industrial pollution cumulatively with vehicle emissions.91 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746,
pp.13-15]
91 See, e.g., EPA, Estimation of Population Size and Demographic Characteristics among People Living
Near Truck Routes in the Coterminous United States (Feb. 16, 2022), EPA-HQ-OAR-2019-0055-0982, at
11-12, Fig. 3, 17-19, Fig. 9 (finding that individuals living near major truck routes are more likely to be
people of color and lower-income); see also Michelle Meyer and Tim Dallmann, The Real Urban
Emissions Initiative, Air quality and health impacts of diesel truck emissions in New York City and policy
implications (2022), at 7 Fig. 5 (concluding that Black and Latino individuals in New York City are
disproportionately exposed to PM2.5 along freight corridors); Gaige Hunter Kerr, et al., COVID-19
Pandemic Reveals Persistent Disparities in Nitrogen Dioxide Pollution, 118 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
SCIENCES 30 (2021); Mary Angelique G. Demetillo, et al. Space-Based Observational Constraints on
N02 Air Pollution Inequality from Diesel Traffic in Major US Cities, GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH
LETTERS 48 (2021); Paul Allen, et al., Newark Community Impacts of Mobile Source Emissions: A
Community- Based Participatory Research Analysis (2020); Maria Cecilia Pinto de Moura, et al., Union of
Concerned Scientists, Inequitable Exposure to Air Pollution from Vehicles in Massachusetts (2019); Iyad
Kheirbek, et al., The Contribution of Motor Vehicle Emissions to Ambient Fine Particulate Matter Public
Health Impacts in New York City: a Health Burden Assessment, 15 ENV'T HEALTH 89 (2016).
For example, EPA modeling has shown that race and income are significantly associated with
living near major roadways nationally, even when controlling for other factors.92 EPA research
has also indicated that people of color are more likely to live within 300 feet of major
transportation facilities and go to school within 200 meters of the largest roadways. 93
Environmental justice communities bear the effects of these land use patterns. In the Northeast
and Mid-Atlantic Region, average concentrations of exposures to PM2.5 are 75%, 73%, and 61%
higher for Latinx residents, Asian-American residents, and African American residents,
respectively, than they are for white residents.94 PM2.5 and N02 concentrations are also highest
for Black and Latinx communities in Massachusetts, in part because of their proximity to
industrial facilities and highways, and these concentrations have increased over time even though
overall exposure to those pollutants has decreased in the Commonwealth.95 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, pp. 13-15]
92 EPA, Estimation of Population Size and Demographic Characteristics among People Living Near Truck
Routes in the Coterminous United States, supra n. 91, at 20-24.
93 Chad Bailey, EPA, Demographic and Social Patterns in Housing Units Near Large Highways and other
Transportation Sources (2011), EPA-HQ-OAR-2019-0055-0126, at 3.
94 Union of Concerned Scientists, Inequitable Exposure to Air Pollution from Vehicles in the Northeast
and Mid-Atlantic (2019), available at https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2019/06/Inequitable-
Exposure-to-Vehicle-Pollution- Northeast-Mid-Atlantic-Region.pdf.
95 Office of Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey, COVID-19's Unequal Effects in
Massachusetts (2020), at 5, available at https://www.mass.gov/doc/covid-19s-unequal-effects-in-
massachusetts/download.
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More granular data from California fully illustrate this phenomenon. The census tracts in
California with the highest levels of exposure to ozone, PM2.5, and air toxics like diesel
particulate matter are communities of color bordering major transportation corridors—Highway
99 in the San Joaquin Valley and Highways 10 and 60 in the Inland Empire: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, pp. 13-15]
Census Tracts in California with Highest Levels of Ozone, PM2.5, and Diesel PM
Exposure96
Census Tract
Location
People of Color
Ozone PM2.5
Diesel PM
6065041408
Riverside
78.1%
91st
92nd
97th
6071002109
Ontario
73.2%
91st
96th
93rd
6071003301
Fontana
91.6%
97th
93rd
94th
6065040303
Jurupa Valley
79.3%
95th
94th
97th
6029003113
Bakersfield
80.4%
94th
100th
96th
6029001801
Bakersfield
57.3%
94th
100th
95th
6029002812
Bakersfield
72.5%
94th
100th
96th
6029002813
Bakersfield
76.6%
94th
100th
95th
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 13-15]
96 Data from CalEnviroScreen 4.0, California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment,
available at https://oehha.ca.gov/calenviroscreen/report/calenviroscreen-40. Metrics for ozone, PM2.5, and
diesel particulate matter exposure are the census tract's percentile ranking as compared to all census tracts
in California, demonstrating that these census tracts are among those with the greatest pollution exposure
statewide. The raw data for these percentile rankings are available on the CalEnviroScreen 4.0 website. The
eight census tracts shown here are examples of the 29 census tracts in California that rank above the 90th
percentile statewide for exposure to ozone, fine particulate matter, and diesel particulate matter, all of
which are communities in Bakersfield or the Inland Empire near major transportation thoroughfares.
Refineries, drilling sites, and other upstream sources of emissions are also disproportionately
located in or near environmental justice communities.97 These facilities routinely emit dozens of
toxic air contaminants, such as formaldehyde and benzene, and can cause accidental releases of
air toxics that require emergency response. 98 Many of these upstream emissions sources also
release other pollution, such as water contaminants.99 Residents of communities near these sites
tend to have higher rates of health problems, such as cancers, chronic disease, and adverse birth
outcomes, even after accounting for other demographic factors. 100 As with transportation
corridors, census tract-level data from California demonstrate these concerns. For example, the
census tracts near the California refinery with the largest output (the Marathon Refinery in
Carson)101 are overwhelmingly communities of color with high cumulative pollution burdens
and adverse health outcomes: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 15-16]
97 James Boyce & Manuel Pastor, Clearing the air: incorporating air quality and environmental justice into
climate policy, 120 CLIMATIC CHANGE 801 (2013).
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98 Karen Riveles & Alyssa Nagai, Analysis of Refinery Chemical Emissions and Health Effects, California
Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (2019), available at
https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/faqs/refinerychemicalsreport032019.pdf.
99 Louisa Markow, et al., Oil's Unchecked Outfalls: Water Pollution from Refineries and EPA's Failure to
Enforce the Clean Water Act, Environmental Integrity Project (2023), available at
https://environmentalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Oils-Unchecked-Outfalls-03.06.2023.pdf.
100 Jill Johnston & Lara Cushing, Chemical exposures, health and environmental justice in communities
living on the fenceline of industry, 7 CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH REPORTS 48 (2020);
Stephen Williams, et al., Proximity to Oil Refineries and Risk of Cancer: A Population-Based Analysis, 4
JNCI CANCER SPECTRUM 6 (2020).
101 California Energy Commission, California's Oil Refineries, available at
https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/californias-petroleum-market/californias-oil-
refineries (data as of Feb. 7, 2023).
Census Tracts near the Marathon Refinery in Carson, California 102
Census Tract People of Color Pollution Toxic
Releases
Asthma
Heart Disease
6037294120
98.0%
93rd
99th
83rd
93rd
6037543306
92.4%
96th
99th
57th
52nd
6037543905
97.2%
84th
99th
72nd
77th
6037294110
90.5%
88th
99th
75th
83rd
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 15-16]
102 Data from CalEnviroScreen 4.0, supra n.96. Metrics for overall pollution burden, toxic releases,
asthma, and heart disease are the census tract's percentile ranking as compared to all census tracts in
California, demonstrating that these census tracts are among those with the greatest pollution exposure and
detrimental health impacts statewide.
Accordingly, achieving emissions reductions from light- and medium-duty vehicles is a
critical step to begin dismantling historical patterns of environmental injustice burdening
communities near transportation infrastructure and upstream emissions sources. See CARB's
Comment at 84- 96. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 15-16]
b. More stringent standards will reduce the air pollution dangers faced by communities
near refineries and roadways
Our States and Cities agree with EPA that reducing air toxics—including known carcinogens
like formaldehyde and benzene—and criteria pollutants from vehicle exhaust and refining will
significantly benefit our residents, especially those in communities proximate to major roadways
and refineries. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,395-97. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 31-32]
PM2.5 and air toxics pollution from refineries significantly impact neighboring communities
due to localized concentrations of these pollutants. Nearly 700,000 people live within three miles
of the 17 refineries that reported actual annual benzene fenceline concentrations in 2020 above
the level set by EPA that requires the refinery to take action to clean up emissions. Of these
700,000 people, 62% are African-American, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, or American
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Indian residents, and nearly 45% have incomes below the poverty level. 182 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, pp. 31-32]
182 Environmental Integrity Project, Environmental Justice and Refinery Pollution: Benzene Monitoring
Around Oil Refineries Showed More Communities at Risk in 2020 (Apr. 28, 2021), at 7, n. 6, available at
https://environmentalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Benzene-report-4.28.21.pdf.
Communities near major roadways will also benefit greatly from any improvements in air
quality. EPA has long acknowledged that people living, working, and attending school near
major roadways face greater air pollution exposure. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,221; 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624,
62,907 (Oct. 15, 2012); 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,504 (May 7, 2010). The pollution and public
health impacts from on-road vehicle emissions are especially significant and greater in
disadvantaged communities. 183 For example, the community of Wilmington, Carson, and West
Long Beach in Los Angeles, California is affected by six major freeway junctions, as well as
freight, port, and rail operations, oil and gas production, and five petroleum refineries. A
majority of this community is considered disadvantaged under California law, scoring higher
than the state average on key indicators of vulnerability, including criteria pollutant exposure,
health status, and socio-economic criteria. See CARB Comment at 88-90. Measures that reduce
pollution in these communities are urgently needed, and addressing that need (and others
described above) is mandatory under Section 202(a). Our States and Cities strongly agree with
EPA's assessment that the proposed standards will significantly benefit public health and
welfare, especially in areas next to major roadways. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,395-97. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, pp. 31-32]
183 CARB, Benefits of California's Zero-Emission Vehicle Standards on Community-Scale Emission
Impacts (Jul. 6, 2021), App. B to Comments of States and Cities in Support of EPA Reversing Its SAFE 1
Actions.
While the proposed standards are expected to moderately increase criteria pollutant and air
toxics emissions from power plants due to some increase in electricity demand from more
electric vehicles, id. at 29,353, 29,397, EPA's other regulatory actions to control power plant
emissions, and emissions from related infrastructure, and our States and Cities' efforts to
promote renewable generation should reduce these impacts to the communities adjacent to these
plants. Nevertheless, EPA should further develop its understanding of the distributive impacts for
communities proximate to power plants and refineries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 31-
32]
Organization: Center for American Progress (CAP)
Automobile emissions and their effects on health are not distributed equally. People of color
are exposed to 24 percent more automobile emissions. 5 and the ALA finds that people of color
are 3.7 times as likely as White Americans to live in a county with 3 failing grades for air
pollution.6 Strong standards must be finalized quickly in order to protect all Americans,
especially those disproportionately affected, from the harmful effects of automotive air
pollution.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0658, pp. 1-2]
5 Tessum et al. "PM2.5 polluters disproportionately and systematically affect people of color in the United
States," Science Advances, April 28, 2021, available online:
https://www.science.org/doi/pdf/10.1126/sciadv.abf4491; CiaranL Gallagher and Tracey Holloway, "U.S.
decarbonization impacts on air quality and environmental justice," Environmental Research Letters,
October 25, 2022, available online: https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ac99ef/pdf
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6 American Lung Association, "State of the Air Report," April 2023, available online:
https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf
7 Kevin DeGood and Michela Zonta. "Colorado's Greenhouse Gas Emissions Rule for Surface
Transportation Offers a Model for Other States and the Nation," Center for American Progress, March 29,
2022, available online: https://www.americanprogress.org/article/colorados-greenhouse-gas-emissions-
rule-for-surface-transportation-offers -a-model-for-other-states-and-the-nation/; Alexander-Kearns et al.
"The Impact of Automation on Carbon Emissions," Center for American Progress, November 18, 2016,
available online: https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-impact-of-vehicle-automation-on-carbon-
emissions-where-uncertainty -lies/
Organization: Center for Biological Diversity et al.
More than one-third of Americans live in areas with failing grades for ozone or particulate
pollution, and people of color are 3.7 times more likely than white people to live in a county with
failing air quality. 1 Already at a disadvantage, these communities have the most to lose from
emissions standards that do little to attack pollution from gas-powered cars and trucks. EPA
should act in accordance with President Biden's recent recommitment to environmental justice
and treat pollution from gas-powered vehicles as an urgent environmental justice issue. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0671, p. 1]
1 American Lung Association, 2023 State of the Air Report, https://www.lung.org/research/sota.
Organization: Ceres BICEP (Business for Innovative Climate and Energy Policy) Network
Finally, on-road vehicles are largely responsible for the harmful pollutant emissions that
disproportionally impact historically low-income and BIPOC16 communities located near fleet
depots, major transportation corridors, distribution centers, and ports. 36% of Americans live in
communities with unhealthy air pollution, and a person of color is 64% more likely than a white
person to live in such a community. 17 Further, the American Lung Association predicts that the
U.S. could see $978 billion in public health benefits from cleaner air by 2050 as the nation shifts
to 100%) zero-emission new passenger vehicle sales and clean electricity generation. 18 EPA's
decision to reduce multipollutant vehicle emissions is positive, and we urge EPA to finalize
LMDV emission standards at least as strong as those proposed as soon as possible to protect the
health of those in these vulnerable communities and realize these significant economic benefits.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0600, pp. 2-3]
16 BIPOC: Black, Indigenous, People of Color.
17 https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf.
18 https://www.lung.org/getmedia/9e9947ea-d4a6-476c-9c78-cccf7d49ffe2/ala-driving-to-clean-air-
report.pdf.
Organization: Ceres Corporate Electric Vehicle Alliance (CEVA)
While medium- and heavy-duty trucks represent only 5% of vehicles on the road, their GHG
emissions represent 23% of the transportation sector's carbon footprint, which grew 75% over
the last three decades.9 They are also largely responsible for the harmful pollutant emissions
that disproportionally impact historically low-income and BIPOC communities located near fleet
depots, major transportation corridors, distribution centers, and ports. 10
In fact, the American Lung Association found that one in three Americans live in places with
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unhealthy air pollution, largely due to transportation sector emissions. As such, vehicle
emissions standards serve as a crucial mechanism to protect public health and advance
environmental justice. 11 Further, with many major companies aiming to deploy 50-100% zero-
emission trucks by 2030, EPA's proposed standards fail to stimulate the rate of commercial
electric truck production that commercial fleet operators seek. 12 By strengthening the proposed
Phase 3 standards to ensure at least 50% ZEV sales across all market segments by 2032, EPA
will accelerate the industry's necessary investments in heavy-duty ZEV manufacturing and the
accompanying investments in charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, pp. 2-3]
9 https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/US-GHG-Inventory-2023-Main-Text.pdf (p.2-35,
3-25)
10 BIPOC: Black, Indigenous, People of Color
11 https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf
12 https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/hdv-phase3-ghg-standards-benefits-apr23.pdf (p.i-19).
Organization: Colorado Energy Office, Colorado Department of Transportation, and Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment
Environmental impacts from the transportation sector—and the resulting health and economic
consequences—are a major concern. Vehicles are the top source of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions in Colorado, and are also a top source of particulate matter, NOx, and other criteria air
pollutants that have disproportionate impacts on communities living near highways and freight
routes. Transportation is one of the two largest sources of ozone precursors in Colorado along
with oil and gas production, largely due to NOx emissions from vehicles, and reducing
transportation emissions is a critical strategy to meet federal health-based air quality
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694, p. 1]
Organization: District of Columbia Department of Energy and Environment (DOEE)
Environmental Justice Implications
DOEE acknowledges that the District's metropolitan and natural environments are
constructed and managed in ways that have not benefitted the District's communities equally.
District residents who continue to suffer the effects of environmental hazards—and their
compounding impacts—are disproportionately people of color and people experiencing poverty.
These hazards manifest as air pollution, inequities in access to clean water and nutritious food,
lack of proximate green space, proximity to industrial toxins, racial disparities in life expectancy,
and increased vulnerability to extreme weather events and climate change. Most germane to this
rulemaking, many of these residents have had highways and major arterials constructed through
their communities, increasing the burdens from air pollution emitted by motor vehicles. By
addressing racial inequity in the systems we manage and influence, we create opportunities for
more communities to benefit from, and participate in, the process of identifying and
implementing environmental solutions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, pp. 3-4]
People of color and people with lower incomes are more likely to live near high-volume or
high-traffic density roads than their white, wealthier counterparts. About 19% of the US
population lives near highly trafficked roads, whereas 27% of people of color live near high-
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volume roads (Census of the US near- roadway population, Rowangould). According to the
Union of Concerned Scientists, "Nearly one half of everyone living in the United States—an
estimated 150 million—live in areas that don't meet federal air quality standards. Passenger
vehicles and heavy-duty trucks are a major source of this pollution, which includes ozone,
particulate matter, and other smog-forming emissions." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, pp. 3-
4]
The Union of Concerned Scientists further confirms the hazards of vehicle emissions and
living near roads through modeling of vehicle air pollution in California as well as the Northeast
and Mid-Atlantic region. The study indicated similar results as the Census of the US near-
roadway population by Rowangould, finding that people near roads are burdened by the
prevalent and harmful PM2.5. UCS modeling shows that Asian Americans are, on average,
exposed to 34 percent higher levels of PM2.5 from vehicles than the average for the total US
population. Other groups also have higher than average exposure: African Americans are
burdened with 24 percent higher than average exposure, and Latinos have 23 percent higher
exposure. On the other hand, exposure of whites to PM2.5 from vehicles is, on average, 14
percent lower than the average exposure for everyone. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, pp.
4]
10 David Reichmuth. Air Pollution from Cars, Trucks, and Buses in the US: Everyone is Exposed, But the
Burdens are not Equally Shared. October 2019. https://blog.ucsusa.org/dave-reichmuth/air-pollution-from-
cars-trucks-and-buses-in-the-u-s- everyone-is-exposed-but-the-burdens-are-not-equally-shared/
In addition, data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention shows that, nationally,
Black and Indigenous people statistically have significantly higher asthma rates than their
counterparts in other races. 11 In the District, children who live in predominately Black
communities have 20 to 25 times more asthma-related emergency room visits than their
counterparts in majority White communities. 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, pp. 4-5]
11 Center for Disease Control. Most Recent National Asthma Data.
https://www.cdc.gov/asthma/most_recent_national_asthma_data.htm.
12 Children's National Medical Hospital. 2017. "Asthma Surveillance in DC Emergency Departments and
Hospitals." https://childrensnational.Org/-/media/cnhs-site/files/departments/impactdc/impact-dc -
surveillance.pdf?la=en&hash=4235C55A9ClDE9DE9725D8D5D99D30831FCA18CF
Studies also illustrate links between increased school absenteeism and ozone exposure. 13
This is a District-wide concern as disparities already exist in the education system between
students of color and White students. In particular, the literacy disparities have grown since the
Covid-19 pandemic: 28% of Black and 30% of Hispanic students were proficient on a fall 2021
test, while 70% of White students were proficient. In the fall of 2019, 44% of Black students and
42%) of Hispanic students hit these benchmarks, compared with 73% of White students. 14 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, pp. 4-5]
13 Daniel L Mendoza et al 2020 Environ. Res. Lett, in press https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abbf7a
14 Perry Stein. 2022 The Washington Post. "Literacy scores show widening achievement gap in D.C.
during pandemic." https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2022/03/17/dc-schools-achievement-gap-
pandemic-reading/
According to DC Kids Count, White students achieve third-grade literacy at a rate 2-3 times
more than Black and Latinx students. This gap continues into high school, where 19% of Black
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students and 41% of Latinx students who enroll in an Advanced Placement (AP) class pass at
least one of the AP or International Baccalaureate (IB) exams. Meanwhile, 83% of White
students pass at least one of the exams. 15 Often, students experiencing greater education
inequality are also living in areas of the District that are exposed to higher levels of air pollution
and noxious emissions, which ultimately leads to more health issues and a higher likelihood of
more missed school days and further education loss. 16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 5]
15 DC Kids Count Powered by DC Action. 2021. "DC Students' Educational Outcomes Gaps are
Massive." https://dckidscount.org/education/
16 DC Kids Count Powered By DC Action. 2021. "How Many DC Kids Live in Poverty in Ward 5? Are
Homeless?" https://dckidscount.org/ward-snapshots/ward5/
On-road vehicle emissions constitute one of the most significant individual contributors to
local air pollution-related health burdens, making up 23% of all pollution-related premature
deaths in the District. On-road vehicle emissions are estimated to contribute to 51% of N02-
attributable new asthma cases and 13% of pollution-attributable premature deaths in the District.
Regional emissions from all sectors, which originate outside of the District's jurisdiction,
contribute disproportionately to the District's air pollution- related new asthma cases and
premature deaths (89% and 57%, respectively). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 5]
These studies illustrate that air quality is an issue connected to all aspects of people's lives.
The pollution from vehicle emissions affects District residents, creating poor air quality and
living conditions and with it, a myriad of health, wellness, and educational discrepancies. The
District strives to reduce pollution as much as possible; however, pollution from light-duty and
medium-duty vehicles must be solved at a larger scale as light-duty and medium-duty vehicles
from states across the United States travel into the District. Therefore, the District cannot solve
all its pollution problems without action from EPA. EPA needs to set stronger light-duty and
medium-duty vehicle emission standards to relieve overburdened and bystander communities
experiencing the adverse impacts of vehicle emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 5]
Organization: Donna Jackson
[From Hearing Testimony, May 10, 2023] This new proposed rule has the distinction of
harming black people on two continents, in the African nation of Congo as well as here in the
United States. In the Congo where 75 percent of the world's cobalt needed for rechargeable EV
batteries is located, black slave and child labor is readily being used to mine these minerals. It is
well documented that their conditions are deplorable. The need for cobalt and thus the extent of
the suffering will increase exponentially as a result of the EPA's proposed rule and if that wasn't
bad enough, this new proposed rule will create an economic hardship and serious decline in the
standard of living for all Americans but especially black Americans. Blacks have more single
parent households, lower medium household income and higher poverty rates than the overall
population. According to the 2021 U.S. Census Bureau, the median household income for black
Americans was $45,000 compared to $71,000 for white Americans and $101,000 for Asian
Americans. As such, they can't afford more expensive EV vehicles nor the higher prices for
limited supply of gasoline powered vehicles and as it is, many Blacks have already been priced
out of the new vehicles markets and can only afford used ones. Overall the consequences of this
rule will remove private car ownership from many if not most black Americans. Even if the EVs
weren't so expensive, they still don't fit the lives of many Blacks Americans, for example, more
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Blacks are renters, so fewer have the chance to charge their vehicles at home. Many black
Americans live in apartments where street and parking lots is the norm with no ability to charge.
In addition, many black households can only afford one vehicle but the reality is EVs are
practical only for multi car households and the list goes on. Suffice to say it is that no EV
supporter ever bothered to ask the black community if this is what they want or fits the needs of
their family. And for those Blacks who want EV vehicle, they are free to choose one with or
without an EPA mandate. The proposed rule here only serves to force more expensive vehicles
on everyone whether they like it or not. The truth is that black people like most Americans want
to make these choices for themselves. For this reason, I urge the EPA to withdraw the proposed
rule and instead start thinking of ways to make personal transportation more accessible. [From
Hearing Testimony, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5115, Day 2]
Organization: Elders Climate Action
Action requested:
Elders Climate Action requests that EPA revise the standards for HDVs to set a zero emission
standard for nitrogen oxides (NOx), PM2.5 and C02 for the classes of L/MDVs or types of
L/MDVs that operate in duty cycles for which zero emission power trains are currently in use or
which EPA expects will be available by 2027 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 1-2],
ECA requests that EPA use its authority to set emission standards to -
1) respond meaningfully to the urgency of the climate crisis that threatens to destroy the
future for our children and grandchildren by destroying or disrupting the natural systems upon
which all life, including human civilization, relies to thrive and survive, to avoid turning the
planet into an unsustainable Hell on Earth;
2) optimize the emission reductions needed from L/MD on-road vehicles to ensure
attainment of the ozone and PM2.5 NAAQS within the deadlines established by the CAA rather
than delaying attainment until 2045 for some areas, and not attaining at all in the New
York/Connecticut?New Jersey, Houston, South Coast and San Joaquin Valley nonattainment
areas; and
3) to end the inequitable and unlawful disparate impact on BIPOC and low income
frontline communities who are most exposed to emissions from L/MDVs in violation of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act and thereby suffer "disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects on minority populations and low-income populations" in violation of EO
12,898. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 1-2]
3. Public Health Urgency.
Diesel trucks and buses are also major sources of other deadly air pollutants. Medium and
heavy-duty diesel engines emit more than 60% percent of the deadly particle pollution from
vehicles. Particle pollution cuts short tens of thousands of US lives per year and contributes to
the heavy burden of asthma on our nation's children. Diesels are the primary source of particles
in communities near heavily-trafficked highways where 65 million Americans are exposed to
harmful concentrations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
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Vehicle pollution inequitably harms Black and Latinex communities that are much more
likely compared to whites to reside near heavy truck traffic on highways, and at truck terminals,
ports and distribution centers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
NOx from diesels combines with heat and sunlight in the atmosphere to form ground level
ozone, or smog, a lung irritant and asthma trigger. Heavy duty vehicle emissions are a major
contributor to urban smog in the 230 urban counties where pollution concentrations violate
national air quality standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
The need for national zero emission standards is greatest in the urban areas that EPA has
designated "extreme" (South Coast AQMD) and "severe" (San Joaquin Valley AQMD), or
recently bumped-up to "serious" for ozone. NOx emissions from L/MDVs are a primary
contributor to their numerous elevated violations of the ozone NAAQS. These areas are not able
to achieve sufficient emissions reductions to attain the NAAQS without significant NOx
reductions from L/MDVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
2. Impacts of Climate Warming on Public Health are Significant and Widespread.
Fire smoke and unprecedented hot temperatures are having a significant impact on human
health as an example of the regional impact of heat waves, drought and wildfires. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
The heat dome that raised temperatures above 110 F for three days in the Pacific NW in June
2021 caused over 200 heat-related deaths in Oregon and Washington. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
Recent research demonstrates that emissions from wildfire are the largest source of fine
particle pollution in large regions of the U.S., and contributed to thousands of pre-mature deaths.
Wildfire in the western U.S. now accounts for half of all fine particle pollution in some areas of
the West, doubling the exposure to PM2.5 [18] from non-fire sources including motor vehicles,
power plants and industrial operations. 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
18 PM2.5 are particles smaller than 2.5 micrometers in diameter.
19 Burke, M. et al., The changing risk and burden of wildfire in the United States | PNAS (Jan 11, 2021).
A warming climate is responsible for roughly half of the increase in burned area in the United
States (4), and future climate change could lead to up to an additional doubling of wildfire-
related particulate emissions in fireprone areas (36) or a many-fold increase in burned area (37,
38). Costs from these increases include both the downstream economic and health costs of
smoke exposure, as well as the cost of suppression activities, direct loss of life and property, and
other adaptive measure (e.g., power shutoffs) that have widespread economic consequences.20
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
20 Id.
Using satellite measurements of smoke plumes integrated with ground level monitored PM2.5
(fine particle) concentration data, Burke et al. estimate that between 7,000 and 14,500 deaths per
year (depending on the dose/response curve used to estimate mortality from observed exposures)
are attributable to fire smoke in the contiguous U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
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Mortality and other health impacts such as asthma attacks and exacerbating COPD will be
experienced most severely by communities already burdened by the adverse health effects of
daily exposure to fine particle pollution emitted from tailpipes, power plants and industrial
sources. Exposure to fire smoke in the American West during the 2020 fire season was universal.
No communities were spared. But fire smoke at least doubled the annual exposure routinely
suffered by BIPOC and low income communities living near major highways and industrial
sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
In Oregon, mortality attributed to fire includes many hundreds more deaths than the lives lost
directly to fires. Statewide smoke pollution during the 2020 fires threatened lives and well- being
with extreme hazard concentrations of particles known to cause pre-mature death and cancer,
exacerbate asthma, COPD and other respiratory conditions, and cardio-vascular diseases. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
The Oregon Health Authority (OHA) reports that "[t]he most severe recent air quality events
in Oregon are due to wildfire smoke.. ."21 OHA cited a study finding that fire smoke in 2012
"caused hundreds of premature deaths, nearly 2,000 emergency room visits and more than $2
billion in health costs."22 OHA points to the longer fire season as increasing the harm from
exposure to smoke. "Fire seasons in Oregon are roughly 100 days longer than they were in the
1970s. Longer seasons mean more smoke in Oregon communities."23 The greater density of
smoke and longer duration of smoke exposure in 2020 likely at least doubled the mortality
caused by smoke exposure compared to 2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
21 Oregon Climate and Health Report, 40 (Oregon Health Authority, 2020).
22 Id., 33.
23 Id.,
In addition, low income families without air conditioning are much less able to escape smoke
pollution by closing doors and windows during the summer heat to keep themselves safe. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
Workers cannot avoid exposure to smoke pollution if required to work outdoors. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
Beyond the economic and environmental damage, social disruption, and harm to health that
will result from a longer fire season and expanded fire zones, more deadly air quality will likely
make parts of the American West uninhabitable during the fire season for the most vulnerable
populations such as the elderly, children and those with existing respiratory and cardiovascular
conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
These recent data and other sources published since 2009, including the data discussed at
length in the Administrator's 2009 Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (December 15,
2009), confirm the finding that EPA made 12 years ago: "The Administrator finds that the
elevated atmospheric concentrations of the well-mixed greenhouse gases may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger the public health and welfare of current and future generations." Id., at
66,523. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 15-17]
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Organization: Energy Innovation
In addition to improvements to public health and welfare that the EPA's proposed tailpipe
GHG standards would achieve, the proposed multi-pollutant standards will help reduce criteria
pollutants and air toxics from remaining internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles. As LDVs
and MDVs transition away from combustion and tailpipes that cause harmful air pollution, these
multi-pollutant standards are critical to saving the lives and improving the health of the people
and children harmed by transportation pollution. 15 Although we do not provide detailed
comments on this aspect of the proposed rule, we encourage the EPA to adopt the most stringent
standards feasible to mitigate the harmful effects of these pollutants. The EPA aptly points out
that "reducing human exposure to these pollutants results in significant and measurable health
benefits," 16 especially to frontline communities, communities of color, and low-income
communities and individuals that bear the burden of bad air quality from tailpipe emissions. 17
Adopting more stringent multi-pollutant standards will also help states meet National Ambient
Air Quality Standards 18 and improve air quality in all communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0561, p. 7]
15 American Lung Association, "Health Impact of Air Pollution," American Lung Association State of the
Air, n.d.,
https://www.lung.org/research/sota/health-risks.
16 U.S. EPA, 29379.
17 "Disparities in the Impact of Air Pollution," American Lung Association, April 20, 2020,
https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/who-isat-risk/disparities.
18 U.S. EPA, "Reviewing National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS): Scientific and Technical
Information," U.S. EPA, n.d., https://www.epa.gov/naaqs and "Current Nonattainment Counties for All
Criteria Pollutants," U.S. EPA, May 31, 2023, https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/ancl.html.
Organization: Environmental and Public Health Organizations
EPA should set strong emissions standards to meet its obligations under presidential
directives on environmental justice. Under Executive Order 12,898, EPA "shall make achieving
environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate,
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs,
policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations." 59 Fed. Reg. 7629
(Feb. 11, 1994). And Executive Order 14,008 directs EPA to develop "programs, policies, and
activities to address the disproportionately high and adverse human health, environmental,
climate-related and other cumulative impacts on disadvantaged communities, as well as the
accompanying economic challenges of such impacts." 86 Fed. Reg. 7619, 7629 (Jan. 27, 2021).
It also establishes the Administration's policy "to secure environmental justice and spur
economic opportunity for disadvantaged communities that have been historically marginalized
and overburdened by pollution." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 18]
C. More stringent standards would bring greater benefits to environmental justice
communities.
This rulemaking will provide benefits to environmental justice communities by reducing harm
from climate change and pollution exposure. And Alternative 1, with a faster ramp rate after
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2030, would bring even greater benefits to vulnerable populations that suffer the brunt of
pollution and climate change harms. EPA appropriately recognizes that environmental justice
communities are disproportionately affected by climate change and pollution impacts related to
light- and medium-duty vehicles and upstream emissions. Addressing these harms by providing
these communities relief more quickly—a priority for this Administration—is a compelling
reason why EPA should adopt Alternative 1 with a faster ramp rate after 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 18]
Given the vast history of disproportionate environmental and public health burdens placed on
communities of color and low-income communities, EPA appropriately included consideration
of environmental justice, energy justice, and equity in its Proposal.74 Communities that are
overburdened with pollution from sources such as major roadways, industrial sites, and
agriculture are predominantly low-income, and a large percentage of residents of these
communities are people of color and non-English speakers.75 With the improvements described
in this comment letter, this rulemaking could bring about significant air quality and health
improvements in communities that are disproportionately burdened with air pollution from motor
vehicles and overburdened from pollution more broadly.76 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
18]
74 For more information on the history and definition of the environmental justice movement, see Initiative
for Energy Justice, Section 1—Defining Energy Justice: Connections to Environmental Justice, Climate
Justice, and the Just Transition (Dec. 23, 2019), https://iejusa.org/section-l-defining-energy-justice/.
75 See GinaM. Solomon et al., Cumulative Environmental Impacts: Science and Policy to Protect
Communities, 83 Annual Review of Public Health (Jan. 6, 2016),
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26735429/.
76 See EPA, ISA for Particulate Matter at Ch. 12: Populations and Lifestages Potentially at Increased Risk
of a Particulate Matter-Related Health Effect; Section 5: Sociodemographic Factors,
https://www.epa.gov/isa/integrated-science-assessment-isa-particulate-matter.
1. Reductions in greenhouse gas emissions will bring climate change benefits to
environmental justice communities.
Reducing GHG emissions from light- and medium-duty vehicles will help reduce the
significant harm that climate change inflicts on environmental justice communities. By 2055, the
Proposed Standards would avoid 7,300 million metric tons (MMT) of C02 emissions, 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29198, tbl. 3, and EPA's calculations show the Proposal would produce climate benefits
of between $82 and $1,000 billion in 2020 dollars by 2055, depending on the values used for
GHG emission reductions. Id. at 29200, tbl. 6 (using a 3% discount rate). As compared to the
Proposed Standards, by 2055 Alternative 1 would achieve an additional 800 MMT of C02
savings, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29203, tbl. 14, and increase climate benefits by between $9 and $100
billion. Id. at 29205, tbl. 17. And adopting Alternative 1 with a faster ramp rate after 2030 would
bring even more climate benefits to environmental justice communities. See infra Section V
(detailing the societal benefits of more stringent standards). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
19]
Reducing climate harm will benefit environmental justice communities because, as EPA has
aptly described, climate change disproportionately affects these communities. 88 Fed. Reg. at
29393-95. EPA recognized in the 2009 Endangerment Finding that vulnerable populations,
including economically and socially disadvantaged communities and Indigenous or minority
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populations, are especially vulnerable to climate change. Id. at 29393. Reports from the U.S. and
international climate bodies over the last decade add evidence to the conclusion that climate
change disproportionately impacts environmental justice communities, including by "altering
exposures to heat waves, floods, droughts, and other extreme events; vector-, food- and
waterborne infectious diseases; changes in the quality and safety of air, food, and water; and
stresses to mental health and well-being." Id. at 29394. Notably, the 2016 scientific assessment
on the Impacts of Climate Change on Human Health predicts that people of color will suffer a
disproportionate impact of climate exacerbations of air pollution. Id. at 29395. It also describes
unique vulnerabilities of Native American communities because of expected impacts to their
cultural resources, customs, and traditional subsistence lifestyles, including expected declines in
food security for Alaskan Indigenous Peoples. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 20]
Though EPA has included a significant number of publications in its literature review, it
should also include its 2021 analysis of the disproportionate climate impacts on vulnerable
populations. The study quantifies the increased risks of climate change on socially vulnerable
populations in six categories: Air Quality and Health; Extreme Temperature and Health; Extreme
Temperature and Labor; Coastal Flooding and Traffic; Coastal Flooding and Property; and
Inland Flooding and Property, using data on where people live as an indicator of exposure.79
The report concludes that Black and African American individuals will likely face higher
impacts of climate change for all six impacts analyzed compared to all other demographic
groups. Black and African Americans are 40% more likely to live in communities with the
highest increase in premature mortality from extreme temperatures, and 34% are more likely to
live in areas with the highest increases in PM2.5 childhood asthma diagnoses with 2°C (3.6°F) of
global warming.80 Hispanic and Latinos are also significantly more likely to live in areas where
impacts are projected to be highest.81 Low-income individuals and those without a high school
diploma have 25-26% greater risk of living in areas with the highest extreme temperature labor
hours lost.82 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 20]
79 EPA, Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States: A Focus on Six Impacts, EPA 430-
R-21-003 (2021) at 9 (Six Impacts), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-09/climate-
vulnerability_september-2021_508.pdf.
80 Id. at 79.
81 Id. at 76.
82 Id. at 77.
And as we witness time and again with each unfolding disaster, vulnerable populations suffer
the most from climate change-fueled extreme events. Taking recent events in this country as
illustrative examples, economically disadvantaged individuals, low-wage outdoor workers, and
homeless and elderly people died from heat stroke in the Northwest heat wave in 2021,83 an
event that researchers found would have been "virtually impossible without human-caused
climate change."84 In New Orleans, the people who could not evacuate before disastrous
Hurricanes Katrina and Ida struck land are those who did not have the means or ability to do
so.85 In New York City, many people who could only afford to live in illegal basement
apartments died as a result of flooding during Ida. 86 During western wildfire season, those
without homes or means do not have the luxury of filtered air to protect their lungs.87 To help
address the urgency of the climate crisis and its impacts on vulnerable populations, EPA must
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adopt the more stringent Alternative 1 with a faster ramp rate after 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, pp. 20-21]
83 E.g., Irfan, U., Extreme heat is killing American workers, Vox (Jul. 21, 2021),
https://www.vox.com/22560815/heat-wave-worker-extreme-climate-change-osha-workplace-farm-
restaurant.; Geranios, N.K., Pacific Northwest strengthens heat protections for workers (Jul. 9, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/business-science-health-environment-and-nature-washington-
c463fc55ab6b601cf70b2fd7 3644f973; Peterson, D., New data shows scope of heatwave-related homeless
deaths, (Jul. 23, 2021), https://www.koin.com/news/special-reports/new-data-shows-scope-of-heatwave-
related-homeless-deaths/; Bella, T., Historic heat wave in Pacific Northwest has killed hundreds in U.S. and
Canada over the past week (Jul. 1, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.eom/nation/2021/07/01/heat-wave-
deaths-pacific-northwest/
84 World Weather Attribution, Western North American extreme heat virtually impossible without human-
caused climate change (Jul. 7, 2021), https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/western-north-american-
extreme-heat-virtually-impossible-without-human -caused-climate-change/.
85 E.g., Willingham, L., "We can't afford to leave": No cash or gas to flee from Ida, (Aug. 29, 2021),
https://www.denverpost.com/2021/08/29/hurricane-ida-no-money-evacuate/see also Wade, L., Who Didn't
Evacuate for Hurricane Katrina?, Pacific Standard (Aug, 31, 2015), at
https://psmag.com/environment/who-didnt-evacuate-for-hurricane-katrina.
86 Haag M. & J.E. Bromwich, Most of the apartments where New Yorkers drowned were illegal
residences, New York Times (Sept. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/09/03/nyregion/nyc-
flooding-ida#nyc-illegal-basement-apartment-ida.
87 E.g., Kardas-Nelson, M., Racial and Economic Divides Extend to Wildfire Smoke, Too, (Sept. 21,
2020), at https://www.invw.org/2020/09/21/racial-and-economic-divides-extend-to-wildfire-smoke-too/.
2. Reductions in criteria pollution emissions will bring health benefits to environmental
justice communities.
This rulemaking presents a critical opportunity to mitigate the adverse health impacts
plaguing communities that are overburdened by air pollution from motor vehicles and other
sources. According to the American Lung Association's (ALA) 2023 State of the Air report,
which grades counties on daily and long-term measures of particle pollution and daily measures
of ozone, more than 119 million Americans live in places that received failing grades for
unhealthy levels of ozone or PM in their air.88 The report notes:
88 Am. Lung Ass'n, State of the Air 2023 Report (2023) at 12, https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-
6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf?ext=.pdf.
Although people of color are 41% of the overall population of the U.S., they are 54% of the
nearly 120 million people living in counties with at least one failing grade. And in the counties
with the worst air quality that get failing grades for all three pollution measures, 72% of the 18
million residents affected are people of color, compared to the 28% who are white.89
89 Id.
In addition to the disproportionate impact on people of color noted above, ALA outlines other
"high-risk" groups that are impacted by the pollution in these regions. For example, low-income
communities are particularly vulnerable and at risk of health impacts from pollution. More than
14.6 million people whose incomes meet the federal definition for living in poverty reside in
counties that received a failing grade on at least one of the ALA's pollutant indicators, while
nearly 2.6 million people living in poverty reside in counties that received failing grades on all
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three pollutant measures.90 In addition, around 27 million children (under age 18) and 18 million
older adults (age 65 or older) live in counties that received a failing grade on at least one
pollutant.91 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 21-22]
90 Id. at 20.
91 Id.
In fact, it is well established that communities of color and economically disadvantaged
communities are disproportionately exposed to environmental burdens from a variety of sources.
The White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) released (and recently updated) a
Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool, which identifies communities around the country
that are "marginalized, underserved, and overburdened by pollution"92 and would therefore
qualify for Justice4093 investments (President Biden's key environmental justice initiative). The
Screening Tool identifies census tracts as "disadvantaged" if they are above the threshold for one
or more environmental or climate indicators (e.g., exposure to diesel PM or PM2.5, traffic
proximity and volume, or proximity to hazardous waste sites) and above the threshold for
socioeconomic indicators related to income and education.94 A recent analysis found that 64%
of the population in census tracts the Screening Tool identifies as disadvantaged are
Hispanic/Latino, Black or African American, or American Indian or Alaskan Native.95 Overall,
50% of Hispanic/Latino, Black or African American, and American Indian or Alaskan Native
individuals in the country reside in disadvantaged communities, compared to just 17% of White,
Non-Hispanic/Latino individuals.96 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 22]
92 The White House, Biden-Harris Administration Launches Version 1.0 of Climate and Economic Justice
Screening Tool, Key Step in Implementing President Biden's Justice40 Initiative (Nov. 22, 2022)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/news-updates/2022/ll/22/biden-harris-administration-launches-version-
1-0-of-cli mate-and-economic-justice-screening-tool-key-step-in-implementing-president-bidens-justice40-
initiative/. See CEQ, Preliminary Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool,
https://screeningtool.geoplatform.gOv/en/#3/33.47/-97.5.
93 The White House, The Path to Achieving Justice40 (July 20, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/briefing-room/2021/07/20/the-path-to-achieving-justice40/.
94 CEQ, Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool: Technical Support Document, (Nov. 2022) at 4-8,
https ://static-data-screeningtool. geoplatform. gov/data-versions/1.0/data/score/downloadable/1.0-cej st-
technical-supp ort-document.pdf.
95 Emma Rutkowski et al., Justice40 Initiative: Mapping Race and Ethnicity, Rhodium Group (Feb. 24,
2022), https://rhg.com/research/justice40-initiative-mapping-race-and-ethnicity/.
96 Id.
3. Significant decreases in vehicle and upstream non-GHG emissions over time will provide
benefits to environmental justice communities.
In addition to securing GHG reductions, the Proposal will reduce non-GHG tailpipe emissions
over time as well as upstream emissions from refineries, both of which will benefit
environmental justice communities. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29393. Compared to the Proposal,
Alternative 1 provides greater reductions in criteria pollutants and air toxics. Compare id. at
29198-99, tbls. 4 and 5, with id. at 29204-05, tbls. 15-16. EPA should adopt Alternative 1 with a
faster ramp rate after 2030 to bring more relief more quickly to environmental justice
communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 23]
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Notably, the immediate benefits more stringent standards would provide from reductions over
time in tailpipe and upstream refining emissions vastly outweigh any potentially small non-GHG
emissions increases from upstream electric generation. By one measure, reducing refinery
emissions may be more beneficial to environmental justice communities as a whole than
reducing emissions from electric generation. EPA has concluded that refineries have far higher
health benefits per ton of emission reductions than do electric generating units, due in part to
greater proximity to populations.97 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 23]
97 EPA, Office of Air and Radiation, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Technical Support
Document, Estimating the Benefit per Ton of Reducing PM2.5 Precursors from 17 Sectors, at 6, 16 (Feb.
2018), available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-
02/documents/sourceapportionmentbpttsd_2018.pdf (valuing electricity-generation-unit emissions of
particulate matter in 2020 at $150,000-350,000 per ton and corresponding refinery emissions at $360,000-
830,000 per ton).
EPA correctly concludes that environmental justice communities are disproportionately
harmed by the non-GHG criteria and air toxics emissions associated with vehicles and upstream
sources, and therefore these communities will especially benefit from reduced tailpipe emissions.
88 Fed. Reg. at 29395-97. After conducting a literature review and its own analysis, EPA
recognizes that higher percentages of communities of color and low-income communities live or
attend school near major roadways, suffering the largest share of their emissions and associated
adverse health impacts. Id. EPA also recognizes that higher percentages of communities of color
and low-income communities live near electric generating units and refineries. Id. at 29397. EPA
should, however, strengthen its statement that "[ajnalysis of populations near refineries also
indicates there may be potential disparities in pollution-related health risk from that source." Id.
(emphasis added). The study of socioeconomic factors near refineries cited by EPA itself
concludes that "[minority and African American percentages are approximately twice as high as
national percentages" for cancer risk as a result of petroleum refinery emissions.98 That study
alone is enough evidence to warrant a conclusion that such populations do experience disparities
in health risk. For further evidence, please see NGO coalition comments on the Proposed SAFE
Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026.99 Additionally, EPA should recognize here, as it did
in its Proposed Rule for MY 2023-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, that "most
anthropogenic sources of PM2.5, including industrial sources, and light- and heavy-duty vehicle
sources, disproportionately affect people of color." 100 Finalizing strong standards will help
mitigate these harms. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 23-24]
98 EPA, Risk and Technology Review—Analysis of Socio-Economic Factors for Populations Living Near
Petroleum Refineries. Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, North
Carolina at 6 (Jan. 2014).
99 See NGO comment, Dkts. NHTSA-2018-0067, EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0283, at 232-34, available at
https://downloads.regulations.gOv/EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0283-5070/attachment_2.pdf. See also EIP,
Monitoring for Benzene at Refinery Fencelines, 10 Oil Refineries Across U.S. Emitted Cancer-Causing
Benzene Above EPA Action Level (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.environmentalintegrity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/Benzene-Report-2.6.20.pdf.
100 86 Fed. Reg. 43726, 43802 n. 213 (citing C.W. Tessum, D.A. Paolella, S.E. Chambliss, J.S. Apte, J.D.
Hill, J.D. Marshall, PM2.5 polluters disproportionately and systemically affect people of color in the
United States. Sci. Adv. 7, eabf4491 (2021)).
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Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
i. Additional reductions in PM pollution are urgently needed, especially in communities that
have long faced elevated pollution burdens. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 63]
Continuing to drive criteria pollutant reductions is particularly important for low-income
communities and communities of color, which have historically faced significant and elevated
harms from health-harming transportation pollution. As a result of housing discrimination and
other unjust policies, communities of color and low-income communities constitute a higher
percentage of the population near our roads and highways and therefore suffer disproportionately
from associated harmful pollution. 174 According to the American Lung Association's 2023
State of the Air report, people of color are almost four times more likely to breathe the most
polluted air when compared to white people. 175 A report by Moving Forward Network also
found that, on average, Asian and Black Americans are exposed to PM2.5 pollution that is 56
and 44 percent higher, respectively, than white Americans. 176 And an EDF analysis of the Bay
Area in California found that neighborhoods with higher percentages of residents of color
experienced double the rate of asthma from nitrogen dioxide (N02) -a pollutant often used as a
marker for transportation-related pollution. 177 Moreover, as described above, recent studies
have found light- duty vehicles, including light-duty trucks are responsible for a significant share
of pm- attributable premature mortalities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 63]
174 Gregory M. Rowangould, A Census of the US Near-Roadway Population: Public Health and
Environmental Justice Considerations, Transportation Research Part D 25, 59-67 (2013),
https://www.sciencedirect.eom/science/article/abs/pii/S1361920913001107.
175 American Lung Association, State of the Air Report 2023 (2023),
https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c- 6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf. (Attachment
C)
176 Jimmy O'dea, Zero-Emissions Technology for Freight: Heavy-Duty Trucks, Tools to Advocate for
Zero- Emissions Technology, Moving Forward Network (2020),
http://www.movingforwardnetwork.com/wp- content/uploads/2020/10/MFN_ZeroEmissionToolkit-l.pdf.
(Attachment X)
177 EDF, Air Pollution's Unequal Impacts in the Bay Area (2021),
https://www.edf.org/airqualitymaps/oakland/health-disparities.
Accordingly, finalizing the criteria standards EPA has proposed, including setting the PM
standard at a level that will encourage the use of GPFs, is critical to protecting health and
combatting environmental injustice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 63]
Organization: Governing for Impact and Evergreen Action (GFI)
In addition to contributing to the climate crisis, light and medium duty passenger vehicles are
responsible for emitting harmful pollutants including carbon monoxide, particulate matter, and
nitrogen oxides, which can cause or contribute to significant negative public health outcomes
such as lung and heart diseases. 15 These harmful health outcomes disproportionately affect low
income populations and communities of color, who are exposed to greater amounts of vehicle
pollution. 16 Unfortunately, these same communities are at the greatest risk of harm from the
impacts of climate change, and often lack sufficient resources or support to protect themselves
from these harmful impacts. 17 Strong transportation emissions standards — for both GHGs and
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criteria pollutants — will limit the present and imminent public health threats that vulnerable
populations face due to vehicle pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 2-3]
15 See U.S. Dep't of Transp., "Cleaner Air," https://www.transportation.gov/mission/health/cleaner-
air#:~:text=Vehicle%20emissions%20contribute%20to%20the,illnesses%2C%20including%20pneumonia
%20and%20b ronchitis (last visited June 15, 2023).
16 See, e.g., Maria Cecilia Pinto de Moura and David Reichmuth, "Inequitable Exposure to Air Pollution
from Vehicles in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic," Union of Concerned Scientists (Jun 21, 2019),
https://www.ucsusa.org/about/news/communities-color-breathe-66-more-air-pollution-vehicles.
17 See generally, EPA "Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States: A Focus on Six
Impacts," 430-R-21- 003 (2021), available at: https://www.epa.gov/cira/social-vulnerability-report.
Organization: GreenLatinos et al.
On behalf of the undersigned environmental justice groups, locality-based organizations, and
other advocacy groups, we urge the U.S. EPA to create the strongest possible standards to
mitigate detrimental impacts of heavy duty vehicle (HDV) and light- and medium-duty vehicle
(L/MDV) pollution on our communities. The current tailpipe emissions rulemaking can help
enable us to achieve a more sustainable, emissions-free future for all communities. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0789, p. 1]
Evidence makes clear how instrumental the swift adoption of stringent HDV and L/MDV
standards are for the future of Latino/e communities. The 2023 American Lung Association State
of the Air Report (https://www.lung.org/research/sota) finds that more than one-third (36%) of
people in the U.S. live in areas with failing grades for ozone or particulate pollution. This is
concerning, especially considering the same report found that people of color are 3.7 times more
likely than white people to live in a county with failing national air quality standards, putting our
communities at even greater risk to severe health impacts and premature death. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0789, p. 1]
Pollution from vehicles makes us sick and kills us. The data shows this over and over again.
We need long-term protective regulation now. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0789, p. 2]
For example, Latino/e children are three times more likely
(https://www.jpedhc.org/article/S0891-5245(06)00737-l/fulltext) than white children to live in
counties with low air quality. About 10% of Latino/e children
(https://www.edf.org/blog/2014/04/22/why-latinos-are-disproportionately-affected-asthma-and-
what-we-can-
do#:~:text=Today%20in%20the%20United%20States,from%20this%20chronic%20respiratory%
20illness.) suffer from asthma, and Latino/e children are 40% more likely to die from asthma
than non-Latino white children. These disparities have only increased over time relative to the air
quality standards set by the U.S. EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0789, p. 2]
Transportation is the largest source of pollution that fuels the climate crisis in the US.
Latino/e communities disproportionately suffer harm from tailpipe emissions. While Latino/es
are less likely to have access to a car (https://salud-america.org/research-latinos-face-big-public-
transportation-challenges/) and Latino/e workers commute by public transit nearly three times
(https://www.demos.org/research/move-thrive-public-transit-and-economic-opportunity-people-
color) the rate of white commuters, our community can face up to 75% higher rates of exposure
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(https://www.ucsusa.org/about/news/communities-color-breathe-66-more-air-pollution-vehicles)
to harmful pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0789, p. 2]
Today, we are at a critical nexus for clean transportation policy: We must drastically and
permanently reduce air pollution from vehicles and transform our transportation landscape.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0789, p. 2]
It is critical that the Biden administration pass regulations to reduce vehicle pollution and
accelerate the shift to EVs. This action is crucial to achieving environmental justice. By
implementing stringent HDV and L/MDV standards, the U.S. EPA will act on the Biden
Administration's stated commitment to environmental justice,
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/briefing-room/2022/05/23/delivering-historic-and-long-
overdue-investments-in-disadvantaged-communities/) which the White House reaffirmed in
April 2023 with a new Executive Order, Revitalizing Our Nation's Commitment to
Environmental Justice for All. (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2023/04/21/fact-sheet-president-biden-signs-executive-order-to-revitalize-our-nations-
commitment-to-environmental-justice-for-all/) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0789, p. 2]
The strongest possible HDV and L/MDV standards will help reach the urgent goal to cut
greenhouse gas emissions by 60% by 2030 and will put American cars and trucks on a clear path
towards achieving 100% zero emission electric vehicle (EV) sales by 2035 or earlier. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0789, p. 2]
The Biden administration's leadership in setting strong HDV and L/MDV standards is
instrumental to mitigate the inequitable tailpipe pollution experienced by Latino/e and other
frontline communities, which triggers asthma and other sometimes fatal respiratory illnesses.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0789, p. 2]
We need the cleanest possible vehicles now. Our lives literally depend on it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0789, p. 2]
Organization: Interfaith Power & Light
It is critical to remember that the climate crisis is a challenge of racial, economic, and
generational justice, and these rules target air pollution that disproportionately harms
marginalized communities of color and low-wealth communities that reside in counties closest to
major freeways. Implementing the strongest light-duty vehicle standards is a matter of
environmental justice, and these standards would deliver massive emission reductions and life-
saving relief to frontline communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0530, p. 1]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
Health benefits and environmental justice modeling recommendations
In evaluating the health benefits of the proposed rule, it is critical to consider the evidence of
increases in PM from recent model year vehicles. The health benefits assessment included in
EPA's proposal uses emission factors from Motor Vehicle Emission Simulator (MOVES), which
likely underestimates PM emissions from recent model year vehicles. Figure 15 shows a
comparison between EPA MOVES emission factors and remote sensing UV smoke averages by
model year, shown as a percent change from each sources respective model year 2005
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averages. 140 From model years 2006-2015, year-to-year changes, shown in the slopes of the
lines, are relatively consistent between EPA MOVES and remote sensing data. However, from
model year 2015 on, the trends diverge. For light-duty passenger trucks, the EPA MOVES PM
emission factors sharply decline while the remote sensing data show an increase in UV smoke
averages. 141 Though less significant, a similar trend is observed for passenger cars, with the
EPA MOVES PM emission factor continuing to decline after 2015 and remote sensing UV
smoke averages showing a slight increase. These findings suggest that the modeled air quality
and health benefits of the proposed rule may be underestimated when considering the large
benefits of replacing 2015-2020 model year vehicles with future vehicles meeting the proposed
PM emission limits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 53-54]
140 EPA MOVES emission factors are converted from fuel-specific to distance-specific emission factors
for this comparison. This is done using real-world fuel economy data from EPA Automotive Trends report,
the same source used to convert the remote sensing emissions from fuel-specific to distance-specific.
141 Light-duty passenger truck emission trends from EPA MOVES are compared to light-duty truck (LDT)
emission trends from remote sensing data. Similarly, passenger car emission trends from EPA MOVES are
compared to light-duty vehicle (LDV) emission trends from remote sensing data.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 15. Percent change in distance-specific PM
emission factor from EPA MOVES and remote sensing (RS) UV smoke measurements from
Colorado (CO) and Virginia (VA) sources by model year, compared to model year 2005. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 53-54]
Additionally, a full assessment of relative air quality and health benefits across demographics,
as done for the heavy-duty multi-pollutant rule, is recommended for this light-duty and medium-
duty multi-pollutant rule. It is widely understood that heavy-duty vehicles contribute to racial
disparities in exposure to air pollution, and EPA reported the projected air quality impacts across
demographics in their finalized heavy-duty multi-pollutant rule. Inequities in air pollution
exposure exist for light-duty vehicle emissions as well. One study finds that on a national level,
people of color are exposed to 46% more ambient PM2.5 from light-duty gasoline vehicles than
White people. 142 This is a greater disparity than that of HDVs; the same study finds that people
of color exposed to 35% higher ambient PM2.5 levels from heavy-duty diesel vehicles compared
to White people. Additionally, the health benefits from the heavy-duty multipollutant rule, as
projected by the EPA, are on similar scales to that of the proposed light-duty and medium-duty
vehicle rule. 143 Thus, as the environmental justice and health implications of the light-duty and
medium-duty vehicle rule are significant, a full assessment of the projected distribution of
changes in PM2.5 and ozone concentrations by geography, race/ethnicity, and income is
recommended for the finalized rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 53-54]
142 Tessum, C et al. (2021). PM2.5 Polluters Disproportionately and Systemically Affect People of Color
in the United States," Science Advances 7, no. 18: eabf4491, https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abf4491.
143 EPA's proposed light-duty and medium-duty rule is estimated to result in $63 billion and $280 billion
(for 7% and 3% discount rates, respectively) in total monetized health benefits from 2027 to 2055. EPA's
finalized heavy-duty multipollutant rule is projected to result in $53-150 billion and $91-260 billion (for
7% and 3% discount rates, respectively) in total monetized health benefits from 2027 to 2045.
Benefits and cost-effectiveness of the proposal
The LDV and MDV proposal is projected to reduce 15,000 tons of PM2.5, 66,000 tons of
NOx, and 220,000 tons of hydrocarbons from 2027 to 2055.144 These benefits are compared to
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2055 levels without the proposal. Based on the previous section on Particulate Matter emission
standards, health benefits associated with PM reductions could be greater than EPA's
projections. The proposed standards would reduce air pollution near-road where affected
populations are often low-income or communities of color. Reducing these emissions will
provide cleaner air and are critical to improving public health. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569,
p. 55]
144 US EPA. (2023). Multi-Pollutant emission standards for Model years 2027 and later Light-duty and
Medium-duty vehicles Program Announcement, https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-
04/420f23009.pdf
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Arizona Interfaith Power & Light, (web)
(216 signatures)
As a person of faith and conscience, I recognize that we have a moral obligation to cut carbon
emissions that harm our Shared Home. People of faith and conscience are ready for bold, new
transportation solutions, and cleaner cars and light trucks are an integral step towards addressing
climate change for our communities, future generations, and our Sacred Earth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0692]
I am asking EPA to move quickly and finalize the strongest possible light-duty vehicle (LDV)
standards. This proposal is a first step and the EPA needs to finish the job by finalizing the
strongest possible standards this year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0692]
In order for the U.S. to meet our Paris Climate Agreement goals we need the strongest
possible long-term standards—beyond model year 2026— that will put the country on a path to a
100% zero-emission new vehicle sales target by 2035. Not implementing the strongest possible
light-duty vehicle standards would create major negative implications for our country's climate
goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0692]
We must also keep in mind that these rules target air pollution that disproportionately harms
marginalized communities of color and low-wealth communities. For example, "Black and
Hispanic Americans are exposed to 56 and 63 percent more particulate matter pollution,
respectively, than they produce." This is especially concerning for people of faith, as all religions
call on us to treat our neighbors with respect, dignity, and compassion. Implementing the
strongest LDV standards is a matter of environmental justice, and these standards would deliver
massive emission reductions and life-saving relief to frontline communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0692]
In addition, electrifying passenger vehicles will be key to improving air quality and saving
lives across the nation. More than 119 million American residents currently live in areas with
unhealthy levels of air pollution. In 2020, the national passenger vehicle fleet represented
approximately 94% of the nation's on-road vehicles and generated over 33,400 tons of fine
particles annually, which are so small that they easily enter our bloodstream and harm our health.
It is also critical that standards require tighter limits on internal combustion engine vehicles in
order to continually make these cars cleaner as manufacturers transition to zero- emission
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0692]
So again, on behalf of millions of people of faith and conscience around the country, I urge
the EPA to move quickly and finalize the strongest possible light-duty vehicle standards in order
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to reap the benefits of light-duty vehicle electrification and accelerate the transition to zero-
emission vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0692]
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown (44,335 signatures)
I am a supporter of the League of Conservation Voters, and I am writing to ask that the EPA
set the strongest rules possible to cut dangerous pollution from trucks and passenger vehicles. I
urge you to ensure that light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicle standards accelerate greater
zero-emission vehicle adoption, pushing beyond what is expected from federal clean energy
investments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1704]
Emissions from cars and trucks both contribute to climate change and impact my health and
the health of communities across the country. Low-wealth communities and communities of
color are often hit hardest, as are any neighborhoods near highways, freight hubs and anywhere
with lots of traffic. These communities deserve a chance to live in a society where access to
clean air is a fundamental right. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1704]
We encourage you to finalize the strongest standards possible that will open the door to a
brighter future for all. Please adopt strong vehicle emissions standards that bring us to 100%
clean vehicles sold by 2035. Or else help us all to buy an electric vehicle, because those things
are expensive! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1704]
Organization: Mayor Becky Daggett, City of Flagstaff, Arizona et al.
Critical pollution reductions
In 2020, the transportation sector contributed 27 percent of total GHG emissions in the United
States—more than any other single sector. Transport also contributes over 55 percent of our
nation's total nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions. NOx and particulate matter pollution pose serious
health risks, leading to devastating human health impacts including asthma, other respiratory
issues, and even premature death. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 2]
Fast-tracking robust car and truck standards is critical for the United States to meet its GHG
targets over the coming decade, meet Clean Air Act requirements and provide long-overdue
protections for environmental justice communities. We believe that such standards would be
consistent with the U.S. nationally determined contribution to the Paris Agreement, under which
the United States committed to cut economy-wide GHG emissions by 50 to 52 percent in 2030,
compared to 2005 levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 2]
Stakeholder involvement
EPA must incorporate a robust and responsive stakeholder engagement process— particularly
for frontline communities. Transportation is a leading source of air pollution and
disproportionately harms people on lower incomes and people of color. EPA must work with
environmental justice communities to ensure they are included in decision-making processes.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 2]
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Organization: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
The proposed standards would advance environmental justice by decreasing vehicle emissions
of non- greenhouse gas pollutants that contribute to ambient concentrations of ozone, particulate
matter, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, and air toxics. Reducing emissions of these from
vehicles through stringent emissions standards is important for protecting the health of
communities near busy roadways. MPCA research demonstrates that communities of concern for
environmental justice are disproportionately exposed to air pollution from transportation.3
National studies have identified significant disparities in exposure to nitrogen oxides (NOX)
based on race: researchers at the University of Minnesota estimate that people of color in
America experience 38% more NOX pollution where they live than white Americans.4 People in
these communities are also often more vulnerable to air pollution health impacts due to
underlying structural inequities, such as limited access to health care, housing insecurity, and
systemic racism. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, p. 3]
3 Pratt et al. (2015) Traffic, Air Pollution, Minority and Socio-Economic Status: Addressing Inequities in
Exposure and Risk. Int. J. Res. Public Health, 12(5): 5355-5372. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerphl20505355
4 Clark LP, Millet DB, Marshall JD (2014) National Patterns in Environmental Injustice and Inequality:
Outdoor N02 Air Pollution in the United States. PLoS ONE 9(4): e94431.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0094431
Organization: National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC)
Representing two thirds of the providers of America's homeowners' insurance, NAMIC is
respectfully concerned with and reaching out about statements made by the Environmental
Protection Agency regarding potential differential treatment of insurance policyholders or
applicants. Specifically, the EPA, in submissions to the Federal Register, appears to assert that
individuals within referenced Environmental Justice populations (defined as people of color and
low-income populations in at least some EPA Federal Register notices) have less or limited
access to homeowner insurance. Examples of such EPA publications follow: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5092, pp.1-2]
- Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and
Medium-Duty Vehicles on 05/05/2023,
- Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles-Phase 3 on 04/27/2023,
- Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards on 12/30/2021,
- Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards on 08/10/2021, and,
- Standards of Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources and Emissions
Guidelines for Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate Review on 11/15/2021.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5092, pp. 1-2]
In its posted online EJ 2020 Glossary, the EPA defines
[https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/ej-2020-glossary] "Environmental Justice" (EJ) as
follows: "The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color,
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culture, national origin, income, and educational levels with respect to the development,
implementation, and enforcement of protective environmental laws, regulations, and policies."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5092, pp. 1-2]
By presenting statements about homeowners' insurance in the above referenced publications
which feature discussions of Environmental Justice, the EPA seems to imply that potential
insurance availability or affordability issues may be linked to EJ. Yet, the EPA does not offer
specific references or "scientific assessments" on insurance coverage in such areas to support the
implication that homeowner insurance is not being made available in some way based on race,
color, culture, national origin. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5092, pp. 1-2]
Respectfully, NAMIC asks the EPA to refrain from such charges regarding homeowners'
insurance in its publications moving forward. NAMIC is greatly concerned that an agency of the
federal government with minimal expertise in homeowners' insurance would infer such morally
repugnant allegations. The Administration's requirement of a "whole of government" focus on
climate and equity does not empower federal agencies to broadly impute blame, particularly in
the absence of legal authority in an industry that is highly regulated at the state level. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-5092, pp. 1-2]
The Information Quality Act passed through Section 515 of the Consolidated Appropriations
Act [PLAW-106publ554.pdf (govinfo.gov)], 2001 requires that each federal agency
disseminating information ensure and maximize the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of
information (including statistical information) disseminated by the agency, and to allow affected
persons to seek and obtain correction of information disseminated by the agency. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-5092, pp. 1-2]
If the EPA has rigorous scientific assessments to support these statements, NAMIC would
greatly appreciate the EPA sharing that information with us. However, if the EPA does not have
such scientific assessments , we would respectfully request that the EPA discontinue the
inclusion of such statements is support of proposed rules of a federal regulatory agency. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5092, p. 2]
Organization: National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)
Bringing high octane fuel to market in the form of midlevel ethanol blends will be
significantly less capital-intensive than attempting to increase blend stock octane with
hydrocarbon components at refineries. It will also be incredibly cleaner. The avoided production
cost and offset emissions lower end-costs to consumers, reducing both economic costs and social
costs related to health and environment, key considerations in advancing environmental justice
and avoiding adverse impacts from oil refineries on communities that have historically borne
them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 7]
Organization: National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA)
Lastly, to the degree through which this proposal could increase the development and
permitting of domestic critical mineral mining projects to support LDV and MDV battery
production, NPCA asks that EPA and the administration as a whole take necessary steps to
mitigate or entirely avoid negative impacts on overburdened populations and sensitive
ecosystems. This includes promoting practices such as critical mineral recycling, as well as
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overseeing the responsible citing of mining projects to limit harms to environmental justice
communities, indigenous communities, and ecosystems within our beloved national parks. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0607, pp. 4-5]
Organization: National Tribal Air Association (NTAA)
Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Mitigation
The acute and continuous impacts of climate change on Native Americans and Alaska Native
Villagers are well documented. Unfortunately, new consequences of this global crisis continue to
be revealed. For multiple reasons including vulnerability and geographic constraints, Tribal
communities are disproportionately suffering from these changes. The U.S. Fourth National
Climate Assessment (NCA4)1 noted, in part, that "Climate change increasingly threatens
indigenous communities' livelihoods, economies, health, and cultural identities by disrupting
interconnected social, physical, and ecological systems." A more focused examination of Tribal
needs to address the impacts of climate change is presented in 2021 publication The Status of
Tribes and Climate Change (STACC)2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, pp. 1-2]
1 USGCRP, 2018: Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States
2 The Status of Tribes and Climate Change (STACC), Institute for Tribal Environmental Professionals,
2021
The NTAA has a long history of information sharing with EPA and advocacy for reducing
emissions of greenhouse gases. Multiple reports, policy statements, and comment letters are
compiled and accessible on our organization's website3. NTAA's Status of Tribal Air Reports
(STAR) including STAR 20224 document climate change impacts on Tribal lands and people.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, pp. 1-2]
3 National Tribal Air Association, www.ntaatribalair.org
4 Status of Tribal Air Report, National Tribal Air Association 2022
Criteria Pollutant Emissions Standards
Many residents in Indian country continue to be exposed to concentrations of ozone and
particulate matter that exceed current National Ambient Air Quality Standards. With a few
exceptions, the sources of this pollution are outside the jurisdiction and control of Tribal
governments. It is imperative that the EPA and applicable state and local authorities take all
necessary measures to return Tribal communities to healthy air quality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0504, p. 2]
The proposed emissions standards for new light-duty and medium-duty vehicles for non-
methane organic gases plus nitrogen oxides (NMOG+NOx) constitute one key step in reducing
the impacts from the largest source of these ozone-precursor pollutants. Concurrently, reduced
emissions of NMOG+NOx will reduce ambient air concentrations of particulate matter, and
PM2.5 more specifically. The NTAA supports the proposed standards for these pollutants across
the applicable vehicle categories and looks forward to healthier air quality in our many impacted
communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, p. 2]
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Organization: Our Children's Trust (OCT)
4. Strengthening the GHG emission standards for passenger cars and light trucks is needed
in order to protect the fundamental constitutional rights of children and future generations,
particularly children within environmental justice communities, including communities of color,
low-income communities, and indigenous communities. Executive Order 13990's policy
directive clearly states "to listen to the science; to improve public health and protect our
environment; to ensure access to clean air and water; ... to reduce greenhouse gas emissions[.]"
The science is clear. The world must stop fossil fuel emissions as soon as possible, every ton
matters and causes more danger, 5 and the transportation sector must be an early target for
decarbonization. A key tool for EPA to facilitate emission reductions is through strong GHG
emission standards for passenger cars and light trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, pp. 2-
3]
5 IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, SPM-37 (2021)
("Every tonne of CO? emissions adds to global warming.").
The Earth's Energy Is Imbalanced and thus the EPA's Must Cease Infringing the
Constitutional Rights of Youth. EPA has Public Trust and Constitutional Obligations to use its
Authority to Protect the Atmosphere. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 3]
Our Children's Trust represents twenty-one youth plaintiffs, including eleven Black, Brown,
and Indigenous youth, in the constitutional climate lawsuit, Juliana v. United States, in which the
Administrator, in his official capacity, and EPA are defendants. This case asserts, and courts
have found, that, through the government's past and ongoing affirmative actions that cause
climate change, it has violated the youngest generation's constitutional rights to life, liberty,
property, and equal protection of the law, as well as failed to protect essential public trust
resources. In this litigation, federal courts have affirmed "that the federal government has long
promoted fossil fuel use despite knowing that it can cause catastrophic climate change" 16 and
"has long understood the risks of fossil fuel use and increasing carbon dioxide emissions". 17
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that there was evidence showing that the federal
government was a substantial factor in causing the youth's constitutional injuries because "[a]
significant portion of [GHG] emissions occur in this country; the United States accounted for
over 25% of worldwide emissions from 1850 to 2012, and currently accounts for about 15%." 18
Without immediate effective action, our children and future generations will continue to suffer
injury with long-lasting and potentially irreversible consequences. 19 These judicially-
recognized facts should guide EPA's policies and practices so they can identify, and alter, those
policies that exacerbate American youth's existing climate change injuries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0542, p. 5]
16 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2020).
17 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020).
18 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1169 (9th Cir. 2020).
19 See Assessing "Dangerous Climate Change"; James Hansen et al., Ice Melt, Sea Level Rise and
Superstorms: Evidence from Paleoclimate Data, Climate Modeling, and Modern Observations that 2°C
Global Warming Could be Dangerous, 16 Atmos. Chem. & Phys. 3761 (2016); U.S. Global Change
Research Program, Fourth National Climate Assessment, Vol. II (2018); David I. Armstrong McKay et al.,
Exceeding 1.5°C Global Warming Could Trigger Multiple Climate Tipping Points, 377 Science eabn7950
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(2022); Nico Wunderling et al., Global Warming Overshoots Increase Risks of Climate Tipping Cascades
in a Network Model, 13 Nature Climate Change 75 (2023). Note that many researchers use the temperature
targets set during the Paris Accord as a point of reference, not as a sanctioning of those levels of average
planetary heating.
Under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the government is restrained from
engaging in conduct that infringes upon fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property, and
equal protection of the law, all of which includes a climate system that sustains human life and
liberty. Under the Public Trust Doctrine, embedded in our Constitution and other founding
documents, and in the very sovereignty of our Nation, U.S. residents (both present and future,
i.e., Posterity) have a right to access and use crucial natural resources, like air and water. The
U.S. government, and its executive agencies, have fiduciary duties as trustees to manage, protect,
and prevent substantial impairment to our country's vital natural resources which the government
holds in trust for present and future generations. 20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 5]
20 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1254 (D. Or. 2016).
Our children and future generations are already suffering injury with long-lasting and
potentially irreversible consequences at present levels of heating. Moreover, all young people
seeking environmental and climate justice, especially youth from frontline and environmental
justice communities that have contributed the least to emissions and have long suffered from
systemic environmental racism and social and economic injustices, must not only have their
voices heard, but have their rights protected. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, pp. 5-6]
To learn more about how young people are being harmed, please watch the award-winning,
independent feature-length documentary film now streaming on Netflix, YOUTH v GOV. These
stories constitute just a small sample of what American children are experiencing due to the
climate crisis the federal government continues to exacerbate by and through its national energy
system. We request that the EPA incorporates the protection of children's fundamental rights to a
safe climate system, defined by the best available science, into future rulemaking, policies, and
initiatives. Human laws must respect the laws of nature; our government ignores the natural laws
of energy imbalance and climate destabilization at the peril of our children. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0542, p. 6]
Organization: South Coast Air Quality Management District
4. Consider special provisions to increase ZEV adoption in environmental justice
communities. Environmental justice (EJ) communities are disproportionately impacted by air
pollution due to proximity to goods movement corridors such as ports and railyards as well as
freeways. Further, many residents in EJ communities are classified in low- or moderate-income
groups, and struggle to afford ZEVs which are still more expensive than conventional engine
vehicles. We believe special provisions and incentives should be considered for easier access to
ZEVs by these communities. For example, ACC II includes a provision for manufacturers to
receive an additional 0.5 credit for each ZEV sold at a discount to qualifying communities. Also,
manufacturers can earn an additional 0.1 credit per each sale of lower-priced vehicles that low-
income community residents can afford. These incentive provisions in the ACC II regulation not
only provide easier access for EJ community members but also lead to accelerated deployment of
ZEVs and PHEVs in communities with the highest pollution burden and public health
need. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0659, p. 3]
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Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
There are also major economic costs to climate change, and studies have found that the future
costs will be unequally distributed across the United States.28 Relative to the rest of the nation,
the South will face the largest economic losses from climate change, with low-income and
minority communities particularly affected.29 Lower income counties in the South may lose
between 5 and 20 percent of gross domestic product per year—compared to an average yearly
loss of 1.2 percent nationally—for every additional degree of warming by the 2080s.30 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, p. 4]
28 See, e.g., Hsiang, et al., supra note 9, at 1363.
29 Id.
30 Id. See also Brad Plumer & Najda Popovich, As Climate Changes, Southern States Will Suffer More
Than Others,
N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/29/climate/southern-states-worse- climate-
effects.html. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, p. 4]
Exposure to this type of pollution is not equally distributed across all populations in the
United States, and this inequity raises serious environmental justice concerns. Compared to
national averages, a higher percentage of low-income and minority communities live along
routes that experience high volumes of light- and medium-duty vehicle traffic,48 increasing
these communities' exposure to tailpipe pollution and its harmful effects. One study estimated
that, even among populations living within 100 meters of major roadways, minorities are
exposed to up to 15 percent more PM2.5 pollution and up to 35 percent more nitrogen dioxide
(N02) pollution than their White counterparts.49 This disproportionate burden stems in part
from our nation's long history of discriminatory zoning and land use policies and practices,
including those implemented in the South, that resulted in redlining and the intentional siting of
infrastructure projects through poor, minority neighborhoods.50 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0591, p. 6]
48 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicle, 88 Fed. Reg. 29184, 29199 (May 5, 2023).
49 Alejandro Valencia, Mark Cerre & Saravanan Arunachalam, A hyperlocal hybrid data fusion near-road
PM2.5 and N02 annual risk and environmental justice assessment across the United States, 18 PLOS ONE
1 (2023).
50 See, e.g., Gabi Velasco, How Transportation Planners Can Advance Racial Equity and Environmental
Justice, URBAN INST. (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/how-transportation-planners-
can-advance-racial- equity-and-environmental-justice.
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
These negative effects of air pollution disproportionately harm the most vulnerable
populations, including children, the elderly, and residents in low-income and disadvantaged
communities.70 Indeed, two-thirds of Americans who live near high-volume roads are people of
color and the median household income in these places is roughly 20% below the national
average.71 Repeatedly, peer reviewed, government and inter- governmental studies point to
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electrification as key to addressing criteria air pollutants, improving air quality, and lower the
risk of respiratory illness.72 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 10]
70 U.N. Environmental Programme, Young and old, air pollution affects the most vulnerable (Oct. 16,
2018). available at h ttps://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/blogpost/young-and-old-air-pollution-affects-
most-v
ulnerable#:~:text=Since%20children%20are%20still%20growing,of%20conditions%20such%20as%20asth
ma.
71 Union of Concerned Scientists, Delivering Opportunity: How Electric Buses and Trucks Can Create
Jobs and Improve Public Health in California," (Oct. 11,2016), at 10. available at h
ttps://www.ucsusa.org/resources/delivering-opportunity.
72 See e.g., International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), AR 6 Climate Change 2022: Impacts,
Adaptation and Vulnerability (Feb. 28, 2022) at 7-120 available at h
ttps://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg2/pdf/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf; USGCRP, National
Climate Assessment 4, Volume II, Chapter 29 at Box 29.2 available at h
ttps://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/29/https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/29/ (In
transportation, for example, switching away from petroleum to potentially lower GHG fuels, such as
electricity and hydrogen, is projected to reduce local air pollution. In California, drastic GHG emissions
reductions have been estimated to improve air quality and reduce local particulate matter emissions
associated with freight transport that disproportionately impact disadvantaged communities").
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
NHTSA estimates that the decline in new vehicle sales would result in up to 812 additional
deaths on the road each year, 16,206 more injuries, and almost 50,000 more crashes involving
property damage.24 This is because fewer people would be able to afford new and later-model
used cars, which are safer than old cars. EPA's proposed regulations would make the situation
worse. EPA does not account for this in the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 5-6]
This increase in prices caused by successive reductions in emissions contradicts NHTSA's
core values,25 namely leading "the Nation by setting the motor vehicle and highway safety
agenda," and serving "as the catalyst for addressing critical safety issues that affect the motor
vehicle and highway safety communities." Deaths and injuries from the new rules would be
concentrated among low-income Americans, disproportionately minorities, who would pay the
price of the new rule: due to the price increases, they would buy fewer new cars and fewer later-
model used cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 5-6]
24 Ibid., pp. 25894-5.
25 U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, "NHTSA's Core
Values," https://www.nhtsa.gov/about-nhtsa/nhtsas-core-values (accessed May 1, 2023).
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
I. EPA fails to adequately consider the environmental justice impacts of the proposed
rule.
Disadvantaged communities already face significant access barriers to electric vehicles, such
as: higher upfront costs to electric vehicle ownership; a lack of existing charging infrastructure
available to them in low-income, minority populated, and rural areas; and costlier and time-
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intensive charging due to a greater reliance on public charging infrastructure, particularly for
individuals living in multi-family housing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 55]
EPA's EJ analysis must be thorough and inclusive of factors that may impact the price of
transported goods, such as ZEV affordability, the availability of public charging, reasonable
charging practices, and a lifecycle analysis of electric vehicles and power generation emissions.
Without doing so, EPA runs the risk of intensifying price disparities and access to transport
relative to the baseline for EJ communities. EPA's EJ analysis must be thorough and inclusive of
electric vehicle affordability, the availability of public charging, reasonable charging practices,
and a lifecycle analysis of electric vehicles and power generation emissions. Without doing so,
EPA runs the risk of intensifying price disparities and access to transport relative to the baseline
for EJ communities. These impacts can be both quantitively and qualitatively characterized.300
EPA's silence on these disparities is especially worrisome given EPA's prior binding
commitments to EJ analysis for the benefit of disadvantaged and low-income communities.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 55]
300 See, i.e., supra.
To date, the target electric vehicle customer base for OEMs consists of "mostly male, high-
income, highly educated, homeowners, who have multiple vehicles in their household and have
access to charging at home."301 Additionally, according to the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), "the rate of EV adoption in rural areas is roughly 40% lower than it is in
urban areas, and EV charging infrastructure expansion has mostly been concentrated in cities and
along major highways".302As a result, electric vehicle ownership remains primarily
concentrated in affluent, large metropolitan and urban areas.303 By contrast, the supporting
electricity generation necessary to support EPA's proposal is predominantly located in more
remote, rural regions that are geographically isolated from urban centers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 55-56]
301 Scott Hardman*, Kelly L. Fleming, Eesha Khare, and Mahmoud M. Ramadan, A perspective on equity
in the transition to electric vehicles, MIT SCIENCE POLICY REVIEW (Aug. 30, 2021) available at
https://sciencepolicyreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-electric-vehicles/.
302 U.S. Department of Transportation, Community Benefits of Rural Vehicle Electrification (last updated
February 2, 2022), available at https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-benefits-and-
challenges/community- benefits.
303 See, i.e., Shuocheng Guo, Eleftheria Kontou, Disparities and equity issues in electric vehicles rebate
allocation, Energy Policy, Volume 154, 2021, 112291, ISSN 0301-4215, available at
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112291.
EPA's proposal directly impacts EJ communities by contributing to additional, local
emissions to meet electric vehicle charging demand. Consequently, in theory, EJ communities
incur an incremental burden in exchange for the subsidization of electric vehicles for more
affluent consumers. And this subsidy occurs at expense of our most vulnerable communities
burdened by emissions as a direct result of the proposal, with no corresponding benefit, since
electric vehicles are likely to remain concentrated in affluent areas. Further, these communities
remain unable to afford EPA's chosen mode of transport and are particularly vulnerable to rising
electricity costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 55-56]
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Notwithstanding EPA's hope that its proposal may serve to incentivize the purchases of
electric vehicles, these vehicles are significantly more expensive on average than their ICE
vehicle counterparts and unaffordable for many households. These are costs are also likely
understated as each electric vehicle already enjoys thousands of dollars' worth of Federal and
state subsidies, which are ultimately funded by taxpayers. Additionally, an automakers' ability to
sell electric vehicles to consumers depends on substantial price subsidies in the form of credit
support. EPA ignores the reality that many EJ stakeholders are currently unable to afford the
upfront costs of purchasing an electric vehicle in the first place. With the cost of transition
minerals expected to escalate exponentially in the coming years as a function of limited supply
and increasing demand, the costs to manufacture and purchase electric vehicles will likely
rise. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 56]
EPA should also consider the effects of the proposal on electricity prices, as low-income
populations often spend a larger percentage of their earnings on essential utilities compared to
the rest of the United States. Reliance on electric vehicles has been shown to spur increases in
load and demand during peak periods, which impact electricity prices. Because EPA lacks
expertise in the area of electrical grid management and economics, EPA should consult with
other agencies and credible experts in these areas in order to adequately evaluate these
impacts.304 EPA should ensure that the proposal meets reliability and affordability criteria and
helps EJ communities make informed decisions about their own energy needs. Additionally,
EPA's EJ assessment fails to acknowledge the likelihood that many owners will lack access to
residential charging, which will substantially increase their operating expenses. Consistent
reliance on fast charging also shortens electric vehicle battery life, resulting in a need to replace
the battery and/or the vehicle more frequently. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
304 See, West Virginia, 142 S.Ct. at 2612-13 (stating that EPA admitted that opining on trends in
electricity transmission, distribution, and storage requires technical and policy expertise not traditionally
needed in EPA regulatory development and finding that there is little reason to think Congress assigned
such decisions to the EPA).
If EJ is truly a commitment for EPA, it should carefully consider criticisms like those leveled
by The Two Hundred, which point out the disproportionate impacts to working and minority
communities as a result of California's climate approach regarding electrified transport; those
impacts and concerns remain true, and indeed are magnified under the proposed standards.305
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
305 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, The Two Hundred for Homeownership, et al. v. California Air Resources
Board, et al., No. 1:22-CV-01474.
It is critical from the outset to design standards to minimize the potential for price shocks and
supply disruptions. As written, the proposal ultimately benefits electric vehicle manufacturers at
the expense of disadvantaged communities by subsidizing unaffordable transportation that is not
fit for the purposes of commuting to and from EJ communities. At minimum, EPA should
perform a thorough EJ assessment specific to its LDV proposal that is comprehensive of both
transport challenges and impacts faced by EJ stakeholders and the government-wide Justice40
Initiative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
The average purchase price of EV cars in 2022 was approximately $65,000, which is more
than what 46 percent of American households earn in income in a year.306 While the average
"used" EV sold for $42,895 in March of 2023.307 While EPA's DRIA anecdotally indicates that
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"emerging consensus suggests that purchase price parity is likely to occur by the mid-2020's for
some vehicle segments and models"308, Ford CEO Jim Farley told attendees at its 2023 Capital
Markets Days that EV cost parity may not come until after 2030.309 Moreover US auto makers
are focusing their efforts on producing higher priced electric SUVs and trucks, including Fords
$100,000 F150 Lightening Platinum310 and GM's announcement that its luxury brands, Cadillac
and Buick, will be its first all-electric product lineups.311 While smaller EV's like the Chevy
Bolt, touted by the Biden Administration as being affordable alternatives, are being
discontinued.312 The reality is that most middle- and lower-income families simply cannot
afford to purchase a new or used EV, even when taking into account available tax incentives and
rebates. In fact, middle - and lower -income families are more likely to purchase older used
vehicle, due to their lower upfront costs, and to hold onto those vehicles for longer periods.313
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
306 Kelly Blue Book and Cox Automotive Average Transaction Prices Reports; and Average, Median, Top
1% and all United States Household Income Percentiles, DQYJD
307 What to know about buying a used electric vehicle as more hit the auto sale market, CNBC, May 21,
2023
308 EPA DRIA, 3.1.3.1,4-15
309 Ford CEO says EV cost parity may not come until after 2030, Reuters, May 31, 2023
310 https://www.ford.com/trucks/fl50/fl50-lightning/models/
311 Cadillac and Buick will be GM's first all-EV brands, Automotive News, July 1, 2022
312 GM Killed the Chevy Bolt- and the dream of a small, affordable EV, The Verge, April 26, 2023
313 Supporting Lower-Income Households' Purchase of Clean Vehicles: Implications From California-
wide Survey Results, UCLA Luskin Center for Innovation, 2020
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
Affordability/Environmental Justice: EPA is assuming that although the retail price of EVs is
typically higher than for comparable ICEVs at this time, the price difference will narrow or
disappear as the cost of batteries and other components fall in the coming years. EPA is taking a
huge leap of faith in the ability of EV manufacturers to innovate in time for the arbitrary
deadlines imposed by the president and EPA through this rule. Market projections six months
from now are difficult, much less nine years into the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p.
7]
But recent evidence suggests that EPA's assumption is well off the mark. EV battery costs
soared in 2022 due to rising raw material and battery component costs. As countries around the
world attempt to reach similar arbitrary targets for EVs and renewable energy, the competition
for limited supplies of raw materials will likewise grow. 13 Prices for rare earth minerals have
increased between 60% and 400% while prices for lithium have increased by over 300% since
2020.14 Further, a U.K. study has found that EVs depreciate at a rate of 51% compared to 37%
for gasoline cars, losing £15,220 ($18,786) versus £9,901 ($12,400).15 Clearly EPA's estimate
that".. .the average upfront per-vehicle cost to meet the proposed standards to be approximately
$1,200 in MY 2032, as shown in Table 7.131..." is greatly underestimated. EPA mentions but
then dismisses the impact on low-income households by just assuming that manufacturers, "will
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continue to offer a variety of models at different price points..and that they will save on fuel
costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 7]
13
"EV battery costs have soared in 2022, hampering EV affordability," Stephen Edelstein, Green Car
Reports, December 8, 2022.
14 Current Strategic Metals Prices, Strategic Metals Invest and D aily Metals Prices, both accessed July 5,
2023.
15 "Electric cars losing value twice as fast as petrol vehicles - drivers may lose £25,000," Felix Reeves,
Express, May 3, 2023.
Organization: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
In this proposal, EPA concludes that people who live or attend school near major roadways
are more likely to be non-White, Hispanic, or have a low socioeconomic status. As such, these
populations are expected to directly benefit from reduced tailpipe emissions of criteria pollutants
and mobile source air toxics that would result from these standards. EPA also notes that poorer
or predominantly non-White communities can be especially vulnerable to climate change
impacts, which these proposed GHG standards would help address. Reducing greenhouse gases,
ozone, and particulate matter pollution from on-road vehicles will improve health outcomes
throughout Wisconsin. Most importantly, it will take a critical step toward improving air quality
in areas overburdened by pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 2]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
It's also critical to highlight that tailpipe emissions from LMD ICEVs do not affect all
communities equally. The intersections of negative health outcomes, their link to transportation-
related pollution, and the ties to race are well-documented. In 2017, a national study found that
in 2010, people of color experienced 37% more NOX exposure than white populations and had
2.5 times higher concentrations of NOX within their communities. 64 Furthermore, had these
communities of color been exposed to the same level of NOX as white populations, 5,000 deaths
from heart disease could have been prevented. Likewise, the American Lung Association
estimates that people of color are 3.2 times more likely to live in a county with at least one
pollution-related "failing grade."65 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 15-16]
64 "Changes in Transportation Related Air Pollution Exposures by Race, Ethnicity, and Socioeconomic
Status: Outdoor Nitrous Oxide in the US in 2000 and 2010", Lara P. Clark, et. al., (September 14, 2017)
https: //ehp. niehs. nih. gov/doi/10.1289/EHP9 5 9
65 Id. at footnote 62
A study conducted in New York State found that road emissions have a disproportionate
impact on both lower-income communities and communities of color.66,67 For example, 74% of
New York's African American and Latino populations and 80% of its Asian American
population experience higher NOX emissions than the state-wide average. Another study found
that the New York City metro area experiences 1,400 premature deaths annually, specifically as
a result of road emissions. Within the city, PM2.5 vehicle air pollution causes approximately 320
premature deaths from heart disease and other illnesses each year. The West Bronx in
particular—whose population is 70% Latino and 29% African American—is home to the Cross
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Bronx Expressway and has the worst air quality in the state. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
pp.15-16]
66 "Inequitable Exposure to Air Pollution from Vehicles in New York State," (June, 2019)
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2019/06/Inequitable-Exposure-to-Vehicle-Pollution-
NY.pdf
67 "Asthma alley - why minorities bear burden of pollution inequity caused by white people," The
Guardian, (April 2019) https://www.theguardian.eom/us-news/2019/apr/04/new-york-south-bronx-
minorities-pollution-inequity
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Many commenters shared concerns and evidence about environmental justice. Commenters
shared evidence and examples of how traffic-related air pollution affects the people who are
likely to be low-income and also likely to be people of color (ACEEE, ALA, BGA, CARB;
CAP; Ceres BICEP, EDF; GFI; Arizona Interfaith Power & Light and League of Conservation
Voters; MPCA; SELC, Tesla; WIDNR; ZETA). The commenters also discussed heath
disparities associated with race and ethnicity (GreenLatinos et al., CARB, others). Elders
Climate Action mentions lack of air conditioning in low-income families and outdoor workers
being unable to avoid exposure to smoke from fires. Several commenters also highlighted
evidence that populations living near refineries and other industrial facilities are more likely to
be people of color or low income, as well as likely to face higher risks from the associated
emissions (Environmental and Public Health Organizations, NCGA, CARB, California Attorney
General et al.). California Attorney General et al. suggested that EPA further develop EJ research
on communities near power plants and refineries. GreenLatinos et al. also shared evidence that
Latino/es are less likely to have access to a car and more likely to commute by public transport.
Environmental and Public Health Organizations provide evidence that reducing emissions
from refineries has higher benefits per ton than do EGU emission reductions, citing an EPA
report. The commenter urges EPA to strengthen statements about evidence of adverse disparities
for populations near refineries (in particular, they prefer a more definitive statement than "may
be potential disparities").
In contrast, numerous commenters express concerns about the potential economic impacts of
the rule on low-income and/or communities of color (Donna Jackson, Valero Energy
Corporation). Also, other commenters pointed to evidence that low-income households face
higher expenditures for fueling their vehicles with gasoline (e.g., ACEEE). The Heritage
Foundation (Davaratna and Furchtgott-Roth) claim new rules will create death and injuries
concentrated among low-income Americans, "disproportionately minorities," who would
purchase fewer new and recent model year used cars. The Hyundai Motor America and
SCAQMD suggest EPA should provide incentives to make it easier for EJ or low-moderate
income communities to purchase ZEV and/or PHEVs. These comments are summarized and
responded to in RTC Section 13.2. By contrast, the Alliance for Automotive Innovation claimed
that vehicle standards without fuel-based regulations will disproportionately benefit higher-SES
communities, as those locations purchase newer vehicles more rapidly than lower-SES
communities.
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Valero Energy Corporation comments that EPA's EJ analysis must be thorough and include
factors affecting the price of transported goods, including ZEV affordability, the availability of
public charging, reasonable charging practices, and lifecycle emissions analysis. The comments
claim that charging will cause higher emissions from electrical generation in more remote rural
regions that are geographically isolated from urban centers. It claims that these standards will
incur burdens on EJ communities that subsidize electric vehicles for more affluent consumers,
who remain concentrated in affluent areas. It claims that electric vehicles are unaffordable to
these communities, despite higher electricity costs being imposed on them.
Commenters shared how the problems of environmental justice were caused by a long history
of discriminatory policies, such as zoning, land use, and infrastructure siting, particularly in poor
and/or communities of color (SELC; California Attorney General et al.). NTAA highlighted the
problems and disparities faced by Tribes and residents of Indian Country that emission
reductions could help address (NTAA).
Several comments suggest that EPA should set new fuel standards to reduce emissions from
gasoline-powered motor vehicles (e.g., Alliance for Automotive Innovation, National Corn
Growers Association). The Alliance for Automotive Innovation stated that reducing heavy
aromatics will reduce PM from all gasoline vehicles on the road and further EJ. The Alliance
also suggested that such fuel-based standards would benefit low-SES communities more quickly
than tailpipe standards, as higher-SES communities purchase new vehicles more quickly than
lower-SES communities.
Two commenters make claims that EPA is bound by legal requirements to reduce emissions
in a manner that either removes inequitable exposure to air pollution (Elders Climate Action,
citing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) or preserves future generations' access to a
healthy climate and environment under the Public Trust Doctrine (Our Children's Trust).
Numerous commenters urged EPA to conduct additional analyses of environmental justice.
ICCT urged EPA to include a full-scale photochemical modeling analysis of the rule and how it
will differentially affect different demographic groups. In the context of how benefits of the rule
would be greater with changes to the MOVES model, ICCT also made comments suggesting that
EPA's MOVES model understates PM emissions from motor vehicles. Environmental and
Public Health Organizations urged EPA to include its 2021 analysis of the adverse and
disproportionate impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations.
Reflecting the "meaningful involvement" part of environmental justice, Mayor Becky Daggett
of Flagstaff, AZ urged EPA to incorporate strong stakeholder engagement process, particularly
involving frontline communities.
NAMIC requested that EPA refrain from stating that people of color or low-income
populations have less or limited access to homeowner insurance.
NPCA requested that, to the extent this rule increases the development and permitting of
domestic critical mineral projects in support of battery production for vehicles, EPA and the
Administration as a whole move to avoid adverse impacts on overburdened populations and
sensitive ecosystems. It lists as examples critical mineral recycling as well as responsible siting
of mining projects to limit harms to EJ communities, indigenous communities, and natural park
ecosystems.
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NTAA and CARB provided comments about how Tribal communities face unique and
adverse effects of climate change and air pollution. NTAA described how Tribal communities
are unique in their vulnerability and limited ability to independently address climate change.
NTAA mentions adverse and disproportionate impacts on Tribal communities resulting from
climate change, with note of the NCA4's statement that climate change threatens indigenous
communities' sociopolitical and ecological systems. NTAA also notes that, despite much air
pollution being outside the jurisdiction of Tribal governments, many residents of Indian country
live in areas with ozone and PM concentrations that exceed current NAAQS. NTAA urges EPA,
in combination with state and local governments, to take all necessary measures to ensure
healthful air quality to Tribal communities.
Response:
EPA acknowledges the comments that provided evidence and examples of how communities
of color and lower-income or lower-SES communities face higher levels of ambient air pollution,
including vehicle-generated air pollution, and higher rates of death and disease than other
communities. EPA recognizes comments about how low-income and low-SES families face
barriers to managing exposures to temperature changes, such as due to limited access to air
conditioning and increased incidence of outdoor work, as well as comments that people of color
are more often reliant on public transit. EPA also acknowledges all those comments that refer to
historical public policies at federal, state, and local levels that had discriminatory intent and
impact, such as discriminatory "redlining" in underwriting criteria for mortgages created by the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) and intentional siting of highways and other locally-
unwanted infrastructure in poor neighborhoods of color. EPA acknowledges the unique
concerns of Tribal and indigenous communities, as expressed by NTAA.
Regarding comments that EPA should strengthen its statement about evidence of adverse and
disparate impacts of refinery emissions on nearby populations, EPA has included new references
to represent the state of research more fully on this issue.
As regards the comment from Elders Climate Action that LMDV emissions create harmful
and disparate exposures that violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EPA did not
propose, nor is finalizing, any federal financial assistance for any program or activity in this
rulemaking, so comments related to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are out of the scope
of this rulemaking. EPA is committed to taking decisive action to advance environmental justice
and civil rights as part of its FY 2022-2026 Strategic Plan. This rulemaking advances that
strategic goal by setting stronger national emission standards for light- and medium-duty
vehicles. In general, our discussion of environmental justice and the impacts of this final rule on
communities overburdened by pollution is included in preamble Section VIII. J, with additional
information in this Section 9 of this RTC document.
Valero Energy Corporation's comments about the impacts of electricity prices are
summarized and addressed in Sections 17 and 18 of this RTC. However, here, we disagree with
the comments on the environmental justice implications of these rules.
First, the assumption that these standards require electrification of the fleet is not aligned with
the final form of the standards. The performance-based standards are technology-neutral. EPA
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presents multiple example pathways for compliance with these standards, and manufacturers are
free to use any combination of vehicle technologies to meet the standards.
Second, Valero Energy Corporation provides no data to support its hypothetical assertions
that low-income communities in remote, rural areas will be disproportionately harmed by these
standards. Preamble Section VII.B and RIA Chapter 7.4 presents results from EPA's air quality
modeling of impacts of this rule in 2055. Preamble Section VII.D and RIA Chapter 7.6
examines the how these air quality changes are expected to affect different demographic groups.
Notably, PM2.5 and ozone reductions are estimated for the total CONUS, for both metropolitan
and non-metropolitan areas, for all racial groups, for all educational levels, and for all levels of
life expectancy. The few areas that experience increased PM2.5 concentrations of 0.025 ug/m3
or greater constitute 0.1% of the CONUS population. Areas experiencing ozone increases of 0.1
ppb or greater also constitute 0.1% of the CONUS population.
Finally, Valero Energy Corporation fails to account for changes in power sector emissions. In
particular, we note that the agency has broad authority to regulate emissions from the power
sector (e.g., the mercury and air toxics standards, and new source performance standards), as do
the States and EPA through cooperative federalism programs (e.g., in response to PM NAAQS
implementation requirements, interstate transport, emission guidelines, and regional haze),384
and that EPA reasonably may address air pollution incrementally across multiple rulemakings,
particularly across multiple industry sectors. For example, EPA has separately proposed new
source performance standards and emission guidelines for greenhouse gas emissions from fossil
fuel-fired power plants, which would also reduce emissions of criteria air pollutants such as
PM2.5 and SO2 (88 FR 33240, May 23, 2023). Furthermore, while some emission increases are
expected associated with higher electrical generation, those impacts decline over time.
Furthermore, the net emissions of all criteria pollutants - including onroad emissions, EGUs, and
refineries - are also decreasing, as described in Section VILA of the preamble and Chapter 7.1 of
the RIA.
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation's comments in support of reductions of heavy
aromatics in gasoline are summarized and addressed in part in Section 11.1 of this RTC.
However, its comment that tailpipe emission rules only reduce emissions for the newest vehicles,
with near-term benefits accruing more to higher-SES communities than lower-SES communities,
is not supported by available evidence. In particular, the Alliance mistakes the location of
individual vehicle ownership for the location where emissions of aggregate vehicle traffic occur.
In fact, numerous studies cited in Section II of the preamble illustrate that concentrations of
traffic-related air pollutants are found to be highest in locations near major roads and other
locations of high vehicle activity. Furthermore, simulation studies examining the impact of
emission reductions focused on turning over the vehicle fleet starting with making the newest
vehicles cleanest have shown similar results. In particular, a recent study by Yu et al. (2023)
examining adoption of light-duty ZEV in California demonstrated that, despite simulating
higher-SES census tracts adopting ZEVs at higher rates than lower-SES tracts, more rapid
reductions in exposures were estimated to occur in low-SES locations.385
384 See also CAA 116.
385 Yu et al. (2023) California's zero-emission adoption brings air quality benefits yet equity gaps persist. Nature
Communications 14: 7778. (Online at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-43309-9)
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The ICCT recommended that EPA conduct a full assessment of the air quality and health
impacts of this rule on different demographic groups, akin to "the heavy-duty multi-pollutant
rule." As described in RIA Chapter 7.6, EPA did conduct full-scale photochemical modeling
and examination of which groups were affected by the rule in a manner consistent with ICCT's
recommendation. ICCT's comments about MOVES PM emission rate are addressed in RTC
Section 12.5.1.
NAMIC's comment and request that we remove mention of limited access to homeowners'
insurance overlooks considerable evidence. The text in the preamble is intended to indicate that
individuals who may be classified as being particularly vulnerable or sensitive to climate
impacts, and who frequently comprise communities facing environmental justice concerns, often
live in locations that face the greatest risks from climate change effects and have fewer resources
available to adapt. As is well documented, areas that experience greater threats of natural
hazards, such as wildfires, hurricanes, or coastal inundation, face higher rates for homeowners'
and flood insurances, which may price out individuals from accessing more comprehensive
coverage, leave them uninsurable, or may prevent them from being able to rebuild in areas where
home values and construction costs have exceeded historic amounts (Gotham 2014; Keenan et
al., 2018; Fleming et al., 2018; Wilson et al. 2021; Brown, 2022).386>387>388>389>390 Low-income
and Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) individuals often are more likely to inhabit
areas facing greater vulnerability to climate change hazards that can affect home displacement or
loss, such as wildfires, sea level rise, or extreme weather events (Gamble et al., 2016; EPA,
2021).391'392
There are clear examples of how this is translating into real-time effects. The costs of the
National Flood Insurance Program have gone up considerably in recent years, and rates are
expected to continue to increase, thus pricing out low-income homeowners (Fleming et al.,
20 1 8).393 We have seen that homeowners' insurance providers are cancelling coverage or failing
386 Gotham, K.F., 2014: Reinforcing inequalities: The impact of the CDBG Program on post-Katrina rebuilding.
Housing Policy Debate, 24 (1), 192-212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2013.840666
387 Brown, A.R. (2022), "Driving Down a Road and Not Knowing Where You're At": Navigating the Loss of
Physical and Social Infrastructure After the Camp Fire. Rural Sociology, 87: 3-25.
https://doi.org/10. Ill 1/ruso. 12411
388 Keenan, J.M., T. Hill, and A. Gumber, 2018: Climate gentrification: From theory to empiricism in Miami-Dade
County, Florida. Environmental Research Letters, 13, 054001. DOI 10.1088/1748-9326/aabb32
389 Wilson, B., E. Tate, and C.T. Emrich, 2021: Flood Recovery Outcomes and Disaster Assistance Barriers for
Vulnerable Populations. Frontiers in Water, 3, 752307. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/frwa.2021.752307
390 Brown, A.R. (2022), "Driving Down a Road and Not Knowing Where You're At": Navigating the Loss of
Physical and Social Infrastructure After the Camp Fire. Rural Sociology, 87: 3-25.
https://doi.org/10. Ill 1/ruso. 12411
391 EPA. 2021. Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States: A Focus on Six Impacts. U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA 430-R-21-003.
392 Gamble, J.L., J. Balbus, M. Berger, K. Bouye, V. Campbell, K. Chief, K. Conlon, A. Crimmins, B. Flanagan, C.
Gonzalez-Maddux, E. Hallisey, S. Hutchins, L. Jantarasami, S. Khoury, M. Kiefer, J. Kolling, K. Lynn, A.
Manangan, M. McDonald, R. Morello-Frosch, M.H. Redsteer, P. Sheffield, K. Thigpen Tart, J. Watson, K.P. Whyte,
and A.F. Wolkin, 2016: Ch. 9: Populations of Concern. The Impacts of Climate Change on Human Health in the
United States: A Scientific Assessment. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, 247-286.
http://dx.doi.org/10.7930/J0Q81B0T
393 Fleming, E., J. Payne, W. Sweet, M. Craghan, J. Haines, J.F. Hart, H. Stiller, and A. Sutton-Grier, 2018: Coastal
Effects. In Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II
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to insure homes at greater risk of wildfire damage, the greatest burdens of which are being, and
will be, borne by low-income individuals (Auer & Hexamer, 2022).394 This all is irrespective of
concerns regarding rising housing costs across the United States (Brooks, 2022), let alone the
influence of gentrification and general disparities in socioeconomic and racial demographics
between renters versus homeownership (Kuebler & Rugh, 2013; Tedesco et al., 2022).395>396>397
Homeownership in desirable areas that are less at risk of climate hazards increasingly is
becoming less available to, or less populated by, low-income or BIPOC households (Keenan et
al., 2018; Ruhks-Ahidiana, 2021; Tedesco et al., 2022). 15>398>399
Comments from NPCA about taking steps to avoid adverse impacts resulting from impacts of
future domestic mining of critical minerals are recognized. While EPA acknowledges that
mining impacts are a concern, many of these topics, such as siting for mines, are out of scope for
this rulemaking which does not regulate the mining sector. Particular issues associated with
critical minerals are addressed in RTC Section 15 (recycling and environmental issues from
mining; critical minerals and supply chain).
The comments by Our Children's Trust about the Public Trust Doctrine are addressed in RTC
Section 2.
Comments about the rule's potential vehicle safety and disparate and adverse impacts on low-
income populations are addressed in RTC Section 22.
Comments about the rule's potential disparate and adverse economic impacts on low-income
and low-SES communities are addressed in RTC Section 13.
In response to commenters who identify potential environmental justice concerns from the
effects of criteria and GHG pollutants from light-duty and medium-duty vehicles, or additional
scientific information, views, or analyses that were not specifically addressed in the proposed or
final action, the EPA notes that the evidence regarding the environmental justice impacts of the
proposed and final rulemakings is adequately described in Section VIII. J of the preamble.
The EPA does not interpret supportive comments related to the environmental justice impacts
associated with the proposal as indicating disagreement with the evidence on environmental
justice information that was presented in the proposal, but rather understands these comments to
suggest that the additional information they provide adds support for finalizing the rulemaking.
[Reidmiller, D.R., C.W. Avery, D.R. Easterling, K.E. Kunkel, K.L.M. Lewis, T.K. Maycock, and B.C. Stewart
(eds.)]. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA, pp. 322-352. doi:
10.7930/NCA4.2018.CH8
394 Auer MR, Hexamer BE. Income and Insurability as Factors in Wildfire Risk. Forests. 2022; 13(7): 1130.
https://doi.org/10.3390/fl3071130
395 Brooks, M.M., 2022: The changing landscape of affordable housing in the rural and urban United States, 1990-
2016. Rural Sociology, 87, 2, 511-546. https://doi.org/10.llll/ruso.12427
396 Kuebler, M., and J.S. Rugh, 2013: New evidence on racial and ethnic disparities in homeownership in the United
States from 2001 to 2010. Social Science Research, 42, 5, 1357-1374.
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2013.06.004
397 Tedesco, M., J.M. Keenan, and C. Hultquist, 2022: Measuring, mapping, and anticipating climate gentrification
in Florida: Miami and Tampa case studies. Cities, 131, 103991. https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.cities.2022.103991
398 Keenan, J.M., T. Hill, and A. Gumber, 2018: Climate gentrification: From theory to empiricism in Miami-Dade
County, Florida. Environmental Research Letters, 13, 054001. DOI 10.1088/1748-9326/aabb32
399 Rucks-Ahidiana, Z, 2021; Racial composition and trajectories of gentrification in the United States. Urban
Studies, 58, 13, 2721-2741. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098020963853
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To the extent that the information introduced by commenters was intended to advocate for more
stringent standards, we refer the reader to Section 3 and 4 of this RTC document. See Sections 8
and 12 of this RTC document for responses relating to our updated cost and technology
assessments for the final rule. For responses related to GHGs and the social cost of GHGs, see
Sections 8.4 and 10 of the RTC. Comments regarding new fuel standards are responded to in
Section 19 of the RTC.
10 - Climate science and GHG emissions
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Advanced Energy United
A large percentage of emissions reductions from the transportation sector will be
accomplished by replacing gas- and diesel-powered buses, trucks and vans with EV models. EVs
are not only much more energy efficient than gas-powered cars but are also less expensive to fuel
and maintain over their lifetimes. Thus, the EPA's proposed rule presents an opportunity to
decarbonize the largest source of emissions in the American economy while scaling up an
emerging domestic market. Electrified transportation reduces our reliance on fossil fuels,
strengthens America's energy independence, and produces economic benefits across the value
chain of the automotive industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, p. 2]
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Once the agency fixes the modeling of C02 emissions with and without the new 2027-2032
standards, it should revisit its decision about how to monetize the C02 emissions benefits. A
good case can be made that one set of benefit calculations should make use of a global measure
of the social cost of carbon, as use of a global measure may encourage other countries to control
C02 emissions through deployment of BEVs and cleaner electricity systems. EPA has taken this
position in the DRIA. However, once again, the agency's analysis should not engage in wishful
thinking, as it is well known that most countries are not meeting their pledged commitments
under the 2015 Paris accords. It also makes sense to disclose to Congress and the public the
climate benefits of the rule, measured with a domestic cost of carbon. This measure would
account for the fact that most of the climate benefits of the 2027-2032 rule will occur outside the
United States, as greenhouse gases are globally mixing pollutants. Presentation of both global
and domestic estimates of climate benefits will ensure that the RIA is seen as an objective
analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 288-289]
Overall, Auto Innovators believes that a more modest, measured claim of climate-control
benefits in the final rule would make the rule more defensible. As the DRIA stands now, the
climate-benefits analysis could be vulnerable to technical criticism. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 291-292]
Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
The U.S. needs the strongest vehicle standards
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The United States will need to greatly reduce light-duty vehicle (LDV) greenhouse gas
emissions if it is to have any chance of meeting the Biden Administration's economy-wide
emissions reduction goal of 50% by 2030 and stave off the worst impacts of climate change.
Transportation is now the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States and the
light-duty sector makes up 58% of those emissions. 1 Reducing carbon emissions is critical to
tackling climate change but increasing LDV efficiency will also have significant benefits to air
quality and will reduce driver fueling costs. Vehicles are a significant contributor to local air
pollution and the associated health impacts, leading to increased rates of asthma, increased risk
of heart attacks, strokes, and lung cancer.2 These impacts are particularly bad in low-income
communities and communities of color, which bear a disproportionate air pollution burden.3
Greater efficiency can also provide significant cost savings for drivers when they refuel their
vehicles. Low-income households are especially burdened by fueling costs, paying three times
more than their higher-income counterparts on gasoline, as a percent of their total income.4
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 1-2]
1 https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/fast-facts-transportation-greenhouse-gas-emissions
2 https://www.consumerreports.org/emissions/how-your-car-can-make-the-air-cleaner/
3 https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/who-is-at-risk/disparities
4 https://www.aceee.org/white-paper/2021/05/understanding-transportation-energy-burdens
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) have
set aside historic amounts of funding for electric vehicles and will greatly reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions from the transportation sector if that money is invested with climate impacts in
mind. EPA's standards must build off of these investments. While we commend EPA for
proposing strong standards that help the U.S. achieve President Biden's 2030 goal of 50% zero
emission new vehicle sales, these historic investments mean we can go even further.5 Since the
IRA was signed into law, $50 billion in investments in EV and battery manufacturing, and
supply chain projects have been announced.6 These investments could get the U.S. to over 60%
new light-duty EV sales by the early 2030s.7 But more will be needed to adequately address the
climate emergency. EPA's MY 2027-2032 standards should fully account for the recent federal
activity and build off them to achieve further emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0642, pp. 1-2]
5 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-
announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/
6 https://www.charged-the-book.com/na-ev-supply-chain-map
7 https://theicct.Org/wp-content/uploads/2023/0l/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23.pdf; https://rmi.org/insight/how-
inflation-reduction-act-will-affect-ev-adoption-in-the-united-states/
Organization: American Enterprise Institute
IV. Assertions of a Serious Anthropogenic Climate Threat Are Inconsistent with the
Evidence
EPA asserts that "there is consensus that the effects of climate change represent a rapidly
growing threat to human health and the environment, and are caused by GHG emissions from
human activity, including motor vehicle transportation." This is not correct, even apart from the
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dubious premise that some sort of undefined "consensus" is a proper basis for policy
formulation, and even apart from the failure of EPA even to attempt to separate anthropogenic
and natural influences on climate phenomena. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, p. 12]
There is no evidence in support of the "rapidly growing threat" asserted by EPA.
Anthropogenic climate change is "real" — increasing GHG concentrations are having detectable
effects — and incontrovertible, but that does not tell us the magnitude of the observable impacts,
which must be measured empirically. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, p. 12]
Temperatures are rising, but as the Little Ice Age ended no later than 1850, it is not easy to
separate natural from anthropogenic effects on temperatures and other climate phenomena, as
discussed below in section VII.36 The latest research in the peer-reviewed literature suggests that
mankind is responsible for about half of the approximate temperature increase of 1.1 degrees C
since 1880.37 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, p. 12]
36 On the Little Ice Age, see Michael E. Mann, "Little Ice Age," in Encyclopedia of Global Environmental
Change, Volume 1: The Earth System: Physical and Chemical Dimensions of Global Environmental
Change, ed. Michael C. MacCracken, John S. Perry and Ted Munn (Chichester, England: John Wiley &
Sons, 2002), http://www.meteo.psu.edu/holocene/public_html/shared/articles/littleiceage.pdf.
37 See, e.g., Nicholas Lewis, "Objectively Combining Climate Sensitivity Evidence," Climate Dynamics,
September 19, 2022, at https://link.springer.eom/article/10.1007/s00382-022-06468-x; Ross McKitrick and
John Christy, "A Test of the Tropical 200- to 300 hPa Warming Rate in Climate Models"; Nicholas Lewis
and Judith Curry, "The Impact of Recent Forcing and Ocean Heat Uptake Data on Estimates of Climate
Sensitivity," Journal of Climate 31 (August 2018): 6051-71,
https://journals.ametsoc.Org/doi/pdf/10.1175/JCLI-D-17-0667.l; and John R. Christy and Richard
McNider, "Satellite Bulk Tropospheric Temperatures as a Metric for Climate Sensitivity," Asia-Pacific
Journal of Atmospheric Sciences 53 (2017): 511-18, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/sl3143-017-
0070-z. For a chart summarizing the recent empirical estimates of equilibrium climate sensitivity as
reported in the peer- reviewed literature, see Patrick J. Michaels and Paul C. Knappenberger, "The
Collection of Evidence for a Low Climate Sensitivity Continues to Grow," Cato Institute, September 25,
2014, https://www.cato.org/blog/collection- evidence-low-climate-sensitivity-continues-grow.
There is little trend in the number of "hot" days for 1895-2017; eleven of the 12 years with
the highest number of such days occurred before 1960, as shown in the following chart.3 8 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 12-15]
38 For the reconstruction of the NASA data, see John R. Christy, "Average per Station (1114 USHCN
Stations) 1895-2017: Number of Days Daily Maximum Temperature Above 100?F and 105?F,"
drroyspencer.com, http://www.drroyspencer.com/wp-content/uploads/US-extreme-high-temperatures-
1895-2017.jpg.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Graph of Average per station (1114 USHCN Stations)
1895-2017. Number days of daily Maximum temperature above 100 F degrees and 105 F
degrees [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 12-15]
NOAA has maintained since 2005 the U.S. Climate Reference Network, comprising 114
meticulously maintained temperature stations spaced more or less uniformly across the lower 48
states, 21 stations in Alaska, and two stations in Hawaii.39 They are placed to avoid heat island
effects and other such distortions as much as possible; the reported data show no trend over the
available 2005-2023 reporting period, as shown in the following chart.40 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0571, pp. 12-15]
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39 For the Climate Reference Network program description, see National Centers for Environmental
Information, "U.S. Climate Reference Network," https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/crn/.
40 For a visualization of a prototypical station, see Willis Eschenbach, "NOAA's USCRN Revisited—No
Significant Warming in the USA in 12 Years," Watts Up with That?, November 8, 2017,
https://wattsupwiththat.eom/2017/l 1/08/the-uscrn-revisited/. For the monthly data and charts reported by
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), see National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, "National Temperature Index," https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/national-
temperature- indcx/tiinc-scrics'Matascts%5B%5D=uscrn, nictei=anoin-
tavg&time_scale=pl2&begyear=2005&endyear=2020&month=8, and the monthly data at
https://www.ncei.noaa.gOv/access/monitoring/national-temperature-index/time-series/anom-tavg/l/0.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Graph of Average Temperature Anomaly Jan 2005-Feb
2023 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 12-15]
Koonin notes for the U.S. as follows for 1900 through 2019:
... the average coldest temperature of the year has clearly increased since 1900, while the
average warmest temperature has hardly changed over the last sixty years and is about the same
today as it was in 1900.41 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 12-15]
41 See Steven E. Koonin, Unsettled: What Climate Science Tells Us, What It Doesn't, and Why It Matters,
Dallas: BenBella Books, 2021, at p. 102.
A NOAA reconstruction of global temperatures over the past one million years, using data
from ice sheet formations, shows that there is nothing unusual about the current warm period.42
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 12-15]
42 See https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/temperature-
flucturations.png, from R. Bintanja and R. S. W. van de Wal, "North American Ice-Sheet Dynamics and the
Onset of 100,000-Year Glacial Cycles," Nature 454, no. 7206 (August 14, 2008): 869-72,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23171740_Bintanja_R_van_de_Wal_R_S_W_North_American_i
ce- sheet_dynamics_and_the_onset_of_100000-year_glacial_cycles_Nature_454_869-872. NOAA
published the underlying data at R. Bintanja and R. S. W. van de Wal, "Global 3Ma Temperature, Sea
Level, and Ice Volume Reconstructions," National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, August 14,
2008, https://www.ncdc.noaa.gOv/paleo-search/study/l 1933.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Graph of Temperature Fluctuations Over the Past Million
Years [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 12-15]
Global mean sea level has been increasing at about 3.3 mm per year since satellite
measurements began in 1993, as shown in the following chart from NASA.43 That ongoing sea
level rise would be about 13 inches over the course of a century, an outcome very unlikely to
prove a "crisis," in particular given the time available for adaptation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0571, pp. 15-17]
43 NASA reports 96.7 millimeters of sea level rise for the period 1993-2022. See the NASA data at
https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/sea-level/.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Graph of Sea Height Variation (mm) 1995-2020
The tidal-gauge data before the altimeter era show annual increases of about 1.8 mm per year,
as shown in the following chart.44 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 15-17]
44 Ibid.
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SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Graph of Sea Level Change (mm)
The two datasets are not directly comparable in that the tidal gauges do not measure sea levels
per se; they measure the difference between sea levels and "fixed" points on land that in reality
might not be fixed due to seismic activity, tectonic shifts, land settlement, precipitation, and
other parameters. Accordingly, the data are unclear as to whether there is occurring an
acceleration in sea level rise. It is reasonable to hypothesize that there has been such an
acceleration simply because temperatures are rising due to both natural and anthropogenic
influences, and such increases should result in more melting ice and the thermal expansion of
seawater. But because rising temperatures are the result of both natural and anthropogenic
causes, as discussed in section VII, we do not know the relative contributions of those causes to
any such acceleration.45 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 15-17]
45 See Frederikse et. al. at https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2591-3. As a crude approximation,
the data suggest that about two-thirds of such sea level increases are due to ice melt, and one-third to
thermal expansion of seawater. See Judith Curry, "Sea Level and Climate Change," Climate Forecast
Applications Network, November 25, 2018, https://curryja.files.wordpress.com/2018/ll/special-report-sea-
level-rise3.pdf. Curry cites research from Xianyao Chen and colleagues, the central finding of which is that
"global mean sea level rise increased from 2.2 ± 0.3 mm/year in 1993 to 3.3 ± 0.3 mm/year in 2014." See
Xianyao Chen et al., "The Increasing Rate of Global Mean Sea-Level Rise During 1993-2014," Nature
Climate Change 7 (June 26, 2017): 492-95, https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate3325. Whether the
trend from a 21 -year period can yield important inferences is a premise problematic at a minimum. For a
different empirical conclusion from the tidal gauge record, see J. R. Houston and R. G. Green, "Sea-Level
Acceleration Based on U.S. Tide Gauges and Extensions of Previous Global-Gauge Analyses," Journal of
Coastal Research 27, no. 3 (May 2011): 409-17, https://meridian.allenpress.com/jcr/article-
abstract/27/3/409/28456/Sea-Level-Acceleration-Based-on-U-S-Tide- Gauges?redirectedFrom=fulltext.
For an example of temporary rapid sea-level rise in the 18th century, see W. R. Gehrels et al., "A
Preindustrial Sea-Level Rise Hotspot Along the Atlantic Coast of North America," Geophysical Research
Letters 47 (2020), https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1029/2019GL085814. Forfurther
reported evidence of an acceleration, see Hans-Otto Portner et al., Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2019,
https://www.ipcc.ch/srocc/.
The inconsistency of the northern and southern hemisphere sea ice changes add to the analytic
complexity of anthropogenic climate change. The arctic sea ice has been declining, as shown in
the following two charts.46 For the second chart, however, note that the small number of years
shown prevents a reliable derivation of inferences. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 17-22]
46 See, respectively, https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/climate-change-indicators-arctic-sea-ice and
https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR GRAPH of Sea Ice Extent (million square miles) 1975-
2025 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 17-22]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Progression Graph of Artie Sea Ice Extent (Area of
Ocean with at least 15% sea ice) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 17-22]
There is no long-term trend in the Antarctic sea ice extent, as shown in the following chart
from the EPA.47 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 17-22]
47 See https://www.epa.gOv/climate-indicators/climate-change-indicators-antarctic-sea-ice#ref5.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR GRAPH of Sea Ice Extent (million square miles) [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 17-22]
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Even for the more recent years, the Antarctic sea ice appears to be stable as a matter of
statistical significance, but, as noted above, it is inappropriate to derive inferences from a small
number of year-to-year variations.48 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 17-22]
48 See https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2023/02/antarctic-sea-ice-minimum-settles-on-record-low-extent-
again/. https://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2021/12/Bates-Sea-Ice-
Trends.pdf?mc_cid=dac7df538b&mc_eid=ad653edd6d; and
https://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2022/04/Humlum-State-of-Climate-2021-
.pdf?mc_cid=dac7df538b&mc_eid=ad653edd6d. See also Patrick J. Michaels, "Spinning Global Sea Ice,"
Cato Institute, February 12, 2015, https://www.cato.org/blog/spinning-global-sea-ice.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Graph of Antarctic Sea Ice Extent (Area of ocean with at
least 15% sea ice) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 17-22]
The data show that the Antarctic eastern ice sheet — about two-thirds of the continent — is
growing, while the western ice sheet (and the peninsula) is shrinking, as shown in the following
chart from the National Snow & Ice Data Center.49 No agreed explanation for this phenomenon
is reported in the literature. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 17-22]
49 See https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2023/02/antarctic-sea-ice-minimum-settles-on-record-low-extent-
again/. On the eastern ice sheet, see https://www.nature.com/articles/s41561-022-00938-x. On the western
ice sheet, see http://nsidc.org/greenland-today/. See also
https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2023/02/antarctic-sea-ice-minimum- settles-on-record-low-extent-again/.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Map View of Sea Ice Extent, 21 Feb 2023 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 17-22]
U.S. tornado activity for all EF ("Enhanced Fujita" scale) classes shows an upward trend
since 1950, but, again, the issue of anthropogenic versus natural origins is unresolved. 50 The
data for the period 1954 through 2014 for EF-3+ tornadoes show no trend or a downward trend.
These trends are shown in the following two charts.51 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 22-
25]
50 See https://www.climate.gov/maps-data/dataset/monthly-and-annual-numbers-tornadoes-graphs-and-
maps.
51 See NOAA, "Historical Records and Trends," at https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/climate-
information/extreme- events/us-tornado-climatology/trends; and https://climateataglance.com/climate-at-a-
glance-tornadoes/. Note that the latter chart shows a heading of " 1954-2020," but the bar chart begins in
1970. This discrepancy is unlikely to change the overall inference.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR BAR GRAPH of 1991-2020 U.S. Tornados [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 22-25]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR BAR GRAPH of U.S. Annual Count of Strong to Violent
Tornados (F3+) 1954-2020 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 22-25]
Tropical cyclones and accumulated cyclone energy show little trend since satellite
measurements began in the early 1970s.52 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 22-25]
52 For data on global tropical cyclone activity, see Ryan N. Maue, "Global Tropical Cyclone Activity,
updated December 31, 2022, at http://climatlas.com/tropical/.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Trend Graph of Global Tropical Cyclone Frequency
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 22-25]
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SEE ORIGINAL Global Major Hurricane Frequency - 12 month running sums [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 22-25]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Trend Graph of Global Tropical Accumulated Cyclone
Energy (ACE) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 22-25]
The number of U.S. wildfires shows no trend since 1985.53 Global acreage burned declined
sharply for 1998-2015, and by about 18 percent for the period 2003-2015 as reported by NASA,
shown in the following figure.54 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 25-28]
53 For the reported U.S. wildfire data, see the EPA at https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/climate-
change- indicators-wildfires and the National Interagency Fire Center, "Total Wildland Fires and Acres
(1926-2019)," https://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_totalFires.html. Note that the recent U.S.
wildfire phenomenon has been observed in government forests to a degree vastly disproportionate relative
to private forests. See
http://nwmapsco.com/ZybachB/Articles/Magazines/Oregon_Fish_&_Wildlife_Journal/20220401_Global_
Warming/ Zybach_20220401 .pdf.
54 On the decline in global area burned over past decades, see NASA at
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/90493/researchers-detect-a-global-drop-in-fires; and Stefan H.
Doerr and Cristina Santin, "Global Trends in Wildfire and Its Impacts: Perceptions Versus Realities in a
Changing World," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological
Sciences 371, no. 1696 (2016),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4874420/pdf/rstb20150345.pdf.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR MAP GRAPH of the Burned Area Trend(% per year)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 25-28]
The Palmer Drought Severity index shows no trend since 1895, as shown in the following
chart. 55 Vicente-Serrano, et. al. report that "Meteorological droughts do not show any
substantial changes at the global scale in at least the last 120 years."56 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0571, pp. 25-28]
55 See US Environmental Protection Agency, "Climate Change Indicators: Drought,"
https://www.epa.gov/climate- indicators/climate-change-indicators-drought; and US Department of
Commerce, National Climatic Data Center, "Divisional Data Select,"
https://www7.ncdc.noaa.gov/CDO/CDODivisionalSelect.jsp.
56 See Sergio M. Vicente-Serrano, et. al., "Global Drought Trends and Future Projections," Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society, October 2022, at
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/364672519_Global_drought_trends_and_future_projections.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR The Palmer Drought Severity index trend from 1890-
2020 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 25-28]
U.S. flooding over the past century is uncorrected with increasing GHG concentrations.57
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 25-28]
57 See R. M. Hirsch and K. R. Ryberg, "Has the Magnitude of Floods Across the USA Changed with
Global C02 Levels?," Hydrological Sciences Journal 57, no. 1 (2012): 1-9,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02626667.2011.621895?scroll=top&needAccess=true&.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR GRAPH OF Estimation of B1 to the Region and the
Percent Change per 10 ppm Increase in C02 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 25-28]
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The IPCC in the AR6 reports that "The SREX (Seneviratne et al., 2012) assessed low
confidence for observed changes in the magnitude or frequency of floods at the global scale. This
assessment was confirmed by AR5 (Hartmann et al., 2013)."58 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0571, pp. 25-28]
58 See https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wgl/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_Chapterll.pdf at p. 1568.
The available data do not support the ubiquitous assertions about the dire impacts of declining
pH levels in the oceans.59 Goklany reports as follows.60 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp.
25-28]
59 For a summary discussion, see https://www.mattridley.co.uk/blog/thousands-of-results-on-ocean-
acidification/. A comprehensive database is at C02 Science, "Ocean Acidification Database,"
http://www.co2science.org/data/acidification/results.php. See also Alan Longhurst, Doubt and Certainty in
Climate Science, pp. 214-25, https://curryja.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/longhurst-print.pdf.
60 See https://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2015/10/benefitsl.pdf at p. 16.
There is no likelihood of the ocean's average pH getting anywhere near as low as 7 (neutral)
because of elevated carbon dioxide concentrations during the next three centuries. Ocean pH
currently averages about 8 and is forecast to fall by 0.2 pH units or so during the present century.
This change is considerably smaller than the difference in pH between different parts of the
ocean, different days in the same part of the ocean, and even different times of day in coral reef
lagoons. An examination of upper-ocean pH for a wide variety of ecosystems ranging from polar
to tropical, open-ocean to coastal, kelp forest to coral reefs, indicates that variations in month-
long pH spanned a range of 0.024 -1.430 pH units, and found that many organisms 'are already
experiencing pH regimes that are not predicted until 2100. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp.
25-28]
The IPCC in the Fifth Assessment Report was deeply dubious about the various severe effects
often asserted to be looming as impacts of anthropogenic warming; an example is a collapse of
the Antarctic western and Greenland ice sheets. The IPCC analysis in the Sixth Assessment
Report is almost identical.61 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 25-28]
61 For the AR5, see Julie M. Arblaster et al., "Long-Term Climate Change: Projections, Commitments and
Irreversibility—Final Draft Underlying Scientific-Technical Assessment," in Working Group I
Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science
Basis, September 23-26, 2013, p. 12-78, at
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/WGIAR5_WGI- 12Doc2b_FinalDraft_Chapterl2.pdf.
See the analogous analysis in the AR6 at p. 12-115 at
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wgl/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_Full_Report.pdf.
Organization: American Lung Association (ALA) et al.
In addition to being a leading contributor to air pollution challenges, transportation is the
leading source of climate pollution in the nation. The life-saving progress made to clean the air
under the Clean Air Act is increasingly challenged by climate change impacts. Extreme heat,
drought and catastrophic wildfire conditions and enhanced conditions for ozone formation
increase pollution burdens and inequities. Climate impacts on health are far reaching beyond
degraded air quality, including water quality, vector-borne diseases, mental health impacts,
health issues from displacement and other risks.3 EPA must act to set the strongest possible
multi-pollutant standards for new passenger vehicles that ensure cleaner combustion engines
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while spurring the rapid and widespread transition to zero-emission technologies needed to
ensure cleaner air and a healthy climate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0745, pp. 1-2]
3 USGCRP. Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment,
Volume II [Reidmiller, D.R., C.W. Avery, D.R. Easterling, K.E. Kunkel, K.L.M. Lewis, T.K. Maycock,
and B.C. Stewart (eds.)]. 2018.
Organization: Anonymous
Losses from additional energy conversions
Conversion of energy from one form to another is not 100% conservative. With each energy
conversion from one form to another, you lose some energy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562,
p. 1]
In a typical vehicle you have energy conversions of fuel => pistons => forward motion. With
an electrical vehicle you have
Power generation => electricity => battery => electricity => electrical motor => forward
motion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, p. 1]
An electrical vehicle has at least 5 conversions with associated losses. Requiring vehicles to
be battery powered will result in increased energy use with increased energy losses. This comes
with a limited benefit, if any. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, p. 1]
Any benefit which can be conceived is tied to power plant generation. According to
https://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_emissions.html [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, p. 1]
In geographic areas that use relatively low-polluting energy sources for electricity generation,
all-electric vehicles and PHEVs typically have an especially large life cycle emissions advantage
over similar conventional vehicles running on gasoline or diesel. In areas with higher-emissions
electricity, all-electric vehicles and PHEVs may not demonstrate as strong a life cycle emissions
benefit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, p. 1]
And the amount of any benefit may not be all that great.
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/climate.shtml [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, p. 1]
Highway vehicles release about 1.4 billion tons of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the
atmosphere each year—mostly in the form of carbon dioxide (C02) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0562, p. 1]
https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions
Today, we collectively emit around 50 billion tonnes of C02e each year.
So the maximum we could hope to save would be 1.4 / 50, or 2.8% of that released. And this
needs to be put in light of the total C02 in the atmosphere. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, pp.
1-2]
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-atmospheric-
carbon- dioxide
Published May 12, 2023
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Based on the annual report from NOAA's Global Monitoring Lab, global average
atmospheric carbon dioxide was 417.06 parts per million ("ppm" for short) in 2022, setting a
new record high. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, pp. 1-2]
Using 1 ppm = 7.8 Gigatonnes of Carbon Dioxide in the atmosphere. This calculates to
417.06 x 7.8 Gigatonnes / 1 ppm = 3,253 Gigatonnes
1.4 billion tonnes (Gigatonnes) / 3,253 Gigatonnes = 0.000307402120091
The most we could hope to save would be 0.0003 of the total atmosphere carbon dioxide. But
that's only if none was produced from vehicles. However, any savings will be less than 0.0003
with the power generation plants which produce carbon dioxide. And there will be additional
waste of energy in the energy conversions to the different forms needed for electric vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, pp. 1-2]
Energy conversion from battery to forward movement [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, pp.
2-3]
According to archive.org, https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/evtech.shtml In December, 2019,
it stated:
EVs convert about 59%-62% of the electrical energy from the grid to power at the wheels.
Conventional gasoline vehicles only convert about 17%—21% of the energy stored in gasoline to
power at the wheels.
Then in February, 2020, it stated: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, pp. 2-3]
EVs convert over 77% of the electrical energy from the grid to power at the wheels.
Conventional gasoline vehicles only convert about 12%—30% of the energy stored in gasoline to
power at the wheels.
with a disclaimer stating:
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/atv-ev.shtml
EVs are 60% to 73% efficient, depending upon drive cycle. However, if the energy recaptured
from regenerative braking is counted (i.e., recounted when it is re-used), EVs are 77% to 100%
efficient. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, pp. 2-3]
Regenerative braking would add additional complexity in calculating conversion efficiencies
and costs.
The university of Calgary agrees with the 2019 statement,
https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Electric_vehicle
Modern EVs have an efficiency of 59-62% converting electrical energy from the storage
system to the wheels.
Energy conversion from electrical grid to battery [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, pp. 2-3]
Battery efficiency declines with age, temperature, and charging speed and the total state of
charge capacity level. This means, range loss.
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Charging to 100% at 60 degrees Celsius can reduce capacity to 60% after 3 months.
Recommended state of charge capacities is from 30% to 70% which also means, range loss.
https://optiwatt.com/blog/the-comprehensive-guide-to-maximizing-your-teslas-battery-
efficiency-and-battery-life [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, pp. 2-3]
Even if the vehicle is not used for extended periods of time, it is recommended to keep it
plugged in. This will result in total waste of energy that only goes for maintaining the battery to
prevent degradation.
Battery charging efficiency is dependent upon internal resistance.
Rolls Battery Engineering states: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, pp. 2-3]
Charge efficiency for Flooded deep cycle models is typically —80%. This should be reduced
1% per year after the third (3) year of operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, p. 2]
Energy power plant to electrical grid
More than 60% of energy used for electricity generation is lost in conversion.
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=44436
Each conversion results in loss to the remaining energy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, pp.
2-3]
More than 60% energy loss from the power plant to the electrical grid. 20% or more energy
loss from the electrical grid to battery.
Up to 41% energy loss from battery to forward movement.
There will be a higher demand on our energy grid, leading to increased electrical costs and
risks of additional brownouts and blackouts throughout the country. Electric vehicles have
increased weight posing safety concerns with increased stopping distances, (including within
school zones), increased damage in crashes, and yet more energy needed to move the vehicle
forward. It also adds more wear and tear to the roads, adding yet more energy waste. It requires
increased structural strength in parking garages with yet more energy waste. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0562, pp. 2-3]
I fear the whole picture has not been presented and that there is going to be a lot of energy
wasted in startup construction, people moved over to something new, and then in a few years,
charging and use efficiencies will have been reduced, the mistake will be realized, and it will be
too late. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, p. 3]
I urge the EPA to hold off on requirements moving towards use of Electric Vehicles. The
power grid is needed to be stabilized to support the dramatic electrical demand, there is lack of
infrastructure to support charging stations, the battery capabilities is not yet up to speed, there are
indirect environmental costs that may not yet be realized. There may be such a time for wide
scale use of Electric Vehicles, but the time is not yet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, p. 3]
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Organization: Arizona State Legislature
3. The proposed rule fails to model its climate change impacts. EPA justifies the proposed
rule on the basis that it will avoid climate change impacts, but EPA did not conduct modeling to
determine the proposed rule's impact on temperature change or sea-level rise. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0537, p. 2]
Global damages. The 2021 Working Group departed from recent practice by considering not
just domestic harms, but global anticipated climate damages in its analysis. 2021 TSD, at 3. The
decision to consider not just damages to the United States of America, but all other countries
potentially impacted by climate change, is not a scientific decision—it is a political decision. In
fact, the Working Group did not make this decision—in E.O. 13990, the President commanded it
to consider global damages. See E.O. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7040; 2021 TSD, at 3 (acknowledging
that "[t]he IWG was tasked with" publishing estimates that "tak[e] global damages into
account"). The Working Group concedes that this is a policy decision, involving considerations
of "climate risk, environmental justice, and intergenerational equity." 2021 TSD, at 3. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 20]
Organization: BlueGreen Alliance (BGA)
Strong, technology-forcing vehicle standards are essential to meet climate goals, advance
environmental justice, and create good jobs in the clean economy. The transportation sector is
the single largest contributor to climate-warming greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S., and the
local air pollutants emitted by vehicles, including particulate matter (PM), nitrous oxides (NOx),
and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) have disproportionate impacts on low-income and non-
white communities. Meanwhile, the supply chains for light- and medium-duty vehicles and the
manufacturing jobs within them—are critical to the economic health and stability of auto
manufacturing communities across the country (See Figurel). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667,
p. 2]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 1: Light- and Medium-Duty Vehicle Assemblers
and Component Manufacturers. Light and Medium Duty Vehicle Manufacturing. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0667, p. 2]
Source: BGA [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, p. 2]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
The science could not be clearer. We must act now to reduce pollution to stabilize the climate
and avoid the most serious consequences of climate change. In California and many other states,
the changing climate is already increasing the frequency and severity of drought, wildfires, and
extreme weather events like heat waves, jeopardizing public health and economic stability.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 7]
In addition to ongoing air quality challenges, California is on the front lines of climate
change. With the increasing severity and frequency of drought, wildfire, extreme heat, and other
impacts, Californians need only look out their windows to know that climate change is real and
rapidly getting worse. 4 The impacts we thought we would see in the decades to come are
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happening now and, as with air pollution, are disproportionately affecting low-income
communities and communities of color. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 8]
Cumulative impacts of climate change
U.S. EPA acknowledges that climate change can disproportionately affect people of color and
low-income communities due to various factors, such as lower resilience to climate impacts.
However, the analysis would benefit from an assessment of the cumulative impacts of multiple
risk factors to thoroughly estimate climate vulnerability. The proposed rule would lower GHG
emissions and mitigate the adverse effects of climate change on health outcomes and inequalities
among these groups. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 54-55]
CARB's 2022 Scoping Plan for Achieving Carbon Neutrality 98 also recognizes that
communities do not experience exposure to pollution sources and the resulting effects equally.
Low-income communities and communities of color consistently experience significantly higher
rates of pollution and adverse health conditions than others. Research has demonstrated that the
"cumulative impacts" 99 of various social, economic, and environmental factors can worsen
health conditions, and the combination of all these factors can compound the health effects of
individual exposures. CARB has been working over the past decade to better understand and
map cumulative impacts in California, in coordination with the California Office of
Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA), and to identify communities that are
experiencing the highest levels of socioeconomic- and pollution-related vulnerability. CARB
notes that U.S. EPA has also conducted research in this area, such as in its report, "Cumulative
Impacts Research: Recommendations for EPA's Office of Research and Development." 100
CARB recommends U.S. EPA incorporate information from this report, which further illustrates
the need to reduce climate stressors for vulnerable groups and the associated public health
benefits of the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 54-55]
98 CARB. 2022 Scoping Plan for Achieving Carbon Neutrality. December 2022.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/2022-sp.pdf.
99 Solomon GM, Morello-Frosch R, Zeise L, Faust JB. Cumulative Environmental Impacts: Science and
Policy to Protect Communities. Annu Rev Public Health. 2016;37:83-96.
100 U.S. EPA. Cumulative Impacts Research: Recommendations for EPA's Office of Research and
Development. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., EPA/600/R-22/014a, 2022.
Co-benefits of climate action
Reducing GHG emissions can help mitigate climate impacts, as U.S. EPA has addressed.
However, many actions to reduce GHG emissions also have health co-benefits that can improve
the health and well-being of populations, as well as address climate change. CARB's 2022
Scoping Plan for Achieving Carbon Neutrality: Appendix G (Public Health) 101 included a
qualitative analysis that evaluated the broad range of benefits of a dramatic reduction in fossil
fuels by 2045 combined with healthier ecosystem management. This analysis supports the
CARB Scoping Plan with scientific literature from eight health co-benefit areas: heat impacts,
children's health and development, economic security, food security, mobility and physical
activity, urban greening, wildfires and smoke impacts, and housing affordability. It indicates the
directional effects of each health outcome and gives details on the magnitude and extent of
health effects when possible. The analysis includes discussion of benefits to community health
and climate resilience, as well as potential inequities experienced at a community level. For
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example, a study by Masri et al. 102 reported that census tracts with predominantly Native
American populations, older adults, and low-income populations are more likely to be highly
impacted by wildfires. Overall, the qualitative analysis shows an overwhelming health benefit for
the State in moving forward to carbon neutrality while continuing efforts to increase health
equity and resilience in individual communities. California is not alone in experiencing climate
impacts, and CARB would expect similar results nationwide. CARB therefore recommends that
U.S. EPA add discussion on potential health co-benefits that are related to the reduction of GHG
emissions resulting from the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 55-56]
101 CARB. Scoping Plan for Achieving Carbon Neutrality: Appendix G (Public Health). December 2022.
Access at https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-l 1/2022-sp-appendix-g-public-health.pdf.
102 Masri S, Scaduto E, Jin Y, Wu J. Disproportionate Impacts of Wildfires among Elderly and Low-
Income Communities in California from 2000-2020. Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2021 Apr
8;18(8):3921.
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
Strong emissions standards are necessary now to stave off the worst impacts of human-
induced climate change and to confront inequitably distributed threats to public health and the
environment from climate change as well as other forms of pollution. From extreme heat to
wildfires to drought, our States and Cities are already experiencing the devastating impacts of
climate change, which will continue to mount and compound with rising concentrations of GHGs
in the atmosphere. Moreover, vehicle emissions of oxides of nitrogen (NOx), particulate matter
(PM), and other criteria pollutants continue to endanger the health and welfare of our
residents. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 1]
BACKGROUND
A. Our States and Cities Confront a Growing Climate Crisis
Our States and Cities are currently experiencing the devastating effects of climate change.
Increased temperatures, extreme heat events, wildfires, sea level rise, and coastal flooding—to
highlight just a few of the effects—are currently causing and projected to continue to cause
significant damage to our States and Cities. The Sixth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") reconfirms these types of impacts are
caused by anthropogenic climate change, and it projects that they will worsen.2 As average
surface temperatures rise and the intensity and frequency of these types of extreme weather
events increases, our States and Cities face direct and compounding challenges to protect the
health and welfare of our residents, our economies, and our natural resources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, pp. 2-3]
2 H.O. Portner et al., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022: Impacts,
Adaptation and Vulnerability, Summary for Policymakers (2022) ("IPCC Report 2022"), at 9, 20.
1. Increased Temperatures and Extreme Heat
Globally, "[t]he past nine years have been the warmest years since modern recordkeeping
began in 1880;"3 and nine of the warmest eleven years on record in the United States have
occurred since 2012.4 There is a "virtually certain" chance that 2023 will rank among the ten
warmest years on record, with a 93% chance it will rank among the top five.5 The IPCC has
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determined that GHG emissions from human activities are already responsible for about 1.1 °C
of warming since 1850-19006 and that "[h]uman influence has warmed the climate at a rate that
is unprecedented in at least the last 2000 years."7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 2-3]
3 National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA"), NASA Says 2022 Fifth Warmest Year on
Record, Warming Trend Continues (Jan. 12, 2023), available at https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-
says-2022-fifth-warmest-year-on-record-warming-trend-continues; see Henry Fountain and Mira
Rojanasakul, The Last 8 Years Were the Hottest on Record, The New York Times (Jan. 10, 2023),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/climate/earth-hottest-years.html ("The eight
warmest years on record [globally] have now occurred since 2014.").
4 National Weather Service, Average Annual Temperature by Year, available at
https://www.weather.gOv/media/slc/ClimateBook/Annual%20Average%20Temperature%20By%20Year.p
df.
5 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"), April 2023 was Earth's fourth warmest
on record (May 12, 2023), available at https://www.noaa.gov/news/april-2023-was-earths-fourth- warmest-
on-record.
6 See V. Masson-Delmote et al., IPCC, Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, Summary for
Policymakers (2021), at 5.
7 Id. at 6.
As temperatures rise, threats to public health and the environment in our States and Cities
continue to mount. For example, extreme heat events are happening more frequently, with more
intensity,8 and for longer duration.9 In June 2021, a four-day heat wave across the Pacific
Northwest set heat records all over the region, including heat so intense that roads buckled. 10
The region experienced 600 excess deaths during the heat wave. 11 In September 2022, a historic
heat wave punished California, breaking high-temperature records in Northern California; it was
considered "extraordinary" in part because of its "mind-blowing duration." 12 Extreme heat
events like these are "likely to become the new normal."13 By 2053, the number of counties
experiencing at least one day with a heat index above 125 degrees Fahrenheit is projected to
increase from 50 to over 1,000.14 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 2-3]
8 H.O. Portner et al., IPCC, Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Working Group
II Contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022)
("IPCC Report 2022"), at 1963.
9 Id. at 1937.
10 Tom Di Liberto, Astounding heat obliterates all-time records across the Pacific Northwest and Western
Canada in June 2021, NOAA (Jun. 30, 2021), available at https://www.climate.gov/news-features/event-
tracker/astounding-heat-obliterates-all-time-records-across-pacific-northwest.
11 Nadja Popovich & Winston Choi-Schagrin, Hidden Toll of the Northwest Heat Wave: Hundreds of
Extra Deaths, The New York Times (Aug. 11, 2021), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/08/ll/climate/deaths-pacific-northwest-heat-wave.html.
Although Washington only reported 95 heat-caused deaths at the time of reporting and Oregon reported 96,
these figures do not include all impacts of extreme heat.
12 Jill Cowan, Historic Heat Pushes California to the Brink, The New York Times (Sep. 7, 2022), available
at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/07/us/historic-heat-california-power.html.
13 Rebecca Hersher, Climate change makes heat waves, storms and droughts worse, climate report
confirms, NPR (Jan. 9, 2023), available at https://www.npr.org/2023/01/09/1147805696/climate-change-
makes-heat-waves-storms-and-droughts-worse-climate-report-confirm.
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14 John Muyskens et al., More dangerous heat waves are on the way: See the impact by Zip code, The
Washington Post (Aug. 15, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-
environment/interactive/2022/extreme-heat-risk-map-us/.
Extreme heat events threaten not only our quality of life, but our lives themselves. 15 As
temperatures rise, heat-related mortality is expected to increase, particularly in urban areas. 16
One study found that by 2100, annual heat-related deaths in the United States are projected to
increase from 12,000 to 36,000 in a moderate-warming scenario or 97,000 in a high-warming
scenario. 17 Another study predicted that by 2080 to 2099, hospital admissions for heat-related
respiratory diseases in New York state will be 2 to 6 times higher than in 1991 to 2004.18 A
third study concluded that extreme heat days were associated with higher all-cause mortality
rates in the contiguous United States, and disproportionately affected some subgroups, including
older adults and Black adults. 19 On a global scale, new research indicates that for every 0.1
degree Celsius above present levels, about 140 million additional people will be exposed to
dangerous levels of heat.20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 4]
15 See Peter Dizikes, Study: Extreme heat is changing habits of daily life, MIT News (Jan. 12, 2023),
available at https://news.mit.edu/2023/study-extreme-heat-less-outside-activity-0112 (finding that extreme
temperatures make people less likely to pursue outdoor activities); Gallup, Climate Change and Wellbeing
Around the World (2022), available at https://www.gallup.com/analytics/397940/climate- change-and-
wellbeing.aspx (describing August 2022 study that found that high-temperature days could decrease global
well-being by 17% by 2030).
16 IPCC Report 2022, supra n. 8, at 1968.
17 Meredith Bailey, A warming climate may lead to dramatic increase in US deaths due to heat exposure,
study shows, University of Washington School of Public Health (Jul. 29, 2020), available at
https://sph.washington.edu/news-events/news/warming-climate-may-lead-dramatic-increase-us-deaths-
due-heat-exposure-study-shows.
18 Shao Lin et al., Excessive Heat and Respiratory Hospitalizations in New York State: Estimating Current
and Future Public Health Burden Related to Climate Change, 120 ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
PERSPECTIVES 1571, 1527 (2012), available at https://doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1104728.
19 Sameed Ahmed M. Khatana, et al., Association of Extreme Heat With All-Cause Mortality in the
Contiguous US, 2008-2017, JAMA Network Open (May 19, 2022), available at
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2022.12957; see Muyskens, supra note 14 (indicating that by
2053, 80% of Black Americans and 60% of white Americans will be affected by dangerous heat).
20 Alex Morrison, Limiting global warming to 1.5 °C would save billions from dangerously hot climate,
University of Exeter (May 22, 2023), available at https://news.exeter.ac.uk/research/limiting-global-
warming-to-l-5c-would-save-billions-from-dangerously-hot-climate/.
2. Wildfires
Global warming is likely responsible for 66% to 88% of the atmospheric conditions fueling
wildfires.21 It engenders warm and dry conditions,22 which have contributed to more extreme
wildfires.23 Since the 1970s, the wildfire season in the western United States has extended from
5 months to over 7 months long.24,25 In the coming decades, climate change is projected to
further increase fire activity across North America.26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 4-6]
21 Alex Wigglesworth, Climate change is now the main driver of increasing wildfire weather, study finds,
Los Angeles Times (Nov. 1, 2021), available at https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-ll-
01/climate-change-is-now-main-driver-of-wildfire-weather.
22 IPCC Report 2022, supra n. 8, at 1948.
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23 Id. at 1939.
24 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Wildfire, available at
https://www.climatehubs.usda.gov/taxonomy/term/398 (last accessed May 26, 2023).
25 IPCC Report 2022, supra n. 8, at 1948.
26 Id.
The annual numbers of large wildland fires and area burned in the western United States have
risen in the past several decades,27 and the last few years have seen numerous record-setting
wildfires. For example, multiple large wildfires burned hundreds of thousands of acres in
Colorado in July and August 2020, including the second-largest fire in state history.28 The
largest wildfire in New Mexico history burned in 2022,29 destroying hundreds of homes.30
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 4-6]
27 Id.
28 TomDi Liberto, A Colorado summer: Drought, wildfires, and smoke in 2020, NOAA (Aug. 20, 2020),
available at https://www.climate.gov/news-features/event-tracker/colorado-summer-drought-wildfires- and-
smoke-2020.
29 NOAA, Assessing the U.S. Climate in 2022 (Jan. 10, 2023), available at
https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/national-climate-202212.
30 Anna Phillips & Jason Samenow, Forest Service finds its planned burns sparked N.M.'s largest wildfire,
The Washington Post (May 27, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-
environment/2022/05/27/new-mexico-wildfire-service-controlled-burn/.
California is uniquely vulnerable to wildfires,31 and the projected impacts on California from
an increase in wildfire risk are severe. In 2018, the Camp Fire burned 155,366 acres of land,
destroying 18,804 structures—roughly 90% of the homes in the town of Paradise—and killing 85
people;32 it was then the deadliest and most destructive wildfire in California history. In 2021, a
record number of acres burned in the Sierra Nevada, breaking the previous record set in 2020.33
The Dixie Fire, now the largest single wildfire in California history, also burned in 2021.34 As a
result of climate change, the average annual area burned across California is projected to
increase by around 77% by 2099, and the worst wildfire years could see burned area increases of
more than 178% by the end of this century.3 5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 4-6]
31 Scott Stephens et al., Prehistoric Fire Area and Emissions from California's Forests, Woodlands,
Shrub lands and Grasslands, 251 FOREST ECOLOGY AND MGMT. 205, 205 (2007); JonKeeley, Fire in
Mediterranean Climate Ecosystems—A Comparative Overview, 58 ISR. J. OF ECOLOGY &
EVOLUTION 123, 124 (2012).
32 California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection, Top 20 Most Destructive California Wildfires (last
accessed June 30, 2023), available at https://www.fire.ca.gov/our-impact/statistics; Kurtis Alexander,
Reclaiming Paradise, The San Francisco Chronicle (May 3, 2019), available at
https://projects.sfchronicle.com/2019/rebuilding-paradise/.
33 Sierra Nevada Conservancy, 2021: Another historic Sierra Nevada fire season (Jan. 24, 2022), available
at https ://sierranevada. ca. gov/2021 -another-historic-sierra-nevada-fire-season/.
34 Id.
35 Anthony Westerling, California Energy Commission, Wildfire Simulations for California's Fourth
Climate Change Assessment: Projecting Changes in Extreme Wildfire Events with a Warming Climate
(2018), at 19.
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Moreover, wildfires pose significant public health risks due to air quality degradation.36
Exposure to wildfire smoke may cause respiratory morbidity, especially exacerbations of asthma
and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.37 "[WJildfire-specific PM2.5 is up to 10 times more
harmful on human health than PM2.5from other sources."38,39 This public health concern
grows as the frequency and intensity of wildfires increase and is not limited to States where the
wildfires are burning. The rising heat from the wildfires takes particulate matter and toxic gases
in the smoke into the jet stream, which can carry those hazardous substances thousands of miles
and cause harmful air pollution across the country. During the 2020 wildfire season and again in
July of 2021, smoke from wildfires burning on the West Coast caused New York City to
experience some of the worst air quality in the world.40 And in June 2023, New York City was
once again blanketed in smoke, resulting in the highest measurements of 2.5 micron particles
since recording began in 1999.41 The combination of fierce wildfires in Canada and airflow
patterns prompted the U.S. National Weather Service to issue air quality alerts for most of the
Atlantic seaboard.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 4-6]
36 IPCC Report 2022, supra n. 8, at 1949.
37 Colleen E. Reid et al., Critical Review of Health Impacts of Wildfire Smoke Exposure, 124
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 1334, 1336-37 (2016), available at
https://doi.org/10.1289/ehp. 1409277.
38 Rosana Aguilera, et al., Wildfire smoke impacts respiratory health more than fine particles from other
sources: observational evidence from Southern California, 12 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS, at 3
(2021), available at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-21708-0.
39 Smoke from wildfires has also been found to exacerbate risks associated with the COVID-19 virus, and
one study found that "[t]housands of COVID-19 cases and deaths in California, Oregon, and Washington
between March and December 2020 may be attributable to increases in fine particulate air pollution
(PM2.5) from wildfire smoke." Karen Feldscher, Link Between Wildfires and COVID cases established,
The Harvard Gazette (Aug. 13, 2021), available at https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/08/wildfire-
smoke-linked-to-increase-in-covid-19-cases-and- deaths/.
40 See, e.g., Oliver Milman, New York air quality among worst in world as haze from western wildfires
shrouds city, The Guardian (Jul. 21, 2021), available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2021/jul/21/new-york-air-quality-plunges-smoke-west-coast-wildfires.
41 Aatish Bhatia, Josh Katz, & Margot Sanger-Katz, Just How Bad was the Pollution in New York?, The
New York Times (Jun. 9, 2023), available at https://www.nytimes.eom/interactive/2023/06/08/upshot/new-
york-city-smoke.html.
42 Tyler Clifford, US East Coast blanketed in veil of smoke from Canadian fires, Reuters (Jun. 8, 2023),
available at https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/us-states-under-air-quality-alerts-canadian-
smoke-drifts-south-2023-06-07/; see Julie Bosnian, Smoky Air From Canadian Wildfires Blankets
Midwestern Skies, The New York Times (Jun. 27, 2023), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/27/us/midwest-chicago-smoke-air-quality.html.
3. Sea Level Rise and Coastal Flooding
In the past three decades, rates of sea level rise have accelerated as a result of climate
change,43 which causes ice sheets and glaciers to melt and seawater to warm and expand. By
2050, sea level along the contiguous United States's coastline is conservatively estimated to rise
by at least 1 foot,44 causing flooding, erosion, and infrastructure damage along the coastlines.45
By the middle of the century, flooding from rising sea levels and storms is likely to make billions
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of dollars of coastal property unusable,46 which is particularly problematic given that nearly
40% of Americans live in coastal counties.47 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 7-8]
43 IPCC Report 2022, supra n. 8, at 1936-37.
44 W.V. Sweet, et al., Global and Regional Sea Level Rise Scenarios for the United States: Updated Mean
Projects and Extreme Water Level Probabilities Along U.S. Coastlines, NOAA (Feb. 2022), available at
https://aambpublicoceanservice.blob.core.windows.net/oceanserviceprod/hazards/sealevelrise/noaa-nos-
techrpt01-global-regional-SLR-scenarios-US.pdf; Ezra David Romero, California Overhauls Its Sea Level
Rise Plan as Climate Change Reshapes Coastal Life, KQED (Apr. 24, 2023), available at
https://www.kqed.org/science/1979603/california-overhauls-its-sea-level-rise-plan-as-climate-change-
reshapes-coastal-life.
45 IPCC Report 2022, supra n. 8, at 1950.
46 David Reidmiller et al., U.S. Global Climate Change Research Program, Fourth National Climate
Assessment: Volume II (2018), at 330.
47 NOAA, Economics and Demographics (last visited Jun. 13, 2023), available at
https://coast.noaa.gov/states/fast-facts/economics-and-demographics.html.
"California is particularly vulnerable to sea level rise because approximately 80% of the
population lives within 30 miles of the Pacific Ocean."48 Projections show that 31% to 67% of
Southern California beaches may be completely lost by 2100, which will effectively eliminate
their recreational and tourism value without large-scale intervention.49 Damages from the
inundation of residential and commercial buildings under 20 inches of sea level rise could reach
nearly $17.9 billion, and these costs would double if a 100-year coastal flood occurred on top of
this sea level rise.50 In a worst case scenario, 6.6 feet of sea level rise combined with a 100-year
storm would cause flooding in Southern California that could affect 250,000 people, $50 billion
worth of property, and $39 billion worth of buildings.51 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp.
7-8]
48 NOAA, Understanding and Planning for Sea Level Rise In California (last visited Jun. 13, 2023),
available at https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/stories/ca-slr.html.
49 Leah Fisher and Sonya Ziaja, California's Fourth Climate Change Assessment: Statewide Summary
Report, California Energy Commission (2019), at 22.
50 Id.
51 Id.
Sea level rise also exacerbates coastal flooding. For example, by 2050, sea levels along the
southern coastal region of Massachusetts are expected to rise over 2 feet, which will cause over
25 miles of road and more than 1,400 buildings in the region to flood every day at high tide. 52
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 7-8]
52 Barbara Moran, Rising seas threaten Mass. South Coast and prosperous fishing port, report finds. Here
are 5 takeaways, WBUR (Sep. 19, 2022), available at
https://www.wbur.org/news/2022/09/19/massachusetts-south-coast-sea-level-rise-new-bedford.
The region also contains 4,900 acres of salt marsh, which filter water, offer wildlife habitat,
and act as storm buffer; 23% of the salt marsh is expected to vanish by 2050.53 Coastal flooding
may also contaminate groundwater.54 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 7-8]
53 Id.
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54 See, e.g., Diana Felton et al., Risks of Sea Level Rise and Increased Flooding on Known Chemical
Contamination in Hawaii, State of Hawaii, Department of Public Health (Jun. 21, 2021), available at
https://health.hawaii.gov/heer/files/2021/06/Climate-Change-and-Chemical-Contamination-memo-
updated-June-2021 .pdf.
1. Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles Require
Urgent and Ambitious Action Now
It is critically important to reduce GHGs from light- and medium-duty vehicles and to do so
as soon as is feasible. Transportation is the leading source of GHG emissions in the country,
accounting for approximately 27.2% of total GHG emissions. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,350 (citing U.S.
GHG Emissions Inventory). Light-duty vehicles alone account for 57% of those transportation
sector emissions, or approximately 15.5% of total U.S. GHG emissions. Id. Reductions of these
emissions are thus crucial for the United States to achieve its climate targets and do its part to
keep the rise in global mean temperatures below 1.5 °C to 2 °C.168 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0746, pp. 28-29]
168 United States, The United States of America Nationally Determined Contribution, Reducing
Greenhouse Gases in the United States: A 2030 Emissions Target (2021), available at
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-
06/United%20States%20NDC%20April%2021%202021%20Final.pdf.
Urgent emissions reductions are necessary, because GHGs can remain in the atmosphere for
long time periods. For example, 40% of carbon dioxide emitted as a result of human activities
will remain in the atmosphere after 100 years, and 20% will remain after 1000 years; only after
about 10,000 years will all the carbon dioxide emitted now break down. 169 As explained in the
Fourth National Climate Assessment, "[wjaiting to begin reducing emissions is likely to increase
the damages from climate-related extreme events (such as heat waves, droughts, wildfires, flash
floods, and stronger storm surges due to higher sea levels and more powerful hurricanes)." 170
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 28-29]
169 Ask the Experts: The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, 5 CARBON MANAGEMENT 17, 24 (2014),
available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.4155/cmt.13.80.
170 Fourth National Climate Assessment: Volume II, supra note 46, at 1488.
Moreover, there may be "tipping points" in the climate system such that even a small
incremental change in temperature could push Earth's climate into catastrophic runaway global
warming. 171 Indeed, a 2022 study published in the journal Science warned that six out of nine
major climate tipping points (including the accelerating ice loss from the West Antarctic ice
sheet) move from "possible" to "likely" to be triggered at 1.5 °C of warming. 172 Therefore,
serious efforts to reduce GHG emissions are urgently needed to avoid scenarios where steeper
(and vastly more expensive) emission reductions are needed later. Delaying efforts to mitigate
carbon dioxide emissions will have negative—and potentially irreversible—consequences for
global warming and its impacts, including more extreme wildfires, rising sea levels, greater
ocean acidification, and increased risks to food security and public health. Moreover, the uneven
distribution of these impacts demands urgent action to protect our most vulnerable populations
from additional climate harms and to prevent the exacerbation of existing climate injustices. 173
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 28-29]
171 IPCC, Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, supra n. 6 at SPM-28.
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172 David Armstrong McKay et al., Exceeding 1.5 °C global warming could trigger multiple climate
tipping points, Science, Vol. 377, No. 6611 (Sep. 9, 2022), available at
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abn7950.
173 See USGCRP Study, supra n. 61, at 247-86; see e.g., EPA, Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in
the United States: A Focus on Six Impacts, supra n. 65, at 35.
The science could not be clearer. We must act now to reduce pollution to stabilize the climate
and avoid the most serious consequences of climate change. In California and many other states,
the changing climate is already increasing the frequency and severity of drought, wildfires, and
extreme weather events like heat waves, jeopardizing public health and economic stability. We
likewise must continue to urgently pursue efforts to improve air quality and reduce toxic
emissions and reduce the disparate impacts that have persisted for decades. In California and
across the U.S., many low-income communities and communities of color are exposed to
disproportionate levels of pollution from on-road vehicle emissions, which contributes to
respiratory illness, cardiovascular disease, cancer, and premature death. These impacts are often
compounded by the congregation of nearby industrial sources, including upstream, midstream,
and downstream fuel production sources. Furthermore, many of these same communities are
especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change, as the most severe harms from climate
change fall disproportionately on these underserved communities who are least able to prepare
for and recover from associated impacts. U.S. EPA's proposed standards are urgently needed to
help address these issues. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 7]
Despite significant progress reducing air pollution, California experiences some of the
nation's poorest air quality, with more than 21 million Californians living in areas that exceed
federal ozone standards. 3 Within these areas, there are many low-income and disadvantaged
communities that are exposed to not only ozone, but also to particulate and toxic pollutant levels
that are significantly higher than applicable federal standards and which have immediate and
detrimental health effects. With new research demonstrating adverse health impacts even below
NAAQS levels, it remains critically important to continue to reduce emissions wherever feasible.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 8]
3 California Air Resources Board (CARB). 2022 State Strategy for the State Implementation Plan. October
2021.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/2022-08/2022_State_SIP_Strategy.pdf
In addition to ongoing air quality challenges, California is on the front lines of climate
change. With the increasing severity and frequency of drought, wildfire, extreme heat, and other
impacts, Californians need only look out their windows to know that climate change is real and
rapidly getting worse. 4 The impacts we thought we would see in the decades to come are
happening now and, as with air pollution, are disproportionately affecting low-income
communities and communities of color. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 8]
4 CARB. 2022 Scoping Plan for Achieving Carbon Neutrality. December 2022.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/2023-04/2022-sp.pdf.
The Proposal Will Protect Public Health
Reducing motor vehicle pollution is imperative to protect public health. U.S. EPA's proposed
emission standards, or a stronger version, would effectively reduce both GHGs and criteria
pollutants like PM, leading to a wide array of vital public health benefits. While U.S. EPA has
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comprehensively summarized the potential public health benefits of its proposal, CARB finds
that there are additional public health benefits that go beyond those described. CARB has
summarized its findings and notes that were U.S. EPA to include this information it would better
encompass the tremendous potential benefits resulting from the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, p. 52]
Cumulative impacts of climate change
U.S. EPA acknowledges that climate change can disproportionately affect people of color and
low-income communities due to various factors, such as lower resilience to climate impacts.
However, the analysis would benefit from an assessment of the cumulative impacts of multiple
risk factors to thoroughly estimate climate vulnerability. The proposed rule would lower GHG
emissions and mitigate the adverse effects of climate change on health outcomes and inequalities
among these groups. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 54-55]
CARB's 2022 Scoping Plan for Achieving Carbon Neutrality 98 also recognizes that
communities do not experience exposure to pollution sources and the resulting effects equally.
Low-income communities and communities of color consistently experience significantly higher
rates of pollution and adverse health conditions than others. Research has demonstrated that the
"cumulative impacts" 99 of various social, economic, and environmental factors can worsen
health conditions, and the combination of all these factors can compound the health effects of
individual exposures. CARB has been working over the past decade to better understand and
map cumulative impacts in California, in coordination with the California Office of
Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA), and to identify communities that are
experiencing the highest levels of socioeconomic- and pollution-related vulnerability. CARB
notes that U.S. EPA has also conducted research in this area, such as in its report, "Cumulative
Impacts Research: Recommendations for EPA's Office of Research and Development." 100
CARB recommends U.S. EPA incorporate information from this report, which further illustrates
the need to reduce climate stressors for vulnerable groups and the associated public health
benefits of the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 54-55]
98 CARB. 2022 Scoping Plan for Achieving Carbon Neutrality. December 2022.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/2022-sp.pdf.
99 Solomon GM, Morello-Frosch R, Zeise L, Faust JB. Cumulative Environmental Impacts: Science and
Policy to Protect Communities. Annu Rev Public Health. 2016;37:83-96.
100 U.S. EPA. Cumulative Impacts Research: Recommendations for EPA's Office of Research and
Development. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., EPA/600/R-22/014a, 2022.
Co-benefits of climate action
Reducing GHG emissions can help mitigate climate impacts, as U.S. EPA has addressed.
However, many actions to reduce GHG emissions also have health co-benefits that can improve
the health and well-being of populations, as well as address climate change. CARB's 2022
Scoping Plan for Achieving Carbon Neutrality: Appendix G (Public Health) 101 included a
qualitative analysis that evaluated the broad range of benefits of a dramatic reduction in fossil
fuels by 2045 combined with healthier ecosystem management. This analysis supports the
CARB Scoping Plan with scientific literature from eight health co-benefit areas: heat impacts,
children's health and development, economic security, food security, mobility and physical
activity, urban greening, wildfires and smoke impacts, and housing affordability. It indicates the
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directional effects of each health outcome and gives details on the magnitude and extent of
health effects when possible. The analysis includes discussion of benefits to community health
and climate resilience, as well as potential inequities experienced at a community level. For
example, a study by Masri et al. 102 reported that census tracts with predominantly Native
American populations, older adults, and low-income populations are more likely to be highly
impacted by wildfires. Overall, the qualitative analysis shows an overwhelming health benefit for
the State in moving forward to carbon neutrality while continuing efforts to increase health
equity and resilience in individual communities. California is not alone in experiencing climate
impacts, and CARB would expect similar results nationwide. CARB therefore recommends that
U.S. EPA add discussion on potential health co-benefits that are related to the reduction of GHG
emissions resulting from the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 55-56]
101 CARB. Scoping Plan for Achieving Carbon Neutrality: Appendix G (Public Health). December 2022.
Access at https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-l 1/2022-sp-appendix-g-public-health.pdf.
102 Masri S, Scaduto E, Jin Y, Wu J. Disproportionate Impacts of Wildfires among Elderly and Low-
Income Communities in California from 2000-2020. Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2021 Apr
8;18(8):3921.
4. Environmental Justice Communities Disproportionately Bear the Burden of Climate
Change Impacts
Climate change's impacts will continue to disproportionately fall on environmental justice
communities.55 Environmental justice communities experience more severe climate impacts and
are more vulnerable as the climate crisis worsens. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 8-10]
55 "Environmental justice" is defined by EPA as the "fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all
people regardless of race, color, national origin or income with respect to development, implementation,
and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies." EPA, EJ 2020 Action Agenda: The U.S.
EPA's Environmental Justice Strategic Plan for 2016-2020, EPA-300-B-1-6004, at 1 (Oct. 2016). For the
purpose of this comment, the term "environmental justice community" refers to a community of color or
community experiencing high rates of poverty that, due to past and/or current unfair and inequitable
treatment, is overburdened by environmental pollution, and the accompanying harms and risks from
exposure to that pollution because of past or current unfair treatment.
Severe climate harms are already a reality for many environmental justice communities.
Globally, the last nine years have been the nine hottest on record, and that trend is expected to
continue.56 Members of environmental justice communities tend to work in occupations with
increased exposure to extreme heat, such as the agricultural, construction, and delivery
industries.57 Farmworkers die of heat-related causes at 20 times the rate of the rest of the U.S.
civilian workforce. 58 Since 2005, the first year California began tracking the number of heat-
related fatalities, 36% of California's heat-related worker deaths have been of farm workers. 5 9
Similarly, although construction workers comprise only 6% of the national workforce, they
account for 36% of heat-related deaths.60 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 8-10]
56 NASA, NASA Says 2022 Fifth Warmest Year on Record, Warming Trend Continues, supra n. 3;
Masson-Delmotte et al., supra n. 6, at 10.
57 See, e.g., Juley Fulcher, Boiling Point: OSHA Must Act Immediately to Protect Workers From Deadly
Temperatures, Public Citizen (Jun. 28, 2022), available at https://www.citizen.org/article/boiling-point/;
Union of Concerned Scientists, Too Hot to Work: Assessing the Threats Climate Change Poses to Outdoor
Workers (2021), at 3, available at https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/Too-Hot-to-Work_9-
7.pdf; Ariel Wittenberg, OSHA Targets Heat Threats Heightened by Climate Change, E&E News (Oct. 26,
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2021), available at https://www.eenews.net/articles/osha-targets-heaththreats-heightened-by-climate-
change/.
58 See Union of Concerned Scientists, Farmworkers at Risk: The Growing Dangers of Pesticides and Heat
(2019) at 4, available at https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-12/farmworkers-at-risk-report-
2019-web.pdf (citing Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Heat-Related Deaths Among Crop
Workers—United States, 1992-2006, available at
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5724al.htm (last updated June 19, 2008)).
59 Teniope Adewumi-Gunn & Juanita Constible, Natural Resources Defense Council, Feeling the Heat:
How California's Workplace Heat Standards Can Inform Stronger Protections Nationwide (2022),
available at https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/feeling-heat-ca-workplace-heat-standards-report.pdf.
60 Xiuwen Sue Dong et al., Heat-Related Deaths Among Construction Workers in the United States, 62
AM. J. INDUS. MED. (2019), at 1047-57.
At home, environmental justice communities suffer disproportionate impacts from extreme
heat because they are more likely to lack air conditioning, tree canopy, and greenspace.
Environmental justice communities have less access to air conditioning to cool down, and are
less able to pay the utility bills required to run air conditioning units or fans.61 In urbanized
environments, pavement, cement, and other non-vegetated areas contribute to the heat island
effect, in which built environments retain heat, causing daytime temperatures to be from 1 °F to
6 °F hotter than suburban and rural areas and nighttime temperatures to be as much as 22 °F
hotter.62 The heat island effect is inequitably distributed—it is most extreme in lower-income
communities and communities of color.63 Contributing to this effect is the lack of tree canopy
and greenspace in environmental justice communities, often due to lower historical and ongoing
investment. Indeed, tree canopy and greenspace is highly correlated with historical redlining
practices, in which federal housing policy directed investment away from lower-income
communities, and especially communities of color, characterized as "risky" for loan servicing.64
Moreover, an EPA report found that individuals with lower incomes and individuals of color are
respectively 11% to 16% and 8% to 14% more likely to live in areas with the highest projected
increases in premature mortality from extreme heat.65 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 8-
10]
61 Michelle Roos et al., California Energy Commission, California's Fourth Climate Change Assessment:
Climate Justice Report, (2018), at 39-40, 45, available at https://resourceslegacyfund.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/Climate-Justice-Report-4CCCA-v.4-00455673xAlC15.pdf ("California Climate
Justice Report"); Allison Crimmins, et al., The Impacts of Climate Change on Human Health in the United
States: A Scientific Assessment, U.S. Global Change Research Program (2016), at 252, available at
https://health2016.globalchange.gov/low/ClimateHealth2016_FullReport_small.pdf ("USGCRP Study").
62 See EPA, Heat Island Effect, available at https://www.epa.gov/heatislands (last updated May 1, 2023);
California Environmental Protection Agency, Understanding the Urban Heat Island Index, available at
https://calepa.ca.gov/climate/urban-heat-island-index-for-california/understanding-the-urban-heat-island-
index/ (last visited May 24, 2023).
63 EPA, Heat Islands and Equity, available at https://www.epa.gov/heatislands/heat-islands-and-equity
(last updated Dec. 12, 2022); USGCRP Study, supra n. 61, at 252.
64 Dexter Locke et al., Residential Housing Segregation and Urban Tree Canopy in 37 US Cities, 1 NPJ
URBAN SUSTAIN ABILITY 15 (2020), at 3-4; Ian Leahy & Yaiyna Serkez, Since When Have Trees
Existed Only for Rich Americans?, The New York Times (Jul. 4, 2021), available at
https://www.nytimes.eom/interactive/2021/06/30/opinion/environmental-inequity-trees-critical-
infrastructure.html.
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65 EPA, Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States: A Focus on Six Impacts (2021), at
36, available at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-09/climate-vulnerability_september-
2021_508.pdf.
In addition, flooding and drought from extreme weather events disproportionately affect
environmental justice communities, and the inequity will grow as climate impacts worsen. Due
to disinvestment, environmental justice communities often lack sufficient infrastructure to
control flooding or ensure steady water supplies.66 They also suffer from more severe impacts,
such as contaminated water from pollutant flows during floods and increased concentration of
contaminants during droughts.67 EPA has also determined that individuals with lower incomes
are more likely to live in areas with the highest projected land losses from sea level rise
inundation and are more likely to face substantial traffic delays due to climate-driven changes in
high-tide flooding.68 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 8-10]
66 Lily Katz, A Racist Past, a Flooded Future: Formerly Redlined Areas Have $107 Billion Worth of
Homes Facing High Flood Risk—25% More Than Non-Redlined Areas, Redfin (2021), available at
https://www.redfin.com/news/redlining-flood-risk/; California Climate Justice Report, supra n. 61, at 41-
42; USGCRP Study, supra n. 61, at 253-54.
67 USGCRP Study, supra n. 61, at 158-74.
68 EPA, Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States: A Focus on Six Impacts, supra n.
65, at 49, 59.
The above impacts especially apply to tribal communities. Due to land dispossession and
forced migration, tribal communities are more exposed to extreme heat and more likely to rely
on local water sources that are less resilient to drought and more contaminated.69 Beyond those
impacts, tribal communities also suffer cultural harms from the decimation or harm to local
ecosystems and species of particular meaning to cultural practices.70 These cultural resources
have intrinsic value, and they are also critical to tribal community identity and group cohesion,
which translates into direct health benefits.71 Moreover, degradation of these cultural resources
threatens traditional ecological knowledge, such as particularized understanding of local
ecosystems, agriculture, and sustainable practices, that can help limit the impacts of climate
change.72 Tribal communities with sovereign land holdings are also more vulnerable to climate
impacts because they are unable to relocate.73 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 10-11]
69 Justin Farnell, et al., Effects of land dispossession and forced migration on Indigenous peoples in North
America, Science (2021), at 374; USGCRP Study, supra n. 61, at 254.
70 Ron Goode et al., California Energy Commission, California's Fourth Climate Change Assessment:
Summary Report from Tribal and Indigenous Communities within California (2018), at 19, available at
https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-ll/Statewide_Reports-SUM-CCCA4-2018-
010_TribalCommunitySummary_ADA.pdf.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 13-16;
73 Farnell et al., supra n. 69.
Furthermore, environmental justice communities, including tribal communities, are
environmentally overburdened due to greater existing pollution exposure.74 This disadvantage
manifests in higher rates of chronic disease, premature death, and other adverse public health
outcomes.75 Compounding these disparities, residents of environmental justice communities
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also have less access to health care—they are less likely to have health insurance and less likely
to be able to afford necessary tests and procedures, and health care facilities are poorly staffed
and equipped.76 Consequently, residents of environmental justice communities are less able to
withstand climate impacts that further damage their health, such as increased local smog
conditions.77 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 10-11]
74 California Climate Justice Report, supra n.61, at 40-41.
75 Id.; USGCRP Study, supra n. 61, at 253.
76 Samantha Artiga et al., Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Coverage by Race and Ethnicity, 2010-2021
(2022), available at https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/health-coverage-by-
race-and-ethnicity/; Benjamin Sommers, et al., Beyond Health Insurance: Remaining Disparities in US
Health Care in the Post-ACA Era, 95 THE MILBANK QUARTERLY 1 (2017).
77 California Climate Justice Report, supra n.61, at 40-43.
In addition to being more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, environmental justice
communities endure structural disadvantages that blunt their ability to adapt to a changing
climate. Environmental justice communities have less access to financial resources, such as
income and wealth, that are critical to climate resilience.78 More financial resources equate to
more mobility, more ability to spend (on utilities, health care, home adaptation, etc.) to reduce
climate harms, and more safeguards (such as insurance) in the event of extreme climate
events.79 Environmental justice communities have higher rates of limited English proficiency,
which can reduce access to climate resilience programs and increase vulnerability in extreme
climate events due to an inability to understand public health information.80 Social capital in the
political process is critical to ensure environmental justice communities receive resources to
increase climate resilience and to prevent further entrenching existing inequities. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 10-11]
78 Id. at 39.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 43; USGCRP Study, supra n.61, at 106.
Organization: Ceres BICEP (Business for Innovative Climate and Energy Policy) Network
BICEP Network companies see climate change as a significant business risk, reducing GHG
emissions as a major economic opportunity, and recognize the urgency of ensuring near-term
reductions. In its most recent March 2023 report, 1 the International Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) emphasized the necessity to "massively fast-track climate efforts by every country and
every sector and on every timeframe,"2 underscoring the urgency of drastically reducing GHG
emissions by 2030. Given that the transportation sector is the largest source of U.S. GHG
emissions,3 strong vehicle emission standards are critical to meeting U.S. climate goals. Recent
analysis from the International Council of Clean Transportation (ICCT) concludes that aligning
the light-duty vehicle sector with climate goals would require a 77% zero- emission vehicle
(ZEV) sales share in 2030.4 A key finding of BloombergNEF's 2023 Electric Vehicle Outlook
was that "(d)irect electrification via batteries is the most efficient, cost-effective and
commercially available route to fully decarbonizing road transport."5 Although ICCT predicts
that IRA incentives could stimulate up to 56-67% electric vehicle sales by 2032,6 even
Alternative 1 falls short of this level of electric vehicle sales share, let alone what is needed to
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meet climate goals. Further, given that ICE vehicles will make up the majority of the fleet for
many years, it is also necessary to ensure greater GHG reductions from these vehicles. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0600, pp. 1-2]
1 https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/.
2.https://www.unmultimedia.org/avlibrary/asset/3022/3022200/#:~:text=UN%20Secretary%2DGeneral%2
0Ant%C3%B3nio%20Guterres%20said%
20that%20the%20new%20IPCC,on%20all%20fronts%20%2D%2D%20everything%2C.
3 https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions.
4 https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/The-Global-Automaker-Rating-2022_final.pdf.
5 https://about.bnef.com/electric-vehicle-outlook/.
6 https://theicct.org/publication/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23/ (p. ii).
BICEP members' abilities to meet their own climate commitments are contingent on strong
standards that will ensure the availability of clean vehicles across the U.S. and drive the
necessary shift to electrification. Unfortunately, the U.S. currently lags behind the European
Union and China in EV sales,7and a recent study projects a shortage of EVs needed to meet
American consumer demand.8 Strong U.S. vehicle emission standards are necessary to ensure
the availability of clean vehicles for our members and the global competitiveness of the U.S.
auto industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0600, pp. 1-2]
7 https ://theicct.org/epa-pr-rule-ldv-mdv-apr23/.
8 https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Excess-Demand-The-Looming-EV-
Shortage.pdf.
Organization: Charles Forsberg
We conducted a series of workshops and wrote multiple papers on replacing all crude oil-
domestically and internationally. By definition, this includes everything covered in the proposed
EPA rule and all other uses of oil-based products. Based on those studies, the likely
consequences of the proposed EPA rulemaking are much higher costs for light vehicles, failure
to meet greenhouse gas reduction goals by decades, significant reductions in life expectancy and
major reductions in incomes of the bottom 60% of the U.S. population. A summary of the basis
for those conclusions and recommendations for EPA is provided herein. The recently published
open-access paper (below) provides more detail and includes references to support these
conclusions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, p. 1]
C. W. Forsberg, "What is the Long-Term Demand for Liquid Hydrocarbon Fuels and
Feedstocks?" Applied Energy, 341, 121104 (2023)
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2023.121104 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, p. 1]
Organization: Charles Gordon
CLIMATE MODELS are HIGHLY SPECULATIVE
The world has gotten warmer over the past 150 years. We have the measurements and we
know the mechanism by which C02 warms the world. These are facts. But we do not know what
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will happen in 10, 25 or 100 years. We have made guesses based on complex models. The
predictions are not scientific facts as they purport to be. They are easily manipulated. They are
created using lots of subjective judgement. Dr. Kooning, an expert, in his book "Unsettled"
attached, shows. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, pp. 3-5]
That 10500 scientists swear by the model's predictions is not as meaningful as it appears. Ten
thousand of those scientists are following the herd in areas outside their expertise. I have seen
this in the 100's of scientists who I have dealt with in my OSHA career. Five hundred of those are
experts in relevant areas with high standards for studies in their fields. But few scientists know or
pay any attention to the historical record or pay much attention to conflicting data. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0747, pp. 3-5]
The models are created by having a computer expert create a speculative model. Then they
see if it fits past data. It never does. So, changes are made to the model to see if it reflects past
data better. This process is repeated many times until the model fits past data. That doesn't prove
that it will fit the future, that is still a guess. Dr. Kooning explains this much more elegantly.
Also because of the process of adjustment, the biases of the researchers will be incorporated,
consciously or unconsciously. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, pp. 3-5]
Consequently, the models are easy to manipulate. When I was at OSHA, industry presented a
complex pharmacokinetic model to show that a chemical was less dangerous than OSHA's
simple, statistical model showed. So, an OSHA staffer asked an expert friend to see if he could
create a pharmacokinetic model that showed more risk than OSHA's statistical model. He did!
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, pp. 3-5]
I, myself, manipulated a model for fun. I had visited an old factory that used carbon disulfide.
They had extensive exposure data and a study had been done showing excess cardiovascular risk
of workers. I thought why might not the risk follow an S shaped curve, common for biologic
functions rather than a linear or quadratic model. I made some fairly sensible adjustments to the
exposure data. Sure enough, the risk followed an S shaped curve. The OSHA scientists laughed
at me for being unscientific. But that is exactly what the scientists who make climate models do.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, pp. 3-5]
Also, at OSHA I worked with a scientist who was considered the country's foremost
biostatistician. He worked for both industry and OSHA. With some exaggeration, he could make
anything correlate or not correlate with anything else. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, pp. 3-5]
Yes, climate models provide some evidence about future climate change and the impacts of
that change. But because of their speculative nature, they should not used to make massive
changes in our technology and life style in a hurried way that will slow growth. They should be
cautiously used to make adjustments at a slower pace to let the future tell us what the future is
and what changes are needed or not needed. They should not be used to scare the population.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, pp. 3-5]
The EPA PRESENTS DATA in a MISLEADING WAY
The EPA presents reductions in C02 in terms of estimated millions of tons kept out of the
atmosphere, an impressively large number. But the important number is the degree of warming
prevented. That number was presented in the Wall Street Journal. As I recall, the proposed rule
would reduce global warming by about 0.01 deg. C. The marginal benefits of reducing warming
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by the proposed 2027 rule must be balanced by the disruption, massive expensive changes
required, and inconvenience to citizens caused. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 5]
Although it is not within EPA's purview, the real problem is the coal being burned by India
and China and that will increase. That is the own way that India can raise the standard of living
of its extremely poor citizens. The same is true of much of Africa. There are more carbon
friendly ways of providing energy to households, but not to industry except nuclear. We as a
country and EPA forget that the burning of hydrocarbons over the past 150 years providing
cheap and efficient energy is what made the West prosperous. That prosperity is what allows the
West to afford to reduce the burning of hydrocarbons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 5]
Though this is not EPA's doing, presenting a temperature increase of 1.5 deg. C as causing
terrible things and an increase of 2 deg. C as causing worse things is misleading as every EPA
scientist knows. Various things happen over varying continuums and not at specific points. The
use of the points 1.5 deg. C and 2 deg. Chas been very successfully used to generate regulatory
and political action and to scare people. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 5]
EPA presents the proposed reductions of particulates a health benefit. But EPA has been
reducing particulate emissions from gas engines since 1968.1 think it keeps claiming the same
health benefits over and over. But the exhaust of gasoline engines is now so clean that further
reductions are marginal. The major causes of particulates in the air are blown dirt, dust, tire
scrubbing and clothes rubbing against clothes. If EPA reads auto magazines it will see that the
particulate filters required on European cars reduce performance and economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0747, p. 5]
SCIENTISTS and their MODELS IGNORE the HISTORICAL RECORD
Fifteen thousand years ago the glaciers in the Northern Hemisphere retreated at a remarkably
fast rate. That retreat led to human life as we know it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 6]
What if the cavemen had the power to prevent the glaciers from retreating which dramatically
changed their life style. Where would we be today? That point is made by the cover drawing.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 6]
There have been many changes in climate that had nothing to do with mankind. The warming
and retreat of the glaciers 15,000 years ago - a short time in geological history. The warm Roman
period which led to much wealth and prosperity. The cold of the middle-ages led to an increase
in poverty and a loss of Roman technology on roads, water systems, sewage systems, medicine,
etc. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 6]
The Mayan civilization ended with drought not caused by man as did the Saharan
Civilization. The England of Dickens was cold and snowy. The late 19th century was warm and
England put its water and sewer pipes outside houses. When I lived in England in the 1960's we
lived with frozen pipes from the cold of the 1950's and 60's. Time Magazine had a cover on the
new cold era. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 6]
The current climate change probably is partially affected by non-human caused factors. The
climate modelers claim their models show that man is causing all the current climate change. But
those models can't show that other factors in nature are not causing some of the change. Those
models are designed to show man has caused it all - they don't explore alternate hypothesis. To
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make an estimate of how much climate change is caused by non-human factors a model has to be
created to show that and then tested against the historical record. Like current models, it then has
to be modified to fit the record, and then used to make a prediction of how much current climate
change is caused by non-human factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 6]
MAJOR CHANGES often have UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES
In the 1980's we worried about the ozone hole and its impact on humans and the environment.
Scientists predicted that the escape of the coolant then used in air conditioners caused it.
Countries then banned the use of that coolant and required the use of another coolant. The
prediction was right and the change in coolant le to the shrinking of the ozone hole. But it turns
out the escape of the new coolant adds to global warming. So now we will have to change our air
conditioners to use another coolant which hopefully will not contribute to global warming.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, pp. 6-7]
In the 1970's we worried about the acidification of our lakes caused by sulfites and sulfates in
the atmosphere. So, we phased-out the burning of high sulfur soft coal. That did reduce the
acidification of lakes. But it turns out that the sulfites and sulfates in the atmosphere reflect sun
light and kept the world cooler. So another change made by man had the unexpected
consequence of warming the world. It takes hubris to think that ending the burning of
hydrocarbons will not have unexpected consequences. One expected consequence is that overall,
it will make the world's people poorer as switching will take the investment that otherwise would
go to growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, pp. 6-7]
BENEFITS of GLOBAL WARMING
If EPA employees looked out their windows, they would see that global warming has some
benefits - though not as great as its costs. Washington residents can move about much easier in
the winter because of less snow. Heating bill are less. Washington has always had hot, hazy and
humid summers. The/4 degree F of summer warming is not noticeable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0747, pp. 8-9]
The milder Chicago winters resulted in my mother and other older people not being
housebound. Indeed, the entire Northeast has benefited from this warming. Warmer temperatures
in Canada and Siberia will permit more wheat to be grown. Places like Anchorage will have a
much more livable climate. Many, but not all species will adjust their habitat to the warmer
climate. Crops will grow quicker more C02 in the atmosphere. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0747, pp. 8-9]
Organization: Clean Fuels Alliance America
When considering options to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles and
equipment, there are two essential elements to consider: the amount of the reduction and when it
happens. This is because carbon emissions are persistent and accumulate. The resulting increased
levels of GHGs in the atmosphere contribute to global warming now and for decades to come. A
reduction in GHG emissions now can avoid decades of associated heating, thus having
significantly more value than carbon reductions made in the future. The time value of carbon is
key, and the next decade is critical.3 The importance of reducing carbon today cannot be
understated as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) clearly reaffirmed in their
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Sixth Assessment Report: Carbon reductions today are more important than carbon reductions in
the future.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0626, p. 2]
3 National Biodiesel Board. Biodiesel.org. (2021). Cutting Carbon: Comparing Biomass-Based Diesel &
Electrification for Commercial Fleet Use.
4 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2021). Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change.
Organization: Colorado Energy Office, Colorado Department of Transportation, and Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment
Our agencies strongly support EPA's development of national air pollution and GHG
emission standards that are as robust as possible to ensure strong progress nationwide on air
pollution and equity. A strong national light- and medium-duty vehicle standard is important to
Colorado for at least three reasons. First, air pollution from nearby states crosses into Colorado
and affects public health, and the longer duration and increased stringency of the proposed
criteria air pollutant standards will reduce interstate air pollution transport into Colorado.
Second, Colorado is already experiencing the impacts of climate change, including increased
wildfires, floods, and drought. Climate change is a global issue that is impacted by all GHG
emissions regardless of geographic source, and the reductions in GHG emissions from the
proposed national rule will help reduce the long-term risks of climate change in Colorado.
Finally, although the proposed national GHG emissions standards are not an explicit EV sales
requirement like Advanced Clean Cars and Advanced Clean Cars II, complying with the
standards will effectively require vehicle manufacturers to sell a significantly greater amount of
EVs. The economies of scale encouraged by the proposed rules will support the production of
more affordable EVs, easing the transition to zero emission vehicles and enabling greater access
to their benefits for disproportionately impacted communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694,
p. 2]
Organization: Daniel Hellebuyck
Minimal Improvement on Global Warming: Reducing global warming requires a global
effort. China and India- two countries with combined populations almost ten time the size of the
Untied States- have not shown they are willing to do anything to reduce global warming. The
US bearing the brunt of carbon emission reduction is an exercise in futility. In fact, global
warming may actually be worse as companies shift jobs and factories from the United States to
these low-wage countries to save money. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0526, p. 2]
Organization: David Hallberg
The Science is Incontrovertibly Clear
Contrary to OTAQ's false assurances, the rapid adoption of advanced engine technologies
such as Gasoline Direct Injection (GDI) will dramatically increase emissions of the most harmful
ultrafine particles (UFP) and secondary organic aerosols (SOAs) that bind with and insulate
highly toxic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and enable their long-range transport.
The attached White Paper, authored by the UN Foundation's Special Advisor for Climate
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Solutions and Chrysler's former Director for Regulatory Affairs, explains how the BTEX
emissions threat is getting WORSE, not better. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, p. 2]
New White Paper Says The Real Cost of Gasoline .. .is to Our Health | Clean Fuels
Development Coalition (cleanfuelsdc.org) [Link: https://cleanfuelsdc.org/2022/05/16/new-white-
paper-says-the-real-cost-of-gasoline-is-to-our-health/] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, p. 2]
Many experts believe that the 20% BTEX fraction found in a typical gallon of U.S. gasoline
poses the single greatest threat to public health and the environment. In their comments to the
MY2023 LDV GHG Final Rule, the same two authors stated: "The effect of aromatics [BTEX]
on pollution and human health is thus magnified twice over: Aromatics lead disproportionately
to PAH formation, and PAHs lead disproportionately to SOA formation. Worse yet, PAHs hitch
a ride on SOA for long distances and weaponize these particles as they travel through the human
body.. .When SOA particles are formed in the presence of gas-phase PAHs, their formation and
properties are significantly different from SOA particles formed without PAHs: They exhibit
slower evaporation kinetics and have higher fractions of non-volatile components and higher
viscosities, assuring their longer atmospheric lifetimes. This increased viscosity and decreased
volatility act as a shield that protects PAHs from chemical degradation and evaporation, allowing
for their long-range transport." [Detchon - Modlin MY2023 Final Rule comments, p. 17.
RDRMCommentsEPA-HQ-OAR.pdf (cleanfuelsdc.org)] [Link: https://cleanfuelsdc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/09/RDRMCommentsEPA-HQ-OAR.pdf] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0548, p. 2]
Organization: District of Columbia Department of Energy and Environment (DOEE)
As EPA mentions in Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later
Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles Section II, without substantial changes to the way people
drive, how people travel, or what people use to travel, the District, and the United States as a
whole, will not avoid the worst consequences of climate change. EPA recognizes that vehicles,
including passenger vehicles, are major sources of air pollution and poor health, yet the proposed
rulemaking from EPA fails to be analogous to the severity of the ensuing climate change
impacts. In fact, EPA proposes to find that standards substantially more stringent than
Alternative 1 would not be appropriate because of uncertainties concerning the cost and
feasibility of such standards. EPA proposes to find that standards substantially less stringent than
Alternative 2 or 3 would not be appropriate because they would forgo feasible emissions
reductions that would improve the protection of public health and welfare. 88 FR 29201. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 2]
DOEE recognizes that the costs involved in implementing and meeting stringent emissions
requirements would be high. However, DOEE disagrees that standards substantially more
stringent than Alternative 1 would be inappropriate due to cost and feasibility. The cost of
inaction or insufficient action toward eliminating vehicle emissions in conjunction with climate
change will be far greater to both public and environmental health and welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0550, p. 2]
Organization: Donn Viviani
1) Why the proposed emission reductions are insufficient:
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EPA has made significant progress in the past two years toward reducing GHG emissions.
However, both EPA and OMB estimate that significant and extremely dangerous emissions will
remain in the pipeline after implemen- tation of the Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for
Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles regulations (EV
rule)2. This comment also takes into account other actions, i.e., the emission reduc- tions that
will be achieved from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA)3 and the Inflation
Reduction Act (IRA)4; implementation of the the new source performance standards for
electrical generating units (EGU)5 and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty
Vehicles - Phase 36 . My comment shows that these actions will fall far short of keep- ing
temperature rise to safe level and this threatens the initiation of nonlin- ear climate feedbacks.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 1-5]
1 cprclimate.org
2 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-05-05/pdf/2023-07974.pdf
3 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-l 17publ58/html/PLAW-l 17publ58.htm
4 https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22122279/inflation-reduction-act-of-2022.pdf
5 https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/05/23/2023-10141/new-source-perfor- mance-
standards-for-greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-new-modified-and-reconstructed
6 https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P 10178RN.pdf
The emissions remaining after implementation of these efforts will, accord- ing to EPA and
OMB estimates, fail to restrict emissions sufficiently and in fact will consume the US share of
the remaining carbon budget, which budget was conservatively calculated by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)7. This budget must not be breached if we
are to have a realistic chance to keep warming to 1.5 C, and avoid some of cli- mate change's
most catastrophic effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 1-5]
7 https://www.ipcc.ch/srl5/chapter/chapter-2/
Here's why additional reductions are needed. According to the IPCC spe- cial report "Global
Warming of 1.5 C " 8 the remaining carbon budget is ~ 580 GtC02 in order to have a 50%
probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C, and -420 GtC02 for a 66% probability. The US has
4.25% of world population, so proportionally and at minimum (due to the oversize contribu- tion
to the climate crisis attributable to our nation) the US has a remaining budget of ~ 26 GtC02 for
a 50% probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C, and a budget of-19 GtC02 for a 66%
probability.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 1-5]
8 https://www.ipcc.ch/srl5/
9 The 95th percentile is the most common exposure limit used today by EPA.regulators (USEPA, 2016:
Guidelines for Human Exposure Assessment), using the 50th or 66th percentile for a heat exposure limit is
not conservative, allowing little room for modeling or other errors
While the EV RIA does not calculate the emissions remaining as a result of the rule, the
emissions can be calculated from the reduction estimates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp.
1-5]
The EV RIA predicts 7.3 Gt will be released from light and medium duty ve- hides by 2055 if
the EV penetration goals in the RIA10 are met. Transporta- tion is responsible for 28% of US
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GHG emissions and the light and medium duty vehicles covered by the EV rule are responsible
for-57.5 % of that amount. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 1-5]
10 https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/420d23003.pdf
The 7.3 Gt remaining after the rule is either ~ 28 % (for a 50% probability of avoiding 1.5C)
or -38% (for a 66% probability of avoiding 1.5C) of the entire remaining carbon
budget But this regulated sector is responsible for only —16% of total US emissions.
Additionally after 2055 there will still be internal combustion vehicles on the road, and EGU will
continue to emit GHGs to charge the BEV vehicles. So the EPA estimate is a bottom line for
remaining emissions. Unless EPA has plans that will reduce emissions astonishingly fast in
the other sectors, e.g., agriculture, construction, indus- try, etc., these reductions are
insufficient. If EPA does have such plans, it is imperative they be made public. The public
sector may have useful in- sights and suggestions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 1-5]
OMB11 has calculated estimates of remaining emissions and time to zero emissions recently,
these estimates were calculated prior to the EV pro- posal. However, these estimates don't
properly meld or make sense with the emission reductions estimates found in three recent
proposed rules: the light, medium and and heavy vehicle proposals; in the EGU proposal: or in
the heavy duty vehicle proposal. For the OMB estimates to be correct, again, huge reductions
would have to occur outside transportation and the power sector. I understand that these are all
projections and estimates, but they are given weight in policy decisions, so they must fit together
reason- ably well, or an explanation as to why they are so disparate is necessary. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 1-5]
11 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/OMB-Analysis-Inflation-Reduction-Act.pdf
OMB 12 characterized 2023 as a hinge point at which GHG emissions take a sharp downward
trajectory. OMB had calculated that the US will reach zero emissions anywhere from 2044 to
2065 with a medium estimate of zero by 2055. This range depends on how aggressively various
US incen- tives and rules are adopted. OMB posits possible annual emission de- clines of
approximately 2.4%, 3.4% or 5.4% starting in 2023, with the rate depending on adoption of
incentives and rules. OMB's stated justification for the steady decline in the analysis is that "it's
reasonable to assume" the emission reduction trajectory estimated by several models for 2023-
2030 will continue forward at the same rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 1-5]
12 ibid
Based on OMB assumptions, the high, low and mid level adoptions give trajectories of
emission reductions resulting in:
High adoption predicts a 5.4% decline and zero emissions in 2044 with -58 Gt cumulative
emissions left in the pipeline
Low adoption predicts a 2.4% decline and zero emissions in 2065 with -115 Gt cumulative
emissions left in the pipeline
Medium adoption predicts a 3.4% decline and zero emissions in 2055 with -88 Gt cumulative
emissions left in the pipeline [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 1-5]
Emissions even at the most optimistic of these adoption rates would very quickly blow past
the US share of the remaining carbon budget. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 1-5]
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In any case, these "rosy" predictions are hard to credit. First, the IRA in- centives that
drive the (modeled) 2023-2030 decline will all expire by 2033. Second, the two sectors,
transportation and power generation, which have regulations proposed and that account for 53%
of current emissions, don't decrease at those rapid rates. Both of these sectors will have Gt
emissions still ongoing in 2055 and beyond, according to EPA's RIAs (regulatory im- pact
analyses) of the power and transportation proposed rules. Third, the RIA for the phase 3
NSPS for heavy duty vehicles estimates -12.8 Gt of emissions in the pipeline to 2055, with the
methane emissions decreasing to about 2045 and then rising thereafterl3. Fourth, there are
no regulatory proposals for the sectors that comprise 47% of the remaining emissions, other than
incentives in the IRA, which again, expire by the end of 2032 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546,
pp. 1-5]
13 https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10178RN.pdf
To sum up, while the EPA and OMB estimates focussed on the GHG reduc- tions, this
comment focusses on the GHG emissions that are still in the pipeline, i.e., will continue to be
released after those reductions are real- ized. It laudatory that EPA is attempting to reduce
emissions to the extent they have, but the important number is the emissions that EPA anticipates
will still occur despite the incentives and regulations. These emissions un- dermine our
decarbonization goals, in fact likely make them unreachable, and more importantly make much
more probable catastrophic climate im- pacts and triggered irreversible feedbacks. EPA estimates
that from the transportation sector (-20 Gt) and electric power sector (RIA estimates -17 Gt
through 2047)14 will release about 37 Gt through the mid 40s to mid 50s. None of these sectors
will be at zero emissions, according to EPA by then, so these are minimum emission
quantities. These are projections, and EPA must be congratulated for the complex modeling
involved. They paint a dismal picture for achieving zero emissions by 2050. And a worse picture
for avoiding the non-linear feedbacks that once they are triggered will act independent of
additional emission. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 1-5]
14 https://www.epa.gOv/system/files/documents/2023-05/utilities_ria_proposal_2023-05.pdf
Organization: Elders Climate Action
2. The Cost of Converting Auto and Truck Makers to ZEVs will be far less than the Cost to
the National Economy of Climate Impacts
The Nation needs strong action from EPA now to achieve sharp reductions in C02 emissions
to slow the warming. Losses from climate related events cost the Nation an estimated $145
billion in 2021. Damage is expanding rapidly year over year. Delaying major reductions from the
transport sector will have devastating consequences. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 4]
The warmer climate has triggered a massive increase in damage from wildfire in the
American West where an average of 1 million acres burned just 20 years ago, to over 15 million
acres each in 2020 and 2021. Thousands of families have lost homes to fire, businesses were
destroyed and communities lost schools, health care facilities, water and power supplies and
other infrastructure. Smoke pollution smothered much of the West with dangerous levels of air
pollution that added thousands of premature deaths across the region. The record setting heat
wave in the Pacific NW in 2021 took hundreds of lives. Wildfire studies estimate deepening
drought in the West will likely double the annual area destroyed by fire in this decade. We
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submit a review of the impacts of wildfire in the West and the expected impacts this decade
because the social cost of carbon developed by the Interagency Working Group does not include
wildfire impacts when estimating the damages associated with GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0737, p. 4]
In other regions of the U.S. more powerful hurricanes, extreme floods and massive tornadoes
have caused devastation to hundreds of communities across the Gulf Coast, Mid- West and
Northeast. These extreme weather events have become more powerful, more frequent and more
destructive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 4]
The Nation needs your help now to slow the warming to protect our families and
communities. Medium and heavy-duty vehicles are a major contributor to the warming. Medium-
and heavy-duty trucks emit a quarter of climate pollution from transportation despite being only
10% of vehicles on the road. You must take action now that accelerates the transition to a zero
emission transport sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 4]
The latest climate modeling report (AR6) from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) now makes clear that exceeding 1.5o C before 2050 is "more likely than not"
even with implementation of the most aggressive GHG reduction scenario, but that the excursion
above 1.5o C can be limited to a few decades if we reduce GHG emissions by half before 2030,
and achieve net zero emissions by 2050. But if we fail to meet either of those targets, it is "more
likely than not" that global temperatures will reach 2.0 o C with dire consequences for humanity.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 10-11]
To achieve net-zero emissions economy wide by 2050, zero emission technologies currently
available must be deployed as soon as possible to put GHG emissions from our largest source of
emissions - transportation - on the path toward zero. EPA's proposed rule merely reduces
carbon fuel combustion by less than 1%. A zero emission economy cannot be achieved if
vehicles continue to burn carbon fuels. Internal combustion engines (ICEs) must be replaced as
quickly as possible by zero emission vehicles (ZEVs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 10-
11]
EPA's proposed L/MDV rule does not chart a course toward implementing either the national
policy declared by President Biden or reflect the urgent need to cut GHG emissions in half by
2030 to avoid much worse future climate catastrophes. The rule preamble acknowledges that the
proposed rule changes will reduce L/MDV C02 emissions by only .2 MMT during MY 2027
from 29 MMT to 28.8 MMT. Over the 20 year useful life of vehicles sold in MYs 2027-29 the
rule will allow millions of diesel and gasoline vehicles to be added to the Nation's highways
which will emit an estimated 1.7 billion MT of C02. These emissions will wipe out more than
half of the 3.1 billion MT of C02 reduction achieved by EPA's SAFE 2 rule for light duty
vehicles. These L/MDV emissions are the equivalent of operating 21 new coal-fired power
plants. A large fraction of these emissions could be avoided if EPA adopted the CARB zero
emission standard for L/MDVs in the ACT rule. The rule does not achieve, or describe how it
will contribute to achieving, zero emissions by 2050. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 10-
11]
We ask EPA to revise the rule to set a zero emission standard for all new L/MDVs by 2035,
and establish a phase-in schedule for the standard that includes ZEV sales targets for MYs 2027-
29 that are the same as the CARB ACT rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 10-11]
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ZEV sales targets are needed now -
to establish benchmarks for all engine manufacturers to create a level playing field
that promotes competitive market conditions for zero emission vehicles based on performance,
reliability and cost;
to ensure a market for ZEVs that will justify early investment by third parties in the
development of supply chains needed for production of batteries and fuel cells;
to ensure the capacity of the industry to ramp up to 100% of sales to ensure that ZEVs
will be available in time to replace on-road ICE vehicles by 2050;
for MY 2027 to give the industry enough lead time to develop supply chains, plan the
conversion of production facilities and develop marketing campaigns designed to assure public
acceptance of their products. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 10-11]
B. Urgent Need for Zero GHG Emission Standard to Achieve GHG Reductions.
Harm to public health and the environmental, property and economic resources of our
communities incorporated into the CAA definition of "public welfare" was anticipated and
comprehensively described in the Administrator's Endangerment Finding that established the
basis for regulating six GHGs under the CAA.4 All of the harms anticipated in 2009 have now
been demonstrated to varying degrees, and are accelerating rapidly as the planet continues to
heat up. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 11-13]
4 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (December 15, 2009).
1. The IPCC Findings.
Since the Endangerment Finding, EPA's catalogue of risks have been augmented by much
more comprehensive modeling of warming trends, the warming expected from a range of global
emission scenarios, and a description of the emission limitations that must be implemented to
avoid more catastrophic climate outcomes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 11-13]
The IPCC's 2018 report reviews and analyzes the then-available scientific literature to
provide the best information available to answer two critical questions posed by world leaders at
the Paris Climate conference: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 11-13]
1) What are the differences between the consequences of allowing the planetary climate
system to rise 1.5o C compared to 2o C above the pre-industrial background?
2) What limitations on C02 and other GHG emissions must be achieved to avoid
overshooting a 1.5o C or a 2o C rise in global temperature?
(a) Consequences of 1.5o C and 2o C rise in global temperatures are both unacceptable, but
2o C is significantly worse. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 11-13]
The IPCC's 2018 report catalogues numerous expected adverse consequences of both a 1.5o
C and a 2o C rise and in global mean temperature. 5 Some of the effects of greatest concern are -
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 11-13]
5 Global Warming of 1.5o C, Chapter 3: "Impacts of 1.5o C of global warming on natural and human
systems."
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1) increases in mean summer temperatures and the frequency of hot days above the
99th%ile of the baseline temperature range, and the increased duration of the summer dry season
that, together, will more quickly desiccate the coastal and Cascade forests each year, increase the
ignitability of forest fuels, increase the frequency and intensity of wildfires, increase the
production of hazardous concentrations of fine particle pollution (smoke), and increase the
adverse health consequences of public exposure to multi-day extreme hazard pollution episodes;
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 11-13]
2) diminished summer stream flows that force curtailment of water for agricultural
operations dependent on irrigation water, and contribute to warmer surface water temperatures
that interfere with the survival of cold water fish species (e.g., salmonids) and contribute to
algalblooms that produce toxic contamination of municipal and agricultural water supplies and
fishery habitats; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 11-13]
3) increasing ocean acidification and ocean temperatures that together prevent
reproduction and survival of some marine species, cause some native local species to abandon
Oregon waters in search of cooler waters, and diminish productivity of species remaining in the
local water column which in turn will reduce the catch, make commercial fishing unprofitable,
and further reduce the food supply for human populations dependent on marine sources of
protein and resident coastal orca populations that are now starving because of diminished food
supply; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 11-13]
4) the frequency and duration of extreme precipitation events that cause flooding,
erosion, displacement of human populations in flood-prone areas, the destruction of freshwater
and anadromous fish spawning habitat and contamination of municipal water supplies; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 11-13]
5) warmer winter temperatures that convert winter snow precipitation events to rainfall
thereby reducing the high altitude storage of water which diminishes water resources available
for agriculture and municipal uses during the spring and summer, and increases the severity of
drought by reducing stream flows, causing crop loss, loss of fishery habitat, and inadequate
water supplies for residential and industrial users and fire fighting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0737, pp. 11-13]
6) longer wildfire seasons and expanded burn zones that increase human exposure to
hazardous levels of air pollution, including multi-week exposure to levels of fine particles
(smoke) known to cause pre-mature death and other adverse health outcomes among vulnerable
populations, and elevated concentrations of ground level ozone harmful to public health
exacerbated by warmer summer temperature regimes that govern the chemistry of ozone
formation in the atmosphere.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 11-13]
6 More Days With Haze: How Oregon is Adapting to the Public Health Risks of Increasing Wildfires," p. 5
(Oregon Health Authority, 2019) available at OHA 2688 More Days with Haze (oregon.gov).
All of these effects are occurring now, and are expected to increase in severity as climate
warming accelerates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 11-13]
(b) Expanding Wildfire Destruction and Smoke Mortality Correlates with Warming Climate.
The IPCC found that global mean temperature was about l.Oo C above the pre-industrial
baseline in 2010. By 2010, the climate regime had not yet triggered large increases in wildfire
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conditions compared to historical fire patterns in the American West. But as the global mean
advanced from 1.1 o C to 1.2 o C, new records were being set. The World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) concluded that "[i]n 2020 - one of the three warmest years on record - the
global average temperature was 1.2 °C above the pre-industrial baseline."7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0737, pp. 13-15]
7 World Meteorological Organization, State of the Global Climate, 6 (April 2021); available at
docnum.php (wmo.int). WMO uses the "1850-1900 baseline as an approximation of pre-industrial
levels." Id.
As the global temperature approached 1.2 °C, the frequency, intensity, areal extent and
duration of wildfires have increased significantly in the last five years. In 2020 burns set records
across the American West. California's burn area grew to nearly 5 million acres, and the total
area burned in the 11 Western states exceeded 10 million acres: 2020 Western United States
wildfire season - Wikipedia. The increasing area burned by wildfire in the American West tracks
the Australian experience where annual fire zones expanded rapidly in response to drought
leading to a massive wildfire season burning 46 million acres (an area equal to the State of
Washington) during their 2019-20 austral summer.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 13-
15]
8 List of major bushfires in Australia - Wikipedia, see Sept. 2019-March 2020.
During the 2017 fire season, wildfire in Oregon destroyed one-half million acres for the first
time in the State's history. In 2018 wildfire consumed 660,000 acres of forest. In 2020 Oregon
wildfires consumed 1.2 million acres,9 forced 500,000 Oregonians to evacuate their homes
ahead of the flames, incinerated 4,000 homes displacing 10,000 Oregonians, leaving many
families homeless, and killed 11. The 2020 burn area doubles the 2017 burn area, and is an order
of magnitude greater than the statewide average of 120,000 acres burned during the 1990-2010
period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 13-15]
9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_0regon_wildfires (1,221,324 acres burned in 2020).
The 2018 IPCC report states that the global mean temperature is rising about 0.2o C per
decade, 10 twice the warming rate during the 20th Century. This accelerated warming rate
suggested in 2018 that 1.5o C rise would be reached about 2035 unless large reductions in GHG
emissions were achieved before 2030. New modeling performed for the 2021 IPCC report, AR6,
indicates that 1.5o C above the pre-industrial baseline will be reached by 2030 if GHG emissions
are held to current rates, and 2o C rise reached by 2050.11,12 WMO has since announced its
estimate that the first annual 1,5o C rise in global temperature will likely occur by 2026.13
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 13-15]
10 Global Warming of 1.5o C, Chapter. 1 (Section 1.2.1.3).
11 "Analysis: When might the world exceed 1.5C and 2C of global warming? | Carbon Brief (Dec. 4,
2020).
12 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Basis (IPCC, 2021), Summary for Policy Makers, B.1.2. available
at 2108-09 IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM.pdf.
13 World Meteorological Organization, press release (May 27, 2021) available at
https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/new-climate-predictions-increase-likelihood-of-temporarily-
reaching- 15-%C2%B0c-next-5.
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Given that the frequency and ferocity of wildfire in the American West began to increase
significantly after 2015 under the climate conditions associated with 1.1° C to 1.2° C rise above
the 1850-1900 baseline, the march higher toward a 1.5o C rise between 2025 and 2030 can be
expected to accelerate the frequency, severity and areal extent of damage caused by wildfire.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 13-15]
The Oregon Climate Assessment (OCAR5.pdf | Powered by Box, January 5, 2021) anticipates
that the destruction of property, disruption of daily life, large costs to the economy, pollution of
the atmosphere and water supplies, impairment of human health, and damage to wildlife, the
environment and habitats will worsen in coming years as the climate continues to warm more
rapidly. The Assessment cites studies predicting the effects of warming on seasonal heat causing
a six-fold increase in hot days (>####90o F) in Oregon counties west of the Cascades during
future Oregon summers (pp. 12-13), and reductions in summer precipitation (Table 2). Summers
will be hotter and drier, and summer heat will start earlier and persist longer. 14 The Assessment
concludes that these conditions are conducive to "high-severity" wildfires: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0737, pp. 13-15]
14 Id., 3.
High-severity fires dominate wet, cool forests, including remnant old growth forests, in
Oregon's Coast Range and western Cascade Range. High-severity wildfires in wet, cool forests
typically are ... facilitated by extremely dry and warm springs and summers or high winds.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 13-15]
As these conditions become more extreme, the area incinerated by wild fires is expected to
increase (pp. 48-54). A 2017 forest modeling analysis "projected a 200% increase in median
annual area burned in Oregon" during the 2010-2039 period compared to 1961-2004.15 Another
2017 study looking at fires across the American West estimates a 200-400% increase in the
"annual probability of very large fires." 16 Going forward, the Assessment makes clear that all
"empirical models ... consistently project that the area burned in Oregon will increase." 17 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 13-15]
15 Climate Assessment, 53.
16 Id., 54.
17 Id., 53.
The fire zone doubled between 2017 and 2020. As predicted by forest science modeling,
another doubling of the acres burned annually by 2025-30 is highly plausible as global
temperature approaches 1.5° C above the pre-industrial baseline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0737, pp.13-15]
If fire zones expand to predicted levels in the Pacific NW, 25% to 40% of Oregon (15 to 25
million acres) and Washington (11 to 20 million acres) will be incinerated during this decade,
economic activity will collapse and hazardous air quality will make the Northwest inhospitable
to human habitation for most residents during the fire season. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737,
pp.13-15]
The data and modeling estimates presented in the Oregon Climate Assessment and other
sources predict a future in which the destruction of Oregon's forest resources by wildfire will
1626
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continue until either 1) the cool and wet conditions that sustained Cascadia's forests during the
8,000 years before 1980 are restored, or 2) most of the standing forests are reduced to shrub or
grasslands. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 13-15]
2. Impacts of Climate Warming on Public Health are Significant and Widespread.
Fire smoke and unprecedented hot temperatures are having a significant impact on human
health as an example of the regional impact of heat waves, drought and wildfires. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 15-17]
The heat dome that raised temperatures above 110 F for three days in the Pacific NW in June
2021 caused over 200 heat-related deaths in Oregon and Washington. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0737, pp.15-17]
Recent research demonstrates that emissions from wildfire are the largest source of fine
particle pollution in large regions of the U.S., and contributed to thousands of pre-mature deaths.
Wildfire in the western U.S. now accounts for half of all fine particle pollution in some areas of
the West, doubling the exposure to PM2.5 [18] from non-fire sources including motor vehicles,
power plants and industrial operations.19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 15-17]
18 PM2.5 are particles smaller than 2.5 micrometers in diameter.
19 Burke, M. et al., The changing risk and burden of wildfire in the United States | PNAS (Jan 11, 2021).
A warming climate is responsible for roughly half of the increase in burned area in the United
States (4), and future climate change could lead to up to an additional doubling of wildfire-
related particulate emissions in fireprone areas (36) or a many-fold increase in burned area (37,
38). Costs from these increases include both the downstream economic and health costs of
smoke exposure, as well as the cost of suppression activities, direct loss of life and property, and
other adaptive measure (e.g., power shutoffs) that have widespread economic consequences.20
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 15-17]
20 Id.
Using satellite measurements of smoke plumes integrated with ground level monitored PM2.5
(fine particle) concentration data, Burke et al. estimate that between 7,000 and 14,500 deaths per
year (depending on the dose/response curve used to estimate mortality from observed exposures)
are attributable to fire smoke in the contiguous U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 15-
17]
Mortality and other health impacts such as asthma attacks and exacerbating COPD will be
experienced most severely by communities already burdened by the adverse health effects of
daily exposure to fine particle pollution emitted from tailpipes, power plants and industrial
sources. Exposure to fire smoke in the American West during the 2020 fire season was universal.
No communities were spared. But fire smoke at least doubled the annual exposure routinely
suffered by BIPOC and low income communities living near major highways and industrial
sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 15-17]
In Oregon, mortality attributed to fire includes many hundreds more deaths than the lives lost
directly to fires. Statewide smoke pollution during the 2020 fires threatened lives and well- being
with extreme hazard concentrations of particles known to cause pre-mature death and cancer,
1627
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exacerbate asthma, COPD and other respiratory conditions, and cardio-vascular diseases. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 15-17]
The Oregon Health Authority (OHA) reports that "[t]he most severe recent air quality events
in Oregon are due to wildfire smoke.. ."21 OHA cited a study finding that fire smoke in 2012
"caused hundreds of premature deaths, nearly 2,000 emergency room visits and more than $2
billion in health costs."22 OHA points to the longer fire season as increasing the harm from
exposure to smoke. "Fire seasons in Oregon are roughly 100 days longer than they were in the
1970s. Longer seasons mean more smoke in Oregon communities."23 The greater density of
smoke and longer duration of smoke exposure in 2020 likely at least doubled the mortality
caused by smoke exposure compared to 2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 15-17]
21 Oregon Climate and Health Report, 40 (Oregon Health Authority, 2020).
22 Id., 33.
23 Id.,
In addition, low income families without air conditioning are much less able to escape smoke
pollution by closing doors and windows during the summer heat to keep themselves safe. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 15-17]
Workers cannot avoid exposure to smoke pollution if required to work outdoors. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 15-17]
Beyond the economic and environmental damage, social disruption, and harm to health that
will result from a longer fire season and expanded fire zones, more deadly air quality will likely
make parts of the American West uninhabitable during the fire season for the most vulnerable
populations such as the elderly, children and those with existing respiratory and cardiovascular
conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 15-17]
These recent data and other sources published since 2009, including the data discussed at
length in the Administrator's 2009 Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (December 15,
2009), confirm the finding that EPA made 12 years ago: "The Administrator finds that the
elevated atmospheric concentrations of the well-mixed greenhouse gases may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger the public health and welfare of current and future generations." Id., at
66,523. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 15-17]
3. Net-Zero Emissions Must be Achieved as Soon as Possible to Protect Public Health and the
Public Welfare.
The climate will need to be stabilized as soon as possible to - [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0737, pp. 17-19]
protect public health from the deadly effects of heat waves and wildfire smoke
particles;
preserve the health, safety and quality of life in the American West from the
devastation caused by massive uncontrollable wildfires;
preserve the health, safety and quality of life for millions of Americans living along
the Gulf Coast from the devastation caused by super hurricanes,
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preserve the health, safety and quality of life for hundreds of millions of Americans
living in the Mid-West and Northeast from the deaths and devastation caused by massive
flooding,
to protect the health, safety and quality of life for millions living in Tornado Alley
from the Great Plains to the upper South;
to protect forests so that they may serve as a sink for C02 rather than as an emission
source;
preserve habitat for wildlife and a resource for forest products and other industries
dependent on them, and
protect the vitality of the marine web of life from collapse as a result of acidification.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 17-19]
The IPCC provided clear guidance in its 2018 report that to stop the warming and stabilize the
climate, the economy must transition to a zero carbon (C02 and methane) emission energy
system, and forests must be expanded to extract C02 from the atmosphere. Climate stability can
be achieved only by reducing GHG emissions to net-zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp.
17-19]
To stabilize global temperature at any level, 'net' C02 emissions would need to be reduced to
zero. This means the amount of C02 entering the atmosphere must equal the amount that is
removed. Achieving a balance between C02 'sources' and 'sinks' is often referred to as 'net
zero' emissions or 'carbon neutrality'.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 17-19]
24 Global Warming of 1.5o C, Chapter 2, FAQs.
Limiting warming to 1.5°C implies reaching net zero C02 emissions globally around 2050
and concurrent deep reductions in emissions of non-C02 forcers, particularly methane25 (high
confidence). Such mitigation pathways are characterized by energy-demand reductions,
decarbonization of electricity and other fuels, electrification of energy end use, deep reductions
in agricultural emissions, and some form of CDR [carbon dioxide reduction] with carbon storage
on land or sequestration in geological reservoirs.26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 17-19]
25 Methane (CH4, i.e, unburned natural gas) is 20 times more powerful than C02 as a climate forcer.
26 Id., Exec, Summary.
Zero GHG emissions to stabilize the climate must be achieved sooner than later to minimize
the losses and deaths associated with devastating warmer climate effects. Zero emissions cannot
be achieved without transforming transportation which is the largest source of GHG emissions.
For most transportation sources such as on-road vehicles, zero emissions can be cost-effectively
achieved by electrification with batteries or fuel cells. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 17-
19]
The latest IPCC modeling report (AR6, 2021) concludes based on the latest climate data and
updated modeling that - [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 17-19]
Under the five illustrative [GHG emissions] scenarios, in the near term (2021-2040), the
1.5°C global warming level is very likely to be exceeded under the very high GHG emissions
1629
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scenario (SSP5-8.5), likely to be exceeded under the intermediate and high GHG emissions
scenarios (SSP2-4.5 and SSP3-7.0), more likely than not to be exceeded under the low GHG
emissions scenario (SSP 1-2.6) and more likely than not to be reached under the very low GHG
emissions scenario (SSP1-1.9).27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 17-19]
27 Climate Change 2021, Summary for Policymakers, B.1.3. (available at IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM.pdf.)
The opportunity to stay below 1.5°C and to prevent the additional devastation that such level
of warming will cause, has been frittered away by inaction and delay. At the current global mean
temperature, the climate has warmed enough to endanger public health, cause devastating
destruction of homes and businesses, loss of life and the disruption of natural systems by extreme
floods, drought, wildfires, hurricanes and tornadoes. The harm we will experience above 1.5°C
will be orders of magnitude greater. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 17-19]
But the IPCC offers the hope that "for the very low GHG emissions scenario (SSP1-1.9), it is
more likely than not that global surface temperature would decline back to below 1.5°C toward
the end of the 21st century, with a temporary overshoot of no more than 0.1 °C above 1.5°C
global warming."28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 17-19]
28 Id.
That hope turns on cutting global C02 emissions in half by 2030, and to net-zero by 2050
along with large reductions in non-C02 climate forcers such as methane. EPA has not set out a
regulatory path for achieving those reductions. EPA's current proposed rule will not achieve
anywhere near those reductions, and fails to identify any future strategy for achieving those
reductions. To fulfill the Agency's statutory mission to protect public health and welfare it must
issue regulations that achieve these targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 17-19]
C. Petition for Finding —
Based on these data and other available evidence, we petition the Administrator to find that -
climate warming already caused by GHG emissions harms the public health and is causing
unacceptable adverse impacts on public welfare and the human environment, and the expected
increase in the severity and frequency of harms to health and the public welfare that will be
caused by more extreme events that will occur as the global mean temperature advances toward
and above the 1.5°C level resulting from growing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere,
establish the need for a zero GHG emissions standard for L/MDVs pursuant to section 202(a)(1)
and (3)(A) of the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 20]
We petition the Administrator to make this finding as the predicate for re-opening this
rulemaking for the purpose of promulgating a zero emission standard for L/MDVs, and a phase-
in schedule that prescribes for each automaker a share of total L/MDV sales that must be ZEVs
beginning with the 2027 MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 20]
Organization: Electrification Coalition (EC)
In addition to our national security challenges, the U.S. also faces the rapidly growing threat
of climate change. The latest National Climate Assessment^ which Congress mandated in 1990
under the Global Change Research Act, shows that the U.S. has been observing the impacts of
climate change for decades and that more frequent and extreme weather and climate-related
1630
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events are creating new and increasing risks across U.S. communities - which we have recently
seen with wildfires that have ravaged the country, more powerful hurricanes causing loss of lives
and immense destruction, more intense tornadoes destroying communities, and extreme weather
events in areas that we should not expect to see these weather events in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0588, p. 2]
To overcome these national security concerns from climate change, the U.S. must reduce
carbon emissions. The EPA notes that the transportation sector is the largest source of
greenhouse gas emissions, representing 27% of total greenhouse gas emissions. 5 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0588, p. 2]
Organization: Energy Innovation
I. The U.S. must transition LDVs and MDVs to zero-emission technologies [i] quickly to
reduce their emissions, which contribute to climate change and air pollution—both of which
endanger public health and welfare. Adoption of the most stringent tailpipe standards for new
vehicles is the most effective tool to achieve this goal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 1-
2]
1 This includes technologies that eliminate tailpipe GHG emissions and other pollutants, namely battery
electric vehicles for LDVs and MDVs.
. THE U.S. MUST TRANSITION LIGHT-DUTY AND MEDIUM-DUTY VEHICLES TO
ZERO-EMISSION TECHNOLOGIES QUICKLY TO REDUCE THEIR EMISSIONS, WHICH
CONTRIBUTE TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND AIR POLLUTION—BOTH OF WHICH
ENDANGER PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE. ADOPTION OF THE MOST
STRINGENT TAILPIPE STANDARDS FOR NEW VEHICLES IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE
WAY TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 3]
We appreciate and agree with the EPA's thorough articulation of the sizable impact LDVs
and MDVs have on climate and public health. The transportation sector is the largest U.S. source
of GHG emissions as of 2021,2 and LDVs and MDVs combined are the largest contributor
within the sector (with LDVs alone accounting for more than 57 percent).3 These vehicles also
emit pollutants such as ozone, particulate matter (PM), nitrogen dioxide (N02), sulfur dioxide
(S02), carbon monoxide (CO), and air toxics—all of which contribute to poor air quality and are
linked to adverse health outcomes, with disproportionate impacts on children,4 people of color,
and people with low socioeconomic status living near or attending school near major roads.5
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 3]
2 "Fast Facts on Transportation Greenhouse Gas Emissions," United States Environmental Protection
Agency (U.S. EPA), Green Vehicle
Guide, 2021, https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/fast-facts-transportation-greenhouse-gas-
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 3]
3 U.S. EPA, "Proposed Rules," May 5, 2023, 29186.
4 U.S. EPA, 29211.
5 U.S. EPA, 29186 and 29395-7.
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The inherently slow stock turnover challenge in the ground transportation sector means that
new vehicles—and the standards they are built to in the coming years—will have long-lasting
effects on the vehicle fleet 10 and even 20 years from now. This, in turn, will have long-lasting
impacts on climate, public health, and welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 3-4]
The EPA clearly articulates the primary takeaways from the well-established body of
scientific research regarding the public health impacts of climate change throughput the proposed
rule, and we concur with their summary: "elevated concentrations of GHGs have been warming
the planet, leading to changes in the Earth's climate including changes in the frequency and
intensity of heat waves, precipitation, and extreme weather events, rising seas, and retreating
snow and ice. The changes taking place in the atmosphere as a result of the well- documented
buildup of GHGs due to human activities are changing the climate at a pace and in a way that
threatens human health, society, and the natural environment."6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, pp. 3-4]
6 U.S. EPA, 29207-8.
The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report corroborates these findings and
makes clear that this is the decade for action if we are to reverse course on untenable and
dangerous climate change: "In this decade, accelerated action to adapt to climate change is
essential to close the gap between existing adaptation and what is needed. Meanwhile, keeping
warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels requires deep, rapid and sustained [GHG]
emissions reductions in all sectors. Emissions should be decreasing by now and will need to be
cut by almost half by 2030, if warming is to be limited to 1.5°C." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, pp. 3-4]
7 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "Press Release: Urgent Climate Action Can Secure a
Liveable Future for All," March 20, 2023,
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/press/IPCC_AR6_SYR_PressRelease_en.pdf.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 3-4]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
EPA has both an opportunity and an obligation to dramatically reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) and other pollutants from light-duty vehicles (LDVs) and medium-
duty vehicles (MDVs). The Agency's mandate to protect public health and welfare is made
urgent by the ever more dire impacts of climate change, as well as the continuing harms to public
health from vehicle criteria pollution. And the opportunity to significantly reduce these impacts
is clear. Zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) are not only feasible and cost-reasonable—they are
rapidly penetrating the fleet, with more than 250,000 fully battery electric vehicles sold in the
first quarter of 2023 alone, a 44.9% increase over the same period last year. 1 In addition,
numerous emission control technologies for combustion vehicles are also feasible, cost-
reasonable, and already extensively deployed on the fleet, yet still have potential for greater
application within the fleet of new combustion vehicles that will continue to be produced. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 8]
1 Cox Automotive, Another Record Broken: Q1 Electric Vehicle Sales Surpass 250,000, as EV Market
Share in the U.S. Jumps to 7.2% of Total Sales (Apr. 12, 2023), https://www.coxautoinc.com/market-
insights/ql-2023-ev-sales/.
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While the market is clearly heading in the right direction, EPA's standards should facilitate
even greater deployment of zero-emission and combustion vehicle technologies to help protect
the public from the destructive effects of climate change and air pollution generally. To this end,
we urge EPA to finalize the strongest possible emission standards. While we do not believe it is
necessary for EPA to set standards beyond 2032 at this point, it is critical that the final standards
are sufficiently stringent through model year 2032 to ensure that the U.S. is on track to reach
100% new ZEV sales in 2035. The standards in Alternative 1, but with greater stringency after
2030, are feasible and would better serve EPA's statutory mandate to address the environmental
and health impacts of air pollution from light- and medium-duty vehicles. Finalizing such
standards will provide feasible, critical air pollution emission reductions, as directed by Congress
in the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 8-9]
Once EPA makes an endangerment finding, it must set standards that are commensurate to the
magnitude of the danger to public health and welfare posed by the covered emissions. 12 The
Clean Air Act defines "effects on welfare" broadly, including "effects on . . . weather . . . and
climate." 13 The dangers to public health and welfare posed by GHGs that EPA originally cited
in the 2009 Endangerment Finding—"risks associated with changes in air quality, increases in
temperatures, changes in extreme weather events, increases in food- and water-borne pathogens,
and changes in aeroallergens,"14 to name a few—have only increased. EPA recognized that this
was likely to happen in the Endangerment Finding itself, finding that these "risk[s] and the
severity of adverse impacts on public welfare are expected to increase over time." 15 As for
criteria pollutants and air toxics—PM, ozone, VOCs, NOx, SOx, CO, diesel exhaust,
formaldehyde, acetaldehyde, acrolein, benzene, butadiene, ethylbenzene, naphthalene, and
POM/PAHs—their harmful health and environmental effects have long been known, and EPA
has recognized the need for continued reductions in their emissions. 16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 10]
12 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532 (noting that Section 202(a) "charge[s] [EPA] with protecting the
public's 'health' and 'welfare'"); Coal, for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 117, 122 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (stating that EPA must carry out "the job Congress gave it in § 202(a)—utilizing emission
standards to prevent reasonably anticipated endangerment from maturing into concrete harm"). See also S.
Rep. No. 91-1196, at 24 (1970), reprinted in A Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,
at 424 (1974) (Section 202(a) requires EPA to "make a judgment on the contribution of moving sources to
deterioration of air quality and establish emission standards which would provide the required degree of
control."). Cf. 74 Fed. Reg. at 66505 ("the Administrator is required to protect public health and welfare,
but she is not asked to wait until harm has occurred. EPA must be ready to take regulatory action to prevent
harm before it occurs.").
13 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h).
14 74 Fed. Reg. at 66497.
15 74 Fed. Reg. at 66498-66499.
16 88 Fed. Reg. at 29186, 29208-24.
III. Further Reductions in Emissions of GHGs and Criteria Pollutants from Motor Vehicles
Are Necessary to Protect Public Health and the Environment.
A. Vehicular emissions of greenhouse gases gravely endanger public health and welfare by
intensifying the climate crisis.
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Emissions of GHGs from the transportation sector pose mortal dangers to public health and
the environment; EPA's exercise of its responsibilities under the Clean Air Act must take
account of and mitigate these dangers. Over thirteen years ago, based upon a massive scientific
record, the EPA found that new motor vehicles and engines contribute to emissions of GHGs that
drive climate change and endanger the health and welfare of current and future generations.46
Specifically, EPA found that the intensifying climate crisis increased the frequency of warmer
temperatures, heat waves, and other extreme weather, worsened air quality by increasing
regional ozone pollution, increased the spread of food and water-borne illnesses, increased the
frequency and severity of seasonal allergies, and increased the severity of coastal storm events
due to rising sea levels.47 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 14]
46 74 Fed. Reg. at 66496.
47 74 Fed. Reg. at 66525-26.
Since EPA issued the Endangerment Finding in 2009, dire evidence of the current and future
impacts of climate change has continued to accumulate. Recent studies demonstrate that climate
change continues to cause heat waves and extreme weather events across the United States.48
Between May and mid-September, 2022, "nearly 10,000 daily maximum temperature records
were broken."49 Additionally, 2022 was "one of the top 10 hottest years on record for daily
maximum temperatures" in 13 states, as well as one of the top 10 hottest for daily minimum
(nighttime low) temperatures for 31 states.50 Warmer temperatures endanger public health by
increasing the risk of heart disease, worsening asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
from increases of ground-level ozone, and causing dehydration and many other ailments. 51
Studies have also found that heat waves and extreme weather events cause severe psychiatric and
mental health impacts. 52 Climate change continues to lead to higher than normal pollen
concentrations and earlier and longer pollen seasons, causing worse allergies and asthma.53 The
intensifying climate crisis also increases the risk of drought across the U.S, which impacts water
supply, agriculture, transportation, and energy, and increases the risk and magnitude of
wildfires.54 And recent projections show that sea level rise is anticipated to be on the high end of
model projections.55 Studies have found that many of the dangers wrought by climate change
exact a higher toll on people with low incomes and people of color. 56 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, pp. 14-15]
48 U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv. (HHS), Off. Climate Change & Health Equity, Climate and Health
Outlook (May 2023) [hereinafter HHS, Climate and Health Outlook],
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/climate-health-outlook-may-2023.pdf. See also Andrew Hoell et al.,
Water Year 2021 Compound Precipitation and Temperature Extremes in California and Nevada, 103 Bull,
of the Am. Meteorological Soc'y E2905, E2910 (Dec. 2022),
https://journals.ametsoc.org/view/journals/bams/103/12/BAMS-D-22-0112. l.xml?tab_body=fulltext-
display(human-caused climate change led to increased extreme high temperatures in 2021 in California and
Nevada); Kristy Dahl, Union of Concerned Scientists, Summer of 2022 Was a Hot One. What was Climate
Change's Impact on Heat?, The Equation (Sept. 21, 2022), https://blog.ucsusa.org/kristy-dahl/summer-of-
2022-was-a-hot-one-what-was-climate-changes-impact-on-heat/.
49 Dahl.
50 Id.
51 HHS, Climate and Health Outlook, at 2; Christopher Nolte et al., U.S. Global Change Rsch. Program,
Air quality, in II Impacts, risks, and adaptation in the United States: Fourth national climate assessment
512, 515 (2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_Chl3_Air-Quality_Full.pdf (climate
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change leads to worsened air quality by increasing concentrations of ozone and particulate matter in many
parts of the U.S.); Am. Lung Ass'n, State of the Air 2023 Report 19 (2023),
https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf?ext=.pdf
(describing worsened air quality resulting from climate change).
52 See, e.g., Amruta Nori-Sarma et al., Association Between Ambient Heat and Risk of Emergency
Department Visits for Mental Health Among US Adults, 2010 to 2019, 79 JAMA Psychiatry 341 (2022),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/2789481?; Marshall Burke et al., Higher
temperatures increase suicide rates in the United States and Mexico, 8 Nature Climate Change 723 (2018),
https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/s41558-018-0222-x.pdf; Sarita Silveira et al., Chronic
Mental Health Sequelae of Climate Change Extremes: A Case Study of the Deadliest Californian Wildfire,
Int'l J. Env'tRsch. & Pub. Health, Feb. 4, 2021, https://www.mdpi.eom/1660-4601/18/4/1487
(demonstrating that climate-related extreme weather events such as wildfires can have severe mental health
impacts).
53 HHS, Climate and Health Outlook, at 5.
54 See Marco Turco et al., Anthropogenic climate change impacts exacerbate summer forest fires in
California PNAS, June 12, 2023, https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2213815120; Ctr. for Climate &
Energy Sol., Drought and Climate Change, https://www.c2es.org/content/drought-and-climate-change/ (last
visited June 2, 2023). See also Nolte et al., at 521.
55 Benjamin Hamlington et al., Observation-based trajectory of future sea level for the coastal United
States tracks near high-end model projections, Commc'n Earth Env't, Oct. 6, 2022,
https://www.nature.com/articles/s43247-022-00537-z.
56 See, e.g., Sameed Khatana et al., Association of Extreme Heat With All-Cause Mortality in the
Contiguous US, 2008-2017, JAMA Network Open, May 19, 2022, at 1
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2792389 (finding extreme heat was
associated with higher mortality in the U.S., particularly among older adults and black individuals); Adam
Schlosser et al., Assessing Compounding Risks Across Multiple Systems and Sectors: A Socio-
Environmental Systems Risk-Triage Approach, Frontiers in Climate, Apr. 24, 2023, at 09,
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fclim.2023.1100600/full (identifying hot spots where flood
risks and water stress disproportionately impact low-income and nonwhite communities); Dahl ("[M]ore
than 80% of the counties with the most frequent heat alerts—21 or more days of heat alerts over the course
of the summer—have moderate to high levels of social vulnerability."). See generally EPA, Climate
Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States, A Focus on Six Impacts (2021),
https://www.epa.gOv/system/files/documents/2021-09/climate-vulnerability_september-2021_508.pdf.
The transportation sector has been responsible for an increasing percentage of GHG emissions
in the U.S. since 2009, thereby playing an outsized role in intensifying the climate crisis. When
EPA made its Endangerment Finding for GHGs, the transportation sector was responsible for
23% of total annual U.S. GHG emissions.57 Since then, transportation sector GHG emissions
have only increased as a share of U.S. emissions, surpassing the electric power sector as the
largest U.S. source of GHG emissions and contributing 27.2% of total GHG emissions in 202058
and 28.5%) in 2021.59 After dipping in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, carbon dioxide
(C02) emissions from the transportation sector increased by 11.5% between 2020 and 2021.60
Transportation as an end use sector "accounted] for 1,757.4 [million metric tons] C02 in 2021
or 37.9%) of total C02 emissions from fossil fuel combustion."61 Adopting stringent GHG
emission standards for light- and medium-duty vehicles will lead to massive public health
benefits by limiting these pollutants.62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 16]
57 74 Fed. Reg. at 66499.
58 EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2020, EPA 430-R-22-003, at ES-21
(2022), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-04/us-ghg-inventory-2022-main-text.pdf.
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59 EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2021, EPA 430-R-23-002, at 2-19,
2-28 (2023), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/US-GHG-Inventory-2023-Main-
Textpdf.
60 Id. at 2-13.
61 Id. at 2-17.
62 See generally Am. Lung Ass'n, Driving to Clean Air: Health Benefits of Zero-Emission Cars and
Electricity (June 2023), https://www.lung.org/getmedia/9e9947ea-d4a6-476c-9c78-cccf7d49ffe2/ala-
driving-to-clean-air-report.pdf.
The IPCC's most recent synthesis of its Sixth Assessment Report confirms the danger to
public health and welfare posed by GHG emissions from the transportation sector. The report
found that global surface temperature was around 1.1 °C higher in 2011-2020 than it was in
1850-1900.63 While average annual GHG emissions growth has slowed in certain sectors such
as energy supply and industry, growth in GHG emissions from the transportation sector has
remained relatively constant at about 2% per year.64 The latest IPCC report warned that "[d]eep,
rapid and sustained GHG emissions reductions, reaching net zero C02 emissions and including
strong emissions reductions of other GHGs ... are necessary to limit warming to 1.5°C ... or
less than 2°C ... by the end of the century."65 To have a chance at limiting global temperature
increase to 1.5? and avoid the worst impacts of climate change, current GHG emissions from the
transportation sector must drop by 59% by 2050 compared to 2020 emissions.66 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 16]
63 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Synthesis Report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment
Report (AR6): Longer Report, at 6 (2023),
https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syr/pdf/IPCC_AR6_SYR_LongerReport.pdf.
64 Id. at 10.
65 Id. at 33.
66 IPCC, Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change 32 (2022),
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FullReport.pdf.
Air pollution has become so significant that the public health burdens attributable to air
pollution are "now estimated to be on a par with other major global health risks such as
unhealthy diet and tobacco smoking, and air pollution is now recognized as the single biggest
environmental threat to human health."70 Researchers at the University of Chicago studied the
impact of air pollution on life expectancy and found that "the impact of particulate pollution on
life expectancy is comparable to that of smoking, more than three times that of alcohol and
unsafe water and sanitation, six times that of HIV/AIDS, and 89 times that of conflict and
terrorism "71 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 17]
70 World Health Organization (WHO), WHO Global Air Quality Guidelines (2021) at xiv,
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/345329/9789240034228-eng.pdf.
71 Michael Greenstone, Christa Hasenkopf, & Ken Lee, Air Quality Life Index Annual Update, Energy
Policy Institute at the University of Chicago (2022) at 6-7, https://aqli.epic.uchicago.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2022/06/AQLI_2022_Report-Global.pdf/.
These reductions are significant on a national and global scale because greenhouse gas
emissions from light- and medium-duty vehicles are a consequential portion of both national and
international GHG emissions. Emissions from the transportation sector are the largest source
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(29%) of GHGs in the country, and light- and medium-duty vehicles are the largest portion of
that.77 The United States is responsible for a large portion of global C02 emissions—
approximately 14% as of 2019—and is the second largest emitter in the world.78 Reducing GHG
emissions from light- and medium- duty vehicles is therefore one of the most consequential steps
EPA—or the United States—can take to mitigate climate change harm. And, as the Supreme
Court found in Massachusetts v. EPA, "[a] reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace
of global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere." 549 U.S. 497, 500 (2007).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 19]
77 EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2021, EPA 430-R-23-002, at 2-35
(Apr. 2023). https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/US-GHG-Inventory-2023-Main-
Textpdf.
78 UCS, Each Country's Share of C02 Emissions (updated Jan. 14, 2022), at
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-countrys-share-co2-emissions.
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
A. Protective standards are urgently needed to safeguard public health.
The transportation sector is now the single largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the
United States, and passenger cars and trucks are the largest contributor, at 58 percent of all
transportation sources and 17 percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, p. 6]
Organization: Governing for Impact and Evergreen Action (GFI)
In addition to contributing to the climate crisis, light and medium duty passenger vehicles are
responsible for emitting harmful pollutants including carbon monoxide, particulate matter, and
nitrogen oxides, which can cause or contribute to significant negative public health outcomes
such as lung and heart diseases. 15 These harmful health outcomes disproportionately affect low
income populations and communities of color, who are exposed to greater amounts of vehicle
pollution. 16 Unfortunately, these same communities are at the greatest risk of harm from the
impacts of climate change, and often lack sufficient resources or support to protect themselves
from these harmful impacts. 17 Strong transportation emissions standards — for both GHGs and
criteria pollutants — will limit the present and imminent public health threats that vulnerable
populations face due to vehicle pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 2-3]
15 See U.S. Dep't of Transp., "Cleaner Air," https://www.transportation.gov/mission/health/cleaner-
air#:~:text=Vehicle%20emissions%20contribute%20to%20the,illnesses%2C%20including%20pneumonia
%20and%20b ronchitis (last visited June 15, 2023).
16 See, e.g., Maria Cecilia Pinto de Moura and David Reichmuth, "Inequitable Exposure to Air Pollution
from Vehicles in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic," Union of Concerned Scientists (Jun 21, 2019),
https://www.ucsusa.org/about/news/communities-color-breathe-66-more-air-pollution-vehicles.
17 See generally, EPA "Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States: A Focus on Six
Impacts," 430-R-21- 003 (2021), available at: https://www.epa.gov/cira/social-vulnerability-report.
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Organization: GreenLatinos et al.
The strongest possible HDV and L/MDV standards will help reach the urgent goal to cut
greenhouse gas emissions by 60% by 2030 and will put American cars and trucks on a clear path
towards achieving 100% zero emission electric vehicle (EV) sales by 2035 or earlier. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0789, p. 2]
The Biden administration's leadership in setting strong HDV and L/MDV standards is
instrumental to mitigate the inequitable tailpipe pollution experienced by Latino/e and other
frontline communities, which triggers asthma and other sometimes fatal respiratory illnesses.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0789, p. 2]
We need the cleanest possible vehicles now. Our lives literally depend on it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0789, p. 2]
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at NYU School of Law et al.
Other key legal commitments compel this same conclusion. For instance, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change—to which the United States is a party26— declares
that national "policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost- effective so as to
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost."27 The Convention further commits parties to
evaluate global climate effects in their policy decisions, by "employing] appropriate methods,
for example impact assessments . . . with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy,
on public health and on the quality of the environment, of projects or measures undertaken by
them to mitigate or adapt to climate change."28 The unmistakable implication of the Convention
is that parties—including the United States—must account for global economic, public health,
and environmental effects in their impact assessments. In 2008, a group of U.S. senators—
including then-Senator John Kerry, who helped ratify the framework convention on climate
change—agreed with this interpretation of the treaty language, saying that "[u]pon signing this
treaty, the United States committed itself to considering the global impacts of its greenhouse gas
emissions."29 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 5]
26 S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38; S. Exec. Rept. No. 102-55.
27 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3(3), May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (emphasis
added); see also id. art. 3(1) ("The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.") (emphasis added); id. art. 4(2)(a) (committing
developed countries to adopt policies that account for "the need for equitable and appropriate contributions
by each of these Parties to the global effort").
28 Id. art. 4(l)(f) (emphasis added); see also id. art. 3(2) (requiring parties to give "full consideration" to
those developing countries "particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change"); see also
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation art. 10(7), Jan. 1, 1994, 32 I.L.M. 1480
(committing the United States to the development of principles for transboundary environmental impact
assessments).
29 Comment Letter from U.S. Sens. Feinstein, Snowe, Nelson, Cantwell, Sanders, Kerry, Durbin, Reed,
Boxer, & CardintoMary Peters, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Transp. on Proposed Rule for Average Fuel
Economy Standards, Passenger Cars and Light Trucks; Model Years 2011-2015 (July 1, 2008).
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This flurry of activity is just the latest evidence of reciprocity in international climate actions.
Some past reciprocity has been explicit. The Kigali Amendment, for example, is the latest
internationally negotiated climate treaty, with more than 120 parties so far committing to
common but differentiated responsibilities to phase down hydrofluorocarbons.46 Previously,
under the Copenhagen Accord and the Paris Agreement, some parties, including the European
Union and Mexico, have at times explicitly made conditional pledges, promising to ratchet up
their efforts if other countries make comparable reductions.47 By contrast, when the United
States "failed to take action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions during the George W. Bush
Administration and during ... the Trump Administration," as economist Michael Greenstone has
testified before the U.S. House of Representatives, "both periods were characterized by little
[international] progress, and indeed many instances of backsliding, in reducing emissions
globally."48 By failing to take international climate damages into account, in other words, EPA
and other U.S. agencies would incentivize other countries to do the same, which in turn would
cause greater greenhouse gas pollution originating in other countries that causes climate damage
within the United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 8]
46 See U.N., Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(2016), https://perma.cc/SEX3-HAQA (last visited June 8, 2021).
47 See Eur. Comm'n, Expression of Willingness to Be Associated with the Copenhagen Accord and
Submission of the Quantified Economy-Wide Emissions Reduction Targets for 2020 at 2, Jan. 28, 2010,
https://perma.cc/77DD- M4LS (committing to a 20% reduction but "reiterat[ing] its conditional offer to
move to a 30% reduction by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, provided that other developed countries
commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately
according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities"); Gov't of Mex. Ministry of Env't & Nat.
Res., Nationally Determined Contributions: 2020 Update at 22, https://perma.cc/VF4A-K5HK (making an
unconditional pledge of 22% reduction of GHGs and 51% of black carbon by 2030; and making a
conditional pledge of up to 36% reduction GHGs and 70% black carbon, conditioned on "an international
price for carbon trading, adjustment of tariffs for carbon content" as well as technology transfers and
financial resources).
48 Economics of Climate Change: Hearing before the U.S. H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform's Subcomm.
onEnv't at 6 (Dec. 19, 2019) (testimony of Michael Greenstone), https://perma.cc/H5JS-V4H6.
2. Use of the Global Values Recognizes Spillover Impacts from Climate Change
As EPA further recognizes, spillover impacts into the United States also support the use of
global damage valuations.53 Significant costs to trade, human health, and security will inevitably
"spill over" to the United States as other regions of the planet experience climate change
damages. 54 Due to its unique place among countries—both as the largest economy with trade-
and investment-dependent links throughout the world, and as a military superpower—the United
States is particularly vulnerable to effects that will spill over from other regions of the world.
The use of global damage values recognizes these spillover effects, which were ignored under
the Trump administration's domestic-only valuation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 9]
53 RIA at 10-11; see also Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 9, at 11-13.
54 Though some positive spillover effects are also possible, such as technology spillovers that reduce the
cost of mitigation or adaptation, see S. Rao et al., Importance of Technological Change and Spillovers in
Long-Term Climate Policy, 27 ENERGY J. 123-39 (2006), overall climate spillovers are likely strongly
negative, see Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 1531 (2009).
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These spillover effects take many forms. In terms of trade-related impacts, for one, as climate
change disrupts the economies of other countries, decreased availability of imported inputs,
intermediary goods, and consumer goods will cause supply shocks to the U.S. economy, causing
particularly damaging disruptions in sectors such as agriculture and technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0743, p. 9]
Similarly, the U.S. economy will experience demand shocks as climate-affected countries
decrease their demand for U.S. goods. U.S. trade and businesses that rely on foreign-owned
infrastructure, services, and resources will suffer.55 Financial markets will also suffer as foreign
countries become less able to loan money to the United States and as the value of U.S. firms
declines with shrinking foreign profits. As seen historically, economic disruptions in one country
can cause financial crises that reverberate globally at a breakneck pace.56 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0743, p. 9]
55 U.S. Global Change Res. Prog., Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II: Impacts, Risks, and
Adaptation in the United States, Chapter 16: Climate Effects on U.S. International Interests 608 (2018)
[hereinafter "NCA4"].
56 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 249 (2008) (observing that financial collapse
in one country is inevitably felt beyond that country's borders).
Climate change is also predicted to exacerbate existing security threats—and possibly
catalyze new security threats—to the United States.57 Besides threats to U.S. military
installations and operations at home and abroad from flooding, storms, extreme heat, and
wildfires,58 climate change is also a "source[] of conflict around the world"59 and a "threat
multiplier" that, as recognized by the Department of Defense, will "aggravate stressors abroad
such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and social tensions—conditions
that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence."60 Climate change will create and
exacerbate new conflicts and humanitarian crises that will require a U.S. response, even as
climate change also complicates the logistics of deploying forces and achieving missions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 9-10]
57 See CNA Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change
(2014).
58 U.S. Gov't Accountability Off, GAO-14-446, Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Can Improve
Infrastructure Planning and Processes to Better Account for Potential Impacts (2014); Union of Concerned
Scientists, The U.S. Military on the Front Lines of Rising Seas (2016).
59 U.S. Dep't of Def., Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense 8 (2019),
https://perma.cc/4WPP-86EN.
60 U.S. Dep't of Def., Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 at vi, 8 (2014).
Climate change will also very directly cause spillover damages across transboundary
resources. As illustrated by recent high-pollution events, the United States has already begun to
experience increased smoke from Canadian wildfires and drought conditions that spread along
the U.S.-Mexico border.61 The United States shares a maritime border with 21 other countries,
shares water resources like the Columbia River with our neighbors, and shares ecosystems—
including the oceans through which migratory species with high economic and ecosystem-
service values, like the Pacific hake, travel and live.62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 10]
61 NCA4, supra note 55, at 607.
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62 Id. at 615.
All of these individual spillover effects can also interact and trigger feedback loops that will
propagate additional spillover damages.63 Economic shocks around the world can make it more
difficult for other countries to continue investing in mitigation and abatement, thus hastening the
pace of climate change.64 Conflict and political instability caused by climate change can further
reduce the willingness or ability of countries to engage in domestic climate policy or
international cooperation.65 Spillover effects can chain together: if climate change accelerates
migration, the attendant economic ripple effects and spread of health risks may cause political
instability, which in turn can cause more migration and further economic ripple effects, thus
starting the feedback loop again.66 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 10]
63 Peter Howard & Michael Livermore, Climate-Society Feedback Effects: Be Wary of Unidentified
Connections, 15 INTL. REV. ENV'T & RES. ECON. 33 (forthcoming 2021).
64 Peter Howard & Michael A. Livermore, Sociopolitical Feedbacks and Climate Change, 43 HARV.
ENV'T L. REV. 119, 122-23 (2019).
65 Id.
66 NCA4, supra note 55, at 621 (explaining that instability has economic effects, and economic risks
create risk of conflict); Freeman & Guzman, supra note 54, at 1581-89; id. at 1581 (noting that climate-
induced pandemics may cause political instability); id. at 1564 n.157 (noting that cross-sectoral interactions
will "reinforce" international spillovers and create "a costly multiplier effect"). Howard & Livermore,
supra note 63.
A. EPA Reasonably Relies on Climate-Damage Estimates from an Interagency Working
Group, But Should Conduct Further Analysis With Its Own Estimates
To monetize the Proposed Rule's climate benefits, EPA appropriately relies on four
valuations produced by the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases
("Working Group"). Those values—though widely agreed to underestimate the full social costs
of greenhouse gas emissions75—are appropriate to use for now as conservative estimates. They
have been applied in dozens of previous rulemakings76 and upheld in federal court.77 Policy
Integrity, along with five other non-profit organizations, has submitted separate comments to this
docket in support of the Proposed Rule's use of the Working Group's climate-damage estimates.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 12-14]
75 Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Technical Support Document:
Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide - Interim Estimates Under Executive Order 13,990 at 4
(2021) [hereinafter 2021 TSD] (acknowledging that current social cost valuations "likely underestimate
societal damages from [greenhouse gas] emissions"). Richard L. Revesz et al., Global Warming: Improve
Economic Models of Climate Change, 508 NATURE 173 (2014) (co-authored with Nobel Prize-winning
economist Kenneth Arrow).
76 Peter Howard & Jason A. Schwartz, Think Global: International Reciprocity as Justification for a Global
Social Cost of Carbon, 42 COLUM. J. ENV'T L. 203, 270-84 (2017) (listing all uses through mid-2016).
77 Zero Zone v. Dept. of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 679 (7th Cir. 2016).
As those joint comments further explain, however, EPA should conduct additional analysis
using draft climate-damage valuations that EPA recently published.78 Though the Working
Group's valuations relied on the best science available at the time of their initial development in
2010, they are now widely recognized to understate the true costs of climate change. In
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November 2022, EPA released updated draft climate-damage estimates.79 EPA's draft
valuations faithfully apply recent advances in science and economics on the costs of climate
change and implement the roadmap laid out in 2017 by the National Academies of Sciences for
updating the social cost of greenhouse gases.80 And while EPA's draft valuations remain
underestimates^ 1 they more fully account for the costs of climate change by incorporating the
latest available research on climate science, damages, and discount rates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0601, pp.12-14]
78 EPA External Review Draft of Report on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (2022) [Draft SC-GHG
Update].
79 Id.
80 Nat'l Acads. Sci., Engineering & Med., Valuing Climate Damages: Updating Estimation of the Social
Cost of Carbon Dioxide (2017).
81 Draft SC-GHG Update, supra note 78, at 4 ("[BJecause of data and modeling limitations . . . estimates of
the SC- GHG are a partial accounting of climate change impacts and, as such, lead to underestimates^]");
id. at 72.
Unsurprisingly, given the developing state of the science and economics around climate
change, EPA's draft valuations find that the incremental cost of greenhouse gas emissions is
substantially higher than the Working Group projected. Using these valuations will provide a
more complete picture of the climate damages from the Proposed Rule and its alternatives. While
EPA should apply the Draft SC-GHG Update in sensitivity analysis if it finalizes this regulation
before it finalizes that update, it should consider applying those valuations in its primary analysis
(with the Working Group's estimates in sensitivity analysis) should it finalize the SC-GHG
Update before this rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 12-14]
Table 2 shows the climate benefits of the Proposed Rule and Alternative 1 using EPA's
"central" certainty-equivalent near-term discount rate of 2%,82 which Policy Integrity generated
using OMEGA and inputting the climate-damage valuations from the Draft Update. For
comparison, Table 2 presents these estimates alongside the four climate-damage estimates from
the Working Group that EPA provides in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601,
pp. 12-14]
82 Id. at 9 (describing 2% as the "central" rate).
Table 2: Climate Benefits Using Draft SC-GHG Update (2020$ Billion)
Proposed Program Alternative 1
Working Group 5% Average 82 91
Working Group 3% Average 330 360
Working Group 2.5% Average 500 560
Working Group 3% 95th percentile 1000 1100
Draft Update (2% discount)83 1200 1300
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 12-14]
83 Emissions in future years are discounted back to present value using a 3% discount rate. This is
consistent with EPA's approach to the climate-damage valuations using non-standard discount rates of
2.5% and 5%.
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As Table 2 illustrates, the climate benefits of the Proposed Rule and its alternatives are higher
under EPA's draft climate-damage valuations than using the four Working Group valuations that
EPA now applies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 12-14]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
ALIGNMENT WITH GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION REDUCTION TARGETS AND
CLIMATE GOALS
ICCT strongly supports the proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years
2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles and recommends its finalization. This
rulemaking is critical to achieving the pace and scale of needed transportation emission
reductions in the United States. There is a clear and urgent need to rapidly transition the
transportation sector to zero-emission vehicles. Continued and strengthened standards are
important to protect public health and deliver on national air quality and climate change goals.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 12-15]
On his first day in office, President Biden issued an executive order for the United States to
rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement.33 With this executive order, the U.S. joined nearly every
country on earth with the shared goal of limiting global warming to well below 2 degrees
Celsius.34 Delivering on the goals of this Agreement will require a significant reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions. The transportation sector is the largest contributor to climate pollution
in the United States, with light-duty vehicles—passenger cars, SUVs, and pickup trucks—
accounting for more than half of these emissions. Therefore, a shift to zero-emission vehicles
like battery electric vehicles, along with increased efficiency of new gasoline vehicles, is needed.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 12-15]
33 U.S. Department of State. (2021, February 19). The United States officially rejoins the Paris Agreement.
https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-officially-rejoins-the-paris-agreement/
34 Denchak, M. (2021, February 19). Paris Climate Agreement: Everything you need to know. Natural
Resources Defense Council, https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-officially-rejoins-the-paris-agreement/
The ICCT's global modeling assessment for the Zero Emission Vehicle Transition Council
shows that for the U.S. to be on a path to limiting global warming to well below 2° C, at least
67% of new passenger vehicle sales will need to be plug-in electric by 2030, with the vast
majority (65%) being battery electric vehicles (BEVs).35 In parallel, new gasoline vehicles
would need to improve at about 3.5% per year for the U.S. to be on a path to be Paris-
compatible. Previous ICCT research estimated that the 2030 U.S. EPA standard would need to
be about 57 grams C02/mile by 2030 to achieve this combination of new gasoline vehicle
improvement with greatly increased BEV penetration that aligns with the Paris Agreement.36
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 12-15]
35 Sen, A., and Miller, J. (2022). Emissions reduction benefits of a faster, global transition to zero-emission
vehicles. International Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/zevs-global-
transition-benefits-mar22/; ZEV Transition Council, https://zevtc.org/
36 Slowik, P., and Miller, J. (2022, December 19). Aligning the U.S. greenhouse gas standard for cars and
light trucks with the Paris climate agreement. International Council on Clean Transportation.
https://theicct.org/us-ghg- standard-paris-agreement-dec22/
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The figure below summarizes the path from the current standard of 161 gC02 per mile in
2026 to 57 gC02e per mile in 2030 for the whole light duty fleet (top panel). This represents a
combination of continued gasoline vehicle efficiency improvements (middle panel) and
accelerated EV uptake to reach 67% sales in 2030 (bottom panel), including 65% BEVs and
about 2% PHEVs. This assumed composition of battery electric vs. plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles is based on BEVs' substantial economic and environmental benefits relative to PHEVs.
Of course, if plug-in hybrids make up a greater share of EV sales than assessed here, then the
fleetwide standards would have to be more stringent than 57 gC02e per mile to be Paris-
compatible.37 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 12-15]
37 Slowik. P., Isenstadt, A., Pierce, L, Searle, S. (2022). Assessment of light-duty electric vehicle costs and
consumer benefits in the United States in the 2022-2035 time frame. International Council on Clean
Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/ev-cost-benefits-2035-oct22/; Bieker, G. (2021). A global
comparison of the life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions of combustion engine and electric passenger cars.
International Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/a-global-comparison-of-the-
life-cycle-greenhouse-gas-emissions-of- combustion-engine-and-electric-passenger-cars/
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 3. Stringency of model year 2030 GHG targets to
be Paris-compatible [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 12-15]
Graph 1: Fleetwide GHG Target including EVs (gC02/mi)
Graph 2: Fleet average gasoline vehicle performance (gC02/mi)
Graph 3: Electric vehicle share [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 12-15]
This Paris-compatible path is ambitious yet achievable. As the middle panel shows, the 3.5%
annual improvement for gasoline vehicles beyond 2026 is less than the rate of improvement
needed to meet the current standards through 2026. As discussed above, EV uptake consistent
with this scenario is possible through a combination of the new federal electric vehicle incentives
and investments from the Inflation Reduction Act and state policies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0569, pp. 12-15]
Although reaching 57 gC02e per mile by 2030 requires a steeper decline in GHG emissions
compared to the current EPA standards through 2026, ICCT's analysis finds this rate of
improvement to be cost-effective for combustion and battery electric vehicles alike.3 8 In
addition, the associated consumer benefits grow well into the tens of billions of dollars annually
by 2027 due to greatly reduced upfront electric vehicle prices and lower fuel and maintenance
costs compared to fossil fuel vehicles.39 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 12-15]
38 Lutsey, N., Meszler, D., Isenstadt, A., German, J., and Miller, J. (2017). Efficiency technology and cost
assessment for U.S. 2025-2030 light-duty vehicles. International Council on Clean Transportation.
https://theicct.org/publication/efficiency-technology-and-cost-assessment-for-u-s-2025-2030-light-duty-
vehicles/; Slowik. P., Isenstadt, A., Pierce, L, Searle, S. (2022). Assessment of light-duty electric vehicle
costs and consumer benefits in the United States in the 2022-2035 time frame. International Council on
Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/ev-cost-benefits-2035-oct22/
39 Ibid
INTERNATIONAL POLICY COMPARISON
The United States is not alone in its commitment to transition to cleaner cars. The number of
national and subnational governments around the world that are committed to cleaner vehicles
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continues to rise. The sections below summarize and compare the U.S. EPA proposal with the
standards in other leading markets around the world in terms of greenhouse gas emissions
requirements, projections for electric vehicle uptake, and criteria pollutant emissions standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 16-18]
Greenhouse gas emissions standards
Figure 5 illustrates the U.S. trajectories of average C02 emissions performance and C02
emissions targets for new passenger cars and light trucks over the years, in comparison with
other global vehicle markets that have C02 emissions targets at least as of 2022. For a consistent
basis of comparison, C02 emissions values for all markets have been converted to the same U.S.
test cycles (referred to as the CAFE cycle), where needed, using the ICCT cycle conversion
factors44. The C02 emissions targets are shown for both enacted and proposed targets for each
country, where applicable including for the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 16-18]
44 Kiihlwein, J. et al. (2014). Development of test cycle conversion factors among worldwide light-duty
vehicle C02 emission standards. International Council on Clean Transportation.
https://theicct.org/publication/development-of- test-cycle-conversion-factors-among-worldwide-light-duty-
vehicle-co2-emission-standards/; Yang, Z. (2014).
Improving the conversions between the various passenger vehicle fuel economy/C02
emission standards around the world. International Council on Clean Transportation.
https://theicct.org/improving-the-conversions-between- the-various-passenger-vehicle-fuel-
economy-co2-emission-standards-around-the-world/ [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 16-
18]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 5. Global comparison of historical data and
standards for passenger car C02 emissions and fuel consumption, normalized to CAFE cycle.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 16-18]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 6. Global comparison of historical data and
standards for light truck C02 emissions and fuel consumption, normalized to CAFE cycle.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 16-18]
The historical trend shows that the U.S. C02 emissions were historically one of the highest
across the global markets, which began to reduce substantially through stringent GHG emissions
standards starting from 2012. While the GHG emissions standards have significantly contributed
to controlling emissions of the fleet over the years, the recent U.S. C02 emissions and enacted
targets are still higher than the average trajectories for a few markets such as the EU, Japan,
South Korea, and UK for passenger cars and Chile, Japan, and UK for light trucks. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 16-18]
The proposed standards for 2027 and later model year vehicles make the U.S. one of the most
ambitious, forward-looking markets for C02 standards. The proposed standard levels are more
stringent compared to most of the global markets, except for the EU and UK. The EU has
already adopted 0 g C02 per km standard by 2035. The UK targets are still in the proposal
phase; however, the UK has set strong ZEV mandates for 100% ZEV sales of light-duty vehicles
by 2035. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 16-18]
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Thus, the proposed U.S. targets are more ambitious compared to the current trajectories for
most of the global markets, yet not stringent enough to align with the most ambitious
international targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 16-18]
Organization: MCS Referral & Resources (MCSRR)
The EPA does not mention CO in any of the sections of the proposed rule that discuss
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Some discussion of CO emissions should be added to these
sections because, according to the IPCC, the indirect Global Warming Potential of CO over 20
years is 2.8 to 10, which is in addition to CO's direct GWG potential of approximately 1.3.
While the GWP of CO is modest, the total annual CO emissions from vehicles in the US exceed
those of all other criteria and toxic air pollutants combined, so EPA should not exclude CO. See:
https://archive.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wgl/249.htm#tab69 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, pp.
3-4]
Organization: Metropolitan Washington Air Quality Committee (MWAQC) et al.
Strengthening the greenhouse gas emissions standards will also provide considerable support
for metropolitan Washington and communities across the United States to meet their greenhouse
gas emissions reduction goals. Unfortunately, our region is already experiencing the impacts of
climate change. Observations in metropolitan Washington show that temperatures and the water
surface level in the Potomac River are rising and will likely continue to rise. Extreme weather
events and increases in the number of days with extreme heat or extreme cold will increase risks
to health, energy usage patterns, plant and animal habitats, and infrastructure. These changes in
our weather patterns are also affecting stormwater, drinking water, and wastewater. Broad-based
climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, such as national rules, are necessary to
reduce the impacts of climate change and fight the adverse effects of climate change on our
region and planet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0503, p. 2]
The National Capital Region has goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 50% by 2030 and
80% by 2050, compared to 2005 levels. In 2022, the TPB adopted the same goals, but
specifically for on-road transportation. As such, MWAQC, CEEPC, and the TPB believe that the
newly proposed greenhouse gas emissions standards for model years 2027 and later light-duty
and medium-duty vehicles, which are estimated by EPA to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by
47%) in 2055 (Table 2 of the Federal Register Notice), are necessary for the region to achieve its
greenhouse gas reduction goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0503, p. 2]
The metropolitan Washington region has implemented emissions reduction measures across
all sectors, including on-road transportation, which contributes approximately 31%> and 39% of
the region's greenhouse gas and NOx emissions, respectively. The region relies heavily on
federal control programs for a significant amount of additional greenhouse gas and NOx
emissions reductions since these programs provide benefits across the economy. The federal
government's leadership in delivering effective regulatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions
from motor vehicles could also help reduce ozone and fine particle precursors and is a critical
component of our ability to meet adopted environmental objectives and standards. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0503, p. 2]
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Organization: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
The MPCA has supported EPA's previous efforts to strengthen vehicle emissions standards
and appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule. We see the proposed
rulemaking as an opportunity to advance climate action, reduce harm to Minnesotans from
criteria pollutants and air toxics, and accelerate the transition to electric vehicles in our state.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
Importance of new federal greenhouse gas standards for climate action
The transportation sector represents the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in
Minnesota. The top three sources in the transportation sector are light-duty trucks, heavy-duty
trucks, and passenger cars.l These categories are inclusive of light and medium-duty vehicles
discussed in this proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
Stronger vehicle emissions standards at the federal level have lowered greenhouse gas
emissions from vehicles generally. However, the long-term consumer trend of choosing larger
vehicles and the general trend of more miles driven (except during the pandemic) are
counteracting more significant emissions reductions in this sector. Increased emissions
stringency at the federal level is critical to continuing the trend of emission reductions in this
sector. Accelerating light- and medium-duty vehicle electrification is vital for Minnesota to meet
its climate and air pollution goals. Specifically, adopting new light- and medium-duty vehicle
emissions standards would: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
1 Greenhouse gas emissions in Minnesota 2005-2020, https://www.pca.state.mn.us/sites/default/files/lraq-
2sy23.pdf.
- Help the state meet economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
In 2022, as part of the publication of the state's Climate Action Framework,2 Governor Walz
and Lieutenant Governor Flanagan endorsed the economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions
reduction goal for the state to reduce emissions by 50% by 2030 and to become carbon-neutral
by 2050. In May 2023, Minnesota codified these targets in statute. Achieving these goals will
require action at all levels of government, across businesses, and by individuals. The proposed
multipollutant standards will be critical for reducing emissions from the transportation sector.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
2 Minnesota's Climate Action Framework, https://climate.state.mn.us/minnesotas-climate-action-
framework.
- Advance transportation actions and targets in the state's Climate Action Framework. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
Minnesota's Climate Action Framework is a plan that sets a vision for how the state will
address and prepare for climate change. The framework broadly guides the direction of climate
action toward a carbon-neutral, resilient, and equitable future for Minnesota and contains
immediate, near-term actions, as well as key progress indicators with measurable targets. The
framework was developed based on significant input from stakeholders, the public, and the
Tribal Nations located within Minnesota's modern borders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557,
pp.1-2]
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The proposed light- and medium-duty vehicle standards would advance the following actions
in the Clean Transportation goal: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
— Increase the use of clean fuels, including lower-carbon biofuels (Sub-initiative 1.2.1)
— Expand electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure (Sub-initiative 1.2.2)
— Increase EV availability and access (Sub-initiative 1.2.3)
— Accelerate the transition to EVs and clean transportation (Sub-initiative 1.2.4)
— Improve vehicle efficiency and emissions standards (Sub-initiative 1.2.5)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
Additionally, the proposed standards would advance the following targets for the Clean
Transportation goal: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
— Reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector 80% by 2040
— Reach 20% electric vehicles on Minnesota roads by 2030 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557,
pp.1-2]
Organization: National Farmers Union (NFU)
The results of climate change, brought on by GHG emissions to the earth's atmosphere
resulting from human activity, will be detrimental to both human health and the economy. As a
family farm organization, NFU is particularly concerned with the challenges that climate change
poses to family farmers' ability to pursue improvements in global food security. Anticipated
disruptions to agricultural production caused by climate include: rising temperatures; changes in
precipitation; increasing frequency of extreme weather events; new pest, disease and weed
pressures; and increases in heat stress on livestock. As formidable as these challenges may be,
farmers, ranchers and rural communities can contribute to climate resilience and help circumvent
serious harm to the economy and human health. Efforts by farmers, ranchers and rural
communities along this front are supported by the biofuels industry that eases the burdens on
farmers and provides additional markets to facilitate a move toward sustainable practices and
climate mitigation actions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 3-4]
Organization: National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA)
II. Pollution from Light and Medium-Duty Vehicles Furthers Climate Change and Harms our
Parks and Communities.
The irrefutable consensus among leading scientists has demonstrated time and again that
climate change poses an increasingly existential threat to America's national parks and the world
around them. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in their
recently released Synthesis for the 6th Assessment Report (AR6): [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0607, p. 2]
[h]uman activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally
caused global warming, with global surface temperature reaching 1.1 °C above 1850-1900 in
2011-2020. Global greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase, with unequal historical
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and ongoing contributions arising from unsustainable energy use, land use and land-use change,
lifestyles and patterns of consumption and production across regions, between and within
countries, and among individuals.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0607, p. 2]
8 IPCC, Synthesis Report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6): Summary for Policymakers, Doc.
4, p.4. Available at https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/.
The IPCC further states that current policies and laws "fall short of the levels needed to meet
climate goals across all sectors and regions," and will likely result in warming that "will exceed
1.5°C during the 21st century and make it harder to limit warming below 2°C."9 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0607, p. 2]
9 Id. at 10.
Our national park system hosts some of America's most beloved natural and cultural
resources, yet our parks are especially vulnerable to the changing climate because of their
sensitive and fragile ecosystems and unique geographic locations. 10 The burning of fossil fuels
driving global warming has resulted in national park mean annual temperatures increasing "at
double the rate of the U.S. as a whole" between 1895 and 2010.11 The ecological turmoil caused
by this warming and the resulting extreme weather conditions is disastrous for the vast majority
of national park units and is expected to only get worse. As temperatures increase, climate
effects are felt across all park geographic regions and locations, from coastal areas to mountain
ranges. 12 These climate effects include: (1) rising sea levels; (2) increasingly intense wildfires;
(3) threat and harm to wildlife habitats and lifestyles, particularly those at high altitudes with low
adaptation buffers; (4) the rapid growth of disruptive, invasive species; (5) extreme weather
damage; (6) drier conditions leading to difficult droughts; (7) loss of glaciers, snowpack and ice;
(8) changing landscapes and disrupted ecosystems; (9) destruction of irreplaceable park
structures and artifacts; and (10) altered visitation patterns and significant losses to valuable
tourism revenue. 13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0607, pp. 2-3]
10 Patrick Gonzalez et al., Disproportionate Magnitude of Climate Change in United States National Parks,
13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 6-10 (2018), https://perma.cc/99FL-CA3S.
11 Id. at 1.
12 Id. at 3.
13 NPCA, How the Climate Crisis Is Affecting National Parks, NPCA.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2022),
https://www.npca.org/reports/climate-impacts; see also Patrick Gonzalez et al., Disproportionate
Magnitude of Climate Change in United States National Parks, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1 (2018),
https://perma.cc/99FL-CA3 S.
Due to the propensity of extreme events to damaging national parks, our findings indicate that
climate change is a very real and significant concern for 80 percent of the nation's parks. 14 If
climate change continues at this rate, park wildlife and plant species' populations will plummet,
and extinctions are likely to occur. In the decades to come, destruction from climate change
could very well cause the near total loss of numerous namesake natural features across the park
system, including, but not limited to, glaciers in Glacier National Park, everglade forests in
Everglades National Park, saguaro cacti in Saguaro National Park, Joshua trees in Joshua Tree
National Park, and giant sequoias in Sequoia National Park. Moreover, threats such as sea-level
rise and storm related flooding and erosion put a long list of cultural park resources at risk,
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including historic structures from the National Mall in Washington, DC to the Golden Gate
National Recreation Area in San Francisco. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0607, pp. 2-3]
14 NPCA, Air and Climate Report: Polluted Parks, NPCA.org (2019), https://www.npca.org/reports/air-
climate-report.
The transportation sector is now the largest source of GHG emissions in the United States,
and LDVs and MDVs are the single largest contributor of domestic GHGs within the sector. 15
EPA's proposed light and medium-duty GHG standards will help address this top source of
climate altering pollution, and, in so doing, help protect our parks from the worst of this
devastation. Taking strong action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from LDVs and MDVs
will be an important step to limit warming below 2°C and protect our treasured national parks.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0607, pp. 2-3]
15 EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 1990-2018 atES-25 (2020),
https://perma.cc/98ZR- XNTR.
National parks are suffering some of the most dire effects of our warming world. We urgently
need to cut significant levels of greenhouse gas emissions from light and medium-duty vehicles,
which are among the single largest contributors to the global climate crisis. EPA's proposed MY
2027 and later LDV and MDV GHG rule represents a necessary step to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, but the alternatives fall short of both CAA requirements and what is needed to ensure
the health and welfare of our parks, communities and climate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0607,
p. 5]
Organization: National Tribal Air Association (NTAA)
Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Mitigation
The acute and continuous impacts of climate change on Native Americans and Alaska Native
Villagers are well documented. Unfortunately, new consequences of this global crisis continue to
be revealed. For multiple reasons including vulnerability and geographic constraints, Tribal
communities are disproportionately suffering from these changes. The U.S. Fourth National
Climate Assessment (NCA4)1 noted, in part, that "Climate change increasingly threatens
indigenous communities' livelihoods, economies, health, and cultural identities by disrupting
interconnected social, physical, and ecological systems." A more focused examination of Tribal
needs to address the impacts of climate change is presented in 2021 publication The Status of
Tribes and Climate Change (STACC)2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, pp. 1-2]
1 USGCRP, 2018: Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States
2 The Status of Tribes and Climate Change (STACC), Institute for Tribal Environmental Professionals,
2021
The NTAA has a long history of information sharing with EPA and advocacy for reducing
emissions of greenhouse gases. Multiple reports, policy statements, and comment letters are
compiled and accessible on our organization's website3. NTAA's Status of Tribal Air Reports
(STAR) including STAR 20224 document climate change impacts on Tribal lands and people.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, pp. 1-2]
3 National Tribal Air Association, www.ntaatribalair.org
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4 Status of Tribal Air Report, National Tribal Air Association 2022
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
1. The Strongest Feasible Emissions Standards Are Needed.
Earth's climate is changing faster than it has at any point in the history of civilization, driven
unequivocally by GHG emissions from human activities. The impacts—including more frequent
and intense precipitation and wind events, flooding, heat waves, drought, wildfires, retreating
snow and ice pack, ocean warming and acidification, accelerating sea level rise, and large-scale
biodiversity loss—are being felt by communities across the globe and will worsen in coming
years. Because GHGs can persist in the atmosphere for decades to centuries, how much worse
these impacts will become depends on how deeply and rapidly humanity can decarbonize all
economic sectors. Each additional ton of carbon dioxide (C02) and other GHGs emitted into the
atmosphere contributes to future climate warming and associated impacts.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0584, p. 2]
4 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC (AR6),
AR6 Synthesis Report: Climate Change 2023 (2023), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/; see also IPCC,
Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III to the AR6
(2022), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/; IPCC, Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to the AR6 (2022), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/;
IPCC, Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the AR6
(2021), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wgl/.
Global C02 emissions reached their highest ever annual level in 2022, surpassing the
previous record high set in 2021.5 The United States has released more C02 into the atmosphere
than any nation in history and remains the second largest emitter today.6 At 28 percent,
transportation is the largest source of U.S. GHG emissions and is expected to remain so through
2050, as population growth, expansion of urban centers, a growing economy, and increasing
international trade will generate increased passenger and freight movement in coming years.
Collectively, LDVs, MDVs, and Class 4-8 heavy-duty vehicles account for 82 percent of GHG
emissions from the U.S. transportation sector, or 23 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions. LDVs
alone are responsible for more than 15 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0584, p. 2]
5 International Energy Agency (IEA), C02 Emissions in 2022 (2023), https://www.iea.org/reports/co2-
emissions-in- 2022; IEA, C02 Emissions in 2021 (2022), https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-
review-co2-emissions-in-2021 -2.
6 Climate Watch, Historical GHG Emissions, https://www.climatewatchdata.org/ghg-
emissions?source=Climate%20Watch (visited June 8, 2023).
7 EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2021,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks-1990-2021 (2023).
Organization: Our Children's Trust (OCT)
2. The federal government has long known that burning fossil fuels causes dangerous
climate change that imperils the health and wellbeing of American children. The environmental
consequences of vehicle emissions are well documented and are contributing to the catastrophic
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heat, drought, and wildfires terrorizing the West coast and hurricanes, flooding and tornadoes
horrifying the East coast. The costs of these climate change-induced disasters are staggering and
many of the victims will be unable to recover. A study shows that children will experience many
more of these extreme, life-threatening adults than their elders living today, including the ones
making these policy decisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 2]
There is simply no legal, scientific, or economic basis to continue burning fossil fuels, as was
proven in the recent children's constitutional climate trial, Held v. Montana in Helena Montana,
June 12-20, where leading scientists testified that fossil fuels endanger children's health and that
powering every state in the nation with 100% clean renewable energy is not only technically
feasible right now, but is economically beneficial and will save states and consumers billions of
dollars in energy bills. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 2]
Excess accumulation of greenhouse gases in our atmosphere results in an Earth energy
imbalance and thus an accumulation of heat in our climate system. 6 The best available science
informs that Earth's energy balance can only be restored by returning the atmospheric C02
concentration to below 350 ppm by 2100. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 3]
Experts have opined that it is economically and technically feasible to achieve the science-
based greenhouse gas emission reduction target of close to 100% by 2050, while simultaneously
enhancing sequestration capacity of sinks to draw down historical cumulative C02 emissions,
placing the U.S. on an emissions trajectory consistent with returning atmospheric C02 to below
350 ppm by 2100, which would bring long-term heating of the Earth back down to
approximately 1.0°C above preindustrial temperatures, stabilizing the climate. 8 Please explain
how the proposed rule aligns with restoring Earth's Energy Imbalance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0542, p. 3]
6 Karina von Schuckmann et al., Heat Stored in the Earth System: Where Does the Energy Go?, 12 Earth
Sys. Sci. Data 2013 (2020); Kevin E. Trenberth & Lijing Cheng, A Perspective on Climate Change from
Earth's Energy Imbalance, 1 Env't Research Climate 013001 (2022).
7 James Hansen et al., Assessing "Dangerous Climate Change": Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions
to Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature, 8 PLOS ONE e81648 (2013),
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0081648; Karina von Schuckmann et al., Heat Stored in the Earth
System: Where Does the Energy Go?, 12 Earth Sys. Sci. Data 2013, 2014-15 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-12-2013-2020.
8 See Our Children's Trust, Government Climate and Energy Policies Must Target <######350 ppm
Atmospheric C02 by 2100 to Protect Children and Future Generations; Mark Z. Jacobson et al., Zero Air
Pollution and Zero Carbon from all Energy at Low Cost and Without Blackouts in Variable Weather
Throughout the U.S. with 100% Wind- Water-Solar and Storage, 184 Renewable Energy 430 (2022),
https://web.stanford.edU/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/21-USStates-PDFs/21-USStatesPaper.pdf; Ben
Haley et al., Evolved Energy Research, 350 PPM Pathways for the United States (2019),
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.Org/s/350-PPM-Pathways-for-the-United-States-gk6k.pdf; Ben Haley et al.,
Evolved Energy Research, 350 PPM Pathways for Florida 71 (2020) (See updated U.S. data in the
Technical Supplement), https://www.ourchildrenstrust.Org/s/350-PPM-Pathways-Florida-Report-pa2t.pdf;
James H. Williams et al., Carbon- Neutral Pathways for the United States, 2 AGU Advances
2020AV000284 (2021); James Hansen et al., Assessing "Dangerous Climate Change": Required Reduction
of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature, 8 PLOS ONE e81648
(2013), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0081648; Karina von Schuckmann et al., Heat Stored in the
Earth System: Where Does the Energy Go?, 12 Earth Sys. Sci. Data 2013, 2014-15 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-12-2013-2020; Andrea Rodgers et al., The Injustice of 1.5°C-2°C: The Need
1652
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for a Scientifically Based Standard of Fundamental Rights Protection in Constitutional Climate Change
Cases, 40 Va. Env'tL.J. 102 (2022).
Current increased average temperatures of 1°C and greater (now at ~1.2°C) are already
dangerous according to the IPCC. 9 Basing policies and decisions that align with temperature
targets of 1.5°C is catastrophic for our children and posterity. 10 The IPCC special report on
Global Warming of 1.5°C (2018) stated that allowing a temperature rise of 1.5°C "is not
considered 'safe' for most nations, communities, ecosystems and sectors and poses significant
risks to natural and human systems as compared to the current warming of 1°C (high
confidence)." 11 The 2023 IPCC Summary for Policymakers for the Synthesis Report (AR6)
stated: "Risks and projected adverse impacts and related losses and damages from climate
change will escalate with every increment of global warming (very high confidence). They are
higher for global warming of 1.5°C than at present, and even higher at 2°C (high confidence)."
12 Medical experts have recently recognized that "[t]he science is unequivocal; a global increase
of 1.5°C above the pre-industrial average and the continued loss of biodiversity risk catastrophic
harm to health that will be impossible to reverse." 13 As such, 1.5°C should not be used to guide
U.S. policy that is required to be based on best available science. The EPA should not be
advancing policies that knowingly make the climate crisis worse, and potentially unsolvable.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, pp. 3-4]
9 IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, in Synthesis Report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6)
(2023), https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syr/pdf/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf.
10 See IPCC, Overarching Frequently Asked Questions: FAQ 3: How will climate change affect the lives
of today's children tomorrow, if no immediate action is taken? in Climate Change 2022: Impacts,
Adaptation and Vulnerability (2022) ("[TJoday's children and future generations are more likely to be
exposed and vulnerable to climate change and related risks such as flooding, heat stress, water scarcity,
poverty, and hunger. Children are amongst those suffering the most.. . [C]hildren aged ten or younger in
the year 2020 are projected to experience a nearly four-fold increase in extreme events under 1.5°C of
global warming by 2100[.]")
11 M.R. Allen et al., Technical Summary, in Global Warming of 1.5°C, at 44 (2018); see also Assessing
"Dangerous Climate Change". This was similarly noted in the IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, in
Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, at 13 (2022): "Global warming, reaching
1.5°C in the near-term, would cause unavoidable increases in multiple climate hazards and present multiple
risks to ecosystems and humans (very high confidence)." Note that global warming was at ~1.0°C when
this report was finalized; it has now risen to 1.2°C.
12 IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, in Synthesis Report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6)
(2023), https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syr/pdf/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf.
13 Lukoye Atwoli et al., Call for Emergency Action to Limit Global Temperature Increases, Restore
Biodiversity, and Protect Health, 398 The Lancet 939 (2021) (emphasis added),
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)01915-2.
Climate change is causing a public health emergency that is already adversely impacting the
physical and mental health of American children through, among other impacts, extreme weather
events, rising temperatures and increased heat exposure, decreased air quality, altered infectious
disease patterns, and food and water insecurity. 14 Children are uniquely vulnerable to climate
change impacts because of their developing bodies, higher exposure to air, food, and water per
unit body weight, unique behavior patterns, dependence on caregivers, political powerlessness,
and longevity on the planet. 15 The protection of constitutional rights of children, by following
the science, is of the utmost importance and must be incorporated in all relevant EPA rulemaking
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and policies. The Held v. Montana trial also put forward unrefuted expert testimony of the harms
children face from the ongoing allowance of fossil fuel energy. EPA must listen to the
pediatricians, psychiatrists, and public health experts on the damage every ton of emissions
continues to have on our nation's children. See Expert Reports. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0542, pp. 4-5]
14 IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, at
11,17 (2022). This summary found that the current level of global warming is already driving heat waves
that cause human morbidity, heavy rains, flooding, extreme fires and drought, coral bleaching and demise,
massive shifts in species habitats, loss of glaciers, snow and permafrost, as well as more destructive
hurricanes. Id. at 11.
15 Samantha Ahdoot, Susan E. Pacheco & Council on Environmental Health, Global Climate Change and
Children's Health, 136 Pediatrics el468 (2015); Rebecca Pass Philipsborn & Kevin Chan, Climate Change
and Global Child Health, 141 Pediatrics e20173774 (2018); Wim Thiery et al., Intergenerational Inequities
in Exposure to Climate Extremes, 374 Science 158 (2021).
Organization: Pearson Fuels
As highlighted by the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change ("IPCC"), emissions from fossil fuels are the dominant contributor to climate change and
continue to increase in scope:
Growth in anthropogenic emissions has persisted across all major groups of GHGs since
1990, albeit at different rates. By 2019, the largest growth in absolute emissions occurred in C02
from fossil fuels and industry followed by CH4, whereas the highest relative growth occurred in
fluorinated gases, starting from low levels in 1990 (high confidence).4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0577, p. 3]
4 IPCC, 2022: Summary for Policymakers [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, A. Reisinger, R. Slade, R. Fradera, M.
Pathak, A. Al Khourdajie, M. Belkacemi, R. vanDiemen, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, D.
McCollum, S. Some, P. Vyas, (eds.)]. In: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change.
Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. vanDiemen, D. McCollum, M.
Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)].
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, U.S.A. doi:
10.1017/9781009157926.001. (hereafter "IPCC, 2022: Summary for Policymakers"), available at
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_SummaryForPolicymakers.pdf,
Finding B.1.2, at p. 6, chart at p. 7.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR CHART of Global net anthropogenic emissions have
continued to rise across all major groups of greenhouse gases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577,
p. 3]
Organization: Sierra Club et al.
Under the U.S. Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Agreement, we committed to
cut economy-wide greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 50 to 52 percent in 2030, compared to
2005 levels. Meeting that commitment is more important than ever. According to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's recently released Sixth Assessment Report, we are
on course to exceed a 1.5° Celsius increase in global average temperature above pre-industrial
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levels within the coming decades. This level of warming would be catastrophic for our health,
our welfare, and our planet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0668, p. 1]
Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
Tailpipe emissions from light- and medium-duty vehicles cause significant environmental,
public health, and economic impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp. 1-2]
a. Light- and medium-duty vehicles are one of the largest sources of climate change- causing
GHG emissions in the United States, resulting in tremendous harm. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0591, pp. 1-2]
The transportation sector is the largest source of GHG emissions in the United States,2 and
this is also true in the South. In fact, transportation is the primary source of carbon dioxide
(C02)—the most prevalent GHG in our atmosphere—in every state in SELC's region except for
Alabama, where it is the second largest source.3 In Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Virginia, emissions from transportation sources account for nearly half of all
C02 emissions.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp. 1-2]
2 The transportation sector generates 27.2 percent of all GHG annual emissions in the United States. See id.
at 29186 (May 5, 2023).
3 Based on 2020 C02 emissions. U.S. ENERGY INFO ADMIN., State Carbon Dioxide Emission Data
Tables, tbl. 3 (Oct. 11, 2022), https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/.
4 Id.
Nationwide, light-duty vehicles are responsible for the majority of GHG pollution from the
transportation sector, contributing 57.1 percent of all transportation sector GHG emissions—
which amounts to 15.5 percent of total GHG emissions in the United States.5 Light-duty vehicles
are also responsible for a disproportionate share of GHG pollution in the South. In Virginia, for
example, emissions from light-duty vehicles generate 53 percent of all transportation-related
GHG emissions in the state;6 in North Carolina, these vehicles produce 74 percent of all
transportation-related GHG emissions.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp. 1-2]
5 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicle, 88 Fed. Reg. 29184, 29186 (May 5, 2023).
6 VA. DEP'T ENV'T QUALITY, Greenhouse Gases: 2016-2019 Inventory (2019),
https://www.deq.virginia.gov/our- programs/air/greenhouse-gases (aggregating C02, N20, and CH4
emissions from light-duty vehicles).
7 N.C. DEP'T ENV'T QUALITY, North Carolina Greenhouse Gas Inventory 29 (Jan. 2022),
https://www.deq.nc.gov/air-quality/ghg-inventory-report-2022/download7attachment.
GHG emissions are the primary driver of climate change,8 and the United States is already
experiencing the environmental, public health, and economic impacts of a changing climate.9
While the effects of climate change are well-documented nationwide, the geography and
demographics of the South make the region particularly vulnerable to climate change. A 2023
analysis of climate vulnerabilities across the United States found that the 100 census tracts with
the highest overall climate vulnerability are located in 28 counties in nine southern states,
including Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and South Carolina. 10 Climate
vulnerability, or the likely damage from climate change-related hazards due to "greater exposure
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to climate risks and lower ability to prepare, adapt, and recover from their effects," often
correlates with race, income, and other socioeconomic factors. 11 The two counties with the most
census tracts among the 100 most vulnerable are located within SELC's region: Shelby County,
Tennessee has 21 of the top 100 most vulnerable tracts, and Mobile County, Alabama has 14.12
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp. 2-4]
8 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SYNTHESIS REPORT OF THE
IPCC SIXTH ASSESSMENT REPORT (AR6): SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 (2023) ("Human
activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming,
with global surface temperature reaching 1.1°C above 1850-1900 in 2011-2020.").
9 See generally Kristie L. Ebi et al., Climate Change and Human Health Impacts in the United States: An
Update on the Results of the U.S. National Assessment, 114 ENV'T HEALTH PERSPS. 1318 (2006);
Solomon Hsiang, et al., Estimating Economic Damage from Climate Change in the United States, 346
SCIENCE 1362 (2017); FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, U.S. GLOB. CHANGE
RSCH. PROG. (2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/.
10 P. Grace Tee Lewis et al., Characterizing Vulnerabilities to Climate Change Across the United States,
172 ENV'T INT'L 1, 6 (2023).
11 Id. atl.
12 Id. at 6.
Rising temperatures are one of the many effects of climate change. The decade from 2010 to
2020 was the warmest on record in the South, and the region is already experiencing a higher
percentage of heat waves than other parts of the country. 13 Longer and more intense heat waves
reduce air quality and cause heat-related illnesses like heat cramps, heatstroke, heat exhaustion,
kidney-associated diseases, and asthma. 14 These health effects are especially likely in vulnerable
populations such as children, outdoor workers, and the elderly. 15 In addition, the South is home
to some of the fastest-growing metropolitan areas in the country. 16 Sprawling, auto-oriented
development like that typical in the South often increases impervious surfaces and reduces tree
canopy cover, which combined with climate change can create and exacerbate heat island effects
and result in greater emergency-room visits, reduced life expectancy, and worsened mental
health outcomes in impacted communities. 17 These impacts are often most acute in communities
of color that have experienced a longstanding history of environmental injustice. 18 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp. 2-4]
13 Southeast, U.S. CLIMATE RESILIENCE TOOLKIT (June 28, 2021),
https://toolkit.climate.gov/regions/southeast.
14 See generally Mary L. Williams, Global Warming, Heat?Related Illnesses, and the Dermatologist, 7
INT'L J. WOMEN'S DERMATOLOGY 70 (2021). See also Daniel Hellden et al., Climate Change and
Child Health: A Scoping Review and an Expanded Conceptual Framework, 5 LANCET PLANETARY
HEALTH 164, 166 (2021).
15 Williams, vis note 14, at 75-76; Hellden et al., supra note 14, at 166.
16 See Andy Kiersz, This map shows the fastest growing and shrinking cities in America over the last
decade, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 13, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.eom/2020-census-fastest-
growing-and-shrinking- metro-areas-2021-8; Adam J. Terando et al., The Southern Megalopolis: Using the
Past to Predict the Future of Urban Sprawl in the Southeast U.S., 9 PLOS ONE 1 (2014).
17 See Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, How Decades of Racist Housing Policy Left Neighborhoods
Sweltering, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2020),
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https://www.nytimes.eom/interactive/2020/08/24/climate/racism-redlining-cities-global- warming.html
(examining the health effects of a heat island in Richmond, Virginia).
18 See, e.g., Groundwork RVA, Climate Safe Neighborhoods,
https://gwmke.maps.arcgis.com/apps/Cascade/ index.html?appid=9b784d9e79324dlf97210b25afelb91d
(analyzing historic redlining maps and satellite imagery to establish a relationship between housing
segregation and vulnerability to extreme heat and flooding in Richmond, Virginia).
With over 12,000 miles of coastline,19 the South is also experiencing frequent flooding due to
increased extreme storm events and sea level rise. Sea level has been rising at a rate about three
times the global pace along the mid-Atlantic coast.20 In the Hampton Roads region of
Virginia—which has the highest rate of sea level rise on the East Coast21—the sea level has
risen by more than a foot over the last 80 years,22 and scientists predict an additional rise of 1.5
to 2 feet by 2050.23 As warmer ocean temperatures result in heavier, more frequent rainfalls and
slower-moving hurricanes, inland flooding is also increasing.24 The number of Category 4 and 5
hurricanes in the mid-Atlantic basin—such as Hurricanes Ian, Irma, Michael, Matthew, and
Florence—has grown substantially since the 1980s.25 These weather events cause serious
injuries and fatalities,26 property damage, respiratory effects from mold exposure, and may lead
to public emergencies and infrastructure disruptions, stressing health services and
communities.27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp. 2-4]
19 Shoreline Mileage of the U.S., NOAA OFFICE FOR COASTAL MGMT. (May 9, 2016),
https://coast.noaa.gov/data/ docs/states/shorelines.pdf.
20 Sonke Dangendorf et al., Acceleration of U.S. Southeast and Gulf Coast Sea-Level Rise Amplified by
Internal Climate Variability, 14 NATURE COMMS. 1 (2023).
21 Brett Buzzanga et al., Toward Sustained Monitoring of Subsidence at the Coast Using InSAR and GPS:
An Application in Hampton Roads, Virginia, 47 GEO. RSCH. LETTERS 1, 1 (2020); see also Kasha Patel,
Land Around the U.S. is Sinking. Here Are Some of the Fastest Areas, WASH. POST (May 30, 2023),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2023/05/30/land-sinking-us-subsidence-sea-level/
(finding that the Hampton Roads region is sinking at a rate of more than 3.5 millimeters per year).
22 Sea Level Rise and Tidal Flooding in Norfolk, Virginia, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
(Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/sea-level-rise-and-tidal-flooding-norfolk-virginia.
23 JohnD. Boon, et al., Anthropocene Sea Level Change: A History of Recent Trends Observed in the U.S.
East, Gulf, and West Coast Regions, VA. INST. MARINE SCI. III-2 (2018); see also Peter Coutu, Sea
Level Rise Continues to Accelerate; Hampton Roads Should Prepare for 1.7 Feet by 2050, Report Says,
THE VIRGINIAN PILOT (Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.pilotonline.eom/2020/02/09/sea-level-rise-
continues-to-accelerate-hampton-roads-should- prepare-for-17-feet-by-2050-report-says/.
24 Craig E. Colton, Hurricane Michael Could Bring More Inland Flooding to Southeast States, THE
CONVERSATION (Oct. 10, 2018), https://theconversation.com/hurricane-michael-could-bring-more-
inland-flooding-to-southeast- states-104681; see also Inland Flooding, U.S. CLIMATE RESILIENCE
TOOLKIT (Apr. 12, 2022), https://toolkit.climate.gov/topics/coastal-flood-risk/inland-flooding.
25 Southeast & The Caribbean, THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, U.S. GLOB. CHANGE
RSCH. PROG. (2014), https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/regions/southeast.
26 See Angel Adegbesan, Hurricane Ian Death Toll in U.S. Hits 100 Across Three States, TIME (Oct. 8,
2022), https://time.com/6220855/hurricane-ian-death-toll/; Robbie M. Marks et al., Association of Tropical
Cyclones With County-Level Mortality in the U.S., 327 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 946, 954 (2022).
27 Deborah N. Barbeau et al., Mold Exposure and Health Effects Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
31 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 165, 168 (2010); Carla Stanke et al., The Effects of Flooding on Mental
Health: Outcomes and Recommendations from a Review of the Literature, PLOS CURRENT DISASTERS
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2, 13 (2012); Hayley T. Olds et al., High Levels of Sewage Contamination Released from Urban Areas
After Storm Events: A Quantitative Survey with Sewage Specific Bacterial Indicators, 15 PLOS MED. 1,
13-15 (2018).
There are also major economic costs to climate change, and studies have found that the future
costs will be unequally distributed across the United States.28 Relative to the rest of the nation,
the South will face the largest economic losses from climate change, with low-income and
minority communities particularly affected.29 Lower income counties in the South may lose
between 5 and 20 percent of gross domestic product per year—compared to an average yearly
loss of 1.2 percent nationally—for every additional degree of warming by the 2080s.30 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, p. 4]
28 See, e.g., Hsiang, et al., supra note 9, at 1363.
29 Id.
30 Id. See also Brad Plumer & Najda Popovich, As Climate Changes, Southern States Will Suffer More
Than Others,
N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/29/climate/southern-states-worse- climate-
effects.html. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, p. 4]
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
Furthermore, EPA has deliberately left out of its cost-benefit equation entirely the upstream
carbon dioxide emissions associated with EV production.49 The minerals and components used
in EV batteries are mostly processed or manufactured in China using power generated from coal.
While the U.S. has achieved huge reduc- tions in carbon dioxide emissions by converting coal-
fired power plants to natural gas, China's and other Asian nations' carbon emissions are growing
rapidly because of their heavy reliance on coal, and EPA's rules will only accelerate that
dynamic.50 An automotive engineering analysis published in 2022 estimated that the carbon
dioxide emissions from producing the battery used in one small EV (the Nissan Leaf) were
equivalent to driving an ICE vehicle 24,000 miles (two years of driving), and those from
producing the battery used in a large EV (the Tesla Model S) were equivalent to driving an ICE
vehicle 60,000 miles (five years of driving). 51 In these rulemaking proposals, EPA has
completely ignored the fact that EVs start out their lives on the road with such a huge head start
(two to five years worth) in carbon dioxide emissions over their ICE counterparts. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 17-18]
49 See id. at 29197, 29254.
50 See Robert Bryce, "The Iron Law of Electricity Strikes Again as Vietnam Boosts Coal Burn," June 17,
2023, https ://robertbryce. substack.com/p/the-iron-law-of-electricity-strikes.
51 See Tristan Burton, et al., Convergent Science, Inc., "A Data-Driven Greenhouse Gas Emission Rate
Analysis for Vehicle Comparisons," SAE Int'l Journal of Electrified Vehicles, April 13, 2022,
https://doi.org/10.4271/14-12-01-0006 (also available at https://www.sae.org/publications/technical-
papers/content/14-12-01-0006/).
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Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
Because of the urgency of the climate and air pollution crises worldwide and the challenges of
predicting consumer acceptance, it is important to take an all-hands-on-deck approach and have
multiple types of zero-emission car and truck technologies in the final regulation including
Strong PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 25]
Strong PHEVs offer more options for consumers which means a faster path to zero
C02 worldwide when combined with BEV and FCEV options especially given supply chain,
utility grid and charging infrastructure challenges we face today.
Many areas of the world are relying on EPA's leadership to commercialize new zero
carbon solutions to transportation such as Strong PHEVs.
The longer-term goal should be PHEVs with 100% zero carbon electricity generation
for almost all of their electric miles, and advanced biofuels or other ultra-low carbon fuel for the
remaining miles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 25]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Tesla supports EPA's efforts to accelerate light-duty vehicle electrification as it is essential
for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) and criteria pollutants and addressing the rapidly escalating
climate crisis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 6]
As the agency highlights, light-duty vehicles are major emitters of climate-warming GHGs,
stating: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 7]
The transportation sector is the largest U. S. source of GHG emissions, representing 27.2
percent of total GHG emissions. Within the transportation sector, light-duty vehicles are the
largest contributor, at 57.1 percent, and thus comprise 15.5 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions,
even before considering the contribution of medium-duty Class 2b and 3 vehicles which are also
included under this rule.45 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 7]
45 88 Fed. Reg. at 29816-17.
As EPA has already determined, vehicle GHG emissions endanger public health and
welfare.46 Since the issuance of the Endangerment Finding continued peer-reviewed scientific
analysis has further elucidated the level of GHG emission reduction needed to adequately protect
the public welfare.47 In finalizing the requisite level of emissions reduction in the new light-duty
standards, the agency should look first toward the consensus UNFCCC and IPCC goal of
limiting global warming to below 1.5 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels as its
baseline.48 The U.S. has adopted an international commitment to put policies in place consistent
with this protective aim.49 To meet this new target the U.S. has committed to achieve a 50-52
percent reduction from 2005 levels in economy wide GHG pollution in 2030.50 This
commitment is part of the national effort to prevent significant domestic impacts from climate
change51 and embodies near term action commensurate with meeting this benchmark.52
Further, EPA recognizes the need to promulgate regulations that "would contribute toward the
goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-
industrial levels, and subsequently reduce the probability of severe climate change related
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impacts including heat waves, drought, sea level rise, extreme climate and weather events,
coastal flooding, and wildfires."53 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 7-9]
46 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (Endangerment Finding).
47 See, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29208.
48 See generally, UNFCCC, Key aspects of the Paris Agreement available at h ttps://unfccc.int/process-
and-meetings/the- p aris-agreement/the-paris-agreement/key-aspects-of-the-paris-agreement.
49 The United States of America Nationally Determined Contribution Reducing Greenhouse Gases in the
United States: A 2030 Emissions Target (April 21, 2021) at 23. available at h
ttps://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-0
6/United%20States%20NDC%20April%2021%202021%20Final.pdf ("As noted above, the United States'
NDC is consistent with the Paris Agreement temperature goal of holding the increase in the global average
temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would
significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change (Article 2.1(a)").
50 White House: FACT SHEET: President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction Target
Aimed at Creating Good-Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S. Leadership on Clean Energy Technologies
(April 22, 2021) available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-sets-2030-g reenhouse-gas-pollution-reduction-target-
aimed-at-creating-good-paying-union-jobs-and-securing-u-s-leadership-on- c lean-energy-technologies/.
51 See, President Biden, Executive Order 14008, Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, 86 Fed.
Reg. 7619 (Feb. 1, 2021). available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/02/01/2021-
02177/tackling-the-climate-crisis-at-h ome-and-abroad.
52 See, Nature, Realization of Paris Agreement pledges may limit warming just below 2 °C (April 13,
2022) available at h ttps://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-04553-z
?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosgenerate&stream=top
(Limiting warming not only to 'just below' but to 'well below' 2 degrees Celsius or 1.5 degrees Celsius
urgently requires policies and actions to bring about steep emission reductions this decade, aligned with
mid-century global net-zero C02 emissions.).
53 88 Fed. Reg. at 29199.
As part of this effort, numerous studies have highlighted that electrifying the light-duty fleet
as rapidly possible will enable the U.S. to meet its commitment and equitably contribute to
emissions reductions that adequately protect the country's health and welfare.54 For example, a
central component of the U.S. long-term climate strategy in transportation is the "rapid
expansion of zero-emission vehicles—in as many applications as possible across light-, medium-
, and heavy-duty applications."55 Moreover, the American Lung Association (ALA) found that
the environmental benefits from electrifying the transportation sector in the form of avoided
climate change impacts, as expressed as the social cost of carbon,56 could surpass $113 billion
in 2050 as transportation systems combust far less fuel and our power system comes to rely on
cleaner, non-combustion renewable energy.57 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 7-9]
54 See e.g., IPCC, AR 6, Working Group III, Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change (April
4, 2022) at 1109 available at https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-3/
(highlighting among other scenarios full light duty vehicle electrification being the most promising low-
carbon pathway to meet a 1.75°C goal); See also, UNFCCC, Nationally determined contributions under the
Paris Agreement; Synthesis report by the secretariat (Feb. 26, 2021) at 32 available at h
ttps://unfccc.int/documents/268571https://unfccc.int/documents/268571 (In terms of specific technologies
that Parties intend to use for achieving their adaptation and mitigation targets, the most frequently
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identified were energy efficient appliances and processes, renewable energy technologies, low- or zero-
emission vehicles and hydrogen technologies) (emphasis added).
55 United States Executive Office of the President, The Long-Term Strategy of The United States
Pathways to Net-Zero Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 2050 (Nov. 2021) at 31. available at h
ttps://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-c ontent/uploads/2021/10/US-Long-Term-Strategy.pdf.
56 See, White House, Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide
Interim Estimates under Executive Order 13990 (Feb. 2021). available at h ttps://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
c ontent/uploads/2021/02/TechnicalSupportDocument_SocialCostofCarbonMethaneNitrousOxide.pdf.
57 American Lung Association, The Road to Clean Air Benefits of a Nationwide Transition to Electric
Vehicles (2020) at 6 available at https://www.lung.org/clean-air/electric-vehicle-report/electric-vehicle-
report-2
020#:~:text=The%20%22Road%20to%20Clean%20Air,diesel%20power)%20and%20toward%20electric.
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
In order to produce supplies of renewables, China is increasing its construction of coal- fired
power plants. This increases carbon emissions and reduces EPA's benefits from U.S. emissions
reduction. America has 225 coal-fired power plants, and China has 1,118 (half of all the coal-
fired plants in the world).31 That is one reason why China has increased carbon emissions by
over 5,000 million metric tons over the past 16 years.32 In contrast, America's carbon emissions
have declined by over 1,000 million metric tons over the same period due to the use of clean
natural gas.33 (See Figure 1.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 7-8]
31 Jessica Aizarani, Statista, "Global operational coal-fired power stations by country 2022," January 30,
2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/859266/number-of-coal-power-plants-by-country/ (accessed April
28, 2023).
32 "International Emissions." International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),
www.eia.gov/international/data/world/other-statistics/emissions-by-
fuel?pd=40&p=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b0001&u=0&f=A&v=
column&a=-&i=none&vo=value&t=C&g=none&l=71~ 71&s=1104537600000&e=1609459200000&
(accessed 21 June 2023).
33 Ibid.
China has not committed to reducing emissions until 2027. Research has shown that even
completely eliminating all fossil fuels from the United States would result in less than 0.2
degrees Celsius in temperature mitigation by 2100.34 Americans, particularly poor and middle
class, would be bearing major costs in higher electricity prices, higher food prices, and a forced
switch to costly electric vehicles without benefits for the environment. They would pay the price
for President Biden's energy agenda. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 7-8]
34 Kevin D. Dayaratna, PhD, Katie Tubb, and David Kreutzer, "The Unsustainable Costs of President
Biden's Climate Agenda," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3713, June 16, 2022,
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/BG3713_0.pdf, (accessed May 1, 2023).
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR GRAPH C02 Emissions Trends in Key Countries, 2005-
2021 Figure 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 7-8]
Environmental benefits overstated
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The study substantially overstates the environmental benefits of the rule. See Tables 172-187.
All of the environmental benefits, even if accurately measured, are limited to benefits in local
areas of the United States. There may well be reductions in C02 and other emissions where a
vehicle is driven. But the environmental harms elsewhere are substantial: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0674, p. 14]
- Environmental harms from the poorly supervised extraction of rare-earth minerals in
developing countries;
- Environmental harms transporting the rare earth minerals to battery factories in other
countries, but principally in China;
- Environmental harms from the manufacture of batteries in other countries, but principally in
China; and
- In addition, environmental harms from the generation and transmission of electricity, even
with renewable generation, in the United States.
For these and other reasons, the environmental benefits are substantially overstated and may
well be negative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 14]
Best scientific practice uses models that work and does not seriously consider those that do
not. This is standard when formulating the daily weather forecast, and should be the standard
with regard to climate forecasts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 24]
The IPCC's recently released Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) uses a new suite of models,
designated CMIP6. As shown by McKitrick and Christy (2020) however, the CMIP6 models are
even worse.62 Of the two models that work, the Russian INM-CM4.8, has even less warming
than its predecessor, with an ECS of 1.8°C, compared to the CMIP6 community value of around
four degrees.63 The other one is also a very low ECS model from the same, group, INM-CM5.
The model mean warming rate exceeds observation by more than two times at altitude in the
tropics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 24]
62 R. McKitrick and J. Christy. 2020. Pervasive Warming Bias in CMIP6 Tropospheric Layers. Earth and
Space Science Volume 7, Issue 9, https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.eom/doi/10.1029/2020EA001281.
63 Most (not all) of the CMIP-6 models were available for McKitrick and Christy (2020); this figure is the
mean ECS of what was released through late 2020.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR GRAPH OF 5-yr Running mean 300-200hPa Tropical
Temperature Anomalies CMIP-6 (Historical + ssp245 after 2014) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0674, p. 24]
Quoting from McKitrick and Christy's conclusion: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 24]
The literature drawing attention to an upward bias in climate model warming responses in the
tropical troposphere extends back at least 15 years now ... Rather than being resolved, the
problem has become worse, since now every member of the CMIP6 generation of climate
models exhibits an upward bias in the entire global troposphere as well as in the tropics. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 24]
Zeke Hausfather, hardly a climate skeptic, has noted that while the CMIP6 models are warmer
than the previous generation, the warmer they are, the more they over-forecast warming in recent
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decades, confirming what McKitrick and Christy found.64 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p.
24]
64 Zeke Hausfather, "Cold Water on Hot Models," The Breakthrough Institute, February 11, 2020,
https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/energy/cold-water-hot-models.
Zhu, Poulsen, and Otto-Bliesner (2020) used a CMIP6 model called CESM2 to project
warming from an emission scenario that reaches 855 parts per million by 2100—roughly three
times the pre-industrial concentration. Despite being tuned to match the behavior of 20th century
climate, CESM2 produced a global mean temperature "5.5°C greater than the upper end of proxy
temperature estimates for the Early Eocene Climate Optimum." That was a period when C02
concentrations of about 1,000 ppm persisted for millions of years.65 Moreover, the modeled
tropical land temperature exceeded 55°C, "which is much higher than the temperature tolerance
of plant photosynthesis and is inconsistent with fossil evidence of an Eocene Neotropical
rainforest."66 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 24]
65 NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, Early Eocene Period, 54 to 48 Million Years
Ago, https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/global-warming/early-eocene-period.
66 Jiang Zhu, Christopher J. Poulsen & Bette L. Otto-Bliesner. 2020. High climate sensitivity in CMIP6
model not supported by paleoclimate. Nature Climate Change volume 10, pages 378-379,
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-0764-6.
under more realistic assumptions regarding agricultural productivity and climate sensitivity,
the mean SCC essentially drops to zero and in many cases has a substantial probability of being
negative. At a minimum, Dayaratna et al. (2020) further demonstrates that the SCC is highly
sensitive to very reasonable changes in assumptions. The models can therefore suggest a variety
of outcomes of climate change - ranging from catastrophic disaster or continued prosperity to
climate change - all under very reasonable assumptions. As a result of the uncertainty
summarized in the above published analysis, the proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious and
therefore should not be implemented. Miniscule Temperature Impact Not Discussed In the
Proposed Rule The proposed rule begins by saying: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 30]
Motor vehicle emissions contribute to ozone, particulate matter (PM), and air toxics, which
are linked with premature death and other serious health impacts, including respiratory illness,
cardiovascular problems, and cancer. This air pollution affects people nationwide, as well as
those who live or work near transportation corridors. In addition, there is consensus that the
effects of climate change represent a rapidly growing threat to human health and the
environment, and are caused by GHG emissions from human activity, including motor vehicle
transportation. Recent trends and developments in emissions control technology, including
vehicle electrification and other advanced vehicle technologies, indicate that more stringent
emissions standards are feasible at reasonable cost and would achieve significant improvements
in public health and welfare. Addressing these public health and welfare needs will require
substantial additional reductions in criteria pollutants and GHG emissions from the
transportation sector, (p.29186) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 30]
Subsequently, the rule states: "The transportation sector is the largest U.S. source of GHG
emissions, representing 27.2% of total GHG emissions." (p. 29186). Since the policy is intended
to avert climate change it is necessary to quantify the climate impact of the proposed rule. At The
Heritage Foundation, we used the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate
Change version 6, developed by researchers at the EPA to quantify the climate impact. We found
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that assuming a climate sensitivity of 5.0 degrees C (the upper bound of estimated climate
sensitivities indicated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), there would be less
than 0.0305 degrees C temperature mitigation by 2050 and less than 0.0644 by 2100. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 30]
If the objective of the proposed rule is to avert climate change, then it is insufficient for the
rule to be based solely on GHG emission reductions; the EPA should go a step further to take
these missions and calculate temperature impacts as done above. As a result, the proposed rule is
arbitrary and capricious and should not be implemented. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p.
30]
Organization: U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB)
4. Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and
Medium-Duty Vehicles], Docket ID No EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829
Personal vehicles—cars, light-duty trucks (including sport utility vehicles, crossover utility
vehicles, minivans, and pickup trucks), and motorcycles—are responsible for 58 percent of U.S.
transportation sector GHG emissions, in addition to being a major source of other pollutants with
adverse effects to human health. 16 The EPA's proposed rule for more stringent emissions
standards for light and medium-duty vehicles addresses pollution from personal vehicles taking
into account industry trends and investments in electric vehicles (EVs) outlined in the Inflation
Reduction Act (IRA) and other policies. 88 Fed. Reg. 29184 (May 5, 2023). The EPA offers that
these "more stringent emissions standards are feasible at reasonable cost and would achieve
significant improvements in public health and welfare." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29186. The goals of
improved public health, welfare and reduced GHG emissions are consistent with Catholic Social
Teaching. As a general matter, it is good to consider strengthening vehicle emissions standards,
as the USCCB stated in 2018: "If any modifications are made to existing fuel efficiency and
greenhouse gas emission standards, we would urge these standards be strengthened, not
weakened, to further protect human and environmental health." 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0540, pp. 3-4]
16 Congressional Budget Office, Dec. 13, 2022, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58566
17 USCCB Rulemaking comment, Oct. 23, 2018, https://www.usccb.org/about/general-
counsel/rulemaking/upload/NPRM-CAFE-Comment-Draft-101118-AP-l .pdf
Organization: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
In addition to the criteria pollutant benefits, the rule's revised GHG standards are critical to
achieving long-term climate goals in Wisconsin. Federally regulated mobile sources are a
significant contributor to Wisconsin's greenhouse gas levels. On-road light- and medium-duty
gasoline vehicles were responsible for about 23.2 million metric tons of carbon dioxide (C02)
equivalent (MMC02E), or 16% of the state's total greenhouse gas emissions inventory in 2018.1
Given that Wisconsin lacks the authority to address GHG emissions from on-road vehicles,
EPA's action to update these standards is needed to help Wisconsin meet its climate objectives.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 2]
1 Wisconsin 2021 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory Report, available at:
https://widnr.widen.net/view/pdf/o9xmpot5x7/AM610.pdf?t_download=true.
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Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
3. Emissions Standards are Necessary to Protect Public Health and the Environment
This rule will accelerate investment in electric technologies that will lead to significant
emissions reductions and improved health outcomes. Americans are keeping their cars longer,
meaning the need for EPA action to reduce emissions from these types of personal vehicles is
even more urgent. 5 5 Failing to rapidly electrify these classes of vehicles means that fossil fuel-
powered vehicles rolling off assembly lines today will remain on the road for many years to
come, adding millions of collective vehicle miles and associated deadly emissions over the
coming decades. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 13-14]
55 "Americans are keeping their cars longer amid sky-high prices, rising interest rates," CNBC, (May 15,
2023) https://www.cnbc.eom/2023/05/15/americans-are-keeping-their-cars-longer-amid-rising-interest-
rates.html
As discussed in more detail below, ICEVs are a constant and ongoing hazard to public health
and the environment. They are also major contributors to anthropogenic climate change. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 13-14]
Electrification presents the most commercially viable pathway to reducing pollution from the
transportation sector and unlocking tangible environmental and public health benefits. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 13-14]
Accordingly, EPA should finalize emissions standards for LMDVs that result in deep cuts to
GHG and criteria pollutant emissions through continued growth in the EV sector. Implementing
and upholding robust emissions standards that decarbonize the transportation sector through
electrification is a national public health, climate, and equity imperative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, pp.13-14]
b. Reducing Transportation Emissions Protects the Environment and the Climate
Never has the evidence been more clear that climate change is anthropogenic, and recent
atmospheric research provides new indications of human-caused climate change associated with
increases in C02 emissions. Differences between tropospheric and lower stratospheric
temperature trends have long been recognized as a fingerprint of human effects on the climate. 68
A new study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences has factored in
temperature from the mid to upper stratosphere-25 to 50 kilometers above the Earth's surface-
into these comparisons.69 The results further underscore the impact humans are having on our
atmosphere and the potentially catastrophic effects that are increasingly likely to result such as
more frequent wildfires, longer periods of drought in some regions, and an increase in the wind
intensity and rainfall from tropical cyclones.70,71 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 16]
68 B. Santer, et.al. "Exceptional stratospheric contribution to human fingerprints on atmospheric
temperature," PNAS, (May 8, 2023) accessed May 15, 2023
https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2300758120
69 Id. at footnote 68
70 "The Effects of Climate Change," NOAA, accessed June 23, 2023 https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/
71 "AR6 Synthesis Report - Climate Change 2023" IPCC (March 2023) https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/
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As the nature of anthropogenic climate change is becoming increasingly evident, the urgency
needed in addressing its causes is becoming greater.72 Between 1971 and 2020, around
380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 joules of energy—equivalent to 25 atomic bombs—have been
trapped in the atmosphere as a result of warming, according to a 2023 study published in Earth
System Science Data.73 In 2021, the U.S. emitted 6,340 million metric tons of C02—of which,
fossil fuel combustion was responsible for nearly 75%. 74 A significant portion of that fossil fuel
combustion occurs within the transportation sector, which accounts for 28% of total emissions
and is the largest emitting sector.75 Light-duty vehicles account for 57% of transportation GHG
emissions and light-duty ICEVs emit around 19 pounds of carbon dioxide and other global-
warming gasses for every gallon of gasoline consumed.76 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p.
16]
72 "Carbon dioxide levels in atmosphere mark a near-record surge," Washington Post, (June 5, 2023)
https://www.washingtonpost.eom/climate-environment/2023/06/05/carbon-dioxide-growing-climate-
change/
73 von Schuckmann, K., et. al. "Heat stored in the Earth system 1960-2020: where does the energy go?,"
Earth Syst. Sci. Data, (April 17, 2023) https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-15-1675-2023
74 "Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2021," (2023) U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-andsinks-
1990-2021
75 "Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, accessed June 26,
2023 https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions
76 "Car Emissions and Global Warming," Union of Concerned Scientists, (July 18, 2014)
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/car-emissions-global-warming
As EPA explains in the proposed rule, automaker investments in electric technologies
implicitly acknowledge that the sector believes electric vehicles are the cleaner alternative. EVs
produce zero tailpipe emissions and studies have shown that in every state in the U.S.—even
states with fossil fuel intensive electricity grids—driving an electric vehicle leads to significantly
fewer GHG emissions.77 In Kentucky, for example, where the electricity mix is 71.8% coal and
20.6% natural gas, driving an EV results in 6,903 fewer pounds of C02 annually than driving an
ICEV.78 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 17]
77 "Driving an EV Is Getting Greener, Especially in the U.S.," The Wall Street Journal (May 10, 2023)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-clean-are-electric-cars-it-depends-4dl086d6?mod=hp_lista_pos2
78 "Emissions from Electric Vehicles," Department of Energy's Alternative Fuels Data Center, accessed
June 26, 2023 https://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_emissions.html
Diesel emissions are of particular concern for environmental outcomes. Many class 2b and 3
vehicles continue to be powered by diesel engines.79 Emissions from diesel engines have
detrimental impacts not only on human health, but on natural ecosystems as well. A study from
the University of Southampton demonstrated that exposure to diesel exhaust has negative
impacts on pollinators and that NOx emissions altered the smell of five out of the eleven most
common single compound floral odors.80 In areas where diesel exhaust is present, a 2022 study
found that there were 70% fewer pollinators and 90% fewer flower visits.81 A separate study
from the Journal of Environmental Health Science and Engineering suggests that prolonged
exposure to internal combustion engine exhaust has potentially significant impacts on agro-
ecosystems and plant germination.82 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 17]
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79 "2023 Trucks With Diesel Engines: Cleaner, Meaner Torque Monsters," MotorTrend, (May 1, 2023)
accessed June 26, 2023 https://www.motortrend.com/features/trucks-with-diesel-engines
80 "Diesel fumes alter half the flower smells bees need," University of Southampton, (October 19, 2015)
https://www.southampton.ac.uk/news/2015/10/diesel-fumes-alter-flower-smell-for-bees.page
81 James M.W. Ryalls, et. al., 'Anthropogenic air pollutants reduce insect-mediated pollination services',
Environmental Pollution, (March 15, 2022) https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.envpol.2022.118847
82 Afsharnia F, Moosavi SA. "Effects of diesel-engine exhaust emissions on seed germination and seedling
growth of Brassicaceae family using digital image analysis." (September 28, 2021)
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8617225/
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Many commenters (e.g., American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, American
Lung Association (ALA), National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA), Southern
Environmental Law Center (SELC), Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)) stressed
that climate change is a top public health priority and a public health emergency. These
commenters stated that climate change is endangering the public health and welfare of all
populations, including children, by increasing risks of heart disease, mental health, pollen
seasons, allergies, drought, frequent flooding, and other listed impacts. One of these commenters
stated that climate change also poses an increasing threat to America's national parks (National
Parks Conservation Association). These commenters stated that massive economic costs to
climate change and studies have found that the future costs will be unequally distributed across
the US. where, the geography and demographics of the South make the region particularly
vulnerable to climate change.
Many of the commenters identified a litany of harms associated with the on-going climate
crisis, and the light-duty sector's contribution to the GHG emissions which are driving that crisis.
Harms identified in the comments included:
¦ Worsening air quality (e.g., ACEEE, ALA, California Attorney General's Office,
Metropolitan Washington Air Quality Committee (MWAQC))
¦ — rise in vector borne disease (American Lung Association)
¦ — flooding, drought, excessive heat, wildfires (e.g., California Attorney General's Office,
Elders Climate Action, Institute for Policy Integrity at NYU School of Law, National
Parks Conservation Association (NPCA), Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use
Management (NESCAUM) and the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC), Southern
Environmental Law Center (SELC), Tesla, Inc.
¦ Adverse mental health implications (e.g., American Lung Association (ALA),
Environmental and Public Health Organizations Our Children's Trust)
¦ — impacts from sea level rise (e.g., National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA),
Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC))
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¦ — disproportionate impact on disadvantaged communities and children, both domestic and
worldwide (BlueGreen Alliance (BGA), Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC),
Our Children's Trust)
¦ —national security implications (Institute for Policy Integrity)
¦ Disastrous impacts on parks from invasive species and loss of glaciers, snowpack and ice
(National Parks Conservation Association)
Our Children's Trust also asserts that failure to manage, protect, and prevent substantial
impairment to the earth, air, and climate would violate the federal government's fiduciary
obligations under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and the Public Trust Doctrine. The
commenter also asserted that in this rule the Ninth Circuit's findings in Juliana v. United States,
947 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2020), on the federal government's role should guide EPA's
policies and practices so that EPA can identify, and alter, those policies that exacerbate
American youth's existing climate change injuries. Finally, the commenter argued that 1.5°C
presents significant risks to the planet when compared to 1°C, and that therefore the EPA should
not use a 1.5°C target to guide policy.
A few commentors assert that serious anthropogenic climate threats are inconsistent with
evidence (American Enterprise Institute). Arizona State Legislature stated that the proposed rule
is arbitrary and capricious because it fails to model and calculate the climate change impacts in
order to weigh the benefits against the costs and what they claim is the transformative nature of
the proposed rule. Without a showing that the rule will result in some type of quantifiable effect
to prevent climate harms, this commenter questions its legality, and asserted that EPA's
summary conclusion that the standards would contribute towards the goal is not good enough.
Response:
The EPA appreciates that many commenters are concerned about past, present, and future
climate change and the many impacts on human health and welfare that result from climate
change. The GHG reductions resulting from this rule will be a meaningful contribution to
slowing the rate of future climate change. Importantly, EPA has found in the record for this
rulemaking that the standards will reduce GHG emissions - almost 8 billion metric tons in net
CO2 equivalent cumulative emission reductions between 2027 and 2055. See preamble Section
VI and RIA Chapter 8, which provide more detail on these emissions estimates and how they
were calculated. This is a meaningful contribution, especially because it is due to one action, for
one sector, for one nation. See Coalition for Responsible Regulation, 684 F. 3d at 332 ("EPA
found that the emission standard would result in meaningful mitigation of greenhouse gas
emissions. For example, EPA estimated that the Rule would result in a reduction of about 960
million metric tons of C02e emission over the lifetime of the model year 2012-2016 vehicles
affected by the new standards.") Climate change is not expected to be solved by any single
action, but rather a large number of them. Moreover, as the Supreme Court recognized,
"Agencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory
swoop. And reducing domestic automobile emissions is hardly a tentative step." Massachusetts
v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007) . Thus, EPA disagrees with the commenters that EPA has
not provided a basis consistent with the requirements of CAA section 202(a)(l)-(2). See Section
3.3.1 of this RTC for response to comments regarding the stringency of the final rule relative to
the proposal.
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While EPA did not conduct additional climate modeling in support of this rulemaking, EPA is
not required to do so in setting the standards under CAA section 202(a)(l)-(2). See Coal. For
Resp. Regulation, 684 F. 3d at 128 (noting that EPA section 202(a)(1) authority is not
"conditioned on evidence of a particular level of mitigation" but rather that authority is triggered
by a showing of significant contribution, which was made in EPA's Endangerment Finding, and
that, as just quoted above, furthermore the record for the vehicle standards rule at issue included
an EPA estimate of the millions of tons that would be reduced by the rule). Indeed, CAA section
202(a)(l)-(2) does not require the agency to calculate the benefits of its rulemaking at all, and the
commenter failed to adduce any statutory authority or other legal basis for the proposition that
EPA must calculate benefits generally or specifically must model avoided temperature change or
sea level rise.
We also note that, for purposes of E.O. 12866, EPA has estimated the value of the benefits of
these reductions by applying the SC-GHG, which is a sufficient means of calculating benefits
and so makes it unnecessary to conduct any further climate modelling for that purpose. The
development of the SC-GHG involves the use of climate models in order to estimate the
damages of an additional ton of emissions and is therefore a reasonable approach that uses the
appropriate tool in benefit-cost analysis. When considering those monetized climate benefits, the
monetized benefits of the rule far exceed its costs. EPA's reliance on SC-GHG to assess the
climate benefits of this rulemaking is clearly reasonable. As we explain in preamble Section
VIII.E and RIA Chapter 6.2, the SC-GHG is based on a voluminous record, significant public
process, and the well-considered judgment of experts.
In response to Our Children's Trust, EPA follows applicable guidance and best practices
when conducting its benefit-cost analyses, including OMB Circular A-4 and EPA's Guidelines
for Preparing Economic Analyses. With respect to the application of discount rates, EPA notes
that we "use constant discount rates (1.5-percent, 2-percent, and 2.5-percent) similar to the near-
term Ramsey discount rates to calculate the present and annualized value of SC-GHGs for
internal consistency" (from the notes on Table VII-2 in the preamble for the final rule). That
approach to discounting follows the same approach that the February 2021 TSD recommends "to
ensure internal consistency—i.e., future damages from climate change using the SC-GHG at 2.5
percent should be discounted to the base year of the analysis using the same 2.5 percent rate."
EPA has also consulted the National Academies' 2017 recommendations on how SC-GHG
estimates can "be combined in RIAs with other cost and benefits estimates that may use different
discount rates." The National Academies reviewed "several options," including "presenting all
discount rate combinations of other costs and benefits with [SC-GHG] estimates." With regards
to Our Children's Trust criticism and assertions regarding a 1.5°C target, the EPA is setting
standards under Clean Air Act section 202(a)(l)-(2) as described in preamble sections I and II.
With regards to Our Children's Trust discussion of the unique vulnerability of children to climate
change, the EPA does recognize these vulnerabilities (see, e.g., the EPA report Climate Change
Impacts on Children's Health and Weil-Being in the U.S.), and the emissions reductions resulting
from this rule will make an important contribution to efforts to limit climate change and its
anticipated impacts to children relative to a future without this rule. The Agency does not dispute
that climate change poses a serious threat, nor that addressing climate change requires the active
involvement of the federal government. With regard to commenters' novel Constitutional and
Public Trust legal theories, see Section 2.3 of the RTC for our response.
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EPA follows applicable guidance and best practices when conducting its benefit-cost
analyses, including OMB Circular A-4 and EPA's Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses.
With respect to the application of discount rates, EPA notes that it used the same discount rate as
the rate used to discount the value of damages from future GHG emissions, for internal
consistency. That approach to discounting follows the same approach that the February 2021
TSD recommends "to ensure internal consistency—i.e., future damages from climate change
using the SC-GHG at 2.5 percent should be discounted to the base year of the analysis using the
same 2.5 percent rate." EPA has also consulted the National Academies' 2017 recommendations
on how SC-GHG estimates can "be combined in RIAs with other cost and benefits estimates that
may use different discount rates." The National Academies reviewed "several options," including
"presenting all discount rate combinations of other costs and benefits with [SC-GHG] estimates."
11 - Criteria and air toxics pollutants
11.1 - General comments
Comments by Organizations
Organization: A. Longo
Moreover, it is important to critically evaluate the direct correlation between these proposed
regulations and substantial improvements in health conditions. While reducing emissions can
have positive effects on respiratory health, it is essential to acknowledge that multiple factors
influence overall health outcomes. A systematic review published in The Lancet Planetary
Health journal analyzed various studies on air pollution and health outcomes. The review found
that while reductions in air pollution are associated with improvements in health, the relationship
between specific regulatory measures and health outcomes is complex and context-dependent
[3], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0517, pp. 1-2]
3 Fuller, Richard., et al. (2020). " Pollution and Health: a progress update." The Lancet Planetary Health,
4(6), e258-e269. Retrieved from
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542- 5 196(22)00090-0/fulltext
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
7. Environmental Justice Considerations
We agree with EPA that a reduction in heavy aromatics in gasoline will produce beneficial
reductions in PM emissions that will further national environmental justice goals. EPA notes in
the NPRM that people living and working near roadways will benefit from fuel improvements
that reduce PM formation, that those individuals are more likely to be people of color and/or
have a low socioeconomic status (SES), and that lower-SES neighborhoods are likely to have
more vehicles with higher emissions than higher-SES neighborhoods.442 A fuel-based
regulation to reduce PM emissions would do so for all vehicles in the on-road fleet. Importantly,
the greatest absolute emissions reductions will occur in and benefit lower-SES communities, as
those communities are more likely to have the highest-emitting vehicles, i.e., a higher proportion
of older vehicles with the highest emissions levels (due to their vehicle's age). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 270-271]
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Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
As previously mentioned, EPA did not fully consider the impact of the rule on fleet turnover.
The Agency is aware that the higher purchase price of new ZEVs will keep older cars and trucks
on the road longer and that new ZEVs will increase particulate matter ("PM") emissions through
increased tire and road wear. In another example of EPA's biased analysis, EPA estimated the
value of health benefits from reductions in PM2.5 emissions by multiplying PM2.5-related
benefit-per-ton ("BPT") values by the annual reduction in tons of directly emitted PM2.5 and
PM2.5 precursor emissions (NOx and S02) from displaced ICEVs.206 However, EPA ignored
the fleet turnover benefit that would result from replacing older ICEVs with new, more efficient,
ICEVs.
EPA also ignored its own National Emissions Inventory, which shows that roadway dust
contributes more PM2.5 emissions than the tailpipe. Roadway dust emissions, including particles
from tire wear, are correlated with vehicle weight, so increases in fleet average vehicle weight
would be expected to increase roadway dust PM2.5 emissions.207 Converting ICEs to ZEVs
under the Proposal would significantly increase the average vehicle weight on U.S. roadways,
which in turn would increase the entrained road dust emissions. Yet EPA did not include these
PM sources or increases in the analysis. There also exist overall medium-duty truck weight
restrictions, which could require a greater number of ZEVs to move the same tonnage of cargo,
thus increasing the number of vehicles needed to haul the same amount of freight, vehicle miles
traveled, and resulting PM emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 45]
206 DRIA at 7-36.
207 EPA, "2020 National Emissions Inventory (NEI) Data," available at https://www.epa.gov/air-
emissions- inventories/2020-national-emissions-inventory-nei-data.
Those emissions are significant and may offset or eliminate the benefits that EPA calculates.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 45]
Organization: American Lung Association (ALA) et al.
The American Lung Association's most recent "State of the Air" report noted that
approximately 120 million Americans live in communities impacted by unhealthy levels of
ozone and/or particle pollution. 1 Exposure to air pollution can contribute to asthma attacks, heart
attacks and stroke, lung cancer, low birthweight and premature birth, premature death and other
health risks. Traffic pollution specifically is associated with premature death due to
cardiovascular disease, lung cancer death, asthma onset in children and adults and other negative
outcomes.2 The burdens of air pollution are not equally shared: people of color make up the
majority of those living in the communities with unhealthy air and a person of color in the
United States is 3.7 times more likely to live in a community with the worst air pollution in the
nation than a white person. . [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0745, p. 1]
1 American Lung Association. State of the Air 2023. April 2023. www.lung.org/sota
2 Health Effects Institute. "Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Selected Health Effects of Long-Term
Exposure to Traffic-Related Air Pollution." Special Report 23: 2022
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Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Despite significant progress reducing air pollution, California experiences some of the
nation's poorest air quality, with more than 21 million Californians living in areas that exceed
federal ozone standards. 3 Within these areas, there are many low-income and disadvantaged
communities that are exposed to not only ozone, but also to particulate and toxic pollutant levels
that are significantly higher than applicable federal standards and which have immediate and
detrimental health effects. With new research demonstrating adverse health impacts even below
NAAQS levels, it remains critically important to continue to reduce emissions wherever feasible.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 8]
3 California Air Resources Board (CARB). 2022 State Strategy for the State Implementation Plan. October
2021.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/2022-08/2022_State_SIP_Strategy.pdf
In addition to ongoing air quality challenges, California is on the front lines of climate
change. With the increasing severity and frequency of drought, wildfire, extreme heat, and other
impacts, Californians need only look out their windows to know that climate change is real and
rapidly getting worse. 4 The impacts we thought we would see in the decades to come are
happening now and, as with air pollution, are disproportionately affecting low-income
communities and communities of color. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 8]
4 CARB. 2022 Scoping Plan for Achieving Carbon Neutrality. December 2022.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/2022-sp.pdf.
The Proposal Will Protect Public Health
Reducing motor vehicle pollution is imperative to protect public health. U.S. EPA's proposed
emission standards, or a stronger version, would effectively reduce both GHGs and criteria
pollutants like PM, leading to a wide array of vital public health benefits. While U.S. EPA has
comprehensively summarized the potential public health benefits of its proposal, CARB finds
that there are additional public health benefits that go beyond those described. CARB has
summarized its findings and notes that were U.S. EPA to include this information it would better
encompass the tremendous potential benefits resulting from the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, p. 52]
Health Risk from Respiratory Infections like COVID
Exposure to elevated pollution levels is not only linked to worsening respiratory and
cardiovascular diseases but also to increased vulnerability to illnesses. The recent COVID-19
pandemic raised new concerns about air pollution increasing the disproportionate burden of
infectious illnesses, particularly among vulnerable communities of color because of higher PM
exposures in their neighborhoods. U.S. EPA's 2022 Supplement to the 2019 PM ISA briefly
described multiple recent studies in this area. CARB's recently funded research has also
demonstrated the link between chronic exposure to elevated PM2.5 levels and increased cases of
premature death and illness from COVID-19 in the State. 95, 96 For instance, English et al.
(2022) determined that if all areas of California had PM2.5 levels below the 2022 PM2.5
NAAQS of 12.0 |ig/m3, a total of 4,250 COVID-19 deaths could have been prevented during the
period of this study. 97 CARB recommends that U.S. EPA add a discussion specifically about
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the benefits of improving air quality to reducing risks for infectious respiratory diseases,
especially in the wake of the COVID pandemic [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 53-54],
95 English PB, Von Behren J, Balmes JR, Boscardin J, Carpenter C, Goldberg DE, Horiuchi S, Richardson
M, Solomon G, Valle J, Reynolds P. Association between long-term exposure to particulate air pollution
with SARS- CoV-2 infections and COVID-19 deaths in California, U.S.A. Environ Adv. 2022
Oct;9:100270. doi: 10.1016/j.envadv.2022.100270. Epub 2022 Jul 26. PMID: 35912397; PMCID:
PMC9316717.
96 Jerrett M, Nau CL, Young DR, Butler RK, Batteate CM, Su J, Burnett RT, Kleeman MJ. Air pollution
and meteorology as risk factors for COVID-19 death in a cohort from Southern California. Environ Int.
2023 Jan; 171:107675. doi: 10.1016/j.envint.2022.107675.
97 See English et al. 2022 p. 8
Disproportionate impact of exposure to Traffic-Related Air Pollution (TRAP)
While U.S. EPA conducted an extensive literature review on disparities in exposure to TRAP
across U.S. populations, CARB has identified several national studies and a series of California
studies that enrich the existing literature already documented by U.S. EPA for the proposed
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 56-57]
A recent nationwide study reported that people of color experience disproportionate exposures
to PM2.5. 103 The study found that the systemic PM2.5 exposure disparity experienced by
people of color is related to emission sources from almost all major emission categories. The
largest sources of the disparities are industry, light-duty gasoline vehicles, construction, and
heavy-duty diesel vehicles. Moreover, the disproportionate exposures have been seen in
individual U.S. states, in individual urban and rural areas, across incomes, and across exposure
levels. Another national study showed that zip codes with more White and Native American
populations have lower average PM2.5 levels than ZIP codes with more Black, Asian, and
Hispanic or Latino populations. 104 The disparities in PM2.5 exposure is also shown in zip
codes with low-income populations compared to zip codes with high-income populations.
Moreover, people of color in the U.S. not only face longer-term PM2.5 exposure but also short-
term PM2.5 exposure (e.g., more days with PM2.5 concentrations above the thresholds) than
non-Hispanic Whites. 105 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 56-57]
103 Tessum CW, PaolellaDA, Chambliss SE, Apte JS, Hill JD, Marshall JD. PM2.5 polluters
disproportionately and systemically affect people of color in the United States. Sci Adv. 2021 Apr
28;7(18):eabf4491.
104 Jbaily A, Zhou X, Liu J, Lee TH, Kamareddine L, Verguet S, Dominici F. Air pollution exposure
disparities across US population and income groups. Nature. 2022 Jan;601(7892):228-233.
105 Collins TW, Grineski SE. Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Short-Term PM2.5 Air Pollution Exposures in
the United States. Environ Health Perspect. 2022 Aug;130(8):87701.
Environmental pollutants affect children more than adults, and children in low-income and
urban areas near industrial, rail, and traffic sources face particularly high health risks. Results
from CARB's groundbreaking, long-term children's health study in Southern California
demonstrated that particle pollution may significantly reduce lung function growth in children
106, 107, 108 and indicates these effects are likely permanent. 109 Additionally, increased
exposure to vehicular traffic pollution was associated with adverse childhood health impacts,
including slower lung development, 110 increased symptoms and medication use in asthmatic
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children, 111, 112 and increases in the development of asthma in children. 113 Compared with
non-Hispanic White children, the cohort's Hispanic White children, especially those with more
Native American ancestry, tended to live closer to a freeway or a major nonfreeway road.
Furthermore, a higher percentage of asthma was observed among the Hispanic White children
with more than 50 percent Native American ancestry who lived near a major nonfreeway road
compared to those who lived farther away. 114 CARB is submitting these studies to U.S. EPA to
further demonstrate the increased impacts on vulnerable populations from TRAP, pointing to the
urgent need to adopt more stringent emission standards to protect these groups. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, pp. 56-57]
106 Peters JM, Avol E, Gauderman WJ, Linn WS, Navidi W, London SJ, Margolis H, Rappaport E, Vora
H, Gong H Jr, Thomas DC. A study of twelve Southern California communities with differing levels and
types of air pollution. II. Effects on pulmonary function. Am J Respir Crit Care Med. 1999
Mar;159(3):768-75.
107 Avol EL, Gauderman WJ, Tan SM, London SJ, Peters JM. Respiratory effects of relocating to areas of
differing air pollution levels. Am J Respir Crit Care Med. 2001 Dec l;164(ll):2067-72.
108 Gauderman WJ, Gilliland GF, Vora H, Avol E, Stram D, McConnell R, Thomas D, Lurmann F,
Margolis HG, Rappaport EB, Berhane K, Peters JM. Association between air pollution and lung function
growth in southern California children: results from a second cohort. Am J Respir Crit Care Med. 2002 Jul
l;166(l):76-84.
109 Gauderman WJ, Avol E, Gilliland F, Vora H, Thomas D, Berhane K, McConnell R, Kuenzli N,
Lurmann F, Rappaport E, Margolis H, Bates D, Peters J. The effect of air pollution on lung development
from 10 to 18 years of age. N Engl J Med. 2004 Sep 9;351(11): 1057-67.
110 Gauderman WJ, Vora H, McConnell R, Berhane K, Gilliland F, Thomas D, Lurmann F, Avol E,
Kunzli N, Jerrett M, Peters J. Effect of exposure to traffic on lung development from 10 to 18 years of age:
a cohort study. Lancet. 2007 Feb 17;369(9561):571-7.
111 Gauderman WJ, Avol E, Lurmann F, Kuenzli N, Gilliland F, Peters J, McConnell R. Childhood asthma
and exposure to traffic and nitrogen dioxide. Epidemiology. 2005 Nov;16(6):737-43.
112 See McConnell et al. 2006
113 See McConnell et al. 2010
114 Weaver GM, Gauderman WJ. Traffic-Related Pollutants: Exposure and Health Effects Among
Hispanic Children. Am J Epidemiol. 2018 Jan l;187(l):45-52.
CalEnviroScreen 4.0 is a screening tool developed by the California Office of Environmental
Health Hazard Assessment to help identify California communities that are disproportionately
burdened by multiple sources of pollution and socioeconomic indicators. Approximately 95
percent of the census tracts in this community are in the top 25 percent (75-100th percentile) of
the CalEnviroScreen 4.0 120 (CES) scores within the State. The maximum overall CES score for
any census tract in the community is the 99th percentile, which means that people living in that
census tract are in the top 1 percent of the most impacted census tracts in the State. Most of the
census tracts in this community are considered disadvantaged under California law. 121 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
120 The Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) released the California
Communities Environmental Health Screening Tool: CalEnviroScreen 4.0 in October 2021.
https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/calenviroscreen/report/calenviroscreen40reportf2021.pdf
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121 Disadvantaged community designations per Senate Bill (SB) 535 (De Leon, Chapter 830, Statutes of
2012).
Table 4 and Table 5 present the number of census tracts in the community that are in the top
25 percent (75-100th percentile) of impacted tracts in the State, as well as the maximum
percentile for exposure (e.g., ozone, PM2.5, diesel PM, traffic impacts), health status (asthma,
cardiovascular disease, low birth weight), and socio-economic (education, linguistic isolation,
poverty, unemployment, and housing burden) indicators for the census tracts in this community.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
Table 4. CalEnviroScreen (CES) 4.0 Overall Score in the East LA/Boyle Heights/West
Commerce Community
CES 4.0 Overall Score: CES Score
Number of Census Tracts with Highest CES Scores (Top 25%, 75-100th Percentile): 51
Percent of Census Tracts with Highest CES Scores (Top 25%, 75-100th Percentile): 91%
Maximum Percentile in Community: 99.9 - (122)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
122 The percentages for the overall CES 4.0 score represent the number of census tracts in this community
that are considered "disadvantaged" per SB 535 (75th percentile or top 25% of all census tracts in the State)
[See original for table titled "Table 5. CalEnviroScreen (CES) 4.0 Scores for Key Exposure,
Health, and Socio-Economic Indicators in the East LA/Boyle Heights/West Commerce
Community"] 123 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
123 The percentages for the individual CES 4.0 metrics present the number of census tracts in the
community that are in the top 25 percent of census tracts for a given indicator.
Figure 6 compares the average scores for exposure (e.g., ozone, PM2.5 concentrations, diesel
PM emissions, traffic impacts), health status (asthma, cardiovascular disease, low birth weight),
and socio-economic (education, linguistic isolation, poverty, unemployment, and housing
burden) indicators in the community against statewide averages—the community scores for these
key indicators are generally higher compared to the statewide averages. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp.60-64]
[See original for graph titled "Figure 6. CalEnviroScreen 4.0 Scores for Key Indicators in the
East LA/Boyle Heights/West Commerce Community Relative to Statewide Averages"] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
The indicators discussed above also explain the disparate effects of air pollution faced by
other communities in California, which extends to numerous other communities across the
nation. Figure 7 presents the average scores for PM2.5 concentrations and diesel PM emissions
relative to statewide averages for a few communities across the State; vehicle emissions
contribute predominantly to the particulate matter and diesel PM impacts in these communities.
The chart includes asthma-related emergency room visits and linguistic isolation (i.e., limited
English speaking) as proxies for demographic and socio-economic disadvantages faced by these
communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
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[See original for graph titled "Figure 7. CalEnviroScreen 4.0 Scores for PM2.5 Concentration,
Diesel PM Emissions, and Socio-economic Indicators in California Communities"] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
Many California communities experience significantly higher levels of both regional and
near-source air pollution, and the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of these
communities exacerbate their susceptibility and vulnerability to the adverse effects of air
pollution. A 2019 CARB research study revealed on-road vehicles and industrial activity to be
the top two sources of exposure in California, each contributing to 24 percent of the total PM2.5
exposure, and disproportionately impacting non-white and low-income populations. 124 Existing
scientific literature conclusively links air pollution to adverse health outcomes, including pre-
mature mortality, and the disproportionate pollution and health burden on poor and socially
disadvantaged communities. OEHHA's CES 4.0 report provides an exhaustive review of existing
literature connecting each of the indicators used in the CES method to pollution burden and
population sensitivities. 125 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-64]
124 Apte J. et al (2019). A Method to Prioritize Sources for Reducing High PM2.5 Exposures in
Environmental Justice Communities in California. CARB Research Contract Number 17RD006.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/classic//research/apr/past/17rd006.pdf
125 OEHHA CES 4.0 Report. October 2021. pp. 29-197.
https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/calenviroscreen/report/calenviroscreen40reportf2021.pdf
The East LA, Boyle Heights, West Commerce community is just one example of many such
communities across the nation that bear the consequences of near-roadway emissions, in addition
to impacts from other sources of air pollution in their neighborhoods. For these communities,
reducing emissions from on-road vehicles is a priority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 60-
64]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
Strong emissions standards are necessary now to stave off the worst impacts of human-
induced climate change and to confront inequitably distributed threats to public health and the
environment from climate change as well as other forms of pollution. From extreme heat to
wildfires to drought, our States and Cities are already experiencing the devastating impacts of
climate change, which will continue to mount and compound with rising concentrations of GHGs
in the atmosphere. Moreover, vehicle emissions of oxides of nitrogen (NOx), particulate matter
(PM), and other criteria pollutants continue to endanger the health and welfare of our
residents. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 1]
B. Public Health Challenges and Poor Air Quality
Our States and Cities also face public health challenges caused by emissions of criteria
pollutants and air toxics, such as fine particulate matter ("PM2.5"), nitrogen oxides ("NOx"), and
non- methane organic gases ("NMOG").81 While our States and Cities are committed to
reducing emissions of these harmful air pollutants,82 among other actions, federal involvement
is necessary to help States attain the National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS")83 and
to reduce emissions that are outside of our control. EPA's proposed PM and NMOG+NOx
emissions standards will significantly reduce emissions of harmful air pollutants from new motor
vehicles sold nationwide, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,257-58, and these reductions are critical to our
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States and Cities' ability to meet our public health and environmental justice goals as well as to
protect our residents. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 10-12]
81 See, e.g., Lake Michigan Air Directors Consortium, Attainment Demonstration Modeling for the 2015
Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard: Technical Support Document (Sep. 21, 2022), available at
https://www.ladco.org/wp-
content/uploads/Projects/Ozone/ModerateTSD/LADCO_2015O3_ModerateNAASIP_TSD_21Sep2022.p
df ("Onroad mobile non-diesel sources are the largest contributor to ozone in all of Wisconsin's remaining
2015 ozone NAAQS nonattainment areas."); EPA, Current Nonattainment Counties for All Criteria
Pollutants (May 31, 2023), available at https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/ancl.html (listing 19 of
the 67 counties in Pennsylvania as nonattainment areas); EPA, 8-Hour Ozone (2008) Nonattainment Areas
(May 31, 2023), available at https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/hnc.html (listing New York,
northern New Jersey, and Long Island area as Severe 15 for 8-hour ozone nonattainment); NYC.gov,
Environment and Health Data Portal, available at https://a816- dohbesp.nyc.gov/IndicatorPublic/beta/data-
explorer/health-impacts-of-air- pollution/?id=2122#display=summary (last accessed Jul. 3, 2023) (tracking
asthma emergency department visits due to ozone).
82 E.g., Washington Department of Ecology, Clean Fuel Standard, available at https://ecology.wa.gov/Air-
Climate/Reducing-Greenhouse-Gas-Emissions/Clean-Fuel-Standard (last accessed Jun. 30, 2023).
83 E.g., California Air Resources Board, Revised Draft 2020 Mobile Source Strategy (Apr. 23, 2021), at
14, 68, available at https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
04/Revised_Draft_2020_Mobile_Source_Strategy.pdf.
1. Particulate Matter, Nitrogen Oxides, and Ozone Pollution Negatively Impact Human
Health
The transportation sector is one of the largest sources of emissions of PM2.5, NOx, and other
harmful air pollutants in the United States.84 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,186 ("Light- and medium-duty
vehicles will account for approximately 20 percent, 19 percent, and 41 percent of 2023 mobile
source NOx, PM2.5, and VOC emissions, respectively.").85 In some states and urban areas,
mobile sources are the primary contributors of emissions of these harmful air pollutants.86 EPA
projects that its standards will significantly reduce emissions of PM in addition to NOx and
NMOGs, both of which contribute to ozone formation. Id. at 29,198, 29,344, 29,351. These
reductions are crucial to avoid the serious adverse health consequences associated with these
pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 12-13]
84 Calvin A. Arter, et al., Mortality-based damages per ton due to the on-road mobile sector in the
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic U.S. by region, vehicle class and precursor, 16 ENVIRONMENTAL
RESEARCH LETTERS 1-2, 5 (June 2021), available at https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abf60b ("The
mobile source sector remains one of the largest contributors to PM2.5 and 03 [ozone] globally and in the
U.S."); 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,214 ("The primary source of N02 is motor vehicle emissions ").
85 Volatile organic compounds (VOCs) are certain carbon compounds "which participate [] in atmospheric
photochemical reactions," 40 CFR § 51.100(s), and include several NMOGs.
86 See, e.g., Vermont Department of Environmental Conservation, Agency of Natural Resources, Mobile
Sources, available at https://dec.vermont.gov/air-quality/mobile-sources (onroad mobile sources contribute
49% of the NOx emissions in Vermont); California Air Resources Board, 2020 Mobile Source Strategy
(Oct. 28, 2021), at 19-20, available at https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
12/2020_Mobile_Source_Strategy.pdf ("Every year, over 5,000 premature deaths and hundreds of illnesses
and emergency room visits for respiratory and cardiovascular disease in California are linked to PM2.5
pollution, of which more than half is produced by mobile sources.").
Specifically, exposure to PM2.5 is causally related to premature mortality87 and
cardiovascular impacts; consistently associated with asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary
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disease exacerbation; and associated with birth outcomes, such as low birth weight and fetal
growth outcomes.88 Exposure to NOx is causally related to asthma exacerbation; likely causally
related to respiratory effects; and possibly causally related to cardiovascular effects, mortality,
diabetes, cancer, and birth defects. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,214. Exposure to ozone is causally related
to respiratory effects, including lung function decrements, pulmonary inflammation,
exacerbation of asthma, respiratory-related hospital admissions, and mortality; likely causally
related to metabolic effects and complications due to diabetes; and possibly causally related to
cardiovascular effects and central nervous system effects. Id. at 29,213-14. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, pp. 12-13]
87 Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Fossil fuel air pollution responsible for 1 in 5 deaths
worldwide (Feb. 9, 2021), available at https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/c-change/news/fossil-fuel-
air- pollution-responsible-for-l-in-5-deaths-worldwide/ ("[RJesearchers [were able] to directly attribute
premature deaths from fine particulate pollution (PM2.5) to fossil fuel combustion") (citing Karn Vohra, et
al., Global mortality from outdoor fine particle pollution generated by fossil fuel combustion: Results from
GEOS-Chem, 195 ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH (Apr. 2021)); Arter, supra n. 84, at 5 ("The largest
source of both PM2.5 and 03 [ozone]-attributable premature mortalities are LDT [light-duty trucks] at 1234
and 1229 mortalities, respectively. LDT PPM emissions are responsible for 46% of PM2.5 mortalities, and
LDT NOx emissions are responsible for 80% of 03 [ozone] mortalities.")
88 See Comment of California Air Resources Board on "Proposed Rule for National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for Particulate Matter" (Jun. 29, 2020), EPA-HQ-OAR-2015-0072-0975.
2. Air Toxics Threaten Public Health
EPA projects that its standards would result in the reduction of emissions of air toxics. 88
Fed. Reg. at 29,199, 29,359. These reductions will also benefit public health and welfare, given
the link between toxic air pollutants and cancer and other serious health effects. Id. at 29,216
("Light- and medium-duty engine emissions contribute to ambient levels of air toxics that are
known or suspected human or animal carcinogens, or that have noncancer health effects."); 72
Fed. Reg. 8,428, 8,430 (Feb. 26, 2007). Of all the outdoor air toxics, benzene contributes the
most to nationwide cancer risk, and most of the nation's benzene emissions come from mobile
sources. Id. at 8,432. In New Jersey, for example, mobile sources are the largest contributors of
air toxics emissions and responsible for over 50% of the state's ambient benzene. 89 In
Allegheny County in Pennsylvania, mobile sources account for over 9% of the estimated cancer
risk from hazardous air pollutants, largely due to gasoline-powered vehicles.90 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, p. 13]
89 New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 2021 New Jersey Air Quality Report (Sep. 2022),
at 10-1, 10-10, available at https://www.nj.gov/dep/airmon/pdf/2021-nj-aq-report.pdf.
90 Cancer & Environment Network of Southwestern Pennsylvania and Clean Air Task Force, National Air
Toxics Assessment and Cancer Risk in Allegheny County Pennsylvania (updated May 2021),
https://www.catf.us/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/NATAFactsheet- Final-May-2021 .pdf.
3. Criteria Pollutant and Air Toxics Emissions from Light- and Medium-Duty Vehicles
Disproportionately Impact Environmental Justice Communities
Criteria pollutant emissions from light- and medium-duty vehicles disproportionately
endanger residents of environmental justice communities by exposing them to harmful air
pollution that causes significant health impacts. Light- and medium-duty vehicles' emissions are
concentrated along transportation corridors. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,396. Aggravating historical
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injustices, decision-makers disproportionately site highways and other transportation
infrastructure in lower-income communities and communities of color. The burden of vehicle
emissions therefore falls inequitably on environmental justice communities, which also face
industrial pollution cumulatively with vehicle emissions.91 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746,
pp.13-15]
91 See, e.g., EPA, Estimation of Population Size and Demographic Characteristics among People Living
Near Truck Routes in the Coterminous United States (Feb. 16, 2022), EPA-HQ-OAR-2019-0055-0982, at
11-12, Fig. 3, 17-19, Fig. 9 (finding that individuals living near major truck routes are more likely to be
people of color and lower-income); see also Michelle Meyer and Tim Dallmann, The Real Urban
Emissions Initiative, Air quality and health impacts of diesel truck emissions in New York City and policy
implications (2022), at 7 Fig. 5 (concluding that Black and Latino individuals in New York City are
disproportionately exposed to PM2.5 along freight corridors); Gaige Hunter Kerr, et al., COVID-19
Pandemic Reveals Persistent Disparities in Nitrogen Dioxide Pollution, 118 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
SCIENCES 30 (2021); Mary Angelique G. Demetillo, et al. Space-Based Observational Constraints on
N02 Air Pollution Inequality from Diesel Traffic in Major US Cities, GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH
LETTERS 48 (2021); Paul Allen, et al., Newark Community Impacts of Mobile Source Emissions: A
Community- Based Participatory Research Analysis (2020); Maria Cecilia Pinto de Moura, et al., Union of
Concerned Scientists, Inequitable Exposure to Air Pollution from Vehicles in Massachusetts (2019); Iyad
Kheirbek, et al., The Contribution of Motor Vehicle Emissions to Ambient Fine Particulate Matter Public
Health Impacts in New York City: a Health Burden Assessment, 15 ENV'T HEALTH 89 (2016).
For example, EPA modeling has shown that race and income are significantly associated with
living near major roadways nationally, even when controlling for other factors.92 EPA research
has also indicated that people of color are more likely to live within 300 feet of major
transportation facilities and go to school within 200 meters of the largest roadways. 93
Environmental justice communities bear the effects of these land use patterns. In the Northeast
and Mid-Atlantic Region, average concentrations of exposures to PM2.5 are 75%, 73%, and 61%
higher for Latinx residents, Asian-American residents, and African American residents,
respectively, than they are for white residents.94 PM2.5 and N02 concentrations are also highest
for Black and Latinx communities in Massachusetts, in part because of their proximity to
industrial facilities and highways, and these concentrations have increased over time even though
overall exposure to those pollutants has decreased in the Commonwealth.95 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, pp. 13-15]
92 EPA, Estimation of Population Size and Demographic Characteristics among People Living Near Truck
Routes in the Coterminous United States, supra n. 91, at 20-24.
93 Chad Bailey, EPA, Demographic and Social Patterns in Housing Units Near Large Highways and other
Transportation Sources (2011), EPA-HQ-OAR-2019-0055-0126, at 3.
94 Union of Concerned Scientists, Inequitable Exposure to Air Pollution from Vehicles in the Northeast
and Mid-Atlantic (2019), available at https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2019/06/Inequitable-
Exposure-to-Vehicle-Pollution- Northeast-Mid-Atlantic-Region.pdf.
95 Office of Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey, COVID-19's Unequal Effects in
Massachusetts (2020), at 5, available at https://www.mass.gov/doc/covid-19s-unequal-effects-in-
massachusetts/download.
More granular data from California fully illustrate this phenomenon. The census tracts in
California with the highest levels of exposure to ozone, PM2.5, and air toxics like diesel
particulate matter are communities of color bordering major transportation corridors—Highway
99 in the San Joaquin Valley and Highways 10 and 60 in the Inland Empire: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, pp. 13-15]
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Census Tracts in California with Highest Levels of Ozone, PM2.5, and Diesel PM Exposure
96
Census Tract
Location
People of Color
Ozone PM2.5
Diesel PM
6065041408
Riverside
78.1%
91st
92nd
97th
6071002109
Ontario
73.2%
91st
96th
93rd
6071003301
Fontana
91.6%
97th
93rd
94th
6065040303
Jurupa Valley
79.3%
95th
94th
97th
6029003113
Bakersfield
80.4%
94th
100th
96th
6029001801
Bakersfield
57.3%
94th
100th
95th
6029002812
Bakersfield
72.5%
94th
100th
96th
6029002813
Bakersfield
76.6%
94th
100th
95th
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 13-15]
96 Data from CalEnviroScreen 4.0, California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment,
available at https://oehha.ca.gov/calenviroscreen/report/calenviroscreen-40. Metrics for ozone, PM2.5, and
diesel particulate matter exposure are the census tract's percentile ranking as compared to all census tracts
in California, demonstrating that these census tracts are among those with the greatest pollution exposure
statewide. The raw data for these percentile rankings are available on the CalEnviroScreen 4.0 website. The
eight census tracts shown here are examples of the 29 census tracts in California that rank above the 90th
percentile statewide for exposure to ozone, fine particulate matter, and diesel particulate matter, all of
which are communities in Bakersfield or the Inland Empire near major transportation thoroughfares.
Refineries, drilling sites, and other upstream sources of emissions are also disproportionately
located in or near environmental justice communities.97 These facilities routinely emit dozens of
toxic air contaminants, such as formaldehyde and benzene, and can cause accidental releases of
air toxics that require emergency response. 98 Many of these upstream emissions sources also
release other pollution, such as water contaminants.99 Residents of communities near these sites
tend to have higher rates of health problems, such as cancers, chronic disease, and adverse birth
outcomes, even after accounting for other demographic factors. 100 As with transportation
corridors, census tract-level data from California demonstrate these concerns. For example, the
census tracts near the California refinery with the largest output (the Marathon Refinery in
Carson)101 are overwhelmingly communities of color with high cumulative pollution burdens
and adverse health outcomes: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 15-16]
97 James Boyce & Manuel Pastor, Clearing the air: incorporating air quality and environmental justice into
climate policy, 120 CLIMATIC CHANGE 801 (2013).
98 Karen Riveles & AlyssaNagai, Analysis of Refinery Chemical Emissions and Health Effects, California
Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (2019), available at
https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/faqs/refinerychemicalsreport032019.pdf.
99 Louisa Markow, et al., Oil's Unchecked Outfalls: Water Pollution from Refineries and EPA's Failure to
Enforce the Clean Water Act, Environmental Integrity Project (2023), available at
https://environmentalintegrity.Org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Oils-Unchecked-Outfalls-03.06.2023.pdf.
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100 Jill Johnston & Lara Cushing, Chemical exposures, health and environmental justice in communities
living on the fenceline of industry, 7 CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH REPORTS 48 (2020);
Stephen Williams, et al., Proximity to Oil Refineries and Risk of Cancer: A Population-Based Analysis, 4
JNCI CANCER SPECTRUM 6 (2020).
101 California Energy Commission, California's Oil Refineries, available at
https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/californias-petroleum-market/californias-oil-
refineries (data as of Feb. 7, 2023).
Census Tracts near the Marathon Refinery in Carson, California 102
Census Tract People of Color Pollution Toxic
Releases
Asthma
Heart Disease
6037294120
98.0%
93rd
99th
83rd
93rd
6037543306
92.4%
96th
99th
57th
52nd
6037543905
97.2%
84th
99th
72nd
77th
6037294110
90.5%
88th
99th
75th
83rd
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 15-16]
102 Data from CalEnviroScreen 4.0, supra n.96. Metrics for overall pollution burden, toxic releases,
asthma, and heart disease are the census tract's percentile ranking as compared to all census tracts in
California, demonstrating that these census tracts are among those with the greatest pollution exposure and
detrimental health impacts statewide.
Accordingly, achieving emissions reductions from light- and medium-duty vehicles is a
critical step to begin dismantling historical patterns of environmental injustice burdening
communities near transportation infrastructure and upstream emissions sources. See CARB's
Comment at 84- 96. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 15-16]
2. Reductions in Criteria and Air Toxic Pollution Are Urgently Needed to Protect Public
Health and Welfare
EPA's Proposal will advance another important, urgent objective of our States and Cities and
of Congress: reductions in criteria and toxic air pollution. GHG reductions mitigate the public
health harms from other pollutants, because "[i]n a warmer future world, stagnant air, coupled
with higher temperatures and absolute humidity, will lead to worse air quality even if air
pollution emissions remain the same."174 Additionally, the Proposal's tightened standards for
criteria and toxics pollution will directly aid our States and Cities in attaining and maintaining
NAAQS for criteria pollutants, securing better health and welfare outcomes for their residents,
and promoting environmental justice in their communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp.
29-31]
174 Nat'l Research Council, Advancing the Science of Climate Change (2010) at 326, available at
http://nap.edu/12782.
a. More stringent standards will help protect public health and support NAAQS
attainment
Various locations throughout our States and Cities have been unable to attain, or face
difficulty maintaining, the NAAQS—designed to protect public health—for ozone and
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PM2.5.175 42 U.S.C.§ 7409(b). For example, multiple counties in California are registering
serious, severe, or extreme nonattainment with the 8-Hour Ozone NAAQS. As EPA notes, the
two major precursors of ozone are NOx and volatile organic compounds ("VOCs"). 88 Fed. Reg.
at 29,210. The proposed standards would cut NOx emissions from light- and medium-duty
vehicles by 41% and VOC emissions by 50% by 2055, while the Alternative 1 standards would
cut these emissions by 44% and 55%, respectively. Id. at 29,198, 29,204. These major reductions
are crucial to helping States attain and maintain the ozone NAAQS. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0746, pp. 29-31]
175 EPA, Current Nonattainment Counties for All Criteria Pollutants, supra n. 81 (providing NAAQS
compliance status of all counties); CARB, Criteria Pollutant Emission Reductions from California's Zero-
Emission Vehicle Standards for Model Years 2017-2025 (Jul. 6, 2021), at 5, App. A to Comments of States
and Cities in Support of EPA Reversing Its SAFE 1 Actions.
While California has adopted stringent emission standards for ozone precursors for vehicles
sold in-state, federal standards will further reduce ozone impacts from vehicles sold out of state
that travel into California. Reductions in ozone due to the proposed standards would thus provide
critical clean air benefits to these locations. Nonattainment areas outside of California will
experience similar benefits. For example, more stringent standards may result in a reduction of
ozone precursors in Colorado's Denver Metro/North Front Range, which includes a major
transportation corridor and a refinery. In 2022, EPA reclassified this area from serious to severe
nonattainment for the 2008 8-Hour Ozone NAAQS, and, thus, any and all reductions in ozone
precursors are needed. Likewise, counties in Connecticut, New Jersey's and New York are in
serious to severe nonattainment with the 2008 8-Hour Ozone NAAQS and are in moderate
nonattainment with the 2015 8-Hour Ozone NAAQS. These challenges in attaining the NAAQS
are due in part to ozone-forming pollution from out-of-state upwind sources, which EPA's
standards will help reduce. 176 84 Fed. Reg. 44,223, 44,245, 44,248, 44,251-44,252 (Aug. 23,
2019) ("EPA acknowledges the role interstate transport of precursors to ozone pollution plays in
the efforts of downwind areas to attain and maintain the NAAQS."). New Jersey has taken action
to reduce NOx and VOC emissions from mobile sources and from stationary sources, including
power plants and refineries, in an attempt to attain the NAAQS. 177 But New Jersey and other
States cannot attain or maintain the NAAQS alone, 178 and EPA's standards will provide
important emissions reductions in upwind states and across the country. 179 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, pp. 29-31]
176 EPA, Current Nonattainment Counties for All Criteria Pollutants, supra note 81.
177 State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, New Jersey SIP Revision for the
Attainment and Maintenance of the Ozone NAAQS (Dec. 2017), at x, 4-14.
178 Id. at xii.
179 EPA, Current Nonattainment Counties for All Criteria Pollutants, supra note 81.
Several counties in our States are in moderate to serious nonattainment for the 1997, 2006,
and 2012 PM2.5 NAAQS,180 and the projected 35% reductions in PM2.5 that the proposed
standards will yield by 2055 will help States attain and maintain NAAQS for PM2.5. See 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29,198, 29,204 (describing expected emissions reductions). Moreover, PM2.5 exposure
at any level is associated with adverse health impacts, so reductions in PM2.5 emissions will
bring public health benefits to our States and Cities regardless of whether our regions have
attained the NAAQS. 181 Indeed, because PM2.5 exposure below the current NAAQS is clearly
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harmful, a multi-state coalition, which includes many of the signatories to this comment,
petitioned EPA to reconsider its 2020 decision not to strengthen the current NAAQS for
Particulate Matter. See CARB Comment at 76-77. On January 27, 2023, EPA proposed to find
the current NAAQS are inadequate to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety
and to tighten the primary NAAQS for PM2.5. 88 Fed. Reg. 5,558, 5,561 (Jan. 27, 2023). [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 29-31]
180 EPA, Current Nonattainment Counties for All Criteria Pollutants, supra note 81.
181 EPA, Policy Assessment for the Reconsideration of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
Particulate Matter (May 2022), at 3-178, available at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-
05/Final%20Policy%20Assessment%20for%20the%20Reconsideration%20of%20the%20PM%20NAAQ
S_May2022_0.pdf ("Studies that examine the shapes of concentration-response functions over the full
distribution of ambient PM2.5 concentrations have not identified a threshold concentration^ below which
associations no longer exist").
Organization: Center for American Progress (CAP)
It is critically important that EPA finalize the strongest possible standard by the end of 2023.
Americans' health and the climate crisis cannot afford to wait for reductions in vehicle
emissions. The American Lung Association's (ALA) 2023 State of the Air Report finds that 36
percent of Americans live in areas with failing grades for ozone or particulate pollution. 1
Research from Harvard University finds 17,000 to 20,000 deaths per year in the U.S. can be
attributed to particulate matter (PM) pollution from transportation alone.2 Achieving the Biden
Administration's goal of zero transportation emissions by 2050, as called for in the National
Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization, would have immense health benefits.3 The ALA
estimates that achieving zero transportation emissions as well as zero power sector emissions
would avoid 110,000 premature deaths between 2020 and 2050 in addition to 2.78 million
avoided asthma attacks and 13.4 million lost workdays. This translates to $1.2 trillion in health
benefits and $1.7 trillion in climate benefits by 2050.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0658, p. 1]
1 American Lung Association, "State of the Air Report," April 2023, available online:
https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf
2 Choma et al. "Health benefits of decreases in on-road transportation emissions in the United States from
2008 to 2017," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, December 13, 2021, available online:
https://www.pnas.org/doi/pdf/10.1073/pnas.2107402118
3 U.S. Department of Energy, "The U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization,"
September 2021, available online: https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/the-us-national-
blueprint-for-transportation- decarbonization.pdf
4 American Lung Association, "Zeroing in on Healthy Air," March 2022, available online:
https://www.lung.org/getmedia/13248145-06f0-4e35-b79b-6dfacfd29a71/zeroing-in-on-healthy-air- report-
2022.pdf
Organization: Ceres BICEP (Business for Innovative Climate and Energy Policy) Network
Finally, on-road vehicles are largely responsible for the harmful pollutant emissions that
disproportionally impact historically low-income and BIPOC16 communities located near fleet
depots, major transportation corridors, distribution centers, and ports. 36% of Americans live in
communities with unhealthy air pollution, and a person of color is 64% more likely than a white
person to live in such a community. 17 Further, the American Lung Association predicts that the
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U.S. could see $978 billion in public health benefits from cleaner air by 2050 as the nation shifts
to 100% zero-emission new passenger vehicle sales and clean electricity generation. 18 EPA's
decision to reduce multipollutant vehicle emissions is positive, and we urge EPA to finalize
LMDV emission standards at least as strong as those proposed as soon as possible to protect the
health of those in these vulnerable communities and realize these significant economic benefits.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0600, pp. 2-3]
16 BIPOC: Black, Indigenous, People of Color.
17 https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf.
18 https://www.lung.org/getmedia/9e9947ea-d4a6-476c-9c78-cccf7d49ffe2/ala-driving-to-clean-air-
report.pdf.
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
The MY2027 and Later Multipollutant Emissions is an ambitious undertaking and
Administrator Regan is to be commended as it appears to contain many worthwhile initiatives.
However, unless significant changes are made to the NPRM before it is finalized—including
those offered here—it will leave huge opportunities to improve climate and health unfulfilled.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 1-2]
In December 2021, EPA finalized the landmark MY2023 and Later LDV GHG Rule to which
we registered strong opposition. Unfortunately, like this NPRM, EPA did not address the
dramatic increases in SOA + PAH emissions that are already being caused by the rapid adoption
of GDI engines in the absence of gasoline BTEX controls. Of even greater concern—as the U.S.
LDV fleet rapidly adopts GDI engines, the most harmful UFP + PAH emissions will
dramatically INCREASE. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 1-2]
We understand that the primary thrust of this rulemaking is to drive commercialization of
electric vehicles. However, it is also widely understood that this process will take many
years/decades, perhaps even generations. For many years, ICE-powered vehicles will require
gasoline and other liquid fuels, and trillions of miles will be driven on them before EVs dominate
the U.S. fleet. EPA staff recently pledged [Link: https://insideepa.com/node/238985] that the rule
would reflect a "balanced approach" taking into account both electrification trends and a
projection that 100 million conventional light- and medium-duty vehicles could be sold before
any full transition to electric vehicles (EVs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 1-2]
When Congress was banning leaded gasoline for its horrific health effects in the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments, it went to extraordinary lengths to ensure that EPA avoided making the
same mistake with BTEX compounds which are in many respects worse than lead. Congress
knew that fuel quality and vehicle emissions control systems were part of an integrated system
and that three-way catalysts were unable to capture BTEX combustion by-products.
Consequently, Congress gave EPA the nondiscretionary duty to reduce BTEX emissions by the
"greatest degree achievable", (Sec 202(1)(2)) as explained in more detail below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0630, pp.1-2]
Many experts believe that the 20% BTEX fraction found in a typical gallon of U.S. gasoline
poses the single greatest threat to public health and the environment. "The effect of aromatics
[BTEX] on pollution and human health is thus magnified twice over: Aromatics lead
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disproportionately to PAH formation, and PAHs lead disproportionately to SOA formation.
Worse yet, PAHs hitch a ride on SOA for long distances and weaponize these particles as they
travel through the human body.. .When SOA particles are formed in the presence of gas-phase
PAHs, their formation and properties are significantly different from SOA particles formed
without PAHs: They exhibit slower evaporation kinetics and have higher fractions of non-
volatile components and higher viscosities, assuring their longer atmospheric lifetimes. This
increased viscosity and decreased volatility act as a shield that protects PAHs from chemical
degradation and evaporation, allowing for their long-range transport." [Detchon - Modlin
MY2023 Final Rule comments, p. 17. RDRMCommentsEPA-HQ-OAR.pdf (cleanfuelsdc.org)]
[Link: https://cleanfuelsdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/RDRMCommentsEPA-HQ-
OAR.pdf] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 1-2]
Americans cannot escape the harmful emissions produced by tens of billions of gallons of
BTEX contained in U.S. gasoline. That is why last fall we wrote Administrator Regan to
commend him on his aggressive actions to control emissions of highly persistent, pervasive, and
toxic PFAS. ReganDuranteFinePMPFAs8-30-22 (cleanfuelsdc.org) [Link:
https://cleanfuelsdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/ReganDuranteFinePMPFAs8-30-22.pdf]
We urged the Administrator to apply those same exacting standards to regulating BTEX-
produced MSATs under the Fine PM and MY2027 Multipollutant NPRMs, because "By any
metric, gasoline PAH emissions are as bad or worse than PFAS for public health and the
environment." [p. 4] In fact, many experts believe that SOA-bound PAH are more pervasive,
have a higher "deposition efficiency", and are less susceptible to remediation than PFAS once
they are emitted from the tailpipe and undergo atmospheric transformation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0630, pp.1-2]
PAHs are not only carcinogenic and highly carbon-intensive, they are also mutagenic and
reprotoxic (CMR) and widely recognized by health experts as ubiquitous endocrine disruptor
compounds (EDCs). [See discussion of 2018 EPARiedel study on p. 9, ResearchGate
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/31586423 l_Mutagenicity_an d_Carcinogenicity]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 1-2]
The science is indisputable: unless EPA recognizes and honors its legal obligation to
substantially reduce gasoline BTEX levels in the final MY2027 rule, it will among other
undesirable consequences violate President Biden's Executive Order 13045, "Protection of
Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks". Beginning at p. 598 of the NPRM,
EPA states "that the environmental health risks or safety risks of the pollutants addressed by this
action may have a disproportionate effect on children". It goes on to describe how children are
more susceptible than adults to air pollutants. In fact, the SOA-bound PAHs that are either
deliberately or inadvertently omitted from the NPRM have been widely acknowledged by health
experts as a predominant cause of some of the most adverse health end points for children,
including pre-term births, IQ loss, asthma, cardiopulmonary conditions, and a wide range of
cancers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 1-2]
Criteria Pollutant Standards for ICE Vehicles. At p. 42, EPA proposes a particulate matter
(PM) standard of 0.5 mg/mi and makes the remarkable (and untrue) assertion that "the standards
will reduce tailpipe PM emissions from ICE vehicles by more than 95 percent"! It goes on to say
that the proposal will also "reduce emissions of mobile source air toxics." According to the
Health Effects Institute: "It is estimated that about 50% of the benzene produced in the exhaust is
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the result of decomposition of aromatic hydrocarbons in the fuel.. .two studies showed that
lowering aromatics levels in gasoline significantly reduces toxic benzene emissions from
vehicles exhausts." [Detchon - Modlin, p. 6, FH #23. RDRMCommentsEPA-HQ-OAR.pdf
(cleanfuelsdc.org)] [Link: https://cleanfuelsdc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/09/RDRMCommentsEPA-HQ-OAR.pdf]
Despite OTAQ assurances, continuation of "business as usual" will ensure dramatic increases
in the most harmful ultrafine particulates and their associated PAH and other toxics. False
assurances like these threaten public health and the environment by lulling the public, health
experts, and policymakers into a false sense of complacency that all is well, when the reality is
that things are bad and rapidly getting worse. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 2-3]
Despite the magnitude and immediacy of the health threat, EPA attempts to address its
gasoline quality "Achilles' heel" beginning at p. 572, "Consideration of Potential Fuels Controls
for a Future Rulemaking". EPA states "there is an opportunity to further address PM emissions
from the existing vehicle fleet, the millions of vehicles produced during the phase-in
period.. .through changes in market fuel composition.. .we expect that tens of millions of
gasoline-powered sources will remain in use well into the 2030s." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, pp. 2-3]
However, despite the nondiscretionary duty Congress imposed on it in the 1990 CAAA, EPA
does what it has done for more than 30 years—defers "potential" action to a "future rulemaking"
by requesting comment on possible changes to "gasoline fuel property standards". EPA falsely
states that it must act under CAA section 211c and that "such changes are beyond the scope of
this rulemaking". In fact, the NPRM rests its authority upon CAA section 202, and section 202(1)
imposes a clear nondiscretionary requirement that EPA must ensure that fuel quality
improvement— specifically BTEX reduction—is employed as a co-equal regulatory tool to
reinforce vehicle technology advances. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 2-3]
No action could be more germane to this rule than reducing gasoline BTEX content to achieve
substantial, and immediate, reductions in the most toxic and carbon intensive ICE tailpipe
emissions. In fact, after more than 30 years of inaction, EPA's failure to comply with CAA
section 202(1) unquestionably qualifies as "action unreasonably withheld". Accepting more years
of inaction will unnecessarily harm yet another generation of American children. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 2-3]
In a letter to Doug Sombke, South Dakota Farmers Union president, Christopher Grundler,
then-director of OTAQ, described his view of CAA section 202(1): "With respect to CAA section
202(1), the EPA has acted twice under this specific authority, including the February 2007 rule
that addresses the aromatics content of gasoline through required limits on benzene... Since
Congress established section 202(1) in the CAAA of 1990, the net result of the EPA regulations
and market shifts has been a reduction in gasoline benzene levels by roughly two thirds and
aromatics levels by roughly one third.. .In combination, these fuel and vehicle standards have
already dramatically reduced air toxics emissions. While the EPA continues to look for
opportunities to further reduce air toxics, as required by CAA section 202(1), we must also
consider technological feasibility and costs, among other factors. We take our regulatory
authority very seriously and must ensure the appropriateness of taking further regulatory action
before doing so "1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 2-3]
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1 Christopher Grundler, EPA Office of Transportation and Air Quality, letter to Doug Sombke, SDFU
president, March 15, 2018.
It should be noted that Mr. Grundler cites the non-benzene aromatics reductions which
occurred not due to EPA's actions, but thanks to Congressional ethanol requirements under
Renewable Fuel Standards 1 and 2. Experts have estimated that the RFS program—which made
E10 the nation's in-use fuel—displaced nearly 10 billion gallons per year of aromatics as refiners
adjusted their blendstocks to accommodate ethanol's higher octane. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, pp. 2-3]
The NPRM indirectly acknowledged the importance of ethanol's rise in the nation's gasoline
pool at p. 579: "A common thread across the market shifts in T90 has been a decreasing
gasoline-to-distillate ratio (GDR) in the product slates produced by refiners.. .Perhaps the most
important factor affecting GDR was the influx of ethanol into gasoline. The increasing ethanol
volume displaced a portion of petroleum, which caused refiners to move more of the midrange
gasoline cut into the distillate pool. Ethanol's octane also allowed refiners to back out aromatic
content." [Emphasis supplied.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 2-3]
For many years, automakers have implored EPA to ensure the availability of higher- octane
fuels (HOFs) because "octane is the single most important fuel property in designing an internal
combustion engine", according to Mercedes Benz. In the U.S., only two commercially available
octane boosting compounds are legally permitted for use in gasoline—benzene-based aromatic
compounds commonly known as BTEX (benzene, toluene, ethyl-benzene, xylene) and ethanol.
A typical gallon of U.S. gasoline contains approximately 20% BTEX and 10% ethanol. Congress
has directed EPA to reduce the carcinogenic mobile source air toxics (MSATs) produced by the
incomplete combustion of BTEX "the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through
the application of technology which will be available". RDRMCommentsEPA-HQ-OAR.pdf
(cleanfuelsdc.org) [Link: https://cleanfuelsdc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/09/RDRMCommentsEPA-HQ-OAR.pdf] [p. 2] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0712, pp. 2-3]
This comment will explain some of the many obstacles that stand in the way of EPA
finalizing this proposed rule: an absence of statutory authorization, the commands of the APA,
the infeasibility of electrification scheme, and the tremendous and overlooked costs associated
with the plan. All these failures result from the Biden's Administration's myopic conclusion that
electric vehicles are the best and only way to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions from the
transportation sector. This is foolish. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 2-3]
Renewable fuels are a far more feasible, cost effective, and lawful way to reduce emissions
from light-duty vehicles. The blending of 10 percent renewable ethanol in the nation's fuel
supply already reduces greenhouse gas emissions from the light-duty fleet by tens of millions of
tons a year. And we could do better. EPA has determined that El 5 is suitable for use in all model
year 2001 and later vehicles. Many newer vehicles on the road could run on mid-level blends
like E25. Every automaker could readily make vehicles designed to run on mid-level blends with
only minimal design changes. These mid-level blends reduce the carbon intensity of liquid fuels,
enable more fuel-efficient engines, and reduce aromatics and particulate matter. EPA has the
statutory authority to account for these savings in its standard setting, and it has done so in the
past. Reinstituting such a system would incentivize the use of more renewable fuels, and allow
automakers to achieve greater emissions reductions, in a shorter time frame, and at a net savings
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to consumers. At the very least, EPA can reform the way engines are tested to better align with
reality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 2-3]
Section 202(1)'s mandatory directive is unique for its "legislative endangerment" language, as
well as the legislative history's clear Congressional expectation that EPA would employ
"technology-forcing" regulatory strategies to improve gasoline quality by substantially reducing
BTEX content. While it was banning the use of poisonous tetraethyl lead in leaded gasoline in
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress took extraordinary steps to ensure that EPA used
its authority to require petroleum refiners to improve fuel quality and thus complement
automakers' efforts to improve vehicle technologies. In the ensuing years, OTAQ has ignored
the "technology-forcing" requirements imposed by Congress by refusing to improve gasoline
quality by requiring an orderly reduction in BTEX and replacement with ethanol's superior, low-
carbon, low-toxics octane. [See Detchon - Modlin MY2023 Final Rule comments discussion on
"EPA's response to a legislative mandate" pp. 21-31] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 3-
5]
The Clean Air Act makes it perfectly clear that EPA requires only one "metric" for guidance
on how best to reduce BTEX content—and it is not some permutation of the GDR. It is the
mandatory language in CAA section 202(1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 3-5]
Technology-Forcing Legal Precedents Put the Burden on EPA to Encourage E30 HOLC Fuels.
"Technology-forcing" language has been used by Congress throughout the Clean Air Act, not only in
section 202(1) [see NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 328 (DC Circuit 1981): "Congress intended the agency to
project future advances in pollution control technology. It was expected to press for development and
application of improved technology rather than be limited by that which exists today." Ecology Law
Quarterly, FN# 126], However, as the record makes clear, OTAQ has done the exact opposite. It has gone to
extraordinary, even unlawful, lengths to OBSTRUCT the development of higher quality fuels which are
required to complement advanced engine technologies.
EPA's sub-sim interpretation that prohibits the use of HOLC fuels like E30 in existing
vehicles is unlawful and contrary to Congressional intent. Since EPA established E10 as the
nation's certification fuel in January 2017, it cannot prohibit increased concentrations of ethanol
for use in existing vehicles unless it complies with all of the steps that Congress set forth in CAA
section 211c. The burden of proof is on EPA, including the legal precedents set by 42 U.S.C.
7545, which require EPA to prove that prohibiting increased ethanol use will NOT result in the
use of another octane substitute—BTEX—that makes tailpipe emissions even worse. Especially
now with the rapid adoption of GDI engines, EPA cannot make such a finding. Finally, section
202(1) and the 1990 CAAA also require EPA to apply Maximum Achievable Control
Technology (MACT) standards to fuel quality improvements. The U.S. light-duty vehicle (LDV)
fleet's ICE vehicles require gasoline of sufficient—ideally much higher than today's—octane or
they will not operate properly. Fuel efficiency improvements and carbon reductions require the
use of HOLC Fuels. EPA cannot comply with the statute's "greatest emissions reduction
achievable" requirement unless it encourages an orderly transition to nationwide use of E30
"clean octane" fuels. By blocking such use, EPA is imposing a "de facto" BTEX mandate on
U.S. consumers because there are only two commercially available, cost effective, and (at least
thus far) legally permissible octane enhancing compounds: BTEX and ethanol. Subsequent
Congressional decisions in both RFS1 and RFS2 (2005 EPACT and 2007 EISA) make it clear
that Congress intended for ethanol to replace BTEX—and that EPA's duty is to promulgate the
necessary regulations to optimize those results. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 5]
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Unfortunately, EPA has spent the past thirty years doing the exact opposite. In fact, EPA's
fuel efficiency demands have driven automakers to accelerate the introduction of gasoline direct
injection (GDI) engines which in the absence of BTEX controls dramatically increase emissions
of the most harmful ultrafine particulates and their associated toxics, especially polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 5]
Restricting BTEX Controls to "High-Boiling" Aromatics Will Not Solve the Problem. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 7]
At p. 572 of the NPRM, EPA introduced the concept of limiting "high-boiling compounds in
gasoline" that have been linked to increased tailpipe PM emissions. The Agency noted that "the
high-boiling tail of gasoline contains a high proportion of aromatics and that the heaviest few
percent of this material has very high leverage on PM emissions". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0630, p. 7]
As interesting as this discussion is—and while it is a worthy goal to limit high-boiling
compounds—we are concerned by EPA's apparent interest in limiting BTEX control to a "few
percent" of the average twenty percent fraction contained in a typical gallon of U.S. gasoline.
Limiting BTEX control to the small high-boiling fraction would most certainly not be consistent
with the spirit and letter of the Congressional mandate in CAA section 202(1) that requires EPA
to reduce BTEX by the "greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the application
of technology which will be available." In fact, OTAQ experts implicitly admitted that more is
needed when they issued their 2016 report on the 2015 UFP Workshop when they said this:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 7]
OTAQ experts admitted that its MOVES Model was defective and in need of replacement more than seven
years ago: "a new SOA paradigm has been developed", [see Detchon/Modlin comments, p. 19, FN#109],
"[SOA] particles play an important role in air quality but for many years available
atmospheric models were not able to predict SOA formation. The main issue was the fact that all
models relied on the assumptions that SOA particles were well-mixed low viscosity solutions
and maintained equilibrium with the gas-phase by rapid mixing in the condensed phase with
evaporation and condensation. Recent studies using the multidimensional characterization
approach demonstrated that these assumptions were wrong and that SOA particles must be
viscous semi-solid. These studies showed also that there is a synergetic effect between PAHs and
SOA since PAHs trapped inside the SOA particles slow down SOA evaporation and increase
SOA yield and lifetime. This can explain the long-range transport of toxic compounds like PAHs
and other persistent pollutants. In conclusion, a new SOA paradigm has been developed."3
(Emphasis supplied] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 7]
3 Richard W. Baldauf et al., "Ultrafine Particle Metric and Research Considerations: Review of the 2015
UFP Workshop," International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (2016): 13(11): p.13:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5129264/pdf/jerph-13-01054.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
For all these reasons, EPA cannot focus only on the few percent of the "high boiler" BTEX
fraction of gasoline—it must reduce BTEX to the greatest degree achievable as required by
Congress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 7]
Despite its enormous deterrent effect on EPA's regulation of mobile source air toxics,
however, EPA has yet to correct MOVES. In fact, EPA continues to use the MOVES Model to
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support its most consequential rulemakings, including the MY2023 and Later LDV GHG Rule,
see end notes, p. 20-22. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 7]
SOA from Gasoline Aromatics. On p. 591, EPA noted that "Mobile sources are an important
contributor to secondary aerosols formed from nitrate, sulfate and organic precursors. Studies
have shown that secondary organic aerosol (SOA) formation from gasoline vehicle exhaust can
exceed directly emitted (tailpipe) PM emissions, and that changes to gasoline formulation can
have impacts on SOA that are larger than the associated shifts in direct PM emissions." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 8]
This statement seems at odds with the Agency's claim that the proposed rule would reduce
PM emissions by "more than 95 percent". In fact, EPA historically has vastly understated the
substantial contributions mobile sources—especially gasoline BTEX— make to SOA + PAH
formation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 8]
Former OTAQ Director Grundler offered this explanation to SDFU President Sombke: "With
respect to your concern that the EPA's models incorrectly predict the contribution of light-duty
gasoline vehicles to PM (e.g., as compared to leaf blowers) it is important to note that the EPA
estimates cited in the Wall Street Journal refer only to directly emitted PM. We agree that
ambient levels of PM are a result of secondarily formed particles in addition to direct PM
emissions, and that light-duty gasoline vehicles are important sources of precursors to PM
formation."4 [Emphasis supplied] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 8]
4 Supra, Grundler letter to Sombke, March 15, 2018.
It took several exchanges to elicit this admission five years ago. It is clear from EPA's claim
that the proposed rule would reduce PM emissions by "more than 95 percent" that the Agency
continues to downplay the disproportionate role SOA plays in fine and ultrafine particulate
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 8]
Leading experts are convinced that aromatics ("organics") are the primary culprit. "An
important recent study, co-authored by the Nobel Prize winner Mario Molina, concluded that
reducing the smallest (ultrafine) particles "without simultaneously limiting organics from
automobile emissions is ineffective and can even exacerbate this problem". [Detchon/Modlin
2021 comments, p. 2.] This has implications not only for GDI engine emissions effects, but also
for the NPRM's gasoline particulate filter (GPF) strategies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p.
8]
Detchon and Modlin went on to note that "Emissions from aromatic compounds in gasoline
were thought to be short-lived, thus posing little threat to human health. But that was wrong. A
recent General Motors study found that nearly 96% of the fine particle emissions from gasoline
are caused by the aromatics in the fuel". [Ibid., p. 1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 8]
In a letter to Acting OAR Administrator Joseph Goffman, former Senate Majority Leader
Tom Daschle cited these experts and then cautioned EPA that failure to control BTEX would
severely compromise, perhaps doom, EPA's PM control strategies
DaschleGoffmanHOLCAexecutedjune2021 .pdf: [Link:
file:///C:/Users/dehbi/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/Content.Outlook/OFSN24I
W/DaschleGoffmanHOLCAexecutedjune2021.pdf] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 8]
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"Given the role of aromatic hydrocarbons in PM formation and given the propensity of GDI
engines to increase emissions of UFPs, EPA's strategies for regulating fine particle pollution in
urban areas are doomed to failure unless they significantly reduce gasoline aromatics." A
prescient statement that is proving itself to be even more true as GDI engines dominate the U.S.
fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 8]
D. Higher ethanol blends enable reduced particulate matter and other criteria pollutant
emissions.
Ethanol also improves gasoline fuel properties to reduce particulate matter emissions. EPA's
proposed rule sets aggressive standards for particulate matter and justifies its electrification plan
in part by the impact it will have on these criteria pollutants. But as explained above, millions of
liquid fueled vehicles will remain on the road for decades, even under the most aggressive
electrification standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 42]
Increasing the blending of ethanol in liquid fuels can reduce the particulate emissions from all
these vehicles. In EPA's most recent study of particulate matter emissions, it found that reducing
the heavy aromatic content of liquid fuels reduced exhaust particulate matter. See Exhaust
Emission Impacts of Replacing Heavy Aromatic Hydrocarbons in Gasoline with Alternate
Octane Sources, EPA-420-R-23-008, Environmental Protection Agency (Apr. 2023). Of each of
the four fuels examined in that study, the most promising results came from El 5, which showed
reductions of particular matter of nearly 40 percent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 42]
These results are corroborated by other studies. For example, a 2023 study published in Fuel
examined the exhaust emissions from a fleet of 20 light-duty vehicles running on both E10 and
E15. Tianbo Tang, et al., Expanding the ethanol blend wall in California: Emissions comparison
between E10 and E15, 350 Fuel 128836 (Oct. 15, 2023),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ S0016236123014497#ab010. While the study
showed that total hydrocarbons, non- methane hydrocarbons, and carbon monoxide all had either
marginally or statistically significant reductions when the fuel was switched to El 5, reductions
of PM emissions were even greater. Id. "The weighted PM emissions showed strong fuel effects,
with E15 being 18% lower than E10 across the fleet of 20 vehicles at a statistically significant
level. For the cold-start and hot-running phases, PM emissions demonstrated statistically
significant reductions of 16% and 54%, respectively, for E15 compared to E10. The hot-start
phase showed a 43% marginally statistically significant reduction in PM emissions for El5
compared to El0." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 42-43]
There are about twenty times as many vehicles on the road in the United States as will be sold
in each model year that EPA projects, all of which emit far more on average than new internal
combustion engine vehicles. Switching those existing vehicles from E10 to El 5 would result in
greater particulate matter emissions reductions than converting all new vehicles to electric
vehicles for several model years.23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 42-43]
23 And this only accounts for tailpipe emissions. As has been well documented, the higher weight of
electric vehicles leads to increased road and tire wear, and thus higher particulate emissions from non-
tailpipe sources.
Additional benefits include avoiding the air quality and health impacts from significant
increases in tire wear from electric vehicles, as well as the increases in C02 emissions that will
result from manufacturing more electric generation infrastructure, transmission, distribution, and
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charging equipment, and the manufacturing of electric vehicles themselves, which produce far
more upstream emissions than their internal combustion engine counterparts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, pp.6-7]
Organization: Colorado Energy Office, Colorado Department of Transportation, and Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment
Environmental impacts from the transportation sector—and the resulting health and economic
consequences—are a major concern. Vehicles are the top source of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions in Colorado, and are also a top source of particulate matter, NOx, and other criteria air
pollutants that have disproportionate impacts on communities living near highways and freight
routes. Transportation is one of the two largest sources of ozone precursors in Colorado along
with oil and gas production, largely due to NOx emissions from vehicles, and reducing
transportation emissions is a critical strategy to meet federal health-based air quality
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694, p. 1]
Our agencies strongly support EPA's development of national air pollution and GHG
emission standards that are as robust as possible to ensure strong progress nationwide on air
pollution and equity. A strong national light- and medium-duty vehicle standard is important to
Colorado for at least three reasons. First, air pollution from nearby states crosses into Colorado
and affects public health, and the longer duration and increased stringency of the proposed
criteria air pollutant standards will reduce interstate air pollution transport into Colorado.
Second, Colorado is already experiencing the impacts of climate change, including increased
wildfires, floods, and drought. Climate change is a global issue that is impacted by all GHG
emissions regardless of geographic source, and the reductions in GHG emissions from the
proposed national rule will help reduce the long-term risks of climate change in Colorado.
Finally, although the proposed national GHG emissions standards are not an explicit EV sales
requirement like Advanced Clean Cars and Advanced Clean Cars II, complying with the
standards will effectively require vehicle manufacturers to sell a significantly greater amount of
EVs. The economies of scale encouraged by the proposed rules will support the production of
more affordable EVs, easing the transition to zero emission vehicles and enabling greater access
to their benefits for disproportionately impacted communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694,
p. 2]
Organization: David Hallberg
Toxicologists commenting on the health threat from Canadian wildfires—which are being
widely covered by media as more than one hundred million Americans are being affected every
day—confirm that the smaller fine PM/PAH/SOA emissions pose the greatest health threat.
https://theconversation.com/wildfire-smoke-can-harm-human-a206057 However, due to EPA's
false assurances that vehicle emissions control systems are capturing the SOA-bound PAHs and
other toxics, the media and public don't know that they are being exposed to far worse on a 24/7
basis because OTAQ refuses to improve gasoline quality as required by Congress. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0548, p. 2]
The Reuters article linked below should more accurately read "Lacking Cleaner Gasoline,
U.S. Cars Set to Emit a Septillion More Particles". It most certainly makes no sense to wait
another fifteen or more years for the LDV fleet to transition to gasoline particulate filters (as the
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EPA seems to propose in this rule) when these enormous quantities of highly potent UFP + PAH
emissions can be substantially reduced immediately by replacing BTEX with ethanol. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0548, p. 2]
1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 is a SEPTILLION, otherwise known as a googol. Experts
say PAHs pose substantial threat to human health in the parts per trillion. [Detchon-Modlin
comments, supra, p. 20-21] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, p. 2]
This means that a breathtaking number of highly lethal UFPs will be forced into Americans
lungs over the next 20 years—septillions of the most HARMFUL PARTICLES THAT EPA
REFUSES TO TELL THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WILL GET WORSE RATHER THAN
BETTER. Millions of avoidable morbidities and premature mortalities will occur due to EPA's
unlawful refusal to enforce section 202(1). It will cost U.S. taxpayers hundreds of billions of
dollars in avoidable health expenditures and lost productivity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548,
pp. 2-3]
Lacking filters, U.S. cars set to emit a septillion more particles - research | Reuters [Link:
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/lacking-filters-us-cars-set-emit-septillion-
more-particles-research-2022-04-27/] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 2-3]
The Science is Incontrovertibly Clear
Contrary to OTAQ's false assurances, the rapid adoption of advanced engine technologies
such as Gasoline Direct Injection (GDI) will dramatically increase emissions of the most harmful
ultrafine particles (UFP) and secondary organic aerosols (SOAs) that bind with and insulate
highly toxic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and enable their long-range transport.
The attached White Paper, authored by the UN Foundation's Special Advisor for Climate
Solutions and Chrysler's former Director for Regulatory Affairs, explains how the BTEX
emissions threat is getting WORSE, not better. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, p. 2]
New White Paper Says The Real Cost of Gasoline .. .is to Our Health | Clean Fuels
Development Coalition (cleanfuelsdc.org) [Link: https://cleanfuelsdc.org/2022/05/16/new-white-
paper-says-the-real-cost-of-gasoline-is-to-our-health/] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, p. 2]
Many experts believe that the 20% BTEX fraction found in a typical gallon of U.S. gasoline
poses the single greatest threat to public health and the environment. In their comments to the
MY2023 LDV GHG Final Rule, the same two authors stated: "The effect of aromatics [BTEX]
on pollution and human health is thus magnified twice over: Aromatics lead disproportionately
to PAH formation, and PAHs lead disproportionately to SOA formation. Worse yet, PAHs hitch
a ride on SOA for long distances and weaponize these particles as they travel through the human
body.. .When SOA particles are formed in the presence of gas-phase PAHs, their formation and
properties are significantly different from SOA particles formed without PAHs: They exhibit
slower evaporation kinetics and have higher fractions of non-volatile components and higher
viscosities, assuring their longer atmospheric lifetimes. This increased viscosity and decreased
volatility act as a shield that protects PAHs from chemical degradation and evaporation, allowing
for their long-range transport." [Detchon - Modlin MY2023 Final Rule comments, p. 17.
RDRMCommentsEPA-HQ-OAR.pdf (cleanfuelsdc.org)] [Link: https://cleanfuelsdc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/09/RDRMCommentsEPA-HQ-OAR.pdf] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0548, p. 2]
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The Law is Also Incontrovertibly Clear
OTAQ's experts are highly intelligent people, but they apparently missed the memo about the
mandatory Clean Air Act provisions that require EPA to reduce gasoline BTEX content as much
as technology (including technology improvements that EPA is expected by Congress to actively
encourage) permits. In the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA), Congress went to
extraordinary lengths to avoid a repeat of the horrific societal and economic costs of leaded
gasoline because it knew that BTEX health effects would be even worse. Section 202(1) of the
CAA imposes a nondiscretionary duty upon EPA to reduce the mobile source air toxics
(MSATs) produced by the incomplete combustion of BTEX by "the greatest degree of emission
reduction achievable through the application of technology which will be available".
RDRMCommentsEPA- HQ-OAR.pdf (cleanfuelsdc.org) [Link: https://cleanfuelsdc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/09/RDRMCommentsEPA-HQ-OAR.pdf], p. 2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0548, p. 3]
Since 1990, Congress has spoken many times about the critical need for EPA to encourage the
substitution of ethanol's superior "clean octane" for BTEX "dirty octane". Three primary
inflection points stand out: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 3-4]
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
In the same law that finally banned the use of leaded gasoline, Congress overcame fierce
opposition from oil interests in a bid to avoid a repeat of the leaded gasoline disaster. The most
important provision was section 202(1), the express language of which constitutes a "legislative
endangerment" finding (EPA has no discretion in the matter under 21 lc as it claims). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 3-4]
Technology-Forcing Legal Precedents Put the Burden on EPA to Encourage E30 HOLC
Fuels. Importantly, Congress also used "technology-forcing" language and imposed for the first
time Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standards on fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0548, pp.3-4]
"Technology-forcing" language has been used by Congress throughout the Clean Air Act, not only in
section 202(1) [see NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 328 (DC Circuit 1981): "Congress intended the agency to
project future advances in pollution control technology. It was expected to press for development and
application of improved technology rather than be limited by that which exists today." Ecology Law
Quarterly, FN#126]
Unfortunately, OTAQ has done the exact opposite and made a mockery of the provision by
imposing technology "advances" that increase harmful emissions while blocking the fuel quality
improvements that automakers require to complement their GDI engines. It has gone to
extraordinary, even unlawful, lengths to OBSTRUCT the development of higher quality fuels
which are required to complement advanced engine technologies. EPA's sub-sim interpretation
is unlawful—it cannot prohibit increased concentrations of ethanol for use in existing vehicles
unless it follows the steps set forth in section 211c. The burden of proof is on EPA, including the
legal precedents set by 42 U.S.C. 7545, which require EPA to conclusively prove that prohibiting
increased ethanol use will NOT result in the use of another additive that will result in more
harmful emissions (see below). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 3-4]
Finally, the MSAT provision sponsors—both Senate and House—made it clear that EPA
should prioritize fuel quality controls as much, if not more, than vehicle technology
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improvements. Section 202(1) and the 1990 CAAA require EPA to apply Maximum Achievable
Control Technology (MACT) standards to fuel quality improvements. The U.S. light-duty
vehicle (LDV) fleet of 270+ million vehicles requires gasoline to have sufficient octane number
or they will not operate properly. EPA cannot comply with the statute's "greatest emissions
reduction achievable" requirement unless it encourages an orderly transition to nationwide use of
E30 "clean octane" fuels. By blocking such use, EPA is imposing a "de facto" BTEX mandate
on U.S. consumers because there are only two commercially available, cost effective, and (at
least thus far) legally permissible octane enhancing compounds: BTEX and ethanol. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0548, p. 4]
1995 Renewable Oxygenate Requirement (ROR)
The Senate vote upholding EPA's ROR is often overlooked, but it sparked an extremely
important DC Circuit Court of Appeals decision AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE v.
Renewable Fuels Association, Intervenor. (1995) | FindLaw [Link:
https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-dc-circuit/1104431.html] (decided in favor of oil interests)
but that inadvertently set the stage for ultimate enactment of the Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS
1 and 2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 4-5]
The ROR would have required an increasing scale of "renewable" oxygenate use under
Section 21 l(k), the 1990 CAAA oxyfuel provision (up to a 30% market share). Inexplicably,
EPA avoided any reference to the MS AT 2021 provision in its rulemaking. Instead, EPA's
exclusive emphasis was on ozone control, which handicapped ethanol (E10, not E30) use in the
summertime, and forced the conversation to ethers. Had EPA informed the court about E30's
lower volatility, the importance of higher octane, and ethanol's improved cost structure, the
outcome would have been far different. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 4-5]
The Court struck down EPA's rule under Section 7545(k)(l) (the oxy fuel provision, not 2021)
on the grounds "that the plain meaning of the statute.. .precludes the adoption of RFG rules that
are not directed toward the reduction of VOCs and toxics emissions, and since the statute is
unambiguous, EPA improperly interpreted the section as giving it the broader power to adopt the
ROR... The whole purpose of the RFG program is to reduce air pollution...[EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0548, pp. 4-5]
While API's attention was focused on the RFG section 211 (k) provision, the court was
cognizant of section 202(1). It emphasized the importance of EPA achieving maximum
reductions in "year- round toxics" (which to the provision's sponsors was even more important
than ozone controls over which OTAQ has prioritized for 30 years). While the oil industry got
the outcome it wanted, it won the battle but lost the war: when MTBE contaminated water
supplies in many cities several years later, and states banned MTBE use, it set the stage for
Congressional enactment of the nationwide RFS standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548,
pp. 4-5]
One noteworthy piece of the court's ruling was its mention of 42U.S.C.7545, which prohibits
EPA from blocking increased concentrations of any fuel additive already in commerce if that
prohibition would result in an increase in harmful mobile source emissions "Our conclusion is
supported by 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c), which authorizes EPA to control or prohibit the manufacture
or sale of fuels or fuel additives if the agency finds that such fuels or fuel additives cause or
contribute to air pollution or impair the performance of emission control devices. 1 Before it can
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prohibit a fuel or fuel additive, EPA must do several things, including publish a finding that such
prohibition will not cause the use of any other fuel or fuel additive which will produce emissions
that will endanger the public health to the same or greater degree than use of the fuel or additive
to be prohibited. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(2)(C). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 4-5]
The MY2027 NPRM acknowledged the importance of ethanol's increased role in the nation's
gasoline pool at p. 579: "A common thread across the market shifts in T90 has been a decreasing
gasoline-to-distillate ratio (GDR) in the product slates produced by refiners.. .Perhaps the most
important factor affecting GDR was the influx of ethanol into gasoline. The increasing ethanol
volume displaced a portion of petroleum, which caused refiners to move more of the midrange
gasoline cut into the distillate pool. Ethanol's octane also allowed refiners to back out aromatic
content." [Emphasis supplied.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, p. 6]
Key Takeaways If EPA Truly Wants to "Be Driven by Science and the Rule of Law"
I. Ethanol is the only technically effective, commercially viable and legally permissible
alternative to BTEX as a gasoline octane enhancer. Despite EPA barriers, ethanol has already
helped to significantly reduce BTEX levels while maintaining market gasoline octane levels. A
gradual transition to nationwide E30 Clean Octane—patterned after EPA's successful and much
more challenging transition from leaded to unleaded gasoline—would add hundreds of billions
of dollars annually to the nation's balance sheet in the form of reduced health and oil import
costs. It would also benefit petroleum refiners: they could use their existing crude oil slates and
produce the same 84 sub-octane BOBs as they do now. Terminals and dispensers are ready to
splash-blend the additional 20% ethanol on top of today's E10 to produce 100+ RON E30
finished gasoline at a much lower cost to consumers with enhanced performance and greatly
reduced emissions. This is precisely what Congress envisioned when it enacted the 1990 CAAA.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 6-7]
BTEX poses the predominant—and dramatically expanding—threat to public health and the
environment, in large part driven by the rapid adoption of GDI engine technology. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0548, p. 7]
III. EPA RFS "Set" Rule encourages RD cannibalization of ethanol D6 RINs, thus
blocking ethanol from displacing BTEX with E30 HOLC Fuels.
"As in recent years, we believe that excess volumes of BBD beyond the BBD volume
requirements will be used to satisfy the advanced biofuel volume requirement within which the
BBD volume requirement is nested," the agency said in the final rule. "Historically, the BBD
standard has not independently driven the use of BBD in the market. This is due to the nested
nature of the standards and the competitiveness of BBD relative to other advanced biofuels.
Instead, the advanced biofuel standard has driven the use of BBD in the market. Moreover, BBD
can also be driven by the implied conventional renewable fuel volume requirement as an
alternative to using increasing volumes of corn ethanol in higher level ethanol blends such as
E15 and E85. We believe these trends will continue through 2025.
[ read more [Link: https://www.governorsbiofuelscoalition.org/epa-explains-thinking-behind-
biomass-based-diesel-volumes-other-reaction-to-rfs-volumes/] ... ] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0548, p. 7]
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EPA's Actions constitute an unlawful violation of CAA section 202(1)'s nondiscretionary
language to replace BTEX with ethanol.
"In the U.S., only two commercially available octane boosting compounds are legally
permitted for use in gasoline—benzene-based aromatic compounds commonly known as BTEX
(benzene, toluene, ethyl-benzene, xylene) and ethanol. Atypical gallon of U.S. gasoline contains
approximately 20% BTEX and 10% ethanol. Congress has directed EPA to reduce the
carcinogenic mobile source air toxics (MSATs) produced by the incomplete combustion of
BTEX "the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the application of
technology which will be available". RDRMCommentsEPA-HQ-OAR.pdf (cleanfuelsdc.org)
[Link: https://cleanfuelsdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/RDRMCommentsEPA-HQ-
OAR.pdf] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 7-8]
Conclusion. Indirectly, by finally admitting to the undeniable linkage between BTEX and
SOA bound PAH emissions, EPA's MY2027 Multipollutant NPRM requires it to encourage
substantial reductions in BTEX content in the final rulemaking. Last year, in West Virginia vs.
EPA, SCOTUS elevated the Major Questions Doctrine and relegated the Chevron Deference
Doctrine. Most experts expect SCOTUS to take Chevron off life support next year. The bottom
line: the test for endurable EPA regulations will be whether they are consistent with the statute's
"plain meaning" and with Congressional intent. The courts will also look closely to ascertain
how EPA regulations impact the nation's economy, energy security, and environment. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 7-8]
Substituting ethanol for toxic, expensive, and carbon intensive BTEX synthesized from crude
oil meets the Supreme Court's criteria for sustainable EPA regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0548, pp.7-8]
EPA does not have the discretionary authority to embark on another 30 year "snipe hunt" to
study whether BTEX "high boiling aromatics" are bad for public health and the environment.
Congress has already made that determination and best available science confirms that Congress
got it right thirty years ago. 30 years is long enough for the nation's public health and
environment to wait: EPA must finally do its job and enforce the law. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0548, pp.7-8]
2005 EPACT & 2007 EISA (RFS1 and 2)
In order to defuse the MTBE contamination crisis, maintain gasoline octane levels
by substituting ethanol to compensate for MTBE's lost octane, and improve the nation's energy
security, Congress enacted the landmark 2005 Energy Policy Act (EPACT) and the 2007 Energy
Independence and Security Act (EISA). These two pieces of legislation were primarily driven by
the nation's reaction to the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq War. [Another reminder of ethanol's many
benefits: in addition to the enormous health and carbon reduction benefits, a nationwide E30
Clean Octane standard would reduce U.S. oil imports by approximately one billion barrels
annually, or $100 billion/year assuming average oil costs of $100/barrel.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0548, pp. 5-6]
Congress dropped the 1990 CAAA "fuel neutral" principle as oil companies raced to get out
of the MTBE business and rescinded the section 211 (k) RFG oxygenated fuel standard provision.
However, when oil interests also pushed for elimination of section 202(1), Congressman Henry
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Waxman, powerful chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, insisted on
retaining the provision he had championed in the 1990 act. Instead, Congress doubled down and
in section 1504 of the 2005 EPACT law, required EPA to at long last promulgate the 2007
MSAT Final Rule within eighteen months. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 5-6]
EPA was only 12 years late in issuing the MSAT Rule. Predictably, its assumptions were
laughable even then. The factual predicates upon which EPA relied in the 2007 MSAT Final
Rule have changed so radically that legal precedents compel it to go back to the drawing board
with a fresh set of facts and best available science. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 5-6]
EPA itself opened the door to revisiting the 2007 MSAT Final Rule when it said that it would
be compelled to do so if "evidence supports a role for aromatics in secondary PM formation".
[Detchon-Modlin comments, supra, p. 23-24] In the MY2027 NPRM, EPA finally concedes that
there is a direct linkage between aromatics/BTEX and SOA PM. At p. 572 of the NPRM, EPA
introduced the concept of limiting "high-boiling compounds in gasoline" that have been linked to
increased tailpipe PM emissions. The Agency noted that "the high-boiling tail of gasoline
contains a high proportion of aromatics and that the heaviest few percent of this material has
very high leverage on PM emissions". As the CFDC et al. comments point out, the statute does
not permit EPA to limit its BTEX control efforts to only the high boiling aromatics—reducing
SOA-bound PAH by the greatest degree achievable requires substantial BTEX reductions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 5-6]
EPA's MSAT Rule did get one thing right in 2007—the U.S. ethanol industry did not have
sufficient capacity to replace significant amounts of BTEX. So Congress called OTAQ's bluff
and enacted RFS1 and 2. Thanks to Congressional action, experts estimate that the RFS
program—which made E10 the nation's in-use fuel—displaced nearly 10 billion gallons per year
of aromatics as refiners adjusted their blend stocks to accommodate ethanol's higher octane.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 5-6]
Organization: District of Columbia Department of Energy and Environment (DOEE)
Particulate Matter Health Impacts
In addition, EPA's proposed standards impede the District's ability to achieve the World
Health Organization's (WHO) Air Quality Guidelines, which the District of Columbia has
committed to achieving through the C40 Clean Air Accelerator.2 The WHO guidelines set the
annual 24-hour PM2.5 guidelines at 5 [j,g/m3 and the 24-hour PM2.5 guidelines at 15 [j,g/m3.
Meanwhile, the WHO annual PM10 guidelines are set at 15 [j,g/m3 and 45 [j,g/m3 for the 24-hour
PM10 guidelines. 3 The WHO used leading scientific evidence from an abundance of research
and evaluation by air quality experts to determine that an annual PM concentration higher than 5
[j,g/m3 is detrimental to public health.4 In fact, according to the Lancet Planetary Health study
released March 6, 2023, 99 percent of the world's population is exposed to unhealthy levels of
PM2.5-levels over 5 micrograms per cubic meter.5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, pp. 2-3]
2 C40 Cities. Clean Air Accelerator, https://www.c40.org/accelerators/clean-air-cities/
3 World Health Organization. What are the WHO Air Quaility Guidelines? https://www.who.int/news-
room/feature- stories/detail/what-are-the-who-air-quality-guidelines
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4 Roman Perez Velasco, Dorota Jarosi?ska, Update of the WHO global air quality guidelines: Systematic
reviews - An introduction, Environment International, Volume 170, 2022, 107556, ISSN 0160 4120,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2022.107556.
5 Wenhua, et al. Global estimates of daily ambient fine particulate matter concentrations and unequal
spatiotemporal distribution of population exposure: a machine learning modelling study. The Lancet
Planetary Health. https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(23)00008-6/fulltext
Annually, 100,000-200,000 people in the United States, and 7,000,000 worldwide, die from
exposure to air pollution, figures that require an expeditious and substantial response.6 In the
District alone, around 120 people die from diseases attributable to PM2.5 pollution annually,
while approximately 30 people visit the Emergency Department annually.7 Particulate matter is
singlehandedly responsible for up to 30,000 premature deaths each year in the United States and
over 4,000,000 worldwide.8 EPA must put the health of people and the environment at the
forefront of their decision-making and develop more stringent and protective vehicle emission
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 3]
6 Thakrar, et. All. Reducing Mortality from Air Pollution in the United States by Targeting Specific
Emission Sources, https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.estlett.0c00424#
7 Castillo, et. All. Estimating Intra-Urban Inequities in PM2.5-Attributable Health Impacts: A Case Study
for Washington, DC. https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2021GH000431
8 World Health Organization. Ambient Outdoor Air Pollution, December 19, 2022.
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact- sheets/detail/ambient-(outdoor)-air-quality-and-
health#:~:text=Ambient%20(outdoor)%20air%20pollution%20is,Asia%20and%20Western%20Pacific%20
Regions.
Ozone Health Impacts
Based on the current preliminary data, the District of Columbia's current design value of 70
ppb means the District currently meets the federal ozone standards. This is determined by a 3-
year average of the fourth-highest daily maximum ozone concentrations. Meeting this standard is
a major priority for the District. However, air pollution from sources like vehicles results in
challenges for the District to maintain clean data. The WHO also sets the annual 8-hour ozone at
100 |ig/m3, which is approximately 51 ppb, far stricter than the current NAAQS. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 3]
The District of Columbia requires more reductions to ensure that we can maintain clean data
and progress toward meeting the WHO goals. This is especially important given how precarious
our clean ozone data is and how much ozone results from emissions produced by light-duty and
medium-duty vehicles operating in and around the District, but not registered in the District.
According to source apportionment modeling conducted by the Ozone Transport Commission
17% of ozone caused by controllable sources on exceedance days is due to gasoline-powered
vehicles, making it the highest source of controllable ozone precursors affecting the District's
ozone levels on exceedance days.9 The reductions in ozone precursors that will result from
Alternative 1 will be necessary to both maintain the ozone NAAQS and progress toward WHO
goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 3]
9 Ozone Transport Commission. Ozone Transport Commission/ Mid-Atlantic Northeastern Visibility
Union 2016 Based Modeling Platform Support Document. January 2023.
https://otcair.org/upload/Documents/Reports/2016TSD_January2023_withAppendices.pdf
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In addition, data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention shows that, nationally,
Black and Indigenous people statistically have significantly higher asthma rates than their
counterparts in other races. 11 In the District, children who live in predominately Black
communities have 20 to 25 times more asthma-related emergency room visits than their
counterparts in majority White communities. 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, pp. 4-5]
11 Center for Disease Control. Most Recent National Asthma Data.
https://www.cdc.gov/asthma/most_recent_national_asthma_data.htm.
12 Children's National Medical Hospital. 2017. "Asthma Surveillance in DC Emergency Departments and
Hospitals." https://childrensnational.Org/-/media/cnhs-site/files/departments/impactdc/impact-dc -
surveillance.pdf?la=en&hash=4235C55A9ClDE9DE9725D8D5D99D30831FCA18CF
Studies also illustrate links between increased school absenteeism and ozone exposure. 13
This is a District-wide concern as disparities already exist in the education system between
students of color and White students. In particular, the literacy disparities have grown since the
Covid-19 pandemic: 28% of Black and 30% of Hispanic students were proficient on a fall 2021
test, while 70% of White students were proficient. In the fall of 2019, 44% of Black students and
42%) of Hispanic students hit these benchmarks, compared with 73% of White students. 14 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, pp. 4-5]
13 Daniel L Mendoza et al 2020 Environ. Res. Lett, in press https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abbf7a
14 Perry Stein. 2022 The Washington Post. "Literacy scores show widening achievement gap inD.C.
during pandemic." https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2022/03/17/dc-schools-achievement-gap-
pandemic-reading/
On-road vehicle emissions constitute one of the most significant individual contributors to
local air pollution-related health burdens, making up 23% of all pollution-related premature
deaths in the District. On-road vehicle emissions are estimated to contribute to 51% of N02-
attributable new asthma cases and 13% of pollution-attributable premature deaths in the District.
Regional emissions from all sectors, which originate outside of the District's jurisdiction,
contribute disproportionately to the District's air pollution- related new asthma cases and
premature deaths (89% and 57%, respectively). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 5]
These studies illustrate that air quality is an issue connected to all aspects of people's lives.
The pollution from vehicle emissions affects District residents, creating poor air quality and
living conditions and with it, a myriad of health, wellness, and educational discrepancies. The
District strives to reduce pollution as much as possible; however, pollution from light-duty and
medium-duty vehicles must be solved at a larger scale as light-duty and medium-duty vehicles
from states across the United States travel into the District. Therefore, the District cannot solve
all its pollution problems without action from EPA. EPA needs to set stronger light-duty and
medium-duty vehicle emission standards to relieve overburdened and bystander communities
experiencing the adverse impacts of vehicle emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 5]
Organization: Donn Viviani
Also not addressed is evidence that the increased weight of BEVs compared to comparable
ICE vehicles, because of battery weight, will result in nonexhaust emissions (NEE) of particulate
matter (PM) that will significantly lessen or even may exceed the proposal's anticipated
reductions. While there is controversy as to whether NEE PM is as large as exhaust PM, with
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evidence on both sides. What is known for certain however, is that heavier vehicles produce
more NEE PM and BEVs are significantly heavier than in-ternal combustion vehicles. 17 While it
is true BEVs regenerative braking removes most brake-NEE, the greater torque of BEVs will
cause some aggressive drivers to produce increased NEE PM. 18 This needs to be acknowledged
and to the extent practicable included in the benefit assessment. In my view, the potential climate
benefits of the necessary transition to EVs is too important to risk with an inadequate analysis as
to other effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0697, pp. 5-6]
17 Liu, Ye, et al. "Comparative analysis of non-exhaust airborne particles from electric and internal
combustion engine vehicles." Journal of Hazardous Materials 420 (2021): 126626.
18 Liu, Ye, et al. "Impact of vehicle type, tyre feature and driving behaviour on tyre wear under real-world
driving conditions." Science of the Total Environment 842 (2022): 156950.
Organization: Elders Climate Action
3. Public Health Urgency.
Diesel trucks and buses are also major sources of other deadly air pollutants. Medium and
heavy-duty diesel engines emit more than 60% percent of the deadly particle pollution from
vehicles. Particle pollution cuts short tens of thousands of US lives per year and contributes to
the heavy burden of asthma on our nation's children. Diesels are the primary source of particles
in communities near heavily-trafficked highways where 65 million Americans are exposed to
harmful concentrations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
Vehicle pollution inequitably harms Black and Latinex communities that are much more
likely compared to whites to reside near heavy truck traffic on highways, and at truck terminals,
ports and distribution centers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
NOx from diesels combines with heat and sunlight in the atmosphere to form ground level
ozone, or smog, a lung irritant and asthma trigger. Heavy duty vehicle emissions are a major
contributor to urban smog in the 230 urban counties where pollution concentrations violate
national air quality standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
The need for national zero emission standards is greatest in the urban areas that EPA has
designated "extreme" (South Coast AQMD) and "severe" (San Joaquin Valley AQMD), or
recently bumped-up to "serious" for ozone. NOx emissions from L/MDVs are a primary
contributor to their numerous elevated violations of the ozone NAAQS. These areas are not able
to achieve sufficient emissions reductions to attain the NAAQS without significant NOx
reductions from L/MDVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Energy Innovation
I. The U.S. must transition LDVs and MDVs to zero-emission technologies [i] quickly to
reduce their emissions, which contribute to climate change and air pollution—both of which
endanger public health and welfare. Adoption of the most stringent tailpipe standards for new
vehicles is the most effective tool to achieve this goal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 1-
2]
i This includes technologies that eliminate tailpipe GHG emissions and other pollutants, namely battery
electric vehicles for LDVs and MDVs.
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In addition to improvements to public health and welfare that the EPA's proposed tailpipe
GHG standards would achieve, the proposed multi-pollutant standards will help reduce criteria
pollutants and air toxics from remaining internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles. As LDVs
and MDVs transition away from combustion and tailpipes that cause harmful air pollution, these
multi-pollutant standards are critical to saving the lives and improving the health of the people
and children harmed by transportation pollution. 15 Although we do not provide detailed
comments on this aspect of the proposed rule, we encourage the EPA to adopt the most stringent
standards feasible to mitigate the harmful effects of these pollutants. The EPA aptly points out
that "reducing human exposure to these pollutants results in significant and measurable health
benefits," 16 especially to frontline communities, communities of color, and low-income
communities and individuals that bear the burden of bad air quality from tailpipe emissions. 17
Adopting more stringent multi-pollutant standards will also help states meet National Ambient
Air Quality Standardsl8 and improve air quality in all communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0561, p. 7]
15 American Lung Association, "Health Impact of Air Pollution," American Lung Association State of the
Air, n.d.,
https://www.lung.org/research/sota/health-risks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 7]
16 U.S. EPA, 29379.
17 "Disparities in the Impact of Air Pollution," American Lung Association, April 20, 2020,
https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/who-isat-risk/disparities.
18 U.S. EPA, "Reviewing National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS): Scientific and Technical
Information," U.S. EPA, n.d., https://www.epa.gov/naaqs and "Current Nonattainment Counties for All
Criteria Pollutants," U.S. EPA, May 31, 2023, https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/ancl.html.
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
III. Further Reductions in Emissions of GHGs and Criteria Pollutants from Motor Vehicles
Are Necessary to Protect Public Health and the Environment.
A. Vehicular emissions of greenhouse gases gravely endanger public health and welfare by
intensifying the climate crisis.
Emissions of GHGs from the transportation sector pose mortal dangers to public health and
the environment; EPA's exercise of its responsibilities under the Clean Air Act must take
account of and mitigate these dangers. Over thirteen years ago, based upon a massive scientific
record, the EPA found that new motor vehicles and engines contribute to emissions of GHGs that
drive climate change and endanger the health and welfare of current and future generations.46
Specifically, EPA found that the intensifying climate crisis increased the frequency of warmer
temperatures, heat waves, and other extreme weather, worsened air quality by increasing
regional ozone pollution, increased the spread of food and water-borne illnesses, increased the
frequency and severity of seasonal allergies, and increased the severity of coastal storm events
due to rising sea levels.47 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 14]
46 74 Fed. Reg. at 66496.
47 74 Fed. Reg. at 66525-26.
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Since EPA issued the Endangerment Finding in 2009, dire evidence of the current and future
impacts of climate change has continued to accumulate. Recent studies demonstrate that climate
change continues to cause heat waves and extreme weather events across the United States.48
Between May and mid-September, 2022, "nearly 10,000 daily maximum temperature records
were broken."49 Additionally, 2022 was "one of the top 10 hottest years on record for daily
maximum temperatures" in 13 states, as well as one of the top 10 hottest for daily minimum
(nighttime low) temperatures for 31 states.50 Warmer temperatures endanger public health by
increasing the risk of heart disease, worsening asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
from increases of ground-level ozone, and causing dehydration and many other ailments. 51
Studies have also found that heat waves and extreme weather events cause severe psychiatric and
mental health impacts. 52 Climate change continues to lead to higher than normal pollen
concentrations and earlier and longer pollen seasons, causing worse allergies and asthma.53 The
intensifying climate crisis also increases the risk of drought across the U.S, which impacts water
supply, agriculture, transportation, and energy, and increases the risk and magnitude of
wildfires.54 And recent projections show that sea level rise is anticipated to be on the high end of
model projections.55 Studies have found that many of the dangers wrought by climate change
exact a higher toll on people with low incomes and people of color. 56 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, pp. 14-15]
48 U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv. (HHS), Off. Climate Change & Health Equity, Climate and Health
Outlook (May 2023) [hereinafter HHS, Climate and Health Outlook],
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/climate-health-outlook-may-2023.pdf. See also Andrew Hoell etal.,
Water Year 2021 Compound Precipitation and Temperature Extremes in California and Nevada, 103 Bull,
of the Am. Meteorological Soc'y E2905, E2910 (Dec. 2022),
https://journals.ametsoc.org/view/journals/bams/103/12/BAMS-D-22-0112. l.xml?tab_body=fulltext-
display(human-caused climate change led to increased extreme high temperatures in 2021 in California and
Nevada); Kristy Dahl, Union of Concerned Scientists, Summer of 2022 Was a Hot One. What was Climate
Change's Impact on Heat?, The Equation (Sept. 21, 2022), https://blog.ucsusa.org/kristy-dahl/summer-of-
2022-was-a-hot-one-what-was-climate-changes-impact-on-heat/.
49 Dahl.
50 Id.
51 HHS, Climate and Health Outlook, at 2; Christopher Nolte et al., U.S. Global Change Rsch. Program,
Air quality, in II Impacts, risks, and adaptation in the United States: Fourth national climate assessment
512, 515 (2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_Chl3_Air-Quality_Full.pdf (climate
change leads to worsened air quality by increasing concentrations of ozone and particulate matter in many
parts of the U.S.); Am. Lung Ass'n, State of the Air 2023 Report 19 (2023),
https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf?ext=.pdf
(describing worsened air quality resulting from climate change).
52 See, e.g., Amruta Nori-Sarma et al., Association Between Ambient Heat and Risk of Emergency
Department Visits for Mental Health Among US Adults, 2010 to 2019, 79 JAMA Psychiatry 341 (2022),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/2789481?; Marshall Burke et al., Higher
temperatures increase suicide rates in the United States and Mexico, 8 Nature Climate Change 723 (2018),
https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/s41558-018-0222-x.pdf; Sarita Silveira et al., Chronic
Mental Health Sequelae of Climate Change Extremes: A Case Study of the Deadliest Californian Wildfire,
Int'l J. Env'tRsch. & Pub. Health, Feb. 4, 2021, https://www.mdpi.eom/1660-4601/18/4/1487
(demonstrating that climate-related extreme weather events such as wildfires can have severe mental health
impacts).
53 HHS, Climate and Health Outlook, at 5.
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54 See Marco Turco et al., Anthropogenic climate change impacts exacerbate summer forest fires in
California PNAS, June 12, 2023, https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2213815120; Ctr. for Climate &
Energy Sol., Drought and Climate Change, https://www.c2es.org/content/drought-and-climate-change/ (last
visited June 2, 2023). See also Nolte et al., at 521.
55 Benjamin Hamlington et al., Observation-based trajectory of future sea level for the coastal United
States tracks near high-end model projections, Commc'n Earth Env't, Oct. 6, 2022,
https://www.nature.com/articles/s43247-022-00537-z.
56 See, e.g., Sameed Khatana et al., Association of Extreme Heat With All-Cause Mortality in the
Contiguous US, 2008-2017, JAMA Network Open, May 19, 2022, at 1
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2792389 (finding extreme heat was
associated with higher mortality in the U.S., particularly among older adults and black individuals); Adam
Schlosser et al., Assessing Compounding Risks Across Multiple Systems and Sectors: A Socio-
Environmental Systems Risk-Triage Approach, Frontiers in Climate, Apr. 24, 2023, at 09,
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fclim.2023.1100600/full (identifying hot spots where flood
risks and water stress disproportionately impact low-income and nonwhite communities); Dahl ("[M]ore
than 80% of the counties with the most frequent heat alerts—21 or more days of heat alerts over the course
of the summer—have moderate to high levels of social vulnerability."). See generally EPA, Climate
Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States, A Focus on Six Impacts (2021),
https://www.epa.gOv/system/files/documents/2021-09/climate-vulnerability_september-2021_508.pdf.
The transportation sector has been responsible for an increasing percentage of GHG emissions
in the U.S. since 2009, thereby playing an outsized role in intensifying the climate crisis. When
EPA made its Endangerment Finding for GHGs, the transportation sector was responsible for
23% of total annual U.S. GHG emissions.57 Since then, transportation sector GHG emissions
have only increased as a share of U.S. emissions, surpassing the electric power sector as the
largest U.S. source of GHG emissions and contributing 27.2% of total GHG emissions in 202058
and 28.5%) in 2021.59 After dipping in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, carbon dioxide
(C02) emissions from the transportation sector increased by 11.5% between 2020 and 2021.60
Transportation as an end use sector "accounted] for 1,757.4 [million metric tons] C02 in 2021
or 37.9%) of total C02 emissions from fossil fuel combustion."61 Adopting stringent GHG
emission standards for light- and medium-duty vehicles will lead to massive public health
benefits by limiting these pollutants.62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 16]
57 74 Fed. Reg. at 66499.
58 EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2020, EPA 430-R-22-003, at ES-21
(2022), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-04/us-ghg-inventory-2022-main-text.pdf.
59 EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2021, EPA 430-R-23-002, at 2-19,
2-28 (2023), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/US-GHG-Inventory-2023-Main-
Textpdf.
60 Id. at 2-13.
61 Id. at 2-17.
62 See generally Am. Lung Ass'n, Driving to Clean Air: Health Benefits of Zero-Emission Cars and
Electricity (June 2023), https://www.lung.org/getmedia/9e9947ea-d4a6-476c-9c78-cccf7d49ffe2/ala-
driving-to-clean-air-report.pdf.
The IPCC's most recent synthesis of its Sixth Assessment Report confirms the danger to
public health and welfare posed by GHG emissions from the transportation sector. The report
found that global surface temperature was around 1.1 °C higher in 2011-2020 than it was in
1850-1900.63 While average annual GHG emissions growth has slowed in certain sectors such
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as energy supply and industry, growth in GHG emissions from the transportation sector has
remained relatively constant at about 2% per year.64 The latest IPCC report warned that "[d]eep,
rapid and sustained GHG emissions reductions, reaching net zero C02 emissions and including
strong emissions reductions of other GHGs ... are necessary to limit warming to 1.5°C ... or
less than 2°C ... by the end of the century."65 To have a chance at limiting global temperature
increase to 1.5? and avoid the worst impacts of climate change, current GHG emissions from the
transportation sector must drop by 59% by 2050 compared to 2020 emissions.66 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 16]
63 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Synthesis Report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment
Report (AR6): Longer Report, at 6 (2023),
https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syr/pdf/IPCC_AR6_SYR_LongerReport.pdf.
64 Id. at 10.
65 Id. at 33.
66 IPCC, Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change 32 (2022),
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FullReport.pdf.
There is consistent evidence showing the relationship between short-term exposure to PM and
mortality, particularly cardiovascular and respiratory mortality. Short- and long-term exposure to
PM2.5 can cause harmful health impacts such as heart attacks, strokes, worsened asthma, and
early death.72 In addition, short-term PM exposure has been linked to increases in infant
mortality, hospital admissions for cardiovascular disease, hospital admissions and emergency
visits for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and severity of asthma attacks and
hospitalization for asthma in children. Year-round exposure to PM is associated with elevated
risks of early death, primarily from cardiovascular and respiratory problems such as heart
disease, stroke, influenza, and pneumonia.73 These findings show the critical need for EPA to
minimize the harmful emissions from the transportation sector. Doing so will only improve
public health and the environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 17-18]
72 See EPA, Supplement to the 2019 Integrated Science Assessment for Particulate Matter (Final Report,
2022), atES-ii, 2-3, 2-4, https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/isa/recordisplay.cfm?deid=354490; EPA, Integrated
Science Assessment (ISA) for Particulate Matter (Dec.
2019),https ://cfpub. epa.gov/ncea/isa/recordisplay .cfm?deid=347534.
73 Am. Lung Ass'n, State of the Air 2023 Report (2023) at 25, https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-
6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf?ext=.pdf.
2. Reductions in criteria pollution emissions will bring health benefits to environmental
justice communities.
This rulemaking presents a critical opportunity to mitigate the adverse health impacts
plaguing communities that are overburdened by air pollution from motor vehicles and other
sources. According to the American Lung Association's (ALA) 2023 State of the Air report,
which grades counties on daily and long-term measures of particle pollution and daily measures
of ozone, more than 119 million Americans live in places that received failing grades for
unhealthy levels of ozone or PM in their air.88 The report notes:
88 Am. Lung Ass'n, State of the Air 2023 Report (2023) at 12, https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-
6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf?ext=.pdf.
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Although people of color are 41% of the overall population of the U.S., they are 54% of the
nearly 120 million people living in counties with at least one failing grade. And in the counties
with the worst air quality that get failing grades for all three pollution measures, 72% of the 18
million residents affected are people of color, compared to the 28% who are white. 89 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 21-22]
89 Id.
In addition to the disproportionate impact on people of color noted above, ALA outlines other
"high-risk" groups that are impacted by the pollution in these regions. For example, low-income
communities are particularly vulnerable and at risk of health impacts from pollution. More than
14.6 million people whose incomes meet the federal definition for living in poverty reside in
counties that received a failing grade on at least one of the ALA's pollutant indicators, while
nearly 2.6 million people living in poverty reside in counties that received failing grades on all
three pollutant measures.90 In addition, around 27 million children (under age 18) and 18 million
older adults (age 65 or older) live in counties that received a failing grade on at least one
pollutant.91 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 22]
90 Id. at 20.
91 Id.
In fact, it is well established that communities of color and economically disadvantaged
communities are disproportionately exposed to environmental burdens from a variety of sources.
The White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) released (and recently updated) a
Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool, which identifies communities around the country
that are "marginalized, underserved, and overburdened by pollution"92 and would therefore
qualify for Justice4093 investments (President Biden's key environmental justice initiative). The
Screening Tool identifies census tracts as "disadvantaged" if they are above the threshold for one
or more environmental or climate indicators (e.g., exposure to diesel PM or PM2.5, traffic
proximity and volume, or proximity to hazardous waste sites) and above the threshold for
socioeconomic indicators related to income and education.94 A recent analysis found that 64%
of the population in census tracts the Screening Tool identifies as disadvantaged are
Hispanic/Latino, Black or African American, or American Indian or Alaskan Native.95 Overall,
50% of Hispanic/Latino, Black or African American, and American Indian or Alaskan Native
individuals in the country reside in disadvantaged communities, compared to just 17% of White,
Non-Hispanic/Latino individuals.96 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 22-23]
92 The White House, Biden-Harris Administration Launches Version 1.0 of Climate and Economic Justice
Screening Tool, Key Step in Implementing President Biden's Justice40 Initiative (Nov. 22, 2022)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/news-updates/2022/ll/22/biden-harris-administration-launches-version-
1-0-of-cli mate-and-economic-justice-screening-tool-key-step-in-implementing-president-bidens-justice40-
initiative/. See CEQ, Preliminary Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool,
https://screeningtool.geoplatform.gOv/en/#3/33.47/-97.5.
93 The White House, The Path to Achieving Justice40 (July 20, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/briefing-room/2021/07/20/the-path-to-achieving-justice40/.
94 CEQ, Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool: Technical Support Document, (Nov. 2022) at 4-8,
https://static-data-screeningtool.geoplatform.gOv/data-versions/l.0/data/score/downloadable/1.0-cejst-
technical-supp ort-document.pdf.
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95 Emma Rutkowski et al., Justice40 Initiative: Mapping Race and Ethnicity, Rhodium Group (Feb. 24,
2022), https://rhg.com/research/justice40-initiative-mapping-race-and-ethnicity/.
96 Id.
Once EPA makes an endangerment finding, it must set standards that are commensurate to the
magnitude of the danger to public health and welfare posed by the covered emissions. 12 The
Clean Air Act defines "effects on welfare" broadly, including "effects on . . . weather . . . and
climate." 13 The dangers to public health and welfare posed by GHGs that EPA originally cited
in the 2009 Endangerment Finding—"risks associated with changes in air quality, increases in
temperatures, changes in extreme weather events, increases in food- and water-borne pathogens,
and changes in aeroallergens,"14 to name a few—have only increased. EPA recognized that this
was likely to happen in the Endangerment Finding itself, finding that these "risk[s] and the
severity of adverse impacts on public welfare are expected to increase over time." 15 As for
criteria pollutants and air toxics—PM, ozone, VOCs, NOx, SOx, CO, diesel exhaust,
formaldehyde, acetaldehyde, acrolein, benzene, butadiene, ethylbenzene, naphthalene, and
POM/PAHs—their harmful health and environmental effects have long been known, and EPA
has recognized the need for continued reductions in their emissions. 16 . [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 10]
12 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532 (noting that Section 202(a) "charge[s] [EPA] with protecting the
public's 'health' and 'welfare'"); Coal, for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 117, 122 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (stating that EPA must carry out "the job Congress gave it in § 202(a)—utilizing emission
standards to prevent reasonably anticipated endangerment from maturing into concrete harm"). See also S.
Rep. No. 91-1196, at 24 (1970), reprinted in A Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,
at 424 (1974) (Section 202(a) requires EPA to "make a judgment on the contribution of moving sources to
deterioration of air quality and establish emission standards which would provide the required degree of
control."). Cf. 74 Fed. Reg. at 66505 ("the Administrator is required to protect public health and welfare,
but she is not asked to wait until harm has occurred. EPA must be ready to take regulatory action to prevent
harm before it occurs.").
13 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h).
14 74 Fed. Reg. at 66497.
15 74 Fed. Reg. at 66498-66499.
16 88 Fed. Reg. at 29186, 29208-24
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
The American Lung Association (ALA) released its updated State of the Air report and finds
that nearly 36% of Americans—119.6 million people—still live in places with failing grades for
unhealthy levels of ozone or particle pollution.3 The number of people living in counties with
failing grades for daily spikes in deadly particle pollution was 63.7 million, the most ever
reported under the current national standard. The report also finds again that the burden of living
with unhealthy air is not shared equally. Although people of color are 41% of the overall
population of the U.S., they are 54% of the nearly 120 million people living in counties with at
least one failing grade. And in the counties with the worst air quality that get failing grades for
all three pollution measures, 72% of the 18 million residents affected are people of color,
compared to the 28% who are white. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 6-7]
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3 American Lung Association, State of the Air, Key Findings, 2023.
https://www.lung.org/research/sota/key-findings (Attachment C)
ALA also recently released a new report that estimates the health and economic benefits of a
transition to 100 percent zero-emission new passenger vehicle sales by 2035, coupled with non-
combustion electricity generation.4 ALA find that, by 2050, the national public health benefits in
the U.S. due to cleaner air could reach $978 billion in public health benefits, 89,300 fewer
premature deaths, 2.2 fewer asthma attacks and 10.7 million fewer lost work days. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 6-7]
4 American Lung Association, "Driving to Clean Air: Health Benefits of Zero-Emission Cars and
Electricity," June 2023. https://www.lung.org/clean-air/electric-vehicle-report/driving-to-clean-air.
(Attachment D)
These recent studies align with and reinforce the need for and the feasibility of protective
emissions standards for passenger vehicles in the timeframe proposed by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 6-7]
Organization: Gabrielle Lawrence
I am a child psychologist and am speaking today as a climate activist who worries and loses
sleep thinking of the damage that the pollution we have in our air is causing. Damage to both
adults and most importantly to children. With poorer children being the most severely damaged.
Daily, clouds of mercury, arsenic and dozens of other heavy metals from power plants and tail
pipe fill our air and water, including one of the worst pollutant, the small particle, PM2.5, soot
coming from our cars, trucks and buses. With all of those, we are poisoning ourselves and our
children. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0455, pp. 1-2]
Daily in my office, I see children who struggle to sit still for even a moment, who struggle in
school because of learning disorders impacting reading and math, with ADHD preventing them
from focusing and Autism Spectrum Disorder that impacts them socially and in many other
ways, All of these impairments have increased dramatically in the last decade. Concerning
Autism Spectrum Disorder, we know that it is directly related to brain impairment and that
impairment may be related to air-pollution. Today, the CDC indicated that 1 in 44 children, or
2.3 % of children in our country have been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum disorder.
That number is now 241 % higher than in 2020. For these children, multiple peer reviewed,
scientific studies have been done using brain-imaging methods to investigate genetic variations
in brain development. The studies investigating air-pollution exposure have found a deficit in
white matter, brain connectivity, and vascularization (Chen et al. 2015). A relationship has also
been found with air pollutants such as; nitrogen oxide (Kalkbrenner et al. 2015), the particulate
matter, PM2.5, (Jung et al. 2013), polyaromatic hydrocarbons, diesel exhaust, and carbon
monoxide. These are only three studies among dozens of studies that suggest a strong connection
between Autism Spectrum Disorder and air-pollution. Numerous other studies with adults have
investigated the relationship between air-pollution and cognitive impairment such as Alzheimer's
and other dementias. Those studies also give evidence that the same air-pollutants listed above,
also create cognitive impairment in adults. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0455, pp. 1-2]
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Organization: Governing for Impact and Evergreen Action (GFI)
In addition to contributing to the climate crisis, light and medium duty passenger vehicles are
responsible for emitting harmful pollutants including carbon monoxide, particulate matter, and
nitrogen oxides, which can cause or contribute to significant negative public health outcomes
such as lung and heart diseases. 15 These harmful health outcomes disproportionately affect low
income populations and communities of color, who are exposed to greater amounts of vehicle
pollution. 16 Unfortunately, these same communities are at the greatest risk of harm from the
impacts of climate change, and often lack sufficient resources or support to protect themselves
from these harmful impacts. 17 Strong transportation emissions standards — for both GHGs and
criteria pollutants — will limit the present and imminent public health threats that vulnerable
populations face due to vehicle pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, pp. 2-3]
15 See U.S. Dep'tof Transp., "Cleaner Air," https://www.transportation.gov/mission/health/cleaner-
air#:~:text=Vehicle%20emissions%20contribute%20to%20the,illnesses%2C%20including%20pneumonia
%20and%20b ronchitis (last visited June 15, 2023).
16 See, e.g., Maria Cecilia Pinto de Moura and David Reichmuth, "Inequitable Exposure to Air Pollution
from Vehicles in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic," Union of Concerned Scientists (Jun 21, 2019),
https://www.ucsusa.org/about/news/communities-color-breathe-66-more-air-pollution-vehicles.
17 See generally, EPA "Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States: A Focus on Six
Impacts," 430-R-21- 003 (2021), available at: https://www.epa.gov/cira/social-vulnerability-report.
Organization: GreenLatinos et al.
Pollution from vehicles makes us sick and kills us. The data shows this over and over again.
We need long-term protective regulation now. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0789, p. 2]
For example, Latino/e children are three times more likely
(https://www.jpedhc.org/article/S0891-5245(06)00737-l/fulltext) than white children to live in
counties with low air quality. About 10% of Latino/e children
(https://www.edf.org/blog/2014/04/22/why-latinos-are-disproportionately-affected-asthma-and-
what-we-can-
do#:~:text=Today%20in%20the%20United%20States,from%20this%20chronic%20respiratory%
20illness.) suffer from asthma, and Latino/e children are 40% more likely to die from asthma
than non-Latino white children. These disparities have only increased over time relative to the air
quality standards set by the U.S. EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0789, p. 2]
Organization: Growth Energy
A. Other Pollutants
In discussing the impacts of the rule on emissions of other pollutants, EPA entirely leaves out
consideration of biofuels. As discussed above, ethanol has lower emissions of many pollutants
than petroleum gasoline. Indeed, recent studies by the University of California Riverside and the
University of Illinois at Chicago found that use of more ethanol and ethanol- blended fuel
significantly reduces harmful pollutants such as particulate matter (PM), carbon monoxide, and
benzene. 19 Just as with GHGs, that failure renders EPA's assessment of emissions of other
pollutants inaccurate. And just as with GHGs, EPA misses an opportunity to reduce emissions
through incentivizing biofuel use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 12]
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19 Patrick Roth et al., Investigating the Effect of Varying Ethanol and Aromatic Fuel Blends on Secondary
Organic Aerosol (SOA) Forming Potential for a FFV-GDI Vehicle: Comparison of Exhaust Emissions
Between E10 CaRFG and Splash Blended E15, University of California Riverside (2018); Steffen Mueller,
The Impact of Higher Ethanol Blend Levels on Vehicle Emissions in Five Global Cities, University of
Illinois at Chicago Energy Resources Center (November 2018).
That failure is particularly egregious in the context of EPA's efforts reduce aromatics in
petroleum fuels that contribute to PM emissions. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,401. As discussed above,
ethanol has an excellent octane rating, and blending it into gasoline in greater quantities can
therefore allow reductions in aromatics and associated PM emissions. EPA explicitly sought
comment on ways to reduce aromatic content, but it completely ignored that increasing the
ethanol content of gasoline is a simple way to do so that has significant benefits. Multiple studies
continue to show that increasing ethanol content in gasoline reduces PM emissions.20 Indeed,
the benefits of ethanol in reducing PM were recently confirmed in EPA's own work with
Environment and Climate Change Canada.21 In that study, fuel with increased ethanol content
showed the deepest reduction in PM compared to the baseline fuel with heavy aromatics. Growth
Energy therefore urges EPA to explore the widespread use of higher ethanol blends to replace
heavy aromatics to significantly reduce PM emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 12]
20 Growth Energy has provided such studies in previous submissions to EPA, including our comment in
support of EPA's proposal to implement the "Request from States for Removal of Gasoline Volatility
Waiver."
21 EPA, Exhaust Emission Impacts of Replacing Heavy Aromatic Hydrocarbons in Gasoline with
Alternate Octane Sources (Apr 2023), Dkt ID: EPA-420-R-23-008.
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
Second, PEVs are heavier, and will increase particulate matter emissions through increased
brake, tire, and road wear.
Organization: Interfaith Power & Light
In addition, electrifying cars and light trucks will be key to improving air quality and saving
lives across the nation. More than 119 million American residents currently live in areas with
unhealthy levels of air pollution. According to research from Harvard University, more than 8
million people died from the effects of fossil fuel combustion in 2018, meaning that fossil fuels
like oil and coal are linked to 1 in 5 deaths worldwide. Pollutants caused by burning fossil fuels
have been linked to early death, heart attacks, respiratory disorders, stroke, and asthma. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0530, p. 1]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
Additionally, a full assessment of relative air quality and health benefits across demographics,
as done for the heavy-duty multi-pollutant rule, is recommended for this light-duty and medium-
duty multi-pollutant rule. It is widely understood that heavy-duty vehicles contribute to racial
disparities in exposure to air pollution, and EPA reported the projected air quality impacts across
demographics in their finalized heavy-duty multi-pollutant rule. Inequities in air pollution
exposure exist for light-duty vehicle emissions as well. One study finds that on a national level,
people of color are exposed to 46% more ambient PM2.5 from light-duty gasoline vehicles than
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White people. 142 This is a greater disparity than that of HDVs; the same study finds that people
of color exposed to 35% higher ambient PM2.5 levels from heavy-duty diesel vehicles compared
to White people. Additionally, the health benefits from the heavy-duty multipollutant rule, as
projected by the EPA, are on similar scales to that of the proposed light-duty and medium-duty
vehicle rule. 143 Thus, as the environmental justice and health implications of the light-duty and
medium-duty vehicle rule are significant, a full assessment of the projected distribution of
changes in PM2.5 and ozone concentrations by geography, race/ethnicity, and income is
recommended for the finalized rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 53-54]
142 Tessum, C et al. (2021). PM2.5 Polluters Disproportionately and Systemically Affect People of Color
in the United States," Science Advances 7, no. 18: eabf4491, https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abf4491.
143 EPA's proposed light-duty and medium-duty rule is estimated to result in $63 billion and $280 billion
(for 7% and 3% discount rates, respectively) in total monetized health benefits from 2027 to 2055. EPA's
finalized heavy-duty multipollutant rule is projected to result in $53-150 billion and $91-260 billion (for
7% and 3% discount rates, respectively) in total monetized health benefits from 2027 to 2045.
Benefits and cost-effectiveness of the proposal
The LDV and MDV proposal is projected to reduce 15,000 tons of PM2.5, 66,000 tons of
NOx, and 220,000 tons of hydrocarbons from 2027 to 2055.144 These benefits are compared to
2055 levels without the proposal. Based on the previous section on Particulate Matter emission
standards, health benefits associated with PM reductions could be greater than EPA's
projections. The proposed standards would reduce air pollution near-road where affected
populations are often low-income or communities of color. Reducing these emissions will
provide cleaner air and are critical to improving public health. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569,
p. 55]
144 US EPA. (2023). Multi-Pollutant emission standards for Model years 2027 and later Light-duty and
Medium-duty vehicles Program Announcement, https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-
04/420f23009.pdf
In addition to the feasible cost, the continuing technology improvement will bring greater
climate and health benefits. As discussed in the DRIA Chapter 3.2.4, the introduction of more
electric vehicles will help make the declining FTP NMOG + NOX fleet average fully feasible.
The MY2021 test data shows 19 vehicles with emissions performance currently below 15
mg/mile, and two below 10 mg/mile from a range of automakers. Similarly, MDV 2022 and
2023 also show similar low emission performance compared to the proposal limit. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 55]
Organization: John Graham
The heavier weight of BEVs not only increases cost, but also generates higher tire wear and
brake wear particulate emissions. These impacts were not considered in the proposed rule.32
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 21]
32 DRIA Section 9.6 page 9-26 states only, "Using the miles traveled (for tailpipe, tire wear and brake
wear emissions) and liquid fuel consumed (for evaporative and fuel spillage emissions), we can then
generate sets of emission rates for use in OMEGA." This suggests that weight was not a factor in
evaluating tire wear and brake wear emissions.
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Organization: Jonathan Walker
[From Hearing Testimony, May 10, 2023] I hope to offer a unique viewpoint as part of the
supporting the strongest emission standards possible. You have heard about the health
consequences of these kind of emissions and how the public health issues fall disproportionately
on people of color and poverty and also support the greenhouse gas emission control, but I am
here because I am an ophthalmologist and in particular, I am a retina specialist, which means I
treat diseases that cause blindness which means macular degeneration and diabetic retinopathy,
things you cannot fix with glasses or Lasik or cataract surgery. When the retina is damaged, it's
gone forever and so is the vision. The tiny blood vessel in the retina are an early marker for that
damage before that damage shows up elsewhere in the body. Basically the retina is like a canary
in the coal mine when it comes to the effect of pollution on the human body and the research
clearly shows that the emissions produced by the vehicles can worsen retina health in a way that
risks permanent vision loss. There are measurable effects on the retina with even relatively low
levels of exposure and I am going to drop some references in the chat and you can also just
Google air pollution and retina damage and I'll also be submitting written comments on the
docket. To thank you, you are all doing important work to protect us from the threats to the
planet and our overall health but I want you to know that you are helping to avoid blindness too.
And we know that industry representatives as have been pointed out have a duty to provide
reasons to weaken the law and you guys need to balance all the viewpoints and what I am about
to say sounds harsh but I think it applies, the tobacco industry in the 1950s when it was clear that
smoking caused cancer yet their lobby sowed doubt and uncertainty when there was none
causing untold harm as people kept smoking. So please continue to keep our air clean by
continue to working to keep the law strong. [From Hearing Testimony, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-5115, Day 2]
Organization: Metropolitan Washington Air Quality Committee (MWAQC) et al.
Poor air quality affects the residents living and working in metropolitan Washington. The
region is currently designated as being in nonattainment of federal National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for ozone. Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) are a precursor pollutant of ground-level
ozone. In addition, NOx is a precursor to secondary particulate matter, such as particulate matter
2.5 micrometers in diameter and smaller (PM2.5). Exposure to PM2.5, along with ground-level
ozone, is associated with premature death, increased hospitalizations, and emergency room visits
due to exacerbation of chronic heart and lung diseases and other serious health impacts.
Some communities in metropolitan Washington face higher rates of illnesses such as asthma than
the national average, and these illnesses are aggravated by these pollutants. As such, reductions
in NOx emissions will provide health benefits from both reduced ozone and PM2.5 pollution.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0503, pp. 1-2]
While significant progress has been made in metropolitan Washington to reduce NOx
emissions, addressing sources of NOx, including those from on-road vehicles, is critical to
continuing to deliver cleaner air for the residents of the region. Over the last five ozone seasons,
the region recorded an annual average of eight unhealthy air days, which are in part caused by
emissions transported into the region, making this not only a regional issue but a national one.
EPA estimates that strengthening these standards will reduce NOx and PM2.5 emissions by 41%
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and 35% in 2055, respectively, as shown in Table 4 of the Federal Register notice. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0503, pp. 1-2]
Organization: MCS Referral & Resources (MCSRR)
At II.B.5, EPA describes Carbon Monoxide as "a colorless, odorless gas emitted from
combustion processes." This is a true statement as far as it goes but incomplete and misleading.
EPA should acknowledge that CO is concentrated in rainwater, freshwater, saltwater, and some
soils to higher levels than found in air. CO also is released by some vegetation and higher in
mammals, who excrete some of the CO they produce endogenously via their lungs, skin, and
eyes whenever the level of CO in ambient air is lower. Lastly, CO also is produced in the
atmosphere from the oxidation of methane, isoprene, terpene, and acetone.
See: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/TAR-04.pdffEPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0615, p. 4]
At II.B.6, EPA says "The lifetimes of the components present in diesel exhaust range from
seconds to days." This is not true of CO. According to a 2012 review by Louis Jaffe, "the exact
duration of CO in the lower atmosphere is not known with certainty; however, the mean
residence time has been variously estimated to be between 0.3 and 5.0 years."
See: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00022470.1968.10469168 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0615, p. 4]
At II.C.5, EPA claims:
"Controlled human exposure studies of subjects with coronary artery disease show a decrease
in the time to onset of exercise-induced angina (chest pain) and electrocardiogram changes
following CO exposure. "[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, p. 4]
EPA gives no reference for this claim, which is not true. While a few studies commissioned
by EPA from Aronow et al in the 1970s and Allred et al in the 1980s claimed to find this result,
both were undermined by falsifying their methods and results. See:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/fmwp8bmke2e8zfo/Donnay%202015%20SOT%20poster%20on%2
0EPA%20CO%20 NAAQS%20Fraud.pdf?dl=0 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, p. 4]
Not surprisingly, subsequent efforts to reproduce these findings have been unsuccessful. At
least 14 studies have reported insignificant results: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, p. 4]
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/7ternrf9343136,24923364,21933352,17321552,16937915,
11696871,104926
50,8210613,8441830,6695663,6750056,7304396,7389699,4640286&format=abstract [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0615, p. 4]
Given this evidence, EPA should stop claiming that people with coronary artery disease show
a decrease in time to exercise-induced angina or ECG changes after CO exposure. They do not.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0615, p. 4]
Organization: Minnesota Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
CRITERIA POLLUTANTS AND PARTICULATE MATTER
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Bringing high octane fuel to market in the form of midlevel ethanol blends will be
significantly less capital-intensive than attempting to increase blend stock octane with
hydrocarbon components at refineries. It will also be incredibly cleaner. The avoided production
cost and offset emissions lower end-costs to consumers, reducing both economic costs and social
costs related to health and environment, key considerations in advancing environmental justice
and avoiding adverse impacts from oil refineries on communities that have historically borne
them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 9-10]
Increased volumes of ethanol in fuel displace the most harmful compounds from gasoline.25
These aromatic hydrocarbon additives (i.e. benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene - or BTEX)
have high cancer-causing potential. Increasing the ethanol volume in fuel to a midlevel blend has
a positive impact on tailpipe emissions of toxins, including significant reductions in particulates
and carbon monoxide. These same aromatic hydrocarbons are also precursors to the formation of
secondary organic aerosols (SOA), which in turn are a major contributor to particulate matter
emissions (PM2.5). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 9-10]
25 Environmental and Energy Study Institute. Ethanol and Air Quality - Separating Fact from Fiction.
October 12, 2018. https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/ethanol-and-air-quality-separating-fact-from-fiction.
According to EPA's review for the 2020 Anti-backsliding Study, ethanol does not form SOA
directly or affect SOA formation. However, as EPA states, toluene is a large contributor to SOA.
Ethanol's high-octane value "greatly reduces the need for other high-octane components
including aromatics such as toluene."26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 9-10]
26 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Air Act Section 211 (v)(l) Anti-backsliding Study,
(2020) Appendix A, Page 61.
As explained in EPA's Fuel Trends Report: Gasoline 2006-2016, "Ethanol's high-octane
value has also allowed refiners to significantly reduce the aromatic content of the gasoline, a
trend borne out in the data." EPA's data shows that aromatics' share of gasoline volume dropped
from nearly 25 percent to 19.3 percent, and benzene volume dropped from 0.99 percent to 0.58
percent between 2000 and 2016, the same time as ethanol blending increased from 1 percent to at
least 10 percent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 9-10]
EPA's data demonstrates the air quality and human health benefits of increased ethanol
blending in gasoline by replacing harmful aromatics with clean octane from ethanol. Limiting the
aromatics content of gasoline and using higher ethanol blends in high octane fuel would further
reduce risks from SOA formation and exposure to PM 2.5, which causes serious respiratory,
cardiovascular, and other health harm, including premature death, according to the American
Lung Association. The same GDI engine advancements that help lower GHG emissions have the
unfortunate side effect of increasing particulate emissions, which could be reduced by use of
midlevel ethanol blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 9-10]
Petroleum-based aerosol particles represent a significant source of pollution, especially in
population-dense urban areas. Health issues related to PM and other emission-based pollutants
can be reduced by lowering the volume of petroleum in the domestic gasoline pool, which can be
accomplished by increasing octane with higher ethanol blends and replacing more hydrocarbon
aromatics with ethanol. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 9-10]
1714
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It is well known that particulate emissions are a strong function of aromatic fuel components
with a high double bond equivalent and low vapor pressure, and the particulate forming potential
is well represented by the "PMI" metric developed by Honda.27 The value of the PMI metric has
been validated in many other studies including the joint auto-oil Coordinating Research
Council28 and the EPA.29 PMI and particulate emissions can be reduced by altering refinery
processes to reduce heavy aromatic content of the fuel, and, as noted, ethanol can replace those
aromatics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 9-10]
27 Aikawa, Sakurai, and Jetter, "Development of a Predictive Model for Gasoline Vehicle Particulate
Matter Emissions", SAE paper 2010-01-2115, 2010; https://doi.org/10.4271/2010-01-2115.
28 Coordinating Research Council, "Evaluation and Investigation of Fuel Effects on Gaseous and
Particulate Emissions on SIDI In-Use Vehicles," Report No. E- 94-2, March 2016;
http://crcsite.wpengine.eom/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CRC_2017-3-21_03-20955_E94-2FinalReport-
Revlb.pdf.
29 Environmental Protection Agency, "Exhaust Emission Impacts of Replacing Heavy Aromatic
Hydrocarbons in Gasoline with Alternate Octane Sources", report EPA-420-R-23-008, April 2023.
Perhaps the most credible and comprehensive study on the effects of ethanol on particulate
emissions topic was published by the University of California Center for Environmental
Research and Technology.30 The study showed statistically significant improvements in
particulate emissions for E15 compared to E10. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 9-10]
30 Tang et al., "Expanding the ethanol blend wall in California: Emissions comparison between E10 and
E15", Fuel, June 2023; https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.fuel.2023.128836.
EPA should adopt rules to limit PMI of both finished fuels and the hydrocarbon blend stocks
used for E10, E15, and E85. Limiting PMI of hydrocarbon blend stocks will ensure that the
particulate emissions benefits of ethanol are not offset by negative changes at refineries. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 10-11]
Improved fuel property standards should be a high priority because they can achieve
significantly lower particulate emissions and dramatically lower GHG emissions. California's
Low Carbon Fuel Standard already recognizes the importance of fuel standards, and it has led to
dramatic increases in sales of E85 and other low- carbon biofuels. High-octane low-carbon fuels
are a key enabler for continued GHG emissions improvements in the millions of liquid-fueled
vehicles which will be produced over the next 10+ years, as documented by the U.S. Department
of Energy Co-Optimization of Fuels & Engines initiative and in numerous other studies, such as
those by MIT and by automakers. A detailed proposed blueprint for future high-octane low-
carbon fuels exists in the Next Generation Fuels Act, and EPA has the statutory authority to
make these changes without waiting for Congress to act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp.
10-11]
Organization: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
The MPCA has supported EPA's previous efforts to strengthen vehicle emissions standards
and appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule. We see the proposed
rulemaking as an opportunity to advance climate action, reduce harm to Minnesotans from
criteria pollutants and air toxics, and accelerate the transition to electric vehicles in our state.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
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Importance of new federal greenhouse gas standards for climate action
The transportation sector represents the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in
Minnesota. The top three sources in the transportation sector are light-duty trucks, heavy-duty
trucks, and passenger cars.l These categories are inclusive of light and medium-duty vehicles
discussed in this proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
Stronger vehicle emissions standards at the federal level have lowered greenhouse gas
emissions from vehicles generally. However, the long-term consumer trend of choosing larger
vehicles and the general trend of more miles driven (except during the pandemic) are
counteracting more significant emissions reductions in this sector. Increased emissions
stringency at the federal level is critical to continuing the trend of emission reductions in this
sector. Accelerating light- and medium-duty vehicle electrification is vital for Minnesota to meet
its climate and air pollution goals. Specifically, adopting new light- and medium-duty vehicle
emissions standards would: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
1 Greenhouse gas emissions in Minnesota 2005-2020, https://www.pca.state.mn.us/sites/default/files/lraq-
2sy23.pdf.
— Help the state meet economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
In 2022, as part of the publication of the state's Climate Action Framework,2 Governor Walz
and Lieutenant Governor Flanagan endorsed the economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions
reduction goal for the state to reduce emissions by 50% by 2030 and to become carbon-neutral
by 2050. In May 2023, Minnesota codified these targets in statute. Achieving these goals will
require action at all levels of government, across businesses, and by individuals. The proposed
multipollutant standards will be critical for reducing emissions from the transportation sector.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
2 Minnesota's Climate Action Framework, https://climate.state.mn.us/minnesotas-climate-action-
framework.
— Advance transportation actions and targets in the state's Climate Action Framework. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
Minnesota's Climate Action Framework is a plan that sets a vision for how the state will
address and prepare for climate change. The framework broadly guides the direction of climate
action toward a carbon-neutral, resilient, and equitable future for Minnesota and contains
immediate, near-term actions, as well as key progress indicators with measurable targets. The
framework was developed based on significant input from stakeholders, the public, and the
Tribal Nations located within Minnesota's modern borders [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp.
1-2].
The proposed light- and medium-duty vehicle standards would advance the following actions
in the Clean Transportation goal: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
— Increase the use of clean fuels, including lower-carbon biofuels (Sub-initiative 1.2.1)
— Expand electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure (Sub-initiative 1.2.2)
— Increase EV availability and access (Sub-initiative 1.2.3)
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— Accelerate the transition to EVs and clean transportation (Sub-initiative 1.2.4)
— Improve vehicle efficiency and emissions standards (Sub-initiative 1.2.5)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
Additionally, the proposed standards would advance the following targets for the Clean
Transportation goal: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 1-2]
— Reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector 80% by 2040
— Reach 20% electric vehicles on Minnesota roads by 2030 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557,
pp.1-2]
Importance of new federal standards for reducing harm from non-greenhouse gas pollution
It is the MPCA's responsibility to protect Minnesotans' health and environment in
collaboration with the federal government through cooperative federalism. Minnesota is attaining
all National Ambient Air Quality Standards; however, as we better understand the health impacts
of air pollution, EPA continues to make these standards more stringent. As emissions from
stationary sources continue to decline, it is increasingly important to drive down emissions from
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, p. 2]
Organization: National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)
As explained in EPA's Fuel Trends Report: Gasoline 2006-2016, "Ethanol's high-octane
value has also allowed refiners to significantly reduce the aromatic content of the gasoline, a
trend borne out in the data." EPA's data shows that aromatics' share of gasoline volume dropped
from nearly 25 percent to 19.3 percent, and benzene volume dropped from 0.99 percent to 0.58
percent between 2000 and 2016, the same time as ethanol blending increased from 1 percent to at
least 10 percent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 8]
EPA's data demonstrates the air quality and human health benefits of increased ethanol
blending in gasoline by replacing harmful aromatics with clean octane from ethanol. Limiting the
aromatics content of gasoline and using higher ethanol blends in high octane fuel would further
reduce risks from SOA formation and exposure to PM 2.5, which causes serious respiratory,
cardiovascular, and other health harm, including premature death, according to the American
Lung Association. The same GDI engine advancements that help lower GHG emissions have the
unfortunate side effect of increasing particulate emissions, which could be reduced by use of
midlevel ethanol blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 8]
Petroleum-based aerosol particles represent a significant source of pollution, especially in
population-dense urban areas. Health issues related to PM and other emission-based pollutants
can be reduced by lowering the volume of petroleum in the domestic gasoline pool, which can be
accomplished by increasing octane with higher ethanol blends and replacing more hydrocarbon
aromatics with ethanol. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 8]
It is well known that particulate emissions are a strong function of aromatic fuel components
with a high double bond equivalent and low vapor pressure, and the particulate forming potential
is well represented by the "PMI" metric developed by Honda. 27 The value of the PMI metric
has been validated in many other studies including the joint auto-oil Coordinating Research
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Council 28 and the EPA. 29 PMI and particulate emissions can be reduced by altering refinery
processes to reduce heavy aromatic content of the fuel, and, as noted, ethanol can replace those
aromatics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 8]
27 Aikawa, Sakurai, and Jetter, "Development of a Predictive Model for Gasoline Vehicle Particulate
Matter Emissions", SAE paper 2010-01-2115, 2010; https://doi.org/10.4271/2010-01-2115
28 Coordinating Research Council, "Evaluation and Investigation of Fuel Effects on Gaseous and
Particulate Emissions on SIDI In-Use Vehicles," Report No. E-94-2, March 2016;
http://crcsite.wpengine.eom/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CRC_2017-3-21_03-20955_E94-2FinalReport-
Revlb.pdf
29 US Environmental Protection Agency, "Exhaust Emission Impacts of Replacing Heavy Aromatic
Hydrocarbons in Gasoline with Alternate Octane Sources", report EPA-420-R-23-008, April 2023
Organization: National Farmers Union (NFU)
Higher vehicle weight also increases wear and tear on vehicle tires, which causes higher
particulate emissions, as illustrated in Figure 56 reproduced below.22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0581, pp. 10-11]
22 Alan Stanard et al., Brake and Tire Wear Emissions-Project 17RD016: Final Report, Revision 2, Eastern
Research Group, Inc. report prepared for California Air Resources Board, at 87, Feb. 11, 2021, available at
https://ww2.arb. ca.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/17RD016 .pdf.
[See original comment for Figure 56. Total vehicle test cycle PM mass emissions vs simulated
vehicle test weight, categorized by pad material] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 10-11]
EPA has regulated tailpipe particulate emissions for many years, but there is abundant
evidence that wear particles from tires and brakes are at least as important as tailpipe
emissions.23 According to one study, "[h]alf a tonne of battery weight can result in tire
emissions that are almost 400 more times greater than real-world tailpipe emissions, everything
else being equal."24 Moreover, minority and low-income communities are more likely to be
exposed to higher traffic-related air pollution, causing environmental justice concerns.25 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 12]
23 See, e.g., Xiaoliang Wang, et al., Evidence of non-tailpipe emission contributions to PM2.5 and PM10
near southern California highways, Environmental Pollution, Vol. 317, Jan. 15, 2023,
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.envpol.2022.120691.
24 Emissions Analytics, Gaining Traction, Losing Tread - Pollution from tire wear now 1,850 times worse
than exhaust emissions, May 10, 2022 Newsletter - Tyre Emissions,
https://www.emissionsanalytics.com/news/gaining- traction-losing-tread.
25 Xiaoliang Wang, et al., supra n.23.
But the proposed emissions standards fail to address the large and growing problem of
particulate emissions from tires, and instead focus on more stringent tailpipe particulate
standards which will add cost without necessarily improving air quality. EPA should not
artificially incentivize heavy BEVs by counting them as "zero emissions," when lighter weight
solutions can provide similar GHG emissions benefits and better safety. EPA needs to look
beyond the tailpipe and create holistic standards which incentivize real improvements. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 12]
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Organization: National Tribal Air Association (NTAA)
Air Toxics
As reflected in the title of the proposed rule, the benefits of reduced emissions from light-duty
and medium-duty vehicles will include reduced exposures to multiple tailpipe emissions. In
addition to greenhouse gases and smog-forming compounds, an array of pollutants will be
addressed that are harmful to human health. These include benzene, a known human
carcinogen6. Tribes in or near urban environments and those with residents near roadways will
benefit from decreased exposure to these multiple toxic air pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0504, p. 2]
6 Benzene; CASRN 71-43-2, U.S.EPA, National Center for Environmental Assessment, Integrated Risk
Information System (IRIS)
Organization: ReginaldModlin andB. ReidDetchon
We note the comment in the Proposed Rule that "in addition to substantially reducing GHG
emissions, a longer-term rulemaking could also address criteria pollutant and air toxics emissions
from the new light-duty vehicle fleet - especially important considerations during the transition
to zero-emission vehicles." Most vehicles entering the market today use gasoline direct
injection (GDI) to enhance performance. DOE studies have identified a notable increase in
ultrafine particle emissions from GDI engines. The increased number of particles and their size
include emissions of toxic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 2-3]
For mobile source air toxics, such as PAHs derived from gasoline emissions, the Clean Air
Act requires "the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the application of
technology which will be available." In that context, just as with greenhouse gas emissions,
vehicles and fuels must be seen as parts of an integrated system. The Department of Energy
clearly understands the need for such an approach. Since 2016, the Co-Optimization of Fuels &
Engines initiative (known as Co-Optima) has explored how simultaneous innovations in fuels
and engines can boost fuel economy and vehicle performance, while reducing emissions. The
Co-Optima team views fuels "not as standalone elements in the transportation system, but as
dynamic design variables that can work with modern engines to optimize and revolutionize the
entire on-road fleet." Their work will be useful as EPA considers the adoption of improved fuels
in current and future rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 2-3]
Emissions from aromatic compounds in gasoline were commonly thought to be short-lived,
thus posing little threat to human health. But that was wrong. A recent General Motors study
found that nearly 96% of the fine-particle emissions from gasoline are caused by the aromatics in
the fuel. Fine particle pollution from fossil fuel combustion is the leading cause of premature
death in the world, responsible for cardiovascular, respiratory, and other health effects that kill
more than 8 million people annually. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 4-5]
Not all particles are alike. Among the worst are polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
(PAHs). Once inhaled, these ultrafine particles reach the deepest part of the lungs and enter the
bloodstream, where they can cross biological membranes, even the placental barrier, and reach
the brain. Fetal exposure to extremely low levels of PAHs has been associated with
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developmental delay at age 3 and reduced IQ at age 5. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 4-
5]
Research has shown that PAHs attach themselves to ultrafine particles in the exhaust stream,
extending their lives over long distances and durations. This new understanding is one reason
why EPA's atmospheric models, by the agency's own admission, have been unable to predict the
formation of secondary organic aerosols as a class - a major component of fine particle pollution
in urban areas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 4-5]
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 required control of toxic emissions from motor
vehicles. EPA responded in 2001 with standards based on the technologies and understanding of
health effects at that time. However, time and science have moved on. Vehicle engine
technologies have advanced, the composition of gasoline has changed, and the public health
effects of aromatics have become better understood: Carburetors and port fuel injection have
largely been replaced by gasoline direct injection (GDI) technology. More than half of the
vehicles entering the market use this technology to enhance fuel economy
performance. Unfortunately, GDI technology greatly increases emissions of ultrafine particles
when using today's gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 5]
It doesn't have to be this way. Technologies and products have come together to define a new
solution for what the Clean Air Act requires: "the greatest degree of emission reduction
achievable through the application of technology which will be available." Along with a rapid
transition to electric vehicles, a complementary program should include adoption of higher
ethanol blends, which have been shown by U.S. National Laboratories to enable higher fuel
economy and vehicle performance. Such blends would enable a 40% reduction in the use of
toxic aromatics in gasoline. An important recent study, co-authored by the Nobel Prize winner
Mario Molina, concluded that reducing the smallest (ultrafine) particles "without simultaneously
limiting organics from automobile emissions is ineffective and can even exacerbate this
problem." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 5]
I. Emissions from the use of toxic chemicals in gasoline - aromatic hydrocarbons - are
causing thousands of premature deaths annually in the United States and harming the cognitive
development of children. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 6-7]
1. The effect on public health in brief [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 6-7]
a. Incomplete combustion of the aromatics in gasoline (comprising 20% of every gallon)
results in tailpipe emissions of fine particles. Inhalation of fine particles from fossil fuel
combustion is the leading cause of premature death in the world, killing more than 8 million
people annually. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 6-7]
1 Karn Vohra et al., "Global mortality from outdoor fine particle pollution generated by fossil fuel
combustion: Results from GEOS-Chem," Environmental Research (2021): 195(110754):
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0013935121000487 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
b. A recent study found that reducing the smallest (ultrafine) particles without
simultaneously limiting organics from automobile emissions "is ineffective and can even
exacerbate the problem." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 6-7]
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2 Song Guo et al., "Remarkable nucleation and growth of ultrafine particles from vehicular exhaust,"
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (2020): 117(7): pp.
3427-32: https://www.pnas.Org/content/117/7/3427 (accessed June 11, 2021).
c. Once inhaled, ultrafine particles reach the deepest part of the lungs and enter the
bloodstream, where they can cross biological membranes, even the placental barrier, and reach
the brain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 6-7]
3 C. Vyvyan Howard, "Particulate Emissions and Health" (2009): pp. 13-16:
http://www.durhamenvironmentwatch.org/Incinerator%20Health/CVHRingaskiddyEvidenceFinall.pdf
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
4 Russell A. Morales-Rubio et al., "In utero exposure to ultrafine particles promotes placental stress-
induced programming of renin-angiotensin system-related elements in the offspring results in altered blood
pressure in adult mice," Particle and Fibre Toxicology (2019): 16(7):
https://particleandfibretoxicology.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/sl2989-019-0289-l (accessed Feb.
24, 2021).
5 Dean E. Schraufnagel, "The health effects of ultrafine particles," Experimental & Molecular Medicine
(2020): 52: pp. 311-17: https://www.nature.com/articles/sl2276-020-0403-3 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
d. Not all particles are alike - some may be benign, while others are clearly toxic. Among
the worst are polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), which mix and combine with other
gasoline emissions to persist over longer times and distances than previously thought possible.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 6-7]
6 Alia Zelenyuk et al., "The Effect of Gas-Phase Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons on the Formation and
Properties of Biogenic Secondary Organic Aerosol Particles," Faraday Discussions (2017): 200: pp. 143-
164: https://pubs.rsc.Org/en/content/articlelanding/2017/FD/C7FD00032D#ldivAbstract (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
e. Fetal exposure to extremely low levels of PAHs - levels that are common in dense urban
areas - has been associated with developmental delay at age 3 years and reduced IQ at age 5
years, similar to the effects reported for children with elevated concentrations of lead in their
blood. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 6-7]
7 Frederica P. Perera et al., "Prenatal Airborne Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon Exposure and Child IQ at
Age 5 Years," Pediatrics (2009): 124(2): pp. el95-e202:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2864932/ (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
1. A recent General Motors study found that nearly 96% of the PM emissions from gasoline
are caused by the aromatics in the fuel. Due to an increase in heavy aromatics in the U.S.
gasoline pool in the last three years, the gasoline particulate index has increased by more than
30% since 2016 and now is worse than in the EU and China. The authors observed: "Fuel quality
improvements are not only important for new vehicles, which are designed for it, but also will
benefit the whole fleet of legacy vehicles in the market and off-highway engines." [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 10-12]
33 Elana Chapman et al., "Global Market Gasoline Quality Review: Five Year Trends in Particulate
Emission Indices," SAE International (2021): SAE Technical Paper 2021-01-0623:
https://saemobilus.sae.org/content/2021-01-0623/ (accessed June 17, 2021).
v. Ultrafine particles (UFPs) are so small that they can only be detected with an electron
microscope, and they are more usefully measured by particle number, not mass. They comprise
1721
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more than 80% of the particles in urban air but are a negligible fraction of PM2.5 mass. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 10-12]
34 Christina H. Fuller et al., "Indoor and outdoor measurements of particle number concentration in near-
highway homes," Journal of Exposure Science and Environmental Epidemiology (2013): 23: p. 506:
https://www.nature.com/articles/jes2012116.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
1. Studies have shown associations between UFPs and increased asthma symptoms,
cardiovascular disease markers, and decreased cognitive function. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0570, pp. 10-12]
35 Ibid.
a. In a recent U.S. study, prenatal UFP exposure was linked to asthma development in
children: Children whose mothers were exposed to high levels of UFPs during pregnancy were
four times more likely to develop asthma than those whose mothers were exposed to lower levels
- roughly the difference between a quiet street and a busy road. Most of the diagnoses occurred
just after three years of age, and overall 18% of the infants developed asthma. The researchers
took account of other factors, including the age of the mothers and obesity, as well as other air
pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 10-12]
36 Rosalind J. Wright et al., "Prenatal Ambient Ultrafine Particle Exposure and Childhood Asthma in the
Northeastern United States," American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine (2021):
https://www.atsjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1164/rccm.202010-37430C (accessed June 11, 2021).
37 Damian Carrington, "Asthma in toddlers linked to in-utero exposure to air pollution, study finds," The
Guardian (May 21, 2021): https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/may/21/asthma-in-toddlers-
linked-to-in-utero-exposure-to-air-pollution-ufps-study-finds (accessed June 11, 2021).
2. UFPs contain large amounts of toxic components, and their adverse health effects
potential would not be predicted from their mass alone. Particle number, surface area, and
chemical composition are more important than mass as a health-relevant metric. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 10-12]
38 Paul A. Solomon, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "An Overview of Ultrafine Particles in
Ambient Air," EM: The Magazine for Environmental Managers (2012): 5: pp. 20-21:
https://cfpub.epa.gov/si/si_public_record_report.cfm?Lab=NERL&dirEntryId=241266 (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
3. There is a growing concern in the public health community about the contribution of
UFPs to human health. Despite their modest mass and size, they dominate in terms of the number
of particles in the ambient air. A particular concern about UFPs is their ability to reach the most
distal lung regions (alveoli) and circumvent primary airway defenses. Moreover, UFPs have a
high surface area and a capacity to adsorb a substantial amount of toxic organic compounds.
Harmful systemic health effects of PM10 or PM2.5 are often due to the UFP fraction. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 10-12]
39 Hyouk-Soo Kwon et al., "Ultrafine particles: unique physicochemical properties relevant to health and
disease," Experimental & Molecular Medicine (2020): 52: pp. 318-28:
https://www.nature.com/articles/sl2276-020-0405-l.pdf (accessed June 11, 2021).
5. The ability of inhaled particles to be captured within the human body, called the
deposition efficiency, is a function of particle size, with the particle deposition efficiency rapidly
1722
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increasing as the particles become smaller and smaller. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp.
10-12]
40 Felipe Rodriguez et al., "Recommendations for Post-Euro 6 Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles in the
EU" (2019), International Council on Clean Transportation, p. 8:
https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/Post_Euro6_standards_report_20191003.pdf (accessed
June 11,2021).
6. UFPs can cross biological membranes, and their mobility within the body is thought to
be high. There is considerable evidence to show that inhaled UFPs can gain access to the
bloodstream and are then distributed to other organs in the body. They can even cross the
placental barrier. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 10-12]
41 Howard, op. cit., supra note 3, pp. 12-15.
7. UFPs have been shown to directly translocate to the brain along the olfactory nerves. In
addition, they can pass intact into cells, where they can have direct access to cytoplasmic
proteins and organelles - for example, the mitochondria impacting the respiratory chain and
DNA in the nucleus - enhancing the toxic potential of these particles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 12-13]
42 Solomon, op. cit., supra note 38, p. 21.
8. Results indicating that particles may contribute to the overall oxidative stress burden of
the brain are particularly troublesome, as these long-term health effects may accumulate over
decades. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 12-13]
43 Annette Peters et al., "Translocation and potential neurological effects of fine and ultrafine particles a
critical update," Particle and Fibre Toxicology (2006): 3(13): https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16961926/
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
vi. Research also suggests that the introduction of excessive UFPs into the atmosphere
results in surprising side effects, such as changes in the distribution and intensity of rainfall,
causing either drought or flooding in extreme cases. Such drastic climate change affects the
global hydrological cycle and thereby affects global public health both directly and indirectly.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 12-13]
44 Kwon et al., op. cit., supra note 39.
vii. In most urban areas, on-road vehicles are the primary source of UFP emissions. These
areas observe a peak in UFPs in the morning during rush hour associated with motor vehicle
emissions and a second peak during the afternoon, enhanced during the summer, associated with
photochemistry, or one slightly later in the afternoon due to rush hour traffic that is enhanced
during cooler conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 12-13]
45 Ibid.
46 Solomon, op. cit., supra note 38, p. 19.
viii.. An important recent study co-authored by Nobel Prize winner Mario Molina found
"remarkable formation of UFPs from urban traffic emissions": [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570,
pp. 12-13]
47 Guo et al., op. cit., supra note 2.
1723
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1. Photooxidation of vehicular exhaust yields abundant UFP precursors, and organics
dominate formation of UFPs under urban conditions. Measurements of gaseous species inside
the chamber showed high levels of aromatics, including toluene and C8 and C9 aromatics. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 12-13]
48 Ibid.
2. The authors concluded: "Recognition of this source of UFPs is essential to assessing
their impacts and developing mitigation policies. Our results imply that reduction of primary
particles or removal of existing particles without simultaneously limiting organics from
automobile emissions is ineffective and can even exacerbate this problem." (emphasis added)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 12-13]
49 Ibid.
b. According to EPA's 2011 National Air Toxics Assessment,: secondary formation is the
largest contributor to cancer risks nationwide, accounting for 47% of the risk. On-road mobile
sources contribute the most cancer risk from directly emitted pollutants (about 18%) and the
most to non-cancer risks (34%).[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 15-16]
66 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Overview of EPA's 2011 National Air Toxics Assessment,"
online fact sheet (2015): https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-12/documents/2011-nata-fact-
sheet.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. A recent study found higher toxicity in combustion aerosols than non-combustion
aerosols, with emissions from vehicle engine exhaust scoring higher on overall toxicity than even
those from coal combustion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 15-16]
67 Minhan Park et al., "Differential toxicities of fine particulate matters from various sources," Nature,
Scientific Reports (2018): 8(17007): https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-35398-0 (accessed Feb.
24, 2021).
c. EPA said in 2005: "Aromatic compounds ... are considered to be the most significant
anthropogenic SOA precursors and have been estimated to be responsible for 50 to 70% of total
SOA in some airsheds. ... The experimental work of Odum and others showed that the
secondary organic aerosol formation potential of gasoline could be accounted for solely in terms
of its aromatic fraction" (emphasis added) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 16-17]
68 Daniel Grosjean and John H. Seinfeld, "Parameterization of the formation potential of secondary
organic aerosols," Atmospheric Environment (1967): 23(8): pp. 1733-47:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0004698189900589 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021) and
J.R. Odum et al., "The atmospheric aerosol-forming potential of whole gasoline vapor," Science (1997):
276(5309): pp. 96-9: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9082994/ (accessed Feb. 24, 2021), cited in U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, "Proposed Rule To Implement the Fine Particle National Ambient Air
Quality Standards," Federal Register (2005): 70(210): p. 65996: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
2005-1 l-01/pdf/05-20455.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. The effect of aromatics on SOA does not seem to be linear: Increasing the level of
aromatics in test fuels by less than 30% (from 28.5% to 26.1%) was shown to cause a 3- to 6-
fold increase in SOA formation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 16-17]
69 Jianfei Peng et al., "Gasoline aromatics: a critical determinant of urban secondary organic aerosol
formation," Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics (2017): 17: pp. 10743-52: https://www.atmos-chem-
phys.net/17/10743/2017/acp-17-10743-2017.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
1724
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d. One study estimated that SOA from aromatics in gasoline is responsible for 3,800 annual
premature deaths and annual social costs of $28.2 billion in 2006 dollars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 16-17]
70 von Stackelberg et al., op. cit., supra note 24:
https://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1476-069X-12-19 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. Those mortality numbers can be compared to the impact of EPA ozone regulation, a
major focus of the Clean Air Act - predicted to reduce premature mortalities by 4,300-7,100
deaths per year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 16-17]
71 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Clean Air Act Overview: Progress Cleaning the Air and
Improving People's Health," online fact sheet: https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/progress-
cleaning-air-and-improving-peoples-health (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
e. Ozone "forms in the atmosphere through a series of complex, non-linear chemical
interactions of precursor pollutants." The cost of ozone regulation has been estimated to be more
than $14 billion annually, with benefits of more than $55 billion per year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570, pp.16-17]
72 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act from 1990 to
2020" (2011): p. 4-2: https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/fullreport_rev_a.pdf
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
73 Ibid., p. 3-8.
74 Ibid., p. 7-5.
i. Many air toxics contribute to ozone formation, especially aromatics, so there is a double
benefit to reducing them. However, an EPA assessment of the Clean Air Act found
approximately 98% of avoided premature mortalities were due to reductions in PM
concentrations, not ozone." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 16-17]
75 Ibid., p. 1-11
76 Barnes and Becker, op. cit., supra note 19.
77 U.S. EPA, "The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act," op. cit., supra note 72, p. 8-12.
5. Emissions from aromatics: Poly cyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs)
a. Not all particles are alike - some may be benign, while others are clearly toxic.
Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) are among the worst. EPA has classified seven PAHs
as probable human carcinogens. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 17-18]
78 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Polycyclic Organic Matter," online fact sheet:
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/polycyclic-organic-matter.pdf (accessed
June 17, 2021).
i. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has set a limit of 0.2 milligrams of
PAHs per cubic meter of air (0.2 mg/m3). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 17-18]
79 Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
"ToxFAQs for Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAH)" (1996):
https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaqs/tfacts69.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
1725
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b. A subset of polycyclic organic matter (POM), PAHs consist of three to seven benzene
rings. The PAH family includes more than 100 different compounds of a similar chemical nature,
all products of incomplete combustion of organic materials. Among all sources, vehicular
exhaust is the major source for PAH air pollution in most urban areas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 17-18]
80 U.S. EPA, "Polycyclic Organic Matter," op. cit., supra note 78.
81 Z. Fan and L. Lin, "PAHs" in "Exposure Science: Contaminant Mixtures," Encyclopedia of
Environmental Health (Second Edition) (2011), Elsevier Reference Collection in Earth Systems and
Environmental Sciences: pp. 805-15: https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-
sciences/polycyclic-aromatic-hydrocarbon (accessed June 21, 2021).
c. Complex mixtures of various PAH compounds are spread with the wind in the
environment, where their presence poses a risk to human health through ingestion and inhalation.
PAHs do not easily degrade in the environment - they undergo long-distance transport and
accumulate in aquatic sediment, where some of them pose a threat to aquatic life. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 17-18]
82 Popek, op. cit., supra note 8: pp. 58-59.
d. PAHs are commonly divided into two categories based on their size. PAHs with two to
three fused aromatic rings are considered low molecular weight PAHs, while those with four and
more fused rings are high molecular weight PAHs, including the most carcinogenic PAH,
benzo[a]pyrene (BaP). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 17-18]
83 Stephen Richardson, "Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAH)":
https://www.enviro.wiki/index.php?title=Polycyclic_Aromatic_Hydrocarbons_(PAHs) (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
i. The larger PAHs are of greatest concern for human health due to their recalcitrance to
degradation, persistence, bioaccumulation, carcinogenicity, genotoxicity and
mutagenicity. Since these high molecular weight PAHs exist almost exclusively on fine
particles, they travel deep into the human respiratory system and pose a serious health risk.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 17-18]
84 M.N. Igwo-Ezikpe et al., "High Molecular Weight Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons Biodegradation
by Bacteria Isolated from Contaminated Soils in Nigeria," Research Journal of Environmental Sciences
(2010): 4: pp. 127-37: https://scialert.net/fulltext/?doi=ijes.2010.127.137 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
85 Yan Lv et al., "Size distributions of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in urban atmosphere: sorption
mechanism and source contributions to respiratory deposition," Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics
(2016): 16: p. 2976: https://acp.copernicus.org/articles/16/2971/2016/acp-16-2971-2016.pdf (accessed Feb.
24, 2021).
ii. More than 95% of the lung deposition of PAHs is due to fine particles, and ultrafine
particles are responsible for 10 times more PAH deposition in the alveolar region than their share
of PM mass. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 17-18]
86 Youhei Kanawaka et al., "Size Distributions of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons in the Atmosphere
and Estimation of the Contribution of Ultrafine Particles to Their Lung Deposition," Environmental
Science & Technology (2009): 43(17): p. 6855: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/19764259 (accessed Feb.
24, 2021).
1726
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e. Combustion of vehicle fuels appears to be the principal source of inhalation exposure for
the larger PAHs, such as BaP, that are associated with particulate matter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 18-20]
87 Health Effects Institute Air Toxics Review Panel, "Polycyclic Organic Matter" in Mobile-Source Air
Toxics: A Critical Review of the Literature on Exposure and Health Effects, HEI Special Report 16 (2007):
pp. 117 -33: https://www.healtheffects.org/system/files/SR16-Polycyclic_Organic_Matter.pdf (accessed
Feb. 24, 2021).
i. BaP is one of 12 Level 1 priority compounds among the "toxic, persistent and
bioaccumulative" chemicals targeted for "virtual elimination" by the Great Lakes Binational
Toxics Strategy signed by the U.S and Canada in 1997. It is almost entirely produced by
vehicular emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 18-20]
88 The Great Lakes Binational Toxics Strategy: Canada - United States Strategy for the Virtual Elimination
of Persistent Toxic Substances in the Great Lakes: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency archive
document (1997): https://archive.epa.gov/greatlakes/p2/web/pdf/bnssign.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
89 Lv et al., op. cit., supra note 85, pp. 2978-79.
f. Motor vehicles account for as much as 90% of the particle-bound PAH mass in the urban
air of major metropolitan areas. Roadway tunnel and dynamometer studies have shown that
diesel vehicle emissions are rich in the lower molecular weight PAHs, whereas the higher
molecular weight PAHs (of greatest concern for human health) are associated with gasoline
vehicle emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 18-20]
90 A. Polidori et al., "Real-time characterization of particle-bound polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in
ambient aerosols and from motor-vehicle exhaust," Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics (2008): 8: pp.
1277-91: https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/8/1277/2008/acp-8-1277-2008.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
91 Douglas R. Lawson et al., "DOE's Gasoline/Diesel PM Split Study" (2004), PowerPoint presentation:
https://www.energy.gOv/sites/prod/files/2014/03/f9/2004_deer_lawson.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. In a tunnel study, for example, diesel trucks were the major source of lighter PAHs,
whereas light-duty gasoline vehicles were the dominant source of higher molecular weight
PAHs, such as BaP. PAH emissions from gasoline were almost entirely ultrafine particles
(UFPs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 18-20]
92 Antonio H. Miguel et al., "On-Road Emissions of Particulate Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons and
Black Carbon from Gasoline and Diesel Vehicles," Environmental Science & Technology (1998): 32(4):
pp. 450-55: https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/es970566w (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
1. Only the high molecular weight aromatics markedly affect particle number. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 18-20]
93 Fatouraie et al., op. cit., supra note 61.
2. As the molecular weight of a specific PAH increases, the carcinogenicity of PAHs also
increases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 18-20]
94 Khaiwal Ravindra et al., "Atmospheric polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons: Source attribution, emission
factors and regulation," Atmospheric Environment (2008): 42(13): pp. 2895-2921:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1352231007011351 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
1727
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3. A comparison of PM2.5 with smaller particles attributed about 86% of the total
carcinogenic potency to the PM1 fraction (particles smaller than 1 micrometer in diameter).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 18-20]
95 Gordana Pehnec and Ivana Jakovljevi?, "Carcinogenic Potency of Airborne Polycyclic Aromatic
Hydrocarbons in Relation to the Particle Fraction Size," International Journal of Environmental Research
and Public Health (2018): 15(11), p. 2485: https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/15/ll/2485/htm (accessed
Feb. 24, 2021).
4. UFPs contain a higher percentage of organic carbon than fine and coarse particles, which
is relevant to their biologic potency, and the enhanced biologic potency of UFPs is correlated
with the PAH content. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 18-20]
96 Ning Li et al., "Ultrafine Particulate Pollutants Induce Oxidative Stress and Mitochondrial Damage,"
Environmental Health Perspectives (2003): 111(4): p. 459:
https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/pdf/10.1289/ehp.6000 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
ii. Just as with SO A, the effect of aromatics on PAH formation does not seem to be linear:
Increasing the aromaticity of the fuel by 12% to 46% was found to increase PAH emissions by 8
to 74%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 18-20]
97 M.R. Guerin, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, "Energy Sources of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons"
(1977): p. 16: https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/7303055 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021), referencing: National
Research Council, "Particulate Polycyclic Organic Matter" (1972):
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/20453/particulate-polycyclic-organic-matter (accessed Feb. 24, 2021), citing
G.P. Gross, "First Annual Report on Gasoline Composition and Vehicle Exhaust Gas Polynuclear Aromatic
Content," U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1970), and Charles R. Begeman and Joseph
M. Colucci, "Polynuclear Aromatic Hydrocarbon Emissions from Automotive Engines," S AE Transactions
79 (1970), p. 1685: www.jstor.org/stable/44716200 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
iii. The presence of PAHs has a large effect on SOA formation - increasing mass loadings
by factors of two to five, and particle number concentrations, in some cases, by more than a
factor of 100. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 18-20]
99 Zelenyuk et al., op. cit., supra note 6.
- Note: The effect of aromatics on pollution and human health is thus magnified twice over:
Aromatics lead disproportionately to PAH formation, and PAHs lead disproportionately to SOA
formation. Worse yet, PAHs hitch a ride on SOA for long distances and weaponize these
particles as they travel through the human body. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 18-20]
g. Groundbreaking research at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has led to
new understanding of the process by which PAHs persist and are transported long distances. It
was shown that the most carcinogenic PAH, benzo[a]pyrene (BaP) - often used as a marker for
PAH content generally - is efficiently bound to and transported with atmospheric particles:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
i. In the laboratory, particle-bound BaP degrades in a few hours, but field observations
indicate it persists much longer in the atmosphere and is transported far from its sources -
increasing its global lung cancer risk as much as fourfold. BaP from East Asia, for example, has
been shown to travel thousands of miles over the Pacific Ocean, reaching the west coast of the
United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
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99 Manish Shrivastava et al., "Global long-range transport and lung cancer risk from polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons shielded by coatings of organic aerosol," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
(2017): 114(6): pp. 1246-51: https://www.pnas.Org/content/114/6/1246 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
ii. When SO A particles are formed in the presence of gas-phase PAHs, their formation and
properties are significantly different from SO A particles formed without PAHs: They exhibit
slower evaporation kinetics and have higher fractions of non-volatile components and higher
viscosities, assuring their longer atmospheric lifetimes. This increased viscosity and decreased
volatility act as a shield that protects PAHs from chemical degradation and evaporation, allowing
for their long-range transport. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
100 Zelenyuk et al., op. cit., supra note 6.
h. Based on numerous experimental studies, PAHs are also widely accepted to be
precursors for soot, or black carbon - a major contributor to climate change. Products of
toluene combustion (one of the BTEX aromatics) are known precursors of PAHs that are
involved in soot formation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
101 H. Richter and J.B. Howard, "Formation of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and their growth to soot
- a review of chemical reaction pathways," Progress in Energy and Combustion Science (2000): 26(4-6),
pp. 565-608: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.467.9757&rep=repl&type=pdf
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
102 Qian Mao et al., "Formation of incipient soot particles from polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons,"
Carbon (2017): 121: pp. 380-88: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0008622317305766
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
103 Gabriel da Silva et al., "Toluene Combustion: Reaction Paths, Thermochemical Properties, and Kinetic
Analysis for the Methylphenyl Radical + 02 Reaction," The Journal of Physical Chemistry A (2007):
111(35): pp. 8663-76: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17696501/ (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. Black carbon is considered the second most important human emission in terms of
climate forcing; only carbon dioxide (C02) has a greater overall effect. The short-term (20-year)
global warming potential per ton of black carbon is 3200 times that of C02. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
Black carbon emissions associated with the shift to GDI engines will lead to increased
warming over the U.S., especially in urban regions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
104 Raza et al., op. cit., supra note 25: p. 5.
ii. However, black carbon is rapidly removed from the atmosphere by deposition, and its
atmospheric concentrations respond quickly to reductions in emissions. Reductions in black
carbon are thus an attractive near-term mitigation strategy to slow the rate of climate change.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
105 T.C. Bond et al., "Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: A scientific assessment,"
Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres (2013): 118(11): pp. 5380-5552:
https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/jgrd.50171 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
c. EPA sets air standards for PM2.5 based on mass, when the more important measure of
health risk may be the number of extremely lightweight ultrafine particles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570, p. 22]
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111 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for PM,"
online fact sheet: https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/national-ambient-air-quality-standards-naaqs-pm
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. This is particularly important because gasoline direct-injection (GDI) engines (the new
automotive norm) emit a higher level of PM emissions measured by particle number than the
prior technology, port fuel injection engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 22]
112 Raza et al., op. cit., supra note 25: p. 1.
d. EPA's assessment of the health risks of PAHs, as reflected in its modeling protocols, is
also based on a limited sample of the PAH universe. This approach understates the total
carcinogenic potency of PAHs by an estimated 85.6%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 22]
113 Vera Samburova et al., "Do 16 Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons Represent PAH Air Toxicity?",
Toxics (2017): 5(3): 17: https://www.mdpi.eom/2305-6304/5/3/17/htm (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
7. Health effects of PAH exposure
a. Toxic air pollutants can affect health and functioning over the course of life by launching
a trajectory of adverse effects related to the initial physical or developmental impairment, and/or
by "seeding" latent disease that becomes evident only in later life. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0570, pp. 23-24]
114 Frederica P. Perera, "Multiple Threats to Child Health from Fossil Fuel Combustion: Impacts of Air
Pollution and Climate Change," Environmental Health Perspectives (2017): 125(2): p. 145:
https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/full/10.1289/EHP299 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
b. In cells UFPs have been found to induce heme oxygenase-1 (HO-1) expression, a
sensitive marker for oxidative stress, directly correlated with the high organic carbon and PAH
content of UFPs. Oxidative stress is associated with numerous diseases, including cardiovascular
disease, hypertension, and diabetes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 23-24]
115 Li et al., op. cit., supra note 96: p. 455.
c. Fetal exposure to PAHs, as measured by prenatal air monitoring for the marker PAH
benzo[a]pyrene during the third trimester of pregnancy, was assessed in a long-term
observational epidemiological study in New York. Exposure levels were characterized relative to
a median of 2.66 nanograms per cubic meter (ng/m3) - that is, 100,000 times less than the
OSHA air standard of 0.2 mg/m3. (A nanogram is one-millionth of a milligram.) [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 23-24]
116 Frederica P. Perera et al., "Effects of Transplacental Exposure to Environmental Pollutants on Birth
Outcomes in a Multiethnic Population," Environmental Health Perspectives (2003): 111(2): p. 203:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gOv/pmc/articles/PMC1241351/pdf/ehp0111-000201.pdf (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
i. Fetal exposure above the median was associated with developmental delay at age 3 years
and reduced IQ at age 5 years, as well as increased anxiety and depression, possibly by
interfering with knowledge acquisition or slowing cognitive processing. The observed decrease
in full-scale IQ is similar to that reported for children with elevated concentrations of lead in
their blood. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 23-24]
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117 Frederica P. Perera et al., "Prenatal Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH) Exposure and Child
Behavior at Age 6-7 Years," Environmental Health Perspectives (2012): 120(6): pp. 921-26:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3385432/ (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
118 Perera et al., "Prenatal Airborne Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon Exposure and Child IQ at Age 5
Years," op. cit., supra note 7.
1. The effects of lead exposure include neurological effects in children and cardiovascular
effects (e.g., high blood pressure and heart disease) in adults. Infants and young children are
especially sensitive to even low levels of lead, which may contribute to behavioral problems,
learning deficits, and lowered IQ. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 23-24]
119 Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, "Air Pollution from Lead," online fact sheet:
https://www.tceq.texas.gov/airquality/sip/criteria-pollutants/sip-lead (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
ii. DNA adducts are a form of DNA damage caused by attachment of a chemical entity to
DNA. Adducts that are not removed by the cell can cause mutations that may give rise to
cancer. The formation of PAH-DNA adducts has been widely studied in experimental models
and has been documented in human tissues. Higher levels of PAH-DNA adducts found in
umbilical cord blood were associated with reduced scores on neurocognitive tests. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 23-24]
120 "DNA adducts," Nature.com: https://www.nature.com/subjects/dna-adducts (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
121 M. Margaret Pratt et al., "Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH) Exposure and DNA Adduct Semi-
Quantitation in Archived Human Tissues," International Journal of Environmental Research and Public
Health (2011): 8(7): pp. 2675-91: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3155323/ (accessed Feb.
24, 2021).
122 Frederica P. Perera et al., "Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons-Aromatic DNA Adducts in Cord Blood
and Behavior Scores in New York City Children," Environmental Health Perspectives (2011): 119(8): pp.
1176-81: https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/pdf/10.1289/ehp.1002705 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
d. A long-term study in California also found an association between exposure to airborne
PAHs during the last 6 weeks of pregnancy and early preterm birth - with median exposure at
the extremely low level of 3.6 ng/m3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 24-25]
123 Amy M. Padula et al., "Exposure to Airborne Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons During Pregnancy
and Risk of Preterm Birth," Environmental Research (2014): 135: pp. 221-226:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4262545/ (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. Preterm birth is a predictor of infant mortality and later-life morbidity. Despite recent
declines, the rate of preterm birth remains high in the U.S. Research increasingly suggests a
possible relationship between a mother's exposure to common air pollutants, including PM2.5
and preterm birth of her baby. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 24-25]
124 Jina J. Kim et al., "Preterm birth and economic benefits of reduced maternal exposure to fine
particulate matter," Environmental Research (2019): 170: pp. 178-86:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S001393511830642X (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
Groundbreaking research at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has led to new
understanding of the process by which PAHs persist and are transported long distances. It was
shown that the most carcinogenic PAH, benzo[a]pyrene (BaP) - often used as a marker for PAH
content generally - is efficiently bound to and transported with atmospheric particles: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
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i. In the laboratory, particle-bound BaP degrades in a few hours, but field observations
indicate it persists much longer in the atmosphere and is transported far from its sources -
increasing its global lung cancer risk as much as fourfold. BaP from East Asia, for example, has
been shown to travel thousands of miles over the Pacific Ocean, reaching the west coast of the
United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
99 Manish Shrivastava et al., "Global long-range transport and lung cancer risk from polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons shielded by coatings of organic aerosol," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
(2017): 114(6): pp. 1246-51: https://www.pnas.Org/content/114/6/1246 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
ii. When SO A particles are formed in the presence of gas-phase PAHs, their formation and
properties are significantly different from SO A particles formed without PAHs: They exhibit
slower evaporation kinetics and have higher fractions of non-volatile components and higher
viscosities, assuring their longer atmospheric lifetimes. This increased viscosity and decreased
volatility act as a shield that protects PAHs from chemical degradation and evaporation, allowing
for their long-range transport. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
100 Zelenyuk et al., op. cit., supra note 6.
h. Based on numerous experimental studies, PAHs are also widely accepted to be
precursors for soot, or black carbon - a major contributor to climate change. Products of
toluene combustion (one of the BTEX aromatics) are known precursors of PAHs that are
involved in soot formation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
101 H. Richter and J.B. Howard, "Formation of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and their growth to soot
- a review of chemical reaction pathways," Progress in Energy and Combustion Science (2000): 26(4-6),
pp. 565-608: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.467.9757&rep=repl&type=pdf
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
102 Qian Mao et al., "Formation of incipient soot particles from polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons,"
Carbon (2017): 121: pp. 380-88: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0008622317305766
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
103 Gabriel da Silva et al., "Toluene Combustion: Reaction Paths, Thermochemical Properties, and Kinetic
Analysis for the Methylphenyl Radical + 02 Reaction," The Journal of Physical Chemistry A (2007):
111(35): pp. 8663-76: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17696501/ (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. Black carbon is considered the second most important human emission in terms of
climate forcing; only carbon dioxide (C02) has a greater overall effect. The short-term (20-year)
global warming potential per ton of black carbon is 3200 times that of C02. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
Black carbon emissions associated with the shift to GDI engines will lead to increased
warming over the U.S., especially in urban regions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
104 Raza et al., op. cit., supra note 25: p. 5.
ii. However, black carbon is rapidly removed from the atmosphere by deposition, and its
atmospheric concentrations respond quickly to reductions in emissions. Reductions in black
carbon are thus an attractive near-term mitigation strategy to slow the rate of climate change.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
105 T.C. Bond et al., "Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: A scientific assessment,"
Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres (2013): 118(11): pp. 5380-5552:
https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/jgrd.50171 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
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II. Thirty years ago Congress required EPA to control these hazardous air pollutants to the
greatest degree achievable, yet aromatics still comprise a fifth of the nation's gasoline supply,
amounting to more than 25 billion gallons a year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 24-25]
1. EPA's response to a legislative mandate
a. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 contained the following requirement, codified
as Section 202(1)(2) of the Clean Air Act, Mobile source-related air toxics - Standards: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 24-25]
"Within 54 months after November 15, 1990, the [EPA] Administrator shall ... promulgate
(and from time to time revise) regulations ... containing reasonable requirements to control
hazardous air pollutants from motor vehicles and motor vehicle fuels. The regulations shall
contain standards for such fuels or vehicles, or both, which the Administrator determines reflect
the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the application of technology which
will be available, taking into consideration the standards established under subsection (a), the
availability and costs of the technology, and noise, energy, and safety factors, and lead
time." (emphasis added) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 24-25]
125 42 U.S. Code, sec.?7521, "Emission standards for new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,"
P.L. 101-549, sec. 206, enacted Nov. 15, 1990: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7521 (accessed
Feb. 24, 2021).
i. Congress made its intent clear by specifically naming the BTEX aromatics (benzene,
toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes), along with polycyclic organic matter, as hazardous air
pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 24-25]
126 42 U.S. Code, sec.?7412, "Hazardous air pollutants," P.L. 101-549, sec. 301, enacted Nov. 15, 1990:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7412 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
ii. Additionally, in the section requiring reformulated gasoline in areas with high
summertime ozone levels, the statute requires "the greatest reduction in ... emissions of toxic air
pollutants (during the entire year) achievable through the reformulation of conventional
gasoline" - with the term "toxic air pollutants" specifically defined as including polycyclic
organic matter (POM). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 24-25]
127 42 U.S. Code, sec.?7545, "Regulation of foels," at (k)(l)(A) and (k)(10)(c): P.L. 101-549, sec. 219,
enacted Nov. 15, 1990: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7545 (accessed June 17, 2021).
iii. As EPA recently noted in its proposed rule setting new GHG standards for light-duty
vehicles, the agency's obligation to act under this section is mandatory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 24-25]
128 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards," Federal Register (2021): 86(151): p. 43751:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-08-10/pdf/2021-16582.pdf (accessed Aug. 18,
2021). e. In December 2020 EPA issued a "Fuels Regulatory Streamlining" rule that relieved
refineries of their responsibility to report regularly on the aromatics levels in reformulated
gasoline (approximately 30% of the national gasoline pool). An industry-led annual sampling
program will be used instead. Refineries also are no longer required to estimate emissions of air
toxics, including polycyclic organic matter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 28-29]
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143 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Fuels Regulatory Streamlining," Federal Register (2020):
85(234), "Program Design," p. 78414, and "Key Differences Between Part 1090 and Part 80," p. 78436:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-12-04/pdf/2020-23164.pdf (accessed June 17, 2021).
f. In August 2021, EPA proposed revised greenhouse gas emissions standards for new cars
that again failed to address the importance of vehicle fuels. EPA noted only that "in addition to
substantially reducing GHG emissions, a longer-term rulemaking could also address criteria
pollutant and air toxics emissions from the new light-duty vehicle fleet - especially important
considerations during the transition to zero-emission vehicles." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0570, pp. 28-29]
144 U.S. EPA, "Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards," op. cit., supra note 128: p. 43730.
i. Indeed, the very basis on which EPA proceeded, according to the Proposed Rule, was the
requirement in Section 202(a) "to establish standards for emissions of air pollutants from new
motor vehicles which, in the Administrator's judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." The requirements of
Section 202(1)(2), cited above, were enacted concurrently and explicitly based on that same
provision of Section 202(a). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 28-29]
145 Ibid., p. 43728.
146 42 U.S. Code, sec.77521, op.cit.,supra note 125.
IV. The urgency of action
Dr. Frederica P. Perera is Professor of Environmental Health Sciences and Founding Director
of the Columbia Center for Children's Environmental Health, currently serving as Director of
Translational Research. She is internationally recognized for pioneering the field of molecular
epidemiology, utilizing biomarkers to understand links between environmental exposures and
disease. Her research, cited above, addresses the multiple impacts of fossil fuel combustion on
children's health and development - both from the toxic pollutants emitted, such as PAHs, and
from climate change related to C02 emissions. The following commentary, while not
addressing aromatics specifically, is nonetheless eloquently on point. It is drawn from her paper
"Multiple Threats to Child Health from Fossil Fuel Combustion: Impacts of Air Pollution and
Climate Change": [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 46-47]
255 Perera is the lead author of five works cited here. See supra notes 7, 114, 116, 117, and 122.
Fossil-fuel combustion by-products are the world's most significant threat to children's health
and future and are major contributors to global inequality and environmental injustice. The
emissions include a myriad of toxic air pollutants and carbon dioxide (C02), which is the most
important human-produced climate-altering greenhouse gas. Synergies between air pollution and
climate change can magnify the harm to children. Impacts include impairment of cognitive and
behavioral development, respiratory illness, and other chronic diseases - all of which may be
"seeded" in utero and affect health and functioning immediately and over the life course. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 46-47]
By impairing children's health, ability to learn, and potential to contribute to society,
pollution and climate change cause children to become less resilient and the communities they
live in to become less equitable. The developing fetus and young child are disproportionately
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affected by these exposures because of their immature defense mechanisms and rapid
development, especially those in low- and middle-income countries where poverty and lack of
resources compound the effects. No country is spared, however: Even high-income countries,
especially low-income communities and communities of color within them, are experiencing
impacts of fossil fuel-related pollution, climate change and resultant widening inequality and
environmental injustice. Global pediatric health is at a tipping point, with catastrophic
consequences in the absence of bold action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 46-47]
Fortunately, technologies and interventions are at hand to reduce and prevent pollution and
climate change, with large economic benefits documented or predicted. All cultures and
communities share a concern for the health and well-being of present and future children: This
shared value provides a politically powerful lever for action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570,
pp. 46-47]
256 Perera, "Multiple Threats to Child Health from Fossil Fuel Combustion," op. cit., supra note 114.
Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)
d. Vehicle weight: Safety concerns and increased PM emissions
It is also well known that higher vehicle weight increases wear and tear on vehicle tires,
which causes higher particulate emissions.39 EPA has regulated tailpipe particulate emissions
for many years, but there is abundant evidence that wear particles from tires and brakes are at
least as important as tailpipe emissions.40 According to one study, "battery weight can result in
tire emissions that are almost 400 times greater than real- world tailpipe emissions."41 But the
proposed emissions standards fail to address the large and growing problem of particulate
emissions from tires, and instead focus on more stringent tailpipe particulate standards which
will add cost without significantly improving air quality. Again, EPA needs to look beyond the
tailpipe and create holistic standards that incentivize real improvements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0602, pp. 18-19]
39 Stanard et al., "Brake and Tire Wear Emissions Project 17RD016: Final Report, Revision 2", prepared
forCARB, February 11, 2021; https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/17RD016.pdf.
40 Wang et al., "Evidence of non-tailpipe emission contributions to PM2.5 and PM10 near southern
California highways" Environmental Pollution Volume 317, 15 January 2023;
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.envpol.2022.120691.
41 Emissions Analytics, "Gaining Traction, Losing Tread";
https://www.emissionsanalytics.com/news/gaining-traction- losing-tread.
[See original comment for Figure 56: Total Vehicle test cycle PM mass emissions vs
simulated vehicle test weight, categorized by pad material. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp.
18-19]
Organization: Satya Consultores
Satya began its DEP work with the goal of solving the tradeoff between reducing diesel soot
and NOX emissions. At higher temperatures, diesel engines achieve more complete combustion,
and emit less soot and other fine particulate matter as a result. However, under these conditions
NOX emissions increase. In turn, lower engine temperatures result in lower NOX emissions but
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cause soot emissions to increase. This tradeoff is well known among fuel scientists. 1 Both
pollutants have significant adverse environmental impacts and health effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0687, pp.2-3]
Satya's DEP resolves this conundrum. We call the resulting fuel "Next Diesel."
1 See, e.g., Narayan et al., Combustion Monitoring in Engines Using Accelerometer Signals, J.
VIBROENGINEERING, Sep. 2019, at 4; Tie Li & Hideyuki Ogawa, Analysis of the Trade-Off between
Soot and Nitrogen Oxides in Diesel- Like Combustion by Chemical Kinetic Calculation.
In DEP, two proprietary additives are mixed into the diesel fuel. The first additive ("Al") is
an ethoxylated fatty acid ester, made with a mixture of stearic and palmitic acid esters of sorbitol
and its mono- and dianhydrides. The second additive ("A2") is a complex water-based blend of
aromatic solvents with methyl radicals mixed with ethoxylated phenol-derived surfactants.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 2-3]
Diesel fuel flows from a tank at the end of the refining process in a continuous stream through
piping to a Shock Wave Power Reactor. En route, Al is metered into the diesel fuel stream via a
Progressive Cavity Injection Pump, and the combination is blended using a static mixer. Once
the fuel/Al mixture is homogenous, A2 is metered in, and that combination is blended in a
second static mixer. The resulting diesel fuel/A 1/A2 mixture then flows into the Shock Wave
Power Reactor where it is subjected to controlled cavitation, a process which creates vapor
bubbles in the fuel mixture. As a liquid passes through the SPR it is subjected to "controlled
cavitation." The heart of the reactor is a specially designed rotor. The spinning action generates
hydrodynamic cavitation in the rotor cavities away from the rotor to prevent damage to metal
surfaces. As microscopic cavitation bubbles are produced and collapse, Shockwaves are given off
into the liquid which can heat and/or mix.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 2-3]
2 Hydro Dynamics, Inc. (n.d.). Retrieved from Harnessing the Power of Cavitation:
https://www.hydrodynamics.com/cavitation-technology/.
The resulting diesel fuel exhibits improved properties, including significantly improved
ignition characteristics. Its electrical conductivity is more than 1,000 times greater than regular
diesel fuel, and the lubricity value is more than 100 times greater. These and other upgraded
properties of Next Diesel enable more complete fuel combustion, which in turn results in less
soot production and also reduces NOX emissions. The corresponding loss of fuel power, if any,
is negligible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 2-3]
The pilot- scale test results, which followed EPA-specified federal test procedures (or
"FTPs"), demonstrated significant reductions in soot with accompanying reductions in NOX
emissions. All Next Diesel emissions test results were compared to ultra-low sulfur diesel
("ULSD") emissions tests on the same engines. Only the fuels were changed; all other test
parameters were identical. All tests were "engine out;" there was no after-treatment or particulate
filtering. Combustion map parameters for both Next Diesel and ULSD were the same. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 3-5]
Satya and SwRI compared Next Diesel with ULSD in extensive tests. Two of the many test
results illustrate Next Diesel's potential. As illustrated in Figure 1 below, transient cycle tests on
a newer model diesel engine, the Navistar N13, documented a 14% reduction in soot emissions
and an 8.6% reduction in NOX: [See original attachment for Navistar N13 Transient Tests]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 3-5]
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As shown in Figure 2, on an older model DDC Series 60 engine, the reductions in soot were
even more dramatic: a 29% reduction of soot, with no increase in NOX emissions. [See original
attachment for DDC Series 60 Transient Tests] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 3-5]
The modified fuels produced by this pilot-scale plant conform to physical, mechanical,
rheological, thermal, and chemical fuel standards promulgated by the American Society for
Testing and Materials ("ASTM"), including ASTM-D975. The fuel has been tested in real-scale
heavy duty certification engines. Based on the success of these evaluations, Satya has worked
with SwRI and other internationally recognized research organizations to design a production-
scale facility. The facility design meets ASTM and American National Standards Institute
("ANSI") standards and would be capable of processing 12,000 barrels of diesel fuel per day, or
150 million gallons per year. SwRI has concluded (Link: https://www.swri.org/press-
release/swri-engineers-help-develop-cleaner-burning-diesel-fuels) that DEP and Next Diesel are
ready for commercial development. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 3-5]
All of the testing conducted to date by Satya and SwRI has been conducted with ultra- low
sulfur diesel ("ULSD") that meets current EPA fuel composition requirements. The introduction
of ULSD in 2006 has led to dramatic reductions in particulate matter and NOX emissions from
diesel engines, and the diesel engine requirements proposed by EPA in the current rulemaking
promise additional reductions. Satya's DEP demonstrates that even more air quality gains are
possible with additional diesel fuel controls. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, p. 5]
Emissions of pollutants like soot and NOX are generally highest immediately following a cold
engine start because after-treatment systems tend to be inefficient during and just after ignition.
Next Diesel reduces emissions during and after a cold engine start, and reductions continue to be
achieved even after the engine and after-treatment systems reach steady operating temperatures.
Engine manufacturers may choose to modify or reprogram new engines to maximize benefits of
Next Diesel, but such modifications are not necessary. Next Diesel is an improved fuel that does
not require modification of any part of a new or existing engine. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0687, p. 5]
The most obvious benefit of Next Diesel fuel will be its use in the large fleet of existing diesel
engines, especially in heavy-duty vehicles, locomotives and other non-road vehicles, and diesel
equipment. As EPA notes in the preamble, many of these engines will remain in service in the
U.S. and around the world longer than light- and medium-duty gasoline engines. 88 Fed. Reg. at
29400; see also 88 Fed. Reg. at 29191 (most major manufacturers anticipate at least a decade
before electrified vehicles dominate sales). DEP has not been tested yet on renewable diesel fuels
like biodiesel or on aviation fuels, but Satya expects similar emissions improvements with those
fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, p. 5]
The reduction of soot achieved by Next Diesel also has benefits for engine operation. The
more complete combustion of the soot in Next Diesel fuel increases the energy captured from the
fuel. Diesel particulate matter filters can become clogged and fuel has to be diverted from engine
operation to burn the collected soot and return the filter to service, resulting in a fuel penalty.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 5-6]
With Next Diesel, less soot generated in the engine translates to less soot that must be
captured in the diesel particulate matter filter, and a reduced fuel penalty. Finally, modern diesel
engines recirculate gases to reduce NOX emissions, but the particulate matter content causes
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engine wear and tear. With Next Diesel, less soot means less damage to the diesel engine and
longer engine life. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 5-6]
Satya contracted with Baker and O'Brien, Inc. to prepare a Technology and
Commercialization Assessment of DEP and Next Diesel. Among other findings, the report
estimated significant net health benefits from widespread adoption of Next Diesel. The U.S.
alone could see $7.8 billion in health benefits, and similar improvements in Europe and China.3
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, p. 6]
3 Baker and O'Brien, Inc., Technology and Commercialization Assessment of Diesel Fuel Technology
(January 7, 2020).
To implement the production of Next Diesel, a refinery or fuel distribution terminal would
need to install conditioning hardware and acquire the necessary additives. In Satya's
commercialization study, the estimated capital hardware cost would be approximately $400,000
for a facility processing 12,000 barrels of diesel fuel per day. The cost of chemicals would be
between one and eight cents per gallon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, p. 6]
Organization: South Coast Air Quality Management District
Our region has long suffered from some of the worst air quality in the country and fails to
meet Federal standards for ozone and fine particulate matter. Over 80% of the emissions that
must be reduced to meet air quality standards are from mobile sources, including light-duty and
medium-duty vehicles. As a local air agency, the South Coast AQMD has limited authority to
regulate mobile sources. That authority instead rests primarily with the U.S. EPA and the
California Air Resources Board (CARB). CARB has taken significant steps to reduce GHG and
NOx emissions from light-duty and medium-duty vehicles through the Advanced Clean Cars
(ACC) II regulations, which became effective on November 30, 2022. Other states, including a
total of 17 other states to- date, have adopted all or part of California's ACC II low-emission and
zero-emission vehicle regulations, as allowed by Section 177 of the Clean Air Act. This
additional support for the clean vehicle market means that more than 35% of the national new
light-duty vehicle sales will meet California's automotive emissions standards. These collective
actions will greatly accelerate the adoption of ZEVs in the nationwide fleet, while supporting
California's progress towards meeting the national ambient air quality standards. However, more
needs to be done and without additional federal action on this and other mobile source sectors
our region will be unable to meet air quality standards. The proposed rule offers an opportunity
to achieve additional emission reductions so desperately needed in our region - both to assist in
attaining national standards, and in supporting our environmental justice communities. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0659, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
Light- and medium-duty vehicles are also significant sources of criteria pollutants and other
air toxics that harm communities and the environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp. 4-
5]
In addition to GHG emissions, light- and medium- duty vehicles are a substantial source of
harmful "criteria pollutants," like particulate matter (PM), sulfur oxides (SOX), nitrogen oxides
(NOX), carbon monoxide (CO), and ozone.31 Light- and medium-duty vehicles account for
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approximately 20 percent of mobile source NOX emissions and 19 percent of mobile source
PM2.5 emissions nationwide.32 Criteria pollutants have damaging effects on our environment
and air quality. Among other things, NOX is a central precursor to photochemical smog, harmful
ozone, and particulate pollution;33 acid rain results from sulfur dioxide (S02) and NOX
emissions;34 and PM is the primary cause of reduced visibility and regional haze in the United
States.35 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp. 4-5]
31 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicle, 88 Fed. Reg. 29184, 29186 (May 5, 2023). See also Criteria Air Pollutants, U.S. EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air- pollutants (last visited June 8, 2023) (listing the six criteria pollutants).
32 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicle, 88 Fed. Reg. 29184, 29186 (May 5, 2023).
33 Nitrogen Oxides, UCAR CTR. FOR SCI. EDUC. (2017), https://scied.ucar.edu/learning-zone/air-
quality/nitrogen- oxides; What Causes Smog, CALTECH SCI. EXCH.,
https://scienceexchange.caltech.edu/topics/sustainability/what- causes-smog (last visited June 22, 2023).
34 Id. See also What is Acid Rain?, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/acidrain/what-acid-rain (last updated
June 1, 2023).
35 Particulate Matter Basics, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/particulate-matter-pm-basics
(last updated July 18, 2022).
These pollutants also negatively impact our health. Due to their detrimental biological effects,
each of these criteria pollutants has a health-based National Ambient Air Quality Standard
(NAAQS) established by EPA.36 Exposure to ozone and CO, for example, can result in nervous
system effects including dementia and cognitive decline, birth defects, and developmental
disorders.37 Exposure to PM and NOX can cause respiratory and cardiovascular problems such
as an increased incidence of asthma and heart disease, reduced lung function, and exacerbated
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.38 According to a recent study, fine particulate pollution
from cars and light trucks in Virginia costs the state $750 million annually and causes
approximately 92 deaths, 71 non-fatal heart attacks, and 2,600 child asthma attacks every year.39
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, p. 5]
36 Criteria Air Pollutants, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants (last visited June 8, 2023).
37 U.S. EPA, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis: Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years
2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles 7-4, 7-12 (Apr. 2023),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey= P10175J2.pdf [hereinafter "2023 Regulatory Impact
Analysis"].
38 Id. at 7-1-7-47.
39 INDUSTRIAL ECON., INC. & VA. CLINICIANS FOR CLIMATE ACTION, AN ASSESSMENT OF
THE HEALTH BURDEN OF AMBIENT PM2.5 CONCENTRATIONS IN VIRGINIA 11-12 (Oct. 28,
2020),https://www.virginiaclinicians.org/_files/ugd/b42dl3_16dldalc63e84d328db4239aea371617.pdf.
Additionally, light- and medium- duty vehicle pollution contributes to high ambient
concentrations of other air toxics, including benzene, 1,3-butadiene, ethylbenzene,
formaldehyde, and naphthalene.40 Within the transportation sector, more than 41 percent of
these air toxics, collectively known as "volatile organic compounds" (VOCs), are produced by
light- and medium-duty vehicles.41 The reaction between pollutants like NOX and CO and
VOCs creates harmful fine particulate and smog pollution.42 Not only have VOCs been
identified as national and regional cancer risk drivers by EPA,43 but they also cause a range of
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noncancer health effects such as eye and nose irritation, headaches, nausea, and dizziness.44
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp. 5-6]
40 2023 Regulatory Impact Analysis, supra note 37, at 7-15.
41 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicle, 88 Fed. Reg. 29184, 29186 (May 5, 2023).
42 Technical Overview of Volatile Organic Compounds, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/indoor-air-
quality-iaq/technical-overview-volatile-organic-compounds (last updated Mar. 14, 2023).
43 2023 Regulatory Impact Analysis, supra note 37, at 7-15.
44 Volatile Organic Compounds' Impact on Indoor Air Quality, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/indoor-
air-quality-iaq/volatile-organic-compounds-impact-indoor-air-quality (last updated Aug. 26, 2022).
The impacts of criteria pollutants and other air toxics from vehicle tailpipe pollution are
widespread, making exposure to this type of pollution a serious public health issue nationwide.
Even after decades of NAAQS implementation, 36 percent of Americans—nearly 120 million
people—live in areas with unhealthy levels of ozone or particulate pollution.45 Many major
metropolitan areas in the United States, including several in the South, continue to suffer from
elevated concentrations of these pollutants. Washington, D.C. is currently a nonattainment area
for ozone,46 and Augusta, Georgia and Birmingham, Alabama rank among the top 25 cities most
polluted by annual PM emissions.47 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp. 5-6]
45 State of the Air: 2023 Report, AM. LUNG ASS'N 12 (2023), https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-
6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf.
46 U.S. EPA, Greenbook 8-Hour Ozone (2015) Designated Area/State Information,
www3.epa.gov/airquality/ greenbook/jbtc.html (last updated May 31, 2023) (identifying Washington, D.C.
as a nonattainment area for ozone).
47 Id. at 16. See also ENV'T AM., U.S. PIRG & FRONTIER GRP., Trouble in the Air: Millions of
Americans Breathed Polluted Air in 2018 (2020),
https://uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/EnvironmentAmerica_TroubleintheAir_ scrn.pdf.
48 See 88 FR at 29303-04.
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
In addition to light-duty vehicles being one of the largest sources of GHG pollutants that
negatively impact public health, they are also one of the largest sources of criteria and air toxic
pollutants, including particulate matter (PM) and nitrogen oxides (NOX). To that end, Tesla
fundamentally agrees with the agency that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 9-10]
In 2023, mobile sources will account for approximately 54 percent of anthropogenic NOX
emissions, 5 percent of anthropogenic direct PM2.5 emissions, and 19 percent of anthropogenic
volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions. Light and medium-duty-vehicles will account for
approximately 20 percent, 19 percent, and 41 percent of 2023 mobile source NOX, PM2.5, and
VOC emissions, respectively.63 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 9-10]
63 88 Fed. Reg. at 29186.
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These emissions contribute to poor air quality in many urban areas, including areas with
vulnerable populations, and increased vulnerability and susceptibility for adverse health effects
related to air pollution in children.64 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 10]
64 Id., at 29211.
The widespread adoption of BEVs is leading to significant benefit from the elimination of
tailpipe pollutants and slashing of ambient levels of air pollutants that have been linked to
hundreds of thousands of early deaths annually around the world from cardiovascular and
respiratory diseases, cancer, and other illnesses.65 Indeed, the public health, climate, and
economic benefit from much more stringent, BEV-based GHG emission standards cannot be
understated. Air pollution is estimated to cause over 200,000 premature deaths in the U.S. each
year; with more than half are caused by transportation emissions.66 Recent findings indicate that
the U.S. health care costs of air pollution and climate change exceed $800 billion per year.67 Air
pollution impacts with pollutants like PM2.5 that are associated with the transportation sector not
only cause premature mortality, cardiovascular disease and respiratory disease but also can affect
neurological disorders.68 Other studies suggest that exacerbation of air pollution and heat
exposure related to climate change may be significantly associated with risk to pregnancy
outcomes in the U.S.69 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 10]
65 PNAS, The other benefit of electric vehicles (Jan. 11, 2023) available at h
ttps://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2220923120
66 Atmospheric Environment, Air pollution and early deaths in the United States. Part I: Quantifying the
impact of major sectors in 2005 (Nov. 2013) available at h
ttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1352231013004548; See also, PNAS, Fine-scale
damage estimates of particulate matter air pollution reveal opportunities for location-specific mitigation of
emissions (April 8, 2019) available at https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1816102116 (Over 100,000
premature death just from PM 2.5).
67 Medical Society Consortium, The Costs of Inaction: The Economic Burden of Fossil Fuels and Climate
Change on Health in the United States (May 20, 2021) available at h
ttps://subscriber.politicopro.com/f/?id=00000179-8a79-de79-a9ff- a e7dbc420000&source=email
68 The Lancet, Long-term effects of PM2 • 5 on neurological disorders in the American Medicare
population: a longitudinal cohort study (Oct. 19, 2020). available at h
ttps://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(20)30227- 8
/fulltext#.X44Xfg2Mloo.twitter
69 Bekkar, et al. JAMA Open Network, Association of Air Pollution and Heat Exposure with Preterm
Birth, Low Birth Weight, and Stillbirth in the USA Systematic Review (June 18, 2020). available at h
ttps://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2767260
Indeed, one recent report estimates that wide-spread transportation electrification across the
U.S. translates into $72 billion in avoided health effects. Electrification would save
approximately 6,300 lives per year and avoid more than 93,000 asthma attacks, and 416,000 lost
workdays annually due to significant reductions in transportation-related pollution.73 Other
studies have found dramatic localized air quality and public health benefits can result from
vehicle electrification.74 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 11]
73 American Lung Association, The Road to Clean Air Benefits of a Nationwide Transition to Electric
Vehicles (March 31, 2022) at 5-6 available at h ttps://www.lung.org/getmedia/99cc945c-47f2-4ba9-ba59-
14c311ca332a/electric-vehicle-report.pdf; See also, ZETA, Medium- and Heavy Duty Electrification:
Weighing the Opportunities and Barriers to Zero Emission Fleets (Jan. 26, 2022) at 8-9 available at h
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ttps://fs.hubspotusercontent00.net/hubfs/8829857/ZETA-WP-MHDV- E lectrification_Opportunities-and-
Barriers_Final3.pdf?utm_medium=email&_hsmi=201943899&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-8
eoZgga7znbaZR7rKvlBaBniH18i3bFI9C8FLIYVA9UYMBZ-H5_7edvGfl l_aMiDLUt4tVYShiR~ I
9VYfDXozCMAQgQ&utm_content=201943899&utm_source=hs_email.
74 See e.g., Texas A&M, Tailpipe Emission Benefits of Medium- and Heavy-Duty Truck Electrification in
Houston, TX (Apr 14, 2021) available at h ttps://carteehdata.org/library/document/tailpipe-emission-
benefit-7ea6 (Finding that by electrifying 40% of the predominantly diesel-fueled MHDVs in the eight-
county area, Texans could avoid 21 tons per day of NOX — over a quarter of the 80 tons per day emitted
by greater Houston's on-road traffic. This could be achieved by electrifying a little over 60,000 MHDVs,
about 1% of all the vehicles in greater Houston. By comparison, it would take 3.8 million light duty
vehicles to achieve the same amount of NOX reductions. Electrification of MHDVs is the quickest way to
take the biggest bite out of greater Houston's NOX emissions).
Organization: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
In this proposal, EPA concludes that people who live or attend school near major roadways
are more likely to be non-White, Hispanic, or have a low socioeconomic status. As such, these
populations are expected to directly benefit from reduced tailpipe emissions of criteria pollutants
and mobile source air toxics that would result from these standards. EPA also notes that poorer
or predominantly non-White communities can be especially vulnerable to climate change
impacts, which these proposed GHG standards would help address. Reducing greenhouse gases,
ozone, and particulate matter pollution from on-road vehicles will improve health outcomes
throughout Wisconsin. Most importantly, it will take a critical step toward improving air quality
in areas overburdened by pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 2]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
a. Reducing Transportation Emissions Protects Public Health
Finalizing stringent emissions standards will save lives, as human interaction with on-road
emissions has proven to yield detrimental health outcomes. When inhaled into the lungs, criteria
pollutant emissions cause inflammation, chest tightness, shortness of breath, and increased risk
of permanent health issues such as asthma. 56 Beyond respiratory health, new research also
demonstrates that ground level ozone, exacerbated by LMDV tailpipe emissions, leads to
worsening coronary disease. A 2023 study shows that "exceeding the World Health Organization
ozone limit is associated with substantial increases in hospital admissions for heart attack, heart
failure and stroke."57 The study looked at coronary disease over three years and found that
increased concentrations of ground-level ozone led to 109,400 of 3,194,577 documented hospital
admissions.58 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 14]
56 "State of the Air Report 2023," American Lung Association, (April 2023)
https://www.lung.org/research/sota
57 "Ozone pollution and hospital admissions for cardiovascular events," European Heart Journal, (2023)
https://academic.oup.com/eurheartj/article/44/18/1622/7070974
58 Id. at footnote 57
LMDVs are major contributors to U.S. emissions of particulate matter (PM2.5), nitrogen
oxides (NOx), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and carbon dioxide (C02).59 Such
pollutants are directly linked to long-term respiratory, cognitive, and autoimmune impairment,
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and the rate of EV deployment is expected to have a direct relationship with improved health
outcomes, particularly for millions of individuals living near high traffic areas.60 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 14]
59 "Federal Vehicle Standards," C2ES, accessed May 18, 2023 https://www.c2es.org/content/regulating-
transportation-sector-carbon-emissions/
60 "PM2.5 polluters disproportionately and systemically affect people of color in the United States,"
Science Advances (April 28, 2021) https://advances.sciencemag.Org/content/7/18/eabf4491
Despite efforts to curtail emissions through ICEV efficiency improvements and various
emissions control technologies, a large portion of the U.S. population remains vulnerable to the
dangers of vehicle pollution. In the United States, 45 million people live within 300 feet of a
major traffic facility or corridor.61 Proximity to these roadways exposes residents to needless
health risks. Replacing combustion engine vehicles with electric alternatives will yield
significant public health benefits. According to the American Lung Association, the widespread
transition to zero-emission transportation and zero-emission generation over the next 30 years
could bring $1.2 trillion in health benefits, save approximately 110,000 lives, prevent more than
2.7 million asthma attacks, and avoid 13.4 million lost workdays.62 Conversely, a recent study
concludes that oil and gas consumption leads to negative health impacts totaling $77 billion
annually in the U.S. alone.63 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 15]
61 "Research on Near Roadway and Other Near Source Air Pollution," Overviews and Factsheets,
Environmental Protection Agency (December 15, 2022) https://www.epa.gov/air-research/research-near-
roadway-and-other-near-source-air-pollution.
62 "Road to Clean Air: Benefits of a Nationwide Transition to Electric Vehicles," American Lung
Association, accessed May 5, 2023 https://www.lung.org/getmedia/99cc945c-47f2-4ba9-ba59-
14c31 lca332a/electric-vehicle-report, pdf
63 Jonathan J Buonocore, et. al. (2023) Environ. Res.: Health
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2752-5309/acc886
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Many of the comments included in this section were supportive of EPA's proposed program
to reduce GHG and criteria emissions from light- and medium-duty vehicles. Commenters note
the need for these standards to address air pollution and reduce the impacts of emissions on
human health, including specifically impacts on EJ communities, impacts on nonattainment
areas, and impacts on children.
As noted above, commenters in this section raised a number of concerns about harm to public
health caused by emissions produced by vehicles. These comments primarily focused on
combustion-related emissions like particulates, NOx, PAHs and other air toxics. Commenters
mentioned that there are health effects below the level of the NAAQS and pointed to specific
health effects associated with exposure to PM, like exacerbation of risks from infectious
respiratory diseases, and impacts on retinal health. One commenter stated that it is important to
critically evaluate the direct correlation between these proposed regulations and substantial
improvements in health conditions, suggesting that the relationship between specific regulatory
measures and health outcomes is complex and context-dependent. While reducing emissions can
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have positive effects on respiratory health, it is essential to acknowledge that multiple factors
influence overall health outcomes.
Some commenters note that the rapid proliferation of GDI vehicles over the past decade has
increased ultrafine particle (UFP) pollution significantly, which along with PAH emissions, have
serious health impacts. They describe how the Clean Air Act requires control of such air toxics
to the greatest extent achievable using technology which will be available and suggest that EPA
could reduce GHGs and air toxics together by taking a systems approach to require simultaneous
improvements in both vehicles and fuels. They highlight higher-ethanol blends as a way to
increase octane and reduce aromatic content of gasoline and suggest requiring particle filters on
all GDI vehicles as a highly effective way to reduce UFP emissions. Commenters also express
support for reducing heavy aromatics content in gasoline as an additional way to reduce PM
emissions. One commenter described a fuel additive that could reduce NOx and PM emissions
from diesel engines.
In addition, some commenters raised concerns about non-combustion sources of emissions
from vehicles, like brake and tire wear emissions, that may increase with an increasing number
of EVs. Several commenters (American Fuel and Petrochemicals Manufacturers, Donn Viviani,
HF Sinclair, John Graham, National Farmers Union and the Renewable Fuels Association) said
that electric vehicles would have higher brake and tire emissions than comparable ICE vehicles
due to higher weight from batteries and/or higher torque of electric vehicles and should be
included in EPA's analysis. Several of these commenters also stated that there would be an
increase in roadway dust and some also said that these higher emissions are likely to harm EJ
communities. The commenters cite:
17 Liu, Ye, et al. "Comparative analysis of non-exhaust airborne particles from electric and internal
combustion engine vehicles." Journal of Hazardous Materials 420 (2021): 126626.
18 Liu, Ye, et al. "Impact of vehicle type, tyre feature and driving behaviour on tyre wear under real-world
driving conditions." Science of the Total Environment 842 (2022): 156950.
23Xiaoliang Wang, et al., Evidence of non-tailpipe emission contributions to PM2.5 and PM10 near
southern California highways, Environmental Pollution, Vol. 317, Jan. 15, 2023,
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.envpol.2022.120691.
24 Emissions Analytics, Gaining Traction, Losing Tread - Pollution from tire wear now 1,850 times worse
than exhaust emissions, May 10, 2022 Newsletter - Tyre Emissions,
https://www.emissionsanalytics.com/news/gaining- traction-losing-tread.
39 Stanard et al., "Brake and Tire Wear Emissions Project 17RD016: Final Report, Revision 2", prepared
forCARB, February 11, 2021; https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/17RD016.pdf.
American Fuel and Petrochemicals Manufacturers also comments that it "could require a
greater number of ZEVs to move the same tonnage of cargo, thus increasing the number of
vehicles needed to haul the same amount of freight, vehicle miles traveled, and resulting PM
emissions." A commenter, MCS Referral & Resources, pointed out an error in the description of
the sources of CO and in the description of diesel exhaust component lifetimes.
Response:
In this RTC section, EPA is focusing on addressing comments related to the criteria and air
toxic pollutant impacts associated with the rule. To the extent that these commenters raise other
issues, those issues are addressed elsewhere in this RTC or in the preamble for the final rule.
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Responses to comments about environmental justice or GHG emissions are included in sections
9 and 10 respectively of this response to comments document. Additionally, responses to
comments about criteria pollutant benefits are included in Section 8.5 of this document.
In general, EPA agrees with commenters that actions to control emissions from light- and
medium-duty vehicles are necessary to improve public health and welfare. In response to
commenters who identify potential health or welfare effects of criteria pollutants from light- and
medium-duty vehicles, or other scientific information, views, or analyses that were not
specifically incorporated into our discussion in the proposed or final action (such as those noted
by CARB, EDF, Jonathan Walker, and others), the EPA notes that the health and welfare
impacts associated with exposure to criteria and air toxic pollutants are adequately described in
Section II of the preamble that accompanies this rule. The EPA does not interpret these
comments as indicating disagreement with the evidence on criteria pollutant health or welfare
effects information that was presented in the proposal, but rather understands these comments to
suggest that the additional information they provide adds support for finalizing the rulemaking.
The EPA concurs with commenters that there may be additional health outcomes, such as
respiratory infections, for which reducing PM2.5 concentrations may lead to public health
benefits. Within the 2019 PM ISA, the EPA evaluated studies that examined both short- and
long-term PM2.5 exposure and respiratory infection, and while few studies examined these
outcomes, there was some evidence indicating that daily or annual exposures may increase the
risk of respiratory infection. In addition, the Supplement to the 2019 PM ISA evaluated recent
studies that examined both short- and long-term PM2.5 exposure and SARS-CoV-2 infection and
COVID-19 deaths and concluded "[wjhile there is initial evidence of positive associations with
SARS-CoV-2 infection and COVID-19 death, uncertainties remain due to methodological
issues." As the Supplement to the 2019 PM ISA represented a targeted evaluation of the science
published since the completion of the 2019 PM ISA, it did not encompass "the full
multidisciplinary evaluation presented within the 2019 PM ISA as described in the Preamble to
the Integrated Science Assessments that would result in weight-of-evidence conclusions on
causality (i.e., causality determinations)."400 As a result, the evidence for SARS-CoV-2 infection
and COVID-19 death were not considered in the context of the causality determination for either
short- or long-term PM2.5 exposure and respiratory effects. In addition, the literature cutoff date
for the Supplement to the 2019 PM ISA, which included studies of SARS-CoV-2 infection and
COVID-19 deaths, was March 2021, which is prior to the publication date of the references
provided by the commenter. As such, EPA will consider these references as well as other newly
published peer-review studies during the development of the next PM ISA.
EPA acknowledges and agrees with the commenter that noted that the relationship between
regulatory measures and health outcomes is complex and context dependent. However, based on
our expertise and past experience we anticipate that this rule will have substantial benefits for
public health and welfare. As noted in RTC Section 8.5, EPA's analysis is consistent with
applicable guidance and best practices for conducting benefit-cost analyses, including OMB
Circular A-4 and EPA's Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses. We consider our analysis
400 U.S. EPA. Preamble to the Integrated Science Assessments (ISA). U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Washington, DC, EPA/600/R-15/067, 2015.
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consistent with the guidance, methodologically rigorous, and a best estimate of the projected
societal benefits and costs associated with the final program.
Air toxics reductions:
We are finalizing stringent PM standards for gasoline vehicles covering a range of operating
conditions, including wintertime temperatures. We expect that manufacturers may choose to
comply with these standards through widespread adoption of particulate filters (GPFs) on new
light- and medium-duty vehicles by 2031.
Modlin and Detchon cite the requirements for mobile source air toxics standards issued under
section 202(1) to reflect the greatest degree of emissions reduction achievable (taking into
account several factors specified in the statute) as support for more stringent PAH controls. EPA,
however, did not propose to further regulate mobile source air toxics under section 202(1), and
new regulation under 202(1) is beyond the scope of this rulemaking. However, EPA anticipates
that the PM standards will result in very effective control of PAHs. As discussed in Section
III.D.3 of the preamble, emission characterization of GPF-equipped vehicles meeting the PM
standards found that filter-based PAHs were reduced by more than 99%. As such, the PM
standards are expected to also reduce PAH and other toxics very well. More detailed
characterization of GPF benefits is described in Chapter 3.2.6.2 of the RIA. Furthermore, air
quality modeling representing the net impacts of the standards on air toxics show average net
reductions in all air toxics modeled. EPA will continue to consider the need for, and appropriate
means of, further reductions in PAH by continuing to investigate costs and benefits of updated
standards for market gasoline that would reduce the content of heavy aromatic compounds
(including PAHs) that contribute most potently to PM and PAH emissions (several aspects are
described in Section IX of the proposal).
Modlin and Detchon also suggest that EPA could achieve emissions reductions by requiring
changes to fuel composition that displace aromatics (including BTEX) with additional ethanol.
As discussed in RTC Section 19, such work and changes to fuel controls are beyond the scope of
this final rule. Nonetheless, EPA offers some preliminary observations regarding this comment.
Imposing limits on gasoline aromatics content would force refiners to reformulate their gasoline
to use other high-octane components. Understanding the impact of such reformulations on
overall air quality would necessarily include changes in a broad range of vehicle emissions
(including refueling and evaporative processes), as well as changes in petroleum refining and
increases in ethanol production and agricultural intensity. These things may reduce the overall air
quality benefits significantly. We are not aware of any analyses integrating all these pieces at this
time. Comments in response to EPA's request for comment on potential future fuel controls are
contained in Appendix D to this document and will be further considered for a potential future
rulemaking.
Non-exhaust PM:
With regard to non-exhaust emissions, including brake and tire wear, road wear and road dust,
EPA did model these emissions for all vehicles, including BEVs, in the proposed rulemaking and
for this final rule. However, for the reasons described below, we found it reasonable to assume
for modeling purposes that BEVs produce non-exhaust emissions at the same level as their ICE
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counterparts. More information on modeling brake, tire and other vehicle emissions is available
in a memo to the docket.401
First, EPA does not agree that increased sales of BEVs would necessarily result in a
substantial increase in average vehicle weight. As shown in Table 8-5 of the RIA, the projected
increase in weight within vehicle classes is small and is dwarfed by the increase in weight due
from the shift from cars to light trucks and SUVs, which is unrelated to the increased sale of
EVs.
Second, for brake wear, as one of the commenters noted, it is reasonable to expect BEVs to
have lower brake wear emissions than comparable ICE vehicles. Most BEVs are equipped with
regenerative braking systems. When a vehicle is using regenerative brakes, some of the kinetic
energy from slowing the vehicle is directed to the motor. In a friction braking system, this kinetic
energy is normally converted to heat, so there is less material wear and emissions from brakes.
This effect is discussed by some of the non-exhaust emission studies cited by the commenters. In
fact, a modeling study by Ye Liu et al. found in a literature review that regenerative braking
decreases brake wear emissions from EVs by 68 percent. In their modeling, the reduced brake
wear emissions offset the increased tire wear, road wear and resuspended road dust emissions
associated with the assumed EV weight increase such that EVs have lower non-exhaust PM2.5
emissions than comparable gasoline vehicles on urban roads, as can be calculated from Table 3
of their paper.402
Still, EPA investigated the possibility of updating our modeling assumptions on brake wear
and tire wear emissions from electric vehicles. Updating these non-exhaust PM emission rates
specific to BEVs would require having detailed emissions data in which brake wear and tire wear
emissions can be calculated in various operating conditions. None of the sources cited by
commenters support this level of detailed analysis, nor has EPA identified any sources of data or
studies that allow this level of detailed analysis for tire wear. Many sources attempt to compare
non-exhaust PM emissions from BEVs directly to ICE vehicles, but they are often modeling
studies or studies done under conditions that may not be representative of typical real-world
operation in the United States. Tire wear projections for BEVs are also difficult because BEV
technologies are evolving rapidly and estimates of tire wear for current BEVs may not be
representative of the future vehicle stock, when BEVs are more prevalent across all
manufacturers, models, and drivers. In addition, we expect tire design will evolve over time in
concert with changes in vehicle design and driving patterns. There are considerable technical
difficulties with modeling such uncertainties, so we did not do so.
Overall, EPA is receptive to and appreciates the comments from stakeholders regarding the
modeling of tire wear and brake wear. We accounted for brake wear, tire wear, road wear and
road dust emissions in the proposal and do so in the final rulemaking. To estimate increased tire
wear and road dust emissions from BEVs relative to ICE vehicles, as suggested by the
commenters, without a corresponding decrease in brake wear emissions would bias the total
401 Mo, Tiffany, 2024. Revisions to MOVES for Air Quality Modeling to support the FRM for the Multi-Pollutant
Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles. Memorandum to
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829. February 2024.
402 Liu, Ye et al. "Exhaust and non-exhaust emissions from conventional and electric vehicles: A comparison of
monetary impact values." Journal of Cleaner Production 331 (2022) 129965.
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.129965
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downstream PM inventory impacts. After consideration of the current data sources and literature,
we have found that, at this time, there is no study or source of data with sufficient information to
improve upon this modeling approach for the FRM.
VMT:
EPA does not agree that an increase in medium-duty ZEVs will result in an increase in overall
VMT and associated PM emissions. Manufacturers of medium-duty vehicles have a strong
incentive in a competitive market to produce vehicles that are capable of meeting the cargo
hauling requirements of commercial owners. As such, EPA's analysis reasonably assumes that
manufacturers will maintain the payload of BEVs by increasing GVWR and GCWR to
compensate for the additional weight of batteries. EPA projects that most of the medium-duty
BEVs will be vans and class 2b pickups, and will therefore not exceed the 14,0001bs GVWR
upper limit for medium-duty vehicles under these final standards.
Carbon Monoxide:
After consideration of comments by MCS, clarifying edits have been made to the CO
background section to indicate that CO can also be formed by photochemical reactions, as well
as being formed by incomplete combustion. In addition, clarifying edits have also been made to
the diesel exhaust background section to indicate that lifetimes of components of diesel exhaust
can range from seconds to months, rather than seconds to days.
With respect to comments related to CO exposure and health effects, we note that the EPA's
statement that "controlled human exposure studies of subjects with coronary artery disease show
a decrease in the time to onset of exercise-induced angina (chest pain) and electrocardiogram
changes following CO exposure," is based on findings of multiple studies reviewed in the 2010
CO Integrated Science Assessment (ISA).403
As the commenter notes, the underlying data for this claim is partially based on results from
an HEI multicenter study that investigated the effects of CO exposure in individuals with
coronary artery disease. This effort resulted in three peer-reviewed publications, which have
been cited more than 250 times: Allred et al 1989a404, Allred et al 1989b405, and Allred et al
1991.406 These studies found that exposures to CO decreased the time to onset of angina during
exercise by 4.2% (low exposure group) or 7.1% (high exposure group) and decreased the time to
development of ischemic ST-segment changes during exercise by 5.1% (low exposure group) or
12.1% (high exposure group). In addition, several other studies investigating individuals with
stable angina also demonstrated that CO exposure during exercise decreases the time to onset of
403 U.S. EPA (2010). Integrated Science Assessment for Carbon Monoxide. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
Washington, DC. EPA/600/R-09/019F.
404 Allred EN; Bleecker ER; Chaitman BR; Dahms TE; Gottlieb SO; Hackney JD; Hayes D; Pagano M; Selvester
RH; Walden SM; Warren J (1989a). Acute effects of carbon monoxide exposure on individuals with coronary artery
disease. Health Effects Institute. Boston, MA.
405 Allred EN; Bleecker ER; Chaitman BR; Dahms TE; Gottlieb SO; Hackney JD; Pagano M; Selvester RH; Walden
SM; Warren J (1989b). Short-term effects of carbon monoxide exposure on the exercise performance of subjects
with coronary artery disease. N Engl J Med, 321: 1426-1432.
406 Allred EN; Bleecker ER; Chaitman BR; Dahms TE; Gottlieb SO; Hackney JD; Pagano M; Selvester RH; Walden
SM; Warren J (1991). Effects of carbon monoxide on myocardial ischemia. Environ Health Perspect, 91: 89-132.
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angina, as well as reduces the duration of exercise and increases ventricular
arrhythmi as 407> 408> 409>410>411
All ISAs undergo review by an independent Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee
(CASAC), whose members have expertise in a variety of scientific fields relevant to air pollution
and air quality issues. In their final Advisory Report for the 2010 CO ISA, CASAC referenced
the importance of the above studies ("The most compelling CO-related cardiovascular results
remain those from the controlled human exposure studies of Allred et al; Kleinman et al; and
Sheps et al.") and expressed support for the related causality determination ("The Panel members
concur with the ISA's conclusion that a causal relationship is likely to exist between relevant
short-term CO exposure and CV morbidity.").412
We have also reviewed the fourteen studies recommended by the commenter. Out of the
fourteen studies, none were directly comparable to those discussed above (i.e., controlled human
exposure to CO in individuals with coronary artery disease). Three of the recommended studies
were review articles,413'414'415 three were experimental animal studies,416'417'418 and eight studies
407 Adams KF; Koch G; Chatteijee B; Goldstein GM; O'Neil JJ; Bromberg PA; Sheps DS; McAllister S; Price CJ;
Bissette J (1988). Acute elevation of blood carboxyhemoglobin to 6% impairs exercise performance and aggravates
symptoms inpatients with ischemic heart disease. J Am Coll Cardiol, 12: 900-909.
408 Anderson EW; Andelman RJ; Strauch JM; Fortuin NJ; Knelson JH (1973). Effect of low-level carbon monoxide
exposure on onset and duration of angina pectoris: a study in ten patients with ischemic heart disease. Ann Intern
Med, 79:46-50.
409 Kleinman MT; Davidson DM; Vandagriff RB; Caiozzo VJ; Whittenberger JL (1989). Effects of short-term
exposure to carbon monoxide in subjects with coronary artery disease. Arch Environ Occup Health, 44: 361-369.
410 Kleinman MT; Leaf DA; Kelly E; Caiozzo V; Osann K; O'Niell T (1998). Urban angina in the mountains: effects
of carbon monoxide and mild hypoxemia on subjects with chronic stable angina. Arch Environ Occup Health, 53:
388-397.
411 Sheps DS; Herbst MC; Hinderliter AL; Adams KF; Ekelund LG; O'Neil JJ; Goldstein GM; Bromberg PA; Dalton
JL; Ballenger MN; Davis SM; Koch GG (1990). Production of arrhythmias by elevated carboxyhemoglobin in
patients with coronary artery disease. Ann Intern Med, 113: 343-351.
412 Brain JD; Samet JM.. (2010). Review of Integrated Science Assessment for Carbon Monoxide (Second External
Review Draft). Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, Science Advisory Board. Washington, DC. EPA-CASAC-
10-005.
413 Andreadou, I.; Iliodromitis, E. K.; Rassaf, T.; Schulz, R.; Papapetropoulos, A.; Ferdinandy, P. (2015). The role of
gasotransmitters NO, H2S and CO in myocardial ischaemia/reperfusion injury and cardioprotection by
preconditioning, postconditioning and remote conditioning. Br J Pharmacol, 172(6): 1587-1606.
414 Mennear J. H. (1993). Carbon monoxide and cardiovascular disease: an analysis of the weight of evidence. Regul
Toxicol Pharmacol, 17(1): 77-84.
415 Weir, F. W.; Fabiano, V. L. (1982). Re-evaluation of the role of carbon monoxide in production or aggravation of
cardiovascular disease processes. J Occup Med, 24(7): 519-525.
416 Varadi, J.; Lekli, I.; Juhasz, B.; Bacskay, I.; Szabo, G.; Gesztelyi, R.; Szendrei, L.; Varga, E.; Bak, I.; Foresti, R.;
Motterlini, R.; Tosaki, A. (2007). Beneficial effects of carbon monoxide-releasing molecules on post-ischemic
myocardial recovery. Life Sci, 80(17): 1619-1626.
417 Rochetaing, A.; Barbe, C.; Kreher, P. (2001). Acute ischemic preconditioning and high subchronic CO exposure
independently increase myocardial tolerance to ischemia. Inhal Toxicol, 13(11): 1015-1032.
418 Foster J. R. (1981). Arrhythmogenic effects of carbon monoxide in experimental acute myocardial ischemia: lack
of slowed conduction and ventricular tachycardia. Am Heart J, 102(5): 876-882.
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were conducted in humans.419'420'421'422'423'424'425'426 Out of the eight human studies, two did not
investigate a CO exposure (37-38), and one was an epidemiologic study evaluating the effects of
acute CO exposures at non-ambient levels(39). The remaining five studies investigated potential
cardiovascular effects of CO exposure in healthy individuals (40 - 44), a topic which was
discussed in the previous ISA. In reference to effects on exercise-induced angina, the 2010 CO
ISA stated that "no such effects have been observed in healthy adults following controlled
exposures to CO." Furthermore, it states, "Although some studies have reported CO-induced
hemodynamic changes among healthy adults at COHb concentrations as low as 5%, this effect
has not been observed consistently across studies."21 These statements are consistent with the
provided studies. Although EPA is not reopening the 2010 CO ISA in this proceeding, we note
that these statements are also consistent with the conclusions from the ISA.
The 2010 CO ISA focused on publications from 1999 to May 2009, and no studies were
identified which investigated potential carcinogenic effects of CO. The studies which the
commenter provides, published from 2012 to 2020, will be considered for inclusion in the next
ISA for CO.
11.2 - Upstream and downstream criteria pollutant emissions
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
Worsening air quality and increasing global carbon emissions. As the EPA touts the
environmental benefits it hopes to achieve from the production of more EVs, it ignores the fact
that as consumers turn away from new models and the overall U.S. fleet ages, the older cars left
on America's highways will produce more smog and other traditional air pollutants that degrade
local air quality. And if there truly were an explosion in the sale of EVs, those EVs would need
to be charged using electricity produced mostly from fossil-fuel-fired power plants, increasing
the national emissions of carbon dioxide.47 EPA largely dismisses this reality based on the wish-
419 Ghio, A. J.; Case, M. W.; Soukup, J. M. (2018). Heme oxygenase activity increases after exercise in healthy
volunteers. Free Radic Res, 52(2): 267-272.
420 Starling, M. R.; Moody, M.; Crawford, M. H.; Levi, B.; O'Rourke, R. A. (1984). Repeat treadmill exercise
testing: variability of results in patients with angina pectoris. American Heart J, 107(2): 298-303.
421 Asian, S.; Uzkeser, M.; Seven, B.; Gundogdu, F.; Acemoglu, H.; Aksakal, E.; Varoglu, E. (2006). The evaluation
of myocardial damage in 83 young adults with carbon monoxide poisoning in the East Anatolia region in Turkey.
Hum Exp Toxicol, 25(8): 439-446.
422 Keramidas, M. E.; Kounalakis, S. N.; Eiken, O.; Mekjavic, I. B. (2012). Carbon monoxide exposure during
exercise performance: muscle and cerebral oxygenation. Acta Physiol, 204(4): 544-554.
423 Adir Y; Merdler A; Haim SB; Front A; Harduf R; BittermanH (1999). Effects of exposure to low concentrations
of carbon monoxide on exercise performance and myocardial perfusion in young healthy men. Occup Environ Med,
56: 535-538.
424 Turner, J. A.; McNicol, M. W. (1993). The effect of nicotine and carbon monoxide on exercise performance in
normal subjects. RespirMed, 87(6): 427-431.
425 Davies, D. M.; Smith, D. J. (1980). Electrocardiographic changes in healthy men during continuous low-level
carbon monoxide exposure. Environ Res, 21(1): 197-206.
426 Ekblom, B.; Huot, R. (1972). Response to submaximal and maximal exercise at different levels of
carboxyhemoglobin. Acta Physiol Scand, 86(4): 474-482.
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ful claim that America's future power generation will soon shift en masse to wind and solar.48
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 17]
47 See Roger Pielke Jr., "The Energy Transition Has Not Yet Started: Global fossil fuel consumption is
still increasing," The Honest Broker, June 29, 2023, https://rogerpielkejr.substack.com/p/the-energy-
transition-has-not-yet; Robert Bryce, "The Energy Transition Isn't: Despite $4.1 trillion spent on wind and
solar, they aren't even keeping pace with the growth in hydrocarbons," July 1, 2023,
https://robertbryce.substack.eom/p/the-energy-transition-isnt.
48 See 88 FR at 29303-04.
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Steven G. Bradbury expressed concerns regarding the potential for the proposed standards to
slow adoption of newer, cleaner vehicles leaving older, dirtier vehicles on the road longer
thereby producing more smog and pollution. This commenter also argued that an explosion of
the sales of EVs would result in more electricity demand produced largely by fossil fueled power
plants thereby increasing emissions.
Response:
We respond to fleet turnover and how our OMEGA modeling addresses this issue in Section
12.1.3 of this document. We respond to comments related to increased emissions from power
plants in Section 11.3 of this document.
11.3 - Air quality modeling
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
1. PM Standard Air Quality and Emissions Inventory Impact
EPA is proposing a PM exhaust emission standard of 0.5 mg/mi that is applicable over three
test cycles and at cold temperature. The standard is phased-in between the 2027 and 2029 model
years, at the same time that CARB's PM 1 mg/mile standard phases in. The current EPA
standard is 3 mg/mi, so the 0.5 mg/mi standard represents an 83% reduction in the standard from
the current standard. Similarly, EPA's proposed 0.5 mg/mile US06 standard is a 92% reduction
from the current standard of 6 mg/mile and 83% lower than the 3 mg/mile US06 standard
recently adopted by CARB. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 151-152]
a)PM Emission Inventory Impacts
EPA estimated PM emission reductions from the entire regulatory scenario and went on to
evaluate nationwide PM air quality benefits. The emissions inventory benefits are summarized in
Figure 41.269 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 151-152]
269 Illustrative Air Quality Analysis for the Light and Medium Duty Vehicle Multipollutant Proposed
Rule, Technical Support Document, EPA-420-D-23-002, April 2023, Table 6-1, page 43.
Figure 41: Annual PM2.5 Benefits from the Regulatory Scenario
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PM2.5 Source: On-road
2016 Base Year: 104,005
2055 Reference Case: 35,737
2055 LMDV Regulatory Case: 26,833
Reference-LMDV: 8,904 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 151-152]
PM2.5 Source: Upstream
2016 Base Year: 167,795
2055 Reference Case: 92,358
2055 LMDV Regulatory Case: 94,533
Reference-LMDV: -2,174 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 151-152]
PM2.5 Source: Total
2016 Base Year: 271,800
2055 Reference Case: 128,096
2055 LMDV Regulatory Case: 121,365
Reference-LMDV: 6,730 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 151-152]
For on-road vehicles, PM2.5 is reduced by 68,268 tons per year, or 66%, between 2016 and
2055 with existing regulations already in place. EPA estimates that the NPRM standards would
reduce PM2.5 by an additional 8,904 tons, or an additional 9%, to 75%. However, upstream
emissions increase by 2,174 tons under the NPRM (mainly from electricity generation). When
upstream emissions are included with on-road emissions, the emission reduction from 2016 to
2055 with current regulations is 53% and is only an additional 2.5% with the RS. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 151-152]
The on-road PM benefits in Figure 41 are the result of two factors - the replacement of ICE
vehicles with BEVs (with zero exhaust PM), and the implementation of the exhaust PM standard
for remaining ICE vehicles. We searched the available documentation but were unable to
determine how much of the on-road PM reduction was due to either factor. This is an important
consideration in determining the overall effectiveness of the proposed exhaust PM standards.
EPA should provide more information regarding the relative benefits of the two factors. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 151-152]
b) Air Quality Analysis
EPA's DRIA presents its air quality impacts for its proposal (Chapter 8).271 Section 8.1.1 of
the DRIA lists the primary and secondary PM2.5 standards as shown in Figure 43, and indicates
that "as of December 31, 2022, more than 19 million people lived in the 4 areas that are
designated as nonattainment for the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS, more than 31 million people lived in
the 11 areas that are designated as nonattainment for the 2006 24-hour PM2.5 NAAQS, and
more than 20 million people lived in the 5 areas designated as nonattainment for the 2012 annual
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PM2.5 NAAQS.272 The report does not indicate what the model predicts as the nonattainment
areas in 2055 without the proposal, or at least without the proposed exhaust PM standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 152-153]
271 Multi-Pollutant Emission Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, EPA- 420-D-23-003, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis, April 2023.
272 Section 8.1.1, page 8-1 ofDraftRIA.
Figure 43: EPA's Primary and Secondary PM2.5 Air Quality Standards (|ig/m3) [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 152-153]
Type: Primary
Annual Average: 12.0
24 Hour: 35.0
Type: Secondary
Annual Average: 15.0
24 Hour: 35.0
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 152-153]
The DRIA goes on to say that the "LMDV regulatory scenario would decrease annual average
PM2.5 by 0.1 |ig/m3... and that the population-weighted average change in annual average
PM2.5 concentrations would be 0.03 |ig/m3 in 2055."273 These impacts are very small, or
0.08% and 0.25% of the annual average primary standard of 12.0 |ig/m3. Again, some of the PM
air quality impact is due to the replacement of ICE vehicles with BEVs, and some due to the PM
standards on ICE vehicles. So, the air quality impact of the PM standards is even smaller than
|ig/mi in 2055. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 152-153]
273 Page 8-21 of DRIA.
EPA did not consider a viable alternative to its PM proposal - and that is the adoption of the
California LEV4 standards for PM. The current Tier 3 PM standard for LDVs and LDTs less
than 8500 lbs is 3 mg/mi.274 The California LEVIII standard is 3 mg/mi until model year 2025,
when a 1 mg/mi standard is phased-in between model years 2025 and 2028 at 25% per year. 275
The California standard of 1 mg/mi represents a 66% reduction in PM emissions from the current
EPA standard of 3 mg/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 152-153]
274 Tier 3 PM regs
275 LEVTI regs
c) Light-Duty Vehicle Contribution to PM Inventory
EPA has inadequately considered the exceedingly low contribution of light-duty vehicles to
PM emission inventories
The NPRM proposes a PM standard of 0.5 mg/mi standard for the 25 °C FTP, US06 and -7 °C
FTP. Auto Innovators and our member companies do not believe the air quality benefit warrants
the additional development and testing issues that this proposal creates. In particular, even with
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the EPA proposal to increase in stringency of the PM2.5 NAQQS as low as 8 or 9 [j,g/m3 from
the current 12 [j,g/m3 earlier this year, EPA has also announced it expects to achieve these levels
in most counties except California—a state that chose an FTP PM standard of 1 mg/mi for its
environmental benefits and in recognition that resources are more appropriately spent on
advancing EV sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 153-154]
With that in mind, Toyota contracted Ramboll Environ US Corporation to conduct
atmospheric research using similar simulation technology between EPA (CMAQ) and Ramboll
(CAMx). Ramboll's results were similar to EPA's in finding that the new PM NAAQS will be
broadly met in major regions. Additionally, Ramboll conducted a Source Contribution Study
(PSAT) that indicates that the emission category "Other Anthropogenic Sources," which includes
prescribed and agricultural fires and other area sources such as residential fuel combustion,
solvent utilization (e.g., paint, printing), dry-cleaning, and fugitive dust emissions, are the largest
source of PM. Ramboll also found that the LDV sector contribution is far less than 5% of total
PM 2.5 emissions in most locations. For details on the Ramboll study, please refer to the
presentation attached as "US Air Quality Studies by Toyota." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp.153-154]
Organization: American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers
1. EPA overstates the environmental benefits
EPA touts several emissions benefits in the Proposed Rule from shifting the light-duty vehicle
fleet to ZEVs. But EPA's analysis is lopsided in favor of its preferred technology. In analyzing
environmental costs and benefits, EPA overlooks negative environmental consequences of ZEVs
from increased power generation, vehicle usage, ZEV tire wear, the EV manufacturing supply
chain, and battery replacements and disposal at the end of their useful life. Notably, EPA fails to
assess net emissions. Although EPA modeled changes to power generation anticipated by the
Proposed Rule as part of its upstream analysis, EPA does not consider the potential degradation
of air quality in areas in the direct vicinity of existing or new power plants.204 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp. 44-45]
204 Id. at 29,379 (noting that although "[e]missions from upstream sources would likely increase in some
cases (e.g., power plants) and decrease in others (e.g., refineries), EPA projects that the Proposed Rule will
result in a total decrease in emissions of certain pollutants").
Organization: Delek US Holdings, Inc.
EPA compounds this flaw by making unsupported assumptions regarding total emissions
impacts of its proposal as well as broad conclusory assertions not based on sufficient data-based
substantiation. For example, EPA asserts that "the air quality analysis does not represent the
proposal's regulatory scenario, nor does it reflect the expected impacts of the [IRA]," that while
its analysis includes "some increases in ambient pollutant concentrations, as the power sector
becomes cleaner over time as a result of the IRA and future policies, these impacts would
decrease," and "the specific locations of increased air pollution are uncertain, [EPA] expect[s]
them to be in more limited geographic areas."20 The Proposed Rule did not quantify emissions
changes associated with producing or extracting crude or manufacturing refined fuels.21 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 5]
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20 Proposed Rule at 29,361.
21 Proposed Rule at 29,353. EPA concluded that EGU emissions will decrease between 2028 and
2055... [but] the increase in EGU emissions associated with the proposal's increased electricity generation
would peak in the late 2030's/early 2040's (depending on the pollutant) and then generally decrease or
level off through 2055." Id.
c. BEVs increased demand for power generation will also result in greater emissions of
criteria pollutant emissions.
The Proposed Rule predicts net emissions reductions but does not adequately evaluate local
ambient air quality impacts from increased power generation spurred by the mass adoption of
electric vehicles. Although EPA modeled changes to power generation anticipated by the
Proposed Rule as part of its upstream analysis, EPA does not consider the potential degradation
of air quality in areas in the direct vicinity of existing or new power plants, especially as the need
for baseload generation at times when the sun is not shining and the wind is not blowing rises
exponentially with rapid electrification.44 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 9]
44 Proposed Rule at 29,361 (describing the illustrative air quality modeling analysis EPA used and
conceding that there would be increases in ambient pollutant concentrations but failing to quantify the
actual concentrations and volumes or identify the geographic areas impacted).
Organization: Elders Climate Action
EPA performed modeling for the 2022 HD vehicle rule to demonstrate the benefits of the HD
rule. That modeling showed that the NOx reductions required by the rule for HD vehicles will
not be sufficient to achieve the ozone NAAQS in severe and extreme ozone nonattainment areas.
The L/MD vehicle rule does not contain any analysis to determine whether the NOx reductions
required by the rule will be sufficient to achieve the NAAQS in the most polluted nonattainment
areas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 5-6]
Without effective action to achieve the emission reductions needed for attainment, many at
risk groups will suffer harm. EPA's review of the NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter have
identified groups especially at risk from vehicle pollution, including— [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0737, pp. 5-6]
Babies and children, whose bodies are rapidly developing,
Pregnant women who risk increased premature birth and low weight births when exposed to
vehicle pollution.
Children who develop asthma.
Children and adults with asthma who suffer asthma attacks.
People with existing respiratory diseases including COPD, COVID-related breathing
limitations, long-COVID, and people with active COVID or respiratory infections.
People with lung cancer or other chronic diseases including other cancers. People with or at
risk for cardiovascular disease.
Elders (over age 65) who risk premature death with exposure to air pollution.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 5-6]
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The proposed rule fails to achieve the public health benefits that will flow from requiring LD
vehicles and MD trucks and buses to emit zero particles, zero NOx and toxic pollutants that
cause urban smog, childhood asthma, respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, and premature
deaths. Equally objectionable is the failure of EPA to even consider zero emission standards for
short-haul L/MDVs, and to evaluate the climate and public health benefits that would follow
from the actions needed for attainment in the worst affected nonattainment areas. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 5-6]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
In addition to the research presented in our previous comments, we are including additional,
analyses that further demonstrate the impact of light- and medium-duty vehicle emissions on
vulnerable populations and the need for and benefits of zero-emitting solutions, including for
light-duty trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 6]
A recent study by Calvin Arter et. al. estimated the air quality and health impacts of on-road
vehicular emissions from five vehicles classes, including light-duty autos and light-duty trucks,
on PM2.5 and 03 concentrations at a 12 x 12 kilometer scale for 12 states and Washington D.C.
as well as four large metropolitan statistical areas in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic U.S. in
2016.2 In the region considered, the research found that light-duty trucks are responsible for the
most PM2.5-and ozone-attributable premature mortalities, with 46% of those mortalities from
directly emitted primary particulate matter and 80% of those mortalities from ozone-attributable
NOx emissions. This study demonstrates the importance and urgent need to address tailpipe
emissions from light-duty trucks and supports EPA's proposal to include Class 2b and 3 vehicles
in the rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 6]
2 Calvin A Arter et al Mortality-based damages per ton due to the on-road mobile sector in the
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic U.S. by region, vehicle class and precursor, 2021 Environ. Res. Lett. 16.
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/abf60b (Attachment B)
Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
Allowing Strong PHEV cars and trucks to be eligible in the final regulation brings air quality
benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 28]
- Strong PHEVs accrue many of the benefits of electrified transportation: they produce no
tailpipe emissions during charge-depletion operation (reducing local air pollution), they weigh
less than comparable BEVs (reducing non-exhaust particulate emissions from tires), they refuel
many fewer times per year than ICEVs (reducing refueling emissions) and address the different
types of cold-start emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 28]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
J. EPA fails to adequately consider the regional air quality impacts associated with the
proposed rule.
EPA describes in the Preamble that it conducted an "illustrative air quality modeling analysis
of a regulatory scenario" involving LDV and MDV emission reductions and corresponding
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changes in upstream emission sources.321 EPA goes on to downplay the results of the analysis,
explaining that [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 58-61]
321 321 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29361 (emphasis added).
"Decisions about the emissions and other elements used in the air quality modeling were
made early in the analytical process for the proposed rulemaking. Accordingly, the air quality
analysis does not represent the proposal's regulatory scenario, nor does it reflect the expected
impacts of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)"322 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 58-61]
322 Id (emphasis added).
"While the results of the illustrative analysis include some increases in ambient pollutant
concentrations, as the power sector becomes cleaner over time as a result of the IRA and future
policies, these impacts would decrease. Although the specific locations of increased air pollution
are uncertain, we expect them to be in more limited geographic areas, compared to the
widespread decreases that we predict to result from the reductions in vehicle emissions."323
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 58-61]
323 Id.
Despite EPA's claims of uncertainty regarding the upstream emissions inventory,324 peer-
reviewed research by Argonne National Laboratory supports the conclusion that BEV adoption
can result in increased regional emissions of criteria pollutants, noting that "gasoline vehicles
currently have lower total NOx, urban NOx, total PM2.5, and urban PM2.5 in 33%; 15%; 70%;
and 10% of states, respectively[, compared with BEV],"325 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
pp. 58-61]
324 DRIA at 8-20.
325 Burnham, A.; Lu, Z.; Wang, M.; Elgowainy, A. "Regional Emissions Analysis of Light-Duty Battery
Electric Vehicles." Atmosphere 2021, 12, 1482. https://doi.org/10.3390/atmosl2111482.
The results of the air quality modeling analysis to which EPA is dismissive are actually quite
alarming. EPA's modelling of "a regulatory scenario" projects regions of increased annual
average concentrations for particulate matter (PM2.5), ozone, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide
(S02), acetaldehyde, benzene, and formaldehyde, as well as regions of increased annual nitrogen
and sulfur deposition.326 Specifically, EPA's modelling projects increased annual average
concentrations of criteria or hazardous air pollutants in at least 39 states: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.327 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 58-61]
326 DRIA at 8-20 to 8-34.
327 DRIA at 8-24 to 8-34, based on Figures 8-6, 8-8, 8-10, 8-12, 8-14 to 8-17, 8-22 and 8-23.
Of particular interest is EPA's modeling results for annual average S02 concentrations, which
show expansive regions of increased ground-level concentrations, in some areas greater than
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0.050 parts per billion.328 Among the regions projected to be impacted are existing S02 1- hour
(2010) non-attainment areas in Arizona, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Texas.329 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 58-61]
328 DRIA at 8-26.
329 EPA, "Green Book Sulfur Dioxide (S02) (2010) Nonattainment Area Map,"
https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/mapso2_2010.html.
The results of the "illustrative" modeling of "a regulatory scenario" are significant enough to
warrant EPA's revisiting the impacts of its actual proposed standards on state and local air
quality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 58-61]
[See original for figure titled "Figure 8-12: Projected illustrative changes in annual average
S02 concentrations in 2055 due to LMDV regulatory scenario"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 58-61]
Source: DRIA at 8-26. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 58-61]
[See original for figure titled "S02 Nonattainment Areas (2010 Standard)"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 58-61]
Source: EPA Green Book S02 (2010) Nonattainment Area Map (June 30, 2023) [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 58-61]
Organization: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
6. Air quality modeling results. EPA should make available, in the docket or website, the
complete results of the illustrative air quality modeling it completed for this proposal, including
results by individual receptors. This will allow state and local agencies to better understand the
potential impacts of this rule on their jurisdictions, especially for ozone and fine particles
(PM2.5). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 3]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI) comments that EPA should provide more
information on the fraction of projected onroad PM emissions reductions in the air quality
analysis that are due to emission control of ICE vehicles as compared to the fraction of
reductions due to electric vehicles. AAI also notes that the impacts on ambient PM from the rule
are small. They present results of an air quality modeling analysis, done by Ramboll for Toyota,
looking at source contributions to ambient concentrations of PM2.5 which shows that light-duty
vehicles contribute less than 5% of total PM2.5 concentration in most locations.
A commenter, Valero Energy Corporation, noted that the air quality modeling analysis
presented in the NPRM projected that the illustrative scenario would result in increases in annual
concentrations of pollutants in some areas, and specifically pointed to projected increased
ambient SO2 concentrations. The commenter suggested that EPA should revisit the impacts of
the proposal on air quality. Other commenters also noted that the air quality analysis was
illustrative and not based on the proposed standards.
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Commenters, e.g., Delek US Holdings, Inc. and American Fuel and Petrochemical
Manufacturers, asserted that EPA has failed to assess localized air quality impacts due to
increased criteria pollutant emissions in areas proximate to EGUs. They also noted that vehicle
electrification will increase energy demand and emissions from power plants, and that this
increased demand will result in even more emissions from power plants when renewables (wind
and solar) are unavailable. And they noted that EPA overlooks negative environmental
consequences of increased power generation and ZEV tire wear among others.
The Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle comment notes that allowing Strong PHEV cars
and trucks to be eligible in the final regulation brings air quality benefits.
A commenter, WIDNR, noted that EPA should make the complete results of the air quality
modeling available to the public, including results by individual receptors, and another
commenter, Elders Climate Action, asked how the rule will impact attainment of the ozone and
PM2.5 NAAQS. Some commenters also noted that this rule is needed to help them meet their
NAAQS attainment goals.
Response:
For the final rule, EPA conducted an air quality modeling analysis of the proposed standards
(the NPRM action case, rather than an illustrative case) and used an updated version of IPM to
project EGU emissions (the 2022 post-IRA version of IPM). EPA also included projected design
value concentrations for PM2.5 and ozone, see Chapter 7.4 of the RIA for more information.
These updates are responsive to comments suggesting that EPA did not model the proposed
program, and to comments suggesting that EPA include the impact on projected nonattainment in
its analysis.427 The air quality modeling used a photochemical model, not a source-receptor
model, and the outputs of the photochemical model are available at the 12 km grid cell level.
EPA docketed the inputs and grid-cell specific outputs to the CMAQ model for the illustrative
air quality modeling documented in the NPRM and also has done so for the air quality modeling
analysis done for the FRM.428
With regard to the request that EPA provide more information on the portion of the projected
PM emission reductions that are due to emissions control of ICE vehicles versus the replacement
of ICE vehicles with electric vehicles, EPA has not estimated this value; for purposes of the air
quality analyses, we model the impacts of the standards, not of specific technologies that
manufacturers may use to comply. We note, moreover, that the final standards do not mandate
numbers of ICE vehicles with improved emissions control or of PEVs; rather, each manufacturer
can comply with the performance-based standards using a mix of technologies that best suits
their business.
EPA believes that the PM2.5 emissions standards are adequately justified even without this
information (see Section III.D.3 of the preamble and Section 4.1.3 of this document). There is no
427 Decisions about the emissions and other elements used in the air quality modeling were made early in the
analytical process for the final rulemaking. Accordingly, the air quality analysis does not fully represent the final
regulatory scenario; however, we consider the modeling results to be a fair reflection of the impact the standards will
have on air quality in 2055.
428 EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0393 Docket memo modeling input and output files for the IPM runs used in the
illustrative AQ and benefits analysis for the LMDV multipollutant proposed rule, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0353
Modeling input files for the illustrative air quality and benefits analysis for the LMDV multipollutant proposed rule,
and EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0418 Additional NPRM Illustrative Air Quality Modeling Outputs.
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question that the PM2.5 standards will yield significant reductions of PM2.5 emissions from the
light- and medium-duty vehicle fleets and that these reductions are important for public health.
Section II of the preamble describes the health and environmental effects associated with
exposure to pollutants, including PM2.5. Emissions from light- and medium-duty vehicle and
upstream sectors contribute to ambient concentrations of PM2.5 at the local, regional, and
national level, often disproportionally affecting communities of color and low-income
populations. As set forth in Sections VI and VII of the final rule preamble, we project that this
rule will result in significant reductions of emissions of GHGs, criteria pollutants, and air toxics
from the light- and medium-duty vehicle sector. The reduction of emissions associated with
vehicles will lead to air quality and health benefits improvements associated with the final rule
(see Section VII.C of the final rule preamble).
EPA disagrees with the commenter who notes that the air quality benefit is not enough to
warrant the costs of the rule; for responses to comments on the benefit-cost analysis, please see
Section 8.5 of this RTC document. The analysis done by Ramboll to assess the contribution of
light-duty gasoline vehicles to ambient PM2.5 concentration and earlier work done by EPA
indicate that light-duty gasoline vehicles contribute to ambient concentrations of PM2.5.429 States
with nonattainment areas are required to take action to bring those areas into attainment. Since
this rule will reduce onroad light- and medium-duty emissions across the country, this rule could
help states and municipal areas in their efforts to attain the PM2.5 NAAQS as expeditiously as
practicable and may relieve areas with already stringent local regulations from some of the
burden associated with adopting additional local controls. The final rule could also assist
counties with ambient concentrations near the level of the ozone and PM2.5 NAAQS who are
working to ensure long-term attainment or maintenance of the ozone and PM2.5 NAAQS.
Additionally, to the extent that the information introduced by commenters was intended to
advocate for more or less stringent standards, we refer the reader to Sections 3.3 and 4 of this
RTC document.
EPA acknowledges and agrees with commenters who note that the air quality analysis models
increased energy demand and increased emissions from EGUs. EPA also notes that for this final
rule, we modeled the air quality impacts of the proposed standards (not an illustrative scenario),
which was a suggestion from a few commenters. Our modeling of projected emissions from the
power sector was done using the Integrated Planning Model (IPM), which we note accounts for
the fact that renewables are not always available and considers alternative ways that clean power
can be supplied during those times. Please see Chapter 7.2.2.1 of the RIA for more information
on the IPM modeling used to project emissions from the power sector for the air quality
modeling and the EPA Power sector website for more details on the post-IRA 2022 version of
IPM (https://www.epa.gov/power-sector-modeling/post-ira-2022-reference-case).
In addition, our air quality modeling finds significant reductions of pollutants across the
nation. One commenter specifically mentioned that there were modeled increases in SO2
concentration presented in the illustrative air quality modeling analysis in the NPRM, see
Chapter 8 of the DRIA. The air quality modeling for the final rule (see Chapter 7 of the RIA)
projects on average a decrease in annual SO2 concentration of 0.001 ppb in 2055 and a
429 Zawacki et al, 2018.Mobile source contributions to ambient ozone and particulate matter in 2025. Atmospheric
Environment, vol 188. https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.atmosenv.2018.04.057
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population-weighted average decrease in annual SO2 concentration of 0.003 ppb. We also
project some increases in SO2 concentration in our final rule air quality modeling analysis,
although the increases are smaller and impact fewer locations than the illustrative modeling in
the NPRM. Although our air quality modeling is not of sufficient resolution to capture impacts at
a smaller than 12 km grid scale, we do expect that increased emissions from EGUs may increase
ambient concentrations of some pollutants, including SO2, in some areas downwind of EGUs.
The impact of these increases is limited and dwarfed by the decreases elsewhere in the nation;
indeed, we project that more than 99 percent of the population will experience reductions in
annual average SO2 concentrations as a result of this rule. We also expect the power sector to
become cleaner over time as a result of the IRA and future policies, which will reduce the air
quality impacts of EGUs. Further, none of the grid cells that are projected to have increases in
SO2 concentration are located in nonattainment areas, as was highlighted by this commenter as a
concern based on the results of the illustrative analysis described in the NPRM. On average the
final rule AQ modeling projects a decrease in annual SO2 concentration of 0.001 ppb in 2055 and
a population-weighted average decrease in annual SO2 concentration of 0.003 ppb.
Comments related to plug-in hybrids are addressed in Sections 3.1.6 or 12.2.4 of this RTC.
Comments related to tire wear are addressed in RTC Section 11.1.
12 - Modeling of compliance pathways, associated costs, and
emissions reductions
12.1 - General comments about OMEGA
Comments by Organizations
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
EPA's Proposal fails to evaluate how government credits are embedded in vehicle pricing.
For example, neither federal or state governments, or auto manufacturers explain how state ZEV
credits, EPA GHG multiplier credits, and NHTSA CAFE EV multiplier credits are accounted for
in both ZEV and ICEV vehicle price. There is increasing evidence that regulations which
mandate EV sales—along with the cross-subsidies from gasoline and diesel vehicle buyers—are
leading manufacturers to abandon sales of the least expensive and higher fuel economy gasoline
and diesel vehicles that do not receive similar subsidization.236 Cox Automotive found that
"in December 2017, automobile makers produced 36 models priced at $25,000 or less. Five
years later, they built just 10," pushing low-income buyers out of the new-car market and into the
used-car market. Conversely, in December 2017 automobile manufacturers offered 61 models
for sale with sticker prices of $60,000 or higher and in December 2022, they offered 90.237 This
is unacceptable. EPA and its sister agencies cannot create credits and then claim they do not
affect vehicle price solely because they have not sought to quantify them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 51-52]
236 Steven G. Bradbury, Distinguished Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, Prepared Statement for the
hearing entitled "Driving Bad Policy: Examining EPA's Tailpipe Emissions Rules and the Realities of a
Rapid Electric Vehicle Transition," before the Subcommittee on Economic Grown, Energy Policy, and
Regulatory Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Accountability, at 10
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(May 17, 2023) available at https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Bradbury-Prepared-
Statement-for-17-May-2023-Oversight-Hearing.pdf
237 See Sean Tucker, Are we witnessing the demise of the affordable car? Automobile makers have all but
abandoned the budget market (MarketWatch Feb. 28, 2023), available at
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/are-we-witnessing-the-demise-of-the-affordable-car-automakers-have-
all-but-abandoned-the-budget-market-a68862f0 (last visited May 24, 2023).
Tellingly, EPA never estimates the annual price of a comparable ZEV and ICEV, for each
year in which EPA proposes standards. EPA's bias towards EVs is demonstrated by EPA's
statement that its OMEGA modeling "now incorporates a consumer choice element. This means
that the impacts of, for example, a $40,000 BEV versus a $35,000 ICE vehicle of similar utility
(i.e., a 14 percent increase for the BEV) is a much different consideration than a $6,000
incremental BEV cost versus a $1,000 incremental ICE cost (a 500 percent increase for the
BEV)."238 In other words, EPA set up its model to show the consumer price (not the actual real-
world cost) of EVs have a lower percentage cost increase than the incremental absolute cost of
switching from ICEVs to ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 51-52]
238 See RIA page 2-42, https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf.
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
. We recommend that EPA provide more thorough documentation of the OMEGA input and
output files, and descriptions of data used in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
66-67]
H. OMEGA Model
EPA introduced OMEGA 2.1.0 to improve the model boundaries by including pre- and post-
processing steps to occur within the model, as well as adding an independent policy module,
modeling of strategic producer decisions, and a consumer response component. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 137-139]
EPA's OMEGA modeling team provided a helpful tutorial of the model's basic operation and
answered numerous manufacturer questions. Despite the assistance, it has been difficult for Auto
Innovators and its member companies to figure out how to exercise the model's new features to
determine how accurately they replicate reality. Auto Innovators' attempts to maneuver through
the model have uncovered information access barriers that make it difficult to understand how
key assumptions supporting the proposed standards affect manufacturer compliance and the
associated costs and environmental improvements over time. Overall, the model the lacks
necessary transparency and user-friendly access needed for stakeholders to evaluate the
feasibility claims in the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 137-139]
The 60-day comment period is insufficient to provide a thorough assessment. With the limited
time provided, we have discovered difficulties such as: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
137-139]
- Many complex aspects of the model are not found or clearly stated in the model
documentation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 137-139]
- A baseline fleet of 2021 discussed, but a 2019 fleet appears to have been used. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 137-139]
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- There are circular definitions applied to basic terms such as "engine cost." [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 137-139]
- We encountered unreasonable difficulty in creating a technology walk to be able to
understand incremental technology penetration and cost to compare to GHG improvements over
time. [EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 137-139]
It is possible, given the limited comment period, that there is some nuance that explains the
apparent deficiencies, and we welcome dialogue with EPA on these concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 137-139]
Auto Innovators recommends that the final rule and associated documentation: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 137-139]
- Provide model documentation with clear steps to develop a technology walk. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 137-139]
- Provide a glossary of technology definitions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 137-
139]
- Provide full details on cost assumptions (as in previous rulemakings). [EP A-HQ-0 AR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 137-139]
- Provide a straight forward way to identify BEVs, PHEVs, strong hybrids, or conventional
ICE technologies in model output files. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 137-139]
We also note that, despite the importance of the OMEGA model in informing its proposed
standards, EPA does not appear to have engaged its Science Advisory Board in a review of the
model's structure, inputs, or outputs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 137-139]
EPA conducted a peer review of the model through its contractor ERG.247 The peer review
report describes that four independent reviewers, free from conflicts of interest, were selected by
ERG. However, one of the reviewers, Rick Rykowksi, is described as an "Independent
Engineering Contractor, Environmental Defense Fund" and is a former EPA employee.248 As
EPA staff is well-aware, Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) is a frequent commenter on
environmental regulations, including those affecting the automotive industry, generally taking
supportive positions on EPA's proposals and advocating for even more stringent requirements.
While Mr. Rykowski may technically be an independent contractor, his close ties to EDF have
likely given that organization an unfair advantage relative to other stakeholders in understanding
and commenting on the operation of the OMEGA model and its input / output structure as it
applies to the NPRM, particularly given the limited comment period. Furthermore, although the
OMEGA model is intended to represent potential manufacturer responses to proposed and
alternative standards, not a single one of the reviewers selected has recent experience in the
automotive industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 137-139]
247 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, External Peer Review of EPA's OMEGA Model: Final Peer
Review Summary Report, EPA-420-R-23-010 (Apr. 2023).
248 Id. at A-59.
We recommend that EPA proactively engage all stakeholders to familiarize them with new
and significantly revised models well in advance of their use in rulemaking. EPA should also
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consider providing notice in the Federal Register of the availability of new modeling tools (again
in advance of their formal use) and take public input in addition to limited peer reviews. Finally,
for a thorough and appropriate peer review, Auto Innovators recommends that EPA provide an
additional peer review now by an independent reviewer with automotive experience and
incorporate the peer review input into OMEGA prior to finalizing a rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.137-139]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
EPA's Reliance on Its OMEGA Model Is Misplaced
EPA unreasonably relies throughout the proposed rule on a barely tested optimization
modeling tool called "OMEGA." All of EPA's projections relat-ing to the number of
combustion-engine and electric vehicles in compliant fleets during the relevant period were
calculated using OMEGA. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,294-95. Those projections in turn inform
many aspects of the proposed rule, including feasibility, estimated overall emissions, and the
agency's cost-benefit calculation. See, e.g., id. at 29,318 (relying on OMEGA projections to
analyze grid reliability); id. at 29,303, 29,347-59 (using OMEGA to estimate emission
inventories); id. at 29,370, 29,379, 29,383, 29,385-86, 29,392 (using OMEGA to estimate costs
and benefits). If OMEGA is flawed, then so too is the rest of the rule that relies on it. And
OMEGA is flawed for multiple reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 53]
EPA misleadingly asserts that the model underwent peer review before it was released. See 88
Fed. Reg. at 29,185, 29,294. Rather than granting anony- mous reviewers access to the model
and permitting them to pressure-test it and provide comments, EPA contracted with one entity
(the Eastern Research Group) to handpick just four reviewers to assess and critique the model.
See External Peer Review of EPA's OMEGA Model: Final Peer Review Summary Report, EPA,
at 1-2 (Apr. 2023) ("External Review Summary"). EPA does not purport to have distributed the
model to any other reviewers. A lack of widespread quality-assessment of the model alone
renders the decision to adopt it unrea- soned and arbitrary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp.
53-54]
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
F. EPA Analysis of Market Impacts
For this proposed rule, EPA utilized an updated and peer reviewed version of their
Optimization Model for reducing Emissions of Greenhouse gases from Automobiles (OMEGA
2.0) to model vehicle manufacturer compliance with GHG standards. OMEGA 2.0 builds on the
previous version and includes some notable new capabilities:
[T]he updated version of OMEGA extends the prior version's projections of cost-effective
manufacturer compliance decisions by also accounting for the relationship between manufacturer
compliance decisions and consumer demand and including important constraints on technology
adoption. Also, the updated OMEGA allows for evaluation of the influence of other policies
beyond the GHG standards being evaluated, such as state-level ZEV policies.43 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 24-25]
43 88 Fed. Reg. 29294 (May 5, 2023)
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As in previous rulemakings, the agency has included the OMEGA model and accompanying
data files associated with each policy "run" in the regulatory Docket. Although the data files and
model documentation were, in our opinion, too opaque for a rulemaking of such significance,
Honda found agency staff to be helpful in answering our questions and providing further clarity.
Such support was greatly appreciated, particularly for a model with this level of complexity.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 24-25]
Organization: POET, LLC
Future Work, including by EPA
While relatively straightforward to run, the OMEGA model comprises hundreds of inputs and
equations across both behavioral, policy, and technological aspects of the LDV market. While
the results in this memo demonstrate some salient characteristics of proposed policies, a more
thorough evaluation by EPA of these issues are warranted. With additional resources and more
time allowed than the short comment period provided by EPA on the proposal, a more
comprehensive analysis of LDV policies using the OMEGA module could be performed leading
to a more complete understanding of the consequences of this Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, p. 50]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
B. Despite feedback from peer reviewers, EPA fails to provide adequate time for
stakeholder review of the OMEGA v2.1.0 Model.
OMEGA vl.O was created to support new LDV GHG standards proposed by EPA in 2011;
OMEGA v2.1.0, released to support EPA's proposed standards, reflects "significant changes in
the light duty vehicle market including technological advancements and the introduction of new
mobility services" in the period since the release of OMEGA vl.O.82 Peer reviewers of the
OMEGA v2.1.0 model offered the feedback "OMEGA 2 is not just updated, it is essentially a
new model"83 and "OMEGA2 a major expansion of the prior OMEGA model in scope."84
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 16-18]
82 DRIA at 2-2.
83 EPA "External Peer Review of EPA's OMEGA Model Final Peer Review Summary Report" (EPA-420-
R-23-010) at 6, April 2023.
84 EPA "External Peer Review of EPA's OMEGA Model Final Peer Review Summary Report" (EPA-420-
R-23- 010) at 22, April 2023.
In the peer review of OMEGA v2.1.0, "the most common category of comments consisted of
recommendations for improving the model's documentation by adding further explanations or
specifics to enhance the user's understanding."85 Specific comments from peer reviewers
include:
85 DRIA at 2-7.
"'The logical decision-making process in OMEGA2 seems too complex for the
necessary level of review (consisting of a review of at least 90+ pages out of total 300+ pages
containing some source code of the model documentation besides the model running) due to the
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limited effort available to reviewers. Some additional documentation would be useful in terms of
logical explanation of various iterative producer consumer vehicle choice process (suited to a
general non-economist audience) before the public model release."86 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 16-18]
86 EPA "External Peer Review of EPA's OMEGA Model Final Peer Review Summary Report" (EPA-420-
R-23- 010) at 3, April 2023.
"The policy-oriented model seems too complex for a novice user. A professional
economics background is necessary for interpretation of model results and so it'd be useful if the
model documentation could be made more simpler for the general users."87 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 16-18]
87 EPA "External Peer Review of EPA's OMEGA Model Final Peer Review Summary Report" (EPA-420-
R-23-010) at 4, April 2023.
"Would be helpful for the novice EPA model users to include a short section on the
other EPA complementary ALPHA model with differences between it and OMEGA2 model."88
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 16-18]
88 EPA "External Peer Review of EPA's OMEGA Model Final Peer Review Summary Report" (EPA-420-
R-23-010) at 4, April 2023.
"Steps for running the model seem not very straight forward to a novice user using the
existing model GUI. It was hard to locate some of the listed files in the model documentation.
Additional step-by-step flow diagrams including the file listing with a clear indication of
necessary user inputs for both necessary preprocessing and post-processing would be useful to be
included in User's manual. In addition, a definition glossary of major variables including a data
dictionary would be useful "89 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 16-18]
89 EPA "External Peer Review of EPA's OMEGA Model Final Peer Review Summary Report" (EPA-420-
R-23-010)at5, April 2023.
In EPA's response to the peer review comments, EPA generally disagreed with the feedback
concerning complexity for the novice user but vowed that it would "continue to look for ways to
make the documentation clearer and more useful for a broad range of readers and users."90
While EPA "continues to look for ways" to facilitate the use and understanding of the OMEGA
model by its stakeholders, these same stakeholders were granted only 60 days to review the
model code, input and output files, run the model themselves, and provide comments to EPA -
not enough time, given the scope of changes since the OMEGA vl.O model and the magnitude
and complexity of the model itself. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 16-18]
90 EPA "External Peer Review of EPA's OMEGA Model Final Peer Review Summary
Report" (EPA-420-R-23 -010) at 4, April 2023.
EPA Summary and Response
The Alliance recommended that EPA provide additional documentation of the OMEGA input
and output files, and descriptions of data used in the final rule. In response, EPA has updated the
model documentation (https://omega2.readthedocs.io/en/2.5.0/) to provide a description of the
model version that was used for the compliance analysis of this final rulemaking. The model
documentation also provides a description of the variables in the input and output files, and a
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description of the data types and file formatting. The input assumptions and values used for this
rulemaking's central and sensitivity case analyses are described in the appropriate sections of the
Preamble and RIA. For example, consumer modeling inputs are described in RIA Chapter 2.6.3;
vehicle powertrain cost inputs in RIA Chapter 2.6.1, and IRA incentive inputs in RIA Chapter
2.6.8. EPA has added a table of OMEGA topics in RIA 2.1 with chapter and section numbers to
help guide the reader to the relevant details in the RIA and Preamble.
AmFree was critical of the process used by EPA to have the OMEGA model peer reviewed
prior to the NPRM. The commenter describes what in their view was "a lack of wide-spread
quality assessment" of the model, and commented that EPA had not distributed the model to
other reviewers. The commenter describes an alternative process which involves EPA granting
"anonymous reviewers access to the model and permitting them to pressure-test it and provide
comments." In response, EPA disagrees with the commenter's view that the review process was
deficient. EPA's OMEGA model was subject to a thorough peer-review process that meets the
standards outlined by the Peer Review Advisory Group and EPA's Science and Technology
Policy Council, as documented in EPA's peer review handbook (https://www.epa.gov/osa/peer-
review-handbook-4th-edition-2015). As a result of this thorough peer review process, EPA
implemented multiple model revisions and improvements that were incorporated into the version
used for the NPRM analysis. In response to the commenter's assertion that the model was not
broadly available for comment beyond the formal peer-review, EPA notes that the complete full
model and inputs were made available publicly for the NPRM. This includes the model
documentation, model code, full peer review report, model inputs and outputs, model executable
file, and an introductory video tutorial. Multiple commenters, including AmFree, used the public
comment process to submit their observations and recommendations for improving the OMEGA
model based on the extensive materials that were available for review.
AmFree commented that EPA's reliance on the OMEGA model is misplaced, since in the
commenters view, the model was "barely tested", and is the source for "all of EPA's projections
relating to the number of combustion engine and electric vehicles." In response EPA disagrees
that the use of the OMEGA model as a tool to project possible compliance pathways is
inappropriate. EPA notes that the OMEGA model's compliance logic for this rulemaking is
consistent with the modeling for all previous light-duty GHG rulemakings. This logic, to
describe briefly, is an optimization approach that applies technologies to comply with GHG
standards at the lowest cost. As discussed above, EPA disagrees with the same commenter's
assertion that the peer-review process was deficient. It is relevant to the perceived lack of model
testing to note that during the formal peer review process, EPA responded to extensive
comments on the OMEGA model's optimization algorithm. Additional comments on the same
topic were submitted for this rulemaking and are discussed further in RTC Section 12.1.1. The
extent and depth of these comments serve to illustrate the intensive review and testing of the
model's algorithm. EPA considers that the OMEGA model's refinement is an ongoing process
spanning over a decade; the process began with previous rulemakings that utilized OMEGA
modeling and continued with development and testing within the Agency over the past several
years. Importantly, the process includes the second peer review of OMEGA to which the
commenter refers, as well as stakeholder engagement that continues up to and including this
current public comment process. Finally, we note that this particular comment regarding EPA's
reliance upon OMEGA modeling does not distinguish between the model and the model inputs.
The discussion above is in response to the review and testing of the model algorithms and the
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OMEGA model itself. It is appropriate to consider input assumptions and values independently,
apart from a discussion of model algorithms. Inputs to the OMEGA model are described in RIA
Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6, and discussed throughout this RTC Section 12.
AAI commented that it was difficult to navigate through the model and understand how key
assumptions were used, while Honda commented that the data files and model documentation
were "too opaque for a rulemaking of such significance." These commenters acknowledged that
the model, model documentation, and complete input and output files were published and
available for public review for the proposal. EPA recognizes that a large volume of materials was
posted to the docket, and took several steps to assist stakeholders, including updating and
expanding the model documentation based on the peer review and publishing a video tutorial
showing how to conduct a run and navigate some of the key output files. One notable step taken
by EPA at the time of the NPRM was the establishment of an OMEGA "help desk" in the form
of a dedicated email contact for the sole purpose of responding to questions about model
operation and interpretation of input and output files. Between April and August of 2023 alone,
EPA fielded inquiries on dozens of topics, and shared responses via more than 100 email
correspondences. Honda expressed appreciation for these engagement efforts in their comments.
Overall, while we agree that it is challenging to navigate a model involving so many inputs and
outputs, we believe that the steps taken by EPA to be responsive to requests for clarification and
increase transparency were appropriate for providing a sufficient understanding of the modeling
during the comment process.
12.1.1 - Producer side modeling
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
8. Reliance on Credit Trading in Analysis of Compliance Pathways
EPA models a potential compliance pathway for each manufacturer as part of its analysis and
justification of proposed GHG standards. Unlike prior rulemakings, EPA has assumed credit
trading between manufacturers as part of its central analysis, rather than as a sensitivity case.215
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 117-120]
215 NPRM at 29343.
In EPA's own words,
We have incorporated a 'credit market efficiency' parameter that can be set by the user. A
value of' 1' represents a perfect credit market; a value of '0' represents no credit trading
provisions. Values between 0 and 1 represent imperfect trading, where manufacturers with cost-
minimizing compliance pathways that involve the purchase of credits will apply more
technology than they would under perfect trading. And as a result, some of the industries credits
will expire, unused.216 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 117-120]
216 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Final Peer Review Summary Report (Apr. 2023) at 9. ("We
have incorporated a ' credit market efficiency' parameter that can be set by the user. A value of' 1'
represents a perfect credit market; a value of '0' represents no credit trading provisions. Values between 0
and 1 represent imperfect trading, where manufacturers with cost-minimizing compliance pathways that
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involve the purchase of credits will apply more technology than they would under perfect trading. And as a
result, some of the industries credits will expire, unused.")
By implication, a value of 1 in EPA's model would generally result in a perfect balance of
industry performance better and worse than target such that any manufacturer needing to
purchase credits would have access to them through a different manufacturer (or multiple
manufacturers) that chose to over-comply with the standards. Put another way, a value of 1
would imply that each individual manufacturer has perfect foreknowledge of other
manufacturers' product plans and of the distribution of sales for ongoing and future model years,
and that they collude in such a manner that they collectively minimize average compliance costs.
Such an outcome is clearly not realistic. Automobile manufacturers are highly competitive and
do not act in a collective manner in planning products and regulatory compliance.217 Nor is it
possible to have perfect knowledge of future sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 117-
120]
217 Auto Innovators strictly follows all U.S. antitrust laws, and expressly discourages its members from
engaging in any collusive or anti-competitive behavior.
For the NPRM, EPA assumed a 'credit market efficiency' of 0.8.218 In other words, that
manufacturers would have an 80% ability to act collectively together and predict future markets
and sales. Auto Innovators was unable to locate any justification from EPA for its choice of 80%
efficiency in collective planning in either the NPRM or RIA, leading us to believe that its choice
was completely arbitrary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 117-120]
218 EPA NPRM OMEGA central analysis batch input file (2023-03-14-22-42-30-ld-central-run-
to2055.zip\2023-03-14- 22-42-30-ld-central-run-to2055\batch-expanded_ld_central.csv), parameter "Credit
Market efficiency" set to a value of 0.8).
Although we agree that some credit trading is occurring, and thus a 'credit market efficiency'
setting greater than 0 may be warranted, the reality is a much more constrained credit market
than a credit market efficiency value of 80% would imply. The U.S. auto market and
manufacturers are highly competitive. The market for compliance credits is closed, with each
participating buyer and seller of credits individually seeking each other out and coming to unique
terms. Historically, only three manufacturers have sold any significant quantity of GHG credits,
and purchases have been dominated by a single manufacturer with a couple of other
manufacturers purchasing significant quantities, and a number of others purchasing relatively
small amounts of credit.219 Moreover, EPA's approach in general ignores that most
manufacturers prefer to maintain some level of banked credits as insurance against unexpected
events that could affect future compliance.220 Maintaining a buffer against unexpected events
will likely become increasingly important as standard stringency rapidly increases after MY
2022, and even more-so in the later half of this decade as compliance relies more heavily on
electric vehicle market share and its present uncertainties. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
117-120]
219 EPA Trends Report at 119.
220 EPA Trends Report at 122. (A number of manufacturers are maintaining positive credit balances.)
EPA's assumption of 0.8 (or 80%) credit market efficiency is not insignificant. EPA's central
analysis of the proposed standards projects two major manufacturers will rely on purchased
credits for compliance in most years after MY 2022. Another three major manufacturers are
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projected to need to purchase credits in at least three years after MY 2022. Despite projections of
small volume manufacturers exceeding fleet average BEV market share, they would also need to
purchase credits in nearly every year under EPA's projections.221 EPA projects that thirteen
manufacturers will generally exceed regulatory requirements, but the two manufacturers with the
greatest degree of credit generation would not have enough surplus credit to cover the two
manufacturers projected to purchase the most credits.222 Generalizing, it appears that EPA's
projected compliance pathways assume virtually all manufacturers participating as buyers or
sellers (or both) of credits. Again, these assumptions do not seem realistic, particularly given
EPA'slack of support for them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 117-120]
221 Auto Innovators examination of the proposal central analysis OMEGA [. . Jcredittransactions.csv
output files, noting where EPA's analysis results in a "PASTDUE" result.
222 Auto Innovators examination of the proposal central analysis OMEGA [. . .Jcredit transactions.csv
output files, noting where EPA's analysis results in an "EXPIRATION" of credits. In other words, credits
that would expire unused unless sold to another manufacturer.
Perhaps more important than the intricacies and assumptions of compliance modeling, which
is almost always an over-simplified projection of potential future outcomes, are the practical
realities that should be considered. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 117-120]
Auto Innovators believes that it is inappropriate to set a standard so stringent as to effectively
require many manufacturers to rely on other manufacturers to maintain compliance. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 117-120]
The decision to sell credits, who to sell them to, what price to sell them at, and when to sell
them (or to keep them for later use or future value) is a business decision. There is nothing that
requires a manufacturer to sell its credits, to sell them to a particular party, or to sell them at a
particular price. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 117-120]
Even if a credit-generating manufacturer is willing to sell credits, the credits may be
purchased by other parties before other manufacturers can purchase them. Manufacturers engage
in multi-year planning. While a small spot purchase of credits might be made to cover an
unforeseen gap in a single year, it is just as likely that manufacturers will seek to purchase credits
for multiple years. Such behavior is observable in EPA's records of credit transactions. One can
clearly identify manufacturers that have purchased more credit than needed in a current model
year, that is then used over the course of multiple years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
117-120]
Setting aside EPA's specific projections, the availability of credits for purchase may also
shrink in the future. Standards that rapidly increase in stringency, as do the MY 2023-2026
standards and EPA's proposed standards for 2027 and later, are challenging to comply with, let
alone exceed. Available investment capital limits the number of models that can be redesigned
and improved or transformed into electric vehicles in a given year. The faster the rate of
stringency increase, the more difficult it is to stay ahead of the standard. Also, as the fleet
average emission standard is decreased, vehicles above their target become even more of a
compliance burden, and vehicles below their target become less of a compliance benefit. Even
manufacturers that only sell electric vehicles (such as Tesla) will not generate the same quantity
of credits assuming relatively constant production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 117-
120]
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Moreover, compliance with EPA's proposed standards is largely premised on rapidly growing
EV market share. If EPA's projections are incorrect, and sales of electric vehicles are not as high
as expected, many manufacturers are likely to need more credits than projected to maintain
compliance with GHG standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 117-120]
Auto Innovators recommends that EPA finalize standards that are not premised on projections
of readily available purchasable credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 117-120]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
EPA misleadingly asserts that the model underwent peer review before it was released. See 88
Fed. Reg. at 29,185, 29,294. Rather than granting anony- mous reviewers access to the model
and permitting them to pressure-test it and provide comments, EPA contracted with one entity
(the Eastern Research Group) to handpick just four reviewers to assess and critique the model.
See External Peer Review of EPA's OMEGA Model: Final Peer Review Summary Report, EPA,
at 1-2 (Apr. 2023) ("External Review Summary"). EPA does not purport to have distributed the
model to any other reviewers. A lack of widespread quality-assessment of the model alone
renders the decision to adopt it unrea- soned and arbitrary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp.
53-54]
Worse, even that limited review raised significant concerns about OMEGA's basic
functionality that EPA has not addressed. One reviewer pointed out that OMEGA has
"limitations that restrict its ability to model some important aspects of policy compliance in
practice," including "firm profit- seeking compliance behavior." External Review Summary at
22. That reviewer suggested that EPA "consider implementing functionality" that would permit
users to model multiple firms competing for market share. Id. at 24. As he ex- plained, the
current version "uses a single monopolist producer with a fleet of products," and that a single
producer may respond to a regulation different than a producer that is competing for market
share. Id. at 25. Those concerns regard- ing market share and structure have substantial
grounding in academic litera- ture. As one scholar has explained, environmental regulation,
particularly in industries with few producers and high fixed costs, may have a significant im-
pact on new market entrants and overall market structure. See Stephen P. Ryan, The Costs of
Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry, 80 Econometrica 1019, 1021 (May 2012).
For that reason, by ignoring the effects on competition, EPA's OMEGA model may significantly
underestimate the negative effects on consumers of the proposed rule. See id. at 1059. EPA
declined to change OMEGA in response to those concerns, see External Review Summary at 22,
24— and it nowhere explains why OMEGA's projections are accurate without hav- ing
addressed his comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 53-54]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
EPA requests comment on their approach to determining charging time, as set forth in the
DRIA, Chapter 4.155 EPA's analysis is contingent on unsupported assumptions regarding (1)
U.S. consumers' adoption of and ability to purchase more expensive ZEVs (see Sections IV.B.2
and IV.E.2.ii); (2) the type of ZEV purchased (used ZEVs or PHEVs compatible with slower
charging units or new ZEVs that can use DCFC) (Section IV,B.2 addresses charging times); (3)
the availability of critical minerals and metals to expand the supply of reliable and renewable
electricity (see Section I.B); and (4) the availability of reliable and affordable charging for all
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users (see Sections IV.B.4). Given the flaws in EPA's methodology that omits significant data
sources and other factors and makes unsupported assumptions, EPA should revise its analysis
concerning charging time and continue with promulgating a final rule for future emissions
standards, that accounts for the reality of today's automotive market and not the public
pronouncements of the automotive industry, a single state or group of states, or other
unsupported estimates of future market growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 33-34]
155 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,367.
EPA's Proposal fails to evaluate how government credits are embedded in vehicle pricing.
For example, neither federal or state governments, or auto manufacturers explain how state ZEV
credits, EPA GHG multiplier credits, and NHTSA CAFE EV multiplier credits are accounted for
in both ZEV and ICEV vehicle price. There is increasing evidence that regulations which
mandate EV sales—along with the cross-subsidies from gasoline and diesel vehicle buyers—are
leading manufacturers to abandon sales of the least expensive and higher fuel economy gasoline
and diesel vehicles that do not receive similar subsidization.236 Cox Automotive found that
"in December 2017, automobile makers produced 36 models priced at $25,000 or less. Five
years later, they built just 10," pushing low-income buyers out of the new-car market and into the
used- car market. Conversely, in December 2017 automobile manufacturers offered 61 models
for sale with sticker prices of $60,000 or higher and in December 2022, they offered 90.237 This
is unacceptable. EPA and its sister agencies cannot create credits and then claim they do not
affect vehicle price solely because they have not sought to quantify them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 51-52]
236 Steven G. Bradbury, Distinguished Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, Prepared Statement for the
hearing entitled "Driving Bad Policy: Examining EPA's Tailpipe Emissions Rules and the Realities of a
Rapid Electric Vehicle Transition," before the Subcommittee on Economic Grown, Energy Policy, and
Regulatory Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Accountability, at 10
(May 17, 2023) available at https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Bradbury- Prepared-
Statement-for-17-May-2023-Oversight-Hearing.pdf
237 See Sean Tucker, Are we witnessing the demise of the affordable car? Automobile makers have all but
abandoned the budget market (MarketWatch Feb. 28, 2023), available at
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/are-we-witnessing-the-demise-of-the-affordable-car-automakers-
have-all-but-abandoned-the-budget-market-a68862f0 (last visited May 24, 2023).
Tellingly, EPA never estimates the annual price of a comparable ZEV and ICEV, for each
year in which EPA proposes standards. EPA's bias towards EVs is demonstrated by EPA's
statement that its OMEGA modeling "now incorporates a consumer choice element. This means
that the impacts of, for example, a $40,000 BEV versus a $35,000 ICE vehicle of similar utility
(i.e., a 14 percent increase for the BEV) is a much different consideration than a $6,000
incremental BEV cost versus a $1,000 incremental ICE cost (a 500 percent increase for the
BEV)."238 In other words, EPA set up its model to show the consumer price (not the actual real-
world cost) of EVs have a lower percentage cost increase than the incremental absolute cost of
switching from ICEVs to ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 51-52]
238 See RIA page 2-42, https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf.EPA
incorrectly assumes that ZEV owners will pay the national average residential electricity price to
charge their vehicles. EPA fails to consider that the majority of ZEVs in the U.S. are located in
utility service territories with some of the highest electricity rates in the country and that the
average EV owner currently pays a much higher price to charge their ZEV at home than the
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national average residential electricity rate. Given that EV penetration has varied widely across
the U.S., it would be arbitrary to assume that EVs will, unlike in the past, penetrate uniformly
across the U.S. and thus that the average electricity price would be representative of the actual
cost electricity. For example, California, which has roughly 40 percent of all registered ZEVs in
the U.S., has a residential electricity rate that is roughly double the national average. Considering
that EPA is modeling its rule after a California-like approach to mandate ZEVs, it would be more
appropriate for EPA to assume similar real-world costs (at a minimum, given California's
temperate climate). Moreover, EPA fails to consider that mandating such a high ZEV sales rate
will necessarily require exponential increases in commercial ZEV charging at rates that are
currently three, four or five times higher than the current national average residential electricity
rate, depending on location and charging speed. Those customers who are not homeowners and
not able to install their own charging stations and take advantage of charging at low-cost times
will be adversely impacted. Instead, EPA uses a residential rate for electricity and does not
consider peak power or time of use charges. California electric prices rose 42 percent - 78
percent between 2010 and 2020 and are projected to rise an additional 50 percent by 2030 as
shown in Figure 9. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Historic and Forecasted Residential Average Rates Based
on Most Recent 5-year Average Rate Increase. Figure 9:
Source: Michael Shellenberger, Twitter (citing California Public Advocate's Office data),
April 27, 2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
Heaping additional demand for EV charging into this market could exacerbate already high
electricity prices. This will be especially impactful to lower-income homeowners who may not
be able to install dedicated charging units, forcing them to pay more out of pocket for charging
during peak demand periods.265 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
265 Hardman, Scott, et al., "A Perspective on Equity in the Transition to Electric Vehicles." MIT Science
Policy Review, (Aug. 20 2021), available at https://sciencepolicyreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-
electric-vehicles/ (accessed June 29, 2023).
EPA must revise its analysis to account for realistic electricity prices. The proposed ZEV
mandate will require an enormous investment in power generation and distribution, resulting in
nationwide increases in electricity bills that EPA has not considered. Of course, considering the
additional trillions of dollars in costs would paint a clear picture that the costs of forced
electrification far exceed even the inflated benefits EPA presented in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
Ignoring actual ZEV production costs, including credit trading costs, is arbitrary and
capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 54]
iii. EPA Must Consider Automobile Manufacturer Cross-Subsidies in Determining the
Costs of the Proposal
While the purchase price differential between comparable ICEVs and ZEVs may be relevant
for forecasting consumer demand, it does not reflect the true costs of the ZEVs required under
the Proposed Rule. A ZEV typically costs tens of thousands of dollars more to produce than a
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comparable ICEV due primarily to the surging costs of critical minerals and resulting high costs
of batteries.245 Additionally, the Proposed Rule will force manufacturers to sell an increasing
percentage of ZEVs each year that goes far beyond the consumer demand for the product at its
true cost. To ensure compliance with the ZEV mandate under the Proposal, manufacturers will
be forced to incentivize ZEV purchases through a practice called cross-subsidization. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 53-54]
245 See PCMag, Profit vs. the Planet, (Sept. 26, 2022), Profit vs. the Planet: Here's Why US Automakers
Are All-in on Electric Vehicles | PCMag last accessed July 3, 2023 ("EVs are currently more expensive to
manufacture than gas-powered vehicles because of spiking battery costs. The cost of lithium, the main
ingredient, has skyrocketed since demand far exceeds the number of working mines that can supply it.").
Automobile cross-subsidization is a pricing strategy to spread the high cost of ZEVs across a
manufacturer's other product offerings. Under this pricing convention, manufacturers set the
prices of certain ICEVs higher than their production costs to generate additional profits that can
then be used to offset losses incurred by selling ZEVs below their actual production costs. This
operates as a hidden tax on ICEVs and results in the purchasers of ICEVs subsidizing the sale of
ZEVs. Without cross-subsidies, ZEV mandates would fail. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp.
53-54]
While opaque, the magnitude of ZEV cross-subsidies is significant.246 Ford's decision to
report EV financial information separately beginning in 2023 provides an additional glimpse into
the magnitude of cross-subsidization. Ford lost approximately $58,000 for each ZEV car it sold
during the quarter.247 This reported per-vehicle loss is more than an order of magnitude greater
than EPA's estimates of the price differential between the two technologies. While cross-
subsidization, tax credits, emissions trading, and other EV subsidies may hide the true costs of a
ZEV mandate from consumers, EPA has a duty to quantify and present those costs that are
attributable to the Proposed Rule. Pursuant to Executive order 12866: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 53-54]
246 EPA's methodology ignores current EPA, DOE, NHTSA, and state regulations that add hundreds of
billions of dollars in costs of ICEVs to cross-subsidize buyers of ZEVs. These cost transfers are in the form
of: (1) state-mandated ZEV credit payments from ICEV manufacturers (i.e., ICEV buyers) to ZEV
manufacturers (i.e., ZEV buyers); (2) current and future potential EPA GHG ZEV multiplier credit
payments from ICEV manufacturers (i.e., ICEV buyers) to ZEV manufacturers (i.e., ZEV buyers); and, (3)
NHTSA-mandated fuel economy ZEV multiplier credit payments from ICEV manufacturers (i.e., ICEV
buyers) to ZEV manufacturers (i.e., ZEV buyers). A NHTSA presentation suggests that NHTSA EV
multiplier credits alone subsidize each EV by more than $25,000, increasing the true average cost of every
EV sold to over $90,000. See https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2015sae-powell-
altfuels_cafe.pdf; https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-04/Model-Documentation_CAFE-MY-
2024-2026_vl-tag.pdf; https://one.nhtsa.gov/cafe_pic/home/ldreports/manufacturerPerformance. Per the
NHTSA information above, since MY2017 standards were ~35mpg and MY2017 Tesla FE performance
(with multipliers) was 518.7 mpg, and since Tesla sold -46,979 MY2017 vehicles in the U.S., then Tesla in
MY2017 generated 227 million excess credits. If the market-value of these credits is ~$5.50 per 0.1 mpg
shortfall per vehicle under the MY2017 CAFE standard of ~35 mpg, then these credits were worth
approximately $1.25 billion, or $26,600 per EV that Tesla sold. [Calculation of estimated value: Credits =
(518.7 - 35) x 46979 x 10 x CAFE Penalty of $5.50 per 0.1 mpg shortfall per vehicle]. Tesla may have
banked, traded, or sold these credits. Tesla MY2022 sales in the U.S. were 484,351 and the CAFE civil
penalty is now $15 per 0.1 mpg shortfall per vehicle.
247 See Luc Olinga, TheStreet, Ford Loses Nearly $60,000 for Every Electric Vehicle Sold, (May 2, 2023)
available at Ford Loses Nearly $60,000 for Every Electric Vehicle Sold - TheStreet (last accessed July 3,
2023).
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EPA is to "assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the
alternative of not regulating. Costs and benefits shall be understood to include both quantifiable
measures (to the fullest extent that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of
costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nonetheless essential to consider.248 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 53-54]
248 E.O. 12866, Section 1(a), Sept. 30, 1993.
Astonishingly, EPA makes no attempt to account for these real-world costs, nor to
communicate to the public that, as the Proposal mandates a higher percentage of ZEV sales, the
cross-subsidies must be paid for by a shrinking number of ICEV buyers and, therefore, must
significantly increase the average price of EVs. As EV prices rise, their sales and ICEV fleet
turnover will slow, reducing environmental benefits and creating a significant drag on the
economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 54-55]
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Of particular interest to Honda when evaluating the model was OMEGA's new capability of
assessing consumer-producer interactions, described by the agency below:
Among the key new features of OMEGA is the representation of consumer-producer
interactions when modeling compliance pathways and the associated technology penetration into
the vehicle fleet. This capability allows us to project the impacts of the producer and consumer
incentives contained in the IRA and BIL legislation. Compared to the previous model version,
the updated version of OMEGA has extended capability to model a wider range of GHG
program provisions, and it has been critical in the assessment of various policy alternatives that
were considered for this proposal.44 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 53-54]
44 88 Fed. Reg. 29294 (May 5, 2023)
In addition to being able to model incentives such as those offered as part of the IRA,
OMEGA also models (within user-specified bounds, and market classes) the price adjustments
(incentives and disincentives) placed on vehicles by producers to reach an equilibrium between
ICE and BEV sales share, also known as a cross subsidized price. This new aspect of the model
provides fascinating insight into the agency's logic of optimized OEM compliance, and the
broader impact of regulatory policies on both industry and consumers. By examining OMEGA
model output files associated with the agency's official regulatory proposal, one can ascertain
which vehicles and market classes the agency reasonably believes would require discounts in
order to drive greater sales in support of the proposal's compliance goals and, conversely, which
vehicles would be expected to shoulder the burden of offsetting those discounts by means of
increased prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 53-54]
When aggregating the agency's output data by powertrain technology type (ICE, HEV and
BEV), a clear pattern emerges. For the agency proposal, which includes an assumption that IRA
provisions for both battery production and consumer tax credits will see near-full utilization, the
model's optimized solution set suggests BEVs are the logical cost-effective technology pathway.
In fact, during the regulation's years in which incentives are assumed to be in effect (MY2027-
2032), OMEGA assumes that BEVs will shoulder a modest cost increase (of about $650 per
vehicle, on average) to cross-subsidize reductions in ICE and hybrid vehicle prices required to
reach a producer and consumer equilibrium. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 53-54]
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Beginning in MY2033, however - when IRA provisions are no longer available - the
agency's modeling results show a staggeringly different calculus. While BEVs are still needed to
meet the agency's stringent emissions standards, the phase-out of 45X and sudden loss of
consumer purchase incentives means that the non-subsidized price of EVs suddenly become
much higher relative to the gasoline vehicle equivalent, and are no longer economically viable
for consumers at the mix shares predicted by the compliance model just one year prior. In order
to maintain the high levels of producer EV penetration achieved to date, the model assumes that
a sudden and substantial cross-subsidization occurs from ICE and HEV models (i.e., the
producer increases the prices of ICE and HEV vehicles and applies that additional revenue to
accommodate a price reduction on EVs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 53-54]
The levels of cross-subsidization required for EVs absent IRA 45X and 30D are not small.
The agency's own model calculates that in order to support the sales mix of EVs required by the
proposed rule, $10-14 billion per year in price subsidies would be required in MYs 2033-2035.
These BEV price subsidies would need to be offset by higher costs of an ICE fleet that is, by the
agency's own design, dwindling in size. According to OMEGA model outputs, this amounts to
an increase (relative to 2032) of between $2,626 and $3,368 for every ICE and HEV vehicle sold
in MYs 2033-2035, as shown in Figure 4. Moreover, should the agency's optimistic forecasts
about future battery costs not materialize as envisioned by the agency, these costs will be even
higher. It is unclear whether the agency considered these costs - which will ultimately be borne
by consumers - in its regulatory analysis, or whether 2033-2035 is being considered "outside the
scope" of the 2027-2032 regulatory window. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 53-54]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR GRAPH of Figure 4. OMEGA 2.0 annual producer cross
subsidization results for ICE (includes conventional and hybrid vehicles) under EPA's Proposed
Scenario. Positive numbers indicate price increases to subsidize BEV technologies; negative
numbers indicate decreases in prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 53-54]
Not surprisingly, the situation would become even more problematic if IRA provisions do not
pan out in a manner consistent with the agency's expectant predictions. To investigate this,
Honda created two custom OMEGA runs, both of which are based on EPA's Proposed
Regulatory Scenario stringency and retain all other EPA proposal assumptions except for those
relating to 45X and 30D. One scenario reduces the agency's assumed amount of utilized IRA
45X and 30D incentives by 50 percent. The other scenario eliminates the 45X and 30D
incentives entirely. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 25-26]
The cumulative cross subsidization impacts for these two OMEGA 2.0 runs for MYs 2027-
2035 are shown in Figure 5 below. Unlike the agency's Proposed Scenario shown in Figure 4, in
which the IRA provisions buoy the high costs of electric vehicles through 2032, these alternate
scenarios illustrate that BEV technology would need to be cross-subsidized by ICE technology
from year one of the regulation, reaching extraordinary cumulative amounts by the mid-203 0s.
While there could be some additional application of emissions reduction technology to ICE
vehicles, the severity of the standards still dictates large-scale adoption of BEVs. As such, the
OMEGA 2.0 model cross subsidization outputs (which are, incidentally, bounded and thus
conservative) show that partial or full loss of IRA incentives under the agency's proposed
standards would drive a "regulatory premium" of $632-$ 1,461 for every ICE and HEV vehicle
sold in 2027, and $l,025-$2,344 for every ICE and HEV vehicle sold in 2032.45 It is important
to note that these runs retain the agency's battery cost assumptions (with the exception of IRA
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45X incentives) which, as noted in our comments above, we believe to be optimistic for a
number of reasons. As such, Honda believes the numbers output by OMEGA and reflected in
this chart represent a conservative estimate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 26-28]
45 The range reflects OMEGA 2.0 results in which IRA provisions are cut in half vs. eliminated.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR GRAPH of Figure 5. Cumulative OMEGA 2.0 cross
subsidization for BEV models under three scenarios: EPA's Proposal, a "50% IRA" scenario,
and a "No IRA" scenario. Positive values indicate a subsidization of BEVs by other
technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 26-28]
It is critical that the impact of a potentially significantly higher new vehicle transaction price
on total sales be accounted for by the agency. Unfortunately, the agency's analysis is extremely
limited, as their sensitivity cases are independently analyzed and omit the possibility of IRA
being weakened. Honda attempted to quantify the impact that a "stacking" of uncertainties would
have on average new vehicle price. We examined average new vehicle price from OMEGA 2.0
under EPA's proposal (shown in light blue in Figure 6, below), as well as the resulting increase
in price that would occur under two additional stacked scenarios: (1) elimination of IRA
incentives, and (2) EPA's high battery cost assumptions. As shown in Figure 6, the cumulative
impact of these two uncertainties could increase the average new vehicle price by more than
$8,600 (a 25% increase) in 2030, relative to the agency's proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0652, pp. 26-28]
Qualitatively, one would assume that such a significant increase in price would have a
noticeable quelling effect on new vehicle sales. Strangely, the agency's OMEGA output files
show very little impact on overall sales, despite the significant price increase. The agency's
modeled sales impacts show a long run demand elasticity of just -0.21, notably different than
values cited in EPA's Draft RIA as well as by other industry experts.46 47 As shown in Table 3
below, the implication of a different demand elasticity has a significant impact on the magnitude
of overall new vehicle sales. If actual demand elasticities are closer to -0.40 (EPA estimate) or -
0.61 (CAR estimate), loss of sales due to a 25% price increase would be between 1.5 million and
2.3 million new vehicle sales annually. One can speculate on the potential impact that such a loss
of sales would have both on the industry and the economy, as well as the impact on consumer
choice, vehicle affordability and equity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 26-28]
46 EPA, 2023. Draft RIA, p. 4-43. Available online at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
47 McAlinden et al., 2016. The Potential Effects of the 2017-2025 EPA/NHTSA GHG/Fuel Economy
Mandates on the U.S. Economy. Center for Automotive Research. Available online at
https://www.cargroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The-Potential-Effects-of-the-2017_2025-
EPANHTSA-GHGFuel-Economy-Mandates-on- the-US-Economy.pdf
While one could argue these are merely modeling outputs, and that automakers would pursue
countermeasures to minimize such impacts, the fact remains that the agency is predicating its
proposed standards on this very same model. This model confirms that the economic viability of
the agency's proposal rests heavily - one might argue entirely - on a suite of policy incentives
that nobody, including the agency, can guarantee will exist through 2032. It is these
considerations of uncertainty and risk that manufacturers must take into account when
developing future products and, similarly, that the agency must consider when developing future
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regulations. In our opinion, the agency has not adequately addressed this uncertainty. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 26-28]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR GRAPH Figure 6. Average new vehicle price from
OMEGA 2.0 under proposal and two alternate scenarios. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp.
26-28]
Table 3.Magnitude of new vehicle sales impacts caused by higher battery cost and loss of IRA
incentives. Calculations were performed using OMEGA 2.0. For comparison, sales impacts with
alternate demand elasticities are shown. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 26-28]
Market Conditions: OMEGA 2.0: High Battery Cost & No IRA
Avg. New Vehicle Price Change Relative to Proposal: +25%
Elasticity of Demand: -0.21
New Vehicle Market Sales Change Relative to Proposal: (372,194) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0652, pp. 26-28]
Market Conditions: Impact assuming Demand Elasticity of -0.4
Avg. New Vehicle Price Change Relative to Proposal: +25%
Elasticity of Demand: -0.40 a
New Vehicle Market Sales Change Relative to Proposal: (1,511,130) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0652, pp. 26-28]
Market Conditions: Impact with Demand Elasticity of -0.61
Avg. New Vehicle Price Change Relative to Proposal: +25%
Elasticity of Demand: -0.61 b
New Vehicle Market Sales Change Relative to Proposal: (2,304,473) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0652, pp. 26-28]
Recommendation: Should the agency continue to set standards based on an inclusion of IRA
and BIL incentives, the agency should similarly provide a mechanism for alternate standards
subject to their removal or weakening. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 26-28]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
1. The Lead Time and Costs of Applying Zero-Emission Technologies Are Adequate and
Reasonable
As EPA observes, its modeling anticipates auto manufacturers will meet the proposed
standards primarily through increased application of zero-emission technologies and secondarily
through application of certain advanced combustion technologies. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,329-30.
Thus, the majority of the proposed standards' costs are likely attributable to EPA's projected
increase of electric vehicle penetration rates in model-year 2032 from 39% in the no-action case
to 67%) under the Proposal. EPA's analysis properly accounts for the key challenges in applying
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zero- emission technologies on this scale—especially the need to build out critical mineral,
battery, and chip supply chains—by simulating likely constraints on auto manufacturers' electric
vehicle production in its modeling. Id. at 29,295; Draft RIA, at 3-22 to 3-26. EPA's approach to
mineral supply constraints appropriately incorporates the effect the battery component supply
chain has on its standards without asserting authority over sectors outside its regulatory purview.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 33-34]
First, EPA assumes that auto manufacturers will produce electric vehicles to comply with
standards in a "purely cost-minimizing" way. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,296. As EPA acknowledges,
however, auto manufacturers have planned for far higher rates of electric vehicle sales in
response to both policies that recognize the significant role of the internal combustion engine in
the climate crisis and the surging demand for electric vehicles. Id. A model of industry behavior
that minimizes costs without accounting for these other drivers of electric vehicle adoption likely
understates electric vehicle penetration in a no-action scenario. 186 And, given that respected
organizations like Bloomberg New Energy Finance are estimating battery electric vehicle
penetrations rates near 52% by 2030 even without considering EPA's proposed standards, 187
EPA's no-action scenario projection of 40% penetration is likely an underestimation. See 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29,329 (Table 81). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 33-34]
186 See Consumer Reports Amicus Brief, Doc. No. 1988445 in Texas v. EPA, Case No. 22-1031 (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 3,2023), at 4-15.
187 Ira Boudway, More Than Half of US Car Sales Will Be Electric by 2030, Bloomberg (Sep. 20, 2022),
available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-20/more-than-half-of-us-car-sales-will- be-
electric-by-2030.
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
And the real costs will be far higher than EPA projects. As the comment will show, EPA's
cost analysis is flawed in at least a dozen ways. Most egregiously, EPA assumes without
support—and with scarcely a mention in the proposed rule or Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis
(DRIA)—that baseline vehicle manufacturing costs it uses to determine all future costs are two-
thirds of a vehicle's current MSRP. But EPA knows this is not true. As far as commentors can
tell, every electric vehicle currently on the market costs significantly more to make than it sells
for. Ford, for example, loses about $60,000 on every electric vehicle it sells. If EPA used
accurate vehicle manufacturing costs in its projections, compliance costs would rise
proportionately, and the cornerstone of EPA's feasibility analysis would crumble. Fixing just the
underestimated vehicle technology costs would raise the proposal's price tag to more than $4,700
per ton of C02, while making EPA's projected electric vehicle penetration rates, and thus
proposed standards, unachievable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 2]
These aggregate costs include:
- Real electric vehicle costs. Not what manufacturers sell their vehicles for, but the actual cost
to build these vehicles. EPA incorrectly assumes that there is currently no cross subsidization
between electric vehicles and internal combustion engine vehicles, despite relying on
California's Advanced Clean Cars programs which create subsidies of at least $3,500 per electric
vehicle through ZEV credits. See Cristian Agatie, Tesla Sits on a Billion dollar Chest of ZEV
Credits That Other Carmakers Are Keen to Buy, Auto Evolution (Sep. 12, 2022),
https://www.autoevolution.com/news/tesla-sits-on-a-billion-dollar-chest-of-zev-credits-that-
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other-carmakers-are-keen-to-buy-198418.html ("To give you an idea, Tesla posted $2.1 billion
in revenue from ZEV credit sales in 2021 and Q1 2022 combined. Automotive News estimates
Tesla sold its ZEV credits at an average of $3,500.") Most vehicles receive 3 or 4 credits. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 5-6]
A. The proposed rule underestimates the current manufacturing cost of electric vehicles,
skewing future vehicle technology costs.
All of EPA's projections for vehicle sales were calculated using the OMEGA model. See 88
Fed. Reg. 29,294-95. The OMEGA model takes as input a bevy of information about vehicles
currently sold by every manufacturer and uses this to project how each manufacturer can update
its current fleet with by adding new technologies to meet EPA's proposed standards most cost-
effectively. These projections are the basis of all of EPA's calculations about the rule: feasibility,
vehicle costs, emissions reductions, etc. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 15-16]
Crucial to OMEGA's projections is its simulation of the adoption of new vehicle
technologies. See OMEGA 2.1.0 Documentation (last accessed July 5, 2023),
https://omega2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/. The model assumes that every vehicle on the road has
some baseline manufacturing costs. These manufacturing costs change as auto manufacturers add
new technologies to existing vehicles to reduce emissions as they seek to comply with the
standards. Every new technology comes with some "cost curve," which represents the added cost
of using this new technology over time. Id. When a vehicle adopts a new technology, this cost
curve is added to a vehicle's baseline manufacturing cost, which the model then uses to project
the vehicle price or MSRP. Id. This means that future projections of vehicle prices are critically
dependent on an accurate picture of current vehicle manufacturing costs. If the model
underestimates current manufacturing costs, all future manufacturing costs—and thus future
MSRP's—will be underestimated proportionately. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 15-16]
But OMEGA cannot accept vehicle manufacturing cost as an input. Instead, the model uses
"the base year vehicle's MSRP value as the [manufacturing cost] for the base year" making the
assumption that current MSRPs are just "a marked up value of direct manufacturing costs using a
1.5X retail price equivalent (RPE) multiplier." Email of Kevin Bolon, EPA, to Taylor Myers,
Boyden Gray & Associates (June 27, 2023) (Attached as Appendix A). EPA acknowledges that
"there may be existing cross subsidies that are already inherent in the empirical MSRP values,"
i.e., manufacturers may raise the MSRPs of internal combustion engine vehicles while lowering
those of electric vehicles to meet regulations while sustaining overall profitability. Id. But
because the agency "cannot observe" these cross subsidies, it has designed the OMEGA to
assume a "crosssubsidymultiplier of 1.0 for all vehicles" in the baseline year. Id. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 16-17]
This is an unreasonable assumption. There is overwhelming evidence that the manufacturing
costs for electric vehicles far exceed their current MSRPs and that current prices are the result of
(large) cross subsidization. For example, Ford recently split its electric vehicle sales off from its
internal combustion engine sales for accounting purposes: Ford e Segment sells the former while
Ford Blue sells the latter. The company's 2023 Q1 SEC filings show the revenue and costs per
unit for both types of vehicles. See Ford Motor Company, Form 10-Q, 2023 Ql,
https://s201.q4cdn.com/693218008/files/doc_financials/2023/ql/ford-ql-2023-10-q-report.pdf.
The filing shows that while the company as a whole was profitable, Ford e Segment was not.
ICE vehicles returned a profit of about $3,700 per vehicle, or about 10 percent of average vehicle
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revenue. By contrast, electric vehicles lost $60,000 per vehicle, meaning that each vehicle
represented a more than 100 percent loss. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 16-17]
Figure 1: Ford's electric vehicles cost $60,000 more to make on average than they were sold
for.
Ford Blue (ICE)
Units: 706,000
Revenue: $25,124,000,000
EBIT: $ 2,623,000,000
Revenue per unit: $ 35,586
Cost per unit: $ 31,871
Profit per unit: $ 3,715
Ford e Segment (EV)
Units: 12,000
Revenue: $ 707,000,000
EBIT: $ (722,000,000)
Revenue per unit: $ 58,917
Cost per unit: $ 119,083
Profit per unit: $ (60,167)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 16-17]
Other companies' statements confirm similar losses. Chrysler Automobiles CEO Sergio
Marchionne explained that while the electric Fiat 500e has an MSRP of about $33,000, the
company is losing about $20,000 per car on each sale: a 60 percent loss. Matthew DeBord, FCA
Loses a Staggering $20,000 on Every One of Its All Electric Cars, Business Insider (Oct. 2,
2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/fca-loses- 20000-on-every-one-electric-car-2017-10.
General Motors' Chevrolet Volt and Bolt EV both lost approximately $16,000 per unit. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 17-18]
Manufacturers are willing to sustain a high loss on electric vehicles because, under EPA,
NHTSA, and California's regulatory schemes, these vehicles are helpful (and now, necessary) to
meet fleet standards. 10 As Marchionne explained, the company is willing to sell each vehicle for
a loss because electric vehicles like the "500e also ha[ve] value as [ ] 'compliance vehicle[s],'
helping FCA meet government-mandated fuel-economy requirements for [an] automaker's
fleet." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 17-18]
10 Historically, the benefit of EVs towards compliance obligations has been largely due to the prevalence
of unlawful "EV multipliers," discussed infra.
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These losses are accepted because of the value of the regulatory cross subsidies. An
automaker charges less for an electric vehicle—expecting to take a loss—so it can sell more of
them, and take advantage of their favorable regulatory treatment to com ply with federal
standards. But to ensure that it is not losing money as a whole, the manufacturer simultaneously
raises prices—and thus profits—on its internal combustion engine vehicles to offset the electric
vehicle losses. And because electric vehicles are treated more favorably in all relevant
regulations, these cross subsidies always go one way: from internal combustion engine vehicles
to electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 17-18]
EPA acknowledges that cross subsidization has a real impact. The OMEGA model expects
manufacturers to cross subsidize into the future to encourage sales of lower emitting, but more
expensive, technologies. Figure 2 below shows the cross- subsidization multiplier, or what
multiple of a natural, unsubsidized MSRP it expects the vehicles to sell for. The OMEGA
modeling used in the proposal arbitrarily limits this cross-subsidization multiplier to values of
between 0.9 and 1.1, or 10 percent. It also unreasonably permits manufacturers to cross subsidize
internal combustion engine vehicles with electric vehicles, a result that would never be logical
because electric vehicles are always treated more favorably by the regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, pp. 17-18]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 2: The cross-subsidization multiplier for all
electric vehicles calculated in the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 17-18]
Even more unreasonably, EPA assumes that current vehicles are not cross subsidized at all.
While the exact magnitude of cross subsidies may be difficult to calculate precisely, EPA knows
that at minimum each electric vehicle is cross subsidized by in an amount equivalent to the
number of California ZEV Credits it earns. California's ZEV mandate requires automobile
manufacturers to acquire a minimum number of ZEV credits either by producing ZEVs for sale
in California or purchasing credits from another auto manufacturer who has done the same. Of
all the manufacturers, Tesla had earned the most credits in California. Simon Alvarez, Tesla's
ZEV Credits in the United States are Poised to Become Even More Valuable, Teslarati (Sep. 12,
2022), https://www.teslarati.com/tesla-zev-credits-usa-more-valu- able-inflation-reduction-act/.
At the end of 2020, Tesla had logged a stockpile of 752,445 credits, with each new vehicle sold
qualifying for between 3 and 4 credits. Id. "Tesla booked about $2.1 billion in revenue from
credit sales in 2021 and Q1 2022. And while the value of a ZEV credit could be flexible
depending on demand, it appeared that Tesla averaged about $3,500 each." Id. In other words,
every Tesla was subsidized by at least $10,500. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 18-20]
Based on the above information, reasonable estimates of cross subsidies for electric vehicles
must be between $10,500 and $60,000 per electric vehicle sold. These cross subsidies are
equivalent to the difference between EPA's estimated vehicle manufacturing costs and the true
vehicle manufacturing costs. While EPA is free to—and obligated to—conduct its own (perhaps
different) analysis of the precise magnitude of cross subsidization, it cannot ignore it.
Accounting for these cross subsidies results in a much higher new vehicle manufacturing costs
for electric vehicles. 11 When these overlooked manufacturing costs are applied to each of the
additional 15 million electric vehicles EPA projects its proposal to require between 2027 and
2032,12 vehicle technology costs rise by between $160-915 billion over the compliance period.
See Figure 3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 18-20]
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11 The same cross subsidization also implies a lower new vehicle manufacturing cost for internal
combustion engine vehicles, which the proposal also ignores.
12 This assumes 13.7 million cars sold peryear and electric vehicle penetrations for the no action case and
the proposal to follow Tables 129 and 80 of the proposal, respectively.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 3: Projected additional manufacturing costs EPA
missed as a result of overlooking cross subsidization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 18-
20]
Accounting for cross subsidization is critical for the feasibility analysis because it will have a
direct impact on future vehicle prices. As EPA forces electric vehicles to grow from 6 percent to
67 percent of light-duty sales, automakers will lose the ability to accommodate large cross
subsidies in electric vehicle price with small increases across conventional vehicle prices because
there will no longer be 12 times as many internal combustion engine vehicles as electric vehicles,
but instead 2 times as many electric vehicles as internal combustion engine vehicles. If, for
example, it continues to cost Ford $120,000 to manufacture an electric vehicle, EPA's proposed
fleet would raise the average Ford vehicle price from around $36,000 today to $92,000 in 2032.
Like all Ponzi schemes, EPA's plan will inevitably hit a wall. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712,
pp. 20-21]
Failing to account for these costs, and how cross subsidization will become less feasible as the
fleet is electrified, papers over the most important aspect of the problem. EPA must make these
calculations when projecting the feasibility of the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 20-
21]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
2. The OMEGA2 model produces unlikely results for combustion vehicles.
As noted above, the OMEGA2 model suffers from significant shortcomings in terms of
capturing the potential improvement available from technologies applicable to combustion
vehicles. However, there is also a problem with the way in which the OMEGA2 model assumes
manufacturers then apply those technologies: not only can manufacturers add new technology,
but they can remove it. The level of so-called "decontenting" that occurs in the OMEGA2 model
is neither unrealistic, and it drastically underestimates the improvements from combustion
vehicles that would likely be deployed for a given PEV scenario. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 40]
In the Proposal modeling, 40% of the combustion vehicle models have worse 2-cycle tailpipe
GHG emissions in 2032 than in 2022. On average, that 40% of the fleet has increased its
emissions by 13%, or 27 g/mi. For reference, this decline in emissions performance
approximates a return to 2016 levels of tailpipe emissions for those vehicles (i.e., those vehicles
would achieve no net progress over a 16-year period). Of course, the remaining combustion
vehicle fleet sees plenty of backsliding in this time as well. While manufacturers may not have
fully slipped back to 2022 levels, OMEGA2 modeling finds that through the course of the 2022-
2032 period, manufacturers are more than twice as likely to make the direct C02 emissions from
a combustion vehicle worse year-to-year, increasing year-to-year emissions 22% of the time,
keeping them unchanged 69% of the time, and reducing emissions just 9% of the time. And this
percentage increases dramatically between the years governed by the current standards and the
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Proposal: the modeling shows that manufacturers are much more likely to decrease the emissions
of a combustion vehicle to achieve compliance with the MY 2023-2026 standards (15%,
compared to 9% for the proposed MY 2027-2032 standards), and are 6 times more likely to
decontent a combustion vehicle in the 2027-2032 period than in the 2023-2026 period. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 41]
Notably, the modeling of manufacturer behavior described above does not distinguish
between the magnitudes of the reduction/increase in emissions. On average, emissions reductions
from the combustion vehicle fleet under the existing standards greatly outweigh the average
increases, since improving combustion vehicles is a significant compliance mechanism for the
current standards. Interestingly, the magnitude of the average increase vs. decrease does not vary
substantially over the entire decade (2022-2032). Instead, the disparity in outcome (combustion
vehicles increasing, rather than decreasing, emissions) is entirely driven by the massive increase
in decontenting that begins to occur in the modeling in the post-2026 period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 41]
EPA provides no explanation for this rapid shift in modeled manufacturer behavior in the
documentation for the rule, and such behavior makes little sense, particularly when examining
cases of decontenting that occur in the modeled compliance for the Proposal. To the extent that
manufacturers may consolidate engine platforms as they reduce the number of available
combustion vehicles, that consolidation is not likely to happen on the oldest, lowest technology
options but rather on the newest engine platforms, in order to avoid accelerated depreciation of
new investments. While there may be some simplification, it is more likely that the
simplification would be elimination of a lower-volume technology package, such as a high-
performance (and higher emission) option, which again would not result in increases in
emissions. Below we present two examples to illustrate the unrealistic aspects of the compliance
model for technology content, in consideration of industry behavior. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 41]
a. Example: Volvo S60
The Volvo S60 is available in multiple configurations and is represented by three different
vehicles in the OMEGA2 model: two conventional vehicles (one of which is a high-performance
trim with greater horsepower), and one strong hybrid (incidentally utilizing the Miller cycle
engine benchmarked by EPA). The modeled technology packages for these vehicles are
illustrated in Table VI.A-1. In 2026, the first redesign opportunity is available for the model. The
vehicles undergo one major change to the platform (a shift from steel to aluminum cuts a
significant amount of weight), and then the three engines move to the same exact configuration,
a 48V mild hybrid with a high compression ratio (HCR) engine utilizing discrete cylinder
deactivation. The power output for the former-hybrid and the high-performance trim are virtually
identical, which is why the emissions numbers are so similar in 2026, effectively reducing the
trims available to two. This type of consolidation could happen, though eliminating the high-tech
Miller cycle engine (part of one of the most efficient technology packages implemented by EPA)
from the vehicle after just one product cycle is unlikely. And, at least in this case, on net the
former-hybrid vehicle still sees a reduction in emissions due to the weight reduction. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 41-42]
Table VI.A-1: Comparison of technology packages, fuel economy, and emissions for the
Volvo S60 at each redesign
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Volvo S60 T8 (313 hp)
Year: 2021
Tech package: SHEV-PS, Miller cycle
Body Material: Steel
Tailpipe C02 (lab) [g/mi]: 194
Label Fuel Economy [mpg]: 35.4
Year: 2026
Tech package: MHEV (P0), HCR + continuous cyl. deac., advanced 8-speed AT
Body Material: Aluminum
Tailpipe C02 (lab) [g/mi]: 181
Label Fuel Economy [mpg]: 38.9
Year: 2031
Tech package: HCR + continuous cylinderdeactivation, 5-speed AT
Body Material: Steel
Tailpipe C02 (lab) [g/mi]: 236
Label Fuel Economy [mpg]: 33.5
Volvo S60 T5 (316 hp)
Year: 2021
Tech package: Start-stop, Turbo, advanced 8-speed AT
Body Material: Steel
Tailpipe C02 (lab) [g/mi]: 225
Label Fuel Economy [mpg]: 32.7
Year: 2026
Tech package: MHEV (P0), HCR + continuous cyl. deac., advanced 8-speed AT
Body Material: Aluminum
Tailpipe C02 (lab) [g/mi]: 183
Label Fuel Economy [mpg]: 38.2
Year: 2031
Tech package: HCR + continuous cylinder deactivation, 5-speed AT
Body Material: Steel
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Tailpipe C02 (lab) [g/mi]: 268
Label Fuel Economy [mpg]: 30.7
Volvo S60 T4 (250 hp)
Year: 2021
Tech package: Start-stop, Turbo, advanced 8-speed AT
Body Material: Steel
Tailpipe C02 (lab) [g/mi]: 206
Label Fuel Economy [mpg]: 34.4
Year: 2026
Tech package: MHEV (P0), HCR + continuous cyl. deac., advanced 8-speed AT
Body Material: Aluminum
Tailpipe C02 (lab) [g/mi]: 170
Label Fuel Economy [mpg]: 40.1
Year: 2031
Tech package: HCR + continuous cyl. deac., 5-speed AT
Body Material: Steel
Tailpipe C02 (lab) [g/mi]: 237
Label Fuel Economy [mpg]: 32.2
In 2031, however, the vehicle platform reverts from aluminum back to steel, gaining weight in
the process. All three vehicles drop the mild hybrid configuration but introduce three completely
distinct engine technologies, again less efficient than the prior offerings, and now paired with a
2007-era 5-speed transmission instead of the advanced 8-speed transmission of the previous
generation. To summarize, under EPA's modeling, the S60 in 2031 will: 1) revert to an old body
platform and an ancient transmission; 2) adopt engine technology that will reduce fuel economy
for consumers by 8 mpg, below what the vehicle started at in 2022 for all configurations; and 3)
not do anything to consolidate engines or platforms, or do anything else that could justify
decontenting, because there remain three distinct engine offerings. There is little reason to
suppose that Volvo (or any other manufacturer) would be able to find consumers for a
combustion vehicle, such as the modeled S60, that gets notably worse over time. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 43]
b. Example: Jeep Cherokee
A similar trajectory is observed in the case of the Jeep Cherokee (Table VI.A-2). In this case,
the modeled vehicle does not correspond directly to each of the real vehicle's trims but is instead
averaged into a high- and low-throughput engine option for the 2WD and 4WD versions. 126
However, the pattern of vehicle change in the modeling is the same: each vehicle is first
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upgraded and then downgraded, with 3 of the 4 model variants ending up worse than they started
a decade prior. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 43]
126 While Jeep has since dropped the 2WD version of the Cherokee, this is not reflected in EPA's model
due to the use of a 2019 baseline fleet.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table VI.A-2: Comparison of technology packages, fuel
economy, and emissions for the Jeep Cherokee at each redesign [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, pp. 43-44]
What makes this behavior particularly unrealistic in the case of the Jeep Cherokee is that the
parent company (Stellantis) is, according to the model, purchasing credits from other
manufacturers in order to comply with the standards after the 2029 model year (Figure VI.A-3).
In other words, the model projects that it is in Stellantis' interest to increase emissions from its
combustion-powered vehicles (even though there is no concurrent improvement in performance-
related vehicle attributes), and this strategy results in the manufacturer falling short of its
regulatory requirements, which then forces the company to purchase credits from its competitors.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 44]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure VI.A-3: Year-over-year average certification for
Stellantis (formerly FCA), from EPA's Proposal modeling run [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
p. 45]
In all years modeled, Stellantis is reliant upon banked credits in order to comply with the
standards, as indicated by the difference between the target curve (blue dots) and the calendar
year certification (red circles). Stellantis is able to use its own banked credits (indicated through
credit transactions via arrows) in order to comply with the standards through the 2026 model
year, indicated by the overlap between the model year certification (orange line) and target
curve. However, beginning with the 2026 model year, those credits (including credits carried
back from the 2029 model year) are no longer sufficient for Stellantis to meet its requirements.
Therefore, Stellantis is required to make up the remaining gap between model year and target
year curves with credits purchased on the general market (not modeled explicitly by the
Agency). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 45]
3. In allowing combustion vehicles to backslide, the OMEGA2 model fails to capture
readily achievable emissions reductions; adjusting these features would further support the
feasibility of stronger standards.
By allowing combustion vehicles to backslide in its modeling, EPA fails to consider a
significant pathway for potential emissions reductions. By 2032, this backsliding results in nearly
a 10% increase in tailpipe emissions from the fleet. In terms of feasibility, it is beyond question
that the decontented combustion vehicle technologies can be deployed in the timeframe of the
rule, since these technologies had previously been on those vehicles. Since manufacturers will
not incur any new costs for research and development and will simply be elongating the period
for which they can utilize their investments, it would be more reasonable for the model to
assume that manufacturers would not remove such technologies, thus preserving emissions levels
already achieved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 45-46]
We urge EPA to take this "no backsliding" approach in its modeling for the final rule. The
impact would be significant: if manufacturers simply adopted a strategy of not removing
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technology from their combustion vehicle fleet, they could nearly achieve the more stringent
Alternative 1 standards with no increase in ZEV sales as compared to ZEV sales in the modeling
supporting the Proposed Rule (Figure VI.A-4). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 46]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure VI.A-4: Fleet-wide average certification levels, as
modeled compared to a scenario where manufacturers do not remove technology from
combustion vehicles[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 46]
4. Summary of available improvement for combustion vehicles
By leaving a significant amount of available and feasible combustion vehicle emission
reduction technologies on the table—including technology improvements EPA identified in prior
rulemakings—the Agency has underestimated the potential emissions reductions available to the
fleet. This problem is compounded because the Agency's compliance model assumes that a large
share of the combustion vehicle fleet will get worse over time, even for manufacturers that the
model projects will fall short of compliance and therefore will be dependent upon purchasing
credits from their competitors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 46-47]
By adjusting its modeling to reflect the full range of combustion vehicle technology
improvements available to manufacturers, and by aligning its modeled manufacturing behavior
with a strategy that reflects continued deployment of the technologies already available and
incorporated into vehicles instead of allowing backsliding, EPA's modeling would better capture
the full range of emissions reductions pathways that are feasible. Improving the OMEGA2
modeling in this way will affirm that manufacturers can easily achieve a standard at least as
stringent as Alternative 1, with little to no increase in ZEV penetration compared to the model
runs supporting the Proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 47]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
As explained above and shown in the table, the ICE fleet emits more in 2032 than in 2027. In
fact, based on analysis of OMEGA results, the car fleet has higher 2-cycle tailpipe emissions in
MY2032 than in MY2022, with its lowest 2-cycle emissions levels occurring in MY2027.108
Similarly, the truck fleet shows its lowest GHG emissions levels in MY2028, with a net increase
in 2-cycle emissions by MY2032. Much of this backsliding is explained by individual ICE
models getting worse over time. Of all the 719 ICE models, 438 show higher emissions in
MY2032 than in MY2027, and 333 show worse emissions in MY2032 than in MY2022. This
modeling result presented in EPA's proposal highlights the risk that backsliding on GHG
emissions could occur in real-world compliance with EPA's standards. If BEV penetration
occurs faster than modeled by EPA, there is risk of further ICE backsliding on GHG emissions.
ICCT recommends EPA include in its regulation a mechanism to prevent the backsliding of new
ICE vehicles or the new ICE fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 40-43]
108 Based on analysis of
2023_03_14_22_42_30_central_3alts_20230314_Proposal_vehicles.csv.
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
Finally, the $l,200-per-vehicle cost figure touted by EPA is simply borrowed and carried over
from the EPA's 2021 rulemaking without additional substantive analysis.32 It is not reasonable
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to assume that the per-vehicle cost of the current proposal for model years 2027 through 2032
would be anywhere close to the same as the estimated cost figure for the 2021 rule covering
model years 2023 through 2026 (even if the figure was accurate for the 2021 rule). The current
proposal is far more expansive and involves much more dra- conian reductions in emissions
limits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 13-14]
32 See 86 FR 74434, 74497, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/12/30/2021-27854/revised-
2023-and-later-model-year-light-duty-vehicle-greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards.
The true per-vehicle technology costs of the proposed rules must be far higher than the figure
thrown out by EPA. Even accepting the thoroughly implausible "no action" base- line that EPA
has posited for future EV sales, EPA is projecting that the regulatory force of the current
proposal, considered in isolation, will by itself cause the overall percentage of EV sales
nationally to go from 39 percent to 67 percent—a huge increase, nearly a doubling in EV
production and sales. Notably, based on EPA's own assumptions, this regu- lation-forced
increase would have to come after all the early adopters have already pur- chased their EVs.
Such an industry-wide transformation in production volumes and sales of EVs to non-early-
adopters would involve a massive capital investment and marketing surge, and all the costs
associated with that transformation would be attributable to the EPA's administrative rule, if the
rule were indeed expected to be the forcing action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 13-14]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Third, the agency's production modelling underestimated BEV production levels on several
fronts. Foremost, the modeling significantly underestimates Tesla vehicle sales and projects them
out at less 100,000 vehicles per year. See Figure 5. EPA's Under Projections of Tesla's Implied
U.S. Sales MY 2027-2032. This under projection is inexplicable, unjustified, and needlessly
undermines the stringency of the rule, as the Tesla Model Y was just recognized as the world's
best-selling vehicle, and second to only the Ford F-150 in the U.S. 120 In 2022, Tesla's U.S. sales
already approached 500,000 vehicles. 121 Further, at Tesla's 2022 shareholder meeting, the
company has established a goal of producing 20M vehicles globally by 2030.122 While this goal
does not speak to Tesla's annual U.S. sales, the agency's modelling already vastly
underestimates Tesla's current and future sales. This data should be updated to recognize both
Tesla's current market status and the ambition of Tesla's future ramp of U.S. sales during the
MY 2027-2032 timeframe. To address this under projection, Tesla has confidentially provided
production and sales estimates to EPA. See Appendix I, submitted as CBI. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0792, p. 18]
120 See, Yahoo Finance, Tesla Model Y was the best-selling car worldwide in the first quarter (May 30,
2023) available at h ttps://finance.yahoo.com/news/tesla-model-y-was-the-best-selling-car-worldwide-in-
the-first-quarter-154909234.html; Inside EVs, Tesla Model Y Second Only To Ford F-150 As Best-Selling
Vehicle In US (June 19, 2023) ("Data from Experian picked up by Automotive News show that Tesla's
best-selling model doubled registrations to 127,541 in the first four months of 2023 over last year.
Remarkably, the Model Y was the second most popular vehicle of any kind in the US after only the Ford F-
150 pickup truck, which posted almost 240,000 sales during the period.") available at h
ttps://insideevs.com/news/672690/tesla-model-y-second-only-ford-f-150-best-selling-vehicle-us/
121 See, GoodCarBadCar.Com, Tesla Sales Figures - US Market (showing 2022 sales at 540,000)
available at https://www.goodcarbadcar.net/tesla-us-sales-figures/
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122 See, Tesla Impact Report 2022 at 64; See also, Reuters, Analysis: Musk's bold goal of selling 20
million EVs could cost Tesla billions (Aug. 30, 2022) available at
https://www.reuters.com/technology/musks-bold-goal-selling-20-mln-evs-could- c ost-tesla-billions-2022-
08-30/
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 5. EPA 's Under Projections of Tesla's Implied U.S.
Sales MY 2027-2032 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 18]Organization: Valero Energy
Corporation
4. The analysis fleets modeled by OMEGA are highly implausible, and EPA fails to
account for the actual costs to produce such fleets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 5-6]
As described in Section 9.2 of the DRIA, when running the OMEGA model, EPA starts with
a "base year fleet" that represents a comprehensive list of vehicles sold in MY 2019.28 OMEGA
then "produces a fleet of new light-and medium-duty vehicles for each analyzed model year."29
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 5-6]
28 DRIA at 9-1.
29 DRIA at 2-1.
Starting in MY 2021, OMEGA creates a BEV "clone" of every ICEV, HEV and PHEV in the
base year fleet, and the BEV clones enter into production when the vehicle ID reaches its next
redesign year. 30 Ultimately OMEGA phases all of the BEV clones into production over MY
2021- 2028, with the original ICEVs, HEVs and PHEVs remaining in production alongside the
BEV clones. This means that between the base year and MY 2028, the number of vehicle IDs in
the OMEGA LDV analysis fleet essentially doubles, growing from 740 to 1,459. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 5-6]
30 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), "vehicles.py" in 2023-03-25-1 l-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip. This approach is adopted for
every modeled scenario (e.g., "No Action" as well as proposed and alternate scenarios). No clone vehicles
are created for the BEVs and FCVs in the base year fleet.
[See original for graph titled "Figure 1 - LDV Models by Powertrain in OMEGA Analysis
Fleet"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 5-6]
EPA's approach to modeling future LDV fleets in OMEGA is disingenuous and inconsistent
with the cost analysis presented in the rulemaking. Doubling the number of LDV models
available for sale in the U.S. would entail a significant increase in vehicle design, engineering,
production, and assembly costs,31 to support flat-to-declining LDV sales numbers. The loss in
economies of scale would be staggering, dropping from an average of 22,000 new vehicle sales
per production model in the base year to 10,000 new vehicle sales per production model in MY
2028.32 EPA does not account for this in its analysis of vehicle costs associated with the
proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 5-6]
31 DRIA at 2-84. EPA notes that it "did not specifically impose a limit on vehicle assembly capacity."
32 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), "vehicles.py" in 2023-03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip. For the base year, new LDV
sales totaled 16,149,471 vehicles ("vehicles_ldv_20221017_cleanedredesigne.csv"), spanning 740 vehicle
IDs (0 to 739) ("2023_03_25_ll_46_49_ld_central_compliance_run_Proposal_vehicles.csv"). For MY
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2028, new LDV sales projected to total 14.8 million vehicles across 1,459 vehicle IDs (calculated from
"2023_03_25_ll_46_49_ld_central_compliance_run_Proposal_vehicles.csv).
EPA fails to present a feasible compliance scenario to accompany its proposed MY 2027-
2032 standards, and it fails to adequately quantify the impacts of the compliance scenario that it
does present. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 5-6]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
The case for emissions standards more stringent than Alternative One is even stronger when
considering the agency's apparent omission of ZETA member Rivian from its analysis. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 26]
Specifically, OMEGA's Manufacturers File, an input file listing vehicle producers considered
as distinct entities for GHG compliance, does not list Rivian. 128 Even the agency's survey of
manufacturer commitments, presented as Table 1 in the NPRM, does not include the
company. 129 Omitting Rivian from the agency's analysis could affect EPA's analysis and
proposal. EPA should update its model inputs to account for Rivian's sales and revise its
evaluation of the alternatives accordingly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 26]
128 Purpose and description of the Manufacturers File per
https://omega2.readthedocs.io/en/2.1.0/index.html#document-l_overview. List of producers found in the
"manufacturers.csv" in the OMEGA zip file.
129 See 88 FR 29192 (May 5, 2023)
ZETA notes that EPA's modeling appears to show a decline in BEV sales in the MD pickup
segment in the early model years covered by these proposed standards. 136 EPA should establish
standards stringent enough to drive increasing electrification across all MD vehicle categories.
The technology can meet the needs of many duty cycles performed by MD pickups, including
those involving towing, but the rapid uptake of BEVs in the van fleet coupled with credit
multipliers in the early years of the program could pad credit banks and allow BEV development
and sales in the MD pickup category to stall. EPA should evaluate the feasibility of even stricter
emissions requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 28]
136 See DRIA at 13-53
As in the LDV segment, EPA's modeling appears to omit ZETA member Rivian. Yet,
Rivian's order book includes 100,000 all-electric Class 2b-3 vans, several thousand of which
already operate on U.S. roads. The agency should assess to what extent the addition of 100,000
BEV vans to the national fleet by MY 2030 could support a lower fleet average emissions target.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 28]
EPA Summary and Response
The Alliance commented that EPA's assumption of credit trading in the central analysis is a
departure from the approach taken in previous rulemakings, and that it is "inappropriate to set a
standard so stringent as to effectively require many manufacturers to rely on other manufactures
to maintain compliance." The commenter also asserted that the choice of an 80 percent value for
modeling credit market efficiency is "completely arbitrary." In response, EPA disagrees that the
approach used for modeling credit trading for the NPRM and for this final rulemaking analysis is
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either inappropriate or unjustified. The justification for the analytical assumptions for EPA's
modeling of credit trading was outlined in the NPRM Preamble RIA Chapter 2.6.4.4, and is
explained further here. On this topic, the primary difference between the 2012 rulemaking and
this one is that we now have over a decade of observations upon which to base our trading
assumptions, compared to no GHG credit trading evidence at the time the earlier rulemakings
were promulgated in 2010 and 2012. For more recent rulemakings, including the 2020 and 2021
light-duty GHG rules, the primary difference is capability of the available modeling tools. EPA
has continued to refine the OMEGA model, including as described in RTC Section 12.1 above.
The version of OMEGA used for this rulemaking analysis has, for the first time in any GHG
rulemaking, the capability to model the expiration of a portion of credits. The analytical question
is then what portion of credits should EPA assume will be allowed to expire. The empirical
evidence from the prior decade of credit trading would suggest a value of zero. In other words,
consistent with EPA's observation that to-date, no GHG credits have expired unused.
Conversely, EPA also recognizes that manufactures might choose to generate and bank at least
some additional credits through technology application to act as a buffer against uncertainty.
Other program flexibilities, such as credit carry-forward and carry-back within a company, serve
the same purpose, but EPA concluded that it was reasonable to assume that, to some extent,
manufacturers would incorporate a buffer against uncertainties into decisions about credit trading
between firms. The value of 80 percent chosen by EPA means that for companies with cost-
minimizing compliance plans where GHG targets are not met entirely through the application of
technology (i.e., plans that involve the purchase of credits), 20 percent of credits would act as a
buffer against uncertainty, and would be expected to expire unused. EPA acknowledges that
there is not any historical evidence or studies that would indicate what the future credit
efficiency and associated compliance buffer will likely be (apart from the supporting evidence
for 100 percent mentioned above). In lieu of empirical studies on this specific topic, EPA
approximated a compliance buffer that is analogous to the five-year credit carry forward
provision, where a manufacture might accumulate a 20 percent credit buffer in each year for five
years to address an unexpected case in the future where no credits can be procured for any
reason. Notably, this idea of a compliance buffer is also identified by the commenter as a
potential business strategy. EPA does not agree with the commenter's assertion that these
standards "effectively require many manufacturers to rely on other manufacturers to maintain
compliance." While the central case does assume some level of credit purchases (with a level of
imperfect trading defined by the "Credit Market Efficiency" parameter of 20 percent, as
described in RIA Chapter 2.6.4.4), other compliance pathways and sensitivities analyzed for this
rulemaking demonstrate that it is feasible for manufactures to comply without a reliance on
credit purchases at still reasonable, although higher, costs than in the central case. (See preamble
Section IV.F.5. "no credit trading case").
CARB, ICCT, and Environmental and Public Health Organizations commented that in EPA's
compliance modeling of the proposed standards, individual ICE vehicles were projected to have
higher tailpipe GHG emissions in 2032 than they did in 2022. In response, EPA acknowledges
these observations that some modeled ICE vehicles exhibited emissions "backsliding" as a result
of EPA's approach of modeling producer decisions to seek the most cost-effective compliance
pathway. Although EPA accounted for various constraints in vehicle production, for the proposal
we did not apply any restriction on the removal of emission-reducing technology from ICE
vehicles. However, we agree with the commenters that it is not likely that there will be a wide-
spread removal of technologies that have been previously developed, produced, and
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implemented, and we do not anticipate manufacturers spending money towards development and
integration of higher GHG-emitting powertrains on a widespread level - for this reason, we have
prevented increases in tailpipe emissions from base year vehicles in the version of OMEGA for
the final rulemaking. Furthermore, the fleet averaging standards ensure that if even if backsliding
were to occur in a few isolated models, those vehicles would need to be offset with additional
cleaner technologies so that the fleet would achieve the GHG reduction performance called for
by the standards.
AmFree, [and others] commented on the OMEGA model's optimization logic or the choice of
the objective function used to define the model's optimization problem. AmFree commented that
by not accounting for the strategic decisions of firms in an oligopoly, the peer-reviewed version
of the OMEGA model may underestimate the negative effects of the proposed rule on
consumers. The example provided from the academic literature was based on a model an
oligopoly in the U.S. Portland cement industry, where firm decisions to enter and leave the
market were simulated, along with the resulting effect on consumer welfare. However, the U.S.
Portland cement industry is an entirely different industry than the motor vehicle industry, with
different market characteristics. EPA does not believe that there is a sufficient basis upon which
such a model could be constructed for this rulemaking's analysis of the light- and medium-duty
vehicle markets. Also, and most significantly, EPA does not draw any conclusion from existing
studies of firm behavior, including the one given by the commenter, that these final regulations
will tend to increase the cost of entry for new firms in the light- and medium-duty vehicle
market. Among the auto manufacturers that submitted comments on the proposed standards, the
most strongly supportive comments were from the newest entrants into the market which
specialize in the production of low-emission PEV models. For these reasons, the OMEGA model
does not attempt to simulate the strategic decisions of firms to leave or enter the vehicle market.
EPA acknowledges comments from the California Attorney General's office that EPA's
modeling properly accounts for constraints on BEV manufacturing such as that automakers must
account for, such as critical material supply for battery production. EPA responds to comments
about the availability of critical minerals in RTC Section 15.
The Clean Fuels Development Coalition asserted that EPA's BEV cost estimates for the
NPRM were under stated, and that "the real costs will be far higher than EPA projects." The
commenter's assertion appears to be based on the incorrect presumption that EPA's future
incremental costs (Action case minus No Action case) are influenced by existing BEV prices.
The commenter contends that because BEV's prices are, in some cases, significantly discounted
today, any incremental cost between an ICE and existing BEV would be lower than the real
costs. This is an incorrect characterization of OMEGA's costing methodology, and in general,
EPA does not agree that the approach used for the NPRM and this final rulemaking analysis will
tend to underestimate incremental costs. In actuality, EPA's approach does not use MSRP to
determine the incremental costs between technologies (e.g. ICE vs BEV). Instead, the
incremental costs are based on the bottom-up cost estimations of powertrain costs and vehicle
structure costs, which are informed by the engineering analyses and contracted vehicle
teardowns that have been the foundation of EPA's cost estimates over multiple previous
rulemakings. The commenter refers to MSRP, but in our analysis that is only relevant for the
estimation of the non-structural glider costs. And because those costs are determined individually
for each base year vehicle, and carried forward unchanged into future years and across policy
scenarios, it has no influence on incremental costs. In other words, the average incremental
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vehicle manufacturing cost presented in our analysis is influenced only by our estimates for
technology costs (i.e. powertrain, battery, structure material). And while vehicle price, MSRP,
and cross subsidies are relevant for the consumer demand modeling within OMEGA, those
values do not factor into the incremental vehicle manufacturing costs.
Valero commented that EPA's projection of future new vehicle production is implausible, and
that we failed to account for the actual costs to produce such fleets because we overestimated the
number of vehicles with both a BEV and ICE variant. EPA disagrees. EPA's OMEGA model
does, as the commenter describes, create "clones" of base year vehicles to act as potential
placeholder options for ICE, PHEV, of BEV powertrain variants. However, the presence of those
placeholder vehicles does not automatically mean that the model is projecting production
volumes for those vehicles, beyond the placeholder value of 1 vehicle. EPA vehicle production
projections are representative of an aggregation of vehicles which, in reality, would have many
individual differences in options, and trim levels. The level of aggregation we have chosen, at the
manufacturer and model type level, is appropriate for this rulemaking since it allows enough
differentiation for emissions performance and incremental cost as a result of the analyzed
polices, while avoiding extraneous details that would not help to inform questions about
compliance costs and feasibility. EPA notes that our marked up production costs account for
vehicle design, development and manufacturing overhead, so even if our modeled results
generate more variants than will be produced in the future, as the commenter suggests, the costs
of producing those variants is appropriately considered in our overall cost estimates.
Steven G. Bradbury commented that EPA simply carried over the $1,200 cost estimate in the
Proposal from the 2021 rulemaking, and that the actual costs would be higher. In response, EPA
disagrees with this comment. We did not carry over the incremental cost estimates from the prior
rulemaking. The Preamble and RIA provide extensive explanations for the modeling tools, inputs
and assumptions that were developed and applied specifically for this rulemaking.
Zero Emission Transportation Association commented that EPA's analysis for the proposal
excluded Rivian from the manufacturers represented in the base year vehicle fleet. Tesla
similarly commented that the MY 2019 base year fleet used in the NPRM has lower volumes for
their vehicles than today. In response, EPA notes that we have updated the base year fleet for this
final rulemaking analysis, consistent with our general practice of using the most recent data
whenever possible. The MY 2022 base year fleet used for the updated analysis now includes
Rivian vehicles, and Tesla production volumes (and volumes of other manufacturers) that
represents MY 2022 instead of the MY 2019 base year used for the NPRM analysis.
12.1.2 - Consumer side modeling
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
B. Comparison of EPA's Projected U.S. BEV Market Share to Other Projections
EPA projects that manufacturers can reach 60% BEV U.S. market share by 2030 and 67%
share by 2032. In context, for all light-duty auto sales in 2022, less than 6% were BEV (or just
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over 7% when including PHEVs). Effectively, EPA's proposed BEV requirements would be
roughly ten times higher than 2022 levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 28-29]
Given the degree of electrification that EPA projects in association with its proposed
standards, it is helpful to compare EPA's projections to those of industry analysts. EPA does
provide some third-party projections of U.S. BEV market share, but does so only in the context
of supporting its finding that demand for BEVs is rapidly increasing.22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 28-29]
22 NPRM at 29189.
Auto Innovators compares EPA's projections23 to those of the U.S. Energy Information
Agency (EIA),24 S&P Global Mobility,25 Bloomberg,26 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence
(BMI),27 and the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)28 in Figure 1. EPA's
projections exceed those of other government agencies (EIA) and of the industry and financial
analysts (S&P Global Mobility, Bloomberg, and BMI). The only projection close to EPA's is
that from ICCT (a well- known non-governmental organization that advocates for stronger
standards), but EPA's projections still exceed even those of ICCT. While projections can and
certainly do vary based on input assumptions, EPA has not adequately explained how increasing
GHG standards in and of itself would enable greater BEV-only market share than those projected
by multiple other analyses that include both BEVs and PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 28-29]
23 For this assessment, Auto Innovators used EPA's projected BEV market share from the ACCII
sensitivity case for the proposed standards. (NPRM at 29335, Table 108.)
24 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2023, High Uptake of the IRA side
case, Table 38. (Market share calculated by Auto Innovators based on EV sales and total sales of light-duty
vehicles.)
25 S&P Global Mobility, U.S. light vehicles sales forecast by propulsion system design (Jan. 2023).
Obtained via personal correspondence. Used with permission.
26 Bloomberg NEF, Electric Vehicle Outlook 2023 (Jun. 2023) at 22 (Figure 30; reflects BloombergNEF
economic transition scenario). Data obtained via BloombergNEF subscription.
27 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, 1Q2023 model for Auto Innovators (proprietary).
28 The International Council on Clean Transportation, Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act
on Electric Vehicle Uptake in the United States (Jan. 2023) at 27. (Table A5, IRA Moderate with increased
state ACC II adoption scenario.)
The projection from S&P Global Mobility, a well-respected third-party analyst of the
automotive industry, suggests approximately 47% EV market share (including PHEVs) in 2030
and 59% in 2032. In comparison, EPA projects a BEV-only market share of 61% by 2030 and
67%) in 2032 under its proposed standards. The projection from Bloomberg is very similar to that
of S&P Global Mobility, reaching 51% combined EV sales in 2030 and 60% combined EV sales
by 2032. The S&P Global Mobility and Bloomberg projections are generally consistent with
Auto Innovators belief that 40-50% EV market share by 2030 is an aspirational, yet achievable
goal if suffcient complementary policies are in place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 28-
29]
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[See original comment for Figure 1: Comparison of EPA-projected BEV market share under
the proposed standards to projections from EIA, S&P Global Mobility, Bloomberg, and ICCT.]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 28-29]
4. Modeling the geographic diffusion of BEVs is important for accurately gauging the
customer acceptance of the national standards.
The OMEGA least-cost compliance modeling suggests that, by model year 2032, 67% of new
vehicle sales will be BEVs, a remarkably different figure than the 8% BEV share observed in the
U.S. in early 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 284-285]
Modeling a highly segmented and geographically dependent market as a single entity is
spurious. The agency's assumption that all consumers will respond with the same elasticity of
demand pegged to the same diffusion of innovation curve is simplistic and not appropriate. As
we know, there are many factors outside of the relative price of powertrains that come into play
when purchasing a new vehicle. These include the robustness of the charging ecosystem,
inclement weather, relative price of fuels, and even political affiliation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 284-285]
It is crucial that EPA model accurately the diffusion of BEVs into different parts of the
country, since the pattern of spatial diffusion influences key issues in this rulemaking: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 284-285]
-the amount of electricity required to support BEVs in different areas;
-the degree of grid investments and public-charging investments required to support BEVs;
-the amount of emissions from the electric utility sector (as some regions are more carbon
intensive than others);
-and the prospects for customer acceptance of BEVs (as regions vary in attitudes toward
BEVs, the pace of the public charging build out, cold weather climates, and the availability of
state incentives and public outreach to facilitate BEV deployment). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 284-285]
In its analysis EPA adapts a "vehicle adopter model" (VAM) developed by the National
Renewable Energy Laboratory. The model includes some plausible predictor variables such as
income, housing type, housing tenure, population density, and rural vs urban location. The
authors also acknowledge the model omits crucial variables relevant to predicting whether a
household will purchase or lease a BEV such as environmental attitudes, interest in advanced
technology, whether the household has a place at home or at work to charge their BEV,
commuting distance, and long-trip frequency. The model explained little of the variation in BEV
ownership in the sample (R-square = 0.04). The authors explain that the model seemed to
perform better statistically at the county level, but with so many omitted variables it seems
doubtful the model coefficients are useful for prediction. A deeper problem is that the data set
included only 224 households that owned at least one BEV, about 6% of the sample, and it is not
clear whether the sample is representative of the U.S. Since the 224 households are, as the
authors note, early BEV adopters, it seems unlikely that information about them will be relevant
in predicting which households adopt BEVs as the technology diffuses from 8% of new vehicle
purchasers in early 2023 to 67% in 2032. For the purposes of the rulemaking, it is more
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important to model carefully, for example, those who are open to a BEV but have not yet
purchased one. The authors were careful to state that their results have limited utility [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 284-285] :
The absolute values of the estimates and the predictive capability of the model are not the
priorities for this purpose—instead, we emphasize the relative scale of these coefficients (for
example, how much influence housing type has on PEV adoption compared with income). [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 284-285]
EPA then decided to use the absolute coefficients to forecast PEV adoption, exactly contrary
to what the authors suggested. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 284-285]
Auto Innovators appreciates that EPA may have been inclined to use this survey because the
results can be linked to the IPM model of the electric utility sector. Unfortunately, the survey and
modeling have so many weaknesses for use in this rulemaking that a different modeling strategy
is required [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 284-285],
In the long run, Auto Innovators suggests that EPA develop an improved BEV adopter model.
Source:
1. Ge, Yanbo, Christina Simeone, Andrew Duvall, and Eric Wood. 2021. There's No Place
Like Home: Residential Parking, Electrical Access, and Implications for the Future of Electric
Vehicle Charging Infrastructure. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory.
NREL/TP-5400-81065. htps://www.nrel,gov/docs/fy22osti/81065 .pdf. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 284-285]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
EPA requests comment on their approach to determining charging time, as set forth in the
DRIA, Chapter 4.155 EPA's analysis is contingent on unsupported assumptions regarding (1)
U.S. consumers' adoption of and ability to purchase more expensive ZEVs (see Sections IV.B.2
and IV.E.2.ii); (2) the type of ZEV purchased (used ZEVs or PHEVs compatible with slower
charging units or new ZEVs that can use DCFC) (Section IV,B.2 addresses charging times); (3)
the availability of critical minerals and metals to expand the supply of reliable and renewable
electricity (see Section I.B); and (4) the availability of reliable and affordable charging for all
users (see Sections IV.B.4). Given the flaws in EPA's methodology that omits significant data
sources and other factors and makes unsupported assumptions, EPA should revise its analysis
concerning charging time and continue with promulgating a final rule for future emissions
standards, that accounts for the reality of today's automotive market and not the public
pronouncements of the automotive industry, a single state or group of states, or other
unsupported estimates of future market growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 33-34]
155 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,367.
EPA's Proposal fails to evaluate how government credits are embedded in vehicle pricing.
For example, neither federal or state governments, or auto manufacturers explain how state ZEV
credits, EPA GHG multiplier credits, and NHTSA CAFE EV multiplier credits are accounted for
in both ZEV and ICEV vehicle price. There is increasing evidence that regulations which
mandate EV sales—along with the cross-subsidies from gasoline and diesel vehicle buyers—are
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leading manufacturers to abandon sales of the least expensive and higher fuel economy gasoline
and diesel vehicles that do not receive similar subsidization.236 Cox Automotive found that
"in December 2017, automobile makers produced 36 models priced at $25,000 or less. Five
years later, they built just 10," pushing low-income buyers out of the new-car market and into the
used- car market. Conversely, in December 2017 automobile manufacturers offered 61 models
for sale with sticker prices of $60,000 or higher and in December 2022, they offered 90.237 This
is unacceptable. EPA and its sister agencies cannot create credits and then claim they do not
affect vehicle price solely because they have not sought to quantify them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 51-52]
236 Steven G. Bradbury, Distinguished Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, Prepared Statement for the
hearing entitled "Driving Bad Policy: Examining EPA's Tailpipe Emissions Rules and the Realities of a
Rapid Electric Vehicle Transition," before the Subcommittee on Economic Grown, Energy Policy, and
Regulatory Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Accountability, at 10
(May 17, 2023) available at https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Bradbury- Prepared-
Statement-for-17-May-2023-Oversight-Hearing.pdf
237 See Sean Tucker, Are we witnessing the demise of the affordable car? Automobile makers have all but
abandoned the budget market (MarketWatch Feb. 28, 2023), available at
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/are-we-witnessing-the-demise-of-the-affordable-car-automakers-
have-all-but-abandoned-the-budget-market-a68862f0 (last visited May 24, 2023).
Tellingly, EPA never estimates the annual price of a comparable ZEV and ICEV, for each
year in which EPA proposes standards. EPA's bias towards EVs is demonstrated by EPA's
statement that its OMEGA modeling "now incorporates a consumer choice element. This means
that the impacts of, for example, a $40,000 BEV versus a $35,000 ICE vehicle of similar utility
(i.e., a 14 percent increase for the BEV) is a much different consideration than a $6,000
incremental BEV cost versus a $1,000 incremental ICE cost (a 500 percent increase for the
BEV)."238 In other words, EPA set up its model to show the consumer price (not the actual real-
world cost) of EVs have a lower percentage cost increase than the incremental absolute cost of
switching from ICEVs to ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 51-52]
238 See RIA page 2-42, https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf.EPA
incorrectly assumes that ZEV owners will pay the national average residential electricity price to
charge their vehicles. EPA fails to consider that the majority of ZEVs in the U.S. are located in
utility service territories with some of the highest electricity rates in the country and that the
average EV owner currently pays a much higher price to charge their ZEV at home than the
national average residential electricity rate. Given that EV penetration has varied widely across
the U.S., it would be arbitrary to assume that EVs will, unlike in the past, penetrate uniformly
across the U.S. and thus that the average electricity price would be representative of the actual
cost electricity. For example, California, which has roughly 40 percent of all registered ZEVs in
the U.S., has a residential electricity rate that is roughly double the national average. Considering
that EPA is modeling its rule after a California-like approach to mandate ZEVs, it would be more
appropriate for EPA to assume similar real-world costs (at a minimum, given California's
temperate climate). Moreover, EPA fails to consider that mandating such a high ZEV sales rate
will necessarily require exponential increases in commercial ZEV charging at rates that are
currently three, four or five times higher than the current national average residential electricity
rate, depending on location and charging speed. Those customers who are not homeowners and
not able to install their own charging stations and take advantage of charging at low-cost times
will be adversely impacted. Instead, EPA uses a residential rate for electricity and does not
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consider peak power or time of use charges. California electric prices rose 42 percent - 78
percent between 2010 and 2020 and are projected to rise an additional 50 percent by 2030 as
shown in Figure 9. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Historic and Forecasted Residential Average Rates Based
on Most Recent 5-year Average Rate Increase. Figure 9:
Source: Michael Shellenberger, Twitter (citing California Public Advocate's Office data),
April 27, 2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
Heaping additional demand for EV charging into this market could exacerbate already high
electricity prices. This will be especially impactful to lower-income homeowners who may not
be able to install dedicated charging units, forcing them to pay more out of pocket for charging
during peak demand periods.265 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
265 Hardman, Scott, et al., "A Perspective on Equity in the Transition to Electric Vehicles." MIT Science
Policy Review, (Aug. 20 2021), available at https://sciencepolicyreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-
electric-vehicles/ (accessed June 29, 2023).
EPA must revise its analysis to account for realistic electricity prices. The proposed ZEV
mandate will require an enormous investment in power generation and distribution, resulting in
nationwide increases in electricity bills that EPA has not considered. Of course, considering the
additional trillions of dollars in costs would paint a clear picture that the costs of forced
electrification far exceed even the inflated benefits EPA presented in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
iii. Review of Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) data and projections.
EPA's BEV projections differ significantly from other federal agencies and reflect that EPA is
improperly mandating that a significant proportion of new LDV and MDV must be powered by
electric drivetrains and setting unrealistic tailpipe emission standards. The EIA published market
share projections for light-duty BEV and PHEV sales in its Annual Energy Outlook35 2023
(AEO 2023). The AEO 2023 Reference Case modeling includes laws, such as the IRA and the
BIL, and other adopted regulations in its analysis. The AEO 2023 incorporates the IRA by
adjusting EV purchase prices to account for the Clean Vehicle Credit using offcial estimates of
vehicles that will be eligible for tax credits. In addition to the Reference Case, the AEO conducts
a range of scenario modeling, that considers different assumptions and uncertainties. Across the
range of modelled scenarios in AEO 2023, EIA36 concluded that sales of BEVs and PHEVs do
not exceed 29% and the share of the on-road light-duty vehicle stocks comprised of BEVs and
PHEVs did not exceed 26%, over the projection period to 2050. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp.13-14]
35 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Annual Energy Outlook 2023." March 2023.
https://www.eia. gov/outlooks/aeo/.
36 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Incentives and lower costs drive electric vehicle adoption in
our Annual Energy Outlook." Today in Energy. Accessed May 15, 2023.
https://www.eia. gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=56480.
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Analysis of BEV-only37 sales data from the AEO 2020 (pre-COVID) and 2023 (most recent)
editions indicate BEVs sales are projected to increase in comparison to the respective Reference
Cases. For example, in 2032, BEV sales are projected to reach 13% in the AEO 2023 Reference
Case up from 5% in the AEO 2020 Reference Case. Increased BEV sales in AEO 2023
compared to AEO 2020 likely reflect emerging trends, technological improvements, relative
manufacturing costs and purchase prices, subsidies, consumer behavior, and other factors. Also,
minimum projections for BEV sales in the AEO 2023 are nearly identical to the AEO 2020
Reference Case (see chart below). However, projections for maximum BEV sales in AEO 2023
reach only 23% in2032. Figure 1 below illustrates BEV sales across a wide range of scenarios as
projected by EIA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 13-14]
37 Transportation supplemental tables for AEO 2020 and AEO 2023 can be found here:
https://www.eia. gov/outlooks/aeo/.
BEV sales projected by EPA,38 under a scenario to meet the proposed standards and a "no
action" scenario, are included in the chart. BEV sales required to meet EPA's proposed standards
or "no action" scenario are significantly higher than any scenario projected by EIA in its AEO
2023 analysis. Differences in trajectories between EPA's proposed standards and the AEO
projections illustrate EPA selecting and essentially forcing one technology over others and
setting an unrealistic stringency for tailpipe emission standards. Although EIA has projected
BEV sales to increase (i.e., AEO 2023 vs. AEO 2020) because of recently enacted federal
subsidies and expenditures (i.e., BIL and IRA), along with technological advancements, 2032
BEV sales are projected to reach to only 13% in the AEO 2023 Reference Case compared to
EPA's proposed standard at 67%. This is a significant difference in projected BEV sales and the
agency has not provided adequate information to explain this major difference. EPA must
explain why its projections differ so significantly from its sister agency with far more expertise
in such projections than EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 13-14]
38 Table 108, 88 Fed. Reg. 29335 (May 5, 2023).
[See original for graph titled "Figure 1. Battery Electric Vehicle Sales Projected by EIA and
EPA"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 13-14]
Organization: Anonymous
2. EPA's consumer demand module isn't explained and leads to strange results
EPA's analysis includes an estimate of consumer demand of vehicles by powertrain, which it
describes as "the share weight parameter changes over time to account for factors that are not
included in the generalized costs, such as greater access to charging infrastructure or greater
availability and awareness BEVs". EPA does not explain how they built their S curve or how it
behaves and relies on a single paragraph in its draft RIA to describe this approach (it reserves
conversation of the 'cost' metrics for a different section of the RIA). More importantly, EPA
does not explain why consumer demand increases because of their proposal across the
alternatives when their proposal shouldn't impact these considerations. EPA's proposal does not
increase the amount of chargers available or reduce range anxiety. If these things are assumed to
change because of EPA's rule, the explanation should be clear in EPA's analysis, and EPA
should also carry the costs of forcing increases to the grid and charger access as a cost to their
rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, p. 3]
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In considering costs, EPA states "consumers assume that approximate annual VMT is 12,000
miles, annual non-fuel ownership costs for BEVs are $1,600, and annual non-fuel ownership
costs for ICE vehicles are $2,000" but does not explain where those assumptions come from and
deprives commenters from being able to meaningfully comment and contribute. This basis of
non-fuel costs for ICE vehicles being higher by 20% leads to ICE vehicles being disadvantaged.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, p. 3]
EPA analysis also seems to gloss over range anxiety which is a leading consideration for
many consumers in whether to purchase a BEV
(https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a40119553/survey-range-anxiety-
evs/#:~:text=The%20bad%20news%3F,list%20their%20top%20three%20concerns) or the time
it takes to charge a vehicle, in their analysis of consumer demand. These oversights seriously
undermine the value of EPA's model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, p. 3]
Ironically, EPA also assumes 0% rebound for BEVs. Rebound is a sign that consumers value
driving a vehicle more and will do so as cost decreases. However, EPA's assumption assumes
that there is no additional value to driving a BEV as it becomes more efficient. So on the one
hand, BEVs confer the same or better benefits to their drivers, on the other, consumers do not
value additional BEV miles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, p. 3]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
The notion that MDV have different use cases than LDV also suggests that consumer and
manufacturer purchase and production decisions may differ between MD and LD. As MDV are
generally used in commercial applications, consumers likely consider the purchase of MDV as a
business decision. Consequently, MDV purchasers are more likely than LD purchasers to
consider the full cost of ownership when making such a decision. In particular, MDV buyers
may fully value the fuel savings from efficiency technologies or BEVs. Because of this full
valuation of fuel savings, ICCT recommends EPA model MDV consumers as valuing at least 5
years of fuel savings (double the 2.5 years of fuel savings currently used for both LD and
MD164). According to ICCT's 2022 MD EV cost study, over the first 5 years of ownership,
before 2030 both MD BEV pickups and vans are expected to cost less to own and operate than
their diesel and gasoline counterparts. 165 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 62-64]
164 According to producer_generalized_cost-body_style_20220613.csv—used in both the LD and MD
central analyses
165 Mulholland, E. (2022). Cost of electric commercial vans and pickup trucks in the United States through
2040. International Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/cost-ev-vans-pickups-
us-2040-jan22/
Organization: Jeremy Michalek et al.
The EPA assesses the potential for future demand for electric vehicles by first simulating a
"No Action" scenario, representing a future scenario without the proposed policy but accounting
for other policies such as the IRA. They then simulate a future scenario that includes the
additional effects of the proposed policy. In both cases, the consumer demand model's
parameters (the "share weights," which we refer to as alternative specific constants to be
consistent with the discrete choice literature) are calibrated so that future shares in the "No
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Action" scenario match those projected in an IHS report (Fiske et al., 2021), resulting in the
projections summarized in Figure 1. We compare these projections to new results from our
research based on an empirical investigation of (1) past trends in consumer preferences and (2)
expected technology trends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 4]
[See original for graph titled "Graphical summary of EPA's assessment of expected BEV
adoption by vehicle class in the proposed rule (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2023)"]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 4]
1.1 Cars and SUVs
In an attached study, published this year in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
we compare results from a discrete choice survey experiment conducted with over 1500 people
in 2020-2021 with those of a similar survey conducted in 2012-2013 (Forsythe et al., 2023a).
This experiment importantly investigates the likelihood of mainstream U.S. new vehicle
consumers choosing BEVs, where our sample is weighted to be representative of the U.S. new
car and SUV buying population across household income, age, education, gender, marital status,
and household size. We find that technological improvements in battery elec-tric vehicles
(BEVs) - particularly increasing range of these vehicles - have driven increases in consumers'
likelihood of choosing these vehicles over their conventional gasoline vehicle counterparts. We
find that the consumer preference parameters defining what consumers want in vehicle
characteristics and what they are willing to pay for have not changed (in to- day's dollars)
enough to identify statistically significant trends over this 8 year period. This implies that
consumer preferences (independent of technology improvements) have been rel-atively static.
The findings suggest that consumers are buying more electric vehicles today because the
technology has improved, and that as BEV technologies continue to improve in the future, it will
further increase consumer likelihood of choosing BEVs over conventional vehicle counterparts.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 4]
Using the consumer preferences estimated from the choice experiment, we examine con-
sumers' likelihood of purchasing a BEV when choosing between two vehicles: one that has a
conventional gasoline powertrain and one that has a battery electric powertrain, but oth-erwise
have very similar characteristics (such as the BMW i4 and the BMW BMW 4-Series Gran
Coupe, and the Nissan Leaf and the Nissan Versa). We find that, if consumer prefer-ence
parameters continue at today's values and if the technology for range and cost improve to levels
predicted by the National Academies (NASEM, 2021), then consumers will become roughly
indifferent, on average, between electric and gasoline versions of several car and SUV models by
2030 (see Figure 2 from Forsythe et al. (2023a)). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 5]
We further simulate market shares for BEVs across the full U.S. new car and new SUV
markets. We find that in a case where BEVs are equally available as conventional gasoline
vehicles (every conventional gasoline vehicle has a counterpart BEV with the same body style,
brand, and other characteristics important to consumers), BEV technology improvements follow
those projected by the National Academies (NASEM, 2021), and consumer preference
parameters remain steady at today's values, we find that simulated BEV market shares of both
new cars and new SUVs would be approximately 50% by 2030 (see Figure 3 from (Forsythe et
al., 2023a)). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 5]
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Our findings support that large increases in consumer demand for BEVs in the near future is
feasible. The research suggests that mainstream consumer demand for BEVs is likely to sharply
increase due to expected BEV technology improvements alone. It also supports that BEV
demand could grow high enough by 2030 so that BEVs become the majority of new passenger
cars, and SUVs nearly the majority, through expected BEV technology improvements and equal
availability of BEVs and conventional vehicles. It is important to note that these findings do not
incorporate the reduced cost of maintenance and repair or the cost of at-home charger
installation. If the net balance of these provides cost savings to consumers as the EPA predicts,
then we would expect consumer demand for BEVs would be even larger than predicted in our
study. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 5]
The proposed EPA rule may further increase consumer demand for BEVs trends by (1)
encouraging automakers to shift price margins to encourage more BEV sales, (2) encouraging
automakers to reduce gasoline vehicle offerings in favor of increasing BEV offerings, (3)
encouraging automakers to invest in electrification technology advancement, potentially
exceeding National Academy projections, (4) triggering network effects, such as vehicle buyers
being more likely to purchase a BEV as they know more friends and family who own them, and
(5) encouraging other efforts - including adver- tising, dealership practices, and other actions -
that would increase consumers' likelihood of purchasing BEVs over conventional
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 5]
Recommendation 1. We recommend that EPA pursue (internal and/or external) re- search to
develop models for future versions of OMEGA such as the one we present here that are capable
of explicitly modeling improvements in BEV characteristics that drive consumer choices, such as
range, so that alternative assumptions beyond the IHS projections can be investigated in future
OMEGA model versions and so that trends can be more explicitly and transparently investigated
and communicated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 5-7]
[See original for Figure 2, titled "Car and SUV head-to-head comparisons over time.] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 5-7]
[See original for Figure 3:, titled "Hypothetical share of BEV cars and SUVs for model year
2020 and 2030 if all gasoline cars and SUVs offered a BEV option and technology trends
followed those predicted by the National Academies (NASEM, 2021). From (Forsythe et al.,
2023a)"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 5-7]
In a working paper, we conducted a similar discrete choice experiment of 52 pickup truck
owners across the U.S. to characterize their preferences. This sample represented a range of
pickup truck consumer household incomes, ages, education, gender, and household size and was
weighted to be representative of the U.S. new pickup truck buying population. We find that most
pickup truck owners (78%) are open to purchasing electric pickup trucks if the technology
provides sufficient performance attributes, including range, operating cost, towing capacity and
payload capacity. We find that the largest group, representing 43% of our consumers, choices
between a BEV or conventional gasoline pickup truck are driven primarily by what the vehicle
can do, rather than its powertrain type (we call this group "tech indifferent" because the don't
value the powertrain technology in and of itself, only what it can deliver). Another group,
representing an additional 13% cared about payload capacity and operating cost, but did not
otherwise value the powertrain technology in and of itself. 17% of pickup truck owners were
"BEV enthusiasts" who were willing to pay significantly more for a BEV pickup truck than a
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conventional gasoline pickup truck, even if they had identical characteristics (including operating
costs, towing, payload, and brand). We find that 22% of pickup truck owners are strongly
opposed to all types of electrification, including hybrid, plug-in hybrid and battery electric
pickup trucks. For this group, a substantial change in consumer preferences would be necessary
for the group to opt for electric pickup trucks over gasoline pickup trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0705, p. 8]
We simulate market shares for BEVs across the full U.S. new pickup truck market. We find
that in a case where BEV pickup trucks are equally available and diverse as conventional
gasoline pickup trucks (every conventional gasoline and diesel truck has a counterpart BEV with
the same towing, payload, brand, and other characteristics important to consumers), BEV
technology improvements follow those projected by the National Academies (NASEM, 2021),
and consumer preference parameters remain steady at today's values, where all gaso- line or
diesel pickup trucks offer a BEV powertrain option and technology trends match those suggested
by the National Academies (NASEM, 2021), we estimate that, despite the notable group opposed
to electrification of pickup trucks, over half of pickup truck owners would choose the electric
powertrain by 2030 (Figure 4), exceeding EPA's assessment of expected BEV pickup truck
adoption in 2030 (Figure 1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 8]
Implications for EPA. Our findings support that large increases in consumer demand for BEV
pickup trucks in the near future is feasible. The research suggests that mainstream consumer
demand for new BEV pickup trucks is likely to sharply increase due to expected BEV
technology improvements in the future. It also supports that, although some pickup truck owners
are strongly opposed to purchasing BEV pickup trucks, the majority of pickup truck owners
value BEV pickup trucks equally to conventional gasoline pickup trucks as long as they have
sufficient performance characteristics. The research supports that consumer de- mand for BEV
pickup trucks may exceed EPA's scenario of BEV pickup truck adoption in 2030. It is important
to note that our study does not incorporate the reduced cost of main- tenance and repair or the
cost of at-home charger installation. If the net balance of these [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705,
pp. 8-9]
[See original for Figure 4, titled "Hypothetical share of BEV pickup trucks for model year
2020 and 2030"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 8-9]
provides cost savings to consumers as the EPA predicts, then we would expect consumer
demand for BEVs would be even larger than predicted in our study. The proposed EPA rule may
further increase consumer demand for BEV trucks by (1) encouraging automak- ers to shift price
margins to encourage more BEV sales, (2) encouraging automakers to reduce gasoline pickup
truck offerings in favor of increasing BEV pickup truck offerings, (3) encouraging automakers to
invest in electrification technology advancement, potentially ex- ceeding National Academy
projections for pickup trucks, (4) triggering network effects, such as pickup truck buyers being
more likely to purchase a BEV as they know more friends and family who own them, and (5)
encouraging other efforts - including advertising, dealership practices, and other actions - that
would increase consumers' likelihood of purchasing BEV pickup truck over conventional trucks.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 8-9]
We show in the attached report that the GCAM-based demand model formulation used to
compute vehicle choice shares, described on pg. 4-5 of the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis
(DRIA), is mathematically equivalent to a multinomial logit model. This means that the demand
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model fits within the random utility model (RUM) paradigm used in the scientific literature and
is grounded in expected utility theory, which has a long history of use in economics and the
decision sciences (McFadden, 1972; von Neumann et al., 1944). It also means that the
parameters EPA uses in the demand model are directly interpretable using expected utility
theory. We find that increases in the "share weight" parameter of BEVs relative to conventional
vehicles represents consumer utility of BEVs associated with factors other than generalized cost
(including but not limited to BEV range, styling, towing capability, and other factors consumers
consider during the purchasing decision). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 10]
Specifically, we find that the formulation used in EPA's proposed rule is equivalent to a
multinomial utility model with a consumer utility function composed of the log of generalized
cost plus an alternative specific constant (ASC). We show in the attached report how the GCAM
"share weight" parameter maps to the ASC in the standard logit form. The logit model falls
within the class of random utility discrete choice models, which all assume the following (Train,
2009): [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 10]
1. Consumers choose the alternative in a choice set that provides them the highest utility
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 10]
2. Utility is partly observable to the modeler, modeled as a function of the product's
attributes [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 10]
3. Utility is partly unobservable to the modeler, modeled as a random variable [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 10]
Upon reviewing over 200 automotive demand model studies in the scientific literature and
government reports, we found random utility discrete choice models to be the dominant
paradigm for modeling automotive demand, with the logit model and its variants most commonly
used. Thus, EPA's demand model follows the dominant paradigm and inherits the properties of
random utility discrete choice models. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 10]
The equivalence of GCAM and the logit model implies several important properties of EPA's
choice model, which we summarize in this section and the sections below. The logit model, and,
by extension, the GCAM model form used by EPA, has a well-known property called
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) that restricts the kinds of substitution patterns
the model can represent (Train, 2009). IIA implies that when a new alternative is introduced or
when an existing alternative is improved, it will draw consumer choice share proportionally from
the other alternatives. Figure 5 shows an illustrative example, where a gasoline vehicle and an
electric vehicle are valued equally by consumers with equal observable utility v and therefore
equal choice shares of 1/2 each. If an additional electric vehicle were introduced that is
effectively identical to the first, then all three alternatives would have equal choice shares,
resulting in 1/3 of consumers choosing gasoline vehicles and 2/3 of consumers choosing one of
the two electric vehicle options. This example (a variation on the classic "red-bus blue-bus
problem" (Train, 2009)), illustrates why predictions made with models that exhibit the IIA
property can be sensitive to how the choice set is modeled. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p.
11]
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[See original for Figure 5: Substitution Patterns Implied by the GCAM logit model's
Independence of Irrel- evant Alternatives (IIA) Property] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p.
11]
In EPA's current OMEGA implementation, as we understand it, the GCAM logit model is
used in scenarios that predict demand independently for the sedan/wagon, CUV/SUV, and
pickup truck markets as separate markets. In each of these demand simulations, consumer
demand is determined between an aggregate representation of conventional gasoline vehicles and
an aggregate representation of BEVs. Based on the fact that GCAM is equivalent to a RUM, we
believe that this representation is equivalent to representing two "composite" vehicles, one
representing the portfolio of conventional vehicle offerings, and one representing the portfolio of
BEV offerings (see (Yip et al., 2021)), as shown in Figure 6. When there are only two
alternatives in a choice set (e.g., only BEV or a conventional vehicle), the IIA property is not
relevant. Therefore, we do not believe that the IIA property causes concerns in EPA's current
simulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 11-12]
The IIA property may cause concerns when simulations include choice sets with more than
two alternatives that do not compete proportionally. In these cases, the model produces
substitution patterns among the vehicle offerings that are determined by implicit assumption
from the model form rather than empirical evidence and has the potential to produce un- realistic
predictions. Issues could arise if future versions of OMEGA were to include choice sets with
more than two alternatives, such as by: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 11-12]
1. Combining sedan/wagon, CUV/SUV, and pickup truck markets into a single choice
set with 6 alternatives (BEV and conventional for each body style) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0705, pp. 11-12]
2. Adding additional technology alternatives to the existing choice set, such as a PHEV
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 11-12]
3. Including disaggregated vehicle alternatives or less coarse composite vehicles [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 11-12]
Recommendation 2. If EPA considers model variations that involve larger vehicle choice sets,
EPA should carefully consider the implications of the IIA property of the GCAM logit model
and/or augment the model to relax the IIA restriction. Potential options for relaxing the GCAM
logit IIA restriction include:
1. Modeling heterogeneity of consumer preferences, such in latent class logit models
(sum of demand from multiple consumer groups with distinct demand model parameters) or
mixed logit models (sum of demand from a set of consumers drawn from a population
distribution of demand model parameters); or [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 11-12]
2. Making alternative assumptions about the unobserved consumer utility error term,
such as in the nested logit or probit models. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 11-12]
We expect that modeling heterogeneity is possible within the GCAM framework; it could be
achieved by modeling multiple different consumer groups and determining demand as the sum
across these consumer groups. This would require specifying the variation of consumer
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preferences across the consumer population. We present an example of empirical data below that
could potentially be used to specify these parameters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 12]
In contrast, we expect that alternative assumptions about the error term would require models
that deviate from the GCAM model form (but remain within the broader RUM framework).
Therefore, relaxing the IIA property through consumer heterogeneity may be more feasible than
relaxing it through alternative assumptions of the error term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705,
p. 12]
Finally, we note that there is no single "right" way to model consumer demand - all models
have assumptions and limitations. Among possible model forms, it is important to select models
whose properties are appropriate for the application. The GCAM logit form's IIA property is not
restrictive for EPA's current implementation predicting demand among two alternatives.
However, if applied to larger choice sets in the future or in response to other comments on the
proposed rule, it may overly restrict predicted substitution patterns among different vehicle types
to ones that are based purely on the assumptions of the model form and may not accurately
represent consumer substitution behavior. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 12]
Because the GCAM logit model is a special case of the logit model, it effectively assumes that
the only source causing different consumers to make different choices is random noise captured
in the error term of the discrete choice model. There are two advantages to expand- ing the
demand model in future iterations of OMEGA to model systematic heterogeneity:
[See original for Figure 6: Illustration of the 3 independent markets, each with 2 composite
vehicles, in EPA's OMEGA model] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 12-13]
1. Capturing systematic heterogeneity in consumer preference parameters, such as with a
latent class logit or mixed logit model, relaxes the IIA substitution pattern restrictions of the logit
model, enabling the ability to capture alternative substitution patterns driven by data rather than
modeling assumptions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 12-13]
2. Capturing systematic heterogeneity in consumer preference parameters allows assess-
ment of differential effects across consumer groups, potentially allowing assessment of equity
implications. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 12-13]
While future adaptations of EPA's demand model to incorporate consumer heterogeneity
would bring these advantages, it is important that the representation of consumer hetero- geneity
appropriately represents consumer behavior. Ideally, the consumer parameters would be
estimated based on empirical data and peer reviewed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 12-
13]
Recommendation 3. We recommend that EPA not modify the GCAM logit model to capture
heterogeneity when finalizing the proposed rule (provided that only two alternatives remain in
each of the demand simulations as described above) because doing so may introduce additional
complications and take substantial time to execute correctly with peer review. We recommend
that EPA begin internal and/or external research to advance the consumer de- mand model so
that future iterations of OMEGA have the potential to incorporate consumer heterogeneity.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 12-13]
2.1.3 Share weights and alternative-specific constants
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We show in the attached report and mathematical proof that the share weights in the GCAM
model are equivalent to well-established alternative-specific constants (ASCs) in the logit
model. 1 This means that they represent the average utility of all unobserved attributes (such as
BEV range, towing capability, accessories, aesthetics, etc.) that are considered by consumers in
their purchasing decisions but are not included in the generalized cost. ASCs, and therefore share
weights, have the following properties: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 13-14]
1 More precisely, the log of the share weight of vehicle j is equal to the alternative specific constant, ln(aj)
= cj. where the alternative-specific constant, cj. represents the average utility associated with all other
attributes of the vehicle not represented by xj in the logit consumer utility, uij = (3jxj + cj + ?ij.
1. ASCs (and therefore share weights) are only interpretable in relative terms. The value
of an ASC has no meaning in and of itself; it can only be interpreted in relation to another ASC
(e.g., if one vehicle's ASC is larger or smaller than another's and by how much). A common
practice in estimating ASCs is to normalize the value of one alternative, which will act as a
reference, and all other ASCs will be interpreted relative to that reference. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0705, pp.13-14]
Implications for EPA:
Implications for EPA. In the draft regulatory impact analysis (DRIA), share weights are
interpreted as being a measure of "consumer acceptance of the technology" (DRIA, p.4-5). The
language in the DRIA implies that the interpretation is in absolute, rather than relative terms.
This language should be modified to clarify the correct interpre- tation of the share weights.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 14]
Specifically, the DRIA states "A constant share weight of 1 reflects the long-established
nature of ICE technology in the light-duty vehicle market and the expectation that consumer
attitudes toward ICE vehicles is stable," (DRIA, p.4-5). This does not have to be the case. Setting
a share weight (ASC) to 1 for the ICE vehicles is a normalization, where the ASC of the BEV is
measured relative to this baseline. This normalization is arbitrary (it could be set to any value),
and it does not imply or reflect the idea that preferences for ICEVs are stable. What matters for
model predictions is only the difference in ASCs (and thus share weights) between the ICE
vehicle and the BEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 14]
Recommendation 4. Revise model documentation to interpret share weights as interpretable
only in relative terms. An increase in the BEV share weight relative to the ICEV share weight
over time means that consumer utility for BEVs (due to factors other than generalized cost) is
improving over time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 14]
2. ASCs (and therefore share weights) that change over time relative to the ref- erence
represent the combined effect of changing technology and changing consumer preferences:
ASCs (and therefore share weights) are lumped parameters representing the consumer utility
associated with all other factors influencing their pur- chasing decisions that are not otherwise
captured in the utility equation. This includes all other vehicle attributes as well as external
considerations, such as ease of finding charging stations, network effects, and other factors
influencing consumer preferences for BEVs relative to ICEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0705, pp. 14-15]
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Implications for EPA: The increasing share weights for BEVs relative to ICEVs over time
represents improvements in BEV attributes other than generalized cost and/or improvements in
consumer preferences for BEVs due to other factors than the ve- hide's attributes. EPA's
calibration of ASCs to IHS's share projections implicitly follows IHS's assumptions of the
reasons why BEV market shares may increase over time. These are not explicitly described. We
find evidence that consumer likelihood of purchasing BEVs could increase in the future if BEV
range increases as expected and BEVs are as widely available across the market as ICEVs
(Forsythe et al., 2023a) (see Appendix). We did not find evidence that consumer preferences for
BEVs indepen- dent of the vehicle's technology improvements statistically significantly changed
over a recent 8 year period. As we describe above in Section 1, it is possible that network effects
and other factors could increase consumer preferences for BEVs in the future, but our study
suggests that technology improvements were the larger factor over the past 8 years. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 14-15]
Recommendation 5. A more transparent approach of justifying increases in BEV share
weights over time relative to ICEV share weights would be to use projected im- provements in
vehicle attributes from a credible source, like the National Academies. We recommend that in
future versions of OMEGA, EPA consider revising the calibra- tion of the share weights
combining projected BEV improvements and credible estimates of how these changes would
affect consumer willingness to pay for BEVs relative to ICEVs. We discuss such an example in
Section 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 14-15]
2.2 Choice set
In the demand model used in the proposed rule, as we understand it, EPA models three
independent markets (sedan/wagon, CUV/SUV, pickup truck) assumed not to interact. In each
market, an aggregated representation of two different types of vehicles compete. This type of
demand model is referred to as using "composite" alternatives Yip et al. (2021). In EPAs model,
consumer share is predicted for two composite vehicle types: an internal combustion engine
vehicle (ICEV) and a battery electric vehicle (BEV), as illustrated in Figure 6. We discuss, in
turn, implications of assuming independent markets, implications of using composite vehicle
representations, and potential issues that may arise if the choice sets were changed. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 15]
2.2.1 Implications of independent markets
The assumption that these markets are independent restricts substitution patterns, by assuming
exogenously that a policy regulating cars and trucks differently will not shift con- sumers from
one vehicle class to the other. In practice, policy may induce consumers to shift among these
classes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 15]
Recommendation 6. We think EPA's decision to model these markets as independent is a
reasonable simplification. We make similar assumptions in our work, described in Sec- tion 1.
We do not recommend changing this assumption in the proposed rule because allowing markets
to interact can introduce other kinds of substitution pattern issues, such as IIA, and substantial
time, critique and peer review would be needed to successfully implement such a generalization.
EPA's current assumptions are simple and transparent. However, we do recommend that EPA
begin internal and/or external research on choice models that may be capable in future iterations
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of OMEGA of modeling the potential for policy intervention to induce consumers to shift across
vehicle classes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 15]
2.2.2 Implications of composite vehicles
EPA's use of composite vehicle representations of ICEV and BEV offerings has two key
advantages:
1. It avoids potential problems from substitution pattern restrictions from the IIA prop-
erty of the GCAM logit model, as discussed in Section 2.1.1.
2. It reduces the search space so that the grid-search approach used by OMEGA is com-
putationally tractable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 16]
However, the use of composite vehicles carries important implications. Yip et al. (2018) show
that using composite vehicles with sales-weighted average attributes can produce substan- tially
different choice share predictions than modeling all disaggregated vehicle alternatives (e.g.:
make-model-trim), which we call the "elemental" alternatives. Two correction factors, one
capturing the number of offerings represented by each composite and another captur- ing the
heterogeneity of those offerings, can be used in a model with composite vehicles to recover the
choice probabilities of the elemental-level choice set (Yip et al., 2018). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0705, p. 16]
The use of ASCs calibrated to market share data, as used by EPA, can eliminate the
discrepancy between composite level choice sets and elemental level choice sets for some, but
not all, counterfactual scenarios. Figure 6 of Yip et al. (2018) shows that ASCs eliminate the
discrepancy in a baseline scenario and in a counterfactual scenario where BEV and PHEV
subsidies are removed (price change only), whereas, without correction factors, models with
composite level choice sets predict different choice shares than models with elemental level
choice sets for counterfactual scenarios where BEV battery cost is reduced and/or the number of
BEV offerings increases. This suggests that the use of composite vehicles can induce changes in
predictions for certain counterfactual scenarios relevant to the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0705, p. 16]
Importantly, it is difficult to know the "right" level to model vehicle alternatives to most
accurately represent consumer choices. Choice share predictions with the elemental level choice
set need not necessarily imply a better match with reality than more aggregated vehicle
alternatives. However, modelers should be aware that the use of composites introduces
modifications to choice predictions in some counterfactual scenarios. These differences can also
affect which vehicle design and pricing decisions are optimal (Yip et al., 2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0705, p. 16]
Recommendation 7. Because the current version of OMEGA uses the GCAM logit model,
which has the IIA property substitution pattern restriction, we do not think an elemental level
vehicle choice set would provide better estimates, and we do not recommend using correction
factors to adjust the composite choice set choice shares. However, we do recommend that EPA
begin (internal and/or external) research on how future versions of OMEGA that may examine
larger choice sets should account for the implications of the use of composite vehicle
representations on outcomes, including the potential use of correction factors described in Yip et
al. (2018) and other sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 16]
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When using composite vehicle representations with correction factors, increases in the
number of vehicles (e.g., different vehicle models) the composite is representing and the
heterogeneity of these vehicle offerings increase the consumer utility of the composite. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 17]
Recommendation 8. If the proposed rule induces automakers to increase BEV offerings, those
increased offerings would increase the ASC (and therefore the share weight) for the BEV
composite via composite correction factors, which would increase consumer demand for BEVs
further than the simulations currently imply. We recommend that EPA avoid quantitatively
accounting for this possibility unless there is credible evidence or justification of the magnitude
that the proposed rule may have on vehicle offerings. We recommend that EPA note
qualitatively that the proposed rule could increase BEV adoption more than estimated in the
model by inducing new vehicle offerings, because new offerings would increase the composite's
share weight. We also recommend that EPA begin (internal and/or external) research to
investigate the implications of composites and policy-induced vehicle offerings for future
versions of OMEGA that may model such effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 17]
2.2.3 PHEVs
EPA's analysis focuses on internal composition vehicles and battery electric vehicles,
ignoring plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) that use electricity for short trips and gasoline
for long trips. We expect PHEVs to represent a substantial portion of the fleet mix over the
period of the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 17]
Recommendation 9. While we do think it would be valuable to assess the implications of
PHEVs, we do not recommend doing so with the current automotive choice model ap- proach
except potentially as a sensitivity case. The reason is that if a composite PHEV were added to
each of the markets in Figure 6, the IIA property substitution pattern restrictions discussed in
2.1.1 would imply that PHEVs compete proportionally with ICEVs and BEVs. Unless there is
evidence to support such substitution patterns, we would be concerned that modeled implications
of the proposed policy would be partly driven by this substitution pat- tern restriction and could
be misleading. Instead, we recommend that EPA pursue (internal and/or external) research
described in Section 1 toward developing a future OMEGA model to support future rules that
avoids this restriction and informs substitution patterns more directly from empirical data, rather
than model assumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 17]
2.3 Data
As we understand it, EPA's GCAM logit model effectively has three parameters:
1. The discount rate
2. The gamma parameter (which we show in the attached report is equivalent to the
utility coefficient for log generalized cost in a logit model)
3. The share weight (which we show is equivalent to a function of the vehicle's
alternative- specific constant in a logit model) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 17-18]
Of these parameters, the share weight parameters are calibrated to exogeneous projections
from IHS to define the baseline, while the discount rate and gamma parameters are as- sumed
exogeneously and determine the consumer response to changes in vehicle efficiency and
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purchase price induced by the proposed policy. We discuss each in turn and provide
recommendations:
1. The discount rate defines the relative importance of purchase cost vs. annual costs
(fuel, maintenance, etc.) paid in the future. EPA assumes it to be 10%. This is within the range of
empirical estimates that appear in the literature [CITE], and it is consistent with the kinds of
opportunity cost opportunities that many consumers have (e.g.: opportunity to pay down loans,
credit card debt, etc.). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 17-18]
Recommendation 10. EPA's assumption for discount rate is reasonable and con- sistent with
theory and empirical evidence, though a range of equally reasonable as- sumptions could be
made. Because the effect of the proposed rule on consumer demand outcomes depends on the
discount rate parameter assumption, we recommend that EPA conduct sensitivity analysis to
alternative assumptions for the discount rate that are consistent with empirical estimates.
Specifically, we recommend testing assumptions x and y because [CITE rationale in literature],
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 17-18]
The gamma parameter defines how much generalized cost weighs in consumer de- cisions
relative to the unobserved attributes captured in the ASC (share weight) term. In extremes, if y =
0 we expect consumers to choose only due to unobserved attributes in the ASC and for demand
to be unaffected by vehicle price, fuel cost, and other costs. As y —~ co we expect consumers to
deterministically select the alternative with the lowest generalized cost. EPA is using y = 0.8, but
it is not clear from the model documentation how EPA selected this value or what empirical
basis it has. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 18]
Recommendation 11. Provide justification for the value of the gamma parameter and conduct
sensitivity analysis to determine the degree to which variation in this parameter may change
predictions of policy implications. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 18]
The share weight, which maps directly to alternative-specific constants (ASCs) in a logit
model, represent the utility of all attributes not otherwise captured by generalized cost (e.g.,
range, accessories, aesthetics, etc.).2 EPA calibrates these ASCs so that the model's resulting
choice shares match those predicted by IHS in a baseline "No Action" scenario: "We calibrated
absolute shareweight values so that the overall BEV shares produced by the OMEGA model
would align with an external projection of BEV sales published by IHS Markit (IHS Markit
2021)" (EPA, p. 4-8). We reviewed the IHS projects and found that, although IHS states that "the
forecast combines both a top down and bottom up approach for transparency, flexibility and
traceability"3, the modeling assumptions behind these projections are not fully in the public
domain: "The Light Vehicle Sales Forecast and most modules are delivered via Autolnsight, a
proprietary web application."4 .... Because all vehicle attributes outside generalized cost are
captured in the ASC term, which includes potential improvements in vehicle attributes and
potential future changes in consumer preferences separate from the vehicle's attributes, there is
limited transparency about what kinds of vehicle and consumer changes could produce these
outcomes. Our work suggests that consumer preferences may be relatively stable and that some
attributes unobserved in EPA's model, like BEV range, may be critical to driving adoption
(Forsythe et al., 2023a). The current approach assumes that the proposed policy does not affect
unobserved attributes such as by incentivizing automakers to increase BEV range or trade off
performance or cargo capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 18-21]
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2 More precisely, the log of the share weight of vehicle j is equal to the alternative specific constant, ln(aj)
= cj. where the alternative-specific constant, cj. represents the average utility associated with all other
attributes of the vehicle not represented by xj in the logit consumer utility, uij = (3jxj + cj + ?ij.
3 IHS Markit Automotive Advisory, Slide 11
4 IHS Markit Light Vehicle Sales Forecast, Page 6
Recommendation 12. We recommend that EPA begin (internal and/or external) research to
develop consumer choice models based on empirical choice data to charac- terize consumer
responses to attributes beyond generalized cost so that future versions of OMEGA can be more
transparent in the implied assumptions of the share weight calibration. We provide an example in
Section 1. We do not recommend that EPA pursue such a model change for the current rule,
since it takes substantial time to de- velop a high quality model, and such models should be
subjected to critique and peer review before use. We view EPA's current OMEGA 2.0 model as
reasonable for in- forming the current rule. We recommend EPA examine how the model could
be further improved in future versions of OMEGA to more clearly justify the assumptions of the
share weight calibration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 18-21]
3 Supporting Information
We provide in an appendix the following supporting documents:
1. Forsythe, C.R., K.T. Gillingham, J.J. Michalek and K.S. Whitefoot (2023)
"Technology advancement is driving electric vehicle adoption," Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 120(23) e2219396120.
2. Forsythe, C.R., K.T. Gillingham, J.J. Michalek and K.S. Whitefoot (2023) "Will
pickup truck owners go electric?" working paper, Carnegie Mellon University and Yale Uni-
versity.
3. Vicente, J., C. Forsythe, K. Gillingham, J.J. Michalek and K.S. Whitefoot (2023) "A
review of automotive demand models for informing public policy," working paper, Carnegie
Mellon University and Yale University.
4. Yip, A., J.J. Michalek and K. Whitefoot (2018) "On the implications of using
composite vehicles in choice model prediction," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
116 pl63-188.
5. Yip, A. H. C., Michalek, J. J., and Whitefoot, K. S. (2021) "Implications of
Competitor Representation for Profit-Maximizing Design." ASME Journal of Mechanical
Design January 2022; 144(1): 011705. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 18-21]
Organization: POET, LLC
OnLocation also identifies factual issues that call into question the robustness of EPA's
assumptions regarding future EV penetration rates. For instance, EPA's projections of BEV sales
are almost nine times higher than those of EIA. 122 EPA may also be making overly optimistic
assumptions regarding battery manufacturing capacity and domestic lithium production. 123
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 27]
122 Id. at 2.
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123 Id.
EPA Summary and Response
The consumer module of OMEGA and RIA Chapter 4.1 have been revised for the FRM and
now address many of the comments received on this topic. Before we list those revisions and
respond to comments, we note that comments on consumer side modeling allude to consumer
demand, PEV acceptance, projected technology shares, third party estimates, heterogeneity
among consumers, and technology diffusion. We respond to those comments here only to the
extent that they are related to modeling structure, assumptions, and inputs. See Section 13 of this
RTC for more on those topics. For example, we discuss the calibration of shareweight
parameters here and discuss the factors influencing consumer acceptance that underlie
shareweight parameter estimation in Chapter 13. In addition, where commenters make additional
recommendations not directly relevant to consumer side modeling such as electricity price, grid
reliability, and charging, we refer readers to respective sections of the Preamble, RIA, and this
RTC.
Revisions to consumer side modeling and corresponding RIA text include the following:
• EPA has revised vehicle choice sets to include PHEVs.
• EPA has estimated re-calibrated shareweights to include PHEVs, recent research of
PEV acceptance, and recent third party-projections of PEV market shares that include
BIL and IRA.
• EPA has assumed that consumers include in their purchase decision estimated annual
vehicle miles traveled equal to 15,000 miles.
• EPA has revised RIA Chapter 4 text to reflect the correct value of the logit parameter
and describe the rationale behind the value of the logit parameter.
• EPA has revised RIA Chapter 4 text to provide additional information on the annual
non-fuel ownership costs consumers incorporate into their purchase decision.
• EPA has revised Chapter 4 text to include reasons for increases in BEV and PHEV
shareweights over time, while reference case shareweights for ICE vehicles remain
static.
These revisions, documented in RIA Chapter 4, address most of the comments on consumer
side modeling. We discuss comments in more detail below. Note that commenters Jeremy
Michalek et al. provided a comprehensive description of EPA's consumer side modeling in their
comments. We refer readers to their excellent exposition. In addition, they situated EPA's
consumer side modeling in the broader context of "random utility discrete choice models" and
their own review of "over 200 automotive demand model studies in the scientific literature and
government reports." Importantly, they state "random utility discrete choice models to be the
dominant paradigm for modeling automotive demand, with the logit model and its variants most
commonly used. Thus, EPA's demand model follows the dominant paradigm and inherits the
properties of random utility discrete choice models." For those reasons, and because Jeremy
Michalek et al. very clearly highlight the comments that require response (i.e., what they call
recommendations), we employ the structure they provide to organize our response to all
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comments relevant to consumer side modeling. Importantly, we exclude the recommendations
for future research and future rulemakings.
"Recommendation 2. If EPA considers model variations that involve larger vehicle choice
sets, EPA should carefully consider the implications of the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) property of the GCAM logit model and/or augment the model to relax the IIA
restriction." In response, EPA has included PHEVs in vehicle choice sets, representing consumer
choice among three technology options - BEVs, PHEVs, and ICE vehicles.430 We have
effectively made "alternative assumptions about the unobserved consumer utility error term." In
lay terms, we have assumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that consumers view
BEV, PHEVs, and ICE vehicles as three distinct choices. In other words, when it comes to
choosing a vehicle, PHEVs are in a category of their own, just like BEVs and ICE vehicles are..
"Recommendation 3. We recommend that EPA not modify the GCAM logit model to capture
heterogeneity when finalizing the proposed rule (provided that only two alternatives remain in
each of the demand simulations as described above) because doing so may introduce additional
complications and take substantial time to execute correctly with peer review." In response, EPA
has not modified the logit model to capture heterogeneity (despite adding a third alternative)
because current PEV sales and registration data are not sufficiently representative of mainstream
consumers to adequately support a model that captures heterogeneity. Relatedly, the Alliance for
Automotive Innovation suggests that modeling the geographic diffusion of BEVs is important for
accurately gauging the customer acceptance of the national standards. In response, we disagree.
Empirical evidence is insufficient to support a modeling endeavor of that granularity, nor is it
imperative. As Jeremy et al. points out and every good modeler knows, models require are a
simplifications, and there are pros and cons to every modeling approach. EPA has opted for an
approach that is well-situated as the dominant paradigm and chosen a level of granularity that is
consistent with available data.
"Recommendation 4. Revise model documentation to interpret share weights as interpretable
only in relative terms. An increase in the BEV share weight relative to the ICEV share weight
over time means that consumer utility for BEVs (due to factors other than generalized cost) is
improving over time." In response, EPA has revised the corresponding text accordingly.
"Recommendation 5. A more transparent approach of justifying increases in BEV share
weights over time relative to ICEV share weights would be to use projected improvements in
vehicle attributes from a credible source, like the National Academies." In response, EPA has
revised RIA Chapter 4 text to include reasons for increases in BEV and PHEV shareweights over
time due to increased awareness and access, while reference case shareweights for ICE vehicles
remain static.
"Recommendation 6. We think EPA's decision to model these markets [i.e., model consumer
decision making within body style] as independent is a reasonable simplification. ... We do not
recommend changing this assumption in the proposed rule." In response, EPA continues to
model consumer choice within body styles.
430 Note that the producer module includes a larger choice set of technology to choose from in meeting the standards,
including different levels of non-plug-in hybrid technology. These are combined into "ICE" for the purposes of
consumer choice in the consumer module.
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"Recommendation 7. Because the current version of OMEGA uses the GCAM logit model,
which has the IIA property substitution pattern restriction, we do not think an elemental level
vehicle choice set would provide better estimates, and we do not recommend using correction
factors to adjust the composite choice set choice shares." In response, EPA continues to use
composite vehicles and does not use correction factors.
"Recommendation 8. If the proposed rule induces automakers to increase BEV offerings,
those increased offerings would increase the ASC (and therefore the share weight) for the BEV
composite via composite correction factors, which would increase consumer demand for BEVs
further than the simulations currently imply. We recommend that EPA avoid quantitatively
accounting for this possibility unless there is credible evidence or justification of the magnitude
that the proposed rule may have on vehicle offerings. We recommend that EPA note
qualitatively that the proposed rule could increase BEV adoption more than estimated in the
model by inducing new vehicle offerings, because new offerings would increase the composite's
share weight." In response and consistent with Recommendation 4, EPA has revised RIA
Chapter 4 text to include reasons for increases in BEV and PHEV shareweights over time due to
increased awareness and access, where "access" includes the availability of PEVs with desired
body style.
Recommendation 9. While we do think it would be valuable to assess the implications of
PHEVs, we do not recommend doing so with the current automotive choice model approach
except potentially as a sensitivity case" due to concerns related to Independence from Irrelevant
Alternatives. In response, EPA disagrees. As stated in response to Recommendation 2, In
response, EPA has included PHEVs in vehicle choice sets, representing consumer choice among
three technology options - BEVs, PHEVs, and ICE vehicles. We have assumed in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that consumers view BEV, PHEVs, and ICE vehicles as three distinct
choices. In other words, PHEVs are not any more like a BEV than they are like an ICE vehicle.
We have also recalibrated shareweights to be consistent with moderate third-party projections of
technology market shares.
"Recommendation 10. EPA's assumption for discount rate is reasonable and consistent with
theory and empirical evidence, though a range of equally reasonable assumptions could be made.
Because the effect of the proposed rule on consumer demand outcomes depends on the discount
rate parameter assumption, we recommend that EPA conduct sensitivity analysis to alternative
assumptions for the discount rate that are consistent with empirical estimates." In response, EPA
appreciates that Jeremey Michalek et al. state that our assumption for discount rate is reasonable
and consistent with theory and empirical evidence. As a result, we did not conduct sensitivity
analysis of the discount rate.
"Recommendation 11. Provide justification for the value of the gamma parameter and conduct
sensitivity analysis to determine the degree to which variation in this parameter may change
predictions of policy implications." In response, we have corrected RIA Chapter 4 text to show
that the logit parameter is -8. The negative sign of the logit parameter reflects that alternatives
are represented with costs (i.e., lower cost items are generally preferred) and the magnitude of
the logit parameter regulates the degree to which relative costs affect choice among battery
electric, plug-in hybrid electric, and ICE vehicle technologies. In our modeling, the magnitude of
the logit is specified to allow for market penetration of lower and higher priced vehicles which is
consistent with other models and with shareweight parameters.
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This concludes the consumer side modeling comments provided by Jeremy Michalek et al.
In addition, ICCT recommends EPA model MDV consumers as valuing at least 5 years of
fuel savings. In response, EPA offers a clarification. In OMEGA, the consumer purchase
decision for MDV is not modeled the same way as it is for LD consumers. LD consumers'
purchase decisions differ from producers' assumptions about consumers' purchase decision,
however MDV consumers incorporate fuel savings exactly as producers assume they do, which
is set to 2.5 years for this analysis. We appreciate the logic of ICCT's argument. We also note
that there is no consensus around the role of fuel consumption in vehicle purchase decisions, and
the evidence discussed in RIA Chapter 4.4.1.1 states that automakers "perceive that typical
consumers would pay upfront for only one to four years of fuel savings." Thus, EPA finalized
this rule assuming 2.5 years of fuel savings are incorporated into MDV purchase decisions. See
RIA Chapter 4.4 or RTC Section 14 for more information on the choice of 2.5 years of fuel
savings in purchase decisions.
Commenters suggested that the estimates of PEV market shares are too high and offer
comparisons to, for example, U.S. Energy Information Administration.431 Annual Energy
Outlook 2023, S&P Global Mobility, Bloomberg, Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (BMI), and
the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT). In response, we note that we have
revised OMEGA projections since the NPRM (See RIA Chapter 8) and demonstrated several
compliance pathways. We have also updated consumer side modeling to include PHEVs in
addition to BEVs, hybrids, and ICE vehicles and re-calibrated shareweight parameters
accordingly. In addition, we have re-calibrated PEV acceptance parameters, taking into account
recent third-party studies that include the BIL and IRA (See RIA Chapter 4.1.2). As a result, we
conclude that projections of PEV market shares in the FRM central case are reasonable estimates
of vehicle technology market shares. Our parametrization of PEV acceptance is based on the
scientific literature on consumer acceptance, and the resulting central case estimate of future
PEV market shares is consistent with moderate third-party estimates (See RIA Chapter 4.1.2).
Importantly, we reviewed lower and higher third-party estimates of PEV market shares, and
calibrated to the moderate cases. Furthermore, we acknowledge the uncertainty inherent in any
estimate, and as a result, we have projected PEV market share for slower and faster PEV
acceptance. These sensitivities, along with others shown in RIA Chapter 12, lead us to conclude
that compliance can be achieved under a broad range of PEV acceptance and adoption rates. (See
RIA Chapter 4.1.3 and RIA Chapter 12.1.4).
12.1.3 - Effects/emissions reductions modeling
Comments by Organizations
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
EPA's Analysis Of Net Emissions Is Flawed
431 Some commenters characterize EPA estimates of technology market shares as "assumptions" To be absolutely
clear, EPA has not assumed growth in PEV adoption. Rather, we have estimated vehicle technology adoption usingt
OMEGA. PEV adoption estimates are model outputs that follow from several modeling inputs, including
acceptance, technology costs, and consumer costs. They also follow from the modeled interaction of producer and
consumer decision making. See RIA Chapters 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3.
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EPA estimates that the proposed rule will result in a net reduction of GHG, criteria air
pollutant, and air toxic emissions in 2055. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,198. That estimate is dubious.
In numerous ways, EPA has underestimated the up- stream emissions—i.e., those that do not
come from the vehicle itself but can still be attributed to its manufacture and operation—that will
result from a widespread shift to electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 55-56]
First, EPA improperly cabins its upstream analysis to only those emissions caused by
electricity generating units ("EGUs") and refineries. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,198, 29,347, 29,353,
29,355; Draft RIA at 9-32-33. But the emissions as- sociated with powering a vehicle—whether
by electricity from an EGU or fuel from a refinery—are far from the only ones reasonably
attributed to its opera- tion. Depending on the vehicle, there are also emissions associated with
pro- ducing, recycling, and disposing of batteries; operating charging infrastructure; and
extracting, refining, transporting, and storing petroleum fuels. These emis- sions can be
substantial and, when considered together, may undermine EPA's assumption that swapping
internal-combustion-engine vehicles for electric ones will necessarily result in an environmental
good. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 55-56]
The International Energy Agency's discussion of emissions from mining il- lustrates this
point. According to the IEA, "the production and processing of energy transition minerals are
energy-intensive" and involve "relatively high emission[s]." Role of Critical Minerals at 15, 130;
see also Charging Infrastructure Challenges for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Fleet, Am. Transp.
Rsch. Inst., https://ti- nyurl.com/3ktjd85v ("Mining and processing produce considerable C02
and pollution issues."). For this reason, producing an electric vehicle is a more car- bon-intensive
process than producing a conventional one. Role of Critical Miner- als at 194. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683, pp. 55-56]
EPA never explains why emissions from EGUs and refineries are the only ones relevant to the
analysis. Instead, it acknowledges that "[t]he upstream emissions inventory does not account for
all upstream sources related to vehicles, fuels, and electricity generation, such as charging
infrastructure, stor- age of petroleum fuels, battery manufacture, etc." Draft RIA at 8-14. But
EPA makes no attempt to justify that selective, incomplete approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0683, pp. 55-56]
Moreover, EPA's current position marks a change from settled agency prac- tice. In earlier
GHG and criteria-pollutant rulemakings, the agency did con- sider additional upstream sources
in assessing net emissions. See SAFE Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars
and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174, 24,872 (Apr. 30, 2020) (noting that emissions "model
accounts for up- stream emissions" from "extraction, transportation, refining, and distribution of
. . . fuel"); Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106, 57,301 (Sept. 15, 2011) ("To project
these impacts, EPA estimated the impact of reduced pe- troleum volumes on the extraction and
transportation of crude oil as well as the production and distribution of finished gasoline and
diesel."); Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-
Duty Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478, 73,852 (Oct. 25, 2016) ("To project
these impacts, Method B estimated the impact of reduced petroleum volumes on the extraction
and transportation of crude oil as well as the production and distribution of finished gasoline and
diesel."). The agency has not acknowl- edged its change in position here, let alone explained
"why the new approach" of ignoring these upstream emissions "better comports with ... the
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provisions that Congress enacted." Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. FLRA, 25 F.4th 1, 12 (D.C.
Cir. 2022). That is reason enough to conclude that "the [agency] has not, in fact, engaged in
reasoned decisionmaking." Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Nor could EPA
offer a valid explanation for its change. Up- stream emissions are more important in the current
rulemaking than they were in previous regulations given that EPA, for the first time, intends to
effectively mandate widespread adoption of electric vehicles, which (as explained above)
produce emissions primarily through upstream sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 56]
Second, EPA's assessment of EGU emissions is flawed. EPA assumes that emissions
associated with increased demand for electricity will decrease over time because of projected
changes in the future generation mix, including "in- creasing use of renewables." 88 Fed. Reg. at
29,303-04, 29,198, 29,353. That expectation is based on speculation that various provisions of
the IRA will sub- stantially alter the power-generation mix. See id. at 29,303-04; Draft RIA at 5-
9-10. But even if the power-generation mix changes in the way EPA predicts— i.e., even if
EGUs alter the sources they use to power their base loads in the way EPA anticipates—analysis
of EGU emissions must also account for the pro- spect that EGUs will switch to other sources to
address peak loads, including those that will inevitably occur if the proposed rule is adopted.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 56-58]
Providing electricity to meet peak loads can have a disproportionately high impact on
emissions, which cannot be adequately captured by looking at "av- erage emissions" (i.e., carbon
intensity) across the electricity sector. Stephen P. Holland et al., Why Marginal C02 Emissions
Are Not Decreasing for US Electricity: Estimates and Implications for Climate Policy, Nat'l
Acad, of Scis., at 1 (2022). For example, according to a recent study, changes in the electricity
sector have caused EGUs to rely increasingly on coal to meet demand that exceeds their typical
capacity. Id. ("More recently, however, changes in the electricity sector have pushed coal, which
has the greatest C02 intensity, to more frequently be used as the marginal fuel for generation,
thereby increasing marginal emissions"). "[Estimates of marginal emissions" thus "are needed
to accurately evaluate the impacts of policies or behaviors that cause changes in the demand or
supply of electricity." Id. at 2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 56-58]
The authors of the study demonstrated the importance of this point in the context of electric
vehicles. They analyzed the Biden Administration's goal to make half of new vehicle purchases
electric by 2030 and concluded that, when taking marginal emissions into account, "the increase
in electricity sector C02 emissions . . . would undo more than half of the reductions from
reducing the number of gasoline-fueled, light-duty vehicles." Holland et al., Why Marginal C02
Emissions Are Not Decreasing, supra, at 2. By contrast, if they had instead looked only at
average emissions, "the emissions reductions would [have been] overestimated by somewhere
between 27% and 114%." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 56-58]
EPA does not explain whether or how it takes marginal emissions into ac- count when
estimating EGU emissions. Although the agency indicates that its power-sector modeling shows
an increase of renewables, it makes clear that, even under its predictions, renewables will not
entirely displace coal or natural gas. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,303-04 (explaining that its "[p]ower
sector modeling results showed that the increased use of renewables will largely displace coal
and (to a lesser extent) natural gas EGUs" (emphases added)). Neither the notice of proposed
rulemaking nor the draft regulatory impact analysis discusses the marginal-emissions concept,
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and stakeholders were denied an opportunity to study the agency's complicated modeling given
the exceedingly short window for public comment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 56-58]
Given the importance of this issue, EPA should clearly explain whether it considered
marginal emissions. If it has, EPA should explain how it analyzed that aspect of the problem and
how it affects EPA's projection of reduced emis- sions. If EPA has not considered the issue, it
should do so, or at a minimum, explain why it believes that omission to be justified.6 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 56-58]
6 EPA does not even address the impact that hydrogen production—necessary for powering fuel-cell
vehicles—w ould have on net emissions.
Finally, EPA may be substantially overestimating the decrease in refinery emissions. The
agency's "central analysis estimates that. . . reduced liquid fuel demand results in reduced
domestic refining." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,358; see also id. at 29,198, 29,353. But at the same time,
EPA "recognize[d] that there is significant uncertainty in the impact on refinery emissions due to
decreased demand." Draft RIA at 8-12. Indeed, there is a distinct "possibility that reduced
domestic demand for liquid fuel would have no impact on domestic refining." 88 Fed. Reg. at
29,358 (emphasis added); see Draft RIA at 8-12 ("If refineries do not decrease production in
response to lower domestic demand" and "in- crease exports" instead, total upstream emissions
"would be higher," not lower, (emphasis added)). EPA must explain the basis for its assumption
that refiner- ies will decrease production before it factors these sizeable reductions into the
calculation. See Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(explaining that EPA must "support its methodology as reliable" with more than "speculation").
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 58]
In sum, EPA's analysis of upstream emissions rests on unfounded assump- tions and
methodological choices that are skewed in favor of the proposed rule. EPA should withdraw its
proposal and conduct a more thorough assessment of the ways in which a widespread shift to
electric vehicles will impact overall emissions.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 58]
7 EPA's superficial analysis of upstream emissions also undermines its discussion of "the envi- ronmental
justice impacts of [its] proposal." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,393; see id. at 29,199, 29,393-97. Although the
agency acknowledges that upstream emissions can negatively affect certain populations, it improperly
discounts those negative effects by failing to consider emissions as- sociated with anything other than
EGUs and refineries, speculating that the emissions from EGUs will decrease over time due to changes in
the future generation mix, and overestimating the decrease in refinery emissions.
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
1. EPA overstates the environmental benefits
EPA touts several emissions benefits in the Proposed Rule from shifting the light-duty vehicle
fleet to ZEVs. But EPA's analysis is lopsided in favor of its preferred technology. In analyzing
environmental costs and benefits, EPA overlooks negative environmental consequences of ZEVs
from increased power generation, vehicle usage, ZEV tire wear, the EV manufacturing supply
chain, and battery replacements and disposal at the end of their useful life. Notably, EPA fails to
assess net emissions. Although EPA modeled changes to power generation anticipated by the
Proposed Rule as part of its upstream analysis, EPA does not consider the potential degradation
of air quality in areas in the direct vicinity of existing or new power plants.204 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp. 44-45]
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204 Id. at 29,379 (noting that although "[e]missions from upstream sources would likely increase in some
cases (e.g., power plants) and decrease in others (e.g., refineries), EPA projects that the Proposed Rule will
result in a total decrease in emissions of certain pollutants").
EPA assumes the power sector is expected to shift over time to using significantly more
wind/solar generation and electricity storage (i.e., batteries), but ignores the environmental
impacts of the overall increase in critical minerals demand for electrical grid storage and how
that compounds the stress on critical minerals for the ZEVs themselves. But the expansion of
electrical grids—even ignoring the Proposed Rule's increased demand—requires a large amount
of earth minerals and metals. Copper and aluminum, which are both needed for ZEVs, are also
the two main materials in wires and cables and, as described above, higher prices could have a
major impact on future grid investments and EV costs.205 The need for expanded grid
capabilities simultaneous to expanded ZEV production places a more pressing demand on
materials like copper and aluminum thereby increasing extraction and refining efforts throughout
the global market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 44-45]
205 IEA Report 2022.
EPA's Proposal unreasonably relies on comparing ICEV's and ZEV's performance based on
EPA's own vastly different fuel economy testing procedures for these two different technologies
and incorrectly assumes it is an apples-to-apples comparison. This error significantly undermines
EPA's estimates of potential environmental benefits. EPA has cherry- picked the data underlying
its analysis to boost the estimated environmental benefits from EVs compared to ICEVs by a
significant percentage. EPA's proposal is based on performance data estimates of ICEV fuel
economy using EPA's "5-cycle method", i.e., Federal Test Procedure-75 ("FTP") at regular and
cold temperatures, Highway Fuel Economy Test ("HWFET") and High- Speed Driving (US06)
and Use of Air Conditioning (SC03). EPA's proposal is also based on performance data
estimates of ZEV fuel economy that (unlike the testing for ICEVs) never account for EVs
operating: above a top speed of 60 mph (whereas ICEVs are tested at 80 mph), above an
acceleration rate of 3.2 mph/sec (whereas ICEVs are tested at 8.46 mph/sec); in real world
temperatures (ZEVs are tested at optimal battery performance temperatures of approximately 75
degrees F, while ICEVs are tested at 20 degrees F and 95 degrees F); with air conditioning and
heating (EPA assumes ZEVs never used air conditioning or heating). See AFPM Comments on
the Department of Energy Petroleum-Equivalent Fuel Economy Calculation and Petition for
Rulemaking, 88 Fed. Reg. 21525 (April 11, 2023) (Attachment 3) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, pp. 46-47]
These discrepancies are unreasonable and arbitrary. If EPA's analysis were based on real-
world fuel economy testing of ZEVs, it would show they use vastly higher amounts of electricity
to travel the same distance, with a corresponding increase in power sector emissions and ZEV
maintenance and battery replacement and associated environmental impacts. EPA must account
for these differences and environmental impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 46-47]
EPA incorrectly assumes that ZEV owners will pay the national average residential electricity
price to charge their vehicles. EPA fails to consider that the majority of ZEVs in the U.S. are
located in utility service territories with some of the highest electricity rates in the country and
that the average EV owner currently pays a much higher price to charge their ZEV at home than
the national average residential electricity rate. Given that EV penetration has varied widely
across the U.S., it would be arbitrary to assume that EVs will, unlike in the past, penetrate
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uniformly across the U.S. and thus that the average electricity price would be representative of
the actual cost electricity. For example, California, which has roughly 40 percent of all registered
ZEVs in the U.S., has a residential electricity rate that is roughly double the national average.
Considering that EPA is modeling its rule after a California-like approach to mandate ZEVs, it
would be more appropriate for EPA to assume similar real-world costs (at a minimum, given
California's temperate climate). Moreover, EPA fails to consider that mandating such a high
ZEV sales rate will necessarily require exponential increases in commercial ZEV charging at
rates that are currently three, four or five times higher than the current national average
residential electricity rate, depending on location and charging speed. Those customers who are
not homeowners and not able to install their own charging stations and take advantage of
charging at low-cost times will be adversely impacted. Instead, EPA uses a residential rate for
electricity and does not consider peak power or time of use charges. California electric prices
rose 42 percent - 78 percent between 2010 and 2020 and are projected to rise an additional 50
percent by 2030 as shown in Figure 9. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Historic and Forecasted Residential Average Rates Based
on Most Recent 5-year Average Rate Increase. Figure 9:
Source: Michael Shellenberger, Twitter (citing California Public Advocate's Office data),
April 27, 2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
Heaping additional demand for EV charging into this market could exacerbate already high
electricity prices. This will be especially impactful to lower-income homeowners who may not
be able to install dedicated charging units, forcing them to pay more out of pocket for charging
during peak demand periods.265 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
265 Hardman, Scott, et al., "A Perspective on Equity in the Transition to Electric Vehicles." MIT Science
Policy Review, (Aug. 20 2021), available at https://sciencepolicyreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-
electric-vehicles/ (accessed June 29, 2023).
EPA must revise its analysis to account for realistic electricity prices. The proposed ZEV
mandate will require an enormous investment in power generation and distribution, resulting in
nationwide increases in electricity bills that EPA has not considered. Of course, considering the
additional trillions of dollars in costs would paint a clear picture that the costs of forced
electrification far exceed even the inflated benefits EPA presented in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
As previously mentioned, EPA did not fully consider the impact of the rule on fleet turnover.
The Agency is aware that the higher purchase price of new ZEVs will keep older cars and trucks
on the road longer and that new ZEVs will increase particulate matter ("PM") emissions through
increased tire and road wear.
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Marginal abatement cost of shifting from 1.0 mg/mi to 0.5 mg/mi is exceedingly high
Using EPA's own cost estimate for a GPF, one can compute a marginal abatement cost of PM
emissions. On a per-vehicle basis, improving from 1.0 mg/mi (Honda's suggested alternative of
aligning with California's LEV IV program nationwide) to 0.5 mg/mi will result in an additional
emissions savings of 0.0001075 metric tons over the life of a vehicle. As shown in Table 2
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below, EPA estimates $128.60 per GPF, a conservative estimate as that excludes any costs
associated with testing, development or updating of laboratory hardware. In spite of this, the
agency's estimated GPF costs still amount to a marginal abatement cost of approximately $1.2
million per metric ton of PM2.5. This number stands in stark contrast to the $160,000/ton
maximum marginal abatement cost threshold for control strategies which EPA set for their
December 2022 PM 2.5 NAAQs rulemaking.28 Comparatively, the PM2.5 marginal abatement
cost being considered for this multipollutant rule is nearly 7.5 times as high. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0652, p. 16]
28 EPA, 2022. Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Reconsideration of the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards for Particulate Matter. Available online at
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023- 01/naaqs-pm_ria_proposed_2022-12.pdf
Table 2. PM2.5 Marginal Abatement Cost, EPA Proposal vs. Nationwide LEV IV adoption
*Based on Average Cost of GPFs for ICE Vehicles represented in EPAs central case proposed
vehicle standards
Program: LEV IV
Emissions Rate (mg/mi): 1.0
GPF needed?: No
GPF Cost ($): $0
Lifetime Emissions (metric tons): 0.000215
Marginal Abatement Cost ($/metric ton): none
Program: EPA Proposal
Emissions Rate (mg/mi): 0.5
GPF needed?: Yes
GPF Cost ($): $128.60
Lifetime Emissions (metric tons): 0.000108
Marginal Abatement Cost ($/metric ton): none
Program: Marginal Benefit of EPA Proposal
Emissions Rate (mg/mi): none
GPF needed?:none
GPF Cost ($): none
Lifetime Emissions (metric tons): 0.0001075
Marginal Abatement Cost ($/metric ton): $1,196,279
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 16]
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Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Maintaining reductions from conventional vehicles
While CARB notes the tremendous benefits associated with ZEV deployment, it is also
important to continue to reduce GHG emissions across the fleet. Due to the inherent flexibility of
a performance standard, U.S. EPA's proposal does not specify or require manufacturers to meet
any particular technology mix to comply with the fleet average standards so long as a
manufacturer's calculated compliance values can meet the fleet average; manufacturers are not
limited in the emission rates of any individual vehicle model as long as their overall sales-
weighted fleet average does not exceed the standard. Indeed, combining the estimated BEV
penetration rates U.S. EPA's model projects with its proposed GHG standards, the standards
allow for the GHG emission rates for the remaining non-BEVs to increase from approximately
240 g/mi in 2027 to approximately 250 g/mi in 2032 with the fleet overall still achieving
compliance with the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 13-15]
To understand this potential increase, CARB analyzed U.S. EPA's modeled fleet results for
the 2022 through 2032 MYs. To remove the possibility that the higher average emissions in the
later years is simply a result of the types or sizes of vehicles remaining as conventional vehicles,
this analysis evaluated only the vehicles that U.S. EPA's model projected to remain as internal
combustion engine vehicles from the 2022 through 2032 MYs (approximately 33 percent of the
2032 MY sales). As shown in Figure 1, the projected sales-weighted average tailpipe emissions
from this subset of vehicles initially declines to approximately 240 g/mi by the 2028 MY but
then increases to 255 g/mi by the 2032 MY. 9 Although not all of the individual vehicle models
in this subset display this trend, the average trend is not driven by a few high-volume models; the
individual emission profiles of the majority of vehicle models decrease and then increase to a
higher emission rate in 2032 than in earlier MYs. Furthermore, this projected increase in
emission rates is not trivial. Three-quarters of the vehicles in this subset increase their emissions
by more than 20 g/mi, with some models increasing by as much as 80 g/mi. These increases
represent roughly a 10 to 40 percent increase in emissions from their lowest levels. Such a
finding indicates that GHG-reducing technologies would be removed from the vehicles at
scheduled redesign intervals for cost savings or other reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780,
pp.13-15]
9 The 255 g/mile emission level represents the 2-cycle tailpipe emission levels before any credits, which is
most reflective of the technologies installed on the vehicles. The 250 mg/mi figure mentioned above
represents the certification value after accounting for credits used for compliance.
[See original for graph titled "Figure 1: Average GHG Tailpipe Emission Values for Internal
Combustion Vehicles in U.S. EPA Proposal"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 13-15]
While some may suggest this is an artifact of the model solving for the lowest-cost method to
comply and that any increased emissions are offset by additional more cost-effective reductions
on other vehicle models, the proposed standards allow for such a backsliding by manufacturers
as they implement increased levels of BEVs. And, to the extent that a manufacturer implements
even more BEVs than U.S. EPA has modeled, the increase in GHG emission levels from the
remaining conventional vehicles could be even larger. Although removing or undoing certain
emission control strategies may involve additional costs that would prevent an auto manufacturer
from actually decontenting as the model projects, there are some that would be relatively easy,
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such as replacing an aluminum hood with a steel one. Additionally, manufacturers could
eliminate some of the lower-emitting model variants and instead offer variants that would
effectively result in greater emissions over time. The complementary, proposed Tier 4 criteria
pollutant standards would not provide any protections against such changes due to different
control technologies and strategies used for controlling different pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, pp.13-15]
While the fleet average approach ensures that this portion of the fleet getting dirtier is offset
by other portions of the fleet getting cleaner, there currently is no guard against a backwards step
in GHG emission levels on a significant portion of vehicles. At a time where every GHG
reduction feasible needs to be considered, there should be additional protections against vehicles
redesigning in later years to remove cost-effective technologies and emit at higher levels. Simply
because those technologies are superseded in cost-effectiveness by BEVs does not mean they are
no longer cost-effective themselves, especially relative to more costly emission reductions
outside of the light-duty vehicle sector. Additionally, there is a risk of increased real-world GHG
emissions not accounted for in the regulatory impact analysis of the proposed standards if those
who continue to purchase conventional vehicles (while most new vehicle offerings are ZEVs)
drive more miles than U.S. EPA estimates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 13-15]
If non-ZEVs were required to stay at their lowest levels throughout the regulatory period,
manufacturers could meet a more stringent fleet average standard than U.S. EPA's proposal
without increasing the projected ZEV share. Maintaining these lowest emission levels would also
provide consumer benefits; as U.S. EPA has analyzed in its proposal, operating cost- savings are
an important metric in assessing emission standards and these savings are generally expected to
be higher for lower-emitting vehicles. Furthermore, to the extent that conventional vehicles are
purchased by lower-income households, operating cost-savings associated with lower-emitting
conventional vehicles may be especially beneficial given that transportation costs are typically a
larger share of their household budgets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 13-15]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
B. The proposed rule misstates emissions benefits because it neglects upstream electric
generating unit emissions, among others.
In addition to underestimating costs, the proposal also overstates benefits. The most egregious
of these comes from the way EPA accounts for upstream emissions for electric generating units
("EGU"). See DRIA 8-10, 11. To realize substantial reductions in GHG emissions—and thus
benefits from such emissions—the rule relies on the decrease in emissions from petroleum-
fueled vehicles replaced by electric vehicles. But these vehicles are themselves still responsible
for emissions from the electricity that powers them. Current electricity GHG emissions factors
are approximately 442,000 U.S. Tons of C02 / Terawatt-Hour. How much carbon dioxide is
produced per kilo watt hour of U.S. electricity generation, Energy Information Administration,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=ll (last accessed July 5, 2023). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 34-35]
This is unrealistic. Emissions reduction on the U.S. electric grid have thus far come primarily
from natural gas replacing coal. To continue to lower C02 emissions in this manner would
require an almost complete conversion to low carbon sources. But barriers to wind, solar, and
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nuclear adoption will not enable these changes on EPA's timeframe. Furthermore, researchers
estimate that the 350 million EVs required to decarbonize the fleet in 2050 could use as much as
half of US national electricity demand. Thea Riofrancos et al., Achieving Zero Emissions with
More Mobility and Less Mining, U.C. Davis Climate + Community Project (Jan. 2023),
https://sub- scriber.politicopro.com/eenews/f/eenews/?id=00000185-e562-de44-a7bf-
ed7751a00000. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 34-35]
These costs also ignore that realizing these reductions requires the installation of new solar
and wind generation, which itself has a cost. Without additional wind and solar generation,
upstream emissions from electricity generating units will not decrease as much as EPA expects,
diminishing those benefits. In addition to the direct costs of this generation, the proposal also
ignores the greenhouse gas emission associated with manufacturing more, less dense, remotely
located intermittent generation sources, and the battery back-up; transmission, substation, and
transformer investment to integrate these technologies into the power grid; and natural gas
peaking capacity necessary to sustain their intermittency. These emissions are significant and
must be accounted for in the calculation of any benefits of the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, pp. 34-35]
Organization: Donn Viviani
Also not addressed is evidence that the increased weight of BEVs com- pared to comparable
ICE vehicles, because of battery weight, will result in nonexhaust emissions (NEE) of particulate
matter (PM) that will significant- ly lessen or even may exceed the proposal's anticipated
reductions. While there is controversy as to whether NEE PM is as large as exhaust PM, with
evidence on both sides. What is known for certain however, is that heavier vehicles produce
more NEE PM and BEVs are significantly heavier than in-ternal combustion
vehiclesl7. While it is true BEVs regenerative braking removes most brake-NEE, the greater
torque of BEVs will cause some ag- gressive drivers to produce increased NEE PM18. This
needs to be ac- knowledged and to the extent practicable included in the benefit assess- ment. In
my view, the potential climate benefits of the necessary transi- tion to EVs is too important to
risk with an inadequate analysis as to other effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 5-6]
17 Liu, Ye, et al. "Comparative analysis of non-exhaust airborne particles from electric and in- ternal
combustion engine vehicles." Journal of Hazardous Materials 420 (2021): 126626.
18 Liu, Ye, et al. "Impact of vehicle type, tyre feature and driving behaviour on tyre wear under real-world
driving conditions." Science of the Total Environment 842 (2022): 156950.
Organization: Elders Climate Action
II. MODELING ANALYSIS
To estimate the emission reduction benefits of the regulatory approach that we ask EPA to
adopt, we have performed modeling using Emfac to quantify the emission reductions that would
be achieved in the South Coast and San Joaquin Valley (SJV) Air Quality Management Districts
(AQMDs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 8-10]
CARB has developed estimates of the NOx reductions needed for attainment in South Coast
and SJV AQMDs. CARB has identified emissions from federally regulated transportation source
sectors as the primary cause of nonattainment after the implementation of stationary and area
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source measures included in the draft ozone SIP. These source sectors include out-of-state (OOS)
trucks traveling into and through California, commercial shipping and aircraft operations in CA.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 8-10]
In these comments we fault EPA for not identifying the degree of emission needed to help
states achieve the emission reductions needed for ozone and PM2.5 attainment. To address that
objection, we have prepared modeling analyses of two scenarios to estimate the contribution to
attainment in the two most polluted ozone NAs in the U.S. where 20 million Americans are at
risk from exposure to frequent (more than 100 days per year) daily violations of the ozone
NAAQS, that include the most extreme daily peak concentrations measured in the U.S. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 8-10]
The two scenarios we test are the emission reductions achieved by applying the proposed
NOx standards for L/MDVs in Option 1 to OOS trucks operating in the AQMDs, and a scenario
that reduces emissions from those trucks to zero based on a zero emission standard. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 8-10]
III. CLIMATE CRISIS REQUIRES ZERO EMISSION STANDARDS TO ACCELERATE
TRANSITION TO ZERO GHG ECONOMY
The science is clear: stabilizing the climate before it becomes too hot to support human
civilization is another reason beyond attaining the ozone NAAQS in all of America's 230
nonattainment counties why GHG emissions from on-road vehicles must be reduced to zero as
soon as possible. In his Climate Executive Order President Biden declared that the policy of the
United States is to "put the United States on a path to achieve net-zero emissions, economy-
wide, by no later than 2050."1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 8-10]
1 Executive Order to Tackle Climate Change (January 27, 2021). Sec. 201. Policy. Even as our Nation
emerges from profound public health and economic crises borne of a pandemic, we face a climate crisis
that threatens our people and communities, public health and economy, and, starkly, our ability to live on
planet Earth. Despite the peril that is already evident, there is promise in the solutions— opportunities to
create well-paying union jobs to build a modern and sustainable infrastructure, deliver an equitable, clean
energy future, and put the United States on a path to achieve net-zero emissions, economy-wide, by no later
than 2050. We must listen to science — and act. We must strengthen our clean air and water protections.
We must hold polluters accountable for their actions. We must deliver environmental justice in
communities all across America. The Federal Government must drive assessment, disclosure, and
mitigation of climate pollution and climate-related risks in every sector of our economy, marshaling the
creativity, courage, and capital necessary to make our Nation resilient in the face of this threat. Together,
we must combat the climate crisis with bold, progressive action that combines the full capacity of the
Federal Government with efforts from every corner of our Nation, every level of government, and every
sector of our economy. It is the policy of my Administration to organize and deploy the full capacity of its
agencies to combat the climate crisis to implement a Government-wide approach that reduces climate
pollution in every sector of the economy; increases resilience to the impacts of climate change; protects
public health; conserves our lands, waters, and biodiversity; delivers environmental justice; and spurs well-
paying union jobs and economic growth, especially through innovation, commercialization, and
deployment of clean energy technologies and infrastructure. Successfully meeting these challenges will
require the Federal Government to pursue such a coordinated approach from planning to implementation,
coupled with substantive engagement by stakeholders, including State, local, and Tribal governments.
The President's declared policy responds to and is supported by the science which makes
clear that the climate will continue to heat up so long as humanity continues to increase GHG
levels in the atmosphere. The global mean temperature reached 1.2 o C above the pre-industrial
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baseline in 2020 [2] which has produced massive damage and destruction to property and natural
systems, and caused hundreds of deaths, displacement, homelessness and loss of livelihoods for
tens of thousands of Americans from extreme floods, drought, wildfires, hurricanes and
tornadoes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, pp. 8-10]
2 World Meteorological Organization, State of the Global Climate, 6 (April 2021); available at
docnum.php (wmo.int). WMO uses the "1850-1900 baseline as an approximation of pre-industrial
levels." Id.
Organization: Energy Innovation
Alternative 1 projects a fleet-wide C02 target that is 10 g/mile lower on average than the
proposed rule targets, representing a 67 percent reduction in average GHG emissions targets,
from the MY 2026 standards, compared with the projected 56 percent reduction for the proposed
rule.27 While the stringency in Alternative 1 does not represent a huge jump from the proposed
rule, the adjustment from the proposed rule would boost BEV penetration rates from 67 to 69
percent in the year 2032. See Table 96 below from the proposed rule.28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0561, pp.11-12]
27 U.S. EPA, 29331.
28 U.S. EPA, 29332-3.
[See original attachment for Table 96 - Fleet BEV Penetration Rates, by Body Style, Under
Alternative 1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 11-12]
According to the EPA's modeling, Alternative 1 will also further reduce GHG emissions and
other pollutants, compared with the proposed rule and other alternatives.29 See Tables 8 and 9
from the proposed rule below. As the EPA aptly states, "[Reducing GHG emissions, including
the three GHGs (C02, CH4, and N20) affected by this program, will contribute toward the goal
of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2[degrees]C above pre-
industrial levels, and subsequently reducing the probability of severe climate change related
impacts including heat waves, drought, sea level rise, extreme climate and weather events,
coastal flooding, and wildfires."30 Similarly, Alternative 1 would result in greater reductions in
criteria pollutants and air toxics, which would result in greater public health benefits and
improvements to air quality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 11-12]
29 U.S. EPA, 29350-3.
30 U.S. EPA, 29199.
[See original attachment for Table 8 - Comparison of Proposed Car Standards to Alternatives,
and Table 9 -Comparison of Proposed Truck Standards to Alternatives] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0561, pp.11-12]
Organization: Marathon Petroleum Corporation (MPC)
Renewable liquid fuels can play a critical role in a multifaceted solution for reducing carbon
emissions, particularly those from the transportation sector. The renewable liquid fuel industry is
well-positioned to produce the renewable fuels needed to help attain the EPA's emissions goals.
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However, EPA has ignored the emission-reduction benefits provided by renewable liquid fuels in
its proposed vehicle emissions standards because EPA did not account for the assumption that
the C02 emissions from renewable liquid fuel combustion are zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0593, pp. 1-2]
Organization: POET, LLC
EPA should leverage all available technologies to begin reducing carbon emissions from
LDVs as promptly as is technologically feasible. This position is consistent with EPA's own
statements. The Proposed Rule explains "EPA's rules have historically not required the use of
any particular technology" and EPA sets standards "without a priori limiting its consideration to
a particular set of technologies." 13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 7]
13 See id. at 29232.
Yet EPA contradicts its own stated approach by proposing a rule that effectively requires one
technology for LDVs—BEVs. POET engaged OnLocation to use EPA's own OMEGA model to
determine what might happen if the auto industry falls short, even by a little, of EPA's optimistic
predictions for BEV adoption. OnLocation's modeling, set out in its report attached to this letter
as Attachment 1, shows that "no amount of technological improvements for ICE vehicles
incorporated by EPA for their supporting analysis with the OMEGA model for ICE vehicles can
compensate for even a relatively small reduction in the penetration rate of BEVs."14 OnLocation
also finds that, when one accounts for the upstream emissions from BEVs, the Proposed Rule's
target of 86 grams per mile in 2032 cannot be met. If BEV deployments drop only a few
percentage points below EPA's very aggressive projections, and if BEV upstream emissions are
accounted for, the proposed standards are impossible to meet, even with BEVs. Given this
microscopic margin for error, EPA must not omit other technologies, such as renewable fuels,
and in particular, bioethanol, that can immediately begin to dramatically reduce LDV emissions
on a lifecycle basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 7]
14 Attachment 1, OnLocation Report, at 3 (June 30, 2023).
B. EPA Has Relied on Unreasonable and Unsupported Assumptions in Its Assessment of
GHG Emissions Reductions.
The Trinity report also addresses certain unfounded assumptions in EPA's assessment of
GHG emissions reductions and has identified the following flaws. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp. 24-25]
First, EPA ignores upstream emissions from BEVs other than emissions from electricity
generation. 105 EPA's assessment assigns 710 metric tons of GHG emissions from the increased
electricity needed to power BEVs incentivized by the Proposed Rule. However, the Trinity
report demonstrates that EPA's assessment significantly undercounts those emissions. The report
cites a recent study showing that between "56 to 494 kilograms of C02eq emissions per kWh of
battery pack capacity which translates to between about 5 and 50 metric tons of GHG emissions
per 100 kWh battery pack."106 Using this study and EPA's estimate of 80 million BEVs on the
road by 2055, Trinity calculates additional upstream emissions between 400 and 4,000 metric
tons. 107 That is in addition to the 710 metric tons EPA calculates for electricity generation.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 24-25]
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105 Attachment 2 at 10.
106 Id.
107 Id.
V. OMEGA Modeling Highlights the Feasibility Challenges of EPA's Proposed Rule and
How Biofuels Could Make the Rule More Workable.
After conducting a series of runs using EPA's OMEGA model, OnLocation in the attached
report concludes that EPA's Proposed Rule on light-duty vehicle emissions "has significant
shortcomings in achieving its stated goal of reducing GHG emissions." 111 OnLocation finds that
compliance with the Proposed Rule "can only be achieved through a narrow range of BEV
vehicle penetration pathways." 112 While EPA relies on BEV penetrations around 67% of new
light-duty vehicle sales in 2032, OnLocation finds that if a production limit of 60% is imposed
on BEVs in that general timeframe, compliance with the target emission goals is prevented
through 2034.113 When a BEV production limit of 50% is similarly imposed, compliance is
generally not achieved throughout the timeframe covered by the Proposed Rule and not even
through the year 2050.114 Furthermore, ICE vehicles cannot make up the difference in GHG
emissions reductions. 115 This result occurs because EPA does not consider the lifecycle benefits
of biofuels while artificially assigning zero emissions to BEVs (ignoring the upstream emissions
of BEVs), and for other reasons that may include EPA assigning unduly low battery costs to
BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 26]
111 Attachment 1, at 2, 16.
112 Id. at 1.
113 Id. at 7 & Fig. 4.
114 Id. 4 & Fig. 1.
115 OnLocation found "no amount of technological improvements for ICE vehicles incorporated by EPA
for their supporting analysis with the OMEGA model for ICE vehicles can compensate for even a relatively
small reduction in the penetration rate of BEVs." See id. at 3.
Introduction
Peter Whitman and Michael Schaal of OnLocation ("Authors") have been asked to review the
assumptions and modeling in support of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA's")
proposed "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and
Medium-Duty Vehicles," under Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0451 ("Proposed
Rule"), that addresses standards for criteria pollutants and greenhouse gases (GHG) for light-
duty vehicles and Class 2b and 3 ("medium-duty") vehicles for model years 2027 through 2032.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-36]
OnLocation's Analysis
In this analysis, we reviewed EPA's assumptions and then we performed a series of test
scenarios to observe the robustness of the results obtained using EPA's OMEGA (Optimization
Model for reducing Emissions of Greenhouse Gases from Automobiles) model. This OMEGA
model is the same model that EPA used in the Proposed Rule for its analysis of compliance
scenarios. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-36]
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1 Available at https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/optimization-model-
reducing-emissions- greenhouse-gases
EPA's Assumptions
We focus on two interrelated aspects of the rulemaking: using only tailpipe emissions for
compliance with the MY 2027 - 2032 standards and only a narrow range of BEV penetration
trajectories that will allow compliance to be achieved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-
36]
Our key insight is that compliance can only be achieved through a narrow range of BEV
vehicle penetration pathways. We demonstrate this through a set of runs using EPA's OMEGA
model described below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-36]
In addition, we note that upstream emissions are a significant contributor to GHG emissions
and ignoring them has implications for aligning the incentives for compliance to the Proposed
Rule with its intent, reductions in GHG emissions. This leads to the following observations:
- Should upstream emissions for all fuels, including electricity, be incorporated in
compliance, projections of grid carbon emissions vary widely, and according to our modeling
using the OMEGA model, EPA's proposed standard of 86 grams/mile in 2032 cannot be met
when using EIA's projected electric grid carbon intensities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609,
pp. 35-36]
- Upstream manufacturing emissions are an important differentiator between vehicles but are
not accounted for. Using only tailpipe emissions provides inconsistent incentives between BEVs
and ICE vehicles, while EPA's optimistic projections for the grid carbon intensity and BEV
penetration could reduce the effectiveness of the Proposed Rule in reducing carbon. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-36]
- Because upstream emissions are ignored in the Proposed Rule, the shape of the GHG
footprint-based compliance curve depends on the assumed BEV penetration, even though it is
only applicable to ICE vehicles. If BEVs penetration is different than EPA projections, then
EPA's proposed compliance curves are likely to be inconsistent with the analysis used in their
development and penalize larger footprint vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-36]
Per the Summary at the end of this report, our analysis of the EPA's Proposed Rule on light-
duty vehicle emissions finds it has significant shortcomings in achieving its stated goal of
reducing GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-36]
Uncertainty in BEV Penetration Rate
In its proposal, EPA forecasts almost 70% BEV penetration will occur in MY 2032 across the
light duty categories (passenger car, crossover/SUV, and light truck), or over 10 million BEVs.
In addition, this compliance pathway would require almost 40% BEV penetration in the medium-
duty van and pickup truck categories. By comparison, EIA projects approximately 1.5 million
BEVs in 2050, with only 1.2 million in 2032.2 Thus, EPA's projections of sales of
approximately 11 million BEVs are almost nine times higher than those of EIA, the leading U.S.
governmental source for independent energy statistics and analysis.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, p. 36]
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2 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2023 Reference Table 38,
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/tables_ref.php
3 Regarding BEV sales in EPA's analysis, EPA finds 15,834,010 total light duty vehicle sales in 2032
(Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis Table 4-18) multiplied by 70% BEV penetration (Multi-Pollutant
Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles Fact Sheet,
EPA-420-F-23-009 pg. 5).
Battery production is a key constraint in the EV penetration rate. Supporting material on the
battery production from S&P Global and Argonne National Laboratories5 are based on battery
manufacturing plant announcements rather than more definitive metrics such as plants under
construction. EPA has focused on lithium as the constraining critical material for battery
production, and growth in domestic lithium production is based on infrastructure that has not yet
been built. None of the studies referenced directly incorporate the level of U.S. EV penetration
proposed in the Proposed Rule. The assumptions underlying EPA's proposed path merit further
analysis by EPA and call into question the robustness of EPA's assumptions regarding future EV
penetration rates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 36]
5 "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles," Federal Register Vol. 88, No. 87, pg. 29317
OnLocation's analysis using OMEGA
OnLocation executed numerous runs of the OMEGA model to test the boundaries of its
domain and the robustness of the supporting analysis. We describe the model and then the
scenarios executed to illustrate some of the limitations of the modeling and the lack of robustness
of the Proposed Rule to changes in market assumptions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 37]
About the OMEGA Model
The OMEGA model was designed by the EPA to visualize the future of the car industry and
its environmental effects. OMEGA can produce predictions about a wide range of the light-duty
vehicle (LDV) market. Within OMEGA, there are different parameters that act as preset events,
of which those specified in the Proposed Rule are used for this investigation. The specific
outputs of importance for this project are the emissions (C02g/mi) per vehicle class (pickup,
sedan, crossover, and SUV) and the market share of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) versus
internal combustion engines (ICE). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 37]
Description of Scenarios Using the OMEGA Model
In order to demonstrate the fairly narrow set of conditions that would allow compliance with
the Proposed Rule, we executed the following runs of the OMEGA model to test the robustness
of the Proposed Rule:
Scenario 1: 50% Market Share Production Limit on BEVs
Scenario 2: Relaxed (60%) Market Share Production Limit on BEVs Scenario 3: Modified
Battery Cost Learning [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 37]
These scenarios demonstrate that no amount of technological improvements for ICE vehicles
incorporated by EPA for their supporting analysis with the OMEGA model for ICE vehicles can
compensate for even a relatively small reduction in the penetration rate of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 37]
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Finally, we look at three scenarios showing the effect of upstream emissions and low-carbon
fuels on meeting the Proposed Rule.
Scenario 4: Adding Upstream Emissions to the Compliance Values Scenario 5: 10%
Reduction in Carbon Intensity of Gasoline, Scenario 6: 75% Reduction in Carbon Intensity of
Gasoline [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 37]
The first three OMEGA runs show a narrow range of BEV penetration pathways will allow
sufficient reductions to support compliance with the Proposed Rule, and that reductions in BEV
market share cannot be compensated for by ICE technology improvements. The latter three runs
show that low carbon fuels could potentially play an important role in GHG emission reductions.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 37]
Testing the Robustness of the Proposed Rule using OMEGA
OnLocation executed numerous runs of the OMEGA model to test the boundaries of its
domain and the robustness of the supporting analysis. The following scenarios explore some of
the limitations of the modeling and the lack of robustness of the Proposed Rule to changes in
market assumptions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 37-41]
Scenario 1: Production Limit on BEV Production
[See original attachment for Figure 1 Compliance Path with Production Limit] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 37-41]
[See original attachment for Figure 2 Market Shares] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp.
37-41]
In Scenario 1, only tailpipe emissions were included for compliance purposes, while potential
BEV penetration was limited to 30% in 2025, 40% in 2030, and 50% from 2035 onwards. Figure
1 shows the effects of BEV production limits. From 2027 through 2051, the target is not reached.
Figure 2 below shows the evolution of the market share of different vehicle categories for this
scenario, where the BEV production limits are binding at 30%, 40%, and then 50%. It is clear
that the BEV penetration constraints limit the ability of manufacturers to meet the target, as the
fuel efficiency improvements available for ICE vehicles are insufficient to compensate for the
zero tailpipe emissions of the BEV vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 37-41]
In Figure 1 and in each of the following figures labeled "Compliance Path," the blue line
indicates the target emissions while the red line indicates achieved emissions. Yellow circles
indicate banked credits from previous periods, while the green lines indicate inter-temporal
credit trades. The red circles indicate fleet does not reach compliance in that year. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 37-41]
Scenario 2: Relaxed Production Limit on BEV Production [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609,
pp. 37-41]
[See original attachment for Figure 3 Compliance Path with Relaxed Production Limit] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 37-41]
[See original attachment for Figure 4 Market Shares with Relaxed Production Limit] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 37-41]
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Scenario 2 follows the C02 targets in the Proposed Rule, with no upstream emissions. In this
scenario, production limits on BEVs were relaxed relative to Scenario 1. BEV penetration was
initially limited to 40%, rising to 50% in 2030 and 60% in 2035 for the remainder of the
scenario. Even these relaxed production limits on BEV market penetration were binding
throughout the simulation (Figure 3), preventing compliance with the target emission goals
through 2034 (Figure 4). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 37-41]
Scenario 3: Modified Learning Coefficient
[See original attachment for Figure 5 Compliance Path with Modified Learning Coefficient]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 41-42]
[See original attachment for Figure 6 Market Shares with Modified Learning Coefficient]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 41-42]
Scenario 3 involves modifying the battery learning curve (i.e., the extent to which EPA
projects battery costs will decline) by setting the learning equation to be constant. As shown in
Figure 5 and Figure 6, BEV market share collapses after 2025 to the 2021 level, and emissions
are far from the target level even as total costs over the model horizon (e.g., through 2055) are
over $2.5 trillion dollars more expensive than in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp. 41-42]
However, we believe this is an artifact of model inputs, not likely to be representative of slow
learning for batteries. Nonetheless, the significance of this potential impact merits a thorough
evaluation of this issue by EPA, and an updated analysis of the impacts of learning curve rates on
costs in in its OMEGA model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 41-42]
The effect of low-carbon fuels
The first three scenarios all identified the risks of developing a new set of rules which are
highly dependent on a high BEV market share being achieved. In the next three scenarios, we
examine the effect of upstream emissions and low-carbon fuels in achieving the targets of the
Proposed Rule. The first scenario evaluated in this regard follows on the next page. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 42-44]
Scenario 4: Adding Upstream Emissions
[See original attachment for Figure 7 Compliance Path with Upstream Emissions] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 42-44]
[See original attachment for Figure 8 Market Shares with Upstream Emissions] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 42-44]
In Scenario 4, upstream emissions were added to the compliance calculations for gasoline,
diesel, and electricity (these upstream emissions for BEVs include grid impacts, but BEV battery
manufacturing impacts are not included). The AEO2023 EIA Reference Scenario was used to
calculate upstream emissions of grid electricity. As shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, with the
addition of upstream emissions, the BEV market share rises to over 80%, much greater than the
67%) market share in the central case of the Proposed Rule. To achieve this BEV market share,
the domestic infrastructure would have to grow at an accelerated rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, pp. 42-44]
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This figure shows that using the OMEGA model, EPA's proposed standard of 86 grams/mile
in 2032 cannot be met if upstream emissions are also included. Furthermore, actual BEV
lifecycle emissions would be even higher if battery manufacturing impacts are considered. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 42-44]
In this scenario, the LDV fleet does not reach the modelled target emission until 2036, and
compliance is intermittent throughout the model forecast. EPA's having such stringent target
emission goals, which rely to such a degree on the implementation of BEVs into the market,
ignores the importance of upstream emissions, as model runs indicate upstream emissions
generally render any achievable fleet of BEVs and ICE vehicles (within the current technology
packages of the model, which don't include biofuels carbon intensity reductions) out of
compliance with EPA's proposed standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 42-44]
Scenario 5: Low Carbon Fuel
[See original attachment for Figure 9 Compliance Path with Low Carbon Fuel (gasoline with
10% lower Carbon Intensity)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 45-46]
[See original attachment for Figure 10 Market Shares with Low Carbon Fuel] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 45-46]
In Scenario 5, starting in 2030, gasoline combustion emissions were reduced by 10% to
represent the introduction of low-carbon biofuels such as bioethanol. No upstream emissions
were included within the model. This scenario effectively provides compliance flexibility for the
Proposed Rule, leading to a 0.2% to 0.4% reduction in the absolute market share of BEVs from
2035-2050. Greater reductions in the need for high BEV shares could potentially result if the
model is revised to (i) assess a broader range of battery learning curve algorithms, and (ii) the
"zero emissions" treatment assigned to BEVs is refined. Further evaluation of these issues is
warranted by EPA to ensure that small changes in BEVs under this scenario 5 (e.g., lower carbon
intensity gasoline) are not a result of artifacts of the modelling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp. 45-46]
Scenario 6: Adding Low Carbon Fuel and Upstream Emissions
[See original attachment for Figure 11 Compliance Path with Low Carbon Fuel and Upstream
Emissions] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 47-48]
[See original attachment for Figure 12 Market Shares with Low Carbon Fuel and Upstream
Emissions] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 47-48]
Scenario 6 presents a 75% reduction in fuel carbon intensity for gasoline, though including
upstream emissions including those for BEVs. Figure 11 and Figure 12 show that using the
model compliance with the Proposed Rule's targets still could be achievable, though outside of
2027 - 2032 timeframe when considering both upstream emissions and the impact if biofuels
reduce ICE vehicle carbon intensity by 75%. In this scenario, the market share of BEVs only
changes slightly from the Proposed Rule, however in the model greater total emission reductions
(i.e., those that consider upstream emissions) are achieved by deploying low-carbon ICE
vehicles. This scenario shows that with lower-carbon ICE fuels (such as low carbon bioethanol),
and considering upstream emissions, compliance within the range of EPA's proposed target is
possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 47-48]
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2. Similarly, U.S. EPA has used assumptions to estimate the GHG reductions associated
with the Proposed Rule that are unreasonable and unsupported. These lead to the benefits of the
Proposed Rule being overstated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 53]
Review of U.S. EPA's Assessment of Reductions in GHG Emissions Due to BEVs
At a high level, the U.S. EPA's assessment of the reductions in GHG emissions due to the
Proposed Rule, presented in Chapter 9 of the DRIA, is straightforward. The agency uses its
MOVES emissions inventory model to estimate GHG emissions from conventional vehicles and
then subtracts the GHG emissions associated with the electricity used to power BEVs. The
methodology used to estimate emissions from electricity generation is presented in Chapter 5.2
of the DRIA. In estimating GHG emissions associated with electricity, U.S. EPA assumes that all
BEVs will be charged using grid electricity. Unfortunately, while the basic approach used in the
assessment is straightforward there are a number of concerns resulting from the way it was
implemented by U.S. EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 62]
The first of these concerns is that U.S. EPA has ignored upstream sources of GHG emissions
other than electricity generation. This is of particular concern given that there are significant
upstream emissions associated with the manufacturer of batteries for BEVs that do not occur
with conventional vehicles. A paper published by ICCT4 notes that estimates of these GHG
emissions range from 56 to 494 kilograms of C02eq emissions per kWh of battery pack capacity
which translates to between about 5 and 50 metric tons of GHG emissions per 100 kWh battery
pack. Using U.S. EPA's assumption that the Proposed Rule will result in an additional
80,000,000 BEVs on the road in the U.S. by 2055 relative to the no[l]action case, and these
estimates of GHG emissions from battery production, the cumulative increase in GHG emissions
by would be between 400 and 4000 metric tons. This value can be compared to U.S. EPA's 710
metric ton estimate of the cumulative GHG emissions increase due to electricity generation for
BEVs and the 8,000 ton reduction from conventional vehicles (see DRIA Table 9-21) to show
the importance of accounting for battery production emissions. U.S. EPA might respond by
noting that they have not accounted for upstream GHG emissions associated with the production
of gasoline and diesel, but those are small compared to the GHG emissions from fuel combustion
and accounting for them would assume a net global reduction in the use of those fuels which
would likely, even with the Proposed Rule, still be used in other parts of the developing world.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 62]
The next concern is with U.S. EPA's assumptions regarding the mix of electricity generation
sources which are shown in DRIA Figure 5-8. This figure is reproduced below and compared to
similar projections prepared by EIA as part of AEO 2023.5 The EIA projections reflect the
impacts of the IRA for several cases including a "high uptake" (e.g. most optimistic case) case of
solar and wind generation technologies which are depicted in yellow and green, respectively that
can be compared directly to the green portion of the bars in Figure 5-8. By 2050, EIA estimates
maximum amounts of solar and wind generation that are about 20% less than U.S. EPA's
estimates with the difference being made up by coal and natural gas generation. What this means
is that U.S. EPA is overstating the contribution of low emissions generation (solar and wind) and
thereby underestimating the magnitude of upstream GHG emissions that will result from BEV
operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 62]
Continuing, U.S. EPA uses the emission factor equations presented in DRIA Table 9-12 to
estimate GHG from electricity generation as a function of time over the period from 2020
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through 2050. These equations predicted that emissions of C02, methane, and nitrous oxide due
to electricity generation will decline by 89, 96, and 98% respectively over the 2020 to 2050
period and if extrapolated to 2054 that there will be no emissions in the U.S. occurring from
Power Plants. Even accounting for the increase in demand for electricity over the period, U.S.
EPA claims that GHG emissions from electricity generation will be reduced by about 80% from
2020 through 2030 compared to EIA's forecast of about 50%. At a minimum, U.S. EPA should
explain in detail the reasons why their forecast of future GHG emissions from electricity
generation are so much lower than those generated by EIA and more appropriately perform a
sensitivity analysis to quantify the GHG reductions associated with the Proposed Use using
EIA's emission forecasts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 62-63]
[See original attachment for U.S. net electricity generation by fuel] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, pp. 62-63]
[See original attachment for Figure 5-8: 2028 through 2055 power sector generation and grid
mix] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 62-63]
The U.S. EPA Emission Inventory analysis in Chapter 9 also overstates the GHG reductions
associated with the Proposed Rule by failing to account for the fact that conventional vehicles
operate on fuels that are a mixture of fossil and low-carbon renewable fuels - including ethanol,
renewable diesel fuel and biodiesel fuel. Based on data from EIA,6 the average ethanol content
of gasoline sold in the U.S. is expected to increase from about 10% to 12% between now and
2050 while the average content of the combination of renewable and biodiesel is expected to
increase from about 7% to 10% over the same range. Although the actual impact of proper
accounting for renewable fuels on C02 emissions from the Proposed Rule will be slightly
smaller than the percentages listed above, they should clearly be accounted for by U.S. EPA. It is
also important to note that use of ethanol and other renewable fuels capable of reducing GHG
emissions from both new and in-use HD vehicles could be increased through incentives like
those that have been provided to electricity and hydrogen through the IRA and the structure of
the Proposed Rule. In addition, the magnitude of GHG reductions due to the use of ethanol and
other renewable fuels could be increased by greater use of carbon capture and storage during
their production, which would further lower their carbon intensity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, p. 64]
6 https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=ll-AE02023&cases=ref2023&sourcekey=0.
Taken together, all of the concerns discussed above suggest that GHG emission benefits of the
Proposed Rule are likely to be substantially less than claimed by U.S. EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, p. 64]
Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
We believe the uncertainty in CARET s report on 2045 fuel neutrality26 argues for EPA to be
broad minded and nimble in adopting regulations, plans and incentives to reach the 2045 carbon
neutrality goal and implies long-term use of low carbon fuels with Strong PHEVs. In addition,
reaching very high levels of ZEV sales in the next decade frees up large amounts of biofuels for
use in spark-ignited and compression-ignited engines such as the strong PHEVs allowed in the
proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 26]
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26 E3 report for CARB at 11. " Many key uncertainties remain around the achievement of carbon neutrality
in California. One of these uncertainties is the optimal use and deployment of zero-carbon fuels in hard-to-
electrify sectors, including certain high temperature industrial processes, heavy-duty long-haul trucking,
aviation, trains and shipping. These fuel uses may be met with a combination of fossil fuels, hydrogen,
synthetic zero-carbon fuels or biofuels. It is still uncertain how the relative costs of these technologies will
evolve over time. As the cost of wind and solar decline, the cost of renewable hydrogen production is also
falling, making hydrogen a more attractive solution than biofuels for some applications. The market for
sustainable biofuels remains nascent, making it uncertain how much sustainable biomass supply will be
available, and what the best uses for these biomass resources will be through mid-century." See
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/achieving-carbon- neutrality-california-final-report-e3
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
6.2. Technology Assessments Should Incorporate Critical Mineral Supply and Lifecycle
Emissions
The modeling should also include a sensitivity analysis of BEV/PHEV mix on critical mineral
usage for any assumed overall PEV penetration. PHEVs can make the most efficient use of the
limited battery supply and constrained infrastructure network forecast through the period of the
rulemaking. The below example compares different vehicle powertrain emissions for a mid-size
SUV using peer-reviewed data from carghg.com. The same amount of lithium in the battery of
one 300-mile plus BEV can be used for up to six PHEVs -or more than eighty conventional
hybrids. See Figure 10 for the C02 saved from replacing a mid-sized SUV powered by a
conventional gasoline engine with electrified alternatives under a constrained lithium supply.
This analysis assumes average US electric grid emissions for BEVs and the electric operation of
PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 31-32]
[See original for attachment for Figure 10 C02 Saving from Replacing ICEs Under
Constrained Mineral Supply] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 31-32]
PHEVs can rival the emissions performance of BEVs under many real-world operating
conditions. PHEVs are not always the best-performing option but can have as good or better
lifecycle performance because of lower manufacturing emissions for smaller batteries and lower
well-to- tank emissions while still covering a significant fraction of daily trips in electric drive.
Given most average daily trips are under 50 miles, this results in a significant portion of all-
electric miles like a BEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 31-32]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
2. The charging efficiencies adopted by EPA for purposes of this proposed rule are
arbitrarily inconsistent with other contemporaneously proposed rules.
EPA adopts the following charging efficiency rates for use in this rulemaking: 13: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 3]
13 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023-03-25-1 l-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip, "onroad_fuels_20220325.csv"
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 3]
fuel id start year unit Refuel efficiency Transmission efficiency
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US electricity 2020 kWh 0.9
0.935
The EV charging efficiencies used by EPA in this rulemaking are inconsistent with those used
in other proposed rulemakings: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 3]
In the "Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis: RFS Standards for 2023-2025 and Other
Changes," to support the generation of eRINs, EPA used an EV charging efficiency of 85% and
a line loss factor of 5.3%, yielding a total loss rate of 19.5%. 14 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, p. 3]
14 EPA "Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis: RFS Standards for 2023-2025 and Other Changes" (EPA-420-
D-22-003) at 329, November 2022.
EPA's Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 15
assume charging efficiencies ranging from 88.0 to 89.25%) across MY 2027-2032, failing to
account for transmission line losses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 3]
15 EPA "Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles: Phase 3 Draft Regulatory Impact
Analysis" (EPA-420-D-23-001) at 227, April 2023.
Here, EPA proposes a third distinct set of charging efficiency and line loss. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 3]
EPA provides no explanation for why the efficiency values should differ among the three
proposed rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 3]
7. The upstream emission factor that EPA uses for transportation electricity is not
consistent with other EPA sources and does not represent full lifecycle emissions from electricity
generation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 10]
EPA's OMEGA modeling uses the following GHG emission factors for electricity:42 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 10]
42 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip, "policy_fuels_20220722.csv."
fuelid start
year unit direct_co2e_grams_per_unit upstream_co2e_grams_per_unit
Electricity 2020 kWh 0 325 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, p. 10]
EPA explains the origin of the 325 gC02e/kWh upstream emissions factor with the note
"20220722 electricity upstream set at midpoint of high BEV 353 g/mi and low BEV 297 g/mi
effects values."43 But the correct units for this emission factor are gC02e/kWh - not g/mi - so
the origin note does not make sense. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 10]
43 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip, "policy_fuels_20220722.csv."
By contrast, EPA's 2021 eGRID reports a U.S. grid average 857.0 lbsC02e/MWh, which is
equivalent to 389 gC02e/kWh. However, this factor represents emissions from electricity
generation only and does not account for line losses or for the "well-to-power plant" GHG
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emissions associated with the extraction and processing of the power plant fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, p. 10]
EPA must correct the emission factor adopted for transportation electricity and adequately
explain any discrepancies with other EPA sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 10]
8. EPA must update its gasoline emission factors to reflect a Tier 3 E10 certification fuel.
EPA's OMEGA modeling uses the following GHG emission factors for electricity:44
44 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip, "policy_fuels_20220722.csv."
fuelid start_year unit direct_co2e_grams_per_unit upstream_co2e_gr
ams_per_unit
gasoline 2020 gallon 8887 2478 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, p. 10]
The direct emission factor of 8,887 gC02e/gallon of gasoline is based on Tier 2 E0
gasoline.45 However, EPA is proposing in this rulemaking to update the gasoline certification
fuel to a Tier 3 E10 gasoline, so it must update the direct C02e emissions accordingly. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 10]
45 75 Fed. Reg. 25330 (May 7, 2010).
Organization: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
3. Compliance flexibilities. Throughout the rule, EPA proposes a variety of compliance
flexibilities (e.g., allowing several compliance pathways and proposing changes to the
compliance factor adjustment) that are intended to facilitate implementation of the standards and
encourage earlier emissions reductions. EPA should carefully assess those flexibilities to ensure
they do not unintentionally reduce the stringency of the rule or result in real world emissions that
would exceed the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 2]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Commenters argued that EPA's estimated emissions reductions were wrong because they
ignore vehicle production, recycling, and disposing of batteries; mining and processing of battery
minerals; operating charging infrastructure; extracting, refining, transporting, and storing
petroleum fuels; etc., and considering these emissions may undermine EPA's assumption that
swapping ICE for BEV will necessarily result in an environmental good (AmFree, American
Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, POET).
Commenters also expressed concern over peak loads and the impact of peak load demands on
EGU emissions. Commenters encouraged EPA to consider marginal emissions, i.e., those
occuring from high peak loads that might be supplied via coal, rather than considering only
average emissions, i.e., those occuring from routine power generation (AmFree).
Commenters provided feedback to EPA on which upstream emissions sources were modeled
and how that affects the modeled net emission impacts of the final standards. They also noted
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that this reflects a change in how EPA has modeled upstream emissions for previous GHG rules
and argued that EPA may be overestimating the decrease in refinery emissions since it is
possible that refinery throughput will not change as evidenced by EPA's own statements in the
NPRM (AmFree).
Commenters stated that EPA had not considered the impacts of changes in power generation
on the potential degradation of air quality in areas around power plants (American Fuel &
Petrochemical Manufacturers).
Commenters argued that EPA was treating ICE vehicles and BEVs differently with respect to
real world fuel and energy consumption by considering 5-cycle, cold temperatures and air
conditioning use when estimating ICE real world fuel consumption but considering only 2-cycle
energy consumption in estimating BEV real world energy consumption (American Fuel &
Petrochemical Manufacturers). Commenters argued that this underestimated power sector
demand and emissions as a result (American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers).
Commenters argued that EPA should not have used the national average electricity price in
estimating charging costs (American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers). Commenters argued
that the majority of BEVs are in areas with the highest electricity rates in the country and that
EPA failed to consider peak rates of time of use charges (American Fuel & Petrochemical
Manufacturers).
Commenters also argued that EPA did not consider the impact of the rule on fleet turnover
suggesting that the higher purchase price of new electrified vehicles will keep older cars and
trucks on the road longer thus increasing particulate matter emissions through increased tire and
road wear (American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers).
Commenters argued that the marginal abatement cost of shifting from 1.0 mg/mi to 0.5 mg/mi
is exceedingly high (American Honda).
Commenters expressed concern about ICE vehicles increasing their emissions as more BEVs
enter the fleet (CARB). Comments stressed the importance of continuing to reduce GHG
emissions across the fleet and to not allow the penetration of electrified vehicles to be offset by
ICE vehicles whose GHG emissions increase which could be possible given the fleet average
nature of the standards (CARB).
Commenters argued that EPA had neglected upstream EGU emissions (Clean Fuels
Development Coalition et al.). Commenters also argued that the 350 million EVs required to
decarbonize the fleet in 2050 could use as much as half of US national electricity demand (Clean
Fuels Development Coalition et al.). Commenters argued that EGU emissions can only decrease
if EPA considers the costs of installing new solar and wind generation and the emissions of such
remote and less dense generating sources, back up storage and transmission along with peak
capacity generation must be considered (American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, Clean
Fuels Development Coalition et al.).
Commenters stated that BEVs, being heavier, will result in more PM emissions associated
with increased brake and tire wear (Donn Viviani).
Commenters faulted EPA for not identifying the degree of emission reduction needed to help
states achieve ozone and PM2.5 attainment (Elders Climate Action).
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Commenters expressed support for the NPRM's Alternative 1 since it provided greater
emissions reductions (Energy Innovation).
Commenters argued that EPA had failed to consider efficiency improvements that were
possible with hybrid architectures even at small costs (John Graham). Commenters also argued
that renewable liquid fuels can play a role in reducing carbon emissions (Marathon Petroleum
Corporation, POET).
Commenters argued that, if one accounts for upstream emissions from BEVs, the Proposed
Rules' target of 86 grams per mile in 2032 cannot be met (POET). If BEV deployments drop
only a few percentage points below EPA's very aggressive projections, and if BEV upstream
emissions are accounted for, the proposed standards are impossible to meet, even with BEVs
(POET).
Commenters claimed that EPA uses its MOVES emissions inventory model to estimate GHG
emissions from conventional vehicles and then subtracts the GHG emissions associated with the
electricity used to power BEVs (POET). Commenters expressed concerns over EPA's
assumption that all BEVs will be charged using grid electricity with one concern being ignoring
other sources of upstream emissions similar to comments already summarized above and another
being EPA's mix of generation sources which were different than those projected by AEO even
though the AEO projections include impacts of the IRA (POET).
Commenters argued that EPA's emission factor equations presented in Chapter 9 of the DRIA
implied that there will be no EGU emissions by 2054 and that EPA had failed to consider that
conventional vehicles operate on fuels that are a mixture of fossil and low-carbon renewable
fuels - including ethanol, renewable diesel fuel and biodiesel fuel (POET).
Commenters argued that EPA's modeling should include a sensitivity analysis of BEV/PHEV
mix on critical mineral usage for any assumed overall PEV penetration (Toyota). PHEVs can
make the most efficient use of the limited battery supply and constrained infrastructure network
forecast through the period of the rulemaking (Toyota). The same amount of lithium in the
battery of one 300-mile plus BEV can be used for up to six PHEVs-or more than eighty
conventional hybrids (Toyota).
Commenters argued that EPA was using charge efficiency estimates that were inconsistent
with an RFS NPRM and the recent heavy-duty GHG NPRM (Valero). Commenters argued that
EPA had used an EGU emission rate inconsistent with other sources and that the rate did not
account for the full life-cycle emissions from electricity generation (Valero). Commenters also
argued that EPA should update the C02/gallon factor for gasoline in compliance modeling to be
consistent with Tier 3 test fuel (Valero).
Commenters encourage EPA to carefully consider compliance flexibilities to ensure that they
do not unintentionally reduce the stringency of the rule or result in real world emissions that
would exceed the standards (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources).
Response:
We respond more fully to comments regarding life cycle analysis in Section 19.2 of this
document. We respond to comments regarding tire wear and brake wear in Section 11.1 of this
document. We respond to issues specific to air quality in Section 11.3 of this document. We
respond to issues related to electricity prices in Section 17 and 18 of this document. We respond
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to comments regarding critical minerals and battery production in Section 15 of this document.
We respond to comments regarding our power sector modeling efforts in Section 18 of this
document.
Regarding comments related to the production of a BEV being more carbon intensive than
production of an ICE vehicle, one commenter pointed to the study "The Role of Critical Minerals
in the Clean Energy Transitions."432 Page 194 of this study has the heading, "Emissions from
minerals development do not negate the climate advantages of clean energy technologies." On
page 192, the study does point out that, "if poorly managed, mineral development can lead to a
myriad of negative consequences," but the key to this warning is the management of this
development. Also on page 192, the study points to companies having a clear business case to
address the risks and consumers and investors demanding that companies do so. We note that
similar risks apply to the production of fossil fuels; for example, improper management at
petroleum refineries can cause oil spills and enormous harm to the environment. We further
respond to comments about life cycle emissions in RTC Section 19.2.
Regarding EPA not including emissions associated with elements of both the BEV and ICE
supply chain (transportation, storage, charging infrastructure, etc.), EPA acknowledges that there
are other potential emissions further upstream than those EPA included in our analysis. EPA has
not historically modeled most of the upstream sources listed by AmFree et al. We expect some of
the emissions sources they listed (for example, the operation of charging infrastructure and the
transportation of petroleum fuels) to have only marginal impacts on the magnitude of the net
emission impacts. This is discussed throughout this RTC section, and more discussion of the
consideration of life cycle emissions in setting standards can be found in Section 19.2 of this
RTC document.
AmFree et al. also commented that the upstream sectors included in the analysis for this rule
represents a change in how EPA has modeled upstream emissions for previous GHG rules. In
this comment, they are referring to EPA's modeling for the SAFE and HD GHG Phase 2 rules,
which included the extraction and transportation of crude oil and distribution of finished gasoline
and diesel.
It is true that, as discussed in RIA Chapter 8.6, EPA's analysis of upstream emissions is
limited to EGUs and refineries. EPA's judgment is that this approach represents a reasonable
balance between considering indirect effects of the rule on emissions and limiting that
consideration to reasonably proximate and predictable effects. Because we lack the data and
capacity to predict every indirect effect of the rule throughout the supply chain and the broader
economy, we judge that by examining the upstream emissions of EGUs and refineries we have
taken into consideration the most significant indirect effects of the rule on air quality, such that
our analysis is sufficiently complete for consideration in the rulemaking. In addition, EPA's
OMEGA modeling of upstream emission impacts from the final standards includes the three
most significant sectors in terms of understanding the impact of the standards on overall GHG
and CAP/HAP emissions (downstream, EGUs, and refineries). In the NPRM illustrative air
quality modeling analysis, we did consider impacts on crude production wells and pipeline
pumps, and natural gas production wells and pipeline pumps. The NPRM air quality modeling
432 "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions," International Energy Agency,
https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a-
52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf, accessed January 30, 2024.
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analysis suggests that emission reductions from crude production wells and pipeline pumps are
partially offset by increases from natural gas production well and pipeline pumps. The net oil and
gas sector emissions changes are therefore small relative to those of the onroad and power
sectors.
EPA also notes that accounting for further upstream emission processes in the context of an
increase in PEV production while failing to do equivalent accounting for a reduction in the
production of other vehicles, including ICE with a range of electrification, would unreasonably
skew the emission impacts estimates. Many of the same metals that are in demand for PEV
production would also be in demand for ICE production, so whether the standards would truly
result in an increase in all mining, resource extraction, and production emissions is not clear.
And, because such a broad accounting of these emission processes for the range of vehicles
would include emissions from around the world, accounting for these emissions presents scope
challenges.
In addition, modeling EGU and refinery emissions is balanced in considering the operation of
ZEV versus ICE vehicles. For both vehicle types, our analysis considers the emissions and
energy consumption of the vehicle itself plus the production of the fuel it uses, be it refined
liquid fuels for ICE vehicles or electricity for ZEVs. It would skew the emission results if EPA
calculated reduced transport of fuels caused by a reduction in ICE vehicle usage but no
corresponding increase in the transport of fueling sources, such as natural gas, used to power the
increased electric vehicle usage. Similarly, EPA does not assess comparable emissions
associated with refinery waste generation and management (many of those wastes are listed as
hazardous under the RCRA subtitle hazardous waste program, 40 CFR Part 261 hazardous
wastes K 048-052).
There were also technical and practical reasons, in OMEGA, for EPA to model upstream
emissions only from EGUs and refineries. EPA has available tools that are well suited to
modeling the impacts of the standards on EGUs (i.e., IPM) and on refineries (i.e., a combination
of the emissions modeling platform and EIA's Annual Energy Outlook to generate emission
factors for refineries). Both the CAFE model and EPA's spreadsheet model used in previous
GHG rules incorporated upstream emission factors from GREET. These emission factors from
GREET were process-level emission factors and often encompassed several upstream emissions
sources together, such as both crude extraction and transport. EPA finds that this approach may
not be adequate to capture the complexities associated with major shifts in transportation fuels.
Furthermore, matching GREET's emission factors to more specific emissions and activities
estimates from EPA's detailed models, including the emissions modeling platform, would
introduce additional uncertainty. EPA determined that other modeling tools, in particular
GREET and EPA's previous upstream modeling tool for emissions from previous GHG rules,
did not have the same advantages as our chosen methodology for the purposes of modeling
quantitative and detailed upstream emission impacts from the final standards.
While EPA included fewer upstream emission sources for this rule than some previous GHG
rules, it's important to note that this modeling is more detailed and rigorous, for the purposes of
this rulemaking, than if we had used the same approach as we did for previous rules. Neither
EPA's spreadsheet tool nor GREET are dynamic models, in which projections of future time
periods depend on the simulation of prior time periods. IPM, however, is a dynamic model.
Because of its dynamic nature, the inclusion of rule-specific IPM runs allows for a better
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understanding of how the standards (especially possible ZEV adoption driven by the standards)
impact the full U.S. energy system.
Nevertheless, EPA does not dispute the utility of other upstream emissions modeling tools,
especially GREET, for other purposes. Also, there is ongoing work to develop the capability to
capture upstream and cross-sector impacts in more detail, including the use of multi-sector
modeling tools such as EPA's GLIMPSE framework.433
Regarding EPA's estimated real world fuel and energy consumption, EPA disagrees with the
commenter's assertion that ICE and BEV onroad energy consumption and associated emissions
are calculated using different drive cycles. EPA uses the same onroad drive cycle assumptions
for both BEV and ICE vehicles in the effects calculations. These weighted onroad cycles include
a significant portion of the higher speed US06 cycle, as described in Chapter 8.5.1 of the final
RIA.
Regarding use of average EGU emissions rather than marginal emissions, we have done so
because the expectation is that transportation charging will be closely monitored and most
charging will be done at times during which grid loads are low (i.e., overnight, see Figure 5-5 in
Chapter 5.1.1 of the RIA for example load profiles). Several strategies exist to alleviate the
concerns associated with peak demand (see Chapter 5.3 and 5.4 of the RIA).
Regarding refinery emissions, EPA has updated the analysis and calculation methodology for
the final analysis and has also updated the estimates of impacts on imports and exports with
much more detail supporting our estimates (see Chapter 8 of the final RIA).
Regarding electricity prices, we have updated our effects modeling and no longer rely on
AEO national average retail electricity prices to estimate costs associated with charging
electrified vehicles. We respond in greater detail in Section 17 of this document.
Regarding fleet turnover, EPA disagrees that our OMEGA modeling does not reflect any shift
towards older vehicles relative to the No Action scenario. EPA projects changes in new vehicle
sales as a result of the standards and associated changes in new vehicle purchase prices. EPA
also accounts for the distributions of vehicle age and VMT across the vehicle stock. The net
effect of the analysis approach is that the slight reduction in new vehicle sales tend to increase
the portion of miles driven by older vehicles, and therefore tend to increase their overall impacts
relative to a case where there is no change in new sales. Our modeling includes a consumer
choice element that considers out-of-pocket expenses when purchasing a new vehicle, projected
operating savings, and incentives available by the IRA. While our modeling normalizes total
sales to projections in AEO, the producer-consumer interaction elements of OMEGA determine
the share of BEVs to PHEV to ICE. In other words, OMEGA is not forcing a level of BEV
penetration. Rather, it is determining a level based on producer requirements to meet standards
and consumer desire to purchase their preferred vehicle. As a result, while we do not model
delayed scrappage per se, OMEGA will show an increased number of older vehicles in the event
that new vehicle sales decrease in response to a policy, and those vehicles will drive more total
miles than driven by older vehicles in the No Action scenario; this shifting of VMT distribution
433 U.S. EPA. "GLIMPSE - A computational framework for supporting state-level environmental and energy
planning". February I, 2024. Available online: https://www.epa.gov/air-research/glimpse-computational-
framework-supporting-state-level-environmental-and-energy
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across the vehicle stock has the same practical effect as changing the scrappage rates of older
vehicles.
Regarding Honda's comment that the marginal abatement costs for the new PM standard are
exceedingly high, we disagree with their assessment. EPA is moving from a higher current
Federal standard to the new Federal standard, so a marginal impact relative to the CARB
standard is not relevant. The CARB ACC II program includes both PM reductions from more
stringent PM standards from ICE-based vehicles and PM reductions from a ZEV mandate. As
noted in RTC Section 4.1, EPA is not adopting a ZEV mandate, as the CARB standards use;
instead, EPA is setting performance-based standards for both criteria pollutants and GHG
emissions. EPA believes it would not be appropriate to project CARB's ACC II program
emission reductions across the entire country, including a ZEV mandate, and then attempting to
calculate the marginal benefits of EPA's final PM standard. In addition, EPA projects that the
PM standard in this FRM will result in the adoption of control technologies which are effective
over the broadest range of environmental and vehicle operating conditions, in other words, EPA
anticipates that PM controls adopted as the result of this rulemaking will be effective both on-
cycle and off-cycle. CARB, on the other hand, has adopted standards which are focused on on-
cycle PM emissions conducted at 25°C. Finally, because at the time of this final rulemaking EPA
has not yet granted a waiver to California for the ACC II program, the agency believes it would
be inappropriate to prejudge the outcome of the waiver request process and project PM emission
reductions and benefits incremental to a program that is still under consideration by the
Administrator.
Regarding backsliding of conventional ICE vehicles as more electrified vehicles enter the
fleet, EPA does not believe that it is likely to happen in any significant manner. See comments
from other commenters, specifically Consumer Reports in Section 12.3.1 of this document where
they state, "Consumer demand for EVs is rapidly increasing, and technology improvements will
mean that the remaining gasoline powered vehicles will have to compete with better and better
EV offerings. In order to continue to find buyers for their remaining gasoline powered vehicles,
automakers will need to make them better, not worse." Also, such an outcome, if it were to
happen, is inherent in any performance standard. Provided performance is achieved, the standard
is met. And there is no indication that the higher GHG vehicles will be driven more miles as
hypothesized by the commenter. Our long-standing practice of setting performance-based fleet
average GHG standards gives the industry the flexibility to achieve emissions reductions in the
most cost-effective and efficient manner. If we set requirements for specific technologies, it
would eliminate manufacturers' flexibility to identify and apply potentially more cost-effective
compliance solutions.
Regarding claims that EPA had failed to consider EGU emissions, this is incorrect. See
Sections VI and VII of the preamble. We did and continue to estimate emission impacts
associated with power generation. Extensive modeling efforts have been undertaken to estimate
charge demand and power sector emissions and those efforts are reflected in our analysis. We
respond to more comments regarding our power sector modeling efforts in Section 18 of this
document. Importantly, we have not estimated full fleet conversion to BEV (presuming that was
the meaning behind the mention of 350 million vehicles by 2050). Indeed, none of the many
pathways that EPA has modeled reflects 100% fleet conversion to BEV by 2050. In contrast, we
project, under just one potential pathway, that roughly 48 percent of the light- and medium-duty
fleet will be BEV with roughly an additional 5 percent being PHEV by 2030. Further, our EGU
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modeling suggests that light- and medium-duty electricity demand will be roughly 12 percent of
U.S. generation in 2050 (see Table 5-3 of the RIA).
Regarding the expectation that EPA would identify the level of emissions needed to achieve
compliance with the NAAQS, we respond to this in Section 2.
We appreciate comments from Energy Innovation regarding the NPRM's Alternative 1 and
address this comment in Section 3.3.1 of this document.
Regarding EPA's failure to consider some technologies, specifically efficiency improvements
available in hybrid architectures, we recognize that manufacturers may develop and apply
additional efficiency improvements in hybrid vehicles. We take the comment to suggest that our
NPRM analysis was conservative since it failed to consider some cost-effective technologies that
could have been used toward compliance. Importantly, our analysis should be viewed as
identifying a set of possible pathways toward meeting the standards and we have included
additional pathways in our sensitivity analysis presented in Sections IV.F and IV.G of the
preamble. Our analysis should not be viewed as an endorsement of specific technologies and, if
the commenter is correct that hybridization can be used more widely and more cost-effectively
than our analysis has estimated, the auto makers are free to choose such technologies. The same
is true of PHEVs. Similarly, renewable liquid fuels may be another means of reducing carbon
emissions and nothing in this final rule precludes Marathon or other fuels producers from
providing those fuels. However, setting standards that would require such fuels is outside the
scope of this action.
Regarding inclusion of upstream emissions for BEVs, we presume that this comment is
directed at the issue of including upstream emissions in the compliance determination because
we have, in fact, included upstream emissions in our effects calculations (i.e., emissions
inventory impacts). The inclusion of upstream emissions in the compliance determination and
the possibility that it makes the standards infeasible even for BEVs is not relevant because we
are not including those emissions in the compliance determination. See Section 3.1.5 of this
RTC.
Regarding the infeasibility of the standards should BEV penetrations fall short of EPA
projections, we note that we have conducted several analyses showing different possible
pathways to compliance including one that involves no additional BEV penetration beyond
current levels in the U.S. market. We present these in Sections IV.F and IV.G of the preamble.
Regarding the claim that we had subtracted the GHG emissions associated with electricity
used to power BEVs from the emissions inventory associated with conventional vehicles, this
claim is incorrect. We account for vehicle emissions (note that BEVs have tirewear and
brakewear emissions) and add to those the EGU emissions. Regarding other upstream sources,
we addressed that issue earlier in this response. Regarding the mix of generation sources in the
EPA modeling compared to that in AEO, we note that part of the reasons we continued to rely on
IPM modeling, as we did in the NPRM, was our disagreement with the AEO projections and the
way that AEO had characterized the impact of the IRA (i.e., AEO 2023 projected very little BEV
penetration). We stand by the IPM modeling we have conducted and the expertise of those
behind that model. We discuss our IPM modeling in Chapter 5 of the final RIA and we respond
to comments regarding use of IPM over AEO in Section 18 of this document.
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Regarding comments related to the EGU emission rates presented in Chapter 9 of the RIA, we
note that the emission rates presented there were used only through calendar year 2050 with the
rates held constant at the 2050 rate thereafter. This is done because the IPM modeling results for
the next to last year modeled (in this case 2050 since the last year modeled was 2055) are
considered the last set of results for use. Importantly, for the final analysis, we have revised our
approach to estimating EGU emission rates and, instead of using emission rate curves as done in
the NPRM, we now use the IPM results directly with linear interpolations between years (IPM
results are done for several but not all calendar years up to 2055). As done in the NPRM, the
IPM results beyond 2050 are not used and the EGU emission rates beyond 2050 are kept at the
2050 rates. One result of this change is that, while the NPRM analysis held rates constant beyond
2050 thereby ensuring that rates never went negative, our final rates give no impression that
perhaps rates could go negative.
Regarding claims that EPA had failed to consider that gasoline consumed in the U.S. contains
both fossil and renewable fuels like ethanol, we disagree. We do adjust for the ethanol and
biodiesel content of retail or pump gasoline when calculating our emissions inventory and fuel
consumption effects. See Chapter 8.5.3 of the RIA. We have improved the transparency of the
calculation approach since the NPRM.
Regarding Valero's claim that EPA had used an inconsistent EGU emission rate, this is a
misunderstanding on the part of the commenter. The emission rate noted by the commenter—325
grams CChe—is meant only for possible use in compliance determinations. Note that the
commenter found the file containing the 325 value in a set of compliance modeling runs.
Because upstream emissions are not included in the compliance determination of any vehicles,
that 325 value is not used. We do not use that value in calculating the upstream inventories
associated with EGUs and instead use the emission rates described in Chapter 8.6.1 of the RIA
which are based on the IPM modeling described in Chapter 5 of the RIA.
Regarding Valero's comment about inconsistent charge efficiencies across EPA analyses, we
note that the final RFS rule did not make use of the value noted by the commenter and slightly
different efficiencies for the light-duty and heavy-duty markets (90 percent in light-duty and 88
percent to 89.25 percent in the heavy-duty NPRM) is not inappropriate from our perspective
given differences in the markets.
Regarding the gasoline CCh/gallon factor used in compliance modeling, this value is not
actually used and we apologize for any confusion. Importantly, all of the response surface
equations used in estimating gasoline vehicle CCh/mile and used for determining gasoline
vehicle compliance within OMEGA were generated using characteristics of in-use retail gasoline
(i.e., pump gasoline containing ethanol). Since the C02/gallon value noted by the commenter is
not actually used, this comment is essentially moot.
Regarding compliance flexibilities, EPA has carefully considered those flexibilities in the
context of determining the final standards. We present those flexibilities and the rationale behind
them in Section III of the preamble and further respond to comments in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4
of this RTC.
12.1.4 - Other
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Comments by Organizations
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Base Year Fleet
The proposed rule and supporting documentation make numerous references to a MY2021
base year fleet, suggesting that agency modeling of low-carbon technology pathways "builds
upon" an automaker's MY2021 fleet. As we have noted in previous sets of comments to the
agency, it is Honda's belief that selection of the base year fleet can have meaningful impact on
modeling results, at least at an OEM-based level of granularity. As Honda noted in comments
submitted to the agency in September 2021:
Fundamentally, the base year defines the sets of technologies already applied in the market,
and therefore sets constraints regarding "technology walks" to further emissions reductions. In
other words, it defines the low-hanging fruit that are available for providing further improvement
to the fleet. By selecting an overly dated base year fleet, the agency's modeling could
erroneously assume application of technology that, in reality, did not occur. Use of [an older]
base year permits the modeling to apply "imagined" technology to model years that
have already passed, ignoring actual technology application decisions and potentially widening
the gap between simulated results and what is achievable with the current vehicle fleet.53 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 31-32]
53 American Honda Motor Co., Inc. comments on Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions. September 27, 2021. Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0208.
Honda was encouraged by the references to a MY2021 base year fleet in the agency's
proposal and supporting documentation. Upon closer examination of the OMEGA 2.0 computer
model, however, it is clear that the agency is not using a MY2021 base year, but rather is using a
MY2019 fleet. For the reasons noted above, we request that the agency update its model
assumptions to reflect a more up-to- date and accurate base year fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0652, pp. 31-32]
Recommendation: Honda respectfully requests that the agency use the most up-to-date and
accurate base year fleet available as part of its modeling activities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0652, pp. 31-32]
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law
C. EPA Should Update the Baseline to Ensure Full Consideration of the Inflation
Reduction Act
In regulatory impact analysis, the baseline refers to "the best assessment of the way the world
would look absent the proposed action."90 Developing an accurate baseline is important for
conducting benefit-cost analysis, but challenging when baseline conditions are in flux. That is
the case here given last year's passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0601, pp. 15-16]
90 Circular A-4, supra note 86, at 15.
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To model the baseline for the Proposed Rule, EPA adopts key variables from the Annual
Energy Outlook 2021 (AEO 2021), such as fleet size, new vehicle sales shares, fuel prices,
electricity prices, and vehicles miles traveled.91 However, AEO 2021 was developed before the
IRA's passage and thus does not include the effects of that law. While it was reasonable for EPA
to rely on AEO 2021 in this proposal, it should consider adjusting the baseline in the final rule to
fully incorporate the IRA's impacts. In particular, according to the 2023 version of Annual
Energy Outlook (AEO 2023), the IRA will decrease both short-run and long-run electricity
prices relative to the no-IRA case.92 AEO 2023 also projects that the IRA will decrease long-run
gas prices, with a minimal short-run impact.93 Gasoline and electricity prices are important
modeling inputs, as they affect the relative cost of ownership between ICE vehicles and BEVs
and thereby influence the sales of these vehicles. These prices also affect the fuel-cost savings,
the rebound effect, and related environmental impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 15-
16]
91 See RIA at 9-1.
92 See infra p. 30 fig.2 (difference between AEO 2023 with IRA (solid-blue line) and AEO 2023's "No
IRA" case (dotted-blue line)).
93 See infra p. 30 fig.l (difference between AEO 2023 with IRA (solid-blue line) and AEO 2023's "No
IRA" case (dotted-blue line)).
There are several potential options for EPA to consistently account for the IRA across
modeling inputs. One option is for EPA to adopt AEO 2023 for parameters where it currently
uses AEO 2021. This would presumably also entail updating future BEV penetration, which,
although EPA models separately, is based in part on parameters from AEO 2021. If EPA updates
its baseline to incorporate AEO 2023, it should beware that AEO 2023 models only certain
aspects of the IRA but does not include the producer-side battery tax credit.94 To blunt the
resulting potential underestimate of the IRA's full impact, EPA should consider using the "High
uptake of the IRA" sensitivity case provided in AEO 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601,
pp.15-16]
94 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Transportation Demand Module Assumptions 26 (Mar. 2023),
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/assumptions/pdf/TDM_Assumptions.pdf.
If updating the baseline to AEO 2023 is infeasible, a more feasible alternative may be for
EPA to continue to use AEO 2021 as its baseline and then add the IRA's impact on other
parameters on top of that. Data within AEO 2023 enables this type of assessment, as AEO 2023
provides sensitivity analysis in which it models the world with and without the IRA.95 This
enables a direct comparison to assess the IRA's effect on key parameters, including electricity
prices and gas prices. 96 As noted above, EPA should consider adopting the "High uptake of the
IRA" sensitivity case in AEO 2023 for comparison purposes.97 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0601, pp. 15-16]
95 See Projection Tables for Side Cases, Annual Energy Outlook 2023,
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/tables_side_xls.php (providing tables for "No IRA" case).
96 EPA acknowledges that it has estimates of future retail electricity prices that account for the IRA and
that these estimates exhibit lower prices compared to a scenario without the IRA. But due to the absence of
corresponding information on gasoline price estimates under the IRA and a desire for consistency across
variables and model components, EPA opts not to use these estimates. RIA at 2-84.
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97 See Projection Tables for Side Cases, supra note 95 (providing tables for "High uptake of the IRA"
case).
This modeling adjustment could have meaningful effects (though it's unclear whether this
would increase or decrease net benefits overall, and it would almost certainly not change the sign
or ordering of net benefits). According to projections from AEO 2023, the retail electricity price
for transportation could be lower by an average of 0.45 cents per kWh from 2027 to 2032 under
a high-IRA uptake scenario compared to a scenario without the IRA. This could translate to a
decrease of about $50 in the "generalized cost," 98 i.e. the purchase price net of vehicle
ownership and operation costs.99 The lower cost of operating an electric vehicle would translate
to greater BEV uptake than EPA projects in its baseline fleet. This suggests, among other
implications, that the Proposed Rule's compliance costs may be lower than EPA projects, since
automakers may already be closer to complying with the proposed standards under the baseline
than EPA recognizes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 15-16]
98 Considering the average EV efficiency at 3 miles per kWh, a reduction of 0.45 cent per kWh equates to
a savings of 0.15 cents per mile. Incorporating EPA's assumptions for consumer fuel-cost calculations in
their purchase decision—with an annual mileage of 12,000 miles, a 2.5-year fuel-cost valuation period, and
a fueling efficiency factor of 0.9—this saving translates to around $50 = 2.5(years)
x{O.15(£/mile)xl2,OOO(miles/year)-lOO(0/$)}-O.9.
99 Both producers and consumers use this metric in their decisionmaking processes. See RIA at 4-2 to 4-4.
The Appendix below includes four figures illustrating the data presented in this section.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 15-16]
Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
EPA Does Not Appear to Account for Rivian's Production
The case for Alternative 1 is even stronger when considering the agency's apparent omission
of Rivian from its analysis. Specifically, OMEGA's Manufacturers File, an input file listing
vehicle producers considered as distinct entities for GHG compliance in the model, does not list
Rivian. 16 Even the agency's survey of manufacturer commitments, presented as Table 1 in the
NPRM and reproduced below, does not include the company. 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0653, pp. 2-7]
16 List of producers found in the file, "manufacturers.csv." Purpose and description of the Manufacturers
File per U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "OMEGA 2.1.0 Documentation (rev. 5/8/2023)" (May 8,
2023), available at https://omega2.readthedocs.io/en/2.1.0/index.html#document-l_overview.
17 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 87 (May 5, 2023) (revising 40 C.F.R. Parts 85, 86, 600, 1036, 1037, and 1066),
Table 1, 29,192.
See original attachment for: Figure 3. EPA's Table 1 reports stated manufacturer EV
commitments but does not include Rivian. In calendar year 2022, Rivian produced
approximately 25,000 EVs. We have a planned annual production capacity for later this decade
of 600,000 units. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 2-7]
Rivian produced and sold four distinct vehicle models in MY22 as recorded in EPA's
"Certified Vehicle Models" data. 18 Over the course of calendar year 2022, we produced
approximately 25,000 units across all our product lines. The R1T was the tenth bestselling EV in
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the U.S. that year. 19 We expect to double production in 2023 as we build toward our planned
production capacity of over half a million units annually across two manufacturing facilities.
Rivian would be pleased to meet directly with the agency to discuss our historical production
volume and plans, and to address any related questions, concerns, or data availability. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 2-7]
18 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Annual Certification Data for Vehicles, Engines, and
Equipment," available at www.epa.gov/compliance-and-fuel-economy-data/annual-certification-data-
vehicles-engines-and-equipment. See "Certified Vehicle Models (Model Years: 2014 - Present) (xlsx)."
19 Mark Kane, InsideEVs, "US: Top Selling BEVs in 2022 Were Long Range Ones," April 18, 2023,
available at www.insideevs.com/news/663012/us-top-selling-bevs-2022-long-range/.
We believe omitting Rivian from the agency's analysis could have material implications for
EPA's findings of feasibility and the final regulatory proposal. EPA should update its model
inputs to account for Rivian's sales and revise its evaluation of the alternatives accordingly.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 2-7]
Update the Baseline Fleet
We have concerns about EPA's reliance on MY 19 as the base year fleet for its analysis, a
baseline now several years in the past during a time of rapid change in the industry.20 Most
significantly for purposes of this rulemaking and EPA's analysis, the EV sales share grew from
just 1.7 percent in MY19 to 4.4 percent in MY21.21 Preliminary data show the sales share
roughly doubling in MY22 to approximately 8 percent.22 In previous regulatory proceedings, the
agency stated that the vintage of the base year will "not normally have a significant impact" but
that certain broad shifts in the market, such as the average vehicle power- to-weight ratio, can
affect the incremental cost-effectiveness of technology application in the modeling.23 The
significant growth in the EV market in recent years—a trend not yet visible in the MY19 data—
would seem to constitute a "broad market shift" with potential impacts on the OMEGA model
runs. For example, could greater BEV volumes in the base year fleet could affect credit-trading
and technology application decisions in the model? If nothing else, greater EV volumes in the
base year fleet would imply greater growth potential and higher penetrations of this technology
by the end of the regulation window and could support greater stringency than currently
proposed. Finalized compliance data through MY21 were available during the analysis and
development phase. We encourage incorporation of the most recent base year data available for
the final rule in accordance with best practice.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 7-8]
20 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light- Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles: Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (April 2023), 9-1.
21 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Explore the Automotive Trends Data," available
at www.epa.gov/automotive-trends/explore-automotive-trends-data#DetailedData.
22 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light- Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles: Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (April 2023), 3-5.
23 Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86 Fed.
Reg. 151, 43,769 - 43,770 (Aug. 10, 2021) (revising 40 C.F.R. Parts 86 and 600).
24 EPA "will often attempt to utilize the most recent base year data," per Revised 2023 and Later Model
Year Light- Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 151, 43,769 (Aug. 10, 2021)
(revising 40 C.F.R. Parts86 and 600).
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Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
EPA has selected an arbitrary vehicle range, 300 miles, as the standard for the Omega model.
This is carried over into the cost analysis since the analysis is based on $/kWh and the range of a
BEV or PHEV is linked to battery capacity along with other factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0674, pp. 8-9]
The mileage regularly advertised is in best-case scenarios, such as flat highway driving
conditions. The introduction of terrain, adverse weather, traffic, excess drag, or load from
something such as a trailer can have a significant negative effect on the advertised range. This is
not acknowledged and is detrimental to the EPA proposal in several ways. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0674, pp. 8-9]
First, for Americans to maintain their current type of usage of their vehicles—including
professional and recreational activities such as landscaping, construction, hotshot trucking,
equestrian sports, boating, camping, road trips, etc.—battery packs will need to become much
larger. This renders the EPA's cost per vehicle analysis invalid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0674, p. 9]
Second, larger packs will mean more weight and potentially more aerodynamic drag and
therefore less efficiency. Unlike an internal combustion engine vehicle, the weight is not reduced
upon energy consumption. The F150 Lightning is a perfect example of a 300-mile EV that
struggles to tow a lightweight camper 100 miles.35 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 9]
35 Tingwall, Eric. "Tow No! The Ford F-150 Lightning Struggled in Our Towing Test."MotorTrend, 12
July 2022, www.motortrend.com/reviews/ford-fl50-lightning-electric-truck-towing-test/ (accessed 5 July
2022).
As a rudimentary example of comparison, consider the scenario of a diesel truck pulling a
trailer a short distance of 150 miles. The truck has a tank size of 36 gallons and achieves 12.5
MPG during the trip. This equates to 12 gallons of burned diesel, well within the no-stop
capability of the truck. With modern diesel engines having an efficiency of just over 40%, and
diesel having 37.95 kWh/gal of energy, the minimum energy required for a no-stop trip is 182.16
kWh. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 9]
With an optimistic motor efficiency of 94% the battery pack must have 193.79 kWh of usable
energy. With high-performance batteries capable of 95% usable capacity this means that for the
battery pack to make this short trip without stopping it must be no less than 203.99 kWh. With
GM's Ultium battery cells having a capacity of 0.1157 kWh per pound, the battery cells alone for
this scenario would weigh in excess of 1700 pounds. While the diesel can complete this task
nearly three times before refueling, the EV must have a 200 kWh battery, twice the size of the
EPAs chosen capacity, to complete the task even once. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 9]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
I. EPA's OMEGA modeling does not support the proposed standards.
EPA relies on an Optimization Model for reducing Emissions of Greenhouse Gases from
Automobiles ("OMEGA") to model manufacturer compliance with the proposed tailpipe
emission standards for light-and medium-duty vehicles by "finding cost-efficient pathways for
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manufacturers to achieve compliance with desired emissions standards." 1 The model projects
producer and consumer behavior in response to policies and their physical and cost effects.
While EPA relies on the modeling results to conclude that the proposed emission standards can
be attained in a range of scenarios, the model inputs are riddled with errors and unreasonable
assumptions. Further, although EPA notes that the model was peer-reviewed, important
qualifications from the peer reviewers were inappropriately dismissed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, p. 1]
1 EPA "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-
Duty Vehicles Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis" ("DRIA"), April 2023, at 2-1.
A. EPA's modeling of technological suitability based on hypothetical future light and
medium duty (LMD) BEVs is significantly compromised by pervasive unreasonable assumptions
in the modeling inputs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 1]
The highly complex OMEGA model relies on a multitude of user inputs, upon which the
model results are highly sensitive.2 Notwithstanding this high degree of sensitivity to specific
inputs, EPA applies numerous unsupported, unreasonable, and in some cases plainly incorrect
assumptions in the model. Consequently, the results of the model are arbitrary and provide an
unsuitable basis for concluding that the proposed standards are feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, p. 1]
2 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29295 to 29297.
1. The EVSE (charging infrastructure) installation costs adopted by EPA are unrealistic.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 1-3]
2. The charging efficiencies adopted by EPA for purposes of this proposed rule are
arbitrarily inconsistent with other contemporaneously proposed rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, p. 3]
3. EPA arbitrarily excludes viable LMDV technologies from its compliance modeling.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 3-4]
4. The analysis fleets modeled by OMEGA are highly implausible, and EPA fails to
account for the actual costs to produce such fleets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 5-6]
5. EPA overstates BEV adoption and associated benefits by failing to calibrate model
projections to reflect current vehicle offerings.
In the OMEGA modeling to support the proposed rulemaking, EPA adopts a MY 2019 base
year fleet, from which the OMEGA model then produces an analysis fleet for each subsequent
year.33 At the time that EPA published the proposed standards in May 2023, the base year fleet
adopted by EPA for this rulemaking was already four years old. Between the outdated base year
fleet and EPA's lack of calibration of the OMEGA inputs and algorithms, the MY 2023 analysis
fleet generated by OMEGA is wildly inaccurate, as demonstrated below for just one auto
manufacturer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 7-8]
33 DRIA at 9-1 and 2-1.
The MY 2023 Ford fleet generated by OMEGA includes 13 vehicle IDs with a BEV
powertrain, spanning six distinct body styles and size classes. By comparison, Ford's actual MY
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2023 light-duty vehicle offerings include only the 2023 Mustang Mach-E® and the 2023 F-150
Lightning®. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 7-8]
[See original for table titled "OMEGA MY 2023 analysis fleet for Ford] 34 35 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 7-8]
34 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip,
"2023_03_25_ll_46_49_ld_central_compliance_run_Proposal_vehicles.csv," Columns A, C, I and V.
35 Ford Showroom, https://shop.ford.eom/showroom#/, accessed on April 27, 2023. The 2023 Ford E-
Transit has a maximum GVWR of 9,500 lbs and is not a light-duty vehicle, per
https://www.ford.com/commercial-trucks/e- transit/models/cargo-van/, accessed April 27, 2023.
While it is understood that OMEGA is intended to be an analytical tool and not a
prognostication, in recognition of the significant impact that the OMEGA analysis fleets have on
future tailpipe standards, EPA has the responsibility to calibrate the OMEGA model and true-up
the legacy analysis fleets using the most current vehicle offerings and attributes. Otherwise, EPA
is knowingly using inaccurate data to support the rulemaking, and in the case of Ford,
overestimating BEV production and the associated benefits of the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 7-8]
Peer reviewers of the OMEGA v2.1.0 model commented to EPA "[i]t'd be good to have a
model calibration/validation, if not already done so," to which EPA responded
"[c]alibration/validation of inputs unique to the user's analysis are the responsibility of the
user."36 As EPA is the "user" of the OMEGA modeling performed to support the proposed
standards, EPA has the responsibility to appropriately calibrate and validate its inputs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 7-8]
36 EPA "External Peer Review of EPA's OMEGA Model Final Peer Review Summary Report" (EPA-420-
R-23-010) at 4, April 2023.
6. EPA's application of price modifications is inconsistent with the Inflation Reduction
Act ("IRA") and IRS's proposed implementation of 26 U.S.C. §30D and §45W. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, p. 9]
7. The upstream emission factor that EPA uses for transportation electricity is not
consistent with other EPA sources and does not represent full lifecycle emissions from electricity
generation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 10]
8. EPA must update its gasoline emission factors to reflect a Tier 3 E10 certification fuel.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 10]
9. EPA fails to account for the rising cost of electricity over the regulatory period. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 10]
10. EPA's baseline and sensitivity analysis is flawed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
pp.11-12]
EPA Summary and Response
The Heritage Foundation commented that EPA's choice of a 300 mile range for BEVs was
arbitrary, and that real world driving often does not achieve the advertised range. EPA disagrees
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that this choice of range is arbitrary. EPA considers this to be representative of today's BEVs
and a good "middle ground" for the typical range of BEVs going forward (see Section 3.1.1 of
the final RIA). Importantly, when we size batteries within OMEGA, we size them for 300 miles
of onroad operation, not 300 miles of test cycle operation. Additionally, the choice of BEV range
in OMEGA impacts battery sizing and ultimately, the cost of the battery. The range does not
impact our results calculations. All vehicles of a given body-style and model year and age will
operate the same number of non-rebound miles regardless of powertrain. For ICE vehicles, all of
those miles are driven using the ICE powertrain. For BEVs, all miles are driven by the BEV
powertrain, but it would be the same number of miles driven within a body-style, model year,
age cohort regardless of the range.
Valero asserted that a number of EPA's modeling inputs are unreasonable or incorrect, and
consequently the results of the model provide an unsuitable basis for concluding that the
proposed standards are feasible. EPA's discussion and response to these comments is provided
throughout the RTC in the relevant topic sections as follows. Topic 1: EVSE installation cost
comments are discussed in RTC Chapter 17, Topic 2: charging efficiencies are discussed in RTC
Section 17, Topic 3: the exclusion of LMDV technologies from compliance modeling is
discussed in RTC Section 12.2.4, Topic 4: analysis fleet and number of vehicle variants is
discussed in RTC Section 12.1.1, Topic 5: base year fleet is discussed immediately below, Topic
6: IRA incentive modeling is discussed in RTC Section 12.4, Topic 7: electricity upstream
emissions factor is discussed in RTC Section 12.1.3, Topic 8 gasoline emissions factor is
discussed in RTC Section 12.1.3, Topic 9: electricity prices are discussed in RTC Section 8.3,
and Topic 10: modeling of the No Action case is discussed in RTC Section 12.5.6.
Several commenters (Honda, Rivian, and Valero) suggested that EPA should update its base
year fleet for the final rule analysis. For example, Valero commented that EPA's use of a MY
2019 base year fleet was already four years old at the time of the NPRM issuance in 2023. The
commenter provided an example where the projected number of BEV models for a vehicle
manufacturer in MY 2023 differed from the actual number of models in that same year. In
response, EPA notes that there will necessarily be some delay between when the vehicle
specifications and end-of-year production volume data becomes available and when the analysis
is conducted. EPA agrees with the underlying point of the comment, which is that it is normally
preferable to use the latest data possible. For this final rulemaking analysis, EPA has updated the
base year fleet to MY 2022, which is the latest available, allowing time to process the data and
quality check the resulting modeling inputs. EPA notes that even though the first Rivian model
was introduced for MY 2022, the certification data for that model year was not available. As a
result, the relatively small volume of Rivian vehicles produced for MY 2022 are not included in
EPA's updated base year fleet for this final analysis.
12.2 - Battery/electrification technologies
12.2.1 - Battery costs
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
F. Lithium-ion Battery Cost
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The high cost of batteries, a crucial component, contributes to the affordability challenge of
EVs. EPA has made ambitious assumptions on future battery raw material and manufacturing
costs for battery packs that include aggressive learning rates that have not been proven with the
new and rapidly evolving technology and manufacturing. From the Proposed Rule and Draft
Regulatory Impact Analysis82 (DRIA), it appears that the agency's basis for setting stringent
standards, which in turn drive significant levels of BEV adoption, is an assumption that battery
costs will be substantially less expensive in the coming years. Given the fundamental importance
of battery costs projections in this rulemaking, we examine the agency's assessment more
closely, below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 47-48]
82 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Draft Regulatory Analysis: Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium Duty Vehicles, EPA-420-D-23-003
(Apr. 2023). Hereinafter "DRIA".
EPA uses Argonne National Laboratory's BatPaC 5.0 model as the basis for battery pack
costs, developing a baseline cost of $120/kWh for an exemplar 75 kWh battery in 2022, based on
a per factory production rate of 250,000 packs/year and NMC811-G battery chemistry among
other features.83 EPA then applies a learning factor based on cumulative battery production
without consideration for the cost of raw materials.84 EPA also assumes that by 2027 all
automotive batteries sold in the U.S. will qualify for IRA 45X credits totaling $45/kWh and that
the savings associated with them will pass through to consumers. The modeling inputs and
assumptions EPA makes culminate in unrealistically low battery costs. In fact, in combination
with additional assumptions regarding IRA 30D/45W EV purchase incentives, EPA's analysis
leads to implied negative battery costs in a number of years of the rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 47-48]
83 DRIA at 2-44 et seq. (Base year battery cost estimation).
84 DRIA at 2-49 (Development of battery pack cost reduction factors for future years).
1. Comparison of EPA's Base Cost (2022) to Third-Party Sources
EPA compares its base 2022 battery cost of $120/kWh to only one third-party source,
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), which documented a current average BEV pack price
of $138/kWh,85 15% higher than EPA's projected cost. EPA promptly dismisses the BNEF
value as too difficult to compare to their analysis based on speculation of potential differences
before concluding, "EPA believes that our proposed battery cost estimates are reasonable based
on the record at this time."86 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 48-49]
85 NPRM at 29301.
86 Ibid.
The article cited by EPA with the BNEF cost projection87 is based on BNEF's 2022 Lithium-
Ion Battery Price Survey.88 More detailed data in that report suggests EPA's assessment of a
base battery cost of $120/kWh in 2022 is even more dubious than it appears in comparison to the
BNEF-reported average BEV pack price of $138. BNEF reports an average price of NMC-based
packs (the same type of cell chemistry that EPA used in its modeling) of $184/kWh (53% higher
than EPA's estimate), with a range of $139 to $523/kWh (Figure 12). EPA described concerns
that it is diffcult to know for sure how closely average costs match its specific assumptions for
production, pack size, specific chemistry, etc.89 However, using even the minimum $139 cost
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reported by BNEF for NMC packs, EPA's base price in 2022 appears to be about 15% too low.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 48-49]
87 Id. at 29301, FN 561.
88 Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2022 Lithium-Ion Battery Price Survey (Dec. 6, 2022).
89 NPRM at 29301.
Figure 12: BNEF 2022 Battery Price Survey Pack Volume-Weighted Price by Chemistry90
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 48-49]
90 Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2022 Lithium-Ion Battery Price Survey (Dec. 6, 2022) at 9 (Figure
10). Available via Bloomberg New Energy Finance subscription. Used with permission.
Moreover, data from the same BNEF price survey provides an average U.S. battery pack price
of $157/kWh91 (31% higher than EPA's estimate of $120/kWh). Regardless of whether the
current average pack matches EPA's specific assumptions, EPA should be concerned that its
specific assumptions fail to align to known, current data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
48-49]
91 BloombergNEF (Dec. 6, 2022), Lithium-ion Battery Pack Prices Rise for First Time to an Average of
$151/kWh, available at htps://about.bnef.com/blog/lithium-ion-battery-pack-prices-rise-for-first-time-to-
an-average-of-151- kwh/. (Battery pack cost of $127/kWh; U.S. prices 24% higher implies $157/kWh U.S.
pack price.)
Data from Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (BMI) also contrasts sharply with EPA's base
pack price assessment of $120 in 2022. BMI estimates the current cost of NMC811-G cells at a
cost of $120-130 per kWh.92 Pack costs would be higher, $150 to $163 per kWh assuming cell
cost is approximately 80% of pack cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 49-50]
92 BMI Study at 28.
EPA also relies on data from EDF/ERM to provide a qualitative comparison to its projected
battery price curves.93 That data indicates as pack price of $135/kWh in 2022,94 12.5% higher
than EPA's $120 projection. It is unclear how EPA could use this data to justify its own
projection of uncertain future costs, yet completely ignore it for comparison to base costs in
2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 49-50]
93 DRIA at 2-51 et seq.
EPA's projections also diverge from those of Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). Using the
same model as EPA, ANL estimates a 2022 battery pack cost of $130/kWh for an NMC811-G
battery of 94 kWh, 8% higher than EPA's estimate for a smaller pack size.95 Battery pack costs
tend to decrease as pack size increases, so ANL's modeling would likely yield a slightly higher
pack cost for a 75 kWh battery. Although EPA discusses its modeling inputs and attempts to
justify them, EPA's analysis ignores the inputs chosen by ANL, the developer of the model used
by EPA, for the same battery chemistry and year. No explanation is given for the differences in
assumptions, or why ANL's inputs are not appropriate in EPA's view. EPA makes no mention of
ANL's estimate. Similar to EPA's analysis, the ANL analysis is based on a specific chemistry,
and the broader question of interest is the alignment of EPA's modeling to known data such as
BNEF's and BMI's. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 49-50]
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94 Environmental Defense Fund, Electric Vehicle Market Update (Sep. 2022) at 27. Available at
htps://blogs.edf.org/climate411/wp-content/blogs.dir/7/files/2022/09/ERM-EDF-Electric-Vehicle-Market-
Report_September2022.pdf.
95 Ahmed, S., et al., 2022. Estimated Cost of EV Batteries 2018-2022. Online slide presentation available
at htps://www.anl.gov/cse/batpac-model-sotiware. Retrieved June 28, 2023. (Slide 6.)
The trend is clear. Third-party sources for current battery pack prices, including those cited
for other purposes by EPA, and those developed by a national laboratory using the same model
as EPA, all agree that the cost of a battery pack in 2022 is higher than that estimated by EPA.
The inescapable conclusion is that EPA's modeling of base battery pack cost is incorrect and
yields too low of a value even before EPA starts adding additional modifiers to it. EPA must
reconsider its assessment of base battery pack costs for the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 50-51]
Figure 13 shows the more accurate 2022-2023 U.S.-specific battery pack cost (about
$153/kWh based on BNEF's and Benchmark Minerals Intelligence industry survey data)
compared to EPA's battery cost projections in its central and high battery cost cases. The
BNEF/BMI data is approximately 33% higher than EPA's Central Case 2022 battery costs and is
10% higher than even the High Battery Cost Sensitivity Case. If future years are adjusted
according to today's higher pricing, it would affect 2030-2032 battery pack-level costs similarly,
about 33%) higher. This makes it abundantly clear that EPA's reference 2022 battery cost96 and
its Central Case 2022-2032 costs are clearly far too low. As shown, EPA's "High Battery Cost
Case" is a much more representative (but still too low) reflection of actual current and projected
future battery costs than EPA's Central Case battery costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
50-51]
96 DRIA at 2-53 (Figure 2-26).
[See original comment for Figure 13: Table of Battery Pack Direct Costs] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 50-51]
Furthermore, this deeper exploration of EPA's battery analysis examined the associated cell-
level battery costs that relates to the above pack-level battery costs, and similarly shows that
EPA's assumed battery costs are far too low. Auto Innovators could not locate EPA's projected
cell-level battery costs, which are critical in vetting the accuracy of their projections against the
leading research and industry battery cost estimates. As a result, Auto Innovators assumes, based
on general industry and research data, that cell-level costs are equivalent to 80%> of battery pack-
level costs97 in order to estimate EPA's implied cell-level cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 51-52]
97 Cost-to-pack ratios differ by battery technology. In the absence of clarity on EPA's assumption, we
assume that the U.S. automotive industry average battery cell cost is 80% of the overall pack cost, which is
the approximate average of the last two years of BNEF industry surveys. See
htps ://about.bnef.com/blog/lithium-ion-battery-pack-prices- rise-for-first-time-to-an-average-of-151 -kwh/
and htps://about.bnef.com/blog/battery-pack-prices-fall-to-an- average-of-132-kwh-but-rising-commodity-
prices-start-to-bite/.
A key cell-level data source in this regard is Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, which
rigorously assesses supply chain and commodity dynamics and prices. Benchmark finds
significantly higher battery prices than what the EPA is assuming. For example, as illustrated in
Figure 14 below, industry-wide North America 2022 battery cell-level prices are around $130
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per kilowat-hour.98 Figure 14 shows NCM811, a representative battery technology for batteries
that meet the technical and market specifications in the U.S. market. The real-world estimated
industry cost that the auto industry experiences are substantially higher than EPA's assumed
reference battery cost. Comparing Benchmark Minerals Intelligence data to EPA's estimated
2022 cost, considering cell-level costs are approximately 80% of pack-level costs, EPA's
reference Central Case 2022 battery cell-level cost is approximately $92/kWh (or approximately
8% too low). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 51-52]
98 Simon Moores, Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (Feb 2023). Benchmark prismatic NCM811 cell price,
htps://twiter.com/sdmoores/status/1627979954892816384/photo/l
Figure 14: Benchmark Prismatic NCM811 Cell Price Figures [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 51-52]
Critically, we observe a key oversight in EPA's research into future battery costs. The EPA
regulatory analysis fails to incorporate what appears to be the most rigorous and representative
peer-reviewed research on the applicable dynamics with battery innovations, battery chemistries,
and critical mineral prices from Mauler et. al (2022).99 The Mauler study more comprehensively
analyzes the associated dynamics for lithium, nickel, manganese, cobalt, and graphite than EPA
or any of the underlying data that EPA cited. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 52-53]
99 Mauler, L., Lou, X., Duffner, F., Leker, J. (2022). Technological innovation vs. tightening raw material
markets: falling battery costs put at risk. Energy Advances. Issue 3: 136-145.
htps://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlelanding/2022/ya/dlya00052g
From our analysis of EPA's data, the BNEF and BMI baseline 2022 data, and the Mauler
research, we compare cell-level battery costs in Figure 15 below. In the figure we convert EPA's
projected pack-level costs to cell-level costs by multiplying by 0.80. BNEF and Benchmark
indicate 2022 (and likely 2023) U.S. cell-level costs are approximately $125 per kWh. Mauler et
al (2022) cell- level estimates for 2030 are shown, including its lowest ($77) and highest ($104)
presented values, as well as the midpoint ($90). As indicated, EPA's implied Central Case direct
manufacturing battery cost for 2030 (at $62/kWh) is 32% lower than the Mauler midpoint, and
20% lower than the Lowest value in Mauler (2022). Considering the Mauler et al (2022) analysis
more accurately and rigorously accounts for the technology and market dynamics related to
batteries, we recommend that EPA revisit its battery cost analysis and align its 2027-and-later
projections with Mauler analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 52-53]
[See original comment for Figure 15: Battery Cell Direct Costs] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 52-53]
Based on this analysis into the underlying research literature, for the final rule's central
analysis, we recommend that EPA increase its reference direct manufacturing battery pack cost
per kilowat-hour for 2022 and 2023 to be approximately $153 per kilowat-hour. Further, we
recommend that EPA adjust its central case battery projection through 2032 to match the
midpoint of the Mauler et al (2022) analysis (i.e., $90/kWh cell-level, approximately equal to
$113/kWh at a pack-level in 2030). To better reflect these key inputs, we also recommend that
the final rule's low battery case sensitivity analysis go no lower than the "Lowest" value in
Mauler et al 2022 (i.e., $77/kWh cell-level, approximately equal to $96/kWh at a pack-level in
2030). This adjustment better matches the U.S.-specific battery characteristics as seen by U.S.
automakers and tailored for the U.S. market, better reflects the actual underlying data that EPA
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references for battery costs, and incorporates research that was not cited in EPA's NPRM and
DRIA. In addition, we recommend EPA clearly present its EV sales-weighted $/kWh values in
pack-level and cell-level estimates for all model years 2022-2032 to transparently allow
comparisons between EPA's projections and the applicable research literature and industry
estimates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 52-53]
Argonne National Laboratory's BatPaC model itself has reflected increased materials costs
over the past few years, directionally consistent with Auto Innovators' understanding of the
market. For example, between 2021 and 2022, updates to BatPaC reflect a 14% increase in the
$/kg cost of cathode active material and a 50% increase in the $/kg cost of positive binder. 100
While Auto Innovators appreciates EPA's use of the most recent version of BatPaC to reflect the
latest information regarding material costs, these recent cost increases are a further indication
that - contrary to EPA's assumptions - costs are unlikely to remain static at 2022 levels for the
next decade. It is unreasonable for EPA to assume that a site, regulation-driven ten-fold increase
in demand for critical minerals in a tight, volatile and geopolitically sensitive global market
would have no impact on electrode and other materials costs beyond levels assessed in 2022.
EPA should consider supply / demand impacts in a volatile and still-developing mineral
commodities market for batteries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 53-54]
100 Ahmed, S., et al., 2022. Estimated Cost of EV Batteries 2018-2022. Online slide presentation available
at htps://www.anl.gov/cse/batpac-model-sotiware.
2. Battery Pack Production Rate Assumptions
Battery pack production rates are an important consideration in estimating the cost of a
battery. Generally, as production rates increase, the cost per kWh of batteries produced decreases
due to economies of scale. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 54]
EPA chooses to model batteries for all manufacturers and all years of its analysis based on a
battery plant production rate of 250,000 packs/year. 101 EPA's entire reasoning is provided in a
single sentence: "The annual volume of 250,000 is similar to that being produced in the largest
plants today, such as those of Tesla, and also is appropriate for the purpose of causing the
BatPaC model to calculate costs applicable to a production plant of 30 to 40 GWh capacity,
which is a common plant capacity among the largest manufacturers today." 102 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 54]
101 DRIA at 2-46. ("The equation for a production volume of 250,000 packs was then used as an input to
OMEGA to represent a base year cost. . .")
102 Ibid.
The source of EPA's assertion that 30-40 GWh battery manufacturing plant capacity is
common among the largest manufacturers is unclear. Whether or not this is the case, EPA's own
descriptions make clear that this assumption applies to "the largest" plants and "the largest"
manufacturers. No consideration is given that there will likely be a range of battery plant
production capacities, nor that smaller automotive manufacturers may only utilize a portion of a
larger plant's total capacity for cells and packs built to their individual specifications. Likewise,
this assumption fails to contemplate the production efficiencies of new battery plants versus
those that have been fully operational for years, including variations in battery chemistry. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 54]
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To the extent that some manufacturers begin to vertically integrate and technically
differentiate on battery systems, Auto Innovators encourages EPA to consider costs and
specifications that are reasonable for the industry as a whole to inform policy analysis, and not to
assume that intellectual property and proprietary production processes that have been the result
of billions of dollars of research and development paid by one manufacturer will be readily
available to all manufacturers. In the BatPac model, production volume can affect direct
manufacturing cost estimates, and Auto Innovators points out that many battery cells vary (size,
shape, chemistry) to suit the application. Even battery packs that share cells may require different
housings and assembly processes, requiring separate production lines, resulting in economies of
scale lower than would be projected if all these parts were the same. Total industry volumes of
BEVs are not an appropriate volume assumption for BatPac. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 54-56]
Furthermore, EPA's battery cost modeling and application in its OMEGA compliance model
implicitly assumes a 100% capacity, 250,000 pack per year production rate from a battery plant's
initial start of production. As shown in Figure 16, the vast majority of anticipated North
American battery cell manufacturing capacity is yet-to-be built. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 54-56]
[See original comment for Figure 16: Benchmark Mineral Intelligence assessment of N.
American battery cell manufacturing capacity, 2020-2032, and country of ownership.] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 54-56]
Such a production ramp-up is unrealistic. For example, Tesla's gigafactories have a decade of
experience. It took Tesla three years to build its first gigafactory, then another three years to
reach a production capacity of 35 GWh per year (Figure 17). 103 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 54-56]
103 htps://www.tesla.com/sites/default/files/blog_atachments/gigafactory.pdf
[See original comment for Figure 17: Gigafactory Projected Timeline] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 54-56]
Auto manufacturers also need to consider machine makers for battery facilities and the lack of
a trained workforce. Auto manufacturers need to be careful with ramp-up rates because a
manufacturing defect equates to a potential safety recall which in turn could result in billions of
dollars of unplanned losses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 54-56]
For the final rule, EPA should adjust its estimated battery pack production rate to account for
average (instead of largest) battery manufacturers, the potential split of total capacity into
multiple cell variants, and production ramp-up associated with all-new manufacturing plants.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 54-56]
1. Consideration of Labor Costs in Battery Cost Projections
EPA uses default BatPaC model labor costs. Presumably those costs reflect global production
of batteries today. Yet given the agency's assumption that all batteries in all electric vehicles sold
in the United States will be domestically produced, it seems likely that default labor values
currently hard coded into the BatPaC model would need some degree of reconsideration. Neither
of these issues, nor other potential issues pertaining to default assumptions applied elsewhere in
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the model, are addressed, or even acknowledged by the agency in its proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 56]
2. Consideration of Critical Mineral Costs in Battery Cost Learning Curve
EPA's use of effectively static 2022 material costs from BatPaC 5.0 is problematic. EPA
does not appear to make any upward adjustments to the core BatPaC material costs to account
for the current cost of critical minerals, nor for potentially elevated prices during the timeframe
of the rulemaking due to the exponential expansion in supplies that are needed to support global
electrification goals. We believe these are gross oversights that likely result in an
underestimation of true vehicle electrification costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 56-
57]
Why is this so important? According to Argonne National Laboratory, the NMC811-G,
graphite, separator, and electrolyte add up to 86% of material costs. 104 Material costs, in turn,
represent about 68% of battery pack costs. 105 And as the agency is well aware, batteries
represent the largest cost associated with an electric vehicle. To put it more plainly, as go
material costs, so go electric vehicle costs. Poorly or improperly forecasted future battery costs
have a very real potential of yielding directionally different conclusions regarding the economic
viability of vehicle electrification at the market share project for the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 56-57]
104 Ahmed, S., et al., 2022. Estimated Cost of EV Batteries 2018-2022. Online slide presentation available
at htps://www.anl.gov/cse/batpac-model-sotiware. Retrieved June 28, 2023. (Slide 11.)
105 Ahmed, S., et al., 2022. Estimated Cost of EV Batteries 2018-2022. Online slide presentation available
at htps://www.anl.gov/cse/batpac-model-sotiware. Retrieved June 28, 2023. (Slide 9.)
The agency's consideration of the critically important topic of battery costs is inadequate. Of
the 688-page DRIA, EPA devotes precisely three paragraphs to this issue, in which it generically
points to two recent forecasts to justify its position. Additionally, it is difficult for stakeholders to
provide feedback on one of those forecasts (Wood Mackenzie), as the agency has excluded it
from the docket on grounds that it is a paid subscription service and not licensed for
publication. 106 The other forecast (EDF/ERM), commissioned by Environmental Defense Fund,
an environmental advocacy group that has long supported stringent vehicle standards and electric
vehicle mandates, simply observes that "supply chain disruptions have affected EV and battery
pricing," 107 and does not at all contemplate the potential impact of a more than 10-fold increase
in demand over the next eight years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 56-57]
106 Safoutin, M. 2022. Agency memorandum. htps://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829- 0316
107 EDF/ERM 2022. Electric Vehicle Market Update: Manufacturer Commitments and Public Policy
Initiatives Supporting Electric Mobility in the U.S. and Worldwide.
htps://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR- 2022-0829-0154
a) Need for Two-Stage Learning Curve to Address Critical Mineral Costs
As EPA notes, average lithium-ion battery prices declined by 85-90%) from 2010 to 2020,
paving the way for the spillover of lithium-ion batteries from consumer electronics to
automotive. In fact, the National Research Council in 2021 - based on data before the
unexpected events of 2021-2022 - was naively forecasting an annual 7% decline in battery prices
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from 2022 to 2030.108 Other sources were predicting that, due to rapid declines in battery prices,
electric vehicles would be cheaper to produce than gasoline vehicles by the early part of the
2020-2030 period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 57-58]
108 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2021. Assessment of Technologies for
Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy 2025-2035. Washington, DC: The National Academies
Press. htps://doi.org/10.17226/26092.
In 2019, an MIT report cautioned that it is naive to believe that battery prices will continue to
fall steadily through 2030 as they fell in the previous decade. 109 The reason is that, according to
Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, raw materials accounted for about 70% of the cost of a
lithium-ion battery in 2022, up from 40% in 2015 and less than 20% in 2010. Over half of the
materials costs are for the cathode alone. As economies have been achieved in manufacturing of
batteries, the costs of raw materials have become relatively more important. Some of the learning
factors that apply in battery manufacturing (e.g., economies of scale) are not applicable - or
apply with less potency — in the raw materials sector. Instead of the one stage model used by
EPA, the MIT report illustrates a two-stage model where the first stage covers "battery
production" (e.g., cell production, battery assembly, and battery-pack assembly) and the second
stage covers "materials synthesis" (e.g., mining of raw materials, immediate processing for use
by component producers). The MIT report estimates that the learning curve is 4.7 times larger in
the battery production phase than in the materials synthesis stage. They also show that the costs
of materials synthesis place a floor on learning in the battery production stage. Using the two-
stage model, the MIT report concludes that it is "unlikely" that battery prices will fall below
$100 kWhby 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 57-58]
109 MIT Energy Initiative. Insights into Future Mobility. Cambridge, MA. 2019, 77-79.
Sources:
1. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2021. Assessment of
Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy 2025-2035. Washington, DC:
The National Academies Press. htps://doi.org/10.17226/26092. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 57-58]
2. MIT Energy Initiative. Insights into Future Mobility. Cambridge, MA. 2019, 77-79. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 57-58]
3. Jacky Wong. Commodity Prices Are Risk for EV Batteries. Wall Street Journal. July 23,
2021, B12. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 57-58]
4. Scott Patterson. Metal Price Surge Threatens EV Growth. Wall Street Journal. February 7,
2022, B4. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 57-58]
The events of 2021-2022 were a shock to the battery industry and have given credence to the
technical concern raised in the MIT report. The decade-long decline in lithium-ion
battery prices stopped for 2021 and 2022. Indeed, battery prices rose 7% in 2022, primarily due
to an explosive surge in the prices of raw materials that support cathode and battery-cell
production. Since battery producers cannot instantly switch the materials used in their cathodes
and battery cells, higher materials prices flowed through to battery prices. As a result, stunned
forecasters have been busily delaying their forecasts of when battery prices would fall below
$100/kWh. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 58-59]
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In our comments on the model year 2023-2026 light-duty rulemaking, Auto Innovators urged
EPA to begin modeling the raw materials synthesis stage separately from battery production,
building on the insight from the MIT report. In response to our comments on the final rule, EPA
acknowledged the key role of raw material costs:
EPA agrees that mineral and other material costs are a large component of the cost of the
currently prevailing family of lithium-ion chemistries . . . [and those chemistries] may not have
the potential to reach as low a cost as suggested by other commenters. . . and these costs might
decline more slowly or increase if supply fails to meet demand in a timely manner. 110 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 58-59]
110 86 Fed. Reg. 74478 (Dec. 30, 2021).
Auto Innovators was therefore disappointed to read the 2021 final rule's treatment of battery
prices (for MY 2023 to 2026) as well as the current NPRM for model years 2027 to 2032. EPA
continues to lump the raw materials synthesis stage with battery production, thereby producing
highly optimistic forecasts for battery prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 58-59]
What EPA needs is a model of the materials synthesis stage - a separate model from the
BatPaC model, which focuses on battery manufacturing. The materials model would forecast
which battery chemistries will be implemented each year, the required amounts of specific
materials for each battery design, and the prices for specific materials. The prices should reflect a
global sub-model of supply and demand for specific materials since those prices are determined
in global commodity markets. This materials synthesis model, and the inputs used in the model,
should be subject to independent expert peer review. The explicitness and transparency of such a
model would subject EPA's analysis of raw materials to accountability over time. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 58-59]
3. Other Considerations for Battery Cost Analysis
a) Omitted Upward Pressures on Battery Prices
One of the obvious biases in EPA's battery-price analysis is that they emphasize factors that
might contribute to a continuing fall in battery prices but omit consideration of several factors -
beyond materials prices — that are working to keep battery prices high. Here are some key
factors working to increase battery prices:
-Increased energy density to enhance driving range - automakers and their suppliers are under
increasing market pressure to produce batteries with higher energy density, especially for the
large SUV and pickup truck segments to provide adequate range for buyers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 59-60]
-Improved safety systems and designs to minimize the risk of battery fires, as several
automakers have experienced NHTSA investigations as well as stigmatizing and costly recalls.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 59-60]
-New battery designs that can accommodate, without battery degradation, frequent use of DC
fast chargers (150 kWh to 350 kWh), which provide higher charging speeds and greater
convenience to consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 59-60]
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-Improved battery management systems that can help protect the battery pack under
extremely cold and hot outdoor temperatures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 59-60]
-Adherence to responsible sourcing guidelines that establish environmental, social and
governance standards for an auto maker's supply chains, including third-party validation of
compliance with those standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 59-60]
-Expectations to source raw materials, processing, component facilities and battery production
in the United States, or at least in North America or with free-trade partners, even though the
lowest cost suppliers in the EV supply chain may be based in China or in other countries that
have no free-trade agreement with the United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 59-
60]
Given the competing pressures on battery prices between now and 2032, Auto Innovators is
not confident that a net decrease in battery prices will occur; an increase in battery prices is a
distinct possibility due to global demand for limited resources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 59-60]
b) Electricity Price Impacts on Costs of Battery Production
Electricity prices have an indirect effect on the cost of producing EVs because the supply
chain of an EV is much more energy-intensive than the supply chain for an ICE vehicle. At
battery manufacturing facilities, for example, large furnaces are required to evaporate the
solvents from the coated electrodes; since battery cells are sensitive to moisture, cell assembly
must occur in a dry room, which incurs high electricity costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 60-61]
State and national policies are shifting electricity generation from fossil fuels and nuclear
power to renewables, especially wind and solar. At low levels of renewables, the effect on
electricity prices may be minimal. Moreover, the cost disadvantages of renewables are declining
over time, but the renewables transition may increase electricity prices at higher levels of
renewables penetration and will likely raise them further when investments are made (e.g., in
grid-scale energy storage solutions) to address the intermittent nature of wind and solar. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 60-61]
It is difficult to estimate how much electricity prices will rise in a precise time frame (e.g.,
2024- 2026) because they are often determined in utility rate-setting processes in each of the 50
states, and the EIA forecasts of future electricity prices do not account for all the policy changes
that are underway or will soon be adopted to promote or compel increased use of renewables.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 60-61]
One way for the agencies to bound the potential magnitude of rising electricity prices is to
undertake a scenario analysis where all of the U.S. - residences and businesses - face the higher
electricity prices now experienced by Germany or the State of California, both jurisdictions that
have made determined efforts to boost renewables and phase out coal and nuclear
power. Germany has the highest household electricity prices in Europe, about $0.30 per kWh. In
May 2021, the average price of residential electricity in California was $0.21 per kWh, about 7%
higher than the price in May 2020. In the U.S. as a whole, the average residential electricity price
is about $0.13-0.14 per kWh. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 60-61]
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The electricity prices paid by businesses need to be analyzed separately, as they tend to be
higher than the residential rates (in part due to demand charges). The business rate for electricity
is appropriate to use when computing the energy costs in the supply chain of battery production.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 60-61]
c) Electrolyte Costs in BatPac 5.0
Finally, it appears that the version of BatPaC 5.0 utilized for this rulemaking may contain
errors. The version of BatPaC utilized in the rulemaking and included by EPA in the docket
assumes an electrolyte cost of $10/L for 2022. Materials price assumptions presented by
Argonne National Laboratory in October 2022 and included on the anl.gov website show a $15/L
cost for electrolyte in 2022.111 We assume this is an oversight, and request that the agency
investigate and address this discrepancy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 61-62]
111 Ahmed, S., et al., 2022. Estimated Cost of EV Batteries 2018-2022. Online slide presentation available
at htps://www.anl.gov/cse/batpac-model-sotiware.
6. Battery Cost Conclusion
As EPA points out, including references to automakers' direct public statements, the
automobile industry is absolutely focused on making the transition to EVs. However, it is critical
that EPA also acknowledge the auto industry's direct statements about EV and battery costs, as
well as related comments addressing the consumer, supply chain, and charging and refueling
infrastructure challenges. Auto Innovators views the NPRM analysis as fundamentally
flawed. EPA needs to update its modeling to align with current battery costs and future critical
mineral costs in its analysis for the final rule. Relatedly, we also recommend that the EPA show
a full cost-benefit analysis for each of its sensitivity cases, including for high and low battery
cost cases, and also for varying assumptions on IRA tax credit eligibility, phase-out, or
elimination. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 67]
Organization: American Coalition for Ethanol (ACE)
Among the rosy forecasts are battery costs. EPA states that "battery costs continue to
decline," but this is not true. Battery costs increased in 2022 and have been generally stagnant
over the last four years.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 2-3]
6 Lithium-ion Battery Pack Prices Rise, Bloomberg NEF (Dec. 6, 2022).
https://about.bnef.com/blog/lithium-ion-battery-pack- prices-rise-for-first-time-to-an-average-of-151-kwh/.
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
As for battery costs, EPA elsewhere concedes that those costs have actually increased—not
decreased—in recent years. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,301. Bloom- berg recently released a report
showing that "the global average price for lith- ium-ion battery packs . . . climbed by about 7
percent in 2022." Id. EPA dis- misses this study by asserting that the survey respondents are
"likely to include both large and small purchasers of diverse battery packs," while EPA's own
modeling looks to "a specific class of pack design manufactured in large quan- tities at a large
manufacturing facility[] to fulfill large orders for a major [origi- nal equipment manufacturer]."
Id. But as major original-equipment manufac- turers have noted, as recently as a few months ago,
high battery prices are the key factor standing in the way of price parity. The CEO of the Renault
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Group, for example, says that prices for electric vehicles are unlikely to match those of internal-
combustion-engine vehicles "anytime soon" because "of the ever in- creasing cost of batteries."
Charette, Convincing Consumers. Likewise, the Chief Technology Officer of Mercedes notes
that he "does not see . . . price parity" between electric and internal-combustion-engine vehicles
given "the battery chemistry we have today." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 25]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
While we have not had sufficient time to fully analyze EPA's cost analyses, we have been
able to identify several significant deficiencies, each of which understates the true costs of the
Proposal: (1) EPA significantly understated the costs of batteries required by the rule; [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 48-49]
i. Battery costs
We start with a discussion of EPA's analysis of battery costs because it has significant
impacts on ZEV production, operating, and disposal costs. EPA "substantially underestimates the
costs of batteries,"223 providing an inadequate analysis and ignoring the cost and long-term
affordability of battery production. In the DRIA, EPA states that "despite recent short-term
fluctuations in price, the price of lithium is expected to stabilize at or near its historical levels by
the mid- to late-2020s, suggesting that the elevated battery costs being reported today will not
persist."224 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 49-50]
223 AAI Comments at iv.
224 DRIA at 2-51.
This analysis misses the mark. Between January 2021 and March 2022, the cost of lithium
increased by 738 percent.225 2022 battery costs were $153 per kWh,226 and cost reduction
curves have already begun to flatten out. Indeed, battery costs rose 7 percent in 2022. With
EPA's and other developing nations' push to electrify transportation and the concomitant need to
deploy utility-scale batteries, the demand for lithium (and other critical minerals) is expected to
grow exponentially. Even so, EPA assumes declining battery costs will reach $120 per kWh in
2032.227 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 49-50]
225 See Canada Energy Regulator, "Market Snapshot: Critical Minerals are Key to the Global Transition"
(Jan. 18, 2023), available at https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-markets/market-
snapshots/2023/market-snapshot-critical-minerals-key-global-energy-transition, html.
226 Dept. of Energy, "Electric Vehicle Battery Pack Costs in 2022 Are Nearly 90% Lower than in 2008,
according to DOE Estimates," (Jan. 9, 2023) available at
https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1272-january-9-2023-electric-vehicle-battery-pack-
costs-2022-are-nearly.
227 DRIA at 2-46 (resulting 75kWh battery).
EPA's reliance on an ICCT study to justify its estimate of falling battery costs is misplaced.
ICCT ignored literature that PHEVs depreciate with certain models and makes losing greater
value than others, like Tesla, especially those with long-range features. A May 2023 CBS article
highlighted a statement from Kelley Blue Book, an automotive research company, that PHEVs
generally depreciate faster than ICEVs.228 Kelley Blue Book said that three-year-old PEVs hold
63 percent of their value compared to 66 percent for ICEVs.229 Additionally, ICCT's battery
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cost curve does not account for the potential of rising PEV-related metal prices which can cause
the price of battery packs to increase, as seen in 2022 and 2023. If ICCT's estimates of PEV
battery pack costs were revised to be higher, PEVs are likely to be priced at a substantial
premium compared to ICEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 49-50]
228 Joe D'Allegro, What to know about buying a used electric vehicle as more hit the auto sales market,
CNBC (May 21, 2023), https://www.cnbc.eom/2023/05/21/what-to-know-about-buying-a-used-ev-as-
more-hit-the-car-market.html. See also AAA Survey Shows EV Owners Should Be Concerned About
Depreciation (insideevs.com).
229 Id.
While prices have since declined, price volatility should be expected to continue. Despite
these very public findings, EPA asserts that "battery costs have continued to decline."230 EPA
points to the IRA as a mechanism to reduce battery prices, yet this law simply extended the
existing battery subsidy and even limited its applicability through domestic sourcing and income
requirements. Thus, EPA is relying on an existing program for the proposition that it will lower
battery prices in the future. EPA is simultaneously ignoring that the increase in demand for
batteries will raise their price. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 49-50]
230 Proposed Rule at 29,188.
Further complicating the projection of future battery prices is the fact that battery raw
materials are not commodities, they are classified as specialty chemicals. As such pricing will
not follow traditional commodity pricing structures, especially because these supplies are
geographically concentrated in areas with geopolitical instabilities. Each OEM, cathode or anode
producer, and battery manufacturer have their own specifications for the materials, and thus the
raw materials must be refined and tested to meet their bespoke specification. Spot markets for
battery materials are virtually non-existent and unlikely to develop in the near term. For example,
most lithium contracts are written as long-term agreements, which are based on Fastmarkets'
lithium index and a discount, and sometimes with a floor/ceiling mechanism to hedge against
pricing volatility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 50]
Ultimately, the volatility of material pricing will directly affect whether certain battery
projects even materialize. And if they do, OEMs will need to increase their prices to ensure a
steady supply. Morgan Stanley estimates ZEV makers will need to increase prices by 25 percent
to account for rising battery prices.231 EPA must consider these data and correct this aspect of
its cost-benefit analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 50-51]
231 James Thornhill, Bloomberg, "Morgan Stanly Flags EV Demand destruction as Lithium
Soars" (Mar. 24, 2022), Chart 7, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-
25/morgan-stanley-flags- ev-demand-destruction-as-lithium-soars#xj4y7vzkg.
EPA ignores that battery prices have begun to rise due to limited supply of minerals.240
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 52-53]
240 BLOOMBERGNEF "Lithium-ion Battery Pack Prices Rise for First Time to an average of $ 151/kWh"
(Dec. 6, 2022) available at https://about.bnef.com/blog/lithium-ion-battery-pack-prices-rise-for-first-time-
to- an-average-of-151-kwh/
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Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
A. Battery Cost Projections
The agency's rationale for setting stringent standards - achieved through significant levels of
battery electric vehicle (BEV) adoption - appears to be driven largely by an assumption that
BEV prices will significantly decrease. These modeled consumer price decreases rest largely on
agency findings that batteries will be substantially less expensive in the coming years. The
accuracy of this claim is perhaps the most important aspect of the entire proposed regulation, one
that will determine whether or not this program and transformation of the auto industry
ultimately occurs on the timeline suggested by the agency. Regulatory stringencies set using a
reasonably accurate forecast of future battery costs would result in standards that are both
feasible in achievement and effective in decarbonizing the transportation fleet. Conversely,
stringencies set using inaccurate (overly optimistic) forecasts of future battery costs would likely
result in unachievable compliance obligations and ultimately an ineffective regulatory program
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 7]
Surprisingly, the agency did not appear to consider one of the few peer-reviewed papers that
does speak to this issue, Technological innovation vs. tightening raw material markets: falling
battery costs put at risk, by Mauler et al., published in the journal Energy Advances. This
important paper notes that cell cost reductions expected to occur between 2020 and 2030 (akin to
those anticipated by the agency) "could be significantly slowed down," or potentially even
"fully vanish": [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 8]
The combined impact of material-specific price increases on cell cost in 2030.. .ranges from
+6.9 to +34.3 $ kW h-1, meaning that cell cost reductions from technological innovations could
be significantly slowed down or, under the most pessimistic raw material price expectations,
fully vanish in 2030.13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 8]
13 Mauler et al., 2022. Technological innovation vs. tightening raw material markets: falling battery costs
put at risk. Energy Advances. https://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlelanding/2022/YA/dlya00052g
In our view, the NPRM would benefit from a more meaningful consideration of battery
material costs. Of the near 700-page Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), EPA devotes only
a few paragraphs to this issue, highlighting two recent forecasts to justify its position. Upon
closer examination, one of those forecasts (Wood Mackenzie) was found to not even be made
available in the Docket, as the agency has excluded it on grounds that it is a paid subscription
service and not licensed for publication. 11 The other forecast (EDF/ERM), commissioned by
Environmental Defense Fund, an environmental advocacy group that has long supported
stringent vehicle emissions standards, is available in the Docket, but falls well short of an
analysis upon which one could make a reasonable decision that materials costs will not
meaningfully climb in the 2027-2032 timeframe. The EDF/ERM forecast was conducted recently
enough to acknowledge that "supply chain disruptions have affected EV and battery pricing," 12
but it does not contemplate the potential impact of a meaningful expected increase in battery
demand over the next eight years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 8]
11 Safoutin, M. 2022. Agency memorandum. https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0316
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12 EDF/ERM 2022. Electric Vehicle Market Update: Manufacturer Commitments and Public Policy
Initiatives Supporting Electric Mobility in the U.S. and Worldwide.
https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR- 2022-0829-0154
The very real possibility that battery material costs will climb during the window of this
regulation needs to be considered by the agency. According to Argonne researchers, the
NMC811, graphite, separator and electrolyte add up to 86% of material costs. 14 Poorly or
improperly forecasted future battery costs can result in directionally different conclusions
regarding the viability of vehicle electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 8-9]
14 Ahmed, S., et al., 2022. Estimated Cost of EV Batteries 2018-2022. Online slide presentation available
at https://www.anl.gov/cse/batpac-model-software
As we have witnessed over the past few years, numerous critical minerals used in EV and
plug-in hybrid- electric vehicle (PHEV) batteries have seen significant price volatility. Even
BloombergNEF, known for its optimistic (low price) forecasts of battery cost, recently
acknowledged that pack costs will see increases in price, at least in the near term, due in part to
supply chain issues and higher demand for critical minerals. The BatPaC model has also noted
increased materials costs over the past few years. Between 2021 and 2022, for example, updates
to BatPaC resulted in a 14% increase in the $/kg cost of cathode active material and a 50%
increase in the $/kg cost of positive binder. 15 While we appreciate EPA's use of the most recent
version of BatPaC to reflect the latest material cost assumptions, these cost increases are a
further indication that - contrary to EPA's assumptions - costs are unlikely to remain at 2022
levels for the next decade. For EPA to assume that a swift, regulation-driven exponential
increase in demand for critical minerals in a tight, volatile and geopolitically sensitive global
market would have no impact on electrode and other battery materials costs calls into question
the fundamental validity of the agency's analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 9]
15 Ahmed, S., et al., 2022. Estimated Cost of EV Batteries 2018-2022. Online slide presentation available
at https://www.anl.gov/cse/batpac-model-software
Recommendation: Honda strongly urges the agency to revise its battery price forecasts used in
the Final Rule to include the impact of increased global demand on materials costs. Specifically,
Honda requests that the agency rely on impartial sources of information, including the peer-
reviewed paper by Mauler et al., to support its position. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 9]
Use of default costs
The agency notes in its proposal that "default costs provided in BatPaC for electrode powders
and other constituents were used." 16 Based on our read of the proposal and Draft RIA, it is not
clear where these cost assumptions came from. Are they predicated on a certain set of
assumptions, such as a globally- sourced mining/refining/production supply chain? If so, such
assumptions should be revisited and adjusted accordingly, since EPA also assumes in this
proposed rule that OEMs will significantly utilize IRA tax incentives, some of which have
particular content and sourcing requirements that may limit their utility (depending on the
outcome of yet-to-be-released IRS guidance). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 9]
16 EPA, 2023. Draft RIA, p. 2-45. Available online at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
Recommendation: Honda respectfully requests that EPA revisit all default values with
Argonne National Laboratory's materials cost experts to ensure that cost estimates extrapolated
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from the BatPaC model are factually consistent with other IRA-based assumptions being made
by EPA in this rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 9]
Lack of transparency regarding BatPaC inputs
EPA claims that "the BatPaC spreadsheet models used to develop the costs for BEVs, HEVs,
and PHEVs are available in the Docket.. .and fully describe the BatPaC inputs."17 Honda
respectfully disagrees. Investigation into the BatPaC model revealed that numerous key inputs
and default values utilized by the agency were in fact undocumented numbers, hard coded into
the model. Investigation into key battery cost assumptions (as noted above) required separate
examination outside of the Docket to better understand the agency's analysis. This should not be
required. EPA's lack of transparency on this potentially critical topic of model assumptions,
particularly given the short 60-day comment period provided by the agency, undermines
stakeholders' abilities to provide meaningful feedback on the agency's proposal. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 10]
17 EPA, 2023. Draft RIA, p. 2-45. Available online at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
Recommendation: Honda respectfully requests that the Final Rule include greater
transparency regarding BatPaC-based values used in its rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0652, p. 10]
Projecting future battery material and labor costs
The agency assumes that the IRA 45X tax credits will be fully utilized by all OEMs through
MY2032 (subject to phase-down in the final years of the program) and applies those reductions
to the overall cost of batteries in EPA's OMEGA modeling. This has resulted in profoundly low
battery cost estimates, for example, below $40/kWh in 2029.10 The agency does not, however,
appear to make any upward adjustments to the core Argonne National Laboratory BatPaC 5.0
material costs to account for exponential growth in critical minerals demand that will occur
during this time frame, or to the increased labor cost associated with domestically produced
packs. We believe these are significant oversights that likely result in a meaningful
underestimation of true vehicle electrification costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 7-8]
10 EPA, 2023. Draft RIA, Figure 2-27. Available online at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
Battery Cost Modeling
The NPRM includes several citationsl 12 of battery cost analysis used by the EPA in
developing the technical feasibility of the regulation based on Argonne National Laboratory's
BatPaC Model Software. This software includes an analysis of several different battery
chemistries and a breakdown of the individual costs for various components needed to
manufacture an automotive battery at scale. 113 Argonne's assessment of the 2022 battery cost
concludes that 63% of the total battery cost is from raw materials on the anode and cathode of
the individual cells. This is an important fact for EPA to consider in the assessment of long-term
battery cost modeling as the model for parts and raw materials are fundamentally different.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
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112 40 CFR Parts 85, 86, 600, 1036, 1037, and 1066 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829; FRL 8953-03-OAR]
pages 29295, 29299, 29301, 29302.
113 https://www.anl.gov/cse/batpac-model-software.
The NPRM then applies a modeling equation to these initial cost/kWh values to develop long-
term costs on a year-by-year basis. This model is detailed in the DRIA in section 2.5.2.1.3.114
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
114 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles - Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (EPA-420-D-23-003, April 2023).
1) Calculate the cumulative GWh needed by BEVs placed into the analysis fleet
through the last model year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
2) Calculate the cost reduction factor due to learning:
factor = 4.1917 x (cumulative ?W ? through last year) -0.225 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 43-46]
3) Calculate battery cost in the base year, as a function of pack kWh, according to the
equation in RIA 2.5.2.1.2: $/????? = 261.61 x (gross ?????) -0.184 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 43-46]
4) Multiply the result of Step 3 by the result of Step 2.
This model makes several unrealistic assumptions:
No lower bound with increasing volume - at some point in the future, the real cost of
battery cells will be $0.00 based on the model used in the NPRM due to cumulative GWh
production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
Cumulative GWh calculation based on production of batteries in the U.S. but it needs
to be based on the global production of batteries to establish a baseline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, pp.43-46]
o It is global economics that support the costs of battery production, not the
economics of the U.S. alone. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
o Global battery volume is expected to rise from ~700GWh to 5,300GWh by
2035. 115 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
115 https://emobilityplus.eom/2023/04/21/global-electric-vehicle-battery-market-to-reach-616-billion-by-
2035- report/.
$75/kWh was selected for 2035; however, the modeling cited above implies a
$46/kWh value based on the model parameters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
o The cost model cited in the NPRM appears to be voided by several
assumptions for cost reduction milestones in section 2.5.2.1.3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 43-46]
Manufacturing battery cells operates on the same cost curve as manufacturing
standard automotive parts - the cost of the materials in manufacturing battery cells operates on a
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different cost curve to standard automotive part production and this is not accounted for in the
model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
o Resource modeling is not capital-dependent but resource dependent. This
curve follows an increasing cost as production levels are increased and not a reduction as cited in
the regulatory framework of the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
Biasing the model with the initial development phase will not represent the long-term
trend and therefore a more appropriate model should be used to represent real-world costs and
volume impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
Since Argonne has established a 63% critical raw material value in their development of the
BatPaC, it is important for the regulation to follow the economics of raw materials rather than
capital depreciation and learning models for purposes of accuracy. Perhaps following the
economics of oil production would be more representative of modeling the costs of 63% of the
batteries in automotive applications. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
[See original for graph titled "Figure 1"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
As shown in Figure 1, over the last 40 years the global supply of oil has increased by
—50%. 116 During that same period, the price increased by -200%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 43-46]
116 EIA Global crude oil production and price sourced in May 2023.
[See original for graph titled "Figure 2"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
As shown in Figure 2, lithium has followed a similar trend to oil - Global productionl 17 is up
400%, and prices are up 600%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
117 USGS Global lithium production and price sourced in May 2023.
[See original for graph titled "Figure 3"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 43-46]
Nickel also follows a similar trend shown in Figure 3. Rising in price with increased demand
and falling with reduced demand over the last 10 years. 118 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 43-46]
118 USGS Global nickel production and price sourced in May 2023.
These examples show how real-world resource costs are impacted by demand. Unlike the
automotive parts model used in the regulation, price and volume tend to move in the same
direction for critical battery raw materials. This is because these raw materials are produced in
the lowest-cost locations, to begin with, and then move to higher-cost locations to meet demand
over time. We see this with oil resources as well. The lowest cost-to-produce sources are used
first and only after those sources are at capacity are the higher cost sources then consumed by the
market. We fully expect to see the same trend with all critical raw materials for battery
production long term, contrary to the assumptions in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 43-46]
Based on the Argonne value of 63% raw material cost in an average automotive battery, we
suggest the agency develop a new costing model to properly account for the 63% resource- based
costs and use the current model only for the remaining 37% to account for the capital
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depreciation and learning on the remaining value of the battery. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 43-46]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
B. The proposal rule underestimates future battery costs.
EPA estimates that battery costs will continually decline over the next decade, decreasing
from around $12,000 per pack in 2022 to around $7,000 per pack in 2032.13 This projection
isn't realistic. For some segments, 2022 battery costs were $153 per kWh, Electric Vehicle
Battery Pack Costs in 2022 Are Nearly 90% Lower than in 2008, according to DOE Estimates,
Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy (Jan. 9, 2023),
https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1272-january-9-2023- electric-vehicle-
battery-pack-costs-2022-are-nearly. While there has been a decrease in cost over the last decade,
prices have not continued to drop. Instead, cost reduction curves have already begun to flatten
out and battery costs rose 7 percent in 2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 21]
13 Projections assume a 100 kWh battery pack and per kWh prices as described by EPA in the Draft
Regulatory Impact Analysis. DRIA 2-53.
Further, many studies project battery costs to rise over the next few years. For example, E
Source estimates battery cell prices will surge 22% from 2023 through 2026. Phil LeBeau, EV
battery costs could spike 22% by 2026 as raw material short- ages drag on, CNBC (May 18,
2022), https://www.cnbc.eom/2022/05/18/ev-battery- costs-set-to-spike-as-raw-material-
shortages-drags-on.html. And Benchmark Mineral Intelligence projects that prices could become
worse at the end of the decade as an increase in global electric vehicle manufacturing leads to
massive lithium short- ages beginning in 2029 and getting increasingly worse as through 2032.
Eric Onstad et al., Lithium prices bounce after big plunge, but surpluses loom, Reuters (May 2,
2023), https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/lithium-prices-bounce-after- big-plunge-
surpluses-loom-2023-04-28/.[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 21-22]
An analysis based on the E Source study and the Benchmark Mineral Intelligence Project,
suggests that battery prices for a 100 kWh battery will rise from $12,800 per pack in 2022 to a
peak of $13,000 per pack in 2027, before stabilizing at $12,000 per pack from 2029 through
2032. See Figure 4. When these additional costs are added to the manufacturing of each of the 15
million electric vehicles needed to comply with the proposed standards, an additional $64 billion
in vehicle technology costs are added to EPA's projections. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712,
pp. 21-22]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 4: Projected battery pack costs for 100 kWh
battery pack. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 21-22]
Organization: Energy Innovation
III. THE EPA'S FINAL STANDARDS SHOULD ACCOUNT FOR ADDITIONAL
FACTORS THAT MAY ACCELERATE ADOPTION OF ZERO-EMISSION
TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPACT LEARNING CURVES FOR BEV ECONOMICS.
We appreciate the EPA's attention to vehicle technologies and trends in the proposed rule and
draft regulatory impact analysis (DRIA)31 to inform the analysis underpinning the proposed
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rule. The EPA notes that, "in designing the scope, structure, and stringency of the proposed
standards, the Administrator considered previous rulemakings, as well as the increasing
availability of vehicle technologies that can be utilized by manufacturers to further reduce
emissions."32 Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act directs the EPA to regulate emissions from
new vehicles or engines that cause or contribute to air pollution that may endanger public health
or welfare— and the EPA is authorized and directed under the same statute to consider emerging
technologies when determining the level of stringency and feasibility of the standards. As with
prior rules, the "EPA is assessing the feasibility of new standards on light of current and
anticipated progress by automakers in developing and deploying new technologies."33 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
31 "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, Draft Regulatory ImpactAnalysis" (Assessment and Standards Division Office of Transportation
and Air Quality U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, April 2023),
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/420d23003.pdf. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561,
pp. 12-15]
32 U.S. EPA, "Proposed Rules," May 5, 2023, 29187.
33 U.S. EPA, 29187.
Notably, as the EPA GHG standards have increased in stringency over the past decade,
"automakers have relied to a greater degree on a range of electrification technologies... [and] as
these technologies have been advancing rapidly in just the past several years, the battery costs
have continued to decline... .As a result, zero- and near- zero emission technologies are more
feasible and cost-effective now than at the time of prior rulemakings."34 We agree and believe
these cost declines will continue for the foreseeable future and exceed projections, due to the
effect of battery learning curves, which we discuss further below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, pp. 12-15]
34 U.S. EPA, 29188.
Both of these trends reflect learning curves, which affect the rate of deployment of newer
technologies and advances in performance and production. As the market scales up, technologies
achieve greater economies of scale, which lowers the cost of production.37 A relevant example
of a learning curve is illustrated in Figure 9, which shows the cost to the public to buy Henry
Ford's Model T automobile in the early 1900s—the beginning of the age of the automobile.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
37 Hal Harvey and Justin Gillis, The Big Fix: 7 Practical Stesps to Save Our Planet (Simon & Schuster,
2022), 9-35.
[See original attachment for line graph "The Learning Curve of the Model T"] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
Figure 9. Learning curve of the Model T, 1909-1925. adjusted for inflation and including all
trim lines of the Model T. Source: Harvey, Hal et al., The Big Fix, Simon & Schuster, 2022, 19.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
Learning curves affect how quickly BEVs can outcompete ICE vehicles on purchase price,
which is a primary factor in market adoption and consumer acceptance. Rapid innovation and
falling battery prices have changed the economics of EVs because batteries are the main driver
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of purchase price differences between EVs and ICE vehicles.38 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, pp. 12-15]
38 Chris Busch and Anand Gopal, "Electric Vehicles Will Soon Lead Global Auto Markets, But Too Slow
to Hit Climate Goals Without New Policy" (Energy Innovation, November 2022),
https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/ll/Electric-Vehicles-Will-Soon-Lead-Global-Auto-
Markets-But-Too-Slow-To-Hit-Climate-Goals-Without-Policy.pdf.
According to a recent analysis from ICCT, "with declining electric vehicle battery and
assembly costs, shorter- range BEVs of 150 to 200 miles are projected to reach price parity by
2024-2026, followed by mid-range BEVs with 250 to 300 miles around 2026-2029, and the
longest-range BEVs with 350 to 400 miles around 2029-2032."39 See Figure 10. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
39 Peter Slowik et al., "Assessment of Light-Duty Electric Vehicle Costs and Consumer Benefits in the
United States in the 2022-2035 Time Frame," International Council on Clean Transportation, October
2022, https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/ev-cost-benefits-2035-oct22.pdf, iii.
[See original attachment for table described below] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-
15]
Figure 10. Summary of year by which battery electric vehicle price parity is reached. Source:
Slowik, Peter, et al., Assessment of Light- Duty Electric Vehicle Costs and Consumer Benefits in
the United States in the 2022-2035 Time Frame, ICCT, October 2022, ii-iii. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
These findings align with the EPA's finding: "[w]hile the retail price of PEVs is typically
higher than for comparable ICE vehicles at this time, the price difference is widely expected to
narrow or disappear, particularly for BEVs, as the cost of batteries and other components fall in
the coming years."40 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
40 U.S. EPA, "Proposed Rules," May 5, 2023, 29190.
From our research, we have identified the following factors related to learning curves that
may further accelerate future cost declines and improvements to BEV technologies. Based on our
assessment, we believe the estimated costs of the proposed rule and Alternative 1 will likely be
lower than projected, making compliance more feasible, more cost-effective, and more beneficial
to consumers and the economy. We summarize these factors below and urge the EPA's
consideration of them as it develops the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
1. Tendency of battery outlooks to underestimate future learning curves
Historic forecasts of battery prices have largely underestimated the impact of future learning
curve effects. Recent, open-source, peer-reviewed research by the Institute for New Economic
Thinking (INET) at Oxford University41 shows the persistent underestimation of future
innovation for batteries and develops an empirical forecasting approach that performs better.42
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
41 "Institute for New Economic Thinking, University of Oxford," n.d., https://www.inet.ox.ac.uk.
42 Rupert Way et al., "Empirically Grounded Technology Forecasts and the Energy Transition," Joule 6,
no. 9 (September 21, 2022): 2057-82,
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.joule.2022.08.009.https://www.cell.com/joule/fulltext/S2542-4351(22)00410-X.
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Figure 11 is reproduced from the INET article to help illustrate this point. The figure denotes
historical prices for lithium-ion (Li-ion) consumer battery cell prices and Li-ion EV battery
packs with black and red data points, respectively, while red line segments trace historical
forecasts for the most optimistic scenarios by leading energy-economy modelers such as the
International Energy Agency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
The figure's graphing of historical data alongside past forecasts of battery cell and EV battery
pack prices reveals the persistent gap between actual and forecasted innovation for batteries.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
Even the most optimistic projections for prior forecasts underestimated future learning curves.
For each, empirical price reductions trace a steeper trajectory, with cost dropping faster,
compared to the forecast's shallower slope. The result is even more compelling considering the
comparison to the most optimistic of each battery forecast sampled. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, pp. 16-19]
[See original attachment for graph described below] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp.
16-19]
Figure 11. Empirically grounded technology forecasts and the energy transition, reproduced
from Figure 5 from INET. Source: https://www.cell.com/cms/attachment/e50686b6-4cba-47f7-
85b6-04ab5411bb7f/gr5.jpg. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 16-19]
2. Battery pack economies of scale
As battery size increases, the added cost of the pack needed to contain battery cells falls,
reducing cost ($/kWh), keeping other factors constant. The larger the battery size, the more the
costs associated with the packaging and management system can be distributed among more
cells. These fixed costs remain largely the same whether the battery is small or large, so
increasing the size of the battery allows for a lower cost per cell. A larger battery pack generally
allows for more efficient design and packaging of the battery cells. For example, in a larger pack,
cells can be arranged more closely together, reducing the amount of wasted space and materials.
This again reduces the ratio of battery pack to cell. The ICCT cost analysis shows that larger
batteries yield lower costs.43 See Figure 12. Comparing the 2030 cost outlook for a car battery
providing 300 miles vs. 150 miles of range, the larger battery costs $68 per kWh vs. $79 per
kWh, offering a 14 percent advantage. Pack-level scale economies of scale will be an advantage
for battery packs for all vehicles, especially trucks and medium-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0561, pp.16-19]
43 Slowik et al., "Assessment of Light-Duty Electric Vehicle Costs and Consumer Benefits in the United
States in the 2022-2035 Time Frame," 10.
[See original attachment for table described below] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 16-
19]
Figure 12. Technical characteristics of electric vehicles for 2022 and 2030. Source: Slowik, et
al., Assessment of Light-Duty Electric Vehicle Costs and Consumer Benefits in the United States
in the 2022-2035 Time Frame, 10. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 16-19]
3. Faster-than-expected moderation of pandemic-induced supply chain disruption
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Key mineral inputs to battery production have dropped in price over the last six months more
quickly than had been anticipated. Lithium prices have also fallen, dropping by half from a
November 2022 peak.44 The downward trend in cobalt has been even more severe, partly
because of the reduction in global cobalt demand due to lithium-ion phosphate batteries' growing
market share. In June, the cobalt price had dropped to $14 per pound, down 65 percent from its
2022 peak.45 See Figure 13. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 16-19]
44 Junaid Shah, "Crash in Lithium Prices: A Boon for EV Buyers or Unsustainable Trend?," Saur Energy
International, April 4, 2023, https://www.saurenergy.com/solar-energy-blog/crash-in-lithium-prices-a-
boon-for-ev-buyers-or-unsustainable-trend.
45 Sophie Caronello, "Five Key Charts to Watch in Global Commodities This Week," Bloomberg. Com,
June 11, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-ll/five-key-charts-to-watch-in-global-
commodity-markets-this-week#xj4y7vzkg.
Trends in cobalt and lithium prices are part of a broader trend in moderation of supply-chain
pressures on EV batteries. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. is forecasting "softness for battery metals
including cobalt, lithium and nickel in the second half of 2023 amid an oversupply."46 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 16-19]
46 "Cobalt Price Has Fallen Nearly 30% This Year," Mining.com, June 12, 2023,
https://www.mining.com/cobalt-price-has-fallen-nearly-30-this-year/.
[See original attachment for graph "Global cobalt metal price"]
Figure 13. Global cobalt metal price, 2020-2023. Source: BloombergNEF, available at:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023- 06-11/five-key-charts-to-watch-in-global-
commodity-markets-this-week. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 16-19]
4. Novel battery chemistries and battery recycling
Novel battery chemistries nearing commercial availability will open new avenues for
innovation, and their effects will not be limited to technological change. Novel battery
chemistries will also have economic benefits by spreading EV battery demand across a greater
array of raw inputs. More diverse mineral input supplies will disperse demand instead of
concentrating it, reducing supply-side price pressure. New battery chemistries will also increase
competition between battery technologies, reducing producer profit margins and improving
consumer economics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 16-19]
[See original attachment for graph "Changing Chemistries: Demand for cobalt is now less
than previously expected as battery chemistries shift"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 16-
19]
Figure 14. Demand for cobalt is now lower than previously expected due to shifting battery
chemistries. Source: BloombergNEF, available at: https://about.bnef.com/blog/race-to-net-zero-
the-pressures-of-the-battery-boom-in-five-charts/. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 16-19]
In response to supply pressures and other market factors, cobalt-free lithium-ion-phosphate
batteries are gaining traction because they can be built at a lower cost than other battery
chemistries.47 The result is a dampening effect on cobalt demand. BloombergNEF analysis finds
that global demand for cobalt would be 52 percent higher if lithium-ion-phosphate batteries had
not experienced this rapid growth.48 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 16-19]
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47 Taylor Kuykendall and Avery Chen, "Battery Next: Metal Supply Concerns Push EV Makers to New
Battery Chemistries," S&P Market Intelligence, June 6, 2023.
48 "Race to Net Zero: The Pressures of the Battery Boom in Five Charts" (BloombergNEF, July 21, 2022),
https://about.bnef.com/blog/raceto-net-zero-the-pressures-of-the-battery-boom-in-five-charts/.
Two new battery chemistries entering commercial use this year in EV battery packs are
sodium-ion batteries49 and lithium-sulfur batteries.50 BloombergNEF estimates that sodium-ion
uptake, substituting for lithium-based chemistries, could lower lithium demand by 40 percent in
2035.51 See Figure 15. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 16-19]
49 Casey Crownhart, "How Sodium Could Change the Game for Batteries," MIT Technology Review,
May 11, 2023, https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/05/ll/1072865/how-sodium-could-change-the-
game-for-batteries/.
50 Kate McAlpine, "1,000-Cycle Lithium-Sulfur Battery Could Quintuple Electric Vehicle Ranges,"
Michigan News, University of Michigan Vice President for Communications (blog), January 12, 2022,
https://news.umich.edu/1000-cycle-lithium-sulfur-battery-could-quintuple-electricvehicle-ranges/.
51 Colin McKerracher, "EV Sales Are Soaring And Oil Use Is About to Peak: Hyperdrive," Bloomberg,
June 8, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-08/ev-sales-are-soaring-and-oil-use-is-
about-to-peakhyperdrive?srnd=premium#xj4y7vzkg.
[See original attachment for graph "Impact of Sodium-Ion Battery Uptake on Lithium
Demand"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 16-19]
Figure 15. Impact of sodium-ion battery uptake on lithium demand, 2020-2035. Source:
BloombergNEF, available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-08/ev-sales-
are-soaring-and-oil-use-is-about-to-peak-hyperdrive#xj4y7vzkg. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, pp. 16-19]
A research team from the University of Michigan is demonstrating the viability of a new
battery membrane (made from a network of aramid nanofibers, recycled from Kevlar) that can
enable lithium-sulfur batteries to have five times the capacity of lithium-ion batteries, increasing
the number of times the battery can be charged and discharged. Sulfur is more abundant than the
cobalt, and the aramid fibers of the battery membrane can be recycled from old bulletproof vests.
The University of Michigan has patented the membrane and the lead researcher is developing a
company to bring it to market.52 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 16-19]
52 McAlpine, "1,000-Cycle Lithium-Sulfur Battery Could Quintuple Electric Vehicle Ranges."
Finally, battery recycling is on the rise and slated for substantial growth over the coming
decades. Numerous factors are fueling the battery-recycling industry, including technological
progress, supply-chain stability considerations, decarbonization targets, new IRA incentives for
recycled battery materials, and ongoing research & development efforts.53 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0561, pp.16-19]
53 McKinsey & Company, "Battery Recycling Takes the Driver's Seat," Our Insights: Automotive &
Assembly, March 13, 2023, https://www.lung.org/research/sota/health-risks.
These and other evolving factors impacting the BEV market are highly likely to result in
lower costs to manufacturers and consumers as learning rates improve, faster adoption of zero-
emission technologies, and greater emissions reductions over the timeline of the proposed rule.
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We recommend the EPA fully consider these factors and other relevant market trends as it
develops the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 16-19]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
C. Battery costs will continue to decline, and EPA should include lithium-iron phosphate
batteries in its modeling of battery pack costs.
Developments in battery technology and reductions in battery costs also support the
promulgation of strong standards. EPA is correct that battery costs will continue to decline.
Improvements in battery chemistries are one reason for that, and EPA should include batteries
with lithium-iron phosphate (LFP) chemistry in its modeling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
p. 49]
1. EPA should include lithium-iron phosphate battery chemistries in its BatPaC modeling of
battery pack costs.
When modeling the cost of BEV batteries, EPA should consider the use of iron-phosphate
cathodes. The use of LFP batteries in current BEV models is growing; these batteries have
potential benefits beyond lower material prices, including higher fast-charging rates and greater
durability. 128 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 49]
128 Ford Media Center, Ford Taps Michigan for New LFP Battery Plant; New Battery Chemistry Offers
Customers Value, Durability, Fast Charging, Creates 2,500 More New American Jobs (Feb. 13, 2023), at
https://media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/fna/us/en/news/2023/02/13/ford-taps-michigan-for-new-lfp-
battery-plant- new-battery-chemis.html (last accessed July 3, 2023).
EPA cites the lower specific energy and energy density of LFP batteries as being less
appropriate to the 300-mile range BEVs modeled in its analysis. While there is demand for
longer-range BEVs, there is still likely to be a role for BEVs with a range of 200-300 miles; in
fact, many current BEV models have a rated range of less than 300 miles. Even if the average
range of BEV vehicles is 300 miles, the actual product mix will include vehicles with ranges
both above and below that average. And as fast-charging infrastructure with higher-power
(>##300 kW) EVSE is deployed, consumers may be more willing to choose a BEV with less
than 300 mile range, as mid-trip recharging would require less time. Vehicles with lower range
are good candidates for LFP batteries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 49]
For these reasons, EPA should evaluate the potential cost savings if a portion of PEV models
use LFP batteries. Using BatPaC version 5,129 switching to LFP from the default of NMC811
reduces battery pack cost 7-10%, depending on battery production volume assumptions and
battery capacity. As supported by findings in BloombergNEF's latest Electric Vehicle Outlook,
LFP batteries are forecasted to be used in an increasing number of passenger BEVs in the United
States, reaching around 30% of new demand in 2032.130 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp.
49-50]
129 U.S. EPA, Battery Cost Estimation Spreadsheets for US EPA LMDV NPRM, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-03 56_attachment_3, available at https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0356.
130 Dr. Andy Leach, Lithium-Ion Batteries: State of the Industry 2022, US demand, chemistry mix, and
recycling Capacity, BloombergNEF, Sept. 9, 2022. Subscription required.
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2. Battery costs will continue to decline.
We concur with EPA's assessment that battery costs will continue to decline. We provide
support for EPA's battery cost-per-kWh inputs for its OMEGA modeling and the continued
downward price trend of batteries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 50]
In its modeling, EPA used an average battery cost ($/kWh) at the pack-level based on a
proprietary analysis by Wood Mackenzie and a report by the Environmental Defense Fund
(EDF) and Environmental Resources Management (ERM) compiling battery cost projections
from a number of sources. 131 The Agency also noted that according to BloombergNEF, global
average pack prices were expected to reach $100/kWh by 2026, as the price increase in 2022 due
to mineral price volatility will be resolved within a couple of years. 132 We believe these costs
are an appropriate representation of the market. Our own analysis based on data available to
BloombergNEF subscribers in the Electric Vehicle Outlook 2023 yields numbers just slightly
below the costs EPA used in its modeling, as shown in the table and figure below, assuming that
EPA's costs were shown in 2021$. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 50]
131 See DRIA at 2-50.
132 88 Fed. Reg. at 29323
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR TABLE Pack-Level Cost Comparison (2021$/kWh)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 50]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure LD Battery Pack-Level Cost Comparison, Cost
EPA Used in OMEGA and Alternate Cost Prediction [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 51]
To develop our estimates, we used battery global cost data (2022$/kWh) for BEVs, global
battery demand forecasts, and the most updated learning rate used by BloombergNEF after the
2022 price increase, as well as a 7.02% inflation rate between June 2021 and June 2022 to
convert the data back to 2021 $/kWh. 133 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 51]
133 Evelina Stoikou, 2022 Lithium-Ion Battery Price Survey, BloombergNEF (Dec. 6, 2022), at 13-15 &
24-27 (Subscription required).
Lastly, as EPA noted, its analysis does account for access to § 45X Advanced Manufacturing
Production tax credits, but there are several other tax credits from the IRA available to battery
manufacturers that will reduce costs below what is represented in EPA's analysis, such as the
10% tax credits for electrode active material or critical mineral production. As a result, this is a
conservative assumption, which further supports the reasonableness of EPA's battery cost
projections. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 51]
In sum, EPA's forecast of battery cost per unit of battery power output ($/kWh) aligns with
the best available knowledge and prediction of the market at this time. However, EPA's forecast
of some of the other factors related to battery technologies, like specific energy, are behind
where the market is currently and where it is trending for the future. These inputs can therefore
cause the full cost of a passenger BEV and the associated mineral demand to be modeled higher
than the most likely real-world scenarios. Therefore, even though the cost per kWh input is
appropriate, the cost and minerals needed per BEV are likely overestimated under the EPA's
current approach meaning that technological feasibility and benefits are higher than predicted by
the EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 51]
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B. Alternative battery-related modeling inputs increase the feasibility and benefits of PEVs.
EPA's OMEGA modeling likely overestimates the battery cost and material demand per
passenger PEV due to conservative technical assumptions made about advancements in lithium-
ion batteries that would replace materials, increase specific energy, or allow for the longer use of
batteries through refurbishment or reuse. Additionally, the variables discussed below can also
cause mineral demand forecasts to be higher than actual future material demand. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 142]
1. Technological advancements resulting in decreased mineral demand can also further
decrease battery costs.
In addition to the substitution of lithium discussed above, advanced lithium-ion batteries such
as solid-state batteries could decrease the amount of lithium required to provide the same kWh
and miles traveled. Innovation will increase battery specific energy and energy density, therefore
reducing the amount of materials needed per kWh as well as battery cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 143]
Solid-state battery startups, such as QuantumScape,379 are already partnering with
automakers to ensure the technology is suitable for PEVs. Solid Power has partnered with Ford
and BMW and has provided BMW with a research and development license to its all-solid-state
cell design and manufacturing knowledge, and QuantumScape in December 2022 shipped its
first lithium metal battery cells for trial.380 Solid-state batteries have increased specific energy,
with QuantumScape reporting their Li-Metal NMC batteries having up to 400 Wh/kg or 1,100
Wh/L depending on the anode. This increase is graphically represented in Figure XVIII.B-1
below, which was produced by QuantumScape. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 143]
379 QuantumScape, Delivering on the promise of solid-state technology,
https://www.quantumscape.com/technology/ (last accessed, June 29, 2023).
380 Steve Hanley, Solid Power & QuantumScape Begin Shipping Solid-State Batteries For Trials,
CleanTechnica (Dec. 22, 2022), at https://cleantechnica.com/2022/12/22/solid-power-quantumscape-begin-
shipping-solid-state-batteries-for-trials/ (last accessed June 29, 2023).
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure XVIII.B-1: Energy Density Improvements as
Projected by QuantumScape
Sources: Cell energy densities for commercialized chemistries based on Ding, et al.381 and
Yang et al.382; Li-metal cell densities based on QuantumScape estimates
381 Yuanli Ding, et al., Automotive Li-Ion Batteries: Current Status and Future Perspectives. Electrochem.
Energy Rev. 2:1-28 (2019), available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s41918-018-0022-z (last accessed June 29,
2023).
382 Xiaofei Yang, et al., Recent advances and perspectives on thin electrolytes for high-energy-density
solid-state lithium batteries, Royal Society of Chem. (2020) DOI: 10.1039/d0ee02714f, available at
https://www.eng.uwo.ca/nanoenergy/publications/2020/pdf/xiaofei-ees-thin-SSE-2020.pdf (last accessed
June 29, 2023).
Sodium-ion batteries are also making their way to the market, providing an alternative to
lithium minerals and potentially reducing future lithium demand. CATL (the world's largest
PEV battery maker) invested in the technology in 2021,383 and the Chery iCar will be the first
EV to use the technology.384 There are already 20 sodium-ion battery factories under
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construction or planned around the world, demonstrating the uptake of this technology. 3 85 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 144]
383 Magdalena Petrova, Here's why sodium-ion batteries are shaping up to be a big technology
breakthrough, CNBC (May 10, 2023), at https://www.cnbc.eom/2023/05/10/sodium-ion-batteries-shaping-
up-to-be-big-technology-breakthrough.html (last accessed June 29, 2023).
384 Jiri Opletal, CATL's sodium-ion batteries will debut in Chery Auto EVs, Car News China (Apr. 16,
2023), at https://carnewschina.com/2023/04/16/catls-sodium-ion-batteries-will-debut-in-chery-auto-evs/
(last accessed June 29, 2023).
385 Steve Hanley, The Sodium-Ion Battery Is Coming To Production Cars This Year, CleanTechnica (Apr.
22, 2023), at https://cleantechnica.com/2023/04/22/the-sodium-ion-battery-is-coming-to-production-cars-
this-year/ (last accessed June 29, 2023).
2. Specific energy assumed in the model is lower than expected for LDVs.
"Specific energy" is the amount of energy a battery can store per unit of its weight, and
"energy density" is the amount of energy a battery can store per unit of its volume. As shown in
Figures XVIII.B-2 and XVIII.B-3 below, both of these metrics have increased dramatically over
time for lithium-ion batteries. Improving battery specific energy and energy density increases the
amount of energy that can be stored using the same amount of materials. This is important not
only for reducing demand for battery minerals but also for improving the range of PEVs. These
increases are the result of various factors, including battery chemistry and design improvements.
Battery chemistries have different specific energies; nickel- and cobalt-containing chemistries
have higher specific energy than LFP. For example, the Tesla Model Y uses an NCA battery
with a reported 276-333 Wh/kg, while the Model S and Model X use a battery with slightly less
at 250 Wh/kg.386 While lower, this 250 Wh/kg is still a dramatic increase from Sony's
commercialization in 1991 when it was 80 Wh/kg.387 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 145]
386 Aditya Dhage, Cylindrical Cell Comparison 4680 vs 21700 vs 18650 (Jan. 8, 2023), at
https://www.batterydesign.net/cylindrical-cell-comparison-4680-vs-21700-vs-18650/ (last accessed June
29, 2023).
387 Tobias Placke, et al., Lithium ion, lithium metal, and alternative rechargeable battery technologies: the
odyssey for high energy density, J Solid State Electrochem, 21:1939-1964 (2017) (hereinafter Placke et al.
- Odyssey).
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure XVIII.B-2: Specific energy and energy density of
nickel-based lithium-ion batteries continue to increase [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 145]
Source: Placke et al.
LFP batteries have similarly seen advancements in their specific energy, from below 90
Wh/kg in 2010388 (shown in the figure below) to current reports from Proterra of 170 Wh/kg389
and BYD of 166 Wh/kg.390 BYD has recently announced the blade LFP battery, which is
estimated to reach 180 Wh/kg391 due to the use of "cell to pack" design, therefore not using the
"cell to module to pack" design that has been historically seen.392 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 146]
388 Dr. Andy Leach, Lithium-Ion Batteries: State of the Industry 2022, Historic and estimated changes to
battery-pack energy density, BloombergNEF, Sept. 9, 2022. Subscription required
389 Proterra, Proterra battery pack features and specifications (2020), at https://www.proterra.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/08/Proterra-EV-Battery-Pack-Specs-2020.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2023).
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390 Nigel, Battery Design from Chemistry to Pack: BYD Blade (July 4, 2022), at
https://www.batterydesign.net/byd-blade/ (last accessed June 29, 2023).
391 Yiwen Shi, Feasibility of BYD blade batteries in electric vehicles, Highlights in Sci., Engineering and
Tech., Vol. 32 (2023), at
https://drpress.org/ojs/index.php/HSET/article/view/5087/4928#:~:text=The%20ratio%20of%20energy%2
Odensity,t o%2030%25%20%5B2%5D (last accessed June 29, 2023).
392 International Energy Agency, Global EV Outlook 2022, at 140, available at
https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-
6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2023).
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT Figure XVIII.B-3: Specific energy of LFP lithium-ion batteries
continues to increase [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 146]
Data Source: BloombergNEF Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022 (subscription required)
a. Specific energy forecasts
U.S. PEV sales are currently dominated by nickel- and cobalt-containing cathode chemistries,
representing 100% of sales in 2019.393 The NCA cathode, used by Tesla, represents the most
sold PEV batteries in the United States over the last couple of years.394 More recently, Tesla
began selling PEVs in the United States that use LFP,395 a trend that is being followed by Ford
andRivian. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 146-147]
393 Jessica Dunn, et al., Circularity of Lithium-Ion Battery Materials in Electric Vehicles, Envtl. Sci. &
Tech., 55 (8), 5189, 5192, Fig. 4 (2021), DOI: 10.1021/acs.est.0c07030 (hereinafter Dunn - Circularity).
394 Id. at 5192, Fig. 4.
395 Michael Wayland, Tesla will change the type of battery cells it uses in all its standard-range cars,
CNBC (Oct. 20, 2021), at https://www.cnbc.eom/2021/10/20/tesla-switching-to-lfp-batteries-in-all-
standard-range-cars.html (last accessed June 29, 2023).
If reviewed globally, NMC of different ratios (particularly 622 and 811) is the most prevalent
chemistry today,396 and LFP is more frequently used globally than in the U.S., with around 40%
of global passenger PEV sales expected to contain LFP batteries in 2023.397 While LFP
batteries have lower specific energy, and therefore less range than nickel- and cobalt-based
chemistries, they are cheaper to manufacture due to the lack of cobalt and nickel, and
technological advances are closing the gap between LFP and nickel- and cobalt-based specific
energies.398 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 147]
396 Colin McKerracher et al. Electric Vehicle Outlook 2023, Figure 202, BloombergNEF. June 8, 2023.
Subscription required
397 Id.
398 Id. at 157-158
Although the prevalence of different ratios of nickel- and cobalt-based chemistries (NMC and
NCA) vary with time, those chemistries are currently predicted to hold nearly half the global
passenger PEV market into the early 2030s, with NMC811 and NMC955 being the most popular
chemistries in that category in 2027.399 U.S.-based forecasts similarly assume nickel- and
cobalt-based chemistries to be dominant over the next decade, despite the increasing use of
LFP.400 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 147]
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399 Id. at Figure 202
400 Dr. Andy Leach, Lithium-Ion Batteries: State of the Industry 2022, US demand, chemistry mix, and
recycling Capacity, BloombergNEF, Sept. 9, 2022. Subscription required.
The OMEGA model uses the NMC811 cathode for a base technology and 180-200 Wh/kg as
the base specific energy. There are a few issues with these assumptions: 1) while NMC811 is
representative of a technology sold today, NMC611 is currently more common, and NMC955
along with other chemistries like NCA and LFP are expected to be more common than NMC811
in 2027-2032; and 2) the specific energy used in OMEGA does not align with real-world
NMC811 specific energy.401 NMC811 has one of the highest specific energies, behind only
NCA.402 When paired with a graphite anode, the specific energy of the battery should be at least
250 Wh/kg, as shown in Figure XVIII.B-4 below, compared to the 180-200 Wh/kg used by
EPA.403 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 147]
401 Id.
402 Id. at Historic and estimated changes to battery-pack energy density
403 Marc Wentker, A Bottom-Up Approach to Lithium-Ion Battery Cost Modeling with a Focus on
Cathode Active Materials, Energies 12(3):504, at 6, Fig. 2 (2019), available at
https://doi.org/10.3390/enl2030504
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure XVIII.B-4: Specific energy of lithium-ion
batteries with various cathodes and anodes [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 148]
Source: Wentker et al., 2019
BloombergNEF's specific energy forecast used linear interpolation to demonstrate that in
2030, the 95% confidence lower limit of specific energy is 210 Wh/kg, with a higher limit of 275
Wh/kg, as shown in Figure XVIII.B-5 below.404 This linear interpretation includes both LFP
and NMC, but does not account for the high amount of nickel- and cobalt-containing cathodes
used in the U.S. The forecast also does not account for material substitution and large specific
energy gains expected from quickly-advancing technology. For example, the use of silicon in the
anode can increase specific energy,405 and while it is not yet used widely, startups are
progressing this technology and constructing commercial-scale manufacturing facilities.406
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 148]
404 Dr. Andy Leach, Lithium-Ion Batteries: State of the Industry 2022, Historic and estimated changes to
battery-pack energy density, BloombergNEF, Sept. 9, 2022. Subscription required
405 Placke et al. - Odyssey, supra.
406 Matt Blois, Silicon anode battery companies get a major boost, Chemical and Engineering News
(2022), at https://cen.acs.org/energy/energy-storage-/Silicon-anode-battery-companies-
major/100/web/2022/12; see also Groupl4 Begins Construction of World's Largest Commercial Factory
for Advanced Silicon Battery Materials (Apr. 4, 2023), at https://groupl4.technology/en/news/groupl4-
technologies-begins-construction-of-the-worlds-largest-commercial-fa ctory-for-advanced-silicon-battery-
materials-
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure XVIII.B-5: Historic and forecasted battery-pack
specific energy for different battery chemistries [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 149]
Data Source: BloombergNEF Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022 (subscription required)
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b. An updated specific energy forecast
The relatively low pack-level specific energy described in section 2.5.2.1.1 (Battery sizing) of
the DRIA (180-200 Wh/kg) appears to only account for the use of LFP, even though the
following section, 2.5.2.1.2 (Base year battery cost estimation), states that vehicles were assumed
to contain batteries with the more efficient NMC811 chemistry in the cost analysis. Therefore,
EPA's inputs for specific energy are conservative considering that nickel- and cobalt-containing
cathodes are used in the vast majority of passenger PEVs sold in the US, and recent
advancements, such as the Blade Battery (10 Wh/kg increase), demonstrate specific energy gains
faster than historically seen. The EPA forecasts generally align with the lowest limit of specific
energy forecasts by BloombergNEF in Figure XVIII.B-5 in the prior section, although it would
be more accurate to align with a high forecast scenario considering the share of NMC
chemistries in use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 149]
Updating the specific energy forecast would likely lead to lower costs and mineral demand for
passenger PEVs, and therefore increased feasibility and cost benefits of PEV technologies
compared to EPA's current analytical approach. EPA's assumptions must be revised to reflect
what is actually occurring in the market and what the currently predicted trends are for the
future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 149]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table XVIII.B-1 Estimated Specific Energy for
Passenger PEVs407 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 150]
407 ColinMcKerracher et al. Electric Vehicle Outlook 2023, Figure 201, BloombergNEF. June 8, 2023.
Subscription required
Table XVIII.B-1 is calculated based on historical energy densities for LFP and cobalt-
containing cathodes (NCX) provided by BloombergNEF.408 When specific energy for LFP and
cobalt-containing cathodes are individually calculated based on linear interpolation, Table
XVIII.B-2 shows the results. If the ratio of 30% LFP and 70% nickel-based is kept, we get the
average specific energy in Table XVIII.B-1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 150]
408 Id.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table XVIII.B-2: Estimated Specific Energy for LFP and
Nickel-Based Battery Chemistries [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 150]
Data Source: BloombergNEF Electric Vehicle Outlook 2023 (subscription required)
Appropriately representing higher specific energies that align with today's technologies and
forecasts also has implications for vehicle range, weight, and mineral demand. Batteries with
higher specific energies can provide the same amount of power while using fewer minerals,
therefore weighing less than batteries with lower specific energies. This means that vehicles with
more efficient batteries can travel further with the same amount of energy because the battery
significantly impacts the weight, and therefore, the efficiency of PEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 151]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
i. ZEV costs are rapidly declining.
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The costs of batteries and ZEVs have declined significantly over the last few years. Recent
analyses project that costs will continue to decline, even when IRA investments are not
considered. The decline has been dramatically accelerated by the IRA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 16-17]
3. Rapidly declining ZEV costs are also supported by manufacturers' projections of battery
cost declines.
A key driver of BEV costs (and future cost projections) is the projected decline of battery
costs. According to a report by ERM for EDF, the cost of battery packs fell dramatically from
over $l,000/kilowatt-hour (kWh) in 2010 to approximately $132/kWh in 2021 and analysts and
automakers project that battery pack prices will continue to fall overall, reaching $100/kWh
between 2023 and 2025 and $61-72/kWh by 2030.51 As early as 2021, companies like Renault
and Ford had publicly announced targets of $80/kWh by 2030.52 While ongoing supply chain
disruptions caused battery pack prices to rise slightly in 2022, it is expected that the IRA, which
provides up to $45/kWh battery cell credit and provides significant incentives for increasing EV
manufacturing, will help further lower the cost of battery packs. 53 In its Q1 2023 earnings
report, General Motors reported that it intends to reduce battery costs down to roughly $87 per
kWh by calendar year 2025, a significant decrease from its original projection of $100 per kWh
by 2025.54 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 21-23]
51 Electric Vehicle Market Update: Manufacturer Commitments and Public Policy Initiatives Supporting
Electric Mobility in the U.S. and Worldwide, ERM for EDF, September 2022,
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-
05/Electric%20Vehicle%20Market%20Update%20April%202023.pdf. (Attachment Q).
52 BNEF, Battery Pack Prices Fall to an Average of $132/kWh, But Rising Commodity Prices Start to
Bite, November 30, 2021. https://about.bnef.com/blog/battery-pack-prices-fall-to-an-average-of-132-kwh-
but-rising- commodity-prices-start-to-bite/
53 Id.
54 Trey Hawkins, "GM Expects Battery Cells To Cost $87 Per kWh By 2025," GM Authority (May 5,
2023), https://gmauthority.eom/blog/2023/05/gm-expects-battery-cells-to-cost-87-per-kwh-by-2025/.
For a 75 kWh battery pack, EPA modeled battery prices as $120/kWh through 2025 falling to
$90/kWh by 2029, $75/kWh by 2035, and finally $65/kWh by 2050. EPA's choice is reasonable
but conservative. EPA assumed that the per kWh price for battery packs decreases as packs get
larger, consistent with modeling by ANL. In Figure 2-26 in the DRIA, EPA plots the average
battery pack for vehicles modeled in OMEGA 2 by year. The average battery pack for vehicles
throughout the model is roughly 100 kWh. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 21-23]
Plotted below in Figure 4 are EPA's battery pack costs as well as eight projections and DOE's
target battery price all made within the last three and a half years. They clearly demonstrate that
EPA's battery cost estimates are reasonable, consistent with, and even conservative when
compared to manufacturer and expert projections. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 21-23]
[See original attachment for Figure 4: Projected Battery Price Costs]55
55 https://insideevs.com/news/551144/nissan-proprietary-solid-state-
batteries/https://about.bnef.com/blog/battery-pack-prices-fall-to-an-average-of-132-kwh-but-rising-
commodity-prices-start-to-bite/; https://news.ihsmarkit.com/prviewer/release_only/slug/2020-09-23-
milestone-average-cost-of-lithium-ion-battery-cell-to-fall-below-100-per-kilowatt-hour-in-2023
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https://nap.nationalacademies.org/download/26092 https://www.carexpert.com.au/car-news/volvo-ceo-
price-parity-between-electric-and-combustion-vehicles-by-2025
Research into next generation battery chemistries also has the potential to dramatically drive
down costs for BEVs. These types of step changes that occur with significant technological
breakthroughs are not represented in the battery cost projections discussed above nor are they
included in EPA's modeling. Novel technologies such as solid-state batteries and sodium-ion
batteries are both promising avenues to reduce battery costs and increase performance.
Additionally, many lithium-ion chemistries are being explored that reduce the reliance on rarer
metals such as cobalt including lithium nickel manganese oxide, lithium sulfur, nickel iron
aluminum oxide, and nickel manganese aluminum oxide.56 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
pp. 21-23]
56 V. Nair, S. Stone, G. Rogers, and S. Pillai, "Medium and Heavy-Duty Electrification Costs for MY
2027- 2030," February 2022. RoushforEDF. (Attachment R)
Improvements in the manufacturing of battery cells and packs also have the potential to
substantially reduce costs. The dry battery electrode (DBE) process eliminates the need for the
wet slurry coating, drying, and solvent recapture steps in conventional battery manufacturing.
These steps account for 50% of the energy consumption and 23% of the cost for cell
manufacturing. Creating tables electrodes can improve yields, reduce cell costs, reduce internal
resistance, reduce battery wear, and improve thermal management, all changes that could
increase battery performance and drive down costs. Improvements in battery pack construction
are also being investigated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 21-23]
In their 2022 study Roush only considered conventional NMC and LFP batteries but stated
"given the number of technologies that the industry is working on that have the potential to
significantly reduce the cost and increase cell and pack energy density, it is likely that the future
battery costs will be below those projected in this study [$68/kWh for an NMC battery pack in
2027]".57 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 21-23]
57 V. Nair, S. Stone, G. Rogers, and S. Pillai, "Medium and Heavy-Duty Electrification Costs for MY
2027- 2030," February 2022. RoushforEDF.
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
BATTERY ELECTRIC VEHICLE COST
While ICCT strongly supports the proposed rule, we believe there is evidence available to
support lower BEV costs than EPA has modeled. EPA analysis shows clear and significant
benefits associated with achieving a reduced combined fleet gram C02/mile standard and an
associated increase in battery electric vehicle penetration. However, the cost of compliance may
be overstated due to the use of outdated technology data and information. Electric vehicle and
battery technology has been improving rapidly and technology costs have been greatly reduced.
Automakers are investing heavily in BEV R&D and manufacturing capacity and are achieving
higher production volumes with more advanced technologies at lower costs. We reviewed EPA's
analysis on electric vehicle and battery costs and identified a few key parameters within EPA's
analysis that we believe could be updated to better reflect the latest evidence and analysis. We
make observations below that would reduce the incremental BEV costs and accelerate the timing
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for cost parity, which further strengthen the case for adopting the proposed rule and would result
in relatively greater benefits at lower cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 22-26]
New 2022 ICCT research assessed light-duty electric vehicle costs and consumer benefits in
the United States in the 2022-2035 time frame and found that without any federal, state, utility,
or local incentives, BEV purchase price parity is coming before 2030 for BEVs with up to 300
miles of range across all light-duty car, crossover, SUV, and pickup truck classes. 65 Continued
technological advancements and increased battery production volumes mean that pack-level
battery costs are expected to decline to about $105/kWh by 2025 and $74/kWh by 2030. These
developments are critical to achieving electric vehicle initial price parity with conventional
vehicles, which the 2022 ICCT analysis finds to occur between 2024 and 2026 for 150- to 200-
mile range BEVs, between 2027 and 2029 for 250- to 300-mile range BEVs, and between 2029
and 2033 for 350- to 400-mile range BEVs. These results—along with others discussed below—
from ICCT's 2022 EV cost parity study are aligned with those found in similarly recent studies
of EV cost parity.66 The cost parity findings are further reinforced by new Energy Innovation
and Consumer Reports research showing that in 2023 most new electric vehicles are already
cheaper to own than gasoline-powered vehicles in the United States from day one.67 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 22-26]
65 Slowik. P., Isenstadt, A., Pierce, L, Searle, S. (2022). Assessment of light-duty electric vehicle costs and
consumer benefits in the United States in the 2022-2035 time frame. International Council on Clean
Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/ev-cost-benefits-2035-oct22/
66 H. Saxena, V. Nair, S. Pillai, "Electrification Cost Evaluation of Light-Duty Vehicles for MY 2030,"
2023. Roush. https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-
05/Electrification_Cost_Evaluation_of_LDVs_for_MY2030_Roush.pdf and Transport and Environment.
(2021). Hitting the EV inflection point. Retrieved from
https://www.transportenvironment.org/discover/hitting-the-ev-inflection-point/
67 Orvis, R. (2022). Most electric vehicles are cheaper to own off the lot than gas cars. Energy Innovation.
https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Most-Electric-Vehicles-Are-Cheaper-Off-The-
Lot-Than- Gas-Cars.pdf and Consumer Reports (2023). Electric vehicles save consumers money.
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/research/cr-fact-sheet-electric-vehicles-save-consumers-money/
Total battery pack costs on average in the ICCT analysis are about $3,700 less than in EPA's
analysis in 2027 and about $5,200 less than in EPA's analysis in 2032. This is due to several
factors, including average BEV pack size (kWh), efficiency (kWh/mile) and pack-level cost
($/kWh). Table 3 summarizes the findings of the underlying technical specifications for 300-mile
range BEVs in 2027, 2030, and 2032 in the EPA and ICCT analyses. As shown, on average in
the ICCT analysis the pack size is smaller for the same range, the efficiency is higher, and
the per-pack costs are lower. As shown in the bottom row, the total pack cost in the ICCT study
is about $3,200 to about $4,400 less than EPA in 2027, about $2,800 to $4,100 in 2030, and
about $4,200 to $6,000 in 2032. The pack cost per kWh in the EPA analysis increase from 2030
to 2032 along with the phaseout of the 45X battery production tax credit. The pack cost per kWh
in the ICCT analysis do not include the 45X tax credit; applying the 45X tax credit to the ICCT
battery costs would further reduce BEV costs and the gap between the findings of incremental
costs in the ICCT and EPA analyses (Figure 9). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 26-29]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table 3. Summary of key BEV technical specifications in
EPA and ICCT (2022) Note. Numbers in table are rounded [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569,
pp. 26-29]
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The combination of reduced per kWh costs and smaller pack size for the same range (due to
improved efficiency) in the ICCT analysis is the driver for lower costs compared to EPA. The
ICCT conducted a thorough battery cost review and applied the best available data and analysis
of current and future electric vehicle and battery technical specifications.68 Figure 10 shows the
ICCT's 2022 battery cost review, which was based on expert sources, research literature
projections, and automaker announcements. Our battery cost review includes the most recent
projections by expert sources including the California Air Resources Board (2022), Roush
Industries Inc. (see Saxena, Stone, Nair, & Pillai, 2023), Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2020,
2021), UBS (2020) and technical research studies, including Mauler, Lou, Duffner, and Leker
(2022), Nykvist, Sprei, andNilsson (2019), Penisa et al. (2020), Hsieh, Pan, Chiang, and Green
(2019), and Berckmans et al. (2017). The automaker announcements shown include Volkswagen
for $135 per kilowatt-hour in 2021-2022 (Witter, 2018), Tesla for $55/kWh in 2025 (Tesla,
2020), and Renault and Ford for $80/kWh in 2030 (Automotive News, 2021a, 2021b; Ford,
2021). Not shown due to uncertainties related to timing, General Motors in 2020 announced
continued improvements toward below $100/kWh at the cell level, and Volkswagen in 2021
announced developments toward "significantly below" $100/kWh at the pack-level (General
Motors, 2020; Volkswagen, 2021).69 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 26-29]
68 Slowik. P., Isenstadt, A., Pierce, L, Searle, S. (2022). Assessment of light-duty electric vehicle costs and
consumer benefits in the United States in the 2022-2035 time frame. International Council on Clean
Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/ev-cost-benefits-2035-oct22/
69 Complete referencing is available at https://theicct.org/publication/ev-cost-benefits-2035-oct22/
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 10. Electric vehicle battery pack costs from
technical studies and automaker statements [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 26-29]
Figure 10 also shows the battery pack cost per kWh applied in EPA's OMEGA analysis,
illustrated by the brown hashed line. The EPA (2023) cost curve in the figure is based on the
volume weighted average pack marked-up cost from EPA Figure 2-27 from the DRIA with the
value of the 45X battery production tax credit incentive removed so that it can be directly
compared to the ICCT's 2022 battery cost review.70 The EPA (2023) battery cost curve clearly
stands out with much higher per-kWh costs than nearly every other study identified in the ICCT
battery cost review. On average over the 2023-2035 timeframe, the annual per kWh battery pack
costs in the EPA model are about 55% greater than those applied in ICCT (2022). To provide
context to these values, industry surveys showed that the volume-weighted average global BEV
pack-level prices were approximately $126 per kWh in 2020 and $118 per kWh in 2021.71 EPA
is applying about $126 kWh in 2029 and about $115 per kWh in 2030, which is about nine years
later than the 2020 and 2021 volume-weighted average global pack prices reported by BNEF.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 26-29]
70 EPA (2023). Multi-pollutant emissions standards for model years 2027 and later light-duty and medium-
duty vehicles. Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis.
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
71 Bloomberg New Energy Finance. (2020). Battery pack prices cited below $100/kWh for the first time in
2020, while market average sits at $137/kWh. Retrieved from https://about.bnef.com/blog/battery-pack-
prices-cited-below-100- kwh-for-the-first-time-in-2020-while-market-average-sits-at-137-kwh/ and
Bloomberg New Energy Finance. (2021). Battery pack prices fall to an average of $132/kWh, but rising
commodity prices start to bite. Retrieved from https://about.bnef.com/blog/battery-pack-prices-fall-to-an-
average-of-132-kwh-but-rising-commodity-prices-start-to-bite/
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For BEV efficiency, the technical specifications applied in the ICCT study are based on
official electric vehicle range and efficiency values from the U.S. Department of Energy and
reflect consumer label efficiency.72 The ICCT study applies a charging efficiency factor of 93%
for all years. A useable-to-total battery pack size ratio is also applied based on average high-
volume MY 2022 electric vehicles such that BEVs can use 92% of the kWh, which increases for
new vehicles by less than 1% per year through 2030, based on the best available models from
2022. For context, several BEV models including the BMW i4, Chevrolet Bolt EV, Chevy Bolt
EUV, Hyundai Ioniq 5, Nissan Leaf, Polestar 2, and Volvo C40 and XC40 have a useable-to-
total battery ratio of 96% or greater in 2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 26-29]
Retrieved from https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/download.shtml] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 26-29]
72 United States Department of Energy. (2022b). "Download fuel economy data".
The initial 2022 electric vehicle efficiencies applied in the ICCT study are based directly on
existing MY 2022 BEV and PHEV models, accounting for increased electricity-per-mile for
longer-range electric vehicles. We apply average technical specifications based on several high-
volume MY2022 electric vehicle models within each class. For example, our BEV crossover
efficiency is based on the Tesla Model Y, Ford Mach-e, Volkswagen ID 4, Hyundai Kona, Kia
Niro, Kia EV6, and Volvo XC40. Electric vehicle efficiency improves annually due to electric
component (battery, motor, power electronic) and vehicle-level (mass reduction, aerodynamic,
and tire rolling resistance) improvements. The 2030-2035 electric vehicle efficiencies are based
on modeling by CARB (2022), accounting for range and adjusting for charging losses.73
Between 2022 and 2030, we apply an average annual improvement that links the high-volume
2022 average electric vehicle model specifications with the 2030 CARB values. By 2030, the
efficiencies are somewhat better than those of the "best in class" models from 2022. For
example, our representative 350-mile range battery electric car is 0.23 kWh/mile compared to the
358-mile range 2022 Tesla Model 3 at 0.26 kWh/mile. Our representative 350-mile range
crossover in 2030 is 0.25 kWh/mile, compared to the 330-mile range 2022 Tesla Model Y at
0.28 kWh/mile. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 26-29]
73 California Air Resources Board. (2022). Advanced Clean Cars II Rulemaking: ZEV Cost Modeling
Workbook March 2022. https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advancedclean-cars-
program/advanced-clean-cars-ii
Very recent BEV-related automaker announcements and developments from automotive
suppliers reflect the continued rapid pace of innovation in BEV technologies. For example,
Toyota recently announced its 2026 plans to produce battery packs capable of over 600 miles of
range at lower cost than its current packs.75 Toyota also plans to produce solid-state battery
packs with 20%-50% more range, and bipolar lithium iron phosphate packs at 40% lower cost
starting around 2028.76 Beyond reducing costs through battery improvements and vehicle
efficiency increases, Toyota plans to reduce vehicle manufacturing costs through improvements
in factory operation, giga-casting to reduce parts and complexity, and reduced development
times.77 Similarly, Volvo announced its plans to reduce EV costs through cell-to-body battery
packaging, integrated motor, inverter, transmission units, and giga-castings.78 Meanwhile, the
advent of two-speed transmissions for BEVs from automotive suppliers increases motor
efficiency and performance, allowing battery and motor downsizing.79 Another supplier
innovation that improves EV efficiency especially for induction motors is Tula's Dynamic Motor
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Drive. 80 Still other areas of innovation include higher voltage EV platforms, axial flux motor
improvements, and current-source inverters. 81 These recent examples go beyond the technology
improvements assumed in the 2022 ICCT EV cost study. With these innovations, BEVs become
even more cost-effective as a technology option for manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0569, pp. 29-31]
75 Greimel, H. (2023, June 12). Newly revealed Toyota EV plans include batteries with 900-plus miles of
range." Automotive News, https://www.autonews.com/mobility-report/toyota-future-ev-plans-include-
batteries-900-mile- range
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Karkaria, U. (2023, June 14). Volvo EX30 electric crossover will approach price parity. Automotive
News, https://www.autonews.com/retail/how-volvos-electric-ex30-crossover-will-approach-price-parity
79 Brooke, L. (2021, February). Gearing EVs for greater efficiency." SAE Automotive
Engineering, https://www.nxtbook.eom/smg/sae/21 AE02/index.php#/p/16
80 Wolfe, M. (2022, December). Tula's DMD promises gains inEV efficiency. SAE Automotive
Engineering, https://www.nxtbook.com/smg/sae/22AE12/index.php#/p/l4
81 Madasamy, K. (2023, May 7). Guest commentary: The next frontier of EV innovation: The powertrain.
Automotive News, https://www.autonews.com/guest-commentary/ev-powertrain-next-frontier-innovation
Based on the above analysis, we believe that the relative BEV costs may be overstated in the
EPA proposal and accompanying OMEGA analysis. If EPA were to update the analysis with the
data and evidence regarding BEV cost and technical specifications based on the ICCT cost study,
BEV costs would be lower, the costs of compliance would be lower, and the net benefits would
be greater. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 29-31]
The above analyses and comparisons were conducted almost entirely relying on OMEGA
output files, which can obscure important modeling assumptions. To allow for more complete
independent comparisons among the proposal, prior EPA analyses, and third-party studies, ICCT
recommends EPA expand its documentation of assumptions and cost breakdowns of underlying
technologies or cost components. For example, EPA could provide average or exemplary vehicle
and component costs across various body styles or classes over time, similar to tables in prior
rulemakings. The general lack of clarity on cost applies to certain combustion technologies, too,
which are identified and discussed in the next section. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 29-
31]
Organization: Jaguar Land Rover NA, LLC (JLR)
Battery Cost Modeling
JLR would like to highlight to EPA our serious concerns with regards to their battery pack
modeling. The overarching assumption that costs "are assumed to decline over time as
production volumes grow and manufacturing efficiencies improve" is overly optimistic and the
factors considered do not fully account for all of the uncertainties that contribute towards the
final cost. JLR's forecast $/kWh cost reduction is considerably lower than EPA's forecasts,
[REDACTED]CBI [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 10-11]
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In response to EPA's request for comment on how they "should consider the issue of global
battery production in the context of our application of learning for the final rule analysis", JLR
recommends that the modeling should consider in greater detail the increase of global net zero
pledges and policies to increase EV uptake and the possible effect on critical mineral supply
chains. The International Energy Agency (IEA) noted in their Energy Technology Perspectives
2023 report, "Anticipated supply expansion suggests that production could fall well short of Net
Zero Emissions (NZE) Scenario requirements for 2030, with deficits of up to 35% for lithium
mining and 60% for nickel sulfate production. If this prediction is correct, despite increased
investment announced across multiple continents to expand the supply chains, critical minerals
will rise in price. With lead times of up to 10 years for new minesl6, we urge EPA to err on the
side of caution and amend the learning factor used in the cost reduction calculation to more
accurately reflect the potential risks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 10-11]
16 IEA (2023), Energy Technology Perspectives 2023, IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-
technology-perspectives- 2023, License: CC BY 4.0
JLR requests that EPA acknowledge the risk of further market volatility for critical mineral
pricing and take a more conservative approach when modeling battery prices. This will also
impact the GHG reductions OEMs can practically achieve, therefore a reduction in stringency is
paramount in the early years of the program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 10-11]
Organization: John Graham
BEV costs assume, implausibly, that shortages of raw materials will be resolved after the mid-
20208. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 9]
Finally, the prices of batteries may not fall as rapidly in the future as they have since 2010.
There are logistical, regulatory, and political barriers to rapidly expanding the mining and
processing of raw materials required to make enough BEVs for motorists in China, Europe,
North America, and the rest of the world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 9]
The batteries for HEVs and BEVs are designed differently, and thus the HEV battery costs
need to be estimated separately and carefully. It is revealing that the agency devoted much more
analysis to the costs of BEV batteries, especially future learning factors, than to the cost of HEV
batteries, for which future learning factors are assumed to be extremely small. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0585, p. 10]
5. BEV Costs
EPA defines the costs of the BEV's propulsion system as the sum of battery and "non-
battery" costs, where the non-battery costs are driven primarily by the cost of the electric motor.
The agency uses differential "learning factors" that cause the predicted costs of BEVs to fall
much faster over time than the predicted costs of hybrids. We discuss first the battery costs and
then the non-battery costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 16-17]
Battery Cost
Baseline battery costs. The DRIA reports a baseline BEV battery cost of $120/kWh for 2022
to 2025, determined using the BatPaC model for a 75 kWh battery pack and 250,000 vehicles
produced per year. BatPaC's estimate of $120/kWh in 2022 seems reasonable, assuming that
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potential issues with battery material supplies are not included in the $120/kWh estimate. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 16-17]
Battery learning factors. Starting in 2026, EPA introduces "learning factors" that slash the
cost of producing batteries by 25% by 2029 ($90/kWh), by another 25% by 2035 ($75/kWh),
and by yet another 13% by 2050 ($65/kWh). In contrast, HEV costs (which are embedded in
"ICE Powertrain Costs and Glider Costs"), decline by only 4% in 2035 and 9% in 2050. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 16-17]
The cumulative learning rates for battery cost are very high and, since no one has a crystal
ball, no one knows whether those learning rates will truly apply. Note that the writeup in the
DRIA on battery learning just states how it is done - there is no real justification for the learning
assumptions. Below we show that the EPA is applying a one-stage learning model to the entire
battery supply chain, a simplistic model that has already been shown to be implausible in the
peer-reviewed scientific literature. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 16-17]
The agency's learning model is "one stage" because the agency applies the same learning
factors to the mining/processing stage that it applies to the later stages when battery cells are
produced and assembled into battery packs. EPA does not disclose that the production-volume
model of cost savings that it relies upon was estimated for assembly-like operations, not mining
and early- stage processing of mined materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 16-17]
In 2019 the MIT Energy Institute produced a report illustrating why treating the entire battery
supply chain as one stage leads to erroneous learning factors.21 A simulation was performed
where the battery supply chain was broken into two stages - "materials synthesis" (mining and
processing) and battery production. Separate learning factors were derived for the two stages.
The analysts found that derived learning factors were almost 80% smaller for materials synthesis
than for battery production. Moreover, the costs of raw materials and their synthesis place a floor
on the amount of cost reduction that can occur for the entire supply chain. The MIT simulation
shows that battery costs are "unlikely" to fall below $100/kWh prior to 2030. EPA forecasts
them below $80/kWh in 2030 and below $70/kWh in 2032 (DRIA Figure 2-26). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 17]
21 MIT Energy Initiative. 2019. Insights into Future Mobility. Cambridge, MA: MIT Energy Initiative, 76-
80 http://energy.mit.edu/insightsintofuturemobility; also see Hsieh, I-YunLisa, Menghsuan SamPan, Yet-
Ming Chiang, and William H. Green. 2019. "Learning Only Buys You So Much: Practical Limits on
Battery Price Reduction." Applied Energy 239, (April): 218-224.
https ://doi.org/10.1016/j. apenergy .2019.01.138.
The folly of EPA's one-stage model was revealed in 2021 and 2022 when battery prices
stopped declining for the first time in a decade. Indeed, EPA acknowledges that battery prices
rose 7% in 2022, principally due to an unexpected surge in prices of lithium, nickel, cobalt, and
other raw materials used in battery-cell production. Since raw materials account for a much
larger share {10%) of battery costs in 2022 than they did in 2015 (40-50%), it is crucial for the
agency to analyze the future paths of raw material prices. Decades from now, when recycling of
batteries and/or components is widespread, the prices of raw materials may moderate, but for the
next two decades, as the battery sector grows explosively and batteries are recycled only 15-25
years after new BEV sales, dependence on mining and processing of raw materials is
unavoidable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 17]
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The solution to this analytic problem is not to simply suspend learning factors for an arbitrary
number of years, as EPA suggests in the NPRM. EPA needs to build a global model of raw
material prices, including global demand as well as supply. One of the principal reasons that
battery prices are unlikely to drop dramatically between now and 2035 is that global supplies for
raw materials will have difficulty keeping up with the explosive growth in demand for batteries
from China, Europe, and North America. We examine the raw materials issues in more detail in
the next section on The Global Supply and Demand for Raw Materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0585, pp. 17-18]
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
To determine a realistic maximum volume of EVs the market can support for each of the
model years covered by the rule, we believe EPA should consider certain critical factors. Among
these factors, we believe EPA must make a thorough and realistic year-by-year assessment of
key factors like projected battery costs, projected supply of battery critical-minerals, projected
residential and public charging infrastructure availability, projected electrical grid capacity, and
consumer acceptance of BEV technology in the broader arena. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682,
p. 2]
EVs currently cost significantly more to produce than equivalent gasoline cars or trucks. The
average price of a BEV today is about $9,000 higher than that of a comparable ICE vehiclel3.
That price difference is driven mostly by the cost of the batteries. Battery cost have come down
significantly in the past, but, contrary to EPA's assumption that the price of EV batteries will be
substantially lower in coming years, that trend is not likely to continue. Given the anticipated
exponential growth in demand for battery critical minerals to meet the proposed GHG standards,
combined with the continued limited supply of those materials for the foreseeable future
(resulting from the long lead time needed to ramp up mining and processing capacity), costs of
these materials and batteries are expected to rise, thereby widening the price gap between ICEs
and BEVs. Mitsubishi agrees with Auto Innovators' assertion that the Agency has not adequately
addressed projected battery critical minerals availability and associated cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0682, pp. 10-11]
13 New-Vehicle Transaction Prices Trend Downward as Incentives Rise, According to Kelley Blue Book -
Mar.8, 2023 (kbb.com).
Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
Another glaring inconsistency in the EPA's analysis is they assume "the [EV vs ICE] price
difference is likely to narrow or become insignificant as the cost of batteries fall..." As
economies of scale are deployed, conventional wisdom would anticipate the continued decrease
in cost of batteries. However, this may not be the case going forward. BloombergNEF's annual
lithium-ion battery price survey shows a "7% increase in average pack prices in 2022 in real
terms. This is the first increase in the history of the survey"16. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551,
p. 6]
16 https://about.bnef.com/blog/increase-in-battery-prices-could-affect-ev-progress/
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Organization: POET, LLC
Apart from those flawed assumptions about technological feasibility, EPA also makes
unfounded assumptions in its analysis regarding costs. EPA first assumes that the cost of
batteries for BEVs will drop dramatically in the short term—by about $40 kWh or 33% between
2027 to 2032—and then by a more modest amount—about $14 kWh or 12%—from 2032 to
2050.87 EPA then adds a significant, additional reduction—from about $80 to $90 per kWh from
2027 to 2032 to $40 to $60 per kWh—because of the IRA tax credits.88 This amounts to a total
cost reduction of about 50 to 67% in "as few as two to three years" simply because of increased
demand and the IRA. 89 These large reductions are not justified. First, the battery production
capacity that would support these cost reductions has yet to be built. Second, even assuming it is
built as EPA predicts, there is no reason to assume that battery manufacturers will pass cost
savings from the IRA directly onto customers on a one-to-one basis.90 Additionally, EPA's
battery cost assessment appears to ignore the impact of other provisions in the Proposed Rule
regarding battery durability and warranty.91 Those requirements will almost certainly impose
additional costs that EPA has omitted.92 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 22-23]
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id at 6.
92 Id.
OnLocation also finds that additional review by EPA of its battery learning curve (i.e., the
extent to which EPA projects battery costs will decline) is warranted, for reasons including that
EPA could be substantially understating the total cost of the rule.434 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp. 28]
In addition to the technical feasibility of producing BEVs in dramatically greater numbers
than at present and relative to the already aggressive forecasts of BEV penetration without the
Proposed Rule, the assumed cost of BEVs is of course another key driver in U.S. EPA's BEV
penetration forecasts. U.S. EPA's analysis of battery cost is presented in Chapter 2.5 of the
DRIA. The agency's basic assumptions regarding the cost of battery production are shown in
Figure 2-25 of the DRIA which is reproduced below. As shown, U.S. EPA assumes that the
production cost of batteries drops substantially over the period from 2027 through 2032 (~$40
kWh or 33%) but then by only modest additional amounts during the period from 2032 through
2050 (~$14 kWh or 12%). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 57-58]
The next step in the agency's analysis is to lower the $80-90 cost per kWh over the period
from MY 2027 to MY 2032 shown in Figure 2-25 to $40-60 per kWh as shown in DRIA Figure
2-27 based on U.S. EPA's assumptions regarding the impact of the tax credits provided by the
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Overall, U.S. EPA assumes that the current battery production
cost of about $120 kWh will fall by 50 to 67% in as few as two to three years because of
434 Id. at 8.
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increased demand for batteries and federal tax credits under the IRA. U.S. EPA also assumes
similar changes in the marked up prices of batteries as is shown in Figure 2-27. While federal tax
credits may lower the ultimate cost of battery production, there is no reason to assume that
battery manufacturers will pass these cost savings through by lower battery prices, particularly
given the projected worldwide demand for batteries. It is unclear that these credits will continue
to be in place over the period from 2027 through 2032 as they could easily be eliminated or
modified by future legislation. Therefore, U.S. EPA should perform a sensitivity analysis that
shows how dependent the high levels of BEV penetration forecast would be impacted by the
elimination of these tax credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 57-58]
Overall, given that most of the battery production capacity required to supply the batteries
U.S. EPA assumes will be available has yet to be built and that automaker demand for those
batteries will be high given the constraints of the Proposed Rule, U.S. EPA's assumptions
regarding battery costs are difficult to accept and the much slower decline U.S. EPA assumes
post MY 2032 may be much more reasonable to apply over the entire time period and would
certainly represent a conservative approach compared to U.S. EPA's highly optimistic approach.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 57-58]
[See original attachment for Figure 2-25. Reference trajectory of future battery pack
manufacturing costs for a 75 kWh BEV pack] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 57-58]
Another issue with U.S. EPA's battery cost assessment is that it appears to completely ignore
the impact of the cost of the proposed battery durability and warranty provisions of the Proposed
Rule. These new regulatory requirements will clearly impose costs on battery manufacturers and
automakers which will ultimately be passed on to consumers and should be included in U.S.
EPA's analyses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 58]
Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
The PHEV battery costs should be based on using BEV batteries as explained in Appendix D
in this letter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 8]
PHEV and BEV Costs
Some parties claim that Strong PHEVs cost too much. Our coalition's research community
believes there are several methods not yet adopted by many automakers that can reduce the cost
of Strong PHEVs. For light-duty PHEVs, our coalition has found that many researchers
incorrectly find that PHEVs are high cost compared to BEVs. However, researchers anticipate
convergence of the purchase prices of ICEVs and PHEVs in the 2030-2035 timeframe. 17 These
studies suggest that declining battery costs, along with close integration of electrification
subsystems, will play an important role in reducing PHEV costs as adoption increases, and that
PHEVs will consequently be manufactured and operated with lower costs than comparable long-
range BEVs. Further Argonne National Lab's recent report 18 shows that light-duty PHEVs are
less expensive than BEVs for cars, and our experts at Strong PHEV coalition assert that several
additional technical modifications can lower the cost of PHEVs that most analyses do not
consider. A common mistake we find in reports is not understanding the difference between a
strong PHEV and other PHEVs because a strong PHEV can use the same batteries as a BEV
which results in significant cost savings. The two charts below show how a light-duty PHEV
should use the same batteries as a BEV and not have to use a special low- volume production
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battery with a different (higher) power to energy ratio. We believe most mid- range and long-
range PHEV cars and trucks will need BEV batteries. Also see our critique of the Advanced
Clean Car II analysis of PHEV cost. 19 Finally, we agree with EPA that BEVs with large battery
backs will need stronger chassis which adds costs but note that PHEVs do not need this to the
same degree. Thus, EPA's cost analysis for PHEVs should reflect this. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0646, pp. 21-22]
17 Three studies. 1) Hamza, K., Laberteaux, K.P., and Chu, K.-C. (2021). On modeling the cost of
ownership of plug- in vehicles. World Electric Vehicle Journal 12, 39,
https://doi.org/10.3390/wevjl2010039. 2) California Air Resources Board (CARB) (2022). Final statement
of reasons for rulemaking, including summary of comments and agency response, Appendix F: Updated
costs and benefits analysis (August 25),
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/fsorappf.pdf and 3) Islam, E.S., Moawad,
A., Kim, N., and Rousseau, A. (2021). Future cost benefits analysis for electrified vehicles from advances
due to U.S. Department of Energy targets. World Electric Vehicle Journal 12, 84,
https://doi.org/10.3390/wevjl2020084.
18 https://www.anl.gov/argonne-scientific-publications/pub/167396
19 Strong PHEV Coalition - Cost Model Inputs 5.2.22.mp4 (sharepoint.com)
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Consistent with vehicle price reduction, BEV battery prices continue to decline in rapid
fashion. As DOE has recently documented, the energy density of lithium-ion batteries Increased
by more than eight times between 2008 and 2020, allowing for BEVs to travel the same distance
with a smaller battery pack, thus saving space, weight, and manufacturing costs.95 Similarly,
DOE has found that BEV battery pack cost dropped 90% since 2008.96 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0792, pp. 14-15]
95 DOE VTO, FOTW #1234, April 18, 2022: Volumetric Energy Density of Lithium-ion Batteries
Increased by More than Eight Times Between 2008 and 2020 (Apr. 18, 2022). available at h
ttps://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1234-april-18-2022-volumetric-energy-density-lithium-
ion-batteries
96 DOE, FOTW #1272, January 9, 2023: Electric Vehicle Battery Pack Costs in 2022 Are Nearly 90%
Lower than in 2008, according to DOE Estimates (Jan. 9, 2023) available at h
ttps://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1272-january-9- 2 023-electric-vehicle-battery-pack-
costs-2022-are-nearly
Moreover, almost all analysts project profound reductions in battery costs by 2030. For
example, UBS reports that leading manufacturers are estimated to reach battery pack costs as
low as $67/kWh between 2022 and 2024.97 Recently, others have also projected costs
significantly lower than EPA's past projections. BNEF's has estimated that pack prices go below
$100/kWh on a volume-weighted average basis by 2024, hit $58/kWh in 2030,98 and could
achieve a volume-weighted average price of $45/kWh in 2035.99 The National Academies of
Sciences found high-volume battery pack production would be at costs of $65-80/kWh by
2030100 and DNV-GL has predicted costs declining to $80/kWh in 2025.101 The IPCC recently
concluded similarly. 102 These cost estimates all were projected before the Inflation Reduction
Act (IRA) passed Congress. The IRA adds a significant new element to battery cost reduction as
Section 45X provides domestically manufactured cells and finished batteries a production tax
credit of $45/kWh.l03 This new policy has accelerated significant new domestic battery
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production capacity that will generate further cost reductions. 104 Indeed, the 45X production tax
credit is predicted to cut one-third to one-half off the total cost of any BEV battery with both
cells and pack built in the U.S. 105 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 14-15]
97 UBS, EVs Shifting into Overdrive: VW ID.3 teardown - How will electric cars re-shape the auto
industry? (March 2, 2021) at 60 available at h ttps://www.ubs.com/global/en/investment-bank/in-
focus/2021/electric-vehicle-revolution.html
98 BNEF, Electric Vehicle Outlook 2021 (June 9, 2021) available at h ttps://bnef.turtl.co/story/evo-2021/
99 BNEF, Hitting the Inflection Point: Electric Vehicle Price Parity and Phasing Out Combustion Vehicle
Sales in Europe (May 5, 2021) available at h
ttps://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/publications/2021_05_05_Electric_vehicle_price_parity
and adoptio n _in_Europe_Final.pdf
100 NAS, Assessment of Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy - 2025-2035
(March 31, 2021) available at h ttps://www.nap.edu/resource/26092/Briefing Slides Public Release Final
20210331.pdf
101 DNV-GL, Tesla's Battery Day and the Energy Transition (Oct. 26, 2020) available at h
ttps://www.dnvgl.com/feature/tesla-battery-day-energy-1
ransition.html?utm_campaign=GR_GLOB_20Q4_PROM_ETO_2020_Tesla_Battery_Article&utm_mediu
m=email&utm_sour c e=Eloqua
102 IPCC, AR 6, Working Group III, Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change (April 4, 2022)
at 10-32 available at h ttps://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg3/pdf/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf (For
example, according to IEA, battery pack costs could be as low as 80 USD perkWhby 2030 (IEA 2019a).
In addition, there are clear trends that now vehicle manufacturers are offering vehicles with bigger
batteries, greater driving ranges, higher top speeds, faster acceleration, and all size categories (Nykvist et
al. 2019). In 2020 there were over 600,000 battery-electric buses and over 31,000 battery- electric trucks
operating globally (IEA 2021a).)
103 Inflation Reduction Act, P.L. 117-169 (Aug. 16, 2022) at Section 13502.
104 DOE, FOTW #1271, January 2, 2023: Electric Vehicle Battery Manufacturing Capacity in North
America in 2030 is Projected to be Nearly 20 Times Greater than in 2021 (Jan. 2, 2023) available at h
ttps://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1271-january-2-2023-electric-vehicle-battery-
manufacturing-capacity; Argonne National Lab, Assessment of Light-Duty Plug-in Electric Vehicles in the
United States, 2010 - 2021 (Nov. 2022) available at
https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2022/ll/178584.pdf
105 Car and Driver, U.S.-Made EVs Could Get Massively Cheaper, Thanks to Battery Provisions in New
Law (Feb. 3, 2023) available at https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a42749754/us-electric-cars-could-get-
cheaper-inflation-reduction-act- s ection-45x/
In general, Tesla believes the agency's cost assumptions are far too high and are not
supported by the record in that they do not fully consider the documented and projected rapid
decline in battery cell and pack costs, as well the significant BEV range increases achieved
through other efficiencies. From 2017 -2022, the Model 3 powertrain evolved with a 20% lighter
drive unit, 25% less rare earth minerals, a 75% smaller powertrain factory, and a 65% cheaper
powertrain factory. 106 While the agency's proposal suggests that vehicle battery size will grow,
Tesla requests the EPA take into account that it has consistently increased range without
increasing battery size. 107 For example, the Model Y All-Wheel Drive (AWD) achieves 4.0
EPA miles/kWh, which makes it the most efficient electric SUV ever made. 108 More
profoundly, Tesla is hard at work on battery cell innovations. Tesla has announced and
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documented a path toward battery cell production that it expects will lower kWh battery costs by
over 50%. 109 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 15]
106 Tesla, 2023 Investor Day Presentation (March 1, 2023) at 51.
107 See, Tesla, Model S Long Range Plus: Building the First 400-Mile Electric Vehicle (June 15, 2020)
(discussing Model S Long Range Plus vehicles having an official EPA-rated range of 402 miles,
representing a nearly 20% increase in range when compared to a 2019 Model S 100D with the same battery
pack design) available at https://www.tesla.com/blog/model-s-l ong-range-plus-building-first-400-mile-
electric-vehicle; Tesla, The Longest-Range Electric Vehicle Now Goes Even Farther (April 23, 2019)
available at https://www.tesla.com/blog/longest-range-electric-vehicle-now-goes-even-farther
108 Tesla 2023 Investor Day Presentation at 50; Tesla Impact Report 2022 at 36-37.
109 Tesla, Battery Day Presentation (Sept. 22, 2020) available at h ttps://tesla-
share.thron.com/content/?id=96ea71cf-8fda- 4 648-a62c-753af436c3b6&pkey=Sldbei4
the agency's assessment should further recognize the technology forcing created by
finalization of the proposed regulations by factoring in battery cost reductions that will likely be
seen during the MY 2027-32 period as well, including LFP applicationsl 10 and sodium ion
batteries. 111 In some forecasts, LFP is viewed at rapidly growing to capture up to 47% of the
EV market by 2026 resulting in dramatically lower battery pack prices. 112 Indeed, battery
technologies entering the commercialization phase such as silicon anodes, solid state batteries,
and sodium-ion batteries are predicted to improve performance and costs and alter current
material supply chains. 113 The current regulatory impact statement only makes glancing
reference to these technologies and the record is deficient in this respect. 114 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0792, p. 15]
110 See, EPA, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and
Medium-Duty Vehicles, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (Draft RIA) at 28; See also, CleanTechnica,
Designwerk Offers LFP Battery Cells for The HIGH CAB Semi Lowliner (April 25, 2023) available at
https://cleantechnica.com/2023/04/25/designwerk-offers-lfp-battery-cells-for-the-high-cab-semi-lowliner/
111 See, Draft RIA at 35; See also, Bloomberg, Silicon Valley Startup Charts a Path to Cheaper Batteries
(Feb. 22, 2023) available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-22/silicon-valley-startup-
charts-a-path-to-cheaper-ev-b
atteries?cmpid=BBD022223_hyperdrive&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&utm_term=23022
2&utm_campai g n=hyperdrive
112 Ark Invest, Lithium Iron Phosphate Could Take 47% of the Battery Market By 2026 (July 29, 2022)
available at h ttps://ark-invest.com/articles/analyst-research/lithium-iron-phosphate-batteries/
113 BloombergNEF, Electric Vehicle Outlook 2023, Executive Summary (June 8, 2023) at 9 available at h
ttps://about.bnef.com/electric-vehicle-outlook/https://about.bnef.com/electric-vehicle-outlook/
114 See generally, IEA, Trends in batteries (2023) (analyzing other battery chemistries) available at h
ttps://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2023/trends-in-batteries
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
4. Battery Costs Projections
EPA's assessment of future battery costs is highly optimistic and inconsistent with available
sources. The assessment starts with an inaccurate baseline cost for 2022 and then uses an
incomplete set of forecasts to develop two trajectories which rely on assumed mid-decade price
stabilization of lithium. The assessment appears to ignore the risk for price spikes arising in a
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tight and geopolitically sensitive market for critical minerals. Please see Appendix A on mineral
supply and potential price implications. Lastly, EPA applies tax credits from the IRA 45X
provision in a confusing way that could go beyond the intent of the legislation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, p. 18]
4.1. Baseline Assumptions
To arrive at the 2022 baseline for direct manufacturing costs, EPA used ANL's BatPaC 5.0 to
develop a sweep of expected costs ($/kWh) for varying battery sizes (gross kWh), at four
different production rates as shown in Figure 3. EPA selected a 75kWh battery at 250,000
packs/year to arrive at $120/kWh to represent the baseline. EPA attempts to justify the baseline
by comparing it to a Tesla 30-40 GWh capacity "gigafactory". The assumed production rates are
overly optimistic and contrary to our comments above on the lead time and scale up of new
battery production facilities. EPA must recognize battery plant sizes and capacities will vary
greatly based on a host of factors ranging from site size to workforce availability, to logistical
optimization in the vehicle production footprint, to battery mineral/cell/pack supply chains and
sources, to capital availability, and so forth. EPA appears to have selected a large capacity
facility to represent what it expects will be "typical". If EPA had data suggesting a 250,000 unit
per year battery facility would be "average" then this approach might make sense. As it stands,
such a large facility is more likely to be the exception and not the rule, and EPA should expect
most battery production to align with the lower capacity curves in Figure 3. Painting the entire
industry's manufacturing approaches with a single broad brush likely underestimates costs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 18-21]
[See original for graph, Figure 3 Proposed Rule Cost Estimates by Battery Size and
Production Rates] 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 18-21]
12 Figure 1 - EPA DRIA Figure 2-20 Plot of Base Year 2022 DMC estimates for different sized BEV
battery packs at 4 different production rates.
EPA also seeks to justify the baseline battery cost with a qualitative comparison to the
summary of cost projections from EDF/ERM as seen in Figure 17.13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0620, pp. 18-21]
13 Environmental Defense Fund, Electric Vehicle Market Update (Sep. 2022) at pg. 27. Available at
htps://blogs.edf.org/climate411/wp-content/blogs.dir/7/files/2022/09/ERM-EDF-Electric-Vehicle-Market-
Report_September2022.pdf.
Toyota's assessment of available sources finds baseline battery costs significantly higher than
$120/kWh. We considered three studies by e-Source, Mauler et. al., and BNEF and added them
to EPA's DRIA Figure 2-24 (shown in Figure 4). For EPA's battery cost future projections, we
added insights from two studies, Mauler et.al. again, and an MITEI study. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0620, pp. 18-21]
[See original for graph, Figure 4 EDF/ERM Batter Cost Survey form Proposal with Added
Data] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 18-21]
A 2023 study from e-Source, which specializes in downstream battery supply chain analysis
and manufacturing modeling,14 concludes a cost of $158/kWh in 2022 for a 75-kWh NMC811
battery pack produced at US 100-GWh plant at 250,000 packs/year. This is significantly higher
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than the proposal's stated $120/kWh for 2022 - even at the high production capacity of 250,000
units. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 18-21]
The December 2022 updated annual battery price survey from BNEF observes average
lithium- ion battery pack prices of $141 per kilowatt hour in 2021 increasing to $151 in 2022,
representing the first increase since 2013 (Figure 5). This agrees with the e-Source study and is
consistent with the price volatility in 2022 stemming from skyrocketing raw material prices,
record-setting inflation, and geopolitical tensions with Russia. EPA appears to have used the
2022 BNEF data, however the 2022 data point is not included in Figure 4. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0620, pp. 18-21]
14 Proprietary study by e-Source for USA cost per pack of NMC811, 75 kWh packs at 250,000 packs per
year assumed
[See original for bar chart, Figure 5 BNEF Battery Pack and Cell Cost Projections] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 18-21]
4.2. Forecasts
The EDF/ERM report referenced in Figure 4 is used to establish a cost trajectory that is
anchored by the following data points: $120/kWh baseline for 2022, $110/kWh for 2026 and
$90/kWh for 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 21-23]
In Figure 6, direct manufacturer costs for a 75-kWh battery (black line) that decline over time
are developed by applying assumed rates of learning to the "reference trajectory". The trajectory
for a 100-kWh battery (blue line) was then generated in the OMEGA model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 21-23]
The steepest reductions occur from 2025 to 2029 due to assumed stabilized lithium prices by
the mid-2020s. The price for the 75-kWh battery falls to about $90/kWh in 2030 which implies
25% reduction in cost from 2022 baseline. The 100 kWh battery cost declines from the
$115/kWh baseline to about $78/kWh in 2030 resulting in an 32% reduction, and to $61/kWh in
2035, a 21% cost reduction. The resulting costs seem implausible and would be considerably
higher if upward pressure on prices cause by tight supply of were appropriately considered.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 21-23]
[See original for graph, Figure 6 OMEGA Battery Pack Costs] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0620, pp. 21-23]
Toyota's referenced sources indicate the cost of batteries is expected to decline in the future,
but this decline could be slowed or even reversed if battery raw material prices rise.
Technological innovation is expected to lead to significant cost reductions, but there is a
significant risk that it may not be able to offset the rising cost of critical minerals. The Mauler
et.al. study analyzed several battery forecast studies and found "the methods of technological
learning, literature-based projection, bottom-up modeling, and expert elicitation.. .(and)
technological advances... and economies of scale" 15 tend to neglect raw material price
volatility. When rising material cost is added to the analysis as a main variable, even the slightest
increase threatens to offset those production savings for battery costs. The study found the 2030
battery pack cost for low price case to be $96/kWh, and $130/kWh for the high price case, with a
midpoint of $113/kWh. This is in stark contrast to EPA's 2030 battery pack cost projection of
$78/kWh in 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 21-23]
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15 Id.
Finally, a 2019 study by MIT Energy Initiative (MITEI) finds that "Though battery costs have
declined substantially, predictions about future price declines must be approached with caution
as they often fail to account for the cost of the raw materials used to make batteries." 16 MITEI
projects the 2030 price of a Li Ion battery pack will be $124/kWh, despite a decline in costs. This
aligns the fluctuating price of Li, Ni, Mn, Co and C found in the Mauler et. al. study, which was
done independently and in 2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 21-23]
16 MIT Energy Initiative. Insights into Future Mobility. Cambridge, MA. (2019), 77-79.
https://energy.mit.edu/wp- content/uploads/2019/ll/Insights-into-Future-Mobility.pdf
4.4. Conclusions
The battery cost projections in the proposal are not realistic because they do not sufficiently
consider the dynamic external variables creating tight supply which increase the risk of supply
chain disruptions and volatile raw material prices. Nor does EPA's assessment account for the
time it takes to establish and ramp up battery production. The Final Rule must take a broader
view of available expert sources and reconsider the applicability cost reductions through IRA.
The result should be revised the battery cost projections. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp.
24-25]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
EPA's cost estimates for future battery packs also ignore the customer-readable battery state-
of-health monitor proposed by EPA as a new requirement under this rulemaking.209 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 38-40]
209 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29284.
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
The EV battery is one of the most significant factors in the cost of an EV, comprising 20-50%
of the total vehicle cost, though this percentage has decreased significantly over time. This
decrease is driven by lithium prices, which have significantly dropped over the last year, from
$85,000 to $30,000 per tonne from November 2022 to April 2023.51 This trend is driven by a
boom in lithium supply from China, Australia, and Chile. The reduction in critical mineral inputs
means we will "see more and more electric vehicles selling for $25,000 to $40,000" according to
Cox Automotive. 52 Overall, the cost of lithium-ion batteries has declined substantially since
2008, down to $153 per kWh, as shown in Figure 2.53 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 12-
13]
51 "Major drop in lithium prices could mean cheaper electric vehicles," CBC News, (April 17, 2023)
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/sudbury/lithium-price-drop-electric-vehicles-l.6811105
52 Id. at footnote 51
53 "FOTW #1272, January 9, 2023: Electric Vehicle Battery Pack Costs in 2022 Are Nearly 90% Lower
than in 2008, according to DOE Estimates," U.S. Department of Energy, (January 9, 2023)
https://www.energy.gOv/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1272-january-9-2023-electric-vehicle-battery-pack-
costs-2022-ar e-nearly
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[See original comment for Figure 2: Estimated historical lithium-ion battery pack costs from
2008-2022] [EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 12-13]
54 Id. at footnote 53
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Several commenters stated the position that EPA's base year battery pack cost per kWh for
2022 was too low. These commenters cited various sources, most prominently the Bloomberg
New Energy Finance (BNEF) battery price survey that was published in December 2022, and
also Benchmark Minerals and ANL. The Alliance specifically noted that these sources indicated
even higher costs for NMC chemistry, which EPA had stated as the chemistry it had assumed. In
general, these commenters requested EPA to reconsider its base year battery cost and revise it to
be more consistent with these sources. These commenters also frequently indicated that part of
the reason that EPA's battery costs were too low, in their view, might be that we assumed
average production rates that were too high. For example, the Alliance and Toyota contended
that our production rate of 250,000 packs per year was too high for the base year cost case, and
recommended that we consider a smaller volume more inclusive of manufacturers who have
smaller production rates. Specifically, the Alliance stated that smaller automotive manufacturers
may only utilize a portion of a larger plant's total capacity for cells and packs built to their
individual specifications. The Alliance also questioned whether "30-40 GWh battery
manufacturing plant capacity is common among the largest manufacturers" and stated that this
assumption "fails to contemplate the production efficiencies of new battery plants versus those
that have been fully operational for years, including variations in battery chemistry." Similarly,
Toyota asserted that "such a large facility is more likely to be the exception and not the rule."
In contrast, other commenters indicated that they felt that our base year battery costs were
appropriate or too high. Tesla commented that it felt that the agency's cost assumptions "are far
too high and are not supported by the record in that they do not fully consider the documented
and projected rapid decline in battery cell and pack costs, as well the significant BEV range
increases achieved through other efficiencies." Tesla also pointed out that EPA's battery sizes
increase over time, and that EPA should consider that Tesla "has consistently increased range
without increasing battery size." Similar positions were expressed by ICCT and EDF.
Response:
EPA appreciates the supportive comments from Tesla, ICCT, the Environmental and Public
Health Organizations coalition, and EDF, and continues to believe that the battery costs used in
the proposal analysis represent one possible outcome for future battery costs. However, in
considering the totality of information and data at the present time, including the battery cost
analysis conducted by ANL (described in Chapter 2 of the RIA and Section IV.C.2 of the
preamble), EPA believes it is appropriate to increase the battery costs in its central case in order
to reflect the results of this analysis and better address the uncertainty that continues to exist in
the market regarding future mineral prices and other drivers of battery cost.
In the proposal, EPA acknowledged the BNEF survey, which became public very late in our
analysis process. We noted that although the nominal cost reported by BNEF for BEV batteries
at $138 per kWh was lower than the base year cost in the proposal, there was considerable
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uncertainty in comparing the battery designs in the proposal to the battery designs represented in
the survey, which were not described in detail. We also cited the BNEF report as an example of
the fluidity of battery cost projections, and indicated that we would consider this and any new
information to update our battery costs for the final rule. We also stated that we would conduct
additional analysis of battery costs with Argonne National Laboratory by using a version of
BatPaC with specific assumptions for technology improvements over time, and current and
forecasted mineral costs. Through this work, and as described in preamble Section IV.C.2 and
Chapter 2 of the RIA, our baseline battery costs have increased, and are now in good agreement
with the 2022 BNEF price survey. In response to comments relating to ANL and BMI forecasts,
we now use battery costs developed by ANL using BMI mineral cost forecasts. Relating to
comments that we should be using the higher NMC costs from these sources, in OMEGA we do
not specify whether specific vehicles are using NMC or another chemistry, and thus for the
purpose of the analysis it is an average cost across all chemistries that may be present in the fleet
that is most relevant. Although our battery costs in the proposal were developed using NMC811-
G, we now use a weighted average of NMC (varying from 522 to 955) and LFP.
We also note that in light of the most recent 2023 BNEF battery price survey, our new costs
are conservative, as the 2023 survey indicates that prices have resumed a downward trend,
dropping by 14 percent from 2022 to 2023.
In addition, as described in the proposal, our assumption of 250,000 packs per year was in
part due to limitations in how BatPaC has historically modeled pack production volume, in order
to capture economies of scale for cell production in cases where a plant manufactures
standardized cells at a volume sufficient to supply the annual production volume of more than
one pack design. Our updated costs are now based on significantly smaller pack production
volumes in the earlier years of the analysis, as described in Table 1 of the ANL study.435
Regarding plant size, we continue to assess that many of the operating battery plants and most
new plant announcements are in the 30 to 40 GWh range or higher. For example, ANL surveyed
U.S. battery manufacturing plants currently in operation and announced for the future and
determined that "the majority of the production volume (860 GWh/year) comes from 22 plants
with a nameplate capacity between 30-50 GWh/year."436 Even if, as the commenter suggests, at
the current time smaller plants are also common and that production costs are higher in these
plants, the sheer volume represented by the large size of announced plants that will enter
production during the time frame of the rule is likely to dominate any calculation of average cost
across the industry. If as the commenter suggests, the cost of production is much higher in these
plants (that is, enough higher to be significant to the findings of the analysis), this assertion is
inconsistent with manufacturers' decision to construct plants of this size, knowing that they
would therefore not be competitive with the majority of future production volume. Given the
significance of battery cost to the cost of PEV production, we continue to assess that
manufacturers will be motivated to achieve the lowest costs by either constructing large plants or
purchasing from suppliers that operate large plants (or alternatively, rationally constructing
smaller plants when they anticipate that the size of the plant will not make the production cost
435 Argonne National Laboratory, "Cost Analysis and Projections for U.S.-Manufactured Automotive Lithium-ion
Batteries," ANL/CSE-24/1, January 2024.
436 Argonne National Laboratory, "Quantification of Commercially Planned Battery Component Supply in North
America through 2035," ANL-24/14, March 2024.
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uncompetitive). Toyota and the Alliance stated the position that EPA's assessment did not
account for the time it takes to establish and ramp up battery production, referring specifically to
OMEGA and its use of costs derived for a 250,000 pack per year production volume in each year
of the analysis. However, the updated analysis for the final rule uses cost correlations developed
by the ANL study which determines costs specifically for each year of the analysis with
reference to a gradually increasing cell yield and plant production volume that ramp in over time.
EPA considers this update also responsive to the Alliance comment that EPA should have
accounted for "the production efficiencies of new battery plants versus those that have been fully
operational for years, including variations in battery chemistry." With regard to this latter
comment, EPA also notes that the commenters did not provide data or evidence as to why or to
what degree they believe that production cost is higher in newer plants, or the effect of a plant's
prior operating time on production efficiencies. EPA believes that cell yield and production
volume are sufficiently representative of any purported such effect that may exist.
Summary:
Several commenters (Alliance, [etc]) stated the position that the learning rates that EPA
applied to battery costs after the base year (2023 and beyond) were too high, and resulted in
projected battery costs that they felt were unrealistic, or were not in agreement with specific
studies that they cited in support of this position. A common theme in these comments was the
position that EPA did not appropriately consider factors that might cause battery costs to decline
at a much slower than historical rate, or not decline at all. These factors included: increased
demand and scarcity of critical minerals, price volatility and geopolitical uncertainty in a time of
dynamic global market growth, and factors beyond material costs such as engineering and
performance improvements. Also exemplary of some of these comments was JLR's comment
that EPA should "acknowledge the risk of further market volatility for critical mineral pricing
and take a more conservative approach when modeling battery prices."
Another theme was that EPA should adopt a two-stage learning model in which material cost
reductions are assessed separately from technology/process cost reductions. Specifically, the
Alliance noted that an MIT report which used such a model concluded that it is unlikely that
battery prices will fall below $100 kWh by 2030. The Alliance also stated that EPA should
implement a model of the materials synthesis stage to better capture the dynamics of mineral
demand and its effect on future prices; similarly, John Graham stated that EPA should "build a
global model of raw material prices, including global demand as well as supply."
Some commenters, in particular API, also criticized our use of cumulative GWh of battery
production as an input to the battery cost learning equation. The Alliance recommended "that
EPA revisit its battery cost analysis and align its 2027-and-later projections with Mauler
analysis." The Alliance also expressed the view that "EPA needs to update its modeling to align
with current battery costs and future critical mineral costs in its analysis for the final rule."
The Alliance and some other commenters also expressed skepticism that costs would decrease
in the future, the Alliance stating that it is "not confident that a net decrease in battery prices will
occur; an increase in battery prices is a distinct possibility due to global demand for limited
resources." These commenters often pointed out that battery costs had begun to rise in recent
years, again citing the BNEF survey and other sources. For example, AFPM stated that "battery
costs rose 7 percent in 2022," and that the cost of lithium increased by 738 percent between
January 2021 and March 2022. Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al. noted a study by E-
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Source that predicted flat battery pack prices through 2032, and a press article that cited
projections by BMI that commenter asserts shows "massive lithium shortages" beginning in
2029.
In contrast, Energy Innovation supported the learning rates used in the proposal, and cited a
paper to support their position that "historic forecasts of battery prices have largely
underestimated the impact of future learning curve effects," and "even the most optimistic
projections for prior forecasts underestimated future learning curves."
Response:
As described below, EPA has updated its battery cost modeling to include a year-by-year
assessment of future mineral prices, manufacturing volumes, and technology improvements, and
the updated costs align well with current battery costs. EPA appreciates the recommendation of
the Mauler analysis, which we have considered carefully. We also appreciate the Alliance's
specific recommendations for where to set base year and future battery costs based directly on
the Mauler paper. However, we disagree that our battery cost analysis should be based on the
findings of a single research paper. We also note that our new costs, like the Mauler paper, begin
with a year-over-year technology roadmap based on expert expectations, and incorporate analyst
forecasts of mineral prices. For the years 2023 through 2035, our new battery costs are based on
the aforementioned ANL battery cost study, which predicts battery costs in specific future years
resulting from specific technology development pathways, and also incorporates mineral price
forecasts published by Benchmark Minerals. Therefore (a) our updated costs now consider the
effect of potential mineral scarcity and demand, through the use of forecast mineral prices by a
leading analyst firm, and (b) our derivation of the new costs from a specific set of technology
improvements means that we no longer rely on a learning rate equation to estimate future costs to
2035. After 2035, because the ANL work did not cover this period, we continue to use a
simplified and modest cost reduction rate of 1.5 percent per year. This rate is reasonable in that it
results in a battery cost projection for 2055 (the endpoint of our long term analysis) of about $60
per kWh, a figure which is often seen in long-range forecasts in the literature, and often
attributed to earlier years than 2055. The figure is also consistent with an analysis performed by
Mauler et al. that examined a large number of published battery cost forecasts and established a
mean regression out to 2050, which if extended to 2055 would suggest a cost of $63 per kWh.437
We consider this to be a reasonable if not conservative endpoint, and we also note Energy
Innovation's perspective that learning rates have historically been conservative with respect to
reality.
The use of mineral price forecasts in the ANL work also obviates the suggestion to adopt a
two-stage learning model, since the costs to 2035 are based on specific mineral price forecasts
and technology improvements rather than a learning equation. Further, our new central case costs
are not in conflict with the MIT report cited by the Alliance in that they do not fall below $100
kWh in 2030.
Regarding the position that EPA should implement a model of the materials synthesis stage
including manufacturing, or a global model of raw material prices, we consider our use of
mineral price forecasts from a leading analyst firm combined with a technology roadmap over
437 Mauler et al., "Battery cost forecasting: a review of methods and results with an outlook to 2050," Energy
Environ. Sci, v. 14, pp. 4712-4739 (2021).
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the time frame of the rule to be an effective way of representing the influence of material choice,
costs, and global demand over the time frame of the rule.
Regarding comments that battery prices had begun to rise and might not decline in the future,
EPA acknowledges that the BNEF 2022 price survey supports that prices had increased between
2021 and 2022. However, it is not clear that battery prices will continue to increase in this
manner or fail to continue to decline. The 2022 BNEF survey itself noted that the cause of the
reported increase may be due to temporary factors, and that cost reductions are expected to
continue in the future. In fact, the 2023 BNEF survey fulfilled this prediction, as it showed that
battery prices had dropped by 14 percent since the 2022 survey. EPA also notes that since these
comments were submitted, analyst firms indicate that many mineral prices have continued a
downward trend and are forecast to continue this trend in the future. For example, ZETA
commented that lithium prices have significantly dropped "from $85,000 to $30,000 per tonne
from November 2022 to April 2023." Further, the most recent short-range forecast by Wood
Mackenzie indicates that mineral prices will moderate and decline over the next several years.438
While forecasts cannot perfectly predict the future, these developments show that drawing a
conclusion regarding future battery costs or mineral prices is subject to uncertainties. EPA's
findings on battery and mineral prices recognize these uncertainties, consider the key factors that
affect battery and critical mineral prices, and are based upon a thorough evaluation of the
technical literature and leading analyst forecasts. Specifically, these most recent forecasts do not
support commenters' suggestion that battery prices will continue to rise or fail to decline. With
regard to comments that EPA should take a more conservative approach that addresses the risk
and uncertainty about mineral prices, EPA considers the updated central case costs to be
responsive. With regard to the possibility of higher battery costs than in our updated central
analysis, EPA considers the high sensitivity case of 25 percent higher costs to adequately
represent these possibilities, especially considering the overall higher costs of the updated central
case.
EPA also appreciates comments related to our use of cumulative GWh of battery production
in the learning equation for future battery costs. As described in preamble Section IV.C.2, the
ANL-derived cost equations for 2023 through 2035 obviate the need for application of a learning
factor, and we no longer use cumulative GWh learning to reflect learning by doing.
While we appreciate the Alliance's perspective questioning that a net decrease in battery
prices will occur at all over the time frame of the rule, we also note that the most recent analyst
outlooks and battery price forecasts continue to anticipate battery and critical mineral cost
reductions to varying degrees, even in the knowledge of the possibility of increased mineral
demand and price volatility. While the highest cost scenario of the Mauler paper assumes battery
costs to stay at a more or less constant level to 2030, that case is arbitrarily based on the most
pessimistic of analyst expectations. EPA sees no consensus that costs will behave in this manner.
Many other commenters do not see such a likelihood either; for example, Tesla stated that
"almost all analysts project profound reductions in battery costs by 2030." Mauler's high cost
scenario of perpetually flat or increasing battery cost is clearly inconsistent with prevailing
analyst outlooks on mineral or battery prices, and based on the date of the Mauler paper
(received November 2021 and published March 2022), appears to be based on earlier outlooks
438 Wood Mackenzie, "Electric Vehicle & Battery Supply Chain Short-term outlook November 2023", December 1,
2023 (filename: evbsc-short-term-outlook-november-2023_final.pdf). Available to subscribers.
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that reflected analyst sentiment that is now out of date and would be considered outlier sentiment
today. Similarly, the comment from Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al. that cites a study
by E Source projecting "battery cell prices will surge 22% from 2023 through 2026" dates from
2022, and the outlook it describes is not supported by more recent forecasts of mineral prices nor
by projections of battery prices such as the 2023 BNEF battery price survey which indicated a 14
percent reduction in battery prices since the time of the E Source study. Further, the commenter's
assertion that "massive lithium shortages" will occur after 2029 is based on a chart in a press
article that actually projects a market balance and not specifically a "shortage." As EPA explains
in Section IV.C.7.i of the preamble, the mere identification of a gap between projected supply
and projected demand, particularly in far future years, is not the same as a shortage in which
manufacturers would not be able to obtain material; the identification of such a gap is in fact
often essential to motivate development of new supply. EPA considers ANL's use of BMI
mineral cost forecasts in developing the battery cost correlations that we use in the updated
analysis through 2035 to be responsive to these comments.
Summary:
In a related vein, the Alliance stated that EPA omitted consideration of several factors other
than materials prices that they contend "are working to keep battery prices high." These
included: motivation to increase energy density for greater range; safety, such as minimizing the
risk of battery fires; frequent use of DC fast chargers; improved thermal management systems;
and adherence to responsible sourcing guidelines, including avoidance of sourcing from lower
cost suppliers that are not free trade agreement partners.
Response:
EPA agrees that there are other factors beyond material costs that affect battery manufacturing
costs, and that manufacturers regularly pursue improved designs. The costs derived by the ANL
study include a capability to fast charge from 15 percent to 95 percent SOC in 26 minutes, and at
this time it is not clear that a faster charge rate will necessarily be prevalent in the future.
Improving energy density is not the only means to improve range; it can also be achieved by
improving energy efficiency of the vehicle, as comments by Lucid and Tesla attest. Safety and
improved thermal management are also important, as are responsible sourcing. However, these
effects are not readily quantifiable, and the commenter did not provide data or evidence as to
how these effects might be quantified. Nor did the commenter persuasively explain or adduce
empirical evidence that these technological developments would increase prices, nor by how
much, nor that it would reasonably be expected to fully or even significantly offset the cost
reductions modeled by EPA. Responsible sourcing is addressed in RTC Section 15 where we
discuss topics related to critical minerals.
Summary:
In the context of either base year battery costs or our learning rates, or both, some
commenters addressed EPA's consideration of mineral costs. Some commenters supported
EPA's assumption that mineral costs would stabilize over the time frame of the rule, while others
did not.
Response:
As also noted above, our updated battery cost assessment for 2023-2035 is based on the ANL
study that incorporates mineral cost forecasts from BMI, a leading analyst firm, and does not rely
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on any blanket assumption regarding mineral cost trends over time. We also note that since these
comments were submitted, analyst firms indicate that many mineral prices have continued a
downward trend, and the most recent mid-range forecast by Wood Mackenzie suggests that
mineral prices will moderate or decline over the next several years and through the duration of
their forecast (to 2029).439 While some commenters have cited an outlook for a shortage of
lithium beginning to form beyond that time frame, forecasting that far into the future is subject to
additional uncertainties, especially in light of the high level of activity in developing new
mineral and processing capability at the current time and anticipated high demand continuing
into the future, all of which provides a strong environment for investment in these resources. As
EPA has pointed out elsewhere, the mere identification of a gap between a future projected
supply and a future projected demand does not equate to identification of a future shortage and is
in fact one of the signals that spurs development of additional supply. While forecasts cannot
perfectly predict the future, these developments do support our outlook that mineral costs will
tend to stabilize over time. EPA's evaluation of the evidence, supported by recent analyses from
ANL and BMI, is that manufacturers choosing to produce PEVs will not be constrained by the
availability of lithium or other critical minerals, including through 2035. See preamble Section
IV.C.7 and RTC Chapter 15 for further discussion of the availability of critical minerals.
Summary:
The Alliance stated that the version of BatPaC utilized in the proposal assumes an electrolyte
cost that differs from that presented by Argonne National Laboratory in October 2022 and
included on the anl.gov website.
Response:
The updated cost analysis was performed by ANL using the latest version of their BatPaC
model and cost inputs that they considered appropriate for the purpose of the study.
Summary:
Some commenters including the Alliance questioned the "default labor values currently hard
coded into the BatPaC model" as needing reconsideration, given that EPA's assumptions
regarding the 45X production tax credit implied that most batteries would be produced in the
U.S.
Response:
As described in Preamble Section IV.C.2, our battery costs are now based on twice the default
labor cost in BatPaC, which we assess to be similar to prevailing hourly rates and overhead for
organized labor in U.S. automotive plants.
Summary:
AFPM commented that "EPA points to the IRA as a mechanism to reduce battery prices, yet
this law simply extended the existing battery subsidy and even limited its applicability through
domestic sourcing and income requirements. Thus, EPA is relying on an existing program for the
proposition that it will lower battery prices in the future." AFPM also stated that "EPA is
simultaneously ignoring that the increase in demand for batteries will raise their price."
439 Wood Mackenzie, "Electric Vehicle & Battery Supply Chain Short-term outlook November 2023", December 1,
2023 (filename: evbsc-short-term-outlook-november-2023_final.pdf). Available to subscribers.
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Response:
EPA disagrees. While the IRC 30D provisions can be understood as a form of the previous
purchase incentive under 30D and is more limited in some ways, we do not apply the 30D
incentive as a reduction in battery manufacturing cost. Moreover, the IRA included entirely new
credits such as for example the 45X production tax credit which previously was not available to
battery manufacturers. With regard to the effect of demand on battery prices, mineral costs are a
major part of battery cost and we have included analyst mineral price forecasts, which would
include the effect of anticipated demand, in our updated battery costs.
Summary:
Some commenters referred to: the status of battery raw materials as specialty chemicals
(AFPM), the potential need for battery replacement (several commenters), and our application of
IRA tax credits in OMEGA (several commenters), including comments that it implied negative
battery costs.
Response:
EPA appreciates AFPM's observations regarding battery raw materials being considered in
the market as specialty chemicals. In referencing the forecasts of respected analyst firms whose
forecasts often are widely used by industry actors, for example to negotiate contracts and assess
market conditions and outlook, we expect that the commenter's observations on specialty
chemical status and volatility of pricing are duly reflected in these forecast products. EPA also
appreciates that several commenters on battery cost mentioned the potential need for battery
replacement, and/or our application of IRA credits to battery and PEV costs, including the
amount of the credits and their accounting in OMEGA as passing to the manufacturer or
consumer. We address comments on battery replacement in RTC Section 12.2.5 and on our
application of IRA credits in RTC Section 12.4.
Summary:
The Alliance stated that they were unable to examine cell-level costs from our analysis, and
recommended that "EPA clearly present its EV sales-weighted $/kWh values in pack-level and
cell-level estimates for all model years 2022-2032 to transparently allow comparisons between
EPA's projections and the applicable research literature and industry estimates."
Response:
The BatPaC spreadsheets that EPA used to develop cell cost equations for the proposal
analysis were included in the public docket and an examination of these files would reveal all of
the calculations made by the BatPaC model, including cell costs for the battery configurations
that were generated in deriving the equations. That said, EPA disagrees that disclosure of cell
costs in addition to pack costs is necessary in order to compare sources. For a given study, the
choice of whether to study costs in terms of pack cost or cell cost depends on the context and
aims of the study, and as a result, many studies choose only one or the other. The EPA analysis
requires cost to be expressed in pack cost, because the unit of interest for costing electrified
vehicles is packs, not cells. For this reason, the ANL battery cost equations are expressed in
terms of pack cost. Also, the relationship between pack cost and cell cost would vary depending
on the size of the battery, making it impractical to maintain a distinction between cell cost and
pack cost throughout the analysis.
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Summary:
Some commenters stated that the default costs provided in BatPaC for electrode powders and
other constituents were not transparent or documented.
Response:
BatPaC is developed by Argonne National Laboratory which develops the default costs based
on pricing research and expert views on the costs typically paid for these materials at the present
time. These costs are part of the BatPaC product and are clearly visible for inspection and are
editable in the model. Our updated battery costs are derived from work by ANL that similarly
used BatPaC but provided BatPaC with costs for electrode powders based on mineral price
forecasts from Benchmark Minerals Intelligence for each year from 2023 through 2035. As the
values used are in fact visible in the model, they are self-evident and can be readily compared
with values that the user considers appropriate. The ANL report includes a full accounting of the
prices used for precursors, anode active material and cathode active material in the battery cost
study.440
Summary:
API notes that raw material costs represent 63 percent of battery costs, and recommends
following "the economics of raw materials rather than capital depreciation and learning models
for purposes of accuracy," further suggesting that "perhaps following the economics of oil
production would be more representative of modeling the costs [...]", also noting that "over the
last 40 years the global supply of oil has increased by -50% [while] the price increased by
-200%."
Response:
EPA disagrees that the economics of oil production is a proper analogy to the economics of
battery minerals. The bulk of oil production is used as fuel and is consumed entirely by its users
in proportion to distance traveled over time, while use of battery minerals is fixed for the lifetime
of a given vehicle and to a large degree can be recovered for recycling, reducing the amount of
new material that must be produced. Although EPA agrees with commenter that mining activities
in general seek to first use "the lowest cost-to-produce sources," EPA notes that many factors
such as this are well understood in the mining industry, and in the updated analysis our estimates
of future battery costs incorporate mineral price forecasts from a leading analyst firm. Such
forecasts are based on expert knowledge of the mining industry and consider a wide range of
factors that are commonly expected to drive mineral prices in the future. Further, over time,
spent batteries will comprise an additional source of minerals through recycling. For more
discussion of the difference between energy security and mineral security, see RTC Section 21
(Energy Security) and RTC Section 15 (which includes responses related to mineral security).
For more discussion of battery recycling, see RTC Section 15.2.
Summary:
JLR stated that their forecast for battery cost reduction is considerably lower than EPA's
forecast for the industry.
440 Argonne National Laboratory, "Cost Analysis and Projections for U.S.-Manufactured Automotive Lithium-Ion
Batteries," Report ANL/CSE-24/1, January 2024 (Appendix A7).
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Response:
EPA anticipates that specific automakers may experience differing battery costs over the time
frame of the rule, due to differences in factors such as level of previous or planned investment,
size of the business operation, or the terms of negotiated supplier agreements and partnerships,
among many others. Battery cost inputs to OMEGA are intended to represent an average cost
across the industry and are not differentiated by specific manufacturer.
Summary:
With regard to HEV batteries, John Graham stated that HEV battery costs should be given
more attention, should be estimated separately from PEV batteries, and that the learning factors
EPA used for HEV batteries were too small.
Response:
EPA agrees that HEV battery costs should be estimated separately from PEV battery costs,
and did so in the proposal analysis. Our updated battery costs include updated cost equations
developed by ANL specifically for HEV batteries and continue to be separate from those used
for PEV battery costs. The learning factors implied by the HEV cost equation in the updated
analysis result from ANL experts' expectations regarding chemistry, manufacturing and design
improvements for these batteries.
Summary:
Mitsubishi Motors recommended that EPA determine a "realistic maximum volume of EVs
the market can support for each of the model years covered by the rule," by considering a
thorough and realistic year-by-year assessment of projected battery costs and projected supply of
battery critical minerals.
Response:
In the proposal and in the current analysis, EPA imposed a constraint on GWh of battery
production available to the U.S. automotive market each year for modeling purposes. See also
the response to comments on critical minerals and supply chain issues in RTC Section 15.
Summary:
Some commenters stated that the battery durability and warranty requirements would increase
battery cost and this should be accounted for.
Response:
See RTC Section 16 where we respond to comments on battery durability and warranty.
Summary:
POET LLC commented that the battery production capacity that would support the cost
reductions EPA attributed to the 45X production tax credit has yet to be built.
Response:
For general discussion of supply chain and battery manufacturing capacity, see RTC Section
15. For discussion of our application of the 45X tax credits, see RTC Section 12.4, Modeling of
IRA.
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Summary:
The Alliance commented that the cost of electricity to manufacture batteries did not account
for the potential for electricity rates to become more expensive as renewable generation is added,
and cited rates in Germany and California as evidence.
Response:
To the extent that electricity is part of the cost of manufacturing batteries, the BatPaC model
accounts for plant utility cost as part of variable overhead. Regarding the idea that renewable
generation will increase this cost, EPA disagrees with this assertion. Electricity rates are a result
of many factors including national, regional, and state policies and conditions, regional costs of
feedstocks, and many other economic and policy factors, all of which must be taken into account
when considering the basis for observed electricity rates. The cost of renewable energy capacity
is declining faster than other sources and its levelized cost is already highly competitive with or
significantly less costly than other sources of new generating capacity,441 and despite recent
increases in commodity costs, renewable energy capacity continues to grow faster than other
sources.442 While integration of renewables with the grid is a consideration that could affect
electricity costs at high levels of renewables, EPA does not expect that this rule will specifically
drive higher levels of renewables on the grid than utilities are already planning to implement to
serve general electricity demand, and as noted previously, the grid is generally expected to be
capable of serving near term electricity needs for an increase in PEVs.443'444. EPA disagrees that
modeling today's rates observed in just one foreign country (Germany) and just one state
(California) would be a valid way of identifying the potential future change in electricity costs
due to large increases in renewable energy, or to support or quantify such a relationship. In the
updated analysis, EPA has carefully analyzed the impact of higher penetrations of PEVs on the
electricity grid including the impact on generation and electricity prices. See preamble Section
IV.C.2 and RIA Chapter 5. We further respond to comments about the grid in RTC Section 18.
Summary:
The Alliance commented that EPA should "consider costs and specifications that are
reasonable for the industry as a whole to inform policy analysis, and not to assume that
intellectual property and proprietary production processes that have been the result of billions of
dollars of research and development paid by one manufacturer will be readily available to all
manufacturers."
Response:
EPA cost inputs to OMEGA are intended to represent reasonable costs for the industry as a
whole and are applied in aggregate across the fleet as a whole and not to any specific individual
manufacturer. EPA recognizes that different manufacturers may experience different costs
resulting from differences in their past research and investments and differences in their
441 International Energy Agency, Levelized Costs of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook
2021, February 2021.
442 International Energy Agency, Renewables 2021: Analysis and forecast to 2026, December 2021.
443 Department of Energy, US DRIVE, Grid Integration Tech Team and Integrated Systems Analysis Tech Team,
Summary Report on EVs at Scale and the U.S. Electric Power System, November 2019.
444 CNBC, '"We could handle it right now' - AEP chief says U.S. power grid can sustain influx of EVs," November
12, 2021. Accessed on December 2, 2021 at https://www.cnbc.com/2021/ll/12/we-could-handle-it-right-now-aep-
chief-says-us-power-grid-can-sustain-influx-of-evs.html
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approach to sourcing components, among other differences. Manufacturers have largely
approached the sourcing of batteries through joint ventures or contractual relationships with
established cell manufacturers rather than true vertical integration.445 For example, while Tesla
has developed intellectual property relating to pack and cell design and production, their
production occurs via a joint venture with Panasonic, and also includes sourcing from other
suppliers that are not part of this venture. Other manufacturers are increasingly adopting a
similar approach in which new manufacturing plants are constructed as part of a joint venture, by
which the OEM may secure a supply of batteries for its products.446'447'448'449'450 EPA's
experience with other technologies has shown that the existence of intellectual property
belonging to one manufacturer seldom prevents other manufacturers from developing and
benefiting from similarly effective technologies. The battery costs that EPA has used in the
compliance analysis are not taken solely from the example of any specific manufacturer but are
developed based on an assessment of the industry as a whole. EPA notes that the battery costs
used in the updated compliance analysis are in fact higher than projections by BNEF, a widely
referenced source on projected battery costs, and are also higher than the costs commonly
reported by Tesla, the OEM that currently has the highest rate of battery production.
Summary:
"Environmental and Public Health Organizations" recommended that we consider the cost of
lithium iron phosphate batteries as being lower than NMC.
Response:
We have included LFP cost based on a percentage penetration of LFP. See Section IV.C.2 of
the Preamble and Chapter 2 of the RIA.
Summary:
Several commenters cite the possibility of new battery chemistries including solid state and
sodium ion chemistries in advocating for lower battery cost assumptions. Some of the same
commenters also advocate for improved specific energy figures to be used in an updated
analysis, higher than the 180 Wh/kg that was used previously.
Response:
In developing battery cost projections for 2023 through 2035, ANL also developed year-by-
year pack-level specific energy projections generated by the same BatPaC model that was used
445 Argonne National Laboratory, "Quantification of Commercially Planned Battery Component Supply in North
America through 2035," ANL-24/14, March 2024. (see Figure 14 therein, titled "Modeled lithium-ion cell
production capacity in North America from 2018 to 2035 by plant ownership").
446 Voelcker, J., "Good News: Ford and GM Are Competing on EV Investments," Car and Driver, October 18, 2021.
Accessed on December 9, 2021 at https://www.caranddriver.com/features/a37930458/ford-gm-ev-investments/
447 Stellantis, "Stellantis and LG Energy Solution to Form Joint Venture for Lithium-Ion Battery Production in North
America," Press Release, October 18, 2021.
448 Toyota Motor Corporation, "Toyota Charges into Electrified Future in the U.S. with 10-year, $3.4 billion
Investment," Press Release, October 18, 2021.
449 Ford Motor Company, "Ford to Lead America's Shift To Electric Vehicles With New Mega Campus in
Tennessee and Twin Battery Plants in Kentucky; $11.4B Investment to Create 11,000 Jobs and Power New Lineup
of Advanced EVs," Press Release, September 27, 2021.
450 General Motors Corporation, "GM and LG Energy Solution Investing $2.3 Billion in 2nd Ultium Cells
Manufacturing Plant in U.S.," Press Release, April 16, 2021.
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to develop the costs, and we are using these values in the analysis. EPA notes that many of the
higher specific energy values cited by the commenters are likely to represent cell-level specific
energy and not pack-level. Regarding new battery chemistries, EPA agrees that there is potential
for these new chemistries to result in even lower battery prices in the future than we project, but
due to the nascent stage of development and the lack of high-production examples we are unable
to quantitatively assign costs to these technologies. We do agree however that the possibilities
offered by these chemistries are widely acknowledged in the industry as a potential route to
lower battery costs and we agree that they at least qualitatively support the possibility of battery
costs being lower in the long term than currently represented in the analysis. They also represent
another factor in considering the possibility that our battery costs estimates are conservative, that
is, more likely to overestimate future costs than underestimate them.
Summary:
ICCT cites their own study of BEV vehicle costs and numerous assumptions for specific cost
elements that result in these lower vehicle costs. ICCT also states that EPA's battery costs in the
proposal are significantly higher than those seen in third party analyses.
Response:
EPA appreciates the ICCT analysis, and also notes that we have made many adjustments to
cost inputs that would affect BEV vehicle costs relative to ICE vehicle costs, and updates are
reflected in the results of the updated analysis. Despite the alternative costs suggested by ICCT,
EPA considers the sources we are using in the updated analysis to be the best possible
information, being based on the FEV teardowns as well as recent FEV work estimating costs and
cost relationships for the wide variety of component and vehicle types that we must consider in
the analysis, and being in a format that is compatible and consistent with the needs of the
OMEGA model and transparency of inputs to the public. Regarding the statement that EPA's
battery costs in the proposal were much higher than the third party projections cited by ICCT,
EPA notes we interpret the third party projections as representing a direct manufacturing cost
that is not marked up by an RPE factor of 1.5, while the EPA costs that ICCT cites include this
RPE factor. Despite the fact that the BatPaC model does in fact include some cost terms that
appear to represent overhead cost, these are assessed in the context of the supplier that produces
the battery, and not in the context of the OEM that purchases the battery. In analyses of this type
it is customary to develop total costs to the OEM by beginning with a direct manufacturing cost,
or a price that an OEM pays a supplier for a part, and marking it up by an RPE factor (in our
case, 1.5) that represents specifically the OEM's overhead in specifying the part, integrating it
into the design, and managing its role in the product afterward (part inventorying, modifications,
etc). Any part, including a simple part like a nut or bolt, or a large part like a battery, incurs this
added cost in our analysis, and is customary accounting practice to account for the myriad
overhead costs that a large OEM incurs, ranging from ongoing research and development to
customer support, advertising, upkeep, recalls, and so on.
Summary:
The Strong PHEV Coalition recommended that we model longer-range PHEVs with BEV
batteries.
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Response:
The ANL battery cost equations were developed with consideration of higher power-to-
energy ratios at the lower end of their kWh capacity range, making those battery sizes applicable
to either BEVs or PHEVs. In the updated analysis, only longer-range PHEVs451 are placed into
the fleet, and their battery costs are derived from the same equations as BEVs.
In response to comments relating to IRA incentives being passed on to the consumer, or views
relating to a hypothetical withdrawal of IRA incentives, see RTC Section 12.4 where we respond
to comments on IRA incentives.
Summary:
Various commenters alluded to the outlook for price parity or cost parity between BEVs and
ICE vehicles.
Response:
See our response to cost/price parity issues in RTC Section 12.2.7.
12.2.2 - Battery cost sensitivities
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Based on this analysis into the underlying research literature, for the final rule's central
analysis, we recommend that EPA increase its reference direct manufacturing battery pack cost
per kilowat-hour for 2022 and 2023 to be approximately $153 per kilowat-hour. Further, we
recommend that EPA adjust its central case battery projection through 2032 to match the
midpoint of the Mauler et al (2022) analysis (i.e., $90/kWh cell-level, approximately equal to
$113/kWh at a pack-level in 2030). To better reflect these key inputs, we also recommend that
the final rule's low battery case sensitivity analysis go no lower than the "Lowest" value in
Mauler et al 2022 (i.e., $77/kWh cell-level, approximately equal to $96/kWh at a pack-level in
2030). This adjustment better matches the U.S.-specific battery characteristics as seen by U.S.
automakers and tailored for the U.S. market, better reflects the actual underlying data that EPA
references for battery costs, and incorporates research that was not cited in EPA's NPRM and
DRIA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 52-53]
4. Insufficient Sensitivity Analysis of Battery Prices
Auto Innovators appreciates the agency's decision to include a sensitivity analysis of battery
prices in the Drati RIA. In addition to the base-case analysis, the agency includes two sensitivity
analyses: one where battery prices fall 15% relative to the base case, and the other where battery
prices increase 25% relative to the base case. The downward sensitivity case is not very
informative because the agency is already showing, under the base-case scenario, that massive
451 EPA assumed that manufacturers would design PHEVs that would provide enough range to qualify as ZEVs
under the ACCII and ACT programs being administered by California and participating Section 177 states. In
OMEGA, EPA assumed that light-duty vehicle PHEV batteries would be sized for 40 miles of all-electric range over
the US06 cycle, while medium-duty PHEVs would be sized to drive 75 miles over the UDDS while tested at
ALVW.
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deployment of BEVs has benefits that justify the costs. The more interesting question is how the
findings of the DRIA might change if the agency's optimism about future battery prices proves
to be incorrect. The Alliance and its members certainly hope that the agency's optimism proves
to be warranted, but an objective regulatory impact analysis should seriously consider a
pessimistic scenario on battery prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 61-62]
What is the basis for the agency's use of a 25% increase in battery prices for a less optimistic
position on the future course of battery prices? Little rationale is given except the preamble states
that it "bound(s) what EPA considered to be a reasonable envelope for future nominal battery
pack cost per kWh, as informed by the full range of forecasts in the literature (see the discussion
of battery cost forecasts we considered in Preamble Section IV.C.2 and DRIA Chapter
2.5.2.1.3."112 We have examined with care preamble section IV.C.2; we found no justification
for using +25% as the upper sensitivity case on battery prices. We also examined DRIA Chapter
2.5.2.1.3; again, we found no rationale for using +25% as the upper sensitivity case. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 61-62]
112 NPRM at 29335.
Auto Innovators is concerned that the +25% sensitivity case may not be large enough to
reveal whether there are sensitivities in the agency's results to a plausible change in a key
forecasting assumption. We are concerned for two different reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 62-63]
First, the +25% is applied to an annual series of cost figures that begins in 2022 and extends
to 2050. No cost reductions are assumed through 2025 but a 25% decline in battery prices is
assumed through 2029. Even if one assumes that EPA starts the series correctly, the +25% upper
sensitivity case simply removes the 25% cost reduction that EPA assumed from 2026 to 2029.
The same point applies qualitatively to the cost reductions from 2029 to 2050 - they accumulate
to such a large magnitude that the +25% sensitivity case does not amount to much of a net
change in battery prices. The +25% battery-price sensitivity scenario simply slows the pace of a
decline in battery prices from 2022 to 2050 rather than halt the decline or presume an unexpected
increase in battery prices over the time horizon of the rulemaking. Auto Innovators is particularly
concerned about the years of the applicable C02 standards (2027-2032) because that happens to
be the period when global raw materials are expected to be most out of balance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 62-63]
Second, it appears that the agency expresses the future battery prices in nominal dollars when
they should be expressed in real dollars. When they are expressed in nominal dollars, the
purchasing power adjustments for future years diminish their impacts in the sensitivity analysis.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 62-63]
Auto Innovators suggests that the upper sensitivity case on battery prices should represent a
more severe, unexpected series: one where the series starts higher than the agency thinks is
appropriate and increases slowly yet steadily throughout the time horizon of the rulemaking, at
least through 2032. The price growth would represent the reality that China, Europe, and the U.S.
will be bidding up the prices of key raw materials over the next decade, before a substantial
impact from recycling can occur. Auto manufacturers will also be under increasing pressure to
choose higher-cost battery suppliers with excellent ESG profiles and facility locations in North
America. It is quite possible that those factors will overwhelm the future economies in battery
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production and innovations in battery design that appear to be dominating EPA's thinking on this
issue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 62-63]
Relatedly, we also recommend that the EPA show a full cost-benefit analysis for each of its
sensitivity cases, including for high and low battery cost cases, and also for varying assumptions
on IRA tax credit eligibility, phase-out, or elimination. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 67]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
Moreover, although the incremental vehicle manufacturing cost in EPA's High Battery Cost
sensitivity is higher (Table 13-140 of the DRIA provides an average increase of $1,547 by 2032
for medium duty vehicles) than the Proposed Rule, EPA does not quantify how much of the
increase in incremental cost is due to battery raw material prices. Finally, as part of its ZEV cost
assessment EPA relies on data as old as 2017 but does not appear to account for the inflation of
cost components in recent years. EPA should make it clear how it is accounting for not just
typical inflation to normalize dollars in a similar year, but also the significant changes in supply
chains in recent years that have led to significantly higher costs for ZEV parts and materials
compared to older data points that EPA references. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 52-53]
Organization: John Graham
The sensitivity analysis of higher battery prices needs to consider scenarios worse than +25%
relative to the agency's central cost path, since the central cost path assumes future learning
factors that are far larger (cumulatively) than 25%. The sensitivity analysis on battery prices
needs to take a more pessimistic view than +25% above the agency's optimistic view.
In a sensitivity analysis, EPA looks at how the results of its modeling might change if battery
prices are +25% (or -15%) compared to base case assumptions. However, the +25% is so small
compared to the learning factors and the importance of material supply issues that it is too small
to reveal any sensitivities that might be there. We suggest that EPA also examine a sensitivity
case where battery prices remain at $120/kWh — or even increase steadily — until 2035 before
falling gradually until 2050. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 17-18]
Organization: POET, LLC
While federal tax credits may lower the ultimate cost of battery production, there is no reason
to assume that battery manufacturers will pass these cost savings through by lower battery prices,
particularly given the projected worldwide demand for batteries. It is unclear that these credits
will continue to be in place over the period from 2027 through 2032 as they could easily be
eliminated or modified by future legislation. Therefore, U.S. EPA should perform a sensitivity
analysis that shows how dependent the high levels of BEV penetration forecast would be
impacted by the elimination of these tax credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 57-58]
It should be noted that U.S. EPA purports to perform a "sensitivity analysis" of BEV
penetration rates under the Proposed Rule to battery costs, the results of which are presented in
Chapter 13 of the DRIA. The results relevant to the proposed standards for the combined light-
duty fleet (passenger cars and trucks) are shown in DRIA Tables 13-49, 13-73, 13-102, 13,-103,
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13-106, and 13-107. There are two cases considered one labeled "low battery costs" and the
other "high battery costs". Under the low cost case, MY 2032 incremental vehicle costs drop
from $1,164 to $490 and BEV penetration increases from 67 to 68%. Under the high cost case,
MY" 2032 incremental costs increase from $1,164 to $1,632, and BEV penetration drops from
67% to 65%). Given these results, the apparent conclusion is that differences battery cost relative
to those assumed by U.S. EPA for the proposed standards will have virtually no impact on BEV
penetration or automakers ability to comply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 58]
However, as discussed above, U.S. EPA's battery cost estimates range from the current $120
per kWh to as low $40 per kWh following the application of learning effects and federal tax
credits. Assuming as U.S. EPA does, that a 100 kWh battery pack size will be common, it
follows that the range of battery costs would be on the order of $12,000 to $4,000 with the
difference from high to low being $8,000 rather than the $1,142 used by U.S. EPA in the battery
cost sensitivity analysis. Clearly, use of a much larger cost differential in the sensitivity analysis
will lead to much greater impacts on estimated BEV penetration rates and the potential ability of
automakers to comply with the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 58]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
We received several comments regarding the sensitivity bounds for battery costs. General
themes were that the selection of 25 percent for the upper bound lacked apparent rationale and/or
was insufficiently high. With regard to the upper bound, the Alliance and John Graham
suggested that we should consider holding prices steady or increase them, to (in the words of the
Alliance) "represent the reality that China, Europe, and the U.S. will be bidding up the prices of
key raw materials over the next decade, before a substantial impact from recycling can occur."
The Alliance also commented that the lower bound of 15% was not informative, and
recommended that "the final rule's low battery case sensitivity analysis go no lower than the
lowest value in Mauler et al 2022 (i.e., $77/kWh cell-level, approximately equal to $96/kWh at a
pack-level in 2030." Some commenters expressed the position that a fixed percentage sensitivity
simply slows the pace of battery price decline and implied that instead it should halt the decline
or even increase battery prices. Another commenter stated that EPA "needs to consider scenarios
worse than +25% [...] since the central cost path assumes future learning factors that are far
larger (cumulatively) than 25%."
Response:
EPA continues to assess that a fixed percentage above and below the central case can be an
appropriate way to establish upper and lower bounds for a sensitivity, if the resulting band can be
shown to adequately cover a range of reasonably plausible outcomes for future battery costs. For
the updated analysis, we examined the appropriateness of this range, particularly in light of the
updated, higher central case battery costs. We also examined the Mauler et al. paper and
compared the range of scenarios expressed there to the new band of costs that would be defined
by 25 percent above and 15 percent below the new central case costs. Please refer to Preamble
IV.C.2 for a description of how we justified our sensitivity bands in the updated analysis. It
shows that retaining the 25 and 15 percent sensitivities around the new central case costs
establishes a band that largely includes the Mauler scenarios, including the highest Mauler
scenario, in which costs do not decline at all, out to 2029-2030. Past 2030, we exclude the
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highest Mauler scenario, as such a scenario of perpetually elevated cost is not consistent with
current outlooks for mineral cost or battery cost as EPA previously noted under our responses in
Section 12.2.1. Therefore we have generally retained the 25 percent higher and 15 percent lower
sensitivities in the updated analysis as it is now largely inclusive of commenters' concerns.
Regarding statements that the high sensitivity should assume constant or rising costs, EPA
notes that there is little support for such a scenario among analyst firms. In addition, and as noted
in our response to similar comments in section 12.2.1, in the time since these comments were
submitted mineral prices have largely continued a downward trend, and the most recent analyst
forecasts of mineral prices out to at least 2029 do not support the prospect of battery prices that
never decline or actually increase. Regarding the statement that global demand will lead to
bidding up of prices, this is to be expected in any market that experiences increased demand, and
this outcome also leads to development of new production to serve that demand, and therefore
does not necessarily lead to commenter's conclusion that it will prevent prices from falling or
cause them to increase.
Regarding John Graham's suggestion that EPA "needs to consider scenarios worse than +25%
[...] since the central cost path assumes future learning factors that are far larger (cumulatively)
than 25%," EPA sees no reason to assume that a percentage of cumulative learning should
dictate the bounds of a sensitivity band. Rather, as stated above, the more relevant factor is the
ability of the band to capture a range of reasonably plausible outcomes.
Summary:
The Alliance commented that "it appears that the agency expresses the future battery prices in
nominal dollars when they should be expressed in real dollars. When they are expressed in
nominal dollars, the purchasing power adjustments for future years diminish their impacts in the
sensitivity analysis."
Response:
The final analysis is done entirely in 2022 dollars so that costs and benefits can be presented
on an equal and consistent basis and in present valuations.
Summary:
The Alliance recommended that we should show a full cost-benefit analysis for each of our
sensitivity cases.
Response:
Comments related to sensitivities and their role in the analysis are discussed in section 12.5.4.
EPA notes that, consistent with CAA section 202, in evaluating potential standards we
carefully weighed the statutory factors, including the emissions impacts of the standards, and the
feasibility of the standards (including cost of compliance in light of available lead time). We
monetize benefits of the standards and evaluate other costs in part to enable a comparison of
costs and benefits pursuant to E.O. 12866, but we recognize there are benefits that we are
currently unable to fully quantify. EPA's practice has been to set standards to achieve improved
air quality consistent with CAA section 202, and not to rely on cost-benefit calculations, with
their uncertainties and limitations, as identifying the appropriate standards. Nonetheless, our
conclusion that the estimated benefits exceed the estimated costs of the final program reinforces
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our view that the standards are appropriate under section 202(a). More specifically, for this rule
our assessment that the rule has positive net monetized benefits, regardless of the magnitude of
those positive net benefits, supports our view that the final standards represent an appropriate
weighing of the statutory factors and other relevant considerations. Given the very limited role
that the benefit-cost analysis for this rule played in decision-making for the standards, EPA
deemed a benefit-cost analysis of every sensitivity unnecessary. See RTC 8 for further
discussion.
Summary:
POET LLC recommended that we perform a sensitivity analysis that includes elimination of
the IRA tax credits, going on to say that "the range of battery costs would be on the order of
$12,000 to $4,000 with the difference from high to low being $8,000 rather than the $1,142 used
by U.S. EPA in the battery cost sensitivity analysis."
Response:
While we agree with POET's statement that "use of a much larger cost differential in the
sensitivity analysis will lead to much greater impacts on estimated BEV penetration rates," we
do not agree that this necessarily implies that every such scenario must be analyzed regardless of
its reality, relevance, or likelihood. In the case of the suggested scenario, in conducting technical
analyses EPA has continued its past practice of considering the effect of laws and regulatory
programs that are a matter of law at the time of the rulemaking, rather than presuming
finalization of pending rules or laws, or conversely, speculating on potential changes to rules or
laws that are in force at the time. At the time of this rulemaking, the assumptions in our analysis
are based on the Inflation Reduction Act provisions which are currently in effect and EPA does
not see a basis for speculating on potential future changes to the IRA.
12.2.3 - Non-battery costs
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
H. Electric Motor Cost
EPA assumes a steady decline in the cost of producing electric motors ("non-battery" costs)
from now until 2032. This assumption is not consistent with current trends in the industry, as the
average price of electric motors for BEVs rose significantly in both 2021 and 2022. The factors
that are driving the costs of electric motors are different from the factors that are driving the
costs of lithium-ion batteries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 69-70]
One of the complicated factors that the agency needs to analyze is the current and projected
global shortage (2027-2030) of electrical steel. This type of steel is comprised of ultra-thin sheets
that transfer electricity into mechanical power. For use in an EV's electric motor, a higher-grade
electrical steel is required that entails stamping and stacking steel into precise shapes that may be
less than a millimeter thick. The U.S. has very limited production capability for electrical steel
and has imposed tariffis on the supplies from South Korea, Japan and China. The cost-reduction
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factors that the agency is using for electric motors need to be modified, as they ignore the current
and likely costs of electric motors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 69-70]
Sources: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 69-70]
1. James Irwin. Price Parity Points: As EV Component Costs Rise, Stalling Push for Parity.
Automotive News. November 7, 2022, 10-11.
2. Daniel Sims. Electrical Steel Supply and Demand Could Impact EV Prices Later This
Decade. Techspot.com. March 28, 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 69-70]
Moreover, the industry has generally moved away from induction motors to permanent
magnet synchronous motors, even though they are more costly (50-75%). While the induction
motors have no need for rare earth magnets, they are harder to cool at sustained high loads and
are inherently less efficient at low speeds. Thus, permanent magnet synchronous motors, due to
their efficiency gain, are important for reducing the overall costs of the powertrain. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 70-71]
R&D efforts are looking into new alternatives that can reduce or eliminate the use of rare
earths while maintaining the effciency advantages of permanent magnet synchronous motors.
Some alternatives require expanded use of liners that depend on the ultra-thin electrical steel, but
the cost premium for electrical steel is signiffcant and global shortages are projected in the 2027-
2030 timeframe. It is possible that some innovations in motor design will penetrate
luxury/premium models prior to 2032, but most of the 2032 light-duty fleet is likely to retain use
of rare earth magnets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 70-71]
Suppliers are also under pressure to design more efficient electric motors. Gallium nitride
semiconductors can enable more efficiency. How would larger amounts of gallium be obtained?
It is not found by itself in nature but is present in small amounts in bauxite. Thus, it is presently
obtained primarily from mining and mineral processing of bauxite ore (as part of aluminum
production). For scaling up to the auto-sector quantities, improved methods would be needed to
extract and separate the gallium from oxide ore, as only a small percentage of the gallium in ore
is now economically recoverable. The amounts of energy and other inputs used in producing
gallium nitride also need to be assessed in lifecycle analysis. The United States currently has no
capacity to produce gallium nitride. Most is produced in China for use by Asian firms. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 70-71]
The gallium nitride example illustrates that it is too simplistic to assume that the price of
electric motors will plummet over the next 20 years. Electric motors are likely to become more
expensive to meet the unique needs of EV consumers before they become less expensive in the
long run. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 70-71]
Sources: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 70-71]
1. John Irwin. Price Points: As EV Component Costs Rise, Stalling Push for Parity.
Automotive News. November 7, 2022, 10-11.
2. National Research Council. Assessment of Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle
Fleet Fuel Economy 2025-2035. National Academy Press. Washington, DC. 2021, 83.
3. Dan Edmunds. EV Motors Explained. Caranddriver.com. April 5, 2022.
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4. USGS. Gallium - A Smart Metal, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2013/3006/pdf/fs2013-
3 006. pdf#: ~: text=Currently%2C%20gallium%20i s%20obtained%20mainly%20from%20m
ining%20and,in%20the%20manufacture%20of)/o20GaAs-%20and%20GaN- based%20devices.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 70-71]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
D. EPA should revise its non-battery BEV powertrain costs.
EPA should use the most recent data available to estimate non-battery BEV powertrain costs.
The choice of electric motor cost equation used in the OMEGA modeling does not reflect the
most recent data and will overestimate the cost of the BEV powertrain, especially in vehicles
with higher-power electric motors. In the 2023 draft report "Cost Modeling for BEV Powertrain"
by FEV Consulting, Inc., the cost for both induction and permanent magnet electric motors is
estimated to have both a fixed cost and a power-dependent variable cost. 134 In contrast, the cost
assumptions used in OMEGA for motors have no fixed costs and only have a power-dependent
variable cost. 135 The effect of this choice is that OMEGA will overestimate the motor (and
powertrain) costs relative to the most recent FEV Consulting analysis for BEVs as the power of
the motors increases. This overestimation of costs will likely create the largest penalty for
electric-drive pickups and SUVs, which will require higher-power electric motors in the
modeling. Additionally, the FEV Consulting analysis differentiates the cost of gearboxes, wiring
harnesses, and coolant circuits for sedans, SUVs, and pickups, which is not reflected in the
OMEGA modeling. EPA should revise these costs in its modeling for the final rule, which would
more accurately show the feasibility of strong standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
52]
134 FEV Consulting, Cost Modeling for BEV Powertrain (prepared for U.S. EPA) (Apr. 10, 2023),
available at https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0384 (as Attachment 1).
135 DRIA at 2-74, Tbl. 2-39.
E. EPA should revisit the teardown study it relied on for the proposed rule.
EPA must also ensure that teardown studies it relies on for its final rulemaking are accurate
and defensible. While the use of teardown studies is appropriate to generate combustion vehicle
and BEV manufacturing cost estimates, it is important that the comparison vehicles chosen are
similar and that any performance differences are quantified. The report "Cost and Technology
Evaluation, Conventional & Electrical Powertrain Vehicles, Same Vehicle Class and OEM" by
FEV Consulting, Inc. prepared for EPA, presents a detailed comparison between combustion and
battery-electric vehicles of similar size made by the same manufacturer. 136 While these vehicles
have many similarities, there are major performance differences that were not quantified or
assigned a cost. The largest variance in performance is in the power, torque, and resulting
acceleration performance. The combustion model (VW Tiguan) has a 0-60 mph time of 9.7
seconds, while the more powerful BEV model (VW ID.4) accelerates to 60 mph in 5.4 seconds.
If the BEV was designed to have similar performance as the combustion model, there would be
downscaling of motor and power electronics, resulting in lower BEV powertrain costs. The
teardown analysis should be revised to estimate the cost reductions associated with components
that have similar performance as the combustion vehicle model. Similarly, the BEV model
chosen has higher towing capacity than the combustion vehicle model, which results in higher
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costs (e.g., from heavier bumpers). EPA should consider the value of the increased towing
performance or adjust the costs of the BEV model to estimate the cost to build a vehicle with the
same performance as the combustion vehicle model chosen. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
pp. 52-53]
136 FEV Consulting, Cost and Technology Evaluation, Conventional & Electrical Powertrain Vehicles,
Same Vehicle Class and OEM (prepared for U.S. EPA) (Feb. 24, 2023), available at
https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0402 (as Attachment 3).
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
EPA's OMEGA model also includes an analysis of light-duty electric vehicle costs. ICCT
examined the BEV cost data from EPA's OMEGA output files and compared the overall costs
and the costs of various battery and vehicle components and technical specifications with those
applied in the 2022 ICCT U.S. EV cost study for industry-average 300-mile range BEVs.
Specifically, we compared the component-level costs and specifications broadly categorized into
powertrain direct, non-powertrain direct, and indirect costs; doing so allowed for the most
appropriate and direct comparisons with the findings in the ICCT study. The Figure 8 flowchart
below illustrates the BEV cost comparison approach based on EPA data from the OMEGA
output file and the ICCT data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 22-26]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 8. Illustration of methodology for EPA vs. ICCT
BEV-300 cost comparison [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 22-26]
To calculate EPA's modeled total manufacturing cost - including all indirect costs using the
1.5 retail price equivalent (RPE) factor - the total costs of individual vehicle elements were
summed. These individual vehicle elements are electrified driveline, e-machine, battery,
driveline (conventional vehicle), engine, glider (non-structure), structure (i.e., chassis/frame).
The first five cost elements are powertrain-specific. The last two are non-powertrain. Some
vehicles, such as hybrids, have all five powertrain cost elements. All vehicles have both non-
powertrain cost elements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 22-26]
To determine the industry average total costs for each cost component, the individual vehicle
model costs were averaged, weighted by model sales. Critically, BEV and ICE platforms are
kept separate by only considering costs associated with designated ICE or BEV vehicles, as
appropriate. For instance, in calculating the average ICE vehicle battery cost, only ICE vehicle
models were considered in the average calculation. Once the average total costs by component
are obtained, they are summed into powertrain and non-powertrain (described above), and then
summed into full vehicle total costs. Lastly, the direct costs for each cost component and for the
full vehicle can be calculated by dividing total costs by 1.5. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569,
pp. 22-26]
While the OMEGA model uses "total manufacturing costs" described above as an input to
calculate final vehicle price, for the purpose of comparison with the ICCT 2022 EV cost
analysis, these total costs represent the equivalent of "price" as defined and analyzed by ICCT
(see the flowchart above). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 22-26]
Figure 9 illustrates the key findings from our comparison of the EPA and ICCT BEV cost
analyses. The figure shows the upfront incremental BEV costs for cars, crossovers, SUVs, and
pickup trucks relative to their combustion counterparts for a 300-mile range BEV. The top figure
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shows the incremental BEV costs in 2027 and the bottom figure shows the incremental BEV
costs in 2032. The blue bars represent EPA's findings of BEV incremental costs and the orange
bars represent the ICCT findings of incremental costs. As shown, ICCT finds that incremental
BEV costs are much lower than estimates by EPA by about $2,300 (pickups) to about $5,300
(crossovers) in 2027. As battery and electric vehicle costs fall and technology improves, the
incremental costs are reduced. For 2032, the EPA finds that BEVs have incremental costs of
about $3,000 to $5,000; during this same timeframe, the ICCT study finds that BEVs will be
cheaper to purchase than comparable gasoline vehicles, which is indicated by the negative
incremental costs shown in the bottom figure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 22-26]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 9. Comparison of EPA and ICCT (2022) findings
of incremental BEV costs compared to ICEV costs, for 2027 (top) and 2032 (bottom) [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 22-26]
The differences in overall incremental cost findings can be explained by comparing the
assessments of combustion and electric vehicle costs. For combustion vehicles, on average, the
costs in the ICCT analysis are about $500 less than EPA for 2027, and about $1,500 more than
EPA for 2032. This shift is for two reasons: 1) the ICCT study applies cost-effective fuel savings
technology to combustion vehicle models that improve the new vehicle fleet by about 3.5% per
year and increase powertrain direct costs by about 1% per year, and 2) the average combustion
vehicle prices in the EPA analysis decline by about $1,400 from 2027 to 2032, along with their
reduced efficiency and increase in per-mile emissions. For battery electric vehicles, the average
BEV costs in the ICCT analysis are about $5,000 less than EPA for 2027 and about $7,000 than
EPA for 2032. The ICCT analysis finds that BEV costs can be reduced faster than the EPA
projections. We further assessed BEV costs by powertrain direct, non- powertrain direct, and
indirect cost elements (Figure 8). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 22-26]
In addition to the powertrain battery costs, we found that the non-battery powertrain costs in
the ICCT analysis are about $600 to $900 less than the EPA modeling in 2027, and that gap
declines to about $400 to $600 less than EPA in 2032. In the ICCT analysis, non-battery costs
scale with power and are based on several sources. Non-battery powertrain costs are assessed
primarily based on a teardown analysis by UBS (2017) and the National Academies of Sciences
Engineering and Medicine fuel economy technology assessment (NASEM, 2021).74 Virtually all
electric vehicles equipped with AWD do so with additional motors, rather than electronic AWD
or another AWD system used on combustion vehicles. By matching electric and combustion
vehicle power, combined motor power for electric vehicles with multiple motors is the same as
the power for single motor vehicles. With additional motors, costs for high voltage cables and
motor cooling increase. It is unclear from literature whether motor costs include driveshaft,
which would also increase with the number of motors. According to NASEM, future permanent
magnet motor costs are expected to decline due to reduced magnetic material requirements.
These future costs scale proportionally with motor power, suggesting that certain cost elements
that increase with motor number are not included. Further investigation into the true costs of
BEV AWD is beyond the scope of this paper. However, manufacturers may opt for induction
motors as a second motor in AWD configurations. Absent permanent magnets, induction motors
have the potential to decrease AWD costs further, even below the future permanent magnet
motor costs shown in NASEM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 29-31]
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74 UBS. (2017). UBS evidence lab electric car teardown: Disruption ahead? [Q-Series newsletter].
Retrieved from https://neo.ubs.com/shared/dlZTxnvF2k/ and National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine. (2021). Assessment of Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel
Economy—2025-2035. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, https://doi.org/10.17226/26092
Table 4 summarizes the findings of the underlying technical specifications for motor power in
kilowatts for 300-mile range BEVs and combustion vehicles in 2027, 2030, and 2032 in the EPA
and ICCT analyses. As shown, the BEV motor power assumed in the ICCT analysis is
significantly less than what is applied by EPA. In the ICCT study, matching electric and
combustion vehicle power means that the combined motor power for electric vehicles with
multiple motors is the same as the power for single motor vehicles. From the table below, EPA
applies BEV motor power that is much greater than comparable combustion vehicles. We
compared EPA's assumed motor power on a model-by-model basis for BEVs and their
combustion counterparts and found that on average BEV motor power is at least 38% (cars) to
45% (pickups) greater than the assumed motor power of the ICE variants. Because the non-
battery powertrain costs in EPA's analysis directly scale with motor power, reducing the assumed
BEV motor power (kW) in EPA's analysis to be similar to the motor power applied for
combustion vehicles - based on evidence from the ICCT analysis - would reduce the BEV non-
battery powertrain costs in EPA's analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 29-31]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table 4. Summary of fleet average motor power (kW)
applied in EPA and ICCT (2022) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 29-31]
Organization: John Graham
Strong Hybrid Cost, Efficiency, and Market Share
Cost
There are two ways in which the hybrid costs in Table 2-36 and Figure 2-21 of the DRIA
overstate hybrid costs. First, the proposed rule assumed the use of a 3.5 kW DC-DC converter,
while 2021 NAS study assumed just a 1.1 kW converter is needed. Second, and more important,
the HEV battery cost is too high. The 2021 NAS study estimated a 1.0 kWh battery plus BMU
would cost $880, while the proposed rule cost is calculated to be $934 (without BMU? - unclear
from discussion in DRIA). Further, FEV teardown cost analyses indicate that the DRIA cost
estimates for HEV batteries are extremely outdated. FEV's teardown studies in 2012/2013 on a
2010 hybrid found HEV battery cost to be 982 Euros for a 1.0 kWh battery pack, similar to the
DRIA estimates. However, FEV's teardown study in 2015 on a 2015 hybrid found a much lower
cost of 610 Euros for a 1.1 kWh battery.4,5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 10]
4 FEV studies summarized in ICCT's comments to the NHTSA 2024-26 NPRM, Appendix A.2 pages 5-9.
FEV, Inc., "2025 Passenger Car and Light Commercial Vehicle Powertrain Technology Analysis," Final
Report, Project Number P33597, September 2015. https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/PV-
LCV-Powertrain- Tech-Analysis_FEV-ICCT_2015.pdf.
5 Page 2-48 of the DRIA states, "The BatPaC spreadsheet models used to develop the costs for BEVs,
HEVs, and PHEVs are available in the Docket (US EPA 2023) and fully describe the BatPaC inputs that
were used to generate the cloud of battery pack cost points that are visible in the plots." This is another
example of the DRIA burying information in extreme detail and thereby making it inaccessible, thus we
were not able to compare the PatPaC model inputs and results for hybrid batteries with the 2015 FEV
teardown study.
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Getting the HEV cost estimates right is important because they are an input to the OMEGA
modeling, which is the source of the projection that HEVs will no longer be cost effective. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 10]
Hybrid efficiency estimates in OMEGA are based upon outdated data. Worse, the agency's
outdated estimates are assumed to continue through 2032 with no improvements. The bias here is
obvious: innovation is assumed to improve BEVs from today through 2032; innovation is
virtually ignored for hybrids, even though Toyota has already introduced revised, more powerful
and more efficient, hybrid systems for 2023 and there are two more potential redesign cycles by
2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 11]
Table 2-2 in the DRIA, page 2-18, states that the engine map for dedicated hybrid systems
was calculated from a Toyota 2.5L TNGA prototype engine from the 2017 Vienna paper. This
dedicated hybrid engine was first introduced in the 2015 Toyota Prius, although in a 1.8L engine.
The use of the TNGA prototype engine is an improvement over the hybrid engine map used by
NHTSA for the 2024-26 light-duty CAFE rule, which was based upon the 2010 Toyota Prius,
but it still ignores that there will be three generations of hybrid improvements by 2032 (given the
industry's typical schedule for redesigns). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 11]
Efficiency improvements averaged about 10% for each previous generation of the Toyota
Prius before 2015, in addition to large increases in engine and motor power for each generation.6
Toyota made even larger improvements to the 2015-2022 5th hybrid generation modeled by
EPA, with C02 emissions reduced by 19% on the Camry Hybrid LE relative to the previous
generation, by 11% on the Camry Hybrid XLE/SE, and by 19% on the RAV4 Hybrid.7 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 11]
6 German, J., Hybrid Vehicles Technology Development and Cost Reduction, ICCT Technical Brief No. 1,
July 2015. https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/ICCT_TechBriefNol_Hybrids_July2015.pdf.
Table 2 shows 36 mpg for 1st gen Prius (98-00), 41 mpg for 2nd gen (01-03), 46 for 3rd gen (04-10), and
50 for 4th gen (11-14), along with large increases in engine and motor power for each generation.
7 Summarized in ICCT's comments to NHTSA on the 2024-26 LD CAFE proposed rule. For additional
information see Joint NGO 2020 Reconsideration Petition, pages 64-68.
Toyota has already brought out the first updated generation of hybrids beyond what was
modelled for the proposed rule, starting with the 2023 Prius. The new Prius increased engine size
from 1.8L to 2.0L, increased motor power from 71 to 111 hp, and increased combined power
from 121 hp to 194 hp - a 60% increase. Acceleration from 0 to 60 as measured by Car and
Driver dropped from 10.4 seconds to 7.1 seconds.8 Yet despite the bigger engine and huge
performance gains, Toyota also managed to improve efficiency from 54/50/52
(city/highway/combined) for 2022 fwd Prius to 57/56/57 in 2023, or a 10% improvement. 9 Part
of this is due to improved aerodynamics, but even the city rating improved by 6%. This
generational improvement in Prius efficiency is in line with previous efficiency improvements
for each generation of the Prius but such innovation is not included in the agency's modeling.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 11]
8 https://www.caranddriver.com/reviews/a42221299/2023-toyota-prius-by-the-numbers/.
9 Comparison from fueleconomy.gov calculation, retrieved at:
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/Find.do?action=sbs&id=44079&id=46359.
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Despite this clear track record of steady HEV efficiency improvements, the proposed rule
assumes no hybrid efficiency improvements from 2015 through 2032. From the baseline hybrid
engine map for the 2015 Prius there has already been one complete redesign and there is time for
two additional hybrid redesigns. The first redesign has already demonstrated major efficiency
improvements that are not in the OMEGA model and historical trends show there is every reason
to believe that large efficiency improvements will also be achieved in two more redesigns by
2032. The failure of OMEGA to update hybrid efficiency maps after the 2015 Prius means that
hybrid efficiency projections in OMEGA will be massively outdated by 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0585, pp.11-12]
Getting the HEV's efficiency estimates right is important because fuel efficiency is the
effectiveness metric in the OMEGA modeling. Incorrect inputs about HEV efficiency help
explain why the OMEGA modeling shows BEVs to be more cost effective than HEVs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 11-12]
Since batteries account for a larger share of BEV costs than non-battery costs, batteries are
usually given the most attention by cost analysts. The non-battery components include electric
motors, e-axles, inverters, and battery management systems. EPA makes non-battery components
even less important by assuming their costs will decline (cumulatively) by 29% in 2030, 45% in
2035, and 54% in 2050. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 18]
This assumption is not consistent with recent market trends. The average price of an electric
motor for BEVs rose 26% in 2021 and rose slightly again in 2022. The prices of e-axles,
inverters, and battery management systems have also been increasing significantly.22 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 18]
22 John Irwin. Price Points: As EV Component Costs Rise, Stalling Push for Parity. Automotive News.
November 7, 2022, 10-11.
One of the factors boosting the prices of electric motors is the need for a higher grade of thin
electrical steel, which has a significant price premium. The ultra-thin sheets of steel transfer
electricity into mechanical power. A temporary global shortage of electrical steel exists now but
a more severe shortage is forecasted for 2027 to 2030, as most of the production capacity is in
Asia, the US has little production capacity, and investments in new capacity are not keeping pace
with demand growth.23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 18]
23 Daniel Sims. Electrical Steel Supply and Demand Could Impact EV Prices Later this Decade.
Techspot.com. March 28, 2023.
For many years it was also thought that the expensive rare earths (neodymium and
dysprosium) used in magnets for electric motors could be avoided through new designs of the
electric motor. Those two rare earths account for up to 50-55% of the raw material costs in
electric motors. However, induction motors, which have no need for rare earth magnets, are
harder to cool at sustained high temperatures and are inherently less efficient at low speeds than
permanent magnet synchronous motors. Tesla and BMW recently moved away from induction
motors to permanent magnet synchronous motors. Given current trends in the industry, it seems
unlikely that major savings in the material costs of electric motors will occur prior to 2035.24
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 18-19]
24 National Research Council. Assessment of Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fleet Fuel
Economy, 2025-2035. National Academy Press. Washington, DC. 2021, 83. James Bonnett. The Quest to
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Cut the Cost of Electric-Vehicle Motors by Adopting New Material Solutions. Victrix.com. August 28,
2018.
For the final rule, we recommend that, in the base case, EPA moderate the learning factors for
non-battery components. In the high BEV cost sensitivity case, we recommend that the non-
battery costs be held constant at their 2022 levels through 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0585, pp. 18-19]
In summary, the application of learning factors in the NPRM's cost assessment is biased in
favor of BEVs and against hybrids. For the cost comparison of BEVs with hybrid technologies, it
is crucial that the agency make sure that the learning factors that apply to batteries and electric
motors also apply to those components in hybrids. Any differences in the learning factors
between BEVs and hybrids should be itemized and defended explicitly. EPA's current approach
to learning factors for hybrids (lumping them with ICEs) is obviously not defensible. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 18-19]
FEV conducted a tear down comparison of ICE and BEV cost for EPA. FEV's draft report in
the docket suggests that the heavier weight of the BEV incurs substantial additional costs.25
Suspension costs, including wheels and tires, were $320 higher on the BEV, brake costs $242
higher, steering costs $22 higher, and frame and mounting costs $320 higher, for a total of $895.
FEV comments on slides 35-36 suggest that most of these cost increases is due to the higher
weight of the BEV. Other parts of the report may also include component costs affected by the
higher BEV weight (e.g. instrument panel cross beam on slide 47; possibly body structure and
closures on slide 59). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 19]
25 Cost and Technology Evaluation, Conventional Powertrain Vehicle Compared to an Electrified
Powertrain Vehicle, Same Vehicle Class and OEM. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0422, posted to the docket
on April 20, 2023. https://www.regulations.gov/search?filter=EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0422.
Costs associated with the heavier weight of the BEV (due to the battery weight) have
previously been ignored. This should be corrected for the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0585, p. 19]
Organization: POET, LLC
EPA also makes unfounded assumptions regarding the costs of non-battery BEV
components.93 EPA assumes that the cost of non-battery components will drop by 42% from
2022 to 2032 and by another 12% between 2032 and 2055. EPA does little to explain those cost
reductions, particularly, when BEVs are currently being produced and substantial work has
already been performed in optimizing non-battery components.94 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp. 22-23]
93 Id. at 6-7.
94 See id. at 7.
Although the cost of batteries is the most significant element leading to differences in the cost
of BEVs, there are sources of cost some of which U.S. EPA accounts for in the agency's
assessment. However, just as with the cost of batteries, U.S. EPA again makes extremely
optimistic assumptions regarding how the cost of non-battery BEV components will change over
time. These assumptions are presented in Table 2-26 of the DRIA. As shown, U.S. EPA assumes
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that the cost of non-battery BEV components will drop by 42% from 2022 to 2032 but only by
another 12% over the remaining period from 2032 through 2055. These cost reductions are
claimed despite the that fact that substantial learning related to the production of BEV
componentry has already occurred in the light-duty vehicle sector as evidenced by the current
mass production of BEVs and further learning curve benefits would therefore be expected to be
much smaller than those assumed by U.S. EPA. It should also be noted that in addition to failing
to properly account for the time required for BEV development and component integration for
platforms that are replacing existing conventional platforms, U.S. EPA also fails to account for
the associated costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 58-59]
Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
We applaud EPA for commissioning a tear down analysis of BEV costs and request that a
similar tear-down analysis be done for a Strong PHEV. Most importantly, In any cost analysis,
scenario or tear-down study for PHEVs, special PHEV batteries should not be used, but rather
medium and long-range PHEVs should use less expensive BEV batteries and the benefits of
PHEVs not needing as strong of chassis as BEVs should be included in the cost. These are the
two largest cost savings with mid- to long-range PHEVs compared to BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0646, p. 8]
Finally, we agree with EPA that BEVs with large battery backs will need stronger chassis
which adds costs but note that PHEVs do not need this to the same degree. Thus, EPA's cost
analysis for PHEVs should reflect this. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 21-22]
EPA Summary and Response
EPA acknowledges and appreciates all of the comments relating to modeling of non-battery
costs in the compliance analysis. Comments in this area related to a number of topics, including:
the costs assumed for HEVs and other technologies, the learning rate applied to those costs, and
the importance of using teardown data and the latest available data.
In response to comments that EPA should use the most recent data available to estimate non-
battery powertrain costs, EPA agrees, and notes that our updated analysis uses updated
powertrain costs derived from work performed by FEV that we described in the proposal.
Specifically, regarding our use of the updated FEV non-battery costs, which we noted in the
proposal, some commenters agreed with using these costs ("Environmental and Public Health
Organizations"), while others (AZ State Legislature) objected to our use of these costs, not based
on disagreement with the costs themselves but on the grounds that the report was not final at the
time of the proposal. EPA disagrees with the latter view, as the proposal clearly described the
nature of the FEV work, and our use of the further developed and updated costs is consistent
with our longstanding practice of considering relevant data to inform the final rule. Further, a
draft of the FEV work was provided in the docket at the time of the proposal and provides a
strong indication of the scope of the work and the costs that were emerging from the work at the
time, which are similar in scope and magnitude to the costs that were ultimately delivered.
In response to comments that our HEV cost inputs to OMEGA were not accurate and
specifically that they were higher than they should be, EPA notes that the HEV costs and non-
battery costs used in the updated analysis are based on evidence provided by the FEV work and
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EPA believes that they represent the best available data. Even if EPA's estimated costs are too
high as commenter suggests, it would not preclude HEVs from entering the market but only
affect the analysis' projection of HEVs in the future fleet. Indeed, such an occurrence would lend
further support to the feasibility of the standards and the availability of a range of technological
pathways for manufacturers to choose for compliance. The presence or absence of relative
penetration of any technology as projected in the compliance analysis is in no way binding on the
industry and does not dictate what automakers will ultimately choose to use to comply with the
standards, as automakers will make these decisions using their own assessment of the relative
costs and effectiveness of these technologies according, in part, to the market circumstances they
observe at the time. If in future years the commenter happens to be correct that HEV costs will
be lower than represented in the compliance analysis, the result would likely be higher
penetration of HEVs and likely lower demand for critical minerals and lower compliance costs,
compared to EPA's projections, implying that our current analysis is conservative. Commenter
has not suggested that this set of events would result in an inability to comply with the standards,
but only that a different collection of technologies would be employed to do so. The possibility
that manufacturers may ultimately choose to comply with a different set of technologies than
were suggested by the compliance analysis at the time of initial rulemaking is well within the
scope of expectations regarding any such analysis; in fact, in complying with past rules,
manufacturers have often chosen a different set of technologies than we projected in the
corresponding compliance analysis. For example, compliance with the 2012 rule was achieved
with less penetration of 48-volt mild hybrid systems and dual-clutch transmissions than we had
projected.
Regarding comments that a cost term should be included to represent higher chassis cost of
BEVs due to higher vehicle weight, EPA did not itemize this cost due to the lack of sufficient
data points that would support its characterization as a function of battery mass, and commenter
did not provide such data. The FEV teardown provided data for only one BEV, and was unable
to characterize how the added cost might be different for vehicles of different configurations or
different size battery. We note also that this data informed our decision not to apply an overall
cost reduction to a BEV chassis to represent a commonly cited expectation among analysts that a
fully optimized, purpose-built BEV platform can realize significant reductions in material cost
and assembly cost due to a simpler design with fewer parts.452'453 Given the possibility of battery
weight increasing chassis cost or other factors reducing it, as well as the lack of available data to
characterize these effects, EPA found it reasonable to not quantitatively model them. We also
note that other aspects of the analysis, in particular our updated battery costs, are likely to be
conservative, particularly in light of recent lower forecasts for future mineral costs than were
used in deriving the updated battery costs. EPA also considered sensitivities for battery costs. As
such, even were battery weight to somewhat increase chassis cost, EPA finds that our analysis
would be reasonable. Commenter suggests that not including the added cost places other
technologies, such as HEVs, at a disadvantage to being selected as part of the cost minimizing
central case compliance path projection. EPA notes, however, that the presence of HEVs or any
other technology in the compliance path only represents a projection of what might occur and
does not preclude these technologies from having an accordingly higher representation in real
452 McKinsey & Company, "Making electric vehicles profitable," March 8, 2019. Accessed on March 3, 2024 at
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/making-electric-vehicles-profitable
453 UBS, "UBS Evidence Lab Electric Car Teardown - Disruption Ahead?," Q-Series report, May 18, 2017.
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life if the future costs and other factors vary from the projections in the analysis and make these
technologies more attractive to manufacturers as part of their chosen technology mix and
compliance strategy.
Regarding comments that EPA assumed cost reduction rates that are too high, EPA notes that
applying a learning cost reduction factor to estimate future costs of components is standard
practice in the industry and that these learning rates typically flatten out in future years compared
to earlier years,454 as is true of the curve that was used in the analysis. Commenter
simultaneously suggests that EPA is "failing to properly account for the time required for BEV
development," which suggests that significant development effort is occurring and remains to
occur in BEV development, which tends to contradict commenter's earlier statement in support
of flattening the learning rates, i.e. that "substantial learning related to the production of BEV
componentry has already occurred." Commenter has not provided evidence that would refute the
learning rates that EPA used nor has provided alternative rates that are supported by specific
evidence relating to the degree of progress that has already occurred or remains to occur.
Regarding comments on performing a teardown of a strong PHEV, EPA notes that this was
not within the scope of the FEV teardown study. Further, EPA is unaware of any pair of
candidate vehicles that would have been available at the time of the study in both an ICE vehicle
and a PHEV version and which also could support the goals of the study. EPA has assessed
PHEV non-battery costs using a scaling of the costs provided by FEV in its work supporting the
analysis and has no reason to believe that a specific teardown of a PHEV as opposed to the
vehicles in the FEV studies would lead to significantly different results.
Regarding comments concerning a potential for increased cost of electrical steel to prevent
learning cost reductions in electric machines, EPA notes that the Techspot article455 cited by
commenter is based on a Wall Street Journal article456 which provides a broader view,
emphasizing U.S. investment to increase capacity, choosing as lede for the article the statement
that "large U.S. steelmakers are ramping up production [...] to capture a fast-growing market."
The article also does not describe anticipated supply deficit as a "shortage," only as a gap
between projected demand and projected supply, which EPA has already described in other
responses as not being proof that an actual shortage will occur, and acting as a signal that
motivates investment in new supply. When discussing the global gap, the article also qualifies it
with the statement "unless more production capacity for high-grade electrical steel is added,"
without further suggesting specific barriers that would prevent one from reasonably expecting
this increased global capacity to be built. In fact, the article places emphasis on examples of U.S.
manufacturers that are making large investments to capture a share of this market. Where the
article mentions creating more capacity "will likely take years," this observation is in the context
of domestic capacity only (where the steel industry as a whole is relatively inexperienced in its
454 Environmental Protection Agency, "Cost Reduction through Learning in Manufacturing Industries and in the
Manufacture of Mobile Sources," Final Report and Peer Review Report, EPA-420-R-16-018, November 2016.
455 Sims, D., "Electrical steel supply and demand could impact EV prices later this decade," Techspot.com, March
28, 2023. Accessed on March 3, 2024 at https://www.techspot.com/news/98117-electrical-steel-supply-demand-
could-impact-ev-prices.html
456 Tita, B., "The Paper-Thin Steel Needed to Power Electric Cars Is in Short Supply," Wall Street Journal, March
27, 2023. Accessed on March 3, 2024 at https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-paper-thin-steel-needed-to-power-
electric-cars-is-in-short-supply-dbd2a78e
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production), and does not go on to suggest that capacity at established global manufacturers
would require a similarly long lead time.
EPA also notes an article by S&P Global that provides more context.457 According to that
article, in ICE vehicles "35 to 45 low-power motors are fitted on average per car, with about 20
in the B segment and 80 in the E segment (with some extremes like the Mercedes S-class that has
more than 100 motors)." While the article does not quantify the amount of electrical steel these
motors need, it does suggest that exposure to increased cost of electrical steel is not unique to
PEVs but only resides in a relative increase of the amount needed. S&P also describes the gap
more precisely as a "structural imbalance between capacity and [...] demand" that "will require
significant capital investment in the coming years." Nor does S&P conclude that the gap
indicates a shortage will take place, discussing the concept of a shortage with the qualification
"without further major investments," and discussing the potential for an impact on OEM
electrification plans with the qualification, "if this is not addressed by adding more capacity and
investment in new capacity." Nor does S&P indicate any reason to believe that such investments
will not occur. According to the Wall Street Journal article, such investment is already occuring
in the U.S.; neither article provides reason to believe that similar activity is not or will not be
taking place elsewhere in the world to capture the same market gap. In any case, commenters
have only alluded to the potential for increased steel cost to impact overall PEV cost and have
not described what they think the effect will be. EPA notes that compared to battery cost, electric
machine cost is a relatively small portion of PEV manufacturing cost, and the cost of electrical
steel only a portion of that, and would likely lie well within the range of the high battery cost
sensitivity. No reasonable estimate of a sustained elevation in electrical steel cost would affect
PEV cost so dramatically that it would change our conclusion regarding ability to comply with
the standards. EPA also notes that our responses under RTC Section 15 relating to investment in
critical minerals production and development of the supply chain would also apply to comments
relating to the need for increased production capacity for other inputs to PEV production,
including electrical steel production.
Regarding one commenter's assertion that the "average price of an electric motor for BEVs
rose 26 percent in 2021 and rose slightly again in 2022," the timing and scale of these increases
suggests that COVID-19 pandemic supply chain disruptions are likely to have had an influence.
Commenter suggests but does not show that this increase indicates similar increases in the future.
In fact, the cited Automotive News article458 indicates that it was "the COVID-19 pandemic,
inflation and the war in Ukraine" that led to this increase, and does not suggest that it is evidence
of a long term trend. The Automotive News article attributes the 26 percent statistic to Interact
Analysis,459 which in that reference (dated 2022) forecasts an even higher increase of 67 percent
in 2022, which incidentally was not borne out by the "slight" 2022 increase indicated by
commenter. Interact Analysis also states, "the much higher numbers are mainly because the
average power of each motor has been increasing due to the production of more powerful
457 S&P Global Mobility, "Electrical steel - Another temporary supply chain shortage or a threat to OEMs'
electrification plans?," December 14, 2021. Accessed on March 3, 2024 at
https://www.spglobal.com/mobility/en/research-analysis/electrical-steel-another-temporary-supply-chain-
shortage.html
458 Irwin, J., "EV Component Costs Rise, Stalling Push for Parity," Automotive News, November 4, 2022.
459 Fox, J., "Which EV Component Increased Price the Most in 2022?," Interact Analysis, October 2022. Accessed
on March 3, 2024 at https://interactanalysis.com/insight/which-ev-component-increased-price-the-most-in-2022/
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vehicles and because in 2022 more larger vehicles are electrifying whereas it was mostly smaller
commercial vehicles in 2020." In fact, the cited Automotive News article points out that "many
of today's EV models have been 'over-engineered' by established automakers." This suggests
that increases in cost of motors over time, if they occur, could be addressed by OEMs with
design optimization, for example, adjusting vehicle power specifications or reducing the number
of motors in models that have multiple motors.
Regarding comments on the use of BEV batteries for PHEVs, see RTC 12.2.1, Battery costs.
12.2.4 - Inclusion of PHEVs
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Its assessment is also limited to only battery electric vehicles, ignoring PHEVs as both a
technology option and their impact on EV supply chains. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
33]
7. Modeling of Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles
In the Proposed Rule, EPA acknowledges that plug-in hybrid electric vehicles "can provide
significant reductions in GHG emissions and that some vehicle manufacturers may choose to
utilize this technology as part of their technology offering portfolio" and, in particular, that a
"PHEV pickup architecture would provide several benefits "210 This is consistent with EPA's
analysis in the MY 2023-2026 GHG emissions standards rulemaking, in which the Agency noted
that "our updated analysis projects that about 17% of vehicles meeting the MY 2026 final
standards will be BEVs or PHEVs," and projected that "BEVs and PHEVs can play a significant
role in complying with the final standards."211 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
210 NPRM at 29298; see also Drati Regulatory Impact Analysis at 2-75 (same).
211 Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86
Fed. Reg. 74434, 74493-94 (Dec. 30, 2021) (emphasis added).
Despite recognizing the importance of PHEVs in meeting GHG emissions standards, EPA has
not attempted to model any PHEVs as part of manufacturers' compliance pathways to meet the
proposed standards or alternatives under consideration. Auto Innovators believes that this
omission of technology that will indisputably be an important part of the transition to a net-zero
carbon transportation future is a significant oversight that should be rectified in the final rule.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
A number of manufacturers are already building PHEVs or have announced plans to do so.
S&P Global Mobility estimates a 5% U.S. market share for PHEVs in 2030.212 Auto
Innovators' commitment to reaching 40-50% EV sales by 2030 was inclusive of PHEVs.
Likewise, President Biden's Executive Order 14037 Specifically set "a goal that 50% of all new
passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric,
plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles." (Emphasis added.)213 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
212 S&P Global Mobility, U.S. light vehicle sales forecast by propulsion system design, January 2023.
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213 E.O. 14037 of Aug 5, 2021.
EPA asks for comments on whether PHEVs should be modeled and what type of PHEV
technology should be incorporated. Auto Innovators believes EPA should include PHEVs in
their modeling and it would be appropriate to model both the typical strong PHEVs (accounting
for stronger electrification needed to meet US06 high power cold starts), as well as the range-
extending type that EPA is modelling at SwRI. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
Moreover, assuming EPA includes PHEVs in the final rule, it should not use PHEV
technology as a justification to further increase greenhouse gas stringency. Rather, EPA should
treat PHEVs in the context that manufacturers consider them - as a component of EV
technology, not as a means to further improve ICE vehicle emissions in addition to rapidly
increasing BEV model availability and production. PHEVs offer unique utility, and because
some consumers are not ready for a BEV, we do not believe the inclusion of PHEVs should
increase the combined ZEV share that EPA has modeled as BEVs in the Proposed Rule. Rather,
a PHEV is a preferred EV to a BEV for some vehicle buyers and should be considered as a
substitute for a BEV. Additionally, the California ZEV mandate allows for PHEVs, meeting
certain criteria, to meet requirements, and treats them as it treats BEVs. At a minimum, EPA
could borrow CARB's assumptions regarding PHEV sales and characteristics and apply them for
states that follow California's rules only. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
PHEVs are well suited to some applications, especially for more capable SUVs and pickup
trucks. Specifically, EPA has modeled 60% BEV light-duty pickup trucks in the Proposed Rule,
see Figure 34 below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
Figure 34: EPA Omega model output - Pickup BEV share percentage214 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
214 OMEGA output abs_share_frac_pickup_BEV divided by abs_share_frac_pickup significant effort to
model battery capacity constraints, but it is only a model, which carries uncertainty.
In addition to consumer demand (for utility or as a bridge to full electrification), another
reason that EPA should include PHEVs in their modeling is the potential for PHEVs to provide
clean electric miles while reducing the amount of battery material needed. EPA has devoted
significant effort to model battery capacity constraints, but it is only a model, which carries
uncertainty.. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
Further, PHEVs can be very useful to sustain the transition to electrification in the case of
unforeseen disruptions in the development of battery manufacturing capacity due to constraints
in mineral availability, processing, or other supply chain challenges. Using MY 2023 EPA Fuel
Economy Guide data, a 300-mile BEV requires a battery of approximately 109kW-hr on
average. Accounting for energy efficiency differences, the same battery material could be used to
make between four and six PHEVs with 50 miles of all-electric range. Fifty miles exceeds what
most Americans drive on most days, enabling significant all-electric driving. Due to battery
supply chain concerns, EPA should include PHEVs in their modeling as a substitute for some
BEVs so that PHEVs comprise at least 20% of the combined BEV plus PHEV share consistent
with California and other ZEV states. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 115-117]
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Organization: Betsy Cooper
Together, we write to propose that the EPA reconsider its approach to PHEVs in its recent
draft regulations, particularly to incentivize car manufacturers to develop longer range PHEVs.
In particular, we recommend you give full off-cycle credits to manufacturers who develop
PHEVs with a range of 50 or more miles. EPA's current plan will disincentivize all PHEVs,
ignoring the real market benefits to keeping long-range versions of these cars in the market.
Intentional or not, the effects of the EPA's current policy will be to push vehicle manufacturers
further towards full EVs—before the charging infrastructure is ready to support them. In the
meantime, consumers not ready to adopt full EVs - including for the same reasons we are not yet
able to do so - will continue to buy gas cars instead. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, pp. 1-4]
With more long-range PHEVs on the market, more Americans will be able to drive their full
commute on electricity and charge overnight at home (with reduced demand on the grid
relatively to fast-charging of full EVs). Moreover, as longer range PHEV cars grow more
popular, there will be greater incentives for individuals and communities to invest in improving
charging infrastructure, thus reducing the friction facing current consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0654, pp.1-4]
PHEVs Fill An Important Market Need That Would Otherwise Be Filled By Gas Vehicles
PHEVs remain an important player in the electric vehicle market. PHEVs are excellent
introductory electric cars, allowing cautious consumers to try electric driving without fully
committing to weaning from gas. Many consumers are not yet ready to fully invest in electric
vehicles for valid reasons including range anxiety and a lack of charging capacity in many
communities. After driving a PHEV, many will purchase a fully electric car for their next car
[Link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-solutions/2023/05/04/plug-in-hybrids-gateway-
evs/]—we count ourselves in that category. Without a PHEV option available to them, these
consumers will instead purchase all-gas cars—putting more polluting vehicles on the road, not
fewer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 2]
PHEVs fill an important gap, providing a transition vehicle that allow consumers to
experience the benefits of all-electric driving without some of the risks: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0654, pp. 2-3]
First, a gas backup can reduce range anxiety, especially in uncertain terrain or cold
temperatures. While our family also owns a pure EV, we are not yet ready to commit to being a
fully electric household. Not least, our PHEV is our vehicle of choice for any road trip in the
snow or mountains, as we do not want to test our full range in a precarious, unpredictable
location. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, pp. 2-3]
Second, PHEVs are more family friendly than EVs; as parents (like us) of small
children will tell you, charging on a road trip is one thing. Charging on the road with an unhappy
toddler - or heaven forbid, one who only sleeps when the car is moving - is quite another.
Having the option to keep driving on gas once the electric range runs out is a blessing. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, pp. 2-3]
Third, and relatedly, this is particularly true because charging infrastructure has not yet
caught up withEV demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, pp. 2-3]
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Rural and disadvantaged communities disproportionately lack access to public
charging infrastructure [Link: https://www.marketplace.org/shows/marketplace-tech/rural-
communities-are-slow-to-adopt-evs-but-a-national-charging-network-depends-on-them/]. So
long as charging infrastructure is not as ubiquitous as gas stations are, gas backups remain an
important option for long haul driving. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, pp. 2-3]
Moreover, even in areas with well-developed charging infrastructure, such as in
California where we live, it can be very difficult to find an available and working charger in a
convenient location. Betsy's current commute has only two chargers within a mile, and both are
broken. Aaron's work sponsors chargers, but even then demand is so high that employees require
a complex interoffice notification system to ensure everyone gets a charge by the end of the day.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, pp. 2-3]
Short-Range PHEVs Do Not Achieve EPA's Greenhouse Gas Emissions Goals
While PHEVs fill an important market need, manufacturers' move to short range PHEVs
(those with less than 40 miles of range) has reduced these benefits significantly. Small electric
batteries do less to reduce range anxiety. Shorter ranges require more frequent charging, and
make it more likely that drivers will need to charge in inconvenient locations away from home.
And these annoyances may make it more likely that new PHEVs will rely on gas. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 3]
EPA may rightfully wish to disincentivize the use of gas cars for any reason. But doing so by
disincentivizing all PHEVs, as the current regulation proposes, is a mistake. The fundamental
problem here is not with PHEVs; it is with the small electric range on offer in those vehicles.
Longer range PHEVs with smaller gas tanks will reduce reliance on gas, helping to get the first-
time electric vehicle consumer more comfortable relying on electric power for their daily needs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 3]
Moreover, by encouraging long-range PHEVs, the EPA may even be able to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions more than by supporting traditional EVs alone, at least in our current
environment where EV battery materials and manufacturing capacity remain constrained. [Link:
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/ford-ceo-on-ev-transition-batteries-are-the-constraint-
190948815.html] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 3]
To overcome range anxiety in a pure EV, manufacturers have been adding larger and
larger batteries (>##95 kilowatt-hours in some cases [Link: https://ev-
database.org/cheatsheet/useable-battery-capacity-electric-car]). Yet given that consumers drive
on average 37 miles a day, such a large battery will never be used most of the time. With current
battery supply and manufacturing constraints, this is an inefficient use of resources. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 3]
This same 95 kilowatt-hour of batteries could make 5 separate PHEVs with a battery
the size of our 53-mile range Chevy Volt. Five vehicles would have electric power and replace
gas cars instead of one. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 3]
Moreover, given less embodied emissions in each car from the creation of the battery,
these cars each could have lower lifecycle emissions as well (provided sufficient availability of
charging). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 3]
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EPA Should Use Its Regulatory Authority To Incentivize Long-Range PHEVs
The EPA thus should use its regulatory process to encourage PHEV manufacturers to return
long-train PHEVs to the market: by providing full off-cycle credits to those who give 50 or more
miles of electric range. EPA's current plan will disincentivize all PHEVs, ignoring the real
market benefits to keeping long-range versions of these cars in the market. Intentional or not, the
effects of the EPA's current policy will be to push vehicle manufacturers further towards full
EVs—before the charging infrastructure is ready to support them. In the meantime, consumers
not ready to adopt full EVs - including for the same reasons we are not yet able to do so - will
continue to buy gas cars instead. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, pp. 3-4]
With more long-range PHEVs on the market, more Americans will be able to drive their full
commute on electricity and charge overnight at home (with reduced demand on the grid
relatively to fast-charging of full EVs). Moreover, as longer range PHEV cars grow more
popular, there will be greater incentives for individuals and communities to invest in improving
charging infrastructure, thus reducing the friction facing current consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0654, pp.3-4]
By encouraging both EVs and long-range PHEVs, the EPA will encourage manufacturers to
offer more long-range PHEV models, and to make more of them. As demand for the 42-mile
RAV4 PHEV shows, consumers crave these long-range PHEV options. There just aren't
currently any affordable and available ones to choose from. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654,
pp. 3-4]
We propose a 50+ mile PHEV range requirement for full off-cycle credit. There is already
momentum in favor of this standard; California is planning to require 50+ mile range PHEVs by
2035 [Link: https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-
vehicle-sales-2035]. Moreover, even with battery degradation, a PHEV rated for 50+ miles at the
point of sale will still cover the average American commute many years later. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0654, p. 4]
The EPA may respond that its scaled utility factor already takes into account miles of range in
its calculation. Even if true, by penalizing all PHEVs across the board, the EPA is incentivizing
manufacturers to make fewer plug-in hybrid vehicles, period. Especially until charging
infrastructure resembles the gas station infrastructure of today, long-range PHEV cars remain an
important consumer option. By rewarding manufacturers for making PHEVs with a 50+ mile
range, EPA will help bring an important class of climate-friendly vehicles back to market. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654, p. 4]@
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
B. EPA should include PHEVs in its modeling.
While EPA did not include any PHEVs in its modeling for the Proposal, we urge it to do so
for the final rule. Modeling PHEVs will both account for manufacturers' plans and help
demonstrate the technical and economic feasibility of strong final standards. Although BEVs are
likely to continue to be the most common electric vehicle, PHEVs are part of some automakers'
stated plans for achieving emissions reductions. PHEVs are currently more commonly used as a
powertrain option for larger and less efficient vehicle models, and that trend is likely to continue
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with future models. Therefore, EPA should include PHEVs as a powertrain option in the final
rule, but should focus on pickup trucks and SUVs as the most likely candidates to offer a PHEV
variant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 48]
When modeling PHEVs, EPA should examine vehicle parameters that span a range of battery
capacities. In particular, EPA should examine vehicles with battery capacity that meets the
minimum capacity (7 kWh) requirements for the IRA § 30D credit. PHEVs that are eligible for
the full amount of that credit ($7,500) and have the required minimum capacity battery pack are
likely to have a lower net cost than conventional vehicles with similar compliance C02 value.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 48]
When considering costs for PHEVs, EPA should assume LI charging infrastructure for these
vehicles with 50-mile or lower electric-only range. The traction battery capacity for these
vehicles will likely be in the range of 7-25 kWh, and therefore they can be fully recharged in 4-
13 hours using a LI EVSE connected to a 20-amp, 120V circuit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 49]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
Incorporating PHEVs in the proposal analysis
EPA did not include PHEVs in its OMEGA modeling for this proposal; ICCT recommends
EPA include PHEVs in its updated modeling for the final rule, if possible. Since PHEVs are
eligible to be used for compliance with the standards, incorporating them into the modeling
would more accurately project compliance pathways. If PHEVs are cost effective in some years
and segments, including them as an option in the modeling would more accurately reflect the
lower compliance costs that could be achieved by PHEVs in those uses compared to modeling
that excludes them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 58-60]
For reference, ICCT previously analyzed the costs of light-duty 150 and medium-duty
PHEVs.151 For light-duty vehicles, ICCT projected PHEVs to have higher prices and 6-year
ownership costs than 300-mile BEVs of all body styles before MY2027. Light-duty PHEVs are
also expected to remain costlier than non-plugin vehicles for the foreseeable future. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 58-60]
150 Slowik. P., Isenstadt, A., Pierce, L, Searle, S. (2022). Assessment of light-duty electric vehicle costs
and consumer benefits in the United States in the 2022-2035 time frame. International Council on Clean
Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/ev-cost-benefits-2035-oct22/
151 Mulholland, E. (2022). Cost of electric commercial vans and pickup trucks in the United States through
2040. ICCT. International Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/cost-ev-vans-
pickups-us-2040- jan22/
For medium-duty pickups, ICCT projected gasoline PHEVs to reach purchase price parity
with 300-mile range BEV pickups around MY2027, but likely to remain costlier than both diesel
and gasoline non-plugin pickups. Diesel PHEVs are not expected to reach price parity with either
BEVs or non-plugin pickups. For medium-duty vans, gasoline PHEVs are expected to reach
price parity with diesel non-plugin vehicles by MY2032, but 300-mi and 150-mile range BEVs
are expected to cost less than PHEV vans throughout MY2027-2032. When it comes to 5-year
total cost of ownership, medium-duty gasoline PHEV pickups and vans are expected to cost less
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than diesel non-plugin vehicles before MY2027 (diesel PHEVs are still expected to cost more
throughout the timeframe of the proposed rule). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 58-60]
As discussed in the combustion vehicle technology section previously, developments in
dedicated hybrid engines suitable for (primarily gasoline) serial/range-extended PHEV
applications may simultaneously improve the efficiency of the engine while also reducing its
cost. Thus, EPA may consider modeling PHEVs in the largest light-duty segments, as well as
both medium-duty pickups and vans. Doing so could lead to reduced overall compliance costs as
compared to those currently modeled in the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 58-
60]
ALPHA validations of P2 and PS hybrids were based on PHEVs (DRIA Table 2-6). With
PHEV- specific data, response surface equations (RSEs) for PHEVs could be developed and
incorporated into OMEGA. Absent full simulation and RSEs for PHEVs, EPA can approximate
PHEVs by combining BEV RSE with P2 or PS RSEs (utilizing UF for electric/ICE split). Such a
combination would need to be validated against the existing PHEV test data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0569, pp. 58-60]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
Mazda strongly requests that EPA take these considerations into account and make necessary
adjustments to the proposed rule as it works towards a Final Rule. We feel the Final Rule should
have more realistic targets and associated ramp ups, include PHEVs, and adopt CARB's current
LEV IV for criteria emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, pp. 3-4]
Organization: Minnesota Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
Toyota6 and others7 have argued for a balanced approach to emissions reductions using
BEVs and other technologies, saying "perfect should not be the enemy of the good". The battery
size8 for a BEV is about 6 times larger than a PHEV (~75-145kWh vs. ~12-18kWh), and about
60 times larger than a HEV (~1.3-1.9kWh). Given the limited supply of battery materials, a large
number of HEVs and PHEVs can clearly achieve substantially better GHG reductions than a
small number of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 5-6]
6 Gill Pratt, Toyota Motor Corporation's Chief Scientist, open letter posted on Medium, August 2021;
https://medium.com/toyotaresearch/more-straight- talk-about-toyotas-electric-vehicle-strategy-K)aba4be40.
7 Foster, Koszewnik, Wade, and Winer, "Pathways to More Rapidly Reduce Transportation's Climate
Change Impact." Issues in Science and Technology, November 17, 2022; https://issues.org/reduce-vehicle-
transportation-emissions-foster-koszewnik-wade-winer/.
8 https://insideevs.com/reviews/344001/compare-evs/.
The proposed rulemaking assumes that BEVs will be the dominant technology for future
emissions reductions. But relying on a single technology is a risky strategy; many factors could
interfere including the supply and/or cost of critical minerals, lack of BEV recharging
infrastructure, slow ramp-up of wind and solar power, poor customer acceptance of BEVs in
some market segments, etc. EPA estimates that 67% of U.S. vehicles sales will be BEVs in 2032,
but most major automakers predict much lower BEV sales, and the world's largest automaker
predicts only 20% in 2030. For comparison, MIT predicts9 that China will achieve only 40% in
2030 despite a head start and extremely strong government interventions. EPA should not base
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mandatory emissions standards on unrealistic predictions of BEV sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0612, pp. 5-6]
9 https://news.mit.edu/2021/chinas-transition-electric-vehicles-0429.
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
In addition, based on its considerable experience discussed previously with BEV and PHEV
leadership, Mitsubishi provides the following recommendations to supplement the comments of
Auto Innovators:
2. Consider the many benefits of PHEVs to consumers and the environment during the
expected period of constrained battery critical minerals production capacity, and how PHEVs are
the perfect stepping- stone to full BEV acceptance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs)
PHEVs offer many benefits and should be an integral part in implementing the proposed
Multi-Pollutant Emissions Rule. PHEVs provide environmental benefits and are a viable
alternative for vehicle buyers not yet ready or able to own or lease a BEV. PHEVs are a
steppingstone to BEV acceptance, teaching consumers the benefits of BEV ownership without
the drawbacks - range anxiety, charge anxiety, etc. PHEVs directly address better overall fuel
economy, and reduced GHG emissions compared to comparable gasoline-only models, while
offering similar utility, comfort, and convenience. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 3-4]
Additionally, PHEVs aid the transition from pure internal-combustion engines to full vehicle
electrification, especially during any period when limited battery critical minerals production
capacity would not be sufficient to meet the volumes necessary to supply the number of BEVs
assumed in EPA's proposal. PHEVs have smaller battery packs that enable clean, electric-only -
and, in our case, significant -driving, thereby using less critical minerals than comparable BEVs
with bigger battery packs. The All-Electric Range (AER) of today's PHEVs already exceed the
average daily commute mileage of most American drivers, and this will only increase in the
future. Consumers would also benefit by having less expensive, easier to install, lower amp,
home chargers installed to charge their PHEVs, rather than the more expensive, higher amp ones
needed to charge larger BEV battery packs. More electrified powertrain options, including
PHEVs, support the shift to electrification, reduce the demand for limited critical mineral supply,
and enable greater EV access to more consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 3-4]
Mitsubishi supports Auto Innovators' recommendation that EPA include PHEVs in its
modeling, as a substitute for some BEVs, so that PHEVs comprise at least 20% of the combined
BEV+PHEV share, based on the availability and benefits of PHEVs and concerns with battery
critical minerals supply constraints. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 3-4]
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
[... ] Nissan requests that EPA adjust the proposed GHG standards and targets to account for a
blended PEV percentage, taking into consideration emissions reductions from PHEVs and BEVs
collectively. EPA has historically considered the emissions benefits of both groups of advanced
technology vehicles, acknowledging the importance and need of PHEVs in the consumer shift
towards clean vehicles. [,..][EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 5]
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Organization: POET, LLC.
In a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Proposed Rule fails to meaningfully
assess PHEV technology, even though it is widely used in vehicles, and has been a key
decarbonization strategy by automakers. The Proposed Rule concedes, "EPA's current analysis
does not include PHEVs, though we recognize that many manufacturers' product plans include
PHEVs" but "EPA plans to incorporate PHEVs into our analysis for the final rule."70 Not only
is this failure to assess PHEVs arbitrary and capricious, but EPA seems to misstate the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act here - analysis like this should be presented in
a proposed rule, so that stakeholders can provide comment, not in the "final rule" analysis where
the time period for comment has been extinguished. EPA's failure to meaningfully assess PHEV
technology deprives stakeholders of the ability to meaningfully comment on this Proposed Rule.
It is essential that the final rule provide incentives for PHEV FFVs, and otherwise recognize the
contribution of higher-level bioethanol blends like MLEBs and E85 that are used in PHEV
FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 20-21]
70 88 Fed. Reg. at 29329.
Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
In order to show additional ways that costs can be reduced and that hard-to-reach markets are
served, we respectfully request that EPA develop a scenario in the final rulemaking that reduces
the total costs. Specifically, this new scenario should include a modest number of PHEV cars and
trucks as that will impact the cost analysis by reducing the cost of charging infrastructure, the
amount of critical minerals and by using BEV batteries in strong PHEVs. This scenario could
reduce the number of BEVs and FCEVs by a small amount (say 20% collectively) and be instead
served by a mix of Strong PHEV cars and trucks and other PHEV cars and trucks. The PHEV
battery costs should be based on using BEV batteries as explained in Appendix D in this letter.
The use of away-from-home DC fast chargers should be modestly reduced, and the cost of the
PHEV including total cost of ownership should be based on work by Argonne national lab for
light-duty PHEVs.7 Finally, bidirectional charging using DC off-board chargers should be
assumed in our recommended alternative cost analysis for a reasonable percentage of BEVs and
PHEVs in order to further reduce the total cost of ownership. [ [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646,
p. 8]
7 Ibid
Another perspective is dollars spent to achieve GHG reductions. Models such as the new
Toyota tool show that PHEVs can be very good at dollars per GHG reduced.20 Finally, total cost
of ownership is another perspective. We believe the above Argonne National Laboratory analysis
correctly finds that PHEVs are lower cost than BEVs, but, as we point out above and, in the
charts below, PHEV costs can be lowered further. In addition, the lower cost for home charging
stations compared to BEVs21 and savings compared to using gasoline or diesel further lower the
total cost of ownership and make Strong PHEVs very attractive in the near-term and the long-
term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 22-23]
20 GitHub - khamza075/PVC: A software for assessing the efficacy of various vehicle powertrains at
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions . Also see https://app.carghg.org/
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21 Many PHEVs use a level 1 portable cord set. Some BEVs use up to 19 kW for home charging (level 2)
but PHEVs do not need this extra cost and, if they use level 2 charging, use 6.6 kW home EVSE.
[See original for graphic titled "Graph of PHEVs vs. ICEVs"]
[See original for graphic titled "Cost of PHEVs, BEVs, & ICEVs"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp.
22-23]
Another perspective is dollars spent to achieve GHG reductions. Models such as the new
Toyota tool show that PHEVs can be very good at dollars per GHG reduced.20 Finally, total cost
of ownership is another perspective. We believe the above Argonne National Laboratory analysis
correctly finds that PHEVs are lower cost than BEVs, but, as we point out above and, in the
charts below, PHEV costs can be lowered further. In addition, the lower cost for home charging
stations compared to BEVs21 and savings compared to using gasoline or diesel further lower the
total cost of ownership and make Strong PHEVs very attractive in the near-term and the long-
term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 22-23]
20 GitHub -khamza075/PVC: A software for assessing the efficacy of various vehicle powertrains at
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions . Also see https://app.carghg.org/
21 Many PHEVs use a level 1 portable cord set. Some BEVs use up to 19 kW for home charging (level 2)
but PHEVs do not need this extra cost and, if they use level 2 charging, use 6.6 kW home EVSE.
[See original for graphic titled "Graph of PHEVs vs. ICEVs"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0646, pp. 22-23]
[See original for graphic titled "Cost of PHEVs, BEVs, & ICEVs"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0646, pp. 22-23]
Allowing PHEV cars and trucks to be in the proposed regulation helps low-income drivers
The flexible nature of Strong PHEV trucks and cars makes them an important
solution for low-and moderate-income drivers of used and new PHEV trucks and cars. Many
drivers need flexibility in their choice of vehicle because they either change residences often,
change jobs often, work two or more jobs or live in areas where charging at night is difficult.
This applies to some vocational vehicles that park at home, or commercial businesses that don't
have easy access to charging or that move relatively often. In addition, we understand that low-
income drivers in the California Clean Cars for All program preferred light duty PHEVs (e.g.,
Chevy Volt and BMW i3 REX) over light duty BEVs.22 Some new PHEVs are less expensive
than their BEV counterparts.23 Also used PHEV cars and trucks are entering the market more
and more and they are attractive to low-and moderate-income owners and renters of cars and
trucks. Low-and moderate-income drivers and small businesses often rent their homes or
business location or move their residence or business. A PHEV car or truck provides needed
flexibility for this hard-to-reach market segment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 24-25]
22 In the Advanced Clean Cars II final statement of reasons.
23 Ford Escape PHEV and Ford Mach-E are both 5 seat, full-function vehicles, built on the same C2
platform, but Ford's PHEV has MSRP $8400 less than the BEV for MY 23.
Lower-income drivers have less economic and social capital, and therefore have less margin
to be able to bear BEV's costs associated with inadequate access to charging facilities in many
areas, to accommodate unplanned or emergency situations and to pay for and access rented or
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owned second vehicles for travel to remote areas.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 24-
25]
24 Two Studies and a survey: 1) Dixon, J., Andersen, P.B., Bell, K., and Tneholt. C. (2020). On the ease of
being green: An investigation of the inconvenience of electric vehicle charging. Applied Energy 258,
114090, https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.114090.2) [1] Greene, D.L., Kontou, E., Borlaug, B.,
Brooker, A., Muratori, M. (2020). Public charging infrastructure for plug-in electric vehicles: What is it
worth? Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 78:102182,
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.trd.2019.ll.011 and 3) DiCamillo, M. (2022). Majority support for the state's all-
electric car mandate. Berkeley Institute of Governmental Studies Poll, Release #2022-19 (Oct,
7),https://escholarship.org/content/qt6fm432sb/qt6fm432sb.pdf.
[See original for graphic titled "Low-Income (LMI) Customers/Consumer Interest"] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 24-25]
Because of the urgency of the climate and air pollution crises worldwide and the challenges of
predicting consumer acceptance, it is important to take an all-hands-on-deck approach and have
multiple types of zero-emission car and truck technologies in the final regulation including
Strong PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 25]
Strong PHEVs offer more options for consumers which means a faster path to zero
C02 worldwide when combined with BEV and FCEV options especially given supply chain,
utility grid and charging infrastructure challenges we face today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0646, p. 25]
Many areas of the world are relying on EPA's leadership to commercialize new zero
carbon solutions to transportation such as Strong PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p.
25]
The longer-term goal should be PHEVs with 100% zero carbon electricity generation
for almost all of their electric miles, and advanced biofuels or other ultra-low carbon fuel for the
remaining miles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 25]
In addition, we believe that at least some car and truck manufacturers will find a better
business case to reach scale and get higher levels of vehicle adoption by producing both PHEVs
and BEVs than only producing battery electric vehicles. Such a result is good for truck and car
maker competition, for consumers and the planet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 26-27]
EPA's actions in this final rule will be heard in many parts of the world. EPA's
leadership matters and should be a factor when finalizing how the rule impacts the
commercialization of Strong PHEVs. Strong PHEV cars and trucks are an excellent solution for
the unique needs of rural areas, mountainous areas and cold weather areas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0646, pp. 26-27]
Strong PHEV cars and trucks are potentially a better option for the portion of the US
and other countries that cover small and mid-size towns where trip distances (when needed)
exceed urban megacity regions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 26-27]
Strong PHEVs do well compared to other ZEVs in mountainous areas, cold weather
regions and other extreme use cases around the world because they are dual fuel vehicles and
technology exists to make the second fuel ultra-low carbon.27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646,
pp. 26-27]
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27 Kambly, K. and Bradley, T.H (2015). Geographical and temporal differences in electric vehicle range
due to cabin conditioning energy consumption, Journal of Power Sources 275, 468-475, and Neubauer, J.,
Wood, E. (2014). Thru-life impacts of driver aggression, climate, cabin thermal management, and battery
thermal management on battery electric vehicle utility, Journal of Power Sources 259, 262-275.
While many trips in these regions are local, both personal and fleet vehicles do take
long distance trips, including to remote areas, where charging is lacking or inadequate.
Mountainous terrain and very cold weather both significantly reduce the range of battery EVs
and/or make charging difficult if not impossible, but PHEVs are not impacted. Even California's
recently adopted Advanced Clean Fleet regulation defers compliance for government fleets in 25
of the State's 58 counties that are heavily rural. This is an acknowledgement that the State's rural
counties will not have the infrastructure to support zero emission vehicles in the near future.
Strong PHEVs are needed in this regulation for cars and trucks that tow or haul for work or
recreation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 26-27]
Due to the large energy requirements of towing, Strong PHEVs are better than other ZEVs. In
addition, Strong PHEVs as dual fuel vehicles offer advantages when towing over mountains and
rural areas where charging or hydrogen refueling is not common or not feasible from a business
case perspective. (Many class 2b and 3 vehicles serve as both work and personal transportation,
and this is a relatively large class of vehicles.) Mountain grades are particularly known for
reducing the all-electric range of battery EVs, but PHEVs are dramatically less impacted and/or
have better access to refueling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 27]
Allowing Strong PHEV cars and trucks to be eligible should result in less need and cost for
away-from-home charging stations for individual drivers and commercial fleets. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 27]
Allowing Strong PHEV cars and trucks to be eligible will help reach skeptical consumers and
other late adopters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 27-28]
EPA should adopt a provision to discourage low-range PHEVs by requiring them to count as
an HEV with no zero emission miles. We suggest a cut-off of 50 km (31 miles). Further we are
not suggesting a ban on low-range PHEVs but rather a disincentive to produce them. Low-range
PHEVs according to the UC Davis data logger project and the EV Project have greater likelihood
of not plugging in and this could increase as PHEVs get older. PHEVs with a long all-electric
range offer much greater benefits to consumers and show much higher levels of plugging
in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 7]
In a future rule, EPA should require automakers to only produce in the early 2030s PHEVs
with 50 miles or greater all-electric range, along with BEVs and fuel cell EVs. Due to the climate
catastrophe, even more electrification will be required. However, for all the reasons provided in
this letter, we do not believe the approach taken by the European Union to ban PHEVs is
appropriate. Further, this current rulemaking by adopting our recommendations above will help
lead to a transition in the 2030s to requirements for Strong PHEVs, BEVs and FCEVs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 10]
Allowing PHEV cars and trucks in the regulation provides a better solution especially for
commercial vehicles that provide services during major catastrophes and daily emergencies.
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Because Strong PHEV cars and trucks are dual fuel that means they are particularly
suited to provide services for society to recover from wildfires, earthquakes, hurricanes, floods,
riots, and other catastrophes, as well as provide needed services in more typical daily
emergencies (e.g., police, ambulance, fire, power outage recovery). PHEVs for some of their
fleet provide the flexibility they need to deal with catastrophes and emergencies as public
servants. CARB's Advanced Clean Truck program recognized this by providing exemptions for
emergency vehicles, and this emphasizes the need for dual fuel vehicles that can provide the
flexibility that some fleets need. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 26]
Because PHEVs and Strong PHEVs are dual fuel vehicles, they provide car and
truck owners who also sometimes use their car or truck for personal use or who park their work
truck at home with a second fuel to travel in case of emergencies. Further, many PHEVs will
come with vehicle-to-load and vehicle-to-building technology that will allow emergency power
for their home or a few appliances in their home or small business. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0646, p. 26]
Strong PHEV cars and trucks are an excellent solution for many parts of the world and a long
commercialization period is needed to scale up this technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0646, p. 26]
Due to the large energy requirements of towing, Strong PHEVs are better than other ZEVs. In
addition, Strong PHEVs as dual fuel vehicles offer advantages when towing over mountains and
rural areas where charging or hydrogen refueling is not common or not feasible from a business
case perspective. (Many class 2b and 3 vehicles serve as both work and personal transportation,
and this is a relatively large class of vehicles.) Mountain grades are particularly known for
reducing the all-electric range of battery EVs, but PHEVs are dramatically less impacted and/or
have better access to refueling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 27]
Organization: Stellantis
Stellantis recommends that EPA should:
GHG Standards
-Include PHEV technology as a critical transition technology to a fully electrified future -
without incorrect discounting - particularly in highly capable vehicle segments [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
-Treat trucks and SUVs fairly by including PHEV technology as an important bridge to a
BEV future, and ensure year-over-year required improvements are the same as cars [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
6. Role of PHEVs and HEVs
Diversity is the antidote for uncertainty. The Final Rule must be more inclusive of PHEVs
and HEVs to hedge compliance and environmental risks in the event the BEV market is slower
to develop because of the previously mentioned market uncertainties. Unfortunately, PHEVs are
excluded from the compliance modeling used to demonstrate feasibility of the standards; and
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HEVs are relegated to a subset of ICEs never exceeding 3 percent combined-fleet penetration
when the technology is in 7 percent of all vehicles sold today. 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0620, pp. 29-30]
19 S&P Global Catalyst for Insight - Data As of April 30, 2023.
The proposal acknowledges "PHEVs can provide significant reductions in GHG emissions
and a bridge for consumers that may not be ready to adopt a fully electric vehicle."20 Toyota is
seeking carbon reductions as quickly as possible by providing our customers with a range of low
carbon solutions that best fit their incomes, needs, and lifestyles. From that perspective, BEVs,
PHVs, and HEVs have a role to play in displacing conventional petroleum vehicles from the
road. During the transition to electrification, PHEVs and HEVs offer a broader spectrum of more
accessible low carbon options to consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 29-30]
20 88 Fed. Reg. at 29298.
6.1. PHEV Architectures and Applications
This modeling deficiency seems temporary in the case of PHEVs as EPA seeks comment and
recommendations on the types of PHEV architectures that should be considered for the analysis
supporting the Final Rule. Toyota recommends that modeling for Final Rule include the more
capable strong-PHEV designs being introduced to meet US06 high power cold starts as well as
the range-extending architecture EPA mentions being studied at Southwest Research Institute.
We agree PHEV architectures can provide pickup trucks expanded utility and power in addition
to all- electric miles, but believe the technology is viable for the entire spectrum of vehicle
classes including sedans, CUVs, SUVs, minivans, and pickup trucks as evidenced by the Prius
Prime and RAV 4 Prime. Compliance modeling to support the Final Rule should incorporate the
technology into all light-duty vehicle classes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 29-30]
6.2. Technology Assessments Should Incorporate Critical Mineral Supply and Lifecycle
Emissions
The modeling should also include a sensitivity analysis of BEV/PHEV mix on critical mineral
usage for any assumed overall PEV penetration. PHEVs can make the most efficient use of the
limited battery supply and constrained infrastructure network forecast through the period of the
rulemaking. The below example compares different vehicle powertrain emissions for a mid-size
SUV using peer-reviewed data from carghg.com. The same amount of lithium in the battery of
one 300-mile plus BEV can be used for up to six PHEVs -or more than eighty conventional
hybrids. See Figure 10 for the C02 saved from replacing a mid-sized SUV powered by a
conventional gasoline engine with electrified alternatives under a constrained lithium supply.
This analysis assumes average US electric grid emissions for BEVs and the electric operation of
PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 31-32]
[See original for attachment for Figure 10 C02 Saving from Replacing ICEs Under
Constrained Mineral Supply] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 31-32]
PHEVs can rival the emissions performance of BEVs under many real-world operating
conditions. PHEVs are not always the best-performing option but can have as good or better
lifecycle performance because of lower manufacturing emissions for smaller batteries and lower
well-to-tank emissions while still covering a significant fraction of daily trips in electric drive.
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Given most average daily trips are under 50 miles, this results in a significant portion of all-
electric miles like a BEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 31-32]
EPA requests any relevant performance or utility data that may help inform their analyses for
the Final Rule. We appreciate the opportunity to share data which will help elevate the role
PHEVs in the Final Rule to be an important part of a sustainable transition to electrification. We
plan to share such PHEV data outside of the comment period, possibly, including confidential
information. For now, we request EPA consider the data we have provided that suggests PHEVs
should be considered be an important contributor in whatever assumed PEV sales mix. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 32]
The proposal notes "that the inclusion of PHEVs could potentially increase the combined
ZEV share projection beyond the BEV penetration levels shown."21 For all the reasons covered
to this point in our comments, Toyota strongly believes that PHEVs must be considered a PEV-
alternative to BEVs, consistent with President Biden's Executive Order 14037. PHEV buyers
seek price, utility, and total driving range that a BEV may not offer. PHEVs must be considered
a substitute for BEVs and not ICEs or a way to increase total PEV share beyond 60% in 2030
and 67 percent in 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 32]
2188 Fed. Reg. at 29329.
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
3. EPA arbitrarily excludes viable LMDV technologies from its compliance modeling.
EPA acknowledges in the Preamble that it "has not specifically modeled the adoption of plug-
in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) architectures in the analysis for this proposal" 16 and asks for
comments on whether or how it should model PHEV architectures in the final rule. 17 EPA
repeats the statement that it "has not specifically modeled the adoption of plug-in hybrid electric
vehicle (PHEV) architectures in the analysis for this proposal" five times in the DRIA, without
any real explanation for the omission. 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 3-4]
16 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29298.
17 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29298.
18 DRIA at 2-48, 2-74 (twice), 2-75 and 3-19.
This critical omission is wholly at odds with EPA's obligation to consider reasonable
alternatives, especially considering the significant role that PHEVs play in light-duty
transportation. Between 2011 and 2021, PHEVs accounted for 32% of all new LD ZEV sales in
the U.S. 19 Looking ahead, IHS Markit projects that PHEVs will comprise 19% of new U.S. ZEV
sales over 2022 to 2032.20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 3-4]
19 IHS Markit "Mobility and Energy Future 2022 light vehicle long-term outlook," September 2022. ZEVs
include BEVs, FCEVs, and PHEVs.
20 IHS Markit "Mobility and Energy Future 2022 light vehicle long-term outlook," September 2022.
Moreover, EPA's treatment of PHEVs in its OMEGA modeling is an intentional
misrepresentation in EPA's analysis fleets. Starting with the MY 2022 analysis fleet, EPA forces
all PHEVs into ICEV fueling and technology classes, ignoring the attributes of the electrical
powertrain and arbitrarily excluding the PHEV technology from the modeled compliance
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scenario.21 For example, OMEGA vehicle ID 18497 (MY 2027 Toyota PHEV,
"Midsize:sedan:PHEV: 1.0: {'gasoline': 1.0} :car:2.0:0.0:2021:2017.0:5.0:PHEV: steel :Toyota:Toyo
ta"), understood to represent the current-day Toyota Prius Prime, is modeled by EPA as having a
zero kWh battery, tailpipe GHG emissions of 185 gC02e/mile, and a vehicle price of $17,079.22
In reality, the 2023 Toyota Prius Prime has a 13.47 kWh battery, 23 tailpipe emissions of 78
gC02e/mile, 24 and an MSRP of $32,350. 25 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 3-4]
21 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip,
"2023_03_25_ll_46_49_ld_central_compliance_run_Proposal_vehicle.csv."
22 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip,
"2023_03_25_ll_46_49_ld_central_compliance_run_Proposal_vehicle.csv."
23 See https://pressroom.toyota.com/prime-time-for-more-ev-miles-with-the-all-new-2023-prius-prime/,
accessed May 2, 2023.
24 See https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/Find.do?action=sbs&id=44362, accessed May 2, 2023.
25 See https://pressroom.toyota.com/prime-time-for-more-ev-miles-with-the-all-new-2023-prius-prime/,
accessed May 2, 2023.
Given that PHEVs accounted for almost one-third of all LD ZEV sales from 2011 to 2021,
failure to account for PHEVs seriously compromises the usefulness of EPA's modeling exercise.
It is unacceptable for EPA to neglect consideration of PHEV in the OMEGA compliance
modeling for the proposed rule, and unacceptable that EPA is proposing to model the PHEV
architectures in the final rule without adequate opportunity for public review and comment.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 3-4]
Organization: United Steelworkers (USW)
While the proposed rule is "technology neutral", there is an underlying assumption in it that
the shift will be to ZEVs, more specifically BEVs, rather than low- emission vehicles. EPA's
proposal completely writes off plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and other low-emission
technologies through the requirement that BEVs take up over half of the U.S. auto market by
2030. EPA's proposed rule calls for 37 percent of new light-duty cars and trucks to be BEVs by
2027 and more than 60 percent by 2030. It is important to note that BEV sales were just under 6
percent in 2022.6 Additionally, the proposed rule goes above the Biden Administration's
Executive Order 14037, Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks, which
called for BEVs, PHEVs, and fuel cell electric vehicles to take up 50 percent of U.S. auto market
by 2030.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
5. Modeling plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs). EPA is requesting comment on if it
should model PHEVs in the final rule. Since the emissions from PHEVs can vary substantially
(based on how they are operated), to fully assess their impacts in this rulemaking, EPA should
update modeling for its final rule to include PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 3]
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EPA Summary and Response
EPA acknowledges and appreciates all of the comments relating to modeling PHEVs in the
compliance analysis.
Comments in this area related primarily to the significance of modeling PHEVs in the
compliance analysis, and predominantly advocated for their inclusion. Many comments referred
to the view that PHEVs have a role to play in compliance with the standards and therefore should
be included. Some comments also dealt with the configuration of PHEVs that we should model,
with Toyota advocating for "the more capable strong-PHEV designs being introduced to meet
US06 high power cold starts as well as the range-extending architecture."
In response, EPA first notes that the exclusion of PHEVs (or any vehicle technology type) in a
compliance analysis in no way prevents manufacturers from utilizing the technology in their fleet
as an emission reducing technology. EPA's compliance analysis is not prescriptive as to the
types of technologies that may be used, but only descriptive of the types of technology that we
anticipate manufacturers are most likely to choose to comply with the standards, based on our
assessment of the relative cost and effectiveness of various technologies in contributing to
compliance with the fleet average standards. Even if PHEVs were left entirely out of the
analysis, a manufacturer would remain free to manufacture PHEVs and these vehicles would
contribute to the manufacturer's compliance according to the emissions performance that they
achieve. If PHEVs were included but the costs assumed for the technology were higher or lower
for a specific manufacturer, that manufacturer may see a different value proposition for including
that technology than that which was represented in the analysis. In neither case would
manufacturers in any way be prevented from using the technology as part of its mix of
technologies that contribute toward compliance with the standards.
In response to the totality of comments advocating for inclusion of PHEVs, we have included
PHEVs in the updated compliance analysis, and our projections of PEV penetration in the
various cases of the analysis now distinguish between BEVs and PHEVs. These PHEVs are
modeled as having an extended US06-capable driving range.
In response to comments that modeling PHEVs in the final rule does not provide "adequate
opportunity for public review and comment," EPA disagrees. EPA provided notice that we
expected to add PHEVs to the final rule analysis, and also provided public notice of the cost
estimates that we were likely to use in the case that we did so. The public was therefore given
notice to expect PHEVs as a possible addition to the final analysis, and was given notice as to
what the primary additional cost inputs to the analysis would likely be. We received very few
comments on these costs, and received a large amount of positive comments recommending that
we add PHEVs to the analysis.
In response to comments that the exclusion of PHEVs represents "an intentional
misrepresentation in EPA's analysis fleets," EPA disagrees. At the time of the proposal, EPA
assessed that PHEVs are generally significantly less cost effective than BEVs and would play a
very limited role in the cost minimizing compliance pathway that EPA routinely identifies as part
of the compliance analysis. In the compliance analysis for the final rule, the cost-minimizing
central case bears out this expectation. As we expected, the inclusion of PHEVs in the updated
analysis has not materially changed the projection of feasibility of industry's compliance with
the standards, but has only provided greater resolution of the specific types and configurations of
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vehicles that are likely to form what we project to be the cost-minimizing compliance pathway.
We note that in addition to the cost-minimizing central case pathway, we also assessed several
additional example pathways, which projected various levels of PHEVs as part of the technology
mix used to meet the standards. See section IV.E of the preamble for this rule.
In response to comments regarding the configurations of PHEVs we should model, we agree
that the longer-range US06 capable configurations are the most relevant to this analysis. Given
that blended-architecture PHEVs often have relatively small driving range that results in a
relatively low GHG effectiveness due to the nature of the PHEV utility factor relationship, we
expect that these vehicles will be less effective at delivering GHG reductions relative to their
cost, and also are likely to be somewhat discouraged from entering the market due to their
inability to generate ZEV credits in states following the California ACC II program.460
In response to the request by Strong PHEV Coalition that we should include scenarios with
higher amounts of PHEVs, we note that our sensitivity cases include two scenarios in which
BEV penetration is lower than in the central case, both of which indicate a higher level of PHEV
penetration.
In response to comments advocating for longer-range PHEVs or that we should incentivize
longer-range PHEVs, EPA notes that the PHEVs in our compliance analysis are longer-range
PHEVs that have US06 capable electric range. As discussed above, the inclusion of a specific
type of technology in the compliance analysis in no way prevents manufacturers from producing
different types. Similarly, a specific type of PHEV being represented in the analysis does not
incentivize production of that type of PHEV. Longer-range PHEVs are already incentivized to
some degree by their treatment under the ZEV program followed by California and the Section
177 states,461 as well as their more beneficial grams per mile compliance contribution based on
the PHEV utility factor.
In response to comments that EPA should apply PHEV technology primarily to pickup trucks
and SUVs, EPA agrees that these vehicles are good candidates for the specific attributes of
PHEVs, but as these are performance-based standards, the OMEGA model reasonably
determines the specific vehicle classes to which each technology is applied based on the relative
cost and effectiveness in each potential vehicle application.
In response to comments that EPA should model PHEVs with 7 kWh batteries that meet the
minimum requirement for IRA eligibility, we agree that PHEVs with a small battery may have a
low battery cost relative the value of the IRC 30D credit. However, these vehicles also have
relatively high GHG grams per mile due to the PHEV utility factor assigning a higher value for
shorter range PHEVs. EPA has also not seen evidence of a clear trend of manufacturers planning
shorter-range PHEVs in order to capture this possible advantage. While it is possible that 7 kWh
PHEVs would have a lower net price due to the IRA incentives, it would still depend on the
battery qualifying for the FEOC and mineral/component content requirements, and with the
battery being much smaller, the 45X production tax credit would have much less of an impact.
EPA instead chose to model longer-range PHEVs with US06 capability, in the expectation that
460 As explained in preamble IV. C, EPA has not at this time approved the waiver that would allow California to
follow the ACC II program.
461 EPA has not at this time approved the waiver that would allow California to follow the ACC II program.
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these will be more commonly produced due to their lower GHG grams per mile and their
eligibility for ZEV credits in California and Section 177 states.
In response to comments that EPA should assume level 1 charging infrastructure for PHEVs
with 50-mile or lower electric-only range, we note that this was not appropriate because as stated
above, the PHEVs in the compliance analysis have longer range. For responses to comments on
charging infrastructure, see section 17 of the response to comments document. In response to
comments regarding the ability of longer-range PHEVs to use BEV batteries, the ANL battery
cost equations were developed with consideration of higher power-to-energy ratios at the lower
end of their kWh capacity range, making those battery sizes applicable to either BEVs or
PHEVs. In the updated analysis, only longer-range PHEVs462 are placed into the fleet, and their
battery costs are derived from the same equations as BEVs.
For response to comments that PHEVs and HEVs are a more efficient use of critical minerals
than BEVs, see the responses in section 15 of the response to comments document, Critical
minerals and supply chain.
12.2.5 - Battery replacement
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Consumers (AFC)
Most notably, while "EPA projects lower maintenance and repair costs for several advanced
technologies (e.g., battery electric vehicles)," EPA has failed to properly consider the likelihood,
frequency, or expense of repairing or replacing a light-duty or medium-duty vehicle's battery due
to wear, accident, or malfunction; a repair or replacement of a battery for an electric vehicle
could potentially undo any cost savings projected by EPA in terms of "lower maintenance and
repair costs" for "battery electric vehicles." Indeed, as some sources have pointed out: "[tjhere
will be scenarios in which a new EV battery will cost more than the vehicle's value." Ronald
Montoya, Electric Car Battery Replacement Costs, Edmunds.com, May 2, 2023; see also id.
("On one hand, [battery replacement] costs might be cheaper than buying a new EV, but
spending $15,000 on a new pack for a car that might be worth $10,000 is a tough sell.").2 EPA
has failed to properly consider this aspect of the problem. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, p.
4]
2 Available at https://www.edmunds.com/electric-car/articles/electric-car-battery- replacement-costs.html.
462 EPA assumed that manufacturers would design PHEVs that would provide enough range to qualify as ZEVs
under the ACCII and ACT programs being administered by California and participating Section 177 states. In
OMEGA, EPA assumed that light-duty vehicle PHEV batteries would be sized for 40 miles of all-electric range over
the US06 cycle, while medium-duty PHEVs would be sized to drive 75 miles over the UDDS while tested at
ALVW. This assumption is supported by EPA's engagement with manufacturers and our understanding of their
product plans. Nonetheless, EPA has not at this time approved the waiver that would allow California to follow the
ACC II program, and we are not prejudging the outcome of that separate administrative proceeding.
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Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
EPA's cost benefit analysis is implicitly built around much longer battery life than is currently
achieved, as EPA does not factor in battery replacement costs or the environmental implications
of additional battery production, recycling, and disposal. EPA cannot have it both ways - either
the batteries are remarkably durable, or the costs of this Proposed Rule are dramatically
understated.
Organization: Anonymous
Perhaps the largest omission in EPA's analysis is considering what happens if BEV needs a
battery replaced. Battery replacements can cost well into the tens of thousands
(https://www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-guides/how-often-do-tesla-batteries-need-to-be-
replaced), and there's some evidence that some BEVs are 'totaled' even with minor damage
because it doesn't make sense to repair and replace the battery pack (for example,
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a42709679/tesla-insurance-fixes-expense/). however, this
consideration is not included in EPA's analysis of repair and maintenance nor elsewhere in the
rule. This unaccounted for cost obscures the true cost of ownership, and if included, could flip
the estimated cost per mile of repair and maintenance costs from BEVs being net positive
compared to ICE vehicles to net negative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, pp. 1-3]
Organization: Arizona State Legislature
EPA also does not calculate the frequency or likelihood that a light-duty or medium-duty
vehicle will need to replace its battery due to wear or accident. Nor does EPA calculate the cost
of battery replacement. Battery replacement for a passenger vehicle can cost between $5,000 and
$15,000.29 One battery replacement could obviate any cost savings estimated by EPA for that
vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 24]
29 Devin Pratt, What Happens to the Old Batteries in Electric Cars, CONSUMER REPORTS,
Feb. 23, 2022, available at https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/hybrids-evs/what-happens-to-
the-old-batteries-in-electric-cars-al 091429417/.
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
- Vehicle maintenance and repair costs. EPA underestimates maintenance costs in several
ways, not the least of which is by ignoring the massive expense of replacing an electric vehicles
battery. For example, a Tesla battery typically costs between $12,000 and $20,000 to replace and
is out of warranty after only 8 years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 5-6]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
3. Design for disassembly holds promise for battery recycling.
The battery design parameters listed in the Proposal, which EPA used to develop battery cost
estimates, see 88 Fed. Reg. at 29299, do not include design for disassembly (Dfd), also referred
to as design for recycling or design for reuse. Dfd involves factoring end-of-life into the design
of the vehicle, meaning that the battery is designed to be taken apart so that cells and modules
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can be refurbished, reused, or replaced, or so that the battery can be more efficiently and safely
disassembled for recycling. This disassembly is typically a difficult, lengthy, and therefore
expensive process because Dfd is not included in the design phase.409 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 151]
409 CalEPA, Lithium-ion car battery recycling advisory group report (2022), https://calepa.ca.gov/lithium-
ion-car-battery-recycling-advisory-group/ (last accessed June 29, 2023).
As reuse and recycling becomes more prevalent and policies begin to require it, we expect
that Dfd will also be more common. If Dfd occurs, more reuse, refurbishment and replacement
will occur and batteries will have a longer lifespan, therefore reducing the amount of new
batteries necessary for electrification.410 The disassembly of a battery from a vehicle and down
to the cell level currently represents approximately a third of light-duty vehicle recycling costs in
the United States.411 If Dfd occurs, this recycling cost will also decline, therefore leading to
more prevalent recycling and greater availability of recycled supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 151]
410 Michael S. Koroma, et al., Life cycle assessment of battery electric vehicles: Implications of future
electricity mix and different battery end-of-life management, Sci Total Env. 20;831:154859 (2022),
available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9171403/ (last accessed June 29, 2023).
411 See Jessica Dunn, et al., Electric vehicle lithium-ion battery recycled content standards for the US -
targets, costs, and environmental impacts, Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 185, 106488, 0921-
3449 (2022), at 6, Fig. 3, available at https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2022.106488
Organization: Fred Reitman
Electric vehicles are unaffordable. New electric vehicles cost about $20,000 more than
gasoline-powered vehicles. More than half of Americans are living paycheck to paycheck and
cannot afford the higher cost of an electric vehicle (EV). Further, batteries will need to be
replaced and the cost of new electric batteries range from $10,000 - $ 15,000. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0432, p.1]
Organization: John Graham
The BEV model with the longest run of real-world experience, the Nissan Leaf, has
experienced troublesome rates of battery degradation within the first half of the Leafs expected
life (Graham, 2021). It is instructive that most battery warranties for BEVs do not extend beyond
8 years or 100,000 miles of vehicle life.26 The NPRM refers to a claim that BEV batteries will
last longer than the life of the vehicle but, as noted by NAS in 2021, that claim is based on
laboratory tests. Real-world driving conditions are much more diverse (e.g., extreme temperature
conditions, extreme uses of batteries and so forth) and may contribute to battery degradation in
ways that lab tests do not cover.27 One specific concern with laboratory tests is that they can
only simulate cycle life, not battery life, and real-world experience with battery life beyond about
10 years is completely lacking. Since battery replacement costs are so large, they must be
addressed in the Final Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 20]
26 For data on the Leaf's rate of battery degradation and battery warranty policies, see John D. Graham.
The Global Rise of the Modern Plug-In Electric Vehicle: Public Policy, Innovation, and Strategy. Elgar
House Publishing, UK, 2021, 44-46.
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27 National Academy of Sciences. Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy: 2025 to 2035. National
Academies Press. Washington, DC., 2021, 115.
It is worth noting here that the smaller batteries in HEVs do tend to last at least as long as the
life of the vehicle. However, that is due to the HEV's battery management system, which
restricts the range of the battery charge level, usually between 30% and 70% of a full charge.
BEVs require deeper charging cycles to accomplish the driving ranges that customers demand. It
is well known that deeper charging cycles contribute to the rate of battery degradation. Unlike
HEVs,28 BEVs also need to be designed to recharge as fast as possible, which also increases the
rate of battery degradation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 20]
28 JohnD. Graham. 2021, 154 (see footnote 26 above for full reference).
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
But used EVs offer little savings if the buyer has to replace the battery. According to the
Department of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory, advanced batteries "wear out
eventually," and today's batteries last only 8 to 15 years. Electric Vehicle Benefits and
Considerations, U.S. Department of Energy Alternate Fuels Data Center, https://bit.ly/3PcOn9i.
Replacing an EV battery costs anywhere from $5,000 to more than $15,000. Electric Car Battery
Replacement Costs, Edmunds (May 2, 2023) https://bit.ly/3NutoNS. Such substantial expenses
hardly qualify as "reduced repair and maintenance costs." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,364. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 17-18]
Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
Furthermore, batteries are the most expensive part of an EV, representing up to 50% of an
EV's price tag40. Though most EV batteries come with a 5- to 10-year warranty, they only kick
in if a battery's capacity falls below 10-15%. This means that an ICE vehicle could lose 30% of
its mileage range, and still be considered by the warranty as in "good working condition." Any
replacement that occurs outside of the warranty is the financial responsibility of the owner. The
battery technology in EVs is very similar to that found in everyday smartphones. Anyone who
has owned a new smartphone knows that the battery degrades over time, and regardless of how
well it is maintained, the battery life will inevitably worsen and eventually die. The same is true
for EV batteries. While some studies show that most EVs lose between 5-10% of their battery
life in the first five years41, there are many reputable reports of brand- new EVs not living up to
their supposed battery life, right off the lot. As an example, MotorTrend tested the F-150
Lighting Platinum EV that has an EPA-rated range of 300-miles on a new battery. When the test
was run at an average highway speed of 70 mph - this resulted in a range of 255 miles, 15% less
than the EPA rating. MotorTrend warns drivers to "expect driving range to fall with extreme [hot
or cold] temperatures, higher speeds, or significant elevation changes. Alternatively, you can
extend that range by driving slower, limiting air-conditioning and other accessory usage, and
minimizing hard braking"42. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 10-11]
40 https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/scratched-ev-battery-your-insurer-may-have-
junk- whole-car-2023-03-20
41 https://www.kbb.com/car-advice/hybrid-ev-battery-warranty
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42 https://www.motortrend.com/reviews/2022-ford-f-150-lightning-platinum-range-max-charging-test-
review/
Organization: POET, LLC
EPA estimates the U.S. will have more than 800 GWh of cell or battery manufacturing
capacity by 2025, and 1,000 GWh by 2030, enough to supply from 10 to 13 million BEVs per
year.4 This production would roughly be sufficient to meet EPA's compliance requirements.
However, EPA did not explicitly consider the battery cost replacement for the current 2 million
electric vehicles in the EV sales projections by 2032. Furthermore, the battery lifetime will
largely depend on the consumer behavior and how often they charge the battery. Public fast
chargers tend to degrade lithium-ion batteries at a quicker rate than slower home charging
options. With shorter battery life, a higher battery production rate and critical material supply
would be required than otherwise projected over the next 8 to 10 years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, p. 36]
4 DRIA pg. 3-24.
U.S. EPA does not even consider the costs associated with battery replacement outside of
warranty later in the life of a BEV or the fact that the overall lifetime of BEVs may be shorter
than that of a conventional vehicle which would also impact a cost comparison based on vehicle
lifetime that would negatively affect BEVs. U.S. EPA should account for these factors in its
analysis of BEV penetration and at a minimum perform sensitivity analyses to determine how
they could affect demand for BEVs and automakers ability to comply with the Proposed Rule.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 59]
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
For one thing, EPA ignores the cost of battery replacements for EV owners.34 EV batteries
degrade over time with each charge and discharge, and this degradation will be accelerated if the
EV gets heavy use, if it is driven through cold winters, or if the owner uses rapid recharging.3 5
Battery degradation reduces significantly the power and range of the EV and will eventually lead
to an unacceptable risk of thermal runaway and fire.36 At a certain point in the life of the EV,
depending on the nature of its use, the type of recharging, and the environment where the vehicle
is driven, the owner will need to replace the battery (if replacement is even feasible)—just to
maintain or restore the utility of the vehicle or for safety reasons. Further, independent of use, if
the battery is scratched or suffers other forms of damage in a relatively minor traffic accident, the
battery may need to be replaced prematurely (or the vehicle may be considered a total loss).37
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 13-14]
34 Section 3.1 of the EPA's draft regulatory impact analysis (DRIA) for the proposed light- and medium-
duty rule, for example, does not include any estimate for the cost of battery replacement.
35 See Jacqueline S. Edge, et al., "Lithium ion battery degradation: what you need to know," Royal Society
of Chemistry, March 22, 2021, https://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlehtml/2021/cp/dlcp00359c (identify-
ing 5 principal and 13 secondary mechanisms causing degradation of lithium-ion batteries in EVs, and
explaining that degradation will be exacerbated by, among other things, usage profile, outside tempera-
ture, and the use of fast charging); Niall Kirkaldy, et al., "Lithium-Ion Battery Degradation: Measuring
Rapid Loss of Active Silicon in Silicon-Graphite Composite Electrodes," American Chemical Society
Applied Energy Materials, November 3, 2022, https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acsaem.2c02047 (similar).
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36 Significant loss in battery capacity and range over the life of the EV is expected and allowed for even
within the parameters of the UN's GTR No. 22 standard for EV battery durability cited by the EPA.
37 See https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/scratched-ev-battery-your-insurer-may-
have-junk-whole-car-2023-03-20/ (full citation in footnote 17 above).
Battery replacement, when available, will undoubtedly be very expensive. For an EV battery
pack with a capacity of 100 kWh (the capacity level assumed by the EPA in its models), the
replacement battery alone (not including labor, any fee for disposing of the old battery, and any
other associated expenses) would cost at least $15,300. That figure is based on the Energy
Department's 2022 estimated cost of manufacturing the battery—$153 per kWh of capacity.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 14]
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
The last detrimental aspect of this arbitrary benchmark is that part of the cost analysis done by
EPA included refueling time. With larger batteries come longer recharge times, which again add
to the cost. While EPA might argue that the high-speed chargers will make up for that, EPA does
not want to address the fact that rapid charge or discharge of a battery accelerates its lifecycle.
Every time a consumer inputs or draws large amounts of power from a battery, it damages it
more than a slower input or draw, thereby decreasing the timeline for the battery's replacement
and moving that expense up sooner in the timeline of EV ownership. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0674, p. 9]
EPA's cost estimate does not include battery replacement.37 With the proposed standards
taking effect in 2027, and some of the cost and savings estimates being extrapolated out through
2055, even if Tesla can be the first EV manufacturer to achieve a battery that lasts 20 years, a
replacement will be a requirement. Based on the EPA's chosen 100 kWh capacity and the
Department of Energy's 2022 estimated cost of manufacturing of $153/kWh, a new battery
without labor, disposal fees, and other associated expenses would cost the consumer $15,300.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 10]
37 "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles." EPA, Apr. 2023, www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-12/420d22003.pdf (accessed 5
July 2023).
Table 4-5, which outlines the studies used to justify the proposal, shows that all but one study
either came from California or New York. The claimed national study only contained 862
vehicles and therefore poses insignificant statistical relevance. It also shows that the entirety of
the country is not represented. While the Census Bureau splits the United States at 80% urban
and 20% rural living, New York and California cannot be considered as viable representations of
the county's entire population. Due to differences in infrastructure, state-imposed regulations and
laws, population density, and other factors, it is likely that differences could be found even
between major cities throughout the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 10]
On page 4-34, when referring to maintenance costs over the 225,000-mile life of a vehicle,
EPA does not mention the need for battery replacement.
While EPA does not address this issue directly in any of its cost analysis, they do open the
door to scrutiny and show their hypocrisy a bit by mentioning the battery durability standards in
1-4, 1-5, and 1-6. Based on the UN standards, a battery capable of supplying its platform with a
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range of 300 miles when new would be considered within the standard so long as it could
provide 240 miles of range after 5 years or 62,000 miles. Additionally, it would remain within
that standard if it could provide 210 miles of range to its associated platform after 8 years or
approximately 100,000 miles. It only continues to degrade from there. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0674, p. 10]
In the table below, the initial data is from the UN standard and the rest is calculated from
there based on linear degradation of the battery throughout its lifecycle. The reality is that the
degradation would be faster than this and fast charging used to compete with ICE vehicle refuel
times will only exacerbate the degradation. I have also placed a couple helpful links below that
support this claim. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 10]
EPA's cost estimate does not include battery replacement.37 With the proposed standards
taking effect in 2027, and some of the cost and savings estimates being extrapolated out through
2055, even if Tesla can be the first EV manufacturer to achieve a battery that lasts 20 years, a
replacement will be a requirement. Based on the EPA's chosen 100 kWh capacity and the
Department of Energy's 2022 estimated cost of manufacturing of $153/kWh, a new battery
without labor, disposal fees, and other associated expenses would cost the consumer $15,300.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 10]
37 "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles." EPA, Apr. 2023, www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-12/420d22003.pdf (accessed 5
July 2023).
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
EPA has not quantified the following program costs:
Full impacts to drivers, including: Costs associated with battery replacements; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 31-33]
c) EPA omits costs of premature battery degradation
Temperature control is important for protecting the functionality of a lithium ion battery. One
of the ways battery suppliers and automakers reduce the costs of batteries is to save money on
their battery cooling systems. The Nissan Leaf, for example, was designed with a passive air-
cooling system, in contrast to Tesla's dual-circuit liquid cooling system. 196,197 The cost
savings in production were accomplished, but the Leaf battery packs experienced unexpectedly
high rates of battery degradation during normal use, especially in the first-generation Nissan
Leaf. Even after the 2015 redesign of the Leaf, which improved the air-cooling system, the
degradation rate (defined as percent loss of battery capacity in a year) was 18% by the fifth year
of use (compared to 24% for the 2014 version of the Leaf). 198 The most recent versions of the
Leaf have only 1-3% degradation rates in the first year of use, 199 but it is too early to tell how
well the improved Leaf batteries will hold up in the middle and later parts of the vehicle's 15-30
year lifespan. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 38-40]
196 Gustavo Henrique Ruffo, This Nissan Leaf Repair Shows Why Liquid-Cooling Is What EVs Need,
INSIDEEVS, Jan. 26, 2021, https://insideevs.com/news/482245/nissan-leaf-repair-liquid-cooling-benefits/.
197 Ling, Chen. (2020), "A Review of Lithium-Ion Battery Thermal Management System Strategies and
the Evaluate Criteria." International journal of electrochemical science. 14. 6077-6107.
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198 CarParts, Nissan LEAF: Battery Degradation and Other Common Problem, CARPARTS.COM, last
accessed June 30, 2023, https://www.carparts.com/blog/nissan-leaf-battery-degradation-and-other-
common-problems/.
199 Id.
The history of Nissan's warranty policy implicitly acknowledges the battery degradation
issue. The original warranty for battery defects in the base Leaf was only 5 years and 60,000
miles.200 The higher-trim version was backed for 8 years and 100,000 miles.201 Consumer
complaints about the Leafs high rate of battery degradation in hot climates compelled Nissan to
upgrade the warranty: a replacement battery with superior battery chemistry was pledged if the
original battery's capacity fell below 75% within the first five years or 60,000 miles.202 More
recently, the 8-year/100,000-mile warranty has been extended to the base version but, again, only
if the battery capacity is compromised by more than 25%.203 That means a loss of driving range
from 150 miles to 112.5 miles might not be covered under the warranty. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 38-40]
200 JOHN D. GRAHAM, THE GLOBAL RISE OF THE MODERN PLUG-IN ELECTRIC VEHICLE,
PUBLIC POLICY, INNOVATION AND STRATEGY, 45 (Elgar Publishing).
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Tina Pavlik, Nissan Will Replace Your Leaf's Battery With a Warranty Under a Certain Percentage,
MOTORBISCUIT, Jun. 10, 2022, https://www.motorbiscuit.com/nissan-replace-leaf-battery-warranty-
certain- percentage/.
The warranty policy for the Chevrolet Bolt also acknowledges battery degradation issues.
Chevrolet states that the Bolt's battery pack should last longer than 15 years.204 However, the
Bolt owner's manual cautions that battery degradation could be as large as 40% during the
warranty period of 8 years or 100,000 miles.205 A 40% degradation corresponds to a loss of 95
miles out of the Bolt's 238 miles of range.206 The cost of replacing a Bolt battery pack is
$16,250 plus $850 for labor.207 That is for the 66 kWh battery back that delivers 250 miles of
driving range.208 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 38-40]
204 JOHN D. GRAHAM, THE GLOBAL RISE OF THE MODERN PLUG-IN ELECTRIC VEHICLE,
PUBLIC POLICY, INNOVATION AND STRATEGY, 45 (Elgar Publishing).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See https://chevyguide.com/chevy-bolt-battery-replacement-cost/.
208 Id.
EPA's cost analysis ignores the Leaf experience and assumes that all future lithium ion
batteries will last longer than the vehicle's lifetime. Thus there are no replacement costs.
However, EPA must acknowledge that the Tesla batteries, which form the foundation for EPA's
optimistic position on battery degradation, were not designed for an affordable EV. Moreover,
the Tesla prediction is based on laboratory predictions where Tesla models were tested. Real-
world rates of battery degradation are less well understood because even the first-generation EVs
(the Nissan Leaf and early Tesla models) are only beginning to enter their second decade of
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vehicle life. It is difficult to predict real-world rates of battery degradation based on laboratory
testing because of the complexity of real-world operating conditions (mixed operating
conditions, various ambient temperatures, different depths of charges, and different voltages).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 38-40]
EPA Summary and Response
In response to comments that we did not consider the cost of replacement of the high-voltage
battery in PEVs, EPA disagrees that high-voltage batteries will routinely need to be replaced
during the useful life of the vehicle. Based on current experience with vehicles in use in the field,
and consultations on this topic that EPA has conducted with experts, stakeholders, and
manufacturers, EPA finds no evidence that battery replacements out of warranty will typically be
necessary for PEVs during their useful life, and therefore we have no basis for including the cost
of battery replacement in the cost of PEV maintenance and repair. Additionally, commenters
provided no supporting data to validate their expectation that any specific percentage of PEVs
will routinely need a battery replacement during their useful life or that manufacturers widely
expect such replacements to be necessary. EPA is not aware of any manufacturer that has
publicly indicated that their battery is not designed to last for the useful life of the vehicle.
Commenters put forth several observations that they claim support their view that PEV
batteries will need to be replaced and/or that EPA should consider their replacement cost in the
analysis, but EPA finds these arguments to lack merit. EPA does not agree with comments that
the batteries used in vehicles are similar to those used in smartphones to the degree that one
commenter suggests; in contrast, PEV batteries typically employ a robust thermal management
system and a battery management system, have a much larger thermal mass that better resists
temperature variations, and have a multi-cell design in which individual cells are electrically
balanced to maintain working order. Further, EPA does not find the example of the first-
generation Nissan Leaf (in production from 2010 to 2017) to be a relevant indicator of the
degradation rate of more recent battery designs in other vehicles, which have not shown the same
behavior. Moreover, the Leaf had a relatively short driving range on the order of 100 miles,
provided by a relatively small battery of about 24 kWh. BEVs modeled in our compliance
analysis have batteries averaging about 100 kWh meaning that a given distance driven daily over
the life of the vehicle would amount to about one-fourth as many equivalent full discharge cycles
as for the Leaf, assuming energy consumption per mile were the same. Even if the energy
consumption were higher, the 100 kWh battery would experience far fewer equivalent discharge
cycles than the Leaf, leading to less potential for degradation. EPA also notes that ICE vehicles
sometimes experience the need for major engine repair, engine replacement, and/or transmission
replacement before their useful life is over, and EPA has not attempted to predict these relatively
unpredictable events nor has traditionally attempted to quantify their costs in its analyses. We
also disagree with the cited example in which an F-150 is said to have battery degradation "right
off the lot," as the cited example does not describe battery degradation but only demonstrates the
expected variation in driving range that is understood to result from driving at different speeds or
temperatures or similar deviations from the certification test cycles. EPA also disagrees with the
contention that the fact we run our analysis out to the year 2055 implies that PEVs in the fleet
will have to last to 2055, because our analysis assumes that vehicles that exist in the early years
of the analysis fleet gradually leave the fleet as they age. We also disagree with the contention
that Tesla batteries are not relevant to establishing the longevity of PEV batteries because they
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"were not designed for an affordable EV." Commenter does not provide evidence that the design
of the Tesla pack, which commenter suggests has good battery life, is somehow more costly or
significantly different than a pack that the same manufacturer would design for a lower priced
vehicle; while Tesla has stated an intention to use lower cost lithium-iron-phosphate packs in its
lower cost vehicles, this chemistry is not generally regarded as having a shorter life than the
nickel-based packs used in its other vehicles.
EPA also disagrees that the example of the Chevy Bolt warranty has evidentiary value in
supporting the belief that PEV batteries will need replacement or will regularly decline to less
than the 60 percent value cited in the warranty manual; in fact, commenter also notes that
"Chevrolet states that the Bolt's battery pack should last longer than 15 years," and does not
provide evidence or data to show that batteries in this vehicle are showing evidence of having a
shorter life or degrading to near 60 percent. We also note that the battery durability and warranty
standards established in this rule provide greater assurance and transparency regarding battery
performance and the conditions under which a warranty repair or replacement must be honored,
which will likely serve to motivate manufacturers to uphold battery longevity in future model
years. See Section III.G.2 of the preamble and Section 16 of the response to comments document
for expanded discussion of battery durability and warranty.
In response to comments from the Heritage Foundation (Bradbury) that assert a perpetual
linear degradation of batteries to as low as 34 percent as suggested by the table commenter
provides, EPA disagrees and notes in particular that citations provided by the commenter do not
support the calculated figures commenter shows in the table and in fact indicate that battery
degradation does not proceed in a perfectly linear manner but commonly assumes different rates
at various stages, for example, see Figure 17 of the cited J.S. Edge et al.463 in which degradation
is flat for a long period during middle of life. EPA also notes that generalizations drawn from
research papers that concern lithium-ion technology in general or at a cell level often do not
apply perfectly to batteries that have been designed for specific applications, including PEV
applications. Regarding commenter's statements on the comparative stringency of the CARB and
EPA standards, comparative stringency is difficult to quantify precisely due to the complexity of
battery durability, but EPA considers the two standards to be similar in stringency, as the
nominal performance criteria are reasonably similar, and where they are not the same, as the
commenter has indicated, this is compensated by differences in other specific aspects (see EPA's
response in RTC Section 16, Battery durability and warranty, to comments that EPA should
adopt certain specific provisions of the CARB program).
In response to comments that even minor accidents can cause a PEV to be "totaled," and that
EPA should therefore account for this possible cost in its analysis, EPA disagrees. EPA
acknowledges that some press reports have suggested that some insurers have chosen not to
repair vehicles with relatively minor damage or potential battery damage, but these observations
are largely anecdotal and EPA is not aware of any well-documented study that shows that this
practice is fundamental to addressing damage to PEVs, nor have commenters provided such data
or evidence. EPA also is not aware of data, nor have commenters provided such data, that would
quantify the frequency of these practices or the increase in repair costs due to these practices in
463 Edge, J. S. et al., "Lithium ion battery degradation: what you need to know," Phys. Chem. Chem. Phys.,
2021,23, 8200.
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the current fleet, nor have commenters provided evidence that the practice is likely to continue in
a future fleet as familiarity with PEVs increases.
12.2.6 - Other battery/electrification technology
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Doug Peterson
Anybody who is truly interested in accelerating BEV adoption should be advocating for the
highest electric fuel economy we can muster. A bloated fleet of overpowered BEVs with jumbo
battery packs will be made up of individual BEVs that take longer to charge [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0500, p. 12]
Organization: Energy Innovation
III. The EPA's final standards should account for additional factors that may accelerate the
adoption of zero- emission technologies and impact learning curves for BEV economics. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 2]
Organization: Lisa Allee
[From Hearing Testimony, May 9, 2023] My first and biggest suggestion is bigger and faster
please. Also please include hydrogen fuel cell vehicles in this regulations but importantly that
the hydrogen has to be made from water and with electrolyzers that are run on electricity from
solar and wind. This will mean that the hydrogen fuel cell cars are actually clean, and in
decentralizing the hydrogen fueling would be great, create their own hydrogen encouraging not
just allowing and local businesses. [From Hearing Testimony, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5115,
Day 1]
Organization: South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR)
Electric Vehicle Battery and Range Limitations
South Dakota is a large state with significant driving distance between many of our
communities. Although several new electrical vehicles indicate they have a 200 mile or greater
range (note -it is 224 miles one way from Pierre to Sioux Falls), a recent study shows electric
vehicles (EVs) do not consistently achieve EPA's range estimates. In addition, all batteries
degrade over time. Reports indicate EV vehicle batteries will degrade between 10 and 40 percent
over a 10-year life span. To maintain the battery's life, manufactures recommend batteries are not
frequently depleted below 10 percent capacity or charged above 90 percent capacity. This means
that an electrical vehicle should be limited to 80 percent of its capacity range to maintain the
battery's life. In addition, cold, hot, and windy weather conditions may reduce an EV vehicle's
range between 20 to 40 percent and may further impact the reliability of EV. South Dakota is
known to have cold and windy winters and hot and windy summers, which, with current EV
ranges, batteries conditions, and availability of charging stations, makes widespread use of EVs
impractical in South Dakota. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0523, p. 2]
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Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
EPA applies a similar approach to FCEVs. For the MY 2021 analysis fleet, EPA correctly
identifies base-year vehicles IDs 168, 436, and 438 as FCEV."26 Starting with the MY 2022
analysis fleet, EPA forces all FCEVs into BEV fueling and technology classes, ignoring the
attributes of the electrical powertrain and arbitrarily excluding the PHEV technology from the
modeled compliance scenario.27 The FCEV technology and costs are distinct from BEVs, and it
is not appropriate for EPA to combine FCEV into the BEV cost curve class or assign BEV
properties that do not logically apply to FCEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 5]
26 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip,
"2023_03_25_ll_46_49_ld_central_compliance_run_Proposal_vehicle.csv."
27 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip,
"2023_03_25_ll_46_49_ld_central_compliance_run_Proposal_vehicle.csv."
d) EPA omits costs of fixing defects in BEV powertrains
A correlation exists between the rapid influx of BEVs to the U.S. market and elevated rates of
safety-related recalls due to manufacturing defects in EV powertrains: General Motors210,
Ford211, Tesla212, Hyundai213, and BMW214 have all issued recalls of BEVs due to battery-
related problems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 40-41]
210 General Motors, Bolt EV and Bolt EUV Recall Information, https://experience.gm.com/recalls/bolt-ev
211 Christopher Smith, Ford F-150 Lightning Recalled for Battery Issue That Halted Production,
MOTOR1, Mar. 10, 2023, https://www.motorl.com/news/656717/ford-fl50-lightning-recalled-battery-
issue-halted-production/
212 Steven Loveday, Tesla Identified As Most Recalled Car Brand, Mercedes & Toyota Least,
INSIDEEVS, Apr. 18, 2023, https://insideevs.com/news/662943/tesla-most-recalled-car-brand-mercedes-
toyota-least/
213 Chris Isidore and Peter Valdes-Dapena, Hyundai's recall of 82,000 electric cars is one of the most
expensive in history, CNN BUSINESS, Feb. 25, 2021, https://www.cnn.eom/2021/02/25/tech/hyundai-ev-
recall/index. html
214 Iulian Dnistran, BMW i4, i7, And iX Get Recalled Because Power Might Cut Out During Driving,
INSIDEEVS, Jan. 11, 2023, https://insideevs.com/news/630693/bmw-i4-i7-ix-recall-power-cut/
Ernst and Young estimates that recalls are costing the auto industry $40-$50 billion per year,
primarily due to defects related to the software used in powertrains.215 "As vehicles become
more software-driven and connected, and suppliers are asked to speed things up, glitches are sure
to pile up higher."216 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 40-41]
215 John Irwin, "Automaker Haste Increases Risk of Recalls," Automotive News, May 8, 2023,
https://www.autonews.com/suppliers/ev-development-speeds-raising-odds-recalls.
216 Id.
The cost of EV-related recalls to automakers and their suppliers has already been significant.
In 2021, General Motors acknowledged $1.9 billion of total costs associated with the Bolt
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recalls.217 It reached a deal with its supplier, South Korea's LG Chem, to reimburse $1.2 billion
of the recall costs.218 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 40-41]
217 Heekyong Yang, GM settles $2 bin Bolt EV recall cost deal with S.Korea's LG, REUTERS, Oct. 12,
2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/lg-units-say-results-accounted-918-mln-costs-gms-bolt-recall-
2021-10-12/
218 Id.
Despite the clear history and trends related to BEV recalls, EPA fails to consider the costs of
recalls in the cost analysis for the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 40-
41]
EPA Summary and Response
EPA acknowledges and appreciates the comment received on other battery or electrification
technologies. The comments in this category relate primarily to electrification technologies or
costs that were not covered in other sections.
In response to comments advocating for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, EPA notes that although
these vehicles were not explicitly represented in the compliance analysis, they are considered
zero-emission vehicles under the program and their inclusion or exclusion from the compliance
analysis does not preclude manufacturers from producing this technology as part of their
compliance plan. EPA expects that these vehicles will be produced in relatively small volumes
during the time frame of the rule due in part to factors such as a relatively high production cost
and the availability of other technologies for compliance. EPA's application of BEVs as a
replacement technology for redesigned FCEVs in the base year fleet is considered the most
similar surrogate technology available in OMEGA, with an equivalent compliance value to
FCEVs (0 g/mi). While the costs for FCEVs and BEVs may differ, the small volumes of FCEVs
modeled as BEVs should be of minimal impact to the fleet technology costs. Regarding
regulating the source of the hydrogen fuel for these vehicles, EPA agrees that hydrogen sources
vary in their upstream C02 impact but due to the limited expected production of these vehicles
during the time frame of the rule we believe that any impacts from hydrogen fueling would have
a very small effect on our estimated C02 emissions impacts.
In response to comments that we should consider the cost of manufacturers recalling vehicles
to repair defects in BEV powertrains, EPA notes that recall and repair costs are commonly
encountered with vehicles of all technology types and are typically considered to be part of the
cost of research and development, and research and development costs are commonly higher for
newer technologies. The use of a multiplication factor applied to direct manufacturing cost of
components is the typical way in which such costs are represented in analyses of technology
cost, and EPA considers our use of a 1.5 multiplier (RPE factor) to be inclusive of these costs.
Commenter has not provided specific data or evidence to support their view that average per
vehicle recall costs over time for BEVs should be expected to be fundamentally higher than for
ICE vehicles or other technologies, nor that EPA's analysis does not adequately account for
these costs by means of the RPE factor.
In response to comments regarding electric vehicles in South Dakota, it is well known that the
range of an electric vehicle is affected by cold weather, that range may vary, and that some long
trips exceed the range of some electric vehicles. ICE vehicles also do not have unlimited range
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and the relative importance of range with electric vehicles depends in part on battery size and the
availability and speed of charging away from home, which at the current time varies from
location to location but is improving. See RTC section 17 for further discussion of charging
infrastructure. EPA notes that the standards can be met with a variety of technologies and that
the standards do not mandate electric vehicles in South Dakota or any other state. Manufacturers
are free to produce vehicles that meet the needs of their customers who are free to choose them.
We expect that customers in any state will include those whose needs are best met by an electric
vehicle and for those whose needs are best met by another technology such as PHEVs, HEVs, or
ICE vehicles, and the standards do not prevent those vehicles from being available.
12.2.7 - PEV vehicle costs and cost/price parity
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
The IRA credits also reduce the time to achieve total cost of ownership (TCO) parity for all
classes and segments of light-duty vehicles - or the time it will take consumers to realize net cost
savings. In MY 2025, TCO parity is achieved immediately for compact cars, midsize cars, small
SUVs, and midsize SUVs, while TCO parity is achieved in 4 years and 2 years for base-segment
large SUVs and pickup trucks, respectively. In MY 2030, TCO parity is achieved immediately
for all segments and classes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 17-20]
The net cumulative savings for a BEV with IRA credits compared to a gasoline vehicle is
substantial across almost all subclasses and segments in the 2025 timeframe, growing even more
significant by 2030 purchase timeframes (see Figure 3). In 2025, the BEV savings over an
equivalent gasoline vehicle are sizeable, ranging from more than $11,000 to over $19,000 for
compact cars, midsize cars, small SUVs and midsize SUVs, across both base and premium
segments. Large SUVs and pickups see fewer savings in 2025, with the premium large SUV still
costing more than a comparable gasoline vehicle. However, in the 2030 timeframe, the savings
range from more than $14,000 to over $27,000 across all vehicle subclasses and segments,
including large SUVs and pickup trucks, with base model pickups seeing the greatest savings.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 17-20]
[See original comment for Figure 3: Cumulative lifetime savings of BEVs over equivalent
gasoline vehicles] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 17-20]
Source: Roush, Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 on Light-Duty Vehicle
Electrification Costs for MYs 2025 and 2030 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 17-20]
Note: The net savings are computed and indicated in the text above the columns [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 17-20]
Even without the significant impact of the IRA, BEVs still provide cost savings over the
timeframe of EPA's proposal. An earlier Roush report for EDF (which only looked at 2030
purchase timeframe) found that for all BEVs up to a 300-mile range, purchase price parity with a
comparable gasoline vehicle is reached by 2030, across all vehicle classes and segments.47 And
by 2030, the total cost of ownership for all BEVs up to a 400-mile range were found to be equal
to or lower than their gasoline counterparts across all classes and segments. The study found that
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even without the IRA tax credits, BEVs purchased in 2030 could see an average cumulative net
savings of about $15,000 over the lifetime of the vehicle, across all classes and segments.
Moreover, as noted in Section 1, above, a new EDF study with WSP demonstrates that
consumers are experiencing these savings right now when purchasing BEVs. Over 10 years of
owning and operating select, current EVs to comparable gasoline vehicles, the analysis finds that
current, higher upfront purchase price and insurance costs for EVs are outweighed by the lower
maintenance and fuel costs, with total lifetime savings of up to $18,440.48 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 17-20]
47 Himanshu Saxena, Vishnu Nair, Sajit Pillai, "Electrification Cost Evaluation of Light-Duty Vehicles for
MY 2030,"(2023) RoushforEDF, https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-
05/Electrification_Cost_Evaluation_of_LDVs_for_MY2030_Roush.pdf.
48 Electric Vehicle Total Cost of Ownership Analysis, Summary Report, WSP for EDF (July 2023),
https://blogs.edf.org/climate411/wp-content/blogs.dir/7/files/WSP-Total-Cost-of-Ownership-Analysis-July-
2023.pdf (Attachment G).
The Roush studies support EPA's proposed standards by showing that BEV costs are
expected to continue to decline, achieving cost parity with gasoline vehicles over the timeframe
of the rulemaking. These findings closely align with EPA's determination that BEVs represent
the most cost-effective option for compliance and, in fact, demonstrate that EPA's BEV cost
projections are likely conservative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 17-20]
2. Roush's analyses are consistent with other recent analyses projecting substantial cost
declines.
Recent expert analyses corroborate Roush's findings that BEV vehicle costs are declining
rapidly and will soon be on par with comparable gasoline vehicle costs. A 2022 paper by ICCT
analyzed bottom-up vehicle component-level costs to assess battery electric, plug-in hybrid
electric, and conventional vehicle prices across the major classes of the U.S. light-duty vehicle
market through 2035.49 Their analysis did not consider the impact of the IRA or other federal or
state tax incentives. Even without those benefits, ICCT found declining battery and assembly
costs, resulting in shorter-range BEV150s and BEV200s estimated to reach price parity by 2024-
2026, with mid-range BEVs seeing parity around 2026-2029 and longer-range BEVs achieving
parity around 2029-2032. These findings apply to electric cars, crossovers, sport utility vehicles,
and pickup trucks, which cover all light-duty vehicle sales in the United States. Table 3
summarizes the year by which BEVs reach price parity with ICEVs. ICCT's analysis is also
consistent with Roush in finding that BEVs provide significant cost savings to consumers before
purchase price parity is achieved. ICCT estimates that typical six-year fuel and maintenance cost
savings range from $6,600 to $11,000 per vehicle purchased in 2025, with the greatest absolute
savings for the pickup and SUV class. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 20-21]
49 Peter Slowik, Aaron Isenstadt, Logan Pierce, Stephanie Searle. 2022. Assessment of Light-duty Electric
Vehicle Costs and Consumer Benefits in the United States in the 2022-2035 Timeframe, ICCT.
https://theicct.org/publication/ev-cost-benefits-2035-oct22/
[See original attachment for Table 3: Summary of year by which BEV price parity is reached]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 20-21]
Source: ICCT, Assessment of Light-duty Electric Vehicle Costs and Consumer Benefits in the
United States in the 2022-2035 Timeframe [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 20-21]
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Following their 2022 cost analysis, ICCT conducted a study assessing the future impact of the
IRA on electrification rates for light-, medium-, and heavy-duty sales in the U.S. through
2035.50 They estimate, on average over the period 2023-2032, the IRA tax credits will reduce
light-duty EV purchase costs by $3,400 to $9,050. ICCT concludes that the IRA will accelerate
electrification of both light-duty and heavy-duty sectors. By 2030, the study estimates a range of
48-61% EV share of light-duty vehicles in the U.S., increasing to 56-67% by 2032, which is the
last year of the IRA credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 20-21]
50 Peter Slowik, Stephanie Searle, Hussein Basma, Josh Miller, Yuanrong Zhou, Felipe Rodriguez, Claire
Buysse, Sara Kelly, Ray Minjares, Logan Pierce, Robbie Orvis and Sara Baldwin. 2023. Analyzing the
Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act on Electric Vehicle Uptake in the United States, ICCT and Energy
Innovation Policy & Technology LLC. https://theicct.org/publication/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23/ (Attachment
P)
Organization: Hyundai Motor America
Further, the Agency should reevaluate the assumption that price parity will be achieved by the
mid- 2020s. Price parity with ICE is key to the high rates of BEV adoption required under the
Proposed Alternative; it is also highly dependent on reducing material costs and costs of battery
technology improvements. The recent increase in raw material prices and the unstable nature of
battery system material costs in the market are just two examples of the headwinds to price
parity. It is exacerbated by the cost impacts resulting from IRA's battery component, critical
minerals, and final assembly requirements even accounting for the benefits of the IRA's 45X tax
credits. This also underscores the need for the EPA to study the true costs of the IRA as
described above and its impacts to ICE-BEV price parity attainment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0599, pp. 6-7]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
ICCT also believes that EPA has overestimated battery electric vehicle (BEV) costs. In in-
depth study, we find that incremental BEV costs relative to their combustion vehicle counterparts
are much lower than the estimates by EPA by about $2,300 (pickups) to about $5,300
(crossovers) in 2027. For 2032, EPA finds that BEVs have incremental costs of about $3,000 to
$5,000; during this same timeframe, the ICCT study finds that BEVs will be cheaper to purchase
than comparable gasoline vehicles. This difference is the result of several factors. We find that
on average, battery pack costs in the ICCT analysis are about $3,700 less than in EPA's analysis
in 2027 and about $5,200 less than in EPA's analysis in 2032. We believe EPA has
overestimated pack size, BEV energy consumption, and pack-level costs ($/kWh). If EPA were
to update their analysis with the data and evidence regarding BEV cost and technical
specifications based on the ICCT cost study, BEV costs would be lower, the costs of compliance
would be lower, and the net benefits would be greater. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 4]
An ICCT and Energy Innovation study assesses the future impact of the IRA on electrification
rates for LDV sales in the United States through 2035.4 We analyze the value of the personal and
commercial EV tax credits, factoring in the various supply chain, income, and price caps on new
EVs, and combine this with new estimates of future light-duty EV cost declines. We find that, on
average over the period 2023-2032, the IRA tax credits will reduce EV purchase costs by $3,400
to $9,050 and accelerate the timing for price parity with combustion vehicles. Using
methodologies from the Energy Policy Simulator, we project how these changing costs and
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incentives over time will affect the LDV markets in the United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 6-7]
4 Slowik, P., Searle, S., Basma, H., Miller, J. Zhou, Y., Rodriguez, F., Buysse, C., Kelly, S., Minjares, R.,
Pierce, L. (ICCT) Orvis, R., and Baldwin, S. (Energy Innovation). (2023). Analyzing the impact of the
inflation reduction act on electric vehicle uptake in the United States, https://theicct.org/publication/ira-
impact-evs-us-jan23/
Figure 1 summarizes the results from the ICCT and Energy Innovation IRA study. It shows
the findings of estimated new electric vehicle sales shares for different IRA scenarios depending
on how certain provisions are implemented and how the value of incentives is passed on to
consumers. The figure shows our modeled projection of how the IRA will accelerate
electrification. By providing thousands of dollars in financial incentives, the IRA unlocks
widespread consumer benefits. We find rapid projected EV uptake when considering both
expected manufacturing cost reductions and the IRA incentives, as well as state policies. By
2030, we find a range of a 48%-61% projected EV sales share, increasing to 56%-67% by 2032,
the final year of the IRA tax credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 6-7]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT for Figure 1. Baseline, Low, Moderate, and High projections
of EV sales share for light-duty vehicles, considering ACC II adoption in only California versus
increased states [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 6-7]
5 ICCT and Energy Innovation. (2023). Analyzing the impact of the inflation reduction act on electric
vehicle uptake in the United States, https://theicct.org/publication/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23/
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
EDF commented that, even without the IRA tax credits, BEVs purchased in 2030 could see an
average cumulative net savings of about $15,000 over the lifetime of the vehicle, across all
classes and segments. EDF also commented on the issue of price parity between BEVs and ICE
vehicles. Hyundai Motor America commented that EPA should reevaluate the assumption that
price parity will be achieve by the mid-2020s, noting that it is key to the high rates of BEV
adoption required under the proposal. ICCT also provided an analysis based on a variety of
assumptions that pointed to lower costs for PEVs than in the proposal, and cited outlooks for cost
parity or price parity.
Response:
EPA appreciates the comments from EDF and ICCT. EPA agrees that BEVs can provide
significant savings to consumers relative to ICE vehicles over the lifetimes of those vehicles.
Regarding projections of BEV or PHEV prices lower than those forecast by EPA, we appreciate
this input but continue to rely on full vehicle costs that are generated by the cost inputs and other
assumptions to OMEGA which we have described in other sections and which EPA believes
represent the best available data.
Regarding the issue of cost parity or price parity, including general comments as well as
Hyundai's suggestion that EPA reevaluate the issue of cost/price parity between BEVs and ICE
vehicles, we have reevaluated most of our technology cost estimates used in our OMEGA
modeling. Note that while we do not analyze price parity explicitly as part of our OMEGA
modeling analysis, we do discuss the literature on the topic in the preamble for both the proposed
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and final rules (see Section IV.C.l of the preamble), and note certain projections that price
parity, particularly on a total cost of ownership basis, would begin to occur by the mid- to late-
2020s. We discussed these projections as part of our general assessment that interest in, and
sales of, BEVs are rapidly increasing in the automotive market. This assessment supports our
general view that it is reasonable to account for BEV technologies in assessing the stringency of
the standards. Specifically, when doing our technical analysis, we do not believe it is necessary
to project or achieve parity between BEV and ICE vehicles, but instead we estimate technology
costs and weigh the relative costs and emission reduction potential in assessing the combination
of technologies that manufacturers could use to meet the standards.
12.3 - ICE vehicle technologies
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
6. Modeling of Internal Combustion Engine Vehicles
Some commenters may advocate that EPA maximize C02 reductions in internal combustion
engine vehicles while also driving large increases in EV market share through the adoption of yet
more stringent standards than those proposed by EPA. Such comments do not adequately
consider the massive human and capital resource requirements of the transition to EVs, and the
limited nature of such resources. They also fail to recognize that revenue from relatively more
profitable ICEVs is generally being used by legacy automakers to fund investments in EVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 111-112]
Other commenters or EPA may downplay concerns associated with the level of EV market
share estimated by EPA to meet its proposed standards or the alternatives under consideration,
noting that improvements in ICE vehicles could reduce the overall EV market share
requirements. Such views again ignore capital and human resource availability, and furthermore
fail to consider that such improvements would only have a minimal effect on EV market share
given the level of standards under consideration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 111-112]
We provide the following comments to EPA in support of our position that EPA should
assume de minimis improvements in the overall efficiency of the average internal combustion
engine vehicle, allowing manufacturers the flexibility to focus investments on the design and
production of EVs, and improving ICEVs only where it makes sense to do so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 111-112]
a) EV vs. ICE Investments
Automakers are focusing investments on electric vehicles. According to the Center for
Automotive Research, recent North American investment announcements are overwhelmingly
on electric vehicles and batteries (Figure 32).203 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 111-112]
203 Data presented in this figure includes non-plug-in hybrid electric vehicle investments. However, we
believe that it is reasonable to assume that almost all of the electric vehicle / battery related investments
shown are for plug-in electric vehicles.
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Figure 32: Announced Automaker EV/Battery Related Investments, North America, 2009-
2023 YTD.204 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 111-112]
204 Center for Automotive Research (Apr. 2023), Book of Deals: Automaker Announced Investment.
b) ICEV Improvement as a Substitute for BEVs
EPA asserts that the standards are performance-based, and therefore improving ICEVs can
reduce the overall level of electrification required to meet GHG standards.205 While technically
accurate, such actions would only have a small effect on the degree of electrification required by
the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 112-114]
205 NPRM at 29342. ("At the same time, we note that the proposed standards are performance-based and
do not mandate any specific technology for any manufacturer or any vehicle. Moreover, the overall
industry does not necessarily need to reach this level of BEVs in order to comply—the projection in our
analysis is one of many possible compliance pathways that manufacturers could choose to take under the
performance-based standards. . .")
Although the standards are, in theory, technology-neutral, the level of standard proposed is far
beyond the capabilities of non-electrified vehicles. For example, the best-performing (relative to
target) MY 2022 or MY 2023 vehicle, a strong hybrid, still exceeds its target by MY 2029 and is
almost 40 g/mile worse than its MY 2032 target.206 In Figure 33, we show MY 2022 and MY
2023 207 vehicles relative to their proposed MY 2032 target. The MY 2032 target is shown as
neutral (zero). Models with 2-cycle C02 emissions that exceed the standard are shown as
negative (i.e., worse than target) and models with 2-cycle C02 emissions lower than target are
shown as positive (i.e., better than target). Only ZEVs are consistently better than the proposed
MY 2032 target. Current PHEVs are both better and worse than the MY 2032 target, depending
on the specific model. Strong hybrid electric models are currently about 40 g/mile or more worse
than their targets. The best mild- and non-hybrid ICEVs are generally over 100 g/mile worse
than the proposed MY 2032 target. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 112-114]
206 Calculation by Auto Innovators based on the NPRM and data from S&P Global Vehicle Technical
Intelligence Platform (VTIP). Includes calculations based on content supplied by S&P Global Mobility
VTIP - Vehicle Technical Intelligence Platform (June 2023). The S&P Global Mobility reports, data and
information referenced herein (the "S&P Global Mobility Materials") are the copyrighted property of S&P
Global Mobility and its subsidiaries and represent data and research published by S&P Global Mobility and
are not representations of fact. The S&P Global Mobility Materials speak as of the original publication date
thereof and not as of the date of this document. The information provided in the S&P Global Mobility
Materials is subject to change without notice and S&P Global Mobility has no duty or responsibility to
update the S&P Global Mobility Materials. Moreover, while the S&P Global Mobility Materials
reproduced herein are from sources considered reliable, the accuracy and completeness thereof are not
warranted, nor are the opinions and analyses which are based upon it. Opinions, statements, estimates and
projections in this message or other media are solely those of the individual author(s). They do not reffect
the opinions of S&P Global Mobility or any of its affiliates. S&P Global Mobility has no obligation to
update, modify or amend this message or other media, or to otherwise notify a recipient thereof, in the
event that any mater stated herein, or any opinion, projection, forecast or estimate set forth herein, changes
or subsequently becomes inaccurate. Any content, information and any materials provided in this message
or other media is on an "as is" basis. S&P Global Mobility makes no warranty, expressed or implied, as to
its accuracy, completeness or timeliness, or as to the results to be obtained by recipients and shall not in any
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foregoing, S&P Global Mobility shall have no liability whatsoever to a recipient of any message or media,
whether in contract, in tort (including negligence), under a warranty, under statute or otherwise, in respect
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recommendations, forecasts, judgments, or any other conclusions, or any course of action determined, by it
or any third party, whether or not based on the content, information or materials contained herein.
207 Both MY 2022 and 2023 vehicles are used to ensure that the changing availability of some MY 2023
hybrids does not result in missing certain better-performing (relative to GHG standards) models. We
acknowledge that there may improvement in certain models between MYs 2022 and 2023, but in general,
most models see little or no change between model years, so overall conclusions drawn from such a view
are likely still accurate.
Figure 33: MY 2022/2023 Light-Duty Models 2-Cycle C02 Performance Relative to
Proposed MY 2032 Target208 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 112-114]
208 Calculations by Auto Innovators. Data sourced from S&P Global Vehicle Technical Intelligence
Platform.
While some ICEVs might be improved, thereby reducing BEV market share requirements to
reach the fleet average target, such approaches are unlikely to significantly reduce the BEV
market share projected by EPA as necessary to meet the proposed targets. Wells Fargo estimates
that BEV market share will need to be 62% to meet the proposed standards, even if automakers
"maximize hybrid mix."209 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 112-114]
209 Wells Fargo Equity Research (Jun. 9, 2023), Will Automakers Get Regulated to Unprofitability?
c) ICE Emissions During the Transition to Electric Vehicles
During the transition to electric vehicles, ICE C02 emissions may not remain completely
stable or improve significantly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 114-115]
Manufacturers are unlikely to remove technologies that they have already sunken investments
into. However, an EV model may replace an ICE model that has relatively lower emissions than
other ICE models. The overall emissions of the fleet would improve, but the emissions from the
remaining ICE portion of the fleet would be higher on average. This is not and should not be
considered backsliding. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 114-115]
A similar effect might be observed with industry-average emissions in the remaining portion
of the ICE fleet. While all manufacturers are moving toward electric vehicles, they are unlikely
to do so at exactly the same rate. If a manufacturer with relatively lower C02 emission vehicles
increases EV market share more quickly than industry on average, the remaining ICE vehicles in
the fleet would have higher average emissions. Again, the higher average emissions of the ICE
fleet would not be related to removal of technology from the existing ICE vehicles, and should
not be considered backsliding. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 114-115]
Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
Continued improvement in internal combustion engine vehicles is needed
Even under Alternative 1, there would still be over 40 million new ICEVs sold over the life of
these standards. These vehicles could be on the road for two decades, contributing significantly
to local air pollution, climate change, and costing drivers considerably at the pump. It is critical
that the new standards continue improvements on ICEV efficiency while also pushing the market
to electrify. Our modelling shows that under EPA's achieved emissions rates, ICEV emission
rates would needlessly rise and would be as high as MY 2023 levels. Under the proposed
standard, ACEEE estimates that average ICEV emissions could increase by up to 2.9% per year,
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contributing an extra 805 million metric tons of lifetime C02 compared to a future where ICEV
performance flatlines at model year 2026 levels. This is equivalent to an approximately 11%
increase in emissions from the projected savings in the rule of 7,300 million metric tons of C02
(FR 29198, Table 3). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 3-4]
This calculation assumes BEV penetration reaches what EPA projects under its proposal and
includes upstream emissions accounting for all vehicles. However, it also factors in the reduction
of credits, which limits the increase in ICEV emissions compared to model year 2026 (when
there are significantly more credits available). Removing the effects of the proposed off-cycle
and AJC credit changes in both model year 2026 and under the proposed standards means that
ICEVs emissions reductions backslide even further, reaching almost 5% annually. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 3-4]
EPA also projects that strong hybrids are completely phased out by MY 2031 in the baseline
scenario despite their wide and growing usage today (FR 29329, Table 83). In 2021, hybrids
accounted for more than 15% of the fleets of five automakers (collectively responsible for
producing 5.5 million vehicles for the US market.) Hybrid vehicles made up 20% of the lineup
for 4 out of 5 of those automakers. .9 Hybrid technology is a proven way to considerably reduce
the emissions from ICEVs and is a pathway for automakers to meet stronger standards. This is
evident in the fact that EPA projects fleetwide strong hybrid penetration to be upwards of 9% in
MY 2029 under Alternative 1 compared to only 2% under the proposed standards. Different
automakers will choose different compliance pathways and those that already produce a
significant number of hybrids could continue to do so, leveraging the investments they've made
thus far, to meet the emissions levels in Alternative 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 2-3]
9 https://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends
Under EPA's proposed standards, rapid electrification can allow automakers to meet their
targets even while letting ICEVs worsen, squandering some of the emissions benefit of
electrification and missing an important opportunity for further emissions reductions. This is
unacceptable given that mature emissions-reducing technologies, such as hybridization, already
exist on the market today and often go underutilized by manufacturers. Our modeled findings are
consistent with EPA's own analysis, which projects that ICEV emissions rates will increase over
the life of the standard. In fact, EPA compliance modeling indicates that manufacturers will go
so far as to remove emissions-reducing technologies from many ICEV models, a completely
counterproductive behavior. 10 On the other hand, if manufacturers do not move backwards on
ICEV efficiency, they will be able to meet the standards with fewer BEVs than EPA projects,
also an undesirable outcome. In either case, the conclusion is that the standards should be
strengthened to incentivize ICEV improvements more strongly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0642, pp. 3-4]
10 Based on analysis of EPA's OMEGA model outputs,
2023_03_14_22_42_30_central_3alts_20230314_Proposal_vehicles.csv
Just a 3% annual reduction in the average emissions for ICEVs — compared, for example, to
the 4.6% per-year reduction called for under the 2012 standards for MY 2017-202511 — could
lead to a further reduction of almost 800 million metric tons of C02 and ICEVs that are about
30% cleaner compared to EPA's proposal. Much of this reduction could come from the
continued adoption of hybrid vehicles in the US market. EPA expects little contribution from
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strong hybrids in meeting the proposed standard even though hybridization is a proven
technology with decades of usage, as discussed above. EPA projects that strong hybrids will be
completely phased out under the proposed standards by 2032 (FR 29329, Table 83), despite
hybrids accounting for a record 10% of new vehicles offerings in model year 2022.12 We should
not be moving backwards on ICEV performance and the penetration of proven efficiency
technologies like hybridization over the life of these standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0642, pp. 3-4]
11 https://nepis.epa. gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100EZ7C.PDF?Dockey=P100EZ7C.PDF
12 https://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends
The standards should take full advantage of the potential for medium-duty ICEV efficiency
gains
The expected GHG emissions trajectory of medium-duty ICEVs under the proposal is
essentially flat. Backing out ICEV emissions rates from the projected achieved values for all
vehicles (FR 29328, Table 26) together with projected BEV adoption rates (FR 29331), one finds
that ICE pickup emissions would decline by about 2% per year and ICE vans' emissions would
increase by 2% per year under the proposal. ICE MDVs overall would improve at 1% per year.
As in the case of light-duty ICEVs, the backsliding of medium-duty ICE van emissions would be
unnecessary and counterproductive. These projections may indicate unrealistic assumptions in
EPA's compliance modeling; otherwise, the standard should be tightened to prevent this
outcome. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, p. 10]
ICE pickup emissions rates would decline under the proposed standards at a rate close to the
required reduction rate in the Phase 2 heavy-duty rule (2.5% per year for heavy-duty pickups and
vans).22 However, if MDV pickups are to reach only 19% EV share in 2032 as EPA projects,
much more needs to be done to promote ICE pickup efficiency gains as plans take shape to zero
out transportation GHG emissions entirely over the next two decades. EPA acknowledges that
hybrids (as well as PHEVs) have high potential for these vehicles (DRIA p. 1-20) yet provides no
explanation of why substantial adoption is not feasible or desirable. The stringency of the
standards should be set to promote adoption of the most efficient ICE technology until any
obstacles to electrification can be overcome. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, p. 10]
22 Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 206. October 25, 2016. Table VI-7.
EPA's assessment of the potential for medium-duty ICEV improvements in the proposal is
perfunctory at best. The proposal states: "The feasibility of the 2027-2032 GHG standards is
based primarily upon an assessment of the potential for a steady increase in MDV electrification,
primarily within the van segment" (DRIA p. 1-21). For medium-duty ICEV pickup emissions
reduction opportunities, the reader is referred to the discussion of efficiency technologies in the
2016 heavy-duty Phase 2 rulemaking (DRIA p.3-12). While stating that "[t]he agency still
expects to see additional penetration of many of these technologies" (DRIA p. 1-20), EPA
provides no account of the extent to which they could cost-effectively reduce medium-duty
pickup emissions rates and how this relates to the projected 2% per year improvement project for
these vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, p. 10]
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Organization: The Aluminum Association
The value of vehicle lightweighting in supporting GHG emissions reductions for internal
combustion engine powered vehicles has been well documented by EPA, NHTSA, and others
across prior rulemakings6,7,8. As internal combustion engine vehicles will continue to comprise
a significant percentage of vehicle sales during the scope of this rulemaking, the Association
encourages EPA to continue recognition of this value as applied to ICE vehicles as it considers
revisions to the proposed rule toward its finalization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 6-7]
6 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards; Final Rule, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/05/07/2010-8159/light-duty-
vehicle-greenhouse-gas-emission-standards-and-corporate-average-fuel-economy-standards (Accessed
June 23, 2023)
7 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2012-10-15/pdf/2012-21972.pdf (Accessed
June 23, 2023)
8 Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards,
https://www.federalregister.gOv/documents/2021/12/30/2021-27854/revised-2023-and-later-model- year-
light-duty-vehicle-greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards (Accessed June 23, 2023)
Lightweighting also plays an important role in BEV design considerations as well. In 2022,
the Association released groundbreaking research9 wherein it specified three BEV's, analyzed
material substitution potentials, assessed the weight, cost, and efficiency impacts of those
material substitutions, calculated their effects on vehicle fuel economy and GHG emissions, and
developed concluding recommendations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 6-7]
9 Aluminum Value In Battery Electric Vehicles, https://drivealuminum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/05/2022-ATG-BEV-Lightweighting-Study_Exec-Summary.pdf (Accessed June 23,
2023)
In particular, this research demonstrates that, despite expected improvements in battery cost
and storage density, aluminum lightweighting solutions are expected to remain economically
attractive for at least the next decade, and that lightweighting battery electric vehicles with
aluminum provides additional economic benefits when the entire sales fleet is considered,
creating additional economic benefit and further increasing the economic viability of aluminum
lightweighting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 6-7]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
Internal combustion engines (ICEs) will continue to play a significant role in the new vehicle
fleet in MY 2025-2035 in ICE-only vehicles, as well as in hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) from
mild hybrids to plug-in hybrids but will decrease in number with increasing battery electric
vehicle (BEV) and fuel cell electric vehicle penetration. In this period, manufacturers will
continue to develop and deploy technologies to further improve the efficiency of conventional
powertrains, for ICE-only vehicles and as implemented in HEVs. Developments in the ICE for
hybrids will advance toward engines optimized for a limited range of engine operating
conditions, with associated efficiency benefits. Major automakers are on differing paths, with
some focusing their research and development and advanced technology deployment more
squarely on BEVs, and others more focused on advanced HEVs to maximize ICE efficiency.6
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 3-4]
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6 Note that the term "zero emissions vehicle" ("ZEVs"), and even near-ZEVs as used by EPA, is a
misnomer. ZEVs are not actually zero emission when accounting for the vehicle lifecycle, including GHG
and criteria pollutant emissions associated with electricity generation required for charging certain ZEVs
and production of the ZEV vehicle and battery. We recognize that in the Proposed Rule, EPA uses "ZEV'
to refer only to those vehicles with a specific meaning under California's EV program, but for ease of
review, "ZEVs" is used throughout these comments and encompasses all of the EV technologies, including
plug in electric vehicles ("PEVs") such as plug-in hybrid electric vehicles ("PHEVs") and battery electric
vehicles ("BEVs").
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
Vehicles powered by internal combustion engines (ICE) offer "outstanding "drivability and
reliability" according to the Department of Energy62 and "increasing the effciency of internal
combustion engines (ICEs) is one of the most promising and cost-effective approaches to
dramatically improving the fuel economy of the on-road vehicle fleet in the near-to mid-term."
Increasing sales of EVs does not necessarily mean they are more reliable. According to this
survey data63 "[ejlectric cars are less reliable" than cars powered by petroleum, where software
related problems cause reliability issues for consumers. In a Consumer Reports survey,64 data
reported by EV owners indicate that EVs, as a category, have "more frequent problems"
compared to conventional vehicles. EPA should take into account these factors in their analysis.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 19]
62 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Transportation Demand Module Assumptions." March 2023.
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2015/ll/f27/QTR2015-8C-Internal-Combustion-Engines.pdf.
63 Hull, R. "Electric cars are LESS reliable than petrols and diesels with nearly a third reporting faults
taking longer to fix -and Tesla is rated worst overall, says Which?" March 2022. Daily Mail.
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/cars/article-10569557/Electric-cars-reliable-petrol-diesel-says-
Which.html.
64 Tucker, S. December 2022. "Consumer Reports: EVs Less Reliable Than Gas-Powered Cars." Kelley
Blue Book, https://www.kbb.com/car-news/consumer-reports-evs-less-reliable-than-gas-powered-cars/.
Organization: Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ)
While ADEQ is supportive, we are curious as to why this proposed rule is less stringent than
similar rules proposed by multiple states. ADEQ recognizes that EPA has adopted some state-
implemented electric vehicle program elements; however, ADEQ encourages EPA to consider
further strengthening its proposal by continuing to improve upon and incentivize advancements
in internal combustion engine technology. By moving the nation towards zero emission vehicle
(ZEV) technology and improving upon the existing traditional combustion engine technology,
EPA will further reduce criteria pollutants and greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation
sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0533, pp. 1-2]
Organization: BorgWarner Inc.
Hydrogen combustion engines (H2ICE) are a cost-effective advanced technology that can
make a significant positive impact to the environment, and we urge EPA to recognize H2ICE as
a technology solution in the Proposal, especially for heavier MD applications. As the IRA and
IIJA are providing billions of dollars for the development of a hydrogen economy, EPA should
support these efforts with program incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 4-5]
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Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Given the urgency of the climate crisis, as well as the opportunity to provide real-world cost
savings to consumers, CARB recommends that U.S. EPA adopt additional regulatory
mechanisms to ensure that all cost-effective technologies that get integrated into conventional
vehicle designs will continue to be installed throughout vehicle line-ups and throughout the
program lifetime to maintain emission reductions from conventional vehicles and save
consumers money. Such a mechanism is especially important in the federal context where there
is no ZEV sales requirement and thus a significant fraction of internal combustion engine
vehicles are expected to persist in the new vehicle fleet longer than they might in California;
those vehicles should not emit more than their counterparts from just a few years prior. In the
absence of policies specifically focused on addressing this issue, CARB notes that a tighter fleet
average standard could mitigate some of this risk and that manufacturers would have a
technically feasible pathway to comply with tighter standards by simply retaining these proven,
already deployed cost-effective technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 15-16]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
Our States and Cities add three observations to EPA's analysis of costs and lead time. First,
EPA's projected costs likely overstate the actual costs attributable to reaching the standards in
the allotted lead time, due to conservative assumptions in EPA's no-action case that omit the
myriad state and local actions to promote electric vehicle adoption. See supra 18-21; CARB
Comment at 16. Second, state and local agencies are implementing ambitious programs to ready
power grids and charging infrastructure for the increased adoption of electric vehicles and the
associated increase in electricity demand, which further supports EPA's feasibility analysis.
Third, although internal-combustion-engine vehicles will make up a smaller portion of the
national fleet, it is imperative that EPA's standards continue to encourage the application of
feasible, cost-effective emission-reduction technologies to these vehicles, as they still represent a
significant source of GHG, criteria, and toxic pollutant emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0746, p. 33]
3. EPA Should Ensure that Internal Combustion Engine Vehicles Continue to Apply
Emission-Reduction Technologies
EPA projects that, aside from electric vehicle adoption, auto manufacturers are likely to apply
advanced technologies to reduce the GHG and criteria emissions of their internal-combustion-
engine vehicles, albeit in lower numbers than is otherwise feasible. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,330. This
highlights an important aspect of the proposed standards: that even as the industry transitions to
zero-emission vehicles, internal-combustion-engine vehicles will continue to make up a sizeable
portion of new vehicle sales. These new internal-combustion-engine vehicles will continue to
drive on the roads and emit GHGs, criteria pollutants, and air toxics for potentially decades, so it
is crucial that EPA's standards continue to require improvements from these vehicles' emissions
performances. Because of the standards' fleet average structure, a manufacturer's production of
zero-emission vehicles may enable it to forego improving or even backslide on internal-
combustion-engine vehicles' emissions performance. Indeed, as the California Air Resources
Board's comment discusses, the compliance pathway EPA projects for its proposed standards
show automakers removing emission-reduction technologies from internal-combustion-engine
vehicles while still complying with the proposed standards. CARB Comment at 18-22.
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Therefore, even if EPA were to forego encouraging the application of zero-emission
technologies, it would still be obligated to tighten these emission standards beyond the proposed
standards simply to keep pace with that trend and ensure the continued integrity of its emissions
program as to new internal-combustion-engine vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp.
35-36]
This dynamic underscores the need for EPA to adopt standards more stringent than those
proposed, and to eliminate outdated or redundant compliance flexibilities as proposed and as
discussed below. We urge EPA to continue to monitor the industry's ongoing transition to zero-
emission vehicles and ensure all of its standards continue to spur necessary and feasible
reductions in vehicle pollution of all kinds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 35-36]
Organization: Center for American Progress (CAP)
c. Improvements for ICE Vehicles-EPA must ensure actual multi-pollutant emissions
reductions for ICE vehicles. Under the current proposal and Alternative 1 there is no guarantee
that ICE vehicles lower their emissions despite the fact that there is proven technology available
to accomplish that goal. Part 3.1.1.1 of EPA's DRIA notes adoption rates of key advanced ICE
technology. The technology with the highest rate of adoption across all manufacturers is 7 or
more gears, with an adoption rate of 57 percent. This shows that opportunities exist for further
emissions reductions from ICE vehicles.25 EPA's final rule should ensure that MY2027 through
MY2032 ICE vehicles make increased use of technology that decreases both GHG and criteria
pollutant emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0658, pp. 5-6]
25 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027
and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis," April 2023,
available online: https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
Organization: Center for Biological Diversity et al.
EPA's own data shows that multiple technologies exist to make the millions of gas-powered
vehicles sold in the next decade much more efficient, from gasoline direct injection and
continuously variable transmission to hybrid technologies. The fact that some automakers use
some of these technologies some of the time shows EPA that it is possible for automakers to
implement more of them consistently. In its final rule, EPA should model widespread adoption
of these well-established technologies, and issue even more ambitious standards that hold
automakers to the higher standards. At a minimum, this means strengthening the rule to account
for annual improvements to the gas-powered light-duty fleet of at least 3.5%, as the International
Council on Clean Transportation recommends.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0671, p. 2]
6 Slowik, Peter & Miller, Josh, Aligning the U.S. Greenhouse Gas Standard for Cars and Light Trucks
With the Paris Climate Agreement, International Council on Clean Transportation (Dec. 19, 2022),
https://theicct.org/us-ghg- standard-paris-agreement-dec22/.
These changes would have immediate consequences on the criteria and carbon pollution that
continues to poison vulnerable communities and populations. With the climate emergency
worsening each day, and public health concerns adding cumulative stress to the lives of
vulnerable Americans, there is no time for delay. The rise of EVs is promising but by itself will
not guarantee a clean air future at the speed that science and justice require. We urge you to curb
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pollution from the gas-powered fleet in this critical rulemaking to help ensure a clean and just
transportation future for all. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0671, p. 2]
EPA claims that technologies to improve gas-powered cars, pickups, and SUVs have already
been widely implemented, and that electrification is therefore the most effective pathway to
further emissions reductions.2 The reality is more complicated. Many emissions control
technologies are proven and cost-effective, yet manufacturers have dallied to implement them
across their fleets. For example, turbocharged engines, which allow for more efficient engine
design and operation, have been adopted in 80% of Ford's vehicles, but only in 37% of GM's
fleet, 13%) of Stellantis', and 3% of Toyota's.3 Cylinder deactivation, which allows for use of
only a portion of the engine when less power is needed, has also been adopted unevenly: it exists
in 54%o of GM's vehicles, but only 22% of Stellantis', 21% of Ford's, and 3% of
Volkswagen's.4 Some automakers continue to shrug their shoulders at proven emissions-
reducing technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0671, pp. 1-2]
2 Proposed Rule: Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and
Medium- Duty Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,297 (May 5, 2023).
3 EPA Automotive Trends Report 2022, ES-8, https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-
12/420s22001 .pdf.
4 Id.
EPA's actions make a huge difference in whether these powerful technologies are adopted
across-the-board or whether some automakers will remain laggards. As EPA acknowledged for
fuel injection technology, "one important driver for adoption was increasingly stringent
emissions standards."5 EPA's past rulemakings caused significant overall improvements in the
gas-powered fleet. Yet with the proposed rule, if automakers manage to achieve the EV targets,
emissions reductions from their gas-powered cars and trucks are allowed to stall. Even worse,
there is a risk that automakers will backslide on improvements to their gas-powered fleets,
arguing that they need to profit from selling more gas-guzzling trucks and SUVs, while also
claiming that the added emissions would be canceled out with increased EVs. That equation is
unacceptable, and EPA must foresee and prevent it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0671, pp. 1-2]
5 EPA Automotive Trends Report 2022, p. 72, https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-
12/420r22029.pdf.
Organization: Consumer Reports (CR)
6. Specific Technical Comments On EPA's Proposal and Modeling
6.1. Internal Combustion Engine Vehicle Backsliding
EPA's modeling accurately considers the high effectiveness of battery EVs at delivering both
significant emissions reductions and consumer savings. EPA's modeling finds that EVs are so
cost-effective that emissions from the remaining ICE fleet actually increase over the period of
the rule by an average of around 4%. This is because EPA's model finds that it would be cost-
effective for automakers to remove already developed technology from their ICE vehicles to
save money while building more EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-20]
However, this modeling result does not seem likely in the real world. Consumer demand for
EVs is rapidly increasing, and technology improvements will mean that the remaining gasoline
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powered vehicles will have to compete with better and better EV offerings.36 In order to
continue to find buyers for their remaining gasoline powered vehicles, automakers will need to
make them better, not worse. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-20]
36 Excess Demand, The Looming EV Shortage, Consumer Reports, March 2023,
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Excess-Demand-The-Looming-EV-Sh
ortage.pdf.
Furthermore, this result ignores consumer demand for cleaner, more efficient gasoline
vehicles. Consumer Reports' 2022 fuel economy survey found continued strong consumer
demand for more efficient vehicles.37 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-20]
37 Fuel Economy: A Nationally Representative Multi Mode Survey, Consumer Reports, November 2022,
https://article.images.consumerreports.org/image/upload/vl670867143/prod/content/dam/surveys/Consume
r_Reports_Fuel_Economy_National_September_October_2022.pdf.
- 95% of American drivers said fuel economy is at least somewhat important to them when
considering what vehicle to purchase or lease, and seven in 10 (70%) say it is very important or
extremely important. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-20]
- 85%) of Americans agreed that automakers should continue to improve fuel economy for all
vehicle types. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-20]
- 78%o of American drivers agreed that they expect each new generation of vehicles available
on the market to be more fuel-efficient than the last. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-
20]
EPA specifically estimates that hybrid vehicles will drop from 4% of the vehicle fleet in 2027
to 0% of the fleet in 2031 and 2032.38 Research from CR has shown that many hybrids on the
market today are extremely cost-effective for consumers, delivering a payback on their cost in 3
years or less, with some delivering savings instantly.39 CR's 2022 nationally representative car
buying survey of 6,960 US adults found that 32%> of consumers planning to purchase or lease a
vehicle within a year were considering a hybrid car or truck.40 While consumer demand for EVs
is likely to continue to grow rapidly, EVs do not yet work for all consumer lifestyles, and hybrids
offer a viable and cost-effective alternative for these consumers to both reduce their emissions
and their fuel spending. EPA's modeling that shows that this popular and cost-effective
technology will be completely abandoned by the entire market by the end of the decade is at
odds with the data on consumer preferences for these vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728,
pp. 18-20]
38 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis, EPA-420-D-23-003, Table 13-68
39 Regardless of Gas Prices, Some Hybrids Pay for Themselves Immediately, Consumer Reports, March 2,
2023, https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/hybrids-evs/hybrids-vehicles-pay-for-themselves-
al092610835/.
40 Fuel Economy: A Nationally Representative Multi Mode Survey, Consumer Reports, November 2022,
https://article.images.consumerreports.org/image/upload/vl670867143/prod/content/dam/surveys/Consu
mer_Reports_Fuel_Economy_National_September_October_2022.pdf.
Finally, over the duration of this proposed rule, EVs will be gaining significant market share.
As they do so, ICE vehicles will by necessity be losing market share. Automakers will need to
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make decisions about which ICE vehicles and powertrains to keep producing and which ones to
discontinue. The most logical approach to meeting these standards would be to phase out their
oldest and least efficient vehicles and powertrains, while keeping their newest, most advanced,
and most efficient powertrains. This process has the potential to result in significant
improvements in average vehicle emissions without automakers having to deploy any additional
technology. For example, in the 2023 model year, the best selling Ford F150 offers ICE variants
that range in emissions from 352 g/mi to 741 g/mi.41 This large range in emissions leaves a lot
of room for improving fleet performance by focusing future production on the lowest emitting
variants and eliminating the highest emitting variants. A more detailed analysis from the Natural
Resource Defense Council found that shifting to the lowest emitting powertrains could result in
emissions reductions of between 19 and 65 grams per mile, compared to the current sales
weighted average, for the 12 best selling vehicles.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-
20]
41 Fuel Economy of 2023 Ford F150, U.S. Department of Energy, 2023,
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch. do?action=noform&path=l&yearl=2023&year2=2023&m
ake=Ford&baseModel=F150&srchtyp=ymm&pageno=l&rowLimit=50.
42 Shifting to Cleaner Gas Engines Can Help Reduce Emissions, Natural Resource Defense Council, July
5, 2023, https://www.nrdc.org/bio/kathy-harris/shifting-cleaner-gas-engines-can-help-reduce-emissions
Given the above, CR makes the following general recommendations to improve EPA's
modeling:
- EPA's model should not remove technology that automakers have already invested in
adding to their existing ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-20]
Organization: David Hallberg
I recognize that the primary thrust of the proposed rule is to propel the electrification of the
U.S. light-duty vehicle (LDV) fleet. However, we all know that the "ICE (internal combustion
engine) Age" is far from over. EPA itself admits that 100 million or more ICE-powered LDVs
will be sold over the coming decade, and the average vehicle's life span is more than 12 years. In
the years to come literally trillions of miles will be driven on billions of gallons of gasoline, the
typical gallon of which contains on average 20% benzene-based octane enhancing compounds
(BTEX), in violation of Congressional mandates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, pp. 1-2]
"Since the U.S. regulation was introduced in 2014, direct injection fuel technology, which
improves fuel efficiency, has increased the amount of particulate matter gasoline cars emit,
industry experts say. Ultrafine particles are harmful because their microscopic size means they
can be drawn deep into human lungs. Even under the most aggressive U.S. scenarios for phasing
out ICEs, they will likely be sold into the 2030s."There is a strong argument we should do what
we can to make ICE vehicles as clean as possible, whatever the speed of electrification," Molden
said." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, p. 3]
Organization: District of Columbia Department of Energy and Environment (DOEE)
"Backsliding"
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DOEE is concerned that EPA's proposal will allow for increased emission rates from non-
zero emission vehicles and internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles as the share of zero
emission vehicles (ZEV) increases. EPA's proposed methodology for determining compliance
could allow manufacturers to meet the proposed emission standards while potentially allowing
emission rates from ICE vehicles to increase because the increased emissions can be offset by
greater shares of ZEVs. The bottom line is that as vehicle emissions become cleaner, no vehicle
should have the ability to become more polluting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 5]
Newer ICE vehicle models should be federally mandated to be cleaner than earlier models of
that vehicle to prevent any theoretical "backsliding." "Backsliding" is inconsistent with air
quality and climate goals necessitating feasible, cost-effective criteria pollutant and GHG
reductions. The EPA must include regulatory mechanisms to prevent "backsliding" on non-ZEVs
by requiring new models to always be as or more efficient than its predecessor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0550, p. 5]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
EPA has both an opportunity and an obligation to dramatically reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) and other pollutants from light-duty vehicles (LDVs) and medium-
duty vehicles (MDVs). The Agency's mandate to protect public health and welfare is made
urgent by the ever more dire impacts of climate change, as well as the continuing harms to public
health from vehicle criteria pollution. And the opportunity to significantly reduce these impacts
is clear. Zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) are not only feasible and cost-reasonable—they are
rapidly penetrating the fleet, with more than 250,000 fully battery electric vehicles sold in the
first quarter of 2023 alone, a 44.9% increase over the same period last year. 1 In addition,
numerous emission control technologies for combustion vehicles are also feasible, cost-
reasonable, and already extensively deployed on the fleet, yet still have potential for greater
application within the fleet of new combustion vehicles that will continue to be produced. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 8]
1 Cox Automotive, Another Record Broken: Q1 Electric Vehicle Sales Surpass 250,000, as EV Market
Share in the U.S. Jumps to 7.2% of Total Sales (Apr. 12, 2023), https://www.coxautoinc.com/market-
insights/q1 -2023 -ev-sales/.
- As EV market share increases over the course of the rule, EPA should model a reduction in
the number of ICE powertrains that automakers continue to build in such a way that the newest
and most advanced options are kept, and the oldest and least advanced are phased out over time.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-20]
A. EPA's modeling should more fully incorporate combustion vehicle technologies that
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which would further demonstrate technological feasibility and
available compliance pathways.
1. EPA's modeling does not account for the full range of combustion vehicle technology
availability and effectiveness.
The technologies EPA assesses to curb GHG emissions from light-duty vehicles are
significantly reduced in number and effectiveness compared to the technology assessment
supporting the MY 2023-2026 Rule, for which EPA used CCEMS as its modeling tool. In
particular, OMEGA2, the modeling tool EPA now employs, omits the following technologies
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when modeling compliance: advanced 10-speed transmissions, turbocharging with cooled
exhaust gas regulation, variable compression ratio engines, and others. 120 Moreover, the
Agency has adopted many fewer technology packages: in contrast to the 6,500 packages
available in the CCEMS modeling for each of the 10 vehicle types, the OMEGA2 modeling is
limited to 108 packages for cars and 60 packages for trucks. 121 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 37]
120 Compare DRIA Table 2-21 with the "Technologies" tab in
technologies_NoHCR_LowBEV200_BatteryAdj2023_YearShift.xlsx, a file accompanying the Agency's
final modeling supporting the FRIA, as well as Figures 2, 3, and 4 in NHTSA's 2020 CAFE Model
Documentation, the documentation included with the agency's CAFE Compliance and Effects Modeling
System (CCEMS). NHTSA, CAFE Model Documentation, DOT HS 812 934, EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0208-
0138 (Mar. 2020), at 24-28, Figs 2-4.
121 Here we refer solely to changes in the powertrain. Throughout this section, we do not consider
differences in how the road load reduction was modeled, since while that effect was considered discretely
in the CCEMS modeling, it was modeled separately and continuously in the OMEGA2 model.
In and of themselves, these changes might not have a significant impact on the modeling if the
technologies contained within the packages were sufficiently representative of the relative
technical potential for reducing emissions from combustion vehicles. However, there are
significant differences between the effectiveness of the packages analyzed by the OMEGA2 and
CCEMS models, as well as the maximum improvement they can deliver (Figure VI.A-1).122
Because the OMEGA2 model calculates absolute emissions, effectiveness of the packages is
considered relative to the base gasoline package modeled in OMEGA2 for each body type, a
direct-injection engine with continuously variable valve timing and five-speed automatic
transmission. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 37]
122 Owing to differences in the model's architecture, we use representative vehicles from each of the
CCEMS classes to obtain the OMEGA2 results using the response surface equations provided. The relevant
parameters include the road load coefficients, test weight, and maximum horsepower. Representative
vehicles were selected by sales volume, using the classification from the CCEMS model. The identified
representative vehicles are: Toyota Corolla, Small Car; Hyundai Elantra, Small Car Perf; Ford Fusion, Med
Car; Mercedes C 300, Med Car Perf; Honda CR-V, Small SUV; Ford Escape Titanium, Small SUV Perf;
Mercedes GLC 300 4 MATIC, Med SUV; Jeep Grand Cherokee, Med SUV Perf; Toyota Tacoma, Pickup;
and Ford F-150 4WD 3.5L EcoBoost, Pickup HT. For the car categories, only unibody packages were
defined. For the pickups, only the truck packages were calculated. For SUVs, which can fall into either
category, both the car and truck packages were included in the comparison, even if the representative
vehicle itself may have been classified as only a light truck.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure VI. A-1: Comparison of the effectiveness of
packages modeled by EPA to reduce emissions in the Proposal and the MY 2023-2026 Rule
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 38]
The technology packages modeled in the Proposal using OMEGA2 show a markedly reduced
effectiveness compared to the same packages modeled using the CCEMS supporting the MY
2023-2026 rulemaking, as indicated by the increased share of data falling below the X=Y line
(black). 74% of the packages modeled in OMEGA2 show a reduced effectiveness. On average, a
given OMEGA2 package shows a 3.9 ± 0.3% increase in emissions compared to the prior
CCEMS modeling. The most efficient packages show an even greater disparity, with the
maximum effectiveness for OMEGA2 showing just a 36% improvement compared to a 53%
improvement in CCEMS. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 38]
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Looking at the relative effectiveness of the modeled packages, it is clear that the CCEMS
modeling generally finds a greater level of improvement than the more recent OMEGA2
modeling. Because the benchmark data for the ALPHA modeling supporting OMEGA2 is almost
identical to that used to support the previous rulemaking (excepting the Volvo Miller cycle
engine, which corresponds most accurately to the prior variable-geometry turbo technology
package), and because the changes to the ALPHA model (vis-a-vis the response surface
equations) are generally reasonable, as supported by the peer review process, the reason for the
disparity in EPA's analysis is unclear. There are some general trends that may be illustrative in
assessing the flaws in EPA's more recent modeling. Across all categories of vehicle, the 5-speed
automatic transmission package (TRX10) was found to be more efficient than the basic 6-speed
automatic (TRX11), which seems implausible and may speak to problems with how the scaling
algorithm matches a modeled vehicle's transmission to different engine maps—all the more
perplexing since the Agency claims to use the same model as before. 123 Similarly, there appears
to be little difference in the effectiveness of any of the three hybrid packages, despite significant
differences in the underlying engines. 124 This is particularly perplexing given that strong
hybrids have continued to evolve with each successive generation, and yet, according to EPA's
modeling, they appear to be stuck at the efficiency levels of the MY 2019 power-split fleet. 125
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 38-39]
123 DRIA at 2-29.
124 Id. at Table 2-2.
125 Id. at Section 2.4.8.6.
In addition to the packages' lack of effectiveness, we question whether these packages cover a
sufficiently robust opportunity for reductions from the internal combustion engine.
Unfortunately, the answer appears to be that they are also now covering a narrower range than
previous modeling (Figure VI. A-2, infra). As expected based on the results discussed above, the
shift in the distribution of effectiveness for the current modeling is below that of the CCEMS,
but the packages are also overweighted towards less effective packages, in contrast to the
symmetric/Gaussian distribution of the CCEMS data. Also of note is the lack of a long tail out to
higher effectiveness; as noted previously, while the few hybrid packages available in the
CCEMS model can reduce emissions by over 50%, the OMEGA2 packages max out at 36%.
This means that about one-third of the assessed maximum potential improvement previously
modeled to be available to manufacturers for their combustion vehicle fleets has been eliminated
due to unknown factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 39]
We believe that once these issues have been addressed, it will become apparent that the
standards are considerably more feasible than EPA states; that combustion vehicle emissions can
be reduced to a much larger degree than EPA assumes; and that even more technologically
diverse compliance pathways are available to manufacturers, enabling them to meet the
standards at PEV penetration levels lower than EPA projects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
p. 39]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure VI. A-2: Available technology packages at
different levels of effectiveness [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 40]
A histogram comparing the share of packages in the current (OMEGA2) and previous
(CCEMS) compliance modeling efforts from EPA, grouped by total package effectiveness
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relative to a GDI engine paired with a 5-speed transmission. It is clear that not only do
manufacturers have significantly more package options at, on average, higher effectiveness, but
the total absolute range has been condensed as well for the current modeling effort, limiting
compliance flexibility for manufacturers in the model that does not reflect the broader range of
options available. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 40]
VIII. Stronger GHG and Criteria Pollutant Standards for Medium-Duty Vehicles Are
Feasible.
We now turn to EPA's proposed emission standards for medium-duty vehicles. Below, we
examine the combustion vehicle and zero-emission technologies that can further reduce GHG
emissions from the medium-duty fleet, comment on EPA's modeling, address economic
considerations, and make suggestions on certain aspects of EPA's regulatory program. We also
offer recommendations for the Tier 4 NMOG+NOx standards and PM requirements. As detailed
below, strong GHG and criteria pollutant emission standards for MDVs are feasible and cost-
reasonable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 64]
A. EPA must strengthen its GHG standards for MDVs.
EPA's proposed GHG standards for MDVs significantly underestimate the potential for
feasible emissions reductions from the Class 2b-3 fleet, particularly pickup trucks. EPA has
primarily focused on the electrification of MDVs in setting its standards. 169 However, not only
has it underestimated the share of MDVs that could be electrified, it has underestimated the
technologies available to reduce GHG emissions from gasoline- and diesel-fueled vehicles. EPA
should adopt more stringent final standards for MDVs that reflect greater application of both the
zero-emission powertrain and conventional emission control technologies that are feasible and
widely available. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 64]
169 DRIA at 1-21: "The feasibility of the 2027-2032 GHG standards is based primarily upon an assessment
of the potential for a steady increase in MDV electrification, primarily within the van segment."
1. The combustion vehicle technology pathways show the feasibility of stronger standards.
EPA proposes as its 2027 standard the current (Phase 2) standards for diesel pickups and
vans, and then adjusts those standards in the future based on assumptions about the level of
electrification within the fleet. In fact, in EPA's modeling, combustion MDVs actually increase
average direct tailpipe emissions by 1.5% between 2022 and 2032, with the increase being even
larger for the Phase 2 baseline. The modeling thus indicates that no technological improvements
to combustion MDVs are needed to comply with even the existing Phase 2 standards through
2027.170 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 64]
170 This remains true for the "No IRA" sensitivity, though there is virtually no difference in the assumed
production of electric MDVs between the default modeling run and this sensitivity case, indicating the
degree to which electrification is expected to take off in the commercial van space due to improved TCO.
Subsequent to finalization of the Phase 2 standards in 2016, a number of technologies have
been developed that EPA did not originally consider in establishing those standards; nor were the
Phase 2 standards predicated on the full adoption of even those technologies that were identified
at the time. As EPA noted in its Phase 3 heavy-duty vehicle proposal: "In developing the Phase 2
C02 emission standards, we developed technology packages that were premised on technology
adoption rates of less than 100%. There may be an opportunity for further improvements and
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increased adoption through MY 2032 for many of these technologies included in the heavy-duty
(HD) GHG Phase 2 technology package used to set the existing MY 2027 standards." 171 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 65]
17188 Fed. Reg. at 25960.
By ignoring technologies for Class 2b-3 combustion vehicles that could achieve emissions
reductions beyond the Phase 2 standards, EPA is setting its MDV standards below a level of
readily achievable technology adoption (and, indeed, many of these technologies are already
being deployed). Below, we walk through a number of the technologies that EPA should assume
will be deployed by MDV manufacturers in the timeframe of the MDV Proposal. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 65]
a. EPA should consider additional compression-ignition (diesel) engine technologies. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 65]
Manufacturers of diesel engines for Class 2b-3 pickups and vans will deploy new engines in
order to meet the 2027 NOX standards that EPA finalized last year. 172 However, the Agency's
modeling assumes that diesel vehicles will reduce GHG emissions by less than 1% from 2022 to
2032. This leaves a tremendous amount of technology on the table, not just from what the
Agency identified in the Phase 2 rulemaking and assumed would be needed to meet the standards
already on the books, but also from additional improvements that have been developed since
then. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 65]
172 See 88 Fed. Reg. 4296.
Diesel engine efficiency continues to increase, with HHD (Class 8) diesel engines
demonstrating up to 55% brake-thermal efficiency (BTE) in response to the second phase of the
SuperTruck program. The Navistar and Cummins/Peterbilt teams demonstrated 55% BTE,
compared to the 50% target for the first phase, while Daimler, Volvo, and PACCAR all
demonstrated over 50% BTE, with a clear pathway towards the 55% target. The PACCAR
team's progress is particularly illuminating, as they undertook an additional challenge to meet
"ultra low NOX" targets consistent with EPA's recent regulation as part of their overall
efficiency effort, indicating that these levels of thermal efficiency are not incompatible with
achieving the 2027 NOX standards. 173 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 65-66]
173 See Zukouski, Russ, Navistar SuperTruck II: Development and demonstration of a fuel-efficient class
8 tractor & trailer, DOE Annual Merit Review, (Jun. 21-23, 2022)
https://wwwl.eere.energy.gOv/vehiclesandfuels/downloads/2022_AMR/acel03_%20Zukouski_2022_o_4-
29_1232p m_ML.pdf; Mielke, David, 2022 Annual Merit Review: Cummins/Peterbilt SuperTruck II, DOE
Annual Merit Review, (Jun. 21-23, 2022)
https://wwwl.eere.energy.gOv/vehiclesandfuels/downloads/2022_AMR/acel02_dickson_2022_o_rev2%20
-%20Trai lLife-GCCC%20IN0110%20REVISED.pdf; Bashir, Murad, etal., Daimler: Improving
transportation efficiency through integrated vehicle, engine, and powertrain research - SuperTruck 2, DOE
Annual Merit Review, (Jun. 21-23, 2022)
https://wwwl.eere.energy.gOv/vehiclesandfuels/downloads/2022_AMR/acel00_Villeneuve_2022_o_4-
301116am_ ML.pdf; Bond, Eric, et al, Volvo SuperTruck 2: Pathway to cost-effective commercialized
freight efficiency, DOE Annual Merit Review, (Jun. 23, 2022)
https://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/downloads/2022_AMR/acel01_bond_2022_o_5-
l_129pm_ML.pdf; Meijer, Maarten, Development and demonstration of advanced engine and vehicle
technologies for class 8 heavy-duty vehicle ([PACCAR] SuperTruck II), DOE Annual Merit Review (Jun.
21-23, 2022),
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https://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/downloads/2022_AMR/acel24_Meijer_2022_o_4-
29_1056pm_KF. pdf.
Significant improvements in efficiency are not limited to the largest engines and can also be
feasibly deployed on Class 2b-3 vehicles. Ford's latest iteration of its 6.7L Power Stroke diesel
engine cut GHG emissions by 3.5% over the previous generation when it was introduced in
2020, and 2023 saw an additional 3% improvement due to a revised injection system. 174
General Motors released its new 6.6L Duramax diesel engine in 2023 with improved cylinder
heads, fuel injection, and other features in a design that is meant to increase both power and
efficiency, particularly at higher output. 175 These engine improvements are already being
deployed today but are not captured in the Agency's OMEGA2 modeling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 66]
174 To assess these improvements, we refer to the combined transient cycle certification results for the
MHD Power Stroke family of diesel engines available in the chassis cab/F-650 and F-750 configurations.
The engines available in the heavy-duty pickups are not required to certify to isolated engine tests, but are
likely to see similar levels of improvement, even with the higher power output, since they also have the
same underlying technology.
175 GMC Pressroom, The Ultimate Heavy Duty: GMC Introduces its Most Luxurious, Advanced and
Capable Sierra HD Ever (Oct. 6, 2022),
https://media.gmc.eom/media/us/en/gmc/home.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2022/oct/1006-
sierra.html. It is difficult to compare apples-to-apples between the new and old Duramax engines due to
limited certification data and because some of that efficiency improvement was used to reduce tailpipe
NOx, since the new diesel-equipped Silverado/Sierra HD 2500 have a reduced NMOG+NOx bin of 200 vs.
250 mg/mile. Additionally, because the standards are set by "work factor," the increase in power used to
raise towing capacity by 4000 pounds increases the allowable emissions for the engine, which means that
despite an apparent increase in certified C02 emissions of 2.4%, there could be a net improvement in
compliance of up to nearly 5% as the result of up to a 7% increase in the model year 2023 emissions target.
Mild electrification also offers increased emissions reduction capabilities. Eaton demonstrated
that it is possible to outperform simultaneously the 2027 NOx standards and the Phase 2 C02
standards through a number of different aftertreatment and powertrain combinations, 176
including those applicable to Class 2b-3 vehicles. A recent research paper by Eaton demonstrates
various combinations of control technologies manufacturers can target C02 and NOx emissions
levels over different regulatory cycles to develop a technology package that is suitable for
compliance, including packages that can achieve C02 reductions beyond Phase 2 while meeting
EPA's future 2027 NOx standards. 177[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 66-67]
176 Se-e generally Dorobantu, Mihai, Eaton considerations on MD/HD GHG Phase 3, OIRA-Eaton
meeting, (Mar. 23, 2023),
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoDownloadDocument?pubId=&eodoc=true&documentID=215442
177 McCarthy, J., et al. 2023. "Technology levers for meeting 2027 NOX and C02 regulations." SAE
Technical Paper 2023-01-0354. https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0354.
One of the strategies deployed by Eaton is a 48V electric heater, which could be deployed
easily with a 48V mild hybrid powertrain, again illustrating the complementary technology
packages available to manufacturers to simultaneously meet GHG and NOx standards. The 48V
mild hybrid powertrain can power accessories, including those related to emissions control, and
can also help reduce engine-out NOx. This was also demonstrated through testing by FEV as a
strategy particularly relevant to medium-heavy-duty vehicles that share chassis and power
requirements with the Class 2b-3 pickups and vans covered by this proposal. 178 Such
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developments should be incorporated into the Agency's analysis of the level of emissions
reductions achievable from diesel-powered Class 2b-3 vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 67]
178 Fnu, D., et al. 2023. "Application of 48V mild-hybrid technology for meeting GHG and low NOX
regulation for MHD vehicles." SAE Technical Paper 2023-01-0484. https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0484.
In the Phase 2 rulemaking, EPA excluded cylinder deactivation from medium-duty diesel
engines, 179 but its own analysis now shows that manufacturers are likely to deploy that
technology to meet the heavy-duty NOx standards. 180 Similarly, a recent report by Roush
identified cylinder deactivation as a likely engine configuration for many Class 2b-3
vehicles. 181 The Agency should consider this technology in its OMEGA2 modeling, further
increasing the available emissions reductions technologies for diesel-powered vehicles. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 67]
179 81 Fed. Reg. at 73754, Table VI-4. Note, however, that the agencies did consider a "right-sizing" of
diesel engines, based on a 4-cylinder vs. 6-cylinder engine, and cylinder deactivation could be seen as a
control-based attempt to yield the equivalent improvement without altering the maximum output. See
NHTSA, Commercial medium- and heavy-duty truck fuel efficiency technology study - Report #2, U.S.
Dep. of Transportation, 52-53 (Feb. 2016),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/812194_commercialmdhdtruckfuelefficiency.pdf.
180 EPA, Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards,
Regulatory Impact Analysis, at 108-131 (Dec. 2022),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1016A9N.pdf.
181 Himanshu Saxena et al., Electrification Cost Evaluation of Class 2b and Class 3 Vehicles in 2027-
2030, Roush, at 24-25, 28-30 (May 2023),
https://cdn.mediavalet.eom/usva/roush/rOYBSBBvOOedOiBP759yoA/3Hcv7F_W-
OG9ekOODPgNMg/Original/Elect rification%20Cost%20Evaluation%20of%20Class%202b-
3%20Vehicles%20in%202027-2030_ROUSH.pdf. [hereinafter Saxena et al., Electrification Cost
Evaluation],
b. EPA should consider additional spark-ignition (gasoline) engine technologies.
Another significant opportunity for increased improvement to combustion vehicles lies in
spark-ignition (SI) engines, for which Phase 2 required no engine improvements beyond the
2016 SI engine standard. While this is somewhat rectified in EPA's move to a fuel-neutral
standard for Class 2b-3 pickups and vans—which effectively results in a 5-6% increase in
stringency for MDVs—this still does not fully recognize the potential improvement available
from gasoline engines. And in fact, in the Agency's modeling, gasoline vehicles see, on average,
5% higher emissions in 2032, compared to 2022.182[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 67]
182 Because the model preferentially selects vans for electrification, some of this decrease is related to a
shift in the vehicles included in the remaining gasoline fleet. However, even when limited to gasoline
pickups there is an apparent backsliding in emissions, with an increase of 3%. This is similar to the
backsliding that appears in the modeling of light-duty vehicles (see Section VI.A.2).
The weakness in EPA's Phase 2 targets for SI engines and vehicles is apparent in looking at
manufacturers' growing bank of compliance credits to-date, particularly for Ford Motor
Company, the largest SI engine supplier. Ford has run a credit surplus in every year of the
vocational engine program, but this surplus exploded in MY 2020 with the release of its latest
7.3L V8 engine, codenamed "Godzilla." 183 Even though the engine platform is relatively low-
tech (naturally aspirated, pushrod V8), by utilizing variable cam timing and a variable-
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displacement oil pump, Ford's engine achieved a significant improvement in efficiency. The
engine was also designed with fuel economy at load in mind for applications like towing. A
smaller engine built on the same platform replaced the older base engine in 2023, no doubt
increasing Ford's overcompliance and increasing the efficiency of even more of the MDV fleet.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 68]
183 EPA, Final Phase 1 EPA Heavy-Duty Vehicle and Engine Greenhouse Gas Emissions Compliance
Report (Model Years 2014-2020), Appendix B, at 40-42 (Nov. 2022)
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgiZP 1016962.PDF?Dockey=P1016962.pdf.
General Motors is not standing still, either—its fifth-generation small-block V8 platform is
getting a next generation update to a 5% improvement over the current generation, 184 and the
current generation is already a credit generator for GM's heavy-duty vehicles under the Phase 2
program. 185 No further details are available about the heir to the current iron-block direct-
injection L8T variant found in GM's heavy-duty offerings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
68]
184 Wren, Wesley, This is why GM is launching a new small block V8, Autoweek, (Feb. 3, 2023)
https://www.autoweek.com/news/industry-news/a42746723/why-gm-is-launching-a-new-small-block-v8/.
185 EPA, Final Phase 1 EPA Heavy-Duty Vehicle and Engine Greenhouse Gas Emissions Compliance
Report (Model Years 2014-2020), Appendix B, at 43.
Note that neither of these new improvements reflect technology adoption that was further
anticipated for gasoline engines when the Phase 2 regulations were finalized. EPA assumed that
cylinder deactivation (discrete or continuous), downsizing, and mild and strong hybridization
would be used to meet those standards, 186 yet none have yet been deployed in Class 2b-3
pickups and vans. This further underscores the significant amount of emissions reductions that
are still readily achievable for Class 2b-3 vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 68]
186 81 Fed Reg. at 73776, Table VI-13.
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
D. EPA must put in place guardrails that prevent ICEVs from removing greenhouse gas
reducing technologies.
EDF reviewed the output from EPA's modeling of manufacturers' compliance with the
Proposal using the OMEGA 2 model and found instances where the model removed technology
that was either on vehicles in the 2021 baseline fleet or that had been added in subsequent model
years. The California Air Resources Board and others have described this technology removal in
considerable detail within their comments. We recognize the light-duty GHG program, since its
inception, has been performance-based and provided manufacturers flexibility in applying
technology to some vehicles and not others. At the same time, the increasing availability of
battery electric vehicles provides manufacturers an even greater ability to trade off emissions
between vehicles (and potentially significantly increase emissions from some of the remaining
combustion engine vehicles in their fleets). While we do not expect manufacturers to take this
approach, we are concerned that the compliance model shows technology removal and an
outcome along these lines is permitted under the current standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0786, pp. 66-67]
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Accordingly, we encourage EPA to put in place guardrails to ensure, at the very least,
technologies that manufacturers have previously deployed on combustion vehicles are not
removed as larger numbers of ZEVs are introduced into the fleet. Notably, EPA's approach to its
NMOG + NOx standards is likewise performance based with guardrails. Though those standards
are designed somewhat differently around a bin structure, EPA has here proposed to eliminate
higher emitting bins in a manner that would ensure, as vehicles become cleaner, manufacturers
can no longer offset those gains by certifying vehicles to higher-polluting levels. EPA should
consider how it can apply the same concept to its greenhouse gas standards, perhaps through an
emissions cap as a function of footprint curve that would retain the flexibility that has been a
hallmark of the program but prevent any abuse that might come with increasing deployment of
ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 66-67]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Next, each full-line automaker needs to allocate finite resources between EV programs and
efforts toward incremental reductions in emissions from ICE vehicles. Insofar as automakers are
required to lower emissions from ICE vehicles, the resources invested toward that end will not be
available to invest toward EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 7]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
There is potential for significant additional GHG savings from ICE vehicles beyond what
EPA has modeled for its proposal. Many existing and recently announced ICEV technology
improvements have ample room for increased application throughout the ICEV fleet. ICCT has
identified several technologies, including advanced mild hybrids and plug-in hybrid EVs
(PHEVs) that are commercially available and could significantly and cost-effectively improve
ICE vehicle efficiency that EPA has not included in its modeling. We have also identified other
technologies for which EPA has overestimated the costs in its modeling, such as Miller cycle
engines and mild hybrid technology. If EPA made these changes to its model, we believe the
agency would project lower overall compliance costs and lower BEV shares to achieve the same
level of GHG reductions compared to its proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 4]
ICCT believes there is even greater opportunity to capture technology potential and cost
reductions for medium-duty vehicles (MDVs) in EPA's modeling. While ICCT believes EPA
underestimated the potential for ICE vehicle improvements for LDVs in its modeling, EPA did
not model any ICE vehicle improvement technologies for MDVs. All of the above findings and
recommendations about combustion and EV technology potential and cost for LDVs apply to
MDVs. In addition, EPA has not included any kind of hybrid technology options in its modeling
for MDVs and has omitted other ICE technology options it included for LDVs. All of the LDV
technology options we review in these comments can be applied to MDVs and can deliver cost
savings in meeting the proposed GHG standards. We strongly recommend EPA add ICE and
PHEV technology options and incorporate the latest evidence on declining ICE and BEV
technology costs into its modeling for MDVs. We also recommend EPA consider increasing the
stringency of the MDV GHG standards since this could be achieved at lower costs when
considering the evidence presented here on technology options. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0569, pp. 4-5]
Cylinder deactivation (DEAC)
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Application in OMEGA
Based on the response surface equations (RSE) input file
(simulated_vehicles_rse_ice_20221021_debug_noP2.csv), there are no technology packages/cost
curve classes with DEAC on a turbocharged engine in EPA's OMEGA modeling. While adding
DEAC to a turbocharged engine has smaller pumping loss reductions than for naturally aspirated
engines, DEAC still has significant pumping loss reductions and has the additional benefit of
enabling the engine to operate in a more thermal efficient region of the engine fuel map. As
described in the National Academies of Sciences' 2021 report on light-duty vehicle fuel
economy (NAS 2021)91, turbocharged engines with DEAC are already in production (NAS
2021, section 4.1.3). EPA could consider adding DEAC option to turbocharged cost curve
classes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 31-34]
91 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. (2021). Assessment of Technologies for
Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy—2025-2035. The National Academies Press.
https://doi.org/10.17226/26092
Cooled Exhaust Gas Recirculation (CEGR)
Application in OMEGA
Similar to the application of DEAC, based on the RSE input file, there are no cost curve
classes with CEGR on a base turbo engine in EPA's OMEGA modeling (i.e. "TDS" within the
input file). As reported in NAS 2021 (section 4.1.3) turbocharged engines with CEGR are
already in production. NAS 2021 also provides estimates for the efficiency benefit of including
CEGR on a base turbo engine. EPA could consider adding CEGR option to turbocharged cost
curve classes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 31-34]
Atkinson cycle engine (ATK)
Application in OMEGA
EPA appears to have excluded the modeling and application of ATK from pickups and other
body-on-frame vehicles (DRIA page 1-10 and RSE input file). However, as detailed in ICCT
2021 comments (pages 14-16), this exclusion could be lifted, allowing all vehicle classes to
adopt ATK in the OMEGA model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 31-34]
To briefly summarize those ICCT 2021 comments, engines in pickup trucks and high-
performance vehicles are sized and powered to handle higher peak loads. This means larger
engines that operate at lower loads relative to their maximum capacity on the 2-cycle test - and
during most real-world driving. This, in turn, means that pickup trucks and high-performance
vehicles will spend more time in Atkinson Cycle operation than lower performance vehicles on
both the test cycles and in the real world. This includes time spent towing, which represents a
very small fraction of light-duty pickup usage.92,93 Altogether, the large majority of pickup
trucks spend the vast majority of driving at low loads relative to the engine's capability, where
Atkinson Cycle engines are very effective. In other words, ATK is likely a highly cost-effective
technology for pickup trucks, which may be the most challenging to electrify, as evidenced by
the low BEV share of pickups in the 2027-2031 time frame compared to other body styles in
EPA's modeling (Preamble Table 80). Furthermore, the claim that an Atkinson Cycle engine that
switches to Otto cycle on demand cannot provide the additional torque reserve is not accurate (a
1992
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claim previously used to justify blocking ATK on pickups in prior rulemakings, see ICCT 2021
comments). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 31-34]
92 Berk, B. (2019, March 13). You Don't Need a Full-Size Pickup Truck, You Need a Cowboy Costume.
Thedrive.com. https://www.thedrive.com/news/26907/you-dont-need-a-full-size-pickup-truck-you-need-a-
cowboy-costume
93 Chase, W., Whalen, J., Muller, J. (2023, January 23). Pickup Trucks: from workhorse to joyride. Axios.
https://www.axios.com/ford-pickup-trucks-history
Moreover, Atkinson Cycle engines have been used on the Toyota Tacoma pickup V6 engine
since 2017, illustrating that Atkinson Cycle engines are cost-effective for use on pickups. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 31-34]
For additional information see:
- ICCT 2021 comments pages 14-16
- ICCT 2018 comments pages 1-2—I-12
- ICCT 2018 Camry study
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 31-34]
Effectiveness
Outlined in the table above, MHEV architectures beyond PO can have substantial C02-
reduction benefits. However, the benefits of more advanced MHEV architectures are expected to
exceed those illustrated in the table, through the implementation of higher power systems
(20kW- 30kW). Roush 2021 LDV96 describes the additional benefits offered by higher power
MHEV systems, including advancements in electric boosting, high energy ignition systems (see
section below), accessory electrification, and electrically heated catalysts. Enabling electrically
heated catalysts in particular permits further fuel economy optimization through, for example,
aggressive stop-start strategies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 34-37]
96 Roush report on Gasoline Engine Technologies for Improved Efficiency (Roush 2021 LDV)
https://www.regulations.gOv/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0208-0210
For additional information, see:
- Roush 2021 LDV page 11 and pages 38-40 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 34-37]
- Roush 2021 48V97 pages 11-23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 34-37]
- AVL 2020 slide 6298 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 34-37]
97 Roush report on 48V and BEV costs (Roush 2021 48V) https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-
HQ-OAR-2021- 0208-0210
98 AVL Webinar on Passenger Car powertrain 4.x - Fuel Consumption, Emissions, and Cost. (2020, June
2). https://www.avl.eom/-/passenger-car-powertrain-4.x-fuel-consumption-emissions-and-cost (Slides
available at https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0208-0522) (AVL 2020)
Roush 2021 LDV provides specific example applications of high power MHEV systems and
the associated fuel efficiency improvements on pickups and SUVs. These examples, which have
not previously been considered by either EPA or ICCT, are excerpted below:
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Pickup/full-size SUV GHG reduction: As ICCT previously commented, Roush 2021 states
"Two powertrain configurations are recommended for study and could support future
rulemaking. The first option synergistically combines available technologies (without a major
redesign of the underlying engine architecture) to give maximum fuel economy benefit for a
relatively low cost, hence high effectiveness. It combines a naturally aspirated DI engine with
advanced cylinder deactivation and a 30kW 48V P2 mild hybrid system. The 48V hybrid system
is used to actively smooth out crankshaft torque pulsations to enable aggressive cylinder
deactivation strategies (advanced deac - like the Tula Skipfire System). Such a system will also
enable start-stop, electric creep, regen braking, slow-speed electric driving, and a heated catalyst.
Depending on system integration factors Roush estimates a reduction in GHG emissions of 20%
or more, compared to a baseline naturally aspirated direct-injection V8." (Roush 2021 LDV page
13).
Additional information can be found at:
- Roush 2021 LDV Section 13.1 page 65 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 37-40]
Compact SUV GHG Reduction: Relatedly, as ICCT previously commented, Roush 2021
states, "A 30kW 48-volt P2 system mated to a low bore-to-stroke ratio Miller cycle engine with
electrified boosting, advanced cylinder deactivation, cooled EGR and a heated catalyst can
provide a fuel economy benefit close to a full high voltage hybrid powertrain at a much lower
cost. The 48 V electric motor can supplement the engine torque under low- speed high load
conditions, thereby avoiding this knock-prone area of the engine map. Also, the use of an
advanced boosting system, combining a turbocharger and a 48V electric supercharger, will
reduce engine backpressure (larger turbine) and improve scavenging, reduce combustion
residuals, and reduce the propensity for knock. This combination enables the use of a higher
compression ratio, thereby increasing engine efficiency. A combination of a high-energy ignition
system (high energy spark plug/plasma ignition) and fuel reforming by pilot fuel injection during
NVO can be used to increase cEGR tolerance at low loads. The initial part of such a project
would include engine and combustion modeling, followed by prototype engine testing. The
overall GHG reduction potential will require modeling and optimization of engine design,
calibration parameters, and boosting system sizing and control. Roush estimates a reduction in
GHG emissions exceeding 30% is possible compared to a level 1 (NHTSA) turbocharged
engine." (Roush 2021 LDV page 14). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 37-40]
Additional information can be found at:
- Roush 2021 LDV Section 2.3 pages 23-25 on higher compression ratios and higher
Miller/Atkinson ratios. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 37-40]
- Roush 2021 LDV Sections 2.4 and 2.5 pages 26-28 on low bore-to-stroke ratio benefits
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 37-40]
- Roush 2021 LDV Section 13.2 page 66 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 37-40]
Strong hybrid (HEV)
Effectiveness
ICCT commends EPA's incorporation of advanced Atkinson and Miller cycle engines.
However, the notion of a dedicated hybrid engine (DHE) extends beyond the engine maps used
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during ALPHA HEV simulation. ICCT recommends EPA consider even further
optimized/efficient dedicated hybrid engines, both for HEV applications and for PHEVs. As
described in ICCT's 2021 comments and in SAE (2021), 101 "EPA should focus on the expanded
application of energy management capabilities in full hybrid powertrains to also minimize
operation under the low-speed high torque areas of the engine which are prone to knocking by
torque augmentation with the electric motor. The instantaneous torque capability of the electric
motor can effectively support transient torque demand. This will allow both naturally aspirated
and turbocharged engines that are part of a hybrid powertrain to be optimized for a narrow
operating range incorporating higher compression ratios and increased EGR dilution
(maintaining stoichiometric operation), thereby prioritizing efficiency over peak torque at low
engine speeds and transient response." (Roush 2021 LDV page 12) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0569, pp. 37-40]
101 Ibid.
For additional information, see:
- Roush 2021 LDV Section 7.0 pages 41-44
- AVL 2020 slide 24: BSFC for Lambda=l
- AVL 2020 slides 25-26: Dedicated Hybrid Engine Efficiency Roadmaps (45% Lambda=l,
51% ideal)
- AVL 2020 slides 35-42: WLTP C02 reduction potential of various hybrid configurations
- AVL 2020 slide 43: Relative comparison of attributes for three powertrain architectures
-AVL 2020 slide 62: WLTP % C02 reduction and slide 63: cost per % FC reduction
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 37-40]
Such dedicated hybrid engines can achieve 45% brake thermal efficiency (BTE) at
stoichiometric air-fuel ratio using known technologies, 102 or 50% BTE in a serial/range-
extender with pre-chamber ignition, ultra-high pressure injection, and reduced intake air
temperatures (SAE 2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 37-40]
102 Visnic, B. (2022, April). Keeping combustion in the conversation. SAE Automotive Engineering. Page
18. https ://www .nxtbook.com/smg/sae/22AE04/index.php#/p/18
Negative valve overlap in-cylinder fuel reforming (NVO)
Effectiveness
As ICCT previously commented, Roush states, "In-cylinder fuel reforming by using pilot fuel
injection during NVO has shown to significantly improve cooled EGR (cEGR) tolerance,
combustion stability, and engine efficiency. Such a system can have wide application in
turbocharged and NA engines across different vehicle segments with minimal hardware
requirements. Depending on the base engine, Roush estimates an efficiency improvement, and
the corresponding reduction in GHG emissions, in the range of 5 to 10% is possible and low
cost, therefore correspondingly high effectiveness." (Roush 2021 LDV page 14). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 37-40]
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Additional information can be found at:
- Roush 2021 LDV Section 10.0 pages 50-52
- Roush 2021 LDV Section 13.3 page 66
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 37-40]
Passive prechamber combustion (PPC)
Effectiveness
As ICCT previously commented, Roush states, "Prechamber combustion systems are one of
the most promising technologies for improving the dilution limit of engines, thereby improving
system efficiency. It can also enable extremely fast burn rates increasing the knock tolerance of
turbocharged engines, allowing higher compression ratios and the associated efficiency
improvements. The Maserati Nettuno engine in the 2021 Maserati MC20 will be the first
application of a passive prechamber engine in production. However, the primary objective in the
MC20 is high performance. It would be very valuable to study the effect of the system on knock
tolerance, burn rates, dilution tolerance (EGR and air), and emissions. The effort should focus on
quantifying possible efficiency gains in a non-performance application." (Roush 2021 LDV
pages 14-15). In a dedicated hybrid engine developed by Mahle, pre-chamber combustion
enabled a C02 emissions reduction of over 5%. 103 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 37-40]
Additional information can be found at:
- Roush 2021 LDV Section 13.4 page 67
- AVL 2020 slides 28, 31, and 33 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 37-40]
103 Birch, S. (2019, November). Mahle reveals modular, scalable integrated hybrid powertrain. SAE
Automotive Engineering. Page 14. https://www.nxtbook.eom/nxtbooks/sae/19AUTPll/index.php#/p/14
High energy ignition (HEI)
Effectiveness
As ICCT previously commented, Roush states, "High energy volume ignition systems can
enable combustion of dilute (cEGR or air diluted) in-cylinder mixtures resulting in a step-change
in engine efficiency compared to conventional spark plugs. Such systems can be a drop-in
replacement for a spark plug, thereby representing a cost-effective GHG improvement option.
Such systems should be evaluated for maximum efficiency potential, in conventional, 48V mild
hybrid, and full HV hybrid applications. Roush estimates that systems such as plasma ignition
can support good combustion stability with high amounts of cooled EGR, thereby achieving
engine efficiency improvements in the range of 5-10% over a baseline turbocharged DI, dual
VVT engine. Microwave ignition systems, on the other hand, have the potential to achieve levels
consistent with prechamber ignition systems. This would enable lean-burn engines with low
engine-out NOx emissions which can achieve brake thermal efficiency which exceeds 45% in
light-duty vehicle applications, compared to a level of 36-38% for a baseline turbocharged DI,
dual VVT engine." (Roush 2021 LDV page 15). Additional information can be found at:
- Roush 2021 LDV Section 11.0 pages 53-62
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-Roush 2021 LDV Section 13.5 page 67
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 37-40]Transmissions
Application in OMEGA
In this proposal, EPA did not consider the application of automatic transmissions with 9 or
more gear ratios. This is unrealistic, as nearly 40% of pickups were equipped with such
transmissions in 2021, and EPA expects more than a quarter of all vehicles to have such
transmissions in MY2022.104 Without including the costs and benefits of transmissions with
additional gears, EPA is missing important fuel-savings technology. Consequently, ICCT
recommends EPA incorporate in its analysis transmissions with 9 or more gears. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 40-43]
104 EPA. (2022). Automotive Trends Report [detailed automotive trends data].
https://www.epa.gov/automotive- trends/explore-automotive-trends-data
Organization: Kia Corporation
- Kia urges EPA to take further action to improve fuel standards that will lower vehicle fuel
consumption and criteria pollutant emissions from legacy and new Internal Combustion Engine
(ICE) vehicles. As Kia is significantly increasing resources for developing and transitioning to
electrified powertrains, Kia will have fewer resources available to improve ICE. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 4]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
On top of this, the additional criteria emissions requirements placed on internal combustion
engine vehicles will also divert limited resources with questionable efficacy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0595, p. 2]
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
Technology Neutrality Pairs with Regulatory Certainty
The proposed rule disproportionally favors battery electric propulsion, which in turn
discourages any further advancements for internal combustion technology, including carbon-
neutral renewable fuels. Emerging innovations and recent technologies offer significant
reduction in emissions from ICE vehicles, in both future and current fleets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0644, pp. 5-6]
Technology-forcing regulations that foster innovation aligned with policy, rather than
regulations that mandate a narrowly defined technology path, will lead to a more positive
national outcome. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 5-6]
MEMA recognizes that the proposal attempts a performance-based standard, and the agency
makes forecasts that estimate a variety of technology combinations in future fleets. By accepting
the potential for technologies other than battery electric and hydrogen fuel cell, EPA can make a
more immediate, widespread, positive impact on nationwide emissions reductions. Therefore,
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EPA must incent the development and deployment of advanced technology options to include
advanced internal combustion (ICE) technologies, renewable fuels, and post-combustion C02
capture (known as mobile carbon capture). These incentives will assist in accelerating the
necessary infrastructure improvements needed to support advanced technology vehicles. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 5-6]
One of the pathways which deserves to be highlighted is the Hydrogen Internal Combustion
Engine (H2ICE). This technology is a promising pathway which for certain applications is
preferable to other alternate advanced technologies in the proposed rule. For example, a vehicle
towing a trailer requires sustained torque output to tow a heavy load. H2ICE would offer the best
solution for this vehicle to achieve the emission targets while fulfilling the customer needs for
range and load. BEVs and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV) have weight and load limitations
that might not allow this vehicle to meet its operational requirements. Indeed, the agency has
recognized the benefit of H2ICE in the separate rulemaking for "Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles -Phase 3 [1], We refer to section II. Proposed C02 Emission
Standards, D. Vehicle Technologies, 1. Technologies to Reduce GHG Emissions from HD
Vehicles with ICES, paragraph 5 [2] which states: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 5-6]
1 https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985-1423121
2 11. Proposed CO? Emission Standards, D. Vehicle Technologies, 1. Technologies to Reduce GHG
Emissions from HD Vehicles with ICES, paragraph 5
Manufacturers may develop new ICE vehicle technologies through the MY 2032 timeframe.
An example of a new technology under development that would reduce GHG emissions from
HD vehicles with ICES is hydrogen-fueled internal combustion engines (H2ICE). These engines
are currently in the prototype stage of innovation for HD vehicles but have also been
demonstrated as technically feasible in the past in the LD fleet. H2ICE is a technology that
produces zero hydrocarbon (HC), carbon monoxide (CO), and C02 engine-out emissions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 5-6]
Furthermore, a large portion of manufacturing technology and workforce skills needed to
manufacture H2ICE equipment may be adapted from currently available gasoline or diesel
manufacturing footprints. H2ICE also builds hydrogen demand, which is a nascent market in the
U.S. Building that market will help supply the needs of hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles in
due course. The two are complementary to each other's growth and commercialization. MEMA
therefore strongly suggests that EPA adopt a consistent pathway for H2ICE for light-duty and
medium-duty vehicles just as proposed for heavy-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0644, pp. 5-6]
MEMA urges:
EPA to move beyond tailpipe emissions and include emissions from electricity
generation in BEV calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 7]
EPA to act decisively to further encourage and incentivize the development and
deployment of advanced clean ICE technologies, including renewable fuels, and mobile carbon
capture. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 7]
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EPA to develop an efficiency metric to comparatively analyze ZEV energy needs and
if not incorporated into this rule - report that metric to the public as an initial step. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 7]
Organization: Our Children's Trust (OCT)
In short, continuing to promulgate rules that contemplate, facilitate, and allow for continued
sales of internal combustion engine ("ICE") vehicles is reckless and nonsensical. Instead, EPA
should set the national standard to align with zero ICE vehicle sales by 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0542, p.1]
Specifically, there is a clear consensus that decarbonizing transportation requires a rapid shift
away from fossil fuel vehicles toward Zero Emissions Vehicles ("ZEVs"), including battery-
electric vehicles ("BEVs"), plug-in hybrid vehicles running primarily on electricity ("PHEVs"),
and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles ("FCEVs"). 1 Transitioning from conventional internal
combustion engine vehicles to electric vehicles is believed to be one of the most promising
pathways for decreasing greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions from the road transportation sectors
and thus should be pursued aggressively. 2 While improving fuel efficiency can help to reduce
emissions in the short-term, it cannot achieve the emissions reductions needed to achieve the
Administration's net zero emissions target, it contributes to ongoing dangerous levels of GHG
emissions, and experts have concluded that the continued use of fossil fuel vehicles is considered
"a technological dead end." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 1]
In short, continuing to promulgate rules that contemplate, facilitate, and allow for continued
sales of internal combustion engine ("ICE") vehicles is reckless and nonsensical. Instead, EPA
should set the national standard to align with zero ICE vehicle sales by 2030. There is also no
justification, no compelling interest, and no rational basis for not aligning EPA's rule with
California and other states that require 100% of light-duty vehicle sales to be ZEVs by 2035.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 2]
1 Austin L. Brown et al., Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Driving California's
Transportation Emissions to Zero (Apr. 2021); Zero Carbon Consortium, America's Zero Carbon Action
Plan (2020).
2 Daniel Sperling et al., 5.2 Accelerating Deep Decarbonization in the U.S. Transportation Sector, in
America's Zero Carbon Action Plan 188 (Zero Carbon Consortium, 2020) ("The most compelling strategy
for deep GHG emissions reductions ... is to electrify surface vehicles: to switch vehicles from fossil fuel
combustion (e.g., gasoline and diesel) to electric propulsion (e.g., battery, plug-in hybrid, and fuel cell
electric vehicles).").
3 Daniel Sperling et al., 5.2 Accelerating Deep Decarbonization in the U.S. Transportation Sector, in
America's Zero Carbon Action Plan 198 (Zero Carbon Consortium, 2020).
Organization: Sierra Club et al.
We appreciate the EPA's proposal, which moves our vehicles in the right direction. However,
the final emissions standard for light-duty vehicles should: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0668, p.
2]
-Appropriately take advantage of available cost-effective improvements to new fossil-
fuel vehicles; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0668, p. 2]
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Organization: South Coast Air Quality Management District
2. Ensure manufacturers continue to reduce emissions from conventional engines and vehicle
technologies. The proposed rule allows manufactures to include ZEVs and PHEVs in the
calculation of fleet average standards. In contrast, ACC II phases out the inclusion of ZEVs and
PHEVs in the fleet averages starting with 60% allowed in 2026 to 0% in 2029 and subsequent
years. CARB adopted this approach to ensure that conventional engine vehicles would also
improve over time on fuel efficiency and emissions control systems. With the increasing
stringency of the emissions standards, manufacturers may opt to rely more on the ZEVs sales to
comply with the standards while forgoing the allocation of resources and needed development
work to lower emissions from conventional engine vehicle technologies. While it is desirable to
see increasing market share of ZEVs, it is also important not to overlook the necessary
improvements that manufacturers should make on conventional vehicles since these vehicles will
be around us for many years to come. Therefore, we recommend U.S. EPA consider including
requirements or mechanisms for manufacturers to continue to allocate necessary resources to
develop cost-effective technologies for conventional engines and vehicles to maximize emissions
reductions, especially in the near term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0659, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
EPA must also ensure its modeling accurately captures emissions reductions that can be
achieved in internal combustion engine vehicles through existing vehicle efficiency
technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, p. 8]
Organization: United Steelworkers (USW)
In the proposed rule, the EPA's approach to lowering emissions is termed the technology-
neutral way, which envisions using more clean-running gas vehicles, hybrids, fuel cell vehicles,
and other innovations to meet more stringent standards. However, in this proposed rule, EPA did
not consider improvements to ICE vehicles with off-the-shelf technology. EPA's proposal will
outlaw ICE vehicles without considering or encouraging manufacturers to invest in engine and
fuel efficiency technologies that would lower emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, p. 6]
Engine efficiency and aftertreatment systems can help achieve C02 reductions, while
protecting workers in the ICE vehicle supply chain and oil refinery workers during the transition
to low-emission vehicles. Existing and new technologies ranging from engine improvements and
hybridization can achieve between 5 and 50 percent GHG reductions. For example, gasoline
particulate filters (GPFs) significantly reduce fine particulates black carbon. 13 GPFs are required
in Europe and Asia in order for vehicles to comply with regulations there. Off-the-shelf
technologies that reduce tailpipe emissions from ICE vehicles - such as GPFs - could easily and
affordably be applied to light- and medium- duty vehicles sold in the United States, with no
additional research and development needed. Automakers should be able to employ a
combination of ZEV and ICE improvement technologies to comply with the final rule. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, p. 6]
13 DieselNet, (Link: https://dieselnet.com/tech/gasoline_particulate_filters.php) "Gasoline Particulate
Filters", Accessed July 5, 2023.
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Technology that lowers emissions for ICE vehicles should be elevated in this proposal. EPA
could do this by keeping the rule technology neutral and finalizing a more practical timeline for
emissions reductions. These technologies protect jobs in the current auto supply chain and ensure
that our nation is actively pursuing policy to lower vehicle emissions. Standards must be
reassessed with the inclusion of these technologies because the current proposal will eliminate
the ICE vehicle all together, and is not an economically or socially viable rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0587, p. 6]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Commenters provided a broad number of themes with respect to ICE vehicle technologies.
Several commenters noted the significant role ICE powertrains will serve in the LMDV fleet for
many years to come. Commenters further noted the opportunity for further ICE-based
improvements to reduce emissions while other commenters expressed concern that ICE
improvements should not be required in addition to electrification. Other commenters expressed
concern regarding the risk of ICE-based vehicles backsliding in emissions.
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI) noted that, based on current emissions
performance, ICE-based vehicles are not able to meet the final standards and levels of
electrification would be required to offset the debits generated by ICE vehicles. In contrast,
Consumer Reports noted that if vehicle manufacturers replace their oldest and highest emitting
ICE vehicles first and retain their newest, most efficient ICE powertrains, significant emissions
reductions can be achieved sooner. Consumer Reports went on to recommend reflecting this
possible type of fleet turnover in the agency's modeling.
Ford, Kia and Mazda all commented that standards that required additional improvements to
ICE powertrains would divert resources away from EV development.
The Aluminum Association and American Fuel & Petrochemicals Manufacturers (AFPM)
both noted that ICE powertrains would be part of the LMDV fleet for some time to come. The
Aluminum Association noted the benefits of ancillary vehicle technologies, such as
lightweighting, while AFPM commented on the benefits of ICE powertrains and drivability.
Commenters recommended that EPA require more improvements from ICE powertrains with
the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ) recommending "EPA to consider
further strengthening its proposal by continuing to improve upon and incentivize advancements
in internal combustion engine technology." Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) noted that
"EPA's own data shows that multiple technologies exist to make the millions of gas-powered
vehicles sold in the next decade much more efficient, from gasoline direct injection and
continuously variable transmission to hybrid technologies" and recommended that EPA adopt
more stringent standards further noting that emission reductions would be significant and
immediate. Environmental and Public Health Organizations and the Center for American
progress echoed the CBD comments. Environmental and Public Health Organizations also
commented on the Agencies use of the CCEMS model and commented that CCEMS was more
likely to project greater ICE technology improvements. Sierra Club, Southern Environmental
Law, United Steel Workers, ICCT and private citizen David Hallberg also recommend that EPA
2001
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fully consider the potential for ICE improvements, with ICCT noting that EPA had not
considered any ICE improvements for MDVs.
Our Childrens Trust (OCT) recommended that EPA "should set the national standard to align
with zero ICE vehicle sales by 2030" and that EPA should not align with California's 100% ZEV
mandate in 2035. OCT further commented that "continuing to promulgate rules that contemplate,
facilitate, and allow for continued sales of internal combustion engine ("ICE") vehicles is
reckless and nonsensical."
Consumer Reports commented with a focus on vehicle buyers and commented that
"Consumer demand for EVs is rapidly increasing, and technology improvements will mean that
the remaining gasoline powered vehicles will have to compete with better and better EV
offerings", suggesting that the ICE backsliding, modeled by EPA, would not automatically
occur. Consumer Reports also noted the strong demand from consumers for clean vehicles.
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) suggested in their comments "that U.S. EPA
adopt additional regulatory mechanisms to ensure that all cost-effective technologies that get
integrated into conventional vehicle designs will continue to be installed throughout vehicle line-
ups and throughout the program lifetime to maintain emission reductions from conventional
vehicles" to prevent backsliding. These comments were also echoed by the California Attorney
General's Office which recommended that EPA adopt more stringent standards to prevent
backsliding. CBD, District of Columbia Department of Energy and Environment (DOEE), and
the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) similarly commented on the need for EPA to put in
place measures to prevent backsliding, with EDF requesting "guardrails" to ensure technology is
not removed.
The Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association commented on hydrogen combustion
technology and noted its potential for emission reductions.
South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) commented that EPA should
"Ensure manufacturers continue to reduce emissions from conventional engines and vehicle
technologies." and compared EPA's proposal to CARB's ACC II program.
Response:
EPA appreciates all the comments received regarding ICE vehicle technologies. EPA agrees
that ICE technologies will most likely be used in light and medium duty vehicles for years to
come and recognizes that further ICE improvements are available to manufacturers and
encourages their implementation. EPA's technology projections are based the Agency's
assessment of technology application to meet a future set of emission standards in a cost-
effective manner. While some technologies may be more cost-effective than others, the decisions
as to which technology to adopt to meet future standards are ultimately made by the
manufacturers. EPA's modeling in the proposal, being cost minimizing in nature, did project that
some manufacturers might remove technology from existing vehicles as their compliance
situation develops and significantly more cost-effective technology is brought to market. The
modeling may illuminate a possibility of backsliding, but it does not necessarily indicate vehicle
manufacturer's intentions. Nevertheless, in our modeling for the final rule, we restricted the
model from allowing the backsliding of ICE technology. This modeling approach reflects our
expectation that manufacturers are unlikely to backslide on technology in actual practice, as the
year over year stringency of the standards will warrant manufacturers to employ a full range of
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technologies; backsliding on ICE vehicles would only result in additional credit deficits that
would need to be made up with more credit-generating vehicles under the fleetwide averaging
standards.
EPA has adopted performance-based standards set at a level we have determined to be
appropriate to achieve substantial air pollutant emission reduction to protect public health and
welfare according to the CAA. Manufacturers are free to adopt any technology strategy, be it via
advancements in ICE, hybrids, PHEVs or BEVs, that enables them to comply with the final
standards. In this rulemaking EPA is not providing additional credits for specific technologies;
that is, we are not providing any advanced technology multipliers for MY 2027 and later years.
However, not all technologies emit the same level of GHG emissions and there will be naturally
more cost-effective technologies, and it is up to each manufacturer to decide which technologies
they ultimately adopt. Performance-based standards account for all emissions reductions and
technology benefits that may be implemented by manufacturers. However, given some of the
comments received, such as those from Ford, Mazda, Kia and AAI, EPA has reason to believe
that vehicle manufacturers are planning to place less emphasis on the design, development, and
deployment of ICE-based technologies to focus on the development of electrified vehicles.
EPA has not put in place specific provisions to prevent backsliding or to control which
vehicles receive specific technology, as suggested by several commentors including CBD,
District of Columbia Department of Energy and Environment (DOEE), CARB, and the
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), although we have made modifications to our fleet analysis
modeling to consider the effects of backsliding, as described above. The comment from
Consumer Reports regarding manufacturers decisions to replace older, less efficient vehicles first
and keep modern, more efficient vehicles longer and that conventional vehicles will need to
compete with BEVs seem like reasonable conclusions, although EPA does not reflect these
recommendations in our modeling.
EPA did not include hydrogen combustion in assessment of ICE technologies, as
recommended by MEMA. Due to the high cost of aftertreatment systems and the availability of
other technologies for compliance, we do not at this time anticipate manufacturers to adopt
hydrogen combustion technologies at significant rates. We agree that it remains a possible
technology pathway that manufacturers are free to choose.
EPA appreciates the supportive comments, such as those from Our Children's Trust,
encouraging the agency to adopt more stringent standards more quickly. We respond to
comments on the stringency of the standards in RTC 3.3.1.
12.3.1 - ICE costs
Comments by Organizations
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
COMBUSTION VEHICLE EFFICIENCY POTENTIAL AND COST- EFFECTIVENESS
While ICCT strongly supports the proposed rule, the cost of compliance may be overstated
due to the use of outdated internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV) technology data and
information. ICEV technology has been consistently improving for decades. While automakers
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are investing heavily in BEV development, the substantial progress that has been—and continues
to be—made in ICE technology has yet to saturate the market. That is, many existing and
recently announced ICEV technology improvements have ample room for increased application
throughout the ICEV fleet. As many ICE vehicles are still to be sold in the MY2027- 2032
timeframe, the proposed rule is an opportunity to maximize their efficiency and minimize their
tailpipe emissions, while providing substantial consumer fuel savings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 31-34]
ICCT commented extensively on recent ICEV technology improvements in its 2018
comments on the SAFE NPRM for 2021-26 cars and light trucks (ICCT 2018 comments)82, its
study of LPM and OMEGA modeling of the 2018 Camry (ICCT 2018 Camry)83, its
supplemental comments responding to Toyota comments on ICCT's study of LPM and OMEGA
modeling of the 2018 Camry (ICCT 2019 comments)84, and its 2021 comments on the Revised
2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards (ICCT
2021 comments). 85 Much of the content of these prior comments are reiterated or summarized in
the following subsections, as appropriate and relevant for this proposed rule. Moreover, recent
reports demonstrate that further technology improvements are coming that can boost ICE vehicle
efficiency levels well beyond that of even the highly-efficient Atkinson cycle engine efficiency
levels assumed in this proposal,86,87 as well as show the declining costs of 48-volt mild hybrid
systems.88,89 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 31-34]
82 ICCT Comments on the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-
2026 Passenger Cars and Light Truck. (2018, October 26). https://theicct.org/news/comments-safe-
regulation-2021- 2026 (ICCT 2018 comments)
83 German J. (2018, February 21). How things work: OMEGA modeling case study based on the 2018
Toyota Camry. https://theicct.org/publications/how-things-work-omega-modeling-case-study-based-2018-
toyota-camry (ICCT 2018 Camry)
84 Supplemental Comment from the International Council on Clean Transportation. (2019, April 28).
Docket #NHTSA- 2018-0067-12387. https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NHTSA-2018-0067-12387,
#NHTSA-2018-0067-12388 https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NHTSA-2018-0067-12388 (ICCT 2019
comments)
85 ICCT comments on the Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards. (2021, September 29). Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0208,
https://www.regulations.gov/docket/EPA- HQ-OAR-2021-0208, Comment ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0208-
0522, https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA- HQ-OAR-2021-0208-0522 (ICCT 2021 comments)
86 AVL Webinar on Passenger Car powertrain 4.x - Fuel Consumption, Emissions, and Cost. (2020, June
2). https://www.avl.eom/-/passenger-car-powertrain-4.x-fuel-consumption-emissions-and-cost (Slides
available at https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0208-0522) (AVL 2020)
87 Roush report on Gasoline Engine Technologies for Improved Efficiency (Roush 2021 LDV)
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0208-0210
88 Roush report on 48V and BEV costs (Roush 2021 48V) https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-
HQ-OAR-2021- 0208-0210
89 Dornoff, J., German, J., Deo, A. (ICCT), Dimaratos, A. (DITENCO). (2022). Mild-hybrid vehicles: a
near term technology trend for C02 emissions reduction, https://theicct.org/publication/mild-hybrid-
emissions-jul22/ (ICCT 2022 MHEV)
As documented in the following subsections, the efficiency potential of ICE technology has
continued to improve, while costs have remained lower than previously estimated. Thus, if
2004
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technology costs and benefits were updated with the latest information, it would show that the
proposed standards are even more feasible and lower-cost than EPA's analysis indicates. The
following subsections discuss various ICE technologies and compare the assumptions about cost
and efficiency potential within EPA's OMEGA analysis with independent research by the ICCT
and other experts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 31-34]
Gasoline Direct Injection (GDI)
Cost
Based on the DRIA Table 2-30, GDI direct manufacturing costs in EPA's OMEGA modeling
are between $55-$81 per cylinder. ICCT submitted direct injection cost data in our 2018
comments based on a 2016 FEV teardown cost study (FEV 2016)90, which found per-cylinder
costs to be about $40 per cylinder. For additional information see:
- ICCT 2021 comments page 6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 31-34]
- ICCT 2018 comments pages I-69-I-70 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 31-34]
-FEV2016 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 31-34]
90 David Bianco-Rodriguez, 2025 Passenger car and light commercial vehicle powertrain technology
analysis. FEV GmbH. (2016, November 21). https://www.theicct.org/publications/2025-passenger-car-and-
light- commercial-vehicle-powertrain-technology-analysis (FEV 2016)
Miller cycle engine (MIL)
Cost
It is unclear from the DRIA how MIL costs were developed and how OMEGA calculates MIL
costs. Nevertheless, based on analysis of output file engine costs, MIL costs appear too high,
especially as compared to base turbo costs (TDS). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 34-37]
Table 5 below is an excerpt from the central analysis of the proposed standards
(2023_03_14_22_42_30_central_3alts_20230314_Proposal_vehicles.csv). It highlights 9 ICE
vehicles which changed from being equipped with MIL to being equipped with TDS only. Note
that the change from a more advanced engine (MIL) to a less advanced engine (TDS) is an
artefact of the modeling and is unlikely to occur in the real world as such a change may come at
the expense of reduced performance, fuel economy, or other consumer-valued function.
Comparing solely the engine costs associated with a specific vehicle model (assigned to a base
year vehicle ID in the table), the cost of MIL appears to be $600-$2400 more expensive than
TDS. As MIL costs very little compared to a turbocharged, downsized engine such as that used
in the proposal analysis to represent TDS (2016 Honda 1.5L L15B7) (see NAS 2021), the
incremental costs shown in the table suggest the MIL costs are far too high. ICCT 2021
comments, ICCT 2018 comments, and NAS 2021 explain that incremental MIL costs range from
$0-$250. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 34-37]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table 5. Comparison of Miller (MIL) and Turbo-
downsized (TDS) engine costs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 34-37]
In prior rulemakings, EPA included the cost of ATK in the cost of MIL which led to
unnecessarily high MIL costs. While it is unclear if ATK costs are included in MIL in the current
2005
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proposal analysis, such an inclusion would contribute to high MIL costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 34-37]
For additional information see:
- ICCT 2021 comments page 7
Mild hybrid (MHEV)
Cost [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 34-37]
The costs for position 0 (P0) MHEV are determined according to the equations in DRIA
Table 2- In Table 6 below, by comparing these MHEV costs to those found by ICCT in 201694
and more recently in 202295, ICCT finds the EPA MHEV costs to be 2x-3x more expensive.
Consequently, ICCT recommends EPA reassess and adjust its MHEV costs to better reflect the
most recent data, which are summarized below. One possible source of added cost in the
proposal is the identical calculation of MHEV and HEV costs (scaled by motor power). This
approach may lead to an overestimate of MHEV costs because the 48 V electrical systems of
MHEVs do not require the same safety and electrical hardware as higher voltage HEVs. ICCT
recommends adjusting MHEV cost calculations according to the table below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0569, pp. 34-37]
94 Isenstadt, A., German, J. (ICCT), Dorobantu, M. (Eaton), Boggs, D. (Ricardo), Watson, T. (JCI).
(2016). Downsized, boosted gasoline engines, https://theicct.org/publication/downsized-boosted-gasoline-
engines-2/
95 Dornoff, J., German, J., Deo, A. (ICCT), Dimaratos, A. (DITENCO). (2022). Mild-hybrid vehicles: a
near term technology trend for C02 emissions reduction, https://theicct.org/publication/mild-hybrid-
emissions-jul22/ (ICCT 2022 MHEV)
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table 6. Comparison of EPA and ICCT PO mild hybrid
(MHEV) direct manufacturing costs, ** Alternator removal costs represented by negative cost
(cost savings), For further information, see Dornoff, J., German, J., Deo, A. (ICCT), Dimaratos,
A. (DITENCO). (2022). Mild-hybrid vehicles: a near term technology trend for C02 emissions
reduction, https://theicct.org/publication/mild-hybrid-emissions-jul22/ and Isenstadt, A.,
German, J. (ICCT), Dorobantu, M. (Eaton), Boggs, D. (Ricardo), Watson, T. (JCI). (2016).
Downsized, boosted gasoline engines, https://theicct.org/publication/downsized-boosted-
gasoline-engines-2/ [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 34-37]
Beyond PO MHEV architectures, there are substantial C02 reduction benefits achievable by
implementing P1-P4 architectures, representing placement of the motor/generator in positions of
increasing distance from the engine along the driveline. While such systems cost more than PO,
they are more cost-effective in that they have lower cost per percent reduction in C02. Thus,
ICCT recommends EPA consider including in its modeling more advanced MHEV architectures
beyond PO. Additional discussion on MHEV effectiveness is in the following section. Table 7
below replicates Table 18 in ICCT 2022 MHEV. As shown in the table, P1-P4 MHEV
architectures with specifications similar to PO MHEV can increase cost by at most 53% (P4+P0
for FWD) with P4+P0 for AWD decreasing costs vs PO. At the same time, P2-P4 architectures
can more than double PO effectiveness. Combining the "Total" cost scaling shown in the below
table with the ICCT PO cost in the table above, all architectures have lower cost than the PO
MHEV cost used in the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 34-37]
2006
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SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table 7. Mild hybrid architecture cost in 2020 (ICCT
2022 MHEV, Table 18) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 34-37]
For further information, see Dornoff, J., German, J., Deo, A. (ICCT), Dimaratos, A.
(DITENCO). (2022). Mild-hybrid vehicles: a near term technology trend for C02 emissions
reduction, https://theicct.org/publication/mild-hybrid-emissions-jul22/ [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 34-37]
Cost
EPA's estimated HEV costs also appear to be overestimated. Due to the challenge of
disentangling the costs and effects of both electrified and conventional powertrain component
changes from one redesign to the next, ICCT examined total powertrain costs from the central
analysis output file (2023_03_14_22_42_30_central_3alts_20230314_Proposal_vehicles.csv).
Total powertrain costs are calculated as the sum of battery cost, electrified driveline cost, e-
machine cost, driveline cost, and engine cost. For redesigns that occur between MY2023-2027,
the difference in cost between the HEV powertrain and non-HEV powertrain ranges from
approximately $3,400 to over $9,000. For redesigns that occur after MY2027, the HEV
powertrain cost difference ranges between approximately $2,700 to over $10,000. Cost changes
due to learning notwithstanding, as analyzed in ICCT's 2015 report on hybrids,99 these levels of
cost premiums are not plausible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 37-40]
99 German, J. (2015). Hybrid vehicles: Trends in technology development and cost reduction. International
Council on Clean Transportation, https://www.theicct.org/hybrid-vehicles-trends-technology-development-
and-cost-reduction
As with MIL costs, it is not clear precisely how HEV engine (MIL, DHE, and DHE2) costs
are calculated. Regardless, as HEV engines are modeled as either Atkinson or Miller cycle
engines, their costs ought to be very similar to the same types of engines on non-HEV models.
As ATK and MIL are fairly inexpensive as compared to a sufficiently advanced engine (NAS
2021), modeled HEV engine costs ought not to be significantly more expensive than their non-
HEV counterparts. In fact, due to the capacity of HEV motor to take up low-speed, high torque
demand and transient response, HEV engines can be optimized to a narrower operating range
than non-HEV engines. This can enable higher compression ratios, increase EGR dilution, and
potentially decrease costs. Especially in the case of a serial hybrid or range extended PHEV, the
engine is effectively decoupled from the drivetrain, permitting deep optimization, with up to
40% engine cost reduction depending on electrification. 100 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569,
pp. 37-40]
100 SAE 2021. (2021). Optimizing hybrids for cost and efficiency. SAE Automotive Engineering. Page 18.
https://www.nxtbook.eom/smg/sae/21AE04/index.php#/p/18
Lightweighting
Cost
In the proposal, the only lightweighting option is the switch to an aluminum body. This is
certainly a viable lightweighting option, but it is not the only one. Manufacturers have many
avenues for lightweighting with various degrees of mass reduction and associated cost (NAS
2021 and ICCT 2018 comments). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 40-43]
2007
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EPA should consider adjusting its lightweighting options in its analysis to incorporate varying
levels of mass reduction at vary levels of cost per unit mass saved. This methodology has been
used in prior rulemakings and can fit into EPA's existing mass and cost calculations.
Alternatively, EPA can add a single, discrete, intermediate lightweighting option (between the
base steel body and lightweighted aluminum body) that mimics the same format as the two
existing options. This intermediate option would be composed of primarily ultra-, advanced- and
high strength steels (as opposed to conventional or mild steel). Such steels with optimized design
can offer mass reductions on the order of 10%-15% (higher for specific parts), at costs
comparable to existing steel costs. 105 More recent steel developments indicate further mass
reductions are possible with both steel and better design optimization, with high strength steel
costs similar to mild steel costs up to half the cost of lightweighting with Aluminum. 106 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 40-43]
105 Isenstadt, A. and German, J. (ICCT); Piyush Bubna and Marc Wiseman (Ricardo Strategic
Consulting); Umamaheswaran Venkatakrishnan and Lenar Abbasov (SABIC); Pedro Guillen and Nick
Moroz (Detroit Materials); Doug Richman (Aluminum Association), Greg Kolwich (FEV). Lightweighting
technology development and trends in U.S. passenger vehicles, (2016, December 19).
http://www.theicct.org/lightweighting-technology- development-and-trends-us-passenger-vehicles
106 Brooke, L. (2019, May). The economics of materials selection. SAE Automotive Engineering.
https://www.sae.org/publications/magazines/automotive-engineering/past-issues; Gehm, R. (2019,
September). Latest mass-reducing innovations honored by Altair. SAE Automotive Engineering.
https://www.sae.org/publications/magazines/automotive-engineering/past-issues; Visnic, B., Brooke, L.
(2019, September). Stuck on structural adhesives. SAE Automotive Engineering.
https://www.sae.org/publications/magazines/automotive-engineering/past-issues; Weissler, P. (2019,
October). Cutting weight seen as less vital for automated and shared vehicles. SAE Automotive
Engineering, https://www.sae.org/publications/magazines/automotive-engineering/past-issues; Gehm, R.
(2020, September). Altair honors lightweight advances. SAE Automotive Engineering.
https://www.sae.org/publications/magazines/automotive-engineering/past-issues; Macek. B. (FCA), Lutz, J.
(US Steel). (2020, September). Virtual and physical testing of Third-generation High Strength Steel. SAE
Automotive Engineering, https://www.sae.org/publications/magazines/automotive-engineering/past-issues;
Vartanov, G. (2021, June). Lightweight steel on a (cold) roll. SAE Automotive Engineering.
https://www.sae.org/publications/magazines/automotive-engineering/past-issues; Gehm, R. (2021,
September). Altair honors weight-saving innovations. SAE Automotive Engineering.
https://www.sae.org/publications/magazines/automotive-engineering/past-issues; Brooke, L. (2022,
September). A materials lesson in Civics. SAE Automotive Engineering.
https://www.sae.org/publications/magazines/automotive- engineering/past-issues; Gehm, R. (2022,
September). Altair honors innovations in sustainability and lightweighting. SAE Automotive Engineering.
https://www.sae.org/publications/magazines/automotive- engineering/past-issues; Brooke, L. (2023,
March). Battle for the box. SAE Automotive Engineering.
https://www.sae.org/publications/magazines/automotive-engineering/past-issues
Organization: John Graham
4. Mild Hybrid Efficiency, Cost, and Architecture
The proposed rule did not consider any improvements to mild hybrids. Estimates of mild
hybrid effectiveness remain unchanged from the PO mild hybrid estimate in previous
rulemakings. Engine efficiency maps for light-duty non-dedicated hybrid systems in DRIA Table
2-2 all date from 2016 or earlier, with the exception of a turbo Miller cycle engine from 2020,
and there are no efficiency improvements for any specific engine through 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0585, pp.15-16]
2008
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Further, EPA implicitly assumed that there would be no improvement in mild hybrid
architecture. Only the PO architecture was considered in the proposed rule. 16 However, several
recent studies have found that P2, P3, and P4 mild hybrid architectures are much more cost
effective than PO systems. 17 They eliminate the losses in the belt, eliminate engine friction and
pumping losses during regenerative braking, and enable the use of 20-30 kW electric motors
with corresponding higher regenerative braking energy and engine synergies (e.g. launch assist,
low-speed electric driving, aggressive fuel cutoff, and torque assist during driver tip-in). Overall,
efficiency more than doubles compared with PO systems at a much smaller incremental cost.
Even though these reports were previously submitted to EPA and NHTSA, there was no
discussion of mild hybrid architecture and system improvements in the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 15-16]
16 Figure 2-4: Summary of components and architectures used in ALPHA'S modeling for this proposal
(DRIA 2-11).
17 ICCT 2022 48V hybrid: Mild-hybrid vehicles: A near term technology trend for C02 emissions
reduction; https://theicct.org/publication/mild-hybrid-emissions-jul22/Roush report on 48V and BEV costs;
https://www.regulations.gOv/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2021- 0208-0210 AVL Webinar on Passenger Car
powertrain 4.x - Fuel Consumption, Emissions, and Cost on June 2, 2020 https://www.avl.com/-
/passenger-car-powertrain-4.x-fuel-consumption-emissions-and-cost plus slides were attached to ICCT's
comments to NHTSA on 2024-26 LD CAFE proposed rule.
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
EPA appreciates the comments from the International Council on Clean Transportation
(ICCT) and John Graham regarding ICE costs provided in response to our proposal. ICCT
commented that EPA's estimated costs of compliance are too high due to the overestimation of
ICE technology costs. ICCT provided several examples and recommendations for changes.
Response:
EPA agrees that the ICE powertrain costs needed updating for the final rulemaking. As we
discuss in chapter 2.5.1 of the RIA, for this rulemaking we are now assessing costs on an
absolute (rather than incremental) basis. This also has enabled us to update our analysis to
include more robust costing of PHEVs which were added to our ALPHA and OMEGA
compliance modeling for analysis of the final standards. As discussed in 2.5.2.3 of the RIA, we
contracted with FEV to evaluate and update our powertrain costs based on information within
their powertrain components and engine database to help inform EPA's scalable cost equations
for the engine and electrified powertrain (i.e., mild HEV, strong HEV, PHEV and EV)
architectures currently being modeled in ALPHA. As a result, our overall ICE and HEV
powertrain costs have decreased which is directionally in agreement with ICCT's comments.
For comments responses related to cost of PM standards and gasoline particulate filters,
please refer to section 4.2.3.
12.3.2 - Other ICE topics
2009
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Comments by Organizations
Organization: GROWMARK, Inc.
Lack of EV Capability for Farmers
Current electric vehicles do not provide the capabilities that farmers rely on to carry out their
operations. According to a study recently released by the American Automobile Association
(AAA), the Ford F-150 Lightning saw its range decrease by almost a quarter when loaded close
to its maximum payload capacity.4 A gasoline-powered truck, however, would only lose 14
percent of its range with the same amount of weight, and of course it would be quicker and more
convenient to refuel.5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, p. 2]
4 American Automobile Association. (2023, June). Effect of payload on driving range of battery electric
truck, https://urldefense.com/v3/ https:/u7061146.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=4tNED-
2FM8iDZJQyQ53jATUZvOE03mirlE13vtAic917ghAOXNRXkwKaKICrDXA3ZoT75TOvo955EZ6-
2FJiQG-2FErJaPZeKHTyfflQJiv4TMR5A-3DMLSQ_wwmARy8TMTevifjaQtiXjzeH-
2FSc8WPX2ToRxYAJ5XFXCYIVurVZ- 2F7aCPZDngjq-
2BQuMDruqnM8cSNwQPzi5UIwwpztKldVzphs52jy6vxI2xgPnkdzJy3C9ftadJYj76WuUf2T26mkge
QA4pLiS2I3PjMzAEYZZu-2BUbgcPfolgmcVfQ7aEf7LxjMjPw-2B8WF3EQEdXTpy-
2BAUfR52wN4rM9lgx75Pxivc VYDED1 S55BpuarlzGYrR-2Bk3PvHnJeb3rGPLd5dXXuQ8SwSjo-
2B W WPLN8 Jrn 1 ZD 1 eOj 0 5qXvdpcF mg7 -
2FbUtbDUzAhjkGZGxVpfcOxvWD4YC810LuMOxWhv3kzMPlXq9BQ4VUljZwYsOjU-2BI-3D
;!! AlOrVxnpMOw! A Qdah29wRyKcLjIUYyHo21FIzdyG78ee-
sIEhfNe4_m8Dkjdh8iAFlUoJGGzPwlxORQOwI8glEedoHHou918NRN7$
5 Tucker, S. (2023, June 6). Study: EVs lose range to hauling, more than gas trucks. Kelly Blue Book.
https://www.kbb.com/car-news/study-evs-lose-range-to-hauling-more-than-gas-trucks/
Additionally, EVs will have worse results when it comes to towing than ICE vehicles. For
example, while an ICE Ford F-150 can tow up to 14,000 pounds, the EV Ford F-150 Lightning
has a max towing capacity of two tons less than that.6 Furthermore, testing of towing any
considerable weights with the EV truck resulted in dramatic decreases in range, up to a 70
percent decrease in one test.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, p. 2]
6 Brandt, E. (2022, August 18). Payload and towing capacity on electric vehicles. Kelly Blue Book.
https://www.kbb.com/car-news/how-far-can-an-electric-truck-tow/
7 Brandt, 2022.
These figures are simply not acceptable to farmers who rely on their vehicles to do their jobs.
Farmers use their trucks to take products to market, bring supplies to their fields, and move
livestock. Vehicles that have less capability than current ICE technology will lead to decreased
efficiency and increased cost at the farm gate, which will lead to further farm consolidation and
threaten our nation's food security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, p. 2]
Organization: Illinois Farm Bureau (IFB)
According to the USEPA, vehicle technology has reduced emissions from common pollutants
by roughly 99 percent in both light- and heavy-duty vehicles and buses, 1 and C02 emissions
from light-duty internal combustion engine vehicles ("ICEV") have decreased 25 percent since
model year 2004.2 All vehicle technologies can continue to reduce emissions effectively and
efficiently. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration ("EIA"), there are about
2010
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272 million ICEVs3 on the road today, and EIA projects over 140 million ICEV sales will occur
between 2023 and 2032.4 Further, EIA projects there will be about 269 million ICEVs in the
fleet in 2050 along with 47 million battery electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0532, p. 2]
1 U.S. EPA, History of Reducing Air Pollution from Transportation in the United States,"
https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/history-reducing-air-pollution-
transportation, accessed June 2, 2023.
2 U.S. EPA, "Highlights of the Automotive Trends Report," https://www.epa.gov/automotive-
trends/highlights- automotive-trends-report, accessed June 2, 2023.
3 That is: light-, medium-, and heavy-duty ICEV including gasoline, diesel, and hybrid electrics.
4 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2023, Supplemental Tables 38. LDV
Sales by Technology Type, 39. LDV Stock by Tech. Type, and 49 Freight Transport Energy Use.
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown (2,088 signatures)
EPA's proposal to ban most new gasoline and diesel vehicles by 2032 will benefit China at
the expense of Americans, our energy security and jobs like mine in U.S. fuel and petrochemical
manufacturing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1707]
Plus stop Ireland from killing 200000 cows. You know it's crap. Cows are not killing the
planet. Plus as long as China Keri's doing what they do doesn't matter how much we do. China
U.S. the problem for the world and y'all know it. Stop the madness [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
1707]
The United States is the world's top producer of liquid fuels. American crude oil—not foreign
oil—is the number one feedstock for our refineries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1707]
We do not have the same strength in electric vehicle (EV) batteries and minerals. China owns
that market. Even with massive investments, a study from the Dallas Fed suggests the United
States is likely to control just 11% of global battery production while China keeps a stranglehold
on 70%. This policy would trade U.S. fuel security and influence for dependence on China.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1707]
Consumers will pay for EPA's proposal long before it's implemented. EVs have yet to reach
cost parity and sell for about $12,000 more than traditional models according to Kelley Blue
Book. Forced EV sales are also inflating the cost of new and used gasoline vehicles. Public
financing for the rushed expansion of the electric grid is also going to fall on consumers' and
taxpayers' shoulders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1707]
EPA claims reduced emissions will make up for these costs, but its accounting ignores all but
one category of vehicle emissions—just those from a vehicle tailpipe. According to this logic, a
Hummer EV, with its nearly 3,000-pound battery, is responsible for ZERO emissions and has
less impact on the environment than a Prius. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1707]
In addition to ignoring lifecycle emissions, EPA overlooks the fact that today's fleet—
composed almost entirely of consumer-preferred gasoline and diesel vehicles—is the cleanest on
record. These improvements can continue—with more carbon capture, clean hydrogen and U.S.
2011
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biofuels—providing EPA allows all vehicle technologies to compete. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-1707]
Please withdraw the current proposal and replace it with policy that (1) considers the full
lifecycle emissions of vehicles, (2) prioritizes consumer choice and (3) commits to upholding to
American energy security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1707]
Organization: Matthew DiPaulo
While OEMs are producing EV vehicles, their entire fleet isn't. The average age of the vehicle
car pare is 13 years with an average of 122,000 miles. With OEMs still manufacturing ICE
engines, those vehicles will last 15+ years (or more) and will require motor oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1514, p.1]
Organization: Missouri Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
To this point, the rulemaking ignores the fact that the ICE engines can be engineered and
further optimized to lower emissions and meet targets. In the 1970s, the U.S. faced a problem
with lead tailpipe emissions. To solve the issue, gasoline was reformulated to meet lead-based
emission reduction targets. The U.S. didn't ban or restrict the use of internal combustion engines.
Instead, the fuel source was reengineered, allowing auto manufacturers to adjust and optimize
powertrain technologies to simultaneously meet emission targets while following and meeting
consumer demands. There are low and zero-emission liquid fuel options available today that can
accomplish the same thing, including low-carbon ethanol as well as biodiesel. EPA should take
the opportunity to focus on solutions that keep ICE engines on the road- because they are on the
road in mass today and will be for the foreseeable future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0578, p. 2]
Suppose EPA is genuinely interested in finding sustainable and workable emissions reduction
solutions. Focusing on new fuel technologies that work within existing vehicle powertrains and
fueling infrastructure available right now is the smart way forward. To that end, MCGA urges
EPA to focus its energy on modernizing the nation's liquid fuel standards, not cherry-picking
winners and losers in the vehicle technology and powertrain sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0578, p. 2]
Organization: ReginaldModlin and B. Reid Detchon
The Proposed Rule primarily targets reducing emission of Greenhouse Gas (GHG). In that
context, we observe that EPA has missed a substantial opportunity to reduce GHG emissions
from vehicles now on the road. In seeking to achieve early wins in the climate challenge, the
goal of deploying effective, available, and affordable technology packages should consider
improving the fuel used by over 250 million existing vehicles. An analysis of the potential
effectiveness of an improved fuel used in Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) powered vehicles
now and into the next few decades shows that adoption of an improved fuel could possibly
double the C02 reductions claimed by the Proposed Rule! (See analysis conducted by Steffen
Mueller, University of Illinois at Chicago, reported by B. West, "Benefits of Ethanol Blending
and Impact on Emissions and Emissions Control," at SAE Powertrains, Fuels and Lubricants
Summit, October, 2021.) This observation alone should cause EPA to give very serious
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consideration into how an improved fuel can be adopted and deployed. And, an improved fuel
would bring along further, substantial, benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Transfer Flow, Inc
Different technologies are appropriate for different scenarios. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0496, p. 5]
Liquid fuels have a strong heritage of radically improving quality of life, and this history is
not going to erase itself overnight. Basing the performance of all liquid fuels on fossil fuels or
even gasoline is a limiting perspective that undercuts the potential for a grassroots fuels
movement where fuels are created and consumed locally by repurposing the waste created from
The United States' rich agricultural resources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, p. 5]
California Senate Bill SB-1383 requires waste management companies to sequester organic
materials and keep them out of landfills. Several CalRecycle24 facilities have developed waste-
to-energy facilities that convert food and yard waste to carbon-negative biofuels, which are then
used to power their garbage trucks and other vehicles. These waste-to-energy projects reduce
landfilling and fossil fuel consumption and provide dramatic air quality benefits. They also
create good-paying local jobs, often in low-income communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0496, p. 5]
24 https://calrecycle.ca.gov/organics/slcp/
Comparing low-NOx renewable natural gas made locally to gasoline is like comparing your
current high-speed internet to the old, antiquated dial-up internet. The EPA's bias against
internal combustion technologies is a short-sighted assumption and serves to undermine the
overall goal of reducing emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, p. 5]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
EPA received several comments related to ICE powertrains overall, or in relation to potential
changes from ICE-based powertrains to EVs. Growmark, Inc. commented that EVs do not have
the same functionality as ICE vehicles and may not meet the utility needs of farmers while the
Illinois Farm Bureau commented on the historical improvement of ICE-based vehicle efficiency
and reductions in emissions. Matthew DiPaulo, a private citizen noted the likely long life of ICE-
based vehicles in the fleet. Missouri Corn Growers, Transfer Flow, and Reginald Modlin and B.
Reid recommended that EPA focus on alternative fuels that could be used in the existing fleet of
vehicles in considering reductions in emissions. EPA also received a number of comments from
a mass comment campaign that ranged from calling into question the impact of livestock on
climate change to recommending that EPA adopt lifecycle analysis into its standard setting
process.
Response:
EPA appreciates all the comments we received related to ICE technologies and fuels. The
agency recognizes that no single technology will meet the needs of every consumer which is why
the Agency has decided to continue our longstanding practice of adopting performance-based
standards instead of a ZEV mandate. Performance-based standards allow vehicle manufacturers
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the option of building lower emission versions of the vehicles that their consumers and intended
applications demand. Under the final standards, we expect that consumers will have more choice
of vehicles; though all the technologies we project that manufacturers might use to comply with
the standards are available in the market today, over the timeframe of the standards we expect
that the technology options will span more vehicle segments and price points.
EPA also appreciates commenters recommendations regarding alternative fuels and the
potential emission reductions that could be achieved. Fuel changes are out of scope for this
rulemaking, however, the EPA will continue to monitor fuel technology developments for future
consideration.
12.4 - Modeling of IRA incentives
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
EPA underestimates battery costs; unrealistic BEV sales assumptions
The NPRM substantially underestimates the cost of batteries while overestimating the
availability of consumer and manufacturing tax credits. For example, the Proposed Rule assumes
that in 2029, the combination of cost reductions from installing larger batteries in BEVs and
incentives from Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)5 Sections 30D, 45W, and 45X results in
consumer incentives and battery production tax credits that substantially exceed the battery cost.
If cost reductions and incentives eliminate the entire cost of EV batteries, it is little wonder the
EPA model suggests a massive increase in sales of long-range BEVs. However, we do not
believe these assumptions are realistic. Moreover, while vehicle cost and affordability are critical
to success, they are just one set of factors in the transformation to electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 4-5]
5 H.R.5376 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): Inflation Reduction Act. (2022, August 16). Available at
htps://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376/text.
- The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)21 committed to incentivizing the retail purchase of EVs;
however, this incentive comes with criteria that exclude the vast majority of EVs currently for
sale in the United States. As of June 2023, due to the North American assembly requirement and
the MSRP limitations, less than 20 of the 97 EVs for sale qualify for either half or all of the
$7,500 tax credit available to eligible taxpayers. Guidance regarding Foreign Entity of Concern
provisions (Section 30D), which go into effect in 2024 (battery components) and 2025 (critical
minerals), is still forthcoming from the Treasury Department. These provisions will potentially
make qualifying for the tax credit more challenging for eligible consumers in the next 12-18
months. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 26-27]
21 H.R.5376 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): Inflation Reduction Act. (2022, August 16). Available at
htps://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376/text.
- The $7,500 retail tax credit under 30D is split in half with eligibility requirements for battery
components and critical minerals. The critical minerals portion requires a qualifying percentage
(currently 40%) to be extracted or processed in the United States or a country with which the
U.S. has a free trade agreement, or recycled in North America. The U.S. does not currently have
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free trade agreements with many of our allies (e.g., the EU and UK) or mineral-rich nations (e.g.,
Indonesia for nickel). Similarly, the other half of the 30D tax credit is available for eligible
vehicles that contain battery components (currently 50%) that are manufactured or assembled in
the United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 26-27]
- The IRA also provides an incentive to produce the needed batteries helping to offset their
cost; however, this only applies to the United States, ignoring the global supply chain needed to
support a 40-50% U.S. EV market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 26-27]
5. IRA Manufacturing Credits (45X)
a) Application of IRA 45X Credit in EPA Modeling
The Inflation Reduction Act has numerous provisions aimed at increasing domestic
manufacturing of clean energy components, including EV batteries, and reducing the cost of EVs
through consumer tax credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 63-64]
While provisions such as the Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit (Section 45X) and
Advanced Energy Project Credit (Section 48C) will assist in onshoring production of EV
batteries and battery components, that will take time. As much as automakers and policymakers
would like this transition to happen faster, increasing access to raw materials, expanding
manufacturing capacity and broadening domestic supply chains will not happen overnight.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 63-64]
In its modeling, EPA assumes that battery costs will be reduced through the use of the
Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit (Section 45X). The 45X production tax credit provides a
credit of $35/kWh for battery cell production and $10/kWh for battery module production. To
qualify for the credit, manufacturing must take place in the U.S. While the 45X tax credit will
assist in bolstering our nation's competitiveness and economic security, the assumptions made
by EPA are overly optimistic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 63-64]
EPA assumes that 60% of manufacturers will be able to take advantage of the $35/kWh
battery cell credit and $10/kWh battery module credit in 2023, ramping up to 100% by 2027.113
The resulting credit is provided in Table 2-49 of the DRIA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 63-64]
113 DRIA at 2-86.
In order for 100% of manufacturers to claim the credit, all EV battery cells and modules
would have to be manufactured in the U.S. As shown in Figure 18, this is an unrealistic
assumption. EPA's projections for GWh of battery capacity needed to support its proposal
exceed estimates of total U.S. battery cell manufacturing capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 63-64]
Figure 18: Projected battery demand under the EPA proposall 14 vs. U.S. battery cell
supply 115 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 63-64]
114 Calculated by Auto Innovators based on data in OMEGA output file [. . .]vehicles.csv for the proposal
central analysis.
115 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (1Q2023), proprietary model for Auto Innovators. Reflects
unweighted U.S. battery cell manufacturing capacity, not weighted for probability.
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It does not appear that EPA considered any specific source to support its estimates for future
U.S. cell and pack manufacturing capacity relative to its projected battery demand for the
proposal. TheDRIA simply says, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 64-65]
We estimated that, across the PEV industry as a whole, the capability of manufacturers to take
advantage of the $35 cell credit and the $10 module credit would ramp up over time, as new U.S.
battery manufacturing facilities come online, allowing manufacturing to increasingly take place
in the U.S. We ramped the modeling value of the credit linearly from 60% of total cells and
modules in 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 64-65]
. . to 100% utilization in 2027 . . . Although a large percentage of 2023 U.S. BEV battery and
cell manufacturing is represented by the production of one OEM, we believe that the many large
U.S. battery production facilities that are being actively developed by suppliers and other OEMs
(as described in IV.C.6 of the Preamble) will allow benefit of the credit to be accessible to all
manufacturers by 2027. We also note that the high value of the credit provides a strong
motivation for manufacturers to utilize it.l 16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 64-65]
116 DRIA at 2-54.
An assumption of 100% applicability of 45X credits also implies that all imported vehicles
will have U.S.-manufactured battery cells and packs. Imported new light-duty vehicles generally
arrive fully assembled. In order to have U.S.-manufactured battery cells and packs, those
components would either have to be exported (only to later be imported as part of a complete
vehicle), or imported vehicles would need to have their battery packs installed upon arrival in the
U.S. Such assumptions could only be applied as an exception to the rule. To apply them to every
imported vehicle is a clear error that needs correction for the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 64-65]
In addition, EPA should consider that some manufacturers do not have domestic production
facilities and import all of their vehicles. EPA applies its 45X credit adjustment equally to all
BEVs, but this would not be a fair or accurate assessment for vehicle importers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 64-65]
Although U.S. battery cell and pack manufacturing are clearly on an upward trajectory, it is
extremely doubtful that 100% of batteries used in vehicles produced for sale in the U.S. will
meet IRA 45X requirements. It is going to take time, certainly longer than 2027, to onshore all
EV battery manufacturing, and it is unclear whether manufacturers would benefit directly from
the $35 kWh credit, or the $10 kWh credit depending on yet to be issued Treasury guidance.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 65]
While we are supportive of the 45X production tax credit and view it as a valuable incentive
to increase the pace of localizing battery manufacturing, the assumption made by EPA that all
battery cell and module manufacturing will be in the U.S. is simply not accurate. This type of
industrial transformation will not happen overnight. We recommend that EPA reconsider its
assumptions for applicability of IRA 45X in the final rule. The reconsideration should include
projected U.S. battery cell and pack manufacturing capacity, domestic versus import vehicles,
and impacts on specific manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 65]
b) Disconnects Between EPA's 45X Projections and BatPac Inputs
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It appears there are likely significant disconnects between EPA's forecasted domestic battery
production environment—in which battery supply is assumed to be available for all OEMs to
source domestically produced batteries while fully passing along IRA-based tax benefits to their
customers—and the agency's acknowledged use of "default" BatPaC values/assumptions in the
model. For example, the model defaults to an assumption that all battery manufacturing will be
performed "in house." Certainly, for some manufacturers, this is a fair characterization. For
others, however, it is unlikely to be the case which, as demonstrated by BatPaC outputs, will
result in higher overall battery costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 65-66]
c) Impact of 45X and 30D/45W Assumption on Implied Battery Cost
In addition to the IRA 45X credits, EPA also projects the availability of IRA 30D/45W retail
and commercial EV purchase incentives. Although we recognize that the 30D/45W incentives
are applied to vehicle purchases or leases, this is similar to EPA's approach to the 45X credit,
which EPA applies the marked-up battery cost. 117 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 65-66]
117 DRIA at 2-54.
Therefore, it is informative to assess the combined impact of EPA's projections of rapidly
declining battery costs, 45X, and 30D/45W credits on net battery cost. In Figure 19, we start
with EPA's sales-weighted average battery cost in 2029, apply EPA's projected 45X credits, and
then apply EPA's projected 30D/45W incentives to calculate a net battery cost. EPA projects that
an average 2029 BEV battery of 103 kWhl 18 will cost $8,190 in 2029. The EPA-projected 45X
credit is $45/kWhl 19 or $4,628 total. EPA's projected 30D/45W credit is $5,250 in 2029.120
The battery is the largest cost driver in an EV and therefore these IRA incentives can be
considered as direct offsets to battery cost. After application of 45X and 30D/45W credits the
implied net cost of the battery is negative - ($1,688). The estimations that EPA relies upon also
presume that Congress makes no changes to the IRA, including the 30D, 45W, or 45X tax
provisions that are used to justify the extraordinarily high BEV levels between MYs 2027-2032.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 65-66]
118 OMEGA, EPA proposal central analysis, [.. .]vehicles.csv output file. Sales-weighted average
calculated by Auto Innovators.
119 DRIA at 2-87 (Table 2-49).
120 DRIA at 2-87 (Table 2-50).
Figure 19: Battery cost walk using EPA projections for average battery cost, 45X credits and
30D/45W credits
Item Cost Cost After Credit
2029 average BEV battery (103 kWh) $8,190 $8,190
EPA-projected 45X credit ($45/kWh) ($4,628) $3,562
EPA-projected 30D/45W credit ($5,250) ($1,688)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 65-66]
d) Transparency of EPA's Methodology in Application of 45X Credits
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To verify our understanding of EPA's methodology in applying estimated 45X credits, Auto
Innovators attempted to recreate results shown in Figure 2-27 based on descriptions of the
methodology 121 and data from OMEGA input and output files. However, those efforts were
unsuccessful. Given the importance of the potential impact of the IRA credits on battery costs in
general, the agency's application of these credits must be accurate and fully transparent. We
recommend that EPA provide more thorough documentation of the OMEGA input and output
files, and descriptions of data used in the final rule. An example calculation for application of
the 45X credits based on OMEGA fields could be helpful. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
66-67]
121 DRIA at 2-53 et seq.
e) Economics of 45X Benefits
The DRIA includes a simple analysis of how the tax provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act
would affect the cost of producing bateries.122 However, EPA does not take into account that
the burden of a tax (or benefit of a credit) does not necessarily accrue to the party that is taxed
(or receives the credit). 123 If the industry is reasonably competitive, then most of the gains and
losses from changes in industrial tax policy may flow through to consumers. If an individual firm
does not pass through the benefit (to either an automaker or ultimately a consumer), they are
vulnerable to competition from another firm that does pass through the benefit of the credit. The
price elasticity of demand for the product also plays a role in the pass-through analysis. Before
the final rule, Auto Innovators recommends that the EPA re-evaluate the analysis of the credit
provisions of the IRA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 66-67]
122 DRIA at 2-53 et seq.
123 htps://pressbooks-dev.oer.hawaii.edu/principlesofeconomics/chapter/5-3-elasticity-and-pricing./
I. Consumer Adoption
1. IRA - Consumer Tax Credits
The Inflation Reduction Act has numerous provisions aimed at reducing the cost of EVs
through consumer tax credits. It remains to be seen how consumer tax credits, such as the Clean
Vehicle Credit (Section 30D) and Credit for Qualified Commercial Clean Vehicles (Section
45W), are implemented. With the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, the clean vehicle tax
credit went from a credit that was widely available to all consumers and all electric vehicles 127
to one that includes critical mineral and battery component requirements and that limits
eligibility based on location of vehicle assembly, customer income and vehicle manufacturer
suggested retail price (MSRP). The previous tax credit provided up to $7,500 depending on
battery size. The new tax credit is split in half with battery component requirements accounting
for one half and critical minerals requirements the other. The 30D tax credit is now more
industrial policy than a simple consumer tax credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 71-72]
127 Up to a per manufacturer cap of 200,000 cumulative sales.
As shown in Figure 21 below, the day a tier President Biden signed the Inflation Reduction
Act, the portion of all PEV models eligible for 30D dropped from 92% to 35% due to the North
American assembly requirement. That percentage further dropped on January 1, 2023, to 24%,
when MSRP caps were implemented, and the number of eligible consumers dropped with the
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implementation of income caps. Battery component and critical mineral provisions then went
into effect on April 18, 2023, which dropped the portion of eligible models to just 19%. Of that
19%, only half of the vehicles qualify for the full $7,500. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
71-72]
Figure 21: Percent of Eligible EV Models for the 30D Clean Vehicle Tax Credit
There will also be another hurdle that manufacturers must meet when Foreign Entity of
Concern restrictions go into effect in 2024 for battery components and 2025 for critical minerals.
We have yet to see any guidance on how these provisions will be rolled out, but it will almost
certainly reduce the number of eligible vehicle models. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
71-72]
As of today, there are 97 ZEVs available to purchase in the U.S. 128 Only 18 unique models
qualify for the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) 30D tax credit. 129 IRS guidance with respect to
Foreign Entities of Concern is still outstanding, which JD Power expects will result in more
vehicles losing eligibility for the tax credit altogether. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 72-
74]
128 htps://www.autosinnovate.org/resources/electric-vehicle-sales-dashboard
129 htps://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/tax2023.shtml. Accessed on June 29, 2023.
The Inflation Reduction Act also created a new tax credit for qualified commercial clean
vehicles (Section 45W). This credit is up to $7,500 and is available for qualified vehicles with a
battery capacity of at least 7 kWh and acquired for use or lease by a taxpayer and not for resale.
In the instance of vehicles leased to a private retail customer, the captive finance company
leasing the vehicle could be the eligible taxpayer and receive the 45W tax credit. The captive
finance company may then pass along all, some, or none of the credit onto the customer. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 72-74]
As shown in Table 2-50 of the DRIA (Figure 22), EPA assumes that on average every EV
sold will qualify for and receive at least $3,750 of the 30D or 45W tax credit in 2023. Currently,
about one-fifth of all available EV models qualify for at least half of the 30D tax credit. EPA
expects that the average amount of tax credits to rise by $250 per year, but again, with foreign
entity of concern provisions going into effect in 2024 for battery components and 2025 for
critical minerals, the amount of available credit is likely to go down, not up. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 72-74]
Additionally, EPA also assumes that 45W will play a significant role in reducing the overall
price of EVs. This assumption is flawed for several reasons. First, the percentage of vehicles
leased in the U.S. has declined steadily over the past three years. Figure 23 shows the percentage
of leased vehicles has dropped from over one-third in January 2020 to less than one-fifth in July
2022.130 While lease rates may rise as a result of the 45W provision, there's no indication they
will rise to a level that would result in 80% of BEVs receiving either a 30D or 45W tax credit.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 72-74]
130 htps://www.coxautoinc.com/market-insights/leasing-decline-has-short-term-and-long-term-
implications/
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Second, in the cases where 45W is applied to a leased vehicle to a private customer, the
captive finance company leasing the vehicle is the eligible taxpayer to receive the 45W credit.
Under existing law, the 45W tax credit does not require that the credit be passed on to the person
leasing the vehicle. The captive finance company has discretion to pass along all, some, or none
of the credit to the customer. Third, 45W is based on the cost differential between battery and
internal combustion engines, and if battery prices decrease as EPA has estimated, the amount
available under 45W could quickly phase down. Fourth, while the 30D credit might not be
widely available to eligible taxpayers, the 45W credit may or may not be a viable option
depending on a host of factors that impact a new vehicle buyer (e.g., credit score, interest rates,
etc.). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 72-74]
Figure 22: Assumed IRS 30D and 45W Clean Vehicle Credit in Omega (EPA NPRM Table 2-
50) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 72-74]
Figure 23: Retail lease share of retail sales [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 72-74]
While there are positive provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act that will help onshore
battery and vehicle production, it is going to take time. The assumptions used by EPA regarding
the number of vehicles that will qualify for consumer tax credits are overly optimistic and should
be reevaluated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 75-76]
Adding to this uncertainty is the potential for federal legislation that could change the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) or the availability of the IRA tax credits. For
example, on June 8, 2023, Bill H.R. 3938132 was introduced to "Build it in America", which, if
passed and signed into law, would end both the 25E used EV tax credit as well the 45W tax
credits. The 30D credit would have the 200,000-vehicle cap per manufacturer reinstated,
including previously qualifying vehicles. Additionally, no credit would be allowed under the
provision for vehicles which have batteries that contain less than 80% critical minerals extracted
or processed in the United States or in any country which the United States has a free trade
agreement. The provision would also further restrict the definition of a "free trade agreement."
No credit would be allowed under the provision for vehicles in which less than 100% of the
value of the battery components contained in the battery were manufactured or assembled in
North America. While H.R. 3938 was passed by the House Ways and Means Committee on June
13th by a vote of 24-18, it demonstrates the possibility of Congressional changes that could
dramatically and negatively change the entire landscape for EVs - including the assumptions that
EPA relied upon for this proposed rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 75-76]
Probably the most significant concern is the impact of the 45X production tax credit on the
overall estimated cost/price reduction of EVs. As mentioned in Section I.A.2, EPA assumes that
every battery cell and every battery module in every EV sold starting in 2027 will be produced in
the United States and will therefore receive the benefit of a $45/kWh price reduction. MDVs are
larger, heavier vehicles that will likely need larger, higher power batteries. As a result of EPA's
assumption, every MDV will receive a significant price reduction scaled to the size of these very
large batteries. For example, a 200-kWh battery under EPA's assumed application of the 45X tax
credit would receive a $9,000 price reduction. This projected, dramatic reduction in price, as
discussed earlier in this comment, is overly optimistic and incorrect, and without doubt
positively, increased the EV penetration rate of these vehicles in support of the Proposed Rule.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 191]
2020
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Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) have
set aside historic amounts of funding for electric vehicles and will greatly reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions from the transportation sector if that money is invested with climate impacts in
mind. EPA's standards must build off of these investments. While we commend EPA for
proposing strong standards that help the U.S. achieve President Biden's 2030 goal of 50% zero
emission new vehicle sales, these historic investments mean we can go even further.5 Since the
IRA was signed into law, $50 billion in investments in EV and battery manufacturing, and
supply chain projects have been announced.6 These investments could get the U.S. to over 60%
new light-duty EV sales by the early 2030s.7 But more will be needed to adequately address the
climate emergency. EPA's MY 2027-2032 standards should fully account for the recent federal
activity and build off them to achieve further emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0642, pp. 1-2]
5 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-
announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/
6 https://www.charged-the-book.com/na-ev-supply-chain-map
7 https://theicct.Org/wp-content/uploads/2023/0l/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23.pdf; https://rmi.org/insight/how-
inflation-reduction-act-will-affect-ev-adoption-in-the-united-states/
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
As for IRA incentives, EPA substantially overestimates the effect that those incentives will
have on the upfront purchase price of electric vehicles. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,195; Draft RIA at
2-86. Many of the credits EPA models come with stringent restrictions and qualifications that
make the benefits una- vailable to most consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 25-27]
For example, EPA relies heavily on the "Clean Vehicle Tax Credit," which offers consumers
up to $7,500 for buying a new electric vehicle during the tax- able year. See 26 U.S.C. §§
30D(a)-(b). The $7,500 is the sum of two credit amounts. Id. § 30D(a). First, purchasers receive
$3,750 if certain percentages of the critical minerals in the vehicle's battery are (i) extracted or
processed in the United States or a country with which the United States has a free-trade
agreement^ or (ii) derived from materials recycled in North America. Id. § 30D(b)(2). The
requisite percentages of minerals that must be extracted, pro- cessed, or recycled in North
America or in a nation that is a U.S. free-trade- agreement partner increase year over year,
beginning with 40 percent for vehi- cles placed in service during 2023 and reaching 80 percent
for vehicles placed in service during or after 2027. Id. § 30D(e)(l)(B). Second, purchasers
receive an additional $3,750 if a certain percentage of the battery components are man- ufactured
or assembled in North America. Id. § 30D(b)(3). Again, the percent- ages increase year over
year, beginning with 50 percent for vehicles placed in service during 2023 and reaching 100
percent for vehicles placed in service dur- ing or after 2029. Id. § 30D(e)(2)(B). In addition, for
either of these credit amounts to apply, the purchaser or vehicle must meet additional
requirements: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 25-27]
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3 The IRS identifies these countries as Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Mo- rocco,
Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, and Singapore. See Treasury Releases Proposed Guidance on New Clean
Vehicle Credit to Lower Costs for Consumers, Build U.S. Industrial Base, Strengthen Supply Chains, U.S.
Dep't of Treasury (Mar. 31, 2023), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-re- leases/jyl379.
Final assembly of the vehicle must occur in North America. Id. § 30D(d)(l)(G).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 25-27]
The vehicle's retail price cannot exceed certain thresholds ($80,000 for vans, SUVs,
and pickups, and $55,000 for all other vehicles). Id. § 30D(f)(ll). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, pp. 25-27]
The taxpayer's income cannot exceed certain threshold amounts ($150,000 for
taxpayers filing a single return; $225,000 for taxpayers fil- ing as head of household; and
$300,000 for taxpayers filing jointly). Id. § 30D(f)(10). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp.
25-27]
Finally, whatever percentage of the critical minerals or battery compo- nents that are
not sourced from North America or a free-trade partner still cannot come from a "foreign entity
of concern"—which is defined by a cross-referenced statute to include (among others) entities
that are "owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of' China and
Russia. Id. § 30D(d)(7)(A); see 42 U.S.C. § 18741(a)(5)(C); 10 U.S.C. § 4872(d)(2). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 25-27]
That panoply of onerous restrictions will likely limit drastically the number of consumers who
will actually benefit from the credit. The critical-minerals sourcing requirements will render
many electric-vehicle models ineligible. In April 2023, the IRS concluded that only 22 electric-
vehicle models qualify. See Tax Credits for Electric Vehicles: The Latest from the IRS, Bradford
Tax Inst. (May 2023), https://tinyurl.com/32akaztz. And the Congressional Research Service
reports that, "[o]ver time, as the battery critical minerals and components re- quirements tighten,
there are claims that no vehicles would qualify." Molly F. Sherlock, Clean Vehicle Tax Credits
in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Cong. Research Serv., at 3 (Aug. 24, 2022) ("Clean
Vehicle Tax Credits"). The retail- price threshold will likely further disqualify many purchases
of electric vehicles. In September 2022, the average cost of a new electric vehicle was $65,291—
far above the $55,000 limit for many passenger vehicles. Renee Valdes, Electric Car FAQ: Your
Questions Answered, Kelly Blue Book (Oct. 31, 2022), https://ti- nyurl.com/4zepcvd4. And
some consumers who purchase electric-vehicles might have incomes exceeding the statutory
thresholds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 25-27]
Despite these impediments to the Clean Vehicle Tax Credit's uptake, EPA predicts that
electric-vehicle purchasers will experience substantial benefits. It states that, "[f]or 2023 [the
agency] estimated that an average credit amount (across all PEV purchases) of $3,750 per
vehicle could reasonably be expected to be realized" through a combination of this credit and the
Qualified Commer- cial Clean Vehicles Credit (which applies for Class 2b or Class 3 vehicles).
88 Fed. Reg. at 29,301. "For later years," the agency assumes that "the attrac- tiveness of the
credits to manufacturers and consumers would likely increase eligibility over time" and "ramped
the value linearly to $6,000 by 2032." Id. EPA does not explain how it settled upon any of those
estimates, offer data to support them, or reconcile them with reports that far less than half of
2022
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current models qualify today and that none may qualify in the coming years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683, pp.25-27]
In addition, although EPA presents the Clean Vehicle Tax Credit as a new incentive that will
accelerate consumer acceptance, it is a successor to a tax credit that has existed for years. And as
amended by the IRA, the credit is in most respects more restrictive than its predecessor.
Although the prior version of the tax credit was subject to a manufacturer-level cap (that the IRA
re- moved)—under which the credit was reduced and ultimately eliminated for a particular
manufacturer if it sold a certain number of vehicles—the prior ver- sion was easier for individual
electric-vehicle buyers to satisfy. Under the prior version, purchasers were eligible for a base
amount of $2,500 with an additional $417 for every kilowatt-hour of capacity above 5 kilowatt-
hours, up to $5,000. See Sherlock, Clean Vehicle Tax Credits at 2. There were no restrictions
based on the critical minerals or components used in the vehicle's battery; there was no
requirement that final assembly occur in North America; and there were no thresholds for
income or retail price. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 27-28]
If the pre-existing, easier-to-satisfy version of this tax credit did not result in the widespread
adoption of electric vehicles—which, by all accounts, it did not—an amended version with more
stringent qualifying requirements is un- likely to do so either. Although the IRA eliminated the
manufacturer-level cap on the tax credit's availability, removing one impediment to consumers'
ability to receive the tax credit for a particular manufacturer's vehicles, the other changes
Congress made to the credit through the IRA could if anything disin- centivize consumers from
purchasing electric vehicles by making it more difficult to obtain a tax credit for any electric
vehicle. Shortly before the IRA was en- acted, the President and CEO of the Alliance for
Automotive Innovation de- scribed the amended credit as a "major setback" to electrification,
noting that "Americans who would otherwise receive the credit today (say, the family test
driving a car this weekend and on the fence about whether to make the switch to an EV) will no
longer be able to take advantage of this financial incentive to purchase an EV." John Bozzella,
What if No EVs Qualify for the EV Tax Credit? It Could Happen., All. for Auto. Innovation
(Aug. 5, 2022), https://ti- nyurl.com/3fhb6mcu (emphasis added). At a minimum, EPA has not
ex- plained how tightening the tax credit's criteria would substantially increase electric-vehicle
adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 27-28]
EPA also relies on the "Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit," which (among other
things) provides manufacturers with a credit of up to $35 per kilowatt-hour for producing battery
cells, 26 U.S.C. § 45X(b)(l)(K), and a credit of up to $10 per kilowatt-hour for producing battery
modules, id. § 45X(b)(l)(L). EPA characterizes this tax credit "as a reduction in direct man-
ufacturing costs, which in turn is assumed to result in a reduction in purchase price for the
consumer." Draft RIA at 2-86. But EPA significantly overstates the likely effect of this credit as
well. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 28-29]
Under the Internal Revenue Code, manufacturers do not qualify for these credits unless the
battery cells and modules are produced within the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 45X(d)(2). As EPA
acknowledges, however, "a large percentage of 2023 U.S. BEV battery and cell manufacturing is
represented by the production of one [original-equipment manufacturer]." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,300
(emphasis added); see also Draft RIA at 2-54. As a result, many batteries do not currently qualify
for the tax credit. Cf. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles—Phase 3,
88 Fed. Reg. 25,926, 25,945 (Apr. 27, 2023) ("there are few manufacturing plants for HD
2023
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vehicle batteries in the United States, which means that few batteries would qualify for the tax
credit now"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 28-29]
EPA rejoins that the amount of domestically produced battery cells and modules will increase
in the coming years and projects that all manufacturers will be eligible for the credit in 2027. See
Draft RIA at 2-54. But that assertion depends entirely on EPA's "expectation] that the many
large U.S. battery pro- duction facilities that are being actively developed by suppliers and other
[orig- inal-equipment manufacturers]" will come online in just a few short years and will
produce enough battery cells and modules to support the Nation's expected electric-vehicle fleet
by the rule's compliance period. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,300. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp.
29-30]
That expectation is unwarranted. Some of the battery-manufacturing plants that EPA relies on
are still only under consideration. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,317 (discussing four plants that
companies are "considering" constructing). The plans for one of those plants were reportedly put
on hold after executives reached an impasse and decided not to move forward. See Peter
Johnson, GM and LG Partnership Falters; Will Another Battery Maker Save the Next US Plant?,
Electrek (Jan. 20, 2023), https://tinyurl.com/mvfewj3e. Other planned facili- ties have
experienced setbacks in construction and production. For example, LG Chem planned to begin
construction on its facilities in the first half of 2023, but construction has been postponed until
"about the end of the third quarter." LG Chem to Develop Tennessee Site as Base for Batteries in
North America, Pulse (Apr. 20, 2023), https://tinyurl.com/37r49eew. Tesla and Panasonic built a
factory in Nevada, but "production ramp-up ran at least a year behind sched- ule" because
workers "had to be trained on manufacturing skills they had long lost" and "battery machinery
had to be redesigned and adapted." Daniel Zlatev, Tesla Battery Factory Took Panasonic 6 Years
to Master Since US Workers Lost Their Manufacturing Skills, Notebook Check (Feb. 27, 2023),
https://ti- nyurl.com/3vu8usmd. Thus far, that "facility hasn't grown to the size that the
companies originally planned." Fred Lambert, Panasonic Is Planning a Large Bat- tery Cell
Factory in the US to Supply Tesla's Demand, Report Says, Electrek (Mar. 3, 2022),
https://tinyurl.com/bdz6j9sy. Recent reports indicate that the factory is still only "about 30%
complete," Fred Lambert, Panasonic to Add New Battery Production Line at Tesla Gigafactory
Nevada, Electrek (June 6, 2023), and although there are plans for expansion, there was "no clear
timeline for Tesla to start the construction project" as of October 2022, Fred Lambert, Tesla Is
Finally Going to Expand Gigafactory Nevada, Electrek (Oct. 3, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/4de-
ump6k. As these examples illustrate, for any number of reasons, the domestic battery-
manufacturing sector may not develop at the pace or scale that EPA predicts. EPA's analysis of
likely effect of the tax credits for producing batteries, which is predicated on that prediction, is
therefore unsound. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 29-30]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
ii. EV Purchase Price
EPA assumes in MY 2032, there will be a $3500-$6100 price gap between EVs and ICEVs,
with ICEVs costing less.234 EPA's purchase price incorrectly assumes that every ZEV will be
eligible for the maximum federal purchase incentive.23 5 EPA asserts the relatively slight
increase in the incremental cost of manufacturing a rule-compliant vehicle (Table 13-46 of the
DRIA provides an average increase of $1,164 by 2032) is based, in part, on the assumption
2024
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battery manufacturers are eligible for the IRA's ten percent Production Tax Credit for modules
manufactured in the U.S. It is arbitrary and capricious for EPA to ignore the likelihood that
battery raw materials will not be mined in the U.S. or available for import from credit-qualifying
countries, given Section I.A.I of these comments illustrates China's dominance in processing
critical minerals needed for ZEV batteries and the manufacture of ZEV batteries. Consequently,
it is unrealistic for the Agency to assume ZEV purchases will be eligible for the full incentive.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0733, p. 51]
234 DRIA at 4-20, Table 4-77
235 AAI Comments at ii-iv.
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Projecting future battery material and labor costs
The agency assumes that the IRA 45X tax credits will be fully utilized by all OEMs through
MY2032 (subject to phase-down in the final years of the program) and applies those reductions
to the overall cost of batteries in EPA's OMEGA modeling. This has resulted in profoundly low
battery cost estimates, for example, below $40/kWh in 2029.10 The agency does not, however,
appear to make any upward adjustments to the core Argonne National Laboratory BatPaC 5.0
material costs to account for exponential growth in critical minerals demand that will occur
during this time frame, or to the increased labor cost associated with domestically produced
packs. We believe these are significant oversights that likely result in a meaningful
underestimation of true vehicle electrification costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 7-8]
10 EPA, 2023. Draft RIA, Figure 2-27. Available online at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
Rather than address those and other concerns head-on, the proposal leans heavily on the
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL). In particular, the
proposal includes generous assumptions about the role that the IRA will play in reducing both
battery costs to manufacturers and vehicle prices to consumers. For example, the agency
assumes:
- Seamless cascading of incentives through the supply base, retail partners and economy in
general [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 23-24]
- Domestic production of all batteries in all EVs produced between model years 2027 and
2032 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 23-24]
- Full IRA 45X credit eligibility for all batteries in all model year 2027-2032 vehicles, despite
the fact that IRS guidance has not yet been issued and may contain certain restrictions [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 23-24]
- Full utilization of domestically produced batteries, even from automakers without domestic
battery manufacturing capability [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 23-24]
- Consumers' utilization of 80% of IRA 30D credit eligibility ($6000 out of $7500), despite
numerous restrictions such as critical minerals sourcing, MRSP caps and household income
eligibility restrictions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 23-24]
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To be clear, the IRA and BIL are critically important and include policies necessary to
support a transition toward greater levels of vehicle electrification. It is important for the agency
to understand, however, that these policies are far from set in stone, representing additional
degrees of uncertainty when trying to assess the feasibility of future electrification levels. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 23-24]
Threats to the longevity of the IRA and BIL are clearly recognizable. In June 2023, for
example, a House tax package proposed to repeal 45W (commercial) and 25E (used) provisions,
and to restrict 30D (consumer) incentives by reverting to older manufacturing caps.42 While this
specific package is unlikely to be signed into law in the near term, it is a clear sign of opposition
by certain policymakers. Surprisingly, the agency does not even appear to acknowledge the
possibility that these credits may not exist through 2032, or contemplate the impact that such a
change would have on an automaker's ability to comply with the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 24]
42 See, for example, H.R.3938, Build it in America Act. https://www.congress.gOv/bill/l 18th-
congress/house- bill/3938, and H.R.2811, Limit, Save, Grow Act of 2023.
https://www.congress.gOv/bill/l 18th-congress/house- bill/2811
Given the impact that IRA and BIL assumptions play in the agency's resulting standards, it is
incumbent upon the agency to also consider the potential for their removal or substantial
weakening. To ignore such potential renders the agency's conclusions fatally flawed. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 24]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
iii. Impacts of IRA.
The NPRM cities the Inlaation Reduction Act (IRA - enacted in 2022) as key legislation that
will support the domestic supply chain for battery and electric vehicle production, subsidize EV
purchases, and incentivize the build-out of charging infrastructure and renewable power
production. However, as outlined below, EPA overstates the potential impacts of the IRA. [EPA-
HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 23-24]
The EPA makes misleading claims regarding the ability of the IRA's Clean Vehicle Credits to
"incentivize the growth and manufacturing capacity of onshore sourcing of critical minerals."78
While critical minerals, from any origin, can be used for manufacturing battery electric vehicles,
the IRA establishes restrictive domestic content requirements for tax credit eligibility. In other
words, the IRA tax credits are not a subsidy or policy that directly remove "potential barriers to
wider adoption of PEVs,"79 but rather potentially only provide tax credits if domestic content
requirements are met.80 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 23-24]
78 88 Fed. Reg. 29195 (May 5, 2023).
79 88 Fed. Reg. 29346 (May 5, 2023).
80 Center for Strategic and International Studies. Tax credits are also subject to other requirements - "An
Electric Debate: Local Content Requirements and Trade Considerations." October 2022.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/electric-debate-local-content-requirements-and-trade-considerations.
According to the National Mining Association:81 demand for minerals is souring and policies
in the U.S. are lagging; scaling up the U.S. supply chain requires increased extraction and
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processing; withdrawing federal leases covering reserves of nickel, cobalt, and copper are
described as "self-sabotage"; and "permitting delays have been, and continue to be, one of the
most significant risks to meeting domestic mineral production goals." According to NMA
testimony, automakers are "warning with ever greater frequency that the coming battery material
shortfall could stop the EV revolution" and a shortage of batteries could arrive as early as 2024.
The NMA reports new mining is needed to meet demand, but it takes, on average, 7 to 10 years
to secure permits to open or expand a mine. Even as the NMA acknowledges domestically mined
minerals are incentivized,82 the NMA indicates the mine permitting process is "unwieldly" and
discourages83 investment in domestic mining. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 23-24]
81 "Unleashing American Energy, Lowering Energy Costs, and Strengthening Supply Chains.", United
States House of Representatives Committee on Energy & Commerce, Testimony of Katie Sweeney,
Executive Vice President & General Counsel National Mining Association, February 7, 2023.
82 National Mining Association. "The Future of Mining Rests on the Actions of Today." September 2022.
https://nma.org/2022/09/22/future-of-mining/.
83 Legislative Hearing, United States House of Representatives Committee on Natural Resources,
Testimony of Rich Nolan, President & CEO, National Mining Association, February 28, 2023.
https://nma.org/wp- content/uploads/2023/02/National-Mining-Association-2-28-23-Nolan-Testimony.pdf.
The IRA places income and purchase price limits on tax credit eligibility, along with foreign
content restrictions beginning in 2024. Overall, according to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS)84, it could be "impossible" for a battery electric vehicle to obtain
the full value of the tax credit (i.e., $7,500) in the near term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 23-24]
84 Center for Strategic and International Studies. "An Electric Debate: Local Content Requirements and
Trade Considerations." October 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/electric-debate-local-content-
requirements-and- trade-considerations.
Organization: Anonymous
4. Assumes tax credits are boom for consumers
EPA assumes that the Commercial Clean Vehicle and Clean Vehicle tax credits will lower
BEV costs up to $6,000 to consumers and the Advance Manufacturer Battery Production Credits
by $45 per kWh. EPA incorrectly assumes that manufacturers will pass on the full credit values
to consumers; instead, it is likely that manufacturers will only lower their vehicle prices by a
fraction of these credits, and thus increase their profits. This is especially true for the battery
credits as they aren't consumer facing where consumers may not realize that manufacturer are
being subsidized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, p. 4]
EPA also incorrectly assumes that the tax credits are free. They use the tax credits to offset
the costs of BEVs, but they do not consider the costs to taxpayers to fund the tax credits. This
hides the costs of BEVs to the American Population by hundreds of billions. Furthermore, EPA
does not address the societal inequities that will be produced by providing tax credits for BEVs.
Since BEVs are typically more expensive than basic ICE vehicles and the fact that the tax credits
are non-refundable (meaning that you have to carry a tax liability to get the benefits of the tax
credit), all taxpayer funds will be going towards funding new BEVs for richer Americans. In this
2027
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sense, EPA's reduces environmental justice by forcing BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565,
p. 4]
Finally, EPA's estimates of tax credits overstates their applicability. The Clean Vehicle credit
has some restrictions that will limit how many vehicles qualify and how much. EPA should
model these restrictions or at the very least make a good faith estimate. For the commercial clean
vehicle tax credit, EPA ignores the cost-basis nature of the credit and assumes that everyone will
lease a vehicle to get the EV tax credit while ignoring the lost utility of owning a vehicle. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, p. 4]
Organization: Arizona State Legislature
V. The proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious because it relies on erroneous assumptions
about vehicle costs.
EPA's analysis includes a tax credit from the Inflation Reduction Act to those who purchase
or lease a qualifying vehicle. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,301. In EPA's view, the tax credit "will have a
strong impact on affordability of these vehicles for a wide range of customers." Id. at 29,195.
Indeed, EPA believes the tax credit "effectively mak[es] some [battery electric vehicles] more
affordable to buy and operate today than comparable ICE vehicles." Id. at 29,190. These are
"significant incentives" in EPA's view. Id. at 29,294. EPA calculated that the average customer
could use half of the tax credit and that it would not impact vehicle production costs. Id. at
29,301. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 22-23]
EPA's analysis already has proven inaccurate. Contrary to EPA's assumptions, the price for
electric vehicles has not remained static with the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act. Instead,
days before passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, "Ford and General Motors announced price
increases at similar rates" as the Act's tax credits. 17 Inflation and supply-chain issues have
caused electric car prices to "surge" and mean fewer buyers can use the Inflation Reduction Act
tax credits. 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 22-23]
17 Ryan King, Inflation Reduction Act promises $7,500 electric vehicle credits after Ford and GM raised
prices, WASHINGTON EXAMINER, Aug. 16, 2022, available at
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/democrats- extended-credits-evs-ford-gm-prices.
18 Keith Laing, Electric Cars' Surging Prices Mean Fewer Buyers Can Use Tax Credit, BLOOMBERG,
Aug. 4, 2022, available at https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/articles/2022-08-04/electric-cars-rising-
prices-mean-fewer-buyers- eligible-for-senate-tax-credit.
Vehicles also have been eliminated from receiving the full tax credit. Ford and Chrysler
parent Stellantis reported in April that "most of its electric and plug-in electric hybrid models
will see tax credits halved to $3,750 on April 18 after new U.S. Treasury rules take effect."19 In
fact, just 11 electric cars from four automakers qualify for the full tax credit.20 And this limited
availability comes before any changes made in response to Senator Joe Manchin, the critical vote
to passing the Inflation Reduction Act, who threatened to repeal the bill or sue the Treasury
Department because the tax credit standards are too liberal.21 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537,
pp. 22-23]
19 David Shepardson and Nathan Gomes, Ford, Stellantis says new rules will cut EV tax credits for most
models, REUTERS, Apr. 5, 2023, available at https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/ford-
confirms-all-three- evs-plug-in-hybrids-eligible-ira-subsidies-2023-04-05/.
2028
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20 Lawrence Ulrich, Electric Vehicle Tax Credit Rules Create 'Chaos for Consumers," The New York
Times, Apr. 20, 2023, available at https://www.nytimes.eom/2023/04/20/business/electric-vehicle-tax-
credits-consumers.html.
21 Ramsey Touchberry, Sen. Manchin threatens to repeal his own climate law if Biden continues to
'liberalize' it, WASHINGTON TIMES, Apr. 25, 2023, available at
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/apr/25/sen-joe- manchin-threatens-repeal-his-own-climate-
1/; David Shepardson, Manchin threatens to sue US Treasury over EV tax credit rules, REUTERS, Mar. 30,
2023, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/us/democratic-sen-manchin- threatens-legal-action-over-
treasury-ev-battery-guidance-2023-03-29/.
EPA also does not grapple with the economic reality that the Inflation Reduction Act's "net
impact is likely to be negative on electric vehicle sales in the immediate future."22 Other
economic analysis concluded the strings attached to the Inflation Reduction Act tax credits "are
likely to make [electric vehicles] even more expensive."23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp.
22-23]
22 Anderson Economic Group, "An estimated 3/4 of recent EV purchases would no longer qualify for tax
credits under the proposed 'Inflation Reduction Act'," Aug. 9, 2022, available at
https://www.andersoneconomicgroup.com/at- least-four-ira-provisions-will-negatively-affect-sales-of-
electric-vehicles/.
23 Tori Smith, "Proposed Tax Credits Would Make Electric Vehicles More Expensive," AMERICAN
ACTION FORUM, Aug. 4, 2022, available at https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/proposed-tax-
credits-would-make-electric-vehicles-more-expensive/.
This all significantly affects EPA's analysis. Vehicles that EPA's analysis includes as eligible
for the credit are now ineligible due to price increases or Treasury Department regulations. The
resulting higher prices for electric vehicles, and reduced amount and availability of subsidies,
will affect consumer demand. EPA's conclusions that there is no cost difference between gas-
powered and electric-powered vehicles, and that there will be a corresponding increase in
purchaser demand, are thus erroneous. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 22-23]
EPA's failure to include accurate estimates for vehicle costs and the resulting impact on
customer demand is arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 22-23]
Organization: BlueGreen Alliance (BGA)
At the same time, EPA must consider that the manufacturing investments from the Inflation
Reduction Act and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law will take time to achieve their full production
capacity. EPA should coordinate with DOE, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), and
the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) to ensure that the manufacturing investments from the
Inflation Reduction Act and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law will be fully leveraged to support
regulatory compliance. Programs like the Battery Manufacturing and Recycling Grants (DOE),
the Battery Material Processing Grants (DOE), the Domestic Manufacturing Conversion Grants
(DOE), the 48C Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit (DOE/DOC), the Advanced Technology
Vehicle Manufacturing Loan Program (DOE), the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure
(NEVI) Program (DOT), and the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure Grant Program (DOT) all
provide unprecedented federal resources that manufacturers and fleet owners can leverage to
support both supply and demand for low- and zero-emission light- and medium-duty vehicles.
However, these programs take time to bear fruit—whether that means a complete public,
affordable, and interoperable EV charging network, or a robust domestic supply chain for
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vehicles eligible for the battery component and critical mineral requirements of the 30D Clean
Vehicle Tax Credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp. 8-9]
It is essential to workers and communities that these programs be carefully designed and
implemented, with robust stakeholder engagement. This helps ensure that they adhere to
Justice40 requirements and new Build America, Buy America provisions that are critical to
ensuring that federal programs support domestic manufacturing investments that are fully
supported by their communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp. 8-9]
With that, EPA must account for the time it takes to convert federal awards and allocations
into actual domestic production capacity and critical on-the-ground infrastructure. EPA should
coordinate with DOT and DOE to fully assess the availability of charging and fueling
infrastructure for electric vehicles, and related grants and loans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0667, pp. 8-9]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Critical Minerals
CARB appreciates the consideration U.S. EPA has given to understanding critical minerals
availability, production, and costs and the impacts that the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) will
have on these factors. The IRA Production Tax Credit provides a key mechanism for helping to
significantly reduce production costs of vehicle traction batteries in the near term which will help
to lower prices for consumers of ZEVs. Additionally, the Production Tax Credit is one policy
tool that will help accelerate domestic processing and production of critical minerals and
batteries, which can support more reliable supply chains for increasing volumes of ZEVs in the
years to come. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 49-50]
Despite those very important production tax credits being put in place, there is still
uncertainty estimating future technology costs. CARB supports U.S. EPA's decision not to
include the 10 percent tax credits for critical minerals production and active cathode materials
production. That decision represents a more conservative cost position which bolsters U.S.
EPA's future battery cost projections and imparts even more confidence in its future modeled
ZEV volumes as the least costly means of meeting the emission standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, pp. 49-50]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
Recent congressional actions demonstrate the federal commitment to substantial
electrification of the transportation sector. In 2021, Congress passed the Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law, which allocates $7.5 billion to building out a national network of electric vehicle chargers,
$7 billion to ensure domestic manufacturers have the critical minerals and other components
necessary to make electric vehicle batteries, and $10 billion for clean transit and school
buses. 110 In 2022, Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, which invests $52.7 billion in
America's manufacturing capacity for the semiconductors used in electric vehicles and
chargers. Ill Later in 2022, Congress passed the Inflation Reduction Act, which provides $7,500
to buyers of new electric vehicles and $4,000 to purchasers of pre-owned electric vehicles. 112
Additionally, the Inflation Reduction Act provides billions of dollars to support vehicle
manufacturers' expansion of their domestic production of clean vehicles,! 13 and billions to
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support battery production in the United States and mining and processing of critical minerals
needed for battery cells and electric motors. 114 The Inflation Reduction Act also allocates
billions to upgrade the nation's power grid in order to help address the new surge in grid demand
from electric vehicles. 115 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 18-19]
110 White House, Building a Better America: A Guidebook to the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law for State,
Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments, and Other Parties (May 2022), at 136, available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/BUILDING-A-BETTER-AMERICA-V2.pdf.;
White House, Building a Clean Energy Economy: A Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act's
Investments in Clean Energy and Climate Action (Jan. 2023) at 46, available at,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Inflation-Reduction-Act-Guidebook.pdf.
111 White House, Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act, supra n. 110, at 46.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 47.
114 Id. at 10, 26, 47.
115 Id. at 34.
Organization: Center for American Progress (CAP)
As recognized by EPA, the historic investments contained in the Infrastructure Investment
and Jobs Act (IIJA) and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) have significant implications for the
American light and medium duty fleet, accelerating an existing market shift towards electric
vehicles. While EPA's proposal takes these changes into account, CAP asserts that the baseline
trend toward electrification is even stronger than EPA's assumptions and that the proposed
standards can be significantly more ambitious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0658, pp. 2-3]
EPA appropriately recognizes that the IRA will have substantial effects on the costs of
electric vehicles and batteries, acknowledging several of the important provisions including up to
$7,500 towards the purchase of new electric vehicles, $35 per kWh for the production of battery
cells, and $10 per kWh for the production of battery modules. However, there are several
additional incentives included in the IRA that EPA should also consider. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0658, pp. 2-3]
First, EPA should account for the 10 percent electrode active materials component of the 45X
credit. Not accounting for this component of the credit significantly underestimates its value.
Electrode active materials include cathode and anode materials. Cathode material costs range
from approximately 22 to 51 percent of the total cost of a battery cell. 11 Anode and electrolyte
costs comprise another 19 percent. 12 Analysis by the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and
Deloitte finds that this component of the 45X could amount to an additional credit of $30 per
kWh. 13 This is a significant increase and EPA should account for this component of the 45X
credit in its final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0658, pp. 2-3]
11 U. S.Department of Energy, "Cobalt is the Most Expensive Material Used in Lithium-Ion Battery
Cathodes," March 7, 2022, available online: https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1228-
march-7-2022-cobalt-most-expensive-material-used-lithium-ion; Frith, James. "EV Battery Prices Risk
Reversing Downward Trend as Metals Surge," Bloomberg, September 14, 2021, available online:
https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/newsletters/2021-09-14/ev-battery-prices-risk-reversing-downward-
trend-as-meta ls-surge; IEA, "Average pack price of lithium-ion batteries and share of cathode material
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cost, 2011-2021, may, 2022, available online: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/average-pack-
price-of-lithium-ion-batteries-and-share-of-cathode-mate rial-cost-2011 -2021
12 Ibid.
13 Environmental Defense Fund, "IRA Activation Guide: Advanced Manufacturing," May 2023, available
online: https://business.edf.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/90/files/EDF-IRA-Advanced-Manufacturing-
Activation-Guide.pdf
Second, EPA should account for the 10 percent critical mineral production cost component of
the credit. This portion of the credit will likely be claimed by firms engaged in critical mineral
production and not battery manufacturers, however, the related cost savings may be passed on to
manufacturers. Analysis by EDF and Deloitte finds that this component of the credit could
amount to over $20 per kWh for lithium-ion batteries. 14 This portion of the 45X credit is also
notable because it will not phase out as the other components of the credit do between 2030 and
2032. EPA should account for the full impact of the 45X on critical mineral input costs in the
final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0658, pp. 2-3]
14 Ibid.
Third, EPA should also consider the effects of other IRA provisions, including the modified
48C Qualifying Advanced Energy Project Credit and multiple DOE loan and grant programs that
have already been influential in establishing battery production capacity. Through the IRA and
IIJA, the DOE may make up to $8.95 billion in grants to support EV, battery, and critical mineral
production as well as battery and critical mineral recycling. 15 The IRA also authorizes an
additional $3 billion for DOE's Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing (ATVM) loan
program and removes the program's $25 billion cap on total lending. 16 While the 48C credit and
these grant and loan programs are discretionary in nature, thus making outcomes for individual
companies difficult to predict, EPA should consider accounting for their effects, at least in a
conservative manner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0658, pp. 3-4]
15 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains, "Domestic
Manufacturing Conversion Grants," available online: https://www.energy.gov/mesc/domestic-
manufacturing-conversion-grants; U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply
Chains, "Battery Materials Processing Grants," available online: https://www.energy.gov/mesc/battery-
materials-processing-grants#:~:text=The%20Battery%20Materials%20Process
ing%20Grants,manufacturing%20and%20enhance%20processing%20capacity; U.S. Department of
Energy, Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains, "Battery Manufacturing and Recycling
Grants," available online: https://www.energy.gov/mesc/battery-manufacturing-and-recycling-grants; U.S.
Department of Energy, "Electric Drive Vehicle Battery Recycling and 2nd Life Apps," available online:
https://www.energy.gov/clean-energy-infrastructure/electric-drive-vehicle-battery-recycling-and-2nd-life-
apps#:~:te
xt=The%20Electric%20Drive%20Vehicle%20Battery,life%20applications%20for%20vehicle%20batteries;
U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains, "Advanced Energy
Manufacturing and Recycling Grants," available online: https://www.energy.gov/mesc/advanced-energy-
manufacturing-and-recycling-grants#:~:text=The%20Advanced%20
Energy%20Manufacturing%20and,coal%20mines%20or%20coal%20power
16 U.S. Department of Energy, Loan Programs Office, "Inflation Reduction Act of 2022," available online:
https://www.energy.gov/lpo/inflation-reduction-act-2022
Accounting for the full range of incentives is critical to accurately predicting industry and
technological trends. Analysis by EDF and WSP Global finds that 42 percent of all EV
investment announcements in the United States, by amount invested, have occurred between the
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passage of the IRA and March 10, 2023.17 Following current trends and announcements, the
U.S. is expected to be able to produce approximately 4.3 million EVs per year by 2026 which
equates to 33 percent of all U.S. new vehicle sales in 2022.18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0658,
pp. 3-4]
17 Environmental Defense Fund, "U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs," March
2023, available online: https://www.edf.org/media/report-finds-investments-us-electric-vehicle-
manufacturing-reach-120-billion- create-143000
18 Ibid.
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
D. The proposed rule overestimates the availability of Clean Vehicle Tax Credits.
The proposal also relies on the tax credits to offset the cost of new electric vehicles. The IRA
modified the electric vehicle tax credit in Section 30D of the tax code, expanding that up-to-
$7,500 credit to all "clean" vehicles while placing strict sourcing requirements on the materials
and components within clean vehicle batteries to promote domestic manufacturing and energy
security, while stabilizing supply chains for the same. To that end, the IRA established threshold
"applicable percentages" of domestically sourced critical minerals and components that must be
met to qualify for the credit. 136 Stat. 1956. This "applicable percentage" ramps up over time,
increasing from "40 percent" when the vehicle is placed in service "after the date on which the
proposed guidance ... is issued ... and before January 1, 2024," to "50 percent" in 2024, "60
percent" in 2025, "70 percent" in 2026, and "80 percent" after December 31, 2026. Id. Similarly,
the "applicable percentage" for battery components increases from "50 percent" "before January
1, 2024," to "60 percent" in 2024 and 2025, "70 percent" in 2026, "80 percent" in 2027, "90
percent" in 2028, and "100 percent" after December 31, 2028. Id. at 1957. Finally, whatever
percentage of the critical minerals or battery components that are not sourced from North
America or a free-trade partner still cannot come from a "foreign entity of concern"—which is
defined by a cross-referenced statute to include (among others) entities that are "owned,
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of' China and Russia. See 136 Stat. 1957;
42 U.S.C. § 18741(a)(5)(C); 10 U.S.C. § 4872(d)(2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 23]
Despite these restrictions, EPA estimates that a steadily increasing share of vehicles will
qualify for the credit. The proposal states that, "[f]or 2023, [the agency] estimated that an
average credit amount (across all PEV purchases) of $3,750 per vehicle could reasonably be
expected to be realized" through a combination of this credit and the Qualified Commercial
Clean Vehicles Credit (which applies for Class 2b or Class 3 vehicles). 88 Fed. Reg. 29,301.
"For later years," the agency assumes that "the attractiveness of the credits to manufacturers and
consumers would likely increase eligibility over time" and "ramped the value linearly to $6,000
by 2032." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 23-24]
This is unreasonable. The proposal does not explain how it reached these estimates or offer
any data to support them. The proposal makes no mention of the what fraction of minerals are
mined domestically and glosses over the fact that China is a key supplier of some 85% of the
global stock of critical minerals (including rare earths, copper, cobalt, etc.), Robert Bryce, The
Electric Vehicle Push Empowers China, Wall St. J. (Dec. 23, 2021), and that almost no vehicles
2033
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will be able to qualify for this credit in the near future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 23-
24]
Indeed, as of April 17, 2023, only 22 of the 68 available electric vehicle models qualify for
the light duty tax credit, and some of those only qualify for half of the tax credit because they
only meet the critical mineral or battery components standards. 14 See Tax Credits for Electric
Vehicles: The Latest from the IRS, Bradford Tax Inst. (May 2023), A more reasonable
assumption is that roughly the same share of electric vehicles will qualify—and for the same
fractional share of the credits—throughout the compliance period as currently qualify, as
domestic manufacturing and sourcing improves in step with the increasingly stringent standards.
See Figure 5. When the reduced availability of Clean Vehicle Credits is added to the
manufacturing of each of the 15 million electric vehicles needed to comply with the proposed
standards, an additional $55 billion in vehicle technology costs are added to EPA's projections.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 24]
14 Only three battery electric vehicle models qualify for the under-$55,000-MSRP credit: the Chevrolet
Bolt, Chevrolet Bolt EUV, and Tesla Model 3.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 5: Projected availability of Clean Vehicle Credits.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 24]
Organization: Electric Drive Transportation Association (EDTA)
The speed of the transition to e-mobility will also be materially impacted by the coherence of
the policy landscape. For instance, consistent and rapid market growth means expanding
consumer interest and confidence, which will require accessible incentives for vehicles and
infrastructure. However, material elements of the IRA's incentives are awaiting final
interpretation. Federal investment in innovation, as well as infrastructure deployment, also needs
to be consistent and coherent to support a rapid transition to e-mobility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0589, p. 2]
Organization: Energy Innovation
We agree with the EPA that the passage of the BIL and IRA represent significant "support for
investment in expanding the manufacture, sale, and use of zero-emission vehicles by addressing
elements critical to the advancement of clean transportation and clean electricity generation in
ways that will facilitate and accelerate the development, production and adoption of zero-
emission technology during the time frame of the rule."20 Our modeling supports these findings.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 8]
20 U.S. EPA, 29195.
In a January 2023 study by the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) and
Energy Innovation, Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act on Electric Vehicle
Uptake in the U.S. (ICCT-EI Study), we examined the IRA's impact on the sale of new EVs in
the LDV and HDV sectors in the U.S. through 2035. We used a customized Excel model based
on Energy Innovation's U.S. EPS, using updated data on vehicle costs, battery pack estimates,
efficiencies, charging behavior, future fuel prices, and state adoption of Advanced Clean Cars II
(ACC II)[vi] rules and Advanced Clean Truck (ACT)21 rules. We have attached the full study
with our comments, [vii] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 8]
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vi California's ACC II rule requires that by 2035, all new passenger cars, trucks, and SUVs sold in
California must be zero-emission vehicles, from MY 2026 through MY 2035. It relies on currently
available advanced vehicle technologies, including battery-electric, hydrogen fuel cell electric, and plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles, to meet air quality and climate change emissions standards. See
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii for more
information.
21 "Advanced Clean Trucks," California Air Resources Board, accessed June 28, 2023,
https://ww2.arb. ca.gov/ourwork/programs/advanced-clean-trucks.
vii The EPA included the ICCT-EI study on the regulations.gov website as part of the supporting and
related material for the docket, but the content was marked as restricted due to copyright reasons. We
believe this was an error. The study is not restricted and is publicly available at
https://theicct.org/publication/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23/. The report is also included as an attachment to
these comments.
We evaluated three IRA scenarios: Low, Moderate, and High, with different assumptions for
each scenario to reflect how certain provisions of the IRA (the Personal Tax Credits for Clean
Passenger Vehicles (30D), the Commercial Vehicle Tax Credits (45W), and the Advanced
Manufacturing Production Tax Credit (45X)) are implemented and the value of incentives passed
on to consumers. We compared these scenarios to a Baseline without the IRA and with just
California adopting ACC II and ACT. For LDVs, we modeled different scenarios to reflect the
impact of California-only adoption of ACC II and increased state adoption of ACC II. Our
results do not evaluate the impact of federal GHG standards for model years 2027 and beyond.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 8]
As shown in Figure 4, we found that the IRA will accelerate electrification in both the light-
duty and heavy-duty sectors. For light-duty, we find a range of 48 to 61 percent EV sales[viii]
share by 2030, increasing to 56 to 67 percent by 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 9-
11]
viii: In our study, we use the term "EV" for new light-duty BEVs and plug-in hybrid vehicles. Used EVs
are not included in the analysis.
[See original attachment for line graph "Light-duty vehicles"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, pp. 9-11]
Figure 4. Baseline, Low, Moderate, and High projections of EV sales share for LDVs,
considering ACC II adoption in only California versus increased states, 2023-2035. Source:
Slowik, Peter, et al., Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act on Electric Vehicle
Uptake in the United States (ICCT-EI Study) (ICCT and Energy Innovation, January 2023),
available at: https://theicct.org/wp- content/uploads/2023/01/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23.pdf. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 9-11]
Given that the proposed rule applies to vehicles that will be manufactured starting in 2027, we
expect more vehicles to qualify for the full 30D incentive, and we also anticipate more supply
chain operations will be in place to serve increased demand for EVs that meet the new IRA
incentive requirements. As of June 2023, private investment commitments for new EV and
battery facilities in the U.S. have already reached nearly $150 Billion.22 These new investments
will create jobs, economic development, and support a stronger domestic supply chain for BEVs
for decades to come. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 9-11]
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22 The White House, "Investing in America," President Joe Biden Investing in America, n.d.,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/invest/.
Similarly, BloombergNEF updated forecast to its account for the IRA's positive impact on the
EV market. Its September 2022 outlook shows an increase in sales shares of EVs from 43
percent of new sales pre-IRA to 52 percent of new sales in 2030 post-IRA.23 See Figure 5.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 9-11]
23 Ira Boudway, "More Than Half of US Car Sales Will Be Electric by 2030," Bloomberg.com, September
20, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/articles/2022-09-20/more-than-half-of-us-car-sales-will-be-
electric-by-2030.9
[See original attachment for line graph "Smashing the Pedal"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, pp. 9-11]
Figure 5. Share of U.S. passenger vehicle sales, pre- and post-IRA. Source: BloombergNEF
via Ira Boudway, "More Than Half of US Car Sales Will Be Electric by 2030" (Bloomberg,
September 2022), available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09- 20/more-
than-half-of-us-car-sales-will-be-electric-by-2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 9-11]
As shown in Figure 6, taken from the ICCT-EI Study, we expect BEVs to make up the
majority of new sales, whereas plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEVs) constitute a small percentage of
vehicles in all scenarios. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 9-11]
[See original attachment for table described below] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 9-
11]
Figure 6. Projected EV sales shares for LDVs nationwide, 2022-2035, according to each
modeled scenario. Source: ICCT-EI Study. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 9-11]
Both the ICCT-EI study findings and BloombergNEF analysis are in line with the projections
of BEV sales shares in EPA's analysis, as shown in tables 80 and 81 below from the proposed
rule.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 9-11]
24 U.S. EPA, "Proposed Rules," May 5, 2023, 29329.
[See original attachment for Tables 80 and 81] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 9-11]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
D. Congressional support will increase ZEV deployment and cost-competitiveness.
In addition to highlighting the investments from the BIL (explored in further detail later in
these comments), EPA rightly points to the historic funding from the IRA as building on and
supporting EPA's efforts to regulate tailpipe emissions from vehicles:
Congress passed the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) in 2021, and the Inflation Reduction
Act (IRA) in 2022, which together provide further support for a government-wide approach to
reducing emissions by providing significant funding and support for air pollution and GHG
reductions across the economy, including specifically, for the component technology and
infrastructure for the manufacture, sales, and use of electric vehicles.262 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 103]
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262 88 Fed. Reg. at 29187.
Together, these legislative measures represent significant congressional support for
accelerating the deployment of and market for ZEV technologies. First, the BIL and IRA provide
an unprecedented level of investment (over $430 billion) in ZEV infrastructure, technology, and
supply chains, through a variety of key tax provisions, manufacturing investments, grants,
rebates, loans, and other investment mechanisms.263 BIL and IRA programs will, among other
things, provide both direct grants and tax credits to lower acquisition costs of vehicles and
increase the range of cost-effective applications,264 help entities conduct planning for fleet
electrification,265 enable deployment of charging and hydrogen fueling infrastructure,266 and
facilitate advances in technology that can lower future vehicle costs. These programs also invest
in vehicle and battery manufacturing and recycling, driving cost reductions and increasing
domestic supply. EPA should accordingly ensure that these important laws are reflected in its
estimate of baseline LD ZEV market penetration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 104]
263 U.S. DOE Office of Policy, The IRA Drives Significant Emission Reductions and Positions America to
Reach Our Climate Goals, DOE/OP-0018 (August 2022), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
08/8.18%20InflationReductionAct_Factsheet_Final.pdf.
264 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7432 (appropriating $1 billion to EPA to create a program that awards grants and
rebates for the costs of replacing existing class 6 and 7 HDVs with ZEVs, purchasing, installing, operating,
and maintaining infrastructure needed for ZEVs, associated workforce development and training, and
planning and technical activities needed to support the deployment of ZEV); 26 U.S.C. § 45W (providing
up to $40,000 in tax credits to assist with vehicle replacements and reduce the effective cost of commercial
ZEVs).
265 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7432.
266 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 30C (providing tax credits to qualified alternative fuel vehicle property); 42
U.S.C. § 16161a (providing $8 billion to DOE to fund regional hydrogen hubs across the country); 23
U.S.C. § 151 (appropriating $2.5 billion to support the build-out of clean charging and fueling
infrastructure projects along designated alternative fuel corridors of the National Highway System).
These federal incentives are a key market enabler and will help drivers (and commercial
L/MD fleets) adopt advanced clean transportation technologies (like ZEVs) that lower operating
costs and reduce emissions. Manufacturers also stand to reap significant benefits, as several key
tax credits are expected to add up to provide robust support of ZEV production. Passing those
savings on to consumers could drive down the cost of new ZEVs and spur sales.267 For
example, Tesla alone could qualify for $1 billion in tax credits this year, while its Giga Nevada
plant could gain up to $17.5 billion in credits for its projected annual production rate of 500
gigawatt hours.268 Ford and General Motors also stated that they could reap significant benefits
as a result of IRA investments. Ford expects $7 billion in tax credits over the next three years
and GM could gain $300 million in 2023.269 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 104]
267 Tom Taylor & Noah Gabriel, The EV Transition: Key Market and Supply Chain Enablers, Atlas Public
Policy (Nov. 2022), https://atlaspolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/2022-EV-Transition-Key-Market-
and-Supply-Chain-Enablers.pdf.
268 JoannMuller, Biden's EV Surprise, Axios (Feb. 1, 2023) https://www.axios.eom/2023/02/01/electric-
car-ev-tax-incentives-biden.
269 Muller, Biden's EV Surprise.
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Second, the congressional investments from the IRA and BIL further the public health goals
of the Clean Air Act and of this rulemaking: the reduction of harmful pollution from light- and
medium-duty vehicles. A preliminary assessment conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) found that the IRA, in combination with other enacted policies and past actions, will help
drive 2030 economy-wide GHG emissions down to 40% below 2005 levels and move the United
States towards its overall 2030 target of achieving a 50 to 52% reduction in GHG emissions
below 2005 levels.270 DOE also noted that the impacts of these congressional investments can
be further amplified and accelerated when paired with ambitious and consistent executive
branch, state, local, and private sector actions to reduce transportation sector emissions and to
make large-scale investments in PEV manufacturing and battery supply chains.271 These
investments are key factors driving industry developments in ZEVs and reducing manufacturing
costs, in turn helping make compliance (with the stringency levels in Alternative 1) through
enhanced ZEV deployment even more feasible and cost-effective for manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 104-105]
270 U.S. DOE Office of Policy, The IRA Drives Significant Emission Reductions.
271 U.S. DOE Office of Policy, The IRA Drives Significant Emission Reductions.
Third, congressional funding will prompt and support private sector investment. An analysis
by Atlas Public Policy explains that the combination of a strong regulatory environment (like
EPA's vehicle standards help provide) along with congressional investments has and will
continue to encourage substantial private sector investment in ZEVs, and finds that the U.S. is on
track to reach $210 billion in economic commitments by automakers and battery manufacturers
by 2030.272 Clear regulatory signals - like EPA's vehicle emissions regulations - can create
further confidence in the private sector to accelerate and expand investments and help ensure
companies follow through on their ZEV commitments. In the Proposal, EPA highlights several
IRA clean vehicles provisions that will help bolster ZEV deployment, drive down costs, and
facilitate compliance with strong standards. These include the clean vehicles tax credit (§ 30D),
the previously owned clean vehicle tax credit (§ 25E), the commercial clean vehicle tax credit (§
45W), and the advanced manufacturing production credit (§ 45X). The § 45X credit is
anticipated to be the most lucrative program for automakers, offering a tax credit of $35 per
kilowatt-hour for each domestically made battery cell, which could slice manufacturer
production costs by a third. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 105]
272 Gabriel, $210 Billion of Annouced Investments.
Fourth, a number of other congressional investments can be leveraged to address timelines for
deploying ZEVs, human capital issues, potential supply chain constraints, consumer demand,
and workforce development issues. For example, the IRA provided $500 million for the
enhanced use of the Defense Production Act (DP A) - which President Biden recently invoked to
support critical minerals production - on top of the funds made available for the DPA through
the normal appropriations process.273 This provision will support domestic mineral supply
chains for large-capacity batteries, including those used in PEVs, and is intended to help increase
productivity, workforce safety, and sustainability in the various steps of the critical minerals
lifecycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 105-106]
273 The White House, Building a Clean Energy Economy: A Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act's
Investments in Clean Energy and Climate Action. (2023). https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/12/Inflation-Reduction-Act-Guidebook.pdf
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Additionally, the CHIPS and Science Act will strengthen American manufacturing, supply
chains, and national security, and will invest in research and development, science and
technology, and the workforce of the future to position the U.S. as a leader in clean
transportation.274 This law is further complemented by other congressional investments like the
IRA's Advanced Energy Project Credit (§ 48C), which provides a $10 billion investment to
expand clean manufacturing and recycling (including critical minerals refining, processing and
recycling) and to address technology supply chain gaps. Manufacturers and other private parties
are more likely to fully leverage these and other congressional investments if strong regulatory
signals are in place, as would be the case under any policy scenarios that are at least as stringent
as Alternative 1. This too helps bolster EPA's conclusion of feasibility for the standards outlined
in Alternative 1 and in EPA's main Proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 106]
274 The White House. "CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains,
and Counter China." press release, August 9, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lo wer-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-
chains-and-counter-china/.
Lastly, EPA's Proposal references a number of studies that look at the effect congressional
investments (especially the IRA) have on ZEV penetration levels. These studies include reports
from ICCT, BloombergNEF,275 IHS Markit,276 and others that suggest that even before the
IRA, the U.S. was on track to reach as much as 50% new ZEV sales by 2030 due to a range of
preexisting policies and market forces. When adjusted for the effects of the IRA, ZEV
penetration levels are expected to increase to as much as 61% of sales in 2030, increasing to as
much as 67% of new sales by 2032, per ICCT's analysis.277 These studies further support the
feasibility of a final rule at least as stringent as Alternative 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
p. 106]
275 Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022: Long term outlook
economic transition scenario.
276 IHS Markit, US EPA Proposed Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Years 2023-2026;
What to Expect (Aug. 9, 2021), https://www.spglobal.com/mobility/en/research-analysis/us-epa-proposed-
greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards-my2 023-26.html. The table indicates 32.3% BEVs and combined
39.7% BEV, PHEV, and range-extended electric vehicle (REX) in 2030.
277 Peter Slowik et. al., Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act on Electric Vehicle Uptake in
the U.S., ICCT (Jan. 2023), https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23.pdf [
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
i. ZEV costs are rapidly declining.
The costs of batteries and ZEVs have declined significantly over the last few years. Recent
analyses project that costs will continue to decline, even when IRA investments are not
considered. The decline has been dramatically accelerated by the IRA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 16-17]
The IRA provides $369 billion in investments to help achieve a 40 percent nation-wide
reduction of carbon emissions by 2030.36 The IRA significantly reduces the upfront cost of
ZEVs by offering consumers $7,500 in tax credits for new light-duty EVs and $4,000 for used
EVs.37 In addition, the IRA provides $3 billion to the Department of Energy's Advanced
Technology Vehicle Manufacturing Loan Program for loans to manufacture clean vehicles and
2039
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their components in the United States, $2 billion to the Department of Energy for Domestic
Manufacturing Conversion Grants, which will fund manufacturers' retooling of production lines
for clean vehicles, and $40 billion in loan authority supported by $3.6 billion in credit subsidy
for innovative clean energy technologies, including critical minerals processing, manufacturing,
and recycling, all of which will drive down the costs of batteries and EV manufacturing.38,39 In
addition, the IRA will distribute $500 million to accelerate domestic manufacturing of clean
energy technologies and components,40 $2 billion for auto manufacturing facility conversion,41
and $3 billion in loans to build out the domestic clean vehicle manufacturing network,42 all of
which will drive down the costs of batteries and EV manufacturing. EDF and WSP found that
over $120 billion in private EV supply ecosystem investments and 143,000 new jobs have been
announced in the last eight years and nearly $50 billion of that, representing 42 percent of all
announced EV investments, has occurred since the passage of the IRA. 43 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 16-17]
36 White House, "Building a Clean Energy Economy: A Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act's
Investments in Clean Energy and Climate Action," January 2023, Version 2.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp- content/uploads/2022/12/Inflation-Reduction-Act-Guidebook.pdf U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Annoucnes Guidance on Inflation Reduction Act's Strong Labor
Protections, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-
releases/jyll28#:~:text=The%20Inflation%20Reduction%20Act%20is,build%20a%20clean%20energy%2
Oeconomy.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 EDF, U.S. Reaches Another Clean Transportation Milestone with New Treasury Department Guidelines
for Electric Vehicle Tax Credits (Mar. 31, 2023), https://www.edf.org/media/us-reaches-another-clean-
transportation- milestone-new-treasury-department-guidelines-electric.
40 Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Section 30001.
41 Department of Energy, Domestic Manufacturing Conversion Grants,
https://www.energy.gov/mesc/domestic- manufacturing-conversion-grants.
42 Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Section 50142(a).
43 U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs, Characterizing the Impacts of the Inflation
Reduction Act after 6 Months, WSP for EDF, (March 2023),
https://blogs.edf.org/climate41 l/files/2023/03/State-Electric- Vehicle-Policy-Landscape.pdf
1. Independent analyses commissioned by EDF show rapidly declining ZEV costs.
A May 2023 study by Roush for EDF assessed and quantified, where possible,44 the key
impacts of the IRA on the cost of electrifying MY 2025 and 2030 light-duty vehicles, using costs
from a previous Roush study45 as a baseline. Both studies analyzed six subclasses of light-duty
vehicles—compact cars, midsize cars, small SUVs, midsize SUVs, large SUVs, and pickup
trucks—under two segments: base (non-performance) and premium (performance). With the
exception of large SUVs and pickups, BEV200s were assumed to be a viable alternative to base
model gasoline vehicles and BEV300s a comparable substitute for premium model gasoline
vehicles. For large SUVs and pickups, the analysis assumes BEV300s as an alternative to base
gasoline model, and BEV400s as a comparable substitute for premium gasoline models. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 17-20]
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44 Roush for EDF, Saxena, S. Pillai, "Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 on Light-Duty Vehicle
Electrification Costs forMYs 2025 and 2030" (2023) https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-
05ZImpact_IRA_LDV_Electrification_Costs_for_MYs_2025_and_2030_Roush.pdf (Attachment N).
45 Himanshu Saxena, Vishnu Nair, Sajit Pillai, "Electrification Cost Evaluation of Light-Duty Vehicles for
MY 2030,"(2023) Roush for EDF, https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-
05/Electrification_Cost_Evaluation_of_LDVs_for_MY2030_Roush.pdf (Attachment O).
Roush's May 2023 study concluded that IRA vehicle and charger credits enable the purchase
price of BEVs to be equal to or less than an equivalent gasoline vehicle in both MYs 2025 and
2030 for compact cars, midsize cars, small SUVs, and midsize SUVs, in both base and premium
segments.46 As shown in Table 2, which applies IRA vehicle tax credits, purchasers of some
subclasses will see savings of more than $7,000 over an equivalent gasoline vehicle in 2025.
With the IRA credits, large SUVs and pickup trucks will achieve purchase price parity by MY
2030. The analysis shows that these credits will help lower the purchase prices of BEVs faced by
consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 17-20]
46 Roush, Saxena, S. Pillai, "Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 on Light-Duty Vehicle
Electrification Costs forMYs 2025 and 2030" (2023) https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-
05ZImpact_IRA_LDV_Electrification_Costs_for_MYs_2025_and_2030_Roush.pdf
[See original attachment for Table 2: Upfront savings of BEV over gasoline vehicle in 2025
and 2030 purchase timeframes] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 17-20]
Source: Roush, Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 on Light-Duty Vehicle
Electrification Costs forMYs 2025 and 2030 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 17-20]
Note: Positive numbers represent BEV upfront savings compared to combustion vehicles and
negative numbers represent an upfront increase in price [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp.
17-20]
The IRA will also result in an estimated 30 percent reduction in charger-unit costs for all
consumers. The consumer will save $300 on a $1,000 Level 2, 11.5 kW charger and the
affordability and savings associated with the purchase price and charger unit price improve
significantly overtime. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 17-20]
Organization: Greg Dotson
It is already apparent that Congress' effort to encourage electric vehicles through incentives in
the IRA has been successful. According to one analysis, the automobile industry has invested
more than $120 billion in electric vehicle manufacturing in the U.S. 123 Moreover, Congress has
increased these incentives even while preserving and ratifying EPA's Clean Air Act authority to
require further reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources. 124 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0685, p. 20]
123 Environmental Defense Fund, Report Finds Investments in U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Reach
$120 Billion, Create 143,000 New Jobs, Mar. 14, 2023, https://www.edf.org/media/report-finds-
investments-us-electric- vehicle-manufacturing-reach-120-billion-create-143000 (finding that more than 40
percent of these investments were announced in the six months after passage of the IRA).
124 For a discussion of how Congress ratified the Clean Air Act's regulatory structure for mobile source
greenhouse gas reductions in the Inflation Reduction Act, see Dotson, Greg and Maghamfar, Dustin, The
Clean Air Act Amendments of 2022: Clean Air, Climate Change, and the Inflation Reduction Act (January
2041
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1, 2023). Environmental Law Reporter, Vol. 53, No. 10017, 2023, Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4338903.
Organization: Hyundai Motor America
The NPRM's No Action Case is Overly Optimistic.
We encourage EPA to revisit the proposed No Action case. As a baseline-setting scenario, it
fundamentally impacts the alternatives under the agency's consideration for a proposed rule. In
this case, the No Action case's assumptions create a rosier picture than reality. The NPRM
assumes 54 percent BEV penetration in MY 2032, adjusted upward from 39 percent based on the
sensitivity analysis that accounts for impact of state adoption of California's Advanced Clean
Cars II Zero Emission Vehicle regulation ("ACC IIZEV Regulation"). The NPRM also lauds the
Inflation Reduction Act's ("IRA") consumer tax incentive ("30D tax credit") and assumes the
30D tax credit will generate unprecedented consumer EV acceptance thereby enabling the
Proposed Alternative's BEV penetration requirements. Data suggests consumers are more likely
to purchase EVs with the availability of tax incentives. 5 A majority of Consumer Reports 2022
survey respondents indicated that the most impactful EV tax incentive is a rebate applied at point
of sale followed by 45% of respondents identifying tax credits such as the 30D tax credit. Id.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 3]
5 "Battery Electric Vehicles and Low Carbon Fuel: A Nationally Representative Multi-Mode Survey,"
Consumer Reports, Page 7, April 2022.
Yet, predictable headwinds caused by federal and state policies are insufficiently
contemplated by the No Action case. Before the enactment of the IRA, 72 BEVs and PHEVs
were eligible for the predecessor 30D tax credit of $7,500 compared to five models that were
ineligible.6 As of March 2023, there are 76,7 plug-in electric vehicles ("PEV") and FCEV,8
light-duty models offered for sale in the U.S. market. The IRS guidance on the IRA's battery
component and critical mineral sourcing requirements effective on April 18, 2023,9 qualified just
17 of these vehicle models for the 30D tax credit's full amount of $7,500.10 It is uncertain when
more vehicle models will become fully eligible, particularly as industry awaits key IRS guidance
on the IRA's Foreign Entities of Concern ("FEOC") provisions. FEOC guidance has the
potential to eliminate all vehicles from 30D tax credit eligibility in the short and medium term,
which could chill EV sales leading up to and during the first few years of the Proposed Rule's
timeframe as automakers shift their supply chains to non- FEOC controlled suppliers and shift
EV manufacturing operations to North America. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 3]
6 "What New Tax Credit Rules Will Mean If You're Shopping for an EV," Car And Driver, 11/13/22.
7 evadoption.com, 40 BEV and 33 PHEV Models Currently Available in the US, 3/3/23.
8 FCEV Models: Hyundai NEXO, Toyota Mirai, Honda Clarity, 3/3/23.
9 FS-2023-08, IRS Fact Sheet, March 2023.
10 "Here's every electric vehicle that currently qualifies for the US federal tax credit," Electrek, 6/7/23.
The IRA Significantly Reduces Availability of the 30D Tax Credit and May Inhibit EV
Purchases during the Proposed Alternative's Term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, pp. 5-6]
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The NPRM's cost assumptions include the benefits purportedly conferred by 30D tax credit
and the IRA's Credit for Qualified Commercial Clean Vehicles ("45W tax credit"). 15 The
NPRM indicates that an estimated average 30D tax credit of $3,750 can be claimed by the
purchaser in 2023.16 However, as stated above and more fully explained here, less than one
quarter of current EVs are currently eligible for at least $3,750 under the 30D tax credit. The
30D tax credit is constrained by the IRA's strict requirements on final assembly in North
America and battery and critical mineral sourcing requirements. For example, effective April 18,
2023,17 the battery must contain a minimum of 40 percent (doubling to 80 percent or more by
2027) critical minerals extracted or processed in the U.S. or in a country of which the U.S. has a
free trade agreement ("FTA"), or from materials recycled in North America. Similar battery
manufacturing requirements are also in place: at least 50 percent (doubling by 2029) of
components must be manufactured or assembled in North America and must not come from a
FEOC. Further complicating the matter is the fact that while sourcing from a FEOC is
prohibited, industry still awaits guidance on this term. Once released, the scope of the FEOC
guidance could curtail even partial access to the 30D tax credit for an unknown period of time.
Although the 45W tax credit may provide a boost, the market demand for EV leases dropped
significantly from 26 to 12.5 percent in CY 2022.18 Generally, leases do not account for a
majority of transactions and therefore, due to the unprecedented nature of the 45 W tax credit, it
is difficult to forecast whether EV lease rates will jump significantly to offset the unavailability
of the 30D tax credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, pp. 5-6]
15 26 U.S.C. §45W.
16 88 Fed. Reg. 29,184 (May 5, 2023). EPA NPRM, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years
2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, Section IV(C)(2).
17 88 Fed. Reg. 23370 (April 17, 2023). IRS Critical Mineral and Battery Component Guidance.
18 Zabritski, M. Auto Finance Year-In-Review Electric Vehicles & Affordability, January 2023. Online
slide presentation available at http://www.experian.com/content/dam/marketing/na/automotive/pr-
folder/experian-automotive-2022-yir-evs-affordability.pdf.
We request that EPA conduct additional analysis to more accurately capture cost impacts
resulting from the IRA's critical minerals requirements and the likely unavailability of full tax
credits for the near term. For example, Benchmark Mineral Intelligence has determined a one (1)
TWh shortfall in domestic supply by 2032.19 Assuming a 30-40 GWh battery capacity for one
plant,20 25 to 30 battery plants will need to be constructed in order to supply the level of critical
minerals needed to meet the estimated BEV penetration rates required by the Proposed
Alternative. In addition, it takes between 5 to 15 years to build one new mining operation.21
China is the only region which will have excess manufacturing to fill the gap.22 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 6]
19 Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, Report for: Alliance for Automotive Innovation U.S. Electric Vehicle
Feasibility Study, page 1.
20 EPA NPRM, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis Report, Figure 2-20, page 2-46.
21 Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, Report for: Alliance for Automotive Innovation U.S. Electric Vehicle
Feasibility Study, page 45.
22 Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, Report for: Alliance for Automotive Innovation U.S. Electric Vehicle
Feasibility Study, page 4.
2043
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This will leave many consumers unable to receive the full tax credit, or with little choice on
what vehicles they can purchase in order to take advantage of it. In addition, high demand for
critical mineral and battery components are expected to spike EV production costs, impacting
affordability likely through the IRA's statutory life. Again, the uncertainty of the FEOC
provision is not yet priced into the vehicle cost. The IRA's statutory language strongly suggests
industry must move all battery component and critical mineral contracts away from their current
primary country of origin - primarily China, which is expressly listed as a FEOC - to non-FEOC
controlled suppliers without the same capabilities. It will take time to robustly develop these
operations outside of FEOCs. IRA costs to both consumers and automakers, including the near
and long term cost of uncertainty, are significant and we urge the EPA to better understand and
assess them. Hyundai supports a confidential EPA survey through AFAI to aggregate industry
data that would help accurately assess this impact. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 6]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 will accelerate electric vehicle sales in the United
States across all vehicle types. The $370 billion allocated to climate and clean energy
investments dramatically expands tax credits and incentives to deploy more clean vehicles,
including commercial vehicles, while supporting a domestic EV supply chain and charging
infrastructure buildout. IRA transportation sector provisions will accelerate the shift to zero-
emission vehicles by combining consumer and manufacturing policies. Consumer tax credits for
new and used EVs and tax credits for commercial EVs, along with individual and commercial
charging infrastructure tax credits, will increase sales. Domestic supply chain incentives and
investments will boost EV manufacturing and battery production. Critical mineral mining and
refining incentives will bolster industrial development. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 6-
7]
Organization: International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW)
Short of including safeguards in the proposed standards to support the domestic auto
manufacturing base, the EPA expects minimal incentive for manufacturers to shift to foreign
production as a result of the rule. 13 However, in its analysis, we are concerned the EPA
overvalues the incentives available to domestic manufacturers to produce vehicles and
components domestically. 14 The new 30D Clean Vehicle Credit for the purchase of light-duty
EVs includes domestic assembly and domestic content requirements, however they are not
stringent enough to prevent the credit from applying to vehicles produced by automakers who
have shifted production to Mexico and Canada. And the 45W Commercial Clean Vehicle "lease
loophole" provides up to $7,500 for light-duty BEVs and PHEVs without any domestic or
regional sourcing requirements on final assembly, battery component, or critical mineral content.
The industry has already seen a significant increase in BEV leasing, as automakers shift sales
strategies to take advantage of the loophole. 15 Thus, federal incentives may serve as a potential
inducement for the further offshoring of manufacturing job or may merely dissuade original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) from onshoring more of these jobs. Since November 2022, the
import of goods generally, and of automotive vehicles and parts in particular, has increased as
more goods arrive from Mexico and Canada. 16 For this reason, these federal investments should
not prima facie be expected to support the domestic build-out of the EV supply chain. Targeted
2044
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safeguards are necessary to ensure the proposed standards support the domestic production of
vehicles and components, instead of encouraging a shift to foreign production. We encourage the
EPA to implement standards that strengthen the domestic auto manufacturing supply chain and
require the EV transition to provide the same level of investment and quality jobs as the current
ICE footprint. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 6-7]
13 See id. at 29313 ("It is also our assessment that widespread automotive electrification in the U.S. will
not lead to a critical long-term dependence on foreign imports of minerals or components").
14 See id. at 29187 ("Congress passed the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) in 2021, and the Inflation
Reduction Act (IRA) in 2022, which together provide further support for a government-wide approach to
reducing emissions by providing significant funding and support for air pollution and GHG reductions
across the economy, including specifically, for the component technology and infrastructure for the
manufacture, sales, and use of electric vehicles").
15 CNBC. May 15, 2023. "Automakers Find a Tax Credit Loophole to Increase EV Leasing and Boost
Sales": https://www.cnbc.com/2023/05/13/electric-vehicles-inflation-reduction-act-tax-credit-loophole-
boosts- leasing.html.
16 Austen Hufford and Anthony DeBarros, "China's Share of U.S. Goods Imports Falls to Lowest Since
2006", (The Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2023), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-imported-more-cars-
phones-supplies-from- abroad-9157aca6.
Organization: Jaguar Land Rover NA, LLC (JLR)
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) Clean Vehicle Tax Credits
Prior to the publication of the IRA last year, our vehicles qualified for the 30D Clean Vehicle
Credit. The changing incentive landscape has adversely affected Jaguar Land Rover, with our
manufacturing facilities located outside the US, we are now ineligible for the amended 30D
credit. Due to the positioning of our vehicles and our customer demographics as a premium
luxury vehicle manufacturer, the income and MSRP pre-requisites for the 30D credit also
exclude us from claiming. We are fortunately eligible to claim the 45W Commercial Clean
Vehicle Credit and we are pursuing this opportunity to potentially benefit our customers. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 9-10]
JLR challenges the assumption made by EPA that: "While the restrictions imposed by the
IRA on the 30D credit (income, MSRP, critical mineral content, and manufacturing content)
limit the vehicles which are eligible for the full $7,500 incentive under 30D, we believe that
manufacturers will work to increase the number of vehicles that qualify over time due to the high
marketing value of the credit." Despite the work that manufacturers carry out, factors relating to
the critical mineral and battery component requirements are largely out of their control. For
example, currently 65% of battery cells and almost 80% of cathodes are manufactured in
China. 15 Until the US develops a robust battery manufacturing industry, it cannot be guaranteed
that a high percentage of the fleet will be able to claim. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 9-
10]
15 IEA (2023), Global EV Outlook 2023, IEA, Paris Trends in batteries -
https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook- 2023/trends-in-batteries License: CC BY 4.0
We suggest that EPA incorporate the following into the final rule analysis and the monitoring
reports mentioned previously to ensure that the portion of BEV sales eligible for credit under
30D in OMEGA is appropriate.
2045
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Industry fleet GWh of cell and battery capacity eligible
Industry fleet battery minerals extraction eligible
Number of IRS eligible vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 9-10]
JLR requests that EPA amends the central case compliance model to reflect a more accurate
and realistic credit utilization of the IRA credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 9-10]
We disagree with the assumptions made by EPA referencing the 45X Advanced
Manufacturing Production Tax Credit. In the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA), EPA
stated, "Although a large percentage of 2023 U.S. BEV battery and cell manufacturing is
represented by the production of one OEM, we believe that the many large U.S. battery
production facilities that are being actively developed by suppliers and other OEMs... will allow
benefit of the credit to be accessible to all manufacturers by 2027." This statement is highly
unlikely, in JLR's case, our vehicles and batteries are produced outside of the US therefore we
are ineligible for the credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 10-11]
Market Comparison
Current and forecast electrification trends show that the US is behind other markets such as
the EU, China and Canada. Despite great advancements recently with policies such as the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the Inflation Reduction Act, the effects of these policies will
take time to realize. The Global EV Outlook 2023 from the IEA expects the US to reach the
government target of 50% ZEV in 2030.6 Based on this forecast, it would seem that EPA's
proposal is too optimistic and leaves no room for error. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 5]
6 IEA (2023), Global EV Outlook 2023, IEA, Paris, Prospects for electric vehicle deployment -
https://www.iea.org/reports/global- ev-outlook-2023/prospects-for-electric-vehicle-deployment License:
CC BY 4.0
Organization: John Graham
A major bias introduced into the cost of future BEVs is the vehicle tax credits from the
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Inclusion of the vehicle incentives would be appropriate if the
incentives continued indefinitely, but they end after 2032. Thus, while the vehicle tax credits will
certainly influence manufacturer decisions in the early stages of the standards, manufacturers
will anticipate the end of the program in 2032 and will make decisions on how to comply in 2032
(and beyond) that do not include the IRA vehicle tax credits. HEVs may look like a better long-
run investment. The Final Rule should reflect this consideration and address in 2032 the reality
of complying without the IRA vehicle tax credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 22]
Organization: Kia Corporation
EPA's Analysis of Supporting Government Policies is Extremely Optimistic
EPA over-estimates the utility of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJ A) and
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) that have started but are nowhere near complete. And we certainly
cannot tell yet if these programs will be successful. Kia is also hopeful that the IIJA and IRA
clean vehicle tax credit can help expedite the sales of EVs, but EPA justifies its proposal with
overly optimistic forecasts about these programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 6]
2046
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As an example, EPA forecasts that the average IRA clean vehicle credit amount (30D) will be
$6000 across all EV purchases by 2032.11 Currently, there are 91 ZEVs available to purchase
but only ten vehicles qualified for the tax credits in February 2023. The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) proposed rules released in March 2023 further decreased the vehicles eligible and will
continue to decrease the vehicles eligible, at least in the short-term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0555, p. 6]
1188 Fed. Reg. 29,201.
There are several actions that will greatly reduce the number of eligible vehicles. Each year,
larger percentages of critical minerals and battery components are required to be sourced outside
China. The Foreign Entities of Concern (FEOC) definition and requirements will start in 2024,
which will greatly impact the eligibility of vehicles over the lifetime of the program, yet has not
been defined. The FEOC is a blind spot for how automakers need to invest and source their
materials. Outside of 30D, 45W is forecast to supplement incentives to consumers for vehicles
ineligible for 30D. Currently, leases do not account for a majority of vehicle transactions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 6-7]
Therefore, it is unlikely the 45W leasing tax credit will fully offset the unavailability of the
30D tax credit, as assumed in the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 6-7]
Importantly, we do not yet know the ability or impact (cost or otherwise) of sourcing EV
batteries outside of China and in North America and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) countries.
Given the limited supply of critical minerals in FTA countries, the future growth of EVs will be
reliant on IRA ineligible sources. This will stunt the growth of the EV market. EPA's optimistic
assumptions on the IRA skews the predicted cost of EVs in the future, and, consequently, results
in underestimating the future price disparity between EVs and ICEs.12 This will have significant
consequences to the vehicle industry and our investments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp.
6-7]
12 Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, U.S. Electric Vehicle Feasibility Study, Report for Alliance for
Automotive Innovation (Quarter 1, 2023).
Organization: Lisa Allee
[From Hearing Testimony, May 9, 2023] And lastly money, you talk about incentives to car
companies, please consider getting incentives directly to consumers so that consumers can afford
to buy electrical and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles because if you give the money to the car
companies, doesn't necessarily pass onto the consumers, you give the money to the consumers,
they buy the cars, the car companies make money, we all win. [From Hearing Testimony, EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5115, Day 1]
Organization: Mayor Becky Daggett, City of Flagstaff, Arizona et al.
Throughout the rulemaking process, EPA should also recognize and consider investments
from the recently enacted Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and Inflation Reduction
Act (IRA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, pp. 1-2]
Together, these two laws are expected to reduce adoption costs for ZEVs by providing at least
$245 billion in federal funds—through tax credits, loans, and grants—to support ZEV charging
2047
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infrastructure, manufacturing, and purchasing. Long-term regulatory certainty will push domestic
manufacturers to take full advantage of these investments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, pp.
1-2]
The final standards should:
Ensure the LDV and HDV standards support greater zero-emission vehicle adoption by
considering market growth expected from IRA and IIJA investments (which will surpass existing
commitments outlined in Executive Order 14037);
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
We also can't ignore the requirements of the recently passed Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)'s
EV incentives. The requirements for consumers to access the full $7500 incentive are
complicated and confusing, and they are driving further changes to EV supply chains and
manufacturer product plans. In the short term the changes to section 30D have reduced the
number of eligible vehicles by 70% including eliminating Mazda's current EVs. While the long-
term effects are not yet fully known, the IRA EV incentives will impact consumer demand in
some ways, and this will impact EPA's aggressive EV goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595,
p. 2]
Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
4. EPA's Modeling Values the IRA's EV Tax Credits Inconsistently.
EPA's approach for estimating electrification technology costs for its technical feasibility
analysis does not assume that all consumers will receive the full $7,500 value of the IRA's EV
tax credits, opting instead to combine portions of the Section 30D and Section 45 W tax credits in
its modeling.46 The initial value of the credit used in the modeling starts at $3,750 in MY 2027
and increases annually until reaching $6,000 in MY 2032.47 But when elsewhere discussing the
TCO savings and expenses for a MY 2032 vehicle, EPA assumes a maximum value of $7,500
when comparing the net purchase price of an EV with that of an ICE vehicle.48 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0656, p. 10]
46 88 Fed. Reg. at 29301; EPA DRIA. p. 2-87.
47 88 Fed. Reg. at 29301; DRIA. p. 2-87, Table 2-50.
48 DRIA. p. 4-20, Table 4-7.
This approach is inconsistent. If EPA's own technical feasibility modeling assumes a credit
value of only $6,000, the agency should use this same value in its TCO analysis, even if doing so
would result in more favorable average purchase price for an ICE powered vehicle versus a
comparable EV. For example, assuming application of a $7,500 credit, an EV CUV/SUV may
have a net purchase price $400 lower than its ICE counterpart, but assuming application of a
$6,000 credit, the ICE CUV/SUV would be $1,100 less expensive than its EV counterpart.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 10]
EPA's assumption that the IRA's clean vehicle credits will have an increasing impact on
vehicle affordability over time is questionable. First, to qualify for the Section 30D credit, future
battery electric (BEV) and plug-in hybrid (PHEV) vehicles will need to satisfy ever more
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stringent critical mineral and battery component requirements. Second, vehicle MSRPs are likely
to increase over time, making an increasing percentage of vehicles ineligible for Section 30D
credits. Today, only a relatively few EV make/models qualify for the full $7,500 tax credit, and
most OEMs are expected to be challenged through 2032 to establish supply chains for necessary
battery componentry independent of China and other foreign entities of concern.49 NADA urges
EPA to revisit its assumptions regarding the extent to which the IRA's tax credits will have a
significant positive impact on the affordability of BEVs and PHEVs.50 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0656, p. 10]
49 See Get Connected EV Quarterly Report 2023 Ql.pdf (autosinnovate.org), pp. 12-15; Transforming
Personal Mobility | AAI (autosinnovate.org).
50 NADA agrees with AAI's suggestions in its comments that EPA should incorporate an adjustment
mechanism into its modeling assumptions to account for EV market uncertainties regarding the various
federal tax incentives, battery cost improvements, and infrastructure development.
Organization: North American Subaru, Inc.
Federal and state consumer incentive programs aim to help bridge the price gap. The 2022
Inflation Reduction Act created a consumer purchase incentive program for new EVs (30D
Clean Vehicle Credit Program), but the program's strict eligibility conditions disqualified most
EVs on the market and many consumers are unable to use it on the vehicle of their choice. As
Auto Innovators has previously noted, seventy percent of previously eligible vehicles became
ineligible the day the Inflation Reduction Act was signed into law 5* As additional conditions
were implemented in January 2023 and again in April 2023 fewer vehicles qualify for the
consumer incentive. The Proposed Rule notes the importance of consumer incentives, but
unfortunately the 2022 IRA creates a consumer incentive program where few vehicles qualify,
limited access to the critical minerals that are needed for EV batteries like lithium, cobalt, and
nickel, pose enormous challenges to automakers' transition to electrification. Significantly more
extraction and processing capabilities are needed to support increased battery demand by
automakers. Critical mineral availability and the impact on battery and vehicle costs should be
considered by regulators. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0576, p. 3]
5 Alliance for Automotive Innovation blog "EV Tax Credit: Is This is Good as it Gets?" March 31, 2023.
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
D. Deployment of Federal Funding
The recently enacted Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and the Inflation Reduction Act
(IRA) provide billions of dollars of funding to advance transportation electrification including
substantial funding for state governments. Combined with state and federal financial incentives
for ZEVs and charging and fueling infrastructure, and other market-enabling policies, the LDV
and MDV market segments are primed for rapid and widespread electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0584, p. 7]
The NESCAUM and OTC states are already beginning to deploy the $5 billion made
available through the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure program to accelerate installation
of public charging and other alternative fueling infrastructure, and the $5 billion Clean School
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Bus grant program for zero-emission school buses and technology. Additional funding will be
available soon through the $7.25 billion Low or No Emission and Grants for Buses and Bus
Facilities programs, the $2.5 billion Charging and Fueling Infrastructure program, the $1 billion
Clean Heavy-Duty Vehicle program, and many other new and existing federal programs for
which activities that support transportation electrification are eligible. All of the NESCAUM and
OTC states recently submitted applications for the $5 billion Climate Pollution Reduction Grant
Planning and Implementation programs, which require states to develop and implement priority
and comprehensive climate action plans to reduce economy-wide GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 7]
Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
The EPA argues that because of the maximum federal purchase incentive tax rebate of
$7,500, this would reduce the price paid by consumers. However, tax rebates are not magic
wands. The money must originate from somewhere: the US economy, aka taxpayers. The tax
rebate does not increase nor decrease the "net benefit" to the US economy. Moreover, there are
income limits to the EV tax rebate, and the current EV owner demographic would not qualify for
any tax rebate when purchasing a new EV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 6]
Organization: Plug In America
These regulations are essential to keeping our climate commitments. They are fortified by
billions of dollars of federal funding authorized through the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and
Jobs Act and the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act. Federal funding has catalyzed private investment
in this market. Vehicle and battery manufacturers are expected to invest $210 billion in the U.S.
by 2030, nearly a quarter of global financial commitments toward the EV transition and more
than any other country in the world.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0625, p. 1]
2 https://www.atlasevhub.com/data_story/210-billion-of-announced-investments-in-electric-vehicle-
manufacturing-headed-for-the-u-s/.
Organization: POET, LLC
EPA then adds a significant, additional reduction—from about $80 to $90 per kWh from 2027
to 2032 to $40 to $60 per kWh—because of the IRA tax credits. 88 This amounts to a total cost
reduction of about 50 to 67% in "as few as two to three years" simply because of increased
demand and the IRA. 89 These large reductions are not justified. First, the battery production
capacity that would support these cost reductions has yet to be built. Second, even assuming it is
built as EPA predicts, there is no reason to assume that battery manufacturers will pass cost
savings from the IRA directly onto customers on a one-to-one basis.90 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, pp. 22-23]
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
Finally, EPA assumes that the significant federal tax incentives supporting batteries and
reducing the purchase price of BEVs for consumers will continue throughout the term of the
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Proposed Rule, when those incentives could be eliminated or modified by future legislation. 100
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 24]
100 Id.at 7.
Beyond the assumptions of dramatic reductions in the cost of batteries and other BEV
componentry over the period from 2022 through 2032, U.S. EPA also assumes that federal tax
incentives will be available that dramatically lower the purchase price of BEVs. In some
instances, U.S. EPA assumes that purchase incentives of $7,500 per BEV apply (see DRIA Table
4-7 for example) but in U.S. EPA's analysis of BEV penetration, somewhat lower values are
used which range from $4,750 in MY 2027 to $6,000 in MY 2032 as shown in DRIA Table 2-
50. Purchase incentives are assumed to end with MY 2033. The main concern with U.S. EPA's
treatment of purchase incentives is the assumption that they will continue to be in place over the
period from 2027 through 2032 as they could easily be eliminated or modified by future
legislation. This assumption should clearly be subjected to a sensitivity analysis as the
elimination of purchase incentives would be expected to dramatically lower BEV penetration
rates during the MY 2027 to 2032 period while U.S. EPA's assumptions regarding dramatic
reductions in BEV battery and component costs are occurring. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609,
p. 59]
Organization: Sierra Club et al.
The EPA should ensure that the final standard reflects the investments from the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act and Inflation Reduction Act. Together, these two laws are expected to
reduce ZEV adoption costs by providing at least $245 billion in federal funds—through tax
credits, loans, and grants—to support ZEV infrastructure, manufacturing, purchasing, and
charging.2 Long-term regulatory certainty, through strong federal clean car standards, will
encourage domestic manufacturers to take full advantage of federal investments and spur ZEV
innovations that can reduce pollution and save families money. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0668, pp. 1-2]
2 Noah Gabriel, $210 Billion of Announced Investments in Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Headed for the
U.S., EVHub (Jan. 12, 2023), https://www.atlasevhub.com/data_story/210-billion-of-announced-
investments-in-electric-vehicle-manufacturing-headed-for-the-u-s/.
Organization: Specialty Equipment Market Association (SEMA)
The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 further expanded these investments by offering $7,500
tax incentives to American consumers to purchase electric vehicles. While initial estimates from
the CBO determined the cost of the program at $30.6 billion over the next 10 years, the
University of Pennsylvania now estimates the EV tax incentive's total cost has increased by over
1,000 percent to $393 billion over 10 years.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 3]
3 University of Pennsylvania: Budgetary Cost of Climate and energy provisions in the Inflation Reduction
Act (Link: https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edU/estimates/2023/4/27/update-cost-climate-and-energy -
inflation-reduction-act).
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Organization: Stellantis
- The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) committed significant funds to incentivize the purchase
of EVs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
- however these incentives come with criteria that exclude many EV models today, and
pending guidance from the IRS likely could exclude more in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
- The IRA also provides an incentive to produce the needed batteries helping to offset their
cost - however this only applies to the U.S., ignoring the global supply chain needed to support a
40- 50% U.S. EV market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
Another example of overly optimistic assumptions is how EPA overestimated the impact of
the federal incentives introduced by the IRA. EPA's modelling assumes all batteries in all EVs
will be built in the U.S. getting the maximum $45/kWh credit offered by the 45X battery
production tax credit for 2027- 2029MY. This results in an assumed price reduction of $4,500
for a vehicle with a lOOkWh battery and scales up to ever larger price reductions with larger
batteries. As shown in Figure 4 below, EPA combined the IRA 30D (retail) and 45W
(lease/commercial) incentives assuming on average vehicles receive $3,750 to $6,000 of price
reduction. Applying both the 45X IRA production and 30D/45W purchase incentives assumes
average BEV price reductions of >##$9K starting in 2027MY, having a significant influence on
EPA's forecasted market demand and affordability for EVs. EPA justifies its assumption citing
most batteries are U.S. manufactured today (even though data is heavily skewed by one OEM)
and that the lucrative credit will drive OEMs to invest in U.S. production. Stellantis supports
Auto Innovators' comments recommending that EPA take a less optimistic approach in applying
IRA incentives incorporating a more realistic price influence on future EV market projections.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 5-6]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table 2-49: IRA Battery Production Tax Credits in
OMEGA and Estimated BEV Price Reduction Assumed due to IRA Incentives. Figure 4 - IRA
incentives assumed in the EPA NPRM [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 5-6]
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
EPA is confident that generous federal subsidies for EV purchases will help con- sumers
overcome their reluctance, but that confidence is questionable at best. EPA's cal- culations
assume that the current subsidies promised in the Inflation Reduction Act will apply to all EV
purchases in the U.S., which they do not and never will, and that these subsidies will remain
available going forward, which will not be the case if a future Con- gress changes course and
repeals these costly subsidies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 12]
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
The Environmental Protection Agency claims that costs of battery cell and pack
manufacturing will continue to decline due to the learning curve, shared costs across larger
volumes, and government subsidies. However, the introduction of government subsidies
artificially reduces the cost of manufacturing and provides an unrealistic perspective of the actual
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costs should the government stop subsidizing battery manufacturing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0674, p. 8]
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
4.3. Application of IRA
Projected battery costs are further reduced in EPA's analysis by applying the IRA 45X cell
and module tax credits. To do this, the direct manufacturing costs above are scaled up to their
retail price equivalent (RPE) from which the IRA tax benefits are subtracted resulting the lower
cost curve in Figure 7. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 24-25]
[See original for graph Figure 7 IRA 45X Cost Reductions] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620,
pp. 24-25]
It is unclear as to how the IRA tax credits are applied to arrive at the lower curve. The RPE
curve seems to be missing from Figure 7making it impossible to visualize the actual cost
reductions due to the IRA tax credits. Toyota recommends the Final Rule clearly describe and
illustrate each step of the process and provide an accounting of the cumulative IRA tax credits
applicable each year, as well as the marked-up (RPE) costs prior to the IRA tax credits being
applied for comparison. Toyota believes EPA must reconsider how the IRA benefits are being
applied to achieve battery cost savings for the proposed standards. The resulting battery costs
seem implausible as total battery costs after the tax credit can be negative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0620, pp. 24-25]
EPA assumes that starting in 27MY virtually every battery produced on the path to hitting the
67% BEV target in 32MY will be produced in the U.S. and earning the 45X credit. This is
unrealistic and not supported by the U.S. Department of Energy or any other projections. EPA's
own analysis of this scenario would put the cost of the 45X credit related to the proposed rule at
around $160 billion between 2027 and 2032 - nearly six times the total CBO score of $30.6B.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 24-25]
Further, EPA assumes that starting in 27MY, every BEV sold in the US will receive part of
the combined 30D+45W Clean Vehicle Credits, up to a maximum of $6,000 per BEV in 32MY.
EPA's own analysis of this scenario would put the total cost of the 30D+45W Clean Vehicle
Credits related to the proposed rule at around $270 billion between 2027 and 2032 - nearly
twenty-five times the total CBO score of $11 billion ($7.5 billion for 30D and $3.5 billion for
45W). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 24-25]
6 Conclusion
A deeper analysis of global and IRA-compliant critical material supply and demand is needed
to support the final rule. The proposal's high-level assessment results in overly optimistic
observations that "critical battery mineral supply is likely to be adequate to meet anticipated
demand, in some cases by a significant margin". 19 The proposal lacks the evidence to support
this finding. Demand for critical minerals today is now higher than the years referenced in the
proposal due to new policy and OEM targets. Future demand growth for PEVs is unclear given
the uncertain geo-political considerations and supply chain operations beyond the control
manufacturers and EPA. It is highly plausible the tight supply-demand for lithium and graphite
will lead to volatile prices and the proposal fails to consider how this could suppress demand and
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annual EV market share. The Final Rule must encompass a significantly deeper analysis based
on a boarder array of sources for assessing global supply-demand by country of origin to support
the use of IRA tax credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 65-66]
19 Id.
Organization: United Steelworkers (USW)
EPA relies heavily on the potential critical role and incentives from the manufacturing
investments from the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs
Act (IIJA) for its proposed emissions standards. Programs related to the auto manufacturing
sector include the Battery Manufacturing and Recycling Grants, the Battery Material Processing
Grants, the Domestic Manufacturing Conversion Grants, the 48C Advanced Manufacturing Tax
Credit, the Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing Loan Program, the National Electric
Vehicle Infrastructure Program, and the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure Grant Program.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, p. 4]
While the proposed rule is not wrong that the investments made by IRA and IIJA should spur
investments in new technologies to lower emissions of vehicles, it does fail to consider the
timeline and effectiveness of program implementation. Undoubtably, these manufacturing
investments will take time to achieve their full production capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0587, p. 4]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
6. EPA's application of price modifications is inconsistent with the Inflation Reduction
Act ("IRA") and IRS's proposed implementation of 26 U.S.C. §30D and §45W. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, p. 9]
In Section 2.6.8 of the DRIA, EPA describes its methodology for incorporating IRA tax
incentives into OMEGA modeling,37 and those price modifications are reflected in the OMEGA
input file.38 However, EPA misapplies the §30D and §45W tax credits in the following ways:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 9]
37 DRIA at 2-86 and 2-87.
38 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip,
"vehicle_price_modifications_20230314b. csv."
• As of April 18, 2023, only 14 light-duty vehicles in the MY 2023 fleet are eligible for
any credit amount under 30D.39 Nonetheless, EPA applies a price modification to every BEV in
the MY 2023 to MY 2032 analysis fleets, without any consideration of: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, p. 9]
39 https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/17/ev-treasury-department-regulation-00092123 and
https://fueleconomy.gov/feg/tax2023.shtml, accessed 4/28/2023.
o Cost of the vehicle - the §30D tax credit is only available for pick-up trucks,
vans and SUVs with an MSRP < $80,000 and other qualified vehicles with an MSRP < $55,000.
The BEV to which EPA applies the price modification have OMEGA-projected prices ranging
from $24,633 to $360,545;40 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 9]
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40 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip, Column AB of
"2023_03_25_ll_46_49_ld_central_compliance_run_Proposal_vehicles/csv."
• Location of final assembly - from August 17, 2022, the §30D tax credit is only
available for vehicles whose final assembly occurs in North America; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 9]
• o Battery components - Starting in 2023, an increasing
percentage of battery components must be manufactured or assembled in North
America; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 9]
• o Battery critical minerals - Starting in 2023, an increasing
percentage of battery critical minerals must be extracted, processed or recycled
in eligible locations; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 9]
• o Purchaser income-the §30D tax credit is only available for
taxpayers with adjusted gross income less than thresholds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, p. 9]
EPA does not apply a price modification to even a single PHEV in the MY 2023 to
MY 2032 analysis fleets. Eligible vehicles under 26 U.S.C. 30D include plug-in electric vehicles
with a battery capacity > 7 kWh and capable of being recharged by external source of
electricity,41 so certainly PHEVs are eligible. And in fact, of the 14 models currently eligible for
30D tax credits, six are PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 9]
41 PHEVs available in the US have a mean battery size of 14.9 kWh, https://evstatistics.com/2022/04/bev-
batteries- average-83-kwh-versus-15-kwh-for-phevs/ (accessed 4/27/2023)
Organization: World Resources Institute (WRI)
Locking in cleaner vehicle standards, and potentially extending them through 2035 as
requested by auto manufacturers, will create market stability and will give manufacturers,
investors, and consumers greater confidence in the direction of the vehicle market. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
Based on the current and growing uptake of electric vehicles, paired with public and private
investments in charging, purchasing, and manufacturing from the Inflation Reduction Act and
the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, these standards would be achievable under the model
years proposed. Public investments from recent legislation include but are not limited to: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
• National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Program [Link:
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/]
Electric Vehicle Tax Credit [Link: https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/credits-
for-new-clean-vehicles-purchased-in-2023-or-after]
Commercial Clean Vehicle Credit (45W) [Link: https://www.irs.gov/credits-
deducti ons/commerci al -cl ean-vehi cl e-credit]
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Used Clean Vehicle Credit [Link: https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/used-clean-
vehicle-credit]
Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit (45X) [Link:
https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i7207] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
Thus, we urge EPA to strengthen and finalize the strongest rule possible as
1. Complementary policies provide incentives for vehicle manufacturers and consumers
in the transition; and
2. Strong private investments are rapidly expanding supply chains and manufacturing,
helping to accelerate the transition to cleaner, electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0544, pp. 1-3]
Complementary policies provide incentives
By leveraging the billions of dollars in new federal investments in electric vehicle charging in
the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the hundreds of millions of dollars of clean
transportation incentives in the Inflation Reduction Act these standards have the potential to be
the floor not the ceiling for transportation emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0544, pp. 1-3]
These policies provide unprecedented levels of public support for electric vehicles specifically
including at least $83 billion of loans, grants, and tax credits that could support the production of
low or zero-emission vehicles, batteries, or chargers according to a recent analysis [Link:
https://www.atlasevhub.com/data_story/210-billion-of-announced-investments-in-electric-
vehicle-manufacturing-headed-for-the-u-s/#_ftn4] by Atlas Public Policy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
Complemented by existing state policies like the Advanced Clean Trucks and Advanced
Clean Fleets rules, which require manufacturers to begin selling an increasing percentage of
zero- emission vehicles starting in 2024, EPA's proposed rules can help to accelerate the
transition to zero-emission transportation while improving public health and reducing climate
pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
Private investments are rapidly expanding supply chains and manufacturing
Since the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act less than one year ago, companies have
announced tens of billions of dollars in renewable energy, battery, and electric vehicle projects
across the country. From the announcement that Our Next Energy [Link:
https://www.michiganbusiness.org/press-releases/2022/10/whitmer-announces-2000-jobs-
investment-of-$1.6-billion-michigan-based-our-next-energy-builds-battery-manufacturing-
campus-wayne-county/] has invested $1.6 billion in their first battery manufacturing campus in
Wayne County, Michigan to the news that Hyundai Motor Group and SK On [Link:
https://fortune.com/2022/12/08/hyundai-new-5-billion-electric-battery-plant-georgia-atlanta-
biden-inflation-reduction-act/] are jointly investing $4-$5 billion to build electric battery plants
outside of Atlanta, Georgia to BMW's [Link: https://apnews.com/article/technology-north-
america-spartanburg-south-carolina-climate-and-environment-
96753f092b29e0d384903591b5221fl3] recent announcement of their $1.7 billion investment
near Spartanburg, South Carolina in their shift to EV manufacturing there is ample evidence that
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recent policies are helping to drive substantial private investments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0544, pp. 1-3]
These investments are leading to rapidly developing supply chains, domestic battery
production capacity, and increased manufacturing which will lead to further reductions in the
cost and increases in the availability of zero-emission vehicles. This market growth will continue
to increase with additional supportive policies and regulations, such as these proposed rules.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0544, pp. 1-3]
EPA Summary and Response
EPA acknowledges and appreciates all of the comments relating to IRA provisions and their
modeling in the compliance analysis. Comments on this topic included a number of distinct
themes that we individually identify and respond to in this section. Our responses to these themes
collectively respond to all of the individual comments on these topics. Some comments touch on
topics that are responded to in other sections of the RTC, and we cite these other sections at the
end of this section.
In general, comments in this area were related either to the potential for IRA provisions to
promote feasibility and adoption of PEV technology, or to our representation of specific IRA
provisions as inputs to the compliance analysis.
Comments relating to the potential of IRA provisions frequently cited the intent of the Act to
support industry development, and cited supportive information relating to recent examples of
how this is occurring robustly and as expected. For example, comments from ACEEE, CARB,
CAP, Energy Innovation, "Environmental and Public Health Organizations", EDF, ICCT,
NESCAUM, Plugin America, and others strongly supported the position that the IRA and other
governmental programs are already and would continue to have a strong and positive influence
on development of the supply chain and promoting feasibility of PEV technology. Other
comments related to the importance of EPA reflecting the potential impact of the IRA in its
compliance analysis (both in the No Action case and the action cases), and setting the stringency
of the standards accordingly. For example, this view was advanced by ACEEE, CAP, the Sierra
Club, and others, including comments that the full potential of the IRA provisions should be
utilized by actively taking full advantage of its provisions. Other commenters were more
skeptical of the impact of the IRA provisions. For example, the Alliance and Stellantis suggested
that the IRA would not be enough, and others (such as Honda, Kia, API, and NAD A) generally
expressed the view that the provisions were unlikely to have the impact EPA had assumed in its
analysis (for example, that the 30D Clean Vehicle Credit is more restrictive than its predecessor
and may be severely restricted in applicability, or that the IRA would take longer than expected
to influence the domestic supply chain). Others stated their view that, because the IRA
provisions could potentially be modified or repealed by a future Congress, EPA should have
either not included the IRA provisions in its analysis or should conduct a sensitivity to account
for this possibility. Others suggested that the limited lifetime of the IRA provisions means that
EPA should have accounted for the effect of their discontinuation after 2032, and specifically
that their inclusion at all biased the analysis toward PEVs and discouraged HEVs and other ICE
technology from playing as significant a role in the modeled compliance fleet.
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Comments relating to our representation of specific IRA provisions in the compliance
analysis primarily consisted of comments about our numeric OMEGA inputs for average values
of credits under 30D (Clean Vehicle Credit), 45W (Commercial Clean Vehicle Credit), and 45X
(Production Tax Credit). Some commenters agreed with our numeric values and in some cases
suggested that our values may be conservative. In particular, some commenters urged EPA to
include the 45X provision that provides 10 percent credit for manufacturing cost of domestic
electrode active materials and critical minerals. Other commenters stated the view that our
assumptions for any or all of the credit programs were too optimistic, for example, that they did
not account for various limitations on eligibility, or did not fully explain the basis for the values
that were used, or did not address the ability of U.S. battery manufacturing facilities currently
planned or under construction to ramp up quickly enough.
EPA acknowledges the comments relating to the current and potential effects of the IRA
provisions, the need for actions and timely progress on the part of other parts of the government,
and the effectiveness of such actions. EPA agrees with commenters who argued that the PEV-
related incentives and other programs under the IRA have strong potential to advance
development of the PEV supply chain and PEV feasibility, not only at the manufacturing level
but also at the infrastructure level, and are already demonstrating this effect through industry's
increased emphasis on building a domestic supply chain, manufacturing battery cells in the U.S.,
securing IRA-compliant mineral and component inputs, and stimulating private investment. EPA
also acknowledges comments relating to the need for action and timely progress across the
government, and/or the likely effectiveness of these efforts, such as the programs under the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the CHIPS Act, and various funding and assistance mechanisms
administered by agencies across the government. The bulk of our responses to these topics are in
RTC 15. EPA also acknowledges the views of adverse commenters who cite uncertainty or
skepticism with respect to the rate at which IRA provisions and other governmental efforts will
grow the domestic supply chain, the effect of specific requirements of specific tax credits or
incentives, and similar concerns. EPA addresses these comments in turn in the paragraphs below.
In response to commenters who stated that our OMEGA inputs for the average composite
value of 30D and 45W credits across the fleet were too optimistic, or more specifically that the
domestic supply chain, including critical mineral mining and processing and electrode active
material manufacturing, will not grow fast enough to allow the assumed levels of 30D credits,
EPA disagrees. EPA acknowledges that eligibility for 30D specifically was reduced for many
manufacturers in 2023 with the activation of critical mineral and battery component sourcing
requirements, and this reduction in the number of eligible vehicle models was understood across
the industry at the time of the proposal. EPA disagrees with commenters who assert that this
means that 30D will be a disincentive to PEV sales, or that it means that few or no vehicles will
be eligible in the future. It is clear that the supply chain is growing in response to market forces
and incentives, and manufacturers are actively pursuing compliance with the IRA incentives,
meaning that some percentage of vehicles will in fact qualify in the future and the primary
uncertainty is to what degree. To reexamine the validity of our assumptions for 30D and 45W,
we requested the Department of Energy to perform an independent assessment464 of the likely
average yearly value per vehicle of combined 30D and 45W, taking into account the various
eligibility constraints, trends in leasing, and rate of growth in U.S. battery manufacturing
464 Department of Energy, "Estimating Federal Tax Incentives for Heavy Duty Electric Vehicle Infrastructure and
for Acquiring Electric Vehicles Weighing Less Than 14,000 Pounds," Memorandum, March 11, 2024.
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facilities including an accounting for gradual ramp-up over time. This work resulted in a set of
year-by-year fleet-average credit values for the combined effect of 30D and 45W that are
described in preamble Section IV.C.2. These updates estimates from DOE represent a more
complete and independent assessment of the issue and EPA believes it to be the best publicly
available accounting of the potential value of the credits given their specific requirements. We
note that the DOE figures are very close to the figures used in the proposal. As described in more
detail in Preamble IV.C.2, in our updated compliance analysis we adopt the DOE figures for
30D/45W but reduce them to conservatively account for uncertainties. See Preamble IV.C.2 for a
full discussion.
Some commenters also expressed the view that the proposal did not adequately explain the
basis for the combined 30D and 45W values that were used in the proposal. In response, we refer
to the DOE analysis which provides specific information on the basis of the estimates used in the
updated compliance analysis.
In response to comments that the IRA's mineral and battery component sourcing requirements
have already reduced the number of PEVs that qualify for one or both halves of the 30D credit,
or that the IRA sourcing requirements will severely limit the percentage of PEVs that qualify for
30D in the future, EPA agrees that not all PEVs qualify for 30D today and that it is likely that
some portion of PEVs will not qualify in the future. However, EPA disagrees with the
implication that our values for combined 30D and 45W are therefore too optimistic. First, we
note that we have modeled 30D and 45 W in combination, either of which potentially provide for
up to $7,500 in credit toward a vehicle transaction, albeit in different forms. The 45W credit is
applicable to commercial vehicles, which includes vehicles that are purchased for the purpose of
leasing, whether to businesses or to consumers, and it is not subject to the sourcing requirements
of 30D. Also, the independent DOE analysis largely corroborates the figures that were used in
the proposal. Some commenters cited current or past lease rates across the vehicle market or
within their own operations, and used this to question whether lease rates would be sufficient in
the future to combine with 30D as described. EPA disagrees that past history or recent trends in
lease rates has a bearing on future rates given 45W; the data for current or past leasing rates
would not reflect the influence of 45W on PEV transactions and thus has limited if any value in
predicting future rates. We also note that there is evidence that vehicle leasing has or is likely to
increase in response to this provision; for example, JLR indicated that it is considering leasing in
response to this provision, and the DOE analysis also observes an increase in leasing rates.
Although some commenters appeared to question the appropriateness of IRS guidance clarifying
that the leased vehicles may qualify for 45W, The Department of Treasury and the IRS have
explained that the guidance simply follows the statutory text of the IRA and longstanding tax
rules regarding leasing. Regarding comments expressing the view that 45W consumer eligibility
will depend in part on the cost differential from ICE vehicles, MSRP is considered in the DOE
study. Regarding comments that some consumers may not qualify for a lease due to credit score
or interest rates, these factors influence ability to purchase a vehicle as well and are not limited to
leasing.
In response to comments that the IRA provisions will take time to have their full effect, EPA
agrees that development of the supply chain will not occur overnight, but also notes that robust
progress is being made. EPA also notes, as stated in comments from "Environmental and Public
Health Organizations" among others, that these programs as well as the standards themselves
provide clear regulatory and market signals that are likely to accelerate this progress. For more
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discussion of comments related to the supply chain, critical minerals, and the impact of the IRA,
BIL, and other measures toward this end, see RTC 15.1.
In response to comments that our assumptions for the value of combined 30D and 45W were
not documented, or that specific requirements such as for example the MSRP limitations on 30D
were not quantified, please see Preamble IV.C.2 where we describe the DOE study that
independently estimated yearly values for combined 30D and 45W,465 and largely confirmed the
estimates used in the proposal. The DOE analysis provides a rigorous accounting of most of the
various restrictions on the credits in developing its estimates, and EPA believes that the study
provides a strong estimate of 30D/45W. However, some commenters additionally noted
limitations on 30D that DOE did not explicitly consider, including: that inflation could affect
vehicle eligibility under the MSRP limit, or that over time buyers might increasingly fail to
qualify under the income limit which also is not adjusted for inflation, or that some buyers would
not have enough tax liability to claim the full credit, and various other uncertainties about the
other limitations on 30D. While EPA continues to believe that the DOE estimates are reasonable
and likely to be an accurate representation, in the interest of addressing these comments and as
described immediately below and in more detail in Preamble IV.C.2, in our updated compliance
analysis we adopt the DOE figures for 30D/45W but reduce them to conservatively account for
these uncertainties. For example, DOE considered the MSRP limit, but did not project increases
in vehicle prices due to inflation, and was unable to include the effect of income limits because
of lack of citable data on customer incomes. See Preamble IV.C.2 for a full discussion.
EPA notes that JLR's comment that "65% of battery cells and almost 80% of cathodes are
manufactured in China" is not relevant to commenter's points on 30D eligibility, as this appears
to refer to global production, the majority of which is not sold into the U.S. market.
In response to comments that significant uncertainty remains regarding Treasury guidance on
the application of the IRA credits (for example, the definition of foreign entities of concern
(FEOC)), EPA notes that the Treasury Department has issued much of this guidance in the time
since the proposal was issued, and EPA has considered this guidance, which was largely as had
been expected across the industry and by EPA at the time of the proposal. The DOE analysis of
30D/45W was conducted with consideration of aspects of Treasury guidance that were under
development at the time and subsequently proposed for rulemaking by Treasury.
In response to comments expressing the view that domestic battery manufacturing capacity
will not grow fast enough to allow the assumed levels of 45X in our analysis, or that the value of
the 45X production tax credits we assumed are not justified by projections of future U.S.
manufacturing capacity, EPA disagrees. The proposal cited work by Argonne National
Laboratory and other organizations on which we based our expectation that planned and
announced U.S. cell manufacturing capacity would grow at a rate greater than expected domestic
battery demand under the central case of the analysis. Comments received on our modeling of
the 45X cell and module credit led us to further investigate our inputs for the phase-in schedule
and average amount realized. Our updated analysis includes updated figures from ANL that
include an allowance for ramp-up time based on ANL's assessment of typical plant construction
and growth rates in the industry. Further, our updated compliance analysis projects less battery
465 Department of Energy, "Estimating Federal Tax Incentives for Heavy Duty Electric Vehicle Infrastructure and
for Acquiring Electric Vehicles Weighing Less Than 14,000 Pounds,", March 11, 2024.
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demand than in the central case of the proposal, and we have included sensitivity cases and other
examples of pathways that project less demand. With projected U.S. manufacturing capacity
exceeding projected demand in every compliance scenario we have analyzed, PEV
manufacturers and cell suppliers are well positioned to take significant advantage of the 45X
credit throughout the time frame of the rule.
In response to comments that EPA did not sufficiently document our conclusion that 45X
could be accommodated by projected U.S. battery manufacturing, EPA disagrees. EPA clearly
based its conclusion on the ANL projection of North American battery manufacturing capacity
plans presented in the proposal. In the final compliance analysis, we updated these projections
with a new study by ANL that explicitly takes into account newly announced plans as well as the
time necessary to build and bring the plants to capacity.
In response to comments that smaller manufacturers may never move battery manufacturing
capacity to the U.S. and thus never realize 45X credits, EPA disagrees that this need be the case
in all situations or that significant value of the credit cannot be realized by other means. In the
case that a manufacturer has not constructed U.S. battery manufacturing capacity for its own use,
we note that many vehicle manufacturers today procure cells and/or modules from suppliers that
do manufacture in the U.S., making it possible for the 45X credit to be passed along in the price
of the product. The ANL report also identifies production capacity associated with suppliers that
have not identified offtake agreements that could be used as a U.S. manufacturing source. We
expect that cell and module suppliers will compete on price by reflecting the advantage of the
45X credit in their pricing to these and other manufacturers.
In response to comments that EPA's accounting for 30D/45W and 45X together causes
battery costs to be unrealistically low or negative, EPA disagrees. Specifically, EPA disagrees
with the characterization by some commenters that the sum of 30D, 45W, and 45X credits imply
that battery costs will be negative. The 30D/45W credit does not impact the modeled battery net
manufacturing cost (only 45X does) but is realized within our modeling on the consumer side in
making the overall cost of the vehicle more attractive to the buyer relative other technologies.
EPA therefore has not assumed that the manufacturing cost of batteries will be negative or zero.
EPA also disagrees with comments alleging that vehicle costs are inaccurate as a result of our
IRA modeling or other OMEGA inputs. As described in the Preamble, RIA, and this RTC, the
large set of OMEGA inputs that result in our estimates of vehicle cost are based on many data
sources, studies, and analyses that EPA considers to be the best available.
In response to comments that there is no guarantee that 30D, 45W, or 45X tax credits will be
passed on to the consumer, but instead could be taken as profit by the manufacturer or otherwise
lost to the consumer, EPA agrees that there is no guarantee but notes that the motivation to
compete in the market on pricing is likely to encourage manufacturers to pass the savings along.
To the degree that manufacturers will choose to produce PEVs as part of their means to comply
with the standards, they are likely to be incentivized to compete with one another on a pricing
basis. If a manufacturer were to arbitrarily capture a large portion of the credit as additional
profit at the expense of selling the vehicles as part of its compliant fleet, this would conflict with
the manufacturer's ability to sell the vehicles, which manufacturers are motivated to do as one of
the lowest cost pathways to meeting the standards. Some commenters have suggested that some
manufacturers appear to have raised MSRP for PEVs in response to the availability of the 30D
credit. EPA notes that the commenter's cited reason for such events is speculative, as
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manufacturers consider a host of factors in setting MSRP for specific vehicle types or models.
The cited example occurred during a time of low vehicle inventory and higher vehicle prices
across the industry, and evidence that the price change was a direct result of availability of 30D
is only speculative and circumstantial, as EPA is not aware of any manufacturer having
announced such a policy. In addition, DOE validated its 30D/45W estimate for 2023 against
actual 2023 market transaction data from J.D. Power illustrating that OEMs are indeed passing
on the value of the credits by reducing the cost of both purchases and leased BEVs and
PHEVs.466 At any rate, in a more mature and competitive PEV sales environment in which
manufacturers are relying on sales of PEVs to comply with increasingly stringent standards,
failure to pass on the credit is unlikely to be beneficial to the manufacturer as it would affect
their ability to comply. In this final rule analysis, EPA continues to apply the full estimated
average value of the 30D/45W credit toward the purchase price seen by the consumer, and to
apply the full estimated average value of the 45X cell and module credit to the cost seen by the
manufacturer. The 30D/45W credit amount is modeled in OMEGA as a direct reduction to the
consumer purchase costs,467 and therefore has an influence on the shares of BEVs demanded by
consumers within the model. The purchase incentive is assumed to be realized entirely by the
consumer and does not impact the vehicle production costs for the producer. For more discussion
and the values used within OMEGA, please see RIA Chapter 2.6.8.
In response to comments from the Alliance that the BatPaC default setting for in-house
production is somehow in conflict with the assumption that batteries will benefit from 45X cell
and module credits, EPA disagrees. Whether a battery is made entirely in-house by an OEM
from cells and modules manufactured in-house, or is purchased from a supplier, 45X cell and
module credits are earned by the applicable manufacturing entity and can be transferred or
passed along in the purchase price, given a competitive industry as discussed elsewhere. The
ANL battery pricing study on which our updated costs are based considers the OEM to be the
consumer that purchases the pack from the supplier, rather than an in-house operation.
Regarding the Alliance's assertion that the value of the 45X credit for MDVs would be
unrealistically large due to the size of the battery, EPA does not see a basis for commenter's
concern, as it is well understood that the amount of the 45X cell and module credit scales with
the energy capacity of the battery in kWh. EPA sees no reasoning that would suggest that large
batteries for large vehicles are somehow limited in the amount of credit they can realize simply
because they are too large.
Regarding AmFree's comment suggesting that a statement from the proposal, "a large
percentage of 2023 U.S. BEV battery and cell manufacturing is represented by the production of
one [original-equipment manufacturer]," implies that the rest do not qualify for 45X, EPA
disagrees. Batteries manufactured in the U.S. qualify for 45X regardless of which OEM makes
them. Further, AmFree wrongly cites the Heavy Duty rule, which specifically deals with
batteries manufactured for the heavy-duty market, which are in lower volumes than the light-
466 Department of Energy, "Estimating Federal Tax Incentives for Heavy Duty Electric Vehicle Infrastructure and
for Acquiring Electric Vehicles Weighing Less Than 14,000 Pounds," March 11, 2024.
467 As described in Chapter 4.1 of the RIA, the modeling of consumer demand for ICE and BEV vehicles considers
purchase and ownership costs as components of a "consumer generalized cost" for the ICE and BEV options. The
purchase cost reflects the vehicle purchase price and any assumed purchase incentives under 30D or 45W.
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duty market and are subject to other factors specific to HD vehicles, as support for the incorrect
implication that many light-duty batteries are not eligible.
Regarding AmFree's citation of examples that in their view indicate a hesitance on the part of
industry to proceed with announced battery manufacturing development plans, and that therefore
EPA's assessment of future U.S. battery manufacturing capacity is "unsound," EPA disagrees.
DOE has assessed future battery manufacturing plants in the U.S. and North America and based
on the latest data, including ramp-up time estimates, continues to conclude that capacity is on
track. EPA is aware that in the second half of 2023, some commentators began reporting on
specific changes in previously announced investment plans by some automakers; see the
discussion in Preamble I.A.2 and IV.C.7.L As we explain there, EPA does not consider such
recent news stories to be indicative of any general trend that would change our assessment of the
outlook for investment in PEV technology, including domestic battery manufacturing capacity.
In response to comments that IRA credits could be repealed by a new Congress and therefore
EPA should consider that possibility in its analysis, EPA disagrees. EPA has traditionally and
consistently considered only the effect of final enacted laws and regulations in its feasibility
analyses, and does not consider speculation about possible actions of Congress, the executive
branch, states, or other entities in assessing the impact or outcome of its rulemakings. The range
of possible future actions by any lawmaking, policymaking, or rulemaking entity would by
definition encompass almost every possible outcome, including those with either positive or
negative implications for the assessment, rendering the selection of any individual outcome
merely speculative and potentially contradictory to the objectiveness of the assessment. EPA also
notes that any regulatory action is subject to potential modification by a future Administrator
subject to the public notice and comment process, just as other laws or regulations are subject to
potential change. In response to the view that the limited time frame during which the IRA
incentives will be available (2023 to 2032) means that they should not be considered in the
analysis, EPA disagrees. The credits are available during this time frame and are very significant,
and there is no reasonable basis for their arbitrary exclusion when it is clear that the credits are
already being claimed and are already impacting the market as intended by Congress.
In response to comments that we should include the 10 percent provisions of 45X, EPA
continues to believe that this aspect of the credit program is relatively small in comparison to
others, and its exclusion makes the analysis conservative. To investigate the potential value of
these credits across the new PEV fleet as a whole, we consulted with the Department of Energy
and Argonne National Laboratory to characterize the potential value of the 10 percent provisions
of 45X on a dollar per kWh basis. ANL determined that the maximum value of the credits would
change over time, as critical minerals become a larger share of battery manufacturing cost due to
efficiencies in other material and manufacturing costs. The maximum value for the electrode
active materials (EAM) credit, or both the EAM credit and the critical minerals (CM) credit,
would range from $5.60 to $10.70 per kWh in 2026 and decline to $3.50 to $7.60 per kWh in
2030, depending on chemistry. The decline is a result of ANL's projection that the amount (and
hence manufacturing cost) of critical mineral content will decline over time. While these tax
credits will be significant to manufacturers that produce EAM and CM in the U.S., their effect on
average battery manufacturing cost across the fleet depends on the degree to which the average
battery uses U.S.-produced EAM and CM. Because qualifying domestic production of CM and
EAM is unlikely to supply all U.S. PEV battery production (as described in Preamble IV.C.7.i),
the average value of the credit on a per kWh basis across the fleet will be less than the figures
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above. Because of the uncertainty in predicting the use of qualifying EAM and CM across the
industry at this time, we have chosen to not include an estimate of the 10 percent credits in this
analysis. Because some manufacturers will likely be in a position to qualify for some portion of
the credit, this represents a conservative assumption, and thus is directionally consistent with
addressing comments that our assumptions for other IRA credits were optimistic.
In response to comments that we should consider in our analysis the full range of IRA
incentives extending beyond 45X and 30D/45W, EPA acknowledges that other parts of the IRA,
for example the 30C charger credit, the 25E used vehicle credit, the 48C energy project credit
and other programs, are likely to have a tangible impact. However, the impacts of these
provisions vary in their ability to be estimated and quantified in the scope of our compliance
analysis and so we have limited our analysis to the largest incentives that are relatively easy to
model. EPA considers the exclusion of these other aspects of the IRA as making our analysis
conservative.
EPA appreciates comments from Center for American Progress (CAP) advocating for
inclusion of the 45X 10 percent provisions, but EPA disagrees regarding the cited size of the
credit. CAP states that the EAM portion of the credit can amount to $30 per kWh and the CM
portion to $20 per kWh. However, the credit is equal to 10 percent of manufacturing cost of
EAM and CM; if for example 10 percent of EAM cost amounts to the cited credit of $30 per
kWh, it implies that total EAM cost alone for a battery is $300 per kWh, which clearly cannot be
correct for batteries whose total manufacturing cost is on the order of $100 per kWh.
In response to comments expressing the view that imported PEVs are unlikely to be able to
benefit from the 45X cell and module credit in accounting for their battery cost, EPA agrees that
imported vehicles are likely to continue to comprise some portion of the future PEV market, and
that imported PEVs currently have limited options to utilize batteries whose cost benefits from
45X. In IV.C.2 of the preamble, we discussed some ways in which imported vehicles may be
able to realize a similar benefit, including using batteries or cells exported from the U.S. or by
benefiting from similarly sized subsidies in their home countries, and EPA still believes that this
is likely to be the case for some foreign manufacturers. Ultimately we decided, for the purpose of
this analysis at this time, to conservatively reduce the 45X credit amount for several reasons
including the uncertainty surrounding imports, as described in section IV.C.2 of the preamble.
In response to the recommendation by the Alliance that we should consider 45X "impacts on
specific manufacturers," the Alliance was unclear about the nature of these impacts, and EPA
assumes that this is a reference to nearby text referring to domestic manufacturers that import
some of their vehicles. As such, this comment is addressed above. In the case that the Alliance
was referring to other reasons that it believes specific manufacturers may not be able to access
the benefit of the credit, EPA also notes that other conservative aspects of our analysis would
tend to offset the effect on our fleetwide 45X amounts, if in fact such an issue exists. For
example, we have conservatively chosen not to account for potential savings from the 45X 10
percent credits for electrode active materials and critical minerals. Similarly, regarding
comments generally suggesting that some U.S. vehicle manufacturers may nonetheless not have
access to 45X, presumably due to internal business decisions to import batteries and/or the
decision not to manufacture batteries in the U.S., we note that manufacturers are free to make
their business decisions as they see fit and consider it reasonable to assume that such decisions
are rational and lead to a lower cost for the manufacturer. We also note again, as previously
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noted, that manufacturers have the option to purchase cells, packs, or modules from suppliers
that manufacture in the U.S. that can claim the credit.
EPA disagrees with API's assertion that the IRA tax credits cannot help to address "potential
barriers to wider adoption of PEVs." Although 30D does not apply to every PEV depending on
eligibility requirements, those that are eligible certainly benefit, and the IRA includes other tax
credits that do not carry such restrictions.
Regarding the view expressed by UAW that the applicability of the 45W Commercial Clean
Vehicle Credit to vehicles offered for lease may prevent 30D from encouraging domestic
manufacture of vehicles, EPA disagrees and notes that 30D is likely to remain a powerful
incentive for several reasons. This is in part because in order to benefit from 45W, customers
must choose to lease rather than purchase, and a lease model may not fit all customers'
preferences. Also, the amount available under 45W depends on the price difference between a
PEV and a comparable ICE vehicle, which is widely expected to diminish or disappear for many
vehicles over time while 30D will not, and over time manufacturers should increasingly be able
meet the 30D sourcing requirements. Further, manufacturers have continued to demonstrate that
30D remains highly influential in manufacturer siting decisions; for example, as discussed in
section I. A 3 of the preamble, while Hyundai has increased the leasing of vehicles to consumers
it has simultaneously also continued plans to site battery and vehicle manufacturing in the
U.S.468 Regarding UAW's suggestion that 30D and/or 45W may promote moving assembly to
Canada or Mexico or dissuade onshoring of jobs, EPA does not see reason to believe that 30D
would specifically or additionally promote such an outcome, as the 30D incentive applies equally
to vehicles assembled in the U.S. and the 45X battery manufacturing tax credits apply
specifically to U.S. manufacture. To the degree that the design and interpretation of IRA tax
incentives are determined by Congress and the Treasury Department, EPA does not have
authority over how the IRA incentives are implemented but has accounted for their likely effect
as written and based on our observation of the market.
Comments related to CBO projections of the cost of the IRA incentives compared to other
estimates are out of scope, as the accuracy or inaccuracy of CBO estimates does not in any way
bear on the availability of IRA incentives.
Regarding the comment advocating for a point of sale option for 30D, EPA notes that the
point of sale option has become available to registered dealer entities as of 2024. EPA also notes,
in response to comments that accessing 30D may be complicated or confusing, that the point of
sale option makes access easier.
In response to the comment from Valero that EPA did not apply IRA incentives to "a single
PHEV," EPA notes that there were no PHEVs in the proposal's compliance analysis, as was
clearly noted in the proposal. The updated compliance analysis includes PHEVs and these
vehicles receive the IRA credits appropriate to PHEVs.
In response to general comments citing various uncertainties with regard to future
development of the supply chain, critical minerals, and similar concerns, see also our responses
to comments on such uncertainties in RTC 15.1.
468 Korea Economic Daily, "Hyundai Motor to boost EV leasing in US for tax credits from 2023," December 30,
2022. Accessed on February 14, 2024 at https://www.kedglobal.eom/electric-vehicles/newsView/ked202212300014
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In response to comments that EPA should improve documentation of 45X assumptions in
OMEGA, EPA believes that docketing of OMEGA files and the provided level of documentation
is sufficient. Stakeholders have in the past contacted EPA staff for assistance with OMEGA files
and are encouraged to do so if desired.
For our response to comments that the total cost of ownership (TCO) example in the proposal
(DRIA p. 4-20 Table 4-7) assumed a different 30D credit amount from the amounts used in the
OMEGA analysis, see RTC 13.5. Comments that relate the IRA to projections of vehicle cost,
cost parity or price parity are discussed in RTC 12.2.7. Comments related to the interaction
between IRA assumptions and estimation of battery costs, or the effect of critical mineral cost or
availability on same, are addressed in RTC 12.2.1. For response to comments related to 30D
being a less effective successor to the previous 30D program, see our response to AFPM on a
similar topic in 12.2.1 where we discuss battery costs. Comments related to the PEV penetrations
in the No Action case are discussed in RTC 12.5.6, Modeling of the No Action case. Comments
related to monitoring development of the supply chain or similar developments in order to
modify stringency of the standards are addressed in RTC 3.4. Comments suggesting that tax
credits have a societal cost are addressed where we discuss transfers in RTC 8.1.
12.5 - Other modeling comments
12.5.1-MOVES
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
EPA's estimated per vehicle PM benefits for the exhaust PM standards are shown below. 270
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 152]
270 Multi-Pollutant Emission Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, EPA- 420-D-23-003, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis, April 2023, Table 8-1, page 8-9.
Figure 42: PM reductions by MOVES
Operating Modes: 0 -29
EC Reduction (%):99.9
Non EC PM Reduction (%):75
Operating Modes: 30
EC Reducti on (%): 9 8.5
Non EC PM Reduction (%):80
Operating Modes: 33-39
EC Reduction (%):99.9
Non EC PM Reduction (%):75
Operating Modes: 40
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EC Reducti on (%): 9 8.5
Non EC PM Reduction (%):80
Operating Modes: 101 -108
EC Reduction (%):99.9
Non EC PM Reduction (%):91
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 152]
It is important to note that when estimating the emission reductions of gasoline particulate
filter (GPFs), EPA used percent reductions obtained from testing new GPFs on test vehicles.
New GPFs would be expected to have high efficiencies. For consistency with MOVES modeling
of criteria pollutants, EPA should consider lifetime average filter efficiency, not just efficiency
on new vehicles in estimates of related emission benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
152]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CDFC)
EPA's judgement is misdirected by OTAQ's MOVES Model. As explained further in the
"Supporting Documentation and End Notes" section, OTAQ's now repudiated MOVES Model
underwent a highly questionable "development process" facilitated by BP and Chevron refinery
experts. OTAQ emails obtained via FOIA requests reveal a shocking degree of
collaboration/collusion between OTAQ experts and Coordinating Research Council (CRC)
scientists funded by the petroleum industry. Their "cooperation" went so far as OTAQ agreeing
to delete fuel samples that produced emissions results that "appeared too positive" when more
ethanol was added. Rather than adhering to market practices in full display at the time—e.g.,
splash-blending additional ethanol on top of market gasoline, thus reducing BTEX content by
dilution—OTAQ/CRC experts developed an incomprehensible "match-blending" scheme that
resulted in more BTEX being added to fuel samples at the same time as more ethanol. Naturally,
the resulting emissions were worse, but they were attributed to ethanol rather than the BTEX.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 5-6]
EPA's testing methods (and relative outcomes) for ethanol-gasoline blends seemed to undergo
a fundamental shift beginning with the Tier 3 NPRM. In 2012, during development of the Tier 3
Rule when EPA was initially requesting comment on encouraging E30 higher octane blends,
OTAQ published test results that compared E10 to E0 fuel sample. In this Tier 3 Fuels Impact
Study [Link: https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P 100TLC7.pdf], E10 had a 0.3%
efficiency gain over E0 gasoline and the E10 fuel had 1.3% less carbon per unit of energy due to
lower aromatic content. Thus, EPA's own data shows a 1.6% C02 reduction mostly due to ElO's
lower aromatic content (22 vol. % vs. 30 vol. % in the E0 test fuel). These results are consistent
with the 2015 Ford/Leone E30 chart in the endnotes, see p. 13. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0630, pp. 5-6]
However, seven years later, in its 2019 El5 RVP Rule (ultimately rejected by the courts),
EPA's MOVES Model concluded that compared to E10, E15 blends increased NMOG by 2.2%,
NOx by 2.5%, and PM by 4.1%. Recently, buried deep in OTAQ/CRC footnotes, we found one
clue: It turns out that CRC admitted in the fine print of one of their subsequently released studies
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that ethanol's alleged propensity to increase PM and NOx emissions was observed ONLY
WHEN ETHANOL WAS MIXED IN A HIGH- AROMATIC FUEL BLEND. Of course, the
burning question is why would EPA encourage the blending of ethanol into fuel samples that
contain elevated levels of aromatics, especially when Congress has directed it to promote
technologies that REDUCE aromatics to the "greatest degree achievable"? [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0630, pp. 5-6]
CRC clarified (after prodding) that "the two-phase vaporization is NOT seen in fuel blend
with lower aromatic content". In other words, if EPA had complied with Congressional
directives to REDUCE aromatics content to the greatest degree achievable there would not be a
MOVES PM controversy.2" [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 5-6]
2 For further explanation of CRC's rationale, see Endnotes, p. 13.
This connection between aromatics and higher PM emissions was indirectly validated by EPA
in the NPRM at p. 590, "Estimated Emissions and Air Quality Impacts", where EPA begins to
acknowledge that changes in fuel composition (e.g., aromatics controls) "may also impact
secondary pollutants formed in the atmosphere". EPA goes on to note that "Mobile sources are
an important contributor to secondary aerosols formed from.. .organic precursors [aromatics]",
and that "Changes in aromatic content may also affect NOx emissions". (P. 592) [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 5-6]
Clearly, the CRC refinery experts knew about the linkage between aromatics and increased
PM emissions very well, which explains why they insisted on adding more aromatics to fuel
samples whenever they added more ethanol. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 5-6]
Organization: David Hallberg
I respectfully urge that you and your experts pay careful attention to the CFDC et al. NPRM
comments—[link here— https://cleanfuelsdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/EPA-
CommentsOnMulti-pollutantRule-July23.pdf.] Of particular importance is the discussion in the
end notes which quotes OTAQ's 2015 UFP Workshop report's admission that its controversial
MOVES Model is defective because it utterly fails to predict the highly potent UFP/SOA-bound
PAHs. They also explain how OTAQ's collusion with oil experts at the Coordinating Research
Council (confirmed by FOIA-secured internal correspondence) manipulated fuel samples in a
way that deliberately pinned the additional PM emissions caused by higher BTEX content on
ethanol. [Experts were amazed at such a counterintuitive finding: EPA's 2013 Tier 3 Rule
confirmed that ethanol does not produce either SO A or PAH.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548,
p. 3]
Administrator Regan, eight years ago OTAQ formally admitted that its defective MOVES
Model requires replacement. It is unconscionable that EPA continue to rely on MOVES as the
basis for highly consequential rulemakings as it did with the MY2023 LDV GHG Final Rule.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548, p. 3]
Clearly, EPA is acting unlawfully in its use of the MOVES Model as well as its recent RFS
"set" rule, because they both contravene the Congressional directive to displace maximum
achievable amounts of BTEX with ethanol's "clean octane". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0548,
p. 7]
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Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
A. Policy Scenarios
ERM investigated five different policy scenarios: EPA's no action "baseline" ("EPA No
Action"); EPA's preferred approach ("EPA Main Proposal"); our recommended approach, which
reflects greater increases in stringency after model year 2030 ("Alternative 1+"); EPA's strongest
option ("EPA Alternative 1"); and EPA's weakest option ("EPA Alternative 3"). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 27]
B. Modeling Background
EPA's updated MOVES model (MOVES3.R3105) was utilized to model electric vehicle (EV)
adoption rates (sales and in-use), vehicle miles traveled (VMT), and pollutant emissions by
vehicle type. Cost assumptions (battery costs, incremental vehicle costs, charging equipment
costs, etc.) and vehicle classification/identification information and sales shares were
incorporated into both ERM's BCA framework and its modification and application of
MOVES3.R3 data outputs. ERM's BCA framework was applied to compare and evaluate the
impacts across several policy scenarios as compared to the EPA No Action case. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 27]
105 Although MOVES3.R1 was used for L/MD rulemaking, MOVES3.R3 reflects an updated version of
MOVES3.R1 but maintains relevant L/MDV data and assumptions.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR PIE CHART - Figure V.B-1: National Light- and
Medium-Duty Vehicle Fleetl06 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 28]
106 ERM, Impacts Report at 6.
This pie chart is based on EPA's modified version of MOVES. EPA projects that the majority
of vehicles subject to the rule will be SUVs and light trucks (-160 million), followed by
passenger cars (i.e., sedans), which are projected to number just over 100 million vehicles. The
remainder is made up of Class 2b (chassis-certified only) and Class 3 medium-duty vehicles,
projected to number around 14 million vehicles nationwide; note that "incomplete" class 2b/3
vehicles covered by the proposed Phase 3 heavy-duty rulemaking were not included in this
analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 28]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
In evaluating the health benefits of the proposed rule, it is critical to consider the evidence of
increases in PM from recent model year vehicles. The health benefits assessment included in
EPA's proposal uses emission factors from Motor Vehicle Emission Simulator (MOVES), which
likely underestimates PM emissions from recent model year vehicles. Figure 15 shows a
comparison between EPA MOVES emission factors and remote sensing UV smoke averages by
model year, shown as a percent change from each sources respective model year 2005
averages. 140 From model years 2006-2015, year-to-year changes, shown in the slopes of the
lines, are relatively consistent between EPA MOVES and remote sensing data. However, from
model year 2015 on, the trends diverge. For light-duty passenger trucks, the EPA MOVES PM
emission factors sharply decline while the remote sensing data show an increase in UV smoke
averages. 141 Though less significant, a similar trend is observed for passenger cars, with the
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EPA MOVES PM emission factor continuing to decline after 2015 and remote sensing UV
smoke averages showing a slight increase. These findings suggest that the modeled air quality
and health benefits of the proposed rule may be underestimated when considering the large
benefits of replacing 2015-2020 model year vehicles with future vehicles meeting the proposed
PM emission limits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 53-54]
140 EPA MOVES emission factors are converted from fuel-specific to distance-specific emission factors
for this comparison. This is done using real-world fuel economy data from EPA Automotive Trends report,
the same source used to convert the remote sensing emissions from fuel-specific to distance-specific.
141 Light-duty passenger truck emission trends from EPA MOVES are compared to light-duty truck (LDT)
emission trends from remote sensing data. Similarly, passenger car emission trends from EPA MOVES are
compared to light-duty vehicle (LDV) emission trends from remote sensing data.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 15. Percent change in distance-specific PM
emission factor from EPA MOVES and remote sensing (RS) UV smoke measurements from
Colorado (CO) and Virginia (VA) sources by model year, compared to model year 2005. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 53-54]
Organization: ReginaldModlin andB. ReidDetchon
2. EPA's modeling - Part 2
a. EPA's Motor Vehicle Emission Simulator (MOVES) is a modeling system that estimates
emissions for mobile sources at the national, county, and project level for criteria air pollutants,
greenhouse gases, and air toxics. Its use is required for the development of State Implementation
Plans to reduce air pollution in areas that do not meet National Ambient Air Quality Standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 29]
i. In 2014 EPA updated the MOVES model to incorporate new emissions factors for
ethanol blends. These changes were based on a laboratory analysis that used "match blending" to
simulate the performance of various fuel formulas. This approach was fundamentally flawed, as
a published paper by industry engineers observed: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 29]
1. Aromatics were added (above the 25% legal limit for reformulated gasoline) to match
certain parameters of fuels that had less ethanol. The resulting degradation of emissions was
primarily caused by the added aromatics but was incorrectly blamed on the ethanol. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 29]
148 James E. Anderson et al., "Issues with T50 and T90 as Match Criteria for Ethanol-Gasoline Blends,"
SAE International Journal of Fuels and Lubricants (2014): 7(3): pp. 1027-40:
https://saemobilus.sae.org/content/2014-01-9080/ (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
2. This mistake causes the MOVES model to predict incorrectly elevated emissions factors
for ethanol blends. For example, smog-forming nitrogen oxides (NOx) have been shown in the
real world to decrease as the percentage of ethanol increases, but the MOVES model predicts
higher NOx emissions for ethanol blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 29]
149 Ioannis Gravalos et al., "Performance and Emission Characteristics of Spark Ignition Engine Fuelled
with Ethanol and Methanol Gasoline Blended Fuels," chapter 7, Alternative Fuel, Maximino Manzanera
(ed.) (2011): p. 170:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/221914443_Performance_and_Emission_Characteristics_of_Spar
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k_Ignition_Engine_Fuelled_with_Ethanol_and_Methanol_Gasoline_Blended_Fuels (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
3. In fact, EPA's Phase I testing results showed that NOx and PM "have significant
decreases in emissions as ethanol levels increase from E0 to E10" - and EPA then "decided to
drop the Phase 1 test fuels ... from the Phase 3 fuel matrix." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570,
p. 30]
150 Adam R.F. Gustafson, Boy den Gray & Associates, "EPA Emails Show the Agency Relied on the Oil
Industry to Design Anti-Ethanol Fuel Effects Study," memo to Urban Air Initiative, Nov. 4, 2016: pp. 15,
17: http://cleanfuelsdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/BGA-FOIA-EPA-EPact-Emails-Nov-4-2016.pdf
(accessed Sept. 14, 2021)
4. At a meeting in June 2015 with the Energy Future Coalition, EPA Administrator Gina
McCarthy erroneously asserted that her hands were tied on mid-level ethanol blends because
they would increase NOx - a comment probably based on the flawed tests and the MOVES
model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 30]
151 Reid Detchon, Energy Future Coalition, personal recollection.
ii. Emissions tests by the U.S. Department of Energy have confirmed that "even though
ethanol is more catalytically reactive than other gasoline components, ethanol will likely neither
help nor hinder compliance with NOx, non-methane organic gases (NMOG), and CO regulations
in realistic fuel blends." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 30]
152 Daniel Gaspar, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, "Top Ten Blendstocks For Turbocharged
Gasoline Engines: Bioblendstocks With Potential to Deliver the Highest Engine Efficiency." PNNL-28713
(2019): p. 34: https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1567705 (accessed June 22, 2021).
iii. Despite repeated calls to fix this clear error, EPA has not done so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570, p. 30]
Organization: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
8. Incorporation of standards into the Motor Vehicle Emission Simulator (MOVES). EPA
should ensure these standards, when finalized, are incorporated into the MOVES emissions
model as soon as possible so that they can be reflected in the regulatory modeling associated
with state implementation plans and transportation conformity. EPA should also consider if
additional MOVES guidance is necessary to address situations in which an individual state's
future on-road electric vehicle penetration ends up differing substantially from those on which
these standards are based. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 3]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
One commenter states that EPA should consider lifetime average exhaust particulate filter
efficiency (not just efficiency on new vehicles) in estimates of related emission benefits.
Other commenters state that the MOVES model incorrectly predicts increases in particulates
and other emissions for mid-level ethanol blends compared to E10 gasoline. They also suggest
this situation has contributed to avoidance of regulatory actions that should have imposed limits
on the aromatic content (referred to as BTEX) in market gasoline, which in turn could have
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reduced emissions of a range of toxic pollutants including compounds known to form secondary
organic aerosols. Some commenters attribute these problems with MOVES to an emissions study
(known as EPAct) using test fuels that didn't represent real-world gasoline formulations. A
commenter asserts that this issue has been brought to EPA's attention in the past, but EPA has
not made corrections to the MOVES model.
One commenter states that EPA's MOVES model underestimates exhaust particulate matter
emissions from recent light duty vehicles.
Another commenter asks if EPA should consider changes to EPA guidance on using MOVES.
Response:
We thank the commenters for their review of the proposed program. With regard to the
comment on lifetime particulate filter efficiency, while we do not yet have data on the
effectiveness of future gasoline particulate filters over the full life of in-use vehicles, we do know
that filtration efficiency increases rapidly in the first -1,500 miles and then increases slowly after
that. At the same time, gasoline engines typically produce more particulate matter as they age,
and there will be some GPF removal, tampering and damage with age. Considering all these
factors, the net PM is likely fairly stable after the first 1,500 miles, which implies an increasing
percent filter effectiveness. The modeling done in the regulatory analysis applied a constant
percent filter effectiveness to all MOVES ages, and thus may have underestimated the GPF
benefits for older vehicles.
We have responded to the comments related to the EPAct study and its application in
MOVES in multiple documents over the past several years. Regarding the central issue of the
design and conduct of the EPAct study, it was not intended to only assess the effects of
incremental increases in ethanol but changes in multiple fuel parameters separately or together so
that it could be applied to a wide range of gasoline formulations found in the market. The
multivariate parametric treatment design used in the EPAct fuel matrix reflects a standard
practice across a wide range of scientific disciplines. Additional responses to specific comments
on the EPAct study are covered at length in Section 3 of a document entitled "Agency Response
to Request for Correction of Information Petition #17001 Concerning the EPAct/V2/E-89 Fuel
Effects Study and the Motor Vehicle Emissions Simulator (MOVES2014'f available via the EPA
website and in this rulemaking docket.469
Regarding the comments about BTEX, imposing limits on BTEX in gasoline would force
refiners to reformulate their gasoline to use other high-octane components, one of which may be
additional ethanol. Understanding the impact of such reformulations on overall air quality would
necessarily include changes in a broad range of vehicle emissions (including refueling and
evaporative processes), as well as changes in petroleum refining and increases in ethanol
production and agricultural intensity. These things may reduce the overall air quality benefits
significantly. We are not aware of any analyses integrating all these pieces at this time, and such
work is beyond the scope of this final rule. The CAA imposes a significantly different regulatory
regime for regulating fuels under 211(c), and EPA solicited comment on potential changes to
fuels regulations but did not propose changes.
469 Available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2018-09/documents/ethanol-
related_request_for_correction_combined_aug_312018 .pdf
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We understand that new data on fuel properties and their effects on emissions are being
generated continuously, and through a process of ongoing and deliberate review, we update the
MOVES model when the weight of evidence warrants. As described in Section IX of the
proposal, as part of a separate, potential future action, we are considering a potential limit on
heavy aromatics in market gasoline, which could reduce particulate emissions and other pollutant
precursors in many areas of the country.
With regards to concerns that MOVES may underestimate exhaust particulate emissions from
recent light duty vehicles, the ICCT analysis seems to have been done with an earlier version of
MOVES. The MOVES3.R1 version used to support the NPRM was revised from MOVES3 to
better account for the phase-in of vehicles with gasoline direct injection engines. For more
information see NPRM Docket Memo " Updates to MOVES for the Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles," FROM:
Megan Beardsley, Environmental Scientist, Assessment and Standards Division, Office of
Transportation and Air Quality, TO: Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829, DATE:
February 10, 2023, and Section 4 of Exhaust Emission Rates for Light-Duty Onroad Vehicles in
MOVES4 (pdf) (8.5 MB, August 2023, EPA-420-R-23-028). Also, it is not clear how the ICCT
analysis accounts for vehicle age. The cited ICCT report says that the data summarized in the
figure was collected over the calendar years from 2015 to 2021, implying that the data points for
older model years represent average values across a range of MOVES age bins. Presumably, the
MOVES emissions shown in the figure are for a single calendar year and thus incorporate
deterioration factors that increase with age (and decline with model year). That means the graph
shared in the comment is not comparing like quantities. Nevertheless, if additional analysis
confirms the commenter's claim that MOVES has underestimated the emissions from light-duty
vehicles, this would further support the need for more stringent PM controls as finalized in this
rule.
With regards to MOVES guidance, the MOVES4 Technical Guidance: Using MOVES to
Prepare Emission Inventories for State Implementation Plans and Transportation Conformity
included in the docket for this rulemaking provides guidance on how to forecast future on-road
electric vehicle fractions. If needed, we will update this guidance for future MOVES versions.
12.5.2 - [Reserved]
12.5.3 - Compliance modeling pathways
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
A de facto battery electric vehicle mandate
Our concerns cover both the GHG requirements and the criteria emission requirements. Taken
together, the proposed GHG and criteria pollutant standards are so stringent as to set a de facto
BEV mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 3]
Auto Innovators is concerned that the proposed standards leave little or no room for error to
address foreseen and unforeseen challenges and overestimates the potential for the EV market to
develop as rapidly as EPA assumes - effectively lOx greater BEV market share than in 2022. In
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the past, multiple technologies were available for manufacturers to pick from or to fall back on if
a chosen technology encountered technical or market issues. For example, for a short time, some
manufacturers applied dual clutch transmission technology and then moved on to advanced
planetary gear automatic transmissions due to customer acceptance issues. Some engine stop-
start systems also encountered challenges, slowing their anticipated roll-out. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 89]
In the case of emissions standards largely premised on zero-emission vehicles, such as EPA's
proposed rule, there is no such fallback. By 2032, under the proposed standards, only EVs are
likely to meet their individual footprint-based targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 89]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
Despite EPA's assertions that the standards are technology-neutral, the reality is the proposed
tailpipe-only approach is a de facto ban on ICEVs. AFPM does not oppose electric vehicles
comprising an increasing share of the transportation mix, but we oppose regulations that are
framed to ultimately ban ICEVs. EPA should establish standards, based on the full lifecycle of
each vehicle class, that are achievable by each powertrain technology. ICEVs will continue to
have a place in a diverse transportation future. This approach was summarized well in a 2021
report from the National Academies of Science [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 3]
In addition, by factoring in ZEV performance into standards broadly applicable to both ZEV
and non-ZEV, utilizing averaging, EPA is ignoring the technological feasibility of emissions-
related systems and simply requiring the production of fewer ICEVs. This approach also ignores
the fact that major automakers are on differing technological paths, as noted by the National
Academies of Sciences, "with some focusing their research and development and advanced
technology deployment more squarely on ZEVs, and others more focused on advanced HEVs to
maximize ICE efficiency."88 During the last two years, 17,000 research articles were published
that focus on improving ICEVs or lowering their carbon footprint with liquid fuel technologies,
such as lower carbon fuel production technologies, the substitution of lower carbon feedstocks
and lower carbon fuels, and by optimizing fuel properties like octane. 89 Instead of focusing on
advances to ICEV technologies when setting the standards, the Proposed Rule relies on ZEVs as
the only relevant advanced technology, which is arbitrary and capricious given that many ICEV
technologies, unlike mass adoption of ZEVs, "permit the development and application of the
requisite technology" within the time necessary to comply with the forthcoming standards.90
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 22-23]
88 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Assessment of Technologies for
Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy—2025-2035. Washington, DC: The National Academies
Press, p. 369. https://doi.org/10.17226/26092.
89 Fuels Institute. Literature Review Summary: Future Capabilities of Combustion Engines and Liquid
Fuels. Nov. 2022.
90 42 U.S.C.(a).
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Unlike with previous automotive emissions regulations, in which an OEM had numerous
compliance technology pathways and could strategically invest in a package of technologies that
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best suited its customers' needs, this proposal sets stringencies at such a level where there is just
one way to comply: significant levels of electrification. Yet should the market not pan out within
the agency's ambitious timeline - even for reasons entirely beyond an automaker's control, such
as a slower-than-expected rollout of public charging infrastructure that has a chilling effect on
consumer interest in EVs - there is no safety net, no alternate package of technologies to which
an OEM can pivot and maintain compliance. Regulated parties will simply fall short, facing a
profoundly disruptive and costly set of noncompliance obligations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0652, p. 5]
In fairness, it is reasonable for the agency to consider announced industry targets as evidence
of automakers' meaningful shift toward an electric portfolio. Similarly, however, it is equally
reasonable to expect that the agency also consider automakers' stated concerns - the availability
and pricing of critical minerals, the availability of sufficient domestic battery production
capacity, the availability and reliability of public charging infrastructure and today's
comparatively modest consumer uptake of EVs that falls well short of the agency's high
expectations for only a few years down the line. In our view, the agency has not adequately
addressed the above noted concerns, or properly accounted for them in its standard-setting
process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 22]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
iii. Non-electrification solutions.
EPA's analysis is flawed in that it failed to account for non-electrification solutions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 9-10]
1. Technology neutrality - all solutions should be allowed to compete.
In the preamble to the proposed rule, EPA states that "[t]he proposed standards are
performance based and do not mandate any specific technology for any manufacturer or any
vehicle type" and "[e]ach manufacturer is free to choose its own set of technologies with which it
will demonstrate compliance.. .".20 We disagree, as the stringency of the proposed standards -
and even the technology mixes suggested by EPA in the proposal - essentially forces
manufacturers to solely focus development efforts on BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 9-10]
20 88 Fed. Reg. 29329 (May 5, 2023).
Although EPA asserts that the proposed rule standards do not mandate any specific
technology, EPA demonstrates compliance with its proposed standards by modeling new light-
duty BEV sales that increase from 36% in 2027 to 67% in 2032. That means, within 5 years, the
ratio of new BEV sales to total sales will increase from one third to two thirds of new car sales.
For the MDV category, EPA21 modelled compliance with average new sales reaching 46% in
2032, up from 17% in 2027. EPA modeling relies heavily on the electrification of vans, which
reaches 98% by 2032. These compliance projections are much higher than sales of battery
electric MDVs in 2020 of less than 1 percent.22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 9-10]
21 88 Fed. Reg. 29331 (May 5, 2023).
22 Table 3-1. "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and
Medium-Duty Vehicles - Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis", EPA-420-D-23-003. April 2023.
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API strongly believes in an all-of-the-above strategy to reducing emissions, and we
recommend that EPA adjust the standards to allow all solutions the ability to compete. Further,
doing so would provide more time for other technologies to be proven with less risk to vehicle
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and the public if electrification expansion of LMDVs
does not pan out in the proposal's implementation timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 9-10]
To that end, various studies have highlighted the importance of allowing all technologies to be
utilized to reduce emissions faster, more effectively, and at a lower cost.23,24 By limiting the
scope to tailpipe emissions, the proposal is inherently not technology neutral. Setting strict
tailpipe-only standards results in a limited, prescribed solution set. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 9-10]
23 National Academy of Sciences. "Cost, Effectiveness, and Deployment of Fuel Economy Technologies
for Light-Duty Vehicles." 2015. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/download/21744.
24 National Academy of Sciences. "Assessment of Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel
Economy 2025-2035." 2021. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/download/26092.
e. API Supports Consumer Choice for Vehicles.
API 53 supports the concept that different vehicle technologies that reduce greenhouse gas
emissions should be allowed to compete equally for consumer and market acceptance and
growth. However, API has concerns with regards to the EPA's approach and its effect on
consumer choice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 18-19]
53 https://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/blog/2021/05/18/us-consumers-need-balance-choice-in-
transportation-policy.
The stringency of the proposed standard is essentially forcing electrification of the
transportation sector and is not in alignment with most Americans that, according to a Pew
Center survey,54 favor "using a mix of energy sources to meet the country's needs" and a
majority of survey respondents oppose phasing out gasoline powered vehicles by 2035. Concerns
with charging availability55 could be relieved with vehicle technologies (e.g., PHEVs56) where
the length of an average daily trip is approximately 30 miles.57 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 18-19]
54 Tyson, A. et al. "Gen Z, Millennial Stand Out for Climate Change Activism, Social Media Engagement
With Issue." Pew Research Center. May 2021. https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2021/05/26/gen-z-
millennials-stand-out- for-climate-change-activism-social-media-engagement-with-issue/.
55 Noblet, S. "Closing The Great EV Charging Gap." August 2021. Forbes.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stacynoblet/2021/08/10/closing-the-great-ev-charging-gap/7slF6cf9107f73f4.
56 EPA is proposing a fleet utility factor (FUF) curve that will increase C02 compliance values for
PHEVs. 88 Fed. Reg. 292557 (May 5, 2023).
57 2019 Bureau of Transportation data indicates 49% of 2019 national trips by distance were less 25 miles.
Organization: BlueGreen Alliance (BGA)
And while automakers will certainly need to produce and sell zero-emission vehicles to meet
the standards laid out in EPA's range of proposals, the standards are ultimately performance-
based, which means that manufacturers can leverage a range of pollution-reducing technologies
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to help bring their fleets into compliance with both the GHG emissions standards and the local
pollutant emissions standards within the proposals. These technologies include plug-in hybrids,
waste heat recovery systems, aerodynamics, lightweighting, and gas particulate filters (GPFs).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp. 4-5]
The range of EPA's proposals effectively advances research, development and deployment of
zero-emission technologies like those in battery electric and fuel cell vehicles, while also pushing
other pollution reducing technologies. The tech-forcing and tech-agnostic nature of EPA's
proposals means that the standards have the potential to create and protect domestic
manufacturing jobs in a diverse range of facilities, from those producing battery components for
plug-in hybrids to those making gas particulate filters for pickup trucks (see Figure 3). A
standard that advances the deployment of zero emission and tailpipe pollution-reducing
technologies provides manufacturers with ample flexibility as they determine how they will meet
the requirements, while also maximizing the standards' potential to create and protect jobs in the
domestic automotive supply chain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp. 4-5]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 3: Zero Emission, Fuel Efficiency, and Tailpipe
Pollution Reduction Technology Manufacturing for Light- and Medium-Duty Vehicles Source:
BGA Research [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp. 4-5]
Organization: BorgWarner Inc.
BorgWarner supports performance-based regulations and opposes technology mandates.
We advise regulators to develop standards that are technology neutral and performance-based
to encourage innovation. 5 All technology pathways with practical applications should be
included as potential solutions to assist the U.S. in achieving its environmental goals.
Regulations based on the end goals of a clean environment, minimizing C02 emissions, and
preserving resources should not give preferential treatment to a specific technology. Public
policies should let innovation and market dynamics determine the most effective solutions.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, p. 6]
5 See BorgWarner Comments EPA-HQ-OAR-2019-0055; FRL-7165-03-OAR.
HEV, PHEV, BEVs, FCEVs, and H2ICE all have strengths depending on the use case, and
regulators must enable every technology solution to reduce GHG emissions as fast as possible.
EPA has demonstrated an enthusiasm for BEV and FCEV technologies, and we urge EPA to
include pathways for all technologies in its clean transportation strategy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0640, p. 6]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
While the proposal is technology-neutral, U.S. EPA's modeling shows that ZEVs will in
many cases be the most likely pathway to comply with the standards. Indeed, ZEVs can
simultaneously reduce greenhouse gas (GHG), toxic air contaminant, and criteria air pollutant
emissions while saving consumers money. Consumers have more choices than ever, and ZEVs
are increasingly capable of functioning equivalently to their conventional gasoline- and diesel-
fueled counterparts. U.S. EPA has also rightly recognized the availability of improved
technologies to control emissions from conventional internal combustion engine vehicles, and
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the proposed standards will help maintain emission benefits from these vehicles that will remain
on the road. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 7-8]
Organization: Competitive Enterprise Institute
The MY 2023-2026 standards are estimated to increase EV market penetration "from about 7
percent market share in MY 2023 (including both fully electric vehicles (EVs) and plug-in
hybrid vehicles (PHEVs)) up to about 17 percent in MY 2026."10 The EPA acknowledges that
the standards coerce increased EV sales, as that is the only way automakers can comply:
"Compliance with the final standards will necessitate greater implementation and pace of
technology penetration through MY 2026 using existing GHG reduction technologies, including
further deployment of BEV and PHEV technologies." 11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, p. 4]
10 EPA, Revised 2023 and Later Model Year 2023 Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards, Final Rule, 86 FR
74434, 74438, December 30, 2021, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-30/pdf/2021-
27854.pdf.
11 86 FR 74493 (emphasis added). See also 86 FR 74484 ("This is a greater penetration of BEVs and
PHEVs than projected in the proposed rule, and is driven by several factors, including the increased
stringency of our final standards....") and 86 FR 74485 ("Our updated analysis projects that the final rule
can be met with a fleet that achieves a gradually increasing market share of EVs and PHEVs....")
Organization: Consumer Reports (CR)
2.1. Automakers Have Multiple Options for Compliance
EPA's proposal for MY27+ Light- and Medium-Duty vehicle GHG standards are strong,
achievable, technology-neutral performance standards. EPA's analysis found that electric
vehicles (EVs) are likely to be the most cost-effective compliance pathway for automakers to
meet these standards, but they are not the only option. EPA estimated that an EV-only
compliance pathway would require 67% of vehicles sold to be EVs by 2032. However,
automakers can also use a mix of improvements in internal combustion engine (ICE) fuel
efficiency, conventional hybrids, plug-in hybrids (PHEV), and even hydrogen fuel cell electric
vehicles (FCEV) to comply with these standards. CR's modeling presented in Section 6.2 shows
that automakers can utilize a wide range of options to comply with these rules. Most automakers
will be able to comply with these rules while only selling between 50-60% battery electric
vehicles (BEVs) by using a mix of widely available and cost effective technologies. Automakers
that invest heavily in conventional and plug-in hybrids will be able to comply while selling as
few as 40% BEVs in 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 7-8]
6.2. Modeling of Compliance Pathways
EPA's compliance modeling estimates the single most cost-effective compliance pathway for
the vehicle fleet under the proposed regulation. However, it is not the only possible compliance
pathway automakers can take. Different automakers are likely to take wildly different
compliance pathways, with some automakers going all in on EVs, while other automakers may
hedge their bets with more hybrids and PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 20-21]
CR modeled a range of reasonable alternative compliance pathways that automakers might
consider. The modeling considers different levels of continued ICE improvement and
deployment of PHEVs as a percentage of all plug-in vehicles.43 The results of this analysis for
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model year 2032 are shown in Table 6.1. They show that a wide range of compliance pathways
are available to automakers that can reduce the required BEV sales market share for model year
2032 to between 50-60% with varying levels of ICE improvement and PHEV deployment. There
is even a feasible compliance option which would allow compliance with only 40% BEVs with
heavy investment in hybrid and PHEV technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 20-21]
43 ICE improvements of 1% (low), 3.5% (medium) and 5% (high) are modeled. PHEV market share was
modeled as a percentage of all plug-in vehicles with values of 0%, 10%, 20% and 40% modeled.
[See original comment for Table 6.1 - Modeling of Compliance Alternatives for EPA's
Proposed Standards for MY2032] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 20-21]
A few scenarios were also modeled for EPA's Alternative 1. These results are shown in Table
6.2. They find that with only a small improvement in ICE vehicles (1% per year reduction in
emissions), automakers can comply with these stronger standards with a minimal increase in
BEV market share from 67% to 68% compared to EPA's modeling of the proposed standards.
Further reductions in BEV market share are also possible with further investment in ICE
improvement and PHEV deployment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 20-21]
[See original comment for Table 6.2 - Modeling of Compliance Alternatives for EPA's
Alternative 1 for MY 2032] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 20-21]
Overall these results show that automakers have many potential reasonable compliance
pathways to comply with either EPA's proposed standards or the stronger Alternative 1. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 20-21]
Organization: Energy Innovation
Ultimately, though, increased adoption of BEVs is the most expedient and effective way to
eliminate harmful tailpipe pollutants. We encourage the EPA to push the auto industry to reduce
all emissions more rapidly through the adoption of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p.
7]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
Because EPA's OMEGA 2 model is designed to show only the most cost-effective
compliance pathways, it does not capture the full range of possible pathways automakers may
choose to take based on the numerous factors that influence product lines. To demonstrate that
the standards can be met with a range of technologies (including increased deployment of
PHEVs), EDF contracted with Roush to project the relative cost of PHEVs and BEVs in the
2024-2035 timeframe.27 EDF then used Roush's cost projections for PHEVs in conjunction with
EPA's costs for BEVs and ICEVs to conduct an analysis of compliance costs under possible
scenarios in which PHEV and ICEV sales represent a greater proportional share of
manufacturers' sales than EPA modeled while still meeting the GHG emissions targets set in
EPA's proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 12-13]
27 Vishnu Nair, Himanshu Saxena, Sajit Pillai, Alternative Powertrain Pathways for Light-Duty and Class
3 Vehicles for MYs 2024, 2027, and 2035 to Meet Future C02 Emission Targets, Roush for EDF (June
2023). (Attachment L)
EDF evaluated 3 alternative pathways towards compliance with EPA's proposed standards:
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Pathway 1 (ICEV Pathway): assumes the greatest possible GHG control from ICEVs
using EPA's OMEGA 2 model; assumes no PHEV technologies [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0786, pp.12-13]
Pathway 2: sets PHEV and BEV sales to roughly equivalent levels leaving ICEV
emissions at the level projected in EPA's compliance simulation of its proposed standards [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 12-13]
Pathway 3: increases PHEV sales further than Pathway 2 by maximizing ICEV
emission controls as in Pathway 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 12-13]
Because Pathway 1 does not assume PHEV deployment, EDF was able to model it using
EPA's OMEGA 2 model directly. EDF constrained battery availability in the model to limit
BEV sales so that the model would apply more ICEV control technology than EPA modeled.28
By running OMEGA 2 multiple times with various battery capacity caps, we found that limiting
annual battery capacity to 954 GWh produced the lowest ICEV emissions while still enabling
compliance with the proposed standards. ICEV emissions averaged 205 g/mi and represented
40% of new vehicle sales, with BEVs accounting for the remaining 60 percent. These ICEV
emissions were 18% lower than in EPA's simulation, while ICEV sales were 7% higher. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 12-13]
28 The ICEV pathway required both ICEV control and increased BEV sales. Since increased BEV sales are
generally more cost effective than reducing ICEV emissions, the only way to force OMEGA 2 to apply
more ICEV control was to limit BEV sales. This was done by reducing the total battery capacity available
to manufacturers per model year, which is input to the model on line 67 of the batch file.
Recent work performed by the ICCT is consistent with these findings and indicates that even
greater levels of ICEV greenhouse gas control could offset BEV sales.29 The ICCT projected
that manufacturers could reduce MY 2022 emissions by 25-37% in the 2030-2035 timeframe.30
This is 2-18%) more than the potential reduction we found using OMEGA 2 above. This greater
degree of ICEV emissions reduction would reduce the number of BEVs required to meet the
proposed 2032 GHG standards to as low as 50%, significantly lower than the 60% level EDF
modeled above. Moreover, neither EDF's nor ICCTs ICEV analysis separately accounts for the
role of PHEVs could play.31 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 12-13]
29 Slowik, Peter, Aaron Isenstadt, Logan Pierce, Stephanie Searle, White Paper, "Assessment of Light-
Duty Electric Vehicle Costs and Consumer Benefits in the United States in the 2022-2035 Time Frame,"
The International Counsel on Clean Technologies (2022), https://theicct.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/10/ev-cost-benefits-2035- oct22.pdf (Attachment M).
30 Id.
31 Some manufacturers, including Toyota, have indicated that they will rely more heavily on PHEVs for
emissions reductions. Peter Johnson, Toyota's New CEO Adjusts EV Plans but Sticks to a Hybrid
Approach, electrek (Apr. 7, 2023), https://electrek.co/2023/04/07/toyotas-new-ceo-adjusts-ev-plans-but-
sticks-to-a-hybrid-approach/. Adjusts EV Plans but Sticks to a Hybrid Approach
For Pathways 2 and 3, we evaluated the role PHEVs could play either in isolation (Pathway 2)
or in combination with ICEVs (Pathway 3) in allowing manufacturers to meet the standards and,
as a consequence, sell fewer BEVs. EPA discusses PHEV technology in its proposal and
includes several aspects of PHEV technology in the OMEGA 2 input files. However, the model
does not appear to allow the selection of PHEV technology as a compliance pathway. Thus, EDF
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used estimates of the emissions and cost of PHEVs to adjust OMEGA 2 projections outside of
the model. We assumed PHEVs would have an onroad all-electric range of 50 miles, as this is
the effective minimum onroad range allowable for a PHEV to qualify as a ZEV under
California's Advanced Clean Cars II program. While this is the type of PHEV EDF chose to use
in its modeling, vehicle manufacturers would be free under EPA regulations to choose the best
mix of PHEV ranges which still met the GHG standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp.
12-13]
Using EPA's proposed formula for calculating a vehicle model's utility factor (UF)—the split
of a PHEV's driving between gasoline and electricity—the UF for a PHEV50 is about 0.67. This
means that 67% of a PHEV50's mileage is performed using electricity and 33% of its mileage
uses gasoline. In terms of C02 emissions, a PHEV50 can be considered equivalent to two-thirds
of a BEV and one-third of a strong hybrid ICEV. EDF further assumed that the GHG
performance of a PHEV50 while operating on gasoline would be 205 g/mi, the same level as
described in the ICEV control-focused run above.32 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 13-
15]
32 Since PHEVs are required to meet the same criteria pollutant emission standards as ICEVs when
operating on gasoline, substituting PHEVs for BEVs at equivalent fleetwide GHG levels has no impact on
criteria pollutant emissions.
PHEVs cost more than BEVs due to requiring both electric and gasoline powertrains. Because
the OMEGA 2 output did not project costs for complete PHEVs, we used the incremental cost
difference between Roush's BEV and PHEV50 costs and applied that difference to EPA's BEV
costs to derive projected PHEV costs.33 On a sales-weighted basis, considering the difference in
electrification costs across vehicle segments and the types of vehicles that OMEGA2 is
projecting to become electrified, we found that the average incremental PHEV50 cost, absent
IRA vehicle tax credits, was $6,700 in MY 2032 relative to a BEV.34 Following EPA's
methodology for applying the IRA vehicle tax credits, we included the credit for the additional
number of BEV plus PHEV sales in each pathway, as EPA had already accounted for the tax
credits available for BEVs projected in their analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 13-
15]
33 Roush's BEV costs are lower than EPA's, so we took this approach in lieu of substituting Roush's costs
for both BEVs and PHEV50s.
34 Based on interpolation between costs in MY 2027 and MY 2035.
As the Table shows, manufacturers choosing to comply with increased application of ICEV
control technology (per OMEGA 2) (Pathway 1) could reduce the need for BEV sales by 7%> in
2032. Average vehicle costs increase to $800 after IRA credits which is more than offset by
vehicle savings principally in the form of less fuel usage. Likewise, cumulative net benefits still
exceed one trillion dollars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 15]
Manufacturers choosing to comply by adding PHEVs (either on their own or in combination
with ICEV improvements) (Pathway 2 or 3) could further reduce BEV sales in 2032 to be
anywhere from 31-38%) and remain compliant with the standards. These are well below EPA's
projected level of 61% in the least cost BEV-only pathway. Per vehicle costs increase to $1,850-
$2,900, though still well below operation savings. Cumulative net benefits decrease significantly,
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but remain above zero due to the relatively high vehicle operation savings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, p. 15]
In summary, EDF's modeling, plus ICCT's projections of manufacturers' capability in
reducing C02 emissions from ICEVs, provides three viable examples of compliance pathways
automakers could choose to take—one reliant on ICEVs, one on PHEV controls and the third on
both—all of which demonstrate the flexibility afforded manufacturers to cost-effectively reduce
emissions using a mix of technologies with lesser reliance on BEV sales than is shown in EPA's
modeling. Of course, these are illustrative compliance pathways, and manufacturers could
choose to rely on a combination of ICEV improvements and PHEV sales in a manner that would
provide yet further cost-effective options to meet EPA's standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0786, p. 15]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
5. Automakers can feasibly and inexpensively improve combustion vehicle emissions
simply by shifting sales to the cleanest trims of popular models.
Yet another pathway that automakers could use to comply with stronger standards lies in
shifting their sales to the cleanest trims of their popular combustion vehicle models. In 2022, 8.6
million sales - more than half of all new automotive sales - were from just twelve combustion
vehicle nameplates. These top-selling vehicles were sold by five automakers: Ford, General
Motors, Honda, Stellantis, Toyota. Within each nameplate, the automakers provided different
powertrain options (such as engine size, transmission gearing, hybridization and other
characteristics), and each had their own emissions performance - some better than others. These
vehicle options are all in production, and selling more of any one powertrain could lead to
reductions in sales volumes of the same nameplate with a different powertrain. These changes in
volumes within a nameplate are a regular feature of the automobile market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 47]
An automaker could improve the emissions performance of its vehicles simply by shifting
sales within a nameplate to versions with cleaner powertrains. This shift could achieve emissions
reductions without an investment in new emissions technologies or large-scale capital
expenditures for factory retooling. Similar emissions improvements could also be achieved due
to a consolidation or reduction in powertrain options as ZEVs replace sales of these combustion
vehicle nameplates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 47]
We estimated the emissions savings that could be achieved by shifting production in a
nameplate from the mix of powertrains sold in 2022 to the cleanest powertrain currently
available in that nameplate. Table VI. A-5 shows the top-selling twelve nameplates analyzed and
the emissions reductions that could be achieved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 47]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table VI.A-5: Emissions Reductions in Top-Selling
Nameplates by Focusing Sales on Cleaner Powertrains 127 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
48]
127 This analysis relies on sales estimates of each powertrain version within each nameplate
and total sales per manufacturer provided by Baum & Associates. Emissions rates per nameplate
version were accessed from www.fueleconomy.gov.
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The high-volume nameplates analyzed comprise between 25% to 51% of each automaker's
total sales in 2022. Adjusting sales within these nameplates toward the versions with the cleanest
powertrains would provide significant emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
pp. 47-48]
Organization: Exxon Mobil Corporation
EPA's Proposal establishes standards for emissions reductions that can be achieved only
through a rapid transformation of the transportation sector and through limited technology
pathways. Specifically, the proposed standards could require as many as two-thirds of all new
light-duty vehicle purchases to be battery electric vehicles (BEVs) by 2032. ExxonMobil
believes BEVs will play an important role in reducing transportation sector emissions. Indeed,
we produce plastics that can help reduce vehicle weight and increase fuel efficiency, butyl rubber
that improves air retention in tires and can improve BEV range by up to 7 percent,6 and our
Mobil EV™ suite of electric vehicle fluids and products help enable further, longer, and safer
performance for electric cars, vans, and trucks.7 We believe, however, that EPA should
encourage a diversity of technology pathways that allow for consumers to choose between
vehicle types. Standards that encourage a combination of BEVs, plug-in hybrids, full hybrids,
and efficient internal combustion engine vehicles, that could operate with bio and renewable
fuels, are a better way to reduce GHG emissions and manage dependence on foreign critical
minerals. Such a technology-neutral policy approach would foster innovation and competition
across all technologies and could ultimately help encourage more effective and lower cost
solutions for consumers and businesses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0632, p. 2]
6 ExxonMobil Advancing Climate Solutions 2023 Progress Report (2023), page 20.
7 www.mobil.com/en-us/commercial-vehicle-lube/pds/na-xx-mobil-ev-drive-201-
Organization: Growth Energy
Second, the proposed rule's stringency makes the impact of EPA's failure to consider both the
upstream carbon sinks of biofuels and the upstream carbon emissions of EVs much greater. To
date, EPA's tailpipe rules have incentivized EVs at the expense of other technologies, but they
have done so in a manner that left room for other vehicles and fuels to play an important part in
meeting the country's transportation needs. Today, EPA is putting all of its eggs in the EV
basket. The only compliance scenario EPA discusses in the proposal would require more than
two-thirds of all new vehicles to be EVs by 2032 (and, if it continues on its current trajectory, the
percentage will presumably climb from there). That dramatic shift to EVs is fundamentally
different than in prior rules. It disincentivizes biofuel use, even where biofuels could help reduce
GHG emissions and be more suited to certain applications, like providing a low-carbon option in
areas without sufficient charging infrastructure or with a carbon-intensive electric grid. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 14]
Organization: Illinois Corn Growers Association
In the current rulemaking, there is only one technology that could achieve the standards in the
current rulemaking: electric vehicles. EPA estimates that it will be necessary for automakers to
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electrify over half of the light and medium duty vehicles they produce and sell by the 2032
model year. This is less than nine years from now. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 1]
Moreover, successful electrification of the transportation sector involves sweeping changes in
other sectors, such as power generation, energy distribution and the extraction of rare materials
essential to making everything from bateries to computer chips. There is no guarantee these
changes will be in place by 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 1]
The standards being proposed in the current rulemaking are at least as difficult to achieve as
those promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for criteria pollutants for
the 1975 model year. Meeting those standards required the adoption of catalytic converters,
unleaded gasoline detuned engines and ultimately on-board computer control. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0756, p. 2]
Today, EPA is proposing even more stringent standards for criteria pollutants and Carbon
Dioxide (C02), the most significant of the greenhouse gases that are altering the global climate.
It is estimated that the rise in C02 levels since the 1950's has largely been the result of the
burning of fossil fuels such as gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 2]
[See original attachment for table titled "Table 1. Fuel Consumption Impact Due to Proposed
Standards"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 2]
Table 1 is reproduced from EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis for the proposed Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards. 1 According to this table, EPA expects the consumption of liquid
fuel in the U.S. (primarily gasoline, diesel and biofuels) to drop by 50% and electrical use to
increase by 110% as a result of these rules. Clearly this will result in sweeping changes to the
transportation system even greater than the emission standards enacted in the 1970's. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 2]
1 "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis," EPA-420-D-23-003 April 2023
In justifying the technological feasibility of the standards, the Technical Support Document3
supporting the rulemaking listed 34 technologies automakers could potentially use to comply
with the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 4-5]
3 "Draft Joint Technical Support Document: Proposed Rulemaking for 2017-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards Office of
Transportation and Air Quality, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and National Highway Trafic
Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation EPA- 420-D-l 1-901,November 2011
By contrast, in support of the proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards, EPA listed only
9 potential technologies that they believe could be employed to meet the proposed standards. As
shown on Table 2, page 5, the twelve automakers with the most U.S. sales have already
significantly adopted these technologies on the vehicles they are producing today. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 4-5]
For instance:
-9 of the 12 automakers have employed at least one of the technologies on 70% or more of
their products sold in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 4-5]
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-5 of the 12 automakers have employed at least three of the technologies on at least 70% of
their products sold in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 4-5]
-One manufacturer has employed three of these technologies on over 90% of their products
sold in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 4-5]
It appears that automakers have already widely utilized those technologies that work best with
their company's vehicles and powertrains while meeting the needs of their customers.
Technologies that have not found favor with multiple manufacturers are likely to have been
found to be ineffective, overly expensive or failure prone. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp.
4-5]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
Potential technology penetration impacts of improved ICE technology adoption
With the above recommended adjustments to ICE technology costs and effectiveness,
potential implementation of such technology on the MY2027-2032 ICEV fleet can result in
significant reduction in tailpipe C02 emissions from ICE vehicles. In its study of updated light-
duty vehicle costs, 107 ICCT assumed updated ICE technology adoption as described above
would continue to provide ICEV improvement equivalent to 3.5% per year through at least 2032.
Fuel savings with that level of improvement more than offset incremental technology cost.
Starting from a 2022 fuel economy value of 27 mpg (328 g/mi), the overall real-world efficiency
of the combustion light-duty vehicle fleet was 32 mpg (275 g/mi) in 2027 and 36 mpg (247 g/mi)
in 2030 and 39 mpg (230 g/mi) in 2032. In total, over MY2027-2032, the net reduction in ICE
tailpipe emissions is 16.4%. Applying that same annual improvement to the industry average car
and truck ICE fleets as modeled for this proposed rule results in a total 16% reduction in ICE
tailpipe emissions, reducing the reliance on BEVs as a compliance pathway. Specifically, we
find that improvements in ICE efficiencies would reduce the projected BEV shares from 60% in
2030 to about 54%, and from 67% in 2032 to about 59%. In other words, the same GHG levels
as proposed can be reached through improved ICE and fewer BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 40-43]
107 Slowik. P., Isenstadt, A., Pierce, L, Searle, S. (2022). Assessment of light-duty electric vehicle costs
and consumer benefits in the United States in the 2022-2035 time frame. International Council on Clean
Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/ev-cost-benefits-2035-oct22/
Table 8 summarizes these and additional results under several ICE improvement pathways.
The ICE fleet, as modeled in the proposal, shows a net increase in 2-cycle tailpipe emissions in
MY2032 versus MY2027. The share of advanced ICE technology, especially mild and strong
hybridization, changes little or even decreases within the ICE fleet. Updating the OMEGA model
to reflect the full technology options and lower costs we detail above would lead to higher
tailpipe GHG reductions from ICE vehicles and, consequently, lower shares of BEVs needed for
any particular GHG standards scenario. As just one example, considering the low share of
hybrids in the ICE fleet as modeled, there is considerable room for powertrain electrification.
With the MHEV and HEV developments discussed above, deeper application of hybridization
could yield total ICE improvements of 15%-30%, easily matching 3.5%/year or even 5%/year.
The MY2032 ICE vehicles in these scenarios would emit 16%-22% lower C02 emissions than
the ICE vehicles modeled in the proposal. The resulting estimated BEV shares in 2032 could be
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12%-20% lower than proposed. The availability of hybrid and other ICE technologies explored
above further strengthens the case that automakers have a variety of technological pathways to
pursue to meet the proposed standards and realize substantial ICE improvements. The potential
impact on the future fleet composition in Table 8 is illustrative of this variety of pathways
automakers can choose to meet the proposed targets. Incorporation of the above ICE technology
changes into OMEGA and subsequent modeling runs are needed for precise estimates of
projected impacts of the above-listed technology updates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp.
40-43]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table 8. Illustrative compliance pathways to meet
MY2027-2032 proposed standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 40-43]
Organization: John Graham
we turn to our critique of EPA's NPRM, whose signature forecast is that the BEV share of
new passenger vehicle demand will rise from 8% in early 2023 to 67% in model year 2032.
During the same period, the share of HEVs in the new vehicle market will decline from about
10% to virtually zero. The penetration of MHEVs and PHEVs in 2032 will be so small that EPA
does not even bother to quantify and report them. EPA would have the reader believe that the
proposal is technologically neutral, and the dominance of BEVs in 2032 reflects the simple fact
that BEVs are the most cost-effective propulsion technology. We respectfully disagree, as we
explain below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 10]
Overall. The real-world marketplace is obviously receptive to HEV offerings. Is it plausible
that manufacturers would add HEV systems to their models for just one generation, and then
drop them before 2032 or even by 2027? This is what EPA's modeling finds. We believe the
more likely explanation is that the inputs to — and assumptions in — EPA's OMEGA modeling
are not accurate, in part due to outdated inputs for HEVs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p.
15]
Organization: Letter Campaign, Ethanol Producers (7)
[The following letter was submitted by seven commenters; it is reproduced only once:
Commonwealth Agri-Energy, LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0739). The other commenters
are: Highwater Ethanol, LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0552), Heartland Corn Products
(EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0622), Absolute Energy, LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0716),
Trenton Agri Products LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0755), Western New York Energy LLC
(EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0753), Southwest Iowa Renewable Energy LLC (EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0582)]
Commonwealth Agri-Energy, LLC appreciates the Biden administration's goals of increasing
vehicle efficiency and reducing carbon emissions. That's why two years ago, we committed to
achieving a net-zero carbon footprint for our ethanol plant by 2050 or sooner. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0739, p.1]
1 Letter from RFA Member Companies to President Joe Biden. July 27, 2021. See more at
https://ethanolrfa.org/pledge.
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However, we firmly oppose regulatory approaches that arbitrarily favor certain technologies
over others, which regrettably seems to be the case with this proposed rule. EPA's proposal
would effectively force automakers to produce more battery electric vehicles and discourage
them from pursuing other technologies that could achieve the same, or even better,
environmental performance at a lower cost to American consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0739, p. 1]
If our nation is to reach its goal of net-zero GHG emissions by mid-century, we will need
cleaner, more efficient cars AND cleaner, more efficient fuels. To that end, we will need honest
accounting using a full lifecycle approach that does not ignore upstream emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0739, p. 2]
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown (20 signatures)
Protect Affordable Vehicles
The Biden Administration and climate change alarmists are moving swiftly to get rid of gas-
fueled carsessentially through abolition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1714]
The latest proposed rule from Biden's politiczed EPAs effectivly mandate that electric
vehicles make up the majority of vehicles sold in America. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1714]
Because the limit would be so severe, it would force carmakers to ensure that two-thirds of
the vehicles they sold were all-electric by 2032, or automakers will be forced to pay fines.
Automakers buy credits or pay fines if they cannot meet the Corporate Average Fuel Equivalent
(CAFE) requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1714]
Stellantis, then known as Fiat Chrysler, paid $152.3 million in total CAFE fines for 2016 and
2017 and faces additional civil penalties. In 2022, NHTSA more than doubled CAFE penalties.
[EP A-HQ-0 AR-2022-0829-1714]
Essentially, the proposed regulations are depriving the American public of vehicle choice that
most fits their lifestyle and could easily affect economic growth in this country by stifling
transportation. This is especially true when only one-third of Americans would consider
purchasing an electric vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1714]
Organization: Minnesota Biofuels Association
As proposed, the rule notably deviates from the traditional technology-neutral approach that
EPA has historically taken when setting greenhouse gas emissions standards for motor vehicles.
The rule effectively compels automakers to produce battery electric vehicles to the detriment of
similar technologies that can achieve the same or better environmental performance. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0672, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Missouri Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
Proposed standards are not "technology neutral."
EPA claims the standards are "technology neutral," implying no favoritism toward a specific
fuel or engine type. However, a straightforward reading of the rule paints a different story. Once
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implemented, the rule will play out as a federal directive to auto manufacturers to produce
battery electric vehicles (BEVs). Auto manufacturers will face an impossible federal compliance
and legal quagmire if they cannot substantially increase EV sales. To comply with the standards,
the proposed rule estimates BEVs will comprise 67% of new passenger vehicle sales by 2032
and 46% of medium-duty vehicle sales. Given the low BEV adoption rates today, rates heavily
weighted towards urban areas, these numbers are astonishing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0578,
pp.1-2]
The proposed standards effectively box automakers into a BEV-only corner, forcing them to
produce BEVs at an increasingly rapid rate. The rule gives no consideration or opportunity for
other liquid fuel technologies to meet emissions goals. The proposed emissions standards would
effectively ban gasoline and diesel-powered vehicles by incentivizing, if not dictating, auto
manufacturers build BEVs. In doing so, the federal government has picked winners and losers in
the energy/technology sector. If implemented, EPA is unilaterally stripping the freedom of
choice away from American consumers and declaring ICE powertrains are on the losing side.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0578, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)
II. The Proposed Rule Uses Inappropriate GHG Accounting Gimmicks to Create a De Facto
Mandate for Battery Electric Vehicles
For light-duty vehicles, EPA is proposing an industry-wide average GHG emissions target of
82 grams C02/mile (g/mile) in model year (MY) 2032. This represents a drastic 56% reduction
from the MY 2026 target of 186 g/mile and a 63% reduction from the MY 2022 target of 224
g/mile. Notably, the estimated industrywide average GHG emissions rate has exceeded the
annual standard each year since 2016, requiring automakers to use banked credits and other
adjustments to comply.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 4-5]
4 Congressional Budget Office. "Emissions of Carbon Dioxide in the Transportation Sector." December
2022. https ://www.cbo.gov/publication/58861.
For the purposes of calculating fleet-average GHG emissions, EPA is proposing to allow auto
manufacturers to use a compliance value of 0 g/mile for BEVs, fuel cell electric vehicles
(FCEVs), and the electric-only portion of operation for plug-in hybrid EVs (PHEVs). As EPA
acknowledges, a compliance value of 0 g/mile for EVs ignores the upstream emissions
associated with battery production and electricity generation (i.e., the "fuel" for EVs). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 4-5]
Given the stringency of the proposed standards (and the inability of most internal combustion
engine (ICE) vehicles to meet them), EPA expects auto manufacturers will be strongly
compelled to substantially increase EV production in order to benefit from the 0 g/mile
assumption when calculating fleet-wide average emissions. According to EPA's own analysis, it
is highly unlikely that automakers will be able to meet EPA's proposed emissions standards for
2027-2032 without dramatically increasing the production of EVs and reducing the production of
ICE vehicles. The proposal's forced push toward EVs would be exacerbated by EPA's proposal
to eliminate the "multiplier incentive" that allows automakers to count one BEV as more than
one "zero emissions vehicle" in compliance calculations. In this way, EPA is essentially forcing
auto manufacturers to increase production of EVs, and in turn forcing the entire transportation
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supply chain to undergo a massive shift toward electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602,
PP- 4-5]
While significantly increasing the production of EVs may help automakers comply with the
proposed future emissions standards, such a transition certainly does not guarantee that real-
world GHG emissions associated with the full transportation supply chain will be meaningfully
reduced. In fact, depending on the sources of electricity used to power EVs and the practices
used for extraction and refining of critical battery minerals, EPA's proposal to force increased
EV production could fall far short of accomplishing the administration's climate objectives.
Thus, EPA's tailpipe emissions standards could perversely incentivize the production and sale of
more expensive vehicles that, in reality, have little practical impact on reducing overall
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Specialty Equipment Market Association (SEMA)
Technology Neutral Alternatives
The proposal intends to lower carbon emissions in a way that essentially forces BEVs to
become the only option for automakers to produce. Given the subsidies in place for BEV
purchases and production, BEVs are the de facto choice to achieve the rulemaking's climate
goals, as other options, such as hydrogen, new synthetic fuels, and multiple renewables, do not
enjoy a level playing field of subsidies. SEMA believes government should not pick winners and
losers regarding automotive technology. Unfortunately, the EPA has chosen to place their thumb
squarely on the scale for electric vehicles. The agency should help the market drive technology
solutions like Cummins' 15- liter fuel-agnostic engine platform, capable of running on hydrogen,
natural gas, or diesel.7 Further, the EPA must recognize that the U.S. has trillions of dollars'
worth of infrastructure already in place for ICE vehicles. The newest ICE vehicle technology can
be considered carbon competitive with EVs when all of the vehicle life cycle costs are analyzed,
including the ICE infrastructure already in-place and paid for versus EV subsidies to install non-
existent EV infrastructure and coax consumers to abandon cost-efficient ICE vehicles. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 4]
7 Cummins Fuel-Agnostic Engine Platform Capability Comes to Con-Expo (Link:
https://www.cummins.com/news/releases/2023/01/23/cummins-fuel-agnostic-engine-platform-capability-
comes-con-expo).
Organization: Stellantis
EPA Needs to Address EV Market Uncertainty & GHG Stringency Concerns [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 13-14]
As discussed above, EPA has erred by assuming an overly optimistic market adoption of a
single EV technology justified by policies that represent partial solutions. The GHG targets
justified by these assumptions exceed what industry and the Biden administration jointly agreed
to and likely exceed what reasonably can be achieved in a 50-state market. Targets are front-
loaded and biased against the most popular trucks and SUVs that customers demand today.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 13-14]
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Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
Congress has not delegated to EPA the power to force the conversion to electric vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 6]
EPA is very candid about the goal of its proposed rules: The Agency is trying to use tailpipe
emissions limits on carbon dioxide and criteria pollutants as a tool to coerce the automotive
industry to build far more electric vehicles (EVs) than market demand would currently support.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 6]
Right now, EVs account for less than 6 percent of new light-duty vehicle sales in the United
States and an even lower percentage of medium- and heavy-duty commercial truck sales.
Following the script laid down by President Biden in an executive order, 12 the EPA is aiming to
force those percentages way up—to 60 percent of light-duty vehicle sales by 2030 and 67
percent by 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 6]
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
5.2. Limited Compliance Paths
EPA suggests that manufacturers have the flexibility to pursue alternative paths that require
less BEVs than assumed in the preferred alternative. In practice, standards based on 60 to 70
percent of the fleet performing at zero grams per mile severely constrain the ability of non-ZEV
technologies to displace the assumed BEV penetration and still comply with the combined fleet
target of 102 g/mi standard in 2030 model year and 82 g/mi in 2032 model year. Based on data
from the OMEGA model for the 2027 model year, the projected combined-fleet performance for
conventional ICE and strong hybrid vehicles, on average, cannot attain the proposed combined-
fleet standards for that model year (Table 2). The performance gap of these technologies relative
to the standards widens with each following model year. This does not mean every ICE vehicle
and hybrid will no longer comply with its footprint target in 2027 model year but increasingly
these vehicles will need to be offset with larger and larger shares of BEVs and PHEVs for
compliance with the fleet standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 27-29]
[Table 2: 2027 Model Year Combined Fleet Performance Relative to the 2027 Model Year
Standard
Standard (g/mi): 152
C02 (g/mi) Performance HEV: 192
C02 (g/mi) Performance ICE: 240
Comply: No] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 27-29]
In Figure 9, the performance of every 2022 model year vehicle is compared to its respective
footprint target proposed for the 2030 model year. Vehicles are distinguished by powertrain
technology type with strong and mild hybrids lumped together. BEVs are the only technology for
which every vehicle can meet the proposed 2030 standard. This further illustrates that 2030
standards are essentially a BEV mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 27-29]
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[See original for graph, Figure 9 U.S. Combined Fleet 2022 MY Performance Relative to
2030 Footprint Targets] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 27-29]
This poses significant risks to consumers, automakers, and the environment. Should the BEV
market not mature at the rate EPA expects due to any of the myriad factors already described,
consumers may be unable to find suitable non-BEVs that meet their needs as automakers would
likely have cut back investment in these products. The result could be that consumers hold on to
older, higher-emitting vehicles longer. Such a scenario is not beneficial for consumers or the
environment. If automakers can somehow "backfill" weak BEV demand with other vehicles and
technologies, they could face compliance challenges. The simple technology market share
analysis using combine fleet emissions values (Table 3) shows several scenarios for "USA
Motors" in which industry-wide BEV sales fall short of EPA's expected 60% in 2030 and are
"backfilled" by other technologies such as ICE, HEV, and PHEV. While these scenarios would
be good for consumers, it would clearly place automakers in a difficult compliance situation
based on factors outside their control. We expect the GHG credit market would not be equipped
to resolve this magnitude of compliance shortfall, especially with off-cycle credits proposed to
be eliminated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 27-29]
[Table 3 U.S. Combine Fleet Recovery Scenarios for Less Than 60% BEV in 2030 MY
Column "Technologies to Comply (C02 Performance*): Row: "ICE(259 g/mi)": Column
"Mix for Assumed 60% BEV Penetration": 37%; Column "Mix for Actual 45% BEV Penetration
- PHEV/HEV Recovery": 30%; Column "Mix for Actual 45% BEV Penetration - ICE
Recovery": 51%
Column "Technologies to Comply (C02 Performance*): Row: "HEV(197 g/mi)": Column
"Mix for Assumed 60% BEV Penetration": 3%; Column "Mix for Actual 45% BEV Penetration
- PHEV/HEV Recovery": 15%; Column "Mix for Actual 45% BEV Penetration - ICE
Recovery": 4%
Column "Technologies to Comply (C02 Performance*): Row: "PHEV (89 g/mi)": Column
"Mix for Assumed 60% BEV Penetration": 0%; Column "Mix for Actual 45% BEV Penetration
- PHEV/HEV Recovery": 10%; Column "Mix for Actual 45% BEV Penetration - ICE
Recovery": 0%
Column "Technologies to Comply (C02 Performance*): Row: "BEV (0 g/mi)": Column "Mix
for Assumed 60% BEV Penetration": 60%; Column "Mix for Actual 45% BEV Penetration
- PHEV/HEV Recovery": 45%; Column "Mix for Actual 45% BEV Penetration - ICE
Recovery": 45%
Column "Technologies to Comply (C02 Performance*): Row: "Fleet Performance": Column
"Mix for Assumed 60% BEV Penetration": 102 g/mi; Column "Mix for Actual 45% BEV
Penetration - PHEV/HEV Recovery": 115 g/mi; Column "Mix for Actual 45% BEV Penetration
- ICE Recovery": 140 g/mi
*includes 6 g/mi AC Efficiency Credits for ICEs]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 27-29]
The ability to pivot on technology strategies and product plans is already severely limited by
the resource shift to electrification and becomes more impractical the longer it takes for
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unresolvable market problems to surface. The only remedy in such a scenario is to revise the
standards, which consumes time and complicates automakers' planning and investments. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 27-29]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Exxon Mobil recommended that EPA "encourage a diversity of technology pathways". In its
comment, BorgWarner expressed support for performance-based regulations and opposition to
technology mandates. EPA agrees with both of these comments, as that is what our final rule
does.
Some commenters (Alliance, AFPM, CEI, Growth Energy, Honda, Illinois Corn Growers,
Mass Comment Campaign, RFA, SEMA, Stellantis) imply or assert that there is only one
technology that could achieve the standards. Other commenters (e.g., Steven Bradbury) imply
that the rule forces electric vehicles; the Alliance claims that EPA's proposed rule is "a de facto
battery electric vehicle mandate." AFPM concludes the rule is a de facto ban on ICE vehicles
and that EPA's approach "ignores the fact that major automakers are on differing technological
paths".
EPA disagrees with these claims. For this rulemaking, we are continuing our longstanding
approach (with over 50 years of experience in reducing criteria pollutants and 14 years of history
for GHGs) of establishing an appropriate and achievable trajectory of emissions reductions by
means of performance-based standards. As we state in section I. A.2 of the preamble, we
anticipate that a compliant fleet under the final performance-based emissions standards will
include a diverse range of technologies. In section I.B.I, of the preamble we discuss the GHG
emissions standards and illustrate multiple potential pathways which demonstrate compliance
with varying mixes of non-hybrid ICE vehicles, hybrids, PHEVs and BEVs (Table 4).
Additional pathway examples are presented as part of our sensitivity scenarios in preamble
section IV.F and G.
The Alliance argues that "By 2032, under the proposed standards, only EVs are likely to meet
their individual footprint-based targets."
EPA disagrees with this assessment. As we describe in section IV.C. 1 of the preamble: at the
time of the proposal, we did not specifically model PHEV architectures for the proposed
standards, but we did acknowledge that PHEVs could provide significant reductions in GHG
emissions, and that we were considering adding them formally into our modeling for the final
rule, which we have now done. Electrification technology, including PHEVs, is feasible and
readily available in the market today as we discuss in section IV.C. 1 of the preamble. EPA has
included PHEVs in its modeling for the FRM, and our analysis shows that PHEVs (with an all-
electric driving range approaching that needed to meet ACC II requirements) can achieve their
individual 2032 MY footprint-based C02 targets. In addition, EPA demonstrates that there are
many potential pathways to compliance with the final standards that include a wide range of
potential technology mixes, including various mixes of non-hybrid ICE vehicles, hybrid vehicles,
PHEVs and BEVs. See section I.B.I, Table 4 of the preamble.
API claims that our analysis "is flawed in that it failed to account for non-electrification
solutions", that "the stringency of the proposed standards... essentially forces manufacturers to
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solely focus development efforts on BEVs" and it recommends that "EPA adjust the standards to
allow all solutions the ability to compete."
Again, EPA disagrees - our standards do not force any one technology. We agree that to meet
the standards, various degrees of electrification - which include a continuum of electrified
powertrains, including BEVs, PHEVs, strong hybrids and mild hybrids - will be necessary at
some level as consistent with the path that automakers are on, as expressed in public comments
from automakers. . Manufacturers may also invest in ICE technology development at varying
levels of hybridization to supplement their electrified portfolio. Through continued progress in
technology advancement, manufacturers have more technology options than they did in the past,
and that is reflected in our feasibility assessment commensurate with the level of stringency in
the final standards. However, EPA does find that given the increasing penetration of PEV
technologies and manufacturers plans to focus development on such technologies, it would be
arbitrary and capricious to not consider PEVs as an available technology.
API (and some renewable fuels groups) claim or imply that the proposed standards are not
"technology neutral." In response, EPA notes that no engine design is truly neutral to another
engine. All engines exhibit different characteristics that distinguish them in terms of performance
and emissions. The same can be said for powertrain architectures as a whole. Across the
continuum of powertrain and vehicle designs, some technologies exhibit lower emissions than
others. The EPA standards are in fact technology neutral in that they do not require the use of
any one technology over another - that decision of technology selection rests with the
manufacturer who has the choice to select among the wide range of available technologies to
select those best suited for its fleet to meet the fleetwide average standards. Considering that
these GHG standards are fleet-average standards, no single vehicle is required to meet its
individual footprint targets and so no technology is off the table. A manufacturer can choose any
technology for a given vehicle, so long as its fleet as a whole complies with the fleet-average
standard. As we demonstrate in the rule, we project that manufacturers will meet the standards
through their choice of a mix of technologies that they deem best suited for their fleets.
We received several comments in support (and some, in acknowledgement) of performance-
based standards:
In its comments, BlueGreen Alliance (BGA) recognizes that while automakers will need to
adopt (some level) of ZEVs to meet the standards, the standards are ultimately performance-
based. BGA then lists some complementary technologies in addition to zero-emission vehicles
and describes the proposal as "tech-forcing and tech-agnostic". EPA agrees with this comment
and considers the technologies as viable options towards meeting compliance for the standards.
Energy Innovation commented that BEVs are the most expedient and effective way to
eliminate pollutants. Based on our modeling, EPA agrees that manufacturers may find the most
cost-effective technology to be BEVs, however, it does not preclude any other technologies from
being adopted by manufacturers to meet compliance.
Some commenters provided analyses which corroborated EPA's "multiple pathways" findings
after they added PHEVs to their modeling for the final standards. In its comments, Consumer
Reports described their own modeling of various technology combinations and found "many
reasonable compliance pathways to comply with either EPA's proposed standards or the stronger
Alternative 1."
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EPA agrees with these comments, and notes that the central case pathway in the proposed
standard was modeled as the lowest cost of compliance and is not "the" only approach. As we
show, there are varying levels of electrification that may be used to achieve compliance. In fact,
in its comments, EDF noted "Because EPA's OMEGA 2 model is designed to show only the
most cost-effective compliance pathways, it does not capture the full range of possible pathways
automakers may choose to take based on the numerous factors that influence product lines," after
which EDF provided a detailed summary of three alternative pathways - with varying levels of
advanced ICE technology, PHEV and BEV sales - it independently evaluated using EPA's
OMEGA 2 model (but with EDF's independent technology and cost assumptions) that each
showed compliance with the proposed standards. We agree with these commenters' assessments.
While affirming that the proposal is technology-neutral, CARB concluded from EPA's
modeling that ZEVs will be the most likely pathway towards compliance. EPA agrees with
CARB's assessment that the standards are technology-neutral, however we emphasize that the
modeling in the proposal is OMEGA's representation of the most cost-effective pathway to
compliance but it is one of many potential pathways to compliance for the industry, and for each
manufacturer.
In its comments, Environmental and Public Health Organizations noted that "an automaker
could improve the emissions performance of its vehicles simply by shifting sales within a
nameplate to versions with cleaner powertrains." They show that for some high-volume models,
they estimate potential GHG reductions from those models of up to 20% by shifting sales to the
cleanest option. EPA agrees that this could be one viable part of a compliance strategy- within a
manufacturer's portfolio of trim levels, it could conceivably change the sales mix of its
powertrain offerings without requiring significant new investment. However, we recognize that
there may be some practical limits to shift all sales to the cleanest trim level, based on, for
example, production capacity and consumer demand.
ICCT provided analysis and commentary on potential GHG reductions still available in ICE
technology, including lesser levels of electrification such as mild and strong hybridization of the
ICE fleet. EPA agrees with this analysis, and while some of these technologies were not modeled
due to lack of available inputs (cost and detailed engine efficiency maps) necessary to
incorporate into our ALPHA and OMEGA models, EPA agrees that these technologies may be
available to manufacturers and provide further evidence of multiple technology pathways. Of
course, it will be up to each manufacturer to determine the most appropriate compliance pathway
for their business case.
12.5.4 - Sensitivities
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Relatedly, we also recommend that the EPA show a full cost-benefit analysis for each of its
sensitivity cases, including for high and low battery cost cases, and also for varying assumptions
on IRA tax credit eligibility, phase-out, or elimination. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 67]
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Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law
II. While EPA Robustly Analyzes the Proposed Rule's Benefits and Costs, It Should
Conduct Additional Analysis Around Key Parameters
Using OMEGA, EPA conducts a thorough and robust analysis of the benefits, costs, and net
benefits of the proposed program and its alternatives. EPA's modeling is the product of extensive
analysis and reasonably concludes that the benefits of the proposed program and all of its
alternatives greatly outweigh their costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, p. 12]
EPA's analysis is commendable in many ways. The agency estimates many key analytical
parameters—such as the rebound rate for ICE vehicles and the elasticity of demand for new
vehicles—consistent with the best available evidence. Nonetheless, EPA could perform more
analysis around key parameters. For instance, whereas EPA conducted more than sixty
sensitivity analyses72 around numerous parameters in the 2020 Rule,73 it presents only seven
sensitivity analyses for the Proposed Rule.74 For some key analytical parameters—such as the
discount rate and the social cost of carbon—additional valuations reflecting the state-of-the-art
economic literature exist and would ensure a more complete presentation of benefits and costs.
EPA should conduct additional analysis around these parameters, which generally show that the
net benefits of the proposed program and its alternatives are even greater than EPA projects.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, p. 12]
72 In regulatory impact analysis, "sensitivity" analysis refers to analysis that "reveal[s] whether, and to
what extent, the results of the analysis are sensitive to plausible changes in the main assumptions and
numeric inputs." OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS 3
(2003).
73 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model
Year 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks 1769-71 tbl.VII-471 (2020).
74 RIA at 13-43 to -48 (five sensitivities for light-duty vehicles), 13-54 to 13-55 (two sensitivities for
medium-duty vehicles).
Specifically, EPA should conduct additional analysis around the social cost of greenhouse
gases, discount rate, analytical baseline, BEV rebound rate, safety modeling, and energy security.
This section explores each of these issues in turn. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, p. 12]
EPA Summary and Response
In its comments, the Alliance requested that EPA conduct a benefit-cost analysis for each of
its sensitivity cases provided in the NPRM and requested additional sensitivities and benefit-cost
analyses for varying assumptions on the levels of available IRA subsidy. For reasons described
at length in RTC 8.1, EPA disagrees with this recommendation and does not provide additional
benefit cost analyses for each sensitivity. Regarding IRA sensitivities specifically, EPA worked
very closely with DOE and NHTSA in determining the appropriate assumptions regarding the
impacts of the IRA on the industry and vehicle market. EPA agrees that additional sensitivities
could be conducted on a number of input assumptions, including this one. However, EPA did not
have a persuasive reason for determining that the value of the IRA incentives would differ
significantly from the central case assumptions. Further, EPA notes that the impact of deviations
in the IRA assumptions from the central case, higher or lower, would impact the results through
the same mechanism as several of the other sensitivities conducted by EPA; namely that both the
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battery cost sensitivity and consumer acceptance sensitivity influence the relative consumer
preference for the various powertrain technologies, and in the case of the battery costs
sensitivity, the producer compliance costs. Therefore, EPA determined that a sensitivity around
the IRA assumptions would not provide substantially different information than already provided
by the current sensitivities.
The Institute for Policy Integrity (IPI) commented that EPA should conduct a greater number
of sensitivity analyses, expanding on those presented in the NPRM. IPI recommended
sensitivities around discount rates and the social cost of carbon, as well as possible sensitivities
for safety, the rebound rate, the analytical baseline and energy security. In response, EPA notes
that for the NPRM and again for this final rule, costs and benefits are presented at both 3 and 7
percent discount rates, and a range of values is used for the social cost of greenhouse gases.
More detailed discussion of the choice of discount rates and social cost of carbon values is
provided in RIA Chapter 9. EPA has analyzed several new sensitivity cases for this final rule in
addition to cases presented in the NPRM. These include cases for more prevalent PHEVs, no
additional BEVs beyond already existing models, and no GHG credit trading between
manufacturers. Regarding the analytical baseline, the sensitivities included in this final
rulemaking analysis cover a wide range of No Action case projections. This range is illustrated in
terms of the market penetration of PEVs across the various sensitivity cases in preamble Section
IV.B and also by the tables of incremental costs for the sensitivity cases presented in RIA
Chapter 12.
12.5.5 - Modeling of MDVs
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
a. EPA's modeling should better reflect the favorable economic case for electric pickup
trucks.
A recent report by Roush examined the potential for electrification of MDVs under a range of
scenarios, finding that electrification is cost-competitive in the great majority of them. 188 It is
clear that some amount of the difference between the uptake of Class 2b-3 pickups and vans in
the OMEGA2 modeling stems from the far lower range assumed for vans (150 miles) compared
to that of pickups (300 miles). But as illustrated in Table VI. A-1 below, 189 Roush finds that by
2030, even when comparing a low-cost combustion powertrain to the most costly battery
chemistry (NMC811) deployed in a 400-mile electric Class 3 pickup, 190 the electric pickup still
achieves total cost of ownership (TCO) parity within the typical loan length for a new vehicle (7
years). And when comparing a Class 3 pickup with a low-cost battery (LFP) to a high-cost
internal combustion engine powertrain, a 400-mile electric pickup would pay off within 1 year,
well within the payback period assumed for consumers by manufacturers within EPA's
OMEGA2 model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 69]
188 Saxena et al., Electrification Cost Evaluation at 26.
189 Table VI. A-1 is adapted from Saxena et al., Electrification Cost Evaluation, Tbl. 24, at 145. Scenario 1
represents the adoption of low-cost BEV and high-cost combustion vehicle technologies; Scenario 2,
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medium-cost BEV and combustion vehicle technologies; and Scenario 3, high-cost BEV and low-cost
combustion vehicle technologies. Id. at 28-29.
190 Roush used an LFP battery for its low-cost BEV, an NMC811 battery for its medium-cost BEV, and a
"10% costlier" NMC811 battery for its high-bost BEV. Id. at 30-31.
Table VIII.A-l. Time to achieve TCO parity for Class 2b-3 BEVs with a 2027 and 2030
purchase timeframe [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 69-70]
[See original comment for Table VIII.A-l.]. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 69-70]
When accounting for the impacts of the IRA, the economic case for electrification of Class
2b-3 pickups is even clearer, as shown in Table VI.A-2. Here the impact of the full § 30D credit
is shown, which is also the maximum allowable limit of the § 45W (commercial clean vehicle)
credit for Class 2b-3 vehicles. 191 Roush's analysis finds that purchase price parity is achieved
for virtually all BEV classes in the timeframe of the analysis, so the § 45W commercial vehicle
credit is not applicable in the later years of their analysis. 192 In fact, Roush finds that, with the
application of IRA credits, by MY 2027 all BEVs except the 400-mile pickup will be priced at or
below a comparable combustion vehicle 193; and that all MY 2027 BEVs will achieve TCO
parity within the first two years of vehicle ownership. 194 Here it is worth noting that, despite
the large share of MDVs that are purchased for commercial fleets, EPA did not directly include
the § 45W credit in its analysis, instead applying the same combination of the § 30D and § 45W
credit as it did for LDVs. 195 Because the § 45W credit is based on the lesser of $7500 or the
difference in purchase price, this credit should act to hedge uncertainty in the Agency's analysis,
though that is not how it was treated within the OMEGA2 modeling runs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, pp.69-70]
191 Id. at 175-79. The § 45W credit is based on 30% of the basis of a vehicle not powered by a gasoline or
diesel internal combustion engine, or the difference in purchase price between a qualified clean vehicle and
a comparable combustion vehicle. In the case of vehicles that have a GVWR less than 14,000 pounds
(which includes Class 2b-3 vehicles), the total credit is capped at $7500.
192 Id. at 195.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 197-98.
195 This is not immediately apparent in the text of the preamble or DRIA but can be assessed by
comparing the contents of the vehicle_price_modifications_20230314b.csv input files from the LDV and
MDV modeling runs, which are identical.
Table VIII. A-2. Time to achieve TCO parity with IRA § 30D credits for MYs 2023 and 2027
196 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 70]
196 This table is adapted from Saxena et al., Electrification Cost Evaluation, Tbl. 30, at 193.
[See original comment for Table VIII.A-2.]. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 70-71]
The Roush report is not the only analysis to find a strong economic rationale for the adoption
of zero-emission MDVs. A recent report from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory
(NREL) found that cost parity will be achieved before 2035 (even in the absence of the IRA) for
medium- and heavy-duty vehicles, including Class 3 vans and Class 4-5 vehicles that share a
platform with Class 2b-3 pickups (which were not part of that analysis). 197 Similarly, a recent
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International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) report on electric MDVs finds that
purchase price parity with diesel MDVs will be achieved prior to 2032 for 300-mile and lower
BEVs, even in the absence of IRA funding. 198 And when IRA funding is considered, even 400-
mile BEV pickups would achieve purchase price parity in the timeframe of this rule. 199 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 71]
197 Catherine Ledna et al., NREL, Decarbonizing medium- and heavy-duty on-road vehicles: Zero-
emission vehicles cost analysis, Mar. 2022, at 2, 46 https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy22osti/82081.pdf.
198 Eamonn Mulholland, ICCT, Cost of electric commercial vans and pickup trucks in the United States
through 2040 (Working Paper 2022-01), Jan. 2022, at 11 (Fig. 5), https://theicct.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/01/cost-ev-vans-pickups-us-2040-jan22.pdf.
199 See id.
There is some difference in costs between EPA's assessment and other studies such as those
described above: on average, according to EPA, Class 2b-3 combustion pickups will cost about
$5,000 less (from a purchase price standpoint) than a comparable electric pickup. However, with
the Agency's application of an average IRA credit of $6,000 in 2032, this would still yield cost
parity, on average, so even EPA's higher cost assessment cannot fully explain the reason for
Class 2b-3 pickups electrifying at such a reduced rate in the Agency's modeling. Even more than
that, this disparity is almost entirely influenced by the relative price difference of gasoline and
diesel pickups in EPA's modeling, with the Agency's BEV300 pickups just $1,100 more
expensive than diesel pickups without the IRA incentives, not far off ICCT's conclusion that
BEV300 pickups will achieve cost parity with diesel pickups by 2031.200 Despite this, the
model's conversion rate of combustion vehicle sales to electric vehicle sales is virtually
indistinguishable between gasoline and diesel pickups, at roughly 20% for each, seemingly
indicating that neither purchase price nor TCO parity have a significant impact on sales. Given
that many Class 2b-3 vehicles are purchased for commercial use,201 such modeling behavior is
inconsistent with the economically-driven decisionmaking that would be expected to occur in the
real world.202 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 71]
200 Id.
201 See id. at 1; Saxena et al., Electrification Cost Evaluation, at 49.
202 For example, EPA's own analysis of the heavy-duty market assumed a conversion rate of 80% when
cost parity is achieved. 88 Fed. Reg. at 25992, Tbl. 11-23. And analysis from NREL finds this number to be
nearly 100%; see comparison at pp. 59-60 of EDF, Comment Letter on GHG Standards for HD Vehicles,
June 16, 2023, https://downloads.regulations.gov/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985-1644/attachment_l.pdf (data
from Ledna et al. 2022).
Based on EPA's own modeling, BEV variants for over 71% of the Class 2b-3 market achieve
first cost parity with their combustion-powered equivalent by 2032 when including IRA
incentives, including 57% of the Class 2b-3 pickup truck market.203 This is a substantially
higher share of vehicles than the model assumes will be deployed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 72]
203 This was established using the output files for the OMEGA2 MDV runs, using the vehicles file
(2023_03_14_22_42_30_central_3alts_20230314_Proposal_vehicles.csv) to compare in a given model
year BEV variants with their combustion equivalent, sharing a base-year vehicle ID.
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For all of these reasons, EPA's modeling does not accurately reflect the favorable economic
case for commercial MDV electrification, particularly for pickups. While some of these
modeling problems can be ascribed to differences in battery costs and EPA's unreasonable
choice to include an artificial 25% production cap on BEV pickups, other problems are intrinsic
to assumptions made within the model that do not reflect the Agency's own assessment of likely
adoption of electrification for commercial vehicles, particularly considering the incentives
available under the IRA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 72]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
Paralleling the limited public MDV data availability, the discussion of MDV technology costs
and effectiveness within the Preamble and DRIA is not as robust as that discussion for LDV.
While certain MD-specific technologies are mentioned (e.g. the MD Ford 7.3L engine which was
not incorporated in the analysis, DRIA 3.5.1.2), it is unclear what engine maps apply to MDV, if
any technology costs/effectiveness were borrowed from LDV, how LDV costs/effectiveness
were modified for MDV (if at all), and if there are any other modeling parameters specific to
MDV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 62-64]
By examining several OMEGA MD input and output files, there are several areas ICCT finds
worthy of comment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 62-64]
The central "vehicles" output filel61 shows that all diesel vehicles throughout MY2021-
MY2035 are considered to have Miller cycle engines (MIL) and all gasoline vehicles are GDI
only. Only these 2 ICE technology packages are available for MD, and both are without any
level of electrification (micro through strong hybrid). 162 This lack of additional ICE technology
packages suggest EPA is significantly underestimating the possibility for improved ICE-based
MD pickups and vans. As there are many cost-effective ICE technologies available, the lack of
detail in the analysis likely overstates the cost of compliance. Relatedly, it is unclear which
engine (and electric motor) maps were used to develop the technology packages' RSEs, as well
as the appropriateness of approximating diesel engines' C02e emissions with those of Miller
cycle engines. The MD cost equations appear identical to the LD costs. 163 While this may be
appropriate for many technologies that are shared between LD and MD, there are certain
performance and utility differences between LD and MD that may lead to differing costs
(consider, in particular, costs related to diesel powertrain improvement, which are unassessed in
the LD analysis). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 62-64]
161 2023_03_17_13_57_07_md_central_v3_Proposal_vehicles.csv
162 simulated_vehicles_rse_ice_MD_input_rse_only.csv
163 powertrain_cost_20230314.csv
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Environmental and Public Health Organizations commented that EPA's modeling does not
accurately reflect the favorable economic case for commercial MDV electrification, particularly
for pickups. In support, they cite several studies finding the total cost of ownership for electric
pickups to be lower than their conventional counterparts by the 2030s. The commenter also notes
that this is in part due to differences in EPA's cost assessment, and also that EPA did not directly
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include the 45W credit in its analysis, but instead applied the same combination of the 30D and
45W credit as for LDVs.
ICCT commented that modeling of medium-duty technology costs and effectiveness in the
proposal was not as robust as light duty modeling. In particular, engine technology was limited
to Miller and GDI engines, and no hybridization was modeled for MDVs. Additionally, medium
duty costs appeared to be identical to light duty costs, which is not appropriate in all cases (for
example, costs related to diesel powertrain improvement, which were unassessed).
Response:
In response to comments on modeling of electric MDVs, EPA stands by its modeling process.
MDV pickups and vans are true work vehicles that are designed for much higher towing and
payload capabilities than are light-duty vehicles. The technologies applied to light-duty vehicles
are not all applicable to MDVs at the same adoption rates, and the internal combustion engine
technologies often produce a lower percent reduction in CO2 emissions when used in many
medium-duty vehicles. For example, electrification of an MDV pick-up designed and used solely
for high towing capacity may be more challenging in the earlier years of the program.
Conversely, delivery vans or payload-oriented pick-ups that operate over limited distances and
daily routes present a significant opportunity for electrification, as evidenced by current last mile
delivery companies' announcements and purchase orders for EVs in this segment. Electrification
technologies applied to MDVs reflect the expected usage of these vehicles, with fully electric
BEVs as the primary electrification pathway for medium duty vans, and both BEV and PHEV
technology applied to 2b/3 pickups in roughly equal proportions. It is important to note that this
is a projection and represents only one of many possible compliance pathways manufacturers
could choose.
Further responses to comments on battery costs are included in section 12.2.1 of this RTC and
further responses to comments on modeling of IRA incentives are included in section 12.5.3 of
this RTC.
In response to comments on limited modeling of MDV technology, EPA believes that our
modeling of MDV technologies was reasonable and sufficiently robust to support the feasibility
of the standards. For this final rule, EPA has updated the modeling of MDV and increased the
variety of powertrains modeled. In modeling for the final rulemaking, EPA used a diesel engine
(rather than the Miller surrogate mentioned by ICCT) and incorporated both turbocharged and
naturally aspirated (the Ford 7.3L engine) gasoline engines for MDV modeling, as further
explained in the RIA, chapter 3.5.1. In addition, EPA modeled fully electric BEVs as the primary
electrification pathway for medium duty vans, and both BEV and PHEV technology applied to
2b/3 pickups in roughly equal proportions, as further explained in the RIA, chapter 3.5.3. While
it is true that EPA could have modeled even more technologies for MDV (as for LDV), the
modeling that we did perform sufficiently demonstrates the feasibility of the standards.
In response to the comment on MDV costs, EPA stands by its modeling of cost inputs. As
noted by ICCT, many technologies that are shared between LD and MD have appropriately
shared costs. For those few technologies not shared (for example, the development of the PHEV
technology applied to 2b/3 trucks), costs were developed appropriately for the MDV modeling.
Powertrain improvements to diesels were not included as a pathway in this analysis, though
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manufacturers are free to choose this pathway as part of their technology mix under the
performance-based standards.
12.5.6 - Modeling of the no action case
Comments by Organizations
Organization: American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
EPA's baseline BEV projections are well below estimated penetration rates expected from
IRA and IIJA programs and investments (FR 29333, Table 99). Multiple analyses project that the
IRA, in particular, will lead to new-vehicle BEV adoption rates of over 60% by the early 2030s,
compared to EPA's baseline, "No Action", scenario where BEVs only reach roughly 40% of new
vehicle sales between MYs 2030 and 2032.8 EPA's standards should fully account for the
impact of activities outside of the federal standards to drive vehicle electrification and set targets
more stringent than what the market is expected to deliver. Alternative 1 is the strongest
proposed option that EPA can adopt to maximize net benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642,
pp. 2-3]
8 https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23.pdf; https://rmi.org/insight/how-
inflation-reduction-act-will-affect-ev-adoption-in-the-united-states/
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
The AEO 202359 contains long term projections based on current laws and regulations in
place at the time of modeling. As part of that modeling, the AEO includes projections for vehicle
sales and vehicle sales projections include consumer choice modeling60. EIA's consumer choice
modeling includes fuel choice, sales penetration among similar technologies, market share
among different technology sets, and vehicle attributes (i.e., sales price, fuel economy, battery
replacement costs, range, etc.). EIA reported that for the first time since 2010, critical mineral
prices increased "significantly" in 2022 resulting in the first year to year increase in electric
vehicle battery prices. According to AEO projections, which consider current policies and
regulations, and consumer choice, BEV sales penetration remains well below EPA's estimates in
the proposed rule, which are induced by its proposed stringent standards. EPA must explain why
its projections differ so significantly from EIA. Furthermore, EIA61 projects electric vehicles to
be less competitive from a cost standpoint than gasoline powered vehicles in the much larger
non-luxury market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 19]
59 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Annual Energy Outlook 2023." March 2023.
https://www.eia. gov/outlooks/aeo/.
60 https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/assumptions/pdf/TDM_Assumptions.pdf
61 61 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Issues in Focus: Inflation Reduction Act Cases in the
AEO2023." March 2023. Annual Energy Outlook 2023. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/IIF_IRA/.
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
Our States and Cities add three observations to EPA's analysis of costs and lead time. First,
EPA's projected costs likely overstate the actual costs attributable to reaching the standards in
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the allotted lead time, due to conservative assumptions in EPA's no-action case that omit the
myriad state and local actions to promote electric vehicle adoption. See supra 18-21; CARB
Comment at 16. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 33]
However, EPA's conservative methodology for constructing the no-action scenario likely
ends up overstating the proposed standards' costs significantly, for two key reasons. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 33-34]
First, EPA assumes that auto manufacturers will produce electric vehicles to comply with
standards in a "purely cost-minimizing" way. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,296. As EPA acknowledges,
however, auto manufacturers have planned for far higher rates of electric vehicle sales in
response to both policies that recognize the significant role of the internal combustion engine in
the climate crisis and the surging demand for electric vehicles. Id. A model of industry behavior
that minimizes costs without accounting for these other drivers of electric vehicle adoption likely
understates electric vehicle penetration in a no-action scenario. 186 And, given that respected
organizations like Bloomberg New Energy Finance are estimating battery electric vehicle
penetrations rates near 52% by 2030 even without considering EPA's proposed standards, 187
EPA's no-action scenario projection of 40% penetration is likely an underestimation. See 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29,329 (Table 81). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 33-34]
186 See Consumer Reports Amicus Brief, Doc. No. 1988445 in Texas v. EPA, Case No. 22-1031 (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 3,2023), at 4-15.
187 Ira Boudway, More Than Half of US Car Sales Will Be Electric by 2030, Bloomberg
(Sep. 20, 2022), available at https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/articles/2022-09-20/more-than-
half-of-us-car-sales-will- be-electric-by-2030. Second, EPA's no-action scenario likely
underestimates the baseline battery electric vehicle penetration rate, because it does not account
for numerous state and local actions that promote electric vehicle adoption. 88 Fed. Reg. at
29,296. As discussed in the Proposal, EPA did not model compliance with California's
Advanced Clean Cars II program ("ACCII"), which requires 100% of in-state new vehicle sales
to be zero-emission or plug-in hybrid electric vehicles by 2035; as EPA notes, 11 other States
have adopted or plan to adopt ACCII by model-year 2027 under Section 177 of the Clean Air
Act. Id.; id. at 29,334. EPA's decision not to include ACCII in the no-action scenario is
appropriate at this stage, because EPA has not yet granted California's pending waiver
application for ACCII under Section 209(b). However, EPA's sensitivity study with ACCII in
the no-action scenario demonstrates that ACCII would reduce the costs of EPA's standards if
EPA were to grant the waiver. See id. at 29,335. Further, beyond ACCII or other state-law sales
mandates, states and their political subdivisions have enacted a host of incentives to promote
electric vehicle adoption, which the no-action scenario does not account for either. See supra at
18-21. These omitted state-law incentives mean that, even apart from ACCII, EPA's no-action
scenario likely understates electric vehicle adoption without the proposed standards, and thus the
proposed standards' costs are likely less than EPA's projected estimates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0746, p. 34]
EPA's conservative estimates provide the industry and other stakeholders important
information on the upper bounds of the proposed standards' costs, and our States and Cities
acknowledge the technical challenges of rigorously modeling the above state laws and market
dynamics. Nevertheless, EPA should be candid that the real-world costs fairly traceable to the
final standards will likely be significantly lower than those disclosed, even apart from ACCII's
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potential effects, and EPA should consider adopting standards more stringent than the proposed
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 34]
Organization: Center for American Progress (CAP)
EPA's Baseline is Too Conservative
By 2027, the incentives contained within the IRA will have made a significant impact on
domestic EV production while increasing the number of EVs that qualify for consumer facing
credits. A subset of the total incentives contained in the IRA is expected to bring the EV market
at least in line with EPA's expected compliance path for the proposed rule. Accounting for
California's Advanced Clean Cars II standard, the 30D, and 45W credits as well as limited
portions of the 45X credit, the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) finds that
EVs are expected to achieve 67 percent penetration by 2032.9 This same analysis finds that EVs
are expected to achieve price parity with ICE vehicles between 2023 and 2025. This conclusion
is supported by analysis by the Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) which finds that electric sedans
will achieve price parity in 2023, electric SUVs between 2023 and 2024, and electric pickup
trucks between 2024 and 2025.10 Further, RMI finds that EVs could reach 76 percent market
penetration by 2032, which significantly exceeds even the proposed Alternative 1. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0658, pp. 2-3]
9 Slowik et al. "Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act on Electric Vehicle Uptake in the
United States," The International Council on Clean Transportation, January 2023, available online:
https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23-2.pdf
10 McNamara et al. "How Policy Actions can Spur EV Adoption in the United States," Rocky Mountain
Institute, June 2023, available online: https://rmi.org/insight/how-inflation-reduction-act-will-affect-ev-
adoption-in-the-united-states/#:~:text=
The%20passage%20of%20the%20Inflation,production%2C%20and%20charging%20infrastructure%20dev
elopment
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
b.EPA should more fully account for the impact of state regulations on the adoption of Class
2b-3 ZEV pickups and vans.
In addition to market forces, state regulatory requirements will have a significant impact on
the adoption of Class 2b-3 ZEV pickups and vans, not just through ZEV sales requirements but
through the corresponding industrial development and production that will occur to meet related
demand. EPA does not appear to have considered the relative impact of such state regulations as
part of its OMEGA2 modeling.204 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 72]
204 While the Agency has conducted a sensitivity analysis around the Advanced Clean Cars II program, for
which California has not yet received a waiver, it has not similarly included any sensitivity or analysis
incorporating into its compliance modeling the Advanced Clean Trucks regulation, for which California
has already been granted a waiver.
Under the Advanced Clean Trucks (ACT) regulation, manufacturers must ensure that 40% of
their sales of Class 2b-3 vehicles are ZEVs by 2032, en route to an eventual target of 55% ZEV
sales in 2035.205 ACT has already been adopted in eight states as of the date of this comment
letter, and these states make up nearly 20% of the heavy-duty market (including Class 2b-3
vehicles) overall.206 While there are no strict requirements on the mix of vehicles a
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manufacturer must sell in order to achieve these targets, the sheer size of the Class 2b-3 pickup
market means that manufacturers cannot simply rely on the widespread deployment of ZEV
commercial vans in order to meet the ACT-required level of ZEV adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 72]
205 Table A-l, California Code of Regulations § 1963.1.
206 Based on new vehicle registration data from PolMHS Markit for 2019-2021 Class 2b-8 trucks, by
state, obtained from Atlas Public Policy.
These state regulations will yield a base level of Class 2b-3 ZEVs, even in the absence of
EPA standards, that the Agency has not adequately considered in its No Action scenario or in its
modeling. As a separate matter, these regulations (and the ZEV development and deployment
efforts that manufacturers have already undertaken to achieve compliance with them) also
validate the Agency's assessment that electrification will be a critical emissions control
technology in the MDV space moving forward. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 73]
207 88 Fed. Reg. at 29341-42; DRIA at 3-12-3-18.
Organization: Hyundai Motor America
In addition, state readiness to successfully implement the ACC II ZEV Regulation remains an
outstanding question. We are concerned there simply is not enough time to delivery key
infrastructure to support the ACC II ZEV Regulations in Section 177 States ("S177 States").
Many of the current SI 77 States that have adopted the ACC II ZEV Regulation lack the
necessary charging infrastructure to support even the MY 2026 ZEV requirements. Further,
several states are on track to become first-time SI77 States and are significantly even farther
behind in terms of infrastructure and other supportive ZEV policies to ensure regulatory success.
To the degree the No Action case assumes equal success of the ACC II ZEV Regulations among
SI77 States, it overlooks the realities on the ground. These assumptions carry forward risk into
the Proposed Rule with an overly ambitious objective for BEV penetration ramp from the current
starting point nationwide of under five percent BEV sales today. 13 For purposes of forecasting
the No Action case, we caution against equating compliance credits 1:1 with BEV penetration.
Notably, the ACC II ZEV Regulation includes PHEVs and FCEVs - coincidentally consistent
with Executive Order 14037. These are just a few assumptions we encourage the EPA to
reconsider in its No Action case. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, pp. 3-4]
13 Experian EV Registration database, 2022 Calendar Year through Q1 2023 Calendar Year. Accessed
May 10, 2023.
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law
C. EPA Should Update the Baseline to Ensure Full Consideration of the Inflation
Reduction Act
In regulatory impact analysis, the baseline refers to "the best assessment of the way the world
would look absent the proposed action."90 Developing an accurate baseline is important for
conducting benefit-cost analysis, but challenging when baseline conditions are in flux. That is
the case here given last year's passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0601, pp. 15-16]
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90 Circular A-4, supra note 86, at 15.
To model the baseline for the Proposed Rule, EPA adopts key variables from the Annual
Energy Outlook 2021 (AEO 2021), such as fleet size, new vehicle sales shares, fuel prices,
electricity prices, and vehicles miles traveled.91 However, AEO 2021 was developed before the
IRA's passage and thus does not include the effects of that law. While it was reasonable for EPA
to rely on AEO 2021 in this proposal, it should consider adjusting the baseline in the final rule to
fully incorporate the IRA's impacts. In particular, according to the 2023 version of Annual
Energy Outlook (AEO 2023), the IRA will decrease both short-run and long-run electricity
prices relative to the no-IRA case.92 AEO 2023 also projects that the IRA will decrease long-run
gas prices, with a minimal short-run impact.93 Gasoline and electricity prices are important
modeling inputs, as they affect the relative cost of ownership between ICE vehicles and BEVs
and thereby influence the sales of these vehicles. These prices also affect the fuel-cost savings,
the rebound effect, and related environmental impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 15-
16]
91 See RIA at 9-1.
92 See infra p. 30 fig.2 (difference between AEO 2023 with IRA (solid-blue line) and AEO 2023's "No
IRA" case (dotted-blue line)).
93 See infra p. 30 fig.l (difference between AEO 2023 with IRA (solid-blue line) and AEO 2023's "No
IRA" case (dotted-blue line)).
There are several potential options for EPA to consistently account for the IRA across
modeling inputs. One option is for EPA to adopt AEO 2023 for parameters where it currently
uses AEO 2021. This would presumably also entail updating future BEV penetration, which,
although EPA models separately, is based in part on parameters from AEO 2021. If EPA updates
its baseline to incorporate AEO 2023, it should beware that AEO 2023 models only certain
aspects of the IRA but does not include the producer-side battery tax credit.94 To blunt the
resulting potential underestimate of the IRA's full impact, EPA should consider using the "High
uptake of the IRA" sensitivity case provided in AEO 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601,
pp.15-16]
94 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Transportation Demand Module Assumptions 26 (Mar. 2023),
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/assumptions/pdf/TDM_Assumptions.pdf.
If updating the baseline to AEO 2023 is infeasible, a more feasible alternative may be for
EPA to continue to use AEO 2021 as its baseline and then add the IRA's impact on other
parameters on top of that. Data within AEO 2023 enables this type of assessment, as AEO 2023
provides sensitivity analysis in which it models the world with and without the IRA.95 This
enables a direct comparison to assess the IRA's effect on key parameters, including electricity
prices and gas prices. 96 As noted above, EPA should consider adopting the "High uptake of the
IRA" sensitivity case in AEO 2023 for comparison purposes.97 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0601, pp. 15-16]
95 See Projection Tables for Side Cases, Annual Energy Outlook 2023,
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/tables_side_xls.php (providing tables for "No IRA" case).
96 EPA acknowledges that it has estimates of future retail electricity prices that account for the IRA and
that these estimates exhibit lower prices compared to a scenario without the IRA. But due to the absence of
corresponding information on gasoline price estimates under the IRA and a desire for consistency across
variables and model components, EPA opts not to use these estimates. RIA at 2-84.
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97 See Projection Tables for Side Cases, supra note 95 (providing tables for "High uptake of the IRA"
case).
This modeling adjustment could have meaningful effects (though it's unclear whether this
would increase or decrease net benefits overall, and it would almost certainly not change the sign
or ordering of net benefits). According to projections from AEO 2023, the retail electricity price
for transportation could be lower by an average of 0.45 cents per kWh from 2027 to 2032 under
a high-IRA uptake scenario compared to a scenario without the IRA. This could translate to a
decrease of about $50 in the "generalized cost," 98 i.e. the purchase price net of vehicle
ownership and operation costs.99 The lower cost of operating an electric vehicle would translate
to greater BEV uptake than EPA projects in its baseline fleet. This suggests, among other
implications, that the Proposed Rule's compliance costs may be lower than EPA projects, since
automakers may already be closer to complying with the proposed standards under the baseline
than EPA recognizes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 15-16]
98 Considering the average EV efficiency at 3 miles per kWh, a reduction of 0.45 cent per kWh equates to
a savings of 0.15 cents per mile. Incorporating EPA's assumptions for consumer fuel-cost calculations in
their purchase decision—with an annual mileage of 12,000 miles, a 2.5-year fuel-cost valuation period, and
a fueling efficiency factor of 0.9—this saving translates to around $50 = 2.5(years)
x{0.15(0/mile)x 12,000(miles/year)-100(£/$)}-0.9.
99 Both producers and consumers use this metric in their decisionmaking processes. See RIA at 4-2 to 4-4.
The Appendix below includes four figures illustrating the data presented in this section.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 15-16]
Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
As noted throughout the proposed rulemaking, there are a number of factors that have resulted
in increased ZEV adoption in recent years, and ZEV deployment is only expected to continue to
accelerate. EPA, however, has developed a somewhat conservative estimate of BEV penetration
in its No Action case59 which may mean it is underestimating the feasibility and impact of more
stringent regulations. An inaccurate model that assumes artificially low BEV penetration is likely
to cause EPA to adopt standards that are too lenient given business-as-usual conditions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp. 7-8]
59 See id. at 29296.
Currently, EPA's modeling of the No Action case does not account for state-level laws and
policies that are likely to impact the nationwide deployment of ZEVs regardless of the status of
the federal standards.60 For example, EPA did not seem to consider the Multi-State Medium-and
Heavy-Duty Vehicle Memorandum of Understanding that has been signed by 18 jurisdictions
and sets a goal of having at least 30 percent of all new medium-and heavy-duty vehicle sales be
ZEVs by no later than 2030, and 100 percent of sales being ZEVs by no later than 2050.61
Additionally, although EPA used a sensitivity analysis to consider the impact of California's
Advanced Clean Cars II program, it did not include all jurisdictions that are committed to
adopting these standards in its analysis.62 EPA also did not consider manufacturer and other
private sector commitments to transition to ZEV fleets. These shifts, along with declining costs
and other economic forces, are likely to increase baseline ZEV deployment. Finally, it is unclear
whether EPA considered impacts of federal funding available under the Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law (BIL) on ZEV deployment.63 The BIL and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) offer significant
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funding and incentives for states, local governments, private individuals, and businesses related
to ZEV manufacturing, charging infrastructure, and vehicles purchases, and many states and
localities have made it a priority to maximize funding opportunities under these laws. EPA
should therefore assume robust implementation and deployment of funds under these laws in its
modeling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp. 7-8]
60 Id.
61 Multi-State Medium-and Heavy-Duty Zero Emission Vehicle Memorandum of Understanding, Ne.
States for Coordinated Air Use Mgmt., https://www.nescaum.org/documents/mhdv-zev-mou-20220329.pdf
(last updated Mar. 29, 2022).
62 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 29334-35 (May 5, 2023). For example, EPA does not consider Virginia's adoption
of the Advanced Clean Cars II standards. See Sarah Rankin, GOP leaders want to untie Virginia from
California EV rule, AP NEWS (Aug. 26, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/technology-california-pollution-
climate-and-environment-e66 Ife8026ab9ed8d5d52 Ial4bee0858.
63 In explaining its No Action case, EPA makes no mention of the BIL and only notes "the availability of
economic incentives for electric vehicles for both manufacturers and consumers provided by the IRA."
Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 29334-35 (May 5, 2023).
While there is always uncertainty in modeling, these are factors EPA should consider in the
No Action case, rather than taking them into account only when assessing the feasibility of the
standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0591, pp. 7-8]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
10. EPA's baseline and sensitivity analysis is flawed.
a) EPA's application of price modifications in the "NTR" and "HDP2" no action
scenarios is inconsistent with the Inflation Reduction Act and IRS's proposed implementation of
26 U.S.C. §30D.
In Section IV.B of the Preamble to EPA's proposal,53 EPA describes its approach for
assessing the baseline case - or "no action" case - as well as several sensitivity cases. Within the
Central Compliance Modeling for LDVs, EPA presents the results of two "no action" modeling
runs:54 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 11-12]
53 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29295-29297.
54 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip.
"NTR" run, which incorporates modeling of the impacts of the Inflation Reduction
Act 55 (IRA) to LDV sales, and
"NTA noIRA" run, which does not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 11-12]
55 117 H.R. 5376 (August 12, 2022).
Similarly, within the Central Compliance Modeling for MDVs, EPA presents the results of
two "no action" modeling runs:56
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56 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-md-central-compliance-run.zip.
"HDP2" run, which incorporates modeling of the impacts of the IRA to MDV sales,
and
"HDP2_noIRA" run, which does not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 11-12]
In both the NTR and HDP2 runs, EPA mis-applies the §30D tax credit in the following ways:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 11-12]
• As of April 18, 2023, only 14 light-duty vehicles in the MY 2023 fleet are eligible for
any credit amount under §30D.57 Nonetheless, EPA applies a price modification to every BEV
in the MY 2023 to MY 2032 analysis fleets, without any consideration of: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 11-12]
57 https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/17/ev-treasury-department-regulation-00092123 and
https://fueleconomy.gov/feg/tax2023.shtml, accessed 4/28/2023.
• Cost of the vehicle - the §30D tax credit is only available for pick-up trucks,
vans and SUVs with an MSRP < $80,000 and other qualified vehicles with an
MSRP < $55,000. The BEV to which EPA applies the price modification have
OMEGA-projected prices ranging from $24,633 to $360,545;58 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 11-12]
• o Location of final assembly - from August 17, 2022, the §30D
tax credit is only available for vehicles whose final assembly occurs in North
America; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 11-12]
• o Battery components - Starting in 2023, the §30D tax credit
requires an increasing percentage of battery components to be manufactured or
assembled in North America; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 11-12]
• o Battery critical minerals - Starting in 2023, the §30D tax credit
requires an increasing percentage of battery critical minerals to be extracted,
processed or recycled in eligible locations; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 11-12]
• o Purchaser income-the §30D tax credit is only available for
taxpayers with adjusted gross income less than thresholds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 11-12]
58 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip,
"2023 03 25 1 l_46_49_ld_central_compliance_run_Proposal_vehicles/csv," Column AB.
b) EPA incorrectly accounts for the regionality of BEV adoption in its ACC II sensitivity
scenario.
In reference to the Central "no action" case, EPA explains that its analysis "does not include
the effect of state-level policies [] because many are still not in effect." 59 For the reasons
discussed in detail below, we agree that EPA cannot rely upon a scenario in which a waiver is
improperly granted for state policies that are unlawful due to Clean Air Act preemption.
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Nevertheless, in anticipation of these state-level policies, EPA models an ACC II sensitivity
scenario, "which includes the ZEV requirements of the California Advanced Clean Car (ACC) II
program for California and other participating states."60 EPA further explains that "if California
were to submit a waiver request for the ACC II program and EPA were to subsequently grant the
waiver, then it may be appropriate to update the No Action case in the final rulemaking to reflect
the ACC II program "61,62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 12-14]
59 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29296.
60 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29296.
61 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29334, footnote 737.
62 California submitted a waiver request for the ACC II program on May 22, 2023. See
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/california-seeks-us-approval-end-gas-only-new-
vehicle- sales-by-2035-2023-05-23/.
In its development of the ACC II sensitivity modeling, EPA separates the base year fleet into
two "regions,"63 such that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 12-14]
63 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29334.
Vehicles sold into ACC II-adopting states ("ZEV regions") are subject to minimum
BEV sales share constraints according to Annual ZEV Requirements in ACC 11,64 and
The remaining vehicle sales within a given fleet year ("non-ZEV regions") are subject to
a "minimum BEV sales share value of zero."65 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 12-14]
64 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29334.
65 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29334.
In the OMEGA modeling to support the ACC II sensitivity scenario, the minimum BEV sales
share requirement for each region is applied as a new constraint within the existing model 66 -
i.e., for the non-ZEV regions, which have a minimum BEV sales share of zero, the ACC II
sensitivity treatment in OMEGA is no different from the underlying base model run.67 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 12-14]
66 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-15-09-58-39-sensitivityACC2-3alts-20230314, "required sales share-
bodysty le_zevregions_withACC2_20230222. csv."
67 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-15-09-58-39-sensitivityACC2-3alts-20230314.zip.
The fatal flaw in EPA's logic is that the underlying base model runs - i.e., the Central Case
Alt linear, Alt minuslO, Alt_pluslO, NTR, NTR-noIRA, Proposal, and SAFE runs - do not
consider the regionally of BEV adoption. 68 By attempting to overlay regional constraints in a
model that does not otherwise consider regionality, EPA is double-counting the BEV sales share
in the high-adopting states. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 12-14]
68 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip.
EPA provides the following data to define the "ZEV regions" and BEV sales share constraints
in the ACC II sensitivity scenario.69 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 12-14]
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69 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29334.
Table 104. Sales share of U.S. new light-duty vehicles in states adopting ACC II, by model
year
Model Years Portion of U.S. new light-duty sales States adopting ACC II
2018 to 2025 12.6% CA
2026 22.6% CA, MA, NY, OR, VT, WA
2027 and later 30.4% CA, CO, CT, MA, MD, ME, NJ, NY,
OR, RI, VT, WA
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 12-14]
Table 105. ZEV Percentage sales requirement within states adopting ACC II, by model year
2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
2033 2034 2035
14.5 17.0 19.5 22.0 35.0 43.0 51.0 59.0 68.0 76.0 82.0 8
8.0 94.0 100.0
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 12-14]
Table 1 summarizes the nationwide BEV sales fractions projected by OMEGA for the "NTR"
no action run within the ACC II sensitivity scenario.
Table 1 - BEV sales fraction under ACC II Sensitivity NTR scenario70
Model Year 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
Nationwide BEV sales fraction 0.325 0.421 0.494 0.523 0.524 0.545
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 12-14]
70 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-15-09-58-39-sensitivityACC2-3alts-20230314.zip,
"2023_03_15_09_58_39_sensitivityACC2_3alts_20230314_NTR_summary results.csv," Columns DU
and BBW.
Although the OMEGA model output does not provide a breakout projection of BEV sales in
states not adopting ACC II, one can calculate the information using Equations 1 and 2, below:
[See original for equation calculating the breakout projection of BEV sales in states not
adopting ACC II] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 14-16]
where:
BEVU.S. = Nationwide BEV sales fraction (Table 1)
BEVACCII = BEV sales fraction in ACC II adopting states (Table 104 from NPRM)71
BEVnon-ACCII = BEV sales fraction in non-ACC II adopting states (Table 2)
salesU.S. = percentage of U.S. new LDV sales occurring in the U.S. (= 100%)
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salesACCII = percentage of U.S. new LDV sales occurring in ACC II adopting states (Table
105 from NPRM)72
salesnon-ACCII = percentage of U.S. new LDV sales occurring in non-ACC II adopting
states (calculated per Eq-2)
71 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29334.
72 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29334.
????????-????? = 111111.1. ~ 1111111111 Eq-2
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 14-16]
Using the EPA data and equations cited above, Table 2 summarizes the BEV sales fractions
that must be achieved in non-ACC II adopting states in order to meet the nationwide BEV sales
fractions modeled by EPA in the ACC II sensitivity scenario. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
pp. 14-16]
Table 2 - BEV sales fractions that would be needed for non-ACC II adopting states73
73 Example calculation for 2027: 0.28 = [(0.325 x 100%) - (0.43 x 30.4%)] / (100% - 30.4%).
Model
Year 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
BEV sales fraction in non-ACC II adopting
states 0.28 0.38 0.45 0.45 0.42 0.42
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 14-16]
Inexplicably, the BEV sales fractions that would be needed for the non-ACC II adopting
states under the ACC II sensitivity scenario (Table 2) are actually greater than the nationwide
BEV sales fractions modeled in EPA's Central NTR scenario, which are provided in Table 3.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 14-16]
Table 3 - BEV sales fractions modeled in EPA's Central NTR scenario74
74 EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance Modeling Runs (Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0486), 2023- 03-25-ll-46-49-ld-central-compliance-run.zip,
"2023_03_25_ll_46_49_ld_central_compliance_run_NTR_summary results.csv," Columns DL and ALG.
Model Year 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
Nationwide BEV sales fraction 0.27 0.32 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.39
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 14-16]
What EPA fails to consider in the ACC II sensitivity scenario is that BEVs are already
disproportionately adopted by states that have or will adopt ACC II. Eight of the ten top states
for EV market share in the first quarter of 2023, as shown in the figure below published by the
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AAI),75 are also identified by EPA as ACC II-adopting
states.76 With the LDV sales associated with those states separated into the "ZEV regions"
bucket in the ACC II NTR sensitivity scenario, the "no action" BEV sales fraction in the
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remaining U.S. states must be less than the Central NTR nationwide average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 14-16]
75 AAI, "Get Connected Electric Vehicle Quarterly Report, First Quarter
2023, https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/papers-
reports/Get%20Connected%20EV%20Quarterly%20Report%202023%20Ql.pdf. In this figure, "EV"
refers to the sum of BEV, PHEV and FCEV.
76 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29334.
[See original for graph titled "EV Market Share by State] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
pp. 14-16]
Source: AAI "Get Connected Electric Vehicle Quarterly Report", First Quarter 2023 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 14-16]
The modeled producer and consumer behaviors in response to the ACC II policy are not
simply additive to the underlying no action (Central NTR) scenario, and EPA cannot reasonably
project the impacts of an ACC II sensitivity case without first regionally disaggregating BEV
sales within the Central NTR scenario. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 14-16]
c) EPA's ACC II sensitivity scenario relies on unreasonable
assumptions regarding the implementation of the ACC II Program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 16-18]
EPA fails to recognize and account for the following complexities of the ACC II Program in
its ACC II sensitivity scenario modeling:
ZEVs are not limited to BEVs. EPA assumes for the purposes of the ACC II
sensitivity scenario that "ZEV" means "BEV" and fails to consider that FCEVs are also ZEVs.77
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 16-18]
77 California Code of Regulations Title 13, Section 1962.2(i)(18).
EPA neglects to consider the compliance options and flexibilities available to
manufacturers under ACC II. EPA assumes that the Annual ZEV Requirement under the ACC II
Program relies wholly on BEV sales, whereas in reality, "manufacturers may meet a portion of
their Annual ZEV Requirement with PHEV values, environmental justice values, or early
compliance values."78 For instance, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 16-18]
78 California Code of Regulations Title 13, Section 1962.4(e).
• ACC II allows manufacturers to satisfy up to 20 percent of their Annual ZEV
Requirement through the sale of qualifying PHEVs;79
• o ACC II offers multiplier incentives of up to 1,5x for vehicles used in
certain Environmental Justice programs, up to 5 percent of a manufacturer's
Annual ZEV Requirement;80 and
o Manufacturers may earn and apply early compliance credits, up to 15 percent of their
Annual ZEV Requirement.81 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 16-18]
79 California Code of Regulations Title 13, Section 1962.4(e)(1).
80 California Code of Regulations Title 13, Section 1962.4(e)(2).
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81 California Code of Regulations Title 13, Section 1962.4(e)(3).
A. EPA disregards obstacles to ZEV Penetration.
To support its conclusion that the automotive fleet is rapidly electrifying, EPA selectively
references projections by third-party sources, but overlooks the caveats and qualifications that
accompany these statements. For example, EPA cites to IHS Markit's prediction of "a nearly 40
percent U.S. PEV share by 2030."92 But IHS Markit also cautions that "specific compliance
challenges vary from OEM to OEM"93, and according to Mike Fiske, an Associate Director of
North America Powertrain Forecasting at IHS Markit, "manufacturers are also keenly aware of
the risks associated with a rapid transition to electrification, [which include] consumer
acceptance, vehicle range, and affordability among top concerns."94 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 19-20]
92 EPA's Proposed Rule: Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty
and Medium-Duty Vehicles [hereinafter "Proposed Rule"] at 29189 (citing to IHS Markit, "US EPA
Proposed Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Years 2023- 2026; What to Expect," August 9,
2021).
93 IHS Markit, "US EPA Proposed Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Years 2023- 2026;
What to Expect," August 9, 2021, https://www.spglobal.com/mobility/en/research-analysis/us-epa-
proposed- greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards-my2023-26.html.
94 Id.
EPA also relies on "[m]ore recent projections by Bloomberg New Energy Finance[, which]
suggest that under current policy and market conditions, and prior to the IRA, the U.S. was on
pace to reach 40 to 50 percent PEVs by 2030."95 However, BNEF's 2022 EV Outlook also
provides as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 19-20]
95 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29189 (citing to Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), "Electric Vehicle
Outlook 2022," Long term outlook economic transition scenario).
"Despite the rapid rise in EV adoption, road transport is still not on track for carbon
neutrality by 2050. Simply changing out the drivetrain of vehicles may not be the most efficient
way to deliver net zero".96 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 19-20]
96 Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), "Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022," Long term outlook
economic transition scenario, Executive Summary at 1.
"Raw materials supply constraints for batteries also look very tight for the years
ahead "97 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 19-20]
97 Id.
• "China still dominates [EV battery manufacturing]".98 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 19-20]
98 Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), "Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022," Long term outlook
economic transition scenario, Batteries at 1.
"The timing for achieving battery pack prices below $100/kWh on a volume-
weighted average basis has become less certain, as raw material prices have significantly
impacted costs over the last 12 months "99 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 19-20]
99 Id.
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"The total demand for lithium surpasses 2.4 million metric tons of lithium carbonate
equivalent (LCE) in 2030, up 259% from current demand. Companies have invested in the
chemical converters that produce carbonate and hydroxide, while ignoring upstream raw material
extraction. This has led to a squeeze in the upstream market driving lithium prices up over the
last 18 months." 100 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 19-20]
100 Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), "Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022," Long term outlook
economic transition scenario, Battery materials at 1.
"About $5.4 billion is needed to ensure the building of 400,000 LCE in lithium raw
material supply, a volume that is currently in the pipeline for 2021-2025 but not yet financed. For
the chemical converters, an additional 100,000t LCE carbonate and 300,000t LCE hydroxide
capacity planned by 2025 still needs at least $8.4 billion to be successfully developed." 101
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 19-20]
101 Id. (emphasis added)
"The announced capacity of upcoming nickel sulfate projects will only be enough to
meet demand up to 2023."102 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 19-20]
102 Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), "Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022," Long term outlook
economic transition scenario, Battery materials at 2.
"The investment to build an extensive charging network is still small in comparison to
the size of the electric vehicle market". 103 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 19-20]
103 Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), "Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022," Long term outlook
economic transition scenario, Charging infrastructure at 5.
Additionally, per EPA, when U.S. ZEV share predictions are "adjusted for the effects of the
Inflation Reduction Act, this estimate increases to 52 percent."104 Yet EPA's source also
caveats that "in 2021, Bloomberg reported], [that] less than 5% of new cars sold in the U.S.
were electric "105 EPA also cites to a "another study by the International Council on Clean
Transportation ("ICCT") and Energy Innovation that includes the effect of the IRA estimates that
the share of BEVs will increase to 56 to 67 percent by 2032." 106 However, the ICCT's estimates
in this study are inclusive of California's Advanced Clean Cars program and other Section 177
State adoptions of the Advanced Clean Cars program. 107 As such, the scope of the ICCT's study
is not exclusive to an assessment of the IRA's impact on U.S. ZEV penetration rates. Rather, it
encompasses other factors that EPA does not properly account for, thus causing EPA to
overestimate the impact of IRA incentives on ZEV penetration. The ICCT study at issue also
highlights material context and conditions that EPA does not sufficiently consider in its proposal,
including the following statements: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 20-22]
104 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29189 (citing to Tucker, S., "Study: More Than Half of Car Sales Could Be
Electric By 2030," Kelley Blue Book, October 4, 2022)).
105 Tucker, S., "Study: More Than Half of Car Sales Could Be Electric By 2030," Kelley Blue Book,
October 4, 2022.
106 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29189 (citing to International Council on Clean Transportation, "Analyzing
the Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act on Electric Vehicle Uptake in the US," ICCT White Paper,
January 2023).
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107 International Council on Clean Transportation, ' 'Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act
on Electric Vehicle Uptake in the US," ICCT White Paper at 13, January 2023.
"The EV and ZEV sales shares [the ICCT] presents] are not guaranteed and there
remains uncertainty in the electrification transition, especially after the IRA tax credits
expire." 108 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 20-22]
108 International Council on Clean Transportation, "Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act
on Electric Vehicle Uptake in the US," ICCT White Paper at ii, January 2023.
The ICCT's analysis "does not account for other non-financial barriers such as lead
time for vehicle manufacturing and charging infrastructure development". 109 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 20-22]
109 Id. at iii.
"The rates of electrification [the ICCT] projects] here can only be achieved if
government and industry invest quickly in ZEV assembly and infrastructure."! 10 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 20-22]
110 Id.
"[The ICCT's] modeling approach carries limitations. The GCAM model logit
function is based on a single numerical value that orders consumer purchase preferences. This
choice indicator approach does not necessarily capture individual preferences, local variations in
cost, and other personal factors that would result in economically inferior choices. Furthermore,
should battery prices not decline as predicted or consumer acceptance of electric vehicles stalls,
our forecasts could be overly optimistic." 111 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 20-22]
111 Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
"There are two key non-financial barriers not accounted for in this study:
manufacturing lead time and charging infrastructure lead time "112 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 20-22]
112 Id.
"Future supply chain development, particularly for materials used in battery
production, is uncertain, as is infrastructure availability "113 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
pp. 20-22]
113 Id. At 18.
EPA's DRIA further provides that "Goldman Sachs projects a 50 percent share for BEVs in
the U.S. in 2030, 70 percent in 2035 and 85 percent in 2040."114 But EPA ignores factors
outside the control of regulators and OEMs alike that will be material to the feasibility of EPA's
proposal and are highlighted in EPA's own citational support. Specifically, the Goldman Sachs
forecast states that "the EV sector is beset by some major crosscurrents", which include "ring
prices for electrical power" and "inflation for the materials that make up battery
components".! 15 Further, "[t]he EV sector has some challenges in the near term." This includes
"'greenflation', as demand for batteries pushes up prices for key materials involved in making
them, according to strategists in Goldman Sachs Research." 116 These strategists "expect battery
costs to increase 6% in 2023 from the year before". 117 Collectively, these issues illustrate the
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neglected assumptions underpinning EPA's central trajectory for LD ZEV sales and supporting
infrastructure. These issues are central to EPA's proposal and make EPA's proposal
unreasonable, arbitrary and contrary to law. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 20-22]
114 DRIA at 3-14 (citing to Goldman Sachs, "Electric vehicles are forecast to be half of global car sales by
2034" (Feb. 10, 2023) https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/pages/electric-vehicles-are-forecast-to-
be-half-of- global-car-sales-by-2035.html).
115 Goldman Sachs, "Electric vehicles are forecast to be half of global car sales by 2034" (Feb. 10, 2023)
https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/pages/electric-vehicles-are-forecast-to-be-half-of-global-car-
sales-by-2035.html.
116 Id.
117 Id. B. EPA disregards caveats regarding ZEV production capabilities.
EPA cites to "[a] proliferation of announcements by automakers in the past two years[,]
signaling] a rapidly growing shift in product development focus among automakers away from
internal-combustion technologies and toward electrification."! 18 Drawing support from these
announcements, EPA concludes that it is feasible within the next decade to force transition of the
domestic LDV fleet to BEV largely on the basis of third-hand sources and news articles taken
out of context. Though EPA acknowledges in passing that "manufacturer announcements such as
these are not binding, and often are conditioned as forward-looking and subject to
uncertainty[,]"119, EPA's proposed rule is not characterized by any reciprocal flexibilities to
adjust ambitious targets in order to accommodate material realities and uncertainties impacting
BEV production. In contrast to EPA's projections, the same OEMs EPA cites to for support of
the Proposed Rule have raised material concerns with an accelerated transition to LD BEVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
118 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29190.
119 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29193.
For example, EPA cites to a May 2021 announcement from Ford, providing that "they expect
40 percent of their global sales will be all-electric by 2030." 120 However, the Ford press release
EPA cites to also contains the following laundry list of caveats: 121 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 22-25]
120 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29190 (citing to Ford Motor Company, "Superior Value From EVs,
Commercial Business, Connected Services is Strategic Focus of Today's 'Delivering Ford+' Capital
Markets Day," Press Release, May 26, 2021).
121 Ford Motor Company, "Superior Value From EVs, Commercial Business, Connected Services is
Strategic Focus of Today's 'Delivering Ford+' Capital Markets Day," Press Release, May 26, 2021).
"Cautionary Note on Forward-Looking Statements
Statements included or incorporated by reference herein may constitute 'forward- looking
statements' within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
Forward-looking statements are based on expectations, forecasts, and assumptions by our
management and involve a number of risks, uncertainties, and other factors that could cause
actual results to differ materially from those stated, including, without limitation: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
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Ford and Ford Credit's financial condition and results of operations have been and
may continue to be adversely affected by public health issues, including epidemics or pandemics
such as COVID-19; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford is highly dependent on its suppliers to deliver components in accordance with
Ford's production schedule, and a shortage of key components, such as semiconductors, can
disrupt Ford's production of vehicles; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford's long-term competitiveness depends on the successful execution of its Plan;
Ford's vehicles could be affected by defects that result in delays in new model
launches, recall campaigns, or increased warranty costs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
22-25]
Ford may not realize the anticipated benefits of existing or pending strategic alliances,
joint ventures, acquisitions, divestitures, or new business strategies; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 22-25]
Operational systems, security systems, and vehicles could be affected by cyber
incidents and other disruptions; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford's production, as well as Ford's suppliers' production, could be disrupted by labor
issues, natural or man-made disasters, financial distress, production difficulties, or other factors;
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford's ability to maintain a competitive cost structure could be affected by labor or
other constraints; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford's ability to attract and retain talented, diverse, and highly skilled employees is
critical to its success and competitiveness; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford's new and existing products and mobility services are subject to market
acceptance and face significant competition from existing and new entrants in the automotive
and mobility industries; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford's results are dependent on sales of larger, more profitable vehicles, particularly
in the United States; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
With a global footprint, Ford's results could be adversely affected by economic,
geopolitical, protectionist trade policies, or other events, including tariffs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Industry sales volume in any of Ford's key markets can be volatile and could decline
if there is a financial crisis, recession, or significant geopolitical event; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford may face increased price competition or a reduction in demand for its products
resulting from industry excess capacity, currency fluctuations, competitive actions, or other
factors; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
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Fluctuations in commodity prices, foreign currency exchange rates, interest rates, and
market value of Ford or Ford Credit's investments can have a significant effect on results; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford and Ford Credit's access to debt, securitization, or derivative markets around the
world at competitive rates or in sufficient amounts could be affected by credit rating
downgrades, market volatility, market disruption, regulatory requirements, or other factors;
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford's receipt of government incentives could be subject to reduction, termination, or
clawback; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford Credit could experience higher-than-expected credit losses, lower-than-
anticipated residual values, or higher-than-expected return volumes for leased vehicles; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Economic and demographic experience for pension and other postretirement benefit
plans (e.g., discount rates or investment returns) could be worse than Ford has assumed; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Pension and other postretirement liabilities could adversely affect Ford's liquidity and
financial condition; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford could experience unusual or significant litigation, governmental investigations,
or adverse publicity arising out of alleged defects in products, perceived environmental impacts,
or otherwise; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford may need to substantially modify its product plans to comply with safety,
emissions, fuel economy, autonomous vehicle, and other regulations; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford and Ford Credit could be affected by the continued development of more
stringent privacy, data use, and data protection laws and regulations as well as consumers'
heightened expectations to safeguard their personal information; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Ford Credit could be subject to new or increased credit regulations, consumer
protection regulations, or other regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
We cannot be certain that any expectation, forecast, or assumption made in preparing
forward-looking statements will prove accurate, or that any projection will be realized. It is to be
expected that there may be differences between projected and actual results. Our forward-
looking statements speak only as of the date of their initial issuance, and we do not undertake
any obligation to update or revise publicly any forward-looking statement, whether as a result of
new information, future events, or otherwise. For additional discussion, see "Item 1 A. Risk
Factors" in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2020, as updated
by subsequent Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and Current Reports on Form 8-K." [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
Moreover, in March 2023, figures released by Ford highlighted that Ford Motor Co.'s EV
business had lost $3 billion before taxes during the past two years and will lose a similar amount
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this year as the company invests heavily in EV technology. 122 Ford's 10-K filed in February
2023 further disclosed: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-25]
122 Krishner, Tom, Associated Press, "Ford's electricity vehicle unit losing billions, as company invests in
new technology" (March 23, 2023), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/fords-electric-vehicle-unit-
losing-billions-as-company-invests-in-new-technology; see also Ford News Release, "'Refounded' Ford to
Show How Customer-Focused Segments Will Drive Value and Growth, Changes in Financial Reporting
(March 23, 2023) https://media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/fna/us/en/news/2023/03/23/_refounded_-ford-
to-show-how-customer-focused-segments-will-driv.html.
"We have announced plans to significantly increase our electric vehicle production
volumes; however, our ability to produce higher volumes of electric vehicles is dependent upon
the availability of raw materials necessary for the production of batteries, e.g., lithium, cobalt,
nickel, graphite, and manganese, among others." 123 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 22-
25]
123 Ford 10-K Annual Report (Feb. 3, 2023) https://shareholder.ford.com/Investors/financials/sec-
filings/sec-filings- details/default.aspx?FilingId=16361873 (emphasis added).
"As a result of the competition for and limited availability of the raw materials needed
for our electric vehicle business, the costs of such materials are difficult to accurately forecast as
they may fluctuate during the term of the offtake agreements and other long-term purchase
contracts based on market conditions. Accordingly, we may be subject to increases in the prices
we pay for those raw materials, and our ability to recoup such costs through increased pricing to
our customers may be limited. As a result, our margins, results of operations, financial condition,
and reputation may be adversely impacted by commitments we make pursuant to offtake
agreements and other long-term purchase contracts." 124 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
22-25]
124 Ford 10-K Annual Report (Feb. 3, 2023) https://shareholder.ford.com/Investors/financials/sec-
filings/sec-filings- details/default.aspx?FilingId=16361873 (emphasis added).
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
EPA relies on rosy market projections, citing a Bloomberg New Energy Finance analysis
suggesting that, "under current policy and market conditions, and prior to the IRA, the U.S. was
on pace to reach 40 to 50 percent PEVs by 2030. When adjusted for the effects of the Inflation
Reduction Act, this estimate increases to 52 percent." (p. 29189) EPA also cites the International
Council on Clean Transportation as projecting an increase in new car sales of 67%. EPA should
conduct a more robust market analysis with less biased sources if it is to avoid the charge of
being arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 8]
EPA Summary and Response
Multiple commenters (Hyundai, Environmental and Public Health Organizations)
recommended that EPA include California's ACC II and ACT regulations in our No Action case
modeling. In response, for this final rulemaking analysis EPA is again including ACT for
medium-duty vehicles, but is not including ACC II for light-duty vehicles in the No Action case.
At the time of this rulemaking EPA has not issued a waiver for ACC II. This rule is independent
from ACC II standards and our feasibility analysis does not depend on the implementation of
ACC II, as discussed further in RTC Chapter 2.3. A sensitivity envisioning a fully implemented
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ACC II - based on the participating states, and their respective vehicle sales shares - is included
in the State-Level Policies sensitivity, as we discuss in preamble section IV.F. This sensitivity
assumes nearly 100% of the Section 177 states achieving the ZEV sales share requirements
specified in ACC II. And so, the actual effect of ACC II should be something between the No
Action case (assuming no state-level policy effects) and 100% of the state-level policy effects. In
this way, Hyundai's expectations of actual ACC II realization should fall somewhere between
those two cases. EPA's analysis of the medium-duty GHG standards does include California's
ACT regulations in the No Action case. This treatment of a state-level policy in the medium-duty
central case analysis is different than for light-duty because EPA has granted a waiver for
California's ACT program.
California Attorney General's Office et al. commented in support of EPA's decision to not
include modeling of ACC II in the No Action case, and observed that if EPA had included it for
the NPRM analysis, the estimated costs of the standards would be lower. EPA agrees with this
assessment. The commenter is correct that in EPA's "State-level ZEV policies" sensitivity
analysis, the No Action case PEV penetrations are higher, and the costs are lower than the central
case. Results for this sensitivity are presented in RIA Chapter 12.1.4.
The Center for American Progress and ACEE commented that EPA's No Action case was
conservative in terms of the number of BEVs projected for the NPRM. The commenters cited
other projections with higher BEV penetrations than the No Action case in EPA's central
analysis. The Center for American Progress cited an ICCT study that accounted for the effects of
ACC II and IRA incentives, and with BEV penetrations for 2032 that approached the level of
EPA's NPRM projections for the Action case. In response, as discussed above, EPA did not
include ACC II in the central case for this final rulemaking analysis. EPA's No Action case PEV
penetrations are a function of multiple considerations, inputs and assumptions. Among these
considerations are various third-party projections of technology penetration rates in the absence
of new standards. The particular study cited by the commenter shows projected PEV penetrations
that are higher than the range of studies used by EPA in the calibration of the No Action case
PEV market, as described in RIA Chapter 4.1. While EPA has concluded that the level of PEVs
projected in our No Action case is not overly conservative, we acknowledge that higher levels
such as those cited by the commenter may be plausible, as illustrated by several of the sensitivity
cases presented in RIA Chapter 12. Such higher PEV levels further support the feasibility of the
final standards.
Western Energy Alliance commented that EPA's No Action case BEV projections were based
on "rosy market projections," and recommended that EPA should conduct a market analysis
using "less biased sources". In response, EPA disagrees that the third-party sources considered
when developing the No Action BEV projections were biased, and we note that the commenter
does not provide any explanation or evidence for the assertion of bias. EPA has continued to
monitor new studies on this topic, and where appropriate incorporate those studies from
respected third-party organizations that specialize in analysis and projections for the automotive
market. A discussion of the range of studies considered for the analysis of the No Action case in
this final rulemaking is provided in RIA Chapter 4.1.
Valero asserted that EPA projections of BEVs in the No Action case for the "State-level ZEV
policies" sensitivity case were incorrect because of double-counting of BEVs in the non-ACC II
regions. In the words of the commenter, "[b]y attempting to overlay regional constraints in a
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model that does not otherwise consider regionality, EPA is double-counting the BEV sales share
in the high-adopting states." In response, EPA disagrees that BEV sales are double counted in
the ACC II sensitivity. The commenter has apparently incorrectly concluded that the single-
region National BEV sales from the central case are carried over unchanged into the non-ZEV
region of the sensitivity analysis, and that the ZEV-region BEV sales are added to those carried
over sales, which, if it were true, would thus generate an inappropriately high level of total BEV
sales. Actually, the model does not use this approach. Instead, the sensitivity analysis has unique
input files (vehicles.csv and context new vehcile market.csv) which define the overall sales
volumes for the analysis context separately for the two regions. As a result, the sales of the non-
ZEV region for the ACC II sensitivity case are appropriately only a portion of the National sales
for the central case. Accordingly, the overall BEV sales for the non-ZEV region for the ACC II
sensitivity will tend to be less National BEV sales of the central case, contrary to the
commenter's assertion that central case BEV sales were "simply additive."
13 - Consumer considerations
13.1 - Response to recurrent comments
Among the comments in this section, which appear below, several themes emerged. For
brevity and clarity, we address those recurrent comments here in this introduction titled
Response to Recurrent Comments. We also note at the outset that the vast majority of comments
address consumer considerations regarding light-duty BEVs and PHEVs; a smaller number of
comments addressed consumer considerations regarding ICE and hybrid vehicles and medium-
duty vehicles.
First, in several comments, the standards are characterized as plug-in electric vehicle (PEV)
mandates, using a variety of terminology such as "mandate", "force", "require", "drive
consumers to purchase products", "prescriptive policy", and "dictating". Similarly, in many
comments, OMEGA estimates of vehicle technology market shares appear to be perceived and
described as a "mandate", "requirement", "preferred option", or "single technology pathway."
For example, the American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce states that the feasibility of
the rule "critically depends on the electric-vehicle adoption rates it projects for model years 2027
through 2032." Relatedly, some commenters appear to perceive and describe the standards and
the compliance pathway as not being technology neutral. For example, the National Association
of Convenience Stores (NACS) et al. asserts that the "proposal ... artificially tilts the scale
toward electric vehicles." In these and all similar comments, these misunderstandings and
misrepresentations of the standards and compliance pathways are incorrect. As a consequence,
subsequent arguments based on these mischaracterizations are invalid.
In response, the standards do not mandate PEV adoption; the standards are performance-based
emissions standards and manufacturers choose the mix of technologies to comply (e.g., see
Preamble I.B.I). In the final rulemaking, we clarify the nature of the standards and demonstrate
several alternate pathways for compliance in the RIA in addition to the central case. We have
demonstrated multiple potential compliance pathways that include ICE vehicle, hybrids, BEVs,
and PHEVs. See sensitivity scenarios in Chapter 4.1 and Chapter 12.1.4 of the RIA. Among
alternative pathways, we demonstrate that manufacturers can comply with these standards
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without increasing the market share of BEVs (i.e., see the No Additional BEVs case, RIA
Chapter 12.1.4.4 and Section IV.F.5 of the Preamble).
We respond further by noting that the converse of this faulty PEV mandate argument is also
incorrect; the standards and the OMEGA estimates of technology shares do not limit the ability
of manufacturers to produce, or for consumer to purchase, ICE vehicles. Likewise, further
extensions of this incorrect notion, such as fossil fuel bans, are also incorrect. The central case
estimates in the FRM present the most reasonable estimate of vehicle technology market shares
according to our analyses. However, within the flexibility of these standards, we expect that
manufacturers will choose their respective compliance pathways and match their production
portfolio to the highly varied demands of their diverse customers (e.g., households, farmers, ride-
hailing drivers, commuters, businesses).
Second, many commenters suggested that EPA's estimates of PEV acceptance (aka demand,
attitudes, preferences) and PEV market shares are unreasonable or, for example, "extremely
aggressive." In contrast, some commenters assert that EPA's estimates of PEV acceptance and
market shares are not sufficiently reflective of state initiatives and manufacturer commitments,
and therefore, estimated PEV market shares were too low. According to the California Air
Resources Board, "the proposal is not only achievable, but that manufacturers could exceed the
standards."
In response, the PEV market shares projected in the FRM central case are reasonable
estimates of vehicle technology market shares according to the parameters of our analyses. Our
parametrization of PEV acceptance is based on the scientific literature on consumer acceptance,
and the resulting central case estimate of future PEV market shares in the No Action case is
consistent with third-party estimates that do include projected effects of the IRA and do not
include projected effects of this rule (See RIA Chapter 4.1.2). Importantly, we acknowledge the
uncertainty inherent in any estimate, and as a result, we have tested the sensitivity of our
modeling to different parameterizations of PEV acceptance. Through these sensitivities, we show
that compliance does not rely or rest on a specific assumption about PEV acceptance, and
therefore, also does not rest upon, for example, the "effect of interacting policies on consumer
acceptance." Rather, compliance can be achieved across a broad range of potential developments
in consumer acceptance.
Third, some commenters advocate for greater certainty. For example, Consumer Reports
states, "By guaranteeing that greater numbers of EVs will be manufactured in the coming years,
the new standards will help give private industry the confidence it needs to invest in
infrastructure." The corollary is that PEV adoption will also rise since charging access enables
PEV adoption. While we agree with this logic, according to our analyses and assuming
manufacturers engage in cost-minimizing decision making,470 EPA's central case projections for
vehicle technology shares are likely. As such, we agree with Zero Emissions Transportation
Association's (ZETA's) comment that "the adoption of more stringent emissions standards
would incentivize the production of more EVs" among the many available technologies that
manufacturers may choose in complying with the standards—not guarantee that result. We note
that beyond our central case analysis, we have demonstrated through a range of sensitivity
470 Specifically, OMEGA, incorporates RSEs, technology costs, and other inputs into its algorithms for finding cost-
efficient pathways for manufacturers to achieve compliance with desired emissions standards.
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scenarios that manufacturers can comply with the standards through a range of technology
pathways, including various mixes of ICE, hybrids, PHEVs and BEVs.
Fourth, several commenters stated that these standards would reduce consumer choice, with
Competitive Enterprise Institute going so far as to suggest that the standards amount to a
"cartelization of the auto industry." We disagree. In response and in contrast to those comments,
consumer choice can be preserved and expanded through a variety of combinations of body
styles, price points, and powertrains not yet available in today's vehicle market. Greater numbers
and diversity of PEVs introduce choices that past consumers did not have, choices that
consumers might have made if more PEV options had been available. For example, Forsythe et
al. (2023) found that the projected reductions in the BEV price-premium "have driven substantial
increases in consumer choices of BEV cars and SUVs over their conventional gasoline vehicle
counterparts." Continuing ZETA's comment from above, "the adoption of more stringent
emissions standards would incentivize the production of more EVs to meet growing consumer
demand while also spurring innovation and increased model availability to meet the needs of an
increasingly wider range of consumers." We have seen evidence of a favorable response to
increased PEV options, as noted by commenters, enthusiastic response to the introduction of
BEV pickup and SUV models. In general, CALSTART expects growth in consumer choice and
in "equitable access to clean transportation options."
Regarding non-PEVs, the findings from Consumer Reports (CR) indicate that vehicle options
will most likely increase, on the whole, with substantially more vehicle options that meet the
desire of the majority of consumers for improved fuel economy. CR states that the remaining
non-PEVs "will have to compete with better and better EV offerings," especially in light of
"consumer demand for cleaner, more efficient gasoline vehicles." Preference for more efficient
vehicles is supported by a preponderance of survey evidence provided by commenters. For
example, CR finds that "seven in ten American drivers say that fuel economy is either 'very
important' or 'extremely important'" to their purchase decision; "43% of drivers selected
improvement in fuel economy" as the attribute of their vehicles that leaves the most room for
improvement; and "85% of Americans agree that automakers should continue to improve fuel
economy across vehicle types." Relatedly, we have assumed in our modeling that ICE vehicle
emissions will not worsen.
Fifth, several commenters, including the Alliance for Automotive Innovation, state that
"customers may simply reject new offerings and remain in older vehicles longer, further
increasing the rising average age of vehicles on the road and delaying rollouts of other
technologies. Any of these outcomes would detract from achieving the agency's overall goals of
reduced emissions and improved fuel economy." In response, EPA models the interaction of
producer production decisions and consumer purchase decisions, where these decision makers
minimize their respective estimation of costs. See RIA Chapter 2.6 and RIA Chapter 4.1. In
addition, "OMEGA estimates the effects of a policy on new vehicle sales volumes as a deviation
from the sales that would take place in the absence of the standards." See RIA Chapter 4.4.1. As
a result, our modeling accounts for consumers who choose not to purchase a new vehicle. Our
modeling also accounts for consumers that will not purchase PEVs and purchase ICE vehicles
instead. Furthermore, our modeling takes into account the cost and non-cost criteria that
influence consumer purchase decisions, many of which were highlighted by commenters. Since
our modeling accounts for changes in sales as a result of the standards, we disagree with
commenters' claims that an unaccounted for "rejection of new offerings" will yield an aging
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vehicle fleet, delayed technology rollouts, and fewer emissions reductions. It's worth noting that
this is a familiar critique and is called the Gruenspecht Effect. Notably, EPA does in fact model
changes in sales as the result of the standards. See RIA Chapter 4.4. Furthermore, given the
nature of transportation and vehicle mileage accumulation in the U.S., most existing vehicles will
eventually be scrapped and replaced.471 In the presence of these standards, that future vehicle is
likely to be more fuel efficient than it would be otherwise.
We note that commenters further attribute a hypothesized unwillingness or inability of
consumers to purchase the vehicles comprising a compliant fleet to a variety of factors such as
technology costs, vehicle purchase price, ownership costs, affordability, inconvenience, access,
reliability, and durability. In short, some commenters disagree with EPA's characterization of
consumer demand, purchase decisions, and behavior. We address assertions regarding the
underpinnings of consumer demand, purchase decisions, and behavior in more detail in
subsequent sections. We believe that Our representations of ICE vehicle and PEV acceptance
and consumer attitudes and preferences, purchase decision, and behavior are based on the
scientific literature in the public record, as discussed in RIA Chapter 4.1. The resulting central
case estimates of future vehicle technology market shares in the No Action case are consistent
with third-party estimates. Our consumer-related modeling assumptions and methods are
substantiated and reasonable and based on the best available information including our
consideration of the public comments, as are the resulting estimates.
Sixth, many comments cite historical and current statistics (e.g., sales, survey results), prices
(e.g., vehicles, fuels), costs (e.g., battery, emissions control technology, infrastructure), and
availability (e.g., critical mineral, charging stations and ports) to argue the inaccuracy of EPA's
projections. In response, we note that the information provided by commenters comes from a
wide variety of sources, some of which agree and some of which do not. These differences and
similarities occur for a variety of generally accepted reasons (e.g., timing of the study, survey
design, sampling population, sample design) and from a variety of familiar sources (e.g.,
academic journals, media, public and private sector reports). We question the strength of an
argument based on those quantities alone, especially those that do not take into account the
dynamic nature of vehicle markets (e.g., See RIA Chapter 4.1 regarding diffusion of
innovations). Instead, to commenters for whom these historical or current quantities are at the
crux of their argument, we reply that scientific, regulatory, governmental, consumer, and
manufacturing communities are in agreement that a significant transition toward PEVs is
underway. We project and substantiate changes in vehicle markets over the next 8 years.
Throughout the Preamble and RIA, we provide detailed descriptions of the analyses behind the
conclusions we reach. We offer our detailed analyses as our response to comments for which
historical and current quantities are at the crux of their arguments.
Lastly, consumer characteristics, issues, impacts, and consideration and therefore comments
regarding consumers cannot be siloed. Many of the comments addressed here regarding
consumer preferences and attitudes, purchase decision, ownership behavior, and savings and
471 Specifically, EPA projects changes in new vehicle sales as a result of the standards and associated changes in
new vehicle purchase prices. EPA also accounts for the distributions of vehicle age and VMT across the vehicle
stock. The net effect of this approach is that the small reduction in new vehicle sales tend to increase the portion of
miles driven by older vehicles, and therefore tend to increase their overall impacts relative to a case where there is
no change in new sales. Our modeling includes a consumer choice element that considers out-of-pocket expenses
when purchasing a new vehicle, projected operating savings and incentives available by the IRA.
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expenses relate to other aspects of this rule. We also acknowledge that this is especially true for
comments regarding PEV acceptance, the consumer-facing nature of PEV technology and the
interconnectedness of PEV acceptance and other market conditions. Specifically, many
commenters correctly link consumer demand for and acceptance of vehicle technologies,
particularly PEV technology, to vehicle attributes such as body style, range, battery durability,
and price; fueling and charging conditions such as feasibility of home and work charging, access
to public charging, time to fuel and charge, reliability of EVSE; and other factors. In response to
all of the comments in this chapter, we address only consumer aspects of the comments here and
refer readers to the substantive analyses regarding other related aspects of this rule to the relevant
sections of this RTC, the RIA, and the Preamble.
13.2 - Consumer demand
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
C. Historical Technology Adoption Versus EV Penetration Assumptions
Figure 2 shows the penetration rate of automotive technologies that have been introduced in
the last nineteen years. Technologies that follow the most aggressive growth curve are those that
are generally transparent to the customer. Eight speed transmissions, gasoline direct injection
(GDI) engines, and stop-start have become standard features, and have little or no impact on
customer driving behaviors. BEVs, on the other hand, require drivers to make active changes to
their driving habits and potentially additional investments (e.g., home charging equipment). In
short, BEVs require change, whereas many of the most successful automotive technologies do
not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 29-30]
EPA is assuming that automobile manufacturers can increase BEV production as quickly as
they have adopted new transmission or engine technologies, despite the need to build entirely
new supply chains and manufacturing facilities. Underlying such rapid growth is also an
assumption that the majority of new vehicle buyers will accept BEVs and their inherent changes
to driving habits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 29-30]
[See original comment for Figure 2: Examples of historical automotive technology
adoption29 compared to projected BEV market share under the EPA proposal.30]
29 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Automotive Trends Report (Mar. 2023), Detailed data.
Available at htps://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends/explore-automotive-trends-data#DetailedData. See
Detailed Real-World Fuel Economy, C02 Emissions, and Vehicle Attribute and Technology data.
30 Reflects EPA proposal, central analysis.
EPA has assumed a steep growth in BEV adoption at rates typically only seen in the evolution
of disruptive technologies such as the cell phone, the television and microwave ovens, all of
which added significant direct convenience and other benefits to customers and that cost
substantially less at the time of purchase than an automobile. BEVs, on the other hand, have not
thus far experienced such rapid adoption. In terms of convenience or additional new utility,
BEVs offer generally superior acceleration performance, home refueling (a convenience not
available to all customers), potentially lower fuel costs (that are dependent on where and when a
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vehicle is charged), and environmental benefits (important to some, but transparent to many).
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0701, p. 31]
Thus, EPA makes an extremely aggressive assumption for a nascent technology that has not
been fully embraced by the consumer and that faces many additional industrial and market
challenges. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 31]
Rapid adoption is generally achieved through customer interest and demand for products.
According to the latest JD Power EV Index, the percentage of Americans who say they are "very
unlikely" to buy an electric vehicle as their next car is growing.34 JD Power has found that the
EV-skeptic contingent has steadily grown from 18% to 21% of respondents between January and
March 2023. Those "very likely" to go electric has stayed flat this year at 27%.35 These trends
are seen across buyer demographics as well. While the majority of baby boomers and pre-
boomers are not considering EVs, 33% of Generation Z shoppers also told JD Power they were
either "somewhat unlikely" or "very unlikely" to buy an EV.36 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 32]
34 JD Power (2023, May 1). EV Divide Grows in U.S. As More New-Vehicle Shoppers Dig in Their Heels
on Internal Combustion. JD Power E-Vision Report. Retrieved June 10, 2023, from
htps://www .jdpower.com/business/resources/ev-divide-grows-us-more-new-vehicle-shoppers-dig-their-
heels- internal-combustion
35 JD Power (2023, May 1). EV Divide Grows in U.S. As More New-Vehicle Shoppers Dig in Their Heels
on Internal Combustion. JD Power E-Vision Report. Retrieved June 10, 2023, from
htps://www .jdpower.com/business/resources/ev-divide-grows-us-more-new-vehicle-shoppers-dig-their-
heels- internal-combustion
36 JD Power (2023, May 1). EV Divide Grows in U.S. As More New-Vehicle Shoppers Dig in Their Heels
on Internal Combustion. JD Power E-Vision Report. Retrieved June 10, 2023, from
htps://www .jdpower.com/business/resources/ev-divide-grows-us-more-new-vehicle-shoppers-dig-their-
heels- internal-combustion
b) Market Concerns
The premise that "Modern vehicles have sufficient power without the use of enrichment"288
is highly subjective and ultimately decided by the customer and their increasing demand for
vehicle utility. Such a broad declaration gives the impression that EPA believes that vehicle
utility has reached a practical zenith or that any incremental utility can and should now be
capped in order to facilitate a new, narrow emissions reduction strategy through the elimination
of enrichment. This is in contrast with EPA's historical practice of setting performance-based
standards that generally assume at least maintaining current levels of performance (i.e., not
negatively affecting a vehicle's utility). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 182-183]
288 NPRM at 68.
New vehicle purchasers generally desire increased vehicle features, including power, not less.
Power, and the enhanced utility and driving dynamics it enables, are core customer-demanded
functional attributes of a vehicle and engine combination. The preference of customers for
improved features transcends all price points and vehicle segments. New vehicle purchasers
consistently raise the bar on what they decide to be sufficient. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 182-183]
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In the past, customers who sought greater vehicle utility or higher performance did so through
selection of optional engines with greater displacement. However, industry, driven in part by
GHG and fuel economy regulations, has developed entire families of downsized engines that
have proven capable of meeting customer demands for power while simultaneously increasing
efficiency and lowering GHG emissions. This is exactly the strategy that EPA previously
identified as the technological pathway to meeting increasingly stringent GHG emissions
regulations while maintaining existing performance levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
183]
Enrichment is a critical strategy that has enabled this technological shift to lower
displacement engines, ensuring their safe and durable operation in transient high-power demand
situations. Manufacturers use enrichment to ensure that when customers demand high power,
they can do so without the risk of costly damage or interrupted performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 183]
Customer needs for power include, but are not limited to, the ability to tow a large trailer up
an occasional steep grade, to operate the vehicle with a full load of passengers and cargo, and to
rapidly accelerate on a short freeway entrance ramp to safely merge into traffic. Other customers,
for example those purchasing supercars, expect superior performance and racetrack i. In each
case, the power requirement from the engine depends on the customer's usage, and if its
"sufficient power" is inadequate to accomplish their task, then the customer may be exposed to
potentially unsafe and inadequate operation and will be dissatisfied with their vehicle's utility. A
sudden reduction or interruption of power in the midst of a driving maneuver (e.g., passing on a
grade) could be disruptive to the driver and confusing to other drivers. In some cases, this may
create an unsafe traffic condition if the vehicle suddenly loses power, forcing other drivers to
take evasive actions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 183]
Customers who seek specific power levels and are dissatisfied with the reduced power of
downsized engines due to prohibitions on enrichment would likely revert to seeking out higher
displacement engines or shift into larger vehicle segments. Worse yet, customers may simply
reject new offerings and remain in older vehicles longer, further increasing the rising average age
of vehicles on the road and delaying rollouts of other technologies. Any of these outcomes would
detract from achieving the agency's overall goals of reduced emissions and improved fuel
economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 183]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
The agency's conclusion that compliance with the proposed rule is feasible critically depends
on the electric-vehicle adoption rates it projects for model years 2027 through 2032. EPA
expects that by 2032, 67 percent of light-duty vehicles and 46 percent of medium-duty vehicles
will be battery-electric. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,329, 29,331. Those numbers are staggering. Current
adoption rates are much lower, and the assumptions that EPA makes to project such sizeable
increases are unwarranted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 19]
a. Current Adoption Of Electric Vehicles
Today, battery-electric vehicles make up a small minority of vehicles in both the light- and
medium-duty categories. Manufacturers offer a limited number of models, and relatively few
consumers buy them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 19]
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Although EPA claims that the production of electric vehicles is growing rapidly, see 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29,188-89, the U.S. Department of Energy reports that there are only 68 models of light-
and medium-duty battery-electric vehi- cles available for the current model year. See U.S. Dep't
of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Ctr., Alternative Fuel and Advanced Vehicle Search, https://ti-
nyurl.com/y853dwvt (last accessed June 26, 2023). Thirty-five of them are se- dans or wagons;
twenty-nine are SUVs; four are pickup trucks; and none are vans. Id. This limited number of
options may be a result of exceedingly low demand. According to the agency, in 2022, battery-
electric vehicles accounted for only 807,000 new car sales, or about 5.8 percent of the new light-
duty pas- senger-vehicle market. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,346. Currently, "in most of the United
States, the share of EVs is zero or near-zero." Kenneth T. Gillingham et al., Has Consumer
Acceptance of Electric Vehicles Been Increasing?, Forthcoming, Am. Econ. Ass'n, at 6 (Jan.
2023) ("Consumer Acceptance"). This is particularly true in rural areas. In Wyoming for
example, there were "only 456 electric cars and light trucks registered statewide as of March
2022." Robert N. Charette, The EV Transition Explained: Converting Gasoline Superusers, IEEE
Spectrum (Dec. 11, 2022) ("EV Transition"), https://tinyurl.com/5dnry66s. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683, p. 19]
By and large, the light- and medium-duty sectors have not embraced a shift from internal-
combustion-engine vehicles to electric ones. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 19]
EPA's projected increase in electric-vehicle adoption also rests on unrealistic expectations of
increased future sales. In addition to assuming that "consumer uptake" will increase as more
models become available and charging infrastructure develops—issues addressed elsewhere in
this comment—the agency asserts that growing interest and satisfaction with electric-vehicle
tech- nology, as well as decreasing costs, will play a substantial role in turning the tides toward
electrification. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,189, 29,312; Draft RIA at 4- [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, pp. 21-22]
17. Available data, however, demonstrate that these assumptions suffer from critical flaws.
Consumer Interest and Satisfaction. Although nearly 95 percent Americans in the market for a
new car chose not to purchase an electric vehicle last year, EPA claims that American consumers
are increasingly interested in, and satisfied with, electric-vehicle technology. That assertion rests
on a collection of un-justified inferences. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 21-22]
First, EPA cites one recent survey reporting that more than one-third of Americans said that
they would either "seriously consider or definitely buy or lease" a battery-electric model today if
they were in the market for a new vehicle. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,189. But other data undermine
EPA's reliance on abstract consumer "affinity" (id.) for electric vehicles. Other polls show that,
even when there is an expressed interest in purchasing an electric vehicle, consumers often do
not follow through. For example, "[a] 2022 CarGurus survey found that 35 percent of new car
buyers expressed an interest in purchasing a hybrid, but only 13 percent eventually did." Robert
N. Charette, Convincing Consumers to Buy EVs: How Range, Affordability, Reliability, and
Behavioral Changes Figure into Purchase Decisions, IEEE Spectrum (Jan. 23, 2023)
("Convincing Consumers"), https://tinyurl.com/3p26536j. "Similarly, 22 percent expressed
interest in a battery electric vehicle . . . , but only 5 percent bought one." Id. Just as manu-
facturer announcements are not a reliable indicator of actual future production, abstract
consumer surveys are not a reliable indicator of actual future purchase. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0683, pp.21-22]
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Second, EPA asserts that most drivers who have opted for electric vehicles in the past have
chosen to buy another one and often "express resistance to returning to an [internal-combustion-
engine] vehicle." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,189. But repeat purchases of electric vehicles by current
electric-vehicle owners does not contribute to meaningful growth in electric-vehicle adoption,
especially to the extent they purchase new electric vehicles to replace existing ones. Moreo-ver, a
significant number of electric-vehicle owners do, in fact, switch back to conventional models.
Sean Szymkowski, Surprising Number of EV Owners Switch Back to Gas Power, Study Says,
CNET (May 4, 2021), https://ti-nyurl.com/ybt2mxy3. Even in California—which has a high rate
of adoption, the most charging infrastructure in the country, and a history of state-law measures
designed to incentivize the purchase of electric vehicles—18 percent of electric-vehicle owners
traded their electric models in for gas-powered vehicles between 2015 and 2019, largely due to
insufficient home charging set-ups. Id. Various factors—such as the price of electricity, safety
concerns, and reliability—may cause that trend to continue or even increase in the future. At this
early stage in electric-vehicle technology, it is far from clear that any pur-chaser—let alone most
of them—will make a permanent switch from tried and true internal-combustion-engine
models. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 22-23]
Finally, EPA cites sales data purportedly showing that "some segments" of the market prefer
electric vehicles to their internal-combustion-engine counter- parts. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,189-90.
One of the studies the EPA relies on, how- ever, makes clear that those segments are in the "high
price brackets"—i.e., generally luxury vehicles—and that "the number of vehicles sold in these
high price brackets is relatively small." Gillingham, Consumer Acceptance at 8; see also
Charette, EV Transition ("Battery-electric vehicle owners 'earn a lot more than not just the U.S.
population but [also] the population of new vehicle buyers.'"). EPA offers no reason to believe
that the preferences of the limited number of consumers who are interested in and able to
purchase those high-end models is a reliable indicator of future purchases by the majority of
American drivers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 23]
Perhaps recognizing this weakness, EPA instead suggests that sales data for high-end electric
vehicles is indirect evidence that forcing manufacturers to increase their electric-vehicle
offerings may result in increased adoption. Citing the asserted preferences for electric vehicles in
those high-end "segments," EPA posits that the lack of widespread penetration in the light- and
medium-duty markets at large is "at least partially [] constrained due to the lack of offerings
needed to convert existing demand into market share." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,190. But EPA's
conjecture that increased offerings would cause increased demand does not follow.
Manufacturers already offer low-priced models and the number of drivers that purchase them
remain low. For example, the Nissan Leaf, which is "the most affordable new electric car in the
United States" (starting at $27,800) was purchased by only 1,276 drivers during the third quarter
of 2022. Colin Ryan, 2023 Nissan LEAF, Kelley Blue Book (June 21, 2022), https://ti-
nyurl.com/mw2372hc; see also Mark Kane, U.S.: Nissan LEAF Sales Noted the Worst Third
Quarter Even, Inside EVs (Oct. 9, 2022), https://ti- nyurl.com/mryu23e7. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0683, p. 23]
In addition, lack of offerings may be merely one among a number of limi- tations that
constrains broader adoption of electric vehicles. That purchasers in high-end segments (where
electric-vehicle offerings are more available) might prefer electric vehicles to a greater extent
does not mean that increasing offerings in other segments will inexorably drive up demand
among all consumers with different needs. This is especially true for consumers in rural areas.
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See Charette, EV Transition. For example, drivers in states like Idaho, Montana, and South
Dakota "are likely to have additional concerns about buying EVs" because of battery life.
Charette, EV Transition. One report indicates that a high- mileage driver switching from a Ford-
150 to a Lightning and driving it the same number of miles "will find that their battery warranty
will expire in about 3.5 years," with the cost of replacement running between $28,556 and
$35,960. Id. Ford's CEO himself acknowledged that, "in mountainous states, driving re-
quirements are 'different than how we've designed (our EV) vehicle so far.'" Id. And "[ajnother
potential bump in the road" is that "EVs are designed for over- the-air software service and
feature updates, but cell service can be highly un- reliable in rural areas," making "[ljengthy trips
to dealers . . . inevitable." Id. The Department of Transportation explains that "[r]educed battery
perfor- mance and EV range during winter months, as well as protection from the ele- ments
while waiting for a vehicle to charge, are a further concern for rural com- munities in cold
climates, particularly to those that do not have access to relia- ble electric service."
Implementation Challenges and Evolving Solutions for Rural Communities, U.S. Dep't of
Transp., https://tinyurl.com/3rkwfxpw. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 23-24]
Each of these problems must be resolved before a widespread shift to elec- trie vehicles is
plausible. "[E]ven in cases where consumer appetite for ZEVs is high, a lack of adequate
charging infrastructure could hold the market back and potentially stall progress." Marie Raj on
Bernard et al., Deploying Charging Infra- structure to Support an Accelerated Transition to Zero-
Emission Vehicles, ZEV Tran- sition Council, at 4 (Sept. 2022). And multiple studies report that
charging is atop concern among prospective electric-vehicle buyers. See, e.g., Barajas, Cali-
fornia's Rural Areas ("[CJoncerns remain, including hesitant consumers wary of 'range anxiety,'
the fear of being stranded without the ability to recharge, or in some cases not having access to
charging capacity at their apartment complex or work."); Kampshoff, Building Electric-Vehicle
Charging Infrastructure at 1 ("[NJearly half of US consumers say that battery or charging issues
are their top concerns about buying EVS."); Nichols, Estimating Electric Vehicle Charging at 1
("Exactly how much charging infrastructure will be needed and what it will cost are top
questions for prospective electric vehicle owners."). Until ade- quate home, workplace, and
public charging infrastructure develops at the rate, in the places, and at the quality desired by
consumers, consumers are unlikely to purchase anything close to the volume of electric vehicles
that EPA intends to mandate that manufacturers provide. The agency has not offered a
reasonable basis for assuming that the necessary expansions and improvements are possible, let
alone likely, within less than a decade. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 46-47]
Organization: American Freedom and America First Policy Institute (AFPI)
Most Americans Prefer Gas-Powered Vehicles
EVs have advantages and disadvantages compared to gas-powered automobiles. Charging an
EV typically costs owners less than fueling a conventional car, and EVs also have lower
maintenance costs and faster acceleration. However, EVs cost substantially more than gas-
powered vehicles, have shorter ranges, and can take a while to fully charge. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0699, pp.2-3]
Although some Americans want EVs, Americans generally prefer conventional vehicles. The
Deloitte 2022 Global Automotive Study found that 69% of Americans prefer their next car
purchase to be a gas-powered vehicle, 5% prefer an entirely battery-powered car, and 22% prefer
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a hybrid vehicle. Range and price concerns were particularly important factors for respondents
who prefer gas-powered vehicles; most Americans (53%) indicated they would not pay more for
an electric vehicle (Edelstein, 2022) (Link:
https://www.greencarreports.com/news/1134702_americans-dont-want-ev-yet-half-wont-pay-
extra-for-electrified). A recent survey of car dealerships also found that 45% of dealerships
reported they would not sell EVs under any circumstances (Lewis, 2023) (Link:
https://electrek.co/2023/05/09/us-car-dealers-evs/). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 2-3]
After purchasing an EV, a significant proportion of drivers switch back to conventional
vehicles. One study found that one-fifth of California EV owners returned to purchasing gas-
powered vehicles, primarily because of the inconvenience of charging EVs (Powell et al., 2022,
p. 39) (Link: https://javatar.bluematrix.com/pdf/N8T7PT0N). Another survey looked at all
Americans—not just Californians—who purchased a new vehicle in 2017. That study found that
about half of EV owners chose not to buy another EV when they bought a new car. Respondents
indicated that range, recharging time, and reduced performance in cold weather were key reasons
for switching back to gas-powered vehicles (Dua & Bansal, 2021, p. 3) (Link:
https://www.kapsarc.org/research/publications/once-consumers-adopt-an-electric-vehicle-do-
they-go-back/). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 2-3]
EVs appeal to some Americans, but without substantial government intervention, they would
likely remain a niche market. However, EPA proposes to force automakers to primarily
produce—and Americans to purchase—EVs. This EV mandate would create significant
challenges for energy supply chains, particularly by creating mineral dependencies on foreign
powers.2 The EV mandate also threatens many auto manufacturing jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0699, pp. 2-3]
2 China dominates the global market for refined energy minerals, surpassing OPEC's dominance in oil
markets. China holds a 40% market share in aluminum, a metal vital for manufacturing electric vehicles.
Each EV requires about 400 pounds more aluminum than a conventional gasoline-powered vehicle (Mills,
2022, p. 8) (Link: https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/the-energy-transition-
delusion a-reality-reset.pdf). Chinese firms can refine minerals for EV batteries at a lower cost than U.S.
firms, due in part to less stringent environmental regulations (Chang & Bradsher, 2023) (Link:
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/05/16/business/china-ev-battery.html).
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
EPA offers no support for its conclusion that there will be substantial consumer adoption of
ZEVs to achieve the increases projected by the Proposed Rule. To the contrary, recent polling
shows that most Americans continue to say that they are unlikely, or will categorically refuse, to
buy an EV. As just one example, a Gallup poll conducted in April revealed that only 4 percent of
adults owned an EV and just 12 percent are seriously considering buying one. However, 41
percent of adults said they would never buy an EV, raising fundamental questions about how
EPA can predict that ZEV sales will reach 67 percent in 2032.136 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, p. 31]
136 Megan Brenan, Gallup, Most Americans Are Not Completely Sold on Electric Vehicles (April 12,
2023). Retrieved a https://news.gallup.com/poll/474095/americans-not-completely-sold-electric-
vehicles.aspxt.
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According to Wards Intelligence, through May 2023, Americans purchased 5.9 million
ICEVs, representing 93 percent of all LDVs sold during the first five months. 137 At this pace,
more than 14 million new ICEVs will be purchased during 2023.138 With the continued sales of
ICEVs, this Rule's effort to limit the ability to purchase ICEVs, and more than 50 percent of
ICEVs remaining in service, it is mindboggling, as discussed in Section IV.6 below, that EPA
never considered the alternative scenarios using vehicle technologies and lower carbon fuels.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 31]
137 John Eichberger, Decarbonizing Combustion Vehicles - A Critical Part in Reducing Transportation
Emissions, Transportation Energy Institute, June 2023. Available at Decarbonizing Combustion Vehicles -
A Critical Part in Reducing Transportation Emissions - Transportation Energy Institute.
138 Id.
Importantly, successful implementation of EPA's Proposed Rule depends on consumer choice
as much as it depends on technological improvements. But there is evidence that premature
embrace of ZEV may backfire if consumers grow frustrated with inadequate infrastructure.
Consumer market demand will not, and cannot, increase to meet the Proposal's required supply.
Charging capabilities is a key apprehension for nearly half the U.S. consumer market. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 32]
For example, in California, roughly one-fifth of consumers who initially purchased PHEVs or
ZEVs subsequently went back to ICEVs based on frustration with convenience factors such as
unavailability of charging. 143 As the study on discontinuance cited by EPA states, "[R]ange
isn't correlated with discontinuance in PHEVs or ZEVs but satisfaction with and access to
charging [is]." 144 Those with multiple vehicles and a single-family home find it easier to
continue ownership than those with fewer vehicles or living in multi-unit dwellings, which could
lower ZEV adoption rates as the ZEV market becomes more mainstream. 145 Finally, a survey of
PHEV owners in California found that current PHEV would not purchase their PHEV without
incentives, therefore EVs and PHEVs adoption may face more challenges over time. 146
Moreover, EPA ignores that current ZEV sales are linked to mandates that force increased prices
of ICEVs to subsidize the mandated ZEV sales. Those mandates are under judicial review.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 32]
143 Hardman, S., and Tal, G., Discontinuance Among California's Electric Vehicle Buyers: Why are Some
Consumers Abandoning Electric Vehicles, April 21, 2021, Report for National Center for Sustainable
Transportation, available at https://ncst.ucdavis.edu/research-product/discontinuance-among-californias-
electric-vehicle-buyers-why-are-some-consumers
144 Id. at 26.
145 Id.
146 Id. See also JATO Blog, "A breakdown of the US EV market by State shows more incentives equals
more sales", April 9, 2019 (latest research shows current tax credits and other incentives in the US are
unequal among states, and that EV sales are growing at the fastest rate in states offering financial
incentives).
As discussed in more detail below, consumer market demand will not, and cannot, increase to
meet the Proposal's required supply. Charging capabilities, which creates range anxiety, is a key
apprehension for nearly half the U.S. consumer market. EVs have less range, both technically
and practically. As noted by J.D. Power, "[T]he majority of EVs provide between 200 and 300
miles of range on a full charge." 147 This same article, however, also noted that EVs with less
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than 200-mile ranges (such as the 2022 Nissan Leaf at 149 miles or the 2022 Mazda MX-30 at
100 miles) are "either affordable or focused on performance." 148 With respect to longer range
vehicles, claimed vehicle ranges of up to 516 miles are available, but this range comes at
considerable cost. The number 1 range-rated vehicle by Car and Driver, the 2023 Lucid Air,
carries a base price of $113,650. And while three out of the ten top-rated EVs by Car and Driver
were more "reasonably priced" from $44,630 to $56,630, all other models within the top 10 cost
anywhere from $74,800 to $110,295,149 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 32-33]
147 See Sebastian Blanco, List of EVs Sorted by Range (Sept. 1, 2022), www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-
guides/list-of-evs-sorted-by-range.
148 Id.
149 See Nicholas Wallace, Austin Irwin, & Nick Kurczewski, Longest Range Electric Cars for 2023,
Ranked (Mar. 23, 2023), https://www.caranddriver.com/features/g32634624/ev-longest-driving-range/.
EPA requests comment on their approach to determining charging time, as set forth in the
DRIA, Chapter 4.155 EPA's analysis is contingent on unsupported assumptions regarding (1)
U.S. consumers' adoption of and ability to purchase more expensive ZEVs (see Sections IV.B.2
and IV.E.2.ii); (2) the type of ZEV purchased (used ZEVs or PHEVs compatible with slower
charging units or new ZEVs that can use DCFC) (Section IV,B.2 addresses charging times); (3)
the availability of critical minerals and metals to expand the supply of reliable and renewable
electricity (see Section I.B); and (4) the availability of reliable and affordable charging for all
users (see Sections IV.B.4). Given the flaws in EPA's methodology that omits significant data
sources and other factors and makes unsupported assumptions, EPA should revise its analysis
concerning charging time and continue with promulgating a final rule for future emissions
standards, that accounts for the reality of today's automotive market and not the public
pronouncements of the automotive industry, a single state or group of states, or other
unsupported estimates of future market growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 33-34]
155 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,367.
As previously mentioned, EPA did not fully consider the impact of the rule on fleet turnover.
The Agency is aware that the higher purchase price of new ZEVs will keep older cars and trucks
on the road longer and that new ZEVs will increase particulate matter ("PM") emissions through
increased tire and road wear. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 45]
EPA's Proposal fails to evaluate how government credits are embedded in vehicle pricing.
For example, neither federal or state governments, or auto manufacturers explain how state ZEV
credits, EPA GHG multiplier credits, and NHTSA CAFE EV multiplier credits are accounted for
in both ZEV and ICEV vehicle price. There is increasing evidence that regulations which
mandate EV sales—along with the cross-subsidies from gasoline and diesel vehicle buyers—are
leading manufacturers to abandon sales of the least expensive and higher fuel economy gasoline
and diesel vehicles that do not receive similar subsidization.236 Cox Automotive found that
"in December 2017, automobile makers produced 36 models priced at $25,000 or less. Five
years later, they built just 10," pushing low-income buyers out of the new-car market and into the
used- car market. Conversely, in December 2017 automobile manufacturers offered 61 models
for sale with sticker prices of $60,000 or higher and in December 2022, they offered 90.237 This
is unacceptable. EPA and its sister agencies cannot create credits and then claim they do not
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affect vehicle price solely because they have not sought to quantify them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 51-52]
236 Steven G. Bradbury, Distinguished Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, Prepared Statement for the
hearing entitled "Driving Bad Policy: Examining EPA's Tailpipe Emissions Rules and the Realities of a
Rapid Electric Vehicle Transition," before the Subcommittee on Economic Grown, Energy Policy, and
Regulatory Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Accountability, at 10
(May 17, 2023) available at https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Bradbury- Prepared-
Statement-for-17-May-2023-Oversight-Hearing.pdf
237 See Sean Tucker, Are we witnessing the demise of the affordable car? Automobile makers have all but
abandoned the budget market (MarketWatch Feb. 28, 2023), available at
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/are-we-witnessing-the-demise-of-the-affordable-car-automakers-
have-all-but-abandoned-the-budget-market-a68862f0 (last visited May 24, 2023).
Tellingly, EPA never estimates the annual price of a comparable ZEV and ICEV, for each
year in which EPA proposes standards. EPA's bias towards EVs is demonstrated by EPA's
statement that its OMEGA modeling "now incorporates a consumer choice element. This means
that the impacts of, for example, a $40,000 BEV versus a $35,000 ICE vehicle of similar utility
(i.e., a 14 percent increase for the BEV) is a much different consideration than a $6,000
incremental BEV cost versus a $1,000 incremental ICE cost (a 500 percent increase for the
BEV)."238 In other words, EPA set up its model to show the consumer price (not the actual real-
world cost) of EVs have a lower percentage cost increase than the incremental absolute cost of
switching from ICEVs to ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 51-52]
238 See RIA page 2-42, https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf.
v. Costs to upgrade electricity generation, transmission, and distribution
For EPA to achieve its GHG reduction aspirations in this Proposed Rule, all three of these
challenges must be met: (1) sufficient materials to manufacture the required EVs, chargers, and
grid upgrades, (2) consumer willingness to substitute ZEVs for ICEVs currently for sale, and (3)
a low-carbon power generation grid capable of reliably supplying energy for this mode of
transportation. Combined with other issues, such as a disorderly transformation of the generation
base as conventional units are replaced with intermittent resources, raises questions of the grid's
ability to reliably meet consumer demand on a regional basis. Despite these challenges, EPA
incredibly assumes no increase in the cost of electricity to consumers (whether EV owners or
others) associated with the proposed rulemaking. EPA underestimates the cost of electricity to all
consumers, including EV owners, and omits the cost of grid upgrades and distributed energy
resources have been excluded from these estimates.260 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp.
56-57]
260 U.S. Department of Energy, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, "The 2030 National Charging
Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure." June 2023.
https://driveelectric.gOv/files/2030-charging-network.pdf.
EPA incorrectly assumes that ZEV owners will pay the national average residential electricity
price to charge their vehicles. EPA fails to consider that the majority of ZEVs in the U.S. are
located in utility service territories with some of the highest electricity rates in the country and
that the average EV owner currently pays a much higher price to charge their ZEV at home than
the national average residential electricity rate. Given that EV penetration has varied widely
across the U.S., it would be arbitrary to assume that EVs will, unlike in the past, penetrate
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uniformly across the U.S. and thus that the average electricity price would be representative of
the actual cost electricity. For example, California, which has roughly 40 percent of all registered
ZEVs in the U.S., has a residential electricity rate that is roughly double the national average.
Considering that EPA is modeling its rule after a California-like approach to mandate ZEVs, it
would be more appropriate for EPA to assume similar real-world costs (at a minimum, given
California's temperate climate). Moreover, EPA fails to consider that mandating such a high
ZEV sales rate will necessarily require exponential increases in commercial ZEV charging at
rates that are currently three, four or five times higher than the current national average
residential electricity rate, depending on location and charging speed. Those customers who are
not homeowners and not able to install their own charging stations and take advantage of
charging at low-cost times will be adversely impacted. Instead, EPA uses a residential rate for
electricity and does not consider peak power or time of use charges. California electric prices
rose 42 percent - 78 percent between 2010 and 2020 and are projected to rise an additional 50
percent by 2030 as shown in Figure 9. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Historic and Forecasted Residential Average Rates Based
on Most Recent 5-year Average Rate Increase. Figure 9: Source: Michael Shellenberger, Twitter
(citing California Public Advocate's Office data), April 27, 2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, pp. 57-58]
Heaping additional demand for EV charging into this market could exacerbate already high
electricity prices. This will be especially impactful to lower-income homeowners who may not
be able to install dedicated charging units, forcing them to pay more out of pocket for charging
during peak demand periods.265 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
265 Hardman, Scott, et al., "A Perspective on Equity in the Transition to Electric Vehicles." MIT Science
Policy Review, (Aug. 20 2021), available at https://sciencepolicyreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-
electric-vehicles/ (accessed June 29, 2023).
EPA must revise its analysis to account for realistic electricity prices. The proposed ZEV
mandate will require an enormous investment in power generation and distribution, resulting in
nationwide increases in electricity bills that EPA has not considered. Of course, considering the
additional trillions of dollars in costs would paint a clear picture that the costs of forced
electrification far exceed even the inflated benefits EPA presented in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
Organization: American Highway Users Alliance
More specifically, EPA's proposal in this docket appears to be premised on huge and rapid
growth in the portion of light-duty and medium-duty vehicles that are electric powered (EVs) as
well as on rapid transformation of the marketplace in a number of related areas that are not the
subject of the proposed regulation. EPA seems to have made favorable assumptions on many
issues bearing on the feasibility of the proposal, including as to the issues set forth below. The
Highway Users, on the other hand, drawing on the expertise of its members, questions that,
within the MY 2027 - 2032 timeframe of the proposed rule, all or most of the following will
occur, that - [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
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• high-speed and other electric charging stations will be sufficiently available to service light-
duty and medium-duty EVs in quantities and locations sufficient to encourage customers to buy
EVs,
• electric utilities can timely provide connections from the electric grid to those charging
stations, or hydrogen fueling stations - and provide the refueling and charging connections at
reasonable cost,
• the electric grid will have the capacity to meet the demand for electricity that will be
required to support increased electrification of trucks, buses, and passenger cars, even if the
connections can be timely made to charging stations (both public and private) that do not yet
exist in sufficient numbers,
• charging times can be reduced sufficiently to encourage customers to buy these EVs,
• major industries, including vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers, can implement major
changes in vehicles as rapidly as the NPRM assumes (given the limited current market
penetration of these EVs),
• there will be an adequate supply of rare earth and other critical minerals, and the ability to
process them, with those minerals being so essential to the manufacture of EVs and batteries,
• with a large portion of such minerals being sourced and/or processed overseas, including in
China and Africa, whether the national interest in sourcing and processing such minerals in the
United States can be met, and
• potential customers of these EVs will proceed to purchase them in sufficient quantity,
notwithstanding significantly higher up-front costs, uncertain availability of charging facilities,
and other concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
This last consideration is highly important because if the potential customers of these EVs do
not become actual customers to a sufficient extent, the manufacturers are unlikely to produce the
vehicles in the quantities EPA has estimated will be required to be compliant with the
regulations, in turn greatly reducing the benefits of the proposal as EPA estimated. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Over the past decade, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)l has played a key
role in helping successfully pivot the entire auto industry toward an electrified future. Previous
debates about whether such a transformation would occur are now merely conversations about
when it will happen. In fact, today all of industry is pursuing this transition at a fever pace.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 4]
1 Henceforth referred to as "the agency"
Amidst a backdrop of this activity, in May 2023, the agency published what EPA
Administrator Michael Regan referred to as "the strongest-ever federal pollution technology
standards for both cars and trucks."2 His reference to "technology standards" was decidedly on-
point. In contrast to the agency's longstanding approach of setting technology-neutral,
performance-based standards, this NPRM proposes to dramatically limit vehicle emissions in the
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United States, effectively requiring - according to EPA's own analysis - two-thirds of all new
vehicles sold in model year (MY) 2032 to be electric vehicles (EVs). This amounts to a ten-fold
increase in electric vehicle adoption nationally, requiring EVs to move beyond today's early
adopters, past ubiquity on main street, and extend to small towns and rural areas across the
nation - all in a mere eight years. It is an exceedingly ambitious attempt to re-envision
Americans' relationship with personal mobility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 4]
2 Davenport, C. E.P.A. Lays Out Rules to Turbocharge Sales of Electric Cars and Trucks. New York
Times. April 12, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/12/climate/biden-electric-cars-epa.html
While perhaps well-intentioned, basing standards on an assumed swift and seamless EV
market transition - completely unprecedented in nature - strikes us as a questionable choice for
policy design. As the agency is well aware, risk management is especially important in the
automotive industry due to market uncertainties, high capital expenditures and long lead times
needed for the design, development and manufacture of products. By mandating a single path to
compliance, the agency shifts a considerable amount of this risk squarely upon automakers and,
ultimately, their customers. It is a risky approach that could not only undermine fragile public
trust and support for the EV transition, but also create hardships for low income and
marginalized communities facing imbalanced infrastructure availability and the still-high cost of
technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 5]
According to S&P Global-IHS Markit data, over the past 12 months, electric vehicles -
including all BEV, PHEV and FCEV models - accounted for approximately seven percent of
nationwide sales. The agency's proposal, on the other hand, would require ten-fold that level of
adoption, all in a mere eight years across all vehicle classes. When examining expected adoption
levels based on specific vehicle categories, the EPA analysis assumes these levels of
electrification would actually be achieved two years sooner - in 2030 or just six years from now.
This is a staggeringly optimistic assumption about the pace of technology transformation in the
auto industry. To illustrate how unprecedented this is, consider EPA's own Automotive Trends
report. As shown in Figure 3 and the associated table below, there is no historical auto industry
analogue to EPA's projected pace of EV adoption, even when generously characterizing EVs
today as having already seen "significant use" nationwide for a few years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0652, pp. 22-23]
All of the technologies shown in Figure 3 took well over eight years to reach 67 percent
market adoption and, in some cases, two to three times as long. Even more importantly, none of
the identified technologies required any kind of behavioral change on the part of the vehicle
owners. For all intents and purposes, apart from experiencing better fuel economy and vehicle
performance, it is possible owners may not have even known those technologies existed on the
vehicle. In contrast, although electrification has many positive attributes, it does require the
owner to embrace a different approach to vehicle use and management, such as ensuring
sufficient charging infrastructure is available for a given trip and that sufficient time is available
to recharge. These factors are important considerations when evaluating the pace of technology
adoption from the general (i.e., non-early adopter) vehicle purchasing population. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 23]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 3. Years to Reach 67% Market Penetration after
First Significant Use. Source: EPA. The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report: Greenhouse Gas
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Emissions, Fuel Economy, and Technology since 1975, p. 71. Table at right added by Honda for
clarity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 23]
to vehicle use and management, such as ensuring sufficient charging infrastructure is
available for a given trip and that sufficient time is available to recharge. These factors are
important considerations when evaluating the pace of technology adoption from the general (i.e.,
non-early adopter) vehicle purchasing population. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 23]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
iii. Review of Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) data and projections.
EPA's BEV projections differ significantly from other federal agencies and reflect that EPA is
improperly mandating that a significant proportion of new LDV and MDV must be powered by
electric drivetrains and setting unrealistic tailpipe emission standards. The EIA published market
share projections for light-duty BEV and PHEV sales in its Annual Energy Outlook35 2023
(AEO 2023). The AEO 2023 Reference Case modeling includes laws, such as the IRA and the
BIL, and other adopted regulations in its analysis. The AEO 2023 incorporates the IRA by
adjusting EV purchase prices to account for the Clean Vehicle Credit using offcial estimates of
vehicles that will be eligible for tax credits. In addition to the Reference Case, the AEO conducts
a range of scenario modeling, that considers different assumptions and uncertainties. Across the
range of modelled scenarios in AEO 2023, EIA36 concluded that sales of BEVs and PHEVs do
not exceed 29% and the share of the on-road light-duty vehicle stocks comprised of BEVs and
PHEVs did not exceed 26%, over the projection period to 2050. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp.13-14]
35 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Annual Energy Outlook 2023." March 2023.
https://www.eia. gov/outlooks/aeo/.
36 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Incentives and lower costs drive electric vehicle adoption in
our Annual Energy Outlook." Today in Energy. Accessed May 15, 2023.
https://www.eia. gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=56480.
Analysis of BEV-only37 sales data from the AEO 2020 (pre-COVID) and 2023 (most recent)
editions indicate BEVs sales are projected to increase in comparison to the respective Reference
Cases. For example, in 2032, BEV sales are projected to reach 13% in the AEO 2023 Reference
Case up from 5% in the AEO 2020 Reference Case. Increased BEV sales in AEO 2023
compared to AEO 2020 likely reflect emerging trends, technological improvements, relative
manufacturing costs and purchase prices, subsidies, consumer behavior, and other factors. Also,
minimum projections for BEV sales in the AEO 2023 are nearly identical to the AEO 2020
Reference Case (see chart below). However, projections for maximum BEV sales in AEO 2023
reach only 23% in2032. Figure 1 below illustrates BEV sales across a wide range of scenarios as
projected by EIA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 13-14]
37 Transportation supplemental tables for AEO 2020 and AEO 2023 can be found here:
https://www.eia. gov/outlooks/aeo/.
BEV sales projected by EPA,38 under a scenario to meet the proposed standards and a "no
action" scenario, are included in the chart. BEV sales required to meet EPA's proposed standards
or "no action" scenario are significantly higher than any scenario projected by EIA in its AEO
2023 analysis. Differences in trajectories between EPA's proposed standards and the AEO
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projections illustrate EPA selecting and essentially forcing one technology over others and
setting an unrealistic stringency for tailpipe emission standards. Although EIA has projected
BEV sales to increase (i.e., AEO 2023 vs. AEO 2020) because of recently enacted federal
subsidies and expenditures (i.e., BIL and IRA), along with technological advancements, 2032
BEV sales are projected to reach to only 13% in the AEO 2023 Reference Case compared to
EPA's proposed standard at 67%. This is a significant difference in projected BEV sales and the
agency has not provided adequate information to explain this major difference. EPA must
explain why its projections differ so significantly from its sister agency with far more expertise
in such projections than EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 13-14]
38 Table 108, 88 Fed. Reg. 29335 (May 5, 2023).
[See original for graph titled "Figure 1. Battery Electric Vehicle Sales Projected by EIA and
EPA"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 13-14]
e. API Supports Consumer Choice for Vehicles.
API 53 supports the concept that different vehicle technologies that reduce greenhouse gas
emissions should be allowed to compete equally for consumer and market acceptance and
growth. However, API has concerns with regards to the EPA's approach and its effect on
consumer choice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 18-19]
53 https://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/blog/2021/05/18/us-consumers-need-balance-choice-in-
transportation-policy.
The stringency of the proposed standard is essentially forcing electrification of the
transportation sector and is not in alignment with most Americans that, according to a Pew
Center survey,54 favor "using a mix of energy sources to meet the country's needs" and a
majority of survey respondents oppose phasing out gasoline powered vehicles by 2035. Concerns
with charging availability55 could be relieved with vehicle technologies (e.g., PHEVs56) where
the length of an average daily trip is approximately 30 miles.57 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 18-19]
54 Tyson, A. et al. "Gen Z, Millennial Stand Out for Climate Change Activism, Social Media Engagement
With Issue." Pew Research Center. May 2021. https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2021/05/26/gen-z-
millennials-stand-out- for-climate-change-activism-social-media-engagement-with-issue/.
55 Noblet, S. "Closing The Great EV Charging Gap." August 2021. Forbes.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stacynoblet/2021/08/10/closing-the-great-ev-charging-gap/7slF6cf9107f73f4.
56 EPA is proposing a fleet utility factor (FUF) curve that will increase C02 compliance values for
PHEVs. 88 Fed. Reg. 292557 (May 5, 2023).
57 2019 Bureau of Transportation data indicates 49% of 2019 national trips by distance were less 25 miles.
Organization: Betsy Cooper
Today's PHEVs do not have enough range to meet Americans' driving needs. The average
American drives 37 miles a day [Link: https://www.kbb.com/car-advice/average-miles-driven-
per-year/#miles-per-day]. Moreover, the average American commute may be as high as 41 miles
a day [Link: https://www.zippia.com/advice/average-commute-time-statistics/]. Thus, almost no
PHEVs on the market will allow the average American commuter to complete their commute
without switching on to gas.2 It is no coincidence that the longest electric range mid-tier car, the
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Toyota RAV4 - with 42 miles of range - has a wait time of between 5 and 24 months [Link:
https://rav4resource.com/rav4-prime-availability/] and dealer markups of more than $10,000!
[Link: https://markups.org/search.html?title=RAV4+prime] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0654,
pp.1-2]
2 This is particularly problematic because most EV batteries degrade over time. Our 2019 Volt now gets 45
miles of range—a 15 percent drop. An EV with only 40 miles of range to start will degrade to well below
the average commuter's distance.
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Feasibility of proposed standards
California's effective vehicle GHG fleet average emission rate for new vehicles is similar to
U.S. EPA's proposal due to similar expected shares of ZEVs entering the market in the 2026
through 2032 MYs and beyond. California's ACC II regulations require that an increasing share
of new vehicle sales be zero-emission, ramping up from 35 percent for the 2026 MY to 100
percent for the 2035 MY. As part of the ACC II rulemaking, CARB estimated that 75 percent of
new car sales in California in 2032 will be BEVs to comply with the ACC II regulations (with a
small percentage of additional fuel cell and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles). In comparison, U.S.
EPA projects a 67 percent BEV market share nationwide to comply with the proposed federal
GHG standards in the same year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 12-13]
In establishing its ZEV sales requirement, CARB assessed the technical feasibility and cost of
ZEV technologies to determine a feasible pace of ZEV introduction in California. 7 This
assessment found several market trends that will drive widespread ZEV penetration in the
coming years, including a rapidly expanding number of ZEV models, increasing all-electric
range, technological battery and fuel cell advancements, energy efficiency improvements, and
declining battery costs. These market trends are also occurring at the national and international
levels, and they underpin the technical feasibility of U.S. EPA's proposed standards. Further, as
U.S. EPA notes in its proposal, every manufacturer has a public commitment to significant if not
full electrification in the next 20 years. 8 Based on public announcements, it is expected that over
100 ZEV and PHEV models will be available to consumers before the 2026 MY. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 12-13]
7 CARB. ACC IIISOR. Appendix G: ACC II ZEV Technology Assessment. April 2022.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/appg.pdf.
8 87 Fed. Reg. at 29,191 - 192.
In addition to these existing market trends, the implementation of ACC II in California and an
expanding number of other states will further spur technological development, supporting
widespread ZEV deployment and providing additional support that the proposal is not only
achievable, but that manufacturers could exceed the standards as proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, pp.12-13]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
Finally, consumer demand for electric vehicles has significantly risen, in large part due to
environmental concerns, greater vehicle choice, improved battery capacity, and cost savings. 124
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 21]
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124 Javier Colato and Lindsey Ice, Charging into the future: the transition to electric vehicles, U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics (Feb. 2023), available at https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-12/charging-into-the-
future-the-transition-to-electric-vehicles.htm#ednref4.
Organization: CALSTART
3. Equity
Importantly, this regulation presents an opportunity for greater equity. Rapid expansion of the
LD ZEV market through ZEV regulations would not only increase the stock of new ZEVs but
would also increase the stock of used ZEVs quickly. Additional stock of used ZEVs would
dramatically expand equitable access to clean transportation options, particularly to communities
disproportionately burdened by transportation pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 4]
Barriers and Solutions
There are several common barriers that arise when discussing more ambitious standards like
Alternative 1. Below, we address three commonly discussed barriers and offer some context that
helps explain why these perceived barriers should not delay progress. These include concerns
related to expected EV deployment timelines, infrastructure, and fleet electrification. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 4]
Organization: Ceres BICEP (Business for Innovative Climate and Energy Policy) Network
Existing policies, market trends, and available funding, including the Advanced Clean Cars II
(ACC II) rule adopted by California and six other states; manufacturer and corporate zero-
emission vehicle (ZEV) commitments; and the significant incentives provided by the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) for vehicle
and battery manufacturers, purchasers, and charging infrastructure, all justify standards
supporting greater ZEV sales shares. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0600, p. 1]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
III. The Proposed Rule is Not Feasible for Other Reasons.
While the proposal's gross misstatement of vehicle technology costs is the primary reason
EPA's proposal is not feasible, the agency also overlooks many other important aspects of the
problem. Despite EPA's hopeful projections, very few American want to buy electric vehicles
and even fewer will at the prices they will inevitably command. Non-binding company
commitments and (unlawful) regulations designed to enforce these commitments do little to
change this. Even if consumers did want to purchase these electric vehicles in the volumes EPA
projects, the proposal fails to confront several barriers to its rapid electrification plans, including
limits on the supply of minerals necessary to manufacture batteries, inadequate charging
infrastructure and electrical supplies, and the complex interactions between this rule and other
proposed rules all of which will further hinder this development. In light of these many barriers,
it is unreasonable for the agency to conclude that compliance with its proposed emission
standards is feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 25-26]
A. Very few Americans want to buy electric vehicles.
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The projections for battery electric vehicle adoption are based on very few— and very
small—real-world data points. See generally 88 Fed. Reg. 29,187-90. Battery electric vehicles
made up 5.8 percent of the new light-duty passenger vehicle market in 2022. Id. at 29,189. To
comply with its proposed standards, EPA needs these sales to increase ten times over the next 8
years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 26-27]
But if EPA expects 67 percent of vehicles sold to be electric vehicles, it must point to at least
something that suggests 67 percent of Americans would be willing to buy them. Instead, the best
the proposal can do is point to "[a] 2022 survey by Consumer Reports [which] shows that more
than one third of Americans would either seriously consider or definitely buy or lease a BEV
today, if they were in the market for a vehicle." 88 Fed. Reg. 29,189. This is a far cry from the
two-thirds of American's EPA needs to want to buy electric vehicles for its proposal to succeed.
And of that one third surveyed by Consumer Reports, only 14% said that they would "definitely"
buy an electric vehicle. Jeff S. Bartlett, More Americans Would Buy an Electric Vehicle, and
Some Consumers Would Use Low-Carbon Fuels, Survey Shows, Consumer Reports (July 7,
2022), https://www.consumerreports.org/hybrids-evs/interest-in-elec- tric-vehicles-and-low-
carbon-fuels-survey-a8457332578/. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 26-27]
The studies the proposal cites in support of its projections are also unreasonable. For example,
the proposal states that "Goldman Sachs projects a 50 percent share for BEVs in the U.S. in
2030, 70 percent in 2035 and 85 percent in 2040,"15 DRIA 3-14. EPA provides no analysis of
why it believes this is correct, or how it can accept projections of 85% electric vehicle adoption
across the nation, while simultaneously acknowledging that 20% of early adopters—the most
sympathetic group—are already discontinuing electric vehicle usage when purchasing another
vehicle. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,189 n.51; Hardiman, S., and Tal, G., Understanding discontinuance
among California's electric vehicle owners, 6 Nature Energy 538 (Apr. 2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, pp. 26-27]
15 N.B.: The 50 percent of sales Goldman Sachs projects is much less than the 60 percent of sales EPA
projects. Indeed, those 10 percent of sales that the proposal waves away represent a larger share of the auto
market than electric vehicles have ever achieved. While EPA is not required to look into a "crystal ball" in
making its projections, it is "subject to the restraints of reasonableness." NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 328
(D.C. Cir. 1981). Assuming an overshot of already unreasonable projections by more sales than have ever
occurred leaps over these restraints.
Organization: Competitive Enterprise Institute
II. The Proposed Standards Imperil Consumer Choice, Vehicle Affordability, and Market
Liberty
EPA's proposal will restrict consumers' freedom to choose which types of vehicles they want
to buy. 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 4-6]
As the EPA acknowledges, Congress is already providing tens of billions of dollars in EV-
related subsidies, such as the IRA's $7,500 tax credit, "effectively making some BEVs more
affordable to buy and operate today than comparable ICE vehicles." 13 The only purpose for
heaping EV mandates on top of EV subsidies is to eliminate choices consumers would otherwise
make. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 4-6]
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12 Diana Furchtgott-Roth, "Biden's Plan to Phase Out Gas-Powered Cars Is All Pain for Consumers and
No Gain," The Hill, June 12, 2023, https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/commentary/bidens-
plan-phase-out-gas- powered-cars-all-pain-consumers-and-no. 13 88 FR 29190.
13 88 FR 29190.
EVs have several well-known drawbacks that regulatory mandates do not remove but rather
intensify by restricting the supply of ICE vehicles available for purchase. Those disadvantages
include the high purchase price, 14 price volatility due to supply-chain bottlenecks, 15 range
anxiety 16(especially in towing mode), 17 long recharging times, 18 reduced performance in
extreme heat and cold, 19 and less reliability during blackouts from hurricanes and other
disasters. 20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 4-6]
14 For example, in 2022, the initial purchase price of a conventional Ford F-150 was $40,960, that of the
electric Ford-150 Lightning was $54,769. Roberto Baldwin, Sasha Richie, and Dave Vanderwerp, "EV vs.
Gas: Which Cars Are Cheaper to Own?" Car and Driver, October 28, 2022,
https://www.caranddriver.com/shopping- advice/a32494027/ev-vs-gas-cheaper-to-own/. The authors
conclude that overall EV ownership costs are lower than those for gasoline powered vehicles (factoring in
expenses for maintenance and fuel). Nonetheless, the higher EV purchase is a disadvantage that
undoubtedly matters to many consumers.
15 Mark P. Mills, Testimony, "Exposing the Environmental, Human Rights, and National Security Risks of
the Biden Administration's Rush to Green Policies," Subcommittee on Environment, Manufacturing, and
Critical Materials, U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce, April 26, 2023,
https://media4.manhattan- institute.org/wp-content/uploads/Testimony_House_Energy_Mills_4-26-
2023.pdf; Institute for Energy Research, "Transition Mineral Prices Are Soaring and the Industry Is Short
of Workers," June 9, 2023, https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/uncategorized/transition-mineral-
prices-are-soaring-and-the-industry-is- short-of-workers/.
16 Analytics Team, "Survey: Price and Range, Not Gas Prices, Dominate Worries about EVs,"
Autolist.Com, July 20, 2022, https://www.autolist.com/news-and-analysis/2022-survey-electric-vehicles.
17 Alex Knizek, "How Well Can an Electric Pickup Tow?" Consumer Reports, April 21, 2023,
https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/hybrids-evs/how-well-can-an-electric-pickup-truck-tow-
al 149286680/: "As capable and smooth as the EVs are, they simply cannot match the heavy long-distance
towing capabilities of gas, hybrid, and diesel-powered trucks. This is primarily due to the severely limited
range, and the amount of time that would be required for charging during the trip. Accessing a public
charger with a trailer in tow also presents potentially significant logistical challenges."
18 Ronald Montoya, "How Long Does It Take to Charge an Electric Car?" Edmunds.Com, March 7, 2023,
https://www.edmunds.com/electric-car/articles/how-long-does-take-charge-electric-car.html
19 Steve Hanley, "Electric Cars, Winter Driving, Range Anxiety, and You," CleanTechnica, February 25,
2022, https://cleantechnica.eom/2022/02/25/electric-cars-winter-driving-range-anxiety-you/.
20 Shawn A. Adderly, Daria Manukian, Timothy D. Sullivan, and Mun Son. 2018. Electric vehicles and
natural disaster policy implications. Energy Policy 212: 437-448,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301421517305906; Diana Furchtgott-Roth,
"Electric Vehicles Powerless During Hurricanes," Forbes, September 5, 2021,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dianafurchtgott- roth/2021/09/05/electric-vehicles-powerless-during-
hurricanes/?sh= 107dlbfe48da.
The proposed standards would impose disproportionate burdens on low-income, single-
vehicle households. My colleague Ben Lieberman explains:
The higher purchase price of an EV is prohibitive enough, but it is only part of the story. Fully
one-third of American households are single-vehicle households, including many low-income
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ones.21 However, the limitations of EVs make them impractical as a household's one and only
vehicle. This includes long charging times (especially inconvenient for renters who are less
likely to be able to charge at home) as well as limited range. Indeed, nearly 90 percent of EVs
currently in use are part of wealthier multi-car households that include one or more gas-powered
vehicles.22 Thus, the EV agenda not only involves the higher sticker price relative to gasoline-
powered vehicles, but also the additional cost of a conventional vehicle to back it up.23 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 4-6]
21 The Geography of Transport Systems, Percentage of Households by Number of Vehicles, 1960-2020,
https://transportgeography.org/contents/chapter8/urban-transport-challenges/household-vehicles-united-
states/ (accessed July 5, 2023).
22 Lucas W. Davis. 2019. How much are electric vehicles driven? Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 26, No.
18, 1497- 1502, https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ldavis/Davis%20AEL%202019.pdf.
23 Ben Lieberman and Donna Jackson, "Costlier cars help the poor, according to EPA," Open Market, June
26, 2023, https://cei.org/blog/costlier-cars-help-the-poor-according-to-epa/.
Government's cartelization of the auto industry via regulations and preferential subsidies
poses an insidious threat to consumer welfare. The IRA and the EPA's mandates increase
automakers' dependence on political subventions while preventing both industry incumbents and
new entrants from competing on price, range, and ease-of-fueling by selling gasoline-powered
cars. Energy analyst Robert Bryce recently reported that Ford loses $64,466 on every EV it sells,
"and isn't making up for it in volume." 24 Bryce cautions that "if a business isn't profitable, it
isn't sustainable." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 4-6]
24 Robert Bryce, "Ford Is Losing $64,446 on Every EV It Sells," Substack, May 3, 2023,
https://robertbryce.substack.eom/p/ford-is-losing-66446-on-every-ev.
Organization: Consumer Reports (CR)
4. There is Strong Consumer Demand for Cleaner Vehicles
In January and February 2022, Consumer Reports fielded a nationally representative survey of
8,027 US adults on consumer awareness of BEV and low carbon fuels. 17 The survey found that
71% of Americans express some level of interest in buying or leasing an electric vehicle, as
shown in Figure 4.1. Within that group, 14% of Americans would "definitely buy" an EV if they
were to buy or lease a vehicle today. This translates to approximately 36 million "EV-ready"
buyers, which is an increase of 350% between 2020 and 2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728,
pp. 10-14]
17 Battery Electric Vehicles & Low Carbon Fuels Survey, Consumer Reports, April 2022,
https://article.images.consumerreports.org/image/upload/vl657127210/prod/content/dam/CRO-Images-2
022/Cars/07July/2022_Consumer_Reports_BEV_and_LCF_Survey _Report.pdf.
[See original comment for Figure 4.1: Likelihood of Buying or Leasing an Electric-Only
Vehicle Today] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 10-14]
Unfortunately, automakers have not kept up with orders. As a result, for every single EV
being manufactured, there are 45 consumers ready to buy or lease one. 18 The imbalance between
supply and demand is resulting in long waitlists and dealer markups. Automakers are making
investments to improve supply, but the growth in supply has been lagging the growth in demand.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 10-14]
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18 Excess Demand, The Looming EV Shortage, Consumer Reports, March 2023,
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Excess-Demand-The-Looming-EV-Sh
ortage.pdf.
Absent strong action and direction from the federal government, this gap between supply and
demand will only continue to widen. This is because the barriers to EV adoption identified in
CR's 2022 survey of BEV and low carbon fuels awareness are being addressed: purchase cost
for EVs is declining, charging infrastructure is expanding, consumers are gaining more
experience with EVs, and automakers are investing in new models and increased production. 19
These trends tend to reinforce one another in a virtuous cycle to create even more demand for
these vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 10-14]
19 Battery Electric Vehicles & Low Carbon Fuels Survey, Consumer Reports, April 2022,
https://article.images.consumerreports.org/image/upload/vl657127210/prod/content/dam/CRO-Images-2
022/Cars/07July/2022_Consumer_Reports_BEV_and_LCF_Survey _Report.pdf.
The EPA's GHG standards can be especially helpful in solving the chicken-and-egg problem
with infrastructure. By guaranteeing that greater numbers of EVs will be manufactured in the
coming years, the new standards will help give private industry the confidence it needs to invest
in infrastructure, knowing that greater demand for reliable charging infrastructure is on the way.
Private corporations are already beginning to see the opportunity that EV charging can provide,
with Walmart, 7-11, Starbucks, and Subway all recently announcing major EV charging
initiatives. This increased private investment combined with the $7.5b in federal investment in
charging infrastructure from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law can help reduce a major barrier to
consumer adoption of EVs. As consumers become more confident in the availability and
reliability of the charging network, their interest in purchasing an EV is likely to increase. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 10-14]
Another key driver of EV purchase interest is direct experience with EVs. This is illustrated in
Figure 4.2, in which the three pie graphs represent low, medium, and high levels of experience
with battery electric vehicles.20 CR found that consumers with the most direct experience were
almost ten times as likely to say they would "definitely buy" an electric vehicle today as
consumers with no direct experience (58% vs 6%).21 More EVs on the road means more
opportunities for Americans to gain more direct experience and exposure to EVs. Right now,
broad consumer experience with EVs is very limited, but that is likely to change as more people
see family, friends, and neighbors bring home their first EV. This data show that as consumers
gain that greater familiarity with EVs they will be more likely to consider purchasing them.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 10-14]
20 Id.
21 Experience was measured based upon "yes" answers to four different questions:
1) Have you seen an EV in your neighborhood in the past month
2) Do you know someone with an EV
3) Have you been a passenger in an EV in the past year
4) Have you driven an EV in the past year
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[See original comment for Figure 4.2 - Survey Results on EV Demand by Experience with
EVs] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 10-14]
Automaker investments and consumer costs have been discussed in other areas of this
comment letter, but they also have the potential to drive increased consumer demand. As
automakers deliver more volume, economies of scale and intensified competition for customers
will further feed cost declines, which will feed back into the cycle, and lead to increased EV
demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 10-14]
However, it's not just that consumers are showing increased interest in EVs; they're also
showing declining interest in conventional gasoline vehicles. CR's car buying survey from
March and April 2022 found that 30% of licensed drivers who were then in the market to buy or
lease a new (and not a used) vehicle were not even considering a conventional, non-hybrid
vehicle.22 This however, isn't just something consumers are telling us, it's also showing up in
the market. Sales of new ICE vehicles decreased by 26% from 2019 to 2022, while combined
sales of BEVs, PHEVs and conventional hybrids increased by 144%. BEV sales alone increased
by 244% over that same period.23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 10-14]
22 Car Buying: A National Representative Multi-Mode Survey, 2022 Results, Consumer Reports, May
2022,
https://article.images.consumerreports.org/prod/content/dam/surveys/Consumer_Reports_Car_Buying_M
arch_2022.pdf.
23 Consumer Reports analysis of Wards Intelligence annual sales data, available with subscription at:
https://wardsintelligence.informa.com/datacenter.
Consumers who are still considering gasoline powered vehicles want them to keep getting
more efficient. In a 2022 CR survey of 2,161 US adults assessing Americans' beliefs and
attitudes about fuel economy, seven in ten American drivers say that fuel economy is either
"very important" or "extremely important" to them when considering what vehicle to purchase
or lease.24 In addition, when asked which attributes of the vehicle they drive most often have the
most room for improvement, 43% of drivers selected improvements in fuel economy, the most
commonly selected attribute, which beat out purchase price (30%), maintenance costs (27%),
and eleven other features.25 The full results are shown in Figure 4.3. Finally, 85% of Americans
agree that automakers should continue to improve fuel economy across vehicle types.26 This
underscores the urgency of this rule to ensure that there is a stringent path forward for
automakers to not only increase access to EV technology, but to improve the efficiency of
conventional vehicles that some consumers will still be buying. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0728, pp. 10-14]
24 CR nationally representative survey of 2,161 US adults in September and October, Consumer Reports,
2022, https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Consumer-Reports-Fuel-
Economy-20 22-National-Sample-Report.pdf.
25 Id.
26 Id.
[See original comment for Figure 4.3 - Vehicle Attributes with the Most Room For
Improvement] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 10-14]
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Unfortunately, the communities most harmed by transportation emissions and pollution are
adopting electric vehicles at disproportionately low rates.27 Despite considerable interest in EVs
across race and ethnicity, inequities in EV adoption persist. The BEV and low carbon fuel
awareness survey found that overall interest in purchasing EVs was high across all
demographics, with communities of color showing at least as great a level of interest in
purchasing an electric vehicle as white consumers: 33 percent of White, 38 percent of Black, 43
percent of Latino, and 52 percent of English-speaking Asian Americans say they would
"definitely" or "seriously consider" purchasing or leasing an EV.28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0728, pp. 10-14]
27 Survey Says: Considerable Interest in Electric Vehicles Across Racial, Ethnic Demographics,
September 2022, Consumer Reports, Union of Concerned Scientists, EV Noire & Green Latinos,
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/EV-Demographic-Survey-English-
final.pdf.
28 Id.
The same survey found that although exposure to EVs was roughly the same among members
of the Black community as white and Latino Americans (either through personal interactions,
observations in their community, or through riding or driving an EV), they reported being less
familiar with the fundamentals of owning an EV than any other group. This finding further
stresses the need to prioritize increasing EV sales in communities that are disproportionately
affected by transportation pollution. EPA should therefore consider the needs of consumers in all
demographics and income levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 10-14]
6. Specific Technical Comments On EPA's Proposal and Modeling
6.1. Internal Combustion Engine Vehicle Backsliding
EPA's modeling accurately considers the high effectiveness of battery EVs at delivering both
significant emissions reductions and consumer savings. EPA's modeling finds that EVs are so
cost-effective that emissions from the remaining ICE fleet actually increase over the period of
the rule by an average of around 4%. This is because EPA's model finds that it would be cost-
effective for automakers to remove already developed technology from their ICE vehicles to
save money while building more EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-20]
However, this modeling result does not seem likely in the real world. Consumer demand for
EVs is rapidly increasing, and technology improvements will mean that the remaining gasoline
powered vehicles will have to compete with better and better EV offerings.36 In order to
continue to find buyers for their remaining gasoline powered vehicles, automakers will need to
make them better, not worse. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-20]
36 Excess Demand, The Looming EV Shortage, Consumer Reports, March 2023,
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Excess-Demand-The-Looming-EV-Sh
ortage.pdf.
Furthermore, this result ignores consumer demand for cleaner, more efficient gasoline
vehicles. Consumer Reports' 2022 fuel economy survey found continued strong consumer
demand for more efficient vehicles.37 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-20]
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37 Fuel Economy: A Nationally Representative Multi Mode Survey, Consumer Reports, November 2022,
https://article.images.consumerreports.org/image/upload/vl670867143/prod/content/dam/surveys/Consume
r_Reports_Fuel_Economy_National_September_October_2022.pdf.
- 95% of American drivers said fuel economy is at least somewhat important to them when
considering what vehicle to purchase or lease, and seven in 10 (70%) say it is very important or
extremely important. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-20]
- 85%) of Americans agreed that automakers should continue to improve fuel economy for all
vehicle types. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-20]
- 78%o of American drivers agreed that they expect each new generation of vehicles available
on the market to be more fuel-efficient than the last. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-
20]
EPA specifically estimates that hybrid vehicles will drop from 4% of the vehicle fleet in 2027
to 0% of the fleet in 2031 and 2032.38 Research from CR has shown that many hybrids on the
market today are extremely cost-effective for consumers, delivering a payback on their cost in 3
years or less, with some delivering savings instantly.39 CR's 2022 nationally representative car
buying survey of 6,960 US adults found that 32%> of consumers planning to purchase or lease a
vehicle within a year were considering a hybrid car or truck.40 While consumer demand for EVs
is likely to continue to grow rapidly, EVs do not yet work for all consumer lifestyles, and hybrids
offer a viable and cost-effective alternative for these consumers to both reduce their emissions
and their fuel spending. EPA's modeling that shows that this popular and cost-effective
technology will be completely abandoned by the entire market by the end of the decade is at
odds with the data on consumer preferences for these vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728,
pp. 18-20]
38 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis, EPA-420-D-23-003, Table 13-68
39 Regardless of Gas Prices, Some Hybrids Pay for Themselves Immediately, Consumer Reports, March 2,
2023, https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/hybrids-evs/hybrids-vehicles-pay-for-themselves-
al092610835/.
40 Fuel Economy: A Nationally Representative Multi Mode Survey, Consumer Reports, November 2022,
https://article.images.consumerreports.org/image/upload/vl670867143/prod/content/dam/surveys/Consu
mer_Reports_Fuel_Economy_National_September_October_2022.pdf.
Finally, over the duration of this proposed rule, EVs will be gaining significant market share.
As they do so, ICE vehicles will by necessity be losing market share. Automakers will need to
make decisions about which ICE vehicles and powertrains to keep producing and which ones to
discontinue. The most logical approach to meeting these standards would be to phase out their
oldest and least efficient vehicles and powertrains, while keeping their newest, most advanced,
and most efficient powertrains. This process has the potential to result in significant
improvements in average vehicle emissions without automakers having to deploy any additional
technology. For example, in the 2023 model year, the best selling Ford F150 offers ICE variants
that range in emissions from 352 g/mi to 741 g/mi.41 This large range in emissions leaves a lot
of room for improving fleet performance by focusing future production on the lowest emitting
variants and eliminating the highest emitting variants. A more detailed analysis from the Natural
Resource Defense Council found that shifting to the lowest emitting powertrains could result in
emissions reductions of between 19 and 65 grams per mile, compared to the current sales
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weighted average, for the 12 best selling vehicles.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-
20]
41 Fuel Economy of 2023 Ford F150, U.S. Department of Energy, 2023,
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch. do?action=noform&path=l&yearl=2023&year2=2023&m
ake=Ford&baseModel=F150&srchtyp=ymm&pageno=l&rowLimit=50.
42 Shifting to Cleaner Gas Engines Can Help Reduce Emissions, Natural Resource Defense Council, July
5, 2023, https://www.nrdc.org/bio/kathy-harris/shifting-cleaner-gas-engines-can-help-reduce-emissions
Given the above, CR makes the following general recommendations to improve EPA's
modeling: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-20]
- EPA's model should not remove technology that automakers have already invested in
adding to their existing ICE vehicles.
- As EV market share increases over the course of the rule, EPA should model a reduction in
the number of ICE powertrains that automakers continue to build in such a way that the newest
and most advanced options are kept, and the oldest and least advanced are phased out over time.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 18-20]
Organization: Countymark
Another issue related to EVs is their weight, ranging from 1,000 to 3,000 pounds more than
gas-powered vehicles. This additional weight results in more damage to American roads,
necessitating increased infrastructure repair costs funded by taxpayers. Mandating a transition to
EVs can lead to increased consumer prices and reduced vehicle choices. It also raises concerns
about the financial burden on low-income families and the potential for increased infrastructure
repair costs due to the heavier weight of EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0665, p. 2]
Organization: Daniel Hellebuyck
Consumer Choice: There is a large percentage of the population that have no desire for an
EV. It may be the extra up-front costs in purchasing an EV, lack of charging stations, limited
range, the vehicle not being suitable for long trips or frequent long-distance rural driving, or the
time it talks to fully charge an EV compared to an ICE counterpart. In the past, the government
has done a poor job of dictating which products or services that customers should purchase and
as a result, consumers lost the freedom of choice that made this country so powerful, and
employees who provided products and services to these consumers lost their jobs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0526, p. 1]
Organization: Doug Peterson
Consumer desire for additional range may also put downward pressure on fuel economy.
Conventional vehicles have the upper hand with this critical vehicle attribute. Gasoline tanks are
sized to provide adequate range. Inadequate range is currently a major convenience drawback for
BEVs, and they will not sell in large numbers until range figures increase substantially. Poor
range also compounds the convenience drawback of slow refueling because it increases the
frequency of charging station visits when travelling far from home. When battery packs are
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enlarged to provide additional range, fuel economy often suffers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0500, pp. 10-11]
The relationship between range and electric fuel economy is complex. Higher fuel economy
increases range, but automakers can achieve the same result by increasing the size of the battery
pack. This approach adds considerable weight to the vehicle and tends to reduce fuel economy.
The tradeoff between range and efficiency will shift as engineers improve the gravimetric energy
density of battery cells, and impressive breakthroughs appear to be just around the corner. It is
also worth noting that some automakers are producing BEV models that deliver impressive range
along with outstanding fuel economy. Still, the EPA should be very concerned that its failure to
regulate BEV fuel economy will result in the unrestrained upsizing of battery packs. The trend
will increase demand for limited supplies of resources like lithium which will also be needed for
batteries that store intermittent renewable energy. In the near term, the inability to secure an
adequate supply of battery materials will slow BEV proliferation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0500, pp. 10-11]
Consumer trends favoring larger, more powerful vehicles have undermined regulatory efforts
to improve the overall fuel economy of the conventional fleet. The compelling statistics are
summarized each year in the EPA's Automotive Trends Report, and the agency would be wise to
not let history repeat itself with the emerging electric fleet. The footprint model was specifically
designed so that automakers would not be held accountable for market trends that affect the
composition of their fleets. The dubious argument applied here was that automakers have no
control over purchasing decisions made by consumers that determine their fleet mix. There is
strong evidence that automakers have actively encouraged consumer trends that are known to
waste gasoline, and they will do the same thing with BEVs if not held accountable for upstream
emissions. The proposed policy will supercharge these wasteful trends just as the electric fleet is
taking shape, and it will be very difficult to restore efficiency to the fleet after it has evolved.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 11-12]
There is already a strong public perception that electric fuel economy is environmentally
meaningless, and this should be very troubling to the EPA. When automakers advertise their
BEVs, MPGe ratings are rarely even cited. The vast disparity between the most efficient BEVs
and the least efficient plug-in hybrids is also being blurred in the eyes of the public. If a vehicle
is "electrified", it is marketed as being very environmentally beneficial, but this is often not the
case. Plug-in hybrids are sometimes even called "zero-emission vehicles". Ardent BEV
enthusiasts are especially indifferent to MPGe disparities, viewing BEVs as environmentally
superior vehicles that are all equally beneficial. The Electric Vehicle Association has no
reservations about electron guzzlers, but the EPA certainly should. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0500, pp. 11-12]
Organization: Departments of Transportation of Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota
and Wyoming
Moreover, EVs are not well suited for all of our nation's climates, especially in states that are
rural, are at high altitude, or both. In such areas Ion such areas long distance travel in often
extreme temperature ranges significantly impact EV range and the ability of Americans to access
healthcare, food, and other neg distance travel in often extreme temperature ranges significantly
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impact EV range and the ability of Americans to access healthcare, food, and other
necessities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0525, p. 2]
Organization: Energy Innovation
As of the first quarter of 2023, the U.S. hit an all-time high of EV sales, which made up just
over 8 percent of new car sales.35 And over the last six months, the U.S. has exceeded the 5
percent tipping point for EVs—a trend established by 18 countries, suggesting that a quarter of
new car sales could be electric by the end of 2025.36 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-
15]
35 Maria Olano, "Chart: EV Sales on Pace to Break 1 Million in US This Year," Canary Media, April 21,
2023, https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/electric-vehicles/chart-ev-sales-on-pace-to-break-l-million-
in-us-this-year.
36 Tom Randall, "US Crosses the Electric-Car Tipping Point for Mass Adoption," Bloomberg.com, July 9,
2022, https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/articles/2022-07-09/us-electric-car-sales-reach-key-
milestone#xj4y7vzkg.
See Figure 7.
[See original attachment for line graph "How Fast Is the Switch to Electric Cars?"] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
Figure 7. Graph charting the countries that have reached the 5 percent tipping point for EVs.
Source: Tom Randall, "US Crosses the Electric-Car Tipping Point for Mass Adoption"
(Bloomberg, July 2022), available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07- 09/us-
electric-car-sales-reach-key-milestone#xj4y7vzkg. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
The trajectory for greater electrification follows the trend over the past decade of increasing
EV ranges and overall improvements to performance as more models become available. As
illustrated in Figure 8, the average EV range has almost tripled over the past 10 years, going
from just under 80 miles in 2010 to 220 miles in 2021. These improvements in vehicle
performance will continue the positive feedback loop of increased consumer acceptance and
vehicle affordability, further accelerating adoption of EVs in this decade. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
[See original attachment for line graph titled "Average range of electric vehicles"] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
Figure 8. The average range of EVs, 2010 - 2021. Source: Ritchie, Hannah, "The End of
Range Anxiety: How Has the Range of Electric Cars Changed over Time," Sustainability by
Numbers, February 26, 2023, available at: https://www.sustainabilitybynumbers.eom/p/electriC"
car-range#footnote-anchor-1-104582203. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 12-15]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
XV. ZEV Penetration in the Absence of the Proposed Standards is Likely to Exceed EPA's
Estimates, Supporting the Feasibility of More Stringent Standards.
To support the feasibility of Alternative 1 with a steeper increase in stringency after 2030, we
now turn to the market growth of ZEVs and anticipated baseline (or "no action") levels of ZEV
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penetration. EPA's No Action scenario projected that BEVs will comprise 39% of the LDV fleet
in 2032. To assess the reasonableness of this projection, EPA reviewed literature and other
analytical projections, which clearly supported ZEV penetration at least as high as EPA's
projections. While EPA's approach is reasonable, real-world "no action" levels of BEVs are
likely to be even higher than EPA's No Action scenario. This supports making the finalized
standards more stringent than proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 100]
XIX. Consumer Acceptance of PEVs Is Not a Barrier to Feasibility of EPA's Proposed
Standards or More Stringent Standards.
In this section and in Sections XX and XXI, we explain how consumer acceptance
considerations support strong final standards. As detailed below, PEVs offer significant
economic and performance benefits to consumers, and consumer interest in PEVs continues to
grow. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 151]
A. EPA has broad discretion in considering consumer preferences when promulgating
emission standards but should not give undue weight to that factor.
As explained in EPA's Proposal and Section II of these comments, when promulgating new
emissions standards under Clean Air Act § 202(a), EPA must consider the statutory criteria of
technological feasibility, cost of compliance, and lead time.412 EPA may consider other factors,
and in the past has considered a rule's various impacts on vehicle purchasers.413 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 152]
412 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a); 88 Fed. Reg. at 29186.
413 88 Fed. Reg. at 29186.
While EPA has often considered consumer acceptance in its Section 202 rulemakings, the
Agency may not let the unique preferences of each and every consumer dictate its consideration
of the appropriateness or feasibility of emission standards. In International Harvester Company
v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded:
We are inclined to agree with the Administrator that as long as feasible technology permits
the demand for new passenger automobiles to be generally met, the basic requirements of the Act
would be satisfied, even though this might occasion fewer models and a more limited choice of
engine types. The driver preferences of hot rodders are not to outweigh the goal of a clean
environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 152]
While International Harvester involved emission requirements for light-duty vehicles under a
provision of the 1970 Amendments, the principles the court expressed apply just as well to
standards under Section 202(a)(1). As detailed in Section II, Congress intended EPA's standards
to push the industry toward greater emission reductions and did not expect them to preserve the
market dominance of any particular type of powertrain or power source. EPA should not give
oversized weight to arguments questioning consumer preferences, which is not a factor Congress
identified in Section 202(a)(1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 152]
While EPA has discretion whether to consider and how much weight to give purchaser
acceptance in setting emission standards, that discretion is limited by EPA's primary statutory
duty to set standards that adequately protect public health and welfare. An understanding of
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consumers' willingness to purchase and drive PEVs could inform the feasibility and
effectiveness of EPA's regulations. EPA's attention to consumer preferences, however, cannot
compromise its overall Clean Air Act mandate to mitigate the automobile's "devastating impact
on the American environment," International Harvester, 478 F.2d at 622, or the Agency's
primary duty to protect public health and welfare by minimizing harmful air pollution. Most
importantly here, however, is that consumer acceptance of PEVs is widespread and growing, and
PEVs provide the vehicle features and characteristics that drivers want and need. Thus, as this
section will explain, consumer acceptance is not a barrier to PEV penetration at the levels
projected by EPA's Proposal or at levels consistent with Alternative 1 with increasing stringency
after 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 152-153]
B. Consumer acceptance of PEVs is not a barrier to feasibility because consumer acceptance
is widespread and growing.
Under EPA's Proposed Standards and under Alternative 1 with a faster ramp-up after 2030,
consumer preferences generally align with the most economically advantageous and cost-
effective compliance pathway (increasing the deployment of PEVs within the light-duty fleet)
toward meeting strong emission standards that fulfill EPA's statutory mandate. American drivers
have shifted and are continuing to shift toward acceptance of—and, increasingly, preference
for—PEVs. As several original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have themselves explained,
"[rjeduced interest in legacy products due to technology advancements and consumer preference
shifts are an inevitable reality of the market and occur in all sectors of the economy." See Initial
Brief for Industry Respondent-Intervenors at 13-14, Ohio v. EPA, No. 22-1081 (D.C. Cir. Feb.
13, 2023).414 Here, as PEV technology advances and both the public health and driver-
experienced benefits of PEVs become apparent, consumer's preferences are naturally shifting
away from combustion vehicles and toward PEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 153]
414 Automaker industry respondent-intervenors on this brief include Ford Motor Company, BMW of
North America, LLC, Volkswagen Group of America, Volvo Car USA LLC, American Honda Motor Co.,
Inc., and the National Coalition for Advanced Transportation (whose members include Rivian and Tesla).
The Initial Brief for Industry Respondent-Intervenors is available at
https://blogs.edf.org/climate411/files/2023/02/Industry-Respondent-Intervenors-Initial-Brief-Feb.-13-
2023_.pdf.
EPA's Proposal accurately highlights the already "greatly increased acceptance [of PEVs] by
consumers," 88 Fed. Reg. at 29187, and that "consumer affinity for PEVs is strong." Id. at
29189. This market-based consumer acceptance is evidenced at least in part by recent rapid
growth in PEV market share—growth that has outpaced historical estimates considered
ambitious just a decade ago. EPA's 2012 Rule, for example, assumed electric vehicles would
account for only 3% of the car market and 2% of the combined car and light-duty truck market
by 2025. 77 Fed. Reg. at 62874, 62875 Tbl.III-52. By 2021, however, combined car BEV and
PHEV market share had already outpaced that estimate for 2025, reaching about 4.2% of LDV
sales and double the 2020 market share.415 By 2022, electric vehicle market share had again
reached a new high, with combined LDV BEV and PHEV market share totaling 7.6% for
2022416—already more than double EPA's 2012 Rule projection for 2025. As of the first
quarter of 2023, U.S. light-duty PEV sales were up again, to 8.3%,417 an increase of 60%
compared to the same period in 2022.418 As discussed in the Proposal, forecasts based on
consumer demand now suggest U.S. passenger car PEV sales percentages of 40% to more than
50% by 2030, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29192, and public announcements by major automobile
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manufacturers support baseline PEV sales at this level or higher. Id. at 29190-2; DRIA at 3-16..
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 153-154]
415 Plug In America, The Expanding EV Market: Observations in a Year of Growth 4 (Feb. 2022),
https://pluginamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2022-PIA-Survey-Report.pdf; David Gohlke et al.,
Assessment of Light-Duty Plug-In Electric Vehicles in the United States, 2010-2021, Argonne National
Laboratory 4 (Nov. 2022), https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2022/ll/178584.pdf; Argonne National
Laboratory, Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates, https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-
duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates); EPA, The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report 57
(Dec. 2022), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-12/420r22029.pdf.
416 Colin McKerracher et al., Electric Vehicle Outlook 2023, BloombergNEF (June 8, 2023). Subscription
required.
417 Argonne National Laboratory, Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates,
https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates (showing, as of May
2023, PEV car sales over 10% of total car sales, and combined PEV car and light-duty truck sales of 8.36%
of total light-duty sales).
418 International Energy Agency, Global EV Outlook 2023, at 22 (April 2023),
https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/dacfl4d2-eabc-498a-8263-9f97fd5dc327/GEVO2023.pdf.
Data regarding PEV registrations and preorders also shows strong and growing consumer
demand for these vehicles and signals widening consumer acceptance. In the first three months
of 2022, registrations for new PEVs increased 60% in the United States, even though overall new
car registrations were down 18%.419 Looking at consumer sales shares, however, is likely an
inadequate proxy for actual consumer interest in PEVs, given the fact that many consumers do
not yet have access to these vehicles. A recent analysis by Sierra Club found that 66% of car
dealerships nationwide did not yet have a single EV available for sale.420 When new PEV
models enter the market, consumers race to place orders. In late 2022, for example, GMC's new
Sierra model electric pickup truck averaged more than 500 reservations per day and reached
roughly 20,000 reservations after a little over a month, on top of over 170,000 reservations for
GMC's Silverado EV pickup.421 Similarly, the Dodge Ram 1500 REV pickup reached its
maximum number of preorders in just 5 days earlier this year.422 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 154]
419 Jayme Deerwester, Registrations for Electric Vehicles Soar, Signaling Increasing Mainstream
Acceptance, USA Today (May 16, 2022),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2022/05/16/electric-vehicle-registration-soars/9798645002/.
420 Sierra Club, Rev Up Electric Vehicles: A Nationwide Study of the Electric Vehicle Shopping
Experience (May 2023), https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/2023-
05/SierraClubRevUpReport2023 .pdf.
421 Peter Holderith, 2024 GMC Sierra EV Waitlist Proves People Want All the Electric Pickups,
thedrive.com (Nov. 29, 2022), https://www.thedrive.com/news/2024-gmc-sierra-ev-waitlist-proves-people-
want-all-the-electric-pickups.
422 Peter Johnson, Ram Closes Reservations for Its First Electric Truck, the 1500 REV, After 5 Days,
electrek (Feb. 17, 2023), https://electrek.co/2023/02/17/ram-closes-reservations-for-its-first-electric-truck-
the-1500-rev/.
This consumer purchase data shows Americans' increasing desire for PEVs, and is backed up
by other data and research. Specifically, as this section will explain, peer-reviewed research and
analyses, customer-based surveys, and comparisons with international sales trends provide
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further evidence of broad and expanding consumer preference for PEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 154]
1. Recent peer-reviewed academic literature supports broad and growing consumer
acceptance of PEVs.
Several recent peer-reviewed papers have shown that consumers are in fact ready and willing
to adopt electric vehicles. EPA references some of these papers in the Proposal, and should also
consider additional research on PEV consumer acceptance, including research that is recently
published. For example, a recent study by leading academics in this field, and not discussed in
EPA's Proposal, examined consumer choices of plug-in electric vehicles (including BEVs and
PHEVs) relative to conventional gasoline vehicles.423 The study, Forsythe et al. (2023), found
that when consumers' basic demands for vehicle attributes are met, they accept or prefer BEVs
to combustion vehicles.424 The analysis was conducted through a nationwide survey-based
consumer discrete choice experiment from December 2020 to September 2021, in which new
vehicle consumers—weighted to be representative of the U.S. population—chose among
potential vehicle options in a manner that mimicked the process of comparing vehicles on an
automaker's website.425 In order to examine how consumer preferences might be changing over
time, the experiment was designed to be compared to an earlier discrete choice experiment
conducted in 2012-2013.426 The Forsythe et al. (2023) experiment was well-designed in that it
(1) mitigated typical concerns of stated-preference experiments by "incorporating] multiple
features into the survey design that tend to improve the ability for survey responses to reveal
comparable preferences as when making true purchase decisions";427 (2) included a substantial
number of participants (734 car-buyers and 862 SUV-buyers) recruited using both Amazon's
Mechanical Turk (to mirror the earlier comparative study) and Dynata (which includes older and
higher-income respondents), and weighted to ensure representativeness of the U.S. new vehicle
buying population;428 and (3) evaluated expected technology for a near-future hypothetical
vehicle based on extensive research conducted by the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine, thus reflecting what PEV models could realistically be available to
consumers in the short term.429 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 154-155]
423 Connor R. Forsythe, Kenneth T. Gillingham, Jeremy J. Michalek & Kate S. Whitefoot, Technology
Advancement is Driving Electric Vehicle Adoption, PNAS (May 2023),
https://www.pnas.org/doi/epdf/10.1073/pnas.2219396120.
424 Id.
425 Id. at 1, 3.
426 Id. at 1; see also J.P. Helveston, et al., Will Subsidies Drive Electric Vehicle Adoption? Measuring
Consumer Preferences in the U.S. and China, 73 Transp. Res. Part A: Policy Pract. 96-112 (2015),
https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0965856415000038?token=029105616ECD043F67531E36FA6F
BC42FD
0801DE87 C8B7FB2771B0B4E37E79E91CA7AE0CBC4CC7EFA61DCFC6A67 lDDFC&originRegion=u
s-east-l&originCreation=20230518185020.
427 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 3 (listing features incorporated to mitigate any limitations of stated-preference
surveys). See also C.A. Vossler, M. Doyon & D. Rondeau, Truth in Consequentiality: Theory and Field
Evidence on Discrete Choice Experiments, 4 Am. Econ. Journal: Microeconomics 145-171 (2012),
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.4.4.145.
428 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 3.
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429 Id. at 2-3; see also National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Assessment of
Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy—2025-2035 (2021),
https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/26092/assessment-of-technologies-for-improving-light-duty-
vehicle-fuel-e conomy-2025-2035.
Forsythe et al. (2023) was the first to examine "the degree to which consumer willingness to
trade off relevant vehicle attributes associated with electrification (e.g., range, operating cost,
price, etc.) may have changed over time due to technology improvements or other factors and
what this could imply for the sales of new vehicles in upcoming years."430 The results indicated
that "any perceived disadvantages of BEVs relative to gasoline vehicles are often compensated
by the BEV's improved operating cost, acceleration, and fast-charging capabilities, particularly
for BEVs with a longer range."431 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 155-156]
430 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 2.
431 Id. at 2.
In short, the study reveals that the attributes consumers look for in their vehicles have most
likely stayed consistent between the 2012 stated-preference experiment and Forsythe et al.
(2023)'s most recent. As BEVs are able to provide more of those attributes, consumers choose
BEVs more often. The authors ultimately concluded that reasonable forecasted improvements of
BEV range and price—based on extensive research on technology development by the National
Academies of Sciences—show that "consumer valuation of many BEVs is expected to equal or
exceed their gasoline counterparts by 2030," resulting in 40% to nearing 60% of consumers
choosing BEV powertrain options over combustion powertrain options for the same vehicle.432
Moreover, "[a] suggestive market-wide simulation extrapolation indicates that if every gasoline
vehicle had a BEV option in 2030, the majority of new car and near-majority of new sport-utility
vehicle choice shares could be electric in that year due to projected technology improvements
alone."433 Finally, Forsythe et al. (2023) suggested that, with the assumed technological
projections, even if all BEV purchase incentives were entirely phased out, BEVs could still have
a market share of about 50% relative to combustion vehicles by 2030, based on consumer choice
alone.434 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 156]
432 Id. at 1, 5 Fig.3 (showing U.S. BEV car market shares in MY 2030 over 50% and U.S. BEV SUV
market shares in MY 2030 over 40%).
433 Id. at 1. These projected technology improvements follow the projections from National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Assessment of Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel
Economy—2025-2035 (2021), https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/26092/assessment-of-
technologies-for-improving-light-duty-vehicle-fuel-e conomy-2025-2035.
434 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 6.
As discussed in EPA's Proposal and the Agency's January 2023 literature review of consumer
acceptance research,43 5 other recent studies show a similar trend of increasing consumer
preference for PEVs. For example, Carley et al. (2019) found that American consumers were
more intent on purchasing PEVs in 2017 than in 2011.436 Gillingham et al. (2023), cited briefly
in EPA's Proposal, is especially illustrative of the increasing consumer demand for PEVs. That
study used data on all new light-duty vehicles sold in the United States between 2014 and 2020
(a dataset of over 106 million observations), and found that in the vehicle segments and classes
where EVs were available, they were competing very successfully with comparable combustion
vehicles, with relative market shares "exceeding 30% in recent years."437 The results of this
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investigation could imply that fleet-wide LDV PEV market share in 2020 was around 2% not
because only 2% of buyers wanted PEVs, but at least in part due to "the (near-)absence of EV
offerings in many segments of the vehicle market"438 where purchasers are interested in
purchasing vehicles. If consumers want to purchase a particular vehicle type and there are no
PEVs available within that market segment, they will buy a combustion vehicle. Gillingham et
al. (2023) shows that when PEVs are available in those market segments, consumers already
often choose the PEV over the combustion vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 156-
157]
435 EPA & Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Literature Review of U.S. Consumer Acceptance of
New Personally Owned Light Duty Plug-In Electric Vehicles (Jan. 2023),
https ://cfpub .epa.gov/si/si_public_record_report. cfm?Lab=OT AQ&dirEntry Id=3 5 3 465.
436 Sanya Carley, Saba Siddiki & Sean Nicholson-Crotty, Evolution of Plug-In Electric Vehicle Demand:
Assessing Consumer Perceptions and Intent to Purchase Over Time, 70 Transp. Res. Part D: Transp.
Environ. 94-111 (2019), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1361920918311635.
437 Kenneth T. Gillingham, Arthur A. van Benthem, Stephanie Weber, Mohamed Ali Saafi & Xin He, Has
Consumer Acceptance of Electric Vehicles Been Increasing? Evidence from Microdata on Every New
Vehicle Sale in the United States, American Economic Association: Papers & Proceedings 333-334 (May
2023).
438 Id. at 334.
A number of studies in addition to those cited in EPA's literature review of consumer
acceptance have considered the impacts of various factors on consumer acceptance of PEVs, and
these—coupled with the current rapid pace of technological development and vast investment in
PEV infrastructure—provide additional evidence that consumer acceptance is not a barrier to
PEV penetration at levels consistent with EPA's Proposal or with Alternative 1 with increasing
stringency after 2030. One body of research, for example, reveals that consumer demand is
responsive to the availability of public charging infrastructure. When this infrastructure is
available—as it increasingly is and will be, see Section XVII—consumer acceptance of and
demand for PEVs increases. Cole et al. (2023) concluded that for encouraging PEV sales,
"[sjpending on charging stations is more effective than spending on rebates," with shifting
spending from rebates to charging station programs increasing projected EV penetration share in
2030 from 48% to 68%.439 Similarly, Li (2017) found that, between 2011 to 2013, the federal
income tax credit of up to $7,500 for EV buyers contributed to about 40% of EV sales, but "[a]
policy of equal-sized spending but subsidizing charging station deployment could have been
more than twice as effective in promoting EV adoption."440 Using data from Norway, Springel
(2021) found that spending on charging station subsidies, at least initially, resulted in more EV
purchases than spending on consumer price subsidies.441 Given the extensive investments in
PEV infrastructure, detailed in Section XVII, PEV demand would be expected to be responsive
to these investments, and increasing. Additionally, Herberz et al. (2022) studied BEV adoption
and found that "car owners systematically underestimate the compatibility of available battery
ranges with their annual mobility needs and that this underestimation is associated with increased
demand for long battery ranges and reduced willingness to adopt electric vehicles."442
Researchers found that simply providing tailored compatibility information increased consumer
willingness to pay for BEVs, even more than information about easy access to charging
infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 157-158]
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439 Cassandra Cole, Michael Droste, Christopher Knittel, ShanjunLi & James Stock, Policies for
Electrifying the Light-Duty Fleet in the United States, American Economic Association: Papers &
Proceedings 320 (May 2023).
440 Shanjun Li, Lang Tong, Jianwei Xing & Yiyi Zhou, The Market for Electric Vehicles: Indirect
Network Effects and Policy Design, 4 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists 89 (Jan. 2017).
441 Katalin Springel, Network Externality and Subsidy Structure in Two-Sided Markets: Evidence from
Electric Vehicle Incentives, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 393, 425-426 (Nov. 2021).
442 Mario Herberz, Ulf J. J. Hahnel & Tobias Brosch, Counteracting Electric Vehicle Range Concern with
a Scalable Behavioural Intervention, Nature Energy 503 (2022).
2. Consumer surveys also support broad and growing consumer acceptance of PEVs.
Many well-designed, real-world consumer surveys also confirm significant and growing
consumer interest in purchasing PEVs. A report on a recent, nationally representative survey of
8,027 Americans conducted by Consumer Reports with input from the Union of Concerned
Scientists, GreenLatinos, and EVNoire, conducted between January 27 and February 18, 2022,
found that "[ojverall interest in EVs is high" across all racial demographics.443 Between 33%
and 52% of respondents (depending on racial demographics) would "definitely" or "seriously
consider" purchasing or leasing an EV as their next vehicle.444 Only 28% of Americans would
not consider getting an electric-only vehicle if they were to buy or lease a vehicle today.445
Even in rural areas, the survey showed that current interest in EV purchases is high, with up to
29% of rural drivers at least seriously considering buying or leasing an EV.446 Between 2020
and 2022, Consumer Reports surveys have shown a 350% increase in consumer demand for
BEVs.447 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 158]
443 Consumer Reports, et al., Survey Says: Considerable Interest in Electric Vehicles Across Racial,
Ethnic Demographics: Smarter Policies Can Help Overcome Barriers 2 (Sept. 2022),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/ev-demographic-survey_0.pdf.
444 Id.
445 Consumer Reports, Battery Electric Vehicles & Low Carbon Fuel Survey: A Nationally Representative
Multi-Mode Survey 3 (Apr. 2022),
https://article.images.consumerreports.org/image/upload/vl657127210/prod/content/dam/CRO-Images-
2022/Cars/0 7July/2022_Consumer_Reports_BEV_and_LCF_Survey_Report.pdf. See also Lydia Saad,
Gallup Vault: Misjudging Cellphone Adoption (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://news.gallup.com/vault/227810/gallup-vault-misjudging-cellphone-adoption.aspx (noting that
Americans have not always accurately judged their acceptance of future behavior and have underestimated
their acceptance of newer technologies, with almost a quarter of Americans saying in 2000 that they had no
intention of ever having a mobile phone).
446 Maria Cecilia Pinto de Moura, Survey Shows Pathway to Speeding Up EV Adoption in Rural Areas,
Union of Concerned Scientists (March 14, 2023), https://blog.ucsusa.org/cecilia-moura/survey-shows-
pathway-to-speeding-up-ev-adoption-in-rural-areas/.
447 Chris Harto, Excess Demand: The Looming EV Shortage, Consumer Reports 2, 4 (Mar. 2023),
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Excess-Demand-The-Looming-EV-
Shortage.pdf.
Survey responses in the 2022 Capital One Car Buying Outlook also overwhelmingly show
that Americans envision a future in which they will be driving PEVs. Over 60% of American car
buyers and 84% of American car dealers surveyed agreed that electric vehicles are the future.448
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Additionally, 46% of car buyers already believe they will be driving an electric vehicle within
the next 10 years.449 The annual global EY Mobility Consumer Index found a similar level of
consumer demand for and interest in PEVs, and also emphasized that this is a global trend with
which the United States must keep pace in order to remain globally competitive. The
investigation, conducted in March 2022, surveyed approximately 13,000 respondents from 18
countries including the United States on themes including EVs, mobility and travel behavior, and
car buying. It found that preference for fully electric cars for those surveyed tripled between
2020 and 2022,450 and 52% of global car buyers currently prefer their next car purchase to be an
EV, PHEV, or hybrid vehicle.451 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 158-159]
448 Capital One, 19 Percent of Consumers Find Car Buying Process Transparent (July 26, 2022),
https://www.capitalone.com/about/newsroom/car-buying-outlook-deep-dive/ (summarizing findings of
Capital One's 2022 Car Buying Outlook).
449 Id.
450 Gaurav Batra, Ankit Khatri, Akshi Goel & Menaka Samant, EY Mobility Consumer Index 2022 Study
4 (May 2022), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_gl/topics/automotive-and-
transportation/automotive-transportation-pdfs/ey-mobility-consumer-index-2022-study.pdf.
451 Id.
Very recent surveys from this year also show strong consumer interest in PEVs. KPMG's
Consumer Pulse Summer 2023 survey of 1,000 Americans showed that nearly half of U.S.
combustion vehicle owners are considering switching to PEVs or hybrid electric vehicles,
prompted in large part by increasing gas prices and environmental concerns.452 A 2023 online
poll of 4,410 Americans by Reuters/Ipsos found that already just over a third of Americans
would consider buying an EV for their next car purchase.453 J.D. Power's most recent U.S.
Electric Vehicle Consideration Study, released in June 2023, also found high interest in EVs.
The study found the number of car buyers "very likely" and "overall likely" to consider
purchasing an EV increased over 2002, with 26% of shoppers "very likely" and 61% "overall
likely" to consider purchasing an EV.454 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 159]
452 KPMG, Consumer Pulse Summer 2023 Report, Consumer & Retail 3, 45-46 (Apr. 2023),
https://advisory.kpmg.us/content/dam/advisory/en/pdfs/2023/consumer-pulse-summer-2023-report-
april.pdf.
453 David Shepardson, One-Third of Americans Would Consider EV Purchase - Reuters/Ipsos Poll,
Reuters (Mar. 21, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/technology/one-third-americans-would-consider-ev-
purchase-reutersipsos-poll-2023-03-21 /; Ipsos, Reuters/Ipsos Issues Survey March 2023 (March 24, 2023),
https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/reutersipsos-issues-survey-march-2023.
454 J.D. Power, Action Needed to Keep Charging from Short Circuiting EV Purchase Consideration, J.D.
Power Finds (June 15, 2023), https://www.jdpower.com/business/press-releases/2023-us-electric-vehicle-
consideration-evc-study.
3. A "tipping point" in PEV adoption can signify rapid mass consumer acceptance, and the
United States has reached this milestone.
Analysis from other countries shows that once 5% of a country's new car sales are electric—a
threshold the United States has crossed—the country has reached an "electric-car tipping point"
which "signals the start of mass EV adoption, the period when technological preferences rapidly
flip."455 So far, 18 countries have reached this "tipping point," and assuming the United States
follows their trend, "a quarter of new car sales could be electric by the end of 2025. That would
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be a year or two ahead of most major forecasts."456 This "tipping point" occurs because
technologies generally follow an S-shaped adoption curve. "Sales move at a crawl in the early-
adopter phase, then surprisingly quickly once things go mainstream... .In the case of electric
vehicles, 5% seems to be the point when early adopters are overtaken by mainstream demand.
Before then, sales tend to be slow and unpredictable. Afterward, rapidly accelerating demand
ensues."457 This S-shaped pace of technology adoption has been observed for numerous
emerging technologies since the early 1900s, including the telephone, the automobile, electricity,
refrigeration, clothes washers and dryers, air conditioning, microwaves, computers, cellphones,
and the internet, as Figure XIX.B-1 shows.458 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 159-160]
455 Tom Randall, U.S. Crosses the Electric-Car Tipping Point for Mass Adoption at 1, Bloomberg (July 9,
2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-09/us-electric-car-sales-reach-key-milestone;
See also McKinsey & Company, Why the Automotive Future is Electric at 7 (Sept. 2021),
https://www.mckinsey.eom/~/media/mckinsey/industries/automotive%20and%20assembly/our%20insights
/why%20 the%20automotive%20future%20is%20electric/why-the-automotive-future-is-electric-f.pdf
(noting that the global "tipping point in passenger EV adoption occurred in the second half of 2020, when
EV sales and penetration accelerated in major markets despite the economic crisis caused by the COVID-
19 pandemic").
456 Tom Randall, U.S. Crosses the Electric-Car Tipping Point for Mass Adoption at 1, Bloomberg (July 9,
2022), https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/articles/2022-07-09/us-electric-car-sales-reach-key-milestone.
457 Id. at 3.
458 Rita McGrath, The Pace of Technology Adoption is Speeding Up, Harvard Business Review (Nov. 25,
2013), https://hbr.org/2013/11/the-pace-of-technology-adoption-is-speeding-up.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure XIX.B-1. Consumption Spreads Faster Today459
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 160]
459 This figure is reproduced from id.
Moreover, the pace of adoption has been speeding up consistently across new technologies, as
Figure XIX.B-1 also shows. For example, "[i]t took decades for the telephone to reach 50% of
households, beginning before 1900. It took five years or less for cellphones to accomplish the
same penetration in 1990."460 The automotive industry has not been left out of this increasing
speed of technological adoption, with automotive design cycles decreasing from 60 months to 24
or 36 months over a period of five years.461 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 161]
460 Id. See also Michael DeGusta, Are Smart Phones Spreading Faster than Any Technology in Human
History, MIT Technology Review (May 9, 2012),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2012/05/09/186160/are-smart-phones-spreading-faster-than-any-
technology-in- human-history/ (showing that it took 25 years for telephones to reach a 10% adoption rate
and an additional 39 years for telephones to reach a 40% penetration rate, but smart phones reached 40%
penetration in just 10 years).
461 Rita McGrath, The Pace of Technology Adoption is Speeding Up, Harvard Business Review (Nov. 25,
2013), https://hbr.org/2013/11/the-pace-of-technology-adoption-is-speeding-up.
Between 2021 and 2022, the United States reached this "tipping point" level of PEV
penetration, jumping from 4% to over 7.6% PEV sales share.462 As this tipping point is reached,
it is likely that Americans' exposure to PEVs increases. Importantly, "studies show that
increasing knowledge and exposure to these [electric] vehicles results in lasting, positive
impressions."463 A comprehensive literature review regarding consumer adoption of BEVs
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found that social interactions can influence BEV adoption.464 Some consumers have no interest
in purchasing a PEV simply because they lack information about the characteristics of PEVs, but
when consumers learn about PEVs, they are more likely to be interested in purchasing one. For
example, a study considering hybrid electric vehicle ("HEV") adoption—which "can be used as
a proxy for future PEV adoption"—found that there is a strong "direct neighbor effect" by which
each consumer's HEV-adoption decision can be influenced by the HEV-adoption decisions of
geographic neighbors.465 Another study, using a survey of vehicle customers in California and a
spatial and statistical analysis, found that having more neighbors and work colleagues who have
EVs increases EV adoption.466 Yet another study using very rich data from Sweden found the
same result: having more neighbors and work colleagues who drive EVs increases EV adoption.
This study also explored reasons for the effect, finding that information transmission is likely
very important.467 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 161]
462 Colin McKerracher et al., Electric Vehicle Outlook 2023, BloombergNEF (June 8, 2023). Subscription
required.
463 CARB, California's Advanced Clean Cars Midterm Review, Appendix B: Consumer Acceptance of
Zero Emission Vehicles and Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles B-2 (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/2020-01/appendix_b_consumer_acceptance_ac.pdf.
464 M. Coffman et al., Electric Vehicles Revisited: A Review of Factors that Affect Adoption, Transp.
Rev. 37, 79-93 (2017).
465 X. Liu, M. Roberts & R. Sioshani, Spatial Effects on Hybrid Electric Vehicle Adoption, Transportation
Research Part D: Transport and Environment 52A, at 86 (2017),
https://www.osti.gov/pages/biblio/1346139.
466 Debapriya Chakraborty, David S. Bunch, David Brownstone, Bingzheng Xu & Gil Tal, Plug-In
Electric Vehicle Diffusion in California: Role of Exposure to New Technology at Home and Work,
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 156, pp. 133-151 (2022).
467 Sebastian Tebbe, Peer Effects in (Hybrid) Electric Vehicle Adoption, working paper, see
https://sebastiantebbe.github.io/files/YST_Slides.pdf.
Survey data again corroborates this research. The 2022 Consumer Reports survey found that
for all groups of consumers, "experience with EVs strongly correlated to interest in purchasing
or leasing an EV "468 The survey found, for example, that "Americans who are more likely to
say that they will buy /lease an electric-only vehicle if they were to get a vehicle today have had
more exposure to them. They see them where they live and have friends, relatives, or co-workers
who own one "469 In fact, 71% of those who said they would definitely buy or lease an EV if
they were getting a vehicle today had seen EVs in their neighborhood, compared to 44% of all
survey respondents.470 "There is ... a strong relationship between having some personal
experience with an electric-only vehicle and the likelihood of buying or leasing one "471
Seventeen percent of all survey respondents had been a passenger in an electric-only vehicle in
the past 12 months, compared to 39% of people who said they would definitely buy or lease an
electric-only vehicle if they were to buy or lease a vehicle today. Only 7% of survey respondents
had driven an EV in the past 12 months, but 20% of those who would definitely buy or lease one
have driven one.472 Two surveys commissioned by the Consumer Federation of America to
study consumer attitudes towards PEVs similarly found that "the more consumers know about
PEVs, the more positive their attitudes towards them and the more likely they are to consider
acquiring one "473 And J.D. Power's 2023 U.S. Electric Vehicle Consideration Study found that
the number of consumers reporting they are "very likely" to consider purchasing an EV was
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more than double for consumers who had ridden as a passenger in an EV compared to those with
no personal experience with EVs.474 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 162]
468 Consumer Reports, et al., Survey Says: Considerable Interest in Electric Vehicles Across Racial,
Ethnic Demographics: Smarter Policies Can Help Overcome Barriers 2 (Sept. 2022),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/ev-demographic-survey_0.pdf.
469 Consumer Reports, Battery Electric Vehicles & Low Carbon Fuel Survey: A Nationally Representative
Multi-Mode Survey 7 (Apr. 2022),
https://article.images.consumerreports.org/image/upload/vl657127210/prod/content/dam/CRO-Images-
2022/Cars/0 7July/2022_Consumer_Reports_BEV_and_LCF_Survey _Report.pdf.
470 Id.
471 Id. at 8.
472 Id.
473 Consumer Federation of America, New Data Shows Consumer Interest in Electric Vehicles Is Growing
(Sept. 19, 2016), https://consumerfed.org/press_release/new-data-shows-consumer-interest-electric-
vehicles-growing/; Consumer Federation of America, Knowledge Affects Consumer Interest in EVs, New
EVs Guide to Address Info Gap (Oct. 29, 2015), https://consumerfed.org/press_release/knowledge-affects-
consumer-interest-in-evs-new-evs-guide-to-address-info-g ap/.
474 J.D. Power, Action Needed to Keep Charging from Short Circuiting EV Purchase Consideration, J.D.
Power Finds (June 15, 2023), https://www.jdpower.com/business/press-releases/2023-us-electric-vehicle-
consideration-evc-study.
This exposure effect is also evident when reviewing the outcome of events specifically aimed
at exposing potential buyers to PEVs. For example, research by CARB has found that "exposure
to PEVs through ride and drive events or car-sharing programs seem to result in lasting, positive
impressions and serve to be one of the most influential information sources for helping
consumers decide on a PEV. Second to a vehicle test drive, another PEV driver is the other most
influential information source for new buyers to choose a PHEV or BEV."475 CARB explained
that "[t]he impact of exposure to PEVs through participation in ride and drive events and
carsharing programs has been shown to have a positive effect on attitudes towards PEVs and
increase interest in PEV adoption."476 Furthermore, "simply giving consumers more
information on PEVs also increases their interest in acquiring one. A study analyzed the effect of
providing information on fuel costs of different vehicle technologies for specific commuting
patterns on attitudes regarding PEVs," and found that after utilizing an online tool that allowed
users to compare fuel costs for different vehicles based on their own commuting patterns, local
fuel prices, and charging opportunities, "[participants reported a significantly greater intention
to acquire a PEV."477 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 162-163]
475 CARB, California's Advanced Clean Cars Midterm Review, Appendix B: Consumer Acceptance of
Zero Emission Vehicles and Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles B-39 (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/2020-01/appendix_b_consumer_acceptance_ac.pdf.
476 Id. atB-50 to B-51.
477 Id. at B-52.
This "tipping point" concept, and the resulting wider PEV exposure when a location reaches
the tipping point, is possibly already playing out in microcosms of high PEV sales within the
nation. In California, for example—a state even further past this "tipping point" than the United
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States as a whole—sales of EVs reached more than 21% of all new vehicles sold in early
2023,478 and at least one survey shows almost three-quarters of California vehicle shoppers say
they are "overall likely" to consider an EV.479 The phase of rapid PEV adoption also has
already been underway in several individual cities. For example, 32.9% of monthly new vehicle
registrations in the San Francisco metro area were EVs in January 2023, up from 26.7% in
January 2022, and 17.2% of new vehicle registrations in Seattle were EVs in January 2023, up
from 8.4%) in January 2022.480 Passenger EV sales shares for the first quarter of 2023 were
29. P/o of sales in San Francisco and 20.7% of sales in Los Angeles.481 In the New York City
metro area in 2020, there were about three EVs per 1,000 people; today there are about seven
EVs per 1,000 people—growth that has been "propelled by more varied models, more charging
stations and lower prices."482 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 163]
478 Amy Chen, Yuri Avila & Dustin Gardiner, EV Sales are Booming in California. Charts Show How
Tesla is Quickly Losing Market Share, San Francisco Chronicle (Apr. 26, 2023),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/projects/2023/ev-tracker-california/.
479 J.D. Power, Action Needed to Keep Charging from Short Circuiting EV Purchase Consideration, J.D.
Power Finds (June 15, 2023), https://www.jdpower.com/business/press-releases/2023-us-electric-vehicle-
consideration-evc-study.
480 Emily Harris, EVs Dominate San Francisco Market as Choices Expand, Axios (Apr. 7, 2023),
https://www.axios.eom/local/san-francisco/2023/04/07/evs-tesla-dominate-san-francisco-market-brand-
choices-expa nd; Melissa Santos & Joann Muller, Electric Vehicle Adoption Doubles in Seattle, Axios
(Apr. 20, 2023), https://www.axios.eom/local/seattle/2023/04/20/electric-vehicles-seattle-registrations.
481 California Energy Commission, New ZEV Sales in California, https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-
reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev- sales (filtered to show
ZEV sales in San Francisco and Los Angeles counties).
482 Robin Shulman Agueros, Why the New York Area Is Seeing an Explosive Growth in Electric Cars,
New York Times (Mar. 7, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/05/nyregion/electric-vehicles-cars-
nyc.html.
This concept could also shed light on one possible reason that PEV sales percentages have
been unevenly distributed across the nation, with more sales in cities than rural areas, in a way
that minimizes any concerns that rural consumers could have insufficient demand for PEVs. A
2023 survey conducted by the Union of Concerned Scientists and Consumer Reports
"uncovered] that there isn't sufficient familiarity with EVs in rural areas. The overwhelming
majority of respondents—96%>—has never owned or leased an EV."483 The survey found that
only 6% of rural respondents said they were very familiar with the fundamentals of buying and
owning an EV, while 30% said they were somewhat familiar, and concluded that "[o]ne of the
reasons for this lack of familiarity could be the scarcity of EVs in rural areas: only 27% of rural
dwellers have seen an EV in their neighborhood in the past month compared to more than half of
urban dwellers, and even fewer have a friend, relative or co-worker who owns an EV. A
whopping 90%) of rural dwellers have never been a passenger in an EV, and almost nobody has
ever driven one."484 As efforts are made to increase familiarity with PEVs in rural areas, more
Americans will learn about the very real benefits and advantages of PEVs, especially for rural
drivers, see Section XIX.C.6 below, and this "neighbor effect" will begin to take hold in more
places. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 164]
483 Maria Cecilia Pinto de Moura, Survey Shows Pathway to Speeding Up EV Adoption in Rural Areas,
Union of Concerned Scientists (Mar. 14, 2023), https://blog.ucsusa.org/cecilia-moura/survey-shows-
pathway-to-speeding-up-ev-adoption-in-rural-areas/.
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484 Id.
C. When considering the attributes consumers care about most, EVs are a great fit.
One of the reasons this "neighbor effect" may occur is because when consumers learn about
PEVs, they often realize that PEVs offer a superior fit for the attributes they care about most in
their driving and vehicle-owning experience. Forsythe et al. (2023) found that key factors
Americans consider when purchasing vehicles and considering PEV options are operating cost,
range, fast-charging capabilities, and performance characteristics such as acceleration.485
Consumer surveys and other studies have found the same attributes, along with fuel economy, as
key to purchase decisions.486 As explained briefly in this section and in more detail in Sections
XIX.C and XX, PEVs offer superior satisfaction of these consumer preferences. Any existing or
perceived barriers to PEV adoption based on consumer acceptance are either minimal or
surmountable, policies are already in place to support rapid elimination of any remaining
barriers, and the pace of PEV incorporation into the fleet will allow for consumer preferences to
be fulfilled. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 164-165]
485 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 1-2.
486 See, e.g., Consumer Reports, Consumer Attitudes Towards Fuel Economy: 2020 Survey Results 3-4, 6
(Feb. 2021), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/National-Fuel-Economy-
Survey-Report-Feb-202 1-FINAL.pdf (showing high value placed on fuel economy in purchase decisions);
Alexey Sinyashin, Optimal Policies for Differentiated Green Products: Characteristics and Usage of
Electric, U.C. Berkeley Haas School of Business (Nov. 8, 2021)
https://drive.google.eom/file/d/lKEYJWa25DjH_g89ukSRW3PymjsTkUq4c/view (finding range and
charging station availability as key elements in purchase decisions); J.D. Power, EV Price Pressure Grows
as Government Incentives and Lease Deals Wield Outsized Influence on Consumer Demand (Mar. 29,
2023), https://www.jdpower.com/business/resources/ev-price-pressure-grows-as-government-incentives-
and-lease-deals-wi eld-outsized-influence-on-consumer-
demand#:~:text=At%20the%20current%20trajectory%2C%20J.D.,is%20expec
ted%20to%20surpass%2075%25 ("Consumer interest in EVs is increasingly being heavily swayed by
price"); Consumer Reports, Consumer Attitudes Towards Fuel Economy: 2020 Survey Results 6 (Feb.
2021), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/National-Fuel-Economy-Survey-
Report-Feb-202 1-FINAL.pdf (finding that 94% of potential vehicle purchasers considered fuel economy to
be "extremely important," "very important," or "somewhat important" when purchasing a vehicle).
1. PEVs are increasingly favorable from a total cost of ownership perspective and save
drivers money over the life of the vehicle. As more models become available, this benefit will be
accessible to more consumers.
First, PEVs are increasingly favorable from an operating cost and total cost of ownership
(TCO) perspective—a factor that is very important to U.S. consumers when deciding which
vehicles they want to buy. A 2020 nationally representative survey of potential vehicle
purchasers found that 94% of potential purchasers considered fuel economy to be important
when purchasing a vehicle.487 PEVs excel in the area of fuel cost savings. As EPA's Proposal
shows, the incremental costs of PEVs over combustion vehicles are increasingly insignificant or
nonexistent—especially in light of various state and federal incentives—resulting in PEVs
saving drivers money in very short periods of time. And as operating costs are reduced,
consumers are willing to pay more for their vehicles. Forsythe et al. (2023) found car buyers
willing to pay upfront an additional $1,960 per 1 cent/mile reduction in operating cost, and SUV
buyers willing to pay an additional $1,490,488 The paper also found that any perceived PEV
disadvantages were made up for by favorable operating costs (along with fast-charging
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capability), and that lower operating costs "can help increase consumer adoption."489 Forsythe
et al. (2023) further found that reductions in the BEV price-premium, which are projected to
occur, "have driven substantial increases in consumer choices of BEV cars and SUVs over their
conventional gasoline vehicle counterparts."490 A March 2023 J.D. Power survey reflected one
example of this consumer responsiveness to price, finding that consumer interest in the Ford
Mustang Mach-E and Tesla Model Y measurably increased when both manufacturers announced
price drops and both models were made eligible for the IRA's $7,500 federal tax credit.491 A
June 2023 J.D. Power survey also indicated that consumers are recognizing these savings,
finding that "[t]he more miles that vehicle owners drive, the more likely they are to consider an
EV. As in prior-year studies, daily commuters faced with higher fuel expenses are trading in
their gas-powered vehicles for EVs "492 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 165-166]
487 Consumer Reports, Consumer Attitudes Towards Fuel Economy at 3-4, 6.
488 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 5.
489 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 1-2, 6 (assuming sufficiently long range).
490 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 2.
491 J.D. Power, EV Price Pressure Grows as Government Incentives and Lease Deals Wield Outsized
Influence on Consumer Demand (Mar. 29, 2023), https://www.jdpower.com/business/resources/ev-price-
pressure-grows-as-government-incentives-and-lease-deals-wi eld-outsized-influence-on-consumer-
demand#:~:text=At%20the%20current%20trajectory%2C%20J.D.,is%20expec
ted%20to%20surpass%2075%25.
492 J.D. Power, Action Needed to Keep Charging from Short Circuiting EV Purchase Consideration, J.D.
Power Finds (June 15, 2023), https://www.jdpower.com/business/press-releases/2023-us-electric-vehicle-
consideration-evc-study.
Up until recently, nearly all PEV models on the market were sedans or hatchbacks, or vehicles
in the luxury car segment of the market,493 leaving vehicle purchasers looking for other types of
vehicles without many options. But dozens of new models are entering the market in the next
year, in all vehicle segments.494 Additional PEV model availability will provide a wider range
of price points and greater diversity of vehicle types and features for potential PEV purchasers,
further driving down average PEV costs and resulting in a PEV "fit" superior to a comparable
combustion vehicle for more consumers. Research by ICCT has shown that "[gjreater
availability of models in more vehicle segments and in higher volumes that meet consumers'
wide range of needs and preferences is critical to market growth," and "states with greater model
availability tend to have higher electric vehicle uptake."495 In recent years, average PEV costs
have appeared higher than average combustion vehicle costs because many PEVs have been
offered only in the luxury vehicle market. Gillingham et al. (2023)'s review of its dataset
containing every new LDV sale in the United States between 2014 and 2020 revealed that,
during that time period, "the market share of EVs and PHEVs is quite high in several price
brackets at the high end, but the number of vehicles sold in these high price brackets is relatively
small," and that "EVs can make up a large market share in the U.S. new car market," and "there
is a great deal of untapped product space for EVs in the lower price brackets."496 Drivers of
non-luxury vehicles want PEVs—and their benefits—as well. Automakers understand this
demand and are expanding their PEV options, and an appropriately stringent rule by EPA will go
further to accelerate this trend by offering automakers regulatory certainty. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 166]
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493 See, e.g., Gillingham et al. (2023) at 329, 332-333 (noting that EVs are overrepresented in the luxury
market segments and that in the hatchback category—"a small market segment with a relatively large
number of EV offerings"—sales of PEVs have been "close to 15% of the market in some years").
494 Jeff S. Bartlett & Ben Preston, Automakers are Adding Electric Vehicles to Their Lineups. Here's
What's Coming, Consumer Reports (Mar. 10, 2023), https://www.consumerreports.org/hybrids-evs/why-
electric-cars-may-soon-flood-the-us-market-a9006292675/.
495 Anh Bui, Peter Slowik & Nic Lutsey, Briefing: Evaluating Electric Vehicle Market Growth Across
U.S. Cities, ICCT 13-14 (Sept. 2021), https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ev-us-market-
growth-cities-sept2 l_0.pdf.
496 Gillingham et al. (2023) at 331-332.
Already, the number of light-duty PEV options has grown dramatically. The Alliance for
Automotive Innovation states that at the end of 2022, there were 95 PEV models available in the
United States.497 More models are forthcoming, including additional truck and SUV models
along with the expansion of a wider range of EV sedans.498 EPA's Proposal notes research by
EDF and ERM projecting that there will be over 180 PEV models available by the end of 2025,
88 Fed. Reg. at 29190 n.59, but EDF and ERM have since updated their analysis and now project
that there will be 197 PEV models available by the end of 2025.499 Many of the world's largest
automakers have committed to significantly expanding PEV production in the next few years,
even absent additional standards,500 which will naturally lead to a larger array of model choices.
For example, BMW, Volkswagen, and Stellantis have each committed to fleets half comprised of
zero-emission vehicles by 2030.501 Mercedes-Benz, Ford, and GM have committed to an
entirely zero-emission fleet by 2035.502 Volvo announced its fleet will be all electric by the end
of the decade.503 J.D. Power's EV Index and EV Consideration Pulse Survey found that half of
all new car shoppers will have a viable EV option by the end of 2023, and three out of four
shoppers will have a viable EV option by the end of 2026.504 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
pp. 166-167]
497 Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Get Connected: Electric Vehicle Quarterly Report, First Quarter,
2023 2 (2023), https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/papers-
reports/Get%20Connected%20EV%20Quarterly%20Report%202023% 20Ql.pdf.
498 Consumer Reports, Hot, New Electric Cars That Are Coming Soon (June 9, 2023),
https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/hybrids-evs/hot-new-electric-cars-are-coming-soon-al000197429/.
499 Rachel Macintosh et al., Electric Vehicle Market Update, Environmental Defense Fund and ERM 7
(Apr. 2023), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-
05/Electric%20Vehicle%20Market%20Update%20April%202023.pdf.
500 Zifei Yang, Beyond Europe: Are There Ambitious Electrification Targets Across Major Markets?, Int'l
Council on Clean Transp. Staff Blog (Nov. 15, 2022), https://theicct.org/global-oem-targets-cars-ldvs-
nov22/.
501 Id.
502 Id.
503 Id.
504 J.D. Power, EV Price Pressure Grows as Government Incentives and Lease Deals Wield Outsized
Influence on Consumer Demand (Mar. 29, 2023), https://www.jdpower.com/business/resources/ev-price-
pressure-grows-as-government-incentives-and-lease-deals-wi eld-outsized-influence-on-consumer-
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demand#:~:text=At%20the%20current%20trajectory%2C%20J.D.,is%20expec
ted%20to%20surpass%2075%25.
2. PEVs offer meaningful refueling (charging) benefits to consumers.
Americans are interested in how quickly they can refuel their vehicles. Again, PEVs have real
advantages that should not be underestimated. While opponents to PEVs frequently assert what
they believe will be fundamental changes to how Americans get to work, school, and run
errands, a closer look at the issue reveals that PEVs can offer meaningful benefits. Most trips are
well below the average PEV range, and charging for these trips can often be done when vehicles
are parked at home, work, or in public in between trips. In fact, recent research has shown that
90% of trips could be completed in vehicles with 124 miles of range—well below the
capabilities of the current average EV range in the United States (almost 300 miles). 505 Even as
of 2016, researchers at MIT found that electric vehicles at the time could handle almost 90% of
all car travel in the U.S.506 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 167]
505 Mario Herberz, Ulf J. J. Hahnel & Tobias Brosch, Counteracting Electric Vehicle Range Concern with
a Scalable Behavioural Intervention, Nature Energy 503 (2022) (finding that 90% of trips could be
completed in vehicles with 124 miles of range); Tom Randall, Americans Insist on 300 Miles of EV Range.
They're Right, Bloomberg (May 4, 2023), (noting that U.S. EVs have almost reached 300 mile average
range).
506 Catherine Caruso, Why Range Anxiety for Electric Cars is Overblown, MIT Technology Review (Aug.
15, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/08/15/158319/why-range-anxiety-for-electric-cars-is-
overblown/.
Drivers with access to a garage or dedicated overnight parking spot may simply charge at
home while they sleep, and most do. EY's Mobility Consumer Index 2022 survey found that
80%) of EV owners use home charging, 507 and other research has found that more than half of
all reported EV charging takes place at home.508 Once a home charger is installed, "the home
then has its own permanent home refueling station that can likely be used with all future
PEVs."509 Substantial investments in infrastructure incentives will help to reduce any consumer
concerns over range or charging availability. About half of Americans (49%>) say "discounts to
install a home charger" are the incentives that would most encourage them to get an EV.510 The
Inflation Reduction Act extended the EV charger credit, which covers 30% (up to $1,000 per
unit) of the cost of charging equipment for individual/residential uses. See 26 U.S.C. § 30C.
Many states and local jurisdictions offer additional installation incentives that can further reduce
costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 168]
507 Gaurav Batra, Ankit Khatri, Akshi Goel & Menaka Samant, EY Mobility Consumer Index 2022 Study
5 (May 2022), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_gl/topics/automotive-and-
transportation/automotive-transportation-pdfs/ey-mobility-consumer-index-2022-study.pdf.
508 Rob Stumpf, Americans Cite Range Anxiety, Cost as Largest Barriers for New EV Purchases: Study
(Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.thedrive.com/news/26637/americans-cite-range-anxiety-cost-as-largest-
barriers-for-new-ev-purchases-s tudy.
509 David P. Tuttle & Ross Baldick, Technological, Market and Policy Drivers of Emerging Trends in the
Diffusion of Plug-In Electric Vehicles in the U.S., Electr. J. 7 (Aug./Sept. 2015),
https://users.ece.utexas.edu/~baldick/papers/plugindiffusion.pdf.
510 Consumer Reports, Battery Electric Vehicles & Low Carbon Fuel Survey: A Nationally Representative
Multi-Mode Survey 4 (Apr. 2022),
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https://article.images.consumerreports.org/image/upload/vl657127210/prod/content/dam/CRO-Images-
2022/Cars/0 7July/2022_Consumer_Reports_BEV_and_LCF_Survey_Report.pdf.
Furthermore, "[ejlectric vehicles have the meaningful advantage of refueling at a far wider
array of locations than gasoline stations."511 Gas stations "must be carefully located to achieve
scale economies to pay for expensive sturdy buried fuel storage tanks, environmental and safety
protection methods, and gas pumps. In contrast, PEVs can charge at millions of potential home,
work, or public locations."512 And, with increasing numbers of chargers available in places
where drivers otherwise spend their time, "drivers can simply plug in and charge at a variety of
locations where they would naturally park their vehicle for long periods of time."513 Recently,
Walmart announced plans to install new BEV fast-charging stations at thousands of Walmart and
Sam's Club locations across the country, in addition to the 1,300 BEV fast-charging stations the
retailer has already made available.514 Other retailers already offering significant levels of BEV
charging include 7-Eleven, Cinemark, Ikea, Kohl's, Kroger, Macy's, Starbucks, Subway, Taco
Bell, Walgreens, and Whole Foods.515 PlugShare's charger locator can be searched based on
various types of charging locations, revealing chargers at hiking, dining, shopping, camping,
park, and grocery locations throughout the country.516 As far back as 2015, drivers who parked
on the street could access street lights for charging in some dense urban areas,517 and this cost-
effective technology518 is expanding in Europe and the United States, with U.S. pilot programs
in New York, Charlotte, and Kansas City,519 and a large number of BEV charging stations on
streetlight poles in Los Angeles.520 In addition, experts anticipate that charging equipment will
increasingly be distributed widely throughout apartment building and multi-family garages.521
Research on parking has found that the average car is parked for 95% of its useful life,522
leaving plenty of time to charge in a large variety of locations. As these public chargers increase,
PEVs become a viable and attractive option for more drivers, including those without access to
easy home-charging.523 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 169]
511 Tuttle & Baldick (2015) at 7.
512 Id.
513 Id.
514 Vishal Kapadia, Leading the Charge: Walmart Announces Plan to Expand Electric Vehicle Charging
Network, Walmart (Apr. 6, 2023), https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2023/04/06/leading-the-
charge-walmart-announces-plan-to-expand-electri c-vehicle-charging-network (noting that this will offer
customers and members the convenience of "being able to pick up essentials for their families or grab a bite
to eat while they charge").
515 Dan Avery, 12 Places That Offer EV Charging While You Shop, CNET (Apr. 19, 2023),
https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/12-places-that-offer-ev-charging-while-you-shop/.
516 PlugShare, Map of EV Charging Locations, https://www.plugshare.com/.
517 See Tuttle & Baldick (2015) at 8 ("Charging cords with wireless revenue-grade meters that plug into
street lights are now offered for drivers who park on the street in dense urban areas.").
518 Research by WRI found that compared to ground-mounted chargers, pole-mounted chargers result in
installation cost savings of up to 55% and overall cost reductions of 30% because they use existing
electrical connections and have minimal costs associated with construction, materials, and labor. See
Emmett Werthmann & Vishant Kothari, Pole-Mounted Electric Vehicle Charging: Preliminary Guidance
for a Low-Cost and More Accessible Public Charging Solution for U.S. Cities, World Resources Institute
12 (Nov. 2021), https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/2021-ll/pole-mounted-electric-vehicle-charging-
preliminary-guidance.pdf?Versi onId=xNjP5je_Ohc5WnFWCbxWGmmk_vMIqpu.
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519 Jay Ramey, Are Lamppost EV Chargers Ideal for City Dwellers?, Autoweek (Jan. 23, 2023),
https://www.autoweek.com/news/green-cars/a42618155/ubitricity-lamppost-ev-chargers-curbside/;
EV ANNEX, Study Finds On-Street Lampost EV Chargers Are Lowest-Carbon Solution, Inside EVs (Nov.
5, 2022), https://insideevs.com/news/619989/using-lamposts-for-ev-charging-reduces-carbon-footprint/.
520 Bradley Berman, LA Adds Hundreds of EV Chargers to Streetlights, Giving Renters a Place to Plug In,
Electrek (Nov. 13, 2019), https://electrek.co/2019/ll/13/la-adds-hundreds-of-ev-chargers-to-streetlights-
giving-renters-a-place-to-plug-in/ (noting over 130 EV chargers on streetlights as of 2019); LA Lights, EV
Charging Stations, https://lalights.lacity.org/connected-infrastructure/ev_stations.html (map showing
streetlight chargers across Los Angeles); Emmett Werthmann & Vishant Kothari, How Utility Poles and
Streetlights Can Improve Equitable Access to EV Charging in U.S. Cities, The City Fix, World Resources
Institute (Nov. 30, 2021), https://thecityfix.com/blog/how-utility-poles-and-streetlights-can-improve-
equitable-access-to-ev-charging-in-u-s-cit ies/ (noting 431 streetlight chargers and 44 utility pole chargers
in Los Angeles and a pilot project in Charlotte, North Carolina).
521 Joshua Stein, How Electric Cars Might Affect Multifamily And Other Real Estate, Forbes (May 25,
2023), https://www.forbes.eom/sites/joshuastein/2023/05/25/how-electric-cars-will-affect-multifamily-and-
other-real-estate/?sh=59dl6f66317c.
522 Ruth Eckdish Knack, Pay As You Park, Planning Magazine (May 2005),
http://shoup.bol.ucla.edu/PayAsYouPark.htm#:~:text=%22Most%20people%20in%20transportation%20fo
cus,learn%20from%20that%2095%20percent.
523 Cassandra Cole, Michael Droste, Christopher Knittel, Shanjun Li & James Stock, Policies for
Electrifying the Light-Duty Fleet in the United States, American Economic Association: Papers &
Proceedings 321 (May 2023) (noting that "providing additional [public] charging stations enables EV
ownership" for more drivers).
PEV charging is increasingly taking less time, further enhancing the convenience benefits of
PEV ownership. Hyper-fast Level 3 DC fast chargers can charge a BEV in as little as 30 minutes
or less, adding up to 10 miles of range for each minute of charging time,524 and consumers have
expressed strong willingness-to-pay for this capability.525 Research has shown that availability
of more fast-chargers "reduce[s] range anxiety and make[s] it possible to use EVs in the way that
drivers now use ICEs."526 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 170]
524 Electrify America, Charging with Electrify America, https://www.electrifyamerica.com/what-to-
expect/ (noting full charging in 30 minutes); Jessica Shea Choksey, What is DC Fast Charging?, J.D. Power
(May 10, 2021), https://www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-guides/what-is-dc-fast-charging (noting ability to
charge to 80% "in anywhere from 15 minutes to 45 minutes"); DriveClean, Electric Car Charging
Overview, CARB https://driveclean.ca.gov/electric-car-charging (noting that DC fast charging can add "up
to 10 miles of range per minute of charging time"); ICCT, Five Things You Know About Electric Vehicles
That Aren't Exactly True (July 19, 2021), https://theicct.org/stack/explaining-evs/ (high-powered DC fast
chargers can charge a long-range EV in 20-36 minutes).
525 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 5 (noting additional willingness to pay $4,140 for BEV fast charging
capability).
526 Cassandra Cole, Michael Droste, Christopher Knittel, Shanjun Li & James Stock, Policies for
Electrifying the Light-Duty Fleet in the United States, American Economic Association: Papers &
Proceedings 321 (May 2023).
PEV charging has additional benefits on top of saving drivers money and eliminating weekly
trips to the gas pump. First, PEVs with bi-directional charging capability have potential to serve
as back-up home generators in temporary power outages, with a typical BEV storing about 67
kWh in its battery—more than three days' worth of electricity.527 In fact, when a 2021 ice storm
in Texas left millions of residents without electricity, Ford "lent out their hybrid F-150s as home
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generators."528 More makes and models are expected to offer bi-directional charging,529 with
the potential that this capability becomes the norm. Additionally, vehicle-to-grid (V2G) charging
offers potential benefits for both the grid and PEV owners. RMI found that by 2030, "virtual
power plants" including parked vehicles supplying energy to the grid could reduce peak loads in
the United States by 60 gigawatts.530 As this capability continues to develop, there could be
additional "revenue opportunities for PEV owners for providing these grid services."531
Research in Germany has shown that bidirectional EV charging can generate significant revenue
for the typical German household: between 310 and 530 euros per year.532 A recent successful
vehicle-to-grid demonstration in North Carolina, taking place over two years, reveals the
potential for V2G not only to improve grid optimization and resilience, but also to save
consumers money. The North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center explained that
"[quantifying the potential value streams from bidirectional charging allows utilities to begin
considering incentive payments and other EV program options for customers and members. By
demonstrating significant positive value, this study encourages utilities in similar market
conditions to help customers overcome the financial barriers to purchasing an EV, particularly in
low- and moderate-income areas where these costs may restrict EV adoption "533 The
University of Delaware has partnered with local electric utilities and a regional transmission
organization to have their vehicles plugged in and available when called upon for grid support,
with the transmission organization paying the university the market rate, or roughly $1,200 per
year per BEV.534 Research by NREL has also considered net revenue generation from V2G
services, including from private LDVs, and found significant potential.535 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, pp. 170-171]
527 Michael J. Coren, Electric Vehicles Can Now Power Your Home for Three Days, Washington Post
(Feb. 17, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2023/02/07/ev-battery-power-
your-home/.
528 Id.
529 Id. (noting that makers of the Hyundai Ioniq 5, Lucid Air, Kia EV6, VW ID.4, Mitsubishi Outlander,
and Chevy Silverado EV, in addition to Ford's F-150, have announced plans for offering electricity
services in the next year or so).
530 Id.; Kevin Brehm, Avery McEvoy, Connor Usry & Mark Dyson, Virtual Power Plants, Real Benefits,
Rocky Mountain Institute (2023), https://rmi.org/insight/virtual-power-plants-real-benefits/.
531 Tuttle & Baldick (2015) at 11 (citing Quinn, C. et al., The Effect of Communication Architecture on
the Availability, Reliability and Economics of Plug In Hybrid Vehicle-to-Grid Charging, 195 J. Power
Sources 1500-1509 (Mar. 5, 2010)).
532 Timo Kern, Patrick Dossow & Elena Morlock, Revenue Opportunities by Integrating Combined
Vehicle-to-Home and Vehicle-to-Grid Applications in Smart Homes, 307 Applied Energy 1 (Feb. 2022),
https ://www. sciencedirect. com/science/article/pii/S0306261921014586.
533 North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center, NC Cooperative Demonstration of Vehicle-to-Grid
Smart Charger Concludes with Positive Results (May 8, 2023), https://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/2023/05/08/nc-
cooperative-demonstration-of-vehicle-to-grid-smart-charger-concludes/.
534 U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Management Program, Bidirectional Charging and
Electric Vehicles for Mobile Storage, https://www.energy.gov/femp/bidirectional-charging-and-electric-
vehicles-mobile-storage.
535 Darlene Steward, Critical Elements of Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) Economics, NREL (Sept. 2017),
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/Iy 17osti/69017.pdf.
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3. PEV range has increased enough to meet the demands of nearly all American car trips.
American consumers are interested in how far their cars can travel, as Americans currently
drive an above average number of vehicle miles per day (compared to the rest of the world),536
and demand "roughly a third more [range] than the global average."537 While range was
therefore once a key challenge for PEV adoption, it is no longer. In fact, "many EVs are
approaching the range of an average gasoline vehicle," and "the combined electric and gasoline
range for PHEVs often exceeds gasoline-only vehicles."538 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
171]
536 Bryn Huxley-Reicher, Fact File: Americans Drive the Most, Frontier Group (Feb. 14, 2022),
https://frontiergroup.org/resources/fact-file-americans-drive-most/.
537 Tom Randall, Americans Insist on 300 Miles of EV Range. They're Right, Bloomberg (May 4, 2023).
538 EPA, The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report: Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Fuel Economy, and
Technology Since 1975 E-2, 60 (Dec. 2022), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-
12/420r22029.pdf (finding that the efficiency of EVs has increased by about 18% in the last ten years).
The average BEV range has skyrocketed in recent years, making range issues no longer a real
concern. Average BEV range reached 298 miles in MY 2021, "or about four times the range of
an average EV in 2011,"539 when range was in fact a real concern. Longer-range BEVs are
available for consumers with more substantial driving needs,540 PEVs are becoming more
efficient,541 and several PHEVs exceed 500 miles of total range.542 The well-designed stated-
preference experiment conducted by Forsythe et al. (2023) found that "[m]ost vehicles with a
range of at least 300 miles were valued by consumers equivalently or more than their
conventional gasoline vehicle counterparts."543 BEV range is "on the cusp of exceeding 300
miles, a key psychological barrier."544 This level of range handily fulfills the needs and
preferences of almost every American driver. The average U.S. one-way commute is about 27.6
minutes,545 and the average single-car American household drives about 30 miles per day546—
both well within the range of all PEVs in today's vehicle market. ICCT has explained that "87%
of American car drivers drive on average less than 100 kilometers (60 miles) a day—that is, only
half the range capacity of the e-Golf, one third of the Leafs, and less than a quarter of the
Tesla's range on a single charge."547 Chakraborty et al. (2021) examined how much PEVs were
used within households, and concluded that "BEVs and PHEVs appear to be viable as
alternatives to conventional vehicles in terms of meeting the travel needs of households," and
that "[s]ince most new and upcoming BEVs are longer-range vehicles, we expect this to mean
BEVs will largely be suitable replacements for conventional vehicles in household fleets."548
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 171-172]
539 Id. at 60.
540 See, e.g., Nicholas Wallace et al., Longest Range Electric Cars for 2023, Ranked, Car and Driver (Mar.
23, 2023), https://www.caranddriver.com/features/g32634624/ev-longest-driving-range/ (listing U.S. PEVs
with longest driving range).
541 EPA, The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report, at 60.
542 Id. at E-2.
543 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 6.
544 Tom Randall, Americans Insist on 300 Miles of EV Range. They're Right, Bloomberg (May 4, 2023).
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545 Charlynn Burd et al., Travel Time to Work in the United States:2019, U.S. Census Bureau 1 (2019),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2021/acs/acs-47.pdf.
546 U.S. Department of Energy, Daily Vehicle Miles Traveled Varies with the Number of Household
Vehicles (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1047-september-17-2018-
daily-vehicle-miles-traveled-varies-number.
547 ICCT, Five Things You Know About Electric Vehicles That Aren't Exactly True (July 19, 2021)
https://theicct.org/stack/explaining-evs/.
548 Debapriya Chakraborty, Scott Hardman & Gil Tal, Integrating Plug-In Electric Vehicles (PEVs) into
Household Fleets - Factors Influencing Miles Traveled by PEV Owners in California, U.C. Davis 2, 33
(Aug. 2021), https://escholarship.org/content/qt2214q937/qt2214q937.pdf.
As consumer understanding of the capabilities inherent in this amount of range increases,
range anxiety would be expected to decline and consumer acceptance of PEVs to match the
vehicles' other benefits. Forsythe et al. (2023) explained that range increase is a key
advancement in BEV technology that has "driven substantial increases in consumer choices of
BEV cars and SUVs over their conventional gasoline vehicle counterparts."549 And Herberz et
al. (2022) found that 90% of trips could be completed in cars with less than half of the current
U.S. average range, but that most drivers do not understand this.550 Surveys by automakers have
also found that range anxiety is the largest factor in consumers refraining from purchasing PEVs,
explaining that drivers can be fearful they will run out of power before being able to recharge
their vehicles, though some of these surveys were conducted in 2019 or earlier, when average
PEV ranges were lower.551 Simply providing tailored compatibility information regarding the
ability of BEVs to fulfill drivers' range needs increased willingness to pay for BEVs even more
than information about easy access to charging infrastructure.552 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, pp. 172-173]
549 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 1-2.
550 Herberz et al. (2022) at 503, 506-507. See also Jennifer Sensiba, Putting Two Ford Announcements
Together Shows Us How It Thinks About EV Range (May 29, 2023),
https://cleantechnica.com/2023/05/29/putting-two-ford-announcements-together-shows-us-how-it-thinks-
about-ev-range/ (noting that 90% of all drives are within range of home).
551 Rob Stumpf, Americans Cite Range Anxiety, Cost as Largest Barriers for New EV Purchases: Study,
The Drive (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.thedrive.com/news/26637/americans-cite-range-anxiety-cost-as-
largest-barriers-for-new-ev-purchases-study.
552 Herberz et al. (2022) at 503.
Even for longer travel and trips in excess of the average daily drive—which make up a very
small percentage of U.S. driving—PEVs provide a good fit for most consumers' needs and
wants. U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics data shows that trips longer than 250 miles make
up a miniscule fraction of U.S. daily driving. In 2022, U.S. drivers took between 1.3 billion and
1.5 billion vehicle trips per day, with fewer than 2 million trips per day 500 miles or longer and
between about 1.5 million and 2.5 million trips per day between 250 and 500 miles.553 Charging
infrastructure is rapidly developing to support this small percentage of longer drives. As Section
XVII explains, the number of public PEV charging stations is growing rapidly,554 and the BIL
and IRA are funding new PEV charging corridors. Alternative Fuels Data Center's map of
nationwide PEV charging stations shows that already—with 8.3% PEV sales penetration in the
first quarter of 2023555—charging stations are widespread.556 In May, U.S. and Canadian
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officials announced the first Binational EV Corridor, covering a nearly 900-mile stretch between
the United States and Canada, with PEV chargers every 50 miles.557 Similarly, last year four
states announced plans to build a 1,100-mile PEV charging circuit along Lake Michigan.558 In
Washington, Oregon, and California, the West Coast Electric Highway provides DC fast
charging stations every 25 to 50 miles along Interstate 5, Highway 99, and other major
roadways.559 Electrify America's DC fast-charging network includes two cross-country routes
(one from Los Angeles to Washington, DC, and another from San Diego to Jacksonville), along
with a route covering much of the East Coast on Interstate 95 (from Portland, Maine to Miami,
Florida), and most of the West Coast along Interstate 5 (from Seattle, Washington to San Diego,
California). 560 GM and Pilot Company just announced plans to collaborate on a national DC
fast charging network of 2,000 charging stalls at up to 500 travel centers across the country, to
"help enable long-distance electric travel of people and vehicles across the U.S."561 These
chargers will be capable of the fastest 350 kW charging speeds.562 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, pp. 173-174]
553 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Trips by Distance Band, https://www.bts.gov/browse-statistical-
products-and-data/covid-related/trips-distance-groupings-national-or-state.
554 Alternative Fuels Data Center, Alternative Fueling Station Locator,
https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/analyze?country=US&fuel=ELEC&ev_levels=all&access=public&acces
s=private (noting 57,882 station locations and 155,449 EVSE ports available) (last accessed June 30, 2023);
see also EPA, The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report, at E-2.
555 Argonne National Laboratory, Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates,
https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates.
556 Alternative Fuels Data Center, Electric Vehicle Charging Station Locations,
https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity _locations.html#/find/nearest?fuel=ELEC.
557 Kalea Hall, EV Corridor to Run Nearly 900 Miles from Kalamazoo to Quebec, US and Canada
Officials Say, The Detroit News (May 16, 2023),
https://www.detroitnews.eom/story/business/autos/2023/05/16/binational-ev-corridor-to-run-860-miles-
from-kalama zoo-to-quebec/70224111007/.
558 Id.
559 West Coast Green Highway, West Coast Electric Highway,
http ://www. westcoastgreenhighway .com/electrichighway .htm.
560 Stephen Edelstein, Electrify America Finishes First Cross-Country Fast-Charging Route for EVs,
Green Car Reports (June 24, 2020), https://www.greencarreports.eom/news/l 128610_electrify-america-
finishes-first-cross-country-fast-charging-route-f or-evs. See also Electrify America, Locate A Charger,
https://www.electrifyamerica.com/locate-charger/ (showing map of fast-charging network across the
United States).
561 Anne LeZotte, GM and Pilot Company to Build Out Coast-to-Coast EV Fast Charging Network, Pilot
Flying J, https://pilotflyingj.com/press-release/19335.
562 Id.
Infrastructure will continue to build out rapidly on highways with increasing PEV penetration,
fulfilling the needs for even these comparatively less frequent longer drives. Survey data from
Europe shows that as PEV penetration rates increase and drivers become more experienced with
PEV operation, they become comfortable taking longer trips in their vehicles and are "more
relaxed" about traveling long distances and when they charge their vehicles.563 In addition,
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other developing technologies could make both short and longer drives even more seamless, such
as possible "electrified" roadways that contain wireless charging infrastructure under the asphalt
and wirelessly charge PEVs while driving.564 Such projects are already in development or
testing in the United States and Europe.565 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 174]
563 Shell Global, Shell Recharge Research Suggests Increasing EV Adoption is Driving Range Confidence
(June 23, 2023), https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/mobility/mobility-news/shell-recharge-
research-suggests-increasing-e v-adoption-is-driving-range-confidence.html.
564 Joann Muller, A Roadway Will Charge Your EV While You're Driving, Axios (Feb. 6, 2022),
https://www.axios.com/2022/02/02/a-roadway-will-charge-your-ev-while-youre-driving.
565 Id.
4. PEVs have additional attributes that are superior to combustion vehicles.
PEVs have additional superior attributes related to the driving and ownership experience that
are widely attractive to drivers. These include faster acceleration; improved performance; better
noise, vibration, and harshness characteristics; and reduced maintenance. Sections XIX.C, XX,
and XXI detail these additional superior attributes and the benefits that they provide for drivers
and vehicle owners. These attributes will continue to further increase consumer preference for
PEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 174]
5. American consumers also place high importance on environmental sustainability, and
EPA should not ignore these preferences.
When considering consumer preferences, EPA cannot overlook the importance that American
consumers place on sustainability. U.S. consumers increasingly place high priority on protecting
the environment, and PEVs are well positioned to satisfy this aspect of consumer preference.
Numerous consumer surveys, including by YouGov, CarMax, and others have found that
protecting the environment is a top consideration in purchasing a vehicle.566 In CarMax's
survey, over 60% of people said a car's "fuel emissions are moderately or extremely important to
them, while only 7.3% of people found fuel emissions not at all important "567 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 175]
566 Bill Howard, Survey: 23% of Americans Would Consider EV as Next Car, Forbes (Oct. 8, 2021),
https://www.forbes.com/wheels/features/ev-survey/ (YouGov poll for Forbes Wheels); CarMax, Green-
Conscious: Exploring Americans' Views on Hybrid and Electric Vehicles (Aug. 23, 2021),
https://www.carmax.com/articles/green-cars-trend.
567 CarMax, Green-Conscious: Exploring Americans' Views on Hybrid and Electric Vehicles (Aug. 23,
2021), https://www.carmax.com/articles/green-cars-trend.
6. PEVs are a great fit for the needs and demands of rural drivers.
PEVs are a great fit even for rural drivers. Although rural Americans are currently adopting
PEVs at slower rates than urban Americans,568 PEVs actually excel at meeting the demands of
rural drivers. "Fuel savings for rural households are larger than for urban households, because
trips in rural areas are longer than in urban areas, and vehicles tend to be older and less efficient,
requiring more fuel per mile, [P]EVs require fewer trips to a mechanic for repairs and
maintenance. Because of the high torque and low center of gravity, they have excellent
performance, which is important on rough, curvy and steep roads."569 A survey by the Union of
Concerned Scientists and Consumer Reports found that "there is plenty of interest [in PEVs] in
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rural areas, but there is a huge knowledge gap about what it is like to own an EV."570 Correcting
for this knowledge gap and educating rural consumers on PEVs' real benefits will undoubtedly
significantly increase PEV adoption in rural areas, allowing all Americans to reap their benefits.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 175]
568 U.S. Department of Transportation, Individual Benefits of Rural Vehicle Electrification (May 4, 2023),
https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-benefits-and-challenges/individual-benefits (noting that
rural EV adoption is currently roughly 40% lower than urban EV adoption, but explaining that EVs can
have significant benefits for rural drivers); Maria Cecilia Pinto de Moura, Survey Shows Pathway to
Speeding Up EV Adoption in Rural Areas, Union of Concerned Scientists (March 14, 2023),
https://blog.ucsusa.org/cecilia-moura/survey-shows-pathway-to-speeding-up-ev-adoption-in-rural-areas/.
569 Maria Cecilia Pinto de Moura, Survey Shows Pathway to Speeding Up EV Adoption in Rural Areas,
Union of Concerned Scientists (March 14, 2023), https://blog.ucsusa.org/cecilia-moura/survey-shows-
pathway-to-speeding-up-ev-adoption-in-rural-areas/.
570 Id.
7. Most PEV drivers purchase or plan to purchase another PEV, indicating high satisfaction.
The appeal of these beneficial PEV attributes is made clear from the fact that most PEV
buyers purchase another PEV for their next vehicle and through the ample available information
pointing to satisfied PEV drivers. As far back as almost a decade ago, Tesla's Model S had the
highest owner satisfaction of any vehicle in the U.S. market.571 A recent analysis of S&P Global
Mobility vehicle registration data found that roughly two-thirds of EV-owning households that
bought a new car in 2022 purchased another EV.572 Other surveys and analyses have found the
same. In 2021, Plug In America surveyed over 5,500 EV owners and more than 1,400 potential
EV purchasers and found that 90% of EV owners said that it was "likely" (13%) or "very likely"
(77%>) that their next vehicle purchase would be an EV.573 In Plug In America's most recent
survey (conducted between December 2022 and February 2023), again 90%> of EV owners said it
is "likely" or "very likely" that their next purchase will be another EV.574 Even as of January
2017, CARB found that over 10%> of recent PEV buyers were already driving their second or
subsequent PEV.575 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 175-176]
571 Consumer Reports, Tesla Model S Takes the Top Spot in Consumer Reports Car Owner-Satisfaction
Ratings (Nov. 21, 2013).
572 Joann Muller, Most Electric Car Buyers Don't Switch Back to Gas, Axios (Oct. 5, 2022),
https://www.axios.com/2022/10/05/ev-adoption-loyalty-electric-cars.
573 Plug In America, The Expanding EV Market: Observations in a Year of Growth 1,11 (Feb. 2022),
https://pluginamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2022-PIA-Survey-Report.pdf.
574 Plug In America, 2023 EV Driver Survey 1 (May 2023), https://pluginamerica.org/wp-
content/uploads/2023/05/2023-EV-Survey-Final.pdf.
575 CARB, California's Advanced Clean Cars Midterm Review, Appendix B: Consumer Acceptance of
Zero Emission Vehicles and Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles B-2 (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/2020-01/appendix_b_consumer_acceptance_ac.pdf.
As Forsythe et al. (2023) explain, "technology progress projections are key for future BEV
adoption projections used in policy planning and cost-benefit analyses."576 Here, it is clear that
technological progress is sufficient to support significant consumer acceptance of (and
satisfaction with) PEVs. Even considering consumer acceptance as a relevant and permissible
factor in EPA's analysis, EPA should enact standards consistent with Alternative 1 with
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increasing stringency after MY 2030. Consumer acceptance is not a barrier to PEV sales at a
pace consistent with this level of stringency, when desirable vehicles are available—as they are
expected to be—and purchasers have information about their benefits.577 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 176]
576 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 6.
577 EPA's approach to modeling consumer acceptance through the Global Change Analysis Model
("GCAM"), utilizing an S curve, while by no means the only approach to modeling consumer acceptance,
is a reasonable one. Specifically, as recent analyses show, GCAM is a random utility discrete choice model
equivalent to a logit model with a particular utility function form. Eric G. O'Rear et al., Projecting Vehicle
Sales: A Review of Light-Duty Vehicle Adoption Models, Rhodium Group 15-16 (Mar. 24, 2023),
https://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Projecting-Vehicle-Sales-A-Review-of-Light-Duty-Vehicle-
Adoption- Models.pdf.
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
EV Adoption Projections
Many organizations have made projections using a variety of models and methods to establish
forward-looking estimates of ZEV sales. All of the projections included were conducted after the
adoption of the Inflation Reduction Act and incorporate the sizable impact the legislation will
have on cost and access to charging infrastructure. The projections are from ICCT, Rhodium
Group, Energy Innovation, and Bloomberg NEF.106.107,108,109 The first three studies included
multiple scenarios. For this analysis the central scenario or one of the central scenarios was
chosen as the best representation of each study. The projections for ZEV adoption by 2030 range
from 32% to 58% of LDV sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 37]
106 Peter Slowik et al., Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act on Electric Vehicle Uptake in
the United States. 2023. The International Council on Clean Transportation,
https://theicct.org/publication/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23/]
107 John Larsen et al., A Turning Point for US Climate Progress: Assessing the Climate and Clean Energy
Provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act. 2022. Rhodium Group, https://rhg.com/research/climate-clean-
energy- inflation-reduction-act/. (Attachment AA).
108 Sara Baldwin and Robbie Orvis. Implementing the Inflation Reduction Act: A Roadmap for Federal
and State Transportation Policy. 2022. Energy Innovation, https://energyinnovation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/ll/Implementing-the-Inflation-Reduction-Act-A-Roadmap-For-Federal-And-State-
Transportation-Policy.pdf. (Attachment BB).
109 Ira Boudway. More Than Half of US Car Sales Will Be Electric by 2030. 2022. Bloomberg
Hyperdrive, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-20/more-than-half-of-us-car-sales-will-be-
electric-by-2030.
All of the above demonstrates EPA's projections of baseline levels of ZEV deployment are
reasonable (if not conservative) and that there are many factors that are accelerating the growth
of ZEV sales apart from EPA's standards. They also show that EPA's proposed standards are
reasonable and that even greater levels of reduction are possible (as we discuss below). Notably,
across all of the indicators we evaluated, manufacturer investments in vehicle and battery
manufacturing capacity show some of the highest levels of ZEV deployment, particularly in the
near term. This finding is consistent with historical precedent showing periods of rapid
technological change often occur more swiftly than models or secondary indicators are able to
predict. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 37]
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Organization: Exxon Mobil Corporation
Linked fuel and lifecycle vehicle C02 standards offer a preferred, technology-neutral policy
pathway relative to BEV-only mandates. A policy that aims to reduce GHG emissions from
existing fuels and that recognizes WTW emissions from new vehicles, can help retain consumer
choice for the type of vehicle they prefer to drive, would avoid overdependence on foreign
critical minerals, would retain high-paying jobs throughout the transportation sector, could grow
the role of agriculture in providing energy feedstocks, and ultimately, would be supported
through a credit-based system, not taxes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0632, p. 4]
ExxonMobil respectfully recommends that EPA consider the role it can play in developing
and implementing policy to reduce GHG emissions from both new and existing vehicles through
the development of WTW emission standards for new vehicles and complementary support for a
federal low carbon fuel standard. We would welcome the opportunity to collaborate with the
agency and share in greater detail our views on what a comprehensive policy approach might
look like. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0632, p. 4]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Ford is enthusiastic and optimistic about the ICE-to-ZEV transition, and we are already
delivering electrified light- and medium-duty EVs at scale. While we remain optimistic, we are
also mindful of the considerable challenges and uncertainties that lie ahead. The pace of
electrification has been and may continue to be limited by many factors and forces, many of
which are outside the control of vehicle manufacturers. These include the availability of critical
minerals for battery manufacturing, the need to allocate finite resources between EV programs
and efforts toward incremental reductions in emissions from ICE vehicles, consumer demand
especially as we proceed beyond early-adopters to the majority of new vehicle purchasers,
economic turbulence, geopolitical events, and, of course, electric vehicle charging
infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 2-3]
Limits on EV Growth
Ford is already delivering electrified light- and medium-duty EVs at scale. While we remain
optimistic that EVs will constitute a steadily growing portion of new vehicle sales in the US, we
are also mindful of the considerable challenges and uncertainties that will affect the rate of
growth. The pace of electrification has been and may continue to be limited by many factors and
forces, many of which are outside the control of vehicle manufacturers. A few deserve mention
here. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 6-7]
Consumer preference is difficult to predict out to 2032. While EV adoption is growing
quickly, and we are seeing enthusiasm for EVs among the early adopters, we cannot assume the
same enthusiasm from the early majority let alone the late majority. Market studies suggest many
people are interested in purchasing an EV, but not at any cost and not while charging
infrastructure remains at a nascent stage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 6-7]
Last, economic turbulence and geopolitical events will impact EV adoption rates over the
2027 - 2032 timeframe. At this time, automakers and regulators can only guess how and to what
extent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 8]
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These and other forces have and will continue to limit the growth of EV production and
consumer adoption, regardless of an automaker's commitment to electrification. A more
conservative path to achieve the proposed 2032 endpoint better accounts for these
considerations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 8]
Organization: GROWMARK, Inc.
Lack of EV Capability for Farmers
Current electric vehicles do not provide the capabilities that farmers rely on to carry out their
operations. According to a study recently released by the American Automobile Association
(AAA), the Ford F-150 Lightning saw its range decrease by almost a quarter when loaded close
to its maximum payload capacity.4 A gasoline-powered truck, however, would only lose 14
percent of its range with the same amount of weight, and of course it would be quicker and more
convenient to refuel.5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, p. 2]
4 American Automobile Association. (2023, June). Effect of payload on driving range of battery electric
truck, https://urldefense.com/v3/ https:/u7061146.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=4tNED-
2FM8iDZJQyQ53jATUZvOE03mirlE13vtAic917ghAOXNRXkwKaKICrDXA3ZoT75TOvo955EZ6-
2FJiQG-2FErJaPZeKHTyfflQJiv4TMR5A-3DMLSQ_wwmARy8TMTevifjaQtiXjzeH-
2FSc8WPX2ToRxYAJ5XFXCYIVurVZ- 2F7aCPZDngjq-
2BQuMDruqnM8cSNwQPzi5UIwwpztKldVzphs52jy6vxI2xgPnkdzJy3C9ftadJYj76WuUf2T26mkge
QA4pLiS2I3PjMzAEYZZu-2BUbgcPfolgmcVfQ7aEf7LxjMjPw-2B8WF3EQEdXTpy-
2BAUfR52wN4rM9lgx75Pxivc VYDED1 S55BpuarlzGYrR-2Bk3PvHnJeb3rGPLd5dXXuQ8SwSjo-
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sIEhfNe4_m8Dkjdh8iAFlUoJGGzPwlxORQOwI8glEedoHHou918NRN7$
5 Tucker, S. (2023, June 6). Study: EVs lose range to hauling, more than gas trucks. Kelly Blue Book.
https://www.kbb.com/car-news/study-evs-lose-range-to-hauling-more-than-gas-trucks/
Additionally, EVs will have worse results when it comes to towing than ICE vehicles. For
example, while an ICE Ford F-150 can tow up to 14,000 pounds, the EV Ford F-150 Lightning
has a max towing capacity of two tons less than that.6 Furthermore, testing of towing any
considerable weights with the EV truck resulted in dramatic decreases in range, up to a 70
percent decrease in one test.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, p. 2]
6 Brandt, E. (2022, August 18). Payload and towing capacity on electric vehicles. Kelly Blue Book.
https://www.kbb.com/car-news/how-far-can-an-electric-truck-tow/
7 Brandt, 2022.
These figures are simply not acceptable to farmers who rely on their vehicles to do their jobs.
Farmers use their trucks to take products to market, bring supplies to their fields, and move
livestock. Vehicles that have less capability than current ICE technology will lead to decreased
efficiency and increased cost at the farm gate, which will lead to further farm consolidation and
threaten our nation's food security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, p. 2]
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
I. Executive Summary
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HF Sinclair believes that such government policies must be technology-neutral and not
manipulate the energy market by picking winners and losers. EPA cannot and should not
promulgate inequitable regulations that mandate compliance through a single technology
pathway. Consumer choice must be allowed in order to drive vehicle manufactures, or original
equipment manufacturers ("OEMs"), to provide a fleet mix that meets emission limits sufficient
to improve air quality in a reliable and efficient manner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 1-
2]
Finally, EPA has not considered the foreseeable, indirect impacts the Proposed Rule will have
on ambient air quality. First, with the high purchase price of new PEVs, consumers will likely
hold on to their older, higher-emitting ICE vehicles to avoid the increased purchase price of a
PEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 9]
Setting aside the fact that the production capacity necessary to meet EPA's proposed adoption
rates is not available,62 EPA takes for granted that the average consumer cannot and that nearly
half of the population would not purchase a PEV. The average consumer cannot afford an
expensive, new PEV or is otherwise not willing to sacrifice the range and convenience provided
by an ICE vehicle—especially when the average EV is nearly $15,000 on average more than an
ICE vehicle and that cost is increasing.63 Consumer demands and willingness to purchase PEVs
are muted given the disparate range and cost differences.64 But EPA overinflates the potential
effect of the IRA tax incentives to change consumers' minds, especially because the new PEV
tax credit is limited to PEVs that meet certain domestic sourcing requirements and, as discussed
below, domestic sourcing of critical battery materials is not currently reliable or practical for a
vast majority of OEMs.65 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 14]
62 Hong Yang and Lewis Fulton, TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART D: TRANSPORT AND
ENVIRONMENT 118, "Decoding US investments for future battery and electric vehicle production" (May
2023) available at https://www.sciencedirect.eom/science/article/pii/S1361920923000901 ("By comparing
announced capacities to EV sales targets, we find that in the most ambitious scenario where US achieves
66% EV sales by 2030, the planned 5.1-million EV production falls short by over half; with tentative plans
included, the gap closes to 4.6 million. In a less rapid scenario (40% by 2030), tentative plans are sufficient.
Needed investments across these scenarios range from $20 to $143 billion, compared to current firm and
tentative commitments of $75 to $108 billion, respectively.").
63 See BrysonHull, BUSINESSWIRE, "Electric Vehicle Mandates Carry Major Price, Electricity Supply
Risks That Must Be Addressed to Avert Potential Harm" (Jun. 8, 2023) available at
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20230608005281/en/Electric-Vehicle-Mandates-Carry-Major-
Price- Electricity-Supply-Risks-That-Must-Be-Addressed-to-Avert-Potential-Harm.
64 Jack Ewing, THE NEW YORK TIMES, "Electric Cars Too Costly for Many, Even With Aid in Climate
Bill" (Aug. 8, 2022) available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/08/business/energy-
environment/electric-vehicles-climate-bill.html.
65 Ewing, supra n. 2 ('"Right now with our lack of capacity for materials, I don't think there is any product
that will meet that today,' Carla Bailo, president of the Center for Automotive Research in Ann Arbor,
Mich., said of the standards. "Tesla is probably close, but the rest of the manufacturers, no way.'").
e. EPA Fails to Consider Current PEV Market Demands
EPA improperly relied on the general characterization of recent years of the light-duty and
medium-duty market as supplemented by incentives in the BIL and IRA to support its
proposition that there will be a sufficiently rapid increase in EV market penetration to achieve
compliance with the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 14]
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As mentioned above, charging capability is a key apprehension for nearly half the U.S.
consumer market. 66 Importantly, successful implementation of the Proposed Rule depends on
consumer choice as much as depends on technological improvements. But, in California as an
example, consumer discontinuance occurs at a rate of 20% for plug-in hybrid electric and 18%
for PEVs—once again based on the dissatisfaction with the convenience or availability of
charging.67 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 14-16]
66 Phillipp Kampshoff, et al., McKinsey & Co., "Building the electric-vehicle charging infrastructure
America needs" (Apr. 18, 2022) available at https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-
insights/building-the- electric-vehicle-charging-infrastructure-america-needs.
67 See EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0077, Abstract (Content restricted for copyright), available at
https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0077.
Moreover, this high purchase price of new PEVs relative is an especially important
consideration, especially for low-income consumers. Although EPA concedes that the Proposed
Rule will result in "increases in upfront purchase costs [that] are likely to be of particular
concern to low-income households" EPA discounts this concern because of a hypothetical
anticipation that "automakers will continue to offer a variety of models at different price
points."68 EPA's next conclusion—that low-income households will save money long-term in
decreased fuel costs, will utilize the used-car market, and be cushioned by federal tax
incentives69—completely misses the mark and illustrates the vacuum in which EPA is proposing
these new standards. For example, the IRA tax credit for used cars would apply only to those
sold for $25,000 or less, but less than 20 percent of used PEVs fit that category today.70 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 14-16]
68 Proposed Rule at 29,344.
69 Id.
70 Ewing, supra n. 2.
The current market share illustrates this issue. Although EPA attempts to circumvent these
market realities by relying on the rapid increase in number of PEV models available in recent
years, the number of PEV models is an improper surrogate for the number of actual units sold
and in use.71 In reality, as EPA acknowledges, the facts show that in model year 2021, only
between 3 and 5% of all vehicles certified by the agency were electric (including hybrid).72
Thus, the ambitions of even the most aggressive OEM from an PEV adoption rate perspective
would require nearly exponential growth over each of the next seven years.73 There is no
support for concluding there will be substantial consumer adoption of PEVs to achieve the 40-
60% increase by 2030 projected by the Proposed Rule. This nearly 60% anticipated increase
would require a similar increase in adoption rates over the same seven year period. For
comparison, PEV sales increased from 0.2% to 4.6 over the ten year period between 2011 and
2021.74 EPA's overreliance on the BIL, IRA, and success of California's Advanced Clean Cars
II program further underscores the insufficiency of the Proposal's analysis, especially where it is
speculative at best whether the Advanced Clean Cars program will be active as currently
proposed during the MY27-32 timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 14-16]
71 See, e.g., Proposed Rule at 29,190.
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72 Proposed Rule at 29,189; Sebastian Blanco, Car And Driver, "Strict EPA Rules for 2027 - 2032
Vehicles Announced, Garnering a Range of Reactions (Apr. 13, 2023) available at
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a43546970/new-strict-epa-mpg-rules-for-2027-2032-vehicles/.
73 VOLVO GROUP, "Report on the first quarter 2023," available at
https://www.volvogroup.com/content/dam/volvo- group/markets/master/news/2023/apr/4519530-volvo-
group-ql-2023.pdf; TUBES AND LUBES DAILY, "Volvo launches electric truck with longer range in N.
America" (Jan. 2021) available at https://www.fuelsandlubes.com/volvo-launches-electric-truck-with-
longer-range-in-n- america/?mc_cid=bl24969b23&mc_eid=4a00dc8f80 (Volvo Trucks set target that half
of all trucks sold are electric by 2030); VOLVO GROUP, "Geared for Growth - Annual Report 2022,"
available at https://www.volvogroup.com/content/dam/volvo-group/markets/master/investors/reports-and-
presentations/annual- reports/AB-Volvo-Annual-Report-2022.pdf.
74 Javier Colato and Lindsey Ice, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Charging into the future: the transition to
electric vehicles" (Feb. 2023) available at https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-12/charging-into-the-
future-the-transition- to-electric-vehicles.htm.
f. EPA Fails to Properly Account for the Cost Impact of the Proposed Rule
As noted above, EPA must consider both feasibility and cost of compliance. In addition to the
infeasibility of delivering an electric grid that can support the PEVs that OEMs must now
produce, EPA has failed to adequately account for the cost of the Proposed Rule. Namely, EPA
has severely underestimated the cost impact on lower-income households. Given the low cost of
carbon-based transportation fuel, fluctuations in the electricity market, and higher insurance
costs, the "break-even" point for a higher-cost PEV - which may be upwards of $15,000 more
than its ICE counterpart - is not a mere few years as EPA predicts, but decades.75 And this
calculus is heavily dependent on the $7,500 tax credit provided by the IRA, which will change if
future policymakers eliminate it or otherwise require PEVs to compete in the market without a
subsidy.76 Not only will this hinder the widespread adoption of PEVs, but it will also drive up
the cost used car prices across the country as consumers hold off on buying new cars.77 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 16]
75 Id. at 5, 13.
76 This subsidy results in a cost-shifting mechanism from middle-class to wealthy families, id. at 14, which
may not be supported by future elected officials.
77 Id. at 6.
Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI)
The result of these massive investments in new and expensive technology, upgraded ICE
engine development, and construction of new testing facilities will undoubtedly result in higher
prices for new vehicles, which increases the cost of both new low-emission ICE vehicles and
ZEVs. These increased costs could lead consumers to reject purchasing new vehicles, extend the
life of the used car market, and reduce the environmental gains desired by the EPA with these
proposed regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 3]
Organization: Illinois Corn Growers Association
Thus, even if in the next eight years automakers, suppliers and retailers can retool their
businesses to supply an estimated 7.5 million new vehicles in 2032 and beyond, it is far from
assured that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
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-The marketplace is willing to buy that many vehicles in spite of their higher purchase cost,
charging requirements, limited utility and extremely high batery replacement costs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
Organization: Illinois Farm Bureau (IFB)
Illinois farmers share the societal goal of reduced greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions across
the broader economy and, specifically from energy production, transportation, and use by
society. IFB supports federal policies that accomplish these goals, but also believes it is critical
to preserve consumers' access to affordable, dependable, and efficient transportation. We are
advocates for clean air and believe the environment is in better condition than it was 50 years
ago, but we must also balance additional regulation and its impacts on our industries and
communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0532, p. 2]
Per IFB Policy, "[w]e support policies that keep agriculture viable and address the costs and
benefits of those programs using sound, economic analysis." USEPA's proposal inhibits the
marketplace from identifying the most efficient, lowest cost opportunities to reduce GHG
emissions from vehicles and restricts consumer choice. We are concerned that such a prescriptive
policy is not in the best interest of the consumer or the U.S. economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0532, p. 2]
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law
G. EPA Should Further Explain Its Choices Around Scrappage, Pass-Through, and
Vehicle Sales
EPA should provide additional explanation around certain modeling choices—namely
scrappage, pass-through, and sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 22-23]
"Scrappage" refers to the rate of which drivers discard old automobiles. OMEGA treats
scrappage as exogenous, meaning that the rate of scrappage does not depend on the Proposed
Rule's other effects. 144 This choice is reasonable: While economic theory and evidence suggest
that scrappage depends in part on the Proposed Rule's other effects (most notably the rate at
which the Proposed Rule affects new vehicle prices and sales), 145 this effect is very difficult to
model due to data limitations, and past attempts by EPA and NHTSA to model scrappage have
fared poorly. 146 Moreover, the increasing movement to electric vehicles provides even more
reason to treat scrappage as exogenous, as virtually no analysis on the scrappage of BEVs exists.
However, the Proposed Rule provides no discussion of scrappage or EPA's choice not to model
it. Particularly since EPA endogenously modeled scrappage in the 2020 Rule, the agency may
wish to explain its decision not to follow this approach in the Proposed Rule and a discussion of
how it may affect the results. Moreover, to the extent feasible, EPA should attempt to model
scrappage in future standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 22-23]
144 See RIA at 9-3 to 9-5.
145 See Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation: A Theory with Applications to Automobile
Emissions Control (1982); Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation: The Case of Auto
Emissions Standards, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 328 (1982); ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, THE EFFECTS OF
NEW-VEHICLE PRICE CHANGES ON NEW- AND USED- VEHICLE MARKETS AND SCRAPPAGE
3-6 to 3-11 & 5-7 to 5-7 to 5-12 (2021).
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146 Inst, for Pol'y Integrity, Comments on the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for
Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks 66-71 (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://policyintegrity.org/documents/Emissions_Standards_EPA_NHTSA_Comments_Oct2018.pdf.
"Pass-through" refers to the degree to which manufacturers pass on cost increases to
consumers. EPA in prior tailpipe rules has assumed 100% pass-through to consumers in the
vehicle market—meaning that every dollar of additional cost to the automaker is ultimately
borne by the purchaser. 147 EPA appears to repeat this assumption in the Proposed Rule. That
approach is also reasonable given consistency with the agency's prior approach and the very
limited economic evidence on vehicle pass-through. Nonetheless, that limited available evidence
(from a 2010 paper) indicates that pass-through in the vehicle market may be below 100%. 148
Accordingly, EPA should discuss and provide a rationale for its approach. EPA should also
support further research in this area, given its potential importance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0601, pp. 22-23]
147 E.g. 2020 Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 24,594-95.
148 Using regression analysis, Hellerstein and Villas-Boas (2010) find only partial pass through for the
vehicle industry with an average pass-through rate of 38%. Rebecca Hellerstein, & Sophia B. Villas-Boas,
Outsourcing and Pass-Through, 81 J. INT'LECON. 170, 175 (2010).
Finally, with regard to sales, EPA should clarify how OMEGA treats how producers expect
consumers to value fuel costs. Within the model, consumers and producers shape their preferred
new vehicle mix independently, 149 each informed by their unique perspectives on fuel costs:
Consumers weigh their expected fuel expenses, whereas producers consider how they think
consumers will weigh their expected fuel expenses. In the RIA, EPA explains that consumers are
assumed to factor in fuel costs of 12,000 miles annually for 2.5 years.150 However, the OMEGA
input files suggest that producers expect consumers to consider fuel costs up to 15,000 miles
annually. 151 Although this difference is not inherently problematic, especially if EPA posits
imperfect information between consumers and producers, 152 EPA should explain this
difference. This might also be a minor programming error, such that EPA intended for producers
to accurately peg consumer valuation of fuel costs at 12,000 miles annually. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0601, pp. 22-23]
149 The model then searches for solutions for a set of vehicle attributes, purchase prices, and quantities
such that the sales and production shares match.
150 RIA at 4-2.
151 This information is derived from the 'sales_share_params_ice_bev_pu_b0p4_klp0_x02031-
Cuv_b2p0_klp0_x02029_nu8p0-sdn_b0p4_klp0_x02020_nulp0_20230228.csv' file for consumers, and
the 'producer_generalized_cost-body_style_20220613.csv' file for producers, both located within the
'2023-03-14-22- 42-30-ld-central-run-to2055\all_inputs' folder, downloadable from the 'Light-duty central
case (zip)' section on EPA's website: https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-
engines/optimization-model-reducing-emissions-greenhouse-gases
152 EPA, OMEGA Documentation Sec. 4.3.2 (last revised May 8, 2023),
https://omega2.readthedocs.io/en/2.1.0/index,html#gl-label-producer-generalized-cost ("The producer, as
an independent decision-making agent, will not have perfect information about the internal consumer
decision process. Within the Producer Module, OMEGA allows the user to define the consumer decisions
from the producer's perspective, which may be different from (or the same as) the representation within the
Consumer Module.").
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Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
MARKET READINESS
The global transition to zero-emission vehicles is accelerating. The U.S. is the third largest
electric vehicle market, behind China and Europe. In 2022, new U.S. plug-in electric vehicle
sales reached nearly 1 million units, representing over 7% of new light-duty vehicle sales. 1 This
growth is expected to continue, as evidenced by the more than $1.2 trillion in announced
automaker spending on electric vehicles, widespread consumer demand, and billions of dollars in
new federal tax credits, incentives, and investments.2 Many electric vehicles have multi-month
long wait times, indicating that demand is outpacing supply, and consumer research surveys
show that demand for BEVs in the United States continues to increase and that 30% of licensed
drivers aren't even considering gasoline vehicles for their next purchase or lease.3 Substantial
public and private sector investments and state and federal policies have primed the market for a
rapid shift to electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 6]
1 Based on data from EV-Volumes. (2023). https://www.ev-volumes.com/datacenter/
2 Lienert, P. (2022, October 25). Exclusive: Automakers to double spending on EVs, batteries to $1.2
trillion by 2030. Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-automakers-double-spending-evs-
batteries-12-trillion-by- 2030-2022-10-21/
3 Kiai, E. (2023, May 6). Waiting times for new electric car deliveries down by 42% since October peak.
Electrifying, https://www.electrifying.com/blog/article/waiting-times-for-new-electric-car-deliveries-down-
by-42-since-october- peak; Consumer Reports (2023). Automakers must increase production of electric
vehicles or risk losing customers, new analysis finds.
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/press_release/new-analysis-of-consumer-ev- demand/
Organization: Jeremy Michalek et al.
The EPA assesses the potential for future demand for electric vehicles by first simulating a
"No Action" scenario, representing a future scenario without the proposed policy but accounting
for other policies such as the IRA. They then simulate a future scenario that includes the
additional effects of the proposed policy. In both cases, the consumer demand model's
parameters (the "share weights," which we refer to as alternative specific constants to be
consistent with the discrete choice literature) are calibrated so that future shares in the "No
Action" scenario match those projected in an IHS report (Fiske et al., 2021), resulting in the
projections summarized in Figure 1. We compare these projections to new results from our
research based on an empirical investigation of (1) past trends in consumer preferences and (2)
expected technology trends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 4]
[See original for graph titled "Graphical summary of EPA's assessment of expected BEV
adoption by vehicle class in the proposed rule (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2023)"]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 4]
1.1 Cars and SUVs
In an attached study, published this year in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
we compare results from a discrete choice survey experiment conducted with over 1500 people
in 2020-2021 with those of a similar survey conducted in 2012-2013 (Forsythe et al., 2023a).
This experiment importantly investigates the likelihood of mainstream U.S. new vehicle
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consumers choosing BEVs, where our sample is weighted to be representative of the U.S. new
car and SUV buying population across household income, age, education, gender, marital status,
and household size. We find that technological improvements in battery electric vehicles (BEVs)
- particularly increasing range of these vehicles - have driven increases in consumers' likelihood
of choosing these vehicles over their conventional gasoline vehicle counterparts. We find that the
consumer preference parameters defining what consumers want in vehicle characteristics and
what they are willing to pay for have not changed (in to- day's dollars) enough to identify
statistically significant trends over this 8 year period. This implies that consumer preferences
(independent of technology improvements) have been relatively static. The findings suggest that
consumers are buying more electric vehicles today because the technology has improved, and
that as BEV technologies continue to improve in the future, it will further increase consumer
likelihood of choosing BEVs over conventional vehicle counterparts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0705, p. 4]
Using the consumer preferences estimated from the choice experiment, we examine
consumers' likelihood of purchasing a BEV when choosing between two vehicles: one that has a
conventional gasoline powertrain and one that has a battery electric powertrain, but otherwise
have very similar characteristics (such as the BMW i4 and the BMW 4-Series Gran Coupe, and
the Nissan Leaf and the Nissan Versa). We find that, if consumer prefer-ence parameters
continue at today's values and if the technology for range and cost improve to levels predicted by
the National Academies (NASEM, 2021), then consumers will become roughly indifferent, on
average, between electric and gasoline versions of several car and SUV models by 2030 (see
Figure 2 from Forsythe et al. (2023a)). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 5]
We further simulate market shares for BEVs across the full U.S. new car and new SUV
markets. We find that in a case where BEVs are equally available as conventional gasoline
vehicles (every conventional gasoline vehicle has a counterpart BEV with the same body style,
brand, and other characteristics important to consumers), BEV technology improvements follow
those projected by the National Academies (NASEM, 2021), and consumer preference
parameters remain steady at today's values, we find that simulated BEV market shares of both
new cars and new SUVs would be approximately 50% by 2030 (see Figure 3 from (Forsythe et
al., 2023a)). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 5]
Our findings support that large increases in consumer demand for BEVs in the near future is
feasible. The research suggests that mainstream consumer demand for BEVs is likely to sharply
increase due to expected BEV technology improvements alone. It also supports that BEV
demand could grow high enough by 2030 so that BEVs become the majority of new passenger
cars, and SUVs nearly the majority, through expected BEV technology improvements and equal
availability of BEVs and conventional vehicles. It is important to note that these findings do not
incorporate the reduced cost of maintenance and repair or the cost of at-home charger
installation. If the net balance of these provides cost savings to consumers as the EPA predicts,
then we would expect consumer demand for BEVs would be even larger than predicted in our
study. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 5]
The proposed EPA rule may further increase consumer demand for BEVs trends by (1)
encouraging automakers to shift price margins to encourage more BEV sales, (2) encouraging
automakers to reduce gasoline vehicle offerings in favor of increasing BEV offerings, (3)
encouraging automakers to invest in electrification technology advancement, potentially
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exceeding National Academy projections, (4) triggering network effects, such as vehicle buyers
being more likely to purchase a BEV as they know more friends and family who own them, and
(5) encouraging other efforts - including advertising, dealership practices, and other actions - that
would increase consumers' likelihood of purchasing BEVs over conventional vehicles. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 5]
In a working paper, we conducted a similar discrete choice experiment of 52 pickup truck
owners across the U.S. to characterize their preferences. This sample represented a range of
pickup truck consumer household incomes, ages, education, gender, and household size and was
weighted to be representative of the U.S. new pickup truck buying population. We find that most
pickup truck owners (78%) are open to purchasing electric pickup trucks if the technology
provides sufficient performance attributes, including range, operating cost, towing capacity and
payload capacity. We find that the largest group, representing 43% of our consumers, choices
between a BEV or conventional gasoline pickup truck are driven primarily by what the vehicle
can do, rather than its powertrain type (we call this group "tech indifferent" because the don't
value the powertrain technology in and of itself, only what it can deliver). Another group,
representing an additional 13% cared about payload capacity and operating cost, but did not
otherwise value the powertrain technology in and of itself. 17% of pickup truck owners were
"BEV enthusiasts" who were willing to pay significantly more for a BEV pickup truck than a
conventional gasoline pickup truck, even if they had identical characteristics (including operating
costs, towing, payload, and brand). We find that 22% of pickup truck owners are strongly
opposed to all types of electrification, including hybrid, plug-in hybrid and battery electric
pickup trucks. For this group, a substantial change in consumer preferences would be necessary
for the group to opt for electric pickup trucks over gasoline pickup trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0705, p. 8]
We simulate market shares for BEVs across the full U.S. new pickup truck market. We find
that in a case where BEV pickup trucks are equally available and diverse as conventional
gasoline pickup trucks (every conventional gasoline and diesel truck has a counterpart BEV with
the same towing, payload, brand, and other characteristics important to consumers), BEV
technology improvements follow those projected by the National Academies (NASEM, 2021),
and consumer preference parameters remain steady at today's values, where all gasoline or diesel
pickup trucks offer a BEV powertrain option and technology trends match those suggested by the
National Academies (NASEM, 2021), we estimate that, despite the notable group opposed to
electrification of pickup trucks, over half of pickup truck owners would choose the electric
powertrain by 2030 (Figure 4), exceeding EPA's assessment of expected BEV pickup truck
adoption in 2030 (Figure 1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, p. 8]
Implications for EPA. Our findings support that large increases in consumer demand for BEV
pickup trucks in the near future is feasible. The research suggests that mainstream consumer
demand for new BEV pickup trucks is likely to sharply increase due to expected BEV
technology improvements in the future. It also supports that, although some pickup truck owners
are strongly opposed to purchasing BEV pickup trucks, the majority of pickup truck owners
value BEV pickup trucks equally to conventional gasoline pickup trucks as long as they have
sufficient performance characteristics. The research supports that consumer de- mand for BEV
pickup trucks may exceed EPA's scenario of BEV pickup truck adoption in 2030. It is important
to note that our study does not incorporate the reduced cost of main- tenance and repair or the
cost of at-home charger installation. If the net balance of these provides cost savings to
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consumers as the EPA predicts, then we would expect consumer demand for BEVs would be
even larger than predicted in our study. The proposed EPA rule may further increase consumer
demand for BEV trucks by (1) encouraging automak- ers to shift price margins to encourage
more BEV sales, (2) encouraging automakers to reduce gasoline pickup truck offerings in favor
of increasing BEV pickup truck offerings, (3) encouraging automakers to invest in electrification
technology advancement, potentially ex- ceeding National Academy projections for pickup
trucks, (4) triggering network effects, such as pickup truck buyers being more likely to purchase
a BEV as they know more friends and family who own them, and (5) encouraging other efforts -
including advertising, dealership practices, and other actions - that would increase consumers'
likelihood of purchasing BEV pickup truck over conventional trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0705, pp. 8-9]
[See original for Figure 4, titled "Hypothetical share of BEV pickup trucks for model year
2020 and 2030"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0705, pp. 8-9]
Organization: John Graham
Tables 82 and 83 in the Preamble (page 29329) show EPA's projected market penetrations for
strong HEVs drops to virtually zero in both the proposed standards and the No Action case. The
preamble states, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 12]
"While manufacturers may in fact choose HEVs, the modeling indicates they are less cost
effective than the BEVs which have been subsidized by the IRA and emit 0 g/mi tailpipe C02."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 12]
"In the proposed standards case, the steady decline in projected HEVs is primarily a result of
continued projected reductions in battery costs which make BEVs increasingly more cost
effective relative to HEVs." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 12]
If the results of EPA's OMEGA modeling were correct, we should already observe HEVs
weakening in the marketplace. While the proposed rule projects penetration of virtually zero
hybrids in 2032,10 the real world reveals hybrids flourishing in the marketplace. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 12]
10 Tables 13-65 through 13-94 in the DRIA indicate that 100% of market share is comprised of Turbol2,
ATK, and BEV technologies for all cases except for Alterative I, where 100% of market share includes 6%
strong hybrids.
EPA's own analyses confirm the recent large increase in hybrid market share. Section 3.1.1.2
Hybrid Electric Technologies in the DRIA (page 3-3) states:
"Hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) were first introduced in the U.S. marketplace in model year
2000 with the Honda Insight. As more models and options were introduced, hybrid production
increased to 3.8 percent of all vehicles in model year 2010, before declining somewhat over the
next several years. However, in model year 2021 hybrid production reached a new high at 9.3
percent and is projected to reach 10.1 percent in model year 2022, as shown in Figure 3-2 (U.S.
EPA 2022)." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 12-13]
"The growth of hybrids in the pickup vehicle type is largely due to the introduction of "mild"
hybrid systems that are capable of regenerative braking and many of the same functions as other
hybrids but utilize a smaller battery and an electrical motor that cannot directly drive the vehicle.
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These mild hybrids account for about a third of hybrid production in model year 2021." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 12-13]
Against this recent rapid increase in hybrid sales, note that OMEGA forecasts only 4%
hybrids in 2027 for the No Action scenario (preamble Table 83) and 3% for the Proposed
Standards (preamble Table 82). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 12-13]
Organization: KALA Engineering Consultants
Comment 5. The Law of Unintended Consequences or Reactions
A. We believe public sentiment toward the obvious potential results of adoption of the
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR- 2022-0829 rulemaking of "forcing" manufacturers to
predominately produce BEVs in order to meet the proposed standards may well have a
host of unintended consequences.
Despite the glowing polling results reported in the Federal Register rulemaking document
regarding eager acceptance of BEVs and polls of PHEV and BEV owners that would be willing
to purchase such vehicles again, we believe that most of those respondents fall into several
categories such as 'Early Adopters,' electric car zealots and wealthy people who can afford
BEVs and want to impress their friends and neighbors with how "Green they are. Seriously, a
person who buys an obscenely ostentatious Lucid 1,000 horsepower electric vehicle cannot be
considered representative of the majority of people who will be presented with BEVs as,
essentially, their only choice in new car showrooms in a few years. We think there may well be
elderly people who buy a new car after 2027 that will get the BEV home and be wondering,
"Where do I put in the gas for this thing?" [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
We looked at several polls, as did several other commenters, but the one we chose to discuss
here has international representation in several developed countries in Europe as well as the US.
The poll was conducted by UK-based Kantar Public in their Journal- 04 publication of polling
data on public attitudes towards the environment, sustainability, and climate change. If you go to
ResearchGate and request the actual PDF of the research, you will get the graphics and
discussion we are about to share with EPA.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/355734467_European_attitudes_to_climate_change_i
mplication sforcitizensinstitutionsandgovernments [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
54-60]
The Guardian also published excerpts from the polling in 10 countries here:
https://www.theguardian.eom/environment/2021/nov/07/few-willing-to-change-lifestyle-
climate-survey [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
From those sources we present the second of two graphics below from the survey and then
comment on the results. The most interesting results we found were from the following question
"How would you rate in terms of importance, the following measures aimed at preserving the
environment and the planet?: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
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Replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy - 45% say important Reducing people's energy
consumption - 32% say important Favoring the use of public transport over cars - 25% say
important And most pertinent to this comment's discussion: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617,
pp. 54-60]
Banning fossil fuel vehicles - 22% say important [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-
60]
[See original attachment for poll on how people ranked, in terms of importance, the following
measures aimed at preserving the environment and the planet] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617,
pp. 54-60]
Only 22% felt that banning fossil fuel vehicles (22%) was important to preserve the planet.
We would characterize this level of response to that question as dismal at best, people do not
want to use electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
In the US, Transportation accounts for slightly more Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions than
does electricity generation. However, in most other large emitter countries, the opposite is true
with Electricity generation being far greater than Transportation. This is especially true of China
(the largest global GHG emitter), where much of the country is still rural in nature, most
electrical generation is by exceedingly dirty coal-fired power plants and the thought of a personal
vehicle being a birthright is a foreign (i.e. US) notion. The most frightening aspect of what we
call the "Lifestyle Gap" is the desire by most people in other countries to have a similar lifestyle
to what they observe in the US. Having personal transportation (something bigger and more
enclosed than a motor scooter) is very high on that desire list. That implies that as other countries
catch up to a US lifestyle, Transportation GHG emissions will continue to rise from that sector.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
Most other countries that do not have oil reserves, look to the US for what to do about
Climate Change. The reasoning goes, the US is the most technically advanced country in the
world and whatever solutions the US comes up with must be the "correct" solutions. These facts
make it doubly important for the US to act as the leader of the world on Climate Change with
truly "correct" and nearly universally applicable solutions. Yet, we do not have a set of National
Climate Change Solution Plans that the Federal Government has endorsed as policy and has
committed funding and regulations to implement. So far, there have been "Band Aid" measures
on Transportation GHG emissions such as the Biden plan to place electric vehicle charging
stations all across the country, a partial solution that KALA disagrees with, not on the viability of
electric vehicle charging stations, but the lack of focus on deployment in locations that
desperately need reductions in emitted vehicle pollution (these are known as EPA's
nonattainment areas such as large cities where most of the pollution that creates the
nonattainment condition is from vehicles). The opposite is true in China where big city pollution
is mostly from nearby electrical generation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
These dichotomies between nations and their levels of technology and emission profiles also
makes it important for the solutions developed by the US be largely applicable to nations with
lower levels of technology and wealth. The battery electric vehicle solution so often touted as
"THE" solution to transportation GHG emissions, will NEVER apply to the hundreds of millions
of motor bikes, motor scooters, motor trikes, motorized boats and various other transport modes,
which all use petroleum-based liquid fuels, found all across Asia, India, Indonesia, the
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Philippines, the Middle East, Africa and South America. Many countries that are considered
"Developed" (I'm thinking Russia and the former USSR vassal states) may not have citizenry
that can easily afford a transition to an entirely different vehicle propulsion method, such as
battery electric, and will struggle to maintain their existing fleets of vehicles that still use fossil
petroleum fuels. In fact, the less developed and lower income nations around the world will balk
at implementing the so-called "solution" that seems to be prevalent in the thinking of the United
States for Transportation GHG emissions, i.e. Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV). Oil producing
states, such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, where oil income is the principal national revenue will
be outright hostile to the notion of changing the vehicle propulsion method. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
In response to the Kantar polling as to why they would be hesitant to make drastic changes to
help with Climate Change: "I need more resources and equipment from public authorities"
(69%) together with "I can't afford to make those efforts" (60%) were major responses. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
Any policy makers who see these results, especially in the US, MUST rethink where policy
making should go on Transportation GHG reductions. When someone says, "I can't afford to
make those efforts" what are they most likely talking about? In our view, for most people, they
are referring to the cost of replacing their current gasoline vehicle with an electric vehicle. In the
US, vehicles are usually the second most costly item of personal ownership, with a home being
in first place. For those who cannot afford home ownership, a large percentage of the Democratic
Party's base, a vehicle is their most costly personal possession. If those individuals are middle to
lower income, their budgets are usually very tight and the thought of being forced to purchase a
vehicle that is 20% to 50% more costly than a gasoline vehicle is generally out of the question
even with generous tax rebates that actually mostly apply to more wealthy individuals with high
personal incomes. We believe that they will instead, choose to buy a replacement vehicle, when
needed, from the existing stock of gasoline-burning used cars for as long as they can. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
This analysis brings up the issue of how little time we have left to actually make the most
significant changes to GHG emissions. We simply do not have time for people to run out of
gasoline-burning used car choices, which could amount to 20 years or more, for them to finally
buy the supposed "solution" to transportation GHG emissions, a BEV. Related to this lower to
middle income demographic is the issue of their vehicle being able to provide "Dual Duty." A
Dual Duty vehicle is one that can provide short-distance (short time frame) transportation for
daily needs such as grocery getting and the back and forth to work commute AND provide a way
to take long trips for such things as vacations and family gatherings. Let me relate an interesting
response to a question I posed to a Nissan representative at a Denver car show about the Leaf
All-Electric vehicle (BEV). I asked what about trips up into places like Wyoming where they
will not be welcoming to electric vehicles in that oil producing state? Incredulously, the Nissan
rep said, "Oh, you don't use the Leaf for longer trips - you use your 'Other car' for that." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
Such a response shows an unbelievable elitism about lower cost BEVs, such as the Leaf and
the Chevrolet Bolt, that the owner of such BEVs will have the financial means to have two or
more vehicles, one of which is capable of long-distance trips without the bother of waiting 3 to 7
hours for a recharge after the car's battery is exhausted. This has become known as "Recharge
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Anxiety." It is a real thing and represents the problem all BEVs have in public perception of:
What happens when you run out of battery charge on a long trip or in a traffic jam? Will it take
hours to recharge even if I can find an open and working recharge outlet? Why would I ever try
to take a BEV on a long trip when I can "recharge" (i.e. refuel) my gasoline vehicle in less than
10 minutes? BEV makers have tried to address this problem, Tesla for example, by providing a
Supercharging option at special recharge stations designed to recharge a half-discharged battery
in about 15 minutes. But, even Tesla admits that rapid recharge is not good for the individual
cells in the battery pack and should not be done too often. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
54-60]
B. If the EPA attempts to "force" people into BEVs, there may be an unexpected and
unforeseen political reaction among people who have traditionally been the base of the
Democratic Party who may switch their political allegiance to the other Party who won't force
them to drive BEVs.
So, what choices do the lower and middle income people that comprise a large percentage of
the Democratic Party base have when it comes to the supposed Transportation GHG emission
"solution," the BEV. The answer is not much, because for the ONE car they can afford, they
need the Dual Duty vehicle that is represented best by a gasoline-fueled vehicle that can be
refueled on longer trips in less than 10 minutes and then they are on their way again. If the
Democratic party at the behest of a Democratic president through a regulatory agency attempts to
force those people to purchase and deal with all the recharge problems that BEVs have, they
might well not be Democrats anymore. Republicans will NEVER support forcing people to buy
BEVs (they are in the back pockets of the oil companies after all) and that may well drive people
who were reliable Democratic voters into the Republican camp over this single issue. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
So, the question to EPA administrators is simple. Do you want to risk political reprisals in the
form of election of Republican legislators and the head of the executive branch, the president,
because you felt this was your chance to "force" the adoption of a vehicle type, the BEV, down
peoples throats that, frankly, we believe we have shown conclusively will not perform the GHG
reduction function that the EPA claims it will. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
Didn't you see what happened when Donald Trump was president and the EPA was rendered
powerless and, now that the Supreme Court is constituted the way it is with ultra-conservative
judges, how do you think court cases that make it to SCOTUS will turn out for EPA on this and
other regulatory Docket issues? Now look, we are not saying to the EPA to be fearful and hunker
down and not do anything about GHG and criteria pollutants from transportation. PLEASE
review our set of alternatives in Comment Section 4, which we think makes more sense,
especially from a GHG reduction standpoint than trying to "force" adoption of BEVs into the US
fleet at unreasonable numbers. Making people buy and drive very different vehicle types may not
be the answer, especially for GHG reductions. We think the "Fuel Change Out" approach with
high GHG reduction potentials and better criteria emissions profiles is a better way to meet the
needs for health risk reductions and more importantly, as we have argued above, for dramatic
reduction in GHG emissions by substituting fossil carbon containing fuels for carbon-neutral
fuels made from biomass. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
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We have the technology to make these carbon-neutral fuels that come very close to the
properties of gasoline and dramatically reduce GHG emissions if we just have the will and
foresight to do so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
C. The consequences that may arise from full implementation of Docket ID No. EPA-
HQ-OAR- 2022-0829 rulemaking standards and requirements may produce something that
could be described as a quiet rebellion against what many people would view as government
overreach via regulation.
To give you a better "feel" or Flavor for the reaction to the docket's provisions, we would
invite EPA to look at a YouTube video by long-time YouTube maven on automotive issues,
Scotty Kilmer. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j 1R0wTBsK3I [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 54-60]
In this video presentation, Kilmer starts out blaming President Biden and by association the
Democratic Party as the villains who want to take your gasoline car away from you and limit
your buying choices in the future. Here are some of the comments elicited from the video with
many of the obvious Trumpian attitudes filtered out: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-
60]
"How do we do this when 90% of Americans cannot afford a new car?"
"As someone who has never bought a new car. I can assure you I will never be buying a used
electric car." "We can barely get enough minerals to power our phones, and now we want 60%of
cars to run on batteries."
"They can build all they want, but you cannot force people to buy them."
"Just where am I supposed to get $61,500 for a car? That is absolutely insane! This is
legislation through regulation. Who voted for those EPA bureaucrats? There is exactly ZERO
percent probability that I will buy an EV." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
"This is the closest thing to government mandating what people get to choose and eliminating
a free market based on consumer demand."
"We just need a group of people with the know-how and the financial ability to sue the EPA
to stop infringing on our rights to purchase what we want. They're just basically taking our
freedom away through regulation without actually saying we don't have the freedom to choose
what we want."
"Thanks to Scotty's advice we just bought a 2023 Camry V-6. We're good for 20 years or
300,000 miles." "I have a Tesla but forcing everyone to get an EV is insane. Many don't have
the capability to charge at home and a lot of homes need panel upgrades to make room for a EV
charger. All of this costs a lot of money for people to afford." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617,
pp. 54-60]
"In our office people are buying hybrid cars instead of EV cars. It make more sense, 500
miles of range, fill the tank in 6 minutes and probably last longer and they are about the same
price or less and are proven technology."
"This sounds like used vehicle prices are going to skyrocket worse than before - probably not
a good sign for those of us stuck as pizza drivers."
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"The EPA doesn't have the authority to change the law or the regulations. The people through
congress will make that decision thank you."
"American people remember you have the power to choose your president and who makes the
laws, if it's affecting you who cannot afford to change your car then get someone who sides with
the working classes and will help you make your own choices, the fact that making batteries
pollutes more than gasoline engines produce doesn't matter to these politicians who don't know
what it's like to have to work for a living."
"Is it at all possible for congress to stop this insane man [presumably Pres. Biden]? [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
So, does the EPA get some of the rebellion flavor in those comments? It is our opinion that
one of the unintended consequences of implementing this Docket may be to create a rebellion of
sorts among millions of Americans. We think that people may decide to hold on to their gasoline
vehicles much longer than they otherwise might. We also think that once BEVs are about the
only vehicles on dealer's showroom floors, the price of used gasoline vehicles may well increase
dramatically. If that happens, millions of low income people may be priced out of the used car
market. What may happen is "Cubanization" of the US used car market. Cuba has long been
banned from importing vehicles from the US and elsewhere. With the parts Cubans are able to
smuggle in and automotive machine shops making some hard-to-get parts, the car owners in that
country are driving around in cars from the Fifties and Sixties with no end in sight. Fortunately,
Cuba is a small island, but the idea is that there could be new "cottage industries" like the ones in
Cuba pop up all across our country that would be mechanics, auto machine shops, and detailers
and upholsterers who keep those old cars in good shape. The very same thing could conceivably
happen here in a "Resistance" movement against the regulations the EPA is advocating for.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
The temporal upshot of these possible consequences is that the gasoline part of the US fleet
will continue to use gasoline and spew the usual GHG and criteria pollutants as time goes by.
The problems we foresee are that as engines in those older vehicles that people in the Resistance
Movement are holding onto will get tired and transmissions get less efficient, the amount of
pollutants and GHGs could go up - exactly what the efforts to implement these new regulations
are meant to avoid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
George H. W. Bush stated it best when he said, "The American life-style is non-negotiable."
And in this context, that means that stubborn Americans are not going to be told what they can
and can't drive and they will resist what they might view as an intrusive government trying to
alter their "life-style." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
3. Consumers are not willing to accept the Proposed Rule's electrification mandate.
All of the above questions whether it is possible to make EVs in the numbers the Proposed
Rule dictates. Assuming the Agency could explain away those concerns, another important
aspect of the problem would persist: Consumers will not buy that many EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0649, p. 15]
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The entire proposal depends on increased—much increased—EV demand. And demand
undoubtedly is growing. But it is not likely that sales will "rapidly grow" enough that 67% of
new passenger cars, trucks, and SUVs will be electric in the next handful of years. 88 Fed. Reg.
at 29,189, 29,329. After all, EVs comprised under 6% of the market last year. Sebastian Blanco,
Strict EPA Rules for 2027-2032 Vehicles Announced, Garnering a Range of Reactions, Car and
Driver (updated Apr. 13, 2023), https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a43546970/new-strict-epa-
mpg-rules-for-2027-2032-vehicles/. Taking another 60% of the market by model year 2032 is
unrealistic. Consumers' "vehicles are near and dear to their hearts," so "[f]or most people,"
EPA's manipulation of the new-vehicle market "could be really problematic." David Ferris,
Gasoline car bans: EV savior or 'stupid' idea?, E&ENews (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://bit.ly/43PIP8I. A March 2023 Gallup survey undercuts EPA's market assumptions, too:
Only 12% of U.S. adults are "seriously considering" buying an EV, while 41% "unequivocally"
say they would not consider buying one. Megan Brenan, Most Americans Are Not Completely
Sold on Electric Vehicles, Gallup (Apr. 12, 2023),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/474095/americans-not-completely-sold- electric-vehicles.aspx. Add
in recent cuts on tax credits for electric-car buyers, and the indications that the Proposed Rule
relies on wildly inaccurate demand projections keep growing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649,
p. 15]
Organization: Matthew DiPaulo
My company produces motor oil for passenger car vehicles with proprietary formulations
which exceed industry specifications, improve fuel economy, reduce emissions, and can be used
in hybrid vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1514, p. 1]
The premature rush to transition the U.S. vehicle fleet to EV's will reduce my sales. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1514, p. 1]
The large-scale shift to electric vehicles, which would comprise two-thirds of all new-car
sales in the U.S. by 2032 under this proposal, will hurt workers, small businesses, and consumers
while doing little to help the environment. The proposed rule would lead to fewer vehicle choices
for individuals and families, reducing the selection of vehicles that fit their household budgets
and unique needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1514, p. 1]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
The proposed rule is the most stringent light duty vehicle regulation that EPA has
promulgated to date. The electrification and carbon reduction goals are incredibly challenging
and will require not just a coordinated effort to achieve but also solutions addressing consumer
demand, affordability, charging network, power grid capacity, rare earth mineral availability, and
striking the right balance regarding China policy [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, p. 2]
Summary
Mazda is proud of its heritage and contributions to personal mobility, and we celebrated our
100th anniversary in 2020. Mazda has also long been an engineering leader known for
innovative powertrains like the rotary engine and Skyactiv technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0595, pp.3-4]
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We look at EPA's NPRM and its preferred option through the lens of a company that is
already working towards an electrified future. It's not a matter of if this transformation will
happen, but when and how. Mazda, like the rest of the industry, faces many challenges: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, pp. 3-4]
- Will charging infrastructure be sufficient?
- Can the electric grid handle the increased demands?
- How will EV incentives on the federal and state level impact this shift? [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0595, pp.3-4]
- Will suppliers be able to develop and produce components like batteries (that currently
require critical minerals, many from China) quickly enough and in enough volume?
- How might future laws or regulations in trade and re-shoring impact our ability to meet
goals?
- Are consumers ready and willing to move away from "tried and true" internal combustion
engines in numbers sufficient to meet these goals?
- Can OEMs remain sufficiently profitable to fuel the transition to EVs? [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0595, pp.3-4]
Mazda strongly requests that EPA take these considerations into account and make necessary
adjustments to the proposed rule as it works towards a Final Rule. We feel the Final Rule should
have more realistic targets and associated ramp ups, include PHEVs, and adopt CARB's current
LEV IV for criteria emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, pp. 3-4]
Organization: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
There is strong and growing demand for EVs in Minnesota, especially as the variety of EV
options grows. During our Clean Cars Minnesota rulemaking, we heard from Minnesotans that
demand for EVs was outstripping supply - Minnesotans were seeking EVs and sitting on long
waitlists or going out of state to obtain them. EV sales in Minnesota increased by more than 2.5
times between 2020 and 2022.5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, p. 3]
5 Alliance for Automotive Innovation, 2023, Advanced Technology Sales Dashboard, retrieved June 14,
2023. https://www.autosinnovate.org/resources/electric-vehicle-sales-dashboard
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
To determine a realistic maximum volume of EVs the market can support for each of the
model years covered by the rule, we believe EPA should consider certain critical factors. Among
these factors, we believe EPA must make a thorough and realistic year-by-year assessment of
key factors like projected battery costs, projected supply of battery critical-minerals, projected
residential and public charging infrastructure availability, projected electrical grid capacity, and
consumer acceptance of BEV technology in the broader arena. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682,
p. 2]
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Organization: National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) et al.
Renewable fuels such as ethanol materially lower gasoline's carbon footprint. If properly
incentivized, these technologies' capability to reduce emissions can continue to grow alongside
other decarbonization technologies such as clean electricity. Pursuing one solution does not
require abandoning others. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 1-2]
As articulated in this letter, and in our associations' respective comments in response to the
Proposal, we are concerned that EPA is pursuing a single technology as the solution to
decarbonize light-duty transportation. The speed at which the Agency appears to anticipate the
market and consumers will transition to electric vehicles is divorced from our members'
assessment of reality. The Proposed Rule does not appreciate the market obstacles associated
with such a massive transition in consumer behavior. It also abandons proven decarbonization
technologies, such as higher-octane liquid fuels, that can deliver material emissions reductions
using existing infrastructure, existing vehicles, and working with consumers' existing behavior.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 1-2]
Our associations support the Agency's stated goal of improving the emissions consequences
of over-the-road transportation. The Proposed Rule's approach toward realizing that objective,
however, is flawed. A technology-neutral approach to transportation decarbonization will help to
mitigate costs, promote innovation, and address the practical challenges associated with
electrification. All fuels and technologies should be treated equally within the context of
emissions standards. The Proposal does not do this, but instead artificially tilts the scale towards
electric vehicles ("EVs") by only accounting for emissions from one segment of the value chain:
vehicle tailpipes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 1-2]
Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
NADA has long supported continuous vehicle emissions improvements that are
technologically achievable and affordable for household and commercial new vehicle customers.
As noted above, NADA's franchised dealer members are "all-in" with selling and servicing the
new EVs being produced by the OEMs they represent. In fact, nationwide, NADA expects
franchised dealers to spend some $5 billion installing EV chargers, buying EV-related
equipment, parts, and tools, and investing in EV training for sales and service personnel. As
evidenced by these investments and by the EV-related activities at the 2022 and 2023 NADA
Shows,22 America's new motor vehicle dealers recognize their importance to the broad, mass
market adoption of EVs. However, they also are concerned that EPA's proposal could undermine
that adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 4]
22 See Exhibit A: "Everything Electric" at NADA Show 2022-2023.
Appropriately structured standards must involve a national, holistic approach to improving
tailpipe emissions. EPA claims that it is not proposing to mandate specific technologies or the
production of specific vehicle types, but its proposal is anything but technology neutral. Unlike
prior rules governing tailpipe emissions, EPA's proposed standards cannot be met by ICE
vehicles alone and would phase-out existing credits for ICE vehicle and hybrid technologies that
have to date helped OEMs to achieve better emissions compliance. Moreover, they are premised
on overly aggressive assumptions regarding future EV market penetration. If adopted, the
cumulative practical effect of the proposal would be to greatly reduce the market availability of
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new ICE vehicles. This "if you build them, they will come" approach ignores the fact that, while
franchisee! dealers are the OEMs' primary customers, actual emission reductions cannot be
achieved unless and until new EVs take to the road. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 5]
Unlike for many regulated goods, prospective purchasers of new light-duty vehicles have
transportation options, including the used vehicle marketplace, the service and repair of existing
vehicles, and alternatives like public transit and micro-mobility. Consequently, vehicle consumer
purchase behaviors must be viewed through the lens of an ever-changing marketplace that hinges
on the willingness and ability of prospective purchasers to buy ever more expensive new vehicles
with enhanced emissions performance. Similarly, new commercial medium-duty vehicle
purchase decisions hinge on affordability, cost-efficiency, and reliability (i.e., uptime). At
bottom, the market will avoid new vehicles that are too costly, that offer performance comprises,
or that pose unacceptable downtime risks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 5]
EPA's current proposal is flawed in that it disregards these critical demand-side marketplace
factors. It also appears aimed at promoting EVs to the exclusion of ICE, hybrid, and other
alternative fuel vehicles. It will likely cause OEMs to produce fewer new technology ICE and
alternative fueled vehicles and will increase their cost, thereby dissuading consumers from
considering their purchase. EPA's final rule should set truly technology-neutral emissions
standards that maximize, not inhibit, fleet turnover. Doing so is critical to maximizing emissions
reduction given that, as noted above, regulatory objectives will not be achieved unless and until
new vehicles subject to more stringent emissions standards are bought. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0656, p. 5]
Less than 10 percent of new vehicle sales are cash transactions, meaning that over 90 percent
of prospective new vehicle purchasers finance their transactions. Today's high interest rates are
compounding the affordability dilemma and driving consumers out of the market.26 As a result,
Americans are holding onto their existing vehicles longer, extending the average age of the on-
road fleet to 12.5 years.27 And, dealers are selling fewer new vehicles, about 13.9 million in
2022, down 8 percent from 2021 and well down from the 17.2 million sold in 2018.28 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 6]
26 See Auto Loan Interest Rates Hit Highest Level Since 2008 and Drive Record Share of $1,000+
Monthly Payments in Q1, | Edmunds.
27 See Average Age of Light Vehicles in the US Hits Record High 12.5 years, | S&P Global
(spglobal.com).
28 See Cox Automotive Forecast: U.S. Auto Sales Expected to Finish 2022 Down 8% Year Over Year, as
General Motors Reclaims Top Spot, Honda and Nissan Fall Significantly - Cox Automotive Inc.
(coxautoinc.com); New- Vehicle Sales Reach 17.3 million; 2019 Less Rosy - Cox Automotive Inc.
(coxautoinc.com).
American consumers generally support incremental emissions improvements, and a recent
survey shows that 61 percent of new vehicle car shoppers say that they are "overall likely" to
consider purchasing an EV.29 But intender surveys are of limited value and often do not reflect
what prospective purchasers will do, or what they care about most. For example, polling by
Centrist Democrats of America shows that while Americans generally support EVs, they do not
support bans on the sale of new ICE vehicles, or prioritizing funding for public EV charging over
building schools and police and fire resources.30 Moreover, a recent Gallop poll shows that 41
percent of U.S. adults state that they will not consider purchasing an EV.31 and a recent poll by
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the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago and the Associated Press-NORC found
that 47 percent of respondents are unlikely to purchase an EV.32 In May 2023, J.D. Power
reported that 21 percent of U.S. car shoppers are "very unlikely" to consider an EV for their next
vehicle purchase, and a GOBankingRates survey found that 22 percent of respondents said they
do not ever want to own an EV.33 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 6-7]
29 See 2023 U.S. Electric Vehicle Consideration (EVC) Study | J.D. Power (jdpower.com).
30 See Democrats should be wary of banning gas vehicles | The Hill.
31 See Most Americans Are Not Completely Sold on Electric Vehicles (gallup.com).
32 See 47 percent in new poll say it's unlikely they would buy EV | EPIC (uchicago.edu); 47 percent in
new poll say it's unlikely they would buy EV | The Hill.
33 See EV Divide Grows in U.S. as More New-Vehicle Shoppers Dig in Their Heels on Internal
Combustion | J.D. Power (jdpower.com); 22% of Americans Never Want To Own an Electric Vehicle |
GOBankingRates.
Now, some of these polls focused on Americans generally versus on prospective new vehicle
shoppers. But they raise real concerns that EPA must consider when setting standards designed
to achieve continuous emission improvements that maximize, not inhibit, fleet turnover. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 6-7]
Now, some of these polls focused on Americans generally versus on prospective new vehicle
shoppers. But they raise real concerns that EPA must consider when setting standards designed
to achieve continuous emission improvements that maximize, not inhibit, fleet turnover. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 6-7]
1. EPA's Use of a Cost-of-Ownership Payback Analysis Is Flawed and Problematic.
EPA correctly acknowledges that under its proposed standards "the average purchase price of
vehicles is estimated to be higher," which it attributes to an anticipated larger share of EVs in the
market. However, its assertion that lower EV operating costs and IRA purchase incentives will
offset these higher up-front costs is unsound.34 As NADA has explained previously, for most
prospective new vehicle purchasers, using a total cost of ownership (TCO) "payback"
cost/benefit analysis is flawed and problematic for several reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0656, pp. 7-8]
34 88 Fed. Reg. at 29201, 29328-29, 29344, 29364.
First, consumers shopping for vehicles with better fuel economy35 must be willing and able
to pay for it. As noted above, 67 percent of Americans presently cannot afford any new vehicle.
And of the 33 percent who can, high interest rates are driving many of them out of the market.
NADA takes issue with EPA's projections that its proposal will result in only a small change in
total new light-duty vehicle sales and no change in new medium-duty vehicle sales. NADA's
projections differ significantly, showing vehicle sales declines corresponding with the higher
vehicle costs attributable to EPA's proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 7-
8]
35 For at least two practical reasons, improved fuel economy performance is a surrogate for better
emissions performance. First, strategies for improving a vehicle's fuel economy often result in improved
emissions performance, especially with respect to GHGs. Second, while some prospective purchasers seek
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and are willing to pay for improved fuel economy performance, few seek and are willing to pay for
improved emissions performance.
Second, consumer demand for fuel efficiency fluctuates with fuel prices. Prospective
purchasers form expectations of the net present value of future fuel savings that are related, but
not closely related, to a standardized financial calculation.36 During dramatic upward fuel price
swings followed by heavy media coverage, consumers place a large value on fuel economy, as
revealed by shifts in demand to more fuel-efficient segments of the market. But during slow and
steady increases in the price of liquid fuels with little or no media attention, consumer demand
reveals a diminished value for fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 7-8]
36 See Exhibit B, Walton & Drake, Willingness to Pay for MY 2025 Fuel Economy Mandates:
Government Estimates v. Economic Reality, February 2012.
Third, a consumer's willingness to purchase improved fuel economy must be viewed in the
context of other vehicle attributes. When assessing the value of fuel economy improvements to
prospective purchasers, the financial benefits of future fuel savings cannot be separated from the
utility lost by necessary reductions to other vehicle qualities and performance. A study released
earlier this year examined the tradeoff between fuel economy and vehicle performance in
connection with NHTSA's most recent round of fuel economy mandates.37 It found evidence
that consumers and OEMs undervalued fuel economy compared to the predictions of a rational-
choice model. However, it also found that fuel economy mandates resulted in foregone
performance, upon which consumers placed a value approximately equal to that of any fuel-
savings benefits resulting from the standards. And it found that models attempting to assess the
new vehicle buying public's willingness to purchase fuel economy, without controlling for
performance tradeoffs, likely suffered from omitted variables bias. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0656, p. 8]
37 Leard, Linn, Zhou; How Much Do Consumers Value Fuel Economy and Performance? Evidence from
Technology Adoption, The Review of Economics and Statistics (2023); 105(1), 158-74.
EPA assumes that consumers value any fuel savings associated with new vehicle purchases
over a 30-month period (at most) but suggests erroneously that there is no consensus regarding
how consumers value fuel efficiency. EPA also made no real attempt to assess how new light-
duty vehicle consumers actually value emissions reduction/fuel economy technology when
making purchase decisions.38 Instead, EPA made reference to a so-called "energy efficiency
gap" and asserted that the issue will become less relevant as the share of EVs in the market
increases.39 But the aforementioned study suggests that the proper approach for setting fuel
economy mandates designed to maximize the achievement of regulatory objectives is to control
for consumer willingness to purchase changes in both a vehicle's performance and fuel economy.
EPA's failure to do so undermines its ability to set emissions reduction mandates premised on
realistic and accurate conclusions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 8]
38 88 Fed. Reg. at 29370, 29397.
39 88 Fed. Reg. at 29397.
Organization: National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA)
The historic passage of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and Inflation Reduction Act
underscores the immense public investment now available for ZEVs and associated
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infrastructure. This public support is being further met with significant private investment from
manufacturers and associated entities, while interest in EVs and ZEVs at the individual consumer
level is expanding year after year. For instance, more than a quarter million battery-electric
vehicles were sold in the first quarter of 2023 alone — a nearly 45% increase over the same
period last year. 17 Unlike past EPA efforts that may have relied on expected future
improvements in technologies, EVs and ZEVs are here now and are growing as a share of the
LDV and MDV market. While ZEV technology will continue to improve and evolve, a rapid
transition to ZEVs is already the clear option when it comes to the on-road vehicle technology
that achieves the greatest degree of emission reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0607, p. 4]
17 Cox Automotive, Another Record Broken: Q1 Electric Vehicle Sales Surpass 250,000, as EV Market
Share in the U.S. Jumps to 7.2% of Total Sales (Apr. 12, 2023), https://www.coxautoinc.com/market-
insights/q1 -2023 -ev-sales/.
Organization: Nebraska Corn Board (NCB) and Nebraska Corn Growers Association
Expecting rural Americans who have a lower median income than those in urban areas to pay
$10,000 -$20,000 for an electric vehicle is out of touch and does not benefit the consumers.
Today, out of the 267 million light-duty vehicles on the road only 1% of them are battery-
powered. As we have seen post-pandemic, legacy vehicles are becoming more common as
consumers are holding onto their car longer and are going further in mileage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0583, pp.1-2]
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
Nissan appreciates the Administration's focus on and support for advancing electrification
and carbon neutrality and shares the same long-term goal of transitioning to zero emission
vehicle society. However, Nissan believes that market realities, infrastructure needs, consumer
impacts, and lack of battery critical mineral availability necessitate an adjustment of the GHG
standard stringency in this rulemaking timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 1]
Beyond the significant market and governmental challenges posed by such a drastic
implementation timeline, consumer adoption will be critical to success. Consumer adoption of
EVs has historically lagged behind expectations, leaving a significant hurdle to encourage a large
and swift shift to EVs. Consumers need to be convinced not only of the appeal, safety,
affordability, and reliability of EVs themselves, but they need to adopt the necessary community
and home charging equipment to facilitate their use. Consumers will need to adapt their trip
planning and driving behavior to allow for vehicle charging needs. The only way to drive these
significant behavioral changes is to assure consumers that charging infrastructure is available and
reliable. This is simply not a reality today and is unlikely to be a reality in time to drive such a
significant shift within the timeline of the Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule. These challenges are
magnified due to the unclear and uncertain benefits under the Inflation Reduction Act, which
place significant limitations on EV consumer incentive programs and charging infrastructure
programs. Moreover, many consumers are reluctant or unable to purchase EVs due to their
significant price premium. The Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule will only exacerbate these
inequalities, with EV prices likely to increase even more due to extreme investments required by
all market sectors involved. Driving too much change too quickly will shut out many
communities who need clean vehicles the most. It will likely force consumers who are uncertain
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about ZEV adoption to continue to operate aging ICE vehicles much longer. This is contrary to
the intent of the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 5]
Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
Moreover, the EPA claims unrealistically low residential electricity charging rates while
simultaneously admitting that low-income households won't have access to, nor be able to afford
installation of, residential charging ports. The EPA admits that low-income households will have
to rely on commercial charging ports that cost 2-3 times more3, yet they don't consider this in
their net impact calculations. The EPA's rule will have a negative impact on the entire
population but will disproportionately negatively impact the poorest Americans. Correcting for
these EPA oversights leads to a more realistic fuel "savings" of NEGATIVE $108 billion, a $998
billion cost increase from the EPA's calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 2-3]
3 Page 601 of EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis -
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
Organization: Plug In America
2. EPA requests comments on data, methods, and perspectives on the role of fuel
consumption in the vehicle purchase decision. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0625, p. 2]
Plug In America conducts an annual survey of thousands of EV drivers across the United
States.4 Our research shows that EV drivers consistently rank "cost savings" as one of the most
important considerations for EV purchases. A full report of this survey can be found on Plug In
America's Website. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0625, p. 2]
4 https://pluginamerica.org/survey/.
Organization: POET, LLC
F. Plug-in Hybrid Electric FFVs (PHEV FFVs) Provide a Key Compliance Solution that Must
be Incentivized.
EPA has recognized the need to incentivize emerging technologies under its vehicle GHG
program. With the proper incentives, PHEVs can rapidly scale up to dramatically reduce GHGs
while providing consumer friendly fuel flexibility to adjust low carbon fuel choices to market
conditions. For instance, a PHEV FFV allows consumers to maximize the bioethanol blend used
in a vehicle or rely more heavily on the vehicle battery, depending on the varying costs and
availability of biofuels, electricity, and electric charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, pp. 19-20]
Various technical analyses show that bioethanol flex-fuel paired with hybrid electric
technology can reduce lifecycle emissions just as effectively as comparable BEVs.64 At a
minimum, PHEVs provide a supplemental means to meeting the Proposed Rule's significant
GHG reduction targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 19-20]
64 See ePure, New research confirms important role for renewable ethanol in reducing car emissions
(September 1, 2022), finding that "plug-in hybrid vehicles running on E85 ethanol blend are at least as
climate-friendly as battery electric vehicles," available at https://www.epure.org/press-release/new-
research-confirms-important-role-for- renewable-ethanol-in-reducing-car-emissions/. See also, Mueller and
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Unnasch, High Octane Low Carbon Fuels: The Bridge to Improve Both Gasoline and Electric Vehicles
(March 22, 2021), p. 1, available at https://erc.uic.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/633/2021/03/UIC-
Marginal-EV-HOF-Analysis-DRAFT- 3_22_2021_UPDATE.pdf. Here, this Mueller and Unnasch study
found that "High octane fuel vehicles with ethanol provide very similar GHG savings compared to EVs
(within 5 gC02e/MJ of each other) for many states" and "E85 and HOF-plug-in hybrids are the lowest
GHG emitting technology as these vehicles are both able to take advantage of the low carbon intensity of
ethanol in their combustion engine and the low carbon intensity of the electricity grid in hybrid mode of
operation."
The Proposed Rule correctly explains, "PHEVs may help provide a bridge for consumers that
may not be ready to adopt a fully electric vehicle."65 The Proposed Rule specifically "requests
comment on the types of PHEVs EPA could consider in our analysis for the final rulemaking."66
The same emissions credit for FFVs discussed above (e.g., the 0.15 Volumetric Conversion
factor or a comparable incentive based on the real-world lifecycle benefits of bioethanol) could
apply to PHEV FFVs for that portion of those hybrid vehicles that operate on bioethanol E85,
MLEBs, or other higher-level ethanol blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 19-20]
65 See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29298.
66 Id.
EPA also assumes that customers will prefer BEVs over conventional ICE vehicles without
sufficient support or much analysis into the many different factors that affect consumer choices
apart from just the costs of BEVs compared to conventional ICE vehicles. 101 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, p. 24]
101 Id. at 8.
EPA's vehicle GHG program is unlike most EPA programs that rely on manufacturers or
other industry participants being directly regulated (under command and control regulations) or
undertaking certain actions in response to a price imposed on industry. The success of EPA's
vehicle GHG program ultimately depends on the willingness of consumers to buy vehicles. The
Proposed Rule cites an EPA and national lab study purporting to support EPA's expansive
"anticipation" of two-thirds of new car purchasers suddenly going electric, but this report EPA
cites also states that the "experiences of current PEV adopters ... do not fully reveal the
mechanisms that will lead to large scale PEV adoption" and "access in the United States" to
PEVs is "low in general."102 Similarly, EPA relies on an ICCT modeling regarding projections
of consumer demand but that ICCT report states that "it does not account for . . . barriers such as
lead time for vehicle manufacturing and charging infrastructure development." 103 The ICCT
report further states "should battery prices not decline as predicted or consumer acceptance of
electric vehicles stalls, our forecasts could be overly optimistic." 104 Those reports EPA relies on
in the Proposed Rule in fact undermine EPA's overly optimistic projections about BEV adoption
in the United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 24]
102 See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29342, n. 744, citing Jackman et al, Jackman, D K, K S Fujita, H C Yang, and M
Taylor. Literature Review of U.S. Consumer Acceptance of New Personally Owned Light Duty Plug-in
Electric Vehicles (2023), and pages 52, 54 within that report.
103 See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29346, footnote 761, citing ICCT, "Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation
Reduction Act on Electric Vehicle Uptake in the US," and the Executive summary, p. iii, in that ICCT
report.
104 ICCT report, supra, at 17.
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OnLocation also identifies factual issues that call into question the robustness of EPA's
assumptions regarding future EV penetration rates. For instance, EPA's projections of BEV sales
are almost nine times higher than those of EIA. 122 EPA may also be making overly optimistic
assumptions regarding battery manufacturing capacity and domestic lithium production. 123
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 27]
122 Id. at 2.
123 Id.
Consumer acceptance of BEVs is another important issue related to BEV penetration with or
without the Proposed Rule. U.S. EPA discusses consumer acceptance of BEVs at length in
Chapter 4.1 of the DRIA and purports to perform a sensitivity analysis of its assumptions in that
regard using two cases it labels as "faster BEV acceptance" and "slower BEV acceptance). In
describing the faster acceptance case U. S. EPA states (DRIA Chapter 4.1.3): [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 60-61]
We acknowledge, however, that a very rapid transition to electric vehicles may be underway
as appears to be reflected in the popular media. In a Faster BEV Acceptance case, BEV
acceptance could rise very quickly and exceed acceptance of ICE vehicles by orders of
magnitude. For sedans and wagons this could mean that within just a few years BEV acceptance
will match that of an ICE vehicle. In fact, recent evidence suggest that BEVs may already be
preferred all else equal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 60-61]
In contrast, in describing the slower adoption case U.S. EPA states (DRIA Chapter 4.1.3):
Though we believe it to be very unlikely given the thoroughness of the Central case and
evidence of BEV acceptance discussed throughout this chapter, we acknowledge that BEV
acceptance may be slower than characterized in the Central case. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp. 60-61]
And
.. .acceptance begins to grow less rapidly in the early to mid-2030's, roughly coincident with
the expiration of the IRA produce and consumer incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609,
pp. 60-61]
The results of the consumer acceptance "sensitivity analysis" on BEV penetration are
presented in Chapter 13 of the DRIA. The results relevant to the proposed standards for the
combined light-duty fleet (passenger cars and trucks) are shown in DRIA Tables 13-49, 13-73,
13-110, 13,-111, 13-114, and 13-115. Under the faster acceptance case, MY 2032 incremental
vehicle costs drop from $1,164 to $712 and BEV penetration increases from 67 to 75%. Under
the slower acceptance case, MY 2032 incremental costs increase from $1,164 to $1,498 and
BEV penetration is actually increased from 67% to 68%. Perhaps not surprisingly given the
descriptions of the two cases, U.S. EPA's sensitivity analysis concludes that regardless of
consumer acceptance of BEVs, BEV penetration, at least in MY 2032 will be equal to or higher
than that forecast for the Proposed Rule. A reasonable conclusion is that U.S. EPA has assumed,
without proper support, that consumers will prefer BEVs to conventional ICE vehicles and as a
result failed to perform a meaningful sensitivity analysis of consumer acceptance. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 60-61]
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Organization: RVIndustry Association (RVIA)
RVIA strongly opposes EPA's overreaching proposed rule for the reasons discussed below
and requests the agency exclude motor homes from having to comply with the proposed
medium- duty vehicle standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
In contradiction to this NPRM, the EPA has already proposed, in the Phase 3 GHG rule (see
88 FR 25996), to establish standards for motor homes that correctly acknowledge the reality that
motor homes are not well-suited for electrification. Under the proposed Phase 3 GHG rules, the
EPA would establish a C02 standard of 226 g/mi for MY2027 and later motor homes. As
discussed in the Phase 3 GHG NPRM, the agency has proposed this standard given the negative
implications of electrifying the motor home chassis. To power a motor home, the batteries would
take up space that is otherwise necessary for housing the various elements of a motor home. It
would also add significant amounts of weight to the motor home making it no longer capable of
being equipped with the components typically found in a motor home. It makes no difference
whether a motor home falls under the MD/HD Phase 3 GHG rules or the LD/MD rules, the
issues are the same. Standards which can only be met by battery-powered vehicles are not
practicable for motor homes. EPA staff who authored the Phase 3 GHG rule have acknowledged
this. In establishing standards for medium-duty vehicles within this rule, staff need to be
consistent and exclude motor homes from standards that would force them to be electrified.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
Motor homes are often operated in locations where there is no electricity. This is known as
"boondocking." Frequently, motor homes will be operated for weeks at a time at such locations.
When motor homes are operated in a boondocking scenario, there is no possibility of EV
charging. Electrification simply does not work for this operating use case. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
Unlike medium-duty vehicles that might be conveniently recharged overnight, motor homes
are routinely driven 500 miles or more a day making it necessary to fully recharge mid-trip. A
multi- hour charging event is simply not something the typical motor home driver would find
acceptable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
Motor homes are typically a discretionary purchase by families who tend to be very cost
sensitive. Large increases in price for a vehicle that is operated on average only 20 days per year
and that travels on average only 4,000 miles will not be viewed favorably by potential buyers.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
The ability to recoup higher vehicle costs through refueling savings is minimal given motor
homes are driven sparingly by their owners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
If finalized, EPA's rule will severely limit the use and affordability of motor homes. As a
result, it will severely hurt motor home manufacturers, dealers, their employees and their
families. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
Regarding the certification of medium-duty motor homes powered by internal combustion
engines, as well as vehicles used to tow RVs, RVIA supports the concerns raised by the Alliance
for Automotive Innovation in its comment letter. Such concerns include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0629, pp. 1-2]
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• EPA's proposed rule is neither reasonable nor achievable in the timeframe provided.
• EPA's proposed rule is a de facto battery electric vehicle mandate.
• EPA outstrips Biden administration's own 50 percent light-duty electrification executive
order from 2021.
• EPA underestimates battery costs and makes unrealistic battery electric vehicle (BEV) sales
assumptions.
• EPA makes no concurrent requirements to support the infrastructure and battery critical
minerals for the required EVs or the drivers that must buy them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0629, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Senator Shelley Moore Capito et al.
Perhaps the most conspicuous flaw that will leap out to the American public is that these
proposed actions were taken with complete disregard to consumer choice or affordability. In
addition to potentially lacking access to charging at home, work, or public charging stations,
consumers looking to purchase a new car may be unable to purchase these vehicles due to the
higher purchase price or lack of availability. Today, the average purchase price of EV cars in
2022 was approximately $65,000-which is more than what 46 percent of American households
earn in income in a year.8 Adding demand to the grid amid the confluence of other EPA
regulations referenced above will drive up the cost of electricity, making powering these vehicles
less affordable and undermining the EPA s claims of savings for consumers that ignore or
understate the increase in vehicle and energy prices. Taken together, the erosion of choice and
affordability of vehicles will have profound impacts on how American families run errands, get
to school, commute to work, and recreate. Additionally, there are serious concerns about the
range of electric vehicles and the performance in rural areas of the country, where people may
have to drive much longer distances to reach a charger, especially in locations where cold
weather can impact the range the vehicle can drive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5083, p. 3]
8 See Kelley Blue Book and Cox Automotive Average Transaction Prices Reports; and Average,
Median, Top 1%, and all United States Household Income Percentiles, DQYDJ.
Organization: South Coast Air Quality Management District
3. Set a minimum range for ZEVs. ACC II requires a minimum certification range of 200
miles for zero emission vehicles. This is to ensure that new ZEVs will provide useful EV miles
to meet the everyday needs of consumers, which will lead to higher acceptance and uses, and
greater reductions of emissions from on-road vehicles. This range is also easily achievable with
technologies that are currently available. We concur with the need for a minimum range
requirement and recommend a similar range limit for the proposed rule. Setting a 200-mile range
minimum threshold will prevent manufacturers from producing ZEVs with limited ranges simply
for the sake of compliance with State and federal regulations, including the Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0659, p. 3]
Organization: South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR)
Electric Vehicle Battery and Range Limitations
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South Dakota is a large state with significant driving distance between many of our
communities. Although several new electrical vehicles indicate they have a 200 mile or greater
range (note - it is 224 miles one way from Pierre to Sioux Falls), a recent study shows electric
vehicles (EVs) do not consistently achieve EPA's range estimates. In addition, all batteries
degrade over time. Reports indicate EV vehicle batteries will degrade between 10 and 40 percent
over a 10-year life span. To maintain the battery's life, manufactures recommend batteries are not
frequently depleted below 10 percent capacity or charged above 90 percent capacity. This means
that an electrical vehicle should be limited to 80 percent of its capacity range to maintain the
battery's life. In addition, cold, hot, and windy weather conditions may reduce an EV vehicle's
range between 20 to 40 percent and may further impact the reliability of EV. South Dakota is
known to have cold and windy winters and hot and windy summers, which, with current EV
ranges, batteries conditions, and availability of charging stations, makes widespread use of EVs
impractical in South Dakota. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0523, p. 2]
Cost
EPA acknowledges the cost of an electrical vehicle will be greater than a gasoline powered
vehicle but justifies the additional expense by stating the "purchase price could be reduced by
any state and federal purchase incentives available to consumers. Under the Inflation Reduction
Act, consumers are eligible for up to $7,500 for the purchase of an electric vehicle." DANR
disagrees with EPAs efforts to use the proposed emissions standards and incentives to force
consumers into purchasing vehicles that may not meet their actual driving needs or budget. In
fact, EPA's approach along with the cost of EVs may encourage South Dakota car owners to hold
on to their older, less efficient vehicles in perpetuity to avoid purchasing a vehicle that will not
meet their driving needs. The proposed rules may also encourage a person to own more than one
vehicle to meet their actual needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0523, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Specialty Equipment Market Association (SEMA)
Vehicle Choice and Cost for Consumers
The EPA's multipollutant proposal flies in the face of consumers having the freedom to
purchase the vehicles that best suit their personal needs and those of their family. The EPA's
rush to further limit tailpipe emissions in the U.S. will cause great economic harm to many
consumers across the country. According to an April 2023 report from Kelley Blue Book, the
average cost of a BEV is $58,000, which is over 20% more than the average cost of a non-BEV.8
The average cost of a BEV outpaces the median salary in 2022 in the United States of $54,132 as
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 9 In addition to the increased up-front costs to
consumers to purchase a BEV, J.D. Power reported that approximately 28 million American
homeowners must spend on average an additional $1,300 to install at home chargers, putting
additional financial burden on American consumers. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, pp. 4-
5]
8 Kelley Blue Book: New-Vehicle Transaction Prices Trend Downward as Incentives Rise (Link:
https://mediaroom.kbb.com/2023-03-08-New-Vehicle-Transaction-Prices-Trend-Downward-as-Incentives-
Rise%2C-According-to-Kelley-Blue-Book).
9 First Republic: How Much Does the Average American Make in 2022? (Link:
https://www.firstrepublic.com/insights-education/how-much-does-the-average-american-
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make#%3A%7E%3Atext%3DAccording%20to%20the%20U.S.%20Bureau%2Cwould%20equal%20%245
4%2C132%20a%20year).
10 J.D. Power: What Does an EV Home Charger Cost? (Link: https://www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-
guides/what-does-an-ev-home-charger-
cost#%3A%7E%3Atext%3DPrices%20for%20these%20home%20EV%20chargers%20range%20from%2
Can%20independent%20seller%2C%20can%20charge%20any%20new%20EV).
Despite 8.5% of new vehicles sold are BEV currently, a May 2023 report from J.D. Power
found that 21% of consumers are very unlikely to consider purchasing a BEV due to issues such
as price, range, and limited charging availability. 11 SEMA questions the presumption that this
rulemaking will result in the lofty goal that 67% of new vehicles sold will be BEVs in 2032
given the many legitimate concerns that American consumers have surrounding BEVs and the
tradeoffs of owning these vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, pp. 4-5]
11 J.D. Power: EV Divide Grows in U.S. as More New-Vehicle Shoppers Dig in Their Heels on Internal
Combustion (Link: https://www.jdpower.com/business/resources/ev-divide-grows-us-more-new-vehicle-
shoppers-dig-their-heels-internal-combustion).
Organization: Stellantis
Electrification Rates Misaligned to Market and Exceed Commitments
Stellantis fully supports comments submitted through The Alliance for Automotive
Innovation (AAI or the Auto Innovators) detailing the challenges associated with EPA's overly
optimistic expectation for EV market growth. Stellantis remains steadfast to delivering on our
commitments to achieve an electrified future, and we acknowledge EPA's efforts with this
rulemaking to help support this difficult yet critical transition. However, the proposed rule
significantly underestimates the actions needed to build the targeted EV market. Addressing
concerns such as manufacturing capacity, battery production, charging infrastructure, and
consumer acceptance of EVs will be paramount to the success of this ambitious proposed
regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
EPA's notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRMs) discuss the possibility of alternative
adjustments to its proposed emissions limits for different pollutants, but those alternatives fall
within a narrow band above and below EPA's proposed levels. They do not encompass any true
alternative approaches, and they do not even leave room for automakers to rely on the various
different powertrain modalities that consumers have shown a greater willingness to embrace,
such as hybrid vehicle technologies and bio-fuel options, to achieve improved environmental
performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 3]
Where does EPA purport to find this authority in the Clean Air Act?
The logic is as follows:
Because most automakers have announced ambitious timetables for transitioning to the
production of EVs going forward and have pledged to make large capital investments to finance
this gradual switchover, 13 and because Congress has recently approved generous federal
subsidies for some EV purchases and charging infrastructure, 14 EPA says it can now declare that
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battery-electric vehicle technology is a "feasible" alternative to the tradi- tional internal-
combustion engine (ICE) powertrain. 15 And on that basis, EPA is proposing to treat EVs as an
available "control technology" for achieving compliance with the tailpipe emissions restrictions
under Clean Air Act section 202.16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 6-8]
13 See 88 FR at 29191, Figure 1 (reproducing a chart prepared by the Environmental Defense Fund
depicting the automakers' announced goals for future electrified vehicle sales as a percentage of total
sales); id. at 29193-94 (summarizing automakers' announced plans for investments in EV technology).
14 See id. at 29195-96; Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law 117-58, 135 Stat. 429 (2021),
https://www.congress.gOv/l 17/plaws/publ58/PLAWl 17publ58.pdf; Inflation Reduction Act of 2022,
Public Law 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818 (2022),
https://www.congress.gOv/l 17/bills/hr5376/BILLSl 17hr5376enr.pdf.
15 See 88 FR at 29194 (light-duty and medium-duty vehicles); 88 FR at 25972 (heavy-duty trucks).
16 See 88 FR at 29284 (for light-duty and medium-duty vehicles); 88 FR at 26015 (for heavy-duty trucks).
This reasoning obviously depends on a kind of feedback loop. The automakers are pledging to
invest in the transition to EVs because governments around the world—like China, the EU, the
Biden White House, and Governor Gavin Newsom and his climate regulators in California—are
demanding that they do so. But everyone knows there is a large looming impediment to this
Green Dream: resistance from American consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 6-8]
The American public is not jumping on the electric bandwagon. EVs are expensive— beyond
the reach of many American families—and most Americans remain skeptical that EVs will
reliably serve the full range of their needs, that quick and convenient charging stations will be
widely available, that EVs will maintain their promised driving range over time or in cold
weather, that they will have any significant resale or trade-in value down the road, and that
insurance carriers will cover the huge costs of battery replacement when the battery wears out or
is damaged in a minor accident. 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 6-8]
17 See Nick Carey, Paul Lienert, and Sarah McFarlane, "Scratched EV battery? Your insurer may have to
junk the whole car," Reuters, March 20, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-
transportation/scratched-ev-battery-your-insurer-may-have-junk-whole-car-2023-03-20/ ("For many elec-
tric vehicles, there is no way to repair or assess even slightly damaged battery packs after accidents, forcing
insurance companies to write off cars with few miles—leading to higher premiums and under-cutting gains
from going electric.").
To push the automakers to convert to EV production in the absence of sufficient mar- ket
demand, EPA plans to ratchet down the emissions limits for carbon dioxide and for the
traditional criteria and other pollutants associated with smog (such as unburned hydrocar- bons,
particulate matter, oxides of nitrogen, and ozone) to super-stringent levels that are
technologically impossible for gas-powered vehicles (even hybrids) to satisfy. 18 At the same
time, EPA is proposing to phase out certain regulatory buffers that allow automakers to report
better emissions compliance results, such as "off-cycle credits" for the addition of onboard
technologies that improve the fuel efficiency of ICE vehicles. 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 6-8]
18 See, e.g., 88 FR at 29237-38; id. at 29257-61.
19 See id. at 29249-50.
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The automakers' only recourse will be to replace more and more of the ICE vehicles in their
fleets (including hybrids) with the "alternative control technology" of battery-electric vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 6-8]
And here is the trick: For enforcement purposes, EPA applies the emissions limits to each
automaker on a fleetwide average basis, and it proposes to reduce these fleetwide averages
dramatically each model year from 2027 through 2032 on a ramp rate calculated to achieve the
Biden administration's desired percentage mix of EVs in the U.S. auto fleets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 6-8]
In other words, EPA is now proposing to set fleetwide average tailpipe pollution limits that
are intended by design to apply increasingly over time to vehicles that have no tailpipes and that
EPA says emit none of the pollutants covered by the regulations.20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 6-8]
20 Automakers can avoid violating the average emissions limits in certain circumstances with regulatory
"credits," earned by producing vehicles, like EVs, that outperform the limits. Under the EPA's rules,
credits can be "banked" from one model year to another within limits, "transferred" from one fleet to
another (for example, from the automaker's light truck fleet to its passenger car fleet), or "traded" between
automakers, which usually involves a privately negotiated purchase. Tesla, which manufactures nothing but
EVs and accounts for approximately 70 percent of the U.S. EV market, receives a large portion of its
income from selling emissions credits to the other automakers. Predictably, the EPA is proposing to retain
this credit system to continue the subsidization of EV manufacturing. See 88 FR at 26245-46.
The 39-40 percent no-action baseline also assumes that American car buyers will suddenly
drop their resistance to EVs. In effect, EPA is banking on a near-term future in which market
demand for the new fleet of EVs will be just as high as it currently is for the most popular brands
of ICE and hybrid vehicles, like the Ford F-150 pickup, the Chevy Silverado pickup, or the
Toyota Camry. That assumption is highly suspect: the average price of an EV today is $61,000
(24 percent higher than the average ICE vehicle),30 and EVs come with limitations and question
marks that concern many buyers.31 EPA is untroubled; it casually predicts that the price of EVs
will fall and buyer demand will rise greatly in the years ahead, assumptions that are critical to
EPA's ability to minimize the true cost effects of its proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, p. 12]
30 See https://www.kbb.com/car-news/average-new-car-price-tops-49500/.
31 For example, reports suggest that some electric pickups may have a greatly reduced effective range
when towing heavy loads—a limitation likely to be of concern to prospective pickup buyers. See
https://www.motortrend.com/reviews/ford-fl50-lightning-electric-truck-towing-test/.
In the real world of the marketplace, the automakers cannot manage the huge capital costs of
EPA's assumed production switchover to battery-electric technology unless con- sumer demand
for EVs is strong. Without sufficient market demand, at levels far more robust than currently
seen, the effective costs of these rules will be much higher than EPA recognizes and will not be
sustainable for the automakers. It is not always true that "if you build it, they will come"—just
ask Facebook about the Metaverse. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 12]
EPA also undercounts the cost of electricity charging over the life of the EV. EPA relies on a
pricing model that claims to show that electricity prices will somehow not rise significantly in a
world where EVs comprise more than half of new cars sold in the U.S., but that claim is wholly
unrealistic. Even absent high EV penetration, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that
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electricity prices are steadily rising in the U.S.38 Increased EV charging demand will only cause
those prices to rise even faster. Driving a single EV 15,000 miles per year and charging it at
home could raise the annual electricity bill for the average family by 50 percent or more.39 If the
nation converts to EV ownership at the rates EPA is aiming for, such a large increase in overall
electricity demand will inevitably cause electricity rates to rise significantly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 14-15]
38 See generally https://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet (allowing user to generate graph showing
the rise from 2003 to the present in the average price of electricity in the U.S.).
39 The Energy Information Agency reports that the average American household uses about 886 kilowatt
hours of electricity per month, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php, and the EPA says the average EV
consumes 36 kilowatt hours of electricity per every 100 miles driven,
https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/comparison-your-car-vs-electric-vehicle. If the family's EV is driven
15,000 miles per year, or 1,250 miles per month, it would consume 450 kilowatt hours of electricity every
month.
The EPA's glib premise that car buyers in the U.S. will respond with strong demand for the
supposed flood of future EVs (notwithstanding the practical concerns, cost consid- erations, and
other uncertainties that surround EVs in the minds of American consumers), is typical of the
consistently rosy—almost relentlessly rosy—assumptions about cost factors and consequential
risks that underlie all parts of EPA's supporting analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp.
14-15]
EPA fails to consider the negative societal consequences and second-order cost effects of its
proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
In putting forward regulatory proposals designed to force upon the American people a vast
and rapid industrial transformation, EPA has an obligation to go further than just considering the
direct cost effects of its proposals (which are themselves woefully under- estimated, as
highlighted above); it must also consider the broader indirect economic con- sequences and
negative societal costs that would follow if these rules are finalized as pro- posed. So far in these
rulemakings, the Agency has either ignored or deliberately down- played these second-order
effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
Some of the most consequential burdens and negative ramifications of the proposed rules that
EPA hides, disregards, or minimizes include the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647,
pp.15-16]
• Stifling consumer choice at the dealership. Many of the vehicle models most pop- ular with
American families will no longer be sustainable under the EPA's proposed rules. Automobiles
have long been America's favorite freedom machines. When the models of ICE vehicles
Americans love the most disappear from dealerships, that will represent an enormous drop in
consumer welfare (in basic happiness and well- being) for the average American family and for
the U.S. economy as a whole. For many of these ICE vehicle models, there is no EV option
likely to be available that could provide the same performance, utility, or recreational value at a
comparable price (or at all). EPA makes no real effort to quantify this generational loss of
consumer welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
• Increasing the purchase price of all new vehicles. Notwithstanding EPA's gaming of the
numbers, the true costs of the industrial transformation forced by the EPA's proposed rules will
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be spread across the automakers' fleets, resulting in a significant increase in the prices of all new
vehicles, with greater price increases concentrated on those vehicles for which the demand is
highest relative to supply. All Americans will be harmed by these price increases, but the biggest
losers will be lower-income Americans who cannot afford to buy an EV or to pay more for a gas-
powered vehicle at the dealership, as well as those who live in rural areas and need to drive
longer distances and for whom EVs are impractical. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-
16]
• Destroying jobs in the U.S. auto industry. The loss of popular new vehicle options and the
significant price increases at the dealership will mean that fewer new vehicles will be
purchased—almost certainly far fewer than EPA is predicting. This drop-off in demand will
challenge the profitability of the auto industry and lead to a loss of jobs for tens of thousands of
America's autoworkers, as well as a loss of jobs in the many U.S. companies that supply inputs
for the production of auto- mobiles and heavy trucks.40 The United Auto Workers union has
warned of the potential for job losses from the transition to EVs,41 as automakers announce
more plant closures and layoffs due to the costs of electrification.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 15-16]
40 See Technality, "Ford Just Proved How Far Ahead Tesla Really Is: Profitability May Continue to Be a
Struggle for All Legacy Automakers," May 10, 2023, https://medium.com/tech-topics/ford-just-proved-
how-far-ahead-tesla-really-is-6a4d95cff519 ("Despite wanting to be a fully-electric brand by 2035, as of
Q4 2022, Ford's average net margin on the Mustang Mach-E was -40.4%. Unfortunately, that's a figure
that's only gotten worse since, to the point where Ford is now losing an average of $58,000 for every EV
sold.").
41 See Press statement, United Auto Workers, "UAW Statement on Job Cuts at Stellantis," April 26, 2023,
https://uaw.org/uaw-statement-job-cuts-stellantis.
42 See Michael Wayland, "Stellantis to indefinitely idle Jeep plant, lay off workers to cut costs for EVs,"
CNBC.com, December 9, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/09/stellantis-to-idle-jeep-plant-lay-off-
workers-to-cut-costs-for-evs.html.
• Causing more deaths and serious injuries on America's highways. As new vehicle models
become unaffordable or unappealing, many American families will be left driving older and
older used cars, and the age of the nation's auto fleet will rise dramatically. Already, the average
age of a car on the road in the United States is approaching 13 years, and many cars are on their
fifth or sixth owners. The aging of the American fleet has very negative safety consequences, as
NHTSA statistics show that older vehicles are much less safe than newer models in an
accident.43 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
43 See https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/newer-cars-safer-cars_fact-sheet_010320-
tag.pdf.
If U.S. consumers do not embrace EVs as quickly and enthusiastically as the EPA assumes
they will, or if even one of the EPA's other overly optimistic assumptions comes a cropper, the
consequences of these rules will be catastrophic—for America's industrial base, our nation's
workforce, and the safety and wellbeing of Americans, particularly medium- and lower-income
Americans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 21]
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Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
Also, we think that willingness to pay is the correct question to ask regarding PHEV cost. As
long as there is consumer demand, some car and truck makers will target this market. That
consumers pay very high prices for luxury vehicles today illustrates this point. A Strong PHEV
especially offers many compelling benefits to consumers even if they are priced higher than a
BEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 22]
The experience of the last fifteen years has shown that many residential and commercial users
of vehicles will first adopt a PHEV instead of a BEV. In addition, we believe that long range
PHEVs are a no-regrets solution for EPA to encourage in the long term. In other words,
uncertainty in speed of adoption of battery EVs and fuel cell EVs, especially by fast followers
and late adopters, requires agencies such as EPA to be fuel and technology neutral in their
regulations. Including in the rule additional alternatives such as Strong PHEVs results in a faster
path to a net zero carbon future.25 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 25]
25 Bistline, J.E.T., Blanford, G., Grant, J., Knipping, E., McCollum, D. L., Nopmongcol, H.S., Shah, T.,
and Yarwood, G. (2022). Economy-wide evaluation of C02 and air quality impacts of electrification in the
United States. Nature communications, 13, 6693, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-33902-9
Strong PHEVs provide the flexibility that is key to convincing the hard-to-convince
individuals and fleets to adopt advanced technology. Many consumers for political or personal
reasons are very skeptical about BEVs and FCEVs, but we have found that Strong PHEVs appeal
to them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 28]
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
Almost three-quarters of vehicles sold are previously owned cars. 7 In 2022, the last year for
which complete data on used car sales are available, Americans bought 36 million used cars8 and
14 million new cars.9 But people do not want to buy used electric vehicles, because it is difficult
to evaluate how long the battery will last. Replacing an EV battery can cost anywhere from
$5,000 to $20,000.10 The poor and middle class will suffer most from higher prices for used
vehicles, because they cannot afford the new electric vehicles. EPA has not fully discussed the
effects on the used car market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 3]
7 Mathilde Carlier, Statista, New and Used Light Vehicle Sales in the United States, 2010 to 2021,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/183713/value-of-us-passenger-cas-sales-and-leases-since-1990/
(accessed April 28, 2023).
8 C.J. Moore, Used Car Sales Hit Lowest In Decade, Automotive News,January 13, 2023,
https://www.autonews.com/used-cars/used-car-volume-hits-lowest-mark-nearly-decade (accessed June 6,
2023).
9 Edmunds, 2023 Predictions: Edmunds Experts Forecast 14.8 Million New Vehicles Will Be Sold in New
Year, https://www.edmunds.com/industry/press/2023-predictions-edmunds-experts-forecast-14-8-million-
new-vehicles- will-be-sold-in-new-year.html (accessed June 6, 2023).
10 Recurrent, "Updated: Electric Car Battery Replacement Costs," March 26, 2023,
https://www.recurrentauto.com/research/costs-ev-battery-replacement (accessed April 28, 2023).
Battery-powered vehicles lack sufficient range to satisfy some customers. Although 60 to 70
miles of range is enough for most trips, people buy cars for all circumstances, including
vacations and cold weather. Moreover, batteries lose up to 40% of their range in cold climates. 13
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A study by Autocar 14 shows that electric vehicles lose, on average, a third of their range in the
winter, which reduces the typical 240-mile range to 160 miles. If a heat pump is added to the car,
the loss is less, but still the 240-mile range would shrink to 180. The effects of the cold are not
sufficiently accounted for by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 4]
13 Ellen Edmonds, "Icy Temperatures Cut Electric Vehicle Range Nearly in Half," AAA News Room,
February 7, 2019, https://newsroom.aaa.com/2019/02/cold-weather-reduces-electric-vehicle-range/
(accessed April 28, 2023).
14 Move Electric, "Electric Vehicle Range Test Reveals Up to 20% Drop in Winter," Autocar, March 17,
2022, https://www.autocar.co.uk/car-news/move-electric/electric-vehicle-range-test-reveals-20-drop-winter
(accessed April 28, 2023).
Car results varied. The Fiat 500 42kWh Icon lost 40% of its range in the winter. 15 The Ford
Mustang Mach-E Extended Range RWD lost 35%, and the Porsche Taycan 4S Performance
Battery Plus, with heat pump, lost 22% (the Taycan costs between $83,000 and $166,000). 16
The loss of range in cold weather is one reason why, at the end of 2021, the latest full year
available, North Dakota had 380 electric vehicle (EV) registrations, the fewest in the United
States, according to the Energy Department. 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 4]
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Electric Vehicle
Registrations by State Data Set, updated June 2022, https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10962 (accessed April 28,
2023).
In addition, if people choose not to buy the mandated electric vehicles, carmakers will have to
reduce their prices and raise prices of popular pickup trucks and SUVs to stay profitable.27
Lower-income and Americans in rural areas will be paying more for their preferred vehicles,
subsidizing better-off residents in cities and California, who are the main purchasers of electric
vehicles. EPA does not account for this. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 6]
27 For a detailed analysis, see Steve Bradbury, "Observation: Cliff Notes," Substack: Adespotoi,
September 16, 2022, https://adespotoi.substack.eom/p/observation-cliff-notes (accessed May 1, 2023).
Organization: Transfer Flow, Inc
Consumers are more likely to adopt near-zero technologies if given a menu of near-zero
emission technologies to choose from. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
Many consumers disapprove of the government dictating which near-zero technologies
they're allowed to utilize. Unfortunately, the EPA has not provided for a battery directive such as
the UN has required setting sustainability requirements for batteries placed on the market,
including responsible sourcing of raw materials, hazardous substances, carbon footprint, and
measures to improve the collection, treatment, and recycling of these waste batteries ensuring
materials recovery. Many concerned citizens do not support the human rights violations
associated with mining cobalt, lithium, and other minerals required for battery manufacturing.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
A major concern for consumers is how they would charge an electric vehicle. For citizens
living in apartment buildings or utilizing on-street parking, managing an electric vehicle would
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be inconvenient and challenging. The image below from Deloitte's 2022 Global Automotive
Consumer Study 17 illustrates consumer powertrain preferences for their next vehicle, which are
not aligned with the EPA's proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027
and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
17 https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Consumer-Business/us-2022-global-
automotive-consumer-study-global-focus-final.pdf
[See original attachment for "Consumer powertrain preferences for their next vehicle"] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
Electric Vehicles require the ramp-up of many new electricity-generating power plants to
provide enough power to charge all the projected electric vehicles, and then those electricity-
generating power plants must rely heavily on carbon capture technologies to keep the emissions
from these electricity-generating power plants out of the atmosphere. Current carbon capture
technologies are experimental and may prove dangerous.22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496,
pp. 3-5]
22 https://www.huffpost.com/entry/gassing-satartia-mississippi-co2-
pipeline_n_60ddea9fe4b0ddef8b0ddc8f
In many places, such as rural environments or for use in utility vehicles, electric vehicles are
not a practical solution. Utility companies working on phone lines, power lines, and performing
construction work all need reliable power sources that can be used for transporting people and
powering equipment, as well as function when the electric power grid may be in need of repair.
Electric vehicles do not have a network in remote areas or the energy density to effectively
transport and power auxiliary equipment needed to, among other functions, install or perform
repairs to electric power lines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), two years after the historical Dixie Fire, is still powering
affected Californians with diesel-powered generators as the infrastructure required to bring
electricity into homes has still not been rebuilt. Citizens living in these affected areas would need
to charge electric vehicles using electricity created from diesel generators, and the logistics of
that simply do not make sense. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
For a myriad of reasons, people may be hesitant to adopt electric vehicle technology. Near-
zero technologies are going to be more agreeably adopted if consumers feel they have a choice of
which near-zero technology works best for them. In Northern California, many citizens affected
by various wildfires still harbor animosity towards PG&E for negligently causing various
wildfires that have ruined thousands of people's lives. In 2020 PG&E pled guilty to 84 counts of
manslaughter for starting the historically devastating Camp Fire.23 Many citizens affected by
these wildfires don't want electric vehicles because they don't believe they can trust PG&E. Not
encouraging a choice of which near-zero technology consumers choose to implement runs the
risk of having the opposite intended effect. Consumers will likely choose to hold on to their old,
dirtier vehicles, defeating the intended purpose. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
23 https://www.nytimes.eom/2020/06/16/business/energy-environment/pge-camp-fire-california-
wildfires.html
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Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
Further, EPA does not consider the impact of charger performance and consumer experience
on consumer acceptance of electric vehicles. A report by the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (NREL) on electric vehicle charging infrastructure development notes that "This
analysis envisions a future national charging network that is strategic in locating the right amount
of charging, in the right locations, with appropriate charging speeds. However, this vision is
irrelevant if the public concludes that charging infrastructure is ultimately unreliable. Even if a
relatively small amount of infrastructure fails drivers, this could negatively impact the public's
perception of electric mobility." 153 There is good reason for NREL to raise this concern. A
national survey of 26,500 charging attempts at Level 2 and Level 3 public stations found that
20% failed to obtain a charge. 154 Common reasons for failure included software glitches,
payment processing errors, and vandalism. In 75% of the failures, the charger was out of service.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 31]
Footnoet 153: Id.
154 Hannah Lutz, "Negative Charge: One in Five Charging Attempts Failed in 2022, JD Power Data
Shows," Automotive News, February 13, 2023.
This type of consumer frustration may cause drivers who initially purchase electric vehicles to
return to ICE vehicles, a phenomenon known as "discontinuance." For example, a 2021 UC
Davis study found that approximately 20% of California drivers who bought a BEV between
2023 and 2018 replaced that vehicle with an ICE vehicle. Seventy percent of those drivers cited
lack of access to charging infrastructure as a basis for their decision. 155 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, p. 31]
155 Hardmand, S., Tal, G."Understanding discontinuance among California's electric vehicle owners."
Nature Energy 6, 538-545 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-021-00814-9
Despite these indications that both the availability and the performance of charging stations
may be a significant impact on consumers' willingness to purchase or to keep EVs, EPA does
not consider the limitations of charging infrastructure in determining that the proposed rule is
feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 31]
I. EPA fails to adequately consider the environmental justice impacts of the proposed
rule.
Disadvantaged communities already face significant access barriers to electric vehicles, such
as: higher upfront costs to electric vehicle ownership; a lack of existing charging infrastructure
available to them in low-income, minority populated, and rural areas; and costlier and time-
intensive charging due to a greater reliance on public charging infrastructure, particularly for
individuals living in multi-family housing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 55]
EPA's EJ analysis must be thorough and inclusive of factors that may impact the price of
transported goods, such as ZEV affordability, the availability of public charging, reasonable
charging practices, and a lifecycle analysis of electric vehicles and power generation emissions.
Without doing so, EPA runs the risk of intensifying price disparities and access to transport
relative to the baseline for EJ communities. EPA's EJ analysis must be thorough and inclusive of
electric vehicle affordability, the availability of public charging, reasonable charging practices,
and a lifecycle analysis of electric vehicles and power generation emissions. Without doing so,
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EPA runs the risk of intensifying price disparities and access to transport relative to the baseline
for EJ communities. These impacts can be both quantitively and qualitatively characterized.300
EPA's silence on these disparities is especially worrisome given EPA's prior binding
commitments to EJ analysis for the benefit of disadvantaged and low-income communities.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 55]
300 See, i.e., supra.
To date, the target electric vehicle customer base for OEMs consists of "mostly male, high-
income, highly educated, homeowners, who have multiple vehicles in their household and have
access to charging at home."301 Additionally, according to the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), "the rate of EV adoption in rural areas is roughly 40% lower than it is in
urban areas, and EV charging infrastructure expansion has mostly been concentrated in cities and
along major highways".302As a result, electric vehicle ownership remains primarily
concentrated in affluent, large metropolitan and urban areas.303 By contrast, the supporting
electricity generation necessary to support EPA's proposal is predominantly located in more
remote, rural regions that are geographically isolated from urban centers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 55-56]
301 Scott Hardman*, Kelly L. Fleming, Eesha Khare, and Mahmoud M. Ramadan, A perspective on equity
in the transition to electric vehicles, MIT SCIENCE POLICY REVIEW (Aug. 30, 2021) available at
https://sciencepolicyreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-electric-vehicles/.
302 U.S. Department of Transportation, Community Benefits of Rural Vehicle Electrification (last updated
February 2, 2022), available at https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-benefits-and-
challenges/community- benefits.
303 See, i.e., Shuocheng Guo, Eleftheria Kontou, Disparities and equity issues in electric vehicles rebate
allocation, Energy Policy, Volume 154, 2021, 112291, ISSN 0301-4215, available at
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112291.
EPA's proposal directly impacts EJ communities by contributing to additional, local
emissions to meet electric vehicle charging demand. Consequently, in theory, EJ communities
incur an incremental burden in exchange for the subsidization of electric vehicles for more
affluent consumers. And this subsidy occurs at expense of our most vulnerable communities
burdened by emissions as a direct result of the proposal, with no corresponding benefit, since
electric vehicles are likely to remain concentrated in affluent areas. Further, these communities
remain unable to afford EPA's chosen mode of transport and are particularly vulnerable to rising
electricity costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 55-56]
Notwithstanding EPA's hope that its proposal may serve to incentivize the purchases of
electric vehicles, these vehicles are significantly more expensive on average than their ICE
vehicle counterparts and unaffordable for many households. These are costs are also likely
understated as each electric vehicle already enjoys thousands of dollars' worth of Federal and
state subsidies, which are ultimately funded by taxpayers. Additionally, an automakers' ability to
sell electric vehicles to consumers depends on substantial price subsidies in the form of credit
support. EPA ignores the reality that many EJ stakeholders are currently unable to afford the
upfront costs of purchasing an electric vehicle in the first place. With the cost of transition
minerals expected to escalate exponentially in the coming years as a function of limited supply
and increasing demand, the costs to manufacture and purchase electric vehicles will likely
rise. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 56]
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EPA should also consider the effects of the proposal on electricity prices, as low-income
populations often spend a larger percentage of their earnings on essential utilities compared to
the rest of the United States. Reliance on electric vehicles has been shown to spur increases in
load and demand during peak periods, which impact electricity prices. Because EPA lacks
expertise in the area of electrical grid management and economics, EPA should consult with
other agencies and credible experts in these areas in order to adequately evaluate these
impacts.304 EPA should ensure that the proposal meets reliability and affordability criteria and
helps EJ communities make informed decisions about their own energy needs. Additionally,
EPA's EJ assessment fails to acknowledge the likelihood that many owners will lack access to
residential charging, which will substantially increase their operating expenses. Consistent
reliance on fast charging also shortens electric vehicle battery life, resulting in a need to replace
the battery and/or the vehicle more frequently. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
304 See, West Virginia, 142 S.Ct. at 2612-13 (stating that EPA admitted that opining on trends in
electricity transmission, distribution, and storage requires technical and policy expertise not traditionally
needed in EPA regulatory development and finding that there is little reason to think Congress assigned
such decisions to the EPA).
If EJ is truly a commitment for EPA, it should carefully consider criticisms like those leveled
by The Two Hundred, which point out the disproportionate impacts to working and minority
communities as a result of California's climate approach regarding electrified transport; those
impacts and concerns remain true, and indeed are magnified under the proposed standards.305
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
305 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, The Two Hundred for Homeownership, et al. v. California Air Resources
Board, et al., No. 1:22-CV-01474.
It is critical from the outset to design standards to minimize the potential for price shocks and
supply disruptions. As written, the proposal ultimately benefits electric vehicle manufacturers at
the expense of disadvantaged communities by subsidizing unaffordable transportation that is not
fit for the purposes of commuting to and from EJ communities. At minimum, EPA should
perform a thorough EJ assessment specific to its LDV proposal that is comprehensive of both
transport challenges and impacts faced by EJ stakeholders and the government-wide Justice40
Initiative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
The average purchase price of EV cars in 2022 was approximately $65,000, which is more
than what 46 percent of American households earn in income in a year.306 While the average
"used" EV sold for $42,895 in March of 2023.307 While EPA's DRIA anecdotally indicates that
"emerging consensus suggests that purchase price parity is likely to occur by the mid-2020's for
some vehicle segments and models"308, Ford CEO Jim Farley told attendees at its 2023 Capital
Markets Days that EV cost parity may not come until after 2030.309 Moreover US auto makers
are focusing their efforts on producing higher priced electric SUVs and trucks, including Fords
$100,000 F150 Lightening Platinum310 and GM's announcement that its luxury brands, Cadillac
and Buick, will be its first all-electric product lineups.311 While smaller EV's like the Chevy
Bolt, touted by the Biden Administration as being affordable alternatives, are being
discontinued.312 The reality is that most middle- and lower-income families simply cannot
afford to purchase a new or used EV, even when taking into account available tax incentives and
rebates. In fact, middle - and lower -income families are more likely to purchase older used
vehicle, due to their lower upfront costs, and to hold onto those vehicles for longer periods.313
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
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306 Kelly Blue Book and Cox Automotive Average Transaction Prices Reports; and Average, Median, Top
1% and all United States Household Income Percentiles, DQYJD
307 What to know about buying a used electric vehicle as more hit the auto sale market, CNBC, May 21,
2023
308 EPA DRIA, 3.1.3.1,4-15
309 Ford CEO says EV cost parity may not come until after 2030, Reuters, May 31, 2023
310 https://www.ford.com/trucks/fl50/fl50-lightning/models/
311 Cadillac and Buick will be GM's first all-EV brands, Automotive News, July 1, 2022
312 GM Killed the Chevy Bolt- and the dream of a small, affordable EV, The Verge, April 26, 2023
313 Supporting Lower-Income Households' Purchase of Clean Vehicles: Implications From California-
wide Survey Results, UCLA Luskin Center for Innovation, 2020
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC) (DONE)
In addition, it is also uncertain how complimentary US policies (infrastructure, utility
capacity, consumer incentives etc.) could impact consumer demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0624, p. 2]
Organization: Western Energy Alliance (DONE in readiness memo and in advantages and
disadvantages)
Technical Infeasibility and Impracticalities for Consumers: EPA uses flawed analysis about
the technical feasibility of the rule, but the behavior aspects are also seriously deficient. There is
little evidence that EVs are being accepted by consumers other than a small niche of high-end,
wealthy individuals who can afford to purchase an expensive vehicle with limited range. 11
Given the long refueling times and battery drain when operating the heater or air conditioning,
only those who can afford a second or third vehicle for exclusive use in-town are currently
purchasing EVs. There has been no evidence to date that these problems of limited range and
functionality will be overcome soon to achieve the high market penetration EPA hopes with this
rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 6]
11 The Energy Information Administration (EIA) shows that 2/3 of households with EVs have incomes
over $100,000. Electrified vehicles continue to see slow growth and less use than conventional vehicles,
EIA, May 2018
EPA's assertion is simply not supported by facts:
"The year-over-year growth in U.S. PEV sales suggests that an increasing share of new
vehicle buyers are concluding that a PEV is the best vehicle to meet their needs. Many of the
zero-emission vehicles already on the market today cost less to operate than ICE vehicles, offer
improved performance and handling, have a driving range similar to that of ICE vehicles, and
can be charged at a growing network of public chargers as well as at home." (p. 29189) [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 6]
At only 5.8% of new vehicle sales, EVs has a long way to go to meet the targets EPA is
setting of 67%, a more than ten-fold increase that is a far goal from the "increasing share of new
vehicle buyers..Further, asserting that the range is similar to an ICEV is preposterous,
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especially in anything less than the most favorable mild weather conditions, as EVs lose range in
cold and hot weather. 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 6]
12 Winter & Cold Weather EV Range Loss in 7,000 Cars, Recurrent, December 12, 2022.
Organization: Wisconsin Automobile and Truck Dealers Association
The EPA also cites trends showing an increased demand for the EV product. What the EPA
does not recognize is huge increases in trends are easy to show when the starting point is single
digit percentages. The EPA does not recognize that many families show interest in adding an
EV to their household, not forsaking ICE vehicles all together. Consumers recognize that the
network will take over a decade to build out. The desired and necessary ranges and convenience
can currently only be met by ICE vehicles. Yet the EPA is comfortable in driving the price of
both ICE and EV technology to the point of completely unaffordable. The Midwest consumer
will be forced to drive their ICE vehicle beyond the average of 12 years, and/or purchase an EV
that will not be able to keep their family warm in the winter, achieve the necessary range in the
winter, and overwhelm an electrical grid that Northern Wisconsin will not be able upgrade due to
numerous reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0494, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
2. There is Strong Consumer Demand for EVs
American consumers are quickly becoming accustomed to EVs, and demand is rising rapidly
as EVs become more ubiquitous. From 2020 to 2022, Consumer Reports found there was a
350% increase in consumer demand for EVs.5 A similar ZETA poll found that 71% of
Americans are considering an electric vehicle for their next car.6 The best-selling vehicle
worldwide in the first quarter of 2023 was Tesla's Model Y, an all-electric SUV.7 In the U.S.,
Tesla's Model 3 was ranked 10th for overall vehicle sales, and the Model Y came in 4th-behind
the top-3 vehicles which were all pickup trucks.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 6]
5 "Excess Demand - The Looming EV Shortage," Consumer Reports, (March 2023)
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Excess-Demand-The-Looming-EV-
Shortage.pdf
6 "New National Poll Shows That A Large, Bipartisan Majority of Voters Favor Policies To Accelerate
Electric Vehicle Adoption," ZETA, (March 28, 2022) https://www.zeta2030.org/news/new-national-poll-
shows-that-a-large-bipartisan-majority-of-voters-favor-policies-to-accelerate-electric-vehicle-adoption
7 "Tesla Model Y Was The World's Best-Selling Car In Q1 2023," Motorl, (May 25, 2023) accessed June
18, 2023 https://www.motorl.com/news/669135/tesla-model-y-worlds-best-selling-car-ql-2023/
8 "The 25 Bestselling Cars, Trucks, and SUVs of 2023 (So Far)," Car and Driver, (April 10, 2023)
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g43553191/bestselling-cars-2023/
This strong interest in EVs is expected to continue to grow throughout 2023, with more than
two million EVs sold in the first quarter of this year. IEA expects more than 14 million EVs will
be sold globally this year, which would comprise 18% of total passenger vehicle sales. 9 In fact,
demand for EVs is expected to exceed supply at the current trajectory. Consumer Reports found
there are 45 buyers for every EV produced. 10 Today, EV demand is driven by factors that
include cost-savings, environmental protection, increasing model availability, and the ability of
an EV to meet a driver's day-to-day needs. The adoption of more stringent emissions standards
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would incentivize the production of more EVs to meet growing consumer demand while also
spurring innovation and increased model availability to meet the needs of an increasingly wider
range of consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 6]
9 "Demand for electric cars is booming, with sales expected to leap 35% this year after a record-breaking
2022," IEA, (April 26, 2023) https://www.iea.org/news/demand-for-electric-cars-is-booming-with-sales-
expected-to-leap-35-this-year-after-a-reco rd-breaking-2022
10 Id. at footnote 5
a. Consumers Prefer to Drive EVs
One of the easiest ways to convert drivers to an EV is to get them behind the wheel of one.
EVs have faster acceleration, are a quieter ride, and have a low center of gravity making for a
safer and more enjoyable drive. 11 As a result, performance is the most frequently cited reason
(75%) among drivers who switched to a premium EV. 12 According to J.D. Power, the Rivian
R1T ranks highest overall among premium EVs, with a satisfaction score of 794 out of 1,000-
points. In particular, owners are pleased with the RIT's driving performance and style. 13 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 6-7]
11 "Top 5 Reasons to Drive Electric," California Air Resource Board, accessed June 30, 2023
https://driveclean.ca.gov/top-reasons
12 "Owner Satisfaction Gets a Jolt from New Models as Electric Vehicle Market Grows, J.D. Power
Finds," J.D. Power, (February 28, 2023) https://www.jdpower.com/business/press-releases/2023-us-
electric-vehicle-experience-evx-ownership-study
13 Id. at footnote 12
A study by AAA found that once drivers own an EV, their previously held concerns (e.g.,
range anxiety, cost, lack of charging) largely disappear. For example, 77% said they had little to
no range anxiety after owning an EV. 14 This underscores that many of the commonly-cited
barriers to EV adoption can be addressed through experience and education. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, pp.6-7]
14 "Owning an Electric Vehicle is the Cure for Most Consumer Concerns," AAA Newsroom, (January 22,
2020) https://newsroom.aaa.eom/2020/01/aaa-owning-an-electric-vehicle-is-the-cure-for-most-consumer-
concerns/
In addition to vehicle owners who purchase an EV for personal use, there are a growing
number of rideshare operators purchasing or renting EVs. These drivers travel significantly more
miles than a typical American, which is on average 40 miles a day. 15 Additionally, they have
expressed satisfaction with the EV driving experience. Because of the greater distance traveled,
rideshare drivers stand to see the greatest fuel and maintenance cost savings. In fact, cost savings
were the number one reason ride-share drivers adopted an EV. Not only have EV drivers seen
higher earnings, but 94% of drivers have reported a positive experience with their EV,16 and up
to 93% of them would choose an EV as their next vehicle according to a survey of Uber
drivers. 17 Among drivers who do not currently use an EV, more than 60% would switch to an
EV.18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 6-7]
15 "Average Miles Driven Per Year: Why It Is Important," Kelley Blue Book, (May 15, 2023)
https://www.kbb.com/car-advice/average-miles-driven-per-year
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16 "Equitable Electrification: Early Findings from the Uber-Hertz Partnership," Uber Under the Hood,
(September 15, 2022) https://medium.com/uber-under-the-hood/equitable-electrification-early-findings-
from-the-uber-hertz-partnership-27 74b6f3 9d9b
17 "How Uber helps drivers go electric," Uber Under the Hood, (August 29, 2022)
https://medium.com/uber-under-the-hood/how-uber-helps-drivers-go-electric-9e637b69f4de
18 Id. at footnote 17
Many consumers prefer to purchase American-made products and vehicles are no exception.
Fortunately, some of the top-selling EVs are made in America. In fact, the top two vehicles on
Cars.com American Made Index are the Tesla Model Y and Model 3, with the Model X and
Model S coming in 5th and 6th place, respectively. 19 With increasing domestic production
requirements tied to the EV tax credit in the IRA, more EVs will be manufactured in America.
Automakers have already announced new EV factories across the country, with new models such
as the Rivian R1T, Lucid Air, Ford's F-150 Lightning, Polestar 3, and Volkswagen ID.4 being
produced in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 7-8]
19 "2023 Cars.com American-Made Index: Which Cars Are the Most American?," Cars.com, (June 21,
2023) https://www.cars.com/articles/2023-cars-com-american-made-index-which-cars-are-the-most-
american-467465/
Another reason the EV market is growing is simply because consumers prefer the new
features and technology in EVs. An article published in June 2023 from Inside Climate News
indicated that while some people buy an EV on principle, the rapid rise in sales is poised to
continue because consumers like the features that EVs offer.20 This includes features such as
longer battery ranges, faster acceleration, lower total cost of ownership, and that EVs have a
higher ride quality than comparable ICEV. As more features are added and technology of EVs
improves, more consumers are likely to switch just based on those facts, independent of the
environmental or climate change incentive to do so. This indicates that the EV market is
broadening to a wider consumer base, which further amplifies the trend of greater adoption
among consumers that the market is currently experiencing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
pp. 7-8]
20 "It's the Features, Stupid: EV Market Share Is Growing Because the Vehicles Keep Getting Better,"
Inside Climate News, (June 8, 2023) https://insideclimatenews.org/news/08062023/inside-clean-energy-
electric-vehicle-market-features/
b. EV Sales are Increasing
Consumer demand for EVs has grown exponentially over the last few years and so too have
EV sales. Global passenger EV sales jumped from 1 million in 2017 to over 10 million in 2022.
In the first half of the decade, it took the same amount of time for sales to grow from 100,000 to
1 million.27 This is because Consumer demand is increasing, and will continue to do so as more
and more models for all different use cases are offered. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 9]
27 "Global EV Outlook 2023: Trends in electric light-duty vehicles," IEA, (2023)
https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2023/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles
In California, EVs comprised more than 21% of new car sales in the first quarter of 2023.28
Much of the growth in the electric vehicle stock has occurred over the last few years, with nearly
10% of all EVs sold in the U.S. occurring in the first quarter of 2023. The U.S. is on pace to sell
over 1 million EVs this year.29 The more than 300,000 EVs sold in Q1 is nearly equivalent to
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the total number sold in the entirety of 2020. Figure 1 depicts the exponential growth in EV sales
since 2011. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 9]
28 "Record-Shattering EV Sales Continue in Q1 2023 as California Reaches the 1.5 Million EVs Sold
Milestone Two Years Ahead of Schedule," Veloz, (April 21, 2023) https://www.veloz.org/record-
shattering-ev-sales-continue-california-reaches-l-5-million-evs-sold/
29 "Chart: EV sales on pace to break 1 million in US this year," Canary Media, (April 21, 2023)
https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/electric-vehicles/chart-ev-sales-on-pace-to-break-l-million-in-us-
this-year
[See original comment for Figure 1: EV Sales in California and the U.S. as of April 2023]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 9]
30 Id. at footnote 28
c. State Consumer Incentive Programs are Well-Utilized
In the United States, clear evidence exists that consumer incentives drive EV sales. The states
with the greatest number of EV registration per thousand people were California, Hawaii,
Washington, Oregon, Vermont, and Colorado.31 These states all have relatively generous state
and local subsidies in addition to available federal subsidies. However, the surge in EV demand
and uptick in applications for state rebates and incentives is leading several states to actually halt
their programs due to overwhelming demand. It is evident that consumers are increasingly
choosing an EV for their next vehicle, and policy development must keep pace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, pp. 10-11]
31 "These 7 US states lead the nation in EV registrations," Green Car Reports, (March 12, 2023)
https://www.greencarreports.com/news/1138974_these-7-us-states-lead-the-nation-in-ev-registrations
New Jersey
Rebate programs like "Charge Up New Jersey" have contributed to the significant growth in
EV sales in the Garden State. In May 2020, New Jersey began to offer a $5,000 rebate for EV
purchases. Since then, annual EV sales increased by over 40% in 2020 from 2019, which was the
highest growth rate in the nation.32 Over that period, Charge Up New Jersey has dispersed
funding for more than 25,000 new EVs in the state. In total, there are more than 91,000 EVs on
the roads of New Jersey.33 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 10-11]
32 "Annual Enacted EV Policies More Than Double Between 2015 and 2020," Atlas EV Hub, (May 7,
2021) https://www.atlasevhub.com/data_story/annual-enacted-ev-policies-more-than-double-between-
2015-and-2020/
33 "New Jersey halts electric vehicle rebates; demand too high," Associated Press, (April 18, 2023)
https://apnews.com/article/new-jersey-electric-vehicle-rebate-02c6965ef22f23ffc88fcc4f68857955
However, the program well exceeded expectations and the program was paused three months
earlier than planned as it had already exceeded its $35 million annual budget after providing
rebates to more than 10,000 New Jerseyans who qualified that year.34 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, pp. 10-11]
34 Id. at footnote 33
Oregon
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A similar situation occurred in Oregon, as they paused the Oregon Clean Vehicle Rebate
program in May of 2023. It surpassed its $15.5 million budget as the program became more
popular than anticipated.35 Unless additional funding is provided by the state, the program will
not be restarted until the next fiscal year begins March 2024. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
pp. 10-11]
35 "Oregon to temporarily suspend popular EV rebate program," OPB, (March 15, 2023)
https://www.opb.org/article/2023/03/15/oregon-ev-rebate-program-electric-vehicles-environment-
greenhouse-gas-e missions
Next year, the estimated program costs are over $33 million, more than doubling this year's
budget.36 While the pause on the credit might be disappointing for EV purchasers in the state, it
is a positive sign that EV adoption is growing and federal, state, and local policies need to adopt
accordingly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 10-11]
36 Id. at footnote 35
California
California leads the U.S. in EV sales with over 1 million full BEV registrations as of April
2023- making up 40% of the total US EV fleet. In the first quarter of 2023, EVs comprised
21.1% of all vehicle sales in the state.37 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 11]
37 "New ZEV Sales in California," California Energy Commission, accessed June 28, 2023
https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-
statistics/new-zev- sales
California's success in EV market share is partially due to their Clean Vehicle Rebate Project
(CVRP), the first state incentive for EV purchasers. Since 2010, the program has provided more
than 500,000 rebates.38 To cut costs, the program was modified to target more lower-income
residents by setting income and MSRP caps. This was because the program was oversubscribed,
with demand far exceeding the program's budget. Every year, CVRP's funding runs out, with a
lengthy waitlist for when more funding becomes available.39 As of June 2023, there was more
than $275 million in funding available for the CVRP program.40 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, p. 11]
38 "Why States Need Electric Vehicle Incentives Now," Center for Sustainable Energy, (March 27, 2023)
https://energycenter.org/thought-leadership/blog/why-states-need-electric-vehicle-incentives-now
39 "California Electric Car Rebate: Everything You Need to Know," Car and Driver, accessed June 28,
2023 https://www.caranddriver.com/research/a31267652/california-ev-tax-credit/
40 "CVRP Overview," California Clean Vehicle Rebate Project, accessed June 30, 2023
https://cleanvehiclerebate.org/en/cvrp-info
e. EV Production and New Model Availability
EVs are now available in all light- and medium-duty classes, with many presenting owners
with a favorable total cost of ownership today. That should be expected to further improve over
the MY 2027-2032 time frame covered by these proposed emissions standards and continued
innovation by industry will only increase product offerings and vehicle capabilities in the coming
years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 70]
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While EV manufacturing investments in the U.S. have been ramping up over the past decade,
the passage of the BIL and IRA have supercharged investment. Before the passage of these bills,
several automakers had already committed to electrify large portions or all of their vehicle
offerings. These targets were in recognition of the need to meet environmental goals and a result
of the market's movement towards EVs. As EPA notes in the proposed rule, several major
automakers set ambitious goals for a 100% electrified fleet. To meet these targets, they have
significantly expanded their EV model offerings alongside manufacturing capability. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 70]
EPA Summary and Response
Many individuals and institutions spoke to the issues related to demand,472 including
consumer preferences and attitudes, purchase decision, and sales. The following, very general
logical sequence applies to these comments. Many factors underpin preferences and attitudes.
Preferences and attitudes drive the desire to consider and purchase a particular vehicle or set of
vehicles. A purchase of a desired vehicle, or equivalently a sale, takes place if the desired vehicle
is available and best matches a consumer's criteria. Comments also vary from general to specific.
Some are descriptive and, when substantiated, are derived from survey results, sales statistics,
sales projections, or some combination thereof. Some leverage assumed or demonstrated causal
relationships (i.e., factors underpinning preferences and attitudes, purchase decision, and sales).
We organize our responses to the content of these comments from general to specific, and as a
consequence, address sales and market share and projections followed by survey-based
comments and assertions about causal relationships.
Before we proceed with our response to demand-related comments, we make three
overarching observations. First, as in RTC Chapter 13.1, we note that the vast majority of
comments regarding demand relate to light-duty BEVs and PHEVs. A smaller number of
demand-related comments address ICE and hybrid vehicles and medium-duty vehicles. This
distribution of comments will be evident in the summary and response.
Second, public relations (PR) announcements, news media, and surveys (sometimes referred
to as "stated preference"), sales and registration statistics which are direct measures of behavior
(sometime referred to as "revealed preference"), and sales projections (often achieved through
modeling of some sort) are all generally accepted forms of information or methods that inform
this rulemaking. Each has well known advantages and disadvantages. Commenters have tended
to focus on disadvantages. For example, people and organizations do not always behave in ways
that are consistent with what they say. Historical sales and registration data for PEV adopters has
been limited to a small percentage of households and small number of vehicles, and preferences
are inferred from sales and registration statistics, not truly "revealed." Models are careful,
simplified representations of systems; projections are not predictions. Each of these methods,
however, has advantages, too. In response to comments that deride these methods and their
applicability to this rulemaking, we note that EPA is mindful of the advantages and
disadvantages of different types of information and methods. We integrate information from
many sources, including data on PEV adopters, survey information from PEV adopters and non-
PEV adopters, manufacturer announcements, public comments, known relationships between
472 We employ a colloquial definition of "demand" that include preferences attitudes, quantity consumed, purchase
behavior, and purchases.
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factors underlying consumer purchase and use behaviors, and historical evidence regarding the
uptake of technological advancements. EPA's analyses are rooted in the full body of relevant
science, and we believe our findings are reasonable and robust as discussed in RIA Chapter 4.
Third, commenters perceive and frame information differently, even when the information is
identical. For example, in EPA's review of PEV acceptance, we cite a UC Davis study in which
roughly one in five PEV owners replaced their PEV with an ICE vehicle (Hardman & Tal, 2021).
Some comments presented this information as evidence of low PEV acceptance and losses in
future sales. In contrast, EPA's presentation of that information was positive. We observed 80%
continuance under past circumstances that were far less favorable than what exists now and will
exist in the future. Given, for example, the smaller number or vehicle models available at the
time of the UC Davis study, the lower average range of PEVs during that time, the absence of the
BIL and IRA incentives, and less expansive charging infrastructure during that timeframe - all of
which are obstacles to PEV adoption and retention - an 80% continuance rate "reveals" a rather
high level of consumer satisfaction with PEVs. PEV satisfaction (aka "approval" per (Jackman,
Fujita, Yang, & Taylor, 2023)) is a key enabler of PEV adoption. Similarly, while some
comments cite recent PEVs sales statistics to argue that EPA's PEV market share projections are
"overly optimistic," Energy Innovation offers a very different interpretation. They note that "the
U.S. hit an all-time high of EV sales" and proceed with a discussion of how the "U.S. has
exceeded the 5 percent tipping point for EVs" and laud the "increasing EV ranges and overall
improvement to performance" that "will continue the positive feedback loop ... further
accelerating adoption of EVs in this decade." Relatedly, some commenters, such as the American
Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce, suggest that EPA has inappropriately described
historical growth in PEV production, number and diversity of PEV models, PEV sales, and/or
PEV demand as "rapid" or some synonymous wording. While the definition of "rapid" and
synonyms may be arguable, we have documented the mathematically exponential growth in PEV
production, the number of PEV models, and PEV sales in the Preamble Section IV.
Correspondingly, approval of PEVs have grown and are expected to continue to grow
exponentially assuming that the number of PEVs that consumers want is at least equal to sales
and may be higher if there is unmet demand or supply shortages.473
Non-PEV Demand
Several commenters highlight current and future demand for hybrid, PHEV, and ICE vehicles
as well as the attributes of these vehicles. These commenters asserted that demand for these
vehicles was not adequately reflected in the proposal. For example, Consumer Report states that
"CRs's 2022 nationally representative car buying survey of 6,960 US adults found that 32% of
consumers planning to purchase or lease a vehicle within a year were considering a hybrid car or
truck.... EPA's modeling that shows that this popular and cost-effective technology will be
completely abandoned by the entire market by the end of the decade is at odds with the data on
consumer preferences for these vehicles." Some of these commenters also claimed that some
attributes of ICE vehicles were superior to PEVs. For example, API states that "vehicles powered
by internal combustion engines (ICE) offer outstanding drivability and reliability" in contrast to
473 Relatedly, we apply Roger's (2003) diffusion of innovation framework in estimating future PEV acceptance and
adoption. See RIA Chapter 4.1.2.2.2. In this framework, as observed for many technologies, early levels of
technology adoption are often low and unpredictable, and also exponential, after which growth in adoption
accelerates.
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the "reliability issues" of EVs. Regarding comments that EVs are less reliable than ICE vehicles,
we note that, as discussed in Chapter 4.3.7 of the RIA, and Section VIII.B.3 of the preamble,
research indicates that maintenance and repair costs for PEVs is lower than that for ICE vehicles,
and that when issues that may impact the reliability of PEVs arise, they are often covered under
warranty and are often related to infotainment or other technology features and not with
drivetrain or other major mechanical issues.474 In response to these and similar comments, we
repeat general responses from above. First, we have included PHEVs in our modeling for the
FRM. Second, we have demonstrated multiple compliance pathways that include BEVs, PHEVs,
hybrids, and ICE vehicles. Third, the standards are technology neutral. Via a logit formulation
that includes generalized cost elements (e.g., repair and maintenance costs) and non-cost
elements (e.g., perceptions of drivability and reliability) of purchase decisions, the consumer
module of OMEGA estimates distributions of consumer purchase decisions across vehicle
technologies. Critically, the non-cost elements of OMEGA's representation of vehicle choice
include acceptance of different vehicle technologies. As discussed in RIA Chapter 4.1, our
parameterization of PHEV acceptance is always lower than ICE vehicle acceptance, and BEV
acceptance for sedans, wagons, SUVs, and CUVs is lower than ICE vehicle acceptance until
2030.
A notable subset of comments addressed consumer preferences for vehicle performance
related to enrichment. EPA is not finalizing its proposal to limit enrichment, but instead will
revisit this issue in a future rulemaking, as discussed in section 4.1.6 of this RTC.
PEV Demand
Regarding PEVs, some commenters assert that consumer demand for PEVs may not or will
not be sufficient to match the EPA proposal's Central case estimates of new PEV sales in the
2027 to 2032 timeframe. For example, Stellantis describes EPA's "expectation for EV market
growth" as "overly optimistic." American Honda Motor Co., Inc. calls it "a staggeringly
optimistic assumption about the pace of technology transformation in the auto industry." Some
commenters note historical PEV sales statistics, compare them to EPA's proposed Central case
PEV penetrations, and conclude that EPA projections are implausible. They assert that EPA has
incorrectly extrapolated current PEV market share (i.e., roughly 9 percent of new vehicle sales in
the first quarter of 2023) to unreasonably high market shares for PEVs in 2027 and later. These
arguments derive from a few lines of reasoning. Some commenters incorrectly characterize PEV
market shares from the Central case as assumptions. Other commenters point to factors
underlying demand such as vehicle attributes (e.g., range, purchase price), current and/or future
system conditions (e.g., electric grid and EVSE availability, capacity, and reliability), and
preferences, needs, and use cases or attributes of consumers or certain groups of consumers (e.g.,
long distance driving, towing, low income).
In response, first, we note that EPA is finalizing GHG standards that are less stringent than
the proposal in the early years of the program to provide additional lead time for manufacturers,
and thus, the pace of PEV penetration projected under the final standards is slower than that of
the proposed standards. Second, EPA has not "assumed" growth in PEV adoption. Rather, we
474 Clean Technica, "Adding Context to That Consumer Reports Electric Car Reliability Report", January 2024,
https://cleantechnica.com/2023/12/03/adding-context-to-that-consumer-reports-electric-car-reliability-report/ and
Green Cars, "Are Electric Cars More Reliable?", July 2023, https://www.greencars.com/expert-insights/are-electric-
cars-more-reliable.
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have estimated vehicle technology adoption using OMEGA. PEV adoption estimates are model
outputs that follow from several modeling inputs, including acceptance, technology costs, and
consumer costs. They also follow from the modeled interaction of producer and consumer
decision making. See RIA Chapters 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3. Consumer acceptance of PEVs, a precursor
of PEV adoption, is represented with shareweight parameters. The parameterization of consumer
acceptance is supported by the scientific literature and consistent with third party estimates. See
RIA Chapter 4.1. Acceptance parameters for PEVs increase but do not exceed ICE vehicle
acceptance in any of the demonstrated compliance pathways except the Faster BEV Acceptance
case. We received no comments that negatively assess our parameterization of BEV acceptance
but did receive positive support for our parameterization of BEV acceptance (e.g., Jeremy
Michalek et al.).
Many commenters, in addition to expressing concerns regarding insufficient demand, point to
factors underlying negative or ambivalent attitudes toward PEVs, and therefore insufficient
demand for and adoption thereof. In general, commenters attribute the factors limiting demand
for PEVs to characteristics of consumers, attributes of vehicles and consumers' perceptions
thereof, and market conditions. EPA conducted a thorough review of the scientific literature
regarding consumer acceptance of new, light-duty plug-in electric vehicles in the United States
and published primarily between 2016 and early 2022 (Jackman, Fujita, Yang, & Taylor, 2023).
Based on the scientific literature, we developed a framework to define and evaluate PEV
acceptance consisting of four stages - awareness, access, approval, and adoption. This
framework facilitated identification of enablers of and obstacles to PEV acceptance among new,
light-duty vehicle consumers in the U.S. attributable to consumer characteristics, attributes of
vehicles, and market conditions.
The obstacles and corresponding enablers identified via EPA's review of the consumer
acceptance literature encompasses the obstacles noted by commenters with few exceptions.
Thus, we refer readers to this report and specifically to Figure 8 in Jackman et al. (2023), which
provides a summary of enablers identified in the review. Note that PEV acceptance obstacles are
the converse of the enablers appearing in Figure 8. Note also that the brevity of the figure relies
upon combining concepts. For example, cold weather range is not explicitly shown in the Figure
but is encapsulated in location, range, and driving performance enablers and obstacles. With this
review in mind, there is significant overlap among the factors that commenters identify as
influencing demand and the enablers identified in EPA's review of PEV acceptance, though
commenters tend to frame them as obstacles (e.g., the inconvenience of inaccessible charging
rather than the convenience of accessible charging). In other words, EPA agrees with
commenters that many factors underly demand. EPA has identified the same or similar drivers of
demand that commenters identify with few exceptions. A key exception relates to the small
number of commenters who disagree with the conclusion that, as automakers have introduced
and continue to introduce additional PEV models, the U.S. has and will continue to experience
increasing PEV market shares. In response, we point to the evidence supporting the conclusion
that the introduction of additional PEV models invites consumers who might not otherwise
consider a PEV into the PEV market by virtue of satisfying consumers' non-compensatory,
inflexible criteria (e.g., body style) with more than one powertrain (e.g., BEV, PHEV, hybrid,
and/or ICE vehicle), which appears to be a more flexible criteria for consumers on average
(Fujita, Yang, Taylor, & Jackman, 2022) (Taylor, Fujita, & Campbell, 2024 ). Forsythe et al.
(2023), published in PNAS, show that "when consumers' basic demands for vehicle attributes
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are met, they accept or prefer BEVs to combustion vehicles." (EPA discusses this paper in
further detail in RIA Chapter 4). Furthermore, and more generally, factors identified by
commenters which do not appear in this review in some fashion, do not, in EPA's assessment,
significantly affect consumer acceptance for PEVs. For example, a commenter's interest in the
U.S. as a global policy leader does not significantly affect consumer acceptance of PEVs.
Some commenters challenge EPA's assessment that these enablers are present and growing
and that these obstacles have been and are continuing to be fewer and less consequential to PEV
adoption. In other words, these comments argue that, for example, charging infrastructure will
not grow fast enough, the grid will not be reliable enough, supply chains will not be sufficiently
robust, critical minerals will be scarce, or prices will be higher. In summary, some commenters
argue that conditions will not be as we estimate in the Central case and will not support the PEV
adoption projected in our Central case. In response to those comments, we refer readers to
respective sections of the Preamble, RIA, and this RTC for the analyses of the many enablers of
PEV acceptance (e.g., grid, infrastructure, battery technology, supply chain, critical minerals).
Our conclusion from the most current and best science available, described in those sections, is
that the enablers and obstacles of PEV acceptance have been and are likely to continue to evolve
over time in a way that is consistent with our Central case representation of consumers' purchase
decisions and resulting PEV market shares.
Many comments cite a variety of PEV advantages and disadvantages as impediments to
adoption of PEVs, especially among mainstream consumers. In response, we do not agree or
disagree uniformly with any of posed advantages or disadvantages. Rather we note that these
advantages and disadvantages are not inherent to the vehicle. What is perceived as an advantage
or disadvantage depends on the consumer (e.g., driver, household, and user) and on the context,
which are heterogenous and dynamic. Thus, we also disagree with commenters who claim that
BEVs are or will remain a niche market (e.g., Western Energy Alliance). We note that current
PEV owners differ from non-PEV owners - e.g., higher income, technological affinity, pro-
environmental - but they are diverse (i.e., not a monolith) and changing (Jackman, Fujita, Yang,
& Taylor, 2023). In other words, PEV adopters are starting to look more and more like
mainstream consumers and we expect this trend to accelerate as PEV adoption increases (Taylor,
Fujita, & Campbell, 2024 ). In addition, a large number of non-PEV owners appear to be well-
positioned and "ready" right now to add a PEV to their households. One study shows that many
non-PEV owners share important enabling characteristics with PEV owners (Fujita, Campbell, &
Taylor, 2024). This does not include all of the current non-PEV owners who will be drawn into
the PEV market via PEVs on-going technological improvements, purchase incentives, exposure
to PEVs, experience with PEVs, fuel savings, maintenance and repair savings, charging
convenience, expanding infrastructure, increased productions, and more PEV model choices
among other enablers.
Different from the evolution of PEV acceptance enablers are consumers' perceptions of
themselves, vehicle capabilities, and context. For example, even when vehicle range, charging
access, and charging speeds meet or exceed consumers' perceived needs, the "key apprehension"
regarding "charging capabilities" that American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers claims is
present "for nearly half of the U.S. consumer market" may impede PEV adoption. In this case
the key enablers support awareness, that is, exposure to and experience with PEVs and accurate
information about PEV technology and the practical aspects of PEV ownership. Environmental
and Public Health Organizations highlights the importance of awareness with regard to PEV
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acceptance in rural areas: "This concept could also shed light on one possible reason that PEV
sales percentages have been unevenly distributed across the nation, with more sales in cities than
rural areas, in a way that minimizes any concerns that rural consumers could have insufficient
demand for PEVs. A 2023 survey conducted by the Union of Concerned Scientists and
Consumer Reports 'uncovered] that there isn't sufficient familiarity with EVs in rural areas. The
overwhelming majority of respondents—96%—has never owned or leased an EV.' The survey
found that only 6% of rural respondents said they were very familiar with the fundamentals of
buying and owning an EV, while 30% said they were somewhat familiar, and concluded that
'[o]ne of the reasons for this lack of familiarity could be the scarcity of EVs in rural areas: only
27%) of rural dwellers have seen an EV in their neighborhood in the past month compared to
more than half of urban dwellers, and even fewer have a friend, relative or co-worker who owns
an EV. A whopping 90%> of rural dwellers have never been a passenger in an EV, and almost
nobody has ever driven one.' As efforts are made to increase familiarity with PEVs in rural
areas, more Americans will learn about the very real benefits and advantages of PEVs, especially
for rural drivers ..., and this "neighbor effect" will begin to take hold in more places." EPA
logically extends the argument made above to other areas and subpopulations where the primary
obstacles to PEV adoption is awareness.
Other commenters indicate that demand for PEVs is very strong, will continue to grow, and
perhaps surpass EPA estimates of PEV market penetration. For example, according to California
Attorney General's Office et al., "consumer demand for electric vehicles has significantly risen,
in large part due to environmental concerns, greater vehicle choice, improved battery capacity,
and cost savings." Citing "the past decade of increasing EV ranges and overall improvements to
performance as more models become available" Jeremy Michalek et al. compared EPA
projections to their "empirical investigation of (1) past trends in consumer preferences and (2)
expected technology trends." They find that "large increases in consumer demand for BEVs in
the near future is feasible.. .Mainstream consumer demand for BEVs is likely to sharply increase
due to expected BEV technology improvements alone... BEV demand could grow high enough
by 2030 so that BEVs become the majority of new passenger cars, and SUVs nearly the majority,
through expected BEV technology improvements and equal availability of BEVs and
conventional vehicles... These findings do not incorporate the reduced cost of maintenance and
repair or the cost of at-home charger installation. If the net balance of these provides cost savings
to consumers as the EPA predicts, then [Jeremy Michalek et al.] would expect consumer demand
for BEVs would be even larger than predicted in their study."
Consumer Reports (CR) describes a virtuous circle in which consumer demand for PEVs will
continue to grow. "As automakers deliver more volume, economies of scale and intensified
competition for customers will further feed cost declines, which will feed back into the cycle,
and lead to increased EV demand." Consumer Reports argues that we have already observed this
effect. "This is because the barriers to EV adoption identified in CR's 2022 survey of BEV and
low carbon fuels awareness are being addressed: purchase cost for EVs is declining, charging
infrastructure is expanding, consumers are gaining more experience with EVs, and automakers
are investing in new models and increased production. These trends tend to reinforce one another
in a virtuous cycle to create even more demand for these vehicles." In response and as is evident
in the Central case of the FRM, we agree that PEV demand is strong, growing, and part of a
positive feedback loop wherein PEV adoption leads to more PEV adoption. Like Consumer
Reports, EPA interprets the large collection of PEV acceptance enablers (and diminishing
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obstacles) as part of a robust feedback loop. But some commenters, in contrast, provide a
different interpretation. In our view, they misrepresent each enabler as a necessary condition. In
this interpretation, every single enabler is required for PEV acceptance to increase/for PEV
market shares to grow. In other words, the absence of any single enabler entirely undermines
PEV acceptance. Relatedly, Volvo Car Corporation highlights the uncertainty of interacting
enablers, that is the uncertainty regarding "how complimentary US policies (infrastructure,
utility capacity, consumer incentives etc.) could impact consumer demand."475 In response, we
disagree with the interpretation that the system of enablers is fragile. Notably, PEV adoption has
already grown primarily based on technology advancement (Forsythe, Gillingham, Michalek, &
Whitefoot, 2023). The introduction of more PEV models, especially SUVs and pickups, has
brought more new car buyers into the PEV market. Purchase incentives lead to more purchases.
Easy, accessible charging leads to higher PEV satisfaction; higher satisfaction correlates with
more purchases. Environmental and Public Health Organizations quotes Forsythe et al. (2023) in
their comments, "With the assumed technological innovations, even if all purchase incentives
were entirely phased out, BEVs could still have a market share of about 50% relative to
combustion vehicles by 2030, based on consumer choice alone." While these enablers can
enhance each other, the absence of any one of these enablers does not appear to diminish the
independent effect of the others. In short, the system doesn't have to be perfect for PEV
acceptance to increase and expand.
Consumer Heterogeneity
Many commenters assert that PEVs will not satisfy every consumer.476 For example,
Consumer Reports urges the EPA to "consider the needs of consumers in all demographic and
income levels," noting that interest in EVs is strong and diverse but knowledge, exposure, and
adoption are uneven. More specifically, commenters often note the challenges associated with
PEV adoption for specific use cases and certain groups of consumers. Use cases that appeared
frequently in comments include towing, hauling, long distance driving, and cold weather driving.
For example, GROWMARK, Inc. notes that "farmers use their trucks to take products to market,
bring supplies to their fields, and move livestock." Consumer groups mentioned frequently by
commenters include rural households, low-income populations, and used vehicle consumers. For
example, American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al. reminds us that "in
most of the United States, the share of EVs is zero or near-zero."
In response, EPA absolutely agrees that consumers are heterogeneous. To the extent that
evidence and scientific methods exist to characterize differences among consumers, we have
considered "the needs of consumers in all demographic and income levels." See RIA Chapters
4.1 and 4.2. We note, however, that the science of modeling consumer heterogeneity is not
sufficiently advanced to include in this rule making. In fact, in their comments Jeremy Michalek
et al. advise against attempting to capture additional consumer heterogeneity in our modeling
that is not already reflected in aggregate and on average via logit and shareweight parameters.
Furthermore, historical, "revealed preference" data on PEV adoption is too limited to support
robust distributional analyses. As a result, EPA has looked to survey data and qualitative
475 We note that uncertainty is inherent in any estimate, by definition, and goes both ways.
476 We recognize that consumers are heterogenous. We also believe that the vast majority of our commenters also
recognize that consumers are heterogeneous, whether they clearly state it or not.
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analyses to estimate PEV demand overall and consider differences among various U.S.
populations.
Many individuals and organizations provided results from a wide variety of surveys in their
comments on this rulemaking. We thank them for their contributions to an ever-growing set of
survey results regarding vehicle demand (or lack thereof). We note, however, that those
comments were not intended as a contribution to a body of scientific literature, but rather to
argue that PEV demand is (not) or will (not) be sufficient to support future PEV market shares
projected to be produced by manufacturers under the proposed standards . For example,
"Consumer Reports found that '71% of Americans expressed some level of interest in buying or
leasing an electric vehicle,' and 14% of Americans within that group would 'definitely buy' an
EV if they were in the market for a vehicle." American Fuel & Petrochemical stated that "41
percent of adults said they would never buy an EV, raising fundamental questions about how
EPA can predict that ZEV sales will reach 67 percent in 2032." The same survey also stated that
"a majority of Americans now say they are at least open to buying an EV in the future," and
acknowledged the limitations of surveys for assessing consumer acceptance, noting that
"[pjrevious Gallup polling has found that Americans aren't always the best judge of their future
behavior when it comes to technology. For example, as recently as 2000, a quarter of Americans
thought they'd never own a smartphone."477 A survey from Consumer Reports in 2022 indicates
that more than 70 percent of survey respondents felt that BEVs are as good or better than ICE
vehicles, up from about 46 percent in 2017 (Bartlett, 2022). One might conclude from this result
that 70 percent of respondents would have been willing to purchase a BEV in 2022, noting, at
minimum, that the percentage has grown significantly since 2017 and possibly also concluding
that the percentage will continue to grow dramatically after 2022. Furthermore, Consumer
Reports (CR) "car buying survey from March and April 2022 found that 30% of licensed drivers
who were then in the market to buy or lease a new (and not a used) vehicle were not even
considering a conventional, non-hybrid vehicle. This however, isn't just something consumers
are telling us, it's also showing up in the market. Sales of new ICE vehicles decreased by 26%
from 2019 to 2022, while combined sales of BEVs, PHEVs and conventional hybrids increased
by 144%. BEV sales alone increased by 244% over that same period." As illustrated with these
examples, survey results reflect a snapshot in time. They vary depending on many factors
including survey design and frame, sample population, sample, sampling design, and timing. In
short, none of the survey results provided by commenters were surprising or provocative. They
fit within the breadth of survey results with which we were already familiar. In addition, EPA is
well versed in the many pros and cons of survey design, sample design, data collection, statistical
summaries and inferences. Consistent with our intention to consider the full breadth and depth of
the scientific literature on PEV acceptance, many surveys as well as the survey statistics
provided by commenters informed EPA's parameterization of PEV acceptance in the Central
case as well as the sensitivity analysis of those parameters included in the final rule making.478
While the Central case estimates of market share are the most plausible and cost minimizing
477 https://news.gallup.com/poll/474095/americans-not-completely-sold-electric-vehicles.aspxt
478 Our modeling assumptions regarding PEV acceptance and consumer demand are based on the scientific literature
which we cite throughout the RIA, particularly in RIA Chapter 4, Chapter 8, and Chapter 9.
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pathway, we have demonstrated multiple, potential feasible compliance pathways that
manufacturers could choose .
In addition to acknowledging consumer heterogeneity, we also acknowledge that PEV
acceptance will occur at different rates for different consumers, and possibly not at all for some.
These differences among consumers are reflected in OMEGA. While OMEGA does not directly
represent different types of new vehicle consumers, the consumer module of OMEGA does
capture heterogeneity in new vehicle consumer choice in any given year (i.e., via the logit
parameters) and over time (i.e., via the shareweight parameters). OMEGA models the
distribution of choice across vehicle technologies via a generalized logit formulation that
includes generalized cost and non-cost elements of purchase decisions. See RIA Chapter 4.1. We
also note that all of the demonstrated compliance pathways in this FRM project that some
consumers will not purchase PEVs.
The modeling approach employed in OMEGA applies broadly to all use cases and consumer
groups. Our modeling does not exclude any use cases or consumer groups from the option of
choosing a PEV or any other available technology. EPA notes that PEV ownership is feasible
and acceptable to many consumers for towing, hauling, long distance driving, and cold weather
driving. EPA also notes that many consumer groups, including lower income buyers and non-
white consumers purchase PEVs and indicate interest in PEVs (Consumer Reports, 2022).
Furthermore, there appears to be no evidence that PEVs cannot meet the demands of many rural
consumers. Instead, there is evidence that information about, exposure to, and access to PEVs
and EVSE has been less in rural areas than in urban areas, and the resulting lack of awareness
and access has been the primary cause of lower adoption rates in rural areas. According to
comments from Environmental and Public Health Organizations, "A 2023 survey conducted by
the Union of Concerned Scientists and Consumer Reports 'uncovered] that there isn't sufficient
familiarity with EVs in rural areas. The overwhelming majority of respondents—96%—has
never owned or leased an EV.' The survey found that only 6% of rural respondents said they
were very familiar with the fundamentals of buying and owning an EV, while 30% said they
were somewhat familiar."479 Environmental and Public Health Organizations also note that
"although rural Americans are currently adopting PEVs at slower rates than urban Americans,
PEVs actually excel at meeting the demands of rural drivers. 'Fuel savings for rural households
are larger than for urban households, because trips in rural areas are longer than in urban areas,
and vehicles tend to be older and less efficient, requiring more fuel per mile, [PJEVs require
fewer trips to a mechanic for repairs and maintenance. Because of the high torque and low center
of gravity, they have excellent performance, which is important on rough, curvy and steep
roads.' A survey by the Union of Concerned Scientists and Consumer Reports found that 'there
is plenty of interest [in PEVs] in rural areas, but there is a huge knowledge gap about what it is
like to own an EV.'"480
Regarding low income and used vehicle market consumers emphasized by many commenters,
EPA recognizes that most consumers want and some really need both lower purchase price and
lower operating costs, and that different customers have different abilities to purchase vehicles at
any given price points. Not every consumer will be able to purchase a new motor vehicle,
whether that is a PEV or an ICE vehicle. At the same time, we expect that PEVs will generate
479 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 164]
48° [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 175]
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large savings for consumers over the lifetime of the vehicle, and we also see a significant trend
toward decreasing consumer upfront costs for purchasing PEVs. First, purchase incentives are
available for eligible new and used PEVs for buyers who qualify (See RIA Chapter 2.6.8).
Second, the price difference for BEVs is widely expected to narrow or disappear as the cost of
batteries and other components fall in the coming years.481 Among the many studies that address
cost parity of BEVs vs. ICE vehicles, an emerging consensus suggests that purchase price parity
is likely to begin occurring by the mid- to late-2020s for some vehicle segments and models, and
for a broader segment of the market on a total cost of ownership (TCO) basis (ICCT, 2022) (EDF
and ERM, 2022). Specifically, the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
projects that price parity with conventional vehicles will "occur between 2024 and 2026 for 150-
to 200-mile range BEVs, between 2027 and 2029 for 250- to 300-mile range BEVs, and between
2029 and 2033 for 350- to 400-mile range BEVs" (ICCT, 2022). The Environmental Defense
Fund notes that "most industry experts believe wide-spread price parity will happen around
2025" (EDF and ERM, 2022). By some accounts, a compact car with a relatively small battery
(for example, a 40 kilowatt-hour (kWh) battery and approximately 150 miles of range) may
already be possible to produce and sell for the same price as a compact ICE vehicle (Walton,
2020). Many expect total cost of ownership (TCO) parity to precede purchase price parity by
several years, as it accounts for the reduced cost of operation and maintenance for BEVs (ICCT,
2022) (EDF and ERM, 2022). See Preamble Sections IV.C.l and IV.C.6. Third, in our modeling,
we assume that a mix of technologies will be used to meet the standards. Our assessment projects
there will be variation in the types of technologies that automakers adopt to meet the standards,
providing consumers increased fuel economy and associated fuel savings via PEV and ICE
vehicle technologies in the new vehicle market and eventually also in the used vehicle market.
We expect that automakers recognize the diversity of their consumers and will leverage the
flexibilities built into the standards to provide consumers with PEV and ICE vehicle choices over
a wide range of utility and price points.
Uptake of technological advancements
In concluding our response to comments related to consumer demand, we acknowledge the
comments regarding the projected pace of PEV adoption. Most of those commenters indicated
that the pace was too rapid and not justified by available evidence. Some commenters
conjectured that the actual pace of PEV adoption will outpace EPA's projections as has been
observed in the past. As with any scientific or modeling endeavor, we agree with these
commenters that our Central case projections are not predictions. They may be too high or too
low. However, our Central case projections are the best estimate of technology market shares
based on our analyses of consumer demand and factors underlying consumer demand. Our
Central case projections are consistent, though more conservative as described in Section IV.C.6
of the preamble, with third party estimates. In other words, other researchers have reached the
same conclusion regarding likely rates of PEV uptake as the EPA. Nevertheless, we provide an
additional response to concerns about the projected demand for PEVs. We also note, that in
addition to our central case estimates, we present numerous sensitivity scenarios which
demonstrate that the standards can be met through various mixes of technologies including ICE,
hybrids, PHEV and BEVs, and thus a wide range of PEV levels.
481 International Council on Clean Transportation, "Assessment of Light-Duty Electric Vehicle Costs and Consumer
Benefits in the United States in the 2022-2035 Time Frame," October 2022.
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By most accounts, vehicle markets are in transition. In the words of American Honda Motor
Co., Inc., "Previous debates about whether such a transformation would occur are now merely
conversations about when it will happen. In fact, today all of industry is pursuing this transition
at a fever pace." Honda continues, however, by misrepresenting and exaggerating proposed,
projected PEV market shares as "requiring EVs to move beyond today's early adopters, past
ubiquity on main street, and extend to small towns and rural areas across the nation - all in a
mere eight years." They characterize these projections an "assumed swift and seamless EV
market transition." Furthermore, they state that "there is no historical auto industry analogue to
EPA's projected pace of EV adoption" and provide examples. They also highlight that "apart
from experiencing better fuel economy and vehicle performance, it is possible owners may not
have even known those technologies existed on the vehicle" which is, admittedly, different from
the consumer-facing nature of PEV technology and the "different approach to [PEV] use and
management".
In response, we acknowledge that it took several years for the PEV technologies to achieve
current levels of adoption, while also emphasizing that growth in PEV market share "has
outpaced historical estimates considered ambitious just a decade ago" according to comments
from Environment and Public Health Organizations. We also agree that it is important to
consider technology-specific factors when projecting technology adoption, particularly the
behavior changes and awareness and access challenges associate with PEVs that have been
identified by commenters as well as the EPA. We respond to the behavioral component of PEV
adoption in four ways. First, as noted about, we are aware of and have accounted for the
challenge of awareness and access in our estimates, as stated above. Second, unprecedented
public and private investment in vehicle electrification, separate from this rulemaking, has
occurred and is expected to continue. Third, EPA has engaged in similarly unprecedented
analyses, for example, regarding infrastructure, grid, supply chains, critical mineral availability,
related to PEV acceptance, as is clearly evidenced in the Preamble, RIA, and other sections of
this RTC. Fourth, we apply Rogers' robust theory of technology diffusion in our modeling of
PEV market shares. As Environmental and Public Health Organizations describes, "'sales move
at a crawl in the early-adopter phase, then surprisingly quickly once things go mainstream...
Before then, sales tend to be slow and unpredictable. Afterward, rapidly accelerating demand
ensues.' This S-shaped pace of technology adoption has been observed for numerous emerging
technologies since the early 1900s, including the telephone, the automobile, electricity,
refrigeration, clothes washers and dryers, air conditioning, microwaves, computers, cellphones,
and the internet." Though Honda notes this pattern as well, they compare the longer transition of
these technologies to the shorter, roughly decade-long transition to roughly two-thirds of new
vehicle sales being PEVs in EPA proposal. It is important to remember that EPA's proposal
projects new vehicle sales, not fleet composition. Statistics on telephones, microwaves, etc. are
more comparable to the later metric. It is also important to know that the pace of technological
innovation and diffusion in the 21st century is much faster than in the 20th century. According to
Environmental Public Health Organizations, "the pace of adoption has been speeding up
consistently across new technologies ... "'[i]t took decades for the telephone to reach 50% of
households, beginning before 1900. It took five years or less for cellphones to accomplish the
same penetration in 1990.' The automotive industry has not been left out of this increasing speed
of technological adoption, with automotive design cycles decreasing from 60 months to 24 or 36
months over a period of five years." We discuss diffusion of innovation, PEV adoption, and PEV
acceptance in See RIA Chapter 4.1.
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13.3 - Vehicle ownership behavior
Comments by Organizations
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
EPA's total cost of EV ownership incorrectly assumes each vehicle type of all new ICEV and
ZEV will travel the same miles each year.249 EVs have less range, both technically and
practically. As noted by J.D. Power, "the majority of EVs provide between 200 and 300 miles of
range on a full charge."250 Studies show that the average electric car is driven 9,059 miles per
year, compared with 12,758 miles for ICEVs.251 By overestimating VMT, EPA compounds all
other errors in its assumptions that all work in favor of ZEVs and to the detriment of ICEVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 55]
249 DRIA at 4-20, Table 4-7 (e.g., EPA assumes EV and ICEV sedans/wagons will both travel 15,700
miles per year).
250 See Sebastian Blanco, List of EVs Sorted by Range (Sept. 1, 2022), www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-
guides/list-of-evs-sorted-by-range.
251 iSeeCars, The Most and Least Driven Electric Cars (May 22, 2023), https://www.iseecars.com/most-
driven-evs-study.
Organization: Anonymous
2. EPA's consumer demand module isn't explained and leads to strange results
EPA's analysis includes an estimate of consumer demand of vehicles by powertrain, which it
describes as "the share weight parameter changes over time to account for factors that are not
included in the generalized costs, such as greater access to charging infrastructure or greater
availability and awareness BEVs". EPA does not explain how they built their S curve or how it
behaves and relies on a single paragraph in its draft RIA to describe this approach (it reserves
conversation of the 'cost' metrics for a different section of the RIA). More importantly, EPA
does not explain why consumer demand increases because of their proposal across the
alternatives when their proposal shouldn't impact these considerations. EPA's proposal does not
increase the amount of chargers available or reduce range anxiety. If these things are assumed to
change because of EPA's rule, the explanation should be clear in EPA's analysis, and EPA
should also carry the costs of forcing increases to the grid and charger access as a cost to their
rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, p. 3]
In considering costs, EPA states "consumers assume that approximate annual VMT is 12,000
miles, annual non-fuel ownership costs for BEVs are $1,600, and annual non-fuel ownership
costs for ICE vehicles are $2,000" but does not explain where those assumptions come from and
deprives commenters from being able to meaningfully comment and contribute. This basis of
non-fuel costs for ICE vehicles being higher by 20% leads to ICE vehicles being disadvantaged.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, p. 3]
EPA analysis also seems to gloss over range anxiety which is a leading consideration for
many consumers in whether to purchase a BEV
(https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a40119553/survey-range-anxiety-
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evs/#:~:text=The%20bad%20news%3F,list%20their%20top%20three%20concerns) or the time
it takes to charge a vehicle, in their analysis of consumer demand. These oversights seriously
undermine the value of EPA's model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, p. 3]
Ironically, EPA also assumes 0% rebound for BEVs. Rebound is a sign that consumers value
driving a vehicle more and will do so as cost decreases. However, EPA's assumption assumes
that there is no additional value to driving a BEV as it becomes more efficient. So on the one
hand, BEVs confer the same or better benefits to their drivers, on the other, consumers do not
value additional BEV miles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, p. 3]
Organization: Delek US Holdings, Inc.
b. BEV charging consumes significantly more time than refueling ICE- powered vehicles.
The Proposed Rule fails to consider the impact that increased charging times will have on
consumer adoption rates and whether end users will be willing to such disruptions to daily travel
in addition to the increased prices and upfront costs. According to DOT, Level 1 EVSE, which
provides charging through a 120-volt AC outlet, can take 40-50+ hours to fully charge (80%) a
BEV from empty; Level 2 EVSE, which offers a higher-rate AC charging and is typically used
for home, workplace and public charging, can take 4-10 hours to fully charge a BEV from
empty; and direct current fast charging EVSE, which provides rapid charging along heavy-traffic
corridors where already installed, can take up to an hour to fully charge a BEV from empty.42
Regardless of fast charging, most PHEVs currently on the market do not work with the DCFC
equipment.43 But under any scenario, these ZEVs will incur additional downtime for more
frequent, and longer, charging times as compared to the equivalent ICE. And faster charging
infrastructure is larger and more expensive, making it difficult for the average consumer to
comfortably travel unless there is sufficient access to fast and convenient charging. Yet the
Proposed Rule fails to consider whether, in light of these impacts, consumers will purchase
ZEVs at the rate necessary to meet EPA's targets regardless of whether a manufacturer can
produce them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 9]
42 DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, "Charger Types and Speeds" (May 4, 2023), available at
https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-basics/charging-
speeds#:~:text=EVs%20can%20be%20charged%20using,6%20hours%20foi%20a%20PHEV.
43 Id.
Organization: Departments of Transportation of Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota
and Wyoming
The proposed rule in this docket would rapidly accelerate a shift from the use of internal
combustion engine vehicles to electric vehicles (EVs). The Alliance for Automotive Innovation
has already submitted testimony in this docket that the proposed rule would require 2/3 of
vehicles covered by this docket to be battery electric vehicles by 2032. In today's market the
share of new light-duty and medium-duty vehicles that are EVs is one-tenth of that share
nationally, and far, far lower in our states and many regions of the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0525, p.1]
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Organization: Donn Viviani
2) Errors/omissions in the proposal and the RIA.
Not addressed in the RIA is the effect the IRA incentivizing carbon capture and sequestration
(CCS) used for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) will have on fuel prices . Setting aside the unsettled
question of how much net car- bon is sequestrated after the oil produced in turn emits additional
C02, as not germane to the EV rulel5. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, p. 5]
What is germane is that the oil will be pro- duced at marginally lower cost. While the rebound
effect is taken into con- sideration in the RIA based on increased vehicle milage efficiency, the
de- creased cost of fuel from EOR is not. Cheaper fuel will also have a re- bound effect,
encouraging more driving, and reducing the pressure to tran- sition to a BEV16. This effect
needs to be reflected in the RIA, otherwise the RIA is incomplete and presents a distorted
projection. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, p. 5]
15 It's estimated a ton of injected C02 will produce about 2 barrels of oil which when combust- ed, will
emit about a ton of C02
16 Small, K., and Hymel Kent. "The rebound effect from fuel effciency standards:
measurement and projection to 2035." Prepared for US EPA, Washington, DC (2011)
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
XXV. EPA's Use of a 10% Rebound Effect for Combustion Vehicles, While Reasonable, Is
Clearly at the High End of Estimates, Leading to a Possible Overestimation of Costs and
Underestimation of Benefits.
This section explores EPA's consideration of rebound effects. As detailed below, while the
Agency has justified a 10% rebound effect in its prior rulemakings, it should consider using a
lower value here. It is also reasonable for EPA to assume no rebound driving for BEVs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 189]
A. EPA has provided a thorough and sufficient justification for a 10% rebound effect in
several prior rulemakings.
EPA's Proposal estimates the vehicle miles traveled (VMT) rebound effect for combustion
vehicles to be 10%. DRIA at 4-16. The quantitative estimate of the rebound effect—which
indicates the amount of additional driving that will occur as the cost of driving decreases due to
fuel economy improvements—significantly influences multiple factors considered in
promulgating new GHG regulations for light-duty vehicles. Additional driving leads to more
accidents, road congestion, and noise, while also reducing the fuel savings and emission
reductions associated with more stringent standards. Therefore, without a reasonable estimate of
the rebound effect, the magnitude of a new rule's costs and benefits cannot be properly
understood. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 189]
The use of a 10% rebound effect is not new. EPA also estimated the rebound effect to be 10%
in the 2010 and 2012 Final Rules and the Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty
Vehicle GHG Emissions Standards finalized in 2021. See 75 Fed. Reg. 25324, 25517 (May 7,
2010); 77 Fed. Reg. 62624, 62716 (Oct. 15, 2012); 86 Fed. Reg. 74434, 74476 (Dec. 30, 2021).
During each of these previous rulemakings, EPA considered a large body of both historical and
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recent literature that reported a very broad range of rebound estimates arrived at through a
variety of research methods. EPA understood that simply averaging all of the rebound estimates
from all of the studies was an unreasonable and inadequate method for reaching an accurate
estimate of rebound for the vehicles subject to the relevant standards.616 For example, many of
the studies considered old research, data from other countries with vastly different driving habits,
or estimates that were not forward-looking to the years when the covered vehicles would be
driven. 77 Fed. Reg. at 62924. Historically, EPA has correctly acknowledged that rebound
research should be weighted based on its relevance to GHG emissions regulations in the United
States.617 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 189]
616 77 Fed. Reg. at 62924; EPA & NHTSA, Joint Technical Support Document, Final Rulemaking for
2017-2025 Light Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0283-0654, at 4-22 to 4-26 (Aug. 2012) (2012 TSD); EPA & NHTSA,
Joint Technical Support Document, Final Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, at 4-15 to 4-22 (Apr. 2010).
617 See 77 Fed. Reg. at 62924 (noting a focus on U.S. estimates and declining to use estimates of elasticity
of demand for gasoline to measure the VMT rebound effect); 2012 TSD at 4-25 (noting that historical
estimates may overstate the rebound effect because the magnitude of the rebound effect declines over time,
so more recent studies were entitled to increased weight). See also EPA, Technical Support Document,
Proposed Determination on the Appropriateness of the Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards under the Midterm Evaluation, at 3-20 to 3-21 (Nov. 2016), available
at https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100Q3L4.pdf (2016 TSD) (finding some rebound
estimates in the literature to be more applicable to the standards than others and according those more
weight).
In the 2010 Final Rule, EPA concluded that while the historical research dating back to the
1950s suggested higher rebound values, the most recent literature supported a 10% "or lower"
rebound effect. 75 Fed. Reg. at 25517. In the 2012 Final Rule, EPA again assumed a 10%
rebound effect, and in 2016, EPA confirmed three times that a 10% rebound effect was
appropriate. In both the 2016 Draft Technical Assessment Report and the 2016 Final Technical
Support Document under the Midterm Evaluation, EPA cited multiple studies demonstrating that
the rebound effect shrinks as incomes rise, and again explained that older studies were likely to
be less reliable than more recent research.618 Also in 2016, EPA used a 10% rebound effect in
adopting standards for heavy-duty pickups and vans.619 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
190]
618 EPA & NHTSA, Draft Technical Assessment Report, Midterm Evaluation of Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years
2022-2025, EPA-HQ-OAR-2015-0827-0926, at 10-10, 10-13 & 10-20 (July 2016), available at
https://nepis.epa.gOv/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P 100OXEO.PDF?Dockey=P 100OXEO.PDF (2016 Draft TAR); 2016
TSD at 3-10 to 3-13, 3-16 & 3-20.
619 Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and
Vehicles—Phase 2, Proposed Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 40138, 40453 (July 13, 2015) ("Since [HD pickups and
trucks] are . . . more similar in use to large light-duty vehicles, we have chosen the light-duty rebound
effect of 10 percent. . ."); Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 73478, 73746 (Oct. 25, 2016)
(finalizing use of 10%).
The 2020 Rule was the only recent rule to depart from this 10% rebound rate, and the revised
MY 2023 and later standards, finalized in 2021, returned to the 10% rebound rate after EPA
conducted a rigorous review of the rebound literature in order to prioritize the most relevant
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rebound studies. EPA's current Proposal refers to the 2021 rule as support for its proposed 10%
rebound rate for combustion vehicles. In the 2021 rule, EPA built on well-established precedent,
citing much of the same support provided in the 2010 and 2012 rulemakings, along with
additional more recent research. EPA also provided even more clarity into the Agency's
approach to the broad body of rebound literature spanning many decades. EPA is correct in its
belief that "it is important to critically evaluate which studies are most likely to be reflective of
the rebound effect that is relevant to the final standards," and that "one cannot just take the
'average' rebound estimates from literature to use for the VMT rebound effect." See EPA,
Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions Standards: Regulatory
Impact Analysis (Dec. 2021) ("2021 RIA"), at 3-13. When agencies consider a range of studies,
they should focus on those that are similar to the relevant policy context.620 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 190]
620 See, e.g., U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4 (Sept. 17, 2003) at 25.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf; see also EPA, Science
Advisory Board (SAB) Consideration of the Scientific and Technical Basis of the EPA's Proposed Rule
titled The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger
Cars and Light Trucks, EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0283-7659, at 27 (Feb. 27, 2020) (SAB Report) (stating that
"the rebound estimate [should] be reconsidered to account for the broader literature, and that it be
determined through a full assessment of the quality and relevance of the individual studies rather than a
simple average of results," and "recent papers using strong methodology and U.S. data should be weighted
more heavily than older papers, or those from outside the U.S., or those with weaker methodology.").
Specifically, in the 2021 rule reasoning on which EPA continues to rely for its 10%
combustion vehicle rebound estimate, EPA appropriately identified factors for weighting
rebound studies that reflect their relevance to the proposed rulemaking: (1) geography/timespan
relevance (priority given to U.S. studies as opposed to international estimates); (2) time period of
study (priority given to recent studies); (3) reliability/replicability of studies (priority given to
studies using odometer readings vs. household surveys such as the 2009 National Household
Travel Survey); and (4) statistical/methodological basis (priority given to studies employing a
strong statistical/methodological basis). 2021 RIA at 3-13. EPA further explained why these
factors are important and why they lead to more accurate estimates of the rebound effect. As a
result, the Agency provided a clear and well-reasoned basis for its decision to give more weight
to studies based on these four key criteria, and thus to conclude that the seven papers listed in
Table 3-4 of the 2021 RIA should be given the most significant weight in developing the
rebound estimate used in the Proposal. See 2021 RIA at 3-14 to 3-15. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 191]
B. Even the 10% rebound effect is too high, and EPA should consider using a rebound
effect of a lesser magnitude.
The two most reliable rebound estimates based on U.S. national data from EPA's preferred
studies are 10% (Greene (2012)) and around 4% (Hymel and Small (2015)).621 Hymel and
Small (2015) noted that their data indicated that fuel economy rebound could be lower than fuel
price rebound, meaning that even the 4.0% and 4.2% values could be too high.622 Moreover,
another paper in the list of EPA's seven preferred studies, Gillingham et al. (2015), estimates the
rebound effect at 10%. But the study also found that "a high percentage of vehicles are almost
entirely inelastic in response to gasoline price changes" and that "the lowest fuel economy
vehicles in the fleet drive the responsiveness, with higher fuel economy vehicles highly inelastic
with respect to gasoline price changes."623 While Gillingham et al. (2015) does not offer an
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alternative best rebound estimate for higher fuel economy vehicles, it is fair to assume that the
10% estimate is at the high end of reasonable estimates for the vehicles impacted by this
rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 191]
621 See Kenneth A. Small, Comment Letter on Proposed MY 2021-2026 Standards, NHTSA-2018-0067-
7789, at 1 (Sept. 14, 2018) ("A better characterization of the most recent study would be that it finds a
long-run rebound effect of 4.0 percent or 4.2 percent under two more realistic models that are supported by
the data.").
622 Hymel K. & K. Small, The Rebound Effect for Automobile Travel: Asymmetric Response to Price
Changes and Novel Features of the 2000s, 49 Energy Econ. 93, 97 (2015); see also Greene, D., Rebound
2007: Analysis of U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle Travel Statistics, 41 Energy Pol'y 14 (2012) (although fuel
prices "had a statistically significant impact on VMT,. . . fuel efficiency did not.").
623 Kenneth Gillingham et al., Heterogeneity in the Response to Gasoline Prices: Evidence from
Pennsylvania and Implications for the Rebound Effect, 52 Energy Economics S41-S52 (2015).
Other factors would also suggest that even the best and most relevant existing studies could
lead to a rebound estimate that is too large. For example, the rebound effect's magnitude
diminishes over time, largely due to increasing income and decreasing driving costs, a fact that
EPA has historically understood.624 As incomes rise over time, any fuel efficiency improvement
will have less of an effect on the total vehicle miles traveled, and thus the rebound effect will
decline. In both 2010 and 2012, EPA chose to use a 10% rebound effect as "a reasonable
compromise between historical estimates and projected future estimates."625 The 2012 Final
Rule noted, however, that several high-quality studies indicated that the rebound effect's
magnitude is significantly diminishing over time as incomes rise.626 This income effect on
rebound makes clear that the projected future estimates are in fact much more accurate than
historical estimates. Moreover, more than 15 years will have passed since the 2010 Final Rule
found a 10% rebound effect to be a good compromise and the implementation of the Proposed
Standards, and income has continued to grow since that time, supporting a substantially
diminished rebound effect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 192]
624 See, e.g., 2016 Draft TAR at 10-14 and 10-20; 77 Fed. Reg. at 62924, 62995; accord Small K. & K.
Van Dender, Fuel Efficiency and Motor Vehicle Travel: The Declining Rebound Effect, 28 Energy J. 25
(2007); Hymel, K. et al., Induced Demand and Rebound Effects in Road Transport, 44 Transp. Rsch. Part B
1220 (2010).
625 77 Fed. Reg. at 62924.
626 NHTSA, Corporate Average Fuel Economy for MY 2017-MY 2025 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks:
Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, at 851-52 (2012) (citing Small & Van Dender (2007) (finding average
rebound to be 22% for 1966-2001, but declining to 11% when looking at only 1997-2001); Hymel et al.
(2010) (finding that average rebound for 1966 through 2004 was 24%, but rebound by 2004 was only
13%); Greene, D., Rebound 2007: Analysis of Light-Duty Vehicle Travel Statistics (Mar. 2010) (internal
EPA research) (estimating the rebound effect would be 10% in 2010 and 8% in 2030, using 1966-2007
data); see also Greene (2012) (same)).
EPA should give more weight to the fact that the rebound effect varies with income over time.
In the 2021 rule, the agency cited Gillingham (2014) to assert that the evidence of how the
rebound effect varies with income is "mixed," but then also correctly excluded that study from
its list of preferred studies. Gillingham (2014) specifically considers the response to the 2008
gasoline price shock in California. EPA is correct to conclude that this was "an unusual period
when gasoline prices were particularly salient to consumers." 2021 RIA at 3-6 to 3-7. As EPA
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noted, Gillingham explained in a follow-up paper in 2020 that the Gillingham (2014) results
should not be used for developing an estimate of the VMT rebound effect for fuel economy or
GHG standards. 2021 RIA at 3-7. The Gillingham (2014) paper is equally irrelevant to the
question of the income effect on rebound. Various papers have confirmed that the rebound effect
is declining over time and one study certainly should not be used as the basis for giving this
factor "less weight," especially a study whose own author acknowledges its irrelevance to this
rulemaking context and to which EPA gives little to no weight otherwise. Because of this, EPA
should more fully consider the impacts of the income effect on rebound, and in doing so, could
support a rebound effect of a magnitude lower than 10%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
192]
In fact, the income effect on rebound is particularly important in the context of setting LDV
GHG emissions regulations for two reasons. First, even the most recent relevant studies on which
rebound estimates are based consider data only from 2013 and earlier. The historical growth rate
of per capita personal income was 1.4% between 2001 and 2019,627 and thus income growth
since 2013 would indicate a declining rebound effect even in the time since the most recent data
utilized were collected. Second, EPA's final standards will affect the fuel efficiency—and
therefore the rebound effect—for vehicles for the next 30 years or more. Private forecasts have
estimated approximately 1.6% growth in real personal income per year over the next 30 years,
see 85 Fed. Reg. at 24675 n. 1763, meaning that when most vehicles subject to the regulations are
retired, incomes will be at least 61% higher than they are today (which are already higher than
during the time periods in which the available rebound studies were conducted).628 More recent
projections in AEO 2023 anticipate incomes rising even more than prior estimates—an average
of 2.4%) per year through 2050.629 This income growth would be expected to cause a large
reduction in the magnitude of the rebound effect, supporting a rebound effect for the vehicles
subject to EPA's final standards of a magnitude well below 10%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, pp. 192-193]
627 See Amicus Brief of Economists at 16 for calculation of 1.4% growth rate.
628 Amicus Brief of Economists at 16.
629 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2023, Table 20: Macroeconomic
Indicators, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=18-
AEO2023&cases=ref2023&sourcekey=0.
C. It is reasonable for EPA to assume no rebound driving for BEVs.
Based on several recent studies looking at VMT for BEVs, and two studies specifically
considering BEV rebound, EPA's Proposed Rule assumes that the rebound effect for BEVs is
0% rather than the 10% value the Agency uses for combustion vehicles. It is reasonable for EPA
to assume no rebound driving for BEVs for the reasons stated in the DRIA, see DRIA at 4-14 to
4-17, and because longstanding rebound research indicates that rebound is likely more a response
to fuel prices than to fuel efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 193]
The rebound effect relevant to these standards—for all vehicles, but especially with respect to
BEVs—is fuel efficiency rebound. A substantial body of research indicates that fuel price or fuel
cost rebound effects are higher than fuel economy rebound effects, meaning that rebound may be
more responsive to fuel prices than fuel efficiency. Both Greene (2012) and Hymel and Small
(2015)—two of EPA's seven most preferred studies—came to this conclusion. Other studies
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cited by EPA—Gillingham (2012), Small and Van Dender (2007), West et al. (2015), and Wang
and Chen (2014)—also concluded the same. Kenneth A. Small has explained that his studies
indicate that the fuel economy rebound effect "is statistically indistinguishable from zero," and
that "[t]his is also true of the vast majority of other studies that have tried to measure separately
these two responses."630 He further explained that "the most defensible result empirically is that
people do respond to fuel prices as expected, but that they do not respond to fuel economy at
all," and that "Small and Van Dender (2007) make this point explicitly, and point out that we are
therefore assuming a positive [fuel economy] rebound effect when actually we cannot prove that
it's greater than zero."631 Greene (2012) also found that the impact of fuel efficiency on VMT
was not statistically significant, a point EPA referred to in the 2016 Draft TAR to suggest that
the relevant rebound effect for policymaking purposes "could be zero." 2016 Draft TAR at 10-
14.632 And Wenzel & Fujita (2018) found that vehicles with the highest fuel economy—but still
vehicles significantly less efficient than BEVs—had notably lower rebound rates than vehicles
with lower fuel economy, with an average rebound effect well below 10%.633 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, pp. 193-194]
630 Kenneth A. Small, Comment Letter at 2.
631 Id. In the 2020 Final Rule, EPA relied on Linn (2016) to support an argument that fuel economy
rebound is greater than fuel price rebound. Linn (2016), however, described the separate coefficients for
fuel price and fuel economy changes as statistically insignificant. Linn, J., The Rebound Effect of
Passenger Vehicles, 37 Energy J. at 277 (2016). Moreover, Linn also explained that self-reported VMT
data (as was used for his research) "may be noisy when compared to VMT calculated from multiple
odometer readings," and that therefore studies that use VMT based on multiple odometer readings—such as
all of those enumerated above—"should have lower measurement error, and yield preferable estimates
from a statistical point of view." Joshua Linn, Comment on Proposed MY 2021-2026 Standards, NHTSA-
2018-0067-7188, at 2 (Oct. 11, 2018).
632 Additionally, this point is relevant to the discussion above regarding 10% rebound being a maximum
estimate for combustion vehicles. Because some of EPA's seven most preferred studies consider fuel prices
rather than fuel efficiency, the most accurate rebound estimate would be no higher than—and likely lower
than—the average of those studies' best estimates.
633 Tom Wenzel & K. Sydney Fujita, Elasticity of Vehicle Miles of Travel to Changes in the Price of
Gasoline and the Cost of Driving in Texas, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (Mar. 2018) at iv
(explaining that rebound for "high MPG" vehicles—w hich are still less efficient than BEVs—is estimated
to be 5.2%).
Additional very recent research that has been presented but is not yet published provides
further support for EPA's 0% BEV rebound effect. Spiller et al. (2023) investigated the existence
of rebound effects in annual miles driven for BEV owners.634 The study "compile[d] household
level fleet data in Massachusetts to perform an event-study and difference-in-difference analysis,
comparing miles driven after new vehicle purchases" across BEVs and combustion vehicles.63 5
The analysis distinguished between BEVs purchased as additions to the household fleet versus
replacement vehicles, and used propensity score matching to find an appropriate control group.
Spiller et al. (2023) "estimate[d] the elasticity of VMT to changes in gasoline prices for
households with and without BEVs, using a fixed effect model and instrumenting for the price of
gasoline with the price of crude oil in the international markets," and found that "EV households
shift VMT to EVs when gasoline prices increase, although the increase in driving after the
purchase of a new vehicle does not differ across fuel type, suggesting the absence of a rebound
effect"636 EPA should include discussion of Spiller et al. (2023) in its final rule if the research
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is published or available in a working paper form prior to promulgation of the final rule. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 194]
634 See American Economic Association, AASA Annual Meeting 2023 Program, Abstract for Beia Spiller,
Kenneth Gillingham & Mart Talevi, The Electric Vehicle Rebound Effect (Jan. 6, 2023),
https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2023/program/1610?q=eNqrVipOLS7OzM8LqSxIVbKqhnGVrAxraw
GlCArl.
635 Id.
636 Id.
Organization: Green Diesel Engineering LLC
- Electric is a good solution for local driving patterns. It is not good for long distance runs or
pulling loads and does suffer in range with extreme cold or heat. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0457, p. 6]
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law
E. EPA Should Consider a Range of Rebound Effect Assumptions for BEVs While
Upholding Its Current Assumption for ICE Vehicles
The "rebound effect" refers to "the additional energy consumption that may arise from the
introduction of a more efficient, lower cost energy service." 118 In the Proposed Rule, EPA
reasonably, and consistently with prior rules, assumes 10% rebound for ICE vehiclesl 19—
meaning that for every 1% improvement in fuel efficiency, there is a 0.9% drop in total fuel use
and a corresponding increase in vehicle miles traveled. EPA's adoption of a 10% rebound rate
for ICE vehicles is consistent with the literature. 120 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 18-
20]
118 RIA at 4-13.
119 Id. at 4-16.
120 See generally Inst, for Pol'y Integrity, Comments on Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards (Sep. 27, 2021),
While a wealth of economic literature supports a small rebound effect for ICE vehicles, there
is comparatively little economic research on the rebound effect for BEVs. Based on the research
available, EPA assumes a rebound effect of 0% for BEVs. 121 This rebound assumption has two
implications. First, it assumes that drivers do not switch their driving behavior when they switch
from an ICE vehicle to a BEV, 122 despite cost differences. 123 Second, it assumes that any
change in per-mile cost for BEVs, including from the introduction of more efficient BEVs or
fluctuations in electricity prices, does not affect driving behavior. In effect, EPA's projection of
no rebound for BEVs over the long term presumes that there is something fundamentally
different about consumer perceptions of BEVs compared to ICE vehicles, and not simply an
issue of familiarity or technological constraints that will be overcome in the future. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 18-20]
121 RIA at 4-16.
122 Id. at 4-17 (stating that "BEVs are not driven more than ICE vehicles").
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123 According to predictions from OMEGA, under the Proposed Rule, the average per-mile fuel cost of
BEVs is projected to be approximately 62% lower than that of ICE vehicles between 2022 and 2055. This
data is sourced from the '20230315_091353_MY_period_costs.csv' file in the
'20230315_091353_effects_centrar folder, downloadable from the 'Light-and medium-duty effects'
section on EPA's website: https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/optimization-
model-reducing-emissions- greenhouse-gases
EPA's assumption of no rebound effect for BEVs relies on the empirical evidence available,
namely Chakraborty et al. (2022) and Nehiba (2022). 124 Although insightful, these studies leave
reason for uncertainty. For instance, both studies employ cross-sectional data and do not fully
address the endogeneity between vehicle choices and usage, which is discussed further below.
This correlation between consumer vehicle choices and usage could significantly vary between
early adopters of BEVs and average ICE vehicle owners, thereby impacting the study
conclusions. While these studies contribute to the emerging body of research in this field, their
findings should thus be interpreted with some caution. Beyond Chakraborty et al. (2022) and
Nehiba (2022), we are aware of several other studies that purport to use better data and
identifying assumptions and also find zero rebound for electric vehicles (but do not yet have
working papers available). 125 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 18-20]
124 RIA at 4-14.
125 Wendan Zhang et al., Brookings Institution Electric Vehicle Adoption and Combustion Mile
Displacement Across Demographics: Short Run Evidence and Implications For Policy, 2023 AERE
Presentation (finding a negative rebound effect for electric vehicles.); Beia Spiller, Kenneth Gillingham &
Marta Talevi. The Electric Vehicle Rebound Effect, 2023 AEA Conference.
While the available research provides some support for a 0% rebound rate for BEVs based on
historical evidence, there is reason to believe that effect may not hold in the future. One potential
explanation for the current BEV rebound findings is that "[cjonsumers are quite price inelastic,
because they are inattentive." 126 With the costs of BEV charging often consolidated into
electricity bills, this alteration in cost perception could augment price inelasticity, rendering BEV
owners less sensitive to per-mile cost variations. 127 But this effect may become less pronounced
as BEVs become more common. In particular, as infrastructure grows, electricity price salience
may increase as gas stations convert to charging stations and prominently display electricity
prices. Relatedly, the current literature could be shaped by the demographic profile of past and
current BEV owners—predominantly early adopters—who may not reflect the population that
purchases BEVs in the future. 128 As BEV penetration accelerates, the associated rebound effect
could potentially deviate from current estimates: Outside the vehicle context, economic literature
documents a small rebound effect as electrical appliances become more efficient, 129 which
could hint at similar patterns in the future for BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 18-
20]
126 Xavier Gabaix, Behavioral Inattention at 311, in 2 Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications
and Foundations (2019).
127 See generally Ben Gilbert & Joshua Graff Zivin, Dynamic Salience with Intermittent Billing: Evidence
from Smart Electricity Meters, 107 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 176 (2014) (finding that households
tend to decrease their consumption in response to billing information—an effect that wanes as the bill's
salience fades); Steven Sexton, Automatic Bill Payment and Salience Effects: Evidence from Electricity
Consumption, 97 REV. ECON. & STAT. 229 (2015) (finding that automatic bill payments decreases price
responsiveness).
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128 RIA at 4-14 (acknowledging that the available data is "not likely representative of the current and
future general population of car buyers and their driving behavior").
129 Kenneth Gillingham et al., The Rebound Effect is Overplayed, 493 NATURE 475, 476 (2013) (finding
a 10% rebound effect). Later, Gillingham et al. (2016) also highlight that the rebound effect for both
gasoline and electricity generally falls within a range of 5% to 40%, with the majority of studies suggesting
a rebound effect between 5% and 25%. Kenneth Gillingham et al., The Rebound Effect and Energy
Efficiency Policy, 10 REV. ENV'T ECON. & POL'Y 68, 75 (2016).
In light of these complexities and uncertainties, EPA should consider exploring a range of
possible rebound estimates for BEVs, including the same 10% assumption used for ICE vehicles.
EPA should conduct sensitivity analysis to assess the implications of a range of rebound effects
between 0% and 10%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 18-20]
Notably, such an analysis would have a very limited impact on EPA's assessment of net
benefit. Policy Integrity reran OMEGA using a 10% rebound rate for BEVs and found that this
change decreased total net benefits by just 0.43-0.71%), leaving the rule highly net beneficial
overall. In fact, when total net benefits were rounded to two significant figures, as EPA does in
the Proposed Rule and RIA, they appeared unchanged. (See Table A-l in the appendix below for
full results.) This is likely because additional BEVs resulting from the Proposed Rule make up a
small share of the total fleet, particularly in the earlier years in the analysis that are weighted
more as a result of discounting. In future standards, the BEV rebound effect could become more
significant as BEVs make up a larger share of the vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0601, pp. 18-20]
G. EPA Should Further Explain Its Choices Around Scrappage, Pass-Through, and
Vehicle Sales
EPA should provide additional explanation around certain modeling choices—namely
scrappage, pass-through, and sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 22-23]
"Scrappage" refers to the rate of which drivers discard old automobiles. OMEGA treats
scrappage as exogenous, meaning that the rate of scrappage does not depend on the Proposed
Rule's other effects. 144 This choice is reasonable: While economic theory and evidence suggest
that scrappage depends in part on the Proposed Rule's other effects (most notably the rate at
which the Proposed Rule affects new vehicle prices and sales), 145 this effect is very difficult to
model due to data limitations, and past attempts by EPA and NHTSA to model scrappage have
fared poorly. 146 Moreover, the increasing movement to electric vehicles provides even more
reason to treat scrappage as exogenous, as virtually no analysis on the scrappage of BEVs exists.
However, the Proposed Rule provides no discussion of scrappage or EPA's choice not to model
it. Particularly since EPA endogenously modeled scrappage in the 2020 Rule, the agency may
wish to explain its decision not to follow this approach in the Proposed Rule and a discussion of
how it may affect the results. Moreover, to the extent feasible, EPA should attempt to model
scrappage in future standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 22-23]
144 See RIA at 9-3 to 9-5.
145 See Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation: A Theory with Applications to Automobile
Emissions Control (1982); Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation: The Case of Auto
Emissions Standards, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 328 (1982); ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, THE EFFECTS OF
NEW-VEHICLE PRICE CHANGES ON NEW- AND USED- VEHICLE MARKETS AND SCRAPPAGE
3-6 to 3-11 & 5-7 to 5-7 to 5-12 (2021).
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146 Inst, for Pol'y Integrity, Comments on the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for
Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks 66-71 (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://policyintegrity.org/documents/Emissions_Standards_EPA_NHTSA_Comments_Oct2018.pdf.
"Pass-through" refers to the degree to which manufacturers pass on cost increases to
consumers. EPA in prior tailpipe rules has assumed 100% pass-through to consumers in the
vehicle market—meaning that every dollar of additional cost to the automaker is ultimately
borne by the purchaser. 147 EPA appears to repeat this assumption in the Proposed Rule. That
approach is also reasonable given consistency with the agency's prior approach and the very
limited economic evidence on vehicle pass-through. Nonetheless, that limited available evidence
(from a 2010 paper) indicates that pass-through in the vehicle market may be below 100%. 148
Accordingly, EPA should discuss and provide a rationale for its approach. EPA should also
support further research in this area, given its potential importance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0601, pp. 22-23]
147 E.g. 2020 Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 24,594-95.
148 Using regression analysis, Hellerstein and Villas-Boas (2010) find only partial pass through for the
vehicle industry with an average pass-through rate of 38%. Rebecca Hellerstein, & Sophia B. Villas-Boas,
Outsourcing and Pass-Through, 81 J. INT'LECON. 170, 175 (2010).
Finally, with regard to sales, EPA should clarify how OMEGA treats how producers expect
consumers to value fuel costs. Within the model, consumers and producers shape their preferred
new vehicle mix independently, 149 each informed by their unique perspectives on fuel costs:
Consumers weigh their expected fuel expenses, whereas producers consider how they think
consumers will weigh their expected fuel expenses. In the RIA, EPA explains that consumers are
assumed to factor in fuel costs of 12,000 miles annually for 2.5 years.150 However, the OMEGA
input files suggest that producers expect consumers to consider fuel costs up to 15,000 miles
annually. 151 Although this difference is not inherently problematic, especially if EPA posits
imperfect information between consumers and producers, 152 EPA should explain this
difference. This might also be a minor programming error, such that EPA intended for producers
to accurately peg consumer valuation of fuel costs at 12,000 miles annually. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0601, pp. 22-23]
149 The model then searches for solutions for a set of vehicle attributes, purchase prices, and quantities
such that the sales and production shares match.
150 RIA at 4-2.
151 This information is derived from the 'sales_share_params_ice_bev_pu_b0p4_klp0_x02031-
Cuv_b2p0_klp0_x02029_nu8p0-sdn_b0p4_klp0_x02020_nulp0_20230228.csv' file for consumers, and
the 'producer_generalized_cost-body_style_20220613.csv' file for producers, both located within the
'2023-03-14-22- 42-30-ld-central-run-to2055\all_inputs' folder, downloadable from the 'Light-duty central
case (zip)' section on EPA's website: https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-
engines/optimization-model-reducing-emissions-greenhouse-gases
152 EPA, OMEGA Documentation Sec. 4.3.2 (last revised May 8, 2023),
https://omega2.readthedocs.io/en/2.1.0/index,html#gl-label-producer-generalized-cost ("The producer, as
an independent decision-making agent, will not have perfect information about the internal consumer
decision process. Within the Producer Module, OMEGA allows the user to define the consumer decisions
from the producer's perspective, which may be different from (or the same as) the representation within the
Consumer Module.").
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Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
Furthermore, the Proposed Rule implicates "question[s] of deep economic and political
significance," King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015), due to the huge "number of people
affected," United States Telecom Ass'n v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 855 F.3d 381, 423 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Because "Americans
place a high value on car ownership," almost 92% of households have at least one vehicle, and
over 22% have access to at least three. Car Ownership Statistics 2023, Forbes (May 8, 2023),
https://bit.ly/3NnPXnn. A regulation affecting so many people is bound to collide with "a
significant portion of the American economy," West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2608 (cleaned up),
and require "billions of dollars in spending by private persons or entities," id. at 2621 (Gorsuch,
J., concurring) (quoting King, 576 U.S. at 485). By EPA's own estimate, technology increases
"through 2055 are estimated at $260 billion to $380 billion." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,344. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 6-7]
The Proposed Rule somewhat attempts to deal with this concern by predicting that sales will
increase as consumers become more familiar with EVs as they see broader "charging
infrastructure" and more electric cars "on the road." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,189. But that raises
another buyer-focused concern that makes it even less likely consumers will change their
purchasing habits to the extreme degree EPA predicts. For people who "rely on street parking,"
park in a garage over 25 feet from a power source, or own a condo where the building
association is not willing to "pay for upgrading the electrical panel or service," where and how to
charge a new electric car is a real concern. Rachel Kurzius, Considering an electric vehicle?
Here's how to prep your home for one, Wash. Post (Sept. 26, 2022), https://bit.ly/3N4Y3zZ.
Even for the slowest and most basic "Level 1" charging option, potential EV customers are out
of luck; their "home probably can't accommodate" an EV. Id. And those who are able to upgrade
their home parking situations may find themselves in a long line as the need for more complex
and expensive charging mechanisms grows at a fast clip. See EV Chargers: How many do we
need?, S&P Global (Jan. 9, 2023), https://bit.ly/3XlxFeM (predicting that the EV population
uptick will require "about 700,000 Level 2 and 70,000 Level 3 chargers deployed, including both
public and restricted-use facilities," 1.2 million and 109,000 nationally by 2027, and 2.13 million
and 172,000 by 2030, "all in addition to the units that consumers put in their own garages").
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 15-16]
Even those who already own EVs may be in for some unpleasant surprises. A recent study
concluded, for example, that "[t]he vast majority of electric vehicle owners [who] charge their
cars at home in the evening or overnight" are "doing it wrong" and should instead "move to
daytime charging at work or public charging stations" so as to not overwhelm the grids. Golden,
supra. But standard electricity pricing "charg[es] commercial and industrial customers big fees
based on their peak electricity use." Id. "This can disincentivize employers from installing
chargers, especially once half or more of their employees have EVs." Id. Some of these vehicle
owners may thus be left in a vehicle-charging no-man's land. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649,
pp.15-16]
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Organization: Marie Gluesenkamp Perez, and Mary Sattler Peltola, Members of Congress,
Congress of the United States
We are writing to express our concerns about the impacts the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) new proposed rules, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027
and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for
Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 may have on rural communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0522, p. 1]
Like you, we believe climate change is a threat to communities across the country, and the
federal government plays a critical role in developing a clean energy apparatus and helping our
communities improve air quality. However, in making that transition, we cannot leave rural
communities or working families behind. The administration's Executive Order 14037 and
subsequent National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization set an ambitious goal for 50
percent of new passenger cars to be electric vehicles (EVs) by 2030. Last year's Inflation
Reduction Act included many concrete policies promoting EV production that will drive costs
down and improve affordability. We are concerned the EPA, along with the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and the Department of Energy (DOE), have not done enough work to
ensure rural communities will have the necessary charging infrastructure in place to make
widespread EV adoption possible. The imposition of additional regulations in the auto market
without key infrastructure investments will reduce consumer choice, which is a recipe for
disaster in rural America. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0522, p. 1]
Rural communities, like ours, have more unique transportation and service options compared
to cities or suburbs. Like many people who live in rural America, we spend a fair amount of time
traveling, whether on or off the road system to get where we need to go. When your job, your
pharmacy, or your child's daycare is over an hour away, you need to know that your car, snow
machine, or ATV, will get you there and back. The ability to refuel a gas-powered vehicle
quickly is valuable given the daily realities of rural life. That option is available because our
country has a robust network of gas stations, and the requisite gas infrastructure, to support
communities of all kinds. An equally robust infrastructure for EV charging must exist before this
transition takes place to ensure working people and rural communities have consumer choices
similar to cities and suburbs. And that infrastructure, especially fast-charging options, is not
being built fast enough in many rural areas. EV charging programs included in the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act will help, but federal agencies remain focused on travel corridors along
interstate highways, leaving many rural communities behind. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0522,
pp.1-2]
Washington's third congressional district has fewer than 100 level 2 and DC fast chargers
available to the public, and they are largely concentrated in just two cities. Alaska has only 60
publicly available EV charging stations. In Congresswoman Gluesenkamp Perez' home county
of Skamania, there are only two EV charging stations right now, and both are located at resorts.
In Congresswoman Peltola's borough of Bethel, along with all the other boroughs of Western
Alaska, there are zero EV charging stations. As DOT has acknowledged, the costs of installing
EV chargers in rural areas can be higher, especially for direct current fast charging stations,
because they are more likely to require expensive electrical service upgrades. Furthermore, for
many working families, installing an EV charger at home remains out of reach, especially for
those who don't own their homes. Bottom line: for EVs to be a meaningful and workable
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emissions reduction solution in rural America, we must have a ubiquitous and affordable
charging infrastructure with access to abundant, cheap electricity. That simply does not exist
right now. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0522, p. 2]
We are only four years away from model year 2027, and we are concerned the EPA's
regulations are not paired with a plan to ensure adequate charging infrastructure on such a short
timeline. Installing hundreds of thousands of new EV chargers and upgrading associated
electrical infrastructure will also require tens of thousands of electricians. We are already
experiencing a nationwide shortage of qualified electricians - anyone who's currently waiting six
months for a residential electrician knows this all too well. Workforce shortages, particularly for
those in the trades, are even more acute in rural communities. We want to ensure the EPA has
considered the significant workforce development challenges that must be addressed to train
electricians for a large-scale roll out of EV charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0522, p. 2]
We request that the EPA, DOT, and DOE respond to the following questions:
1. What have the EPA, DOT, and DOE done to ensure rural communities are not left behind
in the transition to electric vehicles?
2. Is there a clear and detailed deployment plan for electric vehicle charging infrastructure in
rural areas?
3. How do the EPA and DOE anticipate potential shortages of trained electricians will impact
the deployment of charging infrastructure? Further, have agencies evaluated the disparate
impacts these shortages may have in rural communities?
4. Beyond using limited Inflation Reduction Act funding, how do the EPA, DOT, and DOE plan
to address existing and future shortages of trained electricians?
5. Going forward, how do the EPA, DOT, and DOE plan to work together to ensure public
charging infrastructure is abundant and accessible in rural areas? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0522, pp. 2-3]
We also request that you share how you plan to deploy necessary EV charging infrastructure
in a timeframe that matches the implementation of the proposed rules. Building out this
infrastructure will ensure that rural communities are not disproportionately impacted and left
behind in a changing market. While it is critically important that we move toward a clean energy
future, it must be a future that works for all Americans, including those in rural areas. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0522, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
Beyond the significant market and governmental challenges posed by such a drastic
implementation timeline, consumer adoption will be critical to success. Consumer adoption of
EVs has historically lagged behind expectations, leaving a significant hurdle to encourage a large
and swift shift to EVs. Consumers need to be convinced not only of the appeal, safety,
affordability, and reliability of EVs themselves, but they need to adopt the necessary community
and home charging equipment to facilitate their use. Consumers will need to adapt their trip
planning and driving behavior to allow for vehicle charging needs. The only way to drive these
significant behavioral changes is to assure consumers that charging infrastructure is available and
reliable. This is simply not a reality today and is unlikely to be a reality in time to drive such a
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significant shift within the timeline of the Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule. These challenges are
magnified due to the unclear and uncertain benefits under the Inflation Reduction Act, which
place significant limitations on EV consumer incentive programs and charging infrastructure
programs. Moreover, many consumers are reluctant or unable to purchase EVs due to their
significant price premium. The Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule will only exacerbate these
inequalities, with EV prices likely to increase even more due to extreme investments required by
all market sectors involved. Driving too much change too quickly will shut out many
communities who need clean vehicles the most. It will likely force consumers who are uncertain
about ZEV adoption to continue to operate aging ICE vehicles much longer. This is contrary to
the intent of the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 5]
Organization: Senator Shelley Moore Capito et al.
Perhaps the most conspicuous flaw that will leap out to the American public is that these
proposed actions were taken with complete disregard to consumer choice or affordability. In
addition to potentially lacking access to charging at home, work, or public charging stations,
consumers looking to purchase a new car may be unable to purchase these vehicles due to the
higher purchase price or lack of availability. Today, the average purchase price of EV cars in
2022 was approximately $65,000-which is more than what 46 percent of American households
earn in income in a year.8 Adding demand to the grid amid the confluence of other EPA
regulations referenced above will drive up the cost of electricity, making powering these vehicles
less affordable and undermining the EPA s claims of savings for consumers that ignore or
understate the increase in vehicle and energy prices. Taken together, the erosion of choice and
affordability of vehicles will have profound impacts on how American families run errands, get
to school, commute to work, and recreate. Additionally, there are serious concerns about the
range of electric vehicles and the performance in rural areas of the country, where people may
have to drive much longer distances to reach a charger, especially in locations where cold
weather can impact the range the vehicle can drive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5083, p. 3]
8 See Kelley Blue Book and Cox Automotive Average Transaction Prices Reports; and Average,
Median, Top 1%, and all United States Household Income Percentiles, DQYDJ.
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
A common misconception is that range anxiety continues to pose a significant barrier to
adoption across all vehicle classes. The average U.S. household travels 37 miles per day.21 The
average range on an electric vehicle is 291 miles. The EV models currently available can meet
the needs of most American households.22 Vehicles capable of traveling distances up to 520
miles, such as the Lucid Air Dream Edition R,23 are being produced today and those with ranges
greater than 600 miles are expected after 2023.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 8]
21 "Average Miles Driven Per Year: Why It Is Important," Kelley Blue Book, (May 15, 2023)
https://www.kbb.com/car-advice/average-miles-driven-per-
year/#:~:text=Drivers%20in%202021%20drove%20an,about%2035%20miles%20per%20day.
22 "Longest Range Electric Cars for 2023, Ranked," Car and Driver, (March 23, 2023)
https://www.caranddriver.com/features/g32634624/ev-longest-driving-range/
23 "An absolute triumph of efficiency, Lucid Air achieves 520 miles of range," Lucid Newsroom,
(September 16, 2021) https://www.lucidmotors.com/stories/lucid-air-achieves-520-miles-of-range
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24 "Volvo targets 621-mile EV range by 2030 as part of tech focus," Autocar, (June 30, 2021)
https://www.autocar.co.uk/car-news/electric-cars/volvo-targets-621-mile-ev-range-2030-part-tech-focus
In the LDV segment, a recent study found that the majority of EVs that have been driven
more than 100,000 miles still have at least 90 percent of their original range left.25 Bloomberg
recently reported that the average range for an EV in the U.S. has quadrupled since 2011, and is
today a third higher than the global average.26 Average range climbed to 291 miles for U.S. EVs
in 2022 which addresses another key consumer-focused barrier as EV adoption becomes more
widespread. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 8]
25 "New Study: How Long Do Electric Car Batteries Last?" Recurrent Auto, (March 27, 2023)
https://www.recurrentauto.com/research/how-long-do-ev-batteries-last
26 "US Electric Cars Set Record With Almost 300-Mile Average Range," Bloomberg, (March 9, 2023)
https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/articles/2023-03-09/average-range-for-us-electric-cars-reached-a-
record-291-mile s#xj4y7vzkg
EPA Summary and Response
Comments regarding vehicle ownership behavior includes three broad categories: what people
do with vehicles (i.e., buy, lease, sell, scrap), how people use their vehicles (i.e., vehicle miles
traveled, rebound, and use case like commuting, towing, long trips), and activities they undertake
to support use of their vehicles (e.g., trip planning, charging, maintenance and repair). Among
ownership behaviors, we do not discuss type of purchase (i.e., buy and lease) or sell/trade-in
decisions in this section. We note that we have responded to purchase-related comments in
Chapter 13.2 of this RTC where we discuss demand-related comments and there were no
comments on selling and trading in a vehicle. We also defer responses to comments regarding
maintenance and repair comments to Chapter 13.4 of this RTC where we discuss consumers'
savings and expenses. In addition, where a comment addresses topics other than vehicle
ownership behavior - such as PEV demand in rural communities, charging availability, program
design, sales, consumer purchase and producer decision making, affordability- we refer readers
to the appropriate sections of the Preamble, RIA, and this RTC where those topics are addressed.
What people do with vehicles
The Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University Law School comments on vehicle
scrappage. They note that "OMEGA treats scrappage as exogenous" and describe "this choice is
reasonable." They suggest, however, the EPA provide a discussion of our "choice not to model
it." In response, we agree and have briefly discussed this choice in RIA Chapter 4.2.3.
How people use their vehicles
Some commenters called attention to people who live and work in rural environments, stating
that "people who live in rural America ... spend a fair amount of time traveling." Relatedly, they
expressed "serious concerns about the range of electric vehicles and performance in rural areas
of the country, where people may have to drive much longer distances to reach a charger" as well
as concerns that government entities "have not done enough work to ensure rural communities
will have the necessary charging infrastructure in place to make widespread EV adoption
possible." One commenter asserted that "the ability to refuel a gas-powered vehicle quickly is
valuable given the daily realities of rural life." Relatedly, Green Diesel Engineering LLC simply
states that BEVs are a "good solution for local driving patterns. It is not good for long distance
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runs, or pulling loads and does suffer in range in extreme cold or heat." While these comments
focus on number of miles, we know from comments in Chapter 13.2 of this RTC, that consumers
use their vehicles in a variety of ways that have greater energy requirements, like hauling and
towing, which may be especially important to rural communities. We also know that extreme
conditions like very cold temperatures and heavy towing, affect the performance (e.g., fuel or
energy efficiency) of PEVs and ICE vehicles. In response, we repeat some of what we discuss in
RTC Chapter 13.2. All of the compliance pathways presented in the FRM show a substantial
market share of new ICE vehicles. We expect that automakers will continue to produce vehicles,
from ICE to hybrids to PEVs, that meet the needs of rural consumers. Second, the so-called
advantages and disadvantages of any vehicle are not inherent to the vehicle. What is perceived as
an advantage or disadvantage depends on the consumer and on the context, which are
heterogenous and dynamic. While rural drivers may drive more miles on average per day, "the
average U.S. household travels 37 miles per day," "the average electric range on an electric
vehicle is 291 miles," and "U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics data shows that trips longer
than 250 miles make up a miniscule fraction of U.S. daily driving." Even in cold weather or
under high energy demands, average PEV range will likely prove adequate most of the time to
"run errands, get to school, commute to work, and recreate" without recharging, as well as make
long trips. While the range of PEVs will satisfy many rural drivers, rural or other drivers who log
a lot of miles may also enjoy the savings associated with vehicle operation. Also, consumers who
purchase PEVs are able to choose between vehicles with different range capabilities that suit
their needs. With respect to comments about BEV use in extreme temperatures, just as with ICE
vehicles, cold and hot weather can increase EV energy consumption due to use of cabin heating
and cooling and defrosting. Because EVs are more efficient, less waste heat is available to heat
the cabin so the energy must come from the battery. However, climate control requires only a
fraction of the energy needed to drive a vehicle, and most of today's EVs have a substantial
driving range of about 300 miles or more that can easily accommodate climate control needs.
Also, we note that under these standards, ICE vehicles will still be available to purchase for those
consumers who continue to prefer ICE vehicles.
In another section, one commenter stated that EPA "glossed over range anxiety." We
disagree. While limited range used to be a practical concern to many households due to the much
lower range of early PEVs, technology has advanced and will continue to do so. Households are
no longer subject to the range limitations of early PEVs. While range anxiety persists today, it is
unlikely to remain a concern as consumers gain experience with and exposure to the realities of
PEV ownership. We also expect charging infrastructure to advance, increase in availability, and
expand geographically. PEV range, range anxiety, charging behavior, charging availability and
access are among the factors that influence PEV acceptance and are included in our analyses and
representation of PEV acceptance. See Preamble Section IV.C.6, RIA Chapter 4.1, and RTC 13.1
and 13.2 regarding PEV acceptance. See Chapter 17 of this RTC and RIA Chapter 5 regarding
charging infrastructure.
In addition to vehicle miles and use cases, Environmental and Public Health Organizations
and Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law comment extensively on
rebound. The former generally provided support for EPA's assessment of rebound for ICE
vehicles and BEVs. The later provided more cautious support for EPA's BEV rebound
assumptions, suggesting that "the associated rebound effect could potentially deviate from
current estimates" as BEV penetration accelerates and recommended that "EPA should conduct
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sensitivity analysis to assess the implications of a range of rebound effects between 0% and
10%." Environmental and Public Health Organizations made three clear recommendations. First,
they recommend that EPA consider an abstract on BEV rebound, Spiller et al. (2023) which
"provides further support for EPA's 0% BEV rebound effect." In response to these rebound
relevant recommendations, we have reviewed the Spiller et al. 2023 abstract. The results stated
in the abstract are not directly relevant to BEV rebound as we have defined it, and the paper
appears not to have been published. Second, they suggest that "EPA should consider using a
rebound effect [for ICE vehicles] of a lesser magnitude" and relatedly that "EPA should more
fully consider the impacts of the income effect on ICE vehicle rebound." As discussed in Chapter
8.3.3 of the RIA, as in the 2021 rule and our proposal, we to continue our estimate of a 10%
rebound for ICE vehicles in the final rule analysis. The Institute for Policy Integrity
recommended that EPA test a range of rebound estimates for BEVs, but then also noted that their
own analyses show very little sensitivity to this assumption. In response, we agree that future
measures of BEV use may indicate different rebound than currently assumed. EPA will continue
to keep abreast of the literature on this topic. We also appreciate the recommendation to conduct
sensitivity analysis of BEV rebound, though we have not done so based on the small effect we
expect and the small effect that was found by the commenter.
Regarding rebound, EPA also received comments regarding the effect of IRA incentivizing
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) used for enhanced oil recovery ... on fuel prices. The
commenter states that "oil will be produced at a marginally lower cost" leading to "the decreased
cost of fuel" and subsequent rebound. The commenter did not provide any economic analysis of
this issue that we could review. At this time, we conclude that there is too much uncertainty to
determine how many CCS projects with EOR in the U.S. will result from the IRA legislation
over the time frame of analysis of the LMDV rule (2027-2055). We also note that oil prices are
set in the global market. The impacts on U.S. fuel prices of IRA provisions on EOR may be very
modest. Given these uncertainties, we are not able to quantify this effect. However, we anticipate
that the fuel price effect and the subsequent rebound effect would be fairly small. The issue, the
impact of CCS on oil prices and, in turn, the rebound effect for LMDVs, is a topic for further
study in EPA's view.
Activities people undertake to support vehicle use
In closing out our response to comments regarding vehicle ownership behavior, commenters
discussed a few more topics - charging and the behavior necessary to accommodate charging.
Delek US Holdings, Inc. commented on the time it takes for BEVs to be fully charged, the
additional downtime they claim charging will require, and the discomfort of travel in the absence
of "fast and convenient charging." Kentucky Office of Attorney General et al. points out that
consumers will need to know "where and how to charge a new electric car" including time of
day or night. Nissan also cites charging behaviors and the trip planning and driving behavior to
accommodate charging needs.
In response, we first note that most vehicles are in use just a few hours per day. Depending on
the vehicle's location when it is not in use, charging could occur when the vehicle is parked.
Under those conditions, there is effectively no downtime for charging which is reflected in the
refueling time included in the NPRM and in the revised refueling time estimates in the FRM.
Mid-trip charging, which the EPA does estimate, is not necessarily uncomfortable or
inconvenient. It also does not require fast charging or long duration. For example, in some
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circumstances, a full charge might be required, in which case fast charging could be preferred.
However, depending on one's needs, a driver might not require a full change and either charge
for a shorter period of time and/or at a slower rate, stopping before a full charge is reached.
There are, of course, exceptions to the above, but, as discussed above, the advantages and
disadvantages of any vehicle is not inherent to the vehicle. Rather the perception of vehicle
attributes depends on the user and the context. Also as discussed above and throughout this RTC,
we have demonstrated multiple example compliance pathways which include various mixes of
ICE, hybrids, PHEVs and BEVs. With the flexibility of performance-based standards, we expect
that automakers will continue to produce a wide selection of vehicles to meet consumer needs.
We also note that learning and adaptation will occur as PEV markets shares grow and
charging infrastructure expands. For consumers who choose a PEV, more exposure and
experience, the multiplicative nature of network and neighborhood effects, and people's innate
ability to learn and adapt strongly suggest, in combination, that the behaviors associated with
charging will emerge and become "second nature" in very much the same way that visiting a gas
station is today.
13.4 - Consumers' savings and expenses
Comments by Organizations
Organization: A. Longo
The proposed regulation seeks to impose a number of restrictions on the transportation sector,
such as rigorous emissions standards, increased fuel efficiency requirements, and limitations
placed on certain modes of transportation. Specifically, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), aims to establish new greenhouse gas emissions standards placed upon vehicles that meet
the definition of light to medium-duty. These standards seek to achieve an aggressive and sum
what arbitrary thirty percent reduction in emissions by 2030 and a fifty percent reduction by
2050. According to the EPA's own analysis, the reduction in emissions would save $1,500 over
the life of the vehicle primarily due to savings in fuel costs, and economic value of reduced
emissions. However, a number of industry groups have challenged this analysis including the
American Trucking Associations, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers, the Trucking Alliance, and the Owner- Operator Independent
Drivers Association. All have challenged the figure indicating that the analysis does not include
the full economic impact. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0517, p. 1]
While these measures target environmental concerns around the improvement in air quality, it
is necessary to consider their economic impact. According to a recent study led by the
International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT), implementing more rigorous emissions
standards on light to medium-duty vehicles will likely lead to significant increases in
manufacturing costs. These increases are routinely passed on to consumers in the form of higher
vehicle prices. This would result in decreased affordability and potentially contribute to
significant inflationary pressures [1], Additionally, the American Trucking Association
conducted a study indicating that the proposed regulations would increase the cost of
manufacturing medium-duty vehicles by $10,000 to $20,000 per vehicle, leading to higher prices
for consumers [2], According to the Department of Transportation, the CPI sub-index for
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Transportation reached an all-time high of 284 points in June of 2022 and is holding close to that
level, which is well above the last 25-year average. Inflation in the transportation sector increases
the price of all consumer goods brought to market and negatively affects our economy. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0517, p. 1]
1 International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT). (2017). " A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE
U.S. VEHICLE EMISSION COMPLIANCE PROGRAM AND EMISSION RECALL CASES." Retrieved
from https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/EPA-Compliance-and-Recall_ICCT_White- P
aper_12042017_vF.pdf
2 American Trucking Associations. (2023). " ATA Statement on EPA's Greenhouse Gas Emission
Proposals for Light to medium-Duty Trucks" https://www.trucking.org/news-insights/ata-statement- epas-
greenhouse-gas-emission-proposals-light to medium-duty-trucks
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
3. Affordability
The auto industry has made significant progress driving down battery and fuel cell costs. Even
still, further research and development investments will be needed to realize cost, utility, and
convenience parity between EVs and their internal combustion counterparts. EVs currently cost
more to produce than equivalent ICE vehicles, and in many instances are sold at a loss. This
divide grows when considering convenience and utility parity, which requires larger batteries to
support longer EV ranges commensurate with consumer expectations and needs. Larger vehicles
(e.g., pickup trucks and SUVs) used by individuals and businesses for towing or heavy payloads
require even higher-capacity batteries to support payload and towing needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 80-82]
When discussing affordability, EPA looks at the savings associated with a BEV compared to
an ICE vehicle over an eight-year period. 140 According to EPA, consumers who chose to
purchase a new MY 2032 BEV instead of an ICE vehicle save between $400 and $4,000 at the
time of purchase and between $9,000 and $13,000 on operating expenses over the first eight
years of vehicle life (DRIA Table 4-7). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 80-82]
140 DRIA at 4-21 (Table 4-8).
First, these costs rely heavily on steep reductions in battery costs reductions in the 2026-2032
timeframe, which as we discuss in Section I.F. (Lithium-Ion Battery Cost) above, are likely
unrealistic for a host of reasons, not the least of which is the vast increase in global demand
across all sectors for lithium batteries during that same period. Second, the analysis in NPRM
Tables 4-7 and 4-8 assume maximum $7,500 IRA tax credits in 2032, which as we've discussed
earlier is simply not accurate - all vehicles and all buyers will NOT qualify for the maximum
IRA tax credit of $7,500. Moreover, even if they did, what happens in 2033? The standards
remain the same but the IRA tax credit is not available. Finally, the differential prices between
ICE and BEV are not consistent with at least the current market, where EVs have consistently
carried a price premium of close to $10,000 as shown in Figure 30 below. For example, in March
2023, KBB reports the average EV transaction price was $59,553 compared to the average new
vehicle transaction price of $48,289,141 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 80-82]
141 htps://www.coxautoinc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/March-2023-Kelley-Blue-Book-Average-
Transaction- Price-data-tables.pdf
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Figure 30: Automotive Vehicle Transaction Price by Segment (Auto Innovators) [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 80-82]
The higher EV purchase prices require larger down payments and/or longer-term loans at
today's higher interest rates than most people can afford. According to the JD Power EV index
report, there are only nine vehicles that reached total cost of ownership parity compared to an
ICE as of March 2023.142 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 82-83]
142 htps://www .jdpower.com/business/resources/ev-divide-grows-us-more-new-vehicle-shoppers-dig-
their-heels- internal-combustion
Consumer interest in EVs is heavily swayed by the purchase price. According to the April
2023 JD Power E-Vision Intelligence report, 143 the primary barriers to EV purchase over the
past 10 months have been the lack of public charging infrastructure and price (Figure 31). [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 82-83]
143 JD Power (n.d.). JD Power EV Index. JD Power EV Index. Retrieved June 10, 2023, from
htps://www.jdpower.com/business/e-vision
Figure 31: Top 10 Reasons for EV Purchase Rejectionl44 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 82-83]
144 EV Divide Grows in U.S. as More New-Vehicle Shoppers Dig In Their Heels on Internal Combustion,
J.D. POWER (May 1, 2023), htps://www.jdpower.com/business/resources/ev-divide-grows-us-more-new-
vehicle-shoppers-dig- their-heels-internal-combustion.
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
Decreasing Costs. EPA's claims about the costs of purchasing and owning an electric vehicle
also suffer multiple flaws.
EPA acknowledges that retail prices are typically higher for electric vehi- cles, but it asserts
that the price difference is expected to "narrow or disappear" in the coming years. 88 Fed. Reg.
at 29,190. That prediction rests primarily on EPA's expectations regarding declining costs of
batteries and purchase incen- tives provided in the Inflation Reduction Act ("IRA"). EPA
overestimates the effect that these factors will have on upfront purchase prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683, pp. 24-25]
EPA also assumes without justification that manufacturers will pass sav- ings on to purchasers
in the form of lower vehicle prices. EPA must assess— not guess—the impact that the Advanced
Manufacturing Production Credit is likely to have in the relevant years before relying on that
credit to justify its determination regarding feasibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 30]
EPA separately claims that, even if retail prices remain higher, the total cost of ownership for
electric vehicles is lower and will in turn incentivize purchasers to buy them despite higher up-
front outlays. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,190, 29,312. According to the agency, electric-vehicle buyers
will save "between $9,000 and $13,000 on operating expenses over the first 8 years of vehicle
life." Draft RIA at 4-21. But not all consumers can make purchasing decisions based on savings
that they hope to experience years later. "Buying a new car is the second most expensive
purchase a consumer makes behind buying a house." Charette, Con- vincing Consumers. In
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many cases, the price for an electric vehicle will amount to "nearly 100 percent of an annual US
median household income." Id. Poten- tial customers "may not be interested" in those operating-
cost savings "if meet- ing today's monthly auto payments is difficult." Id. In addition, consumers
who focus on the total cost of ownership of a vehicle must consider not only day-to- day
operating expenses but also other "extra costs" of purchasing an electric vehicle—such as the
need to install home charging equipment, "which can add several thousand dollars more," and
higher insurance costs that "could add an extra $500-$600 a year." Id. The total cost of
ownership, therefore, may not be a selling point for many consumers in the vehicle market.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 30]
For these reasons, EPA falls far short of supporting the projected adoption rates upon which
its analysis of the feasibility of its proposed rule rests. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 30]
Second, EPA concludes that the costs of the proposed rule would be offset by a $580 billion
reduction—which EPA counts as a "benefit"—in "mainte- nance and repair costs" that it expects
consumers to realize by shifting to elec- trie vehicles. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,372, 29,385. As support
for this enormous sum, EPA points to a single study suggesting that lifetime repair-and-
maintenance costs for electric vehicles will be less than for combustion-engine vehicles. See
Draft RIA at 4-32. In so doing, the agency unreasonably ignores countervailing sources
suggesting the opposite. For instance, Consumer Reports has found that consumers report more
problems with electric vehicles than combustion- engine vehicles—including issues with battery
packs, charging, electric drive motors, and heating and cooling systems unique to electric
vehicles. Jake Fisher, Tesla and Nissan Make the Most Reliable Electric Vehicles, Consumer
Reps. (Dec. 14, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/mryx9z6c. It also takes longer, and costs more, for
problems with electric vehicles to get resolved. Charette, Convincing Consumers. And there are
fewer qualified technicians to resolve them: out of 229,000 auto-repair technicians in the United
States, only 3,100 are certified for electric vehicles. Id. Moreover, if a manufacturer goes out of
business (much more common in the nascent electric-vehicle industry), purchasers of that com-
pany's vehicles will be on their own in seeking to repair the vehicles, without standard
manufacturer-servicing support. Beia Spiller et al., Medium- and Heavy- Duty Vehicle
Electrification: Challenges, Policy Solutions, and Open Research Questions, Res. for the Future,
at 13 (May 2023). Any final rule must explain why EPA's fuel-savings figures are realistic in the
face of this contrary evidence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 62-63]
Third, EPA asserts that consumers will receive $890 billion in fuel savings— in other words,
that operating electric vehicles will be cheaper than operating combustion-engine vehicles
because consumers will no longer need to purchase fuel directly. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,362. But
this figure depends on consumers' choosing to switch from their familiar combustion-engine
vehicles to electric vehicles in overwhelming numbers. Even if all of the obstacles to
manufactur- ing and charging electric vehicles discussed above could be overcome, the fuel
savings EPA posits still would not materialize unless individuals decide to pur- chase those
vehicles. For the reasons already noted, there is ample reason to doubt that consumers would do
so, including based on concerns about electric vehicles' higher up-front costs and perceptions
that charging and maintenance facilities are inadequate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp.
63-64]
To the extent EPA believes that the prospect of fuel and other operational savings itself would
motivate consumers to adopt electric vehicles in sufficient numbers, experience thus far indicates
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otherwise. As EPA acknowledges, if abandoning combustion-engine vehicles in favor of electric
vehicles actually resulted in net operating savings, rational users of combustion-engine vehicles
would likely already be switching to electric vehicles in much greater numbers than they are
today. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,397; Draft RIA at 4-38-39 (noting that "[conventional economic
principles" would lead "people [to] buy [electric vehicles]"). The fact that consumers are not
doing so—but instead currently "tend to favor [combustion-engine] vehicles over" the electric
vehicles that are available now even "when two vehicles are comparable in cost and capability,"
88 Fed. Reg. at 29,342—is a strong indication that EPA's asserted savings do not in reality
outweigh the costs of switching to electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 63-
64]
EPA attempts to sidestep this problem by invoking a supposed "energy ef- ficiency gap,"
positing a market failure that is responsible for skewing consum- ers' decisions away from
purchasing electric vehicles. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,397. But EPA provides no evidence
demonstrating that low adoption of electric ve- hides is actually the result of any such market
failure, as opposed to well- founded concerns about the drawbacks of the technology. EPA offers
only a hope that nothing "immutable within consumers or inherent to" electric vehi- cles will
"irremediably obstruct[] acceptance." Id. at 29,312. But in light of the gap between the data and
consumer behavior on the one hand, and EPA's rosy savings estimates on the other, any final
rule must explain why EPA's fuel- savings figure is realistic and why it is an appropriate offset
for the rule's costs. See Am. Pub. Gas Ass'n v. DOE, 22 F.4th 1018, 1027-28 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
EPA cannot justify an economy-altering rule by invoking an ill-defined, unsubstan- tiated market
failure of its own imagining. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 63-64]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
Additional barriers to ZEV adoption by particularly low-income stakeholders, include but are
not limited to restricted driving/battery range; inability to charge in different housing and work
situations; high price points to purchase, maintain, and insure EVs; availability of replacement
parts and qualified mechanics, as well as ease and cost of repairs; and unpredictability regarding
future electricity costs. EPA cannot ignore these real-world limitations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, p. 33]
EPA also assumes the increased supply of ZEVs—resulting from OEMs' planned production
expansions and offering of more ZEV models, charging infrastructure, purchase incentives, and
lower battery prices—will lead to lower ZEV prices.239 EPA ignores that battery prices have
begun to rise due to limited supply of minerals.240 While there are some affordable EVs, these
EVs typically have a range below 200 miles on a full charge.241 If consumers want longer range
EVs, they will pay a considerable purchase price as seven of the top ten, range-rated EVs cost
anywhere from $74,800 to $110,295.242 EPA's analysis also fails to account for the increased
vehicle sales tax and property tax associated with the higher purchase price of ZEVs (even after
myriad subsidy programs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 52-53]
239 DRIA at 4-23.
240 BLOOMBERGNEF "Lithium-ion Battery Pack Prices Rise for First Time to an average of $ 151/kWh"
(Dec. 6, 2022) available at https://about.bnef.com/blog/lithium-ion-battery-pack-prices-rise-for-first-time-
to- an-average-of-151-kwh/
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241 See Sebastian Blanco, ListofEVs Sorted by Range (Sept. 1, 2022), www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-
guides/list-of-evs-sorted-by-range.
242 See Nicholas Wallace, Austin Irwin, & Nick Kurczewski, Longest Range Electric Cars for 2023,
Ranked (Mar. 23, 2023), https://www.caranddriver.com/features/g32634624/ev-longest-driving-range/.
EPA's cost benefit analysis is implicitly built around much longer battery life than is currently
achieved, as EPA does not factor in battery replacement costs or the environmental implications
of additional battery production, recycling, and disposal. EPA cannot have it both ways - either
the batteries are remarkably durable, or the costs of this Proposed Rule are dramatically
understated. Even with massive direct and indirect subsidies, EVs are more expensive on average
than their ICEV counterparts and unaffordable for many households. In the first calendar quarter
of 2022, the average price of the top-selling light-duty ZEV in the U.S. was about $20,000 more
than the average price of top-selling ICEV.243 The price disparity has not improved, with the
average price of light-duty EVs near $66,000 in August 2022 and continuing to rise.244 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 52-53]
243 Registration-weighted average retail price for the 20 top-selling ZEVs and ICEVs in the U.S. S&P
Global, Tracking BEV prices - How competitively-priced are BEVs in the major global auto markets? May
2022.
244 Andrew J. Hawkins, EV prices are going in the wrong direction (The Verge Aug. 24,
2022), available at https://www.theverge.eom/2022/8/24/23319794/ev-price-increase-used-carS"
analysis-iseecars (last visited May 24, 2023); see also Justin Banner, Latest Ford F-150
Lightning Price Hike Hands Chevy Silverado EV a $20K Advantage—The least-expensive
electric F-150 Lightning now costs $4,000 more than it did late last year (Motortrend Mar. 30,
2023), available at https://www.motortrend.com/news/2023- ford-f-150-lightning-pro-price-
increase-msrp/ (last visited May 24, 2023).
iv. Total cost of ownership
EPA's proposal also vastly underestimates the cost of ownership for ZEV owners by
assuming ZEVs achieve real-world fuel economy that is equivalent to EPA's test methods. They
do not and it is not close. This error significantly undermines EPA's estimates of costs for both
ZEV owners and associated power infrastructure and charging infrastructure requirements. As
noted in the environmental benefits discussion above, EPA's proposal is based on performance
data estimates of ICEV fuel economy using EPA's "5-cycle method." If EPA's analysis were
based on real-world fuel economy testing of ZEVs, it would show they use vastly higher
amounts of electricity to travel the same distance, with a corresponding increase in ZEV owner
costs for electricity and ZEV maintenance and battery replacement. EPA must account for these
real costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 55]
EPA's total cost of EV ownership incorrectly assumes each vehicle type of all new ICEV and
ZEV will travel the same miles each year.249 EVs have less range, both technically and
practically. As noted by J.D. Power, "the majority of EVs provide between 200 and 300 miles of
range on a full charge."250 Studies show that the average electric car is driven 9,059 miles per
year, compared with 12,758 miles for ICEVs.251 By overestimating VMT, EPA compounds all
other errors in its assumptions that all work in favor of ZEVs and to the detriment of ICEVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 55]
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249 DRIA at 4-20, Table 4-7 (e.g., EPA assumes EV and ICEV sedans/wagons will both travel 15,700
miles per year).
250 See Sebastian Blanco, List of EVs Sorted by Range (Sept. 1, 2022), www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-
guides/list-of-evs-sorted-by-range.
251 iSeeCars, The Most and Least Driven Electric Cars (May 22, 2023), https://www.iseecars.com/most-
driven-evs-study.
Another way that EPA justifies lower EV ownership costs is by failing to fully account for
current state excise tax policies and insurance that establish higher costs for ICEV owners and
lower costs for ZEV owners. Insurance premiums for PEVs are typically higher than comparable
ICEVs because of higher repair and parts cost. The price premium depends on the make and
model, age of the driver, geographic location, and state. According to ValuePenguin, insurance
on a PHEV, depending on the model, could be 19 percent to 32 percent higher than comparable
ICEV.252 Another estimate from an Oct 2022 study from Self Financial concludes PEVs' annual
insurance is $1,674, $442 more compared to an ICEV annual insurance premium of $1,232,253
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 55]
252 How Much Does Electric Car Insurance Cost? - ValuePenguin.
253 Electric Cars vs Gas Cars Cost in Each State | Self Financial.
Should EPA mandate that most new vehicles will be ZEVs, it will become increasingly
untenable for ICEV owners to either further subsidize ZEV owners by paying higher excise
taxes, or for states to suffer a shortfall in revenue collections by continuing to give preferential
treatment to ZEV owners. EPA must acknowledge these significant costs necessarily must
increase for ZEV owners as EPA mandates higher ZEV sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733,
p. 55]
Finally, EPA's total cost of ownership analysis assumes dramatically lower retail fuel costs
for ZEVs (around 60 percent less) than liquid fuels.254 Real-world data squarely contradicts
EPA's cost assumptions on EV charging. For example, California's ZEV mandates have
contributed to the inflationary impacts on energy prices and on jobs in certain industries related
to traditional fuels and vehicles. According to a 2021 California Public Advocates Office
presentation to the California Public Utilities Commission, "it is already cheaper to fuel a
conventional internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicle than it is to charge an EV" in the San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. service area.255 This is astonishing given that gasoline prices in
California are the second highest in the nation, averaging approximately $4.01 per gallon of
gasoline in 2021. Future projections afford consumers no relief, as the California Energy
Commission projects that both commercial and residential electricity prices will continue to rise,
reaching nearly $7 per gasoline-gallon equivalent for the commercial sector. Similarly, many in
New England are finding it is costing more to charge up than fill up, paying $0.28 per kilowatt
hour (double the price of the national average) in the fall of 2022.256 EPA must revise its
analysis to account for realistic electricity prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 55-56]
254 DRIA at 4-20, Table 4-7.
255 California Public Utilities Commission, "Utility Costs and Affordability of the Grid of the Future"
(May 2021). Presentation from Mike Campbell, Public Advocates Office at 116-117 available at
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/office-of-governmental-affairs-
division/reports/2021/senate-bill-695-report-2021-and-en-banc-
whitepaper_final_04302021 ,pdf#page=l 17.
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256 Irina Ivanova, https://www.cbsnews.com/moneywatch?ftag=CNM-16-10abg0dFor some electric
vehicle owners, recharging now more costly than filling up, CBS News Money Watch, Feb. 13, 2023.
Available at Electric cars 2023: In some parts of the U.S., recharging now more costly than filling up - CBS
News.
Finally, charging pricing has been unpredictable, with some stations charging by the minute
instead of charging for electricity consumed.257 Other charging stations offer multiple
subscription plans or charge different rates at various times of day, resulting in significant price
increases over the past few months.258 Boston charging companies raised charging fees in
response to New England utilities increasing their rates to 39 cents per kilowatt-hour in February
2023, from 27 cents a year earlier.259 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 56]
257 Aaron Pressman, "Inside the crazy, mixed-up world of electric-vehicle charger pricing," The Boston
Globe, March 27, 2023. Available at https://www.boston.eom/news/the-boston-globe/2023/03/27/electric-
vehicle-charger-pricing.
258 Id.
259 Id.
However, building more charging stations is not enough. "Electricity purchased at a public
charger can cost five to ten times more than electricity at a private one."278 Lower-income
consumers cannot afford to install solar photovoltaics, which proponents claim will allow ZEVs
to be charged at home with emissions-free electricity.279 Those who cannot afford private
charging will end up paying vastly more for a re-charge than the wealthy. For those who simply
cannot afford the upfront costs for a new EV or pay higher public charging rates, they may end
up retaining older ICEVs for longer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 60]
278 Id.
279 Jonathan A. Lesser, Short Circuit: The High Cost of Electric Vehicle Subsidies 4, Manhattan Institute
(May 15, 2018), available at https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/R-JL-0518-v2.pdf.
Organization: American Highway Users Alliance
We are also concerned that the proposed rule, among other impacts, would increase vehicle
costs for consumers. At the end of the first quarter of 2023, the price of an EV was more than
double the price of a subcompact car.l This represents a real financial challenge for middle class
mobility; for families that need a basic vehicle to get to work, health care, the grocery store, and
other fundamental destinations, and for local business travel, such as meetings and sales calls,
particularly for small business. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, p. 2]
1 https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/papers-reports/get-connected-2023-ql (page 4).
Feasibility of the proposal is highly questionable and benefits are likely overestimated We are
skeptical that the GHG and criteria reductions estimated by EPA can be realized in the proposed
rule's timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 4-5]
We noted above the substantially greater cost of EVs. With such a cost differential (even if
the differential is reduced somewhat in coming years), many consumers and businesses can be
expected to keep and maintain existing vehicles (average age just over 12 years) rather than pay
for new, much more expensive electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 4-5]
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Additionally, the cost of the vehicle itself is not the only consideration for a consumer in
making a purchasing decision. Many businesses and hard-working families will not purchase a
vehicle unless both the vehicle and fuel are cost effective and meet their needs. At this point the
availability of charging stations, while increasing, seems unlikely to approach the current
ubiquitous availability of fuel at gas stations within the time frame of the rule. That could result
from various electricity supply and transmission issues, including the time delay and cost
involved in building out more connections between the grid and charging stations.4 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 4-5]
4 A statement submitted to EPA in conjunction with EPA's May 3 hearing in the heavy-duty vehicle Phase
3 docket by ABF Freight System, a major trucking company with over 4,500 Class 8 and Class 6 vehicles,
noted a wait of 2 years and counting for added utility infrastructure at a facility to support the company's
current EV trucks (only 6) and anticipated EV truck purchases.
Moreover, a recent ATRI study found that electrification of the entire U.S. vehicle fleet would
consume 40.3% of the current electricity demand, yet our aging national grid can hardly sustain
its current needs.5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 4-5]
5 Charging Infrastructure Challenges for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Fleet, American Transportation
Research Institute, December 2022. https://truckingresearch.org/2022/12/charging-infrastructure-
challenges-for-the-u-s-electric-vehicle-fleet/
For such reasons the benefits of the proposed rule as estimated by EPA appear to be
overstated, as the vehicle fleet will not turn over to EVs as quickly as EPA estimated. Further,
the proposed rule will limit consumer choice and the mobility of the American public. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 4-5]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
2. ZEV penetration/customer uptake and adoption rates.
LMD ZEVs are currently not available in sufficient quantities or at affordable levels to
significantly displace ICEVs. Given the lower costs, current ICEV owners may choose to
continue to use and extend the life of their ICEVs to avoid these issues. EPA must address the
potential impacts of this likelihood on its emissions projections. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, p. 15]
Organization: Anonymous
EPA also incorrectly assumes that the tax credits are free. They use the tax credits to offset
the costs of BEVs, but they do not consider the costs to taxpayers to fund the tax credits. This
hides the costs of BEVs to the American Population by hundreds of billions. Furthermore, EPA
does not address the societal inequities that will be produced by providing tax credits for BEVs.
Since BEVs are typically more expensive than basic ICE vehicles and the fact that the tax credits
are non-refundable (meaning that you have to carry a tax liability to get the benefits of the tax
credit), all taxpayer funds will be going towards funding new BEVs for richer Americans. In this
sense, EPA's reduces environmental justice by forcing BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565,
p. 4]
Finally, EPA's estimates of tax credits overstates their applicability. The Clean Vehicle credit
has some restrictions that will limit how many vehicles qualify and how much. EPA should
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model these restrictions or at the very least make a good faith estimate. For the commercial clean
vehicle tax credit, EPA ignores the cost-basis nature of the credit an d assumes that everyone will
lease a vehicle to get the EV tax credit while ignoring the lost utility of owning a vehicle. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0565, p. 4]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
The Proposal Will Provide Economic Benefits
Not only would U.S. EPA's proposed standards bring critically important emission reductions
to combat climate change, improve air quality, and protect public health, the increased ZEV
penetration across the U.S. would also provide important economic benefits such as consumer
savings and economic growth in clean technology sectors. As CARB noted in its comments on
the DRIA, U.S. EPA's analysis demonstrates considerable net benefits to the nation, and these
benefits are likely understated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 65]
U.S. EPA's analysis considers consumer benefits in assessing the impacts of its proposal.
Consumers stand to benefit greatly from more stringent emission standards implemented at the
national level. CARB notes that ZEV technology costs are rapidly declining, and even today
ZEVs are often cheaper for consumers than internal combustion engines when considering the
total cost of ownership. 126 In its ACC II rulemaking process, CARB estimated the benefits to
individuals associated with ZEV adoption. CARB found that, for BEVs, operational savings will
offset any incremental costs over the 10-year period evaluated, with a 300-mile-range BEV
providing savings in the first year for the 2026 MY. 127 Statewide, CARB estimated that
California vehicle owners would save $11 billion (2020 dollars) from implementation of the
regulation, driven primarily by lower fuel costs and dramatic savings in maintenance and repair
associated with ZEV ownership. These savings are even greater when paired with incentives that
reduce upfront purchase prices like those included in the Inflation Reduction Act. Lower
operating and maintenance costs are especially important for lower-income consumers who
spend a greater share of their incomes on transportation. U.S. EPA's proposal would help ensure
that consumers across the U.S. can realize these cost savings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780,
p. 65]
126 ACC IIFSOR. Appendix F: Updated Costs and Benefits Analysis.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/fsorappf.pdf.
127 ACC IIISOR. pp. 143-145. https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/isor.pdf
Organization: Charles Forsberg
The initial cost of light vehicles must not significantly increase. For the majority of
Americans, the biggest barrier to vehicle ownership is the initial cost-not long term fuel costs.
Vehicle ownership opens up job opportunities because people can get to many different job sites,
creates a competitive market for consumer goods and increases life expectancies. When in the
early 1900s Ford developed the manufacturing line that enabled low-cost cars, America rapidly
converted to automobiles because the benefits of transportation on demand were so obvious to
everyone-and ignored by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, pp. 5-6]
Without vehicle ownership, many jobs are off limits. Without vehicle ownership one is held
hostage by the local grocery store that knows its customers can't visit the competition down the
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road and thus it can raise prices. The proposed EPA solutions are for the wealthiest 5% of the
planet and the top 20% of Americans. High-cost vehicles are a health disaster because the
strongest correlation in health is with income. To use a recent example, China has terrible air
pollution but life expectancies have increased rapidly. The small gains in health that EPA
believes will derive from electrifying transportation will be totally overwhelmed by the poor
health effects of driving down economic opportunities for the bottom half of society by making
light vehicles too expensive. The EPA strategy is an economic disaster to rural America and
smaller cities where inexpensive transportation is required. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738,
pp. 5-6]
Recommended EPA action. EPA must consider all of American society-not just the top 20%.
Incomes of much of the working class have gone down as a direct consequence of failed
government policies with good intensions. Poverty generation needs to stop. EPA must consider
all health impacts-not just "cherry pick" a small subset where improvements by those metrics to
improve health are overwhelmed by large decreases in life expectancy due to "secondary"
effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, pp. 5-6]
I recommend you read the papers referenced above that go into the details-all open access.
Good intentions are not enough. The poster child is Germany where they have invested
massively in low-carbon technologies for 20 years without significantly changing greenhouse
gas emissions. They chose faith-based feel-good strategies rather than hard-headed engineering
analysis. That catastrophic failure should be a warning to EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0738, pp. 5-6]
Organization: Charles Gordon
INCONVENIENCE TO PEOPLE
The rapid elimination of new gas-powered cars creates real inconvenience for ordinary
people. Those who live in apartment buildings will have to find charging stations where it will
take 30 minutes to recharge. This will particularly hurt the poor and minorities. Long trips by car
will require careful planning and 30-minute interruptions to recharge. Towing large trailers will
be virtually impossible. This is added to the existing inconvenience of more expensive washing
machines which take 60 minutes to wash a load-not 30 and dishwashers which take 2 hours to
poorly wash dishes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 7]
It may be hard to put a dollar amount on this inconvenience, but it is real nonetheless. EPA
needs to take that inconvenience into account when it reviews the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 7]
Organization: Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA)
As consumers become more accepting of electric vehicles (EV), taxpayer-funded incentives
expand, and automobile manufacturers produce a greater variety of models, EV purchases are
expected to keep growing. Policymakers, however, should be increasingly mindful not to put the
cart before the horse when it comes to attempting to drive consumers to purchase products they
aren't ready to accept, they can't afford to purchase, and that face significant supply-chain
bottlenecks that are already limiting supply and increasing costs. This is an area which we
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explored in-depth in our report Freedom to Fuel: Consumer Choice in the Automotive
Marketplace. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp. 1-2]
1 https://consumerenergvalliance.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CEA EV REPORT 2023.pdf
Should this rule be adopted in its current form - lacking both technological feasibility and
economic practicality - the result will be limiting consumer options and thwarting environmental
progress through depressing innovation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Competitive Enterprise Institute
II. The Proposed Standards Imperil Consumer Choice, Vehicle Affordability, and Market
Liberty
EPA's proposal will restrict consumers' freedom to choose which types of vehicles they want
to buy. 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 4-6]
As the EPA acknowledges, Congress is already providing tens of billions of dollars in EV-
related subsidies, such as the IRA's $7,500 tax credit, "effectively making some BEVs more
affordable to buy and operate today than comparable ICE vehicles." 13 The only purpose for
heaping EV mandates on top of EV subsidies is to eliminate choices consumers would otherwise
make. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 4-6]
12 Diana Furchtgott-Roth, "Biden's Plan to Phase Out Gas-Powered Cars Is All Pain for Consumers and
No Gain," The Hill, June 12, 2023, https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/commentary/bidens-
plan-phase-out-gas- powered-cars-all-pain-consumers-and-no. 13 88 FR 29190.
13 88 FR 29190.
EVs have several well-known drawbacks that regulatory mandates do not remove but rather
intensify by restricting the supply of ICE vehicles available for purchase. Those disadvantages
include the high purchase price, 14 price volatility due to supply-chain bottlenecks, 15 range
anxiety 16(especially in towing mode), 17 long recharging times, 18 reduced performance in
extreme heat and cold, 19 and less reliability during blackouts from hurricanes and other
disasters. 20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 4-6]
14 For example, in 2022, the initial purchase price of a conventional Ford F-150 was $40,960, that of the
electric Ford-150 Lightning was $54,769. Roberto Baldwin, Sasha Richie, and Dave Vanderwerp, "EV vs.
Gas: Which Cars Are Cheaper to Own?" Car and Driver, October 28, 2022,
https://www.caranddriver.com/shopping- advice/a32494027/ev-vs-gas-cheaper-to-own/. The authors
conclude that overall EV ownership costs are lower than those for gasoline powered vehicles (factoring in
expenses for maintenance and fuel). Nonetheless, the higher EV purchase is a disadvantage that
undoubtedly matters to many consumers.
15 Mark P. Mills, Testimony, "Exposing the Environmental, Human Rights, and National Security Risks of
the Biden Administration's Rush to Green Policies," Subcommittee on Environment, Manufacturing, and
Critical Materials, U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce, April 26, 2023,
https://media4.manhattan- institute.org/wp-content/uploads/Testimony_House_Energy_Mills_4-26-
2023.pdf; Institute for Energy Research, "Transition Mineral Prices Are Soaring and the Industry Is Short
of Workers," June 9, 2023, https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/uncategorized/transition-mineral-
prices-are-soaring-and-the-industry-is- short-of-workers/.
16 Analytics Team, "Survey: Price and Range, Not Gas Prices, Dominate Worries about EVs,"
Autolist.Com, July 20, 2022, https://www.autolist.com/news-and-analysis/2022-survey-electric-vehicles.
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17 Alex Knizek, "How Well Can an Electric Pickup Tow?" Consumer Reports, April 21, 2023,
https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/hybrids-evs/how-well-can-an-electric-pickup-truck-tow-
al 149286680/: "As capable and smooth as the EVs are, they simply cannot match the heavy long-distance
towing capabilities of gas, hybrid, and diesel-powered trucks. This is primarily due to the severely limited
range, and the amount of time that would be required for charging during the trip. Accessing a public
charger with a trailer in tow also presents potentially significant logistical challenges."
18 Ronald Montoya, "How Long Does It Take to Charge an Electric Car?" Edmunds.Com, March 7, 2023,
https://www.edmunds.com/electric-car/articles/how-long-does-take-charge-electric-car.html
19 Steve Hanley, "Electric Cars, Winter Driving, Range Anxiety, and You," CleanTechnica, February 25,
2022, https://cleantechnica.eom/2022/02/25/electric-cars-winter-driving-range-anxiety-you/.
20 Shawn A. Adderly, Daria Manukian, Timothy D. Sullivan, and Mun Son. 2018. Electric vehicles and
natural disaster policy implications. Energy Policy 212: 437-448,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301421517305906; Diana Furchtgott-Roth,
"Electric Vehicles Powerless During Hurricanes," Forbes, September 5, 2021,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dianafurchtgott- roth/2021/09/05/electric-vehicles-powerless-during-
hurricanes/?sh= 107dlbfe48da.
The proposed standards would impose disproportionate burdens on low-income, single-
vehicle households. My colleague Ben Lieberman explains: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611,
pp. 4-6]
The higher purchase price of an EV is prohibitive enough, but it is only part of the story. Fully
one-third of American households are single-vehicle households, including many low-income
ones.21 However, the limitations of EVs make them impractical as a household's one and only
vehicle. This includes long charging times (especially inconvenient for renters who are less
likely to be able to charge at home) as well as limited range. Indeed, nearly 90 percent of EVs
currently in use are part of wealthier multi-car households that include one or more gas-powered
vehicles.22 Thus, the EV agenda not only involves the higher sticker price relative to gasoline-
powered vehicles, but also the additional cost of a conventional vehicle to back it up.23 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 4-6]
21 The Geography of Transport Systems, Percentage of Households by Number of Vehicles, 1960-2020,
https://transportgeography.org/contents/chapter8/urban-transport-challenges/household-vehicles-united-
states/ (accessed July 5, 2023).
22 Lucas W. Davis. 2019. How much are electric vehicles driven? Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 26, No.
18, 1497- 1502, https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ldavis/Davis%20AEL%202019.pdf.
23 Ben Lieberman and Donna Jackson, "Costlier cars help the poor, according to EPA," Open Market, June
26, 2023, https://cei.org/blog/costlier-cars-help-the-poor-according-to-epa/.
Government's cartelization of the auto industry via regulations and preferential subsidies
poses an insidious threat to consumer welfare. The IRA and the EPA's mandates increase
automakers' dependence on political subventions while preventing both industry incumbents and
new entrants from competing on price, range, and ease-of-fueling by selling gasoline-powered
cars. Energy analyst Robert Bryce recently reported that Ford loses $64,466 on every EV it sells,
"and isn't making up for it in volume." 24 Bryce cautions that "if a business isn't profitable, it
isn't sustainable." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 4-6]
24 Robert Bryce, "Ford Is Losing $64,446 on Every EV It Sells," Substack, May 3, 2023,
https://robertbryce.substack.eom/p/ford-is-losing-66446-on-every-ev.
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Organization: Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA)
While there are clearly many reasons to pursue EVs as a mobility option, there are many real
world economic, social, and practical considerations the U.S. EPA should fully review before
adopting overly restrictive transportation policies. Consumer impacts -especially the impacts
imposed on those with low- and fixed-incomes -need to be front and center in these
discussions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, p. 2]
Regarding the vehicles that will be mandated because of this rule, has the U.S. EPA
considered affordability of vehicles for low- and middle-income families? The average EV cost
$65,041 in 2022 while the overall average automobile cost only $48,681, according to Kelly
Blue Book data - a $16,360 upfront price differential. This differential is more than two times the
incentives offered by the federal government to purchase qualifying EVs.5 Clearly, even with the
incentive, EVs are out of the price range for the average American. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0788, pp. 2-3]
5 https://b2b kbb com/news/view/new-vehicle-pnces-hit-record-high-in-november 2022/
Will low- and middle-income families fare better in the used vehicle market? [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp. 2-3]
A National Automobile Dealers Association study on the cost of ownership estimated that
after five years, EVs depreciate $43,515 in value, while ICE vehicles average only $27,883 in
depreciation.6 This depreciation almost eliminates any residual value advantage of the higher
priced EVs after only a short period of usage. If EVs become a non-viable option as used cars
due to substantial depreciation and cost of battery replacement, used car markets operating under
EV mandates will see very constrained supply despite sustained demand, eventually making
even used cars too expensive for many working-class families. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0788, p. 3]
6 https://www.nada.orfi/nada/nada-headlines/bevond-sticker-price-cost-ownership-evs-v-ice-vehicles
The initial purchase of an EV Is not one that working-class families can often consider As
noted earlier, the price differential between an EV and a comparable ICE vehicle is often greater
than $15,000. And contrary to popular opinion, the cost of EVs have been steadily increasing
since 2015. Today, the average EV costs well over $60,000, a price which can only be
considered affordable by the upper quintiles of income earners This is not an option for the
average working-class family. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, p. 3]
Organization: Consumer Reports (CR)
1.2. The Benefits of Strong Vehicle Standards to Consumers
Inefficient vehicles impact consumers in a number of ways. Consumers face higher
transportation costs when using less efficient vehicles. Inefficient vehicles produce higher levels
of air pollution and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Criteria pollutants such as ozone and
particulate matter cause health issues such as respiratory diseases, lung cancer, preterm births,
and neurological damage, 1,2 which lead to increased spending on public and individual
healthcare. GHG emissions contribute to extreme weather events such as extreme heat, flooding,
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and drought which cost consumers billions of dollars in property damage and increased
insurance premiums.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 5-6]
1 Air Pollution: Everything You Need to Know, Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 2021,
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/air-pollution-everything-you-need-know.
2 Traffic-Related Air Pollution: A Critical Review of the Literature on Emissions, Exposure, and
Health Effects, Health Effects Institute, 2010,
https://www.healtheffects.org/publication/traffic-related-air-pollution-critical-review-literature-emissions-
exposure-and-health.
3 U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, NOAA National Centers for Environmental
Information, 2022, https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions.
These issues are exacerbated in overburdened communities, such as communities of color,
due to redlining and other historically discriminatory policies which place these communities
along ports and high-transit corridors. Increasing the supply of electric vehicles (EVs) and other
lower emission vehicle technologies can mitigate these impacts and contribute to an equitable
transportation ecosystem for all consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 5-6]
Providing consumers with cleaner and more energy-efficient vehicle technologies can
significantly lower these costs, and enables consumers to make purchasing decisions that save
them money. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 5-6]
The proposed EPA rule would increase the supply of cleaner, cost-saving transportation
options, such as EVs and hybrids, available to consumers. This proposal, particularly the more
stringent Alternative 1, would support the transition to a cleaner transportation sector, providing
cost savings, as well as other benefits that go beyond the pocketbook. This proposal would save
consumers money on fuel and vehicle maintenance. It would also reduce emissions, thus
contributing to reduced spending on healthcare costs tied to air pollution, and disaster recovery
tied to GHG emissions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, p. 6],
These savings are particularly important for overburdened communities who overwhelmingly
bear the brunt of the negative impacts of air pollution. Not only do these communities face a
disproportionate exposure to vehicle tailpipe emissions,4 but lower income households also
spend a greater percentage of their income on transportation costs than their wealthier
counterparts, making them more sensitive to fluctuation and uncertainty in fuel prices.5 Thus,
policies such as the proposed rule, which reduce pollutant exposure and increase accessibility to
clean, reliable modes of transportation, are needed [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, p. 6],
4 Disparities in the Impact of Air Pollution, American Lung Association, April 2020,
https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/who-is-at-risk/disparities.
5 High Cost of Transportation in the United States, Institute for Transportation and Development Policy,
May 2019, https://www.itdp.org/2019/05/23/high-cost-transportation-united-states.
1.3. Consumer Petitions in Support of Proposed Rule
Consumer Reports collected 18,817 signatures from consumers in support of strengthening
EPA's current proposal for greenhouse gas standards.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, p. 6]
6 Petition: More Clean Vehicles = Better Climate Future, Consumer Reports, 2023,
https://action.consumerreports.org/nb-20230425-epa-cleancars-petition.
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Petition Text:
"We're urging the EPA and NHTSA to adopt the strongest possible rules to reduce climate-
and health-damaging vehicle emissions and greatly reduce fuel consumption, while helping
consumers save an estimated $12,000 over the lifetime of a new vehicle. The rules will rapidly
accelerate the number of cleaner vehicles like EVs and hybrids in production over the next
decade; save lives due to a dramatic decrease in tailpipe pollution; and put us on the route
towards a zero emissions future. These rules are a win-win for the climate, consumers' wallets,
and our health." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, p. 6]
5. 2023 EV Ownership Cost Comparison
Many more EVs have entered the market, and significant changes have been made to the
federal EV tax credit since CR released its EV ownership cost study in 2020. Given these
changes, updated analysis of current EV ownership costs has been performed and is presented in
this section.29 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 14-18]
This analysis uses similar modeling methodology as the 2020 study with the following
changes:30 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 14-18]
29 A summary of the results of this analysis can be found in the following fact sheet: CR Fact Sheet:
Electric Vehicles Save Consumers Money, Consumer Reports, June 30, 2023,
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/research/cr-fact-sheet-electric-vehicles-save-consumers-money/
30 New analysis from CR finds that the most popular electric vehicles cost less to own than the best-selling
gas-powered vehicles in their class, Consumer Reports, October 8, 2020,
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/press_release/new-analysis-from-cr-finds-that-the-most-popular-ele
ctric-vehicles-cost-less-to-own-than-the-best-selling-gas-powered-vehicles-in-their-class/.
- Selected vehicles include the 6 mainstream EVs that qualify for at least part of the current
federal EV tax credit in June 2023.
- Comparison ICE vehicles are selected with similar utility and features as the EV. Vehicles
were selected from the same automaker when possible. When no similar vehicle was available
from the automaker, the appropriate trim level of the best selling vehicle in the class was used.
- Energy costs are updated to the reference case from EIA's Annual Energy Outlook 2023.31
- Public direct current fast charging costs are updated to Electrify America's current standard
charging rate of $0.48/kWh.32
- Average loan interest rates were updated to current (June 2023) average values for prime
buyers of 6.4% according to NerdWallet.33 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 14-18]
31 2023 Annual Energy Outlook, US Energy Information Administration, March 16, 2023,
https://www.eia. gov/outlooks/aeo/.
32 Electrify America is increasing prices at its DC fast charging stations, The Verge, February 23, 2023,
https://www.theverge.eom/2023/2/3/23584747/electrify-america-price-increase-ev-charging-stations-marc
h-2023.
33 Average Car Loan Interest Rates by Credit Score, NerdWallet, June 27, 2023,
https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/loans/auto-loans/average-car-loan-interest-rates-by-credit-score.
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The selected vehicles, along with their current market prices according to TrueCar.com, are
shown in Table 5.1. The TrueCar price is used rather than MSRP because it better represents the
price consumers are actually paying for these vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 14-
18]
[See original comment for Table 5.1 - Vehicles for Ownership Cost Comparison]34 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 14-18]
34 All vehicles were model year 2023 except for the Chevy Trax which is a 2024 model.
Table 5.2 shows the estimated average market adjustment for the vehicles being compared.
The TrueCar price represents the market average transaction prices that consumers are actually
paying for the vehicle. This may be higher or lower than MSRP. The market adjustment is the
difference between the average transaction price and the MSRP. A positive value of the market
adjustment means consumers on average are paying above MSRP and a negative value means
that consumers are paying below MSRP. The comparison is made for all four sets of vehicles
that are sold at dealers and from the same manufacturer.35 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp.
14-18]
35 Tesla sells all vehicles at MSRP so they are not included here. Also, the comparison is most useful
comparing vehicles sold by the same automaker, which isolates any effects that might occur due to the
popularity of specific brands or differences in the behavior of different dealer networks, since both vehicles
in a pair are sold at the same dealers.
On average, the four EVs were selling at an average transaction price $2,700 more than
MSRP, while on average the four ICE vehicles were selling at an average transaction price
$2,200 below MSRP. This means that market adjustments are leading to a net increase of $4,900
in the relative price difference between EVs and their gasoline equivalent, compared to what it
would be if both vehicles sold for MSRP. The largest difference is seen on the F150 Lightning,
which is transacting with a net difference of over $11,000 more than the difference that would
have been if both the EV and ICE version were sold at MSRP. This rather large market price
difference is continued evidence that EV demand continues to exceed EV supply in the market.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 14-18]
[See original comment for Table 5.2 - Vehicle Market Adjustments Compared to MSRP]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 14-18]
The results of the ownership cost analysis in Figure 5.1 and Table 5.3 show that despite
paying over MSRP for many EVs, the average consumer is still pocketing significant savings by
purchasing the EV over the comparable ICE vehicle. All 6 EVs analyzed will deliver savings in
the first year to the average American. Overall average savings totaled $4,200 over a 7 year first
owner period, and $9,700 over the vehicle lifetime 200,000 miles. Lifetime savings ranged from
$6,000-$12,000 for the six vehicles studied. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 14-18]
Although the vehicle comparisons are somewhat different from the 2020 study, the results
generally show an increase in savings delivered by EVs, especially for the first owner. It is also
worth noting that while in 2020 Tesla was largely competing with other luxury brands like Audi
and BMW, their recent price cuts have brought their lowest priced vehicles into direct
competition with two of the most popular mainstream vehicles in the country, the Toyota Camry
and Toyota RAV4. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 14-18]
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[See original comment for Table 5.3 - EVNet Ownership Cost Savings] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0728, pp. 14-18]
[See original comment for Figure 5.1 - EVNet Ownership Cost Savings] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0728, pp. 14-18]
All of this indicates that consumers will not have to wait until some date far into the future in
order to achieve significant savings from going electric. For many consumers, big savings can
already be pocketed today. As more consumers recognize this fact, EV demand will inevitably
continue to grow. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 14-18]
Organization: Countymark
In April 2023, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed new emissions
standards for passenger vehicles and trucks that are significantly more stringent than previous
rules. The new proposed standards would require automakers to meet a tailpipe emissions
average of 82 grams of C02/mile across a company's production by model year (MY) 2032.
Your agency estimated this new regulation would result in electric vehicles (EVs) accounting for
67 percent of recent light-duty vehicle sales and 46 percent of new medium-duty vehicle sales in
less than ten years. CountryMark believes that this proposal significantly increases costs for
American families, undermines American energy security, and falls short of estimated
environmental benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0665, p. 1]
Transitioning to electric vehicles (EVs) as a mandated requirement has several negative
consequences. Currently, EVs make up a small portion of new vehicle sales,
with approximately 6% in the light-duty vehicle segment and less than 1% in the heavy-duty
vehicle segment. This demonstrates that EV adoption is still relatively low. One major concern is
the higher cost associated with EVs. On average, EVs are priced over $14,000 more than non-
luxury vehicles. This increased cost also affects the used car market, as the demand for used EVs
rises, leading to higher prices. These higher costs and limited choices in the vehicle market have
a more significant impact on low income and disadvantaged families. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0665, p. 2]
Another issue related to EVs is their weight, ranging from 1,000 to 3,000 pounds more than
gas-powered vehicles. This additional weight results in more damage to American roads,
necessitating increased infrastructure repair costs funded by taxpayers. Mandating
a transition to EVs can lead to increased consumer prices and reduced vehicle choices.
It also raises concerns about the financial burden on low-income families and the potential
for increased infrastructure repair costs due to the heavier weight of EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0665, p. 2]
Organization: DavidManley III
Of course, while the proposed rule benefits China without significantly reducing global
temperatures, American consumers are penalized because (a) while gas-powered cars take five or
10 minutes to refill, recharging an electric vehicle can take 45 minutes, and personal mobility,
including road trips, will be adversely effected since EVs require longer and more frequent
interruptions for charging, (b) The common American cannot afford EVs as EVs were on
average $11,981 more expensive than gas-powered cars at the end of 2022, and today, for
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example, the electric version of the Ford F-150 pickup truck, the best-selling vehicle in America,
costs an additional $26,000 over the gasoline-powered one while Tesla's EVs start at $39,000 for
a Model 3 and go up to nearly $100,000 for a Model X — prices much higher than most families
can afford, and (c) American consumers will have to deal with electric power availability
problems (even with bidirectional charging that has a negative aspect) as the power grids will not
have the capacity to deal with the increased load. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0513, p. 1]
Organization: Donna Jackson
[From Hearing Testimony, May 10, 2023] This new proposed rule has the distinction of
harming black people on two continents, in the African nation of Congo as well as here in the
United States. In the Congo where 75 percent of the world's cobalt needed for rechargeable EV
batteries is located, black slave and child labor is readily being used to mine these minerals. It is
well documented that their conditions are deplorable. The need for cobalt and thus the extent of
the suffering will increase exponentially as a result of the EPA's proposed rule and if that wasn't
bad enough, this new proposed rule will create an economic hardship and serious decline in the
standard of living for all Americans but especially black Americans. Blacks have more single
parent households, lower medium household income and higher poverty rates than the overall
population. According to the 2021 U.S. Census Bureau, the median household income for black
Americans was $45,000 compared to $71,000 for white Americans and $101,000 for Asian
Americans. As such, they can't afford more expensive EV vehicles nor the higher prices for
limited supply of gasoline powered vehicles and as it is, many Blacks have already been priced
out of the new vehicles markets and can only afford used ones. Overall the consequences of this
rule will remove private car ownership from many if not most black Americans. Even if the EVs
weren't so expensive, they still don't fit the lives of many Blacks Americans, for example, more
Blacks are renters, so fewer have the chance to charge their vehicles at home. Many black
Americans live in apartments where street and parking lots is the norm with no ability to charge.
In addition, many black households can only afford one vehicle but the reality is EVs are
practical only for multi car households and the list goes on. Suffice to say it is that no EV
supporter ever bothered to ask the black community if this is what they want or fits the needs of
their family. And for those Blacks who want EV vehicle, they are free to choose one with or
without an EPA mandate. The proposed rule here only serves to force more expensive vehicles
on everyone whether they like it or not. The truth is that black people like most Americans want
to make these choices for themselves. For this reason, I urge the EPA to withdraw the proposed
rule and instead start thinking of ways to make personal transportation more accessible. [From
Hearing Testimony, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5115, Day 2]
Organization: Energy Innovation
Other research from the University of California, Berkeley, Grid Lab, and Energy Innovation,
2035 2.0: Plummeting Costs and Dramatic Improvements in Batteries Can Accelerate Our Clean
Transportation Future (April 2021), evaluated the technical and economic feasibility (and
associated impacts and benefits) of achieving a future scenario where electric vehicles make up
100 percent of new sales of all vehicles by 2035, combined with a 90 percent clean grid (called
the DRIVE Clean Scenario).[iv] Compared with the No New Policy scenario (which was pre-
IRA and BIL), the total transportation sector pollutant[v] and carbon dioxide emissions
reductions in the DRIVE Clean Scenario would reduce ground transportation sector C02
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emissions by 60 percent in 2035 and by 93 percent in 2050, relative to 2020 levels.9 See Figure
3. The DRIVE Clean Scenario would also avoid approximately 150,000 premature deaths and
generate nearly $1.3 trillion in health and environmental savings through 2050.10 Compared to
the No New Policy, the DRIVE Clean Scenario would also result in approximately $2.7 trillion
in consumer savings through 2050 compared—a household savings of about $1000 per year on
average over 30 years.11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 5-6]
9 Amol Phadke et al., "2035 2.0: Plummeting Costs and Dramatic Improvements in Batteries Can
Accelerate Our Clean Transportation Future" (Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California,
Berkeley, GridLab, April 2021), https://www.2035report.com/transportation/downloads/, iv.
10 Phadke et al., iii.
11 Phadke et al., ii.
iv In the Drive Rapid Innovation in Vehicle Electrification (DRIVE Clean) Scenario, EVs constitute 100
percent of new U.S. LDV sales by 2030 as well as 100 percent of MDV and heavy-duty truck sales by
2035. The grid reaches 90 percent clean electricity by 2035. More details and full study findings are
available at https://www.2035report.com/transportation/.
v Namely, fine particulate matter, nitrous oxides, and sulfur oxides.
[See original attachment for line graph "C02 Emissions in the Transportation Sector"] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 5-6]
Figure 3. Transportation sector C02 emissions in the DRIVE Clean and No New Policy
scenarios through 2050. Source: Phadke, Amol, et al., 2035 Report 2.0: Plummeting Costs &
Dramatic Improvements in Batteries Can Accelerate Our Clean Transportation Future,
University of California Berkeley, Goldman School of Public Policy, Grid Lab, and Energy
Innovation, April 2021, available at: https://www.2035report.eom/transportation/.fEPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 5-6]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
Looking just at EPA's analysis (which did not analyze the costs and benefits of any standards
more stringent than Alternative 1), standards more stringent than the Proposed Standards are
feasible and would produce greater societal benefits. While average incremental vehicle costs
increase under Alternative 1, those costs are recouped by the vehicle purchaser through reduced
fueling, maintenance, and repair costs. And as EPA notes, "consumer savings would be ...
somewhat higher under Alternative 1" than under the Proposed Standards. Id. at 29203. The
annualized vehicle technology costs through 2055 are $15 billion under the Proposed Standards
and $17 billion under Alternative 1, using a 3% discount rate, or a difference of $2 billion. Id. at
29364-65, tbl. 160. But the annualized pretax fuel savings under Alternative 1 are $5 billion
higher than those under the Proposed Standards, at $51 billion under Alternative 1 and $46
billion under the Proposed Standards, also using a 3% discount rate. Id. at 19366, tbl. 164.
Similarly, consumers' maintenance and repair costs are further decreased under Alternative 1—
from an annualized value of $29.9 billion in savings under the Proposed Standards to $33.3
billion in savings under Alternative 1, both at a 3% discount rate. 101 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, pp. 24-25]
F. Comparison of Criteria Emissions and Possible Health Benefits
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For this part of the analysis, ERM utilized EPA's COBRA model to estimate the public health
benefits associated with all the policy scenarios. ERM's analysis shows that stricter standards
and increased deployment of clean L/MD vehicles results in greater gains in terms of consumer
savings and avoided public health impacts (such as premature death, hospital admissions and
emergency room visits, respiratory symptoms, and reduced activity and lost workdays). The
policy scenario reflective of our Alternative 1+ recommended approach achieves the most
reductions: nearly an 80% reduction in NOx and a 60% reduction in PM in 2040 compared to
2026 levels. An Alternative 1+ approach is also projected to achieve almost $42 billion in
monetized value of reductions: nearly $8.5 billion more in monetized value than would occur
under EPA's Main Proposal and preferred approach (as shown in Figure V.F-1). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 31]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure V.F-1: Comparison of Possible Health
Benefits 112 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 31]
112 Id. at 12
ERM's analysis incorporates: EPA's assumed changes in tailpipe emission reductions, EPA's
upstream assumptions that rely upon the Integrated Planning Model (IPM) for electricity
generated units, and ERM assumptions on changes from reduced demand on refining of finished
products for diesel (and gasoline) based on the use of Argonne National Laboratory's
Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Technologies (GREET) model.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 31]
The benefits associated with the Alternative 1+ approach are further depicted in Table V.F-1,
which shows the various scenario criteria emissions (NOx and PM) aggregated from 2026-2040
for each of the policy scenarios, as well as possible reduced health incidents, and the monetized
value of these reductions (if realized) compared to EPA's No Action scenario. 113 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 31]
113 ERM's analysis results in slightly lower cumulative reductions of NOx and PM compared with EPA's
net air pollutant impacts for the EPA Main Proposal, Alternative 1, and Alternative 3 policy scenarios
(Tables 9-37, 9-38 and 9-40 of the DRIA). However, despite the difference, Alternative 1+ would
correspond with approximately a 25% increase in benefits relative to the EPA Main Proposal and a similar
increase would be expected under EPA's methodology.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table V.F-1: Comparison of Possible Health Benefitsl 14
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 31]
114 ERM, Impacts Report at 12.
H. Comparison of Incremental Fleet Costs and Savings
While some manufacturers have raised unfounded concerns about the costs associated with
shifting to ZEVs, the ERM analysis overall shows that the average BEV reaches life-cycle cost
parity with diesel and gasoline vehicles before MY 2027. Additionally, from a cost and savings
perspective, purchasing an average MY 2032 BEV would save an owner over $18,000 over the
life of the vehicle (as seen in Figure V.H-1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 34]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure V.H-1: Possible Net Lifecycle Costs of a BEV vs.
a Comparable Diesel or Gasoline Alternative! 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 35]
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118 Id. at 13.
The analysis depicted in Figure V.H-1 incorporates several different cost categories
(including purchasing chargers, charger maintenance, incremental purchase price between
combustion vehicles and BEVs, vehicle maintenance savings associated with BEVs, and the
difference in fuel costs between purchasing gasoline and diesel fuel versus electricity). For this
calculation, fuel and maintenance cost savings are discounted at 3% over 16 years. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 35]
1. Comparison of Overall Societal Benefits
The results from ERM's analysis (depicted in Figure V.I-1) show that on a net societal basis-
-inclusive of the costs to fleets as well as air quality benefits, climate benefits, and reduced
utility bills—the greatest benefits are seen with Alternative 1+ at about $125.7 billion through
the 2040 timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 35]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure V.I-1: Comparison of Possible Annual Net
Societal Benefitsll9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 36]
119 Id. at 15.
This figure depicts net annual societal benefits (which incorporates net incremental fleet cost
savings, climate benefits, air quality benefits, and reduced utility bills). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 36]
5. New utility rates designed for PEV charging increase the fuel cost savings PEVs can
provide.
Gasoline and electricity prices vary across the country, and electricity prices vary depending
upon the particular characteristics of the utility rate on which a customer takes service. And
many existing commercial and industrial utility rates have "demand charges" that can reduce fuel
cost savings for high-powered/low-utilization PEV charging use cases, such as public charging
along highways in remote areas. Thankfully, the challenge such demand charges can pose for
PEV charging has long been recognized, and across the nation, many utilities and regulators have
already implemented solutions or are in the process of doing so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 129]
In fact, the BIL amended the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) Section 111(d)
to require regulators and non-regulated utilities to consider new rates that:
promote affordable and equitable electric vehicle charging options for residential,
commercial, and public electric vehicle charging infrastructure; improve the customer experience
associated with electric vehicle charging; accelerate third-party investment in electric vehicle
charging for light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles; and appropriately recover the marginal
costs of delivering electricity to electric vehicles and electric vehicle charging infrastructure.3 52
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 129-130]
352 H.R.3684. Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. 117th Congress. (2021-2022). Section 40431
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684/text.
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This has spurred new regulatory proceedings across the country. But many utilities,
regulators, and state legislatures were already acting to address this issue before the BIL became
law. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 130]
As detailed in a publication of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC) entitled "Best Practices for Sustainable Commercial EV Rates and PURPA 111(d)
Implementation," rates designed for EV charging can deliver significant fuel cost savings
without relying on cross-subsidies from other utility customers.353 For example, on a new
Pacific Gas & Electric rate designed for commercial EV charging that still recovers all associated
marginal costs, the San Joaquin Regional Transit District reduced its overall fuel cost per mile
from $2.31 to $0.68 (in a utility service territory that has some of the higher underlying marginal
costs in the nation).354 The paper also details rates that take a similar approach that were
approved for Southern California Edison, San Diego Gas & Electric, and Alabama Power. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 130]
353 Nancy Ryan, Alissa Burger, Jenifer Bosco, John Howat, and Miles Muller, Best Practices for
Sustainable Commercial EV Rates and PURPA 111(d) Implementation (2022),
https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/55C47758-1866-DAAC-99FB-FFA9E6574C2B.
354 Id.
Since the publication of that NARUC paper, many other utilities and regulators have either
proposed or secured approval of new rates designed for EV charging. And by the time the
standards in this rulemaking take effect in 2027, many more will have followed suit, increasing
the fuel cost savings EVs can provide. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 130]
C. When considering the attributes consumers care about most, EVs are a great fit.
One of the reasons this "neighbor effect" may occur is because when consumers learn about
PEVs, they often realize that PEVs offer a superior fit for the attributes they care about most in
their driving and vehicle-owning experience. Forsythe et al. (2023) found that key factors
Americans consider when purchasing vehicles and considering PEV options are operating cost,
range, fast-charging capabilities, and performance characteristics such as acceleration.485
Consumer surveys and other studies have found the same attributes, along with fuel economy, as
key to purchase decisions.486 As explained briefly in this section and in more detail in Sections
XIX.C and XX, PEVs offer superior satisfaction of these consumer preferences. Any existing or
perceived barriers to PEV adoption based on consumer acceptance are either minimal or
surmountable, policies are already in place to support rapid elimination of any remaining
barriers, and the pace of PEV incorporation into the fleet will allow for consumer preferences to
be fulfilled. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 164-165]
485 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 1-2.
486 See, e.g., Consumer Reports, Consumer Attitudes Towards Fuel Economy: 2020 Survey Results 3-4, 6
(Feb. 2021), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/National-Fuel-Economy-
Survey-Report-Feb-202 1-FINAL.pdf (showing high value placed on fuel economy in purchase decisions);
Alexey Sinyashin, Optimal Policies for Differentiated Green Products: Characteristics and Usage of
Electric, U.C. Berkeley Haas School of Business (Nov. 8, 2021)
https://drive.google.eom/file/d/lKEYJWa25DjH_g89ukSRW3PymjsTkUq4c/view (finding range and
charging station availability as key elements in purchase decisions); J.D. Power, EV Price Pressure Grows
as Government Incentives and Lease Deals Wield Outsized Influence on Consumer Demand (Mar. 29,
2023), https://www.jdpower.com/business/resources/ev-price-pressure-grows-as-government-incentives-
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and-lease-deals-wi eld-outsized-influence-on-consumer-
demand#:~:text=At%20the%20current%20trajectory%2C%20J.D.,is%20expec
ted%20to%20surpass%2075%25 ("Consumer interest inEVs is increasingly being heavily swayed by
price"); Consumer Reports, Consumer Attitudes Towards Fuel Economy: 2020 Survey Results 6 (Feb.
2021), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/National-Fuel-Economy-Survey-
Report-Feb-202 1-FINAL.pdf (finding that 94% of potential vehicle purchasers considered fuel economy to
be "extremely important," "very important," or "somewhat important" when purchasing a vehicle).
1. PEVs are increasingly favorable from a total cost of ownership perspective and save
drivers money over the life of the vehicle. As more models become available, this benefit will be
accessible to more consumers.
First, PEVs are increasingly favorable from an operating cost and total cost of ownership
(TCO) perspective—a factor that is very important to U.S. consumers when deciding which
vehicles they want to buy. A 2020 nationally representative survey of potential vehicle
purchasers found that 94% of potential purchasers considered fuel economy to be important
when purchasing a vehicle.487 PEVs excel in the area of fuel cost savings. As EPA's Proposal
shows, the incremental costs of PEVs over combustion vehicles are increasingly insignificant or
nonexistent—especially in light of various state and federal incentives—resulting in PEVs
saving drivers money in very short periods of time. And as operating costs are reduced,
consumers are willing to pay more for their vehicles. Forsythe et al. (2023) found car buyers
willing to pay upfront an additional $1,960 per 1 cent/mile reduction in operating cost, and SUV
buyers willing to pay an additional $1,490,488 The paper also found that any perceived PEV
disadvantages were made up for by favorable operating costs (along with fast-charging
capability), and that lower operating costs "can help increase consumer adoption."489 Forsythe
et al. (2023) further found that reductions in the BEV price-premium, which are projected to
occur, "have driven substantial increases in consumer choices of BEV cars and SUVs over their
conventional gasoline vehicle counterparts."490 A March 2023 J.D. Power survey reflected one
example of this consumer responsiveness to price, finding that consumer interest in the Ford
Mustang Mach-E and Tesla Model Y measurably increased when both manufacturers announced
price drops and both models were made eligible for the IRA's $7,500 federal tax credit.491 A
June 2023 J.D. Power survey also indicated that consumers are recognizing these savings,
finding that "[t]he more miles that vehicle owners drive, the more likely they are to consider an
EV. As in prior-year studies, daily commuters faced with higher fuel expenses are trading in
their gas-powered vehicles for EVs."492 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 165-166]
487 Consumer Reports, Consumer Attitudes Towards Fuel Economy at 3-4, 6.
488 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 5.
489 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 1-2, 6 (assuming sufficiently long range).
490 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 2.
491 J.D. Power, EV Price Pressure Grows as Government Incentives and Lease Deals Wield Outsized
Influence on Consumer Demand (Mar. 29, 2023), https://www.jdpower.com/business/resources/ev-price-
pressure-grows-as-government-incentives-and-lease-deals-wi eld-outsized-influence-on-consumer-
demand#:~:text=At%20the%20current%20trajectory%2C%20J.D.,is%20expec
ted%20to%20surpass%2075%25.
492 J.D. Power, Action Needed to Keep Charging from Short Circuiting EV Purchase Consideration, J.D.
Power Finds (June 15, 2023), https://www.jdpower.com/business/press-releases/2023-us-electric-vehicle-
consideration-evc-study.
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Up until recently, nearly all PEV models on the market were sedans or hatchbacks, or vehicles
in the luxury car segment of the market,493 leaving vehicle purchasers looking for other types of
vehicles without many options. But dozens of new models are entering the market in the next
year, in all vehicle segments.494 Additional PEV model availability will provide a wider range
of price points and greater diversity of vehicle types and features for potential PEV purchasers,
further driving down average PEV costs and resulting in a PEV "fit" superior to a comparable
combustion vehicle for more consumers. Research by ICCT has shown that "[gjreater
availability of models in more vehicle segments and in higher volumes that meet consumers'
wide range of needs and preferences is critical to market growth," and "states with greater model
availability tend to have higher electric vehicle uptake."495 In recent years, average PEV costs
have appeared higher than average combustion vehicle costs because many PEVs have been
offered only in the luxury vehicle market. Gillingham et al. (2023)'s review of its dataset
containing every new LDV sale in the United States between 2014 and 2020 revealed that,
during that time period, "the market share of EVs and PHEVs is quite high in several price
brackets at the high end, but the number of vehicles sold in these high price brackets is relatively
small," and that "EVs can make up a large market share in the U.S. new car market," and "there
is a great deal of untapped product space for EVs in the lower price brackets."496 Drivers of
non-luxury vehicles want PEVs—and their benefits—as well. Automakers understand this
demand and are expanding their PEV options, and an appropriately stringent rule by EPA will go
further to accelerate this trend by offering automakers regulatory certainty. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 166]
493 See, e.g., Gillingham et al. (2023) at 329, 332-333 (noting that EVs are overrepresented in the luxury
market segments and that in the hatchback category—"a small market segment with a relatively large
number of EV offerings"—sales of PEVs have been "close to 15% of the market in some years").
494 Jeff S. Bartlett & Ben Preston, Automakers are Adding Electric Vehicles to Their Lineups. Here's
What's Coming, Consumer Reports (Mar. 10, 2023), https://www.consumerreports.org/hybrids-evs/why-
electric-cars-may-soon-flood-the-us-market-a9006292675/.
495 Anh Bui, Peter Slowik & Nic Lutsey, Briefing: Evaluating Electric Vehicle Market Growth Across
U.S. Cities, ICCT 13-14 (Sept. 2021), https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ev-us-market-
growth-cities-sept2 l_0.pdf.
496 Gillingham et al. (2023) at 331-332.
Already, the number of light-duty PEV options has grown dramatically. The Alliance for
Automotive Innovation states that at the end of 2022, there were 95 PEV models available in the
United States.497 More models are forthcoming, including additional truck and SUV models
along with the expansion of a wider range of EV sedans.498 EPA's Proposal notes research by
EDF and ERM projecting that there will be over 180 PEV models available by the end of 2025,
88 Fed. Reg. at 29190 n.59, but EDF and ERM have since updated their analysis and now project
that there will be 197 PEV models available by the end of 2025.499 Many of the world's largest
automakers have committed to significantly expanding PEV production in the next few years,
even absent additional standards,500 which will naturally lead to a larger array of model choices.
For example, BMW, Volkswagen, and Stellantis have each committed to fleets half comprised of
zero-emission vehicles by 2030.501 Mercedes-Benz, Ford, and GM have committed to an
entirely zero-emission fleet by 2035.502 Volvo announced its fleet will be all electric by the end
of the decade.503 J.D. Power's EV Index and EV Consideration Pulse Survey found that half of
all new car shoppers will have a viable EV option by the end of 2023, and three out of four
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shoppers will have a viable EV option by the end of 2026.504 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
pp. 166-167]
497 Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Get Connected: Electric Vehicle Quarterly Report, First Quarter,
2023 2 (2023), https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/papers-
reports/Get%20Connected%20EV%20Quarterly%20Report%202023% 20Ql.pdf.
498 Consumer Reports, Hot, New Electric Cars That Are Coming Soon (June 9, 2023),
https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/hybrids-evs/hot-new-electric-cars-are-coming-soon-al000197429/.
499 Rachel Macintosh et al., Electric Vehicle Market Update, Environmental Defense Fund and ERM 7
(Apr. 2023), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-
05/Electric%20Vehicle%20Market%20Update%20April%202023.pdf.
500 Zifei Yang, Beyond Europe: Are There Ambitious Electrification Targets Across Major Markets?, Int'l
Council on Clean Transp. Staff Blog (Nov. 15, 2022), https://theicct.org/global-oem-targets-cars-ldvs-
nov22/.
501 Id.
502 Id.
503 Id.
504 J.D. Power, EV Price Pressure Grows as Government Incentives and Lease Deals Wield Outsized
Influence on Consumer Demand (Mar. 29, 2023), https://www.jdpower.com/business/resources/ev-price-
pressure-grows-as-government-incentives-and-lease-deals-wi eld-outsized-influence-on-consumer-
demand#:~:text=At%20the%20current%20trajectory%2C%20J.D.,is%20expec
ted%20to%20surpass%2075%25.
2. PEVs offer meaningful refueling (charging) benefits to consumers.
Americans are interested in how quickly they can refuel their vehicles. Again, PEVs have real
advantages that should not be underestimated. While opponents to PEVs frequently assert what
they believe will be fundamental changes to how Americans get to work, school, and run
errands, a closer look at the issue reveals that PEVs can offer meaningful benefits. Most trips are
well below the average PEV range, and charging for these trips can often be done when vehicles
are parked at home, work, or in public in between trips. In fact, recent research has shown that
90% of trips could be completed in vehicles with 124 miles of range—well below the
capabilities of the current average EV range in the United States (almost 300 miles). 505 Even as
of 2016, researchers at MIT found that electric vehicles at the time could handle almost 90% of
all car travel in the U.S.506 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 167]
505 Mario Herberz, Ulf J. J. Hahnel & Tobias Brosch, Counteracting Electric Vehicle Range Concern with
a Scalable Behavioural Intervention, Nature Energy 503 (2022) (finding that 90% of trips could be
completed in vehicles with 124 miles of range); Tom Randall, Americans Insist on 300 Miles of EV Range.
They're Right, Bloomberg (May 4, 2023), (noting that U.S. EVs have almost reached 300 mile average
range).
506 Catherine Caruso, Why Range Anxiety for Electric Cars is Overblown, MIT Technology Review (Aug.
15, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/08/15/158319/why-range-anxiety-for-electric-cars-is-
overblown/.
Drivers with access to a garage or dedicated overnight parking spot may simply charge at
home while they sleep, and most do. EY's Mobility Consumer Index 2022 survey found that
80%) of EV owners use home charging, 507 and other research has found that more than half of
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all reported EV charging takes place at home.508 Once a home charger is installed, "the home
then has its own permanent home refueling station that can likely be used with all future
PEVs."509 Substantial investments in infrastructure incentives will help to reduce any consumer
concerns over range or charging availability. About half of Americans (49%) say "discounts to
install a home charger" are the incentives that would most encourage them to get an EV.510 The
Inflation Reduction Act extended the EV charger credit, which covers 30% (up to $1,000 per
unit) of the cost of charging equipment for individual/residential uses. See 26 U.S.C. § 30C.
Many states and local jurisdictions offer additional installation incentives that can further reduce
costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 168]
507 Gaurav Batra, Ankit Khatri, Akshi Goel & Menaka Samant, EY Mobility Consumer Index 2022 Study
5 (May 2022), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_gl/topics/automotive-and-
transportation/automotive-transportation-pdfs/ey-mobility-consumer-index-2022-study.pdf.
508 Rob Stumpf, Americans Cite Range Anxiety, Cost as Largest Barriers for New EV Purchases: Study
(Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.thedrive.com/news/26637/americans-cite-range-anxiety-cost-as-largest-
barriers-for-new-ev-purchases-s tudy.
509 David P. Tuttle & Ross Baldick, Technological, Market and Policy Drivers of Emerging Trends in the
Diffusion of Plug-In Electric Vehicles in the U.S., Electr. J. 7 (Aug./Sept. 2015),
https://users.ece.utexas.edu/~baldick/papers/plugindiffusion.pdf.
510 Consumer Reports, Battery Electric Vehicles & Low Carbon Fuel Survey: A Nationally Representative
Multi-Mode Survey 4 (Apr. 2022),
https://article.images.consumerreports.org/image/upload/vl657127210/prod/content/dam/CRO-Images-
2022/Cars/0 7July/2022_Consumer_Reports_BEV_and_LCF_Survey_Report.pdf.
Furthermore, "[ejlectric vehicles have the meaningful advantage of refueling at a far wider
array of locations than gasoline stations."511 Gas stations "must be carefully located to achieve
scale economies to pay for expensive sturdy buried fuel storage tanks, environmental and safety
protection methods, and gas pumps. In contrast, PEVs can charge at millions of potential home,
work, or public locations."512 And, with increasing numbers of chargers available in places
where drivers otherwise spend their time, "drivers can simply plug in and charge at a variety of
locations where they would naturally park their vehicle for long periods of time."513 Recently,
Walmart announced plans to install new BEV fast-charging stations at thousands of Walmart and
Sam's Club locations across the country, in addition to the 1,300 BEV fast-charging stations the
retailer has already made available.514 Other retailers already offering significant levels of BEV
charging include 7-Eleven, Cinemark, Ikea, Kohl's, Kroger, Macy's, Starbucks, Subway, Taco
Bell, Walgreens, and Whole Foods.515 PlugShare's charger locator can be searched based on
various types of charging locations, revealing chargers at hiking, dining, shopping, camping,
park, and grocery locations throughout the country.516 As far back as 2015, drivers who parked
on the street could access street lights for charging in some dense urban areas,517 and this cost-
effective technology518 is expanding in Europe and the United States, with U.S. pilot programs
in New York, Charlotte, and Kansas City,519 and a large number of BEV charging stations on
streetlight poles in Los Angeles.520 In addition, experts anticipate that charging equipment will
increasingly be distributed widely throughout apartment building and multi-family garages.521
Research on parking has found that the average car is parked for 95% of its useful life,522
leaving plenty of time to charge in a large variety of locations. As these public chargers increase,
PEVs become a viable and attractive option for more drivers, including those without access to
easy home-charging.523 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 168-169]
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511 Tuttle & Baldick (2015) at 7.
512 Id.
513 Id.
514 Vishal Kapadia, Leading the Charge: Walmart Announces Plan to Expand Electric Vehicle Charging
Network, Walmart (Apr. 6, 2023), https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2023/04/06/leading-the-
charge-walmart-announces-plan-to-expand-electri c-vehicle-charging-network (noting that this will offer
customers and members the convenience of "being able to pick up essentials for their families or grab a bite
to eat while they charge").
515 Dan Avery, 12 Places That Offer EV Charging While You Shop, CNET (Apr. 19, 2023),
https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/12-places-that-offer-ev-charging-while-you-shop/.
516 PlugShare, Map of EV Charging Locations, https://www.plugshare.com/.
517 See Tuttle & Baldick (2015) at 8 ("Charging cords with wireless revenue-grade meters that plug into
street lights are now offered for drivers who park on the street in dense urban areas.").
518 Research by WRI found that compared to ground-mounted chargers, pole-mounted chargers result in
installation cost savings of up to 55% and overall cost reductions of 30% because they use existing
electrical connections and have minimal costs associated with construction, materials, and labor. See
Emmett Werthmann & Vishant Kothari, Pole-Mounted Electric Vehicle Charging: Preliminary Guidance
for a Low-Cost and More Accessible Public Charging Solution for U.S. Cities, World Resources Institute
12 (Nov. 2021), https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/2021-ll/pole-mounted-electric-vehicle-charging-
preliminary-guidance.pdf?Versi onId=xNjP5je_Ohc5WnFWCbxWGmmk_vMIqpu.
519 Jay Ramey, Are Lamppost EV Chargers Ideal for City Dwellers?, Autoweek (Jan. 23, 2023),
https://www.autoweek.com/news/green-cars/a42618155/ubitricity-lamppost-ev-chargers-curbside/;
EVANNEX, Study Finds On-Street Lampost EV Chargers Are Lowest-Carbon Solution, Inside EVs (Nov.
5, 2022), https://insideevs.com/news/619989/using-lamposts-for-ev-charging-reduces-carbon-footprint/.
520 Bradley Berman, LA Adds Hundreds of EV Chargers to Streetlights, Giving Renters a Place to Plug In,
Electrek (Nov. 13, 2019), https://electrek.co/2019/ll/13/la-adds-hundreds-of-ev-chargers-to-streetlights-
giving-renters-a-place-to-plug-in/ (noting over 130 EV chargers on streetlights as of 2019); LA Lights, EV
Charging Stations, https://lalights.lacity.org/connected-infrastructure/ev_stations.html (map showing
streetlight chargers across Los Angeles); Emmett Werthmann & Vishant Kothari, How Utility Poles and
Streetlights Can Improve Equitable Access to EV Charging in U.S. Cities, The City Fix, World Resources
Institute (Nov. 30, 2021), https://thecityfix.com/blog/how-utility-poles-and-streetlights-can-improve-
equitable-access-to-ev-charging-in-u-s-cit ies/ (noting 431 streetlight chargers and 44 utility pole chargers
in Los Angeles and a pilot project in Charlotte, North Carolina).
521 Joshua Stein, How Electric Cars Might Affect Multifamily And Other Real Estate, Forbes (May 25,
2023), https://www.forbes.eom/sites/joshuastein/2023/05/25/how-electric-cars-will-affect-multifamily-and-
other-real-estate/?sh=59dl6f66317c.
522 Ruth Eckdish Knack, Pay As You Park, Planning Magazine (May 2005),
http://shoup.bol.ucla.edu/Pay AsYouPark.htm#:~:text=%22Most%20people%20in%20transportation%20fo
cus,learn%20from%20that%2095%20percent.
523 Cassandra Cole, Michael Droste, Christopher Knittel, Shanjun Li & James Stock, Policies for
Electrifying the Light-Duty Fleet in the United States, American Economic Association: Papers &
Proceedings 321 (May 2023) (noting that "providing additional [public] charging stations enables EV
ownership" for more drivers).
PEV charging is increasingly taking less time, further enhancing the convenience benefits of
PEV ownership. Hyper-fast Level 3 DC fast chargers can charge a BEV in as little as 30 minutes
or less, adding up to 10 miles of range for each minute of charging time,524 and consumers have
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expressed strong willingness-to-pay for this capability.525 Research has shown that availability
of more fast-chargers "reduce[s] range anxiety and make[s] it possible to use EVs in the way that
drivers now use ICEs."526 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 170]
524 Electrify America, Charging with Electrify America, https://www.electrifyamerica.com/what-to-
expect/ (noting full charging in 30 minutes); Jessica Shea Choksey, What is DC Fast Charging?, J.D. Power
(May 10, 2021), https://www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-guides/what-is-dc-fast-charging (noting ability to
charge to 80% "in anywhere from 15 minutes to 45 minutes"); DriveClean, Electric Car Charging
Overview, CARB https://driveclean.ca.gov/electric-car-charging (noting that DC fast charging can add "up
to 10 miles of range per minute of charging time"); ICCT, Five Things You Know About Electric Vehicles
That Aren't Exactly True (July 19, 2021), https://theicct.org/stack/explaining-evs/ (high-powered DC fast
chargers can charge a long-range EV in 20-36 minutes).
525 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 5 (noting additional willingness to pay $4,140 for BEV fast charging
capability).
526 Cassandra Cole, Michael Droste, Christopher Knittel, Shanjun Li & James Stock, Policies for
Electrifying the Light-Duty Fleet in the United States, American Economic Association: Papers &
Proceedings 321 (May 2023).
PEV charging has additional benefits on top of saving drivers money and eliminating weekly
trips to the gas pump. First, PEVs with bi-directional charging capability have potential to serve
as back-up home generators in temporary power outages, with a typical BEV storing about 67
kWh in its battery—more than three days' worth of electricity.527 In fact, when a 2021 ice storm
in Texas left millions of residents without electricity, Ford "lent out their hybrid F-150s as home
generators."528 More makes and models are expected to offer bi-directional charging,529 with
the potential that this capability becomes the norm. Additionally, vehicle-to-grid (V2G) charging
offers potential benefits for both the grid and PEV owners. RMI found that by 2030, "virtual
power plants" including parked vehicles supplying energy to the grid could reduce peak loads in
the United States by 60 gigawatts.530 As this capability continues to develop, there could be
additional "revenue opportunities for PEV owners for providing these grid services."531
Research in Germany has shown that bidirectional EV charging can generate significant revenue
for the typical German household: between 310 and 530 euros per year.532 A recent successful
vehicle-to-grid demonstration in North Carolina, taking place over two years, reveals the
potential for V2G not only to improve grid optimization and resilience, but also to save
consumers money. The North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center explained that
"[quantifying the potential value streams from bidirectional charging allows utilities to begin
considering incentive payments and other EV program options for customers and members. By
demonstrating significant positive value, this study encourages utilities in similar market
conditions to help customers overcome the financial barriers to purchasing an EV, particularly in
low- and moderate-income areas where these costs may restrict EV adoption "533 The
University of Delaware has partnered with local electric utilities and a regional transmission
organization to have their vehicles plugged in and available when called upon for grid support,
with the transmission organization paying the university the market rate, or roughly $1,200 per
year per BEV.534 Research by NREL has also considered net revenue generation from V2G
services, including from private LDVs, and found significant potential.535 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, pp. 170-171]
527 Michael J. Coren, Electric Vehicles Can Now Power Your Home for Three Days, Washington Post
(Feb. 17, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.eom/climate-environment/2023/02/07/ev-battery-power-
your-home/.
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528 Id.
529 Id. (noting that makers of the Hyundai Ioniq 5, Lucid Air, Kia EV6, VW ID.4, Mitsubishi Outlander,
and Chevy Silverado EV, in addition to Ford's F-150, have announced plans for offering electricity
services in the next year or so).
530 Id.; Kevin Brehm, Avery McEvoy, Connor Usry & Mark Dyson, Virtual Power Plants, Real Benefits,
Rocky Mountain Institute (2023), https://rmi.org/insight/virtual-power-plants-real-benefits/.
531 Tuttle & Baldick (2015) at 11 (citing Quinn, C. et al., The Effect of Communication Architecture on
the Availability, Reliability and Economics of Plug In Hybrid Vehicle-to-Grid Charging, 195 J. Power
Sources 1500-1509 (Mar. 5, 2010)).
532 Timo Kern, Patrick Dossow & Elena Morlock, Revenue Opportunities by Integrating Combined
Vehicle-to-Home and Vehicle-to-Grid Applications in Smart Homes, 307 Applied Energy 1 (Feb. 2022),
https ://www. sciencedirect. com/science/article/pii/S0306261921014586.
533 North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center, NC Cooperative Demonstration of Vehicle-to-Grid
Smart Charger Concludes with Positive Results (May 8, 2023), https://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/2023/05/08/nc-
cooperative-demonstration-of-vehicle-to-grid-smart-charger-concludes/.
534 U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Management Program, Bidirectional Charging and
Electric Vehicles for Mobile Storage, https://www.energy.gov/femp/bidirectional-charging-and-electric-
vehicles-mobile-storage.
535 Darlene Steward, Critical Elements of Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) Economics, NREL (Sept. 2017),
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/Iy 17osti/69017.pdf.
3. PEV range has increased enough to meet the demands of nearly all American car trips.
American consumers are interested in how far their cars can travel, as Americans currently
drive an above average number of vehicle miles per day (compared to the rest of the world),536
and demand "roughly a third more [range] than the global average."537 While range was
therefore once a key challenge for PEV adoption, it is no longer. In fact, "many EVs are
approaching the range of an average gasoline vehicle," and "the combined electric and gasoline
range for PHEVs often exceeds gasoline-only vehicles."538 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
171]
536 Bryn Huxley-Reicher, Fact File: Americans Drive the Most, Frontier Group (Feb. 14, 2022),
https://frontiergroup.org/resources/fact-file-americans-drive-most/.
537 Tom Randall, Americans Insist on 300 Miles of EV Range. They're Right, Bloomberg (May 4, 2023).
538 EPA, The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report: Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Fuel Economy, and
Technology Since 1975 E-2, 60 (Dec. 2022), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-
12/420r22029.pdf (finding that the efficiency of EVs has increased by about 18% in the last ten years).
The average BEV range has skyrocketed in recent years, making range issues no longer a real
concern. Average BEV range reached 298 miles in MY 2021, "or about four times the range of
an average EV in 2011,"539 when range was in fact a real concern. Longer-range BEVs are
available for consumers with more substantial driving needs,540 PEVs are becoming more
efficient,541 and several PHEVs exceed 500 miles of total range.542 The well-designed stated-
preference experiment conducted by Forsythe et al. (2023) found that "[m]ost vehicles with a
range of at least 300 miles were valued by consumers equivalently or more than their
conventional gasoline vehicle counterparts."543 BEV range is "on the cusp of exceeding 300
miles, a key psychological barrier."544 This level of range handily fulfills the needs and
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preferences of almost every American driver. The average U.S. one-way commute is about 27.6
minutes,545 and the average single-car American household drives about 30 miles per day546—
both well within the range of all PEVs in today's vehicle market. ICCT has explained that "87%
of American car drivers drive on average less than 100 kilometers (60 miles) a day—that is, only
half the range capacity of the e-Golf, one third of the Leafs, and less than a quarter of the
Tesla's range on a single charge."547 Chakraborty et al. (2021) examined how much PEVs were
used within households, and concluded that "BEVs and PHEVs appear to be viable as
alternatives to conventional vehicles in terms of meeting the travel needs of households," and
that "[s]ince most new and upcoming BEVs are longer-range vehicles, we expect this to mean
BEVs will largely be suitable replacements for conventional vehicles in household fleets."548
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 171-172]
539 Id. at 60.
540 See, e.g., Nicholas Wallace et al., Longest Range Electric Cars for 2023, Ranked, Car and Driver (Mar.
23, 2023), https://www.caranddriver.com/features/g32634624/ev-longest-driving-range/ (listing U.S. PEVs
with longest driving range).
541 EPA, The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report, at 60.
542 Id. at E-2.
543 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 6.
544 Tom Randall, Americans Insist on 300 Miles of EV Range. They're Right, Bloomberg (May 4, 2023).
545 Charlynn Burd et al., Travel Time to Work in the United States:2019, U.S. Census Bureau 1 (2019),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2021/acs/acs-47.pdf.
546 U.S. Department of Energy, Daily Vehicle Miles Traveled Varies with the Number of Household
Vehicles (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1047-september-17-2018-
daily-vehicle-miles-traveled-varies-number.
547 ICCT, Five Things You Know About Electric Vehicles That Aren't Exactly True (July 19, 2021)
https://theicct.org/stack/explaining-evs/.
548 Debapriya Chakraborty, Scott Hardman & Gil Tal, Integrating Plug-In Electric Vehicles (PEVs) into
Household Fleets - Factors Influencing Miles Traveled by PEV Owners in California, U.C. Davis 2, 33
(Aug. 2021), https://escholarship.org/content/qt2214q937/qt2214q937.pdf.
As consumer understanding of the capabilities inherent in this amount of range increases,
range anxiety would be expected to decline and consumer acceptance of PEVs to match the
vehicles' other benefits. Forsythe et al. (2023) explained that range increase is a key
advancement in BEV technology that has "driven substantial increases in consumer choices of
BEV cars and SUVs over their conventional gasoline vehicle counterparts."549 And Herberz et
al. (2022) found that 90% of trips could be completed in cars with less than half of the current
U.S. average range, but that most drivers do not understand this.550 Surveys by automakers have
also found that range anxiety is the largest factor in consumers refraining from purchasing PEVs,
explaining that drivers can be fearful they will run out of power before being able to recharge
their vehicles, though some of these surveys were conducted in 2019 or earlier, when average
PEV ranges were lower.551 Simply providing tailored compatibility information regarding the
ability of BEVs to fulfill drivers' range needs increased willingness to pay for BEVs even more
than information about easy access to charging infrastructure.552 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, pp. 172-173]
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549 Forsythe et al. (2023) at 1-2.
550 Herberz et al. (2022) at 503, 506-507. See also Jennifer Sensiba, Putting Two Ford Announcements
Together Shows Us How It Thinks About EV Range (May 29, 2023),
https://cleantechnica.com/2023/05/29/putting-two-ford-announcements-together-shows-us-how-it-thinks-
about-ev-range/ (noting that 90% of all drives are within range of home).
551 Rob Stumpf, Americans Cite Range Anxiety, Cost as Largest Barriers for New EV Purchases: Study,
The Drive (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.thedrive.com/news/26637/americans-cite-range-anxiety-cost-as-
largest-barriers-for-new-ev-purchases-study.
552 Herberz et al. (2022) at 503.
Even for longer travel and trips in excess of the average daily drive—which make up a very
small percentage of U.S. driving—PEVs provide a good fit for most consumers' needs and
wants. U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics data shows that trips longer than 250 miles make
up a miniscule fraction of U.S. daily driving. In 2022, U.S. drivers took between 1.3 billion and
1.5 billion vehicle trips per day, with fewer than 2 million trips per day 500 miles or longer and
between about 1.5 million and 2.5 million trips per day between 250 and 500 miles.553 Charging
infrastructure is rapidly developing to support this small percentage of longer drives. As Section
XVII explains, the number of public PEV charging stations is growing rapidly,554 and the BIL
and IRA are funding new PEV charging corridors. Alternative Fuels Data Center's map of
nationwide PEV charging stations shows that already—with 8.3% PEV sales penetration in the
first quarter of 2023555—charging stations are widespread.556 In May, U.S. and Canadian
officials announced the first Binational EV Corridor, covering a nearly 900-mile stretch between
the United States and Canada, with PEV chargers every 50 miles.557 Similarly, last year four
states announced plans to build a 1,100-mile PEV charging circuit along Lake Michigan.558 In
Washington, Oregon, and California, the West Coast Electric Highway provides DC fast
charging stations every 25 to 50 miles along Interstate 5, Highway 99, and other major
roadways.559 Electrify America's DC fast-charging network includes two cross-country routes
(one from Los Angeles to Washington, DC, and another from San Diego to Jacksonville), along
with a route covering much of the East Coast on Interstate 95 (from Portland, Maine to Miami,
Florida), and most of the West Coast along Interstate 5 (from Seattle, Washington to San Diego,
California). 560 GM and Pilot Company just announced plans to collaborate on a national DC
fast charging network of 2,000 charging stalls at up to 500 travel centers across the country, to
"help enable long-distance electric travel of people and vehicles across the U.S."561 These
chargers will be capable of the fastest 350 kW charging speeds.562 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, pp. 173-174]
553 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Trips by Distance Band, https://www.bts.gov/browse-statistical-
products-and-data/covid-related/trips-distance-groupings-national-or-state.
554 Alternative Fuels Data Center, Alternative Fueling Station Locator,
https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/analyze?country=US&fuel=ELEC&ev_levels=all&access=public&acces
s=private (noting 57,882 station locations and 155,449 EVSE ports available) (last accessed June 30, 2023);
see also EPA, The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report, at E-2.
555 Argonne National Laboratory, Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates,
https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates.
556 Alternative Fuels Data Center, Electric Vehicle Charging Station Locations,
https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity _locations.html#/find/nearest?fuel=ELEC.
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557 Kalea Hall, EV Corridor to Run Nearly 900 Miles from Kalamazoo to Quebec, US and Canada
Officials Say, The Detroit News (May 16, 2023),
https://www.detroitnews.eom/story/business/autos/2023/05/16/binational-ev-corridor-to-run-860-miles-
from-kalama zoo-to-quebec/70224111007/.
558 Id.
559 West Coast Green Highway, West Coast Electric Highway,
http ://www. westcoastgreenhighway. com/electrichighway .htm.
560 Stephen Edelstein, Electrify America Finishes First Cross-Country Fast-Charging Route for EVs,
Green Car Reports (June 24, 2020), https://www.greencarreports.eom/news/1128610_electrify-america-
finishes-first-cross-country-fast-charging-route-f or-evs. See also Electrify America, Locate A Charger,
https://www.electrifyamerica.com/locate-charger/ (showing map of fast-charging network across the
United States).
561 Anne LeZotte, GM and Pilot Company to Build Out Coast-to-Coast EV Fast Charging Network, Pilot
Flying J, https://pilotflyingj.com/press-release/19335.
562 Id.
Infrastructure will continue to build out rapidly on highways with increasing PEV penetration,
fulfilling the needs for even these comparatively less frequent longer drives. Survey data from
Europe shows that as PEV penetration rates increase and drivers become more experienced with
PEV operation, they become comfortable taking longer trips in their vehicles and are "more
relaxed" about traveling long distances and when they charge their vehicles.563 In addition,
other developing technologies could make both short and longer drives even more seamless, such
as possible "electrified" roadways that contain wireless charging infrastructure under the asphalt
and wirelessly charge PEVs while driving.564 Such projects are already in development or
testing in the United States and Europe.565 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 174]
563 Shell Global, Shell Recharge Research Suggests Increasing EV Adoption is Driving Range Confidence
(June 23, 2023), https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/mobility/mobility-news/shell-recharge-
research-suggests-increasing-e v-adoption-is-driving-range-confidence.html.
564 Joann Muller, A Roadway Will Charge Your EV While You're Driving, Axios (Feb. 6, 2022),
https://www.axios.com/2022/02/02/a-roadway-will-charge-your-ev-while-youre-driving.
565 Id.
4. PEVs have additional attributes that are superior to combustion vehicles.
PEVs have additional superior attributes related to the driving and ownership experience that
are widely attractive to drivers. These include faster acceleration; improved performance; better
noise, vibration, and harshness characteristics; and reduced maintenance. Sections XIX.C, XX,
and XXI detail these additional superior attributes and the benefits that they provide for drivers
and vehicle owners. These attributes will continue to further increase consumer preference for
PEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 174]
5. American consumers also place high importance on environmental sustainability, and
EPA should not ignore these preferences.
When considering consumer preferences, EPA cannot overlook the importance that American
consumers place on sustainability. U.S. consumers increasingly place high priority on protecting
the environment, and PEVs are well positioned to satisfy this aspect of consumer preference.
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Numerous consumer surveys, including by YouGov, CarMax, and others have found that
protecting the environment is a top consideration in purchasing a vehicle.566 In CarMax's
survey, over 60% of people said a car's "fuel emissions are moderately or extremely important to
them, while only 7.3% of people found fuel emissions not at all important "567 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 175]
566 Bill Howard, Survey: 23% of Americans Would Consider EV as Next Car, Forbes (Oct. 8, 2021),
https://www.forbes.com/wheels/features/ev-survey/ (YouGov poll for Forbes Wheels); CarMax, Green-
Conscious: Exploring Americans' Views on Hybrid and Electric Vehicles (Aug. 23, 2021),
https://www.carmax.com/articles/green-cars-trend.
567 CarMax, Green-Conscious: Exploring Americans' Views on Hybrid and Electric Vehicles (Aug. 23,
2021), https://www.carmax.com/articles/green-cars-trend.
6. PEVs are a great fit for the needs and demands of rural drivers.
PEVs are a great fit even for rural drivers. Although rural Americans are currently adopting
PEVs at slower rates than urban Americans,568 PEVs actually excel at meeting the demands of
rural drivers. "Fuel savings for rural households are larger than for urban households, because
trips in rural areas are longer than in urban areas, and vehicles tend to be older and less efficient,
requiring more fuel per mile, [P]EVs require fewer trips to a mechanic for repairs and
maintenance. Because of the high torque and low center of gravity, they have excellent
performance, which is important on rough, curvy and steep roads."569 A survey by the Union of
Concerned Scientists and Consumer Reports found that "there is plenty of interest [in PEVs] in
rural areas, but there is a huge knowledge gap about what it is like to own an EV "570 Correcting
for this knowledge gap and educating rural consumers on PEVs' real benefits will undoubtedly
significantly increase PEV adoption in rural areas, allowing all Americans to reap their benefits.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 175]
568 U.S. Department of Transportation, Individual Benefits of Rural Vehicle Electrification (May 4, 2023),
https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-benefits-and-challenges/individual-benefits (noting that
rural EV adoption is currently roughly 40% lower than urban EV adoption, but explaining that EVs can
have significant benefits for rural drivers); Maria Cecilia Pinto de Moura, Survey Shows Pathway to
Speeding Up EV Adoption in Rural Areas, Union of Concerned Scientists (March 14, 2023),
https://blog.ucsusa.org/cecilia-moura/survey-shows-pathway-to-speeding-up-ev-adoption-in-rural-areas/.
569 Maria Cecilia Pinto de Moura, Survey Shows Pathway to Speeding Up EV Adoption in Rural Areas,
Union of Concerned Scientists (March 14, 2023), https://blog.ucsusa.org/cecilia-moura/survey-shows-
pathway-to-speeding-up-ev-adoption-in-rural-areas/.
570 Id.
XX. BEVs Provide Additional Economic and Performance Benefits to Consumers.
A. Slightly higher upfront costs are offset by lower operating and fuel costs, saving drivers
money.
EPA is correct to conclude that consumers experience net economic benefits when purchasing
electric vehicles because lower operating costs offset increases in vehicle technology costs,
irrespective of purchase incentives. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29344. EPA projects that aggregate vehicle
technology costs through 2055 will range from $260 billion to $380 billion (7 and 3% discount
rates). Id. Yet EPA estimates that total fuel savings over the same period will range from $560
billion to $1.1 trillion, while reduced maintenance and repair costs will range from $280 billion
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to $580 billion. Id. On net, consumers benefit from the Proposed Standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 177]
These savings also filter down to the individual buyer. Even under the "high battery costs"
sensitivity analysis, EPA found that the average incremental vehicle cost for the Proposed
Standards was $1,632, and $2,066 for Alternative 1 (6-year average). Table 117, 88 Fed. Reg. at
29337. (Under the "low battery costs" analysis, incremental cost increases are far lower: $441 for
the Proposed Standards, and $1,360 for Alternative 1 (6-year average). Id. at 29336.) These
upfront costs are quickly eclipsed as the broader picture of overall costs emerges. First, some
BEV models would be eligible for the full $7,500 purchase incentive in the Inflation Reduction
Act, while others would be eligible for a partial credit. As EPA notes, this means that net
purchase expenses are lowest across all body styles for BEVs (assuming the maximum incentive
applies). DRIA at 4-20. Moreover, in operating expenses over 8 years (the average length of time
a new owner keeps a vehicle), BEV owners save between $9,040 for sedans to $12,880 for
pickups. Id. These operating expenses, which include lower maintenance and repair costs, are
highly significant, and only grow larger the longer the owner retains the vehicle. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 177]
B. Consumers and businesses will appreciate the stability of electricity prices relative to the
volatility of gasoline prices.
In addition to providing significant absolute fuel cost savings relative to gasoline or diesel,
driving on electricity also provides a significant price-stability advantage. As shown in Figure
XX.B-1, for more than the last two decades, driving a passenger BEV on residential electricity
prices has been the cost equivalent of driving on dollar-a-gallon gasoline, whereas the price of
gasoline itself jumps up and down in response to world events. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 177]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure XX.B-1: Equivalent Electricity and Gasoline
Prices: January 2001-April 2023578 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 177
578 Source data: EIA, Short Term Energy Outlook. Electricity prices shown in "eGallons" a Department of
Energy metric that "represents the cost of driving an electric vehicle (EV) the same distance a gasoline
powered vehicle could travel on one (1) gallon of gasoline." Methodology available at:
https://www.energy.gov/articles/egallon-methodology.
While gasoline prices fluctuate wildly due to uncontrollable events, electricity prices are
inherently more stable because electricity is produced from a diverse mix of largely domestic
energy sources. Electricity prices also are more stable because the power industry is regulated,
while the world oil market and petro-dictatorships are not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
178]
Households and businesses both stand to benefit from the predictable savings that driving on
electricity can provide. And low-income households that spend a disproportionate share of their
disposable income at the gas pump will benefit financially from getting off the rollercoaster of
the world oil market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 178]
C. BEVs provide additional performance and handling improvements for consumers,
improving their overall driving experience.
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In addition to the clear economic benefits of BEV purchase and ownership described in the
previous section, there are other "intangible" factors that make the overall BEV experience better
for consumers. EPA cites several of these factors, including responsive acceleration, improved
performance and handling, and quiet operation. DRIA at 3-15. Many examples confirm these
advantages. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 178-179]
As Consumer Reports notes, "most electric cars deliver instant power from a stop, and they
are both smooth and quiet when underway. The driving experience is quite different from a
traditional gasoline-fueled car because EVs feel like they glide effortlessly."579 Other reviewers
have found that the lower center of gravity in BEVs improves their handling by allowing turning
and cornering more quickly and smoothly than gas-powered cars. 580 In addition, BEVs'
regenerative braking capabilities, which captures energy normally lost during braking, may also
improve the driving experience by extending the vehicle's range and provide a "smoother and
more controlled" braking experience.581 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 179]
579 Consumer Reports, Electric Cars 101: The Answers to All Your EV Questions (March 2, 2023),
https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/hybrids-evs/electric-cars-101-the-answers-to-all-your-ev-questions-
a7130554 728/.
580 Steer EV, 8 Reasons Why Electric Vehicles Are Safer Than Traditional Cars (Apr. 27, 2023),
https://steerev.com/steer-vs-other/8-reasons-why-electric-vehicles-are-safer-than-traditional-cars/.
581 Id.
Car and Driver tested dozens of EVs and compared the data with gasoline-powered cars,
finding that EVs are quieter at "max-attack acceleration" as well as at 70 miles per hour, have a
more even weight distribution due to battery packs positioned low and in the vehicle's center,
and accelerate almost as quickly as their combustion counterparts.582 Several other analysts
have concluded that EVs accelerate faster than gas-powered vehicles because they provide
instant torque to the wheels.583 For example, a Tesla Model S Plaid (with a starting price of
around $108,000) accelerates from 0 to 60 miles per hour in just under two seconds, a full
second faster than a supercar like the Ferrari Daytona SP3 that starts at $2,226,935 (about 20
times the cost of the Tesla). 584 And the same holds for more affordable vehicles. For example,
the Volvo EX30 promises to be a full second faster to 60 miles per hour than a comparably
priced Chevy Camaro.585 While EPA did not place undue emphasis on these factors when
making its assumptions about BEV adoption rates, these benefits are nonetheless significant and
support EPA's finding that BEV performance and handling factors will contribute to high rates
of adoption in coming years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 179]
582 Dave Vanderwerp, How EVs Compare to Gas-Powered Vehicles in Seven Performance Metrics, Car
and Driver (May 15, 2021), https://www.caranddriver.com/features/g36420161/evs-compared-gas-
powered-vehicles-performance/.
583 See, e.g., Jeremy Laukkonen, Lifewire, Want a High-Performance Car? Think EV (Sept. 29, 2021),
https://www.lifewire.c/want-a-high-performance-car-think-ev-5203444; Electric Driver, Electric Vehicle
Performance, https://electricdriver.co/articles/electric-vehicle-performance/.
584 See Christian Seabaugh, 2022 Tesla Model S Plaid First Test: 0-60 MPH in 1.98 Seconds, Motortrend
(Jun. 17, 2021), https://www.motortrend.com/reviews/2022-tesla-model-s-plaid-first-test-review/; Angus
MacKenzie, Driven! The Ferrari Daytona SP3 Isn't Rational—and That's the Point, Motortrend (Jul. 31,
2022), https://www.motortrend.com/reviews/2023-ferrari-daytona-sp3-supercar-first-drive-review/
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585 See Viknesh Vijayenthiran, 2025 Volvo EX30 hits 0-60 in 3.4 seconds, starts at $36,145, Motor
Authority, https://www.motorauthority.com/news/1139801_2025-volvo-ex30-price.
XXI. Consumers Will Experience Significant Savings Due to Reduced Repair and
Maintenance Costs for BEVs.
EPA's Proposal accurately projects significant consumer savings due to reduced repair and
maintenance costs for BEVs. EPA relies on comprehensive repair and maintenance cost
estimates developed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) in 2021 to project per vehicle
maintenance and repair savings per year of between $430 (BEV sedan/wagons) and $470 (BEV
pickups) in 2032. DRIA at 4-20; see also DRIA at 4-32 to 4-37. Other analyses—both those
that have relied on the same underlying ANL cost estimates and those that have relied on other
data—have found similarly significant maintenance and repair savings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 180]
A 2022 ICCT study considering LDV costs and benefits in the United States between 2022
and 2035 also relied on the ANL cost estimates and found almost identical reductions in per
vehicle maintenance costs.586 The ICCT analysis concluded that maintenance costs for BEVs
are expected to be about $2,650 lower than for gasoline vehicles over a six-year period,587
which averages to about $442 savings per year. A survey conducted by Consumer Reports in
2019 and 2020 also found very significant self-reported consumer savings on repair and
maintenance. The data from surveys of thousands of Consumer Reports members revealed that
"BEV and PHEV owners are paying half as much as ICE owners are paying to repair and
maintain their vehicles," with lifetime savings of BEVs and PHEVs over combustion vehicles
being approximately $4,600,588 Similarly, a study by UBS estimated that the Chevy Bolt (BEV)
has total annual maintenance costs of $255 and the VW Golf (combustion vehicle) has repair and
maintenance costs of $610,589 An analysis using U.S. Office of Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy data regarding maintenance and repair costs and U.S. General Services
Administration data regarding federal vehicle use calculated that "a hypothetical full-electric
government fleet would have saved just over $78 million in maintenance costs" in one year. 590
An analysis of repair and maintenance costs in Canada, which found 47% repair and
maintenance cost savings for BEVs over combustion vehicles, noted that U.S. studies have found
cost savings in similar ranges, and explained that when looking at the top 10 most common U.S.
car repair items, none of the repairs in the list apply to a BEV.591 These significant repair and
maintenance savings are expected to occur because "[tjypical BEV drivetrains have 90% fewer
moving parts, require no maintenance such as oil changes or timing belts and their ability to use
regenerative braking saves energy and makes their brake pads last longer."592 Thus, U.S. drivers
and vehicle purchasers stand to gain significant benefits from reduced automotive repair and
maintenance needs for BEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 180-181]
586 Peter Slowik et al., Assessment of Light-Duty Electric Vehicle Costs and Consumer Benefits in the
United States in the 2022-2035 Time Frame, ICCT (Oct. 2022), https://theicct.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/10/ev-cost-benefits-2035-oct22.pdf.
587 Id. at 24.
588 Chris Harto, Electric Vehicle Ownership Costs: Today's Electric Vehicles Offer Big Savings for
Consumers, Consumer Reports at 9, 11 (Oct. 2020), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/EV-Ownership-Cost-Final-Report-l.pdf.
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589 UBS, UBS Evidence Lab Electric Car Teardown — Disruption Ahead? 7 (May 18, 2017),
https://neo.ubs.com/shared/dlZTxnvF2k/.
590 Nick Yekikian, The Government Confirms Obvious: Electric Cars Cheaper to Maintain Than Internal
Combustion Vehicles, Motortrend (June 21, 2021), https://www.motortrend.com/news/government-ev-ice-
maintenance-cost-comparison/.
591 Ryan Logtenberg, James Pawley & Barry Saxifrage, Comparing Fuel and Maintenance Costs of
Electric and Gas Powered Vehicles in Canada, 2 Degrees Institute at 5 (Sept. 2018),
https://www.2degreesinstitute.org/reports/comparing_fuel_and_maintenance_costs_of_electric_and_gas_p
owered v ehicles_in_canada.pdf.
592 Id.
XXII. BEV Ownership, Combined with Supportive Policies, Will Benefit Lower-Income
Consumers.
EPA describes several expected outcomes of the Proposed Standards on lower-income
households: first, that increased upfront purchase costs may impact highly price-sensitive
consumers; and second, that decreased fuel and maintenance costs from BEV ownership may
benefit these consumers disproportionately. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29368. While upfront BEV cost
concerns may serve as an initial barrier to lower-income consumers, a suite of targeted policies
can mitigate this concern. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 181]
First, several policies may help with the upfront cost concerns, including the (maximum)
$7,500 new vehicle purchase incentive and the first-of-its-kind (maximum) $4,000 incentive for
used vehicles in the Inflation Reduction Act. These policies may also be supplemented by state-
level initiatives that further reduce the purchase cost for buyers falling under defined income
thresholds, such as California's Clean Vehicle Rebate Project.593 Also, as EPA notes, for used
BEVs, there is evidence that the original purchase incentive is passed on to the next buyer, which
reduces the effective price of BEVs. Taken together, these savings bring the initial cost of
several BEV models-and undoubtedly more to come in future years-below the purchase price of
a comparable combustion vehicle. See DRIA Ch. 4.2.2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
181]
593 California Clean Vehicle Rebate Project, Eligibility & Requirements,
https://cleanvehiclerebate.org/en/eligibility-guidelines.
Moreover, because lower-income households spend a disproportionate amount on vehicle
repair and fuel costs,594 they should benefit from these savings that come with BEVs, which
continue to accrue year after year. This is especially true because fuel economy, and therefore
fuel savings, tends not to degrade much as a vehicle ages, even when the vehicle is sold and
resold for a lower price over time. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29368. Separately, from an overall ownership
perspective, modifications to the Alternative Fuel Refueling Property Tax Credit in the IRA limit
applicability to charging infrastructure in low-income areas and areas that are not urban. DRIA at
5-26. This change may help residents in those communities afford home charging or incentivize
businesses to install public chargers, which would improve the BEV ownership experience.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 181-182]
594 See, e.g., Hardman, Fleming et al., A Perspective on Equity in The Transition to Electric Vehicles,
MIT Science Policy Review (Aug. 30, 2021), https://sciencepolicyreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/securepdfs/2021/08/A_perspective_on_equity _in_the_transition_to_electric_vehicles.pdf.
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For these reasons, EPA was correct to consider the effects of BEV purchase and ownership on
lower-income consumers. Inclusive policies that ease the burden of any potential higher costs on
these consumers merit further study, and it is essential that the benefits of BEV ownership are
accessible to all and shared equitably. EPA has shown that the cost savings over time make BEV
ownership worthwhile for lower-income households, and that additional policies like the IRA
purchase incentives can lessen any upfront cost disparities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
182]
101 See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29385-86, tbls. 196 and 197, adding $21 billion in avoided maintenance costs and
$8.9 billion in avoided repair costs under the Proposed Standards, and the analogous values of $24 billion
and $9.3 billion, respectively, under Alternative 1.
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
C. Consumers are already seeing savings from today's ZEVs.
Consumers will also benefit from protective standards that help ensure additional adoption of
ZEVs. As discussed in section III below, the upfront costs and the lifetime costs of ZEVs are
declining rapidly and are expected to continue to do so over the timeframe of this rulemaking,
which will further increase the savings of owning a ZEV as compared to an ICEV. But
consumers are already seeing savings today. WSP performed an analysis for EDF that compares
the lifetime costs, over 10 years, of owning and operating a number of the most popular or
widely anticipated current EVs compared to gasoline vehicles. 8 The costs considered include
purchase and financing of the vehicle and home charger (for EVs) and annual vehicle
registration, maintenance, insurance, and fuel costs. The analysis accounts for federal and state
EV and charger tax credits. WSP compared the Chevrolet Equinox EV to the Equinox RS, the
Ford Mustang Mach-E Premium to the Ford Edge ST-Line, the Volkswagen ID.4 Pro to the
Tiguan SE and the Ford F-150 Lightning XLT to the gasoline F-150 XLT. The analysis finds
that higher upfront purchase price and insurance costs for EVs are outweighed by the lower
maintenance and fuel costs. Over 10 years, all of the studied EVs are estimated to be less
expensive to own and operate than the comparable gasoline vehicle, with total life-time savings
of up to $18,440. As shown in Figure 2, the Chevy Equinox EV has the greatest savings over 10
years at 29% and the VW ID.4 has the lowest savings at 1%. The analysis also concluded that
rural EV drivers would see additional lifetime savings than urban drivers. In addition to cost
savings, there are other attributes of EVs that consumers value, including better performance and
reduced noise. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 8-9]
8 Electric Vehicle Total Cost of Ownership Analysis, Summary Report, WSP for EDF (July 2023),
https://blogs.edf.Org/climate411/wp-content/blogs.dir/7/filesAVSP-Total-Cost-of" Ownership-Analysis-
July-2023.pdf (Attachment G).
[See original attachment for Figure 2: Existing EV vs. ICEV - Total Costs After 10 Years]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 8-9]
Source: WSP, Electric Vehicle Total Cost of Ownership Analysis [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 8-9]
Organization: Fermata Energy
V2X bidirectional charging is a win-win-win investment: many benefits accrue:
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• Achieves EPA's environmental goals. Just like stationary storage, V2X bidirectional
charging platforms can reduce carbon and criteria pollutant emissions from generators by
shifting electricity consumption to the cleanest hours of the day and removing the need for dirty
thermal peaker electricity generation. However, V2X is more cost-effective than stationary
storage, as ratepayers don't have to pay for purchase of the EV battery and can accelerate the
renewable transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-6]
• Provides grid services. With V2X bidirectional charging, utilities gain a low-cost energy
storage resource to help integrate renewable energy into the electric grid by shifting energy,
providing resource adequacy, and ancillary services (Figure 3). For example, modeling by the
CPUC currently projects 14,700 MW of new energy storage is needed in CA by 2032 to support
the integration of renewables but only 2,185 MW is operational today.9,10 V2X, with supportive
policies, can provide many thousands of MW by 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-
6]
9 CPUC Approves Long Term Plans To Meet Electricity Reliability and Climate Goals, CPUC, 2022
(Link: https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/news-and-updates/all-news/cpuc-approves-long-term-plans-to-meet-
electricity-reliability-and-climate-goals)
10 Infographic: Q4'21 US Battery Storage by the Numbers, S&P Global, 2022 (Link:
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/blog/infographic-q4-21-us-battery-storage-
by-the-numbers)
[See original attachment for Figure 3 - Grid services and value from different Vehicle-Grid-
Integration technologies] 11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-6]
11 California Energy Commission, March 2019, Distribution System Constrained Vehicle-to-Grid Services
for Improved Grid Stability and Reliability, (Link: https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
06/CEC-500-2019-027.pdf) Figure 42
• Lower vehicle ownership costs. EV owners can earn money by selling electricity back to the
grid, significantly cutting the cost of vehicle ownership. Offsetting the cost of owning and
maintaining an EV supports equitable access to EVs, particularly those EVs in the used car
market, such as the low-income EV driving community. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-
6]
• Increased resiliency. Unidirectional charging is a grid load. V2X bidirectional charging cost-
effectively supports grid resilience. During blackouts and extreme weather events, such as Public
Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS) in CA, EV owners can power their homes, businesses, and critical
infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-6]
• Ratepayer benefits. EV adoption has already been shown to significantly benefit utility
ratepayers and V2X technology can further those benefits. 12 For example, a 2018 CEC study
projects $1 billion in annual ratepayer benefits if 50% of chargers were V2X capable. 13 V2X
technology also improves driver economics which would likely drive further EV adoption and
even greater ratepayer benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-6]
12 Electric Vehicles Are Driving Electric Rates Down, Synapse Economics, 2019, Electric Vehicles
Benefit All Utility Ratepayers, Forbes, 2019 (Link:
https://www.forbes.eom/sites/jeffmcmahon/2019/02/01/electric-vehicles-benefit-all-utility-customers-as-
much-as-their-owners/)
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13 Distribution System Constrained Vehicle-to-Grid Services for Improved Grid Stability and Reliability,
(Link: https://www.energy.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/2021-06/CEC-500-2019-027.pdf) CEC 2018, Table 8,
High PEV Forecast Scenario
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Vehicle purchase price is a core consideration for prospective buyers, and in general there
may not be cost parity between new EVs and new ICE vehicles until the middle or end of the
2027 - 2032 time period. While purchasers consider many other factors that favor EVs including
lower cost of ownership and vehicle performance, it is uncertain whether enough purchasers will
elect for an EV over an ICE vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 7]
Consumer incentives for EVs help to reduce the upfront cost, however the federal Clean
Vehicle Credit for retail consumers under section 30D of the tax code will not be available for
many new vehicle purchasers. Indeed, this tax incentive is less available now for people who
purchase Ford EVs and PHEVs than was the case before the Inflation Reduction Act. Further,
the supply chain eligibility criteria will become even more strict in the 2027 - 2032 timeframe.
While some states offer incentives to reduce the costs of clean vehicles, and that can provide
material benefit in that state, to meet the proposed GHG standards will require widespread
adoption of EVs nationwide. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 7]
Organization: Fred Reitman
Electric vehicles are unaffordable. New electric vehicles cost about $20,000 more than
gasoline-powered vehicles. More than half of Americans are living paycheck to paycheck and
cannot afford the higher cost of an electric vehicle (EV). Further, batteries will need to be
replaced and the cost of new electric batteries range from $10,000 - $ 15,000. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0432, p.1]
Organization: Fuel Freedom Foundation
Minimize consumer disruption and cost. Since first being introduced more than 15 years ago,
FFVs have been manufactured and sold with no consumer disruption. The functioning and
fueling are virtually indistinguishable to drivers, and from a policy perspective are only limited
in utility by uneven availability of E85. However, the state of California offers an illuminating
example of FFVs fueled by a more robust fueling infrastructure. Due to a long-term sustained
discount of E85 relative to regular gasoline (87 RON), California drivers have continued to
increase use in the state. E85 consumption in California has been increasing by an average of
33% per year—and 40% from 2021 to 2022.14 The usage rate of E85 in FFVs was 16% in 2022
for a total of 103 million gallons. 15 A primary driver of increased E85 use has been its sustained
discount relative to retail gasoline. E85 has consistently offered a steady pump price discount of
~$1.00/gallon in California. Further, when gasoline prices spiked after Russia's invasion of
Ukraine, FFV drivers in the State were buffered from the impact. Unlike gasoline prices, ethanol
prices are not dependent on world oil prices. Consequently, while gasoline prices spiked, E85
prices remained stable, resulting in a discount of up to $2.50/gallon for E85 relative to regular
gasoline, and in some cases more, [see Appendix A] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, pp. 4-5]
14 California Air Resources Board E85 consumption data
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15 California Air Resources Board and Pearson Fuels data
Organization: Green Diesel Engineering LLC
Proposed Emission Standard Guidelines
- Modify the emission standards on gasoline and diesel with the primary emphasis to be on
minimizing C02. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
- Increase NOx limit for diesel engines to 3 gram/mile on EPA emission test cycles. This is
still cleaner than 1980 standards. With proper engine tuning, the smaller NOx increase allows for
a decrease of 100 gram/mile of C02. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
- Maintain the theme of clean diesel and keep particulate filters to prevent PM (particulate
matter) emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
- Manufacturers could add GPS software to go into low NOx mode when near NOx abatement
zones. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
- Re-allocate tax incentives for urban residents to purchase BEV (battery electric vehicle)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
- Work with states on regional smog issues as these are very limited in geographical area. The
top cities are: Los Angeles, Denver, Miami, New York City, Houston, Atlanta, etc. Moving to
primarily electric vehicles in dense population zones eliminates point of use emissions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
- Work with bio-fuel producers, farmers, refineries as needed to promote plant- based fuels
that do not impact the food system. Hemp would be a good starting point as the entire plant can
be utilized. The seed oil produces bio-diesel and the stalk produces ethanol. A robust bio fuel
industry could reduce C02 up to 1000 million metric tons yearly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0457, p. 6]
- Electric is a good solution for local driving patterns. It is not good for long distance runs or
pulling loads and does suffer in range with extreme cold or heat. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0457, p. 6]
- Re-calibrating vehicles in the field for low C02 will yield the quickest return on investment.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
f. EPA Fails to Properly Account for the Cost Impact of the Proposed Rule
As noted above, EPA must consider both feasibility and cost of compliance. In addition to the
infeasibility of delivering an electric grid that can support the PEVs that OEMs must now
produce, EPA has failed to adequately account for the cost of the Proposed Rule. Namely, EPA
has severely underestimated the cost impact on lower-income households. Given the low cost of
carbon-based transportation fuel, fluctuations in the electricity market, and higher insurance
costs, the "break-even" point for a higher-cost PEV - which may be upwards of $15,000 more
than its ICE counterpart - is not a mere few years as EPA predicts, but decades.75 And this
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calculus is heavily dependent on the $7,500 tax credit provided by the IRA, which will change if
future policymakers eliminate it or otherwise require PEVs to compete in the market without a
subsidy.76 Not only will this hinder the widespread adoption of PEVs, but it will also drive up
the cost used car prices across the country as consumers hold off on buying new cars.77 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 16]
75 Id. at 5, 13.
76 This subsidy results in a cost-shifting mechanism from middle-class to wealthy families, id. at 14, which
may not be supported by future elected officials.
77 Id. at 6.
Beyond the cost to the consumer, the Proposed Rule also fails to account for the lost fuel tax
revenue that will come from the expected reduction in transportation fuel consumption. In 2020,
states brought in over $52.7 billion in motor fuel tax revenue which, combined with over $43
billion collected in federal highway-related excise taxes, funded necessary expenditures on
highway and road infrastructure. 78 Elimination of ICE vehicles, and the associated
transportation fuel consumption revenue, will contribute to a deficit of $741 per household
annually. Yet this shortfall is not meaningfully addressed in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, p.16]
78 Id. at.
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law
"Pass-through" refers to the degree to which manufacturers pass on cost increases to
consumers. EPA in prior tailpipe rules has assumed 100% pass-through to consumers in the
vehicle market—meaning that every dollar of additional cost to the automaker is ultimately
borne by the purchaser. 147 EPA appears to repeat this assumption in the Proposed Rule. That
approach is also reasonable given consistency with the agency's prior approach and the very
limited economic evidence on vehicle pass-through. Nonetheless, that limited available evidence
(from a 2010 paper) indicates that pass-through in the vehicle market may be below 100%. 148
Accordingly, EPA should discuss and provide a rationale for its approach. EPA should also
support further research in this area, given its potential importance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0601, pp. 22-23]
147 E.g. 2020 Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 24,594-95.
148 Using regression analysis, Hellerstein and Villas-Boas (2010) find only partial pass through for the
vehicle industry with an average pass-through rate of 38%. Rebecca Hellerstein, & Sophia B. Villas-Boas,
Outsourcing and Pass-Through, 81 J. INT'LECON. 170, 175 (2010).
1. EPA Should Discuss Additional Contributing Market Failures
EPA should describe additional market failures that contribute to the energy efficiency gap.
These include dealership incentives, biases, and information asymmetries; institutional myopia;
and manufacturer market power. As discussed below, most or all of these market failures apply
similarly to electric vehicles as they do to ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp.
25-27]
i. Dealership incentives, biases, and information asymmetries
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Salespeople's incentives and biases may cause informational asymmetries that prevent
consumers from optimizing fuel efficiency. 165 Studies show that dealers and salespeople often
believe that electric vehicles and other efficient cars have lower profits for dealers than gas-
powered cars, 166 for various reasons. 167 Consumers (and researchers posing as consumers)
have often complained of poor dealership experiences when trying to purchase electric vehicles,
citing salespeople's limited knowledge; misinformation and dishonesty about vehicle cost, range,
and other attributes; inconsistent enthusiasm for electric vehicles; lack of inventory for more
efficient and electric vehicles; poor timeliness for completing paperwork and vehicle delivery;
limited promotional materials on energy efficiency; and inability to facilitate consumers' cost
comparisons of electric versus gas vehicles. 168 Some dealerships have admitted that poor sales
training is a major barrier to electric vehicle sales. 169 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 25-
27]
165 See Fred Lambert, After Losing Dealers over Its Electric Move, Cadillac Is Now Gaining New Ones,
ELECTREK, Sept. 23, 2021 (reporting that one-fifth of U.S. Cadillac dealers exited from the brand in 2020
rather than commit to selling electric vehicles).
166 Cox Automotive, Evolution of Mobility: The Path to Electric Vehicle Adoption 23 (2019),
https://perma.cc/UV7N-42BE (reporting that 54% of surveyed dealers say there is a lower ROI for sales of
EVs compared to gas); Eric Cahill et al., New Car Dealers and Retail Innovation in California's Plug-In
Electric Vehicle Market (U.C. Davis Inst. Of Transp. Stud., Working Paper UCD-ITS-WP-14-04, 2014),
https://perma.cc/DJ7T- SGXT (citing real or perceived profitability concerns, especially for compact or
midsized vehicles).
167 Cahill et al., supra note 166, at 10 ("[A]s a category, PEVs may not represent a compelling investment
to many dealers."); id. at 9-10 (noting that dealers have the false perception that PEVs entail longer
transaction times and lower profits, when in fact dealers make more than average on PEVs in gross profits).
168 Id.; EPA, Draft Technical Assessment Report: Midterm Evaluation of Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse
Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years 2022-2025 at
3-14 (2016) at 6-15; Cox Automotive, supra note 166; Gerardo Zarazua de Rubens et al., Dismissive and
Deceptive Car Dealerships Create Barriers to Electric Vehicle Adoption at the Point of Sale, 3 NATURE
ENERGY 501 (2018); Lindsay Matthews et al., Do We Have a Car for You? Encouraging the Uptake of
Electric Vehicles at Point of Sale, 100 ENERGY POL'Y 79 (2017); Zoe Long et al., Consumers Continue
to Be Confused About Electric Vehicles: Comparing Awareness Among Canadian New Car Buyers in
2013 and 2017, 14 ENV'T RES. LTRS. 114036 (2019).
169 Cox Automotive, supra note 166, at 30 (citing lack of OEM support).
ii. Institutional myopia and inattention, including short-termism
Though EPA refers to myopia in both the 2021 RIA170 and (more briefly) in the current
RIA,171 this applies to both individual and institutional consumers. In particular, economists
find that corporate managers can exhibit similar kinds of inattention as individual consumers and
so fail to implement energy efficiency initiatives despite positive paybacks. 172 Businesses may
also face a kind of myopia called short-termism, in which corporate employees have an incentive
to favor short-term profits over long-term investments if, for example, their compensation or
career prospects are tied to near-term earnings (or if they must meet a particular budget in a
given year). 173 Employees with such incentives may have reason to purchase cheaper, less
efficient vehicles. 174 Studies suggest that short-termism can affect managers' choices about
energy efficiency specifically, 175 and about environmental sustainability broadly. 176 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 25-27]
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170 2021 RIA at 8-4.
171 RIA at 4-39 (discussing "a lack of foresight [and] an aversion to short term losses relative to longer
term gains").
172 See Suresh Muthulingam et al., Energy Efficiency in Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturing Firms,
15 MFG. & SERV. OPERATIONS MGMT. 596, 612 (2013) (finding that manager inattention contributed
to the non-adoption of energy efficiency initiatives, since initiatives that appear lower on a list of efficiency
recommendations, and initiatives that require more managerial attention, are less likely to be adopted).
173 A similar dynamic could exist in government, and so affect local, state, and federal government fleet
purchases, if officials are rewarded for short-term cost savings rather than long-term fiscal health.
174 This incentive could be muted by a firm's accounting practices if costs and expenses are amortized
over time.
175 See Stephen J. DeCanio, Barriers Within Firms to Energy-Efficient Investments, 21 ENERGY POL'Y
906, 907-08 (1993); Suresh Muthulingam et al., Adoption of Profitable Energy Efficiency Related Process
Improvements in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 1, 7 (Working Paper, 2008) (finding that managers
fail to implement energy efficiency improvements with short payback periods for several reasons, including
myopia and a stronger focus on upfront costs than on net benefits, attributed partially to short-termism).
176 See Yujing Gong & Kung-Cheng Ho, Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Short-Termism,
ASIA- PACIFIC J. ACCT. & ECON. (2018).
This market failure should remain prominent as electric vehicles become more widely
available, due to the fact that electric vehicles frequently have higher purchasing prices but
provide operating-cost savings over time. The limited price salience of electricity, including the
use of automatic bill-pay, means that many consumers (including corporate consumers) will not
properly factor in long-term operating cost savings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 25-27]
iii. Manufacturer market power
Though EPA mentions in both the 2021 RIA and the current RIA that strategic marketing
choices by manufacturers can result in inefficient under-supply of fuel economy to some
consumer segments, 177 EPA does not fully connect this inefficient pattern to market power.
Because of the limited competition in at least some segments of the vehicle market,
manufacturers may be able to act strategically when pricing vehicles and when producing
vehicles with combinations of different fuel economy and other vehicle features to push
consumers toward purchases that lead to higher manufacturer profits at the expense of optimal
fuel economy. 178 There is a relatively small number of firms producing several types of vehicles
and engines. 179 This market failure therefore could influence purchases by all consumer groups
and across several vehicle classifications, including electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0601, pp. 25-27]
177 2021 RIA at 8-5; id. at 4-39 to -40.
178 See generally Carolyn Fischer, Res. for the Future, Imperfect Competition, Consumer Behavior, and
the Provision of Fuel Efficiency in Light-Duty Vehicles (2010), https://www.rff.org/documents/1472/RFF-
DP-10-60.pdf.
179 See id. at 3 (explaining that "the largest four firms accounted for 75.5 percent of the value of shipments
in the automobile market and 95.7 percent of the light-duty and utility vehicle market"); Nat'l Acad, of
Scis., Assessment of Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy—2025-2035 at 11-
356 (2021) (citing that the top ten firms accounted for 90% of light-duty sales in 2018); see also Winston
Harrington & Alan Krupnick, Res. for the Future, Improving Fuel Economy in Heavy-Duty Vehicles
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(2012), https://media.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-12- 02.pdf (explaining that the heavy-duty trucking
industry "is dominated by a small number of large manufacturers" and is even smaller than it would seem
at first glance because of "affiliations, partnerships, and outright ownership of one company by another").
2. EPA Should More Clearly State That Its Model's Constant- Performance Assumption
Obviates the Need to Estimate Lost Consumer Welfare
As in prior rules, EPA assumes when modeling the Proposed Rule that manufacturers will
incur any additional costs necessary to hold vehicle performance constant. While EPA
highlighted this fact in the 2021 RIA,180 it should strongly conclude that the constant-
performance assumption built into OMEGA obviates the need to estimate any potential lost
consumer welfare from forgone attributes. The reason for this is straightforward: Because EPA
already models the costs of maintaining vehicle performance, any alleged reductions in vehicle
performance resulting from the Proposed Rule would be offset by a reduction in compliance cost
relative to EPA's projection. In effect, therefore, EPA's analysis already accounts for the cost of
any possible efficiency-performance tradeoffs through its projection of compliance costs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 25-27]
180 2021 RIA at 8-3.
Thus, while EPA sensibly concludes that "the presence of fuel-saving technologies do not
lead to adverse effects on other vehicle attributes," 181 it should more forcefully assert that this
conclusion does not increase its estimate of net benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp.
25-27]
181 RIA at 4-38; see also Davis Noll et al., supra note 155, at 32-33 (discussing how "many fuel economy
technologies actually improve various performance attributes").
Organization: Jack Spencer
The proposed rule's impact on low-income Americans is vastly under analyzed in the
proposed rule's publication in the Federal Register and the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0681, pp. 1-2]
Fully Monetize the Proposed Rule's Impact on Low-Income Households
Though the proposed rule acknowledges "that increases in upfront purchase costs are likely to
be of particular concern to low-income households," it goes on to state on page 29368 that "we
look more closely into, but do not monetize, the effects of the standards on low-income
households and on consumers of low priced new vehicles and used vehicles." [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0681, pp.1-2]
Neglecting to fully account for the monetized impact of a proposed rule on disproportionately
impacted populations is an inexcusable oversight and matter of gross negligence. Academic
research has long demonstrated that environmental regulations impose a higher cost on low-
income Americans as compared to the population generally.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0681,
pp.1-2]
2 Graham, JohnD., "Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics," University of
Pennsylvania Law Review," P. 521, 2008-2009,
(https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blog/grahaml57upalrev3952008pdf.pdf)
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The reality is that environmental regulations increase vehicle costs substantially. One
academic study investigated the combined costs of all National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, and California Air Resources Board light
duty-regulations and found that they increased vehicle prices by $6,000 to $7,000. Put another
way, environmental regulation increases the purchase price of most vehicles by 15-20 percent.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0681, pp. 1-2]
Given that 12.8 percent of Americans live in poverty3 and that the mean income for the
lowest two quintiles of American incomes is $13,165 and $34,7674, respectively, low-income
Americans are already being financially disadvantaged by environmental regulation. According
to Kelly Blue Book, the five least expensive sedans available in 2023 cost between $16,490 and
$18,500.5 At current prices, a new car is already beyond the reach of most low-income
Americans, which is one reason why only around 17 percent of low-income households purchase
new cars.6 Given that, according to Cars.com, the top five least expensive electric vehicles (EVs)
range from $27,495 to $35,4857, the proposed rule will undoubtedly make new vehicles
unaffordable for nearly all low-income Americans and make purchasing even used vehicles more
difficult, if not impossible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0681, pp. 1-2]
3 Benson, Craig, United States Census Bureau, "Poverty Rate of Children Higher Than National Rate,
Lower for Older Populations," October 4, 2022, (https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2022/10/poverty-
rate-varies-by-age- groups.html).
4 Bureau of Labor and Statistics, "Table 1101. Quintiles of Income Before Taxes: Annual Expenditure
Means, Shares, Standard Errors, and Coefficients of Variation, Consumer Expenditure Surveys, 2021,"
(https://www.bls.gov/cex/tables/calendar-year/mean-item-share-average-standard-error/cu-income-
quintiles-before- taxes-2021.pdf).
5 "Cheapest Sedans of 2023 & 2024," Kelly Blue Book, (https://www.kbb.com/cheapest-cars/cheapest-
sedans/).
6 Klein, Nicholas J., Basu, Rounaq, and Smart, Michael J., "In the Driver's Seat: Pathway to Automobile
Ownership for Lower-Income Households in the United States," Transportation Research Interdisciplinary
Perspectives 18, p. 4, " 2023,
(https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590198223000349#:~:text=The%20Survey%20of%2
OHouseh old%20Economics,compared%20with%2013%20%25%20of%20households).
7 "Here are the 11 Cheapest Electric Vehicles You Can Buy," Cars.com, June 23, 2023,
(https://www.cars.com/articles/here-are-the-ll-cheapest-electric-vehicles-you-can-buy-439849/).
This is an unacceptable outcome for any regulation as research firmly establishes that access
to a car comes with a litany of positive social benefits including upward economic mobility,
public safety benefits, and healthcare and education opportunities.8 Any public policy that could
threaten access to autos for low-income households should be a nonstarter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0681, pp.1-2]
8 Klein, N. J., "Subsidizing Car Ownership for Low-Income Individuals and Households," Journal of
Planning Education and Research, 2020, (https://doi.org/10.1177/0739456X20950428).
Low Income Americans Accrue Little to No Benefits
The proposed rule suggests, without being monetarily specific, that the rule's additional costs
to low-income Americans will be offset with saving on maintenance and fuel savings. Even a
cursory look at the academic research on low-income households and car ownership and industry
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reports demonstrates that none of these claims are legitimate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0681,
pp. 2-3]
The proposed rule states on page 29368 that, "the introduction of more stringent standards
leads to higher purchase prices and lower fuel expenditures." It goes on to argue that the lower
fuel expenditures will be of even greater significance to low-income households because fuel
costs are a larger portion of the expenses for low-income households, that lower price new cars
are generally more fuel efficient, and fuel efficiency does not decline for used vehicles while
prices do. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0681, pp. 2-3]
The problem with the EPA's reasoning is that as demonstrated above, very few low-income
households purchase new vehicles and thus will not accrue any of the alleged fuel efficiency
savings associated with a new vehicle purchase. This problem will be exacerbated by the
proposed rule as more, higher priced EV's are pushed into the market driving prices even higher,
further removing low-income households from the alleged fuel efficiency benefits. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0681, pp. 2-3]
Further, the EPA argues that low-income households will benefit from savings passed on
through the used car market. First, buying a used EV is a much different proposition than
purchasing a used internal combustion engine vehicle. For instance, much of the cost and value
of EVs resides in their batteries, but many used EVs have significantly diminished battery life. A
well-maintained internal combustion engine vehicle with 100,000 miles could have a couple
hundred thousand miles of life left. An EV with 100,000 miles is a much bigger gamble as most
EV batteries are only warrantied for around 100,000 miles.9 Suggesting that low income families
saddle themselves with the potential $5,000 to $15,000 costslO for replacing a lithium ion
battery for their newly purchased used EV is hardly a recipe for cost savings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0681, p. 3]
9 Mcaleer, Brendan, "Electric Car Batter Life: Everything You Need to Know," Car and Driver, October
26, 2022, (https://www.caranddriver.com/research/a31875141/electric-car-battery-life/).
10 Pratt, Devin, "What Happened to the Old Batteries in Electric Cars?," Consumer Reports, February
23,2022, (https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/hybrids-evs/what-happens-to-the-old-batteries-in-electric-
cars-al091429417/).
Organization: Jaguar Land Rover NA, LLC (JLR)
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) Clean Vehicle Tax Credits
Prior to the publication of the IRA last year, our vehicles qualified for the 30D Clean Vehicle
Credit. The changing incentive landscape has adversely affected Jaguar Land Rover, with our
manufacturing facilities located outside the US, we are now ineligible for the amended 30D
credit. Due to the positioning of our vehicles and our customer demographics as a premium
luxury vehicle manufacturer, the income and MSRP pre-requisites for the 30D credit also
exclude us from claiming. We are fortunately eligible to claim the 45W Commercial Clean
Vehicle Credit and we are pursuing this opportunity to potentially benefit our customers. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 9-10]
JLR challenges the assumption made by EPA that: "While the restrictions imposed by the
IRA on the 30D credit (income, MSRP, critical mineral content, and manufacturing content)
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limit the vehicles which are eligible for the full $7,500 incentive under 30D, we believe that
manufacturers will work to increase the number of vehicles that qualify over time due to the high
marketing value of the credit." Despite the work that manufacturers carry out, factors relating to
the critical mineral and battery component requirements are largely out of their control. For
example, currently 65% of battery cells and almost 80% of cathodes are manufactured in
China. 15 Until the US develops a robust battery manufacturing industry, it cannot be guaranteed
that a high percentage of the fleet will be able to claim. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 9-
10]
15 IEA (2023), Global EV Outlook 2023, IEA, Paris Trends in batteries -
https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook- 2023/trends-in-batteries License: CC BY 4.0
We suggest that EPA incorporate the following into the final rule analysis and the monitoring
reports mentioned previously to ensure that the portion of BEV sales eligible for credit under
30D in OMEGA is appropriate.
• Industry fleet GWh of cell and battery capacity eligible
• Industry fleet battery minerals extraction eligible
• Number of IRS eligible vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 9-10]
JLR requests that EPA amends the central case compliance model to reflect a more accurate
and realistic credit utilization of the IRA credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 9-10]
Organization: Job Creators Network Foundation (JCNF)
In addition to being unconstitutional, EPA also improperly certifies the proposed rule as not
having a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act. That is false. Millions of small businesses use a car or light-duty
truck for their work. Cars are an integral part of certain industries, like limousine or other car
service providers. But the local landscaper, caterer, interior designer, or even the hairdresser who
sees clients at their homes, will use a car for all or a significant part of their business. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0709, p. 2]
Electric cars are at least $10,000 more than the equivalent gas-powered car. For the small
business owner operating on razor-thin margins, $10,000 is a significant increased expense. And
that is just the cost represented to purchase the vehicle. It does not include the cost of lost time
waiting forty-five minutes for an electric car to charge. Or the fact that if the battery pack of an
electric vehicle is damaged in an automobile accident, it likely means the car is totaled and
would have to be replaced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0709, p. 2]
EPA should certify that its proposed rule has a significant impact on a substantial number of
small entities under the RFA, prepare the required Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, and
conduct the required Small Business Advocacy Review Panel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0709,
p. 2]
Organization: Joshua Linn
2. How Would the Proposed Emissions Standards Affect New Vehicle Consumers?
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In Section I.D of the proposed standards, "EPA is seeking comment on three alternatives to its
proposed standards." As described in more detail in a new RFF report [Link:
https://www.rff.org/publications/reports/how-would-the-proposed-epa-passenger-vehicle-
greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards-affect-new-vehicle-consumers/], I use the RFF light-duty
vehicle model to estimate the benefits and costs of the proposed standards and two alternatives. I
quantify how the benefits to new vehicle consumers vary across income groups. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
Despite the Biden administration's interest [Link:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/environmentaljustice/] in environmental justice and equity, the EPA
analysis of the proposed standards does not quantify how effects may vary across consumers.
The standards will increase sales of plug-in vehicles while simultaneously making gasoline
vehicles more fuel efficient. Both changes reduce fuel costs for drivers, which disproportionately
benefits low-income households because they spend a much larger share of their income on
gasoline than do high-income households. However, low-income households typically have
lower demand for plug-in vehicles than high-income households (even putting aside the high up-
front purchase price), and by shifting the market from gasoline to plug-in vehicles, the standards
may reduce purchasing options for low-income households. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635,
pp. 7-10]
The model monetizes benefits and costs to new-vehicle buyers by income group, costs to
manufacturers, and the GHG benefits of the standards. Table 1 summarizes the main results for
two scenarios: a baseline that assumes the standards for year 2026 do not change in subsequent
years (this is the same baseline that EPA assumes); and tightening standards by about 40 percent
between 2026 and 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
Table 2. Aggregate Effects in 2030 of Proposed Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards
[See original for Table 2] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
The baseline market share of plug-in vehicles is about 56 percent in 2030, which is slightly
higher than the Biden administration's target. This market share lies in the middle of the wide
range [Link: https://rhg.com/research/climate-clean-energy-inflation-reduction-act/] of recent
forecasts. The proposed standards would increase plug-in vehicles' market share to 62 percent,
which is comparable to (though slightly lower than) EPA's analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
Expenditure on plug-in vehicle subsidies under the Inflation Reduction Act is about $45
billion in the baseline and $50 billion in the proposed standards. The baseline number is about 20
times greater than the estimate by the Joint Committee on Taxation, reflecting different
assumptions about policies (such as the ZEV standards) and consumer preferences. However, the
estimate is similar to recent estimates [Link: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2023/03/BPEA_Spring2023_Bistline-et-al_unembargoedUpdated.pdf] that have
used different computer models. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
Panel B shows the consumer benefits of purchasing vehicles in 2030. The consumer welfare
number measures the benefits of the vehicles compared with hypothetical purchases of used
vehicles instead. The proposed standards would increase consumer welfare by $110 billion.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
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The tighter GHG standards benefit consumers because people undervalue [Link:
https://www.rff.org/publications/working-papers/emissions-standards-and-electric-vehicle-
targets-for-passenger-vehicles/] fuel cost savings when they purchase vehicles. Consider a
consumer who wants a particular vehicle and is offered the opportunity to purchase an otherwise
identical vehicle that has lower fuel costs. Based on purchase choices that consumers make, on
average [Link: https://www.rff.org/publications/working-papers/emissions-standards-and-
electric-vehicle-targets-for-passenger-vehicles/] a consumer is willing to pay about $35 for a
hypothetical $100 reduction in fuel costs—in other words, people don't pay as much as they
should for the lower fuel costs. Consequently, they buy vehicles with higher fuel costs than is
privately optimal for them. By addressing these mistakes, the standards can increase consumer
welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
Manufacturer profits are the difference between revenue and costs. The tighter standards
reduce manufacturer profits by about $5 billion. This result differs from EPA's since the agency
assumes that manufacturers raise prices sufficiently to cover their costs. In contrast, my
modeling indicates that competition constrains the extent to which manufacturers can increase
their prices. That is, if an individual manufacturer tries to increase its prices enough to offset its
higher costs, it will lose customers to other manufacturers. Because vehicle manufacturers cannot
coordinate with one another on price changes, this competitive pressure prevents manufacturers
from fully passing costs on to consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
Panel C shows the GHG emissions (C02 and methane) from producing and consuming
gasoline and electricity to power the vehicles. The emissions numbers represent the emissions
from the vehicles sold in 2030 over their lifetimes. The proposed standards reduce climate
damages from $72 billion to $49 billion over the lifetimes of vehicles sold in 2030, yielding
climate benefits of about $23 billion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
Panel D shows that the proposed standards would increase welfare by about $128 billion,
where welfare includes new-vehicle consumer welfare, manufacturer profits, and GHG
emissions. The agency's numbers are computed differently from the numbers reported in Table
2, so the two should not be compared explicitly. Rather, the results in Table 2, as well as EPA's
analysis, reveal that the proposed standards are likely to yield large welfare gains. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
Figure 1 shows how the benefits vary across new vehicle consumers, again comparing the
proposed standards with the baseline. The figure plots the average welfare change per household;
for example, the blue bar indicates that the proposed standards would benefit the average
household in the lowest income group (below $44,000) by about $2,500. These benefits, which
include fuel cost savings net of any welfare cost of the policy (such as paying higher vehicle
prices) and do not include climate or local air quality benefits, could be substantial. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
Figure 1. Change in Consumer Welfare per Household for Proposed Relative to Baseline
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
[See original for graph, Figure 1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
That the bars diminish in height from left to right in the diagram means that the proposed
standards benefit low-income households more than high-income households. This pattern holds
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for other levels of stringency and assumptions described in the report. Benefits concentrate
among lower-income households because they substantially undervalue [Link:
https://www.rff.org/publications/working-papers/vehicle-attribute-tradeoffs-and-the-
distributional-effects-of-us-fuel-economy-and-greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards/] fuel cost
savings, whereas high-income consumers undervalue by a moderate amount. If there were no
GHG or fuel economy standards, low-income consumers would buy vehicles that have higher
fuel costs than would be optimal for them; the GHG standards benefit these consumers by
reducing their fuel costs. In contrast, without standards, high-income consumers would buy
vehicles that have only slightly higher fuel costs than would be optimal, and thus the standards
give them smaller benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
An important factor underlying these results is that the modeling indicates that vehicle
manufacturers will introduce many low-price electric vehicle options. If it proves challenging for
vehicle manufacturers to produce and market low-price electric vehicles, low-income consumers
will likely benefit less from the proposed GHG standards than these results indicate. More
generally, whether benefits of plug-in vehicles are widespread across consumer income groups
will depend on how consumer interest in those vehicles evolves and whether manufacturers can
successfully introduce low-price plug-in options. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
3. References [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
Bistline, J., Neil Mehrotra, and Catherine Wolfram. 2023. Economic Implications of the
Climate Provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act. National Bureau of Economic Research.
https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2023/03/BPEA_Spring2023_Bistline-et-
al_unembargoedUpdated.pdf.
Environmental Protection Agency. 2023. Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model
Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles.
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175 J2.pdf.
Larsen, John, Ben King, Hannah Kolus, Naveen Dasari, Galen Hiltbrand, and Whitney
Herndon. 2022. A Turning Point for US Climate Progress: Assessing the Climate and Clean
Energy Provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act. Rhodium Group.
https://rhg.com/research/climate-clean-energy-inflation-reduction-act/.
Leard, B., Joshua Linn, and Katalin Springel. 2023. "Vehicle Attribute Tradeoffs and the
Distributional Effects of US Fuel Economy and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards."
Resources for the Future Working Paper 23-04. https://www.rff.org/publications/working-
papers/vehicle-attribute-tradeoffs-and-the-distributional-effects-of- us-fuel-economy-and-
greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards/.
Leard, B., and Virginia McConnell. 2017. New Markets for Credit Trading Under U.S.
Automobile Greenhouse Gas and Fuel Economy Standards. Review of Environmental
Economics and Policy 11 (2). https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1093/reep/rex010.
Linn, Joshua. 2023. "Can State-Level Regulations Help Reduce National Emissions from
Passenger Vehicles?" Resources for the Future Common Resources blog.
https://www.resources.org/common-resources/can-state-level- regulations-help-reduce-national-
emissions-from-passenger-vehicles/.
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Linn, Joshua. 2023. Emissions Standards and Electric Vehicle Targets for Passenger Vehicles.
Resources for the Future Working Paper 23-05. https://www.rff.org/publications/working-
papers/emissions-standards-and-electric- vehicle-targets-for-passenger-vehicles/.
Linn, Joshua. 2023. How Much Do Regulations for Fuel Economy and Emissions Incentivize
the Production of Larger Vehicles? Resources for the Future Common Resources blog.
https://www.resources.org/common- resources/how-much-do-regulations-for-fuel-economy-and-
emissions-incentivize-the-production-of-larger- vehicles/.
Linn, Joshua. 2023. How Would the Proposed EPA Passenger Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards Affect New- Vehicle Consumers? Resources for the Future Report 23-08.
https://www.rff.org/publications/reports/how- would-the-proposed-epa-passenger-vehicle-
greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards-affect-new-vehicle- consumers/.
White House. Environmental Justice, https://www.whitehouse.gov/environmentaljustice/.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0635, pp. 7-10]
Organization: KALA Engineering Consultants
We have some things to say about Electrification Step 3 later. In many of the comments EPA
has received for the EPA-HQ-OAR- 2022-0829 Docket, many claim that the existing grid is
simply not capable of handling (conductor ampacity) the increased power demands for
recharging millions of electric vehicles that will replace much of the 250 million vehicle US
fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 31-34]
We have some thoughts on that grid capability issue if we may digress for a moment. The
problem with many analyses of electric vehicle switch-out scenarios has been not understanding
and taking into account what we call the Most Probable Time-of-Day for Recharge (MPTODR).
The scenario put forth by electric vehicle advocates for recharging is everyone who has a BEV
will come home from work to their single family home that has been retrofitted with a high-
amperage (50 - 70 amps) charging station or stations if the family has more than one BEV. The
BEV owner will plug their BEV into the charge station, go inside and enjoy a relaxing evening.
That of course, is the elitist part of the whole electrification mythos that other people are like
you, being upper middle class people that can easily afford a BEV and the other expenses
associated with owning a BEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 31-34]
If we take Tesla as a typical BEV example, the Tesla Wall Charger is an outlet that requires
more amperage at 240 Volts than most home outlets for an electric dryer or stove can supply. We
found a cost estimate for installing a Tesla Wall Charger in the Denver, CO metro area that came
in at about $5,000. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 31-34]
[See original attachment for photo of EV calculator] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
31-34]
Remember that the large wire gauge conductors needed for the Tesla charger are usually run
in metal or plastic conduit and the straight-line distance between the electric distribution box and
a garage is not the installed length because the conduit must be routed around your house to the
garage, where the new wires will enter that space and be connected to the wall charger or
chargers (if you need multiple chargers, the conduit size and cost is increased to run multiple sets
of wires for each charger). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 31-34]
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If you want to travel with your Tesla they recommend you should carry recharging gear that
will provide flexibility for charging from various outlet types. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617,
pp. 31-34]
[See original attachment for picture of various types of TESLA recharging gear] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 31-34]
It looks to us like that "flexibility" is another $450 or so just to reduce what we call
"Recharge Anxiety" for BEV owners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 31-34]
Notwithstanding the larger initial cost of the vehicle associated with owning a typical BEV,
we would argue that for people who live paycheck to paycheck who might be in the middle to
lower income economic strata, such expenses are probably out of reach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 31-34]
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
Finally, many consumers may not be able to afford electric cars even if they want them. The
average new car now costs nearly $50,000. Average New Car Price Tops $49,500, Kelly Blue
Book (January 11, 2023) https://bit.ly/3PcSkKT. The typical new car payment is now nearly
$800 a month. New Vehicle Affordability Worse Than Ever, Kelly Blue Book (June 18, 2023)
https://bit.ly/3X3F8Kt. EPA admits that the Proposed Rule "will result in a rise in the average
purchase price for consumers" from even these rates. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,364. The Agency
estimates increased costs for vehicle manufacturers at $7.5 billion annually by 2027. Id. By
2032, the Proposed Rule will cost manufacturers at least $1,200 per vehicle, which they will no
doubt pass to consumers. Id. at 29,201. Prices for used cars will rise as well. Id. at 29,364. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 17]
The Agency argues that the benefits of EV ownership will offset these costs. Specifically,
EPA insists that "projected vehicle technology costs are offset by the savings in reduced
operating costs, including fuel savings and reduced maintenance and repair costs." 88 Fed. Reg.
at 29,364. EPA's reasoning is flawed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 17]
The alleged savings for reduced fuel consumption are based on layers of speculation. The
shift to EVs is projected to "reduce liquid fuel consumption (gasoline and diesel) while
simultaneously increasing electricity consumption." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,365. EPA is correct to
consider the net result of these effects when analyzing the costs and benefits of the Proposed
Rule. But a necessary part of that analysis relies on correctly forecasting electricity prices over
the coming decades. Simultaneous with the forced electrification of vehicles, EPA is attempting
to dramatically restructure America's power-generating portfolio. Whether such a transformation
is possible given resource limitations, geopolitical factors, permitting issues, land-use debates,
jurisdictional policy differences, and litigation is still to be determined. Even if it is possible,
EPA cannot predict with any accuracy the costs to the retail ratepayer for completing such a
drastic transition. In short, no one knows with enough certainty to justify massive regulatory
shifts whether charging an EV will be more cost-effective than refueling a gasoline engine.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 17]
Moreover, low-income consumers will not be able to afford an EV. Despite the Agency's best
efforts to present EVs as increasingly affordable, at the end of 2022 the average new EV sold for
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$61,448. Average New Car Price Tops $49,500, supra. This is why the Agency acknowledges
"low-income households are more likely to buy used vehicles and own older vehicles." 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29,344. But used EVs offer little savings if the buyer has to replace the battery.
According to the Department of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory, advanced
batteries "wear out eventually," and today's batteries last only 8 to 15 years. Electric Vehicle
Benefits and Considerations, U.S. Department of Energy Alternate Fuels Data Center,
https://bit.ly/3PcOn9i. Replacing an EV battery costs anywhere from $5,000 to more than
$15,000. Electric Car Battery Replacement Costs, Edmunds (May 2, 2023)
https://bit.ly/3NutoNS. Such substantial expenses hardly qualify as "reduced repair and
maintenance costs." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,364. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 17-18]
All of this comes at a time of record inflation, historic gasoline prices, and high utility bills.
Since President Biden took office, food prices are up over 18%, and energy prices are up over
37%. Introducing the 'Presidential Inflation Rate': Biden trails only Carter, Roll Call (March 15,
2023) https://bit.ly/3qH63jd. Home prices have also surged. In the first quarter of 2023, the
average home price in the United States was $516,500, Average Sales Price of Houses Sold for
the United States, Federal Reserve Economic Data, https://bit.ly/3p4BenX—an increase of 27%
in less than three years. Agencies cannot ignore context when weighing the costs and benefits of
a proposed rule. Here, the broader economic landscape is another strong mark against the
Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 17-18]
Organization: Lillian Davey
Creating credits for those who are using off cycle and air conditioning is a very bold
incentive. Incentives are almost vital for this kind of legislation as there may be much
opposition. One concern I have is for measuring fuel economy and testing fuel specifications.
There would have to be very stringent and clear procedures. There are many people that are
going to have vehicles that are not going to fit into the electric vehicle category and are going to
need to have fuel specifications for measuring fuel economy to be very clear. Another concern of
mine is the incentive multipliers. The nature of these incentives would also need to be very clear.
The largest concern of mine will be how to make these vehicles affordable to the average person.
I think that the EPA and the government will need to work with companies such as Tesla as well
as all other major automotive companies that are planning on leveraging these advances in Clean
Car Technology. This is not going to be an easy change and many people are not able to afford a
Tesla as it sits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0489, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Marie Gluesenkamp Perez, and Mary Sattler Peltola, Members of Congress,
Congress of the United States
We are writing to express our concerns about the impacts the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) new proposed rules, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027
and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for
Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 may have on rural communities.
Like you, we believe climate change is a threat to communities across the country, and the
federal government plays a critical role in developing a clean energy apparatus and helping our
communities improve air quality. However, in making that transition, we cannot leave rural
communities or working families behind. The administration's Executive Order 14037 and
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subsequent National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization set an ambitious goal for 50
percent of new passenger cars to be electric vehicles (EVs) by 2030. Last year's Inflation
Reduction Act included many concrete policies promoting EV production that will drive costs
down and improve affordability. We are concerned the EPA, along with the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and the Department of Energy (DOE), have not done enough work to
ensure rural communities will have the necessary charging infrastructure in place to make
widespread EV adoption possible. The imposition of additional regulations in the auto market
without key infrastructure investments will reduce consumer choice, which is a recipe for
disaster in rural America. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0522, p. 1]
Washington's third congressional district has fewer than 100 level 2 and DC fast chargers
available to the public, and they are largely concentrated in just two cities. Alaska has only 60
publicly available EV charging stations. In Congresswoman Gluesenkamp Perez' home county
of Skamania, there are only two EV charging stations right now, and both are located at resorts.
In Congresswoman Peltola's borough of Bethel, along with all the other boroughs of Western
Alaska, there are zero EV charging stations. As DOT has acknowledged, the costs of installing
EV chargers in rural areas can be higher, especially for direct current fast charging stations,
because they are more likely to require expensive electrical service upgrades. Furthermore, for
many working families, installing an EV charger at home remains out of reach, especially for
those who don't own their homes. Bottom line: for EVs to be a meaningful and workable
emissions reduction solution in rural America, we must have a ubiquitous and affordable
charging infrastructure with access to abundant, cheap electricity. That simply does not exist
right now. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0522, p. 2]
We are only four years away from model year 2027, and we are concerned the EPA's
regulations are not paired with a plan to ensure adequate charging infrastructure on such a short
timeline. Installing hundreds of thousands of new EV chargers and upgrading associated
electrical infrastructure will also require tens of thousands of electricians. We are already
experiencing a nationwide shortage of qualified electricians - anyone who's currently waiting six
months for a residential electrician knows this all too well. Workforce shortages, particularly for
those in the trades, are even more acute in rural communities. We want to ensure the EPA has
considered the significant workforce development challenges that must be addressed to train
electricians for a large-scale roll out of EV charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0522, p. 2]
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
Mitsubishi shares EPA's goal of achieving net-zero carbon transportation in the future. To be
successful in that future - which represents a major transformation to vehicle electrification - it is
imperative that the market conditions be aligned with, and capable of, supporting the massive
increase in the market share of electric vehicles that will be needed to meet GHG emissions
standards. For the reasons laid-out through our trade association, the Alliance for Automotive
Innovation's (Auto Innovators), comments, Mitsubishi believes that the very aggressive rate of
vehicle electrification assumed in the proposed rule far outpaces what the market can support in
that time frame. If finalized as proposed, our experience in this area to date makes us confident
the final rule would significantly increase the cost of new vehicles, and would reduce consumer
choice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 1-2]
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Mitsubishi participated in the development of - and supports - the comments submitted by
Auto Innovators. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
In addition, based on its considerable experience discussed previously with BEV and PHEV
leadership, Mitsubishi provides the following recommendations to supplement the comments of
Auto Innovators: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
1. Closely align the multi-pollutant emissions standards with President Biden's 2030
goal by assuming no more than 40-50% PHEVs and FCEVs by 2030, even though our
experience leads us to caution that this itself is very ambitious, and is predicated on the
assumption that the necessary supportive policies will be effectively implemented.
2. Consider the many benefits of PHEVs to consumers and the environment during the
expected period of constrained battery critical minerals production capacity, and how PHEVs are
the perfect stepping- stone to full BEV acceptance.
3. Maintain the current PHEV Utility Factor (UF) and work with industry to identify
opportunities to increase PHEV electric operation. This is the ideal stepping-stone technology to
encourage long-term BEV acceptance and utilization.
4. Keep the proposed approach to determine the passenger car curves, and consider
adjusting the cutpoint and stringency levels of the light-duty trucks during the early years of the
program.
5. Maintain the existing GHG program flexibilities, such as Air Conditioning and Off-
Cycle technologies credits (including the alternative method to apply off-cycle credits), and
allow previously approved technologies to continue receiving credits.
6. Align the Tier-4 (criteria pollutants) with CARB's LEV-IV criteria test procedures and
standards.
7. Consider the impact that very aggressive GHG standards will have on vehicle
affordability, and especially the detrimental impact to low-to-moderate income families.
Regardless of the vehicles that regulation may require us to produce, it is critical that regulators
always keep the accessibility of consumers in mind. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
The rationale for each one of these recommendations is further explained below. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 2]
Mitsubishi also is concerned that the increased vehicle cost associated with EPA's proposed
ICE criteria pollutant emissions stringency (particularly the cost to meet proposed PM emissions
standards) will likely lead consumers to retain their old vehicles longer, thereby offsetting
environmental benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, p. 9]
7. Vehicle Affordability
Mitsubishi takes great pride in having the lowest fleet GHG emissions of all mass market
vehicle manufacturers 11 12 while at the same time offering some of the most affordable vehicles
in the US market. Many of our customers own and drive cleaner vehicles because the value of
our vehicles is a financially viable option to them. This combination is a win-win for US
consumers and for the environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 10-11]
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11 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report
12 Excludes BEV-only manufacturers
EVs currently cost significantly more to produce than equivalent gasoline cars or trucks. The
average price of a BEV today is about $9,000 higher than that of a comparable ICE vehiclel3.
That price difference is driven mostly by the cost of the batteries. Battery cost have come down
significantly in the past, but, contrary to EPA's assumption that the price of EV batteries will be
substantially lower in coming years, that trend is not likely to continue. Given the anticipated
exponential growth in demand for battery critical minerals to meet the proposed GHG standards,
combined with the continued limited supply of those materials for the foreseeable future
(resulting from the long lead time needed to ramp up mining and processing capacity), costs of
these materials and batteries are expected to rise, thereby widening the price gap between ICEs
and BEVs. Mitsubishi agrees with Auto Innovators' assertion that the Agency has not adequately
addressed projected battery critical minerals availability and associated cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0682, pp. 10-11]
13 New-Vehicle Transaction Prices Trend Downward as Incentives Rise, According to Kelley Blue Book -
Mar.8, 2023 (kbb.com).
Setting a very aggressive multi-pollutant emissions standard will substantially increase the
cost of all vehicles and reduce consumer choice. If finalized as proposed, EPA's multi-pollutant
emissions standards would require OEMs to prematurely phase-out some of the most
affordable/cleaner vehicles and replace them with more expensive battery electric vehicles,
thereby limiting consumer choice for clean and affordable vehicles. The potential negative
consequence in this scenario is price-sensitive car buyers will likely turn to the used car market,
thus driving buyers into older, less environmentally friendly vehicles, exactly the opposite of the
intention of the GHG regulation. In addition, the resulting increased demand for used cars would
also raise used car prices, leaving a growing segment of the US population - mostly low- to-
moderate income families - unable to purchase a vehicle at all. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682,
pp. 10-11]
Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
A. The Proposed Standards Will Increase Vehicle Costs and Constrain Fleet Turnover.
Appropriate emission standards must not undermine vehicle affordability. Whether new
vehicles are sold or languish on dealer lots depends on whether consumers are able and willing to
purchase them. Affordability is critical, but today, most U.S. households cannot afford to
purchase a new light-duty vehicle.23 In May 2023, the average price of a new EV was
$55,488,[24] down by almost $9,400 from 2022, but higher than the gross income of most
Americans.25 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 5-6]
23 See Buying a new car is becoming an out-of-reach, luxury purchase - The Washington Post.
24 See New-Vehicle Sales Incentives Continue to Climb in May, as Transaction Price Increases Moderate,
Kelley Blue Book - Cox Automotive Inc. (coxautoinc.com).
25 See Average, Median, Top 1% Individual Income Percentiles - DQYDJ.
The chart below reflects data on the costs and budgeting for an average new light-duty ICE
vehicle purchase. Note that only some 33 percent of American consumers can afford a new light-
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duty vehicle in today's market. Stated another way, 67 percent of U.S. consumers currently are
priced out of the new light-duty market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 5-6]
Year: April 2023 YTD
Type of Vehicle: NADANV Avg. Transaction Price
Car Price: $47,239
Average Interest Rate: 6.8%
Average Loan Term: 68
20% Down Payment: $9,448
Loan Amount: $37,791
Monthly Payment: $668
Monthly Take Home Pay Necessary for 10% of Take-Home Income: $6,675
Annual Take Home Pay Necessary: $80,101
Assume Americans Pay 27% of Their Income in Taxes: $109,728
Share of U.S. Households That Can Afford: 33.31%
Number of Households that Can Afford: 43,700,000
Total Households: 131,202,000 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 5-6]
2. EPA's Fuel Savings Analysis Is Unclear and Incomplete.
Despite acknowledging that its proposed mandates will result in increased electricity
consumption and expenditures, EPA claims that consumers will nevertheless experience fuel
savings that will help offset higher upfront EV purchasing costs.40 EPA appears to have
premised its conclusion on the modeling of liquid fuel and electricity consumption levels. EPA
does not explain how it converted modeled consumption levels into monetary values to show
actual consumer savings, and it makes no comparison of fueling costs and electricity rates based
on modeled consumption levels. Nor is information provided on individual consumer savings.
Thus, the basis for EPA's consumer fuel savings conclusion is unclear, at best. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0656, pp. 8-9]
40 88 Fed. Reg. at 29365-66.
EPA's savings assertion seems questionable. Conceivably, liquid fuel costs could decrease
more than electricity costs increase if the proposal is adopted, but even then, EPA's analysis
seems to overstate the fuel savings from switching to EVs. According to the Energy Information
Agency (EIA), the average American household uses 886 kilowatt hours of electricity per
month,41 and EPA reports that the average EV consumes 36 kilowatt hours of electricity per 100
miles driven.42 If the average household drives an EV 15,000 miles per year, or 1,250 miles per
month, and the EV is charged at home to the tune of 450 kilowatt hours of electricity per month,
the household's electricity bill will increase by around 50 percent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0656, pp. 8-9]
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41 See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
42 See Comparison: Your Car vs. an Electric Vehicle | US EPA.
Moreover, as EV sales increase, electricity rates are likely to rise due to increased power
demands. Higher electricity prices will also reflect the cost of increased transmission and
generation infrastructure, which some estimates indicate will need to increase 60 percent by
2030, and even more over the following two decades.43 EPA must account for these higher
electricity costs when determining accurately whether, and to what extent, commercial and
noncommercial purchasers/lessees operating EVs will benefit from any fuel savings. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 8-9]
43 See Queued Up... But in Need of Transmission | Department of Energy.
3. EPA's Modeling Fails to Account for Insurance Costs.
EPA omitted insurance costs from its TCO payback analysis. According to Consumer
Reports, electric vehicles may cost more to insure than gasoline-powered cars44 in part due to
the uncertainty associated with their projected repair costs. Consumer Reports also notes that
insurance companies are more likely to declare an EV a total loss due to battery repair costs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 9]
44 See Electric Vehicles Cost More to Insure Than Gasoline-Powered - Consumer Reports.
Similarly, Progressive, a national insurance company offering auto insurance, has stated that,
"[ijnsurance for an electric car may cost more than insurance for a regular gas-powered car. An
electric car's higher price tag and more complex equipment means it may cost more to repair or
replace if it's in an accident. That can mean higher rates for policyholders who carry
comprehensive and collision coverage."45 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 9]
45 See Electric Car Insurance: Is It More Expensive? | Progressive.
Both Consumer Reports and Progressive note that the gap in insurance prices between EVs
and ICE vehicles should narrow over time but given that it is unknown if or when this will occur,
EPA should factor the higher costs of EV insurance into its modeling [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0656, p. 9]
4. EPA's Modeling Values the IRA's EV Tax Credits Inconsistently.
EPA's approach for estimating electrification technology costs for its technical feasibility
analysis does not assume that all consumers will receive the full $7,500 value of the IRA's EV
tax credits, opting instead to combine portions of the Section 30D and Section 45 W tax credits in
its modeling.46 The initial value of the credit used in the modeling starts at $3,750 in MY 2027
and increases annually until reaching $6,000 in MY 2032.47 But when elsewhere discussing the
TCO savings and expenses for a MY 2032 vehicle, EPA assumes a maximum value of $7,500
when comparing the net purchase price of an EV with that of an ICE vehicle.48 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0656, p. 10]
46 88 Fed. Reg. at 29301; EPA DRIA. p. 2-87.
47 88 Fed. Reg. at 29301; DRIA. p. 2-87, Table 2-50.
48 DRIA. p. 4-20, Table 4-7.
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This approach is inconsistent. If EPA's own technical feasibility modeling assumes a credit
value of only $6,000, the agency should use this same value in its TCO analysis, even if doing so
would result in more favorable average purchase price for an ICE powered vehicle versus a
comparable EV. For example, assuming application of a $7,500 credit, an EV CUV/SUV may
have a net purchase price $400 lower than its ICE counterpart, but assuming application of a
$6,000 credit, the ICE CUV/SUV would be $1,100 less expensive than its EV counterpart.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 10]
Organization: National Tribal Air Association (NTAA)
Electrified Vehicles
As noted in the announcement of the proposed standards, "EPA's proposal builds upon a
proliferation of announcements by automakers that collectively signal a rapidly growing
shift.. .toward zero-emission technologies, including electrification"5. This anticipated reliance
on hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and fully electric power trains may be disproportionately burdensome
and costly in Indian country. Far too many homes on many reservations lack access to an electric
grid. Further, vehicle reliance on centralized or individual battery charging sites as anticipated in
the proposed regulations presents a huge challenge. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, p. 3]
5 Biden-Harris Administration Proposes Strongest-Ever Pollution Standards for cars and trucks to
Accelerate Transition to a Clean - Transportation Future, USEPA News Release, April 12, 2023
The NTAA is well aware of many initiatives to enhance the deployment of renewable energy
technologies to support the nation's electricity demand. We actively participate in meetings,
webinars, forums, etc. as programs emerge under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, Inflation
Reduction Act, and other climate change - related initiatives. The NTAA continues to formally
comment on EPA proposals that emerge which have the potential to impact Indian country.
NTAA remains concerned about realistic access to funding and other resources that are essential
to advance renewable energy in Tribal communities and are necessary to transition vehicle fleets
as anticipated by the proposed light-duty and medium-duty vehicle emissions standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, p. 3]
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
Beyond the significant market and governmental challenges posed by such a drastic
implementation timeline, consumer adoption will be critical to success. Consumer adoption of
EVs has historically lagged behind expectations, leaving a significant hurdle to encourage a large
and swift shift to EVs. Consumers need to be convinced not only of the appeal, safety,
affordability, and reliability of EVs themselves, but they need to adopt the necessary community
and home charging equipment to facilitate their use. Consumers will need to adapt their trip
planning and driving behavior to allow for vehicle charging needs. The only way to drive these
significant behavioral changes is to assure consumers that charging infrastructure is available and
reliable. This is simply not a reality today and is unlikely to be a reality in time to drive such a
significant shift within the timeline of the Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule. These challenges are
magnified due to the unclear and uncertain benefits under the Inflation Reduction Act, which
place significant limitations on EV consumer incentive programs and charging infrastructure
programs. Moreover, many consumers are reluctant or unable to purchase EVs due to their
significant price premium. The Proposed Multi-Pollutant Rule will only exacerbate these
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inequalities, with EV prices likely to increase even more due to extreme investments required by
all market sectors involved. Driving too much change too quickly will shut out many
communities who need clean vehicles the most. It will likely force consumers who are uncertain
about ZEV adoption to continue to operate aging ICE vehicles much longer. This is contrary to
the intent of the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 5]
Organization: North American Subaru, Inc.
EVs are still more expensive than vehicles with ICE powertrains. For many consumers today,
affording an EV is out of reach. According to Kelley Blue Book4 the average transaction price
(ATP) for an EV in May of this year was $55,488. The ATP for all Subaru vehicles in April was
$35,330. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0576, p. 3]
4 KBB. 6/12/23. https://mediaroom.kbb.eom/2023-06-12-New-Vehicles-Sales-Incentives-Continue-to-
Climb-in-May-as-Transaction-Prices-Increase-Moderately,-According-to-Kelly-Blue-Book.
Organization: North Dakota Farmers Union (NDFU)
Slow Turnover of the Vehicle Fleet
Sales of new vehicles displace a small fraction of the existing vehicle fleet each year. EPA
estimates that 67% of new vehicles sales will be battery electric in 2032.5 Even if that growth is
achieved, large numbers of new vehicles that burn liquid fuels will continue to be produced for
many years, and those vehicles will remain on the road well into the future. The table below
shows survival rates for cars and light trucks by vehicle age.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586,
p. 3]
5 Environmental Protection Agency (2023, April 12). Biden-Harris administration proposes strongest-ever
pollution standards for cars and trucks to accelerate transition to a clean-transportation future [Press
Release]. Retrieved from https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris-administration-proposes-
strongest-ever- pollution-standards-cars-and.
6 Davis, S. C., and Boundy, R. G. (2022, June). Transportation energy data book: Edition 40. Oak Ridge
National Laboratory. Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy. Retrieved from https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf.
Based on this data [See original comment for Table 3.15, Survival Rates for Cars and Light
Trucks by Vehicle Age], 86% of passenger cars and 78% of light-duty trucks remain on the road
for 10 years. Moreover, 16% of passenger cars and 32% of light-duty trucks remain on the road
for 20 years. If new electric vehicles are more expensive or less attractive to consumers, it is
reasonable to assume older liquid-fueled vehicles will remain on the road even longer. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 3]
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
C. Market-Enabling Complementary Policies
Many of the NESCAUM and OTC states have state-specific plans to reduce GHGs and air
pollution from on-road transportation and have adopted a diverse set of market-enabling policies
and programs designed to advance the market for light-, medium, and heavy-duty ZEVs.
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Examples include ZEV sales and purchase requirements as discussed above; ZEV and
infrastructure purchase incentives; utility programs and investments in ZEV infrastructure;
consumer and fleet outreach and education programs; innovative financing mechanisms; multi-
family dwelling and workplace charging programs; and deployment of public charging in
communities and along major travel corridors. Many states have established requirements or
goals to transition state vehicles and transit fleets to ZEVs. In addition, most states have adopted
clean energy or renewable portfolio standards, which require a share of power sold by their
utilities to come from renewable sources. Some states have adopted 100 percent renewable
energy goals. States recognize that transitioning to renewable energy sources will maximize
emissions reductions from ZEVs overtime. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 7]
Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
EPA also assumed unrealistically low electricity rates. Not all households have access to
home charging ports. The average rate for charging at a Tesla super-charger is 25 cents per
kilowatt hour (Kwh)9. In contrast, EPA assumes electricity rates for EV charging are 10.3 cents
per kwh in 2027 and fall to 9.3 cents per kwh by 205510. 63 percent of households in the US
have garages or car ports, which provides an upper bound for home chargingl 1. Accordingly, 47
percent of households would be paying much higher commercial rates for EV charging. If we
assume Tesla's price, this implies that EPA underestimated electricity rates paid for EV charging
by 55%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 4]
9 https://www.leafscore.com/tesla/how-much-does-it-cost-to-charge-a-tesla
10 Page 168 of EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis -
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
11 https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/fact-958-january-2-2017-sixty-three-percent-all-housing-units-
have- garage-or-carport
Moreover, the EPA did not factor in the impact on electricity rates from their recent power
plant rule that would essentially force all remaining coal and natural gas power plants to cut
emissions by 90%12. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 4]
12 https://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/biden-administrations-power-plant-rules-underscore-
reality- epa-limits-rcna84201
Repair Savings
EPA Claimed Savings: $170 billion
Realistic Savings: NEGATIVE $4 billion [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 10]
The EPA's "repair savings" also relied on Argonne's study, the same study from which the
EPA dubiously reported maintenance costs. Instead of relying on actual consumer data from a
reputable organization like Kelley Blue Book, the EPA and Argonne use fancy multi-variable
mathematical equations that include a "multiplier" that inherently forces ICE vehicles to be
-50% more expensive to repair than EVs. These equations are used to generate "repair cost
curve" diagrams. One must then calculate the integral under their "repair cost curves" to
decipher an estimated 5-year repair cost for ICE owners of $1,530 compared to $1,065 for EV
owners, a claimed 44% cost increase for ICE owners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 10]
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Compare Kelley Blue Book's much more straightforward real-consumer data, and the
numbers flip completely. KBB reports five-year repair costs for ICE owners of $1,695 compared
to $1,712 for EV owners38. This means that ICE owners save money (-1%) on repairs versus EV
owners, and don't pay 44% more like the EPA claims. Scaling back the EPA's claimed ICE
repair cost from 44% to -1%, changes the repair value of the EPA's proposed rule from a $170
billion "saving" to a $4 billion cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 10]
38 https://www.nada.org/nada/nada-headlines/beyond-sticker-price-cost-ownership-evs-v-ice-vehicles
The National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) also agrees, stating that contrary to
popular belief, EV owners pay more for repairs than their ICE counterparts. Though EVs are in
the shop less frequently, they're more expensive to repair when they do go in 39. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 10]
39 https://www.gobankingrates.com/saving-money/car/experts-factors-to-consider-before-switching-to-ev-
electric- car/
Generally, mechanics do not have the training or the technology to work on EVs, causing a
supply constraint on EV mechanics for repairs. Because of the lack of options, mechanics that do
repair EVs have long wait-times and high prices, as the consumers have no alternative choices. It
may also lead to needing to travel for hours to reach a mechanic capable of repairing an EV
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 10]
Organization: Plains All American Pipeline, L.P.
By 2032—less than 10 years from now—the EPA's Proposal would require nearly 70% of
light-duty cars and trucks sold in the U.S. to be electric or "zero tailpipe emission." We have a
number of concerns with this approach, a few include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-
2]
• By focusing on tailpipe emissions alone, most internal combustion engine vehicles that run
on gasoline, diesel and biofuels would be unable to meet the standards set forth in the Proposal.
This overlooks critical efforts of the energy and automotive industries to pursue continued
innovation and optimization of fuel/vehicle systems to improve efficiency and reduce
emissions. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
• Effectively outlawing most liquid fuel-powered vehicles would undercut U.S. energy
security,2 harm our domestic energy industry and leave the U.S. more dependent on foreign-
controlled supply chains.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
• Transferring a significant amount of energy demand to electricity will strain already
challenged electrical generation and transmission infrastructure. Without substantial additional
investment and significant streamlining of electric transmission permitting, it's unclear whether
the electrical grid could support charging new EVs at the level necessary to support the proposed
emissions reductions.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
• Traditional energy sources are essential for ensuring effective evolution of the energy
landscape-including the manufacture and growth of renewable energy sources and EVs.
However, the Proposal would reduce energy investments and increase costs to consumers for all
forms of energy. Furthermore, this policy risks the continued viability of critical domestic energy
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manufacturing infrastructure, which, if idled, would be very challenging to restore. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
• Eliminating most new gasoline and diesel vehicles from the market limits consumer choice.
Significantly fewer new affordable vehicles are available for sale today5 than a few years ago.
Used cars are also increasing in price6 as some automakers warn that they will be forced to cut
back on supplying popular gasoline models because of government regulations restricting sales
of traditional vehicles.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
1 https://www.afpm.org/newsroom/news/afpm-epa-vehicle-proposal-will-effectively-ban-gasoline-and-
diesel-vehicles
2 https://www.visualcapitalist.com/chinas-dominance-in-battery-manufacturing/
3 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/05/16/business/china-ev-battery.html
4 https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-renewables-electric-grid/
5 https://www.marketwatch.com/story/are-we-witnessing-the-demise-of-the-affordable-car-automakers-
have- all-but-abandoned-the-budget-market-a68862f0
6 https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/buying-a-car/when-to-buy-a-used-car-a6584238157/
7 https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/stellantis-may-limit-some-gas-powered-vehicles-
states-adopting-california-2023-05-24/
Organization: POET, LLC
In some instances, U.S. EPA assumes that purchase incentives of $7,500 per BEV apply (see
DRIA Table 4-7 for example) but in U.S. EPA's analysis of BEV penetration, somewhat lower
values are used which range from $4,750 in MY 2027 to $6,000 in MY 2032 as shown in DRIA
Table 2-50.
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
Electromobility will need continued support from public policy.
Recent legislative actions have seeded the ground with support for electric vehicles and the
beginning of a robust nationwide charging network. With specifics that continue to be defined,
stakeholders are working to maximize the opportunity under these new laws to support
customers with valuable purchase incentives, and to help spur the development of new electric
vehicle component production and material sourcing. Understandably, the complexity of these
laws results in a process that requires careful deliberation with industry representatives working
hard to ensure customers have a clear understanding of the support available. Nevertheless, the
support within these programs will be critical to the growth rates EPA envisions in this proposal
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 3]
Organization: Scott Wilson
Perhaps the most conspicuous flaw that will leap out to the American public is that these
proposed actions were taken with complete disregard to consumer choice or affordability. In
addition to potentially lacking access to charging at home, work, or public charging stations,
consumers looking to purchase a new car may be unable to purchase these vehicles due to the
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higher purchase price or lack of availability. Today, the average purchase price of EV cars in
2022 was approximately $65,000-which is more than what 46 percent of American households
earn in income in a year.8 Adding demand to the grid amid the confluence of other EPA
regulations referenced above will drive up the cost of electricity, making powering these vehicles
less affordable and undermining the EPA s claims of savings for consumers that ignore or
understate the increase in vehicle and energy prices. Taken together, the erosion of choice and
affordability of vehicles will have profound impacts on how American families run errands, get
to school, commute to work, and recreate. Additionally, there are serious concerns about the
range of electric vehicles and the performance in rural areas of the country, where people may
have to drive much longer distances to reach a charger, especially in locations where cold
weather can impact the range the vehicle can drive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5083, p. 3]
8 See Kelley Blue Book and Cox Automotive Average Transaction Prices Reports; and Average,
Median, Top 1%, and all United States Household Income Percentiles, DQYDJ.
Organization: Senator Shelley Moore Capito et al.
Perhaps the most conspicuous flaw that will leap out to the American public is that these
proposed actions were taken with complete disregard to consumer choice or affordability. In
addition to potentially lacking access to charging at home, work, or public charging stations,
consumers looking to purchase a new car may be unable to purchase these vehicles due to the
higher purchase price or lack of availability. Today, the average purchase price of EV cars in
2022 was approximately $65,000-which is more than what 46 percent of American households
earn in income in a year.8 Adding demand to the grid amid the confluence of other EPA
regulations referenced above will drive up the cost of electricity, making powering these vehicles
less affordable and undermining the EPA s claims of savings for consumers that ignore or
understate the increase in vehicle and energy prices. Taken together, the erosion of choice and
affordability of vehicles will have profound impacts on how American families run errands, get
to school, commute to work, and recreate. Additionally, there are serious concerns about the
range of electric vehicles and the performance in rural areas of the country, where people may
have to drive much longer distances to reach a charger, especially in locations where cold
weather can impact the range the vehicle can drive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5083, p. 3]
8 See Kelley Blue Book and Cox Automotive Average Transaction Prices Reports; and Average,
Median, Top 1%, and all United States Household Income Percentiles, DQYDJ.
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
In addition, the comparative lifecycle costs of owning and operating an EV versus an ICE
vehicle are not nearly so different as EPA's NPRMs assert. EPA claims huge cost savings for EV
owners over ICE owners from the avoided costs of fuel and maintenance and repairs over the life
of the vehicle,33 but EPA's analysis fails to include the full costs of owning an EV: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 13-14]
33 See 88 FR at 29200.
Uncertainty about the remaining life and capacity of the vehicle's battery, com-bined with the
high cost of any potential replacement, will likely mean that a used EV will have much lower
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resale or trade-in value relative to a comparable used ICE vehicle. This loss in value will be a
significant cost disadvantage of EV ownership. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 14]
Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
In the longer term, EPA, the DOE or the national labs should conduct a comparative analysis
on PHEV and BEV costs with a stakeholder input or working group). PHEVs can be made in a
less costly manner than shown in most analyses. Technical maturity, engineering advances,
supply chain issues, changes in mineral prices, war and scale-up issues are impacting the costs of
BEV and PHEV up-front and operating costs. Today, costs are rapidly changing, especially for
batteries. In addition, Argonne National Lab's recent report6 shows that PHEVs are less
expensive than BEVs for cars, and our experts at Strong PHEV coalition assert that several
additional technical modifications can lower the cost of PHEVs that most analyses do not
consider. We think this likely applies to plug-in hybrid cars and trucks but recognize that more
analysis is needed. A common mistake we find in reports is not understanding the difference
between a strong PHEV and other PHEVs because a strong PHEV can use the same batteries as
a BEV which results in significant cost savings. See Appendix D for a more detailed explanation.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 7-8]
6 https://www.anl.gov/argonne-scientific-publications/pub/167396
The use of away-from-home DC fast chargers should be modestly reduced, and the cost of the
PHEV including total cost of ownership should be based on work by Argonne national lab for
light-duty PHEVs.7 Finally, bidirectional charging using DC off-board chargers should be
assumed in our recommended alternative cost analysis for a reasonable percentage of BEVs and
PHEVs in order to further reduce the total cost of ownership. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646,
p. 8]
7 Ibid
Organization: T. Becker Power Systems
6- 90%+ of the population of the USA live in areas that do not require increasingly stringent
motor vehicle emission standards to meet EPA air quality standards. However, that 90% of the
US population will be negatively impacted by this proposed regulation, with higher vehicle
purchase costs, higher repair costs (battery replacement costs) and lower vehicle safety. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0567, p. 1]
7- Every issue in items 1-6 has been presented to both EPA and CARB in numerous
documents submitted to EPA and CARB by myself and others over the years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0567, p.1]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
As EPA recognizes, "zero and near-zero emission technologies are more feasible and cost-
effective now than at the time of prior rulemakings."87. To address this Tesla has been a leader
in reducing the costs of high- performance BEVs. A Tesla Model 3's starting price is $40,240
and, inclusive of individual qualification with the current U.S. 30D tax credit, can reach an
equivalent price of $32,740.88 As recently reported, the Model 3 sells for now sells for $4,930
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less than the average new vehicle sold in the U.S.89 Tesla has further outlined a pathway to
reducing the production cost of its next generation vehicle by 50%.90 As evidenced by the
popularity of its Model Y and Model 3 vehicles, Tesla has also demonstrated that increases in
production volumes can reduce BEV costs to levels favoring them in the marketplace and
facilitating broad consumer acceptance.91 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 13]
87 88 Fed. Reg. at 29188.
88 Tesla, Model 3 available at https://www.tesla.com/model3
89 Bloomberg, Tesla Undercuts Average US Car by Almost $5,000 in EV Shakeout (Feb. 21, 2023)
available at h ttps://www .bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-21/tesla-undercuts-average-us-car-by-
almost-5-000-in-ev- s hakeout#xj4y7vzkg
90 Tesla, 2023 Investor Day Presentation (March 1, 2023) at 31-73, 119-131, 158 available at h
ttps://digitalassets.tesla.com/tesla-contents/image/upload/IR/Investor-Day-2023-Keynote; Tesla, Impact
Report 2022 at 64.
91 88 Fed. Reg. at 29312; See also, Bloomberg, Tesla and BYD Post Record Sales on Surge in Electric-Car
Demand (July 3, 2023) available at https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/articles/2023-07-02/tesla-sets-a-
new-delivery-record-as-price-cuts- y ield-results
Tesla also agrees with the agency that there is an "emerging consensus that purchase price
parity is likely to occur by the mid-2020s for some vehicle segments and models, and for a
broader segment of the market on a total cost of ownership (TCO) basis."92 Indeed, this parity
has already been reached by Tesla. The Tesla Model 3 has a TCO better than a Toyota
Corolla.93 Numerous other studies have found that on a TCO basis BEVs are already
competitive with ICE vehicles and overall cheaper to own.94 In short, there is a compelling case
to be made that BEV costs already favor their adoption over ICE vehicles in the marketplace.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 13]
92 88 Fed. Reg. at 29190; See also, IPCC AR 6 Working Group III, Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of
Climate Change (April 4, 2022) at 1079 (stating BEVs are quickly reaching cost parity with ICEVs).
93 Tesla 2023 Investor Day Presentation at 159; Tesla Impact Report 2022 at 63.
94 Energy Innovation, Most Electric Vehicles Are Cheaper to Own Off the Lot Than Gas Cars (May 13,
2022) available at h ttps://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Most-Electric-Vehicles-Are-
Cheaper-Off-the-Lot-Than-Gas- C ars-From-Day-0
ne.pdf?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosgenerate&stream=t
op; Atlas Public Policy, Total Cost of Ownership Analysis (Feb. 2022) available at h
ttps://atlaspolicy.com/wp-c ontent/uploads/2022/01/Total-Cost-of-Ownership-Analysis.pdf; ICCT,
Assessment of Light-Duty Electric Vehicle Costs and Consumer Benefits in the United States in the 2022-
2035 Time Frame (Oct. 18, 2022) available at https://theicct.org/publication/ev-cost-benefits-2035-oct22/;
Pickup & SUV Talk, Ford F-150 deep dive: The cost of owning gas vs. electric trucks (Aug. 25, 2022)
available at h ttps://pickuptrucktalk.com/2022/08/ford-f-150-deep-dive-the-cost-of-o wning-gas-vs-electric-
trucks/
DOE VTO, FOTW #1251, August 15, 2022: Electric Vehicles Have the Lowest Annual Fuel
Cost of All Light-Duty Vehicles (Aug. 15, 2022) available at h
ttps://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1251-august-15-2022-electric-vehicles-have-l
owest-annual-fuel-cost-all [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 13]
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Organization: Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF)
The LMD Tailpipe Rule Will Unnecessarily Harm Consumers
Similarly, the LMD Tailpipe Rule is regulatory overkill that will harm average Americans and
limit innovation. To start, stricter emissions regulations will increase manufacturing costs for
automakers. This will lead to higher sticker prices for vehicles, pricing low- to middle-class
Americans out of the automotive market, leaving them stranded with little recourse or dependent
on public transit, eventually depressing the job market. The government should not place the
burden for green energy on the least fortunate Americans, adding yet another obstacle to their
economic climb. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 5-6]
Automakers will rush to convert their fleets to feature either all or mostly electric vehicle
models, disadvantaging new car buyers in areas without existing electric charging infrastructure.
In the same vein, as mentioned above, the strain placed on the electric grid caused by millions of
Americans charging their vehicles will cause electric prices to rise markedly and lead to "brown-
outs." See, e.g. Nadia Lopez, Race to zero: Can California's power grid handle a 15-fold increase
in electric cars?, CALMATTERS (Feb. 6, 2023), https://calmatters.org/environment/2023/01/
california-electric-cars-grid/ ("State officials claim that the 12.5 million electric vehicles
expected on California's roads in 2035 will not strain the grid. But their confidence that the state
can avoid brownouts relies on a best-case — some say unrealistic — scenario: massive and rapid
construction of offshore wind and solar farms, and drivers charging their cars in off-peak
hours."). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 5-6]
Additionally, electric cars have limited range and require long recharging sessions, and the
infrastructure to support the sudden transition to electric vehicles that the LMD Tailpipe Rule
would cause simply does not exist. Rural and low-income communities, the people most affected
by this regulation, likely will be the last to receive said recharging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 5-6]
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
The Rule Would Raise Driving Costs and Inconvenience Americans
New proposed regulationsl on automobile emissions from the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) would require new car sales to be 60% battery powered electric by 2030 and 67%
by 2032, compared to fewer than 6% in 2022. EPA has also proposed new rules for power
plants,2 driving up the costs of the electricity needed to charge these vehicles. These rules would
raise driving costs for Americans, and poor and middle-class Americans disproportionately
would pay the price. EPA has not fully accounted for these price increases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0674, p. 2]
1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles." Federal Register, 5 May 2023,
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/05/05/2023-07974/multi-pollutant-emissions-standards-for-
model-years- 2027-and-later-light-duty-and-medium-duty (accessed June 20, 2023).
2 Environmental Protection Agency, "Greenhouse Gas Standards and Guidelines for Fossil Fuel-Fired
Power Plants," May 15, 2023, https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/greenhouse-gas-
standards-and-guidelines-fossil-fuel-fired-power (accessed May 18, 2023).
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New electric vehicles cost more than gasoline-powered vehicles. The electric version of the
base version of the Ford 150 pickup truck, the best-selling vehicle in America, costs an
additional $26,000.3 Tesla's base prices start at about $40,000 for a Model 3 and go up to almost
$100,000 for a Model X.4 These are staggering costs to impose on American families. Cars are
part of the American Dream for many Americans, a dream that for too many American families
is put out of reach by these new regulations. EPA has not analyzed the effects of the increased
costs of these vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 2]
3 Ford Motor Company, Models & Specs, 2023 F-150 XL,
https://www.ford.com/trucks/fl50/models/?gnav=vhpnav-specs (accessed April 28, 2023); and Ford motor
Company, Models & Specs, 2023 F-150 Lightning PRO, https://www.ford.com/trucks/fl50/fl50-
lightning/models/?gnav=vhpnav-specs (accessed April 28, 2023).
4 Tesla, Model 3, Purchase Price, https://www.tesla.eom/model3/design#overview (accessed April 28,
2023); and Tesla, Model X, Purchase Price, https://www.tesla.eom/modelx/design#overview (accessed
April 28, 2023).
The push towards expensive electric vehicles as will be required by the EPA rule, directly
contradicts the Department of Transportation's focus on "Health and Equity." According to the
Department,26 "households in low-income areas typically own fewer vehicles, have longer
commutes, and have higher transportation costs." These are the people who will pay the price for
new EPA regulations. Their cars will be older, less safe, and break down more frequently,
resulting in higher repair and maintenance costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 6]
26 U.S. Department of Transportation, "Health and Equity," updated December 17, 2013,
https://www.transportation.gov/mission/health/health-equity (accessed May 1, 2023).
Organization: U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB)
However, there are some aspects of the proposed rule that raise questions and would be the
appropriate grounds for considering modification of the rule. The proposed rule requires two-
thirds adoption of EVs by 2032. Although a laudable goal in the abstract, it seems plausible that
under current economic conditions, such a transition could have a negative impact on lower-
income Americans who cannot afford car prices to increase. 18 In addition, the incentives for EV
use and purchase do not prioritize low-income households, which it should in order to have a
greater environmental impact. The EV market in the United States shows increased trends
towards larger, heavier and less efficient SUVs and trucks, which in turn are being sold at higher
prices. 19 Consequently, incentives and rebates for EV purchases are disproportionately allocated
to high-income households, which tend to use EVs as a second or third vehicle, with much lower
average mileage use.20 EVs that are seldom used may in fact result in larger emissions than
ICEV since EVs create more emissions in their production.21 The lower emissions benefits of
EVs are only fulfilled when they are used for high numbers of miles that would have been
otherwise powered by gasoline.22 Many well intentioned wealthy beneficiaries of EV tax credits
may put their vehicles to good use, but studies show that incentives disproportionately benefit
high income households that use their cars less.23 A revised proposed rule should address this
concern and have a strategy to improve on this outcome. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0540, p. 4]
18 See, e.g., Davis, L. & Knittel, C. 'Are Fuel Economy Standards Regressive?', Dec. 1, 2016. (While fuel
emissions standards are slightly progressive when only new vehicles are considered, they are mildly
regressive when used cars are taken into account. The EPA's proposed rule, with very stringent emissions
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standards and a reliance on incentives for EV's which ignore the used car market will likely have an even
greater regressive impact for used car buyers).
19 See, e.g., Zipper, D., June 1, 2023, https://www.theatlantic.eom/ideas/archive/2023/06/large-electric-
vehicles-road-safety-crashes/674249/. (Four in five new vehicles purchased in the U.S. are SUVs or light-
duty trucks and of only two of 23 EVs for sale in the last two years have a sale price under $35,000. Even
with tax rebates, the price is outside the range of middle class and poor Americans, whose median
household income was $70,784 in 2021).
20 Guo, S. & Kontou, 'Disparities and equity issues in electric vehicles rebate allocation'. Energy Policy
154, July 2021.
21 ".. .because our requisite longevity estimates denote the number of years that must elapse before an EV
can deliver an emissions advantage over the counterfactual procurement scenario (namely, driving an
ICEV), failing to achieve these estimates could make driving an EV worse than driving an ICEV." Nunes,
A., Woodley & Rossetti, Apr. 4, 2022, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-022-00862-3
22 Ritchie, H., Jan. 26, 2023, httpsV/www.sustainabilitybynumbers.com/p/ev-fossil-cars-
climate?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2
23 Burlig, F. et al, 2021. "Low Energy: Estimating Electric Vehicle Electricity Use." AEA Papers and
Proceedings, 111: 430-35.
The greater adoption of EVs can be good for society and the environment when incentives are
directed to consumers who will use EVs extensively, such as single-vehicle households, ride
sharing drivers, used car buyers and middle- and lower-income households.24 In addition, some
aspects of EV infrastructure subsidies, such as in the geographical distribution of charging
stations, tend to reflect and perpetuate "disparities across race and income."25 A modified
proposed rule should address these concerns with a strategy to allocate EV resources to middle-
and low-income households, and also favor users who will be inclined to use the EV for the
necessary number of miles so that it produces a net environmental benefit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0540, pp. 4-5]
24 Hardman, S. et al., Aug. 30, 2021, https://sciencepolicyreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-electric-
vehicles/
25 "The result shows a similar overall pattern of access disparities between the race and ethnicity groups,
but the access gap is larger than that found for public chargers overall... The odds of having publicly-
funded charger access in Black and Hispanic majority CBGs is less than half of that in White-majority
CBGs." Hsu, C. & Figerman, K. 'Public electric vehicle charger access disparities across race and income
in California', https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967070X20309021.
The EPA's numerous regulations that promote human and ecological health, reduce GHG,
and promote the common good are commendable. In these times of growing ecological
challenges, increased inequality, and fiscal pressures, aggressive environmental standards must
also respect economic and social considerations, driving our nation towards an "energy
revolution" that provides "not only sustainable, efficient and clean energy, but also energy that is
secure, affordable, accessible and equitable."26 For these same reasons, the light-duty vehicle
standards should be improved and optimized to benefit primarily low- and middle-income
Americans to reduce racial and economic disparities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0540, pp. 4-5]
26 USCCB-CRS Letter to the Secretary of State, Feb. 17, 2017, https://www.usccb.org/resources/usccb-
crs-letter-secretary-tillerson-care-creation-february-17-2017
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Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
2. EPA's analysis of vehicle ownership costs is flawed.
There is a well-developed body of economics literature covering the total cost to the
consumer of vehicle ownership (TCO). 157, 158, 159 Such studies include extensive data on
powertrain production costs, energy prices, consumption, maintenance and repair costs,
depreciation costs, and vehicle miles of travel. 160 Rather than draw upon and update this
extensive literature, EPA reinvents the wheel and prepares its own TCO analysis without any
independent peer review of its approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 33]
157 Hanna L. Breetz, Deborah Salon, Do Electric Vehicles Need Subsidies? Ownership Costs for
Conventional, Hybrid, and Electric Vehicles in 14 U.S. Cities, Energy Policy. 120. September 2018, 238-
249.
158 Kate Palmer, Zia Wadud, James E Tate, John Nellthorp, Total Cost of Ownership and Market Share for
Hybrid and Electric Vehicles in the UK, US and Japan, Applied Energy. 209. 2018, 109-119.
159 Burnham et al., Comprehensive Total Cost of Ownership Quantification for Vehicles with Different
Size Classes and Powertrains, Argonne National Laboratory. ANL/ESD-21/4. April 2021.
160 See supra.
Disadvantaged communities already face significant access barriers to electric vehicles, such
as: higher upfront costs to electric vehicle ownership; a lack of existing charging infrastructure
available to them in low-income, minority populated, and rural areas; and costlier and time-
intensive charging due to a greater reliance on public charging infrastructure, particularly for
individuals living in multi-family housing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 55]
Notwithstanding EPA's hope that its proposal may serve to incentivize the purchases of
electric vehicles, these vehicles are significantly more expensive on average than their ICE
vehicle counterparts and unaffordable for many households. These are costs are also likely
understated as each electric vehicle already enjoys thousands of dollars' worth of Federal and
state subsidies, which are ultimately funded by taxpayers. Additionally, an automakers' ability to
sell electric vehicles to consumers depends on substantial price subsidies in the form of credit
support. EPA ignores the reality that many EJ stakeholders are currently unable to afford the
upfront costs of purchasing an electric vehicle in the first place. With the cost of transition
minerals expected to escalate exponentially in the coming years as a function of limited supply
and increasing demand, the costs to manufacture and purchase electric vehicles will likely
rise. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 56]
EPA should also consider the effects of the proposal on electricity prices, as low-income
populations often spend a larger percentage of their earnings on essential utilities compared to
the rest of the United States. Reliance on electric vehicles has been shown to spur increases in
load and demand during peak periods, which impact electricity prices. Because EPA lacks
expertise in the area of electrical grid management and economics, EPA should consult with
other agencies and credible experts in these areas in order to adequately evaluate these
impacts.304 EPA should ensure that the proposal meets reliability and affordability criteria and
helps EJ communities make informed decisions about their own energy needs. Additionally,
EPA's EJ assessment fails to acknowledge the likelihood that many owners will lack access to
residential charging, which will substantially increase their operating expenses. Consistent
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reliance on fast charging also shortens electric vehicle battery life, resulting in a need to replace
the battery and/or the vehicle more frequently. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
304 See, West Virginia, 142 S.Ct. at 2612-13 (stating that EPA admitted that opining on trends in
electricity transmission, distribution, and storage requires technical and policy expertise not traditionally
needed in EPA regulatory development and finding that there is little reason to think Congress assigned
such decisions to the EPA).
If EJ is truly a commitment for EPA, it should carefully consider criticisms like those leveled
by The Two Hundred, which point out the disproportionate impacts to working and minority
communities as a result of California's climate approach regarding electrified transport; those
impacts and concerns remain true, and indeed are magnified under the proposed standards.305
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
305 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, The Two Hundred for Homeownership, et al. v. California Air Resources
Board, et al., No. 1:22-CV-01474.
It is critical from the outset to design standards to minimize the potential for price shocks and
supply disruptions. As written, the proposal ultimately benefits electric vehicle manufacturers at
the expense of disadvantaged communities by subsidizing unaffordable transportation that is not
fit for the purposes of commuting to and from EJ communities. At minimum, EPA should
perform a thorough EJ assessment specific to its LDV proposal that is comprehensive of both
transport challenges and impacts faced by EJ stakeholders and the government-wide Justice40
Initiative [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
The average purchase price of EV cars in 2022 was approximately $65,000, which is more
than what 46 percent of American households earn in income in a year.306 While the average
"used" EV sold for $42,895 in March of 2023.307 While EPA's DRIA anecdotally indicates that
"emerging consensus suggests that purchase price parity is likely to occur by the mid-2020's for
some vehicle segments and models"308, Ford CEO Jim Farley told attendees at its 2023 Capital
Markets Days that EV cost parity may not come until after 2030.309 Moreover US auto makers
are focusing their efforts on producing higher priced electric SUVs and trucks, including Fords
$100,000 F150 Lightening Platinum310 and GM's announcement that its luxury brands, Cadillac
and Buick, will be its first all-electric product lineups.311 While smaller EV's like the Chevy
Bolt, touted by the Biden Administration as being affordable alternatives, are being
discontinued.312 The reality is that most middle- and lower-income families simply cannot
afford to purchase a new or used EV, even when taking into account available tax incentives and
rebates. In fact, middle - and lower -income families are more likely to purchase older used
vehicle, due to their lower upfront costs, and to hold onto those vehicles for longer periods.313
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
306 Kelly Blue Book and Cox Automotive Average Transaction Prices Reports; and Average, Median, Top
1% and all United States Household Income Percentiles, DQYJD
307 What to know about buying a used electric vehicle as more hit the auto sale market, CNBC, May 21,
2023
308 EPA DRIA, 3.1.3.1,4-15
309 Ford CEO says EV cost parity may not come until after 2030, Reuters, May 31, 2023
310 https://www.ford.com/trucks/fl50/fl50-lightning/models/
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311 Cadillac and Buick will be GM's first all-EV brands, Automotive News, July 1, 2022
312 GM Killed the Chevy Bolt- and the dream of a small, affordable EV, The Verge, April 26, 2023
313 Supporting Lower-Income Households' Purchase of Clean Vehicles: Implications From California-
wide Survey Results, UCLA Luskin Center for Innovation, 2020
While EPA looks to address fuel saving as a component of the total cost of ownership for
BEVs in an effort to portray BEV's as being cost competitive, or even advantageous versus their
ICE counterparts, EPA fails to properly address insurance and depreciation, claiming they
excluded them because they are quite similar for BEV's and ICE vehicles.314 However, EPA
provides no support for these conclusions, while in the actual markets Tesla introduced its own
insurance products in 2019 in response to high insurance costs for its EVs. More recently
Policygenius.com published its "Electric car insurance 2023 guide", reporting that EV car
insurance costs are higher than for non-electric vehicles, averaging 27.2% more expensive, with
certain models including Tesla Model 3 and Model Y, averaging 43% and 53% more than the
average ICE vehicles in their comparisons. 315 Nerdwallet.com attributes the higher cost of EV
insurance to higher initial sticker prices and specialized repairs.316 More concerning are recent
reports from Car and Driver317 and Reuters318 which highlight an all too common phenomena
for EV's in even minor collisions, the sheer numbers of low mileage (under 10,000 miles)
vehicles siting in salvage yards as insurance companies elect to salvage the vehicle due to the
overwhelming cost of repair/replacement of the battery packs. A trend that is likely to continue
as OEM's further integrate larger battery packs into the structural design of EV's chassis. "We're
buying electric cars for sustainability reasons," said Matthew Avery, research director at
automotive risk intelligence company Thatcham Research. "But an EV isn't very sustainable if
you've got to throw the battery away after a minor collision."319 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 57-58]
314 EPA DRIA, 4.2.2, 4-22
315 Electric car insurance 2023 guide, Policygenius.com, December 29, 2022
316 What You Need To Know About Electric Car Insurance, Nerdwallet.com, January 26, 2023
317 Tesla EVs, Even Mildly Damaged, Are Being Written of by Insurance companies, Car and Driver, Jan
30, 2023
318 Scratched EV Battery? Your insurer may have to junk the whole car, Reuters, Mar 20, 2023
319 Id.
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
Affordability/Environmental Justice: EPA is assuming that although the retail price of EVs is
typically higher than for comparable ICEVs at this time, the price difference will narrow or
disappear as the cost of batteries and other components fall in the coming years. EPA is taking a
huge leap of faith in the ability of EV manufacturers to innovate in time for the arbitrary
deadlines imposed by the president and EPA through this rule. Market projections six months
from now are difficult, much less nine years into the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p.
7]
Further, a U.K. study has found that EVs depreciate at a rate of 51% compared to 37% for
gasoline cars, losing £15,220 ($18,786) versus £9,901 ($12,400). 15 Clearly EPA's estimate that
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. .the average upfront per-vehicle cost to meet the proposed standards to be approximately
$1,200 in MY 2032, as shown in Table 7.131..." is greatly underestimated. EPA mentions but
then dismisses the impact on low-income households by just assuming that manufacturers, "will
continue to offer a variety of models at different price points..and that they will save on fuel
costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 7]
13
EV battery costs have soared in 2022, hampering EV affordability," Stephen Edelstein, Green Car
Reports, December 8, 2022.
14 Current Strategic Metals Prices, Strategic Metals Invest and D aily Metals Prices, both accessed July 5,
2023.
15 "Electric cars losing value twice as fast as petrol vehicles - drivers may lose £25,000," Felix Reeves,
Express, May 3, 2023.
EPA's analysis that EVs have significantly reduced operating costs and would save owners
$12,000 versus ICEVs over the life of the vehicle seems to be lacking several aspects. Further,
the information EPA relies on to arrive at that number seems cherry picked. First, EPA is not
looking at the full refueling costs. Studies call into question EPA's assumption that recharging
costs will be lower than the costs of gasoline. 16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 7-8]
16 Comparison: Real World Cost of Fueling EVs and ICE Vehicles, Anderson Economic Group, October
21,2021.
We wonder at the arrival of EPA's $12,000 lower operating costs, given a Department of
Energy study that looked comprehensively at the total cost of ownership and found that after 15
years and found a much lower cost differential. The DOE study compared EV costs to similar
gasoline-only models, factoring in the price, maintenance, financing, repairs, federal tax break
and fuel costs (emphasis added). 17 While it is disingenuous to include subsidies in the
calculation, since such are at taxpayer expense, nevertheless the EV version of a small SUV
costs $0.4508 per mile, $0.0219 less than the $0.4727 per mile rate of a similar gasoline-based
model. Based on the average lifespan of a car of 200,000 miles, the cost of a gasoline-fueled car
would be $94,540 while a similar EV would be $90,160. The difference of $4,380 is well short
of $12,000. The DRIA references this DOE study but appears to have discounted it. But even
assuming EPA is correct about the $12,000 lower operating costs, the $18,000 higher initial cost
still results in a net cost to the owner. 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 7-8]
17 Comprehensive Total Cost of Ownership Quantification for Vehicles with Different Size Classes and
Powertrains, Argonne National Laboratories, U.S. Department of Energy, April 2021.
18 "Why Are Electric Cars So Expensive?," U.S. News, Cherise Threewitt, November 3, 2022.
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
d. EV Prices are Decreasing
One reason for the explosive growth in EV demand is the increasing cost competitiveness of
EV models. In fact, ICCT reported that EVs could be the same cost this year for certain mass
market models and are already at parity for a few luxury models due to the purchase and
production incentives in the Inflation Reduction Act.41 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp.
11-12]
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41 "Electric Vehicles Could Match Gasoline Cars on Price This Year," The New York Times, (February
14, 2023) https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/10/business/electric-vehicles-price-cost.html
Cost is the number one cited barrier when it comes to purchasing an EV. Approximately 60%
of Americans would purchase an EV if it were the same price as an ICEV.42 The price
differential between EVs and ICEVs is rapidly shrinking. In 2020, an EV cost about 42% more
than an ICEV.43 Today, an EV costs about 20% more than a similar ICEV, with the average
ICEV selling for $48,008, compared to $58,940 for an EV.44 This average selling price is
inflated by the popularity of luxury EVs on the market. Out of the top ten best-selling EVs in the
U.S., the average starting price is $53,509, which drops to a 10% cost premium over ICEVs.45
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 11-12]
42 "International Electric-Vehicle Consumer Survey 2019," AlixPartners, accessed June 21, 2023
https://www.alixpartners.com/insights-impact/insights/international-electric-vehicle-consumer-survey/
43 "The Average Price of an Electric Car," CarEdge, (September 22, 2022)
https://caredge.com/guides/average-price-of-an-electric-car
44 "After Nearly Two Years, New-Vehicle Transaction Prices Fall Below Sticker Price in March 2023,
According to New Data from Kelley Blue Book," Kelley Blue Book, (April 11, 2022)
https://mediaroom.kbb.com/2023-04-ll-After-Nearly-Two-Years,-New-Vehicle-Transaction-Prices-Fall-
Below-Stic ker-Price-in-March-2023,-According-to-New-Data-from-Kelley-Blue-Book
45 Id. at footnote 43
Upfront cost parity might be achieved even sooner than anticipated. The tax incentives in the
IRA bring down the cost premium even further, with up to $7,500 available from the federal
government, in addition to any state and local incentives. After factoring in the $7,500 federal
tax incentive under section 30D, the average starting price is $46,009 for the top-10 best-selling
EVs, $2,000 cheaper than the average ICEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 12]
Today, while most EVs are still more expensive than a comparable ICE vehicle, there are a
range of models at all different price points. Some of the most affordable EVs start at around
$27,495, before factoring in the federal 30D tax credit.46 The Tesla Model 3-one of the most
popular models in the world-recently reduced its starting price to $41,880 before any
incentives.47 In a similar move, Ford cut the price of its Mustang Mach-E, the third-best selling
EV in 2022.48 After two price cuts in 2023, the starting price of the Mach-E premium is
$46,995.49 Each year there is a growing number of EV models available under $50,000. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 12]
46 "Here Are the 11 Cheapest Electric Vehicles You Can Buy," Cars.com, (June 28,
2023) https://www.cars.com/articles/here-are-the-ll-cheapest-electric-vehicles-you-can-buy-439849/
47 "Tesla Model 3 and Model Y Prices Continue to Fluctuate," Car and Driver, (May 3, 2023)
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a43539838/tesla-model-3-price-reduced-again/
48 "2022's top 10 best-selling electric vehicles in the US: Find out why they made the cut," Electrek,
(January 9, 2023) https://electrek.co/2023/01/09/the-top-10-best-selling-electric-vehicles-in-the-us-of-2022/
49 "Ford cuts prices of Mustang Mach-E after Tesla moves," Reuters, (May 3, 2023)
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/ford-cuts-prices-mustang-mach-e-2023-05-02/
The economies of scale and decrease in the cost of components are driving down the price of
new models. The production tax credits from the IRA are expected to cut the cost of producing
batteries and EVs, savings that can be passed on to customers. With incentives for EV
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manufacturing, facility upgrades, critical mineral production, and battery manufacturing and
assembly, the IRA subsidies could cut costs by up to $9,000 per vehicle.50 The result is record-
breaking EV sales every year, driving up the percentage of new car sales that are electric. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 12]
50 Id. at footnote 41
b. EVs Have Lower Total Cost of Ownership than Comparable ICE Vehicles
Though a vehicle's total cost of ownership (TCO) depends on several factors, such as the
region, driving characteristics, and fuel prices, EVs are consistently cheaper to own than gas-
powered cars. A typical driver can expect to save between $6,000 and $12,000 over a vehicle's
lifetime by switching to an EV.98 These savings are magnified in rural areas where drivers travel
an average of 38% more miles than urban drivers.99 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 21]
98 "Electric Vehicles Save Consumers Money," Consumer Reports, (June 2023)
https ://advocacy. consumerreports.org/wp-
content/uploads/2023/06/CR_EVSavings_FACTSHEET_6.2023.pdf
99 "Clean Transportation Strategies for Rural Communities in the Northeast and MidAtlantic States,"
Union of Concerned Scientists, (November 2020) https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2020-ll/rural-
transportation-opportunities.pdf
EVs have fewer moving parts than their ICE counterparts, which makes them simpler to
maintain and reduces the likelihood of a major malfunction. 100 Reduced maintenance saves
customers both time and money. Notably, the average maintenance costs for an EV are 50%
lower than those for a comparable ICEV. 101 EVs have significantly fewer components that
require regular maintenance like engine oil, transmission fluid, and air filters. According to
Argonne National Laboratory, the maintenance costs for an EV averages 6.1 cents per mile,
compared to 10.1 cents per mile for a similar ICEV. 102 That means for vehicles driven 10,000
miles per year can save $400 per year, totalling $2,000 over five years. Over a vehicle's lifetime,
an EV owner can save an average of $4,600 on maintenance costs alone by transitioning away
from driving a gas vehicle. 103 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 21]
100 "Maintenance and Safety of Electric Vehicles" U.S. Department of Energy, accessed June 18, 2023
https://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_maintenance.html
101 "Consumer Reports Study Finds Electric Vehicle Maintenance Costs Are 50% Less Than Gas-Powered
Cars," Great Plains Institite, (November 16, 2020) https://betterenergy.org/blog/consumer-reports-study-
finds-electric-vehicle-maintenance-costs-are-50-less-than-gas- powered-cars/
102 "Comprehensive Total Cost of Ownership Quantification for Vehicles with Different Size Classes and
Powertrains." (April 2021) https://doi.org/10.2172/1780970
103 "EVs Offer Big Savings Over Traditional Gas-Powered Cars," Consumer Reports, (October 8, 2020)
https://www.consumerreports.org/hybrids-evs/evs-offer-big-savings-over-traditional-gas-powered-cars/
The average cost of electricity in the U.S. is 16.5 cents per kWh as of May 2023.104 If
electricity costs 16.5 cents per kWh, charging an EV with a fully-depleted 100 kWh battery will
cost about $16.50 to reach a full charge. While the range of a 100 kWh battery varies depending
on a vehicle's efficiency, a typical Tesla Model S can go up to 400 miles on a single charge. 105
Comparatively, the average national gasoline price for regular grade was $3,685 in May
2023.106 Filling up a 12-gallon passenger vehicle with a 30 mpg fuel economy would cost
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$45.96 to move the vehicle 360 miles. At $16.50 for a full charge, fueling an EV cuts fuel prices
by 64%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 22]
According to AAA, over the course of a year the cost of refueling an EV is around $546,
compared to $1,255 per year when fueling a gasoline car. 107 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-063 8,
p. 22]
104 "Average energy prices for the United States, regions, census divisions, and selected metropolitan
areas," U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, accessed July 3, 2023
https://www.bls.gov/regions/midwest/data/averageenergyprices_selectedareas_table.htm
105 "Fuel Economy of the 2021 Tesla Model S Long Range," U.S. Department of Energy, accessed July 3,
2023 https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/noframes/44051 .shtml
106 Id. at footnote 104
107 "True Cost of Electric Vehicles," AAA Automotive, accessed July 3, 2023,
https://www.aaa.com/autorepair/articles/true-cost-of-ev
EPA Summary and Response
In the NPRM, EPA prepared a summary of consumer expenses for sales-weighted average
vehicles by body style and powertrain for sales-weighted average new, light-duty model year
2032 light-duty vehicles. That summary is an aggregation of analysis substantiated elsewhere in
the RIA from which we make several observations. This portion of this RTC is intended to
respond to comments directly related to the summary and observations provided in RIA Chapter
4.2.2 and 4.2.3. Some of those comments relate to the derivation of the values that appear in
Chapter 4.2.2 but were computed in OMEGA and documented elsewhere. We refer readers to
RTC Chapter 12 for responses to comments regarding values estimated using OMEGA as well as
to RIA Chapter 2, in which Table 2-1 lists OMEGA topics and their location in the RIA. We
refer readers to the cited sources for other values. Other comments suggest that the summaries
presented in RIA Chapter 4.2.2 "does not include the full economic impact."482 In response to
such comments, we refer readers to the benefit cost analysis presented in RIA Chapters 9 and 4.3
as well as responses to comments regarding benefit cost analyses in Chapter 8 of this RTC. Also,
as clearly stated in the RIA, the summary of consumer expenses for sales-weighted average
vehicles by body style and powertrain presented Chapter 4.2.2 of the RIA is not intended to be a
total cost of ownership analysis and is not a benefit cost analysis. See RIA Chapter 4.2.2 for
clarity regarding the intent and purpose of these summaries. Lastly, other topics evoked in the
comments and related to the savings and expense summaries are addressed elsewhere in the
RTC, RIA, and Preamble, such as the following: charging infrastructure and battery durability
(RTC Chapter 17), power sector and grid reliability (RTC Chapter 18), supply chain and critical
minerals (RTC Chapter 15), modeling (RTC Chapter 12), vehicle cost and cost parity (RTC 12.2,
RIA Chapter 2.5), environmental justice (RTC Chapter 9), consumer heterogeneity (RTC
Chapter 13.2), battery costs (RIA Chapter 2.5.2.1), advances in PEV technology (RIA Chapter
3.1.1 and Preamble Section IV), supply chain and critical minerals (RIA Chapter 3.1.4 and
Preamble Section IC.C.7), GHG emissions control technologies (RIA Chapter 3.5), fuel and
electricity prices (RTC Chapter 19, RIA Chapters 2 and 5), and IRA provisions (RIA Chapter
2.6.8)
482 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0517, p. 1]
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We list revisions to consumer savings and expenses completed for the FRM. Many revisions
are in response to comments and recommendations made by commenters. For the sake of
brevity, we consider this list of revisions to stand as our response to those comments. We discuss
these issues further in the RIA.
• EPA has updated the dollars values to 2022 dollars.
• EPA has added PHEVs to our analyses and revised inputs accordingly.
• EPA has revised consumer estimates of miles drive per year to 15,000 miles per year,
instead of 12,000.
• EPA has included revised estimates of each pre-existing line item. See RIA Chapter
4.2.2 for descriptions of line items as well as the following cross-referenced locations
for descriptions OMEGA estimation approaches and procedures.
o Purchase price: RIA Chapters 2.5 and 4.2.2
o Average Sales Tax: RIA Chapter 4.2.2
o Average Federal Purchase Incentive: RIA Chapter 2.6.8
o Vehicle Miles Per Year: RIA Chapter 4.2.1 and 8.3
o Annual Retail Fuel Expenses: RIA Chapters 2.6.6, 4.3.3, and 8.5
o Annual Refueling Time: RIA Chapter 4.3.5
o Annual Maintenance Expenses: RIA Chapter 4.3.7
o Annual Repair Expenses: RIA Chapter 4.3.7
o Annual Registration Expense: See Burnham, Gohkle, et al. (2021)
o Annual Insurance Expense: RIA Chapter 4.3.6
o Residential Charging Equipment and Installation Investments: RIA Chapter 5.3
• EPA has revised methods for estimates of refueling time (See RIA Chapter 4.3.5) and
rebound (See RIA Chapter 8.3.3).
• EPA has revised the 8-year summary of expenses to include average sales taxes; we
have not included property taxes due to their limited applicability.
• EPA has revised the 8-year summary of expenses to include the average estimated
purchase incentive.
• EPA has revised the 8-year summary of expenses to include insurance.
• EPA notes that registration includes additional fees for PEVs.
• EPA has updated the range of optional costs associated with the installation of home
charging.
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• EPA has updated the average savings for PEV consumers compared to ICE vehicle
consumers.
• EPA has added tables summarizing the lifetime expenses associated with sales
weighted average vehicles in the No Action case and in the Central case.
• EPA has revised text in RIA Chapter 4 to reflect the above.
• EPA has revised text in RIA Chapter 4.2.2 to describe and substantiate our assumption
of full pass through of technology costs and producer incentives to the consumer. We
also assume that the consumer receives the full purchase incentive for which they are
eligible.
We augment the clarifications, cross-references, and revisions provided above in RTC
Chapter 13.4 with additional attention to affordability and consumer heterogeneity (i.e.,
consumers of all demographics, income levels, vehicle types). First, note that we address
considerations of specific groups of vehicle consumers in RIA Chapter 4.2.3, including low-
income consumers, consumers of lower-price new vehicles, and consumers of used vehicles. We
also refer readers to RTC Chapter 13.2 where we discuss comments related to consumer demand
and the diversity of vehicle consumers (i.e., consumer heterogeneity). We note that some
commenters suggested a quantitative, rather than qualitative assessment of the above. First, we
have conducted substantive quantitative analyses as evidenced throughout the Preamble, RIA,
and RTC. At this time, the studies and data do not exist to quantitatively examine differences in
PEV purchasing behavior across demographic groups, though there is recent evidence to suggest
that the stereotypes of PEV buyers is breaking down (i.e., PEV consumers are becoming
increasingly diverse and more representative of vehicle consumers (Fujita, Campbell, & Taylor,
2024) (Taylor, Fujita, & Campbell, 2024 )..
Regarding vehicle affordability, comments centered around several themes. Comments were
concerned with the price of vehicles, accessibility of vehicle ownership due to projected vehicle
costs and related issues like financing, and the availability and costs of fueling and charging.
Some commenters were also concerned with the impacts of the standards on vehicle choice,
especially in the lower priced vehicle categories and markets and for members of disadvantaged
communities. Most commenters link those concerns to plug-in electric vehicles. For example,
• Donna Jackson states that the rule "will create an economic hardship and serious
decline in the standard of living for all Americans but especially black Americans"
• Joshua Linn states that "low-income households typically have lower demand for
plug-in vehicles than high-income households (even putting aside the high up-front
purchase price), and by shifting the market from gasoline to plug-in vehicles, the
standards may reduce purchasing options for low-income households.
• Valero Energy Corporation states that "the reality is that most middle- and lower-
income families simply cannot afford to purchase a new or used EV, even when taking
into account available tax incentives and rebates."
• Texas Public Policy Foundation states that "Rural and low-income communities, the
people most affected by this regulation, likely will be the last to receive said
recharging infrastructure"
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• American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce states that "not all consumers can
make purchasing decisions based on savings that they hope to experience years later."
In response, first, our assessment projects there will be variation in the types of technologies
that automakers adopt to meet the standards, providing consumers with vehicles with reduced
GHG emissions and increased fuel economy and associated fuel savings via PEV and ICE
vehicle technologies in the new vehicle market and eventually also in the used vehicle market.
We expect that automakers recognize the diversity of their consumers and will leverage the
flexibilities built into the standards to provide consumers with PEV and ICE vehicle choices over
a wide range of utility and price points. Second, purchase incentives are available for eligible
new and used PEVs for buyers who qualify (See RIA Chapter 2.6.8). Third, the price difference
for PEVs is widely expected to narrow or disappear as the cost of batteries and other components
fall in the coming years.483 See Preamble Sections IV.C.l and IV.C.6. Fourth, in our modeling,
we assume that a mix of technologies will be used to meet the standards, and we demonstrate
several potential compliance pathways.
These and other comments reference impacts on specific communities of vehicle prices, fuel
and electricity prices, charging costs and time, and charging infrastructure as well as the
approaches, methods, procedures, and resources used to estimate these and other quantities. In
response to these and similar comments, we first refer readers to the revisions documented in
RIA Chapter 4.2.2. We make clear that the revised summaries of consumer savings and expenses
provided in RIA Chapter 4.2.2 are illustrative. These summaries provide sales-weighted average
expense and savings information for prospective future consumers of new vehicles. These
estimates are not intended to provide information tailored to any particular demographic group
such as consumers of luxury or lower-priced new vehicles, rural or urban consumers, or
households participating in the used vehicle market. While these estimates will have greater and
lesser relevance to different individuals based on their individual circumstance, they nonetheless
provide a reasonable analysis of consumer savings and expenses related to this nationwide
regulation. Finally, we have qualitatively examined different impacts experienced by different
groups. For example, we discuss low-income consumers, consumers of lower priced vehicles,
and used vehicle consumers in RIA Chapter 4.2.3, and we address comments regarding our
attention to consumer heterogeneity and purchase price and total ownership cost (TOC) parity in
RTC Chapter 13.2.
Commenters also provided more favorable assessment of the effects of the standards on
vehicle affordability, accessibility, and choice:
• Zero Emissions Transportation Association (ZETA) states that "EVs have [a] lower
total cost of ownership than comparable ICE vehicles."
• Environmental and Public Health Organizations argues that "PEVs are a great fit for
the needs and demands of rural drivers," noting, for example, that "trips in rural areas
are longer than in urban areas" and therefore fuel savings would be greater.
• Energy Innovation cites a University of California, Berkeley, Grid Lab, and Energy
Innovation study and found that the DRIVE Clean Scenario, "compared to the No
483 International Council on Clean Transportation, "Assessment of Light-Duty Electric Vehicle Costs and Consumer
Benefits in the United States in the 2022-2035 Time Frame," October 2022.
2334
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New Policy ... [would result] in approximately $2.7 trillion in consumer savings
through 2050 ... a household savings of about $1000 per year on average over 30
years."
• Joshua Linn states that "the standards will increase sales of plug-in vehicles while
simultaneously making gasoline vehicles more fuel efficient. Both changes reduce fuel
costs for drivers, which disproportionately benefits low-income households because
they spend a much larger share of their income on gasoline than do high-income
households."
Among the commenters who contrasted higher upfront purchase expenses and lower
operating costs under the standards for all vehicles and particularly for BEV and ICE vehicles,
some were critical of the tradeoff arguing that higher upfront costs were too much of a burden
especially for lower income households, while others argue that operating savings are important
to many consumers across all demographic groups and income levels.
• American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce et al. states that "not all consumers
can make purchasing decisions based on savings that they hope to experience years
later."
• Environmental and Public Health Organizations noted that "BEV ownership,
combined with supportive policies will benefit lower-income consumers." More
specifically, the state, "While upfront BEV cost concerns may serve as an initial
barrier to lower-income consumers, a suite of targeted policies can mitigate this
concern."
In response, we acknowledge the many commenters who noted the rising average price of a
new vehicles, and we are aware of the strong relationship between new vehicle prices and used
vehicle prices. We emphasize that many factors contribute to the rising average price of vehicles,
such as fleet mix, larger size, increased performance, vehicle amenities, and increased fuel
efficiency. We also note that this historical trend, though likely to continue, is not inevitable.
Tradeoffs are inherent in the vehicle purchase process, and this condition may be especially
important for "Americans who cannot afford [for] car prices to increase." However, the vast
majority of American households own a vehicle, and for the many Americans who do purchase
new and used vehicles, those consumers experience the fuel saving benefits associated with
vehicles with reduced GHG emissions and improved fuel economy, whether or not consumers
consider it fully at the time of purchase.
14 - Vehicle sales
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
National EV sales have demonstrated consistent linear growth, but nothing like the growth in
market share that EPA is projecting for the future (Figure 3). In the first quarter of 2023,
automakers sold about 305,000 electric vehicles (EVs), including battery, plug-in hybrid,
and fuel cell electric vehicles) in the United States, representing 8.6% of overall light-duty
2335
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vehicle sales. Year-over-year (YoY), market share increased 2.7 percentage points (pp)
compared to the first quarter of 2022.31 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 30-31]
31 See past editions of "Get Connected: Electric Vehicle Report" for previous quarters.
[See original comment for Figure 3: U.S. EV (BEV, PHEV, and FCEV) market share, January
2020 through March 2023.32] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 30-31]
32 Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Get Connected: Electric Vehicle Quarterly Report 2023 (Ql) (Jun.
26, 2023). Available at htps://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/papers-reports/get-connected-2023-ql.
EPA's Proposed Rule is projected to require BEV market share that exceeds that of the most
mature and forward-leaning EV market in the U.S. Comparing EPA-projected BEV share to
California zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) mandate requirements,33 EPA projects greater overall
U.S. BEV market share than would be required in California and Section 177 states under the
ZEV Mandate that seeks to ban the sale of internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles by 2035.
Figure 4 summarizes the electrification rates projected in the NPRM against the penetration rates
required in California's ZEV Mandate. California requires at least 34% BEV market share in
2027, reaching 66% in 2032. EPA's proposed rule exceeds these rates in every year from 2027-
2032 and by as much as 6 percentage points in 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 31-
32]
33 See 13 C.C.R. § 1962.4.
[See original comment for Figure 4: Comparison with California] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 31-32]
Organization: Alliance for Consumers (AFC)
Moreover, EPA has failed to consider the interplay between the current profits that
automakers earn on ICE vehicles as opposed to the losses that most automakers are incurring in
their sale of EVs. For example, a recent Ford Motor Company 10-k filing identified a relatively
common reality for automakers: "our larger, more profitable vehicles had an average
contribution margin that was 118%) of our total average contribution margin across all vehicles,
whereas our smaller vehicles had significantly lower contribution margins." Ford Motor
Company 2021 10-K at 35.3 In short, this identifies the reality that larger, primarily ICE cars and
trucks are cross-subsidizing the sale of money-losing EVs to a substantial degree. Yet EPA fails
to adequately address the effects of removing a majority of ICE cars from the road and replacing
them with EVs in terms of the ability of traditional automakers to continue pricing EVs at
current, money-losing levels. Indeed, the same recent Ford Motor Company 10-k notes that EV
mandates like what EPA has proposed in this rule: "may increase the cost of vehicles by more
than the perceived benefit to consumers and dampen margins." Ford Motor Company 2021 10-K
at 35. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, pp. 4-5]
3 Available at https://s201.q4cdn.eom/693218008/files/doc_financials/2021/q4/Ford- 2021-10-K-
Report.pdf.
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
EPA concludes that manufacturers are already on track to transform the nation's automotive
industry and projects that the number of available models will grow from 68 today to 180 by
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model year 2025. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,190, 29,312. In large part, the agency supports these
expectations with announce- ments that various manufacturers have released outlining plans to
shift product development toward electrification in the coming decades. See id. at 29,190,
29,192-93. As EPA acknowledges, however, these announcements "are not binding and often
are conditioned as forward-looking and subject to uncer- tainty." Id. at 29,193. They do not
prove how many models will actually be available by the time of the compliance period. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 20-21]
Manufacturers may significantly revise their plans or fail to meet their tar- gets—as has
happened many times before. Tesla, for example, has fallen re- peatedly fallen behind schedule.
In November 2017, the company introduced an electric semi-truck prototype and set a
production date for December 2019, but following the exit of an executive and "a series of
supply chain issues," the company pushed the production date back nearly three years (to 2022).
Nora Naughton, Another Tesla Semi Was Spotted Apparently Broken Down on the Side of the
Road, Bus. Insider (Jan. 20, 2023), https://tinyurl.com/38x8xkvc. In De- cember 2017, Tesla
unveiled a second-generation Roadster and said that the vehicle would launch in 2020. See Dan
Mihalascu, Tesla Roadster "Hopefully" Entering Production In 2024: El on Musk, Inside EVs
(May 17, 2023) ("Tesla Road- ster"), https://tinyurl.com/39a5jn4d. In 2020, however, the model
"was de- layed to 2021, and then pushed back by a year every year." Id. It is "three years
overdue at this point," and at a recent shareholder meeting, CEO Elon Musk "push[ed] back the
car another year, 'hopefully' to 2024." Id. And in 2019, Tesla unveiled the Cybertruck and said
that it would be available for sale in 2021. See Jack Ewing, Tesla's Pickup Truck Is Coming
Soon. Maybe., NY Times (Feb. 6, 2023) ("Tesla's Pickup"), https://tinyurl.com/3d7f9tv7; Lora
Kolodny, Tesla Unveils Its First Electric Pickup, The Cybertruck, Starting at $39,900, CNBC
(Nov. 21, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/je4esevt. Now production is not expected to begin until the
end of 2023. Ewing, Tesla's Pickup. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 20-21]
Other manufacturers have also experienced setbacks. General Motors, for example, recently
"dialed back" an electric-vehicle sales target by more than two years, "citing startup issues with a
new battery plant in Ohio." Bart Ziegler, Electric Vehicles Require Lots of Scarce Parts. Is the
Supply Chain Up to It?, Wall St. J. (Nov. 12, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/ynkuw9bd. Stellantis
"previously had a stated 2025 target but scrapped it in favor of a new 2030 target." Bloom -
bergNEF, Zero-Emission Vehicles Factbook: A BloombergNEF Special Report Pre- pared for
COP27, at 48 (Nov. 2022), https://tinyurl.com/2dyrxn66 ("Zero-Emis- sion Vehicles Factbook").
Lordstown Motors suspended production and deliveries of its electric pickup truck in February
2023 to address performance and quality issues with certain components, see Michael Wayland,
Lordstown Halts Production, Shipments of Endurance Electric Trucks to Address Quality Issues,
CNBC (Feb. 23, 2023), https://tinyurl.com/ykjwtz39, and last week it filed for Chap- ter 11
bankruptcy protection, after having "produce[d] only 65 of its Endurance pickups since the
company's 2018 founding," Jeanne Whalen & Hamza Sha- ban, Lordstown Motors Files for
Bankruptcy and Sues Foxconn, Wash. Post (June 27, 2023), https://tinyurl.com/35ekmhje. And
Ford has fallen far behind on filling purchase orders for the F-150 Lightning pickup truck. See
Luc Olinga, Ford Suffers Another Setback, TheStreet (Mar. 11, 2023), https://ti-
nyurl.com/ymuuy5nv. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 21]
These real-world examples demonstrate that far-in-advance announcements (often in the face
of significant political pressure) do not reliably indicate whether electric vehicles will get to the
2337
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market on time, in the amounts prom- ised, or even at all. Model year 2032 could come and go
with far fewer electric models than EPA assumes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 21]
In any event, EPA does not indicate whether additional electric-vehicle of- ferings in other
segments that more typical consumers could afford are likely to surface by the time the proposed
rule takes effect. And there is reason to doubt that affordable offerings will materialize in time.
One recent article notes that legacy automakers are "spending much of their effort producing
vehicles that are above the median average annual US household income," and although "some
EVs" will soon appear at lower prices, it is unclear whether those models will stay in the lower
price brackets. Charette, Convincing Consumers (internal quo- tation marks omitted). Already,
various manufacturers such as General Motors and Ford have had to increase the prices of their
lower-end models to keep up with industry pressures. Id. For example, last year Ford's least
expensive F-150 Lightning Pro model was offered for $41,769; this year, the price has jumped
more than 38 percent, to $57,869. Id. Untapped segments of the light- and me- dium-duty market
may therefore see little, if any, traction in the near future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p.
24]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
EPA likewise assumes that the IRA and the BIL funds will be adequate to build the necessary
electrification infrastructure. It is uncertain that (1) critical minerals will be available to
manufacture ZEV batteries (see Section I. A. 1); (2) consumers will buy EVs at the rate assumed
by EPA (see Section IV.B.2); and (3) there will be ample electricity to power these vehicles (see
Sections I.B and IV.B.3).127 What is certain is that the Proposal's timeline is unachievable and
completely detached from reality. 128 EPA also improperly relied on the general characterization
of recent years of the light-duty and medium-duty market as supplemented by incentives in the
BIL and IRA to support its proposition that there will be a rapid increase in ZEV market
penetration. Setting aside the laws of supply and demand and the fact that the future availability
of ZEVs is insufficient to meet the ZEV adoption requirements proposed by EPA (as discussed
further below), EPA improperly relies on the number of models currently available on the free
market as a surrogate for the number of actual units sold and in use. The underlying reality is that
without federal regulation requiring vastly increased ZEV penetration, providing automakers
certainty for long-term planning, automakers could not financially justify long-term investment
in a technology with tepid consumer demand. The referenced electrification projections may be a
function of OEMs striving to create certainty and minimize risk as they attempt to comply with
forthcoming regulations. Indeed, the CEO of the Alliance for Automotive Innovation recently
questioned the feasibility of the Proposed Rule - stating that the proposal was too aggressive and
could benefit China: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 29-30]
127 Id.
128 Id.
I've said the EPA proposal wasn't feasible without certain public policies and in light of
today's market and supply chain conditions .... There's not enough charging and uncertain
utility and grid capacity. Here's the big one - and where China looms largest - essentially no
domestic or allied supply of battery critical minerals, processing, and components until 2025
(and even then, nowhere near enough to supply what's needed). 129 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, pp. 29-30]
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129 John Bozzella, EPA's EV Rules: What it Means for China and the U.S Auto Market. June 12, 2023,
available at https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/blog/epas-ev-rules-what-it-means-for-china-and-the-us-
auto-market (accessed June 23, 2023).
As EPA acknowledges, the facts show that only between 2.2 and 4.4 percent of light duty
vehicles produced in 2021 were electric, rising to about 8.4 percent in 2022.133 Production may
or may not translate into sales and vehicle registration. State-by-state EV registration data shows
that the percentage of EV registrations relative to all registered vehicles ranged from 0.15
percent in Mississippi to 4.01 percent in California. 134 Thus, the ambitions of even the most
aggressive OEM from a ZEV adoption rate perspective would require unprecedented sales over
the next seven years. 135 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 31]
133 Proposed Rule at 29,189; Sebastian Blanco, Car And Driver, "Strict EPA Rules for 2027 - 2032
Vehicles Announced, Garnering a Range of Reactions" (Apr. 13, 2023) available at
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a43546970/new-strict-epa-mpg-rules-for-2027-2032-vehicles/.
134 2023 EV Charing Station Report: State-by-State Breakdown, June 16, 2023, available at
https://zutobi.com/us/driver-guides/the-us-electric-vehicle-charging-point-report.
135 VOLVO GROUP, "Report on the first quarter 2023," available at
https://www.volvogroup.com/content/dam/volvo-group/markets/master/news/2023/apr/4519530-volvo-
group-ql-2023.pdf; TUBES AND LUBES DAILY, "Volvo launches electric truck with longer range in N.
America" (Jan. 2021) available at https://www.fuelsandlubes.com/volvo-launches-electric-truck-with-
Ionger-range-in-n-america/?mc_cid=bl24969b23&mc_eid=4a00dc8f80 (Volvo Trucks set target that half
of all trucks sold are electric by 2030); VOLVO GROUP, "Geared for Growth - Annual Report 2022,"
available at https://www.volvogroup.com/content/dam/volvo-group/markets/master/investors/reports-and-
presentations/annual-reports/AB-Volvo-Annual-Report-2022.pdf.
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
iv. Vehicle readiness.
1. Technology readiness.
The proposed rule identified various LMD ZEVs available in the marketplace or in
production, as well as select manufacturer goals and commitments to producing LMD ZEVs by a
certain timeframe. However, there is significant uncertainty regarding EPA's expectation for
rapid availability of ZEV powertrains on the proposed rule's timeline. OEM goals and
commitments, coupled with IRA/BIL funding may help to increase the availability of LMD
ZEVs; however, it will be extremely challenging to meet the proposal's implementation
schedule. Based on EIA projections, it seems highly unlikely that vehicles will be available at the
rates EPA is projected for the 2027-2032 timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 14-
15]
Even with a fully stocked LMD ZEV market, key barriers to entry include customer uptake,
capital costs to purchase vehicles, and infrastructure readiness. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp.14-15]
The AEO 202359 contains long term projections based on current laws and regulations in
place at the time of modeling. As part of that modeling, the AEO includes projections for vehicle
sales and vehicle sales projections include consumer choice modeling60. EIA's consumer choice
modeling includes fuel choice, sales penetration among similar technologies, market share
among different technology sets, and vehicle attributes (i.e., sales price, fuel economy, battery
2339
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replacement costs, range, etc.). EIA reported that for the first time since 2010, critical mineral
prices increased "significantly" in 2022 resulting in the first year to year increase in electric
vehicle battery prices. According to AEO projections, which consider current policies and
regulations, and consumer choice, BEV sales penetration remains well below EPA's estimates in
the proposed rule, which are induced by its proposed stringent standards. EPA must explain why
its projections differ so significantly from EIA. Furthermore, EIA61 projects electric vehicles to
be less competitive from a cost standpoint than gasoline powered vehicles in the much larger
non-luxury market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 19]
59 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Annual Energy Outlook 2023." March 2023.
https://www.eia. gov/outlooks/aeo/.
60 https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/assumptions/pdf/TDM_Assumptions.pdf
61 61 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Issues in Focus: Inflation Reduction Act Cases in the
AEO2023." March 2023. Annual Energy Outlook 2023. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/IIF_IRA/.
Vehicles powered by internal combustion engines (ICE) offer "outstanding "drivability and
reliability" according to the Department of Energy62 and "increasing the effciency of internal
combustion engines (ICEs) is one of the most promising and cost-effective approaches to
dramatically improving the fuel economy of the on-road vehicle fleet in the near- to mid- term."
Increasing sales of EVs does not necessarily mean they are more reliable. According to this
survey data63 "[ejlectric cars are less reliable" than cars powered by petroleum, where software
related problems cause reliability issues for consumers. In a Consumer Reports survey,64 data
reported by EV owners indicate that EVs, as a category, have "more frequent problems"
compared to conventional vehicles. EPA should take into account these factors in their analysis.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 19]
62 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Transportation Demand Module Assumptions." March 2023.
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2015/ll/f27/QTR2015-8C-Internal-Combustion-Engines.pdf.
63 Hull, R. "Electric cars are LESS reliable than petrols and diesels with nearly a third reporting faults
taking longer to fix - and Tesla is rated worst overall, says Which?" March 2022. Daily Mail.
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/cars/article-10569557/Electric-cars-reliable-petrol-diesel-says-
Which.html.
64 Tucker, S. December 2022. "Consumer Reports: EVs Less Reliable Than Gas-Powered Cars." Kelley
Blue Book, https://www.kbb.com/car-news/consumer-reports-evs-less-reliable-than-gas-powered-cars/.
No-Action EV Scenario Assumption
The regulation accepts as a baseline a 40% BEV share of new vehicle sales by 2030 as part of
the assumed no-action scenario. 123 This scenario appears to be driven by OEM announcements
for future technology penetration for vehicles sold in the U.S. 124 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 47-49]
123 Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis EPA-420-D-23-003 April 2023, Table 13-67.
124 40 CFR Parts 85, 86, 600, 1036, 1037, and 1066 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829; FRL 8953-03- OAR]
page 29192 Table 1.
Table 13-67: Projected BEV Penetrations, No Action - Combined [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, pp. 47-49]
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Manufacturer 2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
BMW
30%
35%
42%
43%
42%
42%
Ford
29%
26%
32%
35%
36%
36%
General Motors 22%
29%
33%
38%
38%
37%
Honda
30%
35%
40%
42%
41%
40%
Hyundai
29%
36%
42%
43%
43%
42%
JLR
26%
32%
37%
38%
38%
38%
Kia
26%
32%
38%
38%
38%
38%
Mazda
28%
34%
40%
42%
42%
41%
Mercedes Benz 29%
35%
41%
42%
42%
41%
Mitsubishi
26%
33%
39%
41%
40%
39%
Nissan
29%
34%
40%
42%
41%
41%
Stellantis
20%
28%
34%
37%
37%
37%
Subaru
25%
33%
39%
41%
40%
39%
Tesla
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Toyota
29%
32%
39%
41%
40%
39%
Volvo
26%
33%
39%
41%
40%
39%
VW
31%
36%
41%
43%
42%
42%
Total
27%
32%
37%
40%
40%
39%
Table 1. Example of U.S. electrified new sales percentages implied by OEM announcements
for 2030 or before [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 47-49]
2022 US Sales Rank OEM Share of Total U. S. Sales
(1) Stated EV Share in 2030 (2) Powertrain (3) Implied OEM Contribution to
2030 Total PEV Market Share
1 General
Motors 16.4% 50%
PEV 8.2%
2 Toyota 15.4% 33%(4)
BEV 5.1%
3 Ford 13.1% 50%
BEV 6.5%
4 Stellantis 11.2% 50%
BEV 5.6%
5 Honda 7.2% 40%
BEV 2.9%
6 Hyundai 5.7% 50%
BEV 2.8%
7 Nissan 5.3% 40%
BEV 2.1%
8 Kia 5.0% 45%
BEV 2.3%
9 Subaru 4.1% 40%
BEV 1.6%
10 Volkswagen,
Audi 3.6% 50% BEV
2341
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1.8%
11
Tesla
BEV
3.4%
3.4%
100%
12
Mercedes-
Benz
2.6%
100%
E
V
2.6%
13
BMW
BEV
2.6%
1.3%
50%
14
Mazda
BEV
2.1%
0.5%
25%
15
Volvo
BEV
0.8%
0.8%
100%
16
Mitsubishi
0.6%
50%
PEV(5)
0.3%
17
Porsche
0.5%
80%
BEV
0.4%
18
Land
Rover
0.4%
60%
BEV
0.3%
19
Jaguar
BEV
0.07%
0.07%
100%
20
Lucid
0.02%
100%
BEV 0.02%
Total 100.9%
48.6%
OEM technology announcements have not always translated to implementation. For example:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 47-49]
• GM had made the claim in 2007 that they would have 1 million fuel cells on the road by
2012.125 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 47-49]
125 https://www. reuters.com/article/us-gm-fuelcells/gm-aims-to-be-first-to-make-l-million-hydrogen-
cars-exec- idUSSHA9988820071114.
• This claim was never reached, and only limited fuel cell vehicles have ever been produced
by GM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 47-49]
• Ford made the claim in 2001 that their SUVs would increase their fuel economy by 25% by
2005.126 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 47-49]
126 https://www.autoweek.com/news/a2108121/fords-goal-boosting-suv-fuel-economy-2005-proves-
elusive/.
• This claim was only reached after the global recession in 2008 forced buyers out of choosing
the larger vehicles they were consuming prior to the recession. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 47-49]
Even the President of the United States isn't the best source of forecasting automotive
technology. In the 2011 State of the Union speech, President Obama claimed that there would be
2342
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1 million EVs on the road by 2015.127 The reality was only -200,000 electric vehicles were on
the roads in 2015 and it would take another 6 years (2021) for the 1 million EV goal to finally be
reached. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 47-49]
127 https://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/pdfs/l_million_electric_vehicles_rpt.pdf.
Furthermore, we also question the agency's use of these forward-looking statements as a basis
of fact when establishing the baseline cost assumption. The forward-looking statements on BEV
penetration rates by the OEMs are predicated on expectations of potential regulatory standards
set by the agency. This circular reasoning cannot support EPA's proposal here as the referenced
forward-looking statements are largely a function of OEMs striving to create certainty and
minimize risk as they attempt to comply with forthcoming regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, pp. 47-49]
Organization: Arizona State Legislature
5. The proposed rule relies on erroneous assumptions about vehicle costs. EPA's projections
of vehicle costs rely on federal tax credits juicing consumer demand, but prices have increased
and few vehicles qualify for the tax credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 2]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
1. There Are Significant Public and Private Investments in and Demand for Zero-
Emission Vehicles
Zero-emission-vehicle technologies are widely used in vehicles today to control emissions
and their deployment is increasing at a rapid pace. For example, in 2020, the U.S. market
penetration of electric vehiclesl08 was just 2.2%; in 2021, it was 4.4%; and, in 2022, electric
vehicles were estimated to reach 8.4% market share. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,189. This dramatic
growth is expected to continue, and forecasts estimate that electric vehicle market share will
climb to 40-50%) in 2030109 given government policies, manufacturer plans, and growing
consumer demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 18]
108 "Electric vehicles" refers to plug-in electric vehicles, which includes battery electric vehicles and plug-
in hybrid electric vehicles.
109 Javier Colato and Lindsey Ice, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Charging into the future: the transition
to electric vehicles (Feb. 2023), available at https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-12/charging-into-the-
future-the-transition-to-electric-
vehicles.htm#:~:text=S%26P%20Global%20Mobility%20forecasts%20electric,surpassing%2050%20per
cent%20by%202030; Sean Tucker, Kelley Blue Book, More Than Half of Car Sales Could Be Electric by
2030 (Oct. 4, 2022), accessible at https://www.kbb.com/car-news/study-more-than-half-of-car-sales- could-
be-electric-by-2030/.
In addition to federal- and state-level laws and policies, "[m]any automakers have detailed
plans to electrify large portions of their fleets over the next decade, with some announcing goals
for fully electrified lineups within five years." 123 These announcements cover the range of zero-
emission vehicle technologies, including hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles. The number of
electric vehicle models available for sale in the United States has more than doubled from about
24 in model year 2015 to about 60 in model year 2021, and is expected to increase to more than
180 models by 2025. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,312. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 21]
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123 Jeff S. Bartlett, Automakers Are Adding Electric Vehicles to Their Lineups. Here's What's Coming,
Consumer Reports (Mar. 10, 2023), available at https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/hybrids-evs/why-
electric-cars-may-soon-flood-the-us-market-a9006292675/.
Organization: Ceres Corporate Electric Vehicle Alliance (CEVA)
Members of the Alliance share a goal to electrify their on-road fleets and networked vehicles
to reduce their carbon footprint, meet climate goals, and support the community health of their
customers and employees, and thus recognize the crucial role of these standards. While the
availability and diversity of commercial ZEVs in the U.S. market have improved, significant
hurdles remain in securing a greater and more diverse supply of cost-competitive ZEVs to meet
long-term corporate demand. The Alliance alone represents robust demand for ZEVs, with
members planning to procure approximately 330,000 ZEVs as soon as 2026. Auto and truck
manufacturers are also recognizing the business case for transitioning to ZEVs. Many have
committed to produce only zero-emission passenger vehicles by 2035 or earlier, and several have
made commitments to reach 50-67% medium- and heavy-duty ZEV sales by 2030 and 100% by
2040 or sooner. 7 Manufacturers and fleet operators rely in large part on technology-driving
federal policy to close the gap between supply and demand for zero-emission commercial
vehicles. Strong standards are needed to spur the availability, production volume, and variety of
zero-emission cars and trucks that meet the requirements of commercial fleets (such as the need
for vehicles with electronic power-takeoff or exportable power capabilities), as well as reduce
harmful pollutants to the maximum extent possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, p. 2]
7 https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/hdv-phase3-ghg-standards-benefits-apr23.pdf (p.i).
Organization: Colorado Energy Office, Colorado Department of Transportation, and Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment
Our agencies strongly support EPA's development of national air pollution and GHG
emission standards that are as robust as possible to ensure strong progress nationwide on air
pollution and equity. A strong national light- and medium-duty vehicle standard is important to
Colorado for at least three reasons. First, air pollution from nearby states crosses into Colorado
and affects public health, and the longer duration and increased stringency of the proposed
criteria air pollutant standards will reduce interstate air pollution transport into Colorado.
Second, Colorado is already experiencing the impacts of climate change, including increased
wildfires, floods, and drought. Climate change is a global issue that is impacted by all GHG
emissions regardless of geographic source, and the reductions in GHG emissions from the
proposed national rule will help reduce the long-term risks of climate change in Colorado.
Finally, although the proposed national GHG emissions standards are not an explicit EV sales
requirement like Advanced Clean Cars and Advanced Clean Cars II, complying with the
standards will effectively require vehicle manufacturers to sell a significantly greater amount of
EVs. The economies of scale encouraged by the proposed rules will support the production of
more affordable EVs, easing the transition to zero emission vehicles and enabling greater access
to their benefits for disproportionately impacted communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694,
p. 2]
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Organization: Electrification Coalition (EC)
To mitigate the impacts of climate change and to reduce national and economic security
threats, the U.S. needs a solution that will decarbonize our economy, reduce dependence on oil
and position the U.S. to maintain our status as a global leader in a new economy that is based on
minerals. The shift to electricity as a fuel source, also called transportation electrification, is the
solution to this triad of concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0588, pp. 2-3]
For these reasons, the adoption of the strongest possible proposal would significantly limit the
greenhouse gas emissions from internal combustion engine vehicles and require them to be
cleaner, bringing the market for these internal combustion engine vehicles to the tipping point
and thereby accelerating the adoption of EVs. The EPA forecasts that the proposed rule would
lead to 67% of new sales of LD/MD vehicles being zero-emission (electric) in 2032, depending
on the vehicle type. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0588, pp. 2-3]
Therefore, the EC supports the adoption of the strongest possible proposal, as it will
accelerate the adoption of EVs in the LD/MD sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0588, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Energy Innovation
Other research from the University of California, Berkeley, Grid Lab, and Energy Innovation,
2035 2.0: Plummeting Costs and Dramatic Improvements in Batteries Can Accelerate Our Clean
Transportation Future (April 2021), evaluated the technical and economic feasibility (and
associated impacts and benefits) of achieving a future scenario where electric vehicles make up
100 percent of new sales of all vehicles by 2035, combined with a 90 percent clean grid (called
the DRIVE Clean Scenario).[iv] Compared with the No New Policy scenario (which was pre-
IRA and BIL), the total transportation sector pollutant[v] and carbon dioxide emissions
reductions in the DRIVE Clean Scenario would reduce ground transportation sector C02
emissions by 60 percent in 2035 and by 93 percent in 2050, relative to 2020 levels.9 See Figure
3. The DRIVE Clean Scenario would also avoid approximately 150,000 premature deaths and
generate nearly $1.3 trillion in health and environmental savings through 2050.10 Compared to
the No New Policy, the DRIVE Clean Scenario would also result in approximately $2.7 trillion
in consumer savings through 2050 compared—a household savings of about $1000 per year on
average over 30 years. 11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 5-6]
9 Amol Phadke et al., "2035 2.0: Plummeting Costs and Dramatic Improvements in Batteries Can
Accelerate Our Clean Transportation Future" (Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California,
Berkeley, GridLab, April 2021), https://www.2035report.com/transportation/downloads/, iv.
10 Phadke et al., iii.
11 Phadke et al., ii.
iv In the Drive Rapid Innovation in Vehicle Electrification (DRIVE Clean) Scenario, EVs constitute 100
percent of new U.S. LDV sales by 2030 as well as 100 percent of MDV and heavy-duty truck sales by
2035. The grid reaches 90 percent clean electricity by 2035. More details and full study findings are
available at https://www.2035report.com/transportation/.
v Namely, fine particulate matter, nitrous oxides, and sulfur oxides.
[See original attachment for line graph "C02 Emissions in the Transportation Sector"]
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Figure 3. Transportation sector C02 emissions in the DRIVE Clean and No New Policy
scenarios through 2050. Source: Phadke, Amol, et al., 2035 Report 2.0: Plummeting Costs &
Dramatic Improvements in Batteries Can Accelerate Our Clean Transportation Future,
University of California Berkeley, Goldman School of Public Policy, Grid Lab, and Energy
Innovation, April 2021, available at: https://www.2035report.com/transportation/. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 5-6]
Organization: Energy Strategy Coalition
In addition to these financial incentives, state and international regulations are promoting
greater levels of vehicle electrification. California's Advanced Clean Cars II rule will require that
all new light-duty vehicles sold in the state be zero-emission vehicles by 2035.11 California's
Advanced Clean Trucks regulation requires that 55% of medium-duty vehicle sales be zero-
emission vehicles by 2035.12 And California's Advanced Clean Fleets regulation separately
applies phased-in zero- emission vehicle requirements to 142,000 medium-duty vehicles
operating in the state. 13 States that have adopted one or more of these California regulations
include Colorado, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington, with more expected to follow. 14 California's rules align with emerging European
standards. The European Union has adopted a regulation that incentivizes zero-emission vehicles
and requires 100% carbon dioxide emission reductions for both new cars and vans by 2035.15
The European standards establish intermediate emissions reduction targets for 2030 that are set
at 55% for cars and 50% for vans. 16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 2-3]
11 About: Advanced Clean Cars Program, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD (2023)
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/about.
12 Advanced Clean Trucks Fact Sheet, CAL. AIR RES. BD. (Aug. 20, 2021),
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/fact-sheets/advanced-clean-trucks-fact-sheet.
13 See Advanced Clean Fleets Regulation Summary, CAL. AIR RES. BD. (May 17, 2023),
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/fact-sheets/advanced-clean-fleets-regulation-summary.
14 See Marie McNamara, Understanding California's Advanced Clean Cars II Regulation, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE (June 13, 2023), https://rmi.org/understanding-californias- advanced-clean-cars-
ii-regulation/ (noting states that have adopted Advanced Clean Cars II); Advanced Clean Trucks Spreads,
ATLAS EVHUB (May 15, 2023), https://www.atlasevhub.com/weekly-digest/advanced-clean-trucks-
spreads/ (noting states that have adopted Advanced Clean Trucks).
15 Fit for 55': Council adopts regulation on C02 emissions for new cars and vans, COUNCIL OF THE EU
(March 28, 2023), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press- releases/2023/03/28/fit-for-55-council-
adopts-regulation-on-co2-emissions-for-new-cars-and- vans/.
16 Fit for 55: zero C02 emissions for new cars and vans in 2035, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Feb. 14,
2023) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20230210IPR74715/fit-for- 55-zero-co2-
emissions-for-new-cars-and-vans-in-203 5.
Given these incentives and regulatory dynamics, some market projections anticipate EV
penetration-rates comparable to the levels contemplated by the LMDV proposal. Prior to
enactment of the IRA, Bloomberg New Energy Finance projected that the U.S. was on pace to
reach 40 to 50 percent electric vehicle sales by 2030.17 More recent studies incorporating the
effects of the IRA project that the share of electric vehicle sales is expected to increase to
between 56 and 67 percent by 2032.18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 2-3]
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17 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,189 (citing Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), "Electric Vehicle Outlook
2022," Long term outlook economic transition scenario).
18 Id. (citing International Council on Clean Transportation, "Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation
Reduction Act on Electric Vehicle Uptake in the US," ICCT White Paper, January 2023. Available at
https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/iraimpact-evs-us-jan23.pdf). As EPA notes, this study takes
into effect state policies (such as the California Advanced Clean Cars II program and its adoption by
Section 177 states). Id.
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
EPA has both an opportunity and an obligation to dramatically reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) and other pollutants from light-duty vehicles (LDVs) and medium-
duty vehicles (MDVs). The Agency's mandate to protect public health and welfare is made
urgent by the ever more dire impacts of climate change, as well as the continuing harms to public
health from vehicle criteria pollution. And the opportunity to significantly reduce these impacts
is clear. Zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) are not only feasible and cost-reasonable—they are
rapidly penetrating the fleet, with more than 250,000 fully battery electric vehicles sold in the
first quarter of 2023 alone, a 44.9% increase over the same period last year. 1 In addition,
numerous emission control technologies for combustion vehicles are also feasible, cost-
reasonable, and already extensively deployed on the fleet, yet still have potential for greater
application within the fleet of new combustion vehicles that will continue to be produced. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 8]
1 Cox Automotive, Another Record Broken: Q1 Electric Vehicle Sales Surpass 250,000, as EV Market
Share in the U.S. Jumps to 7.2% of Total Sales (Apr. 12, 2023), https://www.coxautoinc.com/market-
insights/q1 -2023 -ev-sales/.
The feasibility of greater pollution control, as well as growing consumer demand for ZEVs, is
demonstrated by automaker commitments to increase the number of ZEV models and by their
own investments and sales targets for these vehicles. Indeed, numerous projections of the light-
duty fleet show high levels of ZEVs in the coming years, with several predicting more than 50%
ZEVs as a portion of light-duty vehicle sales by 2030 even in the absence of new EPA
regulations, which is also consistent with automaker announcements.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 8]
4 See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty
and Medium-Duty Vehicles; Proposed rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 29184, 29189, 29192-93 (May 5, 2023).
EPA's analysis shows that Alternative 1 is also feasible. It relies on the same existing
technology—vehicle electrification—at the core of the Proposed Standards, and the share of
battery-electric vehicles (BEVs) in the new vehicle fleet projected by EPA under Alternative 1 is
very similar to those under the Proposed Standards, with the share under Alternative 1 never
exceeding those under the Proposed Standards by more than 3 percentage points through 2032.
Id. at 29333, tbl. 99 (BEV penetration of 60% under the Proposed Standards in 2030, versus 63%
under Alternative 1). While we are recommending that EPA finalize a modified version of
Alternative 1 (which would yield higher levels of BEV penetration, as detailed in Section V
below), EPA's analysis at least shows that BEV levels associated with Alternative 1 are
eminently feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 25]
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According to the Alliance for Automotive Innovation, in the first quarter of 2023, there were
55 BEV models and 40 Plug-in Hybrid (PHEV) models available in the United States,
representing a variety of vehicle types, including sedans, crossovers, SUVs, and light-duty
trucks. 102 The technology is only improving, and the number of models of plug-in electric
vehicles (PEVs, which include both BEVs and PHEVs) available in the U.S. is projected to reach
197 by the end of 2025.103 Higher levels of PEV adoption are already driven by strong
consumer demand and greater model choice. And as is discussed throughout these comments, the
charging infrastructure, electric grid, and vehicle supply chain will be able to accommodate the
projected levels of BEVs—indeed, sending a strong regulatory signal will facilitate that process.
Moreover, given the flexibility in EPA's program, as well as the fact that EPA's modeling did
not include any PHEVs or improvements to combustion vehicle greenhouse gas emissions (and
in fact projects increasing GHG emissions from the combustion vehicle fleet, as discussed in
Section VI.A), it is likely that the levels of BEVs would be lower in the real-world than EPA
projected as automakers employ such technologies to comply with the final standards. That is
because making even minor improvements in combustion vehicle GHG emissions—or even
simply holding the average emissions of the combustion vehicle fleet constant—or
manufacturing PHEVs will allow automakers to achieve compliance with relatively fewer levels
of ZEVs than EPA projected. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 25-26]
102 Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Get Connected: Electric Vehicle Quarterly Report, First Quarter,
2023 (2023), https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/papers-
reports/Get%20Connected%20EV%20Quarterly%20Report%202023% 20Ql.pdf.
103 Rachel Macintosh et al., Electric Vehicle Market Update, Environmental Defense Fund and ERM 7
(April 2023), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-
05/Electric%20Vehicle%20Market%20Update%20April%202023.pdf; see also Jeff S. Bartlett & Ben
Preston, Automakers are Adding Electric Vehicles to Their Lineups. Here's What's Coming, Consumer
Reports (Jan. 6, 2023),https://www.consumerreports.org/hybrids-evs/why-electric-cars-may-soon-flood-
the-us-market-a9006292675/.
A. Other analyses predict high levels of ZEVs in the period of the Proposed Standards.
In the Proposal, EPA cites several sources that model the global and United States ZEV
outlook over the next few decades. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29189, 29192-3.252 These models vary in
their assumptions (including whether IRA funding is considered in the projections), but all point
to upward momentum of the PEV market globally and in the United States. EPA appears to have
considered a variety of analyses available - looking at both aggressive projections and
conservative models - to understand the global transition to PEVs. The most relevant of the
analyses that EPA considered are those that account for the impact of the IRA in baseline ZEV
penetration levels, and each of those supports baseline ZEV sales greater than the baseline levels
projected in EPA's proposed No Action scenario. For example, the 2022 Bloomberg New
Energy Finance (BNEF) analysis incorporating the IRA projects baseline ZEV sales of 52% in
2030, compared to EPA's projection of 39% in 2032. Id. at 29189. And the analysis by ICCT
and Energy Innovation, which also incorporated the impacts of the IRA, projects 2032 baseline
ZEV sales between 17% and 28% higher than EPA's projections. Id. An additional analysis by
Boston Consulting Group not cited by EPA projects similar baseline ZEV sales, anticipating
53% U.S. market share for light-duty ZEVs in 2030.253 The only analysis EPA considered that
projected a baseline close to EPA's projection was IHS Markit—predicting nearly 40% ZEV
sales in the U.S. by 2030—but this analysis was pre-IRA and therefore should be considered an
underestimate. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29189. These analyses justify and support strong EPA
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emission standards, and auto executives have signaled that their sales expectations align with
baseline ZEV sales at least as high as—and most likely higher than—EPA's projections, even
prior to the passage of the IRA.254 As discussed throughout these comments, we request that
EPA adopt at least Alternative 1 based on strong projections of the growth of the PEV market, as
well as consider additional new data that became available since the Proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, pp. 100-101]
252 IHS Markit (2021) predicted nearly 40% US PEV share by 2030 (pre-IRA); BNEF found the U.S. on
pace to reach 40-50% PEVs by 2030, increasing to 52% when adjusted for IRA; ICCT/Energy Innovation
found BEV share to be 56% to 67% by 2032 (including IRA); IEA found OEM announcements equal about
50% ZEVs in 2030.
253 Nathan Niese et al., Electric Cars Are Finding Their Next Gear, BCG, Exhibit 1 (June 9, 2022),
https://www.bcg.com/publications/2022/electric-cars-finding-next-gear. BCG's projections for 2030
include 47% market share for BEVs and 6% market share for PHEVs.
254 KPMG, 22nd Annual Global Automotive Executive Survey 2021 8 (Nov. 2021),
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2021/ll/global-automotive-executive-summary-
2021.pdf (finding that, even before the passage of the IRA, auto executives on average expected 52% of
new vehicle sales to be all-electric by 2030). See also, Michael Wayland, Auto Executives Say More Than
Half of U.S. Car Sales Will Be EVs By 2030, KPMG Survey Shows, CNBC (Nov. 30, 2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/ll/30/auto-executives-say-more-than-half-of-us-car-sales-will-be-evs-by-
2030-kpmg-s urvey-shows.html.
For example, in the Proposal, EPA cites 2022 BNEF data that states that global growth of
EVs is projected to reach 21 million in 2025. However, the latest BNEF EV Outlook updates that
modeling, and estimates that EV sales will reach approximately 22.4 million by 2025, growing to
26.6 million sales by 2026 and reaching 44% of global sales by 2030. In the United States, EVs
are expected to reach 28% of sales by 2026, which equates to over 4 million new ZEV sales, a
large growth from the 980,000 new ZEVs sold in 2022.255 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
101]
255 BloombergNEF, Electric Vehicle Outlook 2023: Executive Summary (2023).
Figure XV. A-l: Global near-term passenger EV sales and share of new passenger vehicle
sales by market
[See original attachment for Figure XV.A-1], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 101]
B. State standards will lead to greater ZEV deployment.
In August 2022, CARB unanimously approved the ACC II standards, which, starting in model
year 2026, require manufacturers to sell an increasing number of new ZEVs256 annually,
culminating in 100% new ZEV sales by model year 2035. CARB submitted a waiver request for
the ACC II standards in late May 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 101-102]
256 Defined as Battery Electric, Plug-in Hybrid, and Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles.
While the ACC II standards cannot be enforced until the waiver is granted by EPA, six
additional states257 have adopted the standards in anticipation of waiver approval. These seven
states (including California) approximately 25% of the United States vehicle market.258 Further,
at least five other states and the District of Columbia have announced their intention to adopt
ACC 11.259 Should those jurisdictions also adopt ACC II, nearly one-third of the United States
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vehicle market would be on a trajectory to have 100% new zero-emission vehicle sales by
2035.260 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 102]
257 The states that have adopted ACCII as of the date of this comment letter are Oregon, Washington,
Virginia, Massachusetts, New York, and Vermont.
258 CARB, States that Have Adopted California's Vehicle Standards under Section 177 of the Federal
Clean Air Act, May 13, 2022, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf
259 These states are: Rhode Island (https://dem.ri.gov/environmental-protection-bureau/air-
resources/advanced-clean-cars-ii-advanced-clean-trucks), Delaware
(https://news.delaware.gov/2022/03/03/delaware-to-adopt-zero-emission-vehicle-regulation/), Maryland
(https://governor.maryland.gov/news/press/pages/Governor-Moore-Announces-Maryland-Adoption-of-the-
Advance d-Clean-Cars-II-Rule-to-Combat-the-Effects-of-Climate-Change.aspx), New Jersey
(https://nj.gov/governor/news/news/562023/approved/20230215b.shtml), and Colorado
(https://cdphe.colorado.gov/coloradocleancars). Earlier this year, Washington D.C completed the public
comment period on its proposal to adopt the ACCII regulations (https://doee.dc.gov/release/notice-
comment-period-proposed-rulemaking-adoption-california-vehicle-emission-standards)
260 CARB, States that Have Adopted California's Vehicle Standards under Section 177 of the Federal
Clean Air Act.
EPA included ACC II in a sensitivity analysis but did not include it in the central analysis, as
CARB had not yet submitted the waiver request for ACC II as of the date of the Proposal.
However, now that CARB has submitted the waiver request, we ask that ACC II be included in
the central analysis if the waiver is granted before the Proposal is finalized. And while ACC II
clearly supports the feasibility of stronger federal standards, including through changes to
business-as-usual (BAU) PEV penetration, it is also clear that stronger federal standards are
feasible and justified even without it. As a result, we encourage EPA to model a scenario in the
final rule that does not include ACC II, which will demonstrate that the record supports the final
standards even in the absence of ACC II. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 102]
The addition of the ACC II sensitivity makes a significant difference in the No Action
scenario, as the BAU for PEVs increases from 39% to 54% and the incremental average cost of
the standards decreases from $1,164 to $164. It appears that this sensitivity does not include all
of the states that have adopted ACC II or intend to adopt ACC II—specifically Virginia—
implying that the BAU will increase, and the average incremental costs of the standards will
decrease even further when the full range of states are included. The inclusion of the full
portfolio of states that have adopted ACC II by the time of the final regulation in the central
analysis will provide a more accurate picture of the state of the U.S. PEV market as well as
presumed costs of the regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 102-103]
The inclusion of ACC II in the central analysis is also aligned with assumptions EPA has
included throughout the Proposal with respect to ACC II adoption, such as the assumption that
"anticipated longer all-electric range and greater all-electric performance, partially driven by
CARB's ACC II program... should result in performance more closely matching [the] proposed
curve," 88 Fed. Reg. at 29254, and the alignment of the NMOG + NOx provisions with ACC II
88 Fed. Reg. at 29275. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 103]
C. Private investments and commitments will lead to greater ZEV deployment.
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EPA should also consider private investments and commitments that have been announced or
implemented throughout the United States thus far that will further facilitate rapid growth of
ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 103]
EPA states in the proposed rule that automakers, based on their public commitments, will
achieve approximately 50% ZEV sales by 2030. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29296. EPA also considered
additional automaker announcements to accelerate the EV market in the United States, see, e.g.,
88 Fed. Reg. at 29193-94. EPA should update these estimates in the final rule, including by
recognizing the $210 billion of investments in the United States to accelerate the transition to
ZEVs and build up a robust, domestic supply chain - a higher investment than any other
country.261 These investments will help increase the availability of ZEVs in the United States
and further accelerate the transition to ZEVs that is already well underway in the market. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 103]
261 Noah Gabriel, $210 Billion of Annouced Investments in Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Heading for
the U.S. (January 12, 2023), https://www.atlasevhub.com/data_story/210-billion-of-announced-
investments-in-electric-vehicle-manufacturing-he aded-for-the-u-s/.
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
ii. Market developments further support the feasibility and lead time reflected in EPA's
proposal.
Market developments, including manufacturer plans to introduce new BEVs, concrete
investments to produce these and other vehicles at volume, and future commitments for
significant BEV sales are all consistent with and reinforce the conclusions of the above-
described analyses and likewise support the feasibility of protective EPA standards. In fact, these
market developments in many cases show manufacturers' plans to produce BEVs at even greater
volumes than EPA has assumed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Increasing BEV Availability and Sales Volumes. An updated report by ERM, based on
announcements by major auto manufacturers, finds the number of electrified models available in
the U.S. is projected to dramatically increase, reaching 197 by the end of 2025, with over 58 new
models slated to launch in model years 2022-2025 (Figure 5).58 As Figure 6 shows, these
vehicles will be available across all vehicle types and classes, and, as a result of IRA tax
incentives, there will be five light-duty EV models available with a net cost of under $30,000
manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) by the end of 2023 and 15 models available for
under $40,000.59 In the United States, more than 800,000 light-duty EVs were purchased in
2022, a 65 percent increase from 2021. The first quarter of 2023 saw EV sales reach over
258,000 units, almost a 45 percent year over year increase.60 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
pp. 23-26]
58 Electric Vehicle Market Update: Manufacturer and Commercial Fleet Electrification Commitments
Supporting Electric Mobility in the United States. April 2023. ERM for EDF.
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-
05/Electric%20Vehicle%20Market%20Update%20April%202023 .pdf (Attachment S)
59 Id.
60 Id.
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[See original attachment for Figure 5: Total Light-duty PHEV and BEV U.S. Models
Available by Year] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Source: ERM, EV Market Update (April 2023)
[See original attachment for Figure 6: Total Light-duty PHEV and BEV U.S. Models
Available by Body Type] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Source: ERM, EV Market Update (April 2023)
Near-Term Investments Dramatically Increase Production Capacity. In addition to introducing
new electric vehicles, manufacturers are investing billions of dollars to produce them at volume.
As noted above, a report by WSP for EDF found over $120 billion in private EV supply
ecosystem investments and 143,000 new jobs announced in the last eight years. That analysis
also evaluated the production capacity of announced facilities with concrete investments. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
As shown in the Figures below, by 2026, U.S. manufacturing facilities will be capable of
producing an estimated 4.3 million new electric passenger vehicles each year, which represents
about 33 percent of all new vehicles sold in 2022. And by 2026, battery manufacturing facilities
will be capable of producing more than 1,000 gigawatt hours (GWh) in battery capacity,
sufficient to supply up to 11.2 million new passenger vehicles each year, which represents an
estimated 84 percent of new vehicle sold in 2022. Both of these levels far exceed EPA's
projections for BEV deployment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
[See original attachment for Figure 7: Total Announced EV Manufacturing Capacity (2020-
2026)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Source: WSP, U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs
[See original attachment for Figure 8: Total Announced Battery Manufacturing Capacity
(2017-2027)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Source: WSP, U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs
Manufacturer Commitments. In addition to near-term model availability and supporting
production investments, vehicle manufacturers have articulated medium- to long-term
commitments to even more substantially grow ZEV sales with many working toward a full ZEV
fleet within the next decade. For instance, according to the recent market update from ERM,
Ford expects 50 percent of its global vehicle volume, and 100 percent of its European volume, to
be fully electric by 2030 with a goal of producing 2 million EVs annually by 2026; GM plans to
offer a lineup of electric-only models by 2035; Honda has a goal of achieving carbon neutrality
by 2050 and 100 percent ZEV sales in North America by 2040—with interim sales goals of 40
percent by 2030 and 80 percent by 2035; Volvo has committed to becoming a fully electric car
company by 2030—with an interim goal of reaching 50 percent of global EV car sales and
having one million EVs on the road by 2025; and Stellantis aims for 100 percent of sales in
Europe and 50 percent of sales in the U.S. to be BEVs by the end of the decade,61 As EPA notes
in the preamble to this proposal, virtually every major automaker is already planning on
widespread electrification across global fleets. Figure 9, below, is an updated synthesis of these
manufacturer commitments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
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61 Id.
[See original attachment for Figure 9: Global Sales Goals by Manufacturers] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
Source: ERM, EV Market Update (April 2023)
Market indicators are consistent with and strongly support protective standards.
Manufacturers have (and are planning to continue to) offer new vehicles. They have invested
billions of dollars to produce these vehicles at near term volumes that far exceed EPA's
projections. And almost every company has articulated medium- to longer term ZEV
commitments that are broadly consistent with levels in EPA's proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 23-26]
iv. EDF has quantified EV sales related to the impacts of state policy, manufacturer
investments and commitments, and other analyses.
As described above, many independent indicators point toward significant ZEV adoption over
the next decade. As Figure 12 below shows, EDF has quantified and plotted the impacts of state
action, market developments (including manufacturer investments and commitments and lithium
mining supply), as well as projections from a number of different independent organizations. The
analysis shows many different indicators plotted together and supports EPA's No Action
(baseline) case as well as the feasibility of the proposal. Under the No Action scenario, EPA's
modeling projects BEV adoption at 27% in 2027 growing to 40% by 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 29-31]
A description of the methodology and sources for each of the EV sales assessments is
included below and importantly, each assessment addresses the independent impacts of each
metric on EV deployment and does not evaluate the combined impacts of all taken together.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 29-31]
[See original attachment for Figure 12: Indicators of Significant ZEV Adoption through 2032]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 29-31]
Source: EDF State Action
As discussed above, many states have taken action to promote ZEV adoption. Seven states71
have already adopted ACC II with five additional states72 along with the District of Columbia in
the process of adopting. Additionally, many states have adopted the Advanced Clean Trucks
(ACT) regulation which sets ZEV sales mandates for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles
(MHDVs) including Class 2b and 3 starting with MY2024. The rule requires 5% of Class 2b and
3 sales be ZEV in MY2024 growing to 55% in 2035. Along with California, nine additional
states have since adopted ACT.73 To understand the impact of state action on baseline ZEV
adoption, we assumed that the 12 states and the District of Columbia adopt ACC II and the 10
states adopted ACT. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 29-31]
71 California, Oregon, Washington, Massachusetts, New York, Vermont, and Virginia
72 Maryland, Delaware, Colorado, Rhode Island, and New Jersey
73 Oregon, Washington, Massachusetts, Vermont, New York, New Jersey, and Colorado have all adopted
ACT. Maryland and Colorado have both passed legislation requiring the rulemaking to take place.
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To conservatively model sales in non-ACC II and non-ACT states, we used EIA's Annual
Energy Outlook (AEO) 2023 ZEV sales projection. AEO2023 does not include ACC II adoption
in their modeling and only minimally includes the impacts of the Inflation Reduction Act. The
model uses the Congressional Budget Office's estimate for the Clean Vehicle Tax Credit (30D)
which assumes roughly only 1 million ZEVs will receive a tax credit over the lifetime of the
legislation. The model also does not include the impact of the additional relevant tax credits,
such as the $45/kWh battery production tax credit. Given these factors, AEO2023's estimate of
ZEV adoption remains a highly conservative estimate of ZEV adoption within the U.S. and
might be considered the lowest bound of what is reasonable to expect in non-ACC II and non-
ACT states. Nevertheless, an approach along these lines helps to isolate the impacts of ACC II in
supporting nation-wide baseline levels of ZEV sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 29-
31]
To calculate the Class l/2a non-ACC II state ZEV sales values, we used AEO2023's LDV
sales by technology type combining cars and light trucks.74 In 2025, this projects 9% of LDV
sales would be ZEVs growing to 16% in 2032. For Class 2b/3, an average of AEO2023's ZEV
sales projection for light commercial vehicles (Class 2b) and light medium vehicles (Class 3)
was used.75,76 In 2025, we assume non-ACT states have 0.24% ZEV sales rising to 0.30% ZEV
sales in 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 29-31]
74 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2023, Table 38. Washington, D.C.
Accessed April 4, 2023. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/supplement/excel/suptab_38.xlsx
75 Annual Energy Outlook 2023, Table 44
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/supplement/excel/suptab_44.xlsx.
76 Annual Energy Outlook 2023, Table 49
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/supplement/excel/suptab_49.xlsx.
ZEV sales as a result of state action along with low baseline sales in other states results in
30% ZEV sales in 2030 growing to 42% in 2035. The values are plotted above in Figure 12 with
the label "ACC II/ACT + Baseline Sales." Under this scenario, Section 177 states account for
61% of the LMD ZEV sales nationwide in 2027 growing to 70% by 2035 even though they only
account for 30% of vehicle sales.77 This demonstrates that even with fairly low and unrealistic
ZEV sales in non-Section 177 states, a robust nationwide adoption of ZEVs will result from
current state action alone. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 29-31]
77 Vehicle sales were based on MOVES3
Vehicle Manufacturer EV Commitments
Many vehicle manufacturers have made commitments to transition a significant portion of
their sales to ZEVs. While many of the commitments are for a share of manufacturers' global
sales, several OEMs have made U.S. specific commitments or have committed to transition their
entire fleet which would mean all of their U.S. sales would be ZEV as well. Even for global
commitments, manufacturers with significant U.S. sales volumes will nonetheless need to sell
meaningful ZEVs to meet their commitments. Because some sales might exceed these global
commitments while others fall short, we used global commitments as a reasonable proxy for U.S.
sales share. Table 4 below shows OEM commitments and includes a total using 2022
manufacturer sales shares to calculate a weighted ZEV commitment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 31-34]
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[See original attachment for Table 4: Manufacturer ZEV Commitments as Share of Total
Sales] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 31-34]
78 Jerry Reynolds. Full-Year 2022 National Auto Sales by Brand. 2023. CarPro,
https://www.carpro.com/blog/full- year-2022-national-auto-sales-by-brand
79 Paul Eisenstein, Mercedez-Benz Goes All-Electric by 2030, Forbes (Oct. 4, 2021),
https://www.forbes.com/wheels/news/mercedes-benz-all-electric-2030/.
80 Luke Wilkinson, Volkswagen 'New Auto' Strategy Predicts Near 100 percent EV Sales by 2040, (July
15, 2021), https://www.carscoops.com/2023/03/bmw-expects-to-smash-50-ev-sales-goal-before-own-2030-
deadline/.
81 Mariella Moon, Faraday Future's FF 91 Electric Vehicles Will Cost as Much as $309,000, Engadget
(June 1, 2023), https://www.engadget.com/faraday-futures-ff-91-electric-vehicles-will-cost-as-much-as-
309000- 053144006.html.
82 Luke Wilkinson, Volkswagen 'New Auto' Strategy Predicts Near 100 percent EV Sales by 2040, (July
15, 2021), https://www.carscoops.eom/2023/03/bmw-expects-to-smash-50-ev-sales-goal-before-own-2030-
deadline/.
83 David Shepardson, GM Backs Setting Tough U.S Emissions Targets for 2030 (Sep. 20, 2022),
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/gm-backs-setting-tough-emissions-targets-2030-
2022-09-20/.
84 PR Newswire, Honda Targets 100% EV Sales in North America by 2040, Makes New Commitments to
Advances in Environmental and Safety Technology (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/honda- targets-100-ev-sales-in-north-america-by-2040-makes-new-commitments-to-advances-in-
environmental-and-safety- technology-301275727.html.
85 ET Auto, Hyundai to Raise Electric Vehicles Ration to 80% by 2040 (Sep. 7, 2021),
https://auto.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/hyundai-to-raise-electric-vehicles-ratio-to-80-by-
2040/85998266.
86 Inside EVs, Hyundai Announces Accelerated Electrification Strategy,
https://insideevs.com/news/571125/hyundai-accelerated-electrification-strategy/.
87 Mark Kane, Mazda Announces Full-Scale Launch of BEVs in 2028-2030 (Nov. 22, 2022),
https://insideevs.eom/news/623055/mazda-full-scale-launch-bevs-2028-2030//
88 Reuters, Nissan Raises Global EV Targets; to Boost U.S. Input (Feb. 27, 2023),
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/nissan-plans-build-second-us-battery-plant-gupta-
says-2023- 02-27/.
89 Stellantis, Accelerating the Drive to Electrification,
https://www.stellantis.com/en/technology/electrification.
90 Reuters Staff, Subaru Sets Mid 2030s Target to Sell Only Electric Vehicles (Jan. 19, 2021),
lhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-subaru-ev-idUSKBNlZJOBU.
91 JustAuto, Subaru to Invest $1.9 Billion in New EV Plant, Batteries, https://www.just-
auto.com/news/subaru-to- invest-usl-9bn-in-new-ev-plant-batteries.
92 Jasper Jolly, Jaguar Land Rover to Ramp up EV Production with £15bn Investment, The Guardian (Apr.
19, 2023), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/apr/19/electric-car-jaguar-land-rover-ev-
production-investment.
93 Peter Johnson, Toyota's New CEO Adjusts EV Plans but Sticks to a Hybrid Approach, electrek (Apr. 7,
2023), https://electrek.co/2023/04/07/toyotas-new-ceo-adjusts-ev-plans-but-sticks-to-a-hybrid-approach/.
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94 Anjani, Trivedi, This is Toyota's Boldest EV Rebranding Exercise Yet, Washington Post (Jan. 30,
2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/this-is-toyotas-boldest-ev-rebranding-exercise-
yet/2023/0 l/30/7dlaf020-a063-l led-8b47-9863fda8e494_story.html.
95 Volvo, The Future is Electric, https://group.volvocars.com/company/innovation/electrification.
96 Volvo, Volvo Cars to be Fully Electric by 2030, https://www.media.volvocars.com/global/en-
gb/media/pressreleases/277409/volvo-cars-to-be-fully-electric-by-2030
97 https://insideevs.com/news/574853/vw-group-bevs-make-up-55percent-us-sales-2030/
98 Luke Wilkinson. Volkswagen 'New Auto' strategy predicts near 100 per cent EV sales by 2040 (Jul. 15,
2021), https://www.autoexpress.co.uk/volkswagen/355550/volkswagen-new-auto-strategy-predicts-near-
100-cent-ev-sales- mix-2040
*Due to rounding, the sum of the market share may not equal the total
All major OEMs have set ZEV targets of at least 30% sales starting in 2030. Considering both
U.S.-specific and global commitments would result in 47% of new vehicles sold in the U.S. in
2030 being ZEVs. Even unrealistically assuming only the US-specific commitments and the
100%) commitments apply, at least 29% of LDV sales in 2030 would be ZEVs growing to 44% in
2035 and 48% in 2040. The 2030 value is plotted above in Figure 12. We also note that the 2035
and 2040 estimates using both approaches are perhaps significantly understated given that some
manufacturers with commitments in 2030 have not made 2035 or later commitments but will
nonetheless likely increase ZEV sales during that timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
pp. 31-34]
Organization: Governing for Impact and Evergreen Action (GFI)
According to EPA estimates, if the agency declines to finalize any new tailpipe emissions
regulations at all — under what the agency calls its central "No Action" baseline — EV sales
will nonetheless comprise approximately 39 percent of new car sales by MY 2032.59 As the
EPA itself acknowledges, this may prove a conservative estimate of IRA and other non-rule
impacts on EV adoption.60 For example, a synthesis of automakers' public EV commitments to
date compiled by the International Energy Agency, which the EPA declined to incorporate into
its projections, suggested that EVs would comprise 50 percent of new car sales by 2030 (again,
even in the Proposed Rule's absence).61 Nor, in reaching its central No Action baseline, did the
EPA take into account certain new state level policies, like California's, which may drive EV
penetration even further.62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0621, p. 8]
59 Proposed Rule at 29329, "Fleet BEV Penetration Rates, by Body Style, Under the No Action Case,"
Table 81. As discussed below, the EPA also conducted alternate No Action sensitivity cases.
60 Proposed Rule at 29296.
61 See Proposed Rule at 29296 ("[F]or purposes of this proposal we have not integrated manufacturer
announcements directly into our modeling of the No Action baseline") (citing International Energy
Agency, "Global EV Outlook 2022," p. 107, May 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/e0d2081d-
487d-4818-8c59-69b638969f9e/ GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf).
62 Proposed Rule at 29296 ("[0]ur analysis does not include the effect of state-level policies whereas
projections from other sources may include those policies. We did not include these policies because many
are still not in effect; however, we do anticipate that in the next decade, state level policies may play an
important role in driving BEV penetration.").
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Moreover, as other advocates have noted elsewhere, adoption of innovative technologies does
not follow a linear trajectory, but rather "an S-shaped curve, with the adoption rate increasing
more rapidly once a critical mass is reached—as we are now seeing with electric vehicles."63 As
a result, now that the United States has crossed the EV "tipping point,"64 we would expect steep
growth over the next several years regardless of the EPA's regulatory path. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0621, p. 8]
63 See Proof Brief of the Institute for Policy Integrity, Texas v. E.P.A., D.C. Cir. No. 22-1031 8 (Mar. 3,
2023), https://policyintegrity.org/documents/Amicus_Brief_of_the_Institute_for_Policy_Integrity_4.pdf
(citing Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations 344 (5th ed. 2003) and Tom Randall, US Crosses the
Electric-Car Tipping Point for Mass Adoption, Bloomberg (July 9, 2022),
https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/articles/2022-07-09/us-electric-carsales- reach-key-milestone
(discussing the S-shaped technology adoption curve and noting that the United States has crossed the 5%
market share "tipping point" that triggers "rapidly accelerating demand")).
64 See Randall.
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law
G. EPA Should Further Explain Its Choices Around Scrappage, Pass-Through, and
Vehicle Sales
EPA should provide additional explanation around certain modeling choices—namely
scrappage, pass-through, and sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 22-23]
"Scrappage" refers to the rate of which drivers discard old automobiles. OMEGA treats
scrappage as exogenous, meaning that the rate of scrappage does not depend on the Proposed
Rule's other effects. 144 This choice is reasonable: While economic theory and evidence suggest
that scrappage depends in part on the Proposed Rule's other effects (most notably the rate at
which the Proposed Rule affects new vehicle prices and sales), 145 this effect is very difficult to
model due to data limitations, and past attempts by EPA and NHTSA to model scrappage have
fared poorly. 146 Moreover, the increasing movement to electric vehicles provides even more
reason to treat scrappage as exogenous, as virtually no analysis on the scrappage of BEVs exists.
However, the Proposed Rule provides no discussion of scrappage or EPA's choice not to model
it. Particularly since EPA endogenously modeled scrappage in the 2020 Rule, the agency may
wish to explain its decision not to follow this approach in the Proposed Rule and a discussion of
how it may affect the results. Moreover, to the extent feasible, EPA should attempt to model
scrappage in future standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 22-23]
144 See RIA at 9-3 to 9-5.
145 See Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation: A Theory with Applications to Automobile
Emissions Control (1982); Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation: The Case of Auto
Emissions Standards, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 328 (1982); ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, THE EFFECTS OF
NEW-VEHICLE PRICE CHANGES ON NEW- AND USED- VEHICLE MARKETS AND SCRAPPAGE
3-6 to 3-11 & 5-7 to 5-7 to 5-12 (2021).
146 Inst, for Pol'y Integrity, Comments on the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for
Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks 66-71 (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://policyintegrity.org/documents/Emissions_Standards_EPA_NHTSA_Comments_Oct2018.pdf.
"Pass-through" refers to the degree to which manufacturers pass on cost increases to
consumers. EPA in prior tailpipe rules has assumed 100% pass-through to consumers in the
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vehicle market—meaning that every dollar of additional cost to the automaker is ultimately
borne by the purchaser. 147 EPA appears to repeat this assumption in the Proposed Rule. That
approach is also reasonable given consistency with the agency's prior approach and the very
limited economic evidence on vehicle pass-through. Nonetheless, that limited available evidence
(from a 2010 paper) indicates that pass-through in the vehicle market may be below 100%. 148
Accordingly, EPA should discuss and provide a rationale for its approach. EPA should also
support further research in this area, given its potential importance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0601, pp. 22-23]
147 E.g. 2020 Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 24,594-95.
148 Using regression analysis, Hellerstein and Villas-Boas (2010) find only partial pass through for the
vehicle industry with an average pass-through rate of 38%. Rebecca Hellerstein, & Sophia B. Villas-Boas,
Outsourcing and Pass-Through, 81 J. INT'LECON. 170, 175 (2010).
Finally, with regard to sales, EPA should clarify how OMEGA treats how producers expect
consumers to value fuel costs. Within the model, consumers and producers shape their preferred
new vehicle mix independently, 149 each informed by their unique perspectives on fuel costs:
Consumers weigh their expected fuel expenses, whereas producers consider how they think
consumers will weigh their expected fuel expenses. In the RIA, EPA explains that consumers are
assumed to factor in fuel costs of 12,000 miles annually for 2.5 years.150 However, the OMEGA
input files suggest that producers expect consumers to consider fuel costs up to 15,000 miles
annually. 151 Although this difference is not inherently problematic, especially if EPA posits
imperfect information between consumers and producers, 152 EPA should explain this
difference. This might also be a minor programming error, such that EPA intended for producers
to accurately peg consumer valuation of fuel costs at 12,000 miles annually. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0601, pp. 22-23]
149 The model then searches for solutions for a set of vehicle attributes, purchase prices, and quantities
such that the sales and production shares match.
150 RIA at 4-2.
151 This information is derived from the 'sales_share_params_ice_bev_pu_b0p4_klp0_x02031-
Cuv_b2p0_klp0_x02029_nu8p0-sdn_b0p4_klp0_x02020_nulp0_20230228.csv' file for consumers, and
the 'producer_generalized_cost-body_style_20220613.csv' file for producers, both located within the
'2023-03-14-22- 42-30-ld-central-run-to2055\all_inputs' folder, downloadable from the 'Light-duty central
case (zip)' section on EPA's website: https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-
engines/optimization-model-reducing-emissions-greenhouse-gases
152 EPA, OMEGA Documentation Sec. 4.3.2 (last revised May 8, 2023),
https://omega2.readthedocs.io/en/2.1.0/index,html#gl-label-producer-generalized-cost ("The producer, as
an independent decision-making agent, will not have perfect information about the internal consumer
decision process. Within the Producer Module, OMEGA allows the user to define the consumer decisions
from the producer's perspective, which may be different from (or the same as) the representation within the
Consumer Module.").
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
The United States is not alone in its commitment to transition to cleaner cars and trucks.
EPA's proposal is in line with regulations in leading countries and automaker commitments. If
implemented, the proposed rule would put the U.S. on track to catch up with Europe and China,
which have led in the global transition to zero-emissions through 2022. Canada, the European
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Union, the United Kingdom, and seven U.S. states have committed to entirely phase out the sale
or registration of new internal combustion engine vehicles by 2035. EPA's proposal also aligns
with announcements from auto manufacturers; Ford, General Motors, Mercedes-Benz, Audi, and
others have committed to selling 100% zero-emission vehicles globally or in leading markets by
2035. With the rapid development of ZEV technologies, automakers are constantly updating
their targets. In fact, ICCT reviewed EPA's compilation of automaker electric vehicle sales
targets and announcements in the proposal and identified several additional announcements that
had been made through 2022 beyond those in EPA's assessment, including announcements of
expanded and accelerated electric vehicle targets by General Motors, Ford, Stellantis, Mercedes-
Benz, Toyota, and Hyundai-Kia. These developments further reflect industry commitment to and
desirability of ZEV technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 3-4]
The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 will accelerate electric vehicle sales in the United
States across all vehicle types. The $370 billion allocated to climate and clean energy
investments dramatically expands tax credits and incentives to deploy more clean vehicles,
including commercial vehicles, while supporting a domestic EV supply chain and charging
infrastructure buildout. IRA transportation sector provisions will accelerate the shift to zero-
emission vehicles by combining consumer and manufacturing policies. Consumer tax credits for
new and used EVs and tax credits for commercial EVs, along with individual and commercial
charging infrastructure tax credits, will increase sales. Domestic supply chain incentives and
investments will boost EV manufacturing and battery production. Critical mineral mining and
refining incentives will bolster industrial development. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 6-
7]
An ICCT and Energy Innovation study assesses the future impact of the IRA on electrification
rates for LDV sales in the United States through 2035.4 We analyze the value of the personal and
commercial EV tax credits, factoring in the various supply chain, income, and price caps on new
EVs, and combine this with new estimates of future light-duty EV cost declines. We find that, on
average over the period 2023-2032, the IRA tax credits will reduce EV purchase costs by $3,400
to $9,050 and accelerate the timing for price parity with combustion vehicles. Using
methodologies from the Energy Policy Simulator, we project how these changing costs and
incentives over time will affect the LDV markets in the United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0569, pp. 6-7]
4 Slowik, P., Searle, S., Basma, H., Miller, J. Zhou, Y., Rodriguez, F., Buysse, C., Kelly, S., Minjares, R.,
Pierce, L. (ICCT) Orvis, R., and Baldwin, S. (Energy Innovation). (2023). Analyzing the impact of the
inflation reduction act on electric vehicle uptake in the United States, https://theicct.org/publication/ira-
impact-evs-us-jan23/
Figure 1 summarizes the results from the ICCT and Energy Innovation IRA study. It shows
the findings of estimated new electric vehicle sales shares for different IRA scenarios depending
on how certain provisions are implemented and how the value of incentives is passed on to
consumers. The figure shows our modeled projection of how the IRA will accelerate
electrification. By providing thousands of dollars in financial incentives, the IRA unlocks
widespread consumer benefits. We find rapid projected EV uptake when considering both
expected manufacturing cost reductions and the IRA incentives, as well as state policies. By
2030, we find a range of a 48%-61% projected EV sales share, increasing to 56%-67% by 2032,
the final year of the IRA tax credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 6-7]
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SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT for Figure 1. Baseline, Low, Moderate, and High projections
of EV sales share for light-duty vehicles, considering ACC II adoption in only California versus
increased states [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 6-7]
5 ICCT and Energy Innovation. (2023). Analyzing the impact of the inflation reduction act on electric
vehicle uptake in the United States, https://theicct.org/publication/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23/
Electric vehicle uptake
Figure 7 shows the historical EV sales shares from 2015 through 2022 (solid lines) and
estimated future sales shares based on regulatory targets (dotted lines) for light-duty vehicles
in the United States compared with other major markets. As shown, about 7% of new light-duty
vehicle sales in the US. Were plug-in electric in 2022, compared to 8% in Canada, 20% in
California, 23% in the United Kingdom and Europe, and 26% in China. Several jurisdictions
have set a 100% ZEV target or a zero gram C02/mile target by 23035, including California,
Canada, European Union, and the United Kingdom (UK).45 The figure shows how the estimated
67%) EV sales share in 2032, the last year of the proposed EPA standard, somewhat lags
compared to the estimated uptake from regulations in California, Canada, Europe, and the UK.
Not shown is the 46% EV sales share EPA projects for medium-duty vehicles in 2032. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 18-19]
45 European Union and UK's proposed standards do not include PHEV in ZEV definition
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 7. Historical electric vehicle sales shares (solid
lines) and regulatory targets or projected ZEV shares consistent with regulatory targets (dotted
lines) for light-duty vehicles in major markets [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 18-19]
As discussed above and shown in Figure 7, at the state-level, California's Advanced Clean
Cars II regulation will lead to 68% electric vehicle sales by 2030 and 100% by 2035. At least a
dozen additional states are considering adopting California's new rules. As of May 2023,
California, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington have adopted
ACC II. It is likely that many other states will continue to follow California's leadership and
adopt the new ACC II Program to benefit from the anticipated emissions reduction and health
benefits of the program.46 Many additional states currently follow the Advanced Clean Cars
regulations through model year 2026; as of May 13th, 2022, 17 U.S. states have adopted all or
part of California's low-emission and zero-emission vehicle regulations, and about 37% of
national new light-duty vehicle sales meet California's emission standards.47 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0569, pp.18-19]
46 Houk, J., Huang, J., and Sussman. (2023). Benefits of adopting California's Advanced Clean Cars II
standards in sixteen U.S. states. Sonoma Technology Inc. Retrieved from
https://theicct.org/publication/benefits-of-state-level- adoption-of-california-acc-ii-regulations/
47 California Air Resources Board. (May 13, 2022). States that have adopted California's vehicle standards
under Section 177 of the Federal Clean Air Act. https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf
Organization: International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW)
A. ICE Sales Fund EV Transition
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The proposed standards must reflect what is feasible for manufacturers to produce and sell to
consumers and promote domestic production of cleaner technologies. The continued production
of ICE vehicles, particularly light trucks (pickup trucks, sport utility vehicles, vans, and
minivans), must be supported by proposed standards. The EV industry is in its infancy. On their
own, EVs are not yet profitable. 18 Some automakers will lose billions producing EVs and don't
expect to reach profitability any time soon. 19 Therefore, federal programs and regulation must
work in concert to incentivize the production of EVs. While the transition is progressing, the
auto industry relies on the continued production of ICE vehicles to reach profitability and fund
required investments in electrification. Domestic automakers specifically rely on the sale of light
trucks to fund investment into the EV transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 8]
18 YeonBaik, Russell Hensley, et. al., "Making electric vehicles profitable", (McKinsey and Company,
Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/making-
electric-vehicles-profitable.
19 Chris Bibey, "Electric Vehicles Are Draining Billions From Profitable ICE Legacy Automakers With
Ford Projecting $3 Billion in Losses" (Yahoo Finance, Mar. 30, 2023),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/electric-vehicles-draining-billions- profitable-151050558.html.
Organization: John Graham
The complete ignoring of mild hybrid improvements is reflected in the projected penetration
of virtually zero mild hybrids in 2032.18 This is in stark opposition to what is happening in
Europe, where mild hybrid market share has risen rapidly from just 0.2% in 2017 and 0.6% in
2018, to 2.2%) in 2019, 7.8% in 2020, and 14.0% in 2021, with some manufacturers being far
ahead of the average. 19 Fiat/FCA projected in 2018 that 40% of its vehicles sold in Europe by
2022 would be MHEVs, which seemed an ambitious projection considering that Fiat sold no
mild hybrid vehicles in 2019.20 However, Fiat exceeded this market share in just two years, with
42.4% of its newly registered vehicles being MHEVs by 2021. Other brands also showed rapid
MHEV market share increases within a short time. These trends in Europe illustrate that mild
hybrids are a cost-effective solution and that mild hybrid systems, at least P0 systems, can be
implemented rapidly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 16]
18 Tables 13-65 through 13-94 in the DRIA indicate that 100% of market share is comprised of Turbol2,
ATK, and BEV technologies for all cases except for Alterative 1, where 100% of market share includes 6%
strong hybrids but still no mild hybrids.
19 ICCT 2022 48V hybrid: Mild-hybrid vehicles: A near term technology trend for C02 emissions
reduction; https://theicct.org/publication/mild-hybrid-emissions-jul22/.
20 Pollard, T. (2018, June 2). Alfa Romeo GTV and 8C return, Maserati Alfieri is a PHEV and diesel is
killed off. CAR Magazine, https://www.carmagazine.co.uk/car-news/industry-news/fiat/fiat- chrysler-ceo-
sergio-marchionne- outlines-2022-plan-strategy/.
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown (5,465 signatures)
I am writing today to express my opposition to the EPA's proposed rule regarding tailpipe
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1702]
I am worried that the pace of transition outlined in this proposed rule is too quick for our
economy and infrastructure to handle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1702]
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Under this rule, two-thirds of all light-duty vehicles sold in the United States would
essentially be required to be all-electric by 2032. Considering electric vehicles only made up 6
percent of total sales in 2022,1 am concerned about how such a large gap will be bridged
quickly. Even if achievable, forcing the market to transition before the necessary resources and
infrastructure are ready raises many concerns and challenges. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1702]
Also, by focusing the EPA's emissions reduction strategy on electric vehicles, this plan could
ultimately leave additional reductions on the table by not encouraging the use of lower carbon
fuels in the internal combustion vehicles that we currently have on the road considering these are
likely to remain on the road for several more years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1702]
In conclusion, the EPA should work with Congress and other stakeholders to craft a policy
that balances and addresses emission reduction goals while addressing serious questions about
infrastructure readiness and its impact on Americans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1702]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
In addition, sales of all-electric Mercedes-Benz passenger cars doubled in 2022, and electric
sales continue to accelerate as we've sold more than 20% more EVs in 2023 through May than
for all of 2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 2]
Organization: Minnesota Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
Each year, sales of new vehicles displace a small fraction of the existing vehicle fleet. EPA
estimates that 67% of new vehicles sales will be battery electric in 2032. The projections for
battery electric vehicle adoption are based on very few—and very small—real-world data points.
See generally 88 Fed. Reg. 29,187-90. Battery electric vehicles made up 5.8 percent of the new
light-duty passenger vehicle market in 2022. Id. at 21,190. EPA needs these sales to increase by
a factor of ten over the next 8 years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 4]
Clearly, a large number of new vehicles that burn liquid fuels will continue to be produced for
many years, and those vehicles will remain on the road for many additional years. According to
data from the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Lab,2 16% of passenger cars and
32% of light-duty trucks remain on the road for more than 20 years. If new electric vehicles are
more expensive or less attractive to consumers, older liquid- fueled vehicles will remain on the
road even longer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 4]
2 Davis and Boundy, "Transportation Energy Data Book: Edition 40", Oak Ridge National Laboratory
report ORNL/TM-2022/2376, February 2022; https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf.
Organization: National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)
The proposed rulemaking assumes that BEVs will be the dominant technology for future
emissions reductions. But relying on a single technology is a risky strategy; many factors could
interfere including the supply and/or cost of critical minerals, lack of BEV recharging
infrastructure, slow ramp-up of wind and solar power, poor customer acceptance of BEVs in
some market segments, etc. EPA estimates that 67% of U.S. vehicles sales will be BEVs in 2032,
but most major automakers predict much lower BEV sales, and the world's largest automaker
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predicts only 20% in 2030. For comparison, MIT predicts9 that China will achieve only 40% in
2030 despite a head start and extremely strong government interventions. EPA should not base
mandatory emissions standards on unrealistic predictions ofBEV sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0643, p. 4]
9 https ://news.mit.edu/202 l/chinas-transition-electric-vehicles-0429
It is essential for EPA to utilize life cycle analysis to create a "level playing field" which
encourages speedy adoption of HEVs, PHEVs, FFVs, and other technologies (in addition to
BEVs) to achieve the most rapid, affordable, robust, and practical GHG emissions reductions in
a wide range of vehicle segments, while satisfying diverse customer needs and preferences.
Europe is already making progress towards regulation based on life cycle analysis. 10 11 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 4]
10 https://www.goldmansachs.eom/intelligence/pages/briefly/from_briefings_21-Jan-2020/new-era-in-co2-
regulation.pdf
11 Sala et al., "The evolution of life cycle assessment in European policies over three decades",
International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment, December 2021; https://doi.org/10.1007/sll367-021-
01893-2
Organization: National Farmers Union (NFU)
III. A More Balanced Solution is Needed to Address the Slow Turnover of the Vehicle Fleet
Sales of new vehicles displace a small fraction of the existing vehicle fleet each year. EPA
estimates that 67% of new vehicles sales will be battery electric in 2032,6 but clearly large
numbers of new vehicles which burn liquid fuels will continue to be produced for many years,
and those vehicles will remain on the road well into the future. The table below shows the
survival rates for cars and light trucks by vehicle age.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 4-
5]
6 EPA April 12, 2023 Press Release, Biden-Harris Administration Proposes Strongest-Ever Pollution
Standards for Cars and Trucks to Accelerate Transition to a Clean-Transportation Future,
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris-administration-proposes-strongest-ever-pollution-
standards- cars-and; see also 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,329.
7 Stacy C. Davis and Robert G. Boundy, Transportation Energy Data Book: Edition 40, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, ORNL/TM-2022/2376, at 3-20 (2022), available at https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf (citing EPA).
[See original comment for Table 3.15: Survival Rates for Cars and Light Trucks by Vehicle
Age] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 4-5]
Based on this data, 16% of passenger cars and 32% of light-duty trucks remain on the road for
more than 20 years. If new electric vehicles are more expensive or less attractive to consumers,
older liquid-fueled vehicles will remain on the road even longer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0581, pp. 4-5]
The proposal basically assumes that BEVs will be the dominant technology for future
emissions reductions. But relying on a single technology is a risky strategy; many factors could
interfere such as the supply and/or cost of critical minerals, lack ofBEV recharging
infrastructure, slow ramp-up of wind and solar power, poor customer acceptance of BEVs in
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some market segments, among others. EPA estimates that 67% of U.S. vehicles sales will be
BEVs in 2032, but other projections are lower and the U.S. lags behind other countries that are
not expected to reach similar levels of sales as predicted by EPA.26 EPA should not base
mandatory emissions standards on unrealistic predictions of BEV sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0581, p. 12]
26 See, e.g., Nancy W. Stauffer, China's transition to electric vehicles: By 2030, 40 percent of vehicles
sold in China will be electric; MIT research finds that despite benefits, the cost to consumers and to society
will be substantial, MIT News, Apr. 29, 2021, https://news.mit.edu/2021/chinas-transition-electric-
vehicles-0429.
Organization: National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA)
The historic passage of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and Inflation Reduction Act
underscores the immense public investment now available for ZEVs and associated
infrastructure. This public support is being further met with significant private investment from
manufacturers and associated entities, while interest in EVs and ZEVs at the individual consumer
level is expanding year after year. For instance, more than a quarter million battery-electric
vehicles were sold in the first quarter of 2023 alone — a nearly 45% increase over the same
period last year. 17 Unlike past EPA efforts that may have relied on expected future
improvements in technologies, EVs and ZEVs are here now and are growing as a share of the
LDV and MDV market. While ZEV technology will continue to improve and evolve, a rapid
transition to ZEVs is already the clear option when it comes to the on-road vehicle technology
that achieves the greatest degree of emission reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0607, p. 4]
17 Cox Automotive, Another Record Broken: Q1 Electric Vehicle Sales Surpass 250,000, as EV Market
Share in the U.S. Jumps to 7.2% of Total Sales (Apr. 12, 2023), https://www.coxautoinc.com/market-
insights/q1 -2023 -ev-sales/.
Organization: North Dakota Farmers Union (NDFU)
Slow Turnover of the Vehicle Fleet
Sales of new vehicles displace a small fraction of the existing vehicle fleet each year. EPA
estimates that 67% of new vehicles sales will be battery electric in 2032.5 Even if that growth is
achieved, large numbers of new vehicles that burn liquid fuels will continue to be produced for
many years, and those vehicles will remain on the road well into the future. The table below
shows survival rates for cars and light trucks by vehicle age.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586,
p. 3]
5 Environmental Protection Agency (2023, April 12). Biden-Harris administration proposes strongest-ever
pollution standards for cars and trucks to accelerate transition to a clean-transportation future [Press
Release]. Retrieved from https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris-administration-proposes-
strongest-ever- pollution-standards-cars-and.
6 Davis, S. C., and Boundy, R. G. (2022, June). Transportation energy data book: Edition 40. Oak Ridge
National Laboratory. Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy. Retrieved from https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf.
Based on this data [See original comment for Table 3.15, Survival Rates for Cars and Light
Trucks by Vehicle Age], 86% of passenger cars and 78% of light-duty trucks remain on the road
for 10 years. Moreover, 16% of passenger cars and 32% of light-duty trucks remain on the road
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for 20 years. If new electric vehicles are more expensive or less attractive to consumers, it is
reasonable to assume older liquid-fueled vehicles will remain on the road even longer. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 3]
The proposal basically assumes that BEVs will be the dominant technology for future
emissions reductions. But relying on a single technology is a risky strategy. Many factors could
interfere with BEV production, including the supply and cost of critical minerals, lack of BEV
recharging infrastructure, slow ramp-up of wind and solar power, poor customer acceptance, and
more. EPA estimates that 67% of U.S. vehicle sales will be BEVs in 2032, but other projections
are lower and the U.S. lags behind other countries that are not expected to reach similar levels of
sales in that timeframe. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 5]
10 Stauffer, N. W. (2021, April 29). China's transition to electric vehicles: By 2030 40 percent of vehicles
sold in China will be electric; MIT research finds that despite benefits, the cost to consumers and to society
will be substantial. MIT News. Retrieved from https://news.mit.edu/2021/chinas-transition-electric-
vehicles-0429.
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
As EPA notes in the NPRM, even with increasing sales of electric vehicles, there will be a
portion of new vehicle sales that will continue to be combustion albeit at decreasing rates.
Porsche believes it is important to recognize that these future combustion vehicles will include
fully phased-in Tier-3 and LEV-III program requirements. As such, these vehicles will be
certified to emissions levels and fleet averages that both EPA and CARB have projected to
deliver significant, meaningful reductions in pollutants from new light-duty vehicles. Across the
industry, fully phased-in Tier-3 and LEV- III fleets will reflect fleet average performance
equivalent to Super Ultra Low Emissions Vehicle performance, commonly referred to as
SULEV. Many of these new vehicle sales will replace older, higher emitting models often
characterized as "gross emitters". Porsche recognizes that both LEV-IV and Tier-4 have sought
to identify opportunities for further, incremental improvements in emissions control. Some of
these proposals are projected by CARB and EPA to be achievable through changes in emissions
control algorithms (i.e., software or calibration strategies), while others may need to rely on new
emissions control hardware or other physical changes to emissions control systems. Porsche
recommends that EPA carefully consider the extent to which these potential incremental gains
beyond the foundational benefits of Tier-3 may consume engineering resources and drive
increased costs considering the industry's general shift towards electrification. Porsche offers
these comments to help inform a balanced outcome that identifies cost-effective improvements in
emissions performance that will allow manufacturers to focus resources on the expansion of
zero- emission electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 8]
Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)
IX. EPA's Proposed Rule Ignores Marketplace Realities and Underestimates Barriers to the
Adoption of Battery Electric Vehicles
The challenges associated with electrifying the light- and medium-duty fleet are significant.
The speed at which the Agency appears to anticipate the market and consumers will transition to
electric vehicles is divorced from our assessment of reality. The proposed rule does not appear to
appreciate the market obstacles associated with such a massive transition in vehicle technology,
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energy infrastructure, or consumer behavior. Several of the most pressing challenges are further
discussed below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 14-15]
a. Slow turnover of the vehicle fleet
Sales of new vehicles displace a small fraction of the existing vehicle fleet each year. EPA
estimates that 67% of new vehicles sales will be battery electric in 2032, but clearly large
numbers of new ICE vehicles that use liquid fuels will continue to be produced for many years,
and those vehicles will remain on the road for many additional years. According to data from
Oak Ridge National Lab, 16% of passenger cars and 32% of light- duty trucks remain on the
road for more than 20 years. 31 The Oak Ridge data also show that the average age of vehicles on
the road is approximately 15 years. If new EVs are more expensive or less attractive to
consumers, older liquid-fueled vehicles will remain on the road even longer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0602, pp. 14-15]
31 Davis and Boundy, "Transportation Energy Data Book: Edition 40", Oak Ridge National Laboratory
report ORNL/TM-2022/2376, February 2022; https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf.
Low-carbon liquid fuels in existing vehicles can achieve GHG reductions faster than new
electric vehicles can displace the existing fleet. As shown in the figure below from a recent Fuels
Institute report, a relatively simple change such as replacing E10 (10% ethanol) with E15 (15%
ethanol) can offer greater GHG reductions than the phase-in of battery electric vehicles, because
it can immediately affect a large fleet of vehicles that are already in use.32 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0602, pp. 14-15]
32 Fuels Institute. "Decarbonizing Combustion Vehicles: A Portfolio Approach to GHG Reductions." June
2023.
[See original comment for Figure 21: Light- and Medum Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions
Reduction Scenario (2022-2032)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 14-15]
Organization: Senator Shelley Moore Capito et al.
The situation for infrastructure to support charging of light- and medium-duty vehicles is only
slightly better, with your Agency touting the availability of 130,000 public chargers in its press
release announcing its proposals.6 Setting aside their significant reliability issues and lack of
broad geographical availability, even a rapid expansion of the number of operational chargers is
unlikely to meet the demand for the electrification of two-thirds of the new vehicle fleet by 2032.
For reference, 2022 was the worst year for US car sales in a decade with 13.7 to 13.9 million
new vehicles sold due to inflation, economic uncertainty, and supply chain disruptions.7 Two-
thirds of that depressed sales figure would still represent more than 9 million new vehicles per
year being added to the cumulative demand on public charging infrastructure by 2032. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5083, pp. 2-3]
6 Biden-Harris Administration Proposes Strongest-Ever Pollution Standards for Cars and Trucks
to Accelerate Transition to a Clean-Transportation Future, US EPA (Apr. 12, 2023).
7 Wayland, Michael. Automakers are cautiously optimistic for a 2023 rebound after worst new
vehicles sales in more than a decade, CNBC (Jan. 6, 2023).
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In addition to pushing larger, heavier, and more expensive BEV s, domestic automakers are
losing money on this transition and are passing costs on to consumers in the form of higher
prices for both internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles and BEVs.9 Ford's electric vehicle
business unit is on track to lose $3 billion this year. 10 GM announced it will lose money on
BEVs until 2025.11 And the Chevy Bolt, cited by multiple members of the Bi den
Administration as an affordable alternative is being discontinued in favor of higher-priced
electric SUVs and trucks. 12 Unless economies of scale and a significant reduction in the cost of
presently foreign-sourced input commodities for BEV production reduce costs - the likelihood
for both of which remain highly uncertain - ICE vehicle buyers will continue to subsidize
purchasers of BEV s directly through taxpayer subsidies and paying fuel excise taxes into the
Highway Trust Fund, as well as indirectly through increased sales prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-5083, p. 4]
9 Borney, Nathan. Gas-powered vehicles are paying for their own funeral, Axios (Mar, 23, 2023).
10 Lienert and Gomes. Ford sees $3 billion pretax loss in its EV business this year, Reuters (Mar.
23, 2023).
11 Holderith, Peter. General Motors Will Lose Money on Its Electric Cars Until 2025: Report, The
Drive (Nov. 14, 2022)
12 Seifert, Dan., GM killed the Chevy Bolt - and the dream of a small, affordable EV, The Verge (Apr.
26, 2023).
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
EPA fails to consider the negative societal consequences and second-order cost effects of its
proposals.
In putting forward regulatory proposals designed to force upon the American people a vast
and rapid industrial transformation, EPA has an obligation to go further than just considering the
direct cost effects of its proposals (which are themselves woefully under- estimated, as
highlighted above); it must also consider the broader indirect economic con- sequences and
negative societal costs that would follow if these rules are finalized as pro- posed. So far in these
rulemakings, the Agency has either ignored or deliberately down- played these second-order
effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
Some of the most consequential burdens and negative ramifications of the proposed rules that
EPA hides, disregards, or minimizes include the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647,
pp.15-16]
• Increasing the purchase price of all new vehicles. Notwithstanding EPA's gaming of the
numbers, the true costs of the industrial transformation forced by the EPA's proposed rules will
be spread across the automakers' fleets, resulting in a significant increase in the prices of all new
vehicles, with greater price increases concentrated on those vehicles for which the demand is
highest relative to supply. All Americans will be harmed by these price increases, but the biggest
losers will be lower-income Americans who cannot afford to buy an EV or to pay more for a gas-
powered vehicle at the dealership, as well as those who live in rural areas and need to drive
longer distances and for whom EVs are impractical. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-
16]
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• Destroying jobs in the U.S. auto industry. The loss of popular new vehicle options and the
significant price increases at the dealership will mean that fewer new vehicles will be
purchased—almost certainly far fewer than EPA is predicting. This drop-off in demand will
challenge the profitability of the auto industry and lead to a loss of jobs for tens of thousands of
America's autoworkers, as well as a loss of jobs in the many U.S. companies that supply inputs
for the production of auto- mobiles and heavy trucks.40 The United Auto Workers union has
warned of the potential for job losses from the transition to EVs,41 as automakers announce
more plant closures and layoffs due to the costs of electrification.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 15-16]
40 See Technality, "Ford Just Proved How Far Ahead Tesla Really Is: Profitability May Continue to Be a
Struggle for All Legacy Automakers," May 10, 2023, https://medium.com/tech-topics/ford-just-proved-
how-far-ahead-tesla-really-is-6a4d95cff519 ("Despite wanting to be a fully-electric brand by 2035, as of
Q4 2022, Ford's average net margin on the Mustang Mach-E was -40.4%. Unfortunately, that's a figure
that's only gotten worse since, to the point where Ford is now losing an average of $58,000 for every EV
sold.").
41 See Press statement, United Auto Workers, "UAW Statement on Job Cuts at Stellantis," April 26, 2023,
https://uaw.org/uaw-statement-job-cuts-stellantis.
42 See Michael Wayland, "Stellantis to indefinitely idle Jeep plant, lay off workers to cut costs for EVs,"
CNBC.com, December 9, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/09/stellantis-to-idle-jeep-plant-lay-off-
workers-to-cut-costs-for-evs.html.
• Causing more deaths and serious injuries on America's highways. As new vehicle models
become unaffordable or unappealing, many American families will be left driving older and
older used cars, and the age of the nation's auto fleet will rise dramatically. Already, the average
age of a car on the road in the United States is approaching 13 years, and many cars are on their
fifth or sixth owners. The aging of the American fleet has very negative safety consequences, as
NHTSA statistics show that older vehicles are much less safe than newer models in an
accident.43 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
43 See https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/newer-cars-safer-cars_fact-sheet_010320-
tag.pdf.
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Since the release of the proposed rule, figures indicate that in Q1 2023 the U.S. recorded the
highest BEV sales increase (64%) ever.80 Continuing this rapid growth has led to estimates that
by 2024 every third commercially newly registered car could be an electric vehicle.81 This
increase is consistent with other projects of rapid BEV sales growth. Some analysts predict that
by 2026 60% of new models will be BEVs and PHEVs.82 Others suggest recent forecasts, like
those of IEA, still significantly underestimate the pace of electrification. 83 Still other analysts
project that BEVs could account for 90% of sales by 2027.84 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792,
p. 12]
80 Strategy& (PwC), Electric Vehicle Sales Review Ql-2023: From 2024, every third commercially
registered car could be an electric vehicle (May 15, 2023) available at h
ttps://www.strategyand.pwc.com/de/en/industries/automotive/electric-v ehicle-sales-review-2023-ql.html
81 Id.
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82 Automotive News, Car Wars study: By 2026, 60% of new models will be EV, hybrid (June 30, 2022)
(citing a Bank of America Merrill Lynch Car Wars study predicting automakers will launch roughly 245
new models over the next four years.) available at h ttps://www.autonews.com/sales/car-wars-study-2026-
60-new-models-will-be-ev-hybrid?utm_source=dont-m
iss&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20220630&utm_content=hero-headline
83 Sustainability by the Numbers, Electric cars are the new solar: people will underestimate how quickly
they will take off (May 8, 2023) available at h ttps://hannahritchie.substack.com/p/ev-iea-p
rojections?utm_source=cbnewsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_term=2023-05- 0
9&utm_campaign=Daily+Briefing+09+05+2023
84 Ark Invest, Sales of Gas-Powered Vehicles Could Collapse 85% In the Next Five Years (Nov. 21, 2022)
available at h ttps://ark-invest.com/newsletters/issue-343/
Fourth, the agency has not included projected U.S. sales volumes, and ramp of such sales,
from a number of emerging BEV-only manufacturers, including Rivian, Lucid, VinFast. Nio,
and Fisker. Estimates of the combined U.S. sales from these BEV manufacturers range from
almost 234,000 vehicles in 2026 to just under 340,000 in 2032. See Figure 6. Projected North
American BEV-Only OEM Sales (Non-Tesla). Combined with the aforementioned severe under
projections of Tesla sales, this oversight further results in the agency significantly
underestimating the projected volume of BEV sales, under calculating the potential buildup of
the overall credit bank available for compliance and, when correctly considered, leads to
supporting increasing the stringency of the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 19]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 6. Projected North American BEV-Only OEM
Sales (Non-Tesla) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 19]
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
Light duty sales are overestimated
The study assumes that the proposed rule will decrease light duty vehicle sales by no more
than 0.35% in any year (2027), and in some years may actually increase sales (2029 and 2029).
(See Table 171.) These results are inconsistent with standard economics: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0674, pp.13-14]
- As noted above, the rule will increase ownership costs of vehicles, resulting in fewer car
purchases;
- Current EV prices, even with tax credits, are substantially above comparable gasoline-
powered vehicle or hybrid vehicle prices.
- By definition, regulations reduce consumer choices, leading to less consumer activity.
- If the proposed rule were not a binding constraint on consumer choices, consumers would be
purchasing the same vehicles without the rule. The Administration wants the rule to change
consumer behavior, not to reinforce it.
For these and other reasons, the number of vehicles purchased under the rule will be
substantially less than without the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 13-14]
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Organization: Transport Evolved LLC (Transportation Consultancy)
We would add:
1) Transport Evolved also favors a move away from allowing transfer of credits both from
year-to-year and from automaker-to-automaker. This allows some automakers to benefit from the
hard work of others, and also reduces the incentive for individual automakers to develop their
own clean vehicle platforms. While some argue that it incentivises automakers to build and sell
EVs, in many other markets the vast majority of automakers (including Stellantis, Ford, GM, and
Honda) have fully electric offerings which are not offered for sale in the US. The choice of those
automakers not to equip those vehicles for sale here should not be rewarded. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0453, p. 1]
2) Some vehicles (for example, the GMC Hummer EV), use substantial resources that could
be used for electrifying multiple smaller vehicles and, at the same time, require substantially
more energy to produce and to travel the same distance as a smaller, more efficient vehicle. As
such, we would also support moves to more substantially reduce or remove the benefit within the
calculation (the "medium duty multiplier") for automakers for building larger, heavier, less
efficient vehicles where those vehicles are expected to substitute for a light duty passenger
vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0453, p. 1]
Organization: U.S. Chamber of Commerce
- Vehicles sold today are on average 30% more fuel efficient than vehicles sold in 2004,
helping to drive a 6% reduction in transportation sector C02 emissions even as overall vehicle
miles traveled have increased by about 10%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0604, p. 1]
- Nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from model year 2025 vehicles will be 57% lower than
vehicles sold in 2004, and 95% lower than those sold in 1994—a major contributor to the more
than 20% reduction in ozone levels during that time period.
- More than 90 models of vehicles currently achieve over 40 miles per gallon in fuel
efficiency.
- Availability of electric vehicle options has increased dramatically, with 150 different models
expected to be available within the next few years
- Automakers have announced plans to invest at least $110 billion in domestic EV
manufacturing and battery production by the end of the decade. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0604, p. 1]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
a) EPA does not adequately characterize vehicle purchase costs.
ZEVs are more expensive on average than their ICE vehicle counterparts and unaffordable for
many households—in the first calendar quarter of 2023, the average price of top-selling light-
duty BEV in the U.S. was about $15,000 more than the average price of top- selling ICE
vehicles. 161 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 33-35]
161 S&P Global, "Tracking battery-electric vehicle prices - 2023 update" at 9 (May 2023).
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According to S&P Global, the ten-top selling light-vehicle models in the U.S. market during
Q1 2023 were as followsl62: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 33-35]
162 S&P Global, "Tracking battery-electric vehicle prices - 2023 update" at 9 (May 2023). All MSRP
values (starting price) were taken from Kelley Blue Book,
https://www.kbb.com/?ds_rl=1293870&gad=l&gclid=eaiaiqobchmigidqxf-
d_wiva2xvbbla2azaeaayasaaegkj[jpd_bwe&gclsrc=aw.ds&psid=20003&utm_campaign=kbb_na_na_nation
aleverg reensite-
visits_na_na&utm_content=keyword_text_na_na_na_20003_na&utm_medium=sem_brand-
core_perf&utm_source=google&utm_term=kelley%20blue%20book
Retail price heat map of top-10 selling LV models for BEV & ICE powertrain in Q1 2023
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 33-35]
Rank BEV 163 2023 MSRP 164 (USD)
165 2023 MSRP (USD)
1 Tesla Model Y $47,490
150 $34,695
2 Tesla Model 3 $40,240
1500 $35,600
3 Volkswagen ID.4 $37,495
1500 $36,820
4 Ford Mustang Mach-E $42,995
RAV4 $27,575
5 Ford F-150 Lightning $55,974
250/350 $43,970/$45,015
6 Chevrolet Bolt $26,500
Tacoma $27,250
7 Tesla Model X $98,490
Camry $25,945
8 Hyundai Ioniq 5 $41,450
1500 $36,400
9 BMW i4 $51,400
Equinox $26,600
10 Rivian R1T $73,000
Rogue $27,360
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 33-35]
163 BEV = battery-electric vehicle.
164 All MSRP values (starting price) were taken from Kelley Blue Book,
https://www.kbb.com/?ds_rl=1293870&gad=l&gclid=eaiaiqobchmigidqxf-
d_wiva2xvbbla2azaeaayasaaegkj[jpd_bwe&gclsrc=aw.ds&psid=20003&utm_campaign=kbb_na_na_nation
aleverg reensite-
visits_na_na&utm_content=keyword_text_na_na_na_20003_na&utm_medium=sem_brand-
core_perf&utm_source=google&utm_term=kelley%20blue%20book
165 ICE = Internal combustion engine vehicle; MHEV = mild-hybrid electric vehicle.
Based on MSRP starting price data from Kelley Blue Bookl66, the average price of the top
10 selling BEVs was approximately $51,503 for Q1 2023. By contrast, the average price of the
ICE & MHEV
Ford F-
Chevrolet Silverado
Ram
Toyota
Ford F-
Toyota
Toyota
GMC Sierra
Chevrolet
Nissan
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top 10 selling ICE & MHEV167 in the U.S. was approximately $32,274 during the same
period. 168 This makes for a $19,230 differential in the average prices of the 10 top selling 2023
BEV and ICEV/MHEV vehicles—a material delta for many demographics. 169 By contrast, the
per capita and median household incomes in the United States are approximately $37,638
and $69,021, respectively. 170 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 33-35]
166 https://www.kbb.com/?ds_rl=1293870&gad=l&gclid=eaiaiqobchmigidqxf-
d_wiva2xvbbla2azaeaayasaaegkjjpd_bwe&gclsrc=aw.ds&psid=20003&utm_campaign=kbb_na_na_nation
aleverg reensite-
visits_na_na&utm_content=keyword_text_na_na_na_20003_na&utm_medium=sem_brand-
core_perf&utm_source=google&utm_term=kelley%20blue%20book
167 ICE = Internal combustion engine vehicle; MHEV = mild-hybrid electric vehicle.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Over 2017-2021, in 2021 dollars. U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts - United States,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/SEX255221.
Moreover, in April 2023, GM announced the discontinuation of its best-seller electric vehicle,
the Chevrolet Bolt at the end of 2023, despite having sold more than 161,000 vehicles since its
introduction to the market in 2016.171 Instead, the company plans to use its capacity at GM's
Orion Township Michigan assembly plant to produce larger electric trucks starting in 2024.172
The Chevy Bolt has been "repeatedly touted by the Biden administration as an example of an
affordable EV."173 Moreover, "[t]he Bolt EV and EUV don't have direct replacements waiting
in the wings", 174 And the Chevy Equinox EV "going on sale this year will take over the role of
GM's entry-level EV, albeit with a starting price over the $30,000 mark." 175 Accounting for the
discontinuation of the Chevy Bolt in the above-mentioned data, the average cost of the 9 top-
selling BEVs rises to approximately $54,282, with price differential between the ICE & MHEV
average being equivalent to approximately $22,008. This further exacerbates price disparity
concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 33-35]
171 S&P Global, EV Essentials (May 22, 2023) at 3.
172 Andrew J. Hawkins, "GM is ending Chevy Bolt EV and EUV production at the end of the year". The
Verge, https://www.theverge.eom/2023/4/25/23697356/gm-chevy-bolt-ev-euv-end-production; See also
Caleb Miller, "2023 Chevy Bolt EV and EUV Dead after This Year". Car and Driver.
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a43698537/2023-chevrolet-bolt-ev-euv-ending-production/
173 David Shepardson, "GM to end production of Chevrolet Bolt EV later this year". Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/gm-end-production-first-mass-market-ev-this-year-
2023-04- 25/.
174 Caleb Miller, "2023 Chevy Bolt EV and EUV Dead after This Year", Car and Driver.
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a43698537/2023-chevrolet-bolt-ev-euv-ending-production/
175 Id.
Organization: Wisconsin Automobile and Truck Dealers Association
The EPA has lost sight of the multi-track plan to reduce multi-pollutant emissions. Substantial
reductions can be accomplished through the continued development of internal combustion
engines (ICE), the increased use of hybrid vehicles, plug-in hybrids, plug-in battery, hydrogen
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fuel cells, as well as new or immerging technologies. A genuine concern arises from consumers
getting priced out of the new vehicle market. Dealers are already being notified by automobile
manufacturers that products will be limited in states. CARB (California Air Resources Board)
states are being notified they will receive fewer ICE vehicles and non-CARB states will receive a
limited amount of EVs (electric vehicles). To further compound the problem, automobile
manufacturers are going to have to reassign resources to build the number of EVs required in
CARB states. That will create fewer ICE vehicles to be distributed throughout the remaining
states. When demand is high and inventory is limited, prices increase. The ICE vehicles will
quickly escalate to the level of current EV prices. A substantial price increase, coupled with
higher interest rates will slow any transformation of consumers to cleaner vehicles. In turn, this
will create a strong market for previously owned vehicles containing dated technology and
higher levels of pollutants being emitted . [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0494, p. 1]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Commenters including the Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Alliance) and Renewable
Fuels Association (RFA) stated that the projected EV market share is too high. RFA stated that
the projections of BEV penetrations do not account for market obstacles to the transition.
Commenters, including the Arizona State Legislature, stated that the projections of costs in the
rule are too high, and erroneously rely on federal tax credits. Minnesota Corn Growers
Association (MCGA) commented that the BEV projections in the rule are based on very few real
world data points. National Corn Growers Association (NCGA), National Farmers Union (NFU),
and North Dakota Farmers Union (NDFU) commented that mandatory emissions standards
should not be based on unrealistic BEV sales predictions. They stated that relying on a single
technology for future emissions reductions is risky because that technology could be influenced
by many factors.
The Alliance for Consumers (AFC) stated that EPA failed to consider how ICE vehicle profits
and EV losses interplay in the sale of EVs, and that EPA failed to address the effects of
removing or replacing ICE vehicles with EVs on the ability of automakers to price EVs at
current, what they perceive as, money-losing levels.
Some comments were focused on automaker announcements. AmFree, API and others stated
that automaker announcements cannot be used to support the justification for the rule, and they
cannot be counted on. Some commenters stated that manufacturers may revise their plans or fail
to meet targets, and others stated that these statements rely on federal regulations, so relying on
them in proposing the rule is circular. Others, like EDF and ICCT, commented on the fact that
we missed some automaker announcements in our proposal, outlining additional announcements
surrounding the planned production and sale of electric vehicles over the next five to ten years,
or more. EDF also commented that market developments and manufacturer plans support the
feasibility of the rule. ICCT and other commented that the IRA will result in increased EV sales
across all vehicle types, as well as bolster EV manufacturing, battery production and industrial
development.
AmFree, API and others commented that EPA does not indicate whether there will be
additional EV offerings in affordable segments by the time the rule becomes effective,
continuing on to state they doubt there will be affordable offerings. API stated that the ZEV
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projections in the proposal will be challenging even given investments supported by the IRA and
BIL, giving examples of barriers to uptake. API stated that AEO projections are well below
EPA's estimates in the proposal, and commented that EPA must explain why they are so
different. On the other hand, commenters including California Attorney General's Office stated
that ZEV tech is already in wide use, and that penetration in increasing quickly. CEVA
commented that though availability and diversity of commercial ZEVs has improved, there are
still barriers to a diverse supply of cost competitive ZEVs. CEVA also commented that strong
standards are necessary and manufactures and fleet operators rely on technology driving federal
regulations to help close the supply-demand gap for ZEV commercial vehicles.
American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) commented that it is uncertain that
the critical minerals needed to support the batteries for the EVs projected by this rule will be
available. The also stated that they are uncertain the electric grid will be able to support the
charging needs created by this rule.
AFPM commented that the timeline for this rule is unachievable and relies on a general
characterization of the number of models currently available on the free market, as opposed
actual number of vehicles sold, supplemented by the BIL and IRA incentives. AFPM is uncertain
the consumers will purchase EVs at the rate assumed in the analysis for the proposal. They stated
that the future availability of ZEVs will not be sufficient to meet ZEV adoption requirements
proposed by EPA. AFPM also stated that auto manufacturers could not justify long term EV
investment without federal regulations given tepid consumer demand. AFPM also commented
that there is not enough charging, uncertain utility and grid capacity, and not enough domestic or
allied supply of battery critical minerals.
API commented that EPA should account for EVs being less reliable than ICE vehicles due to
software reliability issues, and that increasing the efficiency of ICE vehicles is promising and
cost-effective.
Some commenters, including a collection of state offices and departments in Colorado
(Colorado) and the Electrification Coalition (EC), commented in support of a strong, robust rule.
Colorado stated that strong standards are important to progress air pollution and equity
improvements. EC stated that the standards will lead to economies of scale in electrical vehicle
production, which will lead to more affordable EVs and support access and benefits for
disproportionality impacted communities.EC stated that the strongest possible standards will
significantly limit GHG emissions and accelerate the adoption of electric vehicles. A collection
of Environmental, and Public Health Organizations (EPHO) recommended EPA adopt a
modified version of Alternative 1.
The Energy Strategy Coalition (ESC) commented that, given incentives and regulatory
dynamics, public market projections are in line with EPA projections of BEV penetration. EPHO
commented that sources that model ZEV outlook including the impact of the IRA in the baseline
are most relevant to EPA projections. They also stated that there are additional studies EPA
could cite that have become available since the publication of the proposal.
EPHO commented that EPA's mandate to protect public health and welfare is more urgent
than ever due to climate change and stated that ZEVs are feasible and cost-reasonable, BEV and
PHEV technology is improving, and PEV adoption is driven by strong consumer demand and
greater model choice. They commented that the growing consumer demand for ZEVs is
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demonstrated by automaker commitments. EPHO also commented that there are numerous
emission control technology options for ICE vehicles as well, which have potential for greater
application within the fleet. EPHO noted that the flexibility of the program and the fact that EPA
did not include PHEVs or improvements to ICE vehicles could lead to lower BEV projections
that EPA estimated. Wisconsin Automobile and Truck Dealers Association commented that
substantial emissions reductions are achievable through the application of ICE technology,
hybrids, hydrogen fuel cells as well as new or emerging technology.
Some commenters focused on the availability of infrastructure, the electric grid, and the
vehicle supply chain. EPHO commented that all three of these industries will be able to
accommodate the projected level of BEVs, and a strong regulatory signal will only make them
better. Senator Shelley Moore Capito et al. (Senator Capito) commented that it is unlikely there
will be chargers to meet the demand for electrification.
EPHO commented that EPA should include ACC II in the baseline, since CARB has
submitted the waiver request. They go on to state that more stringent standards than proposed are
feasible and justified even without ACC II in the baseline. EPHO commented that EPA did
include a sensitivity with ACC II in the baseline, though they noted that the sensitivity did not
seem to include all the states who have adopted or intend to adopt ACC II by the time of the final
regulation. EDF commented that even though AEO 2023 estimated low and unrealistic ZEV
sales, their estimates show that robust nationwide ZEV adoption will result due to current state
actions, namely those in ACC II and the section 177 states. GFI commented that the No Action
baseline may be conservative because EPA did not incorporate manufacturer announcement or
ACC II. They also stated that, regardless of EPA regulations, a steep growth in EV adoption is
expected over the next several years because the U.S. has reached a tipping point in the EV
adoption S curve. ICCT also commented that ACC II will lead to increased EV sales, focusing
on California and the other states that will adopt the regulation. National Parks Conservation
Association (NPCA) commented that electric vehicles are growing as a share of the LD and MD
markets, and that a rapid transition to ZEVs is the clear option to achieve emission reductions.
Tesla commented that EPA did not include any newer BEV only manufacturers in sales
projections, which led to a significant underestimation of projected BEV sales.
The Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University Law School (IPI) commented that
EPA should give more explanation of scrappage, cost pass-through, and sales effects. They
stated that the treatment of scrappage in OMEGA is reasonable, but there is no discussion in the
proposal on scrappage, and that EPA should attempt to model scrappage in future standards. IPI
stated that EPA should clarify how producers expect consumers to value fuel costs, explaining
why consumers factor in fuel costs for 12,000 annually over 2.5 years while producer side
modeling uses an annual VMT factor of 15,000 miles.
The UAW commented that the proposal must support continued production and sales of ICE
vehicles. They stated that domestic automakers rely on the sale of ICE vehicles to fund
investments in the transition to electrification since EVs are not profitable. Senator Capito
commented that domestic automakers are passing higher costs on to consumers and that ICE
vehicles buyers will continue to subsidize purchasers of BEVs through taxpayer subsidies and
fuel taxes into the Highway Trust Fund, and through increased sale prices. Steven Bradbury
commented that EPA fails to account for the increased purchase price of all new vehicles, which
is especially harmful to lower income Americans who can't afford the higher prices. Valero
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commented that ZEVs are more expensive than ICE vehicles and are unaffordable for many
households.
John Graham commented that the proposal ignores improvements in mild hybrids, which are
rapidly gaining market share in Europe. They stated that European trends indicate that hybrids
are a cost effective solution.
Commenters in a mass comment campaign states that the pace of the transition is too fast for
the economy and infrastructure to handle, and that forcing the transition before resources and
infrastructure are ready is concerning. The commenters also stated that focusing on electric
vehicles could lead to fewer emission reductions by not focusing on encouraging lower carbon
fuels. They stated that the EPA should balance emissions reductions goals while addressing
serious questions about infrastructure readiness and the impact of the rule on Americans.
MCGA, NFU, and NDFU commented that liquid fuel burning vehicles will continue to be
sold for many years, and that more expensive EVs will lead to ICE vehicles staying on the road
longer. RFA stated that low carbon fuels can achieve GHG reductions faster than new EVs can
displace the existing fleet.
NCGA stated that EPA should use life cycle analysis in the determining this rule.
Porsche commented it is important to recognize that combustion based vehicles will include
fully phased in Tier-3 and LEV-III program requirements, and that EPA should carefully
consider potential incremental gains beyond Tier-3 that may consume engineering resources and
drive increased costs considering the shift towards electrification.
Steven Bradbury commented that EPA does not account for the loss of jobs that will result
due to reduced vehicle demand, and that EPA does not account for the safety issues that will
arise due to older, less safe vehicles staying on the road longer.
The Heritage Foundation commented that the sales impacts estimates in the proposal are
inconsistent with standard economics. They stated that increased ownership costs of vehicles will
lead to lower sales, EV costs will be much higher than ICE vehicles, and that the regulation will
reduce consumer choice. They also state that the administration wants to change consumer
behavior because if the rule were not a binding constraint consumers would purchase the same
vehicles without the rule. Wisconsin Automobile and Truck Dealers Association commented that
there will be fewer ICE vehicles available due to this proposal, which will lead to higher prices
and slow the transition to cleaner vehicles. They also commented that this will lead to increased
demand for used vehicles.
Transport Evolved commented in support of moving away from credit banking and trading, as
it allows some manufacturers to benefit from the hard work of other manufacturers. They also
commented in support of removing the MD multiplier because it benefits manufacturers that
produce larger, heavier, less efficient vehicles over smaller, more efficient vehicles.
Response:
Regarding comments that sales impact estimates in the proposal are inconsistent with standard
economics, we do not agree. The estimates of sales impacts for this rule are based on both
producer and consumer decisions, and include the impact of estimated vehicle prices. RTC
Chapter 12.1 discusses producer and consumer side modeling for this rule. RIA Chapter 4.4.1
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discusses how sales impacts were modeled in OMEGA using an elasticity of demand for new
vehicles. The results discussed in RIA Chapter 4.4.2 estimate that there will be slightly fewer
new vehicles sold due to the final rule.
We agree that the availability of electric vehicles in the market has been growing, both in the
number of and models available for purchase. We also agree that PEVs are an important options
for manufacturers to consider on the pathway to achieving significant emissions reductions from
the light- and medium-duty vehicle market, and that these emissions reductions are important to
public health and welfare. Regarding comments on the availability of electric vehicles, as well as
how that may affect vehicle purchases, see Section 13 of this RTC. Regarding Tesla's comment
that EPA did not include any BEV only manufacturers in determining the baseline, we note that
we have updated our baseline since the proposal. Regarding comments on the baseline, or the
No Action case, used in the final rule, see Section IV.B of the preamble.
Regarding comments that the rule needs to support continued production and sale of ICE
vehicles, and that the availability of ZEVs in the future will not be enough to meet EPA
requirements and that emissions reductions are achievable through technology other than ZEVs,
we note that this rule is not a ZEV mandate and manufacturers are free to meet the standards
using the mix of vehicle technologies that is best for their fleets. The main analysis for this rule
assumes one possible pathway to compliance, though, as discussed in preamble IV.F and G,
there are many possible pathways to compliance that utilize many different vehicle technologies,
including ICE, hybrids, PHEVs and BEVs. Regarding comments that manufacturers could not
justify investment in EVs without federal regulations, or that EVs are not profitable we note that
manufacturers have been producing vehicles with varying degrees of powertrain electrification,
including ranging from mild hybrids to full battery electric, for many years before this rule. For a
discussion of consumer demand of electric vehicles, see RTC Section 13. Also, as mentioned
above and discussed in RIA Chapter 2.6.4, the analysis for this rule allows for cross-
subsidization as part of the producer decision making process, ensuring that producers are able to
influence the pricing structure of the vehicles they produce in order to meet the standards in the
manner they choose. In addition, we note that the social cost analysis for this rule accounts for
costs exclusive of transfers (like fuel taxes), and shows that there are significant social benefits
expected from this rule.
Regarding comments on scrappage and cost pass-through, see RTC Section 12.1. Scrappage is
also discussed in RIA Chapter 4.4.2. Also, we note that we have always assumed full cost pass-
through in LD vehicle regulations in our estimates of consumer impacts. Assuming otherwise
might suggest lower consumer costs, therefore this assumption provides us with a conservative
estimate. Regarding comments on using a different VMT for producer and consumer side fuel
cost assumptions, we note that we have updated our analysis to align the assumption for
producers and consumers to both assume 15,000 annual miles in fuel savings estimates.
Regarding comments from IPI that we should model scrappage in future regulations, and support
further research on pass-through, we note that these are topics EPA will continue to refine for
possible future regulations. For more information on topics in the comment provided by IPI,
refer to responses in Sections 13.2 and 13.3 of this RTC.
Regarding comments on automaker announcements surrounding electrified vehicles, we note
that we have updated our discussion of these announcement in Section IV of the preamble. In
addition, as noted in Section 13 of this RTC, mentioning or citing any one study, statistic or
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information source should not be confused with relying on that information to justify the rule.
This information may be supporting information for our analysis, need for this rule, or
background information. For information on the justification of this rule, see Sections III and V
of the preamble. For information on the IRA and other federal actions discussed in this
regulation, see Section I.A of the preamble. Regarding comments from EPHO and others on the
effects of ACC II, as discussed in RTC Section 12.1.3, at the time of this final rulemaking EPA
has not yet granted a waiver to California for the ACC II program, and the agency believes it
would be inappropriate to prejudge the outcome of the waiver request process for program that is
still under consideration by the Administrator.
Regarding comments that the timeline for this rule is unachievable, we note that the final
standards for both GHGs and criteria pollutants are phased in over time. For information on the
phase-ins for this final rule, see Sections III.C and D of the preamble.
Regarding comments on PEV adoption rates, projections of ZEVs in our rule, and the market
share of vehicle technologies projected in the analysis for this rule, see responses in RTC Section
13 and RTC Section 12.5.3.
Comments regarding costs are addressed in RTC Sections 8 and 12.
Regarding comments on the ZEV outlook sources EPA cited in the proposal, as well as
sources that EPA did not cite, see the updated discussion in RIA Chapter 4.1.
Regarding comments that EPA failed to address automaker abilities to cross-subsidize, we
disagree. OMEGA incorporates cross-subsidization into producer decisions. This is discussed in
RIA Chapter 2.6.4.
Regarding comments from API that EPA must explain the difference between AEO
projections and EPA estimates, see RIA Chapter 8.1, which describes how we use AEO 2023 in
our OMEGA analysis. In addition, RIA Chapter 8.2 discusses consistency of OMEGA results
with AEO projections.
Regarding comments from API and others on advantages or disadvantages of PEVs over ICE
vehicles, including conjectures that EVs are less reliable, see Section 13.2 of the RTC.
The availability of affordable vehicles is also discussed in Section 13 of the RTC. Section
13.4 of the RTC contains a discussion of the cost competitiveness of ZEVs.
Regarding comments on the availability of critical minerals, see Section 15 of this document.
Regarding comments on charging availability, see RTC Section 17.
Regarding comments on the electric grid, see RTC Section 18.
Regarding comments about lower carbon fuels, see RTC Section 19.1.
Regarding comments on the LEV-III and Tier-3 programs, see RTC Section 4.1.
Regarding comments on the adoption of the proposed, or stronger, standards, see Section 1.1
of the RTC.
Regarding comments about employment effects of this rule, see RTC Section 20.
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Regarding comments on safety impacts of this proposal, see RTC Section 22.
Regarding comments life cycle analysis, see responses in RTC Section 19.2.
Regarding comments that this rule will lead to reduced fleet turnover and fuel burning
vehicles staying on the road longer, we refer to Section 12.1.3 of the RTC.
Regarding comments on banking and trading and comments on the MD multiplier, see RTC
Section 3.1.
14.1 - Limited vehicle choice
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Consumers (AFC)
Alliance for Consumers, by way of its Executive Director, O.H. Skinner, files this comment to
highlight the ways in which the proposed rule fails to serve the interests of everyday consumers
and how EPA's proposal is procedurally and substantively deficient and should not be finalized.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, pp. 1-2]
The current EPA proposal is best understood as yet another attempt to weaponize the agency
rulemaking process, and the power of the federal government, to wipe away things that everyday
consumers overwhelmingly like, use, and rely upon for life's essential needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0534, pp.1-2]
EPA is proposing to replace a majority of the cars on the market today with EVs that are
currently unpopular with everyday consumers in most parts of the country and do not work
within the household budgets of those who need cars to help their families thrive. And that is
before considering how EPA's proposed rule is premised on speculative, wholesale changes to
other parts of the economy and our national infrastructure outside the purview of EPA (e.g., the
energy grid). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, pp. 1-2]
Make no mistake, this is a proposal to forcibly remove from the market a majority of the cars
that everyday consumers currently buy and use. The EPA Fact Sheet for the proposal focuses
throughout on electric vehicle technology as the critical aspect of the proposed rule, from how it
was conceived, through how it would be complied with. See, e.g., EPA Fact Sheet, "Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles," Apr. 2023, at 1 (highlighting EV technologies and support for a "rapid shift away
from" "internal combustion engine (ICE) technologies"); id. at 2 (focusing on "vehicle
electrification technologies" as central to proposed standards); id. at 6 (emphasizing electric
vehicle costs and benefits throughout cost-benefit analysis section). 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0534, pp. 1-2]
1 Fact Sheet available at https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1017626.pdf.
And then there is the failure by EPA to consider adequately that certain automakers may be
forced to limit the sale of ICE vehicles in order to meet the proposed requirements, limiting the
availability of cars nationwide, driving up prices, and limiting options for consumers, especially
those with families. This consequence is currently playing out with at least one automaker in
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response to California-led EV mandates. See Patrick George, Stellantis Is Restricting Gas-Only
Car Sales In 14 U.S. States Including California And New York, TheAutopian, June 16, 2023;
see also Attached Exhibits, infra. Given the stringency of the proposal, and the limited consumer
appetite for expensive EVs with limited use-cases for many families (especially larger families),
it is a possible aspect of the problem that automakers will be forced to limit the sale of larger,
ICE vehicles to something well below the levels that would otherwise be supported by consumer
demand in order to meet the requirements EPA is currently considering. Yet EPA did not
adequately consider or address this reality, despite it being one that would have dramatic
negative consequences for everyday consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0534, pp. 4-5]
Organization: American Highway Users Alliance
We are skeptical that the GHG and criteria reductions estimated by EPA can be realized in the
proposed rule's timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 4-5]
We noted above the substantially greater cost of EVs. With such a cost differential (even if
the differential is reduced somewhat in coming years), many consumers and businesses can be
expected to keep and maintain existing vehicles (average age just over 12 years) rather than pay
for new, much more expensive electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 4-5]
Additionally, the cost of the vehicle itself is not the only consideration for a consumer in
making a purchasing decision. Many businesses and hard-working families will not purchase a
vehicle unless both the vehicle and fuel are cost effective and meet their needs. At this point the
availability of charging stations, while increasing, seems unlikely to approach the current
ubiquitous availability of fuel at gas stations within the time frame of the rule. That could result
from various electricity supply and transmission issues, including the time delay and cost
involved in building out more connections between the grid and charging stations.4 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 4-5]
4 A statement submitted to EPA in conjunction with EPA's May 3 hearing in the heavy-duty vehicle Phase
3 docket by ABF Freight System, a major trucking company with over 4,500 Class 8 and Class 6 vehicles,
noted a wait of 2 years and counting for added utility infrastructure at a facility to support the company's
current EV trucks (only 6) and anticipated EV truck purchases.
For such reasons the benefits of the proposed rule as estimated by EPA appear to be
overstated, as the vehicle fleet will not turn over to EVs as quickly as EPA estimated. Further,
the proposed rule will limit consumer choice and the mobility of the American public. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Delek US Holdings, Inc.
EPA's Proposed Rule is based on the flawed notion that vague corporate goals are sufficient
to prop up the incredulously stringent standards. EPA relies, in part, on the "proliferation of
announcements by automakers" to achieve increased electrification rates between 2030 and
2040," but these broad and general statements are just that - goals.5 In reality, the U.S.
Department of Energy forecasts ICE-power cars will continue to dominate U.S. sales through
2050.6 And LD fleets take approximately two decades to turn over completely.7 Indeed, analysts
estimate that even with ZEVs making up 25% of new sales by 2035, only 13% of vehicles on the
road would be electric.8 Thus the transition to ZEVs will be, and must be, gradual—regardless of
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regulatory mandates— and much more gradual than EPA's anticipated growth from 4.4% to
upwards of 67% in a mere nine years. EPA's proposed standards must better account for these
real market conditions and, at the very least, propose more feasible and realistic emissions
standards reflective of actual, practicable ZEV adoption rates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527,
p. 3]
5 Proposed Rule at 29,19-92.
6 Notably, the U.S. Energy Information Administration ("EIA") predicts that the global light-duty electric
vehicle fleet will grow to only 31% by 2050, indicating ICE vehicles will continue to dominate global sales
through at least that time. EIA, "EIA projects global conventional vehicle fleet will peak in 2038" (Oct. 26,
2021), available at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.phpfiid=50096.
7 Brad Plumer et al., THE NEW YORK TIMES, Electric Cars Are Coming. How Long Until They Rule
the Road?" (Mar. 10, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.eom/interactive/2021/03/10/climate/electric-
vehicle-fleet-turnover.html; see also Virginia McConnel and Benjamin Leard, RESOURCES FOR THE
FUTURE, "Progress and Potential for Electric Vehicles to Reduce Carbon Emissions" (Dec. 8, 2020),
available at https://www.rff.org/publications/reports/potential-role-and-impact-evs-us-decarbonization-
strategies/#:~:text=Passenger%20vehicle%20fleets%20take%20approximately,important%20in%20the%
20following%20decades.
8 Brad Plumer, supra at 7.
Organization: Matthew DiPaulo
My company produces motor oil for passenger car vehicles with proprietary formulations
which exceed industry specifications, improve fuel economy, reduce emissions, and can be used
in hybrid vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1514, p. 1]
The premature rush to transition the U.S. vehicle fleet to EV's will reduce my sales.
The large-scale shift to electric vehicles, which would comprise two-thirds of all new-car
sales in the U.S. by 2032 under this proposal, will hurt workers, small businesses, and consumers
while doing little to help the environment. The proposed rule would lead to fewer vehicle choices
for individuals and families, reducing the selection of vehicles that fit their household budgets
and unique needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1514, p. 1]
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
EPA fails to consider the negative societal consequences and second-order cost effects of its
proposals.
In putting forward regulatory proposals designed to force upon the American people a vast
and rapid industrial transformation, EPA has an obligation to go further than just considering the
direct cost effects of its proposals (which are themselves woefully under- estimated, as
highlighted above); it must also consider the broader indirect economic con- sequences and
negative societal costs that would follow if these rules are finalized as pro- posed. So far in these
rulemakings, the Agency has either ignored or deliberately down- played these second-order
effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
Some of the most consequential burdens and negative ramifications of the proposed rules that
EPA hides, disregards, or minimizes include the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647,
pp.15-16]
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• Stifling consumer choice at the dealership. Many of the vehicle models most pop- ular with
American families will no longer be sustainable under the EPA's proposed rules. Automobiles
have long been America's favorite freedom machines. When the models of ICE vehicles
Americans love the most disappear from dealerships, that will represent an enormous drop in
consumer welfare (in basic happiness and well- being) for the average American family and for
the U.S. economy as a whole. For many of these ICE vehicle models, there is no EV option
likely to be available that could provide the same performance, utility, or recreational value at a
comparable price (or at all). EPA makes no real effort to quantify this generational loss of
consumer welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
iii. Recent New EV Model Announcements
In 2022, the number of available EV models worldwide reached 500, up from below 450 in
2021 and more than doubling relative to 2018-2019.272 In particular, OEMs are expanding their
SUV and pickup truck offerings in line with consumer demand. Consumer Reports has compiled
a noncomprehensive list of at least 30 new EVs in a variety of makes and models that are
expected in the U.S. by the end of 2024.273 In addition to new models from legacy automakers,
there are a number of new entrants expected in 2024 including Fisker, Indi, Polestar, and
VinFast. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 73-74]
272 Id. at footnote 27
273 "Hot, New Electric Cars That Are Coming Soon," Consumer Reports, (June 9, 2023)
https://www.consumerreports.org/hybrids-evs/hot-new-electric-cars-are-coming-soon-al000197429/
In the United States, there were fewer than 100 models available in 2022, but twice as many
as before the pandemic.274 EV model availability has been growing quickly, at a compound
annual growth rate of 30% over the 2016-2022 period. Such growth is to be expected in a
nascent market with a large number of new entrants bringing innovative products to the market,
and as incumbents diversify their portfolios. Even companies that had previously urged caution
on EV commitments are shifting towards greater electrification. Toyota plans to release at least
10 EV models by 2026. It is also restructuring to create a unit solely dedicated to electric
vehicles.275 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 73-74]
274 "Global EV Outlook 2023 Catching up with climate ambitions," IEA, (2023)
https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/dacfl4d2-eabc-498a-8263-9f97fd5dc327/GEVO2023.pdf
275 Id. at footnote 261
In the future, the number of models can be expected to continue to increase quickly, as major
carmakers expand their EV portfolios and new entrants strengthen their positions, particularly in
emerging markets and developing economies.276 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 73-74]
276 Id. at footnote 2
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EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Commenters stated that this rule will lead to reduced vehicle choices for consumers. AFC
stated that this rule is going to forcibly remove vehicles from the market that consumers like and
rely on, replacing most ICE vehicles with unpopular, expensive EVs. Steven G. Bradbury
commented that the proposal is designed to force a rapid industrial transformation and will lead
to stifled choice at the dealership where American families will not be able to purchase a vehicle
that fits their needs. Bradbury continues on to state that EPA does not attempt to quantify this
loss in consumer welfare. ZETA commented that availability of EV models has grown very
quickly, and is expected to continue to grow.
AFC also stated that the rule is premised on speculative changes to national infrastructure,
like the energy grid. They commented that this rule fails to consider that automakers may be
forced to limit ICE sales to meet requirements, which will increase prices and further limit
options for consumers. The American Highway Users Alliance (AHUA) commented that higher
prices will lead to reduced fleet turnover - consumers will keep used vehicles longer and that this
means that the benefits of the rule are overstated. AHUA also stated that it is unlikely that EV
charging will be available to a level as ubiquitous as the current fuel availability at gas stations.
They also state that the rule, in addition to limiting consumer choice, will limit consumer
mobility.
Delek commented that basing the rule on automaker announcements is flawed and that DOE
forecasts indicate that ICE vehicles sales will continue to dominate vehicle sales far into the
future, and that fleet turnover will take longer than EPA anticipates. They stated that the
standards must better account for real market conditions and be reflective of actual, practicable,
ZEV adoption rates.
Matthew DiPaulo commented that the shift to EVs under the proposal will hurt workers, small
businesses and consumers while doing little to help the environment.
Response:
We do not agree that this rule will lead to reduced vehicle choice. This rule is not a ZEV
mandate and allows manufacturers to meet the standards in the most effective way for their fleet,
which is expected to lead to the lowest cost path for each manufacturer, yet still achieve the
public health and welfare benefits associated with the reduced level of emissions set by the rule.
As described in Section IV.F and G of the preamble, we demonstrate that there are multiple
pathways to compliance, and that these pathways will continue to offer a wide range of mixes of
technologies in the fleet for consumers to choose from, including various mixes of ICE vehicles,
strong hybrid vehicles, PHEVs and BEVs. Specifically, EPA has concluded that the standards
could be met by additional PHEVs and has identified several additional compliance pathways,
with a wide range of BEVs, that can be achieved in the lead-time provided and at a reasonable
cost. In all of these pathways, manufacturers continue to produce ICE vehicles. Indeed, as shown
in RIA Chapter 8.2, EPA's central case modeling shows that over 84 percent of the on-road fleet
will still use gasoline or diesel in 2032, and 58 percent will in 2055. In addition, the increased
fuel economy and associated fuel savings via PEV and ICE vehicle technologies provided to
consumers in the new vehicle market will also eventually be available in the used vehicle market.
Overall, we expect consumers to continue to have access to a wide variety of vehicle choices
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under the standards. More on continued vehicle choice can be found in RTC Section 13.1. For
more information on fleet turnover, see section 12.1.3 of the RTC.
Because we do not agree that this rule will lead to consumers being unable to purchase a
vehicle that fits their needs, we do not agree that we should estimate a loss of welfare associated
with this. In addition, as discussed in RIA 4.4, we hold performance constant in our analysis,
meaning that we deter the need to estimate potential consumer welfare loss due to foregone
vehicle attributes.
We do not agree that this rule will limit consumer mobility. In fact, we believe that consumer
mobility will increase because of the decreased operating costs we estimate will occur due to this
rule. As also discussed in Section 13 of the RTC, many consumers commented that PEVs serve
the interest of many consumers. Not only will consumers be able to purchase the vehicles they
need, but we estimate that operating costs are going to fall, from significant fuel savings for all
vehicles and repair and maintenance savings for PEVs, as described in Sections VIII.B.3 and
VII.C of the preamble and Chapter 4 of the RIA. This will make each trip relatively less
expensive and, as a result, we estimate that under the "rebound effect" consumers will choose to
drive more; thus the rule will actually increase mobility for consumers. See RIA chapter 4.2.1.
Regarding comments that we did not consider vehicle availability or costs in our analysis, we
note that this rule uses the OMEGA model to estimate vehicles produced and sold, taking into
account the estimated costs of those vehicles. In RIA Chapter 2, we discuss the OMEGA model,
including the Consumer Demand module, which estimates the demand for vehicles given the
estimated purchase price and other factors, the Producer Module, which estimates the producers
will make given costs, policy inputs and other factors, as well as the interaction of the modules.
Regarding comments that the benefits of this rule are overstated, we refer to Section 8 of the
RTC, where we discuss benefits of this rule. We disagree that this rule will lead to little
environmental benefit, as described in Sections 8 and 11 of the RTC.
Regarding comments on the availability of EV charging in the future, see RTC Section 17.
For our discussion on the energy grid, including grid reliability, see RTC Section 18.
Regarding Delek's comments on basing the rule on automaker announcements, we address
this issue in RTC Section 14.
Regarding the comments that the standards must be reflective of actual ZEV adoption rates,
we refer to the discussion in Section 13 of the RTC.
Regarding comments about employment impacts, see Section 20 of the RTC.
For information on consumer impacts, see RTC Section 13.
For information on small business impacts, see RTC Section 25.1.
14.2 - Elasticity of demand
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Comments by Organizations
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Vehicle Demand Elasticity
The vehicle demand elasticity, which represents how sensitive consumers are to changes in
vehicle prices, is an important parameter in determining the costs and benefits of the proposal.
The greater the elasticity (in absolute value) that is assumed, the greater new vehicle sales
decline in response to price increases, potentially reducing the estimated emission benefits of the
proposal. CARB agrees with U.S. EPA that the vehicle demand elasticity assumption of -0.4 is
conservative, and thus overstating the effects of price increases, than other better-supported
elasticity estimates would suggest. According to a recent U.S. EPA report, once interactions
across new and used vehicle markets and other transportation options are accounted for in market
equilibrium, the -0.4 vehicle demand elasticity could effectively result in only -0.17 and -0.04
elasticities for new and used vehicles, respectively. 80 These interactions across markets affect
the new vehicle elasticity because as consumers substitute buying used vehicles in response to
increased cost of new vehicles, used vehicle prices would increase, reducing the incentive to
substitute away and implying a lower elasticity in market equilibrium. If the DRIA reflected
these better estimates, the estimated climate and public health benefits of the proposal would be
expected to be greater. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 49]
80 80 Jacobsen, M., R. Beach, C. Cowell, and J. Fletcher. The Effects of New-Vehicle Price Changes on
New- and Used-Vehicle Markets and Scrappage. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington,
D.C., July 31,2021.
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
XXIV. EPA's Consideration of Sales Impacts Is Reasonable, but the Agency Should
Consider Using a Sales Elasticity of Demand Lower in Magnitude for LDVs.
C. Alternative 1+ Results in the Highest BEV Sales Share of All Scenarios
Alternative 1+ results in the highest BEV sales share of all scenarios at 78% by 2032, which
helps spur higher in-use BEV share by 2040 (as depicted in Figure V.C-1). The BEV sales share
for Alternative 1+ is almost 10 percentage points more than what is projected to occur under
EPA Alternative 1 and 13 percentage points more than what is projected to occur under the EPA
Main Proposal and EPA Alternative 3 policy scenarios. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 29]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure V.C-1: Comparison of BEV Adoption Rate
Scenarios: Sales Share 108
108 ERM, Impacts Report at 7-8.
Based on Sales Share (shown in the left side graph), in-use ZEVs will continue to increase
under the Alternative 1+ scenario such that the 2040 in-use share is incrementally higher than all
other scenarios analyzed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 30]
Excerpt Text:
D. Alternative 1+ Achieves the Largest Share of In-Use BEVs of All Scenarios
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The graphs in Figure V.D-1 show projected shares of in-use vehicles through 2040. As
shown, a policy approach implementing our recommended Alternative 1+ provides the highest
in-use ZEV percentages of any scenario analyzed. Under this policy scenario, 50% of the light-
and medium-duty (L/MD) vehicles on the road are expected to be BEVs by 2040.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure V.D-1: Comparison of BEV Adoption Rate
Scenarios: In-Use Sharel09 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 30]
109 Id. at 7-8.
In this section, we turn to EPA's consideration of sales impacts. While we support EPA's
proposal to use a sales elasticity of demand of zero for MDVs, we recommend that it use a sales
elasticity of demand lower than -0.4 for LDVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 183]
A. EPA should consider using a sales elasticity of demand lower in magnitude than -0.4 for
LDVs.
EPA continues to use the new vehicle demand elasticity of-0.4 for its modeling of LDV sales
impacts, based on the Agency's final 2021 rule and a 2021 EPA peer reviewed report on this
topic. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,370.597 Recent research supports a sales elasticity value of-0.4, or one
even lower in absolute value, as EPA suggests. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29370 (noting that" -0.4
appears to be the largest estimate (in absolute value) for a long-run new vehicle demand
elasticity in recent studies," and that "EPA's report examining the relationship between new and
used vehicle markets shows that, for plausible values reflecting that interaction, the new vehicle
demand elasticity varies from -0.15 to -0.4"); see also 83 Fed. Reg. at 43075 (based on the
available research, the 2020 Rule NPRM conducted a data analysis and projected an elasticity in
the range of-0.2 to -0.3.)598 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 183]
597 Citing EPA, The Effects of New-Vehicle Price Changes on New- and Used-Vehicle Markets and
Scrappage, EPA-420-R-21-019 (2021),
https://cfpub.epa.gov/si/si_public_record_Report.cfm?dirEntryId=352754&Lab=OTAQ.
598 This number was actually incorrectly calculated and too high due to a spreadsheet error identified in a
Comment to the 2018 NPRM. It should be -0.07. See J.H. Stock et al., Comments on Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0283-6220, at 6-8 (Oct. 26, 2018). See also Brief
of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of Coordinating Petitioners, Competitive Enterprise Institute v.
NHTSA, D.C. Cir. No. 20-1145, at 26 (filed Jan. 21, 2021) (hereinafter "Amicus Brief of Economists").
Using a price elasticity of demand that is lower in absolute value could provide a more
realistic picture of the sales impacts of LDV GHG regulations, and EPA should consider whether
a value lower in magnitude than -0.4 is appropriate here. The price elasticity of demand for new
vehicles is a critical factor to consider in setting LDV regulations because without this input EPA
could not quantify the rule's effect on vehicle purchases. Changes in demand for new vehicles
can have an impact on jobs, emissions, safety, and other factors relevant to the net benefits of
revised standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 183-184]
Vehicles have different price elasticities depending on the timeframe considered, and sales of
automobiles tend to be less sensitive to price fluctuations, especially in the long run.599 This is
because in most areas of the United States vehicles are essential goods.600 EPA's Science
Advisory Board explained that while "a consumer can easily hold on to their existing vehicle a
bit longer[,] ... an old vehicle will not be functional forever, and thus the long-run price
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elasticity for new vehicles is likely to be smaller [in magnitude] than the short-run elasticity."601
Therefore, it is common to distinguish between short-run elasticity values (sales effects that take
place within one year of a price change)602 and long-run elasticity values (sales effects
beginning approximately five years into the future).603 Thus, the 2012 Final Rule explained,
while short-run elasticity may apply very briefly at the start of a program, "over time, a long-run
elasticity may better reflect behavior." 77 Fed. Reg. at 63102 n. 1300. Similarly, in the 2016
Midterm Evaluation Proposed Determination, EPA explained that "short run elasticity
estimate[s] . . . may not be appropriate for standards that apply several years into the future."604
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 184]
599 Howard, P. & M. Sarinksy, Turbocharged: How One Revision in the SAFE Rule Economic Analysis
Obscures Billions of Dollars in Social Harms, N.Y.U. Inst, for Policy Integrity, at 3 (Nov. 2020),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Turbocharged_How_One_Revision_in_the_SAFE_Rule_Econ
omic An alysis_Obscures.pdf ("Because automobiles are essential goods in most areas of the United States
(and lack any comparable substitute), both economic theory and observed behavior finds that vehicle sales
are relatively inelastic—meaning that price fluctuations produce just modest changes in vehicle sales").
600 See, e.g., Anderson P.L. et al., Price Elasticity of Demand (1997),
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/alada/files/price_elasticity_of_demand_handout.pdf.
601 EPA, Science Advisory Board (SAB) Consideration of the Scientific and Technical Basis of the EPA's
Proposed Rule titled The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-
2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0283-7659, at 22 (Feb. 27, 2020).
602 See Pindyck, R.S. & D.L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics (8th ed.), at 39 (1989) (describing short-run
elasticity as measuring "one year or less").
603 See Klier, T. & J. Linn, The Effect of Vehicle Fuel Economy Standards on Technology Adoption,
Resources for the Future Discussion Paper, at 3, 6 (Rev'd 2015),
https://media.rff.org/archive/files/document/file/RFF-DP-13-40-REV2.pdf (noting that long-run impacts
measure across engine design cycles, and that "models contain redesigned engines about once every five
years in the United States"); see also Amicus Brief of Economists at 20 (noting that "long-run" concerns
sales effects that begin approximately five to ten years into the future).
604 EPA, Proposed Determination on the Appropriateness of the Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards under the Midterm Evaluation, EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0283-
7640, at A-40 (Nov. 2016). See also NHTSA CAFE Model Peer Review, at B-35 (rev. July 2019) (advising
EPA and NHTSA that the long-run price elasticity of demand provides the "proper focus" for analyzing the
2020 Final Rule's impacts).
Because analyses of LDV GHG emissions standards project sales many years into the future,
the long-run price elasticity is the relevant value to apply to the analysis. And because vehicle
sales are less elastic in the long run, the price elasticity of demand for vehicles is substantively
lower in magnitude in the long run than in the short run. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp.
184-185]
The chart below provides a comprehensive review of current and historical long-run and
short-run elasticity estimates. 605 The median elasticity of the studies published since 2000
(including an outlier estimate) is approximately -0.35, with a mean of-0.4, and those numbers
decrease when looking only at studies published since 2010.606 The most recent reliable studies,
such as Leard (2021) and Stock et al. (2018), would support values even lower in magnitude than
-0.4. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 185]
605 This review included the sources cited by the agencies in the 2020 Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 24174
(June 29, 2020), as well as other relevant sources (in particular those in National Research Council, Cost,
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Effectiveness, and Deployment of Fuel Economy Technologies for Light-Duty Vehicles (June 2015), and
previous EPA rules) and more recent studies.
606 These values are consistent with a review done by several economists and detailed in an amicus brief
filed in the litigation over the 2020 Final Rule. That review considered what the economists viewed as the
four most relevant, distinct estimates of long-run elasticity based on original data analysis since 2000, and
found a long-run price elasticity of demand for vehicles subject to the Proposal of between -0.03 and -0.61.
See Amicus Brief of Economists at 25-26.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR TABLE: Sales Elasticity Estimates
607 Sean P. McAlinden et al., The Potential Effects of the 2017-2025 EPA/NHTSA GHG/Fuel Economy
Mandates on the U.S. Economy, Center for Automotive Research (Sept. 2016),
https://www.cargroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The-Potential-Effects-of-the-2017_2025-
EPANHTSA-GHGFuel-Economy-Mandates-on-the-US-Economy.pdf.
608 F. Owen Irvine, Jr., Demand Equations for Individual New Car Models Estimated Using Transaction
Prices with Implications for Regulatory Issues, 49 Southern Economic Journal 764-782 (Jan. 1983).
609 Andrew N. Kleit, The Effect of Annual Changes in Automobile Fuel Economy Standards, 2 Journal of
Regulatory Economics 151-172 (1990).
* McAlinden et al. (2016) conducted both a literature review, represented at the top of this
table, and separately produced its own elasticity estimates, shown here.
** Inconsistent estimates: Nerlove (1957) as long-run elasticity is higher than short-run
elasticity; Evans (1969) as elasticities are extreme outliers with long-run elasticity that is elastic
contrary to intuition in the literature; and Berry et al. (2004) as estimate was suggested by
General Motors staff despite "implying] a large (in absolute value) own-price semi-elasticity of
demand equal to -10.56" and conducted sensitivity analysis using -0.2 and -0.4 (the latter
producing more realistic own-price semi-elasticity) (Leard (2021)).610[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 187]
610 Benjamin Leard, Estimating Consumer Substitution Between New and Used Passenger Vehicles,
Resources for the Future 12 (rev. Aug. 2021), https://media.rff.org/documents/WP_19-01_rev_2021.pdf.
B. EPA is correct to use a sales elasticity of zero for MDVs.
For MDV sales impacts, EPA's Proposal assumes an elasticity of zero, reasoning that MDVs
largely serve commercial applications and that business owners are less sensitive to changes in
vehicle price. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29372. As EPA explains, "as long as the characteristics of the
vehicle do not change, commercial buyers will still purchase the vehicle that fits their needs,"
even with a change in price. Id. We agree with EPA that, for this reason, the literature examining
LDV sales elasticity does not directly translate to MDV sales elasticity, and that factors such as
the importance of fuel efficiency, warranty considerations, maintenance cost, and replacement
parts could be more relevant to commercial vehicle purchasers than changes in vehicle price.
DRIA at 4-43. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 187]
Attributes of MD ZEVs also could help to mitigate vehicle sales impacts, particularly for
commercial applications. For example, as with commercial HDVs, educating commercial MDV
purchasers regarding the benefits of ZEV ownership such as reduced operating and maintenance
costs can be especially effective in mitigating possible sales impacts, 88 Fed. Reg. at 26068,611
as TCO has long been a key consideration for commercial vehicle owners and operators.612 The
availability of data analytics tools for commercial fleets also makes it easier for commercial
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purchasers to understand and evaluate the TC0.613 Medium-duty ZEVs largely have reached
TCO parity with their conventional counterparts, or will in the very near future and by the time
period covered by the Proposed Rule.614 For commercial HDVs, EPA has projected little to no
sales impacts as a result of its newly proposed GHG standards, which are likely to be complied
with through increased ZEV penetration,615 and EPA is correct to do the same for MDVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 188]
611 See also, EPA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles: Phase 3, Draft
Regulatory Impact Analysis (Apr. 2023), at 411-412.
612 See, e.g., Seth Skydel, Determining ROI to Lower TCO, Fleet Equipment (Nov. 5, 2014),
https://www.fleetequipmentmag.com/truck-investment-cost-ownership/ (explaining the importance of TCO
to commercial fleets); David A. Kolman, The True Costs of a Truck Purchase, Fleet Maintenance (June 9,
2015), https://www.fleetmaintenance.com/home/article/12072830/the-true-costs-of-a-truck-purchase
("TCO is far more important than initial price when acquiring a vehicle"); Patrick Gaskins, Despite Initial
Cost, Purchase Decision is Always About TCO, Fleet Owner (Jan. 13, 2022),
https://www.fleetowner.com/operations/article/21213521/despite-initial-cost-purchase-decision-is-always-
about-tco ("Don't base your decision on whether to buy a new piece of equipment on the upfront cost
alone. Take the time to do a TCO calculation that includes both hard and soft costs. That will tell you
whether the time is right to buy."); ICCT & Ricardo Strategic Consulting, E-Truck Virtual Teardown Study
6 (June 11, 2021), https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Final-Report-eTruck-Virtual-Teardown-
Public-Version.pdf; ("Zero emission truck price should be viewed in the wider context of overall TCO.");
McKinsey Center for Future Mobility, Preparing the World for Zero-Emission Trucks 6 (Sept. 2022),
https://www.mckinsey.eom/~/media/mckinsey/industries/automotive%20and%20assembly/our%20insights
/preparing%20the%20world%20for%20zero%20emission%20trucks/preparing-the-world-for-zero-
emission-trucks.pdf (explaining that TCO is a "key factor" in deployment of zero-emission trucks).
613 See, e.g., Seth Skydel, Determining ROI to Lower TCO, Fleet Equipment (Nov. 5, 2014) (detailing
data analytics tools that aid fleets in making equipment purchase decisions based on TCO); David A.
Kolman, The True Costs of a Truck Purchase, Fleet Maintenance (June 9, 2015) (explaining the use of
telematics software in analyzing TCO, and noting that "OEM dealer sales representatives are trained on
effectively calculating TCO costs and on assisting truck buyers [to] evaluate and assess planned operation
of their trucks.").
614 Saxena et al., Electrification Cost Evaluation, at 26 ("While the economics vary based on several
factors, the TCO of most MY 2027 and MY 2030 class 2b-3 BEV types is lower than the TCO of
comparable ICEVs, largely due to BEVs' lower maintenance and energy costs. Across the vehicle types
and three scenarios of electrification considered in this report, the TCO of BEVs averages $0,334 per mile
(ranging from $0,291 per mile to $0.39 per mile), while the TCO of ICEVs averages $0,428 per mile
(ranging from $0,336 per mile to $0,574 per mile)."); Ari Kahn, et al., The Inflation Reduction Act Will
Help Electrify Heavy-Duty Trucking, RMI (Aug. 25, 2022), https://rmi.org/inflation-reduction-act-will-
help-electrify-heavy-duty-trucking/ (finding that the IRA will result in the TCO of electric trucks falling
below the TCO of comparable diesel trucks about five years faster than without the IRA).
615 EPA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles: Phase 3, Draft
Regulatory Impact Analysis (Apr. 2023), at 414.
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
It is critical that the impact of a potentially significantly higher new vehicle transaction price
on total sales be accounted for by the agency. Unfortunately, the agency's analysis is extremely
limited, as their sensitivity cases are independently analyzed and omit the possibility of IRA
being weakened. Honda attempted to quantify the impact that a "stacking" of uncertainties would
have on average new vehicle price. We examined average new vehicle price from OMEGA 2.0
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under EPA's proposal (shown in light blue in Figure 6, below), as well as the resulting increase
in price that would occur under two additional stacked scenarios: (1) elimination of IRA
incentives, and (2) EPA's high battery cost assumptions. As shown in Figure 6, the cumulative
impact of these two uncertainties could increase the average new vehicle price by more than
$8,600 (a 25% increase) in 2030, relative to the agency's proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0652, pp. 26-28]
Qualitatively, one would assume that such a significant increase in price would have a
noticeable quelling effect on new vehicle sales. Strangely, the agency's OMEGA output files
show very little impact on overall sales, despite the significant price increase. The agency's
modeled sales impacts show a long run demand elasticity of just -0.21, notably different than
values cited in EPA's Draft RIA as well as by other industry experts.46 47 As shown in Table 3
below, the implication of a different demand elasticity has a significant impact on the magnitude
of overall new vehicle sales. If actual demand elasticities are closer to -0.40 (EPA estimate) or -
0.61 (CAR estimate), loss of sales due to a 25% price increase would be between 1.5 million and
2.3 million new vehicle sales annually. One can speculate on the potential impact that such a loss
of sales would have both on the industry and the economy, as well as the impact on consumer
choice, vehicle affordability and equity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, pp. 26-28]
46 EPA, 2023. Draft RIA, p. 4-43. Available online at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
47 McAlinden et al., 2016. The Potential Effects of the 2017-2025 EPA/NHTSA GHG/Fuel Economy
Mandates on the U.S. Economy. Center for Automotive Research. Available online at
https://www.cargroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The-Potential-Effects-of-the-2017_2025-
EPANHTSA-GHGFuel-Economy-Mandates-on- the-US-Economy.pdf
Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
Based on OEM fleet electrification investment and production plan announcements and
federal subsidies in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the IRA, EPA
contends that EV technologies have advanced to such a degree that EVs now "are a feasible way
to greatly reduce emissions" and can be used "as an emissions control technology to comply
with" the proposed standards. 15 EPA projects that, although "[t]he proposed standards are
performance-based and do not mandate any specific technology...or any vehicle type[,]" new
light-duty EV sales will increase from 36 percent in MY 2027 to 67 percent in MY 2032.16 EPA
also projects new medium-duty EV sales ranging from 17 percent in MY 2027 to 46 percent in
MY 2032.17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 3-4]
15 88 Fed. Reg. at 29194, 29284, 29341-44.
16 88 Fed. Reg. at 29329.
17 88 Fed. Reg. at 29331.
EPA also projects that its proposed standards will cause new light-duty vehicle sales to
decrease a small amount during the first two years, increase a small amount in the next two
years, and then decrease by a small amount in the final two years. 18 EPA projects no change in
new medium-duty vehicle sales as a result of its proposed standards based on an assumption that,
because commercial buyers "are less sensitive to changes in vehicle prices than personal vehicle
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owners[,]" they will not "change purchase decisions if the price of the vehicle changes" and "will
still purchase the vehicle that fts their needs."19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 3-4]
18 88 Fed. Reg. at 29370.
19 88 Fed. Reg. at 29371.
5. EPA's Sales Projections Are Inaccurate.
In discussing its sales response model, EPA states that it used "a demand elasticity of -0.4 for
[light-duty] vehicles based on an EPA peer reviewed report (U.S. EPA 2021)."51 EPA assumes
that a one percent increase in the average price of new vehicles produces a 0.4 percent decrease
in new light-duty vehicle sales. EPA then concludes that its proposed standards would result in
only a small change in total new light-duty vehicle sales, which equate to -0.35 percent in 2027, -
0.13 percent in 2028, 0.07 percent in 2029, 0.05 percent in 2030, -0.15 percent in 2031, and -0.29
percent in 2032.52 NADA takes issue with EPA's -0.4 percent demand elasticity assumption and
the accuracy of its light-duty sales impact projections. Curiously, EPA's demand elasticity
response for light-duty vehicles is significantly smaller than the -1.0 elasticity of demand
NHTSA used in its most recent fuel economy mandates, and thus implies much smaller price-
related impacts on new vehicle sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 10-11]
5188 Fed. Reg. at 29370-71.
52 Id.
As depicted in the table below [See original attachment for table of sales projections],
NADA's sales projections differ significantly from EPA's sales projections and show sales
declines in all six years covered by EPA's proposal.53 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 10-
11]
53 NADA calculates forecasted price increases using the average year-over-year increase in new vehicle
transaction prices from 2016-April 2023 YTD. During this period, new vehicle prices increased annually,
on average, by 4.62 percent. Note that because price increases in 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 were
abnormally high due to circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic and the semiconductor microchip
shortage, NADA assumes an annual new vehicle transaction price increase of only 2% for 2024-2032.
54 See DRIA Table 13-45. p. 13-25.
NADA believes EPA's sales impacts are significantly understated based on its use of demand
elasticity of -0.4 and asserts that the -1.0 used by NHTSA is a more appropriate elasticity of
demand. Nevertheless, based on EPA's assumed demand elasticity of -0.4 percent, the proposal's
projected regulatory costs, and reasonable assumptions about increased new light- duty vehicle
prices, NADA's analysis suggests that the price increases associated with EPA's proposed
standards (and regulatory alternatives) will result in much more significant negative sales
impacts. For example, in 2027 EPA projects a sales decline of just 0.35%. After accounting for
the additional conservatively forecast market-based price increases, and using EPA's own
demand elasticity metric, NADA estimates a new light-duty sales decline of 1.3%, nearly four
times greater than EPA's estimate. Sales impacts in subsequent years are understated as well.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 11-12]
EPA did not disclose the baseline pricing data, historical or forecast, on which it relied to
calculate its sales projections. Consequently, NADA is unable to fully assess whether EPA's
projections are premised on data from outside the regulatory impact period. NADA urges EPA to
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clarify (and rationalize) how it computed average baseline new vehicle transaction prices, and
how it derived its sales impact forecast due to the proposal's increased regulatory costs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 11-12]
NADA also questions EPA's assumption and use of a demand elasticity of zero when
modeling the medium-duty vehicle sales impacts of its proposal. Goods with a demand elasticity
of zero are referred to as "necessity goods" for which no reasonable substitute is available.
Assuming commercial customers need medium-duty vehicles to run their businesses, they are
unlikely to purchase new vehicles if unaffordable or if they fail to meet their business use case
needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 11-12]
As discussed above and elsewhere, new medium-duty vehicles are not "necessity goods" in
that prospective purchasers have several alternative options. For example, prospective
commercial medium-duty customers almost always have the option to keep existing vehicles on
the road longer than they might otherwise with enhanced maintenance and repair strategies that
may even include engine and/or vehicle re-building. Alternatively, they may meet their needs
with used vehicles, often at costs significantly lower than that of new medium-duty vehicles
subject to EPA's proposed standards. Consequently, NADA urges EPA to use at least a -1.0
elasticity of demand when calculating the impact of its proposed standards on new medium-duty
sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 11-12]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Comments from CARB stated that the elasticity EPA used in the proposal is conservative, and
better, smaller estimates would likely lead to greater estimated climate and public health
benefits. Comments from the Environmental and Public Health Organizations stated that, though
the consideration of sales impacts in the proposal is reasonable, EPA should consider using
smaller elasticity of demand for light duty vehicles, though they agree with the medium duty
elasticity of demand of zero used in the proposal. They state that the analysis for this rule
supports a long run elasticity, and therefore a smaller elasticity is more relevant.
Honda commented that the long run sales elasticity in the modeled sales impacts is noticeably
different than the -0.4 value cited in the proposal, and if demand elasticities are actually closer to
that -0.4 level, vehicle sales impacts will be much larger than EPA estimates.
NADA commented that sales impacts in the proposal are understated, the elasticity used in the
proposal is too small, and EPA should use an elasticity of -1, like NHTSA used in their recent
rules, rather than -0.4 values EPA uses.
NADA commented that the elasticity of demand of zero used for MD vehicles is questionable
because MD vehicles are not "necessity goods" and the EPA should also use an elasticity of
demand of -1 for MD vehicles. NADA points out that MD customers have the option to keep
existing vehicles on the road longer rather than purchase a new vehicle, or may purchase a used
vehicle instead of a new one.
Honda commented that the impact of higher purchase prices must be accounted for in the total
sales estimates for this rule. They also stated that the sensitivity cases analyzed by EPA are
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independent and make the analysis extremely limited, and the EPA does not include the
possibility of the IRA being weakened.
NADA commented that EPA did not disclose the baseline pricing data that was relied on to
calculate sales projections, and the EPA should clarify and rationalize how average baseline new
vehicle transaction prices were estimated. They also commented that EPA should clarify how
sales impacts of increased costs were forecast.
Response:
We agree with CARB that the elasticity measurement use in our modeling is conservative,
and smaller estimates would lead to greater estimated benefits. Regarding comments that EPA
should use a different elasticity of demand for LD vehicles, we point to our discussion in RIA
Chapter 4.4, where we note the reasons for using an elasticity of demand smaller than -1, as well
as why we chose -0.4 as opposed to something smaller. We note that commenters who disagreed
with EPA's choice of elasticities used in the analysis did not provide additional data to support
these views. EPA believes that our choice of vehicles sales elasticities remains appropriate as it
is based on the best available science in the record, as discussed further in RIA Chapter 4.4.
Regarding the comment that MD vehicles are not "necessity goods", we note that necessity
goods are generally goods that are inelastic with respect to income, not with respect to price, for
example tobacco, and medications. Goods with a demand elasticity of 0, or perfectly inelastic
demand, are those whose purchase quantity doesn't change with respect to their own price. Some
of these are necessities (like food or water), but others are things that will remain in demand even
if the price changes.
Commercial vehicle owners purchase vehicles based on the needs of their business, and we
expect them to be less sensitive to changes in vehicle price than personal vehicle owners. As
such, we generally expect that purchasers will purchase the MDV that meets their needs. In the
short run, it is theoretically possible increased upfront costs may lead to short run sales impacts
not modeled here. Short run impacts may include purchasers opting to keep their vehicles on the
road longer, or to buy a used vehicle. With respect to purchasers who decide to keep their
vehicles on the road longer, we note that this will likely increase the cost of maintenance and
may impact the cost of operating the vehicle. As pointed out by other commenters, operating
cost, including maintenance costs and fuel efficiency, are strong motivators in the purchase
decisions of MDV purchasers. Thus, and as we further explain based on our review of past
studies relating to pre-buy and low-buy in preamble VIII.H.2, we expect any possible pre- or
low-buy that may occur in the medium-duty segment as a result of this rule would be small and
short lived.
Further, these short term impacts will likely even out in the long run. The elasticities in our
analysis are long-run elasticities and reflect long-run changes in the market. In the long run, for
example, even if a purchaser decides to keep a used MDV for a longer period of time, that used
vehicle will eventually be replaced with something that costs less to maintain and operate. This
rule is estimated to lead to decreased operating costs for both ICE and PEV vehicles. In addition,
assuming the market served by the MDV purchasers does not grow or shrink, one MDV
purchaser buying a used vehicle will mean another MDV purchaser buying a new vehicle due to
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the finite number of used vehicles that will meet the needs of the individual MDV purchaser
available in the market.484 .
Regarding comments that the impact of increased purchase price must be accounted for in our
analysis, as well as that estimated elasticity of demand is not -0.4 as EPA assumes, we note that
the OMEGA model used to estimate impacts from the rule includes the estimated purchase price
of the vehicles, and therefore we do not agree that purchase price was not accounted for in the
sales estimates. In addition, regarding comments that the modeled sales results show an impact
much different than the -0.4 percent elasticity, as discussed in Chapter 4 of the RIA, the elasticity
of demand is one input into the estimate of consumer demand for vehicles in OMEGA and the
estimate of a change in final new vehicle sales as a function of the change in final new vehicle
price (or cost) will not return a value of -0.4. Regarding comments that EPA should use a sales
elasticity of-1.0, as NHTSA has used, we note that in the most recent CAFE standards proposed
in July 2023, NHTSA uses a sales elasticity of -0.4.485 For more information on how the
elasticity of demand is implemented in the analysis of this rule, see Chapter 4.4 of the RIA.
Regarding comments that the sensitivity cases estimated by EPA are independent and the
uncertainties addressed by them cannot be 'stacked', we note that this is not the purpose of the
sensitivities we analyze. The sensitives published in the final rule are meant to further explore
the assumptions made in support of the analysis of our standards and help assess key areas of
uncertainty in both underlying data and modeling assumptions. For example, in this final rule,
we assess sensitivities about consumer adoption, battery costs, and credit trading. For more
information on the sensitives estimated for the final rule, see preamble Sections IV.E, F, G and
H.
Regarding comments that EPA does not include an analysis of the possibility of the IRA
being weakened, the agency follows OMB Circular A-4, which encourages federal agencies to
consider likely paths of future government programs and policies, as well as ground assumptions
of the future in sound theories and empirical evidence about current conditions and ongoing and
anticipated future trends.486 Based on current evidence, we continue to support the inclusion of
IRA provisions in our modeling assessments. For information on how we include the IRA in
modeling for this final rule, see RIA Chapter 2.6.8.
We do not agree that baseline pricing data or how we analyze sales impacts was not disclosed.
The base year pricing data used for this analysis was assembled from publicly available MSRP
value, and is reported for each vehicle in OMEGA's vehicles.csv input file (in the
"msrpdollars" data column). EPA recognizes that these values do not reflect manufacturer
purchase incentives or other adjustments that determine overall transaction prices, but EPA has
concluded that MSRP values are appropriate for this analysis because it is a reasonable proxy for
the price of the vehicle and because of its consistent availability across all manufacturers. More
484 Another possibility is increasing the market served by other vehicles in the fleet, which increases the wear, and
therefore the maintenance and repair costs, for those other vehicles. This may also lead to the vehicles needing to be
replaced sooner than they otherwise would have been.
485 NHTSA, Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis, Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Passenger
Cars and Light Trucks for Model Years 2027 and Beyond and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Heavy-Duty Pickup
Trucks and Vans for Model Years 2030 and Beyond, July 2023, Chapter 7.1.
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2023-07/CAFE-2027-2032-HDPUV-2030-2035-PRIA.pdf
486 OMB Circular No. A-4, November 9, 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2023/ll/CircularA-4.pdf
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information on base year vehicle prices and sales impacts estimates can be found in public
documentation for the OMEGA model found in the docket, or through exploration of the
OMEGA model itself. Chapter 4.4 of the RIA contains information on how sales impacts were
modeled and RTC Section 12 contains responses to comments on the OMEGA model.
14.3 - Energy efficiency gap
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law
III. EPA Should More Robustly Affirm That Standards Help Correct Market Failures
That Prevent Consumers From Achieving Valuable Fuel Savings
The "energy efficiency gap" refers to the effect of a suite of market failures that together
"lead[] to a slower diffusion of energy-efficient products than would be expected" if consumers
maximized their net investment returns. 153 EPA correctly recognizes the presence of the energy
efficiency gap in the Proposed Rule. 154 Accordingly, the Proposed Rule properly counts the full
value of energy savings as a benefit, just as it and other agencies have done in prior tailpipe and
appliance-efficiency regulations. 155 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 23-25]
153 Kenneth Gillingham & Karen Palmer, Bridging the Energy Efficiency Gap: Policy Insights from
Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence, 26 J. Econ. Perspectives 3, 19 (2014); see also Proposed Rule,
88 Fed. Reg. at 29,397; RIA at 4-38.
154 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,397; RIA at 4-38 to 4-41.
155 See BETHANY DAVIS NOLL ET AL., INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, SHORTCHANGED 21-
29 (2020),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Clean_Car_Standards_Rollback_and_Fuel_Savings_Report.pd
f.
Despite this consistent practice and the widespread evidence of the energy efficiency gap,
certain challengers to the 2021 Rule have disputed the validity of this gap in the ongoing
litigation. They have argued that consumers avoid purchasing fuel-efficient vehicles because
they prioritize other vehicle attributes that these challengers allege are adversely affected by fuel
efficiency, not because of the existence of market failures as is suggested by much of the
economic literature. 156 While their argument lacks merit, 157 its existence counsels EPA to
thoroughly document the energy efficiency gap. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 23-25]
156 See Brief for Private Petitioners at 65-68, Texas v. EPA (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 3, 2022). This account
echoes reasoning that EPA flirted with (but ultimately declined to adopt) in the 2020 Rule. In that rule—as
a sensitivity analysis only—EPA subtracted 42 months of fuel savings per consumer to approximate the
alleged loss of welfare from other vehicle attributes. 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174, 24,701-02 (Apr. 30, 2020).
157 See, e.g., Gloria Helfand et al., Searching for Hidden Costs: A Technology-Based Approach to the
Energy Efficiency Gap in Light-Duty Vehicles, 98 ENERGY POL'Y 590, 605 (2016) ("We find scant
systematic evidence of hidden costs for the primary technologies expected to be used to meet EPA and
DOT standards."); Hsing-Hsiang Huang et al., Re-searching for Hidden Costs: Evidence from the Adoption
of Fuel-Saving Technologies in Light- Duty Vehicles, 65 TRANSP. RESEARCH PART D: TRANSP. &
ENV'T 194, 194 (2018) ("| A |utomakers have typically been able to implement fuel-saving technologies
without harm to vehicle operational characteristics.").
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Yet EPA provides less analysis of this issue than it did in the 2021 Rule. EPA can bolster its
discussion of the energy efficiency gap in three key ways. First, EPA should fully adopt its
justification for the energy efficiency gap from the 2021 Rule. Second, EPA should expand upon
that justification by offering additional explanations that it omitted in 2021. And third, EPA
should affirm the continued relevance of the energy efficiency gap with respect to electric
vehicles, and delete language that could be read to question the gap's continued relevance. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 23-25]
A. At a Minimum, EPA Should Fully Adopt Its Justification for the Energy Efficiency
Gap That It Provided in the 2021 Rule
Although EPA offers support for the existence of the energy efficiency gap in the Proposed
Rule and RIA, it offers less evidence now than it did in the 2021 Rule.158 The agency should
fully adopt its 2021 explanation of the energy efficiency gap to avoid any confusion as to
whether it continues to support the explanation it previously provided. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0601, pp.23-25]
158 See Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,397; RIA at 4-38 to 4-41.
For instance, EPA's regulatory impact analysis for the 2021 Rule (2021 RIA) provided
significantly more explanations for the market failures that cause the energy efficiency gap and
numerous additional supporting citations. 159 The current RIA omits several key market failures
that the agency recognized previously, including consumer prioritization of attributes that convey
status, consumer use of simplified decision rules, and consumer "satisficing" on fuel economy
rather than optimization. 160 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 23-25]
159 2021 RIA at 8-4 to 8-6.
160 Id. at 8-4 (providing all three rationales).
The 2021 RIA also described research identifying problematic assumptions underlying a few
studies showing an efficiency-performance tradeoff, 161 and clearly explained that, if producers
did reduce vehicle performance to comply with fuel-efficiency standards (contrary to the best
available evidence), then EPA's estimate of compliance costs would be too high because that
estimate assumes that producers retain all performance features. 162 While EPA briefly alludes to
this research now, it does not offer nearly as detailed a defense for its conclusion that "the
presence of fuel-saving technologies do not lead to adverse effects on other vehicle
attributes." 163 Similarly, EPA nods at the constant-performance modeling assumption without
explaining how compliance costs would need to be revised downward without it. 164 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 23-25]
161 Id. at 8-2 to 8-3.
162 Id. at 8-3.
163 RIA at 4-38.
164 See id. at 4-40.
To avoid any potential confusion over whether EPA still supports the justifications for the
energy efficiency gap that it provided in 2021, EPA should fully readopt its previous
explanation. EPA can do this through one of two ways: either by expressly incorporating by
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reference its full 2021 explanation or by inserting the explanations that it provided in 2021 but
omits now. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 23-25]
B. EPA Should Provide Additional Justifications for the Energy Efficiency Gap in
Addition to Those It Provided in the 2021 Rule
While EPA provided considerable support for the energy efficiency gap in the 2021 Rule and
2021 RIA (much of which it restates in this proposal), it could have gone further then. In fact,
economic literature offers numerous additional explanations for the energy efficiency gap.
Additionally, these further justifications support EPA's correct choice not to devalue consumer
fuel savings due to any alleged efficiency-performance tradeoff. EPA should now adopt these
additional arguments supporting its treatment of fuel savings, particularly in light of the litigation
over this aspect of the 2021 Rule. Similarly, EPA should state (even more clearly than it did in
2021) that its model's constant-performance assumption obviates the need to estimate any
potential lost consumer welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 23-25]
1. EPA Should Discuss Additional Contributing Market Failures
EPA should describe additional market failures that contribute to the energy efficiency gap.
These include dealership incentives, biases, and information asymmetries; institutional myopia;
and manufacturer market power. As discussed below, most or all of these market failures apply
similarly to electric vehicles as they do to ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp.
25-27]
i. Dealership incentives, biases, and information asymmetries
Salespeople's incentives and biases may cause informational asymmetries that prevent
consumers from optimizing fuel efficiency. 165 Studies show that dealers and salespeople often
believe that electric vehicles and other efficient cars have lower profits for dealers than gas-
powered cars, 166 for various reasons. 167 Consumers (and researchers posing as consumers)
have often complained of poor dealership experiences when trying to purchase electric vehicles,
citing salespeople's limited knowledge; misinformation and dishonesty about vehicle cost, range,
and other attributes; inconsistent enthusiasm for electric vehicles; lack of inventory for more
efficient and electric vehicles; poor timeliness for completing paperwork and vehicle delivery;
limited promotional materials on energy efficiency; and inability to facilitate consumers' cost
comparisons of electric versus gas vehicles. 168 Some dealerships have admitted that poor sales
training is a major barrier to electric vehicle sales. 169 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 25-
27]
165 See Fred Lambert, After Losing Dealers over Its Electric Move, Cadillac Is Now Gaining New Ones,
ELECTREK, Sept. 23, 2021 (reporting that one-fifth of U.S. Cadillac dealers exited from the brand in 2020
rather than commit to selling electric vehicles).
166 Cox Automotive, Evolution of Mobility: The Path to Electric Vehicle Adoption 23 (2019),
https://perma.cc/UV7N-42BE (reporting that 54% of surveyed dealers say there is a lower ROI for sales of
EVs compared to gas); Eric Cahill et al., New Car Dealers and Retail Innovation in California's Plug-In
Electric Vehicle Market (U.C. Davis Inst. Of Transp. Stud., Working Paper UCD-ITS-WP-14-04, 2014),
https://perma.cc/DJ7T- SGXT (citing real or perceived profitability concerns, especially for compact or
midsized vehicles).
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167 Cahill et al., supra note 166, at 10 ("[A]s a category, PEVs may not represent a compelling investment
to many dealers."); id- at 9-10 (noting that dealers have the false perception that PEVs entail longer
transaction times and lower profits, when in fact dealers make more than average on PEVs in gross profits).
168 Id.; EPA, Draft Technical Assessment Report: Midterm Evaluation of Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse
Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years 2022-2025 at
3-14 (2016) at 6-15; Cox Automotive, supra note 166; Gerardo Zarazua de Rubens et al., Dismissive and
Deceptive Car Dealerships Create Barriers to Electric Vehicle Adoption at the Point of Sale, 3 NATURE
ENERGY 501 (2018); Lindsay Matthews et al., Do We Have a Car for You? Encouraging the Uptake of
Electric Vehicles at Point of Sale, 100 ENERGY POL'Y 79 (2017); Zoe Long et al., Consumers Continue
to Be Confused About Electric Vehicles: Comparing Awareness Among Canadian New Car Buyers in
2013 and 2017, 14 ENV'T RES. LTRS. 114036 (2019).
169 Cox Automotive, supra note 166, at 30 (citing lack of OEM support).
ii. Institutional myopia and inattention, including short-termism
Though EPA refers to myopia in both the 2021 RIA170 and (more briefly) in the current
RIA,171 this applies to both individual and institutional consumers. In particular, economists
find that corporate managers can exhibit similar kinds of inattention as individual consumers and
so fail to implement energy efficiency initiatives despite positive paybacks. 172 Businesses may
also face a kind of myopia called short-termism, in which corporate employees have an incentive
to favor short-term profits over long-term investments if, for example, their compensation or
career prospects are tied to near-term earnings (or if they must meet a particular budget in a
given year). 173 Employees with such incentives may have reason to purchase cheaper, less
efficient vehicles. 174 Studies suggest that short-termism can affect managers' choices about
energy efficiency specifically, 175 and about environmental sustainability broadly. 176 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 25-27]
170 2021 RIA at 8-4.
171 RIA at 4-39 (discussing "a lack of foresight [and] an aversion to short term losses relative to longer
term gains").
172 See Suresh Muthulingam et al., Energy Efficiency in Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturing Firms,
15 MFG. & SERV. OPERATIONS MGMT. 596, 612 (2013) (finding that manager inattention contributed
to the non-adoption of energy efficiency initiatives, since initiatives that appear lower on a list of efficiency
recommendations, and initiatives that require more managerial attention, are less likely to be adopted).
173 A similar dynamic could exist in government, and so affect local, state, and federal government fleet
purchases, if officials are rewarded for short-term cost savings rather than long-term fiscal health.
174 This incentive could be muted by a firm's accounting practices if costs and expenses are amortized
over time.
175 See Stephen J. DeCanio, Barriers Within Firms to Energy-Efficient Investments, 21 ENERGY POL'Y
906, 907-08 (1993); Suresh Muthulingam et al., Adoption of Profitable Energy Efficiency Related Process
Improvements in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 1, 7 (Working Paper, 2008) (finding that managers
fail to implement energy efficiency improvements with short payback periods for several reasons, including
myopia and a stronger focus on upfront costs than on net benefits, attributed partially to short-termism).
176 See Yujing Gong & Kung-Cheng Ho, Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Short-Termism,
ASIA- PACIFIC J. ACCT. & ECON. (2018).
This market failure should remain prominent as electric vehicles become more widely
available, due to the fact that electric vehicles frequently have higher purchasing prices but
provide operating-cost savings over time. The limited price salience of electricity, including the
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use of automatic bill-pay, means that many consumers (including corporate consumers) will not
properly factor in long-term operating cost savings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 25-27]
iii. Manufacturer market power
Though EPA mentions in both the 2021 RIA and the current RIA that strategic marketing
choices by manufacturers can result in inefficient under-supply of fuel economy to some
consumer segments, 177 EPA does not fully connect this inefficient pattern to market power.
Because of the limited competition in at least some segments of the vehicle market,
manufacturers may be able to act strategically when pricing vehicles and when producing
vehicles with combinations of different fuel economy and other vehicle features to push
consumers toward purchases that lead to higher manufacturer profits at the expense of optimal
fuel economy. 178 There is a relatively small number of firms producing several types of vehicles
and engines. 179 This market failure therefore could influence purchases by all consumer groups
and across several vehicle classifications, including electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0601, pp. 25-27]
177 2021 RIA at 8-5; id. at 4-39 to -40.
178 See generally Carolyn Fischer, Res. for the Future, Imperfect Competition, Consumer Behavior, and
the Provision of Fuel Efficiency in Light-Duty Vehicles (2010), https://www.rff.org/documents/1472/RFF-
DP-10-60.pdf.
179 See id. at 3 (explaining that "the largest four firms accounted for 75.5 percent of the value of shipments
in the automobile market and 95.7 percent of the light-duty and utility vehicle market"); Nat'l Acad, of
Scis., Assessment of Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy—2025-2035 at 11-
356 (2021) (citing that the top ten firms accounted for 90% of light-duty sales in 2018); see also Winston
Harrington & Alan Krupnick, Res. for the Future, Improving Fuel Economy in Heavy-Duty Vehicles
(2012), https://media.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-12- 02.pdf (explaining that the heavy-duty trucking
industry "is dominated by a small number of large manufacturers" and is even smaller than it would seem
at first glance because of "affiliations, partnerships, and outright ownership of one company by another").
2. EPA Should More Clearly State That Its Model's Constant- Performance Assumption
Obviates the Need to Estimate Lost Consumer Welfare
As in prior rules, EPA assumes when modeling the Proposed Rule that manufacturers will
incur any additional costs necessary to hold vehicle performance constant. While EPA
highlighted this fact in the 2021 RIA, 180 it should strongly conclude that the constant-
performance assumption built into OMEGA obviates the need to estimate any potential lost
consumer welfare from forgone attributes. The reason for this is straightforward: Because EPA
already models the costs of maintaining vehicle performance, any alleged reductions in vehicle
performance resulting from the Proposed Rule would be offset by a reduction in compliance cost
relative to EPA's projection. In effect, therefore, EPA's analysis already accounts for the cost of
any possible efficiency-performance tradeoffs through its projection of compliance costs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 25-27]
180 2021 RIA at 8-3.
Thus, while EPA sensibly concludes that "the presence of fuel-saving technologies do not
lead to adverse effects on other vehicle attributes," 181 it should more forcefully assert that this
conclusion does not increase its estimate of net benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp.
27-29]
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181 RIA at 4-38; see also Davis Noll et al., supra note 155, at 32-33 (discussing how "many fuel economy
technologies actually improve various performance attributes").
C. EPA Should Reaffirm the Continued Relevance of the Energy Efficiency Gap,
Particularly With Respect to Electric Vehicles, and Remove Confusing Language that Could Be
Read to Suggest the Opposite
While EPA supports the energy efficiency gap in the Proposed Rule and RIA, it also makes
some confusing statements that could be read to suggest that the gap may be inapplicable to
electric vehicles, 182 that it has become very small for ICE vehicles, 183 or even to question the
energy efficiency gap's existence. 184 If EPA does not intend these suggestions and instead
means only that a narrow subset of market failures are becoming less impactful, it should clarify
its confusing statements. Insofar as EPA intends to suggest that the energy efficiency gap may
not apply to electric vehicles, it should rethink these claims. For the reasons explained below,
EPA should strongly reaffirm the continued existence and relevance of the energy efficiency gap.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 27-29]
182 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,397 (stating that "it becomes less and less of an issue with the
growing share of electric vehicles in the market, and changes in vehicle attributes due to the new
technology are clearer"); RIA at 4-40 (similar).
183 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,397 ("[T]here may still exist a slight gap in ICE vehicle purchases
due to this uncertainty "); RIA at 4-40 ("[T]he availability of more fuel efficient vehicles has increased
steadily over time, thus narrowing or closing the energy efficiency gap [A] slight gap in ICE vehicle
purchases may still exist due to uncertainty surrounding new fuel savings technologies ").
184 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,397 (describing "uncertainty surrounding the existence or reason
behind the energy efficiency gap"). EPA also states that the energy efficiency gap "may still exist,"
implying that it may not. Id.; RIA at 4-38, 4-40.
EPA's problematic statements reference the "invisibility" explanation for the energy
efficiency gap—i.e., that "the mainstream consumer would [not] know about" certain fuel-
efficient technologies when selecting between vehicles. 185 The agency seems to hypothesize
that this explanation does not apply to electric vehicles, whose fuel efficiency is more salient. 186
However, consumer salience effects should also apply strongly to electric vehicles since
consumers often pay their electricity bills automatically (and with a time delay) and therefore
may not be aware of how much they can save on fuel costs. 187 And, as EPA acknowledges, the
energy efficiency gap is caused by a variety of market failures. 188 Many of these market failures
would not be cured by increased visibility; rather, electric vehicles may exacerbate some market
failures that contribute to the energy efficiency gap. For instance, network externalities apply
especially strongly to electric vehicles as consumers may be reluctant to purchase electric
vehicles until adequate charging and maintenance infrastructure is available. A study finding that
homeowners—who have greater incentive to invest in charging infrastructure than more transient
home renters 189—purchase electric vehicles at a far higher rate supports this hypothesis. 190
And as discussed above, research on dealership biases, incentives, and information asymmetries
often pertains to electric vehicles. 191 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 27-29]
185 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,397; see also RIA at 4-40.
186 Id. at 29,397; RIA at 4-39.
187 Laura Abrardi, Behavioral Barriers and the Energy Efficiency Gap: A Survey of the Literature, 46 J.
INDUS. & BUS. ECON. 25 (2019).
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188 RIA at 4-39 to -40 ("In fact, the gap likely exists due to a combination of consumer- and producer-side
characteristics.").
189 Numerous studies point to a homeowner-tenant agency problem, also known as the split incentives, in
residential rental markets whereby landlords fail to sufficiently invest in energy efficiency because their
tenants (rather than the landlords themselves) will realize the monetary savings. See, e.g., Jesse Melvin,
The Split Incentives Energy Efficiency Problem: Evidence of Underinvestment by Landlords, 115
ENERGY POLICY 342 (2018).
190 Lucas W. Davis, Evidence of a Homeowner-Renter Gap for Electric Vehicles, 26 APP. ECON. LTRS.
927 (2019) (recognizing evidence that "automatic billing increases residential electricity consumption by
4-6%")
191 See supra notes 165-169 and accompanying text.
On the producer side, too, market failures that contribute to the energy efficiency gap apply
strongly to electric vehicles. 192 For instance, the first-mover disadvantage may be especially
prominent for electric vehicles because early movers for electric vehicles must pay to educate
consumers about their product. 193 Indeed, in the same paragraph where EPA appears to suggest
that the energy efficiency gap "becomes less of an issue with the increasing prevalence of BEVs
in the market," EPA also states that "the share of [plug-in electric vehicles] in the marketplace is,
at least partially, constrained due to the lack of offerings." 194 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601,
pp. 27-29]
192 See RIA at 4-40.
193 Todd D. Gerarden et al., Assessing the Energy-Efficiency Gap, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 1486, 1492-93
(2017).
194 RIA at 4-40.
Because many of the justifications for the energy efficiency gap apply to electric vehicles, it is
implausible to suggest that this phenomenon will dissipate as electric vehicles become more
prevalent. In fact, the Department of Energy has consistently recognized evidence that
"consumers undervalue future energy savings" from more efficient electrified appliances,
including because of "excessive focus on the short term "195 Likewise, numerous economic
studies confirm that the energy efficiency gap applies to electrical appliances. 196 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 27-29]
195 Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Room Air Conditioners, 88 Fed.
Reg. 34,298, 34,352 (May 26, 2023).
196 E.g. Gerarden et al., supra note 193, at 1515; Francois Cohen et al., Consumer Myopia, Imperfect
Competition and the Energy Efficiency Gap: Evidence from the UK Refrigerator Market, 93 EUR. ECON.
REV. 1 (2017); Shigeru Matsumoto, Consumer Valuation of Energy-Saving Features of Residential Air
Conditioners WithHedonic and Choice Models, 55 EMPIRICAL ECON. 1779 (2018); Jiaxing Wang et al.,
Determinations of Household Energy Efficiency Investment: Analysis of Refrigerator Purchasing Behavior,
13 INT'L J. ECON. POL'Y STUDS. 389 (2018).
Regarding ICE vehicles, EPA does not cite any evidence that would justify this seeming break
from its prior analyses regarding the significance of the energy efficiency gap. 197 To the
contrary, most or all of the theoretical explanations for the energy efficiency gap still hold. EPA
should therefore delete these unsubstantiated and stray statements regarding the energy
efficiency gap and ICE vehicles, or at least provide a balanced literature review. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 27-29]
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197 See RIA at 4-40.
Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
1. EPA's Use of a Cost-of-Ownership Payback Analysis Is Flawed and Problematic.
EPA correctly acknowledges that under its proposed standards "the average purchase price of
vehicles is estimated to be higher," which it attributes to an anticipated larger share of EVs in the
market. However, its assertion that lower EV operating costs and IRA purchase incentives will
offset these higher up-front costs is unsound.34 As NADA has explained previously, for most
prospective new vehicle purchasers, using a total cost of ownership (TCO) "payback"
cost/benefit analysis is flawed and problematic for several reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0656, pp. 7-8]
34 88 Fed. Reg. at 29201, 29328-29, 29344, 29364.
First, consumers shopping for vehicles with better fuel economy35 must be willing and able
to pay for it. As noted above, 67 percent of Americans presently cannot afford any new vehicle.
And of the 33 percent who can, high interest rates are driving many of them out of the market.
NADA takes issue with EPA's projections that its proposal will result in only a small change in
total new light-duty vehicle sales and no change in new medium-duty vehicle sales. NADA's
projections differ significantly, showing vehicle sales declines corresponding with the higher
vehicle costs attributable to EPA's proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 7-
8]
35 For at least two practical reasons, improved fuel economy performance is a surrogate for better
emissions performance. First, strategies for improving a vehicle's fuel economy often result in improved
emissions performance, especially with respect to GHGs. Second, while some prospective purchasers seek
and are willing to pay for improved fuel economy performance, few seek and are willing to pay for
improved emissions performance.
Second, consumer demand for fuel efficiency fluctuates with fuel prices. Prospective
purchasers form expectations of the net present value of future fuel savings that are related, but
not closely related, to a standardized financial calculation.36 During dramatic upward fuel price
swings followed by heavy media coverage, consumers place a large value on fuel economy, as
revealed by shifts in demand to more fuel-efficient segments of the market. But during slow and
steady increases in the price of liquid fuels with little or no media attention, consumer demand
reveals a diminished value for fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 7-8]
36 See Exhibit B, Walton & Drake, Willingness to Pay for MY 2025 Fuel Economy Mandates:
Government Estimates v. Economic Reality, February 2012.
Third, a consumer's willingness to purchase improved fuel economy must be viewed in the
context of other vehicle attributes. When assessing the value of fuel economy improvements to
prospective purchasers, the financial benefits of future fuel savings cannot be separated from the
utility lost by necessary reductions to other vehicle qualities and performance. A study released
earlier this year examined the tradeoff between fuel economy and vehicle performance in
connection with NHTSA's most recent round of fuel economy mandates.37 It found evidence
that consumers and OEMs undervalued fuel economy compared to the predictions of a rational-
choice model. However, it also found that fuel economy mandates resulted in foregone
performance, upon which consumers placed a value approximately equal to that of any fuel-
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savings benefits resulting from the standards. And it found that models attempting to assess the
new vehicle buying public's willingness to purchase fuel economy, without controlling for
performance tradeoffs, likely suffered from omitted variables bias. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0656, p. 8]
37 Leard, Linn, Zhou; How Much Do Consumers Value Fuel Economy and Performance? Evidence from
Technology Adoption, The Review of Economics and Statistics (2023); 105(1), 158-74.
EPA assumes that consumers value any fuel savings associated with new vehicle purchases
over a 30-month period (at most) but suggests erroneously that there is no consensus regarding
how consumers value fuel efficiency. EPA also made no real attempt to assess how new light-
duty vehicle consumers actually value emissions reduction/fuel economy technology when
making purchase decisions.38 Instead, EPA made reference to a so-called "energy efficiency
gap" and asserted that the issue will become less relevant as the share of EVs in the market
increases.39 But the aforementioned study suggests that the proper approach for setting fuel
economy mandates designed to maximize the achievement of regulatory objectives is to control
for consumer willingness to purchase changes in both a vehicle's performance and fuel economy.
EPA's failure to do so undermines its ability to set emissions reduction mandates premised on
realistic and accurate conclusions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 8]
38 88 Fed. Reg. at 29370, 29397.
39 88 Fed. Reg. at 29397.
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
The Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law (IPI) commented on
EPA's energy efficiency gap discussion, stating that there is less analysis in this rule than
provided in previous rules, and suggesting that EPA affirm the continued relevance of this topic
to EV technology. IPI stated that EPA should offer more detail on how the presence of fuel
saving technology does not lead to adverse effects on other vehicle attributes, or how compliance
costs would have to be revised downward without the inclusion of this constant performance
assumption. They stated that EPA should clearly state that the presence of fuel saving technology
not leading to adverse effects on other attributes does not increase the estimate of net benefits
because any possible efficiency-performance tradeoffs are accounted for in the projection of
compliance costs, and therefore obviates the need to estimate potential lost consumer welfare
from foregone attributes.
IPI also outlined additional market failure factors contribute to the energy efficiency gap,
including dealership incentives, biases and information asymmetries, institutional myopia, and
manufacturer market power. They commented that dealership incentive, biases and information
asymmetries are clear in reports from consumers, or researcher posing as consumers, who
complain about poor experiences when trying to purchase and electric vehicles at the dealership.
They commented that, in addition to consumer myopia, we should discuss institutional myopia,
where businesses may have an incentive to favor short-term profits over long-term investments.
IPI stated that there is limited competition in some vehicle market segments, leading
manufacturers with market power to implement strategic choices in pricing and vehicle attribute
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offerings, which can influence purchase choice across several vehicle classifications including
EVs.
NADA commented that EPA's assumption that lower operating costs and purchase incentives
will offset higher upfront costs is unsound. NADA commented that EPA's use of a cost-of-
ownership payback analysis is flawed and problematic for three reasons: 1) people must still be
willing to pay for any improvements to fuel economy and with the high prices and interest rates
today, many consumers cannot afford new vehicles; 2) demand for fuel economy tracks fuel
prices and the media attention surrounding those prices; and, 3) prospective purchasers weigh
future fuel savings against reductions in other vehicle qualities and performance. NADA
references a recent study finding that there is a tradeoff between fuel economy and vehicle
performance. NADA also commented that EPA's assessment that there is not a consensus on
how consumers value fuel efficiency is "erroneous", and that EPA did not attempt to assess this
value. The commenter stated that failing to control for consumer willingness to purchase changes
in both vehicle performance as well as fuel economy undermines the conclusions reached in the
analysis of the rule.
Response:
As seen in Section VIII.K.l of the preamble, and RIA Chapter 4.4, we have updated the
discussion of the energy efficiency gap to be clearer on its continued relevance, including that
the energy efficiency gap discussion applies to both ICE technology and other fuel saving
technology, including PEVs. In the preamble discussion, we clearly refer to previous EPA light-
duty vehicle regulations and the included, extensive, discussions included in them. In addition,
we have added language indicating that some hypotheses presented as likely reasons for the
existence of the energy efficiency gap, including myopia and asymmetric information, could
apply to both consumers, producers, and dealerships.
Regarding NADA's comments about consumer demand for fuel economy, EPA agrees that
fuel economy is an important purchasing criteria for many consumers, and consumers buy what
they can afford. EPA agrees that affordability is an important consideration in vehicle purchases
and ownership. We do, however, note that affordability is only one criterion among many that
influences consumers' vehicle choice, new or used. We address consumer demand and
affordability comments further in Chapter 13 of this RTC. In addition, though NADA asserts that
the there is consensus in the literature regarding consumer valuation of fuel efficiency, they only
point to one paper on the subject. However, as discussed in RIA Chapter 4.4, there is a much
broader range of literature. The paper the commenter points to indicates that there is a tradeoff
between fuel economy and vehicle performance. However, as also discussed in that RIA chapter,
we provide evidence that this tradeoff may not actually be happening. That is to say, we do not
observe that vehicles with higher fuel economy and lower GHG emissions are otherwise worse
performing vehicles. In some cases, GHG emissions performance and fuel efficiency are
improving alongside other aspects of vehicle performance. Regarding NADA's comments
disagreeing with the sales impacts estimates of this rule, see RTC Section 14, as well as RIA
Chapter 4.4.
Regarding comments about accounting for performance, we note we model constant
performance, which obviates the need to estimate potential lost consumer welfare from foregone
attributes. Regarding comments about fuel economy being accounted for in our modeling, we
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note that fuel economy is included through the inclusion of 2.5 years of fuel savings in the
consumer decision making modeling. These are discussed in Chapter 4.4 of the RIA.
Regarding NADA's comments regarding sales, we acknowledge NADA's statement that their
estimates differ from EPA's, and we acknowledge that NADA attributes their estimates to
"higher vehicle costs attributable to EPA's proposed standards." In response, we note that while
EPA's estimates of vehicle technology costs (See RIA Chapter 9) may indeed translate into
higher upfront purchase costs for consumers, we also estimate that such upfront purchase costs
would be more than offset over time with operating cost savings (See RIA Chapter 4). We also
note the considerable benefits that the IRA tax credits provide to purchasers of new PEVs. In
addition, we note that NADA is unclear on how it estimates these sales impacts, however EPA's
OMEGA model estimates sales impacts using an interaction between consumer purchase
decisions and producer production decisions as described in RIA Chapter 4.4. We also note that,
as discussed in RIA Chapter 2.6 and shown in RIA Chapter 4.3, cost estimates have been
updated from the proposal, and therefore, the final sales impacts for this rule have as well. These
final sales impacts show minor decreases in sales across MYs 2027 - 2032 and are shown in
Chapter 4.4.2 of the RIA.
15 - PEV supply chain, critical minerals, and mineral
security
15.1 - General
Comments by Organizations
Organization: 25x '25 Alliance, et al.
First, there are no established supply chains capable of supplying the raw materials to
manufacture the millions of vehicles needed—just over the next decade—to supply the projected
market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Beyond BEV affordability, success of this regulation will be determined by factors outside of
the vehicle; the U.S. is sorely behind in this effort (despite over the $150 billion of private sector
investment thus far) and the NPRM does little to address these factors. Current charging and
fueling infrastructure is inadequate (particularly residential charging), the grid resources are at
least 5 to 10 years away (without even factoring in the additional demand for grid resources from
the heavy-duty vehicle sector facing similar concerns in a concurrent EPA rulemaking6), and
battery critical minerals (except lithium), which primarily determine the affordability and
availability of EVs, are minimally addressed in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 4-5]
6 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Proposed Rule: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy -
Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 (for Model Years 2027-2032), 88 Fed. Reg. 25,926 (Ap. 27, 2023). Hereinafter
"EPA HD GHG NPRM)."
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No requirements to support required EVs or the drivers that must buy them [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 5]
The NPRM and all the requirements set forth to date focus solely on the sale of BEVs. They
propose no requirements to ensure that infrastructure will be available at homes, businesses,
public event venues, highway corridors, transportation hubs, or other public locations. They
contain no requirements to provide hydrogen or hydrogen fueling stations, or for utilities to
quickly bring reasonably priced high-power charging (5-20 megawats (MW)) to highway service
plazas, fleet locations, city centers, or transportation hubs. They do not address the need for
battery critical minerals to power everything from light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles,
energy storage systems (ESS), lawn and garden equipment, laptops, cell phones, forklitis, and
airport services—not just in the United States, but around the world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, p. 5]
To support the vehicle requirements proposed, all these changes are necessary in under 10
years. For perspective, 10 years is the time required to obtain the necessary permits for a mine in
the United States. Once permitted, another ten years could elapse before the mine produces at
capacity. Ten years is also close to the time required to bring 20 MWs of power to a single
location in the United States. Consequently, to the extent we need critical minerals and high-
power charging, we must start today. Yet, there is no plan to do so. There is no roadmap to
developing these essential pieces necessary for the transformation. Nor is there a commitment
from EPA for ongoing monitoring of these factors as the EV market develops over the duration
of EPA's proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 5]
D. Benchmark Minerals Intelligence - U.S. Electric Vehicle Feasibility Study for Auto
Innovators
Achieving the EV market share EPA projects in support of its proposed light-duty GHG and
criteria pollutant standards will require massive investments in the EV supply chain from cell
manufacturing upstream to active material manufacturing, mineral processing, and mineral
extraction. In assessing this nascent supply chain, EPA limits itself to only light-duty vehicle cell
demand and the potential for the U.S. to satisfy its lithium needs. Its assessment is also limited to
only battery electric vehicles, ignoring PHEVs as both a technology option and their impact on
EV supply chains. EPA's analysis falls short of what is needed to justify such a transformational
rule on an abbreviated timeline relative to the 40-50% EV market share in 2030 that automakers
already feel is an aspirational target. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 33]
A more robust analysis of the EV supply chain would include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 33]
- U.S. and global Li-ion battery demand across multiple transportation sector segments (e.g.,
including medium- and heavy-duty vehicles) and other product sectors (e.g., portable devices
and stationary energy storage systems). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 33]
- Analysis of nickel, cobalt, and graphite supplies and processing in addition to lithium. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 33]
- An assessment of U.S. light-duty vehicle automakers' ability to access the necessary
manufacturing capacity and raw and processed material supplies both in general, and in the
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context of IRA 30D-compliant materials that are presumed to be available to eligible taxpayers.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0701, p. 33]
All of these analyses would be done in a manner that includes the time necessary to permit,
construct, and start operation of new manufacturing (cell and active materials), chemical
processing, and mineral extraction facilities, including their ramp-up to nameplate capacity, and
level of risk given their current phase of investment, construction, and other considerations. This
level of assessment is particularly important given the timeline that EPA proposes for regulations
that, once finalized, cover a timeframe that is two to seven model years away. [EPA-HQ-0AR-
2022-0829-070 1, p. 33]
Given the broad scale of analysis and level of expertise needed for a more robust assessment,
Auto Innovators engaged Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (BMI) to develop a study of U.S. EV
feasibility. Benchmark Minerals Intelligence is a well-known, respected consultant in the area of
Li-ion battery supply chains from the materials extraction to cell production stage. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 33-34]
The resultant work product, a U.S. Electric Vehicle Feasibility Study37 (the "BMI Study,"
attached to these comments) addresses many of the shortcomings of EPA's efforts. The BMI
Study presents the results of two scenarios - a base case defined as BMI's view of "the most
likely demand scenario," and a policy case that assumes 50% U.S. light-duty EV market share
(including PHEVs) in 203038 and 100% U.S. light-duty vehicle EV market share by 2035.39,40
The study also examines a "supply constrained" scenario to assess the potential limits of IRA-
compliant materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 33-34]
37 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (Ql, 2023), U.S. Electric Vehicle Feasibility Study for Alliance for
Automotive Innovation. Hereinafter "BMI Study."
38 I.e., consistent with the Executive Order 14037 and The U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation
Decarbonization.
39 BMI Study at 3.
40 The BMI Study explores risks to U.S. light-duty vehicle policy objectives in isolation from the
additional U.S. heavy-duty vehicle electrification objectives. (BMI Study at 25.) Auto Innovators believes
that inclusion of those heavy-duty vehicle objectives would further increase the overall level of risk
described in the BMI Study.
The BMI Study attempts to answer two core questions: (1) What is the feasibility of achieving
the two demand scenarios with global supply chains; and (2) What is the feasibility of achieving
these two scenarios in a manner that is compliant with the IRA 30D sourcing requirements? BMI
assesses these scenarios in the context of a growing global, multi-sector demand for Li-ion
batteries. The BMI Study spans the supply chain from raw material extraction and processing
(including lithium, nickel, cobalt, and graphite) to active electrode material manufacturing to cell
manufacturing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 33-34]
1. Comparing the BMI Study's Li-Ion Battery Demand to EPA's Projections
As shown in Figures 5 and 6, EPA's proposal exceeds both of the scenarios studied by BMI.
In 2032, the EPA-projected Li-ion battery cell demand to meet its proposed standards is nearly
double that of the BMI Study's base case. EPA's projected demand is 21% higher in 2032 than
that studied by BMI in its policy case. To the extent that the BMI study expresses concerns with
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the Li-ion battery supply chain, such concerns would only become greater given EPA's projected
battery demand. Similarly, BMI's assessment of needed investments would also be expected to
increase under a scenario aligned to that of EPA's. Where the BMI Study finds adequate capacity
under its scenarios, additional work would be required to assess if supply is adequate under the
higher EPA-projected demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 34-35]
[See original comment for Figure 5: EPA-projected Li-ion battery demand (GWh) vs. BMI
Study base case projections.41] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 34-35]
41 BMI Study data from associated model. EPA data calculated by Auto Innovators from supplied proposal
central analysis OMEGA |... |vehicles.csv output file.
[See original comment for Figure 6: EPA-projected Li-ion battery demand (GWh) vs. BMI
Study policy case projections.42] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 34-35]
42 Id.
2. Results
BMI summarizes U.S. battery supply chain risks in its base case (i.e., demand much lower
than EPA's projections) across the Li-ion battery value chains as shown in Figure 7. The first
row of data presents the absolute gap between base case demand and supply from the U.S. plus
50% of supply from free trade agreement countries (i.e., an approximation of potentially IRA
30D- compliant supply). The second row shows the relative (percentage) gap to the U.S. / 50%
FTA supply. The final row of data responds to the broader question of the risk associated with
meeting even base case demand through global supplies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
36]
BMI's assessment suggests that it is unlikely that U.S. and free trade agreement country
supply chains will fully satisfy IRA 30D sourcing requirements with most of the supply chain at
high risk, including cobalt, nickel, graphite, and anode active material supply. There is some risk
to meeting base case demand (about half of EPA's projected demand) even with global supply
chains. It is also worthwhile to note that the only raw material that EPA analyzed, lithium, is the
only raw material not considered by BMI as a medium or high risk. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 36]
[See original comment for Figure 7: Benchmark Minerals Intelligence of U.S. battery value
chain supply risks in its base (current OEM plans) case.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
36]
Other take-aways from the BMI Study include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 37-38]
- "Chinese suppliers dominate many of the constituent stages of the LiB supply chain,
currently engaged in >50%> of global capacity, a fact that potentially circumscribes IRA-
compliant sourcing options for U.S. cell makers and OEMs."43 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 37-38]
- "Resulting from the extreme concentration of anode value chain manufacturing in China
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 37-38]
- measuring >60% global capacity from mine to anode - removal of compliant Chinese
supply will restrict the application of Clean Vehicle Credits under Section 30D beyond 2025.
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This represents the most critical bottleneck for U.S. battery supply."44 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 37-38]
- "As a consequence of the availability of compliant anode active materials, the "supply
constrained" scenario demonstrates U.S. battery cell manufacturing and ZEV objectives are
potentially limited to 15% passenger EV penetration by 2030 vs. a policy driven target of 50%
for the same year "45 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 37-38]
- "Immediate action is necessary due to the inelastic supply response from elements of the
upstream, with lead times for new critical mineral supply extending 5 - 15-years in many
jurisdictions while adhering to minimum Western ESG standards." 46 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 37-38]
- . . [Anode active material] stands out as a section of the supply chain where deficits could
prove more resilient, even in the face of IRA incentives." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
37-38]
- According to BMI, IRA 30D-compliant cathode active material is also at risk without
significant immediate investments in the U.S. and/or free trade agreement countries. "Security of
supply via 50% FTA volumes offers some near-term respite for U.S. procurement. . . Expanding
to the 'policy driven' demand scenario, additional FTA supply would only support the U.S.
market until 2025 before falling short, requiring sustained IRA-compliant capital investment and
proactive purchasing strategies."47 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 37-38]
- "Scale imports of Chinese [active anode material] will likely be necessary in the near- and
medium-term, limiting the application or IRA-derived tax credits from Section 30D. [A]node
battery components face sustained structural shortages of units under both the 'base case' and
'policy driven' demand scenarios throughout the modelling period. There is a 74%
supply/demand shortfall in 2032 under the high case 'policy driven' despite relying on 50% FTA
material deliveries "48 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 37-38]
43 BMI Study at 2. (Emphasis added.)
44 BMI Study at 2. (Emphasis added.)
45 BMI Study at 2. (Emphasis added.)
46 BMI Study at 2.
47 BMI Study at 6.
48 BMI Study at 8.
- Regarding lithium, "Competing requirements from Europe and first-mover advantages from
Chinese capital has already secured significant volumes of FTA materials, potentially limiting
the availability of unallocated IRA-compliant lithium chemicals for North America."49 "While
evidence is growing for direct OEM procurement strategies, there is development risk associated
with new capacity "50 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 38]
- Regarding nickel, "The USA is limited as it currently produces zero domestic nickel
sulphate needed to sustain the growth of its battery value chain; the USA is entirely reliant on
imports . . . [S]ourcing primarily from Canada and Australia presents challenges due to allocated
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volumes in legacy markets. The U.S. nickel sulphate balance is forecast to remain in structural
negative balance into the next decade." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 38]
- "[T]he absolute volume of cobalt required to sustain the U.S. growth remains on an upward
trajectory . . . [DJomestic and FTA sourcing yields limited compliant volumes . .. [WJithout
immediate capital allocation, there are sustained challenges for alternative sourcing to incumbent
Chinese cobalt refining." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 38]
- "U.S. domestic occurrence and output of natural flake graphite is extremely limited . . .
Additionally, the availability of IRA-compliant FTA sources are also restricted ... In the near-
term fundamental supply will need to originate from China to meet U.S. base case demand
through 2025 . . . [AJlmost 100% of spherical graphite (SPG) processing [is] currently controlled
by the FEOC nation . . . IRA credits offer major incentives for SPG processing capacity localised
in domestic or FTA regions, although the challenge remains to connect the upstream feedstock in
sufficient volumes to maintain utilisation, especially given the extended lead times . . . Despite
the encouragement from IRA credits, a strong business case needs to be defined for greenfield
production "51 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 38]
- "Common to the critical minerals theme, the structural shortfall of domestic and FTA
synthetic graphite output is forecast to be sustained throughout the forecast period, creating a
high reliance of imported volumes. While the U.S. is responsible for petroleum coke processing,
the value-add graphitization is predominantly associated with China due to the incredible energy
requirements for the process (requiring sustained temperatures of 2800-3000°C) . . . The
concentration of manufacturing in China therefore presents the most substantial IRA bottleneck
in the expansion of U.S. ZEV penetration across the entire battery value chain . . . [Ojutsized
capital is required in expanding greenfield production capabilities."52 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 38-39]
- "Expanding the U.S. battery value chain is a critical assignment to draw resilience and
competitiveness against the currently established Asian-centric output and optimize the Western
transition to a low-carbon economy . . . [M]aping the capacity plans against the operational
reality will be challenging without sufficient maturity of [IRA] compliant supply chains from the
upstream critical minerals . . . [E]xploring the 'policy driven' demand scenario, the U.S. market
remains exposed to foreign imports (predominantly from China) to meet domestic EV
penetration objectives . . . [E]vidence demonstrates structural shortialls of the entire battery suite,
originating from the differential lead times to established greenfield, qualified battery-purity
material supply."53 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 38-39]
- "The cumulative global battery industry is forecast to top lTWh during 2023, swelling to
approximately 3.6TWh by 2030 and to 7.8TWh by 2040. The evolution will place major
pressure on critical minerals supply. Alignment to U.S. EV penetration objectives under the
"policy driven" scenario generates significantly greater global lithium-ion battery demand by
2040 (19% higher in GWh-equivalent terms), with a corollary requirement for additional raw
materials."54 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 38-39]
- "Based on BMI's current view of existing and planned AAM capacity, Chinese supply could
account for almost 90% of the global total by 2030 "55 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
38-39]
49 BMI Study at 10.
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50 BMI Study at 11.
51 BMI Study at 15 et seq.
52 BMI Study at 17 et seq.
53 BMI Study at 20 et seq.
54 BMI Study at 38.
55 BMI Study at 52.
3. Recommendation
Based on the results of the BMI Study, Auto Innovators recommends that EPA expand its
analysis to critical minerals beyond lithium, that EPA consider cathode and anode active material
manufacturing in addition to cell manufacturing, and that EPA reconsider its overly optimistic
assumptions for the number of vehicles that will qualify for IRA 30D and 45X incentives. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 39]
E. Additional Comments on Critical Minerals
1. Availability
Plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs), which include fully electric and plug-in hybrids, heavily rely
on certain critical minerals, such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and graphite, as well as rare earth
elements. Meeting the increasing demand for these minerals raises concerns about responsible
sourcing, environmental impacts, and geopolitical challenges. Ensuring a sustainable and ethical
supply chain for critical minerals is crucial. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 40-41]
Demand for lithium-ion batteries in North America is forecast to increase nearly six times
between 2022 and 2030, according to Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (BMI).56 BMI forecasts
lack of upstream mining and midstream processing and cathode/anode production capacity to
supply the new battery factories with the necessary battery materials.57 According to BMI, more
than 300 new mines will need to be built over the next decade to satisfy critical mineral demand
(Figure 8).58 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 40-41]
56 BMI Study at 23.
57 Id. at 35.
58 Benchmark Source, More than 300 new mines required to meet battery demand by 2035 (Sep. 6, 2022).
Available at htps://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/more-than-300-new-mines-required-to-meet-
battery- demand-by-2035. (Retrieved Jun. 30, 2023.)
[See original comment for Figure 8: Benchmark Minerals Intelligence infographic on mines
needed to support demand for critical minerals] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 40-41]
Additionally, recycling will not be able to satisfy society's rising demand in the near term.
The current small EV market share coupled with EV batteries' long lifespan (on average between
10- 20 years59) suggests that society will not likely be able to meet the rising demand for critical
minerals through recycling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 42]
59 Moscaritolo, A. (2022, June 29). EV Batteries 101: Degradation, Lifespan, Warranties, and More.
PCMAG. htps://www.pcmag.com/news/ev-batteries-101-degradation-lifespan-warranties-and-more
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EPA assumed a normal and predictable behavior of the critical minerals market that is instead
experiencing exponential growth; EPA expects that growth to continue to develop smoothly.
EPA took only a snapshot in time and smoothly forecasted out in what is expected to be a very
unstable market as it continues to develop, without consideration of outside impacts. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 42]
EPA has also stated that the potential for cost reductions of battery packs is supported by the
EPA observation that analysts largely expect the price of lithium to stabilize at or near its
historical low levels by the mid-2020s. Despite diverse geographic lithium development around
the world, the role of China in the chemical conversion phase of manufacturing represents 61%
global output in 2023 as the nation manufactures and sells large quantities of lithium hydroxide
and lithium carbonate.60 Chinese lithium chemical company ownership is "forecast to maintain
elevated levels around 70% by 2030, placing potentially challenging procurement conditions as
determined by the final IRA definitions for 'Foreign Entity of Concern. "'61 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 42]
60 BMI Study at 41.
61 BMI Study at 21.
In the EPA analysis, the agency highlighted lithium availability and did not bother to look in
depth at the other three critical materials needed for EVs. It just assumed that lithium was the
bottleneck and biggest concern. Despite EPA's belief that lithium supplies are adequate, there is
growing concern with global supplies given planned EV production. Reuters highlights such
concerns in a recent article covering the June 2023 Fastmarkets Lithium and Battery Raw
Materials conference.62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 42-43]
62 Ernest Scheyder, "Lithium producers warn global supplies may not meet electric vehicle demand,"
Reuters (Jun. 22, 2023). Available at htps://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/lithium-producers-
warn-global-supplies-may-not-meet-electric-vehicle-demand-2023-06-22/. Retrieved June 26, 2023.
There were 45 lithium mines operating in the world last year, with 11 expected to open this
year and seven next year, according to Fastmarkets. That pace is far below what consultants say
is needed to ensure adequate global supply . . . Those growth projections assume a best-case-
scenario, even as mining companies face difficulty hiring technical talent, rising costs and delay
times for crucial equipment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 42-43]
EPA acknowledged that there is a lack of diverse supply of graphite, describing that U.S.
deposits of natural graphite exist, but graphite has not been produced in the U.S. since the 1950s.
In addition, significant known resources are largely undeveloped.63 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 42-43]
63 NPRM at 389.
The U.S. does not produce any natural graphite; therefore, it must rely solely on imports to
satisfy domestic demand. Nearly 60% of the world's mined production last year came from
China, making it a dominant player in every stage of the graphite supply chain. Almost all
graphite processing today also takes place in China because of the ready availability of graphite
supplies, weak environmental standards, and low costs.64 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
43]
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64 Adams, A. (2023). Report: A Global Race to the Top for Critical Minerals. SAFE.
htps://secureenergy.org/a-global- race-to-the-top/
According to BMI, the liake graphite feedstock required for all uses in 2021 was just 1 million
tons65. BMI estimates the graphite market is nearing an immediate deficit, with the supply
shortfall growing to 8Mt by 2040. To fill this gap, the mining industry would need to produce
nearly 8x as much graphite as it does currently over the next 18 years.66 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, p. 43]
65 (2022, July 22). Graphite deficit starting this year, as demand for EV battery anode ingredient exceeds
supply. Mining.com. Retrieved June 10, 2023, from htps://www.mining.com/web/graphite-deficit-starting-
this-year-as- demand-for-ev-battery-anode-ingredient-exceeds-
66 Mineral Commodity Summaries 2022 - graphite - USGS publications warehouse. Available at:
htps://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2022/mcs2022-graphite.pdf (Accessed: 06 June 2023).
2. Country of Origin
China dominates minerals processing, processing anywhere from 60 to 100% of all the
minerals needed for batteries and electric motors.67 Moreover, China has strategically invested
in mineral deposits around the world. For example, Chinese-owned interests have developed
vested partnerships in most of the world's lithium deposits, despite only having 8% of global
lithium reserves. Chinese companies also control 15 of the 19 cobalt-producing mines in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).68 China's dominance in cobalt mine ownership
allows it to have a major influence over the majority of the cobalt supply, despite having
negligible resources of their own. Diversifying the critical mineral supply chains in this
environment and competing on cost will be incredibly difficult. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 43-45]
67 Adams, A. (2023). Report: A Global Race to the Top for Critical Minerals. SAFE.
htps://secureenergy.org/a-global- race-to-the-top/
68 Adams, A. (2023). Report: A Global Race to the Top for Critical Minerals. SAFE.
htps://secureenergy.org/a-global- race-to-the-top/
The world's reliance on China for more than 80% of processing of minerals leaves all global
automakers vulnerable to political pressure from China (Figure 9), which has a history of
leveraging supply chains influences in times of conflict. Mines and related processing in the U.S.
are undeveloped, and new permitting can take as long as ten years, yet EPA's proposed
requirements for 67% BEVs by 2032 are less than eight model years away. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 43-45]
Figure 9: Key Mineral Reserves, Mine Production and Processing, 2022 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 43-45]
Source: Adams, A. (2023). Report: A Global Race to the Top for Critical Minerals. SAFE.
htps://secureenergy.org/a-global-race-to-the-top/ [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 43-45]
"Two-thirds of forecasted lithium chemical production in 2030 will be owned by Chinese
companies, despite just half of production taking place in the country in the same year, according
to Benchmark's Lithium Forecast. Second to China is the U.S., with companies from the country
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forecast to own 17% of lithium chemical production at the end of the decade." 69 The lithium
supply will need to double again to reach two million tons of lithium carbonate equivalent
demand as soon as 2027, BMI forecasts.70 Annual growth in lithium supply will ease in 2024 to
27%, fading to single figures by 2028.71 This is before prolonged market deficit sets in from
2029 until at least 2040, according to Benchmark's base forecast.72 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 43-45]
69 Who Will Own Lithium Chemical Production in 2030?, BENCHMARK SOURCE (May 3, 2023),
htps://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/who-will-own-lithium-chemical-production-in-2030.
70 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (2023, April 28). Global lithium supply forecast to hit 1 million tonnes
for first time. Benchmarkminerals.com. Retrieved June 10, 2023, from
htps ://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/global-lithium-supply-forecast-to-hit-1 -million-tonnes-for-
first-time?mc_cid=5f206cabf2&mc_eid=54bceb9fl4
71 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (2023, April 28). Global lithium supply forecast to hit 1 million tonnes
for first time. Benchmarkminerals.com. Retrieved June 10, 2023, from
htps://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/global-lithium-supply-forecast-to-hit-l-million-tonnes-for-
first-time?mc_cid=5f206cabf2&mc_eid=54bceb9fl4
72 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (2023, April 28). Global lithium supply forecast to hit 1 million tonnes
for first time. Benchmarkminerals.com. Retrieved June 10, 2023, from
htps://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/global-lithium-supply-forecast-to-hit-l-million-tonnes-for-
first-time?mc_cid=5f206cabf2&mc_eid=54bceb9fl4
3. Mining/Processing
Not only does China possess an advantage for every critical mineral required for EVs, but as
shown in Figure 10, it also dominates critical minerals mining, processing, active material and
other component production, and battery cell production. While U.S. officials have begun
negotiating agreements with other countries to expand access to important needed minerals, it
remains unclear which of these partnerships will succeed, or if they will be able to generate
anything close to the supply of minerals and components auto manufacturers are projected to
need. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 45-46]
Mining is subject to supply/demand economics. If material prices drop, U.S. mines will not be
built. For example, a U.S. cobalt mine was permitted, but stopped construction claiming the
minimum price of cobalt needs to be $25 per pound to continue construction.73 Such events
have implications for both the availability of U.S. / FTA supplies of critical minerals and the
global prices of critical minerals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 45-46]
73 E&E News: Biden is scrambling for minerals. This U.S. cobalt mine just closed. (2023, May 12).
htps://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/2023/05/12/biden-is-scrambling-for-minerals-this-u-s-
cobalt- mine-just-closed-00096440
EPA acknowledges that about 72% of U.S. cobalt consumption is imported,74 with nearly
70%) of cobalt originating from the Democratic Republic of Congo, some significant production
in Russia and Australia, and about 20% in the rest of the world.75 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 45-46]
74 NPRM at 29314.
75 NPRM at 29314.
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Figure 10: China's Percent of Supply Across the Lithium Ion Battery Value Chain, 202276
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 45-46]
76 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence Q4 2022 Review at 41.
Because China controls all spherical graphite processing, the U.S. is completely dependent on
its battery-grade graphite from China. This is why the U.S. government has included graphite
among the 35 minerals that it deems critical to its national security and economy. A White House
report on critical supply chains showed that graphite demand for clean energy applications will
require 25 times more graphite by 2040 than was produced worldwide in 2020. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 46-47]
The Inflation Reduction Act requires 50% (and 100% by 2029) of the battery components to
be manufactured in North America to qualify for a portion of the 30D tax credit. However, in
2030, BMI forecasts North America will only be able to domestically fulfill 3.5% and 3.4% of its
domestic cathode and anode demands, respectiully (see Figure 11).77 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 46-47]
77 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (2022, November 17). Can North America build a battery supply
chain? Benchmarkminerals.com. Retrieved June 10, 2023, from
htps://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/can-north- america-build-a-battery-supply-chain.
Figure 11: Global Battery Component Supply by Source [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 46-47]
While there are five cathode facilities between the U.S. (4) and Canada (1), they are not at
commercial scale yet. Even with additional facilities set to come online through the decade,
North America's cathode production deficit is forecast to increase 3.5 times between now and
2030.78 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 46-47]
78 "Can North America Build A Battery Supply Chain?," Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, 11/17/22
Currently, China produces approximately 78% of the world's cathodes and 91% of the
world's anodes.79 China will remain the largest producing country for cathode active materials
from today until 2040.80 BMI expects Chinese production to comprise 71% of the globally
produced cathode material - almost seven times the amount of the world's second largest
producer, South Korea. 81 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 46-47]
79 Adams, A. (2023). Report: A Global Race to the Top for Critical Minerals. SAFE.
https://secureenergy.org/a-global- race-to-the-top/
80 Adams, A. (2023). Report: A Global Race to the Top for Critical Minerals. SAFE.
htps://secureenergy.org/a-global- race-to-the-top/
81 Benchmark Minerals, Report, Q1 2023
A detailed analysis of global supply chains is required. In the case of lithium, for example,
agencies need to consider the price of electricity where the lithium is mined, where the lithium is
processed, where the lithium is used in cathode production, where the battery cells are made, and
where battery packs are assembled. Electricity prices vary significantly around the world,
However, EPA projects 100% of battery cells will be produced in the U.S. by 2027 and growing
critical mineral production. As more of the lithium-ion battery supply chain develops in the U.S.,
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the analysis of U.S. electricity prices on battery costs will be more straightforward. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 60-61]
G. Battery Manufacturing Capacity
Despite announced investments in the U.S. and E.U. battery manufacturing capacity, China is
poised to maintain its market dominance throughout the decade. By 2032, China is expected to
continue to control the battery market with more than 4,800 GWh of annual battery production
capacity— approximately 67% of all forecasted battery cell manufacturing capability. Elon
Musk estimates a needed global battery capacity of 300 terawatt-hour by 2050.124 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 67-68]
124 How Can the World Meet Elon Musk's 300 TWh Batteiy Capacity Target?, BENCHMARK SOURCE
(Nov. 16, 2022), htps://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/how-can-the-world-meet-elon-musks-300-
twh-batery-capacity- target.
EPA states that a recent forecast by the Department of Energy, illustrates the rapid recent
growth in new plant announcements, estimating that announcements for North America to date
will enable an estimated 838 GWh of annual capacity by 2025, 896 GWh by 2027, and 998 GWh
by 2030, the vast majority of which is cell manufacturing capacity, enough to supply from 10 to
13 million BEVs peryear.125 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 67-68]
BMI provides somewhat lower estimates for anticipated battery cell manufacturing capacity
in North America, reaching 890 GWh of operating, highly probable, probable, and possible
production by 2032 (Figure 20). 126 BMI also notes that about 70% of the capacity will be
owned by companies based outside of the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 67-68]
125 NPRM at 29317.
126 BMI Study at 47.
Figure 20: Benchmark Mineral Intelligence assessment of N. American battery cell
manufacturing capacity, 2020-2032, and country of ownership. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 67-68]
While these projections and announcements demonstrate progress in expanding battery
manufacturing capacity outside of China, it is important to acknowledge the time required to
realize these goals. The time between announcements and a plant being at full capacity can take
several years. Moreover, the auto industry faces the challenge of meeting the growing demand
for batteries while balancing the complexities of establishing and scaling up manufacturing
operations, which includes building a skilled workforce and securing an adequate supply chain
stretching back to the raw critical minerals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 68-69]
The battery manufacturing landscape is witnessing significant developments, with China
maintaining its stronghold as the dominant player in the market. While the U.S. is making strides
to expand its battery production capacity, the scale and pace of China's investments and
advancements in this sector continue to position it as the frontrunner. As the demand for electric
vehicles and energy storage solutions continues to grow, the need for a substantial global battery
capacity becomes increasingly apparent. Scaling up North American battery manufacturing is a
complex endeavor that requires significant time and effort. Simply put, China has a 10-15-year
head start. Establishing a robust and competitive battery manufacturing ecosystem involves
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various challenges as described above. It is crucial to acknowledge that scaling up production
capacity cannot happen overnight. It requires a long-term commitment and sustained support and
investment from governments, industry, and other stakeholders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 68-69]
One of the complicated factors that the agency needs to analyze is the current and projected
global shortage (2027-2030) of electrical steel. This type of steel is comprised of ultra-thin sheets
that transfer electricity into mechanical power. For use in an EV's electric motor, a higher-grade
electrical steel is required that entails stamping and stacking steel into precise shapes that may be
less than a millimeter thick. The U.S. has very limited production capability for electrical steel
and has imposed tariffis on the supplies from South Korea, Japan and China. The cost-reduction
factors that the agency is using for electric motors need to be modified, as they ignore the current
and likely costs of electric motors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 69-70]
Sources: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 69-70]
1. James Irwin. Price Parity Points: As EV Component Costs Rise, Stalling Push for Parity.
Automotive News. November 7, 2022, 10-11.
2. Daniel Sims. Electrical Steel Supply and Demand Could Impact EV Prices Later This
Decade. Techspot.com. March 28, 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 69-70]
R&D efforts are looking into new alternatives that can reduce or eliminate the use of rare
earths while maintaining the effciency advantages of permanent magnet synchronous motors.
Some alternatives require expanded use of liners that depend on the ultra-thin electrical steel, but
the cost premium for electrical steel is signiffcant and global shortages are projected in the 2027-
2030 timeframe. It is possible that some innovations in motor design will penetrate
luxury/premium models prior to 2032, but most of the 2032 light-duty fleet is likely to retain use
of rare earth magnets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 70-71]
While the U.S. is poised to increase domestic manufacturing and processing of battery
components and critical minerals, we are currently heavily reliant on other nations. This
transition will take time, and that will have a role to play in vehicle eligibility for the 30D tax
credit. Figure 24 shows the portion of battery manufacturing and critical mineral processing that
takes place in China (a foreign entity of concern), the U.S., FTA countries, major U.S. allies, and
other countries that don't fit into the previous categories (e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo).
The dearth of U.S. mining, processing, component production, and cell production is noticeable,
as is the dominance of China in all these areas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 74-75]
[See original comment for: Figure 24: Countries Manufacturing Batteries and Processing
Critical Minerall31] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 74-75]
131 Adams, A. (2023). Report: A Global Race to the Top for Critical Minerals. SAFE.
htps://secureenergy.org/a- global-race-to-the-top/.
132 htp://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/H.R.-3938-Bill-Text.pdf. [
1. Soil and Water Contamination from the Mining and Processing of Rare Earths
Rare earths (especially neodymium and dysprosium) are standard materials used in the
electric motors of BEVs. There is much effort underway to make electric motors with fewer rare
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earths or none at all, but most EVs produced in the 2027-2032 time frame will use rare earths.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 280-281]
The mining and processing of rare earths is environmentally challenging and, if not done
properly, wastes can lead to damaging soil and water contamination near the mine and/or
processing facility. The process of extracting rare earths entails open pits, which leave a large
ecological footprint. The dust at the mine can be radioactive because thorium is often found with
rare earths. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 280-281]
Until 1984, the United States accounted for most of the world's supply of rare earths. The
Mountain Pass mine in California, located in the Mojave Desert near the Nevada line, was the
single largest source of U.S. production. The mine closed in 2002, partly because it could not
earn a profit in competition with low-cost mines in China, and in part because of radioactive
wastewater leaks that triggered community and regulatory at concerns and took more than a
decade to clean up. China has also experienced environmental pollution from rare earth mining,
and has cracked down on illegal rare earth mining, which circumvents the country's export
quotas and is difficult to regulate for environmental protection. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 280-281]
The Mountain Pass mine was revived in 2012 under new ownership but the owner declared
bankruptcy in 2015 in the face of low prices, debt, and a flood of low-cost material from China.
Another owner, Mountain Pass (MP) Materials, has gradually expanded output at the mine from
2018 to 2020 and announced plans for a processing facility. (The company until now has been
using a processing facility in China). In late 2020 the Department of Defense announced a $35
million award to help finance a processing facility. A new plant in Fort Worth, Texas, will begin
processing and magnet production in 2024. General Motors has made a commitment to source its
rare earths from Mountain Pass. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 280-281]
An alternative to open-pit mining of rare earths is vacuuming them from the ocean floor. The
technology for ocean mining does not require the blasting and digging operations that occur at
open-pit land mines. However, the United Nations International Seabed Authority has not been
able to develop standards and permit procedures that satisfy the environmental concerns of
member countries. Thus, ocean mining of rare earths (and other materials used in EVs such as
cobalt and nickel) will not happen on a large scale in the foreseeable future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 280-281]
Sources: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 280-281]
1. John D. Graham. The Global Rise of the Modern Plug-In Electric Vehicle: Public Policy,
Innovation, and Strategy. Elgar House Publishing. UK, 2021, 304-309. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 280-281]
2. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2941793/dod-awards-35- million-
to-mp-materials-to-build-us-heavy-rare-earth-separation-c/. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 280-281]
3. https://www.theverge.com/2021/12/9/22825948/gm-ev-motor-rare-earth-metal- magnet-
mp-materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 280-281]
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4. htps://www.theverge.com/2021/12/9/22825948/gm-ev-motor-rare-earth-metal- magnet-mp-
materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 280-281]
5. Doug Newcomb. Deep Thinking: Ocean Floor Next Frontier. Automotive News. October
31, 2022, 20. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 280-281]
2. Depletion of Scarce Water Supplies from Lithium Mining in the Deserts of Chile
Lithium is a critical mineral used in all variants of the lithium ion battery, and thus will likely
be used in most EVs sold in the U.S. from 2027 to 2032. The largest lithium deposits in the
world are in a remote region of South America, Atacama, near the borders of Chile, Bolivia, and
Argentina ("the Lithium Triangle"). As recently as 2014, Chile was the number one miner of
lithium, and much of Chile's lithium was processed in Chile and then exported to North
America. However, environmental concerns about ecological harm to water-stressed
communities in Chile have slowed the expansion of lithium mining in Chile. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 282-283]
Beginning in 2015, Chile's national government and major companies announced plans to
expand lithium mining. Those plans triggered well-organized, intense opposition from
indigenous groups as well as local and international environmental groups. The reasons for
opposition were variable, but the most common concern was about consumption of scarce water
resources. The Atacama region is one of the driest places in the world: meaningful rainfall of
about 1.5 inches occurs only once per century on average. Despite the dry conditions, the region
is home to protected wetlands, extraordinary wildlife, and unique microorganisms. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 282-283]
Lithium mining in Chile entails withdrawing high volumes of liquid brine that are evaporated
in the dry desert air to create a precursor to the desired lithium material. The brine is not potable
water, but the withdrawals have been associated with measurable changes to regional hydrology
and increases in local temperatures, which mean lithium mining is one of the major stressors
leading to local environmental degradation. Environmental concerns were first expressed by
leaders of indigenous groups. They reported anecdotal evidence of diminished productivity of
desert farms near lithium mining sites. They also reported harm to desert and wetlands wildlife.
Recently published scientific evidence revealed a 10% decline in flamingo populations near
brine operations in Chile. Insofar as the anecdotal reports reflect a pattern of ecological
disruption, the pattern may not be due entirely to lithium mining, as climate change itself can
have similar disruptive effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 282-283]
Lithium mining has become so controversial in Chile that the new leftist government has
pledged stricter environmental controls and control of all lithium mining by a state-owned
enterprise. Since 2015, Australia has surpassed Chile as the number one lithium miner in the
world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 282-283]
Sources: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 282-283]
1. John D. Graham. The Global Rise of the Modern Plug-In Electric Vehicle: Public Policy,
Innovation, and Strategy. Elgar House Publishing, UK, 2021, 288-291. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 282-283]
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2. https://diplomacy21-
adelphi.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Latin%20America%E2%8
0%99s%20Lithium_Critical%20Minerals%20and%20the%20Global%20Energy%
20Transition.pdf. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 282-283]
3. Harry Dempsey, Edward White. Chile's Move to Control Lithium Alarms Industry.
Financial Times. May 2, 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 282-283]
4. Wenjuan Liu, Data B Agusdinata. Dynamics of Local Impacts in Low-Carbon Transition:
Agent-Based Modeling of Lithium Mining-Community-Acquifer Interactions in Salar de
Atacama, Chile. The Extractive Industries and Society. 8(3). September 2021, 100927. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 282-283]
5. D.B. Agusdinata, W Liu. Global Sustainability of Electric Vehicles Minerals: A Critical
Review. The Extractive Industries and Society. 13. 2023, 101231. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 282-283]
6. D.B. Agusdinata et al. Evaluating Sustainability Impacts of Critical Mineral Extractions:
Integration of Life Cycle Sustainability and SDGs Assessment Framework. Journal of Industrial
Ecology. 2022. https://doi.org/10.lll/jiec.13317 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 282-283]
3. Environmental Concerns about Hard-Rock Mining of Lithium and Other Materials
Although hard-rock mining of lithium is growing more rapidly than lithium production from
brine operations, hard-rock mining is not necessarily preferable from an environmental
perspective. Lifecycle studies have compared hard rock mining to brine operations. They find
that hard-rock mining is more energy intensive, generates more C02 emissions, uses more
freshwater supplies, generates more waste material, and creates more local dust and noise in
nearby communities than brine operations. The ecological concerns about hard rock mining help
explain why recent proposals for new hard rock lithium mines have been cancelled or delayed in
Serbia, Portugal, and North Carolina. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 283-284]
Sources: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 283-284]
1. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c8f3/8c96f91ddld37al8d61410b73a7bd0603271.pdf.
2. Sam Fleming, Alice Hancock. EU Eyes Output Boost for Green Energy Raw Materials.
Financial Times. August 17, 2022, 2.
3. Associated Press. Serbia Moves to Defuse Protests Over Rio Tinto Lithium Mine. Climate
Wire. December 9, 2021.
4. Ivana Sekularas. Serbia Revokexs Rio Tinto Lithium Project Amid Protests. Reuters.com.
January 20, 2022.
5. Aime Williams. The Race to Mine Lithium in America. Financial Times. May 11, 2020,
17. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 283-284]
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Organization: American Coalition for Ethanol (ACE)
It must also be pointed out that the proposal will not make the U.S. more energy secure. In
fact, the opposite is true. The lithium, nickel, copper, cobalt and other critical minerals necessary
to make batteries and electric vehicles in the ambitious timeframe set forth by the Agency are not
found in sufficient quantities in the U.S. Instead, these precious minerals must be mined and
imported from countries such as China, Russia, and the Congo. EPA's aggressive timeline will
only serve to increase U.S. reliance on foreign supplies of minerals for BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0613, pp. 2-3]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
Moreover, EPA's feasibility analysis fails to meaningfully confront multiple serious obstacles
to the widespread adoption of electric vehicles on which its proposed rule depends. Increased
production of electric vehicles is constrained by the supply of certain minerals critical to
manufacturing batteries. That supply is sharply limited; mining and processing operations are
nowhere near the levels needed to support the expansion of electric vehicles EPA's proposed rule
would require. The supply chain is subject to serious disruptions, as other fed- eral agencies have
underscored. For example, nearly all existing supply of several critical minerals is controlled by
a small number of foreign and unfriendly nations. The insufficiency of these essential inputs will
only become more acute as worldwide demand for them increases. And developing new
operations would be a decades-long process that extends far beyond the compliance period for
the proposed rule. On average, it takes 16 years to move mining projects from discovery to first
production, and another ten to begin producing at max- imum capacity. EPA barely addresses
this problem in its proposed rule and offers no plausible solution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, p. 4]
EPA's Analysis Fails To Confront Multiple Specific Obstacles To The Level Of Widespread
Electric-Vehicle Adoption Its Proposed Rule Requires
EPA's projection of future electric-vehicle adoption is not only flawed on its own terms, but it
also fails meaningfully to address several chokepoints that could severely constrain future
production and utilization of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 31]
a. The Supply Chain For Critical Minerals Is Vulnerable To Disruption And Price
Volatility
Electric-vehicle technology, and particularly production of batteries, is vi- tally dependent on
certain minerals—including lithium, nickel, copper, cobalt, graphite, and manganese. See IEA,
Global Supply Chains of EV Batteries, at 21 (July 2022) ("Global Supply Chains"). Because "[a]
typical electric car requires six times the mineral inputs of a conventional car," manufacturers
would need a steady, reliable supply of those minerals, much larger than they require today, to
increase production of electric vehicles to the levels necessary to comply with the proposed
standards. Role of Critical Minerals at 5. But by all available evi- dence, manufacturers will face
substantial—possibly insurmountable—chal- lenges in obtaining the necessary quantities of
those essential inputs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 31]
Both the production (mining) and processing (refining) of minerals critical to production of
electric-vehicle batteries are highly concentrated among a small group of countries—and the
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United States is not one of them. According to the Department of Energy, "[ajlmost all
production of raw materials for lith- ium ion batteries, apart from some lithium extraction and
refinement, occurs abroad today," and the United States "currently has virtually no domestic pro-
cessing capacity." Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manu- facturing,
and Fostering Broad-Based Growth, The White House, at 93-94 (June 2021) ("White House
Report"). For example, more than 80 percent of all lith- ium is sourced from Australia, Chile,
and China; 80 percent of natural graphite is sourced from China; more than 70 percent of cobalt
is sourced from the Dem- ocratic Republic of Congo; about half of copper is sourced from Chile,
Peru, and China; and more than half of nickel is sourced from Indonesia, the Philip- pines, and
Russia—with Russia being the world's largest producer of the "Class 1" grade needed for
batteries. See Global Supply Chains at 22, 29; Role of Critical Minerals at 30. And the "project
pipelines" for these minerals indicate that, "in most cases, the geographic concentration of
production is unlikely to change in the near term." Role of Critical Minerals at 121. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 31-32]
Concentration levels are "even higher for processing operations, where China has a strong
presence across the board." Role of Critical Minerals at 12. The Department of Defense reports
that, "[e]ven in cases where other countries conduct the initial beneficiation of a strategic and
critical material, China dom- inates the processing of strategic and critical minerals, giving it de
facto control over the flow of material through the supply chain." White House Report at 165.
China refines almost 60 percent of lithium, over 50 percent of graphite, 72 percent of cobalt, 40
percent of copper, around 35 percent of nickel, and 90 percent of manganese. See Global Supply
Chains at 2,23; Role of Critical Minerals at 31-32; White House Report at 103. It also produces
three-quarters of all lith- ium-ion batteries. See Global Supply Chains at 2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683, pp.31-32]
This lack of supplier diversity greatly increases supply-chain risk. As de- tailed below,
disruptions in even a single country can create supply bottlenecks; the limited number of
countries producing and processing minerals may not be able to meet rapidly increasing demand;
and, according to the federal govern- ment, scholars, and industry observers, the dominance of
potentially uncoop- erative or hostile countries in every segment of the market threatens U.S. en-
ergy security. Under these challenging and unpredictable circumstances, a widespread shift to
electric vehicles in less than a decade is plainly infeasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp.
31-32]
Supply-Chain Disruption. Because the production of these critical minerals depends on one
country or a few countries, "a large portion of global supply is subject to single point disruption
risk." White House Report at 175-76. If a major producing country suffers a natural disaster,
imposes new trade re- strictions, faces political or social unrest, or becomes involved in
geopolitical conflict, the stream of minerals entering the market could dramatically slow. See
Role of Critical Minerals at 32 ("supply chains can quickly be affected by reg- ulatory changes,
trade restrictions or political instability in a small number of countries"); id. at 129 ("Under these
circumstances, physical disruptions (e.g. earthquakes, tsunamis and flooding) or regulatory and
geopolitical events in major producing countries can have large impacts on the availability of
miner- als, and in turn on prices."). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 32]
These concerns are not hypothetical. Independent and governmental re- ports—many of
which EPA relies on in support of the proposed rule— document instances in which each of
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these disruptions have occurred. Natural disasters, for example, have "become one of the most
frequent causes of min- eral supply disruption." Role of Critical Minerals at 12, 129. Mining
operations are also vulnerable to high water-stress levels, extreme heat, and flooding. Id. Over
half of today's lithium and 80 percent of Chile's copper is produced in areas with high water-
stress levels. Id. at 131. In 2019, "the worst drought in more than 60 years severely affected
some operations" in Chile, and that na- tion's "largest underground copper mine" had to
implement water rationing. Id. "[SJimilar events hav[e] occurred in Australia, Zambia and
others." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 32-33]
The federal government has expressed concern that the increased tendency of countries to
engage in "unfair foreign trade practices" presents "[ajnother risk to critical material supply
chains." White House Report at 183-84. The International Energy Agency offered a similar
assessment, explaining that "[rjecent events, such as Indonesia's ban on nickel ore export and
China's ex- port ban on [rare earth elements]," show that "regulatory and geopolitical events in
major producing countries can have large impacts on the availability of minerals." Role of
Critical Minerals at 129. Moreover, news outlets have re- ported that "Chile, a major producer of
lithium, has proposed nationalizing its lithium industry to better control how the resources are
developed and de- ployed, as have Bolivia and Mexico." Ana Swanson, The U.S. Needs
Minerals for Electric Cars. Everyone Else Wants Them Too., N.Y. Times (May 21, 2023),
https://tinyurl.com/2p8txa2h ("Minerals for Electric Cars"). And, according to the Department of
Defense, China has continuously engaged in "dumping"— i.e., exporting products at low prices
in the short term to drive competing pro- viders out of business and secure long-term dominance.
White House Report at 184. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 32-33]
Legal, legislative, and grassroots scrutiny of the environmental and social issues surrounding
the production of critical minerals also threatens supply chains. See Role of Critical Minerals at
12. "Grassroots protests and lawsuits against lithium mining are on the rise . . . amid rising
concern about the socio- environmental impacts and increasingly tense geopolitics around
supply." Nina Lakhani, Revealed: How US Transition to Electric Cars Threatens Environmen-
tal Havoc, Guardian (Jan. 24, 2023), https://tinyurl.com/995uawn8. Reporters have noted that,
"[i]n Chile and Argentina, the world's second- and fourth- largest lithium producers respectively,
broken promises by corporations, water scarcity, land contamination and the lack of informed
consent from Indigenous groups has fueled resistance and social conflicts." Id. And, according to
the Bureau of International Labor Affairs, cobalt mining operations in the Demo- cratic Republic
of Congo have been under the spotlight for their use of child labor. See Exposing Exploitation in
Global Supply Chains, Bureau of Int'l Lab.
Affs., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of- goods/supply-
chains/lithium-ion-batteries. These types of events have the po- tential to depress output. Labor
strikes are already a leading cause of mineral supply disruption, see Role of Critical Minerals at
129, and major protests and legal challenges "could serve as a hard brake" on production,
Bentley Allan et al., Friendshoring Critical Minerals: What Could the U.S. and Its Partners
Produce, Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace (May 3, 2023) ("Friendshoring Critical Min-
erals"). Public opinion in the United States, too, "could turn sharply against any material imports
associated with human rights violations or corruption," which could require manufacturers "to
identify other sources for input materials." White House Report at 122. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0683, pp.33-34]
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Other forms of internal conflict can affect operations within major produc- ing countries. In
the 1970s, for example, the supply of cobalt "was disrupted due to an uprising in the region."
Alexandra Leader et al., The Effect of Critical Material Prices on the Competitiveness of Clean
Energy Technologies, Materials for Renewable and Sustainable Energy, at 2 (2019) ("The Effect
of Critical Material Prices"). "The market saw price increases of over 500%, causing severe
inter- ruptions for the downstream cobalt users, such as General Electric." Id. The majority of
cobalt continues to come from that region, and "such a concen- trated supply in a provenly
unstable region leaves concern over the potential for another major supply disruption." Id. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 34]
Geopolitical conflict could also rapidly shift the supply landscape. See White House Report at
175. The war in Ukraine, for example, has affected the availability and cost of nickel, showing
"just how quickly events can change." McKinsey & Co., Could Supply-Chain Issues Derail the
Energy Transition (Dec. 5, 2022) ("Supply-Chain Issues"); see also Emily Pickrell, Russia-
Ukraine War Helps Drive Nickel Prices, EV Headaches, Forbes (Mar. 31, 2022), https://ti-
nyurl.com/2p95mwfx; Global Supply Chains at 15-16. Likewise, the "military coup in Myanmar
has raised concerns over supply disruption of heavy [rare earth elements], fueling a surge in
prices." Role of Critical Minerals at 129. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 34]
Rapidly Increasing Demand. Beyond potential supply disruptions, the world's facilities for
mining and processing critical minerals will face immense challenges in meeting the increased
demand required by the proposed rule. Shortages could delay electric-vehicle production—of
vital importance to the proposed rule's timelines—and at a minimum will contribute to price
volatility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 34-36]
Imbalances between supply and demand have already resulted in skyrock- eting prices for
critical minerals. Between the beginning of 2021 and May 2022, nickel prices "reach[ed] levels
not seen for almost a decade," cobalt prices more than doubled, and lithium prices increased
more than sevenfold. Global Supply Chains at 15. By September 2022, prices for lithium rose
even more, ranging from 800 to 1,000 percent higher than they were in the beginning of 2021.
Thea Riofrancos et al., Achieving Zero Emissions with More Mobility and Less Mining, Univ. of
Cal., Davis, at 16-17 (Jan. 2023) ("Achieving Zero Emissions"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, pp. 34-36]
These problems are likely to increase. The Department of Energy reports that "[g]lobal
demand for critical materials is expected to increase by 400-600% over the next several decades"
and that "[f]or certain materials, such as lithium and graphite used in electric-vehicle batteries,
demand is expected to increase by as much as 4,000%." Biden-Harris Administration Launches
$675 Million Bipar- tisan Infrastructure Law Program to Expand Domestic Critical Materials
Supply Chains, Dep't of Energy (Aug. 9, 2022), https://www.energy.gov/arti- cles/biden-harris-
administration-launches-675-million-bipartisan-infrastruc- ture-law-program. The International
Energy Agency similarly reports that "[t]he exceptional rise in demand for batteries is now
outstripping supply" and projects that mineral supply chains "will have to expand ten-fold to
meet gov- ernment EV ambitions." Global Supply Chains at 3, 18. To avert inevitable bot-
tlenecks, operations must "dramatically scale up." Id. at 46. Even under existing standards, at a
minimum, "dozens of mining projects will have to enter the market and reach capacity on
schedule and tens of new mineral processing and precursor plants will have to be
commissioned." Id. at 59. Even that may be insufficient to meet demand. See Supply-Chain
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Issues ("Minerals supply from open mines and those with a high probability of opening may be
able to partly meet this growth. However, the supply falls short of reaching all demand, and
harder measures . . . may be required."); Achieving Zero Emissions at 16 ("Despite ongoing
discoveries, most forecasters predict a near- to medium-term gap be- tween market supplies and
demand, resulting in a supply crunch in the next 5 to 10 years."). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, pp. 34-36]
"If history is any guide," attempts to ramp up production will be beset with "considerable
time lags." Role of Critical Minerals at 117. It takes "on average over 16 years to move mining
projects from discovery to first production." Id. at 12. And even once operational, "mines often
require around ten years before they reach nameplate production capacity." Global supply
Chains at 52. It is typ- ical for "[mjarket tightness" to "appear much more quickly than new
projects." Role of Critical Minerals at 122; see also id. at 12 ("These long lead times raise
questions about the ability of suppliers to ramp up output if demand were to pick up rapidly.").
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 34-36]
These high lag times may be exacerbated by declining mineral quality. Some mining
operations, such as those for copper, have "already peaked" or are "expected to peak in the early
2020s due to declining ore quality and reserve exhaustion." Role of Critical Minerals at 136. As
a result, "developing new pro- jects has become challenging," and producers will need to offset
cost escalations with "technology innovation." Id. at 137. Similarly, most of the production
growth in nickel over the coming years will come from regions with large amounts of "Class 2"
resources, which cannot be used for batteries without undergoing high-pressure acid leaching. Id.
at 146. That process brings "several challenges," including projects that "tend to take four to five
years to ramp up to 80% capacity" and have "track records of large cost overruns and delays."
Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 34-36]
Moreover, even when raw material can be mined, major strains may arise at later points in the
supply chain—such as processing. See Role of Critical Min- erals at 142. With respect to
lithium, for example, "[o]nly a handful of compa- nies can produce high-quality, high-purity
lithium chemical products," and "[w]hile several planned expansion projects are in the pipeline,
there is a ques- tion mark over how rapidly their capacity can come online to keep up with
demand growth." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 34-36]
The market's inability to respond quickly to increases in demand will likely lead to high
prices. The Department of Energy concludes that it is "reasonable to anticipate future spikes in
prices as demand increases and supply might, at least temporarily, struggle to catch up." White
House Report at 122. Others explain that "[h]igh demand, coupled with criticality, promotes the
risk of ex- treme price spikes or even material unavailability in the event of a disruption in the
supply chain." The Effect of Critical Material Prices at 2. And because raw materials now
account for the majority of battery costs, "higher mineral prices could have a significant effect on
achieving industry cost targets," Role of Critical Minerals at 107, which in turn could "lead to
lower demand for, and adoption of, clean energy technologies," The Effect of Critical Material
Prices at 3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 36-37]
Energy Security. Researchers and news outlets report that the urgent need for more materials
is already "stoking geopolitical tensions" and causing "a wave of resource nationalism that could
intensify" as countries around the world compete for access. Achieving Zero Emissions at 11;
Minerals for Electric Cars. According to the Department of Energy, American companies in
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partic- ular are at heightened risk because many key minerals come from countries "that are
geopolitical competitors of the United States" that may block access to dominant segments of the
supply chain. White House Report at 122, 138. The agency advises that China has already
"shown a willingness to restrict ac- cess to resources," such as rare earth elements, and could
easily curb exports of cobalt, nickel, lithium, graphite, or other battery components next. Id. at
122. For that reason, the agency warns that "it is reasonable to expect that China could restrict
exports of any or all of the battery supply chain materials it pro- duces, due to trade tensions with
the United States or a simple prioritization of domestic customers for its battery materials." Id. In
addition, the agency raises the "related concern" that China could also sell American
manufacturers "sub- standard or less advanced material" to gain a competitive advantage. Id.
U.S. companies have already indicated "that they were supplied 'previous genera- tion' material
as China's cathode producers reserve their most recent, and best, material for their larger volume
Chinese cell making clients." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 37]
The current Administration has concluded that there is a need to build a more secure
international supply chain that is less concentrated on China, but its strategy so far has been
criticized as "a bit incoherent and not necessarily sufficient to achieve that goal." Minerals for
Electric Cars. A recent report by Johns Hopkins University explains that, even if the United
States can relocate supply chains to countries with shared interests and values, those countries do
not have enough supply to meet demand. See Friendshoring Critical Minerals at 6. Given the
amount of critical minerals that will be needed for solar, wind, and electric-vehicle battery
supply chains by 2030, the study concluded that "[e]ven aggressive growth in the mining sector
would leave democratic coun- tries drastically short on critical minerals supply." Id.
"[Increasing production to achieve clean energy targets for 2030 would require unprecedented
action," and as a result, "excluding China from supply [of] critical minerals is simply not
possible in the short term." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 37]
Despite all of these problems, EPA asserts that critical minerals will not pose an obstacle for
compliance. Its explanation, however, comes up short. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 38]
EPA principally argues that it accounted for the supply problems associated with critical
minerals by assuming an upper limit on the amount of lithium-ion batteries that will be available
each year for electric vehicles. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,323; Draft RIA at 3-22. But that assumption
rests on an incomplete and un- reliable analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 38]
In setting its assumed upper limit on lithium-ion-battery availability, EPA analyzed only one
critical mineral: lithium. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,323; Draft RIA at 3-22. But as discussed above,
lithium is only one of the critical minerals needed for manufacturing batteries, and the
availability of each turns on cir- cumstances unique to the location of its production and
processing. EPA acknowledges that other minerals, such as "cobalt, nickel, and manganese[,] are
important." Draft RIA at 3-23. EPA attempts to justify its failure to consider critical minerals
other than lithium with the blithe assurance that "opportunity will exist" to reduce or eliminate
other minerals' use in battery chemistries in the future. Id. But EPA offers no analysis of key
questions that response raises—such as when those "opportunities]" for replacing other minerals
would arise, the availability of the alternatives that would serve as replace- ments, whether new
plants or production processes would be necessary, and the lead time required to implement the
changes. To assess accurately how the supply and demand problems associated with critical
minerals will impact com- pliance, the agency must address each of the minerals that it expects
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manufac- turers to obtain. It has not done so. Instead, EPA brushes the issue away with the
unfounded hope that new battery technologies might one day render these minerals less essential.
But they are essential now, a reality that EPA cannot ignore. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683,
p. 38]
Moreover, even as to lithium, the agency's analysis focuses solely on whether global
production could accommodate growing domestic demand. Draft RIA at 3-23. The agency does
not appear to have considered any of the potential disruptions discussed above that could render
aggregate global supply of minerals inadequate or unavailable for producing batteries for
vehicles to be sold domestically, or how price volatility might affect electric-vehicle penetra-
tion rates. Id. Moreover, as EPA acknowledges, the data it used to forecast sup- ply and demand
do not reach beyond model year 2027—the start of the compliance period for the proposed rule.
See id. at 3-25. Instead, EPA recog- nizes that projections that far out become prohibitively
difficult. See id. ("Past 2027, estimates of 'excess' lithium as a difference between [rest-of-
world] de- mand and a current accounting of global supply become less informative, be- cause a
demand response is not built into the supply data. Therefore, uncer- tainty about the supply-
demand balance . . . increases rapidly as the time hori- zon increases."). That admitted
uncertainty is more reason for caution, not an excuse to regulate in the absence of adequate
information. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 38-39]
PA also asserts that "widespread automotive electrification in the U.S. will not lead to a
critical long-term dependence on foreign imports of minerals or components," and that
"increased demand for these products will [not] be- come a vulnerability to national security." 88
Fed. Reg. at 29,313. EPA offers two justifications for that "assessment": (1) with funding and
motivation, com- panies can develop a domestic supply chain; and (2) disruptions caused by sup-
ply bottlenecks and volatile prices will not be significant. Neither justification withstands
scrutiny. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 39-40]
As to EPA's first justification—that an adequate domestic supply chain can be developed—
doing so by the time the proposed rule would take effect is vir- tually impossible. Although the
United States has some (small) reserves in this area, mining operations for most minerals are
limited or nonexistent. See Global Supply Chains at 28. There is no domestic production of
graphite or manganese. See White House Report at 105. And there is only one active domestic
mine for each of lithium, cobalt, and nickel—none of which is capable of sourcing enough
material even to scratch the surface of projected U.S. demand. The lith- ium mine's annual
output is enough for only 80,000 vehicles—less than the number of electric cars that a single
manufacturer (Tesla) sold in the first quar- ter of 2022. See Lithium Mining in North America,
Inst, for Energy R'sch (Sept. 21, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/2p89vrkv; Dustin Hawley, What
Percent of US Car Sales Are Electric?, J.D. Power (Apr. 3, 2023), https://ti-
nyurl.com/w6vn9rc5. The cobalt mine has not reached full production, and even when it does,
the company expects to produce enough material for only "several hundred thousand electric
cars." Kirk Siegler, In Idaho, America's First, and Only, Cobalt Mine in Decades Is Opening,
OPB (Oct. 8, 2022), https://ti- nyurl.com/3v929nd3. And the nickel mine is set to shut down in
2025, mean- ing that it will not even be in operation by the time the proposed standards take
effect. See White House Report at 99. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 39-40]
Because the baseline for domestic mineral production is close to zero, new mining operations
are necessary. But although various projects have been an- nounced or are under development,
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whether and when they might begin oper- ations remains uncertain. In the United States, as
elsewhere, establishing a min- ing operation is "an extremely lengthy process." White House
Report at 158. According to the Department of Defense, a "reasonable industry benchmark for
the development... is not less than ten years" and can sometimes take over thirty years. Id. And
that is before factoring in the time needed to obtain the necessary permits, which itself can take
"years, if not decades," even account- ing for the federal government's efforts to "streamline" the
process. Minerals for Electric Cars. Moreover, it is reportedly "quite common for most
companies to fail to reach the end of this development process, simply due to the long project
development time without cash flows to offset expenses and the technical chal- lenges associated
with large, complex project financing for materials produc- tion." White House Report at 158.
For example, during the "peak of industry and market interest in the rare earth sector in early
2011," the "Advanced Rare- Earths Project Index" tracked 275 projects that were under
development by 180 publicly traded companies in 30 different countries. Id. By 2021, only two
had entered full-scale production, with two others still in pilot-plant production and the rest
having failed—representing a "combined success rate of 1.5 percent" over a decade. Id. Thus,
even if EPA is right that minerals could be produced in the United States, that companies have a
competitive interest in developing these operations, and that the federal government is providing
helpful re- sources, there is little chance that enough mines will be up and running in time to
supply manufacturers with minerals they need for any year in the proposed rule's compliance
period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 39-40]
As to EPA's second justification—speculation that supply disruptions and fluctuating prices
will not have a material effect on the electric-vehicle industry—that conjecture is unfounded and
implausible. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,323. Contrary to the agency's contention, supply disruptions
and fluctuating prices of critical minerals will "constraint the ability to travel" if manufacturers
can- not offer enough vehicles for their consumer base or must raise prices beyond what many
consumers can afford. Id. And even if the agency is right that manufacturers have thus far been
able to avoid short-term price fluctuations by entering long-term contracts, EPA cites nothing to
demonstrate that those arrangements will continue to be offered as the demand for a limited
supply of critical minerals skyrockets over the coming years. EPA also cites nothing to
demonstrate that substitutes will be readily available and affordable when the primary critical
mineral is not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 41]
In sum, the vulnerable and volatile supply chain for critical minerals is a challenge that cannot
be overcome in a matter of a few years. Rather than thrusting manufacturers into a sea of risk
and uncertainty, EPA should wait until the global market stabilizes or the domestic market
develops before effec- tively mandating a widespread shift to electric vehicles.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683, p. 41]
4 Supply-chain problems are also likely to affect the manufacture of fuel-cell vehicles. Fuel-cell vehicles
"rely on a platinum catalyst, which is a major downside to this technology, as platinum group elements are
expensive and deposits concentrated enough for economic mining are rare." The Effect of Critical Material
Prices at 3. "According to the United States Geological Survey, platinum group elements are among the
rarest elements on earth and are found in earth crust in concentrations of around 0.5 parts per billion." Id. at
4. And just like the materials needed for batteries, production of platinum group elements is highly
concentrated in South Africa, "accounting for 72% in 2017." Id.
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Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
EPA's proposal also ignores the national security implications of its proposed electric vehicle
mandate. The proposal would trade our energy security for energy dependence on countries like
China. Currently, China controls the vast majority the EV battery supply chain and most of the
related critical mineral mining and processing. Contrast that with the fact that 85 percent of the
crude that ran through U.S. refineries last year was sourced from North America. Forcing
Americans to buy EVs makes us less secure, not more. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 2]
The Proposed Rule requires increased reliance on imported critical minerals and metals for
battery production and grid expansion that could have serious negative consequences for our
energy and national security. The supply chain for key minerals needed to produce electric
vehicle batteries is not assured and will require dramatic increases to meet expected demand. The
extraction and processing of battery critical minerals is concentrated in politically unstable or
unfriendly nations. Domestic copper and aluminum smelting capacity is insufficient to meet grid
expansion needs, and new mines can take over a decade to increase domestic supply. The
deployment timeline necessary to develop new resources for batteries and the grid is
impracticable and presents unnecessary risks to our energy and economic security. In contrast,
domestically consumed liquid fuels sourced from petroleum and bio feedstocks are largely
sourced in North America, and the U.S. benefits from its position as a net exporter of petroleum
and refined product exports. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 3]
I. EPA's Proposal Does Not Comprehensively Address Cross-Cutting Issues
EPA's desire to remake the automotive sector creates significant energy and national security
concerns and stresses an aging electrical grid subject to increasing demand. In glossing over
these issues, EPA fails to adequately consider the mineral, metal, electricity generation,
transmission, distribution, and charging infrastructure requirements necessary for the Proposed
Rule to be feasible. This is alarming and undermines our energy security. We lack the supply of
domestically sourced minerals and metals needed to build batteries and transmission lines and,
contrary to the legislative intent of U.S. laws such as the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law ("BIL")
and Inflation Reduction Act ("IRA"), we will have to rely on foreign countries to fulfill the
Proposed Rule's mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 4]
Even if we could import vast quantities of mineral resources, EPA's electrification mandate is
unobtainable. We face a limited supply of copper, which is a critical mineral needed to build out
the transmission grid to supply electricity to charging stations. We also do not have near the
vehicle charging infrastructure necessary to power the mandated number of ZEVs. Rather than
conducting a clear-eyed assessment of these challenges, EPA erroneously assumes that all the
necessary conditions to enable its proposal will happen on its aggressive timeline. This
conclusion dismisses or outright ignores a multitude of evidence to the contrary. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 4]
A. The Proposal Compromises Energy and National Security
1. Inadequate Minerals for Batteries Will Make Original Equipment Manufacturers
("OEMs") Dependent on Foreign Suppliers and Make it Difficult to Supply Electric Vehicles
Required by this Proposal
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The Russian invasion of Ukraine highlights the importance of assessing, planning, and
mitigating risks to energy supplies. As we have seen with Europe, a strategy of supply
diversification (e.g., increasing imports from a diverse pool of suppliers) is an important way to
mitigate global supply disruptions.3 The key tenet of risk mitigation is not about removing the
likelihood of a risk but about reducing its impact to an acceptable level—the primary
justification for the U.S. holding a Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The U.S. similarly holds a
national defense commodity-based stockpile meant to decrease or prevent "dependence upon
foreign and single points of supply for strategic and critical materials needed in times of national
emergency."4 Exposing U.S. mobility to the risk of critical mineral supply availability raises an
essential energy security question: How best does the U.S. trade risks it can mitigate for risks it
cannot? But EPA fails to address this question in its Proposal. Rather, EPA largely limits its
analysis to energy security impacts resulting from decreased fuel consumption and ignores the
riskier implications of mandating reliance on an unstable, foreign-dominated supply chain, as
evidenced by China's announcement this week that it is limiting exports of two rare earth
minerals.5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 4-5]
3 "Europe's Reliance on Diverse Pool of LNG Sources Continues Year after Ukraine Invasion." Natural
Gas Intelligence, 22 Feb. 2023, www.naturalgasintel.com/europes-reliance-on-diverse-pool-of-lng-sources-
continues-year-after-ukraine-invasion/. Accessed 28 June 2023.
4 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, "National Stockpiles: Background and Issues for
Congress" (June 15, 2020) available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11574;
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, "The Strategic National Stockpile: Overview Issues for
Congress" (Jan. 25, 2023) available at https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R47400.pdf.
5 See, e.g., Proposed Rule at 29,345, 29,388-90; Archie Hunter & Alfred Cang, China Restricts Export of
Chipmaking Metals in Clash with US, July 3, 2023. Bloomberg. Available at China to Restrict Exports of
Metals Critical to Chip Production - Bloomberg.
The supply chain necessary to support new technologies contemplated by the Proposed Rule
is far from assured and is likely to increase dependence on critical minerals from foreign sources.
Reliance on a limited number of technologies (e.g., ZEVs) on the timeline required by the
Proposed Rule will result in a non-resilient transportation sector that is vulnerable to unexpected
disruptions and cost increases. For instance, both the federal government and the private sector
recognized critical minerals are essential to the future of ZEVs.6 Unstable critical mineral supply
chains could disrupt this future. ZEVs, as compared to ICEVs, have a much greater reliance on
several critical minerals, as seen in Figure 1 below. There are six minerals critical to the
production of ZEVs: cobalt, copper, graphite, lithium, manganese, and nickel.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, p. 5]
6 Note that the term "zero emissions vehicle" ("ZEVs"), and even near-ZEVs as used by EPA, is a
misnomer. ZEVs are not actually zero emission when accounting for the vehicle lifecycle, including GHG
and criteria pollutant emissions associated with electricity generation required for charging certain ZEVs
and production of the ZEV vehicle and battery. We recognize that in the Proposed Rule, EPA uses "ZEV"
to refer only to those vehicles with a specific meaning under California's EV program, but for ease of
review, "ZEVs" is used throughout these comments and encompasses all of the EV technologies, including
plug in electric vehicles ("PEVs") such as plug-in hybrid electric vehicles ("PHEVs") and battery electric
vehicles ("BEVs").
7 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy
Transitions," (revised March 2022) available at https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-
clean-energy- transitions, [hereinafter IEA Report 2022],
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SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR EVs Require Over 4x the Critical Minerals of an ICE
Figure 1: Metal intensity - ICEVs vs. EV8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 5]
8 TURNER, MASON & COMPANY. "Evaluation of EPA's Assumptions and Analyses Used in Their
Proposed Rule for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards" (June 7, 2023) (Research funded by AFPM and
available upon request) [hereinafter "Turner Mason Report"].
Critical mineral supply, especially those essential to the manufacturing of a lithium-ion (Li-
ion) battery, is dominated by three lithium producing countries as summarized in Figure 2 below.
Of the foreign nations that produce cobalt, molybdenum, and other minerals needed to produce
ZEVs, China has disproportionate influence. While 70 percent of global cobalt production comes
from the Democratic Republic of Congo,9 most of those mines are owned/operated by China,
and more than 60 percent of cobalt processing is in China. Moreover, 67 percent of the world's
graphite is also produced in China. 10 The U.S. imports most of its manganese from Gabon, a
less politically stable country, providing 65 percent of the United States' supply. 11 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 6]
9 Id.
10 G.R. Robinson, et al., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, "Professional Paper 1802 Critical mineral
resources of the United States—Economic and environmental geology and prospects for future supply"
(Dec. 19, 2017) p. J1-J24, available at https://doi.org/10.3133/ppl802J.
11 OEC, "Manganese Ore in the United States" (Mar. 2023) available at
https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/manganese-ore/reporter/usa. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, p. 6]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR China Dominates Processing of Critical Energy
Transition Minerals. Figure 2: U.S. lack of critical mineral extraction or processing capacity 12
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 6]
12 Turner Mason Report.
Expected supply from existing mines and projects under construction is estimated to meet
only half of projected world demand for lithium and cobalt." 13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, p. 6]
13 Axios Generate, The supply crunch that could slow the climate fight, (May 5, 2021).
In contrast to oil, which has a lower global market concentration than the critical minerals
required for ZEVs, Figure 3 shows that most critical materials for ZEVs are concentrated in less
politically stable countries. Other than lithium production which is dominated by Australia (52
percent), all other critical ZEV minerals have a political stability index less than oil. As demand
for these commodities grows, the market concentration (and ability to exert power over pricing)
swings toward producers in less politically stable countries. If producer countries have market
power, they have the potential to impact not only price, but the ability for consumer countries to
influence other issues, such as sanctity of commercial contracts, labor and/or/human rights, and
environmental standards in the producing jurisdictions. The significance of this issue is
compounded by the fact that multiple critical minerals are needed for ZEV production, so a
disruption in the supply of a single mineral can disable the entire supply chain. The operation of
ICEVs, to the contrary, relies on a single natural resource for which there is an abundant
domestic supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 7-8]
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SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Resource Extraction Locations Are Concentrated in
Risky Jurisdictions. Figure 3: U.S. risk exposure to critical energy resources 14 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp.7-8]
14 Turner Mason Report.
The supply chain necessary to support new technologies contemplated by the Proposed Rule
is far from assured and is likely to increase dependence on critical minerals from foreign
sources. 15 In the event of supply disruption or pricing volatility related to geopolitical pressures,
the U.S. is highly exposed as it heavily relies on imports to satisfy domestic demand in each of
these critical minerals. 16 Figure 4 puts this import dependence in perspective. By 2032 the
Proposed Rule would raise import dependence to 100 percent of U.S. demand for most minerals,
and more than 50 percent for nickel and copper. Except for copper, the U.S. does not mine
significant quantities of these critical minerals. And, despite the U.S. having substantial domestic
copper mining, it still relies on imports to meet 45 percent of U.S. demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp.7-8]
15 See, e.g., Shelley Challis, POST REGISTER, "Jervois shuts down Idaho Cobalt mine" (Apr. 7, 2023),
available at https://www.postregister.com/messenger/news/jervois-shuts-down-idaho-cobalt-
mine/article_efd97f32-d015-l led-9424-bfb28220210c.html (describing suspension of construction at Idaho
Cobalt Operations due to, in part, low cobalt prices).
16 China announced it will restrict the export of two metals (gallium and germanium) used in EV
production. While these metals are not particularly rare, China could limit export of processed key EV
battery minerals to maintain its supply chain dominance. See Archie Hunter & Alfred Cang, China
Restricts Export of Chipmaking Metals in Clash with US, July 3, 2023. Bloomberg, available at
https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/articles/2023-07-03/china-to-restrict-exports-of-metals-critical-to-chip-
production.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR EPA Proposal Essentially Increases Import Reliance of
Most Critical Minerals to 100% Figure 4: U.S. import reliance of several critical minerals 17
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 7-8]
17 Turner Mason Report.
China's dominance does not stop at critical mineral extraction and processing. China produces
75 percent of all Li-ion batteries and houses the production capacity for 70 percent of cathodes
and 85 percent of anodes (both key battery components). 18 Conversely, the United States plays a
very small role in the global electric vehicle ("EV") supply chain, with only 7 percent of battery
production capacity. 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 9-10]
18 International Energy Agency, "Global Supply Chains of EV Batteries," (July 2022),
https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/961cfc6c-6a8c-42bb-a3ef-
57B657b7aca/GlobalSupplyChainsofE VBatteries.pdf.
19 See id. Regardless of recent funding awarded by the Department of Energy to construct three battery
plants, the domestic supply of these critical minerals remains unchanged and, once these manufacturing
facilities are permitted, constructed, and operable, they will rely heavily on foreign-sourced materials to
maximize capacity and output, if even possible.
This new demand for foreign-sourced materials will upset the decades of progress theU.S.
made in energy security, where we are currently a net exporter of crude and refined petroleum
products combined, and it will undermine the domestic security provided by our refining
industry. Sourcing critical minerals and building a secure, North American supply chain for
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ZEVs is not guaranteed as foreign production and processing of critical minerals have an
established, large market share and competitive advantage today. Because passenger vehicles
have domestic manufacturing and sourcing requirements in the IRA to be eligible for the clean
vehicle tax credit, compliance will be challenging.20 Yet the proposal assumes, without basis,
that virtually all batteries will qualify for the full tax credits and will achieve cost parity despite a
significant increase in demand. In making this assumption, EPA ignores the obvious benefits of a
multi-technology approach that would reduce the risks associated with a ZEV-focused approach.
For example, Toyota recently noted in a memo to its dealers that "the amount of raw materials in
one long- range battery electric vehicle could instead be used to make 6 plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles or 90 hybrid electric vehicles ... the overall carbon reduction of those 90 hybrids over
their lifetimes is 37 times as much as a single battery electric vehicle."21 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp.9-10]
20 IRA, Section 45W(c) (The IRA requires 50% of the value of battery components to be produced or
assembled in North America to qualify for a $3,750 credit and 40% of the value of critical minerals sourced
from the United States or a free trade partner also for a $3,750 credit).
21 William Johnson, TESLARATI, "Toyota releases new defense of lagging EV strategy" (May 18, 2023)
available at https://www.teslarati.com/toyota-defends-ev-strategy/. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp.
9-10]
B. The United States Lacks Copper and Aluminum Production Required for Grid
Expansion
Beyond the ZEV itself, electricity networks need a large amount of copper and aluminum.23
The need for grid expansion that would result from this rapid increase in electricity demand
underpins a doubling of annual demand for copper and aluminum.24 Most supply of these
materials will come from overseas, as the United States lacks current production capacity or the
ability to increase such capacity in time to meet the demands of the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 11-12]
23 IEA Report 2022.
24 Id.
The United States does not supply much of the world's aluminum. Instead, China, Russia, and
India lead global production with an estimated 45 million metric tons per year. China possesses
more than half of the entire world's aluminum smelting capacity and produces by far the most
aluminum of any country at over 36 million tons per year.25 The United States, by contrast,
produces approximately 1 million tons per year. Similarly, countries supplying the most copper
are Chile, Peru, China, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These countries supply ten
times the amount produced domestically. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 11-12]
25 Andy Home, "Global aluminum production pendulum swings back to China" (June 21, 2022) available
at https://www.mining.com/web/column-global-aluminum-production-pendulum-swings-back-to-china/.
Experts predict our demand for these materials will rise dramatically, but we lack the ability
to source them domestically. The latest data concludes sourcing copper for electric infrastructure
(e.g., charging stations and storage) needed to accommodate increased electrical demand will be
challenging.26 Copper demand is expected to rise by 53 percent, while supply is expected to rise
by only 16 percent.27 U.S. import dependency for copper has grown from 10 percent in 1995 to
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40 percent in 2020, with projections of copper import dependency reaching between 55 percent
and 67 percent between 2020 and 2040.28 Other estimates predict that by 2030 supply from
existing mines and projects under construction is estimated to meet only 80 percent of copper
needs by 203029—not considering the anticipated increase in ZEV production anticipated by
EPA's Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 11-12]
26 IEA Report 2022.
27 BLOOMBERGNEF, "Copper Miners Eye M&A as Clean Energy Drives Supply" (Aug. 30, 2022),
available at https://about.bnef.com/blog/coppers-miners-eye-ma-as-clean-energy-drives-supply-
gap/#:~:text=Copper%20demand%20is%20set%20to,and%20difficulty%20developing%20greenfield%20
mines.
28 S&P GLOBAL, "The Future of Copper Will the Looming Supply Gap Short-Circuit the Energy
Transition?" (July 2022) available at https://cdn.ihsmarkit.com/www/pdf/0722/The-Future-of-Copper_Full-
Report_14July2022.pdf.
29 IEA Report 2022.
Establishing new mines, particularly in the United States, is not a near-term solution.
Permitting and authorizing new domestic mining and smelting capacity requires a substantial
amount of time and government support. According to the National Mining Association, it can
take up to 10 years to obtain a permit to commence mining operations in the U.S., while
permitting takes two years in Canada and Australia.30 "[UJnless the permitting process can be
improved, U.S. mining developments will continue to take longer to come online and carry more
financial risks compared with the rest of the world, China's domination of battery manufacturing
and critical minerals production will continue for a longer period, and the U.S. will find it
increasingly difficult to acquire the metals and minerals it needs for its long-term clean-energy
goals."31 Despite this Rule's unlawful push to transition to EVs, the Bureau of Land
Management placed a 20-year moratorium on mining rare earth minerals, such as copper, nickel,
and cobalt, from almost a quarter of a million acres of Minnesota, effectively killing the
proposed Twin Metals copper-nickel mine project.32 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 12]
30 National Mining Association, Delays in the U.S. Mine Permitting Process Impair and Discourage
Mining at Home, May 31, 2021. Available at https://nma.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/05/Infographic_SNL_minerals_permitting_5.7_updated.pdf.
31 Jason Lindquist, Don't Pass Me By - With Many Steps Required, Mining Projects Face Trickiest Path
To Approval, RBN Energy Blog (June 30, 2023) (Attachment 2).
32 88 Fed. Reg. 6308 (Jan. 31, 2023).
Globally, regulatory approval for new copper mines is at its lowest level in a decade.33 As a
case in point, the Resolution copper deposit in Arizona was discovered in 1995. This world-
class resource has been trying to acquire the necessary regulatory approvals for over 27 years. As
recently as May 19, 2023, the U.S. Forest Service told a federal court it was suspending approval
of a land swap between the project (owned by Rio Tinto and BHP) and several Native American
groups.34 The land swap was approved by the U.S. Congress in 2014, but the completed
environmental report was blocked in March 2021. Other copper mining projects in Alaska and
Minnesota have been halted by this administration, resulting in increased import dependence.35
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 12]
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33 Ernest Scheyder, REUTERS, "Copper Industry Warns of Looming Supply Gap without More Mines"
(Apr. 21, 2023) available atwww.reuters.com/markets/commodities/copper-industry-warns-looming-
supply- gap-without-more-mines-2023 -04-20/.
34 Ernest Scheyder, REUTERS "U.S. Forest Service Pauses Timeline for Rio Tinto Arizona Copper Mine"
(May 19, 2023) available at https://www.reuters.com/legal/us-forest-service-pauses-timeline-rio-tinto-
arizona-copper-mine-2023 -05-19/.
35 Jim Vinoski, FORBES, "There's Not Enough Copper for Our Electrification Plans-and Biden Is
Making It Worse" (Apr. 28, 2023) available at www.forbes.com/sites/jimvinoski/2023/04/28/theres-not-
enough- copper-for-our-electrification-plansand-biden-is-making-it-worse/?sh=19ca0a5dlfbf.
2. Required battery production is not feasible within the Proposal's time frame.
EPA severely overestimates the availability of minerals and the mining/processing
infrastructure and capabilities in the U.S.54 EPA's position in the DRIA that "PEV production in
the U.S. need not be heavily reliant on foreign manufacture of battery cells or packs as PEV
penetration increases and domestic mineral and cell production comes online" is unfounded.55
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 16-17]
54 AAI Comments at iv.
55 DRIA at 3-20.
The development of natural resources projects, like critical mineral mining and processing,
can easily require more than a decade. Increasing supply is not merely a matter of increasing
current production. "The ability for the miners to quickly ramp up production of key ores is
limited by regulatory hurdles and capital investment." Globally, it takes on average more than 16
years to move mining projects from first discovery to production.56 The ability to quickly scale
minerals production is further affected by ore quality, which in recent years has been declining,
and thus requires more material to be mined, more resources such as water in stressed areas for
processing, and ultimately greater environmental impacts. Even with the requisite authorizations
in hand, mine development and production can take years. For an open pit mine, it takes about 7
to 8 years from discovery to first ore; for a subsurface mine, the time frame is more like 10 to 12
years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 16-17]
56 IEA Report 2022.
Extracting critical minerals is challenging because most critical mineral ores exist in relatively
low concentrations and the quality of the ore grade is declining. For example, the average ore
grade for copper discoveries decreased in excess of 25 percent during the last 15 years. In that
same period, total energy consumption increased at a higher rate (46 percent) than production
(30 percent). Extraction (i.e., mining and processing) of metal content from lower- grade ores
requires removing more overburden to access the ore body, which requires more energy, exerting
upward pressure on production costs, greenhouse gas and criteria pollutant emissions, and waste
volumes. And once the raw material is mined, it must be qualified. This is not a mine-to-
producer scenario. It is a specialty chemical that must be tested at different stages for safety,
consistency of product output, and performance before it can be qualified for use in battery/ZEV
manufacturing. Substantial lead time is needed to qualify battery-grade materials as they go
through a very rigorous, staged approach. Careful attention to putting up projects on the scale of
raw material resource extraction and gigafactories requires time, careful consideration, and
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intensive safety precautions. Accelerating the buildup of a domestic battery value chain should
not overstep aspects of safe project development. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 17]
The required critical minerals are not available at scale today. Mining capacity cannot be
increased as quickly as required to meet the production rate required under the Proposed Rule,
and at-scale recycling capabilities to remove these materials will not be available soon. EPA's
willingness to assume that global supply shortages of critical minerals will resolve themselves
without specific analysis of how that problem will be addressed is another example of EPA
ignoring an issue of central relevance to this rulemaking. EPA neglects to appreciate these
limitations, rendering its Proposed Rule arbitrary and factually unsupported. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, p. 17]
EPA notes that many OEMs and battery manufacturers announced plans to build gigafactories
in North America due to government incentives like the IRA. But these are extraordinarily
complex projects that will take many years to materialize if they progress to the point of battery
production. In the DRIA, EPA states that, based on construction announcements by major
automakers, "the U.S. will have more than 800 GWh of cell or battery manufacturing capacity by
2025, and -1000 GWh by 2030, enough to supply from 10 to 13 million BEVs per year." 130 By
contrast, Wood Mackenzie projects U.S. capacity of less than half that level, at 422 GWh/ year in
2030,131 because many projects have failed to materialize or are delayed as market and other
conditions change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 30]
130 DRIA at 3-20.
131 Wood Mackenzie, "The EPA plans to rev up US EV sales," (Apr. 14, 2023), available at
https://www.woodmac.com/news/opinion/the-epa-plans-to-rev-up-us-ev-sales/.
Regardless of the purported capacity, it is unlikely these factories will operate beyond 50
percent capacity for years. Mature battery factories today rarely operate above 80 percent
utilization rates. For example, in 2022, there was 1,036 GWh of global battery production
capacity, but only 450 GWh of actual production. While there was approximately 7TWh of
forecast battery capacity planned as of September 2022, Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (BMI)
forecast total global supply of Li-ion batteries to reach only 4.5 TWh by 2031 or a 64 percent
utilization rate. 132 This step in the value chain could potentially create a critical bottleneck, in
stark contrast to EPA's assumed 998 GWh capacity by 2030. Given the disparity in forecasts
from different reputable sources, EPA's technology feasibility assessment should factor in
sensitivity cases and acknowledge potential disruptions in the supply chain. Including such
sensitivity cases is fully justified given EPA's experience in projecting available volumes of
cellulosic biofuel for purposes of the RFS. EPA consistently overestimated production of liquid
cellulosic biofuel from Cellulosic Biofuel Production 2010-2013 (RINs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, p. 30]
132 BENCHMARK SOURCE, "Ambition versus reality: why battery production capacity does not equal
supply" (Sept. 2, 2022) at Charts 5, 6, available at https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/ambition-
versus- reality-why-battery-production-capacity-does-not-equal-supply.
EPA requests comment on their approach to determining charging time, as set forth in the
DRIA, Chapter 4.155 EPA's analysis is contingent on unsupported assumptions regarding (1)
U.S. consumers' adoption of and ability to purchase more expensive ZEVs (see Sections IV.B.2
and IV.E.2.ii); (2) the type of ZEV purchased (used ZEVs or PHEVs compatible with slower
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charging units or new ZEVs that can use DCFC) (Section IV,B.2 addresses charging times); (3)
the availability of critical minerals and metals to expand the supply of reliable and renewable
electricity (see Section I.B); and (4) the availability of reliable and affordable charging for all
users (see Sections IV.B.4). Given the flaws in EPA's methodology that omits significant data
sources and other factors and makes unsupported assumptions, EPA should revise its analysis
concerning charging time and continue with promulgating a final rule for future emissions
standards, that accounts for the reality of today's automotive market and not the public
pronouncements of the automotive industry, a single state or group of states, or other
unsupported estimates of future market growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 33-34]
155 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,367.
4. EPA ignores the lack of reliable ZEV charging
The Proposal's success is partially contingent on the availability of "equitable, affordable
charging." 169 Currently, ZEV charging is most available in metropolitan areas, with less
investment occurring outside urban areas. 170 EPA's evaluation of the sourcing of critical
minerals and building a secure supply chain for ZEVs does not consider how challenging it will
be to meet the demand for copper needed for electric infrastructure (e.g., charging stations and
storage) to accommodate increased electrical demand. 171 The Proposed Rule fails to even
consider that copper demand is expected to rise by 53 percent when supply is expected to rise by
only 16 percent by 2040.172 Indeed, by 2030, the expected supply from existing mines and
projects under construction is estimated to meet only 80 percent of copper needs by 2030173—
not considering the anticipated increase in ZEV production anticipated by EPA's Proposed Rule.
Domestic production of critical minerals required for battery production is insufficient to meet
the projected demands. According to a review of multiple sources, there is a six-fold demand
growth expectation by 2030 and approximately 15 times by 2040. This growth rate outpaces the
market's ability to supply such minerals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 36-37]
169 Joann Muller, "The electric car revolution hinges on equitable, affordable charging," Axios, Feb. 8,
2023. Available at The electric vehicle revolution hinges on equitable, affordable charging (axios.com).
170 S&P GLOBAL MOBILITY, "EV Chargers: How Many Do We Need?" (Jan. 9, 2023), available at
https://press.spglobal.com/2023-01-09-EV-Chargers-How-many-do-we-need.
171IEA Report 2022.
172 BLOOMBERGNEF, Copper Miners Eye M&A as Clean Energy Drives Supply (Aug. 30, 2022),
available at https://about.bnef.com/blog/coppers-miners-eye-ma-as-clean-energy-drives-supply-
gap/#:~:text=Copper%20demand%20is%20set%20to,and%20difficulty%20developing%20greenfield%20
mines.
173 IEA Report 2022.
5. The Proposed Rule Incorrectly Assumes that a Secure Supply Chain Will Exist for ZEV
Technologies.
a. The Proposed Rule Does Not Properly Account for the Reliance on Foreign Markets for
Critical Minerals.
In the DRIA, EPA states "according to analyses by Department of Energy's Li-Bridge, no
shortage of cathode active material or lithium chemical supply is seen globally through 2035
under current projections of global demand." But there are many sources that contradict this
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point. Looking forward toward 2030, based on current and anticipated global production plans, a
global supply shortfall is likely to begin toward end of the decade if planned mining and brine
projects do not deliver as expected. Some critical minerals could face shortages as early as next
year. 178 The options for mitigating supply chain risks are increasingly limited. At current
production rates, the world exhausts the minable reserves of copper, cobalt, and nickel in the
2030s. This timeline accelerates significantly with the greater production needed for EPA's
envisioned energy transition. EPA's cherrypicked data on mineral availability is another example
of EPA's failure to address a major aspect of the proposal, in this case obscuring real world
obstacles to the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 38]
178 Lilly Lee, ENERGY INTELLIGENCE, Mining the Gap to a Net-Zero Future (May 15, 2023) available
at https://www.energyintel.com/00000188-le5f-d806-ad9f-
5edfebld0000?utm_campaign=website&utm_source=sendgrid.com&utm_medium=email.
b. The Proposed Rule Over-Estimates the Ability for the U.S. to Source Materials and
Fabricate Batteries Domestically.
The Proposed Rule fails to fully account for the challenges associated with creating and
sustaining a viable domestic supply chain that can deliver production-ready batteries necessary to
meet the Rule's assumed pace of electrification. Notably, the Rule does not carefully consider
the impediments to a viable domestic supply chain because of mineral availability, mineral
processing and manufacturing, and overall costs (see Section I.A.I and Figures 2, 3, and 4).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 38]
EPA's DRIA severely overestimates both the availability of minerals and mining/processing
infrastructure and capabilities in the U.S., assuming PEV production will not be dependent on
foreign manufacture of battery cells. 179 In April, the United States' first and only cobalt plant
decided to halt construction at the Idaho Cobalt Operations mine due to low cobalt prices,
inflation, and the mine's remote location despite Jervois's beneficial support from federal
grants—including a not-yet-approved $15 million award from the U.S. Department of Defense—
for additional drilling and to pay for studies to assess the possibility of constructing a cobalt
refinery in the U.S. 180 Given the Agency's lack of expertise in this area, it is not surprising
EPA neglects to properly analyze mineral availability and mining processing capabilities. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 38]
Though EPA mentions that OEMs are taking steps to secure domestically sourced minerals
and related commodities to supply production for these plants, the OEM's recent comments
express grave concern regarding the availability of critical minerals needed to produce
batteries,181 Moreover, many of those offtake agreements referred to EPA are with projects yet
to be permitted, built, or commercialized at scale. 182 OEMs, cathode or anode producers, and
battery manufacturers are internally assessing their raw material offtake agreements and expect
that some projects will not materialize to fruition. ZEVs are projected to represent approximately
90 percent of lithium demand by 2030, so, contrary to the assumption in the DRIA, switching
chemistries for other uses will not reduce the burden or price on lithium. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, p. 39]
179 DRIA at 3-20.
180 See, e.g., Shelley Challis, POST REGISTER, "Jervois shuts down Idaho Cobalt mine" (Apr. 7, 2023),
available at https://www.postregister.com/messenger/news/jervois-shuts-down-idaho-cobalt-
mine/article efd97f32-d015-l led-9424-bfb28220210c.html.
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181 AAI Comments at iv-v.
182 See, e.g., Shelley Challis, Post Register, "Jervois shuts down Idaho Cobalt mine" (Apr. 7, 2023),
available at https://www.postregister.com/messenger/news/jervois-shuts-down-idaho-cobalt-
mine/article_efd97f32-d015-l led-9424-bfb28220210c.html (describing Jervois's decision to halt
construction at the Idaho Cobalt Operations mine due to low cobalt prices, inflation, and the mine's remote
location despite Jervois's beneficial support from federal grants—including a not-yet-approved $15 million
award from the U.S. Department of Defense—for additional drilling and to pay for studies to assess the
possibility of constructing a cobalt refinery in the U.S.)
Considering the above, the Proposed Rule creates a multi-year—and perhaps
insurmountable—dependence on foreign mineral production and this, coupled with domestic
limitations in battery manufacturing capabilities, will make it impossible to sustain the viable
domestic supply chain that EPA envisions. While EPA acknowledges that "much of the supply
chain supporting the manufacture of ZEVs is located outside of the U.S.," 183 it arbitrarily
underplays this dependency by claiming that "more than half of battery cells and 84 percent of
assembled packs in PEVs sold in the U.S. from 2010 to 2021 were produced in the U.S." Battery
cell production, however, is just a piece of the value chain, and it cannot grow absent a stable
supply of refined critical minerals and precursors. Even assuming critical minerals are available,
a viable supply chain requires sufficient capacity of midstream refining operations prior to
battery cell production. Such capacity does not exist. For instance, BMI foresees a 77 percent
deficit in domestic available cathode active material to meet 2035 demands in North America
(N.A.). And this estimate was done prior to the EPA Proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733,
p. 39]
183 DRIA at 3-20.
While Congress and the Administration have taken steps to accelerate the supply chain, their
efforts are insufficient to fully support the rate of production required by the Proposal. For
example, U.S. supply of battery anode material is supported by the IRA and BIL, but the
production of raw materials supply that feeds the production of battery anode material is not
supported. Currently, Chinese battery firms are the most advanced and the majority of raw
material mining and processing goes through Chinese entities. See Section I. A. and Figure 2.
Thus, it will be difficult for many OEMs to meet the requirements for IRA credits in the near
term. Without a domestic solution to this value chain, reliance on imports will only add to cost to
the battery pack. 184 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 39-40]
184 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, BMI (see Chart 2, 3 & 4).
Ignoring these potential supply chain shortfalls leads to further deficiencies in EPA's analysis.
Indeed, limited supplies and constrained supply chains risk production downtime and inventory
backlogs—and this is just for production of the ZEVs. 185 The Daimler Truck Group
("Daimler"), for example, has been and is likely to continue to be "acutely affected by an
ongoing global shortage of semiconductors, which must be purchased on the global market." 186
And with the "rapidly rising demand for certain new technologies, such as electrified
powertrains," Daimler anticipates higher product costs, supply bottlenecks, and "long-term
increases in demand for battery cells, semiconductors, and certain critical materials, such as
lithium." Taken together, Daimler anticipates these supply chain concerns would limit its "ability
to meet demand for its current generation of vehicles (including its vehicles with conventional
combustion engines) or commercialize its new [ZEVs] profitably (or at all)" 187 Daimler, of
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course, is not alone in these conclusions and yet EPA's Proposed Rule appears to reject outright
any realistic assessment of future supply chains. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 40]
185 See Daimler Truck Group, Annual Report 2022, 141 available at
https://www.daimlertruck.com/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/investors/reports/annual-
reports/2022/daimler-truck-ir-annual-report-2022-incl-combined-management-report-dth-ag.pdf
(describing Daimler Truck Group's reliance on certain commodities, like steel, copper, and precious metals
that are usually sourced from individual suppliers, meaning that a single supplier's inability to fulfill
delivery obligations can have detrimental effects for an entire production line).
186 Id.
187 Id.
The mining sector will also need to grow significantly to meet ZEV demand as anticipated,
and required, by the Proposed Rule. Mining is an energy- and environmental resource-intensive
activity. Critical minerals for electric batteries such as lithium and copper are particularly
vulnerable to water stress given their high-water usage.208 And more than 50 percent of today's
lithium and copper production is concentrated in areas with high water stress levels. Several
major producing regions such as Australia, China, and Africa are also subject to extreme heat or
flooding, which pose greater challenges in ensuring reliable and sustainable supplies. Strong
focus on environmental best practices in this sector are needed to safeguard natural lands,
biodiversity, and sustainable water use. Similarly, focus on ethical best practices is needed to
protect indigenous peoples' rights, and to provide better child labor protections. These challenges
call for sustainable and socially responsible producers to lead the industry. The accelerated ZEV
technology penetration rate required under the EPA's proposal poses significant challenges for
the timely and widespread implementation of best practices to be developed, implemented, and
ensure oversight mechanisms are working.209 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 45-46]
208 See EIA 2022 Report.
209 For example, the United Nations Environment Programme is advising the Global Investor Commission
on Mining 2030 to identify best practice standards for responsible mining. See Mining 2030 at
https://mining2030.org/new-global-commission-launched-to-raise-mining-sustainability-standards-by-
2030/.
In addition, activities associated with mining produce GHG emissions, particulate matter
emissions, nitrogen oxide emissions, and other air pollutant emissions from mining equipment.
As shown in Figure 8, mining and processing several minerals and metals used for ZEV
production are carbon intensive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 45-46]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Average GHG emissions intensity for production of
selected commodities. Figure 8: 210 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 45-46]
210 IEA Report 2022 at 17.
Source: INTERNATIONAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, pp. 45-46]
The process for extracting and processing critical minerals can be responsible for
approximately 20 percent of the lifecycle GHG emissions from battery production.211 EPA
failed to weigh any of these consequences appropriately in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp. 45-46]
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211 H.C. Kim, et al., ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Vol. 50) "Cradle-to-Gate
Emissions from a Commercial Electric Vehicle Li-Ion Battery: A Comparative Analysis," (2016), pp.
7715-22.
EPA's reliance on an ICCT study to justify its estimate of falling battery costs is misplaced.
ICCT ignored literature that PHEVs depreciate with certain models and makes losing greater
value than others, like Tesla, especially those with long-range features. A May 2023 CBS article
highlighted a statement from Kelley Blue Book, an automotive research company, that PHEVs
generally depreciate faster than ICEVs.228 Kelley Blue Book said that three-year-old PEVs hold
63 percent of their value compared to 66 percent for ICEVs.229 Additionally, ICCT's battery
cost curve does not account for the potential of rising PEV-related metal prices which can cause
the price of battery packs to increase, as seen in 2022 and 2023. If ICCT's estimates of PEV
battery pack costs were revised to be higher, PEVs are likely to be priced at a substantial
premium compared to ICEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 49-50]
228 Joe D'Allegro, What to know about buying a used electric vehicle as more hit the auto sales market,
CNBC (May 21, 2023), https://www.cnbc.eom/2023/05/21/what-to-know-about-buying-a-used-ev-as-
more-hit-the-car-market.html. See also AAA Survey Shows EV Owners Should Be Concerned About
Depreciation (insideevs.com).
229 Id.
Moreover, the minerals used for EV batteries are also essential to many components of a
lower-carbon energy system beyond EV batteries, such as solar photovoltaic cells, wind turbines,
and hydrogen electrolyzers. In addition, these minerals have multiple traditional uses, such as
military defense systems, aerospace, mobile phones, computers, fiber-optic cables, semi-
conductors, medical applications, and even bank notes. Without substantial increases in new
mining capacity (or massive shifts toward recycling), competition for these minerals will
materially stiffen with increased electrification and the shift in underlying grid energy mix. An
acceleration in demand for these key minerals could result in price volatility stemming from
supply disruptions and/or geopolitical pressures. By contrast, the U.S. is much less reliant on
foreign sources of petroleum energy sources. In fact, the U.S. has been a net exporter of gasoline
and diesel since late 2009. And much of our petroleum imports come from friendly countries
such as Canada. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 50-51]
Organization: American Highway Users Alliance
More specifically, EPA's proposal in this docket appears to be premised on huge and rapid
growth in the portion of light-duty and medium-duty vehicles that are electric powered (EVs) as
well as on rapid transformation of the marketplace in a number of related areas that are not the
subject of the proposed regulation. EPA seems to have made favorable assumptions on many
issues bearing on the feasibility of the proposal, including as to the issues set forth below. The
Highway Users, on the other hand, drawing on the expertise of its members, questions that,
within the MY 2027 - 2032 timeframe of the proposed rule, all or most of the following will
occur, that - [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
[,„]
there will be an adequate supply of rare earth and other critical minerals, and the
ability to process them, with those minerals being so essential to the manufacture of EVs and
batteries, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
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with a large portion of such minerals being sourced and/or processed overseas,
including in China and Africa, whether the national interest in sourcing and processing such
minerals in the United States can be met, and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
Access to Critical Minerals
As EPA well knows, EVs, whether light-duty, medium-duty, or heavy-duty, require use of
rare earth and other critical minerals for manufacture of batteries and to reduce the weight of EV
parts other than the batteries. These minerals, such as lithium, cobalt, graphite, and nickel,
currently are sourced in and must be transported from places such as China and Africa.
Increasing reliance on EVs both for light/medium-duty vehicles and heavy-duty vehicles means
that important industries and the nation would become increasingly reliant on components and
very long-distance transportation from China, Africa and elsewhere, weakening national security
and increasing trade deficits. These are reasons to do less, not more, to accelerate EV use until
U.S. sources of these materials can be identified and developed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0696, p. 6]
And the need for U.S. sourced minerals and processing will be major. There are reports that,
globally, over 300 new, additional mines will be needed to meet raw materials needs for batteries
and energy storage by 2035.7 Yet, the overall proposal by EPA does not appear to seek to do
anything to accelerate or facilitate the ability to acquire and process these scarce metals in the
United States, where mining would be subject to greater environmental protection. At least to
that extent the vehicle emissions reduction NPRMs appear to underweight adverse
environmental and social impact of less regulated mining (though outside the U.S.), emissions
from very long-distance transportation of important supplies, and perhaps other aspects of EV
manufacture and deployment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, p. 6]
7 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, September 6, 2022, "More than 300 new mines required to meet
battery demand by 2035", https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/more-than-300-new-mines-
required-to-meet-battery-demand-by-2035
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
EPA notes in the proposal various partnerships and plans to build battery manufacturing
plants in the U.S., taking advantage of incentives such as the IRA, one must view these as highly
complex projects - in addition to siting and construction, it will take time for these new battery
manufacturing facilities to be up and running to ramp up to full production. Further, there is the
probability that not all announced projects will materialize. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p.
15]
f. Critical Minerals, Energy Security, BEV Supply Chains, Feasibility and Modeling.
i. Critical minerals.
Reliance on a limited number of technologies (e.g., ZEVs) on the timeline required by the
proposed rule will likely result in a non-resilient transport sector that is vulnerable to unexpected
disruptions. Both the federal government and the private sector have recognized that critical
minerals are essential to the future of ZEV technology, and likewise, that unstable critical
mineral supply chains could disrupt this future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 20-21]
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BEV battery supply chains, including critical minerals and precursors are controlled by a
small number of countries, some with unsustainable environmental and human rights practices,
and geopolitical concerns. The mining sector will need to grow exponentially to meet demand,
and mining is an energy- and environmental-intensive activity. The accelerated BEV technology
penetration rate required under EPA's proposal poses significant challenges for best practices to
be widely and fully deployed in the timeframe anticipated by the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0641, pp. 20-21]
Regarding the availability of critical minerals, especially those essential to the manufacturing
of a Li-ion battery, the supply is dominated by three lithium producing countries — Australia,
Chile and China, which account for nearly 90 percent of the global market.65 While 70% of
global cobalt production comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo,66 most of the mines
are owned/operated by China and more than 60 percent of cobalt processing is located in China.
China produces 67 percent of the world's graphite.67 The U.S. imports most of its manganese
from Gabon, a less geopolitically stable country, providing 65 percent of the United States'
supply.68 Electricity networks need a large amount of copper and aluminum. The need for grid
expansion that would result from this rapid increase in electricity demand underpins a doubling
of annual demand for copper and aluminum.69 China possesses over half of the entire world's
aluminum smelting capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 20-21]
65 "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions", International Energy Agency World
Energy Outlook Special Report. May 2021. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/7d2a83b-8c30-4e9d-
980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.
66 Ibid.
67 Robinson, G.R., Jr., Hammarstrom, J.M., and Olson, D.W., 2017, Graphite, chap. J of Schulz, K.J.,
DeYoung, J.H., Jr., Seal, R.R., II, and Bradley, D.C., eds., Critical mineral resources of the United States—
Economic and environmental geology and prospects for future supply: U.S. Geological Survey Professional
Paper 1802, p. J1-J24, https://doi.org/10.3133/ppl802J.
68 https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/manganese-ore/reporter/usa
69 "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions", International Energy Agency World
Energy Outlook Special Report. May 2021. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/7d2a83b-8c30-4e9d-
980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.
There are sources that indicate a shortage of critical minerals as well as volatility in critical
mineral prices. U.S. energy security would also undergo a dramatic paradigm shift if vehicle
technologies were shifted from ICEVs to ZEVs in the exponential rate that the proposal
contemplates. Domestic production of critical minerals required for battery production is
insufficient to meet the projected demands. Although Congress and the Administration have
taken significant steps to accelerate this activity by funding, facilitating, and promoting the rapid
growth of U.S. supply chains for these products through the IRA, BIL, and numerous Executive
Branch initiatives, more will still be needed given the proposed increase in demand. Further,
EPA failed to consider all the complexities, such as federal permitting, National Environmental
Protection Act reviews, and the supply chains for these critical materials in their technology
feasibility assessment. API requests that EPA include a thorough evaluation of the full supply
chains for each critical mineral/material in their final proposal and their implications on energy
security, factoring in sensitivity cases and acknowledging potential disruptions in the supply
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chain. Please see Appendix A for more discussion regarding our concerns on critical minerals.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 20-21]
Mineral security and energy security, defined as "the uninterrupted availability of energy
sources at affordable prices"71 are essentially interchangeable concepts because the proposed
rule will require affordable supplies of critical minerals, that while available within the U.S., are
largely inaccessible due to permitting challenges.72 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 21-
22]
71 88 Fed. Reg. 29,388 (May 5, 2023).
72 The Martec Group, "Electric vehicle growth in the U.S.: A look Into the EV Battery Supply Chain",
March 2022, https ://martecgroup.com/electric-vehicle-battery-supply-chain/.
According to the Congressional Research Service,73 the U.S. has a heavy dependence on
imported critical minerals and for the five critical minerals used in battery production there is a
"higher potential" for disruptions to the supply chain. In addition to domestic reserves of critical
minerals where it may not even be economical to produce,74 there is a lack of liquidity75 in
global markets that are highly concentrated. Markets for critical minerals are "small, thin, and
opaque"76 and inefficient which is crippling to development and advancement of critical
minerals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 21-22]
73 Tracy, B. S. (2022). "Critical Minerals in Electric Vehicle Batteries" (CRS Report No. R47227).
https://crsreports.congress.gOv/product/pdf/R/R47227.
74 Ibid.
75 Hendrix, C. December 2022. "Markets for Critical Minerals Are Too Prone to Failure." Barron's.
https://www.barrons.com/articles/markets-critical-minerals-lithium-cobalt-copper-51671227168.
76 Ibid.
U.S. energy security would also undergo a dramatic paradigm shift if vehicle technologies
were shifted from ICEVs to ZEVs in the exponential rate that the proposal would likely entail.
The U.S. would move from being energy secure to being dependent largely upon foreign sources
for the minerals needed to make ZEV technologies such as batteries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, pp. 21-22]
iii. BEV Supply Chains.
Given the market and domestic resource challenges identified above, the EPA has failed to
properly address effects on energy security of the U.S. The proposed rule would make the U.S.
more reliant on imported critical minerals that are subject to supply disruptions and market
concentrations. As EPA mentions, disruptions in petroleum supply chains and critical mineral
supply chains are not perfectly comparable; however, similarities should not be ignored. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 21-22]
i. Additional Concerns.
EPA must address several aspects of their analysis of vulnerabilities associated with critical
minerals as outlined in Appendix A and related to cost, modeling, and assumptions as outlined in
Appendix B. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 34]
Appendix A:
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Critical Minerals Assessment
There are hurdles to address in order to support the scale-up adoption of BEV. These hurdles
include impacts on supply chains, energy resilience and the environment. Consideration to both
the hurdles and mitigation measures should be given to inform responsible and effective
implementation of vehicle standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 36]
Reliance on a limited number of technologies (e.g., BEVs) on the timeline required by the
proposed rule will likely result in a non-resilient transport sector that is vulnerable to unexpected
disruptions. Both the federal government and the private sector have recognized that critical
minerals are essential to the future of BEVs, and likewise, that unstable critical mineral supply
chains could disrupt this future. A BEV passenger car requires six times85 more minerals than a
conventional gasoline car. A PHEV requires just one-sixth the critical minerals compared to a
BEV, making it a more achievable bridge while the industry scales.86 We understand that EPA's
current analysis does not include PHEV in their technology penetration rates, and that EPA plans
to incorporate these technologies in the final rule. API recommends the critical minerals section
of the rule be revisited considering PHEV in the assumptions and analysis. Additionally, EPA
needs to explain why more of the total electrical vehicle miles travelled (VMT) could not be
satisfied by PHEV, which would allow supply chains to better accommodate the demand for
critical minerals and hence lower potential global environmental risk. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, p. 36]
85 International Energy Agency. "The Role of Critical World Energy Outlook Special Report Minerals in
Clean Energy Transitions." 2022. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/7d2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a-
52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.
86 Prat, G. "Carbon is our enemy: Let's Use Everything We've Got To Fight It." Toyota Times. September
2021. https://toyotatimes.jp/en/spotlights/172.htnil.
I. Mineral availability and mining.
BEV battery supply chains, including critical minerals and precursors are controlled by a
small number of countries, some with unsustainable environmental and human rights practices,
and geopolitical concerns. The mining sector would need to grow exponentially to meet the
proposed rule's demands. According to a forecast by BMI, at least 384 combined new mines for
graphite, lithium, nickel, and cobalt are required to meet the global demand by 2035.87 These
numbers highlighted by the BMI report were derived prior to EPA releasing the new rule
proposals, which will significantly increase the need for new mines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 36-37]
87 More than 300 new mines required to meet battery demand by 2035:
https://source.benchmarkminerals.eom/article/more-than-300-new-mines-required-to-meet-battery-
demand-by- 2035.
Mining is an energy- and environmental-intensive activity. Critical minerals for electric
batteries such as lithium and copper are particularly vulnerable to water stress given their high-
water requirements. 8 8 Over 50 percent of today's lithium and copper production is concentrated
in areas with high water stress levels. Activities associated with mining produce GHG emissions,
as well as particulate matter emissions, nitrogen oxide emissions, and other air pollutant
emissions from mining equipment. A strong focus on environmental and ethical best practices in
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this sector are needed to safeguard natural lands, biodiversity, sustainable water use, indigenous
peoples' rights, and labor protections.89 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 36-37]
88 International Energy Agency. "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions", International
Energy Agency World Energy Outlook Special Report, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/7d2a83b-
8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.
89 The Global Investor Commission on Mining 2030: https://mining2030.org/.
Regarding the availability of critical minerals, especially those essential to the manufacturing
of a Li-ion battery, the supply is dominated by three lithium producing countries — Australia,
Chile and China, which account for nearly 90 percent of the global market. While 70% of global
cobalt production comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo,90 most of the mines are
owned/operated by China and more than 60 percent of cobalt processing is located in China.
China produces 67 percent of the world's graphite.91 The U.S. imports most of its manganese
from Gabon, a less geopolitically stable country, providing 65 percent of the United States'
supply.92 Electricity networks need a large amount of copper and aluminum. The need for grid
expansion that would result from this rapid increase in electricity demand underpins a doubling
of annual demand for copper and aluminum.93 China possesses over half of the entire world's
aluminum smelting capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 36-37]
90 International Energy Agency. "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions", International
Energy Agency World Energy Outlook Special Report, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/7d2a83b-
8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.
91 "Graphite," Professional Paper 1802-J, US Geological Survey.
https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/ppl802J#:~:text=China%20provides%20approximately%2067%20per
cent%20
of%20worldwide%20output,costs%20and%20some%20mine%20production%20problems%20are%20deve
loping.
92 Observatory of Economic Complexity: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/manganese-
ore/reporter/usa.
93 International Energy Agency. "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions", International
Energy Agency World Energy Outlook Special Report, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/7d2a83b-
8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.
II. Supply chain resilience.
Looking forward toward 2030, based on current and anticipated global production plans, a
global supply shortfall is likely to begin toward the end of the decade. If planned mining projects
do not deliver as expected, some critical minerals could face shortages as early as next year.94
Globally, it takes on average over 16 years to move mining projects from first discovery to
production.95 The ability to quickly scale minerals production is further affected by ore quality,
which in recent years has been declining and thus requires more material to be mined, more
resources such as water in stressed areas for processing, and ultimately greater environmental
impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 37-38]
94 L. Lee, Energy Intelligence "Mining the Gap to a Net-Zero Future," May 15, 2023.
https://www.energyintel.eom/00000188-le5f-d806-ad9f-
5edfebld0000?utm_campaign=website&utm_source=sendgrid.com&utm_medium=email.
95 "International Energy Agency. "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions",
International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook Special Report.
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https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/7d2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a-
52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.
EPA also fails to consider the value chain before the battery cell production. The domestic
supply chain is in its early stages and to meet the proposed goals, automakers and battery
manufacturers will still need to rely on foreign sources of critical materials and precursors. For
instance, BMI foresees a 77 percent deficit in domestic available cathode active material to meet
2035 demands in North America. This estimate was done prior to the proposal. This step in the
value chain will require import/export until it is further built out, which will add to cost to the
battery pack.96 Although Congress and the Administration have taken significant steps to
accelerate this activity by funding, facilitating, and promoting the rapid growth of U.S. supply
chains for these products through the IRA, BIL, and numerous Executive Branch initiatives,
more will still be needed given the increase in demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp.
37-38]
96 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, BMI (see Charts 2, 3 & 4):
https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/ambition-versus-reality-why-battery-production-capacity-
does-not- equal-supply.
For any one of these minerals, this regulation, taken to its logical end, puts the U.S into a
situation resembling the oil embargoes of the 1970s, where foreign actors control majorities of
the critical raw material supplies used in the manufacture of fuels, battery, and motor
components designed to provide transportation mobility services for the U.S. consumer.
Compared with fossil fuel supply, the supply chains for clean energy technologies can be even
more complex (and in many instances, less transparent).97, 98 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 37-38]
97 International Energy Agency. "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions", International
Energy Agency World Energy Outlook Special Report, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/7d2a83b-
8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.
98 SAFE. "The Commanding Heights of Global Transportation," https://secureenergy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/09/The-Commanding-Heights-of-Global-Transportation.pdf.
EPA failed to consider all the hurdles and complexities such as federal permitting, National
Environmental Policy Act reviews, and the supply chains for these critical materials in their
technology feasibility assessment. API requests EPA include a thorough evaluation of the full
supply chains for each critical mineral/material in their final proposal and their implications on
energy security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 37-38]
III. Operational ineffciency of battery production facilities.
While many OEMs and battery manufacturers have announced plans to build gigafactories in
North America, taking advantage of incentives such as the IRA, one must view these as highly
complex projects. It should also be noted that it will take time for these new battery
manufacturing facilities to ramp up to full production. Capacity gives a reflection of what a plant
could potentially produce; capacity reflects ambition. EPA notes in the DRIA that "the
Department of Energy estimates that recent plant announcements for North America to date
could enable an estimated 838 GWh of capacity by 2025, 896 GWh by 2027, and 998 GWh by
2030, the vast majority of which is cell manufacturing capacity." This assumes battery
manufacturing capacity at initial opening or at mature stage at 100% scale. This is not accurate.
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In their early years, battery factories will likely operate at approximately 50 percent production
capacity. Mature battery factories today rarely operate above 80 percent utilization rates.99 The
EPA projects a ten-fold increase in North American battery manufacturing capacity in just eight
years, from 90 gigawatt hours per year in 2022, to 998 GWh/year in 2030, with the great
majority of that sited in the U.S. Wood Mackenzie projects U.S. capacity of less than half that
level, at 422 GWh/ year in 2030.100 Given the disparity in forecasts from different reputable
sources, EPA's technology feasibility assessment should factor sensitivity cases and
acknowledge potential disruptions in the supply chain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 38-
To meet the ambitions that OEMs have set forth in terms of percentage of BEV entering the
market, they must secure adequate amounts of raw materials. With the projected supply and
demand gap that many analysts foresee, as mentioned earlier, pricing of critical minerals could
remain volatile as we have seen through the early 2020s. There are varying views by different
analysts on the direction of critical mineral pricing scenarios. Morgan Stanley estimates BEV
manufacturers will need to increase prices by 25 percent to account for rising battery prices. 101
Battery raw materials are not commodities, they are classified as specialty chemicals, and pricing
should be analyzed as such as they will not follow traditional commodity pricing structures,
especially given where these supplies are geographically concentrated in areas with geopolitical
instabilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 39]
101 Thornhill, J. "Morgan Stanley Flags EV Demand Destruction as Lithium Soars," see Chart 7.
Bloomberg. March 24, 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-25/morgan-stanley-flags-
ev-demand-destruction-as- lithium-soars#xj4y7vzkg.
Battery Raw Materials
Global demand for critical raw materials has been increasing with the increase in demand for
automotive batteries as shown in Table 1. The key raw materials of interest for batteries are
lithium, nickel, cobalt, and graphite. The production of these materials has increased by 18% to
251% over the last 10 years. 119 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 46-47]
119 USGS Global material production sourced in May 2023.
39]
99 Xiao, Maya, "Lithium-ion battery production goes global," January 26, 2022.
https://www.controleng.com/articles/lithium-ion-battery-production-goes-global/.
100 Wood Mackenzie: https://identity.woodmac.com/sign-
in?goto=https%3A%2F%2Fmy.woodmac.com%2Fdocument%2F150115630
IV. Raw materials are specialty chemicals, not commodities.
Table 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 46-47]
Raw Material (1000
tons) 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
2022 % Increase
Lithium
87.1 83.2 107 130
37 35 36 32.5 35 43 96
251%
Graphite
1100 1190 1170 1190 1200 1200 930
18%
1100 1100 1130 1300
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Nickel
2610 2500 2730 3300
2100 2490 2400 2530 2250 2100 2300
57%
Cobalt
110 120 112 124 123 110 140
144 140 165 190 73%
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 46-47]
If we assume that the global production of electric light-duty vehicles grows to -50% by 2032
and that technological improvements will be made in battery cell chemistry consistent with
known publicly available technology announcements, the demand for these critical raw materials
will continue to increase by 47% to 438% by 2032.120 The output of this analysis is that there
will be significant pressure on the mining industry to develop and process the raw materials to
meet automotive battery demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 46-47]
120 Martec Group study on raw material demand from light-duty vehicles - 2022.
[See original for graph titled "Figure 4 - Global Raw Material Demand from Light-Duty
Vehicles"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 46-47]
In Figure 4 above, the increase in global production of raw materials for just light-duty
vehicles is calculated based on the assumed global demand of 50% BEVs by 2032. The global
average kWh per vehicle is assumed to be 71kWh and battery chemistry is expected to be -30%
LFP and 70% NMC battery types. This analysis then calculates the amount of raw material per
kWh based on these inputs. 121 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 46-47]
121 https://www.nature.eom/articles/s43246-020-00095-x#Secl6 Supplementary Table 23.
What the outputs show is that lithium will need to increase the amount of mined material by
more than 4 times in the next 10 years to keep up with just global light-duty automotive demand.
Graphite is also expected to need -3 times the amount currently produced globally. Nickel seems
to be a low number at only a 50% increase from the 2022 production level however, nickel is
already consumed in large quantities for other applications. This 50% increase represents -1.6M
tons of nickel while the 400% increase in lithium is only 400k tones. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, pp. 46-47]
The agency must consider the global demand for these raw materials in the final regulatory
impact assessment and the associated increase in costs to develop supply for these raw materials
that are more in line with market forces rather than assuming the cost of these raw materials will
decrease with increasing production as stated in the DRIA.122 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 46-47]
122 Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis EPA-420-D-23-003 April 2023, Figure 2-24.
Organization: Arizona State Legislature
10. The proposed rule makes erroneous estimates about energy security and critical mineral
availability. The proposed rule will force American dependence on China and impose a high cost
for energy security, not a benefit as EPA calculates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 3]
X. The proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious because of erroneous estimates about energy
security and critical mineral availability.
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EPA calculates a $4.4 billion benefit from energy security resulting from the proposed rule.
88 Fed. Reg. 29,362. In EPA's view, "widespread automotive electrification in the U.S. will not
lead to a critical long-term dependence on foreign imports of minerals or components, nor that
increased demand for these products will become a vulnerability to national security." Id. at
29,313. EPA believes that existing foreign production is adequate simply because of other
countries' investment in supply chains, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and Inflation
Reduction Act combined with market forces will cause American companies to develop their
own supply chains. Id. EPA also reasons that minerals imported into the United States can be
reclaimed and thus increase America's supply of those minerals. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0537, p. 30]
EPA's own statistics show that foreign production of critical minerals presents an energy
security problem. According to EPA [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 30-31]:
As shown in Figure 28, in 2019 about 50 percent of global nickel production occurred in
Indonesia, Philippines, and Russia, with the rest distributed around the world. Nearly 70 percent
of cobalt originated from the Democratic Republic of Congo, with some significant production in
Russia and Australia, and about 20 percent in the rest of the world. More than 60 percent of
graphite production occurred in China, with significant contribution from Mozambique and
Brazil for another 20 percent. About half of lithium was mined in Australia, with Chile
accounting for another 20 percent, and China about 10 percent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0537, pp. 30-31]
According to the Administration's 100-day review under E.O. 14017, of the major actors in
mineral refining, 60 percent of lithium refining occurred in China, with 30 percent in Chile, and
10 percent in Argentina. 72 percent of cobalt refining occurred in China, with another 17 percent
distributed among Finland, Canada, and Norway. 21 percent of Class 1 nickel refining occurred
in Russia, with 16 percent in China, 15 percent in Japan, and 13 percent in Canada. Similar
conclusions were reached in an analysis by the International Energy Agency, shown in Figure
29. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 30-31]
Id. at 29,314.
Indeed, the United States imports most of the minerals needed for the current electric vehicle
production demand, with a net import reliance of 100% for manganese, 100% for graphite, 76%
for cobalt, 48% for nickel, and more than 25% for lithium.60 As the EPA recognizes, "Currently,
the United States is lagging behind much of the rest of the world in critical mineral production."
88 Fed. Reg. 29,315. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 30-31]
60 Congressional Research Service, Critical Minerals in Electric Vehicle Batteries, Aug. 29, 2022, 9,
available at https://crsreports.congress.gOv/product/pdf/R/R47227.
EPA's electric vehicle mandate will surge demand for critical minerals that the United States
will have to import. According to the International Energy Agency, in the "global energy
transition like the one President Biden envisions, demand for key minerals such as lithium,
graphite, nickel and rare-earth metals would explode, rising by 4,200%, 2,500%, 1,900% and
700%), respectively, by 2040."61 The American Transportation Research Institute estimates that
replacing the existing American vehicle fleet with electric cars will require 6.3 to 34.9 years of
current global production of critical minerals and 8.4 to 64.4 percent of global reserves,
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depending on the material.62 EPA does not account for the greenhouse gas emissions resulting
from this dramatically expanded mining production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 31]
61 Carrie Sheffield, Hypocrite Biden blocks mineral mining his clean-energy goals require, New York
Post, Mar. 22, 2023, available at https://nypost.com/2023/03/22/biden-blocks-mineral-mining-his-clean-
energy-goals-require/.
62 American Transportation Research Institute, supra note 55, at 2.
EPA's electric vehicle mandate will force American dependence on China. In 2019, China
accounted for 80% of the world's total production of raw materials for electric batteries.63
China's reach extends around the world. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example,
15 of 19 cobalt-producing mines are owned or financed by Chinese companies.64 China also
refines 95% of the world's cobalt supply.65 China controls 65% of the global lithium processing
and refining capacity and is securing deals to extract lithium from mines in Latin America.66
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 31]
63 Institute for Energy Research, China Dominates the Global Lithium Battery Market, Sept. 9, 2020,
available at https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/renewable/china-dominates-the-global-lithium-
battery-market/.
64 Shin Watanabe, Chinese cobalt producer to double Congo output with eye on top spot, NIKKEI ASIA,
Jan. 7, 2022, available at https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Commodities/Chinese-cobalt-producer-
to-double-Congo- output-with-eye-on-top-spot.
65 Elaine Dezenski, The United States' Energy Future Needs Critical Minerals—and Latin America,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 24, 2023, available at https://www.newsweek.com/united-states-energy-future-needs-
critical-minerals-latin-america- opinion-1789379.
66 Id.
"China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining an
extraction of the minerals used in batteries."67 China accounts for more than 70% of global
electric vehicle battery cell production capacity.68 Of the 13 top battery production companies,
seven have headquarters in China.69 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 31]
67 Congressional Research Service, supra note 60, at Summary.
68 Id at 7.
69 Id.
In the proposed rule, EPA identifies domestic production efforts for only one mineral, lithium.
88 Fed. Reg. 29,321. The global supply of lithium needs to increase by 42 times by 2040 or 2050
to meet demand for electric vehicles.70 But "getting approval for [new mines] can still take
years, if not decades."71 And the Biden Administration admits it does not even know where all
critical minerals may exist: "The United States' non-fuel mineral resources are significantly
under-mapped relative to those of other developed nations; only 12 percent of U.S. territory has
modern high-resolution geophysical surveys of the subsurface, and only 35 percent is covered by
detailed geologic mapping of the surface and near-surface."72 The Alaska governor noted that
the White House's 250-page report on critical minerals mentions Australia 60 times, Canada 32
times, but Alaska only once, in a footnote.73 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 31-32]
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70 Ana Swanson, The U.S. Needs Minerals for Electric Cars. Everyone Else Wants Them Too., The New
York Times, May 21, 2023, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/21/business/economy/minerals-
electric-cars- batteries.html.
71 Id.
72 The White House, Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and
Fostering Broad- Based Growth, June 2021, 197, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/06/100-day- supply-chain-review-report.pdf.
73 Carrie Sheffield, Hypocrite Biden blocks mineral mining his clean-energy goals require, New York
Post, Mar. 22, 2023, available at https://nypost.com/2023/03/22/biden-blocks-mineral-mining-his-clean-
energy-goals-require/.
Under the apparent strategy of "if you subsidize it, they will come," EPA brushes off these
inconvenient facts by focusing on the public and private focus on manufacturing electric
batteries in the United States. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,318-319. But even if America builds all of the
manufacturing capacity needed to supply EPA's forced electric vehicle demand, manufacturing
still requires critical minerals that China has and America does not. Other than recycling critical
minerals from old batteries, EPA proposes no solutions to this grave energy security problem.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 32]
Organization: BMW of North America, LLC (BMW NA)
BMW NA, together with the Alliance of Automotive Innovators, has already agreed with
Biden Administrations' stated goal of reaching 40-50% sales of electric vehicles within the
market by 2030. Achieving this goal will only be possible if the framework conditions allow the
market to develop - i.e. charging infrastructure, availability of critical raw materials and the
overall cost situation for xEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 2]
At this time, BMW NA does not believe that the necessary framework conditions, especially
infrastructure, are advancing as necessary to achieve the targets set forth in the Proposed Rule.
Therefore, we share the concerns expressed by the Alliance of Automotive Innovators that these
targets cannot be met without massive and coordinated efforts of the auto industry, energy
providers, mineral suppliers and the government. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 2]
Further, there are an insufficient number of mining operations available from which to source
critical minerals. Benchmark Minerals3 identifies the need for at least 300 additional mining
operations to be developed worldwide - within the next 10 years. The creation and production
from those mines cannot reasonably be accomplished within that timeframe, - as the usual
development time for new mine operations is at least 10 years. - This is a significant challenge,
which needs to be solved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 2]
3 https://source.benchma rkminerals.com/article/more-than-300-new-mlnes-requ ired-to-meet-battery-
demand-by-2035
Without the availability of adequate mining operations, the scarcity of available critical
minerals can only be managed to a small extent by improved battery technology. The
undersupply of minerals and associated high costs to acquire will mean that price parity between
ICE and xEV will not be achieved in enough time to support the GHG targets. The scarcity and
availability of critical materials are a material and decisive factor, as they represent
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approximately 70% of the total cost to manufacture a battery. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677,
p. 2]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Beyond savings to individual consumers, the proposed standards, to the extent manufacturers
use ZEVs to comply, present economic growth opportunities for many sectors in the United
States, especially auto manufacturing, electricity generation, and upstream ZEV supply chains as
consumers direct more spending to ZEV technology and electricity for transportation fuel. Many
manufacturers are already domestically producing ZEVs, providing tangible employment
opportunities nationwide. 128 Provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act to support domestic
production and materials sourcing will further shore up these benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp.65-66]
Even in the short time since U.S. EPA released its proposal, manufacturers have announced
new investments in vehicle and battery manufacturing and assembly that will strengthen and
expand the ZEV industry across the U.S. For example, Toyota announced that it will assemble its
new battery electric sport utility vehicle at its Kentucky facility using batteries from a new
battery plant in North Carolina. 129 General Motors and Samsung SDI are investing more than
$3 billion to build a battery plan in Indiana, providing local jobs. 130 Hyundai Motor Group and
LG Energy Solution announced that they will build a $4.3 billion electric battery plant in
Georgia. 131 These are just a few examples of the tremendous economic opportunity this
expanding industry can provide to support local jobs and build a resilient supply chain for ZEVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 65-66]
128 Blue Green Alliance. "The High Road to California EV Goals: Raising Ambition for High-Quality
Domestic Manufacturing Jobs." July 2021. https://www.bluegreenalliance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/07/Baum- Report-7121 -FINAL-w-cover.pdf
129 Toyota. "Toyota Ramps Up Commitment to Electrification with U.S. BEV Production and Additional
Battery Plant Investment." Toyota Newsroom. May 31, 2023. https://pressroom.toyota.com/toyota-ramps-
up- commitment-to-electrification-with-u-s-bev-production-and-additional-battery-plant-investment/.
Accessed June 22, 2023.
130 Shepardson, David. "GM, SDI will build $3 billion battery manufacturing plant in Indiana." Reuters.
June 13, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/indiana-confirms-gm-sdi-will-build-
3-bilion-ev-battery-manufacturing-plant-2023-06-13/ Accessed June 22, 2023.
131 Amy, Jeff. "Hyundai and LG announce $4.3 billion plant in Georgia to build batteries for electric
vehicles." Associated Press. May 26, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/hyundai-lg-electric-vehicles-
batteries-georgia-db44d911b3dae0fbf454cb53503ce84c. Accessed June 22, 2023.
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
D. Sales of Zero-Emission Vehicles Are Projected to Continue Growing at a Dramatic
Rate
Zero-emission-vehicle technologies 107 are the most effective tailpipe emission control
technologies available to date, and demand for zero-emission vehicles specifically has exploded
in recent years. In response to this demand, significant public and private investments across the
country continue to be made to build sufficient charging infrastructure and develop the domestic
battery supply chain, and these investments are projected to keep pace with the dramatic growth
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of the zero-emission vehicle market. There is every reason to expect this growth to continue.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 18]
107 The term "zero-emission-vehicle technologies" includes batteries with on-board chargers and hydrogen
stored in a fuel cell stack that transforms chemical energy into electrical energy to propel a vehicle.
Recent congressional actions demonstrate the federal commitment to substantial
electrification of the transportation sector. In 2021, Congress passed the Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law, which allocates $7.5 billion to building out a national network of electric vehicle chargers,
$7 billion to ensure domestic manufacturers have the critical minerals and other components
necessary to make electric vehicle batteries, and $10 billion for clean transit and school
buses. 110 In 2022, Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, which invests $52.7 billion in
America's manufacturing capacity for the semiconductors used in electric vehicles and
chargers. 111 Later in 2022, Congress passed the Inflation Reduction Act, which provides $7,500
to buyers of new electric vehicles and $4,000 to purchasers of pre-owned electric vehicles. 112
Additionally, the Inflation Reduction Act provides billions of dollars to support vehicle
manufacturers' expansion of their domestic production of clean vehicles, 113 and billions to
support battery production in the United States and mining and processing of critical minerals
needed for battery cells and electric motors. 114 The Inflation Reduction Act also allocates
billions to upgrade the nation's power grid in order to help address the new surge in grid demand
from electric vehicles. 115 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 18-19]
110 White House, Building a Better America: A Guidebook to the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law for State,
Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments, and Other Parties (May 2022), at 136, available at
https://www.whitehouse.gOv/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/BUILDING-A-BETTER-AMERICA-V2.pdf.;
White House, Building a Clean Energy Economy: A Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act's
Investments in Clean Energy and Climate Action (Jan. 2023) at 46, available at,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Inflation-Reduction-Act-Guidebook.pdf.
111 White House, Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act, supra n. 110, at 46.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 47.
114 Id. at 10, 26, 47.
115 Id. at 34.
3. Significant Investments Are Being Made to Build Out and Reinforce the Domestic
Battery Supply Chain
The federal and state governments, manufacturers, and others in the private sector are
investing billions to develop the domestic battery supply chain in order to meet the increased
demand for zero-emission vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 25-27]
Congress and the Biden Administration have taken significant steps to accelerate the growth
of the domestic battery supply chain, which consists of (1) the production of raw minerals from
mining and recycling operations and (2) battery component and battery manufacturing.
Specifically, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law provides $7.9 billion for battery manufacturing,
battery recycling, and critical minerals production. 156 The Inflation Reduction Act's Advanced
Manufacturing Production Credit may provide manufacturers $136 billion or more, and the
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Advanced Energy Project Credit may provide manufacturers at least another $6.2 billion. 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29,318. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 25-27]
156 Congressional Research Service, Energy and Minerals Provision in the Infrastructure Investment and
Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58) (Mar. 31, 2023), available at https://crsreports.congress.gOv/product/pdf/R/R47034.
These federal funds are successfully encouraging large-scale investments in domestic
production of critical minerals and battery manufacturing. For example, recipients of $2.8 billion
of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law funding matched the federal investment, leveraging this
portion of the funding to a total of $9 billion to expand domestic production of critical minerals
and manufacturing of batteries for electric vehicles. 157 This investment supports 21 new or
upgraded facilities that produce battery materials, recycle batteries, or manufacture batteries. 158
Additionally, by the end of March 2023, the Inflation Reduction Act had already spurred over
$45 billion in announced investments across the domestic battery supply chain, 159 including LG
Energy Solution's $5.5 billion investment to build a new battery factory in Arizonal60 and
Ford's $3.5 billion investment to build a battery factory in Michigan. 161 And more investments
in battery plants continue to be announced. 162 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 25-27]
157 U.S. Department of Energy, Biden-Harris Administration Awards $2.8 Billion to Supercharge U.S.
Manufacturing of Batteries for Electric Vehicles and Electric Grid (Oct. 19, 2022), available at
https://www.energy.gov/articles/biden-harris-administration-awards-28-billion-supercharge-us-
manufacturing-batteries.
158 U.S. Department of Energy, Bipartisan Infrastructure Law: Battery Materials Processing and Battery
Manufacturing (Nov. 1, 2022), available at https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
ll/DOE%20BIL%20Battery%20FOA-2678%20Selectee%20Fact%20Sheets.pdf.
159 The White House, Treasury Releases Guidance to Drive Investment in Critical Minerals & Battery
Supply Chains in America (Mar. 31, 2023), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/cleanenergy/clean-
energy-updates/2023/03/31/treasury-releases-guidance-to-drive-investment-in-critical-minerals-battery-
supply-chains-in-
america/#:~:text=Since%20the%20enactment%20of%20the,the%20manufacturing%20of%20battery%20
packs.
160 Niraj Chokshi, The New York Times, LG Will Spend $5.5 Billion on a Battery Factory in Arizona
(Mar. 24, 2023), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/24/business/energy-environment/lg-
battery-factory-arizona.html.
161 Neal E. Boudette and Keither Bradsher, The New York Times, Ford Will Build a U.S. Battery Factory
With Technology From China (Feb. 13, 2023), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/13/business/energy-environment/ford-catl-electric-vehicle- battery.html.
162 David Shepardson, Reuters, GM, SDI will build $3 billion battery manufacturing plant in Indiana (Jun.
13, 2023), available at https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/indiana-confirms-gm-sdi-
will-build-3-bilion-ev-battery-manufacturing-plant-2023-06-13/; Rebekah Alvey, E&E, GM to invest in La.
Manganese sulfate production for EVs (Jun. 27, 2023), available at
https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/2023/06/27/gm-to-invest-in-la-manganese-sulfate-
production-for-evs-0010383 8.
These federal funds are complemented by state and local government investments in the
domestic battery supply chain. For example, California offers $25 million in grant funds for
projects that will promote in-state battery manufacturing for zero-emission vehicles. 163 And
New York has invested more than $50 million to support the creation of Battery-NY, a
technology development, manufacturing, and commercialization center in upstate New York. 164
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 25-27]
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163 California Energy Commission, GFO-21-606 - Zero-Emission Vehicle Battery Manufacturing Block
Grant, available at https://www.energy.ca.gov/solicitations/2022-08/gfo-21-606-zero-emission-vehicle-
battery-manufacturing-block-grant.
164 Governor Kathy Hochul, New York State, Governor Hochul Announces Nearly $114 Million in
Federal and State Funding to Create First-In-Class Battery-NY Center at Binghamton University (Sep. 2,
2022), available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-nearly-114-million-
federal-and-state-funding-create-first-class.
By the end of May 2023, over $100 billion of investments had been announced to build or
expand over 160 domestic facilities to extract and refine critical minerals and manufacture
batteries. 165 "In total, domestic [electric vehicle] battery manufacturing capacity will increase
by almost 20-fold between 2021 and 2030."166 Especially given the growing trend toward
domestic battery production, 167 there is every reason to believe that these investments will build
a resilient domestic battery supply chain. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,313 ("EPA has confidence that
these efforts are effectively addressing supply chain concerns."). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0746, pp. 25-27]
165 U.S. Department of Energy, Investments in American-Made Energy (May 23, 2023), available at
https://www.energy.gov/investments-american-made-energy; see e.g., IvanPenn, The New York Times,
Hyundai and LG Plan $4.3 Billion Battery Plant in Georgia (May 26, 2023), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/26/business/hyundai-lg-georgia-battery-plant.html.
166 Jared Sagoff, Argonne National Laboratory, A new look at the electric vehicle supply chain as battery-
powered cars hit the roads en masse (May 4, 2023), available at https://www.anl.gov/article/a-new-look- at-
the-electric-vehicle-supply-chain-as-batterypowered-cars-hit-the-roads-en-masse.
167 Yan Zhou et al., Argonne National Laboratory, Lithium-Ion Battery Supply Chain for E-Drive
Vehicles in the United States: 2010-2020 (Mar. 2021), at xv, available at
https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2021/04/167369.pdf; see id. at xv ("The batteries used in [electric
vehicles] sold in the U.S. have been largely domestically sourced. This trend toward domestic
production has grown over time, with 70% of battery cells and 87% of battery packs produced in the U.S.
in 2020.").
Organization: Center for American Progress (CAP)
Battery manufacturing is expected to increase even faster, with the U.S. expected to have
battery manufacturing capabilities to support the production of approximately 11.2 million EVs
per year by 2026. This equates to 84 percent of U.S. new vehicle sales in 2022. DOE estimates
that by 2030 North American battery manufacturing capacity will be able to supply up to 13
million EVs per year. 19 It is critical that EPA's final rule accurately account for domestic EV
and battery manufacturing capability as supply is expected to remain the limiting factor in EV
adoption. RMI finds that battery supply may just be able to keep up with demand as demand for
passenger EVs alone could exceed 1,000 GWh/year by 2030.20 Survey data from Consumer
Reports finds that demand for EVs has increased 350 percent since 2020, with 45 interested
buyers for every EV produced in the United States.21 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0658, pp. 4-5]
19 Gohlke et al. Assessment of Light-Duty Plug-in Electric Vehicles in the United States, 2010-2021,
Argonne National Laboratory, November 2022, available online:
https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2022/ll/178584.pdf
20 McNamara et al. "How Policy Actions can Spur EV Adoption in the United States," Rocky Mountain
Institute, June 2023, available online: https://rmi.org/insight/how-inflation-reduction-act-will-affect-ev-
adoption-in-the-united-states/#:~:text=
2456
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The%20passage%20of%20the%20Inflation,production%2C%20and%20charging%20infrastructure%20dev
elopmen t
21 Harto, Chris. "Excess Demand, The Looming EV Shortage," Consumer Reports, March 2023, available
online: https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Excess-Demand-The-Looming-
EV-Shortage.pdf
Organization: Charles Forsberg
Converting transportation to batteries is unaffordable because the batteries are made of non-
earth abundant expensive materials and all-electric battery vehicles imply large increases in
electricity costs for everyone. These two effects add trillions of dollars of cost to the EPA
strategy. The primary economic cost drivers were not addressed by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0738, pp. 1-2]
Earth-abundant materials. Internal combustion engine (ICE) light vehicles are
inexpensive because they are made of earth abundant materials: iron, aluminum, plastic (carbon
and hydrogen) and sand (glass). In contrast, all-electric vehicles are made of non-earth-abundant
materials. The average battery electric vehicle (Mechanical Engineering April/May 2023) has:
Copper: 53.2 kg, Lithium: 8.9 kg, Nickel: 39.9 kg, Manganese: 24.5 kg, Cobalt: 13.3 kg,
Graphite: 66.3 kg, Zinc 0/1 kg and Rare Earths: 0.5 ks. Non-earth-abundant materials are
expensive because they are uncommon and the ore grades are low. For example, one must
process almost a 100 times as much ore to recover a pound of nickel versus a pound of iron.
Technology advances do not fix the problem that these elements are expensive on planet earth.
The costs of these materials will increase as will the cost of all-electric vehicles as global
production increases. If our ultimate goals include moving 8 to 10 billion people into the middle
class, that goal can only be done using primarily affordable earth abundant elements (see
discussion in paper). Such futures may allow the use of hybrid or plug-in hybrid vehicles with
much lower quantities of non-earth-abundant materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, pp. 1-
2]
This is not a new observation. It has been well understood since the studies of Goellar and
Weinberg ("The age of substitutability", Science 1976; 191:4228. doi:
10.1126/science.191.4228.683) that a global middle-class standard of living requires that the
civilization be built out of earth-abundant materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, pp. 1-2]
Separate from the costs, fast scale up of the mining of non-abundant elements is not credible.
The International Energy Agency projects that the world will need to increase lithium production
by 40 and nickel production 20. On the average it takes 16 years to open a new mine on earth-
versus a couple of years to build a battery factory. It will take decades, assuming cost is no
concern, to scale up production of these non-abundant elements. In this context, the federal
government in the last two years has blocked opening nickel mines in Minnesota and copper
mines in Alaska-a clear statement that the federal government will not tolerate mining at scale
and that the U.S. is betting on China, Russian (Siberia) and third-world countries to supply the
necessary materials. Unlike oil and natural gas, each of these less-abundant elements are found
only in a few countries. As a starting point, the EPA strategy requires a reversal of current U.S.
policies with Russia and China for access to some of these less-abundant elements.
Simultaneously, Indonesia and other countries are enacting laws prohibiting export of these raw
materials to force conversion of ore to nickel and more value-added products in their own
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countries. Ultimately, the battery production will move to the countries that control the required
non-abundant raw materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, p. 2]
It is possible that new battery chemistries may enable battery systems made of only earth-
abundant materials-but those do not exist today and may or may not be possible to economically
construct. One can't tolerate batteries with large quantities of copper, nickel or lithium. As a side
note, the numbers from the U.S. Energy Information Agency show the total installed cost of
utility batteries has leveled off-in contrast to the belief in the EPA rule making that costs will
continue to go down for batteries based on academic studies. The economics of scale and
learning curves end when the raw materials in the manufactured product are a significant fraction
of the final costs-as we are now beginning to see with battery packs. The bad news is just starting
on the mining front and costs of these less-abundant elements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738,
p. 2]
Recommended action for EPA. Evaluate cost of non-abundant materials required for your
scenarios that accounts for (1) increased European, Chinese and Indian demand, (2) the time it
takes to build real mines for copper, nickel and lithium, and (3) how to obtain the resources that
are mostly in the wrong political locations. This should include analysis by the U.S. State
Department on the national security implications and required changes in U.S. foreign policy. If
EPA assumes significant domestic supplies, the proposed regulatory changes should
simultaneously include changes in mining regulations to fast track mining permits, limit grounds
for denial of permits and limit local objections to such mines. This scale of mining requires a
government willing to quickly move people if in the way. Hand waving does not work when
proposing an increase in hard-rock mining beyond anything seen in human history. The likely
outcome of a credible analysis will be abandonment of the current regulatory strategies. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, p. 2]
Organization: Chevron
Stakeholders have expressed concern about the supply and availability of critical minerals and
supply chains for battery manufacturing, many of which are sourced from China. EPA should
quantitatively assess the impact this regulation will have on the nation/worldwide demand of
lithium and other rare earth metals, and the emissions that will be produced as a result of mining
and shipping these materials. EPA should consider environmental impacts from mining of semi-
precious metals and potential mitigations. The proposal does not address the potential hazards,
construction, noise, or other impacts and potential mitigations for these impacts. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0553, p. 6]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
III. The Proposed Rule is Not Feasible for Other Reasons.
[... ] Even if consumers did want to purchase these electric vehicles in the volumes EPA
projects, the proposal fails to confront several barriers to its rapid electrification plans, including
limits on the supply of minerals necessary to manufacture batteries, inadequate charging
infrastructure and electrical supplies, and the complex interactions between this rule and other
proposed rules all of which will further hinder this development. In light of these many barriers,
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it is unreasonable for the agency to conclude that compliance with its proposed emission
standards is feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 25-26]
D. There is not enough international mining and manufacturing capacity for the global
electric vehicle push.
The proposal also systematically neglects the fact that there are simply not enough minerals,
particularly lithium, available to sustain global electric vehicle growth. The U.C. Davis Climate
+ Community Project explains that the "primary driver of lithium demand—and new lithium
mines—is EVs. Global EV sales for 2022 are estimated to reach 10.6 million, a 60 percent
increase from 2021 (and a 333 percent increase from 2020) that has been driven largely by China
and Europe." Thea Riofrancos et al., Achieving Zero Emissions with More Mobility and Less
Mining, U.C. Davis Climate + Community Project (Jan. 2023), https://subscriber.politi-
copro.com/eenews/f/eenews/?id=00000185-e562-de44-a7bf-ed7751a00000. In 2021, global
lithium production was estimated at just over 100,000 metric tons and consumption at 93,000
metric tons. Id. But "cumulative global lithium demand" could reach "30.3 million metric tons in
2050" and "exhaust[ ] currently existing reserves by 2045." Id. Replacing "the ICE vehicles on
the road with EVs on a 1:1 basis is infeasible." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 29-30]
As Gill Pratt, chief executive of the Toyota Research Institute, told reporters "[I]t's going to
take decades for battery material mines, renewable power generation, transmission lines and
seasonal energy-storage facilities to scale up." Daniel Leussink, Not enough resources for EVs to
be only cleaner car option, Toyota says, Reuters (May 18, 2023),
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/not- enough-resources-evs-be-only-
cleaner-car-option-toyota-says-2023-05-18/. This is an insuperable obstacle to EPA's proposal.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 29-30]
C. The proposed rule also gets energy security costs backwards— electric vehicles are worse
for energy security, not better.
The proposed rule also gets energy security costs backwards—electric vehicles are worse for
energy security, not better. See Table 6, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,200.18 In the present day, China
dominates critical mineral supply chains. China controls nearly two-thirds of all lithium, four-
fifths of the refined cobalt market, and nearly all processed natural graphite. The United States
has nearly no control of critical mineral supply chains and produces less than a tenth of the
world's battery cells, while China is the world's leading producer. China controls much of the
extraction of these materials and has 90 percent of the world's rare earth element processing
capacity, cornering the market for the core minerals of electric car batteries, and dominating
battery and renewable supply chains. See C. Boyden Gray, American Energy, Chinese Ambition,
and Climate Realism, 5 American Affairs Journal (Winter 2021),
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2021/ll/american-energy-chinese-ambition-and- climate-
realism/. EPA acknowledges that there are very few domestic battery manufacturing plants, but
assumes, without justification, that American manufacturers will increase production to a point
sufficient to eliminate the energy security costs flowing from this massive transition. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 35-36]
18 This also ignores that the United States is a net exporter of oil. "The United States is the largest producer
of oil, responsible for nearly a fifth of the world's oil production. Thanks to the hydraulic fracturing
revolution, the United States is a net exporter of oil. China, on the other hand, is the world's largest net
importer of oil. China has few oil reserves, and its dwindling domestic supplies come from legacy fields
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that require expensive enhanced-recovery methods. China's demand for oil is also rapidly increasing. This
explains China's long-term bet on powering transportation with electricity: China can use its abundant coal
reserves, hydropower, and growing nuclear capabilities to power battery-electric cars, vans, and trucks." C.
Boyden Gray, American Energy, Chinese Ambition, and Climate Realism, 5 American Affairs Journal
(Winter 2021), https://americanaffairsjour- nal.org/2021/ll/american-energy-chinese-ambition-and-
climate-realism/. "First, policies that restrict the domestic supply of oil and gas and mandate renewable and
electric car deployment will reduce U.S. geopolitical power. The United States is the world's largest
producer of oil and gas. It is a net loser from unilateral restrictions on domestic hydro-carbons, while
Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iran have the most to gain, as a decline in U.S. supply increases their power to
set cartel prices. China, on the other hand, is the largest net importer of oil and gas, but the dominant
producer of 'green' substitutes like solar panels, battery cells, and critical minerals. 'Greening' the U.S.
economy at the scale envisioned by the Biden administration would damage U.S. growth while
jeopardizing U.S. national security and even global stability. It would empower antagonistic regimes like
Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, while reducing U.S. leverage with China." Id.
Organization: Countymark
In April 2023, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed new emissions
standards for passenger vehicles and trucks that are significantly more stringent than previous
rules. The new proposed standards would require automakers to meet a tailpipe emissions
average of 82 grams of C02/mile across a company's production by model year (MY) 2032.
Your agency estimated this new regulation would result in electric vehicles (EVs) accounting for
67 percent of recent light-duty vehicle sales and 46 percent of new medium-duty vehicle sales in
less than ten years. Countrymark believes that this proposal significantly increases costs for
American families, undermines American energy security, and falls short of estimated
environmental benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0665, p. 1]
Mandating the US's adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) has geopolitical implications that
make the country more reliant on its competitors. The US achieved historic levels of energy
security by becoming a net exporter of petroleum and products in 2020. However, forcing EV
adoption would reduce reliance on American petroleum and increase dependence on batteries,
primarily produced in China, which controls 90% of battery anode production. The US is a
global leader in exporting refined petroleum products, and its refineries heavily rely on
American-sourced crude oil. Implementing a policy that promotes EVs would exclude affordable
vehicles running on US-made liquid fuels, leading to the offshore relocation of millions of jobs
supported by the petroleum industry. Furthermore, America's geopolitical rivals, particularly
China, dominate the supply chain for crucial minerals used in EVs. China controls Africa's
major lithium mining projects and 80% of refining operations. Within two years, they are
expected to control half of the world's cobalt production. In summary, mandating EV adoption in
the US would increase reliance on competitors for battery production, disqualify vehicles
running on US-made liquid fuels, and place the supply chain for essential EV minerals under the
control of geopolitical rivals like China. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0665, p. 2]
Organization: Dana Incorporated
Dana also proposes that EPA expand its consideration of sourcing issues related to
ePropulsion systems in assessing the cost, environmental impact, and feasibility of the proposed
rules. Much of the analysis in the NPRM focuses on sourcing of batteries and battery materials,
which has also been the focus of federal incentives. During the ZEV transition period, however,
sustainable sourcing of magnets, copper, aluminum, and electrical steel materials and local
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processing for ePropulsion systems will be a major challenge for automakers and component
suppliers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0538, pp. 2-3]
Studies by the U.S. International Trade Commission and other groups have highlighted U.S.
dependence on imports of NdFeB magnets and rare earths, for example, and a S&P Global study
found that demand for copper will strain global supplies due to efforts to achieve net-zero carbon
emissions. A group of nine large trade associations recently wrote to President Biden expressing
concern about maintaining a sustainable supply of electrical steel in light of rising demand.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0538, pp. 2-3]
These trends will prove a major challenge, at least during the early years of the ZEV
transition. Dana proposes that EPA consider ways to incentivize the use of sustainable sources of
such key materials and local processing for ePropulsion systems, similar to battery incentives
available during the transition period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0538, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Darius, Matthew DiPaulo
The EPA's proposal boosts an electric vehicle supply chain dominated by China, which
powers its manufacturing-base through coal-fired power plants and mines minerals for EV
batteries with the use of environmental practices that we would never approve of in the United
States. Emissions coming out of tailpipe matter, but so do the lifecycle emissions of building a
car, constructing and charging a battery, and retiring vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0519,
p. 1]
Organization: Delek US Holdings, Inc.
Most illustrative of the future foreign reliance resulting from EPA's Proposed Rule is the
lithium-ion battery supply chain controlled nearly entirely by China. China controls each step of
battery production and, by 2030, is anticipated to "make more than twice as many batteries as
every other county combined."13 This is because China controls 41% of the world's cobalt, 28%
of the world's lithium, and 78% of the world's graphite; China also refines 95% of manganese,
74%) of cobalt, 70% of graphite, 67% of lithium, and 63% of nickel. 14 And even if the U.S. had
sufficient resources to extract and refine independent of foreign sources, a refinery takes two to
five years just to build—not accounting for the time necessary for permitting, construction, and
operations, including waste disposal. 15 Beyond the raw materials, China also makes the battery
components—73% of NMC cathodes and 99% of LFP cathodes—compared to 1% made
domestically. 16 Indeed, "[e]xperts say it is next to impossible for any other country to become
self-reliant in the battery supply chain, no matter if it has cheaper labor or finds other global
partners. Companies anywhere in the world will look to form partnerships with Chinese
manufacturers to enter or expand in the industry." 17 EPA's reliance on federal funding and tax
incentives—such as those under the BIL and IRA—to conclude a domestic supply chain is
forthcoming is, therefore, misplaced. Regardless of these funding sources, domestic
manufacturing alone is unable to meet the production goals EPA is requiring. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0527, p. 4]
13 Agnes Chang and Keith Bradsher, NY TIMES, "Can the World Make an Electric Car Battery Without
China?" (May 17, 2023), available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/05/16/business/china-ev-
battery.html.
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14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
Although EPA has acknowledged that a "transition period must take place in which a robust
supply chain develops to support production of [critical minerals]," the limited time afforded
under the Proposed Rule is simply insufficient to build this supply chain. 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0527, p. 4]
18 Proposed Rule at 29,313.
And as discussed above, EPA hardly pays any mind to the volatile pricing of critical minerals
and how that can greatly affect battery costs. The price of lithium, for example, has consistently
risen in recent years. Between January 2021 and March 2022, the cost of lithium increased by
738% and continues to rise today.36 Despite these very public findings, EPA asserts that these
costs are an uncertainty and that EPA plans to "continue updating [its] estimates of battery cost
for current and future years."37 Rather, future lithium-ion battery production will be heavily
subsidized if the BIL and IRA remain in place, which likely serves as an impediment to actually
reducing the cost of the battery. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, pp. 7-8]
36 See CANADA ENERGY REGULATOR, Market Snapshot: Critical Minerals are Key to the Global
Transition (Jan. 18, 2023), available here. (Link: https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-
markets/market-snapshots/2023/market-snapshot-critical-minerals-key-global-energy-transition, html)
37 Proposed Rule at 29,301 (recognizing the "global average price for lithium-ion battery packs (volume-
weighted across the passenger, commercial, bus, and stationary markets) climbed by about 7 percent in
2022"). Notably, this is in contrast to EPA's conclusion just a few weeks prior. Proposed Rule at 25,930
("the cost to manufacture lithium-ion batteries (the single most expensive component of a BEV) has
dropped significantly in the past eight years, and that cost is projected to continue to fall during this decade,
all while the performance of the batteries (in terms of energy density) improves.").
Organization: Departments of Transportation of Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota
and Wyoming
Another issue is the dependence of EVs and their batteries on rare earth and other minerals
that are largely sourced from and processed in China and other overseas locations. It raises
implications for economic security and national security when a sector as important as car, truck
and battery manufacturing becomes more dependent on foreign suppliers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0525, p. 2]
Organization: Electric Drive Transportation Association (EDTA)
Across the private sector, vehicle manufacturers, materials and components suppliers,
utilities, charging companies and other organizations are making investments in the EV supply
chain that parallel these critical essential policy drivers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0589, p. 1]
In the United States, the EV ecosystem is growing. 3.8 million plug-in electric vehicles have
been sold since 2010. There are 87 plug-in electric models available today - and automakers
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have announced an additional 58 models to be rolled out by 2027. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0589, p. 1]
The U.S. supply chain is expanding too. According to a study conducted by Atlas Public
Policy, more than $210 billion in EV manufacturing and battery investment has been announced
in the U.S. since 2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0589, p. 2]
This rapid growth is speeding the transition to e-mobility but there is much public and private
sector work to do to achieve a fully built-out system, as envisioned by the proposed rule. As the
EPA develops a regulatory framework for 2027 -2032, it is important that the final rule
recognizes these remaining policy and market variables. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0589, p. 2]
The electric drive industry is working rapidly to build a diverse and increasingly domestic
value chain and grow the consumer base with expanding product offerings. This year,
manufacturers are making investments in products and commitments to suppliers for 2027
vehicles. However, the eligibility of the vehicles for federal tax incentives is contingent on future
determinations of eligible trade partners and disqualifying content. Meanwhile, a global race to
secure materials creates pricing volatility throughout the supply chain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0589, p. 2]
Organization: Elizabeth Boynton
Also, the EPA is to be concerned about the environment as a whole, not just the air quality.
As that is the case, EPA needs to realize that encouraging the manufacture, purchase and use of
EVs is not actually that great for the environment. You're just cleaning the air from gas exhaust
pollution by encouraging environmental destruction in the mining of rare earth minerals and
creation of electricity to charge the EV batteries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0568, p. 1]
And finally, one of the very biggest concerns about this is China. It is extremely short sighted
and irresponsible to make this proposed rule without seriously considering and discussing
China's choke hold on the US, and indeed the world, over the rare earth minerals that are
required to make EV batteries, the increased US demand of which is the logical conclusion of
this proposed rule. According to a January 18, 2023 Elements article entitled "Visualizing
China's Dominance in Battery Manufacturing (2022-2027P)", "Regardless of the growth in
North America and Europe, China's dominance is unmatched. Battery manufacturing is just one
piece of the puzzle, albeit a major one. Most of the parts and metals that make up a battery—like
battery-grade lithium, electrolytes, separators, cathodes, and anodes—are primarily made in
China." This same article projects a 10-fold increase in battery production in the US, but even so,
China is still projected to make 69% of the world's EV batteries in 2027. The ONLY rare earth
minerals mine in the US still sells its concentrate to China for refining into usable materials.
(December 14, 2022 Politico article, "China Dominates the Rare Earths Market. This U.S. Mine
Is Trying to Change That") [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0568, pp. 1-3]
As the US industry struggles to try to catch up and provide a viable US-based rare earth
minerals refining structure for our already great demand, including alloys used in our fighter jets
and missiles not to mention phones and other electronics, why accelerate the burden now and
further overwhelm them unnecessarily by artificially increasing demand for EVs and their
batteries? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0568, pp. 1-3]
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And, in the process, make us even more reliant on a country that just a year ago, Army Lt.
Gen. Scott D. Berrier testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee remains a pacing
threat and a major security challenge to the United States and its allies (US Department of
Defense, Top Intelligence Chiefs Testify on Global Threats, May 10, 2022). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0568, pp.1-3]
Indeed, China has proven itself to have no qualms using its rare earth minerals advantage
against us. The most recent example I found was a Wall Street Journal article on July 3, 2023
titled "China Restricts Exports of Two Minerals Used in High-Performance Chips. Industry
executives see export ban on gallium and germanium as retaliation over chip curbs by U.S. and
others" From another Wall Street Journal article on June 22, 2023, ".. .It [China] accounts for
66% of lithium-ion cells, used in electric-vehicle batteries." The article recounts how China has
been aggressive with other countries as well, "Indeed, Beijing once blocked Japan's access to
rare earth elements during a 2010 dispute over Tokyo's detention of a Chinese fishing trawler
captain. Then in 2019, China threatened to include certain products using rare earths in Beijing's
technology-export restrictions, a response to the Trump administration's pressure on telecom
giant Huawei." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0568, pp. 1-3]
And it isn't just the supply of rare earth minerals they exploit to injure us with. In a March 9,
2020 Washington Examiner article, at the beginning of the Covid outbreak, "[Marco Rubio] said
that the Chinese Communist Party published a thinly veiled threat in its newspaper to cut off the
U.S. from many drugs needed by Americans in response to criticisms about China's handling of
the coronavirus. Rubio explained that many generic drugs the public depends on are produced in
China." This was also covered in a March 13, 2020 UK Independent story. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0568, pp.1-3]
Additionally, in the Politico article cited above, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin is quoted as
saying that summer, "We've seen an alarming increase in the number of unsafe aerial intercepts
and confrontations at sea by PLA aircraft and vessels. This should worry us all." [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0568, pp. 1-3]
I vehemently oppose this rule for all of the above reasons, but most strenuously because by so
shackling the gas-powered vehicle industry, this proposed rule will ultimately make us more
reliant on a country that is antagonistic to the US in so many ways by leaving Americans with
few vehicle options but EVs. Granted, the US infrastructure for obtaining and refining rare earth
minerals has begun, but it is just starting. This proposed rule recklessly runs ahead of industry
and American demand of EVs, proceeding to the detriment and endangerment of US security,
economic stability, and the welfare of millions of working class and financially struggling
American citizens. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, p. 4]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
XVIII. EPA Appropriately Concludes that Critical Minerals and the Battery Supply Chain
Will Be Sufficient for the Levels of BEVs Projected in the Proposal, and More Reasonable
Battery-Related Modeling Assumptions Would Demonstrate the Feasibility of Even Higher
Levels of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 131]
In this section, we explore how critical mineral and battery supply chain issues should not act
as constraints on strong final standards, including Alternative 1 with a steeper increase in
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stringency after 2030. As EPA's analysis demonstrates, there will be sufficient materials and
battery supply chain production to electrify light- and medium-duty vehicles consistent with the
levels EPA projects for the Proposal, and for more stringent alternatives. In this section, we
provide additional analysis that supports this conclusion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
131]
In addition, alternative battery-related modeling inputs would increase the feasibility and
benefits of PEVs. Below, we highlight modeling inputs that we believe led EPA to overestimate
battery capacity requirements for electric vehicles. We provide support for alternative input
values including new technologies, specific energy, and battery design, all of which will have
direct implications for cost modeling and mineral demand (underscoring EPA's conclusion that
there is sufficient mineral supply to meet electric vehicle demand). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 131]
As EPA notes, "with any emerging technology, a transition period must take place in which a
robust supply chain develops to support production." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29313. Indeed, this is not
the first time that the automotive industry has confronted critical mineral supply chain issues,
and the industry has proven that it can rise to such challenges. For example, metal supply chain
concerns arose during the move toward catalytic converters, and equipping all new vehicles with
catalytic converters was seen at the time as a challenging "awesome prospect."356 At the time,
"[c]atalyst companies were concerned about their ability to obtain adequate supplies of noble
metals if they would be used extensively in automotive catalytic converters."3 57
Contemporaneous considerations of the "primary technical barriers" to catalytic converter
adoption included "reducing the amount of precious metals used in each converter to a point
where aggregate demand can be supplied without exhausting world reserves in the near
future "358 The only significant reserves of the necessary platinum group metals were located in
the Republic of South Africa and the former USSR, "neither of which [could] be considered
secure sources of supply."3 59 Despite these concerns—which sound very similar to some of the
rhetoric surrounding the battery minerals conversation—the automotive industry succeeded in
incorporating catalytic converters in all U.S. vehicles. As detailed below, the industry can rise to
the challenge again today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 131-132]
356 J.R. Mondt, Cleaner Cars: The History and Technology of Emission Control Since the 1960s, at 105
(2000). See also EPA, Tier 2 Report to Congress, at E-13 to E-15 (1998),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/940054QY.PDF?Dockey=940054QY.PDF (noting that in the late
1990s there were concerns regarding increasing concentrations of palladium in automotive catalyst
applications, and resulting future supply and price concerns).
357 Mondt, at 99.
358 Daniel Dexter, Case Study of the Innovation Process Characterizing the Development of the Three-
Way Catalytic Converter System, at S-3 to S-4 (1979) https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/10766.
359 Id. at S-4, 20.
A. There will be enough materials and battery supply chain production to electrify transportation.
We agree with EPA's conclusion that vehicle electrification, including the electrification of
the heavy-, medium-, and light-duty fleets, will not lead to energy security risks but will instead
provide the potential for a low-impact and domestic energy supply.360 This section provides
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comments on the assessment of battery critical materials and battery production. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 132]
360 88 Fed. Reg. at 29313.
The lithium-ion batteries used to power PEVs include the following materials deemed critical
by the United States Geological Survey: lithium, nickel, manganese, cobalt, graphite, and
aluminum. 361 Of these materials, lithium is the only one that does not have a substitute currently
on the market. Nickel and cobalt are in the cathodes nickel-manganese-cobalt (NMC) and nickel-
cobalt-aluminum (NCA). These are not the constraining materials because they are now
substituted in a growing portion of PEVs with the lithium-iron-phosphate (LFP) cathode.362
Graphite can also be substituted; synthetic graphite is a direct substitution for mined graphite,363
and research has also demonstrated the use of silicon mixed with or to replace graphite as the
anode.364 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 132]
361 U.S. Geological Survey, United States Geological Survey Releases List of 2022 Critical Minerals
(2022), https://www.usgs.gov/news/national-news-release/us-geological-survey-releases-2022-list-critical-
minerals.
362 International Energy Agency, Global EV Outlook 2023 at 11 (2023),
https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2023/trends-in-batteries.
363 Jinrui Zhang, Chao Liang, and Jennifer B. Dunn, Graphite Flows in the U.S.: Insights into a Key
Ingredient of Energy Transition, See 3402-3414, Environ. Sci. and Tech. (2023),
https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.2c08655.
364 Xiuxia Zuo, Jin Zhu, Peter Muller-Buschbaum, Ya-Jun Cheng, Silicon based lithium-ion battery
anodes: A chronicle perspective review, See 2211-2855, Nano Energy, (2017),
http://dx.doi.Org/10.1016/j.nanoen.2016.ll.013.
Lithium is vital to manufacturing lithium-ion batteries, which are currently the only type of
PEV battery used in all PEVs purchased in the U.S. Therefore, the analysis correctly points to
lithium as the constraining material for lithium-ion batteries. Yet, this is a slightly conservative
estimation for future constraints because alternative battery types are beginning to be marketed
globally. For example, sodium-ion batteries have recently been recognized as a potential lithium-
ion battery substitute365 as Chinese automakers unveil their new technology.366 This type of
innovation is likely to reduce lithium demand globally and is further discussed in the next
section. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 132]
365 Petrova, Here's why sodium-ion batteries are shaping up to be a big technology breakthrough (2023),
https://www.cnbc.eom/2023/05/10/sodium-ion-batteries-shaping-up-to-be-big-technology-
breakthrough.html.
366 Jiri Opletal, CATL's sodium-ion batteries will debut in Chery Auto EVs, Car News China (2023),
https://carnewschina.eom/2023/04/16/catls-sodium-ion-batteries-will-debut-in-chery-auto-evs/.
Furthermore, we know that advocating for increased deployment of ZEVs within the light-
and medium-duty fleet, which is an essential step to reducing fossil fuel emissions and
addressing the climate crisis, will potentially include mining projects that impact environmental
justice communities and, in particular, indigenous communities. PEVs also eliminate tailpipe
emissions of harmful air pollutants that cause asthma and respiratory diseases, especially among
Black, Indigenous, and other communities of color. However, without adequate protections for
workers, communities, and environments near mining and processing sites, we risk replicating
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the harms of fossil fuel extraction. Besides the details below that discuss opportunities for PEV
batteries that will not rely on lithium, there are measures that EPA can and should take to address
the potential mining impacts. For example, EPA and the Administration can take action to build
a robust circular economy to reduce the need for virgin material extraction and increase the
supply of more responsibly sourced materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 133]
EPA points to findings by several sources that concur with its assessment that material and
production will be sufficient to meet electric vehicle uptake in the LDV, MDV, and HDV
sectors. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29312-23; DRIA Chs. 3.1.3.2., 3.1.3.3. Increased demand for
minerals, as well as government investments, will continue to spur these developments. The
2023 BNEF Electric Vehicle Outlook demonstrates these effects on the continued expansion of
the supply chain.367 In addition, academic sources have demonstrated that there are enough
reserves and recycled content such that demand for lithium will barely exceed a quarter of the
available reserve by 2050 and about half by 2100.368 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 133]
367 Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Electric Vehicle Outlook 2023 (2023),
https://about.bnef.eom/electric-vehicle-outlook/#download.
368 Klimenko, Ratner, & Tereshin, Constraints imposed by key-material resources on renewable energy
development, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2021, 144, 111011, 1364-0321.
https://www.sciencedirect.eom/science/article/pii/S 1364032121003014.
1. Federal investments have spurred private investments in domestic supply.
Actions taken by the federal government have increased private investment in U.S. battery
production. The impact of the BIL and the IRA on U.S.-based PEV manufacturing, repurposing,
and recycling growth demonstrates the influence U.S. policy has on rapidly growing a
domestically-produced supply. Within six months of the IRA's passage, automakers and battery
manufacturers had announced a total of roughly $52 billion of planned investment in North
America's PEV supply chain, with over 70% of those investments going toward battery supply
chains and recycling.369 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 133]
369 Cory Cantor, US Climate Law Fuels $52 Billion in New EV Investments, p 1, BloombergNEF, Mar.
13, 2023. Subscription required.
2. Recycled content can provide additional domestic mineral supply.
The current oil-dependent transportation system not only impacts the climate and the health of
the U.S. population, it also requires continual drilling, production, and importing of fuel. This is
in stark contrast to the use of materials needed for electrified transportation, which can be
continually recycled to produce the next generation of more efficient vehicles. This results in the
continued growth of U.S. material stock even when initially relying on imported minerals. As the
Proposal states, in 2050, 25 to 50% of lithium demand from electric vehicles can be met with
recycled content. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29323-24.370 Recycled content availability has been highly
studied and documented in academic studies beyond the two listed in the Proposal (Sun et al.,
2022; Ziemann et al., 2018), including in findings by Xu et al.371 and Dunn et al.372 Xu et al.
demonstrates that the material demand that could be met by retiring and recycled supply is
highly impacted by innovation and advancing energy density. As batteries become more
advanced and energy-dense, either through innovation of chemistries used (e.g., the progress
made in NMC) or through different chemistries (e.g., lithium-sulfur or lithium-air batteries), the
mineral demand decreases to meet the same energy storage needs. This means that a high
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percentage of material demand can be met with the retiring supply of less material-efficient and
lower density batteries. This is demonstrated in Figure XVIII. A-1 below; the more energy dense
batteries (Li-S/Air) have higher recycled content for lithium, cobalt, and nickel in 2040-2050
(green bar).373 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 133-134]
370 The Proposal cites Sun et al., Surging lithium price will not impede the electric vehicle boom, Joule,
doi:10.1016/j.joule.2022.06.028, https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/jjoule.2022.06.028, and. Ziemann et al.,
Modeling the potential impact of lithium recycling from EV batteries on lithium demand: a dynamic MFA
approach, Resour.Conserv. Recycl. 133, 76-85. https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.resconrec.
371 Xu, C., Dai, Q., Gaines, L. et al. Future material demand for automotive lithium-based batteries,
Commun Materials, 2020, 1, 99, 5-8, https://doi.org/10.1038/s43246-020-00095-x [hereinafter Xu, Future
material demand].
372 Jessica Dunn, Margaret Slattery, Alissa Kendall, Hanjiro Ambrose, and Shuhan Shen, Circularity of
Lithium-Ion Battery Materials in Electric Vehicles, Environmental Science & Technology, 2021, 55, 5189—
5198. DOI: 10.1021/acs.est.0c07030 [hereinafter Dunn, Circulatity].
373 Xu, Future material demand at 6.
Figure XVIII. A-l: Closed-loop recycling potential of battery materials in a STEP scenario.
[See original comment for Figure XVII.A-l], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 135]
(Source: Xu et al.)
Dunn et al.374 demonstrate that the choice of cathode materials can also highly increase
potential circularity. Figure XVIII.A-2 below shows that a future with high lithium-iron-
phosphate (LFP) market concentration, labeled as C6 in the legend, can significantly increase the
amount of lithium, cobalt, manganese, and nickel demand met with recycled content, compared
to a business-as-usual cathode market share, labeled as CI in the legend. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 135]
374 Dunn, Circulatity at 5194.
Figure XVIII. A-2: Circularity potential of materials as additional years are added to battery
lifespan.
[See original attachment for Figure XVIII. A-2], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 136]
Source: Dunn et al.
The recycled content also varies based on the collection rate and the material recovery rate.
There is potential for high material recovery due to the 95% recovery rate of lithium, nickel,
cobalt, and manganese by commercial-scale hydrometallurgical recyclers in the U.S., such as
Lithion, Redwood Materials, Licycle, and Cirba Solutions. In addition, direct cathode recycling,
which can recover a cathode without breaking it down into separate materials, is under
development by several startups as well as the National Lab research group, ReCell. As shown in
Table XVIII.A-l below, direct recycling currently has a recovery rate of 40% for lithium. But
increasing the lithium recovery rate is a priority area for ongoing research.375 The Argonne
National Laboratory model, BattPac, lists the following recovery rates shown in Table XVIII.A-
1.376 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 136]
375 See generally Kendall, A., Slattery, M., Dunn, J., Lithium-ion car battery recycling advisory group
report, (Mar. 16, 2022), https://calepa.ca.gov/lithium-ion-car-battery-recycling-advisory-group/.
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376 Argonne National Laboratory, "BatPaC: battery manufacturing cost estimation," (2022).
https://www.anl.gov/partnerships/batpac-battery-manufacturing-cost-estimation.
Table XVIII. A-l: Recovery rates of battery materials from different recycling processes.
[See original attachment for Table XVIII.A-l],
Source: Argonne National Lab BatPac
Recycling facilities are also operational and under development in the United States.
Table XVIII. A-2 from Atlas Public Policy attempts to capture all these developments.377
[See original attachment for Table XVIII.A-2]. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 137]
377 Atlas Public Policy, The EV Transition: Key Market and Supply Chain Enablers, at 42 (Nov. 2022).
https://atlaspolicy.com/the-ev-transition-key-market-and-supply-chain-enablers/.
XVIII.A-2: EV battery recycling facilities in the U.S.
[See original attachment for XVIII.A-2].
Source: T. Taylor and N. Gabriel for Atlas Public Policy
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR TABLE XVIII.A-2: EV battery recycling facilities in the
U.S.
Source: T. Taylor and N. Gabriel for Atlas Public Policy[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
138]
3. EPA appropriately concludes that there will be sufficient lithium for the Proposed
Standards, and supporting analysis also indicates likelihood of IRA-qualifying sources.
As discussed above, the current primary constraining material for PEVs is lithium. EPA
points to a variety of sources to support its assumptions regarding lithium availability for U.S.
PEV demand. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29312-23; DRIA Chs. 3.1.3.2, 3.1.3.3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 139]
Recent analysis by Benchmark Mineral Intelligence (BMI) on future lithium supply supports
EPA's findings.378 BMI compiled a list of all currently known lithium mining projects,
including those already in operation as well as those in development, totaling 330 projects
globally as of December 2022. Of those, 153 are already producing lithium or have public,
identified supply projections. BMI took those supply projections and assigned them
probabilities—e.g., currently producing mines were weighted at 100%, while projects that have
secured a significant proportion of their funding and completed certain feasibility milestones
necessary for production within the next 5 years were considered "probable" and weighted at
50%. Supply from the other 177 lithium mining projects (which do not yet have supply
projections) were all counted as 0. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 139]
378 BMI, Lithium Mining Projects - Supply Projections, June 2023 (slide deck); BMI, Lithium Mine
Projects (06.30.2023) (Excel spreadsheet), both attached to this comment letter.
BMI then compared these projections to the projected lithium demand through 2032, using
forecast global demand (including for non-battery applications), as well as demand based on
EPA's proposed light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicle emission standards. Based just on the
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153 included projects, BMI's weighted projections show sufficient lithium for the EPA's
Proposed Standards (on top of forecast demand for the rest of the world) through 2028 as shown
below in Figure XVIII.A-3. When the 18 U.S. projects with supply projections (out of 48 total
U.S. projects) are weighted at 100%, lithium supply is sufficient for the Proposed Standards
through 2030. And when the 153 included projects are weighted at 100%, global supply greatly
exceeds demand through 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 139]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure XVIII.A-3: Global Lithium Supply Based with
U.S. and Global Demand [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 140]
Given that BMI's projections exclude 177 projects that have been announced but do not yet
have supply projections, even a 100% weighting for the 153 projects that are operating or have
supply projections is a conservative approach. It does not include any supply growth outside of
the 153 projects identified as of December 2022, not even from the other 177 identified projects,
despite increasing global demand and strong U.S. tax incentives. Moreover, it would be
reasonable and expected that even BMI's supply projections would continue to increase as the
identified projects get further along in the development process and market forces continue to
act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 140]
In addition, BMI's analysis indicates that there will be sufficient supply for U.S. demand even
after considering competing lithium battery demand from China and Europe and global non-
lithium battery demand as shown below in Figure XVIII. A-4. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
p. 140]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure XVIII.A-4: Remaining Global Lithium Supply
with U.S. Demand [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 141]
BMI also broke down the supply from the 153 included projects by country, and then grouped
those countries into categories based on U.S. trade-agreement status, consistent with the terms in
the IRA. This projection shown in Figure XVIII.A-5 below makes clear that there is ample
lithium supply from sources that satisfy the IRA § 30D Clean Vehicles Tax Credit
requirements—specifically, domestic sources, as well as countries that have free trade
agreements with the U.S. ("FTA countries"). This supports EPA's modeling assumption of an
average tax credit of $6,000 per electric vehicle (out of a maximum allowable credit of $7,500),
as lithium from these sources would qualify a vehicle for the tax credit, provided other
conditions are met (e.g., vehicle assembly in North America, purchaser income limits). [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 141]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure XVIII.A-5: U.S. Lithium Supply and Free Trade
Agreement Country Supply with U.S. Demand [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 142]
Slides of BMI's analysis, as well as their full list of lithium supply projects, are attached to
these comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 142]
Finally, as has been noted elsewhere in these comments, there are alternative battery
chemistries that do not use lithium (including sodium-ion batteries), and thus may end up
lowering lithium demand in the future. In addition, in light of the points made in Section
XVIII.B, below, we believe EPA's analysis of future lithium demand—and thus future lithium
supply sufficiency—is conservative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 142]
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Minerals are "an input to the construction" of vehicles and their infrastructure rather than "a
fuel that is combusted on an ongoing basis," meaning that "the near term risk is not one of
'traditional' energy security (short-term supply constraints or high prices)."659 Critical minerals
do not pose energy security concerns because, "unlike reliance on oil (where the resource is
consumed with each trip) EVs consume locally produced electricity with each trip and additional
lithium is only required when the battery is replaced or a new vehicle is purchased."660 An
event squeezing or shutting off the supply of oil would have "an almost immediate deleterious
effect on transportation," but a squeeze in critical mineral supply would allow "batteries in
existence [to] continue to function," and "there [would] not be a fundamental disruption of the
transportation sector "661 Increases in oil prices and decreases in supply impact all drivers, and
easing this dependence through electrification would shield drivers from daily price volatility.
Moreover, whereas "fuel is burnt once," EV battery materials "can be reused and recovered in a
circular loop to produce new batteries."662 Recyclers such as Redwood Materials and Li-Cycle
can recover up to 95% of the minerals from old batteries at commercial scale today.663 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 200]
659 Sara Hastings-Simon & Morgan Bazilian, Critical Minerals Don't Burn Up - Why the Energy Security
Playbook Needs a Re-Write, Global Policy (July 23, 2020),
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.eom/blog/23/07/2020/critical-minerals-dont-burn-why-energy-security-
playbook-needs-re-write.
660 Fred Stein, Ending America's Energy Insecurity: Why Electric Vehicles Should Drive the United
States to Energy Independence, 9 Homeland Security Affairs (Feb. 2013),
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/236.
661 Id.
662 Transport & Environment, From Dirty Oil to Clean Batteries 6-7, 41 (2021),
https://www.transportenvironment.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/07/202 l_02_Battery_raw_materials_report_final.p df.
663 Redwood Materials, Recycling, Refining, and Remanufacturing Battery Materials for a Clean Energy
Future, Redwood Materials, https://www.redwoodmaterials.com/solutions/. Li-Cycle, Full-Service Solution
for Recycling Lithium-ion Batteries, https://li-cycle.eom/services/#closed-loop-battery-resource-recovery.
Finally, combustion vehicles will remain in production and operation for many years,
diversifying the one-time and ongoing inputs needed for vehicles and allowing the U.S. battery
supply chain time to stabilize through increased domestic mining and production, advances in
battery design and recycling, and cooperation with allies over the next decade. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 200]
XVIII. EPA Appropriately Concludes that Critical Minerals and the Battery Supply Chain
Will Be Sufficient for the Levels of BEVs Projected in the Proposal, and More Reasonable
Battery-Related Modeling Assumptions Would Demonstrate the Feasibility of Even Higher
Levels of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 200]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
Vehicle Manufacturer EV Commitments
Many vehicle manufacturers have made commitments to transition a significant portion of
their sales to ZEVs. While many of the commitments are for a share of manufacturers' global
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sales, several OEMs have made U.S. specific commitments or have committed to transition their
entire fleet which would mean all of their U.S. sales would be ZEV as well. Even for global
commitments, manufacturers with significant U.S. sales volumes will nonetheless need to sell
meaningful ZEVs to meet their commitments. Because some sales might exceed these global
commitments while others fall short, we used global commitments as a reasonable proxy for U.S.
sales share. Table 4 below shows OEM commitments and includes a total using 2022
manufacturer sales shares to calculate a weighted ZEV commitment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 31-34]
[See original attachment for Table 4: Manufacturer ZEV Commitments as Share of Total
Sales] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 31-34]
78 Jerry Reynolds. Full-Year 2022 National Auto Sales by Brand. 2023. CarPro,
https://www.carpro.com/blog/full- year-2022-national-auto-sales-by-brand
79 Paul Eisenstein, Mercedez-Benz Goes All-Electric by 2030, Forbes (Oct. 4, 2021),
https://www.forbes.com/wheels/news/mercedes-benz-all-electric-2030/.
80 Luke Wilkinson, Volkswagen 'New Auto' Strategy Predicts Near 100 percent EV Sales by 2040, (July
15, 2021), https://www.carscoops.com/2023/03/bmw-expects-to-smash-50-ev-sales-goal-before-own-2030-
deadline/.
81 Mariella Moon, Faraday Future's FF 91 Electric Vehicles Will Cost as Much as $309,000, Engadget
(June 1, 2023), https://www.engadget.com/faraday-futures-ff-91-electric-vehicles-will-cost-as-much-as-
309000- 053144006.html.
82 Luke Wilkinson, Volkswagen 'New Auto' Strategy Predicts Near 100 percent EV Sales by 2040, (July
15, 2021), https://www.carscoops.com/2023/03/bmw-expects-to-smash-50-ev-sales-goal-before-own-2030-
deadline/.
83 David Shepardson, GM Backs Setting Tough U.S Emissions Targets for 2030 (Sep. 20, 2022),
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/gm-backs-setting-tough-emissions-targets-2030-
2022-09-20/.
84 PR Newswire, Honda Targets 100% EV Sales in North America by 2040, Makes New Commitments to
Advances in Environmental and Safety Technology (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/honda- targets-100-ev-sales-in-north-america-by-2040-makes-new-commitments-to-advances-in-
environmental-and-safety- technology -301275727.html.
85 ET Auto, Hyundai to Raise Electric Vehicles Ration to 80% by 2040 (Sep. 7, 2021),
https://auto.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/hyundai-to-raise-electric-vehicles-ratio-to-80-by-
2040/85998266.
86 Inside EVs, Hyundai Announces Accelerated Electrification Strategy,
https://insideevs.com/news/571125/hyundai-accelerated-electrification-strategy/.
87 Mark Kane, Mazda Announces Full-Scale Launch of BEVs in 2028-2030 (Nov. 22, 2022),
https://insideevs.eom/news/623055/mazda-full-scale-launch-bevs-2028-2030//
88 Reuters, Nissan Raises Global EV Targets; to Boost U.S. Input (Feb. 27, 2023),
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/nissan-plans-build-second-us-battery-plant-gupta-
says-2023- 02-27/.
89 Stellantis, Accelerating the Drive to Electrification,
https://www.stellantis.com/en/technology/electrification.
90 Reuters Staff, Subaru Sets Mid 2030s Target to Sell Only Electric Vehicles (Jan. 19, 2021),
lhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-subaru-ev-idUSKBNlZJOBU.
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91 JustAuto, Subaru to Invest $1.9 Billion in New EV Plant, Batteries, https://www.just-
auto.com/news/subaru-to- invest-usl-9bn-in-new-ev-plant-batteries.
92 Jasper Jolly, Jaguar Land Rover to Ramp up EV Production with £15bn Investment, The Guardian (Apr.
19, 2023), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/apr/19/electric-car-jaguar-land-rover-ev-
production-investment.
93 Peter Johnson, Toyota's New CEO Adjusts EV Plans but Sticks to a Hybrid Approach, electrek (Apr. 7,
2023), https://electrek.co/2023/04/07/toyotas-new-ceo-adjusts-ev-plans-but-sticks-to-a-hybrid-approach/.
94 Anjani, Trivedi, This is Toyota's Boldest EV Rebranding Exercise Yet, Washington Post (Jan. 30,
2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/this-is-toyotas-boldest-ev-rebranding-exercise-
yet/2023/0 l/30/7dlaf020-a063-l led-8b47-9863fda8e494_story.html.
95 Volvo, The Future is Electric, https://group.volvocars.com/company/innovation/electrification.
96 Volvo, Volvo Cars to be Fully Electric by 2030, https://www.media.volvocars.com/global/en-
gb/media/pressreleases/277409/volvo-cars-to-be-fully-electric-by-2030
97 https://insideevs.com/news/574853/vw-group-bevs-make-up-55percent-us-sales-2030/
98 Luke Wilkinson. Volkswagen 'New Auto' strategy predicts near 100 per cent EV sales by 2040 (Jul. 15,
2021), https://www.autoexpress.co.uk/volkswagen/355550/volkswagen-new-auto-strategy-predicts-near-
100-cent-ev-sales- mix-2040
*Due to rounding, the sum of the market share may not equal the total [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 31-34]
All major OEMs have set ZEV targets of at least 30% sales starting in 2030. Considering both
U.S.-specific and global commitments would result in 47% of new vehicles sold in the U.S. in
2030 being ZEVs. Even unrealistically assuming only the US-specific commitments and the
100%) commitments apply, at least 29% of LDV sales in 2030 would be ZEVs growing to 44% in
2035 and 48% in 2040. The 2030 value is plotted above in Figure 12. We also note that the 2035
and 2040 estimates using both approaches are perhaps significantly understated given that some
manufacturers with commitments in 2030 have not made 2035 or later commitments but will
nonetheless likely increase ZEV sales during that timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
pp. 31-34]
EV Manufacturing Investment Announcements
As discussed above, in their March 2023 report, WSP analyzed investment announcements
for domestic EV manufacturing. Their analysis found that announced investments amount to the
production of 4.4 million EVs per year by 2026 in the U.S.99 This equals roughly a third (31%)
of all LDVs sold in the U.S. last year. Vehicle manufacturers have already committed to
manufacturing these vehicles and it provides a lower bound for what might be expected as more
manufacturers make EV investment announcements, and the industry continues to grow. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 34-35]
99 U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs, Characterizing the Impacts of the Inflation
Reduction Act after 6 Months, WSP for EDF, (March 2023).
https://blogs.edf.org/climate41 l/files/2023/03/State-Electric- Vehicle-Policy-Landscape.pdf.
Over the past ten years, between 60% and 70% of the LDVs sold in the U.S. were
domestically manufactured with imports accounting for the remaining 30% to 40%. 100,101 It is
reasonable to expect that not all EVs purchased in the U.S. will be domestically produced. To
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scale the vehicles, we have assumed that the proportion of EVs within the pool of domestically
produced vehicles will be the same as those imported. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 34-
35]
100 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization-
G.17 Table 3. Originally from Ward's Communications, Chrysler, and GM. 16 Nov 2022.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl7/current/table3.htm.
101 Bureau of Economic Analysis. Motor Vehicle Unit Retail Sales, Table 6. 2023,
https://apps.bea.gov/national/xls/gap_hist.xlsx
If the U.S. imported 35% of its vehicles, the average of the last ten years, the EV
manufacturing investments have been made already account for 48% of domestically made
vehicles sold in the U.S. If the trend of more domestically produced EVs continues and only 20%
of sales are imports, the U.S. produced 4.4 million EVs would result in 39% of LDV sales being
EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 34-35]
For this analysis, we chose an assumption of 80% domestically produced EVs. While this
number is higher than the current share of domestic production, it is in line with the recent trend
of onshoring EV manufacturing. 102 There are significant incentives and funding opportunities to
make domestically producing EVs more attractive to manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 34-35]
102 David Gohlke, Zhou, Yan, Wu, Xinyi, and Courtney, Calista. 2022. "Assessment of Light-Duty Plug-
in Electric Vehicles in the United States, 2010 - 2021". United States, https://doi.org/10.2172/1898424.
https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1898424. (Attachment Z)
Manufacturers only make announcements for facilities a few years in advance of production.
As such, this gives a glimpse into the near future but should the general trend in announcements
continue, tremendous growth would be expected for domestic EV manufacturing. To that end,
WSP's analysis is current only through March of 2023. Since that time, manufacturers have
announced billions of dollars in additional investment and production capacity, which reinforces
the likelihood that these trends will continue to grow and accelerate over time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 34-35]
EV Battery Manufacturing Investment Announcements
WSP also published analysis assessing the annual capacity of lithium-ion batteries that will be
produced in the U.S. based on announced investments. 103 Their analysis found 37 battery and
component manufacturing and recycling announcements totaling nearly $80 billion in investment
and over 1,000 GWh/year of capacity by 2027. Such a large investment into the EV battery
industry demonstrates a significant shift towards EV adoption and the existing market
expectation that EVs will be a dominant powertrain within the decade. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, p. 35]
103 U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs, Characterizing the Impacts of the Inflation
Reduction Act after 6 Months, WSP for EDF, (March 2023).
https://blogs.edf.org/climate41 l/files/2023/03/State-Electric- Vehicle-Policy-Landscape.pdf (Attachment
E).
To get a sense of the scale of the battery investments, WSP calculated the number of LD EVs
those batteries could support. They assumed an average LDV battery is 89 kWh, which would
mean by 2027, the U.S. will be producing enough batteries to supply 84% of all domestic LDV
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sales if all of these batteries went exclusively to LDVs. However, it is likely there will be other
demands for those batteries. The exact split between LD and HD demand for batteries will
depend on how fast different vehicle classes electrify and the market demand for battery sizes.
EDF used current energy consumption as a proxy for relative demand for batteries between LD
and HD vehicles. According to MOVES3, in 2022, LDVs consumed 72% of the on-road energy.
To calculate a more conservative value, EDF assumed that only two-thirds of batteries would go
to LDVs. In this case, 56% of LDV sales could be outfitted with domestically supplied batteries
that manufacturers have already invested in producing by 2027. As with manufacturing
investments, additional investments have been made since WSP published its report and
accordingly, these investments could only be expected to grow. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0786, p. 35]
Lithium Mining Announcements
Announcements of domestic lithium mines have also increased recently. Using a Benchmark
Mineral Intelligence (BMI) database of proposed lithium mines and production amounts by year,
EDF assessed how lithium production would translate to vehicles. 104 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 36-37]
104 Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, Lithium Mine Projects (06.30.2023) (Excel spreadsheet), attached to
comments submitted by Center for Biological Diversity, et al. Mining projects are current as of December
2022.
Forty-eight mines have been announced in the U.S. and are at some stage of development.
Though only one is currently in operation, companies have claimed that many will start
producing lithium in the next few years. Of the 48 mines, BMI has projections of potential
production for 18 mines with 1 mine in operation, 7 "probable" mines and 11 considered
"possible" mines.105 To understand anticipated lithium production within the U.S., we used this
information from BMI to develop two scenarios. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 36-37]
105 BMI defines a "probable mine" as a project having secured a significant portion of its funding, and
completed certain feasibility milestones necessary for production within the next five years. BMI defines a
"possible mine" as a project in the early stages of development with only a small portion of financing
secured.
Scenario A: Only production from the 18 mines with announced anticipated production were
included and they were weighted based on how far along in the development process the mine is
consistent with BMI's weighting system. "Possible" mines were only weighed at 40%,
"probable" mines were weighed at 50%, and mines in operation were weighed at 100%. This
scenario does not include the other 30 announced mines that BMI identified. This provides a
conservative estimate of U.S. lithium production. Under this scenario, domestic lithium
production would supply enough material to outfit 25% of annual LDV sales with battery packs
in 2035. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 36-37]
Scenario B: Production from the 18 mines described above was included and weighed at
100%). This assumes that all of the 18 mines will reach the projected production on the
anticipated timeline but still does not include the other 30 announced mines that are at the
beginning stages of production. Since only one-third of the announced lithium projects are
included in this scenario, it remains a conservative estimate of domestic lithium production based
on current announcements. Under this scenario, domestic lithium production would supply
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enough material to outfit 55% of annual LDV sales with battery packs in 2035. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 36-37]
EDF converted the tons of lithium production into an equivalent number of LDVs. We used
BMI's projection for kg of lithium per kWh of battery for an average battery chemistry. This
value falls over time as batteries are assumed to become more efficient from 0.66 to 0.56 kg
LCE/kWh of battery. We assumed 89 kWh per EV to get the number of LDVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 36-37]
Since the IRA's Commercial Clean Vehicle Credit does not contain the same domestic source
requirements for battery critical minerals that the Clean Vehicle Credit does, it is likely that
domestically produced lithium will go to LDVs rather than HDVs at least through the end of the
IRA credit in 2032. In this analysis, we assume none of the U.S. produced lithium goes to HDVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 36-37]
We plotted the results from Scenario B above as a possible representation of future U.S.
lithium production from announced projects. As described more fully below, this does not fully
account for all U.S. projects nor does it account for projects in countries with which the U.S. has
a free trade agreement. This also does not reflect EDF's view on any particular project. Instead,
based on publicly available information, it provides an indication of the degree to which U.S.
lithium supply may support future EV production based solely on current announcements. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 36-37]
VI. The supply chain for electric vehicle batteries and critical minerals is capable of safely
and equitably meeting the demands of strong standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp.
60-61]
The current and projected critical minerals supply chain for EV batteries is capable of meeting
the demands of strong standards. It is vital that any increase in minerals mining and processing
be undertaken in a safe and equitable way that does not increase pollution burdens on
underserved communities, which have historically faced disproportionate harms from these
processes. Any projects undertaken must be carried out in a way that affirmatively prioritizes the
needs of these communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 60-61]
Domestic production of batteries and battery components is growing rapidly to meet the rising
needs of the EV industry. Analysis by EDF and WSP found that there has been over $79.7
billion in investment in U.S. battery and battery component production announced within the
past 8 years, resulting in almost 70,000 new jobs. 164 In 2026, these already announced
investments will be capable of producing batteries sufficient to supply the equivalent of 11.2
million new passenger vehicles per year. 165 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 60-61]
164 U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs, Characterizing the Impacts of the Inflation
Reduction Act after 6 Months, WSP for EDF, (March 2023).
https://blogs.edf.org/climate41 l/files/2023/03/State-Electric- Vehicle-Policy-Landscape.pdf. (Attachment
E)
165 Id.
Much of this investment has occurred within the last year as a result of the IRA's incentives
for domestic battery production, which will continue to spur production growth and reduce
battery costs throughout the timeframe of this rule. 166 The Advanced Manufacturing Production
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credit, for instance, provides up to $45 per kilowatt-hour for the production of battery cells and
modules as well as up to 10% of the cost of critical minerals through 2032.167 Additionally, the
IRA's amendments to the Clean Vehicle Credit includes provisions requiring that qualifying
vehicles source an increasing percentage of their critical minerals and battery components
domestically, which will further incentivize increased domestic production capacity. 168 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 60-61]
166 Id.
167 Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, P.L. 117-1698 ,136 Stat. 1971-81 (2022).
168 Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, P.L. 117-1698 ,136 Stat. 1956-57 (2022).
The extraction, processing, and recycling of the critical minerals necessary to support rapid
ZEV proliferation is also ramping up and supports the feasibility of protective emission
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 61-62]
EDF has conducted a review of announced investments in the critical minerals supply chain,
including new investments and expansion of existing capacities in raw minerals extraction
(mining), materials separation and processing, and recycling efforts—in both the U.S. and free-
trade-agreement countries - based on publicly available information from company websites and
announcements issued by investors, government agencies, and news media on the operators,
materials, locations, annual capacities, and timelines of the projects. 169 The compilation of
projects includes the scale and date of any announced investments in the projects, including
OEM investments, as well as the details of partnership agreements. We have also compiled
information on specific funding levels secured under the BIL. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
pp. 61-62]
169 The compilation is attached to this comment as an Excel file titled "Domestic Critical Minerals
Projects." We are expanding the review to include countries with which the U.S. has free trade agreements.
(Attachment W)
The numerous projects and partnerships identified demonstrate a growing effort—that is
supported by the BIL and the IRA—to develop a secure supply of critical minerals. In October
2022, the White House announced $2.8 billion in funding under the BIL for projects to support
"new, retrofitted, and expanded commercial-scale domestic facilities to produce battery
materials, processing, and battery recycling and manufacturing demonstrations." 170 The funding
is the first phase of a total $7 billion investment by the federal government to develop domestic
supply chains for electric vehicle battery production. 171 According to project announcements,
these investments in critical minerals projects have been spurred on by downstream consumer
tax benefits under the IRA. 172 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 61-62]
170 U.S. DOE Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chain Bipartisan Infrastructure Law: Battery
Materials Processing and Battery Manufacturing Recycling Selections, available at:
https://www.energy.gov/mesc/bipartisan- infrastructure-law-battery-materials-processing-and-battery-
manufacturing-recycling.
171 U.S. DOE, October 19, 2022 Biden-Harris Administration Awards $2.8 Billion to Supercharge U.S.
Manufacturing of Batteries for Electric Vehicles and Electric Grid, https://www.energy.gov/articles/biden-
harris- administration-awards-28-billion-supercharge-us-manufacturing-batteries.
172 E.g., General Motors announced that, "[m]aterial sourced from Lithium Americas [Thacker Pass mine
in Nevada] will help support EV eligibility for consumer incentives under the U.S. clean energy tax
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credits." Ford noted, in its announcement of a long-term agreement with Nemaska Lithium, that its lithium
hydroxide should help qualify Ford vehicles for consumer tax benefits under the IRA. And Livent
Corporation, in its announcement of the expansion of its largest lithium hydroxide production site in the
U.S. said that its, "leading footprint in North America positions the company to take advantage of long-
term growth opportunities and downstream incentives from the recently enacted Inflation Reduction Act
(IRA), which encourages use of lithium produced or processed in North America."
In all, our review identified 74 domestic mining, processing, and recycling projects and an
additional 30+ projects and agreements in countries with which the United States has a free trade
agreement. Investment levels are not known for all projects but announced domestic investments
total over $25 billion, including $1 billion funded under the BIL and $2.7 billion funded by
automakers. Known investments in free-trade-agreement countries total over $800 million.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 62]
Because less than half of the projects we identified included a projected investment amount,
we can assume that the actual total investment in mining, processing, and recycling projects in
the U.S. and in free-trade-agreement countries is far higher than these publicly announced
figures reflect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 62]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Ford is enthusiastic and optimistic about the ICE-to-ZEV transition, and we are already
delivering electrified light- and medium-duty EVs at scale. While we remain optimistic, we are
also mindful of the considerable challenges and uncertainties that lie ahead. The pace of
electrification has been and may continue to be limited by many factors and forces, many of
which are outside the control of vehicle manufacturers. These include the availability of critical
minerals for battery manufacturing, the need to allocate finite resources between EV programs
and efforts toward incremental reductions in emissions from ICE vehicles, consumer demand
especially as we proceed beyond early-adopters to the majority of new vehicle purchasers,
economic turbulence, geopolitical events, and, of course, electric vehicle charging
infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 2-3]
Critical minerals are essential for EV manufacturing, but demand may outstrip supply during
portions of 2027 - 2032. Automakers are taking extraordinary steps to vertically integrate with
their battery supply chains in order to secure supply and control costs, but in this highly dynamic
market and in light of unprecedented demand from lithium-ion battery manufacturers worldwide,
it is unclear whether critical minerals will be available at a price that makes the EVs sufficiently
competitive in the US market to achieve the EV adoption rates needed to meet EPA's proposed
standards. The production tax credit available under section 45X of the tax code provides some
amount of certainty, but not enough to achieve a high-level of confidence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0605, p. 7]
Organization: Fred Reitman
Leads to child labor. The metals needed for the EV batteries including lithium and cobalt are
mined in third world countries particularly the Congo by child labor under deplorable conditions.
This is what takes place so that people in the United States, western Europe and other countries
can feel good about limiting so-called climate change. Should this proposal become a final rule it
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would only lead to more child labor as it would open a growing market for these batteries in the
U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0432, p. 2]
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
And it will have profound impacts on national security by forcing the American automotive
industry to depend on critical minerals from foreign suppliers, with geopolitical challenges—
most notably, China—rather than a domestically-abundant and secure resource. These issues go
well beyond EPA's expertise, and the Agency is not positioned to fully grapple with the
consequences that such a rapid push for PEV will have across the nation. As a result, EPA can
only proceed with the Proposed Rule if Congress bestowed upon EPA clear authorization to do
so. But Congress did not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 4]
d. EPA's Assumed Supply Chain is no Assured and will Increase Dependence on Foreign
Sources
Today, the U.S. is virtually independent48 as a net exporter of petroleum. The U.S. has
worked for decades to progress this energy security, which is especially pronounced for
transportation fuels (i.e., petroleum- and ethanol-based liquid fuel products) for ICE-powered
vehicles. Although EPA conducts an analysis regarding the Proposed Rule's effect on domestic
"energy security," EPA limits itself to drawing broad conclusions regarding future projections
for exports, imports, and consumption of crude oil and refined petroleum products—as well as
relying on inflated support from potential funding mechanisms of the BIL and IRA. But this
ignores the current state of the supply chain of critical materials necessary for battery and PEV
production at large: "Given the current state of the global supply chain for these raw materials
and the requirements to bring additional supply to market, it is likely that the mandated goals are
unachievable even over several decades."49 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 12-13]
48 While "energy independence" has varying definitions, we are using the term consistent with EPA's use
in the Proposed Rule—"[t]he goal of U.S. energy independence is the elimination of all U.S. imports of
petroleum and other foreign sources of energy, but more broadly it is the elimination of U.S. sensitivity to
the variations in the price and supply of foreign sources of energy"). Proposed Rule at 26,077.
49 CEA Study at 9.
Most illustrative of the future foreign reliance resulting from EPA's Proposed Rule is the
lithium-ion battery supply chain controlled nearly entirely by China. China controls each step of
battery production and, by 2030, is anticipated to "make more than twice as many batteries as
every other county combined."50 This is because China controls 41% of the world's cobalt, 28%
of the world's lithium, and 78% of the world's graphite; China also refines 95% of manganese,
74%) of cobalt, 70% of graphite, 67% of lithium, and 63% of nickel.51 And even if the U.S. had
sufficient resources to extract and refine independent of foreign sources, a refinery takes two to
five years to build—not accounting for the time necessary for permitting, construction, and
operations, including waste disposal.52 Beyond the raw materials, China also makes the battery
components—73% of NMC cathodes and 99% of LFP cathodes—compared to 1% made
domestically.53 Indeed, "[ejxperts say it is next to impossible for any other country to become
self-reliant in the battery supply chain, no matter if it has cheaper labor or finds other global
partners. Companies anywhere in the world will look to form partnerships with Chinese
manufacturers to enter or expand in the industry."54 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 12-
13]
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50 Agnes Chang and Keith Bradsher, NY TIMES, "Can the World Make an Electric Car Battery Without
China?" (May 17, 2023) available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/05/16/business/china-ev-
battery.html.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
Looking at the lithium alone, the "U.S. Geological Survey estimates that in 2022, there was
approximately 130,000 tons of lithium mined globally" and that the "quantity of lithium mined
would be able to produce just under 14 million EV batteries," not accounting for "the lithium
used in other products, including laptop batteries, phones, residential power packs, and utility
scale storage."55 But under proposed PEV mandates, the global annual light-duty vehicle sales
of over 66 million and a global fleet of over 1.3 billion vehicle alone illustrate the difficulty with
practically achieving EPA's proposed mandates.56 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 12-13]
55 CEA Study at 9.
56 Id.
The volatile and increasing costs for these materials further threaten a secure and stable
supply chain capable of meeting EPA's proposed demands. Indeed, EPA ignores the fact that
copper demand is expected to increase by 53% while supply is expected to increase by 16%—the
global copper demand will outstrip supply of copper by just 2026.57 Similarly, the price of
lithium has consistently risen in recent years. Between January 2021 and March 2022, the cost of
lithium increased by 738%) and continues to rise today.58 Despite these very public findings,
EPA asserts that these costs are an uncertainty and that EPA plans to "continue updating [its]
estimates of battery cost for current and future years."59 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp.
13-14]
57 Id.
58 See CANADA ENERGY REGULATOR, Market Snapshot: Critical Minerals are Key to the Global
Transition (Jan. 18, 2023), available here.
59 Proposed Rule at 29,301 (recognizing the "global average price for lithium-ion battery packs (volume-
weighted across the passenger, commercial, bus, and stationary markets) climbed by about 7 percent in
2022"). Notably, this is in contrast to EPA's conclusion just a few weeks prior. Proposed Rule at 25,930
("the cost to manufacture lithium-ion batteries (the single most expensive component of a BEV) has
dropped significantly in the past eight years, and that cost is projected to continue to fall during this decade,
all while the performance of the batteries (in terms of energy density) improves.").
Instead of comprehensively analyzing these supply chain concerns, though, EPA relies
heavily on federal funding and tax incentives—such as those under the BIL and IRA—to merely
conclude a domestic supply chain is forthcoming.60 This incomplete analysis fatal to the
Proposed Rule. Regardless of these funding sources, domestic manufacturing alone is unable to
meet the production goals EPA is requiring right now and this threatens domestic energy
security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 13-14]
60 See, e.g., DRIA at 2-86-87; Proposed Rule at 29,328.
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Finally, although EPA has acknowledged that a "transition period must take place in which a
robust supply chain develops to support production of [critical minerals]," the limited time
afforded under the Proposed Rule is simply insufficient to build this supply chain.61
61 Proposed Rule at 29,313.
Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI)
HMG also has supply chain concerns, as major parts suppliers related to ICEs are also
accelerating their conversion to ZEVs and likewise may not be able to meet the sudden increased
demand required to comply with the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 2]
The NPRM Does Not Fully Capture True Costs of the Proposed Alternative.
The Proposed Alternative's stated cost assumptions exclude important considerations.
Currently, the NPRM estimates the average upfront per-vehicle cost to the automaker to be
$1200 in MY 2032. The NPRM also estimates that by MY 2032, consumers who purchase a
BEV instead of an ICE vehicle will save between $400 and $4,000 at the time of purchase.23
This is predicated on significant assumed reductions in battery pack pricing, which is far from
guaranteed given uncertainties in mineral availability, ability to meet IRA mineral sourcing
requirements, manufacturing and supply chain limitations, and required improvements in battery
energy density. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, pp. 6-7]
23 EPA NPRM, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis, "Table 4-8: Estimated average savings over the first 8
years of vehicle life when MY 2032 BEV purchased instead of ICE (2020 dollars)"
Organization: Illinois Corn Growers Association
Enormous advances have been made in electric vehicle technology in the last two decades and
there is strong auto industry commitment to eventually replace internal combustion engine
powered vehicles with electric ones. There are, however, still technological and economic
challenges in creating products that meet consumer expectations. In addition, there are many
things that must happen to support electric vehicles, many of which are outside the control of
automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
These include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
[...]
-Securing enough raw materials to build the large batery packs needed to give electric
vehicles the range consumers demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
-Upgrading the nation's roads, bridges and parking structures to ensure they can absorb the
extra weight of inherently heavier electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
Thus, even if in the next eight years automakers, suppliers and retailers can retool their
businesses to supply an estimated 7.5 million new vehicles in 2032 and beyond, it is far from
assured that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
[...]
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-The mines can extract enough raw materials to build the bateries necessary to build these
vehicles, especially since it is expected that electric utilities will be buying huge bateries made of
the same materials to deal with the intermit nature of wind and solar energy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
Organization: Illinois Farm Bureau (IFB)
-"If thought through, individuals would realize that EVs are not environmentally efficient nor
cost-effective. The mining of resources for batteries is not environmentally friendly." [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0532, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law
D. EPA Provides Rigorous Analysis of Mineral and Energy Security and Could Provide
Further Support and Analysis
In the context of the Proposed Rule, mineral security refers to the uninterrupted availability at
affordable prices of minerals needed to produce vehicles. Relatedly, energy security refers to the
uninterrupted availability at affordable prices of gas and electricity needed to drive vehicles. 100
While EPA conducts an extensive analysis of both mineral security and energy security,
additional analysis would further support its findings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 16-
17]
100 In the RIA, EPA sometimes uses the term "electricity security" when referencing electricity
specifically.
On mineral security, EPA concludes that increased penetration of electric vehicles resulting
from the Proposed Rule will "not lead to a critical long-term dependence on foreign imports of
minerals or components, nor that increased demand for these products will become a
vulnerability to national security." 101 This is mainly attributable to two basic reasons. First,
EPA explains that there is already substantial domestic capacity to produce critical minerals,
which is likely to increase in the future due to recent policies. 102 Second, EPA explains that
because vehicles are durable goods that can last many years, supply disruptions of critical
minerals have limited impacts because consumers can normally delay vehicle purchases. 103
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 16-17]
101 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,313.
102 Id. at 29,313-23; RIA at 3-19 to 3-29.
103 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,323;
EPA can provide additional context for the first point. Specifically, EPA should highlight that
ICE vehicles may be susceptible to similar risks as BEVs from supply shocks due to our reliance
on foreign vehicles and vehicle parts. From 2017 to 2021, just 69% of U.S. consumer passenger
vehicles and 84% of commercial vehicles were produced domestically. 104 Moreover, an
estimated one-fourth of the 15,000 to 30,000 parts making up an ICE vehicle are sourced
globally as of 2011.105 In fact, ICE vehicles have far more parts and moving parts than electric
vehicles. 106 Thus, shortages of key inputs can cause production delays and shortages, with
supply-chain shortages resulting from the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami 107 and the
COVID-19 pandemic. 108 Moreover, like the rare earth metals in BEV batteries, there are also
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supply-chain risks for metal inputs into ICE vehicles. 109 These various risks put EPA's analysis
of mineral security into context, highlighting the mineral and supply security risks of continuing
to rely on ICE vehicles under the No Action scenario. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 16-
17]
104 See Annual U.S. Motor Vehicle Production and Domestic Sales, U.S. Dep't of Transp.,
https://www.bts.gov/content/annual-us-motor-vehicle-production-and-factory-wholesale-sales-thousands-
units.
105 See CONG. RSCH. SERV., MOTOR VEHICLE SUPPLY CHAIN: EFFECTS OF THE JAPANESE
EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI 4 (2011).
106 Idaho Nat'l Laboratory, How Do Gasoline & Electric Vehicles Compare?,
https://avt.inl.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/fsev/compare.pdf.
107 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 105, at 1.
108 Neal E. Boudette, Supply Problems Hurt Auto Sales in 2022. Now Demand Is Weakening, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 4, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/04/business/new-car-sales-2022.html.
109 Dengye Xun et al., Comparing Supply Chains of Platinum Group Metal Catalysts in Internal
Combustion Engine and Fuel Cell Vehicles: A supply Risk Perspective, 4 CLEANER LOGISTICS AND
SUPPLY CHAIN 100043 (2022).
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
Battery mineral resources and production capacity are sufficient to meet the standards. There
are enough mineral resources available to support a global transition to EVs and there are
substantial ongoing investments in new projects along the mineral supply chain in the U.S. and
in friendly countries. Significant and growing battery recycling capacity, along with battery
technology diversification and improving EV efficiency, will reduce pressure on EV mineral
demand. Domestic battery production capacity is quickly ramping up, already increasing by
more than one-third since the IRA was passed. With major announced public, private, and utility
investment in chargers, the infrastructure is also being built to meet the BEV expansion projected
by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 3]
There is evidence that it should be possible to quickly scale up investments into mining and
battery production with careful planning and investment. EPA's proposal lays out the much
needed roadmap for the mineral mining, refining, and battery production supply chain to plan
and invest around. There are more than enough minerals available for a global transition to EVs,
and the amount of raw material reserves domestically and in friendly countries greatly exceeds
what is needed to meet EPA's proposal.21 With the IRA's Advanced Manufacturing Production
Tax Credit and the domestic content provisions in the Clean Vehicle Tax Credit, the U.S. directly
incentivizes mining, recycling, and battery production on U.S. soil, and further supports
establishing resilient material supply chains from friendly countries. The manufacturing subsidy
of $45/kWh cuts about one third of total battery costs (global average of $151 in 2022), making
battery production in the U.S. even cheaper than in China.22 This support showed an immediate
effect. In response to the IRA, we saw a significant uptick by more than one-third in announced
plans for battery production facilities, catching up with Europe.23 Longer-term forecasts now
indicate U.S. battery production capacity at 1 TWh by 2030, approaching forecasted battery
demand of 1.2 TWh taking the proposed EPA standards into account.24 A mapping compilation
of U.S. EV supply chain investment from December 2022 shows that there are several dozen
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investments in minerals, battery production, recycling, and other electric vehicle facilities across
the country.25 A separate study by the U.S. Department of Energy compiled U.S. battery supply
chain announcements and found over $100 billion announced as of May 2023 with over 160 new
or expanded minerals, materials processing, and manufacturing facilities, and over 70,000 new
jobs.26 Specific recent examples from June 2023 include a $9.2 billion federal loan to Ford to
greatly expand U.S. electric vehicle and battery production, and Hyundai's announcement to
increase its EV investments to $28 billion while reducing China operations.27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0569, pp.9-10]
21 Slowik, P., Lutsey, N., and Hsu, C-W. (2020). How technology, recycling, and policy can mitigate
supply risks to the long-term transition to zero-emission vehicles. International Council on Clean
Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/how-technology-recycling-and-policy-can-mitigate-supply-
risks-to-the-long-term- transition-to-zero-emission-vehicles/ and Oge, M. (2023, May 16). History shows
EPA's proposed vehicle emissions rule can be done - it's worth trillions! Forbes.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/margooge/2023/05/16/history-shows-epas-proposed-vehicle-emissions-rule-
can-be- done—its-worth-trillions/?sh=ea3150cc6275
22 Bloomberg New Energy Finance. (2022, December 6). Lithium-ion battery pack prices rise for the first
time to an average of $151/kWh. https://about.bnef.com/blog/lithium-ion-battery-pack-prices-rise-for-first-
time-to-an-average- of-151 -kwh/
23 Benchmark Minerals. (2022, November 23). IRA lifts US battery pipeline growth in second half of the
year, outpacing Europe, https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/ira-lifts-us-battery-pipeline-growth-
in-second-half- of-the-year-outpacing-europe
24 Benchmark Minerals. (2023, April 14). US EPA emissions rules ratchet up pressure on the battery
supply chain, https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/us-epa-emissions-rules-ratchet-up-pressure-on-
the-battery-supply- chain
25 EV supply chain and investment map. (2022, December 21). Zero Emission Transportation Association.
https://www.zeta2030.org/education-fund/investments
26 U.S. Department of Energy. (2023, May 23). Investments in American-Made Energy: Battery supply
chain investments, https://www.energy.gov/investments-american-made-energy
27 Rathi, A., Natter, A., and Naughton, K. (2023, June 22). Ford gets $9.2 billion to help US catch up with
China's EV dominance. Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2023-ford-ev-battery-plant-
funding-biden-green- technology/ and Yim, H., and Yang, H. (2023, June 20). Hyundai raises EV
investment to $28 billion, to reduce China operations. Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-
transportation/hyundai-motor-invest-8541 - billion-by-2032-accelerate-ev-plans-2023 -06-20/
Organization: International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW)
B. Uncertain EV Job Quality
Federal policy must ensure EV jobs are as good as or better than ICE jobs. Compliance with
GHG emissions standards can never justify the offshoring of jobs, the slashing of wages, or the
busting of unions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 6]
Unless and until we build a comprehensive domestic EV supply chain, the transition to EVs
will risk trading dependency on fossil fuels for dependency on imported EVs, batteries, fuel
cells, and materials, all while hollowing out quality union jobs in the process. Uncertainty around
the build-out of the domestic EV supply chain is not recognized by the EPA and therefore does
not play a significant role in altering the proposed standards' increased adoption of ZEVs.12 The
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EPA must craft its standards to hold manufacturers accountable to both environmental and labor
concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 6]
12 For example, the EPA cites to 13 announced domestic battery plants, but does not indicate how many
are operational or ready to help achieve compliance with the standards. See supra note 29317.
Organization: Jeremy Michalek et al.
Global commodity supply disruptions raise prices but don't necessarily make materials
impossible to acquire. Global commodity supply disruptions of either oil or critical battery
materials may raise prices on the world market, but are unlikely to cut off the supply entirely.
We find that a large portion of lithium, cobalt, nickel and manganese is used in products other
than electric vehicle battery cathodes (Figures 2 and 3). In the event of a supply disruption,
higher prices would be expected to shift demand for these materials among product applications
in the short- run to medium-run. Over the long-term, the price jump will affect the U.S. economy
regardless of how much supply of critical materials originates from the U.S. or its allies.
However, price increases will induce product innovation and redesign, such as shifts in electric
vehicle battery chemistry, which will counteract the price increases. And, applications with
sufficient willingness to pay for higher price materials and products may continue to have access
to materials. How particular material supply disruptions may affect individual automakers and
whether they experience shortages in the short- run depends on a number of factors, including
the specifics of contracts in their supply chains. However, because material markets, battery
manufacturers, and automakers tend to respond to disruptions, and the proposed policy includes
a number of flexibil- ities such as credit borrowing, supply disruptions may result in increased
production costs but not necessarily an inability to produce EVs as a compliance pathway for the
proposed GHG regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0706, p. 2]
Recommendation: EPA could consider using a sensitivity analysis with higher ma- terial
prices as an alternative to using a GWh constraint to represent the effect of potential critical
material supply disruptions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0706, p. 2]
The supply vulnerability for battery materials is fundamentally different from supply
vulnerability for fuels. As discussed in the proposed rule, sensitivity of the U.S. economy to a
supply disruption of critical battery materials is fundamen- tally different from sensitivity of the
U.S. economy to a supply disruption of oil. When oil supply is disrupted, such as in the 1970s
OPEC embargo that triggered the origi- nal CAFE standards, everyone in the economy is
immediately affected as travel costs increase and fuel shortages reduce availability. In contrast,
when critical battery mate- rials are disrupted, economic sectors that produce batteries and
vehicles may be quickly disrupted, but ordinary consumers and businesses can continue
operations with existing vehicles, delay purchase of new vehicles, and delay scrappage of used
vehicles, buying time for responses to disruptions to come online (such as new geopolitical
agreements, shifts in the mix of EVs that have battery chemistries with lower use of the critical
material affected, shifts in supply paths currently used for other products, new mines, refining
facilities, cathode production operations, and increased production from exist- ing facilities).
Thus, while supply disruption vulnerabilities for EVs remain critically important, their impact
may be far more limited than that of oil (though potentially with important second order
effects). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0706, pp. 2-3]
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Current battery material supply chains are dependent upon locations in China in processing
and refining, but these supply chain stages are movable. The proposed rule finds that
"widespread automotive electrification in the U.S. will not lead to a critical long-term
dependence on foreign imports of minerals or components, nor that increased demand for these
products will become a vulnerability to national security," in part because the Inflation
Reduction Act (IRA) incentivizes battery supply chains to shift toward the United States. We
analyzed battery material supply chains based on the most recent production and trade data
available and found that current supply chains are dependent on locations in China, primarily in
the materials refining and battery production phases, rather than in mining (Figure 1). However,
unlike raw material deposits, materials refining and battery production operations can potentially
be shifted to other countries over the period of transition to electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0706, p.3]
Material supply vulnerabilities depend on battery chemistry. Key lithium- ion battery
chemistries used in electric vehicles include (1) nickel manganese cobalt (NMC) and (2) lithium
iron phosphate (LFP). Of these, NMC has more potential dis- ruption pathways because it
requires Li, Ni, Co and Mn, whereas LFP requires only Li (Figures 2 and 3). Today, a larger
percentage of LFP cathodes than NMC cathods pass through China, largely because of its
dominance in LFP cathode production (Fig- ure 2). However, the patents associated with LFP
cathode production expired in 2022, opening up opportunities to open new LFP cathode
production facilities worldwide (Alamalhodaei, 2021). With either chemistry, reducing
disruption vulnerabilities re- quires a whole-supply-chain approach that considers how multiple
stages of the supply chain interact. In the event of extended supply disruptions of Ni, Co or Mn,
a shift of battery chemistry toward LFP could be one pathway to responding to a disruption.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0706, p. 3]
Overall, the U.S. economy's vulnerability to supply disruption could potentially be much
lower for electric vehicle batteries than for oil, given (1) the more limited number of economic
sectors directly impacted, (2) longer time periods for the economy to respond to disruptions, (3)
potential for circular economy strageties, such as recycling and material extraction from waste
streams, and (4) a shift in supply chain diversification encouraged by policies like the IRA. We
recommend that supply chain vulnerability is not a reason to avoid transitioning to electric
vehicles, but it is important that the U.S. simultaneously pursue strategies to reduce supply chain
vulnerabilities as the transition to electric vehicles occurs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0706, p.
3]
Organization: Job Creators Network Foundation (JCNF)
EPA's Proposed Rule Is Not Feasible [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0709, pp. 2-3]
In addition to being illegal, the proposal is not technically feasible. Daniel Yergin, one of the
world's leading energy experts, highlights how electric cars have 2.5 times more copper in them
than regular vehicles.6 He cites the International Monetary Fund's warning that such
environmental policies will "spur unprecedented demand for some of the most crucial metals,"
with price increases that "could derail or delay the energy transition itself "7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0709, pp.2-3]
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6 Daniel Yergin, "'Net Zero' Will Mean a Mining Boom," (Link: https://www.wsj.com/articles/net-zero-
will-mean-a-mining-boom-electric-cars-minerals-oil-fossil-fuels-climate-change-policy-cb8d5137) Wall
Street Journal (April 12, 2023).
7 Lukas Boer, Andrea Pescatori, Martin Stuermer, Nico Valckx, "Soaring Metal Prices May Delay Energy
Transition," (Link: https://www.imf.Org/en/Blogs/Articles/2021/l 1/10/soaring-metal-prices-may-delay-
energy-transition) IMF Blog (Nov. 10,2021).
EPA's Proposed Rule Would Weaken America's Energy Security and Harm the Environment
Nearly half of the world's copper and 60% of lithium needed for electric cars' lithium-ion
batteries are processed in China. 8 Instead of using our rich oil and natural gas resources, this
proposed rule would mean that America would now rely on China for its energy needs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0709, p. 3]
8 lea, "Clean energy supply chains vulnerabilities," (Link: https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-
perspectives-2023/clean-energy-supply-chains-vulnerabilities) Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 (Jan.
2023).
Moreover, EPA's proposed emissions regulations would hurt the environment, since mining
the lithium and cobalt used in batteries is energy intensive. And what will be done with these car
batteries after they have been used? Will they make up the landfills of tomorrow? [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0709, p. 3]
Finally, there are significant concerns regarding the use of child labor to cultivate these
needed minerals. Seventy percent of cobalt needed for lithium-ion batteries comes from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,9 where children hand dig in crowded, primitive mines to try
to service the West's insatiable demand. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0709, p. 3]
9 Id.
10 Terry Gross, "How 'modern-day slavery' in the Congo powers the rechargeable battery economy,"
(Link: https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2023/02/01/1152893248/red-cobalt-congo-drc-mining-
siddharth-kara) npr (Feb. 1, 2023)
Organization: John Graham
The most potent barriers are not physical, geological, technical, or financial; they are
environmental, political, and sociological, as most communities in the world have no interest in
serving as hosts to large mining operations and processing plants with large waste streams. In the
last several years alone, promising proposals for large new lithium mines have been cancelled or
delayed indefinitely in Serbia, Portugal, Oregon, North Carolina, Mexico, and Chile (see below
for details). Since it takes 7 to 15 years to launch large new lithium mines, hybrids will be
needed for the transitionary period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 9-10]
The major reason to expect shortages of raw materials in the 2029-2035 period is that miners
and processers require a "social license" to operate. Owners of mines and processing facilities
require permits to operate because such operations are ecologically disruptive (at least
temporarily), controversial to nearby residents, farmers, ranchers, businesses, schools, and
tourists, and heavily regulated (e.g., due to their waste streams and threats to water and air
quality). Local public opposition to new mines and processing facilities is often substantial,
which explains why many geologically promising proposed projects never come to fruition.33
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 22]
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33 John D. Graham, John A Rupp, Eva Brungard. Lithium in the Green Energy Transition: The Quest for
both Sustainability and Security. Sustainability. 13(20). 2021. 0.3390/sul32011274.
A different problem for mining companies is that many geologically promising sites are in
countries with unstable regimes or stable leftist regimes that want commercial control in the
hands of state-owned enterprises and pro-government royalty policies. The state-owned approach
to mining has failed for many years in Bolivia, yet Chile and Mexico are now moving in that
direction. Leftist governance approaches discourage foreign investors from allocating start-up
capital for mining projects, and miners are often unable to muster the necessary capital from
sources inside the host country. Thus, one cannot imagine a global industry that departs more
sharply from a free-market situation than the global materials sector supporting BEVs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 22-23]
While the challenge of obtaining capital is less severe than the challenge of obtaining the
social license to operate, the capital challenge for miners is not trivial; indeed, it is much more
difficult than the challenge of obtaining capital for plants that make lithium ion batteries or
assemble electric vehicles. A recent survey of capital announcements through 2022 found that
$105.0 billion was allocated for electric vehicle assembly operations, $45.3 billion for battery
manufacturing, yet only $15.7 billion was allocated for the battery materials sector. To meet the
six-fold growth in global demand for battery materials, the capital in the mining sector needs to
be roughly equal to the allocations provided to the battery sector.34 This is why mining
specialists know that materials shortages are likely in the medium term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0585, pp. 22-23]
34 Matt Fernley. Battery Materials Review: 2022 Yearbook. February 2023, 21.
Recent US Federal Efforts to Promote Mining. The Biden administration has invoked the
Defense Production Act, identified critical minerals, and provided technical guidance to
developers on how to access them in the United States. Congress, in the Inflation Reduction Act
of 2022, also applied a new manufacturing tax credit to mining operations, which will ease
somewhat the capital requirements facing a developer. DOE was also awarded roughly $7 billion
in grant authority to stimulate the U.S. supply chain for electric vehicles. However, virtually
none of the DOE grants have been allocated to mining projects; some have supported mine
processing facilities but most of the grants have been awarded to recyclers, component
producers, and battery cell/pack producers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 23]
Explanations for Recent Price Volatility. An understanding of global supply and demand
helps explain why raw material prices for EVs surged in 2021-2022, collapsed in early 2023, and
began to recover in mid-2023.35 Most of the action has been on the demand side because, except
for output from existing mines, the global supply of raw materials does not change rapidly.36
Specifically, the unexpected shortages in raw materials in 2021 - 2022, which led to extreme
price volatility for some materials, were not caused by an unexpected loss of supply. They were
caused by a rapid resurgence in demand for BEVs as China's economy recovered more quickly
from the pandemic than expected.37 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 23]
35 Matt Fernley. Why I Think Lithium Prices Will Bounce. Kitco.com. April 3, 2023.
36 US Geological Service. Mineral Commodity Summaries. 2022, 100 (lithium).
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37 https://internationalbanker.com/brokerage/why-are-lithium-prices-
collapsing/#:~:text=The%20surge%20in%20demand%20for%201ithium%20batteries%20amidst,rally%20o
bserved%20throughout%202021%20and%20much%20of%202022.
The collapse of raw material prices in early 2023 reflected both demand and supply factors:
demand growth for BEVs in China moderated as subsidies for BEVs ended while output from
existing mines in Australia and Chile surged in response to the 2021-2022 price surge. Materials
prices showed signs of recovery in the second quarter of 2023 as BEV demand in China resumed
its strong growth rate.38 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 23]
38 Eric Onstad, Siyi Liu, Mai Nguyen. Lithium Prices Bounce After Big Plunge But Surpluses Loom.
Reuters.com. May 2, 2023.
Flaws in the NPRM Analysis of Materials Shortages. In the NPRM EPA (and some private
forecasters) misanalyze the challenge by treating material shortages as only a near-term problem
(pre-2026) that will disappear as the global supply response occurs.39 The DRIA states (page 2-
50) that battery costs after 2026 "are expected to resume their decline as mineral supply and
demand balance out." EPA explains further: "For the years 2022 through 2025, we suspended
use of the learning factor, to reflect consensus views that elevated mineral prices are likely to
cause battery costs to remain flat for a time." (2-49) Even though EPA finds that battery prices
"are poised to remain somewhat elevated until about 2025 to 2026" and despite forecasting
battery material demand will explode after 2025, somehow EPA finds that battery costs after
2026 "are expected to resume their decline as mineral supply and demand balance out" (2-50).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 23-24]
39 Wood Mackenzie Q3 2022 (Wood Mackenzie 2022) and EDF/ERM (Macintosh, Tolomiczenko and
Van Horn 2022). Reports referenced in DRIA, page 2-50.
The more likely scenario is virtually the opposite of what EPA predicts: adjusted output from
existing mines will address short-term shortages (with less than 1 year of lag) but medium-run
shortages are likely because it is so difficult - and takes so long — to launch new mines. Mining
specialist Matt Fernley explains: "Even in the hard rock (areas), the most commodity-like of all
the lithium products, it's proven exceedingly complex to get new assets into production, and
even to add Brownfield capacity."40 The new mines that start are often delayed many years
compared to plan, and/or confront challenges in continuing to operate or expand due to local
concerns.41 Moreover, some new mines - despite their promise - cannot produce the battery-
grade material that is required for BEVs.42 The real mineral-shortages challenge is the medium
run (2029-2035), after output from existing mines is exhausted but before numerous new mines
are launched and before the impact of a new recycling industry kicks in.43,44 In the long run
(post-2035), there is no reason to expect chronic materials shortages unless miners simply cannot
obtain permits to operate - a distinct possibility given the extensive environmental harm of many
mining operations - and/or the recycling industry confronts insurmountable challenges or
doesn't yet have enough scrapped BEVs to provide large amounts of materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0585, pp. 23-24]
40 Matt Fernley. Battery Materials Review: 2022 Yearbook. February 2023, 3.
41 John Dizard. Absurd Surge in Lithium Prices Poses Problems for the Energy Transition. Financial
Times. February 5-6, 2022, 14.
42 Ibid. 3 (especially the new mines in China and Latin America).
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43 Eric Onstad, Siyi Liu, Mai Nguyen. Lithium Prices Bounce After Big Plunge But Surpluses Loom.
Reuters.com. May 2, 2023.
44 Joe Miller, Peter Campbell, Patrick McGee. Musk Joins Rivals in Warning of Supply Disruption Threat
to EV Rollout. Financial Times. May 14-15, 2022, 8.
Where will materials prices settle in the long run? No one knows for sure, but a good guess is
at the marginal cost of global production. The new mines that are added typically have much
higher costs of production than the existing mines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 24]
However, it is possible that new modes of production (e.g., direct lithium extraction from
brines) will shift the cost curve downward. On the other hand, the increasing demands for
environmental, social, and governance improvements at new mines will only increase marginal
costs of operation (as certain mines and suppliers are judged unacceptable). From the standpoint
of long-run marginal costs, there is no valid reason to expect the steady decline in materials costs
that EPA is projecting from 2026 to 2035.45 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 24]
45 Matt Fernley. Battery Materials Review: 2022 Yearbook. February 2023, 7-9.
The previous section described the global markets for EV materials generally, often using
lithium as the prototypical example. EPA studied only lithium, but here we review the distinctive
challenges with cobalt, nickel, and neodymium as well as lithium. We urge EPA to go beyond
lithium and create global supply-demand analyses for each important material. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0585, pp. 24-25]
Cobalt
The cathode in the lithium-ion battery requires a transition metal as a stabilizer for the
chemical structure. Cobalt, though it is relatively expensive, has ideal properties: thermal
stability, which reduces safety risks, and high energy density, which facilitates long driving
range. The International Energy Agency estimates that 17 new cobalt mines will be needed by
2030 to meet global demand for cobalt induced by the global electric vehicle industry. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 24-25]
Most global reserves and current cobalt production are in a single country: the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC). Labor is so cheap in DRC that it is difficult for new mines around the
world to compete with cobalt from the DRC. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 24-25]
Since 97% of the mined cobalt comes as a byproduct of mined copper or nickel, the global
supplies of cobalt are highly inelastic with respect to the price of cobalt. Even if cobalt prices rise
substantially between now and 2030, the supplies of cobalt will not respond proportionately
unless copper and nickel prices happen to rise at the same time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0585, pp. 24-25]
There are three other complications with the global cobalt market that are causing global
automakers to look for alternatives to cobalt. Chinese corporations have bought up a substantial
share of the low-cost cobalt mines in DRC and the central government of China has fostered a
working relationship with the DRC leadership. From a western perspective, the government of
DRC seems unstable and unreliable, and there is a history of corruption in the DRC's mining
sector. Finally, international rights groups have exposed human-rights abuses in the DRC mines,
including use of child labor and both worker and community exposures to hazardous materials. It
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is these human-rights problems in DRC that motivated the OECD to develop responsible-
sourcing guidelines. At a minimum, those guidelines expect automakers and their suppliers to
know where their cobalt supplies come from and whether those mines engage in responsible
practices. Several global automakers, including Tesla and GM, have pledged to go cobalt free as
soon as possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 25]
The United States does not have any operational cobalt mines. A sustained effort in Utah,
supported by the US Department of Defense, led to the partial construction of a new cobalt mine.
The developer suspended completion of construction in March 2023 due to inflationary cost
pressures and low cobalt prices. The developer also cited the need for an affordable US cobalt
refiner to assist in the commercial viability of the mine.46 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p.
25]
46 https://www.kitco.eom/news/2023-03-28/Jervois-suspends-final-construction-at-Idaho-Cobalt-
Operations-due-to- low-cobalt-prices-and-inflationary-pressures.html.
The most promising substitute for cobalt is nickel because nickel has high energy density.
However, nickel-rich cathode materials tend to suffer from rapid capacity fade and impedance
rise due to deleterious reactions between the nickel atoms on the surface of the cathode and the
cell's electrolyte. R&D projects found that a blend of nickel, manganese and aluminum can
counteract the negative aspects of nickel-rich cathodes.47 Due to the growing use of nickel in
cathodes, the International Energy Agency estimates that 60 new nickel mines around the world
will be needed by 2030 to meet the demand induced by the electric-vehicle transition. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 25-27]
The global nickel industry is much larger than the cobalt industry, as 65% of the refined
nickel in the world is used in stainless steel production.48 A higher grade of nickel is required
for use in the cathodes of lithium-ion batteries. Even with rapid growth of nickel use for electric
vehicles, batteries will account for a minority of refined nickel consumption, but cathode makers
need access to refiners that can deliver the high-grade (Class I) nickel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0585, pp.25-27]
47 https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/reducing-reliance-cobalt-lithium-ion-batteries.
48 https://www.usgs.gov/centers/national-minerals-information-center/nickel-statistics-and-information.
Global reserves of nickel are plentiful and accessible. The mining and processing of nickel,
however, presents their own challenges. Four countries (Indonesia, Philippines, Russia, and New
Caledonia) account for about 67% of refined nickel production.49 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0585, pp. 25-27]
49 https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2022/mcs2022-nickel.pdf.
Indonesia is by far the largest nickel producer, and it has the largest amount of global
reserves, but it has export quotas on unprocessed nickel to boost the commercial fortunes of its
own nickel processing industry. Europe won a World Trade Organization ruling against
Indonesia's export quotas, but the government of Indonesia is not likely to repeal them.50
Indonesia also uses export quotas to attract foreign investment in cathode plants, battery plants,
and electric-vehicle assembly plants. China has already responded with $30 billion for
Indonesia's refining capabilities, but it remains to be seen whether Indonesia can build out the
entire supply chain for electric vehicles.51 Historically, the government of Indonesia has been
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suspicious of multi- national corporations based in the West, so it may not be the best place for
Western companies to place their bets. Ford Motor Company decided otherwise, and recently
signed a $4.5 billion nickel deal with Indonesian officials.52 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585,
pp. 25-27]
50 https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/indonesia-to-appeal-wto-ruling-on-nickel-export-ban/.
51 https://www.csis.org/analysis/indonesias-nickel-industrial-strategy.
52 https://www.verdict.co.uk/ford-signs-4-5bn-deal-for-new-nickel-plant-in-
indonesia/:~:text=US%20motor%20company,%20Ford,%20has%20signed%20a%20$4.5bn,to%20build%
20a%20ni ckel%20processing%20plant%20in%20Indonesia.
China has turned to the Philippines as an alternative supplier of nickel, but environmental
concerns have restrained the country's growth of nickel production. The government of the
Philippines ordered a shutdown of half of the country's nickel mines because they were
contributing to water pollution and other environment damages.53 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0585, pp. 25-27]
53 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/world/asia/philippines-mining-
environment.html#:~:text=In%20February%2C%20Gina%20Lopez%2C%20the%20acting%20secretary%
20of,field s%20and%20watersheds%20stained%20red%20with%20nickel%201aterite.
Russia's invasion of the Ukraine has only underscored the liabilities of depending on Russia
for nickel. Nonetheless, Russia remains a significant nickel supplier of the US and Europe.54
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 25-27]
54 https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/exclusive-eu-us-step-up-russian-aluminium-nickel-imports-
since- ukraine-war-2022-09-06/.
Tesla is trying to develop New Caledonia as a regular supplier of nickel, but mining on the
island has a controversial history. There has been exploitation of indigenous people and
unmanaged ecological destruction.55 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 25-27]
55 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/30/world/asia/tesla-batteries-nickel-new-caledonia.html.
The United States has only one active nickel mine, the Eagle Point mine in Michigan. It is
nearing the end of its useful life, but there was once hope that two new nickel mines in
Minnesota would take its place. However, both of those mining projects are tied up in regulatory
and judicial hurdles, which means they will not be producing nickel anytime soon.
The most promising paths for the United States might be new mines in Canada, Norway, and
Australia. However, other countries, including China, are also talking to miners in those
countries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 25-27]
Global demand for neodymium, one of the rare earths, is projected to grow five-fold by 2030,
as it is crucial for two aspects of the clean-energy transition: electric motors and wind turbines.
Finding reliable suppliers of neodymium is a major challenge for automakers and their suppliers.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 27-28]
In the 1980s, low-cost mines in China caused other rare-earth mines to close, including the
Mountain Pass mine in California near the Mojave Desert on the Nevada line. In less than a
decade, China captured 95% of global rare-earth production. China's competitive advantages are
low-cost labor in Inner Mongolia, lack of strict environmental controls, and state support of rare-
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earth producers. China's largest mine produces rare earths as a byproduct of iron ore mining.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 27-28]
Due to a fishing dispute with Japan in the South China Sea, China in 2011 instituted export
quotas on rare earths, leading to a temporary surge in neodymium prices from $19 per kilogram
to $500 per kilogram. Japan, Europe, and the US won a WTO lawsuit against China, which
claimed, without success, that its export controls were designed only to promote sustainable
development and reduce the environmental damages of mining. By the time the case worked its
way through the WTO appeals process, China had removed its export controls and the prices of
neodymium tapered. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 27-28]
Despite this hard evidence that China is willing to use rare-earths dominance as a geopolitical
weapon, Japan, Europe, and the United States have not come close to self-sufficiency in the
mining and processing of neodymium. The most recent data show China responsible for 69% of
rare-earth mining, 85% of rare-earth processing and 92% of rare-earth magnet production. 56
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 27-28]
56 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/14/rare-earth-mines-00071102.
The United States, with Department of Defense subsidies, has stimulated a restart of the
Mountain Pass mine, giving priority to neodymium and other rear earths needed for military
applications. A new processing and separation plant is also under construction in Fort Worth,
Texas. Production of rare earth magnets is scheduled to begin in 2025. But, even if all goes as
planned, the United States will account for a small share of neodymium mining and processing in
2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 27-28]
If automakers and their suppliers do not want to be dependent on China and cannot access
enough supply from Mountain Pass, where should they go? The reserves data suggest that the
next most promising countries are Vietnam (with half the reserves that China has), Brazil, India,
Australia, and Greenland. 57 Some of those countries would likely require foreign investment to
launch new mines and processing facilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 27-28]
57 https://investingnews.com/daily/resource-investing/critical-metals-investing/rare-earth-investing/rare-
earth- reserves-country/.
In 2021, global lithium production exceeded 100,000 tons of lithium-carbonate-equivalent
(LCE) for the first time in history. To satisfy the global demand forecasts for electric vehicles
(which are dominated by China, Europe, and North America), lithium production will need to
grow three-fold by 2025 and six-fold by 2030.58 If lithium is also required for grid-scale energy
storage of electricity from wind and solar, the global demand for lithium could increase 20-fold
by 2030.59 While existing mines are expected to double their production in the next few years,
most of the growth in production must come from new mines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585,
p. 28]
58 Govind Bhutada. This Chart Shows Which Countries Produce the Most Lithium. Wef.com. January 5,
2023.
59 Stephen Wilmot. Battery Metals Rush is Just Starting. December 3, 2021, B12.
There are vast quantities of lithium around the world and on the ocean floor, but several mines
in four countries (Australia, Chile, Argentina, and China) accounted for almost 98% of global
production in 2020-2021.60 Australia has had the most success expanding production at hard-
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rock mines, largely for export to China, as Chinese companies possess ownership stakes in large
Australian mines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 28-30]
60 USGS. Mineral Commodities Summaries. 2022, 100 (lithium).
Chile was once (2014) the #1 lithium global producer, based on brine operations in the
Atacama desert. To years of royalty increases (2017-2019) hurt Chile's competitiveness. Chile's
brine operations also become controversial in Chile due to ecosystem disruption in desert areas,
overdraws of brine by developers, and protests from indigenous populations.61 The new leftist
government in Chile started by cancelling contracts for some new mines in the Atacama desert.
A Chilean appeals court also suspended a new mining contract following objections from the
local Chilean governor.62 The Chilean government later proposed a new governance
arrangement where all lithium mining will be supervised by a state-owned enterprise. Investors
in Chile's mining operations were appalled to learn of this new governance arrangement. 62
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 28-30]
61 Patricia I. Vasquez (ed). Latin America's Lithium: Perspectives on Critical Minerals and the Global
Energy Transition. The Wilson Center. Washington, DC. April 2023.
62 Harry Dempsey, Edward White. Chile's Move to Control Lithium Alarms Industry. Financial Times.
May 2, 2023.
63 Alexander Villegas, Ernest Scheyder. Chile Bid to Boost State Control Over Lithium Spooks Investors.
Reuters.com. April 21, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/sqm-albemarle-shares-slide-
chile- lithium-nationalization-plan-2023 -04-
2 l/#:~:text=SANTIAGO%2C%20April%202 l%20%28Reuters%29%20-
%20Chile%20has%20moved,white%20metal%2C%20SQM%20%28SQMA.SN%29%20and%20Albemarl
e%20Co rp%20%28ALB.N%29.
Argentina has a promising lithium sector governed primarily by mining-friendly provincial
leaders that have kept royalty rates relatively low.64 But, the industry starts from a small base.
As it grows, it will likely confront opposition from indigenous groups and environmentalists like
Chile has experienced.65,66 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 28-30]
64 Harry Dempsey, Edward White. Chile's Move to Control Lithium Alarms Industry. Financial Times.
May 2, 2023.
65 Daniel Gutman. Lithium and Clean Energy in Argentina. Development or Mirage? Ipsnews.net.
December 2019.
66 Natalie Alcobo. A Race for Lithium is Sparking Fears of Water Shortages in Northern Argentina.
Climatechangenews.com. October 26, 2022.
The efforts of other countries to launch lithium mining and processing have encountered
numerous obstacles. Here is a summary of reasons why other countries have not been highly
successful to date. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 28-30]
1. Bolivia. Although Bolivia has enormous lithium reserves and has been striving to launch
lithium mines for more than a decade, no mining has yet occurred. Bolivia's state-owned
corporation controls lithium mining and has had difficulty attracting foreign capital and
expertise.67 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 28-30]
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2. Mexico. The leftist government upset almost a decade of work at a potential large mining
site when it proposed to nationalize energy assets such as lithium.68 The prospects of foreign
investment are now uncertain.69 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 28-30]
3. Brazil. The impoverished Jequitinhonha Valley is home to 85% of Brazil's large lithium
reserves. A large new hard-rock mine is scheduled to begin production in 2024, but nearby
residents are already expressing concerns about noise, dust, and water consumption from early-
stage pilot activities.70 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 28-30]
4. Africa. Several African countries (Namibia, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo) are exploring the promise of lithium development projects with financial assistance from
foreign investors, including Chinese companies. Obstacles to progress include concerns about
corruption, legal battles over ownership of lithium deposits, capricious politics, lack of electric
power to support local processing, and the absence of adequate roads and port infrastructure.71
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 28-30]
5. Canada. Promising new lithium sites in Ontario and Quebec have been slowed due to
difficulties in arranging new processing capabilities for the mined material.72 An old lithium
mine in Ontario, which may be revived, changed owners four times in the last ten years and had
a record of serious spills of waste. Owners twice filed for creditor protection despite $110
million in support from the Province of Ontario.73 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 28-30]
6. Portugal. The national government of Portugal has proposed a massive expansion of the
country's small lithium mining sector, which currently supplies lower-grade product to ceramics
operations. At the local and provincial level, where the hard-rock mines would be developed,
grass-roots and community-level opposition is intense. One proposed mine has already been
abandoned; another is in litigation.74,75 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 28-30]
7. Serbia. The leadership of Serbia announced a deal with a large multinational mining
company to create what might have been the largest hard-rock lithium mine in the world. In the
face of several months of grass-roots protests, including thousands of demonstrators in Belgrade,
the Serbian government reversed course and revoked the company's exploratory licenses. The
objections were primarily on environmental grounds.76 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp.
28-30]
8. International Ocean Seabed Mining. There are vast quantities of accessible critical
minerals, including lithium, resting on the floor of specific regions of the Pacific Ocean (e.g.,
between Mexico and Hawaii). With new technologies, they can be vacuumed from the ocean
floor without the explosions and digging that characterize hard-rock mining on land. However,
countries around the world have not developed an adequate consensus on environmental-
protection standards for seabed mining, which was supposed to have been the function of the
International Seabed Authority in Kingston, Jamaica. Most recently, the United Nations adopted
the High Seas Treaty, which - if ratified by at least 60 countries - is likely to further complicate
the regulatory environment for ocean seabed mining.77 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp.
28-30]
67 Richard Martin. Bolivia Vies to Join Lithium Producers Club After Years of Disappointment.
Spglobal.com. July 11, 2022.
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68 David Luhnow. Santiago Perez. Mexico Takes Aim at Energy Firms. Wall Street Journal. June 6, 2022,
Al, A10.
69 David Agren, Michael Scott. Mexico Nationalises Lithium in Populist President's Push to Extend State
Control. Financial Times. April 20, 2022.
70 Douglas Magno, Louis Genot. Lithium Boom Comes to Brazil's 'Misery Valley'. Techxplore.com. June
15, 2023.
71 Harry Dempsey, Joseph Cotterill. How China is Winning Race for Africa's Lithium. Financial Times.
April 2, 2023.
72 David Kennedy. Mercedes, VW Sign Raw-Material Deal with Canada. Automotive News. August 29,
2022, 28.
73 Kate McKenna. A New Mine Could Position Quebec as a Lithium Leader, But Its Rocky Past Worries
Locals, www.cbc.ca. November 15, 2022.
74 Aitor Hernandez-Morales, Sofia Diago. Portugal to Scrap Lithium Mining Project. Politico.com. April
27, 2021.
75 Catarina Demony. Portuguese Community Files Legal Action Against Lithium. Reuters.com. July 22,
2022.
76 Ivana Sekularac. Serbia Revokes Rio Tinto Lithium Project Licenses Amid Protests. Reuters.com.
January 20, 2022.
77 https://www.forbes.com/sites/katherinehamilton/2023/06/19/un-adopts-first-ever-international-treaty-
protecting- high-seas/?sh=8bfc263 le459.
The US has only one active lithium mine, a small brine operation in Silver Peak, Nevada. The
developer is striving to double production from 5,000 to 10,000 tons LCE by 2025.78 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 30-32]
EPA, based on a memorandum from DOE, claims that 22 promising lithium development
projects are under investigation in the United States. What DOE and EPA did not disclose is that
only one of the projects (Thacker Pass, Nevada) has successfully acquired a permit to operate.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 30-32]
The Thacker Pass project has, however, been delayed due to determined opposition from
indigenous groups, ranchers, and environmentalists.79 A first round of litigation against the
BLM permit decision led to a split decision by a federal judge, weighted in favor of BLM's
permit. More litigation and protests are likely; the extent of local opposition raises questions
about whether the mine will be sustainable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 30-32]
78 Bill Dentzer. Nevada's Next Boom. Las Vegas Review-Journal. Pctober 2, 2021.
79 Ernest Scheyder. Lithium America's Delays Nevada Mine Work After Environmentalist Lawsuit.
Reuters.com. June 11, 2021.
Here are several lithium project locations in the US that have encountered serious obstacles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 30-32]
1. Borox Lake, Alvard Playa, and Whitehorse Ranch, eastern Oregon. The BLM informed the
developers that lithium mining is not permitted in these areas due to a year 2,000 forest-
conservation law. 80 Another developer continues to explore on the border of Oregon and
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Nevada, but it is one of the best remaining habitats for the sage grouse. 81 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0585, pp. 30-32]
2. Cherryville, Gaston County, North Carolina. In September 2020 a developer announced a
deal with Tesla to supply up to 30,000 tons/year LCE from a new hard-rock mine on private land
outside Cherryville, Gaston County, North Carolina (near Charlotte). Initial deliveries of material
to Tesla were scheduled for July 2022.82 Although the developer spent $58 million and several
years on the project, the Gaston County Board of Commissioners objected to a lack of
consultation outreach from the developer and expressed serious environmental concerns about
the project.83 The County placed a moratorium on mining activities until local zoning
regulations could be revised. Faced with determined local opposition, the developer gave up on
obtaining a state permit and County approval; the project was delayed indefinitely.84 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 30-32]
3. Rhylolite Ridge, Nevada. A developer, which has already spent more than $100 million in
assessment and exploration, is in the BLM environmental impact assessment phase of a new
lithium mine in Nevada that could produce 24,000 tons LCE per year starting 2025-2026. The
project has substantial private-sector backing and a conditional $700 millon DOE loan for a
nearby processing facility. A complication occurred when the US Fish and Wildlife Service,
which is part of the Department of Agriculture, determined that a desert flower, Tiehm's
buckwheat, is an endangered species. The flower is apparently found only near the mine site, but
the developer maintains that the location of the mine, which has been altered to reduce risk, will
not threaten extinction of the flower. The project has triggered intense opposition from a national
environmental group, the Center for Biological Diversity. Further delays and litigation seem
likely.85 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 30-32]
Salton Sea, California. Several developers plan to use a relatively new technology, direct
lithium extraction (DLE), to access lithium suspended in super-hot brine at the Salton Sea, near
geothermal plants that are already extracting brine for power production.86 The projects have
private sector backing and financial support from the State of California. There is another dozen
or so projects around the world seeking to implement DLE, but there is only one operational
DLE project in the world. It is in Argentina, where the lithium content of brine is unusually high,
but even there the developer makes partial use of conventional evaporation ponds. The developer
has not been able to replicate commercial-scale DLE anywhere else. A recent environmental
review of DLE noted that most performance testing of DLE has not been performed on real
brines. Real testing at substantial scale is necessary to assess requirements for energy, fresh
water, chemicals, and waste management. Real-brine testing should evaluate several
performance indicators simultaneously.87 Views of the commercial feasibility of DLE vary
considerably. One estimate of the direct cost of DLE puts it in the range of $4,000/ton LCE, a bit
higher than the direct costs of conventional methods but not prohibitive.88,89 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0585, pp. 30-32]
80 Bradley W. Parks. Company Scraps Lithium Project in Oregon's Alvors Desert. Opb.org. August 3,
2022.
81 Bradley W. Parks. ANew Oregon Mining Boom Could Be aBustforthe Sage Grouse. May 11, 2022.
82 Aime Williams. The Race to Mine Lithium in America. Financial Times. May 11, 2022, 17.
83 file:///C:/Users/grahamjd/Downloads/sustainability-13-l 1274-v2.pdf.
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84 Ernest Scheyder. Piedmont Lithium Looks Abroad Amid North Carolina Uncertainty. Reuters.com.
November 26, 2022.
85 Scott Sonner. Nevada Lithium Mine Gets Conditional $700 Million Government Loan. Apnews.
January 13, 2023.
86 Laurence Lliff. A Sea Change: Geothermal Deposits at Toxic Lake about to Yield Vast Lithium
Supplies. Automotive News. November 29, 2021, 31.
87 Maria L. Vera, Walter R. Jorres, Claudia I Galli, Alexandra Chagnes, Victoria Flexer. Environmental
Impact of Direct Lithium Extraction from Brines. Nature Reviews Earth and Environment. 4, 2023, 149-
165.
88 Warren, I. Techno-Economic Analysis of Lithium Extraction from Geothermal Brines. National
Renewable Energy Laboratory.
89 Adam Webb. Lithium Sector: Production Costs Outlook. S&P Global Market Intelligence.
Spglobal.com. 2019.
Before the final rule, EPA and DOE should assess each of the 22 lithium projects, including a
realistic, itemized assessment of how likely they are to be in commercial operation by 2027-
2032, given the intensity of local opposition to mining. The International Energy Agency
estimates new mining projects take an average of 16.5 years to move from discovery of the
resource to actual production, assuming the mine starts producing at all. . The time scales in the
United States are at the high end of the range in IEA's analysis, and few projects can overcome
intense public opposition.90 The track record to date in the US suggests that most of the 22
lithium projects will not produce a ton of LCE.91 It should be emphasized that DOE has no
authority or special expertise in the regulatory aspects of permits for new mines; that authority
and expertise is housed in the Bureau of Land Management in the Department of Interior and the
Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 30-32]
90 https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/executive-
summary.
91 John D. Graham, John A Rupp, Eva Brungard. Lithium in the Green Energy Transition: The Quest for
both Sustainability and Security. Sustainability. 13(20). 2021. 0.3390/sul32011274.
Flaws in Standard Market Forecasts of Lithium Supply
Prestigious management-consulting and investment firms often produce consensus reports on
global markets for specific commodities. EPA relies on one such report on lithium, a proprietary
forecast by Wood MacKenzie, to support the proposition that global supplies of lithium will be
adequate to meet global demand in the year 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 32-33]
Mining specialists have dismissed such forecasts because of systematic errors in their
methods. Specifically, they (1) overestimate the ease and pace at which new supplies will be
developed,(2) they overestimate the percentage of new supplies that will be of battery-grade
quality for electric vehicles; (3) they underestimate the amount of material lost due to low yields
in cell manufacturing; (4) they underestimate the impact of pricing of high-cost production
(lepidolite); and (5) they underestimate the impact of the higher costs of capital that miners now
face.92 Given how common it is for new projects to falter due to local public opposition, it is
startling that Wood MacKenzie does not even include public support as a formal variable in its
forecast. Daniel Morgan, a mining specialist at the investment bank Barrenjoey, insists that
Western companies and governments have failed to build an adequate supply chain for lithium:
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"There's a great love of throwing out lofty targets, but where the rubber hits that road, it's not
going to happen."93 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 32-33]
92 Matt Fernley. Battery Materials Review: 2022 Yearbook. February 2023, 9.
93 James Fernyhough. Electric Vehicle Targets "impossible" Without Changes to Lithium Pipeline.
Financial Times. April 13, 2022, 6.
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
C. The Proposed Rule ignores significant hurdles to the industry transformation that the rule
requires.
EPA is pushing forward with this proposal at a breakneck pace and in circumstances ill-
suited to the aggressive industry transformations that the Agency demands. The electrical grids
are neither stable nor safe enough to handle EPA's proposal. The country will be more energy
dependent and less secure because of it. Automakers will be left without the materials they need
to comply. And all the while, consumers—our citizens—will have to deal with empty
government promises about vehicle pricing, utilization, and safety. In short, the Proposed Rule
ignores too many aspects of this too-important issue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 10]
2. The automotive supply chain is not ready for the Proposed Rule.
The Proposed Rule's fast-and-furious approach to electrification will also have devastating
consequences for the automotive supply chain. EPA admits that "[c]urrently, the U.S. is lagging
behind much of the rest of the world in critical mineral production" to so great an extent that "it
is more convenient" to import minerals like nickel that are critical to build the necessary
components of EVs. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,315. But talk of convenience masks the reality that
"[t]oday's battery and minerals supply chains revolve around China"—over "half of lithium,
cobalt and graphite processing and refining capacity" is located there, and "the majority of the
[key mineral] supply chain . . . [is] likely to remain in China through 2030." Global Supply
Chains of EV Batteries, International Energy Agency, https://bit.ly/3MXdM3Y. At best,
finalizing a rule that requires this sort of foreign dependence will deal a significant blow to our
energy independence. See WV Amicus Br. at 6-17 (explaining how "forcing a quick transition to
electric vehicles . . . will make automakers unreasonably dependent on foreign-controlled
supply"). At worst, it will raise real threats to our national security. See Opening Br. for State
Pet'rs., Texas v. EPA, No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2023), ECF 1996773, at 22-24
(discussing the "well-documented history of China using its rare-earth-minerals dominance as a
geopolitical weapon"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 12-13]
What is more, demand for these rare materials will spike outside the automotive context as
quickly as the Proposed Rule will spike it within. EPA recognizes this: It acknowledges that
critical minerals for EV component production "are also experiencing increasing demand across
many other sectors of the global economy ... as the world seeks to reduce carbon emissions." 88
Fed. Reg. at 29,313. The Proposed Rule also concedes that other "uncertain issues" like
"permitting, investor expectations of demand and future prices, and many others" make it
"difficult to predict with precision the rate at which new capacity will be brought online in the
future." Id. Yet the proposed solution is just a short "transition period" so that "a robust supply
chain" can develop for these products, including new material mining and expanded processing
capacity. Id. These obstacles should slow a project with even a conservative timetable; for an
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overhaul as rushed as the Proposed Rule, they are reason to return to the drawing board.
Proceeding without more concrete, realistic projects for expanded supply chains—and more
realistic timetables—is another mark of arbitrary and capricious decision-making. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 13-15]
Other concerns about the minerals' supply and their extraction processes raise still more
hurdles. The Proposed Rule had to recognize that it would take an estimated "five to ten" or
more years "to develop a new [lithium] mine or mineral source"—and that delay is despite "very
high" industry motivation from a "very robust" demand outlook. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,313. Yet
even that estimate is likely far too rosy. Last year, one geometallurgy professor looked at what it
would take to shift away from fossil fuels entirely and to these and other rare materials for a
single generation. Based on 2019 mining production rates, he predicted that the necessary
extraction of "battery metals like lithium, cobalt, and graphite" would take over 9,900 years,
1,700 years, and 3,200 years, respectively. Simon P. Michaux, The quantity of metals required to
manufacture just one generation of renewable technology units to phase out fossil fuels,
YouTube (Aug. 18, 2022), https://bit.ly/42w7Fcx; see also Simon P. Michaeux, Assessment of
the Extra Capacity Required of Alternative Energy Electrical Power Systems to Completely
Replace Fossil Fuels (Aug. 18, 2022), https://bit.ly/3qCUlqU. Indeed, in 2022, the global
reserves of those same three metals amounted to "less than five percent of what we need [for]
one generation." Id. And among those reserves, not every discovery deposit becomes a mine.
Only 1 or 2 for every 1000 does, and it takes between 15 and 20 years for those few mines to
become fully functional. Id. And of those, 20-30% of the mines that get up and running will
eventually "go out of business because of market conditions." Id.; see also The Raw-Materials
Challenge: How The Metals And Mining Sector Will Be At The Core Of Enabling The Energy
Transition, McKinsey & Co. (Jan. 10, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/2ne5jt37. Throw in the fact that
each of these materials has a limited life-cycle after which they must be "decommissioned and
replaced," and it becomes clear that we may well need to "make batteries out of something else."
Michaux, The quantity of metals required to manufacture just one generation of renewable
technology units to phase out fossil fuels, supra. That whole endeavor "is not going to be easy."
Id. Quite right. The Proposed Rule needs to deal with real projections for the real demand it
creates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 13-15]
The view further down the supply chain is no better. The Proposed Rule can say only that
supply capacity is "rapidly forming," not that it exists now or in the near-enough future. 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29,323. EPA recognizes that it is still only "a goal of the U.S. manufacturing industry to
create a robust supply chain for these products." Id. (emphasis added). EPA also says that, "[i]n
general, the structure of the proposed standards allows an incremental phase-in to the MY 2032
level and reflects consideration of the appropriate lead time for manufacturers to take actions
necessary to meet the proposed standards." Id. at 29,239. But there is nothing "incremental"
about an edict for an eight-fold increase in EV sales in eight years. See id. at 29,189, 29,329,
29,346. And there is nothing simple about the amount of time and money needed to get the still-
illusory supply chain running at massive new scale. According to former auto executive-turned-
industry adviser Larry Burns, "[t]he transition automakers are perusing requires building totally
new factories, assembly lines and supply chains, a years-long process." Puko, supra. Automakers
will have to apply "major re-engineering" that "usually takes anywhere from three to five years"
per model to dozens of vehicle models in under a decade. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649,
pp.13-15]
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Battery factories, in particular, take years to build. See Eli Leland, So You Want To Build A
Battery Factory, Medium: Batteries are Complicated (July 16, 2021),
https://tinyurl.com/mv4vhh3x. It takes longer still to create and sharpen production processes
that yield quality and safe products that can satisfy consumer demand and federal regulators.
Mistakes are too costly for it to be any other way. See Bradley Berman, Battery Experts Provide
Deeper Explanations for Chevy Bolt Fires, Autoweek (Nov. 15, 2021),
https://tinyurl.com/3r7879u6 (describing recall of 141,000 EVs following 16 reported fires). The
Proposed Rule, however, will have "automakers rac[ing] to supplement material shortages," and
risking far more than prudence allows, just to "scal[e] these facilities and operations quickly."
Paige McKirahan, United States: EV Supply Chain Disruption To Ignite Disputes Over IP,
M&As, And More, Mondaq (Dec. 9, 2022), https://bit.ly/3p6eXpI. This demand, in turn, "put[s]
at risk the stability of mines and refineries with possible unskilled workers," and "[hjuman rights
violations . . . run rampant if safe and proper processes are not identified." Id. None of this is
acceptable. All of it can be avoided. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 13-15]
The Proposed Rule should also account for the reality that too-fast and too-aggressive
regulation can stifle the very innovation it relies on. Even with increased governmental subsidies
toward rapid EV development, mandates like the Proposed Rule will almost certainly "prompt
automakers to make bigger bets on a narrower set of options for complying, which might limit
innovation and progress because technology now is changing so rapidly." Puko, supra. Programs
like the Renewable Fuel Standards are whittled down, contrary to Congress's intent. See WV
Amicus Br., at 24-27. And changing contexts that should command our attention end up ignored,
including that EV "battery technology is still evolving," which means "the U.S. may be at risk of
building mines and factories to produce batteries that wind up being obsolete in a decade." Joann
Muller & Jael Holzman, Why the U.S. Can't build EVs without China, Axios (Apr. 12, 2023),
https://bit.ly/42iaoWS. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 13-15]
The second- and third-order consequences of choosing rushed production based on today's
technologies over innovation are weighty, too. Take nickel, for example. It is possible—even
likely—that later battery technologies will render it unnecessary. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,314
(citing battery applications that "an iron phosphate cathode which has lower energy density but
does not require . . . nickel"). And that may prove to be a very good thing: "Reaching the nickel
means cutting down swaths of rainforest," and "[r]efining it is a carbon-intensive process that. . .
produc[es] waste slurry that's hard to dispose of." Jon Emont, EV Makers Confront the 'Nickel
Pickle,' WSJ (June 4, 2023), https://bit.ly/3PdIoRH. Nickel, then, exposes "a larger contradiction
within the EV industry: Though EVs are designed to be less damaging to the environment in the
long term than conventional cars, the process of building them carries substantial environmental
harm." Id. Rather than letting market demand and innovation explore other paths forward, the
Proposed Rule locks automakers and the rest of our economy into this impossible option. EPA
should slow down this endeavor and allow both safety and innovation to drive decision-making
in this critically important area. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 13-15]
Organization: Kia Corporation
EPA Underestimates Market and External Challenges
EPA's proposed rule highlights the very complex challenges that lie ahead for the EV market.
There are an enormous number of factors that are outside the control of automakers including
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manufacturing capacity, battery production, charging infrastructure, critical mineral supply, and
consumer acceptance. A successful transition in the timeframe proposed will require massive
changes in commitments from all sectors of the economy: vehicle suppliers, labor, utilities,
charging infrastructure, home builders, mining, and mineral processing. Consumer behavior and
acceptance also needs to significantly change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 6]
EPA's proposal requires automakers to sell EVs but does not propose any requirements to
ensure adequate charging infrastructure to homes, highways, or businesses, or mandate utilities
to have adequate capacity or provide reasonably priced high-power charging, or mandate easily
accessible and affordable battery critical minerals for EV batteries. Government policies need to
start today to ensure there are enough critical minerals for batteries and high-power charging.
Unfortunately, there is not yet a roadmap to developing these and other essential pieces to the
transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 6]
All of the above market challenges will need to have complementary policies supporting all of
the sectors outside the vehicle industry including utilities, mining, charging companies and will
require them to meet targets too. It is critical that EPA take these factors into consideration when
setting standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 6]
The government's ability to implement the right complementary policies and monitoring these
factors will be paramount to the success of this ambitious rulemaking. EPA standards alone
cannot and will not create demand or infrastructure for EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555,
pp. 6-7]
Organization: LisaAllee
[.From Hearing Testimony, May 9, 2023] Second fix the problems with electrical vehicles.
The batteries need to be clean, Mr. Musk wants to create a very big mess in the northern part of
the center of the country with a factory so we need to encourage batteries research such that
batteries are actually clean and not made from rare earth metals that have to be mined. [S]o
clean batteries and the electricity for electric vehicles are from solar and wind, that needs to be
part of the solution. [From Hearing Testimony, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5115, Day 1]
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Specialty Equipment Market Association
(SEMA). (web) (1,488 signatures)
The Specialty Equipment Market Association (SEMA) submits the letters included below on
behalf of over 1,480 men and women who work in the specialty automotive aftermarket
outlining their concerns with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's proposed Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 to 2032 Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,184 (May 5, 2023). SEMA members manufacture, sell, and install
parts and products that make motor vehicles more fuel efficient, cleaner, and safer, employing
over one million Americans and contributing over $52 billion annually to the U.S. economy.
Thank you for your consideration of these comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0724]
I write in opposition to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's proposed multipollutant
standards for light-and medium-duty vehicles (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829). I
have serious concerns with all three of the options included in the draft rulemaking, as the EPA
seeks to lower carbon emissions under timelines that effectively make electric vehicles the only
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option for automakers to meet the pollution limits from 2027 through 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0724]
The large-scale shift to electric vehicles, which would comprise two-thirds of all new-car
sales in the U.S. by 2032 under this proposal, will hurt workers, small businesses, and consumers
while doing little to help the environment. The proposed rule would lead to fewer vehicle choices
for individuals and families, reducing the selection of vehicles that fit their household budgets
and unique needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0724]
This proposed rulemaking will disrupt automotive industry supply chains and eliminate large
numbers of jobs in vehicle manufacturing, parts production, and repair businesses. While small
businesses are the lifeblood of the American economy, they will be hit the hardest by a
premature rush to have electric vehicles dominate new vehicle sales. Small, internal-combustion
engine-based businesses are not receiving the billions of dollars that large automakers are to
make the conversion to electric. Thirty-three percent of automotive aftermarket products
purchased by consumers last year were on upgrades and accessories for internal combustion
engines and drive trains. That means as much as $17 billion of small business value will be
wiped out by this proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0724]
While the goal of this proposal is to reduce the U.S. automotive fleet's carbon footprint, it
simply shifts how emissions are produced. The EPA is ignoring the value of technologies
produced by American workers, manufacturers, and farmers that are critical to our transportation
future. Specialty automotive aftermarket businesses are leading the way through alternative fuel
innovations from replacing older engine technologies with newer, cleaner versions to converting
older ICE vehicles to new electric, hydrogen, and other alternative fuels. Sadly, the EPA's plans
to reduce greenhouse gases and criteria pollutants do not factor this in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0724]
The EPA's proposal boosts an electric vehicle supply chain dominated by China, which
powers its manufacturing-base through coal-fired power plants and mines minerals for EV
batteries with the use of environmental practices that we would never approve of in the United
States. Emissions coming out of tailpipe matter, but so do the lifecycle emissions of building a
car, constructing and charging a battery, and retiring vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0724]
The future of automotive technology matters to consumers, millions of automotive
enthusiasts, and all the men and women who work in the industry. Accordingly, I ask that the
EPA does not follow through on any of the three options outlined in this proposed rulemaking
and instead pursues a rulemaking for light and medium-duty vehicles that embrace a technology-
neutral approach that factors in the infrastructure that exists, the innovation we are all capable of,
consumer preferences, and the lifecycle emissions of the technology that powers our vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0724]
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown (web) (679
signatures)
I write in opposition to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's proposed multipollutant
standards for light-and medium-duty vehicles (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829). I
have serious concerns with all three of the options included in the draft rulemaking, as the EPA
seeks to lower carbon emissions under timelines that effectively make electric vehicles the only
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option for automakers to meet the pollution limits from 2027 through 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1700]
The large-scale shift to electric vehicles, which would comprise two-thirds of all new-car
sales in the U.S. by 2032 under this proposal, will hurt workers, small businesses, and consumers
while doing little to help the environment. The proposed rule would lead to fewer vehicle choices
for individuals and families, reducing the selection of vehicles that fit their household budgets
and unique needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1700]
This proposed rulemaking will disrupt automotive industry supply chains and eliminate large
numbers of jobs in vehicle manufacturing, parts production, and repair businesses. While small
businesses are the lifeblood of the American economy, they will be hit the hardest by a
premature rush to have electric vehicles dominate new vehicle sales. Small, internal-combustion
engine-based businesses are not receiving the billions of dollars that large automakers are to
make the conversion to electric. Thirty-three percent of automotive aftermarket products
purchased by consumers last year were on upgrades and accessories for internal combustion
engines and drive trains. That means as much as $17 billion of small business value will be
wiped out by this proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1700]
While the goal of this proposal is to reduce the U.S. automotive fleet's carbon footprint, it
simply shifts how emissions are produced. The EPA is ignoring the value of technologies
produced by American workers, manufacturers, and farmers that are critical to our transportation
future. Specialty automotive aftermarket businesses are leading the way through alternative fuel
innovations from replacing older engine technologies with newer, cleaner versions to converting
older ICE vehicles to new electric, hydrogen, and other alternative fuels. Sadly, the EPA's plans
to reduce greenhouse gases and criteria pollutants do not factor this in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-1700]
The EPA's proposal boosts an electric vehicle supply chain dominated by China, which
powers its manufacturing-base through coal-fired power plants and mines minerals for EV
batteries with the use of environmental practices that we would never approve of in the United
States. Emissions coming out of tailpipe matter, but so do the lifecycle emissions of building a
car, constructing and charging a battery, and retiring vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1700]
The future of automotive technology matters to consumers, millions of automotive
enthusiasts, and all the men and women who work in the industry. Accordingly, I ask that the
EPA does not follow through on any of the three options outlined in this proposed rulemaking
and instead pursues a rulemaking for light and medium-duty vehicles that embrace a technology-
neutral approach that factors in the infrastructure that exists, the innovation we are all capable of,
consumer preferences, and the lifecycle emissions of the technology that powers our vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1700]
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown (118 signatures)
Secondly, by not taking any significant steps to improve permitting for the mining of critical
minerals in America, we are endangering our ability to access the minerals required for EV
production. This over-reliance on foreign sources of minerals could undermine our domestic
energy security and jeopardize our nation's economic independence. After seeing how
international supply chains can break down during the pandemic, American consumers cannot
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and should not be subject to increased reliance on unstable foreign supply chains, especially
concerning something as vital as personal transportation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1701]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
The proposed rule is the most stringent light duty vehicle regulation that EPA has
promulgated to date. The electrification and carbon reduction goals are incredibly challenging
and will require not just a coordinated effort to achieve but also solutions addressing consumer
demand, affordability, charging network, power grid capacity, rare earth mineral availability, and
striking the right balance regarding China policy [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, p. 2]
Summary
Mazda is proud of its heritage and contributions to personal mobility, and we celebrated our
100th anniversary in 2020. Mazda has also long been an engineering leader known for
innovative powertrains like the rotary engine and Skyactiv technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0595, pp.3-4]
We look at EPA's NPRM and its preferred option through the lens of a company that is
already working towards an electrified future. It's not a matter of if this transformation will
happen, but when and how. Mazda, like the rest of the industry, faces many challenges: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, pp. 3-4]
- Will charging infrastructure be sufficient?
- Can the electric grid handle the increased demands?
- How will EV incentives on the federal and state level impact this shift?
- Will suppliers be able to develop and produce components like batteries (that currently
require critical minerals, many from China) quickly enough and in enough volume?
- How might future laws or regulations in trade and re-shoring impact our ability to meet
goals?
- Are consumers ready and willing to move away from "tried and true" internal combustion
engines in numbers sufficient to meet these goals?
- Can OEMs remain sufficiently profitable to fuel the transition to EVs?
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, pp. 3-4]
Mazda strongly requests that EPA take these considerations into account and make necessary
adjustments to the proposed rule as it works towards a Final Rule. We feel the Final Rule should
have more realistic targets and associated ramp ups, include PHEVs, and adopt CARB's current
LEV IV for criteria emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, pp. 3-4]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
Efficient Utilization of Battery Critical Materials
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MECA supports EPA's technology neutral, performance-based approach to reduce both
criteria and GHG emissions from light-duty vehicles through improvements in the efficiency of
today's vehicles combined with accelerated introduction of battery electric vehicles. We agree
with the Agency's conclusion that projected penetration of electric vehicles will provide
significant emission benefits from the light-duty fleet. However, based on current sales rates of
electric vehicles, there is still considerable uncertainty in the projected pace of future electric
vehicle penetration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 26-29]
Table 3 compares the fuel economy, tailpipe & upstream greenhouse gas emissions and
utilized battery capacities of equivalently sized conventional, full hybrid, plug-in hybrid and
battery electric vehicles using available data from the EPA/DOE fueleconomy.gov website.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 26-29]
On a vehicle basis, the tailpipe & upstream greenhouse gas emissions of the battery electric
vehicle (Tesla Model Y Long Range AWD) would avoid 311 g/mile of C02 (i.e.,
381conventional RAV4 - 70Tesla Model Y = 311) compared to avoiding 231 g/mile with the
plug-in hybrid (Toyota RAV4 Prime) assuming that only 69.3% of its operation is all-electric.
However, on an equivalent battery capacity basis, the last row of Table 3 [See original comment
for Table 3. Comparison of Battery Capacities of Conventional, Full Hybrid, Plug-in Hybrid and
Battery Electric Vehicles] shows that HEVs and PHEVs use the available battery materials more
efficiently than BEVs avoiding considerably higher amounts of C02 per kWh of battery
capacity. This improved efficiency of hybrids is due to the higher rate of cycling their smaller
battery capacities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 26-29]
Table 3 displays fueleconomy.gov data with stated battery capacities for selected vehicles. It
should be noted that the amount of battery material needed to manufacture each full battery
electric vehicle could be deployed to manufacture five PHEVs. One can calculate the amount of
C02 reduced each year as a function of battery capacity (kWh) and miles driven. Assuming an
all-electric operation of 69.3%37 of the PHEV, a far greater cumulative amount of avoided C02
(5 x 191 g/mile = 955 g/mile of avoided C02) can be realized by deploying the PHEVs
compared to 271 g/mile of avoided C02 realized by the operation of the one BEV. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 26-29]
37 The assumption of 69.3% electric operation for the RAV4 PHEV is found on www.fueleconomy.gov.
To fully electrify a medium-duty vehicle, a minimum of a 75 to lOOkWh battery would be
needed. We ran the same calculation above to compare example medium-duty vehicles with
varying degrees of electrification. The result is that the latest generation full hybrid powertrain
would eliminate over 700kg C02/kWh/year, whereas a plug-in hybrid would yield 127
kgC02/kWh/year and a BEV would yield 31 kgC02/kWh/year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0564, pp. 26-29]
These analyses illustrate that strategically deploying HEV and PHEV powertrains as well as
BEVs can yield significantly greater C02 reductions on a battery capacity basis thus reducing
battery critical mineral supply chain pressures and providing fleets and manufacturers greater
flexibility in achieving GHG emission goals. Further reductions in the carbon intensity of liquid
fuels would complement hybrid vehicle adoption by reducing the engine-based C02 emissions
from these vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 26-29]
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Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
The success of our industry is interwoven with the success of this proposal and the ability of
the government to work with industry and other stakeholders to meet significant challenges.
Therefore, the rule must address: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Supply chain challenges. The proposed rule assumes that all materials advanced
vehicles, which are not available today in the quantities needed to support the massive growth in
vehicle construction, will become available within sufficient time. This places a significant and
unnecessary risk on manufacturers and suppliers. Furthermore, once a company has converted
production to new technology lines, that company cannot easily pivot its facilities and workforce
back to the previous technology if EPA projections are not realized by the mid-to-late-2020s.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
MEMA members are working to accelerate the performance and availability of clean-
operating vehicle technologies and are directly contributing to their realization. Besides battery
electric options, effective low- and zero-carbon technologies for future and current in-use
vehicles also exist and can readily be put to use to reduce nationwide emissions and help EPA
meet its climate goals. The success of this rule depends on greater inclusion of all available
emissions reduction technologies, significant investment in infrastructure, careful understanding
and investment in the domestic and global supply chain and ensured repair access to serve the
improved and enhanced domestic vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Supply Chain Challenges Will Continue Throughout Implementation
In the supporting documents of the proposed rule, EPA catalogs all public statements of
investment in and projections for future availability of critical minerals. This projected sum is
then cited as evidence there will be sufficient materials for construction of the future fleet. We
disagree with this optimism. To assume that all materials for advanced vehicles in the quantities
needed to support the exponential growth in advanced technology vehicle production and
adoption will become available exposes the automotive industry - both vehicle manufacturers
and suppliers and the jobs it supports to significant, unnecessary risk. While the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the Inflation Recovery Act (IRA) endeavor to bring more
resources to mining in the U.S. to boost supplies of critical materials, it is unclear that these
provisions will resolve some of the other longstanding hurdles that inhibit mining activities in the
U.S. Concerns about environmental issues often make mining projects extremely burdensome to
undertake, and the associated permitting process extends the timelines past the point of
practicality. EPA seems to assume in this rule that domestic mining will become more routine,
but without sufficient evidence to substantiate this belief. It is our perception that in the laws
passed to date will overcome of the most difficult challenges posed by trying to site mines in the
U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 12-13]
One way to supplement domestic mining is through increased recycling. As the EPA notes,
the presence of minerals in materials and products already in the U.S., adds to the "mineral stock
that is available for domestic recycling in the future." The EPA spends much of the analyses
recycling discussion on battery recycling, specifically on the minerals associated with batteries.
Yet, EVs will rely on many other minerals beyond those needed for batteries. Aluminum,
manganese, magnesium, silicon and many other critical minerals are already located in the
automotive supply chain independent of batteries, such as in the aluminum and steel in door
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frames and in the body in white. The domestic recycling infrastructure is not sufficiently
sophisticated to recapture and return the pre- and post-consumer scrap of this material already
present domestically to the automotive sector. While EPA recognizes the value that recycling can
provide to stabilizing the supply of critical minerals, its assumptions about the feasibility of this
recycling to supplement mined minerals is premature without more investments in infrastructure
to support this work. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 12-13]
MEM A urges:
EPA to add battery recycling and disposal costs to the analysis as part of a sustainable
BEV deployment to better address scarcity of critical minerals, provide a more resilient domestic
supply chain, and over time reduce the added carbon impact of battery manufacturing and
associated multi-national logistics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 12-13]
The Biden Administration and Congress must work expeditiously secure, through
trade policy, access to critical materials and expedite projects to refine critical materials in the
U.S. and allied countries and encourage domestic recycling programs for other critical minerals
to further expand and assure supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 12-13]
Additionally, EPA should consider added costs for post-warranty battery pack replacement to
the RIA to capture critical mineral demands resulting from second and third owners who may
have to replace/repair aged batteries after buying a used BEV. This may not factor into the cost
benefit for new vehicle purchases, but it will cause further demand for critical materials. EPA
should add this into the cost benefit for maintenance in Chapter 4.6.1 as well as critical mineral
demands in RIA Preamble IV.C.6. While some of these retired batteries may be recycled, it will
take some time for materials to build up and there will be some demand for new material that
competes with production for new vehicle batteries. This is another reason EPA must forecast a
more diversified, and possibly more expensive, supply chain in the RIA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0644, pp. 14-15]
Organization: Minnesota Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
The proposed EPA standards for 2027 and later set very aggressive goals for reducing GHG
and criteria emissions. Achieving these goals will require dramatic changes not only in vehicle
design, but in the entire automotive supply chain. While the U.S. market share of BEVs will
continue to expand, establishing regulations where success is solely contingent upon an
unattainable tenfold increase in the production and sales of BEVs over the next eight years
represents an avoidable mistake. The proposed rule would require huge investments and rapid
growth in many industries, including the mining and processing of key minerals, the generation
and distribution of electricity, and the recharging of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0612, p. 3]
If the economic damages are not bad enough, the impact of EPA's forced change to BEVs
may compromise our national security. Who is in favor of a move that would incentivize
batteries and minerals produced and mined in countries that are hostile to the U.S. and have
questionable labor standards over relying on homegrown renewable liquid fuels, along with our
domestic energy sources found right here in America, much of it in the Midwest? [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0578, p. 3]
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Other concerns with BEVs are related to the supply of critical minerals for batteries. A
report5 by the International Energy Agency (IEA) says "mineral demand for use in EVs and
battery storage is a major force, growing at least thirty times to 2040, it has taken on average
over 16 years to move mining projects from discovery to first production. These long lead times
raise questions about the ability of suppliers to ramp up output. The Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) and People's Republic of China were responsible for some 70% and 60% of
global production of cobalt and rare earth elements respectively in 2019. The level of
concentration is even higher for processing operations. China's share of refining is around 35%
for nickel, 50- 70% for lithium and cobalt, and nearly 90% for rare earth elements. High levels of
concentration, compounded by complex supply chains, increase the risks that could arise from
physical disruption, trade restrictions or other developments in major producing countries.
Production and processing of mineral resources gives rise to a variety of environmental and
social issues that, if poorly managed, can harm local communities and disrupt supply." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 5]
5 International Energy Agency, "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions", 2021;
https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals- in-clean-energy-transitions.
Toyota6 and others7 have argued for a balanced approach to emissions reductions using
BEVs and other technologies, saying "perfect should not be the enemy of the good". The battery
size8 for a BEV is about 6 times larger than a PHEV (~75-145kWh vs. ~12-18kWh), and about
60 times larger than a HEV (~1.3-1.9kWh). Given the limited supply of battery materials, a large
number of HEVs and PHEVs can clearly achieve substantially better GHG reductions than a
small number of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 5-6]
6 Gill Pratt, Toyota Motor Corporation's Chief Scientist, open letter posted on Medium, August 2021;
https://medium.com/toyotaresearch/more-straight- talk-about-toyotas-electric-vehicle-strategy-K)aba4be40.
7 Foster, Koszewnik, Wade, and Winer, "Pathways to More Rapidly Reduce Transportation's Climate
Change Impact." Issues in Science and Technology, November 17, 2022; https://issues.org/reduce-vehicle-
transportation-emissions-foster-koszewnik-wade-winer/.
8 https://insideevs.com/reviews/344001/compare-evs/.
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
To determine a realistic maximum volume of EVs the market can support for each of the
model years covered by the rule, we believe EPA should consider certain critical factors. Among
these factors, we believe EPA must make a thorough and realistic year-by-year assessment of
key factors like projected battery costs, projected supply of battery critical-minerals, projected
residential and public charging infrastructure availability, projected electrical grid capacity, and
consumer acceptance of BEV technology in the broader arena. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682,
p. 2]
Organization: National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)
Unlock Domestic Critical Minerals
The growth of electric vehicle sales has led to concern about securing mineral inputs used in
EV batteries.3 EV battery production depends on five critical minerals for which the domestic
supply is potentially at risk of disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel and graphite.4 The
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EPA has recognized that a robust supply chain needs to be developed through multiple
production routes to support the production of EVs in the United States.5 The National Mining
Association reports that Australia and Canada, two countries with environmental protections that
are arguably equivalent to or even more stringent than those in the U.S., have mine permitting
processes that last two to three years on average, whereas in the U.S. the permitting process
averages seven to 10 years.6 Many of the raw materials for the EV batteries are still mined
largely outside of the U.S.7 Developing an adequate domestic supply of these minerals will
require congressional and administration action to expedite permissions for developing those
resources in a responsible way. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0633, p. 2]
3
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227#:~:text=These%20EV%20battery%20chemistries%2
0depend,manganese%2C%20nickel%2C%20and%20graphite.
4 Ibid.
5 88 Fed. Reg. 29313
6 https://nma.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Fact-Sheet-Permitting-Delays-l.pdf
7 https://www.gao.gOv/products/gao-22-104824#summary_recommend
Organization: National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)
Other concerns with BEVs are related to the supply of critical minerals for batteries. A report
5 by the International Energy Agency (IEA) says "mineral demand for use in EVs and battery
storage is a major force, growing at least thirty times to 2040, it has taken on average over 16
years to move mining projects from discovery to first production. These long lead times raise
questions about the ability of suppliers to ramp up output. The Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) and People's Republic of China were responsible for some 70% and 60% of
global production of cobalt and rare earth elements respectively in 2019. The level of
concentration is even higher for processing operations. China's share of refining is around 35%
for nickel, 50-70%) for lithium and cobalt, and nearly 90% for rare earth elements. High levels of
concentration, compounded by complex supply chains, increase the risks that could arise from
physical disruption, trade restrictions or other developments in major producing countries.
Production and processing of mineral resources gives rise to a variety of environmental and
social issues that, if poorly managed, can harm local communities and disrupt supply." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 4]
5 International Energy Agency, "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions", 2021;
https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions
Toyota 6 and others 7 have argued for a balanced approach to emissions reductions using
BEVs and other technologies, saying "perfect should not be the enemy of the good". The battery
size 8 for a BEV is about 6 times larger than a PHEV (~75-145kWh vs. -12-18kWh), and about
60 times larger than a HEV (~1.3-1.9kWh). Given the limited supply of battery materials, a large
number of HEVs and PHEVs can clearly achieve substantially better GHG reductions than a
small number of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 4]
6 Gill Pratt, Toyota Motor Corporation's Chief Scientist, open letter posted on Medium, August 2021;
https://medium.com/toyotaresearch/more-straight-talk-about-toyotas-electric-vehicle-strategy-f0aba4be40
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7 Foster, Koszewnik, Wade, and Winer, "Pathways to More Rapidly Reduce Transportation's Climate
Change Impact." Issues in Science and Technology, November 17, 2022; https://issues.org/reduce-vehicle-
transportation-emissions-foster-koszewnik-wade-winer/
8 https://insideevs.com/reviews/344001/compare-evs/
Organization: National Farmers Union (NFU)
In addition, several concerns with BEVs relate to the need for and supply of critical minerals
for batteries. As noted by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and reflected in the chart
below, "[i]n climate-driven scenarios, mineral demand for use in EVs and battery storage is a
major force, growing at least thirty times to 2040."15 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 9]
15 International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, World Energy
Outlook Special Report, at 8-9 (2021), available at https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-
minerals-in-clean- energy-transitions.
[See original comment for bar graph of growth of selected minerals in the SDS, 2040 relative
to 2020] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 9]
As one potential concern regarding supply of these critical minerals, IEA has referenced long
project development lead times, finding "it has taken on average over 16 years to move mining
projects from discovery to first production. These long lead times raise questions about the
ability of suppliers to ramp up output if demand were to pick up rapidly." 16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0581, p. 9]
16 Id. at 12.
IEA also noted concerns with high geographical concentration of production, as discussed and
reflected in the chart below. 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 9]
17 Id. at 10.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and People's Republic of China (China) were
responsible for some 70% and 60% of global production of cobalt and rare earth elements
respectively in 2019. The level of concentration is even higher for processing operations, where
China has a strong presence across the board. China's share of refining is around 35% for nickel,
50- 70%) for lithium and cobalt, and nearly 90% for rare earth elements. ... High levels of
concentration, compounded by complex supply chains, increase the risks that could arise from
physical disruption, trade restrictions or other developments in major producing countries. 18
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 9-10]
18 Id. at 11-12.
[See original comment for share of top three producing countries in production of selected
minerals and fossil fuels, 2019] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 10]
There is also growing scrutiny of environmental and social performance related to this sector.
"Production and processing of mineral resources gives rise to a variety of environmental and
social issues that, if poorly managed, can harm local communities and disrupt supply." 19 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 10]
19 Id. at 12.
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EPA should not focus on one technology. "Multiple types of relatively climate-friendly
vehicles and accelerated development of sustainable substitute fuels should all be part of the
picture."27 While BEVs are part of the solution, a balanced approach to emissions reductions
using BEVs and other technologies is needed.28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 12-13]
27 Dave Foster, et al., Pathways to More Rapidly Reduce Transportation's Climate Change Impact, Issues
in Science and Technology, Nov. 17, 2022; https://issues.org/reduce-vehicle-transportation-emissions-
foster-koszewnik- wade-winer/.
28 Gill Pratt, (More) Straight Talk About Toyota's Electric Vehicle Strategy, Aug. 23, 2021,
https://medium.com/toyotaresearch/more-straight-talk-about-toyotas-electric-vehicle-strategy-f0aba4be40.
BEVs are not the only solution. Comparing vehicle specifications,29 the battery size for a
BEV is about 6 times larger than a PHEV (~75-145kWh vs. ~12-18kWh), and about 60 times
larger than a HEV (~1.3-1.9kWh). Given the limited supply of battery materials, a large number
of HEVs and PHEVs can clearly achieve substantially better GHG reductions than a small
number of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 12-13]
29 See, e.g., Mark Kane, Compare Electric Cars: EV Range, Specs, Pricing & More, Updated
July 1, 2022, https://insideevs.com/reviews/344001/compare-evs/.
Organization: National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA)
Lastly, to the degree through which this proposal could increase the development and
permitting of domestic critical mineral mining projects to support LDV and MDV battery
production, NPCA asks that EPA and the administration as a whole take necessary steps to
mitigate or entirely avoid negative impacts on overburdened populations and sensitive
ecosystems. This includes promoting practices such as critical mineral recycling, as well as
overseeing the responsible citing of mining projects to limit harms to environmental justice
communities, indigenous communities, and ecosystems within our beloved national parks. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0607, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
Nissan appreciates the Administration's focus on and support for advancing electrification
and carbon neutrality and shares the same long-term goal of transitioning to zero emission
vehicle society. However, Nissan believes that market realities, infrastructure needs, consumer
impacts, and lack of battery critical mineral availability necessitate an adjustment of the GHG
standard stringency in this rulemaking timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 1]
These new proposed targets lose sight of the transformational change that is needed from all
sectors of the U.S. economy. Automobile manufacturers such as Nissan have made and will
continue to make significant investments to push the industry forward; however, such drastic and
front-loaded timelines require significant changes and investments from suppliers, energy
providers, mineral extraction and processing industries, battery and charging equipment
manufacturers, etc. Such drastic changes to the market are nearly impossible on such a
compressed timeline, particularly given the current market constraints affecting nearly all
impacted sectors, such as supply-chain complications and limited availability of raw materials.
This is especially true with respect to the critical minerals that are essential to battery production
for EV expansion and development; EPA has not demonstrated that the critical minerals needed
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to meet the extremely aggressive EV penetration rates are available to be extracted in a safe,
responsible, and reliable manner. Significant cooperation and organization from federal, state,
and local governments will also be required to facilitate the roll-out and adoption of EVs and
related charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 4]
Organization: North Dakota Farmers Union (NDFU)
The proposed standards for 2027 and later set very aggressive goals for reducing GHG and
criteria emissions. Achieving these goals will require dramatic changes not only in vehicle
design, but in the entire automotive supply chain. To achieve these goals with a heavy reliance
on battery electric vehicles (BEVs) will require huge investments and rapid growth in many
industries including the mining and processing of key minerals, the generation and distribution of
electricity, and the recharging of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, pp. 1-2]
We are concerned that a swift and dramatic shift to BEVs will be difficult to achieve. The
obstacles include geopolitics, long lead times, significant capital investments, and lagging
consumer acceptance. In a state like North Dakota where drivers face cold weather and long
driving distances, it is difficult to imagine a large portion of the population using BEVs in four
years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, pp. 1-2]
The proposal basically assumes that BEVs will be the dominant technology for future
emissions reductions. But relying on a single technology is a risky strategy. Many factors could
interfere with BEV production, including the supply and cost of critical minerals, lack of BEV
recharging infrastructure, slow ramp-up of wind and solar power, poor customer acceptance, and
more. EPA estimates that 67% of U.S. vehicle sales will be BEVs in 2032, but other projections
are lower and the U.S. lags behind other countries that are not expected to reach similar levels of
sales in that timeframe. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 5]
10 Stauffer, N. W. (2021, April 29). China's transition to electric vehicles: By 2030 40 percent of vehicles
sold in China will be electric; MIT research finds that despite benefits, the cost to consumers and to society
will be substantial. MIT News. Retrieved from https://news.mit.edu/2021/chinas-transition-electric-
vehicles-0429.
Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
Energy Security & Air Pollutant Benefits: The EPA completely ignores the fundamental
problem with critical mineral supply chain while simultaneously acknowledging that it exists.
They claim it is outside the scope of their analysis. Cobalt is used in the manufacture of nearly
all lithium-ion rechargeable batteries, including EV batteries, and 70% of the supply chain is
controlled by China using African slave-labor. Moreover, rare-earth elements are required to
make the permanent magnets used in EVs and China accounts for 63% of the world's rare earth
mining, 85% of rare earth processing, and 92% of rare earth magnet production6. Because China
controls the market, they can dictate the price of magnets, and therefore EVs, at their whim.. .not
very "Energy Security" friendly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 3-4]
6 https ://www .politico. com/news/magazine/2022/12/14/rare-earth-mines-00071102
Energy Security Benefits
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Though the US became a total petroleum net exporter in 2020, the EPA attempts to boast that
their rule would increase the country's energy security by reducing the US's "dependance" on
foreign oil46. In addition to their claim being questionable, they also completely ignore the
critical mineral supply chain aspect of the country's energy security. The EPA states the
fundamental problem with critical mineral supply chain while simultaneously choosing to ignore
the issue: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 11-12]
46 https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php
"At the present time in the U.S. many of these minerals [used to create EV batteries] are
commonly sourced from global suppliers and do not yet benefit from a fully developed domestic
supply chain."47 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 11-12]
47 47 Page 130 of EPA's Rule - https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-05-05/pdf/2023-07974.pdf
"Critical materials and the supply chains necessary for PEV production are, therefore, outside
of our intended scope in this discussion of energy security." 48 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0551, pp. 11-12]
48 Page 600 of EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis -
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
The most critical minerals for battery production include nickel, cobalt, graphite, lithium, and
rare earth elements. As an example of the supply chain problems, in 2021, 70% of cobalt
originated from the Democratic Republic of Congo, whose Chinese-owned cobalt mines are
plagued with accusations of slave labor and human rights violations49. Cobalt is used in the
manufacture of nearly all lithium-ion rechargeable batteries, including EV batteries, and 70% of
the supply chain is controlled by a US adversary using African slave-labor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0551, pp.11-12]
49 https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2023/02/01/1152893248/red-cobalt-congo-drc-mining-
siddharth- kara
To make EV supply chain and energy security matters worse, rare-earth elements (specifically
Neodymium and Praseodymium) are required to manufacture the permanent magnets used in
EVs. China currently dominates all aspects of rare-earth mining, refining, and magnet
production. As of December 2022, China accounts for 63% of the world's rare earth mining,
85%) of rare earth processing, and 92%> of rare earth magnet production50. This means that even
if the US were to ramp up their mining efforts, virtually all the rare earths would end up in China
to be processed or produced into magnets. The extreme uncertainty of the rare earth market has
recently become a national security issue51 and severely limits the supply side of the equation.
Because China controls the market, they can dictate the price of magnets, and therefore EVs, at
their whim. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 11-12]
50 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/14/rare-earth-mines-00071102
51 https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/americas-national-security-dependent-critical-rare-earth-
minerals-and-worse
The EPA's value for Energy Security Benefits is unchanged in this real analysis because it
would require a thorough quantitative investigation. However, even with this likely fictitious
Energy Security Benefit staying consistent, the overall cost of the EPA's rule is still
overwhelmingly negative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 11-12]
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Organization: Plug In America
The danger exists if the United States doesn't commit to rigorous emissions standards.
Choosing to weaken these standards would result in the United States falling behind in the global
race to develop domestic supply chains, good-paying jobs, and battery and EV manufacturing.
These GHG emissions standards will continue to spur investment and innovation, allowing U.S.
battery and vehicle manufacturers to thrive in the global market. Delaying the shift to electric
transportation through diminished regulation will result in resources wasted on fossil-fuel
technologies that will rob the United States of its international status as a technological leader.
Globally, 14% of light-duty vehicles sold in 2022 were electric vehicles.3 According to the same
source, in the U.S., this value is about 7.5%.The proposed GHG regulations provide a pathway to
transportation electrification that will enable U.S. manufacturers to remain competitive in both
domestic and global vehicle markets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0625, pp. 1-2]
3 https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/electric-car-registrations-and-sales-share-in-china-united-
states-and-europe-2018-2022.
Organization: POET, LLC
The Proposed Rule's feasibility assessment is also deficient, and EPA could remedy this by
crediting proven, affordable renewable fuels that achieve real-world GHG emission reductions.
EPA's proposed standards rely on optimistic projections showing an extraordinarily rapid rollout
of battery electric vehicle ("BEV") technologies at scale. However, EPA's modeling omits any
rigorous consideration of the significant supply-chain and infrastructure developments necessary
to support the LDVs needed to meet EPA's proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, p. 5]
IV. EPA's Projections for BEVs are Overly Optimistic and Largely Ignore Significant Supply
Chain and Infrastructure Concerns.
The Proposed Rule is deficient in other significant ways. It relies on overly optimistic
projections for BEV adoption that fail to account for several key factors that will be essential to
meeting the projected targets. POET engaged Jim Lyons of Trinity Consultants ("Trinity"), an
international consulting firm specializing in, among other things, environmental sustainability, to
review EPA's technology assessments. In his report, Attachment 2 to this letter, Mr. Lyons
explains that EPA's forecasted BEV adoption rates "rest on a series of unreasonable,
unsupported, and highly optimistic assumptions" that render those forecasts unreliable.71 The
Trinity report also identifies several flawed assumptions in EPA's assessment of GHG emissions
reductions from BEVs resulting from the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p.
21]
71 Attachment 2, J. Lyons, Review of U.S. EPA's Proposed Multi-Pollutant Emission Standards for 2027
and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, at 2.
A. EPA's Projected BEV Adoption Rates Are Based on Several Flawed Assumptions.
The Proposed Rule relies on overly optimistic BEV adoption rates based on several flaws. As
the Trinity Report explains, EPA is assuming "nearly 70 percent BEV penetration in MY 2032
across the combined light-duty passenger car, crossover/SUV, and pickup truck categories."72
This represents an increase in BEVs by 4 to 10 times over only a 10-year period.73 EPA also
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assumes that "this high level of demand for BEVs will continue unchanged through MY
2055."74 As the Trinity Report explains in greater detail, EPA's projections are based on several
flawed assumptions that render those projections unreliable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609,
pp. 21-22]
72 Id. at 2 (quotations omitted).
73 Id.
74 Id at 2.
First, EPA suggests that the worldwide supply of batteries will be sufficient to meet the
demand for BEVs that EPA is projecting.75 As Trinity has shown, current demand estimates for
batteries without the Proposed Rule range from 500 to 2,500 GWh per year.76 Yet EPA's
demand estimates with and without the Proposed Rule are only 1,000 GWh per year and 600
GWh per year, respectively.77 Turning to supply, EPA estimates, based on existing and
announced battery capacity in North America, that industry will achieve nearly but not quite
1,000 GWh per year by 2032.78 EPA does not explain the difference between its 1,000 GWh
demand estimate and other estimates showing much higher demand for EV batteries.79 Nor does
it explain why the Proposed Rule is feasible if its own projections for the battery supply fall
short, even slightly, than its projected demand.80 EPA also assumes that announced battery
capacity in North America will materialize, when it is possible that some production facilities
will not come online, and EPA's projected 1,000 GWh per year on the supply side will not be
achieved.81 Importing batteries is an option, but EPA does not acknowledge that importing may
be necessary nor assess whether it would be feasible.82 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp.
21-22]
75 Id. at 3.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See id.
OnLocation also identifies factual issues that call into question the robustness of EPA's
assumptions regarding future EV penetration rates. For instance, EPA's projections of BEV sales
are almost nine times higher than those of EIA. 122 EPA may also be making overly optimistic
assumptions regarding battery manufacturing capacity and domestic lithium production. 123
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 27]
122 Id. at 2.
123 Id.
Battery production is a key constraint in the EV penetration rate. Supporting material on the
battery production from S&P Global and Argonne National Laboratories5 are based on battery
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manufacturing plant announcements rather than more definitive metrics such as plants under
construction. EPA has focused on lithium as the constraining critical material for battery
production, and growth in domestic lithium production is based on infrastructure that has not yet
been built. None of the studies referenced directly incorporate the level of U.S. EV penetration
proposed in the Proposed Rule. The assumptions underlying EPA's proposed path merit further
analysis by EPA and call into question the robustness of EPA's assumptions regarding future EV
penetration rates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 36]
5 "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles," Federal Register Vol. 88, No. 87, pg. 29317
EPA estimates the U.S. will have more than 800 GWh of cell or battery manufacturing
capacity by 2025, and 1,000 GWh by 2030, enough to supply from 10 to 13 million BEVs per
year.4 This production would roughly be sufficient to meet EPA's compliance requirements.
However, EPA did not explicitly consider the battery cost replacement for the current 2 million
electric vehicles in the EV sales projections by 2032. Furthermore, the battery lifetime will
largely depend on the consumer behavior and how often they charge the battery. Public fast
chargers tend to degrade lithium-ion batteries at a quicker rate than slower home charging
options. With shorter battery life, a higher battery production rate and critical material supply
would be required than otherwise projected over the next 8 to 10 years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, p. 36]
4 DRIA pg. 3-24.
Given that batteries are the key component of BEVs, it is important to examine U.S. EPA's
assumptions regarding the demand, supply, and cost of batteries. Figure 30 from the Proposed
Rule, reproduced below, shows forecasts of worldwide demand and supply for lithium-ion
batteries through 2030 compiled by U.S. EPA from various sources. The main observation taken
from Figure 30, is that by 2030 worldwide demand is forecast to be between 500 and 2500
gigawatt hours (GWh) per year without the Proposed Rule. U.S. EPA's assumptions regarding
battery demand for the U.S. market both with and without the Proposed Rule are shown in Figure
31 of the Proposed Rule, also reproduced below. As shown, by 2032, U.S. EPA assumes U.S.
battery demand based on vehicle manufacturer's need to comply with the Proposed Rule will be
on the order of 1,000 GWh per year or about 40% of the maximum worldwide demand shown in
Figure 30 compared to about 600 GWh without the Proposed Rule. Shifting to supply, Figure 30
shows forecasts of worldwide battery supply that suggest it will be more than enough to satisfy
worldwide battery demand. [See original attachment for Figure 30: Future global Li-ion battery
demand and production capacity, 2020-2030] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 55-56]
However, Figure 31 from the Proposed Rule shows that both existing and announced North
American battery production will amount a little less than 1,000 GWh by 2032 - a volume that
would not be sufficient to cover U.S. EPA's forecast of demand for batteries in U.S. light- and
medium-duty vehicles. [See original attachment for Figure 31: Announced capacity for battery
plants in North America, as of November 2022.] While batteries imported from other countries
offer another source of supply, it is far from clear that battery supply will meet worldwide
demand during the 2027 to 2032 period when U.S. EPA expects light-duty automobile
manufacturers to essentially transition to the production of nothing but BEVs. In addition, U.S.
EPA presents no data or analysis that suggests that all of the announced North American battery
capacity will actually be online as battery demand driven by the Proposed Rule increases nor a
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demonstration that the likely actual worldwide supply of batteries will be sufficient to meet
worldwide demand. So, in summary, even all announced North American battery production
capacity will be insufficient to meet U.S. EPA's estimate of battery demand of the Proposed
Rule and U.S. EPA hasn't demonstrated where that supply will come from. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 55-56]
[See original attachment for Figure 32: Annual battery production (GWh) required for BEV's
in the Central analysis case of the Proposal] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 55-56]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
Electromobility will need continued support from public policy.
Recent legislative actions have seeded the ground with support for electric vehicles and the
beginning of a robust nationwide charging network. With specifics that continue to be defined,
stakeholders are working to maximize the opportunity under these new laws to support
customers with valuable purchase incentives, and to help spur the development of new electric
vehicle component production and material sourcing. Understandably, the complexity of these
laws results in a process that requires careful deliberation with industry representatives working
hard to ensure customers have a clear understanding of the support available. Nevertheless, the
support within these programs will be critical to the growth rates EPA envisions in this proposal.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 3]
Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)
c. Supply of critical minerals for EV batteries
Other concerns with BEVs are related to the supply of critical minerals for batteries. A report
by the International Energy Agency (IEA) says "mineral demand for use in EVs and battery
storage is a major force," with supplies needing to grow "at least thirty times to 2040." The
report notes that ".. .it has taken on average over 16 years to move mining projects from
discovery to first production."33 These long lead times raise serious questions about the ability
of suppliers to ramp up the output of critical minerals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 16-
18]
33 International Energy Agency, "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions", 2021;
https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions.
[See original comment for Growth of selected minerals in the SDS, 2040 relative to 2020]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 16-18]
In addition, there are national security and human rights concerns associated with the mining
of critical minerals needed for EV batteries. According to IEA, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) and People's Republic of China were responsible for some 70% and 60% of
global production of cobalt and rare earth elements, respectively, in 2019. The level of
concentration is even higher for mineral processing operations. China's market share of global
refining capacity is around 35% for nickel, 50-70%) for lithium and cobalt, and nearly 90%> for
rare earth elements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 16-18]
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[See original comment for Production of many energy transition minerals today is more
geographically concentrated than that of oil or natural gas] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp.
16-18]
According to IEA, "High levels of concentration, compounded by complex supply chains,
increase the risks that could arise from physical disruption, trade restrictions or other
developments in major producing countries.. .Production and processing of mineral resources
gives rise to a variety of environmental and social issues that, if poorly managed, can harm local
communities and disrupt supply."34 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 16-18]
34 Id.
Toyota35 and others36 have argued for a balanced approach to emissions reductions using
BEVs and other technologies, saying "perfect should not be the enemy of the good." The battery
size37 for a BEV is about 6 times larger than a PHEV (~75-145kWh vs. -12- 18kWh), and about
60 times larger than a HEV (~1.3-1.9kWh). Given the limited supply of battery materials, a large
number of HEVs and PHEVs can clearly achieve substantially better GHG reductions than a
small number of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 16-18]
35 Gill Pratt, Toyota Motor Corporation's Chief Scientist, open letter posted on Medium, August 2021;
https://medium.com/toyotaresearch/more-straight-talk-about-toyotas-electric-vehicle-strategy-f0aba4be40.
36 Foster, Koszewnik, Wade, and Winer, "Pathways to More Rapidly Reduce Transportation's Climate
Change Impact." Issues in Science and Technology, November 17, 2022; https://issues.org/reduce-vehicle-
transportation- emissions-foster-koszewnik-wade-winer/.
37 https://insideevs.com/reviews/344001/compare-evs/.
Organization: Roy Littlefield IV
Secondly, by not taking any significant steps to improve permitting for the mining of critical
minerals in America, we are endangering our ability to access the minerals required for EV
production. This over-reliance on foreign sources of minerals could undermine our domestic
energy security and jeopardize our nation's economic independence. After seeing how
international supply chains can break down during the pandemic, American consumers cannot
and should not be subject to increased reliance on unstable foreign supply chains, especially
concerning something as vital as personal transportation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0793, p. 1]
Organization: Senator Shelley Moore Capito et al.
These proposals are also deficient in their consideration of BEV mineral input availability and
cost, and will make our nation's transportation sector reliant on foreign adversaries, including
China. China currently dominates mining, extraction, and battery manufacturing for EV
batteries. For example, China produces nearly 65 percent of the world's graphite, a mineral
required for BEV deployment, and accounts for a third of US graphite imports. 14 Yet, the US
currently does not produce any natural graphite domestically. Lithium is another mineral vital to
EV batteries where China dominates global production and 80 percent of yearly global lithium
production is used in battery manufacturing. 15 Last year, lithium prices spiked by 438 percentl6
- yet EPA's proposals claim the price of these vehicles will decrease even as global demand is
forecasted to grow without offsetting expansion of supply. Finally, cobalt is also essential for
battery chemistry. The United States is dependent on imports for 76 percent of current domestic
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demand. The global leader in cobalt production is the Democratic People's Republic of Congo,
with its mining sector identified as a significant violator of environmental protection and human
rights, including child labor. 17,18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5083, p. 4]
14 Mineral Commodity Summaries 2023, USDOI and USGS (Jan. 2023).
15 Id. at 109.
16 Lithium Prices Surge on Increased Battery Demands, Foley & Lardner LLP (Apr. 28, 2022).
17 Supra, note 14.
18 Combatting Child Labor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's Cobalt Industry, US Dept. of Labor.
Further, our country is reliant on China for more than 50 percent of our imports of between 19
and 26 critical minerals with implications for BEV production. 19 Policies that expand our need
for imports of critical mineral EV battery inputs, without expanding domestic mining and
refining capacity, will only make the US more reliant on our adversaries. Thus, claiming these
regulations will make our country more energy independent and globally secure is patently false.
Moreover, claims that these proposals will meaningfully address climate change or satisfy other
federal priorities, such as securing supply chains, are inherently specious given their dependence
upon environmental and human rights data from - in some cases hostile - foreign competitors.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5083, p. 5]
19 Supra, note 14.
Organization: South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR)
National Security
EV batteries rely on lithium to operate, and recent reports indicate China could control as
much as a third of the world's lithium by 2025. South Dakota does not support any regulatory
effort making the United States more reliant on China. EPA should consider the potential
national security implications of implementing the proposed rules as well as consider the need to,
and impact of mining lithium and other battery components domestically. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0523, p. 2]
Organization: Specialty Equipment Market Association (SEMA)
Critical Resource Shortages
The average cost of new and used vehicles increased 5% and 30% respectively from May
2020 to May 2021 according to Edmunds. 12 These increases were the result of supply chain
issues during the pandemic such as the ongoing global microchip shortage, which has upended
the automotive market over the last couple of years. Sadly, this proposal will exacerbate the
shortage of critical components that still exists today. The draft rulemaking also raises many
unanswered questions about how the U.S. is going to end its dependence on sourcing critical
minerals and resources from foreign countries, including geopolitical foes such as China, that are
needed to produce a dramatic increase in the supply of electric batteries for BEVs. Expanding
America's dependance on foreign entities to achieve the goals of this proposal is problematic
from both a domestic and foreign policy standpoint. Additionally, it could also undermine the
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lofty goal of having 67% of all new motor vehicles sold in in the U.S. be BEV by 2032. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 5]
12 Here's Why Car Prices are so High, and Why That Matters (Link:
https://www.cnn.eom/2021/07/08/business/car-prices-inflation/index.html).
Toyota has circulated information on how the critical raw materials needed for BEVs could be
better allocated to achieve similar goals of reducing GHG. The information demonstrates that the
same amount of raw material needed to produce just one BEV could be used to make either 6
plug- in hybrid vehicles or 90 traditional hybrid vehicles. The agency's proposed rule aims to
reduce multi-pollutant emissions, but it does not consider that those 90 hybrid vehicles reduce
carbon 37 times as much as a single BEV over the lifetime of the vehicles. 13 However, the
proposal treats hybrids unfairly, essentially blocking them out of the marketplace and defining
them as "dirty." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 5]
13 Toyota's Goal: Reduce Carbon Emissions As Much As Possible, As Soon As Possible (Link:
https://jalopnik.eom/toyota-focusing-on-hybrids-not-electric-vehicles-1850440908).
Organization: Stellantis
Electrification Rates Misaligned to Market and Exceed Commitments
Stellantis fully supports comments submitted through The Alliance for Automotive
Innovation (AAI or the Auto Innovators) detailing the challenges associated with EPA's overly
optimistic expectation for EV market growth. Stellantis remains steadfast to delivering on our
commitments to achieve an electrified future, and we acknowledge EPA's efforts with this
rulemaking to help support this difficult yet critical transition. However, the proposed rule
significantly underestimates the actions needed to build the targeted EV market. Addressing
concerns such as manufacturing capacity, battery production, charging infrastructure, and
consumer acceptance of EVs will be paramount to the success of this ambitious proposed
regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
Harming our national security. Finally, EPA minimizes the fact that forcing a faster
switchover to EVs will threaten America's national security by making us more dependent on
China and other unfriendly foreign nations for the production and processing of critical inputs
required for EVs. China controls nearly 70 percent of global EV battery manufacturing
capacity—including 70 percent of the world's lithium supply; 80 percent of the necessary rare
earth minerals; and approximately 75 percent of the magnets needed for EV motors—and it
boasts 107 of the 142 lithium-ion battery mega-factories planned or under construction in the
world today (with only 9 planned for the U.S.).57 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 20-21]
57 See https://secureenergy.org/safe-urges-bipartisan-coordinated-policy-to-lead-new-tech-in-auto-
industry-and-protect-against-chinese-supply-chain-dominance-in-new-report/.
The average EV battery uses about 8-10 kilograms of lithium (even more for higher
performance batteries), and the world today mines a total of about 130,000 tons of lithium per
year. That means if the EPA succeeds in converting 60 percent of annual U.S. car sales to EVs
(about 7.8 million vehicles), those EVs (just for the U.S. market) would require 60 percent of the
entire world's current production of lithium.58 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 20-21]
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58 See https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2023/mcs2023-lithium.pdf.
Similarly, each EV battery requires about 10 kilograms of cobalt, which translates into one
metric ton for each 100 EVs and 10,000 tons of cobalt for one million new EVs. There are only
between 150,000 and 190,000 tons of cobalt mined every year worldwide (the lion's share from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Here again, if 60 percent of annual U.S. auto sales were
EVs by 2030 (7.8 million vehicles), those EVs (just in the U.S.) would consume about 78,000
tons of cobalt— half the world's supply. 59 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 20-21]
59 See https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2020/mcs2020-cobalt.pdf.
To put these percentages in perspective, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA),
"In 2022, about 60% of lithium, 30% of cobalt and 10% of nickel demand was for EV batteries"
worldwide.60 Because the U.S. market accounts for less than 20 percent of new vehicle sales
globally,61 and other governments, particularly China and the EU, are pushing for similar rapid
transitions to EVs, the overall worldwide supply of the critical minerals needed to produce EV
batteries will have to increase at a truly astounding rate in the next several years to meet the
EPA's assumptions.62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 20-21]
60 IEA, Global EV Outlook 2023: Trends in batteries, https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-
2023/trends-in-batteries.
61 See Alex Kopestinsky, "20 In-Depth Global and US Auto Sales Statistics for 2023," Policy Advice,
March 23, 2023, https://policyadvice.net/insurance/insights/us-auto-sales-statistics/.
62 See Doomberg, "Separation Anxiety," June 27, 2023, https://doomberg.substack.com/p/separation-
anxiety (explaining why it is doubtful "the world can mine a sufficient amount of the necessary battery
materials to meet anticipated demand").
EPA predicts all of our strategic dependencies for these inputs will vanish quickly over time,
with the assist of government subsidies, as new mines open up in the U.S. and Canada and new
factories are built here and production capacity is brought to our shores.63 The reality, of course,
is that there is little prospect that the Biden administration or local permitting authorities will
fast-track the environmental approvals needed for all of these new mining operations and
production facilities, even if the projects were otherwise shovel ready. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0647, pp. 20-21]
63 See 88 FR at 29318-24.
On each of these points, EPA blithely asserts that the current problems, challenges, supply
constraints, security risks, and limitations will all miraculously resolve themselves as the United
States collectively marches forward into a happy future of EVs. Taken together, the EPA's long
string of sunny assumptions, each one designed to minimize the costs and challenges of the new
rules, adds up to a wholly arbitrary set of regulatory analyses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647,
pp. 20-21]
Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
The chart below for light-duty PHEVs and BEVs show the benefit of PHEVs in reducing the
use of critical minerals and accounts for the difference in electric miles between BEVs and
different types of PHEVs. Strong PHEV battery utilization maximizes the value of battery
manufacturing and materials capacities and helps address the need for fast scale up of battery
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manufacturing and mineral extraction by better utilizing resources. PHEV cars and trucks,
especially, Strong PHEV cars and trucks, can electrify most daily commuting miles while
occasionally using some gasoline, while BEVs have a lot of battery capacity that only gets
"used" on very long trips. We assert that this could be considered wasted or underutilized lithium
and other battery minerals. Thus, because PHEVs use their batteries more, the USA gets more
EV miles per tonne of lithium by driving PHEVs and Strong PHEVs as shown in the chart
below. PHEV's smaller batteries reduce the lifecycle environmental burdens associated with
battery materials, production, and end-of-life.16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 20-21]
16 Two studies. 1) Dunn, J.B., Gaines, L., Kelly, J.C., Gallagher, K.G. (2016). Life cycle analysis summary
for automotive lithium-ion battery production and recycling. In: REWAS 2016: Towards Materials
Resource Sustainability, R.E. Kirchain, B. Blanpain, C. Meskers, E. Olivetti, D. Apelian, J. Howarter, A.
Kvithyld, B. Mishra, N.R. Neelameggham, and J. Spangenberger, eds. (Springer) pp. 73-79,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48768- 7 11 2) International Energy Agency (IEA) (2022). Global
Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022, https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022
[See original for graph titled "1 Million BEVs or 4-6.7 Million PHEVs?"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0646, pp. 20-21]
[See original for graph titled "EV Miles per Year per Tonne of Lithium"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0646, pp. 20-21]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
The Critical Mineral Supply Chain and the Battery Supply Chain Are Not Limiting Factors in
Light-Duty BEV Deployment
Similar to infrastructure, Clean Air Act Section 202 does not direct EPA to consider upstream
resource availability in promulgating standards, and so this is a factor that need not be given
undue weight. More importantly, Tesla does not believe that the critical minerals and battery
supply chains will constrain future U.S. manufacturing and deployment of BEVs in any vehicle
class.211 There are no fundamental materials constraints when evaluating against 2023 USGS
estimated resources.212 Such assertions assume (wrongly) that reserves are fixed and declining.
In fact, mineral resources and reserves have historically increased - that is, when a mineral is in
demand, there is more incentive to look for it and more is discovered. In comparison, to the
extent that current critical minerals reserves are viewed as limiting, the agency should point to
the long history of "Peak Oil" and how such predictions have never in themselves limited
deployment of ICE vehicles.213 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 33-34]
211 See, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29312.
212 See, Tesla, 2023 Investor Day Presentation (March 1, 2023) at 28.
213 See e.g., Forbes, Peak Oil: The Perennial Prophecy That Went Wrong (Nov. 30, 2022) available at h
ttps://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2022/ll/30/peak-oil-the-perennial-prophecy-that-went- w
rong/? sh=c64aabb2bbe5.
While appropriately assessing the critical minerals supply chain associated with BEVs, EPA
should also note it has never undertaken the same assessment related to ICE vehicles. A
sustainable energy economy actually involves a lower level of mineral extraction than a fossil
fuel-based economy.214 For example, the U.S. oil and gas sector has long been dependent on
critical minerals from China for use in oil and gas exploration and development drilling.215 The
2523
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petroleum industry's reliance on barite has even been used as a case study on U.S. critical
minerals dependence.216 Indeed, the American Petroleum Institute has been so concerned about
dwindling global reserves that it altered the specifications for the type of barite used in oil and
gas drilling.217 At no point has the EPA found that this supply chain constraint has impacted the
fuel supply for ICE light-duty vehicles or impacted such vehicles' viability for deployment.218
Accordingly, to the extent such conditions are found in the battery supply chain, it should be
anticipated that they neither diminish the viability of light-duty BEV technology nor will limit
BEV deployment volumes to meet a stringent emission standard that exceeds Alternative 1.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 34]
214 Tesla, Master Plan Part 3 at 31-36 available at https://www.tesla.com/blog/master-plan-part- 3
https://www.tesla.com/blog/master-plan-part-3.
215 See, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Resources, Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral
Resources, Oversight Hearing on "U.S. Energy and Mineral Needs, Security and Policy: Impacts of
Sustained Increases in Global Energy and Mineral Consumption by Emerging Economies Such as China
And India" (March 16, 2005), Statement of W. David Menzie, Geologist, U.S. Geological Survey ("There
are a significant source of a number of mineral commodities for which the U.S. is dependent for imports of
its supplies, and these include things like antimony, barite, fluorspar, magnesium and there are things that
are used in batteries, ceramics, electronic components, flame retardants, metallurgical processing and
petroleum drilling.") available at h ttps://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
109hhrg20126/html/CHRG-1 09hhrg20126.htm.
216 U.S. Geological Survey, "Barite—A Case Study of Import Reliance on an Essential Material for Oil
and Gas Exploration and Development Drilling" available at h
ttps://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2014/5230/pdf/sir2014-5230.pdf; See also, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Hardrock Mining: Trends in U.S. Reliance on Imports for Selected Minerals (Apr. 30, 2019) at 3, available
at https://www.gao.gOv/products/gao-19-434rhttps://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-434r.
217 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2020 at 29 ("In response to concerns about
dwindling global reserves of 4.2-specific-gravity barite used by the oil and gas drilling industry, the
American Petroleum Institute issued an alternate specification for 4.1-specific-gravity barite in 2010.)
available at h ttps://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2020/mcs2020.pdf.
218 It should be noted that the oil and gas industry's supply chain reliance and constraints have been
exemplified by its continued lobbying for exemptions from the Section 301 tariffs for steel and other inputs
said to be key to the industry. See e.g., Independent Petroleum Association of America, Steel and
Aluminum Tariffs & Quotas available at h ttps://www.ipaa.org/tariffs/https://www.ipaa.org/tariffs/
(highlighting supply chain dependence); Daily Energy Insider, API calls for oil, gas industry exemptions
from steel tariffs (may 22, 2018) available at h ttps://dailyenergyinsider.com/news/12579-api-calls-oil-gas-
industry-exemptions-steel-tariffs/.
Regardless, the significant and growing investment in the battery supply chain and
manufacturing capacity and Tesla's own significant responsible sourcing efforts ensure that BEV
deployment will not be limited during the proposed standard's MY 2027-2032 period. As the
IEA recently found, the strong investment in BEV and energy storage will double in 2023 to $30
billion (from 2022) and has already led to a wave of new lithium-ion battery manufacturing
projects around the world totaling an estimated 5.2 TWh of new capacity that could be available
by 2030.219 This has already led overall investment in critical mineral development to increase
30% in 2022, including a 50% increase in lithium resource development followed by similar
focuses on copper and nickel development.220 This expansion is occurring and is expanding so
fast that battery manufacturing capacity is now on track to meet the 2030 milestones set out in
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the IEA's scenario to achieve net zero C02 emissions by 2050.221 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0792, pp. 34-35]
219 IEA, World Energy Investment 2023 (May 25, 2023) available at h ttps://www.iea.org/reports/world-
energy -investment-2023
220 Id., at 104
221 Bloomberg, Solar, Battery Boom Puts Net Zero Path in Reach: Sparklines (May 25, 2023) available at
https://www.bgov.eom/next/news/RV7L4BT0GlKWhttps://www.bgov.com/next/news/RV7L4BT0GlKW
Similarly, the IRA's domestic critical mineral processing and battery manufacturing
incentives have led to exponential levels of investment in the battery supply chain.222 In early
2023, it was already estimated that there were $210 billion of announced domestic BEV
manufacturing investments.223 This expansion is also happening globally with over $300 billion
of announced investment in new battery gigafactories since 2019.224 The U.S. expansion is
occurring so rapidly it is already exceeding official government forecasts.225 An ongoing tally
of this investment shows that these investments are happening throughout the U.S.226 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 35]
222 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, P.L 117-58 (Nov. 15, 2021), Section 13502.
223 Atlas EV Hub, $210 Billion of Announced Investments in Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Headed for
the U.S. (Jan. 12, 2023) available at https://www.atlasevhub.com/data_story/210-billion-of-announced-
investments-in-electric-vehicle-m anufacturing-headed-for-the-u-s
/?utm_source=Center+for+Climate+and+Energy+Solutions+newsletter+list&utm_campaign=7093a6e673-
E MAIL_CAMPAIGN_2022_04_29_03_23_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_36e5120ca4-
7093a6e673-3 03640237
224 Charged, Billions of bucks for US battery plants announced in 2022 (Jan. 12, 2023) available at h
ttps://chargedevs.com/newswire/billions-of-bucks-for-us-battery-plants-announced-in-2022/
225 See generally, Bloomberg, Goldman Sees Biden's Clean-Energy Law Costing US $1.2 Trillion (March
23, 2023) available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-23/goldman-sees-biden-s-clean-
energy-law-costing-us-l-2-t rillion#xj4y7vzkg; See also, Semafor, How Washington underestimated
Biden's big climate law (May 4, 2023) available at h ttps://www.semafor.com/article/05/04/2023/biden-
climate-ira-cost-inflation-reduction-act
226 See, Charged, Update: U.S. Electric Vehicle Supply Chain IRA + 288 Days available at h
ttps://www.charged-the-b ook.com/na-ev-supply-chain-maphttps://www.charged-the-book.com/na-ev-
supply-chain-map (last visited May 31, 2023)
Tesla Development of a Robust, Secure Critical Minerals Supply Chain
As extensively detailed in Tesla's Impact Report 2022, Tesla's efforts to expand this supply
chain are also accompanied with a commitment to ensuring that companies in our supply chain
respect human rights and protect the environment.227 In every location touched by Tesla's
supply chain, the company seeks to ensure local conditions for stakeholders are continuously
improving as a result of the company's investment and sourcing decisions. This commitment is
further detailed in our publicly available Responsible Sourcing Policy, Human Rights Policy, and
Supplier Code of Conduct.228 These policies and our supply chain due diligence efforts are
aligned with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights229 and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s Due Diligence Guidance
for Responsible Business Conduct.230 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 35-36]
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227 Tesla, Impact Reports 2022: A Sustainable Future Is Within Reach at 139 -185 (describing Tesla's
extensive responsible sourcing efforts) available at h ttps://www.tesla.com/impact
228 Tesla, Responsible Sourcing Policies available at h ttps://www.tesla.com/legal/additional-
resources#responsible- s ourcing-policies
229 United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner, Human Rights (2011) available at h
ttps://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf
230 OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct available at h
ttps://www.oecd.org/investment/due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-business-conduct.htm
To that end, Tesla has taken significant steps to establish and develop a robust supply chain
that will support its future deployment of its light-duty vehicles consistent with the production
and deployment estimates Tesla has previously shared with the agency. More specifically, this
has included developing and expanding its vertical integration up the supply chain to include
expanded cell production, build out of a new cathode production facility at Gigafactory Texas,
and breaking ground on the most technologically advanced lithium processing facility in Corpus
Christi.231 The blueprint for this activity was originally unveiled during Tesla's Battery Day
announcement.232 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 35-36]
231 Tesla, Tesla Lithium Refinery Groundbreaking (May 8, 2023) available at h
ttps://www.tesla.com/blog/tesla-lithium- r efinery-groundbreaking
232 Tesla, Battery Day Presentation (Sept. 22, 2020) available at h
ttps://www.tesla.com/2020shareholdermeeting
Consistent with the Administration's focus on critical minerals, Tesla has continued to focus
on creating a secure and sustainable supply chain anchored with domestic sources.233 To that
end, following its Battery Day announcement, Tesla established an off-take agreement for a
domestic source of lithium with plans to process the lithium hydroxide and manufacture cathode
material in the U.S. - creating a first-ever wholly North American upstream advanced battery
supply chain. 234 Additionally, Tesla continues to support partnerships for domestic mineral
production, establishing supply agreements for North America production from Free Trade
Agreement countries.235 Similarly, Tesla has worked to develop commercial relationships with
companies onshoring critical mineral processing.236 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 35-
36]
233 Tesla Impact Report 2022 at 139 -185.
234 Piedmont Lithium, Piedmont Lithium Amends Agreement with Tesla (Jan. 3, 2023) available at h
ttps://piedmontlithium.com/piedmont-lithium-amends-agreement-with-tesla/
235 See, Bloomberg, Tesla Strikes Battery-Metal Deal in Push to Ensure Supply (Jan. 10, 2022) available
at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-10/tesla-talon-enter-into-nickel-concentrate-supply-
a greement#xj4y7vzkg; See e.g., BHP enters into nickel supply agreement with Tesla Inc (July 28. 2021)
available at h ttps://www.bhp.com/news/media-centre/releases/2021/07/bhp-enters-into-nickel-supply-
agreement-with-tesla-inc; Reuters, Australia's Liontown signs 5-year lithium supply deal with Tesla (Feb.
15., 2022) available at https://www.reuters.com/business/australias-liontown-signs-5-year-lithium-supply-
deal-with-tesla-2022-02-15/
236 See, Magnis, Magnis Signs Offtake Agreement for North American Anode Active Material Production
(Feb. 20, 2023) available at https://magnis.com.au/asx-announcements/https://magnis.com.au/asx-
announcements/; Canary Media, DOE backs US battery materials production with $107M loan (April 18,
2022) (describing Tesla's agreement with Syrah for domestic graphite production) available at h
ttps://www.canarymedia.com/articles/batteries/doe-backs-us-battery-m aterials-production-with-107m-loan
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EPA should also consider that recycling of battery material will play a vital role in alleviating
some pressure on the need to develop new critical mineral resources. To that end, Tesla seeks to
reduce its reliance on primary mined materials and contribute to a more positive environmental
footprint through battery and cell recycling - including ensuring that none of our batteries
(manufacturing scrap or fleet returns) go to landfills and deploying equipment to recycle 100%
of on-site generated manufacturing scrap across manufacturing facilities. In comparison to BEV
batteries, it should also be noted the energy source for ICE vehicles - fossil fuels used in
combustion - is not recyclable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 36]
Finally, in furtherance of this effort, Tesla is also supporting other emerging domestic
suppliers in the advanced battery supply chain as they seek developmental support through
various DOE programs, including the Critical Minerals Mining Research and Development
Program237 and the Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing program.238 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 36]
237 See generally, White House, FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Driving U.S. Battery
Manufacturing and Good- Paying Jobs (Oct. 19, 2022) available at h ttps://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2022/10/19/fact- s heet-biden-harris-administration-driving-u-s-battery-
manufacturing-and-good-paying-jobs/
238 See 85 Fed Reg 77202 (Dec. 1, 2020) (providing notice, inter alia, that the ATVM Program broadly to
encourages applications from potential projects involving the production, manufacture, recycling,
processing, recovery, or reuse of Critical Minerals and other minerals.).
Organization: Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF)
The LMD Tailpipe Rule and the market change it would engender will also make the federal
government complicit in the often exploitative practices associated with rare-earth metal mining.
The production and acquisition of rare-earth metals used in electric vehicle batteries is a dirty
business. The extraction and processing of rare-earth metals can have serious environmental
impacts, including soil and water contamination, deforestation, and habitat destruction,
negatively affecting ecosystems and biodiversity. In certain areas, rare-earth metal mining has
also been linked to labor rights violations, poor working conditions, low wages, child labor, and
inadequate safety measures. The batteries that will power the green future the EPA seeks to
create through the LMD Tailpipe Rule bear the stain of these violations of human dignity. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, p. 6]
Overarching Issues Applicable to the HD and LMD Tailpipe Rules [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0510, p. 7]
A transition to zero emission vehicles ("ZEVs") would expose Americans to supply chain
vulnerabilities that are certainly beyond EPA's authority. Wells Fargo projects a risk of shortages
across virtually all of the key components of electric vehicle ("EV") batteries, 1 and many of
these rely on geopolitical rivals who control those supply chains.2 Accordingly, there is a sharp
mismatch between the proposed rule and the availability of critical minerals essential to realizing
its goals.3 Indeed, "mass electrification of the heavy-duty segment on top of the light-duty
segment would substantially increase the lithium demand and impose further strain on the global
lithium supply." 4 Specifically, "[t]he results suggest that global lithium resources will not be
able to sustain simultaneous mass electrification of both the light duty vehicle ("LDV") and
HDV segments."5 It is therefore "recommended that both the government and vehicle
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manufacturers should carefully consider the ambitious promotion of vehicle electrification in the
heavy-duty segment."6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, p. 7]
1 Colin M. Langan, et al., BEV Teardown Series: The Untold Electric Vehicle Crisis, Part 1: Tesla Model
Y-The Pace Car, WELLS FARGO (May 11, 2022).
2 IEA 2022 Global EV Outlook, at 154-58, 179, https:www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022.
3 IEA, World Energy Outlook Special Report - The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions
(Revised March 2022), https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a-
52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMinerasinCleanEnergyTransisions.pdf.]
4 Hao, H., Geng, Y., Tate, J.E. et al., Impact of transport electrification on critical metal sustainability with
a focus on the heavy-duty segment, NAT COMMUN 10, 5398 (2019)
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-13400-l
5 Id.
6 Id.
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
Minerals such as lithium and cobalt are essential for batteries. EPA does not account for the
difficulty of getting these minerals. Mining for these minerals is energy-intensive, and the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has facilitated access to domestic and foreign minerals for
battery production. Lithium is mined in western China's Qinghai Province, aided by government
funding, and China purchases cobalt for electric batteries from Kisanfu, in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. 18 The United States makes opening new mines virtually impossible, even
though the jobs generated would help all Americans, particularly the poor and middle class.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 4-5]
Thus, the rule will result in a massive increase in mining in countries that have no respect for
the environment or human welfare. The sorts of mining that will be conducted as a result of the
rule will be bad for the environment and are frequently performed by child workers. EPA does
not mention potential human rights violations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 4-5]
18 Dionne Searcey, Michael Forsythe, and Eric Lipton, "A Power Struggle Over Cobalt Rattles the Clean
Energy Revolution," New York Times, December 7, 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/ll/20/world/china-congo- cobalt.html (accessed April 28, 2023).
III. The Proposed Rule Would Strengthen China
The EPA rule will strengthen China's economy, because China makes nearly 80% of the
world's electric batteries,28 EPA does not sufficiently examine the ramifications of this
geopolitical shift. This is especially troubling because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a
totalitarian regime which has a poor record both on the environment and on human rights. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 6-7]
Beijing is engaged in genocide against the minority Uyghur people of Xinjiang and has
imposed draconian restrictions on political freedoms in Hong Kong.29 The CCP has reduced or
eliminated religious liberties for Christians and Buddhist worshippers of the Dalai Lama
throughout Tibet.30 Empowering the Chinese government is fundamentally at odds with "good
corporate governance." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 6-7]
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28 Veronika Henze, "China's Battery Supply Chain Tops BNEF Ranking for Third Consecutive Time, with
Canada a Close Second," BloombergNEF, November 12, 2022, https://about.bnef.com/blog/chinas-battery-
supply-chain-tops- bnef-ranking-for-third-consecutive-time-with-canada-a-close-second/ (accessed April
28, 2023).
29 James J. Carafano et al., "Winning the New Cold War," p. 24.
30 Ibid., p. 3.
Rather than using its own oil and natural gas resources, America will depend on batteries
from China to run its fleet of cars. Countless other renewable energy components and
technologies also depend to a large extent on Chinese supply chains. For instance, many of the
components of batteries will either be sourced, processed, or manufactured in China for the
foreseeable future. Middle-class Americans are losing jobs at Stellantis, Ford, and GM due to the
forced switch to electric vehicles. Recent efforts to require battery manufacturing in the U.S.
mask the source of the components. In contrast, none of the gasoline or diesel fuels for
transportation are from China. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 6-7]
Security benefits are overstated
The study purports to find small energy security benefits by having less imported oil. See
Table 200. The analysis ignores that United States can well be an oil-exporting, rather than an
oil-importing country. For that reason alone, the stated energy security benefits are likely costs
rather than benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 14]
Moreover, the United States is certainly an importer of rare-earth minerals, and products such
as car batteries that depend on rare-earth minerals. Consequently, while the proposed rule may
have little effect from an oil security perspective, it is likely to have a substantial and negative
effect on security for imports of rare earth minerals, particularly as the control of much rare earth
mineral production is in China. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 14]
No analysis is provided for child labor, which almost certainly would increase with greater
exploitation of rare earth minerals in developing countries and in China, and battery production
in China. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 14]
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
The Proposed Rule also for the first time imposes standards on automakers for which
compliance requires significant actions by third parties over which we (or EPA) have no control.
First, achieving the level of BEVs required by the Proposed Rule will require massive new
supplies of critical minerals, the mines to extract them, and the refining facilities to turn ore into
battery-grade material. Currently, virtually the entire mineral and battery supply chain is outside
the U.S. Second, it requires massive investments in home and public charging infrastructure, as
well as upgrades to the electrical grid throughout the U.S. and an accelerated shift to renewable
power generation. Various provisions of the IIJA and IRA directionally support some of these
areas but fall significantly short of what will be needed for the expected level of electrification.
And finally, the ultimate impact of these factors on vehicle costs and consumer demand are
unclear, at best. The are few contingencies for automakers and our customers in the event any or
all these factors stand in the way of complying with the Proposed Rule. Our comments below
address these and other issues. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 8-9]
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We are prepared to follow up with additional information beyond these comments. We look
forward to collaborating toward a more workable Final Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620,
pp. 8-9]
2. Critical Material Supply
Batteries account for largest cost associated with an electric vehicle. The global supply of
battery critical minerals and the refining of those minerals will ultimately determine PEV costs
as global demand increases nearly five-fold over the next decadel. Hundreds of new mines are
needed globally to produce the critical minerals needed to support this demand. Currently,
virtually all critical mineral extraction and processing are conducted outside the U.S. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 9]
1 BMI Lithium Forecast, Q1 2023.
The proposal outlines various incentives, tax credits, and other mechanisms in the Inflation
Reduction Act (IRA) and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) aimed at speeding the
development of a domestic supply chain, as well as efforts the Administration and private sector
are taking to aid the electrification transition. The IIJA and IRA serve as a necessary down
payment on what will be needed to achieve shared electrification goals but fall far short of what
is needed to achieve the proposed standards. Further, the proposal lacks an actionable plan for
translating funding and goals into specific projects in a manner that will enable automakers to
sell the share of BEVs required to meet the preferred alternative standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, p. 9]
Below is a summary of Toyota's understanding of the critical mineral landscape and supply-
demand challenges over the period of the Proposed Rule, based on extensive collaboration with
experts in the field. Please see Appendix A for a more detailed assessment and accompanying
data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 9]
2.1. Lithium
The proposal identifies lithium as most likely to first constrain PEV production due to limited
availability. EPA contends there will be ample supply of the other critical minerals through 2035
and/or there are known substitute minerals that make their availability less critical2. Therefore,
the proposal's assessment of critical mineral availably is limited to a single mineral - lithium.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 10-11]
2 Multi-Pollutant Emission Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, EPA- 420-D-23-003, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA), April 2023, page 3-23.
EPA's analysis concludes there will be sufficient lithium supply to support the 67 percent
BEV share required by the Proposed Rule and that prices will stabilize mid-decade. However, it
appears this conclusion is based on a global lithium supply that in many cases may not qualify
for the 30D IRA tax credits that EPA applied to most every vehicle in the supporting analyses.
The proposal notes "the Inflation Reduction Act incentivizes use of domestically sourced and
processed mineral products, it only ties these products to availability of the related tax incentives
(primarily the Clean Vehicle Credit under 30D) and does not prohibit use of imported mineral
products by manufacturers that cannot secure domestic sources. Thus, it is the global supply for
lithium, not only domestically sourced supply, that potentially constrains battery production."3
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 10-11]
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3 Id. at 3-24.
As described in more detail in Appendix A, the global supply of lithium is highly unlikely to
satisfy the U.S. demand driven by the preferred alternative standards. Further, the supply-
demand gap grows significantly when lithium sources are limited to U.S. and FTA countries that
qualify for the IRA tax credits. Benchmark Mineral Intelligence (BMI) with partner RhoMotion
conducted a forecast of global lithium supply versus demand through 2035. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 10-11]
The BMI study concludes 41% PEV penetration in 2030 is possible globally without
consideration of available lithium under a business-as-usual base case scenario. When available
global lithium supply is considered, the projected supply-demand gap constrains PEV
penetration to 36% of new vehicles sold globally in 2030. A high-demand scenario incorporates
the announced PEV targets for 41 leading OEMs and additional government policy aspirations
which results in supply-demand deficit starting today that would require U.S. manufacturers to
compete on a global scale for limited lithium - creating many unknown supply bottlenecks.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 10-11]
The BMI/RhoMotion study included a PEV mix of 88 percent BEVs and 12 percent PHEVs
for 2030 in contrast to EPA's assumption of 100 percent BEVs for the proposal. The supply-
demand analysis would have concluded larger shortfalls that would have occurred sooner if BMI
had assumed 100 percent BEVs. The data in these supply-demand figures is for calendar year
rather than vehicle model year. For the sake of this evaluation, the calendar year will be used and
assumed equivalent to the previous model year (ex. 2030 calendar year is the same as 2029
model year). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 10-11]
Projected U.S. refined lithium supply (larger than U.S. mined lithium supply) is far short of
the demand needed to comply with the Proposed Rule -allowing for only a 15% PEV penetration
in 2030 assuming a 100 kWh average battery size. Expanding the lithium supply to FTA
countries that qualify for the IRA tax credits enables higher PEV penetrations. However, the
study finds that the U.S. would need to consume an implausible 99% of U.S. and FTA lithium
supply to attain a 60% PEV (80% BEV/20% PHEV) share in 2030 for an assumed battery size of
100 kWh. In the more realistic case where the aggregate demand from other FTA countries in
addition to the U.S. is considered, a deficit occurs after 2028 in the base case demand scenario
(41%) PEV in 2030) and would occur sooner and grow faster if U.S. demand is increased to attain
the 60%) PEV penetration in 2030 being proposed. Supply from IRA-compliant U.S. and FTA
countries would support only a 25% U.S. PEV penetration in 2030 for a 100 kWh average
battery size if FTA countries meet their lithium demand first before providing excess refined
lithium supply to existing U.S. domestic supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 10-11]
Mined lithium supply from Australia, an FTA country, could potentially satisfy U.S. demand
driven by the proposed standards and make the proposal's assumptions about IRA cost savings
more realistic. However, 96% of Australian supply is currently sold to and refined in China, a
foreign entity of concern. Quickly relocating Australian supply to a US+FTA country faces
significant hurdles given existing business partnerships and the effort to establish new
partnerships with capital- and operational-intensive infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0620, pp. 10-11]
2.2. Graphite and Nickel
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As described in Appendix A, data indicate graphite will be more constraining than lithium.
The U.S. currently does not produce any natural graphite and relies on imports mainly from
China. The U.S. is projected to have a combined 22k tonnes of graphite refining capacity per
year by 2030. USA+FTA countries are projected to reach 203k tonnes per year.4 For an average
BEV battery size of 70 kWh, the graphite produced from US+FTA countries would support 2.9
million BEVs per year in 2030 which would satisfy only 18% of the projected new vehicle sales
in 2030. To comply with the 60% BEV share driven by the proposed standard in 2030, 66% of
refined graphite would need to be procured from global supplies that are outside of US+FTA
control and may not qualify for important IRA benefits to incentivize vehicle purchases. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 12]
4 Cite BNEF "Metals Data Hub" online database, last updated Oct. 2022.
Nickel is also experiencing tight supply with a focus on mining in a single country, Indonesia,
which is projected to comprise over 50% of global mined nickel battery material in 2030.
Growing geopolitical and environment concerns surrounding Ni mining in Indonesia are causing
instability, and it is still not known whether Treasury Department guidance will consider
Indonesia as an FTA country, although Indonesia has proposed such status recently.5 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 12]
5 Citation: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/violence-indonesia-nickel-smelter-protest-kills-2-
dozens- detained-2023-01-16/.
2.3. Mining
Over the next decade, projected critical mineral demand will require the development of over
300 new mines.6 EPA's projections for new mines do not account for the significant risk of
announced mines failing to reach the operational stage and the extensive lead times for the
successful ventures to reach efficient operation. The proposal claims significant deposits of
nickel, cobalt, lithium, and graphite in the U.S. remain undeveloped. The proposal notes DOE
has identified 19 mines in addition to three mines from a December 2022 study and concludes
these sources could likely advance lithium sufficiency well beyond 2028. When inherent risk
factors are considered, only 18 out of 50 proposed or announced lithium mining projects in the
U.S. are expected to be operational by 2035, according to BMI. For those mines that do reach the
production stage, lead times can take 4-7 years without delays for lithium mining and 13-19
years for new nickel mining, according to IEA. Permitting and related environmental concerns
add to lead time and are more extensive in the U.S. due to strict regulations and oversight -
unlike mining operations in many parts of the world. Over 70% of mineral reserves are within 35
miles of tribal lands, which can further complicate the approval process with government
authorities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 12-13]
6 Benchmark Source, More than 300 new mines required to meet battery demand by 2035 (Sep. 6, 2022);
htps://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/more-than-300-new-mines-required-to-meet-batery-demand-
by-203 5.
2.4 Price Volatility
The economics behind the forecasted tight global lithium supply are at odds with EPA's claim
that "the price for Lithium is likely to stabilize at or near its historical levels by the mid-2020s".7
In this fragile condition of tight supply, every step of complex and intertwined global operations
must fall perfectly into place as planned to avoid price spikes. BMI suggests that lithium prices
2532
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will stabilize, but there is ongoing risk of underestimating potential volatility resulting from
future shocks to the system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 13]
7 88 Fed. Reg. at 29313.
Clearly higher mineral prices affect PEV manufacturing costs and then have a commensurate
effect on sales volumes. Mining operations have an incentive to minimize risk and thus err on the
side of undersupply because excess supply causes prices to drop and profits to decline.
According to numerous analysts, such a situation unfolded when a temporary "excess" of global
supply spurred by an increase in lithium mining projects occurred at the same time PEV sales
slowed in China because of expiring subsidies. These combined events resulted in the current
lower lithium prices which are expected to remain through the 2026 timeframe but are not
expected to hold, as mining and refining companies will adjust supply to avoid that less
profitable scenario.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 13]
8 https://internationalbanker.com/brokerage/why-are-lithium-prices-collapsing.
3. Battery and Component Production
Toyota's assessment of production capacity aligns with DOE's projections referenced in the
proposal where expected growth based on new plant announcements in North America is
estimated to reach 838 GWh annual capacity by 2025 and 998 GWh by 2030. Just as with
mining operations, there is lead time to establish a battery factory and then ramp up production.
Constructing new facilities, scaling up operations, and training a new workforce is challenging
and takes time. According to e-Source, it takes about 4 years to reach full scale battery
production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 14-15]
- Year 1: 75% for full year's production
- Year 2: 85% for full year's production
- Year 3: 87% (89.5% by end of the year) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 14-15]
3.1. Midstream Constraints
Battery manufacturing capacity is less a constraint to achieving future BEV adoption than the
upstream supply chain steps for sourcing the minerals. The proposal notes preliminary
projections prepared by Li-Bridge for DOE in November 2022 indicate that global supplies of
cathode active material (CAM) and lithium chemical product are expected to be sufficient
through 2035. 10 However, more recent assessments project shortfalls for upstream mining and
the midstream processing and cathode/anode production capacity to supply the new battery
factories with the necessary battery minerals. 11 Leveraging data from BMI, BNEF (Bloomberg
New Energy Finance), e-Source and IHS Markit, we find that with U.S. battery manufacturing at
100 percent capacity is sufficient to meet EPA's proposed requirements at 70 kWh average
battery size. However, the production of US cathode manufacturing is in severe deficit, even to
achieve the previously discussed base case of 41% PEV penetration in 2030 (Figure 1). [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 15-17]
10 88 Fed. Reg. at 29319.
11 Benchmark Minerals, Report, Q1 2023.
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[See original for graph, "Figure 1 U.S. Cathode Supply-Demand Forecast] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 15-17]
For this important mid-stream step of cathode manufacturing, a similar deficit of US+FTA
sourced cathode material also occurs for a base case 41% BEV penetration rate in 2030. Again,
production is not constrained by battery manufacturing capacity but rather by US+FTA cathode
manufacturing capacity as illustrated in Figure 2. China makes up 83% of cathode manufacturing
with Japan and S Korea at 15%, and the rest of the world at 2%. Because Japan and S. Korea are
already included in US+FTA supply, a significant ramp up of new cathode manufacturing in
IRA-compliant countries is needed to meet US base case demand and EPA proposed
requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 15-17]
[See original for graph, Figure 2 U.S. FTA Cathode Supply-Demand Forecast] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 15-17]
3.2. Conclusion
Battery production is less of a constraint than the materials and midstream production that
feed into that process. In addition to cell manufacturing, the assessment supporting the Final
Rule needs include the capacity of cathode and anode active material manufacturing and the
resulting impact on battery and ultimately PEV costs. The Final Rule needs to account for the
lead time associated with establishing new facilities and ramping up production operations to full
scale capacity. Finally, cost assessments supporting the Final Rule need to account for the share
of production that will not qualify for the IRA benefits which could affect the modeled BEV
penetrations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 17]
4. Battery Costs Projections
EPA's assessment of future battery costs is highly optimistic and inconsistent with available
sources. The assessment starts with an inaccurate baseline cost for 2022 and then uses an
incomplete set of forecasts to develop two trajectories which rely on assumed mid-decade price
stabilization of lithium. The assessment appears to ignore the risk for price spikes arising in a
tight and geopolitically sensitive market for critical minerals. Please see Appendix A on mineral
supply and potential price implications. Lastly, EPA applies tax credits from the IRA 45X
provision in a confusing way that could go beyond the intent of the legislation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, p. 18]
According to Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (BMI), battery demand in North America is
forecast to grow nearly five-fold between 2022 and 2030 and with that the demand for the finite
supply of critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and graphite that go into producing
batteries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 50]
The proposed rule identifies lithium as the material most likely to first constrain PEV
production due to limited availability. EPA believes there will be ample supply of the other
critical minerals through 2035 and/or there are known substitute minerals that make their
availability less critical. 1 Therefore, the proposal's assessment of critical mineral availably is
limited to a single mineral - lithium. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 50]
1 Multi-Pollutant Emission Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, EPA- 420-D-23-003, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA), April 2023, page 3-23.
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Toyota agrees lithium availability is likely to constrain global PEV production and put
upward pressure on lithium pricing, but is also concerned about graphite supplies. Both minerals
will be in tight supply sooner and for longer than projected by EPA's outdated sources2, which
do not reflect the current market dynamics for battery demand and material supply in a rapidly
changing market landscape. At a minimum, the final rule must use updated data to reflect current
battery and non-battery demand, mined supply, and battery plant announcements with pragmatic
supply forecasts which show that not every announcement will lead to production. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 50]
2 Ibid pages 29319 to 29323 for examples.
Further, the analyses of critical material supply must distinguish the country of origin because
it determines whether the IRA benefits used to justify aggressive BEV cost reductions apply. The
IRA-qualifying supply of lithium, graphite, nickel, and cobalt and deserve a deeper evaluation to
support the final rule. For example, nickel is also experiencing tight supply with a focus on
mining in a single country, Indonesia, which is projected to comprise over 50% of global mined
nickel battery material in 2030. Growing geopolitical and environment concerns surrounding Ni
mining in Indonesia are causing instability, and it is still unknown whether Treasury will
consider Indonesia as an FTA country as it requested.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 50]
3 Citation: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/violence-indonesia-nickel-smelter-protest-kills-2-
dozens- detained-2023-01-16/.
1. Lithium Constrained PEV Penetration - Global
Toyota's assessment of global lithium supply and demand is more aligned with the
projections of IEA and BNEF studies that project lithium mine production may not meet end-use
demand after 20284. Benchmark Mineral Intelligence (BMI), leveraging transportation demand-
side market data from their partner RhoMotion, forecasts global lithium supply versus demand
through 2035. Figure 1 below forecasts a business-as-usual base case5 global PEV penetration at
41% in 2030 with an average battery size of 68 kWh. This assumes an unconstrained lithium
supply. Taking forecast global lithium supply into account results in supply-demand a gap
emerging around 2028. This widening deficit in supply leads to a constrained PEV penetration of
36% new sales in 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 51-53]
4 88 Fed. Reg 29184 (May 5, 2023) at 29321.
5 For the base case, BMI "subsegments each demand market by end application, [and] considers
government intervention that can impact adoption/use of application, OEM strategies and technology
roadmaps, historical trends to understand consumer behaviour, economics and material
availability/capacity build out to determine forecasted adoption of each application. This then amalgamates
into [an] overall demand for each market by chemistry and region." The BMI analysis considers lithium
demand for battery and non-battery sources (including heavy duty vehicles).
It is important to acknowledge two things. One, the supply shown in these comments utilizes
the original source's (e.g. BMI, BNEF) de-risked supply scenario, meaning not 100% capacity,
unless otherwise stated. Second, increased demand will motivate an increase in future supply
project announcements. The challenge is how quickly the announced sources become operational
and produce the quantities needed for compliance with the proposed standards. These operational
challenges are discussed later in this section of our comments. Figure 1 shows the global PEV
2535
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penetration rates in the base case as provided by BMI/RhoMotion, which includes incentives
stemming from the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 51-53]
[See original for graphs, Figure 1 Global Lithium Supply-Demand Forecast] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 51-53]
With the proposed rule essentially forcing -60% BEVs in 2030, the global lithium gap would
increase with heterogenous effects of supply-demand balance in the US and different countries,
which is described further for the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 51-53]
The BMI study included a PEV mix of 88 percent BEVs and 12 percent PHEVs for 2030 in
contrast to EPA's assumption of 100 percent BEVs for the proposal. The supply-demand
analysis would have concluded larger shortfalls that would have occurred sooner if BMI had
assumed 100 percent BEVs. The data in these supply-demand figures is for calendar year rather
than vehicle model year. For the sake of this evaluation, the calendar year will be used and
assumed equivalent to the previous model year (ex. 2030 calendar year is the same as 2029
model year). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 51-53]
BMI and RhoMotion have also developed a global forecast for a high-demand scenario shown
in 1 which incorporates the announced PEV targets for 41 leading OEMs and additional
government policy aspirations. In this scenario, the lithium supply-demand balance immediately
goes into deficit. This materiality limitation demonstrates how the attainment of ambitious OEM
PEV targets and government policy aspirations in aggregate, which are insufficiently considered
in the proposed standards, would require US manufacturers to compete on a global scale for
limited lithium creating many unknown supply bottlenecks. Lithium supply constraints are next
discussed in terms of domestic US supply and then US and Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
country supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 51-53]
2. Lithium Constrained PEV Penetration - IRA Compliant
2.1. US Domestic Supply
First and not surprisingly, the forecast clearly shows that the U.S.-based lithium mined
capacity and refined capacity (de-risked supply) is able to supply only 33% and 51%,
respectively, of the lithium needed for base case U.S. demand at 41% PEV penetration in 2030,
with an average pack size of 70 kWh. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 54-57]
[See original for graph, Figure 2 U.S. Domestic Lithium Supply-Demand Forecast] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 54-57]
Thus, to meet base case demand requires sourcing the remaining lithium from outside of the
U.S. both for mining and refining purposes. Figure 2 shows this in more detail. Domestic supply
shrinks to only 32% of required lithium supply needed to satisfy a 60% PEV share for an
assumed average battery size of 70 kWk (red dashed line) and only 23% the required lithium for
an average 100 kWh battery (red dotted line) that is referenced in the proposal. This means for a
100 kWh battery, U.S. lithium supply could meet demand for approximately 15% PEV
penetration in 2030, 45% less than 60% BEV penetration EPA is seeking through the proposal.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 53-54]
2.2. US +FTA Supply
2536
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The lithium supply-demand gap narrows but continues when sourcing is extended to the Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) countries that qualify for IRA tax credits. Data from BMI, RhoMotion,
e-Source and IHS Markit show (see Figure 3) that 45% of USA+FTA refined lithium supply
would be needed to meet US demand for the 41% PEV base case penetration in 2030.
Compliance with EPA's proposed requirements in 2030, would consume 71% of USA+FTA
refined lithium supply for an average pack size of 70 kWh and 99% of USA+FTA supply for the
EPA-referenced average 100 kWh battery. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 54-57]
[See original for graph, Figure 3 U.S.+FTA Lithium Supply Required to Meet Proposed 60%
PEV Share] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 54-57]
When we consider the lithium demand of Free Trade Agreement countries in addition to the
U.S. (i.e. US+FTA lithium), the aggregate increased demand results in a deficit after 2028 in the
base case demand scenario as seen in Figure 4. If US demand is increased to attain a 60% PEV
penetration in 2030, the deficit will move early relative to 2028 depending on the PEV ramp-up
required to meet EPA requirements. If the FTA countries are allowed to meet their Li demand
first before providing excess to U.S. domestic supply, the U.S. PEV penetration rate is
constrained to 36% in 2030 with an average pack size of 70 kWh. Supply from IRA-compliant
U.S. and FTA countries would support only a 25% U.S. PEV penetration in 2030 for a 100 kWh
size battery if FTA countries meet their lithium demand first before providing excess refined
lithium supply to existing U.S. domestic supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 54-57]
[See original for graphs, Figure 4 U.S.+FTA Lithium Supply-Demand Forecast]
It should be noted that FTA mined supply includes Australia, which is the largest current
source of lithium (over 50% of global supply) in the world through its spodumene supply and
would qualify under the IRA provisions. However, today 96% of Australian supply is currently
sold to and refined in China, a foreign entity of concern. 6 If the refining of Australian supply
could relocate to a US+FTA country, the expanded source of lithium supply could potentially
satisfy U.S. demand driven by the proposed standards and make the proposal's assumptions
about IRA cost savings more realistic as illustrated in Figure 5. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0620, pp. 54-57]
6 https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202207/1270447.shtml.
Quickly shifting significant amounts of the Australian mined supply would be extremely
challenging. While refineries are faster to build than mines, such an undertaking could be
impractical considering existing business partnerships and the effort to establish new
partnerships with capital- and operational-intensive infrastructure. It would be most efficient for
Australia to establish local refining; however, BMI forecasts Australian refining capacity to be
about 15% of China's capacity in 2030. The Australian government has reported that it could
provide 20% of the world's needed refining capacity in 2027.7 However, delays are already
occurring for current refining projects and there is uncertainty as to whether Australia will be
able to compete with China on prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 54-57]
7 https://www.power-technology.com/news/australia-to-end-dependence-on-china-for-lithium.
[See original for graph, Figure 5 U.S.+FTA Lithium Supply-Demand: Australia Supply
Included] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 54-57]
3. Graphite Constraints
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The proposal categorizes graphite as a substitutable material noting "the role of natural
graphite in many cases can be served by artificial graphite or highly refined hard or amorphous
carbon. However, lithium has no substitute in commercially produced automotive applications at
this time "8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 57-59]
8 Multi-Pollutant Emission Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, EPA- 420-D-23-003, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA), April 2023, page 3-23.
Toyota understands that IRA-qualifying graphite could restrict US battery production and
constrain PEV sales more so than lithium. The U.S. currently does not produce any natural
graphite and must rely on imports where most originates from China. Despite growth of natural
graphite mining in Africa, which is projected to take over China as the major source of graphite
in the mid- 2020s9, the majority of graphite processing called spheroidization which is necessary
to improve battery performance takes place in China (see Figure 6). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0620, pp. 57-59]
9 https://www.greencarcongress.com/2022/08/20220807-benchmark.html.
[See original for graphic, Figure 6 Countries of Origin for Graphite] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0620, pp. 57-59]
China controls every stage of the graphite supply chain and was responsible for almost 60 %
of the world's mined production last year and approximately nearly 99% of graphite processing
because of its scale of operations, established supply, weak environmental requirements, and low
resulting costs. If any portion of a battery's raw material originates from a foreign entity of
concern (including refining), the battery would not qualify for part of the consumer tax credit.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 57-59]
For synthetic graphite, there are three US companies planning to produce a combined 12k
tonnes per year by 2026, up from 2k in 2022.10 Only one company is expected to process natural
graphite in the US (Vidalia) with operations announced to come online in 2023 at 2.5k tonnes
per year and ramp to 10k by 2026. Combined the US is projected to have 22k tonnes of graphite
refining capacity per year by 2030. USA+FTA countries are projected to reach 203k tonnes per
year. 11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 57-59]
10 [FN: PUREgraphite, SGL Carbon, and Amsted Graphite]
11 Cite BNEF "Metals Data Hub" online database, last updated Oct. 2022
As reference, approximately 1 kg of graphite is needed per kWh of battery capacity. For an
average BEV pack size of 70 kWh, the graphite produced from US+FTA countries would
support 2.9 million BEVs per year in 2030 which would satisfy only 18% of the 15,814,296
annual new vehicle sales projected in 2030.12 To comply with the 60% BEV share driven by the
proposed standard in 2030, 66% of refined graphite would need to be procured from global
supplies that are outside of US+FTA control and may not qualify for important IRA benefits to
incentivize vehicle purchases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 57-59]
12 Multi-Pollutant Emission Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, EPA- 420-D-23-003, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA), April 2023, page 4-44.
4. Mining/Processing Limitations
2538
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The proposal claims significant deposits of nickel, cobalt, lithium and graphite in the U.S.
remain undeveloped primarily because of economic considerations. It also recites Biden
Administration and industry efforts toward building a sustainable domestic supply chain and how
the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) will accelerate
that development. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 59-63]
However, the proposal provides no specific roadmap as to how the billions of dollars in
available federal and private funds will translate into a schedule of quantified increases in
domestic material supplies that will enable compliance with the proposed standards. Instead,
EPA relies on anecdotal evidence such as the March 2023 DOE assessment which identified 19
additional lithium production projects in the U.S. in addition to the three BNEF had identified in
a December 2022 study. With this information, EPA concluded that there will be sufficient
lithium supply to meet end-use demand well beyond 2028.13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620,
pp. 59-63]
13 88 Fed. Reg at 29321.
DOE's assessment of the 19 mines appears to ignore the significant uncertainty associated
with starting mining operations. The prospect for a mine to reach the production stage and time
that takes hinges on exploration and feasibility studies, approval and permitting processes,
potential for project abandonment and delays, learning rates for new companies, and production
ramp up. When these risk factors are considered, only 18 out of 50 proposed or announced
lithium mining projects in the US are expected to be operational by 2035, according to BMI (see
Figure 7). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 59-63]
[See original for graph, Figure 7 US Probable Lithium Mines] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0620, pp. 59-63]
Further, the 18 mines are expected to produce less than 14,000 tonnes lithium per year which
fills only 19% of the lithium needed to attain a 60% PEV share in 2030 assuming an average
battery size of 70 kWh. These relatively small and young mining operations will not be able to
add a meaningful amount of IRA-qualifying minerals, much less relieve expected tight global
supply. The U.S. will have more refining capacity than mining capacity, meaning it can absorb
and use supply from FTA countries for US production as shown below (Figure 8). However, like
the mining capacity, the refining capacity is insufficient for US demand, accounting for only
28% of US demand driven by a 60% PEV share in 2030, assuming an average battery size of 70
kWh. As refineries can come online faster than mining operations, an increasing in US or
US+FTA refining capacity could reduce this gap. New mining operations are more complicated.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 59-63]
[See original for graph, Figure 8 US Probable Lithium Refineries] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0620, pp. 59-63]
As seen in Figure 9, reaching the operational stage of a mine entails long lead times. As
provided by the IEA below, lead times for lithium mining can take 4-7 years without delays.
New nickel mining operations can take 13-19 years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 59-
63]
[See original for graphic, Figure 9 Mining Project Development Lead Times] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 59-63]
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In the U.S, the time to establish an operating mine can take even longer because of regulatory
requirements that are stricter than many other countries in the world. Recently, the largest
proposed lithium mine at Thacker Pass was approved to start operations but after years of
delay. 14 Repeat examples of multi-year delays in mine production and the growing number of
small and young companies means there is large uncertainty in the ability of supply to ramp up
to meet ambitious demand targets on shorter time scales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp.
59-63]
14 cite: https://www.reuters.com/legal/us-judge-rule-thacker-pass-lithium-mine-case-within-months-2023-
01-05/.
Approvals become more complex and time consuming because the reserves of critical
minerals in the U.S. are tied closely with tribal lands, where over 70% of these reserves are
within 35 miles of tribal lands as seen in Figure 10. Mining at Thacker Pass mentioned above
also carries controversy with its overlap with sacred tribal land. 15 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0620, pp. 59-63]
15 https://www.npr.org/2023/06/28/1184812267/western-tribes-last-ditch-effort-to-stall-a-large-lithium-
mine-in- nevada.
While an increase in mining operations is necessary to meet supply, a reasonable timeline
should be applied to the availability of such supply to meet demand both in terms of time-to-
production and time-to-full production capacity. Data from BMI suggests it can take 1-4 years to
ramp up to full operating capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 59-63]
[See original for bar chart, Figure 10 Proximity of U.S. Mining Resources[ [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 59-63]
Finally, the resolution of environmental concerns can delay the development and opening of
new mines. Environmental Sustainability and Governance issues surrounding mining are gaining
increased attention. For example, particulate emissions may prove a challenge for natural
graphite mines in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 59-63]
In summary, establishing mining and processing operations and reaching full, efficient
operational entails significant risk and a decade-long process if successful. It is extremely
unlikely the U.S. can attain significant mining capacity in the period of the proposed standards.
However, increasing refining capacity could be a means to alleviating supply deficits. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 59-63]
5 Price Volatility
Forecasts for ongoing tight global lithium supply are at odds with EPA's claim that "the price
for Lithium is likely to stabilize at or near its historical levels by the mid-2020s."16 The forecast
of strong demand coupled with tight supply over the next decade creates an economic recipe for
price volatility. In this fragile condition, every step of complex and intertwined global operations
must fall perfectly into place as planned to avoid price spikes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620,
pp. 63-65]
16 Multi-Pollutant Emission Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, EPA- 420-D-23-003, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA), April 2023, page 3-21.
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BMI suggests that lithium prices will stabilize (see Figure 11), but there is risk of
underestimating potential volatility resulting from future shocks to the system. Historic price
volatility has been primarily caused by localized shocks which are impossible to forecast but can
have large consequences. For example, the lithium price shock below, driven by the covid-19
pandemic created supply restrictions, which increased prices and spurred supply growth, which
has in turn depressed prices again. We will not know if such a spike will occur again until it
happens. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 63-65]
[See original for chart, Figure 11 Historic Lithium Price Trends] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0620, pp.63-65]
Price fluctuations are expected to be a by-product of transitioning the vehicle fleet to PEVs
while simultaneously establishing the supply base. Demand for PEVs will be determined by
prices remaining in a range consumers can afford which requires sufficient supply so only
modest supply- demand gaps occur. Otherwise, demand will contract due to price
spikes/volatility. Figure 12 is an image of how a too much demand relative to available supply
results in price spikes that suppress demand as part of a feedback loop making it more difficult to
meet any government's PEV targets. Mines and refineries seek to avoid excess supply because it
results in lower prices and profits which is occurring now and expected to persist for the next
few years. Thus, mines and refineries seek conditions that favor high demand and prices, erring
on the side of tight or under supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 63-65]
[See original for graph, Figure 12 Supply-Demand Impacts on Pricing] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0620, pp.63-65]
According to numerous analysts, a temporary "excess" of global supply spurred by more
lithium mining projects in conjunction with slower PEV sales in China because of expiring
subsidies has resulted in the current lower lithium prices which are expected to remain through
the 2026 timeframe but are not expected to hold, as mining and refining companies will adjust
supply to avoid that less profitable scenario. 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 63-65]
17 https://internationalbanker.com/brokerage/why-are-lithium-prices-collapsing.
Mining economics are at odds with EPA's conclusion that "rapid growth in lithium demand
has driven new development of resources and robust growth in supply, which is likely a factor in
recently observed reductions in lithium price, with strong profit margins remaining - even
afterward." 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 63-65]
18 88 Fed. Reg at 29313.
6 Conclusion
A deeper analysis of global and IRA-compliant critical material supply and demand is needed
to support the final rule. The proposal's high-level assessment results in overly optimistic
observations that "critical battery mineral supply is likely to be adequate to meet anticipated
demand, in some cases by a significant margin". 19 The proposal lacks the evidence to support
this finding. Demand for critical minerals today is now higher than the years referenced in the
proposal due to new policy and OEM targets. Future demand growth for PEVs is unclear given
the uncertain geo-political considerations and supply chain operations beyond the control
manufacturers and EPA. It is highly plausible the tight supply-demand for lithium and graphite
will lead to volatile prices and the proposal fails to consider how this could suppress demand and
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annual EV market share. The Final Rule must encompass a significantly deeper analysis based
on a boarder array of sources for assessing global supply-demand by country of origin to support
the use of IRA tax credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 65-66]
19 Id.
Organization: Transfer Flow, Inc
Electric vehicle technologies are the opposite of energy independence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0496, pp. 2-3]
Electric vehicle battery chemistry differs significantly from traditional internal combustion
engine batteries. A conventional internal combustion engine uses a typical lead-acid battery. The
most common battery chemistry used in an electric vehicle is nickel manganese cobalt. The
mining of the raw minerals needed to manufacture the battery packs for electric vehicles has
been linked to many horrific human rights abuses.2'3'4'5'6'7'8'9 There are a limited number of
locations around the world where the minerals needed to manufacture electric vehicle batteries
are found. 70% of the cobalt used in electric vehicle batteries comes from a single country, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. 10 80% of the battery supply chain is owned by China.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 2-3]
2 https://www.euronews.eom/green/2022/10/28/south-americas-lithium-triangle-communities-are-being-
sacrificed-to-save-the-planet
3 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/03/amnesty-challenges-industry-leaders-to-clean-up-their-
batteries/
4 https://www.ft.eom/content/c6909812-9ce4-lle9-9c06-a4640c9feebb
5 https://www.theguardian.eom/environment/2021/jan/03/child-labour-toxic-leaks-the-price-we-could-pay-
for-a- greener-future
6 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/06/business/lithium-mining-race.html
7 https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/business/batteries/congo-cobalt-mining-for-lithium-ion-
battery/
8 https://therevelator.org/ev-batteries-seabed-mining/
9 https://earthworks.org/resources/responsible-minerals-sourcing-for-renewable-energy/
10 https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/23/books/review/cobalt-red-siddharth-kara.html
The United States not owning the electric vehicle battery supply chain is especially
concerning when we consider the possibility of a natural disaster or, heaven forbid, an
international conflict. As we have seen recently in several local domestic terrorist attacks,
11'12'13'14 an attack on the power grid could render electric vehicles located in affected regions
useless. According to the United States Geological Survey, a major earthquake (M>=6.7) will
likely strike California by 2032.15 We have recently seen in the wake of Hurricane Ian in Florida
that electric vehicles are dangerous and ineffective in situations of natural disaster. 16 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 2-3]
11 https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/04/us/us-power-grid-attacks/index.html
12 https://lasvegassun.com/news/2023/feb/12/call-attacks-on-the-us-power-grid-what-they-are-do/
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13 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/physical-attacks-on-power-grid-rose-by-71-last-year-compared-to-
2021/
14 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-men-plead-guilty-conspiring-provide-material-support-plot-attack-
power-grids-united
15 https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/events/1906calif/18april/whenagain.php
16 https://abc7.com/hurricane-ian-ev-car-fires-electric-cars-damaged-florida-flood-damage/12356326/
Many consumers disapprove of the government dictating which near-zero technologies
they're allowed to utilize. Unfortunately, the EPA has not provided for a battery directive such as
the UN has required setting sustainability requirements for batteries placed on the market,
including responsible sourcing of raw materials, hazardous substances, carbon footprint, and
measures to improve the collection, treatment, and recycling of these waste batteries ensuring
materials recovery. Many concerned citizens do not support the human rights violations
associated with mining cobalt, lithium, and other minerals required for battery manufacturing.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
Organization: U.S. Chamber of Commerce
- Underdeveloped and unsecure supply chains for electric vehicle batteries and other
components. Electric vehicles need approximately six times more minerals than a conventional
vehicle, and the International Energy Agency estimates that EV- related demand for these
minerals will increase almost 30-fold through 2050. The auto industry and other sectors facing
growing supply chain concerns are working with the mining sector to address projected shortfalls
of these critical minerals and associated refining and processing needs, but the challenge is
immense. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0604, p. 2]
Successfully ramping up these efforts will take several years under even the most optimistic
scenarios. This is a major reason why the proposed rule's aggressive and front-loaded "ramp
rate" is not realistically achievable, and could in fact exacerbate energy security issues associated
with China's current dominance of global critical mineral supply chains. While recently enacted
R&D programs and tax incentives are certain to help attract battery manufacturing and assembly
investments necessary for the downstream end of the supply chain, a more comprehensive
approach including faster permitting is needed. In particular, the Chamber urges the
Administration to reverse course on its opposition to domestic mining projects required to source
the raw materials necessary for manufacturing EV batteries on the scale envisioned by this
proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0604, p. 2]
Organization: United Steelworkers (USW)
As our union represents the majority of unionized workers in the auto supply chain and
workers in the oil sector, we have grave concerns regarding this proposed rule's impact on their
livelihoods, and the negative impact that the rapid implementation of ZEVs will have on our
electric grid and domestic supply chain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, p. 1]
EPA should coordinate with the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of
Transportation (DOT), and the Department of Commerce (DOC) to better understand how its
regulatory timelines correspond with the investments that will support regulatory compliance.
More to this point, the Administration continues to delay rollout of the Build America, Buy
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America provisions in the IIJA, which is hindering domestic manufacturing investments for a
variety of products, including products contributing to the transition to low-emissions
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, p. 4]
Further, the domestic supply chain for components and the charging infrastructure isn't close
to being readily available. 10 This proposed rule does not strike a balance between the ambition
to reduce emissions and the practicality of the disruption in the supply chain. If EPA requires
automakers to achieve far-reaching standards in an unreasonable time frame, they will rely on
cheap, readily available components from countries, like the People's Republic of China (PRC),
where a large amount of the current ZEV supply chain is located. 11 Encouraging sourcing
products from the PRC and similar countries does not advance best practices to reduce our
environmental footprint as the use of coal to power manufacturing facilities is still prevalent
there. 12 The potential offshoring of the automotive supply chain not only harms manufacturing
workers and communities in the U.S., it also allows automakers to cut their costs in pursuit of
lower environmental and labor standards abroad. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, p. 5]
10 Alliance for Automotive Innovation, (Link: https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/blog/epas-ev-rules-
what-it-means-for-china-and-the-us-auto-market )"EPA's EV Rules: What it Means for China and the U.S.
Auto Market", June 12, 2023.
11 Foley & LardnerLLP, (Link: https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2023/04/epa-passenger-
heavy-duty-emissions-standards )"EPA Moves to Tighten Passenger and Heavy-Duty Vehicle Emissions
Standards; Seeks to Drive Majority of New U.S. Car Sales to EVs by 2030", April 13, 2023.
12 National Public Radio, (Link: https://www.npr.org/2023/03/02/1160441919/china-is-building-six-times-
more-new-coal-plants-than-other-countries-report-fin) "China is building six times more new coal plants
than other countries, report finds", March 2, 2023.
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
Moreover, in April 2023, Toyota sent its dealers a "Hybrid Memo" pointing out that "There
are three major barriers to widespread battery electric vehicle adoption in the United States" -
critical minerals, charging infrastructure, and affordability. Noting that the amount of raw
materials in one BEV could be used to make 6 PHEV or 90 hybrid electric vehicles, the memo
concludes that "An 'all of the above' electrification strategy is the bridge to get us to lower
overall carbon emissions." 127 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
127 https://jalopnik.eom/toyota-focusing-on-hybrids-not-electric-vehicles-1850440908
EPA also cites to a July 2021 Stellantis announcement regarding its "intensified focus on
electrification across all of its brands." 128 Yet, EPA does not consider qualifying statements like
those made by Stellantis CEO Carlos Tavares in May 2022, in which he stated that he expects a
shortage of EV batteries by 2024-2025, followed by a lack of raw materials for the vehicles by
2027-2028.129 Mr. Tavares has also provided that "[yjou'll see that the electrification path,
which is a very ambitious one, in a time window that has been set by the administrations is going
to bump on the supply side". 130 Further, in response to EPA's proposed rule, Chrysler parent
Stellantis has said it remains "committed to reducing vehicle emissions," adding "we are
surprised that none of the alternatives align with the President's previously announced target of
50% EVs by 2030 "131 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
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128 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29191(citing to Stellantis, "Stellantis Intensifies Electrification While
Targeting Sustainable Double-Digit Adjusted Operating Income Margins in the Mid-Term," Press Release,
July 8, 2021).
129 Reuters, "Automotive industry faces long term battery, raw material supply issues, Tavares says" (May
10, 2022) https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/automotive-industry-faces-long-term-
battery-raw-material-supply-issues-tavares-2022-05-10/ (emphasis added).
130 Wayland, Michael, "Stellantis CEO warns of electric vehicle battery shortage, followed by lack of raw
materials (May 24, 2022) https://www.cnbc.eom/2022/05/24/stellantis-ceo-warns-of-ev-battery-shortage-
lack-of-raw- materials.html.
131 Root, Al, "Car Makers Don't Love EPA's EV Plan. Here's What Ford, GM, and Others Are Saying,
Barrons (April 13, 2023) https://www.barrons.com/articles/ev-epa-emissions-what-auto-makers-say-
9abaedd6?ns=prod/accounts-barrons.
Further, EPA provides that "in January 2021, General Motors announced plans to become
carbon neutral by 2040, including an effort to shift its light-duty vehicles entirely to zero-
emissions by 2035."132 Yet GM's 10-K filed in January 2023 caveats that: 133 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
132 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29190 (citing to General Motors, "General Motors, the Largest U.S.
Automaker, Plans to be Carbon Neutral by 2040," Press Release, January 28, 2021).
133 GM's 10-K Annual Report for the 2022 Fiscal Year, https://investor.gm.com/static-files/54bdb095-
143e-4b96-b6d5-25937910b59c (emphasis added).
"[A]ny increase in the cost, or reduced availability, of critical materials for our EV propulsion
systems, including lithium, nickel, cobalt and certain rare earth metals, could lead to higher
production costs for our EVs and could impede our ability to successfully deliver on our EV
strategy. Further, increasing global demand for, and uncertain supply of, such materials could
disrupt our or our suppliers' ability to obtain such materials in a timely manner and/or could lead
to increased costs. Geopolitical risk, fluctuations in supply and demand, fluctuations in interest
rates, any weakening of the U.S. dollar and other economic and political factors have created and
may continue to create pricing pressure for commodities, raw materials and other inputs." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
GM's 10-K further disclosed that its "business in China subjects [it] to unique operational,
competitive and regulatory risks" and that "[i]ncreased competition, continued U.S.-China trade
tensions or weakening economic conditions in China, among other factors, may result in cost
increases, price reductions, reduced sales, profitability and margins, and challenges to gaining or
holding market share." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
Other auto-manufacturers have similar views. In response to EPA's proposed rule, a Hyundai
spokesperson provided that "[t]he proposed vehicle emission rules released by EPA will be
challenging to meet and will require further expansion of charging infrastructure, consumer
incentives and supply chains". 134 Regarding Tesla, after stating that the BEV manufacturer aims
to produce 20 million EVs per year before 2030,135 CEO Elon Musk clarified that Tesla's target
is an "aspiration, not a promise ... we may stumble and not reach that goal". 136 In June 2022,
Elon Musk further stated that "[b]oth [of Tesla's] Berlin and Austin factories are gigantic money
furnaces right now. It's like a giant roaring sound, which is the sound of money on fire". 137
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
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134 Root, Al, "Car Makers Don't Love EPA's EV Plan. Here's What Ford, GM, and Others Are Saying,
Barrons (April 13, 2023) https://www.barrons.com/articles/ev-epa-emissions-what-auto-makers-say-
9abaedd6?ns=prod/accounts-barrons.
135 Dean, Grace, "Elon Musk says Tesla will 'probably' make 20 million electric vehicles a year by 2030
- more than 50 times what it produced last year" (Sep. 28, 2020) https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-
musk-tesla- likely-20-million-electric-vehicles-year-2030-2020-9.
136 See https://www.ft.com/content/fbe8843e-ld2e-4a25-bce8-dcf77304fc37 (emphasis added).
137 Ohnsman, Alan, "Musk Calls Tesla's Berlin, Austin Plans 'Money Furnaces' Amid Startup Snags"
(June 22, 2022) https://www.forbes.com/sites/alanohnsman/2022/06/22/musk-calls-teslas-berlin-austin-
plants-money- furnaces-amid-startup-snags/?sh=720166b56adl.
EPA's reliance on a September 2022 Report from the Environmental Defense Fund and ERM
is also similarly inadequate. Specifically, EPA states that its "Figure 1, taken from work by the
Environmental Defense Fund and ERM, illustrates how these and other announcements mean
that virtually every major manufacturer of light-duty vehicles is already planning to introduce
widespread electrification across their global fleets in the coming years." 138 But EPA does not
sufficiently consider the entirety the EDF and ERM report it relies on, which also states as
follows: 139 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 27-28]
138 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29191 (citing to Environmental Defense Fund and ERM, "Electric Vehicle
Market Update: Manufacturer Commitments and Public Policy Initiatives Supporting Electric Mobility in
the U.S. and Worldwide," September 2022).
139 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29191 (citing to Environmental Defense Fund and ERM, "Electric Vehicle
Market Update: Manufacturer Commitments and Public Policy Initiatives Supporting Electric Mobility in
the U.S. and Worldwide" at 31, September 2022) (internal citations omitted).
"Prices of key minerals and metals, like lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, and aluminum that are
required components for battery manufacturing, increased in 2021 with this price trend
predicated to continue through 2022. In recent research from IEA, cathode materials (lithium,
nickel, cobalt, and manganese), essential for lithium-ion batteries, accounted for less than five
percent of battery pack costs in the middle of the last decade. However, this share has risen to
over 20 percent in recent years. The price of lithium and cobalt more than doubled in 2021, with
lithium increasing two and a half times since the start of 2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
pp. 27-28]
IEA also expects that with ongoing geopolitical conflicts like the Russian invasion of Ukraine
and supply being cut in China, lithium-ion battery pack prices will continue to rise. Russia is a
major producer of minerals like aluminum, accounting for nearly six percent of global
production, ten percent of nickel, and two percent for Class-1 nickel, the only grade used in
lithium-ion batteries. According to IEA, on March 8, 2022, nickel prices soared from $25,000
per metric ton to over $100,000 per metric ton which caused the London Metal Exchange to
suspend the trading of nickel for a week. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 27-28]
According to the U.S. State Department, over 80 percent of the global supply chain of rare
earth elements (important components of lithium-ion batteries and other EV components) is
controlled by China, and Bloomberg NEF found that China holds 77 percent of the world's
battery cell manufacturing capacity and 60 percent of the world's component manufacturing."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 27-28]
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B. EPA fails to adequately address critical minerals supply, availability, and geopolitics.
The IEA states that "[t]his World Energy Outlook special report on The Role of Critical
Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions identifies risks to key minerals and metals that - left
unaddressed - could make global progress towards a clean energy future slower or more costly,
and therefore hamper international efforts to tackle climate change." 147 The IEA Report further
provides that EVs require significant mineral inputs compared with ICE vehicles. 148 For
example, the typical electric car contains six times the mineral resources of a kind susceptible to
supply chain disruptions and volatility. Additionally, demand for EV minerals is growing rapidly
and expected to outpace production in the coming years. Further, the long lead time for the
development of new mines constrains industry's ability to respond to rapid increases in mineral
demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 29-30]
147 International Energy Agency, "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions," World
Energy Outlook Special Report, Revised version. March 2022. https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-
critical-minerals- in-clean-energy-transitions
148 Id.
A recent announcement of Chile's intention to nationalize its lithium production led to
questions regarding lithium supply volatility and security, specifically in the context of EV
supply chains. Other examples of geopolitical and national security risk inherent to EV supply
chains include, but are not limited to, as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 29-30]
"Amid growing demand for lithium in the race for electric vehicle batteries, Mexico last year
nationalized the mineral and created the state-run LitioMx, or Litio Para Mexico." Recently, on
February 18, 2023, Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador signed a decree handing
over responsibility for lithium reserves to Mexico's energy ministry, after nationalizing lithium
deposits in April 2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 29-30]
"Indonesia is home to 22% of the world's nickel reserves, and its ban on nickel ore
exports since 2020 has caused major shifts in the supply chains of strategic products such as
electric vehicles and rocket engines." Nickel is a crucial material in the production of EV battery
cathodes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 29-30]
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
Many uncertainties remain (supply chains, tariffs, infrastructure, incentives) so it is very
important that government pursue policies that encourage auto industry investment and jobs,
development of the electric vehicle market and advancement of motor vehicle safety. With the
right complementary government policies, this rulemaking presents an opportunity for
government and industry to pursue these shared goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 5-
6]
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
Energy Security: EPA makes the specious assertion that the energy security benefits of the
rule will include, ".. .reductions in energy security externalities caused by U.S. petroleum
consumption and imports..." p. 29199 Given the huge supply of American oil and the fact that
the United States is the number one oil producer in the world, EPA strains its credibility by
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justifying the proposed rule in such a way. Unlike the ICEV fleet with its majority consumption
of American oil, EV batteries are sourced from minerals largely mined unsustainably in China
and Africa, as are the minerals required for wind turbines and solar panels. Further, the U.S.
lacks copper and aluminum smelting capacity required to expand the grid and it takes years to
develop new mines. Without expansion, the grid is susceptible to reliability issues. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 4]
EPA's cost-benefit analysis regarding energy security is troublesome, finding that the
proposed rule delivers $21 billion to $42 billion in energy security benefits from reduced oil
imports, but ignoring the security implications of the huge foreign mineral needs arising from the
proposed rule. With huge domestic reserves of oil and the fact that Canada is the primary
exporter to the United States, our country enjoys an energy security benefit in terms of oil. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 4]
The supposed benefit EPA finds from reduced imports pales in comparison to the
overwhelming security cost of the rule from forcing the country to becoming nearly 100%
dependent on China and Africa for EVs and the minerals in them. Figure 28 of the proposed rule
makes the case for us, as it shows the foreign sources of minerals, yet EPA does not analyze the
security implications. In fact, EPA waves away the data on the lack of domestic sourcing with
the statement that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 4]
".. .the development of mining and processing capacity in the U.S. is a primary focus of
efforts on the part of both industry and the Administration toward building a robust domestic
supply chain for electrified vehicle production and will be greatly facilitated by the provisions of
the BIL and the IRA as well as large private business investments that are already underway and
continuing." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 4]
As with the expansion of the grid required to achieve the aggressive EV targets, government
policy that wishes to expand domestic capacity is unlikely to achieve its intended goal, given the
track record of the country over the past several decades in permitting mines, long processing
times for National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis, and other environmental laws
that will continue to slow new mining projects. Further the very actions of this administration to
constrain domestic supplies of minerals, such as EPA denying the water permit for the Pebble
Mine in Alaska and the Interior Secretary withdrawing 225,594 acres in Cook, Lake, and Saint
Louis counties of Minnesota from mineral leasing, belie EPA's sanguinity for domestic supply.
Replicating anywhere near an equivalent for critical minerals as our current vast reserves of oil is
nothing short of a fantasy, particularly by the year 2030 or 2032. The fact that the president and
Congress wish to support domestic supply chains for critical minerals does not mean it will be
so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 4-5]
EPA attempts to wave away this dependency problem on page 29323: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0679, pp. 4-5]
"Finally, it is important to note that utilization of critical minerals is different from the
utilization of foreign oil, in that oil is consumed as a fuel while minerals become a constituent of
manufactured vehicles. That is, mineral security is not a perfect analogy to energy security."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 4-5]
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EPA dismisses serious concerns on the viability of critical mineral access with hopes for long-
term contracts, manufacturing flexibility in substituting one mineral for another as their
availability ebbs and flows, and effective mineral recycling. EPA ignores the mineral needs of
the grid expansion that would be necessary for this rule. However, even assuming that EPA has a
point that mineral security is not the same as energy security, then there should be a
corresponding quantification of the mineral security costs in the cost/benefits analysis of the rule.
There should be an entry in Table 156 right along with the "Energy Security Benefits" itemized
as "Critical Minerals Benefits." Were EPA to perform such an analysis, it would find a huge cost
to national security from critical mineral insecurity that would easily dwarf EPA's finding of an
energy security benefit from the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 4-5]
Affordability/Environmental Justice: EPA is assuming that although the retail price of EVs is
typically higher than for comparable ICEVs at this time, the price difference will narrow or
disappear as the cost of batteries and other components fall in the coming years. EPA is taking a
huge leap of faith in the ability of EV manufacturers to innovate in time for the arbitrary
deadlines imposed by the president and EPA through this rule. Market projections six months
from now are difficult, much less nine years into the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p.
7]
But recent evidence suggests that EPA's assumption is well off the mark. EV battery costs
soared in 2022 due to rising raw material and battery component costs. As countries around the
world attempt to reach similar arbitrary targets for EVs and renewable energy, the competition
for limited supplies of raw materials will likewise grow. 13 Prices for rare earth minerals have
increased between 60% and 400% while prices for lithium have increased by over 300% since
2020.14 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 7]
13
"EV battery costs have soared in 2022, hampering EV affordability," Stephen Edelstein, Green Car
Reports, December 8, 2022.
14 Current Strategic Metals Prices, Strategic Metals Invest and D aily Metals Prices, both accessed July 5,
2023.
Organization: Wisconsin Automobile and Truck Dealers Association
Although the EPA argues the price of EVs will decline and affordability will increase, you
also reference the cost of batteries and other components falling in coming years. Yet the agency
acknowledges that the United States barely exists in the production of copper, nickel, cobalt,
graphite, lithium, and platinum. The control of these products rests with other countries, many of
them, our adversaries. How can the EPA predict the decline in price on products we do not
control and on minerals that are precious and non-renewable? It is also irresponsible to make
such predictions when we are currently experiencing conflicts with China and Russia and
believing the United States can still procure adequate supplies from other countries. The EPA
also acknowledges the United States produces large percentages of oil and natural gas. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0494, p. 1]
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Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
The light- and medium-duty electric vehicle (LMDEV) markets are primed for rapid growth
in the coming years. As discussed further in these comments, hundreds of thousands of vehicles
have already been put on U.S. roadways, the diversity of available EV4 models are growing
exponentially, and battery prices are falling rapidly. Significant investments are being made
throughout the supply chain to support a smooth transition to mass consumer adoption of EVs.
Robust EPA emissions standards will provide the regulatory certainty needed to not only ensure
manufacturers continue to invest in LMDEV technologies but that the entire supply chain
supporting the transition to electrification will have a clearer picture of how to plan capital
expenditures today to meet the increased demand for its products over the coming years. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 5]
4 Unless otherwise noted, ZETA refers to "EVs" in these comments to mean battery-electric vehicles.
c. Electrification Promotes American Economic Competitiveness
Governments around the world are setting more stringent emissions standards to align with
recent announcements from global manufacturers. Ensuring U.S. regulations match or exceed
these ambitions is vital in allowing certainty and encouraging investment in the industry. If the
U.S. does not move more aggressively on LMDEV deployment, it risks ceding market share to
other countries and regions who are moving faster, such as China, the European Union, and
others. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 24]
Complimentary incentives embedded in the IRA will facilitate onshoring of the EV supply
chain while robust EPA emission standards will help ensure the United States becomes and
remains a leader in EV technology development and manufacturing. While more work remains
to craft supportive policies in other areas of the supply chain, EPA emissions standards are
crucial drivers of domestic EV supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 24]
Many countries have made commitments to accelerate EV development and deployment in
their borders. An increase in EV sales is taking place across the world, but has been dominated
by the Chinese market, which accounts for the majority of all new EV registrations. As of 2022,
China had 10.7 million BEVs on the road and the U.S. had 2.1 million. 114 Part of this
dominance is due to China's purchase incentives, high registration fees for ICEVs, a robust
charging network, and national "new energy vehicle" targets. 115 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, p. 24]
114 Id. at footnote 27
115 "An evaluation of government incentives for new energy vehicles in China focusing on vehicle
purchasing restrictions," Energy Policy, (October 2017) https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.07.057
With its own emissions targets, countries in Europe are sending strong signals about the
continent's future electric fleet. Europe is the second-largest market for EVs in the world, with
30% of the global share. 116 With robust LMDV emissions standards, the U.S. would be
encouraging quicker adoption of EV technology to ensure the country remains at the forefront of
this global transition. Below is a list of regional and national goals for light- and medium-duty
zero-emission vehicle deployment that further underscores the need for the U.S. via EPA to
maintain pace with the rest of the world: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 24]
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116 Id. at footnote 27
- European Union: Target to reduce C02 emissions from new cars and vans by 55% in 2030
and 100% in 2035 compared to 2021 emissions. 117 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 25-
26]
- Norway: 100% of LDV sales to be zero-emission by 2025.118
- Switzerland: ZEV sales of 28% in 2025, 60% in 2030, and 100% from 2040.119
- Denmark: End the sale of new petrol and diesel cars from 2030, and PHEVs from 2035.120
- Netherlands: 100% ZEV sales by 2030.121
- United Kingdom: Phase out new petrol and diesel cars and vans by 2030. All new cars to be
fully zero emission after 2035.122
- Canada: ZEV targets for light-duty sales of 20% by 2026, 60% by 2030 and 100% by
2035.123
- Chile: 100% of LDV sales will be zero-emissions by 2035, with an accompanying ban on
ICE sales. 124
- Korea: 50% of new sales to be ZEVs by 2025, and 80% by 2030.125
- China: "New energy vehicle" sales in key air pollution control regions to account for about
50% of new vehicle sales by 2030.126
- Japan: 100% of car sales to be electrified by 2035. 127
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 25-26]
117 "Fit for 55: zero C02 emissions for new cars and vans in 2035," European Parliament, accessed June
18, 2023) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20230210IPR74715/fit-for-55-zero-co2-
emissions-for-new-cars-and-vans-in-2035
118 "Annual update on the global transition to electric vehicles: 2022," International Council on Clean
Transportation, (June 2023) https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Global-EV-sales-
2022_FINAL.pdf
119 "Switzerland - EV Adoption by Year," HEV-TCP, accessed June 18, 2023
https ://ieahev. org/countries/switzerland/
120 "Denmark embraces electric car revolution with petrol and diesel ban plan," Reuters, (October 2, 2018)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-autos/denmark-embraces-electric-car-revolution-with-petrol-
and-diesel- ban-plan-idUSKCNlMC121
121 "Supporting Governments With 100% ZEV Targets," ZEV Alliance and ICCT, (November 2021)
https://zevalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/ll/support-governments-zev-targets-nov21.pdf
122 "Transitioning to zero emission cars and vans: 2035 delivery plan," HM Government, accessed June
30, 2023
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1005301/
transition ing-to-zero-emission-cars-vans-2035-delivery-plan.pdf
123 "Proposed regulated sales targets for zero-emission vehicles," Government of Canada, (January 9,
2023) https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/news/2022/12/proposed-regulated-sales-
targets-for-zero-emi ssion-vehicles.html
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124 "Chile to ban sale of light and medium internal combustion engines in 2035," Electrive, (October 18,
2021) https://www.electrive.com/2021/10/18/chila-to-ban-sale-of-internal-combustion-engines-in-2035/
125 "Zero-Emission Vehicles Factbook," BloombergNEF, (November 2022)
https://assets.bbhub.io/professional/sites/24/2022-COP27-ZEV-Transition_Factbook.pdf
126 "Global EV Outlook 2023 - Policy developments," IEA, accessed June 20, 2023
https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2023/policy-developments
127 "Japan Transition to Electric Vehicles, U.S. International Trade Administration, (July 7, 2021)
https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/japan-transition-electric-vehicles
Stringent LMDV multipollutant and GHG emissions standards will encourage more domestic
investment and innovation to position the United States as a global leader in the electric vehicle
space. The regulatory certainty of these standards will enable increased investment and the
continued build-out of a domestic supply chain. Without stringent LMDV emissions standards,
the U.S. risks ceding this vast economic opportunity to other countries, disadvantaging American
businesses and workers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 25-26]
8. The EV Supply Chain is Preparing to Support Increased Electrification
The widespread transition to electrified transportation is involving industries and companies
that have not historically had a major role in supplying products to the transportation sector.
Policies like EPA's proposed LMDV multipollutant emissions standards provide regulatory
certainty for the entire supply chain supporting the transition to electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, p. 31]
As discussed further in this section, the supply chain is composed of discrete, yet
interconnected segments that are continuing to scale up in capacity. Complementary policies in
various stages of implementation today will lead to an even more robust and resilient supply
chain over the MY 2027-2032 time frame covered by EPA's proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 31]
Finalizing strong LMDV emissions standards is not only necessary for public health, climate,
and economic reasons, but they are feasible for industry to implement and align with the planned
and existing investments being made throughout the EV supply chain. 140,141 Through ZETA,
the full scope of the U.S. EV supply chain is coalesced behind the goal of 100% EV sales. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 31]
140 "US and Canada Electric Vehicle Supply Chain Map," Charged by the Book, accessed June 30, 2023
https://www.charged-the-book.com/na-ev-supply-chain-map
141 FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces New Private and Public Sector Investments
for Affordable Electric Vehicles (April 17, 2023) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2023/04/17/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-a nnounces-new-private-and-public-sector-
investments-for-affordable-electric-vehicles/
a. Critical Minerals Development
As projected demand for critical minerals (lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, copper,
graphite, and rare earth elements) for use in EV batteries continues to grow-due in large part to
policies such as EPA's proposed multipollutant emission standards for LMDVs-the supply chain
is preparing to meet that demand both through new extraction and processing and with additional
support from recycling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 31-32]
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Beyond EPA emission standards, the section 30D New Clean Vehicle Tax Credit in the
Inflation Reduction Act ensures that these critical minerals are sourced either in the United States
or from free trade agreement countries. The credit is composed of two halves: qualifying
vehicles will receive $3,750 for meeting each of the critical mineral and battery component
sourcing requirements totaling up to $7,500,142 The stringent ramp-up of the domestic sourcing
requirements in the IRA over the coming years will lead to a robust supply chain capable of
delivering domestically-sourced raw and refined materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp.
31-32]
142 "Overview and Analysis: March Treasury Guidance for Clean Car Tax Credit (30D)," ZETA, (April
2023) https://www.zeta2030.org/insights/overview-and-analysis-march-treasury-guidance-for-clean-car-
tax-credit-30d
A key element to the success of the supply chain's ability to deliver the critical minerals
necessary to support the transition to electrified transportation will be reforming the permitting
processes for new extraction and processing operations. The Biden-Harris Administration has
placed a much-needed focus on this areal43 and ZETA has consistently supported reformsl44
that ensure development projects are constructed quickly while meeting the strongest
environmental standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 31-32]
143 "FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Outlines Priorities for Building America's Energy
Infrastructure Faster, Safer, and Cleaner," (May 2023) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2023/05/10/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-outlines-priorities-for-
building-americas-energy-infrastructure-faster-safer-and-cleaner/
144 "Critical Mineral Permitting Reform Framework," ZETA, (May 2023)
https://www.zeta2030.org/insights/critical-mineral-permitting-reform-framework
The executive branch has been just as aggressive on increasing critical mineral capacity in the
U.S. In March 2022, President Biden invoked the Defense Production Act (DPA). The DPA
allows the Department of Defense (DOD) to fund feasibility and modernization projects for
mining and processing facilities. 145 With funding from the DPA, DOD invested $120 million in
a rare earths separation plant in Texas with Lynas Rare Earths. 146 In February 2023, President
Biden further expanded this authority to allow for large, longer-term investments in critical
mineral projects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 32]
145 "Defense Production Act Title III Presidential Determination for Critical Materials in Large-Capacity
Batteries," U.S. Department of Defense, (April 5, 2022)
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2989973/defense-production-act-title-iii-
presidential-deter mination-for-critical-materi
146 "Australia's Lynas gets $120 mln Pentagon contract for U.S. rare earths project," Reuters, (June 14,
2022) https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/australias-lynas-secures-120-mln-pentagon-contract-us-rare-
earths-facility-2022-06-14/
In 2022, the White House announced the American Battery Material Initiative to leverage
Federal investments and activities to build both a domestic and international critical minerals
supply chain in coordination with our allies. 147 This complements the signing of the Minerals
Security Partnership (MSP) with Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European
Commission. 148 This agreement outlines the ethics, environmental, and safety standards
expected of critical mineral mining and processing and ensures stronger trade connections
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between nations. The MSP also encourages investments between governments for certain
projects. This partnership may explore using loans from the Export-Import Bank of the United
States to on-shore and friend-shore the supply chain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 32]
147 "Biden-Harris Administration Awards $2.8 Billion to Supercharge U.S. Manufacturing of Batteries for
Electric Vehicles and Electric Grid," U.S. Department of Energy, (October 19, 2022)
https://www.energy.gov/articles/biden-harris-administration-awards-28-billion-supercharge-us-
manufacturing-batteri es
148 "Minerals Security Partnership," U.S. Department of State, (June 14, 2022)
https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership/
Federal agencies are also making efforts to improve the critical mineral supply chain.
Organized by the Department of Interior, the interagency working group on mining reform has
gathered experts and stakeholders to discuss potential permitting reform to support a domestic
industry. 149 Efforts by the working groups will include proposals to reform the Mining Law of
1872, form recommendations to bolster the supply chain, and provide community engagement
best practices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 33]
149 "Interior Department Launches Interagency Working Group on Mining Reform," U.S. Department of
the Interior, (February 22, 2022) https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/interior-department-launches-
interagency-working-group-mining-reform
To ensure there is a trained workforce for the critical mineral industry, the DOE and
Department of Labor created a workforce development strategy, funded by the BIL.150 These
efforts will include retraining in fossil-fuel and automotive communities and enhancing
additional training programs across the country. All together, these actions incentivize
manufacturers and developers to create an American supply of critical minerals. Since their
announcement, investments in the critical mineral supply chain have dramatically expanded in
the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 33]
150 "DOE Announces $5 Million to Launch Lithium-Battery Workforce Initiative," U.S. Department of
Energy, (March 18, 2022) https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-announces-5-million-launch-lithium-
battery-workforce-initiative
As EPA accurately notes in the proposed rule, there is an important distinction between
energy security and mineral security. Utilization of critical minerals is inherently different from
the utilization of petroleum, in that petroleum is consumed as a fuel while minerals become a
component of manufactured vehicles. Supply disruptions and fluctuating prices for critical
minerals are felt differently and by different parties as opposed to petroleum which has an
immediate impact on consumers through higher fuel prices, as discussed in section 3(b) of these
comments. In contrast, supply disruptions or price fluctuations of minerals affect only the
production and price of new vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 33]
Moreover, critical minerals are not a single commodity but a number of distinct commodities,
each having its own supply and demand dynamics, and some being capable of substitution by
other minerals. Further, while petroleum is consumed as a fuel and thus requires continuous
supply, minerals become part of the vehicle and have the potential to be recovered and recycled,
as discussed further in section 8(b)(ii) of these comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p.
33]
i. Projected Demand for Critical Minerals
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Demand for critical minerals is expected to grow substantially in the coming years. Figure 5
IEA's projected demand scenarios by 2040 relative to a 2020 baseline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, pp. 33-34]
[See original comment for Figure 5. Mineral demand growth from new EV sales by scenario,
2040 relative to 2020]151 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 33-34]
151 "Mineral demand growth from new EV sales by scenario, 2040 compared to 2020," IEA, (October 26,
2022) https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/mineral-demand-growth-from-new-ev-sales-by-
scenario-2040-compar ed-to-2020
In a scenario that meets the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement, the share of total demand
for critical minerals rises significantly over the next two decades to over 40% for copper and rare
earth elements, 60-70% for nickel and cobalt, and almost 90% for lithium. 152 EVs and battery
storage have already displaced consumer electronics to become the largest consumer of lithium
and are set to displace the stainless steel industry as the largest end user of nickel by 2040. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 33-34]
152 "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions," IEA, (May 2021)
https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions
ii. Meeting the Forthcoming Demand for Critical Minerals
As demand for critical minerals is expected to grow rapidly, it is first necessary to evaluate
the current state of global production. For most minerals, production has grown in the past
decade. 153 However, while much of the production for certain minerals is concentrated in a
handful of countries, there is reason to believe that most critical minerals demand can be met
through extraction in democratic countries. According to the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and as shown in Figure 6 below, nearly all critical mineral demand could be
met through reserves in democratic countries. 154 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 34-36]
153 "bp Statistical Review of World Energy," British Petroleum, (2022)
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-
review/bp- stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf
154 Democratic countries include: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Iceland, Indonesia, Japan,
Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South
Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United States.
[See original comment for Figure 6. Critical Minerals Potential in All Democratic
Countries] 155 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 34-36]
The Net Zero Industrial Policy Lab at Johns Hopkins University finds that partnerships among
democratic countries would be able to produce enough minerals to enable the world to limit
warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, the more ambitious target in the Paris Climate Agreement. 156
However, producing enough metals to meet these targets would require extraordinary
technological and financial cooperation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 34-36]
155 "Friendshoring Critical Minerals: What Could the U.S. and Its Partners Produce?," Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (May 3, 2023)
https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/03/friendshoring-critical-minerals-what-could-u.s.-and-its-
partners-produce-pub-89659
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156 Id. at footnote 155
In regards to lithium, Benchmark Mineral Intelligence found that by the end of 2023, world
supply of lithium will be more than double 202l's output and more than the total produced
between 2015 and 2018.157 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 34-36]
157 "Global lithium supply forecast to hit 1 million tonnes for first time," Benchmark Mineral Intelligence,
(April 28, 2023) https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/global-lithium-supply-forecast-to-hit-l-
million-tonnes-for-first-time
Given the national security implications of ensuring a stable supply of critical minerals, the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the United States Geological
Survey (USGS) have partnered to explore the potential of machine learning and artificial
intelligence tools and techniques to enhance USGS critical mineral assessments. 158 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 34-36]
158 "Artificial Intelligence for Critical Mineral Assessment Competition," DARPA,
https://criticalminerals.darpa.mil/
iii. Critical Mineral Production
ZETA members are scaling up capacity to meet the projected demand in the coming years.
For example, Ioneer's Rhyolite Ridge project-located in Esmeralda County, NV-holds the
largest known lithium and boron deposit in North America. 159 Ioneer recently announced a
mineral resource update that found a 168% increase in estimated lithium at Rhyolite Ridge. 160
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 36-37]
159 Ioneer - Rhyolite Ridge, accessed May 16, 2023 https://rhyolite-ridge.ioneer.com/
160 "New Ioneer Mineral Resource update finds 168% increase in estimated lithium at Rhyolite Ridge,"
BusinessWire, (April 26, 2023) https://www.businesswire.eom/news/home/20230426005886/en/New-
Ioneer-Mineral-Resource-update-finds-168-increase-in-estimated-lithium-at-Rhyolite-Ridge
ZETA member Albemarle Corp. recently announced it is aiming to spend between $1.25
billion and $1.5 billion to double its lithium hydroxide output in Australia to a volume that it
estimates could power more than 2 million electric cars each year. 161 Albemarle plans to build
two additional processing trains at its Kemerton plant south of Perth in Western Australia, which
could boost its lithium hydroxide production by 50,000 tons annually. Albemarle recently
announced that it achieved an IRMA 50 level of performance in an independent third-party
assessment of its lithium brine extraction and concentration site in the Salar de Atacama, using
the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance's (IRMA) comprehensive mining standard. 162
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 36-37]
161 "Lithium giant Albemarle eyes $1.5B Australian expansion," E&E News, (May 4, 2023)
https://subscriber.politicopro.eom/article/eenews/2023/05/04/lithium-giant-albemarle-eyes-l-5b-australian-
expansio n-00095141
162 "Albemarle Becomes First Lithium Producer to Complete Independent Audit and Publich IRMA
Report," Albemarle Newsroom, (June 20, 2023) https://www.albemarle.com/news/albemarle-becomes-
first-lithium-producer-to-complete-independent-audit-and-pub lish-irma-report
Recently, ZETA member Lithium Americas provided an update on the status of its various
projects around the world. 163 Lithium Americas' Cauchari-Olaroz project in Argentina is
expected to begin producing lithium in June 2023. Production ramp up at the Cauchari-Olaroz
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project is expected to produce 40,000 tonnes per year of battery-quality lithium carbonate and is
targeted to be complete in Q1 2024. Domestically, Lithium Americas recently announced the
start of construction activities at Thacker Pass in Nevada following receipt of notice to proceed
from the Bureau of Land Management. 164 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 36-37]
163 "Lithium Americas Reports First Quarter 2023 Results," Lithium Americas, (May 15, 2023)
https://www.lithiumamericas.com/news/lithium-americas-reports-first-quarter-2023-results
164 Id. at footnote 163
[See original comment for Figure 7. ZETA members key domestic lithium production
projects.]
With applications well beyond just EVs, ensuring a domestically-sourced supply of copper
will be critical to ensuring a rapid transition to electrified transportation. In May 2023, the
Department of Energy proposed to characterize copper as critical through its inclusion on the
official DOE Critical Materials List. 165 In particular, DOE is recommending a designation for
copper of "near-critical" in the medium term (2025-2035). To meet the forthcoming increases in
demand for copper, a pair of domestic projects are currently in various stages of development:
One major project that would help the U.S. with its growing demand for copper, molybdenum,
silver and critical minerals is Resolution Copper in Arizona. This project has the potential to
supply up to 25% of the nation's copper demand to power America's clean energy transition
with $1 billion annually into Arizona's economy. The project currently employs 300 people,
80% of whom live locally in rural communities within 40 miles of the project. When the mine is
fully operational, Resolution Copper expects to directly employ about 1,500 workers, paying
around $134 million per year in total compensation. In total, the project is expected to support
3,700 direct and indirect jobs, many of them local building trades and U.S. Steel Workers union
jobs. 166 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 37-38]
165 "Critical Materials Assessment," U.S. Department of Energy, (May 2023)
https://www.energy.gOv/sites/default/files/2023-05/2023-critical-materials-assessment.pdf 166 See:
https://resolutioncopper.com/
NewRange Copper Nickel is a 50:50 joint venture of Teck Resources Limited and PolyMet
Mining Corp., holding the NorthMet and Mesaba deposits - two large, well defined resources in
the established Iron Range mining region of Minnesota. The stand- alone company is creating a
path to develop one of the world's largest and lowest cost copper-nickel-PGM producing
districts, unlocking a new domestic supply of critical minerals for the low-carbon transition
through responsible mining, and delivering significant, multi-generational economic and other
benefits to the region and beyond. 167 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 37-38]
167 See: https://newrangecoppernickel.com/
Anovian, which produces synthetic graphite anodes, is investing $800 million in Georgia to
build a new manufacturing facility. The company's first large-scale facility is expected to
produce 40,000 metric tons of synthetic graphite annually for lithium-ion batteries. 168 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 37-38]
168 "Anovion Technologies to build $800M facility in Georgia," Manufacturing Dive, (May 22, 2023)
https://www.manufacturingdive.com/news/anovion-technologies-800m-facility-in-georgia/650808
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Manganese miner Element 25 has signed a definitive agreement with automotive major
General Motors to supply up to 32,500 t/y of battery-grade high-purity manganese sulfate to
support GM's EV production in North America.169 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 37-
38]
169 "GM signs up to Element 25's Louisiana plans," Mining Weekly, (June 26, 2023)
https://www.miningweekly.com/article/gm-signs-up-to-element-25s-louisiana-plans-2023-06-26
iv. Refining and Processing
In March 2023, Albemarle announced a new lithium processing facility in South Carolina. 170
Albemarle expects the facility to annually produce approximately 50,000 metric tons of battery-
grade lithium hydroxide from multiple sources, with the potential to expand up to 100,000 metric
tons. Production at the facility would support the manufacturing of an estimated 2.4 million
electric vehicles annually. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 38-39]
170 "Albemarle Corporation Announces New U.S. Lithium Mega-Flex Processing Facility in South
Carolina," Albemarle Corporation, (March 22, 2023) https://www.albemarle.com/news/-albemarle-
corporation-announces-new-us-lithium-megaflex-processing-facility-in-south-carolina-
In March 2023, EVelution Energy announced a $200 million cobalt processing plant in
Arizona to produce cobalt sulfate for up to 470,000 EVs per year by the time the facility is fully
operational in 2026.171 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 38-39]
171 "EVelution Announces $200 Million Cobalt Production Facility in Yuma County, Arizona Commerce
Authority, (March 29, 2023) https://www.azcommerce.eom/news-events/news/2023/3/evelution-energy -
announces-200-million-cobalt-productio n-facility-in-yuma-county
In May 2023, Tesla announced a new lithium refinery in Southwest Texas which, when
completed, is expected to produce enough lithium to build about 1 million EVs by 2025.172
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 38-39]
172 "Elon Musk and Tesla break ground on massive Texas lithium refinery," Reuters, (May 8, 2023)
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/tesla-plans-produce-lithium-l-mln-vehicles-texas-
refinery-el on-musk-2023-05-08/
b. Batteries
The U.S. battery manufacturing industry is quickly scaling to meet demand driven by
transportation electrification. According to Argonne National Lab, between 2010 and 2021, $95
billion was invested in the U.S. battery manufacturing industry. 173 This number represents 160
new or expanded critical materials processing and manufacturing facilities, with enough capacity
to provide batteries for 10 million EVs each year and create 70,000 new jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, pp. 39-40]
The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law allocated $1.6 billion to the Department of Energy for the
funding of "new commercial-scale domestic facilities to extract and process lithium, manufacture
battery components, recycle batteries, and develop new technologies to increase U.S. lithium
reserves." 174 In 2022, the Inflation Reduction Act 45X Advanced Manufacturing Production
and Advanced Energy Project Tax Credit provided $35 per kWh in each battery cell, $10 per
kWh in each battery module, 10% of the costs of production of the applicable critical materials
incurred by the taxpayer. The Advanced Energy Project Tax Credit also appropriated a
$10,000,000 fund for tax credits to build clean technology manufacturing facilities, including
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those that process, refine, and recycle critical minerals. 175 Through the 45X credit, the IRA cuts
nearly one third of the cost of producing batteries in the United States. 176 Together, these
historic provisions will drive American battery innovation, ensuring that the sector is equipped to
electrify all vehicle classes as EV deployments accelerate over the coming years. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 39-40]
173 "A new look at the electric vehicle supply chain as battery-powered cars hit the roads en masse,"
Argonne National Laboratory, (May 4, 2023) https://www.anl.gov/article/a-new-look-at-the-electric-
vehicle-supply-chain-as-batterypowered-cars-hit-the-roads-en-masse
174 See Public Law 117-58
175 "Inflation Reduction Act: What it Is and What it Means for EV Adoption," ZETA, (2022)
https://www.zeta2030.org/insights/the-inflation-reduction-act-what-it-is-and-what-it-means-for-ev-
adoption
176 "U.S.-Made EVs Could Get Massively Cheaper, Thanks to Battery Provisions in New Law," Car and
Driver, (February 3, 2023) https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a42749754/us-electric-cars-could-get-
cheaper-inflation-reduction-act-section-4 5xJ
i. Manufacturing
There is historic momentum around battery manufacturing as it ramps up to support
transportation electrification. Over the past year, battery producers have rapidly invested in new
battery capacity in anticipation of strong electric vehicle sales growth. A total of 1.4 terawatt
hours (TWhs) of new battery capacity was announced in just the last six months, according to
Benchmark's Gigafactory Assessment. 177 The number of plants being tracked more than
doubled to 379 in April from 174 plants in November 2020, according to Benchmark. Since
January 2021, the U.S. private sector has announced nearly $82 billion in battery manufacturing
investments, translating to 96 new or expanded processing and manufacturing plants. 178 [EPA-
HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 40-41]
177 "Battery gigafactory plans slow down in April after record 2022," Benchmark Minerals Intelligence,
(April 26, 2023) https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/battery-gigafactory-plans-slow-down-in-
april-after-record-2022?mc_c id=f82a9ac7a8&mc_eid=be723945d8
178 New US Battery Manufacturing and Supply Chain Investments Announced Under President Biden, US
Department of Energy, (February 13, 2023) https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-
02/Battery%20Supply%20Chains%20Investments%20Map.pdf
Below is a list of recently-announced investments in EV battery manufacturing, all of which
will help support the transition to an electrified transportation sector: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, pp. 40-41]
- In March 2023, ZETA member LG announced a $5.5 billion investment to construct a
battery manufacturing complex in Queen Creek, Arizona. The complex will consist of two
manufacturing facilities - one for cylindrical batteries for EVs and another for lithium iron
phosphate (LFP) pouch-type batteries for energy storage systems (ESS). LG plans to invest $3.2
billion in building a cylindrical battery manufacturing facility with a capacity of 27GWh, and
$2.3 billion in LFP pouch-type battery facility with the capacity of 16GWh. Both facilities,
totaling 43 GWh, plan to break ground this year and will begin production in 2025 and 2026,
respectively. 179 A more comprehensive list of LG's investments in domestic battery
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manufacturing can be found in Appendix figure A.l. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 40-
41]
- In April 2023, Hyundai Motor Co. announced it had finalized a $5 billion EV battery joint
venture with SK On, a battery unit of SK Innovation Co Ltd. The plant will be located in Georgia
and is expected to start manufacturing battery cells in the second half of 2025 with an annual
production capacity of 35 GWh.180 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 40-41]
- In April 2023, General Motors and Samsung announced they will invest over $3 billion to
build a joint venture EV battery manufacturing plant in the U.S. Expected to start production in
2026, the plant aims to have an annual production capacity of 30 GWh.181 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, pp. 40-41]
- In May 2023, ZETA member Panasonic announced that it would expand its U.S.
manufacturing capacity from 38 GWh today to 200 GWh by 2030, including Panasonic's $4
billion under-construction investment in Kansas. 182 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 40-
41]
- In June 2023, the Ford/SK On joint venture BlueOval SK was awarded a $9.2 billion
conditional loan from the Department of Energy's Loan Programs Office-the largest in the
office's history. The loan will help the joint venture build two gigafactories in Kentucky and one
in Tennessee. Together, the plants will enable more than 120 GWh of U.S. battery production
annually and displace more than 455 million gallons of gasoline per year for the lifetime of the
vehicles powered by these batteries. The project is expected to create a total of approximately
5,000 construction jobs in Tennessee and Kentucky, and 7,500 operations jobs once the plants
are up and running. 183 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 40-41]
179 "LG Energy Solution to Invest KRW 7.2 Trillion to Build Battery Manufacturing Complex in Arizona,
Step Up EV and ESS Battery Production in North America," LG, (March 24, 2023)
https://news.lgensol.com/company-news/press-releases/1613/
180 "Hyundai Motor bolsters US presence with $5 bin EV battery venture," Reuters, (April 25, 2023)
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/hyundai-motors-ql-net-profit-jumps-109-beating-
expectation s-2023-04-25/
181 "GM, Samsung SDI to invest more than $3 bin to build joint EV battery plant in US," Reuters, (April
25, 2023) accessed May 17, 2023 https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/gm-samsung-sdi-
plan-build-new-us-battery-plant-sources-20 23-04-24/
182 "Group Strategy Briefing," Panasonic Holdings Corporation, (May 18, 2023)
https://holdings.panasonic/global/corporate/investors/pdf/20230518_groupstrategy _e.pdf
183 "LPO Announces Conditional Commitment for Loan to BlueOval SK to Further Expand U.S. EV
Battery Manufacturing Capacity," U.S. Department of Energy, (June 22, 2023)
https://www.energy.gov/lpo/articles/lpo-announces-conditional-commitment-loan-blueoval-sk-further-
expand-us-ev-battery
iii. Alternative Chemistries
As battery manufacturing and recycling capacity ramps up, so too does the development of
innovative alternative battery chemistries that will transform the range, durability, and cost of
EVs. Lithium Iron Phosphate (LFP) batteries do not require nickel or cobalt, leading to reduced
costs. 196 Another potentially promising technology is sodium-ion batteries. Because they
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substitute lithium for sodium, sodium-ion batteries tend to be cheaper, and may have significant
applications in lower-range EVs.197 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 44]
196 "Lithium iron phosphate comes to America," Chemical and Engineering News, (January 29, 2023)
https://cen.acs.org/energy/energy-storage-/Lithium-iron-phosphate-comes-to-America/101/i4
197 "What If Your Tesla Could Run on Sodium?" The Wall Street Journal, (April 19, 2023)
https://www.wsj. com/articles/what-if-y our-tesla-could-run-on-sodium-3 c 18df3 0
Recent advancements in solid-state batteries have also recently been announced, most notably
by Toyota which aims to commercialize the technology as soon as 2027, consistent with the MY
2027-2032 time frame covered by EPA's proposed LMDV emissions standards. 198 While there
remain substantial challenges to mass adoption, solid-state batteries offer some promise in that
they are more energy dense, highly stable, offer potentially faster charging times, and can be
produced faster than lithium-ion batteries. 199 Benchmark Mineral Intelligence forecasts that
solid-state battery production will exceed 30 GWh in 2026.200 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, p. 44]
198 "Japan's Toyota announces initiative for all-solid state battery as part of electric vehicles plan," AP
News, (June 13, 2023) https://apnews.com/article/toyota-evs-hydrogen-battery-climate-
cd7730dbb9c157cf1663d3 9a3b3 9778e
199 "Solid State Battery Tech For EV Cars: Challenges Lie Ahead," MotorTrend, (March 10, 2023)
https://www.motortrend.com/features/solid-state-ev-car-batteries-challenges/
200 Benchmark Mineral Intelligence on Linkedln, accessed June 21, 2023
https://www.linkedin.com/posts/benchmark-mineral-intelligence_solidstatebattery-solidstate-lithiummetal-
activity-7 075019101990989825-0DAG
As research and commercialization of alternative battery chemistries and technologies
continues in the private sector, the Department of Energy's SLAC National Accelerator
Laboratory201 and Stanford University recently announced the launch of a new joint battery
center at SLAC.202 It will bring together the resources and expertise of the national lab, the
university, and Silicon Valley to accelerate the deployment of batteries and other energy storage
solutions. Argonne National Laboratory is also researching emerging new battery technologies
including lithium-air, which could offer much longer driving range compared with the lithium-
ion battery,203 and lithium-sulfur, which can hold more energy than traditional ion-based
batteries.204 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 44-45]
201 "SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory," DOE Office of Enterprise Assessments, accessed May 17,
2023 https://www.energy.gov/ea/slac-national-accelerator-laboratory
202 "New Battery Center Launches In USA," CleanTechnica, (April 13, 2023)
https://cleantechnica.com/2023/04/13/new-battery-center-launches-in-usa/
203 "New design for lithium-air battery could offer much longer driving range compared with the lithium-
ion battery," Argonne National Laboratory, (February 22, 2023) https://www.anl.gov/article/new-design-
for-lithiumair-battery-could-offer-much-longer-driving-range-compared-wit h-the-lithiumion
204 "Lithium-sulfur batteries are one step closer to powering the future," Argonne National Laboratory,
(January 6, 2023) https://www.anl.gov/article/lithiumsulfur-batteries-are-one-step-closer-to-powering-the-
future
i. Impacts to EV Production from BIL and IRA Programs
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Policies in the BIL and IRA are driving demand for EVs both for personal and commercial
use. As discussed previously in these comments, customers are increasingly choosing to electrify
and OEMs are better incentivized to meet this demand through the build out of additional
domestic manufacturing capacity. As a result, EV production and model availability is rapidly
expanding. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 70-71]
Analysis by the Environmental Defense Fund found that announced EV manufacturing
investments from 2015 to 2023 total $31.4 billion and would lead to at least 55,800 newjobs and
result in automakers being capable of producing more than 4.3 million EVs per year in 2026.254
Figure 10 below illustrates the ramp up in EV manufacturing capacity through 2026, with major
manufacturing capacity additions following BIL and IRA passage. As additional announcements
are made, domestic EV manufacturing capacity will continue to grow, leading to a secure
domestic supply chain and thousands of newjobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 70-71]
254 "U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs Characterizing the Impacts of the Inflation
Reduction Act After 6 Months," Environmental Defense Fund, (June 2023)
https://blogs.edf.org/climate411/files/2023/03/State-Electric-Vehicle-Policy-Landscape.pdf
[See original comment for Figure 10. Estimated EV manufacturing capacity following
passage of the IRA and BIL, 2020-2026.]255 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 70-71]
255 Id. at footnote 253
ii. OEM Investments in EV Manufacturing
With ambitious electrification goals, OEMs are investing heavily in domestic EV
manufacturing. By 2026, announced facilities alone will be able to produce about 4.3 million
new electric cars and passenger trucks each year. For reference, that equals about one-third of all
new vehicles sold in the U.S. in 2022.256 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 71-72]
256 "Report Finds Investments in U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Reach $120 Billion, Create 143,000
New Jobs," Environmental Defense Fund, (March 14, 2023) https://www.edf.org/media/report-finds-
investments-us-electric-vehicle-manufacturing-reach-120-billion-create-143000
Here are just a few of the recent major investments that have been announced in 2023: [EPA-
HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 71-72]
- ZETA member Tesla announced a second manufacturing plant in Nevada. The $3.6 billion
facility will be focused on building their electric semi truck as well as lOOGWh of battery
manufacturing.257 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 71-72]
- Tesla also plans to spend upward of $770 million to expand its manufacturing facilities in
Austin, Texas. The expansion will include for battery cell testing and manufacturingon-site.258
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 71-72]
- Ford plans to build 500,000 electric pickup trucks at its new $5.6 billion BlueOval City
facility in Tennessee.259 The complex will also produce 40 GWh of battery cells-capable of
supplying 500,000 vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 71-72]
- Ford plans to invest $1.3 billion in its Ontario plant to transition the facility to build their
next-generation EVs. The facility will also assemble battery packs using cells from Ford's
Kentucky battery plant.260 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 71-72]
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- Toyota is investing $7.4 billion in EVs through the end of the decade.261 This includes a
$2.1 billion battery plant expansion in North Carolina and an expansion of its EV assembly
facility in Kentucky.262 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 71-72]
- Stellantis is planning a $155 million expansion of its three Indiana plants to produce EV
drive-trains.263 This is in addition to the previously announced $3 billion in EV investment by
Stellantis in the state. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 71-72]
- ZETA member Rivian is undergoing a $10 million expansion to its existing manufacturing
facility in Kentucky.264 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 71-72]
- Volkswagen's Scout EV manufacturing facility in South Carolina will undergo a $2 billion
investment and will be capable of producing up to 200,000 EVs each year.265 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, pp. 71-72]
- Hyundai raised its total EV investment to $28 billion over the next decade in an effort to
meet its 2 million EV per year sales goal by 2030.266 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 71-
72]
257 "Tesla to build $3.6 billion battery, electric semi truck manufacturing facility in Northern Nevada,"
Reno Gazette Journal, (January 25, 2023)
https://www.rgj.eom/story/news/money/business/2023/01/24/tesla-to-build-3-6b-battery-electric-nevada-
semi-truck- manufacturing-facility/69837346007/
258 "Tesla plans to spend more than $770 million on Texas factory expansion," CNBC, (January 10, 2023)
https://www.cnbc.eom/2023/01/10/tesla-plans-to-spend-more-than-770-million-on-texas-factory-
expansion.html
259 "Ford's new Tennessee plant aims to build 500,000 electric trucks a year," Reuters, (March 24, 2023)
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/fords-new-tennessee-plant-aims-build-500000-
electric-trucks-year-2023-03-24/
260 "Ford to invest $1.3 billion to build EV manufacturing hub in Canada," CNBC, (April 11, 2023)
https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/ll/ford-to-build-ev-manufacturing-hub-in-canada.html
261 "Toyota Accelerates Its EV Changes With Extra $7 Billion Investment," The Wall Street Journal,
(May 10, 2023) https://www.wsj.com/articles/toyota-accelerates-ev-revamp-with-extra-7-billion-
investment-b323eblc
262 "Toyota Ramps Up Commitment to Electrification with U.S. BEV Production and Additional Battery
Plant Investment," Toyota Pressroom, (May 31, 2023) https://pressroom.toyota.com/toyota-ramps-up-
commitment-to-electrification-with-u-s-bev-production-and-additional-battery-plant-investment/
263 "Stellantis Announces $155 Million Investment in Three Indiana Plants to Support North American
Electrification Goals," Stellantis Media, (February 28, 2023) https://www.stellantis.com/en/news/press-
releases/2023/february/stellantis-announces-155-million-investment-in-thr ee-indiana-plants-to-support-
north-american-electrification-goals
264 "Bullitt County welcomes $10M investment for electric vehicle manufacturing, 200+jobs," Louisville
Courier Journal, (May 1, 2023) https://www.courier-
journal.com/story/money/companies/2023/05/01/rivian-ev-manufacturer-expands-in-kentucky- with-10-
million-investment/70164153007/
265 "VW-backed Scout Motors to build $2B factory in South Carolina," TechCrunch, (March 3, 2023)
https://techcrunch.com/2023/03/03/vw-backed-scout-motors-to-build-2b-factory-in-south-carolina/
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266 "Hyundai raises EV investment to $28 billion, to reduce China operations," Reuters, (June 20, 2023)
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/hyundai-motor-invest-8541-billion-by-2032-
accelerate-ev-pla ns-2023-06-20/
- ZETA member Canoo, a start-up electric vehicle manufacturer, invested $34.27 million to
purchase the former Terex plant in Oklahoma City where it plans to begin EV production later
this year.267 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 73]
- Scout Motors announced its $2 billion investment to establish its first EV manufacturing
plant in South Carolina. At full capacity, more than 200,000 all-electric, next-generation trucks
and rugged SUVs may be produced annually at the facility.268 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, p. 73]
- GM plans to install more than 1 million units of annual EV capacity in North America in
2025 and accelerate from there. This is fueled by a $3 billion investment269 for an EV battery
cell plant in Indiana and a $64 million investment270 in Rochester, New York and Defiance,
Ohio for castings and components to support EV production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
p. 73]
267 "EV manufacturer Canoo to open production facility in OKC. Here's where it will be," The
Oklahoman, (November 11, 2022) https://www.oklahoman.eom/story/business/2022/ll/10/electric-
vehicle-manufacturer-canoo-repurposing-okc-facility-into-plant/69636856007/
268 "Scout Motors selects South Carolina for production site; plans to create 4,000 jobs," Governor of
South Carolina, (March 3, 2023) https://governor.sc.gov/news/2023-03/scout-motors-selects-south-
carolina-production-site-plans-create-4000-jobs
269 Id. at footnote 181
270 "GM Investing $918 Million in Four U.S. Facilities for V-8 Engine Production, EV Components," GM
Newsroom, accessed June 30, 2023
https://news.gm.com/newsroom.detail.html/Pages/news/us/en/2023/jan/0120-investment.html
As a result of these investments, more EVs are already being produced domestically. In the
first quarter of 2023, American factories produced 39% more EVs than the same period the year
before.271 Tesla led the pack, producing more than half of the nation's EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, p. 73]
271 "Five New EV Models Drive Up North American Factory Production," Bloomberg, (May 10, 2023)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-10/five-new-ev-models-drive-up-north-american-
factory-produc tion#xj4y7vzkg
EPA Summary and Response
EPA acknowledges and appreciates all of the comments relating to PEV supply chain, critical
minerals, and mineral security. These topics are closely interrelated, and the comments received
often cover multiple aspects of these topics in varying degrees of detail. The wide diversity and
volume of comments that we received on these topics represent the complexity of these issues,
which we have broken down into a number of distinct themes that we individually identify and
respond to in this section. Our responses to these themes collectively respond to all of the
individual comments on these topics.
In general, comments in this topic area were generally concerned with issues such as the
capability of global and domestic supply chains to support manufacturing of batteries and other
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PEV components, the availability of critical minerals and other inputs to PEV production, and
the possibility that sourcing of these items from other countries might pose a threat to national
security.
Regarding the proposal's overall assessment of the supply chain, critical minerals, and
mineral security, we received a variety of comments, some of which disagreed with the
conclusions of our assessment and others which supported them. At the highest level, many of
the concerns stated by commenters were stated as part of a broader argument that the proposed
standards were too stringent; that is, that the commenter believed that the proposed standards
should be weakened or even withdrawn because of their assertion that the supply chain or the
availability of critical minerals could not grow fast enough to support the amount or rate of
vehicle electrification that would result from the standards, or because they believed that it
would create a degree of reliance on imported products that would harm national security. In
contrast, other commenters supported EPA's conclusions regarding these issues and some also
encouraged EPA to finalize more stringent standards, based on their view that these
considerations would not prevent higher penetrations of PEV technology than anticipated in the
proposal.
One major theme of the comments consisted of generalized observations about the need to
develop a domestic supply chain for the inputs to PEV production. Supportive comments
included recognition of the broad attention that this issue has received in the industry, and
general agreement with the proposal's position that the supply chain is developing rapidly and as
expected, due to market response to anticipation of increasing demand and the effect of
congressional and executive action including the BIL and IRA, among other programs. These
commenters often provided detailed examples of recent developments in supply chain growth
and recent examples of the effect of the BIL and IRA. Adverse comments included a general
citation of risk and uncertainty associated with future development of the supply chain, and with
the possibility that the timeline and/or degree of BEV penetration anticipated by the proposal
could not be supported by available minerals, battery manufacturing, or other aspects of the
supply chain. Some specific themes among the assertions of adverse commenters were: that the
proposal did not adequately address critical minerals or battery manufacturing, or was overly
optimistic about the rate at which domestic minerals or manufacturing would grow; that we
looked only at light-duty battery demand and not at other transportation or product sectors that
use lithium-ion batteries, such as heavy-duty vehicles, stationary storage and portable devices;
that the projections of manufacturing capacity did not include sufficient ramp-up time; that we
should consider active material manufacturing in addition to cell manufacturing; that the
proposal did not adequately address the risk associated with uncertain availability of critical
minerals in the future, and in particular, that we should have quantitatively accounted for
projected availability of all critical minerals rather than lithium only. Some commenters included
data in their comments; for example, the Alliance for Automotive Innovation included a bespoke
report by Benchmark Minerals Intelligence that examined domestic battery and mineral
manufacturing capacity, and a coalition of environmental NGOs and public health organizations
("Environmental and Public Health Organizations") presented a detailed analysis of lithium
availability.
Regarding our analysis of critical minerals, some commenters disagreed with our findings and
others supported them. Supportive comments often pointed to examples of rapidly increasing
attention to development of mineral resources in the U.S. and in nations with which the U.S. has
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good trade relations. These commenters also tended to emphasize current and ongoing support of
the BIL and IRA in advancing such investments. Commenters who disagreed with our findings
largely expressed the position that EPA did not adequately address critical minerals, or did not
adequately consider the risks posed by increased demand for such products. Because mineral
security is closely related to development of the domestic supply chain, comments often included
references to the state of the domestic supply chain and the commenter's views on how it either
is or is not advancing at a sufficient pace to allay mineral security concerns.
Regarding mineral security, some specific themes among adverse commenters were their
views that the rapid growth in demand that would result from the proposal would result in either
temporary or permanent reliance on nations with which the U.S. does not have good trade
relations or has a large trade deficit, or would similarly result in increased reliance on imports in
general. Similarly, some commenters felt that the discussion of national security in the proposal
was not sufficient, pointing again to concerns about vulnerabilities resulting from a dependence
on imported minerals and materials in order to manufacture vehicles or support the infrastructure
they require. Some commenters specifically highlighted the possibility of increased dependence
on China, which manufactures and processes much of the critical minerals and other materials
commonly used in PEV manufacturing. In contrast, other commenters stated that the proposed
rule would improve national security by stimulating development of the domestic supply chain,
in part by providing demand certainty necessary to support investment in these areas.
Another frequent theme across many of the adverse comments was a perception of uncertainty
and risk posed by supply chain, manufacturing, and critical minerals issues. These comments
focused primarily on issues such as uncertainty of mineral prices and hence battery prices, or
unavailability of minerals or other inputs to PEV manufacture, and more generally, to the
implications of such potential developments on the ability to comply with the standards. In this
context some commenters expressed the view that EPA should adopt a stringency adjustment
mechanism (based, for example, on an assessment of progress in domestic critical mineral
sourcing, PEV infrastructure, or other developments the commenters deem necessary to
accompany increased penetration of PEVs under the standards), or else commit to revisiting the
standards if it is determined that development of the supply chain, manufacturing, or critical
minerals have not progressed as expected. This suggestion was often also made in the context of
uncertain future progress in other external factors such as charging infrastructure, grid readiness,
and similar factors (these are discussed separately in their respective sections of this RTC).
Relatedly, some commenters cited a need for complementary government policies and
incentives across the various levels and branches of government to support increased market
penetration of PEVs. These included, among other areas: public charging infrastructure, supply
chain development, workforce training, fleet purchase requirements, support for PEV and battery
recycling and end of life issues, economic and purchase incentives, consumer education, grid
infrastructure, state and local measures and federal engagement with such measures, and other
measures to address the cost and risk of increased PEV presence in the fleet.
Some commenters questioned our assessment that critical mineral prices and availability are
likely to stabilize in the future, stating the view that factors such as rapid demand growth,
international competition for resources, and adverse trade policies may prevent prices from
stabilizing in the near term or even the long term. Commenters also cited the need for permitting
reform and streamlining, as permitting is a major factor in the lead time necessary to develop
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new mineral sources. It was also suggested that the desire to source from responsible vendors
that support Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) goals could increase the cost of
purchased minerals by encouraging use of higher-cost domestic supplies. Relatedly, some
commenters cited the environmental impact of developing new mines, and environmentally or
socially unsound sourcing practices sometimes employed in the production of minerals in other
parts of the world. Some commenters also suggested that BEVs are not an efficient use of these
limited resources, and that the goals of the standards could be more effectively met with HEVs
and PHEVs, which require less critical mineral content and impose less demand on
infrastructure, reducing the level of risk associated with all of these issues.
Many adverse commenters expressed the view that there will not be enough critical minerals,
either in the near term or the long term or both, to supply the anticipated increase in PEV
penetration resulting from the standards. Some of these comments were general in nature while
others referred specifically to our assessment of future annual GWh of battery manufacturing
capacity which we used as a constraint on PEV penetration in the OMEGA model. They also
expressed views that the timeline and/or degree of BEV penetration cannot be supported by
available minerals and/or growth in domestic supplies or battery manufacturing. Some
commenters expressed the view that the supply chain will not develop rapidly enough to meet
the standards with the projected penetration of PEVs. These comments included positions that
U.S. battery manufacturing will not ramp up fast enough, or that there is insufficient lead time
for announced plants to come to full capacity, or that mining permitting and/or development of
production will be too slow to meet increased demand, either globally or domestically. More
specifically, in relation to the growth of the supply chain, some commenters stated the view that
U.S. mineral sourcing and processing will not grow fast enough to keep pace with increasing
content requirements for IRC 30D eligibility.
Some commenters stated that HEVs and PHEVs would be a better use of critical minerals
than BEVs, and so EPA should have projected a greater penetration of these vehicles, or should
have modeled PHEVs explicitly, and/or have adjusted inputs to result in a greater penetration of
these vehicles in the compliance analysis. These commenters also stated that PHEVs and HEVs
could reduce demand for critical minerals and reduce the risk associated with an uncertain future
supply.
EPA has carefully considered all of the comments received. In general response to the totality
of these comments, EPA notes that throughout the rulemaking process, we have taken into
consideration the importance of supply chain, critical mineral, and mineral security issues as they
relate to compliance with the standards. In RIA Chapter 3 and Preamble section IV, EPA
acknowledges that some uncertainty exists regarding future demand and supply of minerals and
mineral processing, as with any forecast of future supply and demand. We have taken them into
account by evaluating their relevance and likely impact in the context of the rulemaking, and by
considering evidence available in the public literature, in analyst forecasts and analyses, and
through our own analyses. We have closely examined the available public literature, consulted
forecasts of mineral supply, mineral cost, and future development of the supply chain as
described by leading analyst firms, and assessed the general state of the industry in preparing for
the demand that is already growing across the industry as well as resulting from the standards.
For this final rule, we have also considered the public comments, and have also continued our
consideration of the mentioned sources, as well as our ongoing consultation with industry and
government agency sources (including the Department of Energy (DOE) and national labs, the
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State Department, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and several analysis firms). Through
these latter means we have continued to collect information on production capacity forecasts,
price forecasts, global mineral markets, and related topics. Importantly, we also coordinated with
DOE and the National Labs, as well as with NHTSA, in their assessment of the outlook for
supply chain development and critical mineral availability. The Department of Energy is well
qualified for such research, as it routinely studies issues related to electric vehicles, development
of the supply chain, and broad-scale issues relating to energy use and infrastructure, through its
network of national laboratories. DOE worked together with Argonne National Laboratory
(ANL) and coordinated this work with EPA during much of 2023. In Sections IV.C.7 of the
preamble we review the main findings of this work, along with the additional information we
have collected since the proposal. As in the proposal, we have considered the totality of
information in the public record in reaching our conclusions regarding the influence of future
manufacturing capacity, critical minerals, and mineral security on the feasibility of the final
standards.
EPA has carefully considered how these factors relate to the feasibility of producing the
incremental penetrations of PEVs that manufacturers may choose to produce to comply with the
final standards, and to national security concerns related to critical minerals and other
manufacturing inputs. The introductory text under section IV.C.7 of the preamble provides
discussion of several key themes that in the proposal led us to conclude that the proposed
standards were appropriate with respect to these issues, and section IV.C.7 in general explains
and provides evidence for our continued assessment that the final standards, which are less
stringent than the proposal in the early years of the program from MYs 2027-2031 and provide
additional lead time, are also appropriate. Section IV.C.7.i of the preamble provides a general
review of how we considered battery and battery component manufacturing considerations in the
updated analysis, the sources we considered, and how we used this information in the analysis.
Section IV.C.7.ii of the preamble examines the issues surrounding availability of critical mineral
inputs. Section IV.C.7.iii of the preamble provides a discussion of the security implications of
increased demand for critical minerals and other materials used to manufacture electrified
vehicles. Section IV.C.7.iv of the preamble considers recycling as a source of minerals in the
future. Additional details on these aspects of the analysis may be found in RIA Chapter 3.1,
including 3.1.5 where we describe how we used this information to develop modeling constraints
on PEV penetration for the compliance analysis.
Our updated assessment continues to support our conclusion that the stringency of the final
standards is appropriate. The final standards implement a number of changes to the proposed
standards and are accompanied by an updated compliance analysis, and together these
developments provide additional support for EPA's assessment that the final standards are
appropriate with respect to supply chain, critical minerals, and mineral security.
First, neither EPA's continued study of these issues nor the information provided in the public
comments have revealed specific new information that undermines our assessment of the
feasibility of the proposal. As we will discuss in the detailed responses later in this section, in
general we do not find evidence in the public comments that would change our previous
assessment that the observed level of investment and other activity across the global and
domestic industry suggests that the industry will be well positioned to support automakers in
meeting the standards. Much of the information provided by adverse commenters is of a similar
nature to the information that EPA has already presented and considered in the proposal, in that
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they describe the same class of uncertainties associated with the future impact of mineral demand
and mineral security that EPA has already considered in the proposal. Similarly, much of the
information provided by supportive commenters also builds on the evidence EPA presented in
the proposal about the pace of activity and overall outlook for buildout of the critical mineral
supply chain. While contributing to the record, the information provided by both groups of
commenters largely serves to reinforce the trends that were already identified and considered by
EPA in the proposal, and largely do not identify new, specific risks or uncertainties that are not
within the general scope of issues considered in the proposal. In particular, adverse comments
fail to definitively identify and quantify specific and unavoidable constraints that would
reasonably lead us to conclude that they cannot be addressed by the private investments,
government development programs, and other industry activity that the proposal and the updated
analysis shows are already underway and are continuing.487'488 They also do not provide a
specific basis for reducing the battery manufacturing GWh constraint we apply in OMEGA.
Taken together, the totality of information in the public record continues to indicate that
development of the critical mineral and manufacturing supply chain is proceeding both
domestically and globally in a robust manner that supports the industry's compliance with the
final standards, and that the likely rate of development of the domestic and global supply chain
and forecast availability of critical minerals on the global market are consistent with the final
standards being met at a reasonable cost and with national security goals being maintained.
Second, the central case of our updated analysis shows that the final standards can be met
with significantly less demand for critical minerals than under the central case of the proposal,
which is a result of several factors, including the final standards being less stringent than the
proposal in the early years of the program from MYs 2027-2031, the inclusion of PHEVs which
reduce the number of BEVs which have larger batteries and therefore greater minerals
requirements, and updated BEV efficiency estimates. We also provide sensitivity cases and other
examples that show that the standards can even be met with much lower levels of BEV
penetration well below our battery manufacturing GWh constraint in OMEGA, including with no
additional BEV penetration beyond that which exists today (see Sections I.B.I, IV.F and IV.G of
the preamble and Chapter 12 of the RIA). Accordingly the compliance analysis indicates a
reduced demand for battery production, implying reduced demand for critical minerals and
supply chain development in all scenarios as compared to the proposal. Combined with our
observation that private and public effort and investment in the supply chain is continuing as
noted in the proposal, we find no evidence that compliance with the standards will be prevented
by issues such as critical unavailability of necessary manufacturing inputs, nor that it will
adversely impact national security by creating a long-term dependence on imports from
adversarial countries or foreign entities of concern (FEOC) sources associated with covered
nations.
Finally, although as noted previously we do not find that the public comments have identified
definitive and hard constraints on the ability to meet the standards, we do note that they
frequently refer more generally to uncertainty and risk associated with the possibility that such
487 Argonne National Laboratory, "Quantification of Commercially Planned Battery Component Supply in North
America through 2035," ANL-24/14, March 2024.
488 Argonne National Laboratory, "Securing Critical Materials for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Industry: A Landscape
Assessment of Domestic and International Supply Chains for Five Key EV Battery Materials," ANL-24/06,
February 2024.
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constraints could nonetheless develop. In addition to our response to concerns about uncertainty
and risk found below, we also note that, as a normal part of our ongoing research activities, EPA
will continue to study the impact of critical material cost and availability, development of the
supply chain, and mineral security. As with any rulemaking, the Administrator has the discretion
to propose modifications to the program through the public notice and comment process, in the
case that modifications are found to be appropriate in the future to address any concrete
constraints that might have developed.
In the remainder of this section we provide additional detailed responses to specific themes
found in the comments.
Regarding comments that we should consider availability of critical minerals other than
lithium, we have included in section IV.C.7 of the preamble and Chapter 3 of the RIA additional
analysis and discussion of additional minerals such as graphite, cobalt, nickel, graphite, and
manganese as well as coverage of cell components and materials, and additional coverage of
lithium. Regarding comments that EPA should consider mineral demand in sectors other than
light-duty automotive, the updated analysis identifies battery cell manufacturing capacity
specifically for light-duty vehicles, and other aspects of the two 2024 ANL reports on battery
manufacturing and critical minerals that are cited in our analysis, as well as other sources such as
the BMI study on global lithium capacity, largely include consideration of the EPA heavy-duty
rule and/or minerals demanded for other uses in the economy.
EPA disagrees with the Alliance comment that EPA "just assumed that lithium was the
bottleneck and biggest concern." In the proposal, EPA clearly explained the reasoning for
focusing particularly on lithium, which included considerations such as other minerals
potentially having substitutes and the lack of a substitute for lithium. Based on its updated
consideration of battery minerals and cell materials and components, including the
characterizations of projected FTA, MSP, and economic ally mineral production provided in the
2024 ANL critical mineral study, EPA continues to consider lithium demand to be an appropriate
basis for a GWh constraint in OMEGA modeling.
In response to comments about the need for development of the supply chain supporting the
manufacture of PEVs, and about the uncertainties and risks associated with the same, EPA
appreciates the additional information provided by commenters citing recent growth in the global
and domestic supply chain. This information is consistent with our continued observation that
development of the supply chain for PEV manufacturing inputs is receiving broad attention in
the industry and is progressing in response to market forces and governmental incentives. EPA
also acknowledges the arguments relating to risk and uncertainty cited by adverse commenters.
Regarding these comments, EPA notes that the presence of uncertainty and risk is a common
element in virtually any forward-looking analysis or plan of action. In general, in establishing
appropriateness of standards, the Clean Air Act does not require that EPA must prove that every
potential uncertainty associated with compliance with the standards must be eliminated a priori.
It is well-established in case law that "[i]n the absence of theoretical objections to the
technology, the agency need only identify the major steps necessary for development of the
device, and give plausible reasons for its belief that the industry will be able to solve those
problems in the time remaining. Thus, EPA is not required to rebut all speculation that
unspecified factors may hinder 'real world' emission control." NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318,
333-34 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Thus, it is not required, nor would it be reasonable to expect, that EPA
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prove sufficient production capacity already exists today for technologies or inputs that are likely
to be required to comply with standards in the future, nor that all potential uncertainties that can
be identified regarding the development of that capacity must be eliminated. In fact, past EPA
rulemakings have been technology-forcing, and so have required industry to develop and
increase production of technologies for which critical inputs and production capacity were not
fully developed and proven at the time. In any forward-looking analysis, uncertainty is typically
approached as a matter of risk assessment, including sensitivity analysis conducted around costs,
compliance paths, or other key factors. Taken as a whole, the robust set of sensitivity cases that
we include in the updated analysis explore the most significant risks and uncertainties
surrounding the future development of these and other issues, and show that compliance with the
final standards is possible under a broad range of reasonable scenarios. Included in these
scenarios are examples of pathways that would rely on fewer BEVs and more vehicles with ICE
across a range of electrification (ICE vehicles, mild HEVs, HEVs and PHEVs), which would
significantly reduce the demand for battery production and critical minerals.
Relatedly, in response to comments that highlight the risks associated with sourcing of
minerals and processed materials from other countries, EPA understands that some inputs
necessary to the production of electrified vehicle components are currently sourced from other
countries. EPA notes, as discussed at length in section IV.C.7 of the preamble, that the
Administration has identified a goal to advance domestic production capacity and secure supply
chains for these minerals and components among FTA partners, MSP partners, and other
economic allies. EPA also notes ongoing work by the Department of Energy to ensure that these
materials can be recycled efficiently. We also note that use of imported materials and minerals is
not unique to PEVs, but also is true for conventional vehicles, which use an array of imported
and strategic materials, such as platinum and palladium for catalysts, computer chips for engine
control and entertainment systems, and other parts and materials that are sourced from other
countries. Materials like these were imported for use in other industries long before the recent
growth in their use in electrification. While some battery chemistries include cobalt which carries
environmental and other impacts depending on how it is sourced, cobalt content is being rapidly
reduced and battery chemistries that do not use cobalt are already gaining market acceptance.
While increased demand for critical minerals can cause costs to increase, at the same time the
increased value of these materials favors their recycling, and there is little evidence to suggest
that minerals that have significant market value will not provide similar incentives for recycling
as other materials in the automotive sector, thus reducing demand on production from mining
operations. See also our response to comments on energy security and electrified vehicles in
RTC Section 21.
In response to comments that suggest that global battery production may not keep pace with
demand, we continue to see evidence that global lithium-ion battery and cell production is
growing rapidly and is likely to keep pace with increasing global demand. In the proposal we
first noted a 2021 report from Argonne National Laboratory (ANL)489 that examined the state of
the global supply chain for electrified vehicles and included a comparison of projections of
future global battery manufacturing capacity and projections of future global battery demand
from various analysis firms out to 2030. The three most recent projections of capacity (from
BNEF, Roland Berger, and S&P Global in 2020-2021) that were collected by ANL at that time
489 Argonne National Laboratory, "Lithium-Ion Battery Supply Chain for E-Drive Vehicles in the United States:
2010-2020," ANL/ESD-21/3, March 2021.
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exceeded the corresponding projections of demand by a significant margin in every year for
which they were projected. Since the proposal, we have only seen evidence that this trend is
accelerating. For example, as described in section IV.C.7.i of the preamble, more recent
projections of supply have greatly exceeded the projections in the 2021 report cited above. See
the discussion in Preamble IV.C.7.i after the figure titled "Future global Li-ion battery demand
and production capacity, 2020-2030."
In response to comments that more time is needed for scale up of supply chains and PEV
production to meet the standards, EPA disagrees. EPA notes that the final standards are less
stringent than the proposal in the early years of the program from MYs 2027-2031 resulting in
fewer BEVs in the central case than in the proposal, particularly in those years. We also note
again the sensitivities and other examples that show that alternative compliance paths are
possible that indicate lower BEV penetration and hence less demand for batteries and critical
minerals (see Sections I.B.I, IV.F and IV.G of the preamble and Chapter 12 of the RIA). See
also the responses to similar comments related to supply chain development throughout this
section.
In response to comments that we overestimated future North American battery manufacturing
capacity, or did not account for ramp up time of these facilities, or did not account for the
specific use of the cells produced by manufacturing plants, EPA disagrees. Our estimates in the
proposal were based on work by ANL as cited in the proposal. We note that ANL has since
performed an updated study of North American battery cell manufacturing capacity490 and we
are using this study in the updated analysis. The updated study accounts for a 3-year period from
beginning of production to full scale operation, based on their assessment of typical time periods
experienced in new plant construction and production plans as stated by manufacturers. ANL
also accounted for the intended use of the cells produced in these plants, finding that the vast
majority are expected to be used in light-duty automotive applications rather than heavy-duty,
stationary or consumer product applications. The updated ANL study further reinforces our
assessment that automotive battery production capacity in North America is rapidly growing and
is likely to meet demand in the central case of the analysis. This is consistent with the assessment
provided by Benchmark Minerals for the Alliance (the "Alliance/BMI Study"), which foresees
similar growth in plant manufacturing capacity, and states, "Benchmark foresees US self-
sufficiency on the basis the current trend is maintained, new capacity is commissioned, and
significant manufacturing credits are realized." EPA considers ANL's assessment through
December 2023 to be thorough and up to date and notes that the Alliance/BMI Study was
performed prior to July 2023 when it was submitted to the docket. While AFPM and API assert
that "mature battery factories today rarely operate above 80 percent utilization rates," there is no
indication in the cited reference491 that this is a matter of ramp-up time or some limitation on the
ability to reach full capacity, but instead appears to refer to historical rates of utilization that
could just as likely reflect planning for future demand, mentioning specifically "optimism about
market growth." In contrast, comments by Toyota indicate that "it takes about 4 years to reach
full scale battery production," reaching 75 percent after the first year and almost 90 percent after
490 Argonne National Laboratory, "Quantification of Commercially Planned Battery Component Supply in North
America through 2035," ANL-24/14, March 2024.
491 Xiao, M., "Lithium-ion battery production goes global," Control Engineering, January 26, 2022. Accessed on
March 9, 2024 at https://www.controleng.com/articles/lithium-ion-battery-production-goes-global/
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the third year.492 While the 4-year period cited by Toyota is longer than the 3 years cited by
ANL, ANL uses a linear ramp that adds capacity more slowly than the ramp shape implied by
Toyota, and Toyota cites only a proprietary study by e-Source. EPA sees no reason to question
the ramp rate that was determined by ANL as a result of its study and notes that due to its linear
shape it is generally more conservative.
According to ANL's analysis of publicly announced cell factories in North America, as of
January 2024, manufacturers in the United States could supply about 10 million new light-duty
electric vehicles each year by 2030, assuming an average pack size of 80 to 100 kWh.493 In
addition, the central case of our updated compliance analysis projects a substantially lower
demand for battery production than in the proposal. This is largely due to the effect of higher
battery cost inputs, which reduce the penetration of BEVs in the central case, the inclusion of
PHEVs which use smaller batteries than BEVs, and updated BEV efficiency inputs. After
including all of these updates, projected North American automotive battery production capacity
continues to meet projected demand. In the case that a shortfall were to occur, our higher battery
cost sensitivity accounts for higher battery costs that might result, and as previously noted,
examples of pathways that include lower BEV penetration in favor of HEVs and PHEVs would
continue to exist and would place even less demand on battery production (see Sections I.B.I,
IV.F and IV.G of the preamble and Chapter 12 of the RIA).
In response to comments that we should include consideration of active material
manufacturing, we did consider global cathode active material manufacturing capacity in the
proposal, and in the updated analysis we consider additional information regarding global and
domestic manufacturing for active materials and other cell components in Preamble IV.C.7 and
RIA Chapter 3. In addition to other sources, we cite the North American battery manufacturing
report from ANL494 that considered domestic manufacturing capacity for electrode active
materials and other cell materials and components.
In response to comments that generally suggest that batteries and/or cells will largely be
imported from other countries, we have not found evidence since the proposal that would change
our observation that U.S. PEV production to date has not been particularly reliant on foreign
manufacture of batteries and cells, nor that increased PEV penetration must imply such a
reliance. In the proposal we noted that about 57 percent of cells and 84 percent of assembled
packs sold in the U.S. from 2010 to 2021 were made in the U.S.495'496 Continued growth in U.S.
BEV sales is dominated by manufacturers such as Tesla who largely use U.S. made batteries,
suggesting that this trend has continued since the cited sources were published. Considering the
influence of the 45X production tax credits on the decisions of manufacturers to produce in the
U.S., and our assessment that planned domestic automotive battery manufacturing capacity is
492 EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 14-15.
493 Argonne National Laboratory, "Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates," January 30, 2024.
Accessed on February 2, 2024 at https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates
494 Argonne National Laboratory, "Quantification of Commercially Planned Battery Component Supply in North
America through 2035," ANL-24/14, March 2024.
495 Argonne National Laboratory, "Lithium-Ion Battery Supply Chain for E-Drive Vehicles in the United States:
2010-2020," ANL/ESD-21/3, March 2021.
496 U.S. Department of Energy, "Vehicle Technologies Office Transportation Analysis Fact of the Week #1278,
Most Battery Cells and Battery Packs in Plug-in Vehicles Sold in the United States From 2010 to 2021 Were
Domestically Produced," February 20, 2023.
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likely to meet demand under the central case, it appears likely that this trend will continue even
as PEV production increases. ANL analysis suggests that North American cell production can
meet projected demand through 2032.497
In response to comments on the potential impact of increased or highly volatile critical
mineral costs on future battery costs, EPA agrees that mineral costs can pose uncertainties for
predicting future battery manufacturing costs as demand for these commodities grows. This kind
of potential cost impact is not unique to batteries; the same is true for critical minerals used in
ICE vehicle emissions control systems, as well as other materials or components used in vehicle
manufacturing generally, like semiconductors.498 EPA acknowledges that price volatility of
critical minerals and products made from them has recently affected the cost of batteries and
other electrification components, as indicated, for example, by the December 2022 BNEF battery
price survey that indicated battery costs had increased from 2021 to 2022. However, we also note
that the most recent December 2023 BNEF survey indicates that battery costs have resumed their
downward trajectory from 2022 to 2023, due in part to reduced mineral costs. In light of the most
recent analyst consensus on future battery mineral prices through approximately 2029 which
indicate a long period of falling and relatively stable prices, our central case battery costs appear
conservative in that they are based on somewhat earlier forecasts of mineral prices that did not
include this declining outlook, and omit any cost reductions through 2025 despite indications
from these sources that mineral costs will be falling during that period and beyond. Therefore we
consider the higher battery costs and the high and low battery cost sensitivity cases that we have
included in the updated analysis as addressing these uncertainties. Further, EPA recognizes and
supports efforts by the Department of Energy and the Administration to pursue initiatives that
can reduce the risk associated with these materials by promoting development of the domestic
supply chain and developing domestic sources for critical minerals and related technology. Many
of these approaches, initiatives and programs are outlined in detail in ANL's February 2024
report on critical materials.499 During the time frame of this rule, our assumptions for future
battery costs in this final rule are consistent with projections by the Department of Energy and
Argonne National Laboratory, leading analysis firms and general industry consensus. Where
future costs beyond the time frame of the rule are used to determine annualized costs, we have
remained conservative with respect to some projections due to these uncertainties.
In response to comments the EPA should consider the Mauler et al. study on the potential
impact of mineral prices on battery costs, EPA has reviewed this study and has considered its
findings in characterizing future battery costs and battery cost sensitivities within and beyond the
time frame of the rule, as discussed in Preamble IV.C.2 and RIA Chapter 2. More discussion of
our reference to the Mauler work and generally on battery costs and development of battery cost
sensitivities can be found in those sections, and responses to comments on battery costs may be
found in section 12 of this RTC.
497 Argonne National Laboratory, "Quantification of Commercially Planned Battery Component Supply in North
America through 2035," ANL-24/14, March 2024.
498 See, e.g., J.D. Power, "Why Is There A Global Chip Shortage For Cars?," July 5, 2023. Accessed on March 3,
2024 at https://www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-guides/why-is-there-a-global-chip-shortage-for-cars
499 Argonne National Laboratory, "Securing Critical Materials for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Industry: A Landscape
Assessment of Domestic and International Supply Chains for Five Key EV Battery Materials," ANL-24/06,
February 2024.
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In response to comments on the representation of increased mineral costs in BatPaC, and that
the default costs of manufacturing inputs in BatPaC do not account for recent volatility or
increases in mineral prices, EPA understands that prices seen in the industry have experienced a
period of volatility and that price swings are difficult to represent as a set of default costs.
However, our battery costs in the updated analysis do not employ the default input costs in
BatPaC but instead are based on costs developed by ANL from forecasts of mineral costs
provided by Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (BMI) from 2023 to 2035. According to
comments from the Alliance, BMI is "a well-known, respected consultant in the area of Li-ion
battery supply chains from the materials extraction to cell production stage."
In response to comments relating to the environmental impacts of increased mining for critical
minerals, EPA notes that this concern applies not only to critical minerals used for PEV
technology but also to all extractive activities, including oil and gas extraction which is used to
provide fuel for ICE vehicles, and mining of virgin materials for numerous other products across
the economy. Commenters have not established that the potential impact of incremental
increases in mining activity to support PEV technology either domestically or worldwide is
meaningfully different in scope or significance than other mining activities that have similar
impacts. As discussed in Preamble IV.C.7 and RIA Chapter 3, EPA assesses that over the long
term, recycling could significantly reduce environmental impacts that may accompany mining of
virgin materials used in electrified vehicles. Additionally, EPA considered possible approaches
to lessen environmental impacts from mining that may be implemented for future mining
projects, including those for materials used in PEVs, including the approaches, initiatives and
programs outlined in ANL's February 2024 report on critical materials.500
In response to comments that environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerations
could impact critical mineral prices and hence battery costs, EPA agrees that some manufacturers
may choose to represent these considerations in their material acquisition policies, but notes that
there is little to no data to quantify the extent of this practice in the future or how it would affect
material prices collectively across the industry, and the commenter did not provide such data. As
noted elsewhere, our battery costs in the central case of the updated analysis are on average
about 25 percent higher than in the proposal, and our high battery cost sensitivity models a 25
percent increase on top of that. The high battery cost sensitivity is meant to address the uncertain
possibility of additional costs of this sort which at present are too uncertain to precisely quantify.
In response to comments that a commitment to a broad array of complementary government
policies is necessary to achieve the PEV penetrations anticipated by the compliance analysis,
EPA has identified a broad array of complementary policies that are oriented to this purpose.
EPA notes that agency action on many of the specific policies and incentives suggested by
commenters are outside the scope of this rulemaking, but we continue to monitor developments
in each of these areas. It is our assessment that these areas continue to receive a large degree of
attention consistent with the action of market forces and government actions necessary to address
commenters' concerns. EPA notes the ongoing work of the Administration and Congress to
address these areas individually and as part of an all-of-government approach, including
Congressional passage of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the CHIPS and Science
5°° Argonnc National Laboratory, "Securing Critical Materials for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Industry: A Landscape
Assessment of Domestic and International Supply Chains for Five Key EV Battery Materials," ANL-24/06,
February 2024.
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Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act. Some relevant programs include the Battery Manufacturing
and Recycling Grants, Battery Material Processing Grants, Domestic Manufacturing Conversion
Grants, and Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing Loan Program (DOE), the 48C
Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit (DOE/DOC), and DOT's National Electric Vehicle
Infrastructure (NEVI) Program and Charging and Fueling Infrastructure Grant Program. These
programs are providing an unprecedented amount of federal resources and guidance to support
both supply and demand for zero- and near-zero emission vehicles. EPA has also reviewed the
programs, initiatives and approaches outlined in ANL's recent work on domestic battery
manufacturing and critical materials and these sources provide an excellent reference for
complementary policies focused both domestically and internationally.501'502 Some commenters
described the investments the auto industry and other segments of the transportation and utility
sectors have made and continue to make in these areas. EPA appreciates the significance of these
efforts and believes that efforts like these will continue to contribute to the advancement of clean
transportation over time.
In general, although some commenters have asserted, for example, the need for "massive and
coordinated" efforts on the part of "the auto industry, energy providers, mineral suppliers and the
government," they do not state specifically why they feel that efforts of the sort described above
either are not appropriate or fall short of what they feel is needed. For example, API states,
"although Congress and the Administration have taken significant steps to accelerate this activity
by funding, facilitating, and promoting the rapid growth of U.S. supply chains for these products
through the IRA, BIL, and numerous Executive Branch initiatives, more will still be needed
given the increase in demand." However, API does not specify what more it feels will be needed.
Similarly, Toyota states that "the proposal lacks an actionable plan for translating funding and
goals into specific projects" but does not state what it believes to be the elements of such a plan.
Some commenters go on to suggest that the standards should therefore include an adjusting
mechanism that would monitor progress in development of the supply chain, critical mineral
sourcing, and other efforts and automatically adjust the stringency of the standards accordingly.
EPA responds to these and similar requests for a stringency adjustment mechanism in RTC 3.3.1.
Based on the available evidence, EPA assesses that the projected level of PEV penetration
indicated under the central case of the compliance analysis is consistent with trends already
underway, such as the current level of sales and sales growth that is taking place, the current
ramp up of charging infrastructure buildout, incentives, and other complementary policies, and
the measures currently underway and planned by the industry as mentioned above and by other
commenters. EPA also assesses that a wide range of actions, including investments and
partnerships by the automotive industry and investments and initiatives by the federal
government (for example, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act that provides significant
funding to the Department of Energy to promote supply chain development), indicate that (a) the
automotive industry has recognized the need to establish a supply chain for electrified vehicles
and is taking appropriate action to address this business need, and (b) the abovementioned
federal investments and initiatives indicate that the federal government is taking appropriate
501 Argonne National Laboratory, "Quantification of Commercially Planned Battery Component Supply in North
America through 2035," ANL-24/14, March 2024.
502 Argonne National Laboratory, "Securing Critical Materials for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Industry: A Landscape
Assessment of Domestic and International Supply Chains for Five Key EV Battery Materials," ANL-24/06,
February 2024.
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actions to support its development. The evidence indicates that automakers are already
demonstrating that they are taking appropriate steps, and that the standards adopted in this rule
will encourage continued investment in supply chains by providing regulatory and market
certainty.
In response to comments that EPA should implement a stringency adjustment mechanism to
account for uncertainties in development of the supply chain, critical minerals, manufacturing
and mineral security, comments related to a stringency adjustment mechanism are discussed in
RTC 3.4.
In response to comments that HEVs and PHEVs would be a better use of critical minerals
than BEVs, and that EPA should therefore have projected a greater penetration of these vehicles
in the compliance analysis, EPA notes that the central case and other scenarios assessed in the
compliance analysis are only projections of potential pathways for complying with the standards.
Manufacturers remain free to use any combination of technologies that they find to be most
effective. If, as commenters suggest, HEV and PHEV technologies are more effective and
available at lower cost in the future than projected in our central analysis, or represent a more
efficient use of resources that are available to a given manufacturer, the manufacturer is free to
realize those benefits by doing so. Our sensitivity cases and other examples that include greater
penetration of HEVs and PHEVs indicate that in such cases, compliance with the standards
would remain possible.
In response to comments that the standards would cause harm to national security (including
comments on the energy security and mineral security impacts of an increased penetration of
PEVs), EPA disagrees. EPA first notes that we define energy security differently from mineral
security, where energy security focuses on security implications of energy sourcing and mineral
security focuses on security implications of critical mineral sourcing. To this end, EPA notes that
the use of imported materials or minerals to build vehicles is not a direct analogy to the issue of
energy security associated with use of imported petroleum, because the minerals used in
production of batteries, motors, and other components are not an energy source that is consumed
to power the vehicle, but rather, once supplied, remain with the manufactured vehicle for its
useful life. Further, once imported, over time these materials can be recycled and thereby
become a domestic source when vehicles have reached end of life. We respond to comments
pertaining to energy security in RTC Section 21. Regarding mineral security, EPA finds no
evidence that compliance with the standards will adversely impact national security by creating a
long-term dependence on imports of critical minerals or components from unfriendly nations, or
creating a vulnerability to disruption of necessary manufacturing inputs. The economic and other
factors that are contributing to continued development of the supply chain today, as described
previously, indicate that the industry is acting rapidly and robustly in response to anticipated
demand and government development incentives to build a secure supply chain that includes
both domestic sources and sources among preferred trading partners, in tandem with increasing
mineral demand. Importantly, the updated analysis also projects significantly reduced battery
demand in the central case and even lower demand in the more prevalent P/HEV penetration
cases and other illustrative examples (see Sections I.B.I, IV.F and IV.G of the preamble and
Chapter 12 of the RIA), further reducing potential exposure to these risks compared to the
proposal. In fact, we assess that the final standards are likely to promote long-term national
security benefits by reducing demand for petroleum, reducing the nation's economic exposure to
global price volatility of petroleum, and by providing regulatory and market certainty for the
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continued development of a domestic supply chain for critical minerals and clean energy
technologies (as mentioned in Section IV.C.7of the preamble).
While section 202(a) does not require EPA to evaluate national security, the Administrator
has nonetheless considered national security in promulgating this rule, consistent with past
rulemakings.503 Commenters raise the issue of national security implications of an increasing
share of PEVs that may be driven by the standards. In response, EPA disagrees that the standards
undermine national security. In fact, it is important to examine the alternative that commenters
appear to be advocating, that is, that the U.S. should weaken or withdraw the standards in order
to avoid an increased need for critical minerals. Under this path, business as usual would prevail,
as U.S. industry would no longer be additionally motivated to meet the standards by investing in
and building a secure supply chain for these products. Instead, the current prevailing industry
practice of conveniently acquiring these products from the very sources that commenters identify
as threats to national security would have greater incentive to continue for a longer time if not
indefinitely. Indeed, as another commenter pointed out, "choosing to weaken these standards
would result in the United States falling behind in the global race to develop domestic supply
chains, good-paying jobs, and battery and EV manufacturing."504 While the increased demand
directly attributable to the rule would be eliminated, over the long term this may not place
national security in a better position. Demand for critical minerals in the U.S. and globally is
poised to grow rapidly in the coming years regardless of the existence of the standards, and
failure of U.S. industry to take immediate and sustained steps to improve its position in
producing and acquiring these products to address U.S. needs and to improve its competitiveness
in the global market can negatively impact national security over the long run.
Regarding the comment from Western Energy Alliance that "there should be a corresponding
quantification of the mineral security costs in the cost/benefits analysis of the rule," and that it
would show a "huge cost to national security," EPA disagrees. EPA has separated mineral
security from the traditional concept of energy security in order to relate the concept to the
projections of mineral supply and demand considered in the rulemaking analysis. As discussed in
section IV.C.7 of the preamble, our assessment of the available evidence indicates that the
increase in PEV production projected to result from the proposed standards can be
accommodated without causing harm to national security and may bring about a net benefit to
national security. Commenter has not provided evidence or data to support their assertion that the
rule would result in a net cost to national security or that it would exceed the projected energy
security benefit of the rule.
As several commenters have noted, the domestic supply chain for critical minerals and
various clean energy technologies largely lags well behind that of other countries, including
China which has invested heavily in these technologies and maintains a leadership position in
many of them; however, ANL analysis demonstrates that investment in the supply chain for
critical minerals and batteries has expanded rapidly and is expected to continue, putting the U.S.
in a better position to meet minerals and materials demand for PEVs from domestic and friendly
503 For example, EPA has evaluated national security impacts associated with petroleum oil imports in all of our
motor vehicle GHG rulemakings.
504 Comments from Plug-In America, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0625, pp. 1-2.
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sources.505'506 Even in the absence of the standards, development of a domestic supply chain for
critical minerals and clean energy technology, which is already underway as demonstrated by the
ANL reports, will be critical to maintaining national security, by maintaining competitiveness of
U.S. industry as the world increasingly moves to these technologies, not just in the transportation
sector but across much of the global economy. The presence of the standards therefore provides
additional regulatory certainty that supports achieving this goal more rapidly than would
otherwise occur, thus benefiting national security.
In response to comments that the standards should be weakened or postponed as a response to
uncertainty about precise availability of minerals in the future, or the sourcing of these products,
or other uncertainties related to minerals, the supply chain, or mineral security, EPA disagrees.
See the discussion in section IV.C.7 of the preamble. This position is also consistent with that of
leading research firms and industry analysts which regularly acknowledge the value of regulatory
certainty in driving investment in their production.507'508'509 Some commenters such as the
"Environmental and Public Health Organizations" echoed this principle, stating for example,
"clear regulatory signals - like EPA's vehicle emissions regulations - can create further
confidence in the private sector to accelerate and expand investments." Similarly, ZETA stated,
"robust EPA emissions standards will provide the regulatory certainty needed to not only ensure
manufacturers continue to invest in LMDEV technologies but that the entire supply chain
supporting the transition to electrification will have a clearer picture of how to plan capital
expenditures today to meet the increased demand for its products over the coming years." If
commenters citing concerns about national security are correct that development of a domestic
supply chain for these products will be important to national security and global competitiveness
of the U.S., it should also be acknowledged that it was in the absence of (i.e., prior to) this rule
that U.S. domestic production capacity has lagged far behind that of China and other countries.
While the domestic supply chain has already begun to develop in part as a result of rapidly
growing industry attention to vehicle electrification as well as the influence of the IRA and BIL,
the need to comply with the standards provides additional market certainty to improve
confidence in investment in this area and is likely to lead to even faster development of the
supply chain. In fact, many of the same critical minerals and the same types of production
capacity are necessary not only for complying with the standards, but also for the general
competitiveness of the U.S. on a global stage, at a time when the need to reduce greenhouse
gases, reduce other pollutants, and produce clean energy is being recognized across the world.
505 Argonne National Laboratory, "Quantification of Commercially Planned Battery Component Supply in North
America through 2035," ANL-24/14, March 2024.
506 Argonne National Laboratory, "Securing Critical Materials for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Industry: A Landscape
Assessment of Domestic and International Supply Chains for Five Key EV Battery Materials," ANL-24/06,
February 2024.
507 Allen & Overy, "U.S. Inflation Reduction Act takes climate change out of political cycle," November 3, 2022.
Accessed on February 16, 2024 at https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-and-insights/publications/us-
inflation-reduction-act-takes-climate-change-out-of-political-cycle
508 Union of Concerned Scientists, "Production Tax Credit for Renewable Energy," February 9, 2015. Accessed on
February 16, 2024 at https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/production-tax-credit-renewable-energy
509 Bistline, J. et al., "Economic Implications of the Climate Provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act," Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, BPEA Conference Draft, March 30-31, 2023. Accessed on February 16, 2024 at
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/BPEA_Spring2023_Bistline-et-
al_unembargoedUpdated.pdf
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The standards are thus consistent with and are likely to strongly promote the competitiveness of
U.S. industry, as well as the national security benefits that accompany such an outcome.
EPA notes that the beneficial impact of CAA standards on US global competitiveness has a
long pedigree. We summarized these impacts in a retrospective study of the economic impacts of
the CAA mandated by Congress.510 We generally found that peer-reviewed studies show that the
Act has been a good economic investment for America. Since 1970, cleaner air and a growing
economy have gone hand in hand. The CAA has created market opportunities that have helped to
inspire innovation in cleaner technologies - technologies in which the United States has become
a global market leader. For example, in 2018, the US environmental technologies and services
industry generated approximately $345 billion in revenues and exported goods and services
worth $47.8 billion, larger than exports of sectors such as plastics and rubber products.
Environmental technology exports help the U.S. balance of trade, generating a $26.9 billion
surplus in 2015. Air pollution control equipment alone generated revenues of $18 billion in 2008,
including exports of approximately $3 billion. The size of the world market for environmental
goods and services - $1.12 trillion—is comparable to the aerospace and pharmaceutical
industries and presents important opportunities for U.S. industry. The final rule continues this
history of EPA's environmental regulations supporting US industry and global competitiveness.
In response to comments that the standards would result in greater dependence on imports,
and/or bring about geopolitical or economic disadvantages associated with such dependency
(such as for example increased trade deficits), EPA disagrees. EPA acknowledges that China,
and to a significant degree other countries (such as South Korea, Japan, and Indonesia), have a
strong market presence or hold a leadership position with respect to the supply chain for various
battery component products and various mining and processing functions related to critical
minerals. EPA notes that mineral resources of all types are unevenly distributed around the
world, with some countries having more naturally occurring resources of some minerals than
exist in others. Similarly, some countries have invested more heavily than others in developing
the resources available to them and in other countries, while others have resources but either
have not invested as heavily in developing them or have discontinued production, for economic
or other reasons. Accordingly, a large portion of everyday international trade is represented by
trade in minerals and related products, and in some cases these minerals must be traded among
countries that differ politically or economically. The U.S. has long relied on critical minerals
obtained from other countries through routine international trade. For example, ICE vehicles
have long relied on imported mineral products, most notably crude oil or refined crude oil
products such as gasoline or diesel, and critical minerals used in catalysts. Historically, supply
and cost of crude oil products have periodically created significant uncertainty for the U.S.
economy and national security. The critical minerals used in emission control catalysts of ICE
products, such as cerium, palladium, platinum, and rhodium, historically have also posed
uncertainty and risk regarding their reliable supply. Well in advance of emission control
standards of the 1970s that were premised on use of those minerals for catalyst control of
pollutants, these minerals were understood to be potentially scarce and costly and to rely largely
on sourcing from countries with whom the U.S. had tenuous trade relations, such as Russia and
510 See EPA, The Clean Air Act and the Economy, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-act-and-
economv: EPA, Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990-2020, the Second Prospective Study,
https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/benefits-and-costs-clean-air-act-1990-2020-second-prospective-studv.
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South Africa.511 In response, over time manufacturers have engineered emission control systems
to reduce the amount of these minerals that are needed, but they continue to be scarce and costly
today. In this sense, the need for building a reliable supply chain for the inputs required for PEV
production is similar to the need already experienced by the ICE supply chain, although for a
different set of inputs. While demand for critical minerals used in PEV batteries would likely
increase as a result of the standards, not all of these minerals will be imported and many can
increasingly be produced domestically or secured from FTA partners and economic allies over
time. EPA has reviewed and agrees with the findings of the two 2024 ANL reports that consider
the current state and future outlook for the supply chain with respect to cell manufacturing and
critical minerals, materials and components.512'513 Minerals that are in fact imported also become
domestic products when the vehicles that use them are recycled and the minerals reclaimed. We
also note that the amount and value of critical minerals residing in a PEV for its lifetime is
significantly less than the amount and value of crude oil-based fuel consumed by an ICE vehicle
during its lifetime. Although some commenters have noted that the U.S. is currently a net
exporter of oil, the U.S. is still a large consumer of oil. Since the price of oil is set globally, the
U.S. remains largely vulnerable to events such as price shocks that affect the global oil market.
Regarding comments alleging that an increased trade deficit will result from increased PEV
production, EPA disagrees. Commenter did not cite specific evidence or data to show that the
economic value of imports associated with PEV manufacture would necessarily increase trade
deficits. Further and as noted elsewhere, EPA notes that the rule provides regulatory and market
certainty for production of PEVs and related products such as batteries, battery components, and
critical minerals, thereby promoting the ability of the U.S. to export these products now and in
the future, offsetting the effect the commenters claim.
In response to comments that EPA should consider the costs and risks to OEMs and
technology suppliers in adapting supply chains to meet the standards, particularly with respect to
PEVs, EPA does in fact consider the impact of its rulemakings on various segments of the
industry, including suppliers. EPA has considered the significant activity, investment, and
progress that is occurring in public and private contexts to prepare the manufacturing base for
PEV production at the levels of penetration anticipated during the time frame of this rule. For
example, among numerous other sources as described in section IV.C.7 of the preamble and
Chapter 3 of the RIA, EPA has reviewed and considered the progress and investments outlined in
the March 2024 ANL reports on battery manufacturing and critical materials.514'515 EPA
considers the broad and ongoing activities outlined there and in the preamble and RIA to
represent an appropriate market response to the anticipated need to meet the standards.
511 U.S. Geological Survey, "Platinum Group Metals." Accessed on January 27, 2024 at
https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2022/mcs2022-platinum.pdf
512 Argonne National Laboratory, "Quantification of Commercially Planned Battery Component Supply in North
America through 2035," ANL-24/14, March 2024.
513 Argonne National Laboratory, "Securing Critical Materials for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Industry: A Landscape
Assessment of Domestic and International Supply Chains for Five Key EV Battery Materials," ANL-24/06,
February 2024.
514 Argonne National Laboratory, "Quantification of Commercially Planned Battery Component Supply in North
America through 2035," ANL-24/14, March 2024.
515 Argonne National Laboratory, "Securing Critical Materials for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Industry: A Landscape
Assessment of Domestic and International Supply Chains for Five Key EV Battery Materials," ANL-24/06,
February 2024.
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In response to comments relating to potential for instability in future supply, future volatility
in pricing, or resiliency of the supply chain to disruption, EPA has noted elsewhere that minerals
and mining have a cyclical nature and are often characterized by changes in pricing and supply
as with any other cyclical market. EPA has also noted that manufacturers typically are insulated
to a significant degree from volatility in spot market prices by entering into long term supply
contracts, and sees no reason to doubt, as AmFree asserts, that such contracts "will continue to
be offered as the demand for a limited supply of critical minerals skyrockets over the coming
years." Indeed, as AFPM has noted in their public comments (see RTC section 12), "most
lithium contracts are written as long-term agreements," and also makes the claim that "spot
markets for battery materials are virtually non-existent," which if true would suggest that
contract arrangements are standard in the industry. Further, Jeremy Michalek et al. notes that the
effect of material supply disruptions on "individual automakers, and whether they experience
shortages in the short-run depends on a number of factors, including the specifics of contracts in
their supply chains," going on to note that "material markets, battery manufacturers, and
automakers tend to respond to disruptions," and also that the rule includes "a number of
flexibilities such as credit borrowing" that can help address the potential for supply disruptions
rather than result in an inability to produce PEVs to comply. EPA also notes comments from
Institute for Policy Integrity noting that "ICE vehicles may be susceptible to similar risks as
BEVs from supply shocks due to our reliance on foreign vehicles and vehicle parts," further
noting that "one-fourth of the 15,000 to 30,000 parts making up an ICE vehicle are sourced
globally," and that because "ICE vehicles have far more parts and moving parts than electric
vehicles [...] shortages of key inputs can cause production delays and shortages."
In response to comments that permitting reform and streamlining is needed to accelerate
mining development in the U.S., EPA notes that efforts are continuing across the Administration
and the Department of the Interior to investigate where permitting and mining development
timelines can be improved.516'517'518 The US also has tools available, including the FAST-41
program, to improve permitting timelines and transparency. The first critical minerals project to
receive FAST-41 Coverage was announced in 2023.519 See also the discussion in section
IV.C.7.ii of the preamble.
In response to comments that assert that there will not be enough critical minerals for
manufacturers to comply with the standards, EPA disagrees. EPA acknowledges and appreciates
the extensive report on IRA-compliant mineral and active material production conducted by
516 Department of the Interior, "Recommendations to Improve Mining on Public Lands / Developed by the Biden-
Harris Administration's Interagency Working Group on Mining Laws, Regulations, and Permitting," Final Report,
September 2023. https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/mriwg-report-final-508.pdf
517 The White House, "FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Releases Permitting Action Plan to Accelerate
and Deliver Infrastructure Projects On Time, On Task, and On Budget," May 11, 2022. Accessed on March 5, 2024
at https://www.whitehouse.gOv/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/ll/fact-sheet-biden-harris-
administration-releases-permitting-action-plan-to-accelerate-and-deliver-infrastructure-projects-on-time-on-task-
and-on-budget/
518 U.S. Department of the Interior, "Biden-Harris Administration Report Outlines Reforms Needed to Promote
Responsible Mining on Public Lands," September 12, 2023. https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/biden-harris-
administration-report-outlines-reforms-needed-promote-responsible-mining
519 Department of Transportation, Permitting Dashboard Office, "Permitting Council Moves to Designate the Critical
Minerals Supply Chain as a FAST-41 Sector," Press Release, September 21, 2023.
https://www.permits.performance.gov/fpisc-content/permitting-council-moves-designate-critical-minerals-supply-
chain-fast-41 -sector
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Benchmark Minerals Intelligence at the request of the Alliance (the "Alliance/BMI Study"). EPA
notes that the Alliance/BMI Study's second scenario of 100 percent BEV penetration in 2035 is
beyond the rulemaking time frame of 2032 and is in excess of projected penetrations for both the
proposal and the final rulemaking. EPA also notes that the Alliance describes the Alliance/BMI
Study as being concerned with two questions: "(1) What is the feasibility of achieving the two
demand scenarios with global supply chains; and (2) What is the feasibility of achieving these
two scenarios in a manner that is compliant with the IRA 30D sourcing requirements?"
However, the Alliance/BMI Study appears to only provide contextual information for the first
question, and quantitatively examines feasibility only for the second question, and thus the
relevance of the quantitatively derived outlooks offered by BMI in this study pertain primarily to
the limited context of 30D eligibility and not to production of PEVs in general. For example,
EPA does not see evidence in the Alliance/BMI Study that, as the Alliance comment asserts,
"There is some risk to meeting base case demand (about half of EPA's projected demand) even
with global supply chains," which as stated implies that BMI has concluded that global supply
from all sources would not be sufficient to meet US demand alone, whereas at the same time
BMI does not appear to have quantified global supply but has focused only on IRA-compliant
supply. Similarly and as a further example, EPA does not find evidence in the Alliance/BMI
Study for commenter's statement that "BMI forecasts lack of upstream mining and midstream
processing and cathode/anode production capacity to supply the new battery factories with the
necessary battery materials," which inaccurately suggests that BMI is identifying a hard
constraint that would prevent new battery plants from operating at capacity, when the statement
clearly applies only to operation using only IRA compliant inputs. Given that the Alliance/BMI
Study focuses on the outlook for IRA-compliant production and not total production potentially
available to the U.S. market, like much of the other mineral forecast analyses EPA has examined,
it fails to definitively identify and quantify specific and unavoidable constraints that would
reasonably lead us to conclude that a lack of mineral availability will prevent manufacturers from
meeting the standards. First, the study focuses on IRA-compliant production, and the conclusions
thus reached apply only to production of PEVs that qualify for IRC 30D and should not be
misunderstood as suggesting a similar limit on production of PEVs that can contribute to
compliance with the standards. That is, while domestically or FTA-sourced, non-FEOC520
mineral content is relevant to eligibility for the 30D clean vehicle tax credit, 30D eligibility is not
required for a vehicle to enter the domestic fleet and contribute to compliance with the standards.
EPA thus disagrees with and finds potentially misleading the commenter's assertion that "U.S.
battery cell manufacturing and ZEV objectives are potentially limited to 15% passenger EV
penetration by 2030 vs. a policy driven target of 50% for the same year," because this statement
fails to note that the cited percentage, if correct, would relate only to the fleet penetration of
PEVs that are eligible for the 30D tax incentive and not to the total penetration of PEVs that can
be produced and enter the fleet. To the degree that the commenter implies that 30D eligibility is
an important factor in helping vehicles enter the fleet, the commenter has not considered the role
of the 45W commercial clean vehicle credit in providing a similar advantage to lessees of
vehicles whether or not they qualify for 30D. Second, EPA has elsewhere noted the robust rate of
private investments, mining exploration, recent announcements of lithium and other mineral
resource discoveries, government development programs, and other industry activity that the
proposal and the updated analysis shows are already underway and are continuing. For example,
520 FT A = free trade agreement. FEOC = foreign entity of concern, a designation used in the IRA to disqualify
certain sources of content from qualifying for some tax credits.
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see the discussion in preamble IV.C.7 where we review numerous sources including the
February and March 2024 ANL reports that examine these issues.521'522 EPA also notes the 45X
tax credit under the IRA which provides an incentive equal to 10 percent of the production cost
of critical minerals and electrode active materials in the U.S. Taken together, the totality of
information in the public record continues to indicate that development of the critical mineral
supply chain is proceeding both domestically and globally in a manner that supports the
industry's compliance with the final standards, and that the likely rate of development of the
domestic and global supply chain and forecast availability of critical minerals on the global
market are consistent with the final standards being met at a reasonable cost. Further, as we have
noted elsewhere, the central case of our updated analysis shows that the final standards can be
met with significantly less demand for critical minerals than under the central case of the
proposal, and we also provide sensitivity cases and other examples that show that the standards
can be met with lower levels of BEV technology and thus lower mineral demand (see Sections
I.B.I, IV.F and IV.G of the preamble and Chapter 12 of the RIA).
Regarding the Alliance's claim that "BMI forecasts North America will only be able to
domestically fulfill 3.5% and 3.4% of its domestic cathode and anode demands," EPA does not
find that the cited reference supports this claim. The percentages shown in the cited Figure 11 of
the comment do not appear to agree with the percentages of 3.5% and 3.4% in the text, and the
caption of the cited Figure appears to indicate that it depicts the percentage of global battery
component supply that is provided by the U.S., and not the percentage of U.S. domestic demand
that U.S. production can supply, as suggested by commenter.
In response to comments that allude to copper and aluminum posing issues similar to other
critical minerals, particularly with regard to a potential shortage or that acquiring the amount of
copper or aluminum needed to comply with the standards will expose the U.S. to national
security risks, EPA disagrees with this view. A number of commenters suggested that demand
for copper from grid development and expansion, the electric vehicle industry, charging stations,
and the like would expose the U.S. to the possibility of shortages and the need to import
increasing amounts of copper from hostile countries. Presently however, the majority of copper
for domestic use is imported from Chile and Peru.523 Neither country is a covered nation for
purposes of the IRA, and so EPA does not regard either country as an insecure source of supply.
Moreover, as documented for example in the comments of ZETA, the U.S. is developing
significant copper resources; for example, cited are the currently operating Resolution Copper,
Arizona project which has potential to supply up to 25 percent of the nation's copper demand,
and the NewRange Copper Nickel project which commenter indicates could become one of the
world's largest and lowest cost producing districts for copper, nickel, and platinum group metals.
Similarly, a number of commenters suggested a potential shortage or risk exposure for aluminum
due to rising demand from the sectors listed above. However, commenters have offered few
specifics or references to support an impending shortage or show that demand cannot be met, and
EPA sees no evidence of such a shortage; in fact, the price of aluminum has been in more or less
521 Argonne National Laboratory, "Quantification of Commercially Planned Battery Component Supply in North
America through 2035," ANL-24/14, March 2024.
522 Argonne National Laboratory, "Securing Critical Materials for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Industry: A Landscape
Assessment of Domestic and International Supply Chains for Five Key EV Battery Materials," ANL-24/06,
February 2024.
523 See Preamble to EPA Heavy-Duty Phase 3 rule, section II, Figure II-6.
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continual decline since it reached its peak in April of 2022. According to one analyst, "The
reason for this is simple: The available supply of primary aluminum is shrinking, but the demand
for that aluminum is shrinking faster, leading to a relative oversupply in the market."524 The
closing price of aluminum at the end of February 2024 continued this trend of trading in a
narrow range.525 The U.S. produces aluminum from both primary and secondary sources, and
Canada, which is an FTA partner, is one of the largest aluminum exporters to the U.S.; about 90
percent of the aluminum produced in Canada is exported to the U.S.526 EPA does not see
evidence that availability of aluminum or copper will prevent the standards from being met or
pose a risk to economic or national security. For discussion and responses to comments relating
to the power sector and electrical grid, see section IV.C.5 of the preamble and RTC section 18.
In response to comments related to rare earths used on magnets for electric machines, EPA
does not anticipate shortages or high prices in rare earth metals that would prevent compliance
with the standards, as indicated by evidence of a gradually increasing but apparently stable price
outlook for rare earths used in magnets, and a generally declining outlook for other rare earths,
during the time frame of the rule.527 EPA has reached similar conclusions regarding electrical
steel, and we discuss the outlook for electrical steel in detail in section 12.2.3 of this Response to
Comments document.
In response to comments expressing the view that IRC 30D-compliant critical mineral
sourcing and processing will not grow fast enough to keep pace with increasing content
thresholds for 30D eligibility, EPA agrees that the near term outlook for most critical minerals,
except for lithium, does not suggest that IRA-compliant mineral content will be sufficient for
every U.S. PEV to qualify for the full 30D credit, particularly in the near term.528 However, this
does not mean that there will not be a substantial portion of vehicles that do qualify. Further,
EPA notes that 30D eligibility is only one factor that can contribute to facilitating manufacturers'
adoption of PEV technology, and that other factors are also influential. In particular, 45W is not
subject to mineral sourcing requirements and can provide many manufacturers similar utility to
30D in terms of making their vehicles financially attractive to consumers, for example, when
vehicles are purchased for commercial use including leasing to consumers. EPA also notes that
the Department of Energy has performed an analysis that indicates a substantial amount of credit
can be captured on average through vehicles that qualify for 30D and others that qualify for
45W.529 We discuss this study in section IV.C.2 of the Preamble where we discuss our
assumptions for IRA credits. It is also important to note that the 45X production tax credits for
U.S. production of cells and modules are not subject to mineral sourcing requirements. 45X also
includes a tax credit for 10 percent of the production cost of U.S.-made critical minerals and
524 Industrial Metal Service, "Aluminum Shortage 2023: Major Impacts and Alternative Options," May 16, 2023.
Accessed on March 10, 2024 at https://industrialmetalservice.com/metal-university/aluminum-shortage-2023/
525 https://markets.businessinsider.com/commodities/aluminum-price. Accessed March 10, 2024.
526 Government of Canada, "Steel and aluminum," web page. Accessed on March 10, 2024 at
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/controls-controles/steel_alum-acier_alum. aspx?lang=eng
527 Wood Mackenzie, "Global rare earths investment horizon outlook," December 2023, p. 15 and 16 (filename:
global-rare-earths-investment-horizon-outlook-q4-2023.pdf). Available to subscribers.
528 Argonne National Laboratory, "Securing Critical Materials for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Industry: A Landscape
Assessment of Domestic and International Supply Chains for Five Key EV Battery Materials," ANL-24/06,
February 2024.
529 Department of Energy, "Estimating Federal Tax Incentives for Heavy Duty Electric Vehicle Infrastructure and
for Acquiring Electric Vehicle Weighing Less than 14,000 pounds," Memorandum, March 11, 2024..
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electrode active materials. Thus 30D is only one component of an array of incentives that
collectively facilitate manufacturers' ability to adopt PEV technology to comply with the
standards.
Regarding comments that suggest that EPA has not considered the benefits of domestic
production and the value of facilitating and accelerating such production, EPA disagrees. We
have clearly acknowledged the importance of other government programs such as BIL, IRA, and
the various funding mechanisms through DOE, among many others. These programs and
mechanisms are discussed at length in RIA Chapter 3 and in IV.C.7 of the Preamble. For
example, results thus far of many of these programs can be found in the March 2024 ANL
reports530'531 which are reviewed there.
In response to a comment about emission impacts of long distance transportation of minerals
and components, the commenter has not offered evidence or data as to how the supplies needed
for PEV production are any different from the supplies already transported for ICE vehicle
production, or the products and merchandise that are already transported long distances for other
purposes or for use in other products. It is no less likely that over time, the growth in domestic
production capacity resulting from the increased demand and market certainty created by the
standards will serve to reduce emissions from long-distance imports of such materials. EPA also
notes that our mobile source emissions standards under Clean Air Act 202(a) are not based on
life-cycle analysis. For response to comments relating to life-cycle analysis and emissions in
other parts of the economy or the world, refer to RTC 19 where we discuss life cycle analysis.
Regarding comments alluding to child labor or other abuses said to take place in the supply
chain for batteries, which appear to primarily refer to cobalt production in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), EPA reiterates that manufacturers are continuing to reduce cobalt
content, and proven battery chemistries that do not use cobalt such as lithium-iron phosphate are
already in widespread use globally and are increasing their market share in the U.S. Further,
although the DRC supplies about 70 percent of global cobalt production, only a relatively small
portion of cobalt produced in the DRC (estimated variously at between 10 to 30 percent) is
produced in artisanal and small-scale mines (ASM) that are associated with use of child
labor.532'533'534'535 Overall, the global share of cobalt believed to come from ASM sources is
530 Argonne National Laboratory, "Quantification of Commercially Planned Battery Component Supply in North
America through 2035," ANL-24/14, March 2024.
531 Argonne National Laboratory, "Securing Critical Materials for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Industry: A Landscape
Assessment of Domestic and International Supply Chains for Five Key EV Battery Materials," ANL-24/06,
February 2024.
532 Council on Foreign Relations, "Why Cobalt Mining in the DRC Needs Urgent Attention," October 29, 2020.
Accessed on March 10, 2024 at https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-cobalt-mining-drc-needs-urgent-attention
533 Cobalt Institute, "Cobalt Sourcing Responsibility," web page. Accessed on March 10, 2024 at
https://www.cobaltinstitute.org/cobalt-sourcing-responsability/
534 Umicore, "Responsible sourcing of cobalt," web page. Accessed on March 10, 2024 at
https://www.umicore.com/en/newsroom/topics-of-interest/cobalt-sourcing/
535 BMW Group, "Greater Transparency in Cobalt Mining," January 20, 2020. Accessed on March 10, 2024 at
https://www.bmwgroup.com/en/news/general/2020/cobalt-mining.html
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approximately 10 percent and is largely exported to China.536'537 According to BMI, the share of
ASM supply increases when prices are high, and in a May 2023 report stated that recent declines
in cobalt prices had caused ASM supply to fall by "more than 50% from the peak."538 Although
business practices and standards for ethical conduct of suppliers in other countries are out of
scope for this rulemaking, EPA notes that the Department of Labor operates the COTECCO
project539 which "works to address child labor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's (DRC)
cobalt supply chain, with a focus on artisanal and small-scale mining," supporting the
development and implementation of "strategies to reduce child labor and improve working
conditions in artisanal and small-scale mines, as well as in the broader cobalt supply chain."
Regarding comments from AFPM and AmFree related to declining mineral quality or ore
quality, commenters have cited concepts that are well understood in the mining industry and
have not provided data or evidence to indicate that declining quality will be a major factor in
future mineral prices that is not already taken into account by forecasts of leading analyst firms.
EPA's updated analysis uses estimates of future battery costs that incorporate mineral price
forecasts from BMI, a respected analysis firm cited by many other commenters. Such forecasts
are based on expert knowledge of the mining industry and consider a wide range of factors that
are commonly expected to drive mineral prices in the future. Regarding the comment from John
Graham that "mining specialists have dismissed such forecasts because of systematic errors in
their methods," the cited reference540 appears only to describe one analyst's opinion regarding
the market consensus on lithium pricing specifically, and gives no indication that it represents
the analyst's opinion about all analyst forecasts in general nor that such a position would be a
commonly held view.
Regarding a comment from MEMA that EPA should "consider added costs for post-warranty
battery pack replacement to the RIA to capture critical mineral demands resulting from second
and third owners who may have to replace/repair aged batteries after buying a used BEV," EPA
disagrees. See the responses to comments on battery replacement in RTC 12.2.5.
By means of our updated analysis and additional discussions and responses found in section
IV.C.7 of the preamble, RIA Chapter 3 and elsewhere, we have addressed other topics raised by
commenters, including but not limited to: the time necessary to permit and approve new mines,
the need for investment to increase production of batteries and minerals, the role of China as a
dominant player in the supply chain, the uneven distribution of minerals and processing facilities
around the world, the availability of minerals and components from FTA nations and economic
allies, the effect of lower mineral prices on future investment in mining, mineral quality, claims
that government efforts and/or industry effort to build the supply chain or support PEVs are
536 Gulley, A.L., "China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and artisanal cobalt mining from 2000 through
2020," PNAS Sustainability Science, vl20 n6, June 20, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2212037120.
537 Id. "Artisanal production's share of world and DRC cobalt mine production peaked around 2008 at 18 to 23%
and 40 to 53%, respectively, before trending down to 6 to 8% and 9 to 11% in 2020, respectively. Artisanal
production was chiefly exported to China or processed within the DRC by Chinese firms."
538 Cobalt Institute, "Cobalt Market Report 2022," p. 24, May 2023. Accessed on March 10, 2024 at
https://www.cobaltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Cobalt-Market-Report-2022_final.pdf
539 U.S. Department of Labor, "Combatting Child Labor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's Cobalt Industry
(COTECCO)," web page. Accessed on March 10, 2024 at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/combatting-child-
labor-democratic-republic-congos-cobalt-industry-cotecco
540 Fernley, M., "Battery Materials Review: 2022 Yearbook," February 2023, p. 21.
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insufficient, growth in battery manufacturing, sensitivity of the supply chain to disruption, and
mineral security, in addition to other specific topics addressed there and/or in this section.
For response to comments that battery recycling will not come online fast enough to help with
critical mineral demand, or other topics relating to battery recycling, please see the next section.
Comments related to the cost of electricity to manufacture batteries are addressed in RTC 12.2.1.
Additional responses to topics relating to the supply chain, critical minerals, and mineral security
may be found in section IV.C.7 of the preamble.
For response to portions of the cited comments that include references to the following topics,
see the indicated RTC sections or related discussion in the preamble: inclusion of PHEVs in the
analysis, RTC 12.2.4; critical minerals and IRA assumptions, RTC 12.4; electrical steel, RTC
12.2.3; life-cycle analysis and/or upstream or manufacturing emissions, RTC 3.1.5 and RTC 19;
employment impacts, RTC 20; energy security, RTC 21; consumer choice, affordability, or
aspects of EV utility, RTC 13; battery replacement, RTC 12.2.5; or other sections that
correspond to a specific topic.
15.2 - Battery recycling
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Additionally, recycling will not be able to satisfy society's rising demand in the near term.
The current small EV market share coupled with EV batteries' long lifespan (on average between
10- 20 years59) suggests that society will not likely be able to meet the rising demand for critical
minerals through recycling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 42]
59 Moscaritolo, A. (2022, June 29). EV Batteries 101: Degradation, Lifespan, Warranties, and More.
PCMAG. htps://www.pcmag.com/news/ev-batteries-101-degradation-lifespan-warranties-and-more
F. Other Costs of Electric Vehicles
1. Battery Recycling
It is reassuring that the Biden administration has allocated $125 million for a DOE program to
advance lithium-ion battery recycling.454 Without such a program, China may be the country
best positioned globally to capture the lithium recycling business, as it already has one battery
recycling plant in operation and plans to build several more overseas. In summary, for the next
decade or so, the shift from recycling of engines and transmissions to the recycling of lithium ion
batteries is expected to impose a net cost on the U.S. economy. That cost should be included in
the final regulatory impact analysis in conjunction with estimates of how the cost of battery
recycling might decline with appropriate supporting policies (e.g., R&D support). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 292]
454 htps://www.energy.gov/articles/biden-harris-administration-announces-192-million-advance-battery-
recycling- technology
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Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree)
EPA asserts that the United States will be able to bolster supply significantly by recycling
minerals from spent batteries that enter the domestic market. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,323-24.
That hope is also misplaced, especially given the proposed rule's compressed timeline. Electric-
vehicle batteries cannot be recy- cled until they are retired. According to the International Energy
Agency, based on "the dates of expected retirement of EV fleets and their battery chemistry
compositions," recycled minerals will be able to supply less than 1 percent of projected global
demand for lithium, less than 1 percent of global projected de- mand for nickel, and only 2
percent of global projected demand for cobalt by 2030. Global Supply Chains at 60. And even if
those numbers increase over time, many steps will need to be taken before American companies
can effectively enter the recycling space. That includes establishing "protocol or industry best
practices" on how to collect and transport spent batteries to a recycling center, navigating the
"increasingly complex disassembly" process, and entering ear- lier phases of the manufacturing
cycle where the recycled materials can actually be used. White House Report at 106, 109-11.
"[WJithout critical material re- fining and processing and battery manufacturing capacity, the
captured mate- rials from recycling end-of-life batteries will be exported for processing at for-
eign facilities and re-imported in the form of processed or manufactured prod- ucts." Id. at
111. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 40-41]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
EPA suggests that improvements in recycling rates and enhancing recovery technologies at
mines will reduce the need to develop new critical mineral sources. But this statement is
misplaced. Recycling technologies for EV batteries remain nascent and cannot scale at a rate fast
enough to alleviate supply shortages in the timeframe of the Proposed Rule. Moreover, even if
those technologies develop at a faster than expected pace and commercial scale facilities are
constructed, there will not be enough batteries to recycle to make the slightest dent in the
quantity of critical minerals needed to build out EPA's projected battery demand (see Section
I.A.I for discussion of lack of critical minerals for batteries). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733,
p. 39]
Another critical aspect of the Proposed Rule not comprehensively considered is that recycling
of the battery and related electrical components of ZEVs is in a state of infancy and poses unique
materials handling and safety challenges. EPA should consider the environmental profiles of
both ZEVs and ICEVs in light of the production, operation, and disposal of the vehicle (its useful
life). The following list provides just some of the electric battery disposal-related issues that are
likely to impact the environment and need to be addressed by EPA in the Proposed Rule:
Battery packs could contribute 250,000 metric tons of waste to landfills for every 1
million retired ZEVs.212 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
212 Kelleher Environmental, "Research Study on Reuse and Recycling of Batteries Employed in Electric
Vehicles: The Technical, Environmental, Economic, Energy and Cost Implications of Reusing and
Recycling EV Batteries", (September 2019) available at https://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas/wells-
toconsumer/fuels-and-refining/fuels/vehicle-technology-studies.
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Less than five percent of Li-ion batteries, the most common batteries used in ZEVs, are
currently being recycled "due in part to the complex technology of the batteries and cost of such
recycling."213 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
213 Gavin Harper, Roberto Sommerville, et al., NATURE, "Recycling lithium-ion batteries from electric
vehicles" (Jan. 21, 2020) available at https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1682-5.
Economies of scale will play a major role in improving the economic viability of
recycling, for which currently cost is the main bottleneck. Increasing collection and sorting rates
is a critical starting point.214 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
214 IEA Report 2022
The cathode is where most of the material value in a Li-ion battery is concentrated.
Currently, there are numerous cathode chemistries being deployed. Each of these chemistries
needs to be known, and then the appropriate method of recycling identified, which poses a
challenge, as batteries pass through a global supply chain and all materials are not well tracked.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
Lithium can be recovered from existing Li-ion recycling practices but is not economical at
current lithium prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
BMI forecasts that near-term recyclers are likely to use scrap material from the increasing
number of gigafactories coming online versus used electric vehicle batteries. Scrap is anticipated
to account for 78 percent of recyclable materials in 2025.215 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733,
pp. 47-48]
215 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, "Battery production scrap to be main source of recyclable material
this decade" (Sept. 5, 2022) available at https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/battery-production-
scrap-to-be-main-source-of-recyclable-material-this-decade.
In 2022, BMI expected over 30 gigawatt hours of process scrap to be available for
recycling, growing ten-fold across the next decade. Loss rates vary by region and tend to be
higher in earlier years of a gigafactory.216 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
216 Id.
Many 'spent' EV batteries still have 70-80 percent of their capacity left, which is more
than enough to be repurposed into other uses such as energy storage and other lower- cycle
applications for approximately another 10 years.217 This will extend the time that batteries and
raw materials remain in use and therefore increase the demand for virgin critical minerals. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
217 Pagliaro, M. and Meneguzzo, F., "Review Article: Lithium battery reusing and recycling: A circular
economy insight," Heilyon 5: E01866 (June 15, 2019) available at
https ://doi. org/10.1016/j .heliy on. 2019. eO 1866
Clear guidance on repackaging, certification, standardization, and warranty liability of
spent ZEV batteries would be needed to overcome safety and regulatory challenges reuse poses
at scale.218 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
218 IEA Report 2022.
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Recycling ZEV batteries to recover high-value metals has not been proven to a
commercial scale. The majority of analysts are aligned that recycling will not become an integral
supplier of raw materials until the 2030s, and at that point, only will provide approximately 20
percent of demand.219 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
219 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, supra at n. 105.
Unlike ICEVs, EPA has recently stated that ZEV batteries may need to be handled as
hazardous waste, further driving up the cost of such recycling efforts.220 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
220 Letter from Carolyn Hoskinson, Director, EPA Office of Resource Conservation and Recovery,
"Lithium Battery Recycling Regulatory Status and Frequently Asked Questions," (May 24, 2023).
Whether sufficient recycling capacity can be permitted and constructed to facilitate the
Proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
EPA must, therefore, conduct a full LCA to compare all environmental impacts to reasonably
conclude that the Proposal will decrease environmental impacts rather than merely shift them.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
V. Recycling of batteries and related electrical components is in its infancy.
Another critical aspect to be considered with this proposal is that recycling of the battery and
related electrical components of BEVs are in a state of infancy and poses unique materials
handling and safety challenges. The environmental profiles of both BEVs and ICEVs should be
considered in light of the production, operation, and disposal of the vehicle (its useful life).
Electric battery disposal-related issues are likely to impact the environment and need to be
addressed in EPA's proposal: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 39-41]
Battery packs could contribute 250,000 metric tons of waste to landfills for every 1
million retired BEVs. 102 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 39-41]
102 Kelleher Environmental. "Research Study on Reuse and Recycling of Batteries Employed in Electric
Vehicles: The Technical, Environmental, Economic, Energy and Cost Implications of Reusing and
Recycling EV Batteries." September 2019. https://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas/wells-
toconsumer/fuels-and-refining/fuels/vehicle- technology-studies.
Less than five percent of lithium-ion batteries, the most common batteries used in
BEVs, are currently being recycled "due in part to the complex technology of the batteries and
cost of such recycling." 103 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 39-41]
103 Harper, G., Sommerville, R., Kendrick, E. et al. Publisher Correction: "Recycling lithium-ion batteries
from electric vehicles." Nature 578, E20 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1862-3.
Economies of scale will play a major role in improving the economic viability of
recycling, which currently cost is the main bottleneck. Increasing collection and sorting rates is a
critical starting point. 104 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 39-41]
104 International Energy Agency. "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions",
International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook Special Report.
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https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/7d2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a-
52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.
The cathode is where much of the material value in a Lithium-ion battery is
concentrated. Currently, there are numerous cathode chemistries being deployed. Each of these
chemistries needs to be known, and then the appropriate method of recycling identified, which
poses a challenge, as batteries pass through a global supply chain and all materials are not well
tracked. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 39-41]
Lithium can be recovered from existing Lithium-ion recycling practices, but it is not
economical at current lithium prices. Cobalt, one of the highest supply risk materials for BEV in
the short- and medium-term, is currently being profitably recovered. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, pp. 39-41]
Benchmark forecasts near-term recyclers are likely to use scrap material from the
increasing number of gigafactories coming online versus used electric vehicle batteries. Scrap
material is anticipated to account for 78 percent of recyclable materials in 2025.105 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 39-41]
105 BMI (see Chart 8): https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/battery-production-scrap-to-be-main-
source- of-recyclable-material-this-decade.
In 2022, Benchmark expected over 30 gigawatt hours of process scrap to be available
for recycling, growing ten-fold across the next decade. Loss rates vary by region and tend to be
higher in earlier years of a gigafactory.106 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 39-41]
106 BMI: https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/battery-production-scrap-to-be-main-source-of-
recyclable- material-this-decade.
EV batteries are high-cycle batteries and are made to function for approximately 10
years, shorter time for a medium-duty vehicle. Many 'spent' EV batteries still have 70-80
percent of their capacity left, which is more than enough to be repurposed into other uses such as
energy storage and other lower-cycle applications. 107 This will extend the time that batteries and
raw materials remain in use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 39-41]
107 Engel, H., Hertzke, P., & Siccardo, G. (2019, April). Second-life EV batteries: The newest value pool
in Energy Storage. McKinsey Center for Future Mobility.
https://www.mckinsey.eom/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Automotive%20and%20Assembly/Our%20Insig
hts/Seco
nd%201ife%20EV%20batteries%20The%20newest%20value%20pool%20in%20energy%20storage/Secon
d-life-EV-batteries-The-newest-value-pool-in-energy-storage.pdf.
Repurposing used EV batteries could generate significant value and help bring down
the cost of residential and utility-scale energy storage to bring forth further penetration of
renewable power to electricity grids. Initial trials are underway. 108 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 39-41]
108 "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions", International Energy Agency World
Energy Outlook Special Report, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/7d2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a-
52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.
Clear guidance on repackaging, certification, standardization, and warranty liability
of spent EV batteries would be needed to overcome safety and regulatory challenges reuse poses
at scale. 109 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 39-41]
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109 Ibid.
Recycling BEV batteries to recover high-value metals has not been proven at
commercial scale. Many analysts are aligned that recycling will not become an integral supplier
of raw materials until the 2030s, and at that point, only will provide approximately 20 percent of
demand. 110 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 39-41]
110 BMI: https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/battery-production-scrap-to-be-main-source-of-
recyclable- material-this-decade.
Organization: Charles Gordon
The proposed rule is intended to lead to the more rapid electrification of automobiles. Five
hundred million cars, each with 1000 pounds of batteries will result in 500 billion pounds of
batteries. What unexpected consequences will be caused by the manufacture, use and disposal of
500 billion pounds of batteries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 7]
Organization: Delek US Holdings, Inc.
In reality, only five percent of lithium-ion batteries for BEVs are currently recycled.48 In
contrast, 99% of lead-acid batteries are currently recycled.49 Despite recognizing the novel
nature of lithium-ion battery recycling (as well as other critical minerals used for ZEVs), EPA's
analysis falls short in examining the broader impacts of its proposal—on energy independence,
national security, and emissions of criteria pollutants. 50 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 10]
48 Robert Rapier, FORBES, "Environmental Implications of Lead-Acid and Lithium-Ion Batteries" (Jan.
19, 2020), available at https://www.forbes.eom/sites/rrapier/2020/01/19/environmental-implications-of-
lead- acid-and-lithium-ion-batteries/?sh=67ec3fe57bf5.
49 Id.
50 Proposed Rule at 29,319, 29,323-24.
d. BEVs cannot be recycled at the same level of ICE-powered vehicles.
EPA asserts that "minerals become part of the vehicle and have the potential to be recovered
and recycled."46 This not only ignores the recycling capabilities of lead-acid batteries used in
ICE vehicles, but also the limited capabilities to recycle lithium-ion batteries. The Proposed Rule
once again relies on vague predictions of the future to support its unrealistic standards. For
example, EPA asserts that a "growing number of private companies are entering the battery
recycling market," "manufacturers are already reaching agreements to use these recycled
materials for domestic battery manufacturing."47 But this is hardly sufficient to support EPA's
proposal to entirely overhaul the ICE vehicle market in as few as four to seven years. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 10]
46 Proposed Rule at 29,323.
47 Id.
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
3. Design for disassembly holds promise for battery recycling.
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The battery design parameters listed in the Proposal, which EPA used to develop battery cost
estimates, see 88 Fed. Reg. at 29299, do not include design for disassembly (Dfd), also referred
to as design for recycling or design for reuse. Dfd involves factoring end-of-life into the design
of the vehicle, meaning that the battery is designed to be taken apart so that cells and modules
can be refurbished, reused, or replaced, or so that the battery can be more efficiently and safely
disassembled for recycling. This disassembly is typically a difficult, lengthy, and therefore
expensive process because Dfd is not included in the design phase.409 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 151]
409 CalEPA, Lithium-ion car battery recycling advisory group report (2022), https://calepa.ca.gov/lithium-
ion-car-battery-recycling-advisory-group/ (last accessed June 29, 2023).
As reuse and recycling becomes more prevalent and policies begin to require it, we expect
that Dfd will also be more common. If Dfd occurs, more reuse, refurbishment and replacement
will occur and batteries will have a longer lifespan, therefore reducing the amount of new
batteries necessary for electrification.410 The disassembly of a battery from a vehicle and down
to the cell level currently represents approximately a third of light-duty vehicle recycling costs in
the United States.411 If Dfd occurs, this recycling cost will also decline, therefore leading to
more prevalent recycling and greater availability of recycled supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 151]
410 Michael S. Koroma, et al., Life cycle assessment of battery electric vehicles: Implications of future
electricity mix and different battery end-of-life management, Sci Total Env. 20;831:154859 (2022),
available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9171403/ (last accessed June 29, 2023).
411 See Jessica Dunn, et al., Electric vehicle lithium-ion battery recycled content standards for the US -
targets, costs, and environmental impacts, Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 185, 106488, 0921-
3449 (2022), at 6, Fig. 3, available at https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2022.106488
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
Battery re-use and recycling will be important to limit unnecessary mining and domestically
maintain critical materials needed for new batteries.28 Several automakers - BMW, Ford, Geely,
General Motors, Honda, Hyundai-Kia, Stellantis, Tesla, and Toyota - have announced one or
more battery recycling or repurposing project in the United States.29 Figure 2 shows draft ICCT
estimates of how the installed U.S. recycling capacity as of 2022 and the announced 2030
capacity compares with the projections for end-of-life batteries that could become available for
recycling in the U.S. It shows that the installed capacity in 2022 (76,000 tons) is sufficient to
process end-of-life batteries up to the year 2035. When also considering the recycling plants
announced as of 2022, bringing the total recycling capacity to 325,000 tons, sufficient capacity is
available to recycle end-of-life batteries until 2039. After which, much more recycling capacity
is needed as the mass of end-of-life batteries becoming available for recycling increases swiftly
between 2030-2050. Not shown in this figure are the additional tons of material from battery
production scrap that become available for recycling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 10-
11]
28 Tankou, A., Bieker, G., and Hall, D. (2023). Scaling up reuse and recycling of electric vehicle batteries:
assessing challenges and policy approaches. International Council on Clean
Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/recycling-electric-vehicle-batteries-feb-23/
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29 Shen, C., Fadhil, I., Yang, Z., Searle, S. (2023). The global automaker rating 2022: who is leading the
transition to electric vehicles? International Council on Clean Transportation.
https://theicct.org/publication/the-global-automaker-rating-2022-may23/
SEE ORIGNIAL COMMENT FOR Bar graph Figure 2. Estimates of installed battery
recycling capacity (data circles) and mass of end-of-life electric vehicle batteries (bars) [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 10-11]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
EPA should harmonize battery labeling requirements with ACC II to facilitate recycling.
MECA believes that mandated standardized battery labeling requirements to identify the
chemistry and technology in the battery pack will facilitate in-use vehicle service and end-of-life
battery recycling. Towards this goal, EPA should align battery labeling requirements with those
required under California's ACC II light-duty regulation. We have previously noted that some
important designations to consider on the label might include: cell type, chemistry, battery
ratings (V, Ah, kWh etc.), and if any internal cooling or other fluids and hazardous materials are
present within the battery pack to facilitate end-of-life handling. Such labeling will protect the
environment, benefit repair, maintenance and recycling personnel as well as assist second life re-
applications of automotive batteries and battery recycling. EPA could also consider incentive
programs that support the implementation and continuous improvement of battery re-use and
recycling and sustainable use of strategic battery materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564,
pp. 33-34]
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
MEM A urges:
EPA to add battery recycling and disposal costs to the analysis as part of a sustainable
BEV deployment to better address scarcity of critical minerals, provide a more resilient domestic
supply chain, and over time reduce the added carbon impact of battery manufacturing and
associated multi-national logistics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 12-13]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
EPA should also consider that recycling of battery material will play a vital role in alleviating
some pressure on the need to develop new critical mineral resources. To that end, Tesla seeks to
reduce its reliance on primary mined materials and contribute to a more positive environmental
footprint through battery and cell recycling - including ensuring that none of our batteries
(manufacturing scrap or fleet returns) go to landfills and deploying equipment to recycle 100%
of on-site generated manufacturing scrap across manufacturing facilities. In comparison to BEV
batteries, it should also be noted the energy source for ICE vehicles - fossil fuels used in
combustion - is not recyclable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 36]
Organization: The Aluminum Association
Material Circularity in Support of Domestic Supply Chains is Crucial and Goes Well Beyond
Batteries [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 10-11]
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EPA recognizes the importance of battery recycling in the proposed rule (88 FR 29323) and
according to a recent study 14, aluminum accounts for over 18% of the mass in a typical vehicle
electric battery. Reclamation and recycling of this aluminum at battery end of life can serve as an
important and needed feedstock for future battery and other raw material supply. Beyond
batteries, EPA should build on the importance of reclamation and recycling to focus on
additional components of the vehicle that can help support efficient vehicle development in the
future, such as aluminum. Aluminum has long been recognized as a critical mineral and material
for the low carbon economy of the future by agencies as varied as the USGS15, the Department
of Commercel6, the Department of Defensel7, and the Department of Energyl8. Given this
criticality and the fact that much of the primary (virgin) aluminum supply chain lies outside of
the U.S. for such operations as bauxite mining, alumina refining, and smelting, domestic
recycling is becoming increasingly important for the U.S. aluminum industry and its biggest
consuming market, transportation applications. In addition to its supply chain value, recycling
aluminum makes good environmental sense in that recycling aluminum is 95% less carbon
intensive than producing primary aluminum from mined ore. Member companies, the
Association itself, and automotive OEMS currently have a variety of active initiatives to keep
pre-consumer scrap aluminum in closed loops for recycling and to reclaim more post-consumer
scrap aluminum back into the supply chain at vehicle end of life. For example, Ford recycles as
much as 20 million pounds of aluminum stamping scrap per month. This is equivalent to enough
aluminum to build 30,000 F150 bodies every monthl9. Although these current initiatives are
predominantly focused on vehicle structure and powertrain applications such as structural
extrusions, body sheet, castings, and forgings, there is increasing recognition of the value of the
aluminum in BEV batteries as well and the need to recycle that material at battery end of life.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 10-11]
14 The Key Minerals in an EV Battery, https://elements.visualcapitalist.com/the-key-minerals-in-an-ev-
battery/ (Accessed June 23, 2023)
15 USGS Critical Minerals List, https://www.usgs.gov/news/national-news-release/interior-releases-
2018s-final-list-35-minerals-deemed-critical-us (Accessed June 29, 2023)
16 U.S. Department of Commerce Critical Minerals Strategy, https://2017-
202 Lcommerce.gov/sites/default/files/2020-01/Critical_Minerals_Strategy _Final.pdf (Accessed June 29,
2023)
17 Defense Logistics Agency Materials of Interest, https://www.dla.mil/Strategic-Materials/Materials/
(Accessed June 29, 2023)
18 U.S. DOE Critical Materials Assessment, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/2023-
critical-materials-assessmentpdf (Accessed June 29, 2023)
19 Ford Recycles Enough Aluminum to Build 30,000 F150 Bodies Every Month,
https://media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/fna/us/en/news/2016/04/22/ford-recycles-enough- aluminum-to-
build-30000-fl50-bodies.html (Accessed June 28, 2023)
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
ii. Recycling
A key component for meeting the coming demand for EV batteries and critical minerals will
be recycling existing batteries at their end-of-life (EOL). As shown in Figure 8, North American
battery recycling capacity is growing rapidly and as it increases in the coming years, so too will
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available EOL battery feedstocks as EVs on the road today will approach the end of their useful
life. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 41-43]
[See original comment for Figure 8. Battery recycling projects in North America (as of May
2023)] 184 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 41-43]
184 "Battery Recycling in North America as of May 2023," Battery-News.de, (May 5, 2023) accessed June
26, 2023 https ://battery-news.de/index.php/2023/05/05/batterie-recycling-in-nordamerika/
In recognition of the potential solutions that battery recycling can provide, Congress required
EPA under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law to develop battery recycling best practices and
battery labeling guidelines. Congress allocated $10 million and $15 million respectively to the
agency to complete these tasks by September 30, 2026.185 While there will likely be more work
needed, potentially through voluntary consensus standards bodies, a framework is beginning to
take shape to ensure increased recycling capacity is built out in the coming years. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 41-43]
185 See Public Law 117-58
The global market for EV battery recycling alone is estimated to reach $17.1 billion by
2030.186 By 2025, Benchmark Minerals Intelligence forecasts that scrap will account for 78% of
the pool of recyclable materials.187 This growth is largely driven by the growing number of EVs
approaching EOL. The volume of EOL batteries from EVs and large storage applications is less
than 2 GWh today but could reach 100 GWh by 2030 and 1.3 TWh by 2040.188 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 41-43]
186 "Battery Recycling Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis Report By Chemistry (Lithium-ion, Lead
Acid, Nickel), By Application (Transportation, Industrial), By Region (Europe, Asia Pacific, North
America), And Segment Forecasts, 2023 - 2030," Grand View Research, (April 2023)
https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/battery-recycling-market
187 "Benchmark Minerals: Battery production scrap will be the main source of recyclable material this
decade," (September 16, 2022) https://chargedevs.com/newswire/benchmark-minerals-battery-production-
scrap-will-be-the-main-source-of-recycla ble-material-this-decade/
188 "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions - Reliable supply of minerals," IEA, (2021)
https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/reliable-supply-of-
minerals
Below is a list of recently-announced investments in EV battery recycling, all of which will
help support the transition to an electrified transportation sector: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, pp. 43-44]
- In October 2022, ZETA member Princeton NuEnergy Inc. (PNE) opened a new 500 t/a plant
capable of direct recycling lithium-ion consumer electronics and EV batteries with its strategic
partner, Wistron GreenTech in McKinney, Texas. 189 This end-to-end facility ingests end of life
batteries fully separating copper, aluminum, plastics, electrolyte, cathode and anode materials.
Cathode materials are cleaned by surface etching with low-temperature plasma (LPAS™) and
reformed into new cathode materials equivalent to OEM specifications that can be directly
reused in battery production. The factory will be certified and commissioned in 2023. In April
2023, Princeton NuEnergy launched a US Department of Energy $12M R&D grant to expand
and enhance PNE's battery recycling production processes through 'up-cycling' of legacy spent
cathode chemistries into newer formulations, scaling processes for direct recycling of anode
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materials, and enhancing recycling/reuse of all other battery components. 190 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, pp. 43-44]
- In April 2023, ZETA member Redwood Materials announced a pair of partnerships to
collect EOL battery feedstocks. This announcement builds on Redwood's announcement from
November 2022 to recycle Panasonic's cell scrap and supply Panasonic with recycled copper foil
and cathode active material. 191 Rad Power Bikes will provide Redwood with e-bike batteries
when they reach the end of their lifespan. 192 Redwood and Volkswagen of America expanded
their partnership to collect more EOL batteries from consumer electronics. 193 Both
announcements come following a historic announcement from the Department of Energy of a $2
billion conditional loan to Redwood to support its McCarran, NV recycling facility. 194 At full
production capacity, the McCarran project's anode copper foil and cathode active material output
is anticipated to support the production of more than 1 million EVs per year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, pp. 43-44]
- In May 2023, ZETA member Li-Cycle announced a partnership with Glencore to build a
battery recycling hub in Portovesme, Italy, with construction expected to commence in late 2026
to early 2027. Once completed, the Portovesme Hub is expected to have processing capacity of
up to 50,000 to 70,000 tons of black mass annually, or the equivalent of up to 36 GWh of
lithium-ion batteries. 195 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 43-44]
189 "Update: Princeton NuEnergy launches end-to-end LIB recycling production line," RecyclingToday,
(October 25, 2022) https://www.recyclingtoday.com/news/princeton-nuenergy-launching-end-to-end-lib-
recycling-production-line/
190 "Princeton Nuenergy teams up with scientists to improve its LIBs recycling technology,"
RecyclingToday, (April 3, 2023) https://recyclingtoday.com/news/princeton-nuenergy-teams-up-with-
scientists-aided-by-doe-grant/
191 https ://news.Panasonic. com/global/press/en221115-4
192 "Rad Power Bikes links up with Redwood Materials for e-bike battery recycling," Verge, (April 24,
2023) https://www.theverge.eom/2023/4/24/23695767/rad-power-bikes-redwood-materials-ebike-battery -
recycle
193 "VW and Redwood want to turn your old laptops into EV batteries," TechCrunch+, (April 4, 2023)
https://techcrunch.eom/2023/04/04/vw-and-redwood-want-to-turn-your-old-laptops-into-ev-batteries/
194 "LPO Offers Conditional Commitment to Redwood Materials to Produce Critical Electric Vehicle
Battery Components From Recycled Materials," U.S. Department of Energy, (February 9, 2023)
https://www.energy.gov/lpo/articles/lpo-offers-conditional-commitment-redwood-materials-produce-
critical-electric- vehicle
195 "Li-Cycle and Glencore unveil plans for recycling hub in Italy," Reuters, (May 9, 2023)
https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/li-cycle-glencore-unveil-plans-recycling-hub-italy-
2023-05-0 9/
EPA Summary and Response
EPA acknowledges and appreciates all of the comments relating to issues surrounding battery
recycling. In general, comments in this topic area were concerned with the potential for lithium-
ion automotive PEV batteries to be recycled, the possibility that the recycling industry will
provide recycled minerals to the supply chain, and the rate at which recycling of these minerals
will grow.
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Some commenters expressed positive views of battery recycling as a potential source of
minerals that could substantially reduce the need for imported minerals or expanded mining of
virgin materials. For example, ICCT stated, "Battery re-use and recycling will be important to
limit unnecessary mining and domestically maintain critical materials needed for new batteries,"
and went on to cite several automakers that have announced battery recycling or repurposing
projects in the U.S. Similarly, Tesla stated, "recycling of battery material will play a vital role in
alleviating some pressure on the need to develop new critical mineral resources." ZETA stated,
"A key component for meeting the coming demand for EV batteries and critical minerals will be
recycling existing batteries at their end-of-life." Other commenters expressed skepticism that
recycling could meet the future demand for minerals or could not grow fast enough to make a
meaningful impact in at least the near term.
EPA acknowledges the many challenges that exist in building battery recycling infrastructure
and in recycling batteries themselves. These challenges are well known throughout the industry
and are being addressed by companies who are developing business models based on battery
recycling. In discussing the potential for recycling to supplement importation or mining of new
materials over time, EPA has not relied upon an expectation of any specific amount of future
recycling in order to justify its standards, and has already acknowledged in the proposal, and in
this final rule, that it will take time for the recycling stream of used PEV batteries to reach scale
as increasing numbers of PEVs reach the end of their useful life. EPA notes that to the degree
that second life use of batteries for applications such as grid storage may delay these batteries
from entering the recycling stream, this would also imply that demand for new grid storage
batteries would decline by a similar amount and therefore is unlikely to represent a net increase
in mineral demand.
In response to comments that only less than 5 percent of lithium-ion batteries are currently
recycled, EPA disagrees that this statistic is relevant to the prospect for future recycling rates of
automotive lithium-ion batteries, as it is based on recycling rates of small batteries used in
consumer electronics and similar products, which are not systematically collected for recycling
due to their extreme diversity of form and product integration and their small size. The much
larger size of PEV batteries facilitates the economics of collection and recycling. Additionally,
given the long life spans of PEV batteries, mass retirements of PEV batteries are not expected in
the immediate near term, which provides more time for the appropriate policy and infrastructure
for recycling to be implemented and scaled. See also the discussion of commercial recycling
initiatives and the CIRCULAR program as described in ANL's March 2024 report on critical
materials.541
In response to comments on the need for battery recycling and/or the current availability of
recycling, or that batteries will be disposed of in landfills, EPA disagrees with comments
suggesting that PEV batteries must be disposed of in landfills, that recycling is not being
considered or planned for, or that they otherwise are not of value for reuse or recycling. Many
companies are actively pursuing business models on the recycling of materials in batteries or the
reapplication of modules and cells for other purposes. EPA notes the comment from ZETA that
indicates, "The global market for EV battery recycling alone is estimated to reach $17.1 billion
541 Argonne National Laboratory, "Securing Critical Materials for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Industry: A Landscape
Assessment of Domestic and International Supply Chains for Five Key EV Battery Materials," ANL-24/06,
February 2024.
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by 2030," which clearly suggests that battery recycling is being recognized as a promising area
of investment. EPA also notes the comment from Tesla which cites the company's practice of
"ensuring that none of our batteries (manufacturing scrap or fleet returns) go to landfills and
deploying equipment to recycle 100% of on-site generated manufacturing scrap across
manufacturing facilities." Currently, the growth and visibility of battery recycling companies has
been limited due to the fact that there does not yet exist a sufficient rate of used automotive
traction batteries being generated by the in-use vehicle fleet because most PEVs on the road
today have not yet reached the end of their useful life. Second-life applications, in which cells,
modules, or batteries from old vehicles are used in other applications such as stationary energy
storage, are likely to create additional market demand for decommissioned vehicle batteries.
Further, the Department of Energy has active research programs on lithium-ion battery recycling,
for example, the ReCell Center542 and the Federal Consortium for Advanced Batteries
(FCAB).543 The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law provides more than $7 billion to promote the
supply chain for batteries,544 including funding for battery processing and manufacturing
research, battery recycling research, and for local governments to establish or enhance battery
collection, recycling, and reprocessing programs. Based on EPA's understanding of battery
recycling and the research and commercial activity and investments surrounding it, EPA assesses
that it is incorrect and unfounded to conclude that EV batteries will not be recycled, and also
specifically disagrees with various commenter's erroneous allusions to "500 billion pounds" of
batteries or similar calculations of battery disposal that are incorrectly based on the assumption
that no automotive lithium-ion batteries will be recycled.
In response to the Alliance suggestion that EPA does not acknowledge the net cost to the
economy from "the shift from recycling of engines and transmission to the recycling of lithium-
ion batteries," EPA disagrees with this characterization of how battery recycling will evolve, and
also with the presumption that it will represent a net cost. EPA believes that the projected
gradual increase in PEV penetration anticipated by the compliance analysis is unlikely to cause
engine recyclers to be compelled to rapidly shift their business to battery recycling and thereby
experience a cost of retooling or retraining. The vast majority of the existing fleet consists of
vehicles with engines and transmissions, and during the time frame of the rule, as these vehicles
continue to approach end of life they will continue to generate a continuous stream of engines
and transmissions to be recycled; even if fewer new engines and transmissions are produced over
time, these recycled metals will be used in other products. Over a longer term, the recycling of
batteries and cells could as likely generate new entrants to the recycling industry, pursuing new
business opportunities and creating new jobs and thus could generate a net benefit (for discussion
of employment, see RTC Section 20). As to the potential difference in the value of materials
recovered, this depends on the battery chemistry; although some chemistries have more valuable
mineral content than others, all contain significant quantities of copper and aluminum. For
542 Argonne National Laboratory, "DOE launches its first lithium-ion battery recycling R&D center: ReCell,"
February 15, 2019. Accessed on December 6, 2021 at https://www.anl.gov/article/doe-launches-its-first-lithiumion-
battery-recycling-rd-center-recell
543 Federal Advanced Battery Consortium, "National Blueprint for Lithium Batteries 2021-2030," June 2021.
Accessed on December 6, 2021 at https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
06/FCAB%20National%20Blueprint%20Lithium%20Batteries%20062 l_0.pdf
544 Department of Energy Fact Sheet: "The Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal Will Deliver For American Workers,
Families and Usher in the Clean Energy Future," November 9, 2021. Accessed on December 6, 2021 at
https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-fact-sheet-bipartisan-infrastructure-deal-will-deliver-american-workers-
families-and-0
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example, the Aluminum Association stated that "aluminum accounts for over 18% of the mass in
a typical vehicle electric battery." Similarly, EPA does not agree with Alliance's comment that
EPA should include in its regulatory impact analysis "estimates of how the cost of battery
recycling might decline with appropriate supporting policies," as costs of this nature are outside
the scope of the rule's technology cost analysis.
In response to comments that battery recycling is not growing fast enough to handle future
recycling streams, EPA disagrees. We note ICCT's comment that "sufficient capacity is
available to recycle end-of-life batteries until 2039," which is based on work cited in the
comment and supports our assessment that the battery recycling industry is receiving an
appropriate level of attention to be prepared with the technology and capacity to process the
future influx of end-of-life batteries.
In response to comments that battery recycling is hindered by labeling and the diversity of
chemistries, or that EPA should add battery labeling requirements to facilitate recycling, or
related to design for disassembly, EPA has not yet determined how such requirements might fit
within the scope of our authority under the Clean Air Act. EPA also notes that the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law included funding for EPA to develop battery recycling best practices and
battery labeling guidelines, which we expect will improve this aspect of battery recycling and
may serve much of the purpose that the commenters describe. We also note that design for
disassembly is not included in our costing of batteries largely because of the difficulty in
assigning any potential cost difference for this practice which is not widely incorporated today.
In response to the AFPM's comment that EPA should "conduct a full LCA" or "consider the
environmental profiles of both ZEVs and ICEVs in light of the production, operation, and
disposal of the vehicle," these comments relate to life-cycle analysis for which comments are
responded to in RTC 19.
In response to comments that EPA should "add battery recycling and disposal costs to the
analysis," EPA disagrees that this is practical or appropriate. Batteries contain a large amount of
recyclable materials that have market value, and no consensus has yet emerged to indicate that
battery recycling will represent a net additional cost nor that batteries will incur a cost of disposal
instead of being profitably recycled, and commenter has provided no new evidence.
Regarding various comments alluding to difficulties associated with recycling, e.g. allusion to
a need for "clear guidance on repackaging, certification, standardization, and warranty liability",
potential classification of used batteries as hazardous waste, transportation difficulties, and
similar claims, EPA notes that commenters have not thus identified any difficulties that are not
already widely acknowledged in the industry and therefore are not already being taken into
account by the businesses, startups, and research initiatives that are currently working to advance
the battery recycling industry. EPA also notes that it is aware of and is in the process of
addressing some of the common concerns regarding recycling of lithium-ion batteries, including
how universal waste handling requirements, hazardous waste recycling regulations, and other
RCRA Subtitle C provisions apply to this waste stream.545
545 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Lithium Battery Recycling Regulatory Status and Frequently Asked
Questions," Memorandum from Carolyn Hoskinson, Director of Office of Resource Conservation and Recovery,
Office of Law and Emergency Management, to LCRD Division Directors Regions 1-10, May 24, 2023. Accessed
on March 5, 2024 at https://rcrapublic.epa.gov/files/14957.pdf
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16 - Battery durability and warranty
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
B. Battery Durability Provisions
1. Battery Durability Monitoring and Performance Requirements
As described in Section III-F,326 EPA is proposing to incorporate new battery durability
monitoring and performance requirements for light-duty BEVs and PHEVs, and battery
durability monitoring requirements for Class 2b and 3 BEVs and PHEVs, beginning with MY
2027. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 218-219]
326 NPRM at 29283.
As an initial mater, we wish to point out that the battery durability requirements are beyond
the scope of EPA's statutory authority as applied to BEVs. According to EPA, the Proposed
Rule's battery durability and testing requirements are anchored in section 206 of the Clean Air
Act, which authorizes EPA to "test, or require to be tested in such manner as [EPA] deems
appropriate, any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine submitted by a manufacturer to
determine whether such vehicle or engine conforms with the regulations prescribed under"
[section 202]".327 By its plain terms, this provision authorizes testing requirements in order to
confirm compliance with vehicle-specific emissions standards promulgated under section 202.
But there are no such vehicle-specific standards for BEVs, which by their nature do not produce
any emissions. To be clear, and as expressed elsewhere in this comment, Auto Innovators
supports the fleetwide averaging approach of the Proposed Rule which has long been used by
EPA under section 202. But the application of fleetwide averaging to BEVs is distinct from the
imposition of vehicle-specific emissions standards for BEVs, which do not exist, and which
would exceed EPA's authority given that section 202(a) allows EPA only to promulgate
"standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engine." Because there are no "standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from" BEVs under section 202(a), there can be no durability testing
requirements for compliance with such standards under section 206. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 218-219]
327 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1) (emphasis added).
That said, we do agree that monitors in conjunction with performance requirements are
important tools when it comes to ensuring proper battery operations and maintaining adequate
battery health. As is laid out in both the UNECE GTR No. 22 [328] as well as this proposed
NPRM, Usable Battery Energy (UBE) has been chosen as the primary metric when measuring
battery durability, with a State of Certified Energy (SOCE) monitor to verify the performance
and overall capacity of the battery. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 218-219]
328 UNECE EVE GTR No. 22 -htps://unece.org/transport/documents/2022/04/standards/un-gtr-no22-
vehicle-battery-durability-electrified-vehicles
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EPA also seeks comments on the potential to include a State of Certified Range (SOCR)
monitor. As stated above, EPA does not have the authority to impose battery testing and
durability requirements under the CAA. specific to the SOCR monitor, Auto Innovators does not
support the use of an SOCR monitor given that calculating range on a large and standardized
scale can result in false readings. Should EPA move forward with battery durability
requirements, we agree with EPA's proposal to use an SOCE metric as opposed to an SOCR
monitor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 218-219]
2. SOH Harmonization
Under this current NPRM, EPA is proposing new battery durability performance requirements
for all light-duty PHEV and BEV, battery health monitoring and in-use accuracy for all light-and
medium-duty PHEVs and BEVs, as well as warranties for PHEVs, BEVs, and FCEVs. EPA
included by reference the April 2022 version of UN GTR No. 22 and has aligned durability
performance that requires 70% SOCE (5ys/62k mi) and 80% (8ys/100k mi). Additionally, this
will require OEMs to provide battery health (SOCE) information visible to the customer, conduct
annual large data collection of this information to verify compliance to the durability
requirements, as well as conduct in-use customer vehicle testing verify monitor accuracy at low,
mid, and high mileage intervals for each monitor family). Finally, EPA proposes to require a
minimum warranty period for batteries and certain e-propulsion components of 8years/80k miles
for all PHEV, BEV, and FCEV vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 219-220]
By adopting UNECE GTR No. 22 by reference, EPA is introducing an SOH monitor based on
SOCE, which differs from that in CARB's ACC II regulation. This difference will cause
customer confusion and frustration with two different SOH monitors. One step to avoid such
confusion would be for EPA to allow the display of the SOCE value to one decimal place, as is
required by CARB's ACC II regulation, instead of to an integer as is in the NPRM. This would
allow for compliance with ACC II, where SOCE display resolution requirements are based on
SAE J1979-DA, in addition to being based on GTR No. 22. Furthermore, CARB provides an
alternative display and accuracy from MY2027. We propose a similar method of early phase-in
flexibility toward SOH display and accuracy to harmonize compliance between the NPRM and
ACC II. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 219-220]
EPA's proposed in-use monitor accuracy verification would significantly increase test facility
resources. Additionally, the GTR No.22 statistical approach to verification can require up to 16
vehicles per monitor family to be tested at each of the 3 mileage intervals. Also, the accuracy
looks at a two-sided delta but there should only be a concern for OEM overpredicting the battery
health. Any underprediction puts all the burden and risk of passing the durability requirements
on the manufacturer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 219-220]
The new battery durability requirements are tied to Tier 4 phase-in percentages regardless of
"default" or "early" compliance paths for vehicles less than 6000 lbs. GVWR vehicles are
required to phase-in 40% of vehicles in 2027MY. This is concerning given the long lead-times to
implement customer facing information on vehicle systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 219-220]
If battery durability is required, it is important to align with global best practices (CARB
should align as well) and harmonize with battery health monitor requirements. Additionally, we
agree with EPA's SOCE health monitor that excludes the battery reserve. Virtual distance is
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fundamental to the V2X technologies such as vehicle-to-grid, vehicle-to-load, and vehicle-to-
home to avoid concerns with meeting durability and warranty requirements. This will provide
transparency to customers who use their vehicles for purposes other than propulsion and will
help reduce OEM concerns over excessive V2X use. We recommend that the virtual distance be
used in both the calculation of the durability mileage as well as the warranty mileage (i.e.,
durability/warranty miles = virtual miles + vehicle odometer miles). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 219-220]
We request that EPA align regulatory text in § 86.1815 (Battery-related requirements) to the
preamble and replace the term "electric vehicles" with BEVs and PHEVs to ensure that
durability and monitoring requirements apply to BEVs and PHEVS and not FCEVs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 219-220]
Lastly, we are still unclear when it comes to a number of factors related to this proposal. As a
result, we respectfully request clarification on the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 219-220]
-Are proposed durability and monitoring requirements tied to the Tier 4 phase-in per 86.1815?
Is the same true for warranty? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 219-220]
-§86.1815 Battery-related requirements for electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles. Electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles must meet requirements related to
batteries serving as a Rechargeable Energy Storage System from GTR No. 22 (incorporated by
reference, see § 86.1). The requirements of this section apply starting in model year 2027 for
vehicles at or below 6,000 pounds GVWR. These requirements apply vehicles above 6,000
pounds GVWR if they are certified to Tier 4 NMOG+NOX standards under § 86.1811-27, not
later than model year 2030 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 219-220]
-If UNECE GTR No. 22 on-vehicle data parameters are required, how will this be harmonized
with CARB ACC II? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 219-220]
3. Reserve Capacity Declaration Requirement
In the NPRM, EPA proposes requirements for battery durability that are applicable to BEVs
and PHEVs. The requirements and general framework of the proposed battery durability
program are largely identical to those outlined in GTR No. 22 [329] and broadly parallel the
GTR in terms of the minimum performance requirements, as well as the hardware, monitoring
and compliance requirements, the associated statistical methods and metrics that apply to
determination of compliance, and criteria for establishing battery durability and monitor families.
Our concerns regarding EPA's authority for battery durability and warranty for BEVs are
discussed elsewhere in these comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 220-221]
329 Id.
Automakers are committed to achieving full electrification and producing vehicles with a
robust battery life. Strategies to achieve these battery durability standards may vary per
automaker; however, one way to achieve them is to include a reserve battery capacity to be
released throughout the course of a battery's lifetime to supplement normal battery degradation.
While EPA is not proposing a similar requirement, EPA requests comment on including a
reserve capacity declaration requirement and use of reserve capacity information in calculating
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an SOCE or SOCR metric. We agree with EPA's decision to not include reserve capacity when
determining battery durability and warranty. While there is additional battery capacity included
in the vehicle, the energy itself is not accessible to the customer until the batteries hit a certain
degradation. Therefore, we believe that a reserve capacity declaration requirement and the use of
the reserve capacity information in calculating an SOCE or SOCR metric should not be required
inthisNPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 220-221]
As a general principle, Auto Innovators supports the harmonization between EPA's
Multipollutant NPRM and the UNECE GTR No. 22 as it pertains to battery durability minimum
performance requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 221-222]
7. IUVP Accuracy Check
We also have concerns over the In-Use Verification Program (IUVP) accuracy check that is
outlined in the NPRM. EPA is proposing to implement an accuracy check for low, medium, and
high mileage vehicles. Implementing and performing three different checks creates a large
burden for manufacturers. Finding and locating acceptable vehicles poses a challenge in itself, let
alone adding a third check point. Due to the unnecessary increase in test burden, we propose that
EPA allow for a single IUVP accuracy check. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 223-224]
Under the NPRM, EPA is also requesting comment on the SOH calculation used as it pertains
to measuring battery durability. Overall, we support the harmonization of CARB's ACCII
standards when it comes to SOH calculations. For model years 2027 through 2028, we propose
that EPA adopt CARB's standard of an 8% threshold. We agree with CARB that it is
unnecessary to include a two-sided threshold. Protection from vehicle overestimation of SOH is
all that is necessary under these circumstances. From model year 2029 and on, we also propose
that EPA lower the threshold to 5%. This gives manufacturers the flexibility to be conservative
on their estimations, while allowing the ability to adjust the threshold at a later time, if need be.
We believe this is in the best interest of all parties involved. Underestimation puts the burden on
OEMs by posing a risk of not hitting the 70% SOCE MPR. Therefore, we propose including this
added flexibility. Furthermore, as the verification procedure for this is new, manufacturers need
time to build up the knowledge to design and calibrate the monitoring function. This will require
SOH data from vehicles that have been in use long enough to have significant battery
degradation. A lower limit for model years 2027 and 2028, again, supports this requirement.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 223-224]
We do not believe an accuracy check should be required where there is no MPR to align with;
therefore, we request that EPA not require an accuracy check for Medium Duty Vehicles and
Class 2b and 3 vehicles due to the absence of an MPR. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
223-224]
C. III.F.3 Battery and Vehicle Component Warranty
1. BEV and PHEV Battery Warranty Requirements
In addition to the battery durability requirements outlined in this NPRM, EPA is also
proposing a set of warranty requirements for both BEV and PHEV batteries, as well as
associated electric powertrain components like inverters or electric machines.333 Historically,
vehicle and vehicle part warranties are left to the respective OEMs to determine what is an
appropriate agreement between the manufacturer and customer based on competition and vehicle
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durability. Therefore, it is our position that warranty requirements remain at the discretion of the
individual OEMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 224-225]
333 NPRM at 29197.
2. Classification of Batteries as "Major Emission Control Components"
Utilizing the Administrator's authority mandated in Section 207(i)(l) of the CAA, EPA is
proposing under this NPRM to designate high-voltage battery systems and associated powertrain
components as "specified major emission control components," thus imposing a warranty period
of eight years or 80,000 miles of use, whichever first occurs. Such a designation for BEVs,
however, is entirely inconsistent with the statute. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 225-226]
Section 207(i)(2) enumerates a discrete list of items that qualify as "specified major emission
control components," and authorizes the Administrator to designate "any other pollution control
device or component" as such if certain conditions are met.334 But a BEV produces zero
emissions from its battery and associated electric powertrain components. It follows that no
device or component of a BEV could logically be a "pollution control device or component" that
can be designated as a "specified major emission control component" under section 207(i)(2),
because there are no emissions from the BEV to control.335 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 225-226]
334 42 U.S.C. § 7541(i)(2).
335 We acknowledge that this designation for PHEVs is more consistent with the statutory authorization,
because the battery-electric power displaces use of the vehicle's ICE, controlling the PHEV's emissions.
The NPRM attempts to justify its counter-textual reasoning in the NPRM, but its reasoning
cannot cure the fundamental legal flaw in its proposal. For instance, the NPRM claims that its
"proposed warranty requirements would be equivalent to those that EPA has the authority to
require and has historically applied to other specified major emission control-related components
for ICE vehicles under EPA's light-duty vehicle regulations..."336 But this is a false
equivalency, because ICE vehicles produce emissions, and a component in the vehicle designed
to reduce those emissions (such as, for example, a catalytic converter or an electronic emissions
control unit) can be considered a "major emission control component." The same cannot be said
of any component of a BEV that produced no emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
225-226]
336 NPRM at 29286.
Recognizing that BEVs do not have any emission themselves, the NPRM nonetheless argues
that BEV batteries can be considered a major emissions control component to the extent that
BEVs are used to displace ICE vehicles. This portion of the NPRM refers back to the battery
durability requirements,337 which argues that a "loss of a large portion of the original driving
range capability as the vehicle ages could reduce total lifetime mileage and the ability for electric
miles to displace conventional miles traveled."338 Not only does this argument find no support
in the statute, but it proves way too much. Just about any component on a BEV that helps it run
or that is important to the consumer will impact the extent to which the BEV will continue to
displace conventional miles traveled. For instance, a consumer may elect to not to drive their
BEV if that vehicle's infotainment system fails completely, but that certainly would not make the
infotainment system a "major emissions control component." Simply put, there is absolutely no
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basis in the CAA for EPA to impose any battery warranty requirements on BEVs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 225-226]
337 NPRM at 29286-87.
338 Id. At 29284
4. Virtual Mileage
As electric vehicles begin to account for an increasing share of new vehicles sold within the
United States and globally, Vehicle to Everything (V2X) capabilities (which may include electric
grid management and storage) will also grow in importance for the adoption and utilization of
electric vehicles. Many BEVs and PHEVs on the road today already possess these bidirectional
capabilities, and their use will only continue to become more prominent. Therefore, this
technology (and other similar battery uses) needs to be accounted for in measuring a battery's
usage and health. More Specifically, as these bidirectional vehicles grow in use, degradation of
the battery continues as the power is extracted from the vehicle's traction batteries. As such, that
particular use of the battery should be reflected in the overall measurement of the battery's usage
and health. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 227]
Subject to our concerns raised on EPA's authority for battery durability and warranty for
BEVs, we have the following recommendations. We propose that V2X usage should be reflected
on the vehicle through the inclusion of a "virtual mileage" metric, similar to a standard
odometer. Additionally, we believe the respective "virtual mileage" should also be included in
the battery durability standards, as it is in the GTR. In addition to the durability standard, we also
propose that virtual mileage be tied to the warranty standard as it pertains to the overall mileage
threshold. These provisions will give customers a more accurate understanding of their overall
battery usage, as well as help ensure that these vehicles remain on the road across multiple
owners. Lastly, as we understand that EPA is incorporating GTR No. 22 by reference,339 we
would like to confirm that that "virtual mileage" is included in the battery durability standard
with respect to the mileage threshold. In addition to the battery durability standard, we would
like "virtual mileage" to be included as a part of the mileage threshold relating to the warranty
standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 227]
339 UNECE EVE GTR No. 22 -htps://unece.org/transport/documents/2022/04/standards/un-gtr-no22-
vehicle-battery-durability-electrified-vehiclesOrganization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
EPA's proposal may impose additional costs of economic risk to individuals and small
business owners who will be asked to depend on increasingly expensive infrastructure necessary
to provide on-the-go fuel.232 Durable and reliable EVs are therefore critical to ensuring that
projected emissions reductions are achieved by this proposed program and costs of ownership
are properly presented. EPA further states that it is proposing new battery durability
requirements for light-duty and medium-duty ZEVs and PHEVs but this doesn't alter EPA's
concession that it is relying on other programs, like California's, to implement battery durability
and a suite of other customer assurance provisions to ensure customer demand.233 EPA should
consider inclusion of durability requirements in this proposal as 150 miles of range for singular
battery life and 24,000-mile range of use (or two years) are well below the period of use for a
comparable ICEV with a full tank of fuel and will impact consumers as there is not enough data
with these technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 51]
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232 88 Fed. Reg. 4,296 (Jan. 24, 2023) (EPA Final Rule re Control of Air Pollution from New Motor
Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards).
233 Proposed Rule at 29,284.
Organization: BMW of North America, LLC (BMW NA)
Another important topic is the deviating rule for battery durability, battery warranty and SOH
monitoring of the NPRM, compared to LEV JV. BMW NA supports the general idea to give the
customers trust in the battery technology via these rules. But two different rules, depending only
on the place of registration in the US, will unnecessarily confuse the customers (e.g., while
buying a used vehicle in another state) and present additional hurdles toward electrification.
BMW NA recommends that a single national approach should be implemented, as proposed by
AAI. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 4]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Zero-Emission Vehicle Assurance Measures
Widespread adoption of ZEV technologies is critical to securing emission reductions for
stabilizing the climate and protecting public health. In order for these vehicles to truly deliver
these benefits, ZEV technologies must similarly have appropriate durability, warranty, and other
assurance measures as the technologies in their conventional gasoline-fueled counterparts.
Research shows that ZEVs with similar capabilities, including range, as conventional vehicles
are used just as much as their conventional counterparts, and that the same factors influence the
choice to use both kinds of vehicles. 50 Conversely, a lack of assurance measures for ZEVs leads
to consumer uncertainty and lack of confidence. 51 U.S. EPA's rulemaking presents a key
opportunity to establish approaches that can support consumers in making the choice to purchase
ZEVs. Assurance measures for ZEVs and PHEVs that, in many cases, mirror requirements for
conventional vehicles are integral to this process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 38-39]
50 Debapriya Chakraborty, Scott Hardman, and Gil Tal, Integrating Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs) into
Household Fleets -Factors Influencing Miles Traveled by PEV Owners in California (Aug. 31, 2021) at 1-
2, 33- 34, accessible at https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2214q937 (showing that electric vehicles travel a
similar number of miles per year as conventional vehicles).
51 See, e.g., ACCIIISOR pp. 23, 70 and accompanying studies.
To ensure ZEVs used to comply with California's program are designed to meet consumers'
needs similarly to their conventional counterparts and therefore capable of achieving and
maintaining needed emission reductions, CARB adopted a suite of ZEV assurance measures.
These assurance measures include: 52 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 38-39]
52 For additional detail on the ZEV Assurance Measures established under ACC II, see: ACC II ISOR pp.
69-89 and ACC IIFSOR Appendix D: Summary of Comments to ZEV Assurance Measures and Agency
Response.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 38-39]
Minimum electric range requirements for ZEVs and PHEVs.
Durability standards based on a vehicle's certified electric range.
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Warranty requirements for batteries and propulsion-related parts.
Data standardization and transparency, including on-board display of the battery state of
health so that consumers can see the quality of their battery.
Requirements for manufacturers to provide highly-capable convenience charging cords
and equipping vehicles with standardized, direct current fast charging inlets.
Requirements that repair information be released to independent repair shops.
Requirements around battery labeling to ease dismantling and recycling.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 38-39]
CARB recommends U.S. EPA adopt CARB's suite of ZEV assurance measures. Full
alignment at the national level with these standards would reduce complexity for manufacturers
and consumers and help ensure a consistent ZEV ownership experience across the U.S. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 38-39]
CARB has included specific recommendations on several key assurance measures, including
battery durability, warranty, and serviceability. In addition to adopting CARB's ZEV assurance
measures, CARB also recommends U.S. EPA adopt further on-vehicle charging standards and
collect additional data to inform future ZEV consumer labels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780,
pp. 38-39]
Durability
CARB commends U.S. EPA for proposing to establish battery durability requirements for
BEVs and PHEVs. Durability requirements provide confidence that those vehicles will provide
sufficient utility for consumers to use them and ensures the needed emissions reductions from
ZEV technologies are fully achieved and maintained. Strong durability and warranty
requirements also support a robust used ZEV market, which will help ensure all consumers can
access these clean technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 39]
Durability Metric
As part of its ACC II rulemaking, CARB established minimum range requirements for ZEVs
and PHEVs and requires vehicle range data at the time of certification using specified test
procedures. For the 2026 through 2029 MYs, CARB's durability provisions require vehicles in a
test group to be designed to maintain 70 percent or more of the certified range for 10 years or
150,000 miles, whichever comes first. For 2030 and subsequent MYs, vehicles must be designed
to maintain 80 percent of the certified range. The range metric captures the whole vehicle
powertrain durability rather than the battery alone. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 39]
U.S. EPA has proposed to establish a durability metric based solely on battery state of health
(SOH). Under U.S. EPA's approach, other powertrain-related components like drive motors or
inverters could deteriorate such that they become less efficient and reduce driving range that is
readily observable to the driver yet are outside the scope of a battery-only durability requirement.
CARB recommends U.S. EPA instead adopt CARB's durability provisions, including the tie to a
vehicle's certified range because it is a more meaningful and protective metric to consumers.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 39]
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Reserve Battery Capacity Disclosure
While CARB strongly supports the inclusion of durability and warranty provisions for ZEVs
and PHEVs, CARB notes that the SOH metric as specified in U.S. EPA's proposal may be
susceptible to manipulation and offers recommendations to help remedy these concerns. U.S.
EPA's proposed SOH monitor requirement that estimates, monitors, and communicates the
vehicle's state of certified energy (SOCE) does not provide explicit direction to manufacturers
for some implementation approaches, most notably in cases where some portion of the battery
capacity is held back "in reserve" early in life and gradually opened to counteract the actual
degradation. Given that the SOCE would be the current usable battery energy (UBE) expressed
as a percentage of the original UBE when the vehicle was new, manufacturers could potentially
undermine the intent of the SOH parameter by reporting the health as 100 percent (or even a
value greater than 100 percent) well into the degradation of the battery. Failing to include reserve
battery capacity in the SOH calculation could limit the credibility of the SOH parameter and
undermine its ability for vehicle owners to use it to validate warranty eligibility or to properly
value used ZEVs based on the amount of degradation of the battery. 53 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp. 39-40]
53 See, e.g., ACCIIISOR, Appendix F-7, pp. 17-18.
https://ww2.arb. ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/appf7 .pdf.
As part of the ACC IIZEV assurance measures, CARB's required customer-accessible SOH
monitor is used to determine if a vehicle's battery is meeting battery-specific warranty
requirements. CARB requires that the SOH parameter be normalized to account for reserve UBE
and ensure full transparency to consumers in degradation of the battery's ability to store energy,
regardless of the manufacturer's implementation strategy. 54 To help ensure that the SOH metric
is a true gauge of battery degradation, CARB urges U.S. EPA to explicitly require manufacturers
to account for all the reserve UBE in the SOCE calculation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780,
pp. 39-40]
54 Cal. Code. Regs., title 13, section 1962.5(c)(4)(A)4.d. For additional information on CARB's inclusion
of battery state-of-health metrics in the ACC II rulemakings, see: ACC II ISOR pp. 71-72; ACC II ISOR,
Appendix F-7, pp. 17-20; and Notice of Public Availability of Modified Text and Availability of Additional
Documents and Information (July 12, 2022), Attachment 1-1, pp. 2-3.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/attil.pdf.
Warranty
Warranty requirements are another important element to give consumers confidence in
purchasing ZEVs and PHEVs. While durability requirements have the effect of ensuring vehicles
in a test group, in the aggregate, are designed to have minimal degradation or deterioration such
that they will meet or exceed a performance standard over the useful life period, they do not
provide assurance that each individual vehicle will be free from defects or other failures. The
purpose of warranty requirements, on the other hand, is to protect against individual vehicles
experiencing failures or defects early in the life of the vehicle. A test group on track to meet the
durability standard does not necessarily mean that there will not be individual vehicles that
experience failures or defects. Likewise, individual vehicles experiencing a failure or defect does
not necessarily mean that the test group as a whole will fail to meet the durability standard.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 40]
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In recognition of this need, CARB established warranty requirements for ZEVs and PHEVs,
which are split into two parts: 1) battery warranty, which applies to BEVs and PHEVs, and 2)
propulsion-related parts warranty, which applies to BEVs and FCEVs. These provisions largely
track similar requirements for conventional vehicles. CARB recommends U.S. EPA adopt
CARB's warranty provisions and offers specific recommendations to strengthen U.S. EPA's
proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 40]
Battery Warranty
In order to make the warranty useful for vehicle owners, it must be tied to a meaningful and
transparent metric. Internal combustion engine vehicles today are equipped with complex on-
board diagnostic systems with consumer-facing warning lights that provide a clear tell-tale to the
owner when a component failure has occurred at a specified level defined by CARB's onboard
diagnostic requirements. Tying battery warranty to a meaningful metric is fundamental to
ensuring drivers are aware of early and unexpected battery degradation and can then pursue the
necessary repair. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 40-41]
CARB established its battery warranty requirements based on battery SOH. For the 2026
through 2030 MYs, CARB established an 8-year or 100,000-mile warranty for any battery that
falls below 70 percent of the SOH. Beginning with the 2031 MY, the warranted SOH increases
to 75 percent. While CARB commends U.S. EPA for explicitly tying battery warranty
requirements to the battery durability metric, as included in the draft regulatory language in
proposed 40 CFR § 85.2103(c), CARB recommends U.S. EPA implement changes to its SOH
metric as CARB recommends above so that U.S. EPA's battery warranty provision would be
similar to CARB's, differing only on the timeframes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 40-
41]
Propulsion-Related Parts Warranty
Non-battery propulsion-related components, such as the on-board charger, the electric motors,
inverters, and battery management system, are not expected to degrade like batteries on BEVs.
However, failure of such components can have detrimental effects on the efficiency,
performance, range, or drivability of the ZEV and thus the ability of ZEVs to achieve and
maintain their emission reductions over time if they are not warranted like their conventional
vehicle counterparts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 41-42]
CARB requires that manufacturers provide a warranty for BEVs and FCEVs, consistent with
what conventional gasoline vehicles are subject to, for a minimum of 3 years or 50,000 miles,
whichever occurs first (or 7 years or 70,000 miles for high-priced parts) for all propulsion-
related (powertrain) components, excluding the traction battery. Under CARB's requirements,
the applicable ZEV components must be warranted to be "free from defects in materials and
workmanship that would cause a propulsion-related part to fail to be identical in all material
respects to the part as it was described in the vehicle manufacturer's application for
certification..." 55 That requirement mirrors the defects warranty conventional vehicles are
subject to and helps ensure consumer confidence in ZEV technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp. 41-42]
55 Cal. Code Regs, title 13, section 1962.8(c)(1)(B).
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While CARB commends U.S. EPA for tying its battery warranty to the battery SOH metric,
U.S. EPA's proposal appears to mistakenly tie all non-battery powertrain components to this
same battery durability performance requirement when defining failures that merit warranty
replacement. Such a connection renders the warranty requirements meaningless for those
components. For example, there are no failures or degradation of electric drive motors that would
reduce the amount of energy the battery can store (which is the metric used for the battery
durability performance requirement). Effectively, this means warranty coverage as proposed
would apply only to the battery despite the explicit reference in draft language that includes other
ZEV powertrain-related components as subject to warranty. Further, even the basic 2-year and
24,000-mile emission warranty appears to cover only failures that involve exceeding the
emission limits of applicable standards. Though failures of powertrain-related components
impact the ability of ZEVs to achieve and maintain their emission reductions over time, as noted
above, if they are not warranted like their conventional vehicle counterparts, this provision as
drafted would not trigger warranty coverage for ZEV powertrain-related components as no
failure of those components can cause the vehicle to emit emissions directly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, pp. 41-42]
Therefore, CARB recommends that U.S. EPA adopt an appropriate failure metric(s) for
warranty coverage for non-battery components. Ensuring warranty coverage for ZEVs that is
comparable to conventional vehicles is critical to protect consumers and achieve and maintain
the emission benefits from ZEV technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 41-42]
Organization: Coalition for Safe Autonomous Vehicles and Electrification (SAVE)
From the perspective of our members' unique ownership and business models, there are two
areas for which we request additional consideration: (1) the proposal to require a State of
Certified Energy (SOCE) monitor that communicates the SOCE of the battery via a "customer-
accessible display"; and (2) the proposed sampling requirements for SOCE monitor accuracy
testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0608, p. 2]
First, with respect to the SOCE monitor, we surmise that the purpose of the proposed
"customer-accessible display" requirement is to provide information to the vehicle owner and
any potential future owner of the vehicle. We understand this information may bolster consumer
confidence in Battery Electric Vehicles (BEVs) and Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs)
generally and provide specific benefit to purchasers of used BEVs and PHEVs by providing
information about the state of the battery health. Because AV-EVs are fully autonomous, not
capable of operation by a human driver, and owned for their useful life by the manufacturer,
providing a "customer-accessible" SOCE monitor serves no benefit to customers (e.g., users of
robotaxi or delivery services). One of the goals of AV-EVs is to deliver a service to customers
without the burdens that come with vehicle ownership, like maintenance. Because our members
are solely responsible for the servicing of our vehicles, customers can simply focus on getting
themselves or their goods from point A to point B. To support EPA's goal while not unduly
burdening fleet ownership models we recommend revising proposed § 86.1815(a) to maintain
the language in Global Technical Regulation 22 that the monitor be available to the owner of the
vehicle rather than the customer as specified in the proposed EPA regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0608, p. 2]
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Additionally, proposed § 86.1815(a) is currently written such that the customer-accessible
display must monitor, estimate, and communicate the SOCE. Typically, the parameters
informing the SOCE would be monitored and estimated within the Battery Management System
(BMS) or a similar electronic control unit (ECU) or combination of ECUs, which often does not
have a display associated with it. The SOCE estimate would then be communicated to a
customer-accessible display. To improve the clarity of this requirement, we suggest the first
sentence of § 86.1815(a) should be modified to read: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0608, p. 2]
"Manufacturers must install a system that monitors, estimates, and communicates the
vehicle's State of Certified Energy (SOCE) and include information in the application for
certification as described in § 86.1844. The estimate of SOCE must be made available on an
owner-accessible display." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0608, p. 2]
Second, with respect to the proposed requirements for battery durability monitoring and
sampling, we recognize the importance of ensuring battery longevity for EVs to ensure their
viability as a desirable alternative to non-EVs. The SAVE Coalition, therefore, supports the goal
of the proposed regulation, i.e., to assure a sufficient useful life of an EV and a robust secondary
market for used EVs to enable the realization of fleet electrification and the corresponding public
health benefits. In order to prove the SOCE monitor can accurately estimate the battery
durability for a given monitor group in all relevant conditions, we understand that sampling of
vehicles in diverse geographic and climatological locations and operating characteristics (See §
86.1815(f)(2)) is being required. However, such sampling may be difficult, if not impossible, for
AV-EVs at least in the near term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0608, pp. 2-3]
Fully autonomous vehicles operating on public roads today are only capable of operation in
specific geographic regions or operational design domains (ODDs). These ODDs may be limited
in terms of physical location or geofence, road types, vehicle speed, meteorological conditions,
and other factors. Unlike privately owned vehicles, AVs are not deployed at random across the
United States and will not necessarily be exposed to the wide variety of roads, speeds, and
weather. The number of AV-EVs being operated on public roads is currently limited. But even as
the industry scales, these vehicles may be deployed to a single city for the duration of their life or
may move between cities over their lifetime. Further, many, if not all, AV-EVs will be recycled
upon completion of their useful life, and will not be offered in the secondary market. Given the
unique operation of AV-EVs, we request that EPA provide more flexibility in the sampling
requirements to account for vehicles that are tightly controlled and only operated in specific parts
of the United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0608, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Colorado Energy Office, Colorado Department of Transportation, and Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment
-We encourage EPA to coordinate its EV battery durability and warranty requirements with
the maintenance and durability requirements of the ACC II program to the greatest extent
possible. These provisions are critical for ensuring consumer confidence in the performance and
durability of EVs in the new and used market, and alignment to the greatest extent possible can
help avoid confusion for consumers, dealers, and other key stakeholders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0694, pp. 2-3]
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Organization: Consumer Reports (CR)
7. CR Supports Strong Consumer Protections for Batteries
CR appreciates the EPA's inclusion of provisions in the rule that would require consumer
protections for batteries in EVs sold beginning in model year 2027 and beyond. When a
consumer goes through the process of purchasing a new vehicle for their household, there is an
expectation that their vehicle will maintain condition and reliability throughout its useful life. For
consumers purchasing a zero-emission vehicle, these concerns can be exacerbated based on their
lack of experience with the technology and the lower general knowledge of EV technology
compared to ICE vehicles, which consumers have had to deal with for decades. While existing
data on EVs has found that battery failures are usually rare, it is critical that EPA maintains
strong consumer protections to give customers continued peace of mind that the vehicle they
purchase will operate as advertised throughout its lifespan.48 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728,
pp. 23-25]
48 New Study: How Long Do Electric Car Batteries Last?, Recurrent, 2023,
https://www.recurrentauto.com/research/how-long-do-ev-batteries-last.
These provisions are especially important for consumers in the secondary vehicle market.
Used cars make up about 70% of sales in the automotive market.49 Further, lower income
consumers are especially price sensitive to transportation costs and spend a disproportionate
amount of their income on transportation. 50 As more EVs enter the secondary market in the
coming years, it is imperative that consumers have protections against poorly designed or
manufactured batteries that diminish in capacity or fail early. The most vulnerable populations at
the forefront of climate and air quality hazards need consumer protections addressing the lifetime
of the vehicle, its battery, and its reparability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 23-25]
49 In 2022 there were 36.2 million used cars and 13.7 new cars sold, so 73% of vehicles sold were used
cars in 2022. This number fluctuates from year to year, but tends to stay around 70% give or take a few
percentage points. Sales data from AutoNews and NADA: https://www.autonews.com/used-cars/used-car-
volume-hits-lowest-mark-nearly-decade and https://www.nada.org/nada/press-releases/nada-issues-
analysis-2022-auto-sales-and-2023-sales-forecas t
50 High Cost of Transportation in the United States, Institute for Transportation and Development Policy,
May 2019, https://www.itdp.org/2019/05/23/high-cost-transportation-united-states/.
Additionally, while the cost of producing batteries continues to drop, the battery is still the
most expensive part of an electric vehicle.51 When shifting from gasoline to electricity, it is the
battery that enables the electric vehicle to eliminate tailpipe pollution and reduce greenhouse gas
and other pollutants. Therefore, reduced capacity or complete failure of the battery pack
represent a significant risk to emissions reductions given the potentially high cost of a
replacement. Strong corresponding consumer protections regarding durability, battery health and
warranties are therefore critical to the emissions and economic success of EPA's multipollutant
program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 23-25]
51 Batteries For Electric Cars Speed Toward a Tipping Point, Bloomberg, December 2020,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-16/electric-cars-are-about-to-be-as-cheap-as-gas-pow
ered-models#xj4y7vzkg.
EPA's proposal that new EVs and PHEVs maintain minimum performance requirements for
vehicle's state of certified energy (SOCE) beginning at 80% SOCE for the first five years (or
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62,000 miles) and 70% SOCE for eight years (or 100,000 miles) will give consumers greater
trust that their batteries will maintain a reliable state of health standard for the useful life of the
vehicle. CR also appreciates EPA's inclusion of warranty provisions that cover the battery, and
associated electric powertrain components of the vehicle, for eight years (or 80,000 miles.)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 23-25]
With the increased requirements surrounding battery health, it is imperative that consumers
have the ability to monitor their battery's individual performance levels. CR appreciates the
inclusion of language requiring accessible battery state-of-health monitors for light-duty vehicles
in addition to provisions for strong testing procedures to confirm the accuracy of these monitors.
Easily accessible and reliable battery state-of-health data will go a long way towards supporting
a thriving used EV market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 23-25]
CR urges the EPA to consider additional standards for vehicle batteries to maintain a strong
state of certified range (SOCR) aligned with the California Air Resources Board's (CARB)
Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC II) rule which requires that new vehicles sold maintain up to 80%
certified range for 10 years (or 150,000 miles) to ensure consistent range-durability standards
across states. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 23-25]
Organization: Dana Incorporated
ePowertrain Warranty
Under CAA section 207, manufacturers are required to provide emission-related warranties.
CAA section 207(i) specifies that the warranty period for light-duty vehicles is 2 years or 24,000
miles of use (whichever first occurs), except for specified major emission control components,
for which the warranty period is 8 years or 80,000 miles of use (whichever first occurs). As a
supplier of ePropulsion and ePowertrain systems for light- and medium-duty vehicles, Dana
supports EPA's proposal to consider the high-voltage battery serving as a renewable energy
storage system for light- and medium-duty EVs and PHEVs, along with related powertrain
components, as specified major emissions control components subject to a warranty requirement
of 8 years/ 80,000 miles. Dana would welcome the opportunity to discuss with EPA which
related powertrain components are included in this proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0538,
p. 2]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
X. EPA Should Adopt the Proposed Durability and Warranty Requirements, But Should Also
Require State-of-Certified Range Monitors.
We urge EPA to adopt the proposed PEV durability and warranty requirements. 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29283-87. As EPA explains, the calculation of emission credits for PEVs is based on
attributed mileage over their useful life. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29283. In addition to helping ensure that
PEVs will in fact achieve the projected emission reductions throughout their useful lives, the
warranty and durability requirements will enhance consumer confidence in PEVs and promote
their faster adoption among purchasers, leading to greater air quality benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 90]
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EPA's authority to adopt the proposed durability requirements is grounded in Section 206 of
the Clean Air Act, which (read in conjunction with Section 203) provides that before introducing
a new motor vehicle into commerce, a manufacturer must obtain an EPA "certificate of
conformity" indicating that the vehicle complies with applicable emission standards promulgated
under Section 202. 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1). Section 202(a)(1), in turn,
requires vehicles to achieve compliance with standards throughout their "useful life," "whether
such vehicles and engines are designed as complete systems or incorporate devices to prevent or
control such pollution." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). Section 206 also provides that EPA may
condition the certificate of conformity "upon such terms.. .as [it] may prescribe." 42 U.S.C. §
7525(a)(1). The statute thus confers broad authority on EPA to ensure that PEVs (like any other
motor vehicle) in fact achieve the level of emission reductions attributed to them for purposes of
compliance calculations throughout their useful lives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 90]
Durability is also important for PEVs to ensure that vehicles in their second or third use cases
maintain their durability and strong benefits to drivers. EPA points to several studies that
highlight the importance of battery durability for PEVs, and notes that auto manufacturers are
already required to "account for potential battery degradation that could result in an increase in
C02 emissions." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29283. Extending these requirements to PEVs is logical and
well within EPA's authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 90]
Manufacturers are well-equipped to meet durability requirements, which are already in place
in other jurisdictions. The United Nations Global Technical Regulation No. 22 (GTR No. 22)
recommends durability standards for batteries in vehicles.222 EPA notes that Agency staff
chaired the informal working group that developed these standards. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29284 n.536.
In the United States, the California Air Resources Board has established battery durability and
warranty standards in the Advanced Clean Cars II regulations. Id. at 29284 nn.537-38. Pending
approval of the ACC II waiver from EPA, at least seven states (representing approximately 25%
of the United States vehicle sales market) will have enforceable battery durability and warranty
requirements. Therefore, EPA's consideration of battery durability and warranty standards is
aligned with global trends and policies, and we support the proposed incorporation of GTR No.
22 into EPA's final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 90-91]
222 See United Nations, Addendum 22: United Nations Global Technical Regulation No. 22 § l.A, April
14, 2022.. https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/ECE_TRANS_180a22e.pdf.
However, while EPA has chosen to incorporate many parts of GTR No. 22, the Agency has
chosen not to require a monitor for the vehicles' state of certified range (SOCR), without
providing a sufficient justification. EPA recognizes that the state of certified energy (SOCE) is
important to track minimum performance requirements, which we support. However, EPA notes
that "monitoring the state of a vehicle's full-charge driving range capability... as an indicator of
battery durability performance may be an attractive option because driving range is a metric that
is more directly experienced and understood by the customer." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29286. The GTR
No. 22 includes a requirement for SOCR, but it is not customer-facing, while California's ACC
II program requires a range metric instead of a SOCE metric. Id. As EPA notes, drivers are
accustomed to think about the range of their vehicles, not the energy levels of the battery. Id.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 91]
Therefore, we request that EPA require both a SOCE monitor for compliance purposes as well
as a SOCR monitor within the vehicle to provide confidence and transparency to drivers about
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the state of health of their vehicle battery. This is especially important as the vehicles transition
into the secondary market, as SOCR monitors will enhance consumer confidence in used PEVs.
We also request that EPA require the SCOR be readable by the customer, in addition to
regulatory authorities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 91]
We also support the proposed warranty provisions, which fall well within EPA's authority
under the Clean Air Act. Section 207(a)(1) provides that manufacturers of motor vehicles must
warrant that the vehicle is "free from defects in materials and workmanship which cause such
vehicle ... to fail to conform with applicable regulations" for the warranty period specified by
EPA through regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 7541(a)(1). And Section 207(i)(2), which applies
specifically to light-duty vehicles and light-duty trucks, establishes a warranty period for
"specified major emission control components," including catalytic converters, electronic
emissions control units, onboard diagnostic devices, and "any other pollution control device or
component" EPA designates under that section. 42 U.S.C. § 7541(i)(2). PEV batteries and
associated electric powertrain components are no different from the enumerated emission control
technologies—they are "pollution control device[s] or components]" because they enable the
control (in fact, the complete elimination) of tailpipe emissions from motor vehicles. We agree
with EPA's rationale for applying warranty requirements to PEV batteries and associated electric
powertrain components, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29286-87, and we recommend that EPA finalize this
aspect of the Proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 91]
Organization: Fermata Energy
III. Recommendations regarding V2G in EPA rules and EPA's Proposed Battery Durability
Monitoring and Warranty Requirements for Light-and Medium-Duty Electric Vehicles
Any eventual battery durability requirements set by EPA should account for frequent
bidirectional charging (e.g. such as vehicle-to-grid) activities [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710,
pp. 6-7]
We recognize that the EPA is proposing battery durability and warranty requirements that are
less than those in Advanced Clean Cars II and we appreciate that.. However, the EPA made no
mention of the need for V2G technology in light-and medium-duty BEVs and PHEVs in the
proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 6-7]
Battery degradation is an inherently complex topic; battery chemistry, temperature, use cases,
the EV duty cycle, and other factors all impact battery degradation. Some V2X activities,
especially those utilizing bidirectional charging capabilities, will require additional battery
cycling that will impact long-term battery durability. While the exact level of cycling will
depend on the specific V2X use case and could vary based on customer behavior, it is reasonable
to expect that in the future most EVs could experience some incremental level of degradation
due to V2X activities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 6-7]
Given the extensive public and private benefits that V2X can offer, as detailed above, it is
paramount that any battery durability and warranty requirements EPA establishes for EVs not
inadvertently foreclose V2X activities, and especially V2G opportunities. Setting overly-
stringent durability requirements that limit V2X activities - whether intentionally or not -
conflicts with the EPA's larger mission of reducing emissions and accelerating EV adoption.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 6-7]
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Final battery warranty and battery durability requirements should include a thorough
understanding of the impact on V2G in light-and medium-duty vehicles so as to not discourage
V2G. At a minimum, the EPA should lower the warranty requirement to account for frequent
bidirectional charging and allow automakers to exclude vehicles that have done V2X from the
pool of vehicles in the durability test sample. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 6-7]
We do not see any consideration of frequent use of V2G in this proposal. V2G technology is
emerging in light-duty and medium-duty vehicles, and attractive use cases exist (e.g. EVs that
spend many hours connected to a charger or EVSE in a fleet or for personal use, such as school
buses). The concern is that overly restrictive warranty or durability requirements by the EPA
could place arbitrary restrictions on V2X activities. Fermata Energy appreciates the EPA's intent
to ensure consumer protection and customer satisfaction with EV ownership through robust
standards and to meet the useful life requirements in the Clean Air Act. However, overly
stringent requirements that constrain battery cycling could also constrain the novel set of value
propositions that V2X offers and that would otherwise spur EV adoption (e.g., home backup
power, payment for grid services, customer bill management, etc.). Overly stringent battery
durability requirements could drive OEMs to limit the range, performance, and/or state of charge
of EV batteries, or take other measures to provide for sufficient degradation margin in later
years. As such, Fermata Energy believes that the EPA should consider an approach to durability
and warranty requirements that balances competing factors and specifically considers the GHG
benefits of V2G as a storage technology which unlocks and enables a faster, more cost-effective
transition to renewable energy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 7-8]
Furthermore, we note there are ongoing efforts by the Informal Working Group on Electric
Vehicles and the Environment under the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN
ECE) to develop minimum performance requirements for EV batteries that include V2X
considerations. This Working Group is chaired by the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and includes the European Commission, individual European and Asian countries, as well
as industry stakeholders from around the world. In order to account for VGI activities, the
Working Group is also considering a "virtual km" mechanism, in which the energy discharged
by the EV battery in bidirectional mode is converted to a km-equivalent via a predetermined
formula. 14 The total mileage used for confirming the compliance with the performance
requirements would consist of the sum of the km driven and the virtual km. While Fermata
Energy is not necessarily endorsing this specific approach or methodology, we believe that the
EPA should seriously consider an agreed upon method to account for V2G battery degradation
such as the UN Global Technical Regulation "virtual miles" before adopting a final regulation
with durability or warranty requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 7-8]
14 For example, see the following presentation on V2X virtual mileage at the 50th EVE IWG meeting:
https://wiki.unece.org/download/attachments/128420289/Input%20on%20V2X%20virtual%20mileage.ppt
x?api=v2
In the absence of an agreed upon method to account for V2G battery degradation, OEMs may
choose to reach individual battery warranty agreements with V2X services providers to approve
specific equipment for use with their bidirectionally-enabled vehicles. In September 2022,
Nissan approved the Fermata Energy bidirectional charger as the first bidirectional charging
system for use with its all-electric LEAF vehicle in the US. 15 While these sorts of battery
warranty approvals are a very important development for the bidirectional charging industry,
OEM approval processes can be slow. It may take years for other OEMs to negotiate these sorts
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of agreements with V2X charger manufacturers and service providers. An agreed-upon
methodology for accounting for V2G battery degradation would be the more expedient approach
to ensuring battery durability, instead of relying on individual OEM to EVSE agreements, which
could take years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 7-8]
15 https://usa.nissannews.com/en-US/releases/release-5078281dl9ed36853371357c4ala8244-nissan-
approves-first-bi-directional-charger-for-use-with-nissan-leaf-in-the-us
Regarding battery warranties, Fermata Energy recommends that the EPA 1) either delay
adopting battery warranty requirements to a future rulemaking when more data on V2X is
available or 2) reduce the battery warranty requirement in the final regulation to account for and
assume frequent vehicle-to-grid charging by battery EVs and plug-in hybrid EVs. We also
recommend that the EPA explicitly state that automakers may exclude those vehicles that have
done vehicle-to-building or vehicle to grid charging from the pool of vehicles in the battery
durability test sample. The Advanced Clean Cars II regulation took this approach, and we
recommend the EPA do the same. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, p. 8]
The EPA should add in the final regulation a small multiplier credit for vehicles that have on-
board AC bidirectional chargers or are integrated with multiple DC off-board chargers. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, p. 8]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
-In the NPRM's redline of regulatory text for 40 CFR § 86.1845-04(g), EPA states that
manufacturers perform Part A in-use testing related to monitor accuracy at low-mileage (1 year),
intermediate mileage (3 years), and high mileage intervals (5 years). While Ford understands
EPA's desire to ensure that battery State of Certified Energy (SOCE) monitors are accurate, this
new in-use testing requirement will create additional vehicle procurement, in-use testing, and
reporting burdens for electric vehicles. Additionally, the NPRM requirement to perform full
MCTs on these in-use vehicles for monitor validation will add significant mileage to these
vehicles (>400-500 miles), which may make it more difficult to procure in-use electric test
vehicles. Since battery monitor accuracy is not expected to degrade over the 1 - 5 year in-use
timeframe, Ford recommends that EPA require only the intermediate testing for Part A SOCE
validation. In summary, requiring Part A in-use testing at three-time intervals is excessive since
we would expect that similar SOCE accuracy trends to be present at each in-use timeframe.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 15-16]
Ford also requests that virtual mileage as referenced in GTR No.22 be included in the battery
durability and warranty standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 15-16]
Organization: Hyundai Motor America
In addition, EPA's assumption of no cost increase resulting from the proposed battery
durability and warranty requirements is not accurate. It is true the Proposed Alternative's
requirements are on par with current product in the market when measured by years and mileage
comparison. However, there are other costly requirements that accompany the battery durability
proposal that do not currently exist today. For example, the development and rollout of a state of
health ("SOH") monitor meeting the State of Certified Energy ("SOCE") requirements24 will
add cost. In addition, there are compliance demonstration requirements increasing costs related
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to the frequency of testing and reporting. These new requirements undoubtedly come with
additional cost and should be considered by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, pp. 6-7]
24 The NPRM's SOH criteria specifically call for 80 percent minimum SOCE at 5 years or
62,000 miles, and a 70 percent minimum SOCE at 8 years or 100,000 miles.
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation
Acknowledging the significant fraction of new U.S. light- duty vehicles subject to
California's regulations, ICCT recommends EPA align with California's BEV and PHEV
provisions on battery durability, warranty, state of health, and other measures. Such an alignment
not only ensures adequate performance of plug-in vehicles for purposes of emissions reductions,
but it would protect all consumers purchasing EVs and would support the development of
secondary EV markets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 7-8]
Organization: Kia Corporation
-Kia supports adoption of United National Economic Commission Europe (UNECE) Global
Technical Regulations (GTR) No. 22 Phase 1 to measure Usable Battery Energy (UBE). Kia
agrees that EPA's battery state of health (SOH) requirement could help support consumer
acceptance and understanding of new powertrain technology. However, Kia supports the State of
Certified Energy (SOCE) as the only monitor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 3]
Kia Recommendations on EV Battery Warranty and Durability
EPA proposes new battery durability and warranty requirements for BEVs and PHEVs
including 8 years or 80,000 miles for the powertrain components. 15 Kia agrees that EPA's
battery state of health (SOH) requirement, which communicates to the vehicle's state of certified
energy (SOCE), could help support consumer acceptance and understanding of new powertrain
technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 8-9]
15 88 Fed. Reg. 29,288.
Kia supports adoption of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)
Global Technical Regulations (GTR) No. 22 Phase 1 to measure Usable Battery Energy (UBE)
as a durability measurement. However, Kia supports the State of Certified Energy (SOCE) as the
only monitor. UBE is a prudent measurement for customers to understand the life remaining in
the battery that meets or exceeds the proposed warranty requirement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0555, pp. 8-9]
Kia does not support the State of Certified Range (SOCR) in addition to the SOCE. Range is
highly variable on the driving and cabin conditioning habits of the owner. Further, when the
vehicle is sold to a second buyer, the range prediction will reflect the previous owner's habits,
and potentially could display an incorrect SOCR that could inflate or underestimate the usable
range of the vehicle. As plug-in vehicles (BEV and PHEVs) continue to increase in the market,
general customer understanding of battery range and durability will also increase. We support
SOCE as a single measurement of the health of the battery. ICE vehicles are not required to
display a SOCR because the range is extremely reliant on consumer behavior. Similarly, as the
EPA proposed rule aims to be performance-based and technology neutral, plug-in electric
vehicles should not be required to display a SOCR. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 8-9]
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Kia does not support including the reserve capacity in the SOCE metric. The additional
battery reserve capacity, intended to maintain battery integrity, is not accessible to the customer
until the battery reaches a certain degradation. This amount of degradation needed to trigger
accessibility to reserve battery capacity will be unique between automakers and battery cell
manufacturers. Including the reserve capacity in the SOCE metric would undermine the
importance of having this additional capacity: maintaining a usable capacity for the rated battery
for the stated time for vehicle use, not for customers to rely on the additional battery capacity.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 8-9]
Kia Supports Including Virtual Mileage in Customer Information
Leveraging bi-directional capability of EVs, especially as these vehicles compete with
stationary energy sources for cathode active materials, is paramount to future EV adoption.
Utilities are currently exploring vehicle to home (V2H) and vehicle to grid (V2G) projects to
enhance grid reliability and reduce additional grid resources. With the correct incentives, Vehicle
to Everything (V2X) could be a useful side benefit that offsets the cost of EV ownership. The
potential for these daily energy discharges of the traction battery, outside of driving events,
should be properly accounted for in Usable Battery Energy (UBE). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0555, pp. 8-9]
Because EPA is adopting most provisions of the UNECE GTRNo. 22, EPA seems to be
adopting "virtual mileage" from V2X events into battery requirements. Kia proposes that the
EPA extend this "virtual mileage" definition to the proposed warranty standards to accurately
reflect the overall measure of the battery's usage and health. These provisions will give
customers a more accurate understanding of their overall battery usage and will ensure that these
vehicles remain on the road across multiple owners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, pp. 8-9]
Organization: Lucid Group, Inc.
Battery Warranty and Durability Requirements
Lucid supports EPA's attention to battery durability and warranty. As EPA has recognized,
multiple organizations and agencies have drafted rules and guidance which provide an
opportunity to harmonize various requirements where appropriate. Specifically, we respectfully
request EPA consider CARB's current battery warranty under ACCII, 70% state of health (SOH)
for 8 years or 100,000 miles, which aligns with EPA's proposed end point warranty. This would
adequately address the agency's concern of vehicle performance during its useful life. EPA's
current proposal requires a midpoint state of certified energy (SOCE) of 80% at 5 years based on
UN GTR No. 22. A mid-point requirement is unnecessary if an 8-year useful life is the concern.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 5-6]
Further, the data cited by UN GTR No. 22 was based on the fleet at the time and extrapolated
to show that 80% of the fleet would meet the 80% SOCE at 5 years. Given battery degradation
over time is nonlinear, a mid-point requirement at this time may be premature without more real-
world data. Similarly, more stringent battery standards may be appropriate when more data is
available as EV penetration increases and OEMs encounter a wider variety of real-world use
cases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 5-6]
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Additionally, bidirectional charging and discharging technology, such as from the vehicle to
the grid, is increasingly found on vehicles. This type of cycling wears on the vehicle battery and
is not captured in the mileage or age of the vehicle. Lucid suggests the agency consider how this
potential wear would affect the battery warranty requirement. We believe the agency should
consider a mileage equivalent or similar metric for each bidirectional charge or amount of energy
delivered to the grid or number of cycles the battery undergoes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0664, pp. 5-6]
Lucid supports CARB's approach to SOH calculations and battery reserve capacity and
encourages EPA to consider that approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 5-6]
Lucid supports the use SOCE because it is a more direct metric to measure the status of
degradation of the battery pack itself. As the UN GTR No. 22 indicated, estimating the SOCR
includes many variables such as "measurement, test to test variability and precision of range
retention calculations," which leads to greater uncertainty in that value. Providing an estimated
SOCR introduces additional nuances which are unlikely to contribute to the customer's
understanding of the state of degradation of their battery pack. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664,
pp. 5-6]
Lucid supports integrating "a customer-accessible" display that conveys the battery's SOCE.
This display should be broadly interpreted and allow the data to be an option in the vehicle's
infotainment system or dashboard menu. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 5-6]
Lucid Supports Warranty Requirements for Specific Components Designated as "SMECC"
EPA proposes to designate the "high-voltage battery systems and associated powertrain
components" as "specified major emission control components" to require manufacturers to
provide a warranty period of 8 years or 80,000 miles for those parts. Lucid supports this warranty
requirement, but encourages the agency to develop an explicit list of "related powertrain
components" in consultation with industry or consider defining these components as the
vehicle's drive unit or motor, inverter, transmission, and differential, if so equipped. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 5-6]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
MECA supports alignment with UNECE Global Technical Regulations for battery durability
and consideration of phase-in to match vehicle useful life in later years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0564, p.33]
MECA supports new battery durability monitoring and performance requirements for light-
duty BEVs and PHEVs, and battery durability monitoring requirements for Class 2b and 3 BEVs
and PHEVs, beginning with MY 2027 in alignment with UNECE GTR No. 22 and soon to be
completed GTR 22b for medium-duty vehicles. These include SOH monitors and usable battery
energy (UBE) measurement requirements, vehicle range and virtual miles traveled for medium-
duty vehicles with power take-off (PTO) or vehicle-to-X capability of light-duty vehicles. This
information will serve to generate durability data to support future EPA programs, as well as
industry and consumer needs. While the EVE IWG chose not to set an MPR for Category 2
(MDV) plug-in electric vehicles at this time, MECA supports EPA aligning with a future
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minimum performance requirement for MDVs when the UNECE finalizes an applicable GTR.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, p. 33]
As experience with battery durability develops, MECA requests the requirements be revisited
and durability requirements be extended to match the useful life of light-and medium-duty
vehicles. Most consumers expect the battery to last the life of the vehicle in these classes, and
alignment of the durability period with the vehicle useful life will facilitate consumer acceptance
and drive innovation in battery technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, p. 33]
MECA supports EPA's proposed battery and vehicle component warranty requirements.
MECA supports EPA's proposed new warranty requirements for BEV and PHEV batteries
and associated electric powertrain components, such as electric machines, power electronics, and
similar key electric powertrain components. We agree with the concept of building on existing
high value component warranty provisions, such as emission controls. We support designating
the high-voltage battery and associated electric powertrain components for light-duty electric
vehicles as specified high value components subject to a warranty period of 8 years or 80,000
miles. In addition, we support the same warranty periods for components in medium-duty BEVs
and PHEVs. This will give consumers confidence in the reliability of any powertrain they chose
for their vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 33-34]
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
Extended warranty. The necessity to clearly define the applicability of the extended
warranty and the need to provide repair access to service these new vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Warranty Provisions Must Not Preclude Choice in Repair of Exclude the Aftermarket
MEMA urges EPA to not proceed with provisions mandating longer warranties for specific
BEV parts, components, and systems. Vehicle warranties undergo robust regulatory oversight by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under authority granted by the Magnusson-Moss Warranty
Act. These regulations meet the needs of consumers by providing reasonable warranty
protections while protecting consumer choice. If EPA chooses to move forward with the
warranty requirements outlined in the NPRM, MEMA urges the EPA to clarify that warranty
repairs can be completed at dealer or authorized repair locations, and at quality independent
aftermarket repair locations. This would ensure safety, affordability, and access to warranty
repairs. Any EPA warranty regulations should specify that vehicle manufacturers and consumers,
in line with the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act, can employ certified or independent repair
facilities of their choice for warranty repairs. Facilities must follow manufacturer repair and
warranty procedures, warranty repairs can use parts and remanufactured parts that meet
manufacturer specifications, and repair procedures and appropriate specifications are made
available. The repair and maintenance of in-service vehicles is critical ensuring they operate as
designed I and continue to meet and emissions standards. A properly operating vehicle is critical
for millions of Americans as their daily transportation. In many locations throughout the country,
the nearest dealer or authorized repair facility is, at best not the most convenient option or, at
worst, hours away. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 14-15]
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Further, EPA has not clearly defined specific vehicle parts intended to be covered by the
proposed warranty requirements, particularly those related to high-voltage battery and propulsion
motors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 14-15]
MEMA urges EPA to maintain current limitations and not expand warranty coverage to parts
that have a shorter life and are a routinely replaced due to wear, or are adjacent to the warrantied
parts through physical, electrical, or software connections but not the targeted component; such
as sensors, filters, monitoring systems, cooling systems, HVAC, braking systems, control
systems, inverters, converters, charging systems, structural systems, transmissions, other
drivetrain components, electrical motors not part of the forward propulsion system, and filters. In
particular, it is important that components found in both an ICE and a zero emissions vehicle not
carry longer warranties for ZEVS than for ICE. We urge EPA to work with industry
stakeholders, including original equipment and aftermarket suppliers and remanufacturers, to
develop a list of wear and non-applicable parts and components with these criteria in mind.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 14-15]
Finally, MEMA urges EPA to consider the impact longer warranties could have on choices in
consumer repair. Longer warranties could lead to monopolistic repair, resulting in delays,
potential safety concerns, and increased costs for businesses and consumers. To successfully
implement the warranty provisions, repair access needs include appropriate repair and
maintenance information (RMI) to enable safe, educated repairs. This typically includes
diagnostic codes, repair procedures, drawings, and vehicle specifications to enable safe and
complete repair. This has typically been provided for other vehicle systems but is often not made
available for the technologies that will be covered by the new warranty provisions. In addition,
access to vehicle diagnostics and state of health, including for all items under warranty and
related systems, for owners, fleets, and repair professionals, need to be provided. This includes
secure over-the-air (OTA) access to vehicle diagnostics and state of health on a fair, reasonable,
and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 14-15]
MEMA urges: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 14-15]
EPA to clarify that warranty repairs can be completed at dealer or authorized repair
locations, and at quality independent aftermarket repair locations.
EPA to not proceed with provisions mandating longer warranties for specific BEV
parts, components, and systems.
EPA to consider the impact longer warranties could have on choices in consumer
repair. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 14-15]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
EPA has included battery-related requirements in the NPRM for BEVs and PHEVs. These
OBD provisions are misaligned and in some cases conflict with CARB's battery-related
requirements, including: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 13]
1. Some low-mileage hybrid vehicles do not qualify for ZEV credits under California's ZEV
program. Therefore, these vehicles are not subject to nor have development resources allocated
to comply with ZEV battery monitoring and display requirements.
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EPA should align with CARB and restrict monitoring and display requirements only to BEVs
with minimum 200-mile range and PHEVs Bin30 or cleaner with minimum 70-mile range, i.e.,
vehicles that qualify for ZEV credits under California's ZEV program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0623, p. 13]
2. For the battery health display provisions, CARB requires the use of State of Health
("SOH"), while EPA has proposed to harmonize with the UNECE GTR 22 and use State of
Certified Energy ("SOCE"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 13]
For battery packs without a battery reserve, the SOCE is equivalent to the SOH. However, for
packs with a reserve, the EPA and CARB metrics are misaligned. This misalignment is further
complicated by the fact that both agencies require a display of the battery health metric visible to
drivers. Display of two different metrics will be confusing to drivers who will likely find it
challenging to understand what the two different measurements of battery health indicate. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 13]
Mercedes-Benz requests that EPA allow manufacturers to voluntarily comply with the CARB
ACCII provisions for battery health display with respect to reserve energy in lieu of the EPA
display requirement, in order to reduce consumer confusion and provide consistent information
to the customer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 13]
3. With respect to enforcement provisions, the EPA proposal for SOH/SOCE accuracy
provisions are misaligned with CARB's ACCII requirement. First, CARB phases-in enforcement
of the 5% accuracy requirement between 2026 to 2029 MYs, while the EPA requires 100%
phase-in for 2027 MY. Second, the CARB requirement includes only an upper tolerance limit,
while the EPA is proposing to include both an upper and lower tolerance limit. And third, CARB
uses "percentage points", while EPA uses "Percent". This difference can be understood with a
simple example: 5 percentage points added to 60 = 60 + 5 = 65, while 5 percent added to 60
= (60*1.05) = 63. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 13]
Mercedes-Benz requests that the EPA align their regulation to the CARB regulation for
battery accuracy provisions to avoid conflicting regulatory requirements and ensure
manufacturers have appropriate flexibility in meeting these upcoming requirements. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0623, p. 13]
Section IV: Batteries
V2X applications such as vehicle-to-grid, vehicle-to-load, and vehicle-to-home are
increasingly considered key features that will support the shift to electrification. For instance, the
California legislature is currently considering a mandate for all new vehicles in the state to have
bidirectional charging capability starting in 2030 MY. Regardless of California's law or separate
OEM efforts to advance V2G, inclusion of the parameter, "virtual distance", is fundamental to
the transparent deployment of V2G technology. As such, we would like EPA to add virtual
distance to the regulatory language in both the durability and warranty mileage calculation.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 15-16]
Organization: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
-Align battery durability and warranty provisions with Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC II)
program The MPCA encourages EPA to bring its battery durability and warranty provisions into
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line with the Advanced Clean Cars II program. The ACC II durability and warranty program
supports the development of EVs that can replace combustion engine vehicles for similar use
cases. If EVs are to become the primary vehicle type in the future, they need to be durable, and
the battery life needs to be transparent to the user when purchased new and in the secondary
market. Bringing the EPA program into line with the ACCII program would result in improved
durability and transparency for consumers, ensure emissions standards deliver expected emission
reduction and needed environmental public health benefits, and set consistent expectations for
manufacturers nationwide. Seven states representing roughly 20 percent of the new light-duty
vehicle market have already adopted ACC II, and several others are expected to follow. More
closely aligning EPA's durability and warranty provisions with those in ACC II will make it
easier for consumers, used automobile dealers, and others to compare the battery state of health
for EVs subject the ACC II regulations with those subject to EPA's final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0557, p. 5]
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
Finally, NACAA recommends that EPA include provisions in the final rule that align with
ACC II regarding data standardization, durability, warranty, minimum mileage range labeling,
charging and serviceability requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, p. 8]
Organization: National Tribal Air Association (NTAA)
Vehicle Durability
The proposed requirements for battery durability and warranty are exceedingly important.
Many Tribal communities are distant from comprehensive vehicle maintenance and repair
facilities. Alaskan Native Villages are particularly vulnerable to the high costs of vehicle
operations. The NTAA supports these provisions that will improve extended battery life and
vehicle reliability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, p. 3]
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
V. Battery Durability Proposal
Nissan understands the critical importance of battery performance to achieving overall
electrification goals. As a result, Nissan has committed to significant investments in research and
development of state-of-the-art battery technology, including a focus on development and
implementation of ASSBs in future EV offerings. Nissan supports EPA's proposal to largely
align its battery durability requirements with the requirements set out in UENCE GTR No. 22.
Nissan also supports EPA's proposal to not adopt a reserve capacity declaration requirement or
State of Certified Range ("SOCR") monitor. Nissan supports the use of Usable Battery Energy
("UBE") as the primary metric for measuring battery durability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0594, pp. 7-8]
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
D. Proposed EV Battery Durability and Warranty Provisions
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NESCAUM and the OTC support EPA's proposal to include minimum battery durability
requirements and warranty provisions for BEV and plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV)
batteries and associated electric powertrain components. Batteries and associated electric
powertrain components are emission control devices that allow BEVs to operate with zero
tailpipe emissions and reduce emissions from PHEVs. By requiring manufacturers to
demonstrate that test groups of BEVs and PHEVs meet battery durability requirements
throughout their useful lives, EPA will be able to assess whether BEVs and PHEVs will operate
as expected over time. Warranty requirements protect consumers against individual vehicles that
experience failures or defects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 11-12]
As EPA surmises, emission control components covered by warranty are more likely to be
repaired or replaced as needed. Thus, working in tandem, the durability and warranty provisions
will ensure that EPA's emissions standards deliver expected emission reductions and needed
environmental and public health benefits. In addition, these provisions are integral to instilling
consumer confidence in the performance and durability of BEVs and PHEVs, not only when
new, but also in secondary markets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 11-12]
To the maximum extent possible, NESCAUM and the OTC encourage EPA to align the
durability and warranty provisions in its final rule with those in the ACC II regulations. As
mentioned above, seven states representing roughly 20 percent of the new LDV market have
already adopted ACC II, and several others are expected to follow. More closely aligning EPA's
durability and warranty provisions with those in ACC II will make it easier for consumers, used
automobile dealers, and others to compare the battery state of health for BEVs and PHEVs
subject the ACC II regulations with those subject to EPA's final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0584, pp.11-12]
Organization: POET, LLC
Another issue with U.S. EPA's battery cost assessment is that it appears to completely ignore
the impact of the cost of the proposed battery durability and warranty provisions of the Proposed
Rule. These new regulatory requirements will clearly impose costs on battery manufacturers and
automakers which will ultimately be passed on to consumers and should be included in U.S.
EPA's analyses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 58]
Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
Battery Durability and Warranty Requirements
Rivian believes reasonable battery durability standards and consumer-facing transparency in
battery health will support the EV market's growth and success. EPA's proposal to include a
durability requirement in the L/MDV standards evolves the regulation for a vehicle market in
which EVs will dominate. Consistent with our position during the development of California's
ACCII regulations, Rivian believes aligning EPA's requirements with Global Technical
Regulation ("GTR") 22 will establish a practicable standard that can be harmonized on a global
basis. In the NPRM, EPA sought comment on various aspects of its proposed approach to
establishing and testing for durability and warranty standards. Rivian addresses several of these
in turn below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, p. 13]
Disclosing Battery Reserve Capacity
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Unlike CARB's ACCII durability program, EPA does not propose to require manufacturers to
disclose reserve capacity that they initially withhold from consumers.41 Disclosing reserve
capacity involves tradeoffs but can serve compelling interests. While it burdens automakers with
an additional compliance obligation, it supports consumers who benefit from additional product
transparency—particularly in the used vehicle market. As a fundamental principle, if
manufacturers elect to use larger batteries and/or withhold capacity for purposes of complying
with durability requirements, consumers should be informed and aware. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0653, p. 14]
Asymmetric information in this regard could undermine consumer confidence and incentivize
hidden battery upsizing among manufacturers. There is also the matter of regulatory
harmonization across CARB and EPA programs. Ultimately, we believe there are benefits to
requiring disclosure of battery reserve capacity and EPA might wish to consider establishing a
requirement in this or a future rulemaking.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, p. 14]
41 13 C.C.R. §1962.5.
42 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 87 (May 5, 2023) (revising 40 C.F.R. Parts 85, 86, 600, 1036, 1037, and 1066,
29,286.
In the event of a failure in a durability testing group, EPA clearly provides for the removal of
compliance credits attributed to the failing vehicles from a manufacturer's credit bank. Rivian
supports this proposed penalty but seeks clarification on its scope. Would the credit removal
apply only to GHG credits or also to NMOG and NOx? Rivian believes NMOG and NOx credits
should be subject to the same penalty in the event of a durability testing failure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0653, pp. 14-15]
Establishing Additional Components as Specified Major Emission Control Components
("SMECCs")
EPA proposes to define "associated powertrain components" as SMECCs under the Clean Air
Act. Rivian understands the agency's rationale and does not necessarily object to this action, but
additional clarity would aid our evaluation of the proposal's full implications. EPA should
clearly define the components proposed to qualify as SMECCs under the new regulations: the
NPRM provides only examples in the preamble.44 California regulations already define
"propulsion-related parts" for purposes of the ACCII warranty requirements and could serve as
the basis for identifying SMECCs.45 EPA should also clarify how anti-tampering rules would
apply to components newly defined as SMECCs in scenarios where maintenance work is
performed. Overall, we anticipate complexity in implementing this aspect of the proposal. The
agency and affected manufacturers will likely benefit from compliance workshops following rule
finalization to establish clear and practicable implementation guidance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0653, pp. 14-15]
44 Id. at 29,286.
45 13 C.C.R. §1962.8.
Other Considerations
Vehicle-to-everything ("V2X") capabilities could introduce complexity, especially with
respect to warranties and consumer-facing transparency regarding a battery's state of health.
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Rivian did not see discussion of V2X capability or its impact on durability and warranty in
EPA's rule documentation and requests clarity on the extent to which the agency considered the
issue. As V2X capabilities see greater use across more EV models, EPA will likely need to
evaluate the interaction of these applications with the durability and warranty standards
proposed. Accounting for diverse V2X capabilities across manufacturers, not to mention varying
approaches to marketing the technology, might favor a degree of regulatory flexibility. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 14-15]
One key issue to consider is whether, with EPA approval, manufacturers could account for
V2X-related battery degradation in setting warranty terms and evaluating durability. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 14-15]
Organization: Sierra Club et al.
We appreciate the EPA's proposal, which moves our vehicles in the right direction. However,
the final emissions standard for light-duty vehicles should: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0668, p.
2]
-Establish protective zero-emission vehicle durability and warranty requirements [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0668, p. 2]
Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
EPA should adopt strong certification, durability, and warranty requirements.
Beyond more stringent numeric standards, EPA also proposes important improvements to
vehicle certifications, durability, and warranty requirements. These changes will help to ensure
light-and medium-duty vehicles run cleanly under a greater range of operating conditions across
the lifetime of a vehicle—which we support. However, we urge EPA to consider ways that these
provisions can be aligned with California's Clean Cars program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0591, p. 10]
Organization: Stellantis
Battery Durability & Warranty Requirements are Beyond EPA's Scope
EPA has proposed new battery durability performance requirements for all light-duty PHEVs
and BEVs, battery health monitoring and in-use accuracy for all light-and medium-duty PHEVs
and BEVs, as well as warranties for PHEVs, BEVs, and FCEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0678, p. 17]
Stellantis concurs with Auto Innovators' comment that battery durability requirements are
beyond the scope of EPA's statutory authority for BEVs. EPA's authority covers emissions
standards under CAA section 202, but there are no applicable air pollutant emissions standards
for BEVs, which do not produce any such emissions. Similarly, EPA lacks the authority to
prescribe warranty standards for BEV powertrain and associated components that do not emit
any air pollutants. Stellantis agrees with Auto Innovators that warranty requirements are
typically left to the respective OEMs to determine and should here as well be addressed by
individual OEMs. EPA should not attempt to reach into the regulatory realm of consumer
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protection as it relates to battery durability and warranty; EPA's jurisdiction does not reach so
far. Stellantis agrees with Auto Innovators that the stringent new durability, testing, and warranty
provisions in the proposed rule do not comport with the CAA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678,
P- 17]
Stellantis fully supports all technical AAI comments and recommendations on EPA's
proposed battery durability and warranty requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 17]
Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
Regarding battery durability and battery warranties, we are concerned that bi-directional
charging was not considered. We request a more reasonable proposal in the final rule that
assumes frequent bi-directional charging for the warranty requirement allows automakers to
exclude from the durability test sample any BEV or PHEV that has been used for vehicle-to-grid
or vehicle-to-building. As described in our recommendation 4 below, vehicle-to-grid and
vehicle-to-building provide substantial benefits to society and to consumers. Therefore, EPA in
its final rulemaking should carefully avoid unintentionally discouraging the development of this
market with warranty and durability requirements for PHEVs (and BEVs) that are too stringent.
We understand that there are many factors to consider including consumer protection, useful life
requirements in the Clean Air Act, but the benefits to consumers, utility ratepayers and the
environmental benefits of V2G and vehicle to building should also be considered. We understand
that EPA does not propose durability and warranty requirements as strict as those in Advanced
Clean Cars II. Even so, bidirectional charging should be addressed in the final rule, and the most
practical way to do this is to make the test sample exception that was adopted in the Advanced
Clean Cars II regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 8-9]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
EPA's Proposed Durability Standards Are Reasonable
Building consumer assurance is a key factor towards achieving significantly higher levels of
BEV penetration. Tesla agrees with EPA that consumers should have access to information
regarding the state of battery health (SOH), especially those considering the purchase of a used
BEV or when filing a warranty claim. As further noted, durability monitoring can ensure
emission reduction benefits are met and provide integrity to credit trading. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0792, pp. 26-27]
In providing such information, Tesla has favored a SOH monitor based upon battery capacity
because it is directly proportional to vehicle range, depends on the least test conditions, can
easily be run with an onboard diagnostic procedure, and can be verified with simple
measurement equipment. Nonetheless, Tesla recognizes and participated in proceedings
developing the UN GTR 22 and agrees with EPA's general adoption of the GTR 22 and a SOH
monitor communicating the battery's state of certified energy (SOCE) based upon usable battery
energy (UBE).167 Tesla also supports the agency's decision to not require a state of certified
range (SOCR) monitor as development of an accurate SOCR monitor is far more difficult and
burdensome than developing an SOCE monitor. 168 Accurate SOCR monitoring would require,
among other things, customizing road load test for each vehicle that can be programmed on the
dynamometer. Such a testing burden would add significant cost to BEV deployment. Consistent
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with implementation of an SOH monitor and accuracy testing, Tesla believes the flexibility
provided in the monitoring family definition provides assurances to manufacturers that
deployment of similar monitors across different vehicle lines does not create any undue or
repetitive SOCE testing burdens and cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 26-27]
167 Id, at 29285.
168 Id., at 29288.
Imposing specific minimum durability performance requirements on BEVs provides no
emissions reduction benefit. BEVs do not emit tailpipe (or evaporative) criteria pollutants and
changes in battery durability and retained range do not alter this fact. Unlike emission controls in
ICE vehicles, BEVs are also not vulnerable to defeat devices and tampering. 169 Requiring
durability standards can cause greater tailpipe emissions by harming the rate of BEV uptake
through imposition of substantial new costs and designs with reserved battery capacity. Tesla
respectfully submits that any speculative benefit from consumer assurance provisions such as
minimum performance requirements must be balanced against increased up-front costs on BEVs,
which are likely to slow consumer uptake and thereby increase emissions. Moreover, as the DOE
has documented, BEV range continues to accelerate as the technology is deployed. 170 As BEV
range increases, the loss of incremental battery capacity over time (due to expected degradation)
will matter less to consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 26-27]
169 See e.g.\, Reuters, Stellantis unit to pay $5.6 million to resolve California emissions probe (Oct. 13,
2022) available at https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/stellantis-unit-pay-56-million-
resolve-california-emissions-probe-2 022-10-13/; Reuters, U.S. Supreme Court rejects Volkswagen appeals
over emissions tampering (Nov. 15, 2021) available at https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-
transportation/us-supreme-court-rejects-volkswagen-appeals-over-emissions-t ampering-2021-11-15/;
Washington Post, Why Carmaker Cheating Probes Stay in High Gear: QuickTake Q&A (Jan. 10, 2018)
available at h ttps://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-carmaker-cheating-probes-stay-in-high-gear-
quicktake-q anda/2018/01/10/318b6d5a-f632-l Ie7-9af7-
a50bc3300042_story.html?utm_term=.2315e81e50b4.
170 U.S. DOE, FOTW #1290, May 15, 2023: In Model Year 2022, the Longest-Range EV Reached 520
Miles on a Single Charge (May 15, 2023) available at h ttps://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-
1290-may-15-2023-model-year-2022-l ongest-range-ev-reached-520-miles.
Tesla believes the proposed minimum performance requirement (MPR) for the SOH are set at
reasonable and achievable levels. 171 Further, the decision not to implement a MPR for Class 2b
and 3 will facilitate greater early adoption in those segments. For testing purposes, defining the
battery family definition is best served by allowing manufacturers to utilize the criteria
mentioned in the proposed regulation such as maximum specified charging power, method of
battery thermal management, battery (cathode) chemistry and the net power of the electrical
machines. 172 This is far preferred over defining the families based on battery capacity which
would create multiple families for the same vehicles with the same battery types and chemistry
but different battery capacity. While establishing a 90 percent pass requirement for battery
family monitor exceed the passage rates set in the ACC II durability provisions, Tesla agrees
with the agency's flexible approach allowing manufacturer to use good engineering judgment in
determining the statistically adequate and representative in-use vehicle data for testing. 173
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 27]
171 88 Fed. Reg. at 29285, Table 64.
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172 Id., at 29288. Tesla notes EPA should provide further guidance of the definition of "net power of
electrical machines."
173 See 13 CCR § 1962.4 (d).
EPA should not encourage manufacturers to overcome the durability threshold by creating
larger batteries with hidden capacity that can slowly be accessed as the battery degrades.
Encouraging this approach is fundamentally flawed. BEV customers, just like other light-duty
vehicle customers, will have guarantees of performance from the manufacturer. Hidden capacity
is adding cost for more performance than what the customer sought in their vehicle, will
unnecessarily raise BEV prices, and dampen deployment of the best emissions reduction
technology currently available. Encouraging full access to the battery (with reliable SOCE
monitoring) allows for maximum utility of deployed products over the entire life -something that
is fundamental to the Tesla customer experience and should be incorporated into good public
policy. Accordingly, Tesla supports the agency in not requiring over capacity declarations. 174
Requiring reserve capacity declarations could have the perverse effect of communicating
unwarranted battery upsizing as beneficial and incent consumers to choose less efficient
vehicles-. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 28]
174 88 Fed. Reg. at 29286.
Under EPA's proposal, manufacturers would be required to warrant a battery and associated
powertrain components are free from defects in materials and workmanship which cause the
deterioration of the battery SOH to less than 80% UBE for eight years or 80,000 miles,
whichever occurs first, starting MY 2027.175 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 28]
175 Id.
Tesla supports a minimum warranty requirement as it may eliminate low-lifetime battery pack
designs and deployment. Tesla notes that the proposed 80% UBE level exceeds the industry
norm. If EPA chooses to exceed the current industry standard, most, if not all, OEMs would be
unable to avoid significant warranty costs and liability without significant additional costs to
each vehicle. These additional warranty costs will be passed on to customers and increase BEV
cost, again dampening BEV uptake. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 28]
Currently, Tesla warrants a Model 3 real-wheel drive vehicle for 8 years or 100,000 miles,
whichever comes first, with minimum 70% retention of battery capacity over the warranty
period. 176 As noted, most other OEMs offer similar warranty coverage. 177 Other Tesla vehicle
models extend the warranty to either 120,000 or 150,000 miles.178 The proposed escalating
liability to 80% of the SOH of the battery pack will be a consequential requirement and likely
add significant costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 28-29]
176 Tesla, New Vehicle Limited Warranty available at https://www.tesla.com/support/vehicle-warranty.
177 See e.g., 2022 Ford F-150 Lightning, What is the warranty on the F-150 Lightning? ("Eight years or
100,000 miles (whichever occurs first), with retention of 70% or more of the original High Voltage Battery
capacity over that period") available at https://www.ford.com/support/how-tos/owner-resources/f-150-
lightning/f-150-lightning-product-frequently-asked-questions/#5 ; 2022 FordMach-E (" Battery is covered
for 8 years or 100,000 ;miles, whichever comes first, retaining a minimum of 70% of its original capacity
over that period."); Chevrolet, Living Electric: A simple smart way to drive ("Certain electric propulsion
components for Bolt EV and Bolt EUV are covered for 8 years or 100,000 miles*") available at h
ttps://www.ford.com/suvs/mach-e/; Volkswagen, The all-new 2021 Volkswagen ID.4 electric SUV ("The
high-voltage battery is warranted for eight years or 100,000 miles, whichever occurs first, for defects in
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material and workmanship and for net capacity loss below 70%, and can also be transferred to a subsequent
owner throughout the remainder of its duration.") available at;
https://media.vw.com/assets/documents/original/13020-2021ID4ReleaseFINAL.pdf; Audi, E -tron "(8
year/lOOK miles (whichever occurs first) high-voltage battery limited warranty coverage on MY21 Audi E-
tron vehicles. Battery capacity decreases with time and use. Warranty coverage may not return battery
capacity to an "as new" condition with 100% net capacity. See owner's literature or dealer for limited
warranty details.") available at https://www.audiusa.com/us/web/en/inside-audi/sustainability/e-tron-i
nnovation/layer/battery_limited_warranty_coverage.html; See generally, MyEV.com, Evaluating Electric
Vehicle Warranties (last visited Feb. 9, 2022) available at https://www.myev.com/research/buyers-sellers-
advice/evaluating-e lectric-vehicle-w
arranties#:~:text=Like%20other%20vehicle%20types%2C%20an,components%2C%20comprehensive%20
and%20powertra i
n%20coverage.&text=Importantly%2C%20federal%20regulations%20mandate%20that,eight%20years%2
0or%20100%2C00 0 %20miles; U.S. Department of Energy, Fact #913: February 22, 2016 The Most
Common Warranty for Plug-In Vehicle Batteries is 8 Years/100,000 Miles (Feb. 22, 2016) available at h
ttps://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/fact-913-february-2 2-2016-most-common-warranty-plug-vehicle-
batteries-8-yearsl00000.
178 Id.
Battery pack replacement is much more expensive than ICE replacement of an emissions
control system or transmission. For example, estimates place battery pack replacement and labor
in the range from a high end of around $16,000179 to $5,500,180 Regardless, if 35% of vehicles
were to fail warranty, it represents an average added cost of between $5,600 and $1,925 per car.
These figures also do not take into consideration the significant new investment manufacturers
will need to make in remanufacturing facilities that seek to repurpose the exchanged battery
packs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 29]
179 See, Recurrent, Costs of Electric Car Battery Replacement available at
https://www.recurrentauto.com/research/costs-e v-battery-replacement
180 Consumer Report, Pay Less for Vehicle Maintenance with an EV (Sept. 26, 2020) available at
https://www.consumerreports.org/car-repair-maintenance/pay-less-for-vehicle-maintenance-with-an-ev/
Accordingly, Tesla advocates warranty thresholds more consistent with the industry standard
and adoption of a standard of 8-year, 80,000 miles warranty with 70% UBE. Battery technology
and capacity retention may improve, and Tesla is actively pursuing ways to improve lifetime
capacity while also decreasing cost, increasing range and, fast charge performance attributes
necessary for the widescale adoption of BEVs.181 However, estimating the precise trajectories
of this research and development and technological breakthroughs and deployment more than
five years out is extremely difficult and should not serve as a basis for an overly prescriptive
warranty requirement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 29]
181 Tesla also continues to make significant investments in advancing EV, solar, and battery storage
technology with over $1. IB dedicated to research and development in 2021 alone. See Tesla, SEC Form
10-K (Jan. 26, 2022) at 39 available at h
ttps://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1318605/000156459021004599/tsla-10k_2020123 l.htm; See also,
InsideEVs, Tesla Spends Least On Ads, Most On R&D: Report (Mar. 25, 2022)(reporting that Tesla spends
$2,984 per car on R&D and that such spending is three times the industry average and higher than Chrysler,
Ford, and GM's R&D budgets combined) available at https://insideevs.com/news/575848/tesla-highest-
research-development-no-a ds/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email.
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Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
On page 4-34, when referring to maintenance costs over the 225,000-mile life of a vehicle,
EPA does not mention the need for battery replacement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 10]
While EPA does not address this issue directly in any of its cost analysis, they do open the
door to scrutiny and show their hypocrisy a bit by mentioning the battery durability standards in
1-4, 1-5, and 1-6. Based on the UN standards, a battery capable of supplying its platform with a
range of 300 miles when new would be considered within the standard so long as it could
provide 240 miles of range after 5 years or 62,000 miles. Additionally, it would remain within
that standard if it could provide 210 miles of range to its associated platform after 8 years or
approximately 100,000 miles. It only continues to degrade from there. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0674, p. 10]
In the table below, the initial data is from the UN standard and the rest is calculated from
there based on linear degradation of the battery throughout its lifecycle. The reality is that the
degradation would be faster than this and fast charging used to compete with ICE vehicle refuel
times will only exacerbate the degradation. I have also placed a couple helpful links below that
support this claim. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 10]
A potential counter argument is that the CARB standard is more stringent. However, when
looking at the tables it is clear that only 70% of the vehicles must achieve the CARB standard vs
90% of vehicles with the UN standards. So, while the wages of retained usable power are higher,
the allowable wage of vehicles failing to meet the standard is higher. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0674, pp. 10-11]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
EPA's cost estimates for future battery packs also ignore the customer-readable battery state-
of-health monitor proposed by EPA as a new requirement under this rulemaking.209 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 38-40]
209 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29284.
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
Comments on EV Topics
VWGoA requests a single battery minimum performance requirement instead of the current
two points NPRM. It is appropriate for the EPA to utilize the requirements outlined in UN GTR
No. 22; it is noteworthy that the GTR also allows the discretion to enforce just one of the two
minimum performance requirements. Volkswagen recommends the EPA adopt the single
minimum performance requirements set point of 70% SOCE over 8 years/lOOk miles. Choosing
the longer-term minimum performance requirements of the two proposed, the EPA simplifies
compliance checks and reduces regulatory complexity without sacrificing the long-term
usefulness of the battery systems of electric vehicles. CARB has implemented a single set point
for 70% battery SOH at 8 years/lOOk miles. Aligning the EPA's minimum performance
requirements with CARB's battery SOH requirement would be a step towards harmonizing
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 11-12]
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Battery State of Health
Harmonization of Battery State of Health Calculation
Volkswagen would like to bring attention to the discrepancy in SOH calculation by the
treatment of how battery reserve capacity is utilized between EPA's NPRM proposal and the
requirements of CARB's LEV IV regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 11-12]
EPA's NPRM adheres to the UN GTR No. 22, which excludes battery reserve capacity in the
SOH calculation. CARB's LEV IV regulation requires a unique SOH calculation that includes
the reserve capacity. This would require displaying two different health monitor results when a
reserve capacity is used. This situation could easily lead to confusion for consumers.
Volkswagen strongly encourages EPA to work with CARB to collaborate on a single solution
regarding SOH calculation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 11-12]
Harmonization of Battery State of Health (SOH) Measurement Method
Volkswagen recommends the EPA specify the state of certified energy (SOCE) display in
whole numbers, rather than in decimals. This modification would enhance readability and
simplify the customer experience. Volkswagen requests harmonization of the NPRM
requirements with CARB's LEV IV regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, pp. 11-12]
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
VCC supports either the battery durability requirements within this NPRM or the CARB
battery durability requirements effective 2026MY and beyond. However, we strongly encourage
EPA to fully harmonize these requirements with the CARB requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0624, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
In addition, EPA is proposing a wide range of program revisions and amendments, including
battery durability and warranty requirements for light-duty and medium-duty plug-in vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 1]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
The following comments relate to the proposed requirements for battery durability:
-ZETA notes that EV batteries have a variety of potential non-propulsion applications that IC
engines do not. As a result, these applications may cause the battery to go through wear cycles
that are unrelated to reducing on road mobile source emissions. The proposed requirements for
battery durability could disincentivize those applications and we encourage EPA to consider
ways to uphold the intent of the MPR without disincentivizing non-propulsionary battery
applications, including the use of good engineering judgment in determining statistically relevant
in-use battery degradation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 29-30]
-ZETA recommends EPA remove the battery durability MPR of 80% at 5 years or 62,000
miles (midpoint) but retain the 70% at 8 years or 100,000 miles endpoint. Battery degradation
may not be linear and depends on a large number of factors. 137 An MPR that assumes linear
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degradation could result in vehicles needing to be recalled despite still meeting the 70% at 8
years or 100,000 miles endpoint if they were allowed to continue operating. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, pp. 29-30]
137 "Optimizing the operation of energy storage using a non-linear lithium-ion battery degradation model,"
Applied Energy, (March 1, 2020)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S03062619193204717via%3Dihub
-In regards to the GTR No. 22 "Part B" compliance test under the durability requirements,
EPA notes in the proposed rule preamble that "In the case that a durability family fails the Part B
durability performance requirement, manufacturers would have to adjust their credit balance to
remove compliance credits previously earned by those vehicles." 138 ZETA supports this
penalty, however, we request clarification that forfeited compliance credits include all relevant
credits generated by vehicles within the applicable durability family, not just GHGs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 29-30]
138 See 88 FR 29286 (May 5, 2023)
The following comments relate to the proposed requirements for emissions control device
warranties: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 30]
-ZETA requests clarity on what vehicle components constitute "associated powertrain
components." While the preamble to the proposed rule includes some discussion on what
components may be included: "e.g., electric machines, inverters, and similar key electric
powertrain components," 139 a more exhaustive list would provide additional clarity for
manufacturers and support a more thorough assessment of this aspect of the proposal. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 30]
139 Id. at footnote 138
-ZETA's member companies stand by the durability of their products and many of them have
their own warranties. While we support EPA's proposed warranty requirements, we note that
designating the electric battery and associated powertrain components as "specified major
emission control components" under the Clean Air Act could subject these components to
additional regulatory requirements and rules. Specifically, we are concerned about the
uncertainty in how EPA's anti-tampering rules may apply to these components and request EPA
clarification on how enforcement would be applied to different scenarios where work may need
to be performed on these components. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 30]
EPA Summary and Response
EPA acknowledges and appreciates all of the comments relating to battery durability and
warranty provisions. Comments on this topic included a number of distinct themes that we
individually identify and respond to in this section. Additional responses in the context of the
final durability and warranty standards may be found in preamble section III.G.2 and III.G.3.
Additional responses in the context of test procedures and certification requirements may be
found in RTC 6.1 and 6.2.
In general, comments in this area related either to the value and relevance of EPA's proposed
regulation of battery durability and/or battery warranty, or to specific aspects of the proposed
durability and/or warranty provisions. Comments on the value and relevance of the provisions
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included statements of support for the importance of ensuring battery durability and warranty for
PEVs, as well as comments expressing the position that the provisions are not within EPA's
authority. Comments on specific aspects of the proposed provisions included requests to
strengthen or weaken the proposed durability and/or warranty program, requests to align with the
California ACC II battery durability and warranty program, and various requests to consider
adding, eliminating, or modifying one or another element of either program.
A large number of commenters, including BMW, CARB, Consumer Reports, Dana,
"Environmental and Public Health Organizations," Lucid, MECA, NTAA, NESCAUM/OTC,
Rivian, Sierra Club, SELC, Tesla), expressed general support for the provisions and their intent
of promoting battery durability. For example, Tesla agreed with EPA's general adoption of GTR
No. 22 and a state of health monitor communicating the battery's state of certified energy based
upon usable battery energy. Tesla also stated that durability monitoring can be useful to ensure
emission reduction benefits are met, and to provide integrity to credit trading. Several
environmental NGOs and supplier organizations indicated support of PEV durability and
warranty requirements, and referenced statutory language supporting these measures. Tesla
advocated for warranty thresholds more consistent with the industry standard, and adoption of a
standard 8-year, 80,000 miles warranty with 70 percent UBE. Lucid requested that EPA consider
CARB's current battery warranty under ACC II, which is 70 percent SoH for 8 years or 100,000
miles, and aligns with EPA's proposed end point durability standard.
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation ("the Alliance"), whose comments were echoed by
Stellantis, questioned EPA's authority to establish battery durability and warranty requirements.
The Alliance, however, also agreed that battery degradation monitors and performance
requirements are important tools for battery operation and state of health, and provided
recommendations for modifying the program. "Environmental and Public Health Organizations",
in contrast to the Alliance, provided commentary supporting EPA's authority.
Commenters' positions varied regarding how the proposed durability and warranty program
based on GTR No. 22 should exist alongside the California Air Resources Board (CARB) ACC
II durability and warranty program (referred to here as the "CARB program"). Several
commenters (Kia, Nissan, Rivian, Tesla) expressed general support or preference for the
proposed program being based on GTR 22. Some commenters stressed the differences between
the proposed durability program and the CARB program, and stated that it would be difficult for
OEMs to comply with two different sets of requirements. Commenters within this group
suggested a variety of solutions, including: aligning certain aspects of the proposed program the
CARB program; adopting the CARB program instead of the proposed program; or accepting
compliance with the CARB program in lieu of compliance with the proposed program. Colorado
Energy Office et al., Consumer Reports, Mercedes-Benz, MPCA, NESCAUM/OTC, SELC, and
Volvo encouraged EPA to fully harmonize with CARB, while similarly, BMW recommended
adopting a single national approach. In contrast, Nissan and "Environmental and Public Health
Organizations" supported adoption of GTR No. 22 as proposed. The Alliance for Automotive
Innovation and the "Environmental and Public Health Organizations" both stated that EPA
should align with global best practices. Mercedes recommended that EPA allow voluntary
compliance with the CARB ACC II provisions in lieu of EPA requirements; similarly, several
environmental NGOs and state organizations recommended that EPA should align with the
CARB regulation to avoid conflicting regulatory requirements, such as for example, differences
in the treatment of reserve capacity. CARB recommended that EPA also adopt the full suite of
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consumer assurance provisions under ACC II.546 Some commenters noted a difference in state of
health monitor display requirements between the proposed program and the CARB program. The
Alliance recommended allowing the display of the SOCE value to one decimal place, as is
required by the CARB program. Volkswagen preferred display in whole numbers, rather than
decimals, and encouraged EPA to work with CARB to collaborate on a single solution regarding
SOH calculation. Others more generally recommended that EPA work with CARB to modify
aspects of the CARB program. The Alliance recommended that we require fewer than the three
separate IUVP monitor accuracy checks under Part A, as the CARB program does not require
that many. Commenters also recommended a phase-in for SOCE monitor accuracy tolerance,
like CARB's allowance of an 8 percent tolerance in 2027 and 2028, and 5 percent thereafter.
Mercedes pointed out that the CARB program would not apply to BEVs with sub-200 mile
driving range or PHEVs with sub-70 mile range, as these are not considered eligible for ZEV
credit under the CARB program, and suggested that EPA should likewise limit the EPA program
to vehicles above these range levels.
EPA also requested comment on the inclusion of a requirement for an SOCR monitor and
associated reporting requirements as specified in GTRNo. 22. Automakers expressed general
support for basing the MPR on a metric of usable energy, or SOCE, as specified in GTR No. 22,
and not on SOCR. Several expressed specific opposition to a range-based metric or SOCR, while
the "Environmental and Public Health Organizations" encouraged use of both SOCE and SOCR.
In the proposal, EPA recognized that the California Air Resources Board durability program
includes a specific provision that requires manufacturers to disclose and account for any battery
reserve capacity that the manufacturer has chosen to initially withhold from use for release later
in the life of the vehicle to maintain driving range or usable energy capacity after degradation has
occurred. This provision of the California regulation is meant to allow consumers to know the
state of chemical degradation of the battery independently of apparent range or energy capacity.
Although EPA did not propose a requirement to disclose reserve battery capacity, in recognition
of CARB's inclusion of this parameter, the agency requested comment on including a reserve
capacity declaration requirement and use of reserve capacity information in calculating an SOCE
or SOCR metric. The Alliance, Kia, Nissan, and Tesla supported not including battery reserve in
the SOCE metric, while others (CARB, Lucid, Rivian) supported it; Volkswagen did not express
a preference but recommended that any requirement be harmonized between EPA and CARB.
Tesla recommended that EPA should not encourage manufacturers to overcome the durability
threshold by creating larger batteries with hidden capacity that can slowly be accessed as the
battery degrades, and supported EPA in not requiring over capacity declarations, but to
encourage full access to the battery (with reliable SOCE monitoring). Lucid supported the CARB
approach to SoH calculations and battery reserve capacity and encouraged EPA to consider that
approach. Rivian indicated that there are benefits to requiring disclosure of battery reserve
capacity and EPA might wish to consider establishing a requirement in this or a future
546 California's suite of assurance measures includes: a minimum electric range for BEVs and PHEVs; durability
standards based on a vehicle's certified electric range; warranty requirements for batteries and propulsion-related
parts; data standardization and transparency, including on-board display of the battery state of health so that
consumers can see the quality of their battery; requirements for manufacturers to provide highly-capable
convenience charging cords and equipping vehicles with standardized, direct current fast charging inlets;
requirements that repair information be released to independent repair shops; and, requirements around battery
labeling to ease dismantling and recycling.
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rulemaking. CARB felt that failing to include reserve battery capacity in the SOH calculation
could limit the credibility of the SOH parameter and undermine its ability for vehicle owners to
use it to validate warranty eligibility or to properly value used ZEVs based on the amount of
degradation of the battery, and urged EPA to explicitly require manufacturers to account for the
reserve UBE in SOCE calculation.
We also received comment relating to the virtual mileage provision of GTR No. 22, which
accounts for use of the battery for purposes other than propulsion of the vehicle (e.g., vehicle-to-
building (V2B) or vehicle-to-grid (V2G) applications). This provision had wide support among
manufacturers. Some commenters noted that GTR No. 22 included virtual mileage provisions
and expressed uncertainty over whether the EPA program proposed to include the virtual
mileage provision in either the durability mileage or the warranty mileage used for compliance
purposes.
EPA received a variety of comments regarding minimum performance requirements (MPR)
and their enforcement. Some commenters considered the requirements to be too stringent, while
others suggested that they could be more stringent. VW recommended that EPA should adopt a
single performance requirement of 70 percent at 8 years/lOOk miles. Tesla supported the
proposed MPR as reasonable and achievable, while also advocating for a flexible approach
allowing the manufacturer to use good engineering judgment in determining the statistically
adequate and representative use of vehicle data. Tesla also supported the decision not to
implement an MPR for medium-duty vehicles (MDVs).
In response to comments that regulation of battery durability or warranty is outside of the
Agency's regulatory authority, EPA disagrees.
At the outset we note that some commenters, including the Alliance for Automotive
Innovation ("the Alliance") questioned EPA's authority to adopt durability and warranty
requirements for batteries in BEVs. The Alliance, however, also agreed that battery degradation
monitors and performance requirements are important tools for battery operation and state of
health, and provided recommendations for modifying the program. Here we first address this
threshold issue.
EPA disagrees that regulation of battery durability is outside of the Agency's regulatory
authority. As is described in further detail in the sections below, EPA's authority to set and
enforce durability requirements for emission-related components like batteries is an integral part
of its title II authority. Durability requirements ensure that vehicle manufacturers and the
vehicles they produce will continue to comply with emissions standards set under 202(a) over the
course of those vehicles' useful lives. Such authority arises both out of section 202(a)(1) and
202(d) (relating to a vehicle's useful life) and section 206(a)(1) and 206(b)(1) (relating to
certification requirements for compliance). As is described in detail in the following section,
EPA has exercised its authority to set emission durability requirements across a variety of
emission-related components for decades.
EPA also disagrees that it lacks the authority to set warranty standards for BEVs. EPA has
already set emission warranty standards under section 207(a) in 2010 for all components that are
used to obtain GHG credits that allow the manufacturer to comply with GHG standards, which
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includes BEV, PHEV, and hybrid batteries.547 EPA was not challenged on those standards. To
the extent the Alliance's comment challenges EPA's ability to set warranty requirements
generally for any component that is used to obtain GHG credits that allow the manufacturer to
comply with GHG standards, it is out of time.
The Alliance is mistaken in suggesting that there is no way for EPA to require an emission-
less vehicle to warrant at time of sale that it is "designed, built, and equipped so as to conform, at
time of sale with applicable regulations under [section 202(a)(1).... and ... for its useful life, as
determined by [section 202(d)].") Section 207(a)(1). In fact, automakers warrant at the time of
sale that each new vehicle is designed to comply with all applicable emission standards and will
be free from defects that may cause noncompliance. They do so with respect to all emission-
related components in the manufacturer's application for certification, which include batteries.
These provisions comport entirely with section 207 of the Act.548
The Alliance suggests that EPA does not have authority to set durability or warranty
requirements because BEV batteries are not emission-related for two reasons. First, the Alliance
argues that because BEVs do not themselves emit, EPA does not have authority to set vehicle
specific standards for them, and EPA's warranty and durability authorities rely on EPA's ability
to set vehicle specific standards. EPA does have the authority to set vehicle-specific standards
for BEVs as part of the "class" of LDVs. See Section III.G.2 of the preamble. In addition, EPA
has already set vehicle-specific standards for BEVs—the in-use standards applicable to all
members of the LDV class.
The Alliance argues second that a component only counts as emission-related if its failure
would allow the vehicle to continue operating, but with higher emissions. In fact, EPA has set
durability requirements for diesel engines (see 40 CFR 86.1823-08(c)), failure of which could
cause the vehicle to stop operating. Similarly, Congress explicitly provided that electronic
control modules (ECMs) (described in the statute as "electronic emissions control units) are
"specified major emissions control component^]" for warranty purposes per section 207(i)(2);
failure of ECMs can also cause the vehicle to stop operating, and not necessarily increase the
emissions of the vehicle.
BEV batteries are emission-related components—thus providing EPA authority to set
durability and warranty requirements applicable to them—for two reasons. First, they are
emission-related by their nature. Durability and warranty requirements for batteries are not, to
use the Alliance's analogy, like requiring a warranty for a vehicle component like a vehicle's
"infotainment system" that has no relevance to a vehicle's emissions. Integrity of a battery in a
vehicle with these powertrains is vital to the vehicle's emission performance; integrity of its
"infotainment system" is not. It would be wrong to say that a component that allows a vehicle
that would otherwise emit to operate entirely without emissions is not inherently emission-
related.
547 See 75 FR 25486.
548 The Alliance's comment argues in passing that EPA does not have the authority to designate a BEV battery as a
"specified major emission control component" with an 8 year or 80,000 mile warranty because it is not a "pollution
control device or component." That term is not defined in the Act; for the reasons described in this section, EPA
believes that BEV batteries are "pollution control device or component[s]" for the same reasons they are "emission
related components."
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Second, for warranty and durability purposes, EPA has consistently considered a component
to be "emission related" if it relates to a manufacturer's ability to comply with emissions
standards, regardless of the form of those standards. For standards to be meaningfully applicable
across a vehicle's useful life, EPA's assessment of compliance with such standards necessarily
includes an evaluation of the performance of the emissions control systems, which for BEVs
(and PHEVs) includes the battery system both when the vehicle is new and across its useful life.
This is particularly true given the averaging form of standards that EPA uses for GHG emissions
(and which the Alliance continues to support), and which most manufacturers choose for
demonstrating compliance. For EPA to determine the level at which to set fleet average
standards, the Agency needs to have confidence that the emissions reductions—and thus credits
generated —by each BEV and PHEV introduced into the fleet are reflective of the real world.
Ensuring that BEVs and PHEVs contain durable batteries is important to assuring the integrity of
the averaging process: vehicles will perform in fact for the useful life mileage reflected in any
credits they may generate. Put another way, durable batteries are a significant factor in
vindicating the averaging form of the standard: that the standard is met per vehicle, and on
average, per fleet throughout the vehicles' useful life. The battery durability provisions finalized
in this rulemaking allow for confidence that the batteries installed by vehicle manufacturers are
durable and thus support the standard.
In addition to EPA's general authority to promulgate durability requirements under sections
202 and 206, EPA has additional separate and specific authority to require on-board monitoring
systems capable of "accurately identifying for the vehicle's useful life as established under
[section 202], emission-related systems deterioration or malfunction." Section 202(m)(l)(A).549
As we discuss at length in this section, EV batteries are "emission-related systems," and thus
EPA has the authority to set durability monitoring requirements for such systems over the course
of a vehicle's useful life.
In response to comments that EPA should work with CARB to modify aspects of the CARB
program, EPA considers modification of the CARB program to be outside the scope of this
rulemaking.
The Alliance and Ford Motor Company requested that EPA require only one battery monitor
accuracy check instead of requiring checks at low, medium, and high mileage to verify the
SOCE monitors are accurate. The Alliance noted that the CARB program requires only a single
check. Ford expressed concern that procuring vehicles will be difficult and the required testing
will add an additional 400 to 500 miles on a procured vehicle. As Ford does not expect the
accuracy of the state-of-certified-energy monitor to change during the first 5 years of BEV
operation, Ford proposed that EPA only perform monitor accuracy testing at the 3 year interval
and not also test at 1 and 5 year intervals.
In response, EPA acknowledges that the CARB program requires fewer in-use accuracy
checks than the EPA program. The EPA program, however, relies explicitly on the accuracy of
the monitor in determining compliance with the MPR. Therefore we do not agree that the
presence of fewer IUVP accuracy checks under the CARB program is necessarily relevant to the
549 Section 202(m)(l)(A) specifically applies to light duty vehicles and light duty trucks, but section 202(m)(l)
allows EPA to "promulgate regulations requiring manufacturers to install such onboard diagnostic systems on
heavy-duty vehicles and engines," which provides concurrent authority for the MD V battery monitoring
requirements discussed in this section.
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EPA program. Through its experience contributing to development of GTRNo. 22 and
continued study of battery durability and monitoring, EPA finds that the additional benefit of
checks at multiple intervals for assessing and assuring compliance outweighs the marginal costs
of conducting additional checks. Carryover provisions apply to monitor testing as described in 40
CFR 86.1839-01(c), making it unnecessary to continue testing for every model year within a
monitor family. Further, monitor accuracy at an early point in the vehicle's life when little
change in SOCE would be expected does not necessary imply similar accuracy when the battery
has aged and a larger change would be expected. This indicates that at least two checks are
necessary to establish longevity of accuracy. However, EPA notes commenters' concerns with
having more checks than necessary. EPA has considered the needs of the program and finds that
two checks, one at 2 years and 20,000 miles and another at 4 years and 40,000 miles are
sufficient to establish monitor accuracy. This also aligns with existing IUVP practice which
includes only two checks. EPA has therefore revised the program to include two accuracy
checks. See 40 CFR 86.1811-27, 86.1845-04(g) and 86.1839-01(c).
Regarding comments recommending that there be no accuracy check for MDVs, EPA
disagrees. EPA continues to consider the accuracy check to be an important component of the
program for both LDVs and MDVs. Although EPA has not yet determined that including MDVs
under the durability MPR is appropriate at this time, EPA considers battery durability to be
relevant to MDVs for the same reasons it is relevant to LDVs, and the presence of a monitor to
provide knowledge of the battery state of health is important in both cases. Further, the presence
of a monitor implies that the monitor should be accurate. EPA also notes that its work
contributing to further development of GTR No. 22 may include extending the GTR MPR to
MDVs. Experience with the accuracy of MDV monitors in its own durability program will be
important to EPA's decision of whether or not to extend EPA MPR requirements to MDVs in the
case that EPA finds it appropriate to do so in a future rulemaking.
Regarding CARET s recommendation that we adopt the full suite of ACC IIZEV assurance
measures, and also adopt "further on-vehicle charging standards and collect additional data to
inform future ZEV consumer labels," EPA agrees that the ZEV assurance measures are likely to
be supportive of ZEV adoption but has not determined whether or not these measures are
appropriate at the national level.
In response to recommendations that EPA should adopt certain specific provisions of the
CARB program (for example, inclusion of battery reserve in SoH calculation, phase-in of
monitor accuracy tolerance, exempting shorter-range BEVs or PHEVs from requirements, OBD
requirements and data parameters, basis on percentage points vs. percent, etc.), EPA believes that
the CARB program and the proposed program based on GTR No. 22, in their entirety, are
similarly effective, but that each program achieves that effectiveness by operating as a whole,
and may become less effective if specific requirements from one program were moved into or
out of the context of the other. For example, the CARB performance requirement is nominally
more stringent in miles and years than the EPA MPR, but this is offset to some degree by
requiring a smaller percentage of vehicles in a test group to pass. The CARB program also
differs from the GTR in its test groupings in ways that are consistent with this difference, while
the GTR adopts test groupings that specifically address the importance of monitor accuracy
under its specific structure. To preserve the integrity of each program as designed, EPA is
generally not taking an approach of adopting specific individual elements of the CARB program
at this time. For example, EPA does not consider phase-in of monitor accuracy tolerance as
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allowed under the CARB program to be as appropriate under the EPA program because the latter
has an explicit reliance on accuracy of the monitor for determination of compliance under Part B,
and the development of GTR No. 22 specifically concluded that a five percent tolerance was
appropriate. Similarly, mathematical features such as use of percentage points or percent derive
from the statistical methods applicable to each program and were determined to be appropriate in
the specific context of each program.
Regarding the number of decimal places for the monitor, EPA clarifies that for purposes of an
on-board SOCE value, the on-board value shall have a resolution of at least 1 part in 100 and the
value used in the compliance calculation shall be reported as the nearest whole number from 0 to
100 as specified in the GTR. The on-board value stored on the vehicle may have greater
resolution as long as the value used in the calculation is as specified above. For the value
displayed to the operator, GTR No. 22 anticipates that "the resolution for the customer values
shall be determined in agreement with the authorities." EPA will accept a display value that is
displayed with one decimal place if the on-board value satisfies the above criteria.
In response to comments that EPA should accept compliance with the CARB program in lieu
of the federal program, EPA agrees that this would promote harmonization between the two
programs. As described above, EPA considers the CARB durability program, when viewed in its
entirety as designed, to be no less effective at achieving the intent of the EPA durability program.
EPA has also assessed both programs carefully and has concluded that it is possible for
manufacturers to comply with both programs simultaneously. Manufacturers who will have to
comply with the CARB program will often also have to comply with GTR No. 22 in other
international jurisdictions, which is very similar to the EPA program. However, EPA agrees with
commenters' concerns that complying with both CARB and EPA durability programs may
require more effort than complying with only one. Accordingly, EPA will accept manufacturer
compliance with the entirety of the CARB ACC II durability program in lieu of the EPA
durability program. To utilize this optional pathway, manufacturers must declare their intention
to do so, in which case their compliance with the CARB durability program will be deemed as
compliance with the EPA durability program. Regardless of whether a manufacturer chooses to
follow the CARB or the EPA program, failure to comply with the chosen program will result in
the same credit loss penalty as under the EPA program.
EPA considers the addition of the option to comply with the CARB durability program in lieu
of the EPA durability program to be responsive to the various requests to adopt certain specific
elements of the CARB program, considering the need to avoid compromising the integrity of
either program.
In response to comments on inclusion of an SOCR monitor and/or enforcement of an SOCR-
based performance requirement, EPA continues to assess that SOCE is sufficient at this time as a
basis for the MPR. To this point, EPA notes that at this time GTR No. 22 requires only that an
SOCR monitor be implemented and does not use it for enforcement of the MPR. EPA has not yet
determined that requiring an SOCR monitor in addition to an SOCE monitor is necessary to
achieve the intent of the durability program in the context of this rulemaking. EPA will continue
to consider whether the addition of an SOCR monitor is necessary as part of a potential future
rulemaking, and will continue to follow development of GTR No. 22 with respect to this issue,
but at this time is electing not to include this requirement in the final standard, as proposed.
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EPA also notes that its decision not to include an SOCR monitor does not imply that the
agency necessarily believes that an SOCR monitor is not desirable or practical to implement. To
this end, EPA notes that some commenters appeared to be confused on the nature of an SOCR
monitor as described by GTR No. 22, for example, the comment from Kia that stated in support
of not including SOCR that "ICE vehicles are not required to display a SOCR because the range
is extremely reliant on consumer behavior." EPA disagrees with the suggestion that the SOCR
metric is somehow subject to the well-known difficulty of predicting the actual range of a
vehicle under variable real-world conditions and variable driver habits and behavior. Instead,
SOCR is an estimate of what the certification label range would be at the current point in the
vehicle's life if the vehicle were tested according to the certification range test procedure that
was used when the vehicle was new. That is, just as with SOCE, SOCR is an estimate of a result
of a controlled-condition test, and is in no way related to variables such as consumer behavior or
on-road conditions.
Several commenters (the Alliance, Fermata Energy, Kia, Lucid, Rivian, and ZETA) expressed
uncertainty as to whether virtual mileage was included in the proposed program and whether it
applied to durability mileage, warranty mileage, or both. Ford and Mercedes-Benz requested that
the virtual mileage provision be applied to both the battery durability requirements and warranty
provisions. In response to these comments, EPA clarifies that virtual mileage as defined in GTR
22 applies to the EPA program but only for durability, that is, virtual mileage is applicable only
to the mileage used for determining compliance with the durability provisions, as defined in
GTR No. 22. EPA notes that the virtual mileage provision originates in EPA's adoption of GTR
No. 22, and as such is applicable only to the durability provisions. GTR No. 22 does not include
warranty provisions, and so the mileage used for warranty under the EPA program does not
include virtual mileage. EPA retained the virtual mileage provision in the context of durability
for the purpose of maintaining consistency with the GTR design and structure, and not for the
purpose of potentially extending the provision to other mileage-related aspects of our
regulations.
Regarding the Alliance's suggestion that virtual mileage be indicated on an odometer-like
display, EPA prefers to remain aligned with the GTR requirements in which the virtual mileage
is retrieved from onboard data.
EPA disagrees with comments that express the belief that, as one commenter said, the
proposal did not include "consideration of frequent use of V2G." The virtual mileage provision
of GTR No. 22 is clearly oriented to this purpose. EPA agrees with comments expressing the
view that vehicle-to-grid and vehicle-to-building offer a potential opportunity to help serve the
grid and provide additional functionality to consumers.
As an alternative to the inclusion of virtual mileage, some commenters suggested that EPA
should exclude vehicles that were used for V2G or V2B from warranty coverage, or "lower the
warranty requirement to account for frequent bidirectional charging." EPA continues to assess
that such provisions are not necessary. We note that the warranty mileage, which does not
include virtual mileage, is only 80,000 miles compared to the durability mileage of 100,000
miles. This reduced stringency largely addresses commenters' concerns regarding warranty
mileage and likely levels of V2G or V2B usage.
Some commenters who may have been uncertain as to whether or not virtual mileage applied
to the durability mileage went on to suggest that EPA should exclude vehicles that were used for
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V2G and V2B from the durability test sample. EPA considers our clarification with respect to
inclusion of virtual mileage to address this comment.
In response to comments suggesting that the minimum performance requirement (MPR) is too
stringent, EPA disagrees. The MPR is derived from GTR No. 22 which was developed with
extensive input, leadership, and participation from EPA and thus it reflects what EPA considers
to be an appropriate framework and set of requirements for ensuring battery durability, including
the choice of MPR. The MPR is very similar to warranty coverage already provided by vehicle
manufacturers, indicating that the MPR described in the proposal is satisfactory and achievable.
As also noted in section III.G.2 of the preamble, manufacturers are already providing warranty
coverage similar to what is required by the final durability and warranty
requirements.550'551'552'553'554 EPA considers the example of current warranty coverage to be a
reasonable starting position to provide consistency across the market. Regarding comments that
warranty terms are not necessarily applicable to a compliance context, see the discussion of
related comments in section III.G.2 of the preamble. EPA is therefore finalizing the proposed
MPR.
In response to comments that the battery durability and/or warranty requirements would
increase battery manufacturing cost and that EPA should account for this cost, EPA disagrees.
Because the durability minimum performance requirement and the minimum battery warranty
are similar to currently observed industry practices regarding durability performance and
warranty terms as mentioned above, EPA continues to assess that these requirements will not
result in a significant increase in battery manufacturing costs, and commenters did not provide
compelling evidence or strong supporting data regarding cost increases that they believe would
result from these requirements.
Regarding comments that EPA did not account for the cost of complying with battery
durability and warranty requirements (e.g. from Hyundai, POET LLC, and Valero), or that it will
add significant cost to the vehicle, EPA disagrees. As stated above, the MPR is very similar to
existing warranty requirements and as such EPA does not assess that it will add significantly to
the cost of the vehicle. EPA also assesses that the instrumentation and algorithmic requirements
of the SOCE monitor are very similar to existing battery state of health monitoring features that
manufacturers already implement to support needs such as, for example, informing the battery
management system of battery state of health and evaluating warranty claims. As such EPA has
not identified any significant additional manufacturing cost, and commenters did not provide
550 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Informal Working Group on Electric Vehicles and the
Environment (UN ECE EVE), "Battery Durability: Review of EVE 34 discussion," May 19, 2020, p. 12. Available
at https://wiki.unece.org/download/attachments/101555222/EVE-35-03e.pdf?api=v2
551 UK Department of Transport, "Commercial electric vehicle battery warranty analysis," April 25, 2023. Available
at https://wiki.unece.org/download/attachments/192840855/EVE-61-08e%20-
%20UK%20warranty%20analysis.pdf?api=v2
552 CarEdge.com, "The Best Electric Vehicle Battery Warranties in 2024," January 9, 2024. Accessed on February
16, 2024 at https://caredge.com/guides/ev-battery-warranties
553 California Air Resources Board, "Cars and Light-Trucks are Going Zero - Frequently Asked Questions."
Accessed on February 16, 2024 at https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/cars-and-light-trucks-are-going-
zero-frequently-asked-questions
554 Forbes, "By The Numbers: Comparing Electric Car Warranties," October 31, 2022. Accessed on February 16,
2024 at https://www.forbes.eom/sites/jimgorzelany/2022/10/31/by-the-numbers-comparing-electric-car-
warranties/?sh=2ed7a5243fd7
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such data. As with other technologies manufacturers add to comply with standards, EPA
accounts for direct manufacturing cost and does not individually account for research and
development costs which are accounted for through our use of an retail price equivalent (RPE)
factor of 1.5 applied to direct manufacturing costs, such as the cost of the battery. RPE is
discussed in Chapter 2.5.4 of the RIA.
Several commenters (Lucid, Volkswagen, ZETA) recommended that EPA adopt only the 8
year, 100,000 mile requirement of the MPR, and not the 5 year, 62,000 mile midpoint
requirement. EPA acknowledges that GTRNo. 22 allows the possibility of local jurisdictions
adopting either or both of the requirements. EPA agrees that requiring only the later requirement
may reduce test burden, (as opposed to a battery design that degrades more rapidly in earlier
years, which would tend to increase the potential impact of lost range capacity on the total
mileage the vehicle can attain over its life). Also, the 5-year requirement allows for an earlier
compliance decision if a vehicle is on track to fail the 8-year standard. In EPA's view, these
substantial compliance benefits outweigh the added burdens of additional testing. For these
reasons we are retaining the 5 year requirement in the program.
The Alliance recommended that, in 40 CFR § 86.1815 of the regulatory text, that we replace
the term "electric vehicles" with "BEVs and PHEVs" to exclude FCEVs from monitoring and
durability requirements. Fuel cell vehicles were not included within the technical analysis or
scope of GTR No. 22 and EPA has not yet determined that the monitoring and durability
requirements developed under GTRNo. 22 are appropriate for FCEVs. Accordingly, EPA has
made the requested change to § 86.1815.
The Alliance also requested clarification on whether or not the durability and monitoring
requirements are tied to the Tier 4 phase-in per § 86.1815. EPA clarifies that there are no phase-
in provisions with regard to the battery durability standards, which begin in model year 2027.
Regarding recommendations that we adopt the most recent versions of SAE J1634 (2021) and
J1711 (2023), please see Section III.G of this preamble, Electric Vehicle Test Procedures.
The SAVE Coalition recommended that we revise § 86.1815(a) to specify that the monitor
estimate of SOCE should be made available on an "owner-accessible" display rather than a
"customer-accessible" display, to accommodate situations such as autonomous transportation
services, where the customer of the autonomous service is not the owner of the vehicle. EPA
agrees that "customer" may be ambiguous in this application; however, we also believe that
using the term "owner" might be interpreted as excluding lessees or other parties with a
legitimate interest in the state of health of the battery. EPA is clarifying the regulatory text by
changing "customer-accessible" to "operator-accessible." As the customer of a fully autonomous
transport service is not an operator, EPA believes that this modification addresses the
commenter's concern.
The SAVE Coalition also recommended flexibility regarding geographic requirements for
sampling in the case of autonomous vehicles that may be restricted to a certain geographic
location. EPA understands the theoretical situation described by the commenter, however, EPA
also notes that few vehicles operate in such fleets today, and even fewer if any are vehicles that
only exist as a vehicle model solely for the purpose of participating in that captive fleet (i.e. are
completely unique from any vehicle models sold to the general public, which would exist in far
greater numbers outside of the fleet described by the commenter). Accordingly, EPA does not
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consider the theoretical situation described by the commenter to require specific action at this
time.
Some commenters requested clarification as to whether the removal of compliance credits
earned by vehicles that fail the durability requirement applies only to GHG credits earned, or
also to NMOG+NOX credits earned. In the proposal, EPA stated that in the case of failure to
meet the durability requirements, "manufacturers would have to adjust their credit balance to
remove compliance credits previously earned by those vehicles," and the regulatory text stated
"the manufacturer must adjust all credit balances to account for the nonconformity." EPA
clarifies that for BEVs, this provision applies to both GHG credits and NMOG+NOX credits,
and for PHEVs, only to GHG credits. As explained in section III.G.2.I of the preamble, given the
fleet average nature of both the GHG and NMOG+NOX standards, EPA needs to have
confidence that the emissions reductions (and thus credits generated by each BEV and PHEV
introduced into the fleet) are reflective of actual performance for the useful life mileage reflected
in any credits they may generate. Credit removal for failing the durability requirement,
specifically the Minimum Performance Requirement, only applies to LD BEVs and PHEVs. In
the case of BEVs, the credits affected include GHG and NMOG+NOx credits. For PHEVs,
although PHEVs earn both GHG and NMOG+NOX credits, the credits affected include only
GHG credits. PHEV credits for NMOG+NOx would not need to be forfeited because testing to
determine compliance with NMOG+NOx standards is based on charge-sustaining mode when
the engine is operating, and NMOG+NOX emissions in this mode are not generally impacted by
the amount of grid energy that can be stored in the battery.
EPA notes that some commenters appeared to interpret the 5 percent tolerance for monitor
accuracy under Part A as a two-sided delta, that is, that the monitor would be judged to fail if it
shows a value either 5 percent over or 5 percent under the test value. For example, the Alliance
indicated that a 2-sided threshold is not necessary, because protection from overestimation is all
that is needed. EPA clarifies that the statistical method defined in GTR No. 22, and the way it is
used to determine compliance with the MPR, only considers the monitor to fail the accuracy test
if it is more than 5 percent over the test value (i.e., is overly optimistic).
EPA also clarifies that Annex 3 of GTR No. 22 applies only in jurisdictions where WLTP is
used. The quantities that represent UBEmeasured and UBEcertified for the purpose of part 6.3.2 of
GTR No. 22 in the context of this rule are specified in the regulatory text.
EPA disagrees with the comment from MEMA that expresses the view that SMECC
warranties are not required due to the existence of warranties under the Magnusson-Moss
Warranty Act. Section 207 of the CAA expressly authorizes the Administrator to require the
warranty requirements in this final rule. These requirements support the emissions reduction
goals of CAA as discussed elsewhere in these responses.
Several commenters (Lucid, MEMA, Rivian, ZETA) indicated that EPA should clarify the
meaning of "associated powertrain components." ZETA specifically recommended adopting a
closely related CARB definition. In response, EPA has revised 40 CFR § 85.2103(d)(l)(v) of the
regulatory text which now clarifies that the provision applies to "all components needed to
charge the system, store energy, and transmit power to move the vehicle."
ZETA and Rivian requested that EPA clarify how anti-tampering rules would apply to
components newly defined as SMECCs in scenarios where maintenance work is performed. EPA
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clarifies that the statutory provisions continue to apply. Annex 1 of GTRNo. 22 specifies that
vehicles that have had the battery replaced or repaired, or have been used for racing, are
exempted from Part A testing.
In the proposed regulatory text, EPA explicitly tied the warranty failure criteria to the
durability requirement, i.e. an individual vehicle would be deemed as eligible for warranty
battery repair if it retains less than 80 percent SOCE at 5 years or 62,000 miles, or less than 70
percent SOCE at 8 years or 80,000 miles (although the MPR for durability states 100,000 miles,
warranty is set at 80,000 miles by statute). The Alliance stated that EPA should not specify
warranty failure criteria at all, and should not tie it to the MPR failure criteria, on the grounds
that they felt that warranty should be determined by the manufacturer and might legitimately
vary between different types of products. In contrast, CARB and other commenters supported the
warranty requirement, and CARB supported EPA's explicitly tying battery warranty failure
criteria to the durability performance requirement.
In response to the comments that EPA should not specify warranty failure criteria (for
example, specifying the SOCE level that would trigger a warranty repair), EPA continues to find
that the proposed warranty requirements are equivalent to those that EPA has the authority to
require and has historically applied to other specified major emission control-related components
for ICE vehicles under EPA's light-duty vehicle regulations, and are similarly implemented and
under the authority of CAA section 207. See also our extended discussion of warranty above.
However, we acknowledge that for analogous warranty requirements as they have pertained to
emissions related ICE powertrain components under the same statute, EPA has in the past
specified only the years and mileage and not the exact failure criteria that would trigger a
warranty repair. This has largely been possible because of the way OBD requirements are
integrated with the emissions rules, in that a material failure of a combustion-engine emission
component to perform as designed (due to any number of potential failure modes) would
ultimately result in increased tailpipe emissions that would in turn activate a malfunction
indicator lamp (MIL) that serves as evidence that a warranty repair is needed. In the case of a
PEV high-voltage battery, current regulations and OBD specifications do not provide for a MIL
to illuminate in response to a battery that has an SOCE monitor reading below the MPR
minimum, and EPA has not yet determined whether it is appropriate to do so. Accordingly EPA
had proposed to tie the battery warranty failure criteria to the MPR criteria to provide a clearer
definition of what constitutes the need for a warranty repair. However, in light of the comments
received and additional research, EPA has reconsidered the appropriateness of doing so. While
EPA considers a Part A-validated SOCE monitor that is installed on all the vehicles in a
durability group to be sufficiently accurate to use for determining collective compliance of a
durability group based on a large sample, based on the current record, EPA finds that it is
possible that on an individual vehicle basis, an individual SOCE monitor may be less definitive
in establishing the true SOCE for that individual vehicle (due to variations in recent use
conditions, a specific defect, etc.) At this time, EPA expects that a manufacturer would therefore
legitimately prefer to evaluate the need for an individual warranty repair by performing an
individual evaluation of the vehicle battery rather than relying solely on the estimate provided by
the monitor. Further, although EPA has determined that the SOCE values of 70 percent and 80
percent for the respective mileages of 62,000 and 100,000 miles (respectively) under the MPR
are appropriate, the warranty statute specifies a mileage of 80,000 miles which lies between the
two. Based on our further review of the record, EPA is not making a final determination at this
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time as to whether it is appropriate to simply interpolate between the two, or if the shape of a
typical degradation curve would suggest a different value as more appropriate. Finally, EPA also
notes that it did not propose specific failure criteria that would be applicable to related (non-
battery) powertrain components (inverters, motors, etc.) which, like the high-voltage battery, are
also not tied to MIL functionality. Accordingly at this time we are not tying the battery warranty
performance criterion to the durability performance requirement. Instead, we are retaining the 8-
year and 80,000 mile warranty duration as specified by the statute, but are allowing the
manufacturer to specify the percentage SOCE that will trigger a warranty repair at that point in
the vehicle's life, and also requiring the manufacturer to (a) clearly disclose the warranted
percentage SOCE to the customer in writing prior to sale, and (b) establish, describe, and
disclose an evaluation method that will be used by the manufacturer to determine that percentage
SOCE has fallen below the warranted percentage, and show to EPA's satisfaction that it is
accurate and reliable. EPA believes that these provisions combined with manufacturers'
competitive need to offer a strong warranty will provide the intended degree of protection and
transparency to the customer until additional data is available allowing EPA to determine an
appropriate SOCE level for the 80,000 mile point. EPA also notes that this is a minimum
warranty, and many manufacturers already offer a longer battery warranty for competitive
reasons and are likely to continue doing so.
This also addresses the comment from CARB which pointed out that the "proposal appears to
mistakenly tie all non-battery powertrain components to this same battery durability performance
requirement when defining failures that merit warranty replacement. Such a connection renders
the warranty requirements meaningless for those components." CARB went on to recommend
that EPA adopt "an appropriate failure metric(s) for warranty coverage for non-battery
components." EPA agrees with CARB's observation that the SOCE stipulation is not applicable
to associated powertrain components, and the removal of the explicit connection as described
above addresses this comment. For these components EPA is specifying only the years and
mileage terms and not specific failure criteria. As stated above, EPA did not propose and has not
yet determined an appropriate failure criteria for these components, because just as with
combustion-engine components, a variety of conceivable failure modes exist and EPA has not
yet determined the most appropriate metrics for each component that could be monitored to
detect a defect.
Regarding the comment from AFPM that EPA is "relying on other programs, like
California's, to implement battery durability... to ensure customer demand," EPA disagrees.
EPA does not rely on the CARB program to ensure customer demand, nor to implement battery
durability, as evidenced by the EPA durability program which is distinct from the CARB
durability program. In the context commenter may be referring to, EPA mentions the CARB
program only as supporting evidence that battery durability has been identified as an important
issue by other regulatory bodies. Although the final standards include an option for
manufacturers to comply with the CARB durability program in lieu of the EPA durability
program, this is offered as a flexibility for manufacturers and does not constitute a reliance on
the CARB program since EPA also offers its own separate durability program.
Regarding the comment from AFPM that "EPA's proposal may impose additional costs of
economic risk to individuals and small business owners who will be asked to depend on
increasingly expensive infrastructure necessary to provide on-the-go fuel," the reference cited by
commenter indicates that this comment is addressed to the heavy-duty rulemaking and is out of
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scope for this rulemaking. Regarding the statement by same commenter that "EPA should
consider inclusion of durability requirements in this proposal as 150 miles of range for singular
battery life and 24,000-mile range of use (or two years) are well below the period of use for a
comparable ICEV with a full tank of fuel and will impact consumers as there is not enough data
with these technologies," EPA is unable to determine what precisely this comment means or
whether the comment indicates support or opposition to durability standards. EPA is not
proposing standards related to "150 miles of range for singular battery life" nor "24,000-mile
range of use."
Regarding the request by Fermata Energy to include a "small multiplier credit for vehicles
that have on-board AC bidirectional chargers or are integrated with multiple DC off-board
chargers," the commenter failed to explain with reasonable specificity why such a multiplier was
appropriate. EPA has not determined whether or not a credit for such purpose is appropriate or
necessary at this time.
Regarding MEMA's request to "clarify that warranty repairs can be completed at dealer or
authorized repair locations, and at quality independent aftermarket repair locations," and
commenter's views on the "impact longer warranties could have on choices in consumer repair,"
and related comments related to consumer choice, this is outside the scope of the proposal. EPA
notes, however, that under section 207(c)(3), each manufacturer "shall furnish with each new
motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine written instructions for the proper maintenance and use of
the vehicle or engine by the ultimate purchaser and such instructions shall correspond to
regulations which the Administrator shall promulgate." These instructions "shall not include any
condition on the ultimate purchaser's using, in connection with such vehicle or engine, any
component or service (other than a component or service provided without charge under the
terms of the purchase agreement) which is identified by brand, trade, or corporate name; or
directly or indirectly distinguishing between service performed by the franchised dealers of such
manufacturer or any other service establishments with which such manufacturer has a
commercial relationship, and service performed by independent automotive repair facilities with
which such manufacturer has no commercial relationship... ,"555
Further, EPA does not agree that longer warranties would necessarily limit choice and
MEMA did not clarify exactly how or why they expect this to happen. Regarding MEMA's
comment that "it is important that components found in both an ICE and a zero emissions vehicle
not carry longer warranties for ZEVS than for ICE," and that EPA "not expand warranty
coverage to parts that have a shorter life and are a routinely replaced due to wear, or are adjacent
to the warrantied parts through physical, electrical, or software connections but not the targeted
component," EPA agrees that in general, ICE vehicles and BEVs should be subject to similar
expectations for parts shared by both that serve a similar function in both. EPA has revised 40
CFR 85.2103(d)(l)(v) of the regulatory text to clarify that the provision applies to "all
components needed to charge the system, store energy, and transmit power to move the vehicle."
It is not EPA's intention to extend warranty coverage beyond these components nor that the
definition include items such as wear parts or other minor parts whose analog in an ICE vehicle
serves the same function and is not covered by an analogous emissions warranty.
555 The provision also allows the Administrator to waive the statutory requirement in certain cases.
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Regarding Tesla's comments that "battery durability provides no emissions reduction benefit"
and relatedly that minimum performance requirements "must be balanced against increased up-
front costs," EPA disagrees with the first and agrees with the latter. EPA has described the
importance of battery durability to achieving emissions reductions previously in these responses
and in the preamble. EPA has balanced this need with cost by selecting performance
requirements that are similar to those of GTR No. 22 and current practices in the industry. We
also note Tesla's support of the MPR as being "set at reasonable and achievable levels."
Regarding Tesla's view that "the proposed 80% UBE level exceeds the industry norm" for
warranty, EPA disagrees, and notes that Tesla appears to have associated the 80 percent SOCE
level with the 8 year/80,000 mile warranty term, when in fact the 80 percent SOCE level is
associated only with the 5 years or 62,000 miles MPR; in fact, the proposed standards would
have specified a 70 percent SOCE level (which EPA assesses as being common industry
practice) at 8 years/80,000 miles (less stringent than common industry practice). The final
standards, as noted previously, allow the manufacturer to specify the SOCE level that will apply
to the 8 year/80,000 mile warranty term.
For response to comments on durability and monitor grouping requirements, and other topics
related to test procedures and test groups related to the durability and warranty program, please
refer to Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of the response to comments document and Section III.G.3 .iii of the
preamble.
For response to comments relating to battery replacement, see Section 12.2.5 of the responses
to comments document.
17 - Charging infrastructure
Comments by Organizations
Organization: 25x '25 Alliance, et al.
The undersigned parties offer the following comments on EPA's proposed rule, "Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles." We write these comments because we believe that the proposed rules would establish
an overly aggressive, high-risk program that would be counterproductive in achieving the
agency's environmental and health objectives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
In establishing or revising Clean Air Act Section 202(a) standards, EPA must consider issues
of technological feasibility, cost of compliance, and lead time. Among other things, that means
the agency must look closely at the impact of its proposed standards on net emissions of air
pollutants and their associated public health effects, impacts on the automotive industry, impacts
on the vehicle purchasers/consumers, energy security, and safety, and how the proposed
approach would compare to other possible rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-
4]
EPA's review of relevant factors in the current proposal is seriously deficient. The chief
failure comes because the agency elides two distinct types of feasibility: the technological
feasibility of electric vehicles as a part of the fleet and the technological feasibility of electric
vehicles as the whole of the fleet. We do not dispute the former, but overwhelming evidence
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disproves the latter. First, there are no established supply chains capable of supplying the raw
materials to manufacture the millions of vehicles needed—just over the next decade—to supply
the projected market. Second, the infrastructure necessary to support these vehicles, particularly
recharging infrastructure, is not and will not be available in the necessary timescales. The high
density of chargers needed in major metropolitan areas and vast web of chargers needed to span
the rural areas of the Country will require tremendous planning and investment. The long lead
times associated with new renewable generation means that this added marginal electric load will
be powered by natural gas and coal for the foreseeable future. And current prices, lack of
infrastructure, and public opinion militate strongly against the conclusion that a ten-fold increase
in the annual sales of electric vehicles will occur in the next eight years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0573, pp.1-4]
The failings of the proposed rule follow almost entirely from EPA's decision to "bet the farm"
on electric vehicles. The agency would be far better served by taking a more holistic approach.
There are 281 million internal combustion engine vehicles on the road today and 100 million
more will be built in the next two decades. All of these vehicles could be improved—and for far
less than what EPA's proposal would cost—with an improvement in fuel quality. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR PIE CHART of Role for Liquid Fuels [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0573, pp.1-4]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR BAR GRAPH of EPA-Projected Cumulative U.S. Sales
2023-2032 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
EPA is statutorily obligated to explore this approach. Section 202(a)(3)(A)(ii) requires that,
"in establishing classes or categories of vehicles or engines for purposes of regulations under this
paragraph, the Administrator may base such classes or categories on gross vehicle weight,
horsepower, type of fuel used, or other appropriate factors." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(ii)
(emphasis added). There are many ways EPA could consider the type of fuel as a means of
settings its regulations: through the consideration of life-cycle emissions under the agency's
Section 202 powers, through increased volumes of low-carbon renewable fuels under the
Renewable Fuel Standard, through alternative, low-carbon certification fuels, or through Section
211(c) rulemaking—as the proposal itself suggests. These options are not beyond the scope of
this rulemaking but are obvious alternatives to EPA's current all-electric approach. And "the
failure of an agency to consider obvious alternatives has led uniformly to reversal." Spirit
Airlines, Inc. v. DOT, 997F.3d 1247, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573,
pp.1-4]
EPA must consider these alternatives, and would be well served to issue a new proposed
multipollutant rule that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
1) incorporates requirements to improve fuel quality by [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573,
pp.1-4]
-establishing a higher federal octane standard while allowing higher blends of ethanol; and
-"incenting the reduction of carbon and aromatic compounds via reformulation or
alternatively increasing ethanol blending. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
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2) provides incentives for automakers to produce flex-fuel vehicles by [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0573, pp.1-4]
-creating alternative certification pathways for higher ethanol blends; and
-correcting the problems with R-Value and C02 penalty that other commentors have
identified and re-establishing the Volumetric Conversion Factor in the fuel economy calculation
algorithm. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
3) adopts a life-cycle analysis approach to calculating and comparing emissions from
different technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
Embracing and enabling a pathway to improve fuel quality will increase and accelerate
emission reductions, improve public health, help achieve environmental justice goals, provide
greater versatility, and improve reliability all at less cost. This pathway is available to EPA and
the consideration of it is demanded by the Clean Air Act. The best and most recent data suggests
that the adoption of even mid-level ethanol blends would reduce pollution emissions at least as
much as EPA's electrification approach, and at far less cost.i Even if EPA's electrification
program could be successful—and as explained above, it cannot—a complimentary fuel
improvement would double EPA's projected emissions reduction. The current rule takes this
option off the table and leaves those pollutants in the air. EPA could do far better. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
1 See "Higher Ethanol Blends Support the Transition to a Low-Carbon Future," Brian West, SAE Update,
February 2023, pp2-6) National adoption of mid-level ethanol blends is available, feasible, and lower cost
than current gasoline. https://www.nxtbook.eom/smg/sae/23UPD02/index.php#/p/2
Organization: Advanced Energy United
Digital permitting processes could also alleviate bottlenecks in EVSE infrastructure. The
Department of Energy's SolarApp+ is a model program that has saved customers and contractor
valuable time and money on solar installations by standardizing and streamlining permitting
processes in localities across the U.S. Policymakers across the country should consider a similar
approach to slash soft costs for the permitting of EV charging infrastructure. Investment alone
cannot satisfy new demand. We must enable streamlined permitting processes if we are to meet
the Biden Administration's goal of building 500,000 new charging stations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0695, p. 5]
However, it is crucial to build the EVSE infrastructure to meet this changing automotive
landscape. Simply put, consumers and businesses can only take advantage of the 30D and 45 W
tax credits if the infrastructure is there to satisfy demand. Ensuring this infrastructure buildout
will enable effective implementation of the EPA's rule and accelerate the transition to 100%
electrified transportation. Fortunately, the IRA's companion legislation - the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) -can help in this effort. IIJA included $7.5 billion in funding as a
part of the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) formula program, which provides
states with resources to deploy charging stations. The pieces are in place to make the transition
from the internal combustion engine to EVs, we just need to put them together. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0695, p. 6]
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Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
EPA underestimates battery costs; unrealistic BEV sales assumptions
The NPRM substantially underestimates the cost of batteries while overestimating the
availability of consumer and manufacturing tax credits. For example, the Proposed Rule assumes
that in 2029, the combination of cost reductions from installing larger batteries in BEVs and
incentives from Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)5 Sections 30D, 45W, and 45X results in
consumer incentives and battery production tax credits that substantially exceed the battery cost.
If cost reductions and incentives eliminate the entire cost of EV batteries, it is little wonder the
EPA model suggests a massive increase in sales of long-range BEVs. However, we do not
believe these assumptions are realistic. Moreover, while vehicle cost and affordability are critical
to success, they are just one set of factors in the transformation to electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 4-5]
5 H.R.5376 -117th Congress (2021-2022): Inflation Reduction Act. (2022, August 16). Available at
htps://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376/text.
Beyond BEV affordability, success of this regulation will be determined by factors outside of
the vehicle; the U.S. is sorely behind in this effort (despite over the $150 billion of private sector
investment thus far) and the NPRM does little to address these factors. Current charging and
fueling infrastructure is inadequate (particularly residential charging), the grid resources are at
least 5 to 10 years away (without even factoring in the additional demand for grid resources from
the heavy-duty vehicle sector facing similar concerns in a concurrent EPA rulemaking6), and
battery critical minerals (except lithium), which primarily determine the affordability and
availability of EVs, are minimally addressed in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 4-5]
6 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Proposed Rule: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy -
Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 (for Model Years 2027-2032), 88 Fed. Reg. 25,926 (Ap. 27, 2023). Hereinafter
"EPA HD GHG NPRM)."
No requirements to support required EVs or the drivers that must buy them
The NPRM and all the requirements set forth to date focus solely on the sale of BEVs. They
propose no requirements to ensure that infrastructure will be available at homes, businesses,
public event venues, highway corridors, transportation hubs, or other public locations. They
contain no requirements to provide hydrogen or hydrogen fueling stations, or for utilities to
quickly bring reasonably priced high-power charging (5-20 megawats (MW)) to highway service
plazas, fleet locations, city centers, or transportation hubs. They do not address the need for
battery critical minerals to power everything from light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles,
energy storage systems (ESS), lawn and garden equipment, laptops, cell phones, forklitis, and
airport services—not just in the United States, but around the world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, p. 5]
To support the vehicle requirements proposed, all these changes are necessary in under 10
years. For perspective, 10 years is the time required to obtain the necessary permits for a mine in
the United States. Once permitted, another ten years could elapse before the mine produces at
capacity. Ten years is also close to the time required to bring 20 MWs of power to a single
location in the United States. Consequently, to the extent we need critical minerals and high-
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power charging, we must start today. Yet, there is no plan to do so. There is no roadmap to
developing these essential pieces necessary for the transformation. Nor is there a commitment
from EPA for ongoing monitoring of these factors as the EV market develops over the duration
of EPA's proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 5]
Automakers are committed to electrification. The industry publicly agreed in August 2021
that BEVs, PHEVs, and FCEVs could constitute 40 to 50% of new vehicle sales by 2030 with
the right combination of supportive measures. Some, but not all, of those supportive measures
have started, but they are nowhere near complete and certainly not suffcient to support the even
higher requirements in the proposed regulations that substantially leapfrog that target. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 5]
In August of 2021, Auto Innovators and our members announced support for a goal of
achieving 40-50% U.S. new light-duty vehicle market share of EVs (including BEVs, PHEVs,
and FCEVs) nationally by 2030, with the right complementary policies, 19 including but not
limited to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 26-27]
-Expand and scale the charging network to EV volumes required by the proposed rule.
-Update widely applicable and comprehensive Federal EV incentives and apply at point of
purchase.
-Develop domestic battery supply chain (raw material mining, processing, manufacturing, and
recycling).
-Implement fleet purchase requirements.
-Commitment to purchase EVs for federal fleets.
-Increase research & development to accelerate cost reduction of batteries and EV
components.
-Educate consumers and increase EV awareness. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 26-
27]
Though the federal government has made progress toward achieving these policy enablers,
significant and crucial gaps remain. For example: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 26-27]
-The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL)20 committed $7.5B to expand public charging
nationwide. This is a good down payment on the needed charging infrastructure, but only
represents a fraction of what is needed to support the market projected by EPA. Moreover, thus
far, almost two years after the BIL was signed, not a single electric vehicle charger has been
installed with the federal funding allocated to states. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 26-
27]
19 Alliance for Automotive Innovation Press Release, Auto Innovators: Aligning Policies for a Cleaner
Future (Aug. 5, 2021), available at htps://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/press-release/aligning-policies-for-
a-cleaner-future.
20 Infrastructure Investments and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58 (2021),
htps ://www. govinfo. gov/app/details/PL AW -117publ58.
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-Unfortunately, the administration removed a pathway in the Renewable Fuel Standard Set
Rule for Renewable Volume Obligations for 2023-2025 for EVs to generate credits by using
electricity produced from biogas to charge (also known as e-RINs). This proposal would have
provided a complementary approach to EPA's multipollutant rule, including supporting and
encouraging both EVs and renewable sources of energy, as well as to the overall goal of
decarbonizing the transportation sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 26-27]
2. Infrastructure
Reliable, convenient, affordable, and ubiquitous access to charging and hydrogen fueling
stations is critical to EV drivers and the feasibility of the rules proposed in the NPRM. [EPA-
HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 76-79]
For BEV and PHEV charging, residential charging is the single most important location.
Virtually every studyl33 shows that 80-90% of charging occurs at home. Home charging is
clearly preferred since it is 2-3x cheaper, vastly more convenient, and far more reliable than
public charging. However, public charging stations are critical too -not only easing perceived
"range anxiety" concerns but also substantially increasing consumer awareness of the
technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 76-79]
133 For example, see Alexander, Mat, Noel Crisostomo, Wendell Krell, Jeffrey Lu, and Raja Ramesh. July
2021. Assembly Bill 2127 Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Assessment: Analyzing Charging
Needs to Support Zero-Emission Vehicles in 2030 - Commission Report. California Energy Commission.
Publication Number: CEC-600-2021-001-CMR. Or Eric Wood, Clement Rames, Mateo Muratori, Sesha
Raghavan, and Marc Melaina. National Renewable Energy Laboratory, April 2017, National Plug-In
Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Analysis
FCEVs cannot be sold until hydrogen fueling stations are in place; there is no reliable
hydrogen fueling outside of California (57 of the 58 hydrogen stations in the U.S. are in
California). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 76-79]
Nonetheless, FCEVs can plan an important role in electrification particularly for customers
that do not have access to charging at home or the workplace, or applications that require towing,
which significantly reduces BEV range, or driving longer distances where short refueling times
like gasoline fueling process are important. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 76-79]
The need for infrastructure (both EV charging and hydrogen) is tied not only to new vehicle
sales but also to the total population of EVs on the road. We cannot afford to fall behind, which
is exactly what is occurring today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 76-79]
The IIJA includes $5 billion in formula funding for states to establish a nationwide EV
charging network. While this is a good first step, as of today, no chargers have been installed
under the IIJA, and every day the U.S. is falling behind the needed number of chargers. While
early adopters and affluent single-family homeowners might tolerate the lack of public charging,
mainstream, lower-income, and rural drivers that are needed for sales to reach 30, 40, or 60%,
are less likely to be so tolerant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 76-79]
[See orignal comment for: Figure 25: Number of publicly available non-proprietary Chargers
(Auto Innovators)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 76-79]
An assessment by the California Energy Commission concluded that 700,000 public and
shared private chargers are needed to support 5 million EVs, amounting to a ratio of 7 EVs per
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public and shared private charger. 134 At the end of the first quarter of 2023, there were about
134,000 public charging outlets across the country and 3.34 million EVs on the road, a ratio of
25 EVs per charger. For charging to meet the 7:1 ratio, more than 342,000 additional chargers
are needed today, which is two and a half times the currently available non-proprietary chargers
across the U.S. Looking to the future, based on current sales and BEV penetration rates projected
in the NPRM, there could be as many as 40 million BEVsl35 on the road by 2030. Using a ratio
of 7:1, this would suggest that 5.8 million public and shared private chargers are needed. As
shown in Figure 26, President Biden's goal of 500,000 public chargersl36 hardly dents the need
for more public and shared private charging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 76-79]
134 Alexander, Mat, Noel Crisostomo, Wendell Krell, Jeffrey Lu, and Raja Ramesh. July 2021. Assembly
Bill 2127 Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Assessment: Analyzing Charging Needs to Support
Zero-Emission Vehicles in 2030 - Commission Report. California Energy Commission. Publication
Number: CEC-600-2021-001-CMR.
135 Based on EPA OMEGA model output of 38M cumulative BEV sales 2022-2030MY combined with
existing U.S. EV registrations and adjusted for vehicle scrappage.
136 htps://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/13/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-
electric-vehicle-charging-action-plan/
Figure 26: 2030 Model Year Anticipated Infrastructure Needs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 76-79]
Moreover, the U.S. is falling further behind in installing publicly available chargers for the
number of EVs that are being sold. More than 305,000 new EVs were added to the roads in the
first quarter of 2023, but only 7,802 new chargers were added,137 a ratio of 39 new EVs for
every new public port, and more than five times higher than the recommended ratio of 7:1.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 76-79]
137 htps://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/papers-
reports/Get%20Connected%20EV%20Quarterly%20Report%202023%20Ql.pdf
JD Power EV Index calculates a score on a scale of 100 points every month to demonstrate
the advancement of EVs toward parity with ICE vehicles. The index is broken into six sub-
categories, one being infrastructure readiness. Figure 27 below shows the April 2023 JD Power
infrastructure assessment at 27 out of 100 points in their EV index as infrastructure continues to
lag EV growth. 138 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 76-79]
138 JD Power (n.d.). JD Power EV Index. JD Power EV Index. Retrieved June 10, 2023, from
htps ://www.j dpower. com/business/evindex
Figure 27: Charging Infrastructure Growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 76-79]
Source: JD Power EV Index report, April 2023 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 76-79]
It is also important to ensure low-to moderate-income (LMI) and multi-family dwelling
(MFD) residents have access to the low-cost, convenient, and reliable level 2 (L2) home
charging that more affuent single-family homeowners enjoy. MFD residents, however, often face
the greatest, most costly, and burdensome obstacles to installing residential EV charging. For
MFD residents, the additional costs to upgrade the electrical panel, install conduit between the
electrical panel and their parking space, and the logistical challenges of securing building owner
approval, coordinating the billing with the building owner, and persuading an owner to make a
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long-term investment on a rental property, make it challenging to have convenient residential
charging in an MFD. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 79]
Renters, low-income, and MFD residents could be forced to charge at public chargers, which
is far more expensive, less reliable, and vastly less convenient. This is unreasonable, and EPA
and its federal counterparts should ensure this population has the same access to L2 home
charging as affuent single-family homeowners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 79]
a) European Union Alternative Fuel Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR)
As discussed, growth of nationwide charging infrastructure is one of the most important
market features needed to establish a robust and EV-dominated market. Without a widely
available charging network, compliance with regulations that demand electric vehicles cannot be
achieved. The European Union recognizes and addresses this with the recent passing of the
Alternative Fuel Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR). 139 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 79-
80]
139 htps://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/AFIR-EU-Policy-Update-A4-Final.pdf
The AFIR sets legally binding targets for the deployment of alternative fuel infrastructure,
including EV charging availability for passenger cars, vans, trucks, and buses. The regulation
assigns objective requirements for each E.U. member state specifying both the amount of
combined charging output required for each registered EV, as well as the maximum distance
between available charging points. As shown in Figure 28, each E.U. state must ensure a total
output of at least 1.3kW for each registered BEV and 0.8kW for each registered PHEV. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 79-80]
Figure 28: Alternative Fuel Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR) Car, Truck, Van Charging
Requirements per Registered Vehicle [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 79-80]
Technology Minimum Available Charging Power Per Registered EV
BEV 1.3 kW
PHEV 0.8 kW [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 79-80]
Distance-based targets specifying the maximum kilometers between charging stations are
assigned for core travel corridors (Trans-European Transport Network or TEN-T) and expand to
all smaller roads included in the TEN-T in 2030. As shown in Figure 29, by 2030 300kW of fast-
charging capacity will need to be available every 60 km in each direction of the entire Trans-
European Transport Network. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 79-80]
Figure 29: Alternative Fuel Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR) Car, Truck, Van Charging
Distance-Based Requirements [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 79-80]
Date Scope of Requirements Minimum Power Every 60km
December 31, 2025 Core Trans-European Roads 400 kW
December 31, 2027 Core Trans-European Roads
50% of smaller roads 600 kW
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300 kW
December 31, 2030 All Trans-European Roads 300kW
December 31, 2035 All Trans-European Roads 600 kW
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 79-80]
The AFIR demonstrates that the deployment of infrastructure is required to build a successful
EV market. It also demonstrates that the deployment of these enablers cannot be left to model
projections, assumption, or chance. EPA should follow the E.U.'s lead and implement similar
complementary mechanisms that treat market enablers as a necessity to achieving the
electrification targets of the NPRM. Otherwise, consumer adoption of such technologies will lag
due to the lack of reliable charging and refueling stations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
79-80]
C. Infrastructure
Large-scale market adoption of EVs is contingent on charging/refueling infrastructure being
in place to support those vehicles. We believe it is appropriate to use the ratio of one public
charging point/refueling station being required per every seven EVs on the road to get EVs to
usage and convenience parity with ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 86-87]
A scalable target adjustment would be applied to each model year based on the deployed
charging/refueling infrastructure deficit and total number of EVs on the road for any given year.
There are a variety of sources for tracking this infrastructure from the Department of Energy to
various 3rd party sources. There are also a variety of 3rd party sources for tracking EV
registrations. Thus, EPA would have available suitable source(s) to reference each year for this
data. A target adjustment would be determined, for example, using the following formula: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 86-87]
Adjustment (lnfr) = Adjustment (max) * (EV (total) / 7) - CRP) / (EV (total) / 7)
Where
Adjustment (lnfr) = Infrastructure adjustment (g/mi)
Adjustment (max) =10 g/mi
EV (total) = Total number of EVs on the road (BEV + PHEV + FCEV)
CRP = Total number of publicly available charging/refueling points
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 86-87]
Using the example of 26 million EVs being on the road in 2030 and 2.5 million total public
charging/refueling points, the target adjustment would be calculated as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 86-87]
Credit (lnfr) = 10 g/mi * (26,000,000 / 7) - (25,000,000) / (26,000,000 / 7) = 3.3 g/mi [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 86-87]
EPA would publish the annual result of this adjustment calculation at the same time as the
other two target adjustment mechanisms. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 86-87]
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Automakers are and will continue to do their part in building vehicles to support
electrification goals. However, automakers should not be penalized for critical aspects in EPA's
modeling projections that are outside of their control. The proposed market-based target
adjustment system would allow for year-by-year adjustments to be made within the framework
of a rule that would reffect a more accurate and fair way to address the recognized uncertainties
of the market. If these EV market enablers develop as projected by EPA, then these adjustments
will be negligible. However, if these key enablers do not develop as projected, these adjustments
could be the difference between a successful rule and a failed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 86-87]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
Beyond critical minerals, the United States lacks adequate infrastructure for electric vehicle
charging and hydrogen refueling. Developing the necessary infrastructure would cost billions of
dollars in funding and require immediate planning and coordination. Even if enough new
charging stations could be built, the Nation's electricity grids could not currently supply them
with sufficient power. And batteries and fuel cells present an array of documented safety risks,
including spontaneous fires and explosions that have resulted in death, injuries, and extensive
property damage. All of these considerations would further stifle electric-vehicle
adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 4-5]
b. The Nation's Charging and Hydrogen Refueling Infrastructure Is Underdeveloped
Even if manufacturers could produce light-and medium-duty electric vehi-cles in the volumes
and variety necessary to make compliance possible, their deployment still would be stunted by
the Nation's inadequate charging and hy-drogen refueling infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0683, pp. 42-43]
Charging Infrastructure. If the proposed rule were adopted, American driv-ers would need
access to a robust network of home, workplace, and public chargers. Home charging is often
accomplished through Level 1 or Level 2 ports, which provide approximately 5 and 25 miles of
range per hour, respec-tively. See Draft RIA at 4-21; Dep't of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data
Ctr., Developing Infrastructure to Charge Electric Vehicles, https://ti-nyurl.com/3buv474m
("Developing Infrastructure"). Workplace charging is often offered in a Level 2 option. See
Michael Nichols, Estimating Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Costs Across Major U.S.
Metropolitan Areas, ICCT, at 1 (Aug. 2019) ("Estimating Electric Vehicle Charging"). And
public charging— which is critical to drivers without access to home or workplace charging,
those who travel long distances, and those who use their vehicles for commercial or ride-sharing
purposes—is offered at a Level 2 option or, more preferably, a "di-rect-current" or "DC" fast
charging port, which provides approximately 100 to 200 or more miles of range per thirty
minutes. See Draft RIA at 4-23; Dep't of Energy, Developing Infrastructure; Philipp Kampshoff
et al., Building the Electric-Vehicle Charging Infrastructure America Needs, McKinsey & Co., at
8-9 (Apr. 18, 2022) ("Building Electric-Vehicle Charging Infrastructure"); Nichols, Estimating
Electric Vehicle Charging at 2-3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 42-43]
The number of charging ports currently available do not come close to meet-ing this need.
According to EPA, the amount of electric vehicles projected un-der its proposed rule would
require 12 million home, 400,000 workplace, and 110,000 public charging ports in 2027—the
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first year that the proposed rule would be in effect. Those numbers would balloon to 75 million
home, 12.7 million workplace, and 1.9 million public chargers, respectively, by 2055. 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29,309; Draft RIA at 5-31. Developing this infrastructure would come at a high cost to
families and businesses across the country. The agency projects that the required installations
will cost between $1 billion and $1.6 bil-lion by 2027, and between $96 billion and $140 billion
by 2055. See Draft RIA at 5-36. Some studies suggest that the costs may be much higher. See,
e.g., Gordon Bauer et al., Charging Up America: Assessing the Growing Need for U.S. Charging
Infrastructure Through 2030, ICCT, at i (July 2021) (estimating that the cost of 2.4 million
workplace and public chargers would alone reach $28 bil-lion). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, pp. 42-43]
EPA assumes that the extraordinary costs for developing this charging in-frastructure will be
covered by federal incentives and funding, as well as private investment. See, e.g., 88 Fed. Reg.
at 29,307. But these sources fall far short of establishing that the billions of dollars needed will
be readily available and ef-fectively implemented by the time the proposed rule would take
effect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 43]
EPA relies on a tax credit in the IRA that it claims will cover up to 30 percent of the
cost of charging equipment. Id. at 29,308. But that credit applies only when the charging
equipment is located within low-income or non-urban area census tracts, and it covers only up to
$1,000 for res-idential charging equipment and $100,000 for public charging equip-ment. Id.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 43]
EPA also points to $7.5 billion in federal funding that the Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law provides to build out a network of public charging stations. Id. at 29,195, 29,307. But the
goal of that federal funding pro-gram is to develop only 500,000 public charging stations—just
over a quarter the amount EPA projects as necessary under its proposed rule in the period EPA
analyzed (2027-2055)—meaning that the remainder must come from other sources. Cf.
Kampshoff, Building Electric-Vehicle Charging Infrastructure at 2 (noting that "even the
addition of half a mil-lion public chargers could be far from enough"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0683, p. 43]
As to private investment, EPA cites investments announced by electric companies, auto
manufacturers, and charging network providers. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,307-08. Some
investments, however, are more lim- ited than the proposed rule acknowledges. For example,
EPA highlights that General Motors is partnering with charging provider FLO "to de- ploy as
many as 40,000 L2 ports," id. at 29,308, but the companies made clear that a portion of these
ports will be located in Canada, see Emma Jarratt, FLO to Supply 40,000 Chargers to GM for
Dealerships Across Canada and the United States, Elec. Autonomy Canada (Dec. 8, 2022),
https://ti- nyurl.com/5xn39ju4. More importantly, EPA does not attempt to quantify the total
amount of investment pledged, the number of charging ports that the investments will provide,
and the overall timing of their deployment—all of which are critical to EPA's assumption that
private investment will bridge the expanding gap in charging infrastruc- ture by the time the
proposed rule would take effect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 43-44]
Moreover, even if federal and private investment were adequate to deploy enough chargers in
the aggregate nationwide to enable compliance with EPA's proposed rules, multiple practical
issues—including chargers' location, speed, and compatibility—would remain. Those concerns
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must be addressed before EPA can plausibly conclude that the infrastructure will be sufficient to
meet the needs of drivers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 43-44]
To begin, there is a serious gap in home charging for drivers that do not live in single-family
homes. A report released by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory shows that there are
only 1,179 charging ports at multi-family resi-dences across the entire country. See Abby Brown
et al., Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Trends from the Alternative Fueling Station
Locator: Third Quarter 2022, NREL, at 21 (Mar. 2023) ("Charging Infrastructure Trends"). That
number is far too low given that there are over 550,000 apartment buildings with five or more
units, and over 2.2 million apartments with between two and four units in the United States. See
Characteristics of Apartment Stock, Nat'l Multifamily Hous. Council,
https://tinyurl.com/nhnsrsea (last accessed June 25, 2023). If EPA intends for the majority of
drivers to switch to electric vehicles by 2032, sub-stantial progress will need to be made in
installing home charging ports in these multi-family residential buildings. But doing so is both
expensive and logisti-cally difficult. "Higher costs for home charging upgrades generally
correspond to a greater number of wall and floor penetrations, total circuit distance, or ser-vice
upgrades," all of which exist in "attached homes and apartments." Nich-ols, Estimating Electric
Vehicle Charging at 6. Drivers living in apartment build-ings also might not plan on staying in
the same residence long enough to justify the effort of persuading landlords to install enough (or
any) charging units. And even when such drivers relocate, in choosing another residence they
may have many other considerations to weigh besides the availability of on-site charging. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 44-45]
There is also a significant gap in public charging stations for drivers that live in poor and rural
communities. "Current charger installations tend to be lo-cated in higher-income areas, following
the location of early EV sales." Kampshoff, Building Electric-Vehicle Charging Infrastructure at
9. And in Califor-nia—the state with the most public charging stations in the country—only
6,000 of the nearly 80,000 stations are located in rural counties, despite the fact that those
counties make up 60 percent of the state's landmass; are home to 14 percent of the state's
population; and contain "sought-after destinations" like national parks, wildlife areas, lakes,
trails, and campgrounds. Angel Barajas, California's Rural Areas Risk Being Left Out in EV
Push, Gov't Tech. (June 1, 2022) ("California's Rural Areas"), https://tinyurl.com/4k8wb38d. In
Wyoming, there are only 169 public charging ports statewide. Charette, EV Transition. The lack
of available public charging stations "is endemic across rural areas" and poses a major obstacle
to EPA's planned shift to electric vehicles. Id. According to one study, seven out of ten people
who do not own an electric vehicle report that "the areas near their homes lack a significant
number of chargers." Kampshoff, Building Electric-Vehicle Charging Infrastructure at 10. Thus,
even if EPA is right about the total number of public charging stations that can be de-veloped by
the compliance period, their geographic distribution is an equally important, but inadequately
addressed, consideration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 44-45]
Beyond geographic distribution of chargers, electric-vehicle drivers have re-ported that their
experience with public charging is "often unsatisfactory]" due to "speed, cost, availability
(including both free and working chargers), and safety of charging locations." Kampshoff,
Building Electric-Vehicle Charging In-frastructure at 14. For example, many drivers prefer DC
fast charging—which as noted can provide 100-200 miles of range per 30 minutes of charging
time— over Level 1 and Level 2 chargers, which provide only a small fraction of that output and
thus can make charging away from home impractical. But very few public stations offer that DC
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fast-charging option. Nationwide, there are a mere 7,406 stations with DC fast charging ports—
amounting to only 14 percent of all public chargers. See Dep't of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data
Ctr., Alternative Fueling Station Locator, https://tinyurl.com/4xjsc3x6 (last accessed June 14,
2023); Dep't of Energy, Developing Infrastructure. And even among that limited number, there
are three different types of DC fast charging connectors (the equipment that is "plugged into a
vehicle"), with the "majority" being on the Tesla network. Brown, Charging Infrastructure
Trends at viii. As a result, electric-vehicle drivers may "need to travel longer distances to find a
station with the right connector type." Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty
Vehi-cles: Phase 3, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis, EPA, at 68 (Apr. 2023) ("Heavy Duty
Draft RIA"). Ensuring the availability of accessible, fast charging equip-ment at public stations
across the country is therefore a critical piece of the infrastructure puzzle. See Brown, Charging
Infrastructure Trends at vii ("Building out the country's network of public DC fast chargers is
critical to supporting EV adoption in the United States."). But EPA does not explain—and likely
does not know—how much of the federal funding or private investment it high-lights will be
used to install fast-charging equipment. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,307-09. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0683, pp.45-46]
In addition to speed, electric-vehicle drivers face problems with interopera-bility and
consistency across public charging stations. As EPA highlighted in the parallel proposed
rulemaking for heavy-duty vehicles, there are "[c]ommu-nication protocols" between chargers
and vehicles that "facilitate the flow of key information important for charging and billing."
Heavy Duty Draft RIA at 69. Thus, without standardization, electric-vehicle drivers may pull up
to a charging port only to realize that they cannot use it. Drivers also report that "[pjricing
systems" at public charging stations "can vary considerably." Kampshoff, Building Electric-
Vehicle Charging Infrastructure at 14. Pricing may be by the minute or by kilowatt-hour, and it
may differ depending on membership. Id. This means that "[i]t isn't always easy to tell which
option offers better value, and payment is often a hassle." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683,
pp. 45-46]
Each of these problems must be resolved before a widespread shift to elec-tric vehicles is
plausible. "[E]ven in cases where consumer appetite for ZEVs is high, a lack of adequate
charging infrastructure could hold the market back and potentially stall progress." Marie Raj on
Bernard et al., Deploying Charging Infra-structure to Support an Accelerated Transition to Zero-
Emission Vehicles, ZEV Tran-sition Council, at 4 (Sept. 2022). And multiple studies report that
charging is atop concern among prospective electric-vehicle buyers. See, e.g., Barajas, Cali-
fornia's Rural Areas ("[C]oncerns remain, including hesitant consumers wary of 'range anxiety,'
the fear of being stranded without the ability to recharge, or in some cases not having access to
charging capacity at their apartment complex or work."); Kampshoff, Building Electric-Vehicle
Charging Infrastructure at 1 ("[N]early half of US consumers say that battery or charging issues
are their top concerns about buying EVS."); Nichols, Estimating Electric Vehicle Charging at 1
("Exactly how much charging infrastructure will be needed and what it will cost are top
questions for prospective electric vehicle owners."). Until ade-quate home, workplace, and
public charging infrastructure develops at the rate, in the places, and at the quality desired by
consumers, consumers are unlikely to purchase anything close to the volume of electric vehicles
that EPA intends to mandate that manufacturers provide. The agency has not offered a
reasonable basis for assuming that the necessary expansions and improvements are possible, let
alone likely, within less than a decade. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 46-47]
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Hydrogen Refueling Infrastructure. Although EPA's proposed rule for light-and medium-duty
vehicles assumes that manufacturers will comply primarily by integrating battery-electric
vehicles into their fleets, see 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,329, 29,331, 29,343, the agency states that fuel-
cell vehicles provide another compliance option, id. at 29,194, 29,252. The state of hydrogen
refueling, how-ever, is even worse than that of charging infrastructure. Although EPA does not
discuss hydrogen refueling in the proposed rule or draft regulatory impact analysis, it made clear
in connection with the parallel heavy-duty rule that every step of this supply chain is
underdeveloped. See Heavy Duty Draft RIA at 81-86. For example, today there are only 58
public hydrogen refueling stations in the entire country, 57 of which are in California. See Dep't
of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Ctr., Alternative Fueling Station Counts by State (Public),
https://ti-nyurl.com/385e5nk2 (last accessed June 14, 2023).5 To provide any national refueling
network, let alone a robust one, operations would need to scale up dramatically and rapidly. EPA
does not explain whether, how, or when that will happen, making fuel-cell vehicles even less
attractive to consumers than battery-electric ones. Emissions standards premised on the adoption
of fuel-cell vehicles are not feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 47]
5 There are also 16 private stations. See Dep't of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Ctr., Alternative Fueling
Station Counts by State (Private), https://tinyurl.com/4xc8jfcs (last accessed June 14, 2023).
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
I. EPA's Proposal Does Not Comprehensively Address Cross-Cutting Issues
EPA's desire to remake the automotive sector creates significant energy and national security
concerns and stresses an aging electrical grid subject to increasing demand. In glossing over
these issues, EPA fails to adequately consider the mineral, metal, electricity generation,
transmission, distribution, and charging infrastructure requirements necessary for the Proposed
Rule to be feasible. This is alarming and undermines our energy security. We lack the supply of
domestically sourced minerals and metals needed to build batteries and transmission lines and,
contrary to the legislative intent of U.S. laws such as the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law ("BIL")
and Inflation Reduction Act ("IRA"), we will have to rely on foreign countries to fulfill the
Proposed Rule's mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 4]
Even if we could import vast quantities of mineral resources, EPA's electrification mandate is
unobtainable. We face a limited supply of copper, which is a critical mineral needed to build out
the transmission grid to supply electricity to charging stations. We also do not have near the
vehicle charging infrastructure necessary to power the mandated number of ZEVs. Rather than
conducting a clear-eyed assessment of these challenges, EPA erroneously assumes that all the
necessary conditions to enable its proposal will happen on its aggressive timeline. This
conclusion dismisses or outright ignores a multitude of evidence to the contrary. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 4]
EV charging infrastructure, range, and charging time remain top concerns for nearly half of
U.S. customers. 139 OEMs expect that ZEV penetration will not be uniform across markets, with
larger impact in markets with more low carbon intensity electricity and greater electrical grid
reliability. 140 Toyota announced that regional energy variation is the reason Toyota will provide
a diversified range of carbon neutral options to meet the needs and circumstances in every
country and region. 141 Toyota believes optionality facilitates the ability to adapt to change,
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while selecting a single option is an attempt to predict the future in uncertain times. 142 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 31-32]
139 Phillipp Kampshoff, et al., McKinsey & Co., "Building the electric-vehicle charging infrastructure
America needs" (Apr. 18, 2022) available at https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-
insights/building-the-electric-vehicle-charging-infrastructure-america-needs; EVBox, "6 reasons why your
electric car isn't charging as fast as you'd expect," Jan. 6, 2023, available at https://blog.evbox.com/6-
reasons-charging-times.
140 The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC's) 2022 Long-Term Reliability
Assessment (Dec. 2022) projects reliability concerns for certain regional entities. Available at
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2022.pdf
141 Toyota Motor Corporation, "'Video: Media Briefing on Battery EV Strategies," Press Release,
December 14, 2021. available at https://global.toyota/en/newsroom/corporate/36428993.html.
142 Id.
As discussed in more detail below, consumer market demand will not, and cannot, increase to
meet the Proposal's required supply. Charging capabilities, which creates range anxiety, is a key
apprehension for nearly half the U.S. consumer market. EVs have less range, both technically
and practically. As noted by J.D. Power, "[T]he majority of EVs provide between 200 and 300
miles of range on a full charge." 147 This same article, however, also noted that EVs with less
than 200-mile ranges (such as the 2022 Nissan Leaf at 149 miles or the 2022 Mazda MX-30 at
100 miles) are "either affordable or focused on performance." 148 With respect to longer range
vehicles, claimed vehicle ranges of up to 516 miles are available, but this range comes at
considerable cost. The number 1 range-rated vehicle by Car and Driver, the 2023 Lucid Air,
carries a base price of $113,650. And while three out of the ten top-rated EVs by Car and Driver
were more "reasonably priced" from $44,630 to $56,630, all other models within the top 10 cost
anywhere from $74,800 to $110,295,149 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 32-33]
147 See Sebastian Blanco, List of EVs Sorted by Range (Sept. 1, 2022), www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-
guides/list-of-evs-sorted-by-range.
148 Id.
149 See Nicholas Wallace, Austin Irwin, & Nick Kurczewski, Longest Range Electric Cars for 2023,
Ranked (Mar. 23, 2023), https://www.caranddriver.com/features/g32634624/ev-longest-driving-range/.
Moreover, the time it takes to charge a ZEV compared to fueling an ICEV deters ZEV
adoption. 150 Depending on the type of vehicle (ZEV v. PHEV) and charger (Level 1, Level 2, or
Direct current fast charging equipment ("DCFCs")), charging times from empty to 80 percent
charged can range from 40-50 hours (Level 1 charging) to 20 minutes to one hour (DCFC),
although most PHEVs on the market do not work with DCFCs. 151 In early 2023, a Boston
Globe survey around the Boston metropolitan area found DCFC chargers were unreliable, going
offline for weeks or months at a time. 152 Since close to two-thirds of U.S. households do not
purchase new vehicles, lower-income people are more likely to purchase less expensive, early
generation PEVs with less range and using a Level 1 or Level 2 charger requires longer charge
times. 153 These extended recharging times remain a barrier to EV adoption. 154 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 33]
150 EVBox, EV Box Mobility Monitor (June 2022). Available at evbox-mobility-monitor-2022-intl.pdf (a
study of EV adoption in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK revealed that excessive charging
time remains a deterrent to EV adoption).
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151 U.S. Department of Transportation, Charger type and speed. Available at
https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-basics/charging-speeds.
152 Aaron Pressman, "Inside the crazy, mixed-up world of electric-vehicle charger pricing," The Boston
Globe, March 27, 2023. Available at Inside the crazy, mixed-up world of electric-vehicle charger pricing
(boston.com).
153 Hardman, Scott, et al. "A Perspective on Equity in the Transition to Electric Vehicles." MIT Science
Policy Review, 20 Aug. 2021, sciencepolicyreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-electric-
vehicles/. Accessed 29 June 2023.
154 Exro, Barriers to electric vehicle adoption in 2022. Available at Barriers to Electric Vehicle Adoption:
The 4 Key Challenges (exro.com).
EPA requests comment on their approach to determining charging time, as set forth in the
DRIA, Chapter 4.155 EPA's analysis is contingent on unsupported assumptions regarding (1)
U.S. consumers' adoption of and ability to purchase more expensive ZEVs (see Sections IV.B.2
and IV.E.2.ii); (2) the type of ZEV purchased (used ZEVs or PHEVs compatible with slower
charging units or new ZEVs that can use DCFC) (Section IV,B.2 addresses charging times); (3)
the availability of critical minerals and metals to expand the supply of reliable and renewable
electricity (see Section I.B); and (4) the availability of reliable and affordable charging for all
users (see Sections IV.B.4). Given the flaws in EPA's methodology that omits significant data
sources and other factors and makes unsupported assumptions, EPA should revise its analysis
concerning charging time and continue with promulgating a final rule for future emissions
standards, that accounts for the reality of today's automotive market and not the public
pronouncements of the automotive industry, a single state or group of states, or other
unsupported estimates of future market growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 33-34]
155 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,367.
4. EPA ignores the lack of reliable ZEV charging
The Proposal's success is partially contingent on the availability of "equitable, affordable
charging." 169 Currently, ZEV charging is most available in metropolitan areas, with less
investment occurring outside urban areas. 170
169 Joann Muller, "The electric car revolution hinges on equitable, affordable charging," Axios, Feb. 8,
2023. Available at The electric vehicle revolution hinges on equitable, affordable charging (axios.com).
170 S&P GLOBAL MOBILITY, "EV Chargers: How Many Do We Need?" (Jan. 9, 2023), available at
https://press.spglobal.com/2023-01-09-EV-Chargers-How-many-do-we-need.
While a significant percentage of the charging installations deployed today are Level 2
EVSEs, dual charging installations to enable the flexibility of LD as well as MD and HDV
charging will become increasingly important. DCFCs will enable broader market coverage, even
for LDVs used in applications where they cannot sit for 6 hours and charge during off-peak,
lower-cost electricity periods. As utility companies gear up to provide infrastructure installations,
we should not minimize the impact of supply chain shortages/strains on the cost of materials
necessary for installing supporting charging infrastructure in the short time ahead to 2032. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 36-37]
The DRIA admits its charging simulations to estimate charging network size excluded
medium-and heavy-duty vehicles, which are also subject to EPA's EV mandate. 174 While these
commercial vehicles may spend most of their time charging at private depot stations, these are
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mobile, commercial vehicles that will need to use (and strain) the charging network. It is
arbitrary and capricious for EPA to omit those vehicles from its simulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, p. 37]
174 DRIA at 5-39, n. 107.
Moreover, many available chargers are unreliable. A recent study on the reliability of fast
chargers found that in 22.7 percent of the cases studied, chargers were nonfunctional because of
"unresponsive or unavailable touchscreens, payment system failures, charge initiation failures,
network failures, or broken connectors," and 4.9 percent of charging cable were too short to
reach an EV's charge port.175 Similarly, in a J.D. Power study, owners in high EV volume
markets like California, Texas and Washington are finding the charging infrastructure inadequate
and plagued with non-functioning stations. 176 This is a significant technological issue that calls
into question the viability of the existing charging network as well as future deployments.
Similarly, in a J.D. Power study, owners in high EV volume markets like California, Texas and
Washington are finding the charging infrastructure inadequate and plagued with non-functioning
stations. 177 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 37-38]
175 Rempel, David and Cullen, Carleen and Bryan, Mary Matteson and Cezar, Gustavo Vianna, Reliability
of Open Public Electric Vehicle Direct Current Fast Chargers. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4077554 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4077554
176 J.D. Power. Press Release, "2022 U.S. Electric Vehicle Experience (EVX) Public Charging Study."
J.D. Power, 17 Aug. 2022, www.jdpower.com/business/press-releases/2022-us-electric-vehicle-experience-
evx-public-charging-study. Accessed 28 June 2023.
Demand charges can be punishing, and in some cases make or break the business case for
transition from ICEVs to ZEVs, particularly for fleets and vehicles that require DCFC charging.
Other considerations for high-reliability use cases should include provisional back-up power
system considerations, which depend upon back-up generators or expensive stationary energy
storage batteries. Absent comprehensive understanding of the dynamics between increased ZEV
use and charging infrastructure needs, OEMs and consumers are vulnerable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp. 37-38]
v. Costs to upgrade electricity generation, transmission, and distribution
For EPA to achieve its GHG reduction aspirations in this Proposed Rule, all three of these
challenges must be met: (1) sufficient materials to manufacture the required EVs, chargers, and
grid upgrades, (2) consumer willingness to substitute ZEVs for ICEVs currently for sale, and (3)
a low-carbon power generation grid capable of reliably supplying energy for this mode of
transportation. Combined with other issues, such as a disorderly transformation of the generation
base as conventional units are replaced with intermittent resources, raises questions of the grid's
ability to reliably meet consumer demand on a regional basis. Despite these challenges, EPA
incredibly assumes no increase in the cost of electricity to consumers (whether EV owners or
others) associated with the proposed rulemaking. EPA underestimates the cost of electricity to all
consumers, including EV owners, and omits the cost of grid upgrades and distributed energy
resources have been excluded from these estimates.260 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp.
56-57]
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260 U.S. Department of Energy, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, "The 2030 National Charging
Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure." June 2023.
https://driveelectric.gOv/files/2030-charging-network.pdf.
EPA incorrectly assumes that ZEV owners will pay the national average residential electricity
price to charge their vehicles. EPA fails to consider that the majority of ZEVs in the U.S. are
located in utility service territories with some of the highest electricity rates in the country and
that the average EV owner currently pays a much higher price to charge their ZEV at home than
the national average residential electricity rate. Given that EV penetration has varied widely
across the U.S., it would be arbitrary to assume that EVs will, unlike in the past, penetrate
uniformly across the U.S. and thus that the average electricity price would be representative of
the actual cost electricity. For example, California, which has roughly 40 percent of all registered
ZEVs in the U.S., has a residential electricity rate that is roughly double the national average.
Considering that EPA is modeling its rule after a California-like approach to mandate ZEVs, it
would be more appropriate for EPA to assume similar real-world costs (at a minimum, given
California's temperate climate). Moreover, EPA fails to consider that mandating such a high
ZEV sales rate will necessarily require exponential increases in commercial ZEV charging at
rates that are currently three, four or five times higher than the current national average
residential electricity rate, depending on location and charging speed. Those customers who are
not homeowners and not able to install their own charging stations and take advantage of
charging at low-cost times will be adversely impacted. Instead, EPA uses a residential rate for
electricity and does not consider peak power or time of use charges. California electric prices
rose 42 percent -78 percent between 2010 and 2020 and are projected to rise an additional 50
percent by 2030 as shown in Figure 9. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Historic and Forecasted Residential Average Rates Based
on Most Recent 5-year Average Rate Increase. Figure 9: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp.
57-58]
Source: Michael Shellenberger, Twitter (citing California Public Advocate's Office data),
April 27, 2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
Heaping additional demand for EV charging into this market could exacerbate already high
electricity prices. This will be especially impactful to lower-income homeowners who may not
be able to install dedicated charging units, forcing them to pay more out of pocket for charging
during peak demand periods.265 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
265 Hardman, Scott, et al., "A Perspective on Equity in the Transition to Electric Vehicles." MIT Science
Policy Review, (Aug. 20 2021), available at https://sciencepolicyreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-
electric-vehicles/ (accessed June 29, 2023).
EPA must revise its analysis to account for realistic electricity prices. The proposed ZEV
mandate will require an enormous investment in power generation and distribution, resulting in
nationwide increases in electricity bills that EPA has not considered. Of course, considering the
additional trillions of dollars in costs would paint a clear picture that the costs of forced
electrification far exceed even the inflated benefits EPA presented in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
vi. Charging infrastructure costs
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EPA vastly underestimates the cost to build the required charging infrastructure. Even as new
ZEVs are ready to enter into production, auto industry representatives have acknowledged the
necessary infrastructure for electric vehicles continues to lag.266 In 2020, there were a total of
103,582 publicly available non-proprietary charging outlets in U.S. (30 percent of which are
located in 14 counties) for 3.04 million EVs on the road, a ratio of 29 EVs per charger.267 In
2022, 51 percent of all new chargers were added in 2 percent of U.S. counties, with California
adding 25 percent of the 2022 new charging capacity and 160 counties adding only one
charger.268 And the pace of installing new public chargers is not keeping up with current and
projected EV sales, as the ratio of registered EVs to new chargers in 2022 was 38 to one.269
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 58-59]
266 ALLIANCE FOR AUTOMOTIVE INNOVATION, "Get Connected Electric Vehicle Quarterly
Report" (Fourth Quarter 2022).
267 ALLIANCE FOR AUTOMOTIVE INNOVATION, "Get Connected Electric Vehicle Quarterly
Report" (Fourth Quarter 2022).
268 Id.
269 Id.
A 2023 EV Charging Station Report based on DOE's Alternative Fuel Data Center data
highlights as the number of ZEVs in the U.S. increased by 42 percent, but the growth in public
charging outlets increased by only 12 percent during the same time.270 According to S&P
Global's Mobility Special Report, U.S. charging infrastructure is not nearly robust enough to
fully support a maturing electric vehicle market, and ZEV charging stations will need to
quadruple between 2022 and 2025 and grow more than eight-fold by 2030.271 There is lower
investment into charging systems outside of major metro markets.272 Of the 3,100 counties and
city-counties in the U.S., 63 percent had five or fewer chargers installed; 39 percent had zero;
and 53 percent of counties added no new chargers in 2022.273 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733,
pp. 58-59]
270 ZUTOBi, "2023 EV Charing Station Report: State-by-State Breakdown" (June 16, 2023) available at
https://zutobi.com/us/driver-guides/the-us-electric-vehicle-charging-point-report.
271 S&P Global Mobility. "EV Chargers: How Many Do We Need?" News Release Archive, (Jan. 9,
2023), https://press.spglobal.com/2023-01-09-EV-Chargers-How-many-do-we-need (accessed June 28,
2023).
272 S&P Global Mobility. "EV Chargers: How Many Do We Need?" News Release Archive, (Jan. 9
2023), https://press.spglobal.com/2023-01-09-EV-Chargers-How-many-do-we-need, (accessed June 28,
2023). Currently EV charging is concentrated in high-income urban areas in California, Colorado,
Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon. Phillipp Kampshoff, et al., McKinsey &
Co., "Building the electric-vehicle charging infrastructure America needs" (Apr. 18, 2022) available at
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/building-the-electric-vehicle-charging-
infrastructure-america-needs.
273 Alliance for Automotive Innovation. Get Connected Electric Vehicle Quarterly Report, Fourth Quarter
2022. See also S&P Global Mobility. "EV Chargers: How Many Do We Need?" News Release Archive, 9
Jan. 2023, https://press.spglobal.com/2023-01-09-EV-Chargers-How-many-do-we-need. Accessed 28 June
2023 (Texas currently has about 5,600 Level 2 non-Tesla and 900 Level 3 chargers, but by 2027 S&P
Global Mobility forecasts the state will need about 87,500 Level 2 and 7,800 level 3 chargers - more than
ten times the current number of Level 2 and 3 chargers -to support an expected the expected 1.1 million
EVs at that time)
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EPA also did not include any cost of power distribution upgrade needed for EVSE
installation, citing large uncertainty. While uncertainty may exist, EPA cannot assume there is no
cost associated with this required upgrade. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory
("NREL") published new estimates of the need for ZEV charging infrastructure investment that
finds: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 59-60]
"A cumulative national capital investment of $53—$127 billion in charging infrastructure is
needed by 2030 (including private residential charging) to support 33 million PEVs. The large
range of potential capital costs found in this study is a result of variable and evolving equipment
and installation costs observed within the industry across charging networks, locations, and site
designs. The estimated cumulative capital investment includes: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, pp.59-60]
-$22-$72 billion for privately accessible Level 1 and Level 2 charging ports
-$27-$44 billion for publicly accessible fast charging ports
-$5—$11 billion for publicly accessible Level 2 charging ports.274 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 59-60]
274 National Renewable Energy Laboratory, The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-
Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure, June 26, 2023, at vii. Available at
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy23osti/85654.pdf.
Clearly, these cost estimates are vastly higher than the $7 billion in costs that EPA claims is
needed over an even longer time frame. Given a general linear relationship between ZEV
charging infrastructure costs and the number of registered ZEVs, it is reasonable to estimate
(using the DOE numbers) a cost adder for charging infrastructure to each ZEV of (at least)
$1,606 to $3,848. These costs are not shown by EPA and EPA's failure to account for them is
arbitrary and unreasonable. Moreover, note that DOE's estimate excludes "the cost of grid
upgrades and distributed energy resources."275 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 59-60]
275 Id.
The BIL provides up to $7.5 billion to install 500,000 public chargers nationwide by 2030.
"However, even the addition of half a million public chargers could be far from enough. In a
scenario in which half of all vehicles sold are ZEVs by 2030—in line with federal targets—
McKinsey estimates that America would require 1.2 million public EV chargers and 28 million
private EV chargers by that year.276 All told, the country would need almost 20 times more
chargers than it has now."277 EPA must address charger investment and reliability by more than
just referencing EV subsidies in recent legislation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 59-60]
276 McKinsey, "Building the Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure America Needs," (Apr. 18, 2022),
available at America's electric-vehicle charging infrastructure | McKinsey; see also S&P Global, "EV
Chargers: How Many Chargers DO We Need?, (Jan. 9, 2023) (millions of chargers are needed).
277 Id.
Organization: American Highway Users Alliance
More specifically, EPA's proposal in this docket appears to be premised on huge and rapid
growth in the portion of light-duty and medium-duty vehicles that are electric powered (EVs) as
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well as on rapid transformation of the marketplace in a number of related areas that are not the
subject of the proposed regulation. EPA seems to have made favorable assumptions on many
issues bearing on the feasibility of the proposal, including as to the issues set forth below. The
Highway Users, on the other hand, drawing on the expertise of its members, questions that,
within the MY 2027 - 2032 timeframe of the proposed rule, all or most of the following will
occur, that - [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
high-speed and other electric charging stations will be sufficiently available to service
light-duty and medium-duty EVs in quantities and locations sufficient to encourage customers to
buy EVs, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
electric utilities can timely provide connections from the electric grid to those
charging stations, or hydrogen fueling stations - and provide the refueling and charging
connections at reasonable cost, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
the electric grid will have the capacity to meet the demand for electricity that will be
required to support increased electrification of trucks, buses, and passenger cars, even if the
connections can be timely made to charging stations (both public and private) that do not yet
exist in sufficient numbers, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
charging times can be reduced sufficiently to encourage customers to buy these EVs,
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
major industries, including vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers, can implement
major changes in vehicles as rapidly as the NPRM assumes (given the limited current market
penetration of these EVs), [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
there will be an adequate supply of rare earth and other critical minerals, and the
ability to process them, with those minerals being so essential to the manufacture of EVs and
batteries, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
with a large portion of such minerals being sourced and/or processed overseas,
including in China and Africa, whether the national interest in sourcing and processing such
minerals in the United States can be met, and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
potential customers of these EVs will proceed to purchase them in sufficient quantity,
notwithstanding significantly higher up-front costs, uncertain availability of charging facilities,
and other concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
This last consideration is highly important because if the potential customers of these EVs do
not become actual customers to a sufficient extent, the manufacturers are unlikely to produce the
vehicles in the quantities EPA has estimated will be required to be compliant with the
regulations, in turn greatly reducing the benefits of the proposal as EPA estimated. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 2-3]
Feasibility of the proposal is highly questionable and benefits are likely overestimated
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
3. Compounding concern resources will also be used for HDV, on the same timeframe.
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EPA released the proposals for LMDV and HDV simultaneously - and the programs have the
same proposed implementation timeline of 2027-2032. API has serious concerns about the
implications of this timing. Both proposed programs are significantly flawed in that they rely on
resources and infrastructure that are not yet ready. Even with EPA's projections regarding the use
of BIL and IRA funding, the transportation industry will be competing for the same resources to
successfully stand up both programs simultaneously. Furthermore, the availability of and process
for obtaining such funding is not certain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 15]
v. Infrastructure.
1. Leadtime and deployment.
API, and many other stakeholders, are concerned about the lack of infrastructure for the LMD
ZEV market.39 Even coupled with significant tax credits and incentives, consumers likely will
not purchase new LMD ZEVs in the volumes that would be required by the proposal without a
reliable charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 15]
39 Khan, Hafiz Anwar Ullah; Price, Sara; Avraam, Charalampos; Dvorkin, Yury. "Inequitable Access to
EV Charging Infrastructure." New York University, Tandon School of Engineering. February 2022.
https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/61454.
A critical part of relying on an EV for transportation is the ability to charge the battery.
According to J.D. Power,58 EV owners in markets with a high volume of EVs are experiencing
problems with charging. Even with the high growth rate of EV chargers, satisfaction has flat-
lined and a "shortage of public charging availability" is the main reason car buyers avoid EVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 19]
58 J.D. Power. "Growing Electric Vehicle Market Threatens to Short-Circuit Public Charging Experience,
J.D. Power Finds." August 2022. https://www.jdpower.com/business/press-releases/2022-us-electric-
vehicle-experience-evx-public-charging-study.
Organization: BlueGreen Alliance (BGA)
At the same time, EPA must consider that the manufacturing investments from the Inflation
Reduction Act and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law will take time to achieve their full production
capacity. EPA should coordinate with DOE, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), and
the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) to ensure that the manufacturing investments from the
Inflation Reduction Act and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law will be fully leveraged to support
regulatory compliance. Programs like the Battery Manufacturing and Recycling Grants (DOE),
the Battery Material Processing Grants (DOE), the Domestic Manufacturing Conversion Grants
(DOE), the 48C Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit (DOE/DOC), the Advanced Technology
Vehicle Manufacturing Loan Program (DOE), the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure
(NEVI) Program (DOT), and the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure Grant Program (DOT) all
provide unprecedented federal resources that manufacturers and fleet owners can leverage to
support both supply and demand for low-and zero-emission light-and medium-duty vehicles.
However, these programs take time to bear fruit—whether that means a complete public,
affordable, and interoperable EV charging network, or a robust domestic supply chain for
vehicles eligible for the battery component and critical mineral requirements of the 30D Clean
Vehicle Tax Credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp. 8-9]
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It is essential to workers and communities that these programs be carefully designed and
implemented, with robust stakeholder engagement. This helps ensure that they adhere to
Justice40 requirements and new Build America, Buy America provisions that are critical to
ensuring that federal programs support domestic manufacturing investments that are fully
supported by their communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp. 8-9]
With that, EPA must account for the time it takes to convert federal awards and allocations
into actual domestic production capacity and critical on-the-ground infrastructure. EPA should
coordinate with DOT and DOE to fully assess the availability of charging and fueling
infrastructure for electric vehicles, and related grants and loans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0667, pp. 8-9]
Organization: BMW of North America, LLC (BMW NA)
BMW NA, together with the Alliance of Automotive Innovators, has already agreed with
Biden Administrations' stated goal of reaching 40-50% sales of electric vehicles within the
market by 2030. Achieving this goal will only be possible if the framework conditions allow the
market to develop -i.e. charging infrastructure, availability of critical raw materials and the
overall cost situation for xEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 2]
At this time, BMW NA does not believe that the necessary framework conditions, especially
infrastructure, are advancing as necessary to achieve the targets set forth in the Proposed Rule.
Therefore, we share the concerns expressed by the Alliance of Automotive Innovators that these
targets cannot be met without massive and coordinated efforts of the auto industry, energy
providers, mineral suppliers and the government. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 2]
The charging infrastructure deployment within the United States must be accelerated even
beyond the targets identified in the Infrastructure Act of 500.000 charges. In fact, BMW NA
believes these figures have to increase by about five-fold (a study of the California Energy
Commission projects, that a 700,000 public and shared private chargers are necessary for 5 Mio.
ZEV1 . Different sources assuming 25 to 44 Mio ZEVs on the US streets in 20302). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 2]
1 https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/ repo rt s/ electric -vehicle-charging-infrastructure-assessment-
ab-2127
2 https:/ / ww w.mckinsey.com/ industries/public-sector/our-insights/building-the-electric-vehicle-
charging-infrastructure-america-needs
Organization: BorgWarner Inc.
BorgWarner appreciates the Administration's support for and recommends prioritization of
DCFCs for EV infrastructure and coordination of hydrogen infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0640, pp. 4-5]
BorgWarner applauds the Administration's support for EV charging infrastructure.
BorgWarner recommends that EPA prioritize DCFC charging capabilities in publicly-funded
infrastructure projects to foster consumer adoption, futureproof site investments, and facilitate
vehicle-to-grid (V2G) bidirectional charging, which becomes more critical to enable sustainable
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grid management, grid resilience, utilization, and national security protection. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0640, pp. 4-5]
In its Proposal, EPA acknowledges the additional needs and costs associated with charging
infrastructure BorgWarner agrees and reiterates its support for current Build America Buy
America (BABA) requirements. BorgWarner has made the capital investment to comply with the
BAB A requirements and should not have that competitive advantage taken away through an
open-ended waiver of the BABA requirements. BorgWarner also asks EPA to require UL
certification as a national certification standard to provide consistency, quality, safety, and
compliance throughout the system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 4-5]
4 Federal Register, Vol. 88, No. 87, May 5, 2023, Page 29311
Hydrogen combustion engines (H2ICE) are a cost-effective advanced technology that can
make a significant positive impact to the environment, and we urge EPA to recognize H2ICE as
a technology solution in the Proposal, especially for heavier MD applications. As the IRA and
IIJA are providing billions of dollars for the development of a hydrogen economy, EPA should
support these efforts with program incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 4-5]
BorgWarner supports the proposed adjustments to compliance credits. BorgWarner agrees
with EPA's proposed changes to the current compliance credits offered for BEVs, PHEVs and
fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs). Credits can serve as a valuable tool to incentivize the
development of new vehicle technologies and should be used to create new technology
pathways. Once these technologies are clearly established, EPA should eliminate these credits.
Offering credits once a technology is established could potentially disincentivize new
innovations in efficiency-and performance-improving vehicle technologies. We also agree with
EPA's decision to discontinue air conditioning credits under the new standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0640, pp. 4-5]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Charging Standards
To the extent that manufacturers comply with U.S. EPA's proposed standards with BEVs and
PHEVs, the demand for charging infrastructure will increase significantly. While these vehicles
offer a variety of benefits to consumers, vehicle charging is a persistent concern and barrier to
electric vehicle adoption in consumer studies. To truly support increased ZEV penetration, it is
important for policymakers and manufacturers to reduce barriers that could otherwise discourage
consumer selection of a BEV or PHEV. In the ACC II program, CARB adopted several
charging-related requirements to help increase access to home charging and standardize the
charging experience. 59 CARB encourages U.S. EPA to explore opportunities to standardize
charging requirements as a component of its ZEV assurance measures and offers the following
specific recommendations as particularly appropriate in the national context. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, pp. 42-43]
59 Cal. Code Regs., title 13, section 1962.3; see also ACC II Final Statement of Reasons, Including
Summary of Comments and Agency Response Appendix D Summary of Comments to ZEV Assurance
Measures and Agency Response, pp. 69-74.
Vehi cl e-to-Infrastructure Integrati on
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As the infrastructure for BEVs expands and becomes more standardized, vehicles themselves
have a role in providing a reliable, consistent, and convenient charging experience for
consumers. BEVs also have the unique opportunity to support grid stability in the future through
"vehicle-to-grid" systems. However, to broadly realize these consumer and grid service benefits,
vehicles must be able to communicate with the chargers themselves, known as electric vehicle
supply equipment (EVSE), in a standardized way. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 43-44]
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 15118 is a set of communication and
charging management standards intended for use between vehicles and EVSE, including a
customer convenience feature referred to as Plug & Charge. To help ensure consistent and
successful use of charging infrastructure, CARB recommends that U.S. EPA require
manufacturers to integrate these industry-developed standards into the design of future BEVs.
CARB notes that several automakers have already introduced or will introduce U.S. vehicles that
can support some portions of these standards, especially the Plug & Charge feature, including
Audi, BMW, Daimler, Porsche, Lucid, Volkswagen, 60 and Ford. 61 Standardized deployment
of vehicle-to-infrastructure communication across the industry will reduce barriers to BEV
adoption and maximize benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 43-44]
60 In a joint comment to the California Public Utilities Commission on its February 2018 Staff Report on
the Vehicle-Grid Integration (VGI) Communication Protocol Working Group, Audi, BMW, Daimler,
Lucid, Porsche, and VW stated their intention to implement ISO 15118 on their future vehicles, including
the Plug & Charge feature. https://www.cpuc.ca.gOv/-/media/cpuc-website/files/legacyfiles/o/6442457082"
oems-final-comments-vgi-wg-draft-report-correction-v2.pdf
61 Ford. "Charging Your Mustang Mach-E." https://www.ford.com/mustang/ev-charging/mache/.
Accessed June 15, 2023.
Specifically, CARB recommends that, for future BEVs, U.S. EPA require manufacturers to:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 43-44]
Implement and conform to ISO 15118-3 Vehicle to grid communication interface - Part
3: physical and data link layer requirements, 62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 43-44]
Implement and conform to ISO 15118-2 Vehicle to grid communication interface - Part
2: Network and application protocol requirements 63 and ISO 15118-20 Vehicle to grid
communication interface: Part 20: 2nd generation network layer and application layer
requirements, 64 and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 43-44]
Demonstrate successful results for each certified vehicle configuration with ISO 15118-
4 Vehicle to grid communication interface - Part 4: Network and application protocol
conformance test 65 and ISO 15118-5 Vehicle to grid communication interface - Part 5: Physical
layer and data link layer conformance test. 66 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 43-44]
62
ISO
15118-3:2015.
63
ISO
15118-2:2014.
64
ISO
15118-20:2022
65
ISO
15118-4:2018.
66
ISO
15118-5:2018.
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CARB notes several important benefits associated with widespread deployment of
harmonized communication standards between the vehicle and the charging infrastructure. First,
drivers will see the benefit of a simplified public charging user experience. Plug & Charge
allows drivers to establish their electric charging preferences and input payment information
once, providing a more seamless charging experience. With widespread implementation of Plug
& Charge, drivers charging their vehicle at a compatible public EVSE will be able to simply plug
in their vehicle and walk away while the vehicle and the EVSE communicate and manage the
charging session accordingly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 44-45]
Second, vehicle-to-grid connectivity could enable BEVs to provide important grid services.
Implementation of the communications protocols outlined in the suite of ISO 15118 standards is
a key step to enable this functionality by ensuring that the vehicle and the EVSE are coordinated
on the bi-directional flow of electricity during grid support services. CARB agrees with U.S.
EPA's findings that grid reliability is not expected to be adversely affected by the modest
increase in electricity demand associated with electric vehicle charging. 67 California's grid has
historically expanded and evolved as consumer demand for electricity services has grown,
including with the recent emergence of electric vehicles. This trend is reflected in the historical
expansion of the national grid as noted in U.S. EPA's proposal. However, BEVs can further
support grid resilience with their unique ability to fuel on a flexible schedule depending on the
driver's and the grid's needs. Drivers with access to residential charging could also realize
greater opportunities to reduce their total cost of ownership by potentially selling electricity back
to the grid or powering their homes during peak times. Furthermore, BEVs have already been
demonstrated to be able to function as back-up power devices during emergencies, and
standardized implementation of this protocol could make such activities even more seamless in
the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 44-45]
67 CARB. Response to Comments on the Draft Environmental Analysis Prepared for the Advanced Clean
Cars II Program. August 2022.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/acciirtcl.pdf.
Third, requiring implementation of these communication standards on the vehicle aligns
with—and maximizes the benefits from—recent infrastructure planning and funding. The federal
government is making unprecedented investments in charging infrastructure through the
Infrastructure Investment Jobs Act. The law set aside $5 billion to build a National Electric
Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) network that will enable widespread travel across the nation. 68
As part of deploying the NEVI funds, the Joint Office of Transportation and Energy set
minimum requirements that NEVI-funded EVSE must meet including minimum payment
standards, minimum power, minimum number of ports, and collection of reliability metrics. One
of these requirements is the implementation of Plug & Charge on direct current fast chargers
(DCFC), utilizing the ISO 15118 suite of standards outlined above. 69 The California Energy
Commission is also taking steps in this direction by requiring public chargers it partially or fully
funds to install EVSE designed to be compatible with the ISO 15118 suite of standards. 70
Matching vehicle requirements with NEVI implementation will harmonize communication flow
between vehicles and charging stations, reducing the number of potential points of failure to
communicate in the charging ecosystem. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 44-45]
68 Public Law No. 117-58. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-
117publ58.pdf. Accessed June 15, 2023.
69 23 C.F.R. § 680.108(a). (2023).
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70 California Energy Commission. TN 241955. Docket 19-AB-2127. "CEC Recommendation for
Deployment of ISO 15118-Ready Chargers." February 2022.
https://efiling.energy.ca.gov/GetDocument.aspx?tn=241955&DocumentContentId=75632
Direct Current Fast Charging Standardization
CARB agrees with U.S. EPA's findings that the increased deployment of ZEVs will require
more charging infrastructure to be installed. For this infrastructure to be most effective, CARB
recommends that U.S. EPA require manufacturers to standardize vehicle charging inlets. In
particular, direct current fast charging (DCFC) will play a key role in charging away from home
both for longer travel trips and for those without convenient access to home or workplace
charging. Making sure that consumers can easily access charging and that all BEVs are DCFC
capable can help increase uptake of ZEVs, better ensure they can be effectively used by second
and third owners, and help fully realize emission benefits from U.S. EPA's proposed standards.
Currently, three distinct DCFC inlets exist on BEVs deployed in the U.S.: CHAdeMO, SAE
Combined Charging System (CCS1) Type 1 (SAE J1772), and Tesla's North America Charging
Standard connector. Having three different DCFC inlets, standards, and communication
protocols can lead to inconsistent and unnecessarily complex charging experiences for
consumers, including interoperability and charging reliability concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp. 45-46]
Most manufacturers are already utilizing the SAE J1772 CCS1 standard in current vehicle
production. In 2020, the CCS1 inlet was on 13 available BEV models and only 2 BEV models
came with the CHAdeMO inlet. For the 2022 MY, 45 BEV models have the CCS1 inlet, with
only 2 vehicle models remaining with the CHAdeMO inlet. 71 The federal government is also
already investing in CCS1 infrastructure through the NEVI program, which requires that each
funded DCFC port have at least one CCS1 connector. 72 However, in Spring 2023, Ford and
General Motors both announced partnership with and future implementation of Tesla's North
America Charging Standard on their vehicles. 73, 74 These moves by industry electric vehicle
leaders are significant and continued lack of standardization could lead to more confusion in the
market and decentralization of resources toward solving those issues that most plague reliable
charging for electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 45-46]
71 ACCIIISOR. Chapter III, Sect C.3. ACCIIISOR (ca.gov)
72 23 CFR §680.106(c) (2023).
73 Ford. "Ford EV Customers To Gain Access To 12,000 Tesla Superchargers; Company To Add North
American Charging Standard Port In Future EVs." May 25, 2023.
https://media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/fna/us/en/news/2023/05/25/ford-ev-customers-to-gain-access-
to- 12-000-tesla-superchargers~.html. Accessed June 15, 2023.
74 General Motors. "General Motors Doubles Down on Commitment to a Unified Charging Standard and
Expands Charging Access to Tesla Supercharger Network" June 8, 2023.
https://news.gm.com/newsroom.detail.html/Pages/news/us/en/2023/jun/0608-gm.html. Accessed June 15,
2023.
Improved Charging Time Information
CARB recommends required disclosure of charging speed information at the time of
certification to ensure the data exists to support an improved label-reported charge time that is
more relevant than what is disclosed today. On today's label, a single charge time is presented,
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representing the time it takes to fully charge a completely depleted battery at the maximum Level
2 charge rate the vehicle is designed to accept. However, in-use vehicle data suggests that this is
not a charge condition relevant to typical consumer behavior as vehicle owners would rarely, if
ever, fully deplete the battery. CARB recommends charging time data be required to be
submitted at the time of certification to represent the full spectrum of rate of charge versus
battery state of charge for typical residential charging. This could allow for a future label that, for
example, determines the most meaningful value to display is the time it takes to recover to the
manufacturer's default or recommended routine maximum state of charge (e.g., 80 percent) after
a typical day's usage of a defined number of miles (e.g., 35 miles) on a commonly available
Level 2 capable circuit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 47-48]
Additionally, CARB recommends similar disclosure of DCFC rates such that a future label
could also meaningfully disclose recharging times a driver could expect at a public charging
station. Like the relevance of highway speeds for determining range, DCFC rates are most
relevant for consumers stopping mid-travel on long trips or for consumers without routine access
to home or workplace charging. In both cases, they may be looking for useful information
relevant to charging as quickly as possible from a largely (but not fully) depleted state of charge.
Disclosure of charge rate data could provide the necessary information to support a label with the
most meaningful data determined through future analysis. Examples of meaningful data could
include the time to recover from the most typical state of charges observed at DCFC stations for
starting and ending charge events or number of miles of range recovered per 10-minute charge
events. Such information, presented in a concise and consistent manner on the label, would
provide valuable information for consumers to shopping for a BEV most suitable for their needs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 47-48]
Infrastructure Costs
Level 2 Charging Infrastructure Costs
CARB recommends that U.S. EPA adjust its infrastructure cost discussion to include
additional residential charging options that are currently being implemented and may help reduce
overall charging infrastructure costs. In particular, CARB recommends that U.S. EPA accounts
for the possibility of low power Level 2 charging, defined as a 208/240 volt 20-ampere minimum
branch circuit and a receptacle that is used for charging a BEV or PHEV. 81 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, p. 50]
81 CALGreen code: 2022 California Green Building Standards (Title 24 Part 11), Chapter 2.
In California, the State's building agencies must provide a cost analysis for any building code
proposal. 82 CARB supports California's building agencies in developing BEV charging
provisions for newly constructed buildings and preparing the required estimates of expected
costs for vehicle charging requirements. 83 California's Green Building Standards Code
("CALGreen") now requires 25 percent of spaces in multi-family housing developments to have
a low power level 2 charging receptacle. 84 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 50]
82 California Government Code §11346 and subsequent.
83 California Health and Safety Code §18930.5(b); Cal. Code Regs, title 24, part 1.
84 See Cal. Code Regs., title 24, pt. 11.
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Based on its technical analysis in support of CALGreen, CARB finds U.S. EPA's cost
analysis to be conservative as it focuses on the installation of Level 2 chargers operating on 40
amperes. CARB's cost analysis focused on the hardware costs (including labor) required to
support a low power Level 2 charging receptacle, which is significantly less expensive to install
than a Level 2 EVSE. CARB estimates the cost of installing a low power Level 2 charging
receptacle to be $781 to $1,477 (including labor) as compared to U.S. EPA's cost estimate of
$3,300 for a 240-volt AC outlet installation to $4,100 for a Level 2 EVSE port in non-single-
family homes (non-SFH). While California is the only state to require the installation of low
power Level 2 charging receptacles, other states could reference CALGreen as a starting point
for their building codes. If other states adopt similar requirements of installing low power Level
2 charging receptacles during new construction, the cost to install charging infrastructure in non-
SFHs may be significantly less when compared to installing Level 2 EVSE or an outlet that can
support a Level 2 EVSE or a Level 2 EVSE in the same number of multifamily housing
developments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 50]
Charger investments
CARB agrees with U.S. EPA's findings that that the increased investment in charging
infrastructure will aid in the deployment of ZEVs. Although U.S. EPA mentions many important
infrastructure investments to date, CARB has identified additional programs to add to the "PEV
Charging Infrastructure Investments" section of the DRIA that will further the deployment of
ZEVs as an economical means of complying with the emission standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp. 50-51]
CARB recognizes that U.S. EPA has included some of Electrify America's investments such
as the charging partnerships the company has with auto manufacturers, the $450 million
investment from Siemens and Volkswagen Group, and the partnership between TravelCenters of
America and Electrify America. However, it is unclear if these investments by Electrify America
are a part of the Volkswagen settlement of $1.2 billion in the U.S. 5 lor this reason, CARB
recommends that U.S. EPA ensures its summary of public and private investments includes
Electrify America's $1.2B settlement that has supported deployment of infrastructure
nationwide. CARB also recommends including Walmart's plans to install chargers at locations
throughout the country, 85 and 7-11 's charging network called 7Charge that will be installed at
select locations. 86 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 50-51]
85 Leading the Charge: Walmart Announces Plan To Expand Electric Vehicle Charging Network. April 6,
2023. Accessed May 26, 2023. https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2023/04/06/leading-the-charge-
walmart- announces-plan-to-expand-electric-vehicle-charging-network
86 7-Eleven Inc. Launches New Electric Vehicle Charging Network. March 16, 2023. Accessed May 26,
2023. https://franchise.7-eleven.com/franchise-press-releases/7-and-8209-eleven-inc-launches-new-
electric-vehicle- charging-network-7charge
These additions would help ensure that the federal analysis account for the increasing
infrastructure deployment that will support ZEV deployment in the coming years . [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 50-51]
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Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
D. Sales of Zero-Emission Vehicles Are Projected to Continue Growing at a Dramatic
Rate
Zero-emission-vehicle technologies 107 are the most effective tailpipe emission control
technologies available to date, and demand for zero-emission vehicles specifically has exploded
in recent years. In response to this demand, significant public and private investments across the
country continue to be made to build sufficient charging infrastructure and develop the domestic
battery supply chain, and these investments are projected to keep pace with the dramatic growth
of the zero-emission vehicle market. There is every reason to expect this growth to continue.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 18]
107 The term "zero-emission-vehicle technologies" includes batteries with on-board chargers and hydrogen
stored in a fuel cell stack that transforms chemical energy into electrical energy to propel a vehicle.
Recent congressional actions demonstrate the federal commitment to substantial
electrification of the transportation sector. In 2021, Congress passed the Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law, which allocates $7.5 billion to building out a national network of electric vehicle chargers,
$7 billion to ensure domestic manufacturers have the critical minerals and other components
necessary to make electric vehicle batteries, and $10 billion for clean transit and school
buses. 110 In 2022, Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, which invests $52.7 billion in
America's manufacturing capacity for the semiconductors used in electric vehicles and
chargers. 111 Later in 2022, Congress passed the Inflation Reduction Act, which provides $7,500
to buyers of new electric vehicles and $4,000 to purchasers of pre-owned electric vehicles. 112
Additionally, the Inflation Reduction Act provides billions of dollars to support vehicle
manufacturers' expansion of their domestic production of clean vehicles, 113 and billions to
support battery production in the United States and mining and processing of critical minerals
needed for battery cells and electric motors. 114 The Inflation Reduction Act also allocates
billions to upgrade the nation's power grid in order to help address the new surge in grid demand
from electric vehicles. 115 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 18-19]
110 White House, Building a Better America: A Guidebook to the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law for State,
Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments, and Other Parties (May 2022), at 136, available at
https://www.whitehouse.gOv/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/BUILDING-A-BETTER-AMERICA-V2.pdf.;
White House, Building a Clean Energy Economy: A Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act's
Investments in Clean Energy and Climate Action (Jan. 2023) at 46, available at,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Inflation-Reduction-Act-Guidebook.pdf.
111 White House, Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act, supra n. 110, at 46.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 47.
114 Id. at 10, 26, 47.
115 Id. at 34.
2. States and the Power Sector Are Rapidly Expanding Electric Vehicle Charging
Infrastructure
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State and local governments are proactively engaged in ensuring a robust electric vehicle
supply equipment ("EVSE") charging infrastructure to support wider electric vehicle adoption,
including, but certainly not limited to, our States and Cities. For example, the California Energy
Commission's Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Project has directed over $180 million in rebates to
encourage the installation of public direct-current fast charger ("DCFC") and Level 2
chargers,125 supporting a current statewide network of 1,737 public DCFC stations (comprising
8,814 DCFC ports) and 13,015 public Level 2 stations (30,099 Level 2 ports).126 California,
Oregon, and Washington have adopted low-carbon fuel/clean fuel standards that support EVSE
installation through the generation of tradeable credits. 127 New Jersey's Department of
Environmental Protection has awarded grants for 2,980 charging stations with 5,271 ports at 680
locations. Maine directed $3.15 million from the Volkswagen litigation settlement and $10
million from the New England Clean Energy Connect settlement toward expanding the state's
DCFC network along key corridors, 128 and has allocated a further $8 million to electric vehicle
charging from American Rescue Plan funds. 129 New York's EVolve program has committed
$250 million to install 800 new EV fast charging stations throughout the state by 2025, including
along major highway corridors. 130 New York has awarded more than $13 million in grants to
cover municipalities' eligible costs toward the installation of Level 2 EV charging stations,
DCFC stations, and hydrogen fuel cell filling stations. 131 Washington has awarded more than
$10 million in Zero-Emission Vehicle Infrastructure Partnership grants and announced $30
million more for 2023-25.132 Massachusetts has required that charging stations for public use be
installed at all service plazas located on the Massachusetts Turnpike by July 1, 2024.133 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 21-22]
125 CALeVIP, About CALeVIP (last accessed on June 8, 2023), available at https://calevip.org/about-
calevip; CALeVIP, CALeVIP Rebate Statistics Dashboard (last accessed on June 8, 2023), available at
https://calevip.org/rebate-statistics.
126 U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Center, Alternative Fuels Station Locator, available
at https://afdc.energy.gov/stations (last accessed June 8, 2023).
127 Cal. Code Reg., tit. 17, § 95486.2(b) (2020); Or. Admin. R. 340-253-0330 (2023); Wash. Admin. Code
§ 173-424-560(2) (2022).
128 Efficiency Maine, Maine's Electric Vehicle Fast-Charging Network Expands to the North and East
(Jun. 3, 2021), available at https://www.efficiencymaine.com/maines-electric-vehicle-fast-charging-
network-expands-to-the-north-and-east/; see also Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 35-A, § 10125; Me. Pub. Utilities
Commission, Order Granting Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity and Approving Stipulation,
Docket No. 2017-00232 (May 3, 2019), at 77, 96.
129 Office of the Governor of Maine, The Maine Jobs & Recovery Plan (May 4, 2021), at 12, available at
https://www.maine.gov/covidl9/sites/maine.gov.covidl9/files/inline-
files/MaineJobs%26RecoveryPlan.pdf.
130 EVolve NY, Making New York a Leader in EV Infrastructure, available at
https://evolveny.nypa.gov/en/about-evolve-new-york (last visited Jun. 27, 2023).
131 New York Department of Environmental Conservancy, Office of Climate Change, Municipal Zero-
emission Vehicle Program (2021), available at
https://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/administration_pdf/2021zevprogrep_(l).pdf (program outlays through FY
2021); New York Governor's Press Office, Governor Hochul Announces More Than $8.3 Million to
Municipalities for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (Apr. 13, 2023), available at
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-more-83-million-municipalities-electric-
vehicle-charging (program outlays in FY 2022).
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132 Washington Department of Transportation, Zero-emission Vehicle Infrastructure Partnerships grant,
available at https ://wsdot. wa.gov/business-wsdot/grants/zero-emission-vehicle-grants/zero-emission-
vehicle-infrastructure-partnerships-grant
133 An Act Driving Clean Energy and Offshore Wind, 2022 Mass. Acts, ch. 179, § 89.
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2022/Chapterl79.
In the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, Congress directed $5 billion toward States to expand
charging infrastructure under the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure ("NEVI") Formula
Program. 134 To date, all 50 States have submitted and received approval for their NEVI
plans. 135 These plans detail the considerable resources and local expertise that state
transportation, energy, and environmental agencies bring in support of Congress's vision of a
"national network of electric vehicle charging infrastructure."136 Those resources include the
mobilization of significant public and private nonfederal monies, 137 the strategic siting of EVSE
infrastructure in high-demand areas and major transportation corridors, 138 designing resilience
strategies to pair chargers with distributed generation and storage resources, 139 and providing
model ordinances for municipal governments to support EVSE expansion. 140 These plans also
illustrate the importance of greater EV adoption to States' climate targets. 141 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, pp. 22-24]
134 Pub. L. No. 117-58, § 801 (Nov. 15, 2021), 135 Stat. 1421.
135 Federal Highway Administration, Fiscal Year 2022/2023 EV Infrastructure Deployment Plans,
available at
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/index.cfm?format=list#map.
136 Pub. L. No. 117-58, §801, 135 Stat. 1422.
137 See, e.g., Colorado NEVI State Plan, at 31, available at
https://www.codot.gov/programs/innovativemobility/assets/co_neviplan_2022_final-l.pdf (describing state
funds available for cost sharing); New Jersey NEVI State Plan, at 23 (describing establishment of a New
Jersey Green Fund with monies from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative to provide low-cost financing
for EVSE projects).
138 See, e.g., California NEVI State Plan, at 34-40, available at
https://www.codot.gov/programs/innovativemobility/assets/co_neviplan_2022_final-l.pdf (describing
phases of EVSE build-out along transport corridors).
139 See, e.g., Oklahoma NEVI State Plan, at 54, available at
https://www.codot.gov/programs/innovativemobility/assets/co_neviplan_2022_final-l.pdf (proposing, e.g.,
preferences for EVSE paired with distributed energy resources like solar or battery storage).
140 See, e.g., Pennsylvania NEVI State Plan, at 7, available at
https://www.penndot.pa.gov/ProjectAndPrograms/Planning/EVs/Documents/Final%20PA%20NEVI%20
State%20Plan%20(ver%207-21-2022).pdf; Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, EV Model
Ordinance Toolkit, available at https://www.penndot.pa.gov/ProjectAndPrograms/Planning/EVs/Pages/EV-
Model-Ordinance-Toolkit.aspx
141 See, e.g., North Carolina NEVI State Plan, at 5, 16, 28, available at
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/nc_nevi_plan.pdf (discussing state
climate and transportation policy and NEVI program); New York NEVI State Plan, at 19-26, available at
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/ny_nevi_plan.pdf (same).
Utilities and private EVSE companies have committed significant resources to expanding
charging infrastructure. 142 New Jersey utilities have committed $215 million for make-ready
infrastructure for public, multi-unit dwelling and workplace charging stations, and residential
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chargers. New York utilities' EV Make-Ready Program has a budget of $701 million allocated to
support the development of electric vehicle infrastructure. 143 As EPA notes, an alliance of over
60 investor-owned and municipal electric companies and electric cooperatives in 48 States and
D.C. have formed the National Electric Highway Coalition to deploy fast-charging infrastructure
seamlessly across major transportation corridors "by the end of 2023."144 State legislatures and
public utility commissions (PUCs) are actively engaged in supplementing utilities' existing
efforts with additional resources and authority. 145 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 22-24]
142 Yvonne Bertucci zum Tobel, Will Florida's improved electric vehicle infrastructure convince people to
buy an EV?, WLRN (Jul. 20, 2022), available at https://www.wlrn.org/news/2022-07-20/will-floridas-
improved-electric-vehicle-infrastructure-convince-people-to-buy-an-ev (detailing Florida Power & Light's
work installing 1,000 charging ports—most of them free, public Level 2 chargers—at over 200 Florida
locations); Tampa Electric Co., Pet. of Tampa Elec. Co. for Approval of Elec. Vehicle Charging Pilot
Program (Sep. 25, 2020), available at https://www.floridapsc.eom/pscfiles/library/filings/2020/09448-
2020/09448-2020.pdf (seeking approval for pilot program to install 200 charging ports at businesses, retail,
and apartment complexes).
143 Joint Utilities of New York, EV Make-Ready Program, available at
https://jointutilitiesofny.org/ev/make-ready (last visited Jun. 27,2023).
144 Edison Electric Institute, National Electric Highway Coalition, available at https://www.eei.org/issues-
and-policy/national-electric-highway-coalition; see 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,308.
145 Last year, for example, Indiana's legislature approved a law to empower its PUC to conduct pilot
programs to expand public EVSE and study their impact on distribution grids. Indiana H.B. 1221 (signed
Mar. 11, 2022), https://iga.in.gOv/legislative/2022/bills/house/1221#document-7bf5903c.
EPA correctly recognizes that increased EV adoption and the build-out of EVSE
infrastructure implies an increase in electricity demand, which EPA estimates at less than 0.4%
in 2030 to approximately 4% in 2050. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,311. The Regional Transmission
Organizations ("RTOs") and Independent System Operators ("ISOs"), which are responsible for
procuring sufficient generation and transmission capacity within their footprints, are already
taking into account projected EV adoption to plan over a 10-20 year horizon. ISO New England
and Texas's ERCOT, for example, both incorporate electrification forecasts into their capacity
planning and conclude that grid capacity will continue to meet demand with substantial reserve
margins. 146, 147 These detailed planning processes apply the RTOs' and ISOs' considerable
expertise, data, and analytical resources to ensure a reliable and adequate grid. 148 States are
likewise active in this area. For example, in 2016, Assembly Bill 2868 in California required
utilities to procure 500 MW of distributed energy storage resources, above and beyond a 1,325
MW utility storage target set under Assembly Bill 2514 (2010). Hawai'i is a national leader in
customer-sited distributed energy resources (such as rooftop and community solar power), with
88,000 systems in use across Hawaiian Electric's five-island service territory. 149 And, in 2018,
the Massachusetts legislature adopted an Energy Storage Initiative Target, which calls for
l,000MWh of energy storage by the end of 2025.150 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 25]
146 ISO New England, 2023-2032 Forecast Report of Capacity, Energy, Loads, and Transmission, sheets
1.1, 1.2, 1.7 (May 1, 2023), available at https://www.iso-ne.com/system-planning/system-plans-studies/celt
(finding grid capacity will exceed peak summer and winter loads through 2032, taking into account
transportation and heating electrification).
147 Texas NEVI State Plan, at 23-25, available at
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/tx_nevi_plan.pdf (discussing reserve
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margins for grid capacity far outstripping the "theoretical maximum energy consumption" from proposed
EVSE build-out).
148 See, e.g., California ISO, 2022-2023 Transmission Plan (Apr. 3, 2023), available at
https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.eom/RecurringStakeholderProcesses/2022-2023-Transmission-planning-
process
149 Hawaiian Electric, Customer Energy Resources for Hawai'i (May 2021),
https://www.hawaiianelectric.com/documents/products_and_services/customer_renewable_programs/202
10503_customer_energy_resources_for_hawaii.pdf.
150 An Act to Advance Clean Energy, 2018 Mass. Acts., ch. 227, § 20.
Our States and Cities add three observations to EPA's analysis of costs and lead time. First,
EPA's projected costs likely overstate the actual costs attributable to reaching the standards in
the allotted lead time, due to conservative assumptions in EPA's no-action case that omit the
myriad state and local actions to promote electric vehicle adoption. See supra 18-21; CARB
Comment at 16. Second, state and local agencies are implementing ambitious programs to ready
power grids and charging infrastructure for the increased adoption of electric vehicles and the
associated increase in electricity demand, which further supports EPA's feasibility analysis.
Third, although internal-combustion-engine vehicles will make up a smaller portion of the
national fleet, it is imperative that EPA's standards continue to encourage the application of
feasible, cost-effective emission-reduction technologies to these vehicles, as they still represent a
significant source of GHG, criteria, and toxic pollutant emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0746, p. 33]
2. State and Local Actions Are Facilitating the Necessary Generation, Transmission, and
Charging Infrastructure to Support the Projected Compliance Pathway
While EPA only needs to consider the costs of regulatory compliance incurred within the
allotted lead time, Coalition for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 128, EPA also considers the
demands on the power sector from projected compliance with the proposed and alternative
standards. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,309-312. We agree with EPA's assessment that the projected modest
increase in electricity demand (0.04 to 2% over the course of the regulated model years) is more
than manageable. This is especially true when compared to other historical and current examples
of rapid demand increases that the power sector successfully met, see 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,311
(noting widespread adoption of air conditioning in 1960s and 1970s and 21st-century growth of
data centers and server farms), 188 and given Congress's significant investments in transmission,
generation, and charging infrastructure in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law's NEVI Formula
Program and the Inflation Reduction Act. Draft RIA, at 5-14 (Tables 5-2 & 5-3); 88 Fed. Reg. at
29,307-08. Part D.2 of the Background section, supra at 21-25, provides examples of some of the
actions our States and Cities are taking, including under the NEVI Formula Program, to ensure
there is sufficient charging infrastructure to support the projected electric vehicle penetration
rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 35]
188 See also White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, Climate and Energy Implications of
Crypto-Assets in the United States (Sep. 2022), at 14-15, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/09/09-2022-Crypto-Assets-and-Climate-Report.pdf (estimating U.S.-based
cryptocurrency mining operations for Bitcoin alone to consume "33 to 55 billion kWh per year, or 0.9% to
1.4% of total U.S. electricity usage in 2021").
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Organization: CALSTART
2. Infrastructure
Infrastructure is an acknowledged real near-term challenge. However, infrastructure is a
solvable challenge, rather than a long-term barrier. Major federal, state, and private investments
outline a realistic path to scale that will create the necessary infrastructure to meet demand where
people live, work, and play. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, pp. 4-5]
For example, in the public charging arena, NEVI and CFI are bringing historic investments to
expand availability and access to public charging. These investments are helping to achieve the
goal of 500,000 EV Level 2 and DC Fast Chargers (DCFC) EV chargers by 2030. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0618, pp. 4-5]
The funding will more than triple the current number of EV chargers and make public
charging significantly more accessible for EV owners.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, pp. 4-
5]
4 htps://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/02/15/fact-sheet-biden-harris-
administration-announces-new-standards-and-major-progress-for-a-made-in-america-national-network-of-
electric-vehicle-chargers/
Additionally, Charge@Work is a DOE-funded National Workplace Charging Program
administered by CALSTART that is helping over 1,000 employers across the country provide
charging solutions to their employees. The Charge@Work program will add over 100,000 ports
at workplaces across the country. Even for drivers who do not have access to home charging,
Charge@Work is making it easier for drivers to go electric by engaging employers to become
part of the solution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, pp. 4-5]
Additionally, the recent moves by industry participants to align with Tesla's North American
Charging Standard (NACS) offer a positive way forward for the industry as it moves towards a
superior charging user experience which will further accelerate EV adoption and unlock mass
market vehicle electrification. Further, a charging network that is used by all EVs has the
potential for optimized, high utilization which translates to better returns to capital and faster
reinvestment to expand the charging network. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Charles Gordon
INCONVENIENCE TO PEOPLE
The rapid elimination of new gas-powered cars creates real inconvenience for ordinary
people. Those who live in apartment buildings will have to find charging stations where it will
take 30 minutes to recharge. This will particularly hurt the poor and minorities. Long trips by car
will require careful planning and 30-minute interruptions to recharge. Towing large trailers will
be virtually impossible. This is added to the existing inconvenience of more expensive washing
machines which take 60 minutes to wash a load-not 30 and dishwashers which take 2 hours to
poorly wash dishes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 7]
It may be hard to put a dollar amount on this inconvenience, but it is real nonetheless. EPA
needs to take that inconvenience into account when it reviews the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 7]
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Organization: Chevron
4. Feasibility and implementation.
Chevron is concerned that the rapid increases in forecasted BEV sales rate are optimistic and
may overstate the benefits of the proposals. The proposals may limit choices and increase costs
for consumers, including those in economically disadvantaged groups and smaller businesses.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, p. 6]
BEV sales forecasts may rely on optimistic expectations for increased electricity generation
and charging infrastructure. EPA should conduct an assessment to account for the costs and
timing associated with upgrades to the nation's grid infrastructure, including new and upgraded
generation, transmission, and distribution, and the costs associated with the installation of public
and private electric vehicle chargers. If it is not feasible to complete expansion and
improvements for the current grid, it may not be possible to meet the additional demand created
by the proposed regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, p. 6]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CFDC) et al.
These aggregate costs include:
- Vehicle charging infrastructure. This includes not only the low $120 billion in EVSE costs
the proposal projects, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,367, but also billions more in surrounding infrastructure.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 5-6]
III. The Proposed Rule is Not Feasible for Other Reasons.
While the proposal's gross misstatement of vehicle technology costs is the primary reason
EPA's proposal is not feasible, the agency also overlooks many other important aspects of the
problem. Despite EPA's hopeful projections, very few American want to buy electric vehicles
and even fewer will at the prices they will inevitably command. Non-binding company
commitments and (unlawful) regulations designed to enforce these commitments do little to
change this. Even if consumers did want to purchase these electric vehicles in the volumes EPA
projects, the proposal fails to confront several barriers to its rapid electrification plans, including
limits on the supply of minerals necessary to manufacture batteries, inadequate charging
infrastructure and electrical supplies, and the complex interactions between this rule and other
proposed rules all of which will further hinder this development. In light of these many barriers,
it is unreasonable for the agency to conclude that compliance with its proposed emission
standards is feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 25-26]
E. There will not be enough charging infrastructure to persuade skeptical consumers to adopt
battery electric vehicles in the numbers EPA projects.
Another reason the proposal is not feasible is a dearth of charging infrastructure. Currently,
electric vehicle charging infrastructure is "inadequate and plagued with non-functioning
stations." Dan Zukowski, EV charging infrastructure is "inadequate and plagued with non-
functioning stations": J.D. Power, SmartCitiesDive (Feb. 22, 2023),
https://www.smartcitiesdive.com/news/ev-charging-infrastructure-inade-quate-non-functioning-
stations/643148/. An on-going study by J.D. Power found that charge point unreliability has
increased 50% from 2021 to January 2023, from 14% to 21%. Id. This unreliability has led to
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high rates of dissatisfaction with public charging stations among electric vehicle owners. Id. This
dissatisfaction is worse in states with higher numbers of electric vehicles and in large cities with
high-density housing. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 30-31]
This is likely to get worse. "[T]he rate of EV adoption is" already "growing at a rate that is
almost double that of charger installation growth rates" and "the construction of new charging
stations is not keeping up with the demand." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 30-31]
Further, as detailed below, the electric grid is simply not ready for the massive increase in
charging infrastructure necessary for the proposed rule to be feasible. "In a little over a decade
... rapid EV growth alone could increase peak electricity demand by up to 25%." Mark Golden,
Charging Cars at Home at Night is Not the Way to Go, Stanford Study Finds, Stanford News
(Sep. 22, 2022), https://news.stanford.edu/press-releases/2022/09/22/charging-cars-honight-not-
way-go/. Recent research found that "when [electric vehicle] penetration hits 30% to 40% of cars
on the road, the grid will experience significant stress." Id. Without significant infrastructure
improvements to support this charging, the proposal will not be feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0712, pp. 30-31]
A. The proposal underestimates the cost for charging infrastructure.
According to EPA, its proposed rule would require 12 million home, 400,000 workplace, and
110,000 public charging ports in 2027. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,309; DRIA at 5-31. This would increase
to 75 million home, 12.7 million workplace, and 1.9 million public chargers, respectively, by
2055. Id. Developing this infrastructure would come at a high cost. The proposal suggests that
these installations would cost between $96 billion and $140 billion by 2055, and $21 billion just
between 2027 and 2032. See DRIA at 5-36. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 33-34]
But even these costs are a dramatic underestimate. This June, the Department of Energy
published new estimates of the need for electric charging infrastructure investment that found
that "[a] cumulative national capital investment of $53-$127 billion in charging infrastructure is
needed by 2030 (including private residential charging) to support 33 million PEVs." U.S.
Department of Energy, National Renew-able Energy Laboratory, The 2030 National Charging
Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (June
2023). https://driveelectric.gov/files/2030-charging-network.pdf. These estimates included
between $22 and $72 billion for privately accessible Level 1 and Level 2 charging ports, $27 and
$44 billion for publicly accessible fast charging ports, and $5 and $11 billion for publicly
accessible Level 2 charging ports. And notably, the "cost of grid upgrades and distributed energy
resources [were] excluded from these estimates." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 33-
34]
DOE's projected costs are for only 33 million vehicles. EPA projects that approximately 54
million electric vehicles will be on the road in 2032. Given the general linear relationship
between electric vehicle charging infrastructure costs and the number of electric vehicles in the
fleet, it is reasonable to estimate a cost of between $1,606 and $3,848 for charging infrastructure
per electric vehicle. This means charging infrastructure would cost up to $207 billion total and
$59 billion for just the 15 million additional vehicles EPA projects its proposal will require by
2032. EPA's failure to account for these costs—and the added costs of "grid upgrades and
distributed energy resources"—would be arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, pp. 33-34]
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Organization: Colorado Energy Office, Colorado Department of Transportation, and Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment
In response to EPA's request for comments on specific aspects of the rule, we offer the
following suggestions to ensure the rule is as successful as possible: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0694, pp. 2-3]
-Regarding criteria pollutants, we urge EPA to consider ways to align these proposed
standards with California, and in doing so to avoid any backsliding in remaining conventional
vehicles sold, while avoiding a scenario in which OEMs are forced to divert investment away
from transportation electrification and towards technology advancement on conventional
vehicles. We are concerned that the criteria standards in the EPA draft rule could have this
unintended effect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694, pp. 2-3]
-We urge EPA to consider investments in charging infrastructure as an option for
manufacturers to achieve compliance credit. For years, EPA has included a broad range of
crediting options to add flexibility to the program in ways that support its underlying goals. At
the state and local level, one of the greatest challenges we face is completing robust and varied
networks of public and private charging infrastructure so that travelers can travel where they
want to go without range anxiety. We appreciate new funding in IIJA, but achieving this goal
will require all the tools in the toolbox. We strongly urge EPA to utilize its credit program to
incentivize companies investing in the charging networks which benefits consumers and will
facilitate more public private partnership around this critical need. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0694, pp. 2-3]
-EPA requested comment on whether to consider a future rulemaking for gasoline fuel
property standards to further reduce PM emissions. Colorado supports EPA exercising its
authority under CAA 211(c) to develop gasoline property standards in a future rulemaking.
Cleaner fuel standards will complement the vehicle emissions standards proposed in the current
rulemaking by addressing emissions from the existing ICE vehicle fleet, as well as the vehicles
that will be produced during the phase-in and operative periods of the proposed vehicle
emissions standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA)
Struggling with access to affordable transportation, however, is just one of the equity impacts
that has not been addressed by the U.S. EPA How will U.S. EPA address the systemic inequity
and energy injustice issues embedded in this rule beyond the financial burden that will be
caused? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp. 3-4]
For example, the practical use of EVs benefit wealthier users as well. Charging infrastructure
Is a critical component for EV usage, with access to chargers (and specifically fast chargers) a
major consideration in purchasing an EV. Wealthier users are far more likely to live In single
family homes where installation of a fast charger costing thousands of dollars is simply a matter
of fact. Lower income families who are more likely to reside in apartments or rented properties
do not have the option of installing their own personal dedicated fast chargers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0788, pp.3-4]
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Even the location of charging infrastructure tends to benefit the wealthier, whiter, male
demographic that makes up 75% of the individuals who purchase EVs. A recent MIT study on
EVs and equity noted 7: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp. 3-4]
"According to Hsu and Fingerman (43], Black and Hispanic neighborhoods only had 0.7
times the access to public chargers as the no-majority reference group in California. They also
determined that even when income, proximity to the nearest highway, and multi-family housing
were controlled for, White-majority census block groups were 1.5 times more likely to have
access to public charging stations compared to Black-and Latino-majority census block groups."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp. 3-4]
7 sciencepolicvreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-electric-vehicles/
They also noted that public charging, when available to lower income communities, typically
costs more than home charging stating: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp. 3-4]
"This higher cost would disproportionately affect low-income households who already pay a
higher proportion of their income towards transportation." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp.
3-4]
By creating disparities in access to the "fuel" through charging network realities this further
exacerbates the differences in transportation equity between rich and poor. Combine that with
what is sure to be higher electricity prices from the requisite generation, distribution and
transmission infrastructure buildout required to meet growing electricity demand as is often the
case the poor will just keep getting poorer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, pp. 3-4]
Organization: DavidManley III
Of course, while the proposed rule benefits China without significantly reducing global
temperatures, American consumers are penalized because (a) while gas-powered cars take five or
10 minutes to refill, recharging an electric vehicle can take 45 minutes, and personal mobility,
including road trips, will be adversely effected since EVs require longer and more frequent
interruptions for charging, (b) The common American cannot afford EVs as EVs were on
average $11,981 more expensive than gas-powered cars at the end of 2022, and today, for
example, the electric version of the Ford F-150 pickup truck, the best-selling vehicle in America,
costs an additional $26,000 over the gasoline-powered one while Tesla's EVs start at $39,000 for
a Model 3 and go up to nearly $100,000 for a Model X — prices much higher than most families
can afford, and (c) American consumers will have to deal with electric power availability
problems (even with bidirectional charging that has a negative aspect) as the power grids will not
have the capacity to deal with the increased load. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0513, p. 1]
Organization: Doug Peterson
It is going to be extremely challenging to build enough public charging infrastructure to keep
up with our rapidly growing fleet of BEVs. Lack of charging infrastructure is currently one of
the main barriers to BEV adoption, and the problem is bound to get worse. BEV owners with no
access to home charging will place much greater demands on public chargers than early adopters
who tend to utilize their own charging equipment. Current BEV owners typically use their own
equipment for roughly 80% of their charging needs, and automakers pair larger battery packs
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with faster onboard chargers to facilitate overnight home charging at 240 volts. As BEVs scale
up, renters will make up a larger percentage of BEV owners and demand for Level 3 public
chargers will increase dramatically. Even if Level 3 charging speeds improve significantly, there
is going to be chronic congestion at public charging stations. Renters will be disproportionally
impacted by the inconvenience, and inequitable access to electric fuel will compel them to stick
with readily available gasoline. These challenges are surmountable, but they are made more
difficult by poor BEV fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 12-13]
An inefficient fleet of BEVs will also increase the amount of electricity that needs to be
transmitted to distant locations along major transportation corridors. It is entirely feasible to
generate enough additional electricity to keep up with a growing fleet of BEVs, but getting the
electricity where it needs to be to facilitate long distance travel is going to be a slow endeavor,
and very expensive. If an urgent transition away from gasoline is to succeed, we need a fleet of
highly efficient BEVs that does not exacerbate the significant difficulties associated with the
distribution of electric auto fuel. It is especially important that we maximize BEV efficiency in
the near term. The electric fleet cannot grow faster than the requisite fueling infrastructure, and
immediate efforts to optimize BEV fuel economy will reduce this significant limitation on their
proliferation [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0500, pp. 12-13]
Organization: Edison Electric Institute (EEI)
II. Electric Companies Are Building Infrastructure To Accommodate The Electrification Of
The Transportation Sector.
EEI member companies are leading the charge to ready the market for widescale adoption of
light-, medium-and heavy-duty EVs. EEI members are making investments and offering
programs designed to help their customers overcome barriers to EV adoption, while also
supporting existing EV users and year-over-year growth in the EV market. Many of these
programs help to deploy and/or offset the cost of EV charging infrastructure in homes,
workplaces, public locations, as well as for fleet operators. To date, more than 30 states and the
District of Columbia have approved electric company customer programs and investments
totaling more than $4.2 billion. 17 Further, EEI members are leading by example with their own
fleets by setting individual fleet electrification goals that put them on track to electrify more than
a third of their fleet vehicles by 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 6-7]
17 See EEI, Electric Transportation Biannual State Regulatory Update (Apr. 2023), https://www.eei.org/-
/media/Project/EEI/Documents/Issues-and-Policy/Electric-Transportation/ET-Biannual-State-Regulatory-
Update.pdf.
However, EPA notes that several stakeholders have raised concerns that "slow growth in ZEV
charging and refueling infrastructure can slow the growth of heavy-duty ZEV adoption, and that
this may present challenges for vehicle manufacturers ability to comply with future EPA GHG
standards." 88 Fed. Reg. 25,934. EEI member companies have addressed similar infrastructure
build out issues in the past. Like those issues, these concerns can be addressed through deliberate
effort and collaboration among electric companies, fleet operators, and stakeholders, including
planning for increased demand, customer engagement, and fleet electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0708, pp. 6-7]
A. Electric companies can accommodate increased energy demand.
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As EPA notes, the electric power sector has a long history of accommodating growth in
electricity demand from the adoption of new technologies, including electric home appliances,
residential and commercial air conditioning, and data centers. See id. At 25,983. Electricity use
from EVs today is modest. Argonne National Lab estimates the approximately 2.3 million EVs
on the road as of the end of 2021 consumed 6.1 terawatt-hours of electricity in that year, or about
0.16 percent of the total electric sales to U.S. customers in that year.18 As EPA also notes, the
increase in electricity use resulting from the Proposed Rule also will be modest, increasing
electricity end-use by less than 3 percent in 2055. See id. On a macro-level, meeting the
increased energy usage from electric truck adoption as contemplated in the Proposed Rule will
not be a significant challenge for the electric power sector. Meeting the location-specific power
needs of large electric vehicle (EV) charging facilities can be a more pressing challenge. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 7-9]
However, this is a challenge that can be addressed with deliberate effort and collaboration
among electric companies, fleet operators, and stakeholders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708,
pp. 7-9]
18 See Gohlke, et al., Assessment of Light-Duty Plug-in Electric Vehicles in the United States, 2010 -
2021, https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2022/ll/178584.pdf and U.S. Energy Information
Administration, Electric Power Monthly
Electric companies can accommodate localized power needs at the pace of customer demand,
provided appropriate customer engagement and enabling policies are in place. The power
required by a customer is essential when considering the infrastructure needed at the facility
level, because the capacity of the local distribution circuit is sized to meet the peak power
requirements of customers on that circuit. Some large EV charging facilities have power
requirements in the tens of megawatts (MW). Electric companies are well accustomed to serving
facilities with those types of power needs, but large fleet customers differ from traditional
electric customers (e.g., commercial or industrial buildings) in several important aspects. These
aspects include, but are not limited to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 7-9]
Construction timelines: A new, large commercial building with a multi-MW power
demand, for example, will typically have a multi-year construction timeline, giving the local
electric company time to plan and make appropriate upgrades to the electric distribution system
serving that customer. A fleet operator, in contrast, may be able to procure vehicles and complete
construction on a multi-MW charging facility in a matter of months. This creates a potential
misalignment between the fleet operators' timeline to procure vehicles and charging equipment
and the electric company's timeline for making the necessary system upgrades to provide power
to that facility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 7-9]
Customer familiarity with procuring electric power: Commercial and industrial
electric customers are used to working with electric companies for the operation of their facilities
as part of their normal course of business, including working with electric companies as part of
the construction process for launching new facilities. In particular, national corporate customers
often have long-standing relationships with the electric companies that serve them. Electric
companies typically assign these customers an account manager, given their scale and
complexity. A fleet operator, in contrast, is used to procuring diesel to operate its vehicles, and
may consider procuring electricity in the same paradigm. Fleet operators may be small electricity
users today and thus that division may not yet be considered a managed account for the electric
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company. However, EEI members have identified this issue and are expanding their working
relationship with these customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 7-9]
Uncertain and dynamic load profiles: The power usage throughout the day, known as
the "load profile," of typical commercial and industrial buildings is well understood (e.g., large
retail store, data center, or manufacturing facility). Typical load profiles for electric fleet
customers are not yet well understood and often hypothetical given the early stage of electric
truck commercialization. A fleet charging load profile is the product of many factors, including
the routes of the vehicles, the state of charge of the EV when returning to the facility, the number
of operating shifts, etc. Unlike a typical commercial building, the load profile of a fleet facility
could also drastically change with a change in vehicle operations (e.g., changing from a one-shift
to two-shift operation). This uncertainty adds complexity for electric companies when
determining how best to serve the power requirements of a fleet customer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0708, pp. 7-9]
These factors could result in misalignment between expectations and reality regarding the
timing, cost, and complexity of procuring electric power for fleet charging. Electric companies
are taking a multi-pronged approach to remedy this potential misalignment, as discussed in the
following sections. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 7-9]
In New York, the Public Service Commission opened a proceeding in April to address
barriers to medium-and heavy-duty electric vehicle infrastructure. In particular, the order
recognizes that "proactive planning for the grid infrastructure needed to serve future
electrification load must anticipate the location and magnitude of future demand" and notes an
analogy to previous policies in which the commission directed the electric companies in New
York to "develop proactive planning processes to anticipate the need for local transmission and
distribution system upgrades to enable the renewable interconnections required to achieve the
State's renewable energy goals "23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 14-15]
23 State of New York Public Service Commission, Case 23-E-0070, Proceeding on Motion of the
Commission to Address Barriers to Medium-and Heavy-Duty Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure.
EPA's assessment that "there is sufficient time for the infrastructure, especially for depot
charging, to gradually increase over the remainder of this decade to levels that support the
stringency of the proposed standards for the timeframe they would apply" is accurate. 88 Fed.
Reg. 25,999. As seen above, EEI members actively are planning for and deploying infrastructure
today. However, the increased deployment of this infrastructure over the next decade and beyond
will not happen on its own. Proactive planning processes, whether initiated by the relevant
electric company or state regulatory commission, will be critical to accommodate fleet
electrification to meet customer expectations and planning requirements, while also providing
affordable and reliable service. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 14-15]
IV. Electric Company Policies and Programs Can Help Reduce Capital and Operational Costs
for Fleet Electrification Customers.
Many EEI members over the last decade have sought regulatory approval from their state
regulatory commissions to accelerate transportation electrification by reducing customer barriers
to adoption. As of March 2023, and as mentioned supra, electric transportation filings from 62
electric companies in 35 states and Washington, D.C. have totaled more than $4.2 billion. The
majority of these investments support the deployment of EV charging infrastructure at customer
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locations, and a significant portion is targeted to fleet customers. These programs can help
reduce the cost that the customer would otherwise pay for the installation of EV charging
infrastructure, which is a commonly cited barrier to EV charging infrastructure deployment.25
Further, electric companies can work with fleet customers to help manage their EV charging to
occur at non-peak times. This can reduce operational costs for the fleet customer and improve
utilization of the electric system, which puts downward pressure on rates for all customers.26
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 16-17]
25 An oft cited barrier to adoption for some customers is the low utilization of EV charging stations.
Traditional electric rates for commercial customers include a demand component designed to recover the
fixed costs of delivery electricity. With low utilization (such as a public EV charging station or some fleet
charging use cases), the effective electric price can be higher than a customer with the same demand but
higher utilization. Many electric companies offer or are exploring commercial rates or other programs that
reduce some of the demand charge exposure for these low utilization customers. See Cappers, et al., A
Snapshot of EV-Specific Rate Designs Among U.S. Investor-Owned Electric Utilities,
https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/snapshot-ev-specific-rate-designs.
26 See, e.g., Metz, et al., Distribution System Investments to Enable Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicle
Electrification - A Case Study of New York, https://www.edf.org/media/worth- investment-report-finds-
utilities-fleet-owners-consumers-benefit-when-utilities-cover.
EPA notes that "there is considerable uncertainty associated with future distribution upgrade
needs, and in many cases, some costs may be borne by utilities rather than directly incurred by
BEV or fleet owners" in explaining why it models these costs as part of the infrastructure cost
analysis. 88 Fed. Reg. 25,983. In general, the upgrades to the local electric system needed to
bring sufficient power to the site may be known as "electric company-side make-ready" or
"front-of-the-meter" infrastructure and includes but is not limited to poles, vaults, service drops,
transformers, mounting pads, trenching, conduit, wire, cables, meters, other equipment as
necessary, and associated engineering and civil construction work. Front-of-the-meter
infrastructure is distinct from infrastructure on the customer side of the meter ("behind-the-
meter"), which includes the supply infrastructure (conduit and wiring to bring power from the
service connection to the charging station, and the associated installation costs, sometimes
known as "customer-side make-ready") and the charging equipment, sometimes known as
Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 16-17]
Front-of-the-meter infrastructure is generally installed, owned, and operated by the electric
company. However, the costs associated with front-of-the-meter infrastructure may be borne by
the site host customer in full or in part if the costs exceed an allowance as determined by the
electric company's line-extension and/or service extension policy. These costs may also be
known as "contributions in aid of construction." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
Modeling these front-of-the-meter infrastructure costs is inappropriate for the following
reasons. First, estimating distribution upgrade costs may be beyond the scope of EPA's analysis,
as it is not clear that a similar scope of analysis is applied to traditional liquid fuels. For example,
the analogous cost comparison for internal combustion engine vehicle would include cost
considerations for fleet operators either 1) installing refueling stations at their own facilities, or
2) the embedded cost of fuel retailers' business operations in the cost of diesel or gasoline.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
Second, as described above, distribution upgrades are highly location specific. The costs
associated with these upgrades are also highly variable, depending on the upgrade requested by
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the customer and the local distribution capacity. As stated in EEI's Preparing to Plug In Your
Fleet guide, "the grid can expand as needed to accommodate the needs of any customer, but the
time and resources needed to make the required upgrades are highly dependent on the specific
facility and the circuit that serves it."27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
27 See EEI, Preparing To Plug In Your Fleet - 10 Things to Consider, https://www.eei.org/-
/media/Project/EEI/Documents/Issues-and-Policy/Electric-
Transportation/PreparingToPluglnYourFleetpdf.
Third, the share of any distribution costs that the customer may bear varies as a matter of
policy. Some electric companies have or are seeking approval for line extension allowances to
cover some or all of these costs for serving EV charging infrastructure. In California, for
example, legislation required electric companies in the state to file tariffs that would authorize
them to "design and deploy all electrical distribution infrastructure on the utility side of the
customer's meter for all customers installing separately metered infrastructure to support
charging stations, other than those in single-family residences." This policy prompted tariffs
from EEI members Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), and
SCE that essentially allow electric companies to invest in more of the electric company-side
infrastructure costs as part of the standard distribution system investment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
Fourth, EEI expects that the majority of fleets to electrify in the next several years will be
those with return-to-base operations, which enables depot charging that is owned and operated
by the fleet itself. Public charging, analogous to the existing gas station model, will be needed to
serve long-haul electric trucks, but that opportunity will be limited in the near-term by battery
capabilities. However, there are many new refueling models emerging, including but not limited
to: fleet charging facilities owned by third parties and accessed by fleet operators through a
reservation or subscription system; charging-as-a-service companies that disintermediate the
fleet operator from the electric company, owning and operating the charging equipment at a
customer facility and assessing the fleet operator a fully-bundled, flat charging fee (e.g., $/kWh);
and transportation-as-a-service companies that provide the vehicle and charging to a fleet
operator, such that the fleet operator pays a fully-bunded, flat service feel (e.g., $/mile). In all of
these models, the fleet operator itself is not exposed to the front-of-the-meter infrastructure costs,
but rather these costs are borne by a third party that then recoups all of its costs through their
charging or service fees. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
In conclusion, EPA is justified in not modeling front-of-the meter costs because doing so
would result in an apples-to-oranges comparison to liquid fuels, those costs are site-specific and
variable, the recovery mechanism of those costs depends upon state-specific policies, and fleet-
operators may not always bear those costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
Front-of-the-meter infrastructure is generally installed, owned, and operated by the electric
company. However, the costs associated with front-of-the-meter infrastructure may be borne by
the site host customer in full or in part if the costs exceed an allowance as determined by the
electric company's line-extension and/or service extension policy. These costs may also be
known as "contributions in aid of construction." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
Modeling these front-of-the-meter infrastructure costs is inappropriate for the following
reasons. First, estimating distribution upgrade costs may be beyond the scope of EPA's analysis,
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as it is not clear that a similar scope of analysis is applied to traditional liquid fuels. For example,
the analogous cost comparison for internal combustion engine vehicle would include cost
considerations for fleet operators either 1) installing refueling stations at their own facilities, or
2) the embedded cost of fuel retailers' business operations in the cost of diesel or gasoline.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
Second, as described above, distribution upgrades are highly location specific. The costs
associated with these upgrades are also highly variable, depending on the upgrade requested by
the customer and the local distribution capacity. As stated in EEI's Preparing to Plug In Your
Fleet guide, "the grid can expand as needed to accommodate the needs of any customer, but the
time and resources needed to make the required upgrades are highly dependent on the specific
facility and the circuit that serves it."27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
27 See EEI, Preparing To Plug In Your Fleet - 10 Things to Consider, https://www.eei.org/-
/media/Project/EEI/Documents/Issues-and-Policy/Electric-
Transportation/PreparingToPluglnYourFleetpdf.
Third, the share of any distribution costs that the customer may bear varies as a matter of
policy. Some electric companies have or are seeking approval for line extension allowances to
cover some or all of these costs for serving EV charging infrastructure. In California, for
example, legislation required electric companies in the state to file tariffs that would authorize
them to "design and deploy all electrical distribution infrastructure on the utility side of the
customer's meter for all customers installing separately metered infrastructure to support
charging stations, other than those in single-family residences." This policy prompted tariffs
from EEI members Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), and
SCE that essentially allow electric companies to invest in more of the electric company-side
infrastructure costs as part of the standard distribution system investment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
Fourth, EEI expects that the majority of fleets to electrify in the next several years will be
those with return-to-base operations, which enables depot charging that is owned and operated
by the fleet itself. Public charging, analogous to the existing gas station model, will be needed to
serve long-haul electric trucks, but that opportunity will be limited in the near-term by battery
capabilities. However, there are many new refueling models emerging, including but not limited
to: fleet charging facilities owned by third parties and accessed by fleet operators through a
reservation or subscription system; charging-as-a-service companies that disintermediate the
fleet operator from the electric company, owning and operating the charging equipment at a
customer facility and assessing the fleet operator a fully-bundled, flat charging fee (e.g., $/kWh);
and transportation-as-a-service companies that provide the vehicle and charging to a fleet
operator, such that the fleet operator pays a fully-bunded, flat service feel (e.g., $/mile). In all of
these models, the fleet operator itself is not exposed to the front-of-the-meter infrastructure costs,
but rather these costs are borne by a third party that then recoups all of its costs through their
charging or service fees. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
In conclusion, EPA is justified in not modeling front-of-the meter costs because doing so
would result in an apples-to-oranges comparison to liquid fuels, those costs are site-specific and
variable, the recovery mechanism of those costs depends upon state-specific policies, and fleet-
operators may not always bear those costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
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Organization: Electric Drive Transportation Association (EDTA)
Infrastructure is growing alongside the plug-in fleet - nearly 54,000 public stations, with more
than 139,000 outlets, are in operation. Tesla has committed to making at least 3,500 of its U.S.
Supercharger stations and 4,000 Level 2 charging docks available to all brands of electric
vehicles by the end of next year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0589, p. 1]
The build-out of direct current fast charging infrastructure (DCFCs), particularly, will require
substantial public and private investment, as well as coordination between users, power and
infrastructure providers and permitting authorities. DCFCs enable bidirectional V2G, future-
proof site installation and provide on-demand fast charge that will enhance commercial and
consumer confidence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0589, p. 2]
Organization: Elizabeth Boynton
I understand that the effect of this rule would reduce the sale of gas cars from 94% of new
cars sold down to just 33% in 9 years. Regardless, a policy that would artificially manufacture an
increased demand for Electric Vehicles (EVs) at this time may be well-meaning but I believe is
bad policy for many reasons, including those listed below: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0568, p.
1]
From a practical standpoint, I anticipate needing to buy a new vehicle in the next few years. I
don't want to be economically coerced into buying an EV because my options were limited by
the Biden administration's attempt to regulate gas-powered vehicles out of the market. As
distasteful as they may be to some, gas powered vehicles are still more reliable, less expensive,
have a longer travel range than EVs and the infrastructure to support demand for fuel is there.
EVs are impractical for longer travel that may include crossing desert environments, which are
plentiful around where I live in Phoenix, Arizona, where running out of charge could be a death
sentence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0568, p. 1]
Additionally, I don't want to wait the 15 minutes to several hours for my battery to charge, as
is the indicated time in a March 7, 2018 CleanTechnica article. More recently, an April 19, 2023
US News and World Report article entitled, "How long does it take to charge an electric car?"
states, "There's really no way to nail down exactly how long it takes to charge an electric
vehicle, but there are certainly reliable estimates." Reliable estimates for multiple variables that
result in a charging time still well beyond the time it takes me to fill my tank at the pump. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0568, p. 1]
Organization: Energy Innovation
IV. The combined impact of federal, state, and private investments on infrastructure
deployment will help meet the needs of an increasingly electrified LDV/MDV fleet over the next
decade. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 2]
We appreciate the EPA's thorough investigation into BEV charging infrastructure to support
increased electrification of the light- and medium-duty vehicle sector. We agree with the EPA's
assessment that charging infrastructure deployment and investments are well underway, and
likely to accelerate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 20]
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Estimates vary on the level of investment needed to support widespread transportation sector
electrification, depending on the timeframe and percentage of BEVs assumed. For example:
-Analysis by Atlas Public Policy shows that to achieve 100 percent passenger EV sales by
2035 and put the nation on the path to full electrification, over $87 billion in investments in
charging infrastructure will be needed over the next decade, including $39 billion for public
charging.54 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 20]
-The 2035 2.0 study's DRIVE Clean Scenario estimates the U.S. would require approximately
270,000 public chargepoints for LDVs and 35,000 MDV/heavy-duty truck chargepoints each
year for the next 30 years, which would cost approximately $6.5 billion annually between now
and 2050.55 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 20]
-According to the ICCT, the U.S. needs to spend roughly $30 to $35 billion on public
charging infrastructure by 2030 to achieve the widespread adoption of light- and heavy-duty
ZEVs as described in the ZEV Declaration and the Global Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on Zero- Emission Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicles.56 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, p. 20]
54 Lucy McKenzie and Nick Nigra, "U.S. Passenger Vehicle Electrification Infrastructure Assessment:
Results for Light-Duty Vehicle Charging"(Atlas Public Policy, April 28, 2021), https://atlaspolicy.com/wp-
content/uploads/2021/04/2021 -04-21_U S_Electrification_Infrastructure_Assessment.pdf.
56 Slowik et al., "Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act on Electric Vehicle Uptake in the
United States."
55 "Public Charging for Electric Cars and Trucks Can Be Built Quickly and Cost Effectively," 2035 2.0,
n.d., https://www.2035report.com/transportation/public-charging/.
Fortunately, a combination of federal, state, utility, and private investments and incentives are
poised to fill the need for charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 20]
At the federal level, the BIL contains $7.5 billion to develop a nationwide EV charging
network, targeting rural and underserved areas.57 To date, all 50 states are moving forward with
plans to develop over 75,000 miles (as of July 2022) of EV charging corridors, via funding
allocated through the National Electric Infrastructure Program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, p. 20]
57 "Updated Fact Sheet: Bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act," The White House Briefing
Room, August 2, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/08/02/updated-fact-sheet-bipartisan-infrastructure-investmentand-jobs-act/.
The IRA also extends the 30C Alternative Fuel Refueling Infrastructure tax credit for private
investments in qualified clean-vehicle infrastructure for 10 years, as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
-Individual credit of 30 percent of installed costs, up to $1,000 per charger, provided the
infrastructure is installed in a qualified census tract where the poverty rate is at least 20 percent,
in a non-metropolitan area where median family income is < 80 percent of the statewide median
family income, or a metropolitan area where median family income is < 80 percent of the
statewide median family income or metropolitan area median family income. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
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-Commercial tax credit of 30 percent up to $100,000 per charger (up from the prior $30,000-
per-location cap).58 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
58 Sara Baldwin and Robbie Orvis, "Implementing the Inflation Reduction Act: A Roadmap for Federal
and State Transportation Policy" (Energy Innovation LLC, October 2022),
https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/ll/Implementing-the-Inflation-Reduction-Act-A-
Roadmap-For-Federal-And-State-Transportation-Policy.pdf.
These incentives for charging infrastructure will support private investments in a more robust
national network, and new eligibility requirements will help expand businesses and individuals
install EV charging access to better serve EV drivers, especially in currently underserved
communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
States are also playing a leading role. According to the State of Sustainable Fleets' 2023
Market Brief, "funding commitments have increased in California and within a handful of other
states, thus driving up the average annual funding that will target the clean fuel market to
approximately $32 billion on average per year during the next four to five years,"59 far
exceeding expectations of funding before the BIL and IRA. See Figure 16. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
59 "The State of Sustainable Fleets: 2023 Market Brief' (Gladstein, Neandross & Associates (GNA), May
2023), https://cdn.stateofsustainablefleets.com/2023/state-of-sustainable-fleets-2023-market-brief.pdf, 15-
16.
[See original attachment for figure "Annual Public Incentive Funding for the Next 4-5
Years"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
Figure 16. Annual funding for clean fuel and vehicle technologies for the next four to five
years averaged by state and nationally, which includes state, local, utility, and federal incentive
programs. Source: www.stateofsustainablefleets.com. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-
24]
State-funded programs aimed at EV charging deployment, including among the largest state
markets, are well on their way to meeting future charging infrastructure demand. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
[See original attachment for table of leading state-funded programs as of March 2023] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
Figure 17. Leading state-funded programs for investment in EV charging as of March 2023.
Source: Atlas Public Policy, available at: https://atlaspolicy.com/wp-
content/uploads/2023/05/Investment-in-Publicly-Accessible-EV-Charging.pdf. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
The private sector and charging companies are also moving quickly to take advantage of new
incentives and funding. According to Atlas Public Policy, private investment in public EV
charging has increased considerably in the last five years, rising from under $200 million in 2017
to nearly $13 billion by early 2023.60 For example: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-
24]
60 Nick Nigro, "Investment in Publicly Accessible EV Charging in the United States (2023)" (Atlas Public
Policy, May 2023),
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https://atlaspolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Investment-in-Publicly-Accessible-EV-
Charging.pdf.6. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
-Pilot Company and Volvo Group signed a letter of intent to co-develop a charging network
across Pilot and Flying J travel centers, catered specifically toward medium-and heavy-duty EVs.
Pilot has more than 750 locations across 44 states and six Canadian provinces.61 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
-Cumulative private investments in EV charging by different infrastructure providers,
including the auto industry, totaled just over $13 billion as of March 2023.62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
-Companies like Electrify America, General Motors, Freightliner, Tesla, and Mercedes are
rapidly expanding investments in charging infrastructure to meet increasing demand for EVs.
See Figure 18. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
61 Scooter Doll, "Pilot Co. Will Expand Charging Network to Heavy-Duty EVs with Help of Volvo
Group," Electrek, November 15, 2022, https://electrek.co/2022/ll/15/pilot-co-expand-charging-network-
heavy-duty-evs-with-volvo-group/.
62 Nigro, "Investment in Publicly Accessible EV Charging in the United States (2023)."
[See original attachment for graph described below] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp.
20-24]
Figure 18. Cumulative private investment in EV charging over time by company. Source:
Atlas Public Policy, available at: https://atlaspolicy.com/wp-
content/uploads/2023/05/Investment-in-Publicly-Accessible-EV-Charging.pdf. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
Utilities are also investing in EV charging at scale, and more states are authorizing utility
investments to support widespread and equitable access to more customers. Total approved
utility investments for transportation electrification totaled $5,230 billion as of December 2022.
See Figure 19. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
[See original attachment for table described below] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-
24]
Figure 19. Leading states with approved utility investments in public charging. The table also
includes the number of DCFC and L2 ports per million residents as of 2021. "Other States"
accounts for the remaining 42 states and the District of Columbia. Source: Atlas Public Policy,
available at: https://atlaspolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Investment-in-Publicly-
Accessible-EV-Charging.pdf, 21. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
In summary, national trends combined with historic investments are poised to fill the charging
gap and meet the need for increased BEV adoption resulting from more stringent EPA tailpipe
rules. In addition, the sizable investment needed will be shared across federal, state, and local
governments, the private sector, and utilities, ensuring a more cost-effective charging network
for future BEV drivers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 20-24]
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Organization: Energy Strategy Coalition
Members of this coalition are already engaging in long-term planning to meet the increased
demand for electricity attributable to vehicle electrification, and the LMDV Proposal will
provide a regulatory backstop supporting further investments in electrification and grid
reliability. Demand for electricity will increase under both the LMDV Proposal and the recently-
proposed Phase 3 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles ("HDV
Proposed Rule"),4 but the electricity grid is capable of planning for and accommodating such
demand growth and has previously experienced periods of significant and sustained growth.
Moreover, historic growth in demand and generation resources does not reflect the investments
that will be made under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act ("IIJA") and the Inflation
Reduction Act ("IRA") to support the deployment of new renewable and zero-carbon generation
resources, energy storage and charging infrastructure. Coalition members are already making
investments in the resources and infrastructure needed to support transportation electrification
and realize the benefits that integration of EVs can provide to the electricity grid. The Coalition
encourages EPA to work closely with state and local partners and other federal agencies to
ensure that deployment of this infrastructure occurs on the pace and scale needed to achieve the
EV penetration-rates contemplated by these proposals, while ensuring grid reliability. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 1-2]
4 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles—Phase 3, 88 Fed. Reg. 25,926
(published April 27, 2023).
II. The proposed rule supports long-term planning and investment
Long-term planning and investment for vehicle electrification is a business imperative for the
Coalition's members and a necessary element of their efforts to provide affordable, clean, and
reliable power to their customers. By setting a clear trajectory for vehicle electrification that
complements existing regulatory and market forces, EPA's LMDV and HDV proposals facilitate
further investment in the generation and charging infrastructure needed to meet increased
demand associated with electrification of the vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp.
1-2]
Even before the LMDV and HDV proposals, market forces and government incentives were
projected to greatly increase the rate of vehicle electrification. As EPA notes, "virtually every
major manufacturer of light-duty vehicles is already planning to introduce widespread
electrification across their global fleets in the coming years." 5The IRA is now providing
significant incentivies for automakers to accelerate these commitments through generous
subsidies for EV purchases. These include up to $7,500 in tax credits for new EVs,6 $4,000 for
used EVs,7 as well as incentives for the commercial purchase of light-and medium-duty
vehicles.8 The IIJA also provides significant incentives to support vehicle electrification,
including $7.5 billion in funding for installation of public charging and other alternative fueling
infrastructure^ and funding for the Department of Energy's ("DOE") Building a Better Grid
Initiative, which allocates $2.5 billion to support the development of nationally significant
transmission lines, $2.3 billion to strengthen and modernize the power grid against wildfires and
other extreme weather exacerbated by climate change, and $10.5 billion to improve grid
resilience and grid flexibility (including by supporting transmission and distribution
infrastructure). 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 1-2]
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5 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,191.
6 26 U.S. Code § 30D.
7 26 U.S. Code § 25E.
8 See 26 U.S. Code § 45W.
9 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,195.
10 See, e.g., Building a Better Grid Initiative, GRID DEPLOYMENT OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY https ://www .energy. gov/gdo/building-better-grid-initiative.
III. Coalition members are investing in EV charging infrastructure
Members of this Coalition have begun making significant investments in the charging
infrastructure for electric passenger cars and trucks: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
-National Grid recently received approval for a $206 million initiative to enable up to 32,000
additional charging ports in Massachusetts.23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
-The New York Power Authority will have up to 400 fast chargers installed or in construction
through its EVolve NY program by the end of 2025.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-
7]
-The Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG&E") has successfully installed through March
2023 over 5,700 charging ports through its EV Charge Network, EV Fleet, EV Fast Charge and
EV Schools programs.25 To aid with equity efforts to expand EV charging, PG&E recently
launched its Empower EV program, which offers income-eligible households up to $2,500 in
financial incentives for the installation of a Level-2 charger and any necessary service panel
upgrades,26 as well as its Multifamily Housing and Small Business EV Charger program, which
will install Level 1 and Level 2 EV chargers at multifamily housing units, not-for-profit
organizations and small businesses, at no cost for sites located in a priority community.27 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
-Austin Energy provides rebates of up to $1,200 and $4,000 for customers installing Level 2
charging stations at their homes and workplaces respectively.28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0610, pp. 4-7]
-The Sacramento Municipal Utility District ("SMUD") offers up to $1,000 toward residential
charging equipment and installation costs through its Charge@Home program.29 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
-Constellation Energy Corporation's venture arm (Constellation Technology Ventures, or
"CTV") has invested in portfolio companies focused on EV and charging infrastructure.30
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
23 NATIONAL GRID, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2022/23, at 30 (2023),
https://www.nationalgrid.coin/document/149701/download.
24 Leading the Way in EV Infrastructure, EVOLVE NY, https://evolveny.nypa.gov/ (last visited June 9,
2023).
25 More information on PG&E's EV charging programs can be found at:
https://www.pge.com/en_US/small-medium-business/energy-alternatives/clean-vehicles/ev-charge-
network/electric-vehicle-charging/electric-vehicle-programs-and-resources.page.
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26 More information on PG&E's Empower EV program can be found at:
https://www.pge.com/en_US/residential/solar-and-vehicles/options/clean-vehicles/electric/empower-ev-
program. page?WT.mc_id=Vanity _empower-ev.
27 More information on PG&E's Multifamily and Small Business EV Charger program can be found at:
https://www.pge.com/en_US/small-medium-business/energy-alternatives/clean-vehicles/ev-charge-
network/program-participants/multifamily-housing-smb-ev-charger-program.page?.
28 Commercial Charging, AUSTIN ENERGY (last reviewed or modified July 8, 2022),
https://austinenergy.com/green-power/plug-in-austin/workplace-charging; Home Charging, AUSTIN
ENERGY (last reviewed or modified July 8, 2022), https://austinenergy.com/green-power/plug-in-
austin/home-charging.
29 Drive electric and save, SMUD, https://www.smud.org/en/Going-Green/Electric-Vehicles/Residential
(last visited June 9, 2023).
Footntoe 30: For instance, CTV invested in Qnovo, which offers a solution suite that uses
advanced computation to optimize the chemical reactions within lithium-ion batteries, resulting
in faster charging, increased daily run times, and longer battery lifetimes. See Constellation
Technology Ventures, https://www.constellationenergy.com/our-work/innovation-and-
advancement/technology-ventures.html. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
Coalition members are making these investments in part because of the benefits that EVs can
provide to grid reliability. EVs' primary near-term grid benefits stem from their enablement of
load shifting—whether from periods of higher load demand to periods of lower load demand, or
from periods of more carbon-intensive power generation to periods where more renewable
energy is available.31 Load shifting can involve both deferral (to avoid charging during periods
of peak load) and more targeted scheduling (to take advantage of periods of excess energy
supply).32 In addition to enhancing grid reliability, load shifting can also reduce customer
electricity rates, increase the value of renewable energy investments (by maximizing usage of
excess solar energy produced during the day), and mitigate the need for equipment upgrades
(e.g., increased storage capacity to accommodate excess solar energy).33 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
31 See TIMOTHY LIPMAN ET AL., CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, TOTAL CHARGE MANAGEMENT
OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES 5 (CEC-500-2021-055, Dec. 2021),
https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/CEC-500-2021-055.pdf.
32 See id.
33 See Aligning Utilities and Electric Vehicles, for the Greater Grid, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY
LAB'Y (Jan. 10, 2022), https://www.nrel.gov/news/program/2022/aligning-utilities-electric-vehicles-for-
greater-grid.html (citing Muhammad Bashar Anwar et al., Assessing the value of electric vehicle managed
charging: a review of methodologies and results, 15 ENERGY ENV'T SCI. 466 (2022)).
For example, PG&E has partnered with the BMW Group to explore ways to incentivize EV
drivers to shift their charging times to support grid reliability.34 This program—called
ChargeForward— first kicked off in 2015 and moved into its third phase in 2021.35 Building on
the success of the first two phases, phase three expanded the program's scope to 3,000 EV
drivers (from prior pilots of 100 and 400 drivers in phases one and two).36 Phase two of
ChargeForward demonstrated the ability to shift nearly 20% of charging from a particular hour to
another time and to shift up to 30% of charging to a particular hour.37 SMUD is also engaged in
a managed charging pilot program with BMW, Ford, and GM, and is planning to add Tesla
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vehicles to the pilot as well, targeting participation of around 2,000 vehicles through 2024.38
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
34 PG&E Corporate Sustainability Report 2022, PG&E CORPORATION 105 (2022),
https://www.pgecorp.com/corp_responsibility/reports/2022/assets/PGE_CSR_2022.pdf.
35 CLARION ENERGY CONTENT DIRECTORS, PG&E and BMW kick off 3rd phase of
ChargeForward for clean, smart EV charging, POWERGRID INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://www.power-grid.com/der-grid-edge/pge-and-bmw-kick-off-3rd-phase-of-chargeforward-for-clean-
smart-ev-charging/#gref.
36 PG&E Corporate Sustainability Report 2022, PG&E CORPORATION 105 (2022),
https://www.pgecorp.eom/corp_responsibility/reports/2022/assets/PGE_CSR_2022.pdf.
37 See Timothy Lipman et al., Total Charge Management of Electric Vehicles, CALIFORNIA ENERGY
COMMISSION iii (CEC-500-2021-055, Dec. 2021), https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
12/CEC-500-2021-055 .pdf.
38 2030 Zero Carbon Plan Progress Report, SMUD 21 (Apr. 2023), https://www.smud.org/-
/media/Documents/Corporate/Environmental-Leadership/ZeroCarbon/2030-ZCP-Progress-Report—April-
2023_FINAL.ashx.
Coalition members are also exploring Vehicle-to-Grid ("V2G") technology, through which
EVs can send power back to load sources (e.g., homes) and the grid from their batteries. While
still in the early stages of development, V2G technology can offer reliability benefits by serving
as a grid resource during periods of peak demand.39 PG&E and BMW recently extended their
ChargeForward partnership until March 2026 and, as part of that program, will conduct a field
trial of V2G-enabled vehicles in order to explore their potential to increase grid reliability.40 In
addition, PG&E has announced vehicle-grid integration ("VGI") pilot programs with Ford41 and
General Motors to test the ability of EVs to provide backup power to homes.42 SMUD is also in
the process of conducting an electric school bus V2G demonstration project with the Twin
Rivers Unified School District.43 SMUD is planning to expand the program to additional school
districts and is also pursuing other projects to explore V2G capabilities for light-duty EVs.44
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
39 See Value Assessment of DC Vehicle-to-Grid Capable Electric Vehicles: Analytical Framework and
Results, EPRI (May 24, 2023), https://www.epri.eom/research/programs/053122/results/3002026772.
40 More Power To You: PG&E and BMW of North America Start V2X Testing in California, PG&E
CORPORATION (May 16, 2023), https://investor.pgecorp.com/news-events/press-releases/press-release-
details/2023/More-Power-To-You-PGE-and-BMW-of-North-America-Start-V2X-Testing-in-
California/default.aspx.
41 PG&E and Ford Collaborate on Bidirectional Electric Vehicle Charging Technology in Customers'
Homes (Mar. 11, 2022), https://investor.pgecorp.com/news-events/press-releases/press-release-
details/2022/PGE-and-Ford-Collaborate-on-Bidirectional-Electric-Vehicle-Charging-Technology-in-
Customers-Homes/default.aspx.
42 A. Vanrenen, PG&E and General Motors Collaborate on Pilot to Reimagine Use of Electric Vechiles as
Backup Power Sources For Customers (Mar. 8, 2022), https://www.pgecurrents.com/articles/3410-pg-e-
general-motors-collaborate-pilot-reimagine-use-electric-vehicles-backup-power-sources-customers.
43 2030 Zero Carbon Plan Progress Report, SMUD 22 (Apr. 2023), https://www.smud.org/-
/media/Documents/Corporate/Environmental-Leadership/ZeroCarbon/2030-ZCP-Progress-Report—April-
2023_FINAL.ashx.
44 Id.
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IV. EPA should work closely with state and local partners to ensure deployment of the
resources and infrastructure needed to accelerate transportation electrification while maintaining
grid reliability
EPA's LMDV Proposal will help support deployment of the charging and generation
resources needed to meet anticipated demand from vehicle electrification. Yet effective and
efficient deployment of these resources will require coordination among electric utilities, state
public utility commissions, and local governments to factor load from EVs into long-range
resource planning and to permit the distribution and transmission system upgrades and new
generation and storage resources needed to serve that load. To ensure these resources are
deployed on the pace and scale needed to support vehicle electrification and grid reliability, EPA
should coordinate closely with federal, state and local agenices to remove deployment barriers
and emphasize the benefits that vehicle electrification can provide to the electricity grid, public
health, and the climate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 13-14]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
XVII.Ongoing Investments in Charging Infrastructure and Efforts to Ready the Grid for
Widespread EV Charging Justify Stronger Standards.
In this section, we explain in detail how charging infrastructure and the electric grid are well-
positioned to support strong final standards—and in particular, Alternative 1 with a steeper
increase in stringency after 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 108]
A.Economic theory and historical precedent show that infrastructure buildout will occur at the
pace and scale needed to support vehicle electrification.
EPA should reject arguments that the buildout of charging and grid infrastructure cannot
occur at the pace and scale needed to support expanded vehicle electrification, which are
unreasonably pessimistic and inconsistent with both economic theory and historical precedent.
These arguments rely on the classic "chicken-and-egg" scenario said to be presented by ZEV
sales and charging infrastructure, where each side of the market waits for the other. But EPA
need not and should not wait for infrastructure to fully mature before finalizing strong standards.
EPA's standards themselves will send a strong signal to the market to undertake the
infrastructure investments needed to accommodate a gradual rise in vehicle electrification,283
such that increased ZEV sales and infrastructure buildout will occur in relative tandem and
reinforce each other. As one analyst sums it up: "The chicken-and-egg conundrum is being
solved. Investments in the space and the adoption of EVs [a]re happening much faster than many
analysts expected, and this is also accelerating the build-out of the charging network."284 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 108-109]
283 Environmental regulation itself, of course, can lead to technology innovation and market development.
See generally Jaegul Lee et al., Forcing Technological Change: A Case of Automobile Emissions Control
Technology Development in the US, 30 Technovation 249 (2010); Margaret R. Taylor, Edward S. Rubin,
& David A. Hounshell, Regulation as the Mother of Innovation: The Case of S02 Control, 27 Law &
Policy 348 (2005); James Lents et al., Chapter II: The regulation of automobile emission: A case study, in
Environmental Regulation and Technology Innovation: Controlling Mercury Emissions from Coal-Fired
Boilers (Marika Tatsutani & Praveen Amar eds., 2000)
https://www.nescaum.org/documents/rpt000906mercury_innovative-technology.pdf.
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284 Gabriela Herculano, Chicken-and-Egg Problem: EV Adoption and Buildout of Charging Networks,
Nasdaq (Apr. 18, 2022), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/chicken-and-egg-problem%3A-ev-adoption-and-
buildout-of-charging-networks.
The economic literature on indirect network effects and two-sided markets shows that an
increase in BEV sales can be expected to stimulate associated infrastructure development. In a
study on flex-fuel vehicles fueled by E85 (85% ethanol), Corts (2010) found that growth in sales
of flex-fuel vehicles due to government fleet acquisition programs led to an increase in the
number of retail E85 stations.285 That relationship held true across all six Midwestern states
analyzed, despite differences in those states' E85 subsidies and tax credits.286 The author
concluded that the results "confirm the basic validity" of the theory underlying government fleet
purchase requirements: that increasing the "base of alternative fuel vehicles can spur the
development of a retail alternative fuel distribution infrastructure."287 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 109]
285 Kenneth S. Corts, Building out alternative fuel retail infrastructure: Government fleet spillovers in E85,
59 J. Env't Econ. & Mgmt. 219, 219-20 (2009).
286 Id.
287 Id at 231.
Recent economic research has confirmed this relationship in the context of ZEVs and
charging infrastructure specifically. An influential study by Li et al. (2017) found that "EV
demand and charging station deployment give rise to feedback loops" and that "subsidizing
either side of the market will result in an increase in both EV sales and charging stations "288
Similarly, Springel (2021) found "evidence of positive feedback effects on both sides of the
market, suggesting that cumulative EV sales affect charging station entry and that public
charging availability has an impact on consumers' vehicle choice."289 The BIL and IRA
subsidize both sides of the market, offering significant incentives for both ZEV purchases and
the construction of charging infrastructure. Economic theory therefore supports the proposition
that strong final standards, particularly in combination with the BIL and IRA's large financial
incentives, will facilitate expansion of charging and grid infrastructure.290 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, p. 109]
288 Shanjun Li et al., The market for electric vehicles: indirect network effects and policy design, 4 J.
Ass'n Env't. & Resources Econ. 89, 128 (2017).
289 Katalin Springel, Network Externality and Subsidy Structure in Two-Sided Markets: Evidence from
Electric Vehicle Incentives, 13 Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Pol'y 393, 426 (2021).
290 See id. at 394 (noting that "the presence of positive feedback amplifies the impact of both types of
subsidies"), 415 ("positive feedback loops between the charging station network and total all-electric
vehicle sales amplify the impact of both types of subsidy").
Economic theory has in fact played out in Norway, where ZEV sales and infrastructure both
expanded rapidly over the span of about a decade. There, the "path to charging point saturation
started by stimulating more demand for EVs "291 In other words, Norway did not wait for
infrastructure to fully mature before beginning its transition to cleaner cars. Rather, rising ZEV
sales themselves "helped trigger a spike in demand for charging stations."292 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0759, pp. 109-110]
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291 Whitney Bauck, How Norway Became the World's Electric Car Capital, Nexus Media News (Mar. 7,
2023), https://nexusmedianews.com/how-norway-became-the-worlds-electric-car-capital/.
292 McKinsey & Co, What Norway's Experience Reveals About the EV Charging Market 3 (2023),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/what-norways-experience-
reveals-abou t-the-ev-charging-market#/.
The concept that charging infrastructure will adequately scale up over time also finds support
in an analogous historical example: the buildout of roads and gasoline refueling infrastructure in
the early 20th century to serve the United States' growing fleet of automobiles. The country's
exponential growth in automobile sales—first exceeding 1,000 in 1899 and growing to 1 million
by 1916293—preceded the establishment of an extensive network of both suitable roads294 and
filling stations.295 The buildout of road and refueling infrastructure unfolded over long time
horizons and in a variety of ways, adapting to the needs of the automobile fleet as it changed and
grew. Paving and other road improvement efforts began on a small scale in cities, where
automobiles were initially concentrated; efforts to improve rural roads and construct highways
happened a decade or more later, as motorists began to expand their driving beyond cities.296
Similarly, in the case of refueling infrastructure, a network of modern filling stations did not
spring up until well after automobiles had grown in popularity.297 Before that, refueling needs
were met through varied and dispersed "non-station" methods such as cans of gasoline sold at
general stores, barrels at repair garages, mobile fuel carts, curb pumps, and home refueling
pumps, which emerged at various times as the demand for gasoline increased.298 Road and
refueling infrastructure therefore exhibited a "long-term, adaptive and portfolio approach"299
that, over the span of several decades, satisfied the shifting needs of the growing ranks of
automobile owners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 110]
293 Roads, Encyclopedia.com (May 29, 2018), https://www.encyclopedia.com/science-and-
technology/technology/technology-terms-and-concepts/roads.
294 See id. (noting that around 1904, "[o]nly a few hundred miles of roads in the entire country were
suitable for motor vehicles"); see also F.W. Geels, The Dynamics of Transitions in Socio-technical
Systems: A Multi-level Analysis of the Transition Pathway from Horse-drawn Carriages to Automobiles
(1860-1930), 17 Tech. Analysis & Strategic Mgmt. 445, 460, 467-68 (2005) (discussing the gradual
expansion and improvement of road infrastructure in the 1910s and 1920s to accommodate growth in and
changes to automobile travel).
295 Marc W. Melaina, Turn of the century refueling: A review of innovations in early gasoline refueling
methods and analogies for hydrogen, 35 Energy Pol'y 4919, 4922 (2007) (noting that "the takeoff period
for gasoline stations occurred between 1915 and 1925, but exponential growth in vehicles began around
1910, so the rise of gasoline filling stations followed rather than preceded the rise of gasoline vehicles").
296 Geels, at 467-68.
297 Melaina, at 4922.
298 Id. at 4924-27.
299 Id. at 4932 (discussing refueling infrastructure).
That approach holds important lessons for this rulemaking. As detailed elsewhere in this
comment letter, the introduction of ZEVs into the total on-road fleet will occur gradually. See
Figure V.C-1 & Figure V.D-1, supra; Table XVII.G-l (L/MD PEVs as a Share of Total On-
Road-L/MD Fleet, 2026-2040), infra. Economic theory and historical precedent show that
growth in ZEV sales and infrastructure buildout will occur in relative tandem, with infrastructure
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responding over time commensurate with the evolving needs of the ZEV fleet. And in finalizing
these standards, EPA will send a strong market signal that will facilitate infrastructure
development at the pace and scale needed to support compliance with the standards. EPA must
reject unfounded chicken-and-egg arguments questioning whether infrastructure will respond to
rising demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 110-111]
B. EPA neglects to account for other significant sources of federal funding for ZEVs and
charging infrastructure.
The Proposed Rule states: "The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) provides up to $7.5
billion over five years to build out a national PEV charging network."300 However, as also
noted in the Proposed Rule, there are many other programs funded by the BIL that could provide
significant additional funding: "Other programs with funding authorizations under the BIL that
could be used in part to support charging infrastructure installations include the Congestion
Mitigation & Air Quality Improvement Program, National Highway Performance Program, and
Surface Transportation Block Grant Program among others."301 To illustrate the point, consider
the two largest programs funded by the BIL, the National Highway Performance Program ($148
billion over five years) and the Surface Transportation Block Grant program ($72 billion over
five years). A portion of those funds could be invested in EV charging infrastructure and other
investments that reduce emissions by reducing the need to drive. The block grant program is
explicitly designed to be versatile and is available for a wide range of uses. In fact, it was
originally created in the 1991 transportation law to encourage states to move beyond the
interstate highway-building era into investments in other improvements to our transportation
system,302 and Congress has added more uses since then. If, say, 20% of the funding provided
by just those two programs were directed to EV charging infrastructure, it would provide $44
billion in additional federal funding.303[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. Ill]
300 88 Fed. Reg. at 29307.
301 Id. at 29308.
302 Ellen Schweppe, Legacy of A Landmark: ISTEA After 10 Years (2001), at
https://highways.dot.gov/public-roads/novemberdecember-2001/legacy-landmark-istea-after-10-years (last
accessed June 30, 2023).
303 See Deron Lovaas & Max Baumhefner. What if States Turn Pavement Into Charging Stations? (May
16, 2022), at https://www.nrdc.org/bio/deron-lovaas/what-if-states-turn-pavement-charging-stations (last
accessed June 30, 2023).
And even without accounting for a portion of the National Highway Performance Program
and Surface Transportation Block Grant (the two largest funding allocations made by the BIL),
Atlas Public Policy's inventory reveals there is a total of over $50 billion in BIL funding for
which ZEVs and charging infrastructure are eligible expenses (see Figure XVII.B-1 below).
Figure XVII.B-1: ZEV Funding in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law304
[See original attachment for Figure XVII.B-1], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 112]
304 Atlas Public Policy, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (H.R. 3684), at
https://www.atlasevhub.com/materials/invest-in-america-act-h-r-3684/ (last accessed June 30, 2023).
C. The Alternative Fuel Refueling Property Tax Credit extended by the IRA is not restricted
to rural areas, but instead to areas that are not urban.
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The Proposed Rule states that under the IRA, "residents in low-income or rural areas would
be eligible for a 30% credit for the cost of installing residential charging equipment up to a
$1,000 cap."305 However, the word "rural" does not appear in IRA § 30C, which defines
"eligible census tracts" for the Alternative Fuel Vehicle Refueling Property credit "as any census
tract which (I) is described in § 45D(e), or (II) is not an urban area."306 The distinction is
important because there are many areas that have not been classified as rural that cannot rightly
be classified as urban. For example, if the U.S. Department of the Treasury classifies a census
tract as not urban if more than 10% of the blocks within the census tract are designated as rural
census blocks (to ensure those who live in rural blocks are not unduly denied access just because
they happen to live next to urban blocks), tens of millions more Americans and businesses would
have access to these important tax credits. This approach has been recommended to Treasury by
a diverse coalition of industry associations, individual companies, environmental, consumer, and
environmental justice groups, and other stakeholders.307 EPA should correct its characterization
of § 30C and should convey to Treasury that adopting the broadly-supported approach described
above would support strong vehicle standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 112]
305 88 Fed. Reg. at 29308.
306 26 U.S.C. § 30C(c)(3)(B).
307 Ltr. from Max Baumhefner et al. to U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, June 2023 (attached to this comment
letter; signatories include Natural Resources Defense Council, Alliance for Automotive Innovation,
American Council on Renewable Energy, Ample, CALSTART, ChargePoint, Clean Energy Works,
Earthjustice, Elders Climate Action, Electrification Coalition, Environmental Defense Fund, EV Charging
for All, EVBox, Forth Mobility, Green Latinos, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
International Parking & Mobility Institute, Itselectric, League of Conservation Voters, National Association
of Convenience Stores, National Consumer Law Center, NATSO, Navistar, Plug in America, Representing
America's Travel Plazas and Truck Stops, Rivian, Sierra Club, SIGMA: America's Leading Fuel Marketers,
TeraWatt, Transportation for America, Union of Concerned Scientists, and Volvo Group North America).
D. A more complete inventory reveals $67 billion in announced investments in charging
infrastructure, including $33 billion dedicated to light-duty vehicles and $4 billion that could
support light-duty vehicles.
EPA also correctly identifies that there has been "rapid growth in the broader market for
charging infrastructure serving cars or other electric vehicles."308 New charging infrastructure
announcements are occurring every week, showing the public and private sectors' commitment
to building out infrastructure to support vehicle electrification. The Proposed Rule's description
of recently announced investments in charging infrastructure underscores the fact that significant
progress is being made.309 However, this narrative should be supplemented by a more
comprehensive inventory of the public, private, and utility sectors. As of March 31, 2023, Atlas
Public Policy (Atlas) estimates $67 billion dollars in charging infrastructure investments that
have been announced by the public, private, and utility sectors but not yet installed as charging
ports in the ground. 310 Table XVII.D-1 provides a summary of tallied investment amounts,
which include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 113]
-$33 billion in announced, unspent investments for LDV charging;
-$30 billion in announced, unspent investments for medium- and heavy-duty vehicle
charging; and
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-$4 billion in announced, unspent investments for use across any vehicle class. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 113]
308 U.S. EPA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles—Phase 3, 88 Fed. Reg.
25926, 25934(Apr. 27, 2023).
309 88 Fed. Reg. at 29308-09.
310 Atlas Pub. Pol'y, Announced EV Infrastructure Funding (June 15, 2023).
Table XVII.D-1: Estimated U.S. Charging Infrastructure Investments Announced but Not Yet
In the Ground, as of March 31, 2023
[See original attachment for Table XVII.D-1]. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 113-
114]
These totals include public sector (e.g., Charging and Fueling Infrastructure Discretionary
Grant funding, state funding commitments, and modeled estimates of 26 U.S. Code § 30C tax
credit payments), private sector (e.g., automaker and charging service provider), and utility
program investments.311 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 114]
311 Note that these figures do not include funding for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. Regarding the § 30C tax
credit, Atlas assumes that 1) all qualifying projects receive the tax credit, 2) on average, qualifying projects
will receive tax credits worth 18% of covered costs, and 3) that Treasury will classify a census tract as not
urban if more than 10% of the blocks within the census tract are designated as rural census blocks, as
recommended by multiple stakeholders described in Section XVII.C. The estimated Low Carbon Fuel
Standard value is based on modeling from Dean Taylor Consulting for California, Oregon, and Washington
and does not include capacity credits. It uses a 2023 - 2032 EV adoption trajectory for those three states
that meets President Biden's LDV goal of 50% ZEV sales share by 2030 (which is lower than the trajectory
modeled in the EPA's proposed vehicle emission standards), an MDHD EV adoption curves modeled on
the EPA's proposed emissions regulations for MD and HD vehicles, and modeling from Atlas's INSITE
tool of MWh demanded by MDHD vehicles. Utility program investments include approved investor-owned
utility programs with an EV charging element. Amounts are unspent program dollars as of the most recent
program report available as of March 31, 2023. If no program report was available, Atlas used the
percentage of time remaining in the approved program schedule to estimate the unspent proportion of
program funding.
Even Atlas's tally of private sector commitments is likely incomplete. Private sector actors
often do not announce their investment plans, and are especially unlikely to do so if they are
investing in home, depot, or workplace charging. Tallied private sector commitments exclude an
estimated $3.0 billion in capital raised by charging companies (including ChargePoint, EVgo,
Blink, and Volta), some percentage of which is expected still to be invested in charging hardware
and installation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 114]
The scale of these announced investments reflects a strong and growing deployment of public
and private charging infrastructure that, even in advance of the finalization of the Proposed
Standards, has begun to set the stage for a robust charging network. Additional analyses have
emphasized the growing momentum in infrastructure deployment; for example, an International
Energy Agency report noted that "there has been a substantial upswing in investment in EV
charging infrastructure, which has doubled in 2022 compared to the previous year."312 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 114]
312 IEA, World Energy Investment 2023, at 50 (2023), https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/54a781e5-
05ab-4d43-bb7f-752c27495680AVorldEnergyInvestment2023.pdf
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E. Increased access to Tesla's large and growing supercharger network will accelerate PEV
adoption.
Recent announcements from Tesla, Ford, GM, Rivian, and Volvo that will allow more drivers
to access Tesla's Supercharger network bolster the case for strong vehicle standards. As shown
in Figure XVII.E-1 and Figure XVII.E-2, this effectively doubles the number of public fast
charging locations and connectors available to a majority of the EV market.
Figure XVII.E-1: J1772Combo and Chademo DC Fast Charging Ports313
[See original comment for Figure XVII.E-1],
313 Atlas Public Policy, EVHub (June 27, 2023) available at https://www.atlasevhub.com/materials/ev-
charging-deployment/ (subscription required).
Figure XVII.E-2: Tesla Supercharger, J1772Combo and Chademo DC Fast Charging
Ports314 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 115]
[See original comment for Figure XVII.E-2],
314 Id.
F. Barriers to the installation of charging infrastructure identified in the Proposal are being
removed.
Barriers to the timely installation of charging infrastructure are being removed, which will
allow investments at an even greater pace and scale.
Most of the challenges associated with energizing charging infrastructure in a timely manner
are being faced in California, which has to date the highest percentage of electric LDVs on the
road. Thankfully, a state law enacted in 2022 provides California's investor- and publicly-owned
utilities with data necessary to inform grid planning to accommodate high levels of EV charging,
requires those utilities to propose proactive grid investments in their General Rate Cases to
comply with ZEV regulations (as well as a long list of other laws, standards, and requirements),
and directs the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and local utility governing boards
to ensure the proposed investments are consistent with achieving the state's goals and
regulations.315 In May 2023, Southern California Edison (SCE) filed its General Rate Case,
which includes such proactive investments.316 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 116]
315 California Assembly Bill 2700 Transportation electrification: electrical distribution grid upgrades.
(2021-2022). https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220AB2700.
316 Southern California Edison, What you should know about SCE's general rate case (May 2023), at
https://energized.edison.com/stories/sce-details-investments-to-advance-electric-grid-reliability-resilience-
and-readi ness (last accessed June 30, 2023).
In addition, the California Senate recently voted 32-to-8 to advance new legislation (Senate
Bill 410, "Powering Up Californians Act") that builds upon existing law to accelerate short-term
energization timelines for EV charging and to ensure timely grid investments needed to electrify
"light-duty, medium-duty, and heavy-duty vehicles and off-road vehicles, vessels, trains, and
equipment" consistent with state law requiring economy-wide carbon neutrality by 2045, and
"federal, state, regional, and local air quality and decarbonization standards, plans, and
regulations."317 The legislation also establishes a balancing account to recover associated costs,
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which would ensure that Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) and San Diego Gas & Electric
(SDG&E) do not have to wait several years for their next General Rate Cases to propose
investments like those recently proposed by SCE (and it would also allow SCE to propose
subsequent investments before its next rate case that could not be predicted when its current rate
case was filed). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 116]
317 California Senate Bill 410. (2023).
https://leginfo.legislatures. gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB410.
Utilities across the country are also already planning for and deploying solutions to address
increased vehicle electrification as their customers adopt PEVs to improve fleet economics and
performance. Utilities and their customers will benefit from the ability to plan ahead for any
significant infrastructure requirements. The regulatory certainty provided by this rulemaking can
aid this planning. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 116]
Regulatory certainty can also help ensure that investments not only maintain strong electric
service but improve it, while at the same time lowering costs. SCE President and CEO Steve
Powell noted: "if we leverage the electric vehicle load and have that work for consumers as well,
that whole idea of vehicle-to-grid, there can be real value in helping alleviate a lot of the
infrastructure investments that need to happen," ultimately lowering overall energy bills for
customers.318 Similarly, Seattle City Light, in its Transportation Electrification Strategic
Investment Plan, stated that "[w]hile there are system costs associated with increased
transportation electrification (e.g., distribution and transmission infrastructure upgrades), with
proactive utility planning and intervention, the system benefits (e.g., new revenue) are estimated
to outweigh the costs, spreading the economic benefits of transportation electrification to all
customers."319 This will require action from regulators as well to help shape and approve these
proactive and critical investments. As RMI recommended, "regulators can fulfil [sic] their
responsibility for ensuring prudent and least-cost grid investments while proactively planning by
using new information."320 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 117]
318 Casey Wian, Transportation Electrification Gains Momentum: Edison International and SCE outline
plans to seize the "huge opportunity" of preparing the grid for exponential EV growth, Energized, (Feb. 1,
2023), https://energized.edison.com/stories/transportation-electrification-gains-momentum.
319 Seattle City Light, Transportation Electrification Strategic Investment Plan 6 (not dated),
https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/CityLight/TESIP.pdf.
320 Ari Kahn et al., RMI, Preventing Electric Truck Gridlock: Meeting the Urgent Need for a Stronger
Grid 16 (2023), https://rmi.org/insight/preventing-electric-truck-gridlock/.
In addition, the historic investments of the BIL and IRA are helping utilities build a stronger,
cleaner grid and prepare for advanced electrification while minimizing customer costs. Duke
Energy, for example, has stated that "[the BIL] provides an important down payment on the
infrastructure and incentives that are needed to electrify transportation and secure the grid," and
"[the IRA] can create significant cost savings for our customers."321 New York utilities have
indicated that they will be applying for $900 million in grants from the BIL and IRA to advance
grid resilience.322 National Grid in particular notes that "EV charging make-ready infrastructure
is identical to electric infrastructure that serves other purposes, this is the kind of work electric
utilities do every day,"323 and that "areas of the [BIL] funding are enabling increased
investment."324 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 117]
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321 Jennifer Loraine, Policy can have a crucial impact on our clean energy future, Duke Energy News
Center (Jan. 20, 2023), https://news.duke-energy.com/our-perspective/policy-can-have-a-crucial-impact-
on-our-clean-energy-future.
322 John Norris, NY Utilities to Seek $900M from DOE, RTO Insider, (Mar. 28, 2023),
https://www.rtoinsider.com/articles/31898-ny-utilities-seek-900m-from-doe.
323 Comments of National Grid to USDOT/FHWA on Docket No. FHWA-2021-0022, at 11 (Jan. 26,
2022), https://downloads.regulations.gOv/FHWA-2021-0022-0150/attachment_l.pdf.
324 Id. at 10.
Grid operators around the country are also beginning to incorporate EV planning into existing
planning structures. For example, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission has shifted
investor-owned utility transportation electrification planning and reporting requirements to the
integrated distribution planning process to account for increasing linkages between EV planning
and distribution system planning.325 Incorporating robust EV planning in existing planning
structures can help ensure those processes account for EV adoption, even where the utility
business units responsible for those areas of planning may be distinct. Furthermore, combined
planning processes can create administrative efficiencies that help expedite time-sensitive
planning needs. On the transmission planning side, regional grid operators, such as the
Midcontinent Independent System Operator, have already begun to think about how
transportation electrification will affect total energy needs and the timing of annual peaks in
electricity demand.326 Strong vehicle standards give grid operators a reliable EV forecast
against which to plan in processes that are already underway. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
p. 118]
325 Minn. Public Utilities Comm'n, Order (Dec. 8, 2022). In the Matter of a Commission Inquiry into
Electric Vehicle Charging and Infrastructure (Docket No. E999/CI-17-879), In the Matter of Minnesota
Power's 2021 Integrated Distribution System Plan (Docket No. M-21-390), In the matter of Distribution
System Planning for Otter Tail Power Company (Docket No. 21-612), In the matter of Xcel Energy's 2021
Integrated Distribution System Plan (Docket No. (21-694).
https://www.edockets.state.mn.us/edockets/searchDocuments.do?method=showPoup&documentId={30E7
F284-000 0-C43 3-8FFA-298183EBEB26 }&documentTitle=202212-191192-02.
326 MISO Electrification Insights (April 2021), at 10, 14-15, available at
https://cdn.misoenergy.org/Electrification%20Insights538860.pdf.
Finally, parties are working across sectors and industries to reduce barriers to charging
deployment. Utilities, public utility commissions and other state regulators, grid operators,
charging providers, and others can and have already begun to coordinate and plan for increased
vehicle electrification. Examples include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 118]
-The National Charging Experience Consortium (ChargeX) is a collaborative effort between
Argonne National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, NREL, BEV charging industry
experts, consumer advocates, and other stakeholders whose mission is "to work together as BEV
industry stakeholders to measure and significantly improve public charging reliability and
usability by June 2025."327 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 118]
327 Idaho Nat! Lab'y, National Charging Experience Consortium, https://inl.gov/chargex/ (last visited
June 13, 2023).
-The National EV Charging Initiative brings together automakers, power providers, PEV and
charging industry leaders, labor, and public interest groups to "develop a national charging
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network for light, medium, and heavy-duty vehicles and inspire deeper commitments from state
leaders, the administration and each other."328 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 118]
328 EV Charging Initiative, https://www.evcharginginitiative.com/ (last visited June 13, 2023).
-The National Association of State Energy Officials and the American Association of State
Highway and Transportation Officials partnered with the U.S. Joint Office of Energy and
Transportation to hold a series of convenings to coordinate on a range of topics, including ZEV
infrastructure and utility planning needs.329 These convenings brought together State
Departments of Transportation officials, State Energy Offices, and other key partners. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 118-119]
329 Nat'l Ass'n State Energy Officials (NASEO) & the Am. Ass'n State Highway & Transp. Officials
(AASHTO), Building a National Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Network: Regional EV Meetings
Key Themes, Takeaways, and Recommendations from the States (not dated),
https://www.naseo.Org/data/sites/l/documents/publications/NASEO_AASHTO_Regional%20EV%20Meet
ings%20 Summary_%20Final.pdf.
-PG&E and BMW of North America are testing a "vehicle-to-everything technology that will
improve grid reliability and help EV customers lower their electric bills by exporting power back
to the grid during peak demand periods." PG&E notes that "[t]he utility and automotive
industries are creating a transformative clean energy future together."330 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 119]
330 BMW Group, More Power To You: BMW of North America and PG&E Start V2X Testing in
California (May 16, 2023), https://www.press.bmwgroup.eom/usa/article/detail/T0417218EN_US/more-
power-to-you:-bmw-of-north-america-and-pg-e-start-v2x-testing-in-california.
-NREL and Volvo collaborated on a research paper regarding challenges and opportunities of
commercial ZEVs, noting:
Coordination between disparate and historically unconnected stakeholders, including state
agencies, local governments, automotive manufacturers, fleets, energy infrastructure and utility
companies, and research and academia will be required to ensure a smooth and timely transition
to ZEVs. This paper, a joint research and industry perspective, is one such example of cross-
sectoral collaboration.331 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 119]
331 Matteo Muratori, et al., Road to zero: Research and industry perspectives on zero-emission commercial
vehicles, iScience, May 19, 2023, https://www.cell.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2589-
0042%2823%2900828-3, at 7.
These examples show that the relevant stakeholders are already stepping up to plan for and
accommodate the charging and grid needs associated with greater vehicle electrification.
Fundamentally, charging infrastructure challenges are being addressed, as evidenced by the
progress described above. We are not starting from scratch and do not need to replicate the
gasoline and diesel refueling network to electrify vehicles. The electric grid is already nearly
ubiquitous; it only needs to be extended at the fringes. These actions benefit utility shareholders
and customers alike by removing barriers to investment in charging infrastructure. As explored
in more detail below, America's utilities have a long history of accommodating significant
growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 119]
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In sum, the private and federal infrastructure investments EPA has identified justify strong
standards, and barriers to additional investment are actively being removed. Furthermore, as
noted above, EPA's inventory of federal, public, and private investments that already justifies
increasingly stringent vehicle standards is incomplete; and a more complete inventory justifies
stronger standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 119]
4. PEV charging is already putting downward pressure on electric rates, to the benefit of all
utility customers.
Because much PEV charging can be accomplished when there is spare capacity on the grid,
charging can spread the costs of maintaining the system over a greater volume of electricity
sales, reducing the per-kilowatt-hour price of electricity to the benefit of all customers. This has
already been demonstrated in the real world. [See original comment for XVII.G-4], [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 128]
In fact, empirical data compiled by Synapse Energy Economics shows that PEV drivers are
not being subsidized by other utility customers and, in fact, they are putting downward pressure
on rates. Between 2011 and 2020, PEV customers across the United States contributed more than
$1.7 billion in net revenue to the body of utility customers.350 [See original comment for
XVII.G-4], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 128]
350 Melissa Whited, Tyler Fitch, Jason Frost, Eric Borden, Courtney Lane, BenHavumaki, Sarah
Shenstone-Harris & Elijah Sinclair, Electric Vehicles Are Driving Rates Down 1 (June 2023),
https://www.synapse-
energy.com/sites/default/files/Electric%20 Vehicles%20Are%20Driving%20Rates%20Down%
20Factsheet.pdf.
The results shown in Figure XVII.G-4 compare the new revenue the utilities collected from
PEV drivers to the cost of the energy, capacity, transmission, and distribution system upgrades
required to charge those vehicles, plus the costs of utility PEV infrastructure programs that are
deploying charging stations for PEVs. In total, PEV drivers contributed an estimated $1.7 billion
more than associated costs. That net revenue is returned to the body of utility customers in the
form of electric bills that are lower than they would otherwise be. [See original comment for
XVII.G-4], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 128]
Figure XVII.G-4: Total Utility Revenues vs. Total Costs Associated with PEVs (2011-
2020)351
351 Id. at 3.
[See original comment for XVII.G-4], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 129]
XXIII. BEV Charging Times Are Constantly Improving and Are Not a Constraint on Strong
Standards.
Taking refueling considerations into account, BEV charging times are consistent with setting
strong final standards. Charging technologies have come a long way in recent years, increasing
in their capability to deliver more energy to a vehicle in the same unit of time. EPA notes that its
assumptions for BEV refueling times are outdated, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29200, and that is indeed the
case. EPA's analysis assumes 100 miles of driving added for each hour of charging as the
"charge rate" across all BEVs. DRIA at 4-29. That equates to an average power delivery of just
over 30 kilowatts, using the current on-road fleet average BEV efficiency.595 While power
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delivery during a charging session does taper off as the vehicle battery approaches a full charge,
the average power delivery for mid-trip charging events will be much higher than 30 kW. Those
events are likely to be done with fast charging, where available, and the availability of high-
powered, fast charging will expand greatly leading up to and through the lifetimes of vehicles
sold during the period of the Proposed Standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 182]
595 David Reichmuth, Jessica Dunn, & Don Anair, Driving Cleaner, Union of Concerned Scientists (July
2022) at 20, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2022-07/driving-cleaner-report_0.pdf.
Not only is consumer demand for fast charging for mid-trip fueling pushing the market in the
direction of higher-powered ports, the minimum power requirements for federal programs, as
well as some state programs, ensure the market will meet those consumer needs in a timely
manner. For example, the minimum standards and requirements for the National EV Charging
Formula Program specify that each charging location must have at least four charging ports that
can deliver 150 kW (or higher) simultaneously. 88 Fed. Reg. at 12754. A 150 kW port would
deliver closer to 450 miles of range in an hour, greatly reducing the disbenefit of refueling time
associated with BEVs. That number of miles per hour of charging is really a theoretical
construct, as the hourly output is more energy than light- and medium-duty vehicle batteries can
hold. A vehicle would not spend a full hour fueling at a 150 kW charging station, even if the
battery is fully depleted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 182]
The hourly charging speed of a 150 kW station is, however, a useful apples-to-apples
comparison to the 100 miles/hour figure used in EPA's analysis. It suggests that many vehicles
will charge nearly four and a half times faster than the speed assumed in the analysis. Still other
vehicles may use even faster charging for their mid-trip events, with chargers on the market
approaching 350 kW, for vehicles that can accept that output.596 Thus, EPA's charging rate
assumption could be quadrupled (and the refueling time disbenefit for BEVs greatly reduced)
and still result in a conservative assumption that leaves room for vehicles that may do some mid-
trip charging at more moderate DC charging power levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
183]
596 Andrei Nedelea, 800V EV Charging Will Drastically Reduce Waiting Times At The Charger, Inside
EVs (June 5, 2020), https://insideevs.com/features/427039/800-volt-charging-to-change-industry/.
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
V. Sufficient infrastructure, electric grid capacity, and policies exist to support strong
standards.
EPA reasonably considered additional factors, including ZEV infrastructure, in projecting
ZEV deployment in its proposal. Recent analyses indicate that buildout of EV infrastructure and
the electric grid distribution capacity are sufficient to support EPA's proposed standards.
Significant federal, state, and private investments are already being made to grow EV
infrastructure. And states and utilities are initiating processes to ensure adequate infrastructure to
meet demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 51-52]
A. Federal, state, and private investments support fast-growing infrastructure.
Investment in the infrastructure required to support rapid ZEV proliferation has already
begun. Federal, state, and private parties have directed substantial resources into developing
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widespread charging networks and driving technological innovation. Together, these investments
are laying the groundwork for protective standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 51-52]
In 2022, President Biden publicly committed to building out a national network of 500,000
EV chargers by 2030.123 The federal government has made significant investments towards
building the infrastructure necessary for a ZEV future with The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)
and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL). Both laws are putting billions of dollars towards
building out charging networks and updating the grid to support the transition to ZEVs. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 51-52]
123 Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Announces New Standards and Major Progress for a Made-
in-America National Network of Electric Vehicle Chargers, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2023/02/15/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-new-standards-and-
major-progress-for-a-made-in-america-national-network-of-electric-vehicle-chargers/.
Multiple provisions of the IRA will boost the development of infrastructure to support light-
duty ZEVs. The Alternative Fuel Refueling Property Credit will directly fund charging
infrastructure in low-income and rural areas. 124 Qualifying businesses and individuals can be
reimbursed for up to 30 percent of the cost of installing charging equipment in these areas,
substantially reducing the costs of this equipment. 125 The Congressional Joint Committee on
Taxation estimates this credit will cost almost $2 billion over its lifetime, demonstrating the
sizeable impact it will make in driving additional investments from private parties. 126 The
Advanced Energy Project Credit allocates $10 billion for facilities manufacturing advanced
energy technologies, which includes manufacturing of charging and refueling infrastructure for
ZEVs as well as grid modernization components. 127 Other provisions fund grants for
infrastructure buildout in nonattainment areas, 128 and fund improvements to electricity
generation and transmission. 129 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 52]
124 Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, P.L. 117-169, § 13404.
125 Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, P.L. 117-169, § 13404.
126 Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of the Revenue Provisions of Tile I—
Committee on Finance, of an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 5376, "An Act to Provide
for Reconciliation Pursuant to Tile II of S. Con. Res. 14," as Passed by the Senate on August 7.2-22, and
Scheduled for Consideration by the House of Representative on August 12, 2022, JCX-18-22,
https://www.jct.gov/publications/2022/jcx-18-22/.
127 Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, P.L. 117-169, § 13501.
128 Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, P.L. 117-169, § 60101.
129 Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, P.L. 117-169, § 50144, 50145, 50151, 50152.
The BIL is another source of considerable federal investment in infrastructure development.
Through its National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) and Charging and Fueling
Infrastructure (CFI) discretionary grant programs, the law allocates $7.5 billion in funding
explicitly towards building out ZEV charging and refueling infrastructure. 130 The NEVI
program directs the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to provide funding to states to
deploy EV charging stations to build an interconnected and reliable charging network. The
FHWA has already announced its first set of plans under the program, which includes investment
in all 50 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. 131 This first round of NEVI
investment is set to bring EV charging to 75,000 miles of highway across the country. 132 The
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CFI program provides additional funding for FHWA administered grants to state and local
authorities for development of publicly accessible charging infrastructure. 133 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 52-53]
130 Infrastructure, Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, P.L. 117-58, 135 Stat. 445, 1421. Infrastructure,
Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, P.L. 117-58, 135 Stat. 445, 1421.
131 U.S. Department of Transportation, Historic Step: All Fifty States Plus D.C. and Puerto Rico Greenlit
to Move EV Charging Networks Forward, Covering 75,000 Milles of Highway (Sep. 27, 2022),
https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/historic-step-all-fifty-states-plus-dc-and-puerto-rico-greenlit-
move-ev-charging.
132 U.S. Department of Transportation, Historic Step: All Fifty States Plus D.C. and Puerto Rico Greenlit
to Move EV Charging Networks Forward, Covering 75,000 Milles of Highway (Sep. 27, 2022),
https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/historic-step-all-fifty-states-plus-dc-and-puerto-rico-greenlit-
move-ev-charging.
133 U.S. Department of Transportation, Biden-Harris Administration Opens Applications for First Round
of $2.5 Billion Program to Build EV Charging in Communities & Neighborhoods Nationwide,
https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/biden-harris-administration-opens-applications-first-round-
25-billion-program-build.
On top of these programs, the BIL authorized more than $40 billion combined for the
Congestion Mitigation & Air Quality Improvement Program, National Highway Performance
Program, and Surface Transportation Grant Block Program. 134 These programs are not
dedicated exclusively to charging, but constructing and installing charging infrastructure is an
eligible activity under each of them. Additional funding from the BIL provides grants to states
and local governments for reducing transportation carbon pollution, which will fund additional
infrastructure investments. 135 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 52-53]
134 Infrastructure, Investment and Jobs Act, P.L. 117-58, § 11115.
135 Infrastructure, Investment and Jobs Act, P.L. 117-58, § 11403.
The ambition of these federal investments is being matched by infrastructure funding in many
states, especially in states that have adopted, or are planning to adopt, California's Advanced
Clean Cars II (ACC II) rule. For example, the California Energy Commission's (CEC) Clean
Transportation Program announced it plans to invest $900 million for light-duty charging
infrastructure through 2026.136 The CEC estimates the plan will result in 90,000 new EV
chargers across the state, more than doubling the state's existing network and helping it meet its
goal of having 250,000 chargers by 2025.137 Colorado has likewise made significant
investments in preparing for a transition to ZEVs. The state's Charge Ahead Colorado Program
provides grants that fund 80% of the cost of charging stations up to certain maximums based on
type of charging equipment. 138 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 53]
136 California Energy Commission, CEC Approves $2.9 Billion Investment for Zero-Emission
Transportation Infrastructure (Dec. 14, 2022), https://www.energy.ca.gov/news/2022-12/cec-approves-29-
billion-investment-zeroemission-transportation-infrastructure.
137 Id.
138 Colorado Energy Office, Charge Ahead Colorado, https://energyoffice.colorado.gov/charge-ahead-
colorado.
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B. Independent analysis commissioned by EDF shows existing and announced public
charging infrastructure is on track to support increased passenger vehicle electrification.
A new study by WSP for EDF submitted along with our comments summarizes the existing
public charging infrastructure in the U.S., the future public charging infrastructure needs based
on EPA's proposal, and quantifies the announced EV charger deployment and investment and
how it compares to those needs. 139 In this analysis, WSP conducted an extensive survey of
charger deployment announcements to quantify the extent of the government and industry
investment in public charging in the U.S. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis
that has attempted to quantify both the current state of the market and the cumulative impacts of
future investments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 53-54]
139 U.S. Public EV Charging Infrastructure Deployment: Announced investment will rapidly expand
publicly available charging, WSP for EDF (June 2023), https://blogs.edf.org/climate411/wp-
content/blogs.dir/7/files/WSP-US-Public-EV-Charging-Infrastrcuture-Deployment-July-2023.pdf
(Attachment U).
The analysis finds that as of June 2023 there were 58,000 existing public EV charging stations
in the U.S. These stations host 155,700 ports that provide electricity to vehicles - 2% are Level
1, 78% are Level 2 and 20% are DCFC chargers (Figure 17). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
pp. 53-54]
[See original attachment for Figure 17: U.S. Public EV Charging Infrastructure] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 53-54]
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Fuel Database (June 19, 2023) [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 53-54]
WSP estimates the number of public chargers that will be added to the current network over
the next five years based on public announcements and commitments made by federal, state, and
private organizations. Since 2021, based on a conservative estimate considering only the most
concrete announcements, more than $21.5 billion in investments have been announced, which
will result in over 800,000 new charger ports coming online before 2030 (Table 14). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 54-57]
[See original attachment for Table 14: Announced Public Charging Ports and Investments]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 54-57]
Source: WSP, U.S. Public EV Charging Infrastructure Deployment
The pace of charger announcements increased markedly since the passage of the Inflation
Reduction Act, representing 4.5 times the number of current public chargers, and underscoring
the impact of recent federal policy in spurring the expansion (Figure 17). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 54-57]
[See original attachment for Figure 17: EV Charger Announcement Timing] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 54-57]
Source: WSP, U.S. Public EV Charging Infrastructure Deployment [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 54-57]
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In the Draft RIA for the proposal, EPA estimates that approximately 1,075,000 new Level 2
chargers and 135,000 new DCFC public chargers will be needed by 2030 to accommodate
increasing numbers of EVs on the road, as a result of BAU and the proposed standards. 140
WSP's analysis finds that existing and already announced public EV charger deployments will
provide at least 70% of the public chargers needed in the U.S. by 2030 under EPA's current
proposed rule. For DCFC, existing and announced chargers account for more than 100% of the
needed DCFC chargers past 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 54-57]
140 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Year
2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis, April 2023,
Figure 5-15.
When WSP further accounted for less concrete announcements, by assuming 25% of these
softer announcements would materialize, along with 50% of unawarded grants resulting in
previously unaccounted for charging ports, the analysis found announced investments would
result in the deployment of well over 100% of the required chargers in 2030, 1.7 million ports.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 54-57]
The combination of market forces and incentives from recent federal policy have attracted a
wide array of players to invest in public charger deployments. The analysis identified
investments by 29 state governments, 18 charge network providers, 10 retailers, 7 vehicle
manufacturers, 6 toll road operators, along with utilities, truck and service station operators, and
fleet owners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 54-57]
For example, Walmart announced it will install publicly available DCFC chargers at all of its
retail locations in the U.S. by 2030 - and nearly 90% of Americans live within 10 miles of a
Walmart. 141 Hertz and bp announced plans to build out a national network of EV fast charging
infrastructure to accelerate the adoption of electric vehicles, bringing charging infrastructure to
Hertz locations across America, including major cities such as Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Chicago,
Denver, Houston, Miami, New York City, Orlando, Phoenix, San Francisco, and Washington,
DC. 142 Hertz's goal is to make one-quarter of its fleet electric by the end of 2024 while bp aims
to invest $1 billion in EV charging in the US by 2030. Pilot Company, General Motors, and
EVgo have partnered to build a coast-to-coast network of 2,000 high power 350 kW fast chargers
at Pilot and Flying J travel centers along American highways, with the first 200+ chargers
expected to be available for use by drivers in 2023.143 And General Motors and FLO announced
a collaborative effort with dealers to install up to 40,000 public Level 2 EV chargers in local
communities by 2026 through GM's Dealer Community Charging Program. 144 As shown in
Figure 18, WSP found that these private sector deployments along with NEVI and other
nationwide grant programs would dramatically expand the EV charging network nationwide.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 54-57]
141 Vishal Kapadia, Leading the Charge: Walmart Announces Plan to Expand Electric Vehicle Charging
Network (Apr. 6, 2023), https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2023/04/06/leading-the-charge-walmart-
announces-plan-to-expand-electric-vehicle-charging-network/
142 Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Announces New Standards and Major Progress for a Made-
in-America National Network of Electric Vehicle Chargers (Feb. 15, 2023),
https://www.whitehouse.gOv/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/02/15/fact-sheet-biden-harris-
administration-announces-new-standards-and-major-progress-for-a-made-in-america-national-network-of-
electric-vehicle-chargers/.
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143 Id.
144 Id.
[See original attachment for Figure 18: Geographic Distribution of Announced EV Charger
Deployments and Investments] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 54-57]
Source: WSP, U.S. Public EV Charging Infrastructure Deployment [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 54-57]
ii. EV charging has the potential to benefit the grid through managed charging and other
programs.
Multiple studies have found that through managed charging, increases in EV adoption and
charging will not meaningfully increase peak demand on the grid. In their study investigating the
grid impacts of BEV adoption in Dallas and New York City, Needell, Wei, and Trancik found
that "delayed home charging nearly eliminates the increase in the evening demand for
electricity.. .even for BEV penetration levels well over 50%." Additionally, they found that
"workplace charging emerges as a simple and effective solution for abating both the peak
increase and the over-supply of [solar generation]." 162 A 2019 article in IEEE Electrification
Magazine found that through managed charging, the peak demand from EVs in California could
be cut to one-eighth of the size without managed charging leaving the increases within the
margins for most residential feeders. 163 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, p. 60]
162 Needell et al., Strategies for beneficial electric vehicle charging to reduce peak electricity demand and
store solar energy, Cell Reports Physical Science 4, 101287 March 15, 2023
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.xcrp.2023.101287 (Attachment V).
163 Jonathan Coignard et al., Will Electric Vehicles Drive Distribution Grid Upgrades?: The case of
California. 2019. IEEE Electrification Magazine, 10.1109/MELE.2019.2908794.
Organization: Fermata Energy
V2X bidirectional charging is a win-win-win investment: many benefits accrue: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-6]
Achieves EPA's environmental goals. Just like stationary storage, V2X bidirectional
charging platforms can reduce carbon and criteria pollutant emissions from generators by
shifting electricity consumption to the cleanest hours of the day and removing the need for dirty
thermal peaker electricity generation. However, V2X is more cost-effective than stationary
storage, as ratepayers don't have to pay for purchase of the EV battery and can accelerate the
renewable transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-6]
Provides grid services. With V2X bidirectional charging, utilities gain a low-cost
energy storage resource to help integrate renewable energy into the electric grid by shifting
energy, providing resource adequacy, and ancillary services (Figure 3). For example, modeling
by the CPUC currently projects 14,700 MW of new energy storage is needed in CA by 2032 to
support the integration of renewables but only 2,185 MW is operational today.9,10 V2X, with
supportive policies, can provide many thousands of MW by 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0710, pp. 4-6]
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9 CPUC Approves Long Term Plans To Meet Electricity Reliability and Climate Goals, CPUC, 2022
(Link: https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/news-and-updates/all-news/cpuc-approves-long-term-plans-to-meet-
electricity-reliability-and-climate-goals)
10 Infographic: Q4'21 US Battery Storage by the Numbers, S&P Global, 2022 (Link:
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/blog/infographic-q4-21-us-battery-storage-
by-the-numbers)
[See original attachment for Figure 3 -Grid services and value from different Vehicle-Grid-
Integration technologies] 11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-6]
11 California Energy Commission, March 2019, Distribution System Constrained Vehicle-to-Grid Services
for Improved Grid Stability and Reliability, (Link: https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
06/CEC-500-2019-027.pdf) Figure 42
Lower vehicle ownership costs. EV owners can earn money by selling electricity back
to the grid, significantly cutting the cost of vehicle ownership. Offsetting the cost of owning and
maintaining an EV supports equitable access to EVs, particularly those EVs in the used car
market, such as the low-income EV driving community. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-
6]
Increased resiliency. Unidirectional charging is a grid load. V2X bidirectional charging
cost-effectively supports grid resilience. During blackouts and extreme weather events, such as
Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS) in CA, EV owners can power their homes, businesses, and
critical infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-6]
Ratepayer benefits. EV adoption has already been shown to significantly benefit utility
ratepayers and V2X technology can further those benefits. 12 For example, a 2018 CEC study
projects $1 billion in annual ratepayer benefits if 50% of chargers were V2X capable. 13 V2X
technology also improves driver economics which would likely drive further EV adoption and
even greater ratepayer benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-6]
12 Electric Vehicles Are Driving Electric Rates Down, Synapse Economics, 2019, Electric Vehicles
Benefit All Utility Ratepayers, Forbes, 2019 (Link:
https://www.forbes.eom/sites/jeffmcmahon/2019/02/01/electric-vehicles-benefit-all-utility-customers-as-
much-as-their-owners/)
13 Distribution System Constrained Vehicle-to-Grid Services for Improved Grid Stability and Reliability,
(Link: https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/CEC-500-2019-027.pdf) CEC 2018, Table 8,
High PEV Forecast Scenario
The promise of bidirectional charging (AC or DC) to address air pollution, GHG emissions,
and challenges to the electric grid is very significant with BEVs and PHEVS in medium-and
light-duty vehicles. While we understand the desire by the EPA to simplify the regulation and
reduce the use of bonus multiplier credits, we believe a small bonus credit in this regulation is
justified and needed to unlock this technology because of the large emissions reduction benefits
and other grid services enabled by bidirectional charging as described in Section II above. The
EPA has a long history of providing multiplier credits to emerging technologies and we strongly
encourage the EPA to adopt in the final regulation a modest multiplier credit for light-duty and
medium-duty passenger vehicles that appropriately phases out over time. This multiplier should
apply to automakers with vehicles that have on-board AC inverters for bidirectional charging and
for vehicles that can show they have integrated with many brands of off-board DC fast chargers.
This approach will not only will help enable the emerging V2G industry, but it will also help
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consumers achieve lower operating costs, 16 reduce GHG and traditional pollutants from fossil
fueled power plants by shifting electricity use to renewable energy in the cleanest hours of the
day, and reduce the need for high-emitting peaker plants. V2G also provides a zero-emission,
lower cost alternative to high-emitting portable back-up generators, and saves utility ratepayers
money with a low-cost resource as compared to battery stationary storage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0710, p. 8]
16 See footnote 11
By implementing our recommendations, the EPA has a unique opportunity to help the
emerging V2G industry, consumers, and the power generation and transportation industries.
Fermata Energy appreciates the opportunity to provide these comments and welcomes a more in-
depth dialogue on this and offers itself as a resource on V2X topics for EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0710, p. 8]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Ford is enthusiastic and optimistic about the ICE-to-ZEV transition, and we are already
delivering electrified light-and medium-duty EVs at scale. While we remain optimistic, we are
also mindful of the considerable challenges and uncertainties that lie ahead. The pace of
electrification has been and may continue to be limited by many factors and forces, many of
which are outside the control of vehicle manufacturers. These include the availability of critical
minerals for battery manufacturing, the need to allocate finite resources between EV programs
and efforts toward incremental reductions in emissions from ICE vehicles, consumer demand
especially as we proceed beyond early-adopters to the majority of new vehicle purchasers,
economic turbulence, geopolitical events, and, of course, electric vehicle charging
infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 2-3]
Charging infrastructure is not currently adequate to support even a fraction of the higher EV
population that the US will have in the coming years. While federal and state programs are
improving the availability of charging infrastructure, there will continue to be hesitation from
many prospective EV buyers due to real (and perceived) lack of adequate infrastructure, and that
will limit EV growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 7]
Organization: Fred Reitman
No charging infrastructure. Cars and trucks run low on gasoline and need refueling. Electric
batteries run down and need recharging. Here the similarities end. The infrastructure to refuel
gasoline and diesel-powered engines has been in place for over half a century so locations to
quickly refuel are abundant in urban areas and even in rural areas are sufficient. By contrast
there are comparatively few on-road locations to recharge EV batteries. The batteries take a long
time to recharge, and recharging cannot even begin until vehicles already in line have charged.
Wait times can easily exceed an hour. People are busy and don't have the time to sit and wait.
They have to get to work. They have to pick up the kids. And many other things. The idea of
mandating EVs before there are enough locations to recharge batteries is not acceptable. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0432, p. 1]
Electric grid cannot support this. The electric grid is remarkable engineering. But there is little
reserve capacity and the grid is overtaxed. EV charging will stress the grid and is sure to result in
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brownouts and blackouts, which are dangerous during winter when power is needed for heating
homes. Brownouts and Blackouts are already a problem in some states. This rule if finalized
would only make the problem worse. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0432, p. 1]
Organization: GROWMARK, Inc.
Our system's approach to fuel and energy business is to provide the fuel and energy sources
that our customers want and use. We do not prefer or advocate for one technology over the other,
but we feel that the proposed rule will cause a tremendous burden on farmers and rural
Americans, where the lack of charging infrastructure will make the conversion to EVs at the
rates necessitated by this proposed rule extremely difficult. Furthermore, current EVs lack the
capabilities that internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles currently have, which are vital for
farmers as they work to feed our nation and the world. Additionally, we feel that the
prioritization this proposed rule places on EVs ignores the tremendous potential of biofuels as a
low-carbon fuel source, especially given the current realities of carbon intensity for EVs and
biofuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, p. 1]
Lack of Charging Infrastructure in Rural Areas
Rural America lacks the charging infrastructure needed to support the adoption of EVs at the
level that would be required by these standards. According to the most recent trend report from
the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, rural areas (which make up almost 93% of U.S. land
area) have the smallest number of EV charging ports by a wide margin, and it is the smallest
category in terms of growth of EV charging ports as well.2 Rural Americans would therefore be
expected to travel much further distances and face much greater burdens to access public
charging infrastructure for EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, pp. 1-2]
2 Brown, A., Cappellucci, J., White, E., Heinrich, A., & Cost, E. (2023, May). Electric vehicle charging
infrastructure trends from the alternative fueling station locator: Fourth quarter 2022. National Renewable
Energy Laboratory.
https://afdc.energy.gOv/files/u/publication/electric_vehicle_charging_infrastructure_trends_fourth_quarter_
2022.pdf
Organization: Growth Energy
In contrast, it is not as simple to convert to EV technology. Doing so at scale requires massive
investments in both charging infrastructure and the electric power sufficient to support massive
new electricity demand. Developing sufficient charging infrastructure can be difficult in rural
areas and in locations where there are competing land uses. And developing additional electric
power faces multiple challenges—the country will need significantly more electric capacity and,
for EVs to have their intended GHG reduction benefits, that additional electric generation will
need to be relatively low-carbon. For example, converting vehicles used in the Appalachian
region rapidly to EVs and powering them by increasing loads on existing coal-fired power plants
would not have the significant benefits claimed by the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0580, p. 6]
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
c. The Proposed Rule Is Not Technologically Feasible Within the Required Timeframe
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The Clean Air Act does not direct EPA to drive emission standards for regulated pollutants to
zero as quickly as possible. Rather, under section 202(a)(2), EPA must ensure that any standards
are issued with sufficient lead time "to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, given appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period."40 For
EPA's aggressive PEV mandates, the "requisite technology" not only includes manufacturing the
vehicles themselves but also the underlying charging infrastructure necessary to power these
vehicles. Here, EPA has not demonstrated that sufficient charging stations, utilities, and other
infrastructure needed to support the deployment of an electrified fleet within the Proposed Rule's
contemplated timeline is possible. Without the ability to charge the PEVs EPA will be requiring
OEMs to produce, the Proposed Rule is nonsensical. Furthermore, according to a recent study,
23% of 657 public charging stations in the San Francisco Bay area were broken, and a big
charging company, ChargePoint, had an operational success rate of just 61%.41 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, pp.10-11]
40 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2).
41 NYT, "A Frustrating Hassle Holding Electric Cars Back: Broken Chargers," (Aug 16, 2022), available
at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/16/business/energy-environment/electric-vehicles-broken-
chargers.html.
Take Virginia as a representative example highlighting the gap between the Proposed Rule's
required infrastructure and that which is actually feasible. According to a report by the Consumer
Energy Alliance, attached herein, Virginia currently has 7.6 million light-duty vehicles on the
road. Assuming Virginia transitions to 100% PEV by 2035, the state would need an additional
35.5 billion kWh of generation - equivalent to the generation required to power almost 70% of
the homes in the state. And to maximize the zero-emission benefit of PEVs, this generation
would need to come from zero-emitting sources such as nuclear or renewables (ignoring, for a
moment, the energy intensity required to construct these resources). But 35.5 billion kWh
corresponds to either 4 new nuclear reactors in the state or over 450,000 acres of off-shore
windfarms. Neither of which is remotely feasible under the Proposed Rule.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, pp.11-12]
42 CONSUMER ENERGY ALLIANCE, "Freedom to Fuel: Consumer Choice in the Automotive
Marketplace," August 2023 [hereinafter, "CEA Study"]. Nor has EPA shown that the electric grid itself can
meet this increased demand. As highlighted by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
("NERC"), certain high-risk areas do not today meet resource adequacy criteria, posing significant concern
about adding even more demand to the grid.43 This risk is further exacerbated by EPA's new carbon
dioxide standards for fossil-fuel fired power plants, proposed shortly after the Proposed Rule and not
otherwise considered in the Proposed Rule, that may rapidly phase out affordable base-load generation.44
Far from what the Proposed Rule requires, the infrastructure upgrades to support a U.S. LD fleet that is
only 7% PEV would require an additional $75-125 billion, which would be passed on from utilities directly
to customers.45 Today, energy insecure households, defined as those that are unable to adequately meet
basic household energy needs because of cost, pay 26 cents more per square foot in energy costs as
compared to energy secure households.46 This disparity will only increase as infrastructure upgrades to
accommodate the increased load from PEVs is passed along to ratepayers.
43 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2022 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (Dec. 2022),
21, available at
https://www.nerc.eom/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2022.pdf
(indicating that increased demand projections may lead to reliability concerns for the electric grid,
especially as dual-peaking or seasonal peaking times change with increased electrification).
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44 See Proposed Rule, "New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New,
Modified, and Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the
Affordable Clean Energy Rule," 88 Fed. Reg. 33,240 (May 23, 2023).
45 CEA Study at 8 (noting that the average price to consumers in New Mexico would be $117-195 per
year).
46 EIA, "U.S. energy insecure households were billed more for energy than other households," (May 30,
2023) available at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=56640.
Absent a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between PEV manufacturing and
charging infrastructure, vehicle manufacturers are left in vulnerable position. If the underlying
infrastructure cannot support the influx of PEVs, or if consumers perceive the requisite
infrastructure is not available or reliable, consumers will simply not purchase PEVs in the
quantities requires for OEMs to meet the proposed standards. Case in point, Toyota has publicly
stated that given the three major barriers to widespread PEV adoption—1) the availability of
sufficient critical minerals; 2) a sufficient nation-wide charging infrastructure; and 3) overall
affordability—"the most immediate way to reduce carbon emissions is through a mix of
electrified options, which includes battery electric, plug-in hybrid, and hybrid vehicles."47
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 11-12]
47 Forbes, "Toyota Says Public Charging Not Ready for Pure EVs," (May 20, 2023) available at
https://www.forbes.eom/sites/brookecrothers/2023/05/20/toyota-admits-inconvenient-truth-about-electric-
vehicle-ev-charging-time-prius-prime-rav4-prime/?sh=2b7ed7ab38bl.
As mentioned above, charging capability is a key apprehension for nearly half the U.S.
consumer market. 66 Importantly, successful implementation of the Proposed Rule depends on
consumer choice as much as depends on technological improvements. But, in California as an
example, consumer discontinuance occurs at a rate of 20% for plug-in hybrid electric and 18%
for PEVs—once again based on the dissatisfaction with the convenience or availability of
charging.67 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 14-16]
66 Phillipp Kampshoff, et al., McKinsey & Co., "Building the electric-vehicle charging infrastructure
America needs" (Apr. 18, 2022) available at https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-
insights/building-the-electric-vehicle-charging-infrastructure-america-needs.
67 See EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0077, Abstract (Content restricted for copyright), available at
https://www.regulations.gOv/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0077.
Organization: Hyundai Motor America
We are also concerned the sheer scale of BEV penetration proposed through MY 2030 may
not be supported by the current energy grid. In their 2030 National Charging Network report, the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory found that 26-35 million electric charging ports will be
necessary to support the estimated 30-42 million PEVs expected to be on the roads by 2030
nationwide. They found that affordable home charging will be the main energy source but that it
"must be complemented by reliable public fast charging." Assuming a mid-point of 33 million
PEVs, they specifically estimate that 2.68 million private Level 1 and Level 2 charging ports will
be needed at homes, workplaces, and multi-unit dwellings ("MUDs"), 1 million public Level 2
charging ports will be needed near homes and workplaces which include high-density
neighborhoods, office buildings and retail outlets, and 182,000 public fast charging ports along
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highway corridors and in local communities. 11 Per the U.S. Department of Energy Alternative
Fuels Data Center, there are currently 54,078 public charging stations comprised of both Level 2
and direct current fast charging ("DCFC").12 Assuming roughly that each station has 2 ports
(this varies by charging station), there are currently 108,156 charging ports showing a need for
891,844 Level 2 charging ports in 7 years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, pp. 3-4]
11 "The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric Vehicles
Charging Infrastructure," Page 6, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, June 27, 2023.
12 Alternative Fuels Data Center, Electric Vehicle Charging Station Locations, Accessed June 28, 2023.
In addition, state readiness to successfully implement the ACC IIZEV Regulation remains an
outstanding question. We are concerned there simply is not enough time to delivery key
infrastructure to support the ACC II ZEV Regulations in Section 177 States ("S177 States").
Many of the current SI 77 States that have adopted the ACC II ZEV Regulation lack the
necessary charging infrastructure to support even the MY 2026 ZEV requirements. Further,
several states are on track to become first-time SI77 States and are significantly even farther
behind in terms of infrastructure and other supportive ZEV policies to ensure regulatory success.
To the degree the No Action case assumes equal success of the ACC II ZEV Regulations among
SI77 States, it overlooks the realities on the ground. These assumptions carry forward risk into
the Proposed Rule with an overly ambitious objective for BEV penetration ramp from the current
starting point nationwide of under five percent BEV sales today. 13 For purposes of forecasting
the No Action case, we caution against equating compliance credits 1:1 with BEV penetration.
Notably, the ACC II ZEV Regulation includes PHEVs and FCEVs - coincidentally consistent
with Executive Order 14037. These are just a few assumptions we encourage the EPA to
reconsider in its No Action case. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, pp. 3-4]
13 Experian EV Registration database, 2022 Calendar Year through Q1 2023 Calendar Year. Accessed
May 10, 2023.
State Investment and Readiness is Paramount.
We appreciate the Administration's commitment to supporting EV infrastructure development
through the enactment of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. 117-58 (enacted
2021). However, infrastructure sufficient to support the BEV penetration levels in the Proposed
Alternative would have required significant funding and planning well before 2021. Long lead
times to approve and build federal and state EV infrastructure represent the biggest barrier to
establishing a robust national PEV charging network by 2030. A significant percentage of U.S.
drivers continue to be apprehensive about BEVs citing range anxiety and charge time concerns,
underscoring the urgent need to vastly expand charging infrastructure - including significant
public investments in DCFC. To meet the BEV penetration rates in the Proposed Alternative, we
will need to increasingly attract customers with limited or no at home charging capabilities. For
these reasons, extensive national charging availability presents perhaps the most daunting
consumer hurdle to PEV adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, pp. 4-5]
At Hyundai we are proud to offer our customers two-year complimentary free charging
through Electrify network of over 3,000 EV chargers, coast-to-coast. 14 Hyundai's Electrify
America partnership not only results in customer savings but also helps to ease range anxiety.
Such infrastructure efforts and incentives by automakers are important to demonstrate
commitment to PEV technology and to our customers but they are no substitute for the larger
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scale solutions that must come from federal and state acceleration of these networks to enable the
bold vision of the Administration. Non-S177 States are particularly important, not only with
regard to infrastructure but also for financial assistance (e.g., state incentives for vehicles and
charging) and PEV consumer education. All these policies must work in lock step to achieve
EPA's goal. To date there is not enough investment, planning, and coordination to achieve the
BEV targets set forth in the Proposed Alternative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, pp. 4-5]
14 Hyundai's Electrify America Program.
Organization: Illinois Corn Growers Association
Enormous advances have been made in electric vehicle technology in the last two decades and
there is strong auto industry commitment to eventually replace internal combustion engine
powered vehicles with electric ones. There are, however, still technological and economic
challenges in creating products that meet consumer expectations. In addition, there are many
things that must happen to support electric vehicles, many of which are outside the control of
automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0532, pp. 1-2]
These include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0532, pp. 1-2]
-Increasing the electrical generating capacity in the U.S to provide the power to replace the
energy now supplied by gasoline.
-Switching the source of energy used to generate this electricity from fossil fuels to zero-
carbon sources such as wind, solar, nuclear and hydroelectric.
-Upgrading the electrical grid to move this additional power from the point of generation to
the point of vehicle recharging.
-Installing recharging stations in nearly every home with an electric vehicle and enough
public charging stations to give electric vehicles the same utility as the gasoline powered
vehicles they are intended to replace.
-Securing enough raw materials to build the large batery packs needed to give electric
vehicles the range consumers demand.
-Upgrading the nation's roads, bridges and parking structures to ensure they can absorb the
extra weight of inherently heavier electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0532, pp. 1-2]
Thus, even if in the next eight years automakers, suppliers and retailers can retool their
businesses to supply an estimated 7.5 million new vehicles in 2032 and beyond, it is far from
assured that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0532, pp. 1-2]
-The marketplace is willing to buy that many vehicles in spite of their higher purchase cost,
charging requirements, limited utility and extremely high batery replacement costs.
-The mines can extract enough raw materials to build the bateries necessary to build these
vehicles, especially since it is expected that electric utilities will be buying huge bateries made of
the same materials to deal with the intermit nature of wind and solar energy.
-The electric utilities can provide enough electricity.
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-The electric grid has been upgraded to handle the new demand, again considering that not
only vehicles but residential and commercial heating systems, railroads and even ships will be
converting from fossil fuels to electricity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0532, pp. 1-2]
Given the uncertainty that automakers can meet the proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards through electric vehicles alone, what other new technologies are available for
compliance? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
Organization: Illinois Farm Bureau (IFB)
These independent comments shared the following sentiments to USEPA: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0532, pp.1-2]
- "Rural America does not now have any of the infrastructure to implement this proposed rule,
nor will it ever have the infrastructure to support an all-electric fleet. Because of the distances we
have to travel to access goods and services and the small population base, it will never be
economically feasible to put the needed charging infrastructure in place."
-"Not enough thought has gone into the negative side of EV vehicles. So many resources will
have to be put into the infrastructure of new charging areas while there is already a system in
place. With the unreliability of electricity in rural areas, EVs will put many in danger during
times of emergency. Rural areas have many more miles that need to be driven to get anywhere.
Please put extra thought into how this affects everyone, not just cities." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0532, pp. 1-2]
-"If thought through, individuals would realize that EVs are not environmentally efficient nor
cost-effective. The mining of resources for batteries is not environmentally friendly." [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0532, pp. 1-2]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
EPA's proposed rule, along with sustained commitments will help build out the charging
infrastructure needed to support accelerated electrification. 10 Norway - the world's electric
vehicle sales share leader - achieved nearly 80% EV sales in 2022 with one public charger for
every 26 EVs. 11 Significant resources are already being dedicated to charging in the United
States, including the $7.5 billion allocation from the IIJA as well as several billions of dollars in
power utility and private sector investment. 12 For example, British Petroleum announced plans
to invest $1 billion in EV charging in the U.S. by 2030.13 Automakers are investing too - GM,
working with its dealers, aims to install up to 40,000 public charging stations across the U.S. and
Canada. 14 Globally, Bloomberg New Energy Finance expects $100 billion to be spent to grow
charging infrastructure in the next 3 years alone. 15 In parallel, state infrastructure planning is
underway, with all 50 states, DC, and Puerto Rico submitting and receiving approval for their
National Electric Vehicle Charging Network plans in 2022.16 New research by WSP and EDF
find that the expected growth in public charging from announced deployments will provide at
least 70% of the infrastructure needed by 2030 to meet the BEV projections in EPA's proposal;
for DC fast chargers, the announced investments sum up to over 100% of the amount needed by
2030.17 These announcements and investments indicate that the pace and scale of U.S. charging
infrastructure deployment is on track to support the projected BEV market shares in EPA's
proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 8-9]
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10 Searle, S., Kodjak, D., and Slowik, P. (2023, April 26). Infrastructure and supply chains won't hold up
EPA's proposed light and medium-duty vehicle standards. International Council on Clean Transportation.
https://theicct.org/infrastructure-and-supepas-proposed-ldv-mdv-standards-apr23/
11 Johnson, P. (2023, January 2). This is the Norway - nation hits record EV share in 2022 on its way to
ending gas car sales. Electrek. https://electrek.co/2023/01/02/norway-hits-record-ev-share-in-2022/; Kok,
I., and Hall, D. (2023). Battery electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicle uptake in European cities.
International Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/bev-phev-european-cities-
mar23/
12 The White House. (2023a). Fact sheet: Biden-Harris administration announces new standards and major
progress for Made-in-America National network of Electric vehicle chargers.
https://www.whitehouse.gOv/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/02/15/fact-sheet-biden-harris-
administration-announces-new-standards-and-major-progress-for-a-made-in-america-national-network-of-
electric-vehicle-chargers/; Electric utility filings. Atlas EVHub.
https://www.atlasevhub.com/materials/electric-utility-filings/
13 British Petroleum (2023, February 15). BP plans to invest $1 billion in EV charging across US by 2030,
helping to meet demand from Hertz's expanding EV rentals, https://www.bp.com/en_us/united-
states/home/news/press-releases/bp-plans-to-invest-l-billion-in-ev-charging-across-us-by-2030-helping-to-
meet-demand-from-hertzs-expanding-ev-rentals.html
14 General Motors. (2022, December 7). GM advances dealer community charging program.
https://news.gm.com/newsroom.detail.html/Pages/news/us/en/2022/dec/1207-charging.html
15 Bloomberg NEF. (2023, January 20). Next $100 Billion EV-Charger spend to be super fast.
https://about.bnef.com/blog/next-100-billion-ev-charger-spend-to-be-super-fast/
16 U.S. Department of Transportation. (2022, September 27). President Biden's Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law provides $5 billion to help States install EV chargers along interstate highways.
https://highways.dot.gov/newsroom/historic-step-all-fifty-states-plus-dc-and-puerto-rico-greenlit-move-ev-
charging-networks
17 U.S. Public Electric Vehicle (EV) Charging Infrastructure Deployment, WSP forEDF (July 2023).
[Link forthcoming]
Organization: International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW)
B. Charging Infrastructure
Adequate charging infrastructure is crucial to support electrification of the auto industry. The
EPA must incorporate a more realistic projection of charging infrastructure build-out in the
proposed standards. We are concerned that the EPA relies too heavily on the projected federal
investment that is intended to support ZEV infrastructure,22 and instead, should take the
sentiment of vehicle manufacturers into greater consideration. The Alliance for Automotive
Innovation has made clear that current charging infrastructure is not enough to support
compliance with the proposed standards.23 According to the DOE's most recent report on EV
charging infrastructure trends the rate of charging infrastructure deployment is not paced to meet
the Biden Administration's goal of 500,000 charging ports by 2030.24 This uncertainty
highlights the need for flexibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 8-9]
22 Id. at 29294 ("New legislation also has provided significant incentives for both the manufacture and
purchase of PEVs, and the expansion of charging infrastructure").
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23 Alliance for Auto Innovation, Auto Perspective on Coming EPA Emissions Rules (April 6, 2023),
https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/communications/Auto%20Perspective%20on%20Coming%20EP A%
20Emissi ons%20Rules.pdf.
24 Brown, Abby, Jeff Cappellucci, Emily White, Alexia Heinrich, and Emma Cost. 2023. Electric Vehicle
Charging Infrastructure Trends from the Alternative Fueling Station Locator: Fourth Quarter 2022 at viii..
Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. NREL/TP-5400-85801.
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/Iy23osti/85801 .pdf.
The proposed standards should better reflect that federal investment and incentives will take
time to reach maturity and that the market and consumer demand will lag further behind. To put
it simply, customers will not purchase ZEVs unless charging infrastructure and energy costs fit
their needs and lifestyles, no matter what vehicles manufacturers offer customers. Given this
uncertainty, GHG standards could also incorporate flexibilities for manufacturers should national
charging infrastructure and grid capacity not meet the necessary levels to support compliance.
We strongly encourage the EPA to modify the standards to better reflect the availability of
charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 8-9]
Organization: Jack Spencer
Even should low-income Americans procure an EV, their lack of access to charging stations
will likely further diminish any potential fuel savings. The proposed rule's Draft Regulatory
Impact Analysis acknowledges on page 11-12 that low-income households often will not have
access to residential charging stations and will therefore have higher fuel costs and "larger
overall energy burden." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0681, p. 3]
Organization: Jaguar Land Rover NA, LLC (JLR)
Relationship to Other Regulations
The targets proposed by EPA are extremely ambitious and the projected BEV penetrations
required to meet the standards exceed that of the California Air Resources Board (CARB)
Advanced Clean Cars II regulation, with a trajectory to achieve 100% ZEV by 2035MY (as
shown in Figure 3 below). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 7-8]
In 2022, California's ZEV market share was over three times higher than the federal US BEV
share.9 It is important that EPA acknowledges the inequality between California and non-S177
states. CARB are a world leader in the pursuit of the 100% ZEV goal, with years of incentives
and effort involved to get to this point. EPA cannot assume that all states will follow a similar
route and the regulation must balance the various adoption curves across the country. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 7-8]
9 Office of Governor Gavin Newsom -California ZEV Sales Near 19% of All New Car Sales in 2022(Jan
2023) https://www.gov.ca.gOv/2023/01/20/california-zev-sales-near-19-of-all-new-car-sales-in-2022/
[See original for graph, Figure 3, titled "EPA Predicted BEV Mix vs California BEV
Requirement"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 7-8]
10 Advanced Clean Cars II (ACCII) Regulations -Section 1962.4, Title 13, California Code of Regulations
-https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/2acciifrol962.4.pdf
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Targets imposed on the automotive industry must be linked to and contingent on the
successful roll-out of a comprehensive and accessible charging infrastructure network. The
current ratio of public chargers in the US is around 1 charger for every 24 EVsl 1. While we
recognize progress made to date in the roll-out of charging infrastructure, it is vital that this
grows proportionally with the increase in uptake of EVs to remain within the EU recommended
ratio of 1 public charger per 10 vehicles 12 especially as these ratios are based on countries with a
much greater population density compared to the United States. With more than 131,200 public
chargers across the US, half (65,300) of them are concentrated across five states. (California,
New York, Florida, Texas and Massachusetts) 13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 7-8]
11IEA (2023), Global EV Outlook 2023, IEA, Paris Trends in charging infrastructure -
https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2023/trends-in-charging-infrastructure, License: CC BY 4.0
12 Directive 2014/94/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the
deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure -https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3 A32014L0094
13 US Department of Energy (Alternative Fuels Data Center (Feb 2023) -U.S. Private Electric Vehicle
Charging Infrastructure -https://afdc.energy.gov/data
JLR urges EPA to re-evaluate the proposed stringency of the regulation so that the required
BEV share does not exceed CARB's targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 7-8]
Organization: John Graham
Third, building a robust national network of public charging stations for BEVs will not occur
overnight. There are no good business models for public charging in rural areas and small towns;
and, as yet, there is no practical solution for millions of people who live in multi-unit dwellings
with no place at home to charge their BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 9]
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
Furthermore, the Proposed Rule implicates "question[s] of deep economic and political
significance," King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015), due to the huge "number of people
affected," United States Telecom Ass'n v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 855 F.3d 381, 423 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Because "Americans
place a high value on car ownership," almost 92% of households have at least one vehicle, and
over 22% have access to at least three. Car Ownership Statistics 2023, Forbes (May 8, 2023),
https://bit.ly/3NnPXnn. A regulation affecting so many people is bound to collide with "a
significant portion of the American economy," West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2608 (cleaned up),
and require "billions of dollars in spending by private persons or entities," id. at 2621 (Gorsuch,
J., concurring) (quoting King, 576 U.S. at 485). By EPA's own estimate, technology increases
"through 2055 are estimated at $260 billion to $380 billion." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,344. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 6-7]
The Proposed Rule somewhat attempts to deal with this concern by predicting that sales will
increase as consumers become more familiar with EVs as they see broader "charging
infrastructure" and more electric cars "on the road." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,189. But that raises
another buyer-focused concern that makes it even less likely consumers will change their
purchasing habits to the extreme degree EPA predicts. For people who "rely on street parking,"
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park in a garage over 25 feet from a power source, or own a condo where the building
association is not willing to "pay for upgrading the electrical panel or service," where and how to
charge a new electric car is a real concern. Rachel Kurzius, Considering an electric vehicle?
Here's how to prep your home for one, Wash. Post (Sept. 26, 2022), https://bit.ly/3N4Y3zZ.
Even for the slowest and most basic "Level 1" charging option, potential EV customers are out
of luck; their "home probably can't accommodate" an EV. Id. And those who are able to upgrade
their home parking situations may find themselves in a long line as the need for more complex
and expensive charging mechanisms grows at a fast clip. See EV Chargers: How many do we
need?, S&P Global (Jan. 9, 2023), https://bit.ly/3XlxFeM (predicting that the EV population
uptick will require "about 700,000 Level 2 and 70,000 Level 3 chargers deployed, including both
public and restricted-use facilities," 1.2 million and 109,000 nationally by 2027, and 2.13 million
and 172,000 by 2030, "all in addition to the units that consumers put in their own garages").
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 15-16]
Even those who already own EVs may be in for some unpleasant surprises. A recent study
concluded, for example, that "[t]he vast majority of electric vehicle owners [who] charge their
cars at home in the evening or overnight" are "doing it wrong" and should instead "move to
daytime charging at work or public charging stations" so as to not overwhelm the grids. Golden,
supra. But standard electricity pricing "charg[es] commercial and industrial customers big fees
based on their peak electricity use." Id. "This can disincentivize employers from installing
chargers, especially once half or more of their employees have EVs." Id. Some of these vehicle
owners may thus be left in a vehicle-charging no-man's land. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649,
pp.15-16]
Organization: Kevin Murphy
I'm interested in participating in the public hearing on vehicle emissions standards. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0440, p. 1]
I am now driving my second hybrid, and I have an EV on order. For short drives, under 30
miles round trip, my hybrid is fully electric. For long drives the car's hybrid mode gets 10 mpg
more than the all-gas mode. Charging stations are not easily available -limited in number, high
percentage of them out of service, the demand for roadside recharge is high, the time required to
recharge is long. Long range Hybrids are the way to go. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0440, p. 1]
Organization: Kia Corporation
EPA Underestimates Market and External Challenges
EPA's proposed rule highlights the very complex challenges that lie ahead for the EV market.
There are an enormous number of factors that are outside the control of automakers including
manufacturing capacity, battery production, charging infrastructure, critical mineral supply, and
consumer acceptance. A successful transition in the timeframe proposed will require massive
changes in commitments from all sectors of the economy: vehicle suppliers, labor, utilities,
charging infrastructure, home builders, mining, and mineral processing. Consumer behavior and
acceptance also needs to significantly change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 6]
EPA's proposal requires automakers to sell EVs but does not propose any requirements to
ensure adequate charging infrastructure to homes, highways, or businesses, or mandate utilities
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to have adequate capacity or provide reasonably priced high-power charging, or mandate easily
accessible and affordable battery critical minerals for EV batteries. Government policies need to
start today to ensure there are enough critical minerals for batteries and high-power charging.
Unfortunately, there is not yet a roadmap to developing these and other essential pieces to the
transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 6]
All of the above market challenges will need to have complementary policies supporting all of
the sectors outside the vehicle industry including utilities, mining, charging companies and will
require them to meet targets too. It is critical that EPA take these factors into consideration when
setting standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 6]
Organization: Marie Gluesenkamp Perez, and Mary Sattler Peltola, Members of Congress,
Congress of the United States
We are writing to express our concerns about the impacts the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) new proposed rules, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027
and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for
Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 may have on rural communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0522, p. 1]
Like you, we believe climate change is a threat to communities across the country, and the
federal government plays a critical role in developing a clean energy apparatus and helping our
communities improve air quality. However, in making that transition, we cannot leave rural
communities or working families behind. The administration's Executive Order 14037 and
subsequent National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization set an ambitious goal for 50
percent of new passenger cars to be electric vehicles (EVs) by 2030. Last year's Inflation
Reduction Act included many concrete policies promoting EV production that will drive costs
down and improve affordability. We are concerned the EPA, along with the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and the Department of Energy (DOE), have not done enough work to
ensure rural communities will have the necessary charging infrastructure in place to make
widespread EV adoption possible. The imposition of additional regulations in the auto market
without key infrastructure investments will reduce consumer choice, which is a recipe for
disaster in rural America. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0522, p. 1]
Rural communities, like ours, have more unique transportation and service options compared
to cities or suburbs. Like many people who live in rural America, we spend a fair amount of time
traveling, whether on or off the road system to get where we need to go. When your job, your
pharmacy, or your child's daycare is over an hour away, you need to know that your car, snow
machine, or ATV, will get you there and back. The ability to refuel a gas-powered vehicle
quickly is valuable given the daily realities of rural life. That option is available because our
country has a robust network of gas stations, and the requisite gas infrastructure, to support
communities of all kinds. An equally robust infrastructure for EV charging must exist before this
transition takes place to ensure working people and rural communities have consumer choices
similar to cities and suburbs. And that infrastructure, especially fast-charging options, is not
being built fast enough in many rural areas. EV charging programs included in the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act will help, but federal agencies remain focused on travel corridors along
interstate highways, leaving many rural communities behind. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0522,
pp.1-2]
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Washington's third congressional district has fewer than 100 level 2 and DC fast chargers
available to the public, and they are largely concentrated in just two cities. Alaska has only 60
publicly available EV charging stations. In Congresswoman Gluesenkamp Perez' home county
of Skamania, there are only two EV charging stations right now, and both are located at resorts.
In Congresswoman Peltola's borough of Bethel, along with all the other boroughs of Western
Alaska, there are zero EV charging stations. As DOT has acknowledged, the costs of installing
EV chargers in rural areas can be higher, especially for direct current fast charging stations,
because they are more likely to require expensive electrical service upgrades. Furthermore, for
many working families, installing an EV charger at home remains out of reach, especially for
those who don't own their homes. Bottom line: for EVs to be a meaningful and workable
emissions reduction solution in rural America, we must have a ubiquitous and affordable
charging infrastructure with access to abundant, cheap electricity. That simply does not exist
right now. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0522, p. 2]
We are only four years away from model year 2027, and we are concerned the EPA's
regulations are not paired with a plan to ensure adequate charging infrastructure on such a short
timeline. Installing hundreds of thousands of new EV chargers and upgrading associated
electrical infrastructure will also require tens of thousands of electricians. We are already
experiencing a nationwide shortage of qualified electricians - anyone who's currently waiting six
months for a residential electrician knows this all too well. Workforce shortages, particularly for
those in the trades, are even more acute in rural communities. We want to ensure the EPA has
considered the significant workforce development challenges that must be addressed to train
electricians for a large-scale roll out of EV charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0522, p. 2]
We request that the EPA, DOT, and DOE respond to the following questions: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0522, pp. 2-3]
1. What have the EPA, DOT, and DOE done to ensure rural communities are not left behind
in the transition to electric vehicles?
2. Is there a clear and detailed deployment plan for electric vehicle charging infrastructure in
rural areas?
3. How do the EPA and DOE anticipate potential shortages of trained electricians will impact
the deployment of charging infrastructure? Further, have agencies evaluated the disparate
impacts these shortages may have in rural communities?
4. Beyond using limited Inflation Reduction Act funding, how do the EPA, DOT, and DOE
plan to address existing and future shortages of trained electricians?
5. Going forward, how do the EPA, DOT, and DOE plan to work together to ensure public
charging infrastructure is abundant and accessible in rural areas? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0522, pp. 2-3]
We also request that you share how you plan to deploy necessary EV charging infrastructure
in a timeframe that matches the implementation of the proposed rules. Building out this
infrastructure will ensure that rural communities are not disproportionately impacted and left
behind in a changing market. While it is critically important that we move toward a clean energy
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future, it must be a future that works for all Americans, including those in rural areas. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0522, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown (118 signatures)
I am writing to express my opposition to the proposed tailpipe emissions rule outlined in
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829. As proposed, I believe these regulations for light-duty vehicles go
too far, reduce consumer choice, and fail to include safeguards to address serious infrastructure,
resource, and funding shortfalls. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1701]
Firstly, the country's current charging infrastructure is inadequate to support a forced shift
towards electric vehicles. Charging infrastructure is not yet fully developed or accessible in
many regions of the country. Forcing consumers to transition to EVs without ensuring sufficient
charging infrastructure could place undue burdens on drivers across the country. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-1701 ]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
The proposed rule is the most stringent light duty vehicle regulation that EPA has
promulgated to date. The electrification and carbon reduction goals are incredibly challenging
and will require not just a coordinated effort to achieve but also solutions addressing consumer
demand, affordability, charging network, power grid capacity, rare earth mineral availability, and
striking the right balance regarding China policy [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, p. 2]
Summary
Mazda is proud of its heritage and contributions to personal mobility, and we celebrated our
100th anniversary in 2020. Mazda has also long been an engineering leader known for
innovative powertrains like the rotary engine and Skyactiv technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0595, pp.3-4]
We look at EPA's NPRM and its preferred option through the lens of a company that is
already working towards an electrified future. It's not a matter of if this transformation will
happen, but when and how. Mazda, like the rest of the industry, faces many challenges: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, pp. 3-4]
-Will charging infrastructure be sufficient?
-Can the electric grid handle the increased demands?
-How will EV incentives on the federal and state level impact this shift?
-Will suppliers be able to develop and produce components like batteries (that currently
require critical minerals, many from China) quickly enough and in enough volume?
-How might future laws or regulations in trade and re-shoring impact our ability to meet
goals?
-Are consumers ready and willing to move away from "tried and true" internal combustion
engines in numbers sufficient to meet these goals?
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-Can OEMs remain sufficiently profitable to fuel the transition to EVs? [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0595, pp.3-4]
Mazda strongly requests that EPA take these considerations into account and make necessary
adjustments to the proposed rule as it works towards a Final Rule. We feel the Final Rule should
have more realistic targets and associated ramp ups, include PHEVs, and adopt CARB's current
LEV IV for criteria emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, pp. 3-4]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
EPA should work with other agencies, like the Joint Office on Energy and Transportation, in
setting minimum charger efficiency standards to ensure that infrastructure funds are spent on
chargers with the best utilization of electric power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 34-35]
The prioritization of building forward-looking vehicle charging infrastructure is critical to the
penetration of electric vehicles. Furthermore, analogous to vehicle electronic design and material
selection impacts to electric vehicle efficiency, similar approaches can be used to improve
charger efficiency in delivering the maximum power to the vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0564, pp. 34-35]
While overnight charging at lower power may be appropriate for most light-duty vehicle use
and certain medium-duty vehicle applications, we recommend the EPA prioritize the planning
and building of direct current fast chargers (DCFC). The planning of public DCFCs is
indispensable to allow in-service electric vehicles to address unforeseen day-to-day vehicle use
variables (i.e., weather, traffic conditions, needed route changes, etc.). The availability of
strategically placed, publicly accessible DCFCs prevents vehicles becoming inoperable due to
these use variables, allowing vehicles to be rapidly charged and quickly placed back into service
while minimizing interruptions to vehicle operations, traffic disruptions from vehicle strandings
and maximizing the utilization of available space for heavy-duty vehicle recharging. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 34-35]
DCFC is also crucial to address long-term medium-duty vehicle charging needs. Many
commercial EVs will need to achieve fast charging times to encourage fleet owners to transition
to e-mobility. This is particularly true for those vehicle operators who do not have access to
charging at their own facilities. EV fleet adopters with slower rate overnight charging should
also diversify their charging assets with DCFCs to have more flexibility as their fleets grow and
unforeseen needs arise to charge vehicles and return them to service. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0564, pp. 34-35]
Additionally, DCFCs futureproof infrastructure investments by allowing fleet operators to
immediately convert and deploy BEVs while also allowing them to remain up to date with
advancements in battery technology. Vehicle batteries are quickly improving in size, chemistry,
energy density, and efficiency resulting in increased vehicle range. This range improvement will,
however, require faster charging capabilities. While medium-duty BEV vehicles typically require
larger batteries with increasing power density than light-duty vehicles, DCFCs enable quicker
and more efficient charging of these vehicles. In addition, site and infrastructure owners
maximize their investment because DCFCs enable site-readiness for future DCFC expansions
while allowing the best utilization of available space and higher turnover of serviced vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 34-35]
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DCFCs also allow for bidirectional charging which futureproofs infrastructure investment
further by providing support for increasing electricity demand. Vehicle-to-Grid ("V2G")
technology can help address energy use and manage peak demand times and costs, as well as
serve as backup power during an outage. As EV adoption increases, this technology becomes
more critical to enable sustainable grid management, grid resilience, utilization, and national
security protection. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0564, pp. 34-35]
MECA also recommends the EPA consider national certification, such as UL Certification,
for EV supply equipment to provide consistency, quality, safety, efficiency and compliance. A
Certificate of Compliance will mean the product has passed a series of rigorous tests to
demonstrate performance, safety, quality, and serviceability, while enhancing sustainability,
strengthening security, and managing risk. National certification also supports local permitting
efficiency, therefore, helps fast track deployment of charging stations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0564, pp. 34-35]
For these reasons, MECA urges EPA to work with other government agencies, such as the
Joint Office for Transportation and Energy, and industry to develop national standards for
minimum charger efficiency which will ensure the efficient energy utilization and lowest
operating cost for electric vehicles. With regards to technology, several suppliers of vehicle
power electronics are applying similar electric efficiency technology innovation to the
development of more efficient chargers to minimize switching losses and deliver maximum
power to the battery. This is important to consumers and fleets as charging losses reduce the total
energy to the battery and increase operating cost. Furthermore, it is important to the environment
because these losses represent electricity that is generated but never used. The difference in
electric efficiency between the first generation of chargers, that are deployed in the field today,
and the advanced, second-generation chargers can be as much as 10-20%. This becomes
significant as electric vehicle penetration increases into the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0564, pp. 34-35]
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
The success of our industry is interwoven with the success of this proposal and the ability of
the government to work with industry and other stakeholders to meet significant challenges.
Therefore, the rule must address: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
The need for regulatory certainty. The final rule must contain an effective mix of
feasible, demonstrated technology along with emerging technology, leaving options to improve
emissions reductions in today's advanced propulsion designs. This will foster innovation in a
coordinated direction, aligned with U.S. policy, but not mandate application of a narrowly
defined technology path to make a positive impact on the country's urgent environmental goals.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
The influence of other technologies -including internal combustion engines fueled by
hydrogen and other renewable carbon-neutral fuels -which can impact measurable environmental
improvements at scale technologies can provide immediate improvement to the environment.
This is important not only for environmental improvements but for environmental justice in
providing cleaner consumer vehicles immediately to communities living and working close to
busy streets, highways, and other transportation networks. Inclusion of all technologies that can
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decarbonize the transportation sector will foster the necessary growth in manufacturing capacity,
vocational performance, infrastructure improvements, and consumer acceptance. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Technology Neutrality and BEV Emissions. EPA should ensure that battery electric
vehicles (BEV) are included in metrics for vehicle-to-vehicle comparison by assigning a metric
that captures the pollutant emissions related to BEV operation, aligned with national electricity
generation figures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Challenges in our nation's infrastructure and power grid. MEMA appreciates the
significant public investments being made to support clean transportation infrastructure. As these
new investments in highways and main corridors are deployed, federal and state incentives are
needed to further expand the EV charging and refueling infrastructure in areas that connect these
major thoroughfares. Urban industrial centers will need focused buildout while rural areas will
need thoughtful rollouts to achieve an effective EV charging infrastructure. These buildouts must
include Direct Current Fast Charge (DCFC) and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) bidirectional charging.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Supply chain challenges. The proposed rule assumes that all materials advanced
vehicles, which are not available today in the quantities needed to support the massive growth in
vehicle construction, will become available within sufficient time. This places a significant and
unnecessary risk on manufacturers and suppliers. Furthermore, once a company has converted
production to new technology lines, that company cannot easily pivot its facilities and workforce
back to the previous technology if EPA projections are not realized by the mid-to-late-2020s.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Workforce challenges. A significant increase in skilled workers will be needed to
support the implementation of this rule and long-term success thereof [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Extended warranty. The necessity to clearly define the applicability of the extended
warranty and the need to provide repair access to service these new vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
MEMA members are working to accelerate the performance and availability of clean-
operating vehicle technologies and are directly contributing to their realization. Besides battery
electric options, effective low-and zero-carbon technologies for future and current in-use
vehicles also exist and can readily be put to use to reduce nationwide emissions and help EPA
meet its climate goals. The success of this rule depends on greater inclusion of all available
emissions reduction technologies, significant investment in infrastructure, careful understanding
and investment in the domestic and global supply chain and ensured repair access to serve the
improved and enhanced domestic vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Infrastructure
To achieve the ambitious vision for U.S. charging infrastructure needed to rapidly electrify a
high proportion of new vehicles, as noted above, EPA must work closely with other U.S.
government agencies to help ensure that the dozens of programs in the Inflation Reduction Act
(IRA) and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), and others still needed to support the transition,
are effectively deployed by the federal government. While it is true that agencies are -so far -
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rolling out these programs expeditiously, strong coordination of these initiatives is needed to
realize nationwide transportation transformation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 11]
V2G bidirectional charging technologies can provide a transformational opportunity to help
address the nation's energy crisis while also decarbonizing the transportation sector. The use of
bidirectional charging installations, for fleet and private vehicles, can help stabilize local grid
activity and balance load versus demand.9 Besides grid load balancing, the use of vehicle
batteries as energy sources can also offset local energy production demands and further improve
grid resiliency and national security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 11]
9 This notice is one example of "grid services vehicles can provide" according to the US DOE
https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USEERE/bulletins/3594aae
EPA should include deployment of Direct Current Fast Chargers (DCFCs) and bi-directional
charging impacts and benefits in the RIA. While overnight charging at lower power may be
appropriate for certain applications, DCFCs can better meet the long-term charging needs of
consumers and fleet operators of light-duty and medium-duty vehicles. Many EVs will need to
achieve fast charging times to encourage consumers, fleet owners and operators to transition to
electric vehicles. Further, medium-duty vehicles often have duty cycles that require faster, higher
power charging due to their on-demand jobs. DCFCs can help address these charging time and
operator confidence issues. Similarly, providing a diversity of charging options to all EV
adopters offers access and flexibility which facilitates consumer confidence in EVs and help
futureproof infrastructure investments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 11-12]
With respect to existing fleet and future ICE vehicles sales, we note the European Union is
exploring renewable fuels as a way to reduce net emissions and decrease dependency on outside
energy sources. 10 The U.S. can do the same, and EPA can and should lead this initiative. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 11-12]
10 https://europe.autonews.com/environmentemissions/eu-german-deal-outlines-legal-path-e-fuel-future
The European Union Alternative Infrastructure Regulation has made significant requirements
on states, making the necessary infrastructure investment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp.
11-12]
As an example of how EPA might compel State and Regional infrastructure buildout, we note
below how the European Union has approached this challenge: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0644, pp. 11-12]
As part of EU's "Fit for 55" package the EU has agreed on a direction forward March 2023
that ensures fast charging availability at distance-based intervals along the trans-European
transport network (TEN-T). https://theicct.org/publication/afir-eu-april2023 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0644, pp. 11-12]
1) Member states will be required to ensure publicly available chargers with power output
capable to support BEV deployment
2) The AFIR established targets for urban nodes for trucks and busses.
3) Member States will be required to ensure installation of a fast-charging pool every 60km in
each direction along the TEN-T (Trans-European Transport Network) with milestones for
completion in 2025, 2027, and 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 11-12]
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Additionally, in Appendix 1, MEMA has prepared a chart that reviews current CA state and
federal actions to support ZEV transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 11-12]
MEMA urges:
EPA to identify and address additional paths and actions within its authority to expand
state and regional EV infrastructure investments, to include DC Fast Charge installations. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 11-12]
Organization: Minnesota Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
The proposed EPA standards for 2027 and later set very aggressive goals for reducing GHG
and criteria emissions. Achieving these goals will require dramatic changes not only in vehicle
design, but in the entire automotive supply chain. While the U.S. market share of BEVs will
continue to expand, establishing regulations where success is solely contingent upon an
unattainable tenfold increase in the production and sales of BEVs over the next eight years
represents an avoidable mistake. The proposed rule would require huge investments and rapid
growth in many industries, including the mining and processing of key minerals, the generation
and distribution of electricity, and the recharging of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0612, p. 3]
Organization: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
To support the rapid electrification of our transportation system, Minnesota is making
significant investments to support EV adoption, including expanding infrastructure. Minnesota
recently adopted an EV purchase incentive and EV-ready building codes requirement. Other
examples of EV investments in Minnesota include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 3-4]
-The Volkswagen Corporation (VW) violated air pollution standards for its diesel cars and
sport utility vehicles. As part of the national legal settlement, Minnesota received $47 million to
spend on projects to replace older, more polluting diesel vehicles and install electric vehicle
charging infrastructure. Minnesota has invested the maximum-allowed 15% of our VW
settlement funds in electric vehicle charging. Grants have funded 60 stations statewide, bringing
the total miles of EV fast-charging corridors to 3,600. All stations from the first two phases of
funding will be installed by early 2024. Between 2024 and 2027, there will be $1.76 million
available for additional EV charging grants [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 3-4]
-The federal National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) program provides funds for
states to build electric vehicle charging infrastructure along highway corridors. The NEVI
program provides $68 million to Minnesota and requires a $17 million match. The Minnesota
Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Plan describes how Minnesota will spend the first year of NEVI
program funds. Minnesota's plan identifies potential exits along the 1-35 and 1-94 Alternative
Fuels Corridors for fast charger installation. The Minnesota Department of Transportation
(MnDOT) will conduct site feasibility analyses and manage a competitive site selection process
in 2023 to install fast chargers at 16 sites. The Minnesota Legislature established a state electric
vehicle program and provided $13.6 million in one-time funding as a match to available federal
funds in the 2023 session. The program allows MnDOT to grant NEVI funds to install, operate,
and maintain EV charging stations outside of highway right-of-way. Minnesotans can expect to
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see the first round of fast chargers installed with NEVI funds by the end of 2024. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 3-4]
-In the Twin Cities metropolitan area, the Metropolitan Council is also investing in
transportation electrification. The council completed an Electric Vehicle Planning Study in 2022
to understand the marketplace and charging landscape and identify strategies to accelerate EV
adoption in the Twin Cities. With the opportunity to compete for funds from the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law's Charging and Fueling Infrastructure Program, Minnesota could expand EV
charging further. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 3-4]
-The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission has found that EVs are both an opportunity and
a challenge for the electric power sector and has therefore directed Minnesota's investor-owned
utilities to take steps to encourage cost-effective integration of EVs and plan for their adoption.
Minnesota's utilities have developed and begun implementing a variety of programs to support
EV adoption, including home charging and rate design, as well as public charging investments.6
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 3-4]
6 Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Electric vehicles, https://mn.gov/puc/activities/economic-
analysis/electric-vehicles/ (accessed 6/15/2023).
Organization: Missouri Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
Monumental challenges in implementing this rule.
Notwithstanding the vast challenges to everyday Americans, the aggressiveness of EPA's
proposal raises immediate doubt about whether such targets are feasible within the required
timeframe. The rule gives a wholly unrealistic and false impression the U.S. has a robust and
reliable public EV charging infrastructure ready to accommodate the vast number of BEVs.
MCGA members driving Missouri's rural roads know this is not the case. In addition, most
American families will find BEVs' dismal range, extended charge time, shortage of maintenance
technicians, and poor performance under heavy loads and extreme temperatures both frustrating
and entirely impractical for everyday personal and business needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0578, p. 2]
Organization: Missouri Farm Bureau (MOFB)
Similar to EPA's proposed HD rule, this proposal picks winners and losers by doubling-down
on electric vehicle (EV) technology, while increasing in adoption in the light-duty sector, only
represents 8.4 percent of light-duty production in MY 2022.2 While the proposed rule cites a
reduced total cost of ownership, EPA estimates it will raise "average upfront per-vehicle costs to
meet the proposed standards to be approximately $1,200 in MY 2032, as estimated using 2020
dollars."3 The proposed rule estimates that in order for automakers to comply with the emissions
standards, Battery Electric Vehicles (BEVs) will comprise up to 67 percent of new passenger
vehicle sales by 2032 and up to 46 percent of medium-duty vehicle sales.4 In addition to
increased purchase costs for EVs, MOFB is concerned about the lack of available public
charging stations to accommodate the vast number of EVs mandated by this rule, especially in
rural Missouri where most of our members live and work. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0590, pp.
1-2]
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2 U.S. EPA Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and
Medium-Duty Vehicles, Vol. 88, Fed. Reg. 29184, p. 29189 (May 5, 2023) (to be codified at 40 CFR pts.
85, 86, 600, 1036, 1037 & 1066).
3 Ibid., 29201.
4 Ibid., 29189, 29331.
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
To determine a realistic maximum volume of EVs the market can support for each of the
model years covered by the rule, we believe EPA should consider certain critical factors. Among
these factors, we believe EPA must make a thorough and realistic year-by-year assessment of
key factors like projected battery costs, projected supply of battery critical-minerals, projected
residential and public charging infrastructure availability, projected electrical grid capacity, and
consumer acceptance of BEV technology in the broader arena. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682,
p. 2]
Organization: National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) et al.
II. Proposed Electrification Timelines are Unworkable.
The challenges associated with electrifying the light-and medium-duty fleet cannot be
understated. EPA projects that the Proposed Rule will result in 67 percent of light-duty vehicles
sold in 2032 being electric. That figure is an average of 78 percent electric sedans, 68 percent
electric pickups and 62 percent electric crossover and SUVs.3 Conversely, EPA estimates that in
the absence of any regulations, electric vehicles would make up only 39 percent of new sales in
2032.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 3-4]
3 Proposed Rule at 29,329 (Table 80).
4 Reputable estimates on how quickly EV sales will increase vary widely. S&P Global Mobility estimates
that by 2030, EVs will be 40 percent of new vehicle sales. The Energy Information Administration, on the
other hand, estimates that EVs will be 17 percent of new vehicle sales by 2030. McKinsey has the highest
estimate and projects that EVs will be 48 percent of new vehicle sales by 2030. Given these varying
estimates - all from highly respected sources - the Agency should exercise caution about consumers'
willingness to purchase, and manufacturers' ability to deliver, EVs at the rates required by the Proposed
Rule. Writing rules on its own does not mean that challenges related to supply chains for making the
vehicles or consumer sentiment will change.
These timelines are entirely untethered from the market's capabilities. Most prospective EV
drivers will need fast, high-powered on-the-go charging solutions before they're comfortable
buying an EV.5 Although fuel retailers are very active in the National Electric Vehicle
Infrastructure Program ("NEW Program) and other federal and state funding opportunities, it
remains unacceptably difficult to identify a viable business case for installing EV charging
stations. Unless those obstacles are permanently removed, these challenges will remain
regardless of what the final rule demands. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 3-4]
5 Consumer Reports, "Battery Electric Vehicles and Low Carbon Fuel: Overview of Methodology," April
2022,
https://article.images.consumerreports.org/prod/content/dam/survey s/Consumer_Reports_BEV%20AND%
20LCF% 20SURVEY18FEBRUARY 2022.
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Most of these impediments involve an electricity market structure that was not designed for -
and is thus incompatible with - the retail fuel market. Many fuel retailers have installed EV
charging stations at their outlets, utilizing any number of business models and ownership
structures. Very few, if any, of these investments are profitable on a self-sustaining basis. The
structural impediments to the profitability of public EV charging are too significant to overcome
These existing investments should therefore be interpreted as "beta tests" by companies
exploring the charging space, rather than indicators of a viable, sustainable business model.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 3-4]
We are confident that the right combination of policy incentives and signals will enable the
market to overcome any barriers that exist today. We simply fail to understand the rationale for
leaving emission reduction opportunities on the table while we work toward those aspirational
objectives. The best way to address practical impediments to electrification is to inject flexibility
into the Proposed Rule while simultaneously promoting near-term emissions reductions through
the use of multiple technologies, including renewable liquid fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0628, pp. 3-4]
No one solution will decarbonize transportation energy. What policymakers think is the best
solution today may be surpassed by subsequent ingenuity and innovation. Sound policy should
not stifle innovation by mandating specific solutions. Instead, policy should set performance
goals and let the market - guided by consumers - innovate to find the best way to meet those
goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 3-4]
II. Electrification Timelines Proposed Under the Rule are Divorced from Reality.
EPA projects that the Proposed Rule will result in 67 percent of light-duty vehicles sold in
2032 being electric. That figure is an average of 78 percent electric sedans, 68 percent electric
pickups and 62 percent electric crossover and SUVs.5 Conversely, EPA estimates that in the
absence of any regulations, electric vehicles would make up only 39 percent of new sales in
2032.6 The extraordinary pace of electrification mandated under this rulemaking is entirely
divorced from the world in which consumers and the broader marketplace operate. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0648, p. 4]
5 Proposed Rule at 29,329 (Table 80).
6 Reputable estimates on how quickly EV sales will increase vary widely. S&P Global Mobility estimates
that by 2030, EVs will be 40% of new vehicle sales. The Energy Information Administration, on the other
hand, estimates that EVs will be 17% of new vehicle sales by 2030. McKinsey has the highest estimate and
projects that EVs will be 48% of new vehicle sales by 2030. Given these varying estimates—all from
highly respected sources—the Agency should exercise caution about consumers' willingness to purchase,
and manufacturers' ability to deliver, EVs at the rates required by the Proposed Rule. Promulgation of this
Proposed Rule, alone, does not mean that challenges related to supply chains for making the vehicles or
consumer sentiment will change.
The challenges to electrification cannot be overstated and will require an unprecedented effort
irrespective of regulatory mandates. Public charging deployment is a principal obstacle. In the
Proposed Rule, EPA catalogs many of the federal incentives currently in place for charging
infrastructure, suggesting that these policies may ameliorate many of these challenges. 7 This
suggestion is short-sighted and incorrect. Subsidies alone will not create a long-term, sustainable
proliferation of EV charging stations. For electrification policies to succeed in the long term,
there must be a competitive, public charging market to refuel electric vehicles. 8 Cars will need
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places to refuel, and private companies need a financial justification to spend capital to install
charging stations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p. 4]
7 Proposed Rule at 29,307.
8 EV charging policy should promote competitive market dynamics and work with consumers' existing
behavior and fuel retailers' real estate and business infrastructure. In a competitive market, private dollars
will make sure infrastructure is there to meet consumers' needs. Without these market-oriented policies in
place as a foundation for any public investment, there is a very real risk that public dollars spent will be
stranded and wasted in ways that do not serve an appreciable number of consumers and ultimately do little
to combat EV range anxiety.
a. Near-to Medium-Term Charging Capabilities
At present, only 8.64 percent of the new light-duty vehicles sold in the United States are EVs
(including both BEVs and PHEVs).9 Even so, EV uptake has far outpaced the development of
the public charging infrastructure that is necessary to accommodate those new EVs on the road.
Last year, according to data reported by the U.S. Department of Energy's Alternative Fuels Data
Center, EV sales increased 65 percent nationally, while public EV charging stations grew by less
than 15 percent over the same period. 10 Further, the limited growth of public charging has not
happened equitably. A recent report from the Alliance of Automotive Innovation warned that, in
2022, 63 percent of U.S. counties have five or fewer chargers and 39 percent of U.S. counties
have zero chargers. 11 In the United States, 30 percent of all EV charging infrastructure is in just
14 counties—or 0.4 percent. 12 Though Congress has appropriated limited funds designed to
mitigate that gap, on their own, grant programs such as the National Electric Vehicle
Infrastructure Program are insufficient to catalyze a nationwide network of EV chargers. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p. 6]
9 ALLIANCE FOR AUTOMOTIVE INNOVATION, "Get Connected Electric Vehicle Quarterly Report"
(Jun. 2023) available at https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/papers-
reports/Get%20Connected%20EV%20Quarterly%20Report%202023%20Ql.pdf.
10 Abby Brown, et al., "Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Trends from the Alternative Fueling
Station Locator: Second Quarter 2022," (2022) available at
https://afdc.energy.gOv/files/u/publication/electric_vehicle_charging_infrastructure_trends_second_quarter
_2022.pdf.
11 ALLIANCE FOR AUTOMOTIVE INNOVATION, "Get Connected Electric Vehicle Quarterly Report
» (2023) available at https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/papers-
reports/Get%20Connected%202022%20Q4%20Electric%20Vehicle%20Report.pdf.
12 Early uptake of EVs has been inequitable, with the benefits of EV ownership disproportionately falling
to wealthier Americans, those with more education, and those more likely to own a home. Access to public
charging infrastructure is particularly important in facilitating EV uptake among communities that are less
likely to own a single-family home, and therefore will have inconsistent access to at-home charging.
The extent to which EV penetration is outpacing public charging station deployment is
changing the landscape of the EV market. A 2022 nation-wide, representative survey by
Consumer Reports and the University of Chicago found that 61 percent of Americans point to
"not enough public charging stations" as the primary issue preventing them from buying or
leasing an EV. 13 In fact, 2022 was the first year in which the study found that 'access to
charging' exceeded 'upfront cost' as the greatest barrier to consumers purchasing an EV.14
Analytics firm J.D. Power and Associates also found that a lack of public charging is directly
preventing EV adoption, writing "public charging infrastructure consistently scores low in
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satisfaction. It's the exceptional use case—like a vacation road trip—that's holding shoppers
back." 15 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p. 6]
13 CONSUMER REPORTS, "Battery Electric Vehicles and Low Carbon Fuel: Overview of
Methodology," (Apr.2022) available at
https://article.images.consumerreports.org/prod/content/dam/surveys/Consumer_Reports_BEV%20 AND%
20LCF% 20SURVEY_18_FEBRUARY_2022.
14 Id.
15 J.D. POWER 2023, "U.S. Electric Vehicle Consideration (EVC) Study" (Jun. 15, 2023)
available at https://www.jdpower.com/business/press-releases/2023-us-electric-vehicle-consideration-evc-
study.
This trend threatens the development and durability of transportation electrification. A 2021
study from the University of California at Davis Institute for Transportation Studies found that
almost 20 percent of EV owners in California switched back to a gas vehicle because of the
difficulty of consistently charging their vehiclel6—this is in the state with the best-developed
EV charging infrastructure in the nation by an order of magnitude. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0648, p. 6]
16 Scott Hardman and Gil Tal, "Understanding Discontinuance among California's Electric Vehicle
Ownef' (Apr. 26, 2021) available at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-021-00814-9.
b. Refueling Challenges Unique to Electric Vehicles
The Associations' members, including many of the largest privately held companies in the
United States, have invested meaningful resources into analyzing business development
opportunities associated with EV charging station investments. 17 These companies' respective
teams include grant-writing specialists to help them access various federal and state grant
opportunities, 18 and electricity market and utility specialists to assess and interface with their
potential "fuel suppliers" for EV charging stations. Many of the Associations' member
companies have installed EV charging stations at their outlets, utilizing any number of business
models and ownership structures. Very few, if any, of these investments are profitable on a self-
sustaining basis where a private business consistently earns a profit on EV charging events.
These existing investments, including the investments cited by EPA in the Proposal, should
therefore be interpreted as "beta tests" by companies exploring the charging space rather than
indicative of a viable, sustainable business model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 6-7]
17 The Agency itself cites many of the Associations' members investments in charging infrastructure.
Proposed Rule at 29,309.
18 The Associations actively supported the development of the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure
("NEVI") and Alternative Fuel Corridor grant programs that were included in the Infrastructure Investment
and Jobs Act. Our members are in the process of analyzing and applying for grant opportunities. These
programs will make a meaningful difference in mitigating the upfront capital expenditures associated with
installing EV charging stations. Absent additional policy incentives or market reforms, however, the grant
programs will not enhance the business case for investing in charging stations as a means of generating a
profit by selling electricity to EV drivers. EPA has an extraordinary opportunity to supplement these EV
charging grant programs by encouraging greater investment in charging stations through eRINs.
To be successful, the on-the-go refueling experience for EVs should be as similar as possible
to the conventional refueling experience to which consumers are accustomed. 19 Fuel retailers
are well positioned to offer fast, safe, and convenient EV charging services because they have a
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keen understanding of consumer preferences and tendencies. This fact is essential when it comes
to adoption of EVs—the transition to EVs will require what was previously a quick stop to
become a 30-minute consumer experience. Currently, it takes the driver of a passenger vehicle
approximately two to three minutes to complete a refueling experience. It takes the driver of an
EV, however, 20 to 40 minutes to recharge at a Direct Current Fast Charger ("DCFC"),
depending upon the vehicle and the capacity of the charger available. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0648, pp. 6-7]
19 Placing chargers only in individual garages in private homes, apartment buildings, and parking lots
cannot combat the notion of "range anxiety" as effectively as fuel retailers offering that service. Most
renters across the nation do not have garages, nor do many homeowners. Even those Americans that do
have garages often do not have space in their garage for the total number of vehicles their family drives,
nor do they have the electrical capacity in their garage to support a charger or multiple chargers. This is
also true for workplaces; many Americans, especially those working in low-income jobs, will not have the
option, for a variety of reasons, to charge at work. Consumers must have viable charging options available
outside of their home or workplace for widespread vehicle electrification to take place.
Consumers must also be able to trust that the charging stations they visit will be functional, an
issue that has increasingly presented a significant problem. We see this playing out today
throughout the country in situations where chargers are owned and operated by entities—often
utilities—that do not have a financial incentive to keep them in good working order.20 If EV
charging is not both available and reliable in the neighborhoods consumers want to visit, as well
as along Interstates where consumers travel, many Americans simply will not purchase an EV,
no matter the price.21 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 6-7]
20 One in every five consumer attempts to charge their EV failed in 2022. See Hannah Lutz,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS "EV Drivers Struggle with Declining Reliability of Charging Network," (Feb. 8,
2023) available at https://www.autonews.com/mobility-report/ev-drivers-struggle-declining-reliability-
charging-network.
21 Low-income communities and communities of color are disproportionately likely to need access to
regular public charging in order to own an EV. Deploying public charging infrastructure, thereby
supporting the ability of all Americans to own an EV, would also help to reduce air pollution and improve
air quality in low-income communities. Any light-duty vehicle electrification policy that forsakes a central
focus on public charging should be amended to consider low-income Americans and the communities in
which they reside.
At present, there are several impediments that make it challenging for private businesses to
identify a pathway to profitability with respect to EV charging. Most of these impediments
involve an electricity market structure that was not designed for—and is thus incompatible
with— the retail fuel market. Importantly, these challenges have not defrayed the intent of the
Associations' members in invest in public charging. They do, however, threaten to depress EV
adoption by creating a market in which the industry relies on government incentives rather than
being incentivized by the free market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 6-7]
i. Electricity Pricing Schemes Are Antiquated
Foremost among these market impediments is an antiquated electricity pricing scheme that
utilities are slow and reluctant to modernize. Many states are exacerbating this problem by
allowing utilities to pass through the costs of EV charging stations to all of their customers on
their monthly utility bill, rather than having EV drivers pay for the costs of refueling their own
vehicles. Rising electricity prices, in conjunction with softer gas prices, made EVs more
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expensive to fuel than gas-powered cars at the end of 2022.22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648,
PP- 7-8]
22 See ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP, "Gas-Powered Cars Cheaper to Fuel than Electric in Late
2022" (Jan. 24, 2023) available at https://www.andersoneconomicgroup.com/cars-gas-powered-cheaper-to-
fuel-than-electric-in-late-2022/.
There are no purchasing options or pricing structures for retailers to provide electricity as a
fuel. Retailers with EV chargers today are forced to pay retail prices for electricity with high
demand charges. There is no business case for buying electricity at retail prices and selling
electricity at retail prices. Regulated utilities that own and operate their own charging stations are
not subject to demand charges and thus have an insurmountable competitive advantage over
anyone else in that market. This situation has dramatically reduced private sector investments in
EV charging stations. The Agency can best promote its electrification goals by addressing this
market disparity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 7-8]
ii. Economics of Public EV Charging
As noted above, to keep up with EV sales growth, the U.S. public fast charging network will
need to grow drastically.23 The economics of vehicle charging, however, are simply
insufficiently attractive to impel the charging network that a fully, or even partially, electrified
fleet would need.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p. 8]
23 Stephen Edelstein, GREEN CAR REPORTS "Study: Pace of US EV Adoption Requires 8X Charger
Growth by 2030" (Jan. 13, 2023) available at https://www.greencarreports.com/news/1138424_study-pace-
of-us-ev-adoption-requires-8x-charger-growth-by-2030.
24 Brennan Borlaug et al., TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART D: TRANSPORT AND
ENVIRONMENT 114, "Public Electric Vehicle Charging Station Utilization in the United States" (Jan. 1,
2023) available at https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.trd.2022.103564.
Internal data collected from our members mirrors what was already understood by
economists: that only where utility demand charges are very low and utilization rates higher than
anticipated do they expect a positive return on their investment. DC fast charger investments are
capital-intensive, costing $150,000-$200,000 to install even in locations with existing utility
service and sufficient open space. Unfortunately, even where support is available to defray this
capital investment, the cost structure to operate and maintain these chargers on an ongoing basis
makes their economics extremely challenging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p. 8]
Charging station owners—like most commercial electric power customers—foot the bill for
energy costs per kilowatt hour (kWh). Unlike a conventional electricity consumer, however,
commercial businesses that own charging stations are burdened by demand charges that reflect
total maximum power demand (in kW) over a given period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p.
8]
Demand charges have rendered the total cost of operating a DCFC practically insurmountable
for private industry. Adding just two DCFCs to a convenience store typically increases its
demand charges from under $1,000 per month to almost $4,500 per month. Because demand
charges are a function of peak demand, they remain fixed no matter how often a given charger is
utilized. This means that the relative cost per kWh delivered is very high for chargers with low
utilization. Most chargers today have very low utilization, and this is expected to continue for
many years in most markets.25 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p. 8]
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25 Though not directly related to this rule, vesting the owners and operators of public charging stations
with the ability to generate electric Renewable Identification Numbers (eRINs) under the Renewable Fuel
Standard (RFS) is one potential way to incentivize our membership to make significant investments in EV
charging. Importantly, our members have indicated that even with the expected low utilization rate, if
eRINs could be generated by owners of public charging stations, installations with a projected negative rate
may be shifted to a positive rate of return. Importantly, if the Agency allows charging station operators to
generate eRINs, it will incentivize the installation of new state-of-the-art fast chargers. This could create a
virtuous cycle in this industry, reducing the price of electricity sold, thereby increasing charging station
utilization rates, and further improving the economics of charging infrastructure. New investments in
charging, in turn, will support EV adoption and the Agency's broader electrification goals.
Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
B. EPA Must Adjust Its Infrastructure Assumptions to Reflect Reality.
Another critical factor creating uncertainty for the market adoption of EVs is the unreliability
and unavailability of charging infrastructure. The infrastructure needed to support EPA's
projected EV market penetration requires both an increased capacity for electricity generation
and a more comprehensive transmission system than exists today. At a minimum, new and
expensive conduits, transformers, and power lines will be necessary. Infrastructure installations
of this magnitude will involve major construction projects subject to permitting requirements,
supply chain delays, and environmental and safety mandates. Even assuming that these upgrades
will be economically feasible, they will take several years and long lead times to fully develop
and deploy. EPA notes that IIJA and IRA funding and incentives will help to address some of
these concerns, but the agency fails to provide a sober assessment of the nature and extent of the
significant infrastructure needs, buildout timelines, and costs associated with its proposal.55 EPA
must revisit and adjust its assumptions to reflect these critical considerations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0656, pp. 12-13]
55 88 Fed. Reg. at 29307-12.
1. Dealer Infrastructure Costs and Lead Times.
As mentioned, franchised dealerships are investing billions in the infrastructure and
equipment to sell and service EVs. Household and commercial customers will require refueling
infrastructure at their homes and businesses and will require expansive and reliable public
refueling infrastructure networks to support the effective use of the EVs contemplated by EPA's
proposed standards. With respect to franchised dealerships alone, the typical dealership will
require the following facility and infrastructure upgrades to sell and service EVs: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 13]
Two EV chargers (Level 2 or DCFC) to ensure availability for sales and service;
Service lifts with higher weight capacity;
Service bays that can accommodate additional lift heights of approximately six feet to
facilitate high-voltage battery maintenance and removal;
Battery storage and quarantine containers;56 and
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Workplace safety and emergency response training to navigate the potential dangers
associated with vehicle high-voltage systems and components. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656,
p. 13]
56 EV battery temperatures must remain at approximately 70 to 75 degrees, depending on the
manufacturer. When an EV comes in for repair, the drive battery may be removed or disconnected from the
low-voltage system (12-volt) which maintains its temperature. For example, for body work that requires
painting, the drive battery may need to be removed due to high paint booth temperatures, especially during
paint curing. When drive batteries are removed, they require special storage. The optimal scenario involves
a separate storage building that is temperature-controlled and has a ventilation system. Industry guidelines
suggest 50 feet of separation between stored drive batteries and a service facility. Ventilation is critical both
around and underneath drive batteries. And when drive batteries are damaged, they can leak fluoride gas,
which is heavier than air. This gas is highly flammable and can contribute to a chemical reaction in the
battery cells leading to a thermal runaway or fire.
The costs involved in these investments can easily exceed $1,000,000 per dealership. The
ability and timeline to make facility upgrades and install chargers will vary significantly by
dealership location, the utility upgrades necessary, and permitting lead times. Some locations
may need minimal to no utility upgrades for charger installation, but in most cases, electrical
infrastructure (e.g., trenches, distribution transformers, switchboards, and conduit) must be
upgraded or installed to accept the high-power service necessary to support several chargers.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 13]
EPA notes power needs as low as 200 kW could require the installation of a distribution
transformer.57 But EPA fails to acknowledge that utilities are facing significant transformer
supply chain issues with an average delivery lead time of 12-18[58] months (which only is
expected to increase). Dealerships requiring distribution transformer upgrades will be unable to
begin selling and servicing EVs in quantity until they are completed. Further, dealerships that
rent or lease their buildings or real estate may be unable to install chargers due to lease
restrictions on property and building modifications. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 13-14]
57 88 Fed. Reg. at 29311.
58 Robert Walton, Utilities sound alarm over distribution transformer shortage as procurement times
surpass 1 year and costs triple, Utility Drive (Dec. 19, 2022). See also Paul Ciampoli, Proposed efficiency
standards for distribution transformers would worsen shortages, POWER GRID INTERNATIONAL
(March 31,2023).
Dealership investments are being made now in preparation for an anticipated future market
demand. NADA urges EPA to accurately assess the cost and timing of the EV refueling
infrastructure necessitated by its proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 13-
14]
2. Public Charging Shortfalls.
EPA has not adequately considered the impact of its proposal on public charging demand and
potential shortfalls associated with the proposal's aggressive EV sales projections. There are
about 140,000 publicly accessible charging ports in operation today,59 far less than what the
Edison Electric Institute (EEI) says will be needed in 2030, let alone what will be needed to
accommodate the new EV sales the proposal projects will occur between MYs 2027 and 2032. In
fact, EEI estimates that 12.9 million charge ports will be needed to support the 26.4 million EVs
it projects to be on U.S. roads by 2030, including more than 2.6 million charge ports in
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workplaces and public locations.60 EEI further concludes that, despite significant planned
investments, a charging infrastructure gap61 will result in a 68 percent shortfall in publicly
accessible DCFC charging ports in 2030, stating: "the number of DCFC ports needed in 2030 to
meet projected demand is more than double the planned DCFC ports."62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0656, p. 14]
59 See Alternative Fuels Data Center: Alternative Fueling Station Locator (energy.gov)
60 Id. at 10, 12.
61 Charles Satterfield et al., Electric Vehicle Sales and the Charging Infrastructure Required Through 2030,
EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE (June 2022).
62 Id. at 15. The image above shows the planned DCFC ports and includes investments by state and federal
governments, automakers, electric companies, and the National Electric Highway Coalition. See Id. at 13-
15.
[See original comment for pie chart titled "2030 Estimated DC Fast Charging Port Shortfall;
140,000 Ports Needed] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 14]
AAI has also found that an infrastructure gap exists, stating that "more than 342 thousand
additional chargers are needed today, which is two and a half times the currently available
chargers across the U.S. as of March 31, 2023."63 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 15]
63 See Get Connected EV Quarterly Report 2023 Ql.pdf (autosinnovate.org), p. 9.
A newly-issued National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) report is consistent with the
findings made by EEI and AAI.64 NREL concludes that the U.S. will need at least 1.2 million
public charging ports, including 182,000 DCFC ports, at a cost of $31—$55 billion to meet the
charging demand from a projected 33 million EVs on the road by 2030.65 NREL estimates that,
as of March 2023, only some $23.7 billion has been committed through funding by the IIJA,
private firms, state and local governments, and electric utilities for projects to meet this need.66
NREL submits that, "with long-term market certainty grounded in accelerating consumer
demand" additional "public and private investments will put the United States on a path to
meeting the [public charging] infrastructure needs" summarized in its report.67 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0656, p. 15]
64 See The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle
Charging Infrastructure (driveelectric.gov)
65 See id. atvi-vii, 35-36, 49, and 58.
66 See id. at 58.
67 Id.
These reports are concerning in that they show that significant additional public charging
infrastructure, and billions more in investment dollars, are needed to meet future demand based
on projected 2030 new EV market penetration levels that are considerably lower than what EPA
projects, in some cases by more than 50 percent! The proposal's discussion on this topic is
woefully inadequate. Simply put, it would be unconscionable for EPA to issue standards
effectively requiring that well over 60% of new light-duty vehicle sales be plug-in electric
vehicles in MY 2032 when critical concerns exist regarding the deployment of public charging
infrastructure necessary to support such sales.68 EPA does appear to estimate the costs for
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deploying the charging infrastructure it believes will be needed to support the aggressive EV
rollout it projects, but provides no analysis showing how those needs can be met.69 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0656, p. 15]
68 88 Fed. Reg. at 23907-10; DRIA at 5-22 - 5-32. EPA's insufficient estimates regarding the number of
charging ports needed to support large numbers of plug-in electric vehicles were calculated for MY 2027
and MY 2055 only.
69 88 Fed. Reg. at 29311-12.
Given that public charging infrastructures gaps have already been identified, the mere
existence of public and private investments in publicly accessible charging projects alone does
not negate the very likely possibility of public charging shortfalls stemming from EPA's
proposal. Reliable charging infrastructure is critical to the successful mass market adoption of
light-and medium-duty EVs. EPA must fully account for the projected public charging demands
of its proposal and clearly demonstrate that shortfalls will not exist. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0656, p. 15]
Organization: National Propane Gas Association (NPGA)
Charging infrastructure has not kept pace and the EPA's projections of charging infrastructure
growth are aspirational at best.4 The goals of the Proposed Rule are likely unachievable, and the
EPA should suspend consideration of the proposed rule until it can evaluate the impact of the
grants for charging infrastructure under the Inflation Reduction Act, and if BEV production
targets can meet anticipated demand for the model years covered. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0634, pp. 1-2]
3 Proposed Rule at 29329.
4 Proposed Rule at 29368.
Organization: National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA)
Specifically, within the proposed rule section on PEV Charging Infrastructure Considerations,
EPA states: 1 "there may be additional infrastructure needs and costs beyond those associated
with charging equipment itself. While planning for additional electricity demand is a standard
practice for utilities and not specific to PEV charging, the buildout of public and private charging
stations (particularly those with multiple high-powered DC fast charging units) could in some
cases require upgrades to local distribution systems.. .However, there is considerable uncertainty
associated with.. .future distribution upgrade needs, and we do not model them directly as part of
our infrastructure cost analysis." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, p. 2]
1 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,311 (May 5, 2023).
Specific Costs for EPA to Consider Incorporating in the Proposed Rule's Analysis [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
Again, we urge EPA to update its analysis to account for the costs needed to make updates to
the grid to support transportation electrification as envisioned in this proposal. Grid upgrade
costs for EV charging will vary by region, neighborhood, cooperative, circuit, and feeder.
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However, to illustrate the types and ranges of costs that EPA should account for, we provide the
following costs sourced from four different cooperative regions, broken down by charge level:
- Residential (Level 1 and Level 2): One out of three households will need an expanded
electric panel to accommodate 240 V Breakers. If a household purchases two electric vehicles,
then four slots on a breaker will be needed to accommodate this load. The average cost will be
approximately $4,000 for a Level 2 residential charger with a panel upgrade. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0575, pp.3-4]
— Upgrading panel (20% of panels must be upgraded) - can start around $600 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
— Transformer upgrades - $2,600 and climbing [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
— Service wire gauge upgrades to accommodate higher amperage - $3,000 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
- Public (Level 2 and DC Fast Charging (DCFC)): For commercial sites, transformer upgrade
needs will vary. Most sites will already have three-phase power available; however, in very rural
locations single-phase power will need to be upgraded to three-phase. If transformers do need to
be upgraded on a three-phase line, then three transformers will need to be upgraded. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
— Level 2 charger including panel - approx. $4,000 on average [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0575, pp. 3-4]
— National EV Infrastructure Program (NEVI)-Compliant DCFC - approx. $25,000-
$150,000 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
- Transformer - $25,000 - $40,000 (reflects current prices for three transformers) [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
- Service entrance - $3,000-$4,000 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
- Metering package (including instrumentation, voltage transformers (PT) and current
transformers (CT) - $2,000 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
- Line extension, if required (site dependent) - $50,000 - $75,000 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0575, pp.3-4]
Circumstances vary across cooperatives, but some of these costs will be borne directly by the
consumer- members and others will be paid for by the cooperative. Regardless, these costs help
to illustrate more accurately the investment it will take to implement on EPA's proposed rule.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
We note that these costs reflect a snapshot estimate in time and are likely to increase,
particularly due to the significant challenges and delays utilities are facing in their supply chains,
which are contributing to an unprecedented shortage of the most basic machinery and
components essential to ensure the continued reliability of the electric grid. Electric cooperatives
are waiting a year, on average, to receive distribution transformers. Additionally, lead times for
large power transformers have grown to more than three years. And orders for electrical conduit
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have been delayed five-fold to 20 weeks with costs ballooning by 200 percent year-over-year. As
a result, new projects are being deferred or canceled, and electric cooperatives are concerned
about their ability to respond to major storms due to depleted stockpiles. We expect these supply
chain challenges to persist with the increased demand for electrification projects being
incentivized by the U.S. federal government. All these delays will likely impact the cost and
timing of charging infrastructure buildout needed to support the transportation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0575, pp.3-4]
EPA should update its analysis in the proposed rule to account for the significant grid
investments that may be needed to support transportation electrification as laid out in the
proposal. As detailed above, these costs may be significant and should not be shouldered by the
electric cooperatives serving this new load. Again, electric cooperatives are consumer-owned
and operate at cost on a not-for-profit basis. They also serve 92% of the nation's persistent
poverty counties. Affordability is critical to electric cooperatives and the consumer-members
they serve, and any new costs imposed on an electric cooperative are ultimately borne by the
consumers at the end of the line. EPA should update its analysis to ensure it more accurately
represents the costs associated with electrifying both LDVs and MDVs, which could be
significant across the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, p. 4]
Organization: National Tribal Air Association (NTAA)
Electrified Vehicles
As noted in the announcement of the proposed standards, "EPA's proposal builds upon a
proliferation of announcements by automakers that collectively signal a rapidly growing
shift.. .toward zero-emission technologies, including electrification"5. This anticipated reliance
on hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and fully electric power trains may be disproportionately burdensome
and costly in Indian country. Far too many homes on many reservations lack access to an electric
grid. Further, vehicle reliance on centralized or individual battery charging sites as anticipated in
the proposed regulations presents a huge challenge. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, p. 3]
5 Biden-Harris Administration Proposes Strongest-Ever Pollution Standards for cars and trucks to
Accelerate Transition to a Clean - Transportation Future, USEPA News Release, April 12, 2023
The NTAA is well aware of many initiatives to enhance the deployment of renewable energy
technologies to support the nation's electricity demand. We actively participate in meetings,
webinars, forums, etc. as programs emerge under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, Inflation
Reduction Act, and other climate change - related initiatives. The NTAA continues to formally
comment on EPA proposals that emerge which have the potential to impact Indian country.
NTAA remains concerned about realistic access to funding and other resources that are essential
to advance renewable energy in Tribal communities and are necessary to transition vehicle fleets
as anticipated by the proposed light-duty and medium-duty vehicle emissions standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, p. 3]
Conclusions
The NTAA appreciates this opportunity to comment on the proposed rule regarding "Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles." We agree with the EPA's stated urgency to improve our air quality and to mitigate
climate change5. The proposed vehicle emissions standards and related provisions can be
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important elements in addressing these critical needs. We support the proposed rule including
Alternative 1 to the proposed greenhouse gas emissions standards. The anticipated shift to
electric vehicle fleets must, however, be coincident with greatly enhanced electric infrastructure
in many Tribal communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, p. 3]
5 Biden-Harris Administration Proposes Strongest-Ever Pollution Standards for cars and trucks to
Accelerate Transition to a Clean - Transportation Future, USEPA News Release, April 12, 2023
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
Nissan appreciates the Administration's focus on and support for advancing electrification
and carbon neutrality and shares the same long-term goal of transitioning to zero emission
vehicle society. However, Nissan believes that market realities, infrastructure needs, consumer
impacts, and lack of battery critical mineral availability necessitate an adjustment of the GHG
standard stringency in this rulemaking timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 1]
Organization: North American Subaru, Inc.
As articulated by Auto Innovators, to reach 67 percent ZEV sales by 2032 a host of supportive
policies is required. Consumers will demand affordability, ease of charging, and a vehicle that
meets performance needs in all-weather conditions. The Bipartisan Infrastructure law included
$7.5 billion to speed the deployment of EV charging infrastructure across the United States.
While this investment in public charging is an important signal to EV-wary consumers, more is
needed, particularly In multifamily unit dwellings and in places where Subaru customers love to
go, often outside the city limits including camping and outdoor recreational areas. And of
growing concern is the reliability and maintenance of installed charging stations. This issue
presents another potential inhibitor for EV adoption, including equity concerns.3 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0576, pp. 2-3]
3 Rempel, Cullen, Bryan, Cezar (2022). Report: Reliability of Open Public Electric Vehicle Direct Current
Fast Chargers, https://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id+4077554.
Organization: North Dakota Farmers Union (NDFU)
The proposal basically assumes that BEVs will be the dominant technology for future
emissions reductions. But relying on a single technology is a risky strategy. Many factors could
interfere with BEV production, including the supply and cost of critical minerals, lack of BEV
recharging infrastructure, slow ramp-up of wind and solar power, poor customer acceptance, and
more. EPA estimates that 67% of U.S. vehicle sales will be BEVs in 2032, but other projections
are lower and the U.S. lags behind other countries that are not expected to reach similar levels of
sales in that timeframe. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 5]
10 Stauffer, N. W. (2021, April 29). China's transition to electric vehicles: By 2030 40 percent of vehicles
sold in China will be electric; MIT research finds that despite benefits, the cost to consumers and to society
will be substantial. MIT News. Retrieved from https://news.mit.edu/2021/chinas-transition-electric-
vehicles-0429.
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Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
D. Deployment of Federal Funding
The recently enacted Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and the Inflation Reduction Act
(IRA) provide billions of dollars of funding to advance transportation electrification including
substantial funding for state governments. Combined with state and federal financial incentives
for ZEVs and charging and fueling infrastructure, and other market-enabling policies, the LDV
and MDV market segments are primed for rapid and widespread electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0584, p. 7]
The NESCAUM and OTC states are already beginning to deploy the $5 billion made
available through the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure program to accelerate installation
of public charging and other alternative fueling infrastructure, and the $5 billion Clean School
Bus grant program for zero-emission school buses and technology. Additional funding will be
available soon through the $7.25 billion Low or No Emission and Grants for Buses and Bus
Facilities programs, the $2.5 billion Charging and Fueling Infrastructure program, the $1 billion
Clean Heavy-Duty Vehicle program, and many other new and existing federal programs for
which activities that support transportation electrification are eligible. All of the NESCAUM and
OTC states recently submitted applications for the $5 billion Climate Pollution Reduction Grant
Planning and Implementation programs, which require states to develop and implement priority
and comprehensive climate action plans to reduce economy-wide GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 7]
Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
Moreover, the EPA claims unrealistically low residential electricity charging rates while
simultaneously admitting that low-income households won't have access to, nor be able to afford
installation of, residential charging ports. The EPA admits that low-income households will have
to rely on commercial charging ports that cost 2-3 times more3, yet they don't consider this in
their net impact calculations. The EPA's rule will have a negative impact on the entire
population but will disproportionately negatively impact the poorest Americans. Correcting for
these EPA oversights leads to a more realistic fuel "savings" of NEGATIVE $108 billion, a $998
billion cost increase from the EPA's calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 2-3]
3 Page 601 of EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis -
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
Organization: POET, LLC
EPA relies on BEVs making up an astounding 67 percent of LDVs by model year ("MY")
2032.4 EPA's modeling largely ignores the significant infrastructure needed to support those
BEVs and offers little to no concrete evidence that this infrastructure will be ready in time.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 5]
4 See U.S. EPA, Proposed Rule, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later
Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29184, 29329 (May 5, 2023) (finding that under the
proposal "penetration of BEVs increases by almost 30 percentage points over this 6-year period, from 36
percent in MY 2027 up to 67 percent of overall vehicle production in MY 2032")
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There are issues with U.S. EPA's assumptions regarding electric vehicle supply equipment
(EVSE) which are presented in Chapter 5.3.1 of the DRIA. The most notable of these can be
seen in DRIA Figures 5-16 and 5-17 which show the number of EVSE ports required under the
Proposed Rule and the No Action Case. The difference in required EVSE ports in 2055 is about
20 million (90 to 70). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 60]
However, as shown in Figure 9-2 of the DRIA in 2055 the difference in BEV populations
under the two cases is about 80 million (160 to 80). What this means is that U.S. EPA is
assuming that the doubling of BEV penetration will require only a 30% increase in the number of
available ESVE ports. While it may be possible that more BEVs will share EVSE outlets if BEV
populations grow, U.S. EPA has done nothing to justify the values used in the BEV assessment.
Because U.S. EPA understates the likely need for EVSE, it also underestimates the cost of EVSE
that will be incurred due to the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 60]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
Electromobility will need continued support from public policy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0637, p. 3]
Recent legislative actions have seeded the ground with support for electric vehicles and the
beginning of a robust nationwide charging network. With specifics that continue to be defined,
stakeholders are working to maximize the opportunity under these new laws to support
customers with valuable purchase incentives, and to help spur the development of new electric
vehicle component production and material sourcing. Understandably, the complexity of these
laws results in a process that requires careful deliberation with industry representatives working
hard to ensure customers have a clear understanding of the support available. Nevertheless, the
support within these programs will be critical to the growth rates EPA envisions in this proposal.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 3]
Other areas important to consumer adoption can benefit from additional policy development.
Further work is needed to reduce barriers to electrification such as streamlining building codes to
futureproof new construction to ease the installation of charging at homes, apartments, and
workplaces. The magnitude of the challenge related to a robust charging infrastructure is
becoming increasingly clear with updated reports such as the Department of Energy's 2030
assessment. 1 This single report indicates a total investment of $53-127 billion dollars for private
and public charging which does not even include costs associated with grid upgrades to support
the 26 million plus ports that are estimated to be needed. Consumers won't be satisfied with
roadblocks that make owning an electric car more complicated than a gasoline model. Actions
are also needed to help lower the cost of electricity as a fuel to ensure that EVs are competitive
and attractive against gasoline models. Policy makers and the auto industry must also continue to
find wins in other regulatory programs. EPA's recently finalized Renewable Fuel Standard for
2023-2025 regrettably was unable to finalize the innovative and robust proposal for "eRINs".
This proposal that was supported by Porsche could have opened the door for continued growth in
electricity derived from biogas and used transportation fuel and to further incentivize growth in
the electric vehicle market. Porsche appreciates the need for EPA to consider the wide range of
input they received on this proposal and will work proactively to support near-term regulatory
actions to finalize this valuable, supportive policy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 3]
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1 The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle
Charging Infrastructure, US Department of Energy, 2023
Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
Infrastructure Development Will Build on Strong Industry Momentum
EPA rightly identifies the importance of ubiquitous and reliable EV charging to achieve the
transportation electrification goals supported by this rulemaking. Rivian is actively investing in
the Rivian Adventure Network, a nationwide fast charging network, with a focus on reliability
and enabling access to areas not historically serviced by existing charging networks. From the
perspective of both an all-electric automaker and charging network provider, we applaud the
EPA's thorough analysis and modeling of the impact of this rulemaking on charging
infrastructure, energy sector emissions, and electric grid infrastructure. The Draft Regulatory
Impact Analysis ("DRIA") addresses concerns around these key topic areas and contextualizes
them within the many active policies, regulations, and funding opportunities that have created
tangible momentum in transportation electrification nationwide. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0653, pp.15-17]
This momentum can be seen in domestic EV manufacturing investments and the
commitments to EV-only sales by Audi, Fiat, Volvo, Mercedes-Benz, General Motors and
Honda.46 With increasing confidence around the availability of EVs now and into the future, the
charging infrastructure needed for those vehicles has also seen significant domestic investment
from a range of industry players. Since August 2022, 11 charging manufacturers have announced
additional manufacturing investments in the U.S. to meet growing demand, including Siemens,
ABB E-mobility and SK Signet.47 Two of the world's largest oil and gas companies, Shell and
BP, have acquired existing charging network providers, Volta and AMPLY Power,
respectively—a demonstration of their intentions to increase their investment in charging
infrastructure in the US.48, 49 These investments coupled with the opportunities coming out of
the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the Inflation Reduction Act have been key forcing
mechanisms for critical discussions around how to expedite and scale the roll out of charging
infrastructure nationwide. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 15-17]
46 BloombergNEF, Zero-Emission Vehicles Factbook: A BloombergNEF Special Report Prepared for
COP27 (November 2022), available at www.assets.bbhub.io/professional/sites/24/2022-COP27-ZEV-
Transition_Factbook.pdf.
47 E2, "Clean Energy Announcements," available at https://e2.org/announcements/sectors/ev/.
48 Shell USA, "Shell USA, Inc. Finalizes Acquisition of Volta Inc, Scaling Up Its U.S. Public Electric
Vehicle Charging Network," March 31, 2023, available at www.shell.us/media/2023-media-releases/shell-
usa-inc-finalizes-acquisition-of-volta-inc.html.
49 bp, "bp Takes First Major Step into Electrification in the U.S. by Acquiring EV Fleet Charging Provider
AMPLY Power," December 7, 2021, available at www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-
insights/press-releases/bp-takes-first-major-step-into-electrification-in-us-by-acquiring-ev-fleet-charging-
provider-amply-power.html.
Rivian is encouraged by the efforts currently underway across state and federal agencies,
private companies, national labs, and non-profits to address the key challenges and opportunities
with scaling charging infrastructure. One of those challenges is the impact of widespread
electrification on the electric grid infrastructure. We applaud EPA for acknowledging this
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challenge as it is a top concern for many industry stakeholders, but also an area where significant
attention is being paid. For example, EPRI has launched its EVs2Scale 2030 initiative, which is
focused on increasing collaboration between industry and utilities to increase communication
around commercial fleet electrification plans and utility capacity mapping.50 Several
deliverables are planned by the group, including key tools focused on helping utilities across the
country receive the necessary buy-in from their decision makers to plan for the grid upgrades
necessitated by transportation electrification. In addition, as noted in the DRIA, NREL recently
published a quantitative needs assessment by state and city for a national charging network
focused on personally owned, light-duty vehicles. 51 The granularity of the analysis available on
the state and city level52 will allow it to serve a similar function as the EPRI effort—increasing
utilities' awareness of the forthcoming load on their systems, thus providing more time to make
necessary grid upgrades. Overall, increasing transparency and information flow with the broad
range of utilities operating in the US will be critical to achieving the electrification goals this
rulemaking aims to help meet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 15-17]
50 Robert Walton, Utility Dive, "EPRI Launches 3-Year Initiative to Address Grid Constraints, Develop
Toops to Serve Coming EV Loads," April 19, 2023, available atwww.utilitydive.com/news/epri-initiative-
electric-vehicle-loads-power-grid-constraints-interconnection/648024/.
51 Wood, E., B. Borlaug, M. Moniot, D.-Y. Lee, Y. Ge, F. Yang, and Z. Liu, National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric
Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (2023), NREL/TP-5400-85654.
52 See data files for Wood, E., B. Borlaug, M. Moniot, D.-Y. Lee, Y. Ge, F. Yang, and Z. Liu, National
Renewable Energy Laboratory, The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty
Demand for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (2023), NREL/TP-5400-85654, available at
https ://data. nrel. gov/submissions/214.
In addition to increasing collaboration with utilities, leveraging load management
technologies to reduce the need for additional build out of grid capacity will be imperative. As
the DRIA notes, there are many commercially available technologies able to manage charging
load, from smart charging to mobile and stationary storage, to vehicle grid integration. In recent
years, these technologies have demonstrated their ability to subtract years from their project
energization timeframes or even enable the completion of a project that would have otherwise
been unable to proceed if a full-nameplate upgrade was required. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0653, pp.15-17]
While we acknowledge new distribution infrastructure will be necessary, we agree with EPA
that commercially available load management technology can leverage the inherent flexibility of
EV charging use cases and insert much-needed efficiency into EV-related distribution grid
planning and buildout processes. Per EPA's analysis in Figure 5-15 in the DRIA, the majority of
charging will be needed at home and at work, which is where load management technologies are
particularly impactful due to long dwell times with maximum charging flexibility. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 15-17]
Overall, increased transparency around the location and scale of future charging load will
enable utilities and their decision makers to make necessary investments in the electric grid
infrastructure as well as increase their adoption of load management technologies. Therefore, we
view the near-term finalization of Alternative 1 as a critical step to build on the existing
momentum described above and continue it into 2027 and beyond. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0653, pp.15-17]
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Organization: Roy Littlefield IV
Firstly, the country's current charging infrastructure is inadequate to support a forced shift
towards electric vehicles. Charging infrastructure is not yet fully developed or accessible in
many regions of the country. Forcing consumers to transition to EVs without ensuring sufficient
charging infrastructure could place undue burdens on drivers across the country. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0793, p. 1]
Organization: Scott Wilson
You will have read also that EVs are unaffordable. Actually, there are 18 new EV models
below the average new car price in the US. (see attached) You will have read there is no
charging infrastructure. Not true, since any home with electricity near a parking place can
support an EV. However, more long-distance highway charging is needed and is the motivation
for the administration's NEVI charger program. You will have read that the grid can't support an
EV fleet. Major electric utility trade groups point out that off-peak charging will become
widespread. It's notable also that 124 business entrepreneurs, executives, and academics have
submitted favorable comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0515, p. 1]
Organization: Senator Shelley Moore Capito et al.
In addition, there remains a lack of support infrastructure capacity to implement the sweeping
transition envisioned in these proposals, particularly for the heavy-duty vehicle category. While
the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act provides states funding for electric vehicle charging
infrastructure, charging technology and deployment continues to focus on passenger and
commercial vehicles, not on heavy-duty vehicles. The White House has noted that 72 percent of
goods in this country are moved by truck, placing the industry and the center of our critical
supply chains and economic competitiveness.5 Efficient and reliable charging infrastructure for
heavy-duty vehicles is essential for the sort of transition to electric trucks that the EPA has
proposed. However, the technology is nowhere near ready to meet the demand necessary to keep
our supply chain moving at the same rate it is today. Charging heavy-duty vehicles requires
significantly more expensive conduits and transformers, and consumes vastly more electricity,
than what is necessary for charging light-and medium-duty vehicles. Heavy-duty vehicle
charging takes longer and is required more frequently than liquid fueling due to electric trucks
having reduced range compared to conventional diesel vehicles. This proposal will result in
increased curb weight for heavy-duty vehicles due to the significant weight of batteries, leading
to reduced payload capacity and ultimately more heavy-duty vehicles on our roadways to move
the same amount of freight. This shift may have highway safety implications and create
increased congestion on our nation's roadways. In short, the charging technology for heavy-duty
vehicles is not readily available and it will take many more years to develop and deploy if it is
even economically feasible, making compliance with the EPA's proposal for heavy-duty
vehicles unattainable for the foreseeable future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5083, p. 2]
5 The Biden-Harris Administration Trucking Action Plan to Strengthen America's Workforce, The
White House (Dec. 16, 2021).
The situation for infrastructure to support charging of light-and medium-duty vehicles is only
slightly better, with your Agency touting the availability of 130,000 public chargers in its press
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release announcing its proposals.6 Setting aside their significant reliability issues and lack of
broad geographical availability, even a rapid expansion of the number of operational chargers is
unlikely to meet the demand for the electrification of two-thirds of the new vehicle fleet by 2032.
For reference, 2022 was the worst year for US car sales in a decade with 13.7 to 13.9 million
new vehicles sold due to inflation, economic uncertainty, and supply chain disruptions.7 Two-
thirds of that depressed sales figure would still represent more than 9 million new vehicles per
year being added to the cumulative demand on public charging infrastructure by 2032. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5083, pp. 2-3]
6 Biden-Harris Administration Proposes Strongest-Ever Pollution Standards for Cars and Trucks
to Accelerate Transition to a Clean-Transportation Future, US EPA (Apr. 12, 2023).
7 Wayland, Michael. Automakers are cautiously optimistic for a 2023 rebound after worst new
vehicles sales in more than a decade, CNBC (Jan. 6, 2023).
Organization: South Coast Air Quality Management District
5. Prioritize infrastructure funding in regions with accelerated ZEV requirements. The
proposed rule understandably devotes considerable attention to the significant funding provided
by the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and Inflation Reduction Act that can support this rule. We
are encouraged by this substantial investment; however, we suggest U.S. EPA consider how
funding will be allocated with priority to non-attainment regions with the highest public health
need. California is arguably well ahead of the rest of the nation in deploying zero emission
technologies, and our experience in these early deployments highlights key challenges where
funding can help to address and accelerate the adoption of ZEVs in our region. Consideration
and preferential funding allocations should be given to states, like California, with advanced
requirements for ZEV adoption which are needed to attain federal clean air standards. The ZEV
regulations in California will require additional costs that can inhibit the deployment of zero
emission vehicles at the scale needed to meet air quality standards. Funding support and targeted
investments in regions with the highest public health need can help overcome many of these
barriers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0659, p. 3]
Organization: Specialty Equipment Market Association (SEMA)
Government Subsidies
The Federal Government has invested billions of dollars to fund infrastructure projects to
support the expansion of BEV charging infrastructure. These investments, which are outlined
more below, come on the heels of the Biden Administration's 2021 Electric Vehicle Charging
Action Plan to drive American leadership forward on clean cars, and by setting an ambitious
target of 50% of electric vehicle (EV) sales shares in the U.S. by 2030.1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0596, p. 3]
1 FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Electric Vehicle Charging Action Plan (Link:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/13/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-
electric-vehicle-charging-action-plan/).
The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law made a $5 billion investment in electric vehicle charging
that will put the U.S. on the path to creating a network of 500,000 chargers across the states.
Even with this multi-billion-dollar investment, the nation will still be well short of the projected
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1.2 million public chargers that will be needed before 2032 under this proposal. The Department
of Energy Loan Program Office (LPO) has also promised roughly $17 billion in loan availability
for the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) Loan Program to support the
domestic battery supply chain.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 3]
2 Department of Energy: Critical Materials Loans & Loan Guarantees (Link:
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/DOE-
LPO_Program_Handout_Critical_Materials_June2021_0.pdf).
Charging Infrastructure Issues
One of the greatest shortcomings of this proposal is that it does not recognize marketplace
realities. According to a report from McKinsey about the charging infrastructure needed to
implement this rulemaking, it estimates that the U.S. will need to build and deploy
approximately 1.2 million more public chargers by 2032. That amounts to an estimated 400 new
chargers per day. This would require an 800% increase compared to the daily average of 50 new
public chargers deployed last year in this country. 14 The federal government's investments in
infrastructure will not meet the projected demand with the current proposal creating more
uncertainty for consumers that switching to a BEV will be right for them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0596, pp. 5-6]
14 McKinsey & Company: Building the electric-vehicle charging infrastructure America needs (Link:
https://www.mckinsey.eom/~/media/mckinsey/industries/public and social sector/our insights/building the
electric vehicle charging infrastructure america needs/building the electric-vehicle-charging-infrastructure-
america-needs-vf.pdf).
The unintended consequences of these regulations will be extremely far-reaching, adversely
impacting both rural and urban vehicle owners. Consumers in rural areas who are forced to drive
long distances for work and other necessities may struggle to meet their needs for convenient
charging requirements. Urban consumers will struggle in a BEV-centric market due to the lack
of charging stations accessible for people who park on the street or in parking garages that
cannot meet the need for charging significant numbers of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0596, pp. 5-6]
Organization: Stellantis
Electrification Rates Misaligned to Market and Exceed Commitments
Stellantis fully supports comments submitted through The Alliance for Automotive
Innovation (AAI or the Auto Innovators) detailing the challenges associated with EPA's overly
optimistic expectation for EV market growth. Stellantis remains steadfast to delivering on our
commitments to achieve an electrified future, and we acknowledge EPA's efforts with this
rulemaking to help support this difficult yet critical transition. However, the proposed rule
significantly underestimates the actions needed to build the targeted EV market. Addressing
concerns such as manufacturing capacity, battery production, charging infrastructure, and
consumer acceptance of EVs will be paramount to the success of this ambitious proposed
regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 2-3]
In August of 2021, Stellantis along with the rest of industry through the Auto Innovators,
announced support of the Biden administration's goal of achieving 40-50% electrification of the
U.S. new light-duty vehicle market by 2030. Foundational to this commitment was the need for
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stakeholders outside the automotive industry to deliver and execute policies essential for such a
significant technology transition: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
-Expand and scale the charging network to the EV volumes required
-Update federal EV incentives and apply at point of purchase
-Develop domestic battery supply chain (raw materials, manufacturing, and recycling)
-Implement fleet purchase requirements for EVs (including government fleets)
-Increase research & development to accelerate cost reduction of batteries and EV
components
-Increase consumer awareness of EVs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
Although there has been progress towards delivering on these essential EV market enablers,
significant gaps remain. For example: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) makes investments in electric vehicle charging that
will put us on the path to a network of 500,000 chargers3 - although this is a good down
payment on the needed charging infrastructure, it only represents a fraction of what is needed to
support the market projected by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
3 FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Electric Vehicle Charging Action Plan | The White House
-The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) committed significant funds to incentivize the purchase of
EVs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
- however these incentives come with criteria that exclude many EV models today, and
pending guidance from the IRS likely could exclude more in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
-The IRA also provides an incentive to produce the needed batteries helping to offset their
cost - however this only applies to the U.S., ignoring the global supply chain needed to support a
40-50% U.S. EV market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
Despite these major gaps, the EPA in its proposed rule incorrectly assumes these policy
actions represent a complete answer to achieve a 40-50% market. EPA's proposed rule extends
even further by assuming a "perfect" transition to a battery electric vehicle (BEV) only market at
60% in 2030MY - exceeding the commitment made to President Biden, the Administration's
National Blueprint for Transport Decarbonization, and the Stellantis Dare Forward commitment.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
These EV penetrations are greater than those of the most mature and forward leaning EV
markets in the U.S. Figure 1 below summarizes the electrification rates projected by the EPA
proposed rule against the penetration rates required in California's ZEV mandate as part of their
recent Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC II) program. California, the most mature EV market in the
U.S., will require at least 34% BEVs in 2027, increasing to 54% in 2030, and reaching 66% in
2032. EPA's proposed rule exceeds these California rates in every year from 2027-2032 and by
as much as 6% in 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
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SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR TABLE Industry Average Electrification Rates Figure 1-
EV Requirements of EPA NPRM vs. CARB ZEV Mandate and Biden Executive Order [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 3-4]
Essential to note is that EPA in this rulemaking is proposing federal standards that will apply
across all 50 states, including in places where infrastructure, incentives, and other market
enablers for EV adoption lag significantly. For example, Figure 3 below shows the current state
of national infrastructure versus what the California Energy Commission (CEC) says will be
required to support an EV market at the scale projected for the 2030MY timeframe. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 4-5]
Stellantis fully supports AAI comments that predict there could be as many as 40M EVs on
the road needing more than 5.8M public chargers by 2030, a threshold that 500,000 (0.5M)
additional chargers targeted by the BIL does not come close to achieving. Even if the estimate of
EVs on the road is significantly reduced by 35% to 26M vehicles on the road by 2030 - the
conclusion does not change. Figure 3 shows that even with a much lower assumption of 26M
EVs on the road, there would still need to be 3.8M public chargers compared to the 700,000
(0.7M) the BIL is scoped to deliver when combined with the 0.2M public chargers available
today - less than one-fifth of what is needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 4-5]
Additionally, approved funding is only the first step to deployment of a new infrastructure -
property needs to be purchased and chargers need to be installed and available to the public,
which takes time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 5]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR 2030MY Anticipated Infrastructure Need (Based on
Estimate of 26M EVs in 2030MY) Figure 3-Estimated public chargers needed based on 26M
EVs on the road (based on CEC Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Assessment -AB 2127)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 5]
These assessments represent estimates for light-duty vehicles. The charging needs for
medium-duty vehicles - also required to grow dramatically by the EPA's proposed rule - is
much larger. Per the CEC, medium and heavy-duty vehicles, due to their much larger batteries
and need for faster charging times require closer to a 1 to 1 ratio of public charger availability to
electric vehicles on the road. The infrastructure challenge is clear: to grow the EV market there
needs to be a dramatic increase in charging infrastructure, but as of now there is only a partial
commitment to achieve this essential market enabler. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 5]
At a House Committee on Energy and Commerce hearing on driving affordability held on
June 22, 2023, Rep. Dingell (D-MI) raised concerns with EPA Principal Deputy Administrator
Goffman on what happens under the NPRM if companies cannot reach BEV as 67% of new
vehicle sales in 2032, consumers cannot afford EVs, the charging stations aren't there, and the
assumptions and forecasting EPA relies upon are not viable. Mr. Goffman's response included a
reference to a possible market assessment review. Stellantis believes the Auto Innovators'
recommended ongoing market-based target adjustment system to be the best embodiment of a
direct market review. However, Stellantis could support an additional market-based review that
is both objective and transparent in reaching the necessary adjustments to allow this rule to be
reasonable and achievable given the large amount of uncertainty with how these key market
enablers will develop over the next decade. At a minimum, Stellantis supports EPA adding
modules to its annual EPA Automotive Trends Reports that capture important metrics such as the
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number of public EV charging stations deployed and percent of EVs purchased. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0678, p. 7]
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
Requiring massive expenditures in electric charging infrastructure. If finalized as proposed,
the EPA's emissions rules will hold America's automotive freedom hostage to the need for huge
new investments in electric infrastructure throughout the U.S. Again, EPA largely minimizes the
portion of these infrastructure costs that would appropriately be attributable to its regulatory
actions and downplays the impact. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 18]
Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
There are several other ways to look at the PHEV cost question. For example, PHEVs result
in significant savings to society due to reduced infrastructure investment for both home and
away- from-home infrastructure compared to BEVs. For Strong PHEVs that can match long-
range BEVs in GHG reduction when battery manufacturing is included, the lower cost of
infrastructure can be in the tens of billions of dollars even with modest percentages of Strong
PHEVs in use. We encourage EPA to model this cost savings in a scenario. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0646, pp. 22-23]
Strong PHEVs do not need public charging and can rely on fleet-only or home-only charging
which reduces the societal cost (e.g., grid upgrades, public incentives for charging stations). For
example, this translates to less expense for and impact on the grid including new transformers,
distribution feeders and substations compared to battery EVs. PHEVs reduce the need for fast
charge stations and potentially for other types of away-from-home charging stations. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 27-28]
Strong PHEVs charging in residential or fleet applications have less cost to the grid
because they typically charge at home or depots at lower kW levels than battery electric vehicles.
Allowing Strong PHEV cars and trucks to be eligible will help with several scale-up issues
including reducing the pressure to quickly scale up away-from-home and depot DC fast chargers
and facilities for battery production and mineral extraction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646,
pp. 27-28]
Strong PHEVs do not need public charging (fleet or home only charging is adequate)
and use smaller batteries which means more efficient use of mineral resources especially in the
near-term. See Appendix C in this letter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 27-28]
Organization: TCWInc.
Yet another significant consideration is our nation's ability to provide enough electricity to
charge commercial BEV's. While California is "leading the way" on ZEV integration, the state
doesn't generate enough power for their consumption needs today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0452, p. 1]
https://truckingresearch.org/2022/12/06/new-atri-research-evaluates-charging-infrastructure-
challenges-for-the-u-s-electric-vehicle-fleet/ [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0452, p. 1]
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Organization: Tesla, Inc.
The Tesla Supercharger network reliably serves quick charging needs to BEV drivers on road
trips with limited time to charge, and without access to charging at home or at the workplace.27
As of April 2023, there are more than 4,900 Supercharger locations globally and more than
45,000 Supercharger stalls. In the U.S., there are approximately 2,000 Supercharger locations
and more than 21,000 Supercharger stalls capable of charge rates up to 250 kW. Superchargers
are located in all fifty States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, representing
approximately 60% of the DCFC plugs operational today in the U.S. In February 2023, in
conjunction with the White House, Tesla announced it will open at least 3,500 Superchargers in
the U.S. to non-Tesla vehicles.28 Further, recently Ford announced it will be adopting the North
America Charging Standard (NACS) and will partner with Tesla to allow Ford vehicles -
including BEV like Mach-E and the F-150 Lightning - to utilize the Tesla Supercharger
network.29 Similarly, General Motors,30 Volvo,31 Polestar32 andRivian33 have announced
that they will also be adopting the NACS standard and several electric vehicle
charging manufacturers, including ABB,34 Flo,35 and BTC Power36 also announced that they
would be supplying NACS capable chargers moving forward. Numerous charging providers
have also followed suit.37 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 5-6]
27 Tesla, Impact Report 2022 at 70 (showing Tesla Supercharger network 2022 uptime reliability at
99.95%).
28 See, President Joe Biden (@POTUS) on Twitter (February 15, 2023) available at h
ttps://twitter.com/POTUS/status/1625983221279125504?s=20https://twitter.com/POTUS/status/162598322
1279125504? s=20.
29 Ford, Ford EV Customers to Gain Access To 12,000 Tesla Superchargers; Company to Add North
American Charging Standard Port in Future EVs (May 25, 2023) available at h
ttps://media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/fna/us/en/news/2023/05/25/ford-ev-customers-to-gain-access-to-
12-000-t esla-superchargers~.html.
30 GM, General Motors Doubles Down on Commitment to a Unified Charging Standard and Expands
Charging Access to Tesla Supercharger Network (June 8, 2023) available at h
ttps://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/general-motors-d oubles-down-on-commitment-to-a-unified-
charging-standard-and-expands-charging-access-to-tesla-supercharger-n etwork-301846599.html.
31 Car & Driver, Volvo Is Latest Automaker to Agree to Adopt Tesla's Charge Port (June 27, 2023)
available athttps://www.caranddriver.com/news/a44350518/volvo-electric-vehicles-tesla-charging-2025/.
32 Businesswire, Polestar will adopt North American Charging Standard to enable access to Tesla
Supercharger network in USA and Canada (June 29, 2023) available at h
ttps://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20230629093526/en/Polestar-w ill-adopt-North-American-
Charging-Standard-to-enable-access-to-Tesla-Supercharger-network-in-USA-and-Canada.
33 Rivian, Rivian Accelerates Electrification through Adoption of North American Charging Standard and
Access to Tesla's Supercharger Network for Rivian Drivers (June 20, 2023) available at h
ttps://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20230620267452/en/Rivian-Accelerates-Electrification-through-
Adoption-of-N orth-American-Charging-Standard-and-Access-to-Tesla%E2%80%99s-Supercharger-
Network-for-Rivian-Drivers.
34 ABB, ABB E-Mobility is Adding North American Charging Standard (NACS) as an Option to Our
Products (June 9, 2023) available at h
ttps://twitter.com/ABBNorthAmerica/status/1667139962830041091https://twitter.com/ABBNorthAmerica/
status/16671 3 9962830041091.
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35 FLO, FLO Stations to Offer North American Charging Standard (NACS); Supports Broader Use (June
8, 2023) available at https://www.flo.com/news/flo-stations-to-offer-north-american-charging-standard-
nacs-supports-broader-use/.
36 BTC Power, BTC POWER To Introduce North American Charging Standard (NACS) Compatibility
For Enhanced EV Charger Accessibility (June 20, 2023) available at h ttps://btcpower.com/blog/btc-power-
to-introduce-north-american-charging-s tandard-nacs-compatibility-for-enhanced-ev-charger-accessibility/.
37 See, EV Station, Tesla NACS Charger Adoption Tracker available at h ttps://evstation.com/tesla-nacs-
charger-adoption-tracker/.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 1: Tesla Global Delivery Volume and Job Growth
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 5-6]
In any event, deployment of adequate charging infrastructure is already, and will be, available
commensurate with the rate of BEV uptake supported by more stringent rules than the agency
proposes. EPA's analysis of this issue should focus on when the standards come into effect: to
the extent EPA has authority to consider infrastructure issues, it would be under its authority to
have the regulation take effect "after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit
the development and application of the requisite technology," 186 which necessarily entails a
predictive judgment about what the infrastructure capacities would be in the future (including in
response to the proposed rule), rather than being limited to the status quo. For example, in the
past EPA has considered whether technology would "would be perfected early enough to allow
its mass production and installation." 187 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 30]
186 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2) (emphasis added).
187 NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
While the proposal focuses its attention on non-residential charging, the agency should more
robustly recognize the role of residential charging.188 In the U.S. there are approximately 82
million single family homes most of which are a capable of providing Level 1 and 2 BEV
charging. 189 As DOE indicates 80% of EV charging is done at home due to the convenience and
low cost of residential charging and strategies for addressing the increase in electricity demand
are readily available. 190 Further, as the EPA notes, the IRA's extension of the Alternative Fuel
Refueling Property Tax Credit through Dec 31, 2032, will support individual home owners
investment in significantly expanding residential charging. 191 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792,
p. 30]
188 See, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29307; Draft RIA at 5-22 thru 5-39.
189 See, Statista, U.S. Single family homes -statistics & facts (Feb. 20, 2023) available at h
ttps://www.statista.com/topics/5144/single-family-homes-in-the-us/#topicOverview
190 See e.g., NREL, Incorporating Residential Smart Electric Vehicle Charging in Home Energy
Management Systems (April 7, 2021) available at https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy21osti/78540.pdf
191 See, Draft RIA at 5-26.
Additionally, the agency unduly dampens the rate of Level 3 charging deployment by
utilizing cost estimates for DCFC installation that are dramatically higher than Tesla's
experience. Tesla has established the lowest cost in the industry and shown the costs to be more
than 50% below current industry averages. 192 EPA utilizes a mid-range DCFC cost of $153,000
per charging port for a 250 kW DCFC port. In comparison, Tesla costs are under $40,000 per
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deployed DCFC port. 193 This overestimation of the cost of deployment indicates that the agency
underestimates the volume of DCFC that can be deployed based on expected investment levels.
Importantly, EPA should recognize, as Tesla's figures exemplify, that non-utility ownership of
BEV charging stations is associated with significantly reduced cost of installation. 194 Further,
charging technology, like vehicle technology, is also maturing as more suppliers and
manufacturing facilities are coming online and the cost of installation will continue to
decline. 195 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 30-31]
192 Tesla, 2023 Investor Day Presentation (March 1, 2023) at 97 - 101.
193 Id., at 97; See also, See Grid Strategies/Electric Serving Customers Best: The Benefits of Competitive
Electric Vehicle Charging Stations (May 2023) at Table 3 (showing calculations for average cost per EV
charging port by company) available at h ttps://www.electricadvisorsconsulting.com/wp-
content/uploads/2023/05/The-Benefits-of-Competitive-EV-Charging-S tations.pdf
194 See, Grid Strategies/Electric Serving Customers Best: The Benefits of Competitive Electric Vehicle
Charging Stations (May 2023) at Table 3 (showing calculations for average cost per EV charging port by
company) available at h ttps://www.electricadvisorsconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/The-
Benefits-of-Competitive-EV-Charging-S tations.pdf
195 See, 2023 Tesla Investor Day Presentation at 99 (showing a 40% Improvement in Per kWh Costs
between Q1 2021 and Q4 2022); See also, ABB, ABB expands US manufacturing footprint with
investment in new EV charger facility (Sept. 14, 2023) available at h
ttps://new.abb.com/news/detail/94725/abb-expands-us-manufacturing-footprint-with-investment-in-n ew-
ev-charger-facility; See also, Tritium, Tritium Celebrates the Opening of Its First Global EV Fast Charger
Manufacturing Facility in the United States (Aug. 23, 2022) available at h
ttps://tritiumcharging.com/tritium-celebrates-the-opening-of-its-f irst-global-ev-fast-charger-
manufacturing-facility-in-the-united-states/
Rapid and Expansive Investment in Charging Infrastructure Supports Stringent Multi-
Pollutant Light-Duty Emission Standards
As EPA notes, investments in BEV charging infrastructure have grown rapidly in recent years
and will continue to accelerate. 196 Moreover, a number of new Congressionally enacted policies
will also facilitate greater and rapid deployment of charging infrastructure sufficient to support
more robust light-duty standards. 197 The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (IIJA) bipartisan
infrastructure and investment and jobs act invests $7.5 billion to build out the first-ever national
network of EV chargers. IIJA also created the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure Discretionary
Grant Program to deploy publicly accessible charging and fueling infrastructure and provides for
$2.5 billion over five years for the program. 198 At the end of March 2023, FHWA issued a
notice of funding opportunity to solicit applications for grants totaling up to $700 million to
deploy charging and alternative fueling infrastructure projects. Half of the $700 million is
allocated for electric vehicle and other infrastructure located on public roads or in other publicly
accessible locations, while the other half is allocated for charging and alternative fueling
infrastructure located along designated alternative fuel corridors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0792, pp. 31-32]
196 88 Fed. Reg. at 29194.
197 88 Fed. Reg. 29195; Draft RIA at 5-25 thru 5-26.
198 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, P.L 117-58 (Nov. 15, 2021), Section 11401.
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In addition to the federal investments in charging facilitated by the IIJA, the IRA's Section
30C provides significant tax incentives for the deployment of private capital into charging
infrastructure for both light and heavy-duty vehicles. 199 It allows for up to $100,000 for each
charger with no limit on how many chargers a fleet can purchase and install at one site; this will
drive significant new private investment. Similarly, tax incentives for building efficiency will
also benefit EV charging installations.200 PWC recently predicted that the BEV
charging market will grow ten-fold by 2030.201 Another new analysis establishes BEV charger
annual installed capacity will overtake distributed solar for the first time in 2023 and will reach
41 GW by 2027 and the BEV charging infrastructure market will reach US $20 billion by 2027,
led by the residential Level 2 (US $6.5 billion) and public DC fast-chargers (US $5.6 billion)
segments.202 Further, the International Energy Agency (IEA), in its 2022 Trends in Charging
Infrastructure study, reported that already "the United States counts about 22,000 fast chargers,
of which nearly 60% are Tesla superchargers."203 Notably, Tesla plans to double the size of our
Supercharging network in the next 18-24 months.204 Other automakers are following in Tesla's
footsteps and entering into EV charging partnerships and investments as well.205 Similarly,
fossil fuel companies are reorienting investment around BEV infrastructure.206 Investment in
charging infrastructure will be further enhanced by state rebates and incentive programs.
Numerous incentives that will also facilitate new charging infrastructure have been established
and enacted.207 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 31-32]
199 Id. at Section 13404.
200 See Credit Suisse, Treeprint: US Inflation Reduction Act -A Tipping Point in Climate Action, at (2022)
available at h ttps://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us-news/en/articles/news-and-expertise/us-inflation-
reduction-act-a-catalyst-for-c limate-action-20221 l.html.
201 PWC, The US electric vehicle charging market could grow nearly tenfold by 2030: How will we get
there? (2023) available at https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/industrial-products/library/electric-
vehicle-charging-market-growth. html.
202 Wood MacKenzie US Distributed Energy Resource market to almost double by 2027 (June 20, 2023)
available at https://www.woodmac.com/press-releases/us-distributed-energy-resource-market-to-almost-
double-by-2027/.
203 IEA, Trends in charging infrastructure (2022) available at https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-
outlook-2022/trends-in-c harging-infrastructure.
204 TechCrunch, Tesla agrees to double supercharger network, open to all EVs under Biden's $7.5B
charging plan (Feb. 15, 2023) (discussing other charging investments as well) available at h
ttps://techcrunch.com/2023/02/15/tesla-agrees-to-double-supercharger-network-open-to-all-evs-under-
bidens-7-5b-charging-plan/.
205 See e.g., Bloomberg, Jeep Maker Stellantis Sets Up EV Charging Unit to Soothe Range Anxiety (June
27, 2023) available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-27/jeep-maker-stellantis-sets-up-
ev-charging-unit-to-soothe-range-a nxiety#xj4y7vzkg; Bloomberg, C ar-Charging Investment Soars,
Driven by EV Growth and Government Funds (Aug. 16, 2022) available at h
ttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-16/car-charging-investment-soars-driven-by-ev-g rowth-
and-government-f
unds?cmpid=BBD081622_hyperdrive&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&utm_term=220816
&utm_campaign= h yperdrive#xj4y7vzkg; Charged, F LO to provide up to 40,000 public chargers for
GM's Dealer Community Charging Program (Dec. 10, 2022) available at h
ttps://chargedevs.com/newswire/flo-to-provide-up-to-40000-public-chargers-for-gms-dealer-community-
charging-program/?utm_source=ChargedEVs.com+Email+Newsletter+Opt-
in&utm_campaign=f22 lea7628-
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Daily+Headlines+RSS+Email+Campaign&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6c05923d39-f221ea7628-
343935020.
206 See e.g., BP, bp leans into convenience and mobility across US, agrees to purchase leading travel
center operator, TravelCenters of America (Feb. 16, 2023) available at h
ttps://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/press-r eleases/bp-agrees-to-purchase-
travelcenters-of-america.html.
207 See generally, N.C. Clean Energy Technology Center (NCCETC), The 50 States of Electric Vehicles:
State ZEV Targets,Managed Charging, & LMI Access Prioritized in 2022 (Feb. 8, 2023) available at h
ttps://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/2023/02/08/the-50-states-of-electric-vehicles-state-zev-targets-managed-
charging-lmi-a ccess-prioritized-in-2022/.
Organization: Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF)
The HD Tailpipe Rule Will Devastate Trucking
Former Supreme Court Justice Breyer stated in Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. 457
(2001), that the Clean Air Act "does not require the EPA to eliminate every health risk, however
slight, at any economic cost, however great, to the point of 'hurtling' industry over 'the brink of
ruin.'" Id. at 494. In the Whitman case the Supreme Court vacated the 1997 NAAQS because of
the poor science and lack of discernable criteria underlying them. Likewise here, no scientific
data requires the EPA to enact the most stringent tailpipe emission limits conceivable. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 4-5]
Electric trucks typically have a higher upfront purchase price compared to traditional diesel
trucks. The HD Tailpipe Rule will effectively bar diesel trucks from sale, forcing trucking
companies seeking to replace their fleet to take on more costs to do so. This will strain the
financial resources of some companies, especially smaller ones. Shifting from diesel trucks to
electric ones will also require adapting to new technologies and training drivers to effectively
operate electric vehicles. This transition period will likely lead to disruptions in the supply chain
and additional costs — both temporal and monetary — for trucking companies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0510, pp.4-5]
Moreover, the availability of charging stations for electric trucks is currently poor and still
developing. It is certainly not as extensive as refueling stations for diesel trucks, and retrofitting
existing truck stops for electric charging will place immense strain on electrical infrastructure
and the national grid, especially in rural communities often frequented by truckers traveling the
nation's highways, causing prices to skyrocket for average Americans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0510, pp. 4-5]
The resulting chaos will limit the range and flexibility of electric trucks for long-haul
journeys. Electric trucks already have limited range compared to diesel trucks, particularly when
fully loaded. This will mean more frequent charging, adjustment to trucking routes, and overall
shipping delays, negatively affecting operational efficiency. And even if the myriad
infrastructure issues involved in getting power to truck refueling stations were solved or
mitigated, the electricity used to charge electric trucks would still primarily come from
America's most reliable and abundant power source: fossil fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0510, pp. 4-5]
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In effect, the HD Tailpipe Rule will force truckers to spend substantial financial and human
resources to comply with ultra vires government regulations that fail to make even a marginal
dent in global issue of changing climate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 4-5]
The LMD Tailpipe Rule Will Unnecessarily Harm Consumers
Similarly, the LMD Tailpipe Rule is regulatory overkill that will harm average Americans and
limit innovation. To start, stricter emissions regulations will increase manufacturing costs for
automakers. This will lead to higher sticker prices for vehicles, pricing low-to middle-class
Americans out of the automotive market, leaving them stranded with little recourse or dependent
on public transit, eventually depressing the job market. The government should not place the
burden for green energy on the least fortunate Americans, adding yet another obstacle to their
economic climb. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 5-6]
Automakers will rush to convert their fleets to feature either all or mostly electric vehicle
models, disadvantaging new car buyers in areas without existing electric charging infrastructure.
In the same vein, as mentioned above, the strain placed on the electric grid caused by millions of
Americans charging their vehicles will cause electric prices to rise markedly and lead to "brown-
outs." See, e.g. Nadia Lopez, Race to zero: Can California's power grid handle a 15-fold increase
in electric cars?, CALMATTERS (Feb. 6, 2023), https://calmatters.org/environment/2023/01/
california-electric-cars-grid/ ("State officials claim that the 12.5 million electric vehicles
expected on California's roads in 2035 will not strain the grid. But their confidence that the state
can avoid brownouts relies on a best-case — some say unrealistic — scenario: massive and rapid
construction of offshore wind and solar farms, and drivers charging their cars in off-peak
hours."). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 5-6]
Additionally, electric cars have limited range and require long recharging sessions, and the
infrastructure to support the sudden transition to electric vehicles that the LMD Tailpipe Rule
would cause simply does not exist. Rural and low-income communities, the people most affected
by this regulation, likely will be the last to receive said recharging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 5-6]
Finally, EPA should assess impacts to the national economy as a result of potentially
accelerating ZEV freight transport that would cease to be reliable or functional outside of a
geographically confined network of charging/fueling infrastructure and support systems. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, p. 7]
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
Charging will also cost more. The new power plant rules will regulate carbon dioxide and
other so-called greenhouse gas emissions from both new and existing natural gas and coal-fired
power plants, and require carbon capture systems or a switch to hydrogen fuels.5 These
commercially unproven systems for capturing carbon are costly and will be passed on to
consumers in the form of higher electricity rates. Drivers will find it more expensive to use
electricity for all purposes, including charging their electric vehicles, harming poor and middle-
class drivers the most. EPA does not address its new power plant rules in this rule. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 2-3]
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5 Environmental Protection Agency, "Greenhouse Gas Standards and Guidelines for Fossil Fuel-Fired
Power Plants," May 15, 2023, https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/greenhouse-gas-
standards-and-guidelines-fossil-fuel-fired-power (accessed May 18, 2023).
Mandating electric vehicles would reduce Americans' standard of living. Back in the early
1900s, when Henry Ford started producing cars, only rich Americans could afford them.
Throughout the 20th century cars became less expensive, and many households can afford not
one but two. Cars are already becoming more expensive, and the proposed rule accelerates that
trend, taking America back a century, where new cars will be only for the rich. EPA does
analyze declines in standards of living. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 3-4]
Recharging an electric vehicle from empty can take over an hour, compared to 5 minutes to
fill up with gas. 11 If there is a line to use the charging station the wait can double. Most people
do not want to let their EV battery go below 20%, and the charging rate goes down when it is
charged over 80%. 12 Throughout America the poor rarely have access to indoor garages for
overnight charging, and in most large cities, such as New York City, the middle-class also have
no access to indoor charging. Using charging stations on the street, if available, risks theft of
expensive charging cables. EPA does not account for this lack of convenience. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0674, pp.3-4]
11 Lazar, "How Long Does It Take to Refuel a Gasoline Car? GasAnswer, https://gasanswer.com/how-
long-take-refuel-gasoline-car/ (accessed April 28, 2023).
12 Sebastian Blanco, "How to Maximize EV Range," J.D. Power, July 20, 2022,
https://www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-guides/how-to-maximize-ev-range (accessed April 28, 2023).
Organization: The Mobility House et al.
Additionally, PCS can save customers and ratepayers through avoided infrastructure
investments. Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) of Northern California reported that sites that used
Automated Load Management (ALM), a form of PCS, to dynamically modulate and reduce EV
charging to meet site infrastructure needs saved $30,000 -$200,000 per site in avoided
infrastructure upgrades. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0657, p. 2]
1 Pacific Gas and Electric Company Electric Vehicle Charge 2 Prepared Testimony, pages 2-9 - 2-10,
October 26, 2021.
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
While our attached comments cover a range of issues for EPA's consideration, the five below
summarize the most critical: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 2]
1. The proposed standards are expected to result in a new vehicle sales mix of 67% BEV by
32MY. Achieving such a high penetration is almost entirely dependent on factors outside our
control. As discussed in more detail in our attached comments, hundreds of new mines are
needed globally to produce enough critical minerals to support so many BEVs. The sources for
those minerals are almost exclusively outside the U.S., as is most of the mineral processing to
turn the ore into usable battery-grade material. And the charging infrastructure (both in-home
and public) needed to support that level of electrification is far from where it needs to be. Recent
legislation and incentives are directionally supportive but appear far short of what is needed.
EPA should adjust the standards in the proposed rule to account for these major uncertainties
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over which automakers have little control, but for which we face significant compliance and
brand/reputation ramifications should they not come to bear. Compliance cannot be based on
factors over which we have no control. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 2]
The Proposed Rule also for the first time imposes standards on automakers for which
compliance requires significant actions by third parties over which we (or EPA) have no control.
First, achieving the level of BEVs required by the Proposed Rule will require massive new
supplies of critical minerals, the mines to extract them, and the refining facilities to turn ore into
battery-grade material. Currently, virtually the entire mineral and battery supply chain is outside
the U.S. Second, it requires massive investments in home and public charging infrastructure, as
well as upgrades to the electrical grid throughout the U.S. and an accelerated shift to renewable
power generation. Various provisions of the IIJA and IRA directionally support some of these
areas but fall significantly short of what will be needed for the expected level of electrification.
And finally, the ultimate impact of these factors on vehicle costs and consumer demand are
unclear, at best. The are few contingencies for automakers and our customers in the event any or
all these factors stand in the way of complying with the Proposed Rule. Our comments below
address these and other issues. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 8-9]
We are prepared to follow up with additional information beyond these comments. We look
forward to collaborating toward a more workable Final Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620,
pp. 8-9]
5. GHG Program
The Proposed Rule fails to demonstrate the penetration of BEVs assumed for compliance with
the proposed standards is feasible. The proposal notes "While emission standards set by the EPA
under CAA section 202(a)(1) generally do not mandate use of particular technologies, they are
technology-based, as the levels chosen must be premised on a finding of technological
feasibility." 17 CAA section 202(a)(1) states "Any regulation prescribed under paragraph (1) of
this subsection (and any revision thereof) shall take effect after such period as the Administrator
finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving
appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
17 88 Fed. Reg at 29232.
18 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2).
The aggressive ramp up of BEVs (see Table 1) required to comply forces a rapid
transformation of how vehicles are manufactured, driven, fueled, and serviced. As such,
"leadtime and requisite technology" must extend to the availability of critical minerals, the
readiness of a sustainable battery supply chain and fueling infrastructure, as well as other
market-related factors that will affect the price and consumer demand of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
[Table 1 Annual BEV Penetration Assume for Compliance w/ Proposed Standards: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
MY 2027: BEV Share 36
MY 2028: BEV Share 45
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MY 2029: BEV Share 55
MY 2030: BEV Share 60
MY 2031: BEV Share 63
MY 2032: BEV Share 67] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
Today's PEV support system clearly cannot meet the needs of the future envisioned by the
proposal. Our comments explain why the proposal lacks a clear justification for how the support
system will be in place over the period of the proposed standards. Neither EPA nor auto
manufactures can control the timing or outcomes of these essential support measures. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
Therefore, it is disappointing that EPA removed the e-RIN proposal from the RFS set rule as
it is one of the few measures for which EPA has direct authority to provide at least some level of
assistance in supporting the EV shares required in the GHG proposal. After a muti-year
collaboration with the auto industry, a valuable policy tool for establishing PEV markets and
promoting clean energy has been lost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
Finally, EPA has taken a more measured view of technology risk and uncertainty in past
vehicle emissions rulemakings in which technology costs were lower and automakers had
significantly more direct control over managing their technology development, deployment, and
sales mix to comply. In this Proposed Rule, EPA appears to be taking a much more cavalier
approach to risk, lead time, and ensuring the "requisite technology" is available, despite the high
cost of BEVs, the massive uncertainty around mineral supplies, the significant investment
needed in charging infrastructure and the power grid, and the uncertain market demand for
BEVs. The standards in the Final Rule should be adjusted to better account for market
uncertainties. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
Organization: Transfer Flow, Inc
A major concern for consumers is how they would charge an electric vehicle. For citizens
living in apartment buildings or utilizing on-street parking, managing an electric vehicle would
be inconvenient and challenging. The image below from Deloitte's 2022 Global Automotive
Consumer Study 17 illustrates consumer powertrain preferences for their next vehicle, which are
not aligned with the EPA's proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027
and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
17 https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Consumer-Business/us-2022-global-
automotive-consumer-study-global-focus-final.pdf
[See original attachment for "Consumer powertrain preferences for their next vehicle"]
Electric Vehicles require the ramp-up of many new electricity-generating power plants to
provide enough power to charge all the projected electric vehicles, and then those electricity-
generating power plants must rely heavily on carbon capture technologies to keep the emissions
from these electricity-generating power plants out of the atmosphere. Current carbon capture
technologies are experimental and may prove dangerous.22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496,
pp. 3-5]
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22 https://www.huffpost.com/entry/gassing-satartia-mississippi-co2-
pipeline_n_60ddea9fe4b0ddef8b0ddc8f
In many places, such as rural environments or for use in utility vehicles, electric vehicles are
not a practical solution. Utility companies working on phone lines, power lines, and performing
construction work all need reliable power sources that can be used for transporting people and
powering equipment, as well as function when the electric power grid may be in need of repair.
Electric vehicles do not have a network in remote areas or the energy density to effectively
transport and power auxiliary equipment needed to, among other functions, install or perform
repairs to electric power lines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), two years after the historical Dixie Fire, is still powering
affected Californians with diesel-powered generators as the infrastructure required to bring
electricity into homes has still not been rebuilt. Citizens living in these affected areas would need
to charge electric vehicles using electricity created from diesel generators, and the logistics of
that simply do not make sense. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
For a myriad of reasons, people may be hesitant to adopt electric vehicle technology. Near-
zero technologies are going to be more agreeably adopted if consumers feel they have a choice of
which near-zero technology works best for them. In Northern California, many citizens affected
by various wildfires still harbor animosity towards PG&E for negligently causing various
wildfires that have ruined thousands of people's lives. In 2020 PG&E pled guilty to 84 counts of
manslaughter for starting the historically devastating Camp Fire.23 Many citizens affected by
these wildfires don't want electric vehicles because they don't believe they can trust PG&E. Not
encouraging a choice of which near-zero technology consumers choose to implement runs the
risk of having the opposite intended effect. Consumers will likely choose to hold on to their old,
dirtier vehicles, defeating the intended purpose. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
23 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/business/energy-environment/pge-camp-fire-california-
wildfires.html
Organization: U.S. Chamber of Commerce
-Inadequate EV charging infrastructure. It is widely regarded that consumer acceptance of and
interest in electric vehicles is highly dependent on the existence of a sufficient nationwide
network of EV charging infrastructure. As noted in the proposed rule, the bipartisan
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act provides $7.5 billion of Federal Highway Administration
funding for charging infrastructure deployment efforts that provide an important start for this
effort. However, implementation of these programs has barely begun, and there is ample
evidence that even their successful and on-time execution will leave the U.S. far short of the
number of charging stations necessary to support the proposal's expectation of nearly 70% EV
sales in 2032. Addressing this shortcoming is fundamental to overcoming consumer reluctance to
EV adoption. The Chamber encourages EPA to work with automakers, utilities, the Department
of Energy, and state governments to adjust phase-in timelines of this rulemaking to correspond to
realistic expectations of EV charging infrastructure buildout. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0604,
p. 2]
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Organization: U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB)
The greater adoption of EVs can be good for society and the environment when incentives are
directed to consumers who will use EVs extensively, such as single-vehicle households, ride
sharing drivers, used car buyers and middle-and lower-income households.24 In addition, some
aspects of EV infrastructure subsidies, such as in the geographical distribution of charging
stations, tend to reflect and perpetuate "disparities across race and income."25 A modified
proposed rule should address these concerns with a strategy to allocate EV resources to middle-
and low-income households, and also favor users who will be inclined to use the EV for the
necessary number of miles so that it produces a net environmental benefit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0540, pp. 4-5]
24 Hardman, S. et al., Aug. 30, 2021, https://sciencepolicyreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-electric-
vehicles/
25 "The result shows a similar overall pattern of access disparities between the race and ethnicity groups,
but the access gap is larger than that found for public chargers overall... The odds of having publicly-
funded charger access in Black and Hispanic majority CBGs is less than half of that in White-majority
CBGs." Hsu, C. & Figerman, K. 'Public electric vehicle charger access disparities across race and income
in California', https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967070X20309021.
The EPA's numerous regulations that promote human and ecological health, reduce GHG,
and promote the common good are commendable. In these times of growing ecological
challenges, increased inequality, and fiscal pressures, aggressive environmental standards must
also respect economic and social considerations, driving our nation towards an "energy
revolution" that provides "not only sustainable, efficient and clean energy, but also energy that is
secure, affordable, accessible and equitable."26 For these same reasons, the light-duty vehicle
standards should be improved and optimized to benefit primarily low-and middle-income
Americans to reduce racial and economic disparities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0540, pp. 4-5]
26 USCCB-CRS Letter to the Secretary of State, Feb. 17, 2017, https://www.usccb.org/resources/usccb-
crs-letter-secretary-tillerson-care-creation-february-17-2017
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation (Valero)
1. The EVSE (charging infrastructure) installation costs adopted by EPA are unrealistic.
Table 5-14 of the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis ("DRIA") summarizes the ranges of costs
that EPA considered for EVSE hardware and installation.3 Recent estimates by EV charging
station vendors and in DOT-approved state EV Infrastructure Deployment Plans project
significantly higher EVSE costs than used by EPA in their cost analysis, ranging from $500,000
to $1.2 million in capital expenditures for a minimally-compliant NEVI charging station
containing four simultaneously operable 150 kW CCS ports (i.e., $125,000 - $300,000 per DC-
150 kW port).4,5,6,7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 1-3]
3 DRIA at 5-32 and 5-33.
4 See https://www.evgo.com/blog/building-ev-charging-stations-with-nevi/ (accessed May 13, 2023).
5 https://betterenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/EV_CorridorRoadmap2023.pdf (accessed May 13,
2023).
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6 ARDOT, "Arkansas Electric Vehicle Charging" (July 2022), https://www.ardot.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/07/ARDOT_NE VI_FAQ.pdf.
7 U.S. DOT Fiscal Year 2022/2023 EV Infrastructure Deployment Plans (accessed May 20, 2023),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/. See plans submitted by and approved
for Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas,
and Wyoming.
Beyond the EVSE hardware and installation costs, EPA fails to consider annual operating and
maintenance costs for EVSE, estimated by the District of Columbia to run $1,000 per Level 2
charger and $l,400-$2,000 per Level 3 DC fast charger.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
1-3]
8 Government of the District of Columbia, "District's Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plan" at
13 (2022), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/dc_nevi_plan.pdf.
Although EPA acknowledges that upgrades to electricity distribution systems may be required
to meet the charging loads associated with EVSE, it immediately dismisses the costs, explaining
that
"EPA acknowledges that there may be additional infrastructure needs and costs beyond those
associated with charging equipment itself. While planning for additional electricity demand is a
standard practice for utilities and not specific to PEV charging, the buildout of public and private
charging stations (particularly those with multiple high-powered DC fast charging units) could in
some cases require upgrades to local distribution systems. For example, a recent study found
power needs as low as 200 kW could trigger the need to install a distribution transformer while a
load of 5 MW or more could require upgrades to feeder circuits or the addition of a feeder
breaker."9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 1-3]
9 DRIA at 5-34 to 5-35.
"There is considerable uncertainty associated with future distribution upgrade needs as well as
with the uptake of the technologies and approaches discussed above that could reduce upgrade
costs, and we do not model them directly as part of our infrastructure cost analysis." 10 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 1-3]
10 DRIA at 5-36.
Regardless of who is paying, upgrades to electrical infrastructure are real impacts associated
with EVSE installation and come with real costs. In their EV Infrastructure Deployment Plans,
several states quantify the cost of electrical system upgrades needed to accommodate EVSE,
including:
Idaho cites that "charging stations installed with NEVI formula funds must be able to
provide a power output of at least 600kW. In Idaho, most NEVI sites will require transformer
upgrades. Additional improvements such as installing new feeder lines and completing
substation upgrades also may be needed. At the very least, new electrical upgrades for a new
transformer cost approximately $20-30,000."11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 1-3]
11 Idaho Transportation Department, "2022 State of Idaho Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Baseline Plan" at
38 (August 1, 2022), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/id_nevi_plan.pdf.
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Indiana cites that "Utilities estimated investment between $50,000 to $125,000 to
serve 600kW per station with locations requiring significant system upgrades totaling greater
than $1 million. Upgrades could include new transformers, trenching, concrete/asphalt work,
conduit, underground vaults, new conductor, and other miscellaneous equipment to serve the
DCFC. Respondents expressed they would not deny an installation from proceeding. However,
as expressed above, costs may be prohibitive for the prospective customer at certain
locations." 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 1-3]
12 Indiana Department of Transportation, "Indiana Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plan" at 37
(July 29, 2022), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/in_nevi_plan.pdf.
These utility costs may not be borne solely by individual customers; in some cases, these
costs will ultimately be passed on to ratepayers. EPA fails to acknowledge these costs and fails
to assess the cumulative cost burden resulting from the concurrent increase in electrical demand
resulting from implementing the proposed LMD vehicle rule in the same time frame it seeks to
force electrification of the heavy-duty vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 1-3]
EPA should evaluate the merits of all fuels and vehicle technologies on a full lifecycle basis.
For example, EPA states that "[i]n December 2022, Toyota announced plans to introduce 30
BEV models by 2030". 125 But EPA's Proposed Rule should also meaningfully consider
following statements from Toyota in the same announcement: 126 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 25-27]
125 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29191 (citing to Toyota Motor Corporation, "Video: Media Briefing on
Battery EV Strategies," Press Release, December 14, 2021. Accessed on December 14, 2021).
126 Toyota Motor Corporation, "Video: Media Briefing on Battery EV Strategies," Press Release,
December 14, 2021 (emphasis added).
"We are living in a diversified world and in an era in which it is hard to predict the
future. Therefore, it is difficult to make everyone happy with a one-size-fits-all option. That is
why Toyota wants to prepare as many options as possible for our customers around the world."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
"If the energy that powers vehicles is not clean, the use of an electrified vehicle, no
matter what type it might be, would not result in zero C02 emissions." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
Moreover, in April 2023, Toyota sent its dealers a "Hybrid Memo" pointing out that "There
are three major barriers to widespread battery electric vehicle adoption in the United States" -
critical minerals, charging infrastructure, and affordability. Noting that the amount of raw
materials in one BEV could be used to make 6 PHEV or 90 hybrid electric vehicles, the memo
concludes that "An 'all of the above' electrification strategy is the bridge to get us to lower
overall carbon emissions." 127 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
127 https://jalopnik.eom/toyota-focusing-on-hybrids-not-electric-vehicles-1850440908
EPA also cites to a July 2021 Stellantis announcement regarding its "intensified focus on
electrification across all of its brands." 128 Yet, EPA does not consider qualifying statements like
those made by Stellantis CEO Carlos Tavares in May 2022, in which he stated that he expects a
shortage of EV batteries by 2024-2025, followed by a lack of raw materials for the vehicles by
2027-2028.129 Mr. Tavares has also provided that "[y]ou'll see that the electrification path,
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which is a very ambitious one, in a time window that has been set by the administrations is going
to bump on the supply side". 130 Further, in response to EPA's proposed rule, Chrysler parent
Stellantis has said it remains "committed to reducing vehicle emissions," adding "we are
surprised that none of the alternatives align with the President's previously announced target of
50% EVs by 2030 "131 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
128 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29191(citing to Stellantis, "Stellantis Intensifies Electrification While
Targeting Sustainable Double-Digit Adjusted Operating Income Margins in the Mid-Term," Press Release,
July 8, 2021).
129 Reuters, "Automotive industry faces long term battery, raw material supply issues, Tavares says" (May
10, 2022) https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/automotive-industry-faces-long-term-
battery-raw-material-supply-issues-tavares-2022-05-10/ (emphasis added).
130 Wayland, Michael, "Stellantis CEO warns of electric vehicle battery shortage, followed by lack of raw
materials (May 24, 2022) https://www.cnbc.eom/2022/05/24/stellantis-ceo-warns-of-ev-battery-shortage-
lack-of-raw-materials.html.
131 Root, Al, "Car Makers Don't Love EPA's EV Plan. Here's What Ford, GM, and Others Are Saying,
Barrons (April 13, 2023) https://www.barrons.com/articles/ev-epa-emissions-what-auto-makers-say-
9abaedd6?ns=prod/accounts-barrons.
Further, EPA provides that "in January 2021, General Motors announced plans to become
carbon neutral by 2040, including an effort to shift its light-duty vehicles entirely to zero-
emissions by 2035."132 Yet GM's 10-K filed in January 2023 caveats that: 133 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
132 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29190 (citing to General Motors, "General Motors, the Largest U.S.
Automaker, Plans to be Carbon Neutral by 2040,'' Press Release, January 28, 2021).
133 GM's 10-K Annual Report for the 2022 Fiscal Year, https://investor.gm.com/static-files/54bdb095-
143e-4b96-b6d5-25937910b59c (emphasis added).
"[A]ny increase in the cost, or reduced availability, of critical materials for our EV propulsion
systems, including lithium, nickel, cobalt and certain rare earth metals, could lead to higher
production costs for our EVs and could impede our ability to successfully deliver on our EV
strategy. Further, increasing global demand for, and uncertain supply of, such materials could
disrupt our or our suppliers' ability to obtain such materials in a timely manner and/or could lead
to increased costs. Geopolitical risk, fluctuations in supply and demand, fluctuations in interest
rates, any weakening of the U.S. dollar and other economic and political factors have created and
may continue to create pricing pressure for commodities, raw materials and other inputs." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
GM's 10-K further disclosed that its "business in China subjects [it] to unique operational,
competitive and regulatory risks" and that "[i]ncreased competition, continued U.S.-China trade
tensions or weakening economic conditions in China, among other factors, may result in cost
increases, price reductions, reduced sales, profitability and margins, and challenges to gaining or
holding market share." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
Other auto-manufacturers have similar views. In response to EPA's proposed rule, a Hyundai
spokesperson provided that "[t]he proposed vehicle emission rules released by EPA will be
challenging to meet and will require further expansion of charging infrastructure, consumer
incentives and supply chains". 134 Regarding Tesla, after stating that the BEV manufacturer aims
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to produce 20 million EVs per year before 2030,135 CEO Elon Musk clarified that Tesla's target
is an "aspiration, not a promise ... we may stumble and not reach that goal". 136 In June 2022,
Elon Musk further stated that "[b]oth [of Tesla's] Berlin and Austin factories are gigantic money
furnaces right now. It's like a giant roaring sound, which is the sound of money on fire". 137
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
134 Root, Al, "Car Makers Don't Love EPA's EV Plan. Here's What Ford, GM, and Others Are Saying,
Barrons (April 13, 2023) https://www.barrons.com/articles/ev-epa-emissions-what-auto-makers-say-
9abaedd6?ns=prod/accounts-barrons.
135 Dean, Grace, "Elon Musk says Tesla will 'probably' make 20 million electric vehicles a year by 2030
- more than 50 times what it produced last year" (Sep. 28, 2020) https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-
musk-tesla-likely-20-million-electric-vehicles-year-2030-2020-9.
136 See https://www.ft.com/content/fbe8843e-ld2e-4a25-bce8-dcf77304fc37 (emphasis added).
137 Ohnsman, Alan, "Musk Calls Tesla's Berlin, Austin Plans 'Money Furnaces' Amid Startup Snags"
(June 22, 2022) https://www.forbes.com/sites/alanohnsman/2022/06/22/musk-calls-teslas-berlin-austin-
plants-money-furnaces-amid-startup-snags/?sh=720166b56adl.
C. EPA's consideration of ZEV infrastructure is inadequate and insufficient.
As described in Valero's comments on EPA's Heavy Duty Vehicle ("HDV") Phase 3
proposal, 149 EPA has not adequately assessed and accounted for ZEV infrastructure readiness.
EPA's LMDV proposal similarly neglects an honest and accurate assessment of ZEV
infrastructure readiness. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 30-31]
149 Comments of Valero Energy Corporation, June 16, 2023, posted at
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985-1566
As EPA acknowledges in the preamble, auto manufacturers have pointed out that charging
infrastructure must be addressed in addition to the technological feasibility of making electric
vehicles. 150 EPA seems to assume that the "powerful incentives" provided by IRA funding are
sufficient to address this issue. However, because IRA credits are intended to expand charging
access in low-income and rural communities, they are not available to incentivize charger
installation in urban areas or in areas exceeding certain average-income or poverty-rate
thresholds. 151 Further, while the BIL provides $7.5B in funding for the National Electric
Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program, this level of funding is not remotely sufficient
to address the cumulative $53-127B investment needed to support growth from approximately
3.1 million charging ports in 2022 to estimated 28 million charging ports needed by 2030.152
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 30-31]
150 Proposed Rule at 29341.
151 https://www.evconnect.com/blog/the-impact-of-inflation-on-ev-charging;
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2022/08/ev-charging-station-tax-credits-are-back
152 National Renewable Energy Laboratory, "The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S.
Light-Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure," June 2023, available at
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy23osti/85654.pdf.
Further, EPA does not consider the impact of charger performance and consumer experience
on consumer acceptance of electric vehicles. A report by the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (NREL) on electric vehicle charging infrastructure development notes that "This
analysis envisions a future national charging network that is strategic in locating the right amount
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of charging, in the right locations, with appropriate charging speeds. However, this vision is
irrelevant if the public concludes that charging infrastructure is ultimately unreliable. Even if a
relatively small amount of infrastructure fails drivers, this could negatively impact the public's
perception of electric mobility." 153 There is good reason for NREL to raise this concern. A
national survey of 26,500 charging attempts at Level 2 and Level 3 public stations found that
20% failed to obtain a charge. 154 Common reasons for failure included software glitches,
payment processing errors, and vandalism. In 75% of the failures, the charger was out of service.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 31]
Footnote 153: Id.
154 Hannah Lutz, "Negative Charge: One in Five Charging Attempts Failed in 2022, JD Power Data
Shows," Automotive News, February 13, 2023.
This type of consumer frustration may cause drivers who initially purchase electric vehicles to
return to ICE vehicles, a phenomenon known as "discontinuance." For example, a 2021 UC
Davis study found that approximately 20% of California drivers who bought a BEV between
2023 and 2018 replaced that vehicle with an ICE vehicle. Seventy percent of those drivers cited
lack of access to charging infrastructure as a basis for their decision. 155 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, p. 31]
155 Hardmand, S., Tal, G."Understanding discontinuance among California's electric vehicle owners."
Nature Energy 6, 538-545 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-021-00814-9
Despite these indications that both the availability and the performance of charging stations
may be a significant impact on consumers' willingness to purchase or to keep EVs, EPA does
not consider the limitations of charging infrastructure in determining that the proposed rule is
feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 31]
E. EPA does not adequately consider potential grid reliability impacts.
As part of its evaluation of potential economic impacts to the welfare of Americans and
businesses, EPA must assess grid reliability impacts stemming from the proposed rule's forced
electrification of the LD and MD transportation sector. Reliance on BEVs may have unintended,
negative consequences, especially in relation to the electricity generation sector. In addition,
EPA needs to accurately predict the number of additional chargers that will be needed to support
the anticipated BEV population. At present, charging infrastructure is inadequate to meet the
country's transportation needs.227 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 41-42]
227 See JD Power, "2023 U.S. Electric Vehicle Consideration (EVC) Study," June 15, 2023, and JD
Power, "2023 U.S. Electric Vehicle Experience (EVX) Home Charging Study," March 16, 2023.
EPA should also consider the effects of the proposal on electricity prices, as low-income
populations often spend a larger percentage of their earnings on essential utilities compared to
the rest of the United States. Reliance on electric vehicles has been shown to spur increases in
load and demand during peak periods, which impact electricity prices. Because EPA lacks
expertise in the area of electrical grid management and economics, EPA should consult with
other agencies and credible experts in these areas in order to adequately evaluate these
impacts.304 EPA should ensure that the proposal meets reliability and affordability criteria and
helps EJ communities make informed decisions about their own energy needs. Additionally,
EPA's EJ assessment fails to acknowledge the likelihood that many owners will lack access to
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residential charging, which will substantially increase their operating expenses. Consistent
reliance on fast charging also shortens electric vehicle battery life, resulting in a need to replace
the battery and/or the vehicle more frequently. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
304 See, West Virginia, 142 S.Ct. at 2612-13 (stating that EPA admitted that opining on trends in
electricity transmission, distribution, and storage requires technical and policy expertise not traditionally
needed in EPA regulatory development and finding that there is little reason to think Congress assigned
such decisions to the EPA).
If EJ is truly a commitment for EPA, it should carefully consider criticisms like those leveled
by The Two Hundred, which point out the disproportionate impacts to working and minority
communities as a result of California's climate approach regarding electrified transport; those
impacts and concerns remain true, and indeed are magnified under the proposed standards.305
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
305 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, The Two Hundred for Homeownership, et al. v. California Air Resources
Board, et al., No. 1:22-CV-01474.
It is critical from the outset to design standards to minimize the potential for price shocks and
supply disruptions. As written, the proposal ultimately benefits electric vehicle manufacturers at
the expense of disadvantaged communities by subsidizing unaffordable transportation that is not
fit for the purposes of commuting to and from EJ communities. At minimum, EPA should
perform a thorough EJ assessment specific to its LDV proposal that is comprehensive of both
transport challenges and impacts faced by EJ stakeholders and the government-wide Justice40
Initiative [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
The average purchase price of EV cars in 2022 was approximately $65,000, which is more
than what 46 percent of American households earn in income in a year.306 While the average
"used" EV sold for $42,895 in March of 2023.307 While EPA's DRIA anecdotally indicates that
"emerging consensus suggests that purchase price parity is likely to occur by the mid-2020's for
some vehicle segments and models"308, Ford CEO Jim Farley told attendees at its 2023 Capital
Markets Days that EV cost parity may not come until after 2030.309 Moreover US auto makers
are focusing their efforts on producing higher priced electric SUVs and trucks, including Fords
$100,000 F150 Lightening Platinum310 and GM's announcement that its luxury brands, Cadillac
and Buick, will be its first all-electric product lineups.311 While smaller EV's like the Chevy
Bolt, touted by the Biden Administration as being affordable alternatives, are being
discontinued.312 The reality is that most middle-and lower-income families simply cannot afford
to purchase a new or used EV, even when taking into account available tax incentives and
rebates. In fact, middle - and lower -income families are more likely to purchase older used
vehicle, due to their lower upfront costs, and to hold onto those vehicles for longer periods.313
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 56-57]
306 Kelly Blue Book and Cox Automotive Average Transaction Prices Reports; and Average, Median, Top
1% and all United States Household Income Percentiles, DQYJD
307 What to know about buying a used electric vehicle as more hit the auto sale market, CNBC, May 21,
2023
308 EPA DRIA, 3.1.3.1,4-15
309 Ford CEO says EV cost parity may not come until after 2030, Reuters, May 31, 2023
310 https://www.ford.com/trucks/fl50/fl50-lightning/models/
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311 Cadillac and Buick will be GM's first all-EV brands, Automotive News, July 1, 2022
312 GM Killed the Chevy Bolt-and the dream of a small, affordable EV, The Verge, April 26, 2023
313 Supporting Lower-Income Households' Purchase of Clean Vehicles: Implications From California-
wide Survey Results, UCLA Luskin Center for Innovation, 2020
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
Transformation to e-mobility requires a supporting ecosystem
Volkswagen is fully committed to electrification. However, there are concerns about the
current market and subsequent market response. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 2]
The prerequisite to achieving ambitious EV sales targets is a supporting EV ecosystem,
including as a priority, a comprehensive, interoperable and integrated charging infrastructure
network across the U.S. Investment is needed to make high power charging available along all
interstates, provide charging solutions in metropolitan areas with limited off street parking, and
provide high-speed charging at destination locations, rural areas and in the workplace. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 2]
Range anxiety remains one of the prime customer concerns. To improve customer acceptance,
Volkswagen suggests that EV penetration targets be linked to EV infrastructure rollout.
Volkswagen recommends that the Biden Administration introduce a comparable approach to the
approved EU Alternative Fuel Infrastructure Directive. Owning and using an electric vehicle
must be comparable to owning an ICE vehicle, with no charging concerns and no cost of
ownership concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 2]
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
Refueling Time: EPA makes the unfounded claim that the benefits of the rule will include,
".. .the value of reduced refueling time needed to refuel vehicles" (p. 29199) Assuming ".. .time
spent refueling vehicles would be reduced due to the lower fuel consumption of new vehicles,
(p. 29200) is simply absurd. EPA seems to be willfully twisting the well-know disadvantage of
long EV charging times. Whereas an ICEV takes a matter of minutes to refuel, charging times
can be over an hour. Even fast charging stations, if available without a long wait due to their
scarcity, require 30 minutes for 125 miles and an hour for 250 miles, well in excess of ICEV
refueling times but with vastly less range.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 5-6]
9 "How Long Does It Take to Charge an Electric Car?", J.D. Power, March 26, 2020.
Limited charging infrastructure could drag refueling times to hours beyond what is needed by
the driver. Further, were EPA's projection that 67% of new sales of light-duty and 46% of
medium-duty vehicles will be EVs by 2032 attained, the strain on the grid would mean
governments and utilities would likely enforce refueling times after hours, well past when a
driver would need. Californians, just days after learning of the state's ban on ICEVs by 2035,
were asked not to charge their EVs during the peak hours of 4 - 9pm because of the strain on the
grid. 10 Rather than being a benefit, EPA should consider how this rule would limit Americans
mobility, as limited electricity capacity would cause drivers to run out of fuel when they need it
for vital activities such as driving to work and school while making long roadtrips impractical.
For example, the Wisconsin Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (WEVI) plan includes
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comprehensive state strategies and actions to facilitate the electrification of Wisconsin's
transportation system.2 The plan also assesses potential agency efforts to advance electrification
and the deployment of electric vehicle
charging infrastructure. These actions, in concert with additional federal investments, will help
support the growing demand for electrified vehicles in the state. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0507, p. 2]
2 Available at: https://wisconsindot.gov/Pages/projects/multimodal/electrification.aspx
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
Recent trends suggest charging deployment is keeping pace with vehicle deployment. The
Department of Energy's Alternative Fuels Data Center has mapped over 139,000 individual
charging ports across 54,100 public EV charging stations in the U.S.-and that doesn't include at-
home charging where a majority of charging occurs. Coupled with the $7.5 billion in federal IRA
investments to expand our national charging network and billions of dollars in private capital
means we're well on track today to meet the EV charging needs of tomorrow. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, p. 2]
SmartCharge New York Managed Charging Case Study
In 2017, Con Edison launched SmartCharge New York program with the goal of instilling
grid-beneficial charging behavior in parallel with the upswing in electric vehicle adoption. The
goal was to influence driver behavior at the inflection point of transitioning from combustion-
engine fueling to electric battery charging and have drivers default to grid-optimizing charging
activity. Program participants received a free cellular-enabled device that plugs into the vehicle's
diagnostic port that allowed Con Edison to track time, energy, and power consumed when
charging in the utility's service territory. Incentives encourage drivers to 1) avoid charging
during the system peak (2 PM to 6 PM) during summer weekdays from June to September, and
2) charge overnight from 12 AM to 8 AM. Incentives were initially paid off-bill through gift
cards to the customer's business of choice, such as Amazon, Starbucks, or Home Depot. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 56]
As electric vehicle adoption continues to rise, managing charging behavior will grow
increasingly important in maintaining a healthy and reliable grid. Since its inception, the
SmartCharge New York program has evolved to meet customer needs and program objectives.
Starting in 2023 for example, the program was overhauled to allow participation through a
mobile application and payments are now issued through Venmo or Paypal, in line with
participant feedback. This shift also changed the way the program collects data, favoring more
cost-effective vehicle onboard telematics or networked electric vehicle supply equipment such as
a Wi-Fi-enabled charger or charging cable. This enables the program to scale efficiently with the
market and give a greater number of drivers insight into their behavior and how that activity
translates to incentive earnings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 56]
In light of the EPA announcement of its heavy-duty and light/medium-duty proposed
emissions standards, Con Edison released the following statement: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, pp. 56-57]
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"Con Edison applauds the Environmental Protection Agency's efforts to rev up the market for
electric vehicles, which will improve the air in the communities we serve and help in the fight
against climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 56-57]
A rapid shift to mass EV adoption looks more achievable all the time, with vehicle options
expanding and new charging stations being built across New York City and Westchester County,
including locations that serve the needs of disadvantaged communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, pp. 56-57]
Con Edison will continue to support the EV market's development through investment in the
grid and by offering a range of programs, from incenting new chargers to managing the grid
impact by rewarding drivers for charging overnight "219 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp.
56-57]
219 "Con Edison Supports Effort to Encourage Electric Vehicle Adoption," Con Edison Media Relations,
(April 12, 2023) https://www.coned.com/en/about-us/media-center/news/2023/04-12/con-edison-supports-
effort-to-encourage-electri c-vehicle-adoption
5. SRP
When EVs were still in the early stages of adoption, SRP recognized the importance of
exploring ways to identify EV households and analyze their charging behavior in order to help
prepare for greater EV uptake in the future. It was also important to begin engaging customers
who were EV drivers in order to understand their interests and their charging patterns and assess
ways to influence charging behaviors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
In 2014, SRP launched "EV Community" (EVC)—a program that offers customers a $50 bill
credit for each EV they register (up to two vehicles per household)—as a means to incentivize
EV drivers to identify themselves and engage with SRP. Participants provide basic information
about the electric vehicle and the type of charger they use. This provides a way for SRP to learn
more about EV customers and their charging behavior and needs while offering them an
incentive to help support EV growth in the region. There are currently more than 7,500
customers enrolled in the program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
While EVC members only account for a small number of total EV households, they are a fair
overall representation of the EV customer base since all price plans are included, as well as
households with one vs. two EVs. The program offers SRP a good platform for analysis,
including the type of cars they drive (PHEV, BEV, brand, etc.) and the charge levels they use. In
addition, SRP found that EVC members are willing to share information and are eager to
participate in future pilot programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
The EVC program also provides SRP with a method and channel to promote their Electric
Vehicle Price Plan, a special time-of-use pricing plan which offers EV drivers the most
opportunity to save on EV charging costs by charging during super off-peak times (between 11
PM and 5 AM). Load research has shown that this program has been highly effective at shifting
EV charging loads away from peak periods. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
The EVC program has helped SRP plan and prepare the grid for widespread EV adoption by
enabling them to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
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-Anticipate load growth. A pilot study with EVC members that monitors their EV driving and
charging behavior through data telematics devices enables SRP to estimate typical consumption
and charging load profiles per EV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
-Understand the impacts of EV charging on the grid. EVC data is used to model the impacts
of EV charging on the electric grid, identify when transformers and wires may need to be
upgraded, and understand when and how customers need to charge. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, pp. 57-58]
-Recruit for Managed Charging pilot programs. The EVC program and channel have enabled
SRP to recruit participants for additional Managed Charging pilot programs to test other active
control technologies to control EV charging load on the grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
pp. 57-58]
-Survey participants for insights. EVC members are surveyed regularly to get more data on
their charging behaviors, including their use of home, workplace, and public charging and their
satisfaction with EVs overall. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
-Engagement. EVC participants receive regular newsletters and other communications with
EV-related information. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
In addition to fleet charging, the site will also function as an innovation hub, allowing Duke
Energy to collect data around charger use, performance, management, and energy integration
with various generation resources. It will also allow for the development of managed charging
algorithms for fleets connected to the bulk power system or integrated with renewables and
storage—which can be utilized to minimize the upgrades needed to the distribution system,
easing the transition to electrifying fleets. Identifying EV charging technologies and how they
may be used to power any type of fleet with vehicles (ranging from class 1) will help develop a
model to show the industry a clear, integrated, and cost-effective path to fleet electrification.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 59]
Duke Energy is teaming up with Daimler Truck North America and Electrada on this
important work. Electrada, an electric fuel solutions company, is providing funding for research
and demonstration efforts. For fleets seeking to electrify, Electrada invests all required capital
"behind the meter" and delivers reliable charging to the fleet's electric vehicles through a
performance contract, eliminating the complexity and risk that fleets face in transitioning to this
new source of fuel. Electrada's investment in the depot allows Duke Energy to focus on
programs that simplify adoption for electric fleet customers and distribution system performance
to support the predictable addition of electric load over time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
p. 59]
By the end of 2023, fleet operators will be able to experience a best-in-class, commercial-
grade fleet depot integrated with energy storage, solar, and optimization software. Moving to
zero-emission vehicles in this sector allows North Carolina to seize the large economic potential
of the transition and generate billions in net benefits for the state. Projects like Duke Energy's
fleet performance center will be key for fleet owners across the state to take advantage of the
cost savings of transitioning to electric vehicles. That said, fleet owners exploring electrification
should engage their electricity provider early and often to identify and address site-specific
considerations. As fleet electrification accelerates, it will be important for electricity providers
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and policymakers to identify best practices to proactively plan for fleet electrification, including
readying the distribution grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 59]
6. Duke Energy
Electric fleet commitments are increasing as companies with ambitious sustainability goals
work to decarbonize operations. Fleet owners are also seeking ways to take advantage of the cost
savings available by transitioning to EVs. However, programs for fleet electrification and
managed charging options are still limited to date. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 58-59]
When transitioning to an electric fleet, it is important that fleet managers understand the full
scope of charging multiple vehicles while maintaining fleet operations and that larger MHDVs
bring with them additional factors to consider. Fleet owners who have electrified fleets without
consulting experts or an electric provider have likely been experiencing avoidable operational
and technological issues. Long-term energy cost and performance risk are also potential issues
for fleets and can hinder mainstream fleet electrification technology development if not managed
correctly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 58-59]
Duke Energy's significant experience and large customer base make it well-positioned to
design and implement fleet electrification and charging programs. Duke Energy is building a
first-of-its-kind performance center that will model and accelerate the development, testing, and
deployment of zero-emission light-, medium-, and heavy-duty commercial electric vehicle EV
fleets. The site will be located in North Carolina at Duke Energy's Mount Holly Technology and
Innovation Center and incorporate microgrid integration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp.
58-59]
The fleet electrification center will provide a commercial-grade charging experience for fleet
customers evaluating or launching electrification strategies—reinforcing reliability, clean power,
and optimization by integrating solar, storage, and microgrid controls software applications. The
center will be connected to both the Duke Energy grid—charging from the bulk electric
system—and to 100% carbon-free resources through the microgrid located at Mount Holly. This
project is the first electric fleet depot to offer a microgrid charging option. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, pp. 58-59]
7. Xcel Energy
Xcel Energy is committed to electrifying all of its light-duty fleet and 30% of its medium-and
heavy-duty fleet by 2030, equating to over 2,500 EVs. It's part of their vision to be a net-zero
energy provider by 2050 and enable one out of five vehicles to be electric in the areas they serve
by 2030. This will save customers $1 billion annually on fuel by 2030 and deliver cleaner air for
everyone. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 59-60]
With a fleet that includes iconic bucket trucks, all-terrain service vehicles, and a host of
pickup trucks and pool cars across eight states, achieving these goals will be no small feat, but an
important one. There are notable hurdles, yet evolving technology presents solutions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 59-60]
Electrifying the Marquee Fleet Vehicle
Xcel Energy is the first electric provider in the nation to add an all-electric bucket truck to its
fleet. The truck features two electric sources: one for the drivetrain and one for the lift
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mechanism. It has a 135-mile driving range and can operate the bucket for an entire workday on
a single charge. Crews are collecting data from real working conditions in Minnesota and
Colorado that will be used to inform further improvement to the vehicle's technology and
operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 59-60]
Optimizing Charging to Minimize Grid Impacts
To support a growing electric fleet, over 1,200 EV chargers must be brought into service by
2030, which will result in an electric load increase of 71 megawatts. Charge management
techniques enable low-cost charging for this growing electric fleet. It's a sophisticated approach
to optimize charging times by using time-of-day and grid demand efficiencies and builds on the
expertise Xcel Energy has developed through offering managed charging programs to customers
in multiple states. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 59-60]
For fleets, overnight charging schedules make the most sense. Demand and rates are lower,
and renewable wind sources are ample at that time. Yet, fast charging outside of these time
periods may be required to help larger vehicles make it through a workday. This is when
charging schedules need to be customized and highly specific. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
pp. 59-60]
d. Charging Infrastructure
Although the majority of charging needs will be ultimately met through at-home or near-home
charging, a fully electrified transportation system will also require a robust public charging
network—one which the sector is already deploying. As of June 2023, there were 140,000
individual Level 2 and DC fast charging ports across 54,000 public EV charging stations in the
U.S.224 A 2022 study by McKinsey & Company projected that the U.S. will need 1.2 million
public EV charging stations to accommodate forecasted EV deployments by 2030.225 A more
recent June 2023 NREL study226 analyzed U.S. progress towards building out an accessible
network of public EV chargers and found that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 62-63]
224 U.S. Department of Energy's Alternative Fuels Data Center, accessed June 23, 2023
https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity _locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC
225 "Building the electric-vehicle charging infrastructure America needs," McKinsey & Company, (April
18, 2022) https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/building-the-electric-
vehicle-charging-infrastructure-america-needs
226 "The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle
Charging Infrastructure," National Renewable Energy Laboratory, (June 2023)
https://driveelectric.gOv/files/2030-charging-network.pdf
-The United States is on track to install a network of 1.2 million public chargers by 2030,
keeping up with rapidly growing demand for EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 62-63]
-Of the 1.2 million charging ports, about 1 million are expected to be Level 2 charging,
providing convenient, low-cost charging to meet a variety of daily needs, with the remaining
charging ports being DC fast chargers that are critical to driver confidence and longer distance
travel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 62-63]
-Building out a public charging network will require between $31 and $55 billion of
cumulative public and private capital investment and will help unlock hundreds of billions of
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dollars of consumer savings from reduced fuel and maintenance costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, pp. 62-63]
As discussed further below, industry is continuing to rapidly build out EV charging capacity
both as a result of private investment and with support from billions of dollars in federal funding.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 62-63]
Strong EPA LMDV emissions standards that encourage vehicle manufacturers to transition to
EVs sends market signals to the charging industry that provide the certainty needed to make
proactive infrastructure and manufacturing investments. [EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0638, pp.
62-63]
i. EVSE Manufacturer and Operator Statements on EPA Standards
As discussed, robust LMDV emissions standards encourage vehicle manufacturers to
transition to EVs, which in turn sends market signals to the charging industry that provide the
certainty needed to make proactive infrastructure and manufacturing investments. A clearer
picture of future electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) demand enables manufacturers and
network operators to plan and allocate capital accordingly. Below are statements by ZETA's
EVSE providers in response to EPA's announcement of these proposed standards: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 63-64]
-"EVgo applauds the EPA for proposing ambitious tailpipe emissions standards. These
standards would accelerate the transition to electric vehicles and result in cleaner air, healthier
communities, and create jobs across the country. More EVs demands more EV charging and we
will continue to expand our fast charging network to provide the infrastructure to support the
growing EV market."227 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 63-64]
-ChargePoint on EPA emissions standards: "This proposal, in addition to state and federal
funding programs like NEVI, will undoubtedly lead to more investment in EVs and chargers.
Over our 15 year history, we have ensured charging infrastructure deployment kept pace with
EV adoption, and we are well-positioned to meet the increased demand these standards will
generate."228 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 63-64]
-ChargePoint on EPA emissions standards: "As EV charging infrastructure buildout
continues, more EV models become available and regulatory efforts ramp up, EV adoption will
continue to grow rapidly and ChargePoint will be there to support drivers who need a charge. We
see ambitious regulations like these as an opportunity, not a barrier, to sustainable business
growth, and we will continue working with policymakers to ensure that policy helps individuals,
businesses and the environment alike."229 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 63-64]
227 EVGo onLinkedln, accessed May 10, 2023 https://www.linkedin.com/posts/evgo_biden-
administration-proposes-toughest-auto-activity-70544878136810 25024-gCcO/
228 ChargePoint on Linkedln, accessed June 26, 2023 https://www.linkedin.com/posts/chargepoint_biden-
harris-administration-proposes-strongest-ever-activity-70522887 57399441408-xX54/
229 "New EPA vehicle emissions regulations to accelerate EV production, adoption and infrastructure,"
ChargePoint, (May 18, 2023) https://chargepoint.com/blog/new-epa-vehicle-emissions-regulations-
accelerate-ev-production-adoption-and-infrastructure
ii. Impacts to EVSE Deployment from BIL and IRA Programs
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With over $7.5 billion available across multiple programs, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law
represents the nation's largest ever investment in increasing Americans' access to EV chargers.
Through the BIL's $5 billion National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program,
the federal government is partnering with private industry to build out a national charging
network along key highway corridors. As of September 2022, the Federal Highway
Administration approved formal plans submitted by all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico and as of June 2023, multiple states had released requests for proposals from
organizations seeking access to NEVI funds. The design of these state application processes
through the NEVI Formula Program will help drive EVSE standardization, which will in turn
improve reliability and consistency in the consumer-facing charging experience. Separately, the
BIL's Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program allocates another
$2.5 billion towards installing EV chargers in communities where people live and work. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 64-65]
As charging deployment continues to increase, the distribution of this network, not just its
size, risks limiting electrification—especially in rural areas. In response, the Biden-Harris
Administration has taken a comprehensive approach to EVSE build-out, recognizing the diverse
demographics, landscapes, and types of communities throughout the United States. Ubitquity and
visibility are important components of a national EVSE network deployment. The Department of
Transportation has put together separate toolkits to guide EVSE deployment in both urban230
and rural231 areas. Both toolkits go through an explanation of electric mobility basics, as well as
the benefits and challenges that are specific to individuals, communities, and transit operators in
their respective region types. Both expand on public-private partnership opportunities, as well as
best practices for early planning and financing. With respect to EVSE, DOT has identified three
levels of EVSE planning: community, corridor, and site. These toolkits are intended to guide
private, state, and local entities as they implement federal funding and engage in other equitable,
thorough EVSE deployment strategies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 64-65]
230 "Charging Forward: A Toolkit for Planning and Funding Urban Electric Mobility Infrastructure," U.S.
Department of Transportation, (June 2023) https://www.transportation.gov/urban-e-mobility-toolkit
231 "Charging Forward: A Toolkit for Planning and Funding Rural Electric Mobility Infrastructure," U.S.
Department of Transportation, (June 2023) https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit
The tax credits provided in the Inflation Reduction Act, specifically the Alternative Fuel
Vehicle Refueling Property Tax Credit232 are critical to helping ensure the continued
availability of products necessary for a fully-electrified transportation sector. By targeting
investments toward rural and lower-income residents, the credit incentivizes individuals and
commercial operators to install charging stations at their homes and private entities. Retailers,
local businesses, or commercial fleet operators can also utilize the credit to offset the costs of
installing charging infrastructure on their property, enabling them to attract and retain customers.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 65]
232 See 26 U.S.C. § 30C
Taken together, the funding in the NEVI and CFI programs under the BIL and the Alternative
Fuel Vehicle Refueling Property Tax Credit in the IRA will lead to significant buildout of EV
charging in communities, at homes and businesses, and along high-traffic highway corridors.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 65]
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iii. Recent Trends in Public EVSE Deployment
The number of chargers in the U.S.—public, private, and residential— is on track for rapid
growth in the next several years. To meet the Administration's goal of deploying 500,000
chargers by 2030, the U.S. Department of Energy's Alternative Fuels Data Center (AFDC) notes
that the deployment rate will have to significantly increase. As discussed, public funding is
helping to spur deployments, while private investment in public EV charging has increased
considerably in the last five years rising from under $200 million in 2017 to nearly $13 billion by
early 2023.233 As the national EVSE network expands, growth tracked by the AFDC found that
between 2015 and 2020, the number of EVSE ports in the U.S. more than doubled and in 2021
the number of ports grew 55% year-over-year.234 This is growth that occurred before the
impacts of both the IRA and BIL took effect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 65-66]
233 "Investment in Publicly Accessible EV Charging in the United States," (2023) Atlas Public Policy
https://atlaspolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Investment-in-Publicly-Accessible-EV-Charging.pdf
234 "Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Trends," Alternative Fuels Data Center,
https ://afdc. energy. gov/fuels/electricity_infrastructure_trends .html
Even without incentives, EV charging has generally kept pace with the rollout of EV
deployment, as shown in Figure 9 below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 65-66]
[See original comment for Figure 9. Trends in Light-Duty EV Deployment vs. Public
Charging Infrastructure Deployment]235,236 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 65-66]
235 "LDV Total Sales of PEV and HEVby Month (updated through March 2023)," Argonne National
Laboratory, (March 2023) https://www.anl.gov/sites/www/files/2023-
04/Total%20Sales%20for%20Website_Marc h2023_0.pdf
236 U.S. Department of Energy Alternative Fuels Data Center, accessed May 2, 2023
https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10964
Deployments of both LDEVs and charging infrastructure have followed an upward growth
trajectory in recent years. Deployments of both products are well correlated with a value of 0.982
between light-duty vehicles and EVSE ports. As such, recent trends suggest that charging
infrastructure should not be a limiting factor in expanded EV deployment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, pp. 65-66]
As a national public charging network continues to take shape, there are multiple efforts
underway to help EV drivers locate and access charging infrastructure. As mentioned previously,
the AFDC maintains a database of public charging stations with route-planning functionality
embedded in the tool.237 NREL recently announced the launch of an interactive map showing
EV charging locations near national parks.238 ZETA member Rivian is incorporating EV
charging locations into their vehicles' onboard display.239 Google Maps will now suggest
charging stops on shorter trips, include a 'very fast' filter for charging station searches, and will
show users in search results when a location has a charging station on-site.240 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, pp. 66-67]
237 U.S. Department of Energy Alternative Fuels Data Center, accessed May 2, 2023
https://afdc.energy.gOv/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/find/nearest7fueMiLEC
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238 "New Interactive Map Shows EV Charging Stations Near National Parks," National Renewable
Energy Laboratory, (April 2023) https://www.nrel.gov/news/program/2023/new-interactive-map-shows-ev-
charging-stations-near-national-parks.html
239 Rivian on Linkedln, accessed June 26, 2023 https://www.linkedin.com/posts/rivian_rivian-
adventurousforever-careersintech-activity-7077710678597238784-Yif P
240 Google is adding some new features for EVs with built-in Google Maps," The Verge, (February 8,
2023) https://www.theverge.eom/2023/2/8/23589724/google-maps-ev-charging-built-in-features
iv. Future State of EVSE Deployment
EVSE manufacturers and operators are regularly announcing investments to build out charger
manufacturing capacity to ensure customers can meet their residential charging needs as well as
publicly-accessible chargers for longer-duration trips. While many are detailed in the White
House EV Accelerator Challenge fact sheet,241 the ZETA members below have made the
following announcements: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 67-68]
241 Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Announces New Private and Public Sector Investments for
Affordable Electric Vehicles (April 17, 2023) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2023/04/17/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-a nnounces-new-private-and-public-sector-
investments-for-affordable-electric-vehicles/
-In January 2023, ZETA member ABB e-Mobility announced manufacturing operations in
Columbia, South Carolina. This will significantly reduce delivery and lead times for DC fast-
chargers in the U.S., enabling charging developers, owners, and operators to deploy reliable
chargers more quickly. Since 2010, ABB has invested $14 billion in the U.S. with plant
expansions, operational improvements, state-of-the-art equipment, products, and people, making
it the company's largest market. With approximately 20,000 employees in more than 40
manufacturing and distribution facilities, ABB is investing, growing, and serving across America
through industries that create jobs, encourage innovation, and achieve a more productive,
sustainable future.242 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 67-68]
-In April 2023, ZETA member Enel announced plans to add at least two million chargers,
including home systems, in North America by 2030.243 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp.
67-68]
-In April 2023, ZETA member Siemens announced the opening of its latest EV charger
manufacturing facility where the company will manufacture EV chargers specifically designed to
serve the U.S. market. The facility is the company's second U.S. EV charging manufacturing
hub and will contribute to the company's goal to build 1 million EV chargers for the U.S.
market. The new facility will support the creation of 100 new jobs at the site and across its
regional supply chain footprint. It will also be operated in part by Wyntron, an existing partner in
Siemens eMobility's manufacturing ecosystem.244 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 67-68]
-In April 2023, ZETA member FLO opened its first U.S. manufacturing facility in Auburn
Hills, Michigan. Available starting in 2024, the FLO Ultra charging stations can charge most
EVs to 80% in 15 minutes, depending on vehicle type, and are built to meet both NEVI and Buy
America requirements. FLO's Level 2 CoRe+ and CoRe+ MAX chargers are currently being
assembled at the facility as preparations for the production of FLO Ultra chargers are underway.
The chargers produced in Auburn Hills will contribute to the 250,000 chargers FLO plans to
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bring to the U.S. market by 2028. In that time span, FLO expects the facility to create and
support 730 jobs.245 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 67-68]
-In June 2023, SK Signet launched a new $15 million facility in Texas to expand EVSE
manufacturing. The factory is expected to produce ultra-fast chargers for over 10,000 EVs per
year, generating up to 183 jobs by 2026.246 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 67-68]
242 "ABB E-mobility begins production of EV chargers in South Carolina," ABB E-Mobility, (January 20,
2023) https://new.abb.com/news/detail/99073/abb-e-mobility-begins-production-of-ev-chargers-in-south-
Carolina
243 "Fast EV Chargers to Nearly Double on U.S. Highways Under Expansion Plan," The Wall Street
Journal, (April 13, 2023) https://www.wsj.eom/articles/italian-company-plans-10-000-fast-chargers-across-
u-s-to-meet-ev-demand-959fd 135? mod=panda_wsj_author_alert
244 "Siemens opens newest electric vehicle charging manufacturing hub in Carrollton, Texas," Siemens
eMobility, (April 24, 2023) https://new.siemens.com/us/en/company/press/press-releases/smart-
infrastructure/newest-siemens-electric-vehicle-mfg-charging-hub-carrollton-texas.html
245 "FLO, Governor Whitmer Announce New EV Charger Production at Auburn Hills Facility," FLO
Charging, (April 26, 2023) https://www.flo.com/news/flo-governor-whitmer-announce-new-ev-charger-
production-at-auburn-hills-facility/
246 "SK Signet's New EV Charger Manufacturing Facility Opens in Piano, Texas," The EV Report, (June
8, 2023) https://theevreport.com/sk-signets-new-ev-charger-manufacturing-facility-opens-in-plano-texas
From national retailers to local businesses, organizations are announcing their intent to host
charging infrastructure on their property, enabling them to attract and retain customers. In some
instances, these chargers could supplant at-home or curbside charging for certain individuals
where such chargers may be less accessible. The following announcements from recent months
indicate the benefits retailers see in becoming an EVSE site host: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, p. 68]
-In January 2023, TravelCenters of America announced it would be purchasing 1,000
Electrify America DC fast charging stations and plans to install them at 200 travel stops over the
next five years.247 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 68]
-In February 2023, bp announced plans to invest $1 billion in EV charging across the U.S. by
2030, helping to meet demand from Hertz's expanding EV rentals.248 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, p. 68]
247 "More Electrify America EV chargers are coming, this time at TravelAmerica rest stops," The Verge,
(January 30, 2023) https://www.theverge.com/2023/l/30/23577696/electrify-america-travelcenters-petro-
ev-dc-fast-chargers
248 "bp plans to invest $1 billion in EV charging across US by 2030, helping to meet demand from Hertz's
expanding EV rentals," Hertz Newsroom, (February 15, 2023) https://newsroom.hertz.com/news-
releases/news-release-details/bp-plans-invest-1 -billion-ev-charging-across-us-203 0-helping
-In February 2023, fast casual sandwich shop Subway announced plans to assist their
franchise owners with installing multiple stand alone fast charge stations for their customers at
multiple locations.249 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 69]
-In March 2023, ZETA member Uber and bp Pulse announced a new global mobility
agreement which will see the companies work together to help accelerate Uber's commitment to
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become a zero-tailpipe emissions mobility platform in the US, Canada and Europe by 2030 and
globally by 2040. Under the terms of the agreement, bp intends to offer bespoke deals to drivers
on the Uber platform that are tailored to each market, including providing incentives for them to
charge with bp pulse. The two companies will also explore working together on convenience and
fuel offers, bp has a global network of almost 21,000 branded retail sites that offer fuel as well as
food for now and for later with retail partners, and facilities such as toilets.250 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, p. 69]
-In March 2023, the convenience store 7-eleven launched its own EV fast charging network of
DC chargers called 7charge. Consumers who use 7charge will pay rates based on the energy they
consume or time spent charging, based on specific local regulations.251 Currently the company's
chargers are in Colorado, Florida, Texas, and California. The company is also planning to launch
a Maryland location soon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 69]
-In April 2023, Walmart announced plans to install new EV fast-charging stations at
thousands of Walmart and Sam's Club locations across the country. This would be in addition to
the almost 1,300 DC fast-charging stations already available at more than 280 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, p. 69]
U.S. facilities. With a store or club located within 10 miles of approximately 90% of
Americans, the company is uniquely positioned to deliver a charging option that will help make
EV ownership possible whether people live in rural, suburban or urban areas.252 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 69]
-In May 2023, Boston based LNG Electric, an EV charging technology company, announced
its plans to install Level 2 and DC charging stations at more than 13,000 hotels across the
U.S.253 The company intends to develop this infrastructure over the next five to six years with
the first chargers going in this past May. Ultimately, LNG Electric aims to create a charging
network that covers 10-15% of the US hospitality market. The company's first set of chargers
will be deployed at Hilton and Marriott hotels in Florida, Ohio, and Illinois. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, p. 69]
249 "The next hot fast food menu item? Electric car charging," Axios, (March 22, 2023)
https://www.axios.com/2023/03/22/electric-vehicle-charging-subway-7-eleven
250 "bp pulse and Uber team up on driver charging as EV momentum builds," Uber Newsroom, (March
31, 2023) https://www.uber.com/newsroom/uber-bp-charging-ahead/
251 "Introducing 7charge," 7-Eleven, accessed June 28, 2023 https://www.7-eleven.com/7charge
252 "Leading the Charge: Walmart Announces Plan To Expand Electric Vehicle Charging Network,"
Walmart Newsroom, (April 6, 2023) https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2023/04/06/leading-the-
charge-walmart-announces-plan-to-expand-electri c-vehicle-charging-network
253 "13,000+ hotels across the US are about to get EV charging stations," Electrek, (May 16, 2023)
https://electrek.co/2023/05/16/lng-electric-ev-charging-stations-hotels/
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EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
EPA acknowledges and appreciates all the comments received on charging infrastructure,
which include both broad comments on future infrastructure needs, availability, and deployment
as well as specific suggestions on the NPRM infrastructure assessment and cost analysis.
Vehicle manufacturers, dealers, and representatives of the fuels industry, among others, raised
concerns stating that charging infrastructure is inadequate today and that the pace of deployment
is not on track to meet levels needed if the proposed standards are finalized. Commenters cited a
variety of recent studies and other sources that project future infrastructure needs. The Alliance
for Automotive Innovation (the "Alliance"), BMW, and Stellantis cited a recent California
Energy Commission report that assessed infrastructure needs in California and found that to
support 5 million PEVs in the state by 2030 would require about 700,000 public and shared
private EVSE ports. Commenters noted that this is equivalent to a ratio of one EVSE port needed
for every seven PEVs and cautioned that current public infrastructure is not keeping up. For
example, the Alliance said, "Moreover, the U.S. is falling further behind in installing publicly
available chargers for the number of EVs that are being sold. More than 305,000 new EVs were
added to the roads in the first quarter of 2023, but only 7,802 new chargers were added, a ratio of
39 new EVs for every new public port, and more than five times higher than the recommended
ratio of 7:1." Jaguar Land Rover made a similar point by noting that an EU directive
recommends one public port for every 10 electric vehicles. Multiple commenters (e.g., AFPM
and SEMA) cited recent work from McKinsey, which estimated that by 2030 1.2 million EVSE
ports would be needed. AFPM, CFDC et al. Hyundai, NAD A, Porsche, Rivian, and Valero all
referenced a 2023 national charging network assessment conducted by NREL for estimates of
future infrastructure needs or associated costs, with some noting that the study found that by
2030 about 1 million public L2 and 182,000 DCFC ports would be needed to support about 33
million PEVs (along with many more private EVSE ports). AFPM cited an S&P Global report
that found charging will need to increase by a factor of eight by 2030 while NAD A cited a report
by EEI, which estimated planned investments will support fewer than half as many DCFC ports
as would be needed in 2030. Multiple commenters cited reports on charging infrastructure trends
from DOE's Alternative Fuels Data Center to caution that the pace of infrastructure deployment
is insufficient, e.g., with NACS et al. citing a report from the second quarter of 2022, and saying
that public stations increased by under 15 percent while EV sales rose by 65 percent in the same
timeframe. Commenters also cited work by Atlas, ICCT, and JD Power to indicate that
significantly more EVSE ports will be necessary to meet future needs.
Multiple commenters raised concerns that current public charging infrastructure is
concentrated in select parts of the country, with some (e.g., GROWMARK, IFB, MCGA,
MOFB, SEMA, TPPF, and Marie Gluesenkamp Perez et al.) noting particular challenges for
rural areas. For example, Growmark said, "According to the most recent trend report from the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory, rural areas (which make up almost 93% of U.S. land
area) have the smallest number of EV charging ports by a wide margin, and it is the smallest
category in terms of growth of EV charging ports as well." Other commenters (e.g., the Alliance,
AmFree et al., CEA, the Heritage Foundation, Subaru, and Transfer Flow) discussed access and
affordability challenges for those without residential charging capabilities or in multi-family
dwellings, and for low-income consumers.
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Manufacturers and others (e.g., American Highway Users Alliance, API, Chevron, Ford,
Hyundai, NACS et al., Subaru, and UAW) cautioned that customers may not buy PEVs if
sufficient charging infrastructure is not available. Toyota commented that infrastructure
availability is largely out of the control of manufacturers but would be critical to complying with
the proposed standards if finalized.
While they recognized the importance of the BIL and the IRA in supporting the buildout of
charging infrastructure, multiple commenters (e.g., AmFree et al., Stellantis, and Valero)
expressed concerns that far more funding would be needed with some characterizing BIL funds
as a 'good downpayment'. The Alliance further noted, "Moreover, thus far, almost two years after
the BIL was signed, not a single electric vehicle charger has been installed with the federal
funding allocated to states." AmFree et al. and Valero cautioned that census tract restrictions
limit the applicability of the IRA tax credit applicable to charging infrastructure. Regarding
private investments, the National Association of Convenience Stores et al. noted that while some
members have installed charging stations as 'beta tests', there are challenges to overcome before
such private investments become a sustainable business model.
The Alliance, Stellantis, Nissan, and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, VW, among others,
recommended that EPA monitor infrastructure deployment after the final rulemaking and/or link
the stringency of the standards to infrastructure buildout. For example, the Alliance
recommended that EPA directly incorporate an adjustment mechanism into the stringency levels
of the standards that scales with infrastructure deployment. Several commenters pointed to other
regulations as positive examples of how EPA could address infrastructure availability concerns.
For example, MEMA and VW noted that EU's "Alternative Fuel Infrastructure" Regulation
requires member states to deploy charging stations at designated intervals.
We also received comments from states, non-governmental organizations, electrification
groups, electric vehicle manufacturers, and utilities (e.g., CARB, California Attorney General's
Office et al., CALSTART, EEI, EDTA, Energy Innovation, EDF, ICCT, MPCA, NESCAUM
and OTC, Rivian, Tesla, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, and ZETA) highlighting
the many public and private investments in charging infrastructure that have been announced or
are already underway, along with a new analysis submitted by EDF. The analysis found that,
taken together, these investments are putting the U.S. on track to meet charging infrastructure
needed in 2030 if the proposed standards were finalized.
Some commenters (e.g., Energy Strategy Coalition, Environmental Public Health
Organizations, Tesla, ZETA) noted that EPA finalizing stringent standards would provide
certainty to manufacturers, EVSE providers and others and spur further investments in charging
infrastructure. For example, a comment from Environmental and Public Health Organizations
addressed the 'chicken-and-egg conundrum' (i.e., that EVSE providers will not build out
infrastructure without having assurance of demand, but vehicle purchasers will not buy without
initial assurance of adequate supporting charging infrastructure) saying EPA should not wait on
finalizing standards. The commenter cited historical precedent in other areas (e.g., E85 stations
to support flex-fuel vehicles) and economic theory to support the point that sufficient charging
infrastructure will be built to meet demand.
EPA also received comments on infrastructure deployment and challenges. In particular,
many commenters (e.g., AFPM, AmFree et al., CFDC et al., HF Sinclair Corporation, NACS et
al., Subaru, and Valero) raised concerns about charging infrastructure reliability. Long charging
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times were also raised as a potential barrier to consumer adoption of PEVs. Several commenters
(e.g., AFPM, BorgWarner, and MECA) suggested that DC fast charging (DCFC), which has
shorter charge times, will therefore be particularly important in infrastructure buildout; some
commenters also said that DCFC better facilitates managed and bidirectional charging, and is
important for futureproofing infrastructure.
Manufacturers and others (e.g., Advanced Energy United, American Highway Users Alliance,
HF Sinclair, Hyundai, NAD A, NRECA, Stellantis and Toyota) raised concerns about the lead
time for deploying charging infrastructure. Advanced Energy United suggested permitting
reform to standardize and streamline the process could help reduce delays and associated soft
costs. Several commenters discussed utility interconnection times and supply chain issues,
particularly those connected to distribution system upgrades. For example, NADA stated that
current lead times of 12 to 18 months for transformers could increase, while NRECA noted a
lead time of over three years for "large power transformers." EEI and Rivian highlighted
proactive steps utilities and industry can take to plan for charging stations and, in some cases,
reduce the need for grid upgrades.
We also received comments on the cost analysis we conducted for the proposed rulemaking.
Several commenters stated that EPA underestimated EVSE costs. For example, both AFPM and
CFDC et al. pointed to what the commenters characterized as a significant discrepancy between
EPA's overall estimated EVSE costs in the NPRM and those in the 2030 charging network
assessment conducted by NREL. Valero stated that EPA underestimated EVSE costs per port
and provided an estimated range of $125,000 to $300,000 per DC-150 kW port drawn from state
NEVI plans and EVSE providers as an example of current costs. On the other hand, CARB
suggested that our residential charging costs for multi-family dwellings may be too high and
recommended that we account for lower-power L2 receptacles, which will be required in some
new buildings in California. Tesla commented that our assumed DCFC costs are too high, noting
that Tesla's costs for a 250-kW port are less than $40,000 compared to EPA's assumed
$153,000. Valero stated that EPA should include the cost of EVSE maintenance in its analysis.
For the NPRM analysis, EPA estimated the EVSE port needs for light-duty PEVs but noted
that it did not assess EVSE costs for medium-duty PEVs. AFPM commented, "While these
commercial vehicles may spend most of their time charging at private depot stations, these are
mobile, commercial vehicles that will need to use (and strain) the charging network. It is
arbitrary and capricious for EPA to omit those vehicles from its simulations." POET expressed a
different concern about EPA's EVSE port estimates, noting what it characterized as a relatively
small difference between the port needs under proposed rule and no-action cases for 2055
considering larger differences in PEV penetration in those two scenarios.
EPA received comments both on the electricity prices we used in the NPRM analysis, and on
additional costs that commenters said should be included in the FRM analysis. Several
commenters (e.g., Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine, CEA, and Valero) thought EPA's use of
residential electricity charging rates underestimated charging costs given that some households
don't have access to lower-cost home charging. Other commenters also noted the higher costs
associated with public charging, which may happen during peak hours and include higher time of
use rates and demand charges among other costs. AFPM cautioned that EPA's use of national
average electricity rates is inappropriate given that ZEVs could be concentrated in areas with
higher electricity rates such as California. AFPM also stated that increased demand from EV
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charging could increase electricity prices whereas a comment from Environmental and Public
Health Organizations stated that EV charging could actually reduce electricity prices for all users
by taking advantage of unused grid capacity (e.g., at night) and distributing system costs that
would be incurred anyway over more electricity sales. In its comments, the Heritage Foundation
stated its belief that electricity prices will increase over time due to power plant regulations.
Multiple commenters (e.g., AFPM, NRECA, and Valero) said that EPA should account for
the cost of distribution or other grid upgrades associated with charging infrastructure and
NRECA provided cost estimates associated with panel upgrades, transformers upgrades, service
wire upgrades, line extensions, and metering among other categories. However, EEI said that
EPA was justified in its decision not to model costs of distribution upgrades in the NPRM. EEI
stated that these costs will be site specific, who bears the costs (utilities vs. site host customers)
will vary, and accounting for these costs would be inconsistent with the approach EPA has taken
for liquid fuels, in which comparable upgrades are not directly accounted for in fleet costs. The
Mobility House et al. noted the use of automated load management could reduce the need for
upgrades.
As described in Chapter 4 of the RIA, EPA evaluates the cost associated with refueling time.
The Western Energy Alliance questioned EPA's analysis, noting that charging times for EVs are
significantly longer compared to refueling time for ICEs. On the other hand, a comment from
Environmental and Public Health Organizations noted that the EPA's charge rate assumption of
100 miles of driving added per hour of charging is far too low given that mid-trip charging
events are likely to occur using DCFCs, suggesting "EPA's charging rate assumption could be
quadrupled (and the refueling time disbenefit for BEVs greatly reduced) and still result in a
conservative assumption that leaves room for vehicles that may do some mid-trip charging at
more moderate DC charging power levels."
Response:
As an initial matter, EPA notes that it anticipates automakers will employ a wide variety of
control technologies, applied to ICE, hybrid, and electric powertrains, to meet the final standards
and will continue to offer a diverse variety of vehicles for the duration of these standards and
beyond. For example, under our central case modeling (which is only one estimate of a possible
compliance path for the industry), in MY 2032, 29 percent of new vehicles would be non-hybrid
ICE vehicles (with an additional 3 percent hybrid vehicles). We anticipate that the flexibilities
offered by the final rule will enable manufacturers who choose to meet the final rule through
producing more PEVs to deploy PEVs in areas and at volumes that meet consumer demand. At
the same time, EPA agrees that continued expansion of reliable charging infrastructure supports
higher rates of PEV adoption.
As discussed in Preamble Section IV.C.4 and RIA Chapter 5.3, public charging has been
growing rapidly in the past few years with more than 160,000 public electric vehicle supply
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equipment (EVSE) ports available in the U.S. today.556'557 As shown in the range of projected
future infrastructure needs cited by commenters, estimates for future infrastructure needs vary
widely in the literature. We note that these variations reflect different assumptions about PEV
adoption, driving and charging behavior, residential charging access, and the mix of EVSE by
power levels, among other factors. As described in RIA Chapter 5.3, we analyzed EVSE port
needs under our final rule and a no-action case from 2027 to 20 5 5.558 Under an Interagency
Agreement between EPA and the U.S. Department of Energy, NREL simulated PEV charging
demand for eight unique charging types and locations: home LI, home L2, depot L2, work L2,
public L2, and public DCFC at 150 kW, 250 kW, and 350 kW power levels. The analysis
framework utilized to estimate charging demand was adapted from the framework used in the
NREL study, "The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle
Demand for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure,"559 which was cited by multiple
commenters, though the PEV adoption scenarios developed were specific to EPA's final
rulemaking analysis. We anticipate that the highest number of ports will be needed at homes
across the full analysis period. For example, as seen in RIA Table 5-11, in 2030, we estimate
approximately 33 million EVSE ports will be needed under the final rule, of which about 30
million are residential ports. We estimate just under one million public Level 2 ports, 780,000
workplace L2 ports, and 170,000 public DCFC ports will also be needed along with 360,000
depot L2 ports to support medium-duty vehicle charging. (See RIA Chapter 5.3.2 for a more
complete discussion of our analysis.)
Regarding comments from the Alliance and Stellantis on public charging needs, EPA
disagrees that one public EVSE port will be needed for every seven PEVs. NREL's national
charging network assessment estimated that to support 33 million PEVs in 2030, about 1.25
million public EVSE ports (including 182,000 DC fast charging ports) would be needed,560 along
with 26.8 million private ports (most at single family homes, but also at multi-family homes and
workplaces). That yields a ratio of one public EVSE port needed per 26 PEVs. This fits well
within a range of other recent studies examining public infrastructure needs. An ICCT report
looking across a dozen studies published between 2018 to 2021 found that two-thirds of the
556 U.S. DOE Alternative Fuels Data Center, "U.S. Public Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure." Accessed
January 10, 2024, at https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10972. U.S. DOE Alternative Fuels Data Center, "Alternative
Fueling Station Locator." Accessed January 10, 2024, at
https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/analyze?country=US&fuel=ELEC.
557 If we include EVSE ports that are temporarily unavailable for maintenance or other short-term causes, the
number of ports is over 170,000. (Source: U.S. DOE Alternative Fuels Data Center, "Alternative Fueling Station
Locator." Accessed March 9, 2024, at
https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/analyze?country=US&fuel=ELEC&status=E&status=T. U.S. DOE Alternative
Fuels Data Center, "Alternative Fueling Station Locator.")
558 The final rule and no-action cases used throughout the PEV charging infrastructure cost analysis were based on a
preliminary analysis compared to the final compliance modeling. While annual PEV charging demand is generally
higher in the compliance scenarios relative to those in the preliminary analysis (with annual differences of between
plus and minus five percent), cumulative electricity consumption associated with PEV charging from 2027 to 2055
in the final rule compliance scenario is only four percent higher for the action case (the final standards) and one
percent higher in the no-action case, compared to the preliminary analysis used to assess PEV charging
infrastructure needs and costs.
559 Wood et al., "The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle
Infrastructure," 2023. Accessed December 18, 2023, at https://driveelectric.gov/files/2030-charging-network.pdf.
560 Ibid. (Note: See Figure ES-1 for EVSE port counts in the public network.)
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estimates (including its own) fell between 20 and 40 PEVs per public EVSE port.561 A new
report conducted by ICF for the Coordinating Research Council, which assessed infrastructure
needs for the level of PEV adoption in the proposed rule, found one public EVSE port would be
needed for every 34 light-duty PEVs.562 While the S&P Global article cited by some
commenters563 projected that 2.3 million public chargers would be needed to support 28 million
PEVs in 2030—yielding a relatively low ratio of one port per 12 PEVs—the McKinsey article
cited by commenters564 estimated that 1.2 million public chargers would be needed to support 44
million electric passenger cars in 2030, yielding a ratio of just one public port needed for about
every 37 light-duty PEVs. There was approximately one public EVSE port for every 26 PEVs on
the road as of the third quarter of 20 23,565 suggesting that the overall level of public charging
infrastructure deployment is generally keeping pace with PEV adoption based on comparisons
with recent national assessments.
The ratio of one public EVSE port per every seven PEVs suggested by some manufacturers
was based on a 2021 California assessment conducted by CEC.566 However, as the commenters
noted, this ratio was calculated from CEC's projected needs for both public and shared private
EVSE ports, which includes a large number of EVSE ports at multi-unit dwellings and
workplaces. In addition, we note that the infrastructure scenario in CEC's report was specific to
California and may not be applicable nationally. For example, the share of PEVs with residential
charging access in a given area may vary based on the mix of housing types (e.g., single-family
or multi-family homes), household incomes, and other factors.567 The CEC study assumed the
number of PEVs with residential charging access in California was under 70 percent,568 much
561 Bauer et al., "Charging Up America: Assessing the Growing Need for U.S. Charging Infrastructure through
2030," 2021. Accessed November 5, 2023, at https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/charging-up-america-
jul2021.pdf. (Note: The full range of studies spanned 12 to 129 PEVs per public charger though all but two were
between 20 and 56.)
562 Coordinating Research Council, "Assess the Battery Re-charging and Hydrogen Re-fueling Infrastructure Needs,
Costs, and Timelines Required to Support Regulatory Requirements for Light-, Medium-, and Heavy-Duty Zero
Emission Vehicles," September 2023. Accessed December 18, 2023, at https://crcao.org/wp-
content/uploads/2023/09/CRC_Infrastructure_Assessment_Report_ICF_09282023_Final-Report. (The LD PEV and
public EVSE ports discussed are from Table 3.)
563 S&P Global, "EV Chargers: How many do we need?" January 9, 2023. Available at:
https://press.spglobal.com/2023-01-09-EV-Chargers-How-many-do-we-need. (We note that public charger estimates
may include chargers at restricted use facilities.)
564 Philipp Kampshoff et al., "Building the electric-vehicle charging infrastructure America needs," April 18, 2022.
Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/building-the-electric-vehicle-
charging-infrastructure-america-needs. (Note: In addition to 44 million electric passenger cars, the report estimates
another 4 million electric buses, trucks, and other commercial vehicles would be on the road by 2030. Including
these in the total would make the ratio of EVs per public port 40 instead of 37.)
565 Brown, A. et al., "Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Trends from the Alternative Fueling Station Locator:
Third Quarter 2023," 2024. Accessed March 9, 2024, at https://www.nrel.gov/docs/Iy24osti/88223.pdf. (Note:
Estimated from approximately 4.16 million EVs and 160,000 public EVSE ports.)
566 Matt Alexander et al., "Assembly Bill 2127 Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Assessment," July 2021.
Accessed March 10, 2024 at: https://www.energy.ca.gov/publications/2020/assembly-bill-2127-electric-vehicle-
charging-infrastructure-assessment-analyzing.
567 Ge, Y. et al., "There's No Place Like Home: Residential Parking, Electrical Access, and Implications for the
Future of Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure," 2021. Accessed March 11, 2024, at:
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/Iy22osti/81065.pdf.
568 See Table 5 in Alexander et al. 2021.
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lower than the 90 percent assumption in NREL's national assessment.569 In general, less access
to home charging will increase the need for public or other non-residential charging
infrastructure. We also note that CEC released an updated version of its charging infrastructure
assessment in August 2023.570 It projects that to support 7.1 million PEVs in 2030, just over
408,000 public (L2 and DCFC) ports will be needed, at a ratio of one public port per 17 PEVs,
along with just over 600,000 shared private ports at workplaces and multi-family housing.571
We agree with commenters that keeping up with charging needs as PEV adoption grows will
require continued infrastructure investments and appreciate the many comments we received that
highlight plans and commitments for charging infrastructure buildout. NREL's national charging
network assessment estimated that between $31 billion and $55 billion would be needed by 2030
for public infrastructure, noting that $24 billion in investments from public and private sources
had already been announced as of March 2023.572 The White House estimates that as of January
2024 total investments to expand the U.S. charging network had grown to over $25 billion.573
Furthermore, there are many public and private parties investing in charging infrastructure,
including federal, state, and local governments, automakers, utilities, charging companies, and
retailers among others. These parties are already responding to the market that is developing for
infrastructure, and we see no reason to believe they won't continue to meet infrastructure
demand as the PEV market grows. See RIA Chapter 5.3.1 for a summary of ongoing and planned
charging infrastructure investments.
We also agree with commenters who said that finalizing strong standards will itself spur
additional investments in charging infrastructure. This is not an unprecedented situation with
respect to CAA section 202 standards. For example, when EPA required the removal of lead
from gasoline, an entire new parallel fuel distribution system was developed to dispense the new
unleaded gasoline. See Preamble section III.B. Other examples where new distribution systems
arose to ensure delivery of fuels necessary to vehicular pollution control include the
infrastructure to supply diesel exhaust fluid (used to support selective catalytic reduction) and
ultra low sulfur diesel fuel (used to support diesel particulate filters). We thus see that there can
be successful market responses to demand created by a section 202 standard, including
successful responses from entities not regulated by the standard.
We acknowledge comments, e.g., from NACS et al., that in certain periods, EV sales may rise
faster than public charging stations. However, as discussed in RIA Chapter 5.3, when looking at
the overall trend in infrastructure deployment from DOE's Alternative Fueling Station Locator,
569 Wood et al., "The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle
Infrastructure," 2023. Accessed December 18, 2023, at https://driveelectric.gov/files/2030-charging-network.pdf.
570 Adam Davis et al., "Assembly Bill 2127 Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Assessment," August 2023.
Accessed March 10, 2024, at: https://www.energy.ca.gov/publications/2023/second-assembly-bill-ab-2127-electric-
vehicle-charging-infrastructure-assessment.
571 The estimate of public charger needs was taken from Figure 1 and represents the sum of "Public (at Work)",
"Other Public", and "DCFC"; other port counts discussed are also from this figure.
572 Wood et al., "The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle
Infrastructure," 2023. Accessed December 18, 2023, at https://driveelectric.gov/files/2030-charging-network.pdf.
573 The White House, "FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces New Actions to Cut Electric
Vehicle Costs for Americans and Continue Building Out a Convenient, Reliable, Made-in-America EV Charging
Network," January 19, 2024. Accessed at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2024/01/19/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-new-actions-to-cut-electric-vehicle-costs-for-
americans-and-continue-building-out-a-convenient-reliable-made-in-america-ev-charging-network/.
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we see a rapid expansion over the past few years with the number of ports more than doubling
from 74,000 ports at the end of 2019 to over 160,000 today.574 And, with many public and
private investments announced or underway (as described in RIA Chapter 5.3), we anticipate
significant additional growth in advance of, and throughout, the timeframe of the standards. With
respect to the comment citing an EEI report,575 which estimated planned investments will
support fewer than half of the 140,000 DCFC ports it estimated as being needed in 2030, we note
that this assessment was released in June 2022 and, therefore, would not include planned
investments announced since then. A survey by EDF and WSP (submitted as part of EDF's
comments)576 found that, as of June 2023, over $21.5 billion in commitments had been
announced. The authors estimate that this will support over 800,000 new EVSE ports by 2030,
including 250,000 DCFC ports—significantly higher than EEI's estimate of DCFC needs. As
noted above, the White House estimates an even higher total of $25 billion in investments had
been announced as of January 2024.577 Given the increasing adoption of PEVs, the significant
regulatory factors supporting that adoption—including BIL, IRA, and the regulatory certainty
provided by the final rule—as well as the considerable economic incentives for EVSE suppliers
and stations, we think it is reasonable to expect that additional investments will be made over the
coming years in charging infrastructure to support the market's levels of PEV adoption. To put it
differently, given the increasing adoption of PEVs, the deployment and operation of EVSE
stations is a highly valuable business opportunity, and market participants are thus highly likely
to avail themselves of this opportunity and meet demand. We do acknowledge lead time
constraints associated with permitting and infrastructure, as discussed further below and in RTC
18, but our review of the evidence does not identify any hard constraints that would preclude the
levels of increased infrastructure associated with the central case, particularly in light of the
additional lead time provided by the final rule relative to the proposal.
As commenters noted, the U.S. government is making large investments through the BIL and
the IRA. This includes extending and modifying a tax credit, through which residents in low-
income or non-urban areas are eligible for a 30 percent credit for the cost of installing residential
charging equipment up to a $1,000 cap and businesses are eligible for up to 30 percent of the
costs associated with purchasing and installing charging equipment in these areas (subject to a
$100,000 cap per item) if prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements are met. We
acknowledge the points made by some commenters that census tract restrictions limit the
applicability of this tax credit. However, a map developed by DOE showing eligible census tracts
574 U.S. DOE Alternative Fuels Data Center, "U.S. Public Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure." Accessed
January 10, 2024, at https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10972. U.S. DOE Alternative Fuels Data Center, "Alternative
Fueling Station Locator." Accessed January 10, 2024, at
https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/analyze?country=US&fuel=ELEC.
575 Charles Satterfield and Kellen Schefter, "Electric Vehicle Sales and the Charging Infrastructure Required through
2030," June 2022. Accessed March 20, 2024, at: https://www.eei.Org/-/media/Project/EEI/Documents/Issues-and"
Policy/Electric-Transportation/EV-Forecast~Infrastructure-Report.pdf.
576 EDF and WSP, "U.S. Public Electric Vehicle (EV) Charging Infrastructure Deployment, Industry Investment
Briefing," July 2023. Accessed March 10, 2024, at: https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-
07/WSP%20US%20Public%20EV%20Charging%20Infrastrcuture%20Deployment%20 July%202023 .pdf.
577 The White House, "FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces New Actions to Cut Electric
Vehicle Costs for Americans and Continue Building Out a Convenient, Reliable, Made-in-America EV Charging
Network," January 19, 2024. Accessed at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2024/01/19/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-new-actions-to-cut-electric-vehicle-costs-for-
americans-and-continue-building-out-a-convenient-reliable-made-in-america-ev-charging-network/.
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suggests that stations installed in a large majority of the U.S. may qualify,578 and as noted by the
White House, two-thirds of Americans live in these areas.579 We also note that this tax credit can
help to expand both residential and public charging infrastructure in rural areas. We
acknowledge that some areas of the country may experience higher growth in the number of
charging stations and PEVs relative to other areas of the country; as noted above, we anticipate
that ICE vehicles will continue to be sold throughout the timeframe of this rule.
Regarding the Alliance's comment that no NEVI-funded stations had yet been deployed, we
note that it is normal for it to take time to initiate a new funding program, develop program
guidance, receive and review applications, make awards, and for awardees to start projects.
Initial plans for all 50 states, DC, and Puerto Rico covering FY22 and FY23 funds were
approved in September 2022, and together, the $1.5 billion in funding will help deploy or expand
charging infrastructure on about 75,000 miles of highway.580 Since the publication of the
proposal, NEVI-funded stations have opened in Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania.581 At least
another 30 states are actively soliciting proposals and making awards, suggesting many more
station openings will be coming soon.582
As discussed in RTC Section 3.4, EPA disagrees with comments from manufacturers who
recommended that EPA incorporate an adjustment mechanism into the stringency levels of the
standards that scales with infrastructure deployment. EPA has assessed charging infrastructure as
part of our assessment of the feasibility of these standards, and as discussed above, expects that
charging infrastructure will continue to rapidly grow to meet demand. Moreover, as previously
noted, we agree with commenters who said that finalizing standards will send clear market
signals to spur additional investments in charging infrastructure. By contrast, including an
automatic stringency adjustment would eliminate the predictability and certainty of the
standards, which would lessen this market signal.
EPA agrees with commenters that in addition to deploying sufficient charging infrastructure,
it must be reliable. In September 2023, the Joint Office of Energy and Transportation (JOET)
announced that up to $100 million in NEVI funding would be available to increase reliability of
578 U.S. Department of Energy, Argonne National Laboratory, "30C Tax Credit Eligibility Locator." Accessed
March 11, 2024, at: https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/3f67d5e82dc64dl589714d5499196d4f/page/Page/.
579 The White House, "FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces New Actions to Cut Electric
Vehicle Costs for Americans and Continue Building Out a Convenient, Reliable, Made-in-America EV Charging
Network," January 19, 2024. Accessed at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2024/01/19/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-new-actions-to-cut-electric-vehicle-costs-for-
americans-and-continue-building-out-a-convenient-reliable-made-in-america-ev-charging-network/.
580 U.S. DOT, FHWA, "Historic Step: All Fifty States Plus D.C. and Puerto Rico Greenlit to Move EV Charging
Networks Forward, Covering 75,000 Miles of Highway," September 27, 2022. Accessed January 10, 2023, at
https://highways.dot.gov/newsroom/historic-step-all-fifty-states-plus-dc-and-puerto-rico-greenlit-move-ev-charging-
networks.
581 JOET, "First Public EV Charging Station Funded by NEVI Open in America," December 13, 2023. Accessed
December 18,2023, at: https://driveelectric.gov/news/first-nevi-funded-stations-open. JOET, "New York Continues
NEVI Charging Station Momentum," December 15, 2023. Accessed December 18, 2023, at:
https://driveelectric.gov/news/new-york-NEVI-charging-station-momentum. JOET, "Pennsylvania Continues Shift
Toward Thriving Electric Transportation Sector," January 23, 2024. Accessed February 24, 2024, at
https://driveelectric.gov/news/new-pennsylvania-nevi-station.
582 JOET, "National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Progress Update," October 2023. Accessed December
18, 2023, at: https://driveelectric.gov/news/nevi-progress-update.
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the existing charging infrastructure network with funds going to repair or replace EVSE ports.583
This will complement efforts of the National Charging Experience (ChargeX) Consortium.584
Launched in May 2023 by JOET and led by U.S. DOE labs, the ChargeX Consortium will
develop solutions and identify best practices for common problems related to the consumer
experience, e.g., payment processing and user interface, vehicle-charger communication, and
diagnostic data sharing. See RIA Chapter 5.3 for additional efforts underway to support
infrastructure reliability.
EPA also recognizes that it takes time for EVSE providers to develop charging site plans for
their facility, obtain permits, purchase equipment, and have it installed. While permitting times
will likely vary based on applicable state or local jurisdiction, specifics of the station site, and
other factors, we note as one example that Electrify America reported that, in 2022, permitting
took an average of 13 weeks for its U.S. "ultra-fast" DCFC stations.585 We agree with Advanced
Energy United that streamlining the permitting process could reduce infrastructure deployment
times though we note that such policies are outside the scope of this rulemaking. As discussed by
multiple commenters, infrastructure lead times will be longer if distribution upgrades are needed.
We also acknowledge comments on supply chain challenges, in particular with respect to lead
times for transformers. See RTC Section 18 for a discussion of the grid component supply chain
and other distribution system considerations, including strategies to reduce the need for
distribution system upgrades and associated lead times. With respect to EVSE manufacturing, we
note that about forty companies have announced over $500 million of investments in U.S.
facilities to construct charging equipment, with planned domestic production capacity of more
than 1,000,000 chargers (including 60,000 DCFCs ) annually.586'587 As discussed in RTC Section
3.3, EPA is finalizing standards with a more gradual ramp-in of GHG stringency, i.e. that are less
stringent than the proposed standards for each year from 2027 through 2031. This means
manufacturers will be able to deploy GHG emissions reducing technology more gradually in the
early years of the program, and also have more time take advantage of ongoing expansion of
public charging infrastructure previously discussed.
As described in RIA Chapter 5.3.2, we estimate the costs to deploy the number of EVSE ports
needed each year (2027—2055) to achieve the modeled network sizes for the final rule and a no-
action case. For the proposal, we sourced hardware and installation costs for each EVSE port
from several studies and we requested comments on any additional estimates we should consider.
AFPM and CFDC et al. commented that EPA's overall estimated EVSE costs were significantly
lower than those presented in NREL's national charging network assessment (Wood et al.
583 JOET, "Biden-Harris Administration to Invest $100 Million for EV Charger Reliability," September 2023.
Accessed December 18, 2023, at: https://driveelectric.gov/news/ev-reliability-funding-opportunity.
584 JOET, "Joint Office Announces National Charging Experience Consortium," May 2023. Accessed March 11,
2024, at: https://driveelectric.gov/news/chargex-consortium.
585 Electrify America, "2022 Annual Report to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency," April 2023. Accessed
March 11, 2024, at: https://media.electrifyamerica.com/assets/documents/original/1018-
2022NationalAnnualReport.pdf.
586 DOE, "Building America's Clean Energy Future," January 11, 2024. Accessed February 24, 2024, at
https://www.energy.gov/invest. (Note: investment and production capacity totals include only those available in
public announcements, as reported by DOE, and may not be comprehensive.)
587 U.S. Department of Energy, Vehicle Technologies Office, "FOTW #1314, October 30, 2023: Manufacturers
Have Announced Investments of Over $500 million in More Than 40 American-Made Electric Vehicle Charger
Plants." Accessed March 11, 2024, at: https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1314-october-30-2023-
manufacturers-have-announced-investments-over-500."
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20 23).588 It is important to clarify that the EVSE cost estimates presented in DRIA Chapter 5 and
used in the NPRM cost benefit analysis did not reflect the total EVSE costs under the proposal,
but rather the difference in EVSE costs between the proposed rule and a no-action case.
Therefore, these costs are not directly comparable to the estimates of how much cumulative
investment would be needed for charging infrastructure by 2030 in Wood et al. 2023.
Nonetheless, it is correct that the assumed hardware and installation costs per EVSE port in
Wood et. al 2023, which was published after the NPRM, are generally higher than those EPA
assumed in the NPRM analysis, and we agreed with commenters that it was appropriate to
update our costs. For the final rule analysis, we have updated our assumed upfront hardware and
installation costs for work and public EVSE ports to align with Wood et al. 2023 in order to
reflect more up-to-date information.589 We note that the resulting updated cost for each DC-150
kW port in our FRM analysis is $154,200, which is within the range Valero provided in its
comments as an example. We also acknowledge CARB's and Tesla's comments on lower L2
residential costs for multi-family housing and DCFC costs, respectively. Given these lower costs
identified by CARB and Tesla, and the potential for these lower costs to be experienced more
widely in future years, our EVSE cost assumptions may be conservative. See RIA Chapter 5.3
for a more complete discussion of the hardware and installation costs we assumed for each
EVSE type in our FRM analysis.
We agree with AFPM that it is important to account not only for infrastructure to support
light-duty PEVs, but also for medium-duty PEVs. We have updated our FRM analysis
accordingly. See RIA Chapter 5.3 for a description of how we estimated depot and public
charging needs for medium-duty PEVs in our EVSE cost analysis for the FRM. Regarding
POET's comment on EVSE port counts in 2055, we note that EVSE port count estimates have
been updated for the final rulemaking (see Table 5-23 and Table 5-24 in the RIA). We also note
that port needs do not scale directly with the number of PEVs. For example, as described in RIA
Chapter 5.3.2, we model more sharing of home and depot EVSE ports as PEV adoption grows.
More broadly, the number and mix of EVSE ports needed will depend not only on the absolute
number of PEVs, but also on the characteristics of the PEVs (e.g., energy consumption rate and
battery capacity), vehicle miles traveled, and other factors (see RIA Chapters 5.1 and 5.3 for
more information on how port counts are estimated in the FRM analysis.)
We agree with Valero that there will be maintenance costs associated with public L2 and
DCFCs. As we discuss in RIA Chapter 5.3, while we did not directly model these costs, we
assume all EVSE ports have a 15-year equipment lifetime, and after that must be replaced at full
cost. This assumption likely overestimates costs as some EVSE providers may opt to upgrade
existing equipment rather than incur the cost of a full replacement. Some installation costs such
as trenching or electrical upgrades may also not be needed for the replacement.
For the NPRM analysis, we used AEO 2021 residential electricity rates to reflect the cost to
charge. EPA agrees with commenters that it is more appropriate for the electricity price to reflect
a mix of rates across consumer classes rather than just a residential electricity rate. As described
in RIA Chapter 5.2, we model future electricity prices for the final rulemaking with the Retail
588 Wood et al., "The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle
Infrastructure," 2023. Accessed December 18, 2023, at https://driveelectric.gov/files/2030-charging-network.pdf.
589 As noted in RIA Chapter 5.3.2, Wood et al. drew from various data and literature sources, including the studies
that were used as sources for hardware and installation costs for workplace and public L2 ports and DCFC ports in
the NPRM.
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Price Model associated with the Integrated Planning Model (IPM). IPM models the power sector,
including changes to power generation based on future demand scenarios. We conducted IPM
runs for a no-action case and a final rule policy or "action" case based upon Alternative 3 from
the proposed rule with the addition of heavy-duty vehicle charge demand based on an interim
scenario developed from for the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles
- Phase 3 Proposed Rule. We agree with commenters that it is appropriate to consider the
geographic allocation of charge demand, and we have modeled this in our IPM runs described
above.590 The resulting impacts to power generation from IPM were then input to the Retail Price
Model to estimate average electricity prices, weighted by the amount of electricity used by each
consumer class (e.g., residential, commercial, and industrial) and in each region. We used this
approach to estimate electricity prices in the FRM, as opposed to AEO, because we can better
model demand under the final rule policy case discussed above with IPM (including geographic
allocation).
In the NPRM we acknowledged that certain stations, particularly those with many high-power
DCFCs, may require upgrades to the distribution system; however, we did not include the
associated costs in our assessment of PEV charging infrastructure. We agree with commenters
that it is appropriate to include distribution system upgrade costs in the final rulemaking analysis,
and as described in RIA Chapter 5.2.4, we have incorporated these costs within the electricity
prices. See RIA Chapter 5.4 and RTC Section 18 for a more detailed discussion of the
distribution system considerations and a new DOE analysis we utilized to estimate the
distribution upgrade costs.
In response to comments on consumer concerns related to range anxiety and the time it takes
to charge, see RTC Section 13. Many refueling events for electric vehicles would be expected to
occur either overnight where the vehicle is parked or during the workday, neither of which
require extra time from the driver. However, some charging events will require drivers to take
extra time to charge, especially when drivers are in the midst of an extended road trip. As
described in RIA Chapter 4.3.5, EPA estimates the cost of time spent refueling. We agree with
commenters who recommended that we update this analysis for the final rulemaking. In
particular, we concur with the comment from Environmental and Public Health Organizations
that our assumed charge rate of 100 miles of added driving range per hour is too low and that
mid-trip charging events are likely to occur using DCFCs. We use an updated value of 400 miles
of added driving range per hour of charging for our FRM analysis, which is consistent with the
commenter's recommendation.
Comments on the impact of EPA's proposed powerplant rule under Section 111 of the Act are
related to a separate regulatory action and thus beyond the scope of this rulemaking. If and when
that rule is finalized, EPA will account for the costs of that rule in that proceeding.
18 - Power sector and grid reliability considerations
590 See Chapters 5.1 and 5.2 for a more complete description of the power sector modeling used in the final
rulemaking analysis, including the development of hourly charging load profiles to reflect the time of day that
charging occurs at the regional level.
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Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
B. Comparison of EPA's Projected U.S. BEV Market Share to Other Projections
EPA projects that manufacturers can reach 60% BEV U.S. market share by 2030 and 67%
share by 2032. In context, for all light-duty auto sales in 2022, less than 6% were BEV (or just
over 7%> when including PHEVs). Effectively, EPA's proposed BEV requirements would be
roughly ten times higher than 2022 levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 28-29]
Given the degree of electrification that EPA projects in association with its proposed
standards, it is helpful to compare EPA's projections to those of industry analysts. EPA does
provide some third-party projections of U.S. BEV market share, but does so only in the context
of supporting its finding that demand for BEVs is rapidly increasing.22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 28-29]
22 NPRM at 29189.
Auto Innovators compares EPA's projections23 to those of the U.S. Energy Information
Agency (EIA),24 S&P Global Mobility,25 Bloomberg,26 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence
(BMI),27 and the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)28 in Figure 1. EPA's
projections exceed those of other government agencies (EIA) and of the industry and financial
analysts (S&P Global Mobility, Bloomberg, and BMI). The only projection close to EPA's is
that from ICCT (a well- known non-governmental organization that advocates for stronger
standards), but EPA's projections still exceed even those of ICCT. While projections can and
certainly do vary based on input assumptions, EPA has not adequately explained how increasing
GHG standards in and of itself would enable greater BEV-only market share than those projected
by multiple other analyses that include both BEVs and PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 28-29]
23 For this assessment, Auto Innovators used EPA's projected BEV market share from the ACCII
sensitivity case for the proposed standards. (NPRM at 29335, Table 108.)
24 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2023, High Uptake of the IRA side
case, Table 38. (Market share calculated by Auto Innovators based on EV sales and total sales of light-duty
vehicles.)
25 S&P Global Mobility, U.S. light vehicles sales forecast by propulsion system design (Jan. 2023).
Obtained via personal correspondence. Used with permission.
26 Bloomberg NEF, Electric Vehicle Outlook 2023 (Jun. 2023) at 22 (Figure 30; reflects BloombergNEF
economic transition scenario). Data obtained via BloombergNEF subscription.
27 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, 1Q2023 model for Auto Innovators (proprietary).
28 The International Council on Clean Transportation, Analyzing the Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act
on Electric Vehicle Uptake in the United States (Jan. 2023) at 27. (Table A5, IRA Moderate with increased
state ACC II adoption scenario.)
The projection from S&P Global Mobility, a well-respected third-party analyst of the
automotive industry, suggests approximately 47% EV market share (including PHEVs) in 2030
and 59% in 2032. In comparison, EPA projects a BEV-only market share of 61% by 2030 and
67%) in 2032 under its proposed standards. The projection from Bloomberg is very similar to that
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of S&P Global Mobility, reaching 51% combined EV sales in 2030 and 60% combined EV sales
by 2032. The S&P Global Mobility and Bloomberg projections are generally consistent with
Auto Innovators belief that 40-50% EV market share by 2030 is an aspirational, yet achievable
goal if suffcient complementary policies are in place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 28-
29]
[See original comment for Figure 1: Comparison of EPA-projected BEV market share under
the proposed standards to projections from EIA, S&P Global Mobility, Bloomberg, and ICCT.]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 28-29]
4. Modeling the geographic diffusion of BEVs is important for accurately gauging the
customer acceptance of the national standards.
The OMEGA least-cost compliance modeling suggests that, by model year 2032, 67% of new
vehicle sales will be BEVs, a remarkably different figure than the 8% BEV share observed in the
U.S. in early 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 284-285]
Modeling a highly segmented and geographically dependent market as a single entity is
spurious. The agency's assumption that all consumers will respond with the same elasticity of
demand pegged to the same diffusion of innovation curve is simplistic and not appropriate. As
we know, there are many factors outside of the relative price of powertrains that come into play
when purchasing a new vehicle. These include the robustness of the charging ecosystem,
inclement weather, relative price of fuels, and even political affiliation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 284-285]
It is crucial that EPA model accurately the diffusion of BEVs into different parts of the
country, since the pattern of spatial diffusion influences key issues in this rulemaking: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 284-285]
-the amount of electricity required to support BEVs in different areas;
-the degree of grid investments and public-charging investments required to support BEVs;
-the amount of emissions from the electric utility sector (as some regions are more carbon
intensive than others);
-and the prospects for customer acceptance of BEVs (as regions vary in attitudes toward
BEVs, the pace of the public charging build out, cold weather climates, and the availability of
state incentives and public outreach to facilitate BEV deployment). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 284-285]
In its analysis EPA adapts a "vehicle adopter model" (VAM) developed by the National
Renewable Energy Laboratory. The model includes some plausible predictor variables such as
income, housing type, housing tenure, population density, and rural vs urban location. The
authors also acknowledge the model omits crucial variables relevant to predicting whether a
household will purchase or lease a BEV such as environmental attitudes, interest in advanced
technology, whether the household has a place at home or at work to charge their BEV,
commuting distance, and long-trip frequency. The model explained little of the variation in BEV
ownership in the sample (R-square = 0.04). The authors explain that the model seemed to
perform better statistically at the county level, but with so many omitted variables it seems
doubtful the model coefficients are useful for prediction. A deeper problem is that the data set
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included only 224 households that owned at least one BEV, about 6% of the sample, and it is not
clear whether the sample is representative of the U.S. Since the 224 households are, as the
authors note, early BEV adopters, it seems unlikely that information about them will be relevant
in predicting which households adopt BEVs as the technology diffuses from 8% of new vehicle
purchasers in early 2023 to 67% in 2032. For the purposes of the rulemaking, it is more
important to model carefully, for example, those who are open to a BEV but have not yet
purchased one. The authors were careful to state that their results have limited utility [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 284-285] :
The absolute values of the estimates and the predictive capability of the model are not the
priorities for this purpose—instead, we emphasize the relative scale of these coefficients (for
example, how much influence housing type has on PEV adoption compared with income). [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 284-285]
EPA then decided to use the absolute coefficients to forecast PEV adoption, exactly contrary
to what the authors suggested. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 284-285]
Auto Innovators appreciates that EPA may have been inclined to use this survey because the
results can be linked to the IPM model of the electric utility sector. Unfortunately, the survey and
modeling have so many weaknesses for use in this rulemaking that a different modeling strategy
is required [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 284-285],
In the long run, Auto Innovators suggests that EPA develop an improved BEV adopter model.
Source:
1. Ge, Yanbo, Christina Simeone, Andrew Duvall, and Eric Wood. 2021. There's No Place
Like Home: Residential Parking, Electrical Access, and Implications for the Future of Electric
Vehicle Charging Infrastructure. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory.
NREL/TP-5400-81065. htps://www.nrel,gov/docs/fy22osti/81065 .pdf. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 284-285]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
3. EPA Fails to Adequately Assess the Availability of Electricity Generation, Distribution,
and Transmission
Despite the potential for increased demands on domestic energy generation and generation
capacity, 156 EPA offers little to no support that these demands will be sufficiently met.
Similarly, EPA's DRIA offers scant analysis regarding the costs associated with meeting
these increased infrastructure and energy generation/capacity needs beyond the flawed reliance
on various legislative actions, such as the BIL and IRA. 157
Consequently, EPA is pushing a single technology at a pace that cannot be adopted within the
time frame of its own proposal.158 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 34]
156 See, e.g., U.S. DRIVE, "Summary Report on EVs at Scale and the U.S. Electric Power System" (Nov.
2019), available at https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/summary-report-evs-scale-and-us-
electric-power-system-2019 (summarizing impacts of light-duty vehicles on energy generation and
generation capacity alone and acknowledging several potential challenges without including analysis of
medium-and heavy-duty ZEVs).
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157 See, e.g., Salma Elmallah et al., Can distribution grid infrastructure accommodate residential
electrification and electric vehicle adoption in Northern California? (Nov. 9, 2022), available at
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2634-4505/ac949c (projecting that upgrades needed solely for the
PG&E service area in Northern California, which serves 4.8 million electricity customers and is subject to
aggressive targets for both EV adoption and electrification of residential space and water heating will add
at least $1 billion and potentially $10 billion to PG&E's rate base).
158 DRIA at 5-28.
Organization: Charles Gordon
INTRODUCTION and SUMMARY
I recommend that EPA withdraw this rulemaking. The earlier rules and the subsidies of the
Inflation Reduction Act will lead to a greater reduction of C02 with less controversy.
In addition, the proposal is attempting to force faster adoption of electric cars than the
infrastructure can support.
Natural gas power plants cannot be replaced by solar and wind fast enough and more
importantly transmissions line cannot be built quickly enough because of local opposition. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 3]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
G. EPA's conclusion that LDV charging will not compromise the reliability of the electric
grid is supported by empirical data.
EPA observes that LDV charging is not anticipated to adversely impact electric grid
reliability:
U.S. electric power utilities routinely upgrade the nation's electric power system to improve
grid reliability and to meet new electric power demands. For example, when confronted with
rapid adoption of air conditioners in the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. electric power utilities
successfully met the new demand for electricity by planning and building upgrades to the electric
power distribution system. Likewise, U.S. electric power utilities planned and built distribution
system upgrades required to service the rapid growth of power-intensive data centers and server
farms over the past two decades. U.S. electric power utilities have already successfully designed
and built the distribution system infrastructure required for 1.4 million battery electric vehicles.
Utilities have also successfully integrated 46.1 GW of new utility-scale electric generating
capacity into the grid.332 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 121]
332 88 Fed. Reg. at 29311 (citations omitted).
These conclusions are supported by empirical evidence from California, which already has
more than 1.3 million PEVs on the road.333 While some pundits have claimed EV charging is
already straining the grid, triggering service disruptions, those claims have been debunked.334
And root cause analysis from the California Independent System Operator (California ISO)
showed that PEVs are not what has strained the grid.335 Indeed, empirical evidence shows that
PEV charging has been accommodated with minimal required grid upgrades and that EV
charging can be shifted to hours of the day when there is plenty of spare grid capacity. Since
2011, CPUC has required the utilities it regulates to report annually on costs associated with
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accommodating PEV charging and on the charging patterns of PEVs on different utility rates.336
As summarized by Synapse Energy Economics, utility grid upgrades required to accommodate
PEV charging to this point in those service territories are essentially rounding errors compared to
the costs of maintaining the electrical grid: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 121]
333 Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Electric Vehicle Sales Dashboard,
https://www.autosinnovate.org/resources/electric-vehicle-sales-dashboard.
334 Dustin Gardiner, No, Newsom's Push for Electric Cars Isn't the Cause of Potential Blackouts in
California, San Francisco Chronicle (Sept. 7, 2022), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/No-
Newsom-s-push-for-electric-cars-isn-t-the-17426102.php.
335 California ISO, Root Cause Analysis: Mid-August 2020 Extreme Heat Waive (Jan. 13, 2021),
http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Final-Root-Cause-Analysis-Mid-August-2020-Extreme-Heat-Wave.pdf.
336 S. Cal. Edison Co., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. & Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., Joint IOU Electric Vehicle
Load Research and Charging Infrastructure Cost Report 10th Report (Mar. 31, 2022),
https://www.cpuc.ca.gOv/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/transportation-
electrification/1 Oth-j oint-iou-ev-load-report-mar-2022.pdf.
Even in the service territories with the most EVs, the observed costs have been minor. For
instance, in California where EV adoption has been markedly higher than other states, EV-
related distribution upgrade costs appear minor compared to total distribution costs. Despite the
fact EVs are often more concentrated in many neighborhoods and distribution circuits, California
utilities collectively spent less than 0.03% of their total distribution-related expenses on
distribution system upgrades associated with residential EV adoption.337 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 121]
337 Melissa Whited, Tyler Fitch, Jason Frost, Eric Borden, Courtney Lane, BenHavumaki, Sarah
Shenstone-Harris & Elijah Sinclair, Electric Vehicles Are Driving Rates Down (June
2023),https://www.synapseenergy.com/sites/default/files/Electric%20Vehicles%20Are%20Driving%20Rat
es%20Down% 20Factsheet.pdf (citations omitted).
Furthermore, as detailed below, the projected growth in electricity demand over the coming
years is well within the range of past historical load growth. Additionally, the industry is already
responding to and preparing for increased electrification as more fleets and individuals adopt
PEVs, and it has a wide range of tools, practices, and partnerships in place to continue to
maintain a strong and reliable grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 121]
3. EVs can lower the cost of managing an increasingly dynamic electric grid.
Third-party analyses have found that PEVs, if deployed strategically, can improve grid
operations. For example, PEVs can "contribute significantly to grid stability" and provide value
to the grid through "deferred or avoided capital expenditure on additional stationary storage,
power electronic infrastructure, transmission build-out, and more."344 Additionally, utilities can
deploy proven and emerging rate designs that ensure utilities recover costs, reliably serve PEV
charging load, improve PEV owner experience, and take advantage of grid strengthening
services from these vehicles.345 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 126-127]
344 Chengjian Xu et al., Electric vehicle batteries alone could satisfy short-term grid storage demand by as
early as 2030, Nature Commc'n, Jan. 17, 2023, at 1, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-35393-0.
345 See e.g., Brittany Blair et al., Smart Electric Power Alliance, Managed Charging Programs:
Maximizing Customer Satisfaction and Grid Benefits (2023), https://sepapower.org/resource/managed-
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charging-programs-maximizing-customer-satisfaction-and-grid-benefits/; Enel-X, Understanding Smart EV
Load Management (Apr. 8, 2022), https://info.evcharging.enelx.com/whitepaper-download-ev-load-
management-utility-dive; Zachary Needell, Wei Wei & Jessika E. Trancik, Strategies for beneficial electric
vehicle charging to reduce peak electricity demand and store solar energy, CELL REPS. PHYSICAL SCI.,
Mar. 15, 2023, https://www.cell.com/cell-reports-physical-science/fulltext/S2666-3864(23)00046-2; Lily
Paul & Maureen Marshall, CALSTART, Not Just Smart: The Importance of Managed Charging (2021),
https://calstart.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Managed-Charging-Paper-Final.pdf; Karen Kirk, Yes, the
grid can handle EV charging, even when demand spikes, Yale Climate Connections (Mar. 23, 2023),
https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2023/03/yes-the-grid-can-handle-ev-charging-even-when-demand-
spikes/.
Researchers from Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory estimate that using smart charging
of light-duty PEVs as a means to comply with California's energy storage procurement mandate
(designed to facilitate the integration of renewable energy) would save utility customers
approximately $1.5 billion because it is cheaper to use batteries customers have already
purchased on four wheels than to pay private companies to deploy standalone battery storage.346
The same study also found that enabling "vehicle-to-grid" (V2G) technology, allowing PEVs to
supply power back to the grid during times of stress, could save $13-15 billion in stationary
battery costs.347 "By displacing the need for construction of new stationary grid storage, EVs
can provide the dual benefit of decarbonizing transportation while lowering the capital costs for
widespread renewables integration," the researchers concluded.348 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 127]
346 Jonathan Coignard, et al., Clean Vehicles as an Enabler for a Clean Electricity Grid. Environmental
Research Letters. V. 13, No. 5. (May 2018), at 4, 5, http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-
9326/aabe97 (last accessed
June 30, 2023).
347 Id. at 5, 6.
348 Id. at 1.
Focusing on the Midwest to underscore the point, researchers concluded that very high levels
of renewable energy penetration in the Midcontinent Independent System Operator region could
result in "negative valleys" (requiring excess renewable energy to be exported or curtailed), but
that "[controlled (EV) charging [both smart charging and smart discharging back onto the grid]
is able to reduce these negative valleys, and with sufficient numbers of EVs can eliminate them
altogether, obviating the need for either export of excess renewable generation or
curtailment "349 This would provide both increased environmental benefits by facilitating the
integration of high levels of renewable generation and significant customer benefits. Put simply,
it is cheaper to pay individual utility customers to use batteries on wheels they have already
bought and paid for than it is to pay corporations to buy big batteries and park them on the grid.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 128]
349 Jeffery Greenblatt, et al., Quantifying the Potential of Electric Vehicles to Provide Electric Grid
Benefits in the MISO Area: Final report to the Midcontinent Independent System Operators. Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory, at 6, 56, at
https://cdn.misoenergy.org/Quantifying%20the%20Potential%20of%20Electric%20Vehicles%20to%20Pro
vide%20 Electric%20Grid%20Benefits%20in%20the%20MISO%20Area354192.pdf. (last accessed June
30, 2023).
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4. PEV charging is already putting downward pressure on electric rates, to the benefit of all
utility customers.
Because much PEV charging can be accomplished when there is spare capacity on the grid,
charging can spread the costs of maintaining the system over a greater volume of electricity
sales, reducing the per-kilowatt-hour price of electricity to the benefit of all customers. This has
already been demonstrated in the real world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 128]
In fact, empirical data compiled by Synapse Energy Economics shows that PEV drivers are
not being subsidized by other utility customers and, in fact, they are putting downward pressure
on rates. Between 2011 and 2020, PEV customers across the United States contributed more than
$1.7 billion in net revenue to the body of utility customers.350 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
p. 128]
350 Melissa Whited, Tyler Fitch, Jason Frost, Eric Borden, Courtney Lane, Ben Havumaki, Sarah
Shenstone-Harris & Elijah Sinclair, Electric Vehicles Are Driving Rates Down 1 (June 2023),
https://www.sy napse-
energy.com/sites/default/files/Electric%20Vehicles%20 Are%20Driving%20Rates%20Down%
20Factsheet.pdf.
The results shown in Figure XVII.G-4 compare the new revenue the utilities collected from
PEV drivers to the cost of the energy, capacity, transmission, and distribution system upgrades
required to charge those vehicles, plus the costs of utility PEV infrastructure programs that are
deploying charging stations for PEVs. In total, PEV drivers contributed an estimated $1.7 billion
more than associated costs. That net revenue is returned to the body of utility customers in the
form of electric bills that are lower than they would otherwise be. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 128]
Figure XVII.G-4: Total Utility Revenues vs. Total Costs Associated with PEVs (2011-
2020)351
351 Id. at 3.
[See original comment for XVII.G-4], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 129]
Organization: John Graham
Table 1 also shows that the lifecycle emissions advantage of the BEV is larger in the states
that have adopted zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) mandates than in states that have not adopted
ZEV mandates. This difference reflects that fact that the average reliance on coal and oil for
electricity production is much less prevalent in ZEV states (6.9%) than in non-ZEV states
(31.2%). 100 Since the incremental effect of the EPA rule will be felt predominantly in the non-
ZEV states, the most appropriate comparison for this rulemaking is HEV emissions versus BEV
emissions in non-ZEV states. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 35]
100 EPA. eGRID with 2021 Data. Released January 30, 2023, https://www.epa.gov/egrid/summary-data.
The central case in the DRIA ignores this reality by assuming that no states have adopted zero
emission vehicle mandates. There is a sensitivity case where state ZEV mandates are considered
in an alternative baseline, but the sensitivity case does not actually assume full implementation
of the state-level mandates. Instead, it uses a BEV adopter model with a state-ZEV variable that
is not properly specified (this weakness is acknowledged by the authors of the model). 101
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As a result, even the sensitivity case assumes, incorrectly, that the EPA rule will have a large
impact on BEV adoption in the ZEV states. In the final rule, EPA should fix this problem,
making sure that the BEV-adoption impact of the rule is concentrated in the non-ZEV states
(since the state regulations and ancillary state policies will handle BEV deployment in the ZEV
states). We also recommend a specific marginal emissions comparison of BEVs versus HEVs in
each of the non- ZEV states. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 35]
101 https://www.nrel.gov/docs/ly22osti/81065.pdf (especially p. 18)..
Organization: National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)
Manufacturers are committed to the communities in which they live and serve. Constant
innovation, investment and dedication make manufacturers leaders in environmental stewardship
and sustainability as they continue to drive our economic growth and prosperity. Modern
manufacturing is a clean and efficient, technology-driven industry that is dedicated to the planet
and its people. The NAM's members are committed to ensuring that progress continues. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0633, pp. 1-2]
Auto manufacturers have been making historic investments to ensure that more zero
emissions vehicles are available for American motorists. As the Environmental Protection
Agency finalizes its light and medium-duty vehicle emissions standards, it should structure them
to allow manufacturers in the U.S. to meet market demand and remain globally competitive. To
achieve these goals, we recommend the following approaches to the proposed rulemaking. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0633, pp. 1-2]
Infrastructure Needed
According to the Department of Energy's draft National Transmission Needs Study released
in February 2023, the national electric transmission infrastructure would need to grow 57% by
2035 to reach the Biden administration's clean energy goals for the light-, medium-and heavy-
duty vehicle industries. 1 Yet at the historical pace of approximately 1% annual growth for these
infrastructure projects,2 the transmission system could require more than half a century for the
administration to achieve its stated goals for the next decade. As such, the rulemaking must
recognize the realities and limitations of current infrastructure. Manufacturers continue to urge
administration officials and congressional leaders to prioritize policies, including critical
permitting reforms, that would strengthen transmission systems and infrastructure and speed up
their growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0633, pp. 1-2]
1 https ://www .energy. gov/gdo/national-transmission-needs-study
2 https://repeatproject.org/docs/REPEAT_IRA_Transmission_2022-09-22.pdf
Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
This rule is like the Clean Power Plan proposed by the Biden Administration. The US Energy
Information Administration conducted a study of the Clean Power Plan and found that average
retail electricity rates would increase upwards of 3-7%. 13 Taking the mid-range of this price
increase, or 5%, the proposed rule would raise the previous electric rate increase of 55% to 58%
and increase electricity costs for EV charging from EPA's estimate of $460 billion to $728
billion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 5]
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13 https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/powerplants/cleanplan/
This $728 billion in higher electricity expenditures more than offsets the savings in reduced
liquid fuel spending of $620. On balance, the fuel cost savings are a NEGATIVE $108 billion in
contrast to EPA's estimated pre-tax fuel savings of $890 billion. This is a nearly $1 trillion
difference. So, under rather conservative but realistic assumptions and elementary economic
analysis, the proposed EV rule will not save consumers money but instead will lead to higher
electricity costs, especially for poor and lower to middle class households living in rental units.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 5]
Organization: Travis Fisher
Specifically, the EPA's DRIA regarding the impact of the Proposed Rule on the cost and
reliability of electricity in the U.S. is gravely flawed. It should be redrafted to enable the EPA
Administrator to give appropriate consideration to the cost and safety factors of the Proposed
Rule, as required by section 202 of the Clean Air Act. 1 Further, the DRIA should address the
interactions between the Proposed Rule and other EPA rules—including the recently proposed
rule on greenhouse gas emissions from power plants2—as required by Executive Order 12866.3
As written, the Proposed Rule: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 1]
1 42 U.S.C. § 7521, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7521.
2 New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions From Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean
Energy Rule, 88 FR 33240; May 23, 2023. Available at:
https://www.federalregister.gOv/documents/2023/05/23/2023-10141/new-source- performance-standards-
for-greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-new-modified-and-reconstructed (accessed July 2, 2023).
3 Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 FR 51735; October 4, 1993. Available at:
https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf (accessed July 2, 2023).
1. Violates section 202 of the Clean Air Act by failing to adequately consider:
A. Impaired bulk power system reliability and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655,
p. 1]
B. Increased retail electricity prices; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 1]
EPA Summary and Response
We received many comments from the public related to the final rule. These comments dealt
with several subjects, including generation capacity, transmission capacity, distribution capacity,
differences in results between various emissions models and inventories, infrastructure upgrade
costs, and electricity rates. A summary of these comments as well as EPA's response appears
below.
Summary
Topic: Electric Power System: Generation Capacity
We received three comments related to generation capacity from the public. Two of the
comments expressed concern that the EPA did not adequately consider the generation system
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capacity, while one comment agreed with EPA's assessment that adequate generation system
capacity currently exists and will so for the duration of this final rule. These commenters
included: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, Charles Gordon, and Environmental
and Public Health Organizations.
Topic: Electric Power System: Transmission Capacity
We received four comments related to transmission capacity from the public. Three of the
comments expressed concern that the EPA did not adequately consider the transmission system
capacity, while one comment agreed with EPA's assessment that adequate transmission system
capacity currently exists and will so for the duration of this final rule. These commenters
included: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, Charles Gordon, Environmental and
Public Health Organizations, and National Association of Manufacturers (NAM).
Topic: Electric Power System: Distribution Capacity
We received two comments related to distribution system from the public. One comment
expressed concern that the EPA did not adequately consider the distribution system capacity,
while another comment agreed with EPA's assessment that adequate distribution system capacity
currently exists and will so for the duration of this final rule. These commentors included:
American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers and Environmental and Public Health
Organizations.
Topic: Electric Power System Reliability
We received three comments related to the electric power sector reliability from the public.
Two of the comments expressed concern that the EPA did not adequately characterize possible
degradation to the electric power system, while another comment agreed with EPA's assessment
that this final rule will not result in significant material harm to electric power system reliability.
These commenters included: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, Environmental and
Public Health Organizations, and Travis Fisher.
Topic: Emissions Modeling
We received one comment related to emissions modeling. The one comment expressed
concern that EPA's emissions modeling in support of this final rule was inaccurate. This
comment was from John Graham.
Topic: Infrastructure Upgrade Costs
We received two comments related to infrastructure upgrade costs from the public. These
comments expressed concern that the EPA did not adequately consider the benefits and/or costs
associated with infrastructure upgrade costs. These commenters included: American Fuel &
Petrochemical Manufacturers and Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine.
Topic: Electricity Rates
We received two comments related to the electricity rates from the public. These comments
expressed concern that the EPA did not adequately consider decreases and/or increases in
electricity rates. These commenters included: Environmental and Public Health Organizations,
and Travis Fisher.
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Response:
EPA conducted extensive electric power sector modeling analyses in which it concluded that
there is adequate generation and transmission capacity required to meet the electric load
demands imposed by the final rule. Moreover, the modeling analyses confirmed that there is
adequate generation and transmission capacity to meet North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) reliability standards, including those for reserve capacity. Our analyses
demonstrate that the impacts of both this rule alone and combined with the Heavy-Duty Phase 3
Rule do not adversely affect resource adequacy and grid reliability. These impacts result in
anticipated power grid changes that 1) are consistent with key National Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) assumptions, 2) that are consistent with historical trends and empirical data,
and 3) are consistent with goals, planning efforts and Integrated Resource Plans (IRPs) of
industry itself. In response to commenters that claimed the cumulative impacts of the final rule
and certain EPA proposed rules relating to the electric generating sector would adversely affect
resource adequacy and grid reliability, we also performed an analysis of cumulative impacts and
assessed that these cumulative impacts were unlikely to adversely affect resource adequacy or
grid reliability. For additional discussion of these topics, see RIA Chapter 5: Electric Power
Sector and Infrastructure Impacts and the Technical Memorandum for Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 Docket ID No
Numbers. EPA-EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829 and EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985.
EPA also conducted extensive and first-ever, national-level distribution system modeling
analyses in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory (NREL), and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) in support
of this final rule. The study found that: the benefits of vehicle electrification to consumers
outweigh the estimated cost of charging infrastructure and grid upgrades; incremental
distribution grid investment needs represent approximately 3 percent of current annual utility
investments in the distribution system; and incremental distribution grid investment needs
decrease by 30% with basic managed charging techniques.
The study also underscored the additional benefits that managed electric vehicle charging
confers to the distribution system, such as the ability to defer distribution system upgrades. With
managed charging, the final standards provide significant distribution system benefits, both
financially and in terms of their ability to defer necessary distribution system upgrades. By more-
effectively utilizing existing electric power system assets, managed electric vehicle charging has
been shown to help reduce overall electricity costs by allowing for the deferral of electric power
system upgrades, with deferment potential of between 5 and 15 years over the 2021-2050 period
(Kintner-Meyer et. al., 2022). While such deferrals reduce immediate capital expenditures for
electric power system operators, they also extend the functional lifespan of these assets, provide
electric utility planners with additional time to more-effectively schedule and coordinate needed
distribution system upgrades, consider cost-effective planning options, and help mitigate supply
chain shortages for electric power system components. For additional discussion, see Chapter 5:
Electric Power Sector and Infrastructure Impacts and the joint DOE-NREL-LBNL-EPA
Technical Report for the Transportation Electrification Infrastructure Study (TEIS).
When considering emissions from various electric vehicles, one commentor cited estimates
from eGRID, a spreadsheet data source produced by EPA. eGRID is a useful, static spreadsheet-
based tool for approximating electric power plant emissions. For rulemaking purposes involving
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the electric power sector, EPA uses the Integrated Planning Model (IPM), a multi-regional,
dynamic, deterministic linear programming model of the U.S. electric power sector. It provides
projections of least-cost capacity expansion, electricity dispatch, and emission control strategies
for meeting energy demand and environmental, transmission, dispatch, and reliability
constraints. The inherent differences between eGRID, a static dataset, and IPM, a dynamic
optimization model used to develop the final rule, likely account for the emissions differences
encountered by the commentor. In other words, eGRID is a list of electric power sector assets
that says nothing about the conditions or times during which they may be called upon to operate,
whereas IPM is a tool that determines the least-cost set of these assets, which vary with time, that
achieve a policy objective. As such, EPA finds that IPM, and not eGRID, is the more suitable
tool for purposes of modeling the effects of this rule.
When discussing transmission system concerns, one commentor cited a statistic from the
Department of Energy (DOE) DRAFT National Transmission Needs Study. However, the
DRAFT National Transmission Needs Study cited by the commentor was superseded by the
FINAL National Transmission Needs Study. Further, the internet link provided by the
commentor for the DRAFT report links, instead, to the FINAL report. A search for the DRAFT
report was fruitless as was a search of the FINAL report for the statistic in question.
One commentor cited differences between the 2050 results of EPA's IPM emissions modeling
conducted in support of this final rule and the Energy Information Administration's (EIA)
Annual Energy Outlook 2023 (AEO2023).
For this final rule, we conducted extensive electric power sector generation modeling analyses
using EPA's Power Sector Modeling Platform v6. To generate projections used in the Annual
Energy Outlook 2023 (AEO2023), EIA uses the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS).
The modeling assumptions used in EIA's NEMS differ from the modeling assumptions used in
EPA's Power Sector Modeling Platform v6 and likely account for the perceived differences in
2050 results. EPA's IPM model differs and EIA's NEMS model in many ways. For instance:
Total electric demand assumed in IPM to support the final rule is higher than that used by
EIA in NEMS for AEO2023.
Regional distribution of electricity demand assumed in IPM to support the final rule
differs from that used by EIA in NEMS for AEO2023. EPA has carefully considered the regional
impacts of our regulation, and we believe accounting for such regional impacts is important
given regional differences between motor vehicle use as well as the electric sector.
IPM uses additional (incremental) EV demand incorporated to the total demand
compared to AEO (NEMS). Given that this rule is associated with increases in electricity
demand, we believe using up-to-date total electric demand numbers reflecting those increases in
IPM is appropriate.
EPA rules are not fully reflected in AEO modeling, and AEO modeling does not capture
the effects of the expiration of tax credits in later years of the IRA. We believe that reflecting
existing regulations in the baseline is important in assessing the impacts of our action; this is also
consistent with Circular A-4. Over the course of this rulemaking EPA has also worked closely
with DOE and carefully evaluated IRS guidance in assessing the impacts of relevant IRA
provisions, and our analysis fully accounts for this updated information.
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EPA updates the generation fleet information (retirements and new capacity additions)
frequently, based on both EIA data, public comments, and EPA research;
EPA incorporates and models various state-level environmental regulations in detail and
updates them frequently;
When reviewing EIA's AEO, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) noted that a
"challenge with AEO projections is that they tend to be less accurate as they go farther out into
the future" (Lawson, A. J. et. al. 2020B). The CRS is a public policy research institute of the
United States Congress that operates within the Library of Congress, works primarily and
directly for members of Congress and their committees and staff on a confidential, nonpartisan
basis.
The CRS also notes that "EIA's projections have been criticized for not taking into account
potential changes in laws and regulations. Some critics argue that this presents a misleading
reference upon which many policy and investment decisions are made. Others argue EIA
insufficiently accounts for policy or technology changes in its projections" (Lawson, A. J. et. al.
2020A).
EIA announced in early 2023 that it will postpone the release of AEO 2024, because NEMS
".. .requires substantial updates to better model hydrogen, carbon capture, and other emerging
technologies." Further, the next AEO release is scheduled for 2025 and will ".. .more
comprehensively address existing laws and regulations in the Reference case, including up-to-
date provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act and regulatory actions that could be finalized in
the coming months." This is the first time in its 41-year history that the AEO will not be
published.
For the above reasons, EPA believed that using IPM is appropriate for purposes of modeling
this rule. In sum, EPA devoted considerable time and resources, including in consultation with
DOE, in assuring that the IPM would accurately model the impacts of this rulemaking, for
example, accounting for additional electricity demand due to EVs associated with this
rulemaking and reflecting the latest EPA and State regulations relevant to the power sector. By
contrast, AEO2023 does not accurately account for these important factors
One commentor suggested that EPA's final rule "Violates section 202 of the Clean Air Act by
failing to adequately consider: A. Impaired bulk power system reliability and B. Increased retail
electricity prices." EPA notes that the Clean Air Act Section 202 does not specifically list these
factors. Nonetheless, EPA did in fact consider both grid reliability and retail electricity prices.
One commentor was supportive of EPA's final rule, stating that the increase in expected
future electricity demands is consistent with past precedent; that electric vehicle-related
distribution upgrade costs will be minor compared to total distribution costs; that electric
vehicles can lower the cost of managing the electric power system; and reduce the curtailment of
renewable electricity. This commenter also added that electric vehicles should provide
downward pressure on electricity prices for electric vehicle users and non-users.
18.1 - Electrical distribution level and transmission level reliability
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Comments by Organizations
Organization: 25x '25 Alliance, et al.
The undersigned parties offer the following comments on EPA's proposed rule, "Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles." We write these comments because we believe that the proposed rules would establish
an overly aggressive, high-risk program that would be counterproductive in achieving the
agency's environmental and health objectives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
In establishing or revising Clean Air Act Section 202(a) standards, EPA must consider issues
of technological feasibility, cost of compliance, and lead time. Among other things, that means
the agency must look closely at the impact of its proposed standards on net emissions of air
pollutants and their associated public health effects, impacts on the automotive industry, impacts
on the vehicle purchasers/consumers, energy security, and safety, and how the proposed
approach would compare to other possible rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-
4]
EPA's review of relevant factors in the current proposal is seriously deficient. The chief
failure comes because the agency elides two distinct types of feasibility: the technological
feasibility of electric vehicles as a part of the fleet and the technological feasibility of electric
vehicles as the whole of the fleet. We do not dispute the former, but overwhelming evidence
disproves the latter. First, there are no established supply chains capable of supplying the raw
materials to manufacture the millions of vehicles needed—just over the next decade—to supply
the projected market. Second, the infrastructure necessary to support these vehicles, particularly
recharging infrastructure, is not and will not be available in the necessary timescales. The high
density of chargers needed in major metropolitan areas and vast web of chargers needed to span
the rural areas of the Country will require tremendous planning and investment. The long lead
times associated with new renewable generation means that this added marginal electric load will
be powered by natural gas and coal for the foreseeable future. And current prices, lack of
infrastructure, and public opinion militate strongly against the conclusion that a ten-fold increase
in the annual sales of electric vehicles will occur in the next eight years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0573, pp.1-4]
Organization: Advanced Energy United
However, in order to fully realize the benefits of this new fuel source, we must consider
innovative approaches that will effectively manage that electric load and mitigate potential grid
impacts. In the draft regulatory impact assessment for the Phase 3 rule, the EPA rightly
recognized that grid constraints will be a challenge, and the likely necessity of a variety of
approaches to reduce the need or scale of upgrades.2 While some solutions to this challenge will
require the engagement of state and federal policymakers, others are already being deployed by
innovative companies across the advanced energy industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, p.
2]
2 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standard for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles -Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis p 5-35
https://nepis.epa.gOv/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P 10175 J2.PDF?Dockey=P10175 J2.PDF
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Building out a decarbonized electric grid with advanced energy technologies—and the
infrastructure necessary to ensure its stability—will require the innovation and speed
demonstrated by President Roosevelt's Arsenal of Democracy. In response to the need for tanks,
weapons, and planes, American companies like Ford, GM, and Boeing ramped up manufacturing
production and began making the technologies, equipment, and parts necessary to bolster Allied
efforts. That is the kind of American innovation that we will need—and have begun to see—
from leading automakers and new market entrants as they increase their share of EVs. For
instance, Ford and Sunrun have teamed up to pair the energy storage capabilities of the all-
electric F-150 Lightening with rooftop solar. In a similar vein, Rivian has indicated an interest in
implementing bi-directional charging—vehicle-to-load—software into their vehicles which
would alleviate grid constraints and improve resiliency. This technology turns an EV into a
mobile battery. This could yield immense benefits to grid resiliency and provide helpful energy
storage for commercial buildings and homes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, p. 2]
In addition to hardware solutions to manage grid impacts from electric LDVs, software-based
managed charging solutions (sometimes called automated load management or power control
systems) serve a similar role to mitigate the need for electrical distribution system upgrades.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, p. 2]
II. Case Studies
Below are three brief case studies that show how these proven technologies have helped to
alleviate grid constraints and benefit consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, pp. 2-3]
Case Study 1:
Dedicated EVSE companies like FreeWire Technologies are mitigating stumbling blocks on
the road to decarbonized transportation. Their battery-integrated charging technology "solves
grid constraints by packaging charging infrastructure, grid infrastructure, and energy storage into
a fully-integrated compact solution."3 These ultrafast chargers provide enhanced grid resiliency
options during peak demand and can support critical facilities during outages and charge vehicles
at 200kW in 15 minutes.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, pp. 2-3]
3 FreeWire Technologies. (27 April, 2022). FreeWire Technologies Announces $125 Million Series D
Financing to Accelerate Deployment and Development of Next-Gen EV Charging Technology and Energy
Management Services, https://freewiretech.com/freewire-technologies-announces-125-million-series-d-
financing/
4 FreeWire Technologies. (2023). FAQ.
https://freewiretech.com/faq/#:~:text=Visit%20the%20Boost%20Chargei%20web,200%20miles%20in%20
15%20minutes.
Case Study 2:
Octopus Energy has employed a demand response program in the United Kingdom called
Intelligent Octopus, which demonstrates the potential for managed charging to reduce grid
pressures and the costs associated with overbuilding the distribution system. A customer simply
sets their preferences in an app (specifying when they need the EV charged and the state of
charge that is needed) and the platform will automatically charge the cars at times where there is
abundant, low-cost energy, helping to balance out demand and supply on the grid while saving
customers money. Intelligent Octopus enrollment has grown from 600 EVs since it was launched
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in January 2022 to over 45,000 EVs today, providing 250 MW in shiftable load resources.
Intelligent Octopus was launched for EV drivers in Texas in February. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0695, p. 3]
Case Study 3:
Irish Post issued an RFP to electrify 100 parking sites across the country for its mail fleet of
trucks, vans, and cars. Understanding that they were working with constrained grid conditions,
Irish Post included load management capability as a requirement so as to avoid the cost and time
delays of extensive local grid upgrades. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, p. 3]
A general contractor and The Mobility House (TMH) won the RFP and deployed 2800 22 kW
AC chargers and 180 DC chargers ranging from 22-50 kW while avoiding an estimated 50 MW
of utility upgrades across all sites. At a subset of 31 sites using exclusively 32 Amp chargers,
TMH's load management technology enabled the team to safely install and operate EVSE
nameplate capacity exceeding the main site panel capability by an average of 200-300%. This
allowed an average of eight extra EVSEs per site to be installed without upgrading service,
saving Irish Post time and money as they electrified their fleet while allowing all EVSEs access
to their full nameplate capacity when needed and serving their mobility needs with no
adjustments in driver behavior. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, p. 3]
Case Study 4:
Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology allows an electric vehicle (EV) to draw energy from the
grid (typically during periods of low cost & low demand) and discharge energy back to the grid
(during periods of high cost & high demand). V2G technology also helps reduce energy costs
associated with owning and operating EV fleets. An increasing number of electric utilities, like
National Grid in Massachusetts, support programs that pay electric fleets and other battery
storage resources to discharge energy, turning them into revenue-generating assets without
disrupting normal operations. In the summers of 2021 & 2022, Highland Electric Fleets piloted
V2G technology in battery storage from electric school buses. 10+ MWh was discharged to the
Massachusetts grid across 158 hours, generating $2,300. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, pp.
3-4]
Case Study 5:
The San Diego-based company Nuvve is a global leader in vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology
with deployments on five continents. In the US, Nuvve is focused on the school bus market.
Electrified school bus fleets represent an excellent candidate for V2G given the large batteries
and the long dwell times. School buses are often idle for months at a time during the summer
when additional grid capacity is at a premium. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) acknowledges the potential of electrified school bus fleets to provide V2G services.5
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, p. 4]
5 See U.S. EPA, What if Electric School Buses Could be Used to Supply Power When Off Duty? Available
at https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/what-if-electric-school-buses-could-be-used-supply-power-when-
duty.
Nuvve is the only company, working collaboratively with San Diego Gas & Electric
(SDG&E), to have successfully developed an electric school bus (ESB) V2G pilot program in
California. Six 60 kW bidirectional chargers and six V2G capable Lion Electric school buses
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were deployed at Cajon Valley Union School District. Using Nuvve's GIVe software platform,
these buses participated in 10 Emergency Load Reduction Program (ELRP) events from August
17th through September 9th through SDG&E.6 The host school district was paid $2/kWh for
V2G exports helping to reduce the total cost of ownership of its ESB fleet. Nuvve has additional
V2G deployments totaling over 1 MW under development in California. In addition, Nuvve has
multiple projects under development in other states including Oregon, Utah, Nevada, Colorado,
Texas, Illinois, Florida, and Rhode Island. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, p. 4]
6 See SDG&E and Cajon Valley Union School District Flip the Switch on Region's First Vehicle-to-Grid
Project Featuring Local Electric School Buses Capable of Sending Power to the Grid available at
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20220726006137/en/SDGE-and-Cajon-Valley-Union-School-
District-Flip-the-Switch-on-Region%E2%80%99s-First-Vehicle-to-Grid-Project-Featuring-Local-Electric-
School-Buses-Capable-of-Sending-Power-to-the-Grid.
III. Technology Impacts
Managed charging with both hardware-and software-based solutions is an essential strategy to
reduce infrastructure costs for fleet charging depots. Depot charging is likely to account for
nearly 90% of fleet operating needs, with vehicles on average having 14 hours of downtime per
day.7 Managing these vehicles' charging load to avoid peak periods can substantially reduce the
need to upgrade both the facility's infrastructure and the utility-side infrastructure, compared to
an unmanaged charging scenario in which vehicles charge simultaneously during peak periods.
A recent NREL study found that managed charging in the MHD sector can reduce distribution
system investment costs by up to $1,090 per EV per year.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, pp.
4-5]
7 Perspectives on Charging Medium-and Heavy-Duty Electric Vehicles, NREL, December 2021.
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy22osti/81656.pdf
8 Electric Vehicle Grid Integration, NREL. https://www.nrel.gov/transportation/project-ev-grid-
integration.html
In 2021 testimony filed at the California Public Utilities Commission, Pacific Gas & Electric
stated that utilizing these load management technologies could reduce the originally requested
capacity by more than 50%, which resulted in cost savings ranging from $30,000 to $200,000 per
project.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, pp. 4-5]
9 PGE testimony 2-9-210 https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/SupDoc/A2110010/4240/417398449.pdf
A 2023 report from Synapse Energy Economics, leveraging data and tariffs from ConEd and
National Grid, found that managed charging reduced site peak load by 15% and 5%
respectively. 10 This data reflects the more rigid charging needs and schedules of fleet vehicles,
but is significant, nonetheless. The cost savings associated with managed charging are also likely
to lead to faster economic return on investment for fleets in the process of electrification. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0695, p. 5]
10 MHDV Integration Costs Report, Synapse, April 2023.
https://acrobat.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3Ab0fd0780-9882-3a25-9ef2-
f8c73bd80c92&viewer%21megaVerb=group-discover
The implementation of managed charging policies are a critical factor to speed overall
adoption of light-duty electric vehicles in line with the EPA's rulemaking. As emissions
standards steadily increase and EVs proliferate on our roads, it is likely that demand for
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electricity will rise beyond what managed charging can save. This new demand will call for
added transmission capacity and resiliency measures, vehicle-grid integration, smart charging,
and bidirectional charging/ V2G, and other innovative solutions. Without proactive planning and
buildout of charging infrastructure, the U.S. is at risk of failing to meet its ambitious, and
laudable, goals for transportation emissions reductions. A 2021 study by the Brattle Group
estimated that investments in transmission would have to reach $25 billion in order to charge 20
million EVs. 11 To fully unlock these investments, the U.S. will need to undertake permitting
reform, to streamline transmission projects and free up interconnection queues. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0695, p. 5]
11 Sergici, S., Hagerty, M., & Long, L. (1 June, 2020). Electric Power Sector Investments of $75-125
Billion Needed to Support Projected 20 Million EVs by 2030, According to Brattle Economists. Brattle
Group, https://www.brattle.com/insights-events/publications/electric-power-sector-investments-of-75-125-
billion-needed-to-support-projected-20-million-evs-by-2030-according-to-brattle-economists/
Digital permitting processes could also alleviate bottlenecks in EVSE infrastructure. The
Department of Energy's SolarApp+ is a model program that has saved customers and contractor
valuable time and money on solar installations by standardizing and streamlining permitting
processes in localities across the U.S. Policymakers across the country should consider a similar
approach to slash soft costs for the permitting of EV charging infrastructure. Investment alone
cannot satisfy new demand. We must enable streamlined permitting processes if we are to meet
the Biden Administration's goal of building 500,000 new charging stations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0695, p. 5]
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
Beyond BEV affordability, success of this regulation will be determined by factors outside of
the vehicle; the U.S. is sorely behind in this effort (despite over the $150 billion of private sector
investment thus far) and the NPRM does little to address these factors. Current charging and
fueling infrastructure is inadequate (particularly residential charging), the grid resources are at
least 5 to 10 years away (without even factoring in the additional demand for grid resources from
the heavy-duty vehicle sector facing similar concerns in a concurrent EPA rulemaking6), and
battery critical minerals (except lithium), which primarily determine the affordability and
availability of EVs, are minimally addressed in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 4-5]
6 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Proposed Rule: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy -
Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 (for Model Years 2027-2032), 88 Fed. Reg. 25,926 (Ap. 27, 2023). Hereinafter
"EPA HD GHG NPRM)."
No requirements to support required EVs or the drivers that must buy them
The NPRM and all the requirements set forth to date focus solely on the sale of BEVs. They
propose no requirements to ensure that infrastructure will be available at homes, businesses,
public event venues, highway corridors, transportation hubs, or other public locations. They
contain no requirements to provide hydrogen or hydrogen fueling stations, or for utilities to
quickly bring reasonably priced high-power charging (5-20 megawats (MW)) to highway service
plazas, fleet locations, city centers, or transportation hubs. They do not address the need for
battery critical minerals to power everything from light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles,
energy storage systems (ESS), lawn and garden equipment, laptops, cell phones, forklitis, and
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airport services—not just in the United States, but around the world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, p. 5]
To support the vehicle requirements proposed, all these changes are necessary in under 10
years. For perspective, 10 years is the time required to obtain the necessary permits for a mine in
the United States. Once permitted, another ten years could elapse before the mine produces at
capacity. Ten years is also close to the time required to bring 20 MWs of power to a single
location in the United States. Consequently, to the extent we need critical minerals and high-
power charging, we must start today. Yet, there is no plan to do so. There is no roadmap to
developing these essential pieces necessary for the transformation. Nor is there a commitment
from EPA for ongoing monitoring of these factors as the EV market develops over the duration
of EPA's proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 5]
Automakers are committed to electrification. The industry publicly agreed in August 2021
that BEVs, PHEVs, and FCEVs could constitute 40 to 50% of new vehicle sales by 2030 with
the right combination of supportive measures. Some, but not all, of those supportive measures
have started, but they are nowhere near complete and certainly not suffcient to support the even
higher requirements in the proposed regulations that substantially leapfrog that target. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 5]
b) Electricity Price Impacts on Costs of Battery Production
Electricity prices have an indirect effect on the cost of producing EVs because the supply
chain of an EV is much more energy-intensive than the supply chain for an ICE vehicle. At
battery manufacturing facilities, for example, large furnaces are required to evaporate the
solvents from the coated electrodes; since battery cells are sensitive to moisture, cell assembly
must occur in a dry room, which incurs high electricity costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp. 60-61]
State and national policies are shifting electricity generation from fossil fuels and nuclear
power to renewables, especially wind and solar. At low levels of renewables, the effect on
electricity prices may be minimal. Moreover, the cost disadvantages of renewables are declining
over time, but the renewables transition may increase electricity prices at higher levels of
renewables penetration and will likely raise them further when investments are made (e.g., in
grid-scale energy storage solutions) to address the intermittent nature of wind and solar. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 60-61]
It is difficult to estimate how much electricity prices will rise in a precise time frame (e.g.,
2024-2026) because they are often determined in utility rate-setting processes in each of the 50
states, and the EIA forecasts of future electricity prices do not account for all the policy changes
that are underway or will soon be adopted to promote or compel increased use of renewables.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 60-61]
One way for the agencies to bound the potential magnitude of rising electricity prices is to
undertake a scenario analysis where all of the U.S. - residences and businesses - face the higher
electricity prices now experienced by Germany or the State of California, both jurisdictions that
have made determined efforts to boost renewables and phase out coal and nuclear
power. Germany has the highest household electricity prices in Europe, about $0.30 per kWh. In
May 2021, the average price of residential electricity in California was $0.21 per kWh, about 7%
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higher than the price in May 2020. In the U.S. as a whole, the average residential electricity price
is about $0.13-0.14 per kWh. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 60-61]
The electricity prices paid by businesses need to be analyzed separately, as they tend to be
higher than the residential rates (in part due to demand charges). The business rate for electricity
is appropriate to use when computing the energy costs in the supply chain of battery production.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 60-61]
A detailed analysis of global supply chains is required. In the case of lithium, for example,
agencies need to consider the price of electricity where the lithium is mined, where the lithium is
processed, where the lithium is used in cathode production, where the battery cells are made, and
where battery packs are assembled. Electricity prices vary significantly around the world,
However, EPA projects 100% of battery cells will be produced in the U.S. by 2027 and growing
critical mineral production. A detailed analysis of global supply chains is required. In the case of
lithium, for example, agencies need to consider the price of electricity where the lithium is
mined, where the lithium is processed, where the lithium is used in cathode production, where
the battery cells are made, and where battery packs are assembled. As more of the lithium-ion
battery supply chain develops in the U.S., the analysis of U.S. electricity prices on battery costs
will be more straightforward. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 60-61]
Renters, low-income, and MFD residents could be forced to charge at public chargers, which
is far more expensive, less reliable, and vastly less convenient. This is unreasonable, and EPA
and its federal counterparts should ensure this population has the same access to L2 home
charging as affuent single-family homeowners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 79]
It is also important to ensure low-to moderate-income (LMI) and multi-family dwelling
(MFD) residents have access to the low-cost, convenient, and reliable level 2 (L2) home
charging that more affuent single-family homeowners enjoy. MFD residents, however, often face
the greatest, most costly, and burdensome obstacles to installing residential EV charging. For
MFD residents, the additional costs to upgrade the electrical panel, install conduit between the
electrical panel and their parking space, and the logistical challenges of securing building owner
approval, coordinating the billing with the building owner, and persuading an owner to make a
long-term investment on a rental property, make it challenging to have convenient residential
charging in an MFD. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 80-82]
2. Statutory Authority
Auto Innovators shares EPA's goal of addressing climate change by achieving a net-zero
carbon transportation future, as part of an ambitious, comprehensive, and national strategy. The
Proposed Rule, however, contemplates a rapid and transformative nationwide shift to
electrification that may be well beyond what the industry or market can bear now or in the
foreseeable future. Given the significant policy and economic consequences that would flow
from this restructuring of the nation's vehicle market, and the breadth and unprecedented nature
of EPA's proposed action, clear congressional authorization is required for the Proposed Rule.
EPA lacks this clear authorization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
The Proposed Rule seeks to use Clean Air Act section 202 rulemaking to force an
extraordinary transformation of the nation's vehicle fleet away from ICE-based vehicles to
BEVs, and it is not at all clear that the level of consumer demand and infrastructure that exists
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now and is expected in the future can support the expedited, aggressive timeline in the Proposed
Rule. The Proposed Rule does not include an explicit electrification target, and EPA states that
"a compliant fleet under the proposed standards will include a diverse range of technologies." 152
But in practice, the stringency of the proposed standards is such that automakers will have no
choice but to convert to BEV fleets on a massive scale. This is the result not only of the Proposed
Rule's GHG emissions standards, but also its criteria pollutant standards and its tightening of
credit programs and other flexibilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
152 NPRM at 29187.
As EPA notes, BEVs accounted for 5.8% of the new U.S. light-duty passenger vehicle market
in 2022.153 Moreover, EPA's MY 2023-2026 GHG emissions standards that were finalized at
the end of 2021 projected only a 17% light-duty penetration rate for both BEVs and PHEVs by
MY 2026.154 Despite this low rate of consumer acceptance, the Proposed Rule projects a light-
duty BEV penetration rate of 67% by MY 2032, up from 36% in MY 2027.155 Importantly, in
the absence of these and other strict regulatory programs (such as California's ZEV mandate),
EPA projects a significantly lower MY 2032 BEV penetration rate of only 39%. 156 It is unclear
from EPA's analysis how the regulations alone justify a 28 percentage point increase in BEV
market between having regulations versus not. This is particularly concerning given that EPA's
no-action analysis presumably includes the same level of existing supportive mechanisms such
as the IRA and IIJA, assumptions for infrastructure development, and other market-enabling
features. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
153 Id. at 29189
154 See Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86
Fed. Reg. 74434, 74485, Table 33 (Dec. 30, 2021).
155 NPRM at 29329, Table 80.
156 Id. at 29329, Table 81.
In other words, a staggering increase in the implementation and adoption of BEV technology
underpins the Proposed Rule and is the central means by which the rule effectuates its
contemplated emissions reductions. But this shift to electrification is not a simple matter of
swapping one technology for another. The mass adoption of BEVs on the scale required for
compliance with the Proposed Rule's standards requires a much broader transformation in the
way vehicles are manufactured, purchased, fueled, serviced, and disposed of. Indeed, the
Proposed Rule would reorder much of the U.S. automobile industry—which supports roughly
10.3 million American jobs and $558 billion in annual car sales, and about 6% of the U.S.'s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 157 Consumers must be willing to purchase BEVs at mass scale;
the power sector must be able to generate and deliver adequate electricity 158—which itself will
contribute to emissions—while maintaining grid reliability and otherwise meeting consumer and
industrial demand; adequate charging infrastructure must be available; batteries and other
components must be manufactured at an increasing rate, critical minerals sourced, and supply
chains developed. These needs must be met not only for light-duty vehicles, but also for
medium-and heavy-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
157 See Economic Insights, Alliance for Automotive Innovation,
htps://www.autosinnovate.org/resources/insights.
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158 In addition to increasing electricity capacity, utilities are also facing a transition in technology types
and more renewable sources, as proposed under the "Greenhouse Gas Standards and Guidelines for Fossil
Fuel-Fired Power Plants" [88 FR 33240, May 23, 2023],
As expressed throughout this comment, we have serious concerns that the market will not be
able to bear the requirements of the Proposed Rule and that those requirements will not be
feasible given these considerations. Compliance will impose significant costs, and require
extraordinary effort, on the part of regulated parties—costs which will be passed along to
consumers. Setting such stringent standards has the potential to create a significant market
disruption, with consequences not only for the automobile industry but for the entire U.S.
economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
In other words, the Proposed Rule is enormously consequential for the automobile industry,
and for the economy and consumers as a whole. The Proposed Rule's provisions insert EPA into
crucial policy tradeoffs and debates, such as concerns about the extraction and supply of critical
minerals overseas, or the need to maintain a reliable, efficient electric grid. 159 These
considerations range far afield from the traditional ambit of section 202 rulemaking, delving into
areas that are the subject of other regulatory schemes, or within the unique purview and authority
of other agencies and other branches and levels of government. In short, the dramatic shift
toward electrification required by the Proposed Rule implicates issues of tremendous political,
economic, and social significance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
159 See, e.g., NPRM at 29311-24.
Nor is such a transformative rule, with such wide-ranging implications, a typical feature of
section 202 rulemaking. We acknowledge that some past EPA section 202 rules, most notably
the MY 2023-2026 rule, have contemplated greater deployment of EVs as one of many options
for complying with emissions standards. The Proposed Rule, however, is different not merely in
degree but in kind, seeking to impose what is, at bottom, a mandate toward nationwide
electrification. Such a proposal amounts to an unprecedented assertion of power on the part of
EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
"[A]n enormous and transformative expansion in EPA's regulatory authority" such as this
necessitates "clear congressional authorization," as Congress is expected to "speak clearly if it
wishes to assign to an agency decision of vast 'economic and political significance.'"160 But
section 202 does not confer such clear authority. Section 202 authorizes EPA to promulgate
"standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant" from vehicles; it does not empower
EPA to force a historic shift in the makeup of the nation's entire vehicle fleet. In the absence of
plain statutory authorization, such a decision, and the tradeoffs and consequences it entails,
properly belongs to Congress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
160 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
The Proposed Rule frequently cites to the IIJA, also known as the "Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law," 161 and the Inflation Reduction Act. 162 To the extent EPA purports to rely on either
statute as providing a legal basis for the Proposed Rule, 163 it should not do so. No provision of
the IIJA or the IRA expands or modifies EPA's regulatory authority under section 202 or the
Clean Air Act more broadly. Nor can these laws be considered to have implicitly altered EPA's
authority. After all, "implied amendments require 'clear and manifest' evidence of congressional
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intent," 164 and "neither courts nor federal agencies can rewrite a statute's plain text to
correspond to its supposed purposes." 165 Those conditions are not satisfied here. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
161 Pub. L. 117-58, 135 Stat. 429 (2021).
162 Pub. L. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818(2022). See, e.g., NPRM at 29187-90, 29195-96, 29233,29300,
29308, 29313, 29318, 29322-24, 29341 (referencing the IIJA and/or IRA).
163 See, e.g., NPRM at 29233 ("The recently enacted Inflation Reduction Act 'reinforces the longstanding
authority and responsibility of [EPA] to regulate GHGs as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act'")
(quoting floor statement by Rep. Pallone).
164 Sackett v. E.P.A., 598 U.S , 2023 WL 3632751, at *13 (U.S. May 25, 2023) (internal quotation
omitted).
165 LandstarExp. America, Inc. v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 569 F.3d 493, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
We reaffirm that we are fundamentally supportive of EPA's goals of reducing GHG emissions
and transitioning to a net-zero carbon transportation future. Section 202 standards have a place
in this effort, as we have previously expressed. We remain concerned, however, that the
extraordinary and unprecedented nature of the Proposed Rule places it outside the bounds of
EPA's statutory authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 89-92]
3 .NMOG+NOx Cold FTP Fleet Average
EPA proposes to set a cold FTP NMOG+NOx fleet average requirement of 300 mg/mile,
excluding ZEVs.258 EPA requests comment on whether a 400 mg/mile vehicle cap should be
used instead of a fleet average.259 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
258 NPRM at 29262.
259 NPRM at 29262.
Auto Innovators prefers a fleet average requirement, but requests a value of 300mg/mi for
LDV+LDT1 and 400mg/mi for LDT2+HLTD+MDPV for the following reasons: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
At -7 °C, emission reduction right after engine start-up and during catalyst warm-up is the key
factor. Large displacement engines (V6, V8, etc.) inevitably have substantially higher emissions
at engine startup before the catalyst is warmed up. For downsized turbocharged engines, the
amount of heat supplied to the catalyst decreases due to the relationship between the recovery of
the exhaust energy by the turbocharger and the heat capacity of the turbocharger itself; thus, the
warm-up time tends to be longer than that of an engine without a turbocharger. During this
longer warm-up time when the catalyst is in a semi-active state, the heavier vehicle with a
turbocharger under high running load conditions has much higher emissions than other vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
According to the DRIA, EPA developed the proposal based on the test results of three models.
The results of these three models certainly meet 300 mg/mi. However, due to differences in
exhaust system layout (i.e., front catalyst distance from the engine) and engine control from
these models, there are some models that cannot achieve both emission reduction before catalyst
warm-up and early catalyst warm-up at a high level under -7 °C condition. There are also
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vehicles that are heavier than the vehicles EPA tested. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
147-148]
Developing technology to adapt these vehicles to 300 mg/mi would require diverting
substantial resources from electrification [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148] :
1.For emission systems development and evaluation, update and/or increase of chassis
dynamometer system testing to make it possible to reproduce cold temperature condition is
necessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
2.Development of pistons and injectors for better combustion and designing arrangement of
emission purification devices are necessary. When changing the catalyst system (increase in the
amount of precious metals, increase in the number of cells), increase in costs occurs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
Regarding the 300 mg/mile fleet average, EPA proposes that the family emission limit (FEL)
be set to a resolution of 0.1 g/mile (100 mg/mile).260 An FEL set to only a single decimal place
(i.e., 0.x g/mile) provides very little flexibility among different vehicles. We recommend that
EPA allow an FEL resolution to three decimal places (i.e., O.xxx g/mile). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
260 NPRM at 29436.
We also note that although EPA describes the 300 mg/mile fleet average as excluding ZEVs
in the preamble,261 the proposed 40 C.F.R. § 86.1811-27(c)(3)(i) regulatory text does not reflect
that exclusion.262 Auto Innovators agrees with the exclusion and recommends updating the
regulatory text accordingly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 147-148]
261 NPRM at 29262.
262 NPRM at 29420.
Below is PM data from another round robin program from 2022 run by the same certification
laboratories and EPA (Figure 49). The 2-standard deviation limit around the EPA mean is 0.56
mg/mile. The all-laboratory average 2-standard deviation is 0.48 mg/mile. The variability from
laboratory to laboratory at a 95% confidence level is almost as high as the proposed FTP PM
standard of 0.5 mg/mile. The offset between the initial baseline tests' average and the
confirmatory tests' average is more 0.37 mg/mile, or more than 25% change within the same
laboratory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 160-164]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 49: FTP PM test results from a 2022
automaker/EPA interlaboratory correlation program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 160-
164]
Results from another recent interlaboratory round robin program from 2022 are shown in
Figure 50 for a vehicle with a FTP PM emission level below 1 mg/mile. The lab to lab offset is
evident here, which cannot be explained. The average 2-standard deviation from all labs is 0.065
mg/mile, or about 13% of the 0.5 mg/mile standard. The offset between Laboratory 2 and
Laboratory 1 confirmatory testing at the end is is 0.27 mg/mile, or 54% of a 0.5 mg/mile
standard. The offset between the initial baseline tests' average and the confirmatory tests'
average is about a 21% change within the same laboratory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
160-164]
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E. Comments on Estimated Social benefits of the C02 Standards
In this section, Auto Innovators comments on the major categories of estimated social benefits
for the C02 performance standards for model years 2027-2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 285-288]
1. Local/Regional Air Quality benefits from Control of Criteria Air Pollutants
The DRIA estimates that the present value of the quantified health benefits from criteria air
pollution control range from $64 billion to $290 billion, depending on the discount rate and the
dose-response study used for PM2.5 and mortality. This range is so large that it overlaps the
lower agency estimate of the Proposed Rule's climate benefits ($83 billion to $1 trillion). Auto
Innovators believes that the agency's estimates are not consistent with the findings in the peer-
reviewed scientific literature and are exaggerated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-
288]
The final regulatory impact analysis should acknowledge that the peer-reviewed scientific
literature does not generally support the agency's claim that a shift from ICEs to BEVs in the
light-duty sector will reduce criteria air pollution across the country. In 2021, Burnham et al. of
Argonne National Laboratory (DOE) presented a regional U.S. lifecycle analysis of the impact of
BEVs through 2050, accounting for upstream emissions of criteria air pollutants at the
powerplant. The abstract of their paper concludes as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp.285-288]
We generated state-level emission factors using a projection from 2020 to 2050 for three
light-duty vehicle types. We found that BEVs currently provide GHG benefits in nearly every
state, with the median state's benefit being between approximately 50% to 60% lower than
gasoline counterparts. However, gasoline vehicles currently have lower total NOx, urban NOx,
total PM2.5, and urban PM2.5 in 33%; 15%; 70%; and 10% of states, respectively. BEV
emissions will decrease in 2050 due to a cleaner grid, but the relative benefits when compared to
gasoline vehicles do not change significantly, as gasoline vehicles are also improving over this
time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
The results of this study concerning total PM2.5 are especially concerning because the
agency's quantified criteria-pollutant benefits in this rulemaking are dominated by an alleged
advantage of BEVs with respect to PM2.5 control. Moreover, the lifecycle analysis by Burnham
et al. (2021) is published in the peer-reviewed literature, while the agency's lifecycle inputs and
analysis have not been peer reviewed by qualified experts. For the final rule, Auto Innovators
believes it is unwise for the agency to rely on its lifecycle analysis of criteria air pollutant control
as a primary rationale for the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
Insofar as criteria air pollution control is considered a primary rationale for a rule that
regulates C02 emissions, we recommend that the agency go beyond an analysis of average ICE
emissions and consider "best-in-class" vehicle emissions in the baseline. For example, in a peer-
reviewed contribution, Winker et al. (2018) compared HEVs and BEVs in terms of criteria air
pollution emissions. When the upstream emissions from BEVs are included, they find that BEV
emissions are 0.06 grams per mile (NOx) while average HEV emissions are 0.004 grams per
mile (NOx and HC). The results of Winkler et al. are consistent with an earlier paper by
Michalek et al. (2011), which found that HEVs and PHEVs, with small battery packs, are
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environmentally and economically superior to BEVs. Thus, HEVs may be a superior
technological option for criteria air pollution control than BEVs, at least in some regions of the
country and until the upstream and manufacturing emissions of BEVs are controlled. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
Sources: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
1. Andrew Burnham, Zifeng Lu, Michael Wang, Amgad Elgowainy. Regional Emissions
Analysis of Light-Duty Battery-Electric Vehicles. Atmosphere. 12(11). 2021, 1482.
2. S.L. Winkler, J.E. Anderson, L. Garza, W.C. Ruona, R. Vogt, T.J. Wellington. Vehicle
Criteria Pollutant (PM, NOx, CO and HCx) Emissions: How Low Should We Go? Climate and
Atmospheric Science. 1. 2018, 26.
3. Jeremy J. Michalek, Mikhail Chester, Paulina Jaramillo, Lester B. Lave. Valuation of Plug-
In Vehicle Life-Cycle Air Emissions and Oil Displacement Benefits. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences. 108(40). 2011, 16554-16558. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-
288]
In any event, any net reductions in PM2.5 emissions (primary or PM2.5 precursors)
accomplished by the revised C02 standards will not provide public health benefits that are
additive to the emissions reductions accomplished by EPA's other mobile-source and stationary-
source programs for criteria air pollutants. The public health benefits are not additive, as we
explain below, because of the way Congress designed the Clean Air Act, structured state
implementation plans, and the way EPA defined emissions limits and nonattainment on a
community-by-community basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
Specifically, reductions in vehicle emissions do not provide additive benefits to public health
because the structure of the Clean Air Act allows the states to include national changes in mobile
source emissions in their state emissions inventories and implementation plans for attainment of
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. In nonattainment areas and areas close to
nonattainment, states and localities are disinclined to impose any more limits on stationary
source emissions than is necessary to meet EPA's air-quality standards. If state and local limits
are unduly strict, new factories may be built in other states and localities where the state
implementation plans are not as strict on new stationary sources. (In attainment areas, where
PM2.5 health benefits might also be considered, there is the complication of the Prevention of
significant Deterioration (PSD) doctrine that needs to be evaluated). Thus, the practical impact of
diminished mobile source emissions, at the margin, is somewhat less pressure on stationary
sources to meet the requirements described in state implementation plans. Thus, there are
benefits from further reductions in mobile source emissions under the Proposed Rule, but they
are likely to be realized in reduced compliance costs for stationary sources rather than as public
health benefits from reduced overall exposures to PM2.5. The magnitude of the compliance cost
savings is likely to be a small fraction of the estimated public health benefits that the agency has
claimed, given EPA estimates that the benefits of PM control vastly exceed costs in the
stationary source arena. At a minimum, Auto Innovators suggests presentation of two alternative
approaches for calculating the benefits of PM2.5 control: one where the benefits are expressed as
compliance-cost savings for stationary sources and one - as developed in the DRIA - where the
benefits of PM2.5 control are expressed as public health gains. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 285-288]
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Auto Innovators made a similar public comment on the DRIA supporting the 2023-2026
rules. In the final rule, Auto Innovators' comment was ignored in the agency's "Response to
Comment" document. (This was unusual, as many of the other Auto Innovators comments were
handled very carefully in the Response to Comment document). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 285-288]
In this rulemaking alone, new criteria pollutant controls are expected to reduce direct PM2.5
emissions from gasoline vehicles by roughly 90%, so those same PM2.5 control benefits should
not also be counted as benefits of the C02 standards and BEVs. Auto Innovators suggests the
EPA focus on the potential benefits of a successful transformation to electric vehicles rather than
incremental benefits of adding additional PM control beyond the California ACC II
requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
Second, EPA is correct that, once BEVs are produced and sold in 2027-2032, they will be
recharged for up to 30 years as they are used by motorists, and the grid may become cleaner over
that time frame. However, Auto Innovators is concerned that the analytic baseline in the DRIA
takes a highly optimistic stance regarding how fast the grid will become clean over the next
several decades. Obviously, if the grid becomes less carbon intensive due to more renewables,
BEVs will be environmentally cleaner, but the agency should not engage in wishful thinking.
The agency assumes, without support from a peer-reviewed analysis, that the Inflation Reduction
Act will reduce C02 emissions from the electricity sector by 70% over the lifetimes of the
affected vehicles. Since the average lifetime of an electric powerplant is roughly twice as long
(30 vs 15 years) as a passenger vehicle, it seems highly unlikely that the electrical grid will turn
over so fast that it will become dramatically cleaner during the lifetimes of model year 2027-
2032 vehicles. Nor is there a good evidence-based foundation for the claim that the Inflation
Reduction Act, which provides only subsidies for clean electricity, will make the electricity
sector dramatically cleaner in the next decade or two. The big need is for large new transmission
lines to bring renewable energy to markets where it can be used. What is holding back those
transmission lines and renewables is not capital, but cumbersome permitting processes. Indeed,
several recent studies suggest that the clean-electricity subsidies in the IRA, without meaningful
permitting reform, will have minimal impact on the carbon-intensity of the grid for the
foreseeable future (e.g., Sud and Patnaik, 2022; Sud, Patnaik, Glicksman, 2023; Rosetti, 2022;
2023). The optimistic studies which find that the IRA will make the grid dramatically cleaner
simply assume that renewable energy resources, and the needed transmissions lines, will obtain
permits in a timely manner. The recent debt-limit deal in Congress did include some limited
permitting reform, but it did not address the transmission-line reforms that are crucial to a rapid
expansion of renewable sources of electricity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 289-290]
Sources: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 289-290]
1. Rayan Sud, Sanjay Patnaik. How Does Permitting for Clean Energy Work? Brookings
Institution. Washington, DC. September 28, 2022.
2. Rayan Sud, Sanjay Patnaik, Robert L. Glicksman. Federal Permitting to Accelerate Clean
Energy Infrastructure: A Nonpartisan Way Forward. Brookings Institution. Washington, DC.
February 14, 2023.
3. Philip Rosetti. Potential Effects of the Inflation Reduction Act on Greenhouse Gas
Emissions. R Street. Washington, DC. September 27, 2022.
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4. Philip Rossetti. Written Testimony for the Hearing on "Tax Incentives in the Inflation
Reduction Act: Jobs and Investment in Energy Communities." Committee on Finance. United
States Senate. Washington, DC. May 18, 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 289-290]
The economics of renewables versus natural gas are also not as solid as the agency suggests.
The agency is correct that the prices of wind and solar continue to decline, but the agency
does not mention that natural gas prices have risen significantly due to the Russian invasion of
Ukraine and Europe's campaign to reduce its dependence on Russian gas. If the conflict ends in
the next 5-10 years, natural gas prices in the U.S. could return to pre-invasion levels, which
would complicate the accelerated deployment of renewables that the agency is forecasting. The
agency's IPM modeling ignores the possibility of a sustained decline in natural gas prices.
Moreover, a dramatic expansion in wind and solar can occur only with breakthroughs in the
economics of grid-scale energy storage technologies. Moreover, the only plausible pathway for
rapid expansion of renewable energy sources is to couple them with new energy storage
technologies that make use of lithium ion batteries. (Wind and solar are not reliable sources of
electricity without energy storage). The agency makes a speculative claim that grid-scale storage
could be accomplished without lithium-ion batteries, but the agency provides no evidence that
those storage technologies are commercially feasible and cost effective. If the agency is serious
about this optimistic claim, they should provide a modeling forecast of grid-scale storage and
expose it to independent peer review. Relatedly, Auto Innovators is concerned that the agency's
analysis of the adequacy of supplies of raw materials for BEVs does not assume a rapid
expansion of grid-scale energy storage between now and 2035. It may not be feasible to expand
BEVs rapidly if scarce lithium ion batteries are used to support energy storage in the utility
sector in the pre-2035 time frame. The agency's modeling of battery prices needs to be modified
if there is a rapid increase in demand from U.S. utilities for lithium ion batteries. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 290-291]
Third, as mentioned earlier, the EV deployment induced by the EPA rule will occur
predominantly in non-ZEV states while the EPA rule will have little incremental effect on EV
deployment in the ZEV states (which account for 30-40% of the new vehicle population). The
ICCT study that EPA cites reports that, in 2019, the California grid produced only 225 g/kWh
C02 while the U.S. average grid (even accounting for a gradually cleaner grid from 2021 to
2038) produces 357 g/kWh. Thus, the grids in the non-ZEV states are associated with much
larger emissions than the grids in the ZEV states. Funke et al. (2023, p. 43 and Figure B3,
Appendix B) make the same point with information on the grids in all ZEV states (not just
California). To avoid exaggerating the climate benefits of the rule, the agency should assume that
most of the BEVs deployed due to the role will be in non-ZEV states that, today, have more
carbon-intensive electricity sectors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 291-292]
Source:
1. Christoph Funke, Joshua Linn, Sally Robson, Ethan Russell, Daniel Shawhan, Steven
Witkin. What Are the Climate Air Pollution and Health benefits of Electric Vehicles? Resources
for Future. Washington, DC. January 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 291-292]
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Organization: Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE)
Many of the estimates for future compliance in the Proposal assume that within four years, all
the following requirements will be in place: that significant quantities of critical minerals and
materials will be available, that the nation's electrical grid will be reliable (and cleaner), that new
supply chains will be established, and that all the necessary technology and components needed
for zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) will be mass produced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp.
2-4]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
Electricity Grids Will Need Substantial Upgrades Before They Can Support Widespread
Electrification
Even if adequate charging stations could be established in the numbers and at the locations
needed across the United States, providing those stations with the massive amounts of electricity
required would pose another likely insuperable obstacle on the proposed rule's timeline. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 47-48]
Compliance with EPA's rule would require chargers to power more than two-thirds of the
Nation's light-duty vehicles and nearly one-half of the Na-tion's medium-duty vehicles.
Powering those numbers of light-and medium-duty vehicles would require an exponential
increases in electricity-generation capacity. One study found that, if half of new passenger cars
and light trucks in 2030 were "zero-emission vehicles," the "annual demand for electricity to
charge them would surge from 11 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) now to 230 bil-lion kWh in
2030." Kampshoff, Building Electric-Vehicle Charging Infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0683, pp. 47-48]
Meeting that more than 20-fold increase in demand for electricity to charge electric vehicles
in such a short period would seriously strain the Nation's gen-eration capabilities—particularly
during peak-charging periods, when demand could reach extraordinary levels. For example,
under stringent state standards like those in New York and Massachusetts, more than a quarter of
highway stations could require 5 megawatts to meet peak demand (the same capacity needed for
an outdoor professional sports stadium) by 2030, and some could require 40 megawatts (the
same capacity needed for a major industrial site) by 2045. See Gideon Katsh et al., Electric
Highways: Accelerating and Optimizing Fast-Charging Deployment for Carbon Free
Transportation, Nat'l Grid, at 2 ("Electric Highways") (2022). Utilities would likely struggle to
address such surging de-mands. See Kampshoff, Building Electric-Vehicle Charging
Infrastructure at 15 (not-ing that few utilities "can deliver large amounts of electricity to many
EVs at high rates at the same time"). One report shows that, in the City of Palo Alto— an area
with high rates of electric-vehicle adoption—"[a] cluster of uncoordi-nated [Level 2] charging
could create an excessive peak load that would over-load or blow out a transformer." Robert N.
Charette, Can Power Grids Cope with Millions of EVs?, IEEE Spectrum (Nov. 28, 2022) ("Can
Power Grids Cope"), https://tinyurl.com/3ybx8st7. The Director of the Center for Distributed En-
ergy at Georgia Tech similarly asserts that, in residential areas, multiple Level 2 chargers on one
distribution transformer can reduce its life from an expected 30 to 40 years to only 3. See id. And
Xcel Energy, an electric utility, told the Minneapolis Star Tribute "that four or five families
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buying EVs noticeably af-fects the transformer load in a neighborhood, with a family buying an
EV 'add-ing another half of their house.'" Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 47-48]
The proposed rule thus would require not only a massive expansion of charging points, but
also significant upgrades of electricity-grid infrastructure and distribution technologies. See
Kampshoff, Building Electric-Vehicle Charging Infrastructure at 15. Those upgrades would be
costly. One study found that, even if only 15 percent of light-duty vehicles were electric by 2030
and used moder-ately optimized charging patterns, a typical utility would "need to make cumu-
lative transmission and distribution investments of $2.8 billion through 2030, for an estimated
grid capacity upgrade cost of $2,600 per EV." Anshuman Sa-hoo et al., The Costs of Revving Up
the Grid for Electric Vehicles, Bos. Consulting Grp. (Dec. 20, 2019) ("Cost of Revving Up"),
https://tinyurl.com/2vrye6ua. Ac-cording to the authors, that is a "meaningful sum" given that a
typical utility "tends to spend about $1 billion annually on transmission and distribution cap-ital
expenditures." Id. EPA's proposal—which anticipates that 67 percent of light-duty and 46
percent of medium-duty vehicles will be electric by 2032— would necessarily entail even more
substantial costs. Another study reports that "for a single public direct-current fast-charging
(DCFC) station consisting of four DC 150-kW chargers, the cost of upgrading the grid and the
site could be more than $150,000." Kampshoff, Building Electric-Vehicle Charging
Infrastructure at 15. And recent reports note that "[sjupplies for distribution transformers are
low," causing prices to "skyrocket[]" from a range of $3,000-$4,000 to $20,000 each. Charette,
Can Power Grids Cope. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 48-49]
Some necessary upgrades will also take a substantial amount of time. For example, in places
with highway charging, a single fast-charging station can quickly exceed the peak-load capacity
of a typical feeder-circuit transformer, which in turn means establishing a transmission
interconnection. Katsh, Electric Highways at 6. That project can take as long as eight years to
complete—if it can be done at all. See id. at 4, 34 ("It may not be feasible to extend the trans-
mission network to every site, particularly in locations where there would be impacts to local
residents and the environment"). And Palo Alto, which is considering investing $150 million
toward modernizing its distribution system to support electric-vehicle charging, states that it will
"take two to three years of planning, as well as another three to four years or more to perform all
the necessary work"—and perhaps longer if the utility cannot "get the engineering and
management staff, which continues to be in short supply there and at other utilities across the
country." Charette, Can Power Grids Cope. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 48-49]
EPA asserts that other measures could be taken to mitigate the problems associated with peak
charging demands, such as: scheduling vehicles to charge at off-peak hours; developing new
electric utility tariffs; using on-site battery storage; and implementing vehicle-to-grid technology
(which allows electricity to be drawn from vehicles that are plugged in) and other vehicle-grid
integration systems (which allow utilities to manage vehicle charging time). See 88 Fed. Reg. at
29,311-12; Draft RIA at 5-37-39. Those mitigating measures, however, may not be effective for
a variety of reasons. For example, off-peak charging will not fully solve the peak-load problem
because transformers are designed to be cooled at night; adding even a few electric-vehicles
using Level 2 chargers during those hours could cause transformers to run hot when they are
supposed to be cooling down. Charette, Can Power Grids Cope. Moreover, spreading peak
charging loads will itself require investment in "better transformers and smart metering
systems," and utilities will need to obtain "regulatory permission to change electricity-rate
structures to encourage off-peak charging." Id. In addi-tion, before vehicle-to-grid technology
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can be implemented, "[njumerous issues need to be addressed, such as the updating of millions
of household electrical panels and smart meters," creating "agreed-upon national technical
standards for the information exchange needed between EVs and local utilities," devel-oping
"[vehicle-to-grid] regulatory policies" and "residential and commercial business models,
including fair compensation for utilizing an EV's stored en-ergy." Id. As a result, one energy
expert explained that "vehicle-to-grid is not really a thing" today, and it will not become a viable
option "for quite some time" until the industry "solve[s] a lot of problems at various utility
commis-sions, state by state, rate by rate." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 49-51]
EPA does not address these problems or meaningfully assess the obstacles that utilities and
station operators would face in the wake of its proposed rule. Instead, although observing that
grid upgrades and mitigation strategies will be necessary, the agency ultimately concludes that
there is too much "uncertainty" with "future distribution upgrade needs" and the "uptake" of
mitigation tech-nologies to "model them directly as part of [its] infrastructure cost analysis." 88
Fed. Reg. at 29,311. Elsewhere, the agency noted that "there is little experience to assess the
impacts of significant PEV use on U.S. electric grid reliability and resiliency" and asserted that it
will be the responsibility of electric utilities and transmission system operators to plan for the
increase in electric-vehicle charg-ing—and how that increase will intersect with other factors
affecting the grid, such as extreme weather events and the greater use of variable supply technol-
ogies. Draft RIA at 11-14. Once again, EPA's regulate-first, confront-practical-impediments-
later approach is backwards and exceedingly problematic in this context. As EPA itself notes,
"[a] reliable and resilient electricity sector is cru-cial for the U.S.'s national security" and
supports "many other types of critical infrastructure," including "water systems, oil, natural gas,
communications, in-formation technology, and financial services." Id. at 11-13-11-14. It is
irrational to press forward without robust analysis of the changes that are likely to be necessary;
if EPA concludes that reliable analysis is impossible, it should stay its hand or pursue a different
approach. At a minimum, the acknowledged un-certainty about the potentially massive burdens
that grid improvements might necessitate provides further doubt on the proposed rule's
feasibility and more reason for caution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 49-51]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
There is significant doubt that the U.S. electric grid can reliably support the proposal. Demand
for electric vehicle charging will place significant stress on generation, transmission, distribution,
and consumer charging systems, that are unlikely to meet increased demand in such a short
timeframe. EPA should better assess grid impacts from a regional basis, particularly in the
Southwest where the grid is already under significant stress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p.
3]
I. EPA's Proposal Does Not Comprehensively Address Cross-Cutting Issues
EPA's desire to remake the automotive sector creates significant energy and national security
concerns and stresses an aging electrical grid subject to increasing demand. In glossing over
these issues, EPA fails to adequately consider the mineral, metal, electricity generation,
transmission, distribution, and charging infrastructure requirements necessary for the Proposed
Rule to be feasible. This is alarming and undermines our energy security. We lack the supply of
domestically sourced minerals and metals needed to build batteries and transmission lines and,
contrary to the legislative intent of U.S. laws such as the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law ("BIL")
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and Inflation Reduction Act ("IRA"), we will have to rely on foreign countries to fulfill the
Proposed Rule's mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 4]
Even if we could import vast quantities of mineral resources, EPA's electrification mandate is
unobtainable. We face a limited supply of copper, which is a critical mineral needed to build out
the transmission grid to supply electricity to charging stations. We also do not have near the
vehicle charging infrastructure necessary to power the mandated number of ZEVs. Rather than
conducting a clear-eyed assessment of these challenges, EPA erroneously assumes that all the
necessary conditions to enable its proposal will happen on its aggressive timeline. This
conclusion dismisses or outright ignores a multitude of evidence to the contrary. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 4]
B. The United States Lacks Copper and Aluminum Production Required for Grid
Expansion
Beyond the ZEV itself, electricity networks need a large amount of copper and aluminum.23
The need for grid expansion that would result from this rapid increase in electricity demand
underpins a doubling of annual demand for copper and aluminum.24 Most supply of these
materials will come from overseas, as the United States lacks current production capacity or the
ability to increase such capacity in time to meet the demands of the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 11-12]
23 IEA Report 2022.
24 Id.
The United States does not supply much of the world's aluminum. Instead, China, Russia, and
India lead global production with an estimated 45 million metric tons per year. China possesses
more than half of the entire world's aluminum smelting capacity and produces by far the most
aluminum of any country at over 36 million tons per year.25 The United States, by contrast,
produces approximately 1 million tons per year. Similarly, countries supplying the most copper
are Chile, Peru, China, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These countries supply ten
times the amount produced domestically. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 11-12]
25 Andy Home, "Global aluminum production pendulum swings back to China" (June 21, 2022) available
at https://www.mining.com/web/column-global-aluminum-production-pendulum-swings-back-to-china/.
Experts predict our demand for these materials will rise dramatically, but we lack the ability
to source them domestically. The latest data concludes sourcing copper for electric infrastructure
(e.g., charging stations and storage) needed to accommodate increased electrical demand will be
challenging.26 Copper demand is expected to rise by 53 percent, while supply is expected to rise
by only 16 percent.27 U.S. import dependency for copper has grown from 10 percent in 1995 to
40 percent in 2020, with projections of copper import dependency reaching between 55 percent
and 67 percent between 2020 and 2040.28 Other estimates predict that by 2030 supply from
existing mines and projects under construction is estimated to meet only 80 percent of copper
needs by 203029—not considering the anticipated increase in ZEV production anticipated by
EPA's Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 11-12]
26 IEA Report 2022.
27 BLOOMBERGNEF, "Copper Miners Eye M&A as Clean Energy Drives Supply" (Aug. 30, 2022),
available at https ://about.bnef.com/blog/coppers-miners-eye-ma-as-clean-energy-drives-supply -
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gap/#:~:text=Copper%20demand%20is%20set%20to,and%20difficulty%20developing%20greenfield%20
mines.
28 S&P GLOBAL, "The Future of Copper Will the Looming Supply Gap Short-Circuit the Energy
Transition?" (July 2022) available at https://cdn.ihsmarkit.com/www/pdf/0722/The-Future-of-Copper_Full-
Report_14July2022.pdf.
29 IEA Report 2022.
C. The Proposal's Deployment Timeline is Impracticable
EPA's emissions standards rely on the unsubstantiated assumption that the U.S. electricity
and transmission grid and ZEV charging infrastructure will be available to charge the massive
numbers of ZEVs that will enter the market. As outlined below, available data supports the
Alliance for Automotive Innovation's conclusion that the timeline for EPA's standard is
infeasible.36 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 13]
36 Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Comments to the Environmental Protection Agency, Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles,
Proposed Rule, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829 (hereinafter AAI Comments) at iv.
1. There is Significant Doubt that the U.S. Electrical Grid and Transmission Grid Can
Reliably Support this Proposal.
The Proposal will further strain our nation's electricity system as global electricity demand
could increase 47 percent by 2050 based on 2021 projections of population and economic
growth, alone.37 In the U.S., the estimated increase in energy consumption is 15 percent by
2050, without consideration of EPA's Proposal. Notably, this value is likely much higher
considering the anticipated increase of between 900 and 2,000 percent electricity purchased for
transportation by 2050 with the increased adoption of EVs.38 The Department of Energy
concluded that transmission systems must expand by 60 percent by 2030 and triple that capacity
by 2050 to meet the Administration's emissions goals.39 An author of the Princeton University's
Net-Zero America Project40 said "The current power grid took 150 years to build. Now, to get to
net-zero emissions by 2050, we have to build that amount of transmission again in the next 15
years and then build that much more again in the 15 years after that. It's a huge amount of
change "41 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 13]
37 Meghan Gordon and Maya Weber, S&P Global, "Global energy demands to grow 47% by 2050, with
oil still top source: US EIA" (Oct. 6, 2021) available at
https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/100621-global-energy-
demand-to-grow-47-by-2050-with-oil-still-top-source-us-eia#.
38 EIA, "U.S. energy consumption increases between 0% and 15% by 2050" (Apr. 3, 2023) available at
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=56040#:~:text=U.S.%20energy%20consumption%20incr
eases%20between%200%25%20and%2015%25%20by%202050.
39 Evan Halper and Timothy Puko, "Biden's Ambitious Climate Plans for EVs Face These Big Hurdles,"
The Washington Post, April 16, 2023.
40 E. Larson, et al., Net-Zero America: Potential Pathways, Infrastructure, and Impacts, Final report,
Princeton University, (Oct. 29, 2021).
41 Molly Seltzer, PRINCETON, "Big but Affordable Effort Needed for America to Reach Net-Zero
Emissions by 2050, Princeton Study Shows" (Dec. 15, 2020) available at
www.princeton.edu/news/2020/12/15/big-affordable-effort-needed-america-reach-net-zero-emissions-
2050-princeton-study. Accessed 28 June 2023.
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Yet, our electricity generation and transmission system are increasingly challenged to keep up
with current demand. As shown in Figure 5, the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation's ("NERC") recent summer assessment shows roughly two-thirds of the U.S. faces
increased resource adequacy risk in the summer of 2023.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p.
13]
42 NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION, "2023 Summer Reliability
Assessment" (May 2023).
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 5: NERC 2023 Summer Risk Assessment 43
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 13]
43 NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION, "2023 Summer Energy Market
and Electric Reliability Assessment" (May 18, 2023), available at https://www.ferc.gov/news-
events/news/presentation-report-2023-summer-energy-market-and-electric-reliability-assessment
Depending on where you are, the long-term reliability assessment is not much better. NERC's
2022 Long-Term Reliability Assessment of the U.S. analyzed the electrical grid and the entities
delivering power to the continental United States during 2023-2032.44 Regional operators of the
power grid—Regional Transmission Organizations ("RTOs") or Independent System Operators
("ISO")—are responsible for transmission, but also balancing a regional power system to ensure
that supply constantly matches demand. The grids in some RTOs are already under various
degrees of stress. Several operating regions are still at-risk during periods of peak demand,
including the Midcontinent ISO (which will face challenges in meeting above-normal peak
demand), the SERC - Central area (where, compared to the summer of 2022, forecasted peak
demand has risen by over 950 MW while growth in anticipated resources has remained flat) and
the Southwest Power Pool (where reserve margins have fallen as a result of increasing peak
demand and declining anticipated resources).45 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 14-15]
44 NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION, "2022 Long Term Reliability
Assessment" (December 2022), available at
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2022.pdf.
45 NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION, "2023 Summer Reliability
Assessment" (May 2023) at 23, available at
https://www.nerc.eom/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_SRA_2023.pdf.
Future electricity demand is expected to grow due to government policies for EV adoption
and energy transition programs. The California Energy Commission staff estimates that by 2030,
an additional 5,500 MW of demand at midnight and 4,600 MW of demand at 10:00 a.m. on a
typical weekday will be needed for plug-in EV charging.46 This is an increase of 25 and 20
percent, respectively, at those times. State and local policies for transitioning appliances and
heating systems, such as banning natural gas stoves, can also affect projections of electricity
demand and daily load shapes.47 Moreover, as global temperatures rise, increased use of air
conditioning will draw a greater load from the grid. As recently reported, "two-thirds of North
America is at risk of energy shortfalls this summer during periods of extreme demand."48 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 14-15]
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/26/business/heat-wave-power-blackout/index.html
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Although EPA projects ZEV sales on a national basis, the ability to charge the vehicles is
driven by the ability of the RTOs and ISOs to manage regional or local power grids to supply
electricity on demand. EPA's national data thus disguise important problems that increasing
ZEV penetration will cause. By 2022, more than 50 percent of ZEVs were concentrated in
California (WECC-CA/MX), Florida (SERC), and Texas (ERCOT).49 The distribution of the
ZEV fleet across RTOs can be seen in Figure 6, in which state shares of ZEV registrations are
allocated across RTOs.50 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 15-16]
49 S&P GLOBAL MOBILITY, "EV Chargers: How Many Do We Need?" (Jan. 9, 2023), available at
press.spglobal.com/2023-01-09-EV-Chargers-How-many-do-we-need.
50 There are several states which are covered by more than one RTO. For this high-level assessment, the
Turner Mason Report allocates state EV sales by roughly the geographic footprint of each RTO within the
state.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR EV Fleet is Heavily Concentrated in California. Figure 6:
ZEV registrations by RT051 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 15-16]
51 Turner Mason Report.
As seen in Figure 7, the greatest stress is not in California (although it is significant in
California), but rather in the southwestern U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 15-16]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Power Grid Serving Southwestern U.S. has Greatest Risk
of Not Being Able to Support Growing EV Fleet. Figure 7: EV Power Requirement by RT052
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 15-16]
In the southwestern U.S., for example, electricity demand from EV charging is expected to
completely consume the 2023 reserve margin for the WECC-SW grid, leaving no reserve margin
to address emergency conditions. This is based on EPA's estimate of ZEV electricity demand in
2032, allocated to RTOs, assuming no reserve capacity is added over the next eight years. For an
RTO to fill incremental ZEV electricity demand and maintain its reserve margin, the required
capacity investment will vary depending on the source of generation and that source's
availability (i.e., expected load factor) specific to that region. For the U.S. the total investment
would be significant; the Brattle Group estimated an additional $75 to $125 billion total
investment across the power sector at a ZEV penetration rate lower than EPA proposes.53 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 15-16]
53 Michael Hagerty, et al., "Opportunities for the Electricity Industry in Preparing for an EV Future" (June
2020).
The "major questions doctrine" holds that Congress must "speak clearly when authorizing an
agency to exercise [such] powers" of "vast economic and political significance."61 And as EPA
is aware, this doctrine applies in the context of environmental regulation. Last year, in West
Virginia v. EPA, the Supreme Court relied on the major questions doctrine in holding that the
EPA exceeded its statutory authority in adopting its Clean Power Plan. That regulation sought to
impose caps on GHG emissions by requiring utilities and other providers to shift electricity
production from coal-fired power to natural gas and then to renewable energy in place of
imposing source-specific requirements reflective of the application of state-of-the-art emission
reduction technologies.62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 18]
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61 Nat'l Fed. Of Indep. Bus. v. Dep't of Labor, 142 S. Ct. 661,665 (2022); see also Ala. Assoc. of Realtors
v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021); Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014); U.S. Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 419-21 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (explaining provenance of "major rules
doctrine").
62 West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022).
As noted by the Court, EPA "announc[ed] what the market share of coal, natural gas, wind,
and solar must be, and then require[d] plants to reduce operations or subsidize their competitors
to get there."63 EPA's attempt to devise GHG emissions caps based on a generation-shifting
approach would have had major economic and political significance impacting vast swaths of
American life and substantially restructured the American energy market; however, EPA's
purported authority was only based on a "vague statutory grant" within Section 111(d) of the
Clean Air Act—far from the "clear authorization required by [Supreme Court] precedents."64
The need for clear congressional authorization for such sweeping regulatory programs is nothing
new - just last week the Supreme Court reaffirmed the major questions doctrine "as an
identifiable body of law that has developed over a series of significant cases spanning
decades."65 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 18]
63 Id. at 2613, n4.
64 Id. at 2614.
65 Biden v. Nebraska, No. 22-506, slip op. at 23 (June 30, 2023) (internal quotations omitted) (applying
major questions doctrine to strike down student loan repayment program that will cost taxpayers
approximately $500 billion and affects nearly every student loan borrower). Just as the trade-offs inherent
in a mass debt cancelation program are ones that Congress would likely have reserved for itself, id., slip op.
at 25, so too are those that must be considered for the mass adoption of electric vehicles.
EPA likewise assumes that the IRA and the BIL funds will be adequate to build the necessary
electrification infrastructure. It is uncertain that (1) critical minerals will be available to
manufacture ZEV batteries (see Section I. A. 1); (2) consumers will buy EVs at the rate assumed
by EPA (see Section IV.B.2); and (3) there will be ample electricity to power these vehicles (see
Sections I.B and IV.B.3).127 What is certain is that the Proposal's timeline is unachievable and
completely detached from reality. 128 EPA also improperly relied on the general characterization
of recent years of the light-duty and medium-duty market as supplemented by incentives in the
BIL and IRA to support its proposition that there will be a rapid increase in ZEV market
penetration. Setting aside the laws of supply and demand and the fact that the future availability
of ZEVs is insufficient to meet the ZEV adoption requirements proposed by EPA (as discussed
further below), EPA improperly relies on the number of models currently available on the free
market as a surrogate for the number of actual units sold and in use. The underlying reality is that
without federal regulation requiring vastly increased ZEV penetration, providing automakers
certainty for long-term planning, automakers could not financially justify long-term investment
in a technology with tepid consumer demand. The referenced electrification projections may be a
function of OEMs striving to create certainty and minimize risk as they attempt to comply with
forthcoming regulations. Indeed, the CEO of the Alliance for Automotive Innovation recently
questioned the feasibility of the Proposed Rule - stating that the proposal was too aggressive and
could benefit China: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 29-30]
127 Id.
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128 Id.
I've said the EPA proposal wasn't feasible without certain public policies and in light of
today's market and supply chain conditions .... There's not enough charging and uncertain
utility and grid capacity. Here's the big one - and where China looms largest - essentially no
domestic or allied supply of battery critical minerals, processing, and components until 2025
(and even then, nowhere near enough to supply what's needed). 129 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, pp. 29-30]
129 John Bozzella, EPA's EV Rules: What it Means for China and the U.S Auto Market. June 12, 2023,
available at https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/blog/epas-ev-rules-what-it-means-for-china-and-the-us-
auto-market (accessed June 23, 2023).
EV charging infrastructure, range, and charging time remain top concerns for nearly half of
U.S. customers. 139 OEMs expect that ZEV penetration will not be uniform across markets, with
larger impact in markets with more low carbon intensity electricity and greater electrical grid
reliability. 140 Toyota announced that regional energy variation is the reason Toyota will provide
a diversified range of carbon neutral options to meet the needs and circumstances in every
country and region. 141 Toyota believes optionality facilitates the ability to adapt to change,
while selecting a single option is an attempt to predict the future in uncertain times. 142 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 31-32]
139 Phillipp Kampshoff, et al., McKinsey & Co., "Building the electric-vehicle charging infrastructure
America needs" (Apr. 18, 2022) available at https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-
insights/building-the-electric-vehicle-charging-infrastructure-america-needs; EVBox, "6 reasons why your
electric car isn't charging as fast as you'd expect," Jan. 6, 2023, available at https://blog.evbox.com/6-
reasons-charging-times.
140 The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC's) 2022 Long-Term Reliability
Assessment (Dec. 2022) projects reliability concerns for certain regional entities. Available at
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2022.pdf
141 Toyota Motor Corporation, "'Video: Media Briefing on Battery EV Strategies," Press Release,
December 14, 2021. available at https://global.toyota/en/newsroom/corporate/36428993.html.
142 Id.
Grid resiliency is at risk of further deterioration due to increasing power demand from
electrification, not just in transportation. EPA overlooks this issue in another example of the
agency's failure to address a major aspect of the Proposal. Notably absent from EPA's analysis is
any demonstration that sufficient utilities and other infrastructure needed to support accelerated
ZEV implementation will be available by MY27. Focusing solely on ZEV themselves, EPA has
not adequately evaluated or grasped the time and resources required to permit, construct, and
operate the necessary infrastructure to power these vehicles, while maintaining reliable and
affordable electricity for all other power consumers. This is particularly concerning in light of
the very real risk that the electric grid will not be able to meet the increased demand anticipated
by the Proposed Rule. 159 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 34-35]
159 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2022 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (Dec.
2022), 21, available at
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2022.pdf
(indicating that increased demand projections may lead to reliability concerns for the electric grid,
especially as dual-peaking or seasonal peaking times change with increased electrification).
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Power generation using traditional fuels has an advantage in that capacity is located near
demand centers. Except for nuclear, any low-carbon power generation capacity must be located
at the energy source (e.g., where the wind blows, water flows, sun shines). Supplying low-carbon
electricity to charge EVs also needs to resolve the transmission of that power to the demand
center. Installation of transmission capacity in a timely manner is not guaranteed, or even likely.
The Bureau of Land Management recently issued its record of decision for the SunZia Southwest
Transmission Project more than 15 years after the project was proposed. 160 Once this
incremental power is transmitted from supply location to a load center, there are potentially
additional distribution constraints before the electrons reach charging stations and homes. Just to
get a sense of the burden that charging will have on the electrical grid, One ZEV supercharger
equals the launch of 70 air-conditioning units at once. Such an instant change in the power
demand profile is a significant problem for the local distribution grid, requiring innumerable
upgrades, such as replacement of nearly every distribution system transformer with a larger
transformer, the costs of which are borne by all electric ratepayers. EV chargers typically used in
a home (Level 2) can increase a home's peak load by 40 percent to 100 percent, which stress
neighborhood transformers and compromise reliability. 161 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733,
pp. 34-35]
160 Emma Peterson, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS, "SunZia Southwest Transmission Project Receives Final
Federal Approval" (May 29, 2023) available at https://insideclimatenews.org/news/29052023/sunzia-
transmission-proj ect-approval/.
161 Matt Egan, "Extreme heat means two-thirds of North America could suffer blackouts this summer,"
Jan 26, 2023 (two-thirds of North America is at risk of energy shortfalls this summer during periods of
extreme demand caused by air conditioning use). See also Gilleran, Madeline & Bonnema, Eric & Woods,
Jason & Mishra, Partha & Doebber, Ian & Hunter, Chad & Mitchell, Matt & Mann, Margaret. (2021).
Impact of electric vehicle charging on the power demand of retail buildings. Advances in Applied Energy.
4 ("[A]n electric vehicle station has the potential to dwarf a big box building's power demand if behind the
same meter, increasing monthly peak power demand at the site by over 250%. Cold-climate areas paired
with rate structures incorporating high demand charges are most susceptible for significant changes to the
annual electricity bill, with increases as high as 88%."). As discussed in Section IV.B.2, charging time will
decrease dramatically with DCFC chargers, but the trade-off is they require vastly more electricity.
The intensity is further complicated in that the capacity factor (percentage of time a plant is
likely to be available for generation) of thermal and photovoltaic solar (ranging from 7-32
percent) and wind (ranging from 23-46 percent) plants is so much lower than dispatchable (e.g.,
nuclear 93 percent) generation capacity. 162 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 34-35]
162 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION "Electric Power Monthly" (June 27, 2023).
Therefore, it is not sufficient to evaluate total grid capacity; EPA must consider the ability of
RTOs to supply power safely and reliably to all users during peak demand conditions and the
impact of commercial charging on local grids, and work with other federal entities to ensure the
growth in power demand stemming from an expanding ZEV fleet in the Proposed Rule can be
safely and reliably supplied. Beyond the normal approximately four-year lead time for OEMs to
make incremental changes to their production needed to meet emissions standard, the typical
duration of an electricity transmission system capital project timeline is approximately ten years,
meaning the additional electricity generation and distribution required by the Proposed Rule is
unlikely to be available in the period covered by the Proposal, large-scale electric generation and
storage projects are increasingly backlogged year-on-year due to long lead times for permitting
and approvals, supply chain shortages, and shortage of skilled workers. While government
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programs have recently been put in place to help overcome some of these hurdles, it will take
time for the grid to be upgraded quickly enough to overcome the constraints above. 163 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 34-35]
163 Gracie Brown, et al., MCKINSEY AND COMPANY, "Upgrade the grid: Speed is of the essence in the
energy transition" (Feb. 1, 2022) available at https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/operations/our-
insights/global-infrastructure-initiative/voices/upgrade-the-grid-speed-is-of-the-essence-in-the-energy-
transitionl; DELOITTE, "2023 power and utilities industry outlook" available
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/energy-resources/us-eri-power-utilities-
outlook-2023.pdf.
Regardless of whether OEMs even could comply with the Proposed Rule, they would likely
be left in a position where there is no consumer demand, and fleet turnover declines because the
infrastructure necessary to support the new ZEVs is either at capacity or nonexistent. Indeed, at
least one study to date has concluded that, upon ZEVs becoming the norm in California, it could
push the total demand for electricity beyond the existing capacity of the state's grid—turning
ZEVs into zero electricity vehicles. 164 Even more important, meeting the electricity demand
will require construction of new power plants, or electricity purchases from neighboring states,
which require increased transmission and distribution capabilities. 165 Or, in the short term,
electricity may come from fossil-fuel fired generators, in which case it makes more sense to
leave the ICE in the car rather than beside it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 36]
164 Beth Daley, THE CONVERSATION, "Switching to electric vehicles could save the US billions, but
timing is everything" (Dec. 4, 2018), available at https://theconversation.com/switching-to-electric-
vehicles-could-save-the-us-billions-but-timing-is-everything-106227.
165 Id.
EPA ignores these constraints, relying on the hope that a massive expansion of renewable
electricity generation and the transmission grid will occur in time to service EVs produced
during MY 2027-2032. The Agency's expectations are unrealistic. While the Lawrence Berkley
National Laboratory reports strong interest in clean energy, increasing delays in studying,
building, and connecting new energy projects to the grid means that "much of this proposed
capacity will not ultimately be built "166 The high-rate project withdrawal is reflected in the fact
that only 21 percent of the projects (representing 14 percent of capacity) seeking connection
from 2000 to 2017 were constructed as of the end of 2022.167 Other challenges cited by the
Berkeley National Lab that prevent timely operation of new renewable energy projects include
increased interconnection wait times, reaching agreements with landowners and communities,
power purchasers, supply chain constraints, and financing. 168 EPA's refusal to examine the
costs associated with grid updates required by the rule is another example of the agency's biased
evaluation, resulting in an arbitrary and capricious regulatory decision. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, p. 36]
166 Berkeley Lab, Electricity Markets and Policy: Queued Up: Characteristics of Power Plants Seeking
Transmission Interconnection, https://emp.lbl.gov/queues (last visited June 9, 2023).
167 Id.
168 Id.
EPA assumes the power sector is expected to shift over time to using significantly more
wind/solar generation and electricity storage (i.e., batteries), but ignores the environmental
impacts of the overall increase in critical minerals demand for electrical grid storage and how
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that compounds the stress on critical minerals for the ZEVs themselves. But the expansion of
electrical grids—even ignoring the Proposed Rule's increased demand—requires a large amount
of earth minerals and metals. Copper and aluminum, which are both needed for ZEVs, are also
the two main materials in wires and cables and, as described above, higher prices could have a
major impact on future grid investments and EV costs.205 The need for expanded grid
capabilities simultaneous to expanded ZEV production places a more pressing demand on
materials like copper and aluminum thereby increasing extraction and refining efforts throughout
the global market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 44-45]
205 IEA Report 2022.
EPA also ignores the GHG emissions associated with manufacturing more, less dense,
remotely located intermittent generation sources and battery back-up, plus the need for more
natural gas peaking capacity and massive transmission, substation, and transformer investment to
integrate these technologies into the power grid. Those emissions are significant and may offset
or eliminate the benefits that EPA calculates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 45]
206 DRIA at 7-36.
207 EPA, "2020 National Emissions Inventory (NEI) Data," available at https://www.epa.gov/air-
emissions- inventories/2020-national-emissions-inventory-nei-data.
The U.S. needs to invest an estimated $4.5 trillion to fully transition the U.S. power grid to
renewables during the next 10-20 years.261 The cost of grid upgrade projects needed to support
the incremental electricity demand growth from transportation is significant and can be quite
variable. A particular case study of Northern California illustrated in IOP Science notes: "[T]he
total cost of these upgrades will be at least $1 billion and potentially more than $10 billion" for a
service area of 4.8 million electricity customers.262 These costs need to be taken into
consideration with expected demand growth, within detailed rate base calculations, and in
concert with appliance upgrade costs to fully understand their ultimate impact on annual
ratepayer expenditures. We agree with and support the Proposed Rule's acknowledgement that
"a recent study found power needs as low as 200 kW could trigger a requirement to install a
distribution transformer."263 Other anecdotal evidence discussed within an RMI report
highlights the expensive mistakes that can emerge from insufficient planning and engagement in
details.264 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 57]
261 Dan Shreve and Wade Schauer, Deep decarbonization requires deep pockets (June 2019),
https://www.decarbonisation.think.woodmac.com/.
262 Salma Elmallah et al., IOP SCIENCE, "Can distribution grid infrastructure accommodate residential
electrification and electric vehicle adoption in Northern California?" (Nov. 9, 2022), available at
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2634-4505/ac949c.
263 DRIA at 5-35.
264 Alessandra R. Carreon, et al., RMI, "Increasing Equitable EV Access and Charging" (2022) available
at https://rmi.org/insight/increasing-equitable-ev-access-charging/.
v. Costs to upgrade electricity generation, transmission, and distribution
For EPA to achieve its GHG reduction aspirations in this Proposed Rule, all three of these
challenges must be met: (1) sufficient materials to manufacture the required EVs, chargers, and
grid upgrades, (2) consumer willingness to substitute ZEVs for ICEVs currently for sale, and (3)
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a low-carbon power generation grid capable of reliably supplying energy for this mode of
transportation. Combined with other issues, such as a disorderly transformation of the generation
base as conventional units are replaced with intermittent resources, raises questions of the grid's
ability to reliably meet consumer demand on a regional basis. Despite these challenges, EPA
incredibly assumes no increase in the cost of electricity to consumers (whether EV owners or
others) associated with the proposed rulemaking. EPA underestimates the cost of electricity to all
consumers, including EV owners, and omits the cost of grid upgrades and distributed energy
resources have been excluded from these estimates.260 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp.
56-57]
260 U.S. Department of Energy, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, "The 2030 National Charging
Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure." June 2023.
https://driveelectric.gOv/files/2030-charging-network.pdf.
EPA incorrectly assumes that ZEV owners will pay the national average residential electricity
price to charge their vehicles. EPA fails to consider that the majority of ZEVs in the U.S. are
located in utility service territories with some of the highest electricity rates in the country and
that the average EV owner currently pays a much higher price to charge their ZEV at home than
the national average residential electricity rate. Given that EV penetration has varied widely
across the U.S., it would be arbitrary to assume that EVs will, unlike in the past, penetrate
uniformly across the U.S. and thus that the average electricity price would be representative of
the actual cost electricity. For example, California, which has roughly 40 percent of all registered
ZEVs in the U.S., has a residential electricity rate that is roughly double the national average.
Considering that EPA is modeling its rule after a California-like approach to mandate ZEVs, it
would be more appropriate for EPA to assume similar real-world costs (at a minimum, given
California's temperate climate). Moreover, EPA fails to consider that mandating such a high
ZEV sales rate will necessarily require exponential increases in commercial ZEV charging at
rates that are currently three, four or five times higher than the current national average
residential electricity rate, depending on location and charging speed. Those customers who are
not homeowners and not able to install their own charging stations and take advantage of
charging at low-cost times will be adversely impacted. Instead, EPA uses a residential rate for
electricity and does not consider peak power or time of use charges. California electric prices
rose 42 percent -78 percent between 2010 and 2020 and are projected to rise an additional 50
percent by 2030 as shown in Figure 9. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Historic and Forecasted Residential Average Rates Based
on Most Recent 5-year Average Rate Increase. Figure 9: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp.
57-58]
Source: Michael Shellenberger, Twitter (citing California Public Advocate's Office data),
April 27, 2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
Heaping additional demand for EV charging into this market could exacerbate already high
electricity prices. This will be especially impactful to lower-income homeowners who may not
be able to install dedicated charging units, forcing them to pay more out of pocket for charging
during peak demand periods.265 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
265 Hardman, Scott, et al., "A Perspective on Equity in the Transition to Electric Vehicles." MIT Science
Policy Review, (Aug. 20 2021), available at https://sciencepolicyreview.org/2021/08/equity-transition-
electric-vehicles/ (accessed June 29, 2023).
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EPA must revise its analysis to account for realistic electricity prices. The proposed ZEV
mandate will require an enormous investment in power generation and distribution, resulting in
nationwide increases in electricity bills that EPA has not considered. Of course, considering the
additional trillions of dollars in costs would paint a clear picture that the costs of forced
electrification far exceed even the inflated benefits EPA presented in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 57-58]
EPA also did not include any cost of power distribution upgrade needed for EVSE
installation, citing large uncertainty. While uncertainty may exist, EPA cannot assume there is no
cost associated with this required upgrade. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory
("NREL") published new estimates of the need for ZEV charging infrastructure investment that
finds: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 59-60]
"A cumulative national capital investment of $53—$127 billion in charging infrastructure is
needed by 2030 (including private residential charging) to support 33 million PEVs. The large
range of potential capital costs found in this study is a result of variable and evolving equipment
and installation costs observed within the industry across charging networks, locations, and site
designs. The estimated cumulative capital investment includes: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, pp.59-60]
-$22-$72 billion for privately accessible Level 1 and Level 2 charging ports
-$27-$44 billion for publicly accessible fast charging ports
-$5—$11 billion for publicly accessible Level 2 charging ports.274 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 59-60]
274 National Renewable Energy Laboratory, The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-
Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure, June 26, 2023, at vii. Available at
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy23osti/85654.pdf.
Clearly, these cost estimates are vastly higher than the $7 billion in costs that EPA claims is
needed over an even longer time frame. Given a general linear relationship between ZEV
charging infrastructure costs and the number of registered ZEVs, it is reasonable to estimate
(using the DOE numbers) a cost adder for charging infrastructure to each ZEV of (at least)
$1,606 to $3,848. These costs are not shown by EPA and EPA's failure to account for them is
arbitrary and unreasonable. Moreover, note that DOE's estimate excludes "the cost of grid
upgrades and distributed energy resources."275 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 59-60]
275 Id.
The BIL provides up to $7.5 billion to install 500,000 public chargers nationwide by 2030.
"However, even the addition of half a million public chargers could be far from enough. In a
scenario in which half of all vehicles sold are ZEVs by 2030—in line with federal targets—
McKinsey estimates that America would require 1.2 million public EV chargers and 28 million
private EV chargers by that year.276 All told, the country would need almost 20 times more
chargers than it has now."277 EPA must address charger investment and reliability by more than
just referencing EV subsidies in recent legislation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 59-60]
276 McKinsey, "Building the Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure America Needs," (Apr. 18, 2022),
available at America's electric-vehicle charging infrastructure | McKinsey; see also S&P Global, "EV
Chargers: How Many Chargers DO We Need?, (Jan. 9, 2023) (millions of chargers are needed).
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277 Id.
However, building more charging stations is not enough. "Electricity purchased at a public
charger can cost five to ten times more than electricity at a private one."278 Lower-income
consumers cannot afford to install solar photovoltaics, which proponents claim will allow ZEVs
to be charged at home with emissions-free electricity.279 Those who cannot afford private
charging will end up paying vastly more for a re-charge than the wealthy. For those who simply
cannot afford the upfront costs for a new EV or pay higher public charging rates, they may end
up retaining older ICEVs for longer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 60]
278 Id.
279 Jonathan A. Lesser, Short Circuit: The High Cost of Electric Vehicle Subsidies 4, Manhattan Institute
(May 15, 2018), available at https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/R-JL-0518-v2.pdf.
Organization: American Highway Users Alliance
Moreover, a recent ATRI study found that electrification of the entire U.S. vehicle fleet would
consume 40.3% of the current electricity demand, yet our aging national grid can hardly sustain
its current needs.5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 4-5]
5 Charging Infrastructure Challenges for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Fleet, American Transportation
Research Institute, December 2022. https://truckingresearch.org/2022/12/charging-infrastructure-
challenges-for-the-u-s-electric-vehicle-fleet/
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
2. The electricity grid and charging.
In the DRIA, EPA estimates that by 2050, the proposed rule would drive annual electricity
demand higher by 430 terawatt hours (TWh). This number represents 10% of today's electricity
demand. EPA makes the claim that it is relatively small in the context of total electricity demand
in 2050 (4.4%). EPA does not include in its assessment a clear explanation on how this estimate
was obtained and, accordingly, has not provided meaningful opportunity for the public to
comment. API requests further clarification on the assessment of electricity demand projections
by EPA. The past two decades have seen an annual growth in energy generation (i.e., total
electricity consumption, or load, and system losses) averaging 30 TWh.40 Historically, the U.S.
electric power system has evolved over time to accommodate new energy demand. However, the
rapid pace at which BEVs will have to be in the market to comply with the proposed rule, in
addition to the HD GHG Phase 3 rule proposed ZEV deployment, poses several potential
challenges at the distribution level that warrant further analysis 41: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 15-16]
40 Energy Information Administration. "Monthly Energy Review." Total Energy. June 2023.
https://www.eia. gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/.
41 USDRIVE. "Summary Report on EVs at Scale and the U.S. Electric Power System." November 2019.
https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/summary-report-evs-scale-and-us-electric-power-system-
2019.
Distribution capacity expansion could present additional costs. Areas that should be
assessed are: (a) high power charging of light-duty EVs (at 150kW and above), (b) high-power
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charging of medium-and heavy-duty vehicles (potentially at over 1 MW), (c) legacy
infrastructure constraints in dense urban areas, and (d) low-power charging of light-duty EVs on
distribution systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 15-16]
Transmission constraints must be assessed. Transmission expansions must be
deliberate as these investments in the U.S. power system are costly and time consuming. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 15-16]
Ramping up capabilities of the generating fleet of the bulk power system should be
considered for BEVs at scale. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 15-16]
Analysis of medium-and heavy-duty EV market growth scenarios are needed to
assess the impact on energy generation and generation capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 15-16]
Additional factors such as utilities' readiness for the installation of new capacity, sufficient
utility labor, capital, land use, other environmental regulations, reliability requirements, and the
policy environment must be taken into consideration.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp.
15-16]
42 Ibid.
BEV impact on the order of 2-4% increased electricity demand may appear "modest" in an
aggregate sense, but EPA has failed to include in their assessment that grid supply-demand strain
is a localized phenomenon (both spatially and temporally). Add on the increased demand from
electrification ambitions and the system becomes more tenuous and requires additional
consideration. While the light-duty and medium-duty NPRM 43 notes "vehicle-to-grid software
and systems that allow management of vehicle charging time and rate have been found to create
value for electric vehicle drivers, electric grid operators, and ratepayers;" however, we submit
that vehicle to grid (V2G) technology is still a topic of active research and development activity
and early pilot demonstrations and will take years44 for effective widespread deployment to help
with load-balancing. Depending on the time of day and the extent of renewable electricity in the
grid mix for a given location, it should be noted that the carbon intensity of the electricity that
gets consumed by these vehicles may also fluctuate depending upon fluctuation of renewable
energy availability.45,46 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 16-17]
43 88 Fed. Reg. 25983 (April 27, 2023).
44 Deloitte. "2023 power and utilities industry outlook."
https://www2.deloite.com/content/dam/Deloite/tw/Documents/energy-resources/2023-power-and-utilities-
industry-outlook-en.pdf.
45 Salma Elmallah et al. December 2022. "Can Distribution Grid Infrastructure Accommodate Residential
Electrification and Electric Vehicle Adoption in Northern California?" Energy Institute at Haas. WP 327R.
https://haas.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/WP327.pdf).
46 Davidson, F. T., D. T., Rhodes, J., & Nagasawa, K. December 4, 2018. "Switching to electric vehicles
could save the US billions, but timing is everything." The Conversation. Retrieved June 30, 2023, from
https://theconversation.com/switching-to-electric-vehicles-could-save-the-us-billions-but-timing-is-
every thing-106227.
Upgrades to the typical duration of an electricity transmission system capital
project timeline would need to be accelerated from roughly 10-year timelines to have a chance to
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support the proposed ZEV demand, while current large-scale electric generation and storage
projects are increasingly facing backlogs year-on-year due to long lead times for permitting and
approvals, supply chain shortages, and shortage of skilled workers. While government programs
have recently been put in place to help overcome some of these hurdles, they will take time for
the benefits of those programs to be realized.47,48,49 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 16-
17]
47 McKinsey. "Upgrade the grid: Speed is of the essence in the energy." 2022.
www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/operations/our%20insights/gii/voices/upgra
de%20t he%20grid%20speed%20is%20of%20the%20essence%20in%20the%20energy%20transition/upgr
ade-the-grid-speed-is-of-the-essence-in-the-energy-transition.pdf.
48 Deloitte. "2023 power and utilities industry outlook."
https://www2.deloite.com/content/dam/Deloite/tw/Documents/energy-resources/2023-power-and-utilities-
industry-outlook-en.pdf.
49 Rocky Mountain Institute. "Increasing Equitable EV Access and Charging: A Path Forward for States."
2022. https://rmi.org/insight/increasing-equitable-ev-access-charging/.
EPA's proposal indicates that by 2035, the "power sector modeling results showed that non-
hydroelectric renewables (primarily wind and solar) will be the largest source of electric
generation (approximately 46 percent of total generation), and they would account for more than
70 percent of generation by 2050." This will primarily be driven by the incentives included in the
IRA. If these projections become a reality, further analysis and consideration should be given to
the intermittency of a grid primarily powered by these sources of energies. As indicated by a
study50 conducted by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), dramatically
accelerating electrification of sectors such as transportation, may make it more difficult to
decarbonize the electricity system due to the higher rate of generation and transmission capacity
additions needed. Wood Mackenzie's51 forecasts for BEV sales includes the projection that
charging will account for about 4% of total U.S. retail electricity sales in the early 2030s. Faster
growth in BEV sales would likewise result in greater demands on the grid, and at a time when
the power industry is also under pressure to cut its own greenhouse gas emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 16-17]
50 Denholm, Paul, Patrick Brown, Wesley Cole, et al. 2022. "Examining Supply-Side Options to Achieve
100% Clean Electricity by 2035." National Renewable Energy Laboratory. NREL/TP-6A40-81644.
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/Iy22osti/81644.pdf.
51 Crooks, E. April 13, 2023. "The EPA plans to rev up US EV sales." Wood Mackenzie.
https://www.woodmac.com/news/opinion/the-epa-plans-to-rev-up-us-ev-sales/.
Another critical aspect to be considered is that normal BEV charging behavior will put extra
load pressure52 on the grid, especially at peak hours. As a general practice, a passenger BEV
user will charge the vehicle during the evening, which is also the time that electricity demand
from the residential sector generally peaks. EV charging at peak hours is anticipated to be more
expensive, as additional generation capacity may be required. Moreover, the current consumer
trend toward acquiring larger vehicles, which typically have lower battery efficiency and further
charging requirements, suggests increasing energy consumption per mile. We believe that
electricity demand from BEVs should not cause additional burden to other electricity users,
especially during emergencies. However, EPA has not provided an adequate analysis of the
feasibility of the proposed regulation given the significant increase of charging infrastructure,
electrical generation and transmission and distribution infrastructure that would be required to
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support a significant shift in the national fleet from ICEVs to BEVs. Furthermore, in its cost-
benefit analysis of the proposed standards, EPA has failed to account for the full costs associated
with the charging infrastructure and grid infrastructure upgrades that would be necessary. It is
also important to note that increased use of high-capacity battery storage and high-voltage
upgrades to the grid's electrical distribution and transmission infrastructure may lead to
increased risk of wildfires in certain areas of the country, which would have an impact on fire
response and other emergency services. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 18]
52 United Nations Industrial Development Organization. "Best Practices in Electric Mobility." Discussion
Paper. 2019. https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/files/2019-09/EMG%20Discussion%20Paper.pdf.
EPA has failed to adequately address the major impacts of the proposed rule on the electricity
grid and charging infrastructure. It would be arbitrary and capricious for EPA not to adjust its
analysis to take into account these factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 18]
e. API Supports Consumer Choice for Vehicles.
API 53 supports the concept that different vehicle technologies that reduce greenhouse gas
emissions should be allowed to compete equally for consumer and market acceptance and
growth. However, API has concerns with regards to the EPA's approach and its effect on
consumer choice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 18-19]
53 https://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/blog/2021/05/18/us-consumers-need-balance-choice-in-
transportation-policy.
The stringency of the proposed standard is essentially forcing electrification of the
transportation sector and is not in alignment with most Americans that, according to a Pew
Center survey,54 favor "using a mix of energy sources to meet the country's needs" and a
majority of survey respondents oppose phasing out gasoline powered vehicles by 2035. Concerns
with charging availability55 could be relieved with vehicle technologies (e.g., PHEVs56) where
the length of an average daily trip is approximately 30 miles.57 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 18-19]
54 Tyson, A. et al. "Gen Z, Millennial Stand Out for Climate Change Activism, Social Media Engagement
With Issue." Pew Research Center. May 2021. https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2021/05/26/gen-z-
millennials-stand-out-for-climate-change-activism-social-media-engagement-with-issue/.
55 Noblet, S. "Closing The Great EV Charging Gap." August 2021. Forbes.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stacynoblet/2021/08/10/closing-the-great-ev-charging-gap/7slF6cf9107f73f4.
56 EPA is proposing a fleet utility factor (FUF) curve that will increase C02 compliance values for
PHEVs. 88 Fed. Reg. 292557 (May 5, 2023).
57 2019 Bureau of Transportation data indicates 49% of 2019 national trips by distance were less 25 miles.
84 Center for Strategic and International Studies. "An Electric Debate: Local Content Requirements and
Trade Considerations." October 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/electric-debate-local-content-
requirements-and-trade-considerations.
Fueling the BEVs
Section 5 of the DRIA discusses the electrical infrastructure impacts of the regulation forcing
67% BEV market share for new vehicles by 2032.128 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 50-
51]
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128 Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis EPA-420-D-23-003 April 2023, Table 5-13.
Table 5-13: IPM results for net export of electricity into the contiguous United States for the
proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 50-51]
2028 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Net US Exports (GWh) -28,312 -23,879 -24,877 -8,809
-4,453 -22
US Electricity Demand (GWh) 4,403,327 4,545,283 4,971,619
5,371,913 5,753,443 6,117,592
Net US Exports as a Percentage of Total Demand (%) -0.64% -0.53% -0.50% -0.16% -
0.08% 0.00% [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 50-51]
Table Notes: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 50-51]
Negative net exports represent imports of electricity
International dispatch to the contiguous United States occurred over the U.S.-Canada border.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 50-51]
This table shows an increase in power generation capacity of 968,586 GWh per year by 2040
due to the impact of the proposed rulemaking. However, this section does not consider the
additional costs to the power generation market as a result of this regulation, merely the net
increase in total power generation. The agency states: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 50-
51]
"However, as the expected increase in electricity generation associated with the
proposal relative to a no-action case is relatively small - approximately 4.4 percent increase in
2050 - we do not expect the U.S. electric power distribution system to be adversely affected by
the projected additional number of charging electric vehicles." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 50-51]
Since the proposed rule now requires BEVs as part of the assumed technology needed to meet
the proposed standards, the agency should also now account for the additional costs borne by the
power generation market to meet the requirements of the standard. Ignoring the costs is not valid
since the proposed rule forces market penetrations higher than would otherwise be natural.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 50-51]
Based on publicly available information 129 and the agency's assumed path of new power
generation sources from wind and solar, the average cost of building the infrastructure required
to support the assumed BEVs in operation by 2040 is ~$l,800/kWh. This means that there could
be ~$200B of infrastructure cost that is ignored by the agency as "relatively small." The financial
burden placed on the power generation industry is not small and should be accounted for
accurately in the final regulatory impact analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 50-51]
129 https://proest.com/construction/cost-estimates/power-plants/.
Organization: Anonymous
2852
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EPA should conduct a rigorous study on the full environmental impacts of a dramatic shift to
BEV with respect to other environmental media (i.e., non-air pollutants/contaminants), since the
proposed rule is designed to more or less force transition to that vehicle technology. The
European Environmental Agency (EEA) issued a report in 2018 that reveals the far higher
"Human Toxicity Potential" of BEVs, largely from mining the mineral requirements for EV
manufacturing (https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/electric-vehicles-from-life-cycle). Note
especially Figure 6.2 on page 58 that even if BEVs are charged with 100% RE (i.e., eliminating
the "In-use phase" segments of the BEV bars in the graph), human toxicity impacts are still over
twice as high. Ecotoxicity is also higher even if BEVs are charged with 100% RE (Figure 6.3).
This is supported by a publically-available European LCA model "carculator"
(https://carculator.psi.ch/). Damages to environmental media other than air should also be taken
into account when a shift to a substantially different vehicle technology is expected, even if some
of that contamination currently is non-domestic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp. 1-2]
A peer-reviewed study in 2018 (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.llll/jiec.12862,
Figure 1) also demonstrated the far higher human toxicity impacts of BEV. Even in extremely
clean future electric grid scenarios (denoted by dotted lines (generally corresponding to the
RCP2.6 scenario in the IPCC AR5)), "Human Toxicity" remains ~3 times higher for BEV in the
same electric grid mix scenario. Note also that "Particle matter formation" is higher for BEV
than ICEV in all but the cleanest future grid mix scenarios, disputing the BEV air quality
benefits claims. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp. 1-2]
The 2023 study in California concludes that".. .our results indicate that the CVRP [clean
vehicle rebate project] has displaced emissions from vehicle tailpipes to electric generating units,
leading to a net increase in primary PM2.5 emissions across the state of California.... [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp. 2-3]
... Of particular concern for environmental justice and public health is the finding that
Disadvantaged Communities, as defined according to CalEnviroScreen 4.0, are
disproportionately more likely to experience either larger net increases or smaller net reductions
in primary PM2.5, NOX, and S02 emissions as a result of the CVRP... " That's considering
California's current electric grid, which is among the cleanest in the U.S. This is counter to the
stated goals of the proposed regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp. 2-3]
These studies come on the heels of a 2010 study by the National Academy of Sciences
(National Research Council -https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2009/10/report-examines-
hidden-costs-of-energy-production-and-use), which concluded... "Electric vehicles and grid-
dependent (plug-in) hybrid vehicles showed somewhat higher nonclimate damages than many
other technologies for both 2005 and 2030." According to Figure 3-7b in the full report, BEV is
projected to be more damaging than most of the ICEV technologies/fuel pathways in 2030. Even
if the NRC committee underestimated the pace of the decline in coal-generated electricity, some
ICEV technologies/fuel pathways would still be less damaging than BEV or FCV, even in much
cleaner grids, most notably diesel/biodiesel and CNG ICEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490,
pp. 2-3]
Environmental regulations should be technology neutral with respect to compliance with the
goals of the regulations. Forcing a transition to 100% BEV will almost certainly result in much
higher contamination of toxic substances, both carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic, in ground
water, surface water, and soils near mining sites. BEVs will likely play a prominent role in the
2853
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future vehicle mix regardless, but categorically excluding ICE vehicle technologies via
regulation is a mistake and potentially counterproductive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp.
2-3]
Organization: Anonymous
EPA should conduct a rigorous study on the full environmental impacts of a dramatic shift to
BEV with respect to other environmental media (i.e., non-air pollutants/contaminants), since the
proposed rule is designed to more or less force transition to that vehicle technology. The
European Environmental Agency (EEA) issued a report in 2018 that reveals the far higher
"Human Toxicity Potential" of BEVs, largely from mining the mineral requirements for EV
manufacturing (https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/electric-vehicles-from-life-cycle). Note
especially Figure 6.2 on page 58 that even if BEVs are charged with 100% RE (i.e., eliminating
the "In-use phase" segments of the BEV bars in the graph), human toxicity impacts are still over
twice as high. Ecotoxicity is also higher even if BEVs are charged with 100% RE (Figure 6.3).
This is supported by a publically-available European LCA model "carculator"
(https://carculator.psi.ch/). Damages to environmental media other than air should also be taken
into account when a shift to a substantially different vehicle technology is expected, even if some
of that contamination currently is non-domestic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp. 1-2]
A peer-reviewed study in 2018 (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.llll/jiec.12862,
Figure 1) also demonstrated the far higher human toxicity impacts of BEV. Even in extremely
clean future electric grid scenarios (denoted by dotted lines (generally corresponding to the
RCP2.6 scenario in the IPCC AR5)), "Human Toxicity" remains ~3 times higher for BEV in the
same electric grid mix scenario. Note also that "Particle matter formation" is higher for BEV
than ICEV in all but the cleanest future grid mix scenarios, disputing the BEV air quality
benefits claims. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp. 1-2]
The 2023 study in California concludes that".. .our results indicate that the CVRP [clean
vehicle rebate project] has displaced emissions from vehicle tailpipes to electric generating units,
leading to a net increase in primary PM2.5 emissions across the state of California.... [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp. 2-3]
... Of particular concern for environmental justice and public health is the finding that
Disadvantaged Communities, as defined according to CalEnviroScreen 4.0, are
disproportionately more likely to experience either larger net increases or smaller net reductions
in primary PM2.5, NOX, and S02 emissions as a result of the CVRP... " That's considering
California's current electric grid, which is among the cleanest in the U.S. This is counter to the
stated goals of the proposed regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp. 2-3]
These studies come on the heels of a 2010 study by the National Academy of Sciences
(National Research Council -https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2009/10/report-examines-
hidden-costs-of-energy-production-and-use), which concluded... "Electric vehicles and grid-
dependent (plug-in) hybrid vehicles showed somewhat higher nonclimate damages than many
other technologies for both 2005 and 2030." According to Figure 3-7b in the full report, BEV is
projected to be more damaging than most of the ICEV technologies/fuel pathways in 2030. Even
if the NRC committee underestimated the pace of the decline in coal-generated electricity, some
ICEV technologies/fuel pathways would still be less damaging than BEV or FCV, even in much
2854
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cleaner grids, most notably diesel/biodiesel and CNGICEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490,
pp. 2-3]
Environmental regulations should be technology neutral with respect to compliance with the
goals of the regulations. Forcing a transition to 100% BEV will almost certainly result in much
higher contamination of toxic substances, both carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic, in ground
water, surface water, and soils near mining sites. BEVs will likely play a prominent role in the
future vehicle mix regardless, but categorically excluding ICE vehicle technologies via
regulation is a mistake and potentially counterproductive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp.
2-3]
Organization: Arizona State Legislature
EPA's proposed rule for light-duty and medium-duty vehicles will cost jobs, increase the
price of goods, hurt families, threaten our electric grid's reliability, and endanger our national
security. We are both elected representatives of the people of Arizona, and citizens of Arizona
who purchase and operate vehicles and participate in the Arizona economy on the same footing
as other Arizonans. In both capacities, we have grave concerns about this reckless proposed rule.
EPA should reject the proposed rule for at least the ten reasons set forth in this comment. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 2]
9. The proposed rule makes erroneous estimates about grid reliability. Current grid-reliability
issues and estimates of electricity needs contradict EPA's view that the proposed rule will only
cause a "modest increase in electricity demand." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 3]
IX. The proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious because of erroneous estimates about grid
reliability.
EPA estimates that the additional electricity generation needed to meet the demand of battery
electric vehicles is "relatively modest." 88 Fed. Reg. 29,311. According to EPA's estimates, "the
proposal is estimated to increase electric power end use by electric vehicles by between 0.1%
(2028) and 4.2% (2055)." Id. EPA argues that the electric grid supported adoption of air
conditioners and data processing centers successfully. Id. EPA concludes that "the expected
increase in electric power demand attributable to vehicle electrification is not expected to
adversely affect grid reliability due to the modest increase in electricity demand associated with
electric vehicle charging." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 27]
The electric grid is already stretched to the breaking point before implementing the proposed
rule. According to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation's 2023 Summer
Reliability Assessment, numerous sectors of the electric grid face shortfalls during peak demand
this summer: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 27-28]
-Midcontinent ISO (MISO): "MISO can face challenges in meeting above-normal peak
demand if wind generator energy output is lower than expected. Furthermore, the need for
external (non-firm) supply assistance during more extreme demand levels will depend largely on
wind energy output "39 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 27-28]
39 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2023 Summer Reliability Assessment, May 2023, 5,
available at
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_SRA_2023.pdf.
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-NPCC-New England: "Operating procedures for obtaining emergency resources or non-firm
supplies from neighboring areas are likely to be needed during more extreme demand or low
resource conditions."40 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 27-28]
40 Id.
-SERC-Central: "Compared to the summer of 2022, forecasted peak demand has risen by over
950 MW while growth in anticipated resources has been flat. The assessment area is expected to
have sufficient supply for normal peak demand while demand-side management or other
operating mitigations can be expected for above-normal demand or high generator-outage
conditions."41 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 27-28]
41 Id.
-Southwest Power Pool (SPP): "Reserve margins have also fallen in SPP as a result of
increasing peak demand and declining anticipated resources. Like MISO, the energy output of
SPP's wind generators during periods of high demand is a key factor in determining whether
there is sufficient electricity supply on the system "42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 27-
28]
42 Id.
-Texas (ERCOT): "Resources are adequate for peak demand of the average summer;
however, dispatchable generation may not be sufficient to meet reserves during an extreme heat-
wave that is accompanied by low winds."43 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 27-28]
43 Id.
-U.S. Western Interconnection: "However, wide-area heat events can expose the WECC
assessment areas of California/Mexico (CA/MX), Northwest (NW), and Southwest (SW) to risk
of energy supply shortfall as each area relies on regional transfers to meet demand at peak and
the late afternoon to evening hours when energy output from the area's vast solar PV resources
are diminished." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 27-28]
44 Id.
Almost all of these sectors are projected to have fewer resources than demand during extreme
heat conditions.45 Power outages reached an all-time high in 2020, and the average person went
seven hours without power in 2021.46 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 28]
45 Id at 11 Table 1
46 Catherine Morehouse, Power grid can't handle Biden's climate rule, industry groups say, POLITICO,
May 12, 2023, available at https://www.politico.eom/news/2023/05/12/biden-power-rule-fossil-fuels-
00096536.
Other observers recognize significant issues with the current electric grid's reliability. A
commissioner to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission recently testified to a U.S. Senate
committee, "The United States is heading for a reliability crisis."47 Another commissioner
echoed this warning, testifying, "We know that there is a looming resource adequacy crisis." The
commissioner predicted that "there will be, in time, a catastrophic reliability event." [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 28]
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47 Oversight of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, 118th Cong. 1 (May 4, 2023) (statement of FERC Commissioner Mark C. Christie),
available at https://www.energy.senate.gov/services/files/0A896B 12-2895-4F68-A367-74009F2975C4.
48 Oversight of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, 118th Cong. 2 (May 4, 2023) (statement of FERC Commissioner James P. Danly),
available at https://www.energy.senate.gov/services/files/0A896B 12-2895-4F68-A367-74009F2975C4.
49 Id.
EPA has only exacerbated the threats to grid reliability by proposing new carbon pollution
standards for coal and natural-gas fired power plants in May 2023.50 The National Rural Electric
Cooperative Association is "concerned the proposal could disrupt domestic energy security,
force critical, always-available power plants into early retirement and make new natural gas
plants exceedingly difficult to permit, site and build."51 This is consistent with a FERC
commissioner's concern that "[t]he problem generally is not the addition of intermittent
resources, primarily wind and solar, but the far too rapid subtraction of dispatchable resources,
especially coal and gas."52 As the Electric Power Supply Association observed upon release of
the proposed power plant rule, "For the EPA to issue proposed rules that are likely to drive
power plant retirements while simultaneously undertaking separate actions to significantly
increase demand for electricity due to electrification of the nation's vehicle fleet creates the
conditions for a reliability failure We are not slow walking into a reliability crisis - if this rule is
finalized, we will be choosing to run toward that outcome."53 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537,
p. 29]
50 U.S. EPA, "EPA Proposes New Carbon Pollution Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Power Plants to
Tackle the Climate Crisis and Protect Public Health," May 11, 2023, available at
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-proposes-new-carbon-pollution-standards-fossil-fuel-fired-power-
plants-tackle.
51 National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, "Electric Co-ops: EPA's Power Plant Proposal Would
Further Jeopardize Reliability," May 11, 2023, available at https://www.electric.coop/electric-co-ops-epas-
power-plant-proposal-would-further-jeopardize-reliability.
52 Statement of FERC Commissioner Mark C. Christie, supra note 47, at 1 (emphasis original).
53 Electric Power Supply Association, "Proposed EPA Power Plant Rules Could Intensify Reliability
Challenges," May 11, 2023, available at https://epsa.org/proposed-epa-power-plant-rule-could-intensify-
reliability-challenges/.
Into the face of these EPA-exacerbated grid reliability issues come EPA's electric vehicle
rules, and many electricity requirement estimates are far less optimistic than EPA's. Before the
electric vehicle rules, the U.S. Energy Information Administration was forecasting that
"electricity consumption by the transportation sector will increase by more than a factor of 12
between 2021 and 2050 (from 12 billion kWh in 2021 to more than 145 billion kWh in
2050)."54 The American Research Transportation Institute estimates that full electrification of
the country's passenger cars and trucks will require a 26.3 percent increase in existing electricity
generation. 55 When combined with the needs for electricity generation for freight trucks, which
EPA is separately proposing, the country needs to increase its existing electricity generation by
more than 40%.56 California needs to increase its existing electricity generation by more than
57%.57 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 29]
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54 North American Electric Reliability Corporation et al., Electric Vehicle Dynamic Charging Performance
Characteristics during Bulk Power System Disturbances, Apr. 11, 2023, 2, available at
https://www.nerc.com/comm/RSTC/Documents/Grid_Friendly_EV_Charging_Recommendations.pdf.
55 American Transportation Research Institute, Charging Infrastructure Challenges for the U.S. Electric
Vehicle Fleet, Dec. 2022, 1, available at https://truckingresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/ATRI-
Charging-Infrastructure-Challenges-for-the-U. S.-EV-Fleet-Summary-12-2022.pdf.
56 Id.
57 Id.
EPA's mandate could require automobile manufacturers to sell 10-12 million electric vehicles
in calendar year 2035 alone.58 Millions more would be sold in the years before that. According
to a study conducted for the Department of Energy that modeled grid impacts in 2028 from
electric vehicles, "The results indicated that the first issues would occur between 30 and 37
million EVs, at which point load could not be reliably met."59 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537,
pp. 29-30]
58 Todd Lassa, Can Automakers Sell 10-12 Million EVs Here By 2032?, AUTO WEEK, Apr. 10, 2023,
available at https://www.autoweek.com/news/industry-news/a43555049/epa-announcing-zero-emissions-
targets-for-new-vehicles/.
59 M. Kintner-Meyer et al., Electric Vehicles at Scale - Phase I Analysis: High EV Adoption Impacts on
the Western U.S. Power Grid, PNNL Report 29894, July 2020, available at
https://www.pnnl.gov/sites/default/files/media/file/EV-AT-SCALE_l_IMPACTS_final.pdf.
EPA has failed to consider the significant grid reliability issues caused by its interconnected
proposals that increase electricity demand while decreasing electricity supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0537, pp. 29-30]
Conclusion
EPA's proposed rule will hurt Arizona families and workers by forcing them to buy vehicles
they cannot afford, increasing the cost of goods they need, costing them jobs, decreasing the
reliability of the electricity they depend on, and weakening our national security by making us
dependent on China. EPA's green dream will be a nightmare for Arizona. EPA should reject the
proposed rule and begin acting in the best interests of Arizonans and Americans. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 32]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Vehi cl e-to-Infrastructure Integrati on
As the infrastructure for BEVs expands and becomes more standardized, vehicles themselves
have a role in providing a reliable, consistent, and convenient charging experience for
consumers. BEVs also have the unique opportunity to support grid stability in the future through
"vehicle-to-grid" systems. However, to broadly realize these consumer and grid service benefits,
vehicles must be able to communicate with the chargers themselves, known as electric vehicle
supply equipment (EVSE), in a standardized way. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 43-44]
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 15118 is a set of communication and
charging management standards intended for use between vehicles and EVSE, including a
customer convenience feature referred to as Plug & Charge. To help ensure consistent and
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successful use of charging infrastructure, CARB recommends that U.S. EPA require
manufacturers to integrate these industry-developed standards into the design of future BEVs.
CARB notes that several automakers have already introduced or will introduce U.S. vehicles that
can support some portions of these standards, especially the Plug & Charge feature, including
Audi, BMW, Daimler, Porsche, Lucid, Volkswagen, 60 and Ford. 61 Standardized deployment
of vehicle-to-infrastructure communication across the industry will reduce barriers to BEV
adoption and maximize benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 43-44]
60 In a joint comment to the California Public Utilities Commission on its February 2018 Staff Report on
the Vehicle-Grid Integration (VGI) Communication Protocol Working Group, Audi, BMW, Daimler,
Lucid, Porsche, and VW stated their intention to implement ISO 15118 on their future vehicles, including
the Plug & Charge feature. https://www.cpuc.ca.gOv/-/media/cpuc-website/files/legacyfiles/o/6442457082"
oems-final-comments-vgi-wg-draft-report-correction-v2.pdf
61 Ford. "Charging Your Mustang Mach-E." https://www.ford.com/mustang/ev-charging/mache/.
Accessed June 15, 2023.
Specifically, CARB recommends that, for future BEVs, U.S. EPA require manufacturers to:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 43-44]
Implement and conform to ISO 15118-3 Vehicle to grid communication interface - Part
3: physical and data link layer requirements, 62 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 43-44]
Implement and conform to ISO 15118-2 Vehicle to grid communication interface - Part
2: Network and application protocol requirements 63 and ISO 15118-20 Vehicle to grid
communication interface: Part 20: 2nd generation network layer and application layer
requirements, 64 and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 43-44]
- Demonstrate successful results for each certified vehicle configuration with ISO 15118-4
Vehicle to grid communication interface - Part 4: Network and application protocol
conformance test 65 and ISO 15118-5 Vehicle to grid communication interface - Part 5: Physical
layer and data link layer conformance test. 66 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 43-44]
62 ISO 15118-3:2015.
63 ISO 15118-2:2014.
64 ISO 15118-20:2022.
65 ISO 15118-4:2018.
66 ISO 15118-5:2018.
CARB notes several important benefits associated with widespread deployment of
harmonized communication standards between the vehicle and the charging infrastructure. First,
drivers will see the benefit of a simplified public charging user experience. Plug & Charge
allows drivers to establish their electric charging preferences and input payment information
once, providing a more seamless charging experience. With widespread implementation of Plug
& Charge, drivers charging their vehicle at a compatible public EVSE will be able to simply plug
in their vehicle and walk away while the vehicle and the EVSE communicate and manage the
charging session accordingly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 44-45]
Second, vehicle-to-grid connectivity could enable BEVs to provide important grid services.
Implementation of the communications protocols outlined in the suite of ISO 15118 standards is
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a key step to enable this functionality by ensuring that the vehicle and the EVSE are coordinated
on the bi-directional flow of electricity during grid support services. CARB agrees with U.S.
EPA's findings that grid reliability is not expected to be adversely affected by the modest
increase in electricity demand associated with electric vehicle charging. 67 California's grid has
historically expanded and evolved as consumer demand for electricity services has grown,
including with the recent emergence of electric vehicles. This trend is reflected in the historical
expansion of the national grid as noted in U.S. EPA's proposal. However, BEVs can further
support grid resilience with their unique ability to fuel on a flexible schedule depending on the
driver's and the grid's needs. Drivers with access to residential charging could also realize
greater opportunities to reduce their total cost of ownership by potentially selling electricity back
to the grid or powering their homes during peak times. Furthermore, BEVs have already been
demonstrated to be able to function as back-up power devices during emergencies, and
standardized implementation of this protocol could make such activities even more seamless in
the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 44-45]
67 CARB. Response to Comments on the Draft Environmental Analysis Prepared for the Advanced Clean
Cars II Program. August 2022.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/acciirtcl.pdf.
Third, requiring implementation of these communication standards on the vehicle aligns
with—and maximizes the benefits from—recent infrastructure planning and funding. The federal
government is making unprecedented investments in charging infrastructure through the
Infrastructure Investment Jobs Act. The law set aside $5 billion to build a National Electric
Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) network that will enable widespread travel across the nation. 68
As part of deploying the NEVI funds, the Joint Office of Transportation and Energy set
minimum requirements that NEVI-funded EVSE must meet including minimum payment
standards, minimum power, minimum number of ports, and collection of reliability metrics. One
of these requirements is the implementation of Plug & Charge on direct current fast chargers
(DCFC), utilizing the ISO 15118 suite of standards outlined above. 69 The California Energy
Commission is also taking steps in this direction by requiring public chargers it partially or fully
funds to install EVSE designed to be compatible with the ISO 15118 suite of standards. 70
Matching vehicle requirements with NEVI implementation will harmonize communication flow
between vehicles and charging stations, reducing the number of potential points of failure to
communicate in the charging ecosystem. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 44-45]
68 Public Law No. 117-58. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-
117publ58.pdf. Accessed June 15, 2023.
69 23 C.F.R. § 680.108(a). (2023).
70 California Energy Commission. TN 241955. Docket 19-AB-2127. "CEC Recommendation for
Deployment of ISO 15118-Ready Chargers." February 2022.
https://efiling.energy.ca.gov/GetDocument.aspx?tn=241955&DocumentContentId=75632
In addition to individual cost savings and broader economic growth, U.S. EPA's proposal will
provide economic benefits for the nation's energy systems. For example, increased ZEV
deployment will reduce our reliance on foreign oil, providing economic resilience to global fuel
supply chain disruptions and price shocks. With the integration of emerging vehicle-to-grid
communication strategies, as CARB recommends, vehicles will be able to promote grid
resilience through enabling demand response load management strategies, providing backup
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power during blackouts, and supporting storage of renewable energy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp. 66-67]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
These state and local actors are also at the forefront of innovative and emerging solutions to
managing grid load, including through EVs, such as "vehicle-to-grid" ("V2G") technology, 151
demand response and distributed energy resource programs, 152 and vehicle-integrated
microgrids.153 For example, the California PUC is actively investing in V2G technologies,
which allow electric vehicles to supply power back to the grid and thereby promote
reliability. 154 One 2019 study estimated potential benefits to ratepayers from these ancillary
services at $670 million to $1.02 billion per year from V2G services.155 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0746, pp. 25]
151 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Corp., PG&E to Offer Nation's First Vehicle-To-Grid Export Rate for
Commercial Electric Vehicles (Oct. 26, 2022), available at https://investor.pgecorp.com/news-events/press-
releases/press-release-details/2022/PGE-to-Offer-Nations-First-Vehicle-To-Grid-Export-Rate-for-
Commercial-Electric-Vehicles/defaultaspx (announcing PUC approval to establish a utility rate to
compensate fleet owners for V2G services during peak energy demand).
152 See, e.g., Green Mountain Power, Bring Your Own Device, available at
https://greenmountainpower.com/rebates-programs/home-energy-storage/bring-your-own-device/ (detailing
Vermont demand response/distributed energy resource incentive program providing up to $10,500 toward
home battery storage).
153 See, e.g., Edison Electric Institute, Duke Energy Announces Microgrid-Integrated Fleet Electrification
Depot (Apr. 13, 2023), available at https://theelectricgeneration.org/2023/04/13/duke-energy-announces-
microgrid-integrated-fleet-electrification-depot (announcing North Carolina electric fleet depot integrated
with microgrid and solar); Daniel Kirschen and Chanaka Keerthisinghe, Techno-Economic Analysis of the
Arlington Microgrid: A Report prepared by the University of Washington for Snohomish Public Utility
District (Feb. 28, 2022), available at https://www.snopud.com/wp-
content/uploads/2022/06/UW_TechnoEcon_AMG_022822.pdf (detailing Washington pilot microgrid
consisting of solar, storage, and V2G systems to support grid resiliency and reliability).
154 California PUC, VGI Policy, Pilots, and Technology Enablement, available at
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/infrastructure/transportation-
electrification/vehicle-grid-integration-activities (detailing CPUC's Vehicle-grid integration (VGI)
initiatives).
155 S. Chhaya et al., Open Standards-Based Vehicle-to-Grid: Value Assessment, Electric Power Research
Institute (Jun. 28, 2019), available at https://www.epri.eom/research/products/000000003002014771.
Second, state and local agencies are implementing ambitious programs to ready power grids
and charging infrastructure for the increased adoption of electric vehicles and the associated
increase in electricity demand, which further supports EPA's feasibility analysis. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 33]
2. State and Local Actions Are Facilitating the Necessary Generation, Transmission, and
Charging Infrastructure to Support the Projected Compliance Pathway
While EPA only needs to consider the costs of regulatory compliance incurred within the
allotted lead time, Coalition for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 128, EPA also considers the
demands on the power sector from projected compliance with the proposed and alternative
standards. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,309-312. We agree with EPA's assessment that the projected modest
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increase in electricity demand (0.04 to 2% over the course of the regulated model years) is more
than manageable. This is especially true when compared to other historical and current examples
of rapid demand increases that the power sector successfully met, see 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,311
(noting widespread adoption of air conditioning in 1960s and 1970s and 21st-century growth of
data centers and server farms), 188 and given Congress's significant investments in transmission,
generation, and charging infrastructure in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law's NEVI Formula
Program and the Inflation Reduction Act. Draft RIA, at 5-14 (Tables 5-2 & 5-3); 88 Fed. Reg. at
29,307-08. Part D.2 of the Background section, supra at 21-25, provides examples of some of the
actions our States and Cities are taking, including under the NEVI Formula Program, to ensure
there is sufficient charging infrastructure to support the projected electric vehicle penetration
rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 35]
188 See also White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, Climate and Energy Implications of
Crypto-Assets in the United States (Sep. 2022), at 14-15, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/09/09-2022-Crypto-Assets-and-Climate-Report.pdf (estimating U.S.-based
cryptocurrency mining operations for Bitcoin alone to consume "33 to 55 billion kWh per year, or 0.9% to
1.4% of total U.S. electricity usage in 2021").
In addition to the federal agencies that ensure the safety and reliability of U.S. power grids,
EPA properly recognizes that many of the decisions that affect the power sector's response to
widespread electric vehicle adoption will be made by non-federal entities. States, RTOs/ISOs,
public utility commissions, and public and private utilities have the responsibility to ensure
adequate supply, transmission capacity, and grid resiliency. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,311; see 16
U.S.C. §§ 824(a), (b)(1), and are at the forefront of developing vehicle-to-grid applications and
other grid management solutions. Part D.2 of the Background section, supra at 21-25, details
many of the initiatives that states and other non-federal actors are taking to meet the transition.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, p. 35]
Organization: Charles Forsberg
Impact on the electricity grid. Fossil fuels provide two services to the electricity grid: energy
and energy storage. Fossil fuel energy storage is on the scale of millions of gigawatt hours.
Moving off liquid hydrocarbon fuels to electricity implies moving to the most expensive energy
source to produce, store and transport. Replacing the hourly to seasonal storage function in the
electricity system with batteries has cost estimates of tens of trillions of dollars. Because of the
cost difference in energy storage and transport by liquid fuels versus electricity, there is a
massive functional and cost difference between hybrid plug-in electric vehicles and all-electric
vehicles. All electric vehicles force hourly to seasonal storage onto the electricity grid whereas
hybrid plug-in electric vehicles enable use of liquid hydrocarbons to provide these storage and
transport functions when the electricity grid is stressed. Plug-in hybrid vehicles can be "good
citizen" electricity customers by buying electricity when generating capacity is available and the
electricity grid is not overloaded because they have liquid hydrocarbon fuel backup. Battery
electric vehicles raise electricity rates because need very expensive upgrades to assure recharging
on an hourly to seasonal basis. The paper below goes into these energy storage cost challenges.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, pp. 2-3]
C. Forsberg, "Addressing the Low-Carbon Million Gigawatt-Hour Energy Storage
Challenge", The Electricity Journal, December 2021. https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.tej.2021.107042
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, pp. 2-3]
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Recommended action for EPA. Conduct a detailed analysis on impacts of different electric
vehicle options on U.S. electricity prices-including separate analysis of the effects of full-
deployment plug-in hybrid versus all electric vehicles. This must include multi-year hourly
analysis to include seasonal and more extreme events that only occur every few years. This far,
nobody has done such an analysis. There are radically different outcomes in terms of electricity
prices for everyone from the use of hybrid/plug-in hybrid versus all-electric vehicles that is not
recognized by EPA. Such analysis will likely make the case that the U.S. should not provide any
regulatory or financial incentives to all-electric vehicles because of the resulting increases in
U.S. electricity prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Chevron
4. Feasibility and implementation.
Chevron is concerned that the rapid increases in forecasted BEV sales rate are optimistic and
may overstate the benefits of the proposals. The proposals may limit choices and increase costs
for consumers, including those in economically disadvantaged groups and smaller businesses.
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0553, p. 6]
BEV sales forecasts may rely on optimistic expectations for increased electricity generation
and charging infrastructure. EPA should conduct an assessment to account for the costs and
timing associated with upgrades to the nation's grid infrastructure, including new and upgraded
generation, transmission, and distribution, and the costs associated with the installation of public
and private electric vehicle chargers. If it is not feasible to complete expansion and
improvements for the current grid, it may not be possible to meet the additional demand created
by the proposed regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, p. 6]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
These aggregate costs include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 5-6]
-Electric power costs. Researchers estimate that the 350 million electric vehicles required to
decarbonize the U.S. fleet by 2050 could use as much as half of U.S. national electricity demand.
See Thea Riofrancos et al., Achieving Zero Emissions with More Mobility and Less Mining,
U.C. Davis Climate+ Community Project (Jan. 2023), https://subscriber.politi-
copro.com/eenews/f/eenews/?id=00000185-e562-de44-a7bf-ed7751a00000. The proposal would
hence amount to a complete transformation of the electric power sector, requiring substantially
more generation, transmission, and distribution, which in turn would result in higher power
prices not just for those using electrified vehicles, but for all users. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, pp. 5-6]
-Air quality effects. These include the air quality and health impacts from significant
increases in tire wear from electric vehicles, as well as the increases in C02 emissions that will
result from manufacturing more electric generation infrastructure, transmission, distribution, and
charging equipment, and the manufacturing of electric vehicles themselves, which produce far
more upstream emissions than their internal combustion engine counterparts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, pp.6-7]
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-Taxpayer subsidies: Taxpayers subsidize the sales of electric vehicles, charging
infrastructure, roads, and the electricity generation, transmission, and distribution required to
power these vehicles. The proposal currently ignores these costs, counting them instead as
"transfers."5 88 Fed. Reg. 29,369. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 6-7]
5 As described below, the many direct subsidies (federal and state electric vehicle credits, charging credits,
etc.) and regulatory subsidies (EPA multiplier credits, NHTSA multiplier credits, state ZEV credits, etc.)
result in real costs to taxpayers and the consumers of the many products that cross-subsidize these
"preferred" products. These costs cannot be treated as "transfers" that are cost-free, and they absolutely
cannot be treated as "transfers" to circumvent the economic significance prong of the major questions
doctrine.
F. The proposed rule neglects the impact of EPA's many other proposed rules on these rules.
Problems with critical minerals and charging infrastructure are made worse when coupled
with EPA's proposed heavy-duty vehicle rule, which will compete with the light-and medium-
duty market for minerals, batteries, charging infrastructure, and more. EPA has entirely ignored
this. See DRIA 5-30 n. 107 ("Estimates above do not include PEV charging demand for medium-
duty or heavy-duty vehicles."). EPA must account for how these parallel standards will increase
the demand for the above and thus raise prices or provide other barriers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0712, pp. 31-32]
EPA has also failed to confront the interaction of its proposed standards with its standards for
electricity generating units—critical to powering electric vehicles— and how these standards and
a surge of electric vehicles will interact with an increasingly unreliable grid. EPA has proposed
new carbon pollution standards for coal and natural gas-fired power plants. "New Source
Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and Reconstructed
Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
From Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean
Energy Rule," 88 Fed. Reg. 33,240 (May 23, 2023). Among other things, this proposal assumes
it would cause all coal facilities to close by 2040 or implement—largely unproven—carbon
capture and storage technology with at least a 90 percent capture rate. The proposal would also
require the use of hydrogen blending or carbon capture in all natural gas plants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, pp. 31-32]
These new rules will drive up electricity costs—by adding large new expenses to the coal and
gas the currently provides a majority of our nation's electricity—and reduce grid reliability by
driving offline the large thermal generation sources that provide most of our electric grid's
reliable power. Grid reliability is a serious concern. A decline in steady thermal sources like coal
makes our grid susceptible to the "fatal trifecta": "overreliance on weather-dependent solar and
wind, just-in-time natural-gas backstops, and imports of electricity from neighboring states."
Michael Buschbacher & Taylor Myers, FERC Gaslights America, American Conservative (Sep.
6, 2022), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/ferc-gaslights-america/. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, pp. 31-32]
The effects of decreasing baseload power are already being felt. The North American Electric
Reliability Corporation's ("NERC") most recent Long-Term Risk Assessment found that found
that most of the country is already at elevated risk of blackouts, with some regions being at high-
risk during even normal peak conditions. 2022 Long-Term Reliability Assessment, North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (Dec. 2022),
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https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assess-
ments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2022.pdf. These problems are exacerbated by rules like EPA's
proposed power plant rule because those rules drive the adoption of less reliable intermittent
resources like solar and wind. NERC explained that "[a]s solar decreases as sunset approaches,
the total of all available resources can fall short of the demand, especially [during] higher
demand levels." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 32]
Reliability concerns are also exacerbated by the increasing penetration of electric vehicles in
the nation's automotive fleet. A recent NERC report explained that when upticks in electrical
vehicle charging coincide with increasingly frequent grid disturbances in the bulk power system.
Electric Vehicle Dynamic Charging Performance Characteristics during Bulk Power System
Disturbances, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (Apr. 10, 2023),
https://www.nerc.com/comm/RSTC/
Documents/Grid_Friendly_EV_Charging_Recommendations.pdf. When these events coincide
they could "have catastrophic consequences for grid reliability if left un checked (i.e., cascading
blackouts and widespread power interruptions)." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 32]
The proposal fails to confront these issues and instead waves away concerns about grid
reliability by explaining that "U.S. electric power utilities routinely up-grade the nation's electric
power system to improve grid reliability and to meet new electric power demand." 88 Fed. Reg.
29,311. This explanation is inadequate. If the Biden Administration is going to adopt a "whole of
government" approach to environmental rulemaking, it must consider the interaction of all of
those rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 32]
Even by its own logic, EPA's rule fails because it fails to account for decreased energy
security owing to an increased demand for natural gas, which currently makes up 40 percent of
our grid's electricity generation. This share—or at least the volume of energy generated—will
need to grow dramatically to make up for the increased electricity demand. 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, p. 36]
19 Of course, "[t]he United States is [also] the leading producer of natural gas," and so increasing reliance
on natural gas does little to move the needle on energy security. C. Boyden Gray, American Energy,
Chinese Ambition, and Climate Realism, 5 American Affairs Journal (Winter 2021),
https://americanaffairsjournal.Org/2021/l 1/american-energy-chinese-ambition-and-climate-realism/. But if
the proposal intends to count decreases in petroleum in its favor it is completely unreasonable to ignore the
concomitant increases in natural gas consumption.
Organization: Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA)
By requiring up to two-thirds of new vehicles sold in the United States to be electric by 2032,
over 48 billion kWh of electricity consumption would be added every year to replace only light
duty vehicles. Ultimately, seeing two-thirds of the current ICE-powered vehicle fleet transition to
EV's would increase electricity consumption by 899.5 billion kWh. As a result, the U.S. EPA
needs to ask itself from where this generation is going to come? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0788, p. 2]
In addition to increased electric generation capacity, what kind of improvements to electric
transmission and distribution infrastructure will be required to serve this increased electricity
demand? Who pays for these upgrades -including the electric vehicle charging infrastructure
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necessary to serve the additional of 9.3 million EVs every year reliably and affordably? [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0788, p. 2]
Organization: Daniel Hellebuyck
Aside from the well publicized drawbacks of electric vehicles (EVs) such as range anxiety,
long charging times, purchase costs, lack of available and operating charging stations, and
replacement of fuel taxes, there are several other issues to consider: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0526, p. 1]
Strained Electrical Grid: While China is developing EVs on a large scale, they are also
building up to two coal-powered generating plants a week to ensure there will be enough power
to reliably charge the vehicles. Compare this to the dismantling of coal-powered power plants in
the United States. There is no assurance that renewable energy sources will be feasible or
sufficient enough to replace all the lost coal-based generating capacity in this nation. Already we
are seeing rolling blackouts and brownouts in states like California as more EVs hit the grid.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0526, p. 1]
Organization: Delek US Holdings, Inc.
EPA also assumes the power sector is expected to become cleaner over time using wind/solar
generation and electricity storage (i.e., batteries), but ignores the environmental impacts of the
overall increase in critical minerals demand for electrical grid storage and how that compounds
the stress on critical minerals for the ZEVs themselves. However, the expansion of electrical
grids—even ignoring the Proposed Rule's increased demand—requires a large amount of earth
minerals and metals. Indeed, copper and aluminum—both needed for ZEVs—are also the two
main materials in wires and cables and, as described above, higher prices could have a major
impact on future grid investments.45 The need for expanded grid capabilities simultaneous to
expanded ZEV production places a more pressing demand on materials like copper and
aluminum thereby increasing extraction and refining efforts throughout the global market. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, pp. 9-10]
45 International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions (Mar. 2022),
77-80, available at https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a-
52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.
Organization: Dylan Ondek
Dear Environmental Protection Agency, I am writing to express my anger at what you are
doing for the environment. Going to electric cars is not the way to go. How are we powering the
chargers for these electric vehicles? How are you going to stop every single person in the world
from stopping driving? It is not going to happen. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5089]
I do agree with some of the things that the EPA is doing. But going to all electric vehicles is
not the right move. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5089]
Organization: Edison Electric Institute (EEI)
A. Electric companies can accommodate increased energy demand.
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As EPA notes, the electric power sector has a long history of accommodating growth in
electricity demand from the adoption of new technologies, including electric home appliances,
residential and commercial air conditioning, and data centers. See id. At 25,983. Electricity use
from EVs today is modest. Argonne National Lab estimates the approximately 2.3 million EVs
on the road as of the end of 2021 consumed 6.1 terawatt-hours of electricity in that year, or about
0.16 percent of the total electric sales to U.S. customers in that year.18 As EPA also notes, the
increase in electricity use resulting from the Proposed Rule also will be modest, increasing
electricity end-use by less than 3 percent in 2055. See id. On a macro-level, meeting the
increased energy usage from electric truck adoption as contemplated in the Proposed Rule will
not be a significant challenge for the electric power sector. Meeting the location-specific power
needs of large electric vehicle (EV) charging facilities can be a more pressing challenge. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 7-9]
However, this is a challenge that can be addressed with deliberate effort and collaboration
among electric companies, fleet operators, and stakeholders.
18 See Gohlke, et al., Assessment of Light-Duty Plug-in Electric Vehicles in the United States, 2010 -
2021, https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2022/ll/178584.pdf and U.S. Energy Information
Administration, Electric Power Monthly
Electric companies can accommodate localized power needs at the pace of customer demand,
provided appropriate customer engagement and enabling policies are in place. The power
required by a customer is essential when considering the infrastructure needed at the facility
level, because the capacity of the local distribution circuit is sized to meet the peak power
requirements of customers on that circuit. Some large EV charging facilities have power
requirements in the tens of megawatts (MW). Electric companies are well accustomed to serving
facilities with those types of power needs, but large fleet customers differ from traditional
electric customers (e.g., commercial or industrial buildings) in several important aspects. These
aspects include, but are not limited to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 7-9]
Construction timelines: A new, large commercial building with a multi-MW power
demand, for example, will typically have a multi-year construction timeline, giving the local
electric company time to plan and make appropriate upgrades to the electric distribution system
serving that customer. A fleet operator, in contrast, may be able to procure vehicles and complete
construction on a multi-MW charging facility in a matter of months. This creates a potential
misalignment between the fleet operators' timeline to procure vehicles and charging equipment
and the electric company's timeline for making the necessary system upgrades to provide power
to that facility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 7-9]
Customer familiarity with procuring electric power: Commercial and industrial
electric customers are used to working with electric companies for the operation of their facilities
as part of their normal course of business, including working with electric companies as part of
the construction process for launching new facilities. In particular, national corporate customers
often have long-standing relationships with the electric companies that serve them. Electric
companies typically assign these customers an account manager, given their scale and
complexity. A fleet operator, in contrast, is used to procuring diesel to operate its vehicles, and
may consider procuring electricity in the same paradigm. Fleet operators may be small electricity
users today and thus that division may not yet be considered a managed account for the electric
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company. However, EEI members have identified this issue and are expanding their working
relationship with these customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 7-9]
Uncertain and dynamic load profiles: The power usage throughout the day, known as
the "load profile," of typical commercial and industrial buildings is well understood (e.g., large
retail store, data center, or manufacturing facility). Typical load profiles for electric fleet
customers are not yet well understood and often hypothetical given the early stage of electric
truck commercialization. A fleet charging load profile is the product of many factors, including
the routes of the vehicles, the state of charge of the EV when returning to the facility, the number
of operating shifts, etc. Unlike a typical commercial building, the load profile of a fleet facility
could also drastically change with a change in vehicle operations (e.g., changing from a one-shift
to two-shift operation). This uncertainty adds complexity for electric companies when
determining how best to serve the power requirements of a fleet customer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0708, pp. 7-9]
These factors could result in misalignment between expectations and reality regarding the
timing, cost, and complexity of procuring electric power for fleet charging. Electric companies
are taking a multi-pronged approach to remedy this potential misalignment, as discussed in the
following sections. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 7-9]
B. Earlier customer engagement through education and coordination will alleviate
infrastructure delays.
Early engagement between the relevant fleet customer and electric company is important as it
allows planning for the infrastructure to support EV charging to occur much earlier and
accommodate longer lead-times. In 2020, EEI began a collaboration with a large, national
corporate customer that was planning to electrify a significant portion of its fleet operation. EEI
facilitated meetings for this customer to share its conceptual plans with EEI's members and
establish points of contact at the customer and each electric company. Over the course of more
than a year, the customer identified the locations within each member's territory where it
planned to deploy EVs and developed a five-year forecast to inform the electric company how
the power demand would increase at each location over time. This unprecedented level of
collaboration has resulted in this customer deploying thousands of electric vehicles to date. This
includes alternative locations that were identified by the electric company after consulting with
the customer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 9-10]
The extent of collaboration described in this example may not be feasible, or necessary, for
every fleet customer. But it does provide a helpful template for how early engagement and
planning can streamline fleet electrification. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) is
developing a data-sharing platform as part of its EVs2Scale2030 initiative that will formalize and
expand this model by allowing fleet customers to upload their forward-looking fleet
electrification plans to a common database. 19 Electric companies will then be able to access this
data to visualize where on its system upgrades will be needed to accommodate growing power
needs from fleet customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 9-10]
19 See Electric Power Research Institute, EVs2Scale2030,
https://www.epri.eom/research/products/000000003002025622.
Many electric companies are developing tools and resources to assist fleet customers. These
include, but are not limited to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 10-11]
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Grid capacity evaluation tools: Several electric companies have launched capacity
hosting maps that are available on public websites that illustrate local grid capacity in their
service territory.20 These maps can be helpful early indicators for fleet customers when
considering the level of upgrades that may be required at a particular facility. These maps have
limitations, as they are a snapshot in time and do not substitute for a formal engineering study.
Even if they have not published such a capacity map, many electric companies have the ability to
assist fleet customers by providing an early screen for local grid capacity by location directly. In
either case, the outcome is the same: for customers that have the ability to consider multiple
locations for their EV deployment plans, pre-screening the local distribution system capacity at
these locations allows the fleet to factor grid upgrade timelines into their deployment plans.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 10-11]
Fleet assessments and advisory services: Many electric companies have launched
programs to provide in-depth consulting services to fleets that are considering electrification,
including elements like feasibility studies based on total cost of ownership.21 These programs
also may include dedicated staff resources to guide customers through the fleet electrification
journey, including choosing the appropriate charging strategy and charging infrastructure to meet
their operational needs. These programs help to educate fleet customers about the nuances of
procuring power for their fleet operations and allow electric companies to learn more about the
expected operations of electric fleets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 10-11]
20 Examples include: AVANGRID (United Illuminating, NYSEG, Rochester Gas & Electric), Ameren
Illinois, Con Edison, Dominion Energy, Eversource, Exelon (Atlantic City Electric, Delmarva Power,
Pepco, Corned, PECO), Jersey Central Power & Light, National Grid, Orange & Rockland, Public Service
Electric & Gas, San Diego Gas & Electric, and Southern California Edison.
21 See Alliance for Transportation Electrification, Fleet Advisory Services (FAS) for Fleet Electrification:
Meet Customer Needs and Provide Grid Benefits, https://evtransportationalliance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2023/02/PRESS-ATE-EC-White-Paper.pdf, which includes case studies from DTE
Energy, Exelon, Portland General Electric, Southern California Edison, and Xcel Energy.
These and other resources being developed and deployed today by electric companies are
essential to ensuring that infrastructure plans and efforts are matched to forthcoming
electrification efforts from fleets and other operators. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 10-
11]
C. Electric companies are planning for fleet electrification.
Investor-owned electric companies are regulated by state commissions, which approve
electric company capital plans to maintain and upgrade the electric grid. While policies vary by
state commission, two generally applicable principles have important implications for fleet
electrification. First, the "used and useful" standard means that regulators will only approve the
electric company to build infrastructure that will be utilized and provide value. The onus is on
electric companies to provide evidence that their capital plans will meet this standard. Second is
the principle that the customer that incurs the cost must pay for the cost. Typically, a customer
seeking new or upgraded electric service must submit a formal service request to the electric
company, which prompts the electric company to perform an engineering study to determine the
cost of the upgrades needed to provide that service. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 11-13]
The implication for fleet electrification, a potentially fast-growing source of significant new
demand on the electric system, is that electric companies are not authorized to upgrade the
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electric system in anticipation of new demand without robust evidence that those upgrades will
be "used and useful." Only when a fleet customer submits a service request is the electric
company permitted to make the upgrades necessary to serve that customer. Electric company
forecasts for load growth, including that due to electrification, are typically at a system level, not
the local distribution system level for individual fleet facilities. Given the nascent
commercialization of fleet electrification, there is a lack of visibility into how, where, and when
fleet electrification will appear on the system sufficient evidence to give electric companies (and
their regulators) confidence to build for it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 11-13]
Importantly, electric companies are recognizing the risks of this approach and are getting
ahead of the need. Given the long lead times to make distribution upgrades, particularly if the
upgrades are significant to extend further upstream to the substation and transmission level, it
will increasingly be unacceptable to customers to wait for the customer service request-driven
process. There is a risk that fleet customers, facing increased regulatory pressure to electrify their
fleets, will be unable to plan their businesses around these infrastructure lead times and fail to
meet their electrification goals. Electric companies must find mechanisms to plan and build for
these increased loads now, so that the power is available when the customer needs them. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 11-13]
In California, the investor-owned electric companies use the California Energy Commission's
Integrated Energy Policy Report (IEPR) as their base forecast. Southern California Edison (SCE)
in its recent General Rate Case found a significant gap between the electric transportation load
growth in the IEPR forecast and that expected due to the state's policies, specifically the
California Air Resources Board's Advanced Clean Cars II, Advanced Clean Trucks, and
Advanced Clean Fleets rules.22 SCE developed a Transportation Electrification Grid Readiness
(TEGR) analysis to account for this gap in its General Rate Case that will set the electric
company's grid investments for the next several years. SCE used a top-down methodology to
apply this higher forecast to the circuit level for electric transportation loads, as well as a bottom-
up methodology for certain high growth areas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 13-14]
22 See Southern California Edison, 2025 General Rate Case, WP SCE-02, Vol. 07 Bk. A, TEGR Forecast
Development Workpaper.
SCE has deployed a variety of new methods to account for HDV development and
deployment, including the Power Service Availability (PSA) initiative to support transportation
electrification. The PSA initiative, working in concert with the TEGR analysis, focuses on
improving SCE's internal processes to streamline interconnection, engaging fleet operators to
better understand their plans for electrification, improving their ability to forecast and assess the
impacts of load growth from electrification, and leveraging new technologies as grid
infrastructure solutions. Because some projects will require more time than others to build, SCE
actively encourages fleet owners to engage with them early in the process so that SCE can better
understand and plan for their needs. For grid upgrades that require a longer construction
schedule, SCE is developing temporary solutions that can deploy quickly while those upgrades
are being built. These solutions may include mobile battery storage or a mobile substation
brought in on a semi tractor-trailer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 13-14]
In New York, the Public Service Commission opened a proceeding in April to address
barriers to medium-and heavy-duty electric vehicle infrastructure. In particular, the order
recognizes that "proactive planning for the grid infrastructure needed to serve future
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electrification load must anticipate the location and magnitude of future demand" and notes an
analogy to previous policies in which the commission directed the electric companies in New
York to "develop proactive planning processes to anticipate the need for local transmission and
distribution system upgrades to enable the renewable interconnections required to achieve the
State's renewable energy goals."23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 14-15]
23 State of New York Public Service Commission, Case 23-E-0070, Proceeding on Motion of the
Commission to Address Barriers to Medium-and Heavy-Duty Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure.
EPA's assessment that "there is sufficient time for the infrastructure, especially for depot
charging, to gradually increase over the remainder of this decade to levels that support the
stringency of the proposed standards for the timeframe they would apply" is accurate. 88 Fed.
Reg. 25,999. As seen above, EEI members actively are planning for and deploying infrastructure
today. However, the increased deployment of this infrastructure over the next decade and beyond
will not happen on its own. Proactive planning processes, whether initiated by the relevant
electric company or state regulatory commission, will be critical to accommodate fleet
electrification to meet customer expectations and planning requirements, while also providing
affordable and reliable service. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 14-15]
EPA specifically requests comment on "whether there are additional stakeholders EPA should
work with during implementation of the Phase 3 standards." 88 Fed. Reg. 26,000. EPA, states,
engine and truck manufacturers, and fleet operators should work with electric companies on a
regional or state level to glean additional insight into their planning processes and help bolster
proactive planning and infrastructure investments. As discussed above, electric companies and
their regulators benefit from the confidence that fleet electrification load will materialize through
additional forward planning and outreach, which also provides visibility into where and when
that load will materialize on the system. Final adoption of the Proposed Rule will help provide
confidence that fleet electrification will occur through the period of the rule, but at a national
level. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, p. 15]
Additionally, the States, Congress, EPA, and other federal partners should work with the
electric power industry to ensure policies are aligned across the federal government to reduce the
cost and timelines associated with building infrastructure to support increased electrification.
This includes but is not limited to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, p. 15]
Investing in domestic manufacturing of critical electrical infrastructure, including
efforts to alleviate the labor pool shortage limiting domestic manufacturing of critical electrical
infrastructure and provide loan or purchase guarantees to manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0708, p. 15]
Not exacerbating the supply shortage of distribution transformers with unsupported
efficiency rules. The U.S. Department of Energy should choose an efficiency standard for
transformers that does not require switching to a new type of steel or make a determination that
no new standard is needed.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, p. 15]
Reforming permitting, both at the bulk power level with respect to building electricity
generation and transmission, and at the state and local levels with respect to building distribution
infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, p. 15]
24 EEI's comments are attached as Appendix A.
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EEI and its members stand ready to work with our regulatory and legislative partners to
ensure these challenges are appropriately addressed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, p. 15]
IV. Electric Company Policies and Programs Can Help Reduce Capital and Operational Costs
for Fleet Electrification Customers.
Many EEI members over the last decade have sought regulatory approval from their state
regulatory commissions to accelerate transportation electrification by reducing customer barriers
to adoption. As of March 2023, and as mentioned supra, electric transportation filings from 62
electric companies in 35 states and Washington, D.C. have totaled more than $4.2 billion. The
majority of these investments support the deployment of EV charging infrastructure at customer
locations, and a significant portion is targeted to fleet customers. These programs can help
reduce the cost that the customer would otherwise pay for the installation of EV charging
infrastructure, which is a commonly cited barrier to EV charging infrastructure deployment.25
Further, electric companies can work with fleet customers to help manage their EV charging to
occur at non-peak times. This can reduce operational costs for the fleet customer and improve
utilization of the electric system, which puts downward pressure on rates for all customers.26
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 16-17]
25 An oft cited barrier to adoption for some customers is the low utilization of EV charging stations.
Traditional electric rates for commercial customers include a demand component designed to recover the
fixed costs of delivery electricity. With low utilization (such as a public EV charging station or some fleet
charging use cases), the effective electric price can be higher than a customer with the same demand but
higher utilization. Many electric companies offer or are exploring commercial rates or other programs that
reduce some of the demand charge exposure for these low utilization customers. See Cappers, et al., A
Snapshot of EV-Specific Rate Designs Among U.S. Investor-Owned Electric Utilities,
https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/snapshot-ev-specific-rate-designs.
26 See, e.g., Metz, et al., Distribution System Investments to Enable Medium-and Heavy-Duty Vehicle
Electrification - A Case Study of New York, https://www.edf.org/media/worth-investment-report-finds-
utilities-fleet-owners-consumers-benefit-when-utilities-cover.
EPA notes that "there is considerable uncertainty associated with future distribution upgrade
needs, and in many cases, some costs may be borne by utilities rather than directly incurred by
BEV or fleet owners" in explaining why it models these costs as part of the infrastructure cost
analysis. 88 Fed. Reg. 25,983. In general, the upgrades to the local electric system needed to
bring sufficient power to the site may be known as "electric company-side make-ready" or
"front-of-the-meter" infrastructure and includes but is not limited to poles, vaults, service drops,
transformers, mounting pads, trenching, conduit, wire, cables, meters, other equipment as
necessary, and associated engineering and civil construction work. Front-of-the-meter
infrastructure is distinct from infrastructure on the customer side of the meter ("behind-the-
meter"), which includes the supply infrastructure (conduit and wiring to bring power from the
service connection to the charging station, and the associated installation costs, sometimes
known as "customer-side make-ready") and the charging equipment, sometimes known as
Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 16-17]
Front-of-the-meter infrastructure is generally installed, owned, and operated by the electric
company. However, the costs associated with front-of-the-meter infrastructure may be borne by
the site host customer in full or in part if the costs exceed an allowance as determined by the
electric company's line-extension and/or service extension policy. These costs may also be
known as "contributions in aid of construction." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
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Modeling these front-of-the-meter infrastructure costs is inappropriate for the following
reasons. First, estimating distribution upgrade costs may be beyond the scope of EPA's analysis,
as it is not clear that a similar scope of analysis is applied to traditional liquid fuels. For example,
the analogous cost comparison for internal combustion engine vehicle would include cost
considerations for fleet operators either 1) installing refueling stations at their own facilities, or
2) the embedded cost of fuel retailers' business operations in the cost of diesel or gasoline.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
Second, as described above, distribution upgrades are highly location specific. The costs
associated with these upgrades are also highly variable, depending on the upgrade requested by
the customer and the local distribution capacity. As stated in EEI's Preparing to Plug In Your
Fleet guide, "the grid can expand as needed to accommodate the needs of any customer, but the
time and resources needed to make the required upgrades are highly dependent on the specific
facility and the circuit that serves it."27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
27 See EEI, Preparing To Plug In Your Fleet - 10 Things to Consider, https://www.eei.org/-
/media/Project/EEI/Documents/Issues-and-Policy/Electric-
Transportation/PreparingToPluglnYourFleetpdf.
Third, the share of any distribution costs that the customer may bear varies as a matter of
policy. Some electric companies have or are seeking approval for line extension allowances to
cover some or all of these costs for serving EV charging infrastructure. In California, for
example, legislation required electric companies in the state to file tariffs that would authorize
them to "design and deploy all electrical distribution infrastructure on the utility side of the
customer's meter for all customers installing separately metered infrastructure to support
charging stations, other than those in single-family residences." This policy prompted tariffs
from EEI members Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), and
SCE that essentially allow electric companies to invest in more of the electric company-side
infrastructure costs as part of the standard distribution system investment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
Fourth, EEI expects that the majority of fleets to electrify in the next several years will be
those with return-to-base operations, which enables depot charging that is owned and operated
by the fleet itself. Public charging, analogous to the existing gas station model, will be needed to
serve long-haul electric trucks, but that opportunity will be limited in the near-term by battery
capabilities. However, there are many new refueling models emerging, including but not limited
to: fleet charging facilities owned by third parties and accessed by fleet operators through a
reservation or subscription system; charging-as-a-service companies that disintermediate the
fleet operator from the electric company, owning and operating the charging equipment at a
customer facility and assessing the fleet operator a fully-bundled, flat charging fee (e.g., $/kWh);
and transportation-as-a-service companies that provide the vehicle and charging to a fleet
operator, such that the fleet operator pays a fully-bunded, flat service feel (e.g., $/mile). In all of
these models, the fleet operator itself is not exposed to the front-of-the-meter infrastructure costs,
but rather these costs are borne by a third party that then recoups all of its costs through their
charging or service fees. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
In conclusion, EPA is justified in not modeling front-of-the meter costs because doing so
would result in an apples-to-oranges comparison to liquid fuels, those costs are site-specific and
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variable, the recovery mechanism of those costs depends upon state-specific policies, and fleet-
operators may not always bear those costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0708, pp. 17-20]
Organization: Electric Drive Transportation Association (EDTA)
Across the private sector, vehicle manufacturers, materials and components suppliers,
utilities, charging companies and other organizations are making investments in the EV supply
chain that parallel these critical essential policy drivers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0589, p. 1]
In the United States, the EV ecosystem is growing. 3.8 million plug-in electric vehicles have
been sold since 2010. There are 87 plug-in electric models available today - and automakers
have announced an additional 58 models to be rolled out by 2027. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0589, p. 1]
We would also urge the agency to revisit modeling assumptions regarding the proposed plug-
in hybrid (PHEV) utility curve to reflect next-generation PHEVs, whose electric range will be
significantly larger than those modelled. New PHEVs' driving range increased 8.5% in 2021 and
that trend is expected to continue. The increase in all-electric operation capability will change
consumer use patterns over the regulated period and the rule for 2027-2032 should reflect that in
an updated utility factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0589, p. 2]
Achieving the penetration rates envisioned in the proposed scenarios will also require an
equally aggressive expansion of charging and refueling infrastructure, and modernization of the
electricity grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0589, p. 2]
A comprehensive approach to electric transportation will also require updates to the electricity
grid, with demand management and V-2-G technologies, which can optimize the use of EV as a
mobile load and distributed energy source while building a more secure, efficient, and resilient
grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0589, p. 2]
These challenges are all addressable and offer opportunities for creating jobs, a more efficient
energy sector and more resilient supply chains. They also present as significant variables that
may alter the market trajectories undergirding the proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0589, p. 2]
Organization: Elizabeth Boynton
Even if I did want to wait that time, even at home, the grid infrastructure for such increased
demand for such a fairly quick jump in EV demand is not there. According to a May 2023 report
from The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), two-thirds of North America
could face power shortages this summer during periods of extreme heat. This, combined with
this quote from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission member Mark Christie during a May
Senate hearing, "I'm afraid to say it, but I think the United States is heading towards a
catastrophic situation." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0568, p. 1]
Organization: Energy Innovation
V. The modern electric grid can support widespread transportation electrification of LDVs
and MDVs overtime. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, p. 2]
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Fortunately, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL)
helped tip the scale in favor of climate-oriented investments and the adoption of zero-emission
technologies,[ii] particularly battery electric vehicles (BEVs), and also hydrogen fuel cell electric
vehicles (FCEVs).[iii] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
ii This includes technologies that eliminate tailpipe GHG emissions and other pollutants, namely battery
electric vehicles (BEVs) for LDVs and MDVs.
iii Based on our analysis and current market trends, we do not anticipate FCEVs will play a sizable role in
the LDV and MDV market for the foreseeable future. However, we recognize the value of technology-
neutral standards.
Energy Innovation's modeling reveals that the IRA's transportation electrification incentives
(combined with infrastructure investments in the BIL) can jump-start transportation
decarbonization this decade. However, these federal policies are insufficient to cut the sector's
GHG emissions at the pace needed to achieve the U.S. nationally determined contribution (NDC)
and to align with the Paris Agreement to limit global warming and achieve net zero by 2050.
Mitigating the transportation sector's (especially LDVs and MDVs) impact on the climate and
public health will require additional policy and regulatory action in the next decade, including
stronger federal tailpipe emissions standards. Our modeling shows that widespread deployment
of clean vehicles, powered by a clean grid, can help reduce GHG emissions to meet the U.S.
NDC.8 See Figures 1 and 2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
8 Robbie Orvis et al., "Closing the Emissions Gap Between the IRA and 2030 NDC: Policies to Meet the
Moment" (Energy Innovation Policy and Technology LLC, December 2022),
https://energyinnovation.org/publication/closing-the-emissions-gap-between-the-ira-and-ndcpolicies-to-
meet-the-moment/.
[See original attachment for line graph titled "Economy-Wide Greenhouse Gas Emissions"]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
Figure 1. Economy-wide GHG emissions by scenario. Source: Orvis, Robbie, et al., Closing
the Emissions Gap Between the IRA and 2030 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
U.S. NDC: Policies to Meet the Moment (Energy Innovation, December 2022), available at:
https://energyinnovation.org/publication/closing-the-emissions-gap-between-the-ira-and-ndc-
policies-to-meet-the-moment/. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
[See original attachment for line graph titled "Transportation Sector GHG Emissions and
Reductions"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
Figure 2. Reductions in transportation sector emissions in the IRA and NDC scenarios relative
to business as usual. Source: Orvis et al., Closing the Emissions Gap Between the IRA and 2030
U.S. NDC. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 4-5]
Other research from the University of California, Berkeley, Grid Lab, and Energy Innovation,
2035 2.0: Plummeting Costs and Dramatic Improvements in Batteries Can Accelerate Our Clean
Transportation Future (April 2021), evaluated the technical and economic feasibility (and
associated impacts and benefits) of achieving a future scenario where electric vehicles make up
100 percent of new sales of all vehicles by 2035, combined with a 90 percent clean grid (called
the DRIVE Clean Scenario).[iv] Compared with the No New Policy scenario (which was pre-
IRA and BIL), the total transportation sector pollutant[v] and carbon dioxide emissions
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reductions in the DRIVE Clean Scenario would reduce ground transportation sector C02
emissions by 60 percent in 2035 and by 93 percent in 2050, relative to 2020 levels.9 See Figure
3. The DRIVE Clean Scenario would also avoid approximately 150,000 premature deaths and
generate nearly $1.3 trillion in health and environmental savings through 2050.10 Compared to
the No New Policy, the DRIVE Clean Scenario would also result in approximately $2.7 trillion
in consumer savings through 2050 compared—a household savings of about $1000 per year on
average over 30 years.11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 5-6]
9 Amol Phadke et al., "2035 2.0: Plummeting Costs and Dramatic Improvements in Batteries Can
Accelerate Our Clean Transportation Future" (Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California,
Berkeley, GridLab, April 2021), https://www.2035report.com/transportation/downloads/, iv.
10 Phadke et al., iii.
11 Phadke et al., ii.
iv In the Drive Rapid Innovation in Vehicle Electrification (DRIVE Clean) Scenario, EVs constitute 100
percent of new U.S. LDV sales by 2030 as well as 100 percent of MDV and heavy-duty truck sales by
2035. The grid reaches 90 percent clean electricity by 2035. More details and full study findings are
available at https://www.2035report.com/transportation/.
v Namely, fine particulate matter, nitrous oxides, and sulfur oxides.
[See original attachment for line graph "C02 Emissions in the Transportation Sector"] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 5-6]
Figure 3. Transportation sector C02 emissions in the DRIVE Clean and No New Policy
scenarios through 2050. Source: Phadke, Amol, et al., 2035 Report 2.0: Plummeting Costs &
Dramatic Improvements in Batteries Can Accelerate Our Clean Transportation Future,
University of California Berkeley, Goldman School of Public Policy, Grid Lab, and Energy
Innovation, April 2021, available at: https://www.2035report.com/transportation/. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 5-6]
V. THE MODERN ELECTRIC GRID CAN SUPPORT WIDESPREAD
TRANSPORTATION ELECTRIFICATION OVER TIME.
As part of its analysis, the EPA modeled "changes to power generation due to the increased
electricity demand anticipated in the proposal as part of our upstream analysis. [It] projects] the
additional generation needed to meet the demand of the light-and medium-duty BEVs in the
proposal to be relatively modest compared to the No Action case, ranging from less than 0.4
percent in 2030 to approximately 4 percent in 2050 (as shown in Figure 23 [below]). The U.S.
electricity end use between the years 1992 and 2021 increased by around 25% without any
adverse effects on electric grid reliability or electricity generation capacity shortages. As the
proposal is estimated to increase electric power end use by electric vehicles by between 0.1%
(2028) and 4.2% (2055) - approximately 18% of the increase that occurred between 1995 and
2021—grid reliability is not expected to be adversely affected by the modest increase in
electricity demand associated with electric vehicle charging."63 We concur with this finding.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 24-27]
63 U.S. EPA, "Proposed Rules," May 5, 2023, 29311.
[See original attachment for graph described below] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp.
24-27]
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A similar analysis in the 2035 2.0 study found that the DRIVE Clean Scenario resulted in
demand growth from increased electrification averages about 2 percent per year, a growth rate
slower than that achieved between 1975 and 2005. See Figure 20. To meet this demand with a 90
percent clean grid (analyzed as part of the DRIVE Clean Scenario), the U.S. would need to
install on average 105 GW of new wind and solar and 30 GW of new battery storage each year—
nearly four times the current deployment rate.64 See Figure 21. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0561, pp. 24-27]
64 Phadke et al., "2035 2.0: Plummeting Costs and Dramatic Improvements in Batteries Can Accelerate
Our Clean Transportation Future."
Even with additional electric loads in the DRIVE Clean Scenario, grid modeling found a 90
percent clean grid would be dependable without coal plants or new natural gas plants by 2035.
The grid model also found that during normal periods of generation and demand, wind, solar,
and batteries provide 72 percent of total annual generation, while hydropower and nuclear
provide 16 percent. During periods of high demand and/or low renewable generation, existing
natural gas plants (primarily combined-cycle plants) cost-effectively compensate for remaining
mismatches between demand and renewables-plus-battery generation—accounting for about 10
percent of total annual electricity generation. The increased electrification and renewable energy
and battery storage deployments require investments mainly in new transmission spurs
connecting renewable generation to existing high-capacity transmission, rather than new
investments in bulk transmission.65 Of note, the rates of LDV/MDV EV adoption envisioned in
the DRIVE Clean Scenario are considerably higher than the adoption rates in the proposed rule,
even if a more stringent alternative is finalized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 24-27]
65 "Transitioning to All-Electric Cars and Trucks Won't Crash the Power Grid," 2035 2.0,
https://www.2035report.com/transportation/evsthe-power-grid/.
[See original attachment for graph described below] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp.
24-27]
Figure 20. Historical and average annual U.S. electricity demand growth in the DRIVE Clean
Scenario, 2020-2050. Source: 2035 Report 2.0. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 24-27]
Figure 21. National generation mix under the modeled DRIVE Clean Scenario, 2020-2050.
Source: 2035 Report 2.0. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 24-27]
The examples the EPA provides in its proposed rule offer useful reminders that increased
electric demand from new technologies has, throughout recent history, been met with
commensurate increases in investments, grid upgrades, and reinforcements to comply with grid
reliability standards. Examples include the rapid adoption of air conditioners in the 1960s and
1970s and the rapid growth of power-intensive data centers and server farms over the past two
decades.66 As noted in the proposed rule, the U.S. electric power utilities have already
successfully designed and built the distribution system infrastructure required for 1.4 million
BEVs and have successfully integrated 46.1 GW of new utility-scale electric generating capacity
into the grid between 2020 and 2021.67 The challenges posed by the prospect of gradual growth
in ZEVs in the HDV sector over the next decade can be addressed with the continued adoption of
policies, regulations, planning, and prudent investments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp.
24-27]
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Numerous reports articulate what's needed to support a highly electrified transportation
future, including Accelerating Clean, Electrified Transportation by 2035: Policy Priorities: A
2035 2.0 Companion Report and the ACEEE State Transportation Electrification Scorecard.68
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 24-27]
66 U.S. EPA, "Proposed Rules," May 5, 2023, 29311.
67 U.S. EPA, 29311.
68 Peter Huether et al., "2023 Transportation Electrification Scorecard" (American Council for an Energy-
Efficient Economy, June 2023), https://www.aceee.org/research-report/t2301.
Finally, more nascent vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technologies, vehicle grid integration (VGI), and
managed charging programs have the potential to be game changers for transportation
electrification and the electric grid. Certain vehicles are especially well suited to deliver on the
promise of V2G, given how they are used and where they are located. V2G can help vehicle and
fleet owners recoup energy costs while also meeting power needs during grid constraints. For
example, a fleet of electric-powered school buses in El Cajon can send electricity back to
California's grid, thanks to V2G technology developed by a San Diego company and a
partnership with San Diego Gas & Electric.69 More utilities are working with original equipment
manufacturers, fleets, and government officials to adopt V2G technologies and develop V2G
programs, and the IRA and BIL both contain funding to support pilots and next-generation
R&D.70 The EPA points to several other entities engaged in VGI research.71 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0561, pp. 24-27]
69 Rob Nikolewski, "How Eight School Buses Are Helping During Power Shortages: They're Transporting
Electrons," Los Angeles Times, July 27, 2022, https://www.latimes.eom/business/story/2022-07-
27/electric-school-buses-in-el-cajon-will-send-power-to-the-grid; "SDG&E and Cajon Valley Union
School District Flip the Switch on Region's First Vehicle-to-Grid Project," SDG&E News Center, July 26,
2022, https://www.sdgenews.com/article/sdge-and-cajon-valley-union-school-district-flip-switch-regions-
first-vehicle-grid-proj ect.
70 See, e.g., Paul Ciampoli, "Public Power Utilities, Others Pursue Vehicle-to-Grid Opportunities"
(American Public Power Association, February 1, 2021),
https://www.publicpower.org/periodical/article/public-power-utilities-others-pursue-vehicle-grid-
opportunities; Dan Zukowski, "GM Partners with Utilities, Solar and Storage Providers on Vehicle-to-Grid,
Home EV Charging," Smart Cities Dive, October 11, 2022, https://www.smartcitiesdive.com/news/gm-
energy-electric-vehicles-v2g-v2h-utilities-solar/633734/.
71 U.S. EPA, "Proposed Rules," May 5, 2023, 29311.
Based on other analyses and continued advancements in technologies, we agree strongly with
the EPA's finding that the increase in electric power demand attributable to vehicle
electrification is not expected to adversely affect grid reliability due to the modest increase in
electricity demand associated with EV charging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 24-27]
Organization: Energy Strategy Coalition
Members of this coalition are already engaging in long-term planning to meet the increased
demand for electricity attributable to vehicle electrification, and the LMDV Proposal will
provide a regulatory backstop supporting further investments in electrification and grid
reliability. Demand for electricity will increase under both the LMDV Proposal and the recently-
proposed Phase 3 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles ("HDV
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Proposed Rule"),4 but the electricity grid is capable of planning for and accommodating such
demand growth and has previously experienced periods of significant and sustained growth.
Moreover, historic growth in demand and generation resources does not reflect the investments
that will be made under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act ("IIJA") and the Inflation
Reduction Act ("IRA") to support the deployment of new renewable and zero-carbon generation
resources, energy storage and charging infrastructure. Coalition members are already making
investments in the resources and infrastructure needed to support transportation electrification
and realize the benefits that integration of EVs can provide to the electricity grid. The Coalition
encourages EPA to work closely with state and local partners and other federal agencies to
ensure that deployment of this infrastructure occurs on the pace and scale needed to achieve the
EV penetration-rates contemplated by these proposals, while ensuring grid reliability. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 1-2]
4 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles—Phase 3, 88 Fed. Reg. 25,926
(published April 27, 2023).
II. The proposed rule supports long-term planning and investment
Long-term planning and investment for vehicle electrification is a business imperative for the
Coalition's members and a necessary element of their efforts to provide affordable, clean, and
reliable power to their customers. By setting a clear trajectory for vehicle electrification that
complements existing regulatory and market forces, EPA's LMDV and HDV proposals facilitate
further investment in the generation and charging infrastructure needed to meet increased
demand associated with electrification of the vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp.
1-2]
Even before the LMDV and HDV proposals, market forces and government incentives were
projected to greatly increase the rate of vehicle electrification. As EPA notes, "virtually every
major manufacturer of light-duty vehicles is already planning to introduce widespread
electrification across their global fleets in the coming years." 5The IRA is now providing
significant incentivies for automakers to accelerate these commitments through generous
subsidies for EV purchases. These include up to $7,500 in tax credits for new EVs,6 $4,000 for
used EVs,7 as well as incentives for the commercial purchase of light-and medium-duty
vehicles.8 The IIJA also provides significant incentives to support vehicle electrification,
including $7.5 billion in funding for installation of public charging and other alternative fueling
infrastructure^ and funding for the Department of Energy's ("DOE") Building a Better Grid
Initiative, which allocates $2.5 billion to support the development of nationally significant
transmission lines, $2.3 billion to strengthen and modernize the power grid against wildfires and
other extreme weather exacerbated by climate change, and $10.5 billion to improve grid
resilience and grid flexibility (including by supporting transmission and distribution
infrastructure). 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 1-2]
5 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,191.
6 26 U.S. Code § 30D.
7 26 U.S. Code § 25E.
8 See 26 U.S. Code § 45W.
9 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,195.
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10 See, e.g., Building a Better Grid Initiative, GRID DEPLOYMENT OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY https://www.energy.gov/gdo/building-better-grid-initiative.
Expectations for electrification of the vehicle fleet are already being incorporated into long-
term planning decisions of electric utilities, regional transmission organizations and independent
system operators. For example, National Grid co-authored a November 2022 study to "support
utility long-term capital planning," 19 which assumed that the two states in its service territory
(New York and Massachusetts) reached 100% sales of zero-emission passenger vehicles by 2035
and complied with California's Advanced Clean Trucks regulation.20 By providing regulatory
certainty needed for long-term resource planning and investment decisions, the proposed LDMV
and HDV rules will help ensure that the necessary resources are deployed to accommodate
anticipated growth in demand due to electrification of the vehicle fleet. Indeed, such long-term
planning has previously made it possible for the electricity grid to accommodate periods of
significant and sustained growth,21 including relatively recently.22 Moreover, these historical
periods do not reflect the pace and scale of generation growth anticipated as a result of
implementation of the IRA and IIJA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, p. 4]
19 See GIDEON KATSH ET AL., NATIONAL GRID, ELECTRIC HIGHWAYS: ACCELERATING
AND OPTIMIZING FAST-CHARGING DEPLOYMENT FOR CARBON-FREE TRANSPORTATION 1
(Nov. 2022), https://www.nationalgrid.com/document/148616/download.
20 Id. at 5.
21 From 1960 to 1980, net generation in the electric power sector increased a remarkable 5.7% per year,
with net generation more than tripling from just 756 GWh to 2,286 GWh. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 134 tbl. 7.2b (May 2023),
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/mer.pdf.
22 Between 1995 and 2007, average nationwide generation demand grew approximately 1.9% per year. See
id. (noting an increase from 3,194 GWh to 4,005 GWh over this 13-year period).
III. Coalition members are investing in EV charging infrastructure
Members of this Coalition have begun making significant investments in the charging
infrastructure for electric passenger cars and trucks: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
-National Grid recently received approval for a $206 million initiative to enable up to 32,000
additional charging ports in Massachusetts.23
-The New York Power Authority will have up to 400 fast chargers installed or in construction
through its EVolve NY program by the end of 2025.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-
7]
-The Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG&E") has successfully installed through March
2023 over 5,700 charging ports through its EV Charge Network, EV Fleet, EV Fast Charge and
EV Schools programs.25 To aid with equity efforts to expand EV charging, PG&E recently
launched its Empower EV program, which offers income-eligible households up to $2,500 in
financial incentives for the installation of a Level-2 charger and any necessary service panel
upgrades,26 as well as its Multifamily Housing and Small Business EV Charger program, which
will install Level 1 and Level 2 EV chargers at multifamily housing units, not-for-profit
organizations and small businesses, at no cost for sites located in a priority community.27 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
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-Austin Energy provides rebates of up to $1,200 and $4,000 for customers installing Level 2
charging stations at their homes and workplaces respectively.28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0610, pp. 4-7]
-The Sacramento Municipal Utility District ("SMUD") offers up to $1,000 toward residential
charging equipment and installation costs through its Charge@Home program.29 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
-Constellation Energy Corporation's venture arm (Constellation Technology Ventures, or
"CTV") has invested in portfolio companies focused on EV and charging infrastructure.30
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
23 NATIONAL GRID, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2022/23, at 30 (2023),
https://www.nationalgrid.com/document/149701/download.
24 Leading the Way in EV Infrastructure, EVOLVE NY, https://evolveny.nypa.gov/ (last visited June 9,
2023).
25 More information on PG&E's EV charging programs can be found at:
https://www.pge.com/en_US/small-medium-business/energy-alternatives/clean-vehicles/ev-charge-
network/electric-vehicle-charging/electric-vehicle-programs-and-resources.page.
26 More information on PG&E's Empower EV program can be found at:
https://www.pge.com/en_US/residential/solar-and-vehicles/options/clean-vehicles/electric/empower-ev-
program. page?WT.mc_id=Vanity _empower-ev.
27 More information on PG&E's Multifamily and Small Business EV Charger program can be found at:
https://www.pge.com/en_US/small-medium-business/energy-alternatives/clean-vehicles/ev-charge-
network/program-participants/multifamily-housing-smb-ev-charger-program.page?.
28 Commercial Charging, AUSTIN ENERGY (last reviewed or modified July 8, 2022),
https://austinenergy.com/green-power/plug-in-austin/workplace-charging; Home Charging, AUSTIN
ENERGY (last reviewed or modified July 8, 2022), https://austinenergy.com/green-power/plug-in-
austin/home-charging.
29 Drive electric and save, SMUD, https://www.smud.org/en/Going-Green/Electric-Vehicles/Residential
(last visited June 9, 2023).
Footntoe 30: For instance, CTV invested in Qnovo, which offers a solution suite that uses
advanced computation to optimize the chemical reactions within lithium-ion batteries, resulting
in faster charging, increased daily run times, and longer battery lifetimes. See Constellation
Technology Ventures, https://www.constellationenergy.com/our-work/innovation-and-
advancement/technology-ventures.html. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
Coalition members are making these investments in part because of the benefits that EVs can
provide to grid reliability. EVs' primary near-term grid benefits stem from their enablement of
load shifting—whether from periods of higher load demand to periods of lower load demand, or
from periods of more carbon-intensive power generation to periods where more renewable
energy is available.31 Load shifting can involve both deferral (to avoid charging during periods
of peak load) and more targeted scheduling (to take advantage of periods of excess energy
supply).32 In addition to enhancing grid reliability, load shifting can also reduce customer
electricity rates, increase the value of renewable energy investments (by maximizing usage of
excess solar energy produced during the day), and mitigate the need for equipment upgrades
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(e.g., increased storage capacity to accommodate excess solar energy).33 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
31 See TIMOTHY LIPMAN ET AL., CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, TOTAL CHARGE MANAGEMENT
OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES 5 (CEC-500-2021-055, Dec. 2021),
https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/CEC-500-2021-055.pdf.
32 See id.
33 See Aligning Utilities and Electric Vehicles, for the Greater Grid, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY
LAB'Y (Jan. 10, 2022), https://www.nrel.gov/news/program/2022/aligning-utilities-electric-vehicles-for-
greater-grid.html (citing Muhammad Bashar Anwar et al., Assessing the value of electric vehicle managed
charging: a review of methodologies and results, 15 ENERGY ENV'T SCI. 466 (2022)).
For example, PG&E has partnered with the BMW Group to explore ways to incentivize EV
drivers to shift their charging times to support grid reliability.34 This program—called
ChargeForward— first kicked off in 2015 and moved into its third phase in 2021.35 Building on
the success of the first two phases, phase three expanded the program's scope to 3,000 EV
drivers (from prior pilots of 100 and 400 drivers in phases one and two).36 Phase two of
ChargeForward demonstrated the ability to shift nearly 20% of charging from a particular hour to
another time and to shift up to 30% of charging to a particular hour.37 SMUD is also engaged in
a managed charging pilot program with BMW, Ford, and GM, and is planning to add Tesla
vehicles to the pilot as well, targeting participation of around 2,000 vehicles through 2024.38
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
34 PG&E Corporate Sustainability Report 2022, PG&E CORPORATION 105 (2022),
https://www.pgecorp.eom/corp_responsibility/reports/2022/assets/PGE_CSR_2022.pdf.
35 CLARION ENERGY CONTENT DIRECTORS, PG&E and BMW kick off 3rd phase of
ChargeForward for clean, smart EV charging, POWERGRID INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://www.power-grid.com/der-grid-edge/pge-and-bmw-kick-off-3rd-phase-of-chargeforward-for-clean-
smart-ev-charging/#gref.
36 PG&E Corporate Sustainability Report 2022, PG&E CORPORATION 105 (2022),
https://www.pgecorp.eom/corp_responsibility/reports/2022/assets/PGE_CSR_2022.pdf.
37 See Timothy Lipman et al., Total Charge Management of Electric Vehicles, CALIFORNIA ENERGY
COMMISSION iii (CEC-500-2021-055, Dec. 2021), https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
12/CEC-500-2021-055 .pdf.
38 2030 Zero Carbon Plan Progress Report, SMUD 21 (Apr. 2023), https://www.smud.org/-
/media/Documents/Corporate/Environmental-Leadership/ZeroCarbon/2030-ZCP-Progress-Report—April-
2023_FINAL.ashx.
Coalition members are also exploring Vehicle-to-Grid ("V2G") technology, through which
EVs can send power back to load sources (e.g., homes) and the grid from their batteries. While
still in the early stages of development, V2G technology can offer reliability benefits by serving
as a grid resource during periods of peak demand.39 PG&E and BMW recently extended their
ChargeForward partnership until March 2026 and, as part of that program, will conduct a field
trial of V2G-enabled vehicles in order to explore their potential to increase grid reliability.40 In
addition, PG&E has announced vehicle-grid integration ("VGI") pilot programs with Ford41 and
General Motors to test the ability of EVs to provide backup power to homes.42 SMUD is also in
the process of conducting an electric school bus V2G demonstration project with the Twin
Rivers Unified School District.43 SMUD is planning to expand the program to additional school
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districts and is also pursuing other projects to explore V2G capabilities for light-duty EVs.44
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 4-7]
39 See Value Assessment of DC Vehicle-to-Grid Capable Electric Vehicles: Analytical Framework and
Results, EPRI (May 24, 2023), https://www.epri.com/research/programs/053122/results/3002026772.
40 More Power To You: PG&E and BMW of North America Start V2X Testing in California, PG&E
CORPORATION (May 16, 2023), https://investor.pgecorp.com/news-events/press-releases/press-release-
details/2023/More-Power-To-You-PGE-and-BMW-of-North-America-Start-V2X-Testing-in-
California/default.aspx.
41 PG&E and Ford Collaborate on Bidirectional Electric Vehicle Charging Technology in Customers'
Homes (Mar. 11, 2022), https://investor.pgecorp.com/news-events/press-releases/press-release-
details/2022/PGE-and-Ford-Collaborate-on-Bidirectional-Electric-Vehicle-Charging-Technology-in-
Customers-Homes/default.aspx.
42 A. Vanrenen, PG&E and General Motors Collaborate on Pilot to Reimagine Use of Electric Vechiles as
Backup Power Sources For Customers (Mar. 8, 2022), https://www.pgecurrents.com/articles/3410-pg-e-
general-motors-collaborate-pilot-reimagine-use-electric-vehicles-backup-power-sources-customers.
43 2030 Zero Carbon Plan Progress Report, SMUD 22 (Apr. 2023), https://www.smud.org/-
/media/Documents/Corporate/Environmental-Leadership/ZeroCarbon/2030-ZCP-Progress-Report—April-
2023_FINAL.ashx.
44 Id.
IV. EPA should work closely with state and local partners to ensure deployment of the
resources and infrastructure needed to accelerate transportation electrification while maintaining
grid reliability [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 13-14]
EPA's LMDV Proposal will help support deployment of the charging and generation
resources needed to meet anticipated demand from vehicle electrification. Yet effective and
efficient deployment of these resources will require coordination among electric utilities, state
public utility commissions, and local governments to factor load from EVs into long-range
resource planning and to permit the distribution and transmission system upgrades and new
generation and storage resources needed to serve that load. To ensure these resources are
deployed on the pace and scale needed to support vehicle electrification and grid reliability, EPA
should coordinate closely with federal, state and local agenices to remove deployment barriers
and emphasize the benefits that vehicle electrification can provide to the electricity grid, public
health, and the climate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0610, pp. 13-14]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
G. Comparison of Utility Impacts
ERM's results also point to the potential for net revenue (revenue in excess of the costs of
serving PEV load) from PEV charging to reduce utility bills for all customers (see Figure V G-
1). Since most PEV charging can be accomplished when there is spare capacity on the grid,
charging can spread the costs of maintaining the system over a greater volume of electricity
sales, reducing the per-kilowatt-hour price of electricity to the benefit of all customers. Public
utility regulations require additional revenues in excess of authorized revenue to be returned to
all utility customers in the form of reduced rates and bills. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
33]
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Electrifying L/MD vehicles (especially at the levels projected under an Alternative 1+
approach) could lead to between $7.7 to $11.3 billion in net utility revenue, which could reduce
electricity rates by 2.1% to 3.1% ($0.004/kWh to $0.006/kWh). This could save the average U.S.
household $35 to $60 per year and the average commercial customer $253 to $428 per year on
their electricity bills. This phenomenon has already been observed in the real world. PEV drivers
have already contributed $1.7 billion in net revenue that has been returned to all utility customers
in the form of rates and bills that are lower than they otherwise would have been. 115 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 33]
115 Synapse Energy. 2022. "Electric Vehicles Are Driving Electric Rates Down."
https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/media-uploads/ev_impacts_december_2022_0.pdf.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure V.G-1: Incremental Reduced Utility Bills from
L/MDV Chargingl 16
116 Id. at 14.
This analysis looks at all of the costs associated with providing and distributing electricity, as
well as any revenue based on the identified utility rate from the Energy Information
Administration (which is approximately 10.4 cents per kilowatt hour for commercial customers
and 12.7 cents per kilowatt hour for residential customers). 117 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 34]
117 These electricity rates come from EIA's Annual Electric Power Industry Report (Form EIA-861 for
2021), using the State data tab and adding all Sales (MWh) divided by the Revenues (Thousand $) to obtain
the average price ($/kWh) for both Residential and Commercial customers.
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/
1. Electric system impacts will be gradual and within the range of historical growth.
When considering infrastructure buildout, it is important to remember that L/MD PEVs will
enter the total on-road L/MD fleet gradually and in volumes that will remain below in-use L/MD
combustion vehicles for the foreseeable future. EPA's data show that the Proposed Standards, if
finalized, would likely result in PEVs comprising just 5% of the total on-road L/MD fleet by
2027, gradually reaching 20% in 2032 and 43 % in 2040. Similarly, under the more stringent
standards we recommend in this comment letter, the transition of the on-road L/MD fleet to
PEVs would be gradual, reaching 22% in 2032 and 49% in 2040 (Table XVII.G-1). In other
words, a relatively small portion of the L/MD fleet will be tapping into charging and grid
infrastructure over the next decade, and even by 2040, L/MD PEVs would comprise less than
half of the on-road fleet under this rulemaking. Infrastructure needs for L/MD PEVs will
accordingly grow gradually overtime. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 121]
Table XVII.G-1: L/MD PEVs as a Share of Total On-Road L/MD Fleet, 2026-2040
[See original attachment for Table XVII.G-1], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 121-
122]
Additionally, projected growth in electricity demand over the coming years, including
demand related to PEV deployment in line with strengthened L/MD standards as well as
additional economy-wide load growth, is well within the range of past historical load growth.
EPA provides estimates of system-wide demand, including L/MD PEVs, under both No Action
(i.e., baseline) and the Proposed Standards. DRIA at 5-14. These values show that system-wide
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increases in demand, including both increased demand from the Proposed Standards (assuming
EPA finalizes the stringency levels it has proposed) and projected economy-wide load growth, is
projected to average 1.6% per year between 2028 and 2040. Furthermore, based on analysis
conducted by ERM (see Section V above), it is expected that incremental annual average
electricity demand growth associated with PEV penetration in line with Alternative 1+, as
compared to EPA's Proposed Standards, would be minimal—i.e., around or less than one tenth
of a percentage point. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 122]
Maintaining reliable and safe electric power delivery through this level of demand growth, as
well as higher levels of growth resulting from more stringent standards, is within electric utility
standard practice as demonstrated through the electric power sector's strong track record of
reliability and resiliency. These annual generation increases are well within the range of
contemporary, normal operations for the U.S. electric sector (see Figure XVII.G-l below).
According to data reported to the Energy Information Administration in Form 861, in the 31
years from 1990 to 2021, average annual national growth in electricity sales was 1.1%. In 15 of
those years, growth was 1.5% or higher, and in ten years it exceeded 2%. The U.S. has also seen
previous periods of sustained high demand growth across most states; for example, 1995 to 2007
saw average nationwide growth of approximately 1.9% per year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, pp.122-123]
Many states saw much higher, sustained levels of growth. In the two decades from 1999 to
2018, North Dakota electric sales more than doubled. Year over year growth averaged nearly
5%>, and in 2014 electric sales were 14% higher than the previous year alone. In Nevada between
1992 and 2007, annual electric sales growth averaged 4.9% and fell below 1.5% only once. More
recently, Virginia has seen strong annual sales growth, with sales increasing 12.3% in the five
years from 2016 to 2021, or 3% on average per year, even accounting for a pandemic dip. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 123]
This analysis draws similar conclusions to those of the researchers at the Electrification
Futures Study, a multi-year research project to explore potential widespread electrification in the
future energy system of the United States. In a report developing an integrated understanding of
how the potential for electrification might impact the demand side in all major sectors of the U.S.
energy system—transportation, residential and commercial buildings, and industry—this study
concluded that "[electrification has the potential to significantly increase overall demand for
electricity, although even in the High scenario, compound annual electricity consumption growth
rates are below long-term historical growth rates."338 And costs associated with integrating PEV
charging onto the grid can also be minimized with effective load management programs, as
described immediately below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 123]
338 Trieu Mai et al., NREL, Electrification Futures Study: Scenarios of Electric Technology Adoption and
Power Consumption for the United States (2018), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl8osti/71500.pdf.
Figure XVII.G-l: Projected Demand Growth Rates Under Proposed Standards Compared to
U.S. Historic Rates
[See original attachment for Figure XVII.G-l], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 124]
2. Time-of-use electric rates are extremely effective at pushing PEV charging to hours of the
day when there is plenty of spare grid capacity.
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Real-world data from hundreds of thousands of PEVs reveals that time-of-use (TOU)
electricity rates work. At the time the data described below was collected, SCE estimated there
were 329,940 PEVs in its service territory (through December 31, 2021).339 Figure XVII.G-2
shows the load profile of households in SCE territory with EVs, with a readily discernible uptick
in electricity demand after 9PM (when the on-peak period ends on the time-of-use rates) as a
result of PEV charging that increases until just before midnight and trails off in the early
morning hours as those PEVs complete their charging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 125]
339 S. Cal. Edison Co., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. & Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., Joint IOU Electric Vehicle
Load Research and Charging Infrastructure Cost Report 10th Report Sec. VI Att. 2 - SCE (Mar. 31, 2022),
https://www.cpuc.ca.gOv/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/transportation-
electrification/1 Oth-j oint-iou-ev-load-report-mar-2022.pdf.
Figure XVII.G-2. Load Profile of Households with PEVs on a TOU Rate in SCE Territory340
[See original attachment for Figure XVII.G-2], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 126]
340 Id. at 59.
The impact of TOU rates is even more self-evident in Figure XVII.G-3, which isolates PEVs
on separate meters, demonstrating that PEVs charge almost exclusively after 9 PM on that TOU
rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 125]
Figure XVII.G-3: Load Profile of PEVs on a Separately Metered TOU Rate in SCE
Territory341 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 125]
341 Id. at 60.
[See original attachment for XVII.G-3:]. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 126]
The figures above represent real-world data collected from hundreds of thousands of
households with PEVs. There is no need to test the proposition that simple TOU rates designed
for PEVs work. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 126]
The combination of TOU rates and more active means of managing PEV charging can yield
even greater benefits. Researchers from NRDC, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, and
Pacific Gas & Electric found that well-designed TOU rates could allow the utility's system to
accommodate universal light-duty BEV adoption with minimal associated costs.342 This peer-
reviewed study used real-world data on the distribution grid and BEVs to simulate what would
happen if every household in a major metro area had a BEV, and found that more comprehensive
load management could essentially prevent all otherwise necessary grid upgrades.343 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 126]
342 Jonathan Coignard et al, Will Electric Vehicles Drive Distribution Grid Upgrades?: The Case of
California, 7 IEEE Electrification Mag. 2, 55-56 (June 5, 2019).
343 Id.
Organization: Fermata Energy
II. Why EPA should enable V2G (bidirectional vehicle-to-grid) technologies in the final
rulemaking and ensure that warranty and durability requirements adequately consider and do not
hinder frequent use ofV2G services. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 3-4]
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There are numerous reasons for the EPA to encourage the adoption of V2G technology and
support our detailed recommendations below. We feel strongly that the EPA has a unique
opportunity to make a major difference in the commercialization of V2X technology. If the EPA
were to provide incentives or regulations on V2X, as we are recommending, it could provide
market confidence for vehicle manufacturers and V2X charging equipment providers, and
accelerate V2X by providing a positive value to consumers, including low-and moderate-income
consumers. EPA action to unlock the full potential of V2X could help mitigate the emerging
generation shortage because with V2X, EVs become grid assets.3 For example, PG&E CEO
Patti Poppe recently noted that EVs on the road in "PG&E's service area today have 6,700 MW
of capacity," which equals "three Diablo Canyon nuclear power plants. It's on the road today,
and we are not using it as a power source. We're only using it as a power draw "4 EPA action on
V2X could also help address the duck curve, evening ramp, and summertime "needle" peaks in
many generation and distribution grids. More importantly V2G, as a storage asset, unlocks and
enables the large GHG benefits of the on-going, large-scale transition to intermittent renewable
energy. EPA action to help commercialize V2X could create a low-cost, cleaner alternative to the
zero-emission portable gensets required by California Air Resources Board's (CARB) recent
Small Off-Road Engines (SORE) regulation and replace dirty portable gensets in other states.
Finally, Fermata Energy encourages the EPA to support all connectors, protocols, and EVSE
sizes in any V2X recommendations for incentives or regulation in order to foster competition and
encourage lower cost solutions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 3-4]
3 Decommissioning of Diablo Canyon and lack of hydropower in drought years.
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/california-drought-could-halve-summer-hydropower-share-leading-to-
more-nat/624489/https://www.utility dive.com/news/california-grid-reliability-2022-2023-summer/609261/
4 https://www.latimes.eom/environment/newsletter/2021-10-14/as-california-fires-burn-pge-ceo-promises-
fixes-boiling-point
BNEF data (Figures 1 and 2) show over 10 million battery-powered EVs on the road globally
at the end of 2020, with a combined 296-gigawatt hours of lithium-ion batteries installed in
them. That's a lot of batteries driving around - 8 times more than the number of stationary grid-
scale batteries installed globally.5,6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 3-4]
5 More EVs Are Being Designed to Push Power to The Electrical Grid -Bloomberg (Link:
https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/newsletters/2021-04-27/more-evs-are-being-designed-to-push-power-to-
the-electrical-grid)
6 https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/electric-vehicles-to-drive-massive-battery-
demand-bnef-chart
[See original attachment for Figures 1 and 2: Energy storage onboard EVs is much greater
than in stationary battery resources]7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 3-4]
7 Electric Vehicles to Drive Massive Battery Demand, BNEF, 2021 (Link:
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/electric-vehicles-to-drive-massive-battery-
demand-bnef-chart)
In addition, a May 2022 presentation by the World Resources Institute using Bloomberg NEF
and Energy Information Administration (EIA) data projected that in 2030, the power capacity
onboard EVs will be 10 to 20 times more than the 2030 power capacity of stationary storage. 8
While these numbers are for light-duty EVs, electrified trucks can also contribute and some
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fleets (e.g., school buses, municipal trucks, trucks in one-shift operations) are expected to be
early adopters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 3-4]
8 See slide 5 at https://www.slideshare.net/emmaline742/building-resiliency-with-v2g-in-residential-
homes-by-camron-gorguinpour
V2X bidirectional charging is a win-win-win investment: many benefits accrue:
Achieves EPA's environmental goals. Just like stationary storage, V2X bidirectional
charging platforms can reduce carbon and criteria pollutant emissions from generators by
shifting electricity consumption to the cleanest hours of the day and removing the need for dirty
thermal peaker electricity generation. However, V2X is more cost-effective than stationary
storage, as ratepayers don't have to pay for purchase of the EV battery and can accelerate the
renewable transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-6]
Provides grid services. With V2X bidirectional charging, utilities gain a low-cost
energy storage resource to help integrate renewable energy into the electric grid by shifting
energy, providing resource adequacy, and ancillary services (Figure 3). For example, modeling
by the CPUC currently projects 14,700 MW of new energy storage is needed in CA by 2032 to
support the integration of renewables but only 2,185 MW is operational today.9,10 V2X, with
supportive policies, can provide many thousands of MW by 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0710, pp. 4-6]
9 CPUC Approves Long Term Plans To Meet Electricity Reliability and Climate Goals, CPUC, 2022
(Link: https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/news-and-updates/all-news/cpuc-approves-long-term-plans-to-meet-
electricity-reliability-and-climate-goals)
10 Infographic: Q4'21 US Battery Storage by the Numbers, S&P Global, 2022 (Link:
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/blog/infographic-q4-21-us-battery-storage-
by-the-numbers)
[See original attachment for Figure 3 -Grid services and value from different Vehicle-Grid-
Integration technologies]! 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-6]
11 California Energy Commission, March 2019, Distribution System Constrained Vehicle-to-Grid Services
for Improved Grid Stability and Reliability, (Link: https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
06/CEC-500-2019-027.pdf) Figure 42
Lower vehicle ownership costs. EV owners can earn money by selling electricity back
to the grid, significantly cutting the cost of vehicle ownership. Offsetting the cost of owning and
maintaining an EV supports equitable access to EVs, particularly those EVs in the used car
market, such as the low-income EV driving community. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-
6]
Increased resiliency. Unidirectional charging is a grid load. V2X bidirectional charging
cost-effectively supports grid resilience. During blackouts and extreme weather events, such as
Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS) in CA, EV owners can power their homes, businesses, and
critical infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-6]
Ratepayer benefits. EV adoption has already been shown to significantly benefit utility
ratepayers and V2X technology can further those benefits. 12 For example, a 2018 CEC study
projects $1 billion in annual ratepayer benefits if 50% of chargers were V2X capable. 13 V2X
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technology also improves driver economics which would likely drive further EV adoption and
even greater ratepayer benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 4-6]
12 Electric Vehicles Are Driving Electric Rates Down, Synapse Economics, 2019, Electric Vehicles
Benefit All Utility Ratepayers, Forbes, 2019 (Link:
https://www.forbes.eom/sites/jeffmcmahon/2019/02/01/electric-vehicles-benefit-all-utility-customers-as-
much-as-their-owners/)
13 Distribution System Constrained Vehicle-to-Grid Services for Improved Grid Stability and Reliability,
(Link: https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/CEC-500-2019-027.pdf) CEC 2018, Table 8,
High PEV Forecast Scenario
III. Recommendations regarding V2G in EPA rules and EPA's Proposed Battery Durability
Monitoring and Warranty Requirements for Light-and Medium-Duty Electric Vehicles
Any eventual battery durability requirements set by EPA should account for frequent
bidirectional charging (e.g. such as vehicle-to-grid) activities [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710,
pp. 6-7]
We recognize that the EPA is proposing battery durability and warranty requirements that are
less than those in Advanced Clean Cars II and we appreciate that.. However, the EPA made no
mention of the need for V2G technology in light-and medium-duty BEVs and PHEVs in the
proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 6-7]
Battery degradation is an inherently complex topic; battery chemistry, temperature, use cases,
the EV duty cycle, and other factors all impact battery degradation. Some V2X activities,
especially those utilizing bidirectional charging capabilities, will require additional battery
cycling that will impact long-term battery durability. While the exact level of cycling will
depend on the specific V2X use case and could vary based on customer behavior, it is reasonable
to expect that in the future most EVs could experience some incremental level of degradation
due to V2X activities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 6-7]
Given the extensive public and private benefits that V2X can offer, as detailed above, it is
paramount that any battery durability and warranty requirements EPA establishes for EVs not
inadvertently foreclose V2X activities, and especially V2G opportunities. Setting overly-
stringent durability requirements that limit V2X activities - whether intentionally or not -
conflicts with the EPA's larger mission of reducing emissions and accelerating EV adoption.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 6-7]
Final battery warranty and battery durability requirements should include a thorough
understanding of the impact on V2G in light-and medium-duty vehicles so as to not discourage
V2G. At a minimum, the EPA should lower the warranty requirement to account for frequent
bidirectional charging and allow automakers to exclude vehicles that have done V2X from the
pool of vehicles in the durability test sample. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 6-7]
We do not see any consideration of frequent use of V2G in this proposal. V2G technology is
emerging in light-duty and medium-duty vehicles, and attractive use cases exist (e.g. EVs that
spend many hours connected to a charger or EVSE in a fleet or for personal use, such as school
buses). The concern is that overly restrictive warranty or durability requirements by the EPA
could place arbitrary restrictions on V2X activities. Fermata Energy appreciates the EPA's intent
to ensure consumer protection and customer satisfaction with EV ownership through robust
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standards and to meet the useful life requirements in the Clean Air Act. However, overly
stringent requirements that constrain battery cycling could also constrain the novel set of value
propositions that V2X offers and that would otherwise spur EV adoption (e.g., home backup
power, payment for grid services, customer bill management, etc.). Overly stringent battery
durability requirements could drive OEMs to limit the range, performance, and/or state of charge
of EV batteries, or take other measures to provide for sufficient degradation margin in later
years. As such, Fermata Energy believes that the EPA should consider an approach to durability
and warranty requirements that balances competing factors and specifically considers the GHG
benefits of V2G as a storage technology which unlocks and enables a faster, more cost-effective
transition to renewable energy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 7-8]
Furthermore, we note there are ongoing efforts by the Informal Working Group on Electric
Vehicles and the Environment under the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN
ECE) to develop minimum performance requirements for EV batteries that include V2X
considerations. This Working Group is chaired by the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and includes the European Commission, individual European and Asian countries, as well
as industry stakeholders from around the world. In order to account for VGI activities, the
Working Group is also considering a "virtual km" mechanism, in which the energy discharged
by the EV battery in bidirectional mode is converted to a km-equivalent via a predetermined
formula. 14 The total mileage used for confirming the compliance with the performance
requirements would consist of the sum of the km driven and the virtual km. While Fermata
Energy is not necessarily endorsing this specific approach or methodology, we believe that the
EPA should seriously consider an agreed upon method to account for V2G battery degradation
such as the UN Global Technical Regulation "virtual miles" before adopting a final regulation
with durability or warranty requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 7-8]
14 For example, see the following presentation on V2X virtual mileage at the 50th EVE IWG meeting:
https://wiki.unece.org/download/attachments/128420289/Input%20on%20V2X%20virtual%20mileage.ppt
x?api=v2
In the absence of an agreed upon method to account for V2G battery degradation, OEMs may
choose to reach individual battery warranty agreements with V2X services providers to approve
specific equipment for use with their bidirectionally-enabled vehicles. In September 2022,
Nissan approved the Fermata Energy bidirectional charger as the first bidirectional charging
system for use with its all-electric LEAF vehicle in the US. 15 While these sorts of battery
warranty approvals are a very important development for the bidirectional charging industry,
OEM approval processes can be slow. It may take years for other OEMs to negotiate these sorts
of agreements with V2X charger manufacturers and service providers. An agreed-upon
methodology for accounting for V2G battery degradation would be the more expedient approach
to ensuring battery durability, instead of relying on individual OEM to EVSE agreements, which
could take years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, pp. 7-8]
15 https://usa.nissannews.com/en-US/releases/release-5078281dl9ed36853371357c4ala8244-nissan-
approves-first-bi-directional-charger-for-use-with-nissan-leaf-in-the-us
Regarding battery warranties, Fermata Energy recommends that the EPA 1) either delay
adopting battery warranty requirements to a future rulemaking when more data on V2X is
available or 2) reduce the battery warranty requirement in the final regulation to account for and
assume frequent vehicle-to-grid charging by battery EVs and plug-in hybrid EVs. We also
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recommend that the EPA explicitly state that automakers may exclude those vehicles that have
done vehicle-to-building or vehicle to grid charging from the pool of vehicles in the battery
durability test sample. The Advanced Clean Cars II regulation took this approach, and we
recommend the EPA do the same. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, p. 8]
The EPA should add in the final regulation a small multiplier credit for vehicles that have on-
board AC bidirectional chargers or are integrated with multiple DC off-board chargers. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0710, p. 8]
The promise of bidirectional charging (AC or DC) to address air pollution, GHG emissions,
and challenges to the electric grid is very significant with BEVs and PHEVS in medium-and
light-duty vehicles. While we understand the desire by the EPA to simplify the regulation and
reduce the use of bonus multiplier credits, we believe a small bonus credit in this regulation is
justified and needed to unlock this technology because of the large emissions reduction benefits
and other grid services enabled by bidirectional charging as described in Section II above. The
EPA has a long history of providing multiplier credits to emerging technologies and we strongly
encourage the EPA to adopt in the final regulation a modest multiplier credit for light-duty and
medium-duty passenger vehicles that appropriately phases out over time. This multiplier should
apply to automakers with vehicles that have on-board AC inverters for bidirectional charging and
for vehicles that can show they have integrated with many brands of off-board DC fast chargers.
This approach will not only will help enable the emerging V2G industry, but it will also help
consumers achieve lower operating costs, 16 reduce GHG and traditional pollutants from fossil
fueled power plants by shifting electricity use to renewable energy in the cleanest hours of the
day, and reduce the need for high-emitting peaker plants. V2G also provides a zero-emission,
lower cost alternative to high-emitting portable back-up generators, and saves utility ratepayers
money with a low-cost resource as compared to battery stationary storage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0710, p. 8]
16 See footnote 11
By implementing our recommendations, the EPA has a unique opportunity to help the
emerging V2G industry, consumers, and the power generation and transportation industries.
Fermata Energy appreciates the opportunity to provide these comments and welcomes a more in-
depth dialogue on this and offers itself as a resource on V2X topics for EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0710, p. 8]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
To achieve the 2032MY goals EPA has proposed and Ford supports, the final regulation must
have the following elements. First, regarding the stringency of the GHG standards, the EPA
should finalize the Alternative 3 standards with minor adjustments to the utility allowance
inherent in the truck curves and provide a phase-out for refrigerant credits (rather than eliminate
all at once). The Alternative 3 standards effectively draw a straight line from 2026 to 2032; that
is, they would require roughly equal reductions in absolute grams-per-mile targets over the
duration of the program. Alternative 3 reaches the same endpoint in 2032 as the EPA's main
proposal, and therefore would achieve the primary goal shared by Ford and EPA—widespread
adoption of ZEVs. In contrast, EPA's main proposal, Alternative 1, and Alternative 2 each would
require precipitous reductions in 2027 - 2029; this is not feasible and does not align with the
anticipated scaling of the EV supply chain and manufacturing base. Similarly, the EPA's
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proposal to end refrigerant credits altogether in 2027 would be abrupt and have the effect of
standards being even more strict; EPA should phase these credits out over time. Lastly, EPA's
final regulations must continue to recognize the utility provided by trucks. Although electrified
vehicles hold promise for all vehicles classes, ICE-powered trucks will continue to provide
unique capability and utility for many years. The EPA proposal (and Alternative 3) would reduce
the existing truck utility allowance too severely. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 3]
Second, to ensure the final rule does not go too far and too fast, especially in 2027 - 2029, the
EPA should adjust two aspects of the proposal regarding criteria emissions: fuel enrichment and
particulate matter testing obligations. Although fuel enrichment can lead to higher emissions
during brief and infrequent conditions which are disclosed to the EPA, fuel enrichment has been
critical for overall emissions reductions. The practice enables automakers to downsize engines
while also meeting consumer needs for some of the toughest jobs, without compromising
powertrain durability. Removing fuel enrichment, as EPA has proposed, will directly impact
customers' acceptance of new products, especially trucks, and they may keep their existing
vehicle longer or opt for a larger (i.e., higher emitting) vehicle to be sure they can get the job
done. Major powertrain redesigns would be needed to recover this lost utility, and these are not
possible within the timeframe defined by the enrichment phase-out proposed by EPA. Next,
although Ford supports aspects of EPA's proposed particulate matter (PM) standards which will
necessitate the use of gasoline particulate filters, the proposed PM standard will challenge
current laboratory equipment and procedures. Ford requests that the EPA eliminate the need to
measure PM on the -7°C FTP for vehicles that are equipped with gasoline particulate
filters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 3]
Car vs. Truck Stringency
Ford appreciates EPA's efforts to develop a data-driven, analytical basis for determining the
appropriate relative stringency between the car and truck footprint curves. It is essential to full-
line OEMs that the utility provided by trucks—particularly large pickup trucks—continue to be
appropriately credited in the footprint-based standards. Any changes should made cautiously and
gradually, with awareness of the broader context of the other sweeping changes that automakers
are managing during the timeframe of this rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 5-6]
Ford believes the following modifications to the EPA's truck utility methodology are
appropriate: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 5-6]
-Increase the 9 g C02/mile per 1000 lbs of incremental towing to 11 g C02/mile to account
for increased road loads on highly capable towing vehicles (e.g., losses from larger brakes, axles,
and engine parasitics).
-Increase the sales weighted towing delta from 7000 lbs to 8500 lbs to better capture the full
range of towing capabilities for full size pickup trucks.
-Decrease the expected EV penetration rate from 50% to 35% for the harder-to-electrify full-
size pickup truck market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 5-6]
These refinements would result in an approximately 40 g C02/mile difference between the
Car and Truck curves by 2032MY utilizing the maximum footprint of 70 ft2, as shown in the
graph below. Ford would like to continue to work with EPA to fully explain our rational and
recommendations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 5-6]
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[See original comment for Graph 1: Vehicle Utility vs Truck Footprint Curves] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 5-6]
Limits on EV Growth
Ford is already delivering electrified light-and medium-duty EVs at scale. While we remain
optimistic that EVs will constitute a steadily growing portion of new vehicle sales in the US, we
are also mindful of the considerable challenges and uncertainties that will affect the rate of
growth. The pace of electrification has been and may continue to be limited by many factors and
forces, many of which are outside the control of vehicle manufacturers. A few deserve mention
here. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 6-7]
Consumer preference is difficult to predict out to 2032. While EV adoption is growing
quickly, and we are seeing enthusiasm for EVs among the early adopters, we cannot assume the
same enthusiasm from the early majority let alone the late majority. Market studies suggest many
people are interested in purchasing an EV, but not at any cost and not while charging
infrastructure remains at a nascent stage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 6-7]
Plug-In Hybrid Vehicle Utility Factor
Ford does not support the proposed update to the Plug-In Hybrid (PHEV) utility factor (UF).
We do not believe it is appropriate to recalibrate the PHEV compliance benefit at the same time
the EPA is proposing other sweeping changes and historically stringent standards. Product
planning lead time and uncertainty in EV market growth requires that all electrification options
be available with stable and predictable compliance benefits. Ford would support an EPA
program designed to gather additional data for use in a future rulemaking which would yield a
robust basis for a UF update and prevent disruption to EV product compliance plans. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 8]
Light-and Medium-Duty Fuel Enrichment
EPA is proposing to eliminate commanded enrichment for ICE-powered vehicles for power
and component protection. Fuel enrichment protects engine components during infrequent and/or
short duration high-power demand events, such as freeway on-ramps or towing on steep grades.
The ability to employ limited commanded enrichment has allowed downsized engines to meet
customer performance demands across a broad range of real-world driving condition, resulting in
considerable C02 savings. If left unmitigated, the elimination of commanded enrichment would
result in performance degradations that would be unacceptable to most customers, forcing many
to retain older models or to upgrade to larger, more capable vehicle classes. Either result would
run counter to EPA's intention to reduce on-road emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605,
pp. 12-13]
In order to meet customer needs without enrichment, Ford will need to implement expensive,
long-lead time engine development actions, such as increasing component sizes (turbos and heat
exchangers) and adding more expensive engine and manifold materials. Under the EPA proposal,
this would need to be accomplished and during a timeframe when we are already stretching our
capital and engineering resources to their limits in order to transition to electrification. The
proposal would also not provide the lead-time needed to undertake such engine redesign
programs. For these reasons, Ford does not consider the proposed phase-in for the enrichment
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prohibition to be feasible. For recommends that EPA shift the phase-in requirements to at least
2029MY for vehicles below 6,0001b GVWR. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 12-13]
[See original comment for Table 2: Ford Recommended Enrichment Phase-in] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 12-13]
Regarding EPA's proposed enrichment exception allowances under 40 CFR 86.1811-
17(d)(2), Ford requests that EPA include the following additional conditions to account for
sporadic pre-ignition and other potential future technologies that may be deemed acceptable for
agency approval through the AECD review process: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, pp. 12-
13]
-Temporary and infrequent enrichment following sporadic pre-ignition events (used to
prevent follow-on events which are prone to causing engine damage),
-Enrichment conditions substantially demonstrated during emissions testing, or
-Enrichment conditions otherwise approved by the EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605,
pp. 12-13]
Organization: Fred Reitman
Electric grid cannot support this. The electric grid is remarkable engineering. But there is little
reserve capacity and the grid is overtaxed. EV charging will stress the grid and is sure to result in
brownouts and blackouts, which are dangerous during winter when power is needed for heating
homes. Brownouts and Blackouts are already a problem in some states. This rule if finalized
would only make the problem worse. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0432, p. 1]
Organization: Fuel Freedom Foundation
Battery electric vehicles are an attractive option for many households. However, they are not
yet on par with internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles in affordability and/or convenience for
the majority of American drivers. Moreover, the electric grid needs vast improvement before
achieving the necessary capacity, carbon intensity, and reliability for a fully electrified
transportation system. GHG reductions should not wait for uncertainties to resolve or for the
technology and market to evolve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, pp. 1-2]
Organization: GROWMARK, Inc.
Furthermore, the electric grid is ill-equipped to handle a rapid increase in the number of EVs.
According to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, two-thirds of North America
risk energy shortfalls this summer.3 Increasing the number of EVs at the rate mandated by these
standards will only exacerbate these issues, especially in rural areas where infrastructure is most
vulnerable. This puts the lives and livelihoods of farmers and all rural Americans at risk. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, p. 2]
3 North American Electric Reliability Corporation (2023, May 17). Two-thirds of North America Faces
reliability challenges in the event of widespread heatwaves. https://www.nerc.com/news/Headlines%20DL/
Summer%20Reliability%20Assessment%20Announcement%20May%202023.pdf
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Organization: Growth Energy
In contrast, it is not as simple to convert to EV technology. Doing so at scale requires massive
investments in both charging infrastructure and the electric power sufficient to support massive
new electricity demand. Developing sufficient charging infrastructure can be difficult in rural
areas and in locations where there are competing land uses. And developing additional electric
power faces multiple challenges—the country will need significantly more electric capacity and,
for EVs to have their intended GHG reduction benefits, that additional electric generation will
need to be relatively low-carbon. For example, converting vehicles used in the Appalachian
region rapidly to EVs and powering them by increasing loads on existing coal-fired power plants
would not have the significant benefits claimed by the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0580, p. 6]
The zero grams/mile compliance value for EVs ... does not reflect the increase in upstream
GHG emissions associated with the electricity used by EVs compared to the upstream GHG
emissions associated with the gasoline or diesel fuel used by conventional vehicles. For example,
based on GHG emissions from today's national average electricity generation (including GHG
emissions associated with feedstock extraction, processing, and transportation) and other key
assumptions related to vehicle electricity consumption, vehicle charging losses, and grid
transmission losses, a midsize EV might have an upstream GHG emissions of about 180
grams/mile, compared to the upstream GHG emissions of a typical midsize gasoline car of about
60 grams/mile. Thus, the EV would cause a net upstream GHG emissions increase of about 120
grams/mile (in general, the net upstream GHG increase would be less for a smaller EV and more
for a larger EV). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 6-7]
75 Fed. Reg. 25,324.
And that estimate of 120 grams/mile for EVs' upstream emissions does not even account for
emissions associated with production of batteries. Recent research has increasingly revealed that
there are significant GHG emissions associated with the mining of materials for production of
batteries used in EVs.6 For example, mining nickel alone requires both significant fossil energy
expenditures and GHG emissions associated with land use, including the clear-cutting of
rainforest in Indonesia.7 When compared to production of an ICE vehicle on a cradle-to-grave
basis, those emissions represent another source of emissions from EVs that are not addressed in
EPA's assumption that EVs produce zero grams per mile of GHGs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0580, pp. 6-7]
6 See, e.g., Catherine Early, The new 'gold rush' for green lithium, BBC News (Nov. 24, 2020)
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201124-how-geothermal-lithium-could-revolutionise-green-energy.
7 Jon Emont, EV Makers Confront the 'Nickel Pickle', Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2023.
Indeed, a recent National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") assessment explained that an
approach like EPA's fails to "fully capture" emissions from "the total light-duty vehicle
system."8 NAS noted that one issue of that type of non-system-based analysis is that it would
lead to inaccurate comparisons between vehicles using different fuels.9 And NAS further opined
that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 6-7]
8 National Academy of Sciences (NAS), Assessment of Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle
Fuel Economy—2025-2035 at 13-416 (2021).
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9 Id.
[I]f deep GHG emissions reduction is a goal, then there will need to be consideration of not
only onboard vehicle emissions, but also the emissions from related sectors, like electricity (for
vehicle charging), and manufacturing (of vehicles and their materials and components). This
motivates the need for life cycle thinking. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 6-7]
10 Id.
Organization: Hyundai Motor America
President Biden's Executive Order 14037 - setting an EV penetration target of 50% in MY
Organization: Illinois Corn Growers Association
Enormous advances have been made in electric vehicle technology in the last two decades and
there is strong auto industry commitment to eventually replace internal combustion engine
powered vehicles with electric ones. There are, however, still technological and economic
challenges in creating products that meet consumer expectations. In addition, there are many
things that must happen to support electric vehicles, many of which are outside the control of
automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
These include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
-Increasing the electrical generating capacity in the U.S to provide the power to replace the
energy now supplied by gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
-Switching the source of energy used to generate this electricity from fossil fuels to zero-
carbon sources such as wind, solar, nuclear and hydroelectric. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756,
p. 3]
-Upgrading the electrical grid to move this additional power from the point of generation to
the point of vehicle recharging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
-Installing recharging stations in nearly every home with an electric vehicle and enough
public charging stations to give electric vehicles the same utility as the gasoline powered
vehicles they are intended to replace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
-Securing enough raw materials to build the large batery packs needed to give electric
vehicles the range consumers demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
-Upgrading the nation's roads, bridges and parking structures to ensure they can absorb the
extra weight of inherently heavier electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
Thus, even if in the next eight years automakers, suppliers and retailers can retool their
businesses to supply an estimated 7.5 million new vehicles in 2032 and beyond, it is far from
assured that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
-The marketplace is willing to buy that many vehicles in spite of their higher purchase cost,
charging requirements, limited utility and extremely high batery replacement costs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
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-The mines can extract enough raw materials to build the bateries necessary to build these
vehicles, especially since it is expected that electric utilities will be buying huge bateries made of
the same materials to deal with the intermit nature of wind and solar energy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
-The electric utilities can provide enough electricity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
-The electric grid has been upgraded to handle the new demand, again considering that not
only vehicles but residential and commercial heating systems, railroads and even ships will be
converting from fossil fuels to electricity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
Given the uncertainty that automakers can meet the proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards through electric vehicles alone, what other new technologies are available for
compliance? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 3]
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
In addition to all this industry investment in EV manufacturing, battery production, and the
battery material supply chain, substantial investments are underway in the electric power sector.
From 2012 through mid 2022, about $3.6 billion in utility transportation electrification
investment plans have been approved across the country. 18 These investments include upgrades
in grid capacity, safety, resilience, and managed charging. The U.S. already has enough power
generation and transmission capacity to fuel the EV expansion over the next few years. 19
Meeting the 2050 demand requires about 1% per year growth in electricity production, well
below the 3.2% average annual growth rate for the electricity generation over the past 70
years.20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p. 9]
18 Lepre, N. (2022, September). Electric utility filing annual update. Atlas Public Policy.
https://atlaspolicy.coni/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Electric-Utility-Filing-Brief-July-2021-through-June-
2022-v2-l.pdf
19 Houston, S. (2022, September 12). Can the electric grid handle EV charging? Union of Concerned
Scientist, https://blog.ucsusa.org/samantha-houston/can-the-electric-grid-handle-ev-charging/
20 Harto, C. (2023, May 10). Blog: Can the grid handle EVs? Yes! Consumer Reports.
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/research/blog-can-the-grid-handle-evs-yes/; Miller, T., andBischof,
A. (2020, November 20). Electricity Demand's COVID comeback. Morningstar investor.
https://www.morningstar.com/stocks/electricity-demands-covid-comeback
Organization: International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW)
Short Summary
The UAW fully supports the transition to a cleaner auto industry, and it must be done in a way
that protects both good union jobs and the environment. We urge the EPA to reach a consensus-
based standard for light-and medium-duty greenhouse gas emissions that avoids allowing the
burden of compliance to fall heaviest on the workers who currently build ICE vehicles and those
who will build ZEVs in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 1]
Regulations that push the industry to adopt cleaner technologies are important to creating a
strong domestic union manufacturing base. We also know that the US auto industry does not
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have a perfect track record in keeping up with consumer interest. In the 1980s, we saw the
decimation of US auto market share and with it of good union auto jobs in this country, in part
due to the companies' misjudging the consumer market and failing to adapt. We cannot allow
this pattern to repeat in the 21st century in case the existing US automakers fail to keep up with
rising EV demand, further sacrificing market share to foreign, non-union, and low-road
employers. There is a risk of US automakers focusing on short-term profit while non-union
employers capture future generations of market share, with disastrous outcomes for the industry
labor standards and union workers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 1]
However, we are also concerned the proposed standards do not adequately address the
projected impact on an industry that balances ICE jobs with the quality of new EV jobs. Nor
does it properly account for the role that the sale of ICE vehicles will play in the transition or the
availability of charging infrastructure. The EPA must involve stakeholders to reach a mutual
agreement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 1]
Organization: John Graham
The IPM modeling assumes that the carbon intensity of the electrical grid will decline by 70
percent over the lifetimes of 2032 vehicles, as renewables replace most fossil fuels throughout
the United States. The reader is led to believe that the subsidies for renewables in the Inflation
Reduction Act will cause this rapid transformation of the US utility industry. However, the
Inflation Reduction Act does not include the permitting reforms that are required for the large
new transmission lines necessary to bring renewable energy to the markets where they are
needed. Recent reports from both Brookings and the R Street Institute show that, without
permitting reform, the monies in the Inflation Reduction Act are likely to have minimal impact
on the expansion of renewables in the utility sector.95 The IPM modeling also ignores the
massive expansion of grid-scale energy storage that would be required to achieve reliability with
renewables. That energy storage, which would likely require large numbers of lithium ion
batteries, is not included in the agency's assessment of battery prices, electricity prices, or
material supply requirements. For these reasons, it is unrealistic to expect that the electricity
currently provided by fossil fuels will be provided by renewables within the average lifetime of
the model year 2032 vehicle. Thus, the upstream emissions from BEVs will be significantly
larger than the agency assumes. Without this bias, HEVs would look much better in comparison
to BEVs, as we illustrate in the simulation below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 33-34]
95 Rayan Sud, Sanjay Patnaik. How Does Permitting for Clean Energy Work? Brookings Institution.
Washington, DC. September 28, 2022; Rayan Sud, Sanjay Patnaik, Robert L. Glicksman. Federal
Permitting to Accelerate Clean Energy Infrastructure: A Nonpartisan Way Forward. Brookings Institution.
Washington, DC. February 14, 2023; Philip Rosetti. Potential Effects of the Inflation Reduction Act on
Greenhouse Gas Emissions. R Street. Washington, DC. September 27, 2022; Philip Rossetti. Written
Testimony for the Hearing on "Tax Incentives in the Inflation Reduction Act: Jobs and Investment in
Energy Communities." Committee on Finance. United States Senate. Washington, DC. May 18, 2023.
The attached Table 1 calculates lifecycle and tailpipe emissions for ICEVs, HEVs, and BEVs
for 2021 and 2030. Model years 2021 and 2030 are used because it begins with ICCT's
calculation of 101 g/km C02 for life cycle emissions of a 2021 model year BEV car in ICCT's
2021 lifecycle emission study.96 The 101 g/km C02 is composed of 60 g/km due to operation
from the U.S. national electric grid at 357 g/kWh C02 and 41 g/km due to manufacturing and
maintenance emissions. These are converted into g/mi C02 in Table 1. BEV emissions with the
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CA grid at 225 g/kWh C02 are also shown for 2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 33-
34]
96 George Bieker, International Council on Clean Transportation, "A Global Comparison of the Life-Cycle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Combustion Engine and Electric Passenger Cars", July 2021, Figure 4.1.
https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/Global-LCA-passenger-cars-jul2021_0.pdf
The ICCT lifecycle study also calculates ICEV life cycle emissions for cars of 252 g/km C02
for model year 2021, comprised of 55 g/km from upstream fuel production, 31 g/km due to
manufacturing and maintenance, and 166 g/km for tailpipe emissions (also converted into g/mi).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 34]
Second, the electric utility industry works on longer time scales (about 30 years for a
powerplant) than the auto industry (about 15 years for a vehicle). Thus, the decarbonization of
the electric power sector will take longer than a transition to BEVs in the transportation sector.
Pushing the transport sector to BEVs faster than the utility sector can decarbonize is wasteful of
scarce battery resources that will likely be needed for grid-scale energy storage systems in the
utility industry. Moreover, it will take many years to site, approve and build new renewables plus
the additional years to build grid-scale energy storage and the long-range transmission lines
necessary to transport wind and solar energy to markets where it is needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0585, p. 9]
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
C. The Proposed Rule ignores significant hurdles to the industry transformation that the rule
requires.
EPA is pushing forward with this proposal at a breakneck pace and in circumstances ill-suited
to the aggressive industry transformations that the Agency demands. The electrical grids are
neither stable nor safe enough to handle EPA's proposal. The country will be more energy
dependent and less secure because of it. Automakers will be left without the materials they need
to comply. And all the while, consumers—our citizens—will have to deal with empty
government promises about vehicle pricing, utilization, and safety. In short, the Proposed Rule
ignores too many aspects of this too-important issue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 10]
1. The American power grids are not ready for the Proposed Rule.
As with other areas of concern, the Proposed Rule minimizes the damage it is poised to inflict
on the power grids. EPA says utility upgrades to "improve grid reliability and ... meet new
electric power demands" are "routine[]." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,311. And the Agency projects that
increased demand from a greater number of EVs in the market will be "relatively modest" and
have no adverse effect on grid reliability. Id. But converting the majority of the automobile
market to EVs is not so simple. The Proposed Rule would forcibly phase out an entire fueling
and service infrastructure, built over a century, and replace it with one that is still in its infancy.
EPA has not accounted for all the problems that will cause. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649,
pp. 10-11]
For starters, the Proposed Rule will send a surge of EV demand to a power grid that is
"running on an antiquated delivery system established several decades ago," Gina S. Warren,
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Hotboxing the Polar Bear: The Energy and Climate Impacts of Indoor Marijuana Cultivation,
101 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 10-11]
B.U. L. Rev. 979, 982 (2021), and "already strained" by the uptick in renewable energy
"share and the challenge of more intermittent energy supply." Luis Avelar, The Road to an EV
Future Still Has a Few Potholes. Here's How To Fix Them, World Econ. Forum (Jan. 31, 2022),
http://bit.ly/3gEVgRj. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 10-11]
One need only look to California—a State the Proposed Rule showcases as an example of a
State's "demonstrated . . . ability" to handle the increased charging loads of EVs, 88 Fed. Reg. at
29,312—to see how this plays out in real time. Just days after California officials "voted in favor
of banning the sale of new gas-powered vehicles in the state by 2035," Simrin Singh, California
bans the sale of new gas-powered vehicles by 2035, CBS News (Aug. 25, 2022),
https://bit.ly/3P5dls8, California faced a heat wave that triggered calls for residents to avoid
charging their EVs during evening hours to "conserve power" as the "aging electricity grid
struggle[d]" to keep up, Flex Alert extended to Saturday; EV owners asked to not charge
vehicles during peak hours, CBS News (Sept. 2, 2022), https://cbsn.ws/3N4CqQa. As "[a]ll
states . . . rethink electricity pricing structures as their EV charging needs increase and their grid
changes," California should serve as a warning, not a model. Mark Golden, Charging cars at
home at night is not the way to go, Stanford study finds, Stanford News Service (Sept. 22, 2022)
https://bit.ly/46a3qqm; see James Downing, Federal Funding Will Speed Up Grid
Modernization, Utility Officials Say, CQ Roll Call (Oct. 12, 2022), 2022 WL 6905896
(predicting Texas will add "nearly a quarter of its peak demand" to its overall load in the coming
years). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 10-11]
The beginnings of needed grid upgrades will not be easy, fast, or cheap. Some experts
estimate that it will cost between $1 and $2.4 trillion by 2050 to make the necessary changes,
including replacing countless miles of transmission lines. See Tim McLaughlin, Creaky U.S.
power grid threatens progress on renewables, EVs, Reuters (May 12, 2022),
https://bit.ly/43Unta3. Even before the Proposed Rule was announced, experts predicted that a
$125 billion share of that price tag would need to be spent just to "allow [the grids] to handle
electric vehicles." Will Englund, Plug-In Cars Are The Future. The Grid Isn't Ready, Wash. Post
(Oct. 13, 2021), http://bit.ly/3SEDPhk. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 10-11]
On top of that, the Proposed Rule is just one part of EPA's full-court press to transform the
very energy sector the grids support. The corollary proposal for tailpipe emissions from heavy-
duty vehicles, the Coal Combustion Residuals Rule, new methane restrictions, new GHG
regulations under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act, the tighter Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards, the recent update to the Good Neighbor Plan for ozone—this comprehensive suite of
regulations adds even greater strain to existing baseload capacity. The Proposed Rule flouts the
reality of existing infrastructure even considered in a vacuum. The Agency has not explained
how pursuing all of these measures together—that is, how the Proposed Rule would operate in
the actual context in which EPA plans to promulgate it—only adds to the impossibility of
achieving EPA's vision. In short, these near-simultaneous responses to President Biden's pledge
to "end fossil fuel" and "generate all electricity from carbon-free sources in just over a
decade"—by, in part, "shutting] down" American coal plants—will "have tangible
consequences for grid reliability and security" that the Proposed Rule does not address. WV
Amicus Brief at 20-24. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 10-11]
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Another serious problem is that power grids present "a massive to-do list" that "belongs to no
one in particular." McLaughlin, supra. Neither of the country's top electricity regulators "has the
authority to fix or upgrade the U.S. grid problems to match Washington's green-energy
ambitions." Id. Similarly, while "[appropriate permits may be required from the local building
and permitting authorities" for new "[cjharging equipment installations," the "state and local
regulators" "have little independent power" to modernize the grids themselves. Charging Electric
Vehicles at Home, U.S. Department of Energy Alternative Fuels Data Center,
https://bit.ly/42y0f8L. EPA's claim that the Proposed Rule has "no[] . . . federalism
implications" is thus puzzling. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,405. Basing a massive proposal on anticipated
grid expansions when "none of the[] players individually [even] have the power or the
responsibility to maintain the U.S. grid in the national interest," McLaughlin, supra, is too
speculative for responsible regulation. And trying to move forward without accounting for the
role of the States at all—who at least are "responsible] for grid maintenance, upgrades and inter-
regional connections" in their own spheres—only increases the Proposed Rule's head-in-the-
sand approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 11-12]
These are just some of the power-grid-related problems the Proposed Rule triggers without a
solution. The grids not only lack the capacity to accommodate the Proposed Rule's new demands
on them, but are also nowhere near secure enough to take them on. This security piece cannot be
overstated; the Agency's failure to sufficiently account for it is another red flag. Within the grids
themselves, the EV ecosystem is still "emerging." Mohammad Sayed, Ribal Atallah, Chadi Assi,
Mourad Debbabi, Electric vehicle attack impact on power grid operation, 137 Int'l J. of
Electrical Power & Energy Systems 107,784 (2022), https://bit.ly/3qFk2WI. The "special nature
of EV loads" means that "EVs now present a new cyber-physical attack vector . . . against the
power grid" that was "previously not possible." Id. So every charging station in the country is
becoming a potential "entry point[] for cyberattacks directed at the American energy grid."
Karoline Gore, Could electric vehicles present a Cybersecurity risk to the grid?, AT&T
Cybersecurity (Dec. 7, 2020), https://bit.ly/3XlL0DW. The increased number of EVs presents
new challenges, too. Because "[a]n electric vehicle has far more hardware chips and software
components than an internal combustion engine," manufacturers and consumers alike must "be
more careful around security in general." Paul Seredynski, SAE WCX 2022: EV Cybersecurity
threats, SAE International (Apr. 14, 2022), https://bit.ly/3oYJklq. More cause for caution and
concern that, again, the Proposed Rule does not resolve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp.
11-12]
At bottom, the Proposed Rule's high "pressure to achieve rapid expansion" will be "a great
hindrance to the secure deployment of the EV infrastructure." Sayed, et al., at 107,784. And
because "[o]perators and manufacturers often forgo security measures to achieve faster and
cheaper deployment of their equipment," id., the Proposed Rule only promises to increase the
risk that grid security will falter in the very years it would be called on to take up massive new
loads. The logical result, then, is that these "[p]oorly implemented electric vehicle . . . systems
could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of
cyberattacks—or public perception of such—would ripple across the industry and produce
lasting effects." Jay Johnson, et al., Cybersecurity for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure,
Sandia National Laboratories (July 1, 2022), https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1877784. And
with "no comprehensive []cybersecurity approach and limited best practices" in the market to
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date, id., the Proposed Rule must do much better to explain how those risks will not become
reality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 11-12]
The Proposed Rule somewhat attempts to deal with this concern by predicting that sales will
increase as consumers become more familiar with EVs as they see broader "charging
infrastructure" and more electric cars "on the road." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,189. But that raises
another buyer-focused concern that makes it even less likely consumers will change their
purchasing habits to the extreme degree EPA predicts. For people who "rely on street parking,"
park in a garage over 25 feet from a power source, or own a condo where the building
association is not willing to "pay for upgrading the electrical panel or service," where and how to
charge a new electric car is a real concern. Rachel Kurzius, Considering an electric vehicle?
Here's how to prep your home for one, Wash. Post (Sept. 26, 2022), https://bit.ly/3N4Y3zZ.
Even for the slowest and most basic "Level 1" charging option, potential EV customers are out
of luck; their "home probably can't accommodate" an EV. Id. And those who are able to upgrade
their home parking situations may find themselves in a long line as the need for more complex
and expensive charging mechanisms grows at a fast clip. See EV Chargers: How many do we
need?, S&P Global (Jan. 9, 2023), https://bit.ly/3XlxFeM (predicting that the EV population
uptick will require "about 700,000 Level 2 and 70,000 Level 3 chargers deployed, including both
public and restricted-use facilities," 1.2 million and 109,000 nationally by 2027, and 2.13 million
and 172,000 by 2030, "all in addition to the units that consumers put in their own garages").
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 15-16]
Even those who already own EVs may be in for some unpleasant surprises. A recent study
concluded, for example, that "[t]he vast majority of electric vehicle owners [who] charge their
cars at home in the evening or overnight" are "doing it wrong" and should instead "move to
daytime charging at work or public charging stations" so as to not overwhelm the grids. Golden,
supra. But standard electricity pricing "charg[es] commercial and industrial customers big fees
based on their peak electricity use." Id. "This can disincentivize employers from installing
chargers, especially once half or more of their employees have EVs." Id. Some of these vehicle
owners may thus be left in a vehicle-charging no-man's land. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649,
pp.15-16]
Finally, many consumers may not be able to afford electric cars even if they want them. The
average new car now costs nearly $50,000. Average New Car Price Tops $49,500, Kelly Blue
Book (January 11, 2023) https://bit.ly/3PcSkKT. The typical new car payment is now nearly
$800 a month. New Vehicle Affordability Worse Than Ever, Kelly Blue Book (June 18, 2023)
https://bit.ly/3X3F8Kt. EPA admits that the Proposed Rule "will result in a rise in the average
purchase price for consumers" from even these rates. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,364. The Agency
estimates increased costs for vehicle manufacturers at $7.5 billion annually by 2027. Id. By
2032, the Proposed Rule will cost manufacturers at least $1,200 per vehicle, which they will no
doubt pass to consumers. Id. at 29,201. Prices for used cars will rise as well. Id. at 29,364. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 17]
The Agency argues that the benefits of EV ownership will offset these costs. Specifically,
EPA insists that "projected vehicle technology costs are offset by the savings in reduced
operating costs, including fuel savings and reduced maintenance and repair costs." 88 Fed. Reg.
at 29,364. EPA's reasoning is flawed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 17]
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The alleged savings for reduced fuel consumption are based on layers of speculation. The
shift to EVs is projected to "reduce liquid fuel consumption (gasoline and diesel) while
simultaneously increasing electricity consumption." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,365. EPA is correct to
consider the net result of these effects when analyzing the costs and benefits of the Proposed
Rule. But a necessary part of that analysis relies on correctly forecasting electricity prices over
the coming decades. Simultaneous with the forced electrification of vehicles, EPA is attempting
to dramatically restructure America's power-generating portfolio. Whether such a transformation
is possible given resource limitations, geopolitical factors, permitting issues, land-use debates,
jurisdictional policy differences, and litigation is still to be determined. Even if it is possible,
EPA cannot predict with any accuracy the costs to the retail ratepayer for completing such a
drastic transition. In short, no one knows with enough certainty to justify massive regulatory
shifts whether charging an EV will be more cost-effective than refueling a gasoline engine.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 17]
Moreover, low-income consumers will not be able to afford an EV. Despite the Agency's best
efforts to present EVs as increasingly affordable, at the end of 2022 the average new EV sold for
$61,448. Average New Car Price Tops $49,500, supra. This is why the Agency acknowledges
"low-income households are more likely to buy used vehicles and own older vehicles." 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29,344. But used EVs offer little savings if the buyer has to replace the battery.
According to the Department of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory, advanced
batteries "wear out eventually," and today's batteries last only 8 to 15 years. Electric Vehicle
Benefits and Considerations, U.S. Department of Energy Alternate Fuels Data Center,
https://bit.ly/3PcOn9i. Replacing an EV battery costs anywhere from $5,000 to more than
$15,000. Electric Car Battery Replacement Costs, Edmunds (May 2, 2023)
https://bit.ly/3NutoNS. Such substantial expenses hardly qualify as "reduced repair and
maintenance costs." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,364. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 17-18]
All of this comes at a time of record inflation, historic gasoline prices, and high utility bills.
Since President Biden took office, food prices are up over 18%, and energy prices are up over
37%. Introducing the 'Presidential Inflation Rate': Biden trails only Carter, Roll Call (March 15,
2023) https://bit.ly/3qH63jd. Home prices have also surged. In the first quarter of 2023, the
average home price in the United States was $516,500, Average Sales Price of Houses Sold for
the United States, Federal Reserve Economic Data, https://bit.ly/3p4BenX—an increase of 27%
in less than three years. Agencies cannot ignore context when weighing the costs and benefits of
a proposed rule. Here, the broader economic landscape is another strong mark against the
Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 17-18]
Organization: Lucid Group, Inc.
The Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA) and its members have found that
electricity providers and grid-readiness will keep pace with the transition to zero-emission
vehicles. In 2021, the U.S. fleet of electric vehicles used 6.1 terawatt hours (TWhs) of electricity,
accounting for 0.15% of the total national energy generation that year.2, 3 It's estimated that an
additional 15-27 TWh of annual new power generation will be needed to service EVs and related
technologies. In the past, nearly 100 TWh have been added in a single year, demonstrating that
such an increase is accomplishable.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 2-3]
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2 "Assessment of Light-Duty Plug-in Electric Vehicles in the United States, 2010-2021," Argonne
National Lab, November 2022, available at https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2022/ll/178584.pdf.
3 "Monthly Energy Review May 2023," EIA, available at
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec7_3.pdf.
4 "Summary Report on EVs at Scale and the U.S. Electric Power System," US Drive
https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/summary-report-evs-scale-and-us-electric-power-system-
2019.
Transmission of the energy generated is another key component, and one that this
Administration has begun to address. This year, the Administration published its plan to decrease
permitting timelines, including those for new transmission projects.5 Additionally, the U.S.
Department of Energy proposed a rule on designating National Interest Electric Transmission
Corridors.6 The Federal government is demonstrating its intent to bolster grid resilience, which
in part will ensure electricity demand is met. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0664, pp. 2-3]
5 "FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Outlines Priorities for Building America's Energy
Infrastructure Faster, Safer, and Cleaner," (May 2023) available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2023/05/10/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-outlines-priorities-for-
building-americas-energy-infrastructure-faster-safer-and-cleaner/.
6 Notice of Intent and Request for Information: Designation of National Interest Electric Transmission
Corridors, 88 FR 30956 (May 15, 2023).
Organization: Mayor Becky Daggett, City of Flagstaff, Arizona et al.
Throughout the rulemaking process, EPA should also recognize and consider investments
from the recently enacted Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and Inflation Reduction
Act (IRA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, pp. 1-2]
Together, these two laws are expected to reduce adoption costs for ZEVs by providing at least
$245 billion in federal funds—through tax credits, loans, and grants—to support ZEV charging
infrastructure, manufacturing, and purchasing. Long-term regulatory certainty will push domestic
manufacturers to take full advantage of these investments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, pp.
1-2]
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
Infrastructure
To achieve the ambitious vision for U.S. charging infrastructure needed to rapidly electrify a
high proportion of new vehicles, as noted above, EPA must work closely with other U.S.
government agencies to help ensure that the dozens of programs in the Inflation Reduction Act
(IRA) and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), and others still needed to support the transition,
are effectively deployed by the federal government. While it is true that agencies are -so far -
rolling out these programs expeditiously, strong coordination of these initiatives is needed to
realize nationwide transportation transformation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 11]
V2G bidirectional charging technologies can provide a transformational opportunity to help
address the nation's energy crisis while also decarbonizing the transportation sector. The use of
bidirectional charging installations, for fleet and private vehicles, can help stabilize local grid
activity and balance load versus demand.9 Besides grid load balancing, the use of vehicle
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batteries as energy sources can also offset local energy production demands and further improve
grid resiliency and national security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 11]
9 This notice is one example of "grid services vehicles can provide" according to the US DOE
https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USEERE/bulletins/3594aae
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
Section IV: Batteries
V2X applications such as vehicle-to-grid, vehicle-to-load, and vehicle-to-home are
increasingly considered key features that will support the shift to electrification. For instance, the
California legislature is currently considering a mandate for all new vehicles in the state to have
bidirectional charging capability starting in 2030 MY. Regardless of California's law or separate
OEM efforts to advance V2G, inclusion of the parameter, "virtual distance", is fundamental to
the transparent deployment of V2G technology. As such, we would like EPA to add virtual
distance to the regulatory language in both the durability and warranty mileage calculation.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0623, pp. 15-16]
Organization: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
-The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission has found that EVs are both an opportunity and
a challenge for the electric power sector and has therefore directed Minnesota's investor-owned
utilities to take steps to encourage cost-effective integration of EVs and plan for their adoption.
Minnesota's utilities have developed and begun implementing a variety of programs to support
EV adoption, including home charging and rate design, as well as public charging investments.6
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0557, pp. 3-4]
6 Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Electric vehicles, https://mn.gov/puc/activities/economic-
analysis/electric-vehicles/ (accessed 6/15/2023).
Organization: Missouri Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
Coincidently, there is no similar proposal to upgrade the power grid to support this rule.
Researchers estimate the 350 million electric vehicles required to decarbonize the U.S. fleet by
2050 could use as much as half of the U.S. national electricity demand. Therefore, EPA's
proposal would require a complete transformation of the electric power sector, requiring
substantially more generation, transmission, and distribution, resulting in higher emissions and
power prices not only for those using electrified vehicles, but for all consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0578, p. 2]
Alongside this rule, EPA should be warning Americans of the higher energy costs and
increased electrical blackouts that may accompany the forced BEV adoption rates. EPA should
also prepare consumers for a future of increasingly expensive vehicles that many lower to
middle-class families can't afford, along with coinciding increases in the cost of used vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0578, p. 2]
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Organization: Missouri Farm Bureau (MOFB)
Further, MOFB is greatly concerned that the proposed rule contains zero language regarding
what impact it will have on the country's severely aged and inadequate electric grid. In 2020, the
U.S. experienced 180 major electrical disruptions, up from fewer than two dozen in 2000.8
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0590, pp. 2-3]
8 America's Power Grid Is Increasingly Unreliable -WSJ, (Link: https://www.wsj.com/articles/americas-
power-grid-is-increasingly-unreliable-11645196772) accessed June 14, 2023.
EPA's proposed rule fails to illustrate how electricity will actually be delivered to thousands
of new charging stations that will be needed to accommodate this mandate, and what impact it
will have upon every other aspect of our lives, much of which relies on the uninterrupted
delivery of electricity. EPA should be warning Americans about the higher energy costs and
increased electrical shortages and blackouts that could accompany the massive EV rate of
adoption mandated by its proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0590, pp. 2-3]
As stated in our HD rule comments, MOFB is especially concerned with the future buildout
of electric transmission lines that will be needed to carry the proposed rule's mandates into
fruition. Unfortunately, and all too often, farmers and ranchers hear others say that their land is
needed for the "public's benefit." Government agencies and renewable energy advocates often
forget that farmers and ranchers are part of the "public" as well, and need to be fairly
compensated for the continued buildout of transmission lines through their private property,
which will take away the critical farm and ranch land necessary to run their businesses for
generations to come. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0590, pp. 2-3]
Organization: National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) et al.
iii. Transmission Capacity is Severely Lacking
Another substantial challenge is the generation and supply of electricity to charging stations.
Every market participant that our membership communicates with is extraordinarily skeptical
that electricity providers will be able to increase generation and transmission activity to service
the kind of load necessary to provide charging infrastructure for the volume and type of Level 3
or DCFCs needed to accommodate travelers or those without access to home charging, which is
likely to be a majority of future EV drivers—and within the next seven to nine years. A recent
analysis of grid upgrades necessary for electrification found that a single highway fast-charging
site, which would offer services to light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles, will require the
same amount of electricity as a sports stadium or a small town.26 This will require the
development of dedicated substations and significant energy resources behind the meter. The
Proposed Rule largely assumes that, with an increase in EV production, there will be a sufficient
increase in electricity generation and transmission to meet those EV needs. Even when charging
sites are financed, lead times for commercial charging infrastructure can range from six months
to two or more years.27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p. 9]
26 Gideon Katsh, et al., CALSTART ET AL., "Electric Highways: Accelerating and Optimizing Fast-
Charging Deployment for Carbon-Free Transportation" (Nov. 11, 2022) available at
https://calstart.org/electric-highways-study/.
27 SPARKCHARGE, "Commercial EV Charging Station Installation Timeline" (2023) available at
https://www.sparkcharge.io/blogs/leadthecharge/commercial-ev-charging-station-installation-timeline.
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EPA cannot ignore that the infrastructure and electricity supply needed for the Proposed Rule
do not exist in a vacuum; the effects of EPA's Proposal is only further compounded by its
simultaneous proposal mandating the electrification of heavy-duty trucks.28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0648, p. 9]
28 88 Fed. Reg. 25,926 (Apr. 27, 2023) (Proposed Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty
Vehicles— Phase 3).
c. Supply Chain and Market-Related Barriers to EV Adoption
Various other barriers to EV adoption exist beyond public charging, including consumer
skepticism toward new technology, higher costs than internal combustion engine ("ICE")
vehicles, limited range, lack of convenient public charging infrastructure, uncertain battery aging
and resale value, dismissive or deceptive car dealerships, lack of available models, and other
supply constraints.29 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p. 9]
29 Matteo Muratori et al., PROG. ENERGY 3 022002 "The rise of electric vehicles—2020 status and
future expectations" (Mar. 25, 2021) available at https://doi.org/10.1088/2516-1083/abe0ad.
EPA acknowledges, though does not meaningfully address, many of the barriers to EV
adoption.30 If the Agency is interested in electrifying light-duty transportation in the United
States, it should proactively redress these obstacles rather than assume they will dissipate on
their own under the full weight of unachievable mandates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p.
9]
30 Proposed Rule at 29,311.
Further, the Proposed Rule overlooks the emissions impacts from the substantial expansion of
the electrical grid. While EPA credits emissions reductions from assuming the power sector will
become cleaner over time using renewable generation and electricity storage (e.g., batteries), it
ignores the impacts of building out that associated infrastructure. New power generation,
renewable power generation, and energy storage require the same critical minerals necessary for
manufacturing EV batteries. Increased electricity demand will only further compound the stress
on critical minerals. Indeed, copper and aluminum—both needed for EVs—are also the two main
materials in wires and cables. Battery storage equipment for solar and other renewable energy
sources rely on similar battery chemistries as EVs.39 Again, EVs may be the most
environmentally compelling solution, but it does neither the climate nor American consumers
any favors for the Agency to pretend the solution is more compelling or achievable than it
actually is. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
39 And, as described above, higher prices on these materials could have a major impact on future grid
investments. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy
Transitions (Mar. 2022), 77-80, available at https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-
980a-52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.
The simultaneous spike in demand for materials such as copper and aluminum for both the
grid and EV manufacturing will increase extraction and refining efforts globally, potentially
exacerbating consequences on a regional level.40 By failing to consider geographic electricity
generation differences and the potential benefits of a non-homogenized vehicle population, the
Proposal misses the opportunity to most effectively respond to emissions concerns and, more
importantly, could indirectly lead to increased emissions in certain regions. A full accounting of
the relative advantages and disadvantages of the different vehicle technologies is necessary to
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ensure the Proposal harnesses the benefits of competition among different current and potential
future vehicle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
40 The U.S. is almost entirely dependent on other countries, especially China, for materials essential to
manufacturing EVs, meaning the Proposal may potentially raise national security concerns.
Organization: National Propane Gas Association (NPGA)
The EPA's efforts will promote additional demand for electricity for zero-emission vehicles at
a time when the electric grid is suffering from a reliability crisis. The North American Electric
Reliability Corporation's most recent long-term reliability assessment shows more than 50% of
the United States is in high risk or elevated risk of shortfalls in electricity supply.5 This
assessment is based on existing demand, and show that the grid needs significant improvements
to meet rising demand, and extreme conditions. Specifically, the Assessment calls on industry
and policymakers to "consider the impact that electrification of transportation, space heating, and
other sectors may have on future electricity demand and infrastructure."6 The EPA has failed to
present its consideration of the impact of its proposal on grid reliability, and consequently, failed
to answer any questions about such necessary analysis.7 Prior to adding additional demand, the
EPA should urge its partner, the DOE and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, to heed
the guidance of the Government Accountability Office and analyze options for grid resilience, so
as to avoid enhanced strain without a demand management or supply plan.8 Further, the EPA
would benefit particularly in this review by reviewing analysis of grid strain during extreme
weather events, which have called for enhanced storage, transmission, and generation
enhancement of 35-70 gigawatts of power.9 The EPA's efforts will only exacerbate the strain on
the grid, risking consumer blackouts and brownouts, as well as vehicles being unable to charge,
which could have fatal follow-on effects when considering the essential role light-and medium-
duty vehicles play in the economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0634, p. 2]
5 2022 LTRA (nerc.com) [Link:
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2022.pdf] at 5-7,
23. (last accessed June 21, 2023).
6 Id.
7 Proposed Rule at 29311-29312. The EPA's analysis of grid reliability is perfunctory at best, and at odds
with the NERC Report.
8 GAO-21-346, Accessible Version, ELECTRICITY GRID RESILIENCE: Climate Change Is Expected to
Have Far-reaching Effects and DOE and FERC Should Take Actions [Link:
https://www.gao.gov/assets/720/712874.pdf] (last accessed June 21, 2023).
9 Hopkins, Asa, Takahashi, Kenji and Nadel, Steven; Keep Warm and Carry On: Electrification and
Efficiency Meet the Polar Vortex, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy at 11-12 (2020).
Organization: National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA)
Critical Role of Electric Cooperatives as Light-and Medium-Duty Vehicles are Electrified
Electrification of the transportation sector creates both opportunities and challenges for the
electric sector, and electric cooperatives will play a critical role in the success of the
transformation now underway. As such, electric cooperatives welcome the opportunity to partner
with state and local entities on implementing the programs dedicated to building out the nation's
electric vehicle (EV) charging network in the bipartisan infrastructure law (BIL) and through
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other opportunities. The funding in the BIL is an important down payment in the federal support
required to electrify the transportation sector, particularly in rural areas that could otherwise be
left behind. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 1-2]
To support the electrification of light-and medium-duty vehicles as laid out in EPA's
proposed rule, electric cooperatives and other utilities must be involved from the very beginning
of planning for the charging infrastructure these vehicles will require. There are already
examples of 1 MW charging stations being built to support vehicle fleets. Electric cooperatives
and other utilities need to be integrated at the very beginning of planning for such facilities by
the project developers, or other relevant planning authorities where applicable, to avoid
unintended consequences. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 1-2]
EPA Should Account for Grid-side Investments in Proposed Rule's Analysis
Bearing these realities in mind, we write to express our significant concern that EPA has
failed to adequately account for the costs associated with serving the new load that will be
created via light-and medium-duty vehicle (LDV and MDV) electrification as outlined in this
proposed rule. While EPA accounts for the cost to purchasers for the hardware and installation of
charging equipment, EPA fails to include the electric grid-side upgrades that will likely be
needed, if not now, certainly in the future as electrification spreads and this could have serious
negative consequences to American consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, p. 2]
Specifically, within the proposed rule section on PEV Charging Infrastructure Considerations,
EPA states: 1 "there may be additional infrastructure needs and costs beyond those associated
with charging equipment itself. While planning for additional electricity demand is a standard
practice for utilities and not specific to PEV charging, the buildout of public and private charging
stations (particularly those with multiple high-powered DC fast charging units) could in some
cases require upgrades to local distribution systems.. .However, there is considerable uncertainty
associated with.. .future distribution upgrade needs, and we do not model them directly as part of
our infrastructure cost analysis." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, p. 2]
1 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,311 (May 5, 2023).
It is important for EPA to correct this failure in the proposed rule stage by updating its
analysis with inclusion of a range of expected costs associated with serving the new load from
the LDV and MDV fleets created by EPA's proposal. Failure to do so will likely result in
unrealistic expectations on the part of consumers and fleet operators and possibly delay plans for
electrification as they learn of the full costs that will be required to serve this new load from their
electric cooperatives or other electric utilities. Neither these consumers/operators, nor the EPA,
should expect that electric cooperatives can bear the burden of these new costs alone, particularly
when these costs will ultimately need to be passed on to the end of the line consumer-members
of the cooperative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, p. 2]
Overall, it is important for EPA to recognize that electrification of the transportation sector,
and the increased flexibility of this newly electrified demand, will require substantial distribution
infrastructure investment over time to meet increased average local electric demand and to meet
increased demand in new locations (e.g., EV charging stations). Significant transmission
infrastructure investment may also be required to meet increased average electric demand and
changes in the spatial distribution of electric demand among load centers. According to the
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National Academy of Sciences, to transition the transportation sector through increased
electrification, electric utilities will need to increase generation by up to 170% and see a three-
fold expansion of the transmission grid by 2050. Over time, electrification of the transportation
sector will require additional generation investment to ensure resource and energy adequacy to
meet increased average electric demand and changing consumption profiles. Unfortunately, this
investment challenge is becoming more complex due to several recent EPA actions that are
jeopardizing flexible, dispatchable always available generation resources.2 These actions would
require increased reliance on intermittent energy sources. Particular attention will be needed to
ensure that generation investment is adequate in amount and in operational characteristics to
meet the demands of electrification while ensuring grid stability, security, and reliability. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 2-3]
2 These actions include: Supplemental Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 88 FR 18824 (March 29, 2023); National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal-and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units
Review of the Residual Risk and Technology Review, 88 FR 24854 (April 24, 2023); Hazardous and Solid
Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals From Electric Utilities; Legacy CCR
Surface Impoundments, 88 FR 31982 (May 18, 2023); New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse
Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units;
Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating
Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean Energy Rule, 88 FR 33240 (May 23, 2023); and Federal Good
Neighbor Plan for the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 88 FR 36654 (June 5, 2023).
Specific Costs for EPA to Consider Incorporating in the Proposed Rule's Analysis
Again, we urge EPA to update its analysis to account for the costs needed to make updates to
the grid to support transportation electrification as envisioned in this proposal. Grid upgrade
costs for EV charging will vary by region, neighborhood, cooperative, circuit, and feeder.
However, to illustrate the types and ranges of costs that EPA should account for, we provide the
following costs sourced from four different cooperative regions, broken down by charge level:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
-Residential (Level 1 and Level 2): One out of three households will need an expanded
electric panel to accommodate 240 V Breakers. If a household purchases two electric vehicles,
then four slots on a breaker will be needed to accommodate this load. The average cost will be
approximately $4,000 for a Level 2 residential charger with a panel upgrade.
—Upgrading panel (20% of panels must be upgraded) - can start around $600
—Transformer upgrades -$2,600 and climbing
—Service wire gauge upgrades to accommodate higher amperage -$3,000
- Public (Level 2 and DC Fast Charging (DCFC)): For commercial sites, transformer upgrade
needs will vary. Most sites will already have three-phase power available; however, in very rural
locations single-phase power will need to be upgraded to three-phase. If transformers do need to
be upgraded on a three-phase line, then three transformers will need to be upgraded.
—Level 2 charger including panel -approx. $4,000 on average
—National EV Infrastructure Program (NEVI)-Compliant DCFC -approx. $25,000-
$150,000
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-Transformer -$25,000 -$40,000 (reflects current prices for three transformers)
-Service entrance -$3,000-$4,000
-Metering package (including instrumentation, voltage transformers (PT) and current
transformers (CT) -$2,000
-Line extension, if required (site dependent) -$50,000 -$75,000
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
Circumstances vary across cooperatives, but some of these costs will be borne directly by the
consumer-members and others will be paid for by the cooperative. Regardless, these costs help to
illustrate more accurately the investment it will take to implement on EPA's proposed rule.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
We note that these costs reflect a snapshot estimate in time and are likely to increase,
particularly due to the significant challenges and delays utilities are facing in their supply chains,
which are contributing to an unprecedented shortage of the most basic machinery and
components essential to ensure the continued reliability of the electric grid. Electric cooperatives
are waiting a year, on average, to receive distribution transformers. Additionally, lead times for
large power transformers have grown to more than three years. And orders for electrical conduit
have been delayed five-fold to 20 weeks with costs ballooning by 200 percent year-over-year. As
a result, new projects are being deferred or canceled, and electric cooperatives are concerned
about their ability to respond to major storms due to depleted stockpiles. We expect these supply
chain challenges to persist with the increased demand for electrification projects being
incentivized by the U.S. federal government. All these delays will likely impact the cost and
timing of charging infrastructure buildout needed to support the transportation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0575, pp.3-4]
EPA should update its analysis in the proposed rule to account for the significant grid
investments that may be needed to support transportation electrification as laid out in the
proposal. As detailed above, these costs may be significant and should not be shouldered by the
electric cooperatives serving this new load. Again, electric cooperatives are consumer-owned
and operate at cost on a not-for-profit basis. They also serve 92% of the nation's persistent
poverty counties. Affordability is critical to electric cooperatives and the consumer-members
they serve, and any new costs imposed on an electric cooperative are ultimately borne by the
consumers at the end of the line. EPA should update its analysis to ensure it more accurately
represents the costs associated with electrifying both LDVs and MDVs, which could be
significant across the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, p. 4]
Organization: National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA)
Critical Role of Electric Cooperatives as Light-and Medium-Duty Vehicles are Electrified
Electrification of the transportation sector creates both opportunities and challenges for the
electric sector, and electric cooperatives will play a critical role in the success of the
transformation now underway. As such, electric cooperatives welcome the opportunity to partner
with state and local entities on implementing the programs dedicated to building out the nation's
electric vehicle (EV) charging network in the bipartisan infrastructure law (BIL) and through
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other opportunities. The funding in the BIL is an important down payment in the federal support
required to electrify the transportation sector, particularly in rural areas that could otherwise be
left behind. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 1-2]
To support the electrification of light-and medium-duty vehicles as laid out in EPA's
proposed rule, electric cooperatives and other utilities must be involved from the very beginning
of planning for the charging infrastructure these vehicles will require. There are already
examples of 1 MW charging stations being built to support vehicle fleets. Electric cooperatives
and other utilities need to be integrated at the very beginning of planning for such facilities by
the project developers, or other relevant planning authorities where applicable, to avoid
unintended consequences. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 1-2]
EPA Should Account for Grid-side Investments in Proposed Rule's Analysis
Bearing these realities in mind, we write to express our significant concern that EPA has
failed to adequately account for the costs associated with serving the new load that will be
created via light-and medium-duty vehicle (LDV and MDV) electrification as outlined in this
proposed rule. While EPA accounts for the cost to purchasers for the hardware and installation of
charging equipment, EPA fails to include the electric grid-side upgrades that will likely be
needed, if not now, certainly in the future as electrification spreads and this could have serious
negative consequences to American consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, p. 2]
Specifically, within the proposed rule section on PEV Charging Infrastructure Considerations,
EPA states: 1 "there may be additional infrastructure needs and costs beyond those associated
with charging equipment itself. While planning for additional electricity demand is a standard
practice for utilities and not specific to PEV charging, the buildout of public and private charging
stations (particularly those with multiple high-powered DC fast charging units) could in some
cases require upgrades to local distribution systems.. .However, there is considerable uncertainty
associated with.. .future distribution upgrade needs, and we do not model them directly as part of
our infrastructure cost analysis." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, p. 2]
1 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29,311 (May 5, 2023).
It is important for EPA to correct this failure in the proposed rule stage by updating its
analysis with inclusion of a range of expected costs associated with serving the new load from
the LDV and MDV fleets created by EPA's proposal. Failure to do so will likely result in
unrealistic expectations on the part of consumers and fleet operators and possibly delay plans for
electrification as they learn of the full costs that will be required to serve this new load from their
electric cooperatives or other electric utilities. Neither these consumers/operators, nor the EPA,
should expect that electric cooperatives can bear the burden of these new costs alone, particularly
when these costs will ultimately need to be passed on to the end of the line consumer-members
of the cooperative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, p. 2]
Overall, it is important for EPA to recognize that electrification of the transportation sector,
and the increased flexibility of this newly electrified demand, will require substantial distribution
infrastructure investment over time to meet increased average local electric demand and to meet
increased demand in new locations (e.g., EV charging stations). Significant transmission
infrastructure investment may also be required to meet increased average electric demand and
changes in the spatial distribution of electric demand among load centers. According to the
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National Academy of Sciences, to transition the transportation sector through increased
electrification, electric utilities will need to increase generation by up to 170% and see a three-
fold expansion of the transmission grid by 2050. Over time, electrification of the transportation
sector will require additional generation investment to ensure resource and energy adequacy to
meet increased average electric demand and changing consumption profiles. Unfortunately, this
investment challenge is becoming more complex due to several recent EPA actions that are
jeopardizing flexible, dispatchable always available generation resources.2 These actions would
require increased reliance on intermittent energy sources. Particular attention will be needed to
ensure that generation investment is adequate in amount and in operational characteristics to
meet the demands of electrification while ensuring grid stability, security, and reliability. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 2-3]
2 These actions include: Supplemental Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 88 FR 18824 (March 29, 2023); National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal-and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units
Review of the Residual Risk and Technology Review, 88 FR 24854 (April 24, 2023); Hazardous and Solid
Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals From Electric Utilities; Legacy CCR
Surface Impoundments, 88 FR 31982 (May 18, 2023); New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse
Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units;
Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating
Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean Energy Rule, 88 FR 33240 (May 23, 2023); and Federal Good
Neighbor Plan for the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 88 FR 36654 (June 5, 2023).
Specific Costs for EPA to Consider Incorporating in the Proposed Rule's Analysis
Again, we urge EPA to update its analysis to account for the costs needed to make updates to
the grid to support transportation electrification as envisioned in this proposal. Grid upgrade
costs for EV charging will vary by region, neighborhood, cooperative, circuit, and feeder.
However, to illustrate the types and ranges of costs that EPA should account for, we provide the
following costs sourced from four different cooperative regions, broken down by charge level:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
-Residential (Level 1 and Level 2): One out of three households will need an expanded
electric panel to accommodate 240 V Breakers. If a household purchases two electric vehicles,
then four slots on a breaker will be needed to accommodate this load. The average cost will be
approximately $4,000 for a Level 2 residential charger with a panel upgrade.
—Upgrading panel (20% of panels must be upgraded) - can start around $600
—Transformer upgrades -$2,600 and climbing
—Service wire gauge upgrades to accommodate higher amperage -$3,000
- Public (Level 2 and DC Fast Charging (DCFC)): For commercial sites, transformer upgrade
needs will vary. Most sites will already have three-phase power available; however, in very rural
locations single-phase power will need to be upgraded to three-phase. If transformers do need to
be upgraded on a three-phase line, then three transformers will need to be upgraded.
—Level 2 charger including panel -approx. $4,000 on average
—National EV Infrastructure Program (NEVI)-Compliant DCFC -approx. $25,000-
$150,000
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-Transformer -$25,000 -$40,000 (reflects current prices for three transformers)
-Service entrance -$3,000-$4,000
-Metering package (including instrumentation, voltage transformers (PT) and current
transformers (CT) -$2,000
-Line extension, if required (site dependent) -$50,000 -$75,000
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
Circumstances vary across cooperatives, but some of these costs will be borne directly by the
consumer-members and others will be paid for by the cooperative. Regardless, these costs help to
illustrate more accurately the investment it will take to implement on EPA's proposed rule.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, pp. 3-4]
We note that these costs reflect a snapshot estimate in time and are likely to increase,
particularly due to the significant challenges and delays utilities are facing in their supply chains,
which are contributing to an unprecedented shortage of the most basic machinery and
components essential to ensure the continued reliability of the electric grid. Electric cooperatives
are waiting a year, on average, to receive distribution transformers. Additionally, lead times for
large power transformers have grown to more than three years. And orders for electrical conduit
have been delayed five-fold to 20 weeks with costs ballooning by 200 percent year-over-year. As
a result, new projects are being deferred or canceled, and electric cooperatives are concerned
about their ability to respond to major storms due to depleted stockpiles. We expect these supply
chain challenges to persist with the increased demand for electrification projects being
incentivized by the U.S. federal government. All these delays will likely impact the cost and
timing of charging infrastructure buildout needed to support the transportation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0575, pp.3-4]
EPA should update its analysis in the proposed rule to account for the significant grid
investments that may be needed to support transportation electrification as laid out in the
proposal. As detailed above, these costs may be significant and should not be shouldered by the
electric cooperatives serving this new load. Again, electric cooperatives are consumer-owned
and operate at cost on a not-for-profit basis. They also serve 92% of the nation's persistent
poverty counties. Affordability is critical to electric cooperatives and the consumer-members
they serve, and any new costs imposed on an electric cooperative are ultimately borne by the
consumers at the end of the line. EPA should update its analysis to ensure it more accurately
represents the costs associated with electrifying both LDVs and MDVs, which could be
significant across the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0575, p. 4]
Organization: National Tribal Air Association (NTAA)
Electrified Vehicles
As noted in the announcement of the proposed standards, "EPA's proposal builds upon a
proliferation of announcements by automakers that collectively signal a rapidly growing
shift.. .toward zero-emission technologies, including electrification"5. This anticipated reliance
on hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and fully electric power trains may be disproportionately burdensome
and costly in Indian country. Far too many homes on many reservations lack access to an electric
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grid. Further, vehicle reliance on centralized or individual battery charging sites as anticipated in
the proposed regulations presents a huge challenge. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, p. 3]
5 Biden-Harris Administration Proposes Strongest-Ever Pollution Standards for cars and trucks to
Accelerate Transition to a Clean - Transportation Future, USEPA News Release, April 12, 2023
The NTAA is well aware of many initiatives to enhance the deployment of renewable energy
technologies to support the nation's electricity demand. We actively participate in meetings,
webinars, forums, etc. as programs emerge under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, Inflation
Reduction Act, and other climate change - related initiatives. The NTAA continues to formally
comment on EPA proposals that emerge which have the potential to impact Indian country.
NTAA remains concerned about realistic access to funding and other resources that are essential
to advance renewable energy in Tribal communities and are necessary to transition vehicle fleets
as anticipated by the proposed light-duty and medium-duty vehicle emissions standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0504, p. 3]
Organization: Nebraska Corn Board (NCB) and Nebraska Corn Growers Association
According to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), two-thirds of the
country could experience rolling blackouts this summer. The current power grid is unable to
handle the added light-duty vehicles and does not include adding heavy-duty electric fleets
requiring larger amounts of electricity. Not only does the infrastructure need updating, but it will
take a large amount of public investment to meet this goal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0583, p.
1]
Further, EVs are not a zero emissions product as 60% of the U.S. power grid is requires coal
and natural gas along with the mining of rare earth minerals. Aside from not being a zero
emissions vehicle, Americans will face rolling blackouts and weakened energy security with EVs
depending on the electrical grid. Current energy infrastructure cannot support this
proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0583, p. 1]
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
Like ZEV sales regulations, the shared ambition memorialized in these multi-state agreements
sends strong and consistent signals to industry and investors and promotes public and private
investment in zero-emission technologies and infrastructure. For example, the public utility
commissions in the U.S. signatories to the 2022 MOU have already approved more than $2
billion dollars of utility funding for medium-and heavy-duty ZEV infrastructure planning and
deployment.22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 5-6]
22 U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Center, Alternative Fueling Station Counts by State,
https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/states (visited June 9, 2023).
Organization: Paul Bonifas and Tim Considine
EVSE Port Costs & Grid Upgrades: The EPA purposefully ignores a fundamental truth about
EV charging. The EPA's study does NOT include the massive costs to upgrade the electrical grid
to accommodate EV charging, as they consider it outside of the scope of their Rule. However,
these mandatory grid upgrades must be included in the analysis as they will be a large cost
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burden for every consumer of electricity in the country. Including these grid upgrade costs
results in a more realistic cost of $330 billion, a $210 billion cost increase from the EPA's
calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 3]
This rule is like the Clean Power Plan proposed by the Biden Administration. The US Energy
Information Administration conducted a study of the Clean Power Plan and found that average
retail electricity rates would increase upwards of 3-7%. 13 Taking the mid-range of this price
increase, or 5%, the proposed rule would raise the previous electric rate increase of 55% to 58%
and increase electricity costs for EV charging from EPA's estimate of $460 billion to $728
billion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 5]
13 https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/powerplants/cleanplan/
This $728 billion in higher electricity expenditures more than offsets the savings in reduced
liquid fuel spending of $620. On balance, the fuel cost savings are a NEGATIVE $108 billion in
contrast to EPA's estimated pre-tax fuel savings of $890 billion. This is a nearly $1 trillion
difference. So, under rather conservative but realistic assumptions and elementary economic
analysis, the proposed EV rule will not save consumers money but instead will lead to higher
electricity costs, especially for poor and lower to middle class households living in rental units.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 5]
There is also another concern related to timing. The electrical grid may not be ready to
accommodate the additional load from this head long rush to force consumers to buy EVs.
Electricity supply is like a backwards "L," with low marginal costs for generation levels up to
capacity constraints. Once demand reaches those capacity constraints, the supply curve is
vertical, and prices can reach extraordinary heights until demand falls or new capacity is
available. We have witnessed this phenomenon in Texas and other regional electricity markets
due to weather events. The EPA's proposed EV rule is a similar demand shock, however, it
would be persistent unlike transitory weather demand shocks and unless electricity providers
respond in a timely manner, rates could increase much more than 58%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0551, p. 5]
EVSE Port Costs & Grid Upgrades
EPA Claimed Costs: $120 billion
Realistic Costs: $330 billion
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 5]
This cost category purposefully ignores a fundamental truth about EV charging. Simply put,
the EPA's study does NOT include the colossal costs to upgrade the electrical grid to
accommodate EV charging. When the EPA discusses Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment
(EVSE), they only consider the costs to install the physical "plugs" or "ports" that provide
electricity to a vehicle and charges its battery, a measly $120 billion cost (present value at 3
percent discount rate). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 8-9]
In their RIA, the EPA states: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 8-9]
"Charging infrastructure is different from the electric power utility distribution system
infrastructure, which is comprised of distribution feeder circuits, switches, protective equipment,
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primary circuits, distribution transformers, secondaries, service drops, etc."29 [2] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 8-9]
29 Page 364 of EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis -
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
and in the EPA rule, they state: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 8-9]
"The buildout of public and private charging stations (particularly those with multiple high-
powered DC fast charging units) could in some cases require upgrades to local distribution
systems. For example, a recent study found power needs as low as 200 kW could trigger a
requirement to install a distribution transformer.... there is considerable uncertainty associated
with the uptake of these technologies as well as with future distribution upgrade needs, and we
do not model them directly as part of our infrastructure cost analysis".30 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0551, pp. 8-9]
30 Page 128 of EPA's Rule -https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-05-05/pdf/2023-07974.pdf
However, these mandatory grid upgrades made by utility companies MUST be included in the
analysis as they will be a large cost burden on consumers of electricity, even for those that do not
ownEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 8-9]
As of 2021, the department of transportation reported more than 272 million vehicles (cars,
buses, and trucks) were registered in the US31. Using the EPA's "EV Penetration Rates" as a
proxy for eventual nationwide EV adoption, their rule would force the ownership of 76 million
more EVs by 2032 compared to the "no change" scenario 32. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551,
p. 9]
31 https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2021/mvl.cfm
32 Pages 668 & 670 of EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis -
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10175J2.pdf
The Boston Consulting Group estimates that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 9]
"Depending on charging patterns, [a utility] will need to invest between $1,700 and $5,800 in
grid upgrades per electric vehicle (EV) through 2030"33. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 9]
33 https://www.bcg.com/publications/2019/costs-rewing-up-the-grid-for-electric-vehicles
The midpoint of that cost range ($3,750 per EV) yields an incremental electric grid upgrade
cost of $286 billion for the eventual 76 million additional EVs. These costs would be in addition
to the $120 billion the EPA estimates solely for EVSE ports. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551,
p. 9]
Another study by the Brattle Group, estimates $60 billion in electric grid upgrades
(generation, storage, transmission, and distribution) for every $40 billion in EVSE port costs34.
Therefore, since the EPA is estimating three times (3X) the EVSE port costs that Brattle is
showing, this would result in an electric grid upgrade cost of $180 billion to accommodate the
EV charging. This would be in addition to the $120 billion in costs the EPA estimates solely for
EVSE ports. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, p. 9]
34 https://www.brattle.com/insights-events/publications/electric-power-sector-investments-of-75-125-
billion-needed-to-support-projected-20-million-evs-by-2030-according-to-brattle-economists/
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Assuming the costs are evenly spread out over the next 8 years, using an average of the
Boston Consulting Group's and Brattle's data for grid upgrades ($233 billion avg, $210 billion
PV3), the resulting combined PV3 costs for EVSE ports and electric grid upgrades is $330
billion, a 175% increase from the EPA figure of $120 billion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551,
P- 9]
According to a recent report by electric grid experts (NERC, CMC, WECC), the mass
charging of EVs as penetration levels increase "may have catastrophic consequences for grid
reliability" and may cause "cascading blackouts and widespread power interruptions" including
causing transmission lines to suddenly go dead, or knocking out a power plant35. This report
warns that widespread EV charging may trigger a fault-induced delayed voltage recovery
(FIDVR) that utility companies have had to deal with since 2010 due to air conditioning units
coming online simultaneously. FIDVRs can ripple from its local neighborhood distribution
system through the transmission lines into other distribution systems. A result can be "cascading
voltage collapse" and "widespread blackouts"36. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 9-10]
35 https://www.nerc.com/comm/RSTC/Documents/Grid_Friendly_EV_Charging_Recommendations.pdf
36 https://www.eenews.net/articles/needed-car-experts-to-fend-off-grid-disaster/
Not only will EV charging dramatically increase the US's overall electricity consumption, but
the immediate issue is that many EVs will all be charging at the exact same time. As an analogy,
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 9-10]
"Imagine a college dorm, where every student switches their 1,800-watt blow dryers on at
exactly 8:00 in the morning. Breakers are going to blow. Lights are going to go out. That's
similar to the potential nightmare for local electricity providers. If just one or two people on a
street have EVs, the load on the local transformers and wires can be met without issues.
However, if everyone on the street has an EV, there might be a problem. That's especially true in
older neighborhoods, where existing demand may already be straining the infrastructure."37
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0551, pp. 9-10]
37 https://cars.usnews.com/cars-trucks/features/can-the-nations-electrical-grid-support-electric-cars
Organization: Plains All American Pipeline, L.P.
By 2032—less than 10 years from now—the EPA's Proposal would require nearly 70% of
light-duty cars and trucks sold in the U.S. to be electric or "zero tailpipe emission." We have a
number of concerns with this approach, a few include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-
2]
By focusing on tailpipe emissions alone, most internal combustion engine vehicles
that run on gasoline, diesel and biofuels would be unable to meet the standards set forth in the
Proposal. This overlooks critical efforts of the energy and automotive industries to pursue
continued innovation and optimization of fuel/vehicle systems to improve efficiency and reduce
emissions. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
Effectively outlawing most liquid fuel-powered vehicles would undercut U.S. energy
security,2 harm our domestic energy industry and leave the U.S. more dependent on foreign-
controlled supply chains.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
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Transferring a significant amount of energy demand to electricity will strain already
challenged electrical generation and transmission infrastructure. Without substantial additional
investment and significant streamlining of electric transmission permitting, it's unclear whether
the electrical grid could support charging new EVs at the level necessary to support the proposed
emissions reductions.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
Traditional energy sources are essential for ensuring effective evolution of the energy
landscape-including the manufacture and growth of renewable energy sources and EVs.
However, the Proposal would reduce energy investments and increase costs to consumers for all
forms of energy. Furthermore, this policy risks the continued viability of critical domestic energy
manufacturing infrastructure, which, if idled, would be very challenging to restore. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
Eliminating most new gasoline and diesel vehicles from the market limits consumer
choice. Significantly fewer new affordable vehicles are available for sale today5 than a few years
ago. Used cars are also increasing in price6 as some automakers warn that they will be forced to
cut back on supplying popular gasoline models because of government regulations restricting
sales of traditional vehicles.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
1 https://www.afpm.org/newsroom/news/afpm-epa-vehicle-proposal-will-effectively-ban-gasoline-and-
diesel-vehicles
2 https://www.visualcapitalist.com/chinas-dominance-in-battery-manufacturing/
3 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/05/16/business/china-ev-battery.html
4 https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-renewables-electric-grid/
5 https://www.marketwatch.com/story/are-we-witnessing-the-demise-of-the-affordable-car-automakers-
have-all-but-abandoned-the-budget-market-a68862f0
6 https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/buying-a-car/when-to-buy-a-used-car-a6584238157/
7 https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/stellantis-may-limit-some-gas-powered-vehicles-
states-adopting-california-2023-05-24/
Organization: POET, LLC
EPA's assumptions for electricity costs are also questionable. EPA uses residential electricity
prices from EIA's AEO 2021 without explaining why it has not relied on EIA's price forecasts
for electricity "used in the transportation sector" instead.95 Those costs are generally 2% to 4%
higher than the residential rates.96 The residential rates also do not reflect the grid mix assumed
by EPA.97 For instance, EPA assumes that renewables will account for approximately 80
percent of U.S. electricity generated by 2050.98 Yet EIA's AEO 2021, which EPA has relied on
for energy prices, predicts that renewable energy generation will make up only about 42% of
electricity generation in 2050.99 The difference in those projections calls into question EPA's
choice to rely on the AEO 2021 electricity prices. EPA does not explain whether its own
projected grid mix will affect electricity prices, when it almost certainly would differ from the
AEO 2021 prices based on a very different energy mix. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp.
23-24]
95 Id.
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96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 8.
EPA also relies on questionable assumptions regarding the mix of renewable and non-
renewable energy sources serving the electric grid. Trinity compared EPA's assumptions to
EIA's AEO 2023, and found that EPA is assuming over 20 percent more renewable sources
serving the grid by 2050 compared to EIA's "high uptake" most optimistic estimate, including
incorporates impacts from IRA incentives for renewables.108 According to Trinity, "[e]ven
accounting for the increase in demand for electricity over the period, U.S. EPA claims that GHG
emissions from electricity generation will be reduced by about 80% from 2020 through 2030
compared to EIA's forecast of about 50%." 109 EPA fails to explain why its estimates of
renewables in the grid mix differ so greatly from EIA's. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 25]
108 Id.
109 Id. at 10-11.
OnLocation also finds that if BEV upstream emissions are considered, "real-world" emissions
to the atmosphere from covered vehicles would be at levels significantly higher than the
proposed compliance standards. More specifically, if upstream fuel production emissions are
accounted for regarding BEVs, the Proposed Rule's 86 gram per mile target in 2032 cannot be
met when using electric grid GHG emission intensities from EIA, the leading U.S. governmental
source for independent energy statistics and analysis. 116 Note that OnLocation's analysis does
not seek to account for battery manufacturing lifecycle emissions, which is addressed in Trinity's
report, as described above. As Trinity has shown, "actual BEV lifecycle emissions would be
even higher if battery manufacturing impacts are considered." 117 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp. 26-27]
116 Id. at 1, 10.
117 Id. at 10.
OnLocation further finds that "using only tailpipe emissions provides inconsistent incentives
between BEV and ICE vehicles, while optimistic projections for the grid carbon intensity and
BEV penetration could reduce the effectiveness of the Proposed Rule in reducing carbon." 118
Regarding electric grid intensity, OnLocation finds that EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis
(DRIA) using its model shows a 70% reduction of power sector-related C02 emissions from
current levels by 2055, while EIA's reference case "shows closer to a 50% reduction from
current levels and substantially less C02 reduction if renewable costs do not decline as quickly
as in the Reference scenario." 119 While ICE vehicles have incentives under the proposal to
reduce their tailpipe GHG emissions, BEVs and the electric grid lack GHG reduction incentives
since the Proposed Rule effectively assumes that all electricity used by BEVs is zero carbon. 120
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 26-27]
118 Id. at 14.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 16.
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U.S. EPA's assumed costs for electricity are another source of concern. As indicated in DRIA
Chapter 2.6.6., U.S. EPA used residential electricity prices from EIA's AEO 2021. It should first
be noted that AEO also includes price forecasts for electricity used in the transportation sector,
which are generally 2 to 4% higher than those for residential electricity. U.S. EPA provides no
explanation for the agency's selection of residential electricity prices instead of transportation
sector electricity prices. Another issue with the U.S. EPA's selection of AEO residential
electricity rates is that they do not reflect the grid mix assumed by U.S. EPA (see Figure 5-8 in
Chapter 5 of the DRIA). As shown in Figure 5-8, by 2050 U.S. EPA assumes that renewables
(hydro and non-hydro renewables) will account for approximately 80% of U.S. electricity
generation by 2050. In contrast, in EIA's AEO 2021, which U.S. EPA relies upon for electricity
prices, only about 42% of power generation was forecast to be renewable in 2050. Given that
U.S. EPA assumes about twice as much renewable power generation in 2050 than EIA, it is not
appropriate for U.S. EPA to use the EIA AEO 2021 prices for electricity without establishing
that the price of that electricity as delivered to vehicles will not be higher than the EIA forecasts.
Further, this "as delivered" price needs to account for much more than just generation costs
(which may be lower than for fossil generating sources) including transmission lines and energy
storage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 59-60]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
Other areas important to consumer adoption can benefit from additional policy development.
Further work is needed to reduce barriers to electrification such as streamlining building codes to
futureproof new construction to ease the installation of charging at homes, apartments, and
workplaces. The magnitude of the challenge related to a robust charging infrastructure is
becoming increasingly clear with updated reports such as the Department of Energy's 2030
assessment. 1 This single report indicates a total investment of $53-127 billion dollars for private
and public charging which does not even include costs associated with grid upgrades to support
the 26 million plus ports that are estimated to be needed. Consumers won't be satisfied with
roadblocks that make owning an electric car more complicated than a gasoline model. Actions
are also needed to help lower the cost of electricity as a fuel to ensure that EVs are competitive
and attractive against gasoline models. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 3]
1 The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric Vehicle
Charging Infrastructure, US Department of Energy, 2023
Organization: Rivian Automotive, LLC
Rivian is encouraged by the efforts currently underway across state and federal agencies,
private companies, national labs, and non-profits to address the key challenges and opportunities
with scaling charging infrastructure. One of those challenges is the impact of widespread
electrification on the electric grid infrastructure. We applaud EPA for acknowledging this
challenge as it is a top concern for many industry stakeholders, but also an area where significant
attention is being paid. For example, EPRI has launched its EVs2Scale 2030 initiative, which is
focused on increasing collaboration between industry and utilities to increase communication
around commercial fleet electrification plans and utility capacity mapping.50 Several
deliverables are planned by the group, including key tools focused on helping utilities across the
country receive the necessary buy-in from their decision makers to plan for the grid upgrades
necessitated by transportation electrification. In addition, as noted in the DRIA, NREL recently
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published a quantitative needs assessment by state and city for a national charging network
focused on personally owned, light-duty vehicles. 51 The granularity of the analysis available on
the state and city level52 will allow it to serve a similar function as the EPRI effort—increasing
utilities' awareness of the forthcoming load on their systems, thus providing more time to make
necessary grid upgrades. Overall, increasing transparency and information flow with the broad
range of utilities operating in the US will be critical to achieving the electrification goals this
rulemaking aims to help meet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 15-17]
50 Robert Walton, Utility Dive, "EPRI Launches 3-Year Initiative to Address Grid Constraints, Develop
Toops to Serve Coming EV Loads," April 19, 2023, available atwww.utilitydive.com/news/epri-initiative-
electric-vehicle-loads-power-grid-constraints-interconnection/648024/.
51 Wood, E., B. Borlaug, M. Moniot, D.-Y. Lee, Y. Ge, F. Yang, and Z. Liu, National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty Demand for Electric
Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (2023), NREL/TP-5400-85654.
52 See data files for Wood, E., B. Borlaug, M. Moniot, D.-Y. Lee, Y. Ge, F. Yang, and Z. Liu, National
Renewable Energy Laboratory, The 2030 National Charging Network: Estimating U.S. Light-Duty
Demand for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (2023), NREL/TP-5400-85654, available at
https ://data. nrel. gov/submissions/214.
In addition to increasing collaboration with utilities, leveraging load management
technologies to reduce the need for additional build out of grid capacity will be imperative. As
the DRIA notes, there are many commercially available technologies able to manage charging
load, from smart charging to mobile and stationary storage, to vehicle grid integration. In recent
years, these technologies have demonstrated their ability to subtract years from their project
energization timeframes or even enable the completion of a project that would have otherwise
been unable to proceed if a full-nameplate upgrade was required. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0653, pp.15-17]
While we acknowledge new distribution infrastructure will be necessary, we agree with EPA
that commercially available load management technology can leverage the inherent flexibility of
EV charging use cases and insert much-needed efficiency into EV-related distribution grid
planning and buildout processes. Per EPA's analysis in Figure 5-15 in the DRIA, the majority of
charging will be needed at home and at work, which is where load management technologies are
particularly impactful due to long dwell times with maximum charging flexibility. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0653, pp. 15-17]
Overall, increased transparency around the location and scale of future charging load will
enable utilities and their decision makers to make necessary investments in the electric grid
infrastructure as well as increase their adoption of load management technologies. Therefore, we
view the near-term finalization of Alternative 1 as a critical step to build on the existing
momentum described above and continue it into 2027 and beyond. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0653, pp.15-17]
Organization: Scott Wilson
You will have read also that EVs are unaffordable. Actually, there are 18 new EV models
below the average new car price in the US. (see attached) You will have read there is no
charging infrastructure. Not true, since any home with electricity near a parking place can
support an EV. However, more long-distance highway charging is needed and is the motivation
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for the administration's NEVI charger program. You will have read that the grid can't support an
EV fleet. Major electric utility trade groups point out that off-peak charging will become
widespread. It's notable also that 124 business entrepreneurs, executives, and academics have
submitted favorable comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0515, p. 1]
In addition to concerns about the legality of these proposals, the EPA is forcing this transition
to electric vehicles at a time when the capacity and reliability of our nation's electric grid to meet
current demand is of increasing concern. A recent American Transportation Research Institute
study found that full-scale electrification of the transportation fleet would require the addition
of generation and transmission capacity equal to more than 40 percent of our current electricity
demand. Grid operators are already raising concerns over other EPA proposals targeting the
electricity generation sector that will significantly impact existing capacity and reliability.3 PJM
recently released a report highlighting how baseload power retirements are policy driven and
"retirements are at risk of outpacing the construction of new resources. "4 Concerns like these
from electric industry stakeholders draw attention to proposed EPA regulatory mandates on that
sector that will decrease the capacity of our nation's grid to meet that existing demand, including
the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, regulations on Coal Combustion Residuals, a new
proposal on Effluent Limitation Guidelines, and the recently announced Clean Power Plan 2.0
Rule. Given this upcoming regulatory onslaught on the electric fleet and the chronic delays and
uncertainty associated with federal and state permitting of new generation and transmission
assets, it is unclear that current levels of electric service can be maintained -much less expanded
to replace the latent energy of liquid fuels with electricity to power BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-5083, pp.1-2]
3 See generally comments on EPA's proposed "Federal Implementation Plan Addressing Regional Ozone
Transport for the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard."
4 See Energy Transition in PJM: Resource Retirements, Replacements & Risks (Feb. 24, 2023).
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
Where does EPA purport to find this authority in the Clean Air Act?
The logic is as follows:
Because most automakers have announced ambitious timetables for transitioning to the
production of EVs going forward and have pledged to make large capital investments to finance
this gradual switchover, 13 and because Congress has recently approved generous federal
subsidies for some EV purchases and charging infrastructure, 14 EPA says it can now declare that
battery-electric vehicle technology is a "feasible" alternative to the tradi-tional internal-
combustion engine (ICE) powertrain. 15 And on that basis, EPA is proposing to treat EVs as an
available "control technology" for achieving compliance with the tailpipe emissions restrictions
under Clean Air Act section 202.16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 6-8]
13 See 88 FR at 29191, Figure 1 (reproducing a chart prepared by the Environmental Defense Fund
depicting the automakers' announced goals for future electrified vehicle sales as a percentage of total
sales); id. at 29193-94 (summarizing automakers' announced plans for investments in EV technology).
14 See id. at 29195-96; Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law 117-58, 135 Stat. 429 (2021),
https://www.congress.gov/! 17/plaws/publ58/PLAW 117publ58.pdf; Inflation Reduction Act of 2022,
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Public Law 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818 (2022),
https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr5376/BILLS117hr5376enr.pdf.
15 See 88 FR at 29194 (light-duty and medium-duty vehicles); 88 FR at 25972 (heavy-duty trucks).
16 See 88 FR at 29284 (for light-duty and medium-duty vehicles); 88 FR at 26015 (for heavy-duty trucks).
This reasoning obviously depends on a kind of feedback loop. The automakers are pledging to
invest in the transition to EVs because governments around the world—like China, the EU, the
Biden White House, and Governor Gavin Newsom and his climate regulators in California—are
demanding that they do so. But everyone knows there is a large looming impediment to this
Green Dream: resistance from American consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 6-8]
The American public is not jumping on the electric bandwagon. EVs are expensive— beyond
the reach of many American families—and most Americans remain skeptical that EVs will
reliably serve the full range of their needs, that quick and convenient charging stations will be
widely available, that EVs will maintain their promised driving range over time or in cold
weather, that they will have any significant resale or trade-in value down the road, and that
insurance carriers will cover the huge costs of battery replacement when the battery wears out or
is damaged in a minor accident. 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 6-8]
17 See Nick Carey, Paul Lienert, and Sarah McFarlane, "Scratched EV battery? Your insurer may have to
junk the whole car," Reuters, March 20, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-
transportation/scratched-ev-battery-your-insurer-may-have-junk-whole-car-2023-03-20/ ("For many elec-
tric vehicles, there is no way to repair or assess even slightly damaged battery packs after accidents, forcing
insurance companies to write off cars with few miles—leading to higher premiums and under-cutting gains
from going electric.").
To push the automakers to convert to EV production in the absence of sufficient mar-ket
demand, EPA plans to ratchet down the emissions limits for carbon dioxide and for the
traditional criteria and other pollutants associated with smog (such as unburned hydrocar-bons,
particulate matter, oxides of nitrogen, and ozone) to super-stringent levels that are
technologically impossible for gas-powered vehicles (even hybrids) to satisfy. 18 At the same
time, EPA is proposing to phase out certain regulatory buffers that allow automakers to report
better emissions compliance results, such as "off-cycle credits" for the addition of onboard
technologies that improve the fuel efficiency of ICE vehicles. 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 6-8]
18 See, e.g., 88 FR at 29237-38; id. at 29257-61.
19 See id. at 29249-50.
The automakers' only recourse will be to replace more and more of the ICE vehicles in their
fleets (including hybrids) with the "alternative control technology" of battery-elec-tric vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 6-8]
And here is the trick: For enforcement purposes, EPA applies the emissions limits to each
automaker on a fleetwide average basis, and it proposes to reduce these fleetwide averages
dramatically each model year from 2027 through 2032 on a ramp rate calculated to achieve the
Biden administration's desired percentage mix of EVs in the U.S. auto fleets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 6-8]
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In other words, EPA is now proposing to set fleetwide average tailpipe pollution limits that
are intended by design to apply increasingly over time to vehicles that have no tailpipes and that
EPA says emit none of the pollutants covered by the regulations.20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 6-8]
20 Automakers can avoid violating the average emissions limits in certain circumstances with regulatory
"credits," earned by producing vehicles, like EVs, that outperform the limits. Under the EPA's rules,
credits can be "banked" from one model year to another within limits, "transferred" from one fleet to
another (for example, from the automaker's light truck fleet to its passenger car fleet), or "traded" between
automakers, which usually involves a privately negotiated purchase. Tesla, which manufactures nothing but
EVs and accounts for approximately 70 percent of the U.S. EV market, receives a large portion of its
income from selling emissions credits to the other automakers. Predictably, the EPA is proposing to retain
this credit system to continue the subsidization of EV manufacturing. See 88 FR at 26245-46.
What is clear is that EPA sees an endless horizon for its new-found power to regulate
practically all aspects of the American automotive market. No doubt, for example, the Agency
intends to be involved in overseeing the buildout and operation of electric vehicle charging
infrastructure around the country—once again, as an incident of the regulators' own expansive
conception of their section 202 authority to ensure the adequacy of EPA's chosen control
technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 10-11]
We can easily imagine that someday this self-assumed mandate will include the power to
ration the timing and extent of drivers' access to charging networks, as EPA deems necessary to
maintain the general supply of electricity for EVs. California is already doing this. Because the
buildout of charging infrastructure will depend critically on gov-ernment subsidies and
approvals, government rationing of access to this infrastructure is a very real prospect, especially
given the strains on grid reliability that I discuss below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp.
10-11]
The bottom line under the Major Questions Doctrine is that section 202, on which the
proposed rules rest, contains no clear and express delegation of any authority that could sustain
these massively consequential proposals. As the Court observed in West Virginia v. EPA,
"Congress certainly has not conferred [such] authority upon EPA anywhere ... in the Clean Air
Act." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 10-11]
The Analyses and Assumptions on Which the Proposed Regulatory Actions Are Based Are
Arbitrary, Fundamentally Flawed, and Fail to Recognize and Account Properly for the Hugely
Negative Consequences that Would Result from These Actions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 10-11]
EPA claims that, despite the coercive power and industry-transforming ambition behind its
proposals, these rules will somehow deliver a stupendous bounty of net benefits, ranging at the
high end from $1.5 trillion to $2.3 trillion for the light-and medium-duty vehicle rule,23 plus
another $180 billion to $320 billion for the heavy-duty truck rule.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 10-11]
23 Id. at 29200.
24 88 FR at 25937.
Finally, the $l,200-per-vehicle cost figure touted by EPA is simply borrowed and carried over
from the EPA's 2021 rulemaking without additional substantive analysis.32 It is not reasonable
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to assume that the per-vehicle cost of the current proposal for model years 2027 through 2032
would be anywhere close to the same as the estimated cost figure for the 2021 rule covering
model years 2023 through 2026 (even if the figure was accurate for the 2021 rule). The current
proposal is far more expansive and involves much more draconian reductions in emissions limits.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 13-14]
32 See 86 FR 74434, 74497, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/12/30/2021-27854/revised-
2023-and-later-model-year-light-duty-vehicle-greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards.
The true per-vehicle technology costs of the proposed rules must be far higher than the figure
thrown out by EPA. Even accepting the thoroughly implausible "no action" base-line that EPA
has posited for future EV sales, EPA is projecting that the regulatory force of the current
proposal, considered in isolation, will by itself cause the overall percentage of EV sales
nationally to go from 39 percent to 67 percent—a huge increase, nearly a doubling in EV
production and sales. Notably, based on EPA's own assumptions, this regulation-forced increase
would have to come after all the early adopters have already purchased their EVs. Such an
industry-wide transformation in production volumes and sales of EVs to non-early-adopters
would involve a massive capital investment and marketing surge, and all the costs associated
with that transformation would be attributable to the EPA's administrative rule, if the rule were
indeed expected to be the forcing action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 13-14]
In addition, the comparative lifecycle costs of owning and operating an EV versus an ICE
vehicle are not nearly so different as EPA's NPRMs assert. EPA claims huge cost savings for EV
owners over ICE owners from the avoided costs of fuel and maintenance and repairs over the life
of the vehicle,33 but EPA's analysis fails to include the full costs of owning an EV: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 13-14]
33 See 88 FR at 29200.
EPA also undercounts the cost of electricity charging over the life of the EV. EPA relies on a
pricing model that claims to show that electricity prices will somehow not rise significantly in a
world where EVs comprise more than half of new cars sold in the U.S., but that claim is wholly
unrealistic. Even absent high EV penetration, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that
electricity prices are steadily rising in the U.S.38 Increased EV charging demand will only cause
those prices to rise even faster. Driving a single EV 15,000 miles per year and charging it at
home could raise the annual electricity bill for the average family by 50 percent or more.39 If the
nation converts to EV ownership at the rates EPA is aiming for, such a large increase in overall
electricity demand will inevitably cause electricity rates to rise significantly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 14-15]
38 See generally https://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet (allowing user to generate graph showing
the rise from 2003 to the present in the average price of electricity in the U.S.).
39 The Energy Information Agency reports that the average American household uses about 886 kilowatt
hours of electricity per month, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php, and the EPA says the average EV
consumes 36 kilowatt hours of electricity per every 100 miles driven,
https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/comparison-your-car-vs-electric-vehicle. If the family's EV is driven
15,000 miles per year, or 1,250 miles per month, it would consume 450 kilowatt hours of electricity every
month.
The EPA's glib premise that car buyers in the U.S. will respond with strong demand for the
supposed flood of future EVs (notwithstanding the practical concerns, cost consid-erations, and
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other uncertainties that surround EVs in the minds of American consumers), is typical of the
consistently rosy—almost relentlessly rosy—assumptions about cost factors and consequential
risks that underlie all parts of EPA's supporting analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp.
14-15]
EPA fails to consider the negative societal consequences and second-order cost effects of its
proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
In putting forward regulatory proposals designed to force upon the American people a vast
and rapid industrial transformation, EPA has an obligation to go further than just considering the
direct cost effects of its proposals (which are themselves woefully under-estimated, as
highlighted above); it must also consider the broader indirect economic con-sequences and
negative societal costs that would follow if these rules are finalized as pro-posed. So far in these
rulemakings, the Agency has either ignored or deliberately down-played these second-order
effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
Some of the most consequential burdens and negative ramifications of the proposed rules that
EPA hides, disregards, or minimizes include the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647,
pp.15-16]
Stifling consumer choice at the dealership. Many of the vehicle models most pop-ular
with American families will no longer be sustainable under the EPA's proposed rules.
Automobiles have long been America's favorite freedom machines. When the models of ICE
vehicles Americans love the most disappear from dealerships, that will represent an enormous
drop in consumer welfare (in basic happiness and well-being) for the average American family
and for the U.S. economy as a whole. For many of these ICE vehicle models, there is no EV
option likely to be available that could provide the same performance, utility, or recreational
value at a comparable price (or at all). EPA makes no real effort to quantify this generational loss
of con-sumer welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
Increasing the purchase price of all new vehicles. Notwithstanding EPA's gaming of
the numbers, the true costs of the industrial transformation forced by the EPA's proposed rules
will be spread across the automakers' fleets, resulting in a significant increase in the prices of all
new vehicles, with greater price increases concentrated on those vehicles for which the demand
is highest relative to supply. All Americans will be harmed by these price increases, but the
biggest losers will be lower-income Americans who cannot afford to buy an EV or to pay more
for a gas-powered vehicle at the dealership, as well as those who live in rural areas and need to
drive longer distances and for whom EVs are impractical. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp.
15-16]
Destroying jobs in the U.S. auto industry. The loss of popular new vehicle options and
the significant price increases at the dealership will mean that fewer new vehicles will be
purchased—almost certainly far fewer than EPA is predicting. This drop-off in demand will
challenge the profitability of the auto industry and lead to a loss of jobs for tens of thousands of
America's autoworkers, as well as a loss of jobs in the many U.S. companies that supply inputs
for the production of auto-mobiles and heavy trucks.40 The United Auto Workers union has
warned of the potential for job losses from the transition to EVs,41 as automakers announce
more plant closures and layoffs due to the costs of electrification.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 15-16]
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40 See Technality, "Ford Just Proved How Far Ahead Tesla Really Is: Profitability May Continue to Be a
Struggle for All Legacy Automakers," May 10, 2023, https://medium.com/tech-topics/ford-just-proved-
how-far-ahead-tesla-really-is-6a4d95cff519 ("Despite wanting to be a fully-electric brand by 2035, as of
Q4 2022, Ford's average net margin on the Mustang Mach-E was -40.4%. Unfortunately, that's a figure
that's only gotten worse since, to the point where Ford is now losing an average of $58,000 for every EV
sold.").
41 See Press statement, United Auto Workers, "UAW Statement on Job Cuts at Stellantis," April 26, 2023,
https://uaw.org/uaw-statement-job-cuts-stellantis.
42 See Michael Wayland, "Stellantis to indefinitely idle Jeep plant, lay off workers to cut costs for EVs,"
CNBC.com, December 9, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/09/stellantis-to-idle-jeep-plant-lay-off-
workers-to-cut-costs-for-evs.html.
Causing more deaths and serious injuries on America's highways. As new vehicle
models become unaffordable or unappealing, many American families will be left driving older
and older used cars, and the age of the nation's auto fleet will rise dramatically. Already, the
average age of a car on the road in the United States is approaching 13 years, and many cars are
on their fifth or sixth owners. The aging of the American fleet has very negative safety
consequences, as NHTSA statistics show that older vehicles are much less safe than newer
models in an accident.43 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
43 See https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/newer-cars-safer-cars_fact-sheet_010320-
tag.pdf.
Straining America's power grid and raising the price of electricity. EPA pre-tends that its
rules will not put a colossal additional strain on our already vulnerable national power grid. But
that is fantasy, if the forecasted EV sales actually were to materialize. To accommodate EPA's
future fleet of EVs, our national electric grid capacity would need to grow 60 percent or so by
2030 and much more over the long term,52 and that is growth in infrastructure alone, not in
power generation. This buildout is simply not practicable in the timeframe EPA is
contemplating. 53 Even if it could happen, it will have to be paid for, and those costs will
inevitably be reflected in higher electricity rates for all users of electricity across the U.S. and
higher EV charging fees in particular. EPA says not to worry about grid reliability— utilities and
the government will be able to manage the EV charging draw on the grid by rationing the hours
for charging.54 American drivers will not tolerate that. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 18-
19]
52 See https://www.energy.gov/policy/queued-need-transmission.
53 See Robert Bryce, "47,300 Gigawatt-Miles from Nowhere," May 26, 2023,
https://robertbryce.substack.eom/p/47300-gigawatt-miles-from-nowhere.
54 See 88 FR at 29312.
At the same time that EPA is proposing to force the electrification of the American auto fleet,
it has just proposed separate rules under the Clean Air Act aimed at forcing power generators to
phase out 90 percent of America's fossil-fuel-powered electric generating capacity.55
Conveniently for the Agency's cost accounting estimates, EPA's newly proposed power plan
ignores the extra electricity draw that would be required by EPA's proposed vehicle rules, and
the vehicle rules, in turn, fail to account for the electricity supply crunch that would be caused by
EPA's own power plan—a perfect concert of coordinated regulatory analysis, orchestrated to
make the costs on Americans appear lower. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 18-19]
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55 See https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-proposes-new-carbon-pollution-standards-fossil-fuel-fired-
power-plants-tackle.
Putting the Highway Trust Fund at risk. The Highway Trust Fund, which covers a large
percentage of the costs of state and local highway improvements and main-tenance in the U.S., is
currently funded through a gas tax. The gas tax is relatively easy to administer because it is paid
at the level of wholesale gasoline and diesel fuel distribution by a small number of large
distributors. If more than half of new vehicles sold in the U.S. were EVs, as contemplated in the
EPA's proposals, the gas-tax revenues for the Fund would drop dramatically, and the solvency
and utility of the Fund would collapse. That would threaten the viability of the national high-way
system and the capacity of states to maintain highways in good repair. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0647, p. 19]
If the Fund were to be retained in some form, it would require a new source of revenue, such
as a tax on all vehicle miles traveled, or VMT. The idea behind a VMT tax is that it would
equitably capture the VMT of EVs, just as well as ICE vehicles. However, a VMT tax is likely to
be more complicated and costly to ad-minister than the gas tax. There are significant questions
about the design and ad-ministrability of a VMT tax that would need to be worked out and
proven—for example, through one or more state-wide pilot programs—before implementation.
Since EPA is proposing to adopt rules that would cause a national shift to EVs, which in turn
would undermine the revenue basis for the Highway Trust Fund, EPA should recognize and
consider as part of these rulemakings the upfront costs and dislocations that would be involved in
transitioning to a new revenue basis for the Highway Trust Fund, as well as the ongoing higher
costs of administering such an alternative tax. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 19]
EPA's benefits analysis is flawed and arbitrary.
On the benefits side of the ledger, EPA claims sky-high monetized benefits from the asserted
reductions in carbon dioxide emissions—to the tune of upwards of a trillion dollars.64 These
estimates are based on predicted reductions in the amount of gasoline and diesel fuel that would
be burned if the U.S. auto fleet converts to EVs at the rates projected by EPA. But they
completely ignore the very large increase in carbon dioxide emissions that would necessarily
occur from the projected expansion in the production of EV batteries. They also ignore the
upstream emissions of carbon dioxide from the increased electricity generation that would be
needed to charge the projected fleet of EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 22-23]
64 See id. at 29200, 29344.
EPA's refusal to account for these huge offsetting emissions of carbon dioxide fundamentally
distorts its analysis of net benefits in a manner that arbitrarily favors the Agency's preferred
regulatory outcome. It is, in fact, false and misleading to label EVs "zero-emission vehicles"
when the production of EV batteries and the charging of the batteries over the life of the vehicles
both generate enormous amounts of carbon dioxide. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 22-
23]
EPA's projections of benefits from carbon dioxide reductions are primarily based on the so-
called "social cost of carbon" models. However, as summarized in analyses pub-lished by my
colleague from The Heritage Foundation, Kevin Dayaratna, these models are deeply flawed and
unreliable. Among other things, they depend on outdated assumptions and fail to account for the
positive agricultural effects of higher carbon dioxide levels. Using more appropriate
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assumptions, these models would show a social cost of carbon dioxide emissions that effectively
approaches zero.65 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 22-23]
65 See Kevin D. Dayaratna, "Climate Change, Part IV: Moving Toward a Sustainable Future," Testimony
before Subcommittee on Environment Committee on Oversight and Reform, U.S. House of
Representatives, September 24, 2020; Kevin Dayaratna and David Kreutzer, Loaded DICE: An EPA Model
Not Ready for the Big Game, Backgrounder No. 2860, The Heritage Foundation, November 21, 2013,
https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/loaded-dice-epa-model-not-ready-the-big-game;
Kevin Dayaratna and David Kreutzer, "Unfounded FUND: Yet Another EPA Model Not Ready for the Big
Game," Backgrounder No. 2897, April 29, 2014,
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/BG2897.pdf; Kevin Dayaratna, Ross McKitrick, and David
Kreutzer, "Empirically Constrained Climate Sensitivity and the Social Cost of Carbon," Climate Change
Economics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2017), pp. 1750006-1-1750006-12,
https://www.worldscientific.eom/doi/abs/10.1142/S2010007817500063; and Kevin Dayaratna, Ross
McKitrick, and Patrick Michaels, "Climate sensitivity, agricultural productivity and the social cost of
carbon in FUND," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 22: 433-448 (2020),
https://link.springer.eom/article/10.1007/sl0018-020-00263-w.
Conclusion
If and when the American people feel the true effects of these rules—when they lose the
vehicle options they love at the local dealership and find themselves stuck driving older and less
safe cars, when the bottom falls out of the job market in the U.S. auto industry, when drivers
cannot find convenient charging stations for their electric vehicles—in sum, when American
voters realize what the EPA's far-reaching regulatory enterprise has wrought for the nation, they
will be angry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 24]
At issue are matters of life, liberty, and prosperity, and the considerations involved are
fundamentally political in nature. That is exactly why, under our constitutional republic, it is for
Congress, and Congress alone, to make the monumental decisions that EPA is purporting to take
upon itself in these proposed rules. For these reasons, EPA should with-draw its proposed
tailpipe rules and reconsider the wisdom of these proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p.
24]
Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
EPA should consider adding a small bonus for vehicles that have on-board AC bidirectional
chargers or are integrated with multiple DC off-board chargers. Alternatively, at minimum, EPA
should conduct an analysis on how EPA can advance bi-directional charging in the future.
Justification: The promise of bi-directional charging (AC or DC) to address air pollution, GHG
and electric grid issues is very significant with BEVs and PHEVS in light-, medium-and heavy-
duty vehicles, or off-road equipment. For example, a recent May 2022 presentation by the World
Resources Institute using Bloomberg NEF and Energy Information Administration data found
the power capacity in 2030 for EVs to be 10 to 20 times more than the 2030 power capacity of
stationary storage.8 EPA can and should play a role in helping to unlock this potential. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 9]
8 See slide 5 at https://www.slideshare.net/emmaline742/building-resiliency-with-v2g-in-residential-
homes-by-camron-gorguinpour
a. For example, the internal combustion engine in a PHEV has a much lower emission
signature than a stand-alone, backup generator. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 9]
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b. Bidirectional charging, like battery stationary energy storage, can reduce
GHG and traditional pollutants from fossil fueled power plants by shifting electricity use to
renewable energy in the cleanest hours of the day and reducing the need for high-emitting plants
(such as traditional peaker power plants). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 9]
c. Bidirectional charging can also provide many types of grid services including
ancillary services, providing resource adequacy, and helping with the evening transition from
renewables to other generation resources. Because the batteries are already paid for by the car
and truck owners, utilities can gain a low-cost resource compared to battery stationary storage.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 9]
d. The potential value is significant and can contribute to lower operating costs for
BEVs and PHEVs.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 9]
9 California Energy Commission, March 2019, Distribution System Constrained Vehicle-to-Grid Services
for Improved Grid Stability and Reliability, Figure 42
While we understand the desire by EPA to simplify the regulation and reduce the use of bonus
multiplier credits, we believe a small bonus credit in the final regulation for a few years is
justified and needed to unlock this technology because of the large emission reduction benefits
and other benefits enabled by bidirectional charging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, p. 9]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Utility Rate Design Reform Will Spur Greater Infrastructure Investment
Additionally, utility investment in grid infrastructure to support EV charging will accrue over
the next several years, as evidenced by active proceedings in many jurisdictions.208 As part of
this investment, addressing utility demand charges will also play a role in facilitating the
expansion of charging infrastructure.209 The combination of low load factors with high demand
charges can result in uneconomic operation of charging stations and stymies investment in
charging infrastructure in otherwise promising markets where electrification is growing. EPA
should recognize that this issue is changing with many utilities now proposing or already having
implemented novel approaches to mitigate the impact of demand charges and encouraging time
of use rates to facilitate further proactive investments in charging infrastructure.210 Moreover,
since BEV charging stations are large upfront investments assessed over a long-time horizon, the
longer-term certainty provided in many of these rate reform proceedings will drive greater
infrastructure investment. A number of utility proceedings have already addressed these issues
including the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 32-33]
208 See e.g., New York State Department of Public Service, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission
Regarding Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment and Infrastructure, Case No. 18-E-0138 available at h
ttps://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster.aspx?MatterCaseNo=18-E-0
13 8&CaseSearch= Search
209 See, Alliance for Transportation Electrification, Rate Design for DC Fast Charging: Demand Charges
(May 2022) available at https://evtransportationalliance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/06/Rate .Design. TF_.Demand-Charge-Paper-F inal-2 .pdf
210 Utility Dive, With looming EV load spikes, PG&E, Duke, other utilities adopt new rate design and cost
recovery strategies (Apr. 18, 2023) available at https://www.utilitydive.com/news/electric-vehicle-load-
spikes-pge-duke-sce-entergy-aps-d ynamic-rate-design-reduced-demand-c
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harges/646603/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Issue:%202023-04-2
l%20Utility%20Dive%20Newsletter%20%5Bissue:49850%5D&utm_term=Utility%20Dive
-Illinois Commerce Commission Docket No. 20-0170 - In the Matter of Ameren Illinois
Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois's Proposed Creation of Rider Optional Vehicle Charging
Program ("Rider EVCP"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 32-33]
-Oregon Public Utilities Commission Docket No. UE 374 - In the Matter of Pacificorp d/b/a
Pacific Power Request for a General Rate Revision [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 32-33]
-New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Docket No. EO18101111 - In the Matter of the Petition
of Public Service Electric and Gas Company for Approval of its Clean Energy Future - Electric
Vehicle and Energy Storage ("CEF-EVES") Program on a Regulated Basis [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0792, pp. 32-33]
-Colorado Public Utilities Commission Proceeding No. 21AL-0494E - In the Matter of
Advice No. 1867-Electric Filed by Public Service Company of Colorado to Revise Its PUC No.
8-Electric Tariff and to Add Schedule S-EV-CPP and Implement Changes to Schedules S-EV,
EVC, and TEPA, to be Effective on Thirty-Days' Notice [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp.
32-33]
-Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities Docket # 21-90 - Petition of NSTAR Electric
Company d/b/a Eversource Energy for approval of its Phase II Electric Vehicle Infrastructure
Program and Electric Vehicle Demand Charge Alternative Proposal [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0792, pp. 32-33]
-Illinois Commerce Commission Docket No. 22-0432 Petition for Approval of Beneficial
Electrification Plan under the Electric Vehicle Act, 20 ILCS 627/45 and New EV Charging
Delivery Classes under the Public Utilities Act, Article IX [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp.
32-33]
-New York PSC's Case No. 22-E-0236 Proceeding to Establish Alternatives to Traditional
Demand-Based Rate Structures for Commercial Electric Vehicle Charging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0792, pp. 32-33]
Additional proceedings addressing these issues will help further facilitate investment and
deployment of charging infrastructure, supporting the agency's adoption of a more ambitious
light-duty standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 32-33]
Organization: Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF)
As if that weren't enough, electric vehicles are especially susceptible to damage from
flooding and hurricanes. When the grid goes down, those who own electric vehicles will be left
at the mercy of the elements, trapped and unable to flee disaster due to the inability to reliably
recharge their cars and trucks. And should they survive but their cars take on water, it is likely
that the vehicles will catch on fire without warning due to corrosion from saltwater. See Jen
Frost, Florida's electric vehicles are catching fire after Hurricane Ian, INSURANCE BUSINESS
(Nov. 4, 2022), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/auto-motor/floridas-electric-
vehicles-are-catching-fire-after-hurricane-ian-426452.aspx. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510,
pp. 6-7]
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In sum, implementing the emission limitations mandated by the LMD Tailpipe Rule will
require a massive, nationwide overhaul of our electrical grid and refueling network. By
regulating in this manner, the EPA will make driving and daily living more expensive and
difficult. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 6-7]
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
We know that these effects are serious and costly. Some states, such as California and Texas,
have experienced many brownouts and blackouts in recent years as the existing electric grid
cannot meet existing demand. Few new net sources of electricity generation are coming online.
Electricity is not a fully reliable source of energy in these states. Moreover, it is becoming
increasingly expensive. Pacific Gas and Electric has advised its customers that the average
electricity bill will be $187 a month as of March 1, 2023, and increase of 5% from January 1,
2023. Over the past two years rates have risen by almost a third.6 Upper-income residents can
afford backup generators to deal with blackouts, but poor and middle-income residents cannot.
Food spoils in their refrigerators and their children cannot do homework without electricity for
lights and computers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 3]
6 California Public Utilities Commission, Rate Change Advisories, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-
and-topics/electrical-energy/electric-rates/rate-change-advisories (accessed April 30, 2023).
Electric vehicles are not emissions free. In addition to batteries made with fossil fuels,
increased electricity demand places additional stress on the electrical grid, as California has
found out from rolling blackouts. In its proposal, EPA discusses the benefits of reducing
pollutants from cars, 19 but higher emissions will come from the electricity generated to recharge
the cars. This electricity is made with natural gas and coal, because wind and solar powers a
small share of America's power. EPA admits that "We expect that in some areas, increased
electricity generation would increase ambient S02, PM 2.5, ozone, or some air toxics."20 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 5]
19 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027
and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles." Federal Register, 5 May 2023,
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/05/05/2023-07974/multi-pollutant-emissions-standards-for-
model-years-2027-and-later-light-duty-and-medium-duty (accessed June 20, 2023).
20 Ibid., p. 48.
Organization: The Mobility House et al.
While this development was troublesome for the EV industry, there were also clear
implications for electric grid resilience following natural disasters. In spring 2022, the Biden
Administration took the remarkable step of activating the Defense Production Act (DPA),
deeming the shortage a national security threat and giving the Department of Energy temporary
power to influence manufacturing of grid components in an attempt to increase supply. This was
before the federal government's historic investment in transportation electrification via the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and later the Inflation Reduction Act set timetables for
deployment of electric school buses, electric transit buses, and a nationwide network of high-
powered direct current chargers for fast refueling on highways, all of which will require
unprecedented construction using the same components that were already in dangerously short
supply. Congress has declined to fund the DPA activation, making it far less likely that the
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United States can manufacture its way out of this situation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0657, p.
1]
We, the undersigned businesses and organizations support the Biden Administration's new
EV emissions standards as proposed. As leaders in transportation electrification, vehicle-grid
integration, and power control systems (PCS) implementation, the signatories are uniquely
positioned to recognize not only the significance of the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA's) new proposals, but also the context in which they are made. We urge the EPA and other
implementing agencies to prioritize strategies to enable use of PCS to facilitate coherent and
efficient secondary and primary upgrade planning. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0657, p. 1]
As a result of industrial consolidation and pandemic-related supply chain disruption in 2020
and 2021, companies engaged in site development for electric vehicles (EVs) watched wait times
for switchgear, and thus for site energization, extend from a standard eight weeks to fifty-two
weeks. It became apparent in 2021 that transformers, switchgear, and even copper and aluminum
for electric lines were increasingly scarce. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0657, p. 1]
While this development was troublesome for the EV industry, there were also clear
implications for electric grid resilience following natural disasters. In spring 2022, the Biden
Administration took the remarkable step of activating the Defense Production Act (DPA),
deeming the shortage a national security threat and giving the Department of Energy temporary
power to influence manufacturing of grid components in an attempt to increase supply. This was
before the federal government's historic investment in transportation electrification via the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and later the Inflation Reduction Act set timetables for
deployment of electric school buses, electric transit buses, and a nationwide network of high-
powered direct current chargers for fast refueling on highways, all of which will require
unprecedented construction using the same components that were already in dangerously short
supply. Congress has declined to fund the DPA activation, making it far less likely that the
United States can manufacture its way out of this situation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0657, p.
1]
On page 5-35 of its draft regulatory impact assessment, EPA recognizes that successful
implementation of the new proposed emissions standards will likely lead to increased
distribution upgrades. EPA then goes on to note that PCS may mitigate the need for
infrastructure upgrades for a range of use cases. While we acknowledge that new distribution
infrastructure will be necessary, we agree with EPA that acknowledging the ability of PCS to tap
the inherent flexibility of many EV charging use cases will insert much-needed efficiency into
EV-related distribution grid planning and buildout processes in the United States. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0657, p. 1]
The signatories of this letter represent a small subset of the universe of companies
implementing PCS across market segments and use cases. This class of technologies includes
both hardware and software solutions applicable across light, medium, and heavy-duty EV
models in the residential, commercial, and fleet segments. PCS can facilitate a number of
flexible use-cases, including but not limited to a combination of EV loads with co-sited solar and
storage resources, use of batteries to mitigate EV load, intelligent scheduling of networked
chargers to minimize aggregate load, batteries integrated into the chargers themselves, home
energy management systems, new advanced electrical panels, price-responsive charging, bi-
directional charging, enabling communications standards, and new metering technologies. PCS
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technologies are widely available but have historically been under-utilized as a means of
minimizing grid impacts of new loads and integrating EVs to the grid. Simply put, efficiency in
these areas was generally not necessary. Now, however, minimization, deferral, or planned
phasing of upgrades based on use of PCS is increasingly enabling customers to subtract years
from their project energization timeframe or save a project that would have been unable to
proceed if a full-nameplate upgrade were required. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0657, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Transfer Flow, Inc
Electric Vehicles require the ramp-up of many new electricity-generating power plants to
provide enough power to charge all the projected electric vehicles, and then those electricity-
generating power plants must rely heavily on carbon capture technologies to keep the emissions
from these electricity-generating power plants out of the atmosphere. Current carbon capture
technologies are experimental and may prove dangerous.22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496,
pp. 3-5]
22 https://www.huffpost.com/entry/gassing-satartia-mississippi-co2-
pipeline_n_60ddea9fe4b0ddef8b0ddc8f
In many places, such as rural environments or for use in utility vehicles, electric vehicles are
not a practical solution. Utility companies working on phone lines, power lines, and performing
construction work all need reliable power sources that can be used for transporting people and
powering equipment, as well as function when the electric power grid may be in need of repair.
Electric vehicles do not have a network in remote areas or the energy density to effectively
transport and power auxiliary equipment needed to, among other functions, install or perform
repairs to electric power lines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), two years after the historical Dixie Fire, is still powering
affected Californians with diesel-powered generators as the infrastructure required to bring
electricity into homes has still not been rebuilt. Citizens living in these affected areas would need
to charge electric vehicles using electricity created from diesel generators, and the logistics of
that simply do not make sense. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
Organization: Travis Fisher
Specifically, the EPA's DRIA regarding the impact of the Proposed Rule on the cost and
reliability of electricity in the U.S. is gravely flawed. It should be redrafted to enable the EPA
Administrator to give appropriate consideration to the cost and safety factors of the Proposed
Rule, as required by section 202 of the Clean Air Act. 1 Further, the DRIA should address the
interactions between the Proposed Rule and other EPA rules—including the recently proposed
rule on greenhouse gas emissions from power plants2—as required by Executive Order 12866.3
As written, the Proposed Rule: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 1]
1 42 U.S.C. § 7521, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7521.
2 New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions From Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean
Energy Rule, 88 FR 33240; May 23, 2023. Available at:
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/05/23/2023-10141/new-source-performance-standards-
for-greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-new-modified-and-reconstructed (accessed July 2, 2023).
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3 Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 FR 51735; October 4, 1993. Available at:
https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf (accessed July 2, 2023).
1. Violates section 202 of the Clean Air Act by failing to adequately consider:
A. Impaired bulk power system reliability and
B. Increased retail electricity prices;
2. Does not comply with Executive Order 12866; and
3. Violates the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 1]
A. THE PROPOSED RULE FAILS TO ADEQUATELY CONSIDER IMPAIRED
BULK POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY
The reliability of the electric grid is a matter of public health and safety. The connection
between access to reliable electric power and public health and safety is well established:
blackouts are a safety hazard worthy of the Administrator's consideration.5 As one recent
example, hundreds of lives were lost during Winter Storm Uri in February 2021 due to a lack of
reliable electricity supplies during a long-lasting extreme cold weather event.6 EPA should avoid
contributing to such losses in the future. Unfortunately, because EPA unreasonably assumed the
Proposed Rule will have no reliability impacts, it failed to consider the risks to human health
stemming from unreliable electricity among the many issues discussed in Chapter 7 of the DRIA
(Health and welfare impacts). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 2]
5 Power Outages and Community Health: A Narrative Review, available at:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7749027/ ("The existing literature suggests that power
outages have important health consequences ranging from carbon monoxide poisoning, temperature-related
illness, gastrointestinal illness, and mortality to all-cause, cardiovascular, respiratory, and renal disease
hospitalizations, especially for individuals relying on electricity-dependent medical equipment.")
6 See: https://comptroller.texas.gov/economy/fiscal-notes/2021/oct/winter-storm-impact.php (accessed July
2, 2023).
The Proposed Rule was issued after many serious warnings of supply shortfalls in the U.S.
electricity system. PJM Interconnection, Inc. (PJM), the largest regional transmission
organization in the U.S., has warned federal policymakers about the rapid retirement of
generation resources. PJM notes: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, pp. 2-3]
Historically, thermal resources have provided the majority of the reliability services in PJM.
Today, a confluence of conditions, including state and federal policy requirements, industry and
corporate goals requiring clean energy, reduced costs and/or subsidies for clean resources,
stringent environmental standards, age-related maintenance costs, and diminished energy
revenues are hastening the decline in thermal resources.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, pp.
2-3]
7 Energy Transition in PJM: Resource Retirements, Replacements & Risks. February 24, 2023. Available
at: https://www.pjm.eom/-/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2023/energy-transition-in-pjm-
resource-retirements-replacements-and-risks.ashx (accessed July 2, 2023) (emphases added).
The following figure illustrates forecast retirements in PJM, of which policy-driven
retirements comprise the majority. The total expected closures—40 GW—represent 21 percent
of PJM's installed generating capacity. Taken together, the suite of EPA regulations already
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impacting the supply side of the electricity sector poses a significant threat to the reliable
operation of the nation's bulk power system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, pp. 2-3]
[See original for graph titled "Retirement Capacity (GW ICAP)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0655, pp. 2-3]
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), which is the organization
responsible for establishing mandatory reliability standards, is also sounding alarms. In its most
recent Long Term Reliability Assessment (LTRA), NERC highlighted the significant grid
reliability problems facing the United States in the near term. The LTRA states that "[w]ithin the
10-year horizon, over 88 GW of generating capacity is confirmed for retirement."8 Speaking to
the press about the report, John Moura, NERC's director of reliability assessment and
performance analysis, said "[w]e are living in extraordinary times, from an electric industry
perspective. There are extraordinary reliability challenges and opportunities in front of us."9
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 3]
8 2022 Long-Term Reliability Assessment. NERC. December 2022. Available at
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2022.pdf (accessed
July 2, 2023).
9 Most of US electric grid faces risk of resource shortfall through 2027, NERC finds. Utility Dive.
December 16, 2022. Available at: https://www.utilitydive.com/news/nerc-grid-resource-adequacy-shortfall-
reliability-assessment/638949/ (accessed July 2, 2023).
In May of this year, NERC released its Summer Reliability Assessment, which warned that
"two-thirds of North America is at risk of energy shortfalls this summer during periods of
extreme demand." Figure 1 from NERC's 2023 Summer Reliability Assessment shows the
regions of the country that face an elevated risk of supply shortfalls this year. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0655, pp.3-5]
10 2023 Summer Reliability Assessment, page 6. NERC. May 2023. Available at:
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_SRA_2023.pdf.
[See original for graphic titled "Figure 1: Summer Reliability Risk Area Summary"]
These risks are well known. NERC has been warning about the speed of the energy transition
for years, largely from the perspective of the changing supply resource mix. However, more
recently, NERC has set up working groups to help maintain the reliability of the bulk power
system under increased penetration of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). Earlier this year, NERC
CEO Jim Robb said "As the electrification of the transportation sector continues to grow, the
North American grid must be prepared. ... Collaboration, innovation, and information sharing
are critical if we are to be able to meet future demands successfully." 11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0655, pp.3-5]
11 Cross-Sector Collaboration: Addressing the Potential Challenges from Electric Vehicle Grid Impacts,
available at:
https://www.nerc.com/news/Headlines%20DL/CMC%20EV%20Grid%20Reliability%20Working%20Gro
up%20Re port%20Press%20Release_l lAPRIL23.pdf.
EPA should be involved in NERC working groups in order to base its rulemakings in sound
science and to fully consider the safety impacts of its rules. Given the requirement in section 202
of the Clean Air Act that the Administrator consider safety factors, EPA should not move
forward with a final rule (or a new proposed rule) until it reaches a better understanding of
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NERC's warnings, including NERC's concerns about distribution-connected inverter-based
resources like PEVs.12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, pp. 3-5]
12 White Paper: BPS-Connected Inverter-Based Resource Priorities. NERC Task Force on Inverter-Based
Resources. June 2020. Available at:
https://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/InverterBased%20Resource%20Performance%20Task%20Force%20IRP
T/IRPTF_Priorities_June_2020.pdf
NERC's elevated risk scenario is for this summer, meaning reliability challenges are already
here. Hence any EPA proposal—including the Proposed Rule—to force an increase in demand or
a decrease in supply will further weaken an already fragile state of grid reliability. The Proposed
Rule creates a new safety hazard by forcing a rapid increase in electricity demand from PEVs
amid an extraordinary and worsening supply crisis. The DRIA notes this tension but ultimately
makes no adverse finding in Chapter 11 (Energy Security Impacts): [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0655, p. 5]
It is difficult to assess the combined effects of higher demand for electricity from PEVs,
increasing extreme weather events in the context of climate change, and the greater use of
variable supply technologies, such as wind/solar power, on electricity grid reliability and
resiliency issues in the U.S. In part, this is because there is little experience to assess the impacts
of significant PEV use on U.S. electric grid reliability and resiliency.13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0655, p. 5]
13 DRIA at 11-14 (PDF page 603).
Although it is true that EPA has little experience in assessing the impacts of increased PEV
penetration, that is precisely why EPA should work more closely with grid experts before
moving forward in this docket. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 5]
Chapter 5 (Electric Infrastructure Impacts) of the DRIA makes similar findings regarding a
lack of impact, but, in doing so, reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC is the federal agency responsible for
ensuring the reliability of the bulk power system (and approving the mandatory standards drafted
by NERC), and its authority lies at the transmission level. However, the DRIA states that EPA
staff "consulted with FERC staff on distribution system reliability and related issues." 14 If that is
true, EPA staff talked to the wrong agency about the distribution system. Further, it is alarming
that EPA staff seem unaware that FERC has no jurisdiction over the reliability of the distribution
system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 5]
14 DRIA at 5-38 (PDF page 380).
The DRIA also misidentifies NERC as the "National Electricity Reliability Corporation." (As
defined above, NERC is short for the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.) These
mistakes in the DRIA indicate a lack of familiarity with the topic area and a fundamental
misunderstanding of the role of FERC and NERC in overseeing the reliability of the bulk power
system. If EPA moves forward with a final rule, it should explain the extent to which EPA staff
have consulted with FERC and NERC regarding the Proposed Rule's impact to the reliability of
the bulk power system. Absent better coordination and information sharing, it is impossible for
the EPA Administrator to give "appropriate consideration" to the electric reliability impacts of
the Proposed Rule as he is required to do under section 202 of the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 5]
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B. THE PROPOSED RULE FAILS TO ADEQUATELY CONSIDER INCREASED
RETAIL ELECTRICITY PRICES
The Retail Price Model (RPM) and Integrated Planning Model (IPM) cited in the DRIA
contain fundamental errors that allow EPA to claim the rule will not increase retail electricity
prices. EPA's modeling is opaque, but upon close inspection it appears to selectively rely on
business-as-usual scenarios for some inputs and altered assumptions in others. Taken together,
EPA's electricity price modeling in the DRIA yields significantly flawed results and does not
enable reasoned decision-making by the Administrator. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 6]
First, the DRIA violates the law of supply. An outward shift in the demand curve for
electricity will increase prices because the new, higher demand intersects the supply curve at a
higher price point. This phenomenon is well established in the economics literature, and a
specific application of the impact of increasing demand on wholesale electricity prices is
outlined in detail in a tutorial by the New England Independent System Operator (see figure
below). 15 This effect holds regardless of the time of day a PEV user decides to charge the
vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 6]
15 See https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/in-depth/how-resources-are-selected-and-prices-are-set
(accessed July 2, 2023).
[See original for graph titled "Supply Stack"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 6]
Astonishingly, the DRIA states that "[rjegional average retail electricity price differences
showed small increases or decreases (less than approximately 1 to 2 percent)," 16 meaning that
EPA's model violates the law of supply. In no case should a rule that forces the rapid
electrification of the transportation fleet—which represents a large increase in the demand for
electricity—cause a reduction in prices. This observation alone is enough to require EPA to
rework its modeling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 6]
16 DRIA at 5-15 (PDF page 357) (emphasis added).
Second, the RPM states that the "models use generation-related outputs from an IPM-modeled
scenario together with T&D and other cost projections and assumptions from EIA's AEO
Reference Case to estimate the retail price of electricity." 17 This is unreasonable because the
increased T&D (transmission and distribution) costs of the Proposed Rule are not captured in the
Energy Information Administration's Annual Energy Outlook Reference Case. That case is used
as a baseline and should apply only to the "no-action" case analyzed in the DRIA. The Proposed
Rule would certainly cause distribution costs to increase because PEVs require substantial and
costly upgrades. For example, a recent report prepared for the California Public Utilities
Commission "estimates up to $50 billion in traditional electricity distribution grid infrastructure
investments by 2035." 18 The Proposed Rule could also cause an increase in transmission costs if
the demand increased triggered by the Proposed Rule necessitates an expansion of the
transmission system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 7]
17 Documentation of the Retail Price Model, page 1. Available at:
https://www.epa.gOv/sites/default/files/2019-06/documents/rpm_documentationJune2019.pdf.
18 Electrification Impacts Study Part 1: Bottom-Up Load Forecasting and System-Level Electrification
Impacts Cost Estimates. May 2023. Available at:
https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M508/K423/508423247.PDF
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Finally, EPA's retail price estimates do not account for the loss in electricity supply resources
caused by EPA rules. The DRIA should cross-reference the EPA rules impacting generating
resources and rework the electricity price estimates after taking into account the reasonably
foreseeable power plant closures caused by its own rules (see Section l.A of this
comment). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 7]
Principle 6 states:
"Each agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation and,
recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation
only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, pp. 7-8]
EPA fails to comply with Principle 6 because it has not undertaken a reasonable assessment of
the cost of the Proposed Rule. As discussed above, EPA does not fully account for the Proposed
Rule's impacts on the electricity system, which include increasing the cost of electricity and
harming electric grid reliability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, pp. 7-8]
Principle 7 states:
"Each agency shall base its decisions on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical,
economic, and other information concerning the need for, and consequences of, the intended
regulation." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 8]
EPA fails to comply with Principle 7 because, as detailed above, it has not availed itself of the
ample scientific and technical information—well known and published by leading sources such
as NERC, FERC, and PJM—regarding the consequences of EPA regulations on the cost and
reliability of the electricity system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 8]
Principle 8 states:
"Each agency shall identify and assess alternative forms of regulation and shall, to the extent
feasible, specify performance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner of
compliance that regulated entities must adopt." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 8]
EPA fails to comply with Principle 8 because the Proposed Rule is a de facto mandate for
PEVs. Much like the unlawful Clean Power Plan,23 the thrust of the Proposed Rule is to force a
shift away from internal combustion engine vehicles and toward PEVs. Indeed, the performance
objectives outlined in the Proposed Rule are only viable if the regulated entities—drivers in the
U.S.—behave as specified by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 8]
23 See https://archive.epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants-regulatory-
actions.html (accessed July 2, 2023).
Principle 10 states:
"Each agency shall avoid regulations that are inconsistent, incompatible, or duplicative with
its other regulations or those of other Federal agencies." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 9]
EPA fails to comply with principle 10 because, as outlined in the section on electric grid
reliability above, the Proposed Rule is incompatible with the suite of existing and new EPA
regulations that are forcing a large reduction in electricity supply. Although a minor conflict with
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an obscure rule from a different agency might be forgivable, EPA's Proposed Rule unreasonably
conflicts with a concurrent proposed rule issued by EPA—the Greenhouse Gas Standards and
Guidelines for Fossil Fuel-Fired Power Plants, issued in May of 2023.24 In fact, it appears that
the DRIA fails to reference or otherwise acknowledge the power plant rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0655, p. 9]
24 New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions From Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean
Energy Rule, 88 FR 33240; May 23, 2023. Available at:
https://www.federalregister.gOv/documents/2023/05/23/2023-10141/new-source-performance-standards-
for-greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-new-modified-and-reconstructed (accessed July 2, 2023).
If the EPA moves forward with a final rule, it should explain why it finds that the federal
mandates included in the Proposed Rule would not significantly affect State, local, or Tribal
governments. As drafted, the Proposed Rule does not detail how it has satisfied the above
procedural requirements of the UMRA and does not indicate that the EPA has undertaken the
required analysis of the impacts on states and local governments and tribes of compliance with
the Proposed Rule. For example, some electric utilities are owned and operated by State, local or
Tribal governments.27 The Proposed Rule will significantly impact the cost of the distribution
systems of those publicly owned utilities, and the DRIA should be amended to evaluate the
extent of the cost increases and the impact of the Proposed Rule on the budgets of State, local or
Tribal governments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, pp. 9-10]
27 Navigating the EV Market: Trends and Changes for Public Power to Know. American Public Power
Association. Available at: https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/documents/Navigating-the-Electric-
Vehicle-Market.pdf (accessed July 2, 2023).
Organization: U.S. Chamber of Commerce
-Impacts on grid reliability and resiliency. The electric grid will be called upon to handle
increased demand during its own period of transition. By EPA's own estimates, deployment of
EVs as envisioned by the proposed rule would increase power demand by 114 terawatt-hours
(2.25 percent) nationwide by 2035. Some geographic regions and subregions will experience
higher changes on a percentage basis, and as EPA notes in the proposed rule, EV charging will
result in "large and abrupt electricity demand peaks" during certain periods of the day. This
presents a major challenge for an electricity system that is now facing its most difficult reliability
challenges in decades, and in which an already accelerated loss of existing dispatchable
generating capacity could be exacerbated by EPA's concurrently proposed rule targeting these
same types of electric generating facilities. The Chamber urges EPA to undertake thorough
analysis of the impact of recent and forthcoming regulations and other policies on the cost and
feasibility of this proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0604, p. 3]
Organization: United Steelworkers (USW)
EPA only models for BEVs, even though our nation's electric grid is far from ready for the
energy transition.8 America's electric grid will be sorely challenged by the need to deliver clean
power to BEVs. Even today, the electric grid barely functions in times of ordinary stress, and
fails altogether too often for comfort, as widespread blackouts in California, Texas, Louisiana,
and other states have shown. 9 Problems ranging from grid congestion to age of transmissions to
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demand for electric cannot be addressed overnight even with investments from the IRA and IIJA.
EPA must work with DOE and other relevant departments and agencies to understand current
bottlenecks, and the additional strain that a high percentage of BEVs would have on our electric
grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, p. 5]
8 The New York Times, (Link: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/06/12/climate/us-electric-grid-
energy-transition.html) "Why the U.S. Electric Grid Isn't Ready for the Energy Transition", June 12, 2023.
9 The Washington Post, (Link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/10/13/electric-vehicles-
grid-upgrade/ ) "Plug-in cars are the future. The grid isn't ready", October 16, 2021.
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
Although EPA acknowledges that upgrades to electricity distribution systems may be required
to meet the charging loads associated with EVSE, it immediately dismisses the costs, explaining
that [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 1-3]
"EPA acknowledges that there may be additional infrastructure needs and costs beyond those
associated with charging equipment itself. While planning for additional electricity demand is a
standard practice for utilities and not specific to PEV charging, the buildout of public and private
charging stations (particularly those with multiple high-powered DC fast charging units) could in
some cases require upgrades to local distribution systems. For example, a recent study found
power needs as low as 200 kW could trigger the need to install a distribution transformer while a
load of 5 MW or more could require upgrades to feeder circuits or the addition of a feeder
breaker."9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 1-3]
9 DRIA at 5-34 to 5-35.
"There is considerable uncertainty associated with future distribution upgrade needs as well as
with the uptake of the technologies and approaches discussed above that could reduce upgrade
costs, and we do not model them directly as part of our infrastructure cost analysis." 10 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 1-3]
10 DRIA at 5-36.
Regardless of who is paying, upgrades to electrical infrastructure are real impacts associated
with EVSE installation and come with real costs. In their EV Infrastructure Deployment Plans,
several states quantify the cost of electrical system upgrades needed to accommodate EVSE,
including: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 1-3]
Idaho cites that "charging stations installed with NEVI formula funds must be able to
provide a power output of at least 600kW. In Idaho, most NEVI sites will require transformer
upgrades. Additional improvements such as installing new feeder lines and completing
substation upgrades also may be needed. At the very least, new electrical upgrades for a new
transformer cost approximately $20-30,000."11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 1-3]
11 Idaho Transportation Department, "2022 State of Idaho Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Baseline Plan" at
38 (August 1, 2022), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/id_nevi_plan.pdf.
Indiana cites that "Utilities estimated investment between $50,000 to $125,000 to
serve 600kW per station with locations requiring significant system upgrades totaling greater
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than $1 million. Upgrades could include new transformers, trenching, concrete/asphalt work,
conduit, underground vaults, new conductor, and other miscellaneous equipment to serve the
DCFC. Respondents expressed they would not deny an installation from proceeding. However,
as expressed above, costs may be prohibitive for the prospective customer at certain
locations." 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 1-3]
12 Indiana Department of Transportation, "Indiana Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plan" at 37
(July 29, 2022), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/in_nevi_plan.pdf.
These utility costs may not be borne solely by individual customers; in some cases, these
costs will ultimately be passed on to ratepayers. EPA fails to acknowledge these costs and fails
to assess the cumulative cost burden resulting from the concurrent increase in electrical demand
resulting from implementing the proposed LMD vehicle rule in the same time frame it seeks to
force electrification of the heavy-duty vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 1-3]
E. EPA does not adequately consider potential grid reliability impacts.
As part of its evaluation of potential economic impacts to the welfare of Americans and
businesses, EPA must assess grid reliability impacts stemming from the proposed rule's forced
electrification of the LD and MD transportation sector. Reliance on BEVs may have unintended,
negative consequences, especially in relation to the electricity generation sector. In addition,
EPA needs to accurately predict the number of additional chargers that will be needed to support
the anticipated BEV population. At present, charging infrastructure is inadequate to meet the
country's transportation needs.227 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 41-42]
227 See JD Power, "2023 U.S. Electric Vehicle Consideration (EVC) Study," June 15, 2023, and JD
Power, "2023 U.S. Electric Vehicle Experience (EVX) Home Charging Study," March 16, 2023.
1. EPA's analysis of grid impacts and electrical reliability is unrealistic.
ZEV mandates like the proposed rule also present significant risks to grid reliability and the
stability of the transportation sector, yet EPA's analysis of electrical grid impacts is weak. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 42-44]
EPA expects that the proposed standards will drive an increase in electricity demand
and generation across the U.S.228 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 42-44]
EPA estimates an increase in electricity consumption in response to this proposal of 2
Terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2028 (a 0.04 percent increase), 18 TWh in 2030 (a 0.39 percent
increase), 114 TWh in 2035 (a 2.25 percent increase), 195 TWh in 2040 (a 3.52 percent increase)
and 252 TWh in 2050 (a 3.92 percent increase) "229 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 42-
44]
EPA does not expect grid reliability to be adversely affected by this increase in
electricity demand and generation, as long as charging behavior is carefully managed.230 This
begs the question who would manage charging behavior, by what authority, and based on what
standards or criteria. In the absence of any specific and credible information about how charging
behavior will be managed, it is unreasonable for EPA to assume that it will be. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 42-44]
In its analysis of electric grid reliability, EPA refers to a 25% increase in electrical
demand that occurred over 1992 to 2021 and concludes that since the increase in demand
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occurred "without any adverse effects on electric grid reliability or electricity generation capacity
shortages," "grid reliability is not expected to be adversely affected by the modest increase in
electricity demand associated with electric vehicle charging."231 However, this glib assessment
overlooks the vast increase in inexpensive natural gas occurring during this period which made it
possible to meet the increased demand without compromising reliability. It also overlooks the
potential impacts to electrical grid costs and reliability from EPA's recently proposed New
Source Performance Standards for GHG emissions from power plants.232 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 42-44]
228 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29311.
229 DRIAat 11-14.
230 DRIA at 11-14 to 11-17.
231 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29311.
232 88 Fed. Reg. 33240 (May 23, 2023).
Considering the regional and temporal nature of the PEV charging load, the recent trends of
seasonal strain on grid reliability, and the increasing replacement of baseload generation with
intermittent renewable sources, EPA's comparison to a national trend occurring over the past
three decades is not relevant or meaningful. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 42-44]
EPA also acknowledges that "PEVs can pose challenges for electricity supply reliability if
PEV charging is not coordinated."233 EPA references efforts by California, public and private
electrical utilities, major automakers, EV charging companies, and other organizations to
demonstrate "the ability of U.S. electric utilities to reschedule up to 20 percent of electric vehicle
charging loads occurring at any hour of the day to any other hour of the day,"234 and concludes
that since the expected increase in electric power demand from PEV charging is less than 20%,
"we do not anticipate it to pose grid reliability issues "235 With this statement, EPA blithely
disregards the regional variations in expected PEV uptake, electricity generation, electricity
demand, and grid reliability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 42-44]
233 DRIA at 11-16.
234 DRIA at 11-14 to 11-17.
234 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29312.
235 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29312.
In seeming contradiction to the confidence of its earlier statements on impacts to grid
reliability, EPA acknowledges the difficulty and lack of experience in assessing the combined
effects of higher PEV electricity demand with other variables that could affect the electrical grid:
"Projections of PEV uptake will need to be accounted for by U.S. electric utilities and
transmission system operators in their resource planning processes. It is difficult to assess the
combined effects of higher demand for electricity from PEVs, increasing extreme weather events
in the context of climate change, and the greater use of variable supply technologies, such as
wind/solar power, on electricity grid reliability and resiliency issues in the U.S. In part, this is
because there is little experience to assess the impacts of significant PEV use on U.S. electric
grid reliability and resiliency."236 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 42-44]
236 DRIA at 11-14.
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EPA explains that most of the electric power grid is owned and operated by the private
industry, with Federal, state, local, Tribal and territorial governments playing significant role in
enhancing the reliability of the electric power grid.237 While EPA is neither the expert in nor
holds responsibility for the reliability of the electrical power grid, the agency offers suggestions
for accommodating the increased electricity demand, such as: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
pp. 42-44]
237 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29311.
Grid operators incorporating vehicle-grid integration (VGI) technology to manage
vehicle charging time and rate;238 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 42-44]
238 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29312.
Utilities developing new electric utility tariffs, including submetering for PEVs;239
and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 42-44]
239 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29312.
Encouraging the adoption of vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology, "which allows
electricity to be drawn from vehicles when not in use."240 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
42-44]
240 DRIA at 5-37, 11-16.
EPA does not account for the costs of these suggestions in its DRIA nor for any other
safeguards to protect grid reliability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 42-44]
EPA asserts that it has statutory authority to adopt technology-forcing standards for reducing
emissions from motor vehicle tailpipes. CAA Section 202(a) does not authorize the agency to
force grid operators to manage electrical loads in completely new ways, or to dictate vehicle
charging behavior. Yet EPA must account for the costs and impacts on the grid in the RIA for
the rule and consider such costs and impacts and the availability and reliability of the grid. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 42-44]
2. EPA fails to adequately account for the regionality of the increased electrical demand.
EPA explains in the Preamble that "the anticipation of a highly regionalized initial rollout of
electric vehicles under the California ZEV program necessitated modeling of the regionalization
of PEV charge demand in order to fully capture emissions and other impacts on the electric
power sector."241 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
241 EPA's Multi-Pollutant LMDV Proposal at 29303.
EPA discusses the integration of several models that it used to project and regionally
disaggregate the electricity demand for PEV charging, as shown in Figure 5-1 of the Draft
RIA.242 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
242 DRIA at 5-2.
First, for each compliance scenario considered by EPA, the OMEGA Compliance
Model solves for the lowest cost compliance solution, thereby generating projections of national
vehicles sales, stock, energy consumption, and tailpipe emissions. However, EPA acknowledges
that "to produce estimates of the spatiotemporal charging loads needed for power sector
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emissions modeling, the national PEV stock from OMEGA must first be disaggregated
regionally."243 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
243 DRIA at 5-2.
To regionally disaggregate the national PEV stocks, EPA indicates that it leverages
NREL's "likely adopter model" (LAM).244 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
244 DRIA at 5-2.
NREL is actively engaged in transportation and mobility research and
offers dozens of integrated modeling and analysis tools designed to "overcome technical barriers
and accelerate the development of advanced technologies and systems" 245 - the LAM upon
which EPA relies is not amongst these NREL tools. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-
47]
Rather, the LAM makes an appearance in an NREL report246 that
predicts the relative likelihood of a household to purchase a PEV based on access to charging.
This LAM is developed from 3,772 survey responses, calibrating likelihood to purchase a PEV
with household income, state of residence (i.e., whether or not the state has ZEV initiatives),
housing type and tenure, and population density of the residential location.247 The NREL study
is nice work, but EPA's reliance on the study for this application is wholly unsuitable. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
Figure 3 of the NREL report shows the geographical distribution of
survey respondents used to develop the LAM, almost none of which are located in the Midwest
states or other areas of low population density.248 Based on the geographical distribution of
survey respondents, the LAM offers EPA no insight into or basis for estimating the PEV update
and grid reliability impacts for most of the United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
44-47]
245 https://www.nrel.gov/transportation/adopt.html.
246 Ge, et al, "There's No Place Like Home: Residential Parking, Electrical Access, and Implications for
the Future of Electrical Vehicle Charging Infrastructure," 2021.
247 Ge, et al at 3-4.
248 Ge, et al at 5.
[See original for graphic titled "Figure 3. Geographic Distribution of the survey respondents
overlaid on a population density map] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
Ge, et al thoroughly acknowledge the limitations of the survey and the resulting LAM,
none of which are acknowledged by EPA in its adoption of the LAM: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
"Our final respondent sample underrepresents the highest income bracket,
overrepresents those with higher levels of education (e.g., those with bachelor's degrees),
underrepresents those with lower levels of education, underrepresents single-family detached
housing, and overrepresents single-family attached housing and high-capacity apartments."249
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
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"Admittedly, the likely adopter model estimated in this study is not able to
account for PEV owners' preference that could cause this result to vary. For example, some PEV
owners might prefer to have a traditional gasoline vehicle in the household to cover long-
distance travel. Therefore, the accuracy of the results on the vehicle ranking is subject to further
scrutiny once a more accurate PEV likely adopter model is available. "250 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
"There are several limitations to this analysis, and some require future research
to improve accuracy. Sampling error associated with a small sample size compared to the
reference population is a concern. Because the U.S. population is so large, and the PEV market is
still in its infancy, a large sample is necessary to reach enough vehicle (PEV and non-PEV)
owners to guarantee an adoption model with results at a high confidence interval."251 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
"The adoption model suffers from data limitations, such as low goodness of fit
and predictive power, due to the omission of psychological variables." "The survey also relied on
the respondents' non-technical judgement about the ability to extend electrical access to their
home parking option. It is unclear if this subjective assessment over-or underestimates the true
potential of enhanced electrical access scenarios."252 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-
47]
"This analysis assumes ceteris paribus conditions. Specifically, we project
future results based on historic data. However, due to the early stage of PEV adoption, an
adoption model calibrated on the current PEV owners is not ideal for projecting adoption
likelihood in the future "253 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
"The analysis herein was conducted without a specific time scale in mind. In
particular, we did not incorporate a specific timeline associated with achieving different PEV
penetration levels. Time-specific factors, such as vehicle replacement, turnover, and scrappage
rates, were likewise not incorporated." "The national-level results shown here may not be
representative of the residential charging accessibility of smaller regions as it does not
distinguish location-specific characteristics other than density class."254 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
"The framework established in this study can be adapted and improved with
higher accuracy PEV adoption modeling and with further increased PEV market
penetration "255 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
249
Ge,
et al
at
6.
250
Ge,
et al
at
23.
251
Ge,
et al
at
25.
252
Ge,
et al
at
25.
253
Ge,
et al
at
25.
254
Ge,
et al
at
25-26
255
Ge,
et al
at
26.
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EPA then purports to have developed four chassis-specific LAMs - a LAM each for
PEV sedans, PEV S/CUVs, PEV pickups, and PEV vans,256 but neither the basis nor the results
are provided for review by stakeholders. How did EPA go about establishing chassis-specific
LAMs when the original NREL report mentioned nothing about vehicle classifications? Did EPA
resurvey the 3,772 respondents with new questions relating to vehicle classification? Did EPA
conduct a separate survey for commercial vehicle use to support its truck and van LAMs? Why is
none of this provided in the docket? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
256 DRIA at 5-3.
The only results that EPA shares from its chassis-specific LAMs fit into a roughly 1-
square inch corner of DRIA Figure 5-2.257 Despite the lack of LAM survey respondents in the
Midwest and Alaska, EPA inexplicably projects these regions to have the highest PEV pickup
stocks of the entire United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
257 DRIA at 5-3. "PEV adoption (IPM region-level)" image within Figure 5-2.
Without an adequate understanding or representation of the regional PEV adoption
that its proposed standards would drive, EPA uses the results of its chassis-specific LAMs to
feed into NREL's EVI-X modelling suite, which simulates PEV charging infrastructure
requirements and spaciotemporal electricity loads.258 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-
47]
258 DRIA at 5-2.
Finally, EPA aggregates county-level load profiles into its Integrated Planning Model
(IPM), which provides projections of least-cost capacity expansion, electricity dispatch, and
emission control strategies for meeting energy demand and environmental, transmission,
dispatch, and reliability constraints.259 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 44-47]
259 DRIA at 5-2.
EPA's assessment of local and temporal impacts to the electrical grid is entirely discredited
by its failure to reasonably disaggregate national PEV adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 44-47]
3. EPA fails to recognize existing grid reliability concerns.
EPA's analysis of impacts to the electrical power grid overlooks existing grid reliability issues
such as the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 47-48]
• The North American Electric Reliability Corporation's (NERC's) "2023 Summer
Reliability Assessment" warns that two-thirds of North America is at risk of energy shortfalls
this summer during periods of extreme demand. While there are no high-risk areas in this year's
assessment, the number of areas identified as being at elevated risk has increased. The
assessment finds that, while resources are adequate for normal summer peak demand, if summer
temperatures spike, seven areas — the U.S. West, SPP and MISO, ERCOT, SERC Central, New
England and Ontario — may face supply shortages during higher demand levels.260 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 47-48]
260 NERC, "2023 Summer Reliability Assessment" (May 17, 2023),
https://www.nerc.com/news/Headlines%20DL/Summer%20Reliability%20Assessment%20Announcement
%20May%202023 .pdf.
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NERC's "2022-2023 Winter Reliability Assessment" warned that a large portion of
the North America BPS was at risk of insufficient electricity supplies during peak winter
conditions, including Texas RE-ERCOT, MISO, SERC-East, WECC-Alberta, NPCC-Maritimes,
NPCC-New England.261 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 47-48]
261 NERC, "2022-2023 Winter Reliability Assessment" (November 2022),
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_WRA_2022.pdf.
NERC's "2022 Long Term Reliability Assessment" identifies three high risk areas -
MISO, NPCC-Ontario, and the California/Mexico part of WECC - that are projected to not have
adequate electricity supply to meet demand forecasts associated with normal weather over the
10-year assessment period. Several other areas are identified as having elevated risk, i.e.,
meeting the resource adequacy criteria for normal forecasted conditions but at risk of shortfall in
extreme conditions. These areas include the U.S. West—CA/MX, Western Power Pool (WPP),
and the Southwest Reserve Sharing Group (SRSG), Texas RE-ERCOT, SPP and New England.
Specific recommendations from NERC to manage the risks include considering "the impact that
the electrification of transportation, space heating, and other sectors may have on future
electricity demand and infrastructure."262 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 47-48]
262 NERC, "2022 Long-Term Reliability Assessment" (December 2022),
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2022.pdf.
As California has faced rolling blackouts and historic energy prices, Governor
Newsom in his May 2022 state budget proposal, has pivoted to the use of traditional fuel
infrastructure to ensure system reliability to protect against outages. Approximately one week
after the California Air Resources Board approved its "Advanced Clean Cars II" rule prohibiting
sales of new ICEV passenger cars in California by 2035, Governor Gavin Newsom issued a
statewide request for electric vehicle owners to refrain from charging their vehicles in order to
prevent blackouts.263 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 47-48]
263 https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/01/us/california-heat-wave-flex-alert-ac-ev-charging.html.
Twelve states expressed concerns regarding electrical grid and utility impacts in their
DOT-approved state EV Infrastructure Deployment Plans, as summarized below. EPA has not
accounted for these concerns in its analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 47-48]
State: Hawaii
Concern: HDOT submits requests for discretionary exceptions based on grid capacity, "as
there is insufficient power availability in areas where charging stations must be installed" and
"delivering sufficient power requires significant upgrades to existing infrastructure. In evaluating
the grid capacity, HDOT considered renewable energy sources, like photovoltaic panels, and has
determined that this approach is also infeasible in supporting these charging facilities."264
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 47-48]
264 "National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Hawai'i State Plan" at 39 (July 2022),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/hi_nevi_plan.pdf.
State: Idaho
Concern: "Idaho's utilities will need to assess grid capacity and plan for increased demand as
EV adoption grows in Idaho. Today, most challenges relating to EV charging occur at the
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distribution system level." "In most, if not all, areas, transformer upgrades will be needed.
Additional improvements such as installing new feeder lines and completing substation upgrades
may also be required at some sites."265 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 47-48]
265 Idaho Transportation Department, "2022 State of Idaho Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Baseline Plan"
at 31 (August 1, 2022),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/id_nevi_plan.pdf.
State: Illinois
Concern: "Illinois may run into challenges related to sufficient electric grid capacity,
particularly in rural areas of the state. Acceptable locations for charging stations may be limited
or may require additional make-ready investments either by site hosts or utilities. This could
increase the cost of these stations or delay the timeline for implementation."266 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 47-48]
266 Illinois Department of Transportation, "Illinois Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plan" at 23
(August 1, 2022), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/il_nevi_plan.pdf.
State: Maine
Concern: "The Roadmap already recognizes electric grid issues as a challenge. In the short
term, demand charges increase the operating costs for DCFC. In the longer term, as EV adoption
rates increase, particularly when combined with other electrification, there will be a need for new
grid capacity in certain areas."267 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 48-50]
267 Maine DOT, "Maine Plan for Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment" at 31 (July 2022),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/me_nevi_plan.pdf.
State: Maryland
Concern: "Electrification of the transportation sector will lead to an increase in electrical
demand on the grid. Existing infrastructure may not be able to support the increase and require
upgrades to ensure the grid can reliably support the increase in electrical load."268 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 48-50]
268 Maryland Department of Transportation, "Maryland State Plan for National Electric Vehicle
Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Funding Deployment" at 19 (July 15, 2022),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/md_nevi_plan.pdf.
State: Montana
Concern: "Northwestern Energy, Montana's largest utility provider, anticipates about an 800-
megawatt (MW) peaking capacity deficit by 2030 without the addition of new peaking capacity
resources (peaking capacity is the amount of power that can be delivered during times of
maximum electricity demand)."269 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 48-50]
269 "Montana Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plan" at 10 (July 28, 2022),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/mt_nevi_plan.pdf.
State: New Jersey
Concern: "There are areas with little to no existing capacity to accommodate the minimum
600 kW required. In addition, based on the dense population of the State there are certain
2950
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locations along AFCs where there may not be grid capacity or site hosts within 1 mile from the
exit ramp."270 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 48-50]
270 "New Jersey's National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Deployment Plan" at 25 (August 1,
2022), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/nj_nevi_plan.pdf.
State: New Mexico
Concern: "While grid capacity may be a concern in the future, it is not the primary issue in
most areas. Utilities are predominately concerned with significant transformer upgrades and the
long lead times the industry is experiencing in the supply chain. Utilities may not be able to
obtain the equipment necessary to begin upgrades and construction in a timely manner."271
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 48-50]
271 New Mexico Department of Transportation, "New Mexico EV Infrastructure Deployment Plan" at 7
(July 13, 2022), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/nm_nevi_plan.pdf.
State: North Dakota
Concern: "In addition, stakeholders that represented utility agencies were concerned about the
demand on the power grid, especially during peak demand."272 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 48-50]
272 North Dakota Transportation, "Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Plan" at 17 (2022),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/nd_nevi_plan.pdf.
State: Pennsylvania
Concern: "PennDOT has also heard through stakeholder outreach that utility demand charges
continue to be a barrier for the more rapid deployment of economically self-sustaining DCFC
stations "273 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 48-50]
273 Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, "Pennsylvania State Plan for Electric Vehicle
Infrastructure Deployment" at 49 (July 21, 2022),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/pa_nevi_plan.pdf.
State: Utah
Concern: "Lack of grid availability: Some rural and remote areas do not have any existing
power infrastructure. In UDOT's previous VW/DEQ grant project, three-phase power did not
exist at two sites. The estimated cost to bring three-phase power to two of the sites was quoted at
double the entire project budget."274[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 48-50]
274 UTDOT, "Utah Plan for Electrical Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment" at 34 (July 2022),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/ut_nevi_plan.pdf.
State: Washington
Concern: "Grid challenges are another known risk and challenge. Washington's electric
power system requires substantial alteration. New or expanded transmission capacity is required
for access to the best renewable resources and to take full advantage of coordination
opportunities across the West "275 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 48-50]
275 "Washington State Plan for Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment" at 27 (July 2022),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/wa_nevi_plan.pdf.
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B. EPA has inappropriately made the 0 g/mile upstream incentive permanent in the
proposed rule.
EPA has proposed to "indefinitely exclude upstream emissions from BEV compliance
calculations."332 EPA has long maintained that its decision to not count upstream emissions
from BEVs was to provide a "temporary regulatory incentive."333 A temporary incentive was
appropriate because while EVs do not have a tailpipe, the incentive did not "reflect the increase
in upstream GHG emissions associated with electricity used by EVs."334 As EPA explained, in
2010 a midsize EV caused a net upstream GHG emissions increase of about 120 grams/mile
compared to a midsize gasoline car.335 EPA's proposal to permanently extend this incentive is
entirely unmerited. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 62-64]
332 Proposed Rule at 29247.
333 See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324, 25434-5 (May 7, 2010) (hereinafter 2010 rule); 2017 and Later
model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62624, 62650-1 (Oct. 15, 2012) ("In order to provide temporary regulatory
incentives .. . EPA is [] finalizing. . . a value of 0 g/mile."); see also, Proposed Rule at 185 ("[T]he 0 g/mile
accounting was temporary.").
334 2010 Rule at 25435.
335 Id.
EV charging necessarily affects the grid, one such effect is a contribution to greater electricity
demand during peak demand hours.336 While today's grid has seen some emissions reductions
in annual total output emission rates since 2010,337 based on EPA's own prior analysis,
upstream greenhouse gas emissions would have needed to fall by two-thirds (or -66%) from
2010 to the present day before the upstream emissions increase caused by EVs is equivalent to
the ICE's upstream emissions.338 But greenhouse emissions, from a pure generation-basis
perspective, have not fallen by nearly the required amount based on EPA's most recently
available data.339 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 62-64]
336 See Siobhan Powell et al., Charging infrastructure access and operation to reduce the grid impacts of
deep electric vehicle adoption, NATURE ENERGY 7, at 932 (Jan. 1, 2022).
337 Cf. eGRID 9th edition Version 1.0 Year 2010 GHG Annual Output Emission Rates, EPA (Feb. 2015),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-02/documents/egrid_9th_edition_vl-
0_year_2010_ghg_rates.pdf, with eGRID Summary Tables 2021, EPA (Jan. 30, 2023),
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-01/eGRID2021_summary_tables.pdf
338 See 2010 Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25435.
339 In 2010, the U.S. average GHG emissions rate for electricity was 1,238.52 lbs/MWh C02e (eGRID 9th
edition Version 1.0 year 2010 GHG Annual Output Emission Rates, supra). But in 2021, the U.S. average
GHG emissions rate was 857.0 lbs/MWh C02e (eGRID Summary Tables 2021, supra, at 2), that means
U.S. average GHG emissions have only fallen by approximately one-third.
Even worse, the emissions associated with power plants called upon to supply the grid at peak
hours generally have higher emissions per generated MWh.340 A fact borne out in EPA's data
that shows that non-baseload power, which reflects the power dispatched to the grid during peak
demand,341 has not seen any major declines in C02 emissions since 2010, and is worse than the
emissions associated with baseload power in 2010.342 This data suggests that the impact of EVs
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on C02 emissions might be, at best, nearly identical to the upstream emissions increase in 2010.
Regardless of which emissions source is used to calculate an EV's true footprint. Indeed, the
table below illustrates just how arbitrary and inappropriate it is for EPA's proposal to ignore the
upstream emissions increase caused by electric vehicle in light of this reality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 62-64]
340 See DOE, Emission Reduction Calculation Roadmap (Jan. 2019),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2019/01/f58/Emission_Roadmap_FINAL.pdf
341 Susy S. Rothschild & Art Diem, Total, Non-baseload, EGRID Subregion, State? Guidance on the Use
of eGRID Output Emission Rate, at 5 (last accessed May 2023),
https ://www3. epa. gov/ttn/chief/conference/ei 18/session5/rothschild.pdf
342 In 2010, baseload power GHG emissions rate was 1,238.52 lbs/MWh C02e (eGRID 9th edition
Version 1.0 year 2010 GHG Annual Output Emission Rates, supra). In 2021, non-baseload GHG
emissions rate was 1,417.3 lbs/MWh C02e (eGRID Summary Tables 2021, supra, at 2). Despite the fact
that "non-baseload values should not be used for assigning an emissions value for electricity," (Rothschild
& Diem, supra) the non-baseload emissions rate reflects emissions for plants "that operate coincident with
peak demand for electricity." (id.) Because EVs are expected to increase demand at peak hours (See Powell
et al., supra) this may be the proper emissions rate to use when evaluating the upstream emissions
associated with EVs.
eGRID C02e Emissions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 62-64]
EV Upstream C02e Emissions343
ICEV Upstream C02e Emissions344
Net Increase345
2010 1,238.52 lbs/MWh346 173.6 g/mile
2021 857.0 lbs/MWh347 120.1 g/mile
2021 1,417.3 lbs/MWh348 198.6 g/mile
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 62-64]
343 Calculated based on 2022 Tesla Model 3 Long Range AWD with an efficiency of 0.26 kWh/mi (see
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/Find.do?action=sbs&id=45011). Calculation uses anEV charging
efficiency of 90% and a transmission efficiency of 93.5% (EPA LMDV OMEGA GHG Compliance
Modeling Runs, "onroad_fuels_20220325.csv," supra).
344 See 2010 Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25435. Refers to a "typical midsize gasoline car."
345 Calculated as (EV upstream C02e emissions) - (ICEV upstream C02e emissions).
346 EPA eGRID 9th edition Version 1.0 year 2010 GHG Annual Output Emission Rates.
347 EPA eGRID Summary Tables 2021.
348 Reflects non-baseload power emissions. (See eGRID Summary Tables 2021, supra, at 2.)
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
it is hard to fathom how EPA comes to that conclusion. The electric grid is in no way capable
of handling the huge increase in electricity demand that the rule would require, the United States
does not have access to the critical minerals required for such a high market penetration of EVs,
60 g/mile 113.6 g/mile
60 g/mile 60.1 g/mile
60 g/mile 138.6 g/mile
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nor is the increased wind and solar energy generation available now nor in the foreseeable future
to make supposedly ZEVs actually ZEVs. EPA has failed to adequately consider the impact of
this rule on grid reliability. EPA should analyze grid reliability in this rulemaking and reference
the large body of work raising concerns about how increased EVs will destabilize the grid.l
Without the grid capability and the critical minerals, EPA's EPA Proposed Rule on Light-Duty
Vehicle Emissions Standards July 5, 2023 statement on technical feasibility is logically flawed,
as current and projected grid infrastructure cannot support the goal of the proposed rule. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 2-3]
1 For example see E lectric Vehicle Dynamic Charging Performance Characteristics during Bulk Power
System D isturbances, North American Electric Grid Reliability Corp. et al., April 2023; T estimony of
Federal Energy Regulatory Commissioners Willie Phillips, Mark Christie, and James Danly before the
Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee, May 4, 2023, warning: "We face unprecedented
challenges to the reliability of our nation's electric system.".. .the U.S. electric grid is "heading for a very
catastrophic situation in terms of reliability..." and there is a "looming reliability crisis in our electricity
markets."
EPA must reconsider its analysis on technical feasibility by considering a full range of data on
grid reliability. The Rapid Energy Policy Evaluation and Analysis Toolkit Domestic, a project of
Princeton University, projects electricity demand would need to increase 18% by 2030 and 38%
by 2035 to meet the president's EV goals.2 Many are warning of the lack of infrastructure to
support the EV goals. The nation would need to spend $20 billion to $30 billion annually on new
transmission lines for the increased demand, but is spending next to nothing.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0679, p.3]
2 Preview: Final REPEAT Project Findings on the Emissions Impacts of the Inflation Reduction Act and
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Rapid Energy Policy Evaluation and Analysis Toolkit, Princeton
University, April 2023.
3 Rob Gramlich, founder and president of Grid Strategies, a transmission policy group, as quoted in "Why
the electric vehicle boom could put a major strain on the U.S. power grid," CNBC, July 1, 2023.
Further, it is not at all clear that the proposed rule will reduce GHGs as planned. Pure plug-in
battery-powered vehicles can create more emissions than hybrid EVs (HEV) and even more than
some traditional ICEVs for a variety of reasons including the fuel mix of the electrical grid
where the EV is being charged and the large GHG footprint for producing the battery. The
manufacture of a battery can produce GHGs equivalent to driving 24,000 miles, in the case of a
Nissan Leaf up to 60,000 miles in the case of a Tesla Model S.4 Those numbers are before a
single mile is driven by the supposed ZEV with its associated GHGs from the electricity used.
When C02 emissions linked to the production of batteries and the energy mix are considered, a
study in Germany found EVs emit 11% to 28% more than their diesel counterparts. 5 Volvo
reports that in comparing a gas-burning model with its fully electric equivalent, with both
vehicles built in the same factory, on the same assembly line, and sharing a large number of
components, it found the electric version results in 70% more emissions.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0679, p. 3]
4 "A Data-Driven Greenhouse Gas Emission Rate Analysis for Vehicle Comparisons," SAE International,
Journal of Electrified Vehicles, V132-14EJ, April 13, 2022.
5 Kohlemotoren, Windmotoren und Dieselmotoren: Was zeigt die C02-Bilanz?, Crhristoph Buchal et al.,
Ifo Institut, 2019.
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6 "Building An EV Produces 70% More Emissions Than ICE, Says Volvo," InsideEVs, Andrei Nedelea,
November 20, 2021.
EPA needs better analysis of the GHG reductions by EVs. The assumption that they are "zero
emission" must be tested using a more comprehensive analysis of full lifecycle emissions
sources from EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 3]
Arbitrary and Capricious
The proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious because EPA relies on incomplete facts, biased
studies, and mistaken assumptions in an attempt to restructure the entire vehicle market. The rule
exposes the country to severe grid instability and increases the chances for electricity blackouts
and brownouts. EPA's reasoning and justification for the rule are similarly flawed, based on a
market assessment that is faulty. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 8]
EPA relies on rosy market projections, citing a Bloomberg New Energy Finance analysis
suggesting that, "under current policy and market conditions, and prior to the IRA, the U.S. was
on pace to reach 40 to 50 percent PEVs by 2030. When adjusted for the effects of the Inflation
Reduction Act, this estimate increases to 52 percent." (p. 29189) EPA also cites the International
Council on Clean Transportation as projecting an increase in new car sales of 67%. EPA should
conduct a more robust market analysis with less biased sources if it is to avoid the charge of
being arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 8]
However, with the generous assumption that the market penetration numbers are correct, then
why does EPA need to move forward with this rule at all? If EPA is right and EV sales will
increase to 67% by 2032 anyway, why is the rule necessary? We are inclined to think that a more
robust market analysis would reach another conclusion, especially as market penetration
increases and the effects from the strain on the electrical grid would become apparent. Given the
fundamental lack of authority to force this transition, EPA's own analysis of market penetration
by 2032 suggests the rule is unwise. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 8]
Organization: World Resources Institute (WRI)
Thus, we urge EPA to strengthen and finalize the strongest rule possible as [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0544, pp.1-3]
1. Complementary policies provide incentives for vehicle manufacturers and consumers
in the transition; and
2. Strong private investments are rapidly expanding supply chains and manufacturing,
helping to accelerate the transition to cleaner, electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-
0544, pp. 1-3]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
Expanded EV deployment will lead to significant changes to the 24-hour electricity demand
cycle. By incorporating emerging technologies such as power storage and grid-scale battery
technology, using smart software to optimize charging schedules, capitalizing on time-of-use
rates, and ensuring strategic charging buildout, transportation electrification has the potential to
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become a mechanism for reinforcing and stabilizing U.S. electricity infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 2]
c. Electricity Generation and Grid Readiness
Transitioning to zero-emission transportation offers a unique challenge to the energy
companies that will need to ensure they have ample electricity supply to match EV-driven
demand. At minimum, this will require investments in the electricity distribution system to
enable the deployment of electric vehicle charging equipment. In some instances, this may also
require investing in new energy generation sources and associated distribution system
infrastructure to accommodate high-use EV charging centers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
pp. 45-46]
However, this is not the first time electricity providers have navigated increases in electricity
demand brought on by new technologies: similar spikes accompanied the mass adoption of now-
standard appliances like refrigerators and in-home air conditioners. Still, it will be important to
ensure that providers and government agencies can work within their regulatory frameworks to
test solutions and upgrade the grid to prepare for future demand increases accompanying greater
EV adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 45-46]
This section will discuss the growing energy demands of widespread EV adoption and new
potential hotspots for energy demand. It will also use case studies to highlight how electricity
providers are preparing for this transition. These case studies showcase solutions that have the
potential to revolutionize energy consumption and highlight how electricity providers support
customer EV adoption through incentive programs, building infrastructure, and other initiatives.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 45-46]
The grid's ability to handle millions of additional EVs hinges on utilities' proactive planning
capacity. Granting utilities the flexibility to make proactive upgrades to the electrical grid and
facilitate transportation electrification will require careful planning and coordination between
regulators and stakeholders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 45-46]
Regulatory certainty will allow utilities to make the investments necessary to facilitate a
smooth EV transition. To invest proactively, rather than in response to firm load, energy
providers will need clear insight into multi-year schedules for customer electrification, approval
from regulators to recover costs, and/or flexibility to serve loads with non-wire alternatives.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 45-46]
Stringent EPA emissions standards will provide the regulatory certainty needed to not only
ensure vehicle manufacturers continue to invest in EV technologies, but that the entire supply
chain supporting the transition to electrification will have a clearer picture of how to plan capital
expenditures today to meet the increased demand over the coming years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, pp. 45-46]
i. Anticipated Impacts to the Electrical Grid from Increased EV Deployment
In 2021, the U.S. fleet of electric vehicles used 6.1 TWhs of electricity to travel 19.1 billion
miles.205 That accounted for just 0.15% of the total national energy generation that year.206 In
2022, the United States produced 4,243 TWhs of electricity.207 To meet the demand of
transportation electrification, more generation will be needed to service EVs and electrified
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vehicle technologies. One estimate suggests it would take roughly 800 to 1,900 TWh of
electricity to power all vehicles if they were electric.208 It is important to remember, however,
that this new demand will not occur all at once but rather more gradually as EVs continue to
displace ICEVs. While achievable, meeting this increase in electricity demand will require
significant strategy as electric providers transition to renewable, carbon free resources. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 46]
205 "Assessment of Light-Duty Plug-in Electric Vehicles in the United States, 2010-2021Argonne
National Laboratory, (November 2022) https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2022/ll/178584.pdf
206 "Monthly Energy Review May 2023," EIA,
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec7_3.pdf
207 Id. at footnote 206
208 "How much electricity would it take to power all cars if they were electric?," USAFacts, (May 15,
2023) https://usafacts.org/articles/how-much-electricity-would-it-take-to-power-all-cars-if-they-were-
electric/
The key to meeting these energy requirements will be the expansion of renewable energy
resources but also the addition of new, zero-emission and low-emission load-following resources
like advanced nuclear, carbon capture, long-term energy storage, and green hydrogen. In 2022,
electricity generated from renewable sources surpassed coal for the first time in U.S. history.209
At the same time, electricity providers are looking at ways to add low-cost energy storage to
increase the availability of non-dispatchable renewable generation such as solar and wind. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 46-47]
Currently, renewable energy generates about 20% of all electricity production in the U.S, and
renewable sources like solar and wind are expected to account for the majority of new utility-
scale electricity generation going forward.210,211 Already, available renewable energy
resources in the U.S. are estimated to amount to more than 100 times the nation's current
electricity needs.212 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 46-47]
209 "U.S. renewable electricity surpassed coal in 2022," Associated Press, (March 28, 2023)
https://apnews.com/article/renewable-energy-coal-nuclear-climate-change-
dd4a0bl68fe057f430e37398615155a0
210 "Renewable Energy," U.S. Department of Energy, accessed June 4, 2023
https://www.energy.gov/eere/renewable-energy
211 "Solar power will account for nearly half of new U.S. electric generating capacity in 2022," EIA,
(January 10, 2022) https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=50818
212 "Renewable Energy Resource Assessment Information for the United States," U.S. Department of
Energy, accessed June 4, 2023 https://www.energy.gov/eere/analysis/renewable-energy-resource-
assessment-information-united-states
Power generation is only one of the considerations when preparing for 100% transportation
electrification. In particular, the industry needs to develop its ability to precisely manage demand
in real time, including by accurately predicting when and where increases in demand will occur.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 47]
It is important to note that energy demand is not constant. Instead, it consists of relatively
predictable peaks and troughs throughout the day. High demand consistently occurs between
5:00 PM and 8:00 PM each day, as customers return home, turn up their climate control systems,
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begin cooking dinner, and turn on other devices.213 System demand peak is typically between
5:00-6:00 PM during the summer, and 7:00-8:00 AM in the winter. As such, EV charging poses
minimal impacts to the winter peak hours but could increase summer peaks without managed
charging. As discussed further below, electricity providers are looking at ways to reduce the
impact of EV charging on these spikes in energy demand by studying the energy needs of their
customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 47]
213 "Yes, the grid can handle EV charging, even when demand spikes," Yale Climate Connections, (March
23, 2023) https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2023/03/yes-the-grid-can-handle-ev-charging-even-when-
demand-spikes/
ii. Utility-Specific Planning Underway
The following collection of case studies demonstrates how electricity providers in ZETA's
membership are preparing for the EV transition and highlights some of their groundbreaking
initiatives to support EV adoption in the United States. It should be noted that each provider
operates within a regulatory framework that is unique to the state in which it serves. The cases
outlined below do not represent the entire portfolio of EV-related products and services offered
by these providers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 47-48]
These examples include programs that exist across the EV supply chain, with earlier examples
covering infrastructure planning programs and later examples focusing on programs to engage
with EV drivers on their charging needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 47-48]
1. Pacific Gas & Electric
As California's largest electric provider, PG&E continues to play an important role in
advancing electric vehicle adoption in support of the state's broad climate goals. PG&E works in
collaboration with the California Energy Commission and California Public Utilities
Commission to plan and approve grid infrastructure upgrades to support this shift to zero-
emission transportation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 47-48]
With nearly 500,000 EVs sold in its service area—one in every seven of all EVs on the road
throughout the nation—expansion of PG&E's EV charging network in Northern and Central
California is critical to support the State's transition to a clean transportation future. Over the last
half-decade, the provider has deployed more than 5,000 EV charging ports across its service
area. Additionally, it offers a variety of resources to help accelerate EV adoption among
customers, and PG&E is working collaboratively with vehicle manufacturers to develop vehicle
grid-integration technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 47-48]
Grid planning requires precise forecasts to ensure electric infrastructure is available to support
future demand. Pre-existing electricity demand (load) forecasts did not provide the geographical
granularity needed to best plan for grid investments. PG&E could allocate the load to residential
charging locations; however, larger charging loads that are often not associated with existing
service points—such as public charging systems—lacked a methodology to be accounted for in
long-term forecasting efforts. Without the ability to identify future EV demand with geographic
and temporal accuracy, PG&E was limited in its ability to plan future grid capacity. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 47-48]
Lacking a long-term geospatial forecasting methodology, PG&E was primarily dependent on
customer requests for service to inform where EV load would materialize. This reliance on
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customer requests led PG&E to reactively develop capacity solutions to serve load requests.
Given the long lead times often associated with capacity projects and the relatively fast pace at
which customers wish to build EV charging infrastructure, there would be instances where
energization timelines exceeded the requested energization date from customers. This can occur
with large load applications associated with public DCFC charging stations or large fleets, which
have the potential to exceed the maximum capacity of existing electrical infrastructure in those
areas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 47-48]
Identifying a need for a more proactive approach, PG&E set out to improve its forecasting
abilities to increase the clarity of where and when EV loading is most likely to materialize. This
enables PG&E to build capacity in advance of service applications being received. Although
research indicates that customer preference for EVs is increasing, and there are many regulations
and incentives which further support the transition to EVs, there are still uncertainties around the
pace of adoption. This impacts how the EV load will manifest on the electric grid. For this
reason, a solution capable of supporting a variety of forecast scenarios was necessary for success.
PG&E commissioned a multi-faceted project focused on three common categories of EV
charging load: 1) public DCFC & Level 2 charging stations, 2) residential EV charging, and 3)
fleet charging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 48-49]
Detailed analysis and machine learning modeling and testing were applied to each of these
focus areas to predict where EV charging is most likely to occur. These analyses were performed
at the premise level and resulted in over 5 million potential growth points across PG&E's service
territory that were integrated into existing distribution planning software. This created a dynamic
tool that can adapt to a variety of forecast inputs, such as system-level adoption forecasts, EV
charging behaviors, and charging infrastructure assumptions. These scenarios can be integrated
into PG&E's distribution planning processes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 48-49]
Developing a solution that was easily integrated into existing distribution planning processes
and software was critical for successful implementation. Involving PG&E forecasting and asset
planning teams in the development of the EV forecasting tool, as well as reviewing and approval
of the major inputs and assumptions used to develop forecast scenarios, ensured alignment in the
scenarios generated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 48-49]
Using varying EV forecast scenarios, PG&E was able to assess the localized grid impacts
from high EV adoption scenarios that are better aligned with state transportation electrification
goals and policies. PG&E assessed how various levels of EV adoption, as well as the impacts
that changing charging behaviors (such as on vs. off-peak charging), can have on grid needs.
Early analysis has indicated that off-peak charging can reduce near-term grid constraints. In the
future, this may lead to new circuit peaks and capacity constraints that must be addressed. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 48-49]
Results from these analyses were helpful in advocating for approval of higher transportation
electrification forecasts with regulators and the state energy commission, which are ultimately
used for electric grid planning. PG&E has also used these forecasts to produce directional
assessments of the resources needed to support capacity investments included in their long-term
capital planning. PG&E continues to work to improve its forecasting and planning capabilities.
Still, the solutions implemented to date have enabled a more robust approach that will allow
PG&E to continue to support its customers' electrification transition. PG&E's plan for a high
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electrification future also includes the following measures:214 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
pp. 49-50]
214 "Answers to Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Seeking Additional Information on the Distribution
Planning Process by Pacific Gas and Electric Company," PG&E, (April 10, 2023)
https://docs.cpuc.ca.gOv/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M505/K839/505839889.PDF
-Working diligently to plan and develop capacity infrastructure to ensure electricity is
available where peak demand is expected to increase as zero-emission vehicle adoption
continues to grow. Efforts include close collaboration with state agencies, technology
partnerships, EV charging developers, vehicle original equipment manufacturers, and adopters of
zero-emission vehicles to proactively prepare electric capacity in high demand areas in ways that
consider economic development and customer electricity rates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, pp. 49-50]
-Proactive discussions with customers and municipalities to understand their individual plans
for electrification load growth to better include them in PG&E forecasting and planning. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 49-50]
-In addition to using customer TE plans to inform longer-term load forecasts and planning,
PG&E is also using these customer plans to inform our near-term priority proactive upgrades.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 49-50]
-Working with state agencies and regulators to increase the load forecasts that are used for
utility planning, enabling a faster build out of additional capacity infrastructure (as described
earlier). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 49-50]
2. Vistra
Electricity generators are making the transition to low-and no-carbon-emitting sources of
energy as quickly as possible in response to investor, regulator, policymaker, and customer
expectations. This transition is backed by a strong business case for doing so, as renewables and
battery storage systems are able to compete effectively with fossil fuel generation and provide
benefits to the power grid. The International Energy Agency expects renewable energy resources
to provide 18% of the world's power by 2030, up from 11.2% in 2019.215 However, certain
renewable energy sources—such as solar and offshore/onshore wind—are dependent on weather
conditions and the time of day. This means deploying these resources at scale will require
accompanying battery technology to ensure electric grid reliability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, p. 50]
215 "Modern renewables," IEA, accessed June 4, 2023 https://www.iea.org/reports/sdg7-data-and-
projections/modern-renewables
Energy storage allows for the integration of more intermittent resources by storing electricity
until it is needed. It also augments existing energy generation by allowing excess energy to be
produced when low demand is stored until demand peaks. Energy storage can provide benefits
beyond emissions reduction, including cost-savings for consumers, reliability, and backup and
startup power during extreme events. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 50]
Vistra operates the Moss Landing Energy Storage Facility in California, the largest of its kind
in the world, and is pursuing an expansion that will bring 750 MW online in the second quarter
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of 2023.216 This facility is particularly valuable in California, where the swift transition to
renewable energy, paired with a constantly growing demand for electricity, illustrates the need
for reliability in the electric grid and the role energy storage can play. As of 2021, non-
hydroelectric renewables provide approximately 35% of California's electricity, and electricity
demand has increased due to a variety of factors, including severe weather events, widespread
electrification, and electric vehicle deployment.217 This combination was put to the test in
September 2022, when the state faced its most extreme September heat event in recorded history.
This weather event put unprecedented strain on the electric grid and set records for electricity
demand. To the surprise of many, the lights stayed on. During that event, batteries, including
Vistra's Moss Landing facility, provided about 4% of supply—over 3,360 MW, more than the
Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant (the state's largest electricity generator)—during the peak
demand, averting rolling blackouts. A report from the California Independent System Operation
(CAISO) following the September 2022 event specifically highlighted the increase in energy
storage resources as a key factor that supported the grid's reliability.218 As a comparison, the
August 2020 heat wave, which occurred when California's energy storage resources were few
and far between, resulted in rolling blackouts over multiple days. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, pp. 50-51]
216 "Vistra Announces Expansion of World's Largest Battery Energy Storage Facility," Vistra, (January
24, 2022) https://investor.vistracorp.com/2022-01-24-Vistra-Announces-Expansion-of-Worlds-Largest-
Battery-Energy-Storage-Facility
217 "2021 Total System Electric Generation," California Energy Commission, accessed June 5, 2023
https://www.energy.ca.gOv/data-reports/energy-almanac/california-electricity-data/2021-total-system-
electric-genera tion
218 "California ISO posts analysis of September heat wave," California ISO, accessed June 5, 2023
http://www.caiso.com/Documents/california-iso-posts-analysis-of-september-heat-wave.pdf
Recognizing that the replacement of fossil fuel-powered assets with zero-carbon resources is
not a one-to-one exchange, Vistra is working to maintain reliability by using energy storage and
installing zero-carbon investments on the sites of retired or soon-to-be-retired fossil fuel plants.
This also ensures that communities do not lose key energy supplies or ongoing tax revenue.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 51-52]
Vistra is also focused on ensuring that existing zero-carbon generation remains online, such as
the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant in Texas, which is currently going through the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's relicensing process to continue operations through 2053. This high-
performing plant is able to produce power—rain, snow, or shine—increasing grid reliability for
Texans and making it a keystone generator for the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT) grid. Alongside the transition to cleaner generation resources, Vistra has been able to
maintain reliability for its consumers and ensure that individuals and businesses are able to keep
their lights on, even during extreme weather events. During Winter Storm Uri in Texas in 2021,
Vistra's plants produced between 25-30% of the power on the grid during the storm, far beyond
its -18% market share. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 51-52]
As the energy supply mix shifts toward low-and zero-carbon resources, energy storage will
fill the reliability gap and allow that mix to evolve more reliably and flexibly. The Inflation
Reduction Act provides new tax incentives for investment in energy storage technologies and
resources to support the R&D of advanced and long-duration energy storage technologies. These
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investments will enable the deployment of utility-scale energy storage and add reliability to the
grid, no matter what the future energy generation mix looks like. It is crucial that the United
States continues to make the transition to a carbon-neutral economy and electric grid in a way
that ensures the continued reliability of the grid at a reasonable cost to consumers. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 51-52]
3. Southern California Edison
About 40% of the nation's electric vehicles, more than 1.3 million, have been sold in the state
of California. More than 430,000 of those are in SCE's service area alone. Many have expressed
doubts that the grid is ready for the energy demand created by the need to charge so many EVs,
but electric power companies, including SCE, are keeping up with increasing levels of adoption.
In anticipation of growing EV demand in Southern California, SCE is continuously taking the
steps to upgrade the grid and promote customers' transition to electric transportation and
proactively solve near-term issues, while also undertaking long-term investments to ensure the
grid is ready for all levels of anticipated electrification adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, pp. 52-53]
Solving near-term challenges
One way SCE is addressing the near-term issues is its Power Service Availability (PSA)
initiative for Transportation Electric service. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 52-53]
-SCE is focusing on (1) improving its internal processes to streamline interconnection, (2)
engaging fleet operators to better understand their plans for electrification, (3) improving its
ability to forecast and assess the impacts of transportation electrification (TE) growth, and (4)
leveraging new technologies as grid infrastructure solutions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
pp. 52-53]
-Because some projects require more time than others to build, SCE is encouraging fleet
owners to engage with the utility early in the process so that SCE can better understand and plan
for the fleets' needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 52-53]
SCE is also improving how we partner with customers to meet their needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, pp. 52-53]
-This includes streamlining buildout, developing deeper customer engagements that include
rate planning and load management education, and right-sizing grid solutions to meet the
expected charging demand growth in both the near and long term. These efforts will provide
more innovative and customer-focused solutions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 52-53]
In addition to customer project deployment, SCE has also pushed to accelerate EV adoption
through customer-side infrastructure programs such as Charge Ready for light-duty vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 52-53]
-Through its Charge Ready program, SCE installs, maintains, and covers installation costs for
charging infrastructure while participants own, operate, and maintain the charging stations. For
those ready to invest in EV charging for medium-and heavy-duty vehicles, SCE's Charge Ready
Transport program similarly offers low-to no-cost site upgrades to support the installation. The
program provides funding to help electrify semi-trucks, buses, and delivery vehicles, among
others. Through its Charge Ready programs, SCE has installed more than 3,000 charging ports
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throughout its service area and is targeting 30,000 charging ports by 2026. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, pp. 52-53]
SCE's Transportation Electrification Advisory Services program is also available for
commercial customers considering electric transportation options. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, pp. 52-53]
-On top of offering educational webinars and workshops, the program also offers to develop
site-specific EV-readiness studies to help determine the feasibility of proposed projects and grant
writing assistance to help customers secure zero-emission vehicle grants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, pp. 52-53]
Long-term Planning and investing in the grid for TE
SCE is improving the value of EV adoption forecasts used for grid planning by assessing
where, when, and how much EVs are likely to charge. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 53-
54]
-SCE led the West Coast Clean Transit Corridor Initiative, composed of nine other electric
utilities and two agencies representing more than two dozen municipal utilities, to conduct a
multi-phase and multi-year research study to forecast EV truck populations and determine the
proper number and size of highway charging sites. Subsequent phases of this initiative are
supporting internal planning operations across the participating utilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, pp. 53-54]
-SCE developed an augmented forecasting approach to capture accelerated load growth due to
Medium-Duty / Heavy Duty (MDHD) vehicles as well as the direct current fast charging
(DCFC) for Light-Duty vehicles and port electrification for the recent General Rate Case (GRC)
Application. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 53-54]
-Because MDHD electrification is still nascent, current forecasting methodologies
that are based (in part) on historical adoption are insufficient [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
pp. 53-54]
-For the GRC, SCE's augmented forecasting methodology leverages MDHD fleet
industry data to more accurately predict MDHD electrification adoption and corresponding grid
needs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 53-54]
-The augmented forecasting approach also included added load from DCFC
charging plazas for Light-Duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 53-54]
-SCE (and the IOUs) are collaborating with CPUC on a new "Freight Infrastructure
Planning" (FIP) Framework to further address planning for MDHD [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, pp. 53-54]
-SCE is working to expand the current distribution planning forecast window from 10 years to
20 years. Developing and implementing an interagency-sponsored forecast that spans 20 years
for distribution will bring benefits, such as: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 53-54]
-Identifying long lead time projects that are needed beyond the 10-year horizon
-Identifying important land acquisition needs
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-Informing how the development of infrastructure may need to be levelized to
practically achieve the scale of development required by achieving state ZEV policies and GHG
targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 53-54]
-SCE has proposed robust investments in its GRC application to support TE adoption and
load growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 53-54]
-The investments proposed are designed to ensure long-lead infrastructure projects
(such as substation expansion or new substations) will be completed when load growth arrives.
The plan especially focuses on high TE locations: freight corridors, fleet hubs, Port of Long
Beach, etc. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 53-54]
-Specific TE-focused projects include: [See original comment for project types
table] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 53-54]
4. Con Edison
Con Edison is helping to accelerate New York State's transition to clean transportation and
EV adoption through grid and customer investments that support buildout of a widespread
charging network. The Company's PowerReady Program provides incentives to connect
thousands of new public and private charging stations to the electric grid. Authorized by the New
York State Public Service Commission's July 2020 Order Establishing Electric Vehicle
Infrastructure Make-Ready Program and Other Programs, the program offsets the electric
infrastructure costs associated with installing chargers for light-duty EVs, including cars and
small vans. To date, nearly 4,000 Level 2 and 175 DCFC chargers have been installed under the
program, with the goal of installing 18,539 Level 2 and 457 DCFC chargers by 2025, with the
potential for significant expansion of the program budget and goals as recently recommended by
the New York State Department of Public Service Staff. The Company provides a similar pilot
program for medium-and heavy-duty (MHD) vehicles, and a full-scale program is being
considered in the recently launched New York State proceeding to address barriers to MHD
charging infrastructure (MHD Proceeding). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 54-55]
Along with these infrastructure incentive programs, Con Edison also offers the SmartCharge
New York managed charging program that provides incentives for personal drivers to charge
outside of grid peak periods and the Company is launching a commercial managed charging
program later this year including eligibility for all fleets, public stations, and multi-unit
dwellings. SmartCharge New York is discussed below as an example of how managed charging
can help mitigate the impact of EV charging on the grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp.
54-55]
An essential step in EV charger buildout is interconnection with the grid. Con Edison has
developed dedicated teams that support the growing number of EV charging interconnections,
including those that provide load evaluation, engineering review, project queue management, and
incentive deployments. The Company is implementing multiple efforts to improve the customer
experience and speed interconnection timelines and will continue to identify and implement
efficiencies and improvements. For example, the Company provides pre-application advisory
services for fleets and other customers to evaluate site feasibility and understand electric fueling
costs, automates internal processes such as service rulings for smaller stations, and is
coordinating with permitting agencies to identify and resolve challenges. Con Edison provides
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load-serving capacity maps to help those seeking to install EV charging infrastructure identify
suitable sites with adequate grid capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 54-55]
While Con Edison is supporting installation of increasing numbers of EV chargers under its
programs today, the Company is also working to evolve its robust planning processes to prepare
for the ramp in clean transportation loads. These loads are expected to drive significant grid
impacts in New York State and ambitious emissions regulations will further accelerate an
already rapidly growing EV market, with the exact timing in the inflection point unknown. The
timeline to install EV chargers is relatively short compared to that of other new customer
infrastructure, such as a new building, while the buildout of utility-side grid infrastructure to
meet the significant increase in demand from EV chargers requires longer timelines, sometimes
of 5 to 7 years. A proactive grid planning process to meet near-term needs and build out the grid
in advance to support long-term growth in the deployment of EVs is being considered in the New
York State MHD Proceeding. Con Edison, along with other NY State Utilities, filed comments
proposing a proactive utility infrastructure planning framework to prepare the grid in advance of
future transportation electrification needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 54-55]
SmartCharge New York Managed Charging Case Study
In 2017, Con Edison launched SmartCharge New York program with the goal of instilling
grid-beneficial charging behavior in parallel with the upswing in electric vehicle adoption. The
goal was to influence driver behavior at the inflection point of transitioning from combustion-
engine fueling to electric battery charging and have drivers default to grid-optimizing charging
activity. Program participants received a free cellular-enabled device that plugs into the vehicle's
diagnostic port that allowed Con Edison to track time, energy, and power consumed when
charging in the utility's service territory. Incentives encourage drivers to 1) avoid charging
during the system peak (2 PM to 6 PM) during summer weekdays from June to September, and
2) charge overnight from 12 AM to 8 AM. Incentives were initially paid off-bill through gift
cards to the customer's business of choice, such as Amazon, Starbucks, or Home Depot. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 56]
As electric vehicle adoption continues to rise, managing charging behavior will grow
increasingly important in maintaining a healthy and reliable grid. Since its inception, the
SmartCharge New York program has evolved to meet customer needs and program objectives.
Starting in 2023 for example, the program was overhauled to allow participation through a
mobile application and payments are now issued through Venmo or Paypal, in line with
participant feedback. This shift also changed the way the program collects data, favoring more
cost-effective vehicle onboard telematics or networked electric vehicle supply equipment such as
a Wi-Fi-enabled charger or charging cable. This enables the program to scale efficiently with the
market and give a greater number of drivers insight into their behavior and how that activity
translates to incentive earnings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 56]
In light of the EPA announcement of its heavy-duty and light/medium-duty proposed
emissions standards, Con Edison released the following statement: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, pp. 56-57]
"Con Edison applauds the Environmental Protection Agency's efforts to rev up the market for
electric vehicles, which will improve the air in the communities we serve and help in the fight
against climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 56-57]
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A rapid shift to mass EV adoption looks more achievable all the time, with vehicle options
expanding and new charging stations being built across New York City and Westchester County,
including locations that serve the needs of disadvantaged communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, pp. 56-57]
Con Edison will continue to support the EV market's development through investment in the
grid and by offering a range of programs, from incenting new chargers to managing the grid
impact by rewarding drivers for charging overnight."219 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp.
56-57]
219 "Con Edison Supports Effort to Encourage Electric Vehicle Adoption," Con Edison Media Relations,
(April 12, 2023) https://www.coned.com/en/about-us/media-center/news/2023/04-12/con-edison-supports-
effort-to-encourage-electri c-vehicle-adoption
5. SRP
When EVs were still in the early stages of adoption, SRP recognized the importance of
exploring ways to identify EV households and analyze their charging behavior in order to help
prepare for greater EV uptake in the future. It was also important to begin engaging customers
who were EV drivers in order to understand their interests and their charging patterns and assess
ways to influence charging behaviors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
In 2014, SRP launched "EV Community" (EVC)—a program that offers customers a $50 bill
credit for each EV they register (up to two vehicles per household)—as a means to incentivize
EV drivers to identify themselves and engage with SRP. Participants provide basic information
about the electric vehicle and the type of charger they use. This provides a way for SRP to learn
more about EV customers and their charging behavior and needs while offering them an
incentive to help support EV growth in the region. There are currently more than 7,500
customers enrolled in the program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
While EVC members only account for a small number of total EV households, they are a fair
overall representation of the EV customer base since all price plans are included, as well as
households with one vs. two EVs. The program offers SRP a good platform for analysis,
including the type of cars they drive (PHEV, BEV, brand, etc.) and the charge levels they use. In
addition, SRP found that EVC members are willing to share information and are eager to
participate in future pilot programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
The EVC program also provides SRP with a method and channel to promote their Electric
Vehicle Price Plan, a special time-of-use pricing plan which offers EV drivers the most
opportunity to save on EV charging costs by charging during super off-peak times (between 11
PM and 5 AM). Load research has shown that this program has been highly effective at shifting
EV charging loads away from peak periods. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
The EVC program has helped SRP plan and prepare the grid for widespread EV adoption by
enabling them to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
-Anticipate load growth. A pilot study with EVC members that monitors their EV driving and
charging behavior through data telematics devices enables SRP to estimate typical consumption
and charging load profiles per EV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
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-Understand the impacts of EV charging on the grid. EVC data is used to model the impacts
of EV charging on the electric grid, identify when transformers and wires may need to be
upgraded, and understand when and how customers need to charge. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, pp. 57-58]
-Recruit for Managed Charging pilot programs. The EVC program and channel have enabled
SRP to recruit participants for additional Managed Charging pilot programs to test other active
control technologies to control EV charging load on the grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
pp. 57-58]
-Survey participants for insights. EVC members are surveyed regularly to get more data on
their charging behaviors, including their use of home, workplace, and public charging and their
satisfaction with EVs overall. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
-Engagement. EVC participants receive regular newsletters and other communications with
EV-related information. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 57-58]
6. Duke Energy
Electric fleet commitments are increasing as companies with ambitious sustainability goals
work to decarbonize operations. Fleet owners are also seeking ways to take advantage of the cost
savings available by transitioning to EVs. However, programs for fleet electrification and
managed charging options are still limited to date. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 58-59]
When transitioning to an electric fleet, it is important that fleet managers understand the full
scope of charging multiple vehicles while maintaining fleet operations and that larger MHDVs
bring with them additional factors to consider. Fleet owners who have electrified fleets without
consulting experts or an electric provider have likely been experiencing avoidable operational
and technological issues. Long-term energy cost and performance risk are also potential issues
for fleets and can hinder mainstream fleet electrification technology development if not managed
correctly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 58-59]
Duke Energy's significant experience and large customer base make it well-positioned to
design and implement fleet electrification and charging programs. Duke Energy is building a
first-of-its-kind performance center that will model and accelerate the development, testing, and
deployment of zero-emission light-, medium-, and heavy-duty commercial electric vehicle EV
fleets. The site will be located in North Carolina at Duke Energy's Mount Holly Technology and
Innovation Center and incorporate microgrid integration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp.
58-59]
The fleet electrification center will provide a commercial-grade charging experience for fleet
customers evaluating or launching electrification strategies—reinforcing reliability, clean power,
and optimization by integrating solar, storage, and microgrid controls software applications. The
center will be connected to both the Duke Energy grid—charging from the bulk electric
system—and to 100% carbon-free resources through the microgrid located at Mount Holly. This
project is the first electric fleet depot to offer a microgrid charging option. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, pp. 58-59]
In addition to fleet charging, the site will also function as an innovation hub, allowing Duke
Energy to collect data around charger use, performance, management, and energy integration
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with various generation resources. It will also allow for the development of managed charging
algorithms for fleets connected to the bulk power system or integrated with renewables and
storage—which can be utilized to minimize the upgrades needed to the distribution system,
easing the transition to electrifying fleets. Identifying EV charging technologies and how they
may be used to power any type of fleet with vehicles (ranging from class 1) will help develop a
model to show the industry a clear, integrated, and cost-effective path to fleet electrification.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 59]
Duke Energy is teaming up with Daimler Truck North America and Electrada on this
important work. Electrada, an electric fuel solutions company, is providing funding for research
and demonstration efforts. For fleets seeking to electrify, Electrada invests all required capital
"behind the meter" and delivers reliable charging to the fleet's electric vehicles through a
performance contract, eliminating the complexity and risk that fleets face in transitioning to this
new source of fuel. Electrada's investment in the depot allows Duke Energy to focus on
programs that simplify adoption for electric fleet customers and distribution system performance
to support the predictable addition of electric load overtime. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
p. 59]
By the end of 2023, fleet operators will be able to experience a best-in-class, commercial-
grade fleet depot integrated with energy storage, solar, and optimization software. Moving to
zero-emission vehicles in this sector allows North Carolina to seize the large economic potential
of the transition and generate billions in net benefits for the state. Projects like Duke Energy's
fleet performance center will be key for fleet owners across the state to take advantage of the
cost savings of transitioning to electric vehicles. That said, fleet owners exploring electrification
should engage their electricity provider early and often to identify and address site-specific
considerations. As fleet electrification accelerates, it will be important for electricity providers
and policymakers to identify best practices to proactively plan for fleet electrification, including
readying the distribution grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 59]
7. Xcel Energy
Xcel Energy is committed to electrifying all of its light-duty fleet and 30% of its medium-and
heavy-duty fleet by 2030, equating to over 2,500 EVs. It's part of their vision to be a net-zero
energy provider by 2050 and enable one out of five vehicles to be electric in the areas they serve
by 2030. This will save customers $1 billion annually on fuel by 2030 and deliver cleaner air for
everyone. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 59-60]
With a fleet that includes iconic bucket trucks, all-terrain service vehicles, and a host of
pickup trucks and pool cars across eight states, achieving these goals will be no small feat, but an
important one. There are notable hurdles, yet evolving technology presents solutions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 59-60]
Electrifying the Marquee Fleet Vehicle
Xcel Energy is the first electric provider in the nation to add an all-electric bucket truck to its
fleet. The truck features two electric sources: one for the drivetrain and one for the lift
mechanism. It has a 135-mile driving range and can operate the bucket for an entire workday on
a single charge. Crews are collecting data from real working conditions in Minnesota and
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Colorado that will be used to inform further improvement to the vehicle's technology and
operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 59-60]
Optimizing Charging to Minimize Grid Impacts
To support a growing electric fleet, over 1,200 EV chargers must be brought into service by
2030, which will result in an electric load increase of 71 megawatts. Charge management
techniques enable low-cost charging for this growing electric fleet. It's a sophisticated approach
to optimize charging times by using time-of-day and grid demand efficiencies and builds on the
expertise Xcel Energy has developed through offering managed charging programs to customers
in multiple states. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 59-60]
For fleets, overnight charging schedules make the most sense. Demand and rates are lower,
and renewable wind sources are ample at that time. Yet, fast charging outside of these time
periods may be required to help larger vehicles make it through a workday. This is when
charging schedules need to be customized and highly specific. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
pp. 59-60]
Enabling Cleaner Service Calls Through Bucket Truck Technology
Xcel is also taking immediate action on other high-impact emission reduction opportunities,
using technologies such as electric power take-off, idle mitigation, and solar systems to power
jobsite tools. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 60-61]
-Electric power take-off (ePTO) -An ePTO system is a device that uses battery power. It's
similar to an EV, but instead of moving the vehicle down the road, it powers equipment and tools
to avoid engine idling at the job site. These devices are recharged by plugging into the same
chargers that EVs use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 60-61]
-Idle mitigation -An idling truck can consume 1.5 gallons of gas each hour. Idle mitigation on
Xcel Energy's utility bucket trucks works by automatically shutting down the gas-powered
engine when the vehicle is not in use or when the engine is idling for too long. This helps to
reduce emissions and conserve fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 60-61]
Fleet Electrification Solutions for Customers
Xcel Energy's experience and expertise with fleet electrification doesn't stop with their own
fleet. They have developed a mix of customer programs across service areas to support fleet
electrification for businesses and communities. These customer-centric solutions enable
sophisticated planning, lower upfront costs with various rebates and incentives, and minimize
impacts to the grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 61]
Xcel's approach for commercial EV fleet development includes: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, p. 61]
-Advisory services: Xcel offers a "white-glove service" to meet customers where they are on
their electrification journey by guiding them through customized planning for their infrastructure
needs. For fleet operators, this includes a free assessment to help them determine the best path to
electrify their fleet and advise them on future electric fleet considerations such as charging best
practices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 61]
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-Infrastructure installation: Xcel designs and builds EV supply infrastructure to support
charging station installations at minimal to no cost to customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, p. 61]
-Equipment recommendations and rental options: Xcel also provides recommendations for
charging equipment and offers customers the option to purchase their own qualifying vehicle
chargers or rent them at a monthly fee that includes installation and maintenance. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 61]
-Grid continuity: Xcel designs long-term clean energy resource and distribution plans to
consider the future impact of new EV load to ensure ongoing grid stability, reliability and
affordability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 61]
-Equitable opportunities: Xcel supports EV adoption in higher emissions communities and
income-qualified neighborhoods through rebates and incentives. This includes facilitating the
electrification of carshare, refuse trucks, school buses, paratransit vehicles, and other fleets
operating in these disproportionately impacted communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
p. 61]
Fleet electrification is a key component of Xcel Energy's larger vision, which includes
enabling zero-carbon transportation by 2050 across our eight-state service footprint. This long-
term strategy balances affordability with sustainability across the entire grid. It's why Xcel is
dedicated to assisting fleet managers across the ecosystem in providing fleet electrification
solutions that empower and inspire a clean energy future while also leading by example. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 61]
iii. Transmission
A critical part of ensuring a smooth transition to an electrified transportation sector will be a
robust build out of high-voltage transmission lines. Doing so will also enable increased
penetration of renewables into the grid mix, helping to further improve the environmental
benefits of electric vehicles. While progress in this space has historically been slow and bogged
down by procedural delays, there are some signs of progress. In April 2023, the U.S. Bureau of
Land Management approved a 732-mile transmission line, which will carry wind energy from
Wyoming through to Nevada.220 Also in April 2023, a Maine court granted approval to restart
work on the 145-mile New England Clean Energy Connect project, which will carry hydropower
from Canada to New England.221 The line is expected to carry up to 1,200 megawatts of power.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 62]
220 "US approves $3bn Wyoming-Nevada power line," Power Technology, (April 12, 2023)
https://www.power-technology.com/news/us-approves-3bn-wyoming-nevada-power-line
221 "Maine court greenlights embattled $1B transmission line," E&E News, (April 17, 2023)
https://subscriber.politicopro.eom/article/eenews/2023/04/21/maine-court-greenlights-embattled-lb-
transmission-lin e-00093087
Electricity transmission is also a key focus of the Biden-Harris Administration. In May 2023,
the administration published its plan to decrease permitting timelines for new transmission
projects, among other key items.222 Also in May 2023, the U.S. Department of Energy proposed
a rule on designating National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors.223 There will also be a
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role for Congress to play in improving transmission permitting times and this is a policy area
where some bipartisan support exists. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 62]
222 "FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Outlines Priorities for Building America's Energy
Infrastructure Faster, Safer, and Cleaner," (May 2023) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2023/05/10/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-o utlines-priorities-for-
building-americas-energy-infrastructure-faster-safer-and-cleaner/
223 See 88 FR 30956
ii. Impacts to EVSE Deployment from BIL and IRA Programs
With over $7.5 billion available across multiple programs, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law
represents the nation's largest ever investment in increasing Americans' access to EV chargers.
Through the BIL's $5 billion National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program,
the federal government is partnering with private industry to build out a national charging
network along key highway corridors. As of September 2022, the Federal Highway
Administration approved formal plans submitted by all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico and as of June 2023, multiple states had released requests for proposals from
organizations seeking access to NEVI funds. The design of these state application processes
through the NEVI Formula Program will help drive EVSE standardization, which will in turn
improve reliability and consistency in the consumer-facing charging experience. Separately, the
BIL's Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program allocates another
$2.5 billion towards installing EV chargers in communities where people live and work. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 64-65]
As charging deployment continues to increase, the distribution of this network, not just its
size, risks limiting electrification—especially in rural areas. In response, the Biden-Harris
Administration has taken a comprehensive approach to EVSE build-out, recognizing the diverse
demographics, landscapes, and types of communities throughout the United States. Ubitquity and
visibility are important components of a national EVSE network deployment. The Department of
Transportation has put together separate toolkits to guide EVSE deployment in both urban230
and rural231 areas. Both toolkits go through an explanation of electric mobility basics, as well as
the benefits and challenges that are specific to individuals, communities, and transit operators in
their respective region types. Both expand on public-private partnership opportunities, as well as
best practices for early planning and financing. With respect to EVSE, DOT has identified three
levels of EVSE planning: community, corridor, and site. These toolkits are intended to guide
private, state, and local entities as they implement federal funding and engage in other equitable,
thorough EVSE deployment strategies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 64-65]
230 "Charging Forward: A Toolkit for Planning and Funding Urban Electric Mobility Infrastructure," U.S.
Department of Transportation, (June 2023) https://www.transportation.gov/urban-e-mobility-toolkit
231 "Charging Forward: A Toolkit for Planning and Funding Rural Electric Mobility Infrastructure," U.S.
Department of Transportation, (June 2023) https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit
EPA Summary and Response
We received many comments from the public related to the electric power sector, including
generation capacity, transmission capacity, distribution capacity, electric power reliability and
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resiliency, air quality and emissions modeling, inventories, infrastructure upgrade costs,
electricity rates, etc.
In those instances when complex comments span several subjects, the reply may appear in
several related sections. For instance, if a hypothetical comment is submitted regarding "How
local health effects may depend upon future natural gas prices and the likelihood that natural gas-
fired electric generating units (EGU) will provide electricity to the surrounding community?" the
response to the comment may appear in the economics section (as the comment touches upon the
price of natural gas over time) or the response may appear in the air quality modeling section (as
the comment touches upon health effects) or it may appear in this section (as the topic touches
upon electric power sector modeling).
A summary of these comments as well as EPA's response appears below.
Summary:
Topic: Electric Power System: Generation Capacity
We received many comments related to generation capacity from the public. Some
commenters expressed concern that the EPA did not adequately consider the generation system
capacity, while other commenters stated that there would be sufficient generation system
capacity to accommodate the modest increases in electricity demand due to additional PEV
charging associated with the final rule.
Topic: Electric Power System: Transmission Capacity
We received many comments related to transmission capacity from the public. Some
comments expressed concern that the EPA did not adequately consider the transmission system
capacity, while other commenters stated that there would be sufficient transmission system
capacity to accommodate the modest increases in electricity demand due to additional PEV
charging associated with the final rule.
Topic: Electric Power System: Distribution Capacity
We received many comments related to distribution system from the public. Some comments
expressed concern that the EPA did not adequately consider the distribution system capacity,
while other commenters stated that the additional distribution needs associated with the rule
could be addressed, including through additional distribution buildout, managed charging
strategies, and other tools to mitigate distribution needs.
Topic: Electric Power System Reliability and Resilience
We received many comments related to the electric power sector reliability from the public.
The comments expressed concern that the EPA did not adequately characterize possible
improvements and/or degradation to the electric power system. Other commenters stated that the
electric power system has historically been reliable and the rule would not adversely affect grid
reliability.
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Response:
Overview of Distribution Infrastructure Feasibility and Lead-Time
EPA has carefully considered the comments regarding the distribution infrastructure for
charging light- and medium-duty PEVs, including issues of feasibility, lead-time, and costs. In
this first response, we focus on the feasibility and lead-time of distribution infrastructure. The
agency has conducted comprehensive analyses of distribution infrastructure needed to support
light- and medium-duty PEV charging, including in close coordination with the Department of
Energy and informed by the extensive public engagement on this issue. We find that there will
be sufficient lead-time to develop the necessary distribution infrastructure associated with light-
and medium-duty PEV uptake under the modeled potential compliance pathway for the final
standards. We note that the final standards themselves provide significant additional lead-time
relative to the proposal, which also means additional lead-time to build and connect distribution
infrastructure. Our conclusion as to the sufficiency of distribution infrastructure is supported by
numerous comments and analyses, including those from the stakeholders most intimately
familiar with building and operating distribution infrastructure: the utility industry and state
utility agencies. Below, we highlight several key lines of evidence.
Because the need for distribution infrastructure is associated with increases in electricity
demand, EPA evaluated demand increases at the national, regional, and local levels. We found
only modest increases in demand associated with this Rule at all of these levels. Assuming
manufacturers follow the modeled potential compliance pathway—which focuses on increasing
penetrations of light- and medium-duty PEVs—we project the additional generation needed to
meet the projected demand of the light- and medium-duty PEVs under the final standards
combined with our estimate of PEV demand from the Heavy-duty Phase 3 GHG proposed rule,
to be relatively modest compared to a no action case, ranging from 0.93 percent in 2030 to
approximately 12 percent in 2050 for both actions combined. Of that increased generation,
approximately 84 percent in 2030 and approximately 66 percent in 2050 is due to light- and
medium-duty PEVs, which are projected to represent approximately 0.78 percent and 7.6 percent
of total U.S. generation in 2030 and 2050, respectively. These are modest increases and
consistent with historical increases in demand, such as accompanying the introduction of
refrigerators, air conditioners, and data centers, which the electric utilities have successfully
managed.
At the local level, our analysis is informed by the recent Department of Energy Transportation
Electrification Impact Study (TEIS) which found that only a small amount of new infrastructure
would be needed. The TEIS evaluated five States susceptible to increased infrastructure needs,
including due to high concentrations of freight corridors necessitating additional infrastructure,
dense urban areas with less space for infrastructure buildout, and rural areas with relatively little
existing infrastructure. The study evaluated the combined effects of both the Light- and Medium-
Duty Multi-Pollutant Rule and the Phase 3 Rule. It found only minor incremental increases in
peak demand associated with the vehicle rules in 2027 and 2032 (+0.1 to +3.0%) and that even
those minor increases could be reduced, in some cases to below zero (i.e., decreases in peak
demand relative to the baseline without the vehicle rules), through basic, easily implemented,
demand management strategies (-1.8% to +0.5%). The study estimated that the peak demand
increases could be accommodated by a small volume of additional infrastructure; for example, in
2027 with basic management strategies, it found the need for zero new substations, five new
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feeders, and 2,400 transformers. Based on our assessment of the time needed to build different
kinds of infrastructure, EPA determined that the level of buildout identified by the TEIS could be
achieved within the timeframe available. EPA regards these projected increases in infrastructure
as modest. The projected increases in 2027, when there is the shortest lead time for buildout, are
small. As expected, demand is projected to increase in 2032 but there is considerably more
available lead time in which buildout can be accommodated.
We also carefully evaluated programs and funding to support charging infrastructure,
including at the Federal, State, local, and utility levels, for both depot and public charging. The
Federal government continues to provide significant funds for developing charging
infrastructure, including through the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure Discretionary Grant
Program. Many States have also developed programs to support such infrastructure. Many
localities and utilities also are actively developing innovative strategies to build and support
additional charging infrastructure; for example, Edison Electric Institute, the trade group for the
nation's investor-owned utilities, identified numerous such strategies and concluded that needed
infrastructure could be timely developed. The final rule provides beneficial regulatory certainty
to support the development of these programs and of charging infrastructure generally.
Finally, we underscore the potential for numerous innovative strategies to mitigate
distribution infrastructure demands. As noted regarding the TEIS study, even basic mitigation
strategies for light- and medium-duty PEV charging can significantly ameliorate or even reduce
peak demand. A panoply of potential strategies—including short-term load rebalancing, smart
charging contracts, flexible interconnections, hosting capacity maps, managed charging software,
vehicle-to-grid technologies, distributed energy generation, integrated battery storage, and
more—provides many opportunities for mitigating the impacts of additional demand, and in
some cases, for providing benefits back to the grid as the volume of BEV charging increases.
Transportation Electrification Impact Study ("TEIS")
To further respond to comments regarding the lead-time and feasibility of distribution
infrastructure, we provide a more in-depth discussion of TEIS, which addresses these issues.
TEIS also addresses the costs of distribution infrastructure buildout, which are discussed in
preamble IV.C.5 and RIA 5.
The Department of Energy Study, "Transportation Electrification Impact Study" ("TEIS")591
is a first-of-its-kind study which performs thermal capacity analysis (at the substation, feeder,
and service transformer levels) compared to cumulative LMHD vehicle demand (i.e., demand
from both the light- and heavy-duty sectors) enabling location-specific estimates of potential
buildout capacity needs and costs. This is the first study to be bottom up, comparing parcel level
LMHD demand to parcel supply by PV (photo voltaic) and grid capacity at each examined
parcel.592 Previous studies made estimates of how the new demand from BEV might align with
the existing grid capacity or studied the parcel level grid needs for a smaller area (as compared to
this 5 state analysis). The TEIS is especially valuable, in fact unique, in assessing both a large
591 Eric Wood, Brennan Borlaug, Kilian McKenna, Jeremy Keen, Bo Liu, Dave Narang, Lawryn Kiboma, Bin
Wang, Wanshi Hong, Julieta Giraldez, Chuck Moran, Margot Everett, Troy Hodges "DOE Multi-State
Transportation Electrification Impact Study" ( March 2024) ("TEIS").
592 A "parcel", as used in TEIS, means "a real estate property or land and any associated structures that are the
property of a person with identification for taxation purposes." TEIS at 16 n. 18.
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area (5-State) coupled with parcel-level analysis.593 The study focuses on five study States
(California, Illinois, New York, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania), and extrapolates those results
nationwide. The five states were intentionally chosen to address geographic concerns such as
freight corridors, crowded urban areas, and rural areas with widely distributed demand sources.
These states represent 30-35% of the costs of the extrapolated results in the TEIS, and 20% of
overall peak 2021 demand. 594 They also account for nearly 20% of 2021 nationwide utility
noncoincident595 peak demand and account for 28% of investor-owned utility national
investment.596 The study also incorporates public charging such that the corresponding high
power needs are reflected, addressing a concern of many comments. The study estimates
overload at the substation level (100% criteria)597, feeder level (100% criteria), and at the
residential service transformer per feeder level (125% criteria).598 Scenarios examined are no
action case (baseline without EPA light-duty or heavy-duty emission standards), and action case
with EPA light and heavy duty rules), using as an Action case the same case EPA used for its
national and regional estimates presented above.), Both action and no action cases are analyzed
with and without mitigation resulting in four scenarios generated. The study examines the same
four scenarios for both 2027 and 2032.599 The TEIS unmanaged (without mitigation) case
assumes BEVs charge as soon as they arrive at a charger. In contract, the managed case simply
distributes the BEV demand over the vehicle dwell time available for charging so that charging
can occur at a slower rate. The BEV charging is ignorant to non BEV loads. Charging could still
occur on top of, and increasing, peak demand. As an example, if the peak load due to existing
homes and business occurs at 7 pm and the BEV dwell time runs from 6 pm to 6 am, the
unmanaged charging would apply peak power charging at 7 pm, exacerbating peak demand. The
managed scenario assumes a lower power level and uses the available dwell time. The peak
power demand increases but at a lower level.
The TEIS projects minimal increase in demand (energy consumption) and minimal increase in
peak demand for the LMHD action case relative to no action for both 2027 and 2032, even
without considering any management. In 2027, incremental energy consumption across the five
states attributable to the light- and heavy-duty rules ranged from 0.1-0.3%.600 In 2032, that
incremental increase ranged from 1.6% to 2.7%.601 Incremental impact on 5 state peak demand,
again from the unmanaged case, was 0.1-0.2% in 2027 and 0.6-3.0% in 2032.602
593 TEIS at 22-23.
594 TEIS at 8, 99, 110. EPA agrees with the TEIS that these States' results are sufficiently representative to allow for
national extrapolation. See TEIS App B for description of the extrapolation methodology in the Study.
595 Noncoincident peak is the maximum power demand for a given time period occuring at different times than other
peaks.
596 TEIS at 111.
597 Criteria level is showing if the peak loads are directly applicable to the design capacity of the system as is the
case for the 100% criteria level. Criteria level of 125% for service transformer shows that many individual
noncoincident peaks exist. See TEIS for additional detail.
598 TEIS at 61 (substation), 62 (feeder), and 63 (transformer).
599 TEIS at 18-19. The No Action case includes current state and federal policies and regulations as of April 2023.
Id.
600 TEIS at 70.
601 TEIS at 71.
602 TEIS at 76
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If BEV users engage in non-optimized "conservative" management - spreading charging out
over dwell times without consideration of actual extra grid capacity603 - not only do these
estimates of energy consumption and peak demand impacts decrease, but in some instances, peak
demand is projected to decrease, that is, to be less than in the no action unmanaged case. Just by
engaging in easy-to-implement time of day charging adjustments, overall demand to the grid is
reduced (demand relative to the no action case), smoothing out overall demand and allowing for
more efficient distribution. Thus, for 2027, incremental peak demand is reduced in four of the
five states, and unchanged in the fifth.604 For 2032, incremental peak demand is positive in two
of the states but the increase is only 0.1% and 0.5%, and reduced in the other states by 0.5%-
1.8% potentially obviating the need for any incremental buildout associated with the vehicle
rules.605
These minor increases reflect low numbers of incremental transformers, feeders, and
substations estimated to be needed (again, for the five states at issue, and for both light and
heavy-duty rules together) relative to the no action case. In 2027, the TEIS projects need for
only a single substation, and zero in the managed case. In 2032, the TEIS projects that only 8
substations would be needed in the unmanaged case, 4 if conservative mitigative measures are
utilized.606 Of these, all but one would be upgrades to an existing substation.607 Projections for
feeders are 9 in 2027 (5 in the managed case), and 125 in 2032 (75 if managed). In 2027, the
TEIS projects 2800 transformers (2,400 if managed), and 30,000 in 2032 (21,000 in the managed
case).608 Compare this to the estimated 1 million transformers sold domestically each year, and
the estimated 50 million transformers associated with the U.S. electric grid.609 Industry is also
responding with actions such as Prolec GE's $30 million expansion at its Shreveport, Louisiana
transformer plant, their $85 million new plant in Monterrey, Mexico, and Siemens Energy
investing $150 million to build their first transformer production facility in the US in Charlotte,
North Carolina.610
EPA finds that this projected amount of buildout attributable to the rule can be accommodated
in the rule's time frame. Realistic estimates for time needed to install infrastructure components
have been studied and are shared here (and see also RIA Chapter 5 for further discussion):
603 TEIS at 19.
604 TEIS at 76.
605 TEIS at 77.
606 TEIS at 84.
607 TEIS at 91-95.
608 TEIS at 84.
609 Power Technology Research, "The U.S. Distribution Transformer Market: A Replacement and Expansion Story"
(June, 2022) at https://ptr.inc./the-u-s-distribution-transformer-market-continues-to-be-replacement-driven: and
Environmental and Energy Study Inst, "Driven to Be More Energy Efficient, Distribution Transformers Are More
than Meets the Eye" (August 25, 2023) at https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/driven-to-be-more-energy-efficient-
distribution-transformers-are-more-than-meets-the-eye.
610 "Siemens Energy addresses the shortage of U.S. power transformers and invests in new factory". Siemens Energy
press release. February 14, 2024. Available online: https://www.siemens-energy.com/global/en/home/press-
releases/siemens_energy_addresses_shortage_US_powertransformers_invests_new_factory.html#:~:text=Siemens%
20Energy%20addresses%20the%20shortage%20of%20U.S.,and%20invests%20in%20new%20factory&text=Sieme
ns%20Energy%20is%20addressing%20the,creating%20almost%20600%201ocal%20jobs
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Time to Implement (months)
Component
Capacity per Borlaug
Borlaug et al. 2021611
EPRI612
Substation New
3 - 10+ MW
24-48
36-60
Substation Upgrade
3 - 10+ MW
12-18
24-36
Feeder New
5+ MW
12-24
Feeder Upgrade
5+ MW
3-12
6-12
Transformer New
200+ kW
3 -8
3-8
Although new substations are a significant undertaking that can take multiple years as shown
in the Table above, as noted, the TEIS finds that, for the 5-state analysis, only 4 incremental
substations are required for the managed scenario and 8 for unmanaged in 2032. In 2027, TEIS
found that only a single upgraded substation (or none in the managed case). We note further that
the estimates in the TEIS Study of the amount of distributive buildout needed are likely
conservative with respect to this rule as the TEIS Study considered aggregate effects of the
light/medium duty standards and the Phase 3 heavy duty emission standards together and did not
disaggregate the results. Given the relatively low power requirements associated with light- and
medium-duty electric vehicle charging, we expect the associated distribution system
infrastructure upgrades to be less significant than that associated with heavy-duty charging. In
addition as noted above, the "unmanaged" scenario presented above considers no mitigation
efforts at all. In the managed scenarios with basic management practices, the estimated impacts
decrease sharply. The action managed case is projected to reduce peak loads in all 5 States in
2027, and to reduce peak loads in 3 of the 5 States in 2032.
Additional Considerations Supporting Feasibility andLeadtime of Infrastructure
Commenters representing the utility sector also emphasized their ability to upgrade their
systems as needed to accommodate the increases in electricity demand associated with PEV
charging. EPA notes this assessment from the Energy Strategy Coalition:
Members of this coalition are already engaging in long-term planning to meet the
increased demand for electricity attributable to vehicle electrification, and the
LMDV Proposal will provide a regulatory backstop supporting further investments
in electrification and grid reliability. Demand for electricity will increase under
both the LMDV Proposal and the recently-proposed Phase 3 Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles ("HDV Proposed Rule"), but the
electricity grid is capable of planning for and accommodating such demand growth
and has previously experienced periods of significant and sustained growth.
Moreover, historic growth in demand and generation resources does not reflect the
investments that will be made under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
("IIJA") and the Inflation Reduction Act ("IRA") to support the deployment of new
renewable and zero-carbon generation resources, energy storage and charging
infrastructure.
611 Borlaug, B., Muratori, M., Gilleran, M. et al. "Heavy-duty truck electrification and the impacts of depot charging
on electricity distribution systems". Nat Energy 6, 673-682 (2021). Available online:
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-021-00855-0
612 EPRI. "EVs2Scale2030TM Grid Primer". August 29, 2023. Available online:
https://www.epri.eom/research/products/000000003002028010
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We also note the following supportive comment from Edison Electric Institute:
As EPA notes, the electric power sector has a long history of accommodating
growth in electricity demand from the adoption of new technologies, including
electric home appliances, residential and commercial air conditioning, and data
centers. See id. At 25,983. Electricity use from EVs today is modest. Argonne
National Lab estimates the approximately 2.3 million EVs on the road as of the end
of 2021 consumed 6.1 terawatt-hours of electricity in that year, or about 0.16
percent of the total electric sales to U.S. customers in that year. As EPA also notes,
the increase in electricity use resulting from the Proposed Rule also will be modest,
increasing electricity end-use by less than 3 percent in 2055. See id. On a macro-
level, meeting the increased energy usage from electric truck adoption as
contemplated in the Proposed Rule will not be a significant challenge for the
electric power sector. Meeting the location-specific power needs of large electric
vehicle (EV) charging facilities can be a more pressing challenge. *** However,
this is a challenge that can be addressed with deliberate effort and collaboration
among electric companies, fleet operators, and stakeholders.
We have also observed States and localities taking appropriate action to support needed
infrastructure. For example, as the Energy Strategy Coalition notes, "Expectations for
electrification of the vehicle fleet are already being incorporated into long-term planning
decisions of electric utilities, regional transmission organizations and independent system
operators. For example, National Grid co-authored a November 2022 study to "support utility
long-term capital planning," which assumed that the two states in its service territory (New York
and Massachusetts) reached 100% sales of zero-emission passenger vehicles by 2035 and
complied with California's Advanced Clean Trucks regulation."613 Numerous States and Cities
also submitted supportive comments reflecting the support for charging infrastructure in their
jurisdictions.614
Historical precedent also provides substantial support for the feasibility of the needed
distribution buildout. As we noted at proposal, and as several commenters agreed, U.S. electric
power utilities routinely upgrade the nation's electric power system to improve grid reliability
and to meet new electric power demands. For example, when confronted with rapid adoption of
air conditioners in the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. electric power utilities maintained reliability and
met the new demand for electricity by planning and building upgrades to the electric power
distribution system. Likewise, U.S. electric power utilities planned and built distribution system
upgrades required to service the rapid growth of power-intensive data centers and server farms
over the past two decades. The U.S. electric power distribution system infrastructure has already
successfully accommodated the addition of 1.4 million electric vehicles in 2023 alone.615
613 See GIDEON KATSH ET AL., NATIONAL GRID, ELECTRIC HIGHWAYS: ACCELERATING AND
OPTIMIZING FAST-CHARGING DEPLOYMENT FOR CARBON-FREE TRANSPORTATION 1 (Nov. 2022),
https://www.nationalgrid.com/document/148616/download.
614 See CA AG Comment at 21-25.
615 U.S. DOE. Statement by U.S. Energy Secretary Jennifer M. Granholm on 2023 EV Sales. Accessed February 22,
2024. January 5, 2024. Available online: https://www.energy.gov/articles/statement-us-energy-secretary-jennifer-
m-granholm-2023 -ev-sales
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We note further that the need for additional infrastructure buildout is not an unprecedented
situation with CAA section 202 standards. For example, when EPA required the removal of lead
from gasoline, an entire new parallel fuel distribution system was developed to dispense the new
unleaded gasoline. Other examples where new distribution systems arose to ensure delivery of
fuels necessary to vehicular pollution control include the infrastructure to supply diesel exhaust
fluid (used to support selective catalytic reduction) and ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel (used to
support diesel particulate filters). We thus see that there can be successful market responses to
demand created by a section 202 standard, including successful responses from unregulated
entities.
Consistent with this historical precedent, we expect that the final rule itself will serve as a
strong signal to the utility industry to make proactive investments and otherwise proactively
analyze and plan for potential buildout needs. Numerous commenters, including utilities, State
and local governments, NGOs, and other experts, filed comments in agreement.
Putting this together, EPA finds that the increases in national electricity demand associated
with the rule are very low in 2027 and increase to modest and manageable levels in later years of
the program. At a regional and local level, we expect some areas to see small increases in peak
demand, while other areas may see small decreases in peak demand associated with basic
managed charging strategies. The resulting level of needed infrastructure buildout is small and
manageable given the lead-time available.
Time for Interconnection
Certain commenters noted that even if no distributive buildout is needed, the time for
interconnection can be significant. In response, EPA notes that the timeline for EVSE
deployment—even without distribution upgrades—is very site specific and also has considerable
variability based on the permitting jurisdiction, but we believe that where connection is required,
that can be accomplished within the leadtime provided. Electrify America found that after site
construction is completed, an additional 12 weeks was required on average for inspection,
commissioning and other steps before a site was energized. In addition, permitting times can
vary by region and site specifics. For example, Electrify America reported that the permitting
process took an average of 13 weeks for its U.S. "ultra-fast" DCFC stations in 2021, but took
over twice as long for stations in New Jersey.616 Finally, we note FERC Order 2023, which
relates to interconnection reforms. Order 2023 requires grid operators to adopt certain
interconnection practices with the goal of reducing interconnection delays. These practices
include a first-ready, first-served interconnection process that requires new generators to
demonstrate commercial readiness to proceed, and a cluster study interconnection process that
studies many new generators together.617
616 Electrify America, "2022 Annual Report to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency," April 2023. Accessed
March 11, 2024 at: https://media.electrifyamerica.com/assets/documents/original/1018-
2022NationalAnnualReport.pdf.
617 See generally FERC Order 1023, 184 FERC 1f 61,054 (July 28, 2023) (Docket No. RM22-14-000).
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Additional Comments and Responses
When commenting on the methodology that we used to determine the effects and costs of
generation, transmission, and distribution system impacts presented in the proposed rule, some
commenters stated that "EPA does not include in its assessment a clear explanation on how this
estimate was obtained."
EPA conducted extensive electric power sector modeling analyses in which it concluded that
there is adequate generation and transmission capacity required to meet the electric load
demands imposed by the final rule. Moreover, the modeling analyses confirmed that there is
adequate generation and transmission capacity to meet North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) reliability standards, including those for reserve capacity.
In this final rule, EPA demonstrates that the impacts of both this rule alone and this rule
combined with other proposed EPA actions result in anticipated power grid changes that 1) are
consistent with key National Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) assumptions, 2) that are
consistent with historical trends and empirical data, and 3) are consistent with goals, planning
efforts and Integrated Resource Plans (IRPs) of industry itself.
For additional discussion of these topics, see RIA Chapter 5: Electric Power Sector and
Infrastructure Impacts and the Technical Memorandum for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 Docket ID No Numbers. EPA-EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829 and EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985 (also referred to as "Resource Adequacy
Technical Memorandum").
EPA also conducted extensive and first-ever, national-level distribution system modeling
analyses in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory (NREL), and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) in support
of this final rule. This analysis found that managed electric vehicle charging confers many
benefits to the distribution system and its reliability and. For additional discussion For additional
discussion, see RIA Chapter 5: Electric Power Sector and Infrastructure Impacts and the joint
DOE-NREL-LBNL-EPA Technical Report for the Transportation Electrification Infrastructure
Study (TEIS).
One commentor expressed concern that electric vehicles will require new EGUs that "rely
heavily on carbon capture technologies to keep the emissions from these electricity-generating
power plants out of the atmosphere. Current carbon capture technologies are experimental and
may prove dangerous."
The final rule is not premised on the adoption of CCS technologies at EGUs. The electric
power grid has been and continues to be in transition, from coal-fired to renewably-sourced
generation. As such, we expect that the electric power generation capacity required to charge the
electric vehicle fleet will be derived increasingly from renewable sources and less so from fossil
fuel-fired sources. Variations of CCS have been in use safely for over 40 years for enhanced oil
recovery, a process by which carbon dioxide is injected underground to increase oil production.
One commenter stated, "As indicated by a study conducted by the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory (NREL), dramatically accelerating electrification of sectors such as
transportation, may make it more difficult to decarbonize the electricity system due to the higher
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rate of generation and transmission capacity additions needed." However, the authors of the cited
NREL report go on to state in the sentence following the one provided by the commentor that
implementing such transportation electrification, when combined with the electrification of
building end-uses "is likely a key part of the most cost-effective pathway to achieving largescale
decarbonization across the economy." EPA's modeling of the emissions impacts of this rule,
including the upstream impacts associated with increased electricity generation, concludes that
the rule will create significant net reductions of GHGs and criteria pollutants and will lead to air
quality improvements across the United States.
One commentor stated that the results of the final rule "leap-frog even President Biden's
ambitious 2030 target... described in The U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation
Decarbonization, authored by four cabinet level agencies."
As a "blueprint", the self-described U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation
Decarbonization does not set enforceable targets but, rather, serves as a long-term guide for
federal agencies tasked with writing climate change-related policies. While EPA is aware of the
U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization, it is not part of EPA's rationale for
this rulemaking. Rather, EPA promulgated this rulemaking under its own authority in the Clean
Air Act and based on the Administrator's own judgments as to feasibility, costs, lead-time, and
other factors.
Some commenters claim that the Integrated Planning Model (IPM), EPA's multi-regional,
dynamic, deterministic linear programming model of the U.S. electric power sector that EPA
used to develop this final rule, does not consider the cost of grid-scale electric power storage.
EPA disagrees; IPM provides projections of least-cost capacity expansion, electricity dispatch,
and emission control strategies for meeting energy demand and environmental, transmission,
dispatch, and reliability constraints and does, in fact, consider the cost of grid-scale electric
power storage.
As some commenters note, the Inflation Reduction Act does not include transmission system
permitting reforms.
As an initial matter, the need for new transmission lines associated with the final rule and the
HD Phase 3 Rule between now and 2050 is projected to be very small, approximately one
percent or less of transmission. Nearly all of the projected new transmission builds appear to
overlap with pre-existing transmission line right of ways (ROW), which makes the permitting
process simpler. Approximately 41-percent of the potential new transmission line builds
projected by IPM have already been independently publicly proposed by developers. The agency
finds that the utility sector can reasonably manage this very limited need for additional
transmission.618 We do not believe transmission system permitting reforms are needed to
accommodate the minimal increases in transmission infrastructure associated with this rule.
Further, several recent initiatives have been undertaken to improve the transmission system
planning and permitting process. These initiatives have been undertaken by the Congress, DOE,
and FERC. For example, FERC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) in 2022, titled
Building for the Future Through Electric Regional Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation
and Generator Interconnection, that requires transmission operators to conduct long-term
618 See RIA 5.2.7.
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transmission planning as well as requiring transmission providers to work with states to develop
a cost-allocation formula, among other changes. The primary goal of the NOPR is to improve the
quality of transmission projects that get built and to align the projects with long-term capacity
needs to insure that the new builds are will continue to foster grid reliability into the future.
DOE recently announced several programs and projects to accelerate transmission system
permitting reforms. Examples of such programs and projects include DOE's Interconnection
Innovation e-Xchange (i2X), which aims to increase data access and transparency, improve
process and timing, promote economic efficiency, and maintaining grid reliability; DOE's Grid
Resilience and Innovation Partnerships (GRIP) program, with $10.5 billion in Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law funding to develop and deploy Grid Enhancing Technologies (GET), such as
Dynamic Line Ratings (DLR) and Advanced Power Flow Controllers (APFC), which help to
increase the load carrying ability of transmission lines. To facilitate upgrading and rebuilding
transmission lines, DOE issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to update its National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") implementing regulations. DOE also conducted the
National Transmission Planning Study to designate areas experiencing electricity transmission
constraints or congestion as National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETCs). In
February 2024, DOE announced a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the second round of the
Transmission Facilitation Program, a revolving fund supported by the Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law to help overcome financial hurdles facing large-scale new and upgraded transmission lines.
To facilitate transmission interconnection reforms, FERC has initiated a rulemaking for Order
2023 (Improvements to Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreements), which requires
grid operators to adopt certain interconnection practices with the goal of reducing
interconnection delays in the face of rapidly growing interconnection queues of new resources
looking to connect to the transmission system. These practices include a first-ready, first-served
interconnection process that requires new generators to demonstrate commercial readiness to
proceed, and a cluster study interconnection process that studies many new generators together.
Citing perceived hurdles in the transmission line siting process, the Congressional Research
Service (CRS) notes that transmission permitting reform has been a topic of debate in the 118th
Congress and that Congress amended FERC's siting authority in the Infrastructure Investment
and Jobs Act in 2021. The CRS also notes that "DOE and FERC are currently developing
regulations to implement this revised authority. Some transmission permitting reform legislative
proposals would further amend this authority, for example by granting siting authority for all
large interstate transmission lines to FERC."619
Energy storage projects can also be used to help to increase transmission line capacity by
reducing line congestion and are seen as alternatives to transmission line construction. These
projects, known as Storage As Transmission Asset (SATA), can help to reduce transmission line
congestion, have smaller footprints, have shorter development, permitting, and construction
times, and can be added incrementally, as required. Examples of SATA projects include the
ERCOT Presidio Project, a 4 MW battery system that improves power quality and reducing
momentary outages due to voltage fluctuations, the APS Punkin Center, a 2 MW, 8 MWh battery
system deployed in place of upgrading 20 miles of transmission and distribution lines, the
619 Congressional Research Service, 2023. Electricity Transmission Permitting Reform
Proposals (https://crsreports.congress.gOv/product/pdf/R/R47627/3).
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National Grid Nantucket Project, a 6 MW, 48 MWh battery system installed on Nantucket
Island, MA, as a contingency to undersea electric supply cables, and the Oakland Clean Energy
Initiative Projects, a 43.25 MW, 173 MWh energy storage project to replace fossil generation in
the Bay area.
Through such efforts, the interconnection queues can be reduced in length, transmission
capacity on existing transmission lines can be increased, additional generation assets can be
brought online, and electricity generated by existing assets will be curtailed less often. These
factors help to improve overall grid reliability.
This should not be considered a comprehensive list of transmission system initiatives or
storage activities currently underway.
One commenter claimed that "The electrical grids are neither stable nor safe enough to handle
EPA's proposal" and that "The country will be more energy dependent and less secure because
of it." The commenter, however, fails to adduce any data, analysis, or other evidence in support
of its view. Therefore, its comment is not raised with reasonable specificity as required. As we
explain in preamble IV.C.5, EPA has performed comprehensive analysis of grid reliability and
projects that this rule will not adverse affect grid reliability. Further, EPA's analysis of energy
security shows that this rule will create significant positive energy security benefits. See
IV.C.7.iii of this preamble for a discussion of energy security benefits.
One commenter claim that the electric power system is "already strained" by the uptick in
renewable energy."
Sources of renewable electricity generation currently comprise one-quarter of total generation
by the U.S. power sector (EIA Monthly Energy Review (2/24). EPA also notes that this increase
in renewable electric power generation coincides with an increase in grid
reliability.(https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=45796).
These indicators suggests that the U.S. electric power system is capable of safely and
effectively delivering electricity from renewable sources. Studies from DOE show how the U.S.
could accommodate between 70-79% of wind and solar generation by 2050 (Brinkman, Gregory,
Dominique Bain, Grant Buster, Caroline Draxl, Paritosh Das, Jonathan Ho, Eduardo Ibanez, et
al. 2021. The North American Renewable Integration Study: A U.S. Perspective. Golden, CO:
National Renewable Energy Laboratory. NREL/TP-6A20-79224.
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy21osti/79224.pdf).
EPA's analysis in the Resource Adequacy Technical Memorandum further finds that this rule
and the HD Phase 3 Rule ("Vehicle Rules"), whether alone or combined with other EPA rules
affecting the power sector ("Power Sector Rules"), are associated with changes in grid
composition that do not adversely affect resource adequacy, a key element of grid reliability. As
part of this analysis, we show that significant increases in variable renewable penetrations can be
achieved while respecting resource adequacy, as projected by multiple, highly respected peer-
reviewed models.
Citing an article about indoor marijuana cultivation, one commenter claimed that the electric
power system is "running on an antiquated delivery system established several decades ago."
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We overview the history of the electric power sector in preamble IV.C.5. While aspects of
this claim may be correct, many articles, reports, and studies from sources such as Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), a "professional association for electronics
engineering, electrical engineering, and other related disciplines," find that electric vehicles can
facilitate the integration of renewable resources. For instance, see "EVs Are Essential Grid-Scale
Storage" (https://spectrum.ieee.org/electric-vehicle-grid-storage), which summarizes the results
of the research of Xu et. al (Xu, C., Behrens, P., Gasper, P. et al. Electric vehicle batteries alone
could satisfy short-term grid storage demand by as early as 2030. Nat Commun 14, 119 (2023).
https://d0i.0rg/l 0.103 8/s41467-022-3 5393-0).
Citing a California news report, one commenter claimed that "EV owners asked to not charge
vehicles during peak hours" during the 2022 heatwave that affected southern California. The
article cited by the commentor cites an alert issued by the California Independent System
Operator (ISO), which oversees the operation of California's bulk electric power system. In the
alert, California ISO requested "voluntary electricity conservation" when temperatures in
Northern California were 10-20 degrees warmer than normal and 10-18 degrees warmer than
normal in Souther California. The California ISO's request continued: "To minimize discomfort
and help with grid stability, consumers are also encouraged to pre-cool their homes and use
major appliances and charge electric vehicles and electronic devices before 4 p.m., when
conservation begins to become most critical."
The California ISO alert also provided a list of ten voluntary ways in which electricity
consumers could help to reduce electricity consumption during the alert, of which postponing
electric vehicle charging was one. A U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) report agrees with these
actions as options for consumers to improve energy efficiency
(https://www.energy.gov/energysaver/reducing-electricity-use-and-
costs#:~:text=Incorporate%20passive%20solar%20design%20concepts,heater%20and%20operat
e%20it%20efficiently).
Generally, we find that scheduling electric vehicle charging during lower demand periods can
significantly reduce the costs of charging as well as provide important services to the grid. We
further discuss the benefits of managed charging practices in preamble IV.C.5.
Citing an article, a commenter claims that the cybersecurity concerns associated with electric
vehicle charging are "without a solution." However, the cited article presents "several patches
for the existing (cybersecurity) vulnerabilities and discuss two methods aimed at detecting EV
attacks." Continuing, the commenter claims that "The grids not only lack the capacity to
accommodate the Proposed Rule's new demands on them, but are also nowhere near secure
enough to take them on."
The commenter makes two claims: that the grid lacks capacity and that the grid is not secure.
Regarding the first claim, EPA conducted extensive electric power sector modeling analyses in
support of this final rule in which it concluded that there is adequate generation and transmission
capacity to meet the load demands imposed by the final rule. Moreover, the modeling analyses
confirmed that there is adequate generation and transmission capacity to also meet North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) reliability standards, including those for
reserve capacity. Through such analyses, we project that the final rule will not have adversely
affect resource adequacy and grid reliability. The managed charging of electric vehicle has also
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been shown to increase grid reliability and facilitate the deferral of electric power sector
infrastructure.
For additional discussion of these topics, see RIA Chapter 5: Electric Power Sector and
Infrastructure Impacts and the Technical Memorandum for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 Docket ID No Numbers. EPA-EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829 and EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985.
Regarding the second claim, Presidential Executive Order 13636: Improving Critical
Infrastructure mandates that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) establish a
Cybersecurity Framework, which has been done in conjunction with the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST). As directed by DHS, NIST has undertaken several actions
and activities, including the recently released NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0,
designed to contend with a range of threats and multiple attack vectors, both physical and cyber.
In response to a National Security Memorandum, "Improving Cybersecurity for Critical
Infrastructure Control Systems," DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(CISA), in coordination with NIST, developed preliminary cybersecurity performance goals
(https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202100622/pdf/DCPD-202100622.pdf). In
addition to collaborating with DHS, NIST works closely with the Department of Energy and
several National Laboratories in securing EV charging stations, data flow networks, and utility
power distributers.
We note, moreover, that cybersecurity concerns are not limited to PEV charging. The same
true with respect to power outages more generally. Both of these concerns apply to infrastructure
more generally, including the infrastructure used to fuel ICE vehicles. For example, as gasoline
pumps are electric powered, power outages affect both owners of all vehicles. As we note in RIA
5.4.5:
The effect of power outages on electric vehicle owners is expected to be similar to that of
non-electric vehicle drivers. Neither driver will be able to "fuel" during power outages, as
gasoline pumps are electric powered. However, electric vehicles can provide their owners with
residential power for a limited time. Moreover, electric vehicle chargers that are attached to
distributed energy resources, such as homes or businesses with solar and/or stationary battery
storage, would be unaffected by power outages and, thereby, can continue to provide charge for
electric vehicles via its independent capacity. In fact, electric vehicles could be used to power
gasoline pumps during electric power outages. Given that the physical extent of typical power
outages tends to be relatively small, electric vehicle drivers, as well as conventional vehicle
drivers, can be expected to drive out of the outage area and to unaffected charging or refueling
stations, should it become necessary. Furthermore, we note that there are cybersecurity concerns
uniquely associated with refueling of ICE vehicles, for example, cybersecurity attacks on
petroleum pipelines. See The Attack on Colonial Pipeline: What We've Learned & What We've
Done Over the Past Two Years, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/attack-colonial-
pipeline-what-weve-learned-what-weve-done-over-past-two-years
One commentor claims that "EPA fails to account for the rising cost of electricity over the
regulatory period." Another commentor claims that "in some cases, these costs will ultimately be
passed on to ratepayers" when discussing the cost of electrical infrastructure upgrades associated
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with this final rule. EPA discusses the impacts on retail electricity prices in preamble IV.C.5 and
RIA5.
When discussing possible costs associated with National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure
(NEVI) program, a formula program administered by the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) and the Joint Office of Energy and Transportation and funded through the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law, as enacted in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, one commentor
cited infrastructure costs from the Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plans from Idaho
and Indiana.
EPA notes that NEVI funds can be used to offset certain increases in EVSE and distribution
costs due to increased PEV charging associated with the final rule. The existence of NEVI funds,
along other funding opportunities, further supports that the needed charging infrastructure can be
developed. We further discuss funding opportunities for EVSEs in RTC 17.
NEVI is a federally-funded voluntary program to which state apply. As such, it is presumed
that the states of Idaho and Indiana voluntarily sought NEVI funding and, conversely, that if
these states did not desire electric vehicle infrastructure funding from this voluntary program,
they would not have applied. The NEVI program has funded a total in $615 million in 2022, an
estimated $885 million in 2023, and $885 million in each successive year until the end of fiscal
year 2026.
NEVI Formula Program funds can be used for electric grid equipment and upgrades. The
costs to acquire and install on-site electric service equipment (e.g., power meter, transformer,
switch gear) are eligible. Costs for minor grid upgrades are also eligible, provided the work is
necessitated solely by the construction or upgrading of the EV charging station and participation
in the upgrade does not exceed the allocable cost of the minimum upgrades needed to match the
planned power requirements of the EV charging station. A minor grid upgrade is defined as the
work necessary to connect a charging station to the electric grid distribution network; for
example, extending power lines or upgrading existing power lines several miles. Finally, major
grid upgrades, such as longer line extensions or upgrades, improvements to offsite power
generation, bulk power transmission, or substations are ineligible.
State DOTs are encouraged to consider the magnitude of these costs and explore whether they
could be covered by the electric utility or programs other than the NEVI Formula Program so as
to minimize use of NEVI Formula funds for grid upgrades where possible. See the Utility
Planning section below for additional information.
States are also encouraged to consult with the FHWA and the Joint Office of Energy and
Transportation to determine if an exception to charging station siting requirements may be
warranted or if there are additional viable alternatives.
One commentor claims that "EPA fails to account for the impacts of mass electrification
(increased electricity demand), the transmission infrastructure upgrades and battery storage that
will be needed to support a transition to renewable generation sources, and the potential impacts
to electrical grid costs and reliability" in its projection of future electricity prices.
As noted earlier, EPA conducted extensive electric power sector modeling analyses in support
of this final rule in which it accounted for the impacts of mass electrification (increased
electricity demand), the transmission infrastructure upgrades and battery storage that will be
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needed to support a transition to renewable generation sources and the potential impacts to
electrical grid costs. In conducting the modeling analysis, EPA demonstrated that there is
adequate generation and transmission capacity to meet the load demands imposed by the final
rule. Moreover, the modeling analyses confirmed that there is adequate generation and
transmission capacity to also meet North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
reliability standards, including those for reserve capacity.
For additional discussion of these topics, see RIA Chapter 5: Electric Power Sector and
Infrastructure Impacts and the Technical Memorandum for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 Docket ID No Numbers. EPA-EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829 and EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985.
One commentor claims that "EPA does not adequately consider potential grid reliability
impacts."
As noted earlier, EPA conducted extensive electric power sector modeling analyses in support
of this final rule in which it considered potential grid reliability impacts. In this modeling
analyses, EPA demonstrated that there is adequate generation and transmission capacity to meet
the load demands imposed by the final rule. Moreover, the modeling analyses confirmed that
there is adequate generation and transmission capacity to also meet North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) reliability standards, including those for reserve capacity for the
Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-
Duty Vehicles, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3.
For additional discussion of these topics, see RIA Chapter 5: Electric Power Sector and
Infrastructure Impacts and the Technical Memorandum for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 Docket ID No Numbers. EPA-EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829 and EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985.
One commentor alleges that "Reliance on BEVs may have unintended, negative
consequences, especially in relation to the electricity generation sector." The commenter,
however, fails to adduce any data, analysis, or other evidence in support of its claim. Therefore,
its comment is not raised with reasonable specificity as required.
Notwithstanding the commenter's failure to provide any data or analysis in support of its
contentions, EPA conducted extensive electric power sector modeling analyses in support of this
final rule in which it considered potential grid reliability impacts. In this modeling analyses, EPA
demonstrated that there is adequate generation and transmission capacity to meet the load
demands imposed by the final rule. Moreover, the modeling analyses confirmed that there is
adequate generation and transmission capacity to also meet North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) reliability standards, including those for reserve capacity for the Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3.
For additional discussion of these topics, see RIA Chapter 5: Electric Power Sector and
Infrastructure Impacts and the Technical Memorandum for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and Greenhouse Gas
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Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 Docket ID No Numbers. EPA-EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829 and EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985.
One commentor claims that "charging infrastructure is inadequate to meet the country's
transportation needs."
This study cited by the commentor discusses shoppers' interest in purchasing electric
vehicles. The study cited by the commentator finds that "26% of shoppers say they are "very
likely" to consider purchasing an EV, up from 24% a year ago, while the percentage of shoppers
who say they are "overall likely" to consider purchasing an EV increases to 61% from 59% in
2022." The study also finds that "Most EV owners will say charging is one of the greatest
benefits of ownership, because 85% of it is done at home, But it's the exceptional use case—like
a vacation road trip—that's holding shoppers back." While the study also reveals dissatisfaction
with public charging, the study makes no claims about the adequacy of the U.S. charging
infrastructure. We further respond to comments about EVSEs, including public charging stations,
in RTC 17.
The second reference cited by the commentator considers "home charging behaviors and
attitudes", rather than the adequacy of the U.S. charging infrastructure. Moreover, the second
reference cited by the commentator is scheduled to be published after this rule is finalized. As
the study has not yet been released to the public, EPA cannot comment on the merits of the
claims made therein.
One commentor claims that "EPA's analysis of grid impacts and electrical reliability is
unrealistic" and that "ZEV mandates like the proposed rule also present significant risks to grid
reliability and the stability of the transportation sector, yet EPA's analysis of electrical grid
impacts is weak." EPA disagrees. EPA conducted extensive electric power sector modeling
analyses in support of this final rule in which it considered potential grid reliability impacts. In
this modeling analyses, EPA demonstrated that there is adequate generation and transmission
capacity to meet the load demands imposed by the final rule. Moreover, the modeling analyses
confirmed that there is adequate generation and transmission capacity to also meet North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) reliability standards, including those for
reserve capacity for the Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later
Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-
Duty Vehicles - Phase 3.
For additional discussion of these topics, see RIA Chapter 5: Electric Power Sector and
Infrastructure Impacts and the Technical Memorandum for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 Docket ID No Numbers. EPA-EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829 and EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985.
Moreover, as we explain in RTC 2, this rule is not a "ZEV mandate." Manufacturers may
comply with this rule in many ways, including by producing no additional BEVs above the no-
action baseline. See preamble IV.
Some commentors expressed a need to be better-integrated into the planning processes. The
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) has undertaken several key
initiatives that help to facilitate outreach and communications between Public Service
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Commissions and Public Utilities Commissions and the investor-owned utilities, publicly owned
utilities, and member-owned or cooperative utilities that they regulate.
Some commentors expressed concerns about supply chain shortfalls related to electric power
sector components. The Department of Energy is undertaking several programs to reduce supply
chain lead times for electric power sector components. These programs range from addressing
the ongoing shortage of grain-oriented electrical steel (GOES) to developing and approving
approaches to speed the development of EV charging infrastructure and include a Siemens
transformer manufacturing facility (Expanding U.S. transformer manufacturing and service
footprint (siemens-energy.com)), a DOE award to CorePower Magnetics to build a
manufacturing facility for magnetic components and advanced metals (CorePower Magnetics
Awarded $20M from DOE to Establish Domestic Manufacturing Facility in Pittsburgh), a DOE
funding announcement for Flexible and Innovative Transformer Technologies (U.S. Department
of Energy Announces $18 Million for Flexible, Innovative Transformers | Department of
Energy), and a late 2022 announcement from Hitachi Energy of a $37 million investment in its
transformer manufacturing facility in Virginia (Hitachi Energy invests US$37 million to expand
transformer manufacturing facility in South Boston, Virginia).
Significant investment is going toward improving grid component supply chains and many
innovative charging solutions are available to minimize the need for grid upgrades. BIL and IRA
incentives have led to significant new investments in grid component supply chains in the U.S.
that will reduce lead times and costs for needed utility upgrades. In February 2024, Siemens
announced that it will invest $150 million in a transformer manufacturing facility in North
Carolina that will build and refurbish large power transformers.620 CorePower Magnetics
received a $20 million DOE award to build a manufacturing facility for amorphous metals and
magnetic components that are used in transformers, among other applications. The facility will
increase U.S. production by 20%.621 DOE also announced a funding opportunity in February
2024 for $18 million to advance research, deployment, and demonstration of transformer
technologies that can alleviate supply chain constraints.622 In addition, numerous tools are
available to accelerate connection of new EV charging loads to the utility grid. As discussed in
Section IV.C.5 of the Preamble, flexible interconnection using power control systems can allow
new fast charging loads to connect to the grid while utility upgrades are still in progress. Battery-
integrated charging, which reduces charging stations' maximum power draw from the grid, can
accelerate deployment by mitigating the need for utility system upgrades and can also potentially
lower levelized costs of charging.623 One company, Freewire, sells DC fast chargers with built-
in battery storage.624 Other types of distributed generation (including solar, linear generators,
and fuel cells) can similarly be used to reduce the dependence of charging infrastructure on the
grid. Utilities also have opportunities to smooth deployment of charging infrastructure, and can
help their customers find locations where fewer grid upgrades would be needed. Utility hosting
620 Siemens Energy. February 15, 2024. Available online: https://www.siemens-
energv.com/global/en/home/stories/transformer-manufacturing-and-service-expansion-in-us.html.
621 U.S. Department of Energy. "Advanced Energy Manufacturing and Recycling Program Selections". Available
online: https://www.energv.gov/mesc/advanced-energy-manufacturing-and-recvcling-program-selections.
622 https://www.energv.gov/oe/articles/us-department-energv-announces-18-million-flexible-innovative-transformers
623 Poudel, S., J. Wang, K. Reddi, A. Elgowainy, and J. Zhou. Forthcoming. "INNOVATIVE CHARGING
SOLUTIONS FOR DEPLOYING THE NATIONAL CHARGING NETWORK: TECHNOECONOMIC
ANALYSIS".
624 https://freewiretech.com/dc-boost-charger/
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capacity maps are available in at least 24 states and the District of Columbia, and maps that show
capacity for additional load can direct charging infrastructure developers toward sites where
installations can be completed more quickly.625 New software platforms like the Energy
Services exchange (ESX), developed by Evoke and Argonne National Laboratory with funding
from DOE, can help utilities manage EV loads on their distribution systems to further limit
required upgrades.626 Other potential solutions to accelerate EVSE deployment include mobile
charging, sharing private chargers, and battery swapping.627'628'629
When inquiring about managed charging, one commentor asks "who would manage charging
behavior, by what authority, and based on what standards or criteria."
The standards and criteria by which managed charging will occur are being addressed by the
relevant state agencies, electric utilities, national associations representing these state agencies,
standard-setting organizations, and the public. The motivation to address such issues is primarily
economic self-interest. Electric utilities benefit from managed charging. The shareholders of
electric utilities benefit from managed charging. Electric vehicle users benefit from managed
charging. And electricity ratepayers - including those who are not electric vehicle users - benefit
from managed charging.
The commenter alleges that "EPA does not account for the costs of these suggestions in its
DRIA nor for any other safeguards to protect grid reliability." The commenter, however, fails to
adduce any data, analysis, or other evidence in support of its claim. Therefore, its comment is not
raised with reasonable specificity as required.
Notwithstanding the commenter's failure to provide any data or analysis in support of its
contentions, EPA conducted extensive electric power sector modeling analyses in support of this
final rule in which it concluded that there is adequate generation and transmission capacity to
meet the load demands imposed by the final rule. Moreover, the modeling analyses confirmed
that there is adequate generation and transmission capacity to also meet North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) reliability standards, including those for reserve capacity.
Our examination of the record, informed by our consultations with DOE, FERC, and other
power sector stakeholders, is that the final standards of this rule, whether considered separately
or in combination with the Phase 3 HD vehicle standards and upcoming power sector rules, are
unlikely to adversely affect the reliability of the electric grid, and widespread adoption of PEVs
could have significant benefits for the electric power system. For additional discussion of these
topics, see RIA Chapter 5: Electric Power Sector and Infrastructure Impacts and the Technical
Memorandum for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-
Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty
Vehicles - Phase 3 Docket ID No Numbers. EPA-EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829 and EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0985.
625 https://www.energv.gov/eere/us-atlas-electric-distribution-SYStem-hosting-capacitv-maps
626 https://esx.energy/
627 https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/articles/2023-ll-04/these-electric-vehicle-chargers-will-come-to-vou
628 https ://evmatch. com/
629 https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/05/17/1073265/how-5-minute-batterv-swaps-could-get-more-evs-on-
the-road/
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One commentor asks about the role of natural gas in helping to secure grid reliability between
1992 and 2021.
According to the Energy Information Administration, four times as much coal was used to
generate electricity in the U.S. in 1992 than natural gas. In 2001, three times as much coal was
used to generate electricity in the U.S. than natural gas. In 2009, two times as much coal was
used to generate electricity in the U.S. than natural gas. It was only in 2015 that the amount of
coal used to generate electricity in the U.S. was roughly equal to the amount of natural gas used
to generate electricity. EPA projects that significant natural gas capacity will remain online to
support grid reliability. We further discuss our projections of generation capacity in RIA 5.2.5.
Renewable sources of electricity have recently supplanted coal-fired sources of electricity and
the increasingly successful integration of the renewable sources into the electric power sector
will continue to help secure grid reliability.
One commentor suggests that EPA "disregards the regional variations in expected PEV
uptake, electricity generation, electricity demand, and grid reliability."
EPA disagrees with this comment. Regional variations in expected PEV uptake are addressed
in the Likely Adopter Model (LAM). Regional variations in electricity generation and demand
are also addressed in the electric power sector modeling, and resource adequacy related issues
are addressed in the Resource Adequacy Technical Memorandum.
As noted earlier, EPA conducted extensive electric power sector modeling analyses in support
of this final rule in which it accounted for the impacts of mass electrification (increased
electricity demand), the transmission infrastructure upgrades and battery storage that will be
needed to support a transition to renewable generation sources and the potential impacts to
electrical grid costs. In conducting the modeling analysis, EPA demonstrated that there is
adequate generation and transmission capacity to meet the load demands imposed by the final
rule. Moreover, the modeling analyses confirmed that there is adequate generation and
transmission capacity to also meet North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
reliability standards, including those for reserve capacity.
For additional discussion of these topics, see RIA Chapter 5: Electric Power Sector and
Infrastructure Impacts and the Technical Memorandum for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 Docket ID No Numbers. EPA-EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829 and EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985.
One commentor claims that "CAA Section 202(a) does not authorize the agency to force grid
operators to manage electrical loads in completely new ways, or to dictate vehicle charging
behavior."
EPA expects those agencies and organizations whose responsibility it is to manage electrical
loads and/or affect charging behavior to fulfill their obligations. Contrary to the commentor's
claim, this final rule does not compel or dictate actions beyond which the CAA Section 202(a)
currently authorizes the agency to do in carrying out its environmental protection mission. EPA
has assessed how grid operators and vehicle drivers may respond to the increased PEV adoption
associated with the rule, but the final rule does not require grid operators to manage electrical
loads in any specific way or dictate the vehicle charging behavior of EV drivers. Citing North
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American Electric Reliability Corporation's (NERC's) reliability assessments, some commentors
suggest that the final rule "fails to recognize existing grid reliability concerns."
EPA conducted extensive electric power sector modeling analyses in which it concluded that
there is adequate generation and transmission capacity required to meet the electric load
demands imposed by the final rule. Moreover, the modeling analyses confirmed that there is
adequate generation and transmission capacity to meet North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) reliability standards, including those for reserve capacity.
In this final rule, EPA demonstrates that the impacts of both this rule alone and this rule
combined with other proposed EPA actions result in anticipated power grid changes that 1) are
consistent with key National Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) assumptions, 2) that are
consistent with historical trends and empirical data, and 3) are consistent with goals, planning
efforts and Integrated Resource Plans (IRPs) of industry itself.
For additional discussion of these topics, see RIA Chapter 5: Electric Power Sector and
Infrastructure Impacts and the Technical Memorandum for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 Docket ID No Numbers. EPA-EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829 and EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985.
Moreover, as we note in preamble IV.C.5, power interruptions caused by extreme weather are
the most-commonly reported, naturally- occurring factors affecting grid reliability, with the
frequency of these severe weather events increasing significantly over the past twenty years due
to climate change. Decreasing emissions of greenhouse gases can be expected to help reduce
future extreme weather events, which would serve to reduce the risks for electric power sector
reliability. By requiring significant reductions in GHGs from new motor vehicles, this rule
mitigates the harmful impacts of climate change, including the increased incidence of extreme
weather events that affect grid reliability.
Citing a suite of integrated modeling and analysis tools created by the Department of
Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) - which are designed to "overcome
technical barriers and accelerate the development of advanced technologies and systems" - and
were used to develop this final rule, one commentor claims that the model in question is "not
amongst these NREL tools."
This claim is incorrect: The model in question is featured prominently as a "Transportation &
Mobility Research" tool on the NREL website" (https://www.nrel.gov/transportation/evi-x.html).
Further, the model in question serves as the analytic basis for NREL's "seminal" 2030 National
Charging Network study, which can be found on NREL's website at:
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy23osti/85970.pdf. Other NREL studies using the model in question
can be found on NREL's website. For instance, Ge et al (2021) was a component of the 2030
study, which can be found on NREL's website at: https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy23osti/85654.pdf.
Citing the above-referenced suite of integrated modeling and analysis tools created by the
Department of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) - which are designed
to "overcome technical barriers and accelerate the development of advanced technologies and
systems" - and were used to develop this final rule, the commentor alleges that "The NREL
study is nice work, but EPA's reliance on the study for this application is wholly unsuitable."
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EPA appreciates the commentor's candor regarding NREL's technical and scientific
competence; the development of this final rule benefited from the technical and scientific
competence as well as the professionalism of NREL and the Department of Energy. The
commenter, however, fails to adduce any data, analysis, or other evidence in support of its view.
Therefore, its comment is not raised with reasonable specificity as required.
The commentor claims that the model in question "offers EPA no insight into or basis for
estimating the PEV update and grid reliability impacts for most of the United States."
This claim is incorrect: "The geographic distribution of responses is representative of the
population distribution in the United States..." which is supported by comparative distributions
of spatial and demographic variables shown in Figures 3-6 of Ge et. al. (2021), as referenced
above.
A commentor cited examples in which the authors of scientific research used in support of
this final rule discussed limitations associated with the methodology used.
As is standard practice in scientific research publications, study limitations are discussed
freely as a measure of transparency and in the name of scientific integrity. However, the
examples of limitations cited by the commentor do not invalidate the subsequent analysis.
When discussing the suite of integrated modeling and analysis tools created by the
Department of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and used to develop
this final rule, a commentor asks: "How did EPA go about establishing chassis-specific LAMs
when the original NREL report mentioned nothing about vehicle classifications?" A "LAM"
(Likely Adopter Model) is a type of model used by NREL, which provides a relative ranking of
the likelihood of electric vehicle adoption across the general population.
Rather than develop four LAMs specific to each chassis type, the same LAM was applied to
each of the four cited chassis types. The vehicle population for each chassis type features a
unique spatial distribution (as reflected in registration data across all fuel types). The LAM was
applied to the national population of each chassis type independently, providing regionalized
adoption scenarios for each chassis type that reflect a combination of relative preference for
chassis type and PEV likely adopters.
A commentor asks "Despite the lack of LAM survey respondents in the Midwest and
Alaska, EPA inexplicably projects these regions to have the highest PEV pickup stocks of the
entire United States."
We believe the commentor misinterpreted the data provided by EPA. Among the top five
states for simulated adoption of PEV pickup trucks in 2032, the state of Ohio is ranked fifth. The
state of Alaska is ranked 44th.
One commenter asserts that the EPA rule will require $1-2.4 trillion to update through 2050.
The high costs specified in the comment are not related to EPA's rules; rather, the comments
refer to the costs of upgrading the entire aging transmission system (independent of EPA's rules)
as well as the costs of capturing benefits associated with the renewable energy provisions of the
IRA. This commentor cites a Reuters article from May 2022, which, in turn, refers to other two
reports as sources of the article's information.
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The first source appears to be an article from PUF (Public Utilities Fortnightly) in May 2020,
entitled Modernizing Aging Transmission - A Golden Opportunity. This article states that the
aging U.S. electrical transmission system - without potential EV load - will require $700 billion
to upgrade its 140,000 miles of transmission lines by 2050. The article then goes on to claim that
the costs of upgrading the transmission system to allow for vehicle electrification will increase
this cost to more than $1 trillion by 2050. The article assumes an electric load growth associated
with EVs of 45%. The article does not include technical details, so it is not possible to comment
on them. However, the load growth associated with vehicle electrification from EPA's rule are
more on the order of 11% by 2050, and not 45%, as claimed in the article.
The second source cited in the Reuters piece is from a Princeton Report on transmission
general system upgrades the report authors believed were necessary in order to capture
renewable energy provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Note that the study pertains to
the IRA, not EPA's rules. This is a preliminary report and its conclusions are subject to change.
As EPA explains in the RIA, the regulatory analysis for this rulemaking evaluates the impacts
of this rule relative to the regulatory baseline. This is consistent with OMB Circular A-4's
guidance on regulatory analysis. For our analysis of electric sector impacts, EPA took the extra
step of evaluating the combined impacts of this rule and the HD Phase 3 Rule, and in some cases,
also evaluating the additional impacts of the Power Sector Rules, in order to better understand
the context for this rule and the cumulative impacts of our rules, and to respond to comments
regarding those cumulative impacts. Our analysis, including the IPM, also considers the impacts
of the IRA and BIL, which provides important context for the final rule, including by
significantly reducing the costs to purchase PEVs. We disagree with the commenter's
suggestion, however, that the impacts of actions beyond this rule should be attributed to this rule
for purposes of assessing costs. For example, even were EPA to accept as true the $1-2.4 trillion
price tag for a complete overhaul of the electric grid, those costs are not attributable to this rule,
and those numbers are therefore irrelevant. In the same way, although we project that
manufacturers may use advanced gasoline vehicle technologies to comply with this rule, it would
not be appropriate to consider the considerable costs associated with US petroleum infrastructure
development as attributable to this rule. In any event, we have fully considered the costs of
increasing electricity demand due to increased PEV adoption associated with this rule and found
that those costs are modest and reasonable, as explained in RIA 5 and preamble IV.C.5.
A commentor claims that states have "expressed concerns regarding electrical grid and utility
impacts in their DOT-approved state EV Infrastructure Deployment Plans".
The "DOT-approved state EV Infrastructure Deployment Plans" to which the commentor
refers to is known collectively as the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) program, a
voluntary program administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the Joint
Office of Energy and Transportation and funded through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, as
enacted in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.
NEVI is a federally-funded program to which states may voluntarily choose to apply. As
such, it is presumed that the states cited by the commenter have voluntarily sought NEVI
funding. By extension, it seems reasonable to conclude that if the states cited by the commentor
did not desire electric vehicle infrastructure funding from this voluntary program, they would not
have applied. The NEVI program has funded a total in $615 million in 2022, an estimated $885
million in 2023, and $885 million in each successive year until the end of fiscal year 2026.
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NEVI Formula Program funds can be used for electric grid equipment and upgrades. The
costs to acquire and install on-site electric service equipment (e.g., power meter, transformer,
switch gear) are eligible. Costs for minor grid upgrades are also eligible, provided the work is
necessitated solely by the construction or upgrading of the EV charging station and participation
in the upgrade does not exceed the allocable cost of the minimum upgrades needed to match the
planned power requirements of the EV charging station. A minor grid upgrade is defined as the
work necessary to connect a charging station to the electric grid distribution network; for
example, extending power lines or upgrading existing power lines several miles. Finally, major
grid upgrades, such as longer line extensions or upgrades, improvements to offsite power
generation, bulk power transmission, or substations are ineligible.
State DOTs are encouraged to consider the magnitude of these costs and explore whether they
could be covered by the electric utility or programs other than the NEVI Formula Program so as
to minimize use of NEVI Formula funds for grid upgrades where possible.
States are also encouraged to consult with the FHWA and the Joint Office of Energy and
Transportation to determine if an exception to charging station siting requirements may be
warranted or if there are additional viable alternatives.
This commentor continues, claiming that "EPA has not accounted for these concerns in its
analysis."
Overall, the identification of potential infrastructure issues (along with other challenges) in
State NEVI plans indicates that State governments are well aware of these issues and giving due
consideration to them as they plan to install new charging infrastructure with NEVI funds. Given
the important role of State agencies in electricity infrastructure, we think this awareness and
consideration by State agencies is a positive factor supporting the development of charging
infrastructure. As we explain in preamble IV.C.5, we do also agree that additional infrastructure
buildout is likely to support increased PEV adoption, and based on our analysis, we find that the
scope and costs of that buildout is modest and reasonable.
To the extent the commenter is concerned with how the NEVI funds themselves are
administered by FHWA and JOET, that issue is beyond the scope of this rulemaking.
A commentor correctly points out that electricity demand varies by time of day. To capture
the time-varying nature of electricity demand, we used the Integrated Planning Model (IPM),
EPA's multi-regional, dynamic, deterministic linear programming model of the U.S. electric
power sector, to estimate electric power plant emissions that were used to develop this final rule.
However, the source of the data cited by the commentor is eGRID, a static database which
does not vary with time. As such, eGRID is incapable of capturing the time-varying nature of
electricity demand, as required, and, therefore, fails to capture actual electric power plant
emissions.
One commentor claims that the cost of charging an electric vehicle at home "could raise the
annual electricity bill for the average family by 50 percent or more", but fails to note that the
reduction of gasoline costs not paid by the family are approximately three-times greater.
In other words, the cost of electricity paid for electric vehicle charging by the average
hypothetical family would be approximately $675 per year, whereas the cost of gasoline paid for
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by the aforementioned family would be approximately $1,900 per year, given the assumptions
provided by the commenter. As such, the cost of driving an electric vehicle is three-times less-
expensive than driving a gasoline-powered vehicle. EPA's own analysis also demonstrates that
purchasers of PEVs will incur significant operating savings over the lifetime of the vehicle.
This same commentor alleges that EPA pretends its "rules will not put a colossal additional
strain on our already vulnerable national power grid."
As noted earlier, EPA conducted extensive electric power sector modeling analyses in which
it concluded that there is adequate generation and transmission capacity required to meet the
electric load demands imposed by the final rule. Moreover, the modeling analyses confirmed that
there is adequate generation and transmission capacity to meet North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) reliability standards, including those for reserve capacity.
In this final rule, EPA demonstrates that the impacts of both this rule alone and this rule
combined with other proposed EPA actions result in anticipated power grid changes that 1) are
consistent with key National Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) assumptions, 2) that are
consistent with historical trends and empirical data, and 3) are consistent with goals, planning
efforts and Integrated Resource Plans (IRPs) of industry itself.
For additional discussion of these topics, see RIA Chapter 5: Electric Power Sector and
Infrastructure Impacts and the Technical Memorandum for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 Docket ID No Numbers. EPA-EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829 and EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985.
Continuing, this commentor alleges that "To accommodate EPA's future fleet of EVs, our
national electric grid capacity would need to grow 60 percent or so by 2030."
Based upon the extensive electric power sector modeling conducted in support of this final
rule, the expected increase in electric power demand in 2030 will be less than one-percent of the
overall expected electricity consumption for that year. In other words, the expected impact on the
electric power system is expected to be approximately 60 times less than alleged by the
commentor.
Continuing the discussion of the expected electricity demand made by this final rule in 2030,
the commentor suggests that the "This buildout is simply not practicable in the timeframe EPA is
contemplating."
As noted above, the increase in electricity demand is expected to be less than one-percent by
2030. The increase in expected electricity demand between the kick-off of the Super Bowl and
the end of the Super Bowl will be approximately 4.2%, according to PJM Interconnection, a
regional transmission organization (RTO) operating the electric transmission system serving all
or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia
that serves 65 million people, or about 20 percent of the U.S. population.
One commenter cited the average retail electricity rates from a 2015 EIA study of the
proposed Clean Power Plan. The commenter subsequently used the average retail electricity rates
to extrapolate electricity expenditures associated with this final rule and claimed that there "is a
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nearly $1 trillion difference" between the costs cited in this final rule and those extrapolated by
the commentor.
We disagree with the commenter's analysis. We do not think a nearly decade old EIA study of
a different rule—indeed a different proposed rule regulating an entirely different industry
sector—has persuasive value. By contrast, EPA conducted extensive electric power sector
modeling analyses in support of this final rule based on the most up to date information. For
additional discussion of these topics, see RIA Chapter 5: Electric Power Sector and Infrastructure
Impacts.
Further, as noted in the EIA study, the model used to develop the analysis is not a
comprehensive macroeconomic model of the economy; rather, it is an energy model, which does
not contain a power flow model or assess the reliability of bulk power transmission systems in
detail. The EIA model also excludes health effects and was also criticized in congressional
hearings for overstating in its base case the emissions from coal plants and understating the
power generation contributions from natural gas, nuclear and renewable energy.
Citing a document entitled "Grid-Friendly EV Charging Dynamic Behavior", one commentor
referenced concerns regarding potential grid reliability issues associated with residential air
conditioning units in the western U.S. and linked these concerns to electric vehicle charging.
There have been no documented instances of electric vehicle charging that have led to the similar
grid reliability issues. The document in question focused on infrequent grid disturbances that
originate on the Bulk-Power System (BPS) that, in 2010, caused residential air conditioning units
to stall. There was concern at the time of the incidents, if left unchecked, might lead to blackouts,
but the matter was quickly diagnosed by a consortium of electric power sector researchers. Many
of these researchers helped author the cited document, which provides recommendations and
describes EV charging behavior.
Some commenters claim that natural gas prices have "risen significantly due to the Russian
invasion of Ukraine." The claims are incorrect. U.S. natural gas prices have decreased steadily
since the start of the Ukrainian war. For instance, the U.S. benchmark Henry Hub natural gas
price in 2023 was about a 62% lower than in 2022 due, in part, to record-high natural gas
production, flat consumption, and rising natural gas inventories, according to the EIA.
Some commentors claim that "If the conflict ends in the next 5-10 years, natural gas prices in
the U.S. could return to pre-invasion levels, which would complicate the accelerated deployment
of renewables that the agency is forecasting." The commenter, however, fails to adduce any data,
analysis, or other evidence in support of its view. Therefore, its comment is not raised with
reasonable specificity as required.
This failure notwithstanding, natural gas prices have decreased, on average, since the start of
Russia's invasion of the Ukraine. Further, a return to relatively higher pre-invasion natural gas
prices would seem to further accelerate the transition from natural gas-fired EGUs to renewable
electric power generation.
Some commenters claim that "dramatic expansion in wind and solar can occur only with
breakthroughs in the economics of grid-scale energy storage technologies." According to the
EIA Monthly Energy Review, wind and solar-powered electricity generation in the U.S.
increased by a factor of 82.5 times - an increase of 2,300% - since 2000 without the need for
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"breakthroughs in the economics of grid-scale energy storage technologies." While we are
unaware of a strict statistical definition of "dramatic", we do believe that the 82.5 times increase
in renewable energy penetration in the U.S. since 2000 does constitute, if nothing else, a
"significant" expansion of wind and solar. In short, the dramatic expansion of wind and solar
penetration has already occurred.
Some commentors claim, in part, that EPA "ignores the need for more natural gas peaking
capacity and massive transmission, substation, and transformer investment to integrate these
technologies into the power grid. Those emissions are significant and may offset or eliminate the
benefits that EPA calculates." This claim is inaccurate. EPA conducted extensive electric power
sector modeling analyses in which it concluded that there is adequate generation and
transmission capacity required to meet the electric load demands imposed by the final rule. The
analysis included the anticipated need for electric power generation, which includes natural gas-
fired peaking units. These costs are included in the retail electricity process. We also modeled
emissions, including upstream emissions associated with electricity generation, and found that on
net, this rule results in significant reductions of GHGs and criteria pollutants, with widespread
benefits for air quality.
One commentor expressed their dissatisfaction with this rule and wondered "How are we
powering the chargers for these electric vehicles?" EPA conducted extensive electric power
sector modeling analyses in which it concluded that there is adequate generation and
transmission capacity required to meet the electric load demands imposed by the final rule. The
analysis presumes that electric vehicles will be charged with electricity generated at electric
generation units (EGU).
When discussing EPA's analysis of the potential impacts of vehicle electrification, some
commentors claim that the EPA violates the "law of supply". These claims might stand to reason
if the economic system described by the commentor was static and unchanging or, as economists
might say, "ceteris paribus".
However, the system, as described by the commentor, is neither.
And the commentor's reasoning neglects to consider these other factors - factors that may
affect electricity prices include location, time, and fluctuations in other inputs (e.g., the effects of
lower cost electricity available from distributed energy resources (DER) or vehicle to grid (V2G)
technologies, which are available at the periphery of the distribution system, as well as other
factors which serve to alter the supply and demand curves). It is through the consumer's shift to
the new, lower-price supply curve that consistency with the "law of supply" is maintained; this is
an example of fluctuations in inputs. The commentor's reasoning also neglects to consider
managed charging, which has the effect of shifting electric vehicle charging to times when
electricity is less expensive; this is an example of the time sensitivity of electric vehicle charging.
Managed charging and related approaches to mitigating distribution system impacts confer
additional benefits that are not captured by the commentor, such as those associated with the
deferral of capital expenditures for distribution system upgrades.
To lend credence to this claim, the commentor cites a tutorial by the New England
Independent System Operator (ISO-NE), an independent, non-profit, regional transmission
organization (RTO) that serves approximately 6.5 million people in the states of Connecticut,
Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont as well as the Commonwealth of
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Massachusetts. EPA notes that in the final section of this tutorial, entitled "Reality Is Much More
Complicated", ISO-NE states that "The examples above provide a simplified way to understand
how the markets work. In reality, the ISO manages market clearing and settlement for hundreds
of market participants at hundreds of distinct clearing prices every day of the year". The tutorial
then goes on to cite the reasons why electricity prices may vary, which includes location, time,
and fluctuation in other inputs, all of which was considered in EPA analysis.
One commentor suggests that the Inflation Reduction Act is "required for the large new
transmission lines necessary to bring renewable energy to the markets where they are needed."
While constraints in the U.S. electricity transmission system exist, DOE, FERC, and others have
taken extensive steps to help reduce the constraints. These are discussed elsewhere in this
document. It is also worth noting that the U.S. electric power system has already successfully
and reliably integrated enough renewable electricity to surpass, for the first time, nuclear
generation in 2021, and coal-fired generation in 2022. In support of the commentor's claim, the
commentor cites various reports and testimony. The first cited report states that "to achieve its
climate ambitions and fully implement transformative legislation like the Inflation Reduction
Act, Congress will also have to enable a massively accelerated build-out of clean energy
infrastructure." The report then goes on to discuss possible approaches that may help to facilitate
transmission line development. These approaches are laid out in the report as "Actionable Policy
Options" and include: a significant expansion of federal planning, general permitting, and
programmatic review; siting authority for all interstate transmission lines could be federalized;
the administration could conduct a staff capacity, funding, and technology needs assessment
across agencies involved with critical permitting for clean energy Congress could support multi-
agency coordination by allocating additional funding to the Federal Permitting Improvement
Steering Council (FPISC); Congress could transfer initial authority for Clean Air Act permitting
for offshore wind from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management (BOEM); Congress could support multi-agency coordination by allocating
additional funding to the Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council (FPISC); and
Congress could proceed with narrow reforms to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
The second report cited by the commentor states that "The IRA may significantly reduce
emissions from coal owing to the large volume of subsidy directed for low-carbon electricity
generation". However, the report authors then go on to note that the potential effects associated
with the IRA on transmission system development were not considered on their report.
Acknowledging such, the report authors write that "This analysis did not assess (IRA) provisions
for energy efficiency, transmission or permitting." The report authors continue, noting that "This
analysis did not assess provisions for energy efficiency, transmission or permitting." As for the
reasoning behind why the report authors elected to not consider the potential effects of the IRA
on transmission system development in the report cited by the commentors, the report authors
write that".. .the IRA spends over $2 billion on transmission facilities. As the impact of this
spending can be highly variable depending on where it is distributed, we do not assume its
effects". The final reference cited by the commentor that electric power transmission may affect
the potential benefits associated with the IRA. As noted above, DOE, FERC, and others have
taken extensive steps to help reduce transmission constraints.
Continuing, the commentor states that "The IPM modeling also ignores the massive
expansion of grid-scale energy storage that would be required to achieve reliability with
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renewables." EPA conducted extensive electric power sector modeling in support of the final
rule, which includes grid-scale storage facilities, which were found to help integrate renewable
electricity sources into the grid. See Chapter 5 of the RIA for a discussion on the electric power
sector modeling. The commentor continues, "For these reasons, it is unrealistic to expect that the
electricity currently provided by fossil fuels will be provided by renewables within the average
lifetime of the model year 2032 vehicle." We do expect continuing use of fossil fuels, including
coal and natural gas. However, we expect significant increases in renewable penetration over the
coming decades. EPA notes that the grid transition referred to by the commentor has already
occurred and continues, in part, with support from the IRA.
More generally, to the extent the commenter is requesting legislative action or permitting
reforms by other Federal agencies or State agencies, the comments are beyond the scope of this
rulemaking.
Some commentors suggested that electric power system upgrades might be needed to
accommodate vehicle electrification in a more-timely manner. Should they be required,
numerous tools are available to expedite the timely incorporation of electric vehicle charging
infrastructure into existing electric power systems. These tools help to ensure that new charging
stations can be connected to the grid as quickly as possible and without adversely affecting grid
reliability. These tools include managed charging, time-of-use (TOU) electric rates, distributed
energy resources (DERs), Power Control Systems (PCS), utility hosting capacity maps, Battery
Energy Storage (BES), Advanced Distribution Management System (ADMS), Load Constraint
Management System (LCMS), and others. For additional discussions of these topic, please see
Chapter 5 of the RIA and preamble IV.C.5.
Some commentors point out that PEV charging can reduce utility bills for all customers. The
EPA agrees with the commentor. Moreover, some commentors claim that the "electric system
impacts associated with this final rule will be gradual and within the range of historical growth"
and that the "projected growth in electricity demand are well within the range of past historical
load growth." The EPA agrees with both comments.
Citing Southern California Edison (SCE), an electric utility based in Southern California,
some commentors note the importance of time-of-use (TOU) electric rates in shifting charging
times for electric vehicles: "The figures above represent real-world data collected from hundreds
of thousands of households with PEVs. There is no need to test the proposition that simple TOU
rates designed for PEVs work." The EPA agrees with the conclusions of commentor.
19 - Fuels and life cycle analysis (LCA)
19.1 - Fuels
Comments by Organizations
Organization: 25x '25 Alliance, et al.
The failings of the proposed rule follow almost entirely from EPA's decision to "bet the farm"
on electric vehicles. The agency would be far better served by taking a more holistic approach.
There are 281 million internal combustion engine vehicles on the road today and 100 million
more will be built in the next two decades. All of these vehicles could be improved—and for far
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less than what EPA's proposal would cost—with an improvement in fuel quality. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR PIE CHART of Role for Liquid Fuels [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0573, pp.1-4]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR BAR GRAPH of EPA-Projected Cumulative U.S. Sales
2023-2032 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
EPA is statutorily obligated to explore this approach. Section 202(a)(3)(A)(ii) requires that,
"in establishing classes or categories of vehicles or engines for purposes of regulations under this
paragraph, the Administrator may base such classes or categories on gross vehicle weight,
horsepower, type of fuel used, or other appropriate factors." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(ii)
(emphasis added). There are many ways EPA could consider the type of fuel as a means of
settings its regulations: through the consideration of life-cycle emissions under the agency's
Section 202 powers, through increased volumes of low-carbon renewable fuels under the
Renewable Fuel Standard, through alternative, low-carbon certification fuels, or through Section
211(c) rulemaking—as the proposal itself suggests. These options are not beyond the scope of
this rulemaking but are obvious alternatives to EPA's current all-electric approach. And "the
failure of an agency to consider obvious alternatives has led uniformly to reversal." Spirit
Airlines, Inc. v. DOT, 997 F.3d 1247, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573,
pp.1-4]
EPA must consider these alternatives, and would be well served to issue a new proposed
multipollutant rule that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
1) incorporates requirements to improve fuel quality by
- establishing a higher federal octane standard while allowing higher blends of ethanol; and
- "incenting the reduction of carbon and aromatic compounds via reformulation or
alternatively increasing ethanol blending. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
2) provides incentives for automakers to produce flex-fuel vehicles by
- creating alternative certification pathways for higher ethanol blends; and
- correcting the problems with R-Value and C02 penalty that other commentors have
identified and re-establishing the Volumetric Conversion Factor in the fuel economy calculation
algorithm. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
3) adopts a life-cycle analysis approach to calculating and comparing emissions from
different technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
Embracing and enabling a pathway to improve fuel quality will increase and accelerate
emission reductions, improve public health, help achieve environmental justice goals, provide
greater versatility, and improve reliability all at less cost. This pathway is available to EPA and
the consideration of it is demanded by the Clean Air Act. The best and most recent data suggests
that the adoption of even mid-level ethanol blends would reduce pollution emissions at least as
much as EPA's electrification approach, and at far less cost.i Even if EPA's electrification
program could be successful—and as explained above, it cannot—a complimentary fuel
improvement would double EPA's projected emissions reduction. The current rule takes this
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option off the table and leaves those pollutants in the air. EPA could do far better. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
1 See "Higher Ethanol Blends Support the Transition to a Low-Carbon Future," Brian West, SAE Update,
February 2023, pp2-6) National adoption of mid-level ethanol blends is available, feasible, and lower cost
than current gasoline. https://www.nxtbook.eom/smg/sae/23UPD02/index.php#/p/2
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
X. Fuels
Given the timespan over which internal combustion engine technology will continue to be
available to new vehicle purchasers, and the years that those vehicles will remain in the field,
improved liquid fuels are a critically important technology enabling pathway. Improved liquid
fuels can facilitate increased fuel efficiency, and reduced GHG and non-GHG emissions as the
EV market continues to grow. EPA has requested comments on potential future gasoline fuel
property standards, and as such we offer the following.403 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
260]
403 NPRM at 29197.
A. EPA Should Act Now to Improve Fuels
EPA should act now to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 260-261]
- Implement a nationwide clean fuel standard to lower GHG emissions;
- Regulate the particulate forming tendency of market gasoline by eliminating the heavy
aromatic fraction of gasoline, thereby reducing PM emissions from all ICE vehicles, equipment,
and engines to improve air quality for all;
- Lower the sulfur cap of gasoline from 80 ppm to 10 ppm at the refinery gate to further
reduce non-GHG emissions from ICE-equipped vehicles and engines to improve air quality;
- Adjust Tier 3 certification fuel specifications to align with current market fuel composition
and to enable fuel suppliers to target a particulate matter index of 1.5 to 1.6;
- Cap summer vapor pressure of gasoline at 9.0 psi or less, regardless of ethanol content, to
further reduce evaporative emissions as E10 fuel is ubiquitous in the market;
- Immediately eliminate sub-87 anti-knock index ("AKI") octane fuels from the market to
increase fuel efficiency and reduce GHG emissions;
- Transition to a higher minimum-octane gasoline (i.e., minimum 95-98 research octane
number) to facilitate higher engine efficiency; and
- Limit air toxics, e.g., olefins and aromatics, and their precursors from the fuel to improve air
quality for all. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 260-261]
In addition to a comprehensive fuels rulemaking, Auto Innovators recommends that EPA also
proceed with finalizing its eRINs proposal from the Renewable Fuel Standard Set Rule for
Renewable Volume Obligations for 2023-2025 NPRM.404 This proposal provides a
complementary approach to EPA's proposed multipollutant rule, including supporting and
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encouraging both EVs and renewable sources of energy, as well as to the overall goal of
decarbonizing the transportation sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 260-261]
404 Renewable Fuel Standard Set Rule for Renewable Volume Obligations for 2023-2025,
htps://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-12-30/pdf/2022-26499.pdf
B. Legacy and New ICE-Equipped Vehicles Will Continue in the Fleet for a significant Time
Liquid fuels will continue to play a vital role in transportation for years to come, and there are
important improvements that can be made to reduce carbon, increase vehicle fuel efficiency, and
lower emissions supported directly by high octane, low carbon, and low emissions fuels. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 261]
There are nearly 290 million light-duty cars and trucks in the United States,405 and nearly
98% of those vehicles operate on gasoline or diesel fuel.406 Even with the proposed GHG
reductions in the NPRM, which as currently proposed would result in a projected BEV
penetration of 67% of sales in 2032, it is clear that substantial numbers of liquid-fueled vehicles
will be produced well through this decade and into the next. In addition, the average age of a
vehicle in the U.S. has grown to over 12 years.407 The car pare will continue to rely on liquid
fuels for years to come, and gasoline will continue to play a significant role in transportation and
ultimately, air quality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 261]
405 U.S. Vehicle Registration Statistics, Hedges & Company, htps://hedgescompany.com/automotive-
market- research-statistics/auto-mailing-lists-and-marketing/ (accessed May 23, 2023).
406 Figures compiled by Alliance for Automotive Innovation with registered vehicle data provided by IHS
Markit, htps://www.autosinnovate.org/resources/electric-vehicle-sales-dashboard, (accessed May 23, 2023)
407 U.S. Vehicle Registration Statistics, Hedges & Company, htps://hedgescompany.com/automotive-
market- research-statistics/auto-mailing-lists-and-marketing/ (accessed May 23, 2023).
Vehicles and fuels are a system and the role of liquid fuel improvements for gasoline vehicles
can reduce emissions and improve air quality now and complement the GHG reduction from the
EV fleet turnover. If EPA does not act as part of this rulemaking, or undertake a comprehensive
fuels rulemaking in the near future, it is missing an important and crucial opportunity to
implement a low-cost approach to improving fuel economy and reducing GHG and criteria
pollutant emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 261]
C. EPA Has the Authority to Regulate Fuels to Improve GHG Emissions
The Clean Air Act provides statutory authority for the EPA to regulate GHG emissions, which
can "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the
public health or welfare."408 Section 211 of the Clean Air Act provides EPA with the authority
to regulate motor vehicle fuels in furtherance of the Act's goals. Specifically, Section 211(c) of
the Act grants EPA the authority to set new national fuel standards, including octane rating,
under the following circumstances: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 261-262]
408 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
- (1)(A) "if in the judgment of the Administrator, any fuel or fuel additive or any emission
product of such fuel or fuel additive causes or contributes to air pollution or water pollution...
that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health or welfare," or
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- (l)(B)"if emission products of such fuel or fuel additive will impair to a significant degree
the performance of any emission control device or system which is in general use, or has been
developed to a point where in a reasonable time it would be in general use were such regulations
to be promulgated." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 261-262]
It is important to note that the addition of GHGs to the list of Clean Air Act "pollutants" is
changing how one thinks of emissions control. For purposes of considering EPA's authority
under 211(c)(1)(B), it is important to realize that the term "any emission control device or
system" must be understood more broadly than it once was. With this realization, it is easy to see
that engine efficiency improvements offer emission control benefits. However, low-octane fuel
acts as a barrier to these efficiency benefits. EPA has the authority and must stand firmly on the
side of removing these barriers and providing manufacturers with a full menu of options for
striving to meet the future GHG standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 261-262]
In light of increasing GHG and CAFE requirements, it continues to be essential for vehicles
and the fuels they operate on to be treated as a system and developed in tandem. Prospective
fuels should enable greater vehicle efficiency and lower emissions, optimize the consumer
experience, and fulfill societal values. Technology is in place to produce advanced engines.
However, without a promulgated higher-octane fuel standard, the advanced engines cannot
optimize their potential operational efficiency. It is now timely for EPA to undertake an
accelerated process to implement and synchronize the market introduction of higher-octane
gasoline that will enable the benefits of advanced technologies and support manufacturer
investments. EPA has the authority to regulate national commercial gasoline octane
specifications under the Clean Air Act. EPA should initiate a fast-track process to assure higher
octane gasoline that meets the market and timing needs of new vehicle technologies for the U.S.
commercial supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 261-262]
D. EPA Should Implement a Nationwide Clean Fuel Standard
Achieving ambitious climate goals requires regulators to recognize and incentivize all carbon
reducing technologies. Fuels and vehicles should be treated as a holistic system, and as such,
decarbonizing liquid fuels would yield immediate benefits for lowering the carbon intensity of
transportation energy. Inclusion of low carbon fuels within a multi-pathway approach to
emissions reductions would enhance the probability of meeting emissions goals. Low carbon
fuels offer a hedge against uncertainties that could affect the pace of electrification. In addition,
low carbon fuels would offer consumer choice on vehicles while still supporting decarbonization
of transportation energy. The proposed regulations should factor for a range of consumers whose
needs or budgets require different solutions, consistent with environmental justice objectives.
Low carbon liquid fuels are an important part of enabling all vehicle owners to play a role in
reducing emissions as fast as possible during the transition to an all-electric future. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 262-263]
EPA should take actions to support low or net-zero carbon liquid fuels. Although automobile
manufacturers are focused on electrification, as noted above, actions on liquid fuels can provide
benefits to legacy vehicles, would support even lower GHG emissions from PHEVs, and could
provide much-needed GHG reduction pathways. EPA should leverage a new national Clean Fuel
Standard (i.e., Low Carbon Fuel Standard or LCFS) and/or modified renewable fuel standard
(RFS) to incentivize low carbon fuel use (e.g., renewable fuels and emerging carbon-neutral
fuels, such as eFuels and synthetic fuels) in legacy and future ICE vehicles and engines. Upon
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introduction, this would have an immediate impact, reducing GHG emissions across the entire
fleet of in use vehicles and engines. In addition, a properly structured nationwide Clean Fuel
Standard, while providing GHG reductions, can also create new revenue sources to incentivize
market adoption of EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 262-263]
F. EPA Should Take Further Action on Fuels to Reduce Emissions and Improve Air Quality
Use of improved liquid fuels supports ongoing efforts to improve air quality and can provide
an important bridge in reducing emissions during the transition to expanded vehicle
electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 274]
In many cases gasoline improvements would improve emissions from virtually all of the 290
million vehicles on the road today, in addition to other liquid-fueled equipment. Given that these
vehicles are on the road today and that benefits would accrue immediately upon introduction, we
see no reason for EPA to delay in implementing a rulemaking. Auto Innovators has commented
extensively in the past on the fuel improvements needed to address criteria pollutant and air
toxics emissions. Several improvements to market fuels should be pursued: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 274]
1. Reduce Refinery Gate and Downstream Sulfur Caps to 10 ppm
When EPA finalized the Tier 3 rules governing gasoline, it lowered the maximum average
sulfur level from 30 ppm to 10 ppm. This change was essential to enable advance emissions
control technology to achieve the lower tailpipe emissions standards that are part of the Tier 3
standards because, as EPA points out, "any amount of gasoline sulfur will deteriorate catalyst
efficiency."446 However, EPA continues to allow gasoline with 80 ppm sulfur at the refinery
gate and 95 ppm downstream. Auto Innovators continues to stand behind previous industry
comments on sulfur as detailed in the Auto Alliance Tier 3 comments.447 Refiners and the
distribution system have had many years to adjust to lower sulfur standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 274]
446 Control of Air Pollution from Motor Vehicles: Tier 3 Motor Vehicle Emission and Fuel Standards,
Proposed Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 29816, 29821 (May 21, 2013).
447 Supplemental Comments of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers on Market Gasoline Sulfur,
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Oct. 31, 2013), Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0135-4950.
If EPA pursues lower Tier 4 emissions standards in the NPRM, we urge EPA to reduce the
refinery gate cap to 10 ppm, perhaps with a phase-in period, and at the same time to develop a
pathway toward a downstream retail cap of 10 ppm per gallon. The elimination of gasoline with
greater than 10 ppm sulfur will enable advanced emissions control technology and will reduce
the impact of sulfur on catalyst efficiency. This cap aligns with sulfur caps in the European
Union and many parts of Asia, including China. The lower sulfur cap also aligns with the lower
NMOG + NOx standards as proposed in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 274]
2. Cap Summer Vapor Pressure at 9.0 psi or Less
EPA should cap summer gasoline vapor pressure at 9.0 psi or less regardless of ethanol level.
From a vehicle operability perspective, there is no need for fuel vapor pressure to be even as high
as 9.0 psi. California summer fuel is capped at 7 psi, and there have been no operability issues
with on-specification fuel in California. Lower vapor pressure will reduce evaporative emissions
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across the fleet, particularly in older vehicles and off-road and handheld equipment. Since the
beneficial effects of lower vapor pressure are enhanced by progressively lowering it and
applying it to all gasoline fueled equipment from day one, there is no reason for EPA not to
follow the California example for summer fuels and cap other seasons at ASTM D4814 maxima.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 274-275]
3. Eliminate sub-87 AKI Market Fuels
Vehicles sold in the U.S. require fuel octane of 87 AKI or higher. Tier 3 regular grade
certification fuel has closely controlled octane and is specified at 87-88.4 AKI. In the majority of
the U.S., the minimum market octane is 87 AKI by regulation or custom. However, in the Rocky
Mountain states sub-octane fuel continues to be marketed. This was justified in the past by high
altitude effects on engine knock. However, as ASTM D4814 section XI.6 points out: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 275]
New vehicles have sensors to measure [sic] and engine management computers, which take
into account such conditions as air charge temperature and barometric pressure. These vehicles
are designed to have the same antiknock requirement at all altitudes and a reduced sensitivity to
changes in ambient temperature. This more sophisticated control technology began to be used
extensively in 1984. This technology, while constantly evolving and improving, is used on
almost all new vehicles. This means that many vehicles in today's fleet require fuel having the
same antiknock index regardless of changes in altitude or ambient temperatures.448 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 275]
448 ASTM D4814, Standard Specification for Automotive Spark-Ignition Engine Fuel.
This text implies that the vehicles produced in the last 39 years require the same fuel as the
rest of the country. More recently, automakers have produced increasing proportions of vehicles
with turbocharged engines. These engines boost manifold pressure using turbochargers and are
insensitive to altitude. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 275]
The result of misfuelling these vehicles, whether they have sensors and engine management
computers dating from 1984 or more advanced technologies, is that the vehicle will knock on the
sub-octane fuel resulting in spark retard and enrichment to protect the engine from damage.
Spark retard will reduce fuel economy and increase GHG emissions, while fuel enrichment will
increase CO and HC emissions. The solution to these issues is easy: EPA must mandate that all
market fuels meet or exceed the octane of Tier 3 certification fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, p. 275]
4. EPA Should Adopt a High-Octane Fuel Standard
Higher-octane gasoline enables opportunities for the use of key energy-efficient technologies,
including higher compression-ratio engines, lighter and smaller engines, improved
turbocharging, and optimized engine combustion phasing and timing. All of these technologies,
when paired with higher-octane gasoline, permit smaller engines to meet the demands of the
consumer while at the same time providing higher efficiencies and thus reducing GHG emissions
during vehicle use. Furthermore, depending on its composition, high-octane fuel is safe to use in
many existing vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 275-277]
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The relative efficiency gain enabled by higher octane rated gasoline is well documented. A
literature review published by Leone et al. shows that increasing fuel octane rating from 91 RON
to 95 RON facilitates an increase in efficiency by 3 to 5%.449 Figure 95 shows the correlation of
efficiency gain enabled by higher octane rated fuels with higher compression ratio engines.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 275-277]
449 Thomas Leone et al., "The Effect of Compression Ratio, Fuel Octane Rating, and Ethanol Content on
Spark- Ignition Engine efficiency." Environ. Sci. Technol. (2015) 49 (18), 10778-10789,
htps://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.5b01420 (accessed Sep. 24, 2021).
[See original for graph titled "Figure 95: Relative efficiency gain with higher octane fuel
rating. Raising octane enables engine compression ratio increases, resulting in improved engine
efficiency."] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 275-277]
Auto Innovators (and its predecessor associations) has long advocated that EPA should
require a transition to a higher minimum-octane gasoline (minimum 95-98 RON). There are
several ways to produce higher octane-grade gasoline. Increasing the ethanol content of gasoline
is one approach. Hydrocarbon composition changes are another. Reducing the proportion of low
octane naphtha or increasing the proportion of higher-octane streams such as alkylate or
reformate will result in higher octane fuels. Ethanol blends higher than E10, with misfuelling
mitigation measures in place, have been suggested by some to provide better value to consumers
to achieve higher octane numbers and reduce carbon emissions. Auto Innovators does not
promote any sole or particular pathway. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 275-277]
Producing higher octane fuel for the future ICE fleet will not impose any significant burdens
on the refining and retail sectors. Hirshfeld et al. analyzed the refining economics of raising the
average octane rating of the U.S. gasoline pool by increasing the octane rating of refinery
produced blendstocks for oxygenated blending and/or the ethanol content of the finished
gasoline.450,451 These studies found a transition to higher-octane (95 RON, E10) gasoline was
technically feasible and could be made without considerable increases in cost or C02 emissions
for refineries.452 The implementation of higher octane-rated gasoline in the marketplace would
be a cost-effective means of improving fuel economy and therefore should be encouraged as
soon as possible to maximize environmental benefits across the new car fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 275-277]
450 David S. Hirshfeld et al., "Refining Economics of U.S. Gasoline: Octane Ratings and Ethanol
Content," 48 ENVT'L SCI. & TECH. 11,064 (2014), htps://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/es5021668 (accessed
Sep. 24, 2021).
451 David S. Hirshfeld et al., "Refining Economics of Higher Octane Sensitivity, Research Octane Number
and Ethanol Content for U.S. Gasoline," Energy Fuels 2021, Publication Date: September 1, 2021,
htps://doi.org/10.1021/acs.energyfuels.lc00247 (accessed Sep. 24, 2021).
Footnote 452: Id.
EPA has the ability to enable the ICE to achieve increased fuel efficiency by requiring higher
minimum octane rated gasoline in the marketplace. Research, data, and evidence confirms the
ability to increase ICE efficiencies as the octane rating of gasoline increases. EPA, in the past,
has recognized its authority to alter fuel quality to increase efficiencies. Specifically, as the
criteria emission standards have increased in stringency, the allowable sulfur concentration
decreased in recognition of sulfur's deleterious effects on emission control systems. Today, the
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GHG regulation has achieved such levels that the minimum market gasoline octane rating is
limiting the ability to advance ICE technology. It is now necessary to adjust the gasoline octane
rating (higher) commensurate with required decreases in GHG emissions. The new minimum
octane rating needs to be set immediately to 95 RON and then increased to 98 RON as new GHG
standards are implemented. The new gasoline octane levels are backwards compatible, and a
subset of the vehicles in the legacy fleet have the ability to also increase efficiency in response to
higher octane. Being able to leverage the legacy fleet in assisting in the reduction in
transportation carbon emissions can significantly benefit the portfolio of technology solutions in
achieving the collective goals associated with the climate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
275-277]
The implementation of higher octane-rated gasoline in new vehicles would be a cost-effective
means of improving fuel economy and reducing GHG emissions for the light-duty vehicle fleet.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 275-277]
Organization: Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE)
AVE seeks stronger support for hydrogen engine and fuel cell platforms as a means for
the U.S. to meet its environmental goals.
AVE seeks stronger support from EPA for hydrogen fuel cells (H2FC) and hydrogen engine
(H2ICE) vehicles, especially at MD levels. Although the Proposal acknowledges the benefits of
fuel cell electric vehicles, ending the credit multipliers will hamper market penetration.
Incentives could also help accelerate and encourage more hydrogen refueling infrastructure,
which is desperately needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 7]
AVE also asks EPA to consider H2ICE as a ZEV technology, as EPA did in its Phase 3
proposal. H2ICE could be an excellent opportunity to decarbonize the MD fleet faster with
continued incentives. As the engine platform emits zero grams of C02 at the tailpipe, H2ICE
should be included as a compliance pathway. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 7]
The IRA allocates billions of dollars towards the hydrogen marketplace, and President Biden
has created a hydrogen policy roadmap. EPA can support these measures with compliance
incentives for hydrogen-powered vehicles as they emit zero C02 at the tailpipe and should
qualify for the same incentives as all ZEV vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, p. 7]
AVE supports incentivizing renewable and low-carbon fuels as a compliance pathway.
AVE supports all efforts to help accelerate reaching the nation's environmental goals.
Although BEVs are expected to reach higher sales volumes, little attention is paid to the
increased sales of larger SUVs. The International Energy Agency estimates that despite large
gains in the future BEV market, the predominant vehicle technology sold in the U.S. will
continue to be ICE vehicles. Moreover, the ICE vehicles will be bigger and have lower fuel
economy than most passenger cars.21 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 8-9]
21IEA - Global EV Outlook 2023 - Catching up with climate ambitions Page 10
Despite these market predictions, the Proposal does nothing to incentivize manufacturers to
produce ICE vehicles that can operate on higher blends of renewable or low-carbon fuels. To
fully appreciate the importance of incentivizing the use of low carbon fuels in ICE vehicles, EPA
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need not look any further than the analysis from the DOE's Energy Information Agency (EIA).
EIA predicts fewer BEVs on U.S. roads than what EPA and others estimate over the next 27
years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 8-9]
[See original for graphic titled "Light-duty vehicle sales by technology or fuel AEO2022
Reference case] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 8-9]
[See original for graphic titled "New vehicle sales of battery-powered vehicles AEO2022
Reference case] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 8-9]
Incentivizing renewable and low-carbon fuels will dramatically improve the emissions of the
nation's existing fleet. The legacy LD fleet consists of approximately 280 million vehicles and
consumers are now keeping vehicles for an average approaching 13-years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0631, pp. 8-9]
Other regions of the world are investing in advanced biofuels and eFuels. In Europe,
regulators have acknowledged the benefit of reducing the carbon footprint of liquid fuels and are
supporting the expansion of eFuels.22 The EPA should support these efforts as well here in the
U.S. Incentivizing the use of renewables and low-carbon fuels for compliance would accelerate
and significantly increase C02 reduction and bring greater environmental gains. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 8-9]
22 https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/03/28/in-win-for-germany-eu-agrees-to-exempt-e-fuels-
from-203 5- ban-on-new-sales-of-combustion-en
Organization: American Coalition for Ethanol (ACE)
From the perspective of tailpipe-focused emissions, EPA's proposal represents the most
ambitious standards ever for light-duty vehicles, effectively requiring 60% of all vehicle sales to
be battery electric vehicles (BEVs) only by 2030, ramping up to BEVs representing 67% of all
vehicle sales just two years later (2032). The Agency is seeking comment on alternative
compliance scenarios; Alternative 1 would require BEVs to represent 69% of all vehicle sales by
2032 and Alternative 2, the "least stringent," would require BEVs to make up 64% of all vehicle
sales by 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, p. 1]
While ACE members share EPA's goal to significantly reduce lifecycle greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions from U.S. passenger vehicles, we know there is a better way than arbitrarily
regulating a solution which merely focuses on the tailpipe and is practically unachievable.
Therefore, ACE does not support the proposal nor either alternative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0613, p. 1]
To be clear, ACE members recognize BEVs can play a meaningful role in decarbonizing the
transportation sector. We also support technology-neutral policies which enable electric vehicles
to compete on a level playing field with other low carbon technology solutions such as ethanol.
We oppose policies which tilt the scale in favor of BEVs and ignore the lifecycle GHG emissions
associated with them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, p. 1]
Our comments will 1) discuss the practical, technical and legal problems associated with
arbitrarily regulating BEVs as the only solution to reduce GHGs from the transportation sector,
and 2) how EPA can fix its proposal to develop a practical and achievable technology-neutral
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final rule which achieves the goals we share to meaningfully reduce carbon pollution from
transportation emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, p. 1]
Another misnomer is the assertion BEVs have no emissions. BEVs are not zero emission
vehicles. They are zero tailpipe emission vehicles. EPA's proposal conveniently ignores this
reality by failing to account for the entirety of lifecycle GHG emissions associated with BEVs
and the minerals/materials necessary to produce and power them. The Agency risks exposing
itself to litigation regarding the potential arbitrary and capricious nature of a rule which ignores
the lifecycle GHG emissions associated with BEVs in relation to how EPA assesses the
emissions of biofuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, p. 3]
What's more, EPA lacks the authority to ignore upstream emissions for BEVs. The Agency
has authority under 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) to prescribe "standards applicable to the emission of
any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,
which in its judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare." If BEVs are not "vehicles" "which cause, or contribute to,
air pollution," then EPA may not set standards for them. If BEVs are "vehicles" "which cause, or
contribute to, air pollution," then EPA must account for those emissions, which in the case of
BEVs come from upstream electricity generating units. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, p. 3]
Recommended changes to ensure final rule achieves meaningful reductions in GHGs
EPA itself acknowledges millions of vehicles with internal combustion engines will continue
to be sold well beyond 2032 and millions more of these vehicles will remain on U.S. roads for
decades to come.7 Given this reality, we recommend the Agency develop a technology-neutral
final rule which gives much more consideration to replacing the fossil fuel-based gasoline
powering these vehicles with a lower carbon and higher-octane alternative, such as ethanol.
President Biden himself has said we "simply cannot get to net-zero [emissions] by 2050 without
biofuels."8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, p. 4]
7 Fed. Register Page 29,397 of EPA's Proposed Rule.
8 U.S. President Joe Biden during an April 12, 2022 visit to Iowa announcing a temporary national
emergency waiver for E15. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-
remarks/2022/04/12/remarks-by-president-biden-on-lowering-energy-costs-for-working-families/.
Many leading corn ethanol producers are on a trajectory to both net-zero and net-negative
lifecycle emissions in the not-too-distant future. Compared to the massive supply chain
disruptions and hurdles that must be cleared to achieve a transition to 67% BEVs by 2032,
billions of gallons of low carbon and high-octane renewable liquid fuels such as ethanol are
available right now to rapidly decarbonize transportation-related GHG emissions. Importantly,
today's vehicle fleet and refueling infrastructure is mostly compatible with renewable fuels such
as ethanol, biodiesel, and renewable diesel, making for a smoother, lower cost transition with the
added benefit of not having to wait for immediate reductions in GHG emissions. If the
overarching goal for the Biden Administration is net-zero emissions by mid- century, let's start
making progress right now by taking full advantage of the 15 billion gallons of domestically
produced ethanol available today as an affordable way to boost octane and meaningfully reduce
GHG emissions from gasoline powered engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, p. 4]
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EPA's final rule must address fuel quality and establish new certification fuel pathways to
account for the tremendous benefits of high ethanol blends such as El 5 and E85. This is the most
effective way to rapidly reduce carbon pollution from light-duty vehicles. We strongly encourage
the Agency to pay particularly close attention to the comprehensive comments submitted on July
2 by Pearson Fuels, the largest distributor of E85 in California, supplying more than 315 retail
E85 stations. ACE specifically supports the recommendations Pearson Fuels makes with respect
to establishing a GHG emissions factor or restoring a multiplier for E85 utilized in flexible fuel
vehicles (FFVs) and developing an incentive to facilitate the development of hybrid FFVs such
as the Toyota Hybrid Flex Corolla being pioneered in Brazil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613,
p. 4]
We welcome EPA specifically identifying fuel and the opportunity to address particulate
matter (PM) emission reductions from sources of liquid fuels in a separate future rulemaking.
Given the inescapable link between vehicle emissions and the fuel used to power the engines in
those vehicles, we strongly recommend the Agency not wait for a future rulemaking but rather
address fuel quality and PM reductions as part of the final rule for 2027 and later model year
vehicles. EPA's proposal explains the complications facing refiners with respect to reducing the
content of high-boiling point compounds in gasoline given the need to meet market octane
requirements (since removing aromatics from gasoline requires a method to replace the octane
those aromatics contained). This presents another opportunity for the Agency to rely on greater
concentrations of ethanol in gasoline because ethanol delivers the highest-octane rating for fuel
at the lowest cost, allowing automakers to benefit by continuing to develop high-compression
and fuel-efficient engine technologies to reduce vehicle GHG emissions. We believe high octane,
low carbon blends comprised of 25 to 30 percent ethanol would enable more fuel-efficient
vehicles, reduce GHG emissions, and reduce other pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613,
pp. 4-5]
There are approximately 25 million FFVs in the U.S. today. The ideal way to transition from
today's legacy fleet of internal combustion engines to new vehicles with advanced engine
technologies designed to run optimally on a high-octane fuel is to utilize FFVs as bridge vehicles
that can provide immediate demand for midlevel ethanol blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0613, pp. 4-5]
As a matter of fact, the Department of Energy Oak Ridge National Lab has investigated the
use of high- octane ethanol blends such as E25 and E30 in FFVs that are designed and
compatible with ethanol blend levels from 0 to 85 percent and can therefore seamlessly and with
OEM approval utilize midlevel ethanol blends.9 Key findings from Oak Ridge include:
"Experiments were performed with four FFVs using an E10 (92 RON) and E30 (100 RON) fuel.
The two direct-injection FFVs demonstrated performance improvements for E30 compared to
E10 of 2.5 to 3 percent, based on the 15-80 wide- open throttle acceleration time. Three of the
four FFVs showed performance improvement with high- octane E30 compared to regular E10.
(...) Marketing E25 or E30 to FFV owners as a performance fuel may enable greater utilization
of ethanol in the near term and could help establish the refueling infrastructure to enable
manufacturers to build dedicated vehicles designed for a high-octane midlevel ethanol blend."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 4-5]
9 Effects of High-Octane Ethanol Blends on Four Legacy FFVs and a Turbocharged GDI Vehicle."
Thomas, J, West, and Huff, S, U.S. DoE ORNL. March 2015.
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Vehicle incentives/credits are not the only area in which EPA seems to penalize technologies
designed to operate efficiently on ethanol-blended fuel, indeed another inequity exists with the
Agency's outdated fuel economy formula. In previous statements, EPA has acknowledged part
of the fuel economy formula (the R-factor) unfairly penalizes fuel containing ethanol.
Consequently, EPA is discouraging automakers from developing efficient engines that require
higher octane ratings and higher ethanol content. EPA has previously said the 0.6 R-factor is
erroneous and fails to achieve the statutory purpose of evaluating the fuel economy of fuels
containing ethanol. The auto industry has asked EPA for an R-factor of 1.0. In response, EPA
has suggested the correct value may lie "between 0.8 and 0.9." ACE supports an R-factor of 1.0.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, p. 5]
Section 202(a)(3)(A)(ii) of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to look beyond the basic engine
to set its engine or vehicle emission standards. Specifically, the statute says "in establishing
classes or categories of vehicles or engines for purposes of regulations under this paragraph, the
Administrator may base such classes or categories on gross vehicle weight, horsepower, type of
fuel used, or other appropriate factors (emphasis added)." To account for the "type of fuel used"
EPA needs to conduct a full lifecycle GHG emissions analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0613, p. 5]
The full lifecycle GHG emissions analysis in the final rule must be based upon the latest
version of the Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Technologies
(GREET) model developed by U.S. Department of Energy's Argonne National Laboratory.
GREET is considered the gold-standard for calculating energy use, GHGs, and other regulated
emissions that occur during the full lifecycle production and combustion of all transportation
fuels and sources. GREET is used by the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard program and the
Oregon Clean Fuels program and has more than 40,000 registered users worldwide. Congress
directed the Treasury Department to use GREET for the new 45Z clean fuel production tax credit
in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 5-6]
While it may be an inconvenient truth for some to accept, corn ethanol is a proven and cost-
effective low carbon fuel playing an important role in reducing GHG emissions and air pollution
from the transportation sector. In fact, the RFS has cut GHG emissions by nearly 600 million
metric tons since 2007, exceeding EPA's original expectation of 444 million metric tons. 10
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 5-6]
10 Unnasch. S. (2019) GHG Reductions from the RFS2 - A 2018 Update. Life Cycle Associates Report
LCA. LCA.6145.199.2019 Prepared for Renewable Fuels Association.
Ethanol and Agriculture are Part of the Solution
ACE members believe ethanol can and should be an even bigger part of the solution to
climate change, and we are encouraged by statements from you and USDA Secretary Vilsack
that biofuels and agriculture will have a seat at the table as the Biden administration determines
how to achieve the ambitious yet important goal of reaching net-zero carbon emissions in the
U.S. by midcentury. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 6-7]
The science is clear: agriculture is critical to reduce GHG emissions. In 2018, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found that 89% of the globe's capacity to
mitigate carbon emissions comes from agricultural soil carbon sequestration.il Farmers help
mitigate climate change through practices such as conservation tillage which promotes soil
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carbon sequestration. It is estimated that U.S. farmers already store 20 million metric tons of
carbon per year and scientists with EPA and USDA believe agricultural soil has the potential to
sequester an additional 180 million metric tons per year.12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp.
6-7]
11 Smith, P., D. Martino, Z. Cai, D. Gwary, H. Janzen, P. Kumar, B. McCarl, S. Ogle, F. O'Mara, C. Rice,
B. Scholes, O. Sirotenko, 2007: Agriculture. In Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working
Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [B. Metz,
O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer (eds)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, at p. 499 (emphasis in original), available at
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4-wg3-chapter8-l.pdf (last viewed July 16, 2020)
(hereafter, 2018 IPCC Agriculture Chapter).
12 Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Potential in U.S. Forestry and Agriculture. EPA 430-R05-006.
We are particularly encouraged by new funding provided to USDA through the IRA to scale
the deployment of climate-smart farming practices and demonstrate the link those practices have
on reducing GHG emissions from products such as biofuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613,
pp. 6-7]
In 2018 ACE published a White Paper, titled "The Case for Properly Valuing the Low Carbon
Benefits of Corn Ethanol," explaining if policymakers encouraged investment and adoption of
more technology innovation, many ethanol plants would respond to the market signal to produce
even cleaner fuel. 13 A study published by MIT, Harvard, Tufts, and Environmental Health &
Engineering Inc. scientists cites ACE's 2018 White Paper and reinforces the fact that the GHG
reduction benefits of corn ethanol have been significantly undervalued because some regulatory
bodies refuse to apply or use the latest lifecycle science. The MIT/Harvard/Tufts study found
that average corn ethanol reduces GHGs by 46 percent compared to gasoline and given
improvements occurring in corn farming and within ethanol facilities, corn ethanol's carbon
footprint will continue to decline over time. 14 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 6-7]
13 The Case for Properly Valuing the Low Carbon Benefits of Corn Ethanol. (2018)
https://ethanol.org/ethanol-essentials/low- carbon-benefits-of-corn-ethanol.
14 https://ethanol.org/news/news/2021/01/26/new-study-showing-corn-ethanol-reduces-carbon-emissions-
by-nearly-50- percent-cites-ace-low-carbon-white-paper/.
Understanding the need to more reliably validate how climate-smart agriculture reduces
ethanol GHG emissions, ACE is proactively working to document the benefits climate smart
practices have on the carbon intensity of corn ethanol in a scientifically irrefutable manner. We
are leading a USDA funded Regional Conservation Partnership Program (RCPP) project, in
partnership with top land-grant scientists and the U.S. Department of Energy's Sandia National
Laboratory, to validate the current predictive model results of climate smart practice adoption
showings significant GHG benefits of reduced tillage, cover crops, and nutrient management on
corn ethanol's carbon footprint.15 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 6-7]
15 https://ethanol.org/carbon/usda-rcpp/.
The best way to unlock decarbonization opportunities from climate-smart agriculture is
through technology neutral clean fuel policy which stands up markets to help offset farmer cost
of adoption. For example, in 2020, Argonne National Laboratory indicated no-till, cover crops
and nutrient management could be worth $279 per acre if they were allowed to generate credits
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under California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS).16 At that value, farmers would rapidly
adopt practices leading to meaningful reductions in the lifecycle carbon emissions of biofuels.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 6-7]
16 https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ab794e.
Unfortunately, the California LCFS does not yet allow carbon credits for biofuels produced
from climate- smart agriculture, and since EPA's proposal puts all our eggs in one basket, it fails
to unlock the significant carbon mitigation potential from agricultural lands and ethanol. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 6-7]
We can and should do better. With this in mind, the result of our RCPP project will be the
establishment of a non-proprietary, scientifically verified protocol for biofuel producers and
farmers to document the carbon intensity benefits of changes in agricultural practices that are
validated with on-farm data at production level scale. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 6-7]
ACE is pleased Congress provided significant resources in the IRA for USDA to build upon
the progress we are making to validate the benefits of climate smart practice adoption and view
this as an opportunity to scale farmer access to state LCFS markets and federal policies such as
the RFS. We have briefed top EPA leadership about this partnership and want to work in
collaboration with the Agency on this project to ensure corn ethanol benefits are acknowledged
by EPA as part of the climate solution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 6-7]
In conclusion, EPA should reconsider its proposal, develop a technology-neutral approach to
decarbonizing transportation fuel, and engage with ACE as we implement our project to ensure
fair and accurate accounting for GHG reductions from climate-smart agriculture and ethanol.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 6-7]
Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
The U.S. needs the strongest vehicle standards
The United States will need to greatly reduce light-duty vehicle (LDV) greenhouse gas
emissions if it is to have any chance of meeting the Biden Administration's economy-wide
emissions reduction goal of 50% by 2030 and stave off the worst impacts of climate change.
Transportation is now the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States and the
light-duty sector makes up 58% of those emissions. 1 Reducing carbon emissions is critical to
tackling climate change but increasing LDV efficiency will also have significant benefits to air
quality and will reduce driver fueling costs. Vehicles are a significant contributor to local air
pollution and the associated health impacts, leading to increased rates of asthma, increased risk
of heart attacks, strokes, and lung cancer.2 These impacts are particularly bad in low-income
communities and communities of color, which bear a disproportionate air pollution burden.3
Greater efficiency can also provide significant cost savings for drivers when they refuel their
vehicles. Low-income households are especially burdened by fueling costs, paying three times
more than their higher-income counterparts on gasoline, as a percent of their total income.4
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 1-2]
1 https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/fast-facts-transportation-greenhouse-gas-emissions
2 https://www.consumerreports.org/emissions/how-your-car-can-make-the-air-cleaner/
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3 https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/who-is-at-risk/disparities
4 https://www.aceee.org/white-paper/2021/05/understanding-transportation-energy-burdens
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) have
set aside historic amounts of funding for electric vehicles and will greatly reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions from the transportation sector if that money is invested with climate impacts in
mind. EPA's standards must build off of these investments. While we commend EPA for
proposing strong standards that help the U.S. achieve President Biden's 2030 goal of 50% zero
emission new vehicle sales, these historic investments mean we can go even further.5 Since the
IRA was signed into law, $50 billion in investments in EV and battery manufacturing, and
supply chain projects have been announced.6 These investments could get the U.S. to over 60%
new light-duty EV sales by the early 2030s.7 But more will be needed to adequately address the
climate emergency. EPA's MY 2027-2032 standards should fully account for the recent federal
activity and build off them to achieve further emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0642, pp. 1-2]
5 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-
announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/
6 https://www.charged-the-book.com/na-ev-supply-chain-map
7 https://theicct.Org/wp-content/uploads/2023/0l/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23.pdf; https://rmi.org/insight/how-
inflation-reduction-act-will-affect-ev-adoption-in-the-united-states/
Continued improvement in internal combustion engine vehicles is needed
Even under Alternative 1, there would still be over 40 million new ICEVs sold over the life of
these standards. These vehicles could be on the road for two decades, contributing significantly
to local air pollution, climate change, and costing drivers considerably at the pump. It is critical
that the new standards continue improvements on ICEV efficiency while also pushing the market
to electrify. Our modelling shows that under EPA's achieved emissions rates, ICEV emission
rates would needlessly rise and would be as high as MY 2023 levels. Under the proposed
standard, ACEEE estimates that average ICEV emissions could increase by up to 2.9% per year,
contributing an extra 805 million metric tons of lifetime C02 compared to a future where ICEV
performance flatlines at model year 2026 levels. This is equivalent to an approximately 11%
increase in emissions from the projected savings in the rule of 7,300 million metric tons of C02
(FR 29198, Table 3). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 3-4]
This calculation assumes BEV penetration reaches what EPA projects under its proposal and
includes upstream emissions accounting for all vehicles. However, it also factors in the reduction
of credits, which limits the increase in ICEV emissions compared to model year 2026 (when
there are significantly more credits available). Removing the effects of the proposed off-cycle
and AJC credit changes in both model year 2026 and under the proposed standards means that
ICEVs emissions reductions backslide even further, reaching almost 5% annually. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 3-4]
Under EPA's proposed standards, rapid electrification can allow automakers to meet their
targets even while letting ICEVs worsen, squandering some of the emissions benefit of
electrification and missing an important opportunity for further emissions reductions. This is
unacceptable given that mature emissions-reducing technologies, such as hybridization, already
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exist on the market today and often go underutilized by manufacturers. Our modeled findings are
consistent with EPA's own analysis, which projects that ICEV emissions rates will increase over
the life of the standard. In fact, EPA compliance modeling indicates that manufacturers will go
so far as to remove emissions-reducing technologies from many ICEV models, a completely
counterproductive behavior. 10 On the other hand, if manufacturers do not move backwards on
ICEV efficiency, they will be able to meet the standards with fewer BEVs than EPA projects,
also an undesirable outcome. In either case, the conclusion is that the standards should be
strengthened to incentivize ICEV improvements more strongly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0642, pp. 3-4]
10 Based on analysis of EPA's OMEGA model outputs,
2023_03_14_22_42_30_central_3alts_20230314_Proposal_vehicles.csv
Just a 3% annual reduction in the average emissions for ICEVs — compared, for example, to
the 4.6% per-year reduction called for under the 2012 standards for MY 2017-202511 — could
lead to a further reduction of almost 800 million metric tons of C02 and ICEVs that are about
30% cleaner compared to EPA's proposal. Much of this reduction could come from the
continued adoption of hybrid vehicles in the US market. EPA expects little contribution from
strong hybrids in meeting the proposed standard even though hybridization is a proven
technology with decades of usage, as discussed above. EPA projects that strong hybrids will be
completely phased out under the proposed standards by 2032 (FR 29329, Table 83), despite
hybrids accounting for a record 10% of new vehicles offerings in model year 2022.12 We should
not be moving backwards on ICEV performance and the penetration of proven efficiency
technologies like hybridization over the life of these standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0642, pp. 3-4]
11 https://nepis.epa. gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100EZ7C.PDF?Dockey=P100EZ7C.PDF
12 https://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends
EPA should implement upstream accounting to encourage BEV Efficiency
EPA proposes to continue, and make permanent, the treatment of electric vehicles as entirely
zero emission vehicles (ZEVs)(FR 29252). While it is true that BEVs generate no emissions at
the tailpipe, charging these vehicles does create emissions upstream. The major flaw with
ignoring refueling emissions is that EPA loses the opportunity to influence the efficiency of a
growing component of the vehicle market. EPA is both empowered and required to regulate the
emissions from on-road light duty vehicles. Given that BEVs are expected to reach the majority
of new sales within this decade, 13 it is imperative we address their emissions. Using the rule to
improve BEV efficiency will accomplish this. Upstream accounting in compliance is a simple
and effective way to promote efficiency. It recognizes that different BEVs, by virtue of their
wide range of efficiencies, are responsible for different levels of emissions from our still fossil
fuel-based electricity grid. EPA's GHG standards for LDVs have historically led to innovations
in emissions reduction technology and design for ICEVs and the same should be true in an all-
electric future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 4-6]
13 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-
announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/
Our own analysis shows that even among BEVs of the same vehicle type and weight there can
be considerable differences in efficiency and, therefore, upstream emissions, as shown in Figure
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1.14 Not all BEVs are created equal and there is still plenty of room for innovation and
emissions improvements in the BEV market. The fact that BEVs with curb weights of 5,000
pounds can have efficiencies varying from under 2.5 mi/kWh to over 4 mi/kWh demonstrates
how important it is that these standards continue their historical role in advancing automotive
innovation as we electrify. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 4-6]
14 https://www.aceee.org/blog-post/2023/04/boosting-ev-efficiency-would-cut-emissions-and-reduce-
strain-grid
[See original for graph titled "Figure 1. Efficiency versus weight in model year 2023 BEVs"]
By our calculations, if upstream accounting, or another mechanism, led to a 3% annual
growth in BEV efficiency over the life of the standards, lifetime emissions from MY 2027- 2032
vehicles would be reduced by over 170 million metric tons under both the proposed standards
and Alternative 1. This does not include the benefits from vehicles sold from model year 2033
onwards that would take advantage of advancements in efficiency technologies and designs
potentially spurred by this standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 4-6]
Greater BEV efficiency has a number of benefits beyond just reducing upstream emissions.
Greater BEV efficiency can allow a vehicle to go the same distance with a smaller battery,
effectively reducing the use of high-demand minerals and the emissions generated from vehicle
production (the calculations discussed above do not account for these emissions reductions
impacts from improved BEV efficiency). While BEVs are certainly still better from an emissions
perspective than their equivalent ICEV when looking at the entire life-cycle, it is still important
to reduce their environmental impact. Mineral supply and battery manufacturing capacity also
have the potential to be limiting factors for rapid electrification, so reducing battery needs per
vehicle by increasing efficiency can facilitate achievement of the MY 2027-2032 standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, pp. 4-6]
Greater BEV efficiency also means a smaller impact on our electricity grid and drivers'
wallets, as less electricity is needed to drive the same distance. 15 If all LDVs on the road were
electric and had an average efficiency equivalent to the highest-efficiency vehicle on the market
today, we could save enough electricity annually to power 21 million homes. Full on- road
fleetwide electrification is not expected for decades so this improvement in BEV efficiency is
feasible and could even be surpassed if incentivized by the standards. 16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0642, pp. 4-6]
15 https://www.aceee.org/blog-post/2022/09/evs-surge-utilities-need-transparent-equitable-comprehensive-
plans-support-them
16 https://www.aceee.org/blog-post/2023/04/boosting-ev-efficiency-would-cut-emissions-and-reduce-
strain-grid
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
EPA also unreasonably ignored alternative solutions to the proposed light- and medium-duty
emissions standards. Agencies are required, as part of any reasoned decisionmaking process, to
consider all "significant and viable and obvious alternatives" to their proposed action. Dist.
Hosp. Partners, 786 F.3d at 59 (citation omitted); see Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. DOT, 997 F.3d
1247, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ("[T]he failure of an agency to consider obvious alternatives has led
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uniformly to reversal." (quoting Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 794 F.2d 737, 746
n.36 (D C. Cir. 1986))). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 65]
Here, EPA failed to consider any alternatives that did not fall within the narrow category of
tailpipe-emissions standards. The agency instead considered only whether emissions standards of
varying level of stringency or with differing phase-in periods may be appropriate alternatives.
See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,201. But tailpipe-emissions standards are not the only means available to
achieve EPA's stated goal of "reducing] . . . criteria pollutants and GHG emissions from the
transportation sector." Id. at 29,186. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 65]
For instance, as EPA acknowledges in the proposed rule, the agency has authority to impose
fuel controls, one possible alternative to emissions standards. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,397-98. But
EPA requested comment only on whether fuel controls should be used in the future as a
"complement" to emissions standards, rather than as an alternative to them. Id. That omission
violates the requirement of reasoned decisionmaking. 10 Cf. Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v.
FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (remanding where agency did not "consider
responsible alternatives to its chosen policy and . . . give a reasoned explanation for its rejection
of such alternatives" (citation omitted)). EPA's failure to consider any non-emissions-standard-
based alternatives to the proposed rule renders the proposed rule arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 66]
10 We do not at this time express any view on any particular fuel-control measure, and any regulation
incorporating such measures would first have to be proposed for public comment. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d).
We simply note the proposed rule's failure to address fuel controls as an alternative.
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
We are also troubled by EPA's failure to evaluate the lifecycle emissions of various
powertrains and the national security implications of the proposal. Focusing exclusively on
"tailpipe" emissions paints a distorted picture and perpetuates the false notion that electric
vehicles are "zero emitters." EPA must present the public with a complete picture, one that
shows how the various powertrains stack up against each other cradle-to-grave and the major
carbon reductions that vehicle manufacturers and fuel producers have made over the last few
decades and continue to make. EPA's failure to do so would render any final rule arbitrary and
capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 1-2]
EPA offers no support for its conclusion that there will be substantial consumer adoption of
ZEVs to achieve the increases projected by the Proposed Rule. To the contrary, recent polling
shows that most Americans continue to say that they are unlikely, or will categorically refuse, to
buy an EV. As just one example, a Gallup poll conducted in April revealed that only 4 percent of
adults owned an EV and just 12 percent are seriously considering buying one. However, 41
percent of adults said they would never buy an EV, raising fundamental questions about how
EPA can predict that ZEV sales will reach 67 percent in 2032.136 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, p. 31]
136 Megan Brenan, Gallup, Most Americans Are Not Completely Sold on Electric Vehicles (April 12,
2023). Retrieved a https://news.gallup.com/poll/474095/americans-not-completely-sold-electric-
vehicles.aspxt.
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According to Wards Intelligence, through May 2023, Americans purchased 5.9 million
ICEVs, representing 93 percent of all LDVs sold during the first five months. 137 At this pace,
more than 14 million new ICEVs will be purchased during 2023.138 With the continued sales of
ICEVs, this Rule's effort to limit the ability to purchase ICEVs, and more than 50 percent of
ICEVs remaining in service, it is mindboggling, as discussed in Section IV.6 below, that EPA
never considered the alternative scenarios using vehicle technologies and lower carbon fuels.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 31]
137 John Eichberger, Decarbonizing Combustion Vehicles - A Critical Part in Reducing Transportation
Emissions, Transportation Energy Institute, June 2023. Available at Decarbonizing Combustion Vehicles -
A Critical Part in Reducing Transportation Emissions - Transportation Energy Institute.
138 Id.
6. EPA failed to consider, let alone evaluate, alternative emissions reductions strategies
Despite all the well-known constraints with mandating electrification of the transportation
sector and building the necessary nationwide infrastructure, EPA never considered, let alone
evaluated, emissions reductions from modifications to ICEVs' emissions control systems, bio
and renewable fuels, alternative fuels (e.g., hydrogen), and use of carbon capture and
sequestration. To reduce carbon emissions and ensure energy security and independence,
Congress created the RFS, which requires increasing volumes of renewable fuel to be blended
into transportation fuel. The four categories of renewable fuel must emit anywhere from 20
percent to 80 percent fewer GHGs relative to the fossil fuel it replaces. In response to this
mandate, U.S. refineries dramatically increased renewable fuel production and invested billions
of dollars to expand U.S. production of liquid renewable fuels, which can now achieve 79 to 86
percent GHG emissions reductions as compared to petroleum fuels. 188 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 40-41]
188 Hui Xu, Longwen Ou, Yuan Li, Troy R. Hawkins, and Michael Wang, Environmental Science &
Technology 2022, 56 (12), 7512-7521. DOI: 10.1021/acs.est.2c00289
According to the Energy Information Agency's June 2023 Short-Term Energy Outlook
(STEO), [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 40-41]
Biomass diesel (which includes biodiesel and renewable diesel) production averaged 3.1
billion gallons in 2022. EIA expects production to average 4.0 billion gallons in 2023 and 4.8
billion gallons in 2024.
Ethanol and renewable oxygenate production is expected to increase from 18.4 billion
gallons in 2022 to 19.2 billion gallons in 2023, and to 20.4 billion gallons in 2024.
Biodiesel production averaged 1.6 billion gallons in 2022. Production is expected to
decline to 1.5 billion gallons in 2023, and to 1.4 billion gallons in 2024.
Renewable diesel production averaged 1.5 billion gallons in 2022. Production is projected
to increase to 2.4 billion gallons in 2023, and to 3.4 billion gallons in 2024. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp. 40-41]
In response to the RFS and other government programs encouraging the production of lower
carbon renewable liquid fuels, U.S. refiners are undertaking significant capital expenditures to
reduce GHG emissions such as: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 40-41]
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Taking advantage of Congress' 45Q tax credit for CCS, ethanol producers are looking to
used carbon capture and sequestration to reduce GHG emissions from the 15 billion gallons of
ethanol blended into our nation's gasoline. 189 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 40-41]
189 Erin Voegele, Carbon America to develop CCS project at Nebraska ethanol plant, Ethanol Producer
Magazine, October 4, 2022 (Carbon America announced its third CCS project at a U.S. ethanol plant).
Retrieved at https://ethanolproducer.com/articles/19655/carbon-america-to-develop-ccs-project-at-
nebraska-ethanol-plant.
Renewable diesel and sustainable aviation fuel production capacity will total 5.1 billion
gallons per year if all announced expansion projects, which represent $10.8 billion in
investments, are completed. 190 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 40-41]
190 EIA,U.S. renewable diesel capacity could increase due to announced and developing projects, Today in
Energy, July 29, 2021. Retrieved at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=48916
Although the RFS, an EPA program, has achieved significant emissions reductions for more
than a decade, there is no mention in the Proposal or the DRIA of alternative emissions standards
that could be achieved through the use of additional changes to emissions control equipment,
alternative fuels, or bio and renewable fuels. Lifecycle assessments (LCAs) of GHG emissions
from ICEVs reveal that 73 percent of lifecycle GHG emissions come from fuel combustion. 191
By comparison, lifecycle emissions from ZEVs occur not from fuel combustion from the vehicle,
but from fuel use and various energy and material inputs upstream from the vehicle. Therefore,
EPA's failure to consider standards that reduce the carbon intensity of liquid fuels used in ICEVs
and ignoring the carbon intensity of EVs is arbitrary and capricious. It results in a highly flawed
assessment of emissions from new motor vehicles which "cause, or contribute to, air pollution"
as envisioned in CAA section 202(a) and demonstrates its unvarnished bias in favor of EVs. The
Agency's refusal to evaluate biofuels illustrates EPA's tunnel vision that proposes a single
panacea for a highly complex problem in a rapidly changing world [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, pp. 40-41]
191 Decarbonizing Combustion Vehicles - A Critical Part in Reducing Transportation Emissions -
Transportation Energy Institute.
As discussed above, because EPA may only prescribe standards applicable to vehicles that
"cause or contribute" to air pollution, its standards cannot account for ZEVs with no tailpipe
emissions. However, if EPA is authorized to promulgate such standards, those standards must
account for any upstream emissions from upstream electric generating units, the mining of
battery materials, and the production of the vehicle. 197 Without consideration of upstream and
full life- cycle impacts (e.g., frequent battery replacements), EPA has failed to inform the public
of the comparative costs of emission reductions, whether from ZEVs, ICEVs, energy efficiency,
or other sectors. EPA's continued failure to address this "major aspect of the problem" is another
example of EPA moving toward its predetermined outcome—the forced electrification of U.S.
transportation. 198 AFPM has continually put EPA on notice of the need to include a LCA to
avoid an arbitrary comparison—the agency continues to ignore this issue of central relevance to
EPA's benefit analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 42-44]
197 Proposed Rule at 29,353-55.
198 See, e.g., Comments of the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers on EPA's Reconsideration
of a Previous Withdrawal of a Waiver of Preemption 10 (July 6, 2021),
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0257-0139, Comments of the American Fuel
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& Petrochemical Manufacturers onEPA's/NHTSA's Proposed The Safe Affordable Fuel-Efficient
Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks 68-73 (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0283-5698; Comments of the American Fuel
& Petrochemical Manufacturers on EPA's California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards;
Advanced Clean Trucks; Zero Emission Airport Shuttle; Zero Emission Power Train Certification; Request
for Waiver of Preemption 7-12 (Aug. 2, 2022), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022- 0331-0088.
For instance, the fuel source of a PEV, like a ZEV—a battery composed of carbon intensive
minerals and the electricity generated to power the battery—produces emissions. The fact that
emissions occur 100 percent upstream of the vehicle's operation and therefore fall outside of the
tailpipe emissions calculation does not make these emissions any less significant. There is no
logical basis for this omission because, as EPA is aware, concerns about GHG emissions relate
to their longer-term global concentrations. Consequently, air pollutant emissions are an
important consideration regardless of where such emissions occur. Without comparing lifecycle
ZEV emissions to lifecycle emissions from ICEVs, EPA cannot know if or how much its
standards are decreasing total emissions. Thus, while EPA is not required to solve all emissions
problems in one rulemaking, EPA cannot claim to be solving part of the problem here without
addressing upstream and downstream emissions. EPA's approach of mandating ZEVs cannot
possibly be reasonable if it is merely shifting emissions from one source to another at the cost of
hundreds of billions of dollars—trillions when costs to upgrade EV infrastructure are factored
in— or could do so more cost-effectively by choosing a different approach. 199 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp. 42-44]
199 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); cf. Antonin Scalia, "Regulatory Review and Management," Regulation
Magazine 19 (Jan./Feb. 1982) ("Is it conceivable that a rule would not be arbitrary or capricious if it
concluded with a statement to the effect that 'we are taking the foregoing action despite the fact that it
probably does more harm than good, and even though there are other less onerous means of achieving
precisely the same desirable results'?").
The flaw in EPA's approach is illustrated by the fact that emissions standards easily become
meaningless by changing the engine's location. The proposed rule would treat a ZEV charged by
a diesel-powered generator as if it had zero tailpipe emissions, notwithstanding the fact that it
remains "powered" by a diesel engine located outside the vehicle. A LDV directly powered by a
diesel engine inside the vehicle, however, is credited with the emissions produced by that engine.
EPA's inconsistent approach begs the question of how nascent technologies such as a vehicle
propelled by compressed air would be evaluated. Thus, the energy source of the "fuel" matters
and EPA arbitrarily ignores lifecycle emissions from ZEVs and also proposes to remove
requirements for upstream emissions calculations.200 EPA admits "the program has now been in
place for a decade, since MY 2012, with no upstream accounting and has functioned as intended,
encouraging the continued development and introduction of electric vehicle technology."201
EPA's mandate is to establish feasible standards rooted in the statute, not to ignore real-world
emissions to "encourage" the development of its favored technology. EPA requested comment
on whether it should account for upstream emissions for all fuel and vehicles. If technologies are
being treated equally, as they must, the answer is an unequivocal yes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 42-44]
200 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,197.
201 Id. at 29,253.
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Organization: American Highway Users Alliance
In addition, EPA seems to have given little or no consideration to incentives for lower
emission liquid fuels as part of the solution to reducing lifecycle emissions from these vehicles.
Such fuels are already in the marketplace; increasing their use would appear to be achievable.
Policy approaches to help encourage the production of lower emission liquid fuels could offer
near-term emissions reductions from existing vehicles, potentially at a lower cost to society. Yet,
EPA's proposal in this docket (as well as in the heavy-duty vehicle docket) focuses on
electrification as the sole means of reducing emissions from vehicles, even though in 2022 EVs
constituted less than 7 percent new light duty vehicle sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, p.
4]
Greater use of lower-emission liquid fuels should be part of the overall approach to reducing
emissions from vehicles
Further, and as noted earlier, the discussion in the NPRM and in the heavy-duty vehicle Phase
3 NPRM seem to have given little or no consideration to the potential gains in emissions
reductions that could be achieved through greater use of lower emission fuels. Fuels produced
with lower emission renewable feedstocks and traditional fuels produced with lower carbon
intensities, such as in association with carbon capture and sequestration, exist today and are
scalable with the right policy support. Greater use of these fuels could help reduce emissions
from the hundreds of millions of vehicles already on the road while EV charging infrastructure,
fueling infrastructure for other alternate fuels, and critical mineral supply chains develop and
don't otherwise create additional energy security or geo-political risks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0696, p. 5]
Even with the accelerated fleet turnover the EPA's proposed standards seek, hundreds of
millions of vehicles with internal combustion engines will remain on the roads in the coming
decades. Instead of pursuing policies that focus on a sole technology pathway for achieving
transportation-related emissions reductions, EPA should allow for multiple technology pathways
- including pathways that recognize how to improve the overall lifecycle carbon intensity for
existing vehicles and fuels. This might include linked carbon-intensity based vehicle and fuel
standards that enable consumers to retain the preference for engine type or powertrain, while still
participating in societal aims to achieve emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696,
p. 5]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
a. API Supports Emission Reductions in the Transportation Sector.
API appreciates EPA's efforts to address transportation sector emissions. As detailed in the
API Climate Action Frameworkl, we support technology-neutral policies at the federal level that
drive GHG emissions reductions in the transportation sector and our members have committed to
delivering solutions that reduce the risks of climate change while meeting society's growing
energy needs. API members work to advance the development, transmission, and use of lower
carbon intensity and lower criteria pollutant fuels and technologies to provide choices for
consumers. Specifically, API members have made, and continue to make, significant investments
in new technologies that reduce emissions in transportation, including: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, p. 4]
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1 https://www.api.org/climate.
GHG Emission Reduction [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 4]
Stand-alone production and coprocessing of bio-feedstocks to make renewable fuels.
Manufacturing of low-carbon ethanol.
Manufacturing of renewable natural gas from wastewater, landfill gas, and
biodigesters at farms as fuel for compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles.
Production of blue and green hydrogen for transportation and stationary applications
including building infrastructure.
Direct air carbon capture.
Carbon capture and sequestration of C02.
Development of advanced plastics to meet auto industry standards and consumer
expectations while mitigating environmental impact through emissions reduction and improved
vehicle efficiency by light-weighting.
Installation of electric vehicle charging stations.
• Installation of hydrogen fueling stations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 4]
Criteria Pollutant Reduction [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 4]
Tier 3 gasoline sulfur standards
MSAT II gasoline benzene standards
Lower vapor pressure reformulated gasoline [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 4]
API shares the goal of reduced emissions across the broader economy and, specifically, those
from energy production, transportation and use by society. To achieve meaningful emissions
reductions that meet the climate challenge, it will take a combination of policies, innovation,
industry initiatives and a partnership of government and economic sectors. The objective is large
enough that no single approach can achieve it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 4]
ii. EPA failed to address emission reductions in the existing LMDV fleet to help
achieve near-term emission reductions.
Fuel- and vehicle-based GHG emissions reduction solutions are currently available in the
marketplace and could achieve nearer-term emission reductions from the existing light- and
medium-duty vehicle fleet. A singular focus on future ZEV technologies does not seem to meet
the stated goals of the proposed program. The proposal would require a significant ramp-up of
electric vehicle production in relation to the scale of the current market, would depend on
infrastructure that may not be readily available at the scale needed to meet the proposal's
requirements, and would be on an extremely challenging (at best) timeline. Meaningful emission
reductions are achievable sooner, and potentially at lower cost, via the use of proven and
available technology. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Co-Optimization of
Fuels & Engines (Co-Optima) initiative examined fuels and engine/vehicle technologies
simultaneously. 18 The combination of sustainable fuels uncovered by the Co-Optima research
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can reduce the emissions of vehicles now, while enabling a faster transition to net-zero-carbon
emissions for on-road transportation in the future. The lifecycle GHG emissions of these studied
fuels were found to be reduced by more than 60%. 19 Such an approach could be utilized by EPA
to better achieve the stated goals of the agency. EPA must address this factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0641, pp. 8-9]
18 U.S. Department of Energy Offce of Energy Effciency & Renewable Energy, "The Road Ahead Toward
a Net-Zero- Carbon Transportation Future Findings and Impact, FY15-FY21."
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022- 06/beto-co-optima-fy 15-fy 21-impact.pdf
19 Gaspar, Daniel J., West, Brian H., Ruddy, Danial, Wilke, Trenton J., Polikarpov, Evgueni, Alleman,
Teresa L., George, Anthe, Monroe, Eric, Davis, Ryan W., Vardon, Derek, Suton, Andrew D., Moore,
Cameron M., Benavides, Pahola T., Dunn, Jennifer, Biddy, Mary J., Jones, Susanne B., Kass, Michael D.,
Pihl, Josh A., Pihl, Josh A., Debusk, Melanie M., Sjoberg, Magnus, Szybist, Jim, Sluder, C S., Fioroni,
Gina, and Pitz, William J. 2019. "Top Ten Blendstocks Derived From Biomass For Turbocharged Spark
Ignition Engines: Bio-blendstocks With Potential for Highest Engine Efficiency". United States.
https://doi.org/10.2172/1567705.
2. Current and future solutions - lower carbon fuels, hydrogen, ICE-based solutions.
As previously noted in our comments, lower-carbon options currently exist and could be used
for near-term reductions. Lower carbon fuels are available in the market now, and research and
development to bring costs down and improve operability is ongoing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, pp. 10-11]
Bio and renewable fuels can and should be considered as part of an "all-of-the-above"
approach to decarbonization of the transportation sector, including biocircularity. As previously
noted, API members are currently investing heavily in renewable fuel production - continued
investment and development will increase the available volumes of such fuels in the marketplace
and allow them to serve both as a viable lower carbon solutions leading up to the start of the
EPA proposed rule, throughout implementation, and beyond. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 10-11]
Further, EPA's LCA modeling for the proposal is based on biocircularity with atmospheric
C02 consumed by biomass, resulting in zero tailpipe carbon emissions if the combusted biofuels
were made from renewable biomass. The agency is thus not taking the source of carbon into
account and is classifying all carbon tailpipe emissions as the same related to their atmospheric
GHG impact. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 10-11]
Organization: Andrea Strzelec
[From Hearing Testimony, May 11, 2023] Let me start by acknowledging that I absolutely
support the goal of this proposal and believe that we need to work to further reduce pollutant and
GHG emissions however I emphatically do not support the specifics of this proposed rule. I
believe that both the EPA and the passionate speakers from the past couple of days are very well
intentioned but you are also likely familiar with the quote that the road to Hell is paved with
them, because intentions can have unintended consequences. We cannot make such gravely
important decisions based on intentioned or impassioned pleas. The stakes are much too high. It
is imperative that we make decisions based on science, in this case, it means including lifecycle
analysis in policy development because dirty is in the details. My strong concern with the
proposed rule is the unintended consequences that we risk because of the outdated methodology
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that has been used to develop it. The EPA claims that the proposed rule is technology neutral but
functionally it is not as it only considers tailpipe emissions. Because mobile and stationary
source emissions are not coupled in the regulatory sense though of course they are in reality, it
means if we only consider tailpipe emissions for this rule, electric vehicles are then considered to
be zero-emissions. Let me be clear this is a policy based definition and is not factually true. Zero
emissions is a physical impossibility, you can blame thermodynamics. EVs simply move the
mobile source emissions that would have come out of the tailpipe to the stationary power
generating source. In the United States that means a vast majority of EVs are actually being
powered by coal or fossil fuels. The hardware is not the problem. Neither the engine nor the
electric drive motor are bad. In fact they both suffer from the same fundamental problem in
terms of emissions, the energy source that allows them to deliver power. In addition only
considering the tailpipe emissions does not consider the emissions from manufacturing and I'll
note that battery materials and manufacturing issues have been described by previous speakers.
The only way to truly understand the impact of any standard technology or rule is by looking at
the entire picture by doing accurate lifecycle analysis that considers all the inputs and outputs,
not just the convenient ones. Therefore I urge the EPA to reconsider the rule using lifecycle
analysis. [From Hearing Testimony, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5115, Day 3]
Organization: Anonymous
There should be provisions in the rule for the handling of biofuels and/or synthetic fuels
("efuels") in GHG emission calculations. Phasing out fossil fuels for ICEVs while phasing in
renewable fuels/efuels could be just as effective in achieving climate goals as a shift to so-called
"zero-emission" vehicles (most likely BEVs), possibly even more so. In fact, even if 100% of
new vehicle sales are BEV by 2035, or any other date for that matter, it could potentially be
counterproductive from an environmental perspective. ICEVs will be on the road for decades
even if new ICEVs are effectively banned by regulation, and those vehicles would be
contributing to significantly reduced GHG emissions with bio/efuels, while still in use. The
European Union just adopted a provision to allow new ICEVs to be sold after 2035 if efuels are
used exclusively to fuel the vehicles, in spite of efforts to "ban" ICEVs after 2035 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0490, p. 1]
According to Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), efuels produced by the Fischer- Tropsch
(FT) process can actually be carbon NEGATIVE from a well-to-wheels perspective if the system
is properly configured (https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.0c05893). Some FT biofuels can
also be carbon negative with CCS (e.g., https://velocys.com/2019/10/10/negative-emission-fuel-
agreement/), or by sequestering carbon produced as a byproduct from the process
(https://www.greencarcongress.com/2023/04/20230415-terrastar.html). There are no pathways in
ANL's GREET model for BEVs to be carbon negative, or even carbon neutral, not even with
100% renewable electricity. If GHG emission reduction is really the goal, these fuels should be
given top priority from a regulatory perspective. It should also be pointed out that FT ediesel fuel
has very low upstream (well-to-tank) criteria pollutant air emissions according to ANL's GREET
model. The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) could be used as a mechanism for phasing out
fossil-based fuels in favor of biofuels/efuels. Alternatively, the U.S. could follow the European
model and allow only ICEVs that use efuels/biofuels exclusively to be produced post 2035.
Some consideration of biofuels/efuels should be adopted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490, p. 1]
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Organization: Billy Brooks
[From Hearing Testimony, May 10, 2023] I agree with the need to reduce emissions however
I believe the proposed ruling is shortsighted and needs to focus on the lifecycle emission of light
and medium-duty vehicles from the production of the component in vehicle to the useful life of
the vehicle instead of focusing solely on the tailpipe emissions. This ruling is pushing for the
extinction of internal combustion engines while small businesses have shown the success in the
reduction of tailpipe emissions with alternative fuel technology. COBB Tuning is one of many in
the aftermarket auto sector that has shown fuel technologies specifically flex fuel and ethanol
blends. New engines and transmission calibrations, emission control equipment, hybrid and other
technologies, a reduction of tailpipe emissions while ultimately leading to improved lifecycle
emissions. These areas of innovation still has potential to be realized and continue feasibility
demonstrated. We know technological breakthroughs usually don't come as quickly as most
would like but innovation does pay off. We just need to give it time. We need to approach the
goals outlined in the EPA ruling with an all of the above approach with diverse fuel technology
not just electric. Without focusing on lifecycle emissions, we may be reducing tailpipe emissions
but continuing to pollute our world with no real way to recycle the batteries from the EVs. Here
in Texas as in many parts of the country, the infrastructure can't handle the current electrical grid
requirements for the amount of EVs that would be proposed. Roughly two years ago the majority
of Texas was without power during the freeze. There needs to be more R&D before making EVs
the only option. In the meantime, bring other technologies to light, give the innovators of this
country a level playing field. I am confident we can reach our desired environmental goals by
clearing the way of technology to provide us with the answers. [From Hearing Testimony, EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5115, Day 2]
Organization: Brian Kalina
[From Hearing Testimony, May 11, 2023] I am aligned with the EPA's end goals and because
of this alignment I do encourage EPA to not discount renewable fuel and combustion engine
technology as an important neighbor of the greenhouse portion of these goals. In my own
personal and professional studies over the last 15 years, I continue to come across evidence that
pursuing a mix of clean solutions and not just battery electric will lead to greatest environmental
economic and geo political sustainability. I am concerned by not considering battery electric
vehicle upstream emissions, emissions which are typically greater than that of internal
combustion engine vehicles, the proposal as it presently stands would treat battery electric as a
less greenhouse gas intensive technology than it really is. In effect the proposal in its current
stance would force a greater fraction of battery electric vehicle sales than I do believe is optimal
for a minimized greenhouse gas emissions and moreover is optimal for a country's economic and
geo political interests. There are four issues associated with increased battery electric vehicle
production and use that I would like to highlight. Number one, increase in adverse environmental
impact associated with battery raw material extraction, battery manufacturing and electricity
generation for battery charging. Number two, political conflict which may arise from over
reliance on battery raw materials which often times must be sourced from certain regions of the
world. Number three and this hits close to home, permanent reduction in auto industry job counts
seeing how battery electric does not use as many parts as an internal combustion engine. These
parts frankly power thousands of good paying jobs. And number four, the decimation of U.S.
biofuels industry, an industry that would otherwise be poised to greatly assist in bringing to
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fruition EPA's greenhouse gas emissions goals. To help protect against the issues, I strongly
encourage EPA to adopt greenhouse gas quantification methods which are guided by lifecycle
assess. To only focus on tailpipe emissions is to discount very important big picture factors. If
we are to achieve balance which is essential for long term sustainability, I sincerely believe that
renewable fuel, internal combustion engine must play a similarly important role as battery
electric as we make transportation clean and sustainable. [From Hearing Testimony, EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-5115, Day 3]
Organization: Charles Forsberg
There are lower cost options to reduce greenhouse gas emissions built upon American
strengths and thus can be implemented much less time. The U.S. globally leads in five areas:
finance, software (but the Chinese are closing in fast), weapons, agriculture and oil/gas. The U.S.
is far behind in mining and manufacturing. Betting on weak industries with near total
dependence on foreign suppliers for non-earth-abundant materials is a good way to assure
failure. Furthermore, it will not take long for the supplier nations to get together and further
increase prices. Because the U.S. is unwilling to expand its mining industry by orders of
magnitude, it can't win this game. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, pp. 3-4]
We use liquid hydrocarbons (gasoline, diesel and jet fuel) because of their remarkable
chemical properties including high energy density, low storage costs and low cost to transport
long distances from producer to consumer. If crude oil had never existed, we would have
invented gasoline, diesel and jet fuel. These liquid fuels can be made from many feed stocks.
They are currently made from crude oil, coal, natural gas and biomass. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0738, pp. 3-4]
We assessed the demand for liquid hydrocarbons-gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and chemical feed
stocks. The U.S. currently consumes 18 million barrels per day. That demand could go as low as
10 million barrels per day before the costs of replacing liquid hydrocarbons with other
technologies dramatically increases with serious reductions in the U.S. standard of living. We
include the adoption of hybrid and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles in estimates of future liquid
hydrocarbon fuel demand but no significant number of battery electric vehicles. The demand
could be as high as 20 million barrels per day if liquid fuels have to replace any significant
fraction of the current energy storage functions of natural gas and coal. All electric vehicles are
not included in the analysis of the need for gasoline, diesel and jet fuel because (1) they are
unaffordable for the majority of Americans and (2) their large-scale use significantly increases
electricity prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, pp. 3-4]
We developed a pathway to replace all crude oil with cellulosic hydrocarbon drop-in fuels
that (1) could produce 25 million barrels of hydrocarbon liquids per day without significant
impacts on food and fiber prices and (2) simultaneous sequestration of atmospheric carbon
dioxide. Cellulosic biomass include materials such as com stover, trees and kelp. It does not
include sugars, vegetables oils or carbohydrates-that are currently used for most biofuels
production. These feed stocks are insufficient to replace crude oil and compete with human food
demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, pp. 3-4]
The major difference between this biofuels strategy and the traditional biofuels strategy is the
abandonment of the 100,000 year old campfire model of biomass that should be left to the Boy
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Scouts. Gasoline, diesel and jet fuel are made of carbon and hydrogen. Most current biofuels
strategies use biomass as (1) a carbon source to produce the hydrocarbon product and (2) an
energy and chemical source for the conversion process. The traditional conversion of biomass
into gasoline, diesel and jet fuel involves using some of the biomass carbon for (1) removal of
40% by weight of the oxygen in biomass as carbon dioxide, (2) the production of hydrogen and
(3) the energy to operate the process. Only a fraction of the biomass carbon ends up in the final
product. Our cellulosic biofuels strategy uses external heat and hydrogen for converting
cellulosic biomass into hydrocarbon liquids. With the conventional strategy, U.S. biofuels
production is limited to something like 6 million barrels per day versus 25 million barrels per day
with external heat and hydrogen inputs. The use of external heat and hydrogen inputs have two
effects: (1) doubles hydrocarbon liquid fuels produced per ton of biomass and (2) makes
hydrogen (not biomass) the primary cost of liquid fuels. If biomass feedstock is not the primary
cost component of biofuels, one can pay more for cellulosic biomass without large impacts on
final liquid fuel costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, pp. 3-4]
In the near term, the low cost hydrogen source is conversion of natural gas to hydrogen with
underground sequestration of the byproduct carbon dioxide. For 10 million barrels per day of
liquid hydrocarbons, this input will require a quarter to a third or more of U.S. natural gas
production capability. There are internal tradeoffs between hydrogen, quantities of biomass and
biomass characteristics. Hydrogen would be shipped via pipeline to the bio-refineries. The main
conversion processes would be done at large bio-refineries with capacities of 250,000 barrels per
day-mostly existing refineries with front-end modifications. The gigawatts of heat required per
refinery would ultimately be provided by nuclear reactors co-located with refineries. Heat can
only be shipped short distances. Nuclear energy is the only credible low-carbon energy source
today for gigawatts of 24/7 heat that is required by integrated refineries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0738, pp. 4-5]
This strategy requires major changes in agriculture and modifications of the big refineries but
not changing the entire U.S. economy-enabling a fast transition off fossil crude oil with large
scale sequestration of atmospheric carbon dioxide and massive economic benefits to rural
America. The natural gas industry becomes the hydrogen supply industry where the primary
market is perhaps alOO integrated bio-refineries. American agriculture provides most of the
biomass with systems that recycle nutrients and carbon char to the soils for long-term
agricultural and forest sustainability. Example feed stocks include com stover (the part of the
com plant you do not eat) and double cropping. Double cropping was done in the Midwest in the
early 1900s to grow forage crops for horses-plant in the fall and harvest in the spring. When
tractors arrived, the horses disappeared and the land was left bare in winter-accelerating soil
erosion. The right strategy will not impact food or fiber prices while increasing the sustainability
of American soils. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, pp. 4-5]
This approach is built upon American strengths in agriculture and the oil/gas industry-thus the
fast track option. It provides an evolutionary pathway for the oil/gas industry to become a
negative carbon emitter. Industry is slowly heading toward this solution. Our recent analysis
(below) indicates there is the possibility of replacing all crude oil within 20 years. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0738, pp. 4-5]
C. Forsberg and B. Dale, "Can We Replace All Crude Oil Within 20 Years with Cellulosic
Liquid Hydrocarbons?", The Biofuels Digest, May 29,
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2023. https://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2023/05/29/can-we-replace-all-cmde-oil-within-
20- years-with-cellulosic-liquid-hydrocarbons/
Recommended EPA action. Develop a technologically-neutral strategy for decarbonization.
The record on predictions of future technologies is one of failure. U.S. emissions per unit of
GDP are substantially lower than other countries because of the development of natural gas
fracking that is rapidly pushing coal out of the market-a technology that nobody in government
predicted. Having the EPA chose future technologies for a low-carbon economy will delay
decarbonization by decades with massive negative impacts on American standards of living.
There are many technology neutral regulatory options-including clean fuel standards adopted by
California, Oregon, Washington and British Columbia or carbon taxes. Carbon dioxide coming
out of the tail pipe may or may have a greenhouse impact depending upon whether it is fossil
carbon (net addition of carbon to atmosphere) or bio-carbon (net negative carbon emission for
many production options). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0738, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Chevron
3. The role of biofuels.
The light and medium duty proposal does not address the potential for biofuel use to create
energy security benefits. EPA should consider options to reduce the nation's dependence on a
single transportation energy resource infrastructure while it supports a reliable and affordable
decarbonization plan for transportation. EPA should support the use of diversified fuels in the
nation's transportation fleet to meet nationwide GHG reduction goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0553, pp. 5-6]
Chevron is investing in capabilities to increase the supply of biofuels. In 2022, Chevron
acquired Renewable Energy Group, a leading biodiesel and renewable diesel fuel producer.
Chevron announced a collaboration with Corteva to introduce winter canola that will produce
lower carbon intensity feedstocks. Chevron has invested in CoverCress to develop and introduce
small winter oilseeds that will also produce lower carbon intensity feedstocks. A Chevron joint
venture with Bunge, a leading oilseed processor, will expand crush capacity to yield greater
access to lower carbon intensity feedstocks. The biomass-based diesel fuels resulting from these
technology and commercial initiatives are well-suited to reduce emissions from the medium duty
vehicles that are powered by diesel engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, pp. 5-6]
We believe there is also potential for increased use of lower CI ethanol and other renewable
fuels to produce renewable gasoline blends for the light and medium-duty fleet. With more than
265 million gasoline-powered vehicles on the road today in the United States, renewable
gasoline blends could empower virtually all drivers to contribute to a lower carbon transportation
future. Recently, we partnered with Toyota to demonstrate lower carbon technologies are
compatible with internal combustion engines by demonstrating the use of fuel with more than
40% lower carbon intensity than traditional gasoline on a life cycle basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0553, pp. 5-6]
Looking into our transportation future, Chevron is developing, producing, and testing blends
of lower carbon intensity renewable gasoline. These blends can be manufactured using today's
facilities and used in almost any gasoline-powered vehicle, delivering an immediate GHG
reduction compared to traditional gasoline. Renewable gasoline blends use a variety of
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feedstocks and technologies to achieve carbon intensity reductions. Along with innovation from
engine manufacturers and public policies supporting lower carbon intensity fuels, renewable
gasoline blends are intended to reduce the carbon intensity of light and medium duty vehicles
already on the road. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, pp. 5-6]
Organization: Clean Fuels Alliance America
The biodiesel and renewable diesel industry is on a path to sustainably double the market to 6
billion gallons annually by 2030, eliminating at least 35 million metric tons of C02 equivalent
greenhouse gas emissions annually with our members leading the U.S. companies investing in
new biodiesel, renewable diesel and SAF capacity. These fuels are among the cleanest and
lowest-carbon fuels available today to help reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions now and are
available to meet President Biden's near- and long-term climate goals.2 To date, the utilization
of low carbon liquid fuels like biodiesel and renewable diesel reduces greenhouse gas emissions
by more than 70% on average, directly and immediately reducing GHG emissions from the
vehicles that use our fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0626, pp. 1-2]
2 Executive Office of the President. Executive Order 14008: Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and
Abroad, 86 FR 7619 (February 1, 2021), available at https://www.federalregister.gOv/d/2021-02177
Our fuels reduce more than just greenhouse gas emissions. Biodiesel and renewable diesel
also reduce criteria pollutants from existing diesel engines, reducing health and environmental
impacts in major trucking corridors, warehouse distribution centers and other diesel hot spots
close to major population sectors. This means that using these fuels today will also lower health
care impacts and costs for all populations living in and near these areas including minority, low-
income, and indigenous populations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0626, pp. 1-2]
Low-carbon liquid fuels are the lowest cost option for decarbonization and can be used in
every diesel- fueled application or engine technology today. Our fuels are being used in fleets
utilizing medium-duty vehicles around the country and provide reliable transportation for those
with unknown schedules and unplanned routes, including emergency vehicles, tow trucks, and
snowplows. It cannot be overlooked that the medium-duty sector will continue to rely on the
internal combustion engines when you consider the decades it will take to pursue across the
board electrification and other decarbonization strategies. As a result, EPA cannot discount the
immediate benefits biodiesel and renewable diesel have and will continue to bring as we
decarbonize the medium-duty sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0626, pp. 1-2]
While the proposed rule outlines fuel neutral standards, in order to meet the across-fleet
average of a 44% GHG reduction by 2032, EPA is in fact forcing the adoption of zero-emission
vehicles. The proposed rule ignores the potential to achieve similar emissions reduction goals by
simply increasing the use of biodiesel and renewable diesel in existing and future engines. These
emission reductions benefits are already being seen by fleets that have chosen to lower their
GHG emissions through the adoption of biodiesel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0626, pp. 1-2]
Climate and Air Quality Urgency
Clean Fuels clearly understands the urgency we face in terms of addressing climate and air
quality. When looking at greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions today, biodiesel is a solution that
reduces carbon dioxide now. Specifically, when compared to electric vehicles (EVs), utilizing
biomass-based diesel now will allow the United States to meet our carbon reduction goals earlier
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than if we were to rely on EVs alone. The benefits of using and increasing the use of biomass-
based diesel now will not only provide immediate greenhouse gas reductions, but also will have
a positive impact on health in disadvantaged communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0626, p.
2]
When considering options to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles and
equipment, there are two essential elements to consider: the amount of the reduction and when it
happens. This is because carbon emissions are persistent and accumulate. The resulting increased
levels of GHGs in the atmosphere contribute to global warming now and for decades to come. A
reduction in GHG emissions now can avoid decades of associated heating, thus having
significantly more value than carbon reductions made in the future. The time value of carbon is
key, and the next decade is critical.3 The importance of reducing carbon today cannot be
understated as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) clearly reaffirmed in their
Sixth Assessment Report: Carbon reductions today are more important than carbon reductions in
the future.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0626, p. 2]
3 National Biodiesel Board. Biodiesel.org. (2021). Cutting Carbon: Comparing Biomass-Based Diesel &
Electrification for Commercial Fleet Use.
4 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2021). Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards
Per Argonne National Labs GREET model, biodiesel and renewable diesel reduce greenhouse
gas emissions by more than 70% on average compared to petroleum, directly and immediately
reducing GHG emissions from the vehicles that use our fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0626,
p. 3]
The immediate reductions achieved by biodiesel and renewable diesel are crucial to reach our
near- and long-term carbon reduction goals. Importantly, biofuels are already reducing GHG
emissions. The biodiesel and renewable diesel industry is on a path to sustainably double the
market size to 6 billion gallons annually by 2030 if not earlier and eliminating over 35 million
metric tons of C02 equivalent greenhouse gas emissions annually. Removing this important
mechanism will be detrimental to meeting our nation's clear air and energy goals. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0626, p. 3]
Criteria Pollutant Emissions and Environmental Justice
In addition to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, biodiesel also reduces particulate matter
emissions. This benefits all populations including minority, low-income, and indigenous
populations. Clean Fuels Alliance America, through our continued partnership with Trinity
Consultants, quantified the health benefits and corresponding economic savings from converting
petroleum-based diesel to 100% biodiesel at 23 sites across the country. 5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0626, p. 3]
5 Trinity Consultants, Assessment of Health Benefits from Using Biodiesel as a Transportation Fuel and
Residential Heating Oil, (April 2022). https://cleanfuels.org/resources/health-benefits-study
The Trinity Report assesses the health benefits of substituting biomass-based diesel in
transportation- related sources currently fueled by conventional ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD or
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diesel fuel) at 14 locations and as a replacement for home heating oil in one location throughout
the United States. This study expands upon the Assessment of Health Benefits from Using
Biodiesel as a Transportation Fuel and Residential Heating Oil completed by Trinity Consultants
in 2021. This study uses a "bottom-up" approach, focusing on specific population groups such as
those living in crowded urban housing complexes and portside communities. Even greater total
benefits can be seen when considering comparable communities outside of these specific markets
and locations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0626, p. 3]
The research finds that switching to 100% biodiesel can provide immediate community health
improvements including more than 436,000 fewer/reduced asthma cases per year; more than
137,000 fewer sick days per year; nearly 9,400 less cancer cases; the prevention of more than
885 premature deaths per year; over $7.4 billion in avoided health costs annually; and a 45%
reduction in cancer risk when legacy heavy-duty trucks such as older semis use B 100.6 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0626, p. 3]
6 id.
The immediacy of these potential health benefits, especially for disadvantaged communities,
is even more critical when one considers the years, possibly decades, it will take for states to
pursue deep electrification and other decarbonization strategies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0626, p. 3]
Costs and Consumer Savings
While the stated purpose of the proposed rule is to significantly reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter to result in widespread
reductions in air pollution, EPA has discounted the known benefits of biodiesel and renewable
diesel. Meeting clean air demands does not require switching to a zero-emissions vehicle.
Biodiesel and renewable diesel are drop-in alternatives, achieving valuable carbon reductions
today at a relatively low cost.7 Fleets utilizing biodiesel today view it as an opportunity to
maximize their emissions reductions while minimizing any effect on their operations. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0626, pp. 3-4]
7 Source: Frank, J. et al. Quantifying and comparing the cumulative greenhouse gas emissions and
financial viability of heavy-duty transportation pathways for the Northeastern, United States. Fuel, 323,
124243, Sep. 2022. https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.fuel.2022.124243. See Table 4.
These fuels offer owners, users, and fleet operators affordable, low-carbon solutions to
immediately improve the sustainability of their operations. These fuels are available now and can
be used in every diesel fueled application and every engine technology. Nearly all medium-duty
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) support using biodiesel blends of 20% or more in the
vehicles they produce, and the vast majority of OEMs support the use of biodiesel blends up to
20%. For those that do not, warranties cannot be voided or impacted in any way using biodiesel,
due to existing federal law.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0626, pp. 3-4]
8 Magnuson-Moss Warrant Act, P.L. 93-637
When compared to other decarbonization strategies such as zero emissions and specifically
electrification approaches, which require both new vehicles and infrastructure to realize the
benefits, biodiesel and renewable diesel remain the lowest cost option. According to a report by
Diesel Technology Forum, prospective fleets contemplating EVs immediately face 3.8 times
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higher upfront cost to their diesel counterparts.9 While new technology diesel vehicles fueled
with biodiesel and renewable diesel have three times lower cost. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0626, pp. 3-4]
9 Environmental Benefits of Medium- and Heavy Duty Zero Emission Vehicles Compared with Clean Bio-
& Renewable-Fueled Vehicles 2022-2032, Prepared for Diesel Technology Forum By Stillwater Associates
LLC, Irvine, California, USA, July 19, 2022, available at
https://dieselforum.egnyte.com/dl/MWHPcRW4e6
10 id.
Infrastructure
As EPA looks to the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) as a policy to support charging
infrastructure in conjunction with the proposed rule, it is important for EPA to consider the
timeframe of such investments along with the timeframe of growing and transitioning an existing
fleet. Congress demonstrated when passing IRA, the need to continue to support biofuels
infrastructure growth to supply low carbon biofuels remains a priority. The U.S. Department of
Agriculture's Higher Blends Infrastructure Incentive program (HBIIP) increases the sales and
use of higher blends of biodiesel by expanding the infrastructure for renewable fuels derived
from U.S. agricultural products. The program by design encourages a more comprehensive
approach to market higher blends by sharing the costs related to building out biofuel-related
infrastructure. The expansion of biofuel infrastructure, as facilitated by HBIIP, broadens the
availability of renewable fuels like B20 and higher blends while reducing carbon emissions and
harmful tailpipe pollution today. Under HBIIP, the grants support fueling stations, convenience
stores, hypermarket fueling stations, and fleet and fuel distribution facilities, including terminal
operations and home heating oil distribution centers throughout the country. Federal matching
grants have helped and continue to help the industry build or retrofit terminals, storage, and rail
capacity to enable broader consumer access to these clean fuels and in turn clean air. This
infrastructure complements existing fueling infrastructure throughout the country and does not
require investment in new vehicles and a full infrastructure overhaul to realize GHG benefits.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0626, p. 4]
Conclusion
The immediate and compounding benefits that biodiesel and renewable diesel provide cannot
be underscored enough. We ask that EPA adjust the fuel neutral standards to reflect a more
appropriate and feasible mix of technologies available in the time frame proposed to meet the
future standards as we work together to decarbonize the transportation sector today and, in the
years to come. Clean Fuels looks forward to working with EPA to ensure the optimization of the
immediate benefits of biodiesel and renewable diesel as you address multi-pollutant emissions
from medium duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0626, p. 5]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CDFC)
B. Higher ethanol blends lower carbon intensity.
The proposal projects that millions of liquid fueled vehicles will continue to be sold
throughout the compliance period and that millions more will remain on the road in the decades
to come. There are two ways to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions from this fleet: improve the
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fuel efficiency of the vehicles or reduce the carbon intensity of the fuel. While vehicles running
on these fuels would emit approximately the same amount of C02 from their tailpipes, the net
C02 emitted would be substantially reduced. This is because these fuels make use of carbon that
was recently sequestered by plants, and thus removed from the atmosphere in the same quantity
that it will reenter it. Converting plants to biofuels does not result in any net increase in carbon
emissions within this natural cycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 40]
When ethanol is blended into gasoline, the carbon intensity of the fuel decreases from average
life cycle number of 95.3 gC02e/MJ down toa 90.2 gC02e/MJ for El5 and 79.8 gC02e/MJ for
E30, after adjusting for the lower energy density of ethanol. See Steffen Mueller, High Octane
Low Carbon Fuels: The Bridge to Improve Both Gasoline and Electric Vehicles, The University
of Illinois at Chicago (Mar. 22, 2021), https://erc.uic.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/633/2021/03/UIC-Marginal-EV-HOF- Analysis-DRAFT-
3_22_2021_UPDATE.pdf. If liquid fuel consumption stays constant at approximately 135 billion
gallons per year, adopting nationwide El 5 would reduce carbon emissions between 2027 and
2032 by 384 million tons, 1.65 times more than the proposal's estimate 232 million tons over the
same time frame. Adopting nationwide E30 could reduce emissions by 1,167 million tons, five
times the savings of EPA's proposed rule. Id. Other studies have confirmed this result,
suggesting that the adoption of even mid-level ethanol blends would reduce pollution emissions
at least as much as EPA's electrification approach, and at far less cost. See Brian West, Higher
Ethanol Blends Support the Transition to a Low-Carbon Future, SAE Int'l Update (Feb. 2023),
https://www.nxtbook.eom/smg/sae/23UPD02/index.php#/p/2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712,
p. 40]
But 2012, EPA declined to extend these FFV incentives. 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624. After EPA's
discontinuation. FFV production dropped from 20% of all 2014 light-duty vehicles to only 8% of
2016 vehicles. See The 2020 EPA Automotive Trends Report, EPA-420-R-21-002,
Environmental Protection Agency (Jan. 2021), https://ne-
pis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1010U68.pdf. FFV production has dropped even further
since 2016 due to EPA's failure to recognize the real-world lifecycle benefits of bioethanol used
in FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 43-44]
EPA removed these incentives because it believed that greenhouse gas emissions compliance
must be based on "demonstrated GHG emissions performance." 77 Fed. Reg. 62,823.
Commentors agree. Because of their "demonstrated GHG emissions performance," EPA should
reintroduce crediting for vehicles that can utilize higher blends of renewable fuels and should
expand the program to include technologies other than just FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, pp. 43-44]
F. EPA should account for the benefits of fuel improvements by accounting for lifecycle
emissions and allowing for new higher ethanol certification fuels.
There are two ways EPA can account for the benefits of renewable fuels to reduce
greenhouse-gas emissions and improve the feasibility of its standards. First, should use lifecycle
emissions to account for the net emissions reductions that come from renewable fuels in the fleet.
EPA has detailed knowledge of the exact volumes and benefits of these fuels because it
administers the Renewable Fuel Standard and has significant data about the volumes of these
fuels that are already used by the fleet.24 Accounting for the current emissions savings of
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renewable fuels sets the stage for fuel improvements that dramatically reduce lifecycle
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 44]
V. The Proposed Rule Fails to Adequately Consider Fuels Related Alternatives.
Beneath the complexity of its reverse-engineered system, the proposal's plan for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions is remarkably straightforward: electrify the light-duty fleet as fast as—
or perhaps even faster—than possible. But this narrow vision of pursuing a singular regulatory
White Whale entirely neglects other more feasible technological solutions auto manufacturers
could adopt to meet the standards if they were properly credited for them: namely, the
manufacture of vehicles that run on low-carbon, renewable fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, pp. 36-37]
There are 281 million internal combustion engine vehicles on the road today and 100 million
more will be built in the next two decades. All of these vehicles could be improved—and for far
less than what EPA's proposal would cost—with an improvement in fuel quality and the
blending of renewable fuels. Gasoline blended with renewable ethanol up to 10 percent by
volume, E10, already reduces greenhouse gas emissions from the light-duty fleet by tens of
millions of tons a year. And we could do better. EPA has determined that El 5 is suitable for use
in all model year 2001 and later vehicles. See e.g., Regulation History of the El 5 Partial Waivers
Under the Clean Air Act, EPA-420-F-15-044, Environmental Protection Agency (Sep. 2015),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-09/documents/420fl5044.pdf. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, pp. 36-37]
Many newer vehicles on the road could run on mid-level blends like E25. See e.g., Amber
Rucker, EPA Approves The Use Of E30 In Nebraska Fleet Demonstration Poised To Reduce
Costs, Pollution, State of Nebraska (Oct. 21, 2022), https://etha- nol.nebraska.gov/epa-approves-
the-use-of-e30-in-nebraska-fleet-demonstration- poised-to-reduce-costs-pollution/. Every
automaker could readily make vehicles designed to run on mid-level blends with only minimal
design changes. And over 27 million flex-fuel vehicles ("FFVs") are capable of running on
approximately 85% ethanol are already on the road. See Growth Energy, Flex Fuel Database,
https://growthenergy.org/choice-at-the-pump/flex-fuel-database/ (last accessed July 5, 2023).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 36-37]
Increased ethanol blends have a myriad of benefits: they reduce the carbon intensity of liquid
fuels, they enable higher compression rations and thus more fuel- efficient engines, and they
reduce the aromatics and particulate matter that come out of the tailpipe. The auto industry,20
the petroleum industry,21 and the renewable fuels industry22 are all on the record calling for
EPA to use its power to improve fuel quality by increasing the minimum octane number. And
there are many direct fuel-related ways EPA might act to incentivize better fuel quality and the
adoption of higher-level blends: through increased volumes of low-carbon renewable fuels under
the Renewable Fuel Standard, through alternative, low-carbon certification fuels, and through
Section 211(c) rulemaking—as the proposal itself suggests. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712,
pp. 37-38]
20 See, e.g., Letter from Mitch Bainwol, President and CEO, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, to
Lisa Jackson, Administrator, EPA (Oct. 6, 2011), available at https://legacy-assets.ee-
news.net/openfiles/assets/2011/10/31/document_pm_04.pdf ("recommend[ed] increasing the mini- mum
gasoline octane rating, commensurate with increased use of ethanol" to "help achieve future requirements
for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions."); Julian Soell & R. Thomas Brunner, Mercedes-Benz,
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Comments on Proposed Tier 3 Rule, EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0135-4676 (June 28, 2013), at 3-4 ; Robert
Babik, General Motors LLC, Comments on Proposed Tier 3 Rule, EPA-HQ-OAR-2011- 0135-4288 (June
28, 2013), at 14 ("support[ing] the future of higher octane and higher ethanol content in order to provide a
pathway to improved vehicle efficiency and lower GHG emissions"); Cynthia Williams, Ford Motor
Company, Comments on Proposed Tier 3 Rule, EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0135-4349 (July 1, 2013), at 16
("Ford supports the development and introduction of an intermediate level blend fuel (E16-E50), with a
minimum octane rating of 91 anti-knock index (AKI) that increases proportionally as ethanol is splash-
blended on top of the base Tier 3 gasoline emission test fuel. The development of such a fuel would enable
the first steps to the development of a new generation of highly efficient internal combustion engine
vehicles. We look forward to future collaboration with the EPA on this item."); id. at 3 (commending the
idea of "maximizing] vehicle efficiency in tandem with use of renew- able fuels").
21 See, e.g., Testimony of Chet Thompson, President and CEO, American Fuel & Petrochemical
Manufacturers before U.S. House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on the Environment (Apr. 13,
2018), https://www.afpm.org/sites/default/files/issue_resources/20180411-AFPM-Written-Testi- mony.pdf
("a 95-RON used in optimized high-compression engines would provide more than a three percent
efficiency gain.") 95 RON Octane Standard: A Smarter Way to Cut Carbon from Vehicles, American Fuel
& Petrochemical Manufacturers (May 27, 2021), https://www.afpm.org/news- room/blog/95-ron-octane-
standard-smarter-way-cut-carbon-vehicles (a nationwide 95 RON octane standard "can deliver major
carbon reductions in the nation's light-duty vehicle fleet faster and at a lower cost than any other proposal
being considered by policymakers at the national level right now.").
22 See, e.g., RFA Welcomes Inclusion of High Octane Fuels in 2021-2026 CAFE/GHG Proposal,
Renewable Fuels Association (Aug. 2, 2018), https://ethanolrfa.org/media-and-news/category/news-re-
leases/article/2018/08/rfa-welcomes-inclusion-of-high-octane-fuels-in-2021 -2026-cafe-ghg-proposal ("high
octane fuels can help enable more efficient engines and reduce GHG emissions, and we believe the Agency
should use its authority to include high octane low carbon fuels as an option available to automakers for
meeting more stringent fuel economy and emissions standards in the future."); Kevin Heavican, Corn
Growers Back Higher Ethanol Blends, Brownfield Ag News (Mar. 11, 2021),
https://brownfieldagnews.com/news/corn-growers-back-higher-ethanol-blends/ ("Nebraska Corn
introduced a resolution at the recent Corn Congress calling for 95 RON E15, a 15-percent blend of ethanol
to raise octane to help auto makers create cleaner engines.").
But EPA also has the authority to consider the impact of these fuels in its consideration of
life-cycle emissions under the agency's Section 202 powers. The agency has done so in the past,
and acknowledging these benefits again would incentivize the use of more renewable fuels, and
allow automakers to achieve greater emissions reductions, in a shorter time frame, and at a net
savings to consumers. Agencies are required, as part of any reasoned decision making process, to
consider all '"significant and viable and obvious alternatives'" to their proposed action. Dist.
Hosp. Partners, L.P. v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see Spirit Airlines, Inc. v.
DOT, 997 F.3d 1247, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ("'[T]he failure of an agency to consider obvious
alternatives has led uniformly to reversal.'"). Ignoring the benefits of renewable fuels— and of
ethanol in particular—violates EPA's duty to give "appropriate consideration to the cost of
compliance" with the proposed regulations, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2), and would render the rule
arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 38-39]
C. Higher ethanol blends raise octane number, improving engine efficiency.
In addition to reducing carbon-intensity, higher ethanol blends of gasoline benefit from higher
octane numbers. After reducing carbon intensity, improving engine efficiency is the only way to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from internal combustion engine vehicles. Engine efficiency
has improved dramatically over the last fifty years, through a blend of technologies that are now
widely used in all new vehicles. But future improvements to vehicle technology to further reduce
C02—as EPA is well aware—will come at steep and increasing marginal cost. Internal
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combustion engines operate together with their fuel as a system and engine efficiency is now
limited by the fuel that is available. Specifically, low-octane gasoline, standard in the U.S.
market, limits the ability of automobile manufactures to produce high compression, and thus
high efficiency, engines. Without higher octane gasoline, the cost of higher efficiency vehicles
will rise, slowing their adoption and raising the overall C02 emissions of the American fleet.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 40-41]
Raising the minimum Research Octane Number (RON) of gasoline to 95, would have
immediate impact. Existing vehicles would, overnight, become more fuel efficient. Thomas G.
Leone, et al., The Effect of Compression Ratio, Fuel Octane Rating, and Ethanol Content on
Spark-Ignition Engine Efficiency, 49 Environmental Science & Technology 10778, 10781
(2015), https://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/acs.est.5b01420?src=recsys. With calibration, the
entire existing U.S. fleet would gain up to 4.4% in engine efficiency and see larger reductions in
C02. Id. Future vehicles, equipped with high compression engines, would achieve even higher
efficiencies. Emissions savings from these high-octane vehicles would rapidly outstrip those of
electric vehicles and cumulatively save nearly 700 million tons of C02 by 2035. And these
benefits would come at only marginal increases in fuel costs - likely less than $0.03 per gallon.
David S. Hirshfeld, et al., Refining Economics of U.S. Gasoline: Octane Ratings and Ethanol
Content, 48 Environmental Science & Technology 11064, 11067 (2014),
https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/es5021668. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 40-41]
These benefits are why individual auto manufacturers, industry groups, and groups across the
liquid fuels space have all called for a high-octane fuel standard. Testimony of Chet Thompson,
President and CEO, American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers before U.S. House Energy
and Commerce Subcommittee on the Environment (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://www.afpm.org/sites/default/files/issue_re sources/20180411-AFPM-Written-
Testimony.pdf ("a 95-RON used in optimized high- compression engines would provide more
than a three percent efficiency gain."). As American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers has
explained, a nationwide 95 RON octane standard "can deliver major carbon reductions in the
nation's light-duty vehicle fleet faster and at a lower cost than any other proposal being
considered by policy makers at the national level right now." 95 RON Octane Standard: A
Smarter Way to Cut Carbon from Vehicles, American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
(May 27, 2021)," https://www.afpm.org/newsroom/blog/95-ron-octane-standard-smarter- way-
cut-carbon-vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 41-42]
E. Flex-fuel vehicles are at least as effective as electric vehicles at reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.
EPA's proposal also neglects the potential benefits of FFVs. Over 27 million FFVs capable of
running on approximately E85 ethanol are already on the road. See Growth Energy, Flex Fuel
Database, https://growthenergy.org/choice-at-the- pump/flex-fuel-database/ (last accessed July 5,
2023). Because of the lower carbon intensity of ethanol, FFVs produce far less greenhouse gas
emissions than conventional gasoline vehicles. An FFV running E85 made from corn starch
ethanol and natural gasoline reduces greenhouse gas emissions as compared to a conventional
liquid fueled vehicle by 46 percent. EPA's Proposed Tailpipe Standards Overlook Ethanol's
Low-Carbon, Efficiency Benefits, Renewable Fuels Association (Apr. 12, 2023),
https://ethanolrfa.org/media-and-news/category/news-releases/article/2023/04/epa-s- proposed-
tailpipe-standards-overlook-ethanol-s-low-carbon-efficiency-benefits. Using corn kernel fiber
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ethanol and renewable naptha reduces emissions as compared to a conventional liquid fueled
vehicle by 77 percent. Id. This is more than the net emissions reductions realized by electric
vehicles. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 43]
Recognizing these benefits, in EPA rules through model year 2015, and in the existing
NHTSA fuel economy standards, FFVs received compliance benefits. See EPA regulations at 40
CFR 600.510-12(j)(2)(iv)(B) (providing FFV crediting through Model Year 2015); see also 49
CFR 536.10 (indicating that dual-fuel vehicles can earn credits under the standards); 77 Fed.
Reg. 62,624, 62,829-30 (Oct. 15, 2012) (providing that FFVs could generate credits under the
standards). These standards incentivized FFVs by accounting for E85's real-world greenhouse
gas reductions, and not merely tailpipe emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 43]
Second, EPA must update its certification pathways to allow vehicles to certify on dedicated
alternative fuels, like the various, widely available high ethanol blends. As detailed in the next
section, there are several problems with the way EPA handles its Tier 3 certification fuel that
penalizes renewable fuels. EPA should fix these problems and establish new pathways for higher
ethanol blends—like EPA is proposing to do with hydrogen—to open new routes by which auto
manufacturers can seek to reduce the emissions from their vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, pp. 44-45]
By failing to consider the benefits of renewable fuels, EPA precludes the most effective way
for automakers to reduce emissions and meet EPA's standards. This would violate EPA's
statutory duties under Section 202 and would, at the very least, make the proposed rule arbitrary
and capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 44-45]
Organization: Countymark
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should consider an alternative approach and
propose a multipollutant fuel rule. The proposed rule should include requirements to improve
fuel quality by establishing a higher federal octane standard and allowing
higher ethanol blends. It should also incentivize the reduction of carbon and aromatic
compounds through reformulation or increased ethanol blending. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0665, p. 3]
Additionally, the rule should incentivize automakers to produce more efficient vehicles by
creating alternative certification pathways for higher ethanol blends and addressing issues with R
Value, C02 penalty, and the Volumetric Conversion Factor in fuel economy
calculations. Adopting a life-cycle analysis approach to compare emissions from different
technologies would yield many benefits. For instance, embracing and enabling a pathway to
improve fuel quality would lead to increased and accelerated emission reductions, improved
public health, environmental justice goals, greater versatility, and improved reliability, all at a
lower cost. The Clean Air Act authorizes the consideration of this pathway by the EPA. Even
mid-level ethanol blends would reduce pollution emissions at least as effectively as the EPA's
electrification approach and at a significantly lower cost. Incorporating a fuel improvement
strategy would double the EPA's projected emissions reduction. However, the current rule
disregards this option, leaving pollutants in the air and leaving the EPA with less than optimal
outcomes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0665, p. 3]
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Organization: Darius
While the goal of this proposal is to reduce the U.S. automotive fleet's carbon footprint, it
simply shifts how emissions are produced. The EPA is ignoring the value of technologies
produced by American workers, manufacturers, and farmers that are critical to our transportation
future. Specialty automotive aftermarket businesses are leading the way through alternative fuel
innovations from replacing older engine technologies with newer, cleaner versions to converting
older ICE vehicles to new electric, hydrogen, and other alternative fuels. Sadly, the EPA's plans
to reduce greenhouse gases and criteria pollutants do not factor this in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0519, p. 1]
Organization: Departments of Transportation of Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota
and Wyoming
Before closing we note that there are many other concerns with this proposal that may well be
developed by others commenting to this docket. For example, we are struck by the singular focus
in the NPRM on tailpipe emissions reduction that virtually compel a transition to EVs and
inadequate attention to low carbon liquid fuels and biofuels as additional means of addressing
emissions concerns that would not be dependent on an adequate electric vehicle charging
network, something that certainly is not available at this time, particularly in rural areas. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0525, p. 2]
Questions could be raised regarding: life-cycle rather than tailpipe emissions; and the ability
of the electric grid, even with costly additions and connections to charging stations, to support all
the EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0525, p. 2]
Organization: East Kansas Agri-Energy (EKAE)
As a member of the EPA Farm Ranch and Rural Communities Committee I am looking to
help our rural communities prosper and operating ethanol plants do just that. EVs are not
practical for everyday use here in rural America so let's make regulations that benefit the whole
country. Ethanol is a clean low carbon fuel that's environmentally friendly and overlooked in
most every conversation on lowering carbon emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0734, p. 1]
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this important issue. As a member of the
Renewable Fuels Association, we also wish to endorse and support their written comments, as
submitted. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0734, p. 1]
Organization: Energy Marketers of America (EMA)
EMA member companies provide a growing portfolio of affordable, efficient, and greener
liquid fuels and alternative energy sources. These liquid fuels have played a critical role in
lowering emissions over the past half century. Through innovation and technological
advancements, liquid fuels will continue to reduce emissions further and be a crucial driver of
economic growth in this country in the coming decades. Therefore, EMA fully supports and
endorses the comments submitted by the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufactures (AFPM)
regarding EPA's GHG standards for light-duty and medium-duty vehicles for model years 2027
and later. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0616, p. 1]
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EMA urges the EPA to consider lifecycle emissions and a technology neutral approach when
considering emission reductions. The proposed rule should consider the lifecycle emissions
associated with EV production, usage, and end-of-life disposal including emissions from raw
material mining and refining, battery manufacturing, and electricity generation for EV charging.
Further EPA needs to consider the logistics, investment, and timing associated with EV and
battery production, electric generation and transmission, and EV charging to support a
substantial increase in EV production. Achieving a significant ramp up of domestic supply of
raw materials for batteries, mineral refining, and battery and vehicle manufacturing as well as
upgrades to the electricity generation and transmission will be complex and take time. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0616, pp. 1-2]
Again, EMA urges the EPA to consider lifecycle emissions and a technology neutral approach
when it comes to promoting policies to reduce emissions. The most cost-effective and timely
way to reduce emissions from transportation is to support multiple technologies that do so for
both new vehicles and vehicles currently on the road. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0616, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Exxon Mobil Corporation
EPA's Proposal establishes standards for emissions reductions that can be achieved only
through a rapid transformation of the transportation sector and through limited technology
pathways. Specifically, the proposed standards could require as many as two-thirds of all new
light-duty vehicle purchases to be battery electric vehicles (BEVs) by 2032. ExxonMobil
believes BEVs will play an important role in reducing transportation sector emissions. Indeed,
we produce plastics that can help reduce vehicle weight and increase fuel efficiency, butyl rubber
that improves air retention in tires and can improve BEV range by up to 7 percent,6 and our
Mobil EV™ suite of electric vehicle fluids and products help enable further, longer, and safer
performance for electric cars, vans, and trucks.7 We believe, however, that EPA should
encourage a diversity of technology pathways that allow for consumers to choose between
vehicle types. Standards that encourage a combination of BEVs, plug-in hybrids, full hybrids,
and efficient internal combustion engine vehicles, that could operate with bio and renewable
fuels, are a better way to reduce GHG emissions and manage dependence on foreign critical
minerals. Such a technology-neutral policy approach would foster innovation and competition
across all technologies and could ultimately help encourage more effective and lower cost
solutions for consumers and businesses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0632, p. 2]
6 ExxonMobil Advancing Climate Solutions 2023 Progress Report (2023), page 20.
7 www.mobil.com/en-us/commercial-vehicle-lube/pds/na-xx-mobil-ev-drive-201-
EPA's Proposal further relies exclusively on vehicle fleet turnovers to accomplish emissions
reductions and thus misses the opportunity to reduce emission from vehicles already in use and
that will continue to be in use for decades. About 12 million new vehicles are sold in the U.S.
each year8 while there are about 280 million cars, S.U.V.s, vans, and pickup trucks on America's
roads today.9 Even after the proposed standards are fully implemented for MY 2032 vehicles,
the majority of vehicles on the road in 2035 are still expected to be powered using conventional
fuels such as gasoline. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0632, pp. 2-3]
8 Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Annual U.S. Motor Vehicle Production and Domestic Sales (2021).
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9 The U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization, A Joint Strategy to Transform
Transportation, DOE/EE- 2674 (Jan 2023).
10 Id.
ExxonMobil believes that existing transportation sector-based federal policies could be
improved to achieve meaningful GHG emissions reductions through complementary fuel and
vehicles standards. Specifically, we encourage EPA to consider how it may assist with the
development and implementation of a federal low carbon fuel standard that would encourage
investment in lowering the carbon intensity of fuels (liquid, compressed/liquefied gas, electricity,
hydrogen) and vehicle standards that account for lifecycle GHG emissions, including emissions
upstream of a vehicle's tailpipe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0632, p. 3]
To encourage investment in technologies to reduce GHG emissions from existing fuels,
ExxonMobil is encouraging U.S. policymakers to consider the development of a federal lifecycle
and carbon-intensity based fuel standard measured in gC02e per Mega Joule (MJ) of fuel energy
(gC02e/MJ) that would provide a long-term market signal for the production and use of lower
carbon fuels. Such a standard, which could be increased in stringency over time, would establish
a market for credit trading that would offer compliance flexibility and would underpin
investments in technologies to reduce carbon emissions from gasoline and diesel used for
existing vehicles. Examples of lower carbon-intensity fuels that might generate credits under
such a standard would include ethanol, biodiesel, renewable diesel, renewable natural gas,
hydrogen, electricity produced for EVs, and traditional fuels produced with lower emission
technology such as carbon capture and sequestration. Moreover, the standard could be expanded
beyond road transportation to the marine and aviation sectors in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0632, p.3]
Organization: Fuel Freedom Foundation
The central role of liquid fuels in transportation
Due to the diverse and ail-American energy sources used for power generation, electric
vehicles are structurally decoupled from the fluctuations of petroleum market. However, there is
significant uncertainty surrounding the market's ability to transition to electrification as quickly
as anticipated by EPA's proposal, which exceeds the goal previously established and reiterated
by the Biden Administration. 1,2,3 Further, even if the ambition in the proposed rule is fully
realized and two-thirds of vehicle sales are electric vehicles by 2032, about 75% of the vehicles
on the road will still use liquid fuels. A more holistic approach is warranted to avoid ceding the
light- duty liquid fuel market to petroleum dominance—and the attendant upstream GHG
emissions— for the period covering this rulemaking as well as many years beyond. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0711, pp. 1-2]
1 Energy Policy Research Foundation "EV Electricity Requirements and EPA's Challenging Rules", Chart
26 at https://eprinc.org/chart-of-the-week/
2 Alliance for Automotive Innovators comment to docket of this Proposed Rule "Auto Innovators does not
believe [GHG and criteria pollutant standards] can be met without substantially increasing the cost of
vehicles, reducing consumer choice, and disadvantaging major portions of the United States population and
territory. EPA's proposed rules effectively assume that everything will go perfectly in the transformation to
electric vehicles (EVs) between now and 2032."
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3 President Biden Executive Order of Aug 5, 2021 ".. .bolstering our domestic market by setting a goal that
50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including
battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles" accessed at
https://www.whitehouse.gOv/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive- order-on-
strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/ and U.S. National Blueprint for
Transportation Decarbonization (2023) "Government, industry, and labor set a target of 50% new light-
duty EV sales share by 2030" accessed at https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/us-national-blueprint-
transportation-decarbonization
More than 280 million ICEs are on the road today, and about 90 million are expected to be
sold by the end of the period covered under this rulemaking. In order to provide insurance for
maximum success of the GHG Standards, EPA should encourage all viable decarbonization
pathways in the light-duty sector. Specifically, the final rule should incorporate provisions to
incentivize the production of vehicles that facilitate decarbonization of the liquid fuels that will
power light-duty transportation for decades to come. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, pp. 1-2]
By not including provisions to incentivize the production of flex-fuel vehicles (FFVs)
including plug-in hybrid electric vehicles that can take advantage of the favorable properties of
higher ethanol blends including high octane, the EPA risks leaving on the table GHG emissions
reductions sooner rather than later. Extrapolating from California's current E85 use in the current
onroad FFV fleet to a national level, annual GHG emissions would be reduced 4.27 MMT tons
of GHG in 2022 and 74.71 MMT in 2032.4 We strongly encourage EPA to leverage the GHG-
reduction potential of FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, p. 2]
4 Pearson Fuels, Comment letter to Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later
Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles rulemaking, p. 11
There are multiple public policy rationales for crediting FFVs within the GHG program:
Maximize cost effectiveness of GHG reductions. As GHG reduction targets are strengthened
over time to achieve Net Zero carbon emissions in transportation, economic costs will inevitably
increase. However, the total economic burden can be lessened, and the social benefits
maximized, by keeping the door open to the most cost-effective fuel pathways. Fuel Freedom
funded a study by Lifecycle Associates to evaluate possible scenarios for achieving an 80% fuel
cycle reduction in light-duty vehicle GHG emissions for the U.S. and for California by 2050.7
The analysis used government estimates8 of fuel carbon intensity, vehicle efficiency
improvements, and incremental costs for each fuel-vehicle combination, to develop feasible
market penetrations for various pathways, including high-octane fuels with high-compression-
ratio ICEs coupled with electrification, biofuels used in ICEs with and without hybridization,
hybrid and plug-in hybrid vehicles, fuel cell EVs, and battery electric vehicles, to compare both
feasibility and relative cost effectiveness for carbon reductions.9 Long-term results to 2050 show
that it is critical to provide market flexibility for both electrification and liquid pathways in the
near term to promote long-term feasibility and cost-effectiveness of GHG reductions.
Regulations should therefore encourage and/or facilitate all feasible vehicle-fuel pathways that
can 1.) immediately reduce carbon intensity in the transportation sector and, 2.) maximize long-
term GHG reductions by transitioning to renewable sources, including electricity, hydrogen, and
increasingly lower-carbon and advanced biofuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, pp. 2-3]
7 Life Cycle Associates, "Assessing Greenhouse Gas Emission and Petroleum Reduction Scenarios for the
U.S. and California Transportation Sectors Final Report" (March 2019) - Submitted in conjunction with
previous comments at Docket EPA-HQ- OAR-2021-0208
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8 EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2016; Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Greenhouse Gasses, Regulated
Emissions and Energy Use in Transportation (GREET) Model, VISION2015, and Cradle-to-Grave
Lifecycle Analysis of U.S. Light Duty Vehicle Fuel Pathways (2016);); National Academies of Science
Transitions report (2013); EPA-NHTSA Draft Technical Assessment Report, EPA Fuel Economy Guide;
CARB VISION2.1 and CA-GREET2 models
9 Each pathway centered on a dominant vehicle technology, constrained by practical limitations and the
attributes of cars versus trucks or SUVs. Vehicles not suitable for battery electric propulsion were assumed
to be ICEs.
Realize GHG reductions sooner rather than later. Given the urgency to forestall the increasing
effects of climate change, the EPA should not foreclose pathways that can immediately reduce
GHG emissions. With a signal from EPA that FFVs will be recognized for their decarbonization
value, higher blends of low-carbon ethanol can be made quickly available in the marketplace to
immediately displace higher-carbon gasoline. Today, more than 20 million FFVs are already on
the road, compared to 3.8 million plug-in EVs. FFVs are a mature vehicle technology that can
quickly be reintegrated into OEM offerings at virtual price parity to existing internal combustion
engine (ICE) vehicles. E85 also has widely available distribution and dispensing infrastructure to
deliver the fuel to retailers and consumers. Another key finding of the Lifecycle Associates
analysis is that policies accelerating a decrease in the carbon intensity of fuels reduce total GHGs
sooner. As EPA has noted, "future [GHG] emissions are expected to produce larger incremental
damages as physical and economic systems become more stressed in response to greater climatic
change." 10 Given the uncertainties in measuring the long-term impacts of GHG emissions, 11
and the accumulated impacts of carbon emissions, 12 EPA should not discount the benefits of
pathways with significant promise to reduce emissions more quickly in the near-term. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0711, p. 3]
10 Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis (PRIA) for the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE)
Vehicles Rule for Model Year 2021 - 2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, p. 10768
11 SAFE PRIA, p. 1069
12 National Academies of Sciences, Valuing Climate Damages: Updating Estimation of the Social Cost of
Carbon Dioxide, (2017)
Minimize consumer disruption and cost. Since first being introduced more than 15 years ago,
FFVs have been manufactured and sold with no consumer disruption. The functioning and
fueling are virtually indistinguishable to drivers, and from a policy perspective are only limited
in utility by uneven availability of E85. However, the state of California offers an illuminating
example of FFVs fueled by a more robust fueling infrastructure. Due to a long-term sustained
discount of E85 relative to regular gasoline (87 RON), California drivers have continued to
increase use in the state. E85 consumption in California has been increasing by an average of
33% per year—and 40% from 2021 to 2022.14 The usage rate of E85 in FFVs was 16% in 2022
for a total of 103 million gallons. 15 A primary driver of increased E85 use has been its sustained
discount relative to retail gasoline. E85 has consistently offered a steady pump price discount of
~$1.00/gallon in California. Further, when gasoline prices spiked after Russia's invasion of
Ukraine, FFV drivers in the State were buffered from the impact. Unlike gasoline prices, ethanol
prices are not dependent on world oil prices. Consequently, while gasoline prices spiked, E85
prices remained stable, resulting in a discount of up to $2.50/gallon for E85 relative to regular
gasoline, and in some cases more, [see Appendix A] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, pp. 4-5]
14 California Air Resources Board E85 consumption data
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15 California Air Resources Board and Pearson Fuels data
FFVs are already equivalent to existing vehicles in cost, attributes and convenience.
Reinvigorating FFV production can leverage the major evolution since the FFV credit was
eliminated. The Department of Agriculture, pump manufacturers and fueling stations have
dedicated significant investments to increasing distribution infrastructure. Ethanol has become
much less carbon intensive and is price advantaged in many areas of the country that sell blends
above E10, while FFVs can use any blend up to E85. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, p. 5]
Summary
By not incorporating a program incentive for the production of FFVs, the proposed GHG
Standards leave on the table the most substantial opportunity to rapidly and cost-effectively
reduce GHG emissions in light-duty transportation in the near term. As acknowledged in the
U.S. Blueprint "Some biofuels and biofuel blends are drop-in replacements for tradi4onal fossil
fuels and offer the most substan4al immediate GHG emissions reduc4ons." Further, foreclosing
the best possibility of lowering the carbon intensity of the liquid fuels that will dominate
roadways for many years effectively cedes the liquid fuel market to petroleum-based fuels and
the attendant climate consequences for the long-term. Even for California, which leads the nation
in EV adoption, ICEs are expected to remain in significant numbers after 2035 and beyond and
beyond. The Institute for Transportation Studies report "Driving California's Emissions to Zero"
concluded that achieving carbon neutrality required a complete transition to bio-based gasoline
and equivalents by 2045.16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, pp. 4-5]
16 University of California Institute of Transportation Studies, "Driving California's Transportation
Emissions to Zero" (April 2021) accessed at https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3np3p2t0
Because consumer sales determine the vehicles on the road, affordability and convenience are
critical to the success of the GHG Standards, and ultimately the transition to a zero-carbon
transportation system. Encouraging the purchase and use of lower-carbon technologies and fuels
in the vehicles that Americans buy today will set us on a path toward that goal, given that these
cars and trucks will be on the road for 15 to 20 years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Green Diesel Engineering LLC
There is a consensus that the rising rate of C02 is leading to global climate change. C02 does
fluctuate naturally on this planet over time, and it can change rapidly when a calamitous natural
disaster occurs, such as a large volcanic eruption, or meteor impact that burns a significant
portion of the planet. These have happened several times on planet earth. C02 spikes from a
natural disaster are somewhat similar to the C02 spike we have seen in the last 100 years. With
the advent of the industrial revolution, the imprint of human activity contributed significantly to
the release of C02. If this trend continues, subsequent generations will be at risk. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 4]
The goal should be carbon neutral, but this will take decades to achieve and new technology
required. In the interim, we must limit C02 generation as best we can. Changing to plant-based
fuels offer the largest net decrease in C02 formation. If all transportation was converted to plant-
based fuel, net C02 would drop 70% on a yearly basis. This approach offers the lowest net
carbon in the atmosphere. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 4]
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The graph above is from a NASA satellite image which highlights the areas with NOx issues.
[See original comment for map of nitrogen dioxide levels throughout the Unites States] Since
these areas are predominantly urban vicinities or downstream of power plants, it would be more
beneficial to focus on localized efforts to reduce NOx. A good 70% of people live in the urban
areas and reducing NOx in these inner cities will provide the most focused assistance. Ideally,
most city transportation would be electric to eliminate emissions at source. Cities could build
large parking lots outside urban areas for combustion vehicles and mass electric transit into city
center. Keep in mind, electric vehicles do not reduce emissions, but rather change where those
emissions are produced (battery mining / manufacturing / recycling plants) and electric power-
distribution facilities. Moving the emissions away from where most people live would be
prudent. Electric transportation does not reduce C02 emissions over the vehicle life cycle due to
battery manufacturing, mining, recycling and charging. Electric vehicles will help reduce smog
in LA, Denver, etc. where there is poor airflow, however, they will not reduce carbon emissions
when battery recycling/lifespan is incorporated in the well to wheels analysis.
(https://climate.mit.edu/ask-mit/are-electric-vehicles-definitely-better-climate-gas-powered-
cars), (https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/comparative-life-cycle-greenhouse-gas-
emissions-of-a-mid-size-bev-and-ice-vehicle),( https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/comparison-
your-car-vs-electric-vehicle),
(https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1361920921000614). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0457, p. 4]
Proposed Emission Standard Guidelines [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
- Modify the emission standards on gasoline and diesel with the primary emphasis to be on
minimizing C02.
- Increase NOx limit for diesel engines to 3 gram/mile on EPA emission test cycles. This is
still cleaner than 1980 standards. With proper engine tuning, the smaller NOx increase allows for
a decrease of 100 gram/mile of C02.
- Maintain the theme of clean diesel and keep particulate filters to prevent PM (particulate
matter) emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
- Manufacturers could add GPS software to go into low NOx mode when near NOx abatement
zones.
- Re-allocate tax incentives for urban residents to purchase BEV (battery electric vehicle)
- Work with states on regional smog issues as these are very limited in geographical area. The
top cities are: Los Angeles, Denver, Miami, New York City, Houston, Atlanta, etc. Moving to
primarily electric vehicles in dense population zones eliminates point of use emissions.
- Work with bio-fuel producers, farmers, refineries as needed to promote plant- based fuels
that do not impact the food system. Hemp would be a good starting point as the entire plant can
be utilized. The seed oil produces bio-diesel and the stalk produces ethanol. A robust bio fuel
industry could reduce C02 up to 1000 million metric tons yearly.
- Electric is a good solution for local driving patterns. It is not good for long distance runs or
pulling loads and does suffer in range with extreme cold or heat.
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- Re-calibrating vehicles in the field for low C02 will yield the quickest return on investment.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0457, p. 6]
Organization: GROWMARK, Inc.
Our system's approach to fuel and energy business is to provide the fuel and energy sources
that our customers want and use. We do not prefer or advocate for one technology over the other,
but we feel that the proposed rule will cause a tremendous burden on farmers and rural
Americans, where the lack of charging infrastructure will make the conversion to EVs at the
rates necessitated by this proposed rule extremely difficult. Furthermore, current EVs lack the
capabilities that internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles currently have, which are vital for
farmers as they work to feed our nation and the world. Additionally, we feel that the
prioritization this proposed rule places on EVs ignores the tremendous potential of biofuels as a
low-carbon fuel source, especially given the current realities of carbon intensity for EVs and
biofuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, p. 1]
Prioritization of EV Technology Over Biofuels
Given the percentage of new vehicle sales that will be required to be EVs in order to comply
with these standards, the EPA is picking EV technology over biofuels grown and produced in
America, much to the detriment of American farmers and the environmental goals of the EPA.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, p. 2]
According to Dr. Steffen Mueller at the University of Illinois Chicago (UIC) Energy
Resources Center, a high-octane fuel (HOF) of E30 or higher that utilizes carbon capture and
storage (CCS) results in fewer greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per mile than EVs operated on
the Marginal Midwest Grid. E85 with CCS results in fewer GHG emissions per mile than the
U.S. Baseload Average Electricity Grid and the California Marginal Electricity Grid.8 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, p. 2]
8 Mueller, S. (2021, December). Life Cycle Emissions of Different Vehicle/Fuel Technology Pathways
[PowerPoint slides]. Illinois Commerce Commission.
https://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/informal-
processes/Doc%203_UIC%20ICC%20EV%20Emissions%20Final_12-15-21.pdf
The EPA's approach with these proposed standards ignores these scientific analyses, and as a
result the unnaturally created leap in adoption of EVs will lead to less investment in biofuel
advancements. Besides actually creating more GHG emissions, this will cause a major economic
burden in rural America as an important market of crops produced by farmers will be diminished
at the same time that they are forced to adopt a more expensive, less reliable technology. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, pp. 2-3]
Our system thanks you for your consideration of these comments, and we ask that you
reconsider this rule that will have such a negative effect on the farmers and customers that we
serve across our nation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Growth Energy
Yet the Proposed Rule almost entirely ignores the GHG-reduction and other benefits of
ethanol and other biofuels. Most significantly, it fails even to consider the upstream carbon sink
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that results from growing crops used in biofuels while simultaneously dismissing the upstream
carbon emissions of building and powering EVs. EPA assesses the emissions lifecycles of two
complex vehicle systems—EVs and internal combustion engine ("ICE") vehicles—in a way that
heavily puts the thumb on the scale in favor in EVs. First, although both EVs and ICE vehicles
generate "upstream" emissions from vehicle and engine production and power generation, EPA
dismisses this reality. Second, although ICE vehicles can run on a diverse range of fuels with
vastly different GHG emissions profiles, EPA fails to consider this diversity when assessing
"downstream" emissions from petroleum-based and biofuels-based vehicle systems. The result is
a proposal that inaccurately treats EVs as if they generate zero grams per mile of carbon and just
as inaccurately treats emissions from the use of biofuels the same as emissions from combusting
petroleum fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 3]
EPA's failure to adequately incorporate the benefits of biofuels into its analysis of the
comparative GHG emission profiles of EVs and ICE vehicles pervades the Proposed Rule. For
example, EPA arbitrarily assumes that biofuels will stay at a constant percentage of the nation's
liquid fuel supply, ignores the potential of greater blends of biofuels in its cost and feasibility
analyses, and fails to consider the potential for incentivizing greater biofuel use through credits.
Of course, as the agency charged with administering the Renewable Fuel Standard, EPA is
uniquely positioned to promote biofuels and increase their percentage of the nation's
transportation fuel supply, all in accordance with Congress's understanding that renewable fuels
must play a central role in reducing the impact of transportation-related GHG emissions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 3-4]
The Proposed Rule's blind spot for biofuels has major policy consequences. EPA misses an
opportunity to further reduce emissions with a biofuel like ethanol that has 46 percent lower
GHG emissions on average and is already in use in the vast majority of light-duty vehicles and
fuels markets across the country. EVs are undoubtedly an important and growing technology, but
not every consumer or business in the country can adopt EVs and not every electricity source in
the country will be able to meet more stringent GHG emissions standards in the timeframe
established in the proposal. The Proposed Rule thus would perversely incentivize EVs in regions
where electricity will continue to be generated from fossil fuels when incentivizing higher
biofuel use in those areas instead could achieve greater emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0580, pp.3-4]
The Proposed Rule is different in kind than EPA's prior tailpipe rules. For one, it makes
permanent EPA's disregard of the upstream emissions of EVs, which prior rules promised would
be temporary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 4]
There are several steps that EPA can and should take to address those deficiencies, both in the
final rule and in other contexts: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 4]
- First, EPA should fix its system of scoring the emissions from vehicles, which both
undercounts EV emissions and overcounts emissions from biofuels used in ICE vehicles. The
most accurate way to do so would be by conducting a complete lifecycle analysis for BEVs—
using the Argonne laboratory's GREET model or its equivalent—and compare that to a lifecycle
analysis for ICE vehicles using various blends of liquid fuels. Alternatively, if EPA does not use
a lifecycle analysis, it should at a minimum assign the portion of fuel used in ICE vehicles
attributable to biofuels a value of zero g/mi in recognition of the fact that the carbon emitted
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from combusting biofuels is biogenic carbon sequestered from the atmosphere by crops. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 4]
- Second, EPA should account for the potential of higher blends of biofuels. At a minimum,
EPA should use El5 as its test fuel and strongly promote El5 as an in-use fuel, because current
ICE technology is capable of using El 5. EPA should also adjust its methodology to account for
increasing use of mid-level and higher-blend fuels such as E30 and E85. Fuels and vehicles act
as a system, so naturally an improvement in fuels will help EPA achieve its emissions goals.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 4]
- Third, EPA should use credits to incentivize biofuel use in ICE vehicles. EPA can and
should use its Section 202 authority to provide credits to manufacturers who create engines and
other technologies that facilitate use of higher blends of ethanol and other biofuels. And, as part
of or in addition to that program, EPA should award credits that are tied to actual use of biofuels
in ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 4]
- Fourth, EPA should also consider additional actions outside of Section 202 to further
incentivize biofuel use. One such action would be to incentivize increased ethanol and other
biofuel production through appropriate volumes under the Renewable Fuel Standard ("RFS")
program. Another would be to establish a minimum octane standard and approve a high-octane,
low-carbon mid-level ethanol blend, which would lower GHG emissions both by ensuring that
ethanol makes up a greater part of the liquid fuel supply and by allowing auto manufacturers to
manufacture more efficient engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 4]
Ethanol also has lower emissions of numerous other pollutants. To begin with, ethanol boosts
octane in fuel without the harmful impacts of alternative octane-boosting fuel additives such as
methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE), lead, and aromatics (including benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene,
and xylene) or olefins. Indeed, the level of aromatics in fuel decreases by about seven percent for
every 10 percent by volume increase in ethanol content.3 Decreasing aromatics in fuel has direct
impacts on tailpipe emissions, with higher-ethanol fuels resulting in lower emissions of black
carbon (BC), particle number (PN), benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, m/p- xylene and o-xylene
(BTEX), and olefins.4 Using higher blends of ethanol also reduces total hydrocarbon (THC),
carbon monoxide (CO), and particulate matter (PM) emissions. For PM emissions in particular,
recent studies have demonstrated substantial benefits from higher blends of ethanol in fuel.5
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 5]
3 Kazemiparkouhi et al., Comprehensive US database and model for ethanol blend effects on regulated
tailpipe emissions. 812 Science of The Total Environment 151426, (Mar. 2022).
4 Macintosh, et al., Response to Proposed Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program Standards for 2023-
2025, Environmental Health & Engineering (Feb. 10, 2023).
5 See Karavalakis, Durbin, & Tang, Final Report, Comparison of Exhaust Emissions Between E10 CaRFG
and Splash Blended E15, Prepared for: California Air Resources Board (CARB), Growth Energy
Inc./Renewable Fuels Association (RFA), and USCAR (Jan. 2022).
II. The Benefits of Biofuels
In its extensive proposal and preamble, EPA included next to no analysis of the benefits
ethanol and other biofuels. That omission is glaring because of the significant GHG-reductions
and other benefits that biofuels offer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 5]
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To begin with, the carbon absorbed by agricultural crops when they grow means that the
lifecycle emissions of biofuels are significantly lower than petroleum fuels. A recent meta-
analysis by Harvard researchers that accounted for all aspects of the lifecycle emissions of corn
ethanol concluded that ethanol reduces GHG emissions by 46 percent compared to gasoline. 1
Recent developments in the biofuels industry, such as the increasing use of carbon capture and
storage and clean power sources at biofuel production facilities, are helping to drive lifecycle
emissions from biofuels even lower.2 And innovative "climate smart" agricultural practices
continue to increase yields while minimizing inputs and lower the GHG emissions from biofuels
feedstock production as well. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 5]
1 Scully, et. al., Carbon intensity of corn ethanol in the United States: state of the science 16 Environ. Res.
Lett. 043001 (2021).
2 Growth Energy, Putting Carbon to Work: Biorefineries' Critical Contributions to Net-Zero,
https://growthenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/GROW-22019-Issue-Brief-Carbon-Capture-2022-
06-22- R8.pdf.
Biofuels also provide significant flexibility in achieving GHG emissions goals because they
can be used in existing ICE vehicles and fueled at existing gas stations. Consumers and operators
of fleets around the country have the ability to use more biofuels. To the extent that some
upgrades are necessary to facilitate storage and fueling with higher blends, the marginal cost of
doing so is minimal. The carbon-reduction benefits of biofuels are therefore achievable in the
near-term even without the massive expansion in electricity generation (and low-carbon
electricity generation in particular) that will be required to power EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0580, p. 5]
Indeed, a recent National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") assessment explained that an
approach like EPA's fails to "fully capture" emissions from "the total light-duty vehicle
system."8 NAS noted that one issue of that type of non-system-based analysis is that it would
lead to inaccurate comparisons between vehicles using different fuels.9 And NAS further opined
that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 6-7]
8 National Academy of Sciences (NAS), Assessment of Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle
Fuel Economy—2025-2035 at 13-416 (2021).
9 Id.
[I]f deep GHG emissions reduction is a goal, then there will need to be consideration of not
only onboard vehicle emissions, but also the emissions from related sectors, like electricity (for
vehicle charging), and manufacturing (of vehicles and their materials and components). This
motivates the need for life cycle thinking. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 6-7]
10 Id.
Moreover, EPA has not acknowledged the inaccuracy of failing to account for the carbon
absorbed by biofuel feedstocks when they are grown. Because all of the carbon emitted from a
tailpipe is sequestered by crops while they grow, EPA's emissions values assigned to ICE
vehicles using biofuels misses dramatically in the other direction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0580, pp. 7-8]
The fundamental scientific reality that emissions from combusting biofuels is offset by crops'
absorption of carbon is reflected in other EPA programs like the Renewable Fuel Standard
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program. There, emissions from combustion of biofuels in a vehicle are excluded in lifecycle
analyses because "[o]ver the full lifecycle of the fuel, the C02 emitted from biomass-based fuels
combustion does not increase atmospheric C02 concentrations, assuming the biogenic carbon
emitted is offset by the uptake of C02 resulting from the growth of new biomass." 74 Fed. Reg.
24,904, 25040 (May 26, 2009). Similarly, the IPCC excludes emissions from combustion of fuels
from biogenic sources when assessing national or sectoral carbon emissions. See 2006 IPCC
Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Vol. 2 at 2.3.3.4. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0580, pp.7-8]
EPA's failure to recognize biofuels' upstream carbon benefits leads to absurd results in the
context of the Proposed Rule. For example, a 2019 MIT study found that, when accounting for
emissions from all aspects of a vehicle's manufacturing, fueling, and use, EVs emitted about 200
grams/mile over their lifetimes, compared to about 350 grams per mile for gasoline powered
cars, for an emissions reduction of about 43 percent. 11 That emissions reduction is very similar
to the 46 percent reduction of 100 percent ethanol compared to petroleum. 12 Yet, the Proposed
Rule would treat an EV as emitting zero GHGs while treating an ICE vehicle running on 100
percent ethanol as having the same lifecycle GHG emissions as petroleum. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0580, pp. 7-8]
11 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Insights into Future Mobility (2019), available at
https://energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/ll/Insights-into-Future-Mobility.pdf.
12 Scully, et. al., Carbon intensity of corn ethanol in the United States: state of the science 16
Environ. Res. Lett. 043001 (2021). Regional differences in electricity generation and the fuel
efficiency of certain ICE vehicles can make the Proposed Rule's comparison even more absurd.
For example, driving a flex-fuel vehicle that can run on E85 would have significantly lower
GHG emissions than using an EV in a state like West Virginia where electricity is generated
largely from combustion of coal. 13 Indeed, driving a highly fuel-efficient ICE vehicle or non-
plug-in-hybrid like a Toyota Prius with higher blends of biofuels would compare favorably in
those circumstances. 14 Yet, the proposal would still treat EVs as emitting no GHGs and biofuels
as achieving no emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 8-10]
13 See Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Insights into Future Mobility (2019), available at
https://energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/ll/Insights-into-Future-Mobility.
14 Id.
IV. EPA Must Consider the Benefits of Biofuels and Higher Biofuel Blends Throughout the
Rule.
In addition to treating biofuels unfairly and inaccurately when assessing GHG emissions
compared to EVs, EPA systematically ignores the benefits of biofuels throughout the Proposed
Rule. In the vast majority of the proposal, EPA assumes a binary choice between petroleum fuels
and EVs. And when EPA does include any consideration of ethanol, it fails to explore the
potential of higher blends—it assumes that all gasoline contains and will always contain at most
E10. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 12]
A. Other Pollutants
In discussing the impacts of the rule on emissions of other pollutants, EPA entirely leaves out
consideration of biofuels. As discussed above, ethanol has lower emissions of many pollutants
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than petroleum gasoline. Indeed, recent studies by the University of California Riverside and the
University of Illinois at Chicago found that use of more ethanol and ethanol- blended fuel
significantly reduces harmful pollutants such as particulate matter (PM), carbon monoxide, and
benzene. 19 Just as with GHGs, that failure renders EPA's assessment of emissions of other
pollutants inaccurate. And just as with GHGs, EPA misses an opportunity to reduce emissions
through incentivizing biofuel use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 12]
19 Patrick Roth et al., Investigating the Effect of Varying Ethanol and Aromatic Fuel Blends on Secondary
Organic Aerosol (SOA) Forming Potential for a FFV-GDI Vehicle: Comparison of Exhaust Emissions
Between E10 CaRFG and Splash Blended E15, University of California Riverside (2018); Steffen Mueller,
The Impact of Higher Ethanol Blend Levels on Vehicle Emissions in Five Global Cities, University of
Illinois at Chicago Energy Resources Center (November 2018).
That failure is particularly egregious in the context of EPA's efforts reduce aromatics in
petroleum fuels that contribute to PM emissions. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,401. As discussed above,
ethanol has an excellent octane rating, and blending it into gasoline in greater quantities can
therefore allow reductions in aromatics and associated PM emissions. EPA explicitly sought
comment on ways to reduce aromatic content, but it completely ignored that increasing the
ethanol content of gasoline is a simple way to do so that has significant benefits. Multiple studies
continue to show that increasing ethanol content in gasoline reduces PM emissions.20 Indeed,
the benefits of ethanol in reducing PM were recently confirmed in EPA's own work with
Environment and Climate Change Canada.21 In that study, fuel with increased ethanol content
showed the deepest reduction in PM compared to the baseline fuel with heavy aromatics. Growth
Energy therefore urges EPA to explore the widespread use of higher ethanol blends to replace
heavy aromatics to significantly reduce PM emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 12]
20 Growth Energy has provided such studies in previous submissions to EPA, including our comment in
support of EPA's proposal to implement the "Request from States for Removal of Gasoline Volatility
Waiver."
21 EPA, Exhaust Emission Impacts of Replacing Heavy Aromatic Hydrocarbons in Gasoline with
Alternate Octane Sources (Apr 2023), Dkt ID: EPA-420-R-23-008.
B. Other Considerations
EPA also continues to ignore biofuels in other parts of its proposal and preamble. To give just
a few examples, EPA ignores biofuels entirely or fails to examine the impacts of different blends
in the following ways [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 13]:
- EPA considers impacts of the proposed rule on employment in the petroleum industry, but
not in the biofuels industry. Id. at 29,393.
- EPA considers the energy security risks of petroleum fuels, but not the energy security
benefits of biofuels. Id. at 29,388.
- EPA uses a Tier 3 test fuel that is 10 percent ethanol and makes no effort to quantify how
GHG emissions reductions would be altered by different levels of use of E15, E85, or other
biofuel blends. Id. at 29,240. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 13]
EPA is therefore failing entirely to look at an important consideration in numerous places
throughout the proposal. That failure is inexcusable given that El5 use is currently increasing in
use around the country, and EPA itself has undertaken to allow for year-round sale of El 5. In the
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final rule, EPA should consider all of the benefits of biofuels—and consider the impacts of
incentivizing adoption of higher blends—in each of its analyses of costs, benefits, and impacts.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 13]
In particular, EPA should ensure that its test fuel is not limited permanently only to E10. It
should instead project increasing biofuel use going forward, and it could potentially test with
multiple different blends based on different projected scenarios of biofuel adoption across the
country. Doing so will ensure that the test fuel reflects the growing range of options for ethanol
use across the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 13]
B. Options Outside of Section 202
EPA should also consider taking actions outside of Section 202 to further incentivize biofuels.
To begin with, EPA should set robust renewable volume obligations under the RFS program for
total and advanced biofuels. The RFS is one of America's most successful clean energy policies,
and it has abundant potential to further reduce emissions. Yet, just a few weeks ago, EPA set the
total and advanced volumes for 2023, 2024, and 2025 significantly below what the industry can
achieve, despite Congress's desire that the RFS be a technology-forcing and demand-driving
program. EPA must do more to help incentivize production of biofuels through the RFS, which
means that it must set volumes going forward that expand market opportunities for higher blends
like El 5 instead of leaving readily available carbon reductions on the table. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0580, pp.16-17]
Another such action would be to require a higher octane standard and approve a high- octane,
midlevel ethanol blend. Growth Energy has been a leader on the need for higher octane, mid-
level ethanol blends, first submitting a proposal for a 100 RON, E30 fuel nearly a decade ago. A
higher octane requirement that incentivizes greater use of mid-level ethanol blends would reduce
emissions by ensuring that a greater portion of the gasoline supply consists of ethanol. But that is
not the only benefit—moving towards using a higher octane, mid-level blend would also enable
automakers to optimize engines to improve efficiency by making engines smaller and increasing
the use of turbocharging.22 So, a higher octane standard would be a win-win that would reduce
emissions of GHGs and other pollutants both by incentivizing more ethanol use and by
facilitating more efficient engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 16-17]
22 See, e.g., Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Summary of High-Octane, Mid-Level Ethanol Blends Study
(July 2016), available at https://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/Files/Pub61169.pdf.
VI. EPA Should Establish or Expand Credits for Biofuels and Should Consider Other
Measures to Encourage Greater Biofuel Use.
A. Credits and Other Measures Under Section 202
Simply addressing EPA's errors regarding the lifecycle emissions of biofuels and EVs will
not sufficiently drive biofuel use in a manner consistent with Section 202 and the RFS. EPA
should also establish credits that specifically reward auto manufacturers for taking measures to
incentivize increased biofuel use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 15-16]
EPA clearly has authority to issue such credits under Section 202. It has for years issued
credits for various measures that reduce emissions that are not reflected in tailpipe emissions,
including credits for efficient air conditioning and off-cycle credits. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,246.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 15-16]
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The simplest type of credits to incentivize biofuels are those that allow greater biofuel use in
vehicles, such as flex-fuel vehicles ("FFVs") that can use E85 and higher blends of ethanol.
EPA, along with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), has already
established credits both under CAFE and Section 202 that provide an incentive for E85 use. 77
Fed. Reg. at 62,829. Those credits were initially awarded to FFVs regardless of the fuel they
actually used, but were later adjusted to account for the amount of fuel actually used. In its 2012
rulemaking for MY 2017 and later years, EPA explained that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580,
pp.15-16]
In the final rulemaking for MYs 2012-2016, EPA promulgated regulations for MYs 2012-
2015 ethanol FFVs that provide significant GHG emissions incentives equivalent to the long-
standing "CAFE credits" for ethanol FFVs under EPCA, since many manufacturers had relied on
the availability of these credits in developing their compliance strategies. Beginning in MY
2016, EPA ended the GHG emissions compliance incentives and adopted a methodology based
on demonstrated vehicle emissions performance. This methodology established a default value
where ethanol FFVs are assumed to be operated 100 percent of the time on gasoline, but allows
manufacturers to use a relative E85 and gasoline vehicle emissions performance weighting based
either on national average E85 and gasoline sales data, or manufacturer-specific data showing the
percentage of miles that are driven on E85 vis-[a]-vis gasoline for that manufacturer's ethanol
FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 15-16]
EPA should, at a minimum, extend and expand upon existing credits for FFVs. Existing
credits are limited in several ways—they do not provide an incentive for other technologies that
facilitate biofuel use in vehicles, they do not incentivize investments in blending infrastructure or
other non-vehicle equipment for biofuel use, and they do not incentivize greater use of biofuels
in standard, non-FFV engines. EPA therefore should also develop additional credits that can
further reduce GHG emissions by incentivizing greater biofuel use. To begin with, EPA could
expand credits to include technologies that facilitate different biofuel blends, like E30, and
investments that help facilitate fueling of vehicles with higher blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0580, pp.15-16]
An even better system of credits would be to provide credits based on overall biofuel use in
the manufacturer's fleet, regardless of whether the manufacturer manufactures FFVs or any
specific technology. That type of credit would give manufacturers incentives to increase biofuel
use in their fleet in any way possible—everything from making more FFVs, to making it easier
for non-FFVs to run on higher blends, to facilitating investments in fueling with higher blends.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 15-16]
Given the discussion of various credit programs in the proposal and past FFV incentive
programs, EPA can finalize a credit program based on biofuel use in this rule. But to the extent
that EPA believes it would require an additional rulemaking proposal, EPA should propose and
finalize such an incentive program as quickly as possible—it need not wait until the end of its
currently proposed standards to develop an important additional mechanism for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions while continuing to maintain options for multiple types of vehicles in
our transportation system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 15-16]
VII. Conclusion
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The proposed rule misses a significant opportunity to reduce GHG emissions through
biofuels. EPA should adjust its proposal by: (1) accounting for the upstream emissions of EVs
and the upstream carbon sinks of biofuels; (2) considering the potential for higher blends of
biofuels in EPA's test fuel and throughout the rule; and (3) developing credit programs and other
measures that incentivize greater biofuel use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 17]
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
EPA's regulations also have a chilling effect on additional investments by companies, such as
HF Sinclair, in carbon reducing technologies like carbon capture and sequestration projects,
green hydrogen, renewable fuels and other low-carbon liquid fuel technologies that can reduce
emissions from ICE vehicles. In addition, HF Sinclair has voluntarily announced a target to
reduce its net greenhouse gas emissions intensity by 25% by 2030 compared to a 2020
baseline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 2]
Organization: Illinois Corn Growers Association
A new technology path is need that would, in the best-case scenario, lower greenhouse gas
emissions from the transportation sector to a greater extent than the proposed standards and, in
the worst-case scenario, make up for any shortfalls if electrification does not go as planned.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 1]
A new technological pathway would need to dramatically reduce C02 emissions, displace
fossil fuels and be readily implemented on liquid fueled new vehicle. This would involve
changes to vehicle fuels in harmony with changes in vehicle design. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0756, p. 1]
For a decade, the National Laboratories and Department of Transportation have been
evaluating fuel blends that would replace a significant amount of fossil fuel with low-carbon
renewable fuel and have properties that would allow automakers to produce more efficient
internal combustion engines. After evaluating over 400 possible compounds, one compound
emerged that is highly effective and had the fewest barriers to implementation: ethanol. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 1]
It is imperative that any consideration of potential fuels controls include the implementation
of regulations and standards that, within the agency's authority, would help bring about a
cleaner, more renewable and less expensive high-octane fuel for use in the advanced, high
efficiency internal combustion engines of the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 1]
Over the last decade, there has been much discussion within the automotive and ethanol
industries about a new pathway that automakers could use to lower C02 tailpipe emissions -
High Octane Low Carbon (HOLC) fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 5-6]
A brief summary of key events in the development of HOLC fuels is shown in Table 3.
[See original attachment for figure "Table 3. Development Timeline for High Octane Low
Carbon Fuel] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 5-6]
These include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 5-6]
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High octane fuels symposiums. Two Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) high octane
fuels symposiums were held in Washington, DC in February 2013 and January 2014 to discuss
the potential of using higher levels of ethanol in gasoline to reduce vehicle emissions. Research
from automakers, Oak Ridge National Laboratory and others presented at these symposiums
showed that an ethanol-gasoline blend fuel made up of 20% - 30% ethanol would have an octane
rating of 95 to 98 Research Octane Number (RON), which is significantly higher than today's 91
RON regular grade fuel. The higher-octane rating in the fuel would allow automakers to design
more efficient engines which would minimize or eliminate the mileage penalty associated with
ethanol blend fuels. Since the resulting fuel would have less carbon than gasoline alone, vehicles
would emit lower C02 emissions. Also, adding ethanol (a single compound with known
properties) to gasoline (a mixture of hundreds of compounds) dilutes the concentration of non-
ethanol compounds in the final blend. The impact of HOLC fuels on octane rating and aromatic
concentrations is shown in Figure 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 5-6]
[See original attachment for "Figure 1. Ethanol Blended with Regular Grade Petroleum Blend
Stock"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 5-6]
A Federal research program called Co- Optima. Begun in 2016, Co-Optima is a U.S.
Department of Energy program that coordinates the work of nine national laboratories to
evaluate various compounds to determine their suitability as a blending agent with gasoline. The
basic goals of creating a new HOLC fuel was expressed in the most recent public report of the
Co-Optima program: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 6-7]
"The urgent need to decarbonize our transportation system—switching from petroleum-based
fuels to cleaner, more sustainable energy sources—has become ever more apparent. While the
nation is moving to rapidly boost production of electric vehicles, the transportation of goods and
people will still rely heavily on gasoline and diesel fuel for decades to come. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0756, pp.6-7]
In just a few short years, breakthroughs from the recently completed U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) Co-Optimization of Fuels & Engines (Co-Optima) initiative could improve cars'
fuel economy by 10% for today's turbocharged engines and as much as 14% more for advanced
engines using multiple combustion modes, compared to a 2015 baseline. At the same time, new
bio-based fuel components could produce at least 60% fewer greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
than those generated by petroleum-based fuels for all on-road vehicles."4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0756, pp. 6-7]
4 "The Road Ahead Toward a Net-Zero-Carbon Transportation Future, Findings and Impact FY15-FY21,"
DOE/EE-2539 June, 2022
After evaluating over 400 possible blending options, the program narrowed it down to six
compounds that "were determined to have the fewest barriers to adoption and use."5 The
evaluation process distilled the results for each of the candidate compounds into a merit function
score, which reflected how well the compound: 1) increased the research octane number and
octane sensitivity, 2) lowered the heat of vaporization, and 3) could be expected to reduce
particulate mater emissions. Of the six compounds out of 400 deemed to have the fewest barriers
to implementation, ethanol had the best merit function score. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756,
pp. 6-7]
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5 Gaspar, Daniel. 2019. Top Ten Blendstocks For Turbocharged Gasoline Engines: Bioblendstocks With
Potential to Deliver the for Highest Engine Efficiency. PNNL-28713, Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory.
From the original work done by Oak Ridge National Laboratory as presented at the SAE
symposiums to the extensive evaluation done by Co-Optima, the result has been the same: the
best way to reduce fossil fuel use and carbon emissions while lowering aromatics and increasing
octane in liquid fuels is to increase the amount of ethanol blended into that fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0756, p. 7]
A bipartisan bill in Congress outlining the steps necessary to bring HOLC fuel to the market.
Based on the findings presented at SAE and the corroborating work done in Co-Optima, the
"Next Generation Fuels Act" has been introduced into the 116th, 117th and 118th Congresses.
This bill would require the phase-in of a new fuel with higher octane and lower aromatics and
carbon intensity beginning in 2028. Vehicle manufacturers would then need to produce vehicles
optimized to run on high octane fuel and warrant these vehicles for higher concentrations of
ethanol in the fuel. It also requires new certification test fuels for 95 and 98 RON fuels with
higher levels of ethanol. Finally, it removes legal barriers to the introduction of these fuels into
the market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 7]
The Greenhouse Gas Benefits of Using HOLC Fuel. What is referred to as "gasoline" is a
blend of a fossil fuel (gasoline blend stock) and a renewable fuel (ethanol). Nearly all such
blended fuel consists of 90% gasoline blend stock and 10% ethanol known as E10. As shown in
Figure 4, the total volume of gasoline blend fuels peaked just prior to the Covid pandemic.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 10-11]
Thus, due to the blending of ethanol into gasoline, the fossil fuel component of liquid fuel
peaked in 2006 while total gasoline blend usage peaked in 2018. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0756, pp. 10-11]
The first substantial reduction in the use of fossil fuels in the transportation sector occurred
over a relatively short period of time. While the overall use of motor fuel began to stabilize
starting in 2005, the replacement of gasoline blend stock by ethanol reduced fossil fuel use
enough to turn the trend downward. This was due primarily to the enactment of the Renewable
Fuel Standards (RFS) which dictated the annual volume of biofuel that must be blended into
gasoline and diesel fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 10-11]
[See original attachment for "Figure 5. Impact of Proposed GHG Emission Reductions on
U.S. Fuel Consumption" and "Figure 6. Benefits from a Possible HOLC Fuel"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0756, pp. 10-11]
Figure 5 illustrates what these trends would look like if the current rulemaking would achieve
the results shown in Table 1. Note that while overall liquid fuel use goes down, the amount of
ethanol used also declines because the concentration of ethanol in gasoline has remained
unchanged at 10%. Thus, the full potential of the proposed shift to electric vehicles is blunted by
the decreased use of ethanol. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 10-11]
If, on the other hand. EPA were to adopt changes to the regulations to bring about widespread
use of HOLC fuel with triple the ethanol that is in today's fuel, an additional 8% to 16%10 of the
fossil fuel portion of the fuel (the gasoline blend stock) would be displaced by 2055. Figure 6
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illustrates what the trends would look like if the current rulemaking would achieve the results
shown in Table 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 10-11]
10 This assumes a 2% reduction in mpg due to ethanol after energy density, heat of vaporization and
optimization impacts are considered.
To illustrate the difference, consider that the amount of petroleum used for light and medium
duty vehicles in 2055 if the proposed standards are successful would drop to 1962 levels. If,
however, HOLC fuel with 20% to 30% ethanol were to replace E10 by 2055, the amount of
petroleum used would drop to levels not seen since 1952. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp.
10-11]
Organization: Illinois Farm Bureau (IFB)
Therefore, in developing the final rule, we urge USEPA to consider an all-of-the-above,
technology-neutral approach to GHG reductions, to create opportunities for market-based
solutions and innovations without picking "winners and losers." A diversified portfolio of
vehicle and fuel technologies that meets the diverse transportation needs of Americans and
makes meaningful GHG reductions can be achieved while also allowing new zero-emission
vehicle ("ZEV") and battery electric vehicle ("BEV") technologies to advance. In addition,
improved crop yield, innovative biofuel and refined product processing, and manufacturing
efficiency tied with carbon capture each represent promising advancements for liquid fuels to
continue to accelerate emissions reductions. Finally, significant opportunities remain to improve
ICEV efficiency by itself and when tied to electrification technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0532, pp. 2-3]
Current and more near-term solutions exist for medium and light duty vehicles that are on the
road today and will remain in use for decades to come. Accelerating the turnover of existing
fleets to advanced diesel technology and using more renewable and alternative fuels will deliver
substantially more GHG reductions sooner and at significantly lower cost than the current
USEPA proposed rule. These technologies can help to reduce emissions from light and medium
duty vehicles while ZEV infrastructure and vehicles envisioned by the proposal are being
developed, tested, and eventually deployed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0532, pp. 2-3]
Organization: KALA Engineering Consultants
Before full comments begin, a personal note
As a personal note, the principal of KALA Consulting wants to let all of EPA administrators,
scientists, and engineers know that I am ON YOUR SIDE. I happen to disagree with the
approach used in this proposed rulemaking that appears to promote extensive electrification of
the US fleet, which I believe to be unsupportable from a GHG reduction standpoint. I believe
that you may not have reviewed the National Academy of Sciences 2010 report that shows, when
all knowable upstream and downstream GHG emissions are considered, BEV associated GHG
emissions are essentially the same as conventional gasoline-fueled vehicles for a projected 2030
time frame. Once Republican law makers and think tank mavens read my section on that study,
they may use it to bash this attempted rulemaking the likes of which you may never have
experienced. I hate to do this to the EPA because I support most of the emissions reduction
efforts you have made up to now and your agency and the national laboratories were so
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beleaguered and mistreated by the Trump Administration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, p.
2]
However in my best engineering judgement, this rulemaking is misguided. There is a biofuel
substitute that could make significant reductions in both criterial pollutants and GHG emissions
if it were to be made from cellulosic sources and entrained into the national fuel mix in high
percentages. We have done extensive research and engineering adaptation of this biofuel,
butanol, that could surprise many of you. We ask your forbearance as we have included a
discussion of this advanced biofuel in our comments as an alternative to mass electrification.
Therefore, we are extending our hand and our knowledge base to EPA and the Department of
Energy to contact us and discuss what we might learn from each other. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, p. 2]
No Conflict of Interest Disclaimer Statement: The author(s) of this document, principals,
officers, staff and others associated with KALA Consulting hereby declare that none of those
persons or the Corporation itself have any potential employment, contracted services, financial,
or familial interests or connections of any kind to any interest, corporations or other entities
mentioned, referenced, or in any other way could be construed to benefit either financially,
public relations or potential contracting of services or equipment sales from any statements or
mentions by name or other reference in this document. No one associated with KALA
Consulting has ever been employed nor wishes to be employed by any entity mentioned or
refenced herein. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, p. 2]
Changing fuel composition to lessen both GHG and many emission species
Shortly after incorporating in 2009, KALA looked at what could be done quickly and
efficiently to significantly reduce GHG emissions from transportation sources, and soon
discovered a new genetic engineering breakthrough made by researchers at UCLA, headed by
Dr. James C. Liao, with extended enhancements to candidate fermentation organisms by UC
Berkely researchers. The breakthrough was a novel method of engineering the metabolic
pathways in certain microbes to produce iso-butanol from the same feedstock materials as
ethanol is now made and any sugars obtained from saccharification of cellulosic biomass. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 30-31]
When we looked at the possibilities for GHG reductions by substituting cellulosic feedstocks
for grains like corn, we realized that this breakthrough had enormous possibilities for substituting
carbon-neutral butanol for fossil petroleum liquid fuels By substituting butanol that is superior in
virtually all respects to ethanol and can be blended with gasoline in greater percentages because
it has lower oxygen content than ethanol we could make significant GHG reductions. Butanol
can also be transported in regular hydrocarbon liquid transport pipelines, where ethanol cannot.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 30-31]
However, the main concern for how to drastically reduce GHG emanating from fossil
petroleum use was the short amount of time in which we have to make those changes. The
United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has for a number of years
stated that we have limited time left, especially considering the potential for runaway warming
from release of methane stored in frozen states in the arctic regions of the planet.
https://www.scientistswarning.org/2022/09/01/methane-emergency/ [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 30-31]
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KALA performed a systems analysis of the pathways to drastically (greater than 80%) reduce
GHG emissions from the Transportation Sector. The first system element steps we considered
were from what has become the standard answer for many so-called Climate Change experts and
that is Electrification of the fleet. This so-called "solution" appears not to take into consideration
the amount of time it will take to convert the existing and near-term fleet of vehicles using
petroleum derived liquid fuels and change out the existing infrastructure of gasoline distribution
and dispensing in favor of electric recharging facilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
30-31]
The second systems analysis we looked at was for introducing and eventual full to nearly full
displacement of petroleum-based fuels with carbon-neutral cellulosic butanol.
We offer a comparison of the system steps for electrification and then displacement of
petroleum fuels with cellulosic butanol or analog hydrocarbon fuels derived from butanol. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 30-31]
System: Electrification Scenario Elements:
Step 1. Initiate a system driver or drivers that requires replacement of liquid fueled vehicles in
favor of electrified vehicles (usually BEV technology). The "forcing" (driver) factor that the
EPA is attempting to promulgate in the EPA-HQ-OAR- 2022-0829 Docket appears to be how
EPA intends to initiate this step. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 30-31]
Step 2. Replace the multi-trillion dollar petroleum fuels (mostly gasoline) distribution and
dispensing infrastructure with electric recharging (i.e., electric "fuel" dispensing) infrastructure,
in effect discarding the existing liquid fuel infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
30-31]
Step 3. Since the United States is not a command economy, attempt to convince vehicle
consumers that they should accept electrified vehicles as the new form of personal and work
transportation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 30-31]
Step 4. Fortify the electric grid and encourage Utility Companies to create additional electric
generating facilities to handle the increased demand for electricity for recharge and improve
electric transmission capabilities to handle increased power demands. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 30-31]
Ostensibly, the ideal additional generating capacity should be from renewable sources, but the
choice of how to produce electricity is still left up to private Utility Companies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 30-31]
Each of these system steps has a time element associated with it. Various estimates for the
amount of time it will take for Electrification Step 2 have varied between 25 and 75 years, but
those estimates did not take into account the "forcing" factor of an EPA set of regulatory
mandates. Even so, EPA admits that the amount of time it will take for the existing fleet will be
lengthy with estimates that use the year 2055, 28 years after the first model year, 2027, affected
by the EPA-HQ-OAR- 2022-0829 rulemaking occurs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
30-31]
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The next major transportation GHG reduction system analysis target KALA looked at was the
breakthrough in genetic engineering that allows fermentation of sugars into the advanced biofuel
Butanol. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 34-36]
System: Large-Scale displacement of Fossil liquid Fuels with Butanol:
Step 1. Initiate a system driver or drivers that requires replacement of fossil carbon containing
petroleum liquid fuels with the Carbon-Neutral advanced biofuel, cellulosic Butanol. This, at a
minimum, would require the Federal Government, probably through the Renewable Fuels
Standard (RFS) authority, to declare the government's intention to move from ethanol as the
majority renewable fuel to butanol and its intention to move butanol production to entirely
cellulosic by a date certain. This requirement should not become an "unfunded mandate" and,
therefore, should be backed by commitment of Federal funding for existing ethanol producers to
replace the fermentation and distillation equipment in their production trains to new equipment
that will produce butanol from sugars being supplied by their current methods (usually corn
mash). As requirements for cellulosic feedstock sourcing are put in place, additional funding will
be required to assist butanol producers to add cellulosic processing equipment. Think of these
funds as one-time subsidies as per-gallon subsidies are phased out. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 34-36]
Step 2. Leverage the multi-trillion dollar petroleum fuels (mostly gasoline) distribution and
dispensing infrastructure to begin displacing fossil carbon containing fuels with the advanced
biofuel, butanol, that at first will be made from the same grains (mostly corn) as ethanol was
made from in the same production plants and later moving to cellulosic sources of fermentable
sugars that will reduce the GHG impact of burning cellulosic butanol fuels dramatically. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 34-36]
Step 3. Implement a consumer education campaign about the new fuel they are putting in their
gas tanks that is more than an oxygenate because it also naturally reduces the tendency of our
fuels to jump into the air as volatile organic compounds (VOC) that are one of the ingredients of
Ozone formation. An emphasis should be put on the fact that a much larger percentage of the
fuel they are using is made right here in America by American workers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 34-36]
Step 4. Promote moves in Congress to legislate around cellulosic butanol as a major solution
to GHG emissions both from our Transportation Sector and the US as a whole. Explain to
members of Congress that voting for measures that will promote the production and use of
butanol at high blend percentages will bring new good-paying jobs to their districts as butanol
production expands all across the country. These changes will require changes to new vehicles
that are similar to existing Flex Fueled Vehicles [FFV] but do not need the extra "hardening" of
gas tanks, fuel pumps and lines that the high percentage of E85 require - in all, about $20 to $40
worth of changes to allow those new vehicles to operate with up to 85% butanol (Bu85) and 15%
gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 34-36]
When we looked at the comparative system steps between the two alternatives and we learned
from the Hidden Costs of Energy report that the upstream GHG emissions attributable to BEVs
might well be about the same or, as we have described above and MPTODR considerations, even
higher than downstream GHG emissions from gasoline vehicles, it became a slam dunk that
cellulosic butanol was the correct solution to current and near-term transportation GHG
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emissions. The speed at which the US could implement a fuel change over as described in Large-
Scale Displacement with Butanol Step 2 above, where the existing refueling infrastructure is
leveraged to entrain larger and larger percentages of carbon-neutral butanol into the US fuel mix
could be astonishingly fast. As we have discussed, it is likely that Climate Change related
calamities may well overwhelm any life-saving results of the new proposed EPA-HQ- OAR-
2022-0829 Docket rulemaking. Which in our view, makes drastic GHG reductions from both
Electrical Generation and Transportation a priority - a priority which should inform the EPA to
make proper and realistic decisions about what solutions should be applied. We believe that Fuel
Changeover with cellulosic butanol is the correct solution for drastically reducing Transportation
GHG emissions. Let us explain why below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 34-36]
Introduction to fuel butanol
We are adding an introduction to butanol as a fuel (not an oxygenate even though it serves
that purpose as well) to the readers of these comments, because very many of them may not
know what butanol is and may have never heard of it. That, by the way, is exactly how the Oil
Companies would like to keep it because they know full well that butanol is a serious threat to
their continued profits from petroleum sales where ethanol could never be. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp.36-44]
Butanol Facts Generated by KALA Consulting, LLC Lakewood, CO [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
What is Butanol? : Butanol is a 4-carbon "higher" alcohol that can be used as a motor fuel.
What is the difference between ethanol which we use in our gasoline now and butanol?
1. Ethanol is a 2-carbon alcohol made from fermenting starches and sugars with yeasts
2. Butanol has 4 carbons in each molecule and is made from the same material with
bacteria
3. Butanol has 26% more energy in a gallon than ethanol, and nearly the same as E10
gasoline (16.4% lower energy content)
4. Unlike ethanol, butanol does not corrode vehicle fuel systems in blends higher than
10%
5. Unlike ethanol, butanol can be moved and stored using our existing petroleum
infrastructure [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
Can Butanol be used as a motor fuel; can it replace gasoline in our existing cars?
1. Butanol is a direct substitute for E-10 gasoline in your existing vehicle up to about
48%
2. Butanol can be expected to yield slightly lower to better gas mileage and safer
emissions
3. N-butanol has a Cetane rating of 25 and can be blended up to 30% with diesel fuel
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4. Iso-Butanol has an R+M/2 octane rating of 97 and will not lower octane in gasoline
blends [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
Any drawbacks to using Butanol?
Butanol has a higher viscosity than gasoline - about the same as diesel fuel and it will gel at
very low temperatures (-25°F). It may need an anti-gelling agent for extremely low temperatures
but some gasoline like that in E85 will serve as anti-gel in cold weather. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
Why haven't I heard more about butanol as a replacement for gasoline before now?
Butanol has been known as a replacement fuel since World War 2. In fact, British and
Japanese fighter planes ran on butanol during that war! If an oil company viewed your
knowledge of butanol as a threat to their business and profits, would they try to keep you from
hearing about it, having the Federal Government test it or acknowledge it as an alternative fuel?
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
The Federal Government has known what the problem is with our dependence on oil for some
time and a succinct statement of the problem was issued by Oak Ridge National Laboratory in a
May 2006 report where authors David Greene and Paul Leiby stated: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
Section 4. Oil Security and Energy Technology R&D: The root of the United States' oil
security problem is economic and strategic dependence on an energy commodity, (1) whose
resources are concentrated in an unstable region, (2) whose supply is vulnerable to disruption by
various causes and subject to substantial collusive control by a cartel of oil producing nations,
and (3) for which demand and supply are highly inelastic, especially in the short-run. Petroleum
is the single largest source of energy for the U.S. economy and its use is highly concentrated in
the transportation sector, a sector vital to all economic activity and one that to this day has found
no ready substitute for petroleum fuels. The combination of these factors has created a situation
in which supply disruptions, whether intentional or unintentional, can produce very large and
sudden price increases that do significant damage to the U.S. economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
This report states that as of 2006: "Petroleum is the largest single source of energy for the
U.S... and one that to this day has found no ready substitute..." If the consequences of being
strategically dependent on one source of energy, especially for transportation, can result in sharp
rises in the price of that commodity which can result in damage to the economy of the United
States, why is there "no ready substitute?" If that source of energy is so vitally important to our
country and its national security and its availability is questionable and using it results in global
climate change, why has the Federal Government not found and promoted introduction of a
"ready substitute?" Are there ready substitutes out there waiting to take the place of oil - biofuels
perhaps? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
With the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, we once again learned the fragility of supply and
the enormous economic damage spikes in the price of our fuels can do to the American
economy. Just as our economy suffered in 1973 when the OPEC oil cartel embargoed oil imports
to the US and once again when crude oil reached an unprecedented high price of $147.50 per
barrel in August 2008, our dependency on this atmosphere-damaging commodity has
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consequences not only to our national security but to our economic security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp.36-44]
Our central question is when are we going to realize there is a "ready substitute," butanol,
already being made for chemical feedstocks and fuel that will stabilize the cost of fuels at a
reasonable price and, in so doing, stabilize the American economy? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 36-44]
We Americans may think we are exceptional, but we are not free of the stranglehold our
dependence on fossil petroleum has on us. We need to ask how we can eliminate the use of fossil
fuels in an environmentally responsible way. How much is it worth to America to prevent the
economic chaos brought on by world events and a capricious commodity market over which we
have no control. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
Could Butanol Actually be a Substitute for Petroleum Fuels
We know how to convert many different types of biomass into different types of fuel and
some sources can lead to a variety of end products. Most scientists in the field consider using
crop items that could be used as either human or animal food as not the best ultimate feedstock
sources for biofuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
Most biofuels scientists would prefer the use of what are called ligno-cellulosic sources to
produce liquid biofuels that are similar to gasoline.
[See original attachment for possible biofuel production pathways] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
There are two principal methods for converting ligno-cellulosic materials into liquid biofuels:
1) Fermentation and 2) Pyrolytic Deconstruction
Each of these methods have their advantages and their drawbacks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
The reason these raw materials are called ligno-cellulosic is because most plant body parts are
constructed of three major constituents:
1) Cellulose 2) Hemicellulose and 3) Lignin
We will not discuss Pyrolysis here because fermentation with bio-engineered microbes seems
to be the best way to arrive at purified butanol.
[See original attachment for the chemical pathway to make Butanol] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
Major advances in genetic manipulation of microorganisms commonly used as fermentation
agents have been made in the last few years, principally in the private sector as patentable
proprietary organisms. Native bacteria or yeasts that might ordinarily make several by-products,
only one or two of which could be used as fuels have been genetically transformed by knocking
out the undesired production pathways and enhancing or leaving only the pathway for producing
the desired fuel metabolic products. Groups like that at UCLA under Dr. James Liao have been
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using the techniques of "synthetic biology" to add highly productive fuel producing pathways to
bacteria, yeasts, and cyano- bacteria. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
[See original attachment for composition of typical woody lignocellulosic compared to corn
grain and stover] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
To use cellulose for fermentation, it must be broken down into the sugars that made up the
original polymers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
Were it not for the remarkable advancements in bioengineering and gene manipulation the
fermentation organisms that can now use sugars from starches and cellulose processed into
fermentable sugars we would not have a way produce a single desirable product, butanol. The
companies that are using these bioengineering methods to produce butanol have developed a
number of methods to separate butanol from the fermentation broth and remove the last traces of
water to produce purified butanol. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
The next question for viability as a fuel must answer is, "Can we make enough of it to make a
difference? If we are going to make this fuel from cellulosic material, is there enough that we can
harvest all over the country? Fortunately, that question has been answered by a study done by the
Federal Government. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
We know from a study done by the Oak Ridge National laboratory and the US Department of
Agriculture that with minor changes in land use, the nation could harvest up to 1.3 billion tons of
varieties of biomass. This study published in 2005 is commonly called the "Billion Ton Study
(BTS)." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
The BTS divided the sources of ligno- cellulosic feedstocks into two broad categories:
Agricultural residues and forest- derived woody biomass. The changes in land use that the report
assumed to arrive at the maximum figure of 1.3 billion tons per year involved land owners
devoting some of their land to the production of dedicated energy crops (EC), growing such
plants as switchgrass and fast-growing hybrid poplar trees. Other land use assumptions were that
land now used for purposes other than food crop production or that is now considered marginal
land would be put into EC production. A 2011 update of the BTS found that the earlier estimate
of 1.3 billion dry tons of biomass could actually be 1.6 billion tons with similar land use changes.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
The next question to be asked is, if we seem to have enough biomass available, how much
butanol can we get from each dry US ton. That does not mean that the cellulosic biomass that
would be brought into butanol processing facilities would need to be absolutely dry, but for
calculation purposes, normalizing the biomass to complete dryness puts those calculations on an
equal footing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
The chart at right shows the theoretical maximum yield of ethanol from common cellulosic
biomass types such as corn stover (the residue from the corn plant that does not include the corn
kernels) and waste paper. Several strategies can be used to recover carbon that might otherwise
be wasted from the fermentation process and the lignin leftovers that still have carbon in them.
The theoretical maximum yields shown do not include any conversion of lignins, which up to
now have been considered not to be able to be convertible into fuel products. If lignins can be
converted, these maximums would be higher. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
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[See original attachment for chart of the theoretical maximum yield of ethanol from common
cellulosic biomass] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
KALA has set a goal of 100 gallons per dry ton of cellulosic biomass for the idealized butanol
production process we have considered. Even if we are only able to get 90 gallons per dry ton, a
total of 90 * 1.6 billion DTons = 144 billion gallons of butanol possible each and every year. If
further fuel economy standards were put in place, lowering our national annual gasoline
consumption to around 120 billion gallons, we would have an extra 24 billion gallons of butanol
to devote to other purposes or to cover volumetric losses from conversion of butanol to analog
hydrocarbon fuels that we call "Green" gasoline and "Green" diesel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
Yes butanol with its 4-carbon molecule (iso- butanol shown at right) can be converted into
hydrocarbon fuels using well known and understood process technologies from oil refining and
post fractional distillation reformation. Iso-butanol is dehydrated to iso- butylene, which is
reformed by oligomerization methods into different hydrocarbon fuels, such as Gasoline, Diesel,
and Aviation Jet fuel. The type of hydrocarbon is dependent on the oligomerization techniques
used. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
https://www.globenewswire.eom/news-release/2020/08/18/2079991/0/en/Gevo-and-Praj-tO"
Commercialize- Sustainable-Aviation-Fuel-in-India.html [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
36-44]
[See original attachment for hydrocarbons from Cellulose Process Schematic] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
So, there is a possibility that current engine control computers could handle higher
percentages of neat butanol blended with either petroleum gasoline or gasoline made from
butanol. This strange "Green" gasoline has interesting properties because it is made from a pure
feedstock instead of being fractionated out of a refining stream that has numerous side chemicals
incorporated into what we know as gasoline. Green gasoline made from butanol would have no
benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene or xylene as well as a host of other substances such as polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH), other aromatics and metals. Many of the air toxics and criteria
pollutants are products of combustion of the other organic chemicals in gasoline other than the 4-
carbon to 12- carbon hydrocarbon molecules making up the bulk of gasoline. Butanol derived
gasoline would have none of those side organics in its makeup. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 36-44]
A 2021 study done by University of Nebraska at Lincoln has done testing on numerous Tier 2
and Tier 3 non-flex fuel vehicles (NFFV) that shows that the engine control computers are able
to adapt to the oxygen content of a 30% ethanol, 70% gasoline fuel blend (E30).
https://ethanol.nebraska.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/E30-Demonstration-FINAL-l.pdf
If this study holds up and NFFV's ECUs are capable of adjusting to the oxygen content in a
30%) ethanol blend, there is an opportunity to run NFFV vehicles with up to 48%> butanol and
52% gasoline blends rather than an E30 ethanol blend. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-
44]
Note: To obtain the oxygen equivalent percentage content from ethanol percentage to
equivalent butanol percentage, divide the ethanol percentage by 0.62. Therefore, an E30 blend
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would translate to a 48% butanol blend based on oxygen content. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 36-44]
The thought of operating an older or non-FFV vehicle that has not been "hardened" to handle
ethanol percentages higher than 10% (E10) is daunting. The reason non-FFV vehicles are not
recommended by the manufacturers to use ethanol percentages greater than 10% in fuel is that
the vehicle's gas tank, the fuel pump, metal fuel lines, elastomeric (rubber) fuel lines and
injection components have not been adjusted in their composition to handle ethanol blends
greater than 10% for any length of time. It seems odd that in the Nebraska research there has not
been a tear-down of any of the aforementioned components to check for excessive corrosion or
decomposition of the interior of elastomeric hoses that handle fuel. The folks in Nebraska so
desperately want to show that more ethanol can be used in ordinary vehicles that they may have
missed some important ethanol attack issues. However, the important part of the Nebraska
research for the use of high percentages of butanol is the reported tolerance of the engine control
computer (ECU) to the oxygen percentage in E30 not causing problems with fuel trim, which
opens the door to much larger butanol percentage blends if the EPA and Department of Energy
will look at the research closely. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
All these suggestions to drastically change fuel blend compositions represent conflicts with
the antiquated Fuel Blend Waiver structure incorporated into the Clean Air Act (CAA).
Requirements in the CAA for private parties requesting waivers for fuel blends demands those
parties perform testing for their particular fuel blend and then present that evidence to the EPA,
upon which the EPA would then rule on the request. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-
44]
However, in the case of the Growth Energy universal waiver request for increases in the
ethanol content of gasoline from 10% (E10) to 15% (El 5), the EPA and Department of Energy
(DOE) insisted that the Federal Government carry out testing of its own rather than asking the
private concern who brought the waiver request to conduct further tests. In fact, the principal
reasons given by the EPA for delaying a decision on the El 5 waiver was to allow more time for
the EPA and DOE to conclude their own testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
In our view, this process destroyed any pretense that a private party could mount a research
effort and present evidence that would make a fundamental change in the US gasoline supply
without the Federal Government conducting its own battery of tests and research in the matter. In
essence, Growth Energy was forced to waste its own private resources in generating test results
when it became apparent that the Federal Government was determined to conduct its own
duplicative research and testing. In our opinion, the Federal Government should drop that
pretense and not force private parties to go to the horrendous expense of conducting private
testing only to have their testing duplicated and, perhaps, expanded upon by Federal agencies or
laboratories. If the El 5 waiver experience is any indication of what the Federal Government
intends to do in response to future similar waiver requests made under provisions of the CAA,
both EPA and DOE should simply require a well-reasoned request for a waiver and conduct the
testing themselves as they did for the E15 waiver. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
In this context, we ask that the EPA and DOE conduct testing for several blend ratios of iso-
butanol blended with ordinary gasoline and with gasoline converted from butanol, if available, to
determine engine performance and emission results in real-world conditions. What in the world
are the National Laboratories for if they cannot be tasked with a simple task such as this. Several
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national laboratories have already done research on butanol blends, so any additional testing
would be adding to that body of research. The potential for drastic GHG reductions by
substituting fossil petroleum- based fuels for both butanol and gasoline made from butanol are
stunning to say the least. Therefore, it is in the national interest to proceed with butanol blend
testing forthwith. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 36-44]
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
The Proposed Rule also runs contrary to Congress's intent by frustrating the purpose of the
Renewable Fuel Standards program. See Brief of Amici Curiae State of West Virginia and 5
Other States, Texas v. EPA, No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 15, 2022), ECF 1973638, at 24-27
("WV Amicus Brief'). Through that program, Congress intended the renewable fuel standards
program to act as "market forcing policy," increasing utilization of renewable fuels. Growth
Energy v. EPA, 5 F.4th 1, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2021). The program has led to a reduction in air
pollution and oil imports, and the creation of American jobs. See Renewable Fuel Standard,
Renewable Fuels Ass'n, https://bit.ly/3TWyRxa. But pushing EVs as aggressively as the
Proposed Rule does is directly at odds with the promoted utilization of renewable fuels. "It is
well established that when two regulatory systems are applicable to a certain subject matter, they
are to be reconciled and, to the extent possible, both given effect." Pennsylvania v. ICC, 561
F.2d 278, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Proposed Rule does nothing to "give effect" to the statutory
authority Congress provides to the Department of Transportation and for the Renewable Fuel
Standards Program. Indeed, the Proposed Rule does not even mention the Program at all. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 5]
Organization: Kia Corporation
Kia Supports Fuel Standard Improvements
Kia urges EPA to take further action to improve fuel standards that will help lower vehicle
fuel consumption and emitted GHG and non-GHG emissions from legacy and new ICE vehicles.
As Kia is significantly increasing resources for developing and transitioning to electrified
powertrains, Kia will have fewer resources available to improve ICE. Kia urges EPA to adopt
cost effective solutions to lower emissions from ICE vehicles such as stringent fuel standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 16]
Kia offers the following on gasoline fuel property standards:
- Kia recommends EPA increase the minimum research octane number (RON) in market
gasoline to 95-98. This increase in RON could improve efficiency by 3-5 percent. An increase in
RON could be achieved in multiple ways, through increasing the ethanol content of market
gasoline or altering the composition of hydrocarbons during the reforming process to higher
octane molecules. For a small segment of legacy vehicles, this increase could improve their
efficiency simply with the fuel change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 16]
- The EPA must mandate that all market fuels meet or exceed the octane of Tier 3 certification
fuel. Sub 87 Anti-Knox Index (AKI) fuel is still sold despite no longer needing to do so.
Mandating market fuels meet this standard could decrease fuel consumption, lower the
likelihood that enrichment will be needed, and lower GHG, CO and HC emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 16]
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- The EPA should leverage a new national Clean Fuel Standard similar to California's Low
Carbon Fuel Standard. A national Clean Fuel Standard requiring lower or net-zero emission
liquid fuels would improve emissions in new and legacy ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0555, p. 16]
- EPA's Tier 3 rules lowered the gasoline maximum average sulfur level from 30 parts per
million (ppm) to 10 ppm stating that "any amount of gasoline sulfur will deteriorate catalyst
efficiency."29 Yet refiners are still allowed 80 ppm with a 95 ppm downstream cap. Kia urges
EPA to require a gasoline retail cap - not average - of 10 ppm. This standard is more aligned
with global standards and aligns with the EPA proposed lower NMOG + NOx standard. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 16]
29 Control of Air Pollution from Motor Vehicles: Tier 3 Motor Vehicle Emission and Fuel Standards,
Proposed Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 29816, 29,821 (May 21, 2013).
Organization: Letter Campaign, Ethanol Producers
EPA's own research has shown that high-octane, low-carbon renewable fuels like ethanol,
when paired with appropriate engine technologies, deliver immediate improvements in fuel
efficiency and carbon performance. Flex fuel vehicles (FFVs) using E85 and other ethanol flex
fuels offer significant emission reduction opportunities. High-compression-ratio engines running
on higher-octane fuels provide substantial fuel efficiency gains and emissions reductions without
relying on foreign mineral imports or causing unintended environmental and economic
consequences. Unfortunately, EPA's proposal does nothing to recognize or encourage growth in
the use of low-carbon liquid fuels in advanced internal combustion engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0739, p. 2]
We urge EPA to reconsider its proposal and adopt a technology-neutral approach that treats
all low-carbon transportation options fairly and equally. We ask that EPA use this rulemaking to
establish a full lifecycle approach for assessing carbon emissions from all fuel and vehicle
options. We also request that EPA use this regulatory opportunity to increase the required
minimum octane rating of our nation's light-duty vehicle fuel, as well as encouraging increased
production of FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0739, p. 2]
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this important issue. As a member of the
Renewable Fuels Association, we also wish to endorse and support their written comments, as
submitted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0739, p. 2]
Organization: Marathon Petroleum Corporation (MPC)
EPA should consider changes to how it treats C02 emissions from renewable liquid fuel
combustion in vehicles to be consistent across programs it oversees. EPA mandates the blending
and use of renewable liquid fuels in vehicles in its Renewable Fuel Standard while
simultaneously ignoring the positive impacts of this use in the vehicle emissions standards.
Consistency across programs would eliminate disparate treatment and reduce regulatory
ambiguity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, p. 2]
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MPC supports the comments that have been entered into the docket by American Fuel &
Petrochemical Manufacturers and American Petroleum Institute. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0593, p.1]
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Missouri Corn Growers Association
(MCGA). (web) (168 signatures)
As a corn grower or allied industry member of the Missouri Corn Growers Association
(MCGA), I write to share my comments on EPA's proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards for model year 2027 and later vehicles. As producers of feedstocks for low-emission
biofuels, farmers across the country share EPA's emission reduction goals. However, this
proposal limits fuel and energy options unnecessarily and fails to take greater advantage of clean,
low-carbon ethanol to contribute to greater emission reductions that consumers can more readily
afford. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to lowering vehicle emissions. Through this rule,
EPA has an opportunity to level the playing field for all low-carbon fuels and technologies and
use ethanol's proven potential to support sustainability in the transportation sector. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0718]
Today's ethanol cuts greenhouse gas emissions in half compared to gasoline and has
pathways to achieve net zero emissions. Clean, high-octane fuel from mid-level ethanol blends,
used as a system with advanced engines, offers an essential pathway for achieving significant
greenhouse gas and complementary criteria emission reductions from model year 2027 and later
vehicles. It also offers substantial public health benefits by reducing particulate matter emissions
from gasoline, all while reducing costs for consumers. In addition to focusing on outcomes and
enabling a wider range of vehicle and fuel choices, I ask EPA to set a clean, high-octane fuel
standard that takes advantage of higher ethanol blends to enable automakers to deploy advanced
engine technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0718]
I strongly urge EPA not to focus on one single solution but to consider all options that
advance transportation toward our shared goal of reducing emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0718]
Respectfully submitted by the following list of 168 Missouri corn farmers and allied industry
members who stand in support of MCGA opposing this proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0718]
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Missouri Corn Growers Association
(MCGA). (web) (168 signatures)
As a corn grower or allied industry member of the Missouri Corn Growers Association
(MCGA), I write to share my comments on EPA's proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards for model year 2027 and later vehicles. As producers of feedstocks for low-emission
biofuels, farmers across the country share EPA's emission reduction goals. However, this
proposal limits fuel and energy options unnecessarily and fails to take greater advantage of clean,
low-carbon ethanol to contribute to greater emission reductions that consumers can more readily
afford. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to lowering vehicle emissions. Through this rule,
EPA has an opportunity to level the playing field for all low-carbon fuels and technologies and
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use ethanol's proven potential to support sustainability in the transportation sector. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0718]
Today's ethanol cuts greenhouse gas emissions in half compared to gasoline and has
pathways to achieve net zero emissions. Clean, high-octane fuel from mid-level ethanol blends,
used as a system with advanced engines, offers an essential pathway for achieving significant
greenhouse gas and complementary criteria emission reductions from model year 2027 and later
vehicles. It also offers substantial public health benefits by reducing particulate matter emissions
from gasoline, all while reducing costs for consumers. In addition to focusing on outcomes and
enabling a wider range of vehicle and fuel choices, I ask EPA to set a clean, high-octane fuel
standard that takes advantage of higher ethanol blends to enable automakers to deploy advanced
engine technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0718]
I strongly urge EPA not to focus on one single solution but to consider all options that
advance transportation toward our shared goal of reducing emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0718]
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Michigan Corn Growers Association
(MCGA). (email) (30 signatures)
I am submitting comments today to express my concern over the EPA's proposed Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for model year 2027 and later vehicles. This proposed rule is
irresponsible and foolish. Instead of working to achieve an environmental goal, the EPA is
effectively mandating the use of electric vehicles, which will have significant impacts on my
farm. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0757]
Primarily, I am concerned with an estimated 1 billion bushels in lost corn demand from 2022-
2032 due to USEPA regulations dictating electric vehicles as the only option. This rule could
decimate corn prices. This rule will hurt family farms all over the country, including my own.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0757]
Secondarily, I understand that the rule will force 67 percent of light duty vehicle sales and
nearly 50 percent of trucks sold to be battery electric vehicles (BEVs) by 2032. The
infrastructure does not yet exist in rural America for my family to efficiently utilize a BEV, nor
am I convinced that a BEV will do the work that I need it to do on my family farm. As a result,
when I purchase an internal combustion engine vehicle for my family, I know I will pay more,
impacting the economic health of our family farm. This is yet another unfair burden for rural
America. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0757]
Finally, the impact of this forced reliance on BEVs will compromise our national security.
This will incentivize batteries and minerals produced and mined in countries hostile to the U.S.
that have questionable labor standards. Knowing that a disproportionate amount of those that
enlist in the U.S. military come from rural areas of our country, I'm very concerned about
rulemaking that would potentially send more rural family members to new wars over batteries.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0757]
Should the U.S. EPA honestly wish to tackle carbon emissions, they should not dictate how
regulated parties must achieve the lowered emissions and they should not dictate the use of a
specific fuel or vehicle. Rather, the EPA should set a standard for emissions that opens the
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marketplace to a broad array of technologies, removes its arcane regulatory barriers, and lets the
market work its magic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0757]
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown (76 signatures)
I am a small business energy marketer who provides a growing portfolio of affordable,
efficient, and greener liquid fuels and alternative energy sources. These liquid fuels have played
a critical role in lowering emissions over the past half century. Through innovation and
technological advancements, they will continue to reduce emissions further and be a crucial
driver of economic growth in this country in the coming decades. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
1709]
I'm also a member of the Energy Marketers of America (EMA) which is a federation of 48
state and regional trade associations representing family-owned and operated small business
energy marketers throughout the United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1709]
As a small business owner, I am concerned that EPA's tailpipe emission standards for light
and medium duty vehicles for model year 2027 and beyond will effectively discourage
investment in lower carbon liquid fuels and more efficient internal combustion engines. This
focus on EV production will essentially eliminate an opportunity to provide liquid fuels that
immediately lower emissions not only for new vehicles, but for the vehicles currently on the
road. In addition, the rule will limit consumer choice on cleaner internal combustion engines and
threaten the viability and jobs of small business energy marketers around the country. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-1709]
I urge the EPA to consider the lifecycle emissions associated with EV production, usage, and
end-of-life disposal including emissions from raw material mining and refining, battery
manufacturing, and electricity generation for EV charging. An assumption of zero emissions
from EVs fails to consider the significant emissions associated with a transition to EV. For
instance, a Hummer EV, with its near-3,000-pound battery weighing more than a full Hyundai
Elantra, would count as having ZERO emissions and less impact on the environment than a
Prius. [EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-1709]
Further, the EPA needs to consider the logistics, investment, and timing associated with EV
and battery production, electric generation and transmission, and EV charging to support a
substantial increase in EV production. Achieving a significant ramp up of domestic supply of
raw materials for batteries, mineral refining, and battery and vehicle manufacturing as well as
upgrades to the electricity generation and transmission will be complex and take time. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-1709]
Again, I urge the EPA to consider lifecycle emissions and a technology neutral approach
when it comes to promoting policies to reduce emissions. The most cost-effective and timely
way to reduce emissions from transportation is to support multiple technologies that do so for
both new vehicles and vehicles currently on the road. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1709]
Thank you for the opportunity to submit comments on this important rulemaking that affects
small business energy marketers nationwide.
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Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown (1,851 signatures)
I am submitting comments today to express my concern over the EPAs proposed Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for model year 2027 and later vehicles. Instead of working to
achieve an environmental goal, the EPA is effectively mandating the use of electric vehicles,
which will have significant impacts on rural America. This rule could severely diminish corn and
soybean prices and put rural Americans whose economies rely on agriculture at a disadvantage.
This rule will hurt family farms all over the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1710]
I understand that the rule will force 67 percent of light duty vehicle sales and nearly 50
percent of trucks sold to be battery electric vehicles (BEVs). By mandating electric vehicles,
EPAs proposal inhibits the marketplace from identifying the most efficient, lowest cost
opportunities to reduce GHG emissions from vehicles and greatly restricts consumer choice. I am
concerned that such a prescriptive policy is not in the best interest of the consumer or the U.S.
economy. Vehicle technologies have made great strides in emission reductions from common
pollutants. By dictating electric vehicles as the only option, on-going investments in vehicle
improvement will be severely hampered. The proposal will also tie the hands of American
automakers flexibility to develop and implement innovative strategies for decarbonizing
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-1710]
Of additional concern is the infrastructure for electric vehicles does not yet exist in rural
America. This is further discrimination against rural communities, family farms and agribusiness
as they do not have the ability to efficiently utilize BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1710]
I am also concerned with the shift from supporting Illinois produced fuels - corn-based
ethanol and soy-based biodiesel to supporting batteries produced overseas (i.e. Australia, Chile
and China). I am not in favor of a move that will incentivize batteries and minerals produced and
mined in countries that are hostile to the U.S. over renewable liquid fuels grown in the Midwest.
[EP A-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1710]
In closing, the EPA should not bet the farm on a defacto electric vehicle mandate with many
deficiencies including removing incentives for innovation, not appropriately analyzed costs, nor
an effective implementation plan. Please think of the renewable supply of corn and soybeans
grown on my farm and farms across Illinois and the Midwest. As a life long dairy farmer who
uses renewable resources your approach using a limited supply material is just not well
researched or sustainable. Please use the renewable approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1710]
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown (2,309 signatures)
As a corn grower in Sd, I write to share my comments on EPAs proposed Multi-Pollutant
Emissions Standards for model year 2027 and later vehicles. As producers of feedstocks for low-
emission biofuels, farmers across the country share EPAs emission reduction goals. However,
this proposal limits fuel and energy options unnecessarily and fails to take greater advantage of
clean, low-carbon ethanol to contribute to greater emission reductions that consumers can more
readily afford. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to lowering vehicle emissions. Through this
rule, EPA has an opportunity to level the playing field for all low-carbon fuels and technologies
and use ethanols proven potential to support sustainability in the transportation sector. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1716]
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Todays ethanol cuts greenhouse gas emissions in half compared to gasoline and has pathways
to achieve net zero emissions. Clean, high-octane fuel from mid-level ethanol blends, used as a
system with advanced engines, offers an essential pathway for achieving significant greenhouse
gas and complementary criteria emission reductions from model year 2027 and later vehicles. It
also offers substantial public health benefits by reducing particulate matter emissions from
gasoline, all while reducing costs for consumers. In addition to focusing on outcomes and
enabling a wider range of vehicle and fuel choices, I ask EPA to set a clean, high-octane fuel
standard that takes advantage of higher ethanol blends to enable automakers to deploy advanced
engine technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1716]
I strongly urge EPA not to focus on one single solution but to consider all options that
advance transportation toward our shared goal of reducing emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-1716]
Organization: Matthew DiPaulo
While the goal of this proposal is to reduce the U.S. automotive fleet's carbon footprint, it
simply shifts how emissions are produced. The EPA is ignoring the value of technologies
produced by American workers, manufacturers, and farmers that are critical to our transportation
future. Specialty automotive aftermarket businesses are leading the way through alternative fuel
innovations from replacing older engine technologies with newer, cleaner versions to converting
older ICE vehicles to new electric, hydrogen, and other alternative fuels. Sadly, the EPA's plans
to reduce greenhouse gases and criteria pollutants do not factor this in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-1514, p. 1]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
In March 2019, the Company assessed the life cycle C02 emissions from internal combustion
engine vehicles and electric vehicles (EVs) in five regions of the world. The results revealed that
the significance of C02 emissions from internal combustion engine vehicles and EVs during
their life cycles depends on the electric power supply status, fuel/electrical power cost, total
mileage, and other factors in each region. Conclusion being EVs do not necessarily have the
advantage when it comes to life cycle of C02 emissions in certain markets globally. For this
reason, as well as others, Mazda has adopted the Building-Block concept to steadily realize its
goal of reducing C02 emissions and raising the average fuel economy of Mazda vehicles. The
Building Block Concept calls for the commercial introduction of electric, plug-in and other
electrified vehicles (EVs) with the combination of optimal control technology and efficient
electrification technologies in consideration of each country or region's energy resources,
regulations, power generation methods, infrastructure, and so on. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0595, p. 1]
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
The success of our industry is interwoven with the success of this proposal and the ability of
the government to work with industry and other stakeholders to meet significant challenges.
Therefore, the rule must address: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
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The need for regulatory certainty. The final rule must contain an effective mix of
feasible, demonstrated technology along with emerging technology, leaving options to improve
emissions reductions in today's advanced propulsion designs. This will foster innovation in a
coordinated direction, aligned with U.S. policy, but not mandate application of a narrowly
defined technology path to make a positive impact on the country's urgent environmental goals.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
The influence of other technologies - including internal combustion engines fueled by
hydrogen and other renewable carbon-neutral fuels - which can impact measurable
environmental improvements at scale technologies can provide immediate improvement to the
environment. This is important not only for environmental improvements but for environmental
justice in providing cleaner consumer vehicles immediately to communities living and working
close to busy streets, highways, and other transportation networks. Inclusion of all technologies
that can decarbonize the transportation sector will foster the necessary growth in manufacturing
capacity, vocational performance, infrastructure improvements, and consumer acceptance. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Technology Neutrality and BEV Emissions. EPA should ensure that battery electric
vehicles (BEV) are included in metrics for vehicle-to-vehicle comparison by assigning a metric
that captures the pollutant emissions related to BEV operation, aligned with national electricity
generation figures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Challenges in our nation's infrastructure and power grid. MEMA appreciates the
significant public investments being made to support clean transportation infrastructure. As these
new investments in highways and main corridors are deployed, federal and state incentives are
needed to further expand the EV charging and refueling infrastructure in areas that connect these
major thoroughfares. Urban industrial centers will need focused buildout while rural areas will
need thoughtful rollouts to achieve an effective EV charging infrastructure. These buildouts must
include Direct Current Fast Charge (DCFC) and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) bidirectional charging.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Supply chain challenges. The proposed rule assumes that all materials advanced
vehicles, which are not available today in the quantities needed to support the massive growth in
vehicle construction, will become available within sufficient time. This places a significant and
unnecessary risk on manufacturers and suppliers. Furthermore, once a company has converted
production to new technology lines, that company cannot easily pivot its facilities and workforce
back to the previous technology if EPA projections are not realized by the mid-to-late-2020s.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Workforce challenges. A significant increase in skilled workers will be needed to
support the implementation of this rule and long-term success thereof [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Extended warranty. The necessity to clearly define the applicability of the extended
warranty and the need to provide repair access to service these new vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
MEMA members are working to accelerate the performance and availability of clean-
operating vehicle technologies and are directly contributing to their realization. Besides battery
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electric options, effective low- and zero-carbon technologies for future and current in-use
vehicles also exist and can readily be put to use to reduce nationwide emissions and help EPA
meet its climate goals. The success of this rule depends on greater inclusion of all available
emissions reduction technologies, significant investment in infrastructure, careful understanding
and investment in the domestic and global supply chain and ensured repair access to serve the
improved and enhanced domestic vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
It is imperative that EPA aligns with the Joint Office of Energy and Transportation through
the implementation period of this rule to identify shared concerns and solutions for the many
moving parts of the rule. Failure in one key sector, lithium sourcing as one example, could result
in significant cost or schedule impacts, stunting availability or adoption of these new vehicles.
Positive regulatory certainty bolsters consumer confidence in new technologies and decreases the
use of gasoline- and diesel-fueled vehicles. EPA should adopt an "all hands on deck" approach
with regards to emissions-lowering technologies and encourage greater acceptance of and
investment in renewable fuels, which can positively impact the net emissions of the entire U.S.
internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 4]
Technology Neutrality Pairs with Regulatory Certainty
The proposed rule disproportionally favors battery electric propulsion, which in turn
discourages any further advancements for internal combustion technology, including carbon-
neutral renewable fuels. Emerging innovations and recent technologies offer significant
reduction in emissions from ICE vehicles, in both future and current fleets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0644, pp. 5-6]
Technology-forcing regulations that foster innovation aligned with policy, rather than
regulations that mandate a narrowly defined technology path, will lead to a more positive
national outcome. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 5-6]
MEMA recognizes that the proposal attempts a performance-based standard, and the agency
makes forecasts that estimate a variety of technology combinations in future fleets. By accepting
the potential for technologies other than battery electric and hydrogen fuel cell, EPA can make a
more immediate, widespread, positive impact on nationwide emissions reductions. Therefore,
EPA must incent the development and deployment of advanced technology options to include
advanced internal combustion (ICE) technologies, renewable fuels, and post-combustion C02
capture (known as mobile carbon capture). These incentives will assist in accelerating the
necessary infrastructure improvements needed to support advanced technology vehicles. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 5-6]
One of the pathways which deserves to be highlighted is the Hydrogen Internal Combustion
Engine (H2ICE). This technology is a promising pathway which for certain applications is
preferable to other alternate advanced technologies in the proposed rule. For example, a vehicle
towing a trailer requires sustained torque output to tow a heavy load. H2ICE would offer the best
solution for this vehicle to achieve the emission targets while fulfilling the customer needs for
range and load. BEVs and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV) have weight and load limitations
that might not allow this vehicle to meet its operational requirements. Indeed, the agency has
recognized the benefit of H2ICE in the separate rulemaking for "Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3 [1], We refer to section II. Proposed C02
Emission Standards, D. Vehicle Technologies, 1. Technologies to Reduce GHG Emissions from
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HD Vehicles with ICES, paragraph 5 [2] which states: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 5-
6]
1 https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985-1423121
2 11. Proposed CO? Emission Standards, D. Vehicle Technologies, 1. Technologies to Reduce GHG
Emissions from HD Vehicles with ICES, paragraph 5
Manufacturers may develop new ICE vehicle technologies through the MY 2032 timeframe.
An example of a new technology under development that would reduce GHG emissions from
HD vehicles with ICES is hydrogen-fueled internal combustion engines (H2ICE). These engines
are currently in the prototype stage of innovation for HD vehicles but have also been
demonstrated as technically feasible in the past in the LD fleet. H2ICE is a technology that
produces zero hydrocarbon (HC), carbon monoxide (CO), and C02 engine-out emissions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 5-6]
Furthermore, a large portion of manufacturing technology and workforce skills needed to
manufacture H2ICE equipment may be adapted from currently available gasoline or diesel
manufacturing footprints. H2ICE also builds hydrogen demand, which is a nascent market in the
U.S. Building that market will help supply the needs of hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles in
due course. The two are complementary to each other's growth and commercialization. MEMA
therefore strongly suggests that EPA adopt a consistent pathway for H2ICE for light-duty and
medium-duty vehicles just as proposed for heavy-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0644, pp. 5-6]
Renewable fuels, such as hydrogen, ethanol, renewable natural gas (RNG) and carbon-neutral
renewable diesel are viable, proven pathways to lower emissions in the transportation sector
almost immediately. The EPA has dismissed alternate fuel options, and as a result is missing
opportunities for greater emissions reductions. We refer the EPA to the U.S. DOE alternate fuels
data center for detailed examples of how alternate fuels can reduce vehicle emissions. 1 Several
studies and programs run by Argonne National Laboratory also point to reduced emissions
through alternate fuels.2 EPA should include more analysis of these alternatives and do more to
encourage investment and deployment of these technologies. We note CARB recognizes one
renewable fuel3 and allows it to be used for compliance with certain regulations. EPA should
consider similar provisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 6]
1 https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/
2 https://www.anl.gov/taps/fuels
3 See § 2449.1(f) of the CARB In-Use Off-Road Diesel-Fueled Fleets Regulation
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/off-roaddiesel/ordl5dayatta-l.pdf
MEMA urges: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 7]
EPA to move beyond tailpipe emissions and include emissions from electricity
generation in BEV calculations.
EPA to act decisively to further encourage and incentivize the development and
deployment of advanced clean ICE technologies, including renewable fuels, and mobile carbon
capture.
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EPA to develop an efficiency metric to comparatively analyze ZEV energy needs and
if not incorporated into this rule - report that metric to the public as an initial step. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 7]
Organization: Minnesota Biofuels Association
While we appreciate EPA's focus on strengthening tailpipe emissions standards for light-duty
and medium-duty vehicles to reduce harmful air pollutants like carbon monoxide, benzene, and
other particulates from the transportation sector, we are concerned that the proposed rule
undervalues and overlooks the contributions that American-made biofuels can make in achieving
enhanced vehicle efficiency and emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0672, pp. 1-
2]
Rather than giving automakers the flexibility to pursue innovative strategies for reducing
emissions from the current and future light- and medium-duty fleets through environmentally
friendly, lower cost options like E15 and E85, the proposal tips the scale toward a single
technology - electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0672, pp. 1-2]
A level playing field for all technologies and fuels is the key to reaching net-zero greenhouse
gas emissions by mid-century. In its overview of the proposed standards 1 EPA notes a "... shift
away from a focus on internal-combustion engines (ICE) technologies and toward zero-emission
technologies, including electrification." We disagree with the assertion that electrification is the
only zero-emission technology available and that ICE technologies cannot play a meaningful role
in the decarbonization of the U.S. transportation sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0672, pp. 1-
2]
1 https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/420f23009.pdf
First, Minnesota-made biofuel is a readily available renewable energy solution that has a
proven track record of reducing carbon emissions. The Department of Energy's Argonne
National Laboratory has shown that today's low-carbon corn ethanol reduces greenhouse gas
emissions by nearly 50 percent compared to gasoline. According to recent estimates and
projections, internal combustion engine vehicles will still occupy more than half the light-duty
vehicle marketplace by 2040. Incentivizing the use of higher blends of ethanol like El 5 and E85
can immediately reduce carbon emissions from those vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0672,
pp.1-2]
Moving forward, technology investments will ensure that ethanol reduces greenhouse gas
emissions by 70 percent on average by 2030 and 100 percent by 2050. Many production facilities
are already utilizing or plan in the next three to five years to adopt a combination of technologies
and practices that lower the carbon intensity of the ethanol produced. These include production
plant upgrades (combined heat and power, fermentation efficiencies, renewable electricity
integration, heat/exhaust recovery), carbon capture, sequestration, and utilization (CCUS), and
carbon-efficient farming practices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0672, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Minnesota Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
In addition to improving this proposal to enable more solutions than only electric vehicles, we
urge EPA to advance a much-needed rulemaking addressing fuel quality to cut emissions from
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the millions of liquid fuel vehicles on the road now and the new vehicles that will be sold
through the compliance period. Greater lifecycle emission reductions are available from
sustainable, affordable low-carbon ethanol through a clean, high-octane standard, by removing
barriers to higher ethanol blends and by equitably incenting all alternative fuels and
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 1-2]
There are many obstacles to this shift including geopolitics, long lead times, capital
investments, and consumer acceptance. In order to achieve emission reduction goals in the most
robust, rapid, and affordable way, EPA must instead encourage multiple additional solutions
such as hybrid electric vehicles (including plug-in hybrids), reinstating meaningful flex-fuel
vehicle credits, and the introduction of credits that encourage the utilization of internal
combustion engines (ICE) designed to utilize higher blends of biofuels (such as ethanol) by
recognizing the combined carbon and multi-pollutant emission reduction benefits of the engine
technology and fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 3]
Low-carbon liquid fuels have a unique and important role to play, immediately and in the
long term. Fuels such as El5 (15% ethanol) are approved for and available for use in the millions
of vehicles already on the road today, and thus offer immediate emissions benefits on a much
larger scale than changes to only new vehicles. In the longer term, low-carbon or zero-carbon
liquid fuels offer emissions solutions for market segments and customers that may not be well
served by battery electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 3]
To foster a vibrant and competitive landscape of multiple solutions, it is critical for EPA to set
performance-based and technology-neutral emissions standards. Unfortunately, the proposed
standard falls short of this ideal. It is essential to look beyond the tailpipe and use life cycle
analysis for fair comparisons and a "level playing field". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 3]
Under the Clean Air Act, EPA has an obligation to protect the health and welfare of
Americans. While EPA projects the proposed standards will result in 7.3 billion cumulative tons
of avoided GHG emissions through 2055, EPA leaves significant GHG emission reductions on
the table if the agency fails to take steps in this proposal, or in a parallel action, to also improve
liquid fuels along with vehicles. EPA must include complementary fuel improvements that
would enable greater total GHG reductions, greater fuel efficiency and substantially greater air
quality improvements than the current proposal offers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 3]
Low-carbon liquid fuels can achieve GHG reductions faster than new vehicles can displace
the existing fleet. A relatively simple change such as replacing E10 (10% ethanol) with E15
(15%) ethanol) can offer greater GHG reductions3 than the phase-in of battery electric vehicles,
because it can immediately affect a huge fleet of vehicles that are already in use. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 4]
3 Fuels Institute report "Decarbonizing Combustion Vehicles: A Portfolio Approach to GHG Reductions",
June 2023.
But El5 is not the only way to achieve large emissions benefits with ethanol. To enable
further displacement of petroleum by ethanol, many stakeholders have agreed to support E25
(25%o ethanol) capability in all vehicles by 2028, and E30 by 2033, as specified in the Next
Generation Fuels Act. However, EPA currently has authority to support the production of new
vehicles with E25/E30 capability through new fuel standards, as well as incentivize flex-fuel
vehicles (FFVs) with E85 capability. Getting these vehicles on the road quickly will build the
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foundation for future increases in cleaner liquid fuels, resulting in GHG and multi-pollutant
emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 4]
Recognizing vehicles and fuels as a complete system, increasing the octane rating of the
nation's fuel supply through a clean, high-octane standard would deliver greater GHG emission
reductions from the approximate 281 million internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles on the
road today and the 100 million projected to be added by MY 2032, and during the 15 to 20 years
those vehicles remain on the road after introduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 4]
In summary, EPA should pursue stringent new fuel standards - not only for reduced
particulate emissions but also for dramatically lower GHG emissions. Fuel standards can achieve
benefits much more quickly than standards which only impact new vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0612, pp. 10-11]
EPA's STATUTORY AUTHORITY and ACTIONS NEEDED
NCGA believes EPA should take the following actions to improve the proposal and through
rulemaking on fuel property standards: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 11]
Set a minimum fuel octane level of 98 RON, phasing out lower octane fuels as new optimized
vehicles enter the market.
NCGA believes EPA has ample authority to regulate fuel octane because of the impact higher
fuel octane would have on reducing GHG and criteria emissions from the vehicle fleet. EPA has
previously acknowledged the agency has authority to regulate fuel octane under Section 211(c).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 11]
Approve a high-octane, midlevel ethanol blend vehicle certification fuel (98-100 RON, E25-
E30).
EPA's timely approval of a high-octane, midlevel ethanol blend vehicle certification fuel
would enable automakers to expedite design and testing of optimized vehicles for use with this
new low carbon fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 11-12]
Lower summer vapor pressure to 9 psi or less for all fuel or provide parity in Reid Vapor
Pressure (RVP) treatment for all ethanol blends with E10.
Higher ethanol blends such as El 5 offer an immediate decarbonization opportunity and support a
transition to low carbon, high octane fuel. However, outdated RVP rules and the oil industry's
refusal to produce lower volatility blend stock prevents El 5 - which is lower in evaporative,
tailpipe and GHG emissions - from reaching the market on the same terms as standard E10
fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 12]
By using existing authority in the Clean Air Act to require lower volatility conventional
gasoline blend stock during the summer months to reduce emissions of volatile organic
compounds and decrease the potential for ozone formation, EPA would simultaneously open the
market to El 5 year-round. NCGA urges EPA to take this action to improve air quality while
simultaneously eliminating outdated barriers to cleaner, low carbon higher ethanol blends like
E15 and future high-octane fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 12]
Reinstate the 0.15 volumetric conversion factor for FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612,
p. 13]
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Organization: Missouri Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
Immediate progress toward decarbonizing the light duty fleet will help meet the
Administration's goal of cutting emissions by 2030 and reaching net zero emissions by 2050.
Achieving those decarbonization goals in transportation will require a mix of solutions. As recent
analysis from the Rhodium Group concludes, a "portfolio of strategies is the lowest cost and
most likely to succeed," including low carbon liquid fuels such as biofuels.l However, the
singular focus of the currently proposed multi-pollutant emission standards for model year (MY)
2027 through 2032 light and medium duty vehicles on battery electric vehicles (BEVs), ignores
the immediate and long-term benefits of leveraging a portfolio of various transportation
technologies and the emission reductions they can achieve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p.
3]
1 Rhodium Group, "Closing the Transportation Emissions Gap with Clean Fuels," January 15, 2021.
https://rhg.com/research/closing-the- transportation-emissions-gap-with-clean-fuels/
The proposed rule and EPA's larger policy vision around vehicles ignore the broad and
diverse range of powertrain and liquid fuel options that could be more widely deployed to reduce
emissions. This includes the use of domestically produced biofuels, like high-octane, low-carbon
ethanol blends used in conjunction with advanced high-technology engines and flex-fuel hybrid
vehicles. This path would leverage existing fueling infrastructure and avoid the vast number of
implementation challenges if this rule is adopted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0578, p. 3]
That's why MCGA, state and national corn partners, as well as a growing list of businesses,
support the Next Generation Fuels Act (NGFA). NGFA, introduced in both the U.S. Senate and
House of Representatives, can bridge this divide. NGFA would update U.S. gasoline fuel
standards to more efficient, high-octane, low-carbon fuels beginning in 2028. It does not dictate
how regulated entities must achieve the higher octane and lower carbon requirements, nor does it
require the use of a specific fuel or vehicle. Instead, it sets the criteria for a new high-octane fuel
standard optimized for tomorrow's high-tech, low-emission engines. This opens the marketplace
to a broad array of high-octane, low-carbon fuel sources, providing consumers and businesses
with various choices and options to meet their transportation needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0578, p. 3]
Organization: Missouri Farm Bureau (MOFB)
EPA's proposed rule gives no consideration or opportunity for other liquid fuel technologies
to meet emissions goals, and effectively bans gasoline- and diesel-powered vehicles by
mandating that auto manufacturers build EVs. Again, MOFB urges EPA to thoroughly consider
an all-of- the-above approach, and not overlook the important role that biofuels such as ethanol
and biodiesel, produced in Missouri and throughout the heartland of America, can and should
play in this policy discussion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0590, p. 2]
According to a 2021 study conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy and published by
Argonne National Laboratory, ethanol has 52 percent less greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than
gasoline.5 In addition, biodiesel and renewable diesel reduce GHG emissions 50-80 percent
when compared to petroleum diesel, depending on the feedstock used.6 Meanwhile, EPA's
proposed rule, which appears to be an attempt to completely electrify the light-duty vehicle
market, projects to achieve a mere 26 percent decrease in cumulative GHG emissions through
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2055.7 EPA must look to biofuels as a key part of the solution, instead of the approach taken by
its proposed rule, which will surely prop up the economies of foreign countries - namely
China's instead of our own. EPA should acknowledge that higher utilization of biofuels and
subsequent greenhouse gas reductions can occur today with the majority of vehicles on our
nation's roadways, rather than attempting to replace all of the internal combustion engines being
driven by Americans on a daily basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0590, p. 2]
5 Ethanol vs. Petroleum-Based Fuel Carbon Emissions | Department of Energy, (Link:
https://www.energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/articles/ethanol-vs-petroleum-based-fuel-carbon-
emissions#%3A%7E%3Atext%3DThe%20most%20recent%20DOE%20study%2Cstudies%20have%20fo
und%20similai%20results%20) accessed June 14, 2023.
6 https://cleanfuels.org/docs/default-source/one-pagers/2019-greenhouse-gas-
benefit.pdf?sfvrsn=d4909bbc_10, accessed June 14, 2023.
7 U.S. EPA Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and
Medium-Duty Vehicles, Vol. 88, Fed. Reg. 29184, p. 29198 (May 5, 2023) (to be codified at 40 CFR pts.
85, 86, 600, 1036, 1037 & 1066).
Organization: National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) et al.
Renewable fuels such as ethanol materially lower gasoline's carbon footprint. If properly
incentivized, these technologies' capability to reduce emissions can continue to grow alongside
other decarbonization technologies such as clean electricity. Pursuing one solution does not
require abandoning others. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 1-2]
As articulated in this letter, and in our associations' respective comments in response to the
Proposal, we are concerned that EPA is pursuing a single technology as the solution to
decarbonize light-duty transportation. The speed at which the Agency appears to anticipate the
market and consumers will transition to electric vehicles is divorced from our members'
assessment of reality. The Proposed Rule does not appreciate the market obstacles associated
with such a massive transition in consumer behavior. It also abandons proven decarbonization
technologies, such as higher-octane liquid fuels, that can deliver material emissions reductions
using existing infrastructure, existing vehicles, and working with consumers' existing behavior.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 1-2]
Our associations support the Agency's stated goal of improving the emissions consequences
of over-the-road transportation. The Proposed Rule's approach toward realizing that objective,
however, is flawed. A technology-neutral approach to transportation decarbonization will help to
mitigate costs, promote innovation, and address the practical challenges associated with
electrification. All fuels and technologies should be treated equally within the context of
emissions standards. The Proposal does not do this, but instead artificially tilts the scale towards
electric vehicles ("EVs") by only accounting for emissions from one segment of the value chain:
vehicle tailpipes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 1-2]
I. Renewable Liquid Fuels Meaningfully Reduce Emissions.
During the past few decades, there has been extraordinary growth in the consumption of
biofuels such as ethanol and biodiesel, as well as other low-carbon fuels such as renewable
natural gas, compressed natural gas, and renewable diesel. These liquid fuels are all mostly
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compatible with existing infrastructure that was originally developed for hydrocarbons and is
already ubiquitous throughout the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 2-3]
Biofuels and other renewable fuels work to build and maintain a competitive marketplace,
maximize the climate benefits of liquid fuels, minimize fuel supply disruptions, and impose
meaningful downward pressure on fuel prices. Existing alternative fuel incentives, including the
Renewable Fuel Standard ("RFS") and biofuel blending and alternative fuel infrastructure tax
credits, have successfully enabled our collective membership to build a robust renewable fuel
value chain in the United States. The incentives Congress established over the past few decades
have caused the displacement of significant volumes of petroleum-based fuel with renewable
fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 2-3]
Congress, in designing programs such as the RFS, recognized that the most effective way to
get American motorists to purchase lower-carbon alternatives is to make renewable fuel blends
less expensive than the petroleum-based fuels they are designed to displace. Over the past few
years, the economic opportunities associated with selling higher biofuel blends have grown. As
petroleum prices rise and refined product supplies tighten, blending incentives tend to increase as
retailers gravitate toward lower-priced, lower-carbon alternatives such as ethanol and other
renewable fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 2-3]
It is also important to recognize the role renewable liquid fuels play in harnessing existing
infrastructure to maximize diverse investments and achieve emissions reduction goals.
Importantly, renewable fuels do not require new vehicle purchases and lead to significant
emissions reductions by improving the emissions profile of vehicles already on the road. It is
exponentially less expensive to leverage existing infrastructure than to create entirely new supply
chains and infrastructure. To the extent environmental objectives can be achieved by utilizing the
infrastructure already in place, consumers will more seamlessly gravitate to new types of fuels
and vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 2-3]
If the final rule better leverages the existing low-carbon fuel value chain and retailers'
understanding of consumer behavior, vehicle manufacturers will be able to lower emissions in
new vehicles (including EVs) while also reducing emissions in the current fleet. Given the
uncertainty surrounding the Agency's overly optimistic timelines, this represents a commonsense
approach to reducing both tailpipe emissions and lifecycle emissions in the most timely, cost-
effective, and efficient way possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, pp. 2-3]
IV. The Proposed Rule Blunts Innovation and Competition.
Climate research has consistently emphasized the importance of near-term emissions
reductions relative to future reductions.41 More efficient vehicle engines coupled with low-
carbon, renewable liquid fuels can reduce emissions immediately. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0648, pp.12-13]
41 See G. Cornells van Kooten, Patrick Withey, and Craig M.T. Johnston, BIOMASS AND BIOENERGY
151 "Climate Urgency and the Timing of Carbon Fluxes," (Aug. 2021) available at
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2021.106162. ("The current climate emergency dictates that immediate
action is required to mitigate climate change, which implies that carbon fluxes occurring 20 or more years
from now are too late to have any mitigative effect.")
EPA's effort to mandate a shift to EV technologies directly disincentivizes investment in new
technologies that have the potential to deliver tangible emissions savings in both the near and
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long term. Indeed, EPA's proposal risks zeroing out new innovations in the ICE vehicles that
most consumers are still expected to drive for decades to come. There is no way for
manufacturers to comply with the Proposal by producing ICE vehicles alone. This means their
only choice will be to divert investments away from ICE fuel economy improvements. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 12-13]
An analysis conducted by McKinsey & Company estimates that if, in 2030, 50 percent of new
vehicle sales are EVs, given the rate of turnover of the fleet, the number of used vehicle sales,
and other factors, EVs will constitute just 17 percent of the vehicles in operation around the
country. Importantly, this analysis also projected the impact of partial electrification on gasoline
demand. Based on those figures, and the fact that many of the ICE vehicles on the road at that
time will be less efficient than the vehicles that the new EVs replaced, McKinsey concludes that
the reduction in gasoline demand based on the increased number of EVs on the road will be only
four percent. This further underscores the importance of adopting a technology-neutral approach
to decarbonization. A laser-focus on electrification means that we will not have maximized the
decarbonization potential of 83 percent of vehicles (ICE engines) that will be on the road in
2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 12-13]
There are many decarbonization technologies beyond even improved fuel economy that EPA
leaves on the table. Higher octane gasoline blended with higher concentrations of biofuels can
allow ICE vehicles to be far more efficient in terms of emissions and fuel economy. There have
also been increasingly innovative technologies surrounding expanded natural gas vehicle
("NGV") production in recent years. But the Proposed Rule fails to provide the automotive
sector with any meaningful incentive to continue developing such technology or similar vehicles
that can effectively rely on renewable natural gas ("RNG"). The latest data available from the
California Low Carbon Fuel Standard Program indicates that the average carbon intensity of bio-
CNG (compressed natural gas) sold in 2020 was -5.85gC)2e/MJ.42 In the coming years, the
carbon intensity of RNG is expected to be even lower as greater amounts of low-carbon dairy gas
is produced and used in NGVs. This is especially important in light of market considerations.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 12-13]
42 CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, "LCFS Pathway Certified Carbon Intensities" (2023)
available at https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/lcfs-pathway-certified-carbon-intensities.
Further, existing alternative fuel incentives—such as the Renewable Fuel Standard ("RFS")
and biofuel blending and alternative fuel infrastructure tax credits—have allowed fuel retailers to
offer less expensive, lower carbon fuels to our customers, while also supporting investments in
renewable fuel production. The incentives Congress established over the past few decades have
caused the displacement of significant volumes of petroleum-based fuel with renewable fuels.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 12-13]
Increased utilization of renewable fuels could lead to significant emissions reductions by
improving the emissions profiles not only of new vehicles but existing vehicles as well.43 The
Proposed Rule surrenders the market's ability to deliver near-term emissions savings by
imposing a top-down, hurried transition to one technology. It will ensure that any technological
breakthroughs with respect to any of these or other liquid fuels and ICE engines in the future
simply will not happen because there will be no economic incentive to pursue those advances.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 12-13]
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43 The automotive industry has demonstrated consistent reductions in emissions and gains in efficiency
through focus on the ICE. The Department of Energy' s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
has estimated that over the past 30 years, advances in internal combustion engines have reduced emissions
of criteria pollutants by more than 99%. See DEP'T. OF ENERGY, "Internal Combustion Engine Basics"
(Nov. 22, 2013), available at https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/internal-combustion-engine-
basics. Since MY2004, carbon dioxide emissions have fallen 25% and improved in fourteen of seventeen
years while fuel efficiency has increased by 32%. EPA, "Highlights of the Automotive Trends Report"
(Dec. 12, 2022), available at https://www.epa.gov/automotive- trends/highlights-automotive-trends-
report#Highlightl. Similarly, data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics from 2011 to 2018 shows
that engine efficiency has reduced light duty fuel consumption. BUREAU OF TRANSP'N STATISTICS,
"Vehicle Miles Traveled by Highway Category and Vehicle Type" (Dec. 2022), available at
https://www.bts.gov/browse-statistical-products-and-data/freight-facts-and-figures/vehicle-miles-traveled-
highway.
Organization: National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)
As the producers of the low carbon feedstock for low carbon ethanol, corn farmers are part of
the solution to cut transportation emissions. We urge EPA to focus less on one solution, electric
vehicles, and instead focus on outcomes and opening pathways for all low carbon fuels and
technologies that enable more stringent vehicle emission standards, taking advantage of not only
the low carbon benefits of higher ethanol blends, but also the cuts in toxic emissions, greater fuel
efficiency and consumer cost savings that come with more renewables. For automakers to use
new technologies and enhanced engines to meet stringent standards, they need updated fuel that
enables new vehicles and fuels to work as a system to enhance greenhouse gas (GHG) and other
tailpipe emissions reductions. Higher ethanol blends used with advanced engines optimized for
higher octane would provide a much-needed pathway for low carbon, low-emission fuels. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 1]
Higher octane fuel is an essential tool for automakers to meet revised standards, but higher
octane must also be clean octane to meet emission reduction goals. Clean octane from today's
ethanol is 50 percent lower in GHG emissions than gasoline and replaces the most harmful
hydrocarbon aromatics to improve air quality and prevent adverse health impacts. EPA failed to
use the proposal to broaden the solutions that reduce transportation emissions by beginning a
transition to low carbon, high-octane fuels to advance climate, air quality and environmental
justice goals with these and future standards. Furthermore, alternative fuel vehicles such as flex-
fuel vehicles, which have the potential to reach zero emissions, should be equitably incentivized
through these vehicle standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 1]
Low-carbon liquid fuels have a unique and important role to play, immediately and in the
long term. Fuels such as El5 (15% ethanol) are approved for and available for use in the millions
of vehicles already on the road today, and thus offer immediate emissions benefits on a much
larger scale than changes to only new vehicles. In the longer term, low-carbon or zero-carbon
liquid fuels offer emissions solutions for market segments and customers that may not be well
served by battery electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 2]
To foster a vibrant and competitive landscape of multiple solutions, it is critical for EPA to set
performance-based and technology-neutral emissions standards. Unfortunately, the proposed
standard falls short of this ideal. It is essential to look beyond the tailpipe and use life cycle
analysis for fair comparisons and a "level playing field". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 2]
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Under the Clean Air Act, EPA has an obligation to protect the health and welfare of
Americans. While EPA projects the proposed standards will result in 7.3 billion cumulative tons
of avoided GHG emissions through 2055, EPA leaves significant GHG emission reductions on
the table if the agency fails to take steps in this proposal, or in a parallel action, to also improve
liquid fuels along with vehicles. EPA must include complementary fuel improvements that
would enable greater total GHG reductions, greater fuel efficiency and substantially greater air
quality improvements than the current proposal offers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 2]
Each year, sales of new vehicles displace a small fraction of the existing vehicle fleet. EPA
estimates that 67% of new vehicles sales will be battery electric in 2032. The projections for
battery electric vehicle adoption are based on very few—and very small—real-world data points.
See generally 88 Fed. Reg. 29,187-90. Battery electric vehicles made up 5.8 percent of the new
light-duty passenger vehicle market in 2022. Id. at 21,190. EPA needs these sales to increase by
a factor of ten over the next 8 years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 2-3]
Clearly, a large number of new vehicles that burn liquid fuels will continue to be produced for
many years, and those vehicles will remain on the road for many additional years. According to
data from the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Lab, 2 16% of passenger cars and
32% of light-duty trucks remain on the road for more than 20 years. If new electric vehicles are
more expensive or less attractive to consumers, older liquid-fueled vehicles will remain on the
road even longer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 2-3]
2 Davis and Boundy, "Transportation Energy Data Book: Edition 40", Oak Ridge National Laboratory
report ORNL/TM-2022/2376, February 2022; https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf
Low-carbon liquid fuels can achieve GHG reductions faster than new vehicles can displace
the existing fleet. A relatively simple change such as replacing E10 (10% ethanol) with E15
(15%) ethanol) can offer greater GHG reductions 3 than the phase-in of battery electric vehicles,
because it can immediately affect a huge fleet of vehicles that are already in use. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 2-3]
3 Fuels Institute report "Decarbonizing Combustion Vehicles: A Portfolio Approach to GHG Reductions",
June 2023
But El5 is not the only way to achieve large emissions benefits with ethanol. To enable
further displacement of petroleum by ethanol, many stakeholders have agreed to support E25
(25%) ethanol) capability in all vehicles by 2028, and E30 by 2033, as specified in the Next
Generation Fuels Act. However, EPA currently has authority to support the production of new
vehicles with E25/E30 capability through new fuel standards, as well as incentivize flex-fuel
vehicles (FFVs) with E85 capability. Getting these vehicles on the road quickly will build the
foundation for future increases in cleaner liquid fuels, resulting in GHG and multi-pollutant
emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 3]
Recognizing vehicles and fuels as a complete system, increasing the octane rating of the
nation's fuel supply through a clean, high-octane standard would deliver greater GHG emission
reductions from the approximate 281 million internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles on the
road today and the 100 million projected to be added by MY 2032, and during the 15 to 20 years
those vehicles remain on the road after introduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 3]
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The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) has already resulted in more 1 billion metric tons of
cumulative GHG savings from 2008-2021, exceeding original projections largely due to the
reduced carbon intensity of corn ethanol, highlighting the importance of using biofuels like
ethanol to enhance the GHG emissions reductions from transportation with the right policies. 18
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 6]
18 Unnasch, S. & Parida, D., Healy, B. "GHG Emissions Reductions due to the RFS2: A 2022 Update,"
February 2023; chrome-
extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://d3 5tlsyewk4d42.cloudfront.net/file/2424/GHG%20
Emissions%20Reductions%20due%20to%20the%20RFS2%20-%20Feb%202023.pdf
The most recent assessment from the Department of Energy's Argonne National Laboratory
concludes corn ethanol's carbon intensity decreased 23 percent from 2005 to 2019 due to
increased corn yield, reduced fertilizer intensity and improved ethanol production efficiency,
with corn ethanol now between 44 and 52 percent lower in carbon intensity (CI) than the
gasoline it replaces. 19 Argonne's conclusions are similar to analysis from Environmental Health
and Engineering finding ethanol now results in 46 percent fewer GHG emissions compared to
gasoline, due to improved corn production, ethanol production efficiencies and land productivity.
20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 6]
19 Lee, Uisung & et al. ANL, "Retrospective Analysis of the U.S. Corn Ethanol Industry for 2005-2019:
Implications for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions," (2021).
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/bbb.2225
20 Scully, Melissa J., et al, "Carbon intensity of corn ethanol in the United States: state of the science,"
(2021) Environmental Research Letters 16 043001. https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-
9326/abde08
Bringing high octane fuel to market in the form of midlevel ethanol blends will be
significantly less capital-intensive than attempting to increase blend stock octane with
hydrocarbon components at refineries. It will also be incredibly cleaner. The avoided production
cost and offset emissions lower end-costs to consumers, reducing both economic costs and social
costs related to health and environment, key considerations in advancing environmental justice
and avoiding adverse impacts from oil refineries on communities that have historically borne
them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 7]
Increased volumes of ethanol in fuel displace the most harmful compounds from gasoline. 25
These aromatic hydrocarbon additives (i.e. benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene - or BTEX)
have high cancer-causing potential. Increasing the ethanol volume in fuel to a midlevel blend has
a positive impact on tailpipe emissions of toxins, including significant reductions in particulates
and carbon monoxide. These same aromatic hydrocarbons are also precursors to the formation of
secondary organic aerosols (SOA), which in turn are a major contributor to particulate matter
emissions (PM 2.5). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 7-8]
25 Environmental and Energy Study Institute. Ethanol and Air Quality - Separating Fact from Fiction.
October 12, 2018. https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/ethanol-and-air-quality-separating-fact-from-fiction
According to EPA's review for the 2020 Anti-backsliding Study, ethanol does not form SOA
directly or affect SOA formation. However, as EPA states, toluene is a large contributor to SOA.
Ethanol's high-octane value "greatly reduces the need for other high-octane components
including aromatics such as toluene." 26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 7-8]
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26 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Air Act Section 211 (v)(l) Anti-backsliding Study,
(2020) Appendix A, Page 61.
Perhaps the most credible and comprehensive study on the effects of ethanol on particulate
emissions topic was published by the University of California Center for Environmental
Research and Technology. 30 The study showed statistically significant improvements in
particulate emissions for E15 compared to E10. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 8]
30 Tang et al., "Expanding the ethanol blend wall in California: Emissions comparison between E10 and
E15", Fuel, June 2023; https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.fuel.2023.128836
EPA should adopt rules to limit PMI of both finished fuels and the hydrocarbon blend stocks
used for E10, E15, and E85. Limiting PMI of hydrocarbon blend stocks will ensure that the
particulate emissions benefits of ethanol are not offset by negative changes at refineries. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 8]
Improved fuel property standards should be a high priority because they can achieve
significantly lower particulate emissions and dramatically lower GHG emissions. California's
Low Carbon Fuel Standard already recognizes the importance of fuel standards, and it has led to
dramatic increases in sales of E85 and other low-carbon biofuels. High-octane low-carbon fuels
are a key enabler for continued GHG emissions improvements in the millions of liquid-fueled
vehicles which will be produced over the next 10+ years, as documented by the U.S. Department
of Energy Co-Optimization of Fuels & Engines initiative and in numerous other studies, such as
those by MIT and by automakers. A detailed proposed blueprint for future high-octane low-
carbon fuels exists in the Next Generation Fuels Act, and EPA has the statutory authority to
make these changes without waiting for Congress to act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp.
8-9]
In summary, EPA should pursue stringent new fuel standards - not only for reduced
particulate emissions but also for dramatically lower GHG emissions. Fuel standards can achieve
benefits much more quickly than standards which only impact new vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0643, pp. 8-9]
Beyond ethanol's utility in all gasoline engines to reduce GHG emissions, other alternative
vehicle technologies can also harness the GHG reductions and air quality benefits of ethanol,
such as Flex Fuel Vehicles (FFVs). FFVs utilizing higher blends of low carbon ethanol, such as
E85, can provide immediate emissions reductions without tangibly altering the price of the
vehicle and reducing fuel costs. In fact, E85 is typically sold at a substantially lower price than
gasoline, translating to monetary savings in addition to the significant air pollution savings.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 9]
Compared to gasoline, E85 leads to significant reductions in NOx and GHG emissions. E85
avoids use of toxic hydrocarbon aromatics in gasoline that are precursors to secondary organic
aerosols that result in harmful fine particulate matter emissions that cause serious respiratory,
cardiovascular, and other health harm, including premature death, according to the American
Lung Association. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 9]
Incentivized to reduce emissions through the state's Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), in
California some FFVs are even powered by a blend of 15 percent renewable naphtha with 85
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percent ethanol. These vehicles use zero fossil fuels, have improved air emissions profiles, and
have an extremely low carbon intensity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 9]
NCGA believes EPA should take the following actions to improve the proposal and through
rulemaking on fuel property standards:
Set a minimum fuel octane level of 98 RON, phasing out lower octane fuels as new optimized
vehicles enter the market. NCGA believes EPA has ample authority to regulate fuel octane
because of the impact higher fuel octane would have on reducing GHG and criteria emissions
from the vehicle fleet. EPA has previously acknowledged the agency has authority to regulate
fuel octane under Section 211(c). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 9-10]
Approve a high-octane, midlevel ethanol blend vehicle certification fuel (98-100 RON, E25-
E30).
EPA's timely approval of a high-octane, midlevel ethanol blend vehicle certification fuel
would enable automakers to expedite design and testing of optimized vehicles for use with this
new low carbon fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 9-10]
Correct the fuel economy formula by updating the R-Factor to 1.0 to reflect documented
operation of modern engine technology.
Correcting the R-Factor in the fuel economy formula would support automakers developing
high efficiency engines that require higher octane ratings and a higher ethanol content. EPA has
acknowledged that the current EPA-mandated R-Factor of 0.6, originally established in the
1980s, is outdated and fails to achieve the statutory purpose of making fuel economy testing on
today's fuel equivalent to fuel economy testing in 1975. An update to 1 from 0.6 would reflect
results of analysis by the Department of Energy and EPA using modern engines and fulfill
previous observations and commitments from EPA to address this issue. Published studies have
shown that R for modern vehicles should be around 0.93 to 0.96. 31 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0643, pp.9-10]
31 Sluder, C., West, B., Butler, A., Mitcham, A. et al. 2014. Determination of the R Factor for Fuel
Economy Calculations Using Ethanol-Blended Fuels over Two Test Cycles. SAE Int. J. Fuels Lubr.
7(2):2014, doi: 10.4271/2014-01-1572.
Setting the R-factor to 1.0 sets fuel economy results on an energy basis. In application, the R
factor equation is a "fuel response factor," adjusting for more than just energy density. An R of
1.0 essentially converts fuel economy to mile per gallon gasoline equivalent (MPGge), which is
how other alternative fuels such as propane, natural gas, and electricity have been compared to
their gasoline counterparts for decades. Setting R to 1.0 provides equitable treatment to
renewable ethanol that other alternative fuels already receive. This change could help speed the
transition to certification with Tier 3 fuel as well as encourage vehicle manufacturers to seek
certification for even higher ethanol blends, such as El5 or the high octane E30 EPA suggested
in its Tier 3 proposal several years ago. Manufacturers are not incentivized to build dedicated
high-octane vehicles that reduce GHG emissions when those low carbon benefits are penalized
by a low R factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 9-10]
Lower summer vapor pressure to 9 psi or less for all fuel or provide parity in Reid Vapor
Pressure (RVP) treatment for all ethanol blends with E10.
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Higher ethanol blends such as El 5 offer an immediate decarbonization opportunity and
support a transition to low carbon, high octane fuel. However, outdated RVP rules and the oil
industry's refusal to produce lower volatility blend stock prevents El5 - which is lower in
evaporative, tailpipe and GHG emissions - from reaching the market on the same terms as
standard E10 fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 9-10]
By using existing authority in the Clean Air Act to require lower volatility conventional
gasoline blend stock during the summer months to reduce emissions of volatile organic
compounds and decrease the potential for ozone formation, EPA would simultaneously open the
market to El 5 year-round. NCGA urges EPA to take this action to improve air quality while
simultaneously eliminating outdated barriers to cleaner, low carbon higher ethanol blends like
E15 and future high-octane fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 10]
Organization: National Farmers Union (NFU)
National Farmers Union (NFU) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed
Multi- Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-
Duty Vehicles ("Proposed Rule"), published at 88 Fed. Reg. 29,184. NFU has long supported
biofuels and has urged the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to facilitate the use of
mid-level ethanol blends (e.g., E20-E40), which are the most economical high-octane fuels
available today. Despite EPA's limited actions to date in this regard, there remains widespread
agreement regarding the need to move this country toward high octane fuels to take advantage of
improved engine technologies for internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles that are likely to
continue to be a significant portion of the transportation sector for years to come. Although EPA
is well aware of the benefits of high octane fuels, NFU is disappointed that EPA has yet again
largely ignored and failed to capitalize on the benefits of biofuels, particularly mid-level ethanol
blends, in establishing its vehicle emissions rules. These are technologies available today and can
achieve significant reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) and criteria pollutant air emissions and
help this country reach its climate change goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 1]
NFU submits these comments to urge EPA to take a more balanced, technology neutral
approach to emissions standards that better reflects the benefits of biofuels and achieves much
needed emissions reductions sooner rather than later. We further, again, urge EPA to take
necessary administrative actions to support the use of mid-level ethanol blends that provide a
significant cost-effective means of reducing GHG and other air pollutant emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 1]
I. Executive Summary
The proposed EPA standards for 2027 and later set very aggressive goals for reducing GHG
and criteria emissions. Achieving these goals will require dramatic changes not only in vehicle
design, but in the entire automotive supply chain. Battery electric vehicles will play a large role
in achieving the goals, but this will require huge investments and rapid growth in many
industries including the mining and processing of key minerals, the generation and distribution of
electricity, and the recharging of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 2]
It would be naive to believe that these dramatic changes will be achieved smoothly and
quickly. There are many obstacles including geopolitics, long lead times, capital investments,
and consumer acceptance. In order to achieve emissions goals in the most robust, rapid, and
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affordable way, EPA should encourage multiple additional solutions such as hybrid electric
vehicles (including plug-in hybrids), biofuels, and E-Fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p.
2]
Low-carbon liquid fuels have a unique and important role to play, immediately and in the
long term. Biofuels, including mid-level ethanol blends, are compatible with a large number of
vehicles on the road today, and thus offer immediate emissions benefits on a much larger scale
than changes to only new vehicles. Moreover, recent reports show that Americans are holding on
to their vehicles longer than in prior years. 1 In the longer term, low-carbon or zero-carbon liquid
fuels offer emissions solutions for market segments and customers that may not be well served
by battery electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 2-3]
1 Tom Krisher, Repelled by high car prices, Americans are holding on to their vehicles longer than ever,
Associated Press, May. 15, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/cars-older-record-age-prices-shortages-supply-
6e3273208399803a402e707e 1393475c ("The average age of a passenger vehicle on the road hit a record
12.5 years this year, according to data gathered by S&P Global Mobility. Sedans ... are even older, on
average — 13.6 years.").
In order to foster a vibrant and competitive landscape of multiple solutions, it is critical for
EPA to set performance-based and technology-neutral emissions standards. Unfortunately, the
proposed standard falls short of this ideal. It is essential to look beyond the tailpipe and use
lifecycle analysis for fair comparisons and a "level playing field". [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0581, pp. 2-3]
II. Ethanol Can Provide Cost-Effective Emissions Reductions Today
NFU continues to believe that high octane fuels "are the cheapest C02 reduction."2 Improved
engines and high octane fuels, specifically mid-level ethanol blends, are technologically feasible
and economically reasonable means to achieve reduced GHG emissions, as well as reduced
emissions of criteria pollutants and air toxics that have significant adverse health impacts. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 3]
2 Eric Brandt, 100-Octane, Super Premium Fuel is Coming to a Pump Near You, The Drive, May 1, 2017,
http://www.thedrive.com/news/9836/100-octane-super-premium-fuel-is-coming-to-a-pump-near-you.
Increased volume of ethanol increases the octane level of gasoline across grades. In addition
to its higher octane level, ethanol also features high sensitivity and high heat of vaporization,
which increase engine efficiency.3 In short, ethanol offers engine knock resistance at a lower
cost than any other octane booster in gasoline. Higher ethanol blends can increase fuel octane
without expensive refinery upgrades. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 3]
3 Ricardo, Inc., The Draft Technical Assessment Report: Implications for High Octane, Mid-Level Ethanol
Blends, Final Report, at 24 (2016), available at https://ethanolrfa.org/library/reports-studies-and-white-
papers/mid-level- blends-octane-and-fuel-properties.
Ethanol is also substantially cleaner than petroleum-based octane additives. It reduces
emissions of particulate matter and air toxics such as benzene, toluene, and xylene. Ethanol
further provides GHG emissions reductions, which is increasingly important as the carbon
intensity of gasoline is increasing with greater use of unconventional fossil fuels. "Emissions
from fossil fuel combustion comprise the vast majority of energy-related emissions," with an
increase in emissions from the transportation sector largely attributed to increased vehicle miles
travelled and motor gasoline consumption by light-duty vehicles.4 At the same time, energy use
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in ethanol production and lifecycle GHG emissions have decreased with changes in farming
practices and increased intensification (e.g., higher yields). As EPA has found, the land use,
land-use change, and forestry sector resulted in a net increase in carbon stocks (i.e., net C02
removals). 5 This has occurred despite the loss of cropland and the struggle to retain existing
agricultural lands against the ongoing pressures from urban and industrial expansion. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 3]
4 EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2021, at 3-1, 3-23-3-24 (2023),
available at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/US-GHG-Inventory-2023-Main-
Textpdf.
5 Id. at 6-2. Low-carbon liquid fuels can achieve GHG reductions faster than new vehicles
can displace the existing fleet. As illustrated in Figure 21 below,8 a relatively simple change
such as replacing E10 (10% ethanol) with E15 (15% ethanol) can offer greater GHG reductions
than the phase-in of battery electric vehicles, because it can immediately affect a huge fleet of
vehicles that are already in use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 5-6]
8 John Eichberger, Decarbonizing Combustion Vehicles, June 2023,
https://www.transportationenergy.org/resources/blog-post/decarbonizing-combustion-vehicles-a-critical-
part-in- reducing-transportation-emissions/.
[See original comment for Figure 21, Light and Medium Duty Vehicle Annual GHG
Emissions Reduction Scenario (2022-2023)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 5-6]
Ethanol can continue to significantly contribute to reductions in GHG emissions from the
transportation sector. Argonne National Laboratory published a study finding that the carbon
intensity of corn-based ethanol improved 23% from 2005 to 2019 and that "displacement of
gasoline by corn ethanol on an energy equivalent basis from 2005 to 2019 has resulted in a
cumulative GHG emissions reduction of 544 MMT C02e."9 To enable further displacement of
gasoline by ethanol, many stakeholders have agreed to support E25 (25% ethanol) capability in
all vehicles by 2028, and E30 by 2033, as specified in the Next Generation Fuels Act. 10 EPA
need not wait for legislation, however. It can use existing authority to mandate or encourage the
production of new vehicles with E25/E30 capability, as well as flex-fuel vehicles with E85
capability. Getting these vehicles on the road quickly will build the foundation for future
increases in ethanol usage, and consequent dramatic GHG emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 5-6]
9 Uisung Lee, et al., Retrospective analysis of the U.S. corn ethanol industry for 2005-2019: implications
for greenhouse gas emission reductions, Biofuels, Bioproducts and Biorefining, May 2021, available at
https://doi.org/10.1002/bbb.2225.
10 The Next Generation Fuels Act was reintroduced by a bipartisan group of Senators in March of 2023.
See Sen. Grassley Mar. 22, 2023 Press Release, Grassley Introduces Bipartisan Bill to Improve Vehicle
Efficiency and Lower Fuel Costs, https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-
introduces-bipartisan-bill-to-improve- vehicle-efficiency-and-lower-fuel-costs.
While not the only available biofuel to support GHG emissions reductions in the
transportation fuel sector, ethanol is well-developed and cost-effective. Moreover, gasoline
vehicles continue to dominate and likely will continue to make up a significant portion of the
light-duty and medium-duty vehicle market. Further, ethanol is compatible with efforts toward
renewable gasoline.11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 6]
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11 See, e.g., https://www.chevron.com/-/media/chevron/newsroom/2023/Q2/renewable-gasoline-blend-
factsheet-may-2023.pdf; https://pressroom.toyota.com/exxonmobil-and-toyota-team-up-to-test-fuels-with-
a- lower-carbon-footprint/; Uisung Lee, et al., Carbon Intensities of Refining Products in Petroleum
Refineries with Co- processed Biofeedstocks, Argonne National Laboratory, ANL/ESD-21/20, at 19
(2022), available at https://greet.es.anl.gov/files/refinery_co_processing_ci (discussing lifecycle emissions
reductions for various feedstocks for co-processed fuels).
Organization: Natural Gas Vehicles for America
EPA must act now to adopt regulations that reward, credit, or account for the emission
reductions provided by biofuels. Without this requested action, eventually there could be no new
natural gas vehicles or other biofuel vehicles, and consequently no use of biofuels in
transportation unless they are used to produce electricity for electric vehicles. To continue to
certify and sell new natural gas vehicles, the current and proposed approach means that natural
gas vehicle manufacturers will eventually be forced to subsidize electric vehicle truck sales to
offset their tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions. This factor combined with regulations adopted by
California and approved by EPA that mandate the sale of zero- tailpipe vehicles eventually will
force manufacturers to stop offering natural gas trucks despite delivering substantial criteria
pollutant and greenhouse gas emission reductions, and supplying a significant portion of the on-
and off-road vehicles that will not be able to be electrified. This will have a negative impact on
emission reductions and will be extremely financially detrimental to businesses that have
invested in and employ workers in supporting the use of natural gas in transportation. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 4-5]
The pressure on natural gas vehicle manufacturers is not limited to the U.S. Similar regulatory
proposals in Europe could have the same effect of marginalizing or limiting the future role of
biofuel powered vehicles. NGVA Europe recently wrote that: It is necessary to break silos when
designing fuel and mobility policies. Vehicle manufacturers must be encouraged to invest in
solutions that can immediately reduce C02 emissions, including vehicles with Internal
Combustion Engines (ICE) that can run on fuels with lower GHG footprints, such as fuels from
renewable sources.2 We wholeheartedly agree with that sentiment and admittedly lean heavily
on our European trade association partners in our comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597,
pp. 4-5]
2 C02-HDV Position-paper-Eurogas-NGVAv2.pdf
Emission Benefits of Natural Gas Vehicles
Numerous studies and analyses support the conclusion that there are significant environmental
benefits associated with powering natural gas vehicles with RNG to displace petroleum motor
fuels. Many of these studies support the conclusion that RNG fueled vehicles offer superior
benefits to electric vehicles. To be fair, that should not be a requirement for equitable treatment.
It should not be the job of RNG advocates to prove that RNG is superior to electricity or
hydrogen, or that it is more cost-effective, or more readily deployable, or doesn't rely on rare
earth minerals, etc. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, p. 5]
EPA must stop favoring one technology over others by relying on outdated methods of
certifying vehicles and engines. There is not a single environmental journal that would publish a
paper or study that evaluates greenhouse gas emissions by only looking at tailpipe emissions or
tank to wheel emissions. They would not do it because it is not defensible and would be an
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absurd comparison. The same is true for retaining greenhouse gas vehicle regulations that only
look at tailpipe emissions. It is no longer rational, defensible, or equitable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0597, p. 5]
As noted in the introduction, data from California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS)
program demonstrates how clean and low carbon these RNG fueled heavy-duty vehicles truly
are. The most recent data confirms that the average carbon intensity (CI) value of California's
bio-CNG is negative 99 gC02e/MJ and has been negative for three consecutive years. In
California, 97 percent of the natural gas consumed or credited to on-road transportation fuel in
2022 was renewable natural gas. Nationally the percentage was 69 percent in 2022 including fuel
used in California. California continues to be a critical market for natural gas vehicles, but it is
noteworthy that nearly 50 percent of the RNG reported in 2022 was for use in areas outside of
California. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, p. 5]
RNG Supply Can Support Additional NGV Uptake Here and Abroad
The International Energy Agency's (IEA) World Energy Outlook 2022 projects that, under its
different scenarios to 2050, renewable biogases (hydrogen and others) reach more than 400
billion cubic meters (bcm) by 2050; around 65 percent of that (260 bcm) is biomethane.5 The
World Biogas Association's far more aggressive outlook estimates that biomethane could
substitute 993 to 1380 bcm of natural gas, equivalent to 26-37 percent of the current natural gas
consumed globally.6 European authorities recently set a target of achieving 35 bcm of
biomethane by 2030.7 That target is roughly the energy equivalent of 8.9 billion diesel gallons.
The European target is notable in that if achieved it would represent a ten-fold increase in
production levels in less than ten years.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 7-9]
5 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, Chapter 8, Outlook for Gaseous Fuels pp. 370,
377, and 380.
6 https://www.worldbiogasassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/WBA-execsummary-
4ppa4_digital-Sept-2019.pdf
7 European Parliament supports 35 bcm biomethane target in EU Gas Package (gasworld.com)
8 EBA: 30% increase in European biomethane plants since 2021 | Bioenergy Insight Magazine (bioenergy-
news.com)
Part of the reason NGV advocates are confident there are ample supplies is that the RNG
industry and technology associated with it is very mature and existing domestic resources have
not been fully exploited. Another reason is that NGVs are expected to make up a portion of the
on-road market but not totally displace all gasoline or diesel vehicles. For example,
NGV America projects that successful future commercialization of NGVs in the heavy-duty
market segment, specifically Class 8 trucks, in the U.S. could begin to displace between 10-15
percent of annual sales in the next several years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 7-9]
If NGVs sales attain and maintain a level of 10 - 15 percent of new Class 8 sales, over the
next decade that could result in several hundred thousand Class 8 NGV trucks consuming the
equivalent of roughly 3-3.5 billion diesel gallon equivalents of fuel. Based on projections
developed by the America Gas Foundation and other organizations, this level of fuel
consumption — even if the vehicles were operated 100 percent on biomethane — would represent
only a small portion of the available RNG supplies projected to be available in the U.S. As noted
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above, natural gas vehicles operating on blends considerably less than 100 percent still offer
significant greenhouse gas benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 7-9]
Various reports include projections of U.S. renewable natural gas supply. The most recent is a
2019 report prepared by ICF for the American Gas Foundation.9 Based on the projections in that
report and shown below, there is more than sufficient potential supply of RNG to meet the
demand posed by on-road NGVs. NGVs today consume approximately 75 trillion Btu per year
(tBtu/y) and based on NGV Am erica's projections could grow to about 485 tBtu/y by 2035. This
amount is far below what the AGF report projects is possible in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0597, pp.7-9]
9 AGF 2019 RNG Study Full Report - FINAL 12-18-2019 (l).docx (gasfoundation.org)
[See original comment for Figure 2: Estimated Annual RNG Production, High Resource
Potential Scenario, tBty/u] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 7-9]
The graphic below shows how the AGF figures compare with other less recent reports.
[See original comment for RNG Supply Forecasts (Billion DGE Year)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0597, pp.7-9]
EPA Must Amend its Proposal to Account for Benefits of Biofuels
NGV America is not alone in making the case that EPA must amend its proposal. Other
organizations including the refinery industry, independent fuel retailers, and the ethanol industry
have argued that EPA must make a course correction and following through on its prior
commitment to do so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 9-10]
In 2012, EPA10 committed to sunset the use of the 0 g/mi allowance for electric vehicles as
explained below:
10 2012-21972.pdf (govinfo.gov)
EPA is finalizing the full net upstream GHG emissions approach for the compliance treatment
for EV/PHEV/ FCVs beyond the per-company vehicle production threshold caps in MYs 2022-
2025. EPA is not adopting any type of "phase-in", i.e., the compliance value will change from 0
g/mi to the full net upstream GHG emissions value once a manufacturer exceeds the cap. EPA
believes that the levels of the per company vehicle production caps in MYs 2017-2025 are high
enough to provide a sufficient incentive such that any production beyond those caps should use
the full net upstream GHG emissions accounting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 9-10]
The preamble to that rule included the following discussion aptly summarizing the opposition
to the use of the 0 g/mi standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 9-10]
(1) EPA should amend its greenhouse gas regulations for all types of vehicles including light-,
medium-, and heavy-duty motor vehicles and incorporate the well-to-wheel benefits of natural
gas and renewable natural gas as part of the engine and vehicle certification regulations; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
(2) EPA to the extent it incorporates other technology advancement credits in its vehicle
regulations should extend these incentives to natural gas and natural gas hybrid- electric vehicles
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based on the demonstrated benefits of these vehicles and the need to accelerate the introduction
of a diverse mix of cleaner vehicle technologies; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
(3) EPA should provide enhanced SmartWay designations for trucks powered by low-NOx
engines and fueled by carbon-neutral or even carbon-negative renewable natural gas; [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
(4) Federal agencies should fund pilot programs and infrastructure development that
demonstrate the ways in which natural gas can be used to fuel a variety of different
transportation sectors by supporting the purchase of vehicles and equipment at multimodal
facilities such as ports and rail facilities; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
(5) Federal agencies should ensure that federal funding provided under the CMAQ Program
and the DERA Program and other programs enacted as part of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law
and Inflation Reduction Act are competitively awarded for projects that provide the most cost-
effective emission reductions and offer increased funding levels for engines and vehicles that are
certified to more demanding standards in advance of EPA's adoption of such standards; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
(6) Federal agencies should work with state authorities to ensure that transportation policies
include performance metrics and consider a variety of different technologies as opposed to only
promoting specific technologies regardless of their cost; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp.
14-15]
(7) The Administration should work with Congress to amend the federal excise tax on new
trucks to reduce the impediment to fleets and businesses purchasing cleaner new trucks by either
eliminating the tax altogether since it discourages new purchases or amend the tax so that it does
not penalize more costly, lower polluting technologies (i.e., eliminate the excise tax on the
incremental cost). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
Organization: Nebraska Corn Board (NCB) and Nebraska Corn Growers Association
On behalf of the nearly 2,500 Nebraska Corn Growers Association (NeCGA) dues paying
members and the over 21,000 corn farmers in Nebraska who contribute to the state's corn
checkoff program through the Nebraska Corn Board (NCB), we appreciate the opportunity to
comment on the Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-
Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0583, p. 1]
Nebraska corn farmers and ethanol producers have worked diligently in reducing greenhouse
gas emissions while supplying the fuels industry with a low carbon, high octane alternative.
However, the EPA seemingly overlooks the contribution that biofuels, such as ethanol, can
provide to reducing carbon emissions through tailpipes and internal combustion engines. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0583, p. 1]
This proposal gives EVs an unfair advantage when the EPA upstream emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0583, p. 1]
As most Americans will continue driving their current vehicle, it is crucial to ensure they have
access to an affordable and environmentally friendly product such as gasoline with 15% ethanol,
known as El 5. This is a fuel that is acceptable for vehicles 2001 and newer which are 97% of the
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vehicles on the road. If made available to every consumer in the country, this would reduce
carbon emissions by 280 million tons in the next decade. We ask the EPA to consider the
University of California, Riverside's study on the Comparison of Exhaust Emissions between
E10 and splash blended El5 as it demonstrates the opportunity that El5 has at reducing
emissions. This study states around 54% reduction in carbon emissions compared to E10. We
strongly believe in the role biofuels have as a critical step in reducing carbon emissions and
being a cost-effective fuel for consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0583, p. 2]
Organization: Nebraska Farm Bureau Federation (NEFB)
Rather than selecting winners and losers, EPA should pursue an "all-of-the-above",
technology-neutral approach and ensure a place for both electric and liquid fuel, including
biofuel, powered vehicles. A continued diversified fuel portfolio can meet meaningful green-
house gas emission reductions and also acknowledges our nation's continued need for biofuels
and other liquid fuel products. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0660, p. 1]
Farm and ranch families want clean air just as much as the rest of the nation. At the same
time, we'd also urge your Administration reconsider these proposals from EPA to better allow
for emissions reductions from a myriad of vehicle and fuels technologies while at the same time
meeting Americans' transportation needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0660, p. 1]
Organization: North Dakota Farmers Union (NDFU)
NDFU urges the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to take a more balanced,
technology neutral approach that better reflects the benefits of biofuels to emissions reductions
efforts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, pp. 1-2]
Background
NDFU is a strong supporter of renewable fuels, which provide high octane fuels with lower
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Renewable fuels also provide a critical market for farmers'
crops and create well-paying jobs in our rural communities. However, barriers to the growth in
renewable fuels markets remain. We continue to urge EPA to support the use of mid-level
ethanol blends that provide a significant cost-effective means of reducing GHG and other air
pollutant emissions. Unfortunately, the proposed rule ignores those benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0586, pp.1-2]
The proposed standards for 2027 and later set very aggressive goals for reducing GHG and
criteria emissions. Achieving these goals will require dramatic changes not only in vehicle
design, but in the entire automotive supply chain. To achieve these goals with a heavy reliance
on battery electric vehicles (BEVs) will require huge investments and rapid growth in many
industries including the mining and processing of key minerals, the generation and distribution of
electricity, and the recharging of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, pp. 1-2]
We are concerned that a swift and dramatic shift to BEVs will be difficult to achieve. The
obstacles include geopolitics, long lead times, significant capital investments, and lagging
consumer acceptance. In a state like North Dakota where drivers face cold weather and long
driving distances, it is difficult to imagine a large portion of the population using BEVs in four
years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, pp. 1-2]
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On the other hand, renewable fuels are already compatible with many vehicles on the road
today and can offer immediate emissions benefits on a larger scale than relying solely on new
vehicles to achieve EPA's targets. Recent reports show that Americans are keeping their vehicles
longer than in prior years. 1 In the long-term, promoting multiple solutions, including renewable
fuels offers solutions for customers who may not be well served by BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0586, pp.1-2]
1 Krisher, T. (2023, May 15). Repelled by high car prices, Americans are holding onto their vehicles
longer than ever. Associated Press. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/cars-older-record-age-prices-
shortages- supply-6e3273208399803a402e707el393475c.
In order to foster a vibrant and competitive landscape where multiple solutions co-exist, EPA
should set performance-based and technology-neutral emissions standards. Unfortunately, the
proposed standard falls short of this ideal. We urge EPA to look beyond tailpipe emissions and
use life cycle analysis for fair comparisons and a "level playing field." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0586, pp. 1-2]
Benefits of Renewable Fuels
NDFU continues to believe that high octanes fuels are the cheapest method for reducing GHG
emissions. Improved engines and high octane fuels, specifically mid-level ethanol blends, are
technologically feasible and economically reasonable means to achieve reduced GHG emissions.
Increased ethanol volume increases the octane level of gasoline across grades. In addition to its
higher octane level, ethanol also boosts engine efficiency.2 Higher ethanol blends can increase
fuel octane without expensive refinery upgrades. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 2]
2 Ricardo, Inc. (2016, September 20). The draft technical assessment report: Implications for high octane,
mid- level ethanol blends, Final report. Prepared for Renewable Fuels Association. Retrieved from
https://d35tlsyewk4d42.cloudfront.net/file/1607/ATTACHMENT-A_Ricardo-TAR-Report-for-
RFA_2016_09-20.pdf.
Ethanol is substantially cleaner than petroleum-based octane additives. It reduces emissions of
particulate matter and air toxics, such as benzene, toluene, and xylene. Ethanol further provides
GHG emissions reductions, which is increasingly important as the carbon intensity of gasoline is
increasing with greater use of unconventional fossil fuels. "Emissions from fossil fuel
combustion comprise the vast majority of energy-related emissions," with an increase in
emissions from the transportation sector largely attributed to increased vehicle miles travelled
and motor gasoline consumption by light-duty vehicles.3 At the same time, energy use in ethanol
production and lifecycle GHG emissions have decreased with changes in farming practices and
higher yields. As EPA has found, the land use, lang-use change, and forestry sector generated a
net increase in carbon stocks.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 2]
3 Environmental Protection Agency (2023). Inventory of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and sinks: 1990-
2021. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA 430-R-23-002.
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/US-GHG-Inventory-2023-Main-Text.pdf.
4 Id. Low-carbon liquid fuels can achieve GHG reductions faster than new vehicles can
displace the existing fleet. As illustrated below [See original comment for Figure 21. Light and
Medium Duty Vehicle Annual GHG Emissions Reduction Scenario (2022-2023)], a relatively
simple change such as replacing E10 (10% ethanol) with E15 (15% ethanol) can offer greater
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GHG reductions than the phase-in of BEVs,7 because it can immediately affect a huge fleet of
vehicles that are already in use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, pp. 4-5]
7 Eichbethanolerger, J. (2023, June). Decarbonizing combustion vehicles - A critical part in reducing
transportation emissions. Transportation Energy Institute. Retrieved from
https://www.transportationenergy.org/resources/blog-post/decarbonizing-combustion-vehicles-a-critical-
part-in-reducing-transportation-emissions/.
Ethanol can continue to significantly contribute to reductions in GHG emissions from the
transportation sector. Argonne National Laboratory published a study finding that the carbon
intensity of corn-based ethanol improved 23% from 2005 to 2019 and that "displacement of
gasoline by corn ethanol on an energy equivalent basis from 2005 to 2019 has resulted in a
cumulative GHG emissions reduction of 544 MMT C02e."8 To enable further displacement of
gasoline by ethanol, many stakeholders have agreed to support E25 capability in all vehicles by
2028, and E30 by 2033, as specified in the Next Generation Fuels Act.9 EPA need not wait for
legislation, however. It can use existing authority to mandate or encourage the production of new
vehicles with E25/E30 capability, as well as flex-fuel vehicles with E85 capability. Getting these
vehicles on the road quickly will build the foundation for future increases in ethanol usage and
dramatic GHG emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, pp. 4-5]
8 Lee, U., Kwon, H., Wu, M., and Wang, M. (2021, May 4). Retrospective analysis of the U.S. corn
ethanol industry for 2005-2019: implications for greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Biofuels,
Bioproducts and Biorefining. Retrieved from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/bbb.2225.
9 Grassley, C. (2023, March 22). Grassley introduces bipartisan bill to improve vehicle efficiency and
lower fuel costs. [Press Release]. Retrieved from https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-
releases/grassley- introduces-bipartisan-bill-to-improve-vehicle-efficiency-and-lower-fuel-costs.
Unfortunately, the significant GHG benefits of ethanol and other low-carbon fuels are not
accounted for in the proposed rulemaking. EPA should use life cycle analysis to properly
account for and incentivize their use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, pp. 4-5]
Biofuels have an important role to play in supporting family farms and rural communities.
Renewable fuels can also significantly contribute to EPA's emissions reduction goals. However,
we are concerned that EPA's proposal is biased in favor of BEVs and against renewable fuels.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 6]
We also urge EPA to take appropriate regulatory actions to promote higher blends of ethanol
and support any legislative changes necessary to overcome limits to EPA's authority. These
actions include ensuring that vehicles can use mid-level ethanol blend and revising the
certification fuel as needed to do so. We believe this would also provide reduced emissions for
particulate matter and air toxics, providing a truly multi-pollutant emissions reduction
solutions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 7]
Organization: Novozymes North America
Novozymes' Innovative Technologies Result in Lower Biofuel Lifecycle Emissions
Novozymes' enzymatic catalyst solutions, also known as biocatalysts, make the production of
biofuels more efficient and environmentally friendly. Enzymes increase yield, reduce waste,
reduce raw material input, and produce higher energy savings. Enzymes enable biofuel producers
to convert corn kernel, corn stover, wheat straw, wood chips, sawdust, waste, and sugarcane
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bagasse into fuel, while collectively increasing yield and energy efficiency throughout the sector.
Our enzymes help biofuel producers get more energy out of every harvest. These technologies
have already helped the U.S. replace about 10% of liquid fuels with renewable alternatives.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0650, pp. 2-3]
Fiberex is a platform designed by Novozymes to utilize waste cellulosic material found in
agricultural products. These cellulase enzymes can convert the cellulosic fiber found in, for
example, corn kernel fiber, into high-value, low-CI products including cellulosic ethanol and
increases corn oil yield that may be utilized as a raw material for renewable diesel production.
This process is critical in maximizing fermentation efficiency and generating the low carbon
products the markets (and consumers) are demanding. This technology has been instrumental in
generating the roughly 120 million gallons of cellulosic ethanol that is currently being shipped to
California every year. With a CI score 70 percent lower than gasoline, this cellulosic ethanol
made from the corn kernel is helping to lower carbon emissions, drive sustainability in our
transportation sector and create economic impacts from coast to coast. It is vital that, moving
forward, this cellulosic technology can be applied not only to the production of low carbon
ethanol, but increasingly to low carbon biochemicals as well as Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF).
This includes supporting large-scale production of critical enzymes and yeast used in fiber
conversion as well as ensuring that modeling (i.e. Argonne GREET) accurately accounts for the
benefits being seen via this advanced technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0650, pp. 2-3]
Novozymes Innova yeast products deliver unparalleled robustness, help increase ethanol
yield, and reduce fermentation time and operational costs. Novozymes launched its first yeast
product in North America in 2018, and it has now launched 11 yeast products across the globe.
Novozymes' yeast allows producers to consistently reduce corn and chemical inputs and power
through the most challenging conditions. Most of Novozymes' yeast products express enzymes
required to hydrolyze starch to produce glucose. Delivering enzymes via yeast decreases
exogenous enzyme requirements resulting in a more sustainable, and lower CI fermentation
process. Novozymes also developed the Cellerity® yeast platform for second generation biomass
refineries. Cellerity enables increased ethanol yield and improved xylose conversion and
inhibitor tolerance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0650, pp. 2-3]
Above the inherent efficiencies and savings achievable with Novozymes' enzymes alone, the
company's yeast technologies provide additional benefits. Many of our yeasts express critical
enzymes needed for the lowest emissions biofuel production, in addition to converting available
sugars to ethanol. These enzymes reduce the need for exogenous enzyme addition, further
enabling overall lower CI values for today's biofuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0650, pp. 2-3]
EPA Should Issue a Final Rule That is Technology Neutral and Promotes All Available
Lower Emissions Transportation Fuels
Whether intended or not, the practical effect of the proposed rule in its current form would be
to pick winners and losers and would fail to help encourage and facilitate the continued growth,
production and use of vehicles that run on all lower emissions transportation fuels, including low
CI biofuels. This effect would make it harder for the United States to attain its necessarily
ambitious goal to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. This conclusion is especially true
considering that many in the auto and other industries have predicted as overly ambitious and
impractical the myriad policy goals to phase out the sale and production of light and medium
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duty vehicles with internal combustion engines by 2030 to 2040. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0650, pp. 2-3]
Although, through this proposal, EPA appears to be essentially directing the auto industry to
sell approximately 67 percent of new cars and trucks as EVs by 2032, there are real questions
whether that many consumers will want to buy them and whether the necessary infrastructure
and grid enhancements to handle that many EVs on the road will be available by that time.
Meantime, the federal government has formulated laws and policies to encourage the increased
investment in and production and use of the cleanest biofuels that have been and continue to be
responsible for massive emissions reductions in the transportation fuel sector over the last two
decades. These policies and laws, including the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), have
worked together to encourage these outcomes and the ongoing innovation within the biofuels
industry that has and continues to improve the carbon and other GHG emissions reduction
capabilities of the biofuels used in transportation fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0650, pp. 2-3]
We respectfully urge the EPA to revise the proposed rule, so that when it is issued in its final
form, the regulation will not only help facilitate the wider production, sale and use of EVs, but
will simultaneously recognize and build on the enormous emissions reduction success and
potential of biofuels. Both of these outcomes will be needed to meet the transportation fuel need
in this country at least over the next two decades. Moreover, they will be necessary for this
country to achieve net zero emissions by 2050, especially given the realities of legacy ICE
vehicles expected to be on the road at least through the 2040s. Put another way, to achieve this
country's collective net zero by 2050 emissions reduction goals, U.S. policies and laws will need
to recognize and encourage every potential source of clean energy. Biofuels must continue to be
on top of this list for the foreseeable future, and the final rule must reflect this fact so as to avoid
inadvertently leaving behind millions of tons of avoided emissions reductions, or discouraging
the continued investment, innovation and use of low carbon and other GHG emissions fuels in
this country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0650, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Oryxe International Inc.
1. EPA Should Affirm Vehicle Manufacturers Can Use Low Emission Fuel Additives to
Achieve Compliance under the Proposed Rule
In the Proposed Rule, EPA states that it "anticipates that a compliant fleet under the proposed
standards would include a diverse range of technologies, including higher penetrations of
advanced gasoline technologies ..." Oryxe strongly agrees with this and urges EPA to include
low emission fuel additives in the list of technology examples. Moreover, Oryxe urges EPA to
ensure that any final rule recognizes the ability of vehicle manufacturers to use fuel additives to
comply with the carbon dioxide and criteria pollutant standards. Internal combustion engine
("ICE") vehicles are and will continue to be a major part of the domestic fleet for many years to
come. EPA's rule should explicitly acknowledge that the fuel placed into ICE vehicle engines
will have a significant impact on carbon dioxide and criteria pollutant emissions, as well as on
fuel economy. By EPA's own estimation, "tens of millions of gasoline-powered sources will
remain in use well into the 2030s." 88 Fed. Reg. 29397. Notably, the Proposed Rule already
recognizes the emission reduction benefits associated with using ethanol as a gasoline additive.
As stated in the preamble, using gasoline containing 10 percent ethanol results in approximately
1.5 percent lower carbon dioxide emissions than using pure gasoline. Starting in Model Year
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2027, the Proposed Rule would require manufactures of light-duty gasoline powered vehicles to
demonstrate compliance using gasoline containing 10% ethanol, referred to as Tier 3 fuel. 88
Fed. Reg. 29240-41. Given that EPA understands and accepts the use of fuel additives to reduce
emissions, it makes sense for EPA to ensure that any final rule explicitly provide that
manufacturers are permitted to use fuel additives to comply with the emission standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0752, p. 2]
Oryxe's experience clearly demonstrates that fuel additives such as BetterFill provide an
immediate opportunity to achieve significant cost-effective carbon dioxide and criteria pollutant
emissions reductions that should be maximized. Such emission reductions will play an important
role while the electric utility generation sector transitions to less emitting technologies and as the
infrastructure for electrified vehicles develops. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0752, p. 2]
Oryxe's fuel additive technology significantly reduces emissions of carbon dioxide, nitrogen
oxides, and particulate matter from gasoline, diesel, and biodiesel. For example, Oryxe has
reduced more than 70 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent over the past five (5)
years in the United States alone and has recently proven to reduce 4.2 grams of carbon dioxide
equivalent per megajoule of energy (gC02e/MJ) in gasoline and 2.15 gC02e/MJ in diesel fuel. It
is important to note that the reductions associated with the use of fuel additives are immediate
and low-cost, without the need for long and costly capital expenditure investments. Treating all
diesel and gasoline consumed in the United States would prevent more than 30 billion tons of
carbon dioxide from entering the atmosphere each year. It would also result in a reduction of
annual emissions of nitrogen oxides and particulate matter by up to eight (8) and 30 percent
respectively. Additional benefits would result from treating biodiesel with Oryxe's fuel additive
technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0752, pp. 2-3]
A final rule that recognizes the ability of vehicle manufacturers to use low emission fuel
additives for ICE vehicles to comply with the emissions standards is necessary and appropriate to
achieving meaningful reductions, as well as within the scope of the rule. Oryxe understands that
in promulgating past emissions standards for vehicles, EPA dismissed comments urging it to set
a minimum octane fuel standard as a means of achieving the proposed emission standards as
non-germane. 2 Oryxe's comments on the Proposed Rule differ from those comments and should
not be dismissed. Here, Oryxe is not seeking a change, for example, to the octane levels; rather,
Oryxe is asking EPA to give credit to fuel additives towards meeting the carbon dioxide and
criteria pollutant emission standards. Such explicit acknowledgement is germane to this
rulemaking, which requires the fuel efficiency gains and emissions reductions to achieve
compliance standards without mandating a specific technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0752, pp. 2-3]
2 See, e.g., EPA, Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards: Response to Comments, EPA-420-R-21-027 (Dec. 2021).
As noted above, the preamble to the Proposed Rule maintains that "EPA anticipates that a
compliant fleet under the proposed standards would include a diverse range of technologies,
including higher penetrations of advanced gasoline technologies as well as zero-emission
vehicles. It is therefore important to consider the environmental and other implications of the
ICE portion of the fleet." 88 Fed. Reg. 29187. Oryxe agrees that vehicle manufacturers will rely
on a diverse portfolio of technologies to achieve the emissions standard. For this reason, Oryxe
respectfully requests that EPA ensure any final rule clearly provides that vehicle manufactures
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may use low emission fuel additives to comply with the carbon dioxide and criteria pollutant
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0752, p. 4]
Organization: Our Children's Trust (OCT)
Specifically, there is a clear consensus that decarbonizing transportation requires a rapid shift
away from fossil fuel vehicles toward Zero Emissions Vehicles ("ZEVs"), including battery-
electric vehicles ("BEVs"), plug-in hybrid vehicles running primarily on electricity ("PHEVs"),
and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles ("FCEVs"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 1]
1 Transitioning from conventional internal combustion engine vehicles to electric vehicles is
believed to be one of the most promising pathways for decreasing greenhouse gas ("GHG")
emissions from the road transportation sectors and thus should be pursued aggressively.2 While
improving fuel efficiency can help to reduce emissions in the short-term, it cannot achieve the
emissions reductions needed to achieve the Administration's net zero emissions target, it
contributes to ongoing dangerous levels of GHG emissions, and experts have concluded that the
continued use of fossil fuel vehicles is considered "a technological dead end."3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0542, p.1]
Organization: Pearson Fuels
On behalf of Pearson Fuels, thank you for the opportunity to submit comments on the Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles (the "Proposed Standards"). These comments are focused on the light-duty greenhouse
gas emissions standards (the "GHG Standards"). As the leading supplier of E85 fuel in
California, Pearson Fuels' primary interests in this proceeding are to ensure that: 1) the
tremendous policy value of flex fuel vehicles (FFVs) that utilize E85 fuel is recognized as an
important GHG mitigation strategy, and 2) this policy value is reflected programmatically by
EPA re-integrating a commensurate level of FFV crediting into the EPA's GHG Standards.
Through precisely calibrated FFV crediting, EPA will revitalize FFV manufacturing by some
automakers and facilitate the development of hybrid FFVs like the Toyota Hybrid Flex Corolla
that is being pioneered by Toyota of Brazil.1 This revitalization will not impede EPA's
aggressive goal of rapid light-duty electrification but will diversify EPA's portfolio of
decarbonization strategies for internal combustion engines thereby catalyzing more rapid and
comprehensive decarbonization of the light-duty sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 1-
2]
1 See ET Auto, "Toyota launches pilot project on flex-fuel strong hybrid EVs in India," at
https://auto.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/toyota-launches-pilot-project-on-flexi-fuel-strong-hybrid-
electric- vehicles-ffv-shev-in-india-signs-mou-with-iisc-bengaluru/94786626, and Nikkei Asia, "Toyota to
invest $334m to make compact biofuel hybrids in Brazil, Carmaker seeks to provide consumers with
cheaper, eco-friendly vehicles," at https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Automobiles/Toyota-to-invest-334m-
to-make-compact-biofuel-hybrids-in-Brazil.
FFVs are a proven, robust, cost-saving and energy security enhancing GHG reduction tool
that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") integrated into the 2012-2016 light-duty
GHG standards in a manner that aligned with the methodology of the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy ("CAFE") program and facilitated extensive FFV manufacturing. Beginning in 2016,
EPA eliminated its use of the 0.15 multiplier in the EPA's GHG Standards which triggered the
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rapid decline of FFV manufacturing. EPA explained its elimination of the multiplier based
on the distinct goals of the CAFE program wherein the use of E85 achieves an 85% reduction in
petroleum use thereby justifying the multiplier as compared to the EPA's GHG program which is
focused on GHG reduction with no comparable justification for a multiplier.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0577, pp.1-2]
2 77 FR 62816.
If the U.S. as a nation leveraged E85 as California does now, the benefit would be an
estimated MMT tons of GHG reduction and petroleum displacement annually in 2022 and 74.71
MMT in 2032.5 We appreciate the opportunity to present these comments to this critical
rulemaking and are hopeful that EPA will reassess and leverage the GHG-reduction potential of
FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 3]
5 See p. 10-12 of this Comment for the data and analysis underlying these figures.
EPA went on to assert in the Final Rule that despite the very substantial reduction of GHG
emissions incentives that would result from the elimination of the 0.15 multiplier in 2016,
automakers would continue to manufacture FFVs: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 4-5]
"There are approximately 10 million ethanol FFVs on the road in the U.S. today (far more
than any other incentivized technology), and automakers produced approximately 2 million
ethanol FFVs in MY 2011 alone. Although the great majority of ethanol FFVs currently use
gasoline, EPA believes that automakers will continue to produce ethanol FFVs, as more
consumers begin to fuel their ethanol FFVs with E85 fuel. Given the long history of federal
incentives for ethanol FFVs, and the fact that ethanol FFVs can achieve small GHG emissions
credits after the GHG emissions incentives expire, the Agency believes that there is no need to
provide additional incentives for ethanol FFVs in this rulemaking, beyond those already
provided."9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 4-5]
9 77 FR 62823-4.
In making this assertion, EPA failed to recognize that distinct and tailored program structures
and incentives are necessary to incentivize GHG-reducing technologies and fuels from different
market participants. The 0.15 multiplier was highly effective in motivating automakers to
manufacture FFVs. By contrast, the small GHG emissions credits based solely on tailpipe GHG
emissions proved to be insufficient to motivate automakers to manufacture FFVs. This deficient
GHG program incentive was not overcome by the existence of incentives for ethanol production
that exist in RFS2. The credits in the RFS2 program are known as Renewable Identification
Numbers (RINs), and are generated by fuel producers of ethanol and other qualifying RFS2
fuels. However, there is no opportunity for automakers to benefit from RINs generated for
ethanol production, so the RFS2 program does not influence their manufacturing behavior.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 4-5]
In order to effectively achieve GHG reductions, it is necessary to develop and maintain
programs that both put the right vehicles on the road (in this case, FFVs) as well as programs that
put the right fuels in fueling stations (in this case, E85). The rapid expansion of the U.S. FFV
fleet preceded both the existence of a robust E85 station network and widespread customer
recognition of the benefits of ethanol, as well as consumer awareness of FFV capabilities. As a
result, the 2012-2015 FFV fleet initially utilized relatively small quantities of E85. In sharp
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contrast today in California, the drivers of that same fleet (that remains on the road today) are
using the Pearson Fuel application on their smart phones to access a burgeoning E85 station
network and check local station prices. Upon identifying a cost savings opportunity, the
customer is motivated to drive to a targeted E85 station to save money and fill up with an
American-grown, low-carbon, octane-boosting fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 5]
This GHG Standards rulemaking provides EPA with the unique opportunity to leverage a
GHG reducing tool that is already proven in the marketplace and is complementary rather than
competitive with EPA's core decarbonization strategy of light-duty electrification. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 5]
Restoring more harmonized FFV crediting between the CAFE and GHG programs would
benefit automakers, consumers, and marketers by affording all a choice in the market and by
establishing a diversified technology portfolio approach to decarbonization. FFVs deliver a wide
array of real-world benefits when fueled with E85 or other gasoline-ethanol blends, including
improved U.S. energy security, support for the U.S. farm economy, as well as significant
reductions in GHG emissions. FFV consumers can respond to fuel market signals by utilizing
high blend E85 ethanol when the fuel is at the greatest discount to petroleum and conventional
gasoline when ethanol prices are relatively high as compared to gasoline (which has rarely been
the case in the past five years). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 6]
These are all vital flexibilities to a successful evolution of the vehicle market and to achieving
the goals of the GHG rulemaking - increased efficiency, improved energy security, reduced
costs to consumers, and reduced GHG emissions from the transportation sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0577, p. 6]
c. The use of sustainable biofuels is internationally recognized as a vitally important
GHG reduction strategy.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recently released a critical GHG
report entitled, "Climate Change 2022, Mitigation of Climate Change, Summary for
Policymakers." 11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 7]
11 IPCC, 2022: Summary for Policymakers,
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_SummaryForPolicymakers.pdf.
The report reached the following findings pertaining to biofuels:
- C.8 (...) Sustainable biofuels can offer additional mitigation benefits in land-based transport
in the short and medium term (medium confidence). Sustainable biofuels, low- emissions
hydrogen, and derivatives (including synthetic fuels) can support mitigation of C02 emissions
from shipping, aviation, and heavy-duty land transport but require production process
improvements and cost reductions (medium confidence). (...) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577,
p. 7]
- C.8.3 (...) Sourced sustainably and with low-GHG emissions feedstocks, bio-based fuels,
blended or unblended with fossil fuels, can provide mitigation benefits, particularly in the short
and medium term (medium confidence). (. . .)12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 7]
12 Id. at p. 32.
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d. California has recognized the value of biofuels as a vitally important GHG reduction
strategy; has leveraged its existing FFV fleet to reduce GHGs in the light-duty sector; and has
determined that deploying low carbon liquid fuels in all remaining internal combustion engines
is essential to achieve carbon neutrality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 7-8]
The State of California has taken a leadership role in climate policy dating back to 2006, and
has developed a network of policies and strategies to enable decarbonization. Consistent with
this, Governor Jerry Brown signed Executive Order No. B-55-18 in 2018. The Executive Order
established a new statewide goal to achieve carbon neutrality as soon as possible, and no later
than 2045, and to achieve and maintain net negative emissions thereafter. Further to that goal, the
California Legislature approved the Budget Act of 2019 (AB 74) that funded two studies,
administered by the California Environmental Protection Agency, to: 1) identify strategies to
reduce emissions from transportation energy use, and 2) identify strategies to manage the decline
in fossil fuel production and associated emissions in parallel with reductions in demand. The
study to reduce emissions from transportation use was conducted by the University of California
Institute of Transportation Studies ("ITS") at four campuses, UC Davis, UC Berkeley, UC
Irvine, and UCLA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 7-8]
The resulting ITS report is entitled, "Driving California's Transportation Emissions to
Zero." 13 While California leads the nation in electrifying transportation, the report recognized
the reality that a significant number of internal combustion engines will remain on the road
beyond 2035. As a result, the Driving California's Transportation Emissions to Zero report
concluded that to achieve carbon neutrality it was necessary for California to make a complete
transition by 2045 from petroleum-based gasoline to bio-based gasoline including ethanol blends
as is illustrated in the following graph. The only existing vehicles that can utilize E85, the only
type of bio-based gasoline that has been commercialized, are FFVs. GHG-reducing innovations
in fuels as well as vehicles are necessary to meet President Biden's climate goals and should be
supported by the EPA's GHG Standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 7-8]
13 Institute of Transportation Studies, "Driving California's Transportation Emissions to Zero," (April
2021), available at https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3np3p2t0.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR BAR GRAPH of Fuel Consumption 2010-2045 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 7-8]
e. California marketers have identified and promoted E85 as a consumer- friendly fuel;
built out a massive E85 station network including in disadvantaged communities; and leveraged
California's existing FFV fleet to reduce petroleum dependence and GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 8-9]
As previously noted, Pearson Fuels is the largest distributor of E85 in California and supplies
more than 315 retail E85 stations under long-term contracts. Pearson Fuels continues to open 3-4
new E85 stations per month. These stations are spread throughout the state with a high
concentration in disadvantaged communities where the fuel savings from E85 are most valuable
to low and moderate-income consumers. The following map was developed based on the Pearson
Fuels network of stations in Los Angeles overlayed on the California Legislature's SB 535
"Disadvantaged Communities Map" that highlights CalEPA designated communities in red, as
further discussed in the attached Exhibit 2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 8-9]
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SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR MAP of LA area [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp.
8-9]
During 2022, Pearson Fuels' station network delivered E85 at massive discounts to
conventional gasoline, even after adjusting for fuel mileage per gallon, with price discounts
ranging from $1.00-$2.20 on an average monthly basis as compared with same station gasoline
prices. 14 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 9-10]
14 Pricing graph based on Pearson Fuels' internal price tracking of all grades of unleaded gasoline vs. E85,
supporting information available upon request.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Progression Line Graph of Cost of Pearson Fuels E85 vs
California Gasoline January-December. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 9-10]
In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of the Ukraine and the resulting price spike in world
and U.S. national crude oil prices, E85 offered a refreshingly cost-effective and non-petroleum
dependent fuel alternative to FFV drivers- but only to FFV drivers. The price discount spurred a
remarkable year-on-year E85 demand growth rate of over 65% in California. Through its E85
program found at Title 13, California Code of Regulations, section §2292.4, CARB tracks every
gallon of E85 sold in the state. The following table and chart reflect the dramatic growth in E85
that California has achieved. 15 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 9-10]
15 See California Air Resources Board, "Alternative Fuels: E85 Ethanol," website page at
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/alternative-fuels/alternative-fuels-e85-ethanol, "Annual E85
Volumes based on Reported Test Program Exemption Data," at https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-
work/programs/alternative- fuels/alternative-fuels-e85-ethanol See also Exhibit 4 attached.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR BAR GRAPH of Annual E85 Volumes (Million Gallons)
for 2006-2022 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 9-10]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR TABLE of Total Volume (gal) for 2006-2022 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 9-10]
Given that the size of the California E85 market in 2022 was 103 million gallons and using
Pearson Fuels' corn starch ethanol/renewable naphtha as the reference fuel, California FFVs
using E85 displaced the use of approximately 80 million gallons of petroleum gasoline in
2022.20 According to EPA's Green Vehicle Guide, a typical light-duty vehicle emits 8.9 kg
C02/gallon.21 Using this figure, the light-duty vehicle use of 80 million gallons of gasoline will
result in 712,000 MT of GHG emissions. The use of the Pearson Fuels' E85 renewable naphtha
blend across all of California's demand would provide a 60% GHG reduction, or a 427,000 MT
annual reduction in GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 11-12]
20 See U.S. Department of Energy, "Is E85 Fuel Right for You?," referencing a 15-27% mileage penalty
due to the lesser energy density of ethanol, at https://www.energy.gov/energysaver/articles/e85-fuel-right-
you.
21 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Tailpipe Greenhouse Gas Emissions from a Typical Passenger
Vehicle," at https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/tailpipe-greenhouse-gas-emissions-typical-passenger-
vehicle.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration ("EIA"), California accounts for
one- tenth of U.S. motor gasoline consumption.22 Thus if California's utilization of E85 in FFVs
as a GHG reduction strategy were replicated nation-wide, the U.S. would reap the benefit of 4.27
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MMT of GHG reduction per year solely from E85 usage in FFVs. Based on California's 10-
year, year-on-year growth rate of 33%, this would reach 17.82 MMT based on 432 MG of E85 in
2027, and 74.71 MMT based on 1.8 BG of E85 in 2032. However, given the sharp decline in
FFV manufacturing, this rate of expansion could only be sustained with the re-introduction of
additional FFV models by the automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 11-12]
22 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "California State Energy Profile," at
https://www.eia. gov/state/print.php? sid=C A.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR TABLE Year/Gallons of E85/%Growth 23/ MMT GHG
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 12]
The above chart is based on the assumption of a continuation of linear growth based on the
10- year average annual growth rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 11-12]
23 Chart forecast for future years utilizes Annual Average Growth Rate (AAGR) based on past 10 years of
California's E85 market growth as reported by California Air Resources Board 2012-2022. 66% growth
rate for 2022 based on actual reported growth rate.
ICF completed an analysis of the growth of E85 in the California marketplace and forecasted
a similar growth rate for 2023-2027 (the "ICF E85 Report). However, ICF capped market growth
based on a maximum anticipated average usage rate of E85 per FFV of 50%, and also projected a
decline in registered FFVs beginning in 2025 because of fleet turnover and the rapid decline in
FFV manufacturing. The ICF report, "Forecasting E85 Consumption in California" provides the
background and details of the ICF E85 forecast and is attached as Exhibit 3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0577, p. 12]
The ICF E85 Report also analyzed the current usage rate of E85 in FFVs in California for
2022, and determined this rate to be 0.16. As previously noted, the usage rate of E85 is known as
the F Factor that is utilized in determining crediting for FFV manufacturing for the CAFE and
GHG programs. Based on California Energy Commission data pertaining to the number of
registered FFVs in California and the rapid growth in demand for E85, the ICF Report E85
forecasts the F Factor for California FFVs to grow from 0.16 to 0.50 over the next five years.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 12]
Table 2 of the Proposed Rule is entitled the "Projected GHG Emission Impacts in 2055 From
The Proposed Rule, Light-Duty and Medium-Duty." For C02 emissions, the Table contains a
projected reduction of 440 MMT in 2055. Thus, even the 2022 national opportunity of GHG
reductions from FFVs of 4.27 MMT represents nearly 1% of EPA's total targeted reductions for
2055. Coupled with the California E85 growth rate of 33%, the leveraging of the E85/FFV
opportunity through 2032 could contribute to 17% annual GHG reduction opportunity in the
internal combustion engine sector of the market. From a policy design perspective, FFV
crediting in the GHG program represents low-hanging fruit that EPA should harvest in this
rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 12-13]
However, as illustrated by the ICF report, in order to realize these potential GHG reduction
gains from E85 usage nation-wide, EPA must make a course correction in the light-duty GHG
Standards to reinstate a reasonable level of crediting for FFV manufacturing. Without this
adjustment, the automakers will continue to manufacture light-duty vehicles that can only be
operated on fossil-based gasoline and the nation's FFV fleet will continue to decline. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 12-13]
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g. The use of E85 as a decarbonization strategy is a uniquely cost-efficient GHG strategy
that reduces petroleum dependence and enhances energy security
As has been discussed, it is now clear that Californians are embracing E85 fuel with the
second largest gasoline market in the country showing 66% year-on-year growth in E85 sales
from 2021 to 2022. CARB has confirmed the rigor of its oversight program and the rate of E85
growth in a letter to Pearson Fuels that is attached as Exhibit 4 to this comment.24 The sustained
growth in demand for E85 from FFVs in California is remarkable, surging from less than 6.5
MGY in 2006 to over 103 MGY in 2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 13]
24 Letter from Alexander "Lex" Mitchell, Manager, Emerging Technologies Section, California Air
Resources Board regarding E85 use, to Graham Noyes, Noyes Law Corporation. This CARB letter is
attached as an exhibit to the comment of Pearson Fuels to this proceeding.
The primary reason E85 use is on the rise in California is a typical and crucial driver in the
fuel market, price. At the retail level, California FFV owners can fill up on E85 and routinely
save 10 percent or more compared to conventional unleaded on a price per mile basis. It is due to
these favorable economics that FFV stations are flourishing in disadvantaged communities where
spiking gasoline prices are most damaging to consumer budgets. FFV owners previously unable
to fuel with E85 because of limited availability are just now being exposed to a robust network
of E85 stations offering steep price discounts to gasoline, and providing a cleaner fuel that
simultaneously boosts octane, the farm economy, and U.S. energy security. E85's rapidly
growing market appeal is not limited to California and is part of a broader U.S. market transition
toward higher ethanol blends. This rapid growth in E85 demand is occurring at the same time
that diminished FFV crediting under the GHG program has undercut the incentive for
automakers to manufacture FFVs. This deployment of FFVs utilizing E85 by U.S. consumers to
save money and reduce GHG emissions would be greatly enhanced to the extent EPA establishes
an appropriate GHG emissions factor for FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 13]
DOE's analysis of corn ethanol provides an appropriate reference for determining the
appropriate multiplier for the use of E85 in FFVs. The midpoint of the range is 48%, and the
annualized rate of CI reduction is approximately 1.5% for the period 2005-2019. Applying a
steady rate of carbon intensity reduction between 2019 and 2027 provides a forecasted carbon
intensity reduction of 12%. This would establish a carbon intensity reduction rate vs. gasoline of
48% (2019) + 12% (8 years of 1.5%/year) = 60% for 2027-2032. This carbon intensity reduction
rate is conservative as it is based solely on corn starch ethanol, which is the predominant
feedstock for the production of U.S. ethanol but is also the highest carbon intensity ethanol that
is supplied in significant quantities. It is forecast that there will be a substantial expansion of new
carbon intensity reduction technologies including carbon capture and sequestration, and climate
smart agriculture that will significantly lower the CI of corn starch ethanol over the next
decade.26 It is also anticipated that there will be a substantial expansion of ethanol produced
from lower carbon intensity feedstocks as has occurred in the California marketplace.27 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 14]
26 See Reuters, "Ethanol could get boost from carbon capture credits in Biden climate law, at
https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/ethanol-could-get-boost-carbon-capture-credits-biden-
climate-law- 2022-08-18/ and Investigate Midwest, "As U.S. pushes 'climate-smart' agriculture, hopes and
fears collide," at https ://investigatemidwest.org/2023/03/30/as-us-pushes-climate-smart-agriculture-hopes-
and-fears-collide/.
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27 U.S. Department of Agriculture, "The California Low Carbon Fuel Standard: Incentivizing Greenhouse
Gas Mitigation in the Ethanol Industry," (November 2020), at
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CA- LCFS-Incentivizing-Ethanol-Industry-GHG-
Mitigation.pdf.
i. EPA established a new methodology for calculating FFV crediting for MY 2016 and
later in its joint rule with NHTSA for MY 2012-2016.
In the joint NHTSA Final Rule for MY 2012-2016 ("Joint 2012 Final Rule"), EPA
established first the approach for FFV crediting for 2012-2016:
(1) The assumption that the vehicle is operated 50% of the time on the conventional fuel and
50% of the time on the alternative fuel, (2) that 1 gallon of alternative fuel is treated as 0.15
gallon of fuel, essentially increasing the fuel economy of a vehicle on alternative fuel by a factor
of 6.67, and (3) a "cap" provision that limits the maximum fuel economy increase that can be
applied to a manufacturer's overall CAFE compliance value for all CAFE compliance categories
(i.e., domestic passenger cars, import passenger cars, and light trucks) to 1.2 mpg through 2014
and 1.0 mpg in 2015.28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 14-15]
28 75 FR 25432.
The Joint 2012 Final Rule also established the methodology for FFV crediting for MY 2016
and subsequent years as being distinct from the 2012-2016 methodology as follows:
Starting with model year 2016, as proposed, EPA will no longer allow manufacturers to base
FFV emissions on the use of the 0.15 factor credit described above, and on the use of an assumed
50% usage of alternative fuel. Instead, EPA believes the appropriate approach is to ensure that
FFV emissions are based on demonstrated emissions performance.29 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0577, pp. 14-15]
29 Id. at 25433.
EPA provided the following example calculation:
For example, for a flexible-fuel vehicle that emitted 300 g/mi C02 operating on E85 ten
percent of the time and 350 g/mi C02 operating on gasoline ninety percent of the time, the C02
emissions for the vehicles to be used in the manufacturer's fleet average would be calculated as
follows:
C02 = (300 x 0.10) + (350 x 0.90) = 345 g/mi30
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 15-16]
30 Id. at 25434.
Regarding the method of apportionment between E85 usage and gasoline usage, EPA stated:
One option EPA is finalizing is establishing a rebuttable presumption using a national average
approach based on national E85 fuel use. (...) EPA plans to make this assigned fuel usage factor
available through guidance prior to the start of MY 2016 and adjust it annually as necessary.
EPA believes this is a reasonable way to apportion E85 use across the fleet.31 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0577, pp.15-16]
31 Id.
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In subsequent rulemakings, this usage factor has come to be known as the F Factor.32
32 See U.S. EPA, Technical Memorandum Describing Potential Methods for Determining the Weighting
Factor (F- Factor) for Testing E85 Flexible Fuel Vehicles (FFV) Light-duty Vehicles, (August 18, 2020), at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/documents/f-factor-technical-memo-ty20-determination-
2020-08- 18.pdf.
Thus EPA's methodology for determining GHG crediting for FFVs beginning MY 2016 may
be summarized as represented by the following equation:
C02 = (E85 Tailpipe GHG Emissions x F Factor) + [Gasoline Tailpipe GHG Emissions x (1-
F Factor)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 15-16]
Organization: Plains All American Pipeline, L.P.
By 2032—less than 10 years from now—the EPA's Proposal would require nearly 70% of
light-duty cars and trucks sold in the U.S. to be electric or "zero tailpipe emission." We have a
number of concerns with this approach, a few include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-
2]
By focusing on tailpipe emissions alone, most internal combustion engine vehicles
that run on gasoline, diesel and biofuels would be unable to meet the standards set forth in the
Proposal. This overlooks critical efforts of the energy and automotive industries to pursue
continued innovation and optimization of fuel/vehicle systems to improve efficiency and reduce
emissions. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
Effectively outlawing most liquid fuel-powered vehicles would undercut U.S. energy
security,2 harm our domestic energy industry and leave the U.S. more dependent on foreign-
controlled supply chains.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
Transferring a significant amount of energy demand to electricity will strain already
challenged electrical generation and transmission infrastructure. Without substantial additional
investment and significant streamlining of electric transmission permitting, it's unclear whether
the electrical grid could support charging new EVs at the level necessary to support the proposed
emissions reductions.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
Traditional energy sources are essential for ensuring effective evolution of the energy
landscape-including the manufacture and growth of renewable energy sources and EVs.
However, the Proposal would reduce energy investments and increase costs to consumers for all
forms of energy. Furthermore, this policy risks the continued viability of critical domestic energy
manufacturing infrastructure, which, if idled, would be very challenging to restore. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
Eliminating most new gasoline and diesel vehicles from the market limits consumer
choice. Significantly fewer new affordable vehicles are available for sale today5 than a few years
ago. Used cars are also increasing in price6 as some automakers warn that they will be forced to
cut back on supplying popular gasoline models because of government regulations restricting
sales of traditional vehicles.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
1 https://www.afpm.org/newsroom/news/afpm-epa-vehicle-proposal-will-effectively-ban-gasoline-and-
diesel-vehicles
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2 https://www.visualcapitalist.com/chinas-dominance-in-battery-manufacturing/
3 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/05/16/business/china-ev-battery.html
4 https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-renewables-electric-grid/
5 https://www.marketwatch.com/story/are-we-witnessing-the-demise-of-the-affordable-car-automakers-
have- all-but-abandoned-the-budget-market-a68862f0
6 https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/buying-a-car/when-to-buy-a-used-car-a6584238157/
7 https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/stellantis-may-limit-some-gas-powered-vehicles-
states-adopting-california-2023-05-24/
Organization: POET, LLC
Bioethanol, by contrast, already constitutes a significant share of LDV fuel and can rapidly
scale up to significantly reduce GHG emissions from those vehicles. But the Proposed Rule
ignores bioethanol. This is a potentially fatal flaw. Bioethanol and other biofuel-derived fuels
account for a significant proportion—approximately 10 percent—of current LDV fuel
nationwide.5 Over 27 million flex-fuel vehicles capable of running on approximately 85%
bioethanol (and 100% renewable energy) are on the road today.6 And, given the many advances
in technologies and methods for producing bioethanol discussed above, bioethanol could achieve
net-zero emissions before the electric grid is completely decarbonized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, p. 5]
5 See e.g., EIA, More ethanol was blended into U.S. gasoline last summer than ever before (Dec. 1, 2022),
available at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=54839#
6 See Growth Energy, Flex Fuel Database, available at https://growthenergy.org/choice-at-the-pump/flex-
fuel- database/ (which notes that over 27 million FFVs are on the road).
If EPA adds incentives for the real-world GHG benefits of renewable liquid fuels, EPA's rule
would build on historical carbon-reducing policies and help ensure the success of its light- duty
GHG emission reduction program. EPA's vehicle GHG program would not be, as the West
Virginia Court put it, an impermissible "transformative expansion of' the agency's "regulatory
authority."10 Instead, if EPA revises its proposed approach so as to credit bioethanol's real-
world GHG emission reductions, EPA would have more well-considered, legally durable,
flexible, cost-effective, and successful regulations to reduce GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, p. 6]
10 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2595.
2. Renewable fuels are a proven technology in a growing industry.
Renewable fuels are proven technology with a well-developed industry that continues to
grow. This is due in part to existing federal and state incentive programs for fuels production,
including the RFS, California's LCFS, and Oregon's Clean Fuel Standard. EPA can rely on the
existing biofuel incentive programs in the same way it relies on the BIL and IRA—which also
promote biofuel production—when assessing technology pathways in the Proposed Rule. The
existing programs have given EPA years of real-world evidence showing how renewable fuels
have succeeded in reducing and replacing fossil transportation fuels at scale. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, p. 9]
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Beyond innovation in liquid renewable fuels themselves, automakers can readily produce a
variety of vehicles capable of running on ethanol blends. Gasoline containing 10% ethanol is the
most prevalent gasoline nationwide. 19 EPA has determined that El 5 can be used as a drop-in
fuel for all model year 2001 and later vehicles.20 Many modern vehicles may be able to use E25
as a drop-in fuel, and automakers can readily make vehicles capable of using such "mid-level
ethanol blends" ("MLEBs").21 Over 27 million flex-fuel vehicles ("FFVs") capable of running
on approximately 85% bioethanol (and 100% renewable energy) are also already on the road.22
Ignoring the significant, real-world emissions reductions from MLEBs and FFVs would run
counter to the very purpose of utilizing § 202 to reduce GHG emissions. Instead of encouraging
these incredibly promising GHG reduction technologies, the EPA approach would move towards
eliminating them from the marketplace by treating MLEB-compatible and FFV vehicles the
same as engines that run on only traditional fossil fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 9]
19 The Proposed Rule appropriately produces a test fuel that "more closely represents the typical market
fuel available to consumers in that it contains 10 percent ethanol." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,240. See also, EIA,
More ethanol was blended into U.S. gasoline last summer than ever before, supra note 5, noting a
nationwide average blend rate of 10.5%.
20 See e.g., https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-09/documents/420fl5044.pdf.
21 See e.g., State of Nebraska, EPA Approves The Use Of E30 In Nebraska Fleet Demonstration Poised To
Reduce Costs, Pollution, available at https://ethanol.nebraska.gov/epa-approves-the-use-of-e30-in-
nebraska-fleet- demonstration-poised-to-reduce-costs-pollution/.
22 See Growth Energy, Flex Fuel Database, which notes that over 27 million FFVs are on the road,
available at https://growthenergy.org/choice-at-the-pump/flex-fuel-database/.
3. Renewable fuels crediting would give vehicle manufacturers more options to comply and
make for a more durable emissions reduction program.
Adding a renewable fuel crediting mechanism would make it more feasible for automakers to
meet EPA's stringent standards. Renewable fuels would further diversify the pathways for
manufacturers to comply with the proposed standards. This would be especially important in
places, particularly rural areas with lower population densities, where BEV infrastructure will be
difficult to develop at scale and may not be cost-effective. Renewable fuels would serve as a
viable alternative to attain significant light-duty vehicle emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, p. 10]
EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") have experience
with exactly this type of bioethanol crediting that POET proposes. In prior iterations of EPA's §
202 standard through model year 2015, and in the existing NHTSA fuel economy standards,
FFVs receive compliance benefits because they can run on alternative fuels such as E85.23 This
ability to utilize lower GHG fuels is adjusted by an "F Factor" that represents how much
renewable fuel is used in the real world.24 EPA should re-introduce crediting for vehicles that
can utilize higher blends of renewable fuels, and should expand the program to include
technologies other than just FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 10]
23 See EPA regulations at 40 CFR 600.510-12(j)(2)(iv)(B) providing FFV crediting through Model Year
2015. Regarding currently applicable NHTSA regulations at 49 CFR 523.2 (definition of dual-fuel vehicle
includes flexible fuel vehicles); 49 CFR 536.10 (indicating that dual-fuel vehicles can earn credits under
the standards); 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate
3112
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Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62624, 62829-30 (Oct. 15, 2012) (providing that FFVs
could generate credits under the standards). See the discussion in section IILd below for additional details.
24 40 CFR 600.510-12(k).
Crediting vehicle engines that run on biofuels would also create a more durable program.
Enabling a broader suite of emissions reduction technologies would avoid supply chain and other
problems that threaten to undermine the Proposed Rule as currently structured.25 EPA should
take a broader, more diversified approach to guard against other unforeseen events that may
affect the flow of critical materials in the international economy that are needed to produce
BEVs at the scale EPA is envisioning. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 10-11]
25 See below discussion in Section IV of these comments regarding the supply chain and infrastructure
challenges facing EVs.
Incentivizing a broader set of technologies may also protect the rule from being withdrawn by
future administrations. Biofuels enjoy broad bipartisan support, as evidenced by the recent debt
ceiling negotiations between members of Congress.26 Both Republicans and Democrats in the
House of Representatives successfully pressed for the removal of provisions in an early version
of the debt ceiling bill that would have cut support for biofuels, and Congress remained steadfast
in including important biofuels incentives that should not be undermined by the Proposed
Rule.27 A rule that moves the needle too far toward a single technology risks political pushback
if that technology loses public support or faces widespread technical challenges. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 10-11]
26 K. Brugger, Clean Energy, Ethanol Concerns Dog Debt Ceiling Bill, E&E Daily (Apr. 25, 2023),
https://subscriber.politicopro.eom/article/eenews/2023/04/25/clean-energy-ethanol-concerns-dog-debt-
ceiling- bill-00093594; J. Dillon et al., GOP Scrambles to Address Energy Concerns with Debt Bill, E&E
Daily (Apr. 26, 2023), https://www.eenews.net/articles/gop-scrambles-to-address-energy-concerns-with-
debt-bill/.
27 Id.
Finally, affordable ethanol blends may be particularly attractive to diverse, lower and middle
income populations and in the parts of the country that are centers of biofuel production. EPA's
Proposed Rule should cater to diverse communities with unique needs, including those people
who may not be able to afford EVs in the near future.28 Historically, vehicles that can utilize
higher ethanol blends have been popular with these communities. While California has
dominated EV registrations with approximately 39% of all EV registrations nationwide
(followed by Florida at approximately 6% of all EV registrations nationwide), the registrations of
FFVs still vastly exceed EV registrations in every state in the country.29 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, pp. 10-11]
28 See e.g., CalMatters, Who buys electric cars in California — and who doesn't? (Apr. 12, 2023),
available at https://calmatters.org/environment/2023/03/california-electric-cars-demographics/ (finding
"Communities with high concentrations of electric cars are affluent, college-educated and at least 75%
white and Asian" while "electric cars are almost nonexistent in Black, Latino, low-income and rural
communities").
29 See DOE, Vehicle Registration Counts by State, available at https://afdc.energy.gov/vehicle-registration.
C. Ethanol Provides a Key Solution to Statutory Goals that Underpin the Proposed Rule and
EPA's Stated Purpose for Undertaking the Rulemaking.
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EPA justifies the Proposed Rule based on (i) GHG emission reduction benefits, (ii)
manufacturer cost and consumer cost, (iii) energy security, and (iv) "criteria" and toxic air
pollutant reductions.41 The Proposed Rule also considers environmental justice impacts.42 The
Proposed Rule inadequately addresses each of these key factors because EPA fails to consider
the benefits of ethanol for each. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 13-14]
41 See e.g., 88 Fed. Reg. at 29347.
42 Regarding EPA's environmental justice analysis, see e.g., Section VIII.I of the Proposed Rule, 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29393-97.
VI. EPA Must Not Inhibit the Use of Bioethanol Through Inappropriate "Adjustment Factors"
Including an Erroneous R Factor and Improper C02 Adjustment Factor.
Regarding EPA's choice of a test fuel, POET agrees with EPA that rather than using Indolene
"Tier 3 test fuel more closely represents the typical market fuel available to consumers in that it
contains 10 percent ethanol."127 EPA proposes to apply certain test formula "corrections" for
CAFE calculations from a May 13, 2020 proposed rule, 128 including an "R-factor" regarding
fuel energy content. EPA must not inhibit the use of bioethanol through inappropriate
"adjustment factors," including an erroneous R-factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 28]
127 88 Fed. Reg. at 29240.
128 Air Plan Approval; Wisconsin; Redesignation of the Shoreline Sheboygan, WI Area to Attainment of
the 2008 Ozone Standards, 85 Fed. Reg. at 28564 (May 13, 2020).
EPA requested comment on several potential alternatives to maintain octane levels, including
increasing alkylation operations, increasing isomerization production, or increasing reliance on
ethanol blending. 145 But increased alkylation and/or isomerization are not workable solutions.
Refiners already produce alkylate and isomerized natural gas liquids at near capacity, so
additional infrastructure would be required to meaningfully increase production. 146 And it is
unlikely that refiners will make any significant investments into alkylation/isomerization
infrastructure, as the gasoline market is facing long-term decline as alternative fuel vehicles
become more popular. 147 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 31-32]
145 88 Fed. Reg. at 29401-02.
146 Attachment 3 at 2-3, 9.
147 Id. at 9.
POET strongly supports EPA's third proposed alternative: increasing ethanol blending,
specifically bioethanol. Increasing bioethanol blending is feasible. The bioethanol industry
continues to grow significantly, and trends indicate that this growth will continue. Unlike the
infrastructure that supports alkylation and isomerization capacity, bioethanol production
infrastructure continues to expand, providing sufficient capacity for a possible increased reliance
on bioethanol to lower vehicle PM emissions. Bioethanol is also cost-effective. Edgeworth
Economics assessed economic data provided by POET to compare the costs of using gasoline
additives other than ethanol and determined that those alternatives would cost between $0.10 to
$0.24 cents more per gallon based on prices from January 2021 through January 2022.148
Adding alkylate, for instance, costs $0.19 more per gallon than ethanol. 149 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 31-32]
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148 EPA Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0427, comment submitted by POET LLC at 22.
149 Id.
As we have discussed above, bioethanol has a significantly lower PMI value than heavy
aromatics. Bioethanol also contributes significantly to octane in gasoline. Increasing ethanol
blending from E10 to E15 would more than make up for the octane loss related to reducing
heavy aromatics in gasoline. 150 Using bioethanol blending as a replacement would significantly
reduce the PMI beyond the reductions that would be realized simply by imposing the potential
PM emissions standards. 151 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 31-32]
150 Attachment 3 at 10.
151 Id. at 10, 12-18.
3. U. S. EPA has failed to incorporate provisions into the Proposed Rule that recognize
the ability of ethanol and other renewable biofuels to create reductions in GHG emissions from
new light- and medium-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 53]
U.S. EPA's analysis of BEV cost and BEV penetration has other issues as well. Of these, U.S.
EPA's failure to perform a comparative lifetime analysis of BEVs and conventional vehicles is
particularly significant. As noted in Chapter 4 of the DRIA, the U.S. EPA analysis considers
costs for only the first eight years of vehicle operation. In addition, as noted in Chapter 4.2.2,
U.S. EPA intentionally ignores differences in insurance and depreciation costs claiming that they
are equivalent even though some sources suggest that insurance costs are higher2 and resale
values are lower3 for BEVs. U.S. EPA does not even consider the costs associated with battery
replacement outside of warranty later in the life of a BEV or the fact that the overall lifetime of
BEVs may be shorter than that of a conventional vehicle which would also impact a cost
comparison based on vehicle lifetime that would negatively affect BEVs. U.S. EPA should
account for these factors in its analysis of BEV penetration and at a minimum perform sensitivity
analyses to determine how they could affect demand for BEVs and automakers ability to comply
with the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 59]
2 See for example, https://www.caranddriver.eom/car-insurance/a35600058/insure-electric-car/.
3 See for example, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0967070X22002074.
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
Porsche recognizes that a portion of our customers may continue to seek out the qualities of
advanced combustion vehicles and is working both internally and with external partners to find
opportunities for these vehicles to contribute to decarbonization goals. Porsche believes that a
limited suite of advanced combustion vehicles, powered by highly innovative, near carbon-
neutral fuels can coexist alongside electrification and positively contribute to environmental and
energy goals. Near carbon-neutral fuels derived from renewable electricity, water, and non-fossil
carbon dioxide, commonly referred to as "eFuels", can enable advanced combustion and hybrid
technologies to operate in near-zero manner. Porsche refers to this emerging strategy as our
double-e strategy: electromobility and eFuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 4]
Porsche is working together with external partners who have successfully launched an eFuel
pilot project and are now developing strategies to bring these fuels to global markets at scale.
eFuels can be processed along with additives to meet market gasoline standards and offer a drop-
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in solution that requires no unique fueling infrastructure or vehicle modifications. Because eFuel
will meet market fuel standards, the near carbon-neutral benefits can be applicable to new
vehicles and many of the existing, on-road legacy combustion cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0637, p. 4]
Porsche recognizes that within the context of this specific proposal, EPA has not sought
comment on how to include the benefits of innovative, near carbon-neutral liquid fuels within the
structure of the light-duty greenhouse gas program for 2027 through 2032. Porsche recognizes
that innovations like eFuels are still an emerging development and may take time to reach market
scale. Porsche looks to future opportunities with EPA and other policy stakeholders to explore
how these fuels in a limited number of vehicles, with potentially near carbon-neutral properties,
could work within the range of Federal and State regulations. Porsche recognizes that these
strategies may extend into future updates to EPA's GHG regulation as well as for other Federal
and State regulations. Nevertheless, Porsche very much appreciates the foresight of governments
who may consider an inclusive regulatory framework. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 4]
Organization: ReginaldModlin and B. Reid Detchon
As discussed below, and then presented in carefully annotated detail, we believe EPA missed
an opportunity to consider the benefits of high-octane, low-carbon fuels to contribute to the
objectives of the Proposed Rule. Such fuels could deliver average annualized benefits
comparable to that claimed for the Proposed Rule and could achieve them sooner. As you
prepare the Final Rule, we urge you to consider that potential and to seek input from
stakeholders beyond the walls of EPA as to how an improved fuel can be adopted by the market.
This consideration should be seen as a companion to the electrification of the transportation
sector by application of feasible, available, and affordable technological solutions to climate and
health challenges. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 1]
The urgent need for action on the growing global danger of climate change could not be
clearer. In response, the world is moving toward a goal of zero net carbon emissions by mid-
century. The most important near-term steps on that journey will be to decarbonize the global
electricity supply and to shift the transportation sector from fossil fuels to electricity. In the U.S.,
a rapid transition to electric vehicles should be the object of financial and regulatory incentives
by all levels of government. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 4]
However, the average car on the road today is over 12 years old, with 25% of cars being over
16 years old. Even if the nation moves to end the sale of cars with internal combustion engines
by 2035, replacing the existing fleet of 250 million passenger vehicles will take at least until
mid-century. During that transition, increasing the use of biofuels, such as ethanol with a lower
carbon footprint than gasoline, would unlock direct and indirect benefits for the climate and for
the health of Americans: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 4]
-Greenhouse gas emissions from cars and light trucks could be reduced by more than 12%
(roughly 123 million metric tons annually) principally by enabling vehicles to operate more
efficiently (a greater reduction than would be achieved by EPA's proposed new vehicle
standards!). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 4]
- Coupled with incentives for carbon capture in agriculture, it could shift tens of millions of
acres of farmland now under conventional cultivation to low-impact sustainable practices,
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delivering further carbon benefits and reducing fertilizer runoff into our waterways. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 4]
By providing the octane needed for more efficient engines, increased ethanol content in
gasoline would also enable a 40% reduction in the use of aromatic hydrocarbons in the
fuel. Aromatics are petrochemicals produced in the oil refining process and used to increase
gasoline octane. They comprise roughly 20% of all the gasoline sold in the US. Emissions from
these toxic chemicals today pose a significant public health risk. Ethanol offers a cleaner source
of octane. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 4]
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 required control of toxic emissions from motor
vehicles. EPA responded in 2001 with standards based on the technologies and understanding of
health effects at that time. However, time and science have moved on. Vehicle engine
technologies have advanced, the composition of gasoline has changed, and the public health
effects of aromatics have become better understood: Carburetors and port fuel injection have
largely been replaced by gasoline direct injection (GDI) technology. More than half of the
vehicles entering the market use this technology to enhance fuel economy
performance. Unfortunately, GDI technology greatly increases emissions of ultrafine particles
when using today's gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 5]
It doesn't have to be this way. Technologies and products have come together to define a new
solution for what the Clean Air Act requires: "the greatest degree of emission reduction
achievable through the application of technology which will be available." Along with a rapid
transition to electric vehicles, a complementary program should include adoption of higher
ethanol blends, which have been shown by U.S. National Laboratories to enable higher fuel
economy and vehicle performance. Such blends would enable a 40% reduction in the use of
toxic aromatics in gasoline. An important recent study, co-authored by the Nobel Prize winner
Mario Molina, concluded that reducing the smallest (ultrafine) particles "without simultaneously
limiting organics from automobile emissions is ineffective and can even exacerbate this
problem." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 5]
Today, the nation's gasoline fuel pool includes 10% ethanol (E10). Concerns about ethanol
consuming food supplies to make transportation fuel, a feared lack of corn and ethanol
production capability, and a claimed inability to distribute ethanol to customers have all been
considered and assessed as low to no risk in contemporary studies. Gradual uptake of higher-
level ethanol blends could be supplied without any expansion of U.S. cropland and offered to
consumers at less cost than today's gasoline with lower carbon and toxic emissions. Test
programs in the rural Midwest have shown that today's vehicles operate well on higher levels of
ethanol blended with conventional gasoline. Automakers have affirmed that such benefits would
be realized by both new and existing internal combustion engines and therefore should be
encouraged as additional solutions as soon as possible. Consumer demand, supported by
automaker recommendations for new cars, would steadily increase the market share of mid-level
blends over time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 5-6]
The pathway to that outcome is straightforward: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 5-6]
- EPA (and similarly the California Air Resources Board) should specify an improved, higher
octane gasoline and identify mid-level ethanol blends as the fuel of choice for new vehicles.
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- EPA and CARB should cap the permissible level of aromatics allowed in improved gasoline.
- Automakers should optimize new-car design for higher ethanol blends, seek approval for a
related certification fuel, and urge its use as a preferred fuel.
Supporting information and references [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 5-6]
g. Groundbreaking research at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has led to new
understanding of the process by which PAHs persist and are transported long distances. It was
shown that the most carcinogenic PAH, benzo[a]pyrene (BaP) - often used as a marker for PAH
content generally - is efficiently bound to and transported with atmospheric particles: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
i. In the laboratory, particle-bound BaP degrades in a few hours, but field observations
indicate it persists much longer in the atmosphere and is transported far from its sources -
increasing its global lung cancer risk as much as fourfold. BaP from East Asia, for example, has
been shown to travel thousands of miles over the Pacific Ocean, reaching the west coast of the
United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
99 Manish Shrivastava et al., "Global long-range transport and lung cancer risk from polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons shielded by coatings of organic aerosol," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
(2017): 114(6): pp. 1246-51: https://www.pnas.Org/content/114/6/1246 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
ii. When SO A particles are formed in the presence of gas-phase PAHs, their formation and
properties are significantly different from SO A particles formed without PAHs: They exhibit
slower evaporation kinetics and have higher fractions of non-volatile components and higher
viscosities, assuring their longer atmospheric lifetimes. This increased viscosity and decreased
volatility act as a shield that protects PAHs from chemical degradation and evaporation, allowing
for their long-range transport. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
100 Zelenyuk et al., op. cit., supra note 6.
h. Based on numerous experimental studies, PAHs are also widely accepted to be precursors
for soot, or black carbon - a major contributor to climate change. Products of toluene
combustion (one of the BTEX aromatics) are known precursors of PAHs that are involved in
soot formation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
101 H. Richter and J.B. Howard, "Formation of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and their growth to soot
- a review of chemical reaction pathways," Progress in Energy and Combustion Science (2000): 26(4-6),
pp. 565-608: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.467.9757&rep=repl&type=pdf
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
102 Qian Mao et al., "Formation of incipient soot particles from polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons,"
Carbon (2017): 121: pp. 380-88: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0008622317305766
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
103 Gabriel da Silva et al., "Toluene Combustion: Reaction Paths, Thermochemical Properties, and Kinetic
Analysis for the Methylphenyl Radical + 02 Reaction," The Journal of Physical Chemistry A (2007):
111(35): pp. 8663-76: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17696501/ (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. Black carbon is considered the second most important human emission in terms of climate
forcing; only carbon dioxide (C02) has a greater overall effect. The short-term (20-year) global
warming potential per ton of black carbon is 3200 times that of C02. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
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Black carbon emissions associated with the shift to GDI engines will lead to increased
warming over the U.S., especially in urban regions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
104 Raza et al., op. cit., supra note 25: p. 5.
ii. However, black carbon is rapidly removed from the atmosphere by deposition, and its
atmospheric concentrations respond quickly to reductions in emissions. Reductions in black
carbon are thus an attractive near-term mitigation strategy to slow the rate of climate change.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 20-21]
105 T.C. Bond et al., "Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: A scientific assessment,"
Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres (2013): 118(11): pp. 5380-5552:
https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.eom/doi/full/10.1002/jgrd.50171 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
III. Cleaner burning substitutes are readily available and affordable and should be phased
in as quickly as practicable.
1. Ethanol and vehicle performance
a. Like aromatics, alcohols such as ethanol have a much higher octane rating than base
refinery gasoline. Increasing ethanol levels raises the octane rating of finished gasoline. In effect,
aromatics and ethanol compete for the octane enhancement market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0570, pp. 30-31]
b. Higher octane enables greater engine efficiency and improved vehicle performance
through higher compression ratios and/or more aggressive turbocharging and downsizing - also
facilitated by ethanol's cylinder "charge cooling" effect due to its high heat of
vaporization. Raising the engine's compression ratio from 10:1 to 12:1 could increase vehicle
efficiency by 5-7%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 30-31]
153 J.E. Anderson et al., "High octane number ethanol-gasoline blends: Quantifying the potential benefits
in the United States," Fuel (2012): 97: pp. 585-94:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016236112002268 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
III. Cleaner burning substitutes are readily available and affordable and should be phased
in as quickly as practicable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 30-31]
1. Ethanol and vehicle performance
a. Like aromatics, alcohols such as ethanol have a much higher octane rating than base
refinery gasoline. Increasing ethanol levels raises the octane rating of finished gasoline. In effect,
aromatics and ethanol compete for the octane enhancement market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0570, pp. 30-31]
b. Higher octane enables greater engine efficiency and improved vehicle performance
through higher compression ratios and/or more aggressive turbocharging and downsizing - also
facilitated by ethanol's cylinder "charge cooling" effect due to its high heat of
vaporization. Raising the engine's compression ratio from 10:1 to 12:1 could increase vehicle
efficiency by 5-7%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 30-31]
153 J.E. Anderson et al., "High octane number ethanol-gasoline blends: Quantifying the potential b
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154 David S. Hirshfeld et al., "Refining Economics of U.S. Gasoline: Octane Ratings and Ethanol
Content," Environmental Science & Technology (2014): 48(19): p. 11064-71:
https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es5021668 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
155 Thomas G. Leone et al., "The Effect of Compression Ratio, Fuel Octane Rating, and Ethanol Content
on Spark-Ignition Engine Efficiency," Environmental Science & Technology (2015): 49(18): pp. 10778-89:
https://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/acs.est.5b01420 (accessed June 17, 2021).
i. To increase octane enough to achieve these efficiency gains (i.e., to a "premium" rating
of 94 AKI (anti-knock index) at the gas pump), there are two principal options - aromatics or
alcohols. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 30-31]
156 Petroleum Equipment Institute, "Octane Number," https://www.pei.org/wiki/octane-number (accessed
Aug. 23, 2021). The AKI rating is used on U.S. gas pumps, while the Research Octane Number (RON) is
used in Europe. A U.S. octane rating of 94 is roughly equivalent to 98 RON:
http://www.pencilgeek.org/2009/05/octane-rating-conversions.html (accessed Aug. 23, 2021).
ii. Since 2016, researchers at nine national laboratories participating in the U.S. Department
of Energy's Co-Optimization of Fuels & Engines initiative (known as Co-Optima) have explored
how simultaneous innovations in fuels and engines can boost fuel economy and vehicle
performance, while reducing emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 30-31]
157 Magnus Sjoberg, Sandia National Laboratories, "An Introduction to DOE's Co-Optima Initiative,"
presentation at International Workshop on Fuel & Engine Interactions, Aug. 23, 2017:
https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1466483 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
1. The initiative identified 10 candidate fuels from four chemical families - alcohols,
olefins, furans, and ketones - with the greatest potential to increase vehicle efficiency. Seven of
them were alcohols. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 30-31]
158 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, "Co-Optimization of
Fuels & Engines: Scientific Innovation For Efficient, Clean, And Affordable Transportation" (2019):
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/04/f61/CoOptimization_FactSheet_2019%20PRESS%20QU
ALITY_0.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
2. A team at Oak Ridge National Laboratory found that intermediate alcohol-gasoline
blends (particularly a 30% ethanol blend, or E30) "exhibit exceptional antiknock properties and
performance beyond that indicated by the octane number tests," and that engine and vehicle
optimization could offset the reduced fuel energy content of such blends and likely reduce
vehicle fuel consumption and tailpipe C02 emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 30-
31]
159 Derek A. Splitter and James P. Szybist, "Experimental Investigation of Spark-Ignited Combustion with
High-Octane Biofuels and EGR. 2. Fuel and EGR Effects on Knock-Limited Load and Speed," Energy
Fuels (2014): 28(2): pp. 1432-45: https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/ef401575e (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
160 Derek A. Splitter and James P. Szybist, "Experimental Investigation of Spark-Ignited Combustion with
High-Octane Biofuels and EGR. 1. Engine Load Range and Downsize Downspeed Opportunity," Energy
Fuels (2014): 28(2): pp. 1418-31: https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/ef401574p (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
161 Tim Theiss et al., "Summary of High-Octane, Mid-Level Ethanol Blends Study" (2016): ORNL/TM-
2016/42: https://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/Files/Pub61169.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
3. The use of E30 in one test vehicle enabled a 13:1 compression ratio, reducing C02
emissions by 6-9%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 32]
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162 Thomas Leone et al., "Effects of Fuel Octane Rating and Ethanol Content on Knock, Fuel Economy,
and C02 for a Turbocharged DI Engine," SAE International Journal of Fuels and Lubricants (2014): 7(1):
pp. 9-28: https://www.sae.org/publications/technical-papers/content/2014-01-1228/ (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
4. Enabling use of a high-octane mid-level ethanol blend would significantly reduce the
cost of stronger fuel economy standards, a 2016 analysis by AIR, Inc., found. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570, p. 32]
163 Air Improvement Resource, "Evaluation of Costs of EPA's 2022-2025 GHG Standards With High
Octane Fuels and Optimized High Efficiency Engines" (2016): http://www.mncorn.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/1079-16EU-Final-Report-091616.pdf (accessed Aug. 18, 2021).
c. A shift from E10 to E30 would displace an estimated 40% of the BTEX aromatics - the
most carbon-intensive fraction of gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 32]
164 Hirshfeld et al., op. cit., supra note 154: Supporting Information, Table S15: Summary of Refinery
Modeling Results: E10/E85 Cases with 20 vol% and 30 vol% Ethanol in the Gasoline Pool: p. SI-34:
https://pubs.acs.Org/doi/suppl/10.1021/es5021668/suppl_file/es5021668_si_001.pdf (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
165 M.A. DeLuchi, "Emissions of Greenhouse Gases from the Use of Transportation Fuels and Electricity"
(1993), Argonne National Laboratory, ANL/ESD/TM-22, Vol. 2, Table C.2: Analysis of Petroleum
Products: p. C-6: https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/10119540 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. The addition of ethanol also hinders the formation of soot precursors, including PAHs, in
turn reducing PM emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 32]
166 Raza et al., op. cit., supra note 25: p. 15.
ii. Ethanol does not contribute to SO A or PAH formation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0570, p. 32]
167 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Renewable Fuel Standard Program (RFS2) Regulatory
Impact Analysis" (2010): p. 579:
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P1006DXP.PDF?Dockey=P1006DXP.PDF (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
d. A 2012 study by Ford engineers examined the influence of ethanol on PM emissions
from vehicles with GDI engines. It found a very strong reduction in particle emissions by mid-
level ethanol blends above E20. In other words, there was a modest benefit from lower-level
blends and a dramatic improvement from mid-level blends: "When the ethanol content increases
to >######30%, there is a statistically significant 30%-45% reduction in PM mass and number
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 32-33]
168 M. Matti Maricq et al., "The Impact of Ethanol Fuel Blends on PM Emissions from a Light-Duty GDI
Vehicle," Aerosol Science and Technology (2012): 46(5), pp. 576-83:
https://www.tandfonline.eom/doi/pdf/10.1080/02786826.2011.648780# (accessed June 11, 2021).
- Note: Automakers could quickly adapt to higher-level blends and meet consumer preference
for increased engine power and efficiency with a cleaner, often cheaper fuel. In a recent letter,
the Alliance for Automotive Innovation, a group of automakers that produce nearly 99% of the
new light-duty vehicles sold in the U.S., said: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 32-33]
169 Julia M. Rege, Alliance for Automotive Innovation, letter to Senator Tom Daschle, Chairman, High-
Octane Low-Carbon Alliance, June 11, 2021.
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[A]s automakers invest significantly in the transition to expanded vehicle electrification, the
auto industry is also continuing to invest in vehicle improvements that increase fuel economy
and reduce greenhouse gases in internal combustion engine vehicles. Many of the technologies
being used to make these improvements can be enhanced or complemented with the use of high
octane, low carbon liquid fuels. These fuels would simultaneously support vehicle performance,
including fuel economy, and further reduce greenhouse gas emissions during vehicle use. Such
benefits would be realized by new and existing internal combustion engines and therefore should
be encouraged as additional solutions as soon as possible to maximize environmental benefits
across the fleet. Given the timespan over which combustion technology will continue to be
sought by new car shoppers, and the timespan that those vehicles will remain in the field, low
carbon liquid fuels are an increasingly important technology pathway to help achieve carbon
reductions while the electric vehicle market continues to grow, (emphasis added) [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 32-33]
e. Ethanol has a long history as a transportation fuel. Henry Ford built his very first car to
run on what he called farm alcohol. In 1921 Thomas Midgley, the same engineer who later
developed tetraethyl lead for a General Motors subsidiary, drove to a meeting of the Society of
Automotive Engineers using a gasoline blend with 30% ethanol. The benefits, he said, included
"clean burning and freedom from any carbon deposit... [and] tremendously high compression
under which alcohol will operate without knocking. ... Because of the possible high
compression, the available horsepower is much greater with alcohol than with gasoline." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 32-33]
170 Jamie Lincoln Kitman, "The Secret History of Lead," The Nation (2000):
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/secret-history-lead/ (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
f. The proven technology used by today's ethanol industry enables rapid scale-up. The
industry tripled its production capacity in just four years - from 4.4 billion gallons a year in 2005
to 14.5 billion in 2009. U.S. ethanol production capacity today is 17.4 billion gallons. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 32-33]
171 U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Center, "U.S. Ethanol Plant Count, Capacity, and
Production" (2020): https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10342 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
172 Renewable Fuels Association, "Essential Energy" (2021): p. 3: https://ethanolrfa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/2021-Pocket-Guide.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. The transportation fuel infrastructure has also adapted to the increased use of ethanol in
cars and light trucks. As 10% ethanol blends became the market's dominant fuel, refiners
reduced their use of aromatics and lowered the octane content of their blendstocks. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 33-34]
173 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Modifications to Fuel Regulations To Provide Flexibility for
E15," Federal Register (2019): 84(111): p. 26986: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-06-
10/pdf/2019-11653.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021)
174 U.S. EPA, "Fuel Trends Report," op. cit., supra note 14.
ii. New gas pumps are now certified for mid-level ethanol blends.
175 "UL Announces Midlevel Certification for Ethanol Fuel Dispensers," CSP (2009):
https://www.cspdailynews.com/fuels/ul-announces-midlevel-certification-ethanol-fuel-dispensers (accessed
Feb. 24, 2021).
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iii. U.S. ethanol production in recent years has averaged more than 1 million barrels per
day. Increasing that level to support an E30 market would displace more oil than the Biden
administration's proposed Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards would save - bringing an
oil security premium valued at more than $1 billion per year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570,
pp. 33-34]
176 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "U.S. fuel ethanol production capacity increased by 3% in
2019," Today in Energy, Sept. 29, 2020: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=45316 (accessed
Aug. 18, 2021); National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation,
"Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years 2024-2026 Passenger Cars and Light
Trucks," proposed rule (Aug. 5, 2021): https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2021-08/CAFE-
NHTSA-2127-AM34-Preamble-Complete-web-tag.pdf (accessed Aug. 18, 2021).
177 U.S. EPA, "Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards," op. cit., supra note 128: Table 49, p. 43792.
i. Real-world experience indicates that higher-level blends such as E30 are, like El5, also
harmless to existing vehicles. In Watertown, SD, dynamometer testing and on-road driving
experience showed that conventional vehicles using E30 benefit from greater horsepower and
torque, providing better vehicle performance, drivability, and increased power. They also
experience no loss in fuel economy (despite ethanol's lower energy content) due to engine
sensors that can recognize the higher octane and adjust spark ignition timing for greater
efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 34-35]
179 Brad Brunner and Andy Wicks, "Fuel Economy and Power Generation of 30% Ethanol (E30) Splash
Blended Fuel in Fuel injected Non-FFV Gasoline Engines," Glacier Lakes Energy white paper (2017), gle-
e30-challenge-white-paper-l-19-17final.pdf: link at item #12:
https://www.forestriverforums.com/forums/fl2/towing-with-e30-or-e85-190278.html (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
1. The State of Nebraska recently conducted similar tests with 50 conventional vehicles and
found that "overall performance and adaptability are not compromised by consumption of E30."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 34-35]
180 Adil Alsiyabi et al., "Investigating the effect of E30 fuel on long term vehicle performance,
adaptability and economic feasibility," Fuel (2021): 306(121629):
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016236121015106 (accessed Aug. 18, 2021).
h. Brazil has been the largest laboratory in the world for ethanol as an automotive fuel,
dating back to the launch of the National Alcohol Program in 1975. Ethanol has made up at least
20% of the standard gasoline blend in Brazil almost continuously since 1984. Currently the
standard national blend is set at 27%, and one third of the fleet is capable of operating on ethanol
alone. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 34-35]
181 Julieta Andrea Puerto Rico, "Programa de Biocombustiveis no Brasil e na Colombia: Uma Analise da
Implantacao. Resultados e Perspectivas" (2007): Tabela 3.8 Misturas de alcool anidro com gasolina durante
o PRO ALCOOL: pp. 81-82: https://teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/86/86131/tde-07052008-
115336/publico/ultimaju.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
182 Wikipedia, "History of ethanol fuel in Brazil":
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_ethanol_fuel_in_Brazil (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. The city of Sao Paulo, which had a traditional problem with smog and toxic emissions
from automobiles, saw significant improvements in air quality due to ethanol use. Sao Paulo is
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among the top 10 urban concentrations in the world, but in 2019 it fared better than 1200 other
cities globally in terms of particulate air pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 34-35]
183 Clovis Zapata and Paul Nieuwenhuis, "Driving on Liquid Sunshine - the Brazilian Biofuel
Experience," Business Strategy and the Environment (2009): 18: pp. 536-37:
https ://www. academia. edu/27002759/Driving_on_liquid_sunshine_%C3 %A2_the_Brazilian_biofuel_exper
ience_a_policy_driven_analysis (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
184 IQAir, "World's most polluted cities 2019 (PM2.5)," online fact sheet:
https://www.iqair.com/us/world-most-polluted-cities (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
1. The use of high levels of ethanol in gasoline made it unnecessary to produce gasoline
with high aromatics content. Nor did it result in ambient aldehyde levels that might bring
significant risks to the population. (Aldehydes such as acetaldehyde and formaldehyde are
byproducts of ethanol combustion but, as noted below, can be easily controlled by conventional
emissions technology.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 34-35]
185 Alfred Szwarc, "Impacts of the use of ethanol on vehicle emissions in urban areas," in Isaias de
Carvalho Macedo (ed.), Sugar Cane's Energy: Twelve studies on Brazilian sugar cane agribusiness and its
sustainability, UNICA (second edition) (2007): pp. 84-85:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281397642_Sugar_cane's_energy_-
_Twelve_studies_on_Brazilian_sugar_cane_agribusiness_and_its_sustainability (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
2. Ethanol and climate change
a. A 2017 assessment by the consulting firm ICF concluded that life-cycle greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions associated with producing corn-based ethanol in the United States, using
today's practices in a typical natural gas-powered refinery, are almost 43% lower than those of
gasoline on an energy-equivalent basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 35-37]
186 M. Flugge et al., "A Life-Cycle Analysis of the Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Corn-Based Ethanol,"
Report prepared by ICF for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (2017): p. 166:
https ://digitalcommons .unl. edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=2623&context=usdaarsfacpub (accessed Feb.
24, 2021). Similarly: J. Rosenfeld et al. (2018), p. 99:
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/LCA_of_Corn_Ethanol_2018_Report.pdf (accessed
Feb. 24, 2021).
187 Jan Lewandrowski et al., "The greenhouse gas benefits of corn ethanol - assessing recent evidence,"
Biofuels (2018): 11(3): pp. 361-75: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17597269.2018.1546488
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. This estimate is consistent with more than 15 years of life-cycle analysis at Argonne
National Laboratory, recently reaffirmed in a retrospective analysis. It is also more than twice
as large as the 21% reduction predicted by EPA in its 2010 life-cycle analysis for ethanol
produced by an average natural gas-fired plant in 2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp.
35-37]
188 Argonne National Laboratory, "More about GREET" (The greenhouse gases, regulated emissions, and
energy use in transportation (GREET) model), online fact sheet: https://greet.es.anl.gov/homepage2
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
189 Uisung Lee et al., "Retrospective analysis of the U.S. corn ethanol industry for 2005-2019:
implications for greenhouse gas emission reductions," Biofuels, Bioproducts and Biorefining (2021):
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/bbb.2225 (accessed June 11, 2021).
190 U.S. EPA, "RFS2 Regulatory Impact Analysis," op. cit., supra note 167: pp. 468-70.
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1. Argonne senior scientist Michael Wang estimates that corn ethanol has resulted in a total
GHG reduction in the U.S. of more than 500 million metric tons between 2005 and 2019. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 35-37]
191 Kathryn Jandeska, Argonne National Laboratory, "Corn ethanol reduces carbon footprint, greenhouse
gases," Science X, May 24, 2021: https://phys.org/news/2021-05-corn-ethanol-carbon-footprint-
greenhouse.html (accessed Aug. 18, 2021).
ii. A recent "state-of-the-science review" by the consulting firm Environmental Health &
Engineering yielded a "central best estimate of carbon intensity for corn ethanol" that was 46%
lower than for gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 35-37]
192 Melissa J. Scully et al., "Carbon intensity of corn ethanol in the United States: state of the science,"
Environmental Research Letters (2021): https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/abde08
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
iii. In contrast, for electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles EPA used "tailpipe-only values to
determine vehicle GHG emissions, without accounting for upstream emissions" in its proposed
rule setting new GHG standards for 2023 and later model years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0570, pp. 35-37]
193 U.S. EPA, "Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards," op. cit., supra note 128: p. 43746.
1. As EPA notes on its web site, the power used to charge electric vehicles may create
carbon pollution, and EPA and DOE's "Beyond Tailpipe Emissions Calculator" is offered to
"help you estimate the greenhouse gas emissions associated with charging and driving an EV or
a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 35-37]
194 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Electric Vehicle Myths" in "Green Vehicle Guide," online
fact sheet: https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/electric-vehicle-myths (accessed Aug. 18, 2021).
iv. Another way to assess the value of ethanol is to calculate its net gain in energy content.
On that point, a recent USDA report concluded that a corn ethanol plant using conventional
fossil fuel power and electricity "produces slightly more than twice the energy in the form of
ethanol delivered to customers than it uses for corn, processing, and transportation." [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 35-37]
195 Paul W. Gallagher et al., "2015 Energy Balance for the Corn-Ethanol Industry" (2016), report for U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Office of the Chief Economist, Office of Energy Policy and New Uses: p. 18:
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015EnergyBalanceCornEthanol.pdf (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
v. California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) has demonstrated the impact of market-
based price incentives for environmental performance. To gain credits under the LCFS, ethanol
refineries have steadily reduced their carbon scores through increased production efficiencies,
most notably by shifting from coal to natural gas as a process fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0570, pp. 37-38]
1. For the purpose of credits under the LCFS, corn ethanol on average is currently rated as
30% better than its gasoline blendstock. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 37-38]
196 California Air Resources Board, "Low Carbon Fuel Standard - Life Cycle Analysis," online fact sheet:
pp. 16-18: https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/2020-06/basics-notes_l.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
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2. LCFS credits have led to an annual average gain in E85 sales of nearly 39% over the last
10 years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 37-38]
197 California Air Resources Board, "Alternative Fuels: Annual E85 Volumes," online chart (2020):
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/alternative-fuels-annual-e85-volumes (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
3. Providing credit for soil carbon sequestration under the LCFS would incentivize farmers
to employ improved conservation practices. Such practices would reduce ethanol's carbon
footprint further - to as much as 70% lower than gasoline, the ICF report found. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 37-38]
198 Flugge et al., op. cit., supra note 186: p. 166. Also Rosenfeld et al., p. 99.
4. In 2020 the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis recommended that Congress
develop a national LCFS reflecting "the best-available science about the carbon intensity of fuel
production, farming practices, land use changes, and crop productivity." Such a standard, the
report said, should reward producers that use "climate-smart practices that reduce carbon
emissions, store soil carbon, and reduce nitrous oxide emissions." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0570, pp. 37-38]
199 U.S. Select Committee on the Climate Crisis, Majority Staff Report: "Solving the Climate Crisis: The
Congressional Action Plan for a Clean Energy Economy and a Healthy, Resilient, and Just America"
(2020): pp. 101-02:
https://climatecrisis.house.gov/sites/climatecrisis.house.gov/files/Climate%20Crisis%20Action%20Plan.pd
f (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
vi. The carbon dioxide produced by the ethanol process is extremely pure - making it easier
to capture and reuse than C02 from a power plant. Ethanol giant Archer Daniels Midland is
capturing C02 from its processing facility in Decatur, IL, and storing it permanently
underground - another step that could lower ethanol's carbon footprint. However, this process
was made possible by a $141 million federal grant and is not yet justified economically. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 37-38]
200 Archer Daniels Midland Company news release, "ADM Begins Operations for Second Carbon Capture
and Storage Project" (2017): https://www.adm.com/news/news-releases/adm-begins-operations-for-second-
carbon-capture-and-storage-project-1 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
201 U. S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy, "DOE Announces Major Milestone Reached for
Illinois Industrial CCS Project" (2017), news release: https://www.energy.gov/fe/articles/doe-announces-
major-milestone-reached-illinois-industrial-ccs-project (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
1. A recently announced project will capture C02 from several biorefineries in the Midwest
for geologic storage of up to 10 million tons annually in underground saline aquifers in North
Dakota. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 38-39]
202 Erin Voegele, "Large-scale CCS project will sequester C02 from ethanol plants," Ethanol Producer
Magazine (2021): http://www.ethanolproducer.eom/articles/18001/large-scale-ccs-project-will-sequester-
co2-from-ethanol-plants (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
2. Recently scientists at Argonne National Laboratory reported discovery of a new
electrocatalyst that converts C02 and water into ethanol with very high energy efficiency, high
selectivity, and low cost. If proven at scale, this could enable the production of ethanol from
C02 emitted by industrial processes of all kinds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 38-39]
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203 Argonne National Laboratory, "New Electrocatalyst Turns Carbon Dioxide Into Liquid Fuel,"
SciTechDaily (2020): https://scitechdaily.com/new-electrocatalyst-turns-carbon-dioxide-into-liquid-fuel/
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
b. U.S. consumption of gasoline adds roughly 1 billion metric tons of the most significant
greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide (C02), to the atmosphere per year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0570, pp. 38-39]
204 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Monthly Energy Review" May 2020, Table 11.5, Carbon
Dioxide Emissions From Energy Consumption: Transportation Sector:
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/secll_8.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. Based on current consumption rates of gasoline, increasing vehicle fuel economy by 7%
with the higher octane of an E30 blend would reduce annual U.S. emissions by 70 million metric
tons per year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 38-39]
205 C02 emissions from U.S. light-duty vehicles in 2018 totaled 1050 million metric tons (MMT). A 7%
reduction would be 70 MMT per year. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Fast Facts: U.S.
Transportation Sector Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 1990-2018," online fact sheet:
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100ZK4P.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
ii. Reducing the share of aromatics in gasoline by 40% - with E30 fuel that is 40% less
emitting - would reduce U.S. emissions by another 32 million metric tons per year. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 38-39]
206 Aromatics comprise 20% of U.S. gasoline consumption by light-duty vehicles [U.S. EPA, "Fuel
Trends Report," op. cit., supra note 14], producing 200 MMT of C02 annually. Replacing 40% of the
aromatics, or 80 MMT, with fuel that produces 40% less C02 per gallon would reduce total U.S. C02
emissions by 32 MMT per year.
iii. GHG emissions from oil refineries would also fall, due to reduced demand for their
most intensively refined products. Oil refiners could produce blendstocks for E30 gasoline at a
modest additional cost of 1-2 cents per gallon. Reduced refinery throughput and intensity would
reduce refinery C02 emissions and crude oil consumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp.
38-39]
207 Hirshfeld et al., op. cit., supra note 154: p. 11070.]
1. One assessment found that refinery GHG emissions would decline by 12% to 27% for
various E30 cases, due to both lower crude oil throughput and differences in the severity of
refining operations. Since the refinery sector emits 180 million metric tons per year, that would
mean a further reduction in U.S. GHG emissions of at least 21 million metric tons per year.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 39-40]
208 Vincent Kwasniewski et al., "Petroleum refinery greenhouse gas emission variations related to higher
ethanol blends at different gasoline octane rating and pool volume levels," Biofuels, Bioproducts &
Biorefining (2016): (10)1: pp. 36-46: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/bbb.1612 (accessed
Feb. 24, 2021).
209 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "GHGRP Refineries" in "Greenhouse Gas Reporting
Program," online fact sheet: https://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/ghgrp-refineries (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
iv. Thus, the total reduction in U.S. GHG emissions from adoption of E30 blends -
combining fuel economy gains, the replacement of aromatics with a lower-carbon substitute, and
the change in refinery operations - would total 123 million metric tons per year. That would be a
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cut of more than 12% in emissions from light-duty vehicles, which comprise 58% of the
emissions from the transportation sector (the source of more GHG emissions than any other
sector). It would also exceed the GHG reductions from EPA's strengthened emissions standards
for new cars, which reach only 117 million tons in 2050. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp.
39-40]
210 U.S. EPA, "Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards," op. cit., supra note 128: p. 43779.
211 Ibid., Table 43, p. 43778.
1. Valuing the social cost of those avoided emissions at $25 per ton would imply a benefit
of more than $3 billion per year. Using the "interim" rate of $51 per ton put forward by the
Biden administration in 2021, the benefits would come to more than $6 billion per year. At the
rate of $76 per ton used in the administration's proposed Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, the benefits exceed $9 billion per year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 39-40]
212 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, United States Government,
"Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide Interim Estimates
under Executive Order 13990" (2021): Figure ES-1: Frequency Distribution of SC-C02 Estimates for
2020, p. 5: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/TechnicalSupportDocument_SocialCostofCarbonMethaneNitrousOxide.pdf
(accessed Mar. 1,2021)
213 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, op. cit., supra note 176.
v. An aggressive program to increase adoption of electric vehicles is urgently needed to
phase out fossil fuels altogether, but even optimistic forecasts recognize that it will take a long
time to turn over the U.S. fleet of 250 million light-duty vehicles. (The average age of such
vehicles in operation in the U.S. has risen to 12.1 years this year.) Internal combustion engines
will still be used in hundreds of millions of vehicles between now and 2050. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570, p. 40]
214 See, for example, U.S. DRIVE, "Summary Report on EVs at Scale and the U.S. Electric Power
System" (2019): U.S. EV Market Penetration Scenarios: pp. 1-2:
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/12/f69/GITT%20ISATT%20EVs%20at%20Scale%20Grid%
20Summary%20Report%20FINAL%20Nov2019.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
215 IHS Markit, "Average age of cars and light trucks in the US rises to 12.1 years, accelerated by
COVID-19," press release, June 14, 2021: https://news.ihsmarkit.com/prviewer/release_only/id/4759502/
(accessed June 21, 2021).
1. California is in the vanguard of the transition to electric vehicles in the U. S., with a
newly announced goal of limiting new-car sales in 2035 to zero-emission vehicles. But under
the state's LCFS program to date (since 2011), ethanol has reduced GHG emissions nearly three
times more than electricity. As more electric vehicles enter the market, that ratio is dropping
sharply, but even for the last 12 months reported (through December 2020), ethanol reduced
GHG emissions by one third more than electricity - despite being limited almost entirely to E10
blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 40-42]
216 Governor of California, Executive Order N-79-20 (2020): https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/09/9.23.20-EO-N-79-20-text.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
217 California Air Resources Board, "2020 LCFS Reporting Tool (LRT) Quarterly Data Summary: Report
No. 4" (2021):
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https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/classic//fuels/lcfs/dashboard/quarterlysummary/20210430_q4data
summary.pdf (accessed June 21, 2021).
3. The use of corn for ethanol
a. Almost any plant-based material can made into ethanol. All plants contain sugars, and
those sugars can be fermented to make ethanol. Plant material also can be converted to ethanol
using heat and chemicals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 40-42]
b. Today, nearly all ethanol produced in the world is derived from starch- and sugar-based
feedstocks. Corn serves as the feedstock for most U.S. ethanol production. Its C4 carbon
fixation process (also found in sugarcane) is uncommon among plants and unusually efficient -
producing four-carbon compounds instead of the usual three. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570,
pp. 40-42]
218 U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Center, "Ethanol Feedstocks," online fact sheet:
https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/ethanol_feedstocks.html (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
219 Realizing Increased Photo synthetic Efficiency (RIPE), "The difference between C3 and C4 plants,"
online fact sheet (2020): https://ripe.illinois.edu/blog/difference-between-c3-and-c4-plants (accessed Feb.
24, 2021).
i. Only about 3% of flowering plant species use the C4 pathway, but this relative handful
accounts for 23% of all terrestrial carbon fixation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 40-42]
220 Elizabeth A. Kellogg, "C4 Photosynthesis," Current Biology (2013): 23(14): p. R594:
https://www.cell.com/current-biology/fulltext/S0960-9822( 13)00507-1 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
c. Cellulose (plant fiber) also offers several advantages as a biofuel feedstock: It is
abundant and can be derived from either agricultural waste or non-food crops such as
switchgrass and miscanthus. However, it is challenging to access the sugars in these feedstocks
for conversion, and cellulosic ethanol remains more expensive than corn ethanol, which traded
for $1.60 a gallon or less for most of the last five years - albeit with a recent spike in 2021. That
is roughly half the cost of cellulosic ethanol, which is burdened by the high capital costs of
pioneer facilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 40-42]
221 RIPE, op. cit., supra note 219.
222 Trading Economics, "Ethanol 2005-2020 Data": https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/ethanol
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
223 Lee R. Lynd et al., "Cellulosic Ethanol: Status and Innovation" (2017):
https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1364156 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
d. The effect of increased corn production to meet ethanol demand has been a subject of
long-standing contention in U.S. agricultural and environmental policy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 40-42]
i. The amount of land planted in corn rose from 60 million acres in 1983 to roughly 90
million since 2010, much of that due to expanding ethanol production, which now accounts for
nearly 40% of total corn use. Yet that represents a shift in cropland more than an increase: The
overall amount of U.S. cropland in production has changed little over the last 30 years, varying
between 300 and 330 million acres+. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 40-42]
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224 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, "Feedgrains Sector at a Glance," online
fact sheet: https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/corn-and-other-feedgrains/feedgrains-sector-at-a-glance/
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
225 U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, "2012 Census of Agriculture
Highlights: Farms and Farmland" (2014): ACH12-13:
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2014/Highlights_Farms_and_Farmland.pdf (accessed
Feb. 24, 2021).
226 U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, "Crop Production Historical
Track Records" (2020): Principal Crops Area Planted and Harvested - United States: 1983-2019:
https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/c534fn92g/r781xl60h/8w32rq739/croptr20.pdf
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
ii. Corn yields have increased at a remarkably steady rate of about 1.9 bushels per acre per
year since the mid-1950s - quadrupling in that time from 40 to 170 bushels per acre. Between
2002 and 2017 U.S. agriculture gained about 669 million metric tons of corn due to yield
improvement. That is equivalent to about 71 billion gallons of ethanol (45% of the ethanol
produced during that period) plus 223 million metric tons of byproducts for animal feed. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 40-42]
227 R.L. Nielsen, Purdue University, "Historical Corn Grain Yields in the U.S." (2020):
https://www.agry.purdue.edu/ext/corn/news/timeless/YieldTrends.html (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
228 F.Taheripour et al., "Response to 'how robust are reductions in modeled estimates from GTAP-BIO of
the indirect land use change induced by conventional biofuels?'" Journal of Cleaner Production (2021),
letter to the editor: 310(127431):
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959652621016504 (accessed June 17, 2021).
iii. Modern farming uses low-impact, "precision" techniques that require less land, less
energy and fewer chemicals for every bushel produced. Since 1980, irrigation water use per
bushel has fallen by 46%, energy use by 41%, and greenhouse-gas emissions by 31%. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 42-43]
229 Robert Paarlberg, "The Environmental Upside of Modern Farming," The Wall Street Journal (2021):
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-environmental-upside-of-modern-farming-l 1612534962 (accessed Feb.
24, 2021), citing: Field to Market: The Alliance for Sustainable Agriculture, "Environmental and
Socioeconomic Indicators for Measuring Outcomes of On Farm Agricultural Production in the United
States" (Third Edition) (2016): https://fieldtomarket.org/national-indicators-report-2016/ (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
iv. With increased acreage and yields meeting the demand for ethanol, the price of corn
(apart from a sudden spike in the first half of 2021) traded in a narrow range for the past six
years, about half its peak in 2012 and lower than the average inflation-adjusted price from 1981
to the present. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 42-43]
230 Macrotrends, "Corn Prices - 59 Year Historical Chart": https://www.macrotrends.net/2532/corn-prices-
historical-chart-data (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
231 InflationData.com, "What Is the Inflation Adjusted Price of Corn?":
https://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Articles/Corn_Inflation.asp (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
232 Madhu Khanna et al., "Lessons Learned from US Experience with Biofuels: Comparing the Hype with
the Evidence," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy (2021): (15)1: pp. 67-86:
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/713026 (accessed Apr. 27, 2021).
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v. Concerns about the impact of ethanol production on food prices have largely abated over
that time. A study of eight Asian economies found that 64% of the variance in food prices during
the 2000-2016 time period was explained by oil price movement, and only 2% by biofuel prices.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 42-43]
233 Farhad Taghizadeh-Hesary et al., "Energy and Food Security: Linkages through Price Volatility,"
Energy Policy (2019): 128: pp. 796-806:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421518308486 (accessed Apr. 27, 2021).
vi. Controversial claims about large negative "indirect land use" effects of increased corn
production have not been borne out by data, as shown in a recent review of the research. Life-
cycle analyses by ICF and Argonne both reflect modest assessments of indirect land use
effects. EPA and California regulators include land-use factors in their evaluations of ethanol's
GHG emissions, and California's figure, for example, is only 19% of the very high estimate that
kicked off the debate. Argonne's recent retrospective analysis found that the initial estimate was
at least five times overstated - indeed, by Argonne's estimate, nearly 15 times. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570, pp. 42-43]
234 Khanna et al., op. cit., supra note 232.
235 Flugge et al., op. cit., supra note 186, p. 167. Also Rosenfeld et al., p. 97.
236 Zhangcai Qin et al., "Estimating soil carbon change and biofuel life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions
with economic, ecosystem and life-cycle models," conference paper (2015):
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287330899_Estimating_soil_carbon_change_and_biofuel_life-
cycle_greenhouse_gas_emissions_with_economic_ecosystem_and_life-cycle_models (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
237 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Lifecycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions for Select Pathways"
(2016): https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-07/documents/select-ghg-results-table-vl.pdf
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
238 Cf. the value of 19.8 grams of C02 per megajoule in California Air Resources Board, "Detailed
Analysis for Indirect Land Use Change" (2015), Table H-5, Summary of ILUC Values: p. 1-25:
https://ww2.arb.ca.gOv/sites/default/files/classic//fuels/lcfs/iluc_assessment/iluc_analysis.pdf (accessed
Feb. 24, 2021) vs. the estimate of 104 gC02/MJ in Timothy Searchinger et al., "Use of U.S. Croplands for
Biofuels Increases Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change," Science (2008), Table
1: 319(5867), pp. 1238-40:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326450544_Use_of_US_Croplands_for_Biofuels_Increases_Gre
enhouse_Gases_Through_Emissions_from_Land-Use_Change (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
239 Lee et al., op. cit., supra note 189, Figure 5.
vii. The Energy Information Administration projects that demand for gasoline will decline
from 137.5 billion gallons per year in 2021 to 127 billion gallons in 2050, due to increased
vehicle efficiency and greater use of electric vehicles. Fueling the 2050 fleet with higher-level
blends such as E30 thus would require little more than a doubling of today's ethanol capacity.
Demand will fall further if electric vehicles are adopted more rapidly than currently envisioned.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 42-43]
240 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Annual Energy Outlook 2021," Table 11. Petroleum and
Other Liquids Supply and Disposition (Reference case):
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=ll-AE02021®ion=0-
0&cases=ref202 l&start=2019&end=2050&f= A&linechart=ref2021 -d113020a. 3 -11 -
AE02021&chartindexed=0&sourcekey=0 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
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Note: The recurrent affliction of American farmers is overproduction and low prices.
Increased demand for ethanol in higher-level blends could be met within today's cropland
footprint, absorbing that overproduction and helping to restore farm income. A more robust
future market for ethanol would also attract additional investment to the production of next-
generation biofuels from cellulosic feedstocks - investment that has been lacking in the face of a
saturated market for E10. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 43-45]
e. Environmental concerns about the effects of increased agricultural production on water
quality (due to nitrogen fertilizer runoff) can be addressed directly with incentives (e.g., from a
low-carbon fuel standard) for improved conservation practices that would increase the amount of
carbon sequestered in the soil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 43-45]
i. Corn may be a particular beneficiary of carbon sequestration incentives, according to
studies that looked at carbon stored below the 30-centimeter depth usually measured (12 inches).
A long-term study by USD A in eastern Nebraska found that corn grown with best management
practices had average annual increases in soil organic carbon of one ton per acre, more than half
of it below the 30 cm depth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 43-45]
241 Ronald F. Follett et al., "Soil Carbon Sequestration by Switchgrass and No-Till Maize Grown for
Bioenergy," BioEnergy Research (2012): 5: pp. 866-75:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256147354_Soil_Carbon_Sequestration_by_Switchgrass_and_N
o-Till_Maize_Grown_for_Bioenergy (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
- Note: A combination of best practices - the use of renewable natural gas in processing and
carbon-sequestering techniques on the farm - would bring corn ethanol's carbon footprint almost
to zero, and carbon capture and storage after processing would make it a carbon-negative fuel.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 43-45]
4. EPA regulation of ethanol blends
a. The Clean Air Act prohibits fuel manufacturers from introducing into commerce, or
increasing the concentration of, new fuels and fuel additives unless they are "substantially
similar" to fuels or fuel additives used in the certification of motor vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570, pp. 43-45]
242 42 U.S. Code, sec.?7545, "Regulation of fuels", subsection (f), "New fuels and fuel additives":
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7545 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. Since EPA now uses ethanol (in E10) as its certification fuel for new vehicles, increasing
the concentration of ethanol in gasoline is not prohibited. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp.
43-45]
b. The law separately limits Reid vapor pressure (RVP) - a measure of the fuel's propensity
to give off evaporative emissions - for fuel blends containing gasoline and 10% ethanol
(E10). EPA granted RVP waivers in 2010 and 2011 to enable the use of E15 in late-model
vehicles - those produced from model year 2001 on. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 43-
45]
243 Ibid., subsection (h)(4), "Ethanol waiver."
c. In 2019 EPA issued an interpretive rulemaking defining gasoline blended with up to 15%
ethanol as "substantially similar" to the E10 fuel it has used since 2014 to certify all new motor
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vehicles. Referring to the RVP limit, EPA said, "We are interpreting this language as
establishing a lower limit, or floor, on the minimum ethanol content ... rather than an upper limit
on the ethanol content." However, a federal appeals court struck down that action in 2021.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 43-45]
244 U.S. EPA, "Modifications to Fuel Regulations To Provide Flexibility forE15," op. cit., supra note 173:
pp. 26980-27025.
245 Ibid., p. 26992.
246 American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturer v. Environmental Protection Agency, Opinion 19-1124,
U.S. Court of Appeals forthe D.C. Circuit, July 2, 2021:
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/D33AF132E64A3D lE85258706005062EC/$file/19-
1124-1904888.pdf (accessed July 7, 2021).
i. EPA said in its rulemaking, "We are confident that relative evaporative emissions effects
for E15 would largely be similar or slightly less than those for E10." Since the RVP of ethanol
blends reaches its maximum level at E10 and then declines as more ethanol is added, this
conclusion would be equally true of higher-level blends. In fact, the RVP of E30 is similar to
that of EO. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 43-45]
247 U.S. EPA, "Modifications to Fuel Regulations To Provide Flexibility forE15," op. cit., supra note 173:
p. 26993.
248 Wei-Dong Hsieh et al., "Engine performance and pollutant emission of an SI engine using ethanol-
gasoline blended fuel," Atmospheric Environment (2002): 36(3), p. 403:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1352231001005088 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
249 V.F. Andersen et al., "Vapor Pressures of Alcohol-Gasoline Blends," Energy Fuels (2010): 24(6): pp.
3647-54, Table S-2: https://pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/efl00254w (accessed June 11, 2021).
250 C. Hammel-Smith et al., "Issues Associated with the Use of Higher Ethanol Blends (E17-E24)" (2002),
Technical Report, National Renewable Energy Laboratory: NREL/TP-510-32206, Table 3-1, p. 13:
http://www.nmma.org/lib/docs/nmma/gr/environmental/32206.pdf (accessed July 6, 2021).
- Note: EPA could either certify E30 fuel based on an application from an automaker or
simply define E30 as "substantially similar" to E10. The benefits derived from adding ethanol to
gasoline - in terms of reduced emissions and improved performance that offsets the lower energy
content of ethanol - appear to be optimized around the 30% blend level - as Thomas Midgley
found a century ago. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 43-45]
d. Citing the need for "the development of infrastructure and promotion of fuels, including
biofuels, which will enable the development and widespread deployment of advanced
technologies," in May 2010 President Obama issued an Executive Memorandum requesting that
EPA "review for adequacy the current non-greenhouse gas emissions regulations for new motor
vehicles, new motor vehicle engines, and motor vehicle fuels, including tailpipe emissions
standards for nitrogen oxides and air toxics, and sulfur standards for gasoline." Yet no action
addressing fuels or mobile source air toxics resulted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 45]
251 The White House, "Presidential Memorandum Regarding Fuel Efficiency Standards" (2010):
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-regarding-fuel-
efficiency-standards (accessed July 7, 2021).
e. Regarding other air pollutants, a 2008 study by the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory found that increasing ethanol content (to E20) reduced hydrocarbon emissions while
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increasing emissions of ethanol and aldehydes. Vehicles that used a power enrichment strategy
called long-term fuel trim (LTFT) to adjust the engine's air-fuel ratio showed no statistically
significant fuel effect on emissions, including NOx. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, p. 45]
252 Keith Knoll et al., "Effects of Mid-Level Ethanol Blends on Conventional Vehicle Emissions,"
NREL/CP-540-46570 (2009): 2009-01-2723: pp. 1-16: https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl0osti/46570.pdf
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
V. Summary and recommendations
The use of aromatics in gasoline is an unnecessary cause of toxic air pollution that harms and
shortens lives - as a major contributor to fine particle emissions, especially dangerous PAHs and
secondary organic aerosol. These emissions are a menace to the health and cognitive
development of millions of children who live in high-traffic areas. EPA has yet to fulfill its
statutory obligation to produce the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable in the
hazardous air pollutants from motor vehicles and motor vehicle fuels. The risk to public health
has been increased by the shift to new automotive direct-injection engine technology. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
Pollution causes many threats to public health, not all of which can be cost-effectively
regulated, but it is hard to imagine one that could be solved more easily or at less cost than this
one. Reducing the use of aromatics requires only a minor regulatory adjustment and would
deliver important benefits for both public health and the environment. Reconsideration of
national fuel economy standards provides an opportunity for EPA to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
257 42 U.S. Code, sec.77521, op. cit., supra note 125.
- -Immediately permit the sale and use of higher-level ethanol blends.
- Encourage their adoption as a standard fuel for vehicles sold in model year 2025 and
beyond.
- Reduce the cap on aromatic co ions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
The use of aromatics in gasoline is an unnecessary cause of toxic air pollution that harms and
shortens lives - as a major contributor to fine particle emissions, especially dangerous PAHs and
secondary organic aerosol. These emissions are a menace to the health and cognitive
development of millions of children who live in high-traffic areas. EPA has yet to fulfill its
statutory obligation to produce the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable in the
hazardous air pollutants from motor vehicles and motor vehicle fuels. The risk to public health
has been increased by the shift to new automotive direct-injection engine technology. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
Pollution causes many threats to public health, not all of which can be cost-effectively
regulated, but it is hard to imagine one that could be solved more easily or at less cost than this
one. Reducing the use of aromatics requires only a minor regulatory adjustment and would
deliver important benefits for both public health and the environment. Reconsideration of
national fuel economy standards provides an opportunity for EPA to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
257 42 U.S. Code, sec.77521, op. cit., supra note 125.
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- -Immediately permit the sale and use of higher-level ethanol blends.
- Encourage their adoption as a standard fuel for vehicles sold in model year 2025 and
beyond.
- Reduce the cap on aromatic content in gasoline by half- to no more than 12.5% in
reformulated gasoline, much as it imposed a cap on benzene in 2007. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
258 U.S. EPA, "Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Mobile Sources" (2007), op. cit., supra note
131: p. 8477-79.
The California Air Resources Board should do likewise, and its Low Carbon Fuel Standard
should become a model for federal legislation, replacing the Renewable Fuel Standard at the
national level. Concurrently, automakers should be encouraged to optimize their vehicle designs
to take best advantage of ethanol's beneficial attributes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp.
47-49]
We are on the cusp of a rapid global shift to electric vehicles as a necessary and urgent
response to climate change, but internal combustion engines will remain a substantial part of the
light-duty fleet until mid-century. As a transition strategy for the next 30 years, reducing
aromatics through the increased use of ethanol would have significant near-term climate benefits
for the transportation sector. The public health benefits - especially to newborn children -
demand this change and could be replicated at greater scale, to even greater effect, worldwide.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
High-priority opportunities for immediate action
The Clean Air Act prohibits fuel manufacturers from introducing into commerce, or
increasing the concentration of, new fuels and fuel additives unless they are "substantially
similar" to fuels or fuel additives used in the certification of motor vehicles. Since EPA now uses
E10 as its certification fuel for new vehicles, increasing the concentration of ethanol in gasoline
to E30 would be permissible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
- EPA should define gasoline blended with 30% ethanol as "substantially similar" to E10. The
benefits derived from adding ethanol to gasoline - in terms of reduced emissions and improved
performance that offsets the lower energy content of ethanol - appear to be optimized around the
30% blend level. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
- Concurrently, upon an automaker's request for approval of an E30 certification fuel, EPA
should move quickly to grant it. This would, among other things, resolve any remaining
uncertainties about the effect of higher levels of ethanol on pollutants such as nitrogen oxides
and aldehydes, which can be managed by appropriate engine settings and emissions technology.
Approval would be a green light to automakers to optimize their new vehicles for higher-octane
fuel -enabling them to improve vehicle efficiency and performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0570, pp. 47-49]
Near-term regulatory opportunities
- EPA should incorporate the use of higher-octane fuels as an available control strategy for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing fuel economy standards. It should set a
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minimum octane standard for gasoline used in light-duty vehicles, and that standard should
ensure the use of biofuels, not aromatics, to increase octane - either by setting the standard high
enough to preclude the use of aromatics only, or by capping the permissible level of aromatics in
fuel (at 12.5%, half the current limit for reformulated gasoline), or both. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
- EPA and NHTSA should review and revise available incentives for alternative fuels to
support the use of biofuels. In particular, the agencies should discard their outdated analysis of
ethanol's life-cycle greenhouse gas footprint and conform it to the most recent assessments from
USDA and Argonne National Laboratory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
- EPA should revise its MOVES model, which estimates emissions for mobile sources at the
national, county, and project level for criteria air pollutants, greenhouse gases, and air toxics. A
2014 update based on erroneous modeling assumptions has caused the model to predict
incorrectly elevated emissions factors for ethanol blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp.
47-49]
- More generally, EPA should undertake a thorough revision of its air quality models, which
fail to account for secondary organic aerosol - a major contributor to deadly fine particle
pollution - and should rely more heavily on atmospheric measurement of pollution levels instead
of model predictions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
Longer-term legislative opportunities
The Renewable Fuel Standard has served its purpose but is not well adapted to the urgent
need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) has
demonstrated the value, impact, and effectiveness of market-based price incentives for
performance and should be adopted by Congress as a substitute for the RFS. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
- Congress should develop a national LCFS reflecting "the best-available science about the
carbon intensity of fuel production, farming practices, land use changes, and crop productivity."
Such a standard should reward producers that use "climate-smart practices that reduce carbon
emissions, store soil carbon, and reduce nitrous oxide emissions." In particular, credit for soil
carbon sequestration under a national LCFS would incentivize farmers to employ improved
conservation practices that would minimize the environmental impacts of corn production.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
- Congress should provide incentives to retail gasoline outlets to encourage them to update
their refueling infrastructure, including UL-certified pumps and waterproof underground tanks.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 47-49]
Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)
To achieve the Agency's ambitious emissions reduction goals in the most robust, rapid, and
affordable way, EPA should use this rulemaking to encourage multiple additional solutions that
can decarbonize light- and medium duty transportation. EPA must also recognize that vehicles
and fuels operate as integrated systems. Focusing only on emissions from the vehicle—while
ignoring emissions related to the extraction and production of the fuel used to power the
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vehicle—will almost certainly result in falling far short of the administration's overall climate
goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 3-4]
Low-carbon liquid fuels like ethanol have a unique and vital role to play in the
administration's efforts to combat climate change and reduce overall emissions from the
transportation sector—both immediately and in the long term. Fuels such as El 5 (15% ethanol)
are compatible with nearly all vehicles on the road today, and thus offer immediate emissions
benefits on a much larger scale than changes to only new vehicles. In addition, E85 (51-83%
ethanol) used in flexible fuel vehicles (FFVs) can substantially reduce GHG emissions from the
light-duty vehicle sector. More than 25 million FFVs are already on the road today and FFV
production can be ramped up quickly by automakers at no additional cost to the consumer. In the
longer term, low-carbon or zero-carbon liquid fuels used in FFVs or plug-in hybrid electric FFVs
can offer emissions solutions for market segments and customers that may not be well served by
battery electric vehicles (BEVs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 3-4]
To foster a vibrant and competitive landscape of multiple low-carbon solutions, it is critical
for EPA to set performance-based and technology-neutral emissions standards. Unfortunately,
the proposed rule falls short of this ideal by focusing narrowly on one technology and only one
segment of the GHG emissions lifecycle (i.e., tailpipe emissions). It is essential that EPA look
beyond tailpipe emissions; the Agency should use a full lifecycle3 analysis to fairly and
accurately compare the climate impacts of all current and future transportation options. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 3-4]
3 Throughout these comments, the terms "full lifecycle analysis" refer to a complete "well-to-wheel"
analysis as defined by Argonne National Laboratory.
V. The Proposed Rule Ignores the GHG Reduction Benefits of Ethanol and Other Renewable
Liquid Fuels
Renewable fuels like ethanol offer an effective and immediate solution for decarbonizing
liquid fuels and ICE vehicles across all segments of the transportation sector. Ethanol has a vital
role to play in reducing GHG emissions from the transportation sector, but EPA's proposed
emissions standards regrettably fail to provide any mechanisms for capturing these benefits or
encouraging greater production and sale of vehicles that can operate on higher levels of low-
carbon liquid fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 9-11]
Today's corn starch ethanol already reduces GHG emissions by roughly half, on average,
compared to gasoline. According to the Department of Energy's Argonne National Laboratory,
typical corn ethanol provides a 44% GHG savings compared to gasoline, even when unverifiable
emissions from direct and indirect changes in land cover/land use are included. 18 When corn
ethanol is compared directly to gasoline (i.e., no indirect emissions included for either fuel),
Argonne National Laboratory finds that corn ethanol reduces GHG emissions by 52%, on
average, versus gasoline. Similarly, researchers affiliated with Harvard University, MIT, and
Tufts University concluded that today's corn ethanol offers an average GHG reduction of 46%
versus gasoline, including land use change emissions. 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp.
9-11]
18 Lee, U., Kwon, H., Wu, M. and Wang, M. (2021), Retrospective analysis of the U.S. corn ethanol
industry for 2005- 2019: implications for greenhouse gas emission reductions. Biofuels, Bioprod. Bioref.,
15: 1318-1331. https://doi.org/10.1002/bbb.2225.
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19 Melissa J Scully et al (2021), Carbon intensity of corn ethanol in the United States: state of the science.
Environ. Res. Lett. 16 043001. https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/abde08.
In addition, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) has conducted extensive lifecycle
analysis and certified that ethanol produced from the cellulosic biomass found in corn generally
reduces GHG emissions by 70-80% compared to gasoline; more than 140 million gallons of
ethanol from corn-based cellulosic biomass were used in California in 2021, reducing GHG
emissions by nearly 800,000 MT CO2e.20 Overall, CARB found that from 2011 to 2021, the use
of ethanol from all feedstocks cut GHG emissions from the California transportation sector by 31
million MT C02e, more than any other fuel used to meet the state's Low Carbon Fuel Standard
(LCFS) requirements.21 All liquid biofuels—including ethanol, renewable diesel, and
biodiesel—accounted for 74% of the carbon reductions delivered under the LCFS from 2011
through 2021.22 Similarly, ethanol has generated 45% of the carbon reductions achieved under
Oregon's Clean Fuel Program (CFP) since its inception 2016.23 When combined with biodiesel
and renewable diesel, liquid biofuels have accounted for 87% of total GHG reductions under the
Oregon CFP.24[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 9-11]
20 CARB. "LCFS Pathway Certified Carbon Intensities." Viewed Feb. 7, 2023.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/lcfs-pathway-certified-carbon-intensities.
21 CARB. "Low Carbon Fuel Standard Reporting Tool Quarterly Summaries." Viewed Jan. 20, 2023.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/low-carbon-fuel-standard-reporting-tool-quarterlysummaries.
22 Id.
23 Oregon DEQ. "Quarterly Data Summaries." Viewed Feb. 8, 2023.
https://www.oregon.gov/deq/ghgp/cfp/Pages/Quarterly-Data-Summaries.aspx.
24 Id.
With the rapid emergence of new technologies and more efficient practices, even greater
GHG reductions are coming to the corn ethanol sector. In fact, analysis by the U.S. Department
of Agriculture found that some biorefineries are likely already producing corn starch ethanol that
offers a 70% GHG reduction versus gasoline.25 Indeed, the U.S. ethanol industry is well on its
way to producing corn ethanol that is fully carbon neutral. With the adoption of CCUS, biogas
and renewable electricity substitution, and climate- smart farming practices, corn ethanol is
expected to achieve net zero emissions, on average, by 2050 or sooner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0602, pp. 9-11]
25 Jan Lewandrowski, Jeffrey Rosenfeld, Diana Pape, Tommy Hendrickson, Kirsten Jaglo & Katrin
Moffroid (2020). "The greenhouse gas benefits of corn ethanol - assessing recent evidence," Biofuels,
11:3, 361-375, DOI: 10.1080/17597269.2018.1546488
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17597269.2018.1546488.
A landmark 2022 study examined numerous technology pathways for corn ethanol producers
to achieve net zero emissions, concluding that".. .ethanol producers can achieve extremely low
corn ethanol emissions and fill a critical need in tomorrow's zero- carbon economy."26 The
study found that the corn ethanol industry is likely to meet its goals of producing net-zero
ethanol, on average, well before 2050. In fact, RFA's member companies are so confident about
the promise of carbon neutral ethanol that they adopted a resolution in 2021 to achieve a net-zero
carbon footprint, on average, for ethanol by 2050 or sooner. This pledge was memorialized in a
letter to President Biden in July 2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 9-11]
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26 Emery, Isaac. Informed Sustainability Consulting (2022). "Pathways to Net-Zero Ethanol: Scenarios for
Ethanol Producers to Achieve Carbon Neutrality by 2050." Prepared for the Renewable Fuels Association.
https://d35tlsyewk4d42.cloudfront.net/file/2146/Pathways%20to%20Net%20Zero%20Ethanol%20Feb%2
02022.pdf.
It is important to note that the expansion of low-carbon ethanol production in the United
States has not resulted in cropland expansion or conversion of native lands (e.g., forest or
grassland) to agriculture. As part of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program, EPA conducts
an annual analysis of U.S. agricultural land area to ensure that the RFS has not caused cropland
to expand beyond 2007 levels. Each year, EPA's analysis continues to show that the amount of
land engaged in agricultural production is well below the level in 2007 when the RFS was
extended and expanded by Congress. Over the last 10 years, the U.S. agricultural land area has
averaged 380 million acres, which is 22 million acres less than the agricultural land area in 2007,
according to EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 9-11]
In addition to its environmental benefits, ethanol also makes a vital contribution to our
nation's economy. The 199 ethanol biorefineries across the country serve as crucial drivers of
employment and income in the communities in which they operate. Even as Russia's invasion of
Ukraine caused a global energy crisis in 2022, and even as abnormally high inflation rates
impacted the U.S. economy, the production of 15.4 billion gallons of ethanol directly employed
nearly 79,000 American workers in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors. In addition, the
ethanol industry supported 343,000 indirect and induced jobs across all sectors of the economy.
Meanwhile, the industry generated $35 billion in household income and contributed $57 billion
to the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2022.27 These significant employment impacts
and economic contributions should be taken into consideration by EPA as it examines potential
future energy and climate regulatory actions that may impact the biofuels sector. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 9-11]
27 J.M. Urbanchuk (ABF Economics). "Contribution of the Ethanol Industry to the Economy of the United
States in 2022." (February 2023).
Organization: South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR)
Biofuels
The proposed emissions standards and the effort to use regulations to essentially mandate EV
use ignores the benefits of continued use of renewable biofuels to power our vehicles. South
Dakota's primary industry is agriculture, and we are the nation's fifth-largest ethanol producer.
Ethanol is clean burning, renewable fuel used in our existing vehicle fleet allowing our citizens
to travel across our state safely and reliably. Instead of working to mandate EV use, DANR
recommends EPA look for ways to support the continued production and use of renewable
biofuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0523, p. 3]
South Dakota is a rural state with a small population, wide open spaces, and clean air. South
Dakota is in full compliance or attainment with all federal criteria pollutants and the proposed
emissions standards will not significantly improve our air quality. However, by essentially
mandating EV use, they will limit the ability of our citizens to live and work in rural South
Dakota. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0523, p. 3]
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Organization: Stellantis
Improve Fuels and Implement a Nationwide Low Carbon Fuel Standard
Stellantis supports cost effective liquid fuel improvements that enable increased fuel
efficiency and reduce emissions. To that end, Stellantis fully supports Auto Innovators'
comments on improved liquid fuels, proposed changes to Tier 3 test fuel, and request for EPA to
take action now on fuels.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 22-23]
8 See Alliance for Automotive Innovation comments submitted to docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later
Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles"; Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 29184 (May 5, 2023)
Auto Innovators states in their comments that out of the 290 million light-duty cars and trucks
on the road in the United States,9 98% operate on gasoline or diesel fuel. 10 Auto Innovators also
points out that the average age of a vehicle in the U.S. has grown to over 12 years.11 It's clear,
even with the NPRM's projected BEV penetration rate of 67% of new car sales in 2032, the car
pare will continue to rely on liquid fuels for years to come. Liquid fuels will continue to play a
significant role in transportation and, ultimately, air quality. Improved liquid fuel can benefit the
entire pare with immediate impact once deployed and need not rely on turnover or the
introduction of new vehicle technology, which can take decades to become widespread. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 22-23]
9 U.S. Vehicle Registration Statistics, Hedges & Company, https://hedgescompany.com/automotive-
market- research-statistics/auto-mailing-lists-and-marketing/ (accessed May 23, 2023).
10 Figures compiled by Alliance for Automotive Innovation with registered vehicle data provided by IHS
Markit, https://www.autosinnovate.org/resources/electric-vehicle-sales-dashboard. (accessed May 23,
2023)
11 U.S. Vehicle Registration Statistics, Hedges & Company, https://hedgescompany.com/automotive-
market- research-statistics/auto-mailing-lists-and-marketing/ (accessed May 23, 2023).
Improved liquid fuels will complement, not compete with, other technologies like
electrification. Improving liquid fuels can provide significant reductions in GHG and non-GHG
emissions from ICE equipped vehicles, engines, and equipment while the EV market grows. For
example, implementation of a national low carbon fuel standard could act as a market-based
approach to decarbonizing transportation fuel and provide revenue sources to incentivize market
adoption of EVs. Eliminating a small fraction of heavy boiling aromatics in gasoline can
significantly reduce PM emissions from all spark-ignited vehicles and engines. Capping the
sulfur content of gasoline to no more than 10 ppm will enable advanced emissions control
technology and will reduce the impact of sulfur on catalyst efficiency. Capping summer vapor
pressure of gasoline to 9.0 psi or less, regardless of ethanol content, further reduces evaporative
emissions. Additionally, octane is a critical fuel parameter for ICE vehicles, and low octane fuels
(sub-87 anti-knock index) remain a barrier to market introduction of more efficient ICE vehicles.
Furthermore, transitioning to a higher minimum-octane gasoline (i.e., minimum 95-98 research
octane number) would enable increased engine efficiency in new ICE vehicles. EPA should act
now to improve liquid fuels, treat vehicle and fuels as a system and leverage the opportunities
that improved liquid fuels provide to the approximately 290M vehicles in the car pare. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, pp. 22-23]
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Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
In the longer term, EPA, the DOE or the national labs should conduct an analysis on the value
of PHEVs as a platform for low-carbon alternative fuels including whether to allow PHEVs with
85% or more low carbon liquid biofuels blended with gasoline to be treated as zero- emission
vehicles (ZEVs) in future EPA regulations. The main issue to be studied is feedstock availability
in the long run for both diesel and gasoline substitutes that could be used in PHEVs to make
them have lower life cycle emissions. Related environmental issues could be studied. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 9-10]
Justification: Some biomass feedstocks used in gasoline can't or won't be used in diesel or jet
fuel powered transportation. This should result in large amounts of unused feedstocks because
biomass feedstocks for spark-ignited engines may not be needed in the long run (e.g.,2050) for
transportation or industrial uses. However, using some of these existing feedstocks would make
future PHEVs have even lower full fuel cycle GHG emissions than they have today. Strong plug-
in hybrid cars and light trucks using gasoline already can have lower GHG than long range
electric cars and light trucks due to the GHG emissions from battery manufacturing and the
slightly poorer fuel economy of long-range BEVs. (See Appendix B in this letter). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 9-10]
CARB-funded research by UC Davis, 13 shows a PHEV 60 has the same life cycle GHG
emissions as a Tesla model S because of the weight of the Tesla and it has fewer GHG life cycle
emissions than a heavier BEV with 400- or 500-mile AER. See the first chart below. Toyota's
publicly available tool also correctly shows this result. 14 Furthermore, the UC Davis analysis
does not include battery manufacturing GHG emissions. Using data from the USDOE cradle to
grave analysis, 15we estimate that adding 350 miles more of AER adds about 10 grams per mile
of GHG emissions to the above analysis for a light duty EV. See the next three charts below.
Further, a flex fuel vehicle requirement to enable low carbon fuels for these stronger PHEVs
would further lower their life cycle GHG. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 18-20]
13 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/12-319.pdf Figure 82
14 GitHub - khamza075/PVC: A software for assessing the efficacy of various vehicle powertrains at
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions . Also see https://app.carghg.org/
15 See page 143 at https://greet.es.anl.gov/publication-c2g-2016-report. Extrapolate from 210 to 410-mile
all electric range and divide by 150,000-mile vehicle life.
[See original for graph titled "BEV Households Have a Lower Average GHG Per Mile"]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 18-20]
[See original for graph titled "GHG Reductions of Strong PHEVs Compared to Large BEVs
without Battery Manufacturing"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 18-20]
[See original for graph titled "GHG Reductions of Strong PHEVs Compared to Large BEVs
with Battery Manufacturing"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 18-20]
[See original for graph titled "PHEVs Can Match BEVs on GHGs"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0646, pp. 18-20]
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Organization: T. Becker Power Systems
1- It is unlawful for EPA to thwart or prevent the implementation of any technology that has
the ability to meet the environmental goals of any rule or regulation proposed by EPA. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0567, p. 1]
2- This proposed rule/regulation intentionally thwarts the use of liquid and gaseous fuel
technologies that, if implemented, can meet the air quality goals of the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0567, p. 1]
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
5. We encourage EPA to consider a role for low-carbon liquid fuels (LCLFs) in future
rulemaking. This is the only viable option to reduce GHG emissions from the existing U.S. fleet
of 270 million vehicles. Regardless of how quickly the needed shift to electrification occurs,
vehicles with internal combustion engines (ICEs) will be on U.S. roads in large numbers for
decades to come. Failure to provide a GHG-reduction solution for this massive source of
emissions would be missing an enormous opportunity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, p. 2]
5. GHG Program
The Proposed Rule fails to demonstrate the penetration of BEVs assumed for compliance with
the proposed standards is feasible. The proposal notes "While emission standards set by the EPA
under CAA section 202(a)(1) generally do not mandate use of particular technologies, they are
technology-based, as the levels chosen must be premised on a finding of technological
feasibility." 17 CAA section 202(a)(1) states "Any regulation prescribed under paragraph (1) of
this subsection (and any revision thereof) shall take effect after such period as the Administrator
finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving
appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
17 88 Fed. Reg at 29232.
18 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2).
The aggressive ramp up of BEVs (see Table 1) required to comply forces a rapid
transformation of how vehicles are manufactured, driven, fueled, and serviced. As such,
"leadtime and requisite technology" must extend to the availability of critical minerals, the
readiness of a sustainable battery supply chain and fueling infrastructure, as well as other
market-related factors that will affect the price and consumer demand of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
[Table 1 Annual BEV Penetration Assume for Compliance w/ Proposed Standards [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
MY 2027: BEV Share 36
MY 2028: BEV Share 45
MY 2029: BEV Share 55
MY 2030: BEV Share 60
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MY 2031: BEV Share 63
MY 2032: BEV Share 67]
Today's PEV support system clearly cannot meet the needs of the future envisioned by the
proposal. Our comments explain why the proposal lacks a clear justification for how the support
system will be in place over the period of the proposed standards. Neither EPA nor auto
manufactures can control the timing or outcomes of these essential support measures. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
Therefore, it is disappointing that EPA removed the e-RIN proposal from the RFS set rule as
it is one of the few measures for which EPA has direct authority to provide at least some level of
assistance in supporting the EV shares required in the GHG proposal. After a muti-year
collaboration with the auto industry, a valuable policy tool for establishing PEV markets and
promoting clean energy has been lost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
Finally, EPA has taken a more measured view of technology risk and uncertainty in past
vehicle emissions rulemakings in which technology costs were lower and automakers had
significantly more direct control over managing their technology development, deployment, and
sales mix to comply. In this Proposed Rule, EPA appears to be taking a much more cavalier
approach to risk, lead time, and ensuring the "requisite technology" is available, despite the high
cost of BEVs, the massive uncertainty around mineral supplies, the significant investment
needed in charging infrastructure and the power grid, and the uncertain market demand for
BEVs. The standards in the Final Rule should be adjusted to better account for market
uncertainties. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
8. Low Carbon Fuels
EPA needs to return to treating fuels and vehicles as a holistic system to capture the benefits
of low carbon fuels. Low carbon liquid fuels are (1) technically feasible today, (2) the only
viable decarbonization solution for the legacy vehicle fleet, (3) an important complement to
vehicle electrification over a long transition, and (4) factor for a range of consumers whose needs
or budgets require different solutions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 46-48]
Toyota has been working with fuels industry partners to demonstrate the technical feasibility
of low carbon fuels today. In April 2023, Toyota announced work with ExxonMobil to test
research fuels in Toyota's advanced engines and vehicles. ExxonMobil reports their innovative
fuels have potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions up to 75% compared to conventional
fuels available today.36 During that same month, Toyota and Chevron demonstrated a real-world
use-case of Chevron's Renewable Gasoline Blend (RGB). Toyota and Chevron drove three
Toyota vehicles almost 1,000 miles across parts of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Chevron
reports a 40% lower carbon intensity for Chevron RGB compared to traditional gasoline on a
lifecycle basis. These low carbon liquid fuels are compatible with the existing vehicle fleet and
existing infrastructure and are technically feasible today. The US ethanol industry continues to
make great strides in reducing carbon the carbon intensity of their product. In a 2021 study,
researchers from Harvard, Tufts, and EH&E estimated corn ethanol was 46% lower carbon
intensity compared to average gasoline.37 The Renewable Fuels Association reports their fuel
producing members aim to reduce their lifecycle ethanol GHG by at least 70% on average
compared to gasoline by 2030, and achieve net- zero lifecycle GHG by 2050.38 Since the vast
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majority of the 280 million vehicles on US roads today have an internal combustion engine,
decarbonizing liquid fuels on a well-to-wheel basis would yield immediate benefits for lowering
the carbon intensity of transportation energy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 46-48]
36 Reductions in Carbon Intensity (CI) estimates are based on the lifecycle greenhouse gas emission of the
fuels tested at Toyota's Research Center, compared to petroleum gasoline. Estimated CI values are based
on either GREET 2021 estimates, or feedstock Proof of Sustainability documents. Actual results may vary.
37 Melissa J Scully et al 2021 Environ. Res. Lett. 16 043001.
38 Renewable Fuels Association. (2021, July 27). RFA Pledge to President: Ethanol to Achieve Net Zero
Emissions by 2050 or Sooner Link: https://ethanolrfa.org/media-and-news/category/news-
releases/article/2021/07/rfa-pledge-to- president-ethanol-to-achieve-net-zero-emissions-by-2050-or-sooner.
Low carbon fuels are an additional pathway for reducing transportation GHG. This pathway
offers a hedge against uncertainties that could affect the pace of electrification, such as critical
mineral supply and charging infrastructure development. The combination of low carbon fuels
with hybrids and PHEVs shows excellent overall GHG performance while optimizing usage of
potentially scarce critical minerals. In this way, low carbon fuels would be complementary to
vehicle electrification and future GHG goals during the long energy transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0620, pp. 46-48]
Low carbon fuels preserve consumer choice on vehicles while still supporting decarbonization
of transportation energy. Proposed regulations should factor for a range of consumers whose
needs or budgets require different solutions. Vehicle electrification will proceed at different
paces in different regions. Full vehicle electrification could take longer in rural areas or other
locations lacking sufficient charging infrastructure. If forecasts for future battery costs prove
inaccurate, it would have disparate impact on different socioeconomic levels. A diverse set of
solutions offers more certainty of both emissions reductions and affordability, which is
consistent with environmental justice objectives. Low carbon liquid fuels are an important part of
enabling all vehicle owners/users to play a role in reducing emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0620, pp. 46-48]
Organization: Transfer Flow, Inc
Transfer Flow disagrees with EPA's transportation technology biases.
A singular fixation focusing only on tailpipe emissions reduction does not consider important
life-cycle emission analysis. 1 Vehicular emissions should be considered from the cradle to the
grave, from manufacturing and usage to end-of-life disposal of both the vehicle and the energy
used to power the vehicle or equipment. Requiring new vehicles sold to either be battery electric
vehicles (BEVs), plug-in electric hybrids (PHEV), or fuel-cell battery electric vehicles crowds
out other near-zero technologies. Implementation of any and all available near-zero technologies
should be encouraged for a multitude of reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 1-2]
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SlE8SQde5rk
All near-zero technologies should be ramped up and implemented as quickly as feasible in
order to help meet the EPA's pollution prevention goals. Encouraging the sales of all new
vehicles or equipment to contain some sort of electric vehicle technology and, therefore, also
contain a heavy-duty battery instead of encouraging the adoption of the plethora of currently
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available near-zero technologies is a disservice to the citizens of our great country. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 1-2]
It's going to take a suite of technologies to achieve carbon neutrality.
The EPA's technology bias serves to stymie other clean technologies currently being
implemented. The anaerobic practices that create renewable natural gas and biofuels created by
keeping organic matter out of landfills should be encouraged. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496,
pp. 5-6]
One of the major contributing factors to the devastating wildfires affecting California over the
last several years is, besides climate change, decades of forest mismanagement leading to
unhealthy forests filled with rotting biomass. A healthy forest is a carbon sink, and an unhealthy
forest is a carbon source. In 2022, UC Berkeley published a study that the best way to clean up
these unhealthy forests would be to convert that rotting biomass into renewable drop-in gasoline,
which requires no change in behavior from consumers.25 It's simply a different and
compatible product being dispensed from the gasoline refueling station. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0496, pp. 5-6]
25 https://bof.fire.ca.gov/media/mn5gzmxv/joint-institute-forest-biofuels_final_2022_ada.pdf
The infrastructure buildout and grid reliability needed to support fleet electrification will take
considerable time and funding to achieve. The basic strategy of electrifying transportation delays
our dependency on fossil fuels and falls short of immediately reducing greenhouse gas emissions
with currently available technologies as well as significantly mitigating short-term criteria
pollutants methane, black carbon, and C02. All near-zero transportation technologies, electric,
fuel cell, biofuels, renewable natural gas, biodiesel, renewable diesel, sustainable aviation
fuels26, and hydrogen internal combustion engines27'28'29'30'3r32'33 are all needed to drive
our great nation towards a sustainable future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 5-6]
26 https://prometheusfuels.com/
27 https://www.autonews.com/technology/toyota-cummins-invest-hydrogen-combustion-engines
28 https://www.act-news.com/news/hydrogen-internal-combustion-mobility-is-here/
29 https://www.equipmentworld.com/alternative-power/article/15306854/why-hydrogen-combustion-
engines- not-fuel-cells-are-jcbs-future
30 https://www.act-news.com/news/hydrogen-internal-combustion-mobility-is-here/
31 https://www.hydrogenfuelnews.com/hydrogen-powered-vehicles-classic/8555907/
32 https://learning.sema.org/products/hydrogen-fueled-ice-for-performance-application#tab-
producttaboverview
33 https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/how-hydrogen-
combustion- engines-can-contribute-to-zero-emissions
Transfer Flow suggests the EPA encourage usage of all near-zero technologies. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 5-6]
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Organization: Transport Evolved LLC (Transportation Consultancy)
3) While calls have been made (mostly from the fossil fuel industry) for the EPA to adopt a
"Well to Wheel" calculation, due to the poor quality of data available from the oil and gas
industry on the amount of pollution produced, at this point a shift to 'Well to Wheel' calculation
would be highly counterproductive.4,5 Should the fossil fuel industry provide accurate, timely
and thoroughly researched, independently verified data on the amount of pollution it produces,
then it might be more viable, but given the substantial secondary effects (as noted above) it
seems incredibly difficult to quantify the harms to society from continuing to allow significant
fossil fuel extraction for energy use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0453, p. 2]
4 https://climatetrace.org/news/more-than-70000-of-the-highest-emitting-greenhouse-gas.
5 https://www.iea.org/news/methane-emissions-from-the-energy-sector-are-70-higher-than-official-figures.
Organization: U.S. Chamber of Commerce
American businesses are playing an essential role in addressing climate change, and the
business community is an essential partner in the development of sound policies that protect our
environment. We strongly support the continued transition to lower-carbon fuels and vehicles,
and are committed to partnering with EPA, the Department of Transportation, and other federal
stakeholders to facilitate a successful transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0604, p. 1]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Numerous commenters stated that millions of ICE vehicles will remain in widespread use for
many years, so it will be beneficial for EPA to incentivize lower-carbon liquid fuels alongside
the phase-in of BEVs. Several commenters criticized EPA's proposal for being too narrowly
focused on BEVs while ignoring a broader array of options like biofuels and hybrid powertrains.
A commenter asserted that EPA has the authority to regulate fuels and vehicles as a holistic
system in reducing GHGs.
Some said EPA should put in place a federal low-carbon fuel standard, citing California's
program as an example, while others suggested providing certification pathways for higher
octane and higher ethanol blends, setting a 95 RON requirement for market fuel, and eliminating
fuels with AKI below 87. A commenter encouraged EPA to consider the broad range of fuel-
related options that are proven and could be cheaper and faster than widespread rollout of BEVs,
including co-processing of biofeedstocks with petroleum, methane production from waste
digesters, and carbon capture and sequestration.
Several commenters disagreed with EPA's analyses counting zero CO2 emissions from EVs,
saying that a full lifecycle analysis was needed to evaluate a full range of options, including
liquid fuels, and truly make the standards technology-neutral. A commenter stated that Flex-Fuel
PHEVs operated on E85 can provide lifecycle GHG performance equivalent to BEVs. Another
noted that a proper lifecycle analysis for liquid fuels has not been possible because of the poor
quality of data being released by the oil and gas industry, and thus it may be difficult to quantify
the harms to society from continued fossil fuel use.
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Commenters from biofuel groups highlighted the many hurdles and uncertainties in
international supply chains for battery production, meanwhile the domestic ethanol industry has
been producing billions of gallons of low-carbon fuel each year while continually reducing their
lifecycle emissions. They noted that expansion of ethanol blends can be done with minimal
additional infrastructure, something that EPA could further incentivize by establishing carbon
intensity factors, FFV multipliers, revising the fuel economy R-factor for E10 test fuel to 1.0,
and recognizing ethanol's potential as a high-octane replacement for aromatics. A commenter
suggested there is additional potential for net GHG reductions through properly valuing and
incentivizing low-carbon agricultural practices where, for example, farmers could earn LCFS
credits for acres managed according to certain guidelines. Some ethanol and corn producers
stated that they expect rapid vehicle electrification to reduce corn demand and prices, eliminating
biofuel jobs and hurting rural communities.
Response:
Implicit (or in some cases, explicit) in many of these comments is that the proposed standards
in some manner mandate use of BEVs. They do not. As explained in preamble Sections I and III
and RTC 2.3, the final standards are numerical performance-based standards, and can be met in
any manner an automaker sees fit that achieves compliance with that numerical standard. In
assessing a modeled potential compliance pathway that includes a range of technologies that
include ICE vehicles, hybrids, PHEVs, and BEVs, EPA was illustrating one possible approach
for compliance as part of its conclusions that the final standards are feasible and appropriate;
EPA was not requiring that manufacturers utilize that modeled potential compliance pathway.
This is the Agency's approach for all of its CAA Title II standards, following the template set
forth initially by the D.C. Circuit in NRDC v. EPA, 655 F. 2d at 332, and echoed many times
since in succeeding rules and court opinions.
These standards are vehicle emission standards, and EPA considers all comments asserting
that EPA must, or should, set or determine compliance with such standards in a manner other
than by reference to emissions from the vehicle as comments asserting that EPA must, or should,
consider life cycle assessment. For EPA's response to comments on life cycle assessment, see
the next RTC section, 19.2.
EPA recognizes that changes to fuel requirements can result in emission reductions but
disagrees that such changes are within the scope of this rulemaking or that EPA is required to
consider them as alternatives to this rulemaking, which is concerned with vehicle and engine
standards under section 202(a). The CAA has a separate and distinct set of requirements for
engaging in fuels regulations and EPA has not at this point undertaken the requisite analyses to
regulate GHGs under section 211(c). Indeed, section 211(c)(2)(A) provides that fuel may not be
regulated to control harmful air pollution except after "consideration of other technologically or
economically feasible means of achieving emissions standards under section [202]." Thus, it is
entirely appropriate (if not required) for the Administrator to take the technologically and
economically feasible steps of this rule before undertaking further controls on fuels to address
emissions reduction.
In light of this statutory structure, with very different regulatory programs for vehicles
standards under section 202 and fuels standards under section 211, EPA disagrees that it is
required to consider fundamentally altering this rulemaking from a vehicles rulemaking to a fuels
rulemaking. "While an agency must consider and explain its rejection of 'reasonably obvious
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alternative[s],' it need not consider every alternative proposed nor respond to every comment
made. Rather, an agency must consider only 'significant and viable' and 'obvious' alternatives."
Nat'l Shooting Sports Found., Inc. v. Jones, 716 F.3d 200, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citations
omitted). At this point, given that EPA has not met the statutory prerequisites for new fuels
controls, much less proposed new fuels controls, the adoption of new fuels controls is not a
viable alternative. For these reasons, EPA considers comments in support of adopting changes to
fuels requirements as beyond the scope of this rule.
EPA of course continues to separately implement the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)
program, which provides requirements and incentives to encourage the domestic consumption of
low carbon liquid fuels, including cellulosic fuels, under the RFS program pursuant to section
21 l(o) of the CAA. The most recent renewable fuel standards require the largest volumes to date
of renewable fuel use in the U.S. transportation sector. (See 88 FR 44468, July 12, 2023).
19.2 - Life cycle analysis
Comments by Organizations
Organization: 25x'25 Alliance, et al.(25X25)
3) adopts a life-cycle analysis approach to calculating and comparing emissions from
different technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
Embracing and enabling a pathway to improve fuel quality will increase and accelerate
emission reductions, improve public health, help achieve environmental justice goals, provide
greater versatility, and improve reliability all at less cost. This pathway is available to EPA and
the consideration of it is demanded by the Clean Air Act. The best and most recent data suggests
that the adoption of even mid-level ethanol blends would reduce pollution emissions at least as
much as EPA's electrification approach, and at far less cost.
Even if EPA's electrification program could be successful—and as explained above, it
cannot—a complimentary fuel improvement would double EPA's projected emissions reduction.
The current rule takes this option off the table and leaves those pollutants in the air. EPA could
do far better. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0573, pp. 1-4]
1 See "Higher Ethanol Blends Support the Transition to a Low-Carbon Future," Brian West, SAE Update,
February 2023, pp2-6) National adoption of mid-level ethanol blends is available, feasible, and lower cost
than current gasoline. https://www.nxtbook.eom/smg/sae/23UPD02/index.php#/p/2
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Alliance)
E. Comments on Estimated Social benefits of the C02 Standards
In this section, Auto Innovators comments on the major categories of estimated social benefits
for the C02 performance standards for model years 2027-2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 285-288]
1. Local/Regional Air Quality benefits from Control of Criteria Air Pollutants
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The final regulatory impact analysis should acknowledge that the peer-reviewed scientific
literature does not generally support the agency's claim that a shift from ICEs to BEVs in the
light-duty sector will reduce criteria air pollution across the country. In 2021, Burnham et al. of
Argonne National Laboratory (DOE) presented a regional U.S. lifecycle analysis of the impact of
BEVs through 2050, accounting for upstream emissions of criteria air pollutants at the
powerplant. The abstract of their paper concludes as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
pp.285-288]
We generated state-level emission factors using a projection from 2020 to 2050 for three
light-duty vehicle types. We found that BEVs currently provide GHG benefits in nearly every
state, with the median state's benefit being between approximately 50% to 60% lower than
gasoline counterparts. However, gasoline vehicles currently have lower total NOx, urban NOx,
total PM2.5, and urban PM2.5 in 33%; 15%; 70%; and 10% of states, respectively. BEV
emissions will decrease in 2050 due to a cleaner grid, but the relative benefits when compared to
gasoline vehicles do not change significantly, as gasoline vehicles are also improving over this
time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
The results of this study concerning total PM2.5 are especially concerning because the
agency's quantified criteria-pollutant benefits in this rulemaking are dominated by an alleged
advantage of BEVs with respect to PM2.5 control. Moreover, the lifecycle analysis by Burnham
et al. (2021) is published in the peer-reviewed literature, while the agency's lifecycle inputs and
analysis have not been peer reviewed by qualified experts. For the final rule, Auto Innovators
believes it is unwise for the agency to rely on its lifecycle analysis of criteria air pollutant control
as a primary rationale for the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
Insofar as criteria air pollution control is considered a primary rationale for a rule that
regulates C02 emissions, we recommend that the agency go beyond an analysis of average ICE
emissions and consider "best-in-class" vehicle emissions in the baseline. For example, in a peer-
reviewed contribution, Winker et al. (2018) compared HEVs and BEVs in terms of criteria air
pollution emissions. When the upstream emissions from BEVs are included, they find that BEV
emissions are 0.06 grams per mile (NOx) while average HEV emissions are 0.004 grams per
mile (NOx and HC). The results of Winkler et al. are consistent with an earlier paper by
Michalek et al. (2011), which found that HEVs and PHEVs, with small battery packs, are
environmentally and economically superior to BEVs. Thus, HEVs may be a superior
technological option for criteria air pollution control than BEVs, at least in some regions of the
country and until the upstream and manufacturing emissions of BEVs are controlled. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
Sources: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
1. Andrew Burnham, Zifeng Lu, Michael Wang, Amgad Elgowainy. Regional Emissions Analysis of
Light-Duty Battery-Electric Vehicles. Atmosphere. 12(11). 2021, 1482.
2. S.L. Winkler, J.E. Anderson, L. Garza, W.C. Ruona, R. Vogt, T.J. Wellington. Vehicle Criteria Pollutant
(PM, NOx, CO and HCx) Emissions: How Low Should We Go? Climate and Atmospheric Science. 1.
2018, 26.
3. Jeremy J. Michalek, Mikhail Chester, Paulina Jaramillo, Lester B. Lave. Valuation of Plug- In Vehicle
Life-Cycle Air Emissions and Oil Displacement Benefits. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences. 108(40). 2011, 16554-16558. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 285-288]
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2. Climate Change Benefits
Auto Innovators sees C02 emissions control as the primary rationale for the agency's
rulemaking. We urge the agency to take great pains to ensure that the C02 benefits in the final
RIA are not exaggerated significantly, as this will make the entire rulemaking vulnerable to
reversal, which will create tremendous regulatory uncertainty for our members. The agency's
IPM modeling contains three glaring errors or exaggerations that contribute to an overestimation
of the C02 emissions benefits of the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 288-289]
First, the state-of-the art lifecycle analyses (LCAs) of BEVs in the scientific literature account
for the upstream emissions associated with a BEV's use of the electrical grid and the emissions
associated with the supply chain of lithium ion batteries for use in BEVs (e.g., Peters et al, 2017;
Hall and Lutsey, 2018; Cox et al, 2020; Koroma et al, 2020; Woody et al 2022). EPA's LCA
tries to account for the grid-related emissions within the IPM model but ignores the C02
emissions in the supply chain of lithium ion batteries. This is a serious error because the
production of lithium ion batteries requires enormous amounts of energy, especially in the
mining and processing of raw materials. The MIT group estimates that building a new EV can
produce up to 80% more GHG emissions than building a comparably-sized gasoline-powered
vehicle. The ICCT study that EPA cites attributes approximately 100 grams per kilogram of C02
to a model year 2021 BEV - 60% from grid-related emissions, 40% from battery production
(primarily mining and processing of raw materials in the BEV supply chain). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 288-289]
In the structure of EPA's analysis, the battery-production emissions, once added, will be even
more important than the grid-related emissions because they occur immediately, in the years that
the BEVs are produced (model years 2027 to 2032); they do not gradually decline over the
lifetimes of the vehicles as the grid becomes cleaner. The U.S. will not be able to build its own
mining and processing sector quickly (e.g., due to permitting obstacles), as standard timelines for
new lithium mines in the U.S. are 7 to 12 years. The BEVs sold in the United States from 2027
to 2032 will likely make use of mined and processed materials from countries around the world
(e.g., the average grid-associated emissions in 2022 were 530 g/kWh C02 in China compared to
368 g/kWh in the United States). Over the long run, the Inflation Reduction Act may reduce the
amount of C02 emissions in the battery supply chain, but the IRA is unlikely to have much
impact on mining and processing in the United States between 2023 and 2027-2032, and the new
mining/processing sites in the U.S. may access energy from powerplants using fossil fuels.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 288-289]
Sources: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 288-289]
1. William Boston. EVs Don't All Affect Climate the Same. Wall Street Journal. May 11, 2023, Bl, B4.
2. MIT Climate Portal. Are Electric Vehicles definitely Better for the Climate than Gas- Powered Vehicles?
October 13, 2022.
3. Georg Bieker. A Global Comparison of the Life-Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Combustion
Engine and Electric Passenger Cars. White Paper. International Council on Clean Transportation.
Washington, DC. July 20, 2021.
4. M. Woody, P Vaishnaw, GA Keolian et al. The Role of Pickup electrification in the Decarbonization of
Light-Duty Vehicles. Environmental Research Letters. 17(3). 2022, 034031.
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5. JF Peters, M Baumann, B. Zimmerman, J Braun, M. Weil. The Environmental Impact of Lithium-Ion
Batteries and the Role of Key Parameters - A Review. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews. 67.
2017, 419-506.
6. D Hall, N Lutsey. Effects of Battery Manufacturing on Electric Vehicle Lifecyle Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Briefing. ICCT. February 2018.
7. Cox, C Bauer, A Mendoza Beltran, DP van Vuuren, CL Mutel. Life Cycle Environmental and Cost
Comparison of Current and Future Passenger Cars Under different Energy Scenarios. Applied Energy. 269.
2020. Article 115021.
8. MS Koroma, N. Brown, G. Cardellini, M Messagie. Prospective Environmental Impacts of Passenger
Cars Under different Energy and Steel Production Scenarios. Energies. 13. 2020, 6236. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 288-289]
Third, as mentioned earlier, the EV deployment induced by the EPA rule will occur
predominantly in non-ZEV states while the EPA rule will have little incremental effect on EV
deployment in the ZEV states (which account for 30-40% of the new vehicle population). The
ICCT study that EPA cites reports that, in 2019, the California grid produced only 225 g/kWh
C02 while the U.S. average grid (even accounting for a gradually cleaner grid from 2021 to
2038) produces 357 g/kWh. Thus, the grids in the non-ZEV states are associated with much
larger emissions than the grids in the ZEV states. Funke et al. (2023, p. 43 and Figure B3,
Appendix B) make the same point with information on the grids in all ZEV states (not just
California). To avoid exaggerating the climate benefits of the rule, the agency should assume that
most of the BEVs deployed due to the role will be in non-ZEV states that, today, have more
carbon-intensive electricity sectors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 288-289]
Source:
1. Christoph Funke, Joshua Linn, Sally Robson, Ethan Russell, Daniel Shawhan, Steven Witkin. What Are
the Climate Air Pollution and Health benefits of Electric Vehicles? Resources for Future. Washington, DC.
January 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 288-289]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
EPA exacerbates that arbitrarily selective approach in the proposed rule's method for
measuring compliance. EPA proposes to determine whether man- ufacturers' fleets meet the new
standards based solely on their tailpipe emissions—disregarding the other downstream and all
upstream emissions caused by producing and operating vehicles. EPA's proposal thus would
skew producers' and purchasers' incentives toward electric vehicles even though they may
increase emissions overall. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 5]
EPA's Analysis Of Net Emissions Is Flawed
EPA estimates that the proposed rule will result in a net reduction of GHG, criteria air
pollutant, and air toxic emissions in 2055. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,198. That estimate is dubious.
In numerous ways, EPA has underestimated the up-stream emissions—i.e., those that do not
come from the vehicle itself but can still be attributed to its manufacture and operation—that will
result from a widespread shift to electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 55-56]
First, EPA improperly cabins its upstream analysis to only those emissions caused by
electricity generating units ("EGUs") and refineries. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,198, 29,347, 29,353,
29,355; Draft RIA at 9-32-33. But the emissions as-sociated with powering a vehicle—whether
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by electricity from an EGU or fuel from a refinery—are far from the only ones reasonably
attributed to its opera-tion. Depending on the vehicle, there are also emissions associated with
pro-ducing, recycling, and disposing of batteries; operating charging infrastructure; and
extracting, refining, transporting, and storing petroleum fuels. These emis-sions can be
substantial and, when considered together, may undermine EPA's assumption that swapping
internal-combustion-engine vehicles for electric ones will necessarily result in an environmental
good. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 55-56]
The International Energy Agency's discussion of emissions from mining il-lustrates this
point. According to the IEA, "the production and processing of energy transition minerals are
energy-intensive" and involve "relatively high emission[s]." Role of Critical Minerals at 15, 130;
see also Charging Infrastructure Challenges for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Fleet, Am. Transp.
Rsch. Inst., https://ti-nyurl.com/3ktjd85v ("Mining and processing produce considerable C02
and pollution issues."). For this reason, producing an electric vehicle is a more car-bon-intensive
process than producing a conventional one. Role of Critical Miner-als at 194. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683, pp. 55-56]
EPA never explains why emissions from EGUs and refineries are the only ones relevant to the
analysis. Instead, it acknowledges that "[t]he upstream emissions inventory does not account for
all upstream sources related to vehicles, fuels, and electricity generation, such as charging
infrastructure, stor-age of petroleum fuels, battery manufacture, etc." Draft RIA at 8-14. But
EPA makes no attempt to justify that selective, incomplete approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0683, pp. 55-56]
Moreover, EPA's current position marks a change from settled agency prac- tice. In earlier
GHG and criteria-pollutant rulemakings, the agency did con- sider additional upstream sources
in assessing net emissions. See SAFE Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars
and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174, 24,872 (Apr. 30, 2020) (noting that emissions "model
accounts for up- stream emissions" from "extraction, transportation, refining, and distribution of
. . . fuel"); Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106, 57,301 (Sept. 15, 2011) ("To project
these impacts, EPA estimated the impact of reduced pe- troleum volumes on the extraction and
transportation of crude oil as well as the production and distribution of finished gasoline and
diesel."); Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-
Duty Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478, 73,852 (Oct. 25, 2016) ("To project
these impacts, Method B estimated the impact of reduced petroleum volumes on the extraction
and transportation of crude oil as well as the production and distribution of finished gasoline and
diesel."). The agency has not acknowl- edged its change in position here, let alone explained
"why the new approach" of ignoring these upstream emissions "better comports with ... the
provisions that Congress enacted." Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. FLRA, 25 F.4th 1, 12 (D.C.
Cir. 2022). That is reason enough to conclude that "the [agency] has not, in fact, engaged in
reasoned decisionmaking." Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Nor could EPA
offer a valid explanation for its change. Up- stream emissions are more important in the current
rulemaking than they were in previous regulations given that EPA, for the first time, intends to
effectively mandate widespread adoption of electric vehicles, which (as explained above)
produce emissions primarily through upstream sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 56]
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Finally, EPA may be substantially overestimating the decrease in refinery emissions. The
agency's "central analysis estimates that. . . reduced liquid fuel demand results in reduced
domestic refining." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,358; see also id. at 29,198, 29,353. But at the same time,
EPA "recognize[d] that there is significant uncertainty in the impact on refinery emissions due to
decreased demand." Draft RIA at 8-12. Indeed, there is a distinct "possibility that reduced
domestic demand for liquid fuel would have no impact on domestic refining." 88 Fed. Reg. at
29,358 (emphasis added); see Draft RIA at 8-12 ("If refineries do not decrease production in
response to lower domestic demand" and "in- crease exports" instead, total upstream emissions
"would be higher," not lower, (emphasis added)). EPA must explain the basis for its assumption
that refiner- ies will decrease production before it factors these sizeable reductions into the
calculation. See Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(explaining that EPA must "support its methodology as reliable" with more than "speculation").
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 58]
In sum, EPA's analysis of upstream emissions rests on unfounded assump- tions and
methodological choices that are skewed in favor of the proposed rule. EPA should withdraw its
proposal and conduct a more thorough assessment of the ways in which a widespread shift to
electric vehicles will impact overall emissions.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 58]
7 EPA's superficial analysis of upstream emissions also undermines its discussion of "the envi- ronmental
justice impacts of [its] proposal." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,393; see id. at 29,199, 29,393-97. Although the
agency acknowledges that upstream emissions can negatively affect certain populations, it improperly
discounts those negative effects by failing to consider emissions as- sociated with anything other than
EGUs and refineries, speculating that the emissions from EGUs will decrease over time due to changes in
the future generation mix, and overestimating the decrease in refinery emissions.
The Method For Measuring Compliance Is Irrational
Under existing rules, beginning in model year 2027, manufacturers are re- quired to account
for upstream emissions as part of their compliance calcula- tion. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,197. But
under the proposed rule, EPA has explic- itly changed course and would "remove[]" that
requirement—meaning that electric vehicles, rather than fairly reflecting their actual total
emissions, would "be counted as zero grams/mile in a manufacturer's compliance calculation."
Id. In other words, EPA proposes that vehicle compliance with the new stand- ards be measured
solely by the grams of pollutants emitted from the tailpipe. Id. To survive arbitrary-and-
capricious review, EPA must provide a reasoned explanation for this change and show that there
are "good reasons" for its new policy. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 221
(2016) (internal quo- tation marks omitted). The proposed rule does not do so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683, p. 59]
First, EPA attempts to justify its change in position by explaining that it does not include
upstream emissions when calculating the compliance of inter- nal-combustion-engine vehicles,
contending that the principle of equal treat- ment requires that it take the same approach for
electric vehicles. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,252. But that compares apples to oranges. These vehicle
technologies emit air pollutants in different ways. Internal-combustion-engine vehicles cause
emissions mostly from the tailpipe, whereas electric vehicles cause emissions mostly by other
means. The timing and manner of their respective emissions is thus fundamentally different.
Granularly focusing on tailpipe emissions would mean that almost none of the emissions from
electric vehicles are counted, while almost all of the emissions from vehicles with internal-
combustion vehicles are. If equal treatment is the goal, EPA must account for both types of
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emissions when calculating compliance, rather than myopically focusing on tailpipe emis- sions,
which prejudges any analysis in favor of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p.
59]
Second, EPA states that it originally proposed including upstream emissions in compliance
calculations at a time when there was "little if any regulation" of those upstream sources for
GHGs, noting that this approach was "a depar- ture from its usual practice of relying on
stationary source programs to address pollution risks from stationary sources." 88 Fed. Reg. at
29,252. Now that power-generation emissions are declining, EPA asserts that "manufacturers
should not account for upstream utility emissions" any longer. Id. That circular explanation
assumes that the only or principal reason to consider upstream emissions is to indirectly regulate
the power-generation industry itself—to make each unit of power generated by that industry
cleaner. But as EPA acknowledges elsewhere in the proposed rule, it designs vehicle-emissions
standards to force vehicle manufacturers to adopt technology that reduces the harmful emissions
it is charged with regulating. See, e.g., id. at 29,233. Thus, if a vehicle has no tailpipe emissions
but massive upstream emissions—e.g., from producing vehicles and their components, and from
generating increased amounts of electricity to operate them—incentivizing manufacturers to
incor- porate that vehicle into their fleets would be contrary to the agency's stated goal. The
increased regulation of stationary sources will not solve this problem. Increased reliance on
electric vehicles will increase demand for the electricity that the power-generation industry
produces, and improvements in emissions per unit of power generated would not address the
total increase in emissions. Moreover, regulation of stationery sources will not capture many of
the up- stream emissions associated with electric vehicles. As discussed above, operat- ing
charging infrastructure and producing, recycling, and disposing of batteries all result in
emissions. If upstream emissions are not included in the compliance calculation, these emissions
may not be accounted for at all. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 59-60]
EPA itself correctly recognized elsewhere in the proposed rule that up- stream emissions are
relevant to its overall effort to address the "well-docu- mented buildup of GHGs due to human
activities." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,207. For instance, when estimating the proposed rule's impact on
overall emissions, as well as the costs and benefits that it generates, EPA took into account at
least some (though far from all) relevant upstream emissions. In doing so, EPA acknowledged
that it would be irrational to adopt a rule that decreases down- stream emissions but has the
effect of increasing overall emissions. The same principle applies here: It would be irrational to
find a manufacturer's fleet com- pliant if the vehicles within the fleet have lower tailpipe
emissions but cause emission of harmful pollutants in other ways that exceeds the levels
permitted for tailpipe emissions. EPA offers no explanation for this inconsistent approach to
upstream emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 59-60]
Moreover, factoring a broader set of emissions into the compliance calcula- tion will not be
difficult or unduly burden EPA. The agency has already devel- oped a method for attributing
some of these emissions to manufacturers. In its proposed rule, EPA explained that it initially
planned to take emissions from electricity generation into account by "attribut[ing] a pro rata
share of national C02 emissions from electricity generation to each mile driven under electric
power minus a pro rata share of upstream emissions associated with . . . gasoline production." 88
Fed. Reg. at 29,252. That method remains available now. And EPA could develop similarly
simple and administrable techniques to account for other key sources of upstream emissions like
battery production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 60-61]
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For all of these reasons, EPA's proposed method of calculating compliance is irrational. Any
final rule must comprehensively account for the emissions generated by electric vehicles to
ensure that EPA's solution (a widespread shift to electric vehicles) bears a rational connection to
its regulatory goal of reducing harmful emissions. Cf. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., 25 F.4th at 9
(faulting agency for failing to explain why the standard it adopted will address "the principal
problem the new standard is designed to fix"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 60-61]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)
We are also troubled by EPA's failure to evaluate the lifecycle emissions of various
powertrains and the national security implications of the proposal. Focusing exclusively on
"tailpipe" emissions paints a distorted picture and perpetuates the false notion that electric
vehicles are "zero emitters." EPA must present the public with a complete picture, one that
shows how the various powertrains stack up against each other cradle-to-grave and the major
carbon reductions that vehicle manufacturers and fuel producers have made over the last few
decades and continue to make. EPA's failure to do so would render any final rule arbitrary and
capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 1-2]
Even if EPA had Congressional authority to promulgate the proposed standards, the proposal
is arbitrary and capricious due to the Agency's reliance on incomplete facts, overly optimistic or
outright mistaken assumptions, and failure to use reason-based decision-making. The Agency
significantly overestimates environmental benefits and feasibility, underestimates costs, and
relies on little more than unsupported hope that consumer preferences will change to enable the
Agency's intended policy. EPA's decision to not only ignore lifecycle emissions of ZEVs, but to
explicitly propose removing the requirement for automakers to account for them, serves neither
consumers nor the environment. EPA's reasoning, that its policy of not accounting for these
emissions serves its goal of promoting the use of EVs, is the definition of arbitrary and
capricious biased decision-making. Unfortunately, the Agency also ignored significant issues
related to energy security and U.S. national security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 2]
The purported benefits in terms of reductions in cost, greenhouse gas emissions, and
environmental impacts are based on flawed analyses and will not be realized by consumers.
EPA's tailpipe-only approach is flawed, and the Agency needs to evaluate light- and medium-
duty vehicles on a full lifecycle basis, regardless of whether those emissions result from
electricity generation, battery production, or the combustion of liquid or gaseous fuels.
Consumer benefits from the proposal are exaggerated by assuming an unrealistic baseline rate of
ZEV-adoption, and inadequate assessments of ZEV purchase and ownership costs, charging
costs, and road infrastructure costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 3]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR EVs Require Over 4x the Critical Minerals of an ICE
Figure 1: Metal intensity - ICEVs vs. EV8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 5]
8 TURNER, MASON & COMPANY. "Evaluation of EPA's Assumptions and Analyses Used in Their
Proposed Rule for Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards" (June 7, 2023) (Research funded by AFPM and
available upon request) [hereinafter "Turner Mason Report"].
C. In the Alternative, EPA Should Set Separate Emissions Standards for Each Vehicle
Class.
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The Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to establish and revise standards for the emissions of air
pollutants from "any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines... .that
endanger public health or welfare" 111 Assuming for sake of argument EPA has authority to set
emissions standards for EVs, which we posit it does not, 112 EPA should promulgate distinct
emissions standards for each vehicle class on the basis of the vehicle's powertrain (e.g., diesel,
gasoline, natural gas, electricity). At a minimum, this would obligate EPA to abandon its position
that ZEVs are emission-less and account for upstream and other lifecycle emissions as the
agency envisioned in its 2012 rule. 113 This approach would ensure that EPA is regulating
relevant pollutants from specific vehicle classes and would promote a level playing field for
different vehicle technologies. 114 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 26]
11142 U.S.C.§ 7521(a)(1).
112 As discussed in Section III.A., supra, the CAA sec. 202 does not authorize EPA to regulate ZEV
emissions because EPA characterizes them as having "zero" emissions.
113 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,341 (May 7, 2010).
114 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(ii) ("In establishing classes or categories of vehicles or engines for purposes
of regulations under this paragraph, the Administrator may base such classes or categories on gross vehicle
weight, horsepower, type of fuel used, or other appropriate factors."). Although this section of CAA
Section 202 references "heavy-duty" vehicles, this applies to light-duty vehicles that weigh more than
6,000 lbs gross vehicle weight rating, such as light-duty heavy trucks, and if EPA has authority to set
emissions standards for EVs, the Clean Air Act does not otherwise limit EPA's discretion to expand its
classification of vehicles by fuel type.
ZEVs are entirely distinct from other classes of vehicles. Their powertrain design frontloads
emissions, meaning the air pollutants associated with these vehicles are emitted before operation
(i.e., during vehicle production and recharging). During operation, a ZEV experiences no direct
drivetrain emissions. In contrast, most emissions from ICEVs generally occur during operation,
not production and refueling. Such different emissions points require different regulatory
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 26]
AFPM suggests that EPA establish separate emission standards based on the lifecycle
emissions of a ZEV and ascribe those emissions to the vehicle over its useful life. Previous
regulatory history supports such an approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 27]
For example, while EPA did not set widely varying emission standards for methanol-fueled
vehicles versus "conventionally fueled" vehicles, the Agency discussed how lifecycle emissions
were relevant to its determination of Clean Air Act vehicle emission standards: [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, p. 27]
Methanol vehicles could have an impact on global warming (i.e., the "greenhouse effect") as
well. While increased combustion efficiency may result in lower carbon dioxide (C02)
emissions from methanol-fueled vehicles compared with petroleum-fueled vehicles, the overall
impact of a shift to methanol-fueled vehicles on global warming is uncertain. The analysis of the
impact must include the effect of not only emissions from the vehicles, but also emissions from
methanol production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 27]
In the long-term, the implications of using methanol as a transportation fuel are difficult to
predict. Should petroleum and natural gas prices rise substantially, it is probable that methanol
would be produced from coal. Assuming vehicle miles traveled, and other factors remain
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constant and assuming current process technology, a methanol-fueled system using methanol
derived from coal could result in as much as a doubling of the motor vehicle contribution to the
greenhouse effect relative to the contribution of current petroleum fuels. 121 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp. 27-28]
121 Id. at 14451-2.
EPA's continued reliance on attribute-based regulation of light duty vehicles which focuses
solely on the "footprint" of a vehicle cannot be justified in relation to the larger goals expressed
in the Proposed Rule. The statute directs EPA to address "class or classes" of vehicles and EVs
constitute such a severable class where emissions must be considered based on the full attributes
(including lifecycle GHG emissions) of that class of vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733,
pp. 27-28]
EPA compounds this flaw by making unsupported assumptions regarding the total emissions
impacts of its Proposal. While it claims that the overall analysis for combined downstream and
upstream emissions "likely underestimates the net emissions reductions that may result" from the
Proposed Rule, EPA fails to offer a data-based substantiation. The Proposed Rule failed to assess
emissions from battery manufacturing or electricity production. EPA acknowledges that its
standards will increase the demand for electricity and that demand will simultaneously increase
emissions from the electric generating sector, but by making the unsupported assumption that
low carbon electricity will be readily available, it makes no real attempt to quantify those
emissions or compare them to alternative options for reducing emissions from this sector. EPA
must provide a more comprehensive analysis to comply with its directive under the Clean Air
Act and better assess the resulting impact of the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, pp. 42-44]
In addition, activities associated with mining produce GHG emissions, particulate matter
emissions, nitrogen oxide emissions, and other air pollutant emissions from mining equipment.
As shown in Figure 8, mining and processing several minerals and metals used for ZEV
production are carbon intensive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 45-46]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Average GHG emissions intensity for production of
selected commodities. Figure 8: 210 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 45-46]
210 IEA Report 2022 at 17.
Source: INTERNATIONAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION
The process for extracting and processing critical minerals can be responsible for
approximately 20 percent of the lifecycle GHG emissions from battery production.211 EPA
failed to weigh any of these consequences appropriately in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp. 45-46]
211 H.C. Kim, et al., ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Vol. 50) "Cradle-to-Gate
Emissions from a Commercial Electric Vehicle Li-Ion Battery: A Comparative Analysis," (2016), pp.
7715-22.
Another critical aspect of the Proposed Rule not comprehensively considered is that recycling
of the battery and related electrical components of ZEVs is in a state of infancy and poses unique
materials handling and safety challenges. EPA should consider the environmental profiles of
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both ZEVs and ICEVs in light of the production, operation, and disposal of the vehicle (its useful
life). The following list provides just some of the electric battery disposal-related issues that are
likely to impact the environment and need to be addressed by EPA in the Proposed Rule: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
Battery packs could contribute 250,000 metric tons of waste to landfills for every 1
million retired ZEVs.212 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
212 Kelleher Environmental, "Research Study on Reuse and Recycling of Batteries Employed in Electric
Vehicles: The Technical, Environmental, Economic, Energy and Cost Implications of Reusing and
Recycling EV Batteries", (September 2019) available at https://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas/wells-
toconsumer/fuels-and-refining/fuels/vehicle-technology-studies.
Less than five percent of Li-ion batteries, the most common batteries used in ZEVs, are
currently being recycled "due in part to the complex technology of the batteries and cost of such
recycling."213 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
213 Gavin Harper, Roberto Sommerville, et al., NATURE, "Recycling lithium-ion batteries from electric
vehicles" (Jan. 21, 2020) available at https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1682-5.
Economies of scale will play a major role in improving the economic viability of
recycling, for which currently cost is the main bottleneck. Increasing collection and sorting rates
is a critical starting point.214 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
214 IEA Report 2022
The cathode is where most of the material value in a Li-ion battery is concentrated.
Currently, there are numerous cathode chemistries being deployed. Each of these chemistries
needs to be known, and then the appropriate method of recycling identified, which poses a
challenge, as batteries pass through a global supply chain and all materials are not well tracked.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
Lithium can be recovered from existing Li-ion recycling practices but is not economical at
current lithium prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
BMI forecasts that near-term recyclers are likely to use scrap material from the increasing
number of gigafactories coming online versus used electric vehicle batteries. Scrap is anticipated
to account for 78 percent of recyclable materials in 2025.215 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733,
pp. 47-48]
215 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, "Battery production scrap to be main source of recyclable material
this decade" (Sept. 5, 2022) available at https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/battery-production-
scrap-to-be-main-source-of-recyclable-material-this-decade.
In 2022, BMI expected over 30 gigawatt hours of process scrap to be available for
recycling, growing ten-fold across the next decade. Loss rates vary by region and tend to be
higher in earlier years of a gigafactory.216 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
216 Id.
Many 'spent' EV batteries still have 70-80 percent of their capacity left, which is more
than enough to be repurposed into other uses such as energy storage and other lower- cycle
applications for approximately another 10 years.217 This will extend the time that batteries and
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raw materials remain in use and therefore increase the demand for virgin critical minerals. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
217 Pagliaro, M. and Meneguzzo, F., "Review Article: Lithium battery reusing and recycling: A circular
economy insight," Heilyon 5: E01866 (June 15, 2019) available at
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2019.e01866
Clear guidance on repackaging, certification, standardization, and warranty liability of
spent ZEV batteries would be needed to overcome safety and regulatory challenges reuse poses
at scale.218 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
218 IEA Report 2022.
Recycling ZEV batteries to recover high-value metals has not been proven to a
commercial scale. The majority of analysts are aligned that recycling will not become an integral
supplier of raw materials until the 2030s, and at that point, only will provide approximately 20
percent of demand.219 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
219 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, supra at n. 105.
Unlike ICEVs, EPA has recently stated that ZEV batteries may need to be handled as
hazardous waste, further driving up the cost of such recycling efforts.220 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
220 Letter from Carolyn Hoskinson, Director, EPA Office of Resource Conservation and Recovery,
"Lithium Battery Recycling Regulatory Status and Frequently Asked Questions," (May 24, 2023).
Whether sufficient recycling capacity can be permitted and constructed to facilitate the
Proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
EPA must, therefore, conduct a full LCA to compare all environmental impacts to reasonably
conclude that the Proposal will decrease environmental impacts rather than merely shift them.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 47-48]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
b. API Supports the Concepts of a Lifecycle Approach to Emissions Reductions.
i. EPA should use a lifecycle assessment (LCA) approach vs. tailpipe only.
To effectively achieve emissions reductions in the transportation sector, technology- neutral
solutions are needed, utilizing an approach that addresses fuels, vehicles, and infrastructure
systems. This is best accomplished through holistic policy that encompasses the lifecycle
emissions of both the fuel and the vehicle. This combination makes for the most effective
reduction of transportation GHG emissions, as emissions occur at multiple stages of the lifecycle
of internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) and battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and the
fuels used in them. Further, utilizing a lifecycle approach would enable quantification of the
emissions associated with light- and medium-duty vehicles (LMDVs), and allow technologies to
be identified that provide more expeditious and robust GHG emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 2]
Use of a lifecycle approach would better achieve the goals of the proposed rule, as it would
allow the agency and stakeholders alike to fully identify and reduce transportation sector
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emissions and to identify and develop meaningful solutions. The reductions achieved by EPA's
existing programs - including the Tier 3 Motor Vehicle Emissions and Fuel Standards, Heavy-
Duty (HD) GHG Phase 2 standards, and HD engine and vehicle criteria pollutant standards - are
due in large part to addressing emissions holistically, and utilizing all available and emerging
technology to do so. The myopic focus on tailpipe emissions in the proposed rule essentially
means that the rule would only address certain transportation emissions, while ignoring other
sources of emissions and potential emissions reduction solutions. A lifecycle approach would
allow EPA to quantify all of the emissions associated with LMDVs, and to mitigate those
emissions more effectively. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 2]
EPA has set the GHG emissions standards as attribute-based, using vehicle footprint as the
attribute. As per EPA, "footprint is defined as a vehicle's wheelbase multiplied by its average
track width—in other words, the area enclosed by the points at which the wheels meet the
ground. The standards are therefore generally based on a vehicle's size." In Draft Regulatory
Impact Analysis (DRIA) Section 1.1.2, EPA states that "footprint does not have any relationship
with tailpipe emissions from BEVs or any other zero-emission vehicle." Yet, the proposed
footprint-based standards are based on a projected penetration rate of BEVs of greater than 50%.
A footprint-based tailpipe emission standard where, for the majority of the feet, there is "no
relationship" between footprint and tailpipe emissions could drive undesirable behaviors. For
example, the weight of BEVs increases as the footprint is increased. This increase in weight
impacts the efficiency of larger BEVs. With BEVs on the same footprint curve as internal
combustion engines (ICEs) (with a positive slope) in a tailpipe emission banking and trading
system, larger BEVs will generate a larger credit relative to their footprint. This could incentivize
the production of larger more inefficient BEVs, increasing the upstream electricity generation
emissions. The largest potential credit generator based on the proposal would be large BEV
trucks which are the most inefficient BEVs. While BEVs have zero tailpipe emissions, the
upstream electricity production does generate GHG emissions. Analysis by Argonne National
Laboratory2 showed that a current midsize sedan with 200-mile range could achieve 124 mile
per gallon gasoline equivalent (MPGge) while a heavier and larger 400-mile range small sport
utility vehicle (SUV) could achieve 88 MPGge. This corresponds to cradle-to-grave lifecycle
emissions of-160 and 250 g C02eq / mile, respectively. For comparison, the same analysis
found that a current midsize hybrid ICE would generate -270 g C02eq / mile, similar to the 400-
mile range SUV. The emissions from the hybrid ICE could be further reduced with lower-
emission fuels. Under the current proposal, the hybrid ICE from this example would generate
tailpipe emissions of 190 g C02 / mile, while the BEVs would generate zero tailpipe emissions.
EPA should consider a rulemaking that accurately accounts for all emissions in the lifecycle of a
vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 2]
2 Kelly, J. et al., "Cradle-to-grave lifecycle analysis of U.S. light-duty vehicle-fuel pathways: a greenhouse
gas emissions and economic assessment of current (2020) and future (2030-2035) technologies", June
2022, ANL- 22/27. https://greet.es.anl.gov/publication-c2g_lca_us_ldv.
By EPA's own account,3 transportation pollution has been reduced significantly since the
passage of the Clean Air Act - new passenger vehicles are 98-99% cleaner for most tailpipe
pollutants compared to the 1960s, new vehicle estimated real-world C02 tailpipe emissions are
at a record low,4 and U.S. cities have much improved air quality, despite ever increasing
population and increasing vehicle miles traveled. Criteria pollutant emissions have been
mitigated via engine and after-treatment system improvements as well as through fuel quality
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improvements (e.g., low sulfur gasoline and ultra-low sulfur diesel). As noted in a study prepared
for the Transportation Energy Institute, criteria pollutants are well controlled with the existing
feet, and ICEV emissions will continue to be reduced into the future as the ICEV feet becomes
more efficient (especially as high-emitting vehicles are replaced in the existing feet).5 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 2]
3 https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/history-reducing-air-pollution-
transportation.
4 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report - Executive Summary, December 2022, EPA-420-S-22-001.
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-12/420s22001.pdf.
5 "Decarbonizing Combustion Vehicles: A Portfolio Approach to GHG Reductions," study prepared for the
Transportation Energy Institute by Stillwater Associates, July 2023.
https://www.transportationenergy.org/research/reports/decarbonizing-combustion-vehicles-a-portfolio-
approach- to-ghg-reductions/.
These reductions are due in large part to addressing emissions holistically and utilizing all
available and emerging technology to do so. Use of a lifecycle approach would better achieve the
goals of the proposed rule, as it would allow the agency and stakeholders alike to fully identify
and reduce transportation sector emissions and to identify and develop meaningful solutions. The
myopic focus on tailpipe emissions in the proposed rule essentially means that the rule would
only address certain transportation emissions, while ignoring other sources of emissions and
potential emissions reduction solutions. A lifecycle approach would allow EPA to quantify all
emissions associated with light- and medium-duty vehicles6 and more effectively mitigate those
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 2]
6 EPA's proposed rule covers light-duty vehicles (i.e., less than 8,500 pounds gross vehicle weight rating)
and medium-duty vehicles (i.e., up to 14,000 pounds GVWR), https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10380.
ii. Zero emission vehicles also have emissions impacts.
As with ICEVs, ZEVs7 have carbon emissions impact associated both with their production
and throughout their lifetime which EPA should incorporate in its analysis. While ZEVs can be
an important part of a diverse transportation future to reduce emissions, they do produce GHG
emissions. For instance, BEV production, use, and the disposal of BEV batteries, are not zero-
emission activities. Further, all fuels - whether conventional fuels or electricity - have associated
carbon emissions regardless of their source. A study conducted by Ricardo, which is included in
a report by the Transportation Energy Institute^ concludes that BEVs "have higher embedded
GHG emissions" and therefore carbon intensity of the electricity mix also plays a vital role in
defining the magnitude of carbon emissions in this phase. While meaningful reductions have
historically been accomplished by focusing on tailpipe emissions from the vehicle, the growing
market share of different technologies that include significant upstream emissions warrant
inclusion of those emissions in the standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 5-6]
7 In these comments, "ZEV" refers broadly to PHEVs, FCEVs and BEV refers specifically to battery
electric vehicles.
8 Ricardo, Inc. "Life Cycle Analysis Comparison: Electric and Internal Combustion Engine Vehicles",
study prepared for the Transportation Energy Institute (formerly known as the Fuels Institute). January
2022. https://www.transportationenergy.org/research/reports/life-cycle-analysis-comparison-electric-and-
internlife- cycle-analysis-comparison-electric-and-intern.
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We encourage the agency to not only acknowledge and address the emissions of ZEVs, but to
also continue to study the impacts. Failure to do both would be arbitrary and capricious. As noted
below in these comments, and in our comments on the Heavy-Duty GHG Phase 3 proposed
rule,9 we strongly recommend that EPA include both a readiness assessment prior to program
implementation as well as a program review once implementation begins. There will be C02
emissions associated with the production and use of BEVs,10 and it is important to address these
emissions to provide a full picture of the emissions impacts and mitigation needs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 8-9]
9 API Comments on "Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles—Phase 3",
Document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985-1423.
10 Kelly, J. et al., "Cradle-to-grave lifecycle analysis of U.S. light-duty vehicle-fuel pathways: a
greenhouse gas emissions and economic assessment of current (2020) and future (2030-2035)
technologies", June 2022, ANL- 22/27. Figure B.8. https://greet.es.anl.gov/publication-c2g_lca_us_ldv.
While still in the early stages and very small market penetration (in model year 2021 there
were three hydrogen FCEV models produced, but they were only available in the state of
California and Hawaii and in very small numbers25), hydrogen-based vehicles are a promising
technology that many stakeholders are considering.26 As acknowledged by EPA in the DRIA,27
modeled compliance relied on the assumption that 55% of new sales of class 2b and class 3
vehicles would be BEV or FCEV. Furthermore, hydrogen fueling infrastructure is covered by the
Bi-partisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) funding. API
members are engaged in hydrogen projects to support development of hydrogen focused
technology. Companies28 are partnering with OEMs to explore commercial business
opportunities to build demand for vehicles powered by hydrogen. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 10-11]
25 "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles -Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis." EPA-420-D-23-003. April 2023.
26 Morales, M. (April 25, 2023). "Automakers deeply invested in hydrogen-powered cars." TopSpeed.
https://www.topspeed.com/automakers-invested-hydrogen-powered-cars/.
27 Ibid.
28 https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/what-we-do/lower-emission-transportation/emerging-vehicle-and-
fuel- technology/exxonmobil-and-porsche-strategic-
collaboration;https://www.chevron.com/newsroom/2021/q2/chevron-toyota-pursue-strategic-alliance-on-
hydrogen; https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/press-releases/bp-and-daimler-truck-
ag- to-accelerate-the-deployment-of-hydrogen-infrastructure.html.
As noted by the American Trucking Associations (ATA), in testimony before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works:29 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 10-11]
29 U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, hearing on "The Future of Low Carbon
Transportation Fuels and Considerations for a National Clean Fuels Program", February 15, 2023.
https://www.epw.senate.gOv/public/index.cfm/2023/2/the-future-of-low-carbon-transportation-fuels-and-
considerations-for-a-national-clean-fuels-program.
When battery electric vehicles are not the answer, federal support should refrain from playing
favorites, and instead assist in the buildout of alternative fuel facilities. Proposals for hydrogen
infrastructure for trucks need to ensure that the infrastructure is in place where that technology
best fits in supply chains. Where lifecycle emissions can be reduced by deploying renewable
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diesel and renewable natural gas, those fuel stocks need to be available for trucking. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 10-11]
While this statement is in relation to heavy-duty vehicles, the issues are the same for light-
and medium-duty vehicles. Infrastructure readiness and reduction of lifecycle emissions without
picking one technology over others should be EPA's focus for the proposed program. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 10-11]
d. EPA is Not Taking a Realistic Approach.
i. Further, EPA should consider a lifecycle approach that would accurately capture all
the emissions associated with the life of a vehicle and capture the efficiency differences of
different technologies in different applications. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 11]
ii. Future program incentives and program adjustment of standards.
In the development of the program, EPA needs to consider future program incentives such as
adoption of a lifecycle approach, combined with fuel carbon intensity reductions. Such an
approach would provide a broad spectrum of industries that power the transportation system
(e.g., OEMs, petroleum refiners, power generators, and renewable fuel manufacturers) with
incentives to reduce emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 23]
Organization: Anonymous
EPA should conduct a rigorous study on the full environmental impacts of a dramatic shift to
BEV with respect to other environmental media (i.e., non-air pollutants/contaminants), since the
proposed rule is designed to more or less force transition to that vehicle technology. The
European Environmental Agency (EEA) issued a report in 2018 that reveals the far higher
"Human Toxicity Potential" of BEVs, largely from mining the mineral requirements for EV
manufacturing (https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/electric-vehicles-from-life-cycle). Note
especially Figure 6.2 on page 58 that even if BEVs are charged with 100% RE (i.e., eliminating
the "In-use phase" segments of the BEV bars in the graph), human toxicity impacts are still over
twice as high. Ecotoxicity is also higher even if BEVs are charged with 100% RE (Figure 6.3).
This is supported by a publically-available European LCA model "carculator"
(https://carculator.psi.ch/). Damages to environmental media other than air should also be taken
into account when a shift to a substantially different vehicle technology is expected, even if some
of that contamination currently is non- domestic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp. 1-2]
A peer-reviewed study in 2018 (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.llll/jiec.12862,
Figure 1) also demonstrated the far higher human toxicity impacts of BEV. Even in extremely
clean future electric grid scenarios (denoted by dotted lines (generally corresponding to the
RCP2.6 scenario in the IPCC AR5)), "Human Toxicity" remains ~3 times higher for BEV in the
same electric grid mix scenario. Note also that "Particle matter formation" is higher for BEV
than ICEV in all but the cleanest future grid mix scenarios, disputing the BEV air quality
benefits claims. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp. 1-2]
It should be noted that 3 recent peer-reviewed studies, one by staffers from ANL
(https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4433/12/ll/1482/htm), one from European (Spanish) researchers
(https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959652621001037), and a study by
U.S. researchers in academia just published in May 2023
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(https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000183) conclude that PM2.5
emissions would generally INCREASE with increasing shift to BEV technology. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0490, p. 2]
The Spanish paper concluded that "electric vehicles will produce an increase in fine
particulate matter formation (26%), human carcinogenic (20%) and non-carcinogenic toxicity
(6P/o), terrestrial ecotoxicity, freshwater ecotoxicity (39%>), and marine ecotoxicity (41%>)
relative to petrol vehicles," and will continue to for the foreseeable future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0490, p. 2]
The 2023 study in California concludes that".. .our results indicate that the CVRP [clean
vehicle rebate project] has displaced emissions from vehicle tailpipes to electric generating units,
leading to a net increase in primary PM2.5 emissions across the state of California... [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp. 2-3]
... Of particular concern for environmental justice and public health is the finding that
Disadvantaged Communities, as defined according to CalEnviroScreen 4.0, are
disproportionately more likely to experience either larger net increases or smaller net reductions
in primary PM2.5, NOX, and S02 emissions as a result of the CVRP... " That's considering
California's current electric grid, which is among the cleanest in the U.S. This is counter to the
stated goals of the proposed regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp. 2-3]
These studies come on the heels of a 2010 study by the National Academy of Sciences
(National Research Council - https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2009/10/report-
examines-hidden-costs-of-energy-production-and-use), which concluded... "Electric vehicles and
grid-dependent (plug-in) hybrid vehicles showed somewhat higher nonclimate damages than
many other technologies for both 2005 and 2030." According to Figure 3-7b in the full report,
BEV is projected to be more damaging than most of the ICEV technologies/fuel pathways in
2030. Even if the NRC committee underestimated the pace of the decline in coal-generated
electricity, some ICEV technologies/fuel pathways would still be less damaging than BEV or
FCV, even in much cleaner grids, most notably diesel/biodiesel and CNG ICEV. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp. 2-3]
Environmental regulations should be technology neutral with respect to compliance with the
goals of the regulations. Forcing a transition to 100% BEV will almost certainly result in much
higher contamination of toxic substances, both carcinogenic and non- carcinogenic, in ground
water, surface water, and soils near mining sites. BEVs will likely play a prominent role in the
future vehicle mix regardless, but categorically excluding ICE vehicle technologies via
regulation is a mistake and potentially counterproductive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0490, pp.
2-3]
Organization: Chevron
1. Lifecycle GHG based standards.
The proposal is focused on tailpipe GHG emissions rather than lifecycle emissions. Therefore,
upstream GHG emissions for fuel and vehicle manufacturing are not included in the analysis,
favoring "zero tailpipe emission" technologies like Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0553, pp. 3-4]
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We recommend EPA revise the proposed standards to incorporate a lifecycle GHG
assessment of light and medium duty vehicles and fuel technologies. In an analysis of the
California Air Resources Board Advanced Clean Cars II program, a study performed by
Rambolll in 2022 concluded that a transition to lower carbon intensity (CI) gasoline could
provide similar lifecycle GHG emissions compared to zero tailpipe emission alternatives. The
Ramboll study utilized a full lifecycle approach to account for emissions associated with vehicle
material recovery and production, vehicle component fabrication, vehicle assembly, and vehicle
disposal/recycling. EPA should consider alternatives such as low-CI liquid fuels to provide
multiple compliance options and avoid a one-size-fits-all solution to reducing transportation
sector GHG emissions. Lifecycle assessment is a technology neutral approach that allows for
more flexibility in the transition towards reducing transportation GHG emissions in the short and
long-term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, pp. 3-4]
1 Ramboll US Consulting Inc "Multi-Technology Pathways to Achieve California Greenhouse Gas Goals
Light- Duty Auto Case Study" May, 2022; Available here: www.arb.ca.gov/lists/com-attach/477-
accii2022- AHcAdQBxBDZSeVc2.pdf beginning page 59
The proposal does not incentivize GHG reductions from the existing vehicle fleet, thus
missing an opportunity to accelerate GHG reduction in the early years of the program. Recent
published research from SUNY2 shows that the time value of carbon is important in evaluating
technology pathways to maximize emission reductions from the fleet of heavy-duty trucks that
includes new and older trucks in-use. GHG emissions generated by the truck fleet accumulate in
the atmosphere and dissipate slowly over time. GHG emissions that may be reduced or
eliminated today can be more valuable than future emission reductions given the annual
accumulation of emissions. While this study focused on heavy-duty vehicle examples, the time
value of carbon concept would apply equally to GHG emissions from light and medium-duty
vehicles. A GHG reduction strategy that focuses on lifecycle emissions, as opposed to tailpipe
emissions only, would incentivize near term emission reductions that would create long term
environmental benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, pp. 3-4]
2 Quantifying the comparative value of carbon abatement scenarios over different investment timing
scenarios - College of Environmental Science (exlibrisgroup.com)
2. Broad technology approach.
There are a wide variety of vehicle technologies and fuel types that can be used to meet
consumer needs, employing market-based approaches instead of focusing exclusively on zero
tailpipe emission technology options. EPA could allow for innovation within the current market
to dramatically reduce GHG emissions, without the systemic risks associated with a single
technology solution. It is unlikely that the market would identify a single vehicle technology that
would be appropriate for all different customer needs. The proposed rule should be broadened to
encourage the use of multiple technologies by establishing a neutral, market-based, lifecycle
standard. Light and medium duty vehicles powered by biofuels, hybrid technologies, and
renewable natural gas leverage the existing infrastructure and are proven to deliver the power,
convenience, and functionality desired by consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, pp. 4-5]
Hybrid electric, plug-in hybrid electric, and internal combustion technologies can be paired
with lower carbon intensity fuels to result in lower GHG emissions from light and medium duty
transportation. These alternative pathways would not require the wholesale transformation of
electric energy production and distribution infrastructure on an unprecedented, abbreviated time
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scale. They would allow battery, hydrogen, and low-carbon intensity gaseous and liquid fueled
vehicles to compete to achieve the GHG targets for light-duty transportation in the quickest and
most cost-effective manner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, pp. 4-5]
For example, the Ramboll Light Duty Auto Case study showed that a zero-tailpipe strategy
did not achieve the maximum emission reductions possible. A fleet mix that deployed a wider
range of technologies, including hybrid electric, plug-in hybrid electric, BEVs, and fuel cell
electric vehicles, along with a gradual phase-in of low-CI gasoline, out-performed the ZEV only
deployment strategy in the near-term and achieved equitable emission reductions in the long-
term.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, pp. 4-5]
3 Ramboll US Consulting Inc "Multi-Technology Pathways to Achieve California Greenhouse Gas Goals
Light- Duty Auto Case Study" May, 2022; Available here: www.arb.ca.gov/lists/com-attach/477-
accii2022- AHcAdQBxBDZSeVc2.pdf Figure 4-8.
Argonne National Laboratory's "Cradle-to-Grave Lifecycle Analysis of U.S. Light-Duty
Vehicle- Fuel Pathways: A Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Economic Assessment of Current
(2020) and Future (2030-2035) Technologies" report4, demonstrates that the combination of
advancements in lower carbon fuel and higher efficiency vehicles can help all vehicle propulsion
types achieve parity for GHG emissions. The Argonne study states, ".. .large GHG reductions for
LDVs are challenging and require consideration of the entire life cycle, including vehicle
manufacture, fuel production, and vehicle operation. Achieving a life cycle reduction in GHG
emissions is a challenging task and must overcome both technological hurdles as well as cost and
market acceptance constraints." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, pp. 4-5]
4 Argonne GREET Publication: Cradle-to-grave lifecycle analysis of U.S. light-duty vehicle-fuel pathways:
a greenhouse gas emissions and economic assessment of current (2020) and future (2030-2035)
technologies (anl.gov)
This conclusion reinforces our belief that a robust vehicle standard, embracing a lifecycle
method to quantify vehicle emissions, is the preferred approach to reducing the GHG impact of
light and medium-duty transportation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, pp. 4-5]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al. (CFDC)
- Air quality effects. These include the air quality and health impacts from significant
increases in tire wear from electric vehicles, as well as the increases in C02 emissions that will
result from manufacturing more electric generation infrastructure, transmission, distribution, and
charging equipment, and the manufacturing of electric vehicles themselves, which produce far
more upstream emissions than their internal combustion engine counterparts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, pp.6-7]
D. EPA lacks the statutory authority to ignore upstream emissions for electric vehicles.
EPA has statutory authority to prescribe "standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in
[its] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). This presents an interpretive
dilemma. On the one hand, if electric vehicles are not "vehicles" "which cause[ ] or contribute
to" a given type of air pollution, then EPA may not set standards for them. Id. On the other, if
electric vehicles are "vehicles" "which cause, or contribute to" a given type of air pollution, then
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EPA must set "standards applicable to the[ir] emissions." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712,
p. 11]
The proposal tries to solve this problem by splitting the baby.8 EPA reasons that electric
vehicles are vehicles that "cause or contribute to air pollution," but EPA just chooses to set their
contribution to zero. This cannot be right. Cf. C.S. Lewis, That Hideous Strength 291 (Samizdat
ed., 2015) ("Just imagine a man who was too dainty to eat with his fingers and yet wouldn't use
forks!"). If electric vehicles truly emit no emissions, then they are not the sort of vehicle EPA
can regulate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, p. 11]
8 Of course, the point of the story about Solomon is that the baby wasn't split. See 1 Kings 3:16- 28 ("Give
the living child to the first woman, and by no means put him to death; she is his mother.").
Of course, EPA freely admits that electric vehicles do produce upstream emissions, and that
these upstream emissions matter. This is true and very important. And the proposal does consider
upstream emissions when determining the rule's impact on total emissions. EPA's position is
that this inconsistent approach to electric vehicles' upstream emissions is reasonable because it
treats upstream emissions of all vehicles, electrified or not, the same way for compliance
purposes. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,252 ("EPA proposes to include only emissions measured directly from
the vehicle in the vehicle GHG program for MYs 2027 and later (or until EPA changes the
regulations through future rulemaking) consistent with the treatment of all other vehicles.
Electric vehicle operation would therefore continue to be counted as 0 g/mile, based on tailpipe
emissions only.") [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 11-12]
But this "consisten[cy]" is precisely what makes the rule unreasonable. Electric vehicles are
not like "all other vehicles." EPA has previously recognized that "that for each EV that is sold, in
reality the total emissions off-set relative to the typical gasoline or diesel powered vehicle is not
zero, as there is a corresponding increase in up-stream C02 emissions due to an increase in the
requirements for electric utility generation." 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454, 49,533 (Sept. 28, 2009). EPA
only chose the initial "zero grams/mile compliance value [a]s an incentive," Response to
Comments, EPA-420-R- 10-012a at 5-237 (Apr. 2010),), and explained that in future standards it
"would at- tribute a pro rata share of national C02 emissions from electricity generation to each
mile driven under electric power minus a pro rata share of upstream emissions associated with
from gasoline production," 88 Fed. Reg. 29,252. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 11-12]
EPA never had authority to incentivize electric vehicles in this way. Section 202(a) requires the agency to
"standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles."
Because it acknowledged that these emissions are "not zero," it is arbitrary to treat them as such. Indeed, as
EPA previously acknowledged, treating upstream emissions of all vehicles, electrified or not, the same way
puts a thumb on the scale against conventional vehicles in favor of electric vehicles. An agency's bare
preference for one technology cannot satisfy the requirement that it "reasonably consider[] the relevant
issues and reasonably explain[] the decision." FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1158
(2021).
At the very least, the agency is not permitted to change its position on the future inclusion of
upstream emissions in compliance calculations without explanation. When an agency makes a
decision, it must articulate a "satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.'" Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). If the agency fails to "cogently explain why it
has exercised its discretion in a given manner," its action will be held invalid. Id. at 48. In
addition, the agency must "provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a
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new policy created on a blank slate . . . when, for example, its new policy rests upon factual
findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy." FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1209
(2015). EPA previously thought that the zero grams-per-mile compliance value was only viable
as a temporary incentive because "in reality" the total emissions were not zero. Failure to
consider and adequately explain departure from this finding would render the entire rulemaking
arbitrary and capricious. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, pp.12-13]
F. EPA lacks authority to Misleads Consumers by Using the Term "Zero-emissions
Vehicle."
While it is true that all-electric vehicles have no tailpipe emissions, it is completely false to
claim that they are "zero-emissions vehicles." As already noted, EPA acknowledges that what it
calls "ZEVs" have significant upstream emissions. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,303. Despite this, the
proposal repeatedly describes these vehicles as having no emissions. This is per se unreasonable,
and it enables illegal marketing by auto- manufacturers. Seizing on EPA's label, dozens of auto-
manufacturers have described their electric vehicles as "zero-emissions." Making false claims in
the marketing of products is prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce" 15 U.S.C. § 45. The agency
lacks authority to facilitate these deceptive acts or to promote innumerable other false "zero
emission" statements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 14-15]
B. The proposed rule misstates emissions benefits because it neglects upstream electric
generating unit emissions, among others.
In addition to underestimating costs, the proposal also overstates benefits. The most egregious
of these comes from the way EPA accounts for upstream emissions for electric generating units
("EGU"). See DRIA 8-10, 11. To realize substantial reductions in GHG emissions—and thus
benefits from such emissions—the rule relies on the decrease in emissions from petroleum-
fueled vehicles replaced by electric vehicles. But these vehicles are themselves still responsible
for emissions from the electricity that powers them. Current electricity GHG emissions factors
are approximately 442,000 U.S. Tons of C02 / Terawatt-Hour. How much carbon dioxide is
produced per kilo watt hour of U.S. electricity generation, Energy Information Administration,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=ll (last accessed July 5, 2023). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 34-35]
This is unrealistic. Emissions reduction on the U.S. electric grid have thus far come primarily
from natural gas replacing coal. To continue to lower C02 emissions in this manner would
require an almost complete conversion to low carbon sources. But barriers to wind, solar, and
nuclear adoption will not enable these changes on EPA's timeframe. Furthermore, researchers
estimate that the 350 million EVs required to decarbonize the fleet in 2050 could use as much as
half of US national electricity demand. Thea Riofrancos et al., Achieving Zero Emissions with
More Mobility and Less Mining, U.C. Davis Climate + Community Project (Jan. 2023),
https://sub- scriber.politicopro.com/eenews/f/eenews/?id=00000185-e562-de44-a7bf-
ed7751a00000. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 34-35]
These costs also ignore that realizing these reductions requires the installation of new solar
and wind generation, which itself has a cost. Without additional wind and solar generation,
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upstream emissions from electricity generating units will not decrease as much as EPA expects,
diminishing those benefits. In addition to the direct costs of this generation, the proposal also
ignores the greenhouse gas emission associated with manufacturing more, less dense, remotely
located intermittent generation sources, and the battery back-up; transmission, substation, and
transformer investment to integrate these technologies into the power grid; and natural gas
peaking capacity necessary to sustain their intermittency. These emissions are significant and
must be accounted for in the calculation of any benefits of the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, pp. 34-35]
A. EPA has authority to consider the lifecycle emissions from different fuels in its standard
setting.
Section 202(a)(3)(A)(ii) authorizes EPA to look beyond the basic engine to set its engine or
vehicle emission standards. Specifically, it states that, "[i]n establishing classes or categories of
vehicles or engines for purposes of regulations under this paragraph, the [agency] may base such
classes or categories on gross vehicle weight, horsepower, type of fuel used, or other appropriate
factors." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). To account for the "type of fuel used,"
EPA would need to engage in lifecycle emissions analysis. EPA has often eschewed lifecycle
analysis because of the nature of the pollutants it regulates, but it is the obvious best fit for
greenhouse gas regulations. Section 202(a)(1) gives EPA's authority to issue rules setting
emissions standards for "air pollutants" that it finds may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare. And while most air pollutants work on the local and regional level,
which makes lifecycle analysis a poor fit, greenhouse gases' harms are all at the global level.
Except in truly extreme concentrations, C02 emissions do not lead to adverse health effects if
breathed in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712, pp. 39-40]
Clean Air Act Section 202(a)(4)(A) and (B) require that EPA consider whether its proposed
standards "will cause or contribute to an unreasonable risk to public health, welfare or safety",
including whether the proposed standard "causes, increases, reduces, or eliminates emissions of
any unregulated pollutants" and to assess "the availability of other devices, systems, or elements
of design which may be used to conform to requirements prescribed under this subchapter
without causing or contributing to such unreasonable risk." Neglecting lifecycle greenhouse gas
emissions incentivizes compliance options that increase upstream carbon emissions at the
expense of measured tailpipe emissions. This is exactly the sort of "other ... element[ ] of
design" that Congress imagined might "increase[ ] emissions." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0712, pp. 39-40]
24 Despite the benefits of renewable fuels, EPA's recent rulemaking decreases total volumes. EPA
finalized a multi-year Renewable Fuel Standard that reduces volumes from proposed levels for both
advanced biofuels and corn ethanol. Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program: Standards for 2023-2025
and Other Changes, EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0427. (EPA's final numbers show a 250-million- gallon
reduction in total corn-ethanol volumes for 2024 and 2025 from the original proposal, setting those
volumes at 15 billion gallons for both years. This is inexplicable given EPA's aggressive decarbonization
plans.
Organization: Countymark
The EPA has ignored lifecycle emissions in its environmental impact assessment. The EPA
fails to provide a comprehensive picture of a vehicle's environmental impact throughout its
lifecycle by focusing solely on tailpipe emissions. It is argued that a ton of carbon emitted during
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a vehicle's lifecycle has the same climate impact regardless of when or where it is emitted. This
means that emissions from the production of batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) should be
considered, as they are carbon intensive. A proper lifecycle assessment should consider all
emissions associated with a vehicle, including those from production, recharging or refueling,
drivetrain or battery replacements, infrastructure modifications, and end-of-life disposal and
recycling. By neglecting these factors, the EPA's assessment does not accurately represent the
true environmental impact of different vehicle types. In summary, we believe that the EPA's
focus on tailpipe emissions alone distorts assessing a vehicle's environmental impact. A more
comprehensive approach considering all emissions throughout a vehicle's lifecycle, including
production and disposal, is necessary for a more accurate evaluation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0665, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Cummins Inc. (Cummins)
II. General Principles
Aligned with Cummins' commitments described above, Cummins offer these principles for
consideration as EPA develops its Final Rule addressing criteria pollutant and GHG emissions
for light-duty (LD) and medium-duty vehicles (MDV) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-
3]:
Well-to-wheels emissions should be considered in assessing technology effectiveness
to ensure alignment of the standards with the most beneficial path to zero emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
Cummins currently certifies heavy-duty (HD) pickup trucks with gross vehicle weight ratings
(GVWR) between 8,501 and 14,000 pounds, also known as Class 2b and 3 vehicles, meeting
EPA's Tier 3 criteria pollutant emissions standards and Phase 2 GHG standards. Diesel Class 2b
and 3 pickup trucks can have significant towing capability and are used in applications going
beyond personal use such as construction and agriculture, and as such, do vital work for
America. Our additional comments detailed below pertain to those vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Dana Incorporated (Dana)
Sustainable Sourcing
As noted above, Dana is heavily focused on steps to drive sustainable best practices in our
operations. Sustainable sourcing of materials is still a concern in the production of LD/MD
BEVs and suppliers like Dana will face pressures to provide sustainably sourced products at
competitive prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0538, pp. 2-3]
There is little consideration of the manufacturing side in the NPRM, which is mainly focused
on reducing in-use C02 emissions from LD/MD vehicles. While the NPRM does discuss
upstream power-sector emissions driven by increased PEV charging demand, EPA should also
consider the impact of manufacturing the full propulsion system when assessing the
environmental impact of its proposals. Doing so could help ensure that the cross-over point of
combining manufacturing and in-use vehicle C02 emissions is reasonable for the targeted
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adoption rate. Dana suggests that EPA include a cross-over point in addition to what is provided
on break-even timing for LD/MD ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0538, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Darius
The EPA's proposal boosts an electric vehicle supply chain dominated by China, which
powers its manufacturing-base through coal-fired power plants and mines minerals for EV
batteries with the use of environmental practices that we would never approve of in the United
States. Emissions coming out of tailpipe matter, but so do the lifecycle emissions of building a
car, constructing and charging a battery, and retiring vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0519,
p. 1]
Organization: Delek US Holdings, Inc. (Delek)
EPA's Proposed Rule is, at best, arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with
the Clean Air Act because it is based on flawed projections for zero emissions vehicles
("ZEVs"), such as plug-in electric vehicles ("PEVs") and battery electric vehicles ("BEVs"), will
increase domestic reliance on foreign supply chains, underestimates the lifecycle GHG emissions
associated with PEVs, overstates the benefits of the proposal, severely underestimates the costs,
and fails to consider the impacts to other industries. Accordingly, Delek urges EPA to abandon
or substantially reconsider its proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 2]
III. The Proposed Rule Underestimates the Lifecycle GHG Emissions of BEVs
Contrary to the naming convention, ZEVs—including PEVs and BEVs—are not truly zero-
emission vehicles. 19 In fact, the lifecycle GHG emissions of BEVs exceed that of ICE- powered
vehicles. If EPA is authorized to promulgate such standards, those standards must account for
any upstream emissions from electric generating units. The failure to do so creates an uneven
playing field that substantially disadvantages ICE engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p.
4]
19 Proposed Rule at 29,187 ("As the term 'zero-emission vehicle' suggests, these cars and trucks have zero
GHG and criteria pollutant emissions from their tailpipes.").
Organization: Donn Viviani (Viviani)
GHG emissions embedded in the production of vehicles is responsible for -10% of vehicle
carbon footprints. Slowly reducing down the allowable embedded carbon by class will have
several outcomes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0697, pp. 6-7]
Limiting the embedded carbon per ton would result in, e.g., more steel made with green
hydrogen, less metal and more plastic parts (already these are replacing metal) which can require
less energy to produce, and even parts made with bio-based plastics which count as negative
carbon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0697, pp. 6-7]
Lastly, here, it is important to ensure that imports would be subject to any such embedded
carbon restrictions, as that would serve to increase pressure on overseas EGUs to transition away
from coal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0697, pp. 6-7]
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Organization: Energy Marketers of America (EMA)
EMA is concerned over EPA's tailpipe emission standards for light-duty and medium-duty
vehicles for model year 2027 and later which will effectively discourage investment in lower
carbon liquid fuels. EPA projects that a potential outcome of the rule would require nearly 70
percent of all new light duty vehicle sales to be battery electric vehicles (EVs) by 2032.
Unfortunately, the focus on EV production will fundamentally eliminate an opportunity to
provide clean green liquid fuels such as renewable diesel, biodiesel, renewable gasoline, clean
hydrogen and ethanol that immediately lower emissions not only for new vehicles, but for the
vehicles currently on the road. In addition, the rule will limit consumer choice on cleaner internal
combustion engines and threaten the viability and jobs of small business energy marketers
around the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0616, pp. 1-2]
EMA urges the EPA to consider lifecycle emissions and a technology neutral approach when
considering emission reductions. The proposed rule should consider the lifecycle emissions
associated with EV production, usage, and end-of-life disposal including emissions from raw
material mining and refining, battery manufacturing, and electricity generation for EV charging.
Further EPA needs to consider the logistics, investment, and timing associated with EV and
battery production, electric generation and transmission, and EV charging to support a
substantial increase in EV production. Achieving a significant ramp up of domestic supply of
raw materials for batteries, mineral refining, and battery and vehicle manufacturing as well as
upgrades to the electricity generation and transmission will be complex and take time. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0616, pp. 1-2]
Again, EMA urges the EPA to consider lifecycle emissions and a technology neutral approach
when it comes to promoting policies to reduce emissions. The most cost-effective and timely
way to reduce emissions from transportation is to support multiple technologies that do so for
both new vehicles and vehicles currently on the road. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0616, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Exxon Mobil Corporation (ExxonMobil)
ExxonMobil believes that existing transportation sector-based federal policies could be
improved to achieve meaningful GHG emissions reductions through complementary fuel and
vehicles standards. Specifically, we encourage EPA to consider how it may assist with the
development and implementation of a federal low carbon fuel standard that would encourage
investment in lowering the carbon intensity of fuels (liquid, compressed/liquefied gas, electricity,
hydrogen) and vehicle standards that account for lifecycle GHG emissions, including emissions
upstream of a vehicle's tailpipe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0632, p. 3]
To encourage investment in technologies to reduce GHG emissions from existing fuels,
ExxonMobil is encouraging U.S. policymakers to consider the development of a federal lifecycle
and carbon-intensity based fuel standard measured in gC02e per Mega Joule (MJ) of fuel energy
(gC02e/MJ) that would provide a long-term market signal for the production and use of lower
carbon fuels. Such a standard, which could be increased in stringency over time, would establish
a market for credit trading that would offer compliance flexibility and would underpin
investments in technologies to reduce carbon emissions from gasoline and diesel used for
existing vehicles. Examples of lower carbon-intensity fuels that might generate credits under
such a standard would include ethanol, biodiesel, renewable diesel, renewable natural gas,
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hydrogen, electricity produced for EVs, and traditional fuels produced with lower emission
technology such as carbon capture and sequestration. Moreover, the standard could be expanded
beyond road transportation to the marine and aviation sectors in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0632, p.3]
EPA should also consider complementary GHG emission standards for new vehicles based on
a well-to-wheels (WTW) lifecycle emissions accounting methodology. Such standards would
encourage lower C02e emissions per mile driven (gC02e/mile) complementing the above-
mentioned carbon-intensity based standards for the energy used by the vehicles. Current vehicle
GHG standards account only for fuel combustion or tank- to-wheels emissions. A WTW
approach, which accounts for lifecycle GHG emissions, allows for a more transparent
comparison between the lifecycle emissions associated with vehicle types. In the case of BEVs
or plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, such a standard would allow consumers to see the emissions
associated with the electricity used to power these vehicles. Moreover, it enables consistent GHG
accounting, and thus provides a more holistic approach toward encouraging advancement in
vehicle technologies that can reduce GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0632, pp. 3-4]
Linked fuel and lifecycle vehicle C02 standards offer a preferred, technology-neutral policy
pathway relative to BEV-only mandates. A policy that aims to reduce GHG emissions from
existing fuels and that recognizes WTW emissions from new vehicles, can help retain consumer
choice for the type of vehicle they prefer to drive, would avoid overdependence on foreign
critical minerals, would retain high-paying jobs throughout the transportation sector, could grow
the role of agriculture in providing energy feedstocks, and ultimately, would be supported
through a credit-based system, not taxes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0632, p. 4]
ExxonMobil respectfully recommends that EPA consider the role it can play in developing
and implementing policy to reduce GHG emissions from both new and existing vehicles through
the development of WTW emission standards for new vehicles and complementary support for a
federal low carbon fuel standard. We would welcome the opportunity to collaborate with the
agency and share in greater detail our views on what a comprehensive policy approach might
look like. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0632, p. 4]
Organization: Green Diesel Engineering LLC (GDE)
The graph above is from a NASA satellite image which highlights the areas with NOx issues.
[See original comment for map of nitrogen dioxide levels throughout the Unites States] Since
these areas are predominantly urban vicinities or downstream of power plants, it would be more
beneficial to focus on localized efforts to reduce NOx. A good 70% of people live in the urban
areas and reducing NOx in these inner cities will provide the most focused assistance. Ideally,
most city transportation would be electric to eliminate emissions at source. Cities could build
large parking lots outside urban areas for combustion vehicles and mass electric transit into city
center. Keep in mind, electric vehicles do not reduce emissions, but rather change where those
emissions are produced (battery mining / manufacturing / recycling plants) and electric power-
distribution facilities. Moving the emissions away from where most people live would be
prudent. Electric transportation does not reduce C02 emissions over the vehicle life cycle due to
battery manufacturing, mining, recycling and charging. Electric vehicles will help reduce smog
in LA, Denver, etc. where there is poor airflow, however, they will not reduce carbon emissions
when battery recycling/lifespan is incorporated in the well to wheels analysis.
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(https://climate.mit.edu/ask-mit/are-electric-vehicles-definitely-better- climate-gas-powered-
cars),(https://www.iea.org/data-and- statistics/charts/comparative-life-cycle-greenhouse-gas-
emissions-of-a-mid-size-bev- and-ice-vehicle),( https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/comparison-
your-car-vs-electric- vehicle),(
https://www. sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S 1361920921000614). [EP A-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0457, p. 4]
Organization: Growth Energy
There are several steps that EPA can and should take to address those deficiencies, both in the
final rule and in other contexts: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 4]
- First, EPA should fix its system of scoring the emissions from vehicles, which both
undercounts EV emissions and overcounts emissions from biofuels used in ICE vehicles. The
most accurate way to do so would be by conducting a complete lifecycle analysis for BEVs—
using the Argonne laboratory's GREET model or its equivalent—and compare that to a lifecycle
analysis for ICE vehicles using various blends of liquid fuels. Alternatively, if EPA does not use
a lifecycle analysis, it should at a minimum assign the portion of fuel used in ICE vehicles
attributable to biofuels a value of zero g/mi in recognition of the fact that the carbon emitted
from combusting biofuels is biogenic carbon sequestered from the atmosphere by crops. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 4]
III. EPA Must Compare the Emissions from Electric Vehicles and Biofuels in a Rational
Way.
A. The Proposed Rule Dramatically Misconstrues the Relative Lifecycle GHG Emissions of
EVs and Biofuels.
The Proposed Rule's emission standard for GHGs is doubly inaccurate—it both severely
underestimates emissions from EVs and overestimates emissions from biofuels. EPA has
previously acknowledged the severity of its undercounting of GHG emissions from EVs: [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 6]
C. EPA Can and Should Conduct a Lifecycle Analysis for all Vehicles.
The best way to address the Proposed Rule's inaccurate assessment of emissions would be to
conduct a lifecycle analysis for all vehicles covered by the rule. That analysis should fully assess
the upstream emissions from production of the vehicle, the upstream emissions associated with
the vehicle's fuel source, any upstream sinks of carbon (e.g., uptake of carbon by growing
crops), and the emissions from the vehicle itself. Assessing emissions on that type of lifecycle,
cradle-to-grave basis would ensure that all components of a vehicle's emissions are appropriately
accounted for and compared to other types of vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
In particular, EPA should assess lifecycle emissions based on the Argonne National
Laboratory's Greenhouse Gas and Regulated Emissions and Energy Use in Transportation
("GREET") model. GREET is a state-of-the art model for assessing lifecycle emissions that
incorporates the latest scientific consensus on modeling and latest data and assumptions on
important variables, like induced land-use change ("ILUC"). It is "continually updated by world-
class researchers ... provides reliable calculations of life-cycle energy and emissions related to
transportation, and accounts for a wide range of conventional and emerging energy systems and
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vehicle technologies." 15 Some other models currently in use include estimates for ILUC that are
outside the scientific consensus on the "credible range" for land use change induced by crops
like corn grown in the United States. 16 GREET's ILUC value for corn ethanol of 7.4 gC02e/MJ
is solidly within the credible range of ILUC values identified in a recent meta-analysis by
researchers at Harvard University. 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
15 U.S. Department of Energy, GREET: The Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in
Transportation Model (May 16, 2019), https://www.energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/articles/greet-greenhouse-
gases- regulated-emissions-and-energy-use-transportation.
16 Scully, et. al., Carbon intensity of corn ethanol in the United States: state of the science 16 Environ. Res.
Lett. 043001 (2021).
17 See id. (identifying the credible range as between -1.0 and 8.7 gC02e/MJ).
Tellingly, GREET is already used in numerous applications by EPA and across federal and
state agencies. For example, it is a central component of the EPA's assessment of lifecycle
emissions under the RFS program. And it has been adapted by California's Air Resources Board
for use in assessing pathways under California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard ("LCFS") program.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 10]
When assessing lifecycle emissions of ICE engines under a GREET-based approach, EPA
must appropriately and accurately consider the emissions of biofuels. In particular, to adequately
assess the emissions of biofuels going forward, EPA should assume increasing use of biofuel
blends in future years. While the prevailing mix of ethanol in the nation's gasoline supply is
currently E10, El5 is being increasingly adopted, and efforts to change to Reid Vapor Pressure
("RVP") requirements are likely to further spur its adoption. EPA should also assume that
increasing amounts of E30 and E85 can be used in the future. The marginal cost of converting
fueling stations and other infrastructure to accommodate E85 is low, so its use could easily be
expanded with appropriate incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 10-11]
If EPA is unable to incorporate lifecycle analysis for all vehicles by the time it intends to
publish the final rule, an interim alternative would be to simply treat the emissions from the
biofuels used in ICE vehicle as zero grams per mile. That solution would be only a partial one
because it would not compare, for example, the emissions associated with creating batteries for
EVs to the emissions associated with constructing ICE vehicle engines. But it would at least
address the glaring inconsistency of the treatment of EVs and the treatment of biofuels. And
using such an assumption would be consistent with GREET, which treats the tailpipe GHG
emissions from biogenic sources as zero because they net out with the carbon absorbed by crops.
It would also be consistent with several of EPA's prior statements on emissions from biogenic
sources, like its 2018 policy with respect to the combustion of woody biomass.18 If EPA adopts
that short-term fix in this final rule, it should nonetheless finalize a system for conducting a
lifecycle analysis as soon as possible, rather than waiting to incorporate it until the time period
covered by the current rule ends after 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 10-11]
18 EPA, EPA's Treatment of Biogenic Carbon Dioxide (C02) Emissions from Stationary Sources that Use
Forest Biomass for Energy Production at 6 (Apr. 23, 2018), available at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2018- 04/documents/biomass_policy_statement_2018_04_23.pdf.
EPA should ensure that its tailpipe rule maximizes emissions reductions and minimize costs.
Appropriately accounting for the lifecycle GHG emissions of vehicles would eliminate
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unintended consequences like incentivizing fossil hydrogen over low-carbon biofuels. And it
would align the incentives provided by EPA's tailpipe rule with an accurate calculation of
lifecycle GHG emissions so that the market can achieve the greatest emissions reductions in the
most efficient way. For some vehicle needs and local markets, that may be investing in EVs, but
in others it may be investing in vehicles with efficient ICE engines that can and do use higher
biofuel blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 11-12]
B. The Proposed Rule is Arbitrary and Capricious and Outside of EPA's Authority.
EPA failed entirely to consider both the upstream emissions of EVs and the emissions
reductions of biofuels as part of a rule that will shift new vehicle production dramatically
towards EVs. By doing so, EPA "failed to consider an important aspect of the problem," a
hallmark of arbitrary and capricious rulemaking under the APA. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association v. State Farm Auto Mutual Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0580, p. 14]
VII. Conclusion
The proposed rule misses a significant opportunity to reduce GHG emissions through
biofuels. EPA should adjust its proposal by: (1) accounting for the upstream emissions of EVs
and the upstream carbon sinks of biofuels; (2) considering the potential for higher blends of
biofuels in EPA's test fuel and throughout the rule; and (3) developing credit programs and other
measures that incentivize greater biofuel use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 17]
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation (Sinclair)
a. EPA Fails to Properly Account for All GHG Emissions from PEVs
In an attempt to hinder consumer choice and penalize specific forms of technology, EPA's
proposed rule fails fully account for the lifecycle GHG emissions that come from PEVs, creating
a disparity between how ICE and PEV vehicle emissions are treated. While EPA purports to
have considered the GHG emissions attributed to upstream emissions impacts from fuel
production at refineries and electricity generating units,27 EPA assumes - without any factual
basis - that the power sector will become cleaner over time through the increased use of wind
and solar generation and electricity storage (i.e., more batteries). This in turn will purportedly
mitigate EPA's recognized concern that, as a result of the proposed rule, "increases in emissions
from [Electric Generating Units] . . . would lead to changes in exposure for people living in
communities near these facilities."28 But, EPA glosses over this analysis, and instead only
focuses on tailpipe emissions. And even if EPA's assumptions on a cleaner electric grid are
correct, EPA fails to account for the increased GHG emissions that will come from an increasing
effort to mine, process, and manufacture the critical minerals that will be required to both deliver
batteries to power an all- electric future fleet as well as deliver "zero-emission" power to the
grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 7-9]
27 Proposed Rule at 29,252.
28 Proposed Rule at 29,327.
. Ultimately, EPA arbitrarily ignores the full scope of emissions that will come from PEVs,
and a full lifecycle analysis of all potential vehicle technologies must be conducted to fully
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understand the environmental impacts of the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579,
PP- 7-9]
III. The Proposed Rule is Arbitrary and Capricious
a. EPA Fails to Properly Account for All GHG Emissions from PEVs
In an attempt to hinder consumer choice and penalize specific forms of technology, EPA's
proposed rule fails fully account for the lifecycle GHG emissions that come from PEVs, creating
a disparity between how ICE and PEV vehicle emissions are treated. While EPA purports to
have considered the GHG emissions attributed to upstream emissions impacts from fuel
production at refineries and electricity generating units,27 EPA assumes - without any factual
basis - that the power sector will become cleaner over time through the increased use of wind
and solar generation and electricity storage (i.e., more batteries). This in turn will purportedly
mitigate EPA's recognized concern that, as a result of the proposed rule, "increases in emissions
from [Electric Generating Units] . . . would lead to changes in exposure for people living in
communities near these facilities."28 But, EPA glosses over this analysis, and instead only
focuses on tailpipe emissions. And even if EPA's assumptions on a cleaner electric grid are
correct, EPA fails to account for the increased GHG emissions that will come from an increasing
effort to mine, process, and manufacture the critical minerals that will be required to both deliver
batteries to power an all- electric future fleet as well as deliver "zero-emission" power to the
grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 7-9]
27 Proposed Rule at 29,252.
28 Proposed Rule at 29,327.
For instance, the power source of a PEV—a battery composed of carbon intensive minerals
and the electricity generated to power the battery—produces emissions. The fact such emissions
occur 100% upstream of the vehicle's operation and therefore fall outside of the tailpipe
emissions calculation stacks the deck in favor of this technology. In fact, according to the
International Energy Association, PEVs require six times the raw materials as a traditional ICE
vehicle.30 There is no logical basis for this omission because, as EPA is aware, concerns about
GHG emissions relate to their longer term global concentrations. Consequently, air pollutant
emissions should be an important consideration regardless of where such emissions occur and,
by myopically prioritizing PEVs, EPA fails to look at all technologically feasible options that
may provide commensurate GHG reductions in a more cost-efficient manner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, pp.7-9]
30 IEA, "In the transition to clean energy, critical minerals bring new challenges to energy security," (June
2023), available at https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions/executive- summary.
The flaw in EPA's approach is illustrated by the fact that emissions standards easily become
meaningless by changing the engine's location. The proposed rule would treat a PEV charged by
a diesel-powered generator as if it had zero tailpipe emissions, notwithstanding the fact that it
remains "powered" by a diesel engine located outside the vehicle. A light-duty vehicle directly
powered by a diesel engine inside the vehicle, however, is credited with the emissions produced
by that engine. Thus, the source of the "fuel" matters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 7-9]
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Finally, EPA has not considered the foreseeable, indirect impacts the Proposed Rule will have
on ambient air quality. First, with the high purchase price of new PEVs, consumers will likely
hold on to their older, higher-emitting ICE vehicles to avoid the increased purchase price of a
PEV. Second, PEVs are heavier, and will increase particulate matter emissions through increased
brake, tire, and road wear. Ultimately, EPA arbitrarily ignores the full scope of emissions that
will come from PEVs, and a full lifecycle analysis of all potential vehicle technologies must be
conducted to fully understand the environmental impacts of the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, pp.7-9]
Take Virginia as a representative example highlighting the gap between the Proposed Rule's
required infrastructure and that which is actually feasible. According to a report by the Consumer
Energy Alliance, attached herein, Virginia currently has 7.6 million light-duty vehicles on the
road. Assuming Virginia transitions to 100% PEV by 2035, the state would need an additional
35.5 billion kWh of generation - equivalent to the generation required to power almost 70% of
the homes in the state. And to maximize the zero-emission benefit of PEVs, this generation
would need to come from zero-emitting sources such as nuclear or renewables (ignoring, for a
moment, the energy intensity required to construct these resources). But 35.5 billion kWh
corresponds to either 4 new nuclear reactors in the state or over 450,000 acres of off-shore
windfarms. Neither of which is remotely feasible under the Proposed Rule.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, pp.11-12]
42 CONSUMER ENERGY ALLIANCE, "Freedom to Fuel: Consumer Choice in the Automotive
Marketplace," August 2023 [hereinafter, "CEA Study"]. Nor has EPA shown that the electric grid itself can
meet this increased demand. As highlighted by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
("NERC"), certain high-risk areas do not today meet resource adequacy criteria, posing significant concern
about adding even more demand to the grid.43 This risk is further exacerbated by EPA's new carbon
dioxide standards for fossil-fuel fired power plants, proposed shortly after the Proposed Rule and not
otherwise considered in the Proposed Rule, that may rapidly phase out affordable base-load generation.44
Far from what the Proposed Rule requires, the infrastructure upgrades to support a U.S. LD fleet that is
only 7% PEV would require an additional $75-125 billion, which would be passed on from utilities directly
to customers.45 Today, energy insecure households, defined as those that are unable to adequately meet
basic household energy needs because of cost, pay 26 cents more per square foot in energy costs as
compared to energy secure households.46 This disparity will only increase as infrastructure upgrades to
accommodate the increased load from PEVs is passed along to ratepayers.
43 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2022 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (Dec. 2022),
21, available at
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2022.pdf
(indicating that increased demand projections may lead to reliability concerns for the electric grid,
especially as dual-peaking or seasonal peaking times change with increased electrification).
44 See Proposed Rule, "New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New,
Modified, and Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the
Affordable Clean Energy Rule," 88 Fed. Reg. 33,240 (May 23, 2023).
45 CEA Study at 8 (noting that the average price to consumers in New Mexico would be $117-195 per
year).
46 EIA, "U.S. energy insecure households were billed more for energy than other households," (May 30,
2023) available at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=56640.
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Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
Life-cycle comparison of combustion and electric vehicles
The climate benefits of electric vehicles compared to internal combustion engine vehicles are
clear and growing. Numerous studies show that BEVs are much cleaner than combustion
vehicles over their lifetime. In fact, the most recent ICCT life-cycle analysis shows that only
battery electric and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles have the potential to achieve the
magnitude of life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions reductions needed to meet Paris Agreement
goals.40 Specifically, the assessment finds that the life-cycle emissions over the lifetime of
BEVs registered in 2021 in the United States are lower than comparable gasoline vehicles by
60%- 68%. For new vehicles registered in 2030, the life-cycle emissions gap between BEV and
gasoline vehicles increase to 62%-76%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 15-16]
40 Bieker, G. (2021). A global comparison of the life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions of combustion
engine and electric passenger cars. International Council on Clean Transportation.
https://theicct.org/publication/a-global- comparison-of-the-life-cycle-greenhouse-gas-emissions-of-
combustion-engine-and-electric-passenger-cars/
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 4. Life-cycle GHG emission of average medium-
size gasoline internal combustion engine and battery electric vehicles registered in the United
States in 2021 and projected to be registered in 2030.41 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp.
15-16]
41 Bieker, G. (2021). A global comparison of the life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions of combustion
engine and electric passenger cars. International Council on Clean Transportation.
https://theicct.org/publication/a-global- comparison-of-the-life-cycle-greenhouse-gas-emissions-of-
combustion-engine-and-electric-passenger-cars/
There are a few reasons our study finds such high life-cycle GHG benefits of BEVs compared
to gasoline passenger vehicles. The foremost reason is that electric motors are far more efficient
than internal combustion engines. Another important reason is that we expect continued
reductions in the U.S. electricity generation mix as renewables such as solar and wind become
more economically competitive (these sources also continue to be supported by fiscal incentives
through the IRA). Our analysis accounts for this expected reduction in the GHG emissions from
U.S. electricity throughout the 18-year lifetime of a passenger vehicle registered in the U.S.
before it is deregistered. A third reason why the life-cycle GHG emissions from BEVs are so low
is that estimated GHG emissions from battery production have declined significantly over the
past few years as we have collected new data from commercial-scale battery production plants.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 15-16]
These findings are aligned with other life-cycle analysis of electric and combustion vehicles
in the U.S. A 2022 UCS study found that electric vehicles produce fewer emissions than new
gasoline vehicles everywhere in the U.S., and that on average EVs produce emissions equivalent
to 91-mile-per-gallon gasoline cars.42 The same study found that BEVs' higher manufacturing
emissions are quickly paid off after about 12,600 to 21,300 miles of driving, which is typically
reached in about 1-2 years for most U.S. drivers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 15-16]
42 Reichmuth, D., Dunn, J., Anair, D. (2022). Driving cleaner: Electric cars and pickups beat gasoline on
lifetime global warming emissions. Union of Concerned Scientists.
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2022- 09/driving-cleaner-report.pdf
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For combustion vehicles, there is no realistic pathway for deep decarbonization, even when
the potential for biofuels and biogas are taken into account. For gasoline cars, we account for the
current -10% blend of corn ethanol and its associated GHG emissions. Blending corn ethanol
does not significantly reduce the life-cycle GHG emissions from combusting gasoline because
the GHG emissions from producing corn ethanol are also quite high when including EPA's
estimated GHG emissions from land use change - only around 20% lower than the lifecycle
GHG emissions from producing and combusting gasoline. The production and consumption
within the U.S. of ultra-low GHG biofuels that can be blended into the gasoline mix (mainly
cellulosic ethanol) remains relatively very low.43 Given the greater incentives for second
generation biofuels used in aviation compared to the road sector in the IRA, it seems unlikely
that biofuels will significantly reduce the overall GHG intensity of the U.S. gasoline mix over
the timeframe of EPA's proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 15-16]
43 U.S. EPA (2022 December 13). Public data for the renewable fuel standard, https://www.epa.gov/fuels-
registration- reporting-and-compliance-help/public-data-renewable-fuel-standard
Organization: John Graham (Graham)
I. While EPA claims that the NPRM is technologically neutral, 1 the structure of the standards
for model years 2027 to 2032 is biased in favor of all-electric vehicles and biased against hybrid
propulsion systems.
1 Preamble, p. 29342, states, "At the same time, we note that the proposed standards are performance-based
and do not mandate any specific technology for any manufacturer or any vehicle."
Rationale: the compliance calculations under the rule assume that BEVs have zero emissions
of carbon dioxide, even though it is well established that increasing use of BEVs will increase
carbon dioxide emissions at the electric power plant and create more carbon dioxide emissions in
the supply chain for BEVs than would be created in the supply chains for hybrids. Based
primarily upon ICCT's 2021 lifecycle analysis, we calculate an artificial benefit to BEVs versus
hybrids of slightly over $4,500 per vehicle in 2021 and slightly less than $4,500 per vehicle in
2030 towards standard compliance (retail price - artificial benefit in DMC is about $3,000 per
vehicle). Had EPA used a lifecycle metric in the C02 performance standards (rather than the
tailpipe metric), the deployment rates of BEVs and hybrids would be more evenly distributed
and the overall impact of the standards on C02 and costs would have been more favorable.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 4]
First, the notion that BEVs have zero emissions is a myth; they transfer pollution from the
tailpipe to the stack of the electric power plant, where the electricity is produced to power the
BEVs. Moreover, the supply chains for BEVs are more polluting than the supply chains for
hybrids, principally because of the large amount of energy required to mine and process the raw
materials used in batteries and electric motors. The batteries in HEVs are much smaller than
batteries in BEVs, typically less than 2% of BEV battery size. Also, upstream emissions from
electricity production are usually greater than the energy required to explore, develop, refine, and
distribute petroleum resources and ethanol. Thus, environmentally, BEVs and hybrids need to be
compared on a lifecycle basis, not simply at the tailpipe. BEVs may be environmentally
preferable in some locations (e.g., where electric power is generated from renewables) while
hybrids might be environmentally acceptable or even preferable in areas where electric power is
dependent on fossil-fuels, especially coal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 9]
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Real-World GHG Emissions
In this section, we distinguish the compliance values for greenhouse gas emissions, which
address only tailpipe emissions, from real-world lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, which
include induced utility emissions and emissions throughout the BEV manufacturing and supply
chain, as well as tailpipe emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 33]
The proposed rule states that BEVs are assumed to have zero-GHG emissions for purposes of
compliance with the proposed standards. The DRIA includes some flawed IPM modeling of
upstream grid emissions that are biased to make BEVs look cleaner than they will be (see
below). Even worse, embedded GHG emissions from battery and BEV manufacturing are not
only excluded for compliance purposes but are ignored when computing real-world impacts
within the IPM model.94 The omission of emissions from the BEV supply chain is especially
appalling given that the agency counts some of the environmental benefits of reducing petroleum
production (e.g., reduced emissions at refineries). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 33]
94 DRIA 8.2.2.5 page 8-14 states, "The upstream emissions inventory does not account for all upstream
sources related to vehicles, fuels, and electricity generation, such as charging infrastructure, storage of
petroleum fuels, battery manufacture, etc."
The IPM modeling assumes that the carbon intensity of the electrical grid will decline by 70
percent over the lifetimes of 2032 vehicles, as renewables replace most fossil fuels throughout
the United States. The reader is led to believe that the subsidies for renewables in the Inflation
Reduction Act will cause this rapid transformation of the US utility industry. However, the
Inflation Reduction Act does not include the permitting reforms that are required for the large
new transmission lines necessary to bring renewable energy to the markets where they are
needed. Recent reports from both Brookings and the R Street Institute show that, without
permitting reform, the monies in the Inflation Reduction Act are likely to have minimal impact
on the expansion of renewables in the utility sector.95 The IPM modeling also ignores the
massive expansion of grid-scale energy storage that would be required to achieve reliability with
renewables. That energy storage, which would likely require large numbers of lithium ion
batteries, is not included in the agency's assessment of battery prices, electricity prices, or
material supply requirements. For these reasons, it is unrealistic to expect that the electricity
currently provided by fossil fuels will be provided by renewables within the average lifetime of
the model year 2032 vehicle. Thus, the upstream emissions from BEVs will be significantly
larger than the agency assumes. Without this bias, HEVs would look much better in comparison
to BEVs, as we illustrate in the simulation below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 33-34]
95 Rayan Sud, Sanjay Patnaik. How Does Permitting for Clean Energy Work? Brookings Institution.
Washington, DC. September 28, 2022; Rayan Sud, Sanjay Patnaik, Robert L. Glicksman. Federal
Permitting to Accelerate Clean Energy Infrastructure: A Nonpartisan Way Forward. Brookings Institution.
Washington, DC. February 14, 2023; Philip Rosetti. Potential Effects of the Inflation Reduction Act on
Greenhouse Gas Emissions. R Street. Washington, DC. September 27, 2022; Philip Rossetti. Written
Testimony for the Hearing on "Tax Incentives in the Inflation Reduction Act: Jobs and Investment in
Energy Communities." Committee on Finance. United States Senate. Washington, DC. May 18, 2023.
The attached Table 1 calculates lifecycle and tailpipe emissions for ICEVs, HEVs, and BEVs
for 2021 and 2030. Model years 2021 and 2030 are used because it begins with ICCT's
calculation of 101 g/km C02 for life cycle emissions of a 2021 model year BEV car in ICCT's
2021 lifecycle emission study.96 The 101 g/km C02 is composed of 60 g/km due to operation
from the U.S. national electric grid at 357 g/kWh C02 and 41 g/km due to manufacturing and
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maintenance emissions. These are converted into g/mi C02 in Table 1. BEV emissions with the
CA grid at 225 g/kWh C02 are also shown for 2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 33-
34]
96 George Bieker, International Council on Clean Transportation, "A Global Comparison of the Life-Cycle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Combustion Engine and Electric Passenger Cars", July 2021, Figure 4.1.
https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/Global-LCA-passenger-cars-jul2021_0.pdf
The ICCT lifecycle study also calculates ICEV life cycle emissions for cars of 252 g/km C02
for model year 2021, comprised of 55 g/km from upstream fuel production, 31 g/km due to
manufacturing and maintenance, and 166 g/km for tailpipe emissions (also converted into g/mi).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 34]
HEV manufacturing and maintenance emissions are assumed to be the same as ICEV since
HEVs do not access the grid and the batteries in HEVs are small compared to the batteries in
BEVs (see above) Tailpipe emissions are computed by comparing ICEV and HEV fuel
consumption from fueleconomy.gov for seven 2022 models offered with optional HEV
systems.97 The average reduction was 30%, which was applied to the ICEV upstream and
tailpipe C02 emissions in Table 1. v [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 34-35]
97 The 2022 models are the Kia Sorento, Hyundai Santa Fe, Hyundai Tuscan, Ford Escape, Toyota RAV4,
and Toyota Highlander. Calculations were performed for a submitted SAE paper: John D. Graham and
Wallace R. Wade, "Reducing Greenhouse-Gas Emissions from Light-Duty Vehicles: Supply- Chain and
Cost-Effectiveness Analyses Suggest a Near-Term Role for Hybrids", accepted for publication in SAE
International Journal of Sustainable Transportation, Energy, Environment, & Policy (STEEP) and available
from the authors upon request.
Table 1 also calculates emissions for 2030 model year vehicles, also based on the 2021 ICCT
lifecycle study. ICCT assumes that manufacturing and maintenance emissions will drop from 41
in 2021 to 34 g/km C02 in 2030 for car BEVs and from 31 to 26 g/km for car ICEVs; upstream
electricity/fuel emissions will drop from 60 to 52 g/km for car BEVs and from 55 to 52 g/km for
car ICEVs; and car ICEV tailpipe emissions will drop from 166 to 150 g/km. As for 2021, 2030
car HEV manufacturing and maintenance emissions are the same as 2030 ICEV and 2030 HEV
upstream fuel production and tailpipe emissions are 30% lower than 2030 ICEV. All values in
Table 1 have been converted to g/mi C02. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 34-35]
A key insight from Table 1 is that the emissions advantage of the BEV relative to the HEV is
substantially smaller when the BEV is assigned a plausible amount of upstream and embedded
emissions. We have understated the upstream emissions of BEVs in Table 1 by using the average
carbon intensity of the electrical grid, rather than the marginal emissions that will result from the
additional electricity consumed by BEVs. Insofar as BEVs are charged at night, they will often
rely on fossil fuel plants that run at night (solar energy is not available at night). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0585, pp. 34-35]
Lifecycle studies that have investigated marginal emissions find that BEVs do not always
have a significant advantage over HEVs, especially in some parts of the country where marginal
emissions rely on fossil fuels.98 Interestingly, while overall coal use has been steadily declining
in the US since 2010, coal use to meet marginal emissions demands has actually been increasing
over the same time period.99 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 34-35]
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98 J Zivin, M Kotchen, ET Mansur. Spatial and Temporal Heterogeneity of Marginal Emissions:
Implications for Electric Cars and Other Electricity-Shifting Policies. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization. 107 (Part A). 2014, 248-68.
99 Stephen P. Holland, Matthew J Kotchen, Erin T. Mansur, Andrew J. Yate. Why Marginal C02
Emissions Are Not Decreasing for US Electricity: Estimates and Implications for Policy. PNAS. 119(8).
2022, e2116632119. https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116632119.
Table 1 also shows that the lifecycle emissions advantage of the BEV is larger in the states
that have adopted zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) mandates than in states that have not adopted
ZEV mandates. This difference reflects that fact that the average reliance on coal and oil for
electricity production is much less prevalent in ZEV states (6.9%) than in non-ZEV states
(31.2%). 100 Since the incremental effect of the EPA rule will be felt predominantly in the non-
ZEV states, the most appropriate comparison for this rulemaking is HEV emissions versus BEV
emissions in non-ZEV states. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 35]
100 EPA. eGRID with 2021 Data. Released January 30, 2023, https://www.epa.gov/egrid/summary-data.
The central case in the DRIA ignores this reality by assuming that no states have adopted zero
emission vehicle mandates. There is a sensitivity case where state ZEV mandates are considered
in an alternative baseline, but the sensitivity case does not actually assume full implementation
of the state-level mandates. Instead, it uses a BEV adopter model with a state-ZEV variable that
is not properly specified (this weakness is acknowledged by the authors of the model). 101 As a
result, even the sensitivity case assumes, incorrectly, that the EPA rule will have a large impact
on BEV adoption in the ZEV states. In the final rule, EPA should fix this problem, making sure
that the BEV-adoption impact of the rule is concentrated in the non-ZEV states (since the state
regulations and ancillary state policies will handle BEV deployment in the ZEV states). We also
recommend a specific marginal emissions comparison of BEVs versus HEVs in each of the non-
ZEV states. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 35]
101 https://www.nrel.gov/docs/Iy22osti/81065.pdf (especially p. 18).
The HEV incremental cost (DMC) over ICEV for 2021 of $2,055 in Table 1 was taken
directly from the 2021 NAS study. 103 The 2030 HEV incremental DMC was reduced using the
0.97 learning factor from PRIA Table 2-26. From the incremental DMC cost and total emissions,
the HEV cost per g/mi C02 avoided was calculated, $19.3 $/g/mi C02 for 2021 and $20.5 for
2030. (Note: as explained earlier, larger learning factors should be used for HEVs but here we
use the agency's assumption for illustrative purposes). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 36-
37]
103 National Academies, Assessment of Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy;
2025-2035. 2021. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/26092/assessment-of-technologies-for-
improving-light-duty-vehicle-fuel-economy-2025-2035.
The final step was to calculate the incremental BEV DMC over ICEV that matches the cost-
effectiveness calculated for the HEV, for lifecycle emissions using the US grid and tailpipe only
scenarios (CA grid is also shown for 2021 for comparison). The results are similar for 2021 and
2030. Using lifecycle emissions and US grid, a BEV is more cost-effective than a HEV only if
the incremental BEV DMC is less than $4,686 in 2021 and $4,679 in 2030. Using tailpipe
emissions only, a BEV is more cost effective than a HEV only if the incremental BEV DMC is
less than $7,820 in 2021 and $7,513 in 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 36-37]
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The important finding from these calculations is the large difference between BEV cost-
effectiveness for the lifecycle and tailpipe scenarios, which is $3,134 for cars in 2021 ($7,820 -
$4,686) and $2,834 in 2030 ($7,513-$4,679). Applying EPA's RPE of 1.5 to the DMC cost-
effectiveness increases the amount to about $4,500. This is an artificial advantage given to BEVs
over HEVs from using tailpipe-emissions standards instead of lifecycle emission standards. To
put this in perspective, the artificial incentive for car BEVs of about $3,000 is 50% more than the
HEV DMC cost increment over ICEVs of about $2,000 in both 2021 and 2030. It is also about
63% of the $4,725 incremental DMC of a car BEV over a car HEV in 2022.104,105 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 36-37]
104 2022 BEV and HEV DMC calculated from ICCT 2022 BEV cost study: Peter Slowik, Aaron Isenstadt,
Logan Pierce, Stephanie Searle, ASSESSMENT OF LIGHT-DUTY ELECTRIC VEHICLE COSTS AND
CONSUMER BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE 2022-2035 TIME FRAME. ICCT, Oct.
2022. https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/ev-cost-benefits-2035-oct22.pdf.
105 Data: 2020 car ICEV DMC from ICCT 2022 BEV cost study (described in footnote 98) Table 3
adjusted to 2022 using Table 4 ($19,956); 2022 car BEV-250 DMC from ICCT 2022 BEV cost study Table
6 adjusted to 300 mile range using Table 5 ($26,736); 2022 car HEV DMC as previously calculated from
2021 NAS study ($2,055).
[See original comment for Table 1: Comparison of tailpipe and lifecycle emissions and cost-
effectiveness] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, pp. 36-37]
The Preamble states on page 29342:
"At the same time, we note that the proposed standards are performance-based and do not
mandate any specific technology for any manufacturer or any vehicle. Moreover, the overall
industry does not necessarily need to reach this level of BEVs in order to comply—the projection
in our analysis is one of many possible compliance pathways that manufacturers could choose to
take under the performance-based standards. For example, manufacturers that choose to increase
their sales of HEV and PHEV technologies or apply more advanced technology to non-hybrid
ICE vehicles would require a smaller number of BEVs than we have projected in our assessment
to comply with the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 37]
While EPA is correct that specific technologies are not actually mandated and manufacturers
can choose to increase their sales of HEV and PHEV technologies, EPA is NOT correct that the
"proposed standards are performance-based". As illustrated in Table 1, EPA has put its thumb on
the scale and given BEVs approximately a $4,500 ($3,000 DMC) advantage - in addition to the
temporary advantages that Congress gave BEVs in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. Given
that the incremental cost (DMC) of a HEV is only about $2,000, this is a huge artificial
disadvantage to HEVs. Had EPA used a lifecycle metric in the C02 performance standards
(rather than the tailpipe metric), the deployment rates of BEVs and hybrids would be more
evenly distributed and the overall impact of the standards on total C02 emissions and total costs
would have been more favorable. The agency should run the OMEGA modeling using our
suggested assumptions in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 37]
EPA's Response to Comments document for the 2023-2026 light-duty standards dismissed
lifecycle arguments as irrelevant since the Agency has not proposed to address a possible change
in the "form" of the standard. However, lifecycle emissions are not a "form of the standard",
they are part of what determines the total amount of C02 emissions caused by vehicles. It is
disingenuous to suggest that, for example, selecting between footprint- and weight-based
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adjustments to the standards, which is well accepted as a change in the form of the standards, is
the same as ignoring C02 emissions equivalent to 40% of 2021 ICEV emissions. Delaying
indefinitely a move to a lifecycle standard is not technology-neutral, as it retards HEV
deployment and innovation, while hurting the environment and the economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0585, p.38]
Therefore, we are requesting that EPA also consider our comment as a petition for rulemaking
(under the APA and CAA) to adopt a lifecycle emissions standard for vehicles. If necessary, the
agency could go final with the 2027 standards with the tailpipe metric and hold on finalization of
the 2028-2032 standards until the lifecycle rulemaking is completed. This would ensure that
automakers have ample lead time (4-5 years) to adjust to the new lifecycle metric and the new
lifecycle performance standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 38]
Moreover, by ignoring upstream and manufacturing emissions that are higher for BEVs than
conventional vehicles, the final rule will generate more total carbon dioxide emissions and larger
compliance costs than would occur if the final rule was designed objectively using lifecycle
emissions. This is contrary to the intent of the Clean Air Act, which authorizes no special
treatment of BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 38]
Organization: KALA Engineering Consultants (KALA)
Comments
1. If I was not an engineer deeply steeped in the subtleties of transportation emission
issues and I read your Federal Register (FedReg) text or news reports written by reporters
unfamiliar with the actual science basis for your proposed rulemaking for Docket EPA-HQ-
OAR- 2022-0829 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-
Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, I might come away from certain descriptions of vehicles
discussed in such text as describing transportation vehicles that have absolutely no emissions
coming from them or attributable to them at all. Repeated use by the EPA of the terms Zero
Emission and Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) could lead some to believe there actually is such a
thing, when all of EPA's emission scientists and engineers know this is not the case. We hesitate
to charge EPA with putting out deliberately misleading characterizations of Battery Electric
Vehicles (BEV) as true ZERO emission vehicles, but it seems that way. Examples from the
FedReg text below: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 3-4]
From Section I. A. 2, i: "These industry advancements in the production and sales of zero-and
near-zero emission vehicles are already occurring both domestically and globally,... [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 3-4]
As the term "zero-emission vehicle" suggests, these cars and trucks have zero GHG and
criteria pollutant emissions from their tailpipes, which can represent significant reductions over
current emissions (particularly for GHG). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 3-4]
[I]t is important to recognize that, despite this anticipated growth in zero-emission vehicles,
many internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles will continue to be sold during the time frame
of the rule and will remain on the road for many years afterward." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 3-4]
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KALA strenuously objects to what seems to be un-scientific and cavalier use of the "zero
emission" terminology when referring to all-electric rechargeable vehicles when all of you know
that there may well be fossil-fueled electric generating units (EGU), emitting lots of GHG,
supplying the electric power to recharge those vehicle batteries. We implore the EPA to be more
scientifically precise in its terminology for BEVs as Zero Operating Emission vehicles and use
acronyms of (ZOE and ZOEV). Such proper terminology gives the uninformed reader the idea
that there may be no emissions from operation of BEVs, but there might be emissions associated
with the electrical refueling, ie, recharging, of those vehicles. Yes, we know that the ZEV
terminology used by EPA fits into what we believe is misguided regulatory consideration of
ONLY the operating emissions or lack thereof from ZOEVs while entirely ignoring the
"Upstream" GHG emissions associated with battery recharge. EPA cannot have this situation
represent realistic GHG considerations if you cling to that artifice. We could give you several
dandy analogies, but we won't waste your time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 3-4]
EPA waxes poetic about all the upcoming public and private BEV recharging facilities that
have been and are being installed or planned to be installed. It seems odd to us that the GHG
emissions associated with all those charging facilities are simply being ignored in any
calculations of attributable GHG emissions that could arguably be linked to BEV expansion in
the US fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 3-4]
Charging facilities are NOT zero emission when all of the associated GHG emissions are
considered. These recharging facilities would not be being installed if there were no BEVs.
Therefore, all of these recharging stations and facilities are new to the status quo situation and
therefore have GHG emissions directly relatable to the presence of BEVs. All of the copper used
in these facilities has GHG emissions associated with mining, haulage, transport, smelting, wire
drawing and reeling. The plastic used in these facilities and as wire insulation almost certainly
comes from petroleum stocks with GHG emissions associated with the creation of the plastics.
Concrete and reinforcing steel used to support the facilities and provide driveways and parking
areas have GHG emissions directly associated with the construction of these facilities, plus the
fossil fuels used by construction machinery and vehicles doing that construction. We could go
on, but it seems that EPA staff is conveniently ignoring the GHG emissions associated with what
will become the millions of recharging facilities and stations needed to support the advancement
of electric vehicles promulgated under these proposed regulatory rules. Such willful dismissal or
ignoring of these types of issues when it comes to GHG emissions associated with rule making
that essentially requires vehicle manufacturers to move to BEV adoption as virtually their sole
option for compliance smacks of the work of zealots - in this case electrification zealots within
the EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 3-4]
Comment
3. The EPA appears to be using a very "special" consideration of emissions that are to be
counted as regulated emission from Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV). In unbelievable statements
of contorted logic, the EPA has set forth what we describe as a complete artifice designed to
promote and "force" a major change to vehicle propulsion starting in model year 2027. While it
is true that during operation BEVs produce no criteria pollutants and emit no GHG gasses, the
same cannot be said for the probable sources of the electric power used to recharge the batteries
of BEVs. We wish this were not so, but we must deal factually with emissions associated with
BEV recharging. If the EPA is serious about GHG reductions, they MUST include and consider
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the GHG emissions of grid-connected Electric Generating Units (EGU). Much like the water that
comes from our faucets, several water sources could be being used to provide that water. So it is
with electricity. No one can distinguish or filter out clean electrons coming from wind and solar
sources and "dirty" electrons coming from GHG-intensive electric generation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 8-10]
Power that comes into homes and businesses may well be a mix of so-called clean energy and
emission-laden dirty energy produced by burning fossil fuels. In fact, the mix of electricity
generation varies greatly by state or region, depending on what the "serving utility" chooses to
use for generation. Some regions rely almost entirely on fossil fuel and nuclear generation
methods, while others have added or switched to renewable energy production methods, such as
wind and solar as part of their generation mix. There are few if any regions of the United States
that are completely powered by renewable or GHG-free energy. There are GHG implications for
most of the so-called renewable generation methods. Solar panels are often produced with high
Global Warming Potential (GWP) chemicals being released and there are GHG emissions
associated with the steel, carbon fibers, plastics and copper conductors used in wind turbines. All
this is to say there are GHG emissions associated with virtually all forms of electric generation
that cannot be ignored when considering whether or not the introduction of a new form of
vehicle propulsion that relies on recharging batteries will have associated GHG emissions. The
latest figures from the Energy Information Agency for 2022, show the mix of energy production
for the US: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 8-10]
[See original attachment for U.S. utility-scale electricity generation by source, amount, and
share of total in 20221 Data as of February 2023] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 8-10]
As you can see, 60.2% of overall US electricity generation was still produced by burning
fossil fuels with their associated GHG and other pollutant emissions. When we aggregate how
much GHG emissions might be attributable to recharging Battery Electric Vehicles we normally
do so on a nation-wide scale using the latest available information. Since regional electric power
generation is so varied, we cannot say a BEV in Southern California will have lower associated
GHG emissions than one recharging in St. Paul, Minnesota. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617,
pp. 8-10]
Therefore, as of 2022, we can say in aggregate, there is a 60% chance that the electrons used
to recharge BEVs over the next few years will be from fossil C02 emitting fossil fuel generating
plants. That is why, any scientific calculations made for the GHG contributions that a BEV
makes must consider how the recharging power delivered to the BEV was generated. A BEV
may have zero operating emissions but they do NOT have zero GHG emissions associated with
their use. It is our considered engineering opinion that much of the so-called "low-hanging fruit"
for renewable generation in the US has already been implemented and is now on-line or soon
will be. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 8-10]
Think about an Electric Utility company that has literally made billions of dollars of
investments in coal and/or natural gas fired power plants. In their board room minds, they are
doing just fine making electricity in the same old way as they did 50 years ago and feel no
compunction at all about charging their customers more for electricity when the cost of the fossil
fuels they burn go up. Why would such a business feel compelled to create "stranded assets" of
their fossil-fired generating facilities long before their estimated useful life expires and switch
over to renewable forms of electricity generation? Might it be because the board of directors and
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the management suddenly "feel" like it is the "right" thing to do for the planet. Really??
Seriously, businesses have built-in inertia when they have made large investments in what brings
in revenue for the business and for their stock holders. They might agree that new generating
capacity should be renewable, but there is great impetus to expand their existing fossil fuel-fired
facilities with a new generator unit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 8-10]
So, the 60% fossil fuel number may stubbornly stay close to that figure for some time. The
EPA attempted to control both pollutant and GHG emissions from power plants when the "Clean
Power Plan" was part of policy thrusts, but they were less than successful in courts and
countering the Utility and Fossil Fuel lobbies in Congress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
8-10]
https://www.nationofchange.org/2022/07/05/the-supreme-court-has-curtailed-epas-power-to-
regulate-carbon-pollution-and-sent-a-warning-to-other-regulators/ [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 8-10]
Fig. 2. Alternative metrics for evaluating ethanol based on the intensity of primary energy
inputs (MJ) per MJ of fuel and of net greenhouse gas emissions (kg C02-equivalent) per MJ of
fuel. For gasoline, both petroleum feedstock and petroleum energy inputs are included. "Other"
includes nuclear and hydrological electricity generation. Relative to gasoline, ethanol produced
today is much less petroleum intensive but much more natural gas and coal-intensive. Production
of ethanol from lignite fired biorefineries located far from where the corn is grown results in
ethanol with a high coal intensity and a moderate petroleum intensity. Cellulosic ethanol is
expected to have an extremely low intensity for all fossil fuels and a very slightly negative coal
intensity due to electricity sales that would displace coal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
10-15]
The caption explains the units for GHG emissions calculated, which should be easily
converted to what ever units EPA would like to use for its purposes. So, please, EPA, don't tell
us such calculations would be a huge burden since someone else has done them for you. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 10-15]
B. EPA may not have legislative authority to make such sweeping changes to the vehicle
mix in the 250 million strong US fleet.
Comment
4. We begin this comment by citing passages from A Framework for Federal Scientific
Integrity Policy and Practice formulated by The Scientific Integrity Framework Interagency
Working Group (SIF-IWG) of The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). "The
Framework," as we will refer to it, was commissioned by the January 27, 2021 Presidential
Memorandum on Restoring Trust in Government Through Scientific Integrity and Evidence-
Based Policymaking to create a Scientific Integrity Task Force. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, p. 16]
While the creation of a Scientific Integrity Policy is laudable, we wonder why people in the
Executive Branch felt it necessary to state or re-state the requirements for Integrity in Federal
Government science products. We believe the timing of the Presidential Memorandum, after the
administration of Donald Trump had left office, is consequential. We further believe, while not
stated per se in The Framework verbiage, the Executive Branch felt it was necessary to re-state
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and strengthen Scientific Integrity policies for Federal agencies directly due to the unethical
behavior of Agency heads and group leaders hand-selected to further the Trump
Administration's policy agendas. Those agendas in numerous cases had Federal Agencies
coming out with so-called scientific findings that were diametrically opposite or nearly so to
science findings made under prior administrations and under prior Congressional commissions
for scientific studies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, p. 16]
We would be glad to debate our prior statements with anybody, but that is not why we are
here. We are going to introduce science results that appear to be directly in conflict with science
findings from and related to EPA Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR- 2022- 0829, specifically
projected Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emission reductions, and more specifically projected GHG
reductions from Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV) as a result of full adoption of the rulemaking
and standards set forth in the cited proposed rulemaking. As such, KALA Consulting is hereby
requesting that, at a minimum, the complete content of this Comment's section (Section 4) be
referred to the Science Integrity Officer(s) who oversees science integrity conflicts and opposing
views by staff or outside commentors. We might also suggest review of negative conclusions
drawn by KALA for what we view as misguided regulatory stances made in formulating the
subject docket in our full set of comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, p. 16]
There are those that will argue that this report on the Hidden Costs of Energy is too old to be
applicable to today's situation and that things have changed enough that the assumptions made in
2009 are far from the realities of today. We would in part agree with that assessment except for
the issue of GHG emissions projected for 2030 in the report. In that case, the changes that
became apparent between 2009 and today would not be in your favor when it comes to GHG
emissions from fossil-fueled power plants, which are the main source of GHG emissions
associated with Grid Dependent BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
Fugitive Methane Emissions: Let's look at those GHG and power plant-related changes that
have come up since the NAS Hidden Costs of Energy report was written. The Hydraulic
Fracturing of oil and gas shale rocks method of recovering both oil and natural gas (mostly
methane) did not really get going until around 2012 when US oil and gas production did a U-turn
and both oil and natural gas became more abundant for US consumers. However, as the amounts
of natural gas extraction went up, researchers found increasing amounts of methane in the
atmosphere that had a carbon signature attributable to fracked gas.
https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2019/08/study-fracking-prompts-global-spike-atmospheric-
methane
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
It was becoming apparent in research being done in the US that fugitive methane emissions
upstream of natural gas electric generating plants was much worse than the power generating
industry or the oil and gas industry were reporting. In a landmark study conducted by Purdue
University investigators, the "Well to fire-box nozzle" releases of methane may be as much as
120 times higher than previously reported.
https://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/releases/2017/Ql/estimates-of-emissions-from-natural-
gas-fueled-plants-much- too-low,-study-finds.html
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
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It was thought that a switch over to burning natural gas for electricity generation would
produce about half of the GHG emissions of a coal-fired power plant (EGU). With the new
availability and low price of fracked gas, many electric utility companies switched their coal-
fired generating units to natural gas or built new natural gas-fired units. But when upstream
methane emissions are considered and the fact that methane is approximately 85 times more
potent a greenhouse gas (85x GWP over the first 20 years after release) than C02, the GHG
emissions from natural gas electric generating units is considerably greater than once thought.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/methane-leaks-erase-some-of-the-climate-
benefits-of-natural-gas/
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
These new study revelations would undoubtedly have increased the estimates for GHG
emissions from grid-recharged "Electric" vehicles as the Hidden Costs of Energy study calls
BEVs. So, in our view, the GHG emissions for BEVs shown in the Hidden Costs of Energy
report are undoubtedly UNDERSTATED. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
The other major change related to GHG emissions from electric generation that could not
have been known to the Hidden Costs of Energy authors has to do with the environmental
disaster known as the Trump Administration. That administration attempted to roll back
emission standards and promote the use of coal for electric generating. The writing was on the
wall for abandoning coal in favor of natural gas for generation during that time, but some utilities
may have extended operations of existing coal-fired generating units or added additional coal
burners and generators to portfolios under that coal-favorable oversite. For each day of extended
coal-fired operation for electricity, the terrible mix of air pollutants and the solid waste problem
of coal ash disposal became worse, something those authors could not have foreseen.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/climate-environment/trump-climate-
environment-protections/
[EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
All of these findings and administrative disasters were not known at the time the Hidden
Costs of Energy report was being assembled and study authors were not aware of the "Hidden"
methane emissions from the natural gas distribution system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617,
pp. 19-27]
It may seem odd that a report whose name has Costs as a prominent part of its title would
have an assessment of GHG emissions as part of its findings in the Transportation section. The
Hidden Costs of Energy report actually made projections for 2030 of environmental damage
costs on a cents per vehicle mile traveled basis for multiple carbon-containing fuels, hydrogen
and electric vehicles (BEVs). In that projection, BEVs were considered to have higher per mile
traveled environmental damage costs than conventional gasoline spark Ignition (CG-SI) vehicles
in 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
From Page 210 of the Hidden Costs of Energy report:
[See original attachment for Table 3-18 Relative Categories of Damages in 2030 for Major
Categories of Light-Duty Fuels and Technologies (2005 data deleted)]
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Notes: Costs are in 2007 USD. ABBREVIATIONS: VMT = vehicle miles traveled; CNG =
compressed natural gas; HEV = hybrid electric vehicle; RFG = reformulated gasoline.; E85 =
85% Ethanol /15% gasoline fuel blend; E10 = 10% Ethanol / 90% gasoline fuel blend [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
The authors of the Hidden Costs of Energy report also depicted their environmental damage
costs per vehicle mile traveled (VMT) projected to the year 2030 graphically, which makes
comparisons by inspection much easier:
[See original attachment for Health and Other Damages by Life-Cycle Component 2030
Light-Duty Automobiles] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
Graphic abbreviation notes: RFG=Reformulated Gasoline (used in warmer US regions in
summer); SI=Spark Ignition as opposed to Compression Ignition (Diesel); CG=Conventional
Gasoline; SIDI=Spark Ignition Direct Injection; CNG=Compressed Natural Gas; E85=85%
Ethanol /15% Gasoline fuel blend; E10=10% Ethanol / 90% Gasoline fuel blend;
Electric=Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV); SI HEV= Spark Ignition Hybrid Electric Vehicle;
BD20=20% Biodiesel / 80% petroleum diesel fuel blend [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
19-27]
It should be obvious to the most casual observer that it was no walk in the park for the authors
of the Hidden Costs of Energy report to consider all 22 of the shown vehicle propulsion fuel and
technology types and run projected calculations for each. The graphic also shows that the BEV
(Electric) cohort is slightly higher in environmental damages, when monetized, than the spark
Ignition Gasoline vehicle types. To put a number to it, if the vehicle travels 100,000 miles, the
monetary difference in environ- mental damages between gasoline and BEVs ranges from $10 to
$1,000 (2007 USD), which would be about 20% higher in 2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 19-27]
The takeaway from this environmental damage assessment in the Hidden Costs of Energy
report for 2030 vehicle types is that the EPA is now proposing standards that would probably
require high percentages of vehicles, namely BEVs, to be sold into the US fleet that are going to
cause MORE environmental damage than a good old gasoline vehicle. If the report's assessment
for environmental damages is correct, i.e. that BEVS will be more damaging to the environment
than conventional gasoline vehicles, why are we expected to want to drive BEVs and damage the
environment more so than the gasoline vehicles we have been using? Moreover, why would the
EPA want to force, through regulations, a switch over to BEVs if they are going to do more
environmental damage, something that is antithetical to the stated mission of the EPA? [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
We are still scratching our heads over why the EPA would be pushing for a change to vehicles
that do more damage to the environment than the gasoline vehicles we have been driving. The
environmental damages assessment shown above does not include any attributable damages from
GHG emissions for each vehicle type assessed. Fortunately, for those of us who want to see a
comparison of estimated GHG emissions between the type of vehicles we have been driving,
gasoline vehicles, and BEVs, the Hidden Costs of Energy report did just that projected for the
year 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
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The tabular form of the Hidden Costs of Energy report's table providing ranges of GHG
emissions in grams per Vehicle Mile Traveled (VMT) estimates are shown below from Page 215
of the report, (errata note: The final Hidden Costs of Energy report had an error in units for the
tabulation of GHG C02 equivalent emissions by stating gal/VMT, which we would assume to
mean Gallons/VMT, when the left axis title in the graphical representation of the same data that
will be shown below, correctly indicates the units to be grams of C02 equivalent per VMT)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
It should be noted that the ranges of GHG emissions shown in the table below consider ALL
upstream and downstream attributable GHG emissions and we would also remind that the
calculations done for attributable BEV GHG emissions were made without the benefit of the
recent studies that revealed the extent of methane being released in the US natural gas
distribution system and at natural gas-fired Electric Generating Units. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
[See original attachment for Table 3-19 Relative Categories of GHG Emissions in 2030 for
Major Categories of Light-Duty Fuels and Technologies (2005 data deleted)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
ABBREVIATIONS: GHG = Greenhouse Gas; VMT = vehicle miles traveled; CNG =
compressed natural gas; CG = Conventional Gasoline; SI = Spark Ignition; HEV = hybrid
electric vehicle; BEV = Battery Electric Vehicle; RFG = reformulated gasoline.; E85 = 85%
Ethanol /15% gasoline fuel blend; E10 = 10% Ethanol / 90% gasoline fuel blend; Cellulosic =
Alcohol Fuel made from cellulosic biomass [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
We hope you will notice that the calculations made for BEV GHG emissions place the BEV
in this table within the same range block as conventional gasoline fueled vehicles. The similarity
in attributable GHG emissions for both vehicle types can better be evaluated from the graphic
representation of the above estimate data, which when looking at the bar heights, we believe
those bars represent the actual numbers calculated for each vehicle type. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
For completeness, we will show the original graphic of GHG emissions for all 22 types as
shown in the Hidden Costs of Energy report. However, there are notations that the authors made
indicating that further deductions for GHG emissions need to be made for the Cellulosic alcohol
fuel sources bar heights. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
Graphic abbreviation notes: RFG=Reformulated Gasoline (used in warmer US regions in
summer); SI=Spark Ignition as opposed to Compression Ignition (Diesel); CG=Conventional
Gasoline; SIDI=Spark Ignition Direct Injection; CNG=Compressed Natural Gas; E85=85%
Ethanol /15% Gasoline fuel blend; E10=10% Ethanol / 90% Gasoline fuel blend;
Electric=Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV); SI HEV= Spark Ignition Hybrid Electric Vehicle;
BD20=20% Biodiesel / 80% petroleum diesel fuel blend [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
19-27]
It is difficult to accurately gauge the respective bar heights in this very dense graphic, the bar
heights of which we believe to represent the actual calculated amounts in each source category in
the stacked bars. In the caption for this graphic (Figure 3-8) the following statement and
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instructions for revising the bar heights was provided: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-
27]
Going from bottom to top of each bar, damages are shown for life-cycle stages as follows:
vehicle operation, feedstock production, fuel refining or conversion, and vehicle manufacturing.
One exception is ethanol fuels for which feedstock production exhibits negative values because
of C02 uptake. The amount of C02 consumed should be subtracted from the positive value to
arrive at a net value. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
The reason given for having negative bars for cellulosic alcohols was that cellulosic fuels are
derived from living plants that use carbon dioxide in the air, the carbon of which is in what we
call the "current" carbon cycle and, while some of the atmospheric C02 used by plants has fossil
carbon in it, the plants are incorporating that C02 into plant biomass and the roots of cellulosic
feedstock plants sequester carbon. For example, the switchgrass perennial plant has often been
used as an example of one that could be grown and harvested for cellulosic fuel production.
Switchgrass can grow to a height of about 5 feet above ground, while the root system of each
switchgrass plant can attain a length of up to 15 feet below ground. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 19-27]
While the instructions were given on how and why the stacked bars for cellulosic alcohols
should be handled and represented, the Hidden Costs of Energy report never actually made those
bar height adjustments in a separate graphic. Not to worry, we have done that while removing
many of the vehicle types superfluous to this comment, such as vehicles fueled with Hydrogen.
We present that revised graphic below: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
[See original comment for Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Life-Cycle Component 2030 Light-
Duty Automobiles] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
Please notice that we have added a thin red horizontal line that stretches from the top of the
Conventional Spark Ignition Gasoline (CG SI) vehicle bar to the "Electric" (BEV) stacked bar.
You may also notice that there is no blue bar segment in the BEV bar stack, denoting no GHG
emissions from operation of Battery Electric Vehicles, yet there are associated GHG emissions
shown for BEVs from attributable upstream sources, namely fossil fuel-fired Electric Generating
Units and their upstream emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
Please note that the stacked bar for BEV attributable GHG emissions is nearly equal to the
stacked bar height of a normal, everyday, conventional gasoline-fueled vehicle as projected to
the year 2030. AND, we would repeat that the calculations done for the Fuel component (green
bar segment) did NOT include the upstream GHG impacts of fugitive methane, which recent
studies have shown is much greater than previously thought. How much greater is something we
think EPA should look into immediately to acquire quantitative figures that could be added to the
calculations made by the Hidden Costs of Energy report modelling or new modelling made with
updated inputs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
The GHG emission comparison just given in the revised graphic above may well be
something the EPA did not want the public to be made aware of. Otherwise, the EPA would not
have been so circumspect about accounting for upstream emissions, as we are sure EPA is fully
aware of the upstream GHG implications of these new fugitive methane studies. The fact that
EPA did not address the attributable upstream GHG emissions associated with BEV recharge
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may well be because they know that after those upstream GHG emissions are accounted for
along with fugitive methane accounting, the result will be similar to what the Hidden Costs of
Energy report had shown 14 years ago, or, more likely, even worse for BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
We believe that if a full accounting of BOTH downstream and upstream GHG emissions for
BOTH gasoline and EGU emissions recharging BEV batteries was made and the results will
show, as the Hidden Costs of Energy report results shown above suggests, that GHG emissions
from gasoline-fueled vehicles may well be about the same or very possibly LOWER than those
attributable to BEVs. We DARE the EPA to make ethical calculations and share with the public
the results of accounting for ALL attributable GHG emissions, both upstream and downstream,
for conventional/RFG gasoline vehicles and BEVs. If EPA fails to do so after reviewing this
comment, the assumption will be in the public's mind and ours that EPA has something to hide.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
The other implication of full upstream and downstream GHG accounting is, if the results of
such accounting shows that the true associated GHG emissions, both upstream and downstream,
for CG-SI and BEV vehicles are nearly the same or, as we suspect, attributable GHG emissions
will be HIGHER for BEVs than gasoline-fueled vehicles the GHG reduction claims made in the
rulemaking documentation cannot possibly be real. If ethical attributable emissions calculations
for both gasoline vehicles and BEVs prove to be nearly the same, the claims made on page
29198 of the Federal Register in Table 2 - Projected GHG Emission Impacts In 2055 From The
Proposed Rule, Light-Duty And Medium-Duty of a net 420 Million Metric Tonnes of GHG
gasses cannot be supported in any scientific way. If that reduction estimate includes assumed
reductions in GHG emissions from stationary EGUs as a result of new EPA regulatory standards
being imposed, the EPA is being less than candid by not providing a GHG emissions estimate
regulated by new standards and estimated emission reductions with no new GHG EGU standards
regulation applied comparison. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
[See original attachment for Table 2 - projected GHG emissions impacts in 2055 from the
proposed rule, light-duty and medium-duty] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
It is our belief that EPA made a simple calculation of their zero GHG counting for BEVs
replacing a certain number of gasoline vehicles, with some accounting for increased EGU GHG
output and subtracted the gasoline vehicle GHGs to arrive at Table 2 figures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 19-27]
The Scientific Integrity Policy and procedures adopted by the EPA reflect the model
framework's guidance appearing on Page 31 of "The Framework." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 19-27]
II. Ensuring the Free Flow of Scientific Information
Open and timely communication of EPA science plays a valuable role in building public trust
and understanding of EPA's work. EPA shall facilitate the free flow of scientific and
technological information and support scientific integrity in the communication of scientific
activities, findings and products. Scientific and technological information will be disseminated to
the extent allowed by and consistent with privacy and classification standards and responsible
communication of scientific information. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, p. 27]
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We believe that EPA has not lived up to these "Open Government" requirements and has been
unnecessarily circumspect, secretive and less than open when it comes to revealing all knowable
science facts regarding attributable GHG emissions from BEVs and how they would compare to
the majority vehicle type in the US fleet, the gasoline- fueled vehicle. The comparative results
taken from the Hidden Costs of Energy report shows beyond a shadow of a doubt that the
attributable GHG emissions for BEVs, when both upstream and downstream emissions are
counted in an ethical manner, may well be nearly the same or larger than those emitted by
gasoline-fueled vehicles. If that is true, the claimed GHG reductions from implementing the
proposed regulations from this docket simply cannot be true and cannot be scientifically
supported and, therefore, cannot be used as a supporting reason for proceeding with
implementing these new standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, p. 27]
Suggested Alternatives
KALA is an engineering firm and would not be making these comments unless we had some
alternatives to suggest to EPA. If the EPA does the right thing and makes known the attributable
upstream and downstream GHG emissions for both gasoline and BEV vehicles in a straight-
forward comparison, the GHG reduction premise for the EPA Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829 would be nullified. That leaves the criteria air pollutant emission reduction premise
for the proposed rulemaking. As we stated above, we concur with EPA that BEVs would reduce
criteria pollutant levels where they operate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
However, looking at what has been happening with weather events, forest and wildfire
emissions and more frequent flooding events over the last 20 years, the number of lives lost from
those Climate Change-related calamities may soon overwhelm any life-saving measures that
would stem from implementing the criteria pollution standards proposed in this docket, previous
dockets and future dockets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
Despite that grim assessment, we feel that continuing to try and reduce criteria pollutants is
worthwhile, even though massive forest fires in Canada this year seem to have wiped out any
progress in that area for the time being. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
Focusing Criteria Pollutant Emission Reductions on Nonattainment Areas
In the Federal Register Text for the EPA-HQ-OAR- 2022-0829, EPA identifies the number
of air pollution nonattainment areas around the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
27-30]
From Section I. A. 2, i: "There are currently 15 PM2.5 nonattainment areas with a population
of more than 32 million people and 57 ozone nonattainment areas with a population of more than
130 million people." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
Each of those PM 2.5 and Ozone nonattainment areas of the country have vehicles that are
either registered within the nonattainment area or are registered in surrounding counties that by
regularly driving into the nonattainment area contribute to criteria pollutant emissions within the
geographic nonattainment area. The vehicles registered outside the nonattainment area itself that
contribute to emissions within the actual geographic confines of the defined nonattainment area
are probably used to drive to destinations inside the nonattainment area for work or other
reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
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Our reasoning for what we are about to suggest is based on the question we asked ourselves.
"If we really want to make the biggest impact on highly air polluted locations, as defined by
nonattainment areas, why require nation-wide criteria pollutant standards when requiring low or
no operating emission vehicles to be used within or to enter nonattainment areas might obtain
acceptable significant reductions?" We really must agree with the comments from South Dakota
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR), in which they said, [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
South Dakota is a large state with significant driving distance between many of our
communities. Although several new electrical vehicles indicate they have a 200 mile or greater
range (note - it is 224 miles one way from Pierre to Sioux Falls), a recent study shows electric
vehicles (EVs) do not consistently achieve EPA s range estimates. In addition, all batteries
degrade over time. Reports indicate EV vehicle batteries will degrade between 10 and 40 percent
over a 10-year life span. To maintain the battery's life, manufactures recommend batteries are not
frequently depleted below 10 percent capacity or charged above 90 percent capacity. This means
that an electrical vehicle should be limited to 80 percent of its capacity range to maintain the
battery's life. In addition, cold, hot, and windy weather conditions may reduce an EV vehicle's
range between 20 to 40 percent and may further impact the reliability of EV. South Dakota is
known to have cold and windy winters and hot and windy summers, which, with current EV
ranges, batteries conditions, and availability of charging stations, makes widespread use of EV s
impractical in South Dakota. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
We believe that a regulatory scheme targeted at vehicles that regularly operate within
nonattainment areas, requiring vehicle registrants to use low or no operating emission vehicles if
they wish to operate those vehicles inside the nonattainment area on a regular basis would be one
approach to reduce criteria emissions in those designated areas. Such a regulatory scheme would
require cooperation with the automobile registration agencies, the air quality or resources
agencies and potential enforcement agencies within the state where the nonattainment areas are
located. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
By shifting focus to nonattainment areas, the efforts underway to add charging stations all
over the country could be re-focused to install many more charging stations within
nonattainment areas and get more bang for the Federal buck spent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 27-30]
Here is how we see such a plan could work. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
A. Vehicle registrants who reside inside the non-attainment area would receive notices
that their vehicle(s) do not meet newly promulgated EPA regulations for lowering air pollutant
emissions in the local nonattainment area. These of course, would include fleet owners of
delivery vans, service vehicles, school busses and other owners of large numbers of vehicles that
operate principally inside or very nearby the nonattainment area boundaries. These notices would
inform them that one or more of the vehicles they own may no longer be used to drive within the
local area because the emissions from the vehicle(s) are too high. The notice would inform the
registrants that they can ask for monetary assistance with purchase of a compliant vehicle (sort of
like Cash for Clunkers, i.e. high polluting vehicles) or ask for a waiver due to the age of the
registrant and/or very low use of the non-complying vehicles (you know, that little old lady who
just drives her car to church and the grocery store). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
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B. Since vehicles are re-registered every year, state registration bureaus would ask
registrants if they work or travel to destinations inside the nonattainment area on a regular basis.
If so and their vehicles are non-compliant, they would receive the same notice that the non-
compliant vehicle they drive into the nonattainment area must be changed out to a compliant
vehicle by a date certain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
C. Enforcement could be carried out by application of modern technology. With the
advancement of Artificial Intelligence, cameras, many of which are now in place, could be
connected to computer systems using software that reads the license plate numbers for vehicles
entering the nonattainment area. As time goes by and the same license plates, which of course
have vehicle information tied to them including engine type and possibly latest emissions testing
data, are read over and over again, the registrant for that vehicle would be notified that the
vehicle they are using has been spotted entering the nonattainment area multiple times, enough
times to meet criteria for regular entry, and they must switch to a compliant vehicle by a date
certain. Warnings and then fines could be levied in stepped amounts against repeat offenders
who regularly operate non-compliant vehicles in the nonattainment area. Impoundment would be
the final step. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
D. The states where these focused programs would be operating could set up a vehicle
connection service similar to or connected to Craig's List in which non-compliant vehicle
owners could sell or swap their vehicles with interested parties within the state or outside of the
state. The description of such vehicles would be required to notify potential buyers that the
vehicle does not comply with nonattainment area emission requirements and buyers should not
attempt to register the vehicle if they will be entering a nonattainment area with it regularly.
There should also be a website that will show car buyers where nonattainment areas and possible
candidates for nonattainment areas are located and the qualifying vehicles for each, which could
be tailored to the particular criteria pollutant group, such as PM2.5 or Ozone, the area falls under.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
E. EPA might require large over-the-road trucks to drive to a central off-loading location
where their cargo would be removed in a timely manner from their trailers into covered or
enclosed staging platforms where pallets or other items would be re-loaded onto heavy-duty all-
electric urban delivery vehicles that would then distribute the goods to various destination points
within the nonattainment area (about a 75 mile round trip distance). These truck off-loading
facilities would be located downwind of the prevailing winds for the area so that PM and diesel
soot would be blown away from the nonattainment area most of the time and be dispersed
through dilution. Moving trucks and special loads that require heavy lift machinery to off-load
would be exempt from these requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
We believe this sort of regulatory scheme could work better than applying universal, nation-
wide criteria pollutant standards for all vehicles, especially in those locations where such
standards are not actually required to meet local air quality goals. If the proposed rulemaking
standards were revised to apply to nonattainment areas, and major urban corridor areas, such as
the more dense parts of the 1-95 corridor, the complaints seen in the comments to this rulemaking
would be lessened or mitigated. We think most people can agree that vehicle requirements that
address the worst air pollution areas in the country should be acceptable to protect the health of
those who live and work in those areas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 27-30]
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We have some things to say about Electrification Step 3 later. In many of the comments EPA
has received for the EPA-HQ-OAR- 2022-0829 Docket, many claim that the existing grid is
simply not capable of handling (conductor ampacity) the increased power demands for
recharging millions of electric vehicles that will replace much of the 250 million vehicle US
fleet. [EPA-HQ-0AR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 31-34]
We have some thoughts on that grid capability issue if we may digress for a moment. The
problem with many analyses of electric vehicle switch-out scenarios has been not understanding
and taking into account what we call the Most Probable Time-of-Day for Recharge (MPTODR).
The scenario put forth by electric vehicle advocates for recharging is everyone who has a BEV
will come home from work to their single family home that has been retrofitted with a high-
amperage (50 - 70 amps) charging station or stations if the family has more than one BEV. The
BEV owner will plug their BEV into the charge station, go inside and enjoy a relaxing evening.
That of course, is the elitist part of the whole electrification mythos that other people are like
you, being upper middle class people that can easily afford a BEV and the other expenses
associated with owning a BEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 31-34]
If we take Tesla as a typical BEV example, the Tesla Wall Charger is an outlet that requires
more amperage at 240 Volts than most home outlets for an electric dryer or stove can supply. We
found a cost estimate for installing a Tesla Wall Charger in the Denver, CO metro area that came
in at about $5,000. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 31-34]
[See original attachment for photo ofEV calculator] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
31-34]
Remember that the large wire gauge conductors needed for the Tesla charger are usually run
in metal or plastic conduit and the straight-line distance between the electric distribution box and
a garage is not the installed length because the conduit must be routed around your house to the
garage, where the new wires will enter that space and be connected to the wall charger or
chargers (if you need multiple chargers, the conduit size and cost is increased to run multiple sets
of wires for each charger). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 31-34]
If you want to travel with your Tesla they recommend you should carry recharging gear that
will provide flexibility for charging from various outlet types. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617,
pp. 31-34]
[See original attachment for picture of various types of TESLA recharging gear] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 31-34]
It looks to us like that "flexibility" is another $450 or so just to reduce what we call
"Recharge Anxiety" for BEV owners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 31-34]
Notwithstanding the larger initial cost of the vehicle associated with owning a typical BEV,
we would argue that for people who live paycheck to paycheck who might be in the middle to
lower income economic strata, such expenses are probably out of reach. [EP A-HQ-0 AR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 31-34]
Now, back to the Most Probable Time-of-Day for Recharge (MPTODR) issue. If most BEV
owners will choose to recharge overnight, this is the time when utility companies are generating
what is called Base Load. Base Load is the minimum power output load that a utility company
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has for its daily load swings. This is the time when most people are asleep and not using a lot of
electric power, as opposed to increased power needs when people are up and using more
electricity. Most utility companies use the Base Load time period to do maintenance on their
Intermediate and Peaking generators. With a massive increase in BEV recharging needs in the
overnight Base Load time frame, utility companies may have to run their Intermediate generating
units during that time, as well as for meeting daytime loads. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, p.
34]
Many utility companies use coal-fired generation for Base Load power needs because they
cannot switch coal-fired generators on and off like they could a natural gas-fired turbine
generator. It can take days for a large coal generating station to come up to temperature from
cold start and start making electricity. We believe that some utility companies will choose to add
coal-fired or natural gas-fired generating capacity to meet increased Base Load demand, rather
than adding renewables, which would need to be wind power because solar power is not
available at night. Whatever generating mix utility companies decide to use to meet BEV
recharging demand, the proportion of fossil-fueled generation will be larger because solar will
not be available during the MPTODR. This is another aspect of making the upstream
calculations for fossil-fired pro rata GHG accounting that we are urging EPA to do for
attributable BEV GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, p. 34]We now present
several graphics that show results of butanol blending tests and fuel properties. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
[See original attachment for comparison of fuels] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-
53]
In the Comparison of Fuels chart above, you can see that Butanol comes the closest to E10
gasoline in energy density than any other non-petroleum fuel. But because it is an alcohol with
higher Heat of Vaporization (the ability of a liquid to absorb heat and turn into a vapor - the
lower the HOV the more readily the fuel will vaporize on its way into an engine) we will need to
add some gasoline to Butanol fuel blends, just as we do for E85 to make cold starting easier,
bringing the energy density to 27.8 MJ/L, very close to the 31.8 MJ/L (mega Joules per Liter) of
E10. Butanol's stoichiometry at 11.2 : 1 is also far closer to that of E10 gasoline (14.3 : 1) than
any other candidate fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
Argonne National Laboratory performed FTIR species characterization for butanol blends in
their 2010 work on butanol as a fuel using a direct injection ecotec stationary engine. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
[See original attachment for graphic of Speciated Hydrocarbons] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 44-53]
This graphic shows emissions prior to entering a catalytic converter and depicts a number of
selected "species" for different ratios of both ethanol and butanol compared to both gasoline and
E10. The two higher alcohol blend ratios are based on equal percent oxygen by mass, meaning
that an 83% butanol-gasoline blend has as much oxygen content as a 50% ethanol blend or about
18 mass%. The vertical bars represent the percent of each species by volume when all of them
are added together for each blend's emissions. Note that the percentage of Acetaldehyde for the
Bu83 blend is about the same as that for E50, even though there is 66% more alcohol in the Bu83
blend. Obviously, there is an increase in Formaldehyde for the Bu83 blend compared to E50.
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That is why we are suggesting lower blend percentages up to 48% butanol with 52% or more of
gasoline derived from cellulosic butanol as a potential maximum blend ratio for maximum GHG
reductions while reducing formaldehyde emissions indicated for the higher ratio blends. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
We also show the Argonne chart of Acetaldehyde emissions below, comparing only 50%
ethanol with 83% butanol (66% more alcohol in the butanol blend but same oxygen mass%).
[See original attachment for chart of acetaldehyde emissions] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 44-53]
Clearly, the Bu83 blend is producing far less aldehydes than an equal Oxygen % blend ratio
of ethanol would produce. The three aldehydes expected to increase with alcohol fuels,
Acetaldehyde, Formaldehyde and Acrolein (Acrylic-aldehyde) are among the EPA's group of six
"priority" Mobile Source Air Toxics compounds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
From this confirmation, we can conclude that butanol is a far better fuel at equal blend ratios
as to emission of aldehydes when compared to ethanol. If we look at oxides of nitrogen (NOx),
the Argonne data show that both ethanol and butanol will reduce NOx, but butanol tends to
reduce NOx more as the mass percent of oxygen increases. Argonne also indicates that Carbon
Monoxide (CO) is also reduced with increasing ratios of both ethanol and butanol. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
While emissions of Acetaldehyde and, perhaps, Acrolein may decrease with butanol in
comparison with ethanol for the same blend ratio with gasoline, Formaldehyde (HCHO)
emissions will increase. But, unlike Benzene that is in and can evaporate from gasoline, and is
also formed by burning other aromatic constituents of gasoline, Formaldehyde is only produced
as a combustion product. Formaldehyde is now classified by the EPA as an "A" carcinogen and
also has other non-carcinogenic health effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
[See original attachment for graphs of regulated and formaldehyde emissions] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
It is known that VOC emissions from volatile fuels escape into the air and combine with NOx
compounds in the presence of sunlight (photochemical) to form Ozone. The volatility of fuels is
measured using the Reid Vapor pressure (RVP) scale. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-
53]
In the vapor pressure effect graphic below for blends of ethanol and butanol, the Bui6 blend,
equivalent in oxygen to 10% ethanol will lower the RVP of that blend by about 0.6 psi. A 10%
ethanol blend would have increased the blend's RVP by anywhere from 0.6psi to 1.2 psi, or an
average of 0.9 psi. To compare the two effects, we must look at the difference between the
addition of the two oxygenates to understand the complete effect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 44-53]
[See original attachment for graph of vapor pressure of ethanol and n-butanol in gasoline]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
As shown in the graphic above, vapor pressure is reduced as soon as any butanol is added to
gasoline blends, while ethanol additions to gasoline increase vapor pressure and, thus, the
tendency for fuel molecules to enter the air more readily. Ethanol at 10% V/V produces the
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greatest increase in vapor pressure. The vapor pressure difference between the two gasoline
additives at equal oxygen content for E10 and Bul6 is 1.5 psi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617,
pp. 44-53]
By reducing fuel blend vapor pressure using butanol, the effect is likely to be reduced VOC
releases from butanol blended fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
For PM 2.5 considerations, decreasing the amount of aromatics in diesel fuel, especially
polynuclear or poly-aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) could lead to reduced PM emissions and
possibly lower mutagenicity (ability to cause genetic mutations) and carcinogenicity risks. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
Testing of blends of butanol with diesel fuel with no attempt to maintain Cetane Number
(CN) has been performed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). In tests on a light-duty
vehicle with a diesel engine, ANL was able to show that increasing ratios of n-butanol with a
native CN of about 25, blended at various ratios with a CN 42 diesel fuel (presumably with an
initial aromatic content of 35 volume% or less) could significantly reduce diesel smoke with its
accompanying PM content. Soot and smoke content is measured by the Filter Smoke
measurement where diesel exhaust is run through a filter designed to capture almost all of the
PM materials in the exhaust and a Filter Smoke Number (FSN) is obtained. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
[See original attachment for graph of smoke and NO Emissions] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 44-53]
While 100% n-butanol would not operate properly in an engine designed and calibrated for
diesel fuel, Argonne found that low to medium blends of 1-butanol and ultra-low sulfur diesel
(ULSD) provide acceptable Cetane along with the potential advantage of oxygen in the fuel.
Broadly, the study found that on the urban drive cycle, both total hydrocarbon (THC) and carbon
monoxide (CO) emissions increased as larger quantities of butanol were added to the diesel fuel.
THC increased significantly as the percentage of butanol increased for cold-start UDDS drive
cycle and only modestly for the hot-start UDDS cycle. Oxides of nitrogen (NOx) were not
significantly affected by the 20% butanol blend and decreased with the 40% butanol blend. For
the highway drive cycle, THC and CO emissions were not significantly impacted but NOx
showed a slight increase as the butanol blend ratio increased. For the steady-state tests, they
found a reduction in filter smoke number with increasing butanol quantity—an 80% reduction in
filter smoke number was observed for the 40% butanol blend. The lowest fuel economy
reduction (-9%) occurred for the HWFET drive cycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-
53]
Comments 4. (Cont.) http://pure-
oai.bham.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/54062490/Hergueta_Santos_01mo_et_al_Impact_bio_alcoh
ol_fuels_Applied_Energy.pdf [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
For PM 2.5 considerations for butanol/gasoline blends, we refer EPA to newer research
performed at University of Birmingham, United Kingdom in 2018. In this study, both particulate
size and overall particulate quantity released from combustion were characterized for neat
gasoline, E25 and Bu33 (not equal in oxygen content). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-
53]
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[See original attachment for average primary particle diameter] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 44-53]
The study showed nearly equal PM particle size for both gasoline and Bu33 (B33 in the
graph), while particle size for E25 was lower than either. The study text states: "The average
primary particle size dpO is 29.42 nm, 28.60 nm and 25 nm from the combustion of gas- oline,
B33 and E25, respectively.. .E25 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
emitted the highest concentration of smaller particles in the range between 7 nm and 40 nm."
Not good news for advocates of higher ethanol blends when those Exx blends appear from these
results to produce smaller particle sizes, which might be more deeply inhaled into the lungs. The
research further looked at overall PM reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
[See original attachment for graph of particle size distribution for gasoline and DN/DlogDp]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
The study stated, "The most significant reduction of 80% in the PM peak concentration was
achieved in the combustion of B33, when compared to gasoline. The maximum particle
concentration was 30% lower from the combustion of E25 when compared to gasoline." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
We don't know how EPA feels about an 80% reduction in PM concentration just by adding
33%) V/V of butanol to gasoline, but we think that is pretty darned good. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
The major issue in this Comment #4 has been a discussion of how to dramatically lower GHG
emissions from the liquid fuels that will still be being used in all those millions of gasoline
vehicles that EPA in the Federal Register document admits will still be on the road emitting
GHG and criteria pollutants. From the foregoing research hints at what benefits may be obtained
by adding higher blend ratios of butanol to the nation's gasoline supply, the reduction of fossil
carbon emissions we believe to be the most important for Climate Change solutions, solutions
that will actually work. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
We are asking the EPA to start thinking differently about GHG emissions. Tail pipe emissions
from a vehicle that has a blend of say 48% cellulosic butanol and 52% "Green" gasoline made
from that same butanol will show C02 emissions. But, the carbon in that C02 will have an
extremely small percentage of FOSSIL CARBON in those emissions, because the carbon in the
C02 was inside green plants growing just a few months before being processed into butanol and
"Green" gasoline. The measured C02 emissions will certainly contain carbon, but that carbon
will not be fossil carbon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
We ask that EPA begin to formulate methods of calculating actual fossil and non-fossil GHG
emissions from exotic blends of advanced biofuels made from biomass, where the carbon
incorporated into the fuels is from the "current" carbon cycle. The emission of C02 from such
fuels will cycle that C02 back into the bodies of growing plants, which are later harvested and
converted into carbon-neutral fuels in an endless cycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
44-53]
We believe efficient production of the advanced biofuel, cellulosic butanol, can and will
produce major reductions in FOSSIL carbon emissions from the US transportation fleet. Our
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calculations for potential GHG reductions use the UC Berkeley RAEL (Farrel, et. al.)
calculations done for ethanol GHG emissions compared to gasoline burned in ICEs. Our
interpretation of those GHG computations for cellulosic butanol are shown below:
[See original attachment for Effects of Producing Cellulosic Butanol Rather than Ethanol]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
The main reason cellulosic butanol can achieve such high GHG reduction numbers has to do
with the opportunity to cycle butanol in a much larger way than ethanol ever could back into the
production train, where farm and ranch production, harvesting and transport of cellulosic
biomass can be made with machinery and vehicles fueled by butanol/diesel blends and high
butanol/gasoline blends. We don't know how EPA feels about a potential for 91.5% reductions
in GHG emissions from fuel compositions using high ratios of cellulosic butanol in gasoline and,
perhaps "Green" gasoline made from butanol, but we are pretty excited. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
So, let's review. We offer a qualitative review of GHG and liquid fuel combustion air
pollutants when cellulosic butanol and analog hydrocarbon fuels made from it are incorporated
into the fuel mix for US transportation use. Probable movement: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 44-53]
1. GHG emissions
a) Reduced (KALA calculations show that for pure cellulosic butanol and gasoline or
diesel made from cellulosic butanol and blends thereof could reduce GHG emissions by 91.5%)
2. Criteria and other air pollution components likely direction
[See original attachment for list or air pollutants and their reductions and increases] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
Another way of looking at the severity of the pollutants and how reductions or increases
might affect human health would be to look at a grouping of the highest rated Human
Carcinogen Potential (HCP) rating these pollutants have. Therefore, we offer tables of those
compounds that are likely to decrease with butanol induction into common fuels and those that
would increase in amounts emitted and their associated HCP below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 44-53]
[See original attachment for Likely-to-be-Reduced Compounds] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 44-53]
[See original attachment for Inclusive list of Probable Increased EPA Master List & Non-
Listed Butanol Fuel Emissions] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
Listing Notes: * Based on IARC Determination [ Likely to be produced in small quantities &
consumed in a catalytic converter
We might note that the HCP A-rated compound in the above "Increased" list, Formaldehyde,
has a half-life in air in the absence of nitrogen dioxide, of approximately 50 minutes during the
daytime; in the presence of nitrogen dioxide, this drops to 35 minutes (source WHO), while the
other HCP A-rated compound that will be reduced, Benzene, has a half-life in air of 13.4 days
(source: Spectrum Chemical Fact Sheet: Benzene). We would much rather increase an A-rated
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carcinogen, Formaldehyde, that degrades and decomposes over a matter of hours than keeping an
A-rated carcinogen, Benzene, that will only decompose after a matter of tens of days in the air
pollutant mix. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 44-53]
We believe the observable benefits of adding butanol into the US fuel mix outweighs the
minimal drawbacks of some increased emission species. This tradeoff, of course, is what we
have been doing for a long time in this country, trading the health degrading aspects of vehicle
air pollution for the speed and convenience modern vehicles provide. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0617, pp.44-53]
Comment 5. The Law of Unintended Consequences or Reactions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 54-60]
A. We believe public sentiment toward the obvious potential results of adoption of the Docket
ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR- 2022-0829 rulemaking of "forcing" manufacturers to predominately
produce BEVs in order to meet the proposed standards may well have a host of unintended
consequences.
Despite the glowing polling results reported in the Federal Register rulemaking document
regarding eager acceptance of BEVs and polls of PHEV and BEV owners that would be willing
to purchase such vehicles again, we believe that most of those respondents fall into several
categories such as 'Early Adopters,' electric car zealots and wealthy people who can afford
BEVs and want to impress their friends and neighbors with how "Green they are. Seriously, a
person who buys an obscenely ostentatious Lucid 1,000 horsepower electric vehicle cannot be
considered represen-tative of the majority of people who will be presented with BEVs as,
essentially, their only choice in new car showrooms in a few years. We think there may well be
elderly people who buy a new car after 2027 that will get the BEV home and be wondering,
"Where do I put in the gas for this thing?" [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
We looked at several polls, as did several other commenters, but the one we chose to discuss
here has international representation in several developed countries in Europe as well as the US.
The poll was conducted by UK-based Kantar Public in their Journal-04 publication of polling
data on public attitudes towards the environment, sustainability, and climate change. If you go to
ResearchGate and request the actual PDF of the research, you will get the graphics and
discussion we are about to share with EPA.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/355734467_European_attitudes_to_climate_change_i
mplication sforcitizensinstitutionsandgovernments [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
54-60]
The Guardian also published excerpts from the polling in 10 countries here:
https://www.theguardian.eom/environment/2021/nov/07/few-willing-to-change-lifestyle-
climate-survey [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
From those sources we present the second of two graphics below from the survey and then
comment on the results. The most interesting results we found were from the following question
"How would you rate in terms of importance, the following measures aimed at preserving the
environment and the planet?: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
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Replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy - 45% say important Reducing people's energy
consumption - 32% say important Favoring the use of public transport over cars - 25% say
important And most pertinent to this comment's discussion: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617,
pp. 54-60]
Banning fossil fuel vehicles - 22% say important [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-
60]
[See original attachment for poll on how people ranked, in terms of importance, the following
measures aimed at preserving the environment and the planet] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617,
pp. 54-60]
Only 22% felt that banning fossil fuel vehicles (22%) was important to preserve the planet.
We would characterize this level of response to that question as dismal at best, people do not
want to use electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
In the US, Transportation accounts for slightly more Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions than
does electricity generation. However, in most other large emitter countries, the opposite is true
with Electricity generation being far greater than Transportation. This is especially true of China
(the largest global GHG emitter), where much of the country is still rural in nature, most
electrical generation is by exceedingly dirty coal-fired power plants and the thought of a personal
vehicle being a birthright is a foreign (i.e. US) notion. The most frightening aspect of what we
call the "Lifestyle Gap" is the desire by most people in other countries to have a similar lifestyle
to what they observe in the US. Having personal transportation (something bigger and more
enclosed than a motor scooter) is very high on that desire list. That implies that as other countries
catch up to a US lifestyle, Transportation GHG emissions will continue to rise from that sector.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
Most other countries that do not have oil reserves, look to the US for what to do about
Climate Change. The reasoning goes, the US is the most technically advanced country in the
world and whatever solutions the US comes up with must be the "correct" solutions. These facts
make it doubly important for the US to act as the leader of the world on Climate Change with
truly "correct" and nearly universally applicable solutions. Yet, we do not have a set of National
Climate Change Solution Plans that the Federal Government has endorsed as policy and has
committed funding and regulations to implement. So far, there have been "Band Aid" measures
on Transportation GHG emissions such as the Biden plan to place electric vehicle charging
stations all across the country, a partial solution that KALA disagrees with, not on the viability of
electric vehicle charging stations, but the lack of focus on deployment in locations that
desperately need reductions in emitted vehicle pollution (these are known as EPA's
nonattainment areas such as large cities where most of the pollution that creates the
nonattainment condition is from vehicles). The opposite is true in China where big city pollution
is mostly from nearby electrical generation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
These dichotomies between nations and their levels of technology and emission profiles also
makes it important for the solutions developed by the US be largely applicable to nations with
lower levels of technology and wealth. The battery electric vehicle solution so often touted as
"THE" solution to transportation GHG emissions, will NEVER apply to the hundreds of millions
of motor bikes, motor scooters, motor trikes, motorized boats and various other transport modes,
which all use petroleum-based liquid fuels, found all across Asia, India, Indonesia, the
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Philippines, the Middle East, Africa and South America. Many countries that are considered
"Developed" (I'm thinking Russia and the former USSR vassal states) may not have citizenry
that can easily afford a transition to an entirely different vehicle propulsion method, such as
battery electric, and will struggle to maintain their existing fleets of vehicles that still use fossil
petroleum fuels. In fact, the less developed and lower income nations around the world will balk
at implementing the so-called "solution" that seems to be prevalent in the thinking of the United
States for Transportation GHG emissions, i.e. Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV). Oil producing
states, such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, where oil income is the principal national revenue will
be outright hostile to the notion of changing the vehicle propulsion method. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
In response to the Kantar polling as to why they would be hesitant to make drastic changes to
help with Climate Change: "I need more resources and equipment from public authorities"
(69%) together with "I can't afford to make those efforts" (60%) were major responses. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
Any policy makers who see these results, especially in the US, MUST rethink where policy
making should go on Transportation GHG reductions. When someone says, "I can't afford to
make those efforts" what are they most likely talking about? In our view, for most people, they
are referring to the cost of replacing their current gasoline vehicle with an electric vehicle. In the
US, vehicles are usually the second most costly item of personal ownership, with a home being
in first place. For those who cannot afford home ownership, a large percentage of the Democratic
Party's base, a vehicle is their most costly personal possession. If those individuals are middle to
lower income, their budgets are usually very tight and the thought of being forced to purchase a
vehicle that is 20% to 50% more costly than a gasoline vehicle is generally out of the question
even with generous tax rebates that actually mostly apply to more wealthy individuals with high
personal incomes. We believe that they will instead, choose to buy a replacement vehicle, when
needed, from the existing stock of gasoline-burning used cars for as long as they can. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
This analysis brings up the issue of how little time we have left to actually make the most
significant changes to GHG emissions. We simply do not have time for people to run out of
gasoline-burning used car choices, which could amount to 20 years or more, for them to finally
buy the supposed "solution" to transportation GHG emissions, a BEV. Related to this lower to
middle income demographic is the issue of their vehicle being able to provide "Dual Duty." A
Dual Duty vehicle is one that can provide short-distance (short time frame) transportation for
daily needs such as grocery getting and the back and forth to work commute AND provide a way
to take long trips for such things as vacations and family gatherings. Let me relate an interesting
response to a question I posed to a Nissan representative at a Denver car show about the Leaf
All-Electric vehicle (BEV). I asked what about trips up into places like Wyoming where they
will not be welcoming to electric vehicles in that oil producing state? Incredulously, the Nissan
rep said, "Oh, you don't use the Leaf for longer trips - you use your 'Other car' for that." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
Such a response shows an unbelievable elitism about lower cost BEVs, such as the Leaf and
the Chevrolet Bolt, that the owner of such BEVs will have the financial means to have two or
more vehicles, one of which is capable of long-distance trips without the bother of waiting 3 to 7
hours for a recharge after the car's battery is exhausted. This has become known as "Recharge
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Anxiety." It is a real thing and represents the problem all BEVs have in public perception of:
What happens when you run out of battery charge on a long trip or in a traffic jam? Will it take
hours to recharge even if I can find an open and working recharge outlet? Why would I ever try
to take a BEV on a long trip when I can "recharge" (i.e. refuel) my gasoline vehicle in less than
10 minutes? BEV makers have tried to address this problem, Tesla for example, by providing a
Supercharging option at special recharge stations designed to recharge a half-discharged battery
in about 15 minutes. But, even Tesla admits that rapid recharge is not good for the individual
cells in the battery pack and should not be done too often. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp.
54-60]
B. If the EPA attempts to "force" people into BEVs, there may be an unexpected and
unforeseen political reaction among people who have traditionally been the base of the
Democratic Party who may switch their political allegiance to the other Party who won't force
them to drive BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
So, what choices do the lower and middle income people that comprise a large percentage of
the Democratic Party base have when it comes to the supposed Transportation GHG emission
"solution," the BEV. The answer is not much, because for the ONE car they can afford, they
need the Dual Duty vehicle that is represented best by a gasoline-fueled vehicle that can be
refueled on longer trips in less than 10 minutes and then they are on their way again. If the
Democratic party at the behest of a Democratic president through a regulatory agency attempts to
force those people to purchase and deal with all the recharge problems that BEVs have, they
might well not be Democrats anymore. Republicans will NEVER support forcing people to buy
BEVs (they are in the back pockets of the oil companies after all) and that may well drive people
who were reliable Democratic voters into the Republican camp over this single issue. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
So, the question to EPA administrators is simple. Do you want to risk political reprisals in the
form of election of Republican legislators and the head of the executive branch, the president,
because you felt this was your chance to "force" the adoption of a vehicle type, the BEV, down
peoples throats that, frankly, we believe we have shown conclusively will not perform the GHG
reduction function that the EPA claims it will. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
Didn't you see what happened when Donald Trump was president and the EPA was rendered
powerless and, now that the Supreme Court is constituted the way it is with ultra-conservative
judges, how do you think court cases that make it to SCOTUS will turn out for EPA on this and
other regulatory Docket issues? Now look, we are not saying to the EPA to be fearful and hunker
down and not do anything about GHG and criteria pollutants from transportation. PLEASE
review our set of alternatives in Comment Section 4, which we think makes more sense,
especially from a GHG reduction standpoint than trying to "force" adoption of BEVs into the US
fleet at unreasonable numbers. Making people buy and drive very different vehicle types may not
be the answer, especially for GHG reductions. We think the "Fuel Change Out" approach with
high GHG reduction potentials and better criteria emissions profiles is a better way to meet the
needs for health risk reductions and more importantly, as we have argued above, for dramatic
reduction in GHG emissions by substituting fossil carbon containing fuels for carbon-neutral
fuels made from biomass. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
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We have the technology to make these carbon-neutral fuels that come very close to the
properties of gasoline and dramatically reduce GHG emissions if we just have the will and
foresight to do so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
C. The consequences that may arise from full implementation of Docket ID No. EPA-
HQ-OAR- 2022-0829 rulemaking standards and requirements may produce something that
could be described as a quiet rebellion against what many people would view as government
overreach via regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
To give you a better "feel" or Flavor for the reaction to the docket's provisions, we would
invite EPA to look at a YouTube video by long-time YouTube maven on automotive issues,
Scotty Kilmer. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j 1R0wTBsK3I [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0617, pp. 54-60]
In this video presentation, Kilmer starts out blaming President Biden and by association the
Democratic Party as the villains who want to take your gasoline car away from you and limit
your buying choices in the future. Here are some of the comments elicited from the video with
many of the obvious Trumpian attitudes filtered out: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-
60]
"How do we do this when 90% of Americans cannot afford a new car?" [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
"As someone who has never bought a new car. I can assure you I will never be buying a used
electric car." "We can barely get enough minerals to power our phones, and now we want 60%of
cars to run on batteries." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
"They can build all they want, but you cannot force people to buy them." [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
"Just where am I supposed to get $61,500 for a car? That is absolutely insane! This is
legislation through regulation. Who voted for those EPA bureaucrats? There is exactly ZERO
percent probability that I will buy an EV." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
"This is the closest thing to government mandating what people get to choose and eliminating
a free market based on consumer demand." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
"We just need a group of people with the know-how and the financial ability to sue the EPA
to stop infringing on our rights to purchase what we want. They're just basically taking our
freedom away through regulation without actually saying we don't have the freedom to choose
what we want." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
"Thanks to Scotty's advice we just bought a 2023 Camry V-6. We're good for 20 years or
300,000 miles." "I have a Tesla but forcing everyone to get an EV is insane. Many don't have
the capability to charge at home and a lot of homes need panel upgrades to make room for a EV
charger. All of this costs a lot of money for people to afford." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617,
pp. 54-60]
"In our office people are buying hybrid cars instead of EV cars. It make more sense, 500
miles of range, fill the tank in 6 minutes and probably last longer and they are about the same
price or less and are proven technology." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
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"This sounds like used vehicle prices are going to skyrocket worse than before -probably not a
good sign for those of us stuck as pizza drivers." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
"The EPA doesn't have the authority to change the law or the regulations. The people through
congress will make that decision thank you." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
"American people remember you have the power to choose your president and who makes the
laws, if it's affecting you who cannot afford to change your car then get someone who sides with
the working classes and will help you make your own choices, the fact that making batteries
pollutes more than gasoline engines produce doesn't matter to these politicians who don't know
what it's like to have to work for a living." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
"Is it at all possible for congress to stop this insane man [presumably Pres. Biden]? [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
So, does the EPA get some of the rebellion flavor in those comments? It is our opinion that
one of the unintended consequences of implementing this Docket may be to create a rebellion of
sorts among millions of Americans. We think that people may decide to hold on to their gasoline
vehicles much longer than they otherwise might. We also think that once BEVs are about the
only vehicles on dealer's showroom floors, the price of used gasoline vehicles may well increase
dramatically. If that happens, millions of low income people may be priced out of the used car
market. What may happen is "Cubanization" of the US used car market. Cuba has long been
banned from importing vehicles from the US and elsewhere. With the parts Cubans are able to
smuggle in and automotive machine shops making some hard-to-get parts, the car owners in that
country are driving around in cars from the Fifties and Sixties with no end in sight. Fortunately,
Cuba is a small island, but the idea is that there could be new "cottage industries" like the ones in
Cuba pop up all across our country that would be mechanics, auto machine shops, and detailers
and upholsterers who keep those old cars in good shape. The very same thing could conceivably
happen here in a "Resistance" movement against the regulations the EPA is advocating for.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
The temporal upshot of these possible consequences is that the gasoline part of the US fleet
will continue to use gasoline and spew the usual GHG and criteria pollutants as time goes by.
The problems we foresee are that as engines in those older vehicles that people in the Resistance
Movement are holding onto will get tired and transmissions get less efficient, the amount of
pollutants and GHGs could go up - exactly what the efforts to implement these new regulations
are meant to avoid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
George H. W. Bush stated it best when he said, "The American life-style is non-negotiable."
And in this context, that means that stubborn Americans are not going to be told what they can
and can't drive and they will resist what they might view as an intrusive government trying to
alter their "life-style." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0617, pp. 54-60]
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al. (KY-AG)
What is more, demand for these rare materials will spike outside the automotive context as
quickly as the Proposed Rule will spike it within. EPA recognizes this: It acknowledges that
critical minerals for EV component production "are also experiencing increasing demand across
many other sectors of the global economy ... as the world seeks to reduce carbon emissions." 88
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Fed. Reg. at 29,313. The Proposed Rule also concedes that other "uncertain issues" like
"permitting, investor expectations of demand and future prices, and many others" make it
"difficult to predict with precision the rate at which new capacity will be brought online in the
future." Id. Yet the proposed solution is just a short "transition period" so that "a robust supply
chain" can develop for these products, including new material mining and expanded processing
capacity. Id. These obstacles should slow a project with even a conservative timetable; for an
overhaul as rushed as the Proposed Rule, they are reason to return to the drawing board.
Proceeding without more concrete, realistic projects for expanded supply chains—and more
realistic timetables—is another mark of arbitrary and capricious decision-making. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 13-15]
Other concerns about the minerals' supply and their extraction processes raise still more
hurdles. The Proposed Rule had to recognize that it would take an estimated "five to ten" or
more years "to develop a new [lithium] mine or mineral source"—and that delay is despite "very
high" industry motivation from a "very robust" demand outlook. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,313. Yet
even that estimate is likely far too rosy. Last year, one geometallurgy professor looked at what it
would take to shift away from fossil fuels entirely and to these and other rare materials for a
single generation. Based on 2019 mining production rates, he predicted that the necessary
extraction of "battery metals like lithium, cobalt, and graphite" would take over 9,900 years,
1,700 years, and 3,200 years, respectively. Simon P. Michaux, The quantity of metals required to
manufacture just one generation of renewable technology units to phase out fossil fuels,
YouTube (Aug. 18, 2022), https://bit.ly/42w7Fcx; see also Simon P. Michaeux, Assessment of
the Extra Capacity Required of Alternative Energy Electrical Power Systems to Completely
Replace Fossil Fuels (Aug. 18, 2022), https://bit.ly/3qCUlqU. Indeed, in 2022, the global
reserves of those same three metals amounted to "less than five percent of what we need [for]
one generation." Id. And among those reserves, not every discovery deposit becomes a mine.
Only 1 or 2 for every 1000 does, and it takes between 15 and 20 years for those few mines to
become fully functional. Id. And of those, 20-30% of the mines that get up and running will
eventually "go out of business because of market conditions." Id.; see also The Raw-Materials
Challenge: How The Metals And Mining Sector Will Be At The Core Of Enabling The Energy
Transition, McKinsey & Co. (Jan. 10, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/2ne5jt37. Throw in the fact that
each of these materials has a limited life-cycle after which they must be "decommissioned and
replaced," and it becomes clear that we may well need to "make batteries out of something else."
Michaux, The quantity of metals required to manufacture just one generation of renewable
technology units to phase out fossil fuels, supra. That whole endeavor "is not going to be easy."
Id. Quite right. The Proposed Rule needs to deal with real projections for the real demand it
creates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 13-15]
The view further down the supply chain is no better. The Proposed Rule can say only that
supply capacity is "rapidly forming," not that it exists now or in the near-enough future. 88 Fed.
Reg. at 29,323. EPA recognizes that it is still only "a goal of the U.S. manufacturing industry to
create a robust supply chain for these products." Id. (emphasis added). EPA also says that, "[i]n
general, the structure of the proposed standards allows an incremental phase-in to the MY 2032
level and reflects consideration of the appropriate lead time for manufacturers to take actions
necessary to meet the proposed standards." Id. at 29,239. But there is nothing "incremental"
about an edict for an eight-fold increase in EV sales in eight years. See id. at 29,189, 29,329,
29,346. And there is nothing simple about the amount of time and money needed to get the still-
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illusory supply chain running at massive new scale. According to former auto executive-turned-
industry adviser Larry Burns, "[t]he transition automakers are perusing requires building totally
new factories, assembly lines and supply chains, a years-long process." Puko, supra. Automakers
will have to apply "major re-engineering" that "usually takes anywhere from three to five years"
per model to dozens of vehicle models in under a decade. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649,
pp.13-15]
Battery factories, in particular, take years to build. See Eli Leland, So You Want To Build A
Battery Factory, Medium: Batteries are Complicated (July 16, 2021),
https://tinyurl.com/mv4vhh3x. It takes longer still to create and sharpen production processes
that yield quality and safe products that can satisfy consumer demand and federal regulators.
Mistakes are too costly for it to be any other way. See Bradley Berman, Battery Experts Provide
Deeper Explanations for Chevy Bolt Fires, Autoweek (Nov. 15, 2021),
https://tinyurl.com/3r7879u6 (describing recall of 141,000 EVs following 16 reported fires). The
Proposed Rule, however, will have "automakers rac[ing] to supplement material shortages," and
risking far more than prudence allows, just to "scal[e] these facilities and operations quickly."
Paige McKirahan, United States: EV Supply Chain Disruption To Ignite Disputes Over IP,
M&As, And More, Mondaq (Dec. 9, 2022), https://bit.ly/3p6eXpI. This demand, in turn, "put[s]
at risk the stability of mines and refineries with possible unskilled workers," and "[hjuman rights
violations . . . run rampant if safe and proper processes are not identified." Id. None of this is
acceptable. All of it can be avoided. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 13-15]
The Proposed Rule should also account for the reality that too-fast and too-aggressive
regulation can stifle the very innovation it relies on. Even with increased governmental subsidies
toward rapid EV development, mandates like the Proposed Rule will almost certainly "prompt
automakers to make bigger bets on a narrower set of options for complying, which might limit
innovation and progress because technology now is changing so rapidly." Puko, supra. Programs
like the Renewable Fuel Standards are whittled down, contrary to Congress's intent. See WV
Amicus Br., at 24-27. And changing contexts that should command our attention end up ignored,
including that EV "battery technology is still evolving," which means "the U.S. may be at risk of
building mines and factories to produce batteries that wind up being obsolete in a decade." Joann
Muller & Jael Holzman, Why the U.S. Can't build EVs without China, Axios (Apr. 12, 2023),
https://bit.ly/42iaoWS. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 13-15]
The second- and third-order consequences of choosing rushed production based on today's
technologies over innovation are weighty, too. Take nickel, for example. It is possible—even
likely—that later battery technologies will render it unnecessary. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,314
(citing battery applications that "an iron phosphate cathode which has lower energy density but
does not require . . . nickel"). And that may prove to be a very good thing: "Reaching the nickel
means cutting down swaths of rainforest," and "[r]e?ning it is a carbon-intensive process that. . .
produc[es] waste slurry that's hard to dispose of." Jon Emont, EV Makers Confront the 'Nickel
Pickle,' WSJ (June 4, 2023), https://bit.ly/3PdIoRH. Nickel, then, exposes "a larger contradiction
within the EV industry: Though EVs are designed to be less damaging to the environment in the
long term than conventional cars, the process of building them carries substantial environmental
harm." Id. Rather than letting market demand and innovation explore other paths forward, the
Proposed Rule locks automakers and the rest of our economy into this impossible option. EPA
should slow down this endeavor and allow both safety and innovation to drive decision-making
in this critically important area. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 13-15]
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Organization: Marathon Petroleum Corporation (MPC)
Renewable liquid fuels can play a critical role in a multifaceted solution for reducing carbon
emissions, particularly those from the transportation sector. The renewable liquid fuel industry is
well-positioned to produce the renewable fuels needed to help attain the EPA's emissions goals.
However, EPA has ignored the emission-reduction benefits provided by renewable liquid fuels in
its proposed vehicle emissions standards because EPA did not account for the assumption that
the C02 emissions from renewable liquid fuel combustion are zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0593, pp. 1-2]
EPA should consider changes to its emissions standards to address total lifecycle emissions of
vehicles rather than focusing specifically on tailpipe emissions. EPA's historic methodology no
longer meets the needs of the complex vehicle market. Cradle- to-grave lifecycle analysis allows
all technologies to be evaluated using consistent criteria. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, p. 2]
A. To Properly Compare ICE Vehicles to EVs, EPA Needs to Evaluate the Lifecycle GHG
Emissions, and Not Just the Tailpipe Emissions, of These Types of Vehicles.
EPA's approach to vehicle emissions standards includes a strict interpretation that centers on
the vehicle's tailpipe in determining standards and compliance. EPA takes this approach because
EPA's historic framework for the vehicle emission program only contemplated internal
combustion engine ("ICE") vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, pp. 2-3]
With the significant changes in vehicles and vehicle power trains, MPC believes that EPA's
approach should include lifecycle analysis ("LCA") and modeling, which would quantify the
breadth of vehicle emissions. Use of LCA shows that all vehicle types have emissions impacts
across their supply chains and ensures that certain technologies are not disproportionately
advantaged or disadvantaged simply based on power train. Adopting an LCA approach to vehicle
categorization would present a science-based, technology-neutral solution to adequately capture
the differences between electric vehicles ("EVs") and ICE vehicles, as well as future vehicle
technology advancements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, pp. 2-3]
LCA most accurately quantifies total EV emissions, which include emissions-intensive
operations such as critical mineral mining, electricity generation, and battery production as well
as disposal and recycling. These activities can generate significant C02 emissions and should be
fully quantified before setting a standard that effectively mandates an increase in the production
of EVs. Full lifecycle impacts, cradle to grave, for all vehicles should be itemized. Then
emissions standards based on equivalent metrics among similar vehicle technologies could be
applied. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, pp. 2-3]
MPC supports efforts to reduce emissions from the transportation sector. However, EPA has
failed to recognize in this rule a way to achieve an immediate and significant reduction in
transportation emissions by excluding the benefit that renewable liquid fuels provide when used
in transportation vehicles. EPA's calculation of tailpipe emissions from ICE vehicles presumes
that the vehicle is operating on petroleum fuel. In comparison, renewable liquid fuel use can
result in vehicle emissions reductions that are equal to or greater than the reductions EPA is
claiming from converting the fleet to electric vehicles. Renewable liquid fuels are readily
available and compatible with the current vehicle fleet. Renewable liquid fuels can provide
emissions reductions immediately at the scale required to meet emissions reduction targets and
3212
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do so more economically than EVs or other nascent technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0593, pp.3-4]
Other emissions reduction programs, including the EPA's Renewable Fuel Standard ("RFS"),
as well as LCA models, including the Greenhouse gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy use
in Technologies (GREET) model, do not include C02 emissions from renewable liquid fuels
combustion in their lifecycle analyses. As EPA explained in its RFS rulemaking, "the C02
emitted from biomass-based fuels combustion does not increase atmospheric C02
concentrations, assuming the biogenic carbon emitted is offset by the uptake of C02 resulting
from the growth of new biomass."l Similarly, EPA adopts the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change ("IPCC") Tier 1 approach to C02 emissions from biofuels, including renewable
liquid fuels, in its Greenhouse Gas ("GHG") Inventory. IPCC Tier 1 methods are based on
default emission factors and define a methodology to track shifts in carbon stocks due to biofuel
combustion. When using Tier 1 methods, C02 emissions from biofuel combustion are attributed
to the Agriculture and Land Use sector, where it is assumed that the biofuel emissions are
balanced by carbon uptake prior to the feedstock's harvest, resulting in net combustion emissions
of zero.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, pp. 3-4]
1 2010 Renewable Fuels Standard Program (RFS2) Regulatory Impact Analysis, EPA-420-R-10-006, Pg
444.
2 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, General Guidance and Reporting,
Volume 1, pg. 1.6.
Despite the science-based approach used by these authoritative sources, EPA chose not to
assign zero C02 emissions from renewable fuel combustion in an ICE vehicle to its vehicle
emissions standard. With the ever-increasing volume of renewable fuel available in the market,
EPA's failure to attribute zero C02 emissions to renewable fuel results in an over-estimation of
C02 emissions from ICE vehicles. Consistency in the treatment of renewable liquid fuels and
their C02 emissions across programs is key to ensuring that data are treated similarly, and that
no technology is favored over another. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, pp. 3-4]
Alignment of EPA's tailpipe emissions standards with other programs that promote domestic
renewable liquid fuels, such as the RFS is needed. Mandating the blending and use of renewable
liquid fuels in vehicles in one program while simultaneously ignoring the positive impacts of
their use in another results in rules that are at cross purposes. Renewable liquid fuels can be a
part of a multifaceted solution for reducing carbon emissions and similar treatment of their
benefits from program to program would be a significant step forward for the EPA. This change
would lead to significantly more investments in renewable liquid fuels, providing an option for
meeting EPA's goals that is compatible with ICE vehicles and does not require a wholesale shift
in vehicle manufacturing and infrastructure, with its concomitant effects on U.S. drivers who
would bear the costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, p. 4]
A continued push from the Agency to further narrow regulations in regard to renewable liquid
fuels results in lost opportunities for investments and places additional burden on the
transportation and fuels industry, as well as consumers. In addition, these lost opportunities for
decarbonization are impactful, as renewable liquid fuels can be deployed quickly, at a large
scale, and with significant carbon reductions in the transportation fuel sector. The renewable
liquid fuel industry is well-positioned to produce the fuels needed to contribute to the EPA's
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goals because renewable liquid fuels are widely accepted throughout the country. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0593, p. 4]
Organization: Matthew DiPaulo (DiPaulo)
The EPA's proposal boosts an electric vehicle supply chain dominated by China, which
powers its manufacturing-base through coal-fired power plants and mines minerals for EV
batteries with the use of environmental practices that we would never approve of in the United
States. Emissions coming out of tailpipe matter, but so do the lifecycle emissions of building a
car, constructing and charging a battery, and retiring vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1514,
p. 1]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations (Mazda)
As a global automaker that sells in over 120 countries around the world, Mazda is already
working to reduce the carbon footprint of our vehicles and our corporate operations. In January
2021, Mazda announced its Endeavor for Carbon Neutrality by 2050. To achieve this, we will
first strive to realize carbon neutrality at Mazda manufacturing facilities around the globe by
2035. Mazda sees reducing emissions of C02 and other greenhouse gases over a vehicle's entire
lifecycle - including manufacturing, use and disposal - as one of its top priorities. Life Cycle
Assessment (LCA) is a method for calculating and evaluating the environmental influence of
vehicles across their entire life cycle through the purchase of materials, manufacture, use,
recycling, and final disposal. Since 2009, Mazda has adopted LCA as a means of determining the
time required to reduce the environmental impact of vehicles in their life cycle and has been
actively working to reduce the environmental impact at each stage of the life cycle. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0595, p. 1]
Organization: Michalek and Bruchon
Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments on the proposed rule for Multi-Pollutant
Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehi- cles.
We are researchers at Carnegie Mellon University with experience in life cycle as- sessment of
plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). We recently conducted a study, currently in peer review,
analyzing how to reduce electric vehicle life cycle emissions during the transition to PEVs
(Bruchon et al., 2023). We are attaching the working version of that study for your reference. An
interactive app to explore the results is also available at https://mbruchon.shinyapps.io/PJM_EV/
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0514, pp. 2-4]
Our study was motivated by a prior finding, using 2010 grid data of the PJM grid region,
that a battery electric vehicle (BEV) would produce an estimated 2x to 3x the consequential air
emissions externalities of an ordinary gasoline vehicle, largely due to S02 emissions from coal
fired power plants operating on the margin. In the updated study, using the most recent data
available, we find that PEV consequential emissions externalities have dropped by 17-18% as
natural gas has replaced coal. Using data on expected generator retirements, we expect
consequential life cycle PEV emissions to continue to drop through 2025, bringing PEV
emissions in line with those of gasoline vehicles (Figure 1). However, base case projections
suggest that consequential PEV emissions externalities will bottom out and remain comparable
to gasoline vehicles through at least 2035. These projections reflect a trend that even though the
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power system is expected to become cleaner on average during that period, marginal generation
that responds to changes in load at the times that PEVs charge will remain primarily a mix of
fossil fuel sources in this timeframe. Increased renewable capacity will reduce total grid
emissions in the near and long term, but it will not substantially reduce consequential PEV
emissions in PJM over the period of the proposed policy—only in the long term (later than 2035)
if renewables are routinely curtailed and available to supply additional load on the margin.
We find that the three largest levers available for reducing PEV emissions externalities
during the period of the proposed policy are [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0514, pp. 2-4]
1. Shifting electric vehicle batteries away from nickel-based chemistries. We estimate that
nickel production emissions contribute a substantial portion of consequential PEV emissions,
depending on the source, and a shift away from nickel-based lithium-ion battery chemistries
toward lithium iron phosphate (LFP) would reduce electric vehicle life cycle emissions below
those of gasoline vehicles and hybrid electric vehicles in PJM (Figure 1). We are already
observing this shift in the electric vehicle market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0514, pp. 2-4]
2. Reducing emissions from fossil generators. Because fossil fuel generators like coal and
natural gas power plants will continue to dominate operational responses to changes in load
during the period of the proposed policy, emission rates from fossil generators are key to
determining the consequential emissions of electric vehicles. EPA's new proposed rule on "New
Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse
Gas Emissions from Existing Fossil Fuel- [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0514, pp. 2-4]
[See original attachment for: Figure 1: Estimated consequential life cycle emissions
externalities as PJM's generator fleet evolves over time. ICEV = internal combustion engine
vehicle, HEV = gasoline hybrid electric vehicle, BEV300 = battery electric vehicle with a 300-
mile range, LFP = lithium iron phosphate BEV battery chemistry, NMC = nickel manganese
cobalt lithium ion BEV battery chemistry. For BEV300 the base case includes uncontrolled
(convenience) charging, NMC622 battery chemistry, 10% renewables in 2035, and no
accelerated coal retirements or natural gas installations. The y-axis is truncated to make trends
visible. From Bruchon et al. (2023)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0514, pp. 2-4]
Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean Energy Rule"l has the
potential to address this factor directly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0514, pp. 2-4]
1 Federal Register v88 n99 p33240-33420
3. Revising vehicle fleet emissions standards. Past work has found that when PEVs are
adopted this triggers slack in the light duty vehicle greenhouse gas standards that increases
permitted emissions from the rest of the fleet (Goulder et al., 2012) and that this "leakage" effect
is amplified when the standards count PEVs favorably in compliance calculations by counting
each PEV sale as though it were more than one sale and by excluding electric vehicle charging
emissions (Jenn et al., 2019, 2016). In our new study we find that this effect is still substantial
today, and the emissions consequences of adopting PEVs are higher because of the design of
existing light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas emissions standards (Figure 2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0514, pp. 2-4]
The proposed rule does two things that mitigate this effect.
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(a) First, the multipliers used in prior standards to count individual PEV sales as more than
one sale in compliance calculations have been discontinued, which reduces the amplification of
the emissions leakage effect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0514, pp. 4-6]
(b) Second, while prior light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas standards were not primary drivers
of vehicle electrification, the proposed rule is sufficiently stringent that it is expected to act as a
binding constraint, pushing automakers to electrify more than they would without the rule. When
the GHG standard is the driver of electrification, the leakage question changes. Specifically,
prior concerns about leakage were based on other policies (e.g.: California's ZEV policy, tax
incentives) and consumers driving electric vehicle adoption and triggering an increase in
permitted fleetwide emissions. When the GHG standard is a primary driver of electrification, this
type of leakage is less relevant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0514, pp. 4-6]
Both of these changes in the proposed rule reduce consequential emissions of PEV adoption.
However, the proposed rule continues to exclude PEV charging emissions in compliance
calculations, and thus the extent of consequential GHG reductions implied by the proposed rule
hinges on reduced emissions from marginal generators in the power system. Ideally, regulation
would be based on the full consequential life cycle emissions of each vehicle technology so that
incentives and constraints would be directly aligned with the target externalities (National
Academies of Sciences and Medicine, 2022). When practical and regulatory authority limitations
restrict the scope of policy, it is important to assess the consequential implications of the
restricted policy on overall emissions, which EPA does in the draft regulatory impact analysis.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0514, pp. 4-6]
Overall, with this proposed rule for vehicles together with EPA's proposed rule for limiting
fossil fuel generator emissions, EPA is acting on two of the top three levers we identified for
reducing life cycle emissions of PEVs during the transition to electric vehicles (and during the
period of the proposed policy). We also note that EPA's regulatory impact analyses, which
computes predicted emissions in scenarios both with and without the proposed policy to estimate
the effect of the proposed policy, is (at least in this sense) consistent with [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0514, pp. 4-6]
[See original attachment for: Figure 2: Range of estimates for consequential life cycle
emissions externalities in our Base Case (ignoring policy interactions) and our Policy Interaction
Case (including the effect of EV sales on permitted fleetwide emissions in the light duty GHG
standard). From Bruchon et al. (2023)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0514, pp. 4-6]
the National Academies report on methods for life cycle assessment of transportation fuels
(National Academies of Sciences and Medicine, 2022). Specifically, from that report [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0514, pp. 4-6]:
Recommendation 3-2: Public policy design based on LCA should ensure through regulatory
impact assessment that, at a minimum, the consequential life-cycle impact of the proposed policy
is likely to reduce net GHG emissions and increase net benefits to society... -National
Academies of Sciences and Medicine (2022) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0514, pp. 4-6]
We recommend citing the National Academies of Sciences and Medicine (2022) report and
describing the regulatory impact analysis in consequential terms for clarity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0514, pp.4-6]
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Supporting Information
We attach as supporting information both Bruchon et al. (2023) and National Academies of
Sciences and Medicine (2022). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0514, pp. 4-6]
Organization: Minnesota Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
PERFOMANCE BASED/TECHNOLOGY NEUTRAL RULEMAKING NEEDED
A recent study4 by Argonne National Lab, in cooperation with coauthors from the automotive
and energy industries, shows a BEV with 400-mile range (BEV400) has lifecycle GHG
emissions of about 250 g/mi. This is an improvement from a conventional internal combustion
engine vehicle (ICEV) which is about 430 g/mi. However, the lifecycle GHG emissions of a
BEV are far from zero. In fact, lifecycle GHG emissions of a BEV400 are comparable to other
low-emission options such as E85 or PHEV. Regulations based only on tailpipe emissions are
clearly inadequate for comparing BEVs to other pathways for reducing GHG emissions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 4-5]
4 Kelly et al., "Cradle-to-Grave Lifecycle Analysis of U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle-Fuel Pathways: A
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Economic Assessment of Current (2020) and Future (2030-2035)
Technologies", report ANL-22/27, June 2022.
The Argonne report demonstrates that other "vehicle-fuel pathways" can compete with BEVs.
For example, a conventional gasoline hybrid (HEV) achieves about 310 g/mi and E85 in a non-
HEV FFV achieves 260 g/mi. The future potential of HEVs combined with FFV technology,
utilizing E85, is comparable to future BEVs with wind and solar power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0612, pp. 4-5]
The proposed rulemaking does not allow other vehicle-fuel pathways to compete with BEVs.
By regulating only tailpipe emissions, and ignoring the rich literature of lifecycle analysis, EPA
would create artificial incentives for auto manufacturers to pursue only BEVs. This could have
disastrous impacts on both the cost and the GHG emissions of future vehicles. The same
Argonne report found the cost and GHG emissions of a BEV are strongly affected by the driving
range. A BEV with 400-mile range is dramatically more expensive than one with 200-mile
range, and its lifetime GHG emissions are substantially worse. In fact, a BEV with 400-mile
range has only a slight GHG benefit compared to a HEV or an E85 FFV. But the proposed rule
counts all BEVs as zero GHG emissions, regardless of battery size - and regardless of vehicle
size and weight. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 4-5]
It is essential for EPA to utilize life cycle analysis to create a "level playing field" which
encourages speedy adoption of HEVs, PHEVs, FFVs, and other technologies (in addition to
BEVs) to achieve the most rapid, affordable, robust, and practical GHG emissions reductions in
a wide range of vehicle segments, while satisfying diverse customer needs and preferences.
Europe is already making progress towards regulation based on life cycle analysis. 10 11 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 6]
10 https://www.goldmansachs.eom/intelligence/pages/briefly/from_briefings_21-Jan-2020/new-era-in-co2-
regulation.pdf.
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11 Sala et al., "The evolution of life cycle assessment in European policies over three decades",
International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment, December 2021; https://doi.org/10.1007/sll367-021-
01893-2.
UPSTREAM EMISSIONS
EPA's proposal continues to treat EVs as carbon neutral, without regard to the source of
electricity powering the vehicles. Depending on the sources of electricity - whether coal, natural
gas, wind or nuclear and the mix of those sources - full lifecycle emissions of EVs vary widely,
masking the true GHG emissions from these vehicles. Without accounting for upstream
emissions from these vehicles, full lifecycle emissions are not considered. Furthermore, EPA
notes in the proposal that increases in electricity demand will result in increased non-GHG
emissions for some upstream pollutants. EPA does a disservice to emissions reduction goals by
accounting for upstream emissions from some fuels and vehicle technologies but not others,
providing an advantage to the sources for which "wells-to- wheels" upstream emissions are
excluded and concealing emissions from coal power generation, mineral extraction, and other
high-carbon sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 6]
Adopt Argonne's GREET Model
Argonne's Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Transportation
(GREET) model is the federal government's most accurate tool for evaluating biofuel and energy
lifecycle emissions. Adopting a true "wells-to- wheels" methodology will help to ensure an
accurate accounting of total carbon intensity so that all low carbon fuels and technologies are
compared on full and accurate lifecycle emissions on a technology and feedstock neutral
basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 13]
Organization: National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) et al.
The Proposed Rule is also arbitrary and capricious because it fails to accurately and fairly
account for the greenhouse gas emissions impacts of both EVs and biofuels. EPA should use the
best available science to accurately account for the full lifecycle carbon intensity associated with
each fuel and technology, but the Proposal ignores the significant upstream emissions from
electricity generation associated with EVs. Incentives for alternative fuel technologies should be
tied to those technologies' full lifecycle environmental attributes rather than a single segment of
the lifecycle (i.e., tailpipe emissions). The Agency should revise the Proposal to adopt a more
market-oriented, technology-neutral, and consumer-focused approach to decarbonizing light-
duty vehicle transportation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0628, p. 2]
III. The Proposed Rule Fails to Account for the Lifecycle Emissions of Electric Vehicles.
Under the Proposal, electric vehicles effectively serve as the only means of compliance with
the standards in part because the Agency focuses solely on tailpipe emissions rather than the full
lifecycle emissions of light- and medium-duty EVs. This is a flawed approach. To ensure an
accurate accounting of the lifecycle carbon intensity associated with each technology, EPA
should incorporate lifecycle emissions into its analysis. This will facilitate continued investment
in all decarbonization technologies alongside deployment of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
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Though EVs do not directly have tailpipe emissions, other segments along the lifecycle of the
EV do. The fuel source of an EV—a battery composed of carbon intensive minerals and the
electricity generated to power the battery—produces meaningful emissions to which the Proposal
turns a blind eye. Addressing the impact of climate change, however, requires mitigating
emissions irrespective of whether they originate from a tailpipe, a mining operation, a power
plant, or a battery plant. Consequently, emissions standards should account for the entire
lifecycle emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
EPA's analysis examines only logistical challenges to EV manufacturing and does not
account for carbon impacts of critical mineral mining, the use of natural resources for refining
and processing, engine and battery manufacturing, and other confounding variables such as
prolonged ICE turnover rates and vehicle end-of-life consequences. Importantly, a lifecycle
analysis of EV emissions impacts will better equip EPA to understand the varying costs and
emissions reductions associated with all technologies and best inform manufacturers and
consumers of their options. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
EPA also makes flawed assumptions regarding the total emissions impacts of the Proposal.
Despite claiming that "upstream emissions impacts from fuel production at refineries and
electricity generating units are considered in EPA's analysis of overall estimated emissions
impacts and project benefits," 31 this analysis uses overgeneralizations and assumes cleaner and
less expensive generation over time—incorrectly assuming as a certainty that the power sector
will become cleaner through the increased use of wind and solar generation as well as electricity
storage (e.g., batteries) despite opposition from the power sector.32 Although the Agency
concedes these assumptions will still result in "some increases in ambient pollutant
concentrations" and that "the specific locations of increased air pollution are uncertain," EPA
fails to meaningfully engage with the consequences of even its own flawed analysis.33 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
31 Proposed Rule at 29,252.
32 See, e.g., David Pomerantz, The New York Times, "Guess Who's Been Paying to Block Green Energy?
You Have." (Jul. 5, 2023) available at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/05/opinion/utility-bills-clean-
energy.html; Susan Cosier, "Why Electric Utilities Are Resorting to Dark Money and Bribes to Resist
Renewables," Audubon, March 16, 2021, available at https://www.audubon.org/news/why-electric-utilities-
are-resorting-dark-money-and-bribes-resist- renewables ("Many utility companies cling to old business
models and dirty fuels rather than go through the tough energy transition that climate change demands.")
Comment from Southern Company on EPA Proposed Rule, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0723,
Comment ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0723-0029 (Dec. 21, 2022) available at
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0723-0029 (advocating for continued
construction of new EGU infrastructure for fossil fuels and cautioning against unattainable limits for
existing coal and natural gas EGUs); Valerie Volcovici and Nichola Groom, Reuters, "U.S. utilities want
protection from Biden's tight timeline in clean energy mandate" (Apr. 14, 2021) available at
https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/us- utilities-want-protection-bidens-tight-timeline-
clean-energy-mandate-2021-04-14/.
33 Proposed Rule at 29,361.
The Proposed Rule fails to adequately evaluate local ambient air quality impacts from
increased power generation. Though EPA modeled changes to power generation anticipated by
the Proposed Rule as part of its upstream analysis, the Agency does not consider the potential
degradation of air quality in areas in the direct vicinity of existing or new power plants.34 This is
further complicated by the fact that emissions associated with electricity generation are not
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consistent across the U.S. In contrast to EPA's generalized emissions benefits, the emissions
advantages of EVs are much lower in states with relatively high carbon profiles for electricity
generation than those states with relatively low carbon profiles. Indeed, the Fuels Institute
analyzed these differences and concluded that in states with high-carbon intensity electric
generation, such as West Virginia, ICE vehicles produced decidedly less carbon emissions
relative to EVs over the entire 200,000-mile life of the vehicles.35 Of course, the Report
recognizes emissions advantages to EVs in those low-carbon states as well, but these differences
further illustrate the importance of accurately accounting for full lifecycle emissions. Instead of
comprehensively accounting for these emissions in compliance calculations, the Agency
proposes to continue providing EVs with a discounted emissions rate by allowing these vehicles
to be counted as producing 0 g/mile of C02, and solidifying preferential treatment of one mode
of technology: electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
34 Proposed Rule at 29,361.
35 Ricardo Inc., FUELS INSTITUTE, "Lifecycle Analysis Comparison" (Jan. 2022) available
https://transportationenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/FI_Report_Lifecycle_FINAL.pdf.
While ICE-powered vehicles generally emit more carbon dioxide during operation, the
emissions associated with the manufacturing of ICE-powered vehicles are significantly lower
than those emitted from battery-electric vehicles.36 There is no climate rationale for EPA to
pursue this rulemaking from a state of willful blindness over these distinctions. A recent
examination conducted by Volvo provides a directly applicable case study. Volvo concluded that
the "accumulated emissions from the [mjaterials production and refining, [Lithium-ion] battery
modules and Volvo Cars manufacturing phases of C40 Recharge are nearly 70 percent higher
than for XC40 ICE."37 Volvo explains, "[electrification of cars causes a shift of focus from the
use phase to the materials production and refining phase."38 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648,
pp. 10-12]
36 See IEA, "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transition" (May 2021) available at
https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions; see also David Biello,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, "Electric Cars Are Not Necessarily Clean,"(May 11, 2016) available at
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/electric-cars-are-not-necessarily-clean/ ("Your battery-powered
vehicle is only as green as your electricity supplier"); see also Nina Lakhani, THE GUARDIAN,
"Revealed: How US Transition to Electric Cars Threatens Environmental Havoc," the Guardian, (January
24, 2023) available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jan/24/us-electric-vehicles-lithium-
consequences-research. ("The US's transition to electric vehicles could require three times as much lithium
as is currently produced for the entire global market, causing needless water shortages, Indigenous land
grabs, and ecosystem destruction.").
37 Elisabeth Evrard, et al., VOLVO, "Carbon footprint report - Volvo C40 Recharge," (2021), pg. 24,
available at https://www.volvocars.com/images/v/-/media/Market-
Assets/INTL/Applications/DotCom/PDF/C40/Volvo-C40- Recharge-LCA-report.pdf.
38 Id. atpg. 5.
Further, the Proposed Rule overlooks the emissions impacts from the substantial expansion of
the electrical grid. While EPA credits emissions reductions from assuming the power sector will
become cleaner over time using renewable generation and electricity storage (e.g., batteries), it
ignores the impacts of building out that associated infrastructure. New power generation,
renewable power generation, and energy storage require the same critical minerals necessary for
manufacturing EV batteries. Increased electricity demand will only further compound the stress
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on critical minerals. Indeed, copper and aluminum—both needed for EVs—are also the two main
materials in wires and cables. Battery storage equipment for solar and other renewable energy
sources rely on similar battery chemistries as EVs.39 Again, EVs may be the most
environmentally compelling solution, but it does neither the climate nor American consumers
any favors for the Agency to pretend the solution is more compelling or achievable than it
actually is. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
39 And, as described above, higher prices on these materials could have a major impact on future grid
investments. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy
Transitions (Mar. 2022), 77-80, available at https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-
980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.
The simultaneous spike in demand for materials such as copper and aluminum for both the
grid and EV manufacturing will increase extraction and refining efforts globally, potentially
exacerbating consequences on a regional level.40 By failing to consider geographic electricity
generation differences and the potential benefits of a non-homogenized vehicle population, the
Proposal misses the opportunity to most effectively respond to emissions concerns and, more
importantly, could indirectly lead to increased emissions in certain regions. A full accounting of
the relative advantages and disadvantages of the different vehicle technologies is necessary to
ensure the Proposal harnesses the benefits of competition among different current and potential
future vehicle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, pp. 10-12]
40 The U.S. is almost entirely dependent on other countries, especially China, for materials essential to
manufacturing EVs, meaning the Proposal may potentially raise national security concerns.
Organization: National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)
NCGA urges EPA to advance a much-needed rulemaking addressing fuel quality to cut
emissions from the millions of liquid fuel vehicles on the road now and the new vehicles that
will be sold through the compliance period. Greater lifecycle emission reductions are available
from sustainable, affordable low carbon ethanol through a clean, high-octane standard, by
removing barriers to higher ethanol blends and by equitably incentivizing all alternative fuels
and vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 1]
A recent study 4 by Argonne National Lab, in cooperation with coauthors from the
automotive and energy industries, shows a BEV with 400-mile range (BEV400) has lifecycle
GHG emissions of about 250 g/mi. This is an improvement from a conventional internal
combustion engine vehicle (ICEV) which is about 430 g/mi. However, the lifecycle GHG
emissions of a BEV are far from zero. In fact, lifecycle GHG emissions of a BEV400 are
comparable to other low-emission options such as E85 or PHEV. Regulations based only on
tailpipe emissions are clearly inadequate for comparing BEVs to other pathways for reducing
GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 3]
4 Kelly et al., "Cradle-to-Grave Lifecycle Analysis of U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle-Fuel Pathways: A
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Economic Assessment of Current (2020) and Future (2030-2035)
Technologies", report ANL-22/27, June 2022
The Argonne report demonstrates that other "vehicle-fuel pathways" can compete with BEVs.
For example, a conventional gasoline hybrid (HEV) achieves about 310 g/mi and E85 in a non-
HEV FFV achieves 260 g/mi. The future potential of HEVs combined with FFV technology,
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utilizing E85, is comparable to future BEVs with wind and solar power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0643, pp.3-4]
The proposed rulemaking does not allow other vehicle-fuel pathways to compete with BEVs.
By regulating only tailpipe emissions, and ignoring the rich literature of lifecycle analysis, EPA
would create artificial incentives for auto manufacturers to pursue only BEVs. This could have
disastrous impacts on both the cost and the GHG emissions of future vehicles. The same
Argonne report found the cost and GHG emissions of a BEV are strongly affected by the driving
range. A BEV with 400-mile range is dramatically more expensive than one with 200-mile
range, and its lifetime GHG emissions are substantially worse. In fact, a BEV with 400-mile
range has only a slight GHG benefit compared to a HEV or an E85 FFV. But the proposed rule
counts all BEVs as zero GHG emissions, regardless of battery size - and regardless of vehicle
size and weight. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 3-4]
It is essential for EPA to utilize life cycle analysis to create a "level playing field" which
encourages speedy adoption of HEVs, PHEVs, FFVs, and other technologies (in addition to
BEVs) to achieve the most rapid, affordable, robust, and practical GHG emissions reductions in
a wide range of vehicle segments, while satisfying diverse customer needs and preferences.
Europe is already making progress towards regulation based on life cycle analysis. 10 11 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 4]
10 https://www.goldmansachs.eom/intelligence/pages/briefly/from_briefings_21-Jan-2020/new-era-in-co2-
regulation.pdf
11 Sala et al., "The evolution of life cycle assessment in European policies over three decades",
International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment, December 2021; https://doi.org/10.1007/sll367-021-
01893-2
EPA's proposal continues to treat EVs as carbon neutral, without regard to the source of
electricity powering the vehicles. Depending on the sources of electricity - whether coal, natural
gas, wind or nuclear and the mix of those sources - full lifecycle emissions of EVs vary widely,
masking the true GHG emissions from these vehicles. Without accounting for upstream
emissions from these vehicles, full lifecycle emissions are not considered. Furthermore, EPA
notes in the proposal that increases in electricity demand will result in increased non-GHG
emissions for some upstream pollutants. EPA does a disservice to emissions reduction goals by
accounting for upstream emissions from some fuels and vehicle technologies but not others,
providing an advantage to the sources for which "wells-to-wheels" upstream emissions are
excluded and concealing emissions from coal power generation, mineral extraction, and other
high-carbon sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 4]
Corn-based ethanol can reach net zero emissions with continued on-farm improvements and
soil carbon sequestration, along with carbon capture technology and new efficiencies in ethanol
production. Corn farmers are proud of our leadership in adopting conservation and best
management practices. NCGA's recently released Corn Sustainability Report 21 details corn
farmers' history of improvements and our commitment to further sustainability achievements by
2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 6-7]
21 National Corn Growers Association Corn Sustainability Report: chrome-
extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://dtl76nijwhl4e.cloudfront.net/file/392/NCGA%20S
ustainability%20Report_final_digital_07_29_21 .pdf
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Sustainable production means corn farmers today are producing more corn using less land and
fewer resources. For example, planted corn acres in 2022, at 88.6 million acres, were less than
planted acres in 2007, the year the RFS was expanded, at 93.5 million acres. USDA data also
shows the area planted to principal crops in the United States is not expanding overall. Corn
production has increased primarily because crop yields have increased from an average of 150
bushels per acre in 2007 to 173 bushels in 2022. With the average yield in 1980 at just 91
bushels per acre, productivity growth is a long-term trend. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp.
6-7]
Using the expertise of Argonne's scientists and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's data, we
believe Argonne's Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Technologies
(GREET) model is the federal government's most accurate tool for evaluating biofuel and energy
lifecycle emissions. Because GREET is regularly updated, this model captures GHG emissions
reductions from farmers' improved production practices and will incorporate the ongoing,
voluntary climate-smart improvements in agriculture production this Administration supports,
ensuring further carbon intensity reductions are accounted for in the LCA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0643, pp. 6-7]
Corn production has improved across all measures of resource efficiency, including higher
crop yields per acre, resulting in greater corn production using less land and fewer inputs, further
fortifying ethanol as a sustainable, low-carbon renewable fuel. This progress is reflected in
Argonne's most recent analysis, which builds on and is consistent with other recent reviews.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 7]
For example, a 2018 USDA study shows that ethanol then resulted in 39 to 43 percent fewer
GHG emissions than gasoline. 22 Building on this progress, additional improvements on farms
and in ethanol production supported by expanding markets for low carbon fuels could result in
ethanol with up to 70 percent fewer GHG emissions than gasoline, according to USDA's
analysis. Furthermore, according to California Air Resources Board (CARB) data, the CI of
ethanol is more than 40 percent lower than the CI of gasoline. 23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0643, p. 7]
22 Lewandrowski, Jan, and et. al, "The Greenhouse Gas Benefits of Corn Ethanol - Assessing Recent
Evidence," (202) Biofuels, 11:3, 361-375.
https://www.tandfonline.eom/doi/full/10.1080/17597269.2018.1546488
23 California Air Resources Board, Low Carbon Fuel Standard Reporting Tool Quarterly Summaries,
based on data through Q3 2020 at https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/lrtqsummaries.htm
These increasing benefits have occurred without accounting for corn's ability to sequester
carbon in the soil. Corn as a crop can serve as a carbon sink. As a photo-synthetically superior
C4 plant, corn has an extraordinary ability to sequester carbon and move fertilizer nutrients back
to the surface for plant growth rather than polluting ground water. Corn's extensive, deep root
system makes it one of the few plants with this important capability to make crop production
sustainable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 7]
High-yield corn—combined with the steady adoption of best practices such as reductions in
tillage intensity—is sequestering carbon from the atmosphere into the soil. This sequestration is
increasing soil carbon levels and reducing atmospheric C02. Although GHG lifecycle models do
not currently account for this direct GHG reduction from corn production, NCGA believes the
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effect of corn crops on soil carbon sequestration, among other considerations, should be
incorporated into current lifecycle analysis. This increase in soil carbon from corn production,
when included, could result in a 20 gram/MJ carbon credit for corn-based ethanol. 24 Fully
accounting for corn's carbon sequestration would further demonstrate significant low-carbon
advantages of a high-octane midlevel ethanol blend. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 7]
24 American Coalition for Ethanol, The Case for Properly Valuing the Low Carbon Benefits of Corn
Ethanol, 2018
Argonne's Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Transportation
(GREET) model is the federal government's most accurate tool for evaluating biofuel and energy
lifecycle emissions. Adopting a true "wells-to-wheels" methodology will help to ensure an
accurate accounting of total carbon intensity so that all low carbon fuels and technologies are
compared on full and accurate lifecycle emissions on a technology and feedstock neutral basis.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 10]
Organization: National Farmers Union (NFU)
Unfortunately, the large GHG benefits of ethanol and other low-carbon fuels are not
adequately accounted for in the proposed rulemaking. EPA should use lifecycle analysis to
properly account for and incentivize their use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 6]
Numerous studies have used lifecycle analysis to quantify GHG benefits of BEVs compared
to other options including hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) and renewable fuels. As these studies
show, BEVs are not zero emissions. Further, they are not the most cost-effective way to reduce
GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 6]
For example, below is a plot from a study released by Argonne National Laboratory. 12 It
shows that a BEV with 400 mile range (BEV400) has lifecycle GHG emissions of about 250
gC02e/mi. This calls into question the term "zero emissions vehicle." According to this study,
lifecycle GHG emissions of a BEV400 are not much better than other options such as E85 or
PHEV. Regulations based only on tailpipe emissions are insufficient to compare BEVs to other
ways of reducing GHG emissions. The report found that "these results demonstrate that large
GHG reductions for LDVs are challenging and require consideration of the entire life cycle,
including vehicle manufacture, fuel production, and vehicle operation. Achieving a net life cycle
reduction in GHG emissions is a challenging task and must overcome technological, cost, and
market acceptance hurdles."13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 7-8]
12 Jarod C. Kelly, et al., Cradle-to-Grave Lifecycle Analysis of U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle-Fuel Pathways: A
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Economic Assessment of Current (2020) and Future (2030-2035)
Technologies, Argonne National Laboratory, ANL-22/27, at xxi (2022), available at
https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2022/07/176270.pdf.
13 Id.
[See original comment for Figure ES-1.C2G GHG emissions of various vehicle-fuel pathways
for small SUVs assuming high technology progress. Analysis was performed using
GREET2020] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 7-8]
The Argonne report shows that other "vehicle-fuel pathways" can compete with BEVs. For
example, a conventional gasoline hybrid (HEV) achieves about 310 gC02e/mi and conventional
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corn-based E85 in a non-HEV achieves 260 gC02e/mi. The grey arrows in the plot indicate that
the future potential of HEVs with advanced E85 or E-Fuels is comparable to future BEVs with
wind and solar power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 7-8]
The proposed rulemaking would not allow other vehicle-fuel pathways to compete with
BEVs. By regulating only tailpipe emissions, EPA would create artificial incentives for only
BEVs. This could have disastrous effects on both the cost and the GHG emissions of future
vehicles. As shown in Figure 37 from the same Argonne report (reproduced below), 14 the cost
and GHG emissions of a BEV are strongly affected by the driving range. A BEV with a 400-mile
range is dramatically more expensive than one with a 200-mile range, and its lifetime GHG
emissions are substantially worse. A 400-mile-range BEV has only a slight GHG benefit
compared to a HEV or an E85 internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV). But the proposed rule
would count all BEVs as zero GHG emissions, regardless of battery size, vehicle size, or
weight—all of which can have an impact on lifecycle GHG emissions and costs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 8]
14 Id. at 114.
[See original comment for graph of Lifetime Cost vs. GHGs, Current Tech] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0581, p. 8]
It is important that EPA utilize lifecycle analysis to create a "level playing field" which
encourages speedy adoption of HEVs, PHEVs, flex-fuel vehicles, and other technologies (in
addition to BEVs) to achieve the most rapid, affordable, robust, and practical GHG emissions
reductions in a wide range of vehicle segments, while satisfying diverse customer needs and
preferences. Europe is already making progress towards regulation based on lifecycle analysis.30
Furthermore, EPA should revise the proposed standards to a level which can be achieved using
more realistic estimates for future penetration of vehicle technologies and that incorporates low
carbon fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 13]
30 See Goldman Sachs, New era in C02 regulation: EVs to be tested across life cycle, not only on running
performance, Dec. 5, 2019, available at
https://www.goldmansachs.eom/intelligence/pages/briefly/from_briefings_21-Jan-2020/new-era-in-co2-
regulation.pdf; Serenella Sala, et al., The evolution of life cycle assessment in European policies over three
decades, The International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment 26, 2295-2314 (2021), available at
https://doi.org/10.1007/sll367-021-01893-2.
Organization: Natural Gas Vehicles for America (NGVA)
Introduction
Natural Gas Vehicles for America (NGVAmerica) respectfully submits these comments in
response to the above captioned notice. NGV America supports EPA finalizing regulations that
achieve needed emission reductions and incorporate a strong fuel- and technology- neutral
performance standard. Future standards must incorporate realistic expectations about the pace,
cost, and deployability of technology, and to ensure success must encourage engine makers and
vehicle manufacturers to deploy a variety of available, scalable, and cost-effective technologies.
To achieve these objectives and drive manufacturers toward zero-emission technology, EPA
must incorporate well-to-wheel emission or life-cycle assessments into its regulations. We
therefore request that EPA develop and approve a method of calculating and certifying emission
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reductions related to the use of low-carbon and carbon-negative biofuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0597, p. 3]
Two compelling developments have occurred in recent years that require EPA to reevaluate
its past conclusion that only electric vehicle technology is a "game-changer" and therefore only
electric vehicles warrant special regulatory incentives to assist in their development and
commercialization. These developments are the certification and sale of low-NOx natural gas
trucks, which achieve reductions surpassing the 2027 standards finalized by EPA1 and the
increasing uptake of renewable natural gas as a transportation fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0597, pp. 3-4]
1 See https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-01-24/pdf/2022-27957.pdf
Renewable natural gas currently consumed in California achieves a lower carbon intensity
score than electricity. In fact, based on the latest data submitted to CARB under the low- carbon
fuel standard program, bio-CNG in 2022 had an average carbon intensity value of negative 99.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 3-4]
The time has come for EPA to fully embrace all low-carbon technologies and provide a level
playing field in its regulations. EPA staff previously stated to NGVAmerica in meetings that the
Renewable Fuel Standard Program already incentivizes low-carbon fuels like RNG and that its
vehicle regulations are not intended for that purpose. EPA staff also has acknowledged in
meetings with NGV America that when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions, moving to a life
cycle analysis (LCA) or well-to-wheels (WTW) approach would be preferable, and previously
indicated as part of the proceedings for the 2012 light-duty GHG regulations that it would move
away from the tailpipe only approach once automakers surpass sales of 200,000 vehicles. EPA
under the Biden Administration, however, has abandoned that prior commitment. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 5-6]
There are ample studies that support the importance of evaluating well-to-wheel emissions. A
September 2022 study published in the Journal Sustainable Energy & Fuels included the
following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 5-6]
The results show that in both the U.S. and EU markets, waste-streams-to-energy technologies,
such as CNG production via AD of wet waste resources, offer the biggest opportunities to reduce
WTW GHG emissions. .. .Drop-in renewable diesel fuels, produced from forest residues or wood
waste feedstock via thermochemical conversion technologies, including FT and pyrolysis
technologies, could potentially reduce GHG emissions more than 75% in both the U.S. and the
EU, despite the varying energy efficiency of the conversion routes and feedstocks used. 3 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 5-6]
3 Journal of Sustainable Energy & Fuels, Decarbonization potential of on-road fuels and powertrains in the
European Union and the United States: a well-to-wheels assessment, (Published Sept. 1, 2022)(
Decarbonization potential of on-road fuels and powertrains in the European Union and the United States: a
well-to-wheels assessment - Sustainable Energy & Fuels (RSC Publishing).
This report looks at benefits in the U.S. and Europe, references numerous other studies, and
its authors include several prominent experts on greenhouse gas emissions. A White Paper
entitled Smart C02 Standards for Negative Emissions Mobility published by the European
Biogas Associations references nearly a dozen studies with similar findings regarding emission
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reduction benefits and cost-effectiveness of RNG reductions. A copy of that document is
included in Appendix A. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 5-6]
Another excellent report on the importance of accounting for well-to-wheel emissions and
life-cycle emissions was prepared in 2021 by Frontier Economics for NGVA Europe. That report
was specifically prepared with the intention of highlighting the need for regulatory standards that
account for well-to-wheel emissions. The frontier economics evaluation included a comparison
based on conventional natural gas, 100 percent biomethane, and a mixture of 40 percent
conventional natural gas and 60 percent biomethane. This study supports the contention that a
mixture of biomethane of 60 percent biomethane is cost- competitive from a purchase
perspective with electric vehicle technology while also delivering greater emission C02
equivalent emission reductions. A copy of this report is included in Appendix B. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 6-7]
A report4 prepared by Ramboll US Consulting, Inc. for the Western States Petroleum
Association provides additional evidence on the cost-effectiveness and well-to-wheel benefits of
natural gas vehicles and other low-emission technologies. The report evaluated California's plans
to focus almost exclusively on electrification as the solution to address transportation related
emissions including NOx emissions and greenhouse gas emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0597, pp. 6-7]
4 Ramboll Multi-Technology Pathways Study - Western States Petroleum Association (wspa.org)
The report's executive summary includes the following:
- Expanded implementation of zero-emission and Low-NOx vehicles, coupled with increased
introduction of renewable liquid and gaseous fuels, can deliver (as shown in Figures ES-1) and
more cost-effective benefits than a zero-emission vehicle (ZEV)-only approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0597, pp.6-7]
- As advanced low-emitting trucks are commercially available (citation omitted) to deliver
benefits to communities sooner, multi-technology pathways can help achieve emission
reductions without reliance on infrastructure and technology upgrades that will take years to
resolve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 6-7]
- There is growing potential for renewable fuels, including those with negative carbon
intensity, to [sic] achieve GHG reductions, which CARB has not acknowledged fully in the MSS
nor assessed the potential for early and cost-effective GHG reductions through these multi-
technology vehicle pathways. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 6-7]
- Low-emission heavy-duty trucks are cost-competitive with (or cheaper than) battery electric
vehicles (BEVs). This is true even though battery technology promises (such as greater energy
density /lower cost) have not been adequately demonstrated and related transmission/distribution
infrastructure cost have not been included in the state's analyses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0597, pp. 6-7]
In addition to the greenhouse gas emission benefits, it is important to note that virtually all
new natural gas engines already achieve emission reductions of nitrogen oxides that surpass the
reductions required by EPA recently finalized low-NOx rule for medium and heavy-duty
vehicles. All new natural gas trucks and buses regardless of whether they operate on
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conventional natural gas or RNG therefore provide meaningful reductions of this important
pollutant. EPA's regulations provide averaging, banking, and trading credits to manufacturers
that exceed emission requirements (i.e., deliver lower emitting engines). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0597, p. 7]
The new regulations are expected to further encourage the development and sale of natural
gas engines. The incentive for lower polluting natural gas engines however could be offset by
this rulemaking if EPA does not amend its proposal to incorporate well-to-wheel, greenhouse gas
emission benefits of NGVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, p. 7]
Two automakers opposed the use of 0 g/mi. Honda "believes that EPA should separate
incentives and credits from the measurement of emissions. Honda believes that without
accounting for the upstream emissions of all fuels, inaccurate comparisons between technologies
will take place * * *. EPA's regulations need to be comprehensive and transparent. By zeroing
out the upstream emissions, EPA is conflating incentives and credits with proper emissions
accounting." EcoMotors International "encourages EPA to drop the 0 g/mile tailpipe
compliance value." Environmental advocacy groups also opposed the 0 g/ mi compliance
treatment. The Natural Resources Defense Council claimed that 0 g/mi "undermines" the
pollution and technology benefits of the program. Along with other environmental groups, the
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy also opposed 0 g/mi, but added that "[m]ost
important, however, is that a zero-upstream treatment of plug-in vehicles not be continued
indefinitely, and that full upstream accounting be applied to these vehicles by a date certain.
EPA's proposed treatment of EVs largely accomplishes this, so we strongly support that aspect
of the proposal." The American Petroleum Institute argued that "[ijgnoring the significant
contribution of (and extensive compilation of published literature on) upstream C02 emissions
from electricity generation, defies principles of transparency and sound science and distorts the
market for developing transportation fuel alternatives. It incentivizes the electrification of the
vehicle fleet with a pre- defined specific and costly set of technologies whose future potential is
not measured with the same well-to-wheels methodology against that of advanced biofuels or
other carbon mitigation strategies." Organizations advocating fuels other than electricity also
opposed the use of 0 g/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 10-11]
Despite the expressed views, EPA nevertheless retained the 0 g/mi standard. In defense of
continuing to retain the 0 g/mi treatment and providing multiplier credits, EPA stated that:
EPA believes that it is both reasonable and appropriate to accept some short- term loss of
emissions benefits in the short run to increase the potential for far- greater game-changing
benefits in the longer run. The agency believes that these multipliers may help bring some
technologies to market more quickly than in the absence of incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0597, pp. 10-11]
The European Biogas Association eloquently explained why the EU Commissions rules
should account for well-to-wheel emissions and their explanation is worth including here:
The current "tank-to-wheel" approach does not compare the different technologies
appropriately because it ignores emissions associated with the production of the fuel. It does not
recognise the positive contribution of renewable fuels such as biomethane to climate protection,
and thus biases one technology over others without a climate protection rationale. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 10-11]
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The revised C02 regulation should propose technology-neutral solutions to reduce emissions
in an accelerated and cost-effective way. It should avoid one-size-fits-all options that could prove
insufficient in the long-term and may lead to a slow, unfair and costly emissions reduction
process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 10-11]
The C02 regulation should be amended to ensure an integrated transition that picks no single
green technology over others and leaves no-one behind. All alternative fuels are necessary if
transport decarbonisation is to be delivered at pace. 11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 10-
11]
11 SMART C02 STANDARDS FOR LEAN MOBILITY (europeanbiogas.eu)
The Frontier Economics report similarly offers an excellent case for ensuring proper treatment
and inclusion of biomethane.
Our analysis shows that gas mobility can help to contribute to reducing GHG emissions in
road transport at comparably low system cost. As gas mobility - in contrast to other drivetrain
technologies which are less mature - is readily available on vehicle, infrastructure and fuel
supply levels and thus quickly scalable now, it can contribute to ambitious early GHG emission
reduction by 2030 at low cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 11-12]
- Technological diversification. The immense challenge and high urgency for the mobility
sector to achieve emissions reductions does not allow for cherry picking of individual
technologies. Rather, we have to go "all-in" by enabling as many options to contribute as
possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 11-12]
- Freedom of choice and competition of technologies. The heterogeneity of mobility
applications with many individual factors determining the most efficient technology in each case
rules out any central planning approach - there is no "one size fits all" solution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0597, pp.11-12]
- Keeping options open. There is a high degree of uncertainty around the optimal technology
options in the future. Regulation therefore should avoid prematurely ruling out any pathway (e.g.
by banning combustion engines which may in the future be fuelled by renewable or low-carbon
fuels or gases). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 11-12]
We fervently believe that the Administration's decarbonization and clean air goals will only
be achieved by focusing on a multi-technology approach that includes cost-effective carbon-
negative solutions like RNG trucks that can begin accruing and compounding significant clean
air and carbon reductions right away. We, therefore, respectfully request that EPA provide
credits for natural gas vehicles based on the well-to-wheel benefits of the consuming natural gas
which increasingly includes larger amounts of RNG. We also believe that any additional
incentives finalized in this rulemaking to offer aid in the commercialization of electric vehicles
or fuel-cell vehicles should be extended to NGVs based on the extraordinary emission reduction
potential of these vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 11-12]
Organization: Nebraska Corn Board (NCB) and Nebraska Corn Growers Association
On behalf of the nearly 2,500 Nebraska Corn Growers Association (NeCGA) dues paying
members and the over 21,000 corn farmers in Nebraska who contribute to the state's corn
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checkoff program through the Nebraska Corn Board (NCB), we appreciate the opportunity to
comment on the Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-
Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0583, p. 1]
Nebraska corn farmers and ethanol producers have worked diligently in reducing greenhouse
gas emissions while supplying the fuels industry with a low carbon, high octane alternative.
However, the EPA seemingly overlooks the contribution that biofuels, such as ethanol, can
provide to reducing carbon emissions through tailpipes and internal combustion engines. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0583, p. 1]
This proposal gives EVs an unfair advantage when the EPA upstream emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0583, p. 1]
As most Americans will continue driving their current vehicle, it is crucial to ensure they have
access to an affordable and environmentally friendly product such as gasoline with 15% ethanol,
known as El 5. This is a fuel that is acceptable for vehicles 2001 and newer which are 97% of the
vehicles on the road. If made available to every consumer in the country, this would reduce
carbon emissions by 280 million tons in the next decade. We ask the EPA to consider the
University of California, Riverside's study on the Comparison of Exhaust Emissions between
E10 and splash blended E15 as it demonstrates the opportunity that E15 has at reducing
emissions. This study states around 54% reduction in carbon emissions compared to E10. We
strongly believe in the role biofuels have as a critical step in reducing carbon emissions and
being a cost-effective fuel for consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0583, p. 2]
Organization: North Dakota Farmers Union (NDFU)
Benefits of Renewable Fuels
NDFU continues to believe that high octanes fuels are the cheapest method for reducing GHG
emissions. Improved engines and high octane fuels, specifically mid-level ethanol blends, are
technologically feasible and economically reasonable means to achieve reduced GHG emissions.
Increased ethanol volume increases the octane level of gasoline across grades. In addition to its
higher octane level, ethanol also boosts engine efficiency.2 Higher ethanol blends can increase
fuel octane without expensive refinery upgrades. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 2]
2 Ricardo, Inc. (2016, September 20). The draft technical assessment report: Implications for high octane,
mid- level ethanol blends, Final report. Prepared for Renewable Fuels Association. Retrieved from
https://d35tlsyewk4d42.cloudfront.net/file/1607/ATTACHMENT-A_Ricardo-TAR-Report-for-
RFA_2016_09-20.pdf.
Ethanol is substantially cleaner than petroleum-based octane additives. It reduces emissions of
particulate matter and air toxics, such as benzene, toluene, and xylene. Ethanol further provides
GHG emissions reductions, which is increasingly important as the carbon intensity of gasoline is
increasing with greater use of unconventional fossil fuels. "Emissions from fossil fuel
combustion comprise the vast majority of energy-related emissions," with an increase in
emissions from the transportation sector largely attributed to increased vehicle miles travelled
and motor gasoline consumption by light-duty vehicles.3 At the same time, energy use in ethanol
production and lifecycle GHG emissions have decreased with changes in farming practices and
higher yields. As EPA has found, the land use, lang-use change, and forestry sector generated a
net increase in carbon stocks.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 2]
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3 Environmental Protection Agency (2023). Inventory of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and sinks: 1990-
2021. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA 430-R-23-002.
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/US-GHG-Inventory-2023-Main-Text.pdf.
4 Id.
EPA should not focus on one technology. While BEVs may be part of the solution, a balanced
approach to emissions reductions using BEVs and other technologies is needed. 11 It is important
that EPA utilize lifecycle analysis to create a level playing field that encourages speedy adoption
of flex-fuel vehicles, hybrid electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and other
technologies, to achieve the most rapid, affordable, robust, and practical GHG emissions
reductions in a wide range of vehicle segments, while satisfying diverse customer needs and
preferences. Furthermore, EPA should revise the proposed standards to a level which can be
achieved using more realistic estimates for future penetration of vehicle technologies and that
incorporates low carbon fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 5]
11 Pratt, G. (2021, August 23). (More) straight talk about Toyota's electric vehicle strategy. Medium.
Retrieved from https://medium.com/toyotaresearch/more-straight-talk-about-toyotas-electric-vehicle-
strategy- f0aba4be40.
Biofuels have an important role to play in supporting family farms and rural communities.
Renewable fuels can also significantly contribute to EPA's emissions reduction goals. However,
we are concerned that EPA's proposal is biased in favor of BEVs and against renewable fuels.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 6]
NDFU believes EPA should take into account lifecycle analysis to provide a fairer and neutral
comparison of technologies available to reduce emissions, including consideration of biofuels.
BEVs are not zero emissions in this context and would not necessarily provide the most cost-
effective, practical or fastest way to achieve EPA's emission reduction goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0586, p. 6]
Organization: Novozymes North America (Novozymes)
Novozymes' Innovative Technologies Result in Lower Biofuel Lifecycle Emissions
Novozymes' enzymatic catalyst solutions, also known as biocatalysts, make the production of
biofuels more efficient and environmentally friendly. Enzymes increase yield, reduce waste,
reduce raw material input, and produce higher energy savings. Enzymes enable biofuel producers
to convert corn kernel, corn stover, wheat straw, wood chips, sawdust, waste, and sugarcane
bagasse into fuel, while collectively increasing yield and energy efficiency throughout the sector.
Our enzymes help biofuel producers get more energy out of every harvest. These technologies
have already helped the U.S. replace about 10% of liquid fuels with renewable alternatives.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0650, pp. 2-3]
Fiberex is a platform designed by Novozymes to utilize waste cellulosic material found in
agricultural products. These cellulase enzymes can convert the cellulosic fiber found in, for
example, corn kernel fiber, into high-value, low-CI products including cellulosic ethanol and
increases corn oil yield that may be utilized as a raw material for renewable diesel production.
This process is critical in maximizing fermentation efficiency and generating the low carbon
products the markets (and consumers) are demanding. This technology has been instrumental in
generating the roughly 120 million gallons of cellulosic ethanol that is currently being shipped to
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California every year. With a CI score 70 percent lower than gasoline, this cellulosic ethanol
made from the corn kernel is helping to lower carbon emissions, drive sustainability in our
transportation sector and create economic impacts from coast to coast. It is vital that, moving
forward, this cellulosic technology can be applied not only to the production of low carbon
ethanol, but increasingly to low carbon biochemicals as well as Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF).
This includes supporting large-scale production of critical enzymes and yeast used in fiber
conversion as well as ensuring that modeling (i.e. Argonne GREET) accurately accounts for the
benefits being seen via this advanced technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0650, pp. 2-3]
Novozymes Innova yeast products deliver unparalleled robustness, help increase ethanol
yield, and reduce fermentation time and operational costs. Novozymes launched its first yeast
product in North America in 2018, and it has now launched 11 yeast products across the globe.
Novozymes' yeast allows producers to consistently reduce corn and chemical inputs and power
through the most challenging conditions. Most of Novozymes' yeast products express enzymes
required to hydrolyze starch to produce glucose. Delivering enzymes via yeast decreases
exogenous enzyme requirements resulting in a more sustainable, and lower CI fermentation
process. Novozymes also developed the Cellerity® yeast platform for second generation biomass
refineries. Cellerity enables increased ethanol yield and improved xylose conversion and
inhibitor tolerance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0650, pp. 2-3]
Above the inherent efficiencies and savings achievable with Novozymes' enzymes alone, the
company's yeast technologies provide additional benefits. Many of our yeasts express critical
enzymes needed for the lowest emissions biofuel production, in addition to converting available
sugars to ethanol. These enzymes reduce the need for exogenous enzyme addition, further
enabling overall lower CI values for today's biofuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0650, pp. 2-3]
EPA Should Issue a Final Rule That is Technology Neutral and Promotes All Available
Lower Emissions Transportation Fuels
Whether intended or not, the practical effect of the proposed rule in its current form would be
to pick winners and losers and would fail to help encourage and facilitate the continued growth,
production and use of vehicles that run on all lower emissions transportation fuels, including low
CI biofuels. This effect would make it harder for the United States to attain its necessarily
ambitious goal to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. This conclusion is especially true
considering that many in the auto and other industries have predicted as overly ambitious and
impractical the myriad policy goals to phase out the sale and production of light and medium
duty vehicles with internal combustion engines by 2030 to 2040. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0650, pp. 2-3]
Although, through this proposal, EPA appears to be essentially directing the auto industry to
sell approximately 67 percent of new cars and trucks as EVs by 2032, there are real questions
whether that many consumers will want to buy them and whether the necessary infrastructure
and grid enhancements to handle that many EVs on the road will be available by that time.
Meantime, the federal government has formulated laws and policies to encourage the increased
investment in and production and use of the cleanest biofuels that have been and continue to be
responsible for massive emissions reductions in the transportation fuel sector over the last two
decades. These policies and laws, including the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), have
worked together to encourage these outcomes and the ongoing innovation within the biofuels
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industry that has and continues to improve the carbon and other GHG emissions reduction
capabilities of the biofuels used in transportation fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0650, pp. 2-3]
We respectfully urge the EPA to revise the proposed rule, so that when it is issued in its final
form, the regulation will not only help facilitate the wider production, sale and use of EVs, but
will simultaneously recognize and build on the enormous emissions reduction success and
potential of biofuels. Both of these outcomes will be needed to meet the transportation fuel need
in this country at least over the next two decades. Moreover, they will be necessary for this
country to achieve net zero emissions by 2050, especially given the realities of legacy ICE
vehicles expected to be on the road at least through the 2040s. Put another way, to achieve this
country's collective net zero by 2050 emissions reduction goals, U.S. policies and laws will need
to recognize and encourage every potential source of clean energy. Biofuels must continue to be
on top of this list for the foreseeable future, and the final rule must reflect this fact so as to avoid
inadvertently leaving behind millions of tons of avoided emissions reductions, or discouraging
the continued investment, innovation and use of low carbon and other GHG emissions fuels in
this country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0650, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Oryxe International Inc. (Oryxe)
Oryxe is a strong supporter of balanced environmental stewardship and shares the Biden
Administration's commitment to increasing vehicle efficiency and reducing carbon dioxide and
criteria pollutant emissions from the transportation sector. In fact, Oryxe built and operates its
business in the pursuit of these goals. However, if finalized as proposed, the Proposed Rule
would have a very significant negative impact on producers of low emission fuel additives such
as Oryxe. For this reason, as discussed further below, Oryxe respectfully requests that EPA
ensure that the final rule (1) recognizes the ability of vehicle manufacturers to use fuel additives
to comply with the standards and (2) accounts for the upstream and lifecycle emissions impact of
electrified vehicles in the light-duty and medium-duty vehicle sectors. Oryxe also offers
comment in response to EPA's announcement that the Agency is considering proposing changes
to the gasoline fuel property standards in order to further reducing PM emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0752, p. 2]
2. EPA Should Account for the Upstream and Lifecycle Emissions Impact of Electrified
Vehicles
Oryxe further urges EPA to fully account for the upstream and lifecycle emissions impact of
electrified vehicles in the light-duty and medium-duty sectors. The Proposed Rule will
effectively force a transition to electrified vehicles while disregarding the emissions impact
associated with sourcing, production, and use of electrified vehicles. These include the carbon
impacts associated with mineral extraction and battery manufacturing, fueling with electricity
made from coal or natural gas, battery disposal and recycling, and potential higher tire and brake
wear from electric vehicles. Manufacturing batteries for use in electric vehicles can contribute
between 10 and 30 percent of lifecycle emissions due to the significant amount of energy needed
to extract and process critical materials.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0752, p. 3]
3 See "Slow Down: The Case for Technology Neutral Transportation Policy," ConservAmerica, at 4-5,
https://staticl.squarespace.eom/static/5d0c9cc5b4fb470001el2e6d/t/5fdl580999fe644e8a504a54/16075
55090612/C A+T ech+Neutral+Paper+-+12,20+%281 %29 .pdf.
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A national strategy that forces a dramatic transition from ICE vehicles to electrified vehicles
in the domestic light-duty and medium-duty vehicle sectors deserves and demands that EPA
undertake a lifecycle analysis for each vehicle technology. To determine the impact on emissions
of each vehicle technology, EPA should conduct a lifecycle analysis to evaluate the manufacture,
materials, disposal, and transport for all needed vehicle components and provide a grams/ton-
mile comparison of the emissions of ICE vehicles and electrified vehicles. Accounting for the
upstream and lifecycle emissions impact of electrified vehicles in any final rule will ensure a
level playing field for all vehicles, including ICE vehicles using fuel additives. In addition, a
technology-neutral strategy that supports multiple options will promote innovation and increase
near-term carbon dioxide and criteria pollutant emission reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0752, pp. 3-4]
Organization: Plains All American Pipeline, L.P. (PAAP)
In general, we have serious concerns about the Proposal. It will render America more
dependent on foreign- controlled supply chains and create irreparable harm to our energy
security, while missing the mark on well- intentioned emission reductions. By focusing solely on
tailpipe emissions, the Proposal would only address certain transportation emissions and fail to
quantify the full lifecycle of emissions for all vehicles, including materials resourcing,
production, operation, battery replacement, recycling and end-of-life disposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0713, p. 1]
Organization: POET, LLC (POET)
POET thanks the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for the opportunity to submit
this comment on the proposed rule, "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027
and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles" (the "Proposed Rule"). POET generally
supports standards, like those in the Proposed Rule, that will significantly curb greenhouse gas
("GHG") emissions from cars and light- and medium-duty trucks covered by the Proposed Rule.
However, EPA must broaden the range of technologies the Proposed Rule relies upon to include
renewable fuels, such as bioethanol, in setting standards for reducing GHG and other emissions.
Renewable fuels will be critical to decarbonizing and reducing other air pollutant emissions from
these vehicles. POET urges EPA to credit renewable fuels, including their significant lifecycle
carbon emissions reductions, and adopt POET's other recommendations in these
comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 1]
I. Summary of Comments
A. Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions.
Renewable fuels, such as bioethanol, significantly reduce lifecycle carbon emissions relative
to fossil fuels and are a key pathway to achieving the Proposed Rule's goals. Yet, the Proposed
Rule provides no mechanism for low-carbon fuels to contribute to decarbonizing the light- and
medium-duty vehicle fleet. Bioethanol can achieve net-zero, or even net-negative, lifecycle
emissions within the Proposed Rule's 2032 timeframe by employing technologies and methods
such as carbon capture, climate-smart farming, and using renewable power or process energy and
biomass for process heat at bioethanol plants. Renewable fuels will be particularly critical in
decarbonizing internal combustion engines ("ICE") in light-duty vehicles ("LDVs") that will
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remain on the road for at least the next several decades. EPA's proposed GHG standards should
credit vehicles that use renewable fuels to reduce their net GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, p. 4]
Renewable fuels are a proven technology. Expanding their use is consistent with federal and
state programs. Many federal and state programs, such as the federal Renewable Fuel Standard
("RFS") and California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard ("LCFS"), support the production of
significant quantities of low-carbon renewable fuels. Renewable fuels such as bioethanol receive
congressionally approved funding and tax credits under the recently enacted Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law ("BIL") and Inflation Reduction Act ("IRA").l Renewable fuels are also key
to the Administration's renewable energy policies. The U.S. National Blueprint for
Transportation Decarbonization, which EPA co-authored, calls for more renewable fuels as one
of its many decarbonization strategies.2 EPA's Proposed Rule must align with those policies by
incentivizing vehicles that run on higher bioethanol blends and thus can achieve significant
lifecycle GHG emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 4]
1 135 Stat. 429 (2021); 136 Stat. 1818 (2022).
2 The U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization (Jan. 2023), available at
https://www.energy.gOv/sites/default/files/2023-01/the-us-national-blueprint-for-transportation-
decarbonization.pdf.
EPA's proposal to address reducing GHG emissions is arbitrary and capricious in only
addressing tailpipe emissions and ignoring the real-world GHG lifecycle impacts of vehicles.
EPA's approach could have significant adverse consequences with respect to GHG emissions
because it inaccurately assumes that electric vehicles have no "upstream" emissions while failing
to incentivize crucial technologies such as bioethanol with significant lifecycle GHG emissions
benefits. EPA thus pushes out of the market highly beneficial but disincentivized bioethanol-
compatible vehicles. To most efficiently reduce greenhouse gases, EPA must establish
compliance crediting for the lifecycle GHG emissions reductions from bioethanol. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 4-5]
Even if EPA does not adopt the lifecycle approach to assess GHG emissions from all light-
duty vehicles, its vehicle GHG program must still distinguish between biogenic and fossil carbon
sources and credit the former (biogenic) as carbon neutral. This approach would recognize the
carbon neutrality and significant benefits of replacing petroleum with renewable liquid fuels. As
President Biden has correctly indicated, "you simply can't get to net zero by 2050 without
biofuels "3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 4-5]
3 See The White House, Remarks by President Biden on Lowering Energy Costs for Working Families
(Apr. 12, 2022), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-
remarks/2022/04/12/remarks-by-president- biden-on-lowering-energy-costs-for-working-families/.
Under EPA's own justification for the Proposed Rule, bioethanol is an essential strategy that
must be recognized and given due credit under the GHG standards. EPA justifies the proposal
based on (i) GHG emission reduction benefits, (ii) manufacturer cost and consumer cost, (iii)
energy security, (iv) "criteria" and toxic air pollutant reductions, and (v) environmental justice.7
EPA inadequately addresses each of these key factors because EPA fails to consider the benefits
of bioethanol for each. By taking this narrow approach that effectively pushes biofuels out of the
market, EPA undermines its own criteria for undertaking the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 5-6]
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7 See e.g., 88 Fed. Reg. at 29347.
The Proposed Rule's analytical gaps regarding the failure to credit real-world biogenic
lifecycle emission benefits and BEV feasibility call into question the legality of the Proposed
Rule as currently structured. As EPA knows, courts will invalidate rules if the agency has
"entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem" or "offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency."8 Additionally, the United States
Supreme Court in West Virginia v. EPA faulted EPA for exercising Clean Air Act authority to
"substantially restructure the American energy market" in a way that "Congress had
conspicuously and repeatedly declined to enact itself "9 By pressing for the extraordinarily rapid
deployment of light-duty BEVs without thoroughly evaluating the lifecycle drawbacks of BEVs
and BEV feasibility, supply chain and infrastructure challenges, and by failing to credit the
lifecycle benefits of biofuels, the Proposed Rule is similarly deficient. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, pp. 5-6]
8 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'nv. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
9 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2610 (2022) (quotation omitted). Similarly, under the "major questions" doctrine,
agencies may not construe a statute to authorize them to exercise powers of "vast economic and political
significance" unless the statute does so in clear terms. Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485,
2489 (2021) (quoting Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 324 (2014)).
Finally, POET strongly supports EPA's proposal to set gasoline fuel property standards to
reduce particulate matter ("PM") emissions from gasoline-fueled LDVs and medium-duty
vehicles. 11 Bioethanol must play a major role in any future regulatory proposal. Bioethanol has
been shown to significantly reduce PM and other toxic air emissions relative to alternative
aromatics and other blending compounds. It will also boost octane levels in gasoline to make up
for any loss in octane from standards requiring removal of certain high-boiling, heavy aromatics.
Bioethanol also has the added benefit of significantly reducing lifecycle GHG emissions unlike
other, carbon-intensive alternatives. EPA should propose standards that tackle two problems at
once, by promoting increased bioethanol blends, such as El 5, that both reduce PM emissions and
help combat climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 6-7]
11 See Proposed Rule at Section IX, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29397-29404.
III. EPA Must Revise the Proposed Rule to Credit Real-World Lifecycle Emissions
Reductions from Renewable Fuels, including Bioethanol.
The Proposed Rule must credit renewable fuels such as bioethanol and their lifecycle GHG
emissions reductions as an additional technology pathway for meeting EPA's emissions
reduction standards. ICE vehicles are expected to remain on the road for decades. The Proposed
Rule recognizes this. It states that "some portion of their light-duty sales will remain ICE-based
for the foreseeable future, predominantly in large SUVs and pickup trucks." 15 Other sources,
such as the U.S. government's leading energy forecaster, show much larger numbers of ICE
vehicles will be on the road for decades to come. 16 Renewable liquid fuels offer one of the best
solutions to decarbonizing those legacy ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 8]
15 See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29187.
16 U.S. Energy Information Administration, AEO2023 Issues in Focus: Inflation Reduction Act Cases in
the AEO2023, at 11 (2023).
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A. Incentivizing Renewable Fuels in the Vehicle GHG Program Will Have Myriad Benefits.
1. Renewable fuels significantly reduce carbon emissions on a lifecycle basis and may soon
achieve net-zero or net-negative emissions.
The carbon-reducing benefits of renewable fuels are immense. Bioethanol, for instance,
reduces lifecycle GHG emissions by at least 46 percent relative to fossil transportation fuels. 17
POET and others are also pursuing ways to reduce lifecycle emissions of renewable fuels even
further. By deploying carbon capture and storage technologies, switching to renewables such as
wind and solar for process energy at production facilities, utilization of renewable biomass rather
than natural gas for process heat, and encouraging farmers to implement climate-smart farming
practices, renewable fuel producers are working to reduce the carbon footprint of their processes
even further and may even achieve net-negative lifecycle emissions—removing carbon from the
total atmospheric carbon load. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 8-9]
17 See Scully MJ, Norris GA, AlarconFalconi TM, Macintosh DL. 2021a. Carbon intensity of corn
ethanol in the United States: state of the science. Environmental Research Letters, 16(4), pp. 043001. The
46 percent reduction figure relates to typical corn starch ethanol on an energy-adjusted basis. Cellulosic
ethanol that is currently being produced is associated with even greater reductions, and corn starch ethanol
may also have greater benefits when its octane value is accounted for.
By POET's calculations, bioethanol production could achieve significant emissions
reductions from such measures, and could even achieve net-negative emissions. The latest
scientific assessments assign bioethanol a carbon intensity of 51.4 gC02/MJ.18 POET estimates
that sequestering the biogenic carbon dioxide byproduct of bioethanol production would reduce
bioethanol's carbon intensity by 30 gC02/MJ. Switching to renewable electricity for process
energy at bioethanol plants would reduce bioethanol's carbon intensity by another 5 gC02/MJ.
And climate-smart farming practices could lower bioethanol's carbon intensity by at least an
additional 30 gC02/MJ. The Proposed Rule should encourage these developments by crediting
renewable fuels for vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 8-9]
18 Id. See also Lewandrawski et al., The greenhouse gas benefits of corn ethanol (March 2019), for a study
with USD A input that while earlier nevertheless finds "opportunities to produce corn ethanol" with
emissions that are 70% lower than gasoline, available at
https://www.tandfonline.eom/doi/full/10.1080/17597269.2018.1546488.
B. EPA Has the Authority to Set GHG Emissions Standards Based on Lifecycle GHG
Emissions Reductions.
EPA has broad authority under Clean Air Action § 202 to set vehicle emissions standards that
extends beyond tailpipe emissions reductions to other emissions in the fuel and vehicle
manufacturing lifecycle. Clean Air Act § 202(a) requires EPA to set vehicle emissions standards
for any air pollutant the Administrator determines may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare. EPA may regulate emissions of such a pollutant "from any class or
classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines."30 The statute does not expressly
limit EPA to regulating emissions only from vehicle tailpipes or the engines themselves. Instead,
it is broadly worded to include emissions of any air pollutant that "cause[s], or contribute^] to,
air pollution."31 Lifecycle (upstream) emissions, especially for GHGs, fit that description.32
And in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court confirmed EPA's broad authority to regulate
additional, non-specified pollutants, provided the agency determines they endanger the public
health or welfare.33 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 8-9]
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30 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
31 Id.
32 Other constraints in § 202(a) do not bar EPA from considering lifecycle emissions. The statute states
that EPA's standards must apply to vehicles and engines during their useful life, cannot take effect until
after a time that the EPA Administrator determines is necessary for the development and application of the
technologies needed to meet EPA's standards, and must consider costs. Id. § 7521(a). None of those
provisions prohibit EPA from crediting bioethanol vehicles for their positive lifecycle GHG emissions
benefits.
33 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 506-07 (2007).
The best reading of Clean Air Act § 202(a) is that it mandates that EPA consider lifecycle
GHG emissions as part of considering GHG emissions "from" motor vehicles. Otherwise, EPA
would be failing "to consider an important aspect of the problem" in violation of U.S. Supreme
Court precedent in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm.34 Emissions of
GHGs, which are a globally mixed pollutant, from any phase of a LDV's lifecycle should be
equally subject to § 202(a). Biofuels address the hazards caused by GHG emissions by reducing
emissions on a lifecycle basis. As a result, the benefits generated by bioethanol in reducing
lifecycle GHG emissions must be recognized through a crediting mechanism or other compliance
flexibility benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 12-13]
34 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, supra. If EPA considers accounting for upstream
emissions inappropriate under 202(a), query if 202(a) is inappropriate for addressing GHGs at all since
GHGs are a globally mixed pollutant not a "tailpipe" pollution issue. Such a question is timely now since
EPA proposes in this rulemaking to affirmatively ignore EV upstream emissions (as opposed to temporarily
excluding upstream emissions when EVs were only an emerging and de minimis share of the vehicle
market).
Courts interpreting § 202 have also found that EPA has the type of discretion sufficient to
allow crediting bioethanol compatible vehicles for their lifecycle benefits. The D.C. Circuit has
observed that"[manufacturers produce a wide variety of motor vehicles of different sizes, some
using different engine technologies resulting in unusual emission characteristics.'^ 5 If EPA's
authority to set emissions standards is flexible enough to address those varying vehicle
characteristics, it should be similarly flexible to allow EPA to credit lifecycle emissions
reductions from bioethanol. Under a common sense reading of section 202(a), EPA's ability to
regulate GHGs from vehicles includes those lifecycle emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp.12-13]
35 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 655 F.2d 318, 322 (1981).
EPA's statements in the Proposed Rule are consistent with the need for the vehicle GHG
program to address lifecycle GHG emissions beyond a narrow focus on tailpipe emissions. EPA
observes that, "[s]ince the earliest days of the CAA, Congress has emphasized that the goal of
section 202 is to address air quality hazards from motor vehicles, not to simply reduce emissions
from internal combustion engines to the extent feasible."36 While EPA is referring to electric
vehicles, that sentiment also applies to the need for EPA to credit the lifecycle benefits of
bioethanol. EPA's goal is to address air quality hazards from carbon dioxide emissions
associated with classes of vehicles. One ton of GHG emissions causes the same harm whether it
is released from a vehicle tailpipe or further upstream. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 12-
13]
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36 88 Fed. Reg. at 29233.
The Proposed Rule's discussion of the legislative and regulatory history regarding automotive
emissions under the Clean Air Act repeatedly refers to alternative power sources and fuels,
which further supports EPA's authority to establish a crediting program that accounts for
bioethanol's lifecycle emissions benefits.37 Nothing in the record suggests that alternative power
sources exclude other low-carbon alternatives, such as liquid renewable fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 12-13]
37 Id.
The Proposed Rule, in fact, confirms that EPA believes it can regulate upstream emissions
under § 202. EPA notes that its own current regulations would require "upstream emissions
accounting for BEVs and PHEVs as part of a manufacturer's compliance calculation" to begin in
MY 2027.38 EPA is now proposing, for the very first time, to permanently eliminate that
upstream emissions accounting.39 But the fact that the current regulations do account for
upstream emissions demonstrates that EPA knows it has the power to account for them in this
Proposed Rule as well. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 12-13]
38 Id. at 29197.
39 Id.
Incorporating lifecycle emissions reductions into the Proposed Rule is the best reading of §
202 for carbon dioxide as an air pollutant, because, unlike other regulated substances, carbon
dioxide (as a GHG) is a global, rather than a local, pollutant, meaning that it does not necessarily
cause adverse effects in the specific places where emitted. GHGs instead result in adverse effects
at a global scale, such as rising sea levels and eroding coastlines, flooding, more frequent and
intense storms, melting polar icecaps, and droughts. A GHG emissions rule that focuses only on
tailpipe emissions when emissions at all lifecycle stages have equal import is the very definition
of arbitrary and capricious.40 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 12-13]
40 See Section IlI.e of these comments regarding absurd results in terms of emissions increases that may
arise from the Proposed Rule as currently structured.
Speed and significance of GHG reductions. Bioethanol significantly reduces carbon emissions
on a lifecycle basis and may soon achieve net-zero, if not or net-negative emissions, within the
timeframe covered by the Proposed Rule.43 As described elsewhere in these comments, FFVs
with low carbon bioethanol can derive significant GHG reductions on par or greater than BEVs,
MLEB-compatible vehicles can provide a key means compliance alternative, and renewable
gasoline can provide a key drop-in fuels and vehicle solution. Agencies are required, as part of
reasoned decision making, to consider "significant and viable and obvious alternatives" to their
proposed action.44 Here, EPA violates this basic requirement with respect to bioethanol. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 14-15]
- Cost effectiveness. Ethanol is a widely used, proven technology that can be cost effective
in reducing GHGs. Again, EPA fails to assess ethanol as a "significant and viable and obvious
alternative[]" including by incentivizing the lifecycle benefits of ethanol to obtain real-world
emission reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 14-15]
- Energy security. EPA acknowledges the energy security benefits of bioethanol in the
technical support document for the proposed rule, noting the "U.S. is less dependent on imported
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oil ... due in part to ... increased production of renewable fuels such as ethanol and biodiesel."45
However, the Proposed Rules ignores bioethanol's significant energy security benefits, while
failing to fully assess the supply chain and critical mineral drawbacks of the dramatically
increased use of BEVs on which the Proposed Rule relies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp.
14-15]
- Criteria pollutant reductions. Ethanol can replace toxic and PM-generating aromatics in
gasoline blends, further reducing criteria and other toxic air pollutant emissions.46 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 14-15]
- Environmental justice. Bioethanol provides a proven solution for low-income communities
compared BEVs, which, due to high costs, lack of charging infrastructure, and other factors,
have yet to be successfully deployed at scale in those communities.47 Bioethanol also reduces
air toxics emissions near roadways that disproportionately impact minority and low-income
communities.48 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 14-15]
43 See generally, Section IILa. 1 of these comments regarding the significant GHG emission reduction
benefits of bioethanol.
44 See Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P. v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see Spirit Airlines, Inc. v.
DOT, 997 F.3d 1247, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ("[T]he failure of an agency to consider obvious alternatives
has led uniformly to reversal.").
45 Draft RIA, p. 11-4.
46 See Section VIII, supra, at 28; see also Attachment 3, EH&E Report (July 5, 2023).
47 See e.g., CalMatters, Who buys electric cars in California, supra, finding "Communities with high
concentrations of electric cars are affluent, college-educated and at least 75% white and Asian" while
"electric cars are almost nonexistent in Black, Latino, low-income and rural communities").
48 See Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Justice and Transportation (last accessed July 5,
2023), available at https://www.epa.gov/mobile-source-pollution/environmental-justice-and-transportation;
see also Kazemiparkouhi, F., Alarcon Falconi, T.M., Macintosh, D.L., and Clark, N. 2022a,
Comprehensive U.S. database and model for ethanol blend effects on regulated tailpipe emissions, Sci.
Total Environ., 812, at 151426; Kazemiparkouhi, F., Karavalakis, G., Alarcon Falconi, T.M., Macintosh,
D.L., and Clark, N. 2022b, Comprehensive U.S. database and model for ethanol blend effects on air toxics,
particle number, and black carbon tailpipe emissions, Atmospheric Environment: X, 16, 100185.
D. EPA Should Credit Renewable Fuels for Their Lifecycle Emissions Reductions or By
Treating the Biogenic Emissions from Renewable Fuels as Zero-Emissions Sources.
Because carbon dioxide differs from other air pollutants, a different regulatory approach is
warranted. The Proposed Rule should include a crediting program for liquid renewable fuels
because they reduce fossil fuel use and the need to extract and burn fossil fuels. Although liquid
renewable fuels emit carbon when burned, those emissions are biogenic: the carbon dioxide
naturally recirculates when the plants and other biomass sources absorb the carbon dioxide as
they grow. The result is no net increase in atmospheric carbon. The more we can rely on fuels
utilizing biogenic carbon, the less we will need to use fossil fuels that increase the atmosphere's
total carbon load. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 15-17]
The lifecycle benefits of biofuels, including bioethanol, are widely recognized by GHG
models such as the GREET model developed and maintained by Argonne National Laboratory.
EPA regularly utilizes lifecycle greenhouse gas modeling in its implementation of the RFS. EPA
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could utilize the Argonne GREET model and its own experience with lifecycle assessments to
establish nationwide average carbon intensity scores for renewable fuels. Vehicles that utilize
those fuels could be credited based on the degree of GHG reductions compared to fossil fuels
and a factor that represents real-world use of renewable fuels in the vehicle—i.e., using an "F
Factor" representing real world biofuel use similar to what EPA currently applies to FFVs, as
discussed below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 15-17]
The crediting mechanism POET recommends closely resembles the "Volumetric Conversion
Factor" (VCF) that EPA established in the vehicle GHG program through model year 2015.
Mathematically, the VCF multiplied the carbon compliance value for E85 by 0.15 to account for
the fact that such fuel nominally contained only 15% petroleum.49 In 2012, EPA declined to
extend use of a VCF beyond model year 2015, stating GHG compliance must be based on
"demonstrated GHG emissions performance."50 However, EPA has learned much regarding
lifecycle emissions in the ensuing 10+ years, and the VCF should be reinstituted for FFVs at
0.15 or some similar value that EPA considers appropriately represents the lifecycle benefits of
ethanol using the latest GHG lifecycle models such as the widely used GREET model. Without
the VCF (or some comparable crediting value) re-instituted in EPA's vehicle GHG regulations,
automakers will stop making FFVs, thus eliminating a key pathway to compliance and real-
world GHG emissions.51 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 15-17]
49 See National Academy of Sciences, Cost, Effectiveness, and Deployment of Fuel Economy
Technologies for Light- Duty Vehicles (2015), p. 60, available at
https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/21744/cost-effectiveness-and- deployment-of-fuel-economy-
technologies-for-light-duty-vehicles. This statutory . 15 VCF derives from the Alternative Motor Fuels Act
of 1988, Public Law 100-494, section 6.
50 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62624, 62823 (Oct. 15, 2012).
51 After EPA's GHG program VCF discontinuation in Model Year 2015, FFV production dropped from
20% of all 2014 light-duty vehicles to only 8% of 2016 vehicles. See EPA, 2020 EPA Automotive Trends
Report (January 2021), pp. 83-84, available at
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1010U68.pdf. FFV production has dropped even further
since 2016 due to EPA's failure to recognize the real-world lifecycle benefits of bioethanol used in FFVs.
If EPA does not wish to examine lifecycle emissions in detail, an alternative approach could
be to assign zero tailpipe emissions to renewable fuels because their biogenic emissions are
canceled out by the carbon intake of biofuels feedstocks. Such an approach would be consistent
with EPA's lack of consideration of lifecycle emissions associated with electric vehicles. EPA
already largely assumes zero tailpipe emissions for renewable fuels when determining whether to
approve new RFS production pathways for biofuels.52 EPA also considers "biogenic C02
emissions resulting from the combustion of biomass from managed forests at stationary sources
for energy production as carbon neutral," per the agency's 2018 statement of policy.53 Similarly,
the California Air Resources Board ("CARB") treats biogenic emissions as carbon neutral under
its cap-and-trade regulations. Under CARB's regulations, C02 emissions from certain biomass-
derived fuels (biogenic solid waste; waste pallets, crates, dunnage, manufacturing and
construction wood wastes, tree trimmings, mill residues, and range land maintenance residues;
all agricultural crops and waste; and certain wood and wood wastes) do not count towards an
entity's compliance obligations. 54 If EPA fails to add any other incentives under its vehicle
GHG program to credit the lifecycle benefits of biofuels, to avoid an arbitrary and capricious
favoring of one technology over another EPA must apply the same assumptions of zero tailpipe
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emissions here for that component of a biofuels-compatible vehicle deemed to operate (per an F
factor) on those biofuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 15-17]
52 See, e.g., ENVIA Energy, LLC, Landfill Biogas to Diesel, Naphtha for D-Code 3 or D-Code 7 RINs
(May 8, 2015), available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-08/documents/envia-energy-
merged-deter-ltr.pdf; Oberon Fuels, Inc., Waste-derived Biogas to Demethyl ether ("DME") (Aug. 12,
2014), available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-08/documents/oberon-fuels-
determination.pdf.
53 EPA's Treatment of Biogenic Carbon Dioxide (C02) Emissions from Stationary Sources that Use
Forest Biomass for Energy Production at 6 (Apr. 23, 2018), available at https://www.epa.gov/air-and-
radiation/epas-treatment- biogenic-carbon-dioxide-emissions-stationary-sources-use-forest.
54 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95852.2.
E. Failing to Account for Lifecycle Emissions Would Lead to Absurd Results.
EPA risks implementing a rule that leads to absurd results if it omits the lifecycle emissions
benefits of biofuels. The rule could end up incentivizing transportation fuels that greatly increase
upstream carbon emissions in the near- and medium-term. Because electricity generation remains
largely fossil-based, EPA concedes that increasing electricity demand in the near-term would
drive up fossil fuel use while the country tries to solve the many challenges associated with
developing renewable electric generating facilities and the transmission capacity to support
them.58 BEVs will also require extracting certain metals at a far larger scale. That extraction can
be energy-intensive and much of it occurs in countries where mining can severely degrade the
environment, including by clear-cutting rainforests that store vast amounts of carbon.59 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 18-19]
58 EPA forecasts that "GHG and criteria pollutant emissions from EGUs would increase as a result of the
increased demand for electricity associated with the proposal." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29198.
59 J. Emont, EV Makers Confront the 'Nickel Pickle,' Wall Street Journal (June 4, 2023),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/electric-vehicles-batteries-nickel-pickle-indonesia-9152blf (describing the
EV makers shift from cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo to nickel mining by clear-cutting
Indonesian rainforests); N. Lahkni, Reveaeled: how US transition to electric cars threatens environmental
havoc, The Guardian (Jan. 24, 2023), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jan/24/us-
electric-vehicles-lithium- consequences-research.
EPA concedes the absurd results of its regulatory approach by noting a "Fleet of all BEVs
would emit 0 g/mi, regardless of their footprints."60 In other words, an electric Lincoln
Navigator, GM Hummer, or "monster truck" has the same GHG emissions (zero) as a sub-
compact Chevy Bolt. This is of course not the case. Larger BEVs have much larger battery packs
(which significantly increase lifecycle emissions) and require much more electricity, which as
discussed above, is still largely fossil-generated. Thus, larger BEVs have much higher upstream
GHG emissions, but EPA's Proposed Rule considers all BEVs as equally having no emissions at
all, regardless of size. Worse still, by granting a zero upstream benefit for BEVs while providing
no credit for the lifecycle benefits of bioethanol or other biofuels, EPA would push real-word
GHG solutions out of the marketplace in favor of potentially more carbon-intensive vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 18-19]
60 88 Fed. Reg. at 29235.
Incorporating renewable fuels could also shore up the rule against a challenge that it violates
precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court in West Virginia v. EPA. That case overturned EPA's
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Clean Power Plan because the Court determined that EPA's regulatory program went too far
toward requiring a shift from conventional sources of electricity generation to renewables, which
in the Court's view would have substantially restructured the American energy market.61
Crediting biofuels in the Proposed Rule would have the opposite effect. Biofuels are already a
key component of the American transportation sector. This is not the case in which, as the
Supreme Court stated in West Virginia v. EPA, the "history and the breadth of the authority that
[EPA] has asserted, and the economic and political significance of that assertion, provide a
reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress meant to confer such authority."62 Congress
has given EPA plain authority to incentivize biofuels under the Clean Air Act and RFS. Those
preexisting programs have encouraged producers to make billions of gallons of renewable fuels
every year. Congress' mandate was clear. The RFS was meant to encourage the production of
renewable fuels that are "used to replace or reduce the quantity of fossil fuel present in a
transportation fuel."63 EPA must interpret its § 202 authority in a manner that is consistent with
the other directives that Congress has imposed on the transportation sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 18-19]
61 See West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2616.
62 Id. at 2595 (quotations omitted).
62 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(l)(J).
63 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(l)(J).
F. Plug-in Hybrid Electric FFVs (PHEV FFVs) Provide a Key Compliance Solution that Must
be Incentivized.
EPA has recognized the need to incentivize emerging technologies under its vehicle GHG
program. With the proper incentives, PHEVs can rapidly scale up to dramatically reduce GHGs
while providing consumer friendly fuel flexibility to adjust low carbon fuel choices to market
conditions. For instance, a PHEV FFV allows consumers to maximize the bioethanol blend used
in a vehicle or rely more heavily on the vehicle battery, depending on the varying costs and
availability of biofuels, electricity, and electric charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, pp. 19-20]
Various technical analyses show that bioethanol flex-fuel paired with hybrid electric
technology can reduce lifecycle emissions just as effectively as comparable BEVs.64 At a
minimum, PHEVs provide a supplemental means to meeting the Proposed Rule's significant
GHG reduction targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 19-20]
64 See ePure, New research confirms important role for renewable ethanol in reducing car emissions
(September 1, 2022), finding that "plug-in hybrid vehicles running on E85 ethanol blend are at least as
climate-friendly as battery electric vehicles," available at https://www.epure.org/press-release/new-
research-confirms-important-role-for- renewable-ethanol-in-reducing-car-emissions/. See also, Mueller and
Unnasch, High Octane Low Carbon Fuels: The Bridge to Improve Both Gasoline and Electric Vehicles
(March 22, 2021), p. 1, available at https://erc.uic.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/633/2021/03/UIC-
Marginal-EV-HOF-Analysis-DRAFT- 3_22_2021_UPDATE.pdf. Here, this Mueller and Unnasch study
found that "High octane fuel vehicles with ethanol provide very similar GHG savings compared to EVs
(within 5 gC02e/MJ of each other) for many states" and "E85 and HOF-plug-in hybrids are the lowest
GHG emitting technology as these vehicles are both able to take advantage of the low carbon intensity of
ethanol in their combustion engine and the low carbon intensity of the electricity grid in hybrid mode of
operation."
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The Proposed Rule correctly explains, "PHEVs may help provide a bridge for consumers that
may not be ready to adopt a fully electric vehicle."65 The Proposed Rule specifically "requests
comment on the types of PHEVs EPA could consider in our analysis for the final rulemaking."66
The same emissions credit for FFVs discussed above (e.g., the 0.15 Volumetric Conversion
factor or a comparable incentive based on the real-world lifecycle benefits of bioethanol) could
apply to PHEV FFVs for that portion of those hybrid vehicles that operate on bioethanol E85,
MLEBs, or other higher-level ethanol blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 19-20]
65 See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29298.
66 Id.
Regarding PHEV pickup trucks, the Proposed Rule correctly notes that "PHEV pickup
architecture would provide several benefits" including among others "zero-emission electric
range," "increased total vehicle range during heavy towing and hauling," and "job-site utility
with auxiliary power capabilities."67 Also, pickup trucks have been a difficult-to-decarbonize
class of vehicles. Even under the Proposed Rule's extremely aggressive electrification scenarios,
medium-duty pickup trucks only obtain a 19% BEV deployment rate in 2032.68 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 20]
67 Id.
68 Id. at 29331.
EPA should specifically incentivize PHEV FFV pickup trucks with additional incentives,
which could go even further beyond incentives for other FFVs. FFV architecture has been
broadly used with pickup trucks, so consumers are familiar with the role biofuels can play.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 20]
Pickup trucks are also broadly used in Midwestern states where bioethanol is readily
available. Various precedent exists for specially incentivizing pickup trucks given the difficulties
in decarbonizing pickup trucks and other work vehicles where consumers need high towing
capacity, reliability and extended range. 69 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 20]
69 California Hybrid and Zero-Emission Truck and Bus Voucher Incentive Project (see more information
at: https://californiahvip.org/); California Innovative Small E-Fleet Pilot (see more information at:
https://californiahvip.Org/purchasers/#isef); Oregon Advanced Clean Trucks Rule 2021, Permanent
Administrative Order DEQ 17-2021 (available at: https://lpdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/DEQ_17-
2021.pdf).
B. EPA Has Relied on Unreasonable and Unsupported Assumptions in Its Assessment of
GHG Emissions Reductions.
The Trinity report also addresses certain unfounded assumptions in EPA's assessment of
GHG emissions reductions and has identified the following flaws. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp. 24-25]
First, EPA ignores upstream emissions from BEVs other than emissions from electricity
generation. 105 EPA's assessment assigns 710 metric tons of GHG emissions from the increased
electricity needed to power BEVs incentivized by the Proposed Rule. However, the Trinity
report demonstrates that EPA's assessment significantly undercounts those emissions. The report
cites a recent study showing that between "56 to 494 kilograms of C02eq emissions per kWh of
battery pack capacity which translates to between about 5 and 50 metric tons of GHG emissions
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per 100 kWh battery pack."106 Using this study and EPA's estimate of 80 million BEVs on the
road by 2055, Trinity calculates additional upstream emissions between 400 and 4,000 metric
tons. 107 That is in addition to the 710 metric tons EPA calculates for electricity generation.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 24-25]
105 Attachment 2 at 10.
106 Id.
107 Id.
Finally, the Proposed Rule overstates the GHG emissions reductions the Proposed Rule could
achieve by failing to account for emissions reductions from bioethanol and other biofuels that are
currently blended into transportation fuels for existing conventional vehicles. 110 EPA must take
those emission reductions into account in its baseline when calculating GHG emissions
reductions attributable to the Proposed Rule. Lifecycle emission reductions are at the core of
EPA's own RFS program incentivizing the production of biofuels. EPA should not consider
those reductions in the RFS program only to ignore them here in order to inflate this Proposed
Rule's GHG benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 25]
110 Id. at 12.
EPA should address these flawed assumptions in its GHG emissions assessment. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 25]
V. OMEGA Modeling Highlights the Feasibility Challenges of EPA's Proposed Rule and
How Biofuels Could Make the Rule More Workable.
After conducting a series of runs using EPA's OMEGA model, OnLocation in the attached
report concludes that EPA's Proposed Rule on light-duty vehicle emissions "has significant
shortcomings in achieving its stated goal of reducing GHG emissions." 111 OnLocation finds that
compliance with the Proposed Rule "can only be achieved through a narrow range of BEV
vehicle penetration pathways." 112 While EPA relies on BEV penetrations around 67% of new
light-duty vehicle sales in 2032, OnLocation finds that if a production limit of 60% is imposed
on BEVs in that general timeframe, compliance with the target emission goals is prevented
through 2034.113 When a BEV production limit of 50% is similarly imposed, compliance is
generally not achieved throughout the timeframe covered by the Proposed Rule and not even
through the year 2050.114 Furthermore, ICE vehicles cannot make up the difference in GHG
emissions reductions. 115 This result occurs because EPA does not consider the lifecycle benefits
of biofuels while artificially assigning zero emissions to BEVs (ignoring the upstream emissions
of BEVs), and for other reasons that may include EPA assigning unduly low battery costs to
BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 26]
111 Attachment 1, at 2, 16.
112 Id. at 1.
113 Id. at 7 & Fig. 4.
114 Id. 4 & Fig. 1.
115 OnLocation found "no amount of technological improvements for ICE vehicles incorporated by EPA
for their supporting analysis with the OMEGA model for ICE vehicles can compensate for even a relatively
small reduction in the penetration rate of BEVs." See id. at 3.
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OnLocation also finds that if BEV upstream emissions are considered, "real-world" emissions
to the atmosphere from covered vehicles would be at levels significantly higher than the
proposed compliance standards. More specifically, if upstream fuel production emissions are
accounted for regarding BEVs, the Proposed Rule's 86 gram per mile target in 2032 cannot be
met when using electric grid GHG emission intensities from EIA, the leading U.S. governmental
source for independent energy statistics and analysis. 116 Note that OnLocation's analysis does
not seek to account for battery manufacturing lifecycle emissions, which is addressed in Trinity's
report, as described above. As Trinity has shown, "actual BEV lifecycle emissions would be
even higher if battery manufacturing impacts are considered." 117 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp. 26-27]
116 Id. at 1, 10.
117 Id. at 10.
OnLocation further finds that "using only tailpipe emissions provides inconsistent incentives
between BEV and ICE vehicles, while optimistic projections for the grid carbon intensity and
BEV penetration could reduce the effectiveness of the Proposed Rule in reducing carbon." 118
Regarding electric grid intensity, OnLocation finds that EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis
(DRIA) using its model shows a 70% reduction of power sector-related C02 emissions from
current levels by 2055, while EIA's reference case "shows closer to a 50% reduction from
current levels and substantially less C02 reduction if renewable costs do not decline as quickly
as in the Reference scenario." 119 While ICE vehicles have incentives under the proposal to
reduce their tailpipe GHG emissions, BEVs and the electric grid lack GHG reduction incentives
since the Proposed Rule effectively assumes that all electricity used by BEVs is zero
carbon. 120[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 26-27]
118 Id. at 14.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 16.
OnLocation also finds EPA considering the lifecycle benefits of biofuels (like bioethanol)
would have various benefits. For instance, OnLocation considers a scenario where biofuels
reduce ICE vehicle carbon intensity by 75%. In this scenario, "greater total emission reductions
(i.e., those that consider upstream emissions) are achieved by deploying low-carbon ICE
vehicles" and "with lower-carbon ICE fuels (such as low carbon bioethanol), and considering
upstream emissions, compliance within the range of EPA's proposed target is possible."121
However, as OnLocation highlights, the OMEGA model is likely undercounting actual biofuel
benefits for a number of reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 27]
121 Id. at 14.
Manufacturing emissions differ between EV and ICE
[See original attachment for Figure 14. Vehicle Manufacturing Emissions] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
Emissions for BEV200, BEV300, and BEV400 compared with midsize gasoline ICEV.
Source: Cradle-to-Grave Lifecycle Analysis of U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle-Fuel Pathways: A
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Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Economic Assessment of Current (2020) and Future (2030-
2035) Technologies, Argonne National Lab, 2022 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
As shown in Figure 14, compared with a midsize gasoline ICEV, a BEV has higher emissions
from vehicle manufacturing under current technologies, ranging from approximately 10
gC02e/mi in a BEV200, to 25 gC02e/mi in a BEV300, and 35 gC02e/mi in BEV400, according
to the lifecycle analysis by the Argonne National Lab (battery emissions are embedded in Figure
14 within "vehicle" emissions, and are most significant in the data in Figure 14 labelled "Current
Tech"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
Relative to the -80 gC02e/mi EPA proposed compliance value, where the alternatives are +-
10 gC02e/mi, these are substantial incremental emissions that are neglected when upstream
emissions are ignored. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
VIII. POET Strongly Supports EPA's Suggestion in Section IX of the Proposed Rule to
Institute a Future Regulatory Action to Further Limit PM Emissions from Vehicles and Nonroad
Equipment.
POET strongly supports EPA's consideration of a possible future rulemaking aimed at further
PM emissions reductions for vehicles and nonroad equipment. 134 POET agrees with the EPA's
assessment that reducing certain high-boiling compounds in gasoline could further reduce
vehicle PM emissions. 135 However, removing those heavy aromatic compounds will lower
gasoline octane levels. To most effectively reduce tailpipe PM emissions while retaining high-
octane gasoline, POET urges EPA to support a future rule that would limit the use of high-
boiling compounds while encouraging those compounds to be replaced with higher bioethanol
blends, such as E15. Bioethanol boosts octane while decreasing PM emissions. Bioethanol also
significantly reduces lifecycle GHG emissions compared to more carbon-intensive alternative
octane-boosting compounds, such as heavy aromatics.136 Bioethanol should be EPA's preferred
solution because it both reduces toxic air pollutants and helps combat climate change. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 29-31]
134 88 Fed. Reg. at 29397.
135 Id. at 29398.
136 See generally Attachment 3.
In support of POET's position, POET retained Environmental Health & Engineering, Inc.
("EH&E"), who prepared a report on the potential changes to EPA gasoline fuel property and
GHG standards for light- and medium-duty vehicles in the Proposed Rule, attached hereto as
Attachment 3. EH&E's report confirms that heavy aromatics have significant negative impacts
on PM emissions. 137 The report assesses EPA's position that high boiling compounds are
associated with increased tailpipe emissions, reviews the impact of removing high boiling
compounds on gasoline and refineries, analyzes the suitability of EPA's Haverly model, studies
the importance of octane for gasoline, and evaluates increased ethanol blending as an alternative
for octane contributions in gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 29-31]
137 88 Fed. Reg. at 29398.
EH&E's report uses the particulate matter index, or "PMI," to predict the propensity of PM in
various gasoline compounds. PMI values are correlated with emissions of PM: the higher a
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compound's PMI value, the higher the tailpipe PM emissions for gasoline containing that
compound. 138 Studies have found that high-boiling compounds—and particularly heavy
aromatics—have significantly higher PMI values than other, lower-boiling compounds in
gasoline blends. 139 And while heavy aromatics are only a small portion of the compounds
making up gasoline, about 2.4% of gasoline by volume, they contribute disproportionately to the
PMI of gasoline, making up about 38 percent of gasoline's PMI value. 140 In comparison,
ethanol has proven to be the most favorable component in gasoline in terms of PMI contribution:
it represents 10% of gasoline volume but contributes less than 1% to PMI. 141 Because the PMI
value of ethanol is so low, the PM emissions associated with gasoline blended with higher levels
of ethanol are significantly lower than gasoline containing heavy aromatics. 142 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 29-31]
138 Attachment 3 at 3.
139 Id. at 1, 3.
140 Id. at 6.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 3-8.
Despite the negative air quality impacts of heavy aromatics, they do serve to increase octane
in gasoline. Sufficiently high octane levels are necessary for the efficient operation of vehicles
with internal combustion engines. 143 Specifically, octane supports high compression ratios,
turbocharging, and advanced spark and valve timing and downsizing. 144 If EPA moves forward
with a rulemaking to limit heavy aromatics in gasoline, EPA should also identify an alternative
to maintain octane levels and develop its standards with that alternative in mind. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 29-31]
143 Id. at 10-11.
144 Id. at 11.
Bioethanol's criteria pollutant emission benefits are well documented. Two studies published
by EH&E's team, the Kazemiparkouhi et al. (2022a) and Kazemiparkouhi et al. (2022b) studies,
establish the air quality benefits of adding increasing ethanol blends to El 5 or higher. Those
studies represent the "first large-scale analyses of data from light-duty vehicle emissions studies
to examine real-world impacts of ethanol-blended fuels on air pollutant emissions, including PM,
NOx, CO, and THC, as well as BTEX (benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene) and 1,3-
butadiene "152 These significant benefits include: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 32-33]
152 EPA Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0513, comment submitted by POET LLC, Attachment 1 at 3; see
also Kazemiparkouhi, F., Alarcon Falconi, T.M., Macintosh, D.L., and Clark, N. 2022a, Comprehensive
U.S. database and model for ethanol blend effects on regulated tailpipe emissions, Sci. Total Environ., 812,
at 151426; Kazemiparkouhi, F., Karavalakis, G., Alarcon Falconi, T.M., Macintosh, D.L., and Clark, N.
2022b, Comprehensive U.S. database and model for ethanol blend effects on air toxics, particle number,
and black carbon tailpipe emissions, Atmospheric Environment: X, 16, 100185.
- Aromatic levels in market fuels decreased by -7% by volume for each 10% by volume
increase in ethanol content.
- PM emissions decreased by 15-18% on average for each 10% increase in ethanol content
under cold-start conditions.
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- Emissions of CO and THC generally decreased with increasing ethanol fuel content under
cold running conditions, while NOx emissions did not change.
- Air toxic emissions showed lower BTEX, 1-3 butadiene, black carbon, and particle number
emissions with increasing ethanol fuel content. 153 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 32-33]
153 EPA Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0513, comment submitted by POET LLC, Attachment 1 at 3-4.
Using bioethanol blending as an alternative for octane in gasoline would also promote EPA's
goal of reducing GHG emissions. As discussed above, bioethanol reduces lifecycle GHG
emissions by at least 46 percent relative to fossil fuel. 154 Thus, EPA's potential rulemaking
could tackle two goals at once—decreasing tailpipe PM emissions and reducing lifecycle GHG
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 32-33]
154 See Scully MJ, Norris GA, Alarcon Falconi TM, Macintosh DL. 2021a. Carbon intensity of corn
ethanol in the United States: state of the science. Environmental Research Letters, 16(4), pp. 043001. The
46 percent reduction figure relates to typical corn starch ethanol on an energy-adjusted basis. Cellulosic
ethanol that is currently being produced is associated with even greater reductions, and corn starch ethanol
may also have greater benefits when its octane value is accounted for.
EPA has broad authority under Section 211(c)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act to issue regulations
controlling fuels or fuel additives that cause and/or contribute to air pollution that may endanger
public health. 155 This authority permits EPA to limit high-boiling compounds/heavy aromatics
because these fuel additives contribute to PM emissions which endanger public health. Pursuant
to Section 211(c)(2)(A), EPA must consider all relevant scientific evidence available to the
agency when setting these standards, including the significant evidence that bioethanol blending
is the most practicable replacement for heavy aromatics, and that bioethanol has particularly
significant emissions benefits for PM, other criteria pollutants, and GHGs.156 The further
reduction of aromatics in gasoline would also be consistent with EPA's mandates and authority
under the Mobile Source Air Toxics Program. 157 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 33]
155 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A).
156 Id. § 7545(c)(2)(A).
157 See Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources, 72 Fed. Reg. 8428 (Feb. 26, 2007).
Bioethanol does not receive the credit it deserves as a powerful tool in reducing both criteria
pollutant and GHG emissions. Replacing heavy aromatics with bioethanol blending would
maintain octane levels, reduce tailpipe PM emissions, and reduce lifecycle GHG emissions,
furthering many of EPA's Clean Air Act mandates. EPA should carefully consider the benefits
of bioethanol blending as a key solution in any potential rulemaking to further reduce tailpipe
PM reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 33]
Introduction
Peter Whitman and Michael Schaal of OnLocation ("Authors") have been asked to review the
assumptions and modeling in support of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA's")
proposed "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and
Medium-Duty Vehicles," under Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0451 ("Proposed
Rule"), that addresses standards for criteria pollutants and greenhouse gases (GHG) for light-
duty vehicles and Class 2b and 3 ("medium-duty") vehicles for model years 2027 through 2032.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-36]
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OnLocation's Analysis
In this analysis, we reviewed EPA's assumptions and then we performed a series of test
scenarios to observe the robustness of the results obtained using EPA's OMEGA (Optimization
Model for reducing Emissions of Greenhouse Gases from Automobiles) model. This OMEGA
model is the same model that EPA used in the Proposed Rule for its analysis of compliance
scenarios. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-36]
1 Available at https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/optimization-model-
reducing-emissions- greenhouse-gases
EPA's Assumptions
We focus on two interrelated aspects of the rulemaking: using only tailpipe emissions for
compliance with the MY 2027 - 2032 standards and only a narrow range of BEV penetration
trajectories that will allow compliance to be achieved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-
36]
Our key insight is that compliance can only be achieved through a narrow range of BEV
vehicle penetration pathways. We demonstrate this through a set of runs using EPA's OMEGA
model described below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-36]
In addition, we note that upstream emissions are a significant contributor to GHG emissions
and ignoring them has implications for aligning the incentives for compliance to the Proposed
Rule with its intent, reductions in GHG emissions. This leads to the following observations:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-36]
- Should upstream emissions for all fuels, including electricity, be incorporated in
compliance, projections of grid carbon emissions vary widely, and according to our modeling
using the OMEGA model, EPA's proposed standard of 86 grams/mile in 2032 cannot be met
when using EIA's projected electric grid carbon intensities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609,
pp. 35-36]
- Upstream manufacturing emissions are an important differentiator between vehicles but are
not accounted for. Using only tailpipe emissions provides inconsistent incentives between BEVs
and ICE vehicles, while EPA's optimistic projections for the grid carbon intensity and BEV
penetration could reduce the effectiveness of the Proposed Rule in reducing carbon. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-36]
- Because upstream emissions are ignored in the Proposed Rule, the shape of the GHG
footprint-based compliance curve depends on the assumed BEV penetration, even though it is
only applicable to ICE vehicles. If BEVs penetration is different than EPA projections, then
EPA's proposed compliance curves are likely to be inconsistent with the analysis used in their
development and penalize larger footprint vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-36]
Per the Summary at the end of this report, our analysis of the EPA's Proposed Rule on light-
duty vehicle emissions finds it has significant shortcomings in achieving its stated goal of
reducing GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 35-36]
Finally, we look at three scenarios showing the effect of upstream emissions and low-carbon
fuels on meeting the Proposed Rule.
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Scenario 4: Adding Upstream Emissions to the Compliance Values Scenario 5: 10%
Reduction in Carbon Intensity of Gasoline, Scenario 6: 75% Reduction in Carbon Intensity of
Gasoline [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 37]
The first three OMEGA runs show a narrow range of BEV penetration pathways will allow
sufficient reductions to support compliance with the Proposed Rule, and that reductions in BEV
market share cannot be compensated for by ICE technology improvements. The latter three runs
show that low carbon fuels could potentially play an important role in GHG emission reductions.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 37]
Testing the Robustness of the Proposed Rule using OMEGA
OnLocation executed numerous runs of the OMEGA model to test the boundaries of its
domain and the robustness of the supporting analysis. The following scenarios explore some of
the limitations of the modeling and the lack of robustness of the Proposed Rule to changes in
market assumptions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 37-41]
Scenario 1: Production Limit on BEV Production [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 37-
41]
[See original attachment for Figure 1 Compliance Path with Production Limit]
[See original attachment for Figure 2 Market Shares]
In Scenario 1, only tailpipe emissions were included for compliance purposes, while potential
BEV penetration was limited to 30% in 2025, 40% in 2030, and 50% from 2035 onwards. Figure
1 shows the effects of BEV production limits. From 2027 through 2051, the target is not reached.
Figure 2 below shows the evolution of the market share of different vehicle categories for this
scenario, where the BEV production limits are binding at 30%, 40%, and then 50%. It is clear
that the BEV penetration constraints limit the ability of manufacturers to meet the target, as the
fuel efficiency improvements available for ICE vehicles are insufficient to compensate for the
zero tailpipe emissions of the BEV vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 37-41]
In Figure 1 and in each of the following figures labeled "Compliance Path," the blue line
indicates the target emissions while the red line indicates achieved emissions. Yellow circles
indicate banked credits from previous periods, while the green lines indicate inter-temporal
credit trades. The red circles indicate fleet does not reach compliance in that year. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 37-41]
Scenario 2: Relaxed Production Limit on BEV Production [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609,
pp. 37-41]
[See original attachment for Figure 3 Compliance Path with Relaxed Production Limit]
[See original attachment for Figure 4 Market Shares with Relaxed Production Limit]
Scenario 2 follows the C02 targets in the Proposed Rule, with no upstream emissions. In this
scenario, production limits on BEVs were relaxed relative to Scenario 1. BEV penetration was
initially limited to 40%, rising to 50% in 2030 and 60% in 2035 for the remainder of the
scenario. Even these relaxed production limits on BEV market penetration were binding
throughout the simulation (Figure 3), preventing compliance with the target emission goals
through 2034 (Figure 4). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 37-41]
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The effect of low-carbon fuels
The first three scenarios all identified the risks of developing a new set of rules which are
highly dependent on a high BEV market share being achieved. In the next three scenarios, we
examine the effect of upstream emissions and low-carbon fuels in achieving the targets of the
Proposed Rule. The first scenario evaluated in this regard follows on the next page. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 42-44]
Scenario 4: Adding Upstream Emissions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 42-44]
[See original attachment for Figure 7 Compliance Path with Upstream Emissions]
[See original attachment for Figure 8 Market Shares with Upstream Emissions]
In Scenario 4, upstream emissions were added to the compliance calculations for gasoline,
diesel, and electricity (these upstream emissions for BEVs include grid impacts, but BEV battery
manufacturing impacts are not included). The AEO2023 EIA Reference Scenario was used to
calculate upstream emissions of grid electricity. As shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, with the
addition of upstream emissions, the BEV market share rises to over 80%, much greater than the
67% market share in the central case of the Proposed Rule. To achieve this BEV market share,
the domestic infrastructure would have to grow at an accelerated rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, pp. 42-44]
This figure shows that using the OMEGA model, EPA's proposed standard of 86 grams/mile
in 2032 cannot be met if upstream emissions are also included. Furthermore, actual BEV
lifecycle emissions would be even higher if battery manufacturing impacts are considered. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 42-44]
In this scenario, the LDV fleet does not reach the modelled target emission until 2036, and
compliance is intermittent throughout the model forecast. EPA's having such stringent target
emission goals, which rely to such a degree on the implementation of BEVs into the market,
ignores the importance of upstream emissions, as model runs indicate upstream emissions
generally render any achievable fleet of BEVs and ICE vehicles (within the current technology
packages of the model, which don't include biofuels carbon intensity reductions) out of
compliance with EPA's proposed standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 42-44]
Scenario 5: Low Carbon Fuel [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 45-46]
[See original attachment for Figure 9 Compliance Path with Low Carbon Fuel (gasoline with
10%) lower Carbon Intensity)]
[See original attachment for Figure 10 Market Shares with Low Carbon Fuel]
In Scenario 5, starting in 2030, gasoline combustion emissions were reduced by 10%> to
represent the introduction of low-carbon biofuels such as bioethanol. No upstream emissions
were included within the model. This scenario effectively provides compliance flexibility for the
Proposed Rule, leading to a 0.2% to 0.4% reduction in the absolute market share of BEVs from
2035-2050. Greater reductions in the need for high BEV shares could potentially result if the
model is revised to (i) assess a broader range of battery learning curve algorithms, and (ii) the
"zero emissions" treatment assigned to BEVs is refined. Further evaluation of these issues is
warranted by EPA to ensure that small changes in BEVs under this scenario 5 (e.g., lower carbon
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intensity gasoline) are not a result of artifacts of the modelling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp. 45-46]
Scenario 6: Adding Low Carbon Fuel and Upstream Emissions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp. 47-48]
[See original attachment for Figure 11 Compliance Path with Low Carbon Fuel and Upstream
Emissions]
[See original attachment for Figure 12 Market Shares with Low Carbon Fuel and Upstream
Emissions]
Scenario 6 presents a 75% reduction in fuel carbon intensity for gasoline, though including
upstream emissions including those for BEVs. Figure 11 and Figure 12 show that using the
model compliance with the Proposed Rule's targets still could be achievable, though outside of
2027 - 2032 timeframe when considering both upstream emissions and the impact if biofuels
reduce ICE vehicle carbon intensity by 75%. In this scenario, the market share of BEVs only
changes slightly from the Proposed Rule, however in the model greater total emission reductions
(i.e., those that consider upstream emissions) are achieved by deploying low-carbon ICE
vehicles. This scenario shows that with lower-carbon ICE fuels (such as low carbon bioethanol),
and considering upstream emissions, compliance within the range of EPA's proposed target is
possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 47-48]
Ignoring Upstream Emissions is Inconsistent with Incentivizing GHG Emission Reductions
The following section demonstrates that using only tailpipe emissions provides inconsistent
incentives between BEV and ICE vehicles, while optimistic projections for the grid carbon
intensity and BEV penetration could reduce the effectiveness of the Proposed Rule in reducing
carbon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 48]
Upstream Emissions are Uncertain
While EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA) using its model shows a 70%
reduction of power sector- related C02 emissions from current levels by 2055. As shown in
Figure 13, EIA's reference scenario shows closer to a 50% reduction from current levels and
substantially less C02 reduction if renewable costs do not decline as quickly as in the Reference
scenario. If included in the C02 targets, differences between grid emissions and projections used
in the Proposed Rule could have a significant impact on the ability of manufacturers to achieve
compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 48]
[See original attachment Figure 13. Grid Intensity]
Source: AEO 2023 Reference, High Technology Cost Tables 8, 18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0609, p. 48]
Manufacturing emissions differ between EV and ICE
[See original attachment for Figure 14. Vehicle Manufacturing Emissions] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
Emissions for BEV200, BEV300, and BEV400 compared with midsize gasoline ICEV.
Source: Cradle-to-Grave Lifecycle Analysis of U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle-Fuel Pathways: A
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Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Economic Assessment of Current (2020) and Future (2030-
2035) Technologies, Argonne National Lab, 2022 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
As shown in Figure 14, compared with a midsize gasoline ICEV, a BEV has higher emissions
from vehicle manufacturing under current technologies, ranging from approximately 10
gC02e/mi in a BEV200, to 25 gC02e/mi in a BEV300, and 35 gC02e/mi in BEV400, according
to the lifecycle analysis by the Argonne National Lab (battery emissions are embedded in Figure
14 within "vehicle" emissions, and are most significant in the data in Figure 14 labelled "Current
Tech"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
Relative to the -80 gC02e/mi EPA proposed compliance value, where the alternatives are +-
10 gC02e/mi, these are substantial incremental emissions that are neglected when upstream
emissions are ignored. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
Shape of footprint curve depends on BEV penetration rate
As noted in the Proposed Rule, "The slope that corresponded with a neutral response for ICE
vehicles only (overall, no change in the average footprint of ICE vehicles) was 0.8 g/mi/square
foot. This slope was then scaled down accordingly-for example, based on a nominal BEV sales
penetration of around 50%, this 0.8 slope would be scaled down to 0.4 (based on the remaining
50% of ICE vehicles) "6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
6 Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis, 1-7.
The targets defined in the Proposed Rule are a function of vehicle footprint. That is, the
compliance target depends upon the footprint of the vehicle. Figure 15 shows the EPA's
proposed footprint for cars. If the penetration of BEV is much below the proposal, the footprint
target function is too flat relative to the actual market share of non-BEV vehicles, penalizing ICE
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
[See original attachment for Figure 15] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
Source: "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty
and Medium-Duty Vehicles," Federal Register Vol. 88, No. 87, pg. 29237. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 49-50]
Ignoring upstream emissions has other negative effects on incentivizing reductions of GHG
emissions from LDVs, including disregarding the substantially greater GHG manufacturing
footprint of BEVs over conventional vehicles and decreasing incentives for clean electricity
(since EPA assumes, under the Proposed Rule's compliance scheme, that all electricity used in
EVs is effectively zero carbon). This analysis also shows that a rulemaking that also considers
low-carbon ICE vehicles (such as enabled by low-carbon bioethanol) can facilitate compliance
with EPA standards while decreasing the larger system emissions (including upstream
emissions) in the atmosphere. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 50]
The first of these concerns is that U.S. EPA has ignored upstream sources of GHG emissions
other than electricity generation. This is of particular concern given that there are significant
upstream emissions associated with the manufacturer of batteries for BEVs that do not occur
with conventional vehicles. A paper published by ICCT4 notes that estimates of these GHG
emissions range from 56 to 494 kilograms of C02eq emissions per kWh of battery pack capacity
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which translates to between about 5 and 50 metric tons of GHG emissions per 100 kWh battery
pack. Using U.S. EPA's assumption that the Proposed Rule will result in an additional
80,000,000 BEVs on the road in the U.S. by 2055 relative to the no- action case, and these
estimates of GHG emissions from battery production, the cumulative increase in GHG emissions
by would be between 400 and 4000 metric tons. This value can be compared to U.S. EPA's 710
metric ton estimate of the cumulative GHG emissions increase due to electricity generation for
BEVs and the 8,000 ton reduction from conventional vehicles (see DRIA Table 9-21) to show
the importance of accounting for battery production emissions. U.S. EPA might respond by
noting that they have not accounted for upstream GHG emissions associated with the production
of gasoline and diesel, but those are small compared to the GHG emissions from fuel combustion
and accounting for them would assume a net global reduction in the use of those fuels which
would likely, even with the Proposed Rule, still be used in other parts of the developing world.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 62]
4 https ://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/EV-life-cycle-GHG_ICCT-Briefing_09022018_vF.pdf.
U.S. EPA Fails to Account for the Potential of Increased Use of Ethanol to Achieve GHG
Reductions as an Alternative to BEVs
Although BEVs have zero tailpipe emissions of C02, they are still sources of C02 emissions
because of the emissions associated with fossil fuels used to produce the electricity used to
power them. It then follows that the magnitude of the effective C02 emissions from these BEVs
will, in general, not be zero but will in fact vary depending on the source of that electricity. GHG
emissions associated with the manufacture of batteries are another significant source of upstream
emissions for BEVs. As noted above, based on a paper published by ICCT,7 upstream emissions
associated with battery production vary considerably depending on the region in which they are
manufactured as well as the size of the battery pack and selected a value on the order of 50
gC02eq per mile as being representative. This value is obviously large when compared to the
standards of the Proposed Rule (see Table 8) which range from 134 gC02eq per mile in MY
2027 and 73 gC02eq per mile in MY 2032 and thereafter. Despite the significant upstream
emissions associated with BEVs, U.S. EPA is, as part of the Proposed Rule, planning to change
existing requirements that would account for these "upstream" emissions in determining GHG
associated with BEVs for purposes of regulatory compliance (FR Vol. 88, No. 87 at 29197).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 64-96]
7 https ://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/EV-life-cycle-GHG_ICCT-Briefing_09022018_vF.pdf.
In contrast, while ICE vehicles fueled by ethanol-gasoline or neat ethanol will have tailpipe
C02 emissions, they may have lower overall effective C02 emissions than BEVs. This is
because there may be less fossil fuel used in their production and/or carbon capture and
sequestration may be applied as well as the fact that the C02 emitted at the tailpipe will
ultimately be removed from the atmosphere by the growing of the next generation of feedstock
plants. In addition, and unlike BEVs, the expanded use of ethanol would not result in any
appreciable increase in upstream GHG emissions associated with vehicle manufacture. It is
important to note that U.S. EPA claims that the purpose of the Proposed Rule is to generate
. substantial additional reductions in criteria pollutants and GHG emissions from the
transportation sector" in order to achieve public health and welfare goals (FR Vol. 88, No. 87 at
29186). Given this, it is unclear why the Proposed Rule is effectively a mandate forcing
automakers to produce and attempt to sell BEVs rather than a mechanism providing vehicle
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manufacturers with a range of options to reduce GHG emissions from new vehicles. Clearly,
increased use of renewable ethanol as a direct substitute for petroleum-based gasoline would
achieve this goal. For example, the widespread use of 20 percent gasoline-ethanol blends rather
than the current 10 percent blends in new light-duty vehicles would double the associated GHG
reductions. Further, the use of biofuels such as ethanol-gasoline which offer high octane ratings
in combination with advanced combustion technologies that can offer substantial improvements
in fuel efficiency as evidenced by the results of the U.S. Department of Energy's "Co-
Optimization of Fuels & Engines" program8 and other research. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0609, pp. 64-96]
8 https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/beto-co-optima-fyl5-fy21-impact.pdf.
Overall, it is not clear why U.S. EPA has chosen to completely ignore the potential for the use
of renewable biofuels to substantially reduce GHG emissions from light- and medium-duty
vehicles in developing the Proposed Rule and instead myopically focused on a single unproven
technology that will require a complete transformation of the vehicle industry - BEVs. U.S. EPA
should consider the addition of provisions in the Proposed Rule that would lead to greater
substitution of ethanol and other renewable fuels for gasoline and diesel used in conventional
vehicles These provisions would include creating appropriate tailpipe GHG credit provisions for
new vehicles designed to operate on ethanol blends above E10 and up to E99 that recognize the
renewable nature of ethanol. An obvious advantage of this approach is that it would provide
vehicle and engine manufacturers with compliance options other than overreliance on BEV
technology that may or may not be available and/or accepted in the marketplace and help to
ensure that substantial reductions in GHG emissions are actually realized by the Proposed Rule.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 64-96]
[See original attachment for James Lyon's resume] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 64-
96]
[See original attachment (A3) for comments attributed to Environmental Health and
Engineering and address proposed potential changes to EPA gasoline fuel property and
greenhouse gas standards.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 64-96]
Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)
To ensure the final tailpipe standards have the desired effect of truly reducing GHG emissions
from transportation, RFA strongly urges EPA to adopt a full lifecycle GHG accounting approach
for all vehicles in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 6-8]
VI. EPA Should Adopt a Full Lifecycle Analysis Approach for All Vehicle Options that
Includes Upstream GHG Emissions Associated with Vehicle Fuel/Energy Use
Vehicles and fuels operate together as integrated systems. This is true whether the system is a
battery electric vehicle operating on electricity, or an ICE vehicle operating on liquid fuel. To
effectively regulate emissions associated with the operation of light- and medium-duty vehicles,
EPA must adopt approaches that most accurately assess the overall climate impacts of various
transportation options. Specifically, EPA should examine the full scope of lifecycle GHG
emissions associated with each vehicle/fuel system and allow automakers to use g/mile
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compliance values that reflect the overall GHG impacts of various vehicle/fuel options. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 11-12]
In the proposal, EPA requests comments on its proposed treatment of electrified vehicles in
manufacturer compliance calculations (i.e., the use of a 0 g/mile compliance value for EVs). As
part of its rationale for proposing to maintain the 0 g/mile value for EVs, the Agency states that
"[i]f EPA deviated from this tailpipe emissions approach [i.e., using 0 g/mile] by including
upstream accounting, it would appear appropriate to do so for all vehicles, including gasoline-
fueled vehicles."28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 11-12]
28 88 Fed. Reg. 29252 (May 5, 2023).
RFA agrees with this statement by EPA and recommends that the Agency should indeed
adopt an approach that accounts for full lifecycle emissions for all fuel and vehicle combinations.
In fact, this is the only scientifically defensible approach for regulating emissions from light- and
medium-duty vehicles. Implementing an approach that accounts for all lifecycle emissions would
not only open the automotive market to greater competition and lower costs for consumers, but it
would stimulate investment in lower- carbon technologies and practices across the entire
fuel/vehicle supply chain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 11-12]
RFA believes the final rule should take a market-based approach that sets clear and
predictable annual full lifecycle GHG reduction requirements for automakers (in g/mile values),
then allows the marketplace to determine the most cost-effective means for achieving the
reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 11-12]
Robust, peer-reviewed methodologies already exist for conducting full lifecycle emissions
analysis for current and future vehicle and fuel options. Specifically, EPA should use the
Department of Energy Argonne National Laboratory GREET model, which is accepted
worldwide as the most robust and authoritative tool for lifecycle GHG accounting for a wide
array of transportation fuels. The GREET model is also updated annually to incorporate the latest
data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 11-12]
EPA's proposed rule is also arbitrary and capricious because it fails to accurately account for
the GHG emissions reductions achieved by both EVs and biofuels. EPA should use the best
available science to accurately account for the lifecycle carbon intensity associated with
particular fuels and technologies, but its proposed approach ignores the upstream emissions and
emissions from electricity generation associated with EVs. Specifically, EPA proposes to assign
a value of 0 grams/mile to EVs, which in effect assumes that electricity and battery minerals
powering EVs are always 100% renewable and free of any C02 emissions impacts. This
assumption is flawed because the C02 emissions associated with producing and transmitting
electricity, as well as the emissions linked to critical mineral extraction and battery production,
are significant. Indeed, lifecycle analysis studies show that some EVs (using coal-generated
electricity and battery minerals from intensive mining practices) may have a larger carbon
footprint than conventional vehicles using internal combustion engines. At the same time, EPA's
proposal fails to recognize or account for the meaningful C02 emissions savings that can be
achieved through greater use of low-carbon ethanol in vehicles designed to accommodate higher
blends (e.g., flex fuel vehicles). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 13-14]
In sum, we urge EPA to revise its proposal to create a technology neutral rule that accounts
for all lifecycle emissions of the vehicles it regulates. A technology neutral rule will not only
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avoid some of the legal issues EPA's current proposal will face, but incentivizing multiple
technologies is also the best way for EPA to achieve its ambitious goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0602, pp.13-14]
b. Lifetime cost of the vehicle versus GHG reduction
The proposed rulemaking would not allow other vehicle/fuel pathways to compete with
BEVs. By regulating only tailpipe emissions, and ignoring the rich literature of lifecycle
analysis, EPA would create artificial incentives for auto manufacturers to pursue only BEVs.
This could have disastrous effects on both the cost and the GHG emissions of future vehicles. As
shown in the figure below from Argonne National Laboratory, the cost and GHG emissions of a
BEV are strongly affected by the driving range. A BEV with 400- mile range is dramatically
more expensive than one with 200-mile range, and its lifetime [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602,
pp.15-16]
GHG emissions are substantially worse. In fact, a BEV with 400-mile range has only a slight
GHG benefit compared to a hybrid EV or an FFV operating on E85. But the proposed rule would
count all BEVs as "zero emissions," regardless of battery size - and regardless of vehicle size
and weight. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 15-16]
[See original comment for Lifetime Cost vs GHG, Current Tech] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0602, pp. 15-16]
Organization: Specialty Equipment Market Association (SEMA)
While the draft rule will adversely impact automotive businesses, their employees, and the
millions of automotive enthusiasts whose careers, businesses, and passions are threatened by this
proposal, it will also have considerable unintended consequences for individuals and families
who will have fewer choices when looking to purchase a new vehicle in the coming years. The
agency's proposal is also problematic when digging into its actual environmental impact, as the
draft rule considers only the emissions coming out of the tailpipe rather than the lifecycle
emissions of producing and operating a vehicle. The move to a cleaner vehicle fleet is critical to
our future, but it cannot be done in a way that picks winners and losers while also strengthening
China and other geopolitical foes. It is imperative that the EPA factors-in automotive industry
and consumer concerns and amend this proposed rule to help facilitate a technology-neutral
transition to reducing vehicle emissions that thoughtfully positions multiple technologies to be
part of a market-based solution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 2]
Tailpipe Emissions vs. Lifecycle Emissions
SEMA is disappointed that this proposal exclusively looks at tailpipe emissions and not the
full carbon footprint surrounding the manufacture of BEVs, including their batteries and
components. The EPA's calculations should include the environmental impacts associated with
mining for battery minerals, manufacturing batteries, and the resources from the power grid to
power a full fleet of BEVs. Of note, the U.S. Energy Information Administration reported that
fossil fuels are the largest sources of energy for electricity generation in the United States with an
estimated 61% of all the electricity generated in 2021 coming from a combination of coal,
natural gas, and petroleum.4 While BEVs do not have tailpipe emissions, it is nai ve to assume
that they are carbon neutral given the fossil fuels that the U.S. and other countries around the
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world rely upon to produce the power to operate these vehicles. An analysis from S&P Global
Mobility found that for the sixth consecutive year in a row the average age of a vehicle on the
road today is 12.5 years old. Conversely, the "average age of battery electric vehicles in the U.S.
fell to 3.6 years down slightly from 3.7 years in 2022."5 According to a 2022 EPA report on
greenhouse gas emissions, new vehicle fuel economy has increased 32% since model year
2004.6 SEMA believes that tailpipe emissions can continue to be reduced without shifting to a
zero-based tailpipe emissions model. A diverse approach to addressing GHG emissions through
a multifaceted approach of cleaner fuels, alternative fuels and electrification provides consumers
with a choice in how they reduce their carbon footprint. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 4]
4 U.S. Energy Information Administration: Electricity in the United States (Link:
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/electricity-in-the-us.php).
5 S&P Global Mobility: US consumers keep vehicles for a record 12.5 years on average (Link:
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/us-consumers-keep-vehicles-record-125-years-
average-sp-2023 -05-15/).
6 The 2022 EPA Automotive Trends Report (Link: https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-
12/420s22001.pdf).
Conclusion
While the automobile's roots are tied to the internal combustion engine, SEMA prides itself
on maintaining a forward-looking vision that embraces innovative technology, including EVs
and other zero-emissions vehicles. The specialty automotive aftermarket has led the way on
alternative fuel innovations from replacing older engine technologies with newer, cleaner
versions to converting older ICE vehicles to new electric, hydrogen, and other alternative-fuel
vehicles. Sadly, the EPA's plans to reduce greenhouse gases and criteria pollutants do not factor
this in. SEMA and its members have serious concerns with this proposal, which aggressively
seeks to lower carbon emissions under timelines that effectively make electric vehicles the de
facto choice for automakers to meet the requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 6]
Clean air and the reduction of greenhouse gases are goals everyone can acknowledge. That
said, when governments arbitrarily pick technology winners and losers, the marketplace is
deprived of choices and the public suffers. Instead of forcing this transition, the EPA should put
in place incentives to support a diversified, zero-emissions approach that takes advantage of
breakthrough technologies across the spectrum. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 6]
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury (Bradbury)
Worsening air quality and increasing global carbon emissions. As the EPA touts the
environmental benefits it hopes to achieve from the production of more EVs, it ignores the fact
that as consumers turn away from new models and the overall U.S. fleet ages, the older cars left
on America's highways will produce more smog and other traditional air pollutants that degrade
local air quality. And if there truly were an explosion in the sale of EVs, those EVs would need
to be charged using elec- tricity produced mostly from fossil-fuel-fired power plants, increasing
the national emissions of carbon dioxide.47 EPA largely dismisses this reality based on the wish-
ful claim that America's future power generation will soon shift en masse to wind and solar.48
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 17]
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47 See Roger Pielke Jr., "The Energy Transition Has Not Yet Started: Global fossil fuel consumption is
still increasing," The Honest Broker, June 29, 2023, https://rogerpielkejr.substack.com/p/the-energy-
transition-has-not-yet; Robert Bryce, "The Energy Transition Isn't: Despite $4.1 trillion spent on wind and
solar, they aren't even keeping pace with the growth in hydrocarbons," July 1, 2023,
https://robertbryce.substack.eom/p/the-energy-transition-isnt.
48 See 88 FR at 29303-04.
Furthermore, EPA has deliberately left out of its cost-benefit equation entirely the upstream
carbon dioxide emissions associated with EV production.49 The minerals and components used
in EV batteries are mostly processed or manufactured in China using power generated from coal.
While the U.S. has achieved huge reduc- tions in carbon dioxide emissions by converting coal-
fired power plants to natural gas, China's and other Asian nations' carbon emissions are growing
rapidly because of their heavy reliance on coal, and EPA's rules will only accelerate that
dynamic.50 An automotive engineering analysis published in 2022 estimated that the carbon
dioxide emissions from producing the battery used in one small EV (the Nissan Leaf) were
equivalent to driving an ICE vehicle 24,000 miles (two years of driving), and those from
producing the battery used in a large EV (the Tesla Model S) were equivalent to driving an ICE
vehicle 60,000 miles (five years of driving). 51 In these rulemaking proposals, EPA has
completely ignored the fact that EVs start out their lives on the road with such a huge head start
(two to five years worth) in carbon dioxide emissions over their ICE counterparts. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 17-18]
49 See id. at 29197, 29254.
50 See Robert Bryce, "The Iron Law of Electricity Strikes Again as Vietnam Boosts Coal Burn," June 17,
2023, https ://robertbryce. substack.com/p/the-iron-law-of-electricity-strikes.
51 See Tristan Burton, et al., Convergent Science, Inc., "A Data-Driven Greenhouse Gas Emission Rate
Analysis for Vehicle Comparisons," SAE Int'l Journal of Electrified Vehicles, April 13, 2022,
https://doi.org/10.4271/14-12-01-0006 (also available at https://www.sae.org/publications/technical-
papers/content/14-12-01-0006/).
EPA's benefits analysis is flawed and arbitrary.
On the benefits side of the ledger, EPA claims sky-high monetized benefits from the asserted
reductions in carbon dioxide emissions—to the tune of upwards of a trillion dollars.64 These
estimates are based on predicted reductions in the amount of gasoline and diesel fuel that would
be burned if the U.S. auto fleet converts to EVs at the rates projected by EPA. But they
completely ignore the very large increase in carbon dioxide emissions that would necessarily
occur from the projected expansion in the production of EV batteries. They also ignore the
upstream emissions of carbon dioxide from the increased electricity generation that would be
needed to charge the projected fleet of EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 22-23]
64 See id. at 29200, 29344.
EPA's refusal to account for these huge offsetting emissions of carbon dioxide fundamentally
distorts its analysis of net benefits in a manner that arbitrarily favors the Agency's preferred
regulatory outcome. It is, in fact, false and misleading to label EVs "zero-emission vehicles"
when the production of EV batteries and the charging of the batteries over the life of the vehicles
both generate enormous amounts of carbon dioxide. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 22-
23]
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Organization: Strong Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (SPHEV)
The chart below for light-duty PHEVs and BEVs show the benefit of PHEVs in reducing the
use of critical minerals and accounts for the difference in electric miles between BEVs and
different types of PHEVs. Strong PHEV battery utilization maximizes the value of battery
manufacturing and materials capacities and helps address the need for fast scale up of battery
manufacturing and mineral extraction by better utilizing resources. PHEV cars and trucks,
especially, Strong PHEV cars and trucks, can electrify most daily commuting miles while
occasionally using some gasoline, while BEVs have a lot of battery capacity that only gets
"used" on very long trips. We assert that this could be considered wasted or underutilized lithium
and other battery minerals. Thus, because PHEVs use their batteries more, the USA gets more
EV miles per tonne of lithium by driving PHEVs and Strong PHEVs as shown in the chart
below. PHEV's smaller batteries reduce the lifecycle environmental burdens associated with
battery materials, production, and end-of-life.16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0646, pp. 20-21]
16 Two studies. 1) Dunn, J.B., Gaines, L., Kelly, J.C., Gallagher, K.G. (2016). Life cycle analysis summary
for automotive lithium-ion battery production and recycling. In: REWAS 2016: Towards Materials
Resource Sustainability, R.E. Kirchain, B. Blanpain, C. Meskers, E. Olivetti, D. Apelian, J. Howarter, A.
Kvithyld, B. Mishra, N.R. Neelameggham, and J. Spangenberger, eds. (Springer) pp. 73-79,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48768- 7 11 2) International Energy Agency (IEA) (2022). Global
Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022, https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022
[See original for graph titled "1 Million BEVs or 4-6.7 Million PHEVs?"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0646, pp. 20-21]
[See original for graph titled "EV Miles per Year per Tonne of Lithium"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0646, pp. 20-21]
Organization: TCWInc. (TCW)
The current tunnel vision approach to ZEV's fails to consider the significant opportunities that
are likely to come with hydrogen. Perhaps equally important is the recent use of R99, a
renewable diesel fuel that is a direct replacement for petroleum based fuel. Studies have shown
R99 emissions at 30-40% that of petroleum based fuel. When comparing the total lifecycle
carbon footprint of a BEV (production, electricity generation, disposal), R99 has actually been
shown to have less of a carbon footprint than BEV and does not rely on Russia, The Democratic
Republic of Congo, or China to source materials for production. (Reference ATRI study at the
link below) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0452, p. 1]
https://truckingresearch.org/2022/05/03/new-atri-research-quantifies-the-environmental-
impacts-of-zero-emission-trucks/ [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0452, p. 1]
Organization: Tesla, Inc. (Tesla)
EPA has long considered BEVs to be the most effective mobile source pollution mitigating
technology, stating over a decade ago, "From a vehicle tailpipe perspective, EVs are a game-
changing technology."38 Additionally, study after study shows BEVs are a superior technology
for reducing air pollution and GHG emissions over their lifetime.39 On a well to wheels analysis
including upstream emissions, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has repeatedly found
BEVs to be far superior in emission performance than internal combustion engine (ICE)
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technology.40 For example, a Tesla Model 3 or Model Y charging on the U.S. grid has average
lifecycle emissions almost 3.5 times less than an average premium ICE vehicle.41 As a result,
over a 17- year lifetime, a Tesla vehicle driver can avoid emitting over 55 tons of C02e.42
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 6-7]
38 77 Fed. Reg.62624, 62815 (Oct. 15, 2012); See also, IPCC, AR6 Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of
Climate Change (April 4, 2022) at 2-78 (Electric vehicles (EVs) powered by clean electricity can reduce
GHG emissions and such policies are important for spurring adoption of such vehicles and GHG emission
reductions); at 10-41 (BEVs manufactured and operated can lower emission by 85% compared to ICE
vehicles) available at https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg3/pdf/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf
(last visited Sept. 12, 2022).
39 See e.g., McKinsey, Battery 2030: Resilient, sustainable, and circular (Jan. 16, 2023) (In the worst case
scenario, with no low-carbon electricity, total life-cycle emissions for BEVs are about 50 percent lower in
Europe and 72 percent lower in the United States compared with ICE vehicles) available at h
ttps://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-a ssembly/our-insights/battery-2030-resilient-
sustainable-and-c ircular?stcr=032392E457A548838A737BD614EB8B24&cid=other-eml-alt-mip-m
Ck&hlkid=38d0ad0585af40979275683ed8a9dl67&hctky=10204926&hdpid=b8cb9677-a52c-48al-b6ae-
ded25e562aac; Environmental Research Letters, Mapping electric vehicle impacts: greenhouse gas
emissions, fuel costs, and energy justice in the United States (Jan. 11, 2023) (finding that over 90% of
vehicle-owning U.S. households would see reductions in both GHGs and transportation energy burden by
adopting an EV) available at h ttps://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9
326/aca4e6?utm_source=cbnewsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_term=2023-01-l
4&utm_campaign=Daily+Briefing+12+01+2023; ICCT, A global comparison of the life-cycle greenhouse
gas emissions of combustion engine and electric passenger cars (July 20, 2021) available at h
ttps://theicct.org/publications/global-LCA-p assenger-cars-jul2021 ; National Academies of Science,
Accelerating Decarbonization of the U.S. Energy System (Feb. 2, 2021) at 97 ("Further, light-duty trucks
and buses should be electrified, particularly in urban areas. Over the next decade, the United States needs to
ensure that electric vehicles become the predominant share of new purchases."); available at h
ttps://www.nap.edu/read/25932; Environment International, Assessing the health impacts of electric
vehicles through air pollution in the United States (Nov. 2020) available at h
ttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016041202031970X.
40 See, Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Center, Emissions from Hybrid and Plug-In Electric
Vehicles available at h
ttps://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_emissions.htmlhttps://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_emissions.
html
41 Tesla, Impact Report 2022 at 31-34.
42 Tesla, Impact Report 2022 at 22, 149.
Further, California's recent adoption of the ACC II rule, setting a 100 percent zero-emission
vehicle (ZEV) sales standard by 2035, will also accelerate BEV adoption. As EPA recognizes, a
number of states have already adopted ACC II and the list is growing.85 New research assessing
the impact of additional states adopting California's standards (accounting for the IRA's tax
credits) finds that adoption by California and 16 other states would accelerate electric vehicle
adoption, cut 1.3 gigatons of carbon emissions (equivalent to closing 13 coal plants), create
300,000 new jobs, save households $230 per year, and prevent 5,000 deaths in 2050.86 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 12-13]
85 88. Fed. Reg. at 29344; Bloomberg Law, More States Join California's Push to Phase Out Gas Cars by
2035 (May 16, 2023) available at https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/more-states-
join-californias-push-to-phase-out-gas- c ars-by-2035
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86 Energy Innovation, Nationwide Impacts Of California's Advanced Clean Cars II Rule (April 9, 2023)
available at https://energyinnovation.org/publication/nationwide-impacts-of-californias-advanced-clean-
cars-ii-rule/
Furthermore, the seemingly sharp former distinctions between regulatory strategies to address
criteria pollutant emissions and GHG emissions have continued to erode in view of the
appropriate control strategies and technologies and the increasingly smaller margins for
improvement from conventional ICE emissions. States have noted that zero emission vehicles
(ZEVs) produce no tailpipe emissions, reduce brake wear PM emissions, and have lower
upstream emissions to contribute to their State Implementation Plan (SIP) strategies. 133 EPA's
2017 Tier 3 standards, for example, achieved reductions of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide
(N20), each of which are GHGs that were part of EPA's endangerment finding. 134 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 21-22]
133 See e.g., CARB, Staff Report: Initial Statement of Reasons (Oct. 22, 2019) at 5, Table ES-1: Expected
Emission Reductions of Proposed ACT Regulation Calendar Year (NOx (tpd) PM2.5 (tpd) WTW GHG
(MMT/yr.) 2031 5.0 0.16 0.4 2040 16.9 0.46 1.7 (Proposed Rule)) available at h
ttps://ww3 .arb.ca.gov/regact/2019/act2019/isor.pdf
134 79 Fed. Reg. at 23445.
EPA has previously recognized the importance of this harmonization. In promulgating its Tier
3 motor vehicle emissions standards, for example, the agency noted:
The Tier 3 program addresses interactions with the 2017 LD GHG rule in a manner that aligns
implementation of the two actions, to achieve significant criteria pollutant and GHG emissions
reductions while providing regulatory certainty and compliance efficiency. As vehicle
manufacturers introduce new vehicle platforms for compliance with the GHG standards, they
will be able to design them for compliance with the Tier 3 standards at the same time. 135 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 21-22]
135 79 Fed. Reg. at 23417.
Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
(Heritage Foundation)
In order to produce supplies of renewables, China is increasing its construction of coal- fired
power plants. This increases carbon emissions and reduces EPA's benefits from U.S. emissions
reduction. America has 225 coal-fired power plants, and China has 1,118 (half of all the coal-
fired plants in the world).31 That is one reason why China has increased carbon emissions by
over 5,000 million metric tons over the past 16 years.32 In contrast, America's carbon emissions
have declined by over 1,000 million metric tons over the same period due to the use of clean
natural gas.33 (See Figure 1.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 7-8]
31 Jessica Aizarani, Statista, "Global operational coal-fired power stations by country 2022," January 30,
2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/859266/number-of-coal-power-plants-by-country/ (accessed April
28, 2023).
32 "International Emissions." International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),
www.eia.gov/international/data/world/other-statistics/emissions-by-
fuel?pd=40&p=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b0001&u=0&f=A&v=
column&a=-&i=none&vo=value&t=C&g=none&l=71~ 71&s=1104537600000&e=1609459200000&
(accessed 21 June 2023).
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33 Ibid.
China has not committed to reducing emissions until 2027. Research has shown that even
completely eliminating all fossil fuels from the United States would result in less than 0.2
degrees Celsius in temperature mitigation by 2100.34 Americans, particularly poor and middle
class, would be bearing major costs in higher electricity prices, higher food prices, and a forced
switch to costly electric vehicles without benefits for the environment. They would pay the price
for President Biden's energy agenda. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 7-8]
34 Kevin D. Dayaratna, PhD, Katie Tubb, and David Kreutzer, "The Unsustainable Costs of President
Biden's Climate Agenda," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3713, June 16, 2022,
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/BG3713_0.pdf, (accessed May 1, 2023).
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR GRAPH C02 Emissions Trends in Key Countries, 2005-
2021 Figure 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 7-8]
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
6.2. Technology Assessments Should Incorporate Critical Mineral Supply and Lifecycle
Emissions
The modeling should also include a sensitivity analysis of BEV/PHEV mix on critical mineral
usage for any assumed overall PEV penetration. PHEVs can make the most efficient use of the
limited battery supply and constrained infrastructure network forecast through the period of the
rulemaking. The below example compares different vehicle powertrain emissions for a mid-size
SUV using peer-reviewed data from carghg.com. The same amount of lithium in the battery of
one 300-mile plus BEV can be used for up to six PHEVs -or more than eighty conventional
hybrids. See Figure 10 for the C02 saved from replacing a mid-sized SUV powered by a
conventional gasoline engine with electrified alternatives under a constrained lithium supply.
This analysis assumes average US electric grid emissions for BEVs and the electric operation of
PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 31-32]
[See original for attachment for Figure 10 C02 Saving from Replacing ICEs Under
Constrained Mineral Supply]
PHEVs can rival the emissions performance of BEVs under many real-world operating
conditions. PHEVs are not always the best-performing option but can have as good or better
lifecycle performance because of lower manufacturing emissions for smaller batteries and lower
well-to- tank emissions while still covering a significant fraction of daily trips in electric drive.
Given most average daily trips are under 50 miles, this results in a significant portion of all-
electric miles like a BEV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 31-32]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
EPA should evaluate the merits of all fuels and vehicle technologies on a full lifecycle basis.
For example, EPA states that "[i]n December 2022, Toyota announced plans to introduce 30
BEV models by 2030". 125 But EPA's Proposed Rule should also meaningfully consider
following statements from Toyota in the same announcement: 126 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 25-27]
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125 EPA's Proposed Rule at 29191 (citing to Toyota Motor Corporation, "Video: Media Briefing on
Battery EV Strategies," Press Release, December 14, 2021. Accessed on December 14, 2021).
126 Toyota Motor Corporation, "Video: Media Briefing on Battery EV Strategies," Press Release,
December 14, 2021 (emphasis added).
"We are living in a diversified world and in an era in which it is hard to predict the
future. Therefore, it is difficult to make everyone happy with a one-size- fits-all option. That is
why Toyota wants to prepare as many options as possible for our customers around the world."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
"If the energy that powers vehicles is not clean, the use of an electrified vehicle, no
matter what type it might be, would not result in zero C02 emissions." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 25-27]
IV. The proposed rule should be technology- and fuel-neutral.
A. The proposed rule should evaluate all fuels and technologies on a lifecycle basis.
Although the preamble describes the proposed standards as being achievable by
manufacturers using a variety of strategies that may include varying degrees of electrification
among vehicle offerings, elements of the program have been skewed to favor electric vehicles. A
glaring example of this is EPA's refusal to recognize the upstream emissions associated with EV
power and battery production, on the one hand, or on the other hand, to provide a mechanism for
appropriately quantifying and crediting reductions in GHG emissions attributable to low-carbon
fuels used in ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 61-62]
The National Bureau of Economic Research has acknowledged that".. .despite being treated
by regulators as 'zero emission vehicles', EVs are not necessarily emissions free."330 In fact, the
Hummer EV using U.S. average grid electricity is reported as generating higher carbon dioxide
emissions per mile than many smaller, more efficient gasoline-powered cars.331 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 61-62]
330 See http://www.nber.org/papers/w21291.
331 See https://qz.com/2154558/big-electric-trucks-and-suvs-are-the-new-gas-guzzlers.
A lifecycle analyses conducted by Southwest Research Institute finds that GHG emissions
from a light-duty internal combustion engine ("ICE") vehicle that runs on renewable diesel with
a carbon intensity of 25 g/MJ results in 25% fewer lifecycle GHG emissions when compared to a
comparable battery electric vehicle ("BEV") using U.S. average grid electricity, as illustrated
below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 61-62]
[See original for graphic titled "Figure 2: U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle Lifecycle Emissions (Sept.
2022 Valero Investor Relations Presentation)"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 61-62]
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
Further, it is not at all clear that the proposed rule will reduce GHGs as planned. Pure plug-in
battery- powered vehicles can create more emissions than hybrid EVs (HEV) and even more than
some traditional ICEVs for a variety of reasons including the fuel mix of the electrical grid
where the EV is being charged and the large GHG footprint for producing the battery. The
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manufacture of a battery can produce GHGs equivalent to driving 24,000 miles, in the case of a
Nissan Leaf up to 60,000 miles in the case of a Tesla Model S.4 Those numbers are before a
single mile is driven by the supposed ZEV with its associated GHGs from the electricity used.
When C02 emissions linked to the production of batteries and the energy mix are considered, a
study in Germany found EVs emit 11% to 28% more than their diesel counterparts. 5 Volvo
reports that in comparing a gas-burning model with its fully electric equivalent, with both
vehicles built in the same factory, on the same assembly line, and sharing a large number of
components, it found the electric version results in 70% more emissions.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0679, p. 3]
4 "A Data-Driven Greenhouse Gas Emission Rate Analysis for Vehicle Comparisons," SAE International,
Journal of Electrified Vehicles, V132-14EJ, April 13, 2022.
5 Kohlemotoren, Windmotoren und Dieselmotoren: Was zeigt die C02-Bilanz?, Crhristoph Buchal et al.,
Ifo Institut, 2019.
6 "Building An EV Produces 70% More Emissions Than ICE, Says Volvo," InsideEVs, Andrei Nedelea,
November 20, 2021.
EPA needs better analysis of the GHG reductions by EVs. The assumption that they are "zero
emission" must be tested using a more comprehensive analysis of full lifecycle emissions
sources from EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 3]
EPA Summary and Response:
Summary:
A number of commenters maintained that lifecycle GHG emissions should be reflected in the
emission standards themselves as well as in the compliance regime for the standards (i.e.,
certification) or within a GHG credit program. These commenters included fuel suppliers, fuel
producers, several fleets and dealers, non-governmental organizations, and a few environmental
groups. In addition, no commenter questioned the appropriateness of EPA considering upstream
emissions as part of its overall assessment of CO2 emission impacts, non-CCh emission impacts,
or use in cost-benefit calculations.
The remainder of this section addresses exclusively the issue of life cycle analysis in the
standard setting process and in determining compliance with standards. Comments relating to
EPA's consideration of upstream emissions in calculating emission impacts are addressed in
sections 11.3 and 12.1.3 of this document.
A threshold issue addressed by some of the commenters is whether EPA has the legal
authority to use some type of lifecycle approach in standard setting. Some of these commenters
cited the broad discretion afforded by CAA section 202 (a) (1). Other commenters cited CAA
sections 202 (a)(3)(A) and 202 (a)(4)(A) and (B).
Most of these commenters' arguments were based on considerations of policy. They point out
that PEVs in fact have greenhouse gas emissions associated with their production and their fuel
source, i.e., emissions upstream of the vehicle tailpipe (and some commenters would consider
downstream emissions as well, such as emissions attributable to battery disposal). Given these
emissions, they maintain, it is more consistent with the Act's emission reduction goals, and the
technology-neutral basis of this rule, to account for those emissions in the standards. Certain
proponents of alternative fuel use presented studies and other information which they
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characterized as showing that ICE vehicles powered by various types of biofuels would emit less
than a comparable BEV vehicle, and, in any case, alleged that emission reductions from
alternative fuel-powered vehicles would accrue immediately rather than after fleet turnover.
Some commenters went further and argued that EPA would be acting arbitrarily by ignoring
lifecycle impacts in the standards, since this would amount to just moving pollution around
rather than reducing it, and would otherwise arbitrarily fail to solve the problem the rule is
addressing.
Commenters were divided as to how a lifecycle approach could be reflected in the standards.
Indeed, it was not always clear if the commenters intend for the approach only to apply to
standards for PEVs, or for all vehicles. With respect to PEVs, suggestions ranged from
accounting only for GHG emissions from the electricity generating source (potentially including
an accounting for electricity lost in transmission and distribution), to emissions from battery
manufacture, battery disposal, electricity supply chains, and mining of materials critical to
battery production (including from overseas mining venues). Commenters were unclear as to
whether their suggestions applied to GHG emissions only, or to other pollutants as well
(although some pointed out that GHGs are exceptional, being global pollutants, such that a
lifecycle accounting was justified).
Several commenters noted that EPA also did not consider emissions from mining and
resource extraction processes as well as from battery production.
Response:
EPA is adhering to the approach for measuring compliance that every light and medium
vehicle has used to date: compliance is based on emissions from the vehicle. As EPA stated in
the Response to Comments in the 2021 final rule:
EPA disagrees that it is required to perform a life cycle analysis of vehicle and fuel
production before setting vehicle standards, or to treat emissions of air pollutants attributable to
electricity generation, or the mining, production or disposal of batteries for electric vehicles, as
emissions "from" new motor vehicles. The Clean Air Act's entire structure evidences a clear
divide between stationary sources (regulated under Title I) and mobile sources (regulated under
Title II). There may be indirect impacts of stationary source regulation on mobile sources and
vice versa, and it may be appropriate to consider those impacts in some circumstances, but it
would be inappropriate and contrary to the plain text of the Clean Air Act to conflate the
consideration of indirect impacts, when appropriate, with actually treating stationary source
emissions as mobile source emissions. Cf. Coal, for Responsible Regul., Inc. v. E.P.A., 684 F.3d
102, 128-29 (D.C. Cir. 2012), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. E.P.A.,
573 U.S. 302 (2014), and amended sub nom. Coal, for Responsible Regul., Inc. v. Env'tProt.
Agency, 606 F. App'x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ("EPA was not arbitrary and capricious by not
considering stationary-source costs in its analyses"). Congress directed EPA to address emissions
from manufacturing fuels and vehicles under EPA's authority to reduce pollution from stationary
sources and to address emissions from the operation of light duty vehicles under its authority to
reduce pollution from mobile sources. It would be contrary to the purpose of the Clean Air Act if
EPA declined to adopt otherwise-appropriate standards to reduce emissions from new light duty
vehicles because additional reductions in pollution could be, but had not yet been, achieved by
refineries, electric generating units, or vehicle manufacturers (due to vehicle production
facilities). EPA interprets the Clean Air Act as directing EPA to consider regulation of emissions
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for each sector according to the applicable statutory requirements for each program. Congress
has established and EPA intends to continue to undertake regulation of GHG consistent with
those statutory requirements.630
Thus, EPA disagrees it is required to treat lifecycle emissions (such as those attributable to the
production of vehicle fuel) as emissions "from" new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines for purposes of CAA 202(a), and even assuming EPA has authority to do so, EPA finds
it would not be appropriate to do so.
EPA also finds that at this time there would be enormous, likely insuperable, practical
difficulties in trying to incorporate a lifecycle approach into the standard setting process. As
EPA has previously explained,631 there are two fundamental problems with incorporating
lifecycle analysis into standard setting: 1) having sufficient data for every technology; and 2) life
cycle emissions are dependent on factors outside the scope of the rulemaking that may change in
the future.
First, we doubt the data is adequate to undertake reliable life cycle analysis for any
technology, but even if it is available for one technology, that is of little benefit unless it is
available for every technology, or else there is no way to compare technologies. And as
discussed elsewhere, sometimes the industry innovates in unforeseen ways and it is unclear how
a lifecycle-based approach can be applied on an ongoing basis. Commenters advocating for life
cycle analysis did not provide adequate data to support such an analysis. Although some
commenters cited studies performing LCA for certain fuel or vehicle types, we also did not find
those studies sufficiently robust for reasons we explain later in this section.
Second, this rule is not regulating manufacturing processes, distribution practices, or the
locations of manufacturing facilities. And yet each of these factors could impact life cycle
emissions. So while we could theoretically take a snapshot of life cycle emissions at this point in
time for specific manufacturers, it may or may not have any relation to life cycle emissions in
2027 or a later year, or for other manufacturers.
With respect to comments from alternative fuel providers, EPA disagrees that it would be
appropriate to provide a credit for renewable-fueled vehicles to reflect the lifecycle emissions of
renewable fuels as compared to a baseline fuel. There already is a statutory program which
encourages use of renewable fuels in transportation, including light- and medium-duty vehicles
and heavy-duty engines, which moreover requires EPA to consider lifecycle greenhouse gas
emissions. Id.; see also 76 FR at 57124 (Sept. 15, 2011) (Renewable Fuel Standards provisions,
not section 202 (a)(1), are the appropriate means of evaluating and encouraging use of alternative
fuels). The RFS program is the Congressionally mandated and appropriate means of evaluating
630 2021 Rule RTC at 16-41; see also Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. E.P.A., 627 F.2d 1095, 1118 (D.C. Cir.
1979) ("there is no indication that Congress intended section 202's "cost of compliance" consideration to embody
"social costs" of the type petitioners advance. Every effort at pollution control exacts social costs. Congress, not the
Administrator, made the decision to accept those costs. Section 202's "cost of compliance" concern, juxtaposed as it
is with the requirement that the Administrator provide the requisite lead time to allow technological developments,
refers to the economic costs of motor vehicle emission standards and accompanying enforcement procedures. ... It
relates to the timing of a particular emission control regulation rather than to its social implications.").
631 81 FR 73478, 73528 (Oct 25, 2016).
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lifecycle implications of biofuels, and of encouraging their use, as appropriate.632 There is no
legal mandate or otherwise compelling reason to achieve the same purpose through Section 202
(a) (1) — a provision directed at reducing emissions "from ... motor vehicles." EPA notes that
Congress established two distinct regimes for reducing pollution from vehicles—section 202,
which is directed at vehicle and engine emissions, and section 211, which is directed at fuels.
Congress was clearly aware that fuels and engines work in tandem to produce emissions633 and
yet the two sections, as discussed above, have very distinct structures and requirements. EPA
finds that in light of this careful Congressional design, it would be inappropriate to adopt a fuels
rule in the guise of a vehicle standard. Just as section 202 standards should be based on vehicle
emissions, and not stationary source emissions, so too they should be based on vehicle
emissions, as opposed to the lifecycle emissions of fuels.
Lifecycle emissions, especially those related to resource extraction, affect the total
environmental footprint of all vehicles, including ICE vehicles with a range of electrification and
BEVs. However, considering all such emissions in the context of modeling emission inventory
impacts attributable to the final GHG standards is fraught and presents scope challenges. For
example, resource extraction is a very large worldwide industry that supports many other
manufacturing industries. Attributing any activity specifically to the standards is very difficult
and highly uncertain. Another challenge is that the emissions from the mining sector are
constantly changing as processes evolve, power grids become cleaner, and the areas of the
mining itself change.634 Therefore, calculating future emissions for this sector, especially in later
years such as through the 2030s and 40s, is exceedingly difficult. These arguments also exist in
the context of battery production itself. We note further that for a comparison to be valid, there
would need to be an accounting of emissions associated with all aspects of petroleum extraction,
all aspects of mineral extraction needed for catalytic converters (rhodium, palladium, platinum),
and all aspects of lead acid battery production and subsequent management, which the
commenters appear to disregard.
One commenter stated that EPA did not explain why, in assessing the air quality impacts of
the rule, EPA limits its analysis of upstream emissions. It is true that, as discussed in RIA
chapter 7.2, EPA's analysis of upstream emissions is limited to EGUs, refineries, and well sites
and pipeline pumps for crude oil and natural gas production. EPA's judgment is that this
approach represents a reasonable balance between considering indirect effects of the rule on air
quality and limiting that consideration to reasonably proximate and predictable effects. Because
we lack the data and capacity to predict every indirect effect of the rule throughout the supply
chain and the broader economy, we judge that by examining the upstream emissions of EGUs
and refineries we have taken into consideration the most significant indirect effects of the rule on
632 To the extent the RFS statute is of any relevance in understanding section 202(a)(1), but see CAA section
21 l(o)(12) (savings clause), it indicates that when Congress wanted the agency to consider lifecycle emissions, it
knew how to say that clearly. See also 26 USC 45V (providing a credit for clean hydrogen considering certain
lifecycle emissions). Sections 202(a)(l)-(2) do not contain any such language, and particularly in light of the Act's
overall division between mobile and stationary source regulation, any mandate to consider lifecycle emissions ought
not to be implied.
633 See, e.g., section 211(c)(1)(B) (authorizing EPA to regulate fuels that will impair emissions control devices);
section 211(f)(1) (prohibiting the introduction into commerce of any fuel not substantially similar to the fuel used in
certification testing of vehicles).
634 Even the minerals being mined are likely to change as new battery chemistries are developed.
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air quality, such that our air quality analysis is sufficiently complete for consideration in the
rulemaking.
EPA also notes that accounting for these upstream emission processes in the context of an
increase in PEV production while failing to do equivalent accounting for a reduction in the
production of other vehicles, including ICE with a range of electrification, would unreasonably
skew the emission impacts estimates. Many of the same metals that are in demand for PEV
production would also be in demand for ICE production, so whether the standards would truly
result in an increase in all mining, resource extraction, and production emissions is not clear.
And, because such a broad accounting of these emission processes for the range of vehicles
would include emissions from around the world, accounting for these emissions presents scope
challenges.
EPA notes further that the emission benefits of certain alternative fuels are recognized at the
tailpipe (in addition to whatever credit may be obtained under the RFS program). In response to
comments that alternative fuel vehicles can provide CO2 emission reduction benefits
immediately and without the need for new supporting infrastructure, to the extent that is true,
EPA notes that this potential compliance pathway remains an option.
EPA notes further that the commenters maintaining that use of alternative fuels producing
GHG emission benefits sooner (on a lifecycle basis) than PEV deployment did not address the
temporal issue of emissions associated with producing the additional quantities of agricultural
biofuels. When crop production is expanded to produce more biofuels, a carbon debt is incurred
through land use change emissions, by releasing carbon stored in vegetation and soil as one
clears land and prepares it for cropping. That carbon debt must be "paid back" over time by
displacing fossil fuel consumption with biofuels using the crops grown on that land. This 'debt'
can require decades to pay back.635
Certainty of emission benefits (again, on a lifecycle basis) is by no means clear cut either. For
example, in its recent RFS volume-setting rulemaking (the "Set Rule"), EPA analyzed the GHG-
saving potential of soybean biodiesel, which is both the most widely used domestic biofuel in the
diesel pool. EPA's analysis of the existing literature and comparison of biofuel modeling tools
documented significant uncertainty regarding the GHG emissions profile of soybean oil
biodiesel, including some uncertainty as to whether this fuel's GHG emission profile is favorable
compared to diesel.636
EPA also notes the irony that many of the commenters raising concerns about lifecycle
accounting are the same ones who claimed EPA's standards implicate the major questions
doctrine because they represent a significant and novel expansion of EPA's regulatory
635 For discussion of the carbon debt and payback time see for example: Fargione, J., Hill, J., Tilman, D., Polasky,
S., & Hawthorne, P. (2008). Land clearing and the biofuel carbon debt. Science, 319(5867), 1235-1238. For more
recent modeling of the temporal profile of biofuel GHG emissions see Sections 6.7 and 7.7 of the EPA Model
Comparison Exercise Technical Document (EPA-420-R-23-017):
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZvPDF.cgi?Dockev=P1017P9B.pdf
636 See Chapter 4 of the Regulatory Impact Analysis (EPA-420-R-23-015) accompanying 88 FR 44468 and also
EPA's Model Comparison Technical Document (EPA-420-R-23-017) accompanying this FRM.
https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/final-renewable-fuels-standards-rule-2023-2024-and-2025
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authority.637 Despite their putative concern about the expansion of agency power, these
commenters seem to suggest the agency should further extend its regulatory ambit under section
202(a)(1) to include a broad range of stationary sources, including not only major point sources,
but area sources and agricultural operations, both domestic and foreign. A comprehensive
lifecycle analysis of motor vehicle control technologies could be extraordinarily far ranging,
including assessment of factors ranging from practices for clearing agricultural land for farming
palm oil in Malaysia, to the environmental standards for cobalt mines in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, to spills of diesel fuel at countless retailers across the United States. And
while a lifecycle analysis could potentially be less far-reaching, the commenters requesting
lifecycle accounting uniformly failed to advance a coherent basis for why the statute requires or
permits the lifecycle accounting line to be drawn at a particular industry or degree of nexus. It
would be remarkable if EPA's authority to regulate "the emissions of any air pollutant from any
class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines" encompassed consideration
of emissions attributable to the manufacture of fertilizer for growing corn but excluded
consideration of the emissions performance of BEVs. Regardless of whether the agency has
authority to account for these or other lifecycle emissions in the manner advocated for by these
commenters, we think that so extending the agency's authority is neither necessary nor
appropriate for administering a statutory program focused on reducing vehicular emissions.
Finally, in response to comments suggesting that tailpipe emissions of biogenic and non-
biogenic C02 should be treated differently, we disagree. EPA notes that ever since the section
202 Endangerment Finding was made, it has considered GHG pollution as being comprised of
six well-mixed gases (one of which is C02), based on their properties and behaviors in the
atmosphere that are relevant to the climate change problem, including characteristics and
attributes related to radiative forcing, chemical reactivity, and atmospheric lifetime. As EPA
stated, in reiterating this position in the 2016 Endangerment Finding for GHG Emissions from
Aircraft, "[i]n the record for the 2009 Endangerment Finding, the Agency stated that 'all CO2
emissions, regardless of source, influence radiative forcing equally once it reaches the
atmosphere and therefore there is no distinction between biogenic and non-biogenic CO2
regarding the CO2 and the other well-mixed GHGs within the definition of air pollution that is
reasonably anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.'"638 EPA finds it appropriate to
continue this policy of treating all tailpipe CO2 emissions equivalently, since once they have been
emitted to the atmosphere the CO2 molecules have equivalent impacts on the climate, regardless
of the origin and constitution of the fuel prior to combustion.
Responses to specific comments:
Summary:
EPA has legal authority to consider life cycle emissions in the standard setting process under
CAA section 202 (a)(1) given the breadth of discretion afforded by that provision. Further, the
provision does not specify regulation from vehicles. Rather, it refers to standards applicable to
637 We explain in the RTC 2.3 why this rule is not an extraordinary exercise of agency power that would justify
invocation of the major questions doctrine.
638 81 FR 54422, 54446.
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emissions of air pollutants from a class or classes of motor vehicles which contribute to that air
pollution.
Response:
First, these commenters' reading of section 202(a)(1) is problematic. The provision refers to
emissions "from any class or classes of new motor vehicles" and EPA's endangerment
determination identified new motor vehicles - specifically, passenger cars, light-duty trucks,
motorcycles, buses, and medium and heavy-duty trucks - as the class contributing to the air
pollution which endangers. EPA's contribution finding respecting this class considered only the
emissions from the vehicles in the class. See 74 FR at 66537-540 (Dec. 15, 2009.)639 Therefore,
EPA does not perceive that the reference to 'class' in section 202(a) advances the commenter's
argument.
If the provision is read as discretionary, as the commenters urge, EPA has explained above
why it is inappropriate to exercise that discretion to include lifecycle-based standards. As noted
and referenced above, there is both a clear demarcation in the CAA between stationary and
mobile sources, and an entire statutory program devoted to consideration of alternative vehicular
fuel use. There is no compelling reason to import all of those considerations into the section 202
(a)(1) standard setting process for light- and medium-duty vehicles. This would turn an
emissions program into a fuel program, and obliviate the distinction between the two now
codified in the Act.
Summary:
CAA sections 202(a)(3)(A)(ii) and 202(a)(4)(B) authorize or require consideration of
lifecycle emissions in the standard setting process.
Response:
Section 202(a)(3)(A)(ii) does not compel EPA to establish standards based on lifecycle
emissions. First, that provision only applies to certain criteria pollutant standards (including
certain criteria pollutant standards for medium-duty vehicles established in this final rule), not to
GHG standards or any light-duty standards. In any event, the reference to subcategorizing based
on "type of fuel use" does not compel lifecycle standards. The natural meaning of that provision
is that EPA may subcategorize based on the fuel used by a vehicle, for example, gasoline versus
diesel, recognizing for example that vehicles of different fuel types may have different emissions
characteristics. That provision does not mean that the Administrator must establish standards
based on lifecycle emissions relating to fuel type. Moreover, section 202(a)(3) (A) (ii) is
discretionary ("the Administrator may base such classes or categories"), and so cannot be read to
compel any particular approach. Finally, given that the standard-setting provisions in section
202(a)(1) and 202(a)(3)(A)(i) speak to addressing emissions from classes of motor vehicles, we
do not think a subsidiary provision on how such classes can be subdivided indicates that EPA is
in fact compelled to establish standards based on lifecycle emissions from a wide range of
stationary and agricultural sources. Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes.
639 See, e.g. 74 FR at 55538/1 (contribution finding relates to the "emissions from the source category"); id. at
55540/2 (contribution finding relates to "[e]missions from the CAA section 202(a) source categories constitute the
major part of the emissions from the transportation sector"); id. (showing transportation and electricity sector
contributions separately).
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Sections 202(a)(4)(A) and (B) are directed to whether emission control devices used to
comply with the vehicular emission standards in vehicles might pose unreasonable risks. See
section 202 (a)(4) (A) ("devices .. .used in a new motor vehicle"; "if such device ... contributes
to ... unreasonable risk ... in its operation or function"); and section 202(a)(4)(B) ("whether ...
the use of any device" affects emissions of unregulated pollutants, and whether any risk posed by
"the use of such device" can be eliminated). These provisions consequently are directed at risks
posed by devices used in the vehicle, not to upstream emissions. EPA has carefully evaluated
the potential safety risks of PEV technologies in RTC 22. We note, moreover, the significant
expansion of regulatory authority the commenter's approach suggests: to conform to section
202(a)(4) EPA must evaluate the public health, welfare, and safety risks associated with gasoline
refining and distribution, electricity generation and transmission, mining, and agriculture, in the
US and in foreign nations. It would be odd, to say the least, for such a capacious command to lie
hidden in an ancillary provision of the statute.
Summary:
Given that there are upstream and downstream emissions associated with BEVs, terming them
zero emission vehicles is misleading. Without accounting for such emissions, EPA is improperly
assessing the environmental impacts of its standards, and potentially just transferring pollution
from one source to another. This can be demonstrated by an example: if a BEV were to be
fueled by electricity from a stationary diesel generator, it would count as a zero emission vehicle,
yet its overall impact would be the same as an ICE operating on diesel fuel. EPA's distinctions
are consequently arbitrary, and potentially counterproductive.
Response:
EPA is not ignoring emissions from upstream sources. See Preamble section VI and VII, and
RTC section 11.3 and 12.1.3. These analyses show that the net GHG and criteria pollutant
emission impacts of this rule are overwhelmingly positive, taking into account GHG emissions
from both vehicles and upstream sources. We also find substantial positive PM2.5 health benefits
while accounting for both vehicular and upstream emissions. Thus, EPA does not accept the
assertion in some of the comments that this rule fails to positively address the problem which
prompts the need for the rule.
Second, the commenters ignore that upstream, and for that matter, downstream potential
emission impacts from stationary sources are controlled via other EPA regulatory programs.
Thus, electricity generation, battery manufacture, and recycling and disposal of spent batteries
are all comprehensively regulated under other EPA programs. For example, EPA regulates
electric generating units under many programs such as the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards
(CAA), the Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CAA), the Cooling Water Intake Systems Rule
(CWA), the Coal Combustion Residuals Rule (RCRA), the Steam Electric Power Generating
Effluent Guidelines (CWA), as well as under various actions of particularly applicability such as
State and Federal Implementation Plans to implement the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards and the visibility protection program. See also 88 FR 24854 (proposing further
controls on hazardous air pollutants emitted by steam electric power units), and 88 FR 33240
(May 11, 2023) (proposing GHG emission standards for existing coal- and oil-fired steam
generating units, and for new and some existing gas fired steam electric generating units). With
respect to the commenters' example of PEVs being charged by electricity from a stationary
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source diesel generator, we note that notwithstanding some viral social media videos,640 there is
no evidence that this is happening in a way that significantly affects the emissions reductions
achieved by the standards. Moreover, EPA notes that there are emission standards for such
generators under the NESHAP for Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines. 40 CFR subpart
ZZZZ. Disposal of lithium-ion batteries is regulated comprehensively under EPA rules
implementing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, see 40 CFR Part 173, and their
transport is regulated comprehensively under DOT Hazardous Material Rules in 49 CFR Parts
171-180 (see RTC Section 22 "safety" responses, and RTC section 12.2.5 "recycling"
responses.) Moreover, on October 23, 2023, EPA announced plans to propose further
regulations adding to the safety standards for management of spent lithium-ion batteries.641
Many of these same activities are regulated by other jurisdictions as well, including by U.S.
states and foreign governments and their local jurisdictions. The preamble and RIA also discuss
anticipated emissions reductions from the power sector attributable to the IRA.
As noted above, the delineation between mobile and stationary source standard setting is in
keeping with the structure of the Act, whereby Congress directed EPA to control stationary
sources under Title I of the Act, and mobile sources under Title II. For these reasons, EPA
rejects the assertion of commenters that it has ignored these issues and consequently arbitrarily
failed to consider an issue of importance in the rulemaking.
Summary:
Commenters had various suggestions as to which lifecycle emissions should figure into the
standard setting process. All recommending the approach would include emissions associated
with electricity generation. Others would include emissions associated with battery production.
Commenters also mentioned inclusion of electricity supply chain-related emissions, associated
with battery "disposal", and mining of materials critical to battery manufacture, including cobalt
and other minerals presently supplied primarily from overseas.
Response:
The differing perspectives of commenters on where to draw the line for what is included in a
lifecycle analysis illustrates the difficulties of importing a lifecycle approach into the section
202(a) GHG standard setting and compliance process, and reinforces EPA's long-established
choice not to do so. Aside from the practical difficulties of making reliable accounting for
emissions from overseas extractive activities, these commenters are not advocating consideration
of emissions associated with extraction of precious and semi-precious metals used in ICE
emission control systems, or extraction of lead used for lead-acid batteries.
As noted above, these commenters do not appear to be advocating a similar approach for
fossil fuels, whereby all emissions and other impacts of locating, extracting, and processing
fossil fuels, or all emissions associated with growing, harvesting, and transporting biofuels,
would be accounted for in the vehicular standard setting process. Nor have the commenters
640 See, e.g., https://www.usatoday.eom/story/news/factcheck/2023/l 1/15/ev-charger-is-solar-and-diesel-powered-
not-247-diesel-fact-check/71568937007/ (determining that video showing "EV charging station with diesel
generator that 'runs 24 hours of the day, seven days a week"' was "false").
611 The Unified Regulatory Agenda Entry reads, in relevant part. "EPA is proposing universal waste standards
specially tailored for lithium batteries, separate from the existing general battery universal waste category. This
change in the RCRA regulations would benefit those generating and managing waste lithium batteries by improving
the safety standards and reducing fires from end-of-life lithium batteries, while continuing to promote recycling."
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urging consideration of end-of-life battery disposal and recycling emission issues addressed
emissions relating to disposal and recycling of lead acid batteries, or of wastes from petroleum
refining. 642
As noted above, EPA does not consider a partial life cycle analysis, which focuses only on
certain technologies to be a sufficient analytical basis for standard setting.
Summary:
Various commenters submitted quantified analyses or cited journal papers, technical papers or
reports purporting to show that ICE vehicles operating with biofuels, or HEVs, or PHEVs would
actually emit less GHGs (or comparable amounts of GHGs) than comparable BEV vehicles
when their respective lifecycle GHG emissions, including raw material extraction and
processing, component and vehicle manufacturing, use-phase emissions, and end-of-life are
accounted for.
Response:
None of the commenters citing journal papers, technical papers, or reports presented any
evidence of having conducted a thorough literature review of automotive LCA in general, or for
prospective/comparative LCA of BEV relative to other energy sources in particular.
Commenters cherry-picked from among a small number of LCA studies, some extremely dated
(e.g., a 2009 National Academies study) and that contain data and results that are of little or no
relevance with respect to current or prospective life cycle emissions inventories (LCI) and LCA.
In some cases, specific examples were then cherry-picked from within specific studies or
generated from extreme cases among current automotive offerings using findings of a single
study. For example, some commenters selected a single vehicle example from within a single
study, e.g., an ICEV or HEV light-duty passenger car, and made direct comparisons to a BEV
with substantially different use and capability, e.g., a 400-mile range BEV SUV; and then further
attempted to apply conclusions from such a comparison to the broad diversity of the U.S. light-
and medium-duty vehicle fleet. One commenter calculated emissions using a Hummer EV, as if
a limited production, large, off-road-capable truck is somehow representative of the future U.S.
vehicle fleet. Other commenters selected a single power sector scenario with higher carbon
emissions from among the scenarios in the ICCT/Bieker et al (2021) LCA study instead of
showing the full range of results.
In some cases, these studies pose methodological issues, or scope issues, that make them of
limited value for comparison with this final rule, e.g., not referencing and adhering to
international standards for conducting LCA (e.g., the ISO 14040 and ISO 14044 Standards) or
not using transparent, traceable life-cycle inventories of sufficient data quality (see "Guidance on
Data Quality Assessment for Life Cycle Inventory Data", EPA/600/R-16/096 June 2016). Since
this rulemaking occurs in the future, the use of prospective LCA is key to understanding life-
cycle emissions impacts at future dates. Some analyses included power sector and other
analytical tools that are wholly unsuited for prospective LCA use, for example, Graham's use of
EPA's own eGRID model for modeling prospective secondary power sector LCI.
642 Among other things, petroleum refining results in the generation of a number of hazardous wastes, listed as
hazardous wastes K048-K052 under the regulations (40 CFR Part 261.32) implementing subtitle C of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act.
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Even relatively recent and fully ISO compliant studies may have shortcomings with respect to
prospective LCA if they do not include sensitivity analyses sufficient to cover the full range of
fast-changing inputs. For example, battery cathode chemistries for automotive applications are
rapidly evolving and different chemistries predominate to meet differing conditions and priorities
in different regions of the world. Energy policies and policies to address the growing climate
crisis are also rapidly evolving. The geographic regions for extraction and processing of raw
materials, component manufacturing, battery manufacturing, and whole vehicle manufacturing
are also evolving as new legislation such the BIL and IRA are put into place. Stationary
emissions regulations, especially U.S. electric power sector emissions regulations, have evolved
significantly over the past decade. One example of a recent study that did not, and frankly could
not, account for the full range and rapid pace of changes impacting key LCI used for LCA was
the ANL/Kelly et al. 2022 study cited by the Alliance, API, Chevron, Growth Energy, MCGA,
NCGA, NFU, POET, RFA and others. The study relied on EIA 2017 power sector forecasting,
which is now significantly out of date but was still fairly recent at the time that the work for the
study was underway. The power sector analysis thus did not take into account implementation of
recent EPA EGU emissions regulations or newer regulations finalized since 2017 (for example,
the Mercury and Air Toxics or "MATS" rule or the Good Neighbor Plan's FIP requirements)
that significantly impact coal thermoelectric retirement. Thus the prospective LCI from the
study would reflect criteria pollutant emissions exceeding EGU standards implemented under the
CAA. The study was also published just after and immediately prior to the BIL and the IRA,
respectively, and thus includes none of the power sector investment in clean technologies
encompassed within those laws. One of the primary reasons that EPA continues to use the
Integrated Planning Model for developing prospective power sector LCI is that it incorporates all
final EPA CAA actions impacting the power sector and it is regularly updated to incorporate new
legislation. For example, EPA's Power Sector Modeling Platform Post-IRA 2022 Reference
Case included updates to incorporate impacts from both the BIL and IRA.
To address some of these shortcomings with respect to the preponderance of LCA data and
what it may say regarding comparative and prospective LCA of BEV relative to other energy
carriers, EPA commissioned Eastern Research Group, Incorporated, (ERG) to conduct a
thorough and comprehensive review of recently published (2019-2023 publication dates)
automotive life cycle assessments (LCA) focusing on attributional LCA of battery electric
vehicles (BEV) and competing technologies that included internal combustion engine vehicles
(ICEV) as well as other electrified vehicles such as hybrid electric vehicles (HEV), plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV), and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV).
In addition to a thorough review of the literature, ERG conducted a meta-analysis of available
automotive LCA studies. The final report for the literature review and meta-analysis identified
approximately 10.000 potentially relevant automotive LCA studies for review. Of these studies,
91 studies were identified by ERG as relevant for detailed review, with 74 studies further
identified as meeting acceptance criteria of both peer review and full compliance with ISO LCA
standards. Of those 74 ISO-compliant studies, 31 studies were further identified as having
sufficiently consistent assumptions and context, and sufficient level of detail regarding LCI and
other parameters to allow intra-study comparison. A total of 23 LCA studies within the intra-
study comparison found GWP impacts that were lower for BEVs relative to ICEVs, while 5
studies found that BEVs were higher than ICEVs. Those 5 studies represented a portion of the
BEV use cases in parts of Asia and Eastern Europe that employ electricity grid mixes
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predominantly reliant on coal and/or natural gas to generate power. Results for U.S.-based use
cases all found BEVs to have a lower GWP relative to ICEV, with a minimum of 20 percent
GWP reduction, a maximum of 65% GWP reduction, and a median of 37% GWP reduction for
BEV impacts relative to ICEV. While the Agency's analysis of upstream and tailpipe emissions
for the final rule does not constitute a full LCA, the reduction in GWP reported after 2040 for the
final rule (see RIA Chapter 8.6) falls within the bounds of ISO-compliant comparative
automotive LCA literature for BEV GWP reductions. The preponderance of ISO-compliant
LCA literature is supportive of GHG reductions for BEV when the full life-cycle is taken into
account.
It should be noted, however, that there remain serious limitations to the use of LCA for
determining life-cycle emissions from passenger cars and trucks. EPA received many comments
with statements like "EPA should just use GREET". GREET is a major LCA platform that is
frequently used by EPA for fuels and other analyses. It is important to take into consideration,
however, that GREET is a platform that still must be populated with valid LCI input data in
order to construct a valid LCA for prospective and comparative purposes. LCI for many key
processes for both electrified and conventional automotive component and whole vehicle
manufacturing, including LCI for extractive, manufacturing, and critical material recycling, lacks
sufficient transparency and data quality, and may not be relevant for differing geographic
locations and thus differing resulting energy/power sector LCI.
ERG's final report outlined a number of significant LCI data gaps and provided a summary of
recommendations necessary for valid comparative and prospective automotive LCA. Please
refer to the ERG report for a complete summary of the literature review, meta-analysis of BEV
and other automotive energy carriers, data gaps, and recommendations. It is important to note
that one key set of data gaps identified by ERG and also identified by the Automotive Life Cycle
Assessment Informal Working Group of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations643 is with respect to component
manufacturing processes (in particular batteries, semiconductors, and levels of automation),
vehicle manufacturing processes, and their respective LCI.
Summary:
EPA itself has used a lifecycle approach for light-duty electric vehicles, whereby emissions
associated with the source of electricity are considered for compliance once there is a given
volume of sales in a model year. EPA should not ignore those upstream emissions, since doing
643 EPA currently represents the U.S. as a contracting party to the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (UN ECE
WP.29). Recognizing the limitations and shortcomings of automotive LCA with respect to
comparative and prospective LCA of different energy carriers, the UN ECE WP.29 established
the Automotive Life Cycle Assessment Informal Working Group (A-LCAIWG). The role
established for the A-LCA IWG is to serve as an international forum to develop common
methodology and accepted practices for comparative and prospective automotive LCA for
policymakers, LCA practitioners, and other stakeholders. The A-LCA IWG is currently working
towards preparation of an initial set of draft recommendations tentatively scheduled for UN ECE
WP.29 review by the end of 2025.
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so dilutes the rule's benefits and exaggerates the difference in emission impacts of ICE and BEV
vehicles. Nor is the zero emission needed any longer as an incentive.
Response:
The commenter notes correctly that past light-duty vehicle rules included a provision capping
the number of BEVs whose tailpipe emissions count as zero. EPA adopted the cap to balance
the competing concerns of promoting highly promising (then) relatively new technologies with
concerns about decreasing overall emission reductions associated with the program at a time
when neither the IRA nor EPA regulations were in existence to reduce upstream emissions. 77
FR at 62817, 62818 (Oct. 15, 2012). However, EPA postponed the implementation of the cap
before any manufacturer became subject to it and returned to "its historical practice of basing
compliance with vehicle emissions standards on tailpipe emissions." 85 FR 24174, 25208. As
proposed, EPA is finalizing provisions that would continue to base manufacturer compliance
calculations for tailpipe standards on tailpipe emissions. See preamble III.C.7 and section 3.1.5
of this RTC. With respect to accounting for electricity production emissions, EPA does so in its
analysis of emissions impacts. Moreover, as the commenter notes, GHG emissions associated
with electricity generation are decreasing with the increased use of renewables. Such a decline
was a key factor for EPA in deciding to return to basing compliance on actual tailpipe emissions
in 2020, 85 FR 25208, and confirms the reasonableness of the approach currently as well. EPA
reiterates its view expressed above, and in the 2021 rule, that the appropriate means of
addressing those emissions is through the Act's stationary source provisions.
Summary:
Several commenters said a lifecycle standard-setting approach was important for protecting
disadvantaged communities.
Response:
EPA notes that BEVs not only have zero tailpipe GHG emissions, but zero tailpipe emissions
of all other pollutants. Their operation consequently has very significant benefits, including for
disadvantaged communities. See generally section 9 of this for addressing issues of
environmental justice. As described in preamble section VI and VII, EPA has undertaken an
analysis of the upstream and downstream emission impacts of the final rule's standards, which
were set consistent with EPA's historic approach to standard setting, and EPA considers that
analysis of the net impacts as supportive of the final standards.
Summary:
NGV America cites undocumented conversations with unspecified agency staff which the
commenter characterizes as EPA staff support for a lifecycle approach to GHG vehicular
standard setting.
Response:
Given the absence of documentation of these contacts - indeed, not even a year when the
purported conversations occurred — it is impossible to assess the accuracy of the commenter's
characterization of them. In any case, agency staff are not the agency decisionmaker. The EPA
Administrator is. For the commenter to speak of a 'breached commitment' by the administration
is consequently both incorrect and inappropriate. Furthermore, as discussed in other comment
responses, EPA's views have evolved as circumstances (e.g., the RFS program, power sector
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emissions, and PEV market development) have developed and changed. EPA has fully
explained the basis for its decisions.
Summary:
Some comments suggest that EPA ignores the upstream emissions of CO2 from the increased
electricity generation that would be needed to charge the projected fleet of EVs and that it is
false and misleading to label EVs "zero-emission vehicles" when the production of EV batteries
and the charging of the batteries over the life of the vehicles both generate emissions, including
CO2.
Response:
This comment is incorrect. While EPA uses the name "zero-emission vehicle" to reference
vehicles with no tailpipe emissions by convention, EPA never asserts or models the vehicles as
having no emissions attributed to their activity. In this rulemaking, EPA largely uses the term
"BEV" to denote battery electric vehicles. EPA's emission impacts analysis includes EGU
emissions resulting from the charging demand in Chapter 5 of the RIA.
Summary and Response:
KALA Consulting ("KALA") filed a late comment.
KALA criticizes EPA for referring to BEVs as "zero emission vehicles" when there are
upstream emissions associated with fueling them. As noted in the previous response, EPA has
accounted for upstream emissions associated with both electricity generation and petroleum
refining and has monetized those reductions in assessing the phase 3 rule's costs and benefits. In
this regard, we note that KALA states mistakenly that EPA failed to account for electricity
transmission losses in its analysis (Comment p. 13). See RIA chapter 5 noting that the 2022
post-IRA version of the Integrated Planning Model accounts for both energy generation and
transmission. KALA is also incorrect in asserting that EPA has failed to consider issues
associated with time-of-day recharging (Comment p. 34). Assessment of time-of-day charging is
in fact is a critical part of EPA's analysis of both emission impacts and costs of this rule. See
RIA Chapter 5.1 (load profiles reflecting total daily demand from BEV charging for each vehicle
type).
Like a number of other commenters, KALA believes the section 202(a) GHG emission
standards (although not standards for criteria pollutants or toxics) should reflect upstream
emissions along with tailpipe emissions. KALA would draw the line at upstream GHG
emissions associated with electricity generation, and it would do the same for gasoline and
diesel-fueled vehicles. Comment p. 14. Among the bases for the commenter's suggestion is its
assumption that EGU GHG emission profiles are unlikely to improve (Comment p. 10), failing to
account for the effect of the IRA or any of the other factors reflected in EPA's IPM modelling
showing renewables becoming an increasingly large portion of the EGU power-generating
energy source. See RIA Chapters 5.4. Nor does KALA discuss why its upstream analysis stops
at the EGU or refinery. For example, there is no discussion of whether to consider methane
emissions associated with petroleum extraction.
KALA acknowledges EPA's statement that the Clean Air Act clearly delineates between mobile
and stationary sources, but disagrees with EPA's further statement that stationary source GHG
emissions can be and are being controlled by EPA regulatory programs addressing stationary
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sources. We respectfully disagree. KALA also does also does not speak to any potential legal
impediments to including stationary source emissions as part of a mobile source section 202(a)
standard (e.g., "from any class ... of new motor vehicle").
20 - Employment
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
1. Consideration of Labor Costs in Battery Cost Projections
EPA uses default BatPaC model labor costs. Presumably those costs reflect global production
of batteries today. Yet given the agency's assumption that all batteries in all electric vehicles sold
in the United States will be domestically produced, it seems likely that default labor values
currently hard coded into the BatPaC model would need some degree of reconsideration. Neither
of these issues, nor other potential issues pertaining to default assumptions applied elsewhere in
the model, are addressed, or even acknowledged by the agency in its proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 56]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
First, EPA asserts that the proposed rule will likely have a net positive employment effect
within the automotive industry by 2032—and even its worst- case scenario projects only a few
thousand job losses. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,392. But a wealth of contrary research in recent years
shows that a shift to electric vehicles is likely to have a substantial negative effect on
employment in key automotive-related sectors. For instance, the Economic Policy Institute es-
timates that "a rise in BEVs to 50% of domestic auto sales by 2030 could see losses of roughly
75,000 jobs by 2030." Jim Barrett & Josh Bivens, The Stakes for Workers in How Policymakers
Manage the Coming Shift to All-Electric Vehicles, Econ. Pol'y Inst. (Sept. 22, 2021). Likewise,
a Princeton analysis estimates that jobs in the fossil-fuel industry may decline by 131,000 to
210,000 jobs by 2030 as a result of the move to electric vehicles. See Net-Zero America: State-
Level Health, Employment, and Land Use Impacts (Oct. 2021). And the California Air
Resources Board projects that by 2040, nearly 32,000 (13.8 percent of baseline employment)
auto-mechanic jobs will be lost in that State alone. See Advanced Clean Cars II Proposed
Amendments to the Low Emission, Zero Emission, and Associ- ated Vehicle Regulations:
Standardized Regulatory Impact Assessment (Mar. 29, 2022). Although EPA acknowledges
some of this research, see 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,390, it has made no effort to distinguish it or
explain why it is wrong—and thus failed to justify its optimistic employment predictions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 61-62]
Worse, many of the jobs that are created by the shift to electric vehicles likely will not be
located in the United States. Virtually all of the dominant battery producers that will need to
ramp up production, for instance, are in Asia. Daniel Kupper et al., Shifting Gears in Auto
Manufacturing, Bos. Consulting Grp. (Sept. 28, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/5a9w33ph. As EPA
concedes, the proposed rule could well result in domestic "job loss" if "the United States does
not become a major producer" of electric-vehicle components like "batteries, electric motors,
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regenerative braking systems and semiconductors." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,390. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0683, pp.61-62]
Organization: American Freedom and America First Policy Institute (AFPI)
EV Manufacturing Requires Fewer Workers
EVs are technologically different from conventional vehicles. They are significantly more
expensive than gas-powered vehicles because their batteries require costly minerals (Mills, 2022,
pp.7-8; Frazin, 2022) (Link: https://thehill.com/policy/3607123-heres-why-many-electric-
vehicles-are-so-expensive/). Nonetheless, EVs are mechanically less complex. Conventional
vehicles have many interconnected moving parts that convert the energy from burning gasoline
to motion while processing exhaust. These parts include catalytic converters, gears, clutches, and
torque converters. None of these parts are needed in electric vehicles, which consist of relatively
simple motors and a battery. Ernst and Young report that conventional vehicles have 2,000
moving parts in their powertrains, while Tesla EV drivetrains have only 17 (Canis, 2019, p. 2)
(Link: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/IF11101.pdf). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 3-4]
Consequently, EVs require fewer workers to assemble. Automakers like Ford and
Volkswagen report that EV manufacturing requires 30% to 40% less labor than gasoline-
powered vehicles (United Auto Workers, 2020, p. 13; Bushey, 2022) (Link:
https://www.ft.com/content/8df00b42-4e3f-4a45-b665-2726720105e0). Moreover, parts
suppliers—not final assembly plants—employ almost three-quarters of auto manufacturing
workers. 3 About one- quarter of those parts workers produce gasoline engines and parts or
powertrain and transmission parts—jobs that would be largely eliminated by a shift to EVs (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2021) (Link: https://www.bls.gov/cew/data.htm). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0699, pp.3-4]
3 As shown in Table 1, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and
Wages shows that 219,000 employees worked in automobile and/or light-duty motor vehicle manufacturing
facilities in 2021, while 539,000 workers were employed in motor vehicle part manufacturing facilities.
EV Mandates Will Eliminate Manufacturing Jobs
Auto industry analysts have accordingly noted that EV mandates will eliminate many existing
auto manufacturing jobs. As Brett Smith, director of technology at the Center for Automotive
Research, explained "[t]he industry is going through a transition unlike anything we've ever seen.
There's a pretty strong chance that there will be fewer people building these cars, fewer people
building the parts to these cars, and that will create challenges in some automotive communities"
(Levin, 2022) (Link: https://www.yahoo.com/now/going-electric-could-cost-auto-
105500604.html). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 3-4]
Analysts across the ideological spectrum project substantial job losses. In 2018, analysts
projected EVs would account for about one-fifth of new U.S. vehicle sales by 2030 (International
Energy Agency, 2018, p. 80; Cooper & Schefter, 2018, p. 2) (Link:
https://www.edisonfoundation.net/-/media/Files/IEI/publications/IEI_EEI-EV-Forecast-
Report_Nov2018.ashx). That year, the United Auto Workers (UAW) union estimated that the
shift to electric vehicles would eliminate 35,000 of its members' jobs (Bogage, 2022) (Link:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/12/08/ev-union-gm/). That figure accounts for
nearly 1 in 10 UAW members. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 3-4]
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UAW research director Jennifer Kelly has publicly predicted that "[t]he workers who are
making engines and transmissions today, their jobs will be eliminated when we make a transition
to electric vehicles" (Beene & Coppola, 2018) (Link: https://www.ttnews.com/articles/electric-
vehicles-seen-imperiling-us-jobs-uaw-says?itx%5bidio%5d=5856017&ito=792&itq=7d3aaldf-
ab57-4b41-adf2-d079d9cla42f). She warns that "electric, to me, is where the real risk is to our
membership" (Dawson et al., 2019). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 3-4]
In 2021 President Biden set a target of EVs accounting for half of all new vehicle sales by
2030 (The White House, 2021) (Link: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-
forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/). The left-wing Economic Policy Institute (EPI) estimated
that, without substantial government intervention, hitting this target would eliminate 75,000 auto
manufacturing jobs (Barrett & Bivens, 2021) (Link: https://www.epi.org/publication/ev-policy-
workers/). EPA's even stricter proposed new mandate—two- thirds of all vehicles sold by
2032—would cost even more jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 3-4]
Foreign analysts similarly project that EV mandates will eliminate many auto-related jobs
overseas. For example, the European Union has advanced aggressive EV mandates. The
European Association of Automotive Suppliers estimated that, by 2040, these measures will
eliminate a net of 275,000 jobs in automotive suppliers (Sigal, 2021) (Link:
https://europe.autonews.eom/suppliers/ev-transition-could-cost-500000-jobs-supplier-group-
says). Japanese analysts expect EVs to eliminate more than 80,000 auto-related jobs in their
country by 2050 (Yamada & Abe, 2021) (Link:
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Automobiles/EV-shift-puts-engine-jobs-on-chopping-block-in-
Japan-and-Germany). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 3-4]
Great Lakes Region Will Be Particularly Affected
EV mandates will particularly affect the industrial Midwest. The tri-state region of Indiana,
Michigan, and Ohio is the heartland of U.S. automobile production, particularly for gas-powered
vehicles, transmissions, and related parts manufacturing. More than two-fifths of U.S.-built
vehicles and three-fifths of U.S.- built transmissions are manufactured in these three states
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2022, p. 2) (Link:
https://energyjustice.indiana.edu/doc/2022-the-roosevelt-project-industrial-heartland-case-
study.pdf). These states account for 43% of U.S. autoworkers, including more than 70,000
workers who produce parts for motor vehicle powertrains, transmissions, or gasoline engines
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2021) (Link: https://www.bls.gov/cew/data.htm). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 4-5]
Industry analysts have noted that an EV transition will be particularly painful to the Midwest
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2022, pp. 21-22) (Link:
https://energyjustice.indiana.edu/doc/2022-the-roosevelt-project-industrial-heartland-case-
study.pdf). As Lawrence Burns, former vice president for research and development at General
Motors, told reporters, "If you play this out in a five- to 10-year time frame, employment
ramifications for states like Michigan and regions like southeast Michigan and northwest Ohio
are really going to be a big deal" (Grzelewski, 2020) (Link:
https://www.govtech.com/fs/transportation/in-the-shift-to-evs-some-worry-workers-could-
suffer.html). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 4-5]
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Table 1 shows motor vehicle manufacturing employment in the tristate area and in the U.S. as
a whole, including both employees on primary assembly lines and employees in parts
production. Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana have significantly more jobs—and thus economic
disruption—at stake from EV mandates than any other region of the country. [See original
comment for Table 1: Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Employment in Indiana, Michigan, Ohio,
and the Entire United States (2021) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 4-5]
Estimated Job Losses
While EV mandates are widely expected to eliminate existing auto manufacturing jobs—
especially in the Midwest—few public estimates are available for how EV mandates will affect
individual states. EPA did not project the economic impact of its proposed rule on individual
states or look at how it would affect Midwest manufacturing employment. To fill this gap, AFPI
used data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages to
model the net national auto manufacturing job losses from EV mandates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0699, pp. 5-7]
Based on the automaker and UAW estimates discussed above, the model assumes EVs require
30% less labor to assemble than conventional vehicles. It also assumes that positions in gas
engines and parts manufacturing facilities do not have a role in producing EVs and that four-
fifths of positions involved in producing transmission and powertrain parts are similarly
unnecessary for EV production. The methodological appendix explains the model in detail.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 5-7]
This model focuses only on auto manufacturing jobs; it does not estimate jobs created or lost
in other sectors, such as car dealerships, vehicle maintenance facilities, or battery
manufacturing.4 Workers cannot easily transition between these sectors because they generally
involve different skill sets (St. John, 2022) (Link: https://www.businessinsider.com/automakers-
jobs-desperate-workers-fuel-electric-vehicle-transition-batteries-2022-12). As a European
industry association explained, battery manufacturing "typically requires more academically
schooled workers and less vocationally trained workers than the production of transmission
systems, fuel tanks or other powertrain components" (European Association of Automotive
Suppliers, 2022) (Link: https://clepa.eu/mediaroom/5-key-questions-answered/). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 5-7]
4 The North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) classifies battery manufacturing in a
different industrial sector than it does auto manufacturing. NAICS code 336—transportation equipment
manufacturing— encompasses motor vehicle and motor vehicle parts manufacturing. Battery
manufacturing is covered under NAICS code 335—electrical equipment, appliance, and component
manufacturing.
In 2022, electric vehicles accounted for 5.6% of U.S. motor vehicle sales (Mihalascu, 2023)
(Link: https://insideevs.com/news/653395/evs-made-up-5point6-percent-of-overall-us-car-
market-in-2022-driven-by-tesla/). Table 2 shows estimated net national auto-manufacturing job
losses—in both final assembly and parts manufacturing—for different levels of EV growth. 5
[See original comment for Table 2: U.S. Auto Manufacturing Job Losses if Electric Vehicle
Market Share Rises] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 5-7]
5 The model does not show a strictly linear relationship between job losses and EV market share, i.e. job
losses at 20% market share are not two-fifths of the job losses at 50% EV market share. This is because
EVs currently account for about 6% of the U.S. market, and the model takes that into account.
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These national projections track those of other analysts. If EVs increase to one-fifth of the
U.S. market, the model projects, 27,000 net auto-manufacturing jobs will be lost. This closely
tracks the UAW's 2018 estimate that EVs would eliminate 35,000 auto manufacturing jobs—at a
time when analysts expected EV market share to increase to only 20% over the decade.6 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 5-7]
6 The discrepancy between the AFPI model and the UAW's 2018 estimates is explained by EV market
share growth and auto manufacturing job losses between 2018 and 2022. In 2018, EVs accounted for only 2
percent of all vehicle sales (McDonald, 2019) (Link: https://cleantechnica.com/2019/01/12/us-ev-sales-
surpass-2-for-2018-8-more-sales-charts/). If the model were specified using employment data from 2018
and estimating job losses from EV market share rising from 2% to 20%, it would project 35,100 jobs lost
nationally—almost exactly the UAW estimate.
If EVs rise to half of U.S. vehicle sales—President Biden's original policy—the model
estimates almost 85,000 net auto-manufacturing jobs will be lost. This is similar to EPFs
estimated 75,000 manufacturing jobs lost at 50% EV market share. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0699, pp. 5-7]
The model also shows that EPA's proposed stricter EV mandate would cost tens of thousands
more jobs than its original policy. If EV sales rose to two-thirds of the market—the proposed
new requirement—then 117,000 net auto-manufacturing jobs would be eliminated. About two-
thirds of those job losses would come from parts manufacturers. The remaining third would be in
final assembly positions. Overall, the proposed rule would substantially reduce auto-
manufacturing employment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 5-7]
Job Losses by State
Previous studies do not provide state-specific estimates of EV-induced job losses. EPA also
did not consider the regional employment impact of its proposed rule. Table 3 presents "best-
case cenario" estimates of auto-manufacturing job losses by state if EVs rise to two-thirds of new
vehicle sales. The model assumes that existing auto manufacturers would retain their market
share through the EV transition and that they would build these EVs at their existing facilities
instead of closing some plants and opening new facilities in different states. Under these
optimistic assumptions, total job losses are driven only by the aggregate labor efficiencies in EV
assembly and by the elimination of engine and powertrain part manufacturing positions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 7-8]
Table 3 presents the nine states that, under this best-case scenario, would experience the
greatest auto manufacturing job losses under EPA's proposed rule. These states collectively
account for almost 84,000 of the 117,000 jobs lost nationally. The model shows that the
proposed rule would impose significant economic costs on Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana. These
three states bear the brunt of job losses, although several southern states would also see
significant losses. [See original comment for Table 3: Auto Manufacturing Job Losses by State
under a 67% EV Mandate] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 7-8]
Michigan is projected to experience the worst job losses, with 25,000 jobs lost. About 8,000
of those jobs would occur in final assembly, while about 17,000 would be in parts
manufacturing. Indiana (-16,000) and Ohio (-14,000) would suffer the next worst losses.
Tennessee (-7,000), South Carolina (-5,600), and Alabama (-5,200) would also experience large
job losses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 7-8]
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However, the Midwest is likely to see even greater job losses than these best-case estimates
project. EV mandates are likely to push auto manufacturing jobs out of the Midwest. Telsa
dominates EV manufacturing, accounting for almost two-thirds of EVs sold in 2022. It is
accordingly likely that Tesla will take considerable market share from the other automakers if the
government forces them to switch to EVs. This would mean higher employment in Tesla's
California, Texas, and forthcoming Nevada manufacturing facilities, but even lower employment
in Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana. Similarly, many of the traditional auto manufacturers are
building their EVs in new facilities outside the tri-state area. Ford Motor Co., for example, has
announced plans to create a large assembly plant for electric trucks in Tennessee (Ford, 2021)
(Link: https://media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/fna/us/en/news/2021/09/27/ford-to-lead-
americas-shift-to-electric-vehicles.html.) This shift would mitigate job losses in Tennessee but
would result in even worse job losses for Michigan. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 7-8]
EPA's proposed rule, which did not analyze or consider potential regional economic effects,
would impose heavy economic costs on the Midwest. The rule would directly eliminate tens of
thousands of blue-collar jobs in what is currently the epicenter of U.S. automobile
manufacturing. Forcing consumers to switch to electric vehicles would eliminate the jobs of
many workers who produce those vehicles. To the extent the proposed EV mandate spurs labor
reallocation in vehicle manufacturing, Midwest job losses will be even greater. These job losses
would devastate many communities in Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana. The EPA should reject this
proposed rule for this reason. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 7-8]
Methodological Appendix
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) used motor vehicle manufacturing employment
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW)
to estimate net job losses from EV adoption. The QCEW is based on records derived from
unemployment payroll tax payments. It is highly reliable administrative data, but it is produced
with a lag. QCEW data from 2021 is the most recent annual data available. AFPI collected both
national and statewide QCEW employment data for 2021 from four industry subsectors [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-11]:
Automobile and light-duty motor vehicle manufacturing (NAICS code 33611); [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-11]
Motor Vehicle Parts Manufacturing (NAICS code 3363); [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0699, pp. 9-11]
Motor Vehicle Gasoline Engine and Engine Parts Manufacturing (NAICS code
336310); and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-11]
Motor Vehicle Transmission and Power Train Parts Manufacturing (NAICS code
33635). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-11]
AFPI assumed the annual quantity of vehicles sold would remain constant throughout any
transition to EVs. This is a somewhat strong assumption, as—even with substantial tax credits—
EVs remain considerably more expensive than gas-powered vehicles. The average cost of
vehicles consequently would rise considerably as EV market share increases, and higher prices
reduce sales. To the extent that vehicle sales drop instead of remaining constant, the model will
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tend to underestimate job losses, as fewer workers would be needed to make fewer vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-11]
Assuming constant production and constant market share, the model assumes job losses at the
national and state level would be proportional to the reduction in conventional vehicle sales.
Automakers report that EVs require 30% to 40% less labor to assemble than conventional
vehicles (United Auto Workers, 2020, p. 13; Bushey, 2022) (Link:
https://regionld.uaw.org/system/files/ev-white-paper-revised-january-2020-final.pdf) (Link:
https://www.ft.com/content/8df00b42-4e3f-4a45-b665-2726720105e0). AFPI used the lower end
of this range, estimating that the reduction of employment in automobile and light-duty motor
vehicle manufacturing ("Motor Vehicle Assembly" in Tables 2 and 3) is proportional to 30% of
the reduction in conventional vehicle sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-11]
This assumption implies that automakers would respond to the mandate by retooling their
existing conventional vehicle assembly facilities to produce EVs, keeping the large majority of
their current assembly workforces. This is an optimistic assumption. In reality, some facilities
that assemble gas-powered vehicles are likely to close entirely, while new EV assembly facilities
are likely to open. Those new EV facilities may not be in the same states as the conventional
facilities, and they are unlikely to solely reemploy workers laid off from conventional vehicle
production. Such shifts in domestic production have no impact on net national job loss estimates.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-11]
However, as discussed in the text, they mean the state job loss figures are a "best-case
scenario" for the Midwest. In reality, production shifts would mean the Midwest would likely
experience even greater job losses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-11]
The model assumes that job losses for workers in motor vehicle gasoline engine and engine
parts manufacturing would be fully proportional to decreases in conventional vehicle sales, i.e.,
none of these jobs would have a role in producing electric vehicles. The model further assumes
that job losses in motor vehicle transmission and power train parts manufacturing would be
proportional to 80% of the reduction in conventional vehicle sales, e.g., EV manufacturing
would require 20% of current transmission and powertrain parts employees. This allows for the
possibility that transmission and powertrain parts manufacturers will retool to provide parts for
EV power trains, while recognizing that EV power trains are much simpler and require far fewer
parts than gas-powered vehicles.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-11]
7 The UAW reports that an EV Chevy Bolt powertrain has 80% fewer moving parts than the gas-powered
version, and predicted that design improvements would enable that figure to rise in the future (United Auto
Workers, 2020, pp. 12-13) (Link: https://regionld.uaw.org/system/files/ev-white-paper-revised-january-
2020-final.pdf).
The assumption that some current transmission and powertrain parts manufacturing
employees will have a role in producing EVs is somewhat optimistic. As discussed above, the
UAW's research director has predicted these jobs will be completely eliminated (Beene &
Coppola, 2018) (Link: https://www.ttnews.com/articles/electric-vehicles-seen-imperiling-us-
jobs-uaw-says?itx%5bidio%5d=5856017&ito=792&itq=7d3aaldf-ab57-4b41-adf2-
d079d9cla42f). If employment losses in transmission and powertrain parts manufacturing are
fully proportional to the reduction in conventional vehicle sales, then job losses among
powertrain and transmission parts manufacturing employees will be proportionately higher.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-11]
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Using these assumptions, the model calculated employment losses from increased EV market
share at both the state and national levels as follows. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-11]
The model first calculates the percentage decrease in conventional gas-powered vehicle sales
implied by a given proportion of EV market share. For example, if EV market share rises from
5.6% (2022 levels) to 67% (the Biden Administration's proposed requirement for 2032), then the
conventional vehicle market share will drop from 94.4% to 33%. This would be a 61.3
percentage point decrease in conventional vehicle market share, and—assuming vehicles sold
remain constant—a 64.9% reduction in conventional vehicles sold (61.3 percentage point
reduction in market share / 94.4% initial market share). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-
11]
The model assumes that all employees in gasoline engine and parts manufacturing work on
conventional vehicles. The model estimates job losses in this sector by multiplying the
percentage reduction in conventional gas-powered vehicle sales by QCEW employment in that
sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-11]
The number of positions involved in assembling conventional gas-powered vehicles is
estimated by multiplying QCEW employment for all automobile and light-duty motor vehicle
manufacturing by the 2022 conventional vehicle market share (94.4%), as well as an adjustment
factor to account for the fact that EVs require less labor to assemble. The estimated number of
positions involved in assembling conventional motor vehicles is then multiplied by the
percentage reduction in conventional vehicle sales and the 30% labor efficiency factor to
estimate total job losses in motor vehicle assembly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-11]
The number of positions involved in manufacturing transmission and powertrain parts for
conventional vehicles is estimated by multiplying QCEW employment for all transmission and
powertrain parts by the 2022 conventional vehicle market share (94.6%), plus an adjustment
factor to account for the 80% assumed reduced labor requirements for EV powertrains. The
estimated number of positions involved in manufacturing conventional vehicle powertrains and
transmission parts is then multiplied by the percentage reduction in conventional vehicle sales
and the 80% labor efficiency factor to estimate total job losses in transmission and powertrain
parts manufacturing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0699, pp. 9-11]
As discussed in the text, the model assumes that existing automakers maintain their current
market share through the transition to EVs. This optimistic assumption seems unlikely to actually
materialize. Tesla currently dominates EV production, accounting for almost two-thirds of new
EV sales in 2022 (Mihalascu, 2023) (Link: https://insideevs.com/news/653395/evs-made-up-
5point6-percent-of-overall-us-car-market-in-2022-driven-by-tesla/). Tesla'sU.S. factories are
primarily located in California and Texas, with a new facility under construction in Nevada. If
Tesla continues to maintain its dominant EV position, the market share of the Detroit-based
automakers—General Motors, Ford, and Stellantis/Chrysler—will fall. As long as domestic
manufacturers maintain their collective market share, changes in market share will not affect the
net national job loss figures. However, such shifts would produce even larger job losses in
Michigan and other Midwestern states than the model projects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0699, pp. 9-11]
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Organization: BlueGreen Alliance (BGA)
Climate change, economic injustice, and racial inequity are the most fundamental challenges
we face today—and we know they're inextricably intertwined. In the transportation sector, which
accounts for nearly 30% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, this intersection is visible in the
disproportionate impact of transportation emissions on non-white communities. 1 It's visible in
the disparities in access to cleaner vehicles and other mobility options across income levels. And
it's visible in the economic impacts of decades of disinvestment in auto manufacturing
communities, which have seen good jobs offshored and anchor facilities shuttered due to ill-
conceived policies that gutted the middle class. That's why it is critical that regulators,
policymakers, and advocates coordinate standards, policies, investments, and infrastructure
projects that engage and benefit all people—from the manufacturing workers who build the
vehicles of the future, to the people who drive them, to the communities they drive through.
Strong vehicle emissions standards—accompanied by policies to rebuild manufacturing, protect
and create good family supporting jobs, and revitalize communities—are critical to achieving
these aims. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, p. 1]
1 U.S. EPA, "Study finds exposure to air pollution higher for people of color regardless of region or
income," September 2021. Available Online: https://www.epa.gov/sciencematters/study-finds-exposure-
air-pollution-higher-people-color-regardless-region-or-income
Strong, technology-forcing vehicle standards are essential to meet climate goals, advance
environmental justice, and create good jobs in the clean economy. The transportation sector is
the single largest contributor to climate-warming greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S., and the
local air pollutants emitted by vehicles, including particulate matter (PM), nitrous oxides (NOx),
and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) have disproportionate impacts on low-income and non-
white communities. Meanwhile, the supply chains for light- and medium-duty vehicles and the
manufacturing jobs within them—are critical to the economic health and stability of auto
manufacturing communities across the country (See Figure 1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667,
p. 2]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 1: Light- and Medium-Duty Vehicle Assemblers
and Component Manufacturers. Light and Medium Duty Vehicle Manufacturing.
Source: BGA [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, p. 2]Contrary to the repeated threats of
certain industry stakeholders opposing regulation, strong vehicle emissions standards do not have
to come at the cost of good auto manufacturing jobs. In fact, they can support U.S.
competitiveness in the global auto market, which protects and creates jobs. BGA analysis on the
impact of former rounds of light-duty vehicle emissions standards has found that when they are
well-designed and supported by worker protections and investments, standards can generate
high-quality jobs, and position the domestic auto industry as a leader in a competitive global
market.2, 3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp. 3-4]
2 BlueGreen Alliance, Supplying Ingenuity II, May 2017: Available Online:
https://www.bluegreenalliance.org/resources/supplying-ingenuity-ii-u-s-suppliers-of-key-clean-fuel-
efficient-vehicle-technologies/.
3 BlueGreen Alliance, Tech@Risk, August 2019. Available Online:
https://www.bluegreenalliance.org/resources/techrisk-the-domestic-innovation-technology-deployment-
m anufacturing-and-jobs-at-risk-in-stepping-away-from-global-leadership-on-clean-cars/.
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A 2021 Economic Policy Institute (EPI) report conducted in collaboration with BGA, the
United Auto Workers, the United Steelworkers, and the AFL-CIO modeled how different
timelines and scenarios of light-duty electrification in the U.S. would impact auto manufacturing
and supply chain jobs.4 The report found that over 150,000 new auto manufacturing and supply
chain jobs could be created under the assumption of 50%new EV sales by 2030—a timeline that
closely matches the EPA's preferred proposal (See Scenario 2 in Figure 2). However, such job
gains are contingent upon a significant onshoring of the EV supply chain such that 1) the
domestic content of EVs at least matches that of ICEs, and 2) there is a 10% increase in the share
of U.S.-made vehicles sold in the U.S. auto market. A tech-forcing rule that drives electrification
of some share of the vehicle fleet, coupled with investments to ensure that the vehicles and their
components are made here, can be a major economic boon to communities across the country.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp. 3-4]
4 Economic Policy Institute, The stakes for workers in how policymakers manage the coming shift to all-
electric vehicles, September 2021. Available Online: https://www.epi.org/publication/ev-policy-workers/.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Figure 2: Potential Auto Manufacturing Job Growth at
EV Deployment Scenarios [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp. 3-4]
Onshoring powertrain production and boosting domestic share of vehicles sold would lead to
large job gains. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp. 3-4]
Change in the U.S. auto jobs under various BEV penetration scenarios, if U.S. EV powertrain
component production matched ICE average and the share of domestically produced vehicles
sold in the U.S. increase by 10 percentage points. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp. 3-4]
Source: Economic Policy Institute [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp. 3-4]
The fact that EPA's proposed standards address both GHG emissions and local pollutant
emissions clearly broadens the scope of auto manufacturing supply chain communities that stand
to grow from increased demand for a range of efficiency and pollution reducing technologies. It
is essential that automakers achieve gains along both axes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp.
5-6]
EPA must consider how the transition to clean vehicles will impact manufacturing workers
and the communities they live in. This should be an essential part of the comprehensive analysis
that EPA conducts to project its proposals' economic impacts. The map in Figure 1 plots
approximately 1,300 facilities manufacturing light- and medium-duty vehicles and their
components. Of these facilities, approximately 225 manufacture ICE light- and medium-duty
vehicles and their components, like engines and transmissions, fuel efficiency technologies, and
tailpipe pollution reducing technologies. These facilities in the ICE supply chain, the nearly 900
facilities making "fuel agnostic" components for light- and medium-duty vehicles, and other as
yet unbuilt ZEV manufacturing facilities may experience employment impacts as ZEVs become
increasingly cost competitive compared to ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp.
5-6]
EPA already develops its proposed standards based on sophisticated economic analyses that
model the impact of the proposal on total fuel cost savings, vehicle maintenance savings, and
health cost savings from improved health outcomes. EPA's economic analysis should also seek
to project the economic and employment impacts of the shift to clean vehicles on auto
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manufacturing communities. For each of EPA's proposals and alternatives, this analysis should,
at minimum, identify light- and medium-duty vehicle manufacturing communities (as in Figure
1), quantify the share of each community's economy that is supported by jobs associated with
light- and medium-duty vehicle manufacturing, and quantify the number of jobs associated with
that sector. EPA should collaborate with the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE) to conduct this analysis. EPA may consider structuring its analysis to identify
communities that are particularly reliant on a domestic vehicle manufacturing supply chain,
potentially identified as those with light- and medium-duty vehicle manufacturing "clusters"—or
geographic areas where there are at least two manufacturing facilities within a 50-mile radius
that are producing light- and medium-duty vehicles, or components for them. BGA collects
detailed supply chain data that can support this analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, pp. 6-
7]
Considering and quantifying the employment opportunities and risks associated with each of
EPA's proposals is essential to ensuring that the regulations advance equity along economic
axes, as well as climate and public health ones. The domestic auto manufacturing sector has
historically been characterized by a higher unionization rate, community-supporting wages and
benefits, the provision of pathways to the middle class (particularly for people without a four-
year college education), and strong representation of Black workers. Research from EPI finds
that "Black workers account for 12.5% of workers economy wide, but 16.6% of workers in the
auto sector, while workers without a four-year degree account for 62.2% of workers economy
wide, but 74.6% in the auto sector."5 The auto manufacturing sector represents a critical path to
the middle class for the very workers and communities that have disproportionately borne the
brunt of neoliberal economic and trade policies. It is therefore essential that EPA leverage
available data to project how its proposals will shape the domestic auto manufacturing sector,
and the workers and communities that comprise it. Such analysis would also help inform
stakeholders weighing in on the proposals by projecting tangible, on-the-ground, economic
impacts of the transition to cleaner light- and medium-duty vehicles, rather than limiting the
scope of the economic analysis to fleet owners and automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0667, pp. 6-7]
5 Economic Policy Institute, The stakes for workers in how policymakers manage the coming
shift to all-electric vehicles, September 2021. Available Online:
https://www.epi.org/publication/ev-policy-workers/.
[EPA must hold automakers and industry stakeholders accountable to workers and
communities in their pursuit of regulatory compliance. In particular, this means collecting data to
ensure that standards do not exacerbate the offshoring of the automotive supply chain, or
facilitate rent-seeking behavior from automakers seeking to reduce their regulatory burdens and
labor costs. BGA research demonstrates the significant economic footprint that the light- and
medium-duty auto manufacturing sector has in the United States. This footprint represents both
an opportunity and a risk, depending on whether or not the United States emerges as a global
leader in the manufacturing of clean vehicles during this critical transitional period. The past two
decades have seen significant offshoring of the automotive supply chain to other countries in
Asia, Europe, and North America, where automakers have benefitted from lower labor costs,
looser environmental regulations, and favorable tax regimes. Between 1998 and 2019,
employment in the manufacturing of motor vehicles and motor vehicle components fell by more
than 20%.6 A part of a larger globalization trend, this shift not only gutted auto manufacturing
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communities in the United States, but it also allowed auto suppliers to establish supply chains in
other countries, often with minimal labor protections and loose environmental standards.7 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, p. 7]
6 Economic Policy Institute, Botched policy responses to globalization have decimated manufacturing
employment with often overlooked costs for Black, Brown, and other workers of color, January 2022.
Available Online: https://www.epi.org/publication/botched-policy-responses-to-globalization/.
7 Strategic Management Journal, Offshoring pollution while offshoring production, March 2017. Available
Online: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/smj.2656.
EPA recently published a Request for Information (RFI) targeting automakers manufacturing
clean school buses receiving funding through the Clean School Bus Program. 10 This optional
RFI asks bus manufacturers to provide information about worker voice (whether employees are
covered by a collective bargaining agreement, whether the company is committed to maintaining
union neutrality, etc.), employee benefits, inclusive hiring practices, training and advancement
programs, and community partnerships. Such an RFI can be a powerful tool through which EPA
can solicit information about how manufacturers interact with their employees and their
communities, and facilitate a "race-to-the-top" for the quality of auto manufacturing jobs in the
United States. EPA should create a new RFI for automakers regulated by the proposed light- and
medium-duty standards that builds upon the data collected by the Clean School Bus RFI to
illuminate the quality of jobs currently supported by the light- and medium-duty manufacturing
sector. The new RFI should, at minimum, seek detailed information about worker voice,
employee wages and benefits, inclusive hiring practices, training and advancement programs,
and community partnerships. In order to improve upon the Clean School Bus RFI, automakers
should be prompted to provide granular information that not only reveals whether workers
receive healthcare benefits, for example, but also the quality of those benefits. 11 This RFI could
also apply to vehicle battery manufacturers, fuel efficiency technology manufacturers, tailpipe
pollution reducing technology manufacturers, and other advanced materials and components
manufacturers in the automotive supply chain, which will play a significant role in automakers'
ability to meet increasingly stringent emissions standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, p.
8]
10 U.S. EPA, Request for information about OEM job quality and workforce development practices, April
2023. Available Online: https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/fy23-csb-oem-workforce-
req-info-2024-04.pdf.
11 EPA. Bus manufacturer job quality and workforce development practices, June 2023. Available
Online: https://www.epa.gov/cleanschoolbus/bus-manufacturer-job-quality-and-workforce-development-
practices
Ultimately, the transition to cleaner vehicles must function to raise the job quality and safety
standards associated with all impacted workforces, including auto assembly workers, and supply
chain workers. It is essential, but not enough, to create and protect auto manufacturing jobs in the
United States. As increasingly stringent standards drive the transition to cleaner vehicles, we
must also work to ensure that all jobs that will facilitate the transition are good, community-
supporting jobs in safe and democratic work environments, where workers have the free and fair
choice to join a union. The current landscape—wherein some new manufacturing jobs
(especially in the battery sector) are low-paid contract roles in hazardous facilities, located in
states where employers can evade union organizing—must be corrected. 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0667, p. 9]
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12 The Washington Post. "The unlikely center of America's EV battery revolution," April 2023. Available
Online: https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2023/04/17/georgia-evs-battery-belt/.
Deregulation, unfavorable trade policy, and the systematic undermining of labor laws have
been chipping away at worker power in this country for decades. But as clean vehicle
technologies continue to transform the auto industry—regulators, policymakers, advocates, and
organizers have an important opportunity to determine what the jobs of tomorrow's auto industry
will look like. EPA must leverage its regulatory power to set the industry on the right course, for
the climate, for public health, and for workers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0667, p. 9]
Organization: BorgWarner Inc.
BorgWarner is investing in our workforce and recommends increased public investment to
upskill the U.S. talent pool to assist the industry's ZEV transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0640, pp. 7-8]
BorgWarner is committed to developing the workforce necessary to support our EV transition
and a key facet of that strategy is evolving the skills of our existing talent. Our U.S. production
facilities continue to invest in apprenticeships and technical workforce training. In addition, to
support our industry-leading automotive engineers' transformation into cutting-edge teams
responsible for developing our EV products, we created "Power to Evolve," a training program
in partnership with leading universities in the U.S. and Europe. The program is designed to
increase our talent's knowledge of, and skills for, electrical engineering by integrating hands-on
skills required for productive work and learning modules on inverters, batteries, and motors.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 7-8]
For manufacturers and the broader industry, the need to train and certify workers is
paramount. Similarly, for consumers, the lack of qualified BEV technicians is leading to
increased costs for repairs, lengthy delays, and higher insurance premiums. These delays could
have an impact on the decision-making process of future BEV purchasers who cannot afford to
be without a vehicle for an extended period.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 7-8]
7 Tesla, insurers take different paths to deal with expensive repairs | Reuters
BorgWarner is also concerned about the shortage of certified automotive technicians trained
to analyze and repair BEVs and EV charging stations. The National Institute for Automotive
Service Excellence estimates that the U.S. currently has approximately 229,000 certified car
technicians. Only about 3,100 (less than 1.4%) of these technicians, however, are certified to
work on electric vehicles.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 7-8]
8 https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/08/16/business/ev-sales-soar-its-back-school-car-techs/
We propose that EPA revisit how the lack of qualified technicians could impact the total cost
of BEV ownership along with the maintenance and service needed to ensure reliable, consistent
charging station operability as both could significantly impact consumer's purchasing decisions.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0640, pp. 7-8]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Beyond savings to individual consumers, the proposed standards, to the extent manufacturers
use ZEVs to comply, present economic growth opportunities for many sectors in the United
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States, especially auto manufacturing, electricity generation, and upstream ZEV supply chains as
consumers direct more spending to ZEV technology and electricity for transportation fuel. Many
manufacturers are already domestically producing ZEVs, providing tangible employment
opportunities nationwide. 128 Provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act to support domestic
production and materials sourcing will further shore up these benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp.65-66]
Even in the short time since U.S. EPA released its proposal, manufacturers have announced
new investments in vehicle and battery manufacturing and assembly that will strengthen and
expand the ZEV industry across the U.S. For example, Toyota announced that it will assemble its
new battery electric sport utility vehicle at its Kentucky facility using batteries from a new
battery plant in North Carolina. 129 General Motors and Samsung SDI are investing more than
$3 billion to build a battery plan in Indiana, providing local jobs. 130 Hyundai Motor Group and
LG Energy Solution announced that they will build a $4.3 billion electric battery plant in
Georgia. 131 These are just a few examples of the tremendous economic opportunity this
expanding industry can provide to support local jobs and build a resilient supply chain for ZEVs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 65-66]
128 Blue Green Alliance. "The High Road to California EV Goals: Raising Ambition for High-Quality
Domestic Manufacturing Jobs." July 2021. https://www.bluegreenalliance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/07/Baum- Report-7121 -FINAL-w-cover.pdf
129 Toyota. "Toyota Ramps Up Commitment to Electrification with U.S. BEV Production and Additional
Battery Plant Investment." Toyota Newsroom. May 31, 2023. https://pressroom.toyota.com/toyota-ramps-
up- commitment-to-electrification-with-u-s-bev-production-and-additional-battery-plant-investment/.
Accessed June 22, 2023.
130 Shepardson, David. "GM, SDI will build $3 billion battery manufacturing plant in Indiana." Reuters.
June 13, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/indiana-confirms-gm-sdi-will-build-
3-bilion-ev-battery-manufacturing-plant-2023-06-13/ Accessed June 22, 2023.
131 Amy, Jeff. "Hyundai and LG announce $4.3 billion plant in Georgia to build batteries for electric
vehicles." Associated Press. May 26, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/hyundai-lg-electric-vehicles-
batteries-georgia-db44d911b3dae0fbf454cb53503ce84c. Accessed June 22, 2023.
Complementary workforce development policies and programs to support job replacement in
sectors that may see reduced demand can help ensure equitable participation in the clean
technology economy. CARB commends the federal government for taking proactive steps to
help support employment opportunities in clean technology sectors, particularly for workers
impacted by anticipated reductions in fossil fuel industries associated with increased deployment
of ZEV technology. 132 California has likewise recognized the need to support potentially
displaced workers and is investing in workforce development strategies as an element of its
pathway towards a zero-emission transportation system. For example, the California Workforce
Development Board has identified several actions to help further development of robust and
equitable ZEV industry in California. 133 CARB also notes an opportunity to support further
workforce development and employment through its recommendation on ZEV assurance
measures regarding serviceability. Enabling access to vehicle data increases the opportunity for
independent repair shops to participate in the servicing and repair of ZEVs, ensuring these
businesses benefit from increased ZEV deployment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 65-
66]
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132 See, for example, Center for American Progress. September 14, 2022. "The Inflation Reduction Act
Provides Pathways to High-Quality Jobs." https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-inflation-
reduction-act-provides- pathways-to-high-quality-jobs/ Accessed May 26, 2023.
133 California Workforce Development Board. ZEV Agency Action Plan. January 2023.
https://business.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/ZEV-Agency-Action-Plan-2023-CWDB.pdf
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
- Elimination of American Jobs. EPA's electrification goal would overhaul the American
fuels industry, causing harm to both the petroleum industry and to those who, like commentors,
help to supply clean and renewable fuels. Additionally, the proposal would reshape the American
automobile industry, which "supports 10 million direct and indirect jobs" and "accounts for more
than three percent of GDP." See Comments of Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE) on
EPA's Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards (Sept. 27, 2021), EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0208-0527. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0712,
p. 6]
Organization: Countymark
CountryMark is a small refiner that operates a small refinery in a rural area in Mt. Vernon,
Indiana, with a capacity of 35,000 barrels per day (BPD). CountryMark is wholly owned by
Countrymark Cooperative Holding Corp, a regional federated cooperative operating primarily in
Indiana. CountryMark and its affiliates operate on a cooperative basis for the benefit of their
members and patrons. Unlike most energy companies, CountryMark is completely American
owned and controlled by its member local cooperatives. The member cooperatives are, in turn ,
owned and controlled by individual farmers within their trade territory. Over 100,000 farmers in
Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio participate in these local cooperatives. CountryMark's
Board of Directors is comprised of farmers. Distributions of profit (if any) are distributed back to
these farmers via the cooperative system, and these distributions remain in rural communities
where the dollars support their local economies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0665, pp. 1-2]
Although CountryMark is one of the smallest fuel refineries in the country, its local economic
impact is significant, directly employing over 470 people whose wages and benefits exceed $40
million per year. Most of the Company's employees do not have college degrees but support their
families and communities through well-paying jobs. CountryMark is the second largest employer
in Mt. Vernon, a rural community of only about 6,500, and one of the five largest employers in
Posey County, Indiana. The Company also partners with the local community onemergency
response training, which includes funding fire schools for local firefighters, holding quarterly
emergency response meetings, and hosting training exercises. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0665,
pp.1-2]
CountryMark is Indiana's only American-owned oil production, refining, and marketing
company. The refinery uses 100% North American crude oil sourced predominantly from the
Illinois Basin in southern Illinois, southwest Indiana, and western Kentucky. CountryMark
supplies nearly 70% of the agricultural market fuels and 50% of school district fuels in Indiana.
The Illinois Basin is a high-cost conventional oil basin abandoned by big oil companies decades
ago that, due CountryMark's business, supports 20,000 well-paid industry workers and supplies
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royalties to over 40,000 landowners. CountryMark will spend over $500 million for crude oil in
a typical year, most staying in the three-state area. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0665, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Daniel Hellebuyck
Costs and Job Losses: This "dartboard" approach to setting arbitrary standards like the one in
this proposal does not take into account the enormous costs placed on automakers trying to reach
the target. Companies- like Ford and General Motors- have tried to fund their EV ventures by
laying off employees, sending American jobs to low-wage countries, and dramatically raising
prices on ICE vehicles to pay for EVs that the market may not want or be ready for. Quality of
ICE vehicles has suffered as car companies have shifted resources from quality control and
design to development of EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0526, p. 1]
Organization: Delek US Holdings, Inc.
VI. The Proposed Rule Fails to Holistically Consider Impacts Beyond the Automotive
Industry
a. ZEV mandates will negatively affect domestic employment rates.
If EPA's Proposed Rule goes into effect, tens of thousands of high-paying, family- supporting
jobs will be lost as refining capacity continues to decline. Indeed, EPA admits that its proposal
may affect employment for firms providing fuels: "Reduced consumption of petroleum
represents cost savings for purchasers of fuel, as well as a potential loss in value of output for the
petroleum refining industry, fuel distributors, and gasoline stations, which could result in
reduced employment in these sectors."38 But EPA also presumes that the Proposed Rule will not
have a noticeable impact on aggregate net employment as labor will be reallocated from one
product use to another and that the reduction in fuel consumption will be met through reduced
petroleum imports rather than reductions in domestic production, shielding American jobs in the
petroleum refining industry.39,40 Further, EPA's conjectural conclusions are made weaker by
the Agency's failure to consider employment impacts in related sectors, including downstream
businesses such as automotive dealerships and other small businesses like parts suppliers and
auto mechanics.41 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 8]
38 Id. at 29,393; DRIA at 4-59.
39 DRIA at 4-46-48 (citing external sources indicating that "although BEVs have fewer parts than their
ICE counterparts, there is potential for job growth in electric vehicle component manufacturing, including
batteries, electric motors, regenerative braking systems and semiconductors, and manufacturing those
components in the US can lead to an increase in jobs... [but] if the US does not become a major producer
for these components, there is risk of job loss.").
40 Id. at 4-59.
41 See, e.g., EDMUNDS, "Where Does the Car Dealer Make Money?" (June 13, 2019), available at
https://www.edmunds.com/car-buying/where-does-the-car-dealer-make-money.html (automobile
dealerships, for example, cannot recoup revenue or maintain employees by merely switching the types of
vehicles it sells because parts and service accounts for 44% of revenue).
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Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
H. EPA should expect significant employment opportunities associated with the installation
and maintenance of charging infrastructure and related grid infrastructure.
Research conducted on behalf of EV Infrastructure Strike Force suggests that, if the Biden
Administration's goal of deploying 500,000 EV charging stations is met with public fast
charging stations, it will support about 30,000 job-years.355 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759,
p. 130]
355 Edward W. Carr, James J. Winebrake, and Samuel G. Winebrake, Workforce Projections to Support
Battery Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Installation, Energy and Environmental Research
Associates, LLC (2021), https://etcommunity.org/assets/files/Workforce-
ProjectionstoSupportBatteryElectricVehicleCharginglnfrastructureln stallation-Final202106082.pdf.
XXVIII. U.S. Employment in the Auto Sector is Likely to Increase as Electrification of the
Vehicle Fleet Grows.
Finally, we turn to employment considerations. EPA is correct that the employment effects of
environmental regulation "are difficult to disentangle from other economic changes (especially
the state of the macroeconomy) and business decisions that affect employment, both over time
and across regions and industries," 88 Fed. Reg. at 29390, and that there is some uncertainty in
the data regarding specific job impacts of increased electrification, id. EPA notes that although
BEVs have fewer parts than combustion vehicles, initial results of a vehicle tear-down study
commissioned by the Agency and performed by FEV Consulting suggest that the labor hours
needed to assemble BEVs and combustion vehicles are "very similar." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29392;
DRIA at 2-57 to 2-58. The teardown study performed a side-by-side analysis of significant
systems and subsystems to develop a projected cost model comparing a "relatively equivalent"
BEV (2021 Volkswagen ID.4) and a combustion vehicle (2021 Volkswagen Tiguan). DRIA at 2-
57.664 Although the full final results of EPA's commissioned study are not yet publicly
available, the information provided in the docket indicates a well-designed peer-reviewed
analysis that considered platform optimization, used an absolute costing approach, considered
potential differences in incremental costs, and involved a detailed labor assessment for each
component. Id. The docket includes detailed slides from FEV Consulting summarizing the
preliminary cost results of the study, and EPA should further incorporate these and other relevant
results from the FEV Consulting research into the Agency's support for the final rule.665 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 201]
664 See also Michael Safoutin, Cost and Technology Evaluation, Conventional Powertrain Vehicle
Compared to an Electrified Powertrain Vehicle, Same Vehicle Class and OEM, Memo to EPA Docket #
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0422 (Apr. 18, 2023).
665 See FEV Consulting, EPA FEV Cost and Technology Evaluation VW Tiguan and VWID4,
Attachment to Safoutin, Cost and Technology Evaluation, Memo to EPA Docket # EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0422 (Apr. 18, 2023).
EPA's DRIA notes two additional older teardown studies that the Agency considered in its
analysis—a 2017 UBS teardown of the Chevy Bolt EV, and a 2017-2018 teardown study of
several EV components performed for CARB—neither of which was as comprehensive or
comparative as EPA's project with FEV Consulting, and neither of which specifically looked at
total labor hours.666 See DRIA at 2-58. At least one other recent teardown study has considered
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labor hours and come to a conclusion similar to FEV Consulting's analysis—that "very similar"
labor hours are needed between BEVs and combustion vehicles—finding that BEVs require 99%
of the total labor hours per vehicle compared to combustion vehicles, primarily due to battery
cell manufacturing, and PHEVs require more labor than combustion vehicles.667 As automakers
have already begun taking significant steps toward on-shoring battery manufacturing and the rest
of the PEV supply chain, supported by the significant funding incentives for domestic
manufacturing in the BIL and IRA, the United States is well-positioned to capture battery-related
and other PEV manufacturing jobs as the PEV sector grows. The positive impact on employment
from this increase in vertical integration is illustrated in preliminary results from the Agency's
FEV Consulting study, which finds nearly a 50% increase in labor hours in BEV compared to
combustion engine manufacturing for a highly vertically integrated manufacturer.668 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 201-202]
666 The UBS project was an EV teardown only, and UBS did not conduct a side-by-side comparison with a
similar combustion vehicle, and the CARB project involved only specific components from strong hybrids
and plug-in hybrids, which have cost profiles very different from BEVs.
667 Daniel Kupper et al., Shifting Gears in Auto Manufacturing, Boston Consulting Group (Sept. 28,
2020), https://www.bcg.eom/publications/2020/transformative-impact-of-electric-vehicles-on-auto-
manufacturing.
668 FEV Consulting, Assembly Times Comparison Draft Report, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0460, Slide
28 (May 9, 2023).
EPA cites reports by the Economic Policy Institute, Seattle Jobs Initiative, and Climate
Nexus, all of which found that total U.S. employment in the auto sector could increase with
electrification, in particular if the share of vehicles sold in the United States that are produced in
the United States increases. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29390-92. In fact, Congress has recognized the
benefits of ensuring that large shares of vehicles sold in the United States are produced in the
United States. Through the on-shoring incentives in recent legislation, particularly the IRA,
Congress has encouraged substantial growth in the domestic ZEV manufacturing and supply
chain and has indicated congressional support for increasing numbers of ZEVs in the light-duty
fleet in order to meet the nation's climate goals. These IRA incentives are having their intended
effects of encouraging development of the domestic ZEV supply chain. As EPA notes, reports by
the BlueGreen Alliance and the Political Economy Research Institute estimate that the IRA will
create over 9 million jobs over the next decade, with about 400,000 attributed directly to the
battery and fuel cell provisions. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29390-91. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p.
202]
Other analyses have found similar positive employment impacts. A University of
Massachusetts study of job creation resulting from the IRA found that the IRA's programs,
including the law's transportation-sector funding programs that encourage ZEV development,
could lead to overall job creation.669 The analysis estimated significant job increases in the
transportation, electricity, and manufacturing sectors, both annually and in total job-years.670
Analysis of the IRA and BIL by the Boston Consulting Group found that the two laws would
increase new U.S. ZEV industry jobs through 2030 from about 455,000 to about 680,000,
"primarily due to domestic manufacturing incentives."671 And, supporting this post-IRA upward
trend, EDF recently found that "46,400 announced jobs, representing approximately 32% of all
EV job announcements, have occurred in the last 6 months since the passage of the IRA."672
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 202]
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669 Robert Pollin et al., Job Creation Estimates Through Proposed Inflation Reduction Act, University of
Massachusetts Amherst Political Economy Research Institute 10-13 (Aug. 4, 2022),
https://peri.umass.edu/publication/item/1633-job-creation-estimates-through-proposed-inflation-reduction-
act.
670 Id. at 3, 13 (estimating 447,472 additional job-years in relevant transportation jobs due to IRA, along
with 31,510 additional job-years due to IRA's EV manufacturing grants under Section 50143 and 114,592
additional job-years due to IRA's clean manufacturing investment tax credit under Section 13501).
671 Boston Consulting Group, Impact of IRA, IIJA, CHIPS, and Energy Act of 2020 on Clean
Technologies 3 (April 2023), https://breakthroughenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/EV-Cleantech-
Policy-Impact-Assessment.pdf.
672 EDF, U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs: Characterizing the Impacts of the
Inflation Reduction Act after 6 Months 5 (March 2023),
https://blogs.edf.org/climate411/files/2023/03/State-Electric-Vehicle-Policy-
Landscape.pdf?_gl= 1 * luxcnl5 *_ga*M
Tk3NDc4MzQ3NS4xNjMyODU4NDY0*_ga_2B3856Y9QW*MTY3ODgwMjg0Ny4xNTQuMC4xNjc4O
DAyOD
Q5LjU4LjAuMA..*_ga_Q5CTTQBJD8*MTY3ODgwMjg0Ny4xNTMuMC4xNjc4ODAyODQ5LjU4LjAu
MA.
Other analyses in addition to those cited by EPA also have concluded that more stringent
GHG standards can lead to positive job impacts. For example, several state-level analyses
conducted by ERM using the Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) model found that state
adoption of clean car standards would result in net job increases, assuming that incremental
spending on PEV batteries and electric drivetrain components would be in the United States.673
Moreover, each of these analyses found that the jobs created would be high-quality, high-paying
jobs, with average wages for the new jobs between 33% and 100% higher than average wages
for the jobs being replaced.674 Similarly, a state-level analysis conducted by the World
Resources Institute (WRI) on increased PEV penetration in Michigan found that the state "stands
to gain tens of thousands of high-quality jobs," if it "seize[s] the opportunities" of the PEV
sector.675 Because PEVs are cheaper to drive, the analysis found that "[sjwitching to EVs will
allow drivers to save money on vehicle purchases, maintenance, and gasoline, which will
improve household finances and have positive employment impacts" as consumers spend their
extra money throughout the rest of the economy.676 Analysis on the nationwide impacts of
California's clean car policies also projects significant overall job gains resulting from increased
production of ZEVs—with over 7.3 million full-time equivalent job-years of employment
created through 2045.677 Another nationwide study found that, compared to a "no new policy"
scenario, a scenario with high levels of ZEVs would result in a peak of over 2 million jobs
created in 2035, even without accounting for the impact of any additional on-shoring incentives
such as those in the IRA.678 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 203]
673 Dave Seamonds et al., New York Advanced Clean Cars II Program, ERM 20 (Feb. 2023),
https://www.erm.com/globalassets/documents/global-policies/new-york-advanced-clean-cars-program-
report_2023. pdf (evaluating impacts of Advanced Clean Cars II adoption in New York); Sophie
Tolomiczenko et al., The Benefits of the Colorado Clean Car Standard, ERM 19-20 (May
2023), https://www.erm.com/globalassets/foundation-annual-report-
2023/co_acc_ii_final_report_15may2023.pdf (evaluating Colorado's Clean Car Standards); Sophie
Tolomiczenko et al., New Jersey Advanced Clean Cars II Program, ERM 21 (April 2023),
https://www.erm.eom/contentassets/0ea3bl93115448cd9dd5c7e3622373a0/new-jersey-advanced-clean-
cars-ii-progr am.pdf (evaluating impacts of Advanced Clean Cars II adoption in New Jersey).
674 Id.
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675 Devashree Saha et al., A Roadmap for Michigan's Electric Vehicle Future, World Resources Institute 3
(May 2023), https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/2023-05/roadmap-michigan-ev-
future.pdf?VersionId=vOClQYM5LrUtDymSBY zRPGHpKMUmRju.
676 Id. at 10-11.
677 Austin L. Brown et al., Driving California's Transportation Emissions to Zero, University of California
Institute of Transportation Studies 327 (April 2021), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3np3p2t0.
678 University of California Berkeley Goldman School of Public Policy, The 2035 Report: Transportation
ES-4 & 22-24 (April 2023), http://www.2035report.com/transportation/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/2035Report2.0-l.pdf?hsCtaTracking=544e8 e73-752a-40ee-b3a5-
90e28d5f2el8%7C81c0077a-d01d-45b9-a338-fcaef78a20e7.
These new clean vehicle jobs are also poised to have positive environmental justice impacts
as they bring significant new jobs to communities of color. Research by Climate Power has
found that "[a] majority of new clean energy jobs and projects [resulting from IRA investments]
are located in communities of color across America," with Arizona, Georgia, South Carolina,
Nevada, and Michigan home to the largest number.679 Climate Power's report details numerous
gigafactories, cathode manufacturing facilities, and ZEV factories that will bring jobs to
communities of color nationwide. For example, Kore Power Gigafactory will bring 6,400 jobs to
Arizona, in two counties that are 46.6% and 32% Hispanic/Latino, and Scout Motors will open
an EV plant in South Carolina, bringing 4,000 jobs to two counties that are between 40% and
50% Black/African American.680 Climate Power's Clean Energy Jobs Tracker provides detailed
data on new clean energy jobs since the passage of the IRA, showing large job growth in
numerous states related to battery and ZEV manufacturing.681 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 204]
679 Climate Power, The Clean Energy Boom in Communities of Color 1, 4, https://climatepower.us/wp-
content/uploads/sites/23/2023/05/Clean-Energy-Boom-Communities-of-Color-Report.pd f (noting plans
for 51 new battery manufacturing sites in places like Augusta, Georgia; Tucson, Arizona; and St. Louis,
Missouri; and plans for 26 new or expanded EV manufacturing facilities in Pryor, Oklahoma; Montgomery,
Alabama; and Detroit, Michigan).
680 Id. at 4-5.
681 Climate Power, The Clean Energy Plan, https://thecleanenergyplan.com/.
While certain employment sectors may be impacted over time by increased electrification, as
EPA notes, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29392, we agree that this will "happen over a longer time span due to
the nature of fleet turnover," see Table XVII.G-l (L/MD PEVs as a Share of Total On-Road
L/MD Fleet, 2020-2040), supra, with time to retrain workers for better, higher paying jobs, 88
Fed. Reg. at 29392. A World Resources Institute study considering Michigan's automotive
industry noted that many new ZEV-sector jobs will require skill development, with opportunities
to "re-skill, upskill, or shift to jobs of equal or greater quality," and that much of this "could be
addressed as part of normal rates of retirement, given that 52% of all current auto manufacturing
workers in Michigan will reach age 65 by 2040."682 Moreover, programs have already been
implemented to train workers with the skills they will need for jobs within ZEV manufacturing.
California's Energy Commission, for example, created the state's Clean Transportation Program
to "invest[] in manufacturing and workforce training and development, working with a variety of
public and private partners."683 Electric bus company Proterra and community colleges in
California joined together to provide a nine-week training program to become electric bus
manufacturing technicians, which workers have already used to transition from lower-paying
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restaurant jobs, for example, to higher-paying union jobs at Proterra.684 General Motors
launched the Automotive Manufacturing Electrical College (AMEC) "to train current and future
employees to work on evolving electrical systems in future GM vehicles."685 States are also
funding training for ZEV-related jobs.686 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 204]
682 Devashree Saha et al., A Roadmap for Michigan's Electric Vehicle Future at 8, 10.
683 California Energy Commission, Workforce Development, https://www.energy.ca.gov/programs-and-
topics/programs/clean-transportation-program/clean-transportation-fundin g-areas-4.
684 Jill Replogle, Training a New Workforce for California's Move to Electric Vehicles, Marketplace
(June 28, 2021), https://www.marketplace.org/2021/06/28/training-a-new-workforce-for-californias-move-
to-electric-vehicles/.
685 General Motors, Training Manufacturers for the Vehicles of Tomorrow,
https://www.gm.com/stories/amec-electric-manufacturing-workforce.
686 See, e.g., State of Illinois, Illinois Drives Electric: Training and Degree Programs,
https://ev.illinois.gov/grow-your-business/training-and-degree-programs.html (noting various job programs
with state funding); State of Michigan, Gov. Whitmer Announces New EV Jobs Academy Website to
Connect Michiganders to Careers in Electric Vehicle Industry (March 1, 2023),
https://www.michigan.gov/leo/news/2023/03/01/gov-whitmer-announces-new-ev-jobs-academy-website-
to-connect- michiganders-to-careers-in-ev-industry ("The EV Jobs Academy is designed to provide
Michiganders with tuition assistance and supportive services, including "earn while you learn"
opportunities through a Registered Apprenticeship, to support and streamline onramps to high-wage, in-
demand careers. With more than 100 partners including employers, industry stakeholders and education
institutions, the EV Jobs Academy is driving the state's advanced mobility talent development for the
future.").
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
B. Protective standards will help to grow American jobs.
In addition to delivering significant health and environmental benefits, protective standards
that help to ensure additional ZEV deployment will also bolster the economy and grow U.S. jobs.
The U.S. is currently making historic investments in electric vehicle manufacturing and domestic
job creation, both of which have been catalyzed by the IRA and BIL. According to a report by
Environmental Defense Fund and WSP USA, more than $120 billion in EV manufacturing
investments and 143,000 new U.S. jobs have been announced in the last eight years, with more
than 40 percent of those announcements happening in the last six months, since passage of the
IRA (Figure 1).5 Over $31 billion of those announced investments has been toward the
manufacturing of electric passenger cars and trucks, providing over 55,000 new jobs and $65.3
billion in investment supporting over 60,000 jobs in battery manufacturing. Protective EPA
standards that drive additional electrification of the transportation sector can help support and
accelerate these important trends, promoting continued investment in zero-emitting vehicles,
batteries and components and associated America jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 7-
8]
5 U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs, Characterizing the Impacts of the Inflation
Reduction Act after 6 Months, WSP for EDF, (March 2023).
https://blogs.edf.org/climate41 l/files/2023/03/State-Electric- Vehicle-Policy-Landscape.pdf (Attachment
E)
3300
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[See original attachment for Figure 1: New EV Job Announcements Accelerated by National
Policy]
Source: WSP, U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 7-8]
In addition to these sector-wide trends, EDF also commissioned a study by M.J. Bradley &
Associates in 2021 that focused on the broader economic and employment effects associated
with the production of electric F-Series light trucks, including the Ford F-150 Lightning, as a
case study for the broader electric vehicle manufacturing sector within the U.S.6 The report
shows that EV manufacturing in the U.S. has the potential to support significant positive job and
GDP impacts. Specifically, the analysis, which was conducted prior to passage of the IRA, finds
that a single direct job associated with the production of electric F-Series vehicles could support
13 to 14 jobs in the wider U.S. economy. And every 1,000 such direct electric F-Series
production-related jobs would support $1 billion in direct, indirect, and induced labor income
benefits and $1.6 billion in U.S. GDP. The results show that a plant supporting 3,300 jobs7 could
result in 44,000 jobs in the wider economy, providing $319 million in direct income and over
$3.2 billion in direct, indirect, and induced labor income benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0786, pp. 7-8]
6 Amlan Saha, Miranda Freeman, Jane Culkin, and Dana Lowell, U.S. Light Truck Electrification:
Economic and Jobs Impact Study, M.J. Bradley & Assoc. for EDF, Nov. 2021. (Attachment F).
7 Ford announcements suggest that its new EV plant in Tennessee would support between 3,200 and 3,300
directjobs.
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
As discussed in further detail below, the Proposed Rule will have significant impacts beyond
the traditional automotive market. It will eliminate American jobs in the refining sector, which
directly employs more than 100,000 individuals across the United States - it is also widely
accepted that every refinery job is a job multiplier of ten. It will significantly strain the electric
grid, requiring utilities to rapidly increase generation, transmission, and distribution capacity to a
degree not fully contemplated by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 3-4]
h. The EPA Fails to Properly Consider Employment Impacts
The Proposed Rule fails to appreciate the employment impacts, including those on lower
income consumer that will result from rapid electrification. First and foremost, any mandate to
replace conventional ICE vehicles with PEVs will have a direct impact on the 890,000 gas
station employees around the country.83 A mandate will also have an impact on the 113,000
employees supporting the transportation fuels industry upstream of the pump as well as the many
industries tangentially related to the production of ICE vehicles, including motor vehicle parts,
automobile dealers, repair and maintenance services, and parts manufacturers. 84 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 17]
83 CEA Study at 12.
84 Id.
While EPA does mention employment impacts in the Proposed Rule, EPA cannot simply
assume that because the U.S. economy is at full employment, the regulation "is unlikely to have
3301
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a noticeable impact on aggregate net employment" as labor will be reallocated from one
productive use to another.85 Even if true on a macro scale, "transitory" impacts of affected
industries will be significant as there will not be a one-for-one job replacement - especially if
jobs in the domestic transportation fuels industry are replaced with those in battery processing
operations, which are largely conducted overseas. It cannot be assumed that trained workers in
one field will be able to move to another (both physically and through re-training). Instead, EPA
must consider the wholesale changes to the workforce that will come from mass adoption of
PEVs. Entire industries may be eliminated, such as emission inspection services, third-party
dealer networks, and aftermarket product tuning. 86 EPA must fully address how the Proposed
Rule will redefine the vast U.S. labor pool supporting the automotive industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0579, p.17]
85 Proposed Rule at 29,390.
86 The Week, "How Tesla's direct sales model is roiling the car dealership industry," (June 21, 223
available at https://theweek.com/us/1024416/tesla-vs-car-dealerships (reporting on PEV manufacturer
direct-sales allowances that bypass franchise dealer networks).
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
The shift to cleaner cars and trucks can strengthen domestic manufacturing and supply chains,
increase industrial competitiveness, and create good-paying jobs.30 Research about the U.S. job
potential from electric vehicle manufacturing finds that transitioning 50% of sales to battery
electric vehicles (BEVs) can lead to 150,000 net job creation in the auto sector, including auto
parts and auto assembly, if coupled with an increase in domestic content for vehicles sold in the
U.S., and market share growth for U.S. made vehicles.31 The growth in electric vehicle charging
infrastructure can also lead to domestic job creation. Research quantifying the number of jobs
associated with EV infrastructure from assembly, deployment, and maintenance appears limited.
Draft work by the ICCT is underway that quantifies the number of jobs needed to support this
rapidly growing infrastructure network. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 11-12]
30 The White House (2023b). Fact sheet: Biden-Harris Administration announces new private and public
sector investments for affordable electric vehicles, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2023/04/17/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-new-private-and-public-sector-
investments- for-affordable-electric-vehicles/; Naimoli, S., Kodjak, D., German, J., and Schultz, J. (2017,
May 23). International competitiveness and the auto industry: what's the role of motor vehicle emission
standards? International Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/international-
competitiveness-and-the-auto-industry-whats- the-role-of-motor-vehicle-emission-standards/
31 Barrett, J., and Bivens, J. (2021, September 22). The stakes for workers in how policymakers manage
the coming shift to all-electric vehicles. Economic Policy Institute, https://www.epi.org/publication/ev-
policy-workers/
Table 1 shows the draft results of the number of infrastructure-related jobs created from the
charging infrastructure sector in 2035: more than 183,000. The light-duty vehicle EV
infrastructure industry would generate in total close to 160,000 jobs that involve the public,
workplace, and home charging infrastructure assembly, deployment, and maintenance, and the
MDHV EV infrastructure industry will generate close to 23,700 jobs. Around 36% of these jobs
come from electrical work, followed by 29% from assembly, 17% from maintenance, 10% from
planning and design, 6% from general labor, and 3% from administration and legal. These jobs
would further support supply chain jobs in assembly components and materials for EV charging
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equipment, which are not included in our estimates but can be significant, especially with
increase in domestic production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 11-12]
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR Table 1. Estimate of light-duty and medium- and heavy
duty vehicle charging infrastructure- related jobs in 2035 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp.
11-12]
The number of chargers needed for light-duty vehicles and the associated findings for U.S.
job growth potential are based on an analysis of charging needs based on achieving Biden
administration's goal of 50% EV sales by 2030, which is assumed to increase to 80% sales by
2035. For MHDV, the model a scenario where EV sales achieve 30% for tractor truck, 50% for
buses and rigid truck by 2030, and 100% for all segments in 2040, which builds on the
manufacturers' ambitions and existing legislation in California and several other states.32 The
analysis is being updated based on the projections in EPA's new multi-pollutant standards
proposal. Because the EPA proposal estimates that 60% of new light-duty vehicle sales would be
battery electric by 2030 and 67% by 2032 - greater than Biden's 50% by 2030 target - updating
our analysis for increased BEV penetration would increase the number of chargers needed and
thus increase the estimates of the number of jobs in this industry through 2035 compared to what
is shown in Table 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 11-12]
32 International Council on Clean Transportation. (2022a). ICCT comments on EPA proposed HDV rule.
https://theicct.org/comments-epa-proposed-hdv-rule-may22/
Organization: International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW)
Short Summary
The UAW fully supports the transition to a cleaner auto industry, and it must be done in a way
that protects both good union jobs and the environment. We urge the EPA to reach a consensus-
based standard for light- and medium-duty greenhouse gas emissions that avoids allowing the
burden of compliance to fall heaviest on the workers who currently build ICE vehicles and those
who will build ZEVs in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 1]
Regulations that push the industry to adopt cleaner technologies are important to creating a
strong domestic union manufacturing base. We also know that the US auto industry does not
have a perfect track record in keeping up with consumer interest. In the 1980s, we saw the
decimation of US auto market share and with it of good union auto jobs in this country, in part
due to the companies' misjudging the consumer market and failing to adapt. We cannot allow
this pattern to repeat in the 21st century in case the existing US automakers fail to keep up with
rising EV demand, further sacrificing market share to foreign, non-union, and low-road
employers. There is a risk of US automakers focusing on short-term profit while non-union
employers capture future generations of market share, with disastrous outcomes for the industry
labor standards and union workers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 1]
However, we are also concerned the proposed standards do not adequately address the
projected impact on an industry that balances ICE jobs with the quality of new EV jobs. Nor
does it properly account for the role that the sale of ICE vehicles will play in the transition or the
availability of charging infrastructure. The EPA must involve stakeholders to reach a mutual
agreement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 1]
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Discussion
I. Direct Impact on UAW Members
The auto industry is reaching a key inflection point with the rise of electrification. Policies
and investment decisions made in the next few years will re-shape the industry for decades.
There is an opportunity to get this transition right for workers and the environment. That means
avoiding the mistakes of the past, adopting a strategy that reverses decades of off-shoring and
declining unionization in the industry and ensuring the domestic auto industry keeps pace on the
latest clean technologies. The UAW is leading the transition to a cleaner and greener auto
industry. UAW members are building light, medium, and heavy- duty electric vehicles (EVs),
batteries, and the next generation of efficient and zero-emission vehicles. We are also doing our
part to ensure the EV transition is a just transition, organizing the country's first union battery
cell manufacturing plant, securing neutrality agreements with firms along the EV supply chain,
and negotiating investment commitments for the production of EVs and components in our
collective bargaining agreements. Over 1 million people work in motor vehicle parts and
manufacturing.2 While auto industry profitability has reached record highs in recent years,
autoworker wages have not kept pace. Since 2000, inflation adjusted wages have declined by
25% in motor vehicle manufacturing and by 19% in motor vehicle parts manufacturing.3 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 2]
2 See Bureau of Labor Statistics. Automotive Industry: Employment, Earnings, and Hours. Retrieved from:
https://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iagauto.htm.
3 See Bureau of Labor Statistics. Average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees,
motor vehicle parts manufacturing, not seasonally adjusted and Average hourly earnings of production and
nonsupervisory employees, motor vehicle manufacturing, not seasonally adjusted. January 2000 to
February 2023 wages adjusted usings Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator.
The standards must create economic security for workers in the industry, include safeguards
that strengthen the domestic manufacturing supply chain, and require the EV transition to
provide the same level of investment and quality jobs as the current ICE footprint, otherwise we
will fail to build the popular support necessary to sustain policies for the EV transition and the
continued competitive position of the U.S. auto industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 2]
Despite planning to invest over a trillion dollars globally in electric vehicle production,4
major auto companies seek to use the transition to cleaner vehicles in order to roll back hard-
fought gains, including by shuttering and offshoring manufacturing facilities, cutting wages, and
fighting attempts to include new facilities under existing collective bargaining agreements. We
cannot allow the transition to electric vehicles to continue the erosion of job quality in the auto
industry. Yet, initial trends are quite troubling. As the White House notes in its report on
domestic supply chains, "the automotive battery plants that are in existence or are advertising for
production workers pay much less than existing powertrain plants, in the range of $17-21 per
hour [emphasis added],"5 The realized and potential closure of Ford's Romeo Engine Plant,
Stellantis's Belvidere Assembly Plant, and General Motors' Lordstown Assembly Plant
demonstrate the risk facing autoworkers and our economy if business as usual is allowed to
continue. Research indicates that by 2030 the domestic auto industry could add or lose jobs
depending on whether EV assembly and parts production is expanded and onshored.6 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 2-3]
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4 See Paul Lienert, Reuters, Exclusive: Automakers to Double Spending onEVs, Batteries to $1.2 Trillion
by 2030 (Oct. 25, 2022).
5 See The White House. Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and
Fostering Broad-Based Growth (June 2021) at 120.
6 See Jim Barrett and Josh Bivens, Economic Policy Institute, The Stakes for Workers in How
Policymakers Manage the Coming Shift to All-Electric Vehicles (Sept. 21, 2022) at 11.
"If policymakers ignore the opportunity to build the [auto] sector back stronger, large job
losses and further degradation of job quality is the most likely outcome. If instead policymakers
help meet this coming transformation with strong investment targeted at boosting the U.S.
position in the electric vehicle market and in advanced vehicle technology manufacturing, and if
these investments are accompanied by measures aimed at strengthening bargaining power for
workers, then employment will expand in the U.S. auto sector and the number of unionized jobs
will grow."7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 2-3]
The UAW demands that the electric vehicle transition be a just transition, which prioritizes
the creation and preservation of good union jobs, internal combustion engine (ICE)-comparable
or better wages, collective bargaining, and the reshoring of vehicle and parts production. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 3-4]
UAW members work at 26 light-duty vehicle final assembly plants in 8 states building
vehicles for a wide variety of applications - from sports cars to work pickups. Additionally, the
UAW represents auto parts workers throughout the country making engines, transmissions,
stampings, axles, drivelines, seats, interiors, and various other components. The shift to EVs
presents a challenge to the employment of workers currently making ICE engines, transmissions,
exhaust systems, and fuel systems. Tens of thousands of UAW members have high quality union
jobs producing such components. If an increasing number of vehicles do not require these
components, it could have a negative impact on employment levels at plants making these
components. Employers must commit to re-tool plants and re-train workers to maintain
employment levels and allow American workers to make advanced technology vehicles. The
DOE should support reinvestment in these workforces and plants. Such support should be
conditioned on employers maintaining employment levels, job quality standards, and freedom of
association. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 3-4]
UAW-Represented Final Assembly Plants, Light-Duty Vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0614, pp. 3-4]
7 Id. at 15.
Automaker Plant
City
State
1.
Stellantis
Warren Truck
Warren
MI
2. Stellantis Belvidere Assembly*(recently idled) Belvidere
3. Stellantis Jefferson North Detroit MI
MI
IL
4. Stellantis Mack Assembly
5. Stellantis Sterling Heights
6. Stellantis Toledo North
Toledo
Detroit
Sterling Heights MI
OH
MI
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7.
Stellantis
Toledo Supplier Park
Toledo
OH
8.
Ford
Chicago
Chicago
IL
9.
Ford
Dearborn
Dearborn
MI
10.
Ford
Flat Rock
Flat Rock
MI
11.
Ford
Michigan Assembly
Wayne
MI
12.
Ford
Kansas City
Kansas City
MO
13.
Ford
Kentucky Truck
Louisville
KY
14.
Ford
Louisville
Louisville
KY
15.
Ford
Ohio Assembly
Avon Lake
OH
16.
GM
Arlington
Arlington
TX
17.
GM
Bowling Green
Bowling Green KY
18.
GM
Factory Zero
Detroit-Hamtramck
19.
GM
Flint
Flint
MI
20.
GM
Lansing Delta
Lansing
MI
21.
GM
Lansing Grand River
Lansing
MI
22.
GM
Orion
Lake Orion
MI
23.
GM
Spring Hill
Spring Hill
TN
24.
GM
Fort Wayne
Fort Wayne
IN
25.
GM
Wentzville
Wentzville
MO
26.
GM
Fairfax
Kansas City
MO
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 3-4]
UAW members are proud to be building the vehicles of the future, including hybrids, plug-in
hybrids (PHEVs), battery electric vehicles (BEVs), autonomous vehicles, and increasingly
efficient gasoline vehicles. UAW members are building advanced technology vehicles across the
country and many UAW-represented plants are slated to add electrified vehicles in the future.
Current UAW-made BEVs and PHEVs include [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 4-5]:
1. Ford F-150 Lightning - BEV Pickup (Dearborn, MI)
2. Ford Escape - PHEV SUV (Louisville, KY)
3. Lincoln Corsair - PHEV SUV (Louisville, KY)
4. Lincoln Aviator - PHEV SUV (Chicago, IL)
5. Cadillac Lyriq - BEV SUV (Spring Hill, TN)
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6. GMC Hummer Pickup - BEV Pickup (Detroit, MI)
7. GMC Hummer SUV - BEV SUV (Detroit, MI)
8. Chevy Bolt & Bolt EUV - BEV CUV (Orion, MI)
9. Cruise Autonomous Vehicle - BEV CUV (Orion, MI)
10. Jeep Wrangler - PHEV SUV (Toledo, OH)
11. Jeep Grand Cherokee - PHEV SUV (Detroit, MI)
12. Ford E-Transit - BEV Commercial Van (Kansas City, MO)
13. Thomas Built Bus Saf-T-Liner C2 Jouley - BEV School Bus (High Point, NC)
14. IC Bus Electric CE - BEV School Bus (Tulsa, OK)
15. Mack LR - BEV Refuse Truck (Macungie, PA)
16. Volvo Truck VNR - BEV Class 8 Truck (Dublin, VA) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0614, pp. 4-5]
UAW members are also fighting to raise the standards in the emerging domestic EV battery
cell industry. Workers at Ultium Cells' battery cell plant in Lordstown, OH, voted
overwhelmingly to join the UAW by a vote of 710 to 16.8 The vote by Ultium workers sent a
message that is loud and clear - the EV future must be powered by batteries that are union-made
and provide wages, benefits, and workplace safety that is comparable or better than ICE
powertrain jobs. Just as these workers are fighting for EV jobs that meet union industry
standards, federally supported manufacturing projects should also be required to meet these
standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 4-5]
8 UAW. December 9, 2022, "UAW Statement on Ultium Organizing Victory": https://uaw.org/uaw-
statement-ultium- organizing-victory/.
UAW members produce internal combustion vehicles, engines, transmissions, and other ICE-
exclusive components. Transmission and engine plants, like final assembly plants, help create
economic ecosystems as the success of suppliers and local businesses often depend on the
success of the transmission and engine plants. Therefore, the potential for economic
displacement can be far greater than meets the eye. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 4-5]
Absent sufficient safeguards incorporated into the rule or revisions to the proposed standards,
the burden of compliance is poised to fall heaviest on the workers who currently build ICE
vehicles and those who will build ZEVs in the future. The proposed standards' uncertain
disruption to ICE jobs and the uncertain quality of new EV jobs must be addressed as the EPA
works to finalize the rule. Without this, we fear the proposed standards threaten to facilitate a
race to the bottom, allowing manufacturers to pit EV jobs against ICE jobs, and ensuring the
standards we fought for are absent for the next generation of vehicles and those who build them.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 4-5]
A. Uncertain Disruption to ICE Jobs
The EPA's proposed standards anticipate a dramatic change in the types of vehicles that will
be driven on our roads. But the expedited transition to ZEVs that is required by the standards will
3307
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not impact vehicles and drivetrains alone. The robust supply chain and domestic manufacturing
base that has long supported the production of ICE vehicles will be placed in jeopardy. We are
concerned that an impracticable regulatory environment will only encourage original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) to seek cost savings by placing the risk of the electric vehicle (EV)
transition solely on autoworkers. The EV transition will not succeed if the workers building ICE
vehicles are left behind. Rest assured, it is never a more efficient process, innovative technology,
or greater market share that saves the industry. Autoworkers are always expected to sacrifice:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 5-6]
"We absolutely have too many people in certain places, no doubt about it... And we have
skills that don't work anymore. We have jobs that need to change." (Ford CEO Jim Farley)9
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 5-6]
9 Neal Boudette, "Ford to Cut 3,000 Jobs to Reduce Costs in Transition to Electric Vehicles", (New York
Times, Aug. 22, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/22/business/ford-motor-job-cuts.html.
The scores of workers who power the industry and rely on stable employment to provide for
their families deserve a better path forward. Unfortunately, the EPA's projections of the
proposed standards' impact on employment will fail to ease concerns about a major disruption to
the workforce. The EPA projects that the proposed standards could have a dramatic impact on
employment, ranging from a loss of 12,380 - 24,100 jobs per year or an increase in 30,800 -
81,500 job per year.10 We are highly skeptical of claims that the proposed standards will have
minimal effect on employment. In the light-duty sector, automakers have used the cost of EVs as
an excuse to cut jobs. 11 Whether these claims by manufacturers are valid or a pretext to reduce
costs should be interrogated, but in either case it is the workers building the vehicles that bear the
brunt of these threats. And where EV battery jobs have been established domestically, job quality
at these plants threaten to undermine standards in the entire sector. The only way to mitigate
these concerns is to build out a completely unionized domestic supply chain for vehicles and
batteries. The union workers who build ICE vehicles deserve a comprehensive assessment of the
proposed standards' impact on their livelihoods. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, pp. 5-6]
10 Supra note 1 at 29392.
11 The Washington Post. April 26, 2023. "Auto giant Stellantis offers buyouts to 33,500 workers":
https://www.washingtonpost.eom/business/2023/04/26/auto-giant-stellantis-offers-buyouts-33500-
workers/; Reuters. May 21, 2021. "Daimler Truck predicts engine job losses in transition to 'green' trucks":
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/daimler-truck-predicts-engine-job-losses-transition-
green-trucks-2021-05-21/.
The EPA should recognize that the domestic vehicle manufacturing footprint relies
substantially on the production of profitable ICE vehicles and that those profits will be necessary
to fund the transition to cleaner technologies. By requiring increased ZEV adoption, and
therefore fewer ICE vehicles, the proposed standards should be expected to disrupt ICE jobs. We
urge the EPA to conduct additional analysis of the proposed standards' projected impact on
employment, with particular focus on the union workforce that produces ICE vehicles. EPA's
analysis should also consider the location, job quality, and unionization rates of workers
manufacturing the batteries, fuel cells, and advanced ICE powertrain components that will be
necessary to meet the regulations. Viewing employment in the aggregate is not sufficient. Not all
jobs should be treated as equal. Vehicle manufacturing relies on a union workforce. Therefore,
the preservation of standards, fought for and won by UAW members, in new EV jobs should
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receive significant attention in the EPA's economic impact analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0614, pp. 5-6]
B. Uncertain EV Job Quality
Federal policy must ensure EV jobs are as good as or better than ICE jobs. Compliance with
GHG emissions standards can never justify the offshoring of jobs, the slashing of wages, or the
busting of unions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 6]
Unless and until we build a comprehensive domestic EV supply chain, the transition to EVs
will risk trading dependency on fossil fuels for dependency on imported EVs, batteries, fuel
cells, and materials, all while hollowing out quality union jobs in the process. Uncertainty around
the build-out of the domestic EV supply chain is not recognized by the EPA and therefore does
not play a significant role in altering the proposed standards' increased adoption of ZEVs.12 The
EPA must craft its standards to hold manufacturers accountable to both environmental and labor
concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 6]
12 For example, the EPA cites to 13 announced domestic battery plants, but does not indicate how many
are operational or ready to help achieve compliance with the standards. See supra note 29317.
The EPA must recognize that the current domestic auto assembly footprint is heavily
weighted towards the profitable light-duty truck and SUVs that are tasked with funding the EV
transition.20 In 2022, nearly 60% of all vehicles produced by the unionized automakers in the
U.S. were pickups or SUVs.21 The EPA must also consider the resiliency of the domestic
manufacturing footprint that builds both ICEs and EVs. Federal regulation should be geared
towards strengthening the domestic auto manufacturing supply chain and requiring that the EV
transition provide the same levels of investment and quality jobs as the current ICE footprint. We
fear the proposed standards are premature and risk disrupting the market that will make the EV
transition possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0614, p. 8]
20 David Welch, "GM's Strong Truck Sales Are Funding This Year's EV Sales Blitz, Barra Says",
(Bloomberg, Feb. 16, 2023), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-16/gm-s-strong-truck-
sales-are-funding-this-year-s-ev-sales- blitz#xj4y7vzkg.
21 S&P Global. 2022. "Light Vehicle Production".
Organization: Job Creators Network Foundation (JCNF)
Finally, there are significant concerns regarding the use of child labor to cultivate these
needed minerals. Seventy percent of cobalt needed for lithium-ion batteries comes from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,9 where children hand dig in crowded, primitive mines to try
to service the West's insatiable demand. 10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0709, p. 3]
9 Id.
10 Terry Gross, "How 'modern-day slavery' in the Congo powers the rechargeable battery economy,"
(Link: https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2023/02/01/1152893248/red-cobalt-congo-drc-mining-
siddharth-kara) npr (Feb. 1, 2023)
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Organization: Matthew DiPaulo
This proposal will disrupt automotive industry supply chains and eliminate large numbers of
jobs in vehicle manufacturing, parts production, and repair businesses. While small businesses
are the lifeblood of the American economy, they will be hit the hardest by a premature rush to
have electric vehicles dominate new vehicle sales. Small, internal-combustion engine-based
businesses are not receiving the billions of dollars that large automakers are to make the
conversion to electric. Thirty-three percent of automotive aftermarket products purchased by
consumers last year were on upgrades and accessories for internal combustion engines and drive
trains. That means as much as $17 billion of small business value will be wiped out by this
proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1514, p. 1]
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
The success of our industry is interwoven with the success of this proposal and the ability of
the government to work with industry and other stakeholders to meet significant challenges.
Therefore, the rule must address: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
The need for regulatory certainty. The final rule must contain an effective mix of
feasible, demonstrated technology along with emerging technology, leaving options to improve
emissions reductions in today's advanced propulsion designs. This will foster innovation in a
coordinated direction, aligned with U.S. policy, but not mandate application of a narrowly
defined technology path to make a positive impact on the country's urgent environmental goals.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
The influence of other technologies - including internal combustion engines fueled by
hydrogen and other renewable carbon-neutral fuels - which can impact measurable
environmental improvements at scale technologies can provide immediate improvement to the
environment. This is important not only for environmental improvements but for environmental
justice in providing cleaner consumer vehicles immediately to communities living and working
close to busy streets, highways, and other transportation networks. Inclusion of all technologies
that can decarbonize the transportation sector will foster the necessary growth in manufacturing
capacity, vocational performance, infrastructure improvements, and consumer acceptance. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Technology Neutrality and BEV Emissions. EPA should ensure that battery electric
vehicles (BEV) are included in metrics for vehicle-to-vehicle comparison by assigning a metric
that captures the pollutant emissions related to BEV operation, aligned with national electricity
generation figures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Challenges in our nation's infrastructure and power grid. MEMA appreciates the
significant public investments being made to support clean transportation infrastructure. As these
new investments in highways and main corridors are deployed, federal and state incentives are
needed to further expand the EV charging and refueling infrastructure in areas that connect these
major thoroughfares. Urban industrial centers will need focused buildout while rural areas will
need thoughtful rollouts to achieve an effective EV charging infrastructure. These buildouts must
include Direct Current Fast Charge (DCFC) and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) bidirectional charging.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
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Supply chain challenges. The proposed rule assumes that all materials advanced
vehicles, which are not available today in the quantities needed to support the massive growth in
vehicle construction, will become available within sufficient time. This places a significant and
unnecessary risk on manufacturers and suppliers. Furthermore, once a company has converted
production to new technology lines, that company cannot easily pivot its facilities and workforce
back to the previous technology if EPA projections are not realized by the mid-to-late-2020s.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Workforce challenges. A significant increase in skilled workers will be needed to
support the implementation of this rule and long-term success thereof [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Extended warranty. The necessity to clearly define the applicability of the extended
warranty and the need to provide repair access to service these new vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
MEMA members are working to accelerate the performance and availability of clean-
operating vehicle technologies and are directly contributing to their realization. Besides battery
electric options, effective low- and zero-carbon technologies for future and current in-use
vehicles also exist and can readily be put to use to reduce nationwide emissions and help EPA
meet its climate goals. The success of this rule depends on greater inclusion of all available
emissions reduction technologies, significant investment in infrastructure, careful understanding
and investment in the domestic and global supply chain and ensured repair access to serve the
improved and enhanced domestic vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Senator Shelley Moore Capito et al.
Moving to BEVs will also result in a loss of domestic auto manufacturing jobs due to higher
levels of automation and a reduction in the number of components that go into these vehicles.
For example, Ford has estimated a 30-percent labor reduction in its transition to electric vehicles,
with many more jobs to be lost in the specialty automotive aftermarket that has been built on the
internal combustion engine. In Europe, more than a half-million jobs are expected to be lost in
the auto sector if the European Union relies on an electric vehicle-only approach. 13 Similar job
losses can be expected in the United States based on these proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-5083, p. 4]
13 An Electric Vehicle-only approach would lead to the loss of half a million jobs in the EU, study finds,
CLEPA (June 12, 2021)
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
EPA fails to consider the negative societal consequences and second-order cost effects of its
proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
In putting forward regulatory proposals designed to force upon the American people a vast
and rapid industrial transformation, EPA has an obligation to go further than just considering the
direct cost effects of its proposals (which are themselves woefully under- estimated, as
highlighted above); it must also consider the broader indirect economic con- sequences and
negative societal costs that would follow if these rules are finalized as pro- posed. So far in these
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rulemakings, the Agency has either ignored or deliberately down- played these second-order
effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
Some of the most consequential burdens and negative ramifications of the proposed rules that
EPA hides, disregards, or minimizes include the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647,
pp.15-16]
Stifling consumer choice at the dealership. Many of the vehicle models most pop- ular
with American families will no longer be sustainable under the EPA's proposed rules.
Automobiles have long been America's favorite freedom machines. When the models of ICE
vehicles Americans love the most disappear from dealerships, that will represent an enormous
drop in consumer welfare (in basic happiness and well- being) for the average American family
and for the U.S. economy as a whole. For many of these ICE vehicle models, there is no EV
option likely to be available that could provide the same performance, utility, or recreational
value at a comparable price (or at all). EPA makes no real effort to quantify this generational loss
of con- sumer welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
Increasing the purchase price of all new vehicles. Notwithstanding EPA's gaming of
the numbers, the true costs of the industrial transformation forced by the EPA's proposed rules
will be spread across the automakers' fleets, resulting in a significant increase in the prices of all
new vehicles, with greater price increases concentrated on those vehicles for which the demand
is highest relative to supply. All Americans will be harmed by these price increases, but the
biggest losers will be lower-income Americans who cannot afford to buy an EV or to pay more
for a gas-powered vehicle at the dealership, as well as those who live in rural areas and need to
drive longer distances and for whom EVs are impractical. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp.
15-16]
Destroying jobs in the U.S. auto industry. The loss of popular new vehicle options and
the significant price increases at the dealership will mean that fewer new vehicles will be
purchased—almost certainly far fewer than EPA is predicting. This drop-off in demand will
challenge the profitability of the auto industry and lead to a loss of jobs for tens of thousands of
America's autoworkers, as well as a loss of jobs in the many U.S. companies that supply inputs
for the production of automobiles and heavy trucks.40 The United Auto Workers union has
warned of the potential for job losses from the transition to EVs,41 as automakers announce
more plant closures and layoffs due to the costs of electrification.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 15-16]
40 See Technality, "Ford Just Proved How Far Ahead Tesla Really Is: Profitability May Continue to Be a
Struggle for All Legacy Automakers," May 10, 2023, https://medium.com/tech-topics/ford-just-proved-
how-far-ahead-tesla-really-is-6a4d95cff519 ("Despite wanting to be a fully-electric brand by 2035, as of
Q4 2022, Ford's average net margin on the Mustang Mach-E was -40.4%. Unfortunately, that's a figure
that's only gotten worse since, to the point where Ford is now losing an average of $58,000 for every EV
sold.").
41 See Press statement, United Auto Workers, "UAW Statement on Job Cuts at Stellantis," April 26, 2023,
https://uaw.org/uaw-statement-job-cuts-stellantis.
42 See Michael Wayland, "Stellantis to indefinitely idle Jeep plant, lay off workers to cut costs for EVs,"
CNBC.com, December 9, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/09/stellantis-to-idle-jeep-plant-lay-off-
workers-to-cut-costs-for-evs.html.
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Causing more deaths and serious injuries on America's highways. As new vehicle
models become unaffordable or unappealing, many American families will be left driving older
and older used cars, and the age of the nation's auto fleet will rise dramatically. Already, the
average age of a car on the road in the United States is approaching 13 years, and many cars are
on their fifth or sixth owners. The aging of the American fleet has very negative safety
consequences, as NHTSA statistics show that older vehicles are much less safe than newer
models in an accident.43 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 15-16]
43 See https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/newer-cars-safer-cars_fact-sheet_010320-
tag.pdf.
Organization: United Steelworkers (USW)
As our union represents the majority of unionized workers in the auto supply chain and
workers in the oil sector, we have grave concerns regarding this proposed rule's impact on their
livelihoods, and the negative impact that the rapid implementation of ZEVs will have on our
electric grid and domestic supply chain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, p. 1]
As mentioned prior, USW represents the majority of workers in the auto supply chain and oil
refinery workers. The auto supply chain has historically been characterized by high union
density, family-supporting wages and benefits, and pathways to the middle class. However, the
shift to low-emission vehicle deployment cannot leave these workers behind. Unfortunately, the
EPA's proposal for multi- pollutant emissions standards does not address the impact on jobs.
EPA must consider how the transition to low-emission vehicles will impact manufacturing
workers and the communities they live in. This should be an essential part of the comprehensive
analysis that EPA conducts to project its proposals' economic impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0587, p. 2]
Due to the speed of the transition to electric vehicles in EPA's proposal, tens of thousands of
America's best manufacturing jobs are at risk, devastating not only oil workers, but those who
make catalytic converters, pistons, fuel lines, and numerous other materials, parts, and
components for gasoline-powered vehicles. Research finds that there are 1,300 facilities
manufacturing light- and medium-duty vehicles and their components. Of these facilities,
approximately 225 manufacture ICE light- and medium-duty vehicles and their components, like
engines and transmissions, fuel efficiency technologies, and tailpipe pollution reducing
technologies. The facilities producing these components and fuel are the most likely to see near-
term job loss from the increased deployment of low-emission and ZEVs. Additionally, there are
nearly 900 facilities making "fuel agnostic" components for heavy-duty vehicles, such as glass
and seat belts, and these components are a large part of the auto supply chain that will be
disrupted with the proposed rapid transition to ZEVs.l [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, p. 2]
1 BlueGreen Alliance Foundation, (Link: https://www.bgafoundation.org/programs/visualizing-the-clean-
economy-autos/) "U.S. Automotive Manufacturing: Motor Vehicles, Parts, and Materials", Accessed July
5, 2023.
The transition to low-emission vehicles must function to raise the job quality and safety
standards associated with all impacted workforces, including manufacturing workers, drivers,
and mechanics. We remain deeply concerned that workers manufacturing components for and
assembling ZEVs earn lower wages and receive less benefits when compared with workers
manufacturing components for ICE vehicles.2 The high quality of these jobs is attributable to the
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ICE vehicle manufacturing sector's dense unionization. Union membership helps ensure that
workers share in the benefits of the economic growth they help generate through collective
bargaining, higher wages, increased access to healthcare, and improved retirement security. As a
whole, union members earn approximately 20 percent more than their nonunion counterparts,
helping to increase social mobility and improving workers' economic outcomes.3 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0587, p. 3]
2 Economic Policy Institute, (Link: https://www.epi.org/publication/ev-policy-workers/) "The stakes for
workers in how policymakers manage the coming shift to all-electric vehicles," September 22, 2021.
3 U.S. Department of Labor, (Link: https://www.dol.gov/general/workcenter/union-
advantage#%3A%7E%3Atext%3DWorkers%20who%20are%20union%20members%2CPartnership%20fo
r%20Women%20and%20Families) The Union Advantage. Accessed July 5, 2023.
Additionally, it is imperative to highlight that Black workers account for 12.5 percent of
workers economy wide, but 16.6 percent of workers in the auto sector, while workers without a
four-year degree account for 62.2 percent of workers economy wide, but 74.6 percent in the auto
sector.4 The auto manufacturing sector represents a critical path to the middle class for the very
workers and communities that have disproportionately borne the brunt of neoliberal economic
and trade policies. It is essential that EPA leverage available data to project how its proposals
will shape the domestic auto manufacturing sector, and the workers and communities that
comprise it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, p. 3]
4 Economic Policy Institute, (Link: https://www.epi.org/publication/ev-policy-workers/) "The stakes for
workers in how policymakers manage the coming shift to all-electric vehicles," September 22, 2021.
Fortunately, there is a way to ensure that a transition to low-emission vehicles is equitable for
the workers significantly impacted - a gradual transition. An Economic Policy Institute (EPI)
report, conducted in collaboration with BGA, the United Auto Workers, the United Steelworkers,
and the AFL-CIO, found that a gradual transition to BEVs significantly reduced the amount of
jobs lost in the auto sector. For example, one of the best scenarios configured in the report
accounted for combustion vehicles taking up 50 percent, hybrid vehicles at 25 percent, and
battery electric vehicles at 25 percent of the market share by 2030. This scenario could lead to
the creation of over 154,000 new jobs in the auto supply chain and over 36,000 new jobs in auto
assembly. However, such job gains are contingent upon a significant onshoring of the BEV
supply chain, such that the domestic content of BEVs at least matches that of ICEs, and there
being a 10 percent increase in the share of U.S.-made vehicles sold in the U.S. auto market. This
report concludes that a more gradual and focused approach in transitioning to ZEVs is key.5
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, pp. 3-4]
5 Economic Policy Institute, (Link: https://www.epi.org/publication/ev-policy-workers/) "The stakes for
workers in how policymakers manage the coming shift to all-electric vehicles," September 22, 2021.
In order to protect good-paying, union jobs and promote a safer environment, EPA should
address the negative impacts on jobs and job quality that the proposed rule creates. Without well-
rounded policy, good paying jobs are lost and communities are destroyed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0587, pp.3-4]
EPA relies heavily on the potential critical role and incentives from the manufacturing
investments from the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs
Act (IIJA) for its proposed emissions standards. Programs related to the auto manufacturing
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sector include the Battery Manufacturing and Recycling Grants, the Battery Material Processing
Grants, the Domestic Manufacturing Conversion Grants, the 48C Advanced Manufacturing Tax
Credit, the Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing Loan Program, the National Electric
Vehicle Infrastructure Program, and the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure Grant Program.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, p. 4]
While the proposed rule is not wrong that the investments made by IRA and IIJA should spur
investments in new technologies to lower emissions of vehicles, it does fail to consider the
timeline and effectiveness of program implementation. Undoubtably, these manufacturing
investments will take time to achieve their full production capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0587, p. 4]
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
Many uncertainties remain (supply chains, tariffs, infrastructure, incentives) so it is very
important that government pursue policies that encourage auto industry investment and jobs,
development of the electric vehicle market and advancement of motor vehicle safety. With the
right complementary government policies, this rulemaking presents an opportunity for
government and industry to pursue these shared goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, pp. 5-
6]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
Electrification will not only reduce emissions but it will also promote American economic
competitiveness, create good-paying jobs, and improve local health outcomes. Private sector
investments in the domestic EV supply chain total billions of dollars and support hundreds of
thousands of American jobs. Moreover, research has indicated that without adequate regulation
of vehicle emissions, U.S. communities would experience avoidable increases in
mortality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 2]
4. Transportation Electrification Benefits Consumers and the Economy
Beyond health and environmental improvements, electrification will benefit the country's
economic development and Americans' pocketbooks. The transition to EVs is already leading to
new manufacturing jobs, improved property values, and new investments in
communities.84,85,86 This trend should be expected to continue and accelerate in the coming
years. The burgeoning EV industry will create new jobs for the manufacturing of components
such as batteries, electric motors, and power electronics, as well as charging infrastructure. In
addition, the manufacture of conventional vehicle component parts like brakes and windshields
will continue to be a source of employment in the automotive industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, pp. 18-19]
84 Sklarz and Miller, "The Impact of Noise on Residential Property Value," (September 20, 2018)
https://www.collateralanalytics.eom/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/CA-RESEARCH-The-Impact-of-Noise-
on-Reside ntial-Property-Values.pdf
85 "Electric Vehicle Investments Provide Benefits Across the U.S.," ZETA, accessed June 27, 2023
https://www.zeta2030.org/education-fund/investments
86 "U.S. Energy & Employment Jobs Report," U.S. Department of Energy, (June 2023)
https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer
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Electrification will also help ensure the United States maintains its economic competitiveness
with the rest of the world. As discussed further below, governments around the world are
establishing more ambitious electrification goals to align with recent announcements from global
manufacturers. Ensuring U.S. regulations match or exceed these ambitions is vital to
encouraging domestic investments and accelerated job creation in the industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, pp. 18-19]
a. Electrification Will Continue to Create Good-Paying American Jobs
EVs are the lynchpin to simultaneously tackling the climate crisis and restoring the United
States as a global leader in automotive manufacturing. As of March 2023, more than 143,000
jobs in the EV industry had been created since the passage of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law
(BIL) in November 2021.90 Combined with the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 and
stringent emissions standards from EPA, manufacturing investments and job creation will
continue to grow. The IRA alone is projected to create around 9 million new clean energy jobs
over the next decade.91 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 19-20]
90 "Report Finds Investments in U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Reach $120 Billion, Create 143,000
New Jobs," Environmental Defense Fund, (March 14, 2023) https://www.edf.org/media/report-finds-
investments-us-electric-vehicle-manufacturing-reach-120-billion-create-143 000
91 "Job Creation Estimates Through Proposed Inflation Reduction Act," University of Massachusetts,
(August 4, 2022) https://peri.umass.edu/publication/item/1633-job-creation-estimates-through-proposed-
inflation-reduction-act
Researchers at the Goldman School of Public Policy found that a scenario with 100% electric
LDV sales by 2030 and 100% MHDV by 2035 would result in 2 million more jobs than the
current trajectory.92 This is a result of the new jobs in the charging infrastructure, electricity, and
maintenance sectors. The manufacturing and installation of charging infrastructure alone is
projected to create more than 29,000 jobs.93 In general, jobs in the EV industry are high-quality
and high-paying and as a result, are attracting a new generation of workers who are eager to
work in the sustainable transportation industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 19-20]
92 "Switching to Electric Cars and Trucks Would Support 2 Million Green Jobs in 2035," UC Berkeley
School of Public Policy, accessed May 15, 2023, https://www.2035report.com/transportation/green-jobs
93 "The Commanding Heights of Global Transportation: Quantifying the Employment Effects," SAFE,
(March 9, 2021) https://secureenergy.org/the-commanding-heights-of-global-transportation-quantifying-
the-employment-effects/
EV charging infrastructure buildout similarly promises to generate substantial job creation
throughout the country. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that 12 new jobs are
created for every $1 million invested in charging infrastructure.94 By comparison, ICE vehicle
manufacturing creates an average of 7.2 jobs per million dollars invested. At this rate, the BIL's
$5 billion allocations through the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) formula
program to build out a national EV charging network could create at least 60,000 direct jobs.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 20-21]
94 "Sustainable Recovery - Transport," IEA, accessed June 23, 2023
https://www.iea.org/reports/sustainable-recovery/transport
Beyond installation, ongoing electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) operations and
maintenance will create thousands more jobs. This creates an entirely new occupation, that of an
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EVSE technician, that goes beyond the role of a traditional electrician. EVSE technicians are
responsible for the ongoing maintenance and operations of chargers and are specially trained to
handle electrical and parts malfunctions, software upgrades, cell signal issues, damages, and
more.95,96 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 20-21]
95 ChargerHelp Guiding Standards 2022, accessed June 23, 2023
https://www.chargerhelp.eom/_files/ugd/30el28_0032898550534e609ce4188fa91bc926.pdf
96 "FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces New Standards and Major Progress for a
Made-in-America National Network of Electric Vehicle Chargers," The White House, accessed June 6,
2023 https://www.whitehouse.gOv/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/02/15/fact-sheet-biden-harris-
administration-a nnounces-new-standards-and-major-progress-for-a-made-in-america-national-network-of-
electric-vehicle-chargers/
As discussed further in section eight of these comments, the U.S. battery manufacturing
industry is quickly scaling to meet demand driven by transportation electrification. Since January
2021, the U.S. private sector has announced nearly $82 billion in domestic battery manufacturing
investments, translating to 96 new or expanded processing and manufacturing plants creating
thousands of new jobs in the process.97 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 20-21]
97 New US Battery Manufacturing and Supply Chain Investments Announced Under President Biden, US
Department of Energy, (February 13, 2023) https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-
02/Battery%20Supply%20Chains%20Investments%20Map.pdf
The average cost of electricity in the U.S. is 16.5 cents per kWh as of May 2023.104 If
electricity costs 16.5 cents per kWh, charging an EV with a fully-depleted 100 kWh battery will
cost about $16.50 to reach a full charge. While the range of a 100 kWh battery varies depending
on a vehicle's efficiency, a typical Tesla Model S can go up to 400 miles on a single charge. 105
Comparatively, the average national gasoline price for regular grade was $3,685 in May
2023.106 Filling up a 12-gallon passenger vehicle with a 30 mpg fuel economy would cost
$45.96 to move the vehicle 360 miles. At $16.50 for a full charge, fueling an EV cuts fuel prices
by 64%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 22]
According to AAA, over the course of a year the cost of refueling an EV is around $546,
compared to $1,255 per year when fueling a gasoline car. 107 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
p. 22]
104 "Average energy prices for the United States, regions, census divisions, and selected metropolitan
areas," U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, accessed July 3, 2023
https://www.bls.gov/regions/midwest/data/averageenergyprices_selectedareas_table.htm
105 "Fuel Economy of the 2021 Tesla Model S Long Range," U.S. Department of Energy, accessed July 3,
2023 https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/noframes/44051 .shtml
106 Id. at footnote 104
107 "True Cost of Electric Vehicles," AAA Automotive, accessed July 3, 2023,
https://www.aaa.com/autorepair/articles/true-cost-of-ev
c. Electrification Promotes American Economic Competitiveness
Governments around the world are setting more stringent emissions standards to align with
recent announcements from global manufacturers. Ensuring U.S. regulations match or exceed
these ambitions is vital in allowing certainty and encouraging investment in the industry. If the
U.S. does not move more aggressively on LMDEV deployment, it risks ceding market share to
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other countries and regions who are moving faster, such as China, the European Union, and
others. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 24]
Complimentary incentives embedded in the IRA will facilitate onshoring of the EV supply
chain while robust EPA emission standards will help ensure the United States becomes and
remains a leader in EV technology development and manufacturing. While more work remains
to craft supportive policies in other areas of the supply chain, EPA emissions standards are
crucial drivers of domestic EV supply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 24]
Many countries have made commitments to accelerate EV development and deployment in
their borders. An increase in EV sales is taking place across the world, but has been dominated
by the Chinese market, which accounts for the majority of all new EV registrations. As of 2022,
China had 10.7 million BEVs on the road and the U.S. had 2.1 million. 114 Part of this
dominance is due to China's purchase incentives, high registration fees for ICEVs, a robust
charging network, and national "new energy vehicle" targets. 115 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, p. 24]
114 Id. at footnote 27
115 "An evaluation of government incentives for new energy vehicles in China focusing on vehicle
purchasing restrictions," Energy Policy, (October 2017) https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.07.057
With its own emissions targets, countries in Europe are sending strong signals about the
continent's future electric fleet. Europe is the second-largest market for EVs in the world, with
30% of the global share. 116 With robust LMDV emissions standards, the U.S. would be
encouraging quicker adoption of EV technology to ensure the country remains at the forefront of
this global transition. Below is a list of regional and national goals for light-and medium-duty
zero-emission vehicle deployment that further underscores the need for the U.S. via EPA to
maintain pace with the rest of the world: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 24]
116 Id. at footnote 27
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Some commenters state that the rule doesn't adequately explain why reports that claim jobs
will be lost are wrong, or address the projected impact on jobs, or the role ICE vehicle sales or
charging infrastructure will play in the transition. The UAW is skeptical of EPA's projections of
small employment impacts, stating that union workers deserve a comprehensive assessment of
the impact of the standards on livelihoods. The USW commented that the EPA should leverage
data to project how the regulation will shape domestic auto manufacturing, its workers, and their
communities. Steven Bradbury commented that EPA has to consider the broader indirect
economic consequence of the rule.
Commenters, including the AmFree, AFPI, Dalek, Stephen Bradbury and others, commented
that the rule will lead to job losses. AFPI and others mentioned that EVs have fewer parts than
their ICE counterparts and will require less labor to assemble. A group of U.S. Senators
commented that BEV production will lead to more automating, resulting in job loss.
Commenters mentioned the auto industry, as well as jobs both upstream and downstream of the
manufacturing sector. Some specific sectors mentioned include the petroleum industry, the
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refining sector, dealerships, repair and maintenance, oil workers, supply workers, and gas station
employees. USW and others stated that the speed of the transition will put workers at risk, and
that the standards will lead to a dramatic change in the type of vehicles driven, with some
commenters stating that a gradual transition will ensure the transition to low or zero-emission
vehicles is equitable. Some commenters stated that jobs will be reallocated overseas, or,
similarly, that the success of the rule will depend on the onshoring of electric vehicles and their
batteries and parts. The Alliance stated that the EPA analysis assumed that all EVs sold in the
U.S. will be made in the U.S. BGA and others are particularly concerned that jobs will be
offshored to countries with minimal labor protections and loose environmental standards. Others,
including Steven Bradbury, BGA, and USW, commented on possible environmental justice
implications of the rule including that the rule is critical to advancing EJ and equity, and that this
rule disregards the impact that higher purchase prices will have on lower-income Americans.
Job Creators Network Foundation commented with concerns that battery production will
promote child labor in lithium-ion production in foreign countries. MEMA commented that the
proposal assumes materials for advanced materials will be available in sufficient time, which
places risk on manufacturers and suppliers.
Some commenters stated that there is a lack of qualified technicians for BEVs and EV
charging stations, which will lead to higher costs of ownership and impact purchase decisions.
AFPI and others also commented on the costs of the rule. AFPI commented that costly minerals
will make the cost of the rule higher than estimated. Daniel Hellebuyck commented that the
standards don't account for the costs of companies trying to fund EV ventures. Steven Bradbury
commented that the proposal underestimated costs. Some commenters stated that the higher costs
will lead to reduced vehicle sales, which will lead to job losses. Steven Bradbury further states
that the rule will lead to reduced vehicle choice, with fewer ICE vehicle options and no EV
option to replace them.
Some commenters stated that this rule must not mandate the application of specific
technology, but contain options including demonstrated and emerging technologies. BGA
commented that EPA should include a request for information to seek information on worker
voice, employee wages and benefits, hiring practices, training and advancement programs and
community partnerships.
UAW commented that the analysis for the rule should consider location, job quality and
unionization rates of workers manufacturing batteries, fuel cells and advanced powertrain
components that will be needed to meet the regulations. Both the UAW and USW commented
that the rule will negatively impact job quality and safety, as well as that there will be localized
effects, where some communities may see a decrease in number or quality of jobs even if some
communities gain jobs. UAW and USW commented that BEV workers earn lower wages and get
less benefits from ICE worker counterparts due to unionization in ICE manufacturing. The UAW
also commented that the uncertain quality of new EV jobs must be addressed. BGA commented
that the EPA should identify communities associated with manufacturing and quantify the share
of the economy supported by auto manufacturing, as well as the number of jobs in the sector.
UAW also commented that not all jobs should be treated as equal, and EPA should pay
attention to preserving workforce standards for UAW members in new EV jobs in the analysis
for the rule. They commented that setting emissions standards should not justify offshoring,
wage cuts or union busting, and that the government should ensure that EV jobs are as good as or
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better than ICE jobs. BGA and UAW commented that EPA needs to consider how the transition
to EVs will affect workers and their communities, that there will be distributional/geographic
differences in the effects of the rule on employment where some places will see reduced
employment, and others may see increased employment, though the quality or quantity of those
jobs may not be equal. AFPI commented that the shift to EVs would cost union jobs. UAW
commented that EPA should conduct additional analyses on the impact on employment, focusing
on the union workforce, and consider location, quality and unionization rates of workers
manufacturing batteries, fuel cells, advances ICE powertrain components; an aggregate view is
not sufficient.
Commenters including MEMA, AFPI and HF Sinclair focused comments on the skill sets of
workers. AFPI commented that workers can't easily transition due to different skill sets are
needed, while MEMA stated that the transitions to EVs will need significantly more skilled
workers. HF Sinclair commented that EPA can't assume workers from one field can move to
another through retraining, or physically. Commenters stated that there will be geographic
impacts, and the rule will spur labor reallocation, with some commenters stating that the midwest
will experience the strongest job losses. Commenters also stated that impacts will be felt
differently in different industries, with HF Sinclair Corp stating that industries like emissions
inspections, third party dealers, aftermarket tuning will disappear, and AFPI commented that
production will shift even if there is no national level change in employment.
Some commenters stated that EPA must involve stakeholders, that EPA should collaborate
with the Departments and Labor and Energy, and that Federal and State incentives are needed to
expand EV charging and refueling infrastructure. Some commenters state that electrification, the
IRA and BIL have already led to new jobs, creating incentives and investments in domestic
battery manufacturing, Some commenters said that recent investment in EV and battery
manufacturing, as well as the installation and maintenance of charging and grid infrastructure
provide significant job opportunities. Comments by a collection of Environmental and Public
health organizations stated that ZEVs can support good quality jobs and increase employment
opportunities. ZETA commented that electrification will create jobs in battery production,
electric motor, power electronics and charging infrastructure, as well as continue to employ
people in industries like brakes and windshields. They also stated that the rule will help ensure
the U.S. remains competitive and can be a crucial driver of domestic EV supply. The USW
stated that the IRA and BIL will spur investments, though they stated that the EPA does not
account for the time it will take for those investments to come to fruition. Commenters state that
increased demand for new technology to meet GHG standards could lead to growth in supply
chains, strengthen domestic manufacturing and supply chains, and create jobs in EV charging
infrastructure. Commenters state that if EVs are built in the U.S., job gains can happen, and
produced labor income effects would ripple through the wider economy, benefit economic
development and the consumer pocketbook. BGA commented that strong emissions regulations
and economic growth are not mutually exclusive.
Commenters stated that the policy should encourage investment and jobs, the development of
the EV market and advancement of safety. Stephen Bradbury commented that the rule will lead
to safety issues with older, less safe vehicles remaining on the road longer.
Some commenters stated that EPA should further incorporate the FEV study's labor impacts
results into the final rule analysis.
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Some commenters, including the USW and HF Sinclair Corp, stated that the rule will have a
negative effect on the electric grid. MEMA commented that the rule will need clearly defined
applicability of extended warranty and need to provide repair access. Matthew DiPaulo
commented that small businesses will be hit hardest because they are not getting the investments
that large autos get to convert to electric. They also commented that small businesses in the
automotive aftermarket production sector will be negatively affected.
Response:
We acknowledge that the increasing penetration of zero-emission vehicles in the automotive
industry will have an effect on employment, including ICE and PEV manufacturing sectors,
infrastructure-related employment sectors, and upstream and downstream sectors. While EPA
does not mandate a specific compliance pathway for this rule, we recognize that adoption of
additional pollution control technologies in response to the rule can also affect employment. This
rule provides regulatory certainty to support increased employment in many economic sectors,
though we acknowledge that OEM compliance decisions in response to the rule may reduce
employment in other sectors. Opposing impacts across many sectors (e.g., increasing
employment in PEV and battery manufacturing, decreasing employment in ICE and ICE vehicle
manufacturing) are normal, expected changes during periods of technological transition and are
not specific to this rule. As is indicated by the partial employment results discussed in Chapter
4.5.4 of the RIA and Section VIII. 1.4 of the preamble, we note that there is the potential for net
positive employment as an effect of this rule. As also discussed, support from a peer-reviewed
tear-down study of a battery electric car and a comparable internal combustion engine vehicle
indicates that if production of plug-in vehicles and their power supplies are done in the U.S. at
the same rates as ICE vehicles, employment may increase. In addition, as noted by ZETA,
research from Goldman School of Public Policy indicates that electrification leads to increased
job availability and provides benefits to the economy over other fleet compositions.
According to the U.S. Energy and Employment Report (USEER), jobs related to the energy
sector increased from 2020 to 2021, and at a faster rate than the workforce overall.644 These
energy-sector-related jobs include electric power generation; transmission, distribution and
storage; fuels; energy efficiency; and motor vehicles and component parts. The report states that
employment in motor vehicles and component parts increased about 2.5 percent from 2020 to
2021, and jobs in clean energy vehicles increased by almost 21 percent, with jobs in BEVs
increasing by 27 percent, and PHEVs increasing by 10 percent. Employment in producing,
building and maintaining charging infrastructure needed to support the ever-increasing number
of plug-in vehicles on the road is also expected to significantly increase with the increasing
buildout of charging infrastructure and thereby affect the nature of employment in automotive
and related sectors. A recent report from the World Resources Institute indicates that if the right
investments are made in manufacturing and infrastructure, autoworkers and communities will
644 https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf. The data in the
USEER relies on a comprehensive survey of about 34,000 respondents across the U.S. and because it is a snapshot
in time, current events may impact these results. For example, the report notes that COVID-19 and associated effects
deeply impacted energy employment, leading the sector to lose jobs at a higher rate in 2020 than the economy as a
whole, though the report indicates that the energy sector has recovered about 71% of the jobs lost during 2020. In
addition, USEER notes that the conflict in Ukraine has impacted fuels industries leading to increased petroleum and
wet gas exports from the U.S.
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benefit from job growth, lower auto related costs, and reduced air pollution.645 The report
focused on effects that would be felt in Michigan, which, as of 2023 has the most clean energy
jobs in the Midwest, and the ranks 5th nationally.646 Michigan also ranks second, behind
California, for the most hybrid and electric vehicle employment. Taking Michigan as an
example, clean energy jobs grew by almost 4.6 percent in 2022, which was twice as fast as the
overall economy. Electric vehicle-related jobs, specifically, grew by about 14 percent in the state
in 2022. In addition to the 21 percent increase in employment in 2021 that USEER reported in
clean energy vehicles, EDF also reports that the job growth and investment in the EV sector that
has been seen nationally over the last eight years is expected to continue, with new factories or
production lines for EVs, batteries, components and chargers supporting more than 125,000 jobs
being announced across 26 states.647 EDF reports that more than 140,000 new jobs have been
announced in the U.S. since 2015, with 60,000 jobs being created in U.S. battery
manufacturing.648 They also point out that 66 percent of those job announcements were made in
the time after BIL was passed, and 32 percent of those jobs were announced after the IRA was
passed, and 86 percent of those jobs announcements were concentrated in ten states: Michigan,
Tennessee, Georgia, Nevada, Kentucky, South Carolina, Ohio, North Carolina, Indiana and
Kansas. DOE reports that more than 80,000 potential jobs in U.S. battery manufacturing and
supply chain, and more than 50,000 potential jobs in U.S. EV component and assembly have
been announced since 2020.649
EPA has considered input from labor groups and others in carefully designing the final rule,
which includes a slower phase-in of the final standards compared to the proposed standards (as
described in Section I.B of the preamble). In addition, EPA has consulted other federal partners,
including the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Labor (DOL), and engaged in
significant dialogue with EJ and labor groups. Here in this RTC section, as well in the RIA and
preamble, we note many of the ongoing efforts that labor-oriented groups, federal agencies and
others are engaging in to support workers and their communities in providing opportunities for a
just economic transition. The list of programs and other efforts discussed throughout this
rulemaking not exhaustive, and there may be more programs available that are not included here.
While EPA does not set standards for labor, the agency fully supports a just economic transition
for workers in association with the transition to clean vehicle technologies, and we believe that
the numerous Federal, State, and private efforts we have identified, as well as other efforts not
included here, significantly support quality jobs for workers across the nation.
There is a DOE funding package which makes $2 billion in grants and up to $10 billion in
loans available to support projects converting existing automotive manufacturing facilities to
645 https://www.wri.org/insights/michigan-electric-vehicle-job-creation, https://www.wri.org/research/michigan-ev-
future-assessment-employment-just-transition
646 https://www.governing.com/work/michigan-leads-electric-vehicle-jobs-but-lags-in-
sales#:~:text=More%20than%2032%2C000%20Michigan%20workers,involved%20%E2%80%9Cin%20this%20ec
osystem.%E2%80%9D
647 EDF. (2023). New climate laws drive boom in electric vehicle jobs. Retrieved November I, 2023 from
https://vitalsigns.edf.org/story/new-climate-laws-drive-boom-electric-vehicle-jobs
648 EDF. (2023). U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs.
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/State-Electric-Vehicle-Policy-Landscape.pdf
649 https://www.energy.gov/invest
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support electric vehicle production.650 This package is focused on the retention of high-quality,
high-paying jobs in communities that currently host manufacturing facilities, and along the full
supply chain for the automotive sector from components to assembly, and it gives priority to
refurbishing and retooling manufacturing facilities, especially for those likely to retain collective
bargaining agreements and/or an existing higher-quality, high-wage hourly production
workforce.651 DOE has also announced funding to support clean energy supply chains, with the
funding going toward projects to support domestic clean energy manufacturing (including
projects supporting battery production) in, or near, nine communities that were formerly tied to
coal mining, and are expected to create almost 1,500 jobs.652 The Joint Office of Energy and
Transportation (JOET), created by the BIL, supports efforts related to deploying infrastructure,
chargers and zero emission vehicles.653 One example of a project from the JOET is the Ride and
Drive grant program, which targets investments in EV charging resiliency, community-driven
workforce development and EV charging performance and reliability. The ongoing actions
discussed throughout this section supporting green jobs, including those by DOE, the
Department of Labor (DOL), the Office of Energy Jobs, and others, are particularly focused on
jobs with high standards and the right to collective bargaining.
In addition to the many programs at the federal level, states are making efforts to support
increasing domestic production of electric vehicles and batteries, including support for the
workforce. An Executive Order issued in South Carolina prioritized implementing a strategic
initiative to explore opportunities related to ongoing economic development, business support
and recruitment efforts with electric vehicle and automotive manufacturers.654 A study from
Ohio estimates that there will be more than 25,000 new jobs in EV manufacturing and
maintenance, battery development and charging station installation and operations in the state by
20 3 0.655 California has a Workforce Development Board that has been focused on furthering the
development of an equitable PEV industry, including high quality jobs and access to them, since
at least 2021.656 Illinois has invested in EV training programs, research and development in the
EV industry, and in workforce development and community support in the clean energy
sector.657 The Nevada Battery Coalition is tasked with identifying gaps in, and developing
650 https://www.energy.gov/articles/biden-harris-administration-announces-155-billion-support-strong-and-just-
transition
651 U.S. Department of Energy Office of Manufacturing and Energy. 2024. "Supply Chains Inflation Reduction Act
Domestic Manufacturing Conversion Grants Funding Opportunity Announcement DE-FOA-
0003106_FOA_Doc_Amendment_000006_IRA 50143." https://infrastructure-
exchange.energy.gov/Default.aspx#FoaIdf9eblc8a-9922-46b6-993e-78972d823cb2
652 EnergyTech. 2023. DOE Announces $275Mfor 7 Projects to Strengthen Clean Energy Supply Chains adn
Manufacturing in Former Coal Communities. EnergyTech. https://www.energytech.com/energy-
efficiency/article/21278185/doe-announces-275m-for-7-projects-to-strengthen-clean-energy-supply-chains-and-
manufacturing-in-former-coal-communities
653 More information on these programs, and other programs, can be found in the memo Labor/Employment
Initiatives in the Battery/Vehicle Electrification Space located in the docket for this rule.
654 SCpowersEV: State support - Driving the Future, https://scpowersev.com/state-support.
655 Accelerating Ohio's Auto & Advanced Mobility Workforce, Auto and Advanced Mobility Workforce Strategy,
2023. https://workforce.ohio.gov/wps/wcm/connect/gov/2e9f6e52-a4bc-4ef6-9080-
e6b06f067a 1 a/Ohio %27s+Electric+Vehicle+Workforce+Strategy .pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
656 California Workforce Development Board, 2021. https://business.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/CWDB_ZEV-Plan.pdf
657 Illinois Drive Electric: Abundant Workforce, https://ev.illinois.gov/grow-your-business/abundant-
workforce.html.
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solutions for, workforce and economic development supporting the lithium industry in
Nevada.658 Kentucky has been the location for at least two recent automotive sector development
projects, and it is providing resources toward upgrading industrial sites throughout the state, with
funding evaluated based on factors including workforce availability.659 Tennessee is co-locating
a new Tennessee College of Applied Technology with a new EV manufacturing facility Ford is
building in the state to provide specialized technical training.660 In Michigan, the Department of
Labor and Economic Opportunity created the Electric Vehicle Jobs Academy to assist with
tuition and other supportive services for those training to be in the advanced automotive mobility
and electrification industry, and the University of Michigan contracted with the state to open the
University of Michigan Electric Vehicle Center focusing on research and development and
developing a highly skilled workforce.661'662
Regarding comments that EVs have fewer parts than ICE counterparts, and that BEV
production will lead to automation, resulting in job loss, we first note that even if EVs have
fewer parts, these analyses do not include the labor needs of battery manufacturing or
infrastructure build out and maintenance. In addition, as discussed throughout this section, as
well as in Section VIII.1.3 of the preamble and Chapter 4.5.4 of the RIA, research indicates that
if PEV and PEV power supply production is done in the U.S. at the same rates as ICE vehicles,
employment may increase, and this is even more likely if job creation related to infrastructure is
included in the analysis. We also note that there will likely be a significant increase in demand
for labor in sectors that manufacture, build and maintain charging stations associated with the
increasing penetration of electric vehicles. To that end, the BIL is investing in the build out of
EV chargers along America's major roads, freeways and interstates, focusing on domestically
produced iron and steel, and domestically manufactured chargers.663 The magnitude of all of
these impacts depends on a variety of factors including the labor intensities of the related sectors,
as well as the nature of the linkages (which can be reflected in measures of elasticity) between
them and the regulated firms.
Regarding comments that there will be upstream and downstream job impacts, we refer to our
discussions in RIA Chapter 4.5.5 and Section VIII.1.4 of the preamble where we discuss possible
impacts in sectors such as petroleum refining, dealerships and more. As stated earlier in this
section, according to the U.S. Energy and Employment Report, jobs related to the energy sector
(including electric power generation; transmission, distribution and storage; fuels; energy
efficiency; and motor vehicles and component parts) have increased at a faster rate than the
workforce overall, from 2020 to 2021.664 ZETA cites a study by the Goldman School of Public
658 Nevada Battery Coalition: https://nevadabatterycoalition.com/about/
659 Kentucky: Leading the Charge, https://ced.ky.gov/Newsroom/Article/20230816_Leading_th.
660 Area Development: Tennessee: A growing Capital of Electric Vehicle Production,
https://www.areadevelopment.eom/ContributedContent/Q4-2021/tennessee-growing-capital-of-electric-vehicle-
production, shtml
661 MI Labor and Economic Opportunity: Electric Vehicle Jobs Academy, https://www.michigan.gov/leo/bureaus-
agencies/wd/industry-business/mobility/electric-vehicle-jobs-academy.
662 Michigan Engineering News, $130M Electric Vehicle Center launches at U-Michigan,
https://news.engin.umich.edu/2023/04/130m-electric-vehicle-center-launches-at-u-michigan/.
663 The White house: Full Charge: The Economics of Building a National EV Charging Network,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/blog/2023/12/ll/full-charge-the-economics-of-building-a-national-ev-
charging-network/.
664 https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf.
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Policy indicating that as EV sales increase, reductions in auto repair and maintenance jobs are
more than offset by increases in jobs in construction and maintenance in green sectors like wind,
solar, and battery storage, and in electric grid infrastructure.665 EDF noted that almost 60,000
jobs were added in the battery production and components sector over the last 8 years. The
projects, agencies and efforts mentioned above will support the continued investment in
domestic, quality jobs in a transition to cleaner transportation, which will happen slowly over
time. Traditional gas stations and liquid fuel providers are already incorporating EV charging
into their business strategies. Many retail gas stations are being outfitted with EVSE right
now.666'667'668 With respect to the effect a change in petroleum demand may have on
employment, the petroleum refining industry is material intensive and not labor intensive, and
we estimate that only part of the reduction in liquid fuel consumption will be met by reduced
refinery production in the U.S.; therefore, we expect that any employment effect due to reduced
petroleum demand will be small. With respect to possible employment effects at dealerships, we
note that vehicle sales are affected by more than regulation, including macroeconomic
conditions, and that dealers may be affected by more than just changing sales (for example,
changing maintenance needs). We discuss this, and more, in RIA Chapter 4.5.5.
In response to comments that the standards will lead to a dramatic change in the type of
vehicles driven, we first note that this rule is not a mandate and does not force manufactures to
use any specific technology. Manufacturers can determine the best path of compliance for them.
Allowing manufacturers to meet the standards in the most effective way for their fleet is
expected to lead to the lowest cost path for each manufacturer, yet still achieve the
environmental and health benefits associated with the reduced level of emissions set by the rule.
In addition, as described in Section IV.F of the preamble, we demonstrate that there are multiple
pathways to compliance, and that these pathways include a wide range of mixes of technologies
in the fleet, including various mixes of ICE vehicles, strong hybrid vehicles, PHEVs and BEVs.
See Sections 13 of the RTC for information on consumer considerations as part of this rule, and
14 of the RTC for more information on vehicle sales.
In response to comments on the speed of the transition to electrification, and that a slower
phase in will support workers during the transition, as described in Section III.C of the preamble,
EPA is finalizing standards for both light- and medium-duty vehicles that have a slower ramp
rate in the early years of the program compared to the proposal. For the light-duty GHG
standards, we have reduced the stringency of the standards from MYs 2027 through 2031
compared to the proposed standards and have also extended the phase-down of certain optional
665 "Switching to Electric Cars and Trucks Would Support 2 Million Green Jobs in 2035," UC Berkeley School of
Public Policy, accessed May 15, 2023, https://www.2035report.com/transportation/green-iobs
666 Businesswire: Electric Era Announces Investment from Chevron Technology Ventures to Scale Adoption of it
PowerNode Electric Vehicle Charging Stations.
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20231003932625/en/Electric-Era-Announces-Investment-from-Chevron-
Technology-Ventures-to-Scale-Adoption-of-its-PowerNode%E2%84%A2-Electric-Vehicle-Charging-Stations
667 Shell Recharge: https://www.shell.us/business-customers/shell-fleet-solutions/shell-
recharge?msclkid=b 112711 a7f16131508b614dal ed43 9cf&utm_source=bing&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=
US_RCG_EN_NB_PM_BNG_Fleet_Recharge_Product&utm_term=ev%20charging&utm_content=Recharge%20S
olution#iframe=L0xlYWRfR2VuX0Zvcm0_SUQ9VUhKdlpIVmpkRDFUWld4bUlITmxiRlZqZEdWa0preGxZVlJ
UYjNWeVkyVTlUM0puWVclcF13PT0
668 Love's: Electrify America Announces Collaboration with Love's Travel Stops:
https://www.loves.com/en/news/2020/august/electrify-america-announces-collaboration-with-loves-travel-stops
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credit flexibilities. These changes were made in response to comments from labor groups and the
auto industry that the pace of the standards was too fast, and that more lead time was needed to
provide a more orderly transition that allowed for the scale up of battery supply chains and
vehicle production. In turn, EPA believes that this slower pace of the final standards will further
support workers and labor impacts during the transition to manufacturers building a range of
vehicle technologies to meet the standards, as well as allow for increased opportunities for
training, education and facility upgrades over time. This will also allow for continued
investments from IRA, BIL and other programs, as described throughout this section.
Regarding comments that we do not adequately address the impact the rule may have on
employment, and other comments that the supply chain supporting auto manufacturing will be
affected in addition to domestic auto manufacturing, we first refer to our discussion on
employment in RIA Chapter 4.5 where we discuss quantitative partial employment effects of this
rule in auto manufacturing sectors, as well as possible qualitative employment impacts in related
sectors. The partial employment effects we estimate indicate that the joint cost and demand
effect of this rule will lead to an increase in employment for sectors related to the electrified
portion of vehicle production that outweighs possible decreases in the ICE portion of vehicle
production and possible decreases in sectors that are common to both ICE and electric portions
of vehicle production. To estimate further effects of this final rule on employment would
necessitate data which is not available to EPA, and quantifying employment effects in sectors
upstream or downstream from the directly affected sector is dependent on more than just the
effect of this final regulation, for example macroeconomic conditions in each state, as well for
the country as whole. We note that in addition to the partial employment analysis described and
presented in the RIA, in cooperation with DOE and DOL, we did qualitatively assess a number
of employment initiatives currently underway pertaining to EVs and EV-related industries. These
are discussed throughout Section VIII.I of the preamble, Chapter 4.5 of the RIA, and this RTC
section. These initiatives support continued growth, training, and investment in workers and their
communities throughout the automotive manufacturing and supply chain industries, as well as
throughout industries related to charging infrastructure.
Regarding claims this rule will affect, and we should account for, job quality and safety as
well as quantity, that there may be geographically localized effects even if there are not national
net effects, and that jobs may look different in a market where vehicles are electrified, we
acknowledge that different markets and different workers may be affected differently by a
transition to clean vehicle technologies. If, as some commenters claim, the transition to EVs will
require more skilled workers, we note that jobs that require a higher skill level generally provide
a higher wage. In addition, we find that there are significant Federal, State, and private efforts to
support quality jobs and training opportunities for workers across the nation, including those we
summarized earlier in this section and more below. We point to work by the Departments of
Energy (DOE) and Labor (DOL), as well as others, who are funding grants and initiating
programs to support green jobs, including those related to electric vehicle battery production,
training and apprenticeship programs, and more. JOET is responsible for executing funding
from the Investing in America Agenda granted to 30 projects across 16 states and Washington
D.C. to support EV charging performance, resiliency and reliability, support equitable access to
clean transportation solutions, and to help grow the clean energy workforce.669 DOE has an
669 https://www.energy.gov/articles/biden-harris-administration-announces-over-46-million-enhance-ev-charging-
reliability-and
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Office of Energy Jobs, focused on supporting the creation of jobs in the energy sector, with
particular focus on jobs with high standards and the right to collective bargaining.670 The office
works with other federal agencies to support meaningful jobs in the transition to a zero-emission
economy, including through:
• The 21st Century Energy Workforce Advisory Board to support current and future
energy-sector labor needs, and to expand energy jobs and training opportunities
• A DOE Labor Working Group, a forum with labor unions and others to engage on key
energy topics
• A Community Benefits Plan to account for labor and community engagement, quality
jobs, worker investment and more
• The Battery Workforce Initiative established by the Department of Energy (DOE) in
coordination with the Department of Labor (DOL), AFL-CIO and other organizations
to bring together industry stakeholders, including employers and unions, to develop
consensus on skills and training needed to support a growing domestic battery supply
chain with the goal of accelerating the development of high-quality training
DOL's Employment and Training Administration oversees the DOL Building Pathways to
Infrastructure Jobs Grant Program aimed at investing in the development and implementation of
worker-centered strategies and training programs needed to support the transition to a zero-
emissions economy.671 These programs include support aimed at jobs in renewable energy,
energy efficiency, broadband expansion, smart city grids, and jobs facilitating the design,
construction, modernization and maintenance of infrastructure. DOL also provides grants to help
community colleges provide skilled pathways to good jobs in the transportation and clean energy
sectors. DOL is providing technical assistance to the Southeast EV Collaborative, which is made
up of collection of state workforce agencies in the southeast region of the U.S. focused on
identifying opportunities to work together to provide equitable access to good jobs across the
region.
Research on domestic employment in the EV transition funded by the Department of Energy
(DOE) indicates that a wide range of jobs in the ICE vehicle sector have a relatively high
similarity in needed skill sets to jobs in the EV sector, as well as in other sectors, including the
heat pump, solar panel manufacturing and transformer industry.672 The research also indicates
that higher-wage jobs with more specialized skills may be better positioned to transition their
skill sets from ICE sectors to EV sectors, although they are more geographically concentrated
and hence dependent on co-location of EV production capacity with automotive production for
transition opportunities. This research is supported by comments provided by ZETA, indicating
that the EV industry is attracting workers transitioning from other industries. At the same time,
we note the considerable efforts to support workers with lower wages and lower skill levels,
including, for instance, the targeting of IRA funds to economically disadvantaged counties
670 https://www.energy.gov/policy/energy-jobs
671
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/skillstraining/Building%20Pathways%20to%20lnfrastructure%20Grantee%
20Abstracts_12-4-2023.pdf
672 Workforce Analytic Approaches to Find Degrees of Freedom in the EV Transition;
https://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4699308
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discussed below. Also, we point out that even though vehicle manufacturing and battery
manufacturing may create more localized employment effects, infrastructure work is, and will
continue to be, a nation-wide effort. We note that ICCT estimated that charging infrastructure
growth in the U.S. could create about 160,000 jobs by 2032, in sectors ranging from electrical
installation, maintenance and repair, charger assembly, general construction, software
maintenance and repair, planning and design, and administration and legal.673 We also note that
JOET has funded initiatives related to job training for many sectors related to charging resiliency
and performance, including those in the electrical industry.674
Regarding community-level effects, we note data at sub-national level is not consistent, nor
consistently available, and subnational estimations are too precise compared to the uncertainty in
estimating possible future effects for the nation as a whole. Regarding comments that we should
quantify effects on job quality at existing ICE plants versus those at new or to-be-built electric
vehicle or battery manufacturing plants, we point out that data related to job quality is not
widespread or consistent enough and is too uncertain to rely on, in addition to the fact that we do
not know where these plants may be in 2030, nor their size or employment capacity. We may be
able to obtain data from a select few manufacturers, but this would ignore the possible effects at
all vehicle and battery plants, leading to a high level of uncertainty. Also, we would need to
determine a consistent measure of job "quality." Commenters who advocated for this kind of
quantitative job quality analysis did not provide any such analysis themselves. Notwithstanding
the technical difficulties with performing such an analysis, we find there is considerable support
for quality jobs in association with the ongoing transition to clean vehicle technologies, as
discussed throughout this section, as well as in comments by EDF, ZETA and others. And
though crafting standards about labor concerns are not in the purview of EPA, we point out that
these efforts, among others, support the workforce in the transition to cleaner vehicles, as well as
supporting and encouraging domestic production of electric vehicles and battery manufacturing.
Regarding related comments that the rule will have possible environmental justice
implications and the rule is critical to advancing environmental justice and equity, as well as the
impact the higher purchase price will have on lower-income Americans, we refer to RTC
Sections 9 (environmental justice) and 13 (consumer impacts). It is also important to note that
investments from the IRA have, so far, been focused in more economically disadvantaged
counties. The U.S. Department of Treasury states that as of November 2023, 70 percent of post-
IRA investments in clean energy have happened in counties with a smaller share of the
population employed than the U.S. average; almost 80 percent have happened in counties with
below-average median household incomes; more than 80 percent of have happened in counties
with below-average wages; and more than 85 percent have gone to counties with below-average
college graduation rates.675 We also note that during and after the comment period, several major
U.S. automakers were negotiating new labor contracts, with an emphasis on workers in facilities
673 ICCT: Charging Up America, https://theicct.Org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/ID-28-%E2%80%93-U.S.-infra-
jobs-report-letter-70112-ALT-v6.pdf.
674 JOET: New Funding Enhances EV Charging Resiliency, Reliability, Equity and Workforce Development,
https://driveelectric.gov/news/workforce-development-ev-projects.
675 The Inflation Reduction Act: A Place-Based Analysis: https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/the-
inflation-reduction-act-a-place-based-analysis
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that support the production of electrified vehicles.676 The negotiations resulted in many workers
in EV production, including EV battery workers, becoming newly eligible to join the union, as
well as in raising wages for those employed by unionized automakers, and those employed by
non-unionized automakers.677
Regarding comments that there is a lack of qualified technicians for electric vehicle and
infrastructure manufacturing, repair and maintenance, As described throughout this section, there
are many programs available to support training of electric vehicle repair and maintenance
technicians, as well as technicians supporting ZEV infrastructure. We do not agree that there will
be a significant lack of technicians in the timeframe of this rule given investments and programs
focused on training for EV sector positions, including those discussed throughout this RTC
section, as well as other programs, such as those at many community colleges supporting jobs
related to EV technology, including technicians.678 Additionally, the phase-in of this final rule,
described in Section I.B of the preamble, will allow time for technicians to be trained. We do
find that this rule provides regulatory certainty that supports significant job growth for qualified
technicians that service electric vehicles..
Regarding comments that EPA should create a request for information (RFI) like the
voluntary one EPA published targeting manufactures receiving funding in the Clean School Bus
(CSB) Program to solicit information from affected parties, we disagree, noting that the CSB
Program was not a regulation that limits pollution emissions from school buses, but instead is a
program meant to help schools replace existing buses with zero- or low-emission models through
grants and rebate funding opportunities. The RFI in the CSB was created to support the overall
success of the CSB Program, and to help EPA, partners, and stakeholders understand how the
CSB Program, with funds provided by the BIL, is contributing to the creation of high-quality
jobs across the country. We appreciate the information provided by those OEMs who have
already volunteered to participate, and those who might in the future.679
We note that comments suggesting EPA track and hold industry accountable for specific
business practices such as offshoring or child labor are out of scope for this rulemaking. For
comments specific to child labor said to take place in the supply chain for batteries, see the
response to comments in RTC Section 15. While we set standards and prescribe test procedures
to demonstrate compliance, and consider costs, employment impacts, and potential supply chain
concerns in setting the standards, EPA's engine and vehicle regulations do not dictate how
676 UAW: Bargaining 2023 UAW-GM, https://uaw.org/gm2023/; UAW: UAW National Negotiators Reach
Tentative Agreement with Ford on Record Contract, https://uaw.org/uaw-national-negotiators-reach-tentative-
agreement-with-ford-on-record-contract/#:~:text=Some%20of%20our%201ower-
tier%20members%20at%20Sterling%20Axle,workers%20will%20receive%20an%20immediate%2011%25%20wag
e%20increase.; UAW: UAW reaches a Tentative Agreement with Stellantis, https://uaw-
newsroom.prgloo.com/press-release/uaw-reaches-a-tentative-agreement-with-stellantis.
677 Bloomberg: UAW Scores Victory in EV Worker Battle Even with Wage Compromise,
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/uaw-scores-victory-in-ev-worker-battle-even-with-wage-
compromise; The Washington Post: UAW members ratify record contracts with Big 3 automakers,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/ll/20/uaw-contract-ford-general-motors-stellantis/.
678 For a list of some of the community college and other programs that support the electric vehicle industry, see the
Community College and Other EV Training Programs memo to the docket.
679 For responses provided to the Clean School Bus RFI, see https://www.epa.gov/cleanschoolbus/bus-manufacturer-
iob-aualitv-and-workforce-development-practices. A copy of this webpage as of March 5, 2024 is provided in the
docket for this rule.
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manufacturers source their materials or staff their production to meet the standards. This
approach allows each manufacturer to identify the business approach most appropriate for their
company, yet still achieve the environmental and health benefits associated with the reduced
level of tailpipe emissions allowed by the rule. Similarly, we do not account for business
decisions regarding how to fund research and development, and therefore do not include costs
such as the cost of funding EV ventures into the analysis for this rule.
Regarding comments that EPA should further incorporate FEV results into the final rule
analysis, we refer to RIA Chapter 4.5, where we discuss the employment focused FEV results.
Regarding comments on a gradual phase-in of the standards, we refer to Section III.C and D
of the preamble, where we describe how this final rule phases in over time, which will allow for
training, education, and planning for workforces as the market transitions to BEVs. We also
point out that there are many alternative pathways to compliance for this rule, and they include
continued production of vehicles with IC engines (e.g., ICE, hybrids, PHEVs).
Regarding comments on the costs of the rule, we refer to RTC Section 8. Regarding
comments about the impact of the rule on vehicle sales, we refer to RIA Chapter 4 and RTC
Section 14. Regarding comments that this rule will result in reduced vehicle choice, we do not
agree. See Section 13 of the RTC for more information. In addition, we do not agree that critical
minerals will lead to higher costs than estimated. We present our analysis of critical minerals in
preamble Section IV.C.7 and respond to comments in Section 15 of this document. Regarding
comments that this rule will lead to safety issues, we refer to RTC Section 22, where we respond
to comments on safety impacts associated with this rule. Regarding comments that this rule will
have a negative effect on the electric grid, we refer to Section 18 of this RTC where we discuss
the interaction between the electric grid and our regulation. Regarding comments that this rule
will disproportionately affect small businesses, we refer to RTC Section 25.1 and RIA Chapter
11 where we discuss how we account for small businesses in our analysis. Regarding comments
that this rule needs clearly defined applicability of extended warranty and need to provide repair
access, we refer the reader to RTC Section 16.
21 - Energy security
Comments by Organizations
Organization: American Enterprise Institute
III. The Purported Energy Security Benefits of the Proposed Rule Are Illusory
EPA argues that the proposed rule would provide "energy security" benefits in the form of a
reduction in the prospective costs "caused by U.S. petroleum consumption and imports." EPA
views such benefits as a reduction in the adverse effects of future disruptions in the supplies of
crude oil, refined products, and other liquid fuels, a reduction in the costs of public preparation
as embodied in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), and a reduction in the defense costs of
defending sea lanes and other dimensions of national security spending. Each of those arguments
is incorrect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 11-12]
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Because there can be only one world market price for such fungible commodities as crude oil,
abstracting from such second-order differences as transportation costs, exchange rate impacts,
and the like, nations that import all of their oil (e.g., Japan) face the same prices and price
changes as those importing none of their oil (e.g., the UK).32 Accordingly, the common view of
"energy security" as a direct impact of the level or proportion of imports is incorrect. Japan is not
less "energy secure" than the UK, and a U.S. that imports more oil is not less "energy secure"
than a U.S. that imports less. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 11-12]
32 Natural gas is a somewhat different case, in that delivery through pipelines cannot be shifted quickly.
Deliveries of liquified natural gas can be expensive, but analytically are similar to deliveries of crude oil,
although the importation facilities are more complex and cannot be created quickly.
Note that the queues and market disruptions experienced in the U.S. in 1973 did not result
from the oil "embargo" imposed by Arab OPEC and directed at the U.S., the Netherlands, and a
few others. The targeted nations faced the same international prices, and the same changes in
prices, as all other economies. Prices increased because of the production cutback in the Middle
East in the Wake of the 1973 Middle East war; it was the imposition of price and allocation
controls and other regulatory rigidities and constraints that yielded the market disruptions. Note
that there was no "embargo" in 1979; but there was a production cutback in the wake of the
Iranian revolution, higher international prices, the re-imposition of price and allocation
regulations in the U.S. market, and resulting queues and market dislocations.33 "Energy
security" — the risk of disruptions from a given source and the cost of obtaining substitute
supplies over some (short) time horizon — is an attribute of liquid fuels reflected fully in market
prices. "Insecure" — that is, unreliable — suppliers will command market prices lower than
those enjoyed by suppliers more reliable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 11-12]
33 See Benjamin Zycher at https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/14jun2016Zycher.pdf,
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/World-Oil-Prices.pdf, and
https ://www. econlib. org/library/Enc/OPEC. html.
The market is fully capable of anticipating supply disruptions, even if not the precise
magnitudes and timing, and then stockpiling supplies for periods when supply disruptions yield
higher prices.34 Market prices unconstrained by regulatory distortions provide efficient
incentives for such preparation; it is the threat of price controls and "windfall profits" taxes and
other such policies that are likely to yield investment in private sector preparation smaller than
economically efficient in the aggregate.35 This means that the costs of the SPR are the direct
result of adverse government policies anticipated with some nontrivial probability. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0571, pp. 11-12]
34 See the Energy Information Administration data on U.S. oil stocks at
https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/data.php.
35 It is likely to be the case that the corporation income tax also, by forcing the private sector to use a
before-tax discount rate higher than the after-tax return to investment, yields suboptimal investment.
Similarly, the defense cost argument is misguided. In a narrow context, the portion of the
costs of the U.S. defense effort that can be attributed to defense of the sea lanes and the like is a
hugely complex analytic calculation. More broadly, defense capital assets serve multiple
functions; because national security needs and the physical and human force structures evolve
only over decades, it is reasonable as a first approximation to assume that defense capital
provides those multiple functions in more-or-less fixed proportions. It is axiomatic that the
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allocation of fixed costs across multiple functions in fixed proportions is arbitrary. Accordingly,
the analysis of the purported benefits of a forced reduction in the consumption of transportation
fuels in terms of an asserted reduction in (long-run) defense costs is illusory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0571, pp.11-12]
2. The Availability of North American Crude, Refining, and Biofuel Capacity Makes the
United States Energy Secure
Unlike critical minerals, the U.S. is the largest producer of crude oil and petroleum products
in the world. We are also home to the world's largest biofuels industry. Our refineries and
petrochemical producers are the most competitive in the world, taking advantage of a
sophisticated workforce, low-cost resources, refinery complexity, and scale to compete with even
the largest state-owned enterprises in foreign markets. In 2022, the crude oil processed by U.S.
refineries was 84 percent sourced from North America. The U.S. produces more crude and
refined products than it consumes and became a net exporter of crude and refined petroleum
products in late 2019, after being a net exporter of refined products for the past decade.22 EPA's
DRIA undervalues the energy security aspects of the domestic petroleum industry, particularly
by failing to distinguish between sources of imported crude oil, ignoring that 70 percent and 84
percent of imported and total crude oil, respectively, is sourced from North America. The
proposal also ignores the significant pipeline connectivity between the U.S. and our North
American trading partners, as well as the unique configurations of each U.S. refinery. For
example, many U.S. refiners require heavier crude oils, which are not produced in the U.S. and
must be sourced from Canada or other heavy crude producers. U.S. energy leadership means that
the energy security impacts of reduced oil imports are not as significant as they historically had
been. It also means that reduced U.S. demand for liquid fuels will impact U.S. oil producers as
much, if not more so, than existing trading partners. This employment effect is not contemplated
in EPA's analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 10]
22 EIA, "Oil imports and petroleum product explained" (Jun. 12, 2023) available
at https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php.
U.S. refiners are also critical suppliers of fuel to the U.S. military. In the most recent contract
year, U.S. refiners provided 750 million gallons of fuel on the West Coast alone, supporting
force readiness for conflict in the Pacific. EPA did not assess the impact of likely refinery
closures on military operations and readiness. Instead, the DRIA inexplicably focuses on a
narrow aspect of energy security, choosing to describe the cost of protecting trade routes. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 10]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
In ORNL's study, a significant portion of the estimated security premium is the potential
reduction of "the transfer of U.S. wealth to foreign producers" which "can lead to
macroeconomic contraction, dislocation, and GDP losses" during an oil supply disruption. In
2008, when ORNL calculated energy security premiums, net U.S. crude and product imports
were over 50 percent of U.S. liquid petroleum consumption. However, since ONRL's
calculations the U.S. has become, and is projected to be, a net oil and product exporter, thus an
increase in global oil prices would likely lead to a net transfer of wealth to the U.S. not away
from it. Without modifications that account for the transfer of wealth to the U.S. during a supply
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disruption, EPA's calculated energy security premium estimates are likely overstated and not
meaningful. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 21-22]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB)
In addition to individual cost savings and broader economic growth, U.S. EPA's proposal will
provide economic benefits for the nation's energy systems. For example, increased ZEV
deployment will reduce our reliance on foreign oil, providing economic resilience to global fuel
supply chain disruptions and price shocks. With the integration of emerging vehicle-to- grid
communication strategies, as CARB recommends, vehicles will be able to promote grid
resilience through enabling demand response load management strategies, providing backup
power during blackouts, and supporting storage of renewable energy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp. 66-67]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.
Even by its own logic, EPA's rule fails because it fails to account for decreased energy
security owing to an increased demand for natural gas, which currently makes up 40 percent of
our grid's electricity generation. This share—or at least the volume of energy generated—will
need to grow dramatically to make up for the increased electricity demand. 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0712, p. 36]
19 Of course, "[t]he United States is [also] the leading producer of natural gas," and so increasing reliance
on natural gas does little to move the needle on energy security. C. Boyden Gray, American Energy,
Chinese Ambition, and Climate Realism, 5 American Affairs Journal (Winter 2021),
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2021/ll/3333tellant-energy-chinese-ambition-and-climate-realism/. But
if the proposal intends to count decreases in petroleum in its favor it is completely unreasonable to ignore
the concomitant increases in natural gas consumption.
Organization: Delek US Holdings, Inc.
II. EPA's Proposed Rule Will Increase Domestic Reliance on Foreign Supply Chains.
Today, the U.S. is virtually independent in terms of transportation fuels (i.e., petroleum- and
ethanol-based liquid fuel products) for ICE-powered vehicles.9 Although EPA spends a not
insignificant amount of space in its draft Regulatory Impact Analysis ("DRIA") assessing energy
security, EPA limits itself to drawing broad conclusions regarding future projections for exports,
imports, and consumption of crude oil and refined petroleum products—as well as relying on
inflated support from potential funding mechanisms of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law ("BIL")
and the Inflation Reduction Act ("IRA").10,11,12 But this ignores the larger concern regarding
energy and national security: an unfavorable transition from reliable, abundant, domestically-
sourced fuels to a complex supply chain reliant on foreign-sourced critical minerals. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0527, p. 3]
9 While "energy independence" has varying definitions, we are using the term consistent with EPA's use in
the Proposed Rule—"[t]he goal of U.S. energy independence is the elimination of all U.S. imports of
petroleum and other foreign sources of energy, but more broadly it is the elimination of U.S. sensitivity to
the variations in the price and supply of foreign sources of energy"). Proposed Rule at 26,077.
10 Public Law 117-58, Nov. 15, 2021.
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11 Public Law 117-169, Aug. 16, 2022.
12 EPA, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis for Proposed Rule, 3-19-29 (Apr. 2023) [hereinafter "DRIA"].
Notably, EPA concludes that U.S. oil consumption is projected to be fairly steady for the time period from
2027 to 2050" and will actually increase gradually over that time. Id. At 11-26 (Table 11-1). EPA also
concludes that the Proposed Rule will result in a 90.7% reduction in oil imports.
Organization: Electrification Coalition (EC)
The national and economic security concerns that persist from our nation still exposed to a
global oil market characterized by volatility and instability are critical to consider when
considering a regulation such as the EPA's Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years
2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles. The U.S.'s exposure is most recently
exemplified by the global ramifications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and of
Russia's willingness to use petroleum resources as a weapon, which sent oil prices to their
highest point since 2008. Despite the U.S.'s increased prominence in the world's oil markets -
which includes a roughly six-fold increase in oil exports between 2015 and 2019 - the oil market
is only as strong as its weakest links, which the U.S. must expend considerable resources to
defend to minimize market disruptions. More broadly, the nation's costs to protecting the flow of
oil includes the roughly $81 billion spent annually by the U.S. taxpayer - which proportionally
represents 16 percent of the current defense budget - but also less quantifiable losses of global
strength and leadership, and distorted American diplomacy goals which must prioritize the
global flow of oil.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0588, p. 2]
In short, the underlying factors that led to record oil prices in 2008 and 2022 have not
substantially changed, nor will they in the future as there are additional influencing factors for
the global oil market. These influencing factors include a growing demand for oil from emerging
markets, geopolitical instability that causes global oil shocks, market manipulation across many
oil-producing nations, limited access to reserves owned by national oil companies, and the higher
cost of production of fields that are available to international oil companies. While oil has
facilitated the rise of the modern era, these persistent national and economic security threats
indicate it is past time to shift to a better, more stable fuel source: electricity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0588, p. 2]
Organization: Environmental and Public Health Organizations
XXVII. Stronger Standards Will Improve U.S. Energy Security.
Energy security considerations also support strong final standards. Reducing U.S. reliance on
oil enhances U.S. energy security, and—with energy security in mind—Congress has specifically
directed the U.S. to conserve energy. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §
32902(f). EPA defines energy security as "the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at
affordable prices," 88 Fed. Reg. at 29388; DRIA at 11-1, and states that "[t]he goal of U.S.
energy independence is the elimination of all U.S. imports of petroleum and other foreign
sources of energy, but more broadly, it is the elimination of U.S. sensitivity to variations in the
price and supply of foreign sources of energy." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29388. Despite increases in
domestic oil production that have made the United States an energy exporter, EPA should
continue to consider the energy security impacts of GHG standards. EPA notes that combustion
vehicles continue to present an energy security risk because the United States remains vulnerable
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to "episodic oil supply shocks and price spikes." Id. U.S. refineries continue to import heavy
crude oil from potentially unstable regions of the world, and sudden disruptions in supply pose a
threat to U.S. financial and strategic interests. DRIA at 11-1. Moreover, EPA is correct that "oil
exporters with a large share of global production have the ability to raise or lower the price of oil
by exerting the market power associated with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) to alter oil supply relative to demand," id., which would cause oil price shocks that have
greater impacts when nations are heavily reliant on oil. Because the Proposed Standards will
significantly reduce U.S. reliance on foreign oil, see 88 Fed. Reg. at 29388, Tbl.198 (showing
decrease of 42,000 barrels of imported oil per day in 2027 and decrease of 2.3 million barrels of
imported oil per day by 2055, and even greater import reductions under Alternative 1), EPA's
Proposal and Alternative 1 both enhance U.S. energy security and make progress toward the goal
of energy independence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 197]
For the Proposal, EPA has quantified the energy security risks using a macroeconomic oil
security premium. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29389. Oil security premiums measure the extra cost of
importing oil beyond the price paid for the oil itself (or, in the case of a reduction in demand, the
extra benefit of reducing oil imports beyond the actual expenditures saved). The main input to
calculating the oil security premium is the macroeconomic benefit, which measures the potential
macroeconomic disruptions and increased oil import costs to the economy resulting from oil
price spikes or "shocks," or the value of avoiding these costs due to less domestic reliance on oil.
In estimating the macroeconomic benefit used to calculate oil security premiums, EPA has
historically relied on research conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and EPA
again takes this approach in the Proposal.653 Id. EPA has estimated macroeconomic oil security
premiums based on ORNL's methodology developed in 1997 and updated in 2008654 for a
series of past rulemakings including the 2010, 2012, and 2021 Final Rules and the heavy-duty
vehicle GHG and fuel economy Phase I and Phase II standards and Phase III proposal.655 In this
Proposal, EPA reasonably utilizes the long-used ORNL methodology and applies the same
values for the price elasticity of demand for oil and elasticity of GDP to oil price shocks as for
the 2021 Rule. DRIA at 11-28 to 11-29. Similarly, EPA reasonably calculates the oil import
reduction factor by the same method used for the most recent rulemaking. Id. At 11-25. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 198]
653 In this Proposal, EPA reasonably calculates the macroeconomic oil security premiums using the same
price elasticity of demand for oil and the same elasticity of GDP to an oil price shock as for the 2021 Rule.
DRIA at 11-28 to 11-29.
654 Leiby, P.N., Estimating the Energy Security Benefits of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports, Final Report,
ORNL/TM-2007/028, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Rev. Mar. 14, 2008); Leiby, P.N. et al., Oil
Imports: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs, ORNL-6851, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Nov. 1997);
see also R. Uria-Martinez, et al., Using Meta-Analysis to Estimate World Oil Demand Elasticity, ORNL
Working Paper (2018).
655 The 2020 LDV GHG standards proposal also relied on the ORNL literature and methodologies for
estimating oil security premiums, and only the 2020 Final Rule abandoned this research and methodology,
instead relying on a single paper (Brown (2018)) to drastically reduce oil security premiums. Stephen A.
Brown, New Estimates of the Security Costs of U.S. Oil Consumption, 13 Energy Policy 171-92 (2018).
Reliance on Brown was inappropriate for two reasons: (1) EPA failed to provide adequate justification for
departing from the established ORNL methodologies and research that had been used for over 20 years to
instead rely on a single study; and (2) the 2020 Final Rule did not appear to have used Brown's best or
most accurate estimates in setting oil security premiums, but rather used estimates that even Brown (2018)
suspected to be inaccurate. Id. At 181 (noting that Brown's estimate of the "combined" value for oil
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security premiums "might best reflect the uncertainty in what we know about oil security premiums," and
that the values derived from only the most recent research—w hich EPA used in the 2020 Final Rule—may
not be the most reliable).
In addition to the macroeconomic oil security premium, military and monopsony benefits are
considered energy security benefits of reduced U.S. oil demand. DRIA at 11-2, 11-30 to 11-32.
While EPA has historically refrained from applying these values in any quantified way, it is
important to recognize that energy security benefits that take into account only the
macroeconomic oil security premiums could be low estimates. EPA's Proposal correctly explains
that one cost of oil use is "maintaining a military presence to help secure a stable oil supply from
potentially vulnerable regions of the world," id. At 11-30, and therefore, reducing domestic
reliance on oil has the potential to result in some form of military benefit. EPA states that the
Agency does not include these benefits because they are hard to quantify. Id. At 11-31 to 11-32.
EPA is encouraged to consider methodologies for quantifying these benefits in the future, and to
acknowledge that their existence makes EPA's current estimations of energy security benefits
conservative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 199]
Finally, EPA is correct that electricity used in PEVs will "improve the U.S.'s overall energy
security position," 88 Fed. Reg. at 29389, because electricity is more affordable and less price
volatile than oil, a point that numerous sources support.656 Even more importantly, the
electricity will be almost exclusively produced in the United States, "mov[ing] the U.S. towards
the goal of energy independence." Id. Additionally, PEVs offer significant energy security
benefits in that "[ejlectric vehicles can be powered by any energy source because all energy
sources can be converted to electricity."657 Unlike combustion vehicles—which can be powered
only by oil—PEVs can utilize solar, wind, hydroelectric, geothermal, or any other electricity
resources available to the grid.658 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 199]
656 See, e.g., Talor Gruenwald, Reality Check: The Myth of Stable and Affordable Natural Gas Prices,
Rocky Mountain Institute (Nov. 17, 2021), https://rmi.org/the-myth-of-stable-and-affordable-natural-gas-
prices/ ("Electricity prices, which are driven by the costs of a variety of fuels including renewables, are
much less susceptible to individual commodity price shocks."); Jeremy Martin, Why Are Gasoline Prices
So Volatile?, Union of Concerned Scientists (Mar. 29, 2022), https://blog.ucsusa.org/3336tella-martin/why-
are-gasoline-prices-so-volatile/ (explaining the price volatility of the oil market and noting that its global
nature "means that U.S. consumers remain vulnerable to changes in oil prices across the globe" and that
"electricity prices are far less volatile than gasoline."); U.S. Department of Energy, Saving Money with
Electric Vehicles (Sept. 28, 2022), https://www.energy.gov/energysaver/articles/saving-money-electric-
vehicles (noting that "electricity is less expensive than gasoline," and that "[p]etroleum prices are
historically very volatile and change substantially over time," while "electricity prices are much more
stable.").
657 Nicholas Brown, Evs Provide Energy Security, Aid Energy Transitions During Conflicts, Clean
Technica (July 12, 2022), https://cleantechnica.com/2022/07/12/evs-provide-energy-security-aid-energy-
transitions-during-conflicts/.
658 Id.; see also Lee F. Gunn, Electric Vehicles Improve Our National Security, Orlando Sentinel (June 9,
2023), https://www.orlandosentinel.eom/2023/06/09/electric-vehicles-national-security-opinion/
("Diversified energy resources and Evs are already beginning to reduce our dependence on unpredictable
oil-exporting partners. Accordingly, Evs can reduce our exposure to energy supply shocks and, importantly,
limit the risk of supply disruptions for military operations.").
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Organization: Fuel Freedom Foundation
Increase national and energy security. The decades-long strategic imperative to reduce
petroleum dependence has not been inhibited by record-breaking U.S. domestic drilling, as
succinctly laid out in the U.S. National Blueprint for Transportation Decarbonization (U.S.
Blueprint): "More than 95% of transportation energy use comes from petroleum-based fuels,
making it the least energy-diverse sector and subjecting the American economy to the volatility
of global markets." Oil prices still regularly rise rapidly in response to world events or market
manipulation, even after the U.S. surpassed Saudi Arabia as the world's largest producer.
Americans remain subject to such price fluctuations, driven by geopolitics and market dynamics
that reflect a lack of fuel alternatives. From a policy perspective, our national options remain
inhibited by overwhelming petroleum dependence in transportation. We can only gain genuine
energy and economic security by weakening petroleum's strategic consequence. The EPA can
move us in the right direction by incentivizing the re-adoption of FFVs that can quickly enable
displacement of large volumes of gasoline at little to no cost to consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0711, p. 4]
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law
Turning to energy security, EPA reasonably concludes that the Proposed Rule will benefit
domestic energy security by shifting consumption from petroleum to electricity, which is
cheaper, more price-stable, and more domestically-produced. 110 In addition to a thorough
qualitative analysis, 111 EPA conducts a quantitative analysis of the Proposed Rule's oil security
premium using a peer-reviewed methodology. 112 In a nutshell, this analysis estimates the
economic benefits resulting from reductions in oil imports. 113 An important parameter in this
analysis is the own-price elasticity of demand for oil. This parameter reflects the sensitivity of oil
sales to oil price changes. More specifically, it represents the expected decline in oil demand (on
a percentage basis) from a 1% increase in oil price. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 17-18]
110 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,388-89.
111 RIAat 11-1 to 11-26.
112 Id. At 11-26 to 11-30.
113 Id. At 11-26; see also Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,389.
EPA should update the own-price elasticity of demand for oil to account for increased
electrification over time. Specifically, EPA adopts a low own-price elasticity of demand for oil
of -0.07—meaning that oil sales only marginally decline when prices increase, reflecting the fact
that oil cannot be easily substituted with other products. 114 But in the future, as electric vehicles
become more prominent, this is likely to change as electricity becomes more easily substitutable
for oil. 115 Accordingly, the own-price elasticity of demand for oil is likely to increase in the
future. EPA should thus use a higher absolute valuation of this parameter that is not based purely
on historical data. One option is to apply a valuation between -0.175 and -0.33 as the research
from Resources for the Future shows. 116 Alternatively, EPA could recalculate the own-price
elasticity of demand for oil within the NEMS model. 117 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp.
17-18]
114 RIA at 11-28.
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115 See infra p. 30 figs. 1-2.
116 Id.
117 See Bureau of Energy and Ocean Management, Consumer Surplus and Energy Substitutes for OCS Oil
and Gas Production: The 2021 Revised Market Simulation Model (MarketSim) Model Description 22
(2021) (describing similar methodology). Using this methodology, the elasticity of demand may still be too
low because the latest version of NEMS only considers current policy and fails to consider the likely path
of policy—such as the Proposed Rule—that could further increase electricity-to-oil substitution.
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Association
Vehicles that use alternative, lower-carbon fuels can help advance EPA climate goals while
also contributing to improved national security by lowering our dependence on foreign oil.
Additionally, encouragement and investment in carbon-neutral fuels will also positively impact
existing vehicles already on the road. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 6]
Organization: Missouri Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
If the economic damages are not bad enough, the impact of EPA's forced change to BEVs
may compromise our national security. Who is in favor of a move that would incentivize
batteries and minerals produced and mined in countries that are hostile to the U.S. and have
questionable labor standards over relying on homegrown renewable liquid fuels, along with our
domestic energy sources found right here in America, much of it in the Midwest? [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0578, p. 3]
18 Id. At 11-12.
Organization: Pearson Fuels
g. The use of E85 as a decarbonization strategy is a uniquely cost-efficient GHG strategy
that reduces petroleum dependence and enhances energy security
As has been discussed, it is now clear that Californians are embracing E85 fuel with the
second largest gasoline market in the country showing 66% year-on-year growth in E85 sales
from 2021 to 2022. CARB has confirmed the rigor of its oversight program and the rate of E85
growth in a letter to Pearson Fuels that is attached as Exhibit 4 to this comment.24 The sustained
growth in demand for E85 from FFVs in California is remarkable, surging from less than 6.5
MGY in 2006 to over 103 MGY in 2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 13]
24 Letter from Alexander "Lex" Mitchell, Manager, Emerging Technologies Section, California Air
Resources Board regarding E85 use, to Graham Noyes, Noyes Law Corporation. This CARB letter is
attached as an exhibit to the comment of Pearson Fuels to this proceeding.
The primary reason E85 use is on the rise in California is a typical and crucial driver in the
fuel market, price. At the retail level, California FFV owners can fill up on E85 and routinely
save 10 percent or more compared to conventional unleaded on a price per mile basis. It is due to
these favorable economics that FFV stations are flourishing in disadvantaged communities where
spiking gasoline prices are most damaging to consumer budgets. FFV owners previously unable
to fuel with E85 because of limited availability are just now being exposed to a robust network
of E85 stations offering steep price discounts to gasoline, and providing a cleaner fuel that
simultaneously boosts octane, the farm economy, and U.S. energy security. E85's rapidly
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growing market appeal is not limited to California and is part of a broader U.S. market transition
toward higher ethanol blends. This rapid growth in E85 demand is occurring at the same time
that diminished FFV crediting under the GHG program has undercut the incentive for
automakers to manufacture FFVs. This deployment of FFVs utilizing E85 by U.S. consumers to
save money and reduce GHG emissions would be greatly enhanced to the extent EPA establishes
an appropriate GHG emissions factor for FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 13]
Organization: Plains All American Pipeline, L.P.
In general, we have serious concerns about the Proposal. It will render America more
dependent on foreign-controlled supply chains and create irreparable harm to our energy
security, while missing the mark on well-intentioned emission reductions. By focusing solely on
tailpipe emissions, the Proposal would only address certain transportation emissions and fail to
quantify the full lifecycle of emissions for all vehicles, including materials resourcing,
production, operation, battery replacement, recycling and end-of-life disposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0713, p. 1]
By 2032—less than 10 years from now—the EPA's Proposal would require nearly 70% of
light-duty cars and trucks sold in the U.S. to be electric or "zero tailpipe emission." We have a
number of concerns with this approach, a few include [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-
2]:
By focusing on tailpipe emissions alone, most internal combustion engine vehicles
that run on gasoline, diesel and biofuels would be unable to meet the standards set forth in the
Proposal. This overlooks critical efforts of the energy and automotive industries to pursue
continued innovation and optimization of fuel/vehicle systems to improve efficiency and reduce
emissions. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
Effectively outlawing most liquid fuel-powered vehicles would undercut U.S. energy
security,2 harm our domestic energy industry and leave the U.S. more dependent on foreign-
controlled supply chains.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
Transferring a significant amount of energy demand to electricity will strain already
challenged electrical generation and transmission infrastructure. Without substantial additional
investment and significant streamlining of electric transmission permitting, it's unclear whether
the electrical grid could support charging new Evs at the level necessary to support the proposed
emissions reductions.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
Traditional energy sources are essential for ensuring effective evolution of the energy
landscape-including the manufacture and growth of renewable energy sources and Evs.
However, the Proposal would reduce energy investments and increase costs to consumers for all
forms of energy. Furthermore, this policy risks the continued viability of critical domestic energy
manufacturing infrastructure, which, if idled, would be very challenging to restore. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
Eliminating most new gasoline and diesel vehicles from the market limits consumer
choice. Significantly fewer new affordable vehicles are available for sale today5 than a few years
ago. Used cars are also increasing in price6 as some automakers warn that they will be forced to
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cut back on supplying popular gasoline models because of government regulations restricting
sales of traditional vehicles.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0713, pp. 1-2]
1 https://www.afpm.org/newsroom/news/afpm-epa-vehicle-proposal-will-effectively-ban-gasoline-and-
diesel-vehicles
2 https://www.visualcapitalist.com/chinas-dominance-in-battery-manufacturing/
3 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/05/16/business/china-ev-battery.html
4 https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-renewables-electric-grid/
5 https://www.marketwatch.com/story/are-we-witnessing-the-demise-of-the-affordable-car-automakers-
have- all-but-abandoned-the-budget-market-a68862f0
6 https://www.consumerreports.org/cars/buying-a-car/when-to-buy-a-used-car-a6584238157/
7 https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/3340tellantis-may-limit-some-gas-powered-
vehicles- states-adopting-california-2023-05-24/
Organization: The Heritage Foundation
Security benefits are overstated.
The study purports to find small energy security benefits by having less imported oil. See
Table 200. The analysis ignores that United States can well be an oil-exporting, rather than an
oil-importing country. For that reason alone, the stated energy security benefits are likely costs
rather than benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 14]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
F. EPA fails to account for potential energy security impacts.
EPA acknowledges a lack of literature on the energy security implication of PEV charging:
"Even though there is likely to be a substantial increase in the use of electricity from PEVs in the
U.S., the literature on the topic of the energy security implications of wider use of PEVs is
somewhat limited. We have not been able to identify any study that systematically quantifies the
differential energy security risks of using electricity versus petroleum-based fuels to power
vehicles in the U.S."276 While EPA focuses on the energy security benefits of reducing
dependence on oil imports, its consideration of the energy security threats associated with PEV
adoption is limited to the electricity consumption by PEVs277 - EPA fails to address the energy
security threats of increasing dependence on imports for minerals and battery supply chains.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 50-51]
276 DRIAat 11-10.
277 DRIAat 11-1 to 11-40.
EPA refers to the 2021 ransomware attack of Colonial Pipeline278 but fails to consider
cybersecurity threats associated with PEV charging.279 As published recently by Sandia
National Laboratories in a study of EV charging infrastructure, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 50-51]
278 DRIA at 11-1, footnote 170.
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279 See Cloete, Schalk, "Electric Cars and Energy Security: Out of the Frying Pan and Into the Fire",
March 14, 2022, https://medium.com/a-balanced-transition/electric-cars-and-energy-security-out-of-the-
frying-pan-and-into-the-fire-a3a27bfb54d5.
The breadth and complexity of EVSE connections create a large cybersecurity profile and
raise concerns that bad cyber actors could use insecure chargers as an unauthorized access point
to abuse charging equipment, vehicles, buildings, or grid resources. Each of these systems
represents a set of interconnected attack vectors. Evs, for example, interface with dealerships,
mobile phones, navigation, mapping, telemetry, entertainment, vehicle-based web browsers,
other vehicles, driver assist systems, over-the-air software updates, and more [], using an array of
protocols, including Bluetooth, GSM Mobile, and Wi-Fi. Autonomous-driving electric vehicles
add further cybersecurity complexity []. Researchers have highlighted the manipulation of
onboard, safety-critical electronic control units (ECUs) to interfere with braking, steering, engine
and battery controls []. Vehicle data are also at risk, including telematics, tracking [], customer,
dealer and insurance data []. EVSE interfaces with highly connected Evs and vendor systems,
charger owners, and grid operator systems.280 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 50-51]
280 Johnson, Jay et al, "Review of Electric Vehicle Charger Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities, Potential
Impacts, and Defenses", May 26, 2022, https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/15/ll/3931.
C. EPA's action would undermine the Renewable Fuel Standard and Congress' goals for
renewable fuels and energy security.
EPA's proposal and ZEV sales mandate are also inconsistent with the broader statutory
scheme and Congress's plan for tackling climate change. When Congress sought to address
greenhouse-gas emissions from the transportation sector, it did so by promoting renewable liquid
fuels, which are used in conventional vehicles and which—unlike electric-vehicle components—
are in abundant domestic supply. See, e.g., Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-
169. §§ 13202, 13404, 22003, 136 Stat 1818, 1932, 1966-69, 2020 (2022). Indeed, Congress has
consistently legislated against the background expectation that conventional vehicles powered by
liquid fuels will remain on the market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 86-]
The Clean Air Act also includes the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program, which
"requires that increasing volumes of renewable fuel be introduced into the Nation's supply of
transportation fuel each year." Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA (ACE), 864 F.3d 691, 697
(D.C. Cir. 2017). Two goals animate the RFS: (1) to "move the United States toward greater
energy independence and security," and (2) to "increase the production of clean renewable
fuels." Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492, 1492 (2007)). To these ends, "Congress
ordained the inclusion of 4 billion gallons of renewable fuel in the Nation's fuel supply" for
calendar year 2006, and required that, "[b]y 2022, the number will climb to 36 billion gallons."
HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass'n, 141 S. Ct. 2172, 2175 (2021).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 86-]
In other words, through the RFS, which is also in the Clean Air Act, Congress mandated that
"fuel sold or introduced into commerce in the United States" must contain increasing shares of
renewable fuels and specifically increasing shares of advanced biofuel, cellulosic biofuel, and
biomass-based diesel. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i). For these fuels, Congress called for not
simply a percentage of the fuel market but mandated a minimum volume of biofuel in the
market. The proposed standards, on the other hand, would reduce the use of renewable fuels,
particularly renewable diesel and other advanced biofuels, cellulosic biofuels, and biomass-
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based diesel, and make it impossible to meet the mandates of the RFS. EPA is thus working at
cross-purposes with Congress, which has required a move toward increases in liquid renewable
fuels at the same time that EPA is seeking to eliminate vehicles that use such fuels. Congress has
never mandated, nor authorized, that EPA issue regulations to phase out the use of liquid fuels.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 86-]
The congressional intent underlying these mandated obligations under the RFS was to
incentivize liquid fuels with lower lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions. For example, renewable
diesel generates credits under the RFS, whereas traditional diesel generates an obligation. Here,
however, treating renewable diesel and traditional diesel the same—giving no recognition of or
benefit to manufacturers based on use of liquid fuels with lower lifecycle greenhouse gas
emissions— underscores EPA's failure to read its statutory authority as a whole and emphasizes
the conflict between the proposal and the RFS. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 86-]
Congress also cited national energy security as one of the primary reasons for implementing
the RFS. In the proposal, EPA deigns to resolve energy security concerns by reducing use of
liquid fuels without accounting for the impact on renewable fuels. EPA has also not adequately
accounted for increased energy security risks associated with battery production and use in the
transportation of the nation's commerce and in all the industries that use and rely on LDVs and
MDVs. See supra at XX. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 86-]
With no apparent recognition that its proposed vehicle standards will reduce consumption of
both nonrenewable and renewable fuels, EPA continues to mandate increasing volumes of
renewable fuels consistent with its mandates under the RFS, proposing a 1.7 billion gallon
increase in all renewable fuels by 2025 in its proposed "RFS Set" rule.368 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 86-]
368 Final Rule: Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program: Standards for 2023-2025 and Other Changes,
signed June 2023, pre-publication version available at https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel- standard-
program/final-renewable-fuels-standards-rule-2023 -2024-and-2025.
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
Energy Security: EPA makes the specious assertion that the energy security benefits of the
rule will include, ".. .reductions in energy security externalities caused by U.S. petroleum
consumption and imports..." p. 29199 Given the huge supply of American oil and the fact that
the United States is the number one oil producer in the world, EPA strains its credibility by
justifying the proposed rule in such a way. Unlike the ICEV fleet with its majority consumption
of American oil, EV batteries are sourced from minerals largely mined unsustainably in China
and Africa, as are the minerals required for wind turbines and solar panels. Further, the U.S.
lacks copper and aluminum smelting capacity required to expand the grid and it takes years to
develop new mines. Without expansion, the grid is susceptible to reliability issues. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 4]
EPA's cost-benefit analysis regarding energy security is troublesome, finding that the
proposed rule delivers $21 billion to $42 billion in energy security benefits from reduced oil
imports, but ignoring the security implications of the huge foreign mineral needs arising from the
proposed rule. With huge domestic reserves of oil and the fact that Canada is the primary
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exporter to the United States, our country enjoys an energy security benefit in terms of oil. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 4]
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
As EPA notes in the proposed rule, the light- and medium-duty GHG standards would reduce
U.S. oil imports by 2.3 million barrels per day in 2055, meaning American consumers would be
more insulated from foreign geopolitical turmoil and associated oil price volatility.87 Finalizing
more stringent standards than Alternative One would reduce U.S. oil imports by more than 2.5
million barrels per day in 2055. Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody's has noted that fossil
fuels were a major cause of every period of inflation since World War II. "Every recession since
World War II has been preceded by a jump in oil prices."88 As discussed further below,
reducing exposure to such volatility that affects the transportation of goods, people and services,
electrification can stabilize costs as these are often heavily affected by transportation fuel
costs.89 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 19]
87 See 88 FR 29388 (May 5, 2023)
88 "Fight climate change. End fossilflation. Here's how," Vox, (August 12, 2022)
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2022/8/12/23290488/fight-climate-change-end-fossil-fuel-
inflation
89 'Energy Price Stability: The Peril of Fossil Fuels and the Promise of Renewables,' Roosevelt Institute,
(2022) https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/05/RI_Energy PriceStability_IssueBrief_202205.pdf
With the price of oil subject to a wide range of economic, geopolitical, and operational
factors, Evs help protect consumers from rapid fuel price spikes. As shown in Figure 4 below,
Evs are not only cheaper to drive per mile but their fuel costs are more consistent and predictable
compared to similar ICEVs. Electricity prices tend to be less volatile and subject to fewer supply
shocks than oil prices. 108 Even when sourcing petroleum domestically, disturbances can have
dramatic price consequences. For example, on December 24, 2022, Suncor shut down its
103,000-barrel per day (bpd) oil refinery in Commerce City, Colorado, just outside of Denver.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 22-23]
Suncor announced that extreme cold weather earlier in the month had damaged equipment
and that the repairs would require a full shutdown of the facility and delay operations until the
end of the first quarter of 2023. By February 2023 gasoline prices in the Rocky Mountain region
had increased by 51%, considerably higher than the 9% national average. 109 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0638, pp. 22-23]
108 Id. At footnote 89
109 "Colorado refinery outage is causing higher gasoline prices in Rocky Mountain region," U.S. Energy
Information Administration, (February 28, 2023) https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php
[See original comment for Figure 4: A comparison of operating costs for electric and gas-
powered vehicles from March 2022 to March 2023.] 110 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp.
22-23]
110 "Electric vehicles are far cheaper to drive than gas-powered cars," ZETA, (March 2023)
https://8829857.fsl.hubspotusercontent-nal.net/hubfs/8829857/ZETA-
EV%20vs.%20Gas%20Report_V4.pdf
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Reliance on petroleum for light- and medium-duty vehicles also exposes American
consumers' wallets to geopolitical instability. The February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
resulted in rapid, significant spikes in the price of crude oil, which contributes about half the cost
of finished gasoline. 111 In June 2023, Saudi Arabia announced it would cut oil production by 1
million bpd, pushing up oil prices in the short term and causing them to be projected to remain
high through at least summer 2023.112 This will ultimately result in higher prices for gasoline in
the US per oil analysts at Rystad Energy who believe gas will become marginally more
expensive for consumers. In addition to Saudi Arabia, other members of OPEC agreed on recent
surprise cuts in oil production, adding to the ultimate uncertainty for consumers that relying on
oil provides. 113 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 23-24]
111 "Yes, Russia's War on Ukraine Did Raise the Price of Gasoline," Cato Institute, (April 6, 2022)
https://www.cato.org/blog/yes-russias-war-ukraine-did-raise-price-gasoline-0
112 "Saudi Arabia is slashing oil supply. It could mean higher gas prices for US drivers," Associated Press,
(June 4, 2023) https://apnews.com/article/opec-oil-prices-saudi-arabia-russia-
8d70999cb8258aebc3edbfdfcae278b7
113 Id. At footnote 112
Americans are at the mercy of these decisions with the reliance of ICEVs. The shift to Evs is a
hedge against this price volatility and will bring stability to the cost of transportation in the U.S.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 23-24]
As EPA accurately notes in the proposed rule, there is an important distinction between
energy security and mineral security. Utilization of critical minerals is inherently different from
the utilization of petroleum, in that petroleum is consumed as a fuel while minerals become a
component of manufactured vehicles. Supply disruptions and fluctuating prices for critical
minerals are felt differently and by different parties as opposed to petroleum which has an
immediate impact on consumers through higher fuel prices, as discussed in section 3(b) of these
comments. In contrast, supply disruptions or price fluctuations of minerals affect only the
production and price of new vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 33]
Moreover, critical minerals are not a single commodity but a number of distinct commodities,
each having its own supply and demand dynamics, and some being capable of substitution by
other minerals. Further, while petroleum is consumed as a fuel and thus requires continuous
supply, minerals become part of the vehicle and have the potential to be recovered and recycled,
as discussed further in section 8(b)(ii) of these comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p.
33]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Some commenters (Electrification Coalition, Zero Emission Transportation Association,
Institute for Policy Integrity, Environmental and Public Health Organizations, California Air
Resources Board) claimed that the proposed rule will improve the U.S.'s energy security and
independence position by resulting in an increase in the use of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs).
According to two commenters (Institute for Policy Integrity, Environmental and Public Health
Organizations), PEVs are cheaper to drive per mile than light- and medium-duty vehicles
(LMDVs) that use petroleum-derived fuels such as gasoline. Also, according to the same
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commenters, electricity prices are more stable and are not subject to as much price volatility as
oil-derived petroleum products such as gasoline. Finally, the same two commenters suggested
that the electricity to power PEVs will likely be domestically produced. Since electricity used to
power the PEVs will be produced in the U.S., the wider use of PEVs would move the U.S. to the
goal of energy independence, the commenters claimed. In contrast, according to these
commenters, the global oil market is subject to price volatility and price instability, which
reduces the U.S.'s energy security.
Response:
EPA believes that the wider use of electricity in light- and medium-duty vehicles will increase
the U.S.'s energy security and independence by reducing the U.S.'s petroleum consumption and
imports. A reduction of U.S. petroleum consumption and imports reduces both financial and
strategic risks caused by potential sudden disruptions in the supply of imported petroleum to the
U.S., thus increasing the U.S.'s energy security. We agree with the commenters that electricity is
generally a more affordable fuel for powering light- and medium-duty vehicles compared to
petroleum-derived fuels. See Chapter 10, Section 10.3.1, of the RIA for more discussion on this
topic. Also, electricity prices have been less volatile than petroleum-derived fuels used to power
light- and medium-duty vehicles. See Chapter 10, Section 10.3.2, of the RIA for more discussion
on this topic. Since it is anticipated that the electricity to power LMDVs will be produced in the
U.S., the wider use of PEVs will likely increase the U.S.'s energy independence. See Chapter 10,
Section 10.3.3, of the RIA for more discussion on this topic.
Summary:
Some commenters (Valero, Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association, Fuel Freedom
Foundation, Pearson Fuels, Missouri Corn Growers Association, Plains All American Pipeline,
L.P.) suggested that since this proposed rule focuses on the promotion the wider use of PEVs,
that the demand for renewable fuels will be reduced. These commenters suggested that EPA
should instead focus upon achieving U.S. energy security and independence objectives with
increasing use of renewable fuels and, more specifically, flexible-fueled vehicles/higher ethanol
blends and the greater use of renewable diesel fuel. One result of this proposed rule, according to
one commenter (Valero), is that it would be more difficult to meet the renewable fuel mandates
of the Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS). When the U.S. Congress passed the RFS, one goal of
the RFS was to promote U.S. energy security and energy independence. Thus, according to this
commenter, the proposed rule is at odds with the Congressional intent of the RFS requiring
renewable fuels to achieve energy security and independence objectives.
Response:
As explained in preamble Section V, EPA is setting the final LMDV GHG standards under
our CAA section 202(a)(l)-(2) authority. EPA also evaluated the impacts of the final LDMV
GHG standards on energy, in terms of oil conservation and energy security through reductions in
fuel consumption. EPA considers this final rule to be beneficial from an energy security
perspective and thus this factor was considered to be a supportive and not constraining
consideration.
EPA agrees with the commenters that use of renewable fuels can further the U.S.'s energy
security and energy independence since use of those fuels results in reduced consumption and
reduced U.S. net imports of petroleum, but the use of renewable fuels are not the only available
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or appropriate strategies for reducing demand for petroleum-based fuels. A reduction of U.S.
petroleum consumption and imports reduces both financial and strategic risks caused by potential
sudden disruptions in the supply of imported petroleum to the U.S., thus increasing the U.S.'s
energy security. EPA responds to issues about flexible-fueled vehicles in RTC Section 26. In
addition, the wider use of renewable fuels increases the U.S.'s energy independence, since the
renewable fuels used to meet the RFS requirements are expected to be almost exclusively
produced in the U.S. We also note that renewable fuels also may have some energy security
risks, for example, as a result of weather-related events (e.g., droughts that limit crop production
used to make biofuels). As discussed further below, we view this rule and the recently finalized
RFS rule as complementary strategies in promoting the U.S.'s energy security.
All energy sources, including petroleum-based fuels and renewable biomass-based fuels, have
associated potential energy security risks that depend on their domestic availability, price
volatility, and the regionality and global integration of their markets and associated
vulnerabilities to market disruption events. However, EPA is aware of robust quantitative
methods for estimating the energy security benefits of reductions in petroleum use only; we are
not aware of any published estimates of the energy security risks associated with increased use of
either electricity or renewable fuels. Thus, in this final rule we are not able to quantify any
potential energy security risks associated with use of non-petroleum-based fuels in our method of
estimating energy security impacts. In general, however, we consider the energy security risks
of these fuels to be lower because they are less likely to have supply disruptions and include a
diversity of energy sources.680
Additionally, EPA disagrees with the commenter regarding their claims on the interaction of
this final rule with the RFS program. First, as we explain further in RTC Section 2, Congress
specifically determined that the RFS provisions do not limit EPA's authority to regulate GHGs
under any other provision of the Clean Air Act, including section 202(a)(1).681 Second, the
recently finalized RFS Set Rule, which established the highest RFS volumes in the history of the
program, and the final LMDV GHG rule are complementary in achieving GHG reductions in the
U.S. transportation sector. The RFS Set rule is relevant to renewable fuel volumes in the 2023-
2025 timeframe, and this final rule sets GHG emissions standards for LMDV vehicles in the
2027-2032 timeframe. As a result, the RFS Set rule and the LMDV GHG rule's GHG emissions
standards do not have overlapping timeframes. Finally, any impacts of the increasing use of
advanced vehicle technologies, including EV technologies, in U.S. vehicle fleets on renewable
fuel volumes can be taken into consideration in future RFS rules under the RFS program. Both
680 Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program: Standards for 2023-2025 and Other Changes. Federal Register /
Volume 88, No. 132 / Wednesday, July 12, 2023.
681 Notwithstanding the savings clause noted above, to the extent the RFS statute is of any relevance, we think it
clearly is consistent with this rulemaking. For years after 2022, Congress authorized the Administrator to establish
the standards based on his analysis of various factors. Congress mandated only a single numeric floor for renewable
fuel use: the requirement that the minimum volume of biomass-based diesel (BBD) be not less than one billion
gallons, CAA section 21 l(o)(2)(B)(v). This requirement can be met by BBD used in any kind of transportation fuel,
including fuel used in motor vehicles, nonroad vehicles, jet fuel, and home heating oil. The commenters did not
explain with any specificity how the proposed standards would be an impediment to meeting the one-billion-gallon
statutory floor for BBD.
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programs, vehicle standards and renewable fuel standards, support meeting our nation's GHG
goals.
Summary:
One commenter (American Enterprise Institute) suggested that EPA's energy security
analysis in this rule was inaccurate because it focuses on the level or proportion of U.S. oil
imports, not changes in U.S. consumption. According to the commenter, there is only "one world
price" for oil that influences every country in the world, so it is U.S consumption levels, and not
U.S. imports, that influences the U.S.'s energy security. Since oil price shocks are transmitted
globally, according to the commenter, countries that consume oil cannot be shielded from the
change in world oil prices when world oil supply disruptions occur. Also, private markets are
capable of anticipating oil supply disruptions and minimizing the disruption impacts. Thus, the
energy security benefits estimated in this proposed rule are "illusory".
Response:
This final rule is anticipated to simultaneously reduce both U.S. oil consumption and U.S. net
oil imports. Using the AEO 2023 with updated refinery throughput assumptions for this final
rule, EPA estimates that approximately 94.8 percent of the change in fuel consumption resulting
from these final standards will be reflected in reduced U.S. net oil imports. Reductions in U.S.
product demand (i.e., gasoline and diesel fuels) and, in turn, reductions in U.S. net oil imports
stemming from this final rule rebalance the pattern of oil supplies being produced worldwide,
reducing the quantity of oil produced in countries that are likely to experience oil supply
disruptions over the analytical timeframe of this final rule, 2027-2055. From this perspective, the
impacts of any future world oil supply disruptions are lessened.
The ORNL oil security premium methodology acknowledges the availability of private
market mechanisms that allow the U.S. economy to anticipate and prepare for oil supply
disruptions. However, those private market mechanisms lead to less investment in insurance
protection (through private stockholding, hedging in oil futures markets, investment in energy
conservation etc) than would be socially optimal because private individuals generally only
protect themselves from the economic costs they expect to bear directly. Private individuals do
not necessarily take into account the external and non-market consequences of their oil
production or consumption activities. As a result, market mechanisms mitigate, but do not
eliminate, oil supply disruption costs to the U.S. economy. Thus, reductions in both U.S. oil
consumption and net oil imports improve the U.S.'s energy security position.
Summary:
Two commenters (Electrification Coalition, Environmental and Public Health Organizations)
asserted that the U.S. spends a considerable amount of its national defense budget to protect
access to oil in regions of the world (i.e., the Middle East) which have significant oil supply
disruption risks. If the U.S. could shift to the wider use of electricity to power light- and
medium-duty vehicles and away from oil, these defense costs would be lower, which would be a
benefit to the U.S. Another commenter (American Enterprise Institute) suggested that changes in
military costs to secure oil from unstable parts of the world should not be counted as a benefit for
this rule. According to this commenter, estimating the U.S. effort of providing defense for
overseas sea lanes for oil shipments is a hugely complex analytical calculation, which cannot be
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reasonably calculated. Thus, according to this commenter, military cost savings from reduced
U.S. oil use as a result of this proposed rule should be left unquantified.
Response:
We agree that the U.S. likely incurs defense costs in maintaining access to oil from regions of
the world that have significant oil supply risks such as the Middle East. For this final rule, we are
not quantifying avoided defense costs from decreased consumption of oil used in the U.S.
transportation sector, which would be a benefit to the U.S. There is an ongoing literature on the
measurement of this component of energy security, but methodological and measurement issues
- attribution and incremental analysis - pose two significant challenges to providing a robust
estimate of this component of energy security. The attribution challenge is to determine which
military programs and expenditures can properly be attributed to oil supply protection, rather
than some other objective (i.e., other strategic/geopolitical concerns). The incremental challenge
is to estimate how much the petroleum supply protection costs might vary if U.S. oil use were to
be reduced, but not eliminated. EPA has not been able to identify a robust methodology to
quantify the U.S. military costs of securing overseas oil. Thus, our analysis for this final rule
leaves this benefit, avoided military costs with reductions in U.S. oil imports, unquantified. From
this perspective, the monetized energy security benefits presented in the RIA are conservative.
Summary:
One commenter (Environmental and Public Health Organizations) supported the use of the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) energy security methodology being used by EPA to
estimate the oil security premiums in the proposed LMDV rule. Another commenter (American
Petroleum Institute) raised concerns that the ORNL oil security premium estimates that EPA is
using in this proposed LMDV GHG rule are too high. According to this commenter, the
estimated energy security benefits of the proposed rule are overstated and not meaningful. This
commenter suggested that the energy security methodology developed by ORNL and entitled,
Estimating the Energy Security Benefits of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports (2008), is outdated and no
longer applicable to the current structure of global oil markets.682 When the oil security model
methodology was developed, net U.S. crude oil and product imports were roughly 50 percent of
U.S. petroleum consumption, according to the commenter. Currently, the U.S. is, and projected
to continue to be, a net crude oil and product exporter. Another commenter (Heritage
Foundation) suggested that EPA's energy security methodology ignores that the U.S. is an oil-
exporting country, rather than an oil-importing country. For this reason, according to this
commenter, the stated energy security benefits are likely costs, rather than benefits. Another
commenter (Western Energy Alliance) suggested that since the U.S. is a large supplier of oil, that
the final rule would not result in energy security benefits.
Response:
Several of the commenters (American Petroleum Institute, Heritage Foundation, Western
Energy Alliance) fundamentally misunderstand the ORNL model as well as how EPA is
applying it in this final rule. The ORNL model is a flexible economic model that allows for
changes in input parameters to account for the kinds of changes the commenters are describing.
Specifically, the ORNL model accounts for the fact that the U.S. is a net crude oil and refined
682 Leiby, P., Estimating the Energy Security Benefits of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports: Final Report. March 2008. Oak
Ridge National Laboratory. ORNL/TM-2007/028.
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product exporter, which reduces the oil security premium estimates used in both the proposal and
final rule. The ORNL model also accounts for other key changes, such as oil price
responsiveness and U.S. GDP sensitivity, to accurately model oil security premiums and energy
security benefits. We further explain each of these points below.
The ORNL energy security model used to estimate oil security premiums in this final rule is
structurally the same as the version of the model described in the 2008 documentation cited by
one commenter. The ORNL energy security methodology calculates oil security premiums based
upon the macroeconomic disruption/adjustment import costs, which are numerically estimated
with a compact model of the oil market by performing simulations of market outcomes using
probabilistic distributions for the occurrence of oil supply shocks, calculating marginal changes
in economic welfare with respect to changes in U.S. oil import levels in each of the simulations,
and summarizing the results from the individual simulations into a mean and 90 percent
confidence intervals for the oil security premium estimates. The macroeconomic
disruption/adjustment import cost component is the sum of two parts: the marginal change in
expected import costs during disruption events and the marginal change in gross domestic
product due to the macroeconomic disruption of an oil supply shock. While the U.S. is a net
exporter of crude oil and refined products and a large producer of oil, the U.S. economy is also a
large consumer of oil. When there is an oil supply disruption in the world, the supply disruption
results in a loss of economic output in the U.S., measured in terms of a loss in U.S. gross
domestic product (GDP). From this perspective, since this rule reduces U.S. oil consumption and
U.S. oil imports, EPA believes that there are energy security benefits associated with the rule.
The ORNL energy security model was peer reviewed in March 2008 before it was utilized in
EPA rules.683 EPA's use of the ORNL energy security model underwent public comment and
review in the in the LDV GHG rule (2012-2016) in 2010.684 While the ORNL model structure is
unchanged since 2010, ORNL has regularly updated data and other quantitative inputs to the
model to account for new and emerging oil market trends. ORNL estimates revised oil security
premiums based upon the most recent Annual Energy Outlooks (AEOs) used in support of each
of the LDV rulemakings undertaken by EPA. As the U.S. has gone from a net importer to a net
crude oil and refined product exporter, the oil security premiums have steadily declined over the
timeframe of the different EPA LDV rules, in part, due to evolving oil market trends. The value
of the oil security premium remains positive because of its GDP disruption cost premium
component. It continues to hold that a reduction in U.S. imports results in a lower amount of "at
risk" oil supply susceptible to disruption and mitigates the price increase during a supply shock
and the resulting GDP losses. Moreover, a decrease in oil imports partly results in a decrease in
consumption, and the GDP losses with respect to the disrupted oil price decrease with reductions
in the level of oil consumption.
In addition, two key parameters that influence the size of the impacts of oil supply disruptions
on U.S. GDP have been updated since the ORNL model was used in the EPA's LDV GHG rule
683 Transmittal of the Peer Review Document and Peer Review Comments Document, both in support of the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory Report, "Estimating the Benefits of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports'", March 2008. ORNL/TM-
2007/2008.
684 Joint Technical Support Document, Final Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards. EPA-420-R-10-901. April 2010.
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(2012-2016) in 2010.685 The first parameter updated is the oil price responsiveness (i.e., the
short-run price elasticity of demand for oil). In the LDV GHG rule (2012-2016), EPA used a
short-run price elasticity of demand for oil of -0.045. In this current proposed and final LMDV
GHG rule (2027-2032), we are using a short-run elasticity of demand for oil of -0.07, a 56
percent increase (in absolute value). The effect of the increase in the short-run price elasticity of
demand is to lower the impacts of an oil price shock on U.S. GDP. It is thought that consumers
of oil in the U.S. are likely to be more responsive and consume less oil when the price of oil rises
than previously estimated in the older version of the ORNL model.
The second parameter that has been updated is the U.S. GDP sensitivity (i.e., the elasticity of
GDP to an oil price shock). This parameter has been updated to be more inelastic, i.e., there is
less sensitivity of U.S. GDP to an oil price shock. In other words, for a given oil price shock,
there will be a smaller loss of U.S. GDP. In the LDV GHG rule (2012-2016), EPA used an
elasticity of U.S. GDP to an oil shock of-0.032.686 For the current proposed and final light- and
medium-duty GHG rule (2027-2032), we are using an elasticity of U.S. GDP with respect to an
oil price shock of-0.021, a 34 percent reduction (in absolute value). The paper by Oladosu et al.,
Impacts of oil price shocks on the U.S. economy: a meta-analysis of oil price elasticity of GDP for
net oil-importing economies, provides the basis for the updated GDP elasticity.687 Thus, for an
equivalent oil price shock, there will be less adverse impacts on the U.S. economy than with the
older version of the ORNL model.
A variety of factors that have occurred over the last decade are thought to have reduced the
impacts of oil shocks on the U.S. economy. First, the U.S. is less dependent on imported oil than
in the early 2000s due in part to the 'Tracking revolution" (i.e., increased U.S. production of
tight/shale oil), and to a lesser extent, increased U.S. production of renewable fuels such as
ethanol and biodiesel. As one commenter notes, the increase in U.S. tight oil production and the
resulting expansion of the U.S.'s net oil export position over roughly the last decade, has resulted
in less of a wealth transfer from the U.S. to foreigners during an oil price shock, lowering the oil
security premium. In addition, it is thought that the U.S. economy is more resilient to oil shocks
than in the earlier 2000s timeframe because of increased global financial integration and greater
flexibility of the U.S. economy (especially labor and financial markets).
In summary, EPA believes that the ORNL model has been updated for this proposed and final
rule to account for concerns raised by several of the commenters (American Petroleum Institute,
Heritage Foundation, Western Energy Alliance). Even though the U.S. is a net oil exporter, EPA
believes that there are energy security benefits, not costs, associated with the rule. EPA agrees
with one of the commenters (Environmental and Public Health Organizations) that the ORNL
model provides reasonable energy security benefits estimates of this final rule.
Summary:
One commenter (Institute for Policy Integrity) suggested that EPA should update the own-
price elasticity of demand for oil in its energy security analysis to account for increased
electrification over time. According to the commenter, EPA used an own-price elasticity of
685Ibid.
686 Ibid.
687 Oladosu et al., Impacts of oil price shocks on the U.S. economy: a meta-analysis of oil price elasticity of GDP for
net oil-importing economies, Energy Policy, 2018.
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demand for oil of -0.07 - meaning that oil sales only marginally decline when oil prices increase,
reflecting the fact that oil cannot be easily substituted with other fuels. But in the future, as
electric vehicles become more widely adopted, this is likely to change as electricity becomes
more easily substitutable for oil.
Response:
We agree with the commenter that the own-price elasticity of demand for oil could change
with increasing penetration of electric vehicles over the timeframe of this final rule, 2027-2055.
Increased substitution between oil and electricity would likely first occur in multi-vehicle
households that have both an electric and a gasoline-powered vehicle. But there could also be
substitution of electricity for oil in the household purchase decision when choosing between
buying an electric or a gasoline-powered vehicle. A higher own-price elasticity of demand for oil
would lower the oil security premiums and the energy security benefits of this final rule. We are
unaware of any study to date that has addressed this issue, how the own-price elasticity of
demand for oil could change with the wider use of electric vehicles. It is a topic for further,
future research in our view. Thus, EPA does not consider it appropriate to adjust its quantitative
estimates of the energy security benefits of this final rule based upon changes in the own price
elasticity of demand for oil with greater electric vehicle usage in the timeframe of this final rule.
Summary:
One commenter (Valero) suggested that EPA should consider cybersecurity threats associated
with PEV charging infrastructure as part of its energy security analysis of this rule.
Response:
Cybersecurity threats are an increasing concern for all types of energy infrastructure in the
U.S including oil and natural gas pipelines, electric transmission lines, electric vehicle supply
equipment and PEV charging infrastructure. Currently, the magnitude and frequency of the
disruption risks associated with cybersecurity threats to the U.S.'s PEV charging infrastructure is
not well characterized. Until a better characterization of PEV charging infrastructure
cybersecurity risks is developed, it is not possible to quantify the energy security impacts of this
type of risk. The same is true for cybersecurity risks associated with petroleum production and
distribution infrastructure, which EPA is also not quantifying in this rule. Further study is needed
on this topic before it can be systematically included in EPA's energy security analysis of its
GHG vehicle rules.
Summary:
One commenter (Clean Fuels Development Coalition et al.) suggested that the proposed rule
does not address the U.S. energy security impacts of the greater use of natural gas in the U.S.
electricity sector stemming from the wider use of PEVs from this proposed rule.
Response:
As discussed in Chapter 5.2 of the RIA, EPA used the IPM model to assess the impacts of this
rule on U.S. electricity generation. In the IPM modeling, natural gas use for electricity generation
declines by roughly 52 percent between 2028 and 2050 in the reference (no action) case, and 48
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percent in the central case representing the standards in the final rule.688 In other words, over the
timeframe assessed in this rule and in either scenario, use of natural gas for electricity generation
is projected to decline substantially in both absolute and relative terms.
The United States has been the world's largest producer of natural gas since 2011 and is a
substantial net exporter of natural gas.689'690 Proven U.S. reserves of natural gas substantially
exceed projected U.S. demand in the coming decades, and are not expected to be a constraint on
the ability of U.S. production to meet the marginally larger natural gas demand for electricity
generation estimated to result from these standards in the IPM analysis.691
The IPM analysis does not provide estimated impacts of the rule on U.S. trade of natural gas,
and specific quantitative estimates of this potential effect were not readily available for our
analysis of this rule. While the magnitude of the effect of the final rule on natural gas trade
remains uncertain without additional energy sector modeling specific to the reference case (no
action) and central case, some insight can be drawn from considering differences in natural gas
use and trade in different Annual Energy Outlook scenarios. When we consider the difference in
consumption and net imports of natural gas between the AEO 2023 Reference and Low
Economic Growth cases - the two cases compared in EPA's methodology for estimating its oil
import reduction factor (see RIA section 10.4.1) - we calculate that cumulative differences in net
imports (i.e., reduced net exports) account for only 18 percent of the cumulative difference in
U.S. consumption of natural gas over the time period covered by the AEO (2022-2050).692 In
other words, a significant portion - more than 80 percent - of marginal increases in U.S. demand
for natural gas demand may be expected to be met by increased domestic production.
While the effect of this rule on trade of natural gas is uncertain, based on the current domestic
production, exports, proven reserves, the projected decline in natural gas as a proportion of
overall U.S. electricity generation, and trends seen in AEO cases discussed above, we expect that
any increase in net imports of natural gas (i.e., decrease in net exports) will be relatively small,
on an energy equivalent basis, compared to the size of reduced U.S. net oil imports expected to
result from this final rule. Additionally, we are not aware of, nor has the commenter provided, a
methodology sufficient to quantify the energy security risks associated with trade of natural gas.
We note that natural gas markets are more regionally distinct than oil markets, meaning prices
and potential disruptions of natural gas markets outside of North America, are less correlated
688 Because of the lead times necessary to complete our IPM modeling for the final rulemaking analysis, it was
necessary to run IPM on interim versions of the reference and policy cases which we expect overestimate the impact
of the final standards on energy demand. Therefore, these estimates of increased use of natural gas should be
considered conservative; an updated IPM analysis aligned with the final standards would be expected to show a
decline in natural gas use for electricity generation from 2028 to 2050 somewhere between 48 percent and 52
percent. The IPM modelling done for this final rule is described in RIA section 5.2.
689 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). "Dry Natural Gas Production: International." Accessed January
23, 2024. Available online: https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/natural-gas/drv-natural-gas-production.
690 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). "Natural gas explained: Natural gas imports and exports." Last
updated June 30, 2023. Available online: https://www.eia.gov/energvexplained/natural-gas/imports-and-exports.php
691 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). "U.S. Crude Oil and Natural Gas Proved Reserves, Year-end
2021." December 30, 2022. Available online: https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves/
692 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). "Annual Energy Outlook 2023". March 16, 2023. Available
online: https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/
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with price impacts on U.S. consumers.693 Thus, while we are not aware of existing estimates of
probabilities of disruptions of North American natural gas supply - a necessary component of
any extension of EPA's oil security premium methodology to natural gas - one might expect the
probabilities of significant global events impacting U.S. natural gas supply to be smaller than the
existing estimates for globally integrated oil markets. Lower disruption probabilities, all else
equal, would result in lower potential energy security premia. In summary, while we are not able
to quantify the potential energy security risks associated with an increased use of natural gas for
electricity generation, for the reasons above, we believe these impacts would be relatively
modest when compared with the energy security impacts of decreased use and net U.S. imports
of petroleum.
Summary:
One commenter (American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers) suggested that EPA's
energy security analysis of the proposed rule does not account for the fact that there will likely
be petroleum refinery closures in the U.S. According to the commenter, petroleum refinery
closures in the U.S., in turn, will likely have an adverse impact on the supply of petroleum-
derived fuels that are necessary for U.S. military operations and readiness. The availability of
refined oil products for U.S. military use is an energy security issue.
Response:
EPA has updated its estimates of the impacts of this final rule on U.S. refinery output. Based
upon comments EPA received on the proposed rule and in consultation with DOE and NHTSA,
EPA is estimating that U.S. refineries will operate at higher production levels in this final rule.
Given a reduction in U.S. refined fuel demand as a result of this final rule, U.S. refinery output
will account for half (50 percent) of that reduced demand, while reduced U.S. net imports (i.e.,
increases in refined product exports) will account for the other half (50 percent) of that reduced
demand. Using the AEO 2023 with updated refinery throughput assumptions for this final rule,
EPA estimates that approximately 94.8 percent of the change in fuel consumption resulting from
these final standards will be reflected in reduced U.S. net oil imports. See Chapter 8 of the RIA
for more discussion on this topic.
Under the central case, manufacturers choose to comply with the final rule principally by
producing more PEVs, and their operation is associated with a gradual, but steady reduction in
the demand for petroleum-derived fuels from light- and medium-duty vehicles in the U.S.
through the timeframe of analysis for this final rule, 2027-2055. Yet there is still anticipated to
be significant, ongoing need for petroleum-derived fuels in the U.S. through 2055. Sources of
petroleum-derived fuel demand in the U.S. include: new and existing gasoline and diesel
powered light- and medium-duty vehicles, heavy-duty vehicles, nonroad equipment, and fuels
for use in the aviation sector of the U.S. economy. Given the significant, future demand for
petroleum-derived fuels in the U.S., it is not likely that there will be closures of U.S. refineries
due to this final rule. In any case, it is widely expected that there will be sufficient U.S. refinery
capacity to supply fully anticipated petroleum-derived fuels for U.S. military purposes through
2055. Also, EPA has not seen any economic study that suggests that its GHG vehicle rules will
result in refinery shutdowns in the U.S.
693 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). "Natural gas markets remain regionalized compared with oil
markets." April 29, 2020. Available online: https://www.eia.gov/todavinenergy/detail.php?id=43535
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Summary:
According to this commenter (American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers),
EPA's energy security analysis of the proposed rule inaccurately characterized the U.S. oil
industry's energy security situation. EPA's energy security analysis ignored that a significant
percentage of total crude oil consumed in the U.S. is produced in the U.S. and a significant
percentage of U.S. oil imports are from Canada. Also, the EPA analysis ignored the significant
pipeline connectivity between the U.S. and Canada. Further, many U.S. oil refineries require
heavy crude oils, which are likely to be imported from Canada. According to the commenter,
reduced demand for petroleum-derived fuels will impact U.S. oil producers as much, if not more,
than the U.S.'s existing oil trading partners.
Response:
EPA is in general agreement with the commenter's characterization of the U.S. oil industry
and the links between the U.S. and Canadian oil supply industries. EPA's energy security
analysis stems from the characteristics of the global oil market. Oil is bought and sold in a world
market and there are periodic oil supply disruptions typically from foreign (i.e., non-North
American) oil producers. Also, oil exporters with a large share of global production have the
ability to raise or lower the price of oil by exerting the market power associated with the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to alter oil supply relative to demand.
World oil price instability and volatility are a result of these features of the global oil market.
EPA estimates that this final rule will reduce both U.S. oil consumption and U.S. net oil
imports. For the final rule, using the AEO 2023 and updated refinery throughput assumptions,
EPA estimates that approximately 94.8 percent of the change in fuel consumption resulting from
these final standards is likely to be reflected in reduced U.S. net imports of crude oil and refined
products over the timeframe of the analysis of this final rule, 2027-2055. See Chapter 8 of the
RIA for more discussion on this topic. Reductions in U.S. oil demand and U.S. oil imports as a
result of the final rule rebalance the pattern of oil supplies being produced worldwide, reducing
the quantity of oil produced in countries that are likely to experience oil supply disruptions. This
in turn mitigates oil supply disruptions and associated price shocks that affect the world market,
including U.S. oil consumption, resulting in energy security benefits for the U.S. From this
perspective, the impacts on the U.S. economy of any future world oil supply disruptions are
lessened. Thus, the final rule provides energy security benefits to the U.S., even when the U.S.
and North American oil supplies are relatively integrated and secure.
Summary:
Many commenters (Valero, Delk U.S. Holdings, Missouri Corn Growers Association,
Western Energy Alliance, Plains All American Pipeline, L.P.) suggested that while EPA focuses
on the energy security benefits of reduced dependence on U.S. oil imports, EPA failed to address
the energy security threats of the U.S.'s increasing dependence on imports of critical minerals
and PEV battery supply chains. One commenter (Zero Emission Transportation Association)
agreed with EPA that the issues of energy security and mineral security are distinct and should
be addressed separately.
Response:
For this final rule, EPA distinguishes between energy security and critical minerals, mineral
security and security issues associated with the importation of PEV batteries and component
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parts. Energy security focuses on the impacts of the use of different fuels by light- and medium-
duty vehicles, such as electricity and gasoline, on the U.S.'s energy security position. Critical
minerals/mineral security, on the other hand, involves the risks associated with the reliance on
different minerals used in the manufacturing and ultimate sale of the batteries in electric
vehicles. Importation of PEV batteries and their component parts is an additional security issue
that is associated with this final light- and medium-duty vehicle GHG rule. EPA addresses
comments on the energy security impacts of this rule in this Section, Section 21, of this Response
to Comment document. Critical minerals/mineral security/PEV supply chain issues are addressed
in Section 15 of the Response to Comment document. We agree with Zero Emission
Transportation Association that energy security and mineral security are two distinct issues that
should be addressed separately.
22 - Vehicle safety
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
In the past, customers who sought greater vehicle utility or higher performance did so through
selection of optional engines with greater displacement. However, industry, driven in part by
GHG and fuel economy regulations, has developed entire families of downsized engines that
have proven capable of meeting customer demands for power while simultaneously increasing
efficiency and lowering GHG emissions. This is exactly the strategy that EPA previously
identified as the technological pathway to meeting increasingly stringent GHG emissions
regulations while maintaining existing performance levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p.
183]
Enrichment is a critical strategy that has enabled this technological shift to lower
displacement engines, ensuring their safe and durable operation in transient high-power demand
situations. Manufacturers use enrichment to ensure that when customers demand high power,
they can do so without the risk of costly damage or interrupted performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, p. 183]
Customer needs for power include, but are not limited to, the ability to tow a large trailer up
an occasional steep grade, to operate the vehicle with a full load of passengers and cargo, and to
rapidly accelerate on a short freeway entrance ramp to safely merge into traffic. Other customers,
for example those purchasing supercars, expect superior performance and racetrack i. In each
case, the power requirement from the engine depends on the customer's usage, and if its
"sufficient power" is inadequate to accomplish their task, then the customer may be exposed to
potentially unsafe and inadequate operation and will be dissatisfied with their vehicle's utility. A
sudden reduction or interruption of power in the midst of a driving maneuver (e.g., passing on a
grade) could be disruptive to the driver and confusing to other drivers. In some cases, this may
create an unsafe traffic condition if the vehicle suddenly loses power, forcing other drivers to
take evasive actions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 183]
Customers who seek specific power levels and are dissatisfied with the reduced power of
downsized engines due to prohibitions on enrichment would likely revert to seeking out higher
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displacement engines or shift into larger vehicle segments. Worse yet, customers may simply
reject new offerings and remain in older vehicles longer, further increasing the rising average age
of vehicles on the road and delaying rollouts of other technologies. Any of these outcomes would
detract from achieving the agency's overall goals of reduced emissions and improved fuel
economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, p. 183]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
Beyond critical minerals, the United States lacks adequate infrastructure for electric vehicle
charging and hydrogen refueling. Developing the necessary infrastructure would cost billions of
dollars in funding and require immediate planning and coordination. Even if enough new
charging stations could be built, the Nation's electricity grids could not currently supply them
with sufficient power. And batteries and fuel cells present an array of documented safety risks,
including spontaneous fires and explosions that have resulted in death, injuries, and extensive
property damage. All of these considerations would further stifle electric-vehicle
adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 4-5]
Finally, battery-electric vehicles implicate significant, well-documented safety concerns that
could materially impede deployment of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p.
51]
Spontaneous fires involving battery-electric vehicles have been reported across the country,
and major manufacturers have reported battery defects and issued recalls due to fire-related risks.
See Joce Sterman et al., Ignition: Sponta- neous Electric Vehicle Fires Prompt Recalls, But Some
Owners Stalled Waiting on Re- pairs, WBTV (Sept. 26, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/bddjbbw6. In
addition, the National Transportation Safety Board conducted an investigation of electric-
vehicle crashes and found that, "[i]n each case, emergency responders faced safety risks related
to electric shock, thermal runaway, battery ignition and re- ignition, and stranded energy." Safety
Risks to Emergency Responders from Lith- ium-Ion Battery Fires in Electric Vehicles, Nat'l
Transp. Safety Bd. (Nov. 13, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/4b9bw869. Electric vehicles also are
frequently heavier than conventional vehicles, and their greater weight could exacerbate injuries
in the case of an accident. See Raul Arbelaez, As Heavy Evs Proliferate, Their Weight May Be a
Drag on Safety, Ins. Inst. For Highway Safety (Mar. 9, 2023), https://tinyurl.com/txwb5wtn.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, p. 51]
EPA must consider these safety concerns as part of its feasibility analysis. See Sierra Club v.
EPA, 325 F.3d 374, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("The statute also intends the agency to consider many
factors other than pure technological ca- pability, such as costs, lead time, safety, noise and
energy."). But there is no mention of them in the proposed rule. Cf. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,387
("[T]here is strong reason to believe that BEVs are at least as safe as conventional vehicles, if not
more so." (footnote omitted)). The only material safety risk EPA even acknowledges is the
possibility that declining fuel costs will cause drivers to drive more often, resulting "in an
increase in accidents, injuries, and fatalities." Id. At 29,345. It offers no discussion of the unique
safety risks posed by electric vehicles. That omission is striking because the agency does
speculate on the unique safety benefits of such vehicles. See id. At 29,387 ("[T]he BEV
architecture often lends itself to the addition of a 'frunk' or front truck. The frunk can pro- vide
additional crush space and occupant protection in frontal or front offset impacts."); id. (claiming
that electric-vehicles have a lower center of mass, which "provides additional vehicle stability
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and could reduce the propensity for vehicle rollover"). That cursory, cherry-picked analysis is
insufficient given the safety problems that have arisen already, and the likely increase in similar
incidents if use of electric vehicles substantially increases, as the proposed rule not only
anticipates but affirmatively intends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 51-52]
The safety concerns accompanying fuel-cell vehicles are at least as serious. Hydrogen leaks
are reportedly common in fuel-cell vehicles and can lead to spontaneous combustion and
explosions. See Hao Li et al., Safety of Hydrogen Storage and Transportation, 8 Energy Reps.
6258, 6259 (May 2022). Already, catastrophic accidents have occurred in the United States and
abroad resulting in death, injury, and major property damage. See id. At 6259; see also Agnete
Klevstrand, "Explosion After Explosion," Hydrogen Insight (Feb. 7, 2023),
https://tinyurl.com/ypea2at8; Report on the June 2019 Hydrogen Explosion and Fire Incident in
Santa Clara, California, H2 Hydrogen Safety Panel, at 7 (June 2021),
https://tinyurl.com/yeyu28bj; Norway Fines Nel Units $3 Million over 2019 Blast at Hydrogen
Fuel Station, Reuters (Feb. 16, 2021), https://ti- nyurl.com/3twp99k4; CSB Releases AB
Specialty Silicones Factual Update, U.S. Chem. Safety Bd. (Dec. 18, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/yc4pyz4c; Hyunjoo Jin & Jane Chung, Hydrogen Hurdles: A Deadly Blast
Hampers South Korea's Big Fuel Cell Car Bet, Reuters (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/yx93d5c9; Luz Pena, Hydrogen Explosion Shakes Santa Clara Neighborhood,
ABC7 NEWS (June 2, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/mr3r3yxe. Manufacturers are unlikely to pro-
duce, and consumers are unlikely to buy, a vehicle technology that poses such substantial
risk. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 52-53]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
2. EPA Fails to Adequately Evaluate ZEV Safety Risks as Required by Clean Air Act
Section 202(a)(4)(B).
In setting new emissions standards, EPA must consider whether any technology used to
comply with the requirements "will cause or contribute to an unreasonable risk to public health,
welfare, or safety in its operation or function." 102 The Proposed Rule's health and safety
assessment, however, is myopically limited to the health effects of tailpipe emissions and fails to
fully account for all of the risks posed by ZEV mandates. Increased prices to the consumer
resulting from EPA's proposed rule (when purchasing a new vehicle) likely will delay the
purchase of all vehicles subject to the rule and slow fleet turnover. For example, nowhere in the
Proposal does EPA assess how slower fleet turnover impacts safety and the environment. Older
vehicles have fewer safety features and higher emissions profiles than new vehicles. Other
interested parties have raised safety issues that EPA has a duty to analyze. 103 EPA must analyze
and take comment on the safety issues associated with ZEV mandates prior to finalizing the
Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 24-25]
102 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(4)(A).
103 See, e.g., https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/12848-
lithiumionsafetyhybridslO 1217-v3-tag.pdf.
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Organization: Anonymous
See attached files. Reducing pollution and emissions is a narrative. The pictures are of lithium
mines and cobalt mines. Battery fires burn hotter and require more water than ICE fires. What
are you going to do when there's a fire in an underground parking garage where the building gets
condemned? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0627, p. 1]
[See original comment for image attachments A1 (cobalt image) and A2 (lithium image)]
Organization: Anonymous
National Bureau of Economic Research https://www.nber.org/papers/wl7170 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0562, p. 3]
We show that, controlling for own-vehicle weight, being hit by a vehicle that is 1,000 pounds
heavier results in a 47% increase in the baseline fatality probability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0562, p. 3]
https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/07/business/electric-vehicles-weight/index.html [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0562, p. 3]
The Ford F-150 Lightning will weigh about 1,600 pounds more than a similar gas-powered F-
150 truck. Similarly, the electric Volvo XC40 Recharge weighs about 1,000 pounds more than a
gas-powered Volvo XC40. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0562, p. 3]
Organization: Arconic Corporation (ARCO)
In the automotive industry, material engineers are increasingly turning to aluminum to
improve vehicle performance, fuel efficiency and to enhance battery life and driving range in
electric vehicles. Arconic's lightweight aluminum sheet and extruded solutions are found bumper
to bumper in a variety of vehicles from doors and hoods to heat exchangers and structural parts.
Aluminum sheet products are used in auto closures and body-in-white (BIW) components.
Arconic also produces proprietary heat exchanger products like multilayer brazing sheet used in
battery pack cooling systems and aluminum sheet used in truck cab structures and fuel tanks and
plate products used in trailer applications. Additionally, the company produces a range of
extruded products, including driveshafts, anti-lock brake housings, and components of turbo
chargers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, pp. 1-2]
Mass reduction utilizing advanced materials like aluminum is recognized as one of the
technology options to achieve safe, fuel-efficient and cost-effective vehicles that meet or exceed
consumer demands. As future standards are more and more reliant on Battery Electric Vehicle
(BEV) implementation, lightweighting can provide improved vehicle range or reduced battery
size for a given range and improve vehicle safety. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, pp. 1-2]
In general, Arconic urges EPA to consider a few key points as it moves to finalize this
proposed rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, p. 2]
EPA should include a fixed electric generation emission value per kWh in the
standard for calculation of vehicle emissions for battery electric vehicles (BEVs) based upon
their energy efficiency. This would provide an incentive for improved vehicle efficiency, and it
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would also allow the EPA rules to easily equate to the DOT I standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0741, p. 2]
Emissions standards should correlate with passenger and pedestrian safety
imperatives. If all BEVs are counted as zero emission, irrespective of their size and weight, there
is no incentive for vehicle manufacturers to continue seeking weight reductions that clearly
improve safety. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, p. 2]
Similarly, adding incentives for weight reduction for BEVs will correlate to
reductions in electricity use, reduced embedded emissions and reduced use of critical minerals
that can be difficult to produce in an environmentally friendly manner or recycle. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0741, p. 2]
2. Currently, a BEV version of a vehicle is 500 to 2000 pounds heavier than a
comparable ICE model depending on the battery pack size. It is reasonable to assume that the
adoption of BEVs will result in higher vehicle weights across the fleet compared to ICE vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, p. 3]
Over the past 17 years (2004-2021), the average weight increase was 178 pounds for the U.S.
new vehicle fleet. In the current fleet comprised of mainly ICE vehicles, lightweighting has been
applied predominantly in larger vehicles, which results in improved fleet crash compatibility.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, p. 3]
If the BEV share reaches 50% by 2032, the new vehicle fleet will be 500 to 800 pounds
heavier on average than the current new vehicle fleet. This is an unprecedented weight increase,
along with slightly smaller footprints. This results in reduced crash compatibility as many
heavier vehicles will be introduced into the fleet over a very short time period resulting in higher
percentages of accidents where heavier vehicles strike lighter vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0741, p. 3]
Moving the fleet to BEVs without lightweighting incentives will result in the largest weight
increases occurring in the heaviest vehicles (due to the need for larger battery packs). If all BEVs
are counted as zero emission, there is no incentive for weight reduction which will be detrimental
to safety of the fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, p. 3]
Organization: Arizona State Legislature
7. The proposed rule fails to consider safety issues. EPA does not sufficiently address the
greater fire and explosion risk from electric and hydrogen vehicles or appreciate the increased
fatality risk on impact from heavier electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 3]VII.
The proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious because it fails to consider safety issues.
EPA understands that when acting under Section 202(a) it should consider relevant factors
such as impacts on safety. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,186. In fact, EPA interprets Section 202(a)(4) to
"specifically prohibit[] the use of an emission control device, system or element of design that
will cause or contribute to an unreasonable risk to public health, welfare, or safety." Id. at
29,387. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 24-25]
Stunningly, EPA accepts that the proposed rule will increase the number of traffic deaths. Id.
at 29,345. Because EPA estimates that the proposed rule will cause people to drive more since
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driving will be less expensive, "EPA projects this will result in an increase in accidents, injuries,
and fatalities." Id. Specifically, EPA estimates a proposed 0.2% increase in annual fatalities per
billion miles driven, which results in an increase of 1,595 total fatalities from 2027 through 2055.
Id. at 29,387. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 24-25]
EPA downplays the increased number of deaths in three ways. First, EPA claims the increase
in fatalities per distance traveled is not "statistically significant." Id. at 29,345, 29,387. Tell that
to the approximately 1,600 families who EPA projects will lose family members. Every life has
significant value. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 24-25]
Second, EPA claims that the "only statistically significant increase in fatalities is due to
consumers' voluntary choices to drive more." Id. But while EPA is blaming Americans for
causing increased fatalities by driving more, EPA is separately calculating the benefits associated
with "social and economic opportunities that become accessible with additional travel." Id. at
29,383. EPA estimates this "drive value" generates more than $300 million in benefits. Id. at
29,362. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 24-25]
Third and finally, EPA argues that more premature deaths will be avoided by the proposed
rule reducing exposure to PM2.5 (between 730 and 1,400) and ozone (between 15 and 330). Id.
at 29,345, 29,387. But that is only true if EPA's upper-end estimate is correct. Under EPA's
lower- end estimates, the 1,595 increased traffic fatalities from the proposed rule would more
than double the 745 deaths EPA projects will be avoided from exposure to PM2.5 and ozone.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 24-25]
EPA likely underestimates the serious safety issues presented by electric vehicles. Increased
weight also may lead to increased fatalities. The head of the National Transportation Safety
Board has expressed concern about the increased weight of electric vehicles: "I'm concerned
about the increased risk of severe injury and death for all road users from heavier curb weights
and increasing size, power, and performance of vehicles on our roads, including electric
vehicles."30 The executive director of the Center for Auto Safety warned, "These bigger, heavier
batteries are going to cause more damage. It's a simple matter of mass and speed."31 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 25]
30 NTSB head warns of risks posed by heavy electric vehicles colliding with lighter cars, THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 11, 2023, available at https://www.npr.org/2023/01/ll/1148483758/ntsb-
heavy-electric-vehicles-safety-risks.
31 Id.
Heavier electric vehicles increase the risk of fatal crashes. A 2011 study by the National
Bureau of Economic Research found that "a 1,000-pound increase in striking vehicle weight
raises the probability of a fatality in the struck vehicle by 47%."32 Converting this increased
fatality risks into external costs, "total external costs of vehicle weight from fatalities alone are
estimated at $93 billion per year "33 Electric vehicles can weigh more than 1,000 pounds more
than their gas- powered counterparts.34 EPA does not estimate the cost from the increased
fatalities or more severe injuries from crashes caused by electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0537, p. 25]
32 Michael Anderson and Maximilian Auffhammer, Pounds That Kill: The External Costs of Vehicle
Weight, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 17170, June 2011, 3, available at
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/wl7170/wl7170.pdf.
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33 Id.
34 Peter Valdes-Dapena, Why electric cars are so much heavier than regular cars, CNN, June 7, 2021,
available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/07/business/electric-vehicles-weight/index.html.
Electric vehicles also increase safety risks from fires. The National Transportation Safety
Board has warned that "[f]ires in electric vehicles powered by high-voltage lithium-ion batteries
pose the risk of electric shock to emergency responders from exposure to the high-voltage
components of a damaged lithium-ion battery."3 5 The National Transportation Safety Board also
found that "[tjhermal runaway and multiple battery reignitions after initial fire suppression are
safety risks in high-voltage lithium-ion battery fires."36 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 25]
35 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Risks to Emergency Responders from Lithium-Ion Battery
Fires in Electric Vehicles, NTSB/SR-20/01, Nov. 13, 2020, viii, available at
https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety- studies/Documents/SR2001 .pdf.
36 Id at 63.
Neither the proposed rule nor EPA's draft regulatory impact analysis discuss fire risk. EPA
recognizes this risk elsewhere, hinting at it in its draft regulatory impact analysis for the
companion emissions rule for heavy-duty vehicles. In that analysis, EPA notes that first
responders need "large amounts of water"—2,600 gallons for a 600-pound lithium-ion battery—
"to cool the batteries and eliminate the risk of fire." Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for
Heavy-Duty Vehicles: Phase 3, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis, 38. EPA also suggests that
fire remains a risk days after a crash: "Safe storage of crashed vehicles is critical as internal
battery failure reactions may occur days after the crash and reignite." Id. EPA recommends
standard maintenance and safety training to mitigate these risks. Id. EPA does not estimate the
cost or timetable for the safety training or the potential cost from fires and other damage. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 25-26]
The risk is greater for hydrogen-powered vehicles. EPA recommends flame detectors since
hydrogen flames are "almost invisible"; ventilation for vehicles stored indoors or under a roof to
avoid hydrogen accumulation; safety training for first responders to turning the vehicle off or
physically interrupting the power supply; and storage in "an isolated area" after a crash. Id. at 74-
75. One study simulating a vehicle's hydrogen tank explosion in an underground parking garage
and road tunnel found fatality distances from 1-3.2 meters and 3-9.5 meters, respectively,
depending on the size of the tank. 3 7 Again, EPA does not estimate the cost or timetable for the
safety training or the potential cost from fires, explosions, and other damage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0537, pp. 25-26]
37 Jinouk Park et al., Study on the Explosion of the Hydrogen Fuel Tank of Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles in
Semi-Enclosed Spaces, ENERGIES 2023 16(1), 241 (Dec. 2022), available at
https://www.mdpi.eom/1996-1073/16/l/241; see also Shaoqi Cui et al., Analysis of the fire hazard and
leakage explosion simulation of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, 41 THERMAL SCIENCE AND
ENGINEERING PROGRESS 101754 (June 2023).
EPA's failure to adequately consider safety issues is arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0537, pp. 25-26]
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Organization: Daniel Hellebuyck
Weight: An EV can weigh up to 1 V2 times a comparable internal combustion engine (ICE)
vehicle. This creates more safety issues in a collision and more weight that our crumbling
infrastructure has to absorb. Furthermore, insurance companies may be charging higher
premiums to all customers to pay for the increased risk of injury and the larger costs involved in
repairing EVs versus and ICE vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0526, p. 1]
Organization: Donn Viviani
Also not addressed is evidence that the increased weight of BEVs com- pared to comparable
ICE vehicles, because of battery weight, will result in nonexhaust emissions (NEE) of particulate
matter (PM) that will significant- ly lessen or even may exceed the proposal's anticipated
reductions. While there is controversy as to whether NEE PM is as large as exhaust PM, with
evidence on both sides. What is known for certain however, is that heavier vehicles produce
more NEE PM and BEVs are significantly heavier than in-ternal combustion
vehiclesl7. While it is true BEVs regenerative braking removes most brake-NEE, the greater
torque of BEVs will cause some ag- gressive drivers to produce increased NEE PM18. This
needs to be ac- knowledged and to the extent practicable included in the benefit assess- ment. In
my view, the potential climate benefits of the necessary transi- tion to EVs is too important to
risk with an inadequate analysis as to other effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 5-6]
17 Liu, Ye, et "1. "Comparative analysis of non-exhaust airborne particles from electric and in- ternal
combustion engine vehic"es." Journal of Hazardous Materials 420 (2021): 126626.
18 Liu, Ye, et "1. "Impact of vehicle type, tyre feature and driving behaviour on tyre wear under real-world
driving conditi"ns." Science of the Total Environment 842 (2022): 156950.
3) Recommendations for changes in the rule to decrease emissions further
What can be done under this rule to extract additional reductions in GHGs? Reducing the
average weight of the fleet can address both the NEE issue and reduce carbon emissions further.
Lighter EVs extend mileage and re- duce EGU emissions. Lighter IC vehicles will reduce fuel
combustion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 6-7]
Lighter vehicles result in less NWW PM.. Perhaps more importantly, lighter vehicles can
reduce emissions in the manufacturing sector, especial- ly important in light of the quantity new
BEVs EPA projects will penetrate the market. EPA should investigate regulatory options for
reducing fleet gross vehicle weights (GVW). One way to require lower fleet average
weight and decrease the emissions from manufacture of vehicles is to limit the embedded carbon
allowed per ton of vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 6-7]
Savings promoted by weight reduction are immediate and do not depend on the pace of
decarbonization of the electricity grid. The sooner the emis- sion reductions occur the better the
chance of avoiding catastrophic non- linear feedback warming effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0546, pp. 6-7]
GHG emissions embedded in the production of vehicles is responsible for -10% of vehicle
carbon footprints. Slowly reducing down the allowable embedded carbon by class will have
several outcomes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 6-7]
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Limiting the embedded carbon per ton would result in, e.g., more steel made with green
hydrogen, less metal and more plastic parts (already these are replacing metal) which can require
less energy to produce, and even parts made with bio-based plastics which count as negative
carbon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 6-7]
Lighter vehicles burn less fuel or draw less electrical power from EGUs, all these reduce
carbon emissions. The lighter weight will produce less NEE PM as well. Weight is one driver of
road friction and resuspension of PM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 6-7]
Lastly, here, it is important to ensure that imports would be subject to any such embedded
carbon restrictions, as that would serve to increase pres- sure on overseas EGUs to transition
away from coal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0546, pp. 6-7]
Organization: Dylan Ondek
Everyone thinks Tesla is the greatest electric vehicle but it is not. I have seen videos of these
cars in wrecks and they just go up in flames. It can take four to five hours to extinguish the fire
of a tesla that is not safe. If two cars have a head on collision and one is a tesla it could easily
ignite the other vehicle on fire. There would be no possible quick way to get out of the vehicle
already on fire after the head on collision. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5089]
Organization: Energy Innovation
ther research from the University of California, Berkeley, Grid Lab, and Energy Innovation,
2035 2.0: Plummeting Costs and Dramatic Improvements in Batteries Can Accelerate Our Clean
Transportation Future (April 2021), evaluated the technical and economic feasibility (and
associated impacts and benefits) of achieving a future scenario where electric vehicles make up
100 percent of new sales of all vehicles by 2035, combined with a 90 percent clean grid (called
the DRIVE Clean Scenario).[iv] Compared with the No New Policy scenario (which was pre-
IRA and BIL), the total transportation sector pollutant[v] and carbon dioxide emissions
reductions in the DRIVE Clean Scenario would reduce ground transportation sector C02
emissions by 60 percent in 2035 and by 93 percent in 2050, relative to 2020 levels.9 See Figure
3. The DRIVE Clean Scenario would also avoid approximately 150,000 premature deaths and
generate nearly $1.3 trillion in health and environmental savings through 2050.10 Compared to
the No New Policy, the DRIVE Clean Scenario would also resllt in approximately $2.7 trillion in
consumer savings through 2050 compared—a household savings of about $1000 per year on
average over 30 years.11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 5-6]
9 Amol Phadke et al., "2035 2.0: Plummeting Costs and Dramatic Improvements in Batteries Can
Accelerate Our Clean Transportation Future" (Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California,
Berkeley, GridLab, April 2021), https://www.2035report.com/transportation/downloads/, iv.
10 Phadke et al., iii.
11 Phadke et al., ii.
iv In the Drive Rapid Innovation in Vehicle Electrification (DRIVE Clean) Scenario, EVs constitute 100
percent of new U.S. LDV sales by 2030 as well as 100 percent of MDV and heavy-duty truck sales by
2035. The grid reaches 90 percent clean electricity by 2035. More details and full study findings are
available at https://www.2035report.com/transportation/.
v Namely, fine particulate matter, nitrous oxides, and sulfur oxides.
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[See original attachment for line graph "C02 Emissions in the Transportation Sector"] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 5-6]
Figure 3. Transportation sector C02 emissions in the DRIVE Clean and No New Policy
scenarios through 2050. Source: Phadke, Amol, et al., 2035 Report 2.0: Plummeting Costs &
Dramatic Improvements in Batteries Can Accelerate Our Clean Transportation Future,
University of California Berkeley, Goldman School of Public Policy, Grid Lab, and Energy
Innovation, April 2021, available at: https://www.2035report.com/transportation/. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0561, pp. 5-6]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
XXVI. BEV Safety Should Not Be a Constraining Factor in This Rulemaking.
We agree with EPA's conclusion that, taking safety into consideration, the standards are
appropriate under Section 202(a). 88 Fed. Reg. at 29347. While some have put forward
misguided arguments about the safety of BEVs as a reason for EPA to set weak standards in this
rulemaking, those claims miss the mark for many reasons. BEVs have been on the road in
appreciable numbers for more than a decade already, and BEV sales will continue to grow due to
market forces alone. OEMs, trade and professional associations, and safety authorities at all
levels have long been studying, planning for, and responding to BEV safety matters.637 With or
without this rulemaking, the number of BEVs will continue to grow, and safety research,
planning, and design efforts will continue apace. Thus, safety should not act as a constraining
factor in this rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 195]
637 Indeed, these efforts began more than a decade ago. For example, in 2010, the National Fire Protection
Association and SAE International hosted a summit on EV safety standards. Am. Nat'l Standards Inst.
(ANSI), U.S. National Electric Vehicle Safety Standards Summit Report Released (Jan. 5, 2011),
https://www.ansi.org/news/standards-news/all-news/2011/01/us-national-electric-vehicle-safety-standards-
summit-re port-released-05. And in 2011, ANSI convened a workshop on behalf of the U.S. DOE "to
consider current and future U.S. domestic, regional, and international standards, codes, and conformity
assessment activities needed to facilitate the introduction and widespread deployment of grid-connected
electric vehicles." ANSI, ANSI Workshop: Standards and Codes for Electric Drive Vehicles (Apr. 5-6,
2011),
https://share.ansi.org/Shared%20Documents/Meetings%20and%20Events/EDV%20Workshop/EDVSpons
orship.pdf
In the Proposal, EPA considered the impact of projected changes in vehicle weight on safety,
including heavier BEV vehicles. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29387-88; DRIA Ch. 9.4. EPA relied on
analysis developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), which
found no statistically significant impact on safety due to vehicle weight changes, holding vehicle
footprint constant. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29387 n.796.638 EPA also considered the possible safety
effects of changes in fleet composition due to changes in new vehicle sales and fleet turnover,
also relying on underlying analysis by NHTSA. See DRIA Ch. 9.4. Based on these analyses,
EPA concluded that "there are no changes to the vehicles themselves, nor the combined effects
of fleet composition and vehicle design, that will have a statistically significant impact on
safety." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29387. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 195]
638 In addition, the weight of future BEVs will be influenced by a variety of factors, including
developments in battery chemistries and other technologies that could reduce weight. See generally
Sebastian Blanco, The Future of Solid-State Batteries, J.D. Power (Apr. 3, 2023),
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https://www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-guides/the-future-of-solid-state-batteries; Chris Teague, What
You Need To Know About Solid-State Batteries, Autoweek,
https://www.autoweek.com/news/technology/a36189339/solid-state-batteries/ (last visited June 15, 2023);
Michael Bull, Mass Reduction and Performance of PEV and PHEV Vehicles (undated), https://www-
esv.nhtsa.dot.gov/Proceedings/22/files/22ESV-000346.pdf; Stanley, How Electric Vehicle Light-weighting
is Changing the Automotive Industry,
https://www.stanley engineeredfastening.com/en/News%20and%20Stories/How%20Electric%20 Vehicle%2
0Light-weighting%20is%20Changing%20the%20Automotive%20Industry (last visited June 15, 2023).
While EPA did not find any statistically significant impacts on safety from changes in vehicle
weight and fleet turnover, EPA nonetheless quantified those impacts, based on NHTSA's
underlying analysis, as well as the impacts of rebound driving (i.e., increased driving due to
lower fueling costs). Id. at 29387. EPA's modeling projected that over the full period of 2027-
2055, the Proposal would lead to an increase of 1,595 vehicle fatalities from all three sources
(weight changes, fleet turnover changes, and rebound driving). Id. As EPA notes, this is of a
similar scale to the expected reductions in premature deaths from air pollution in just a single
year (2055) that would result from the Proposed Standards. Id. at 29388. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, pp. 195-196]
As EPA explained in its proposal for the Phase 3 Heavy-Duty GHG standards, numerous
standards and codes govern BEV safety. 88 Fed. Reg. at 25962; Phase 3 DRIA Ch. 1.5.2. BEVs
must meet the same federal safety requirements and undergo the same safety testing as
combustion vehicles.639 Evidence shows that BEVs "are at least as safe" as combustion vehicles
in terms of crashworthiness test performance, while "injury claims are substantially less
frequent" for BEVs than for combustion vehicles.640 And on some safety metrics, BEVs
perform substantially better than combustion vehicles. Due to their battery architecture, for
example, BEVs typically have a lower center of gravity than combustion vehicles, which
increases stability and reduces the risk of rollovers641 (the cause of up to 35% of accident
deaths642). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 196]
639 DOE, Maintenance and Safety of Electric Vehicles, Alternative Fuels Data Center,
https://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_maintenance.html (last visited June 15, 2023).
640 Insurance Inst, for Highway Safety, With More Electric Vehicles Comes More Proof of Safety (Apr.
22, 2021), https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/with-more-electric-vehicles-comes-more-proof-of-safety.
641 DOE, Maintenance and Safety of Electric Vehicles.
642 CleanTechnica, The EV Safety Advantage 4 (2018),
https://cleantechnica.com/files/2018/07/CleanTechnica-EV-Safety-Advantage-Report.pdf.
Fire risk and emergency response can also be managed effectively. BEVs are significantly
less likely to catch fire than combustion vehicles in the first place.643 While BEVs can behave
differently in fires than combustion vehicles, emergency responders have been gaining
experience in BEV fire response as the number of BEVs on the road has grown. Numerous
agencies and associations, including the National Transportation Safety Board,644 National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration,645 and National Fire Protection Association,646 have
established fire safety and emergency response recommendations for BEVs. The National Fire
Protection Association and other organizations offer BEV fire response trainings,647 as do
OEMs, which also produce emergency response guides for their vehicles.648 The National
Institute for Automotive Service has also developed safety-related standards and a testing and
certification program for automotive technicians who service BEVs.649 Expected future use of
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solid state batteries will further reduce BEV fire risk.650 Other research efforts have identified
battery designs that can improve thermal management,651 as well as improved methods of
extinguishing battery fires.652 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, pp. 196-197]
643 See Rachel Bodine, Gas vs. Electric Car Fires [2023 Findings], AutoinsuranceEZ (Nov. 11, 2022),
https://www.autoinsuranceez.com/gas-vs-electric-car-fires/ (calculating rate of car fires using National
Transportation Safety Board data).
644 See, e.g., NTSB, Risks to Emergency Responders from High-Voltage, Lithium-Ion Battery Fires
Addressed in Safety Report (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-
releases/Pages/NR20210113 .aspx.
645 See, e.g., NHTSA, Interim Guidance for Electric and Hybrid-Electric Vehicles Equipped With High
Voltage Batteries (2012),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/interimguide_emergencyresponse_012012_v3 .pdf.
646 See, e.g., R. Thomas Long Jr., et al., Best Practices for Emergency Response to Incidents Involving
Electric Vehicles Battery Hazards: A Report on Full-Scale Testing Results (2013), https://www.nfpa.org/-
/media/Files/News-and-Research/Fire-statistics-and-reports/Electrical/EV-BatteriesPart-1 .ash x.
647 See generally Nat'l Fire Protection Ass'n, Training that Helps Keep You Protected,
https://www.nfpa.org/EV (last visited June 15, 2023).
648 DOE, Maintenance and Safety of Electric Vehicles.
649 FleetMaintenance, ASE unveils new EV standards, testing, and certification (May 4, 2023),
https://www.fleetmaintenance.eom/equipment/safety-and-technology/article/53059346/national-institute-
for-automo tive-service-excellence-ase-ase-unveils-new-ev-standards-testing-and-certification.
650 Blanco, at 3; Teague, at 5.
651 See generally Chuanbo Yang et al., Compressible battery foams to prevent cascading thermal runaway
in Li-ion pouch batteries, J. Power Sources, Sept. 1, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1016/jjpowsour.2022.231666.
652 See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n Fire & Rescue Services, New revolutionary method tested extinguishes lithium-
Ion EV fires in ten minutes with minimal water use (Mar. 22, 2023), https://www.ctif.org/news/new-
revolutionary-method-extinguishes-lithium-ion-ev-fires-ten-minutes-minimal-water.
In sum, EPA properly considered the impact of the Proposal on safety, including by placing
vehicle safety impacts "in the context of all projected health impacts from the rule including
public health benefits from the projected reductions in air pollution." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29345. In
addition, the public and private sectors have been working diligently to address BEV safety
considerations; those efforts will continue as the number of BEVs on the road grows, regardless
of EPA's regulatory actions. EPA is correct in not treating safety as a constraining factor in this
rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 197]
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
g. EPA Failed to Evaluate PEV Safety Risks
In setting new emissions standards, EPA must consider whether any technology used to
comply with the requirements "will cause or contribute to an unreasonable risk to public health,
welfare, or safety in its operation or function."79 The Proposed Rule's health and safety
assessment, however, is limited to the health benefits of reduced tailpipe emissions and fails to
fully account for all of the risks posed by more PEVs on the road. While EPA presumes that the
heaver PEVs will not have a statistically-significant effect on safety, and particularly, fatalities,
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the data relied upon from EPA was based on crash studies for MY 2007-2011 vehicles, well
before PEVs were on the road.80 As recognized by NHTSA Administrator Ann Carlson,
"[b]igger is safer if you don't look at the communities surrounding you and you don't look at the
other vehicles on the road . . . [i]t actually turns out to be a very complex interaction."81 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 16-17]
79 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(4)(A).
80 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,387.
81 Reuters, "U.S. NTSB chair raises safety concerns about heavy electric vehicles," David Shepardson
(January 11, 2023) available at https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/us-ntsb-chair-raises-
safety-concerns- about-heavy-electric-vehicles-2023-01-11/. EPA also fails to recognize that PEVs are
heavier than equivalent ICE vehicles and, therefore, may present result in more severe accidents given the
additional mass of the battery. PEVs, as compared to ICE vehicles, are quieter and prone to rapid
acceleration, making them 37% more likely to cause accidents involving pedestrians and 57% more likely
to cause accidence involving cyclist. 82 Yet EPA has not considered this interaction, on safety directly or
the associated increase in insurance costs.
82 NHTSA report DOT HS 811 526, "Incidence Rates of Pedestrian And Bicyclist Crashes by Hybrid
Electric Passenger Vehicles: An Update," (October 2011), available at
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811526.
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law
F. EPA Should Work With NHTSA to Incorporate Electric Vehicles Into the Safety
Analysis
To measure the Proposed Rule's safety impacts, EPA relies on two safety models developed
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 130 First, the safety-trend
model uses regression analysis to determine the impact of the model year on safety (fatalities and
injuries) and property damage, and then estimate an underlying trend in baseline safety. Second,
the safety-weight model identifies the impact of weight on crash fatalities by each vehicle type.
EPA then combines the results of the two models and considers the effect of total vehicle miles
traveled (including the Proposed Rule's rebound effect) to measure the rule's total safety
impacts. Through this safety analysis, EPA concludes that the Proposed Rule could increase
traffic fatalities by 1,595 compared to the No Action case. 131 This total increase in traffic
fatalities is comparable to one year of avoided premature deaths from the Proposed Rule due to
reductions in particulate matter. 132 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 20-21]
130 RIA at 9-7; see also National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Technical Support Document:
Final Rulemaking for Model Years 2024-2026 Light-Duty Vehicle Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards 646-83 (2022) ("NHTSA 2022 TSD") (describing impact of weight reduction, vehicle scrappage
and sales response, and rebound effect on fatalities).
131 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,387.
132 See, e.g., id. at 29,345.
EPA does not monetize these traffic fatalities as part of its benefit-cost analysis for two
distinct reasons. First, because some of the projected fatality increase (approximately 19%133) is
due to "consumers' voluntary choices to drive more when operating costs are reduced" (i.e. the
rebound effect), EPA concludes that the cost of these fatalities are offset by the benefit of
additional driving. 134 Second, because the majority (approximately 81%135) of the projected
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fatality increase is due to a statistically insignificant change in the estimated risk of fatalities per
distance traveled due to the change in the vehicle mix,136 EPA reasonably chooses not to
incorporate that risk into its benefit-cost analysis because it cannot be distinguished from
zero. 137 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 20-21]
133 See id. at 29,387 (projecting increase of 300 fatalities attributable to increased driving).
134 Proposed Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,345.
135 Id. at 29,387 (projecting increase of 1,265 fatalities due to non-statistically significant increase in
fatality risk from driving on a per-mile basis).
136 EPA projects that of the 1,595 increased fatalities from the Proposed Rule, 300 are attributable to
increased driving and 1,265 are attributable to the non-statistically significant increase in fatality risk. Id. at
29,387.
137 Id. at 29,345.
In either this rule or future standards, EPA should work with NHTSA to incorporate electric
vehicles into both safety models. While NHTSA's safety modeling accounts for various changes
in the vehicle mix such as model year and age, 138 it does not account for electrification as part
of the vehicle mix and instead appears to assume constant safety trends regardless of whether a
vehicle is electric or gas-powered. But due to their distinct engineering, electric vehicles present
unique safety implications that EPA and NHTSA should explore further. Some of these safety
implications are positive. For instance, electric vehicles have additional crumple space due to a
lack of a combustion engine, which improves crash safety. 139 Additionally, the typical
placement of the heavy electric powertrain under the vehicle lowers the car's center of gravity
and thus improves handling and reduces the risk of dangerous rollover accidents. In fact, current
electric- vehicle models are associated with some of the lowest rates of rollover accidents. 140
But some of these safety implications are negative. For instance, the additional acceleration of
electric vehicles could increase safety risks to electric-vehicle passengers, passengers in ICE
vehicles, and pedestrians. 141 Because electric vehicles present both safety benefits and risks, it
is not clear how accounting for electric vehicles in the safety modeling would affect EPA's
results. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 20-21]
138 NHTSA 2022 TSD, supra note 130, at 681; see also id. at 598.
139 Zachary Shahan, EV Safety Benefits—Crumple Zones, Rollover Results, Vehicle Control,
CleanTechnica, https://cleantechnica.eom/2018/12/30/ev-safety-benefits-crumple-zones-rollover-results-
vehicle-control/ (Dec. 30, 2018).
140 Id.
141 Chao Gong et al., Safety of Electric Vehicles in Crash Conditions: A Review of Hazards to Occupants,
Regulatory Activities, and Technical Support, 8 IEEE Transactions on Trasp. Electrification 3870, 3872
(2022).
Including electrification in the safety analysis can admittedly be challenging given the limited
information available about the relative safety of electric versus ICE vehicles. 142 Nonetheless, a
few principles are helpful. First, because NHTSA's safety-weight model already accounts for the
impact of vehicle weight on safety, weight (and any features of electric vehicles associated with
it) should be run through regression to avoid double-counting. Specifically, weight may be
correlated with other safety features, such that the regression suffers from omitted variable bias.
Second, the safety-trend model should control for horsepower, which may have a negative safety
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externality in both electric and ICE vehicles. 143 And third, the safety-trend model should control
for vehicle type more generally such as cars, crossovers, and minivans (which the weight model
already does). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0601, pp. 20-21]
142 See generally id.
143 See Insurance Institute for Highway Safety & Highway Loss Data Institute, Flexing Muscle: Sports
Car Ratings Show Range of Performance, 51 Status Report, no. 5 (2016), at 4-5,
https://www.iihs.Org/iihs/sr/statusreport/article/51/5/2 (explaining how "high-horsepower vehicles are more
likely to exceed the speed limit, particularly by 10 mph or more, and have higher mean speeds than
vehicles with less powerful engines").
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
The Proposed Rule also fails to consider the adverse safety impacts of its mandate. EPA
represents that fatality risk will increase "0.2% per distance travelled" under the Proposed Rule,
a value it deems is "non-statistically significant." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,345. EPA also argues that
while there will be a projected "increase in accidents, injuries, and fatalities," this increase will
stem from "personal decisions[s] by consumers to drive more due to the reduced cost of driving."
Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 16]
The National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB")—one of the federal agencies actually
charged with regulating vehicle safety—disagrees with EPA's assertions. The Chair of NTSB
recently stated "I'm concerned about the increased risk of severe injury and death for all road
users from heavier curb weights and increasing size, power, and performance of vehicles on our
roads, including electric vehicles." NTSB Head Calls Out Heavy EVs As A Safety Risk,
Autoweek (Jan. 13, 2023), https://bit.ly/464YR0j. She noted that a "GMC Hummer EV weighs
over 9000 pounds," with a "gross vehicle weight rating [of] a staggering 10,550 pounds" and a
battery pack that "weighs over 2900 pounds—about the weight of a Honda Civic." Id. Likewise,
a Ford F-150 Lightning weighs between 2000 and 3000 pounds more than non-electric versions,
while battery- powered SUVs are roughly 33% heavier than non-battery options. Id. According
to the Chair of NTSB, these factors have "a significant impact on safety for all road users." Id.
So while EPA may be sanguine about added safety risks, consumers may have good reason not
to be. The Proposed Rule does not adequately account for these concerns, either. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 16]
Organization: National Farmers Union (NFU)
Another concern with BEVs is increased vehicle weight. Chair of the National Transportation
Safety Board has expressed concerns "about the increased risk of severe injury and death for all
road users from heavier curb weights and increasing size, power, and performance of vehicles on
our roads, including electric vehicles."20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 10-11]
20 The Honorable Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board, Remarks as Prepared
for Delivery Before the Transportation Research Board, January 11, 2023- 102nd Annual Meeting,
https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/Activities/Pages/Homendy-20230111 .aspx.
A GMC Hummer EV weighs over 9,000 pounds, up from about 6,000 pounds. Its gross
vehicle weight rating is a staggering 10,550 pounds. The battery pack alone weighs over 2,900
pounds—about the weight of a Honda Civic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, pp. 10-11]
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The Ford F-150 Lightning is between 2,000 and 3,000 pounds heavier than the non-electric
version. The Mustang Mach-E, Volvo XC40 EV, and RAV4 EV are all roughly 33% heavier.
That has a significant impact on safety for all road users.21 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581,
pp. 10-11]
21 Id.
Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)
d. Vehicle weight: Safety concerns and increased PM emissions
Another concern with BEVs is increased vehicle weight. The chair of the National
Transportation Safety Board testified that "the Ford F-150 Lightning is between 2,000 and 3,000
pounds heavier than the non-electric version. The Mustang Mach-E, Volvo XC40 EV, and
RAV4 EV are all roughly 33% heavier. That has a significant impact on safety for all road
users."38 EPA should not artificially incentivize heavy BEVs by counting them as "zero
emissions," when lighter weight solutions can provide similar GHG emissions benefits and better
safety. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 18-19]
38 https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/Activities/Pages/Homendy-20230111.aspx
Organization: Senator Shelley Moore Capito et al.
Further, the proposals lack coordination with the US Department of Transportation (DOT) to
address safety issues that increased vehicle weight will introduce on our roadways. Safety should
always come first. The National Transportation Safety Board recently warned that the heavier
weight of electric vehicles pose increase risks of severe injury or death to passengers in lighter
vehicles. The increased weight of BEV s not only calls into question safety impacts during
vehicle-to-vehicle collisions and vehicle-to-pedestrian or bicyclist collisions, but also the overall
design and safety standards of our roads, bridges, and roadside safety hardware such as
guardrails. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5083, p. 3]
The DOt has a responsibility to research and ensure vehicle and roadway design and safety
standards meet the challenges and demands of our future transportation system. This
Administration continues to push policies that will result in more BEV s on our roadways, but
has failed to plan from a safety and infrastructure perspective. The sequence of proposals is
misguided; vehicle and roadway design and safety standards should have been under
development and deployed well before the EPA proposed a rule to force consumer adoption of
heavier EV s. This type of research and development, including vehicle, roadway lifespan, and
guardrail and work zone safety equipment testing all will require years to undertake. If these
proposals move forward without the appropriate safeguards in place, backed by sound science,
the vehicle and infrastructure investments being made today may miss the mark on safety and
longevity in the years to come. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5083, p. 3]
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
In the current rulemaking, EPA is downplaying and minimizing the loss of lives on U.S.
highways that its proposals will cause by estimating them on a per-distance- traveled basis, and
is ignoring altogether the many more serious injuries that will be attributable to these
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regulations.44 In contrast, NHTSA was more candid in acknowledging these negative safety
effects just last year when it promulgated stringent fuel economy standards through model year
2026 in lockstep with EPA's 2021 emissions rule.45 Meanwhile, EPA is playing up and
magnifying the economic value of the lives it claims will be saved in the long run from the
reduction of toxic pollutants.46 EPA's starkly different accounting treatment for the lives lost
from less safe vehicles versus those saved by improved air quality is telling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 16-17]
44 See 88 FR at 29345, 29386.
45 See 87 FR 25710, 25895, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf.
46 See 88 FR at 29345, 29379-82.
Organization: The Aluminum Association
Efficiency is not the only consideration that supports assigning a carbon emission value to
BEVs. Safety is also an important factor supporting this conclusion. In the proposed rule, EPA
states that it placed emphasis on the level of risk of injury per mile traveled, considered the
projected change in injuries in that context, and concluded that, with the proposed rule, the
increase in fatalities per distance traveled is not statistically significantl 1. However, with the
expected acceleration of the transition to BEV's an additional factor arises that has not been
adequately addressed. This is the net increase in weight projected for BEV's versus equivalent
internal combustion engine vehicles. 12 This increased weight increases the differential weights
in both vehicle-to-vehicle impact collisions as well as in vehicle to pedestrian impact collisions.
Because lightweighting is of most value as applied to larger/heavier ICE vehicles and BEV's, it
plays an important role in these areas in terms of reducing the weight differential between
vehicles and in vehicle to pedestrian impacts. EPA devotes considerable attention to safety
factors in this rulemaking (88 FR 29344) and should not lose sight of the significant safety
benefits that will come from lightweighting when BEVs are assigned an accurate emission level
above zero g/mile. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 8-10]
11 88 FR 29345
12 This can be 500-2000 lbs. depending on the vehicle size and battery configuration.
In a broad context, the Association has long focused on the relationship between vehicle size,
mass, and societal safety, 13 and aluminum-intensive vehicles have a long history of achieving 5-
star ratings, either from NHTSA or the EU's analogous new car assessment program (NCAP).
Notably, the economic value of mass reduction is most recognized in larger, heavier vehicles
such as pickup trucks and SUV's, and lightweighting these vehicle classes also helps improve
the differential weight safety concerns referenced above. Moving the fleet to BEVs without
lightweighting incentives will result in the largest weight increases occurring in the heaviest
vehicles due to the need for larger battery packs. If all BEVs are assigned zero g/mile GHG
emissions, there is no incentive for vehicle weight reduction with this ultimately being
detrimental to overall societal safety. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 8-10]
13 Clearly Identifying the Relationship Between Vehicle Size, Mass, and Societal Safety,
https://drivealuminum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Size-Mass-Safety.pdf (Accessed June 23, 2023)
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Organization: The Heritage Foundation (Kevin Dayaratna and Diana Furchtgott-Roth)
Almost 43,000 people died on the roads in 2022,21 the equivalent of 215 plane crashes a year
killing 200 people each time. EPA's tailpipe emissions proposal would, if implemented, make
Americans even less safe on the road. EPA does not sufficiently analyze these effects. The prior
2022 fuel economy proposal22 from the National Highway Transportation and Safety
Administration (NHTSA) raises the 2026 Corporate Average Fuel Economy standard to 49 miles
per gallon (MPG) from the current standard of 40 MPG. The rule sets a new minimum standard
of 59.4 MPG for passenger cars and 42.4 MPG for light trucks made in the United States by
model year 2026, with fines for non-compliant carmakers. NHTSA concludes that the higher
price of cars would increase fatalities because fewer people would be able to afford the safer,
newer, cars, "The slowing of fleet turnover due to higher vehicle prices has the largest impact of
the three factors on fatalities "23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 5]
21 National Highway Transportation Safety Administration. "Early Estimate of Motor Vehicle Traffic
Fatalities in 2022", Apr. 2023, Crash Stats: Early Estimate of Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities in 2022
(dot.gov) (accessed 22 June 20.
1 22 Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 84, (May 2, 2022), pp. 25710-26092,
https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf (accessed May 1,
20.
1 23 Ibid., p. 25896.
NHTSA estimates that the decline in new vehicle sales would result in up to 812 additional
deaths on the road each year, 16,206 more injuries, and almost 50,000 more crashes involving
property damage.24 This is because fewer people would be able to afford new and later-model
used cars, which are safer than old cars. EPA's proposed regulations would make the situation
worse. EPA does not account for this in the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. 5-6]
This increase in prices caused by successive reductions in emissions contradicts NHTSA's
core values,25 namely leading "the Nation by setting the motor vehicle and highway safety
agenda," and serving "as the catalyst for addressing critical safety issues that affect the motor
vehicle and highway safety communities." Deaths and injuries from the new rules would be
concentrated among low-income Americans, disproportionately minorities, who would pay the
price of the new rule: due to the price increases, they would buy fewer new cars and fewer later-
model used cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, pp. ]
1 24 Ibid., pp. 25894-5.
25 U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, "'HTSA's Core
Values," https://www.nhtsa.gov/about-nhtsa/nhtsas-core-values (accessed May 1, 2023).
There is no mention of additional equipment, training, or hazards mentioned regarding the
increased number of EVs on the road. The risk of toxic exposure in the event of an EV on a
public roadway should be a profoundly serious consideration and yet is not mentioned.36 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0674, p. 10]
Organization: Transfer Flow, Inc
The National Transportation Safety Board has raised concerns about the safety of electric
vehicles in automobile accidents due to the increased weight associated with carrying a heavy
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electric vehicle battery, 18 and the British Parking Association published a report outlining the
dangers associated with the increased weight of electric vehicles causing older parking structures
to collapse, 19'20 which we recently saw in New York City where one person died.21 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0496, pp. 3-5]
18 https://www.autoweek.com/news/green-cars/a42486843/ntsb-heavy-electric-cars-trucks-suvs-safety/
19 https://all-car-news.com/en/british-parking-association-weight-of-electric-cars-causes-collapse-of-
parking- garages/
20 https://www.curbed.com/2023/04/parking-garage-collapse-heavier-electric-vehicles-suvs.html
21 https://nypost.com/2023/04/19/electric-vehicles-could-put-pressure-on-parking-garages/
1. Organization: Valero Energy Corpora EPA has failed to address the on-road safety
implications of its proposed rule which would require 67% of all LDV and MDVs to
be zero emission by 2032.
EPA has placed the cart before the horse by promulgating a rule that fails to address the on-
road implications of its proposed rule; including the impact of the increased risk of crash related
fatalities to the motoring public and the disproportionate impact of the fatality risk born by low-
income and other environmental justice commuters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 29]
In promulgating the LDV and MDV rule EPA has failed to address the safety issues
surrounding the real-world implications of requiring 67% of the LDV and MDV to be
significantly heavier battery electric vehicles (BEV). In fact, Jennifer Homendy, the head of the
National Transportation Safety Board recently warned that the heavier weight of electric vehicles
pose increased risk of severe injury or death to passengers in lighter vehicles. 143 Her comments
center around the multi-thousand-pound weight differential between BEV's and their much
lighter conventional internal combustion engine (ICE) LDV counterparts. In work performed by
the National Bureau of Economic Research, Pounds that Kill: The External Cost of Vehicle
Weight, showed that "controlling for own-vehicle weight, being hit by a vehicle that is 1,000
pounds heavier results in a 47% increase in the baseline fatality probability". 144 Unfortunately,
the weight of the BEV battery packs alone can weigh as much as an entire ICE vehicle, putting
the overall weight difference between BEV's and their ICE counterparts at double, or even triple
that of an ICE vehicle. Take for example GM's new 9,000-pound Hummer EV, which touts a
massive 3,000- pound battery. 145 In fact the weight of the Hummer battery pack alone is
approximately equal to the total curb weight of a new 2023 Honda Civic Sedan. 146 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 29]
143 NTSB head warns of risks posed by heavy electric vehicles colliding with lighters cars, NPR, January
11,2023
144 National Bureau of Economic Research, Pounds That Kill: The external costs of Vehicle Weight, June
2011
145 The 2022 GMC Hummer EV's Battery Alone Weighs 2,923 Pounds, That's roughly a third of its 9,63-
pound curb weight, The Drive, Feb 15, 2022
146 https://automobiles.honda.com/civic-sedan#trims-specs
Finally, EPA's proposal disproportionately exposes middle-and lower-income commuters to
increased on-road dangers as they are left behind in lighter weight ICE LDV's as more affluent
consumers purchase significantly heavier BEV's. Further, EPA's proposal lacks coordination
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with the National Transportation Safety Board and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
to address safety issues created directly from EPA's proposed LDV and MDV rule. "The DOT
has a responsibility to research and ensure vehicle and roadway design and safety standards meet
the challenges and demands of our future transportation system. This Administration continues
to push policies that will result in more BEVs on our roadways, but has failed to plan from a
safety and infrastructure perspective. The sequence of proposals is misguided; vehicle and
roadway design and safety standards should have been under development and deployed well
before the EPA proposed a rule to force consumer adoption of heavier EVs. This type of research
and development, including vehicle, roadway lifespan, and guardrail and work zone safety
equipment testing all will require years to undertake. If these proposals move forward without
the appropriate safeguards in place, backed by sound science, the vehicle and infrastructure
investments being made today may miss the mark on safety and longevity in the years to
come."320 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, p. 58]
320 Letter from the United States Senate to EPA Administrator, May 25, 2023
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
Safety: It does not appear that EPA is taking into consideration the added weight of EVs.
With their large batteries, they are generally one third heavier than a similarly sized vehicle of a
similar body style. Section 9.4.2 of the DRIA dealing with vehicle weight does not take the
increased battery weight into account, and therefore, needs to be updated before it can make the
conclusion that "there is no statistically significant change in the estimated risk of fatalities per
distance traled..." and ".. .virtually no change in fatality risk as a result of the proposed
standards..." (p. 29345) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, p. 5]
Likewise, it does not appear that EPA has considered the risk of EV battery fires. It is well
known that EVs carry an increased risk of fire because of the nature of their batteries and that
these chemical fires are extremely hot and hard to put out.7 Firefighters have reported the
difficulty of extinguishing EV fires, which burn much more intensely than ICEV fires because of
the batteries and require 40 times the amount of water needed to contain an ICEV. 8 Firefighters
report that that there is no obtainable extinguishing agent available to them. EPA's analysis on
safety is deficient in failing to consider the impact of battery fires on safety. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0679, p' 5]
7 We're not putting t'is out:' F-150 Lightning fire melts EV trucks," Detroit Free Press, April 21, 2023.
8 "F irefighters have to blast 40 times more water at burning Tesla than other cars," The Hill, August 17,
2021.
EPA Summary and Response
EPA appreciates the range of comments that were submitted related to safety. The majority of
these comments can be categorized into one of two different topics related a future shift in the
vehicle stock towards more PEVs. The first comment topic of mass-safety is one that EPA has
analyzed quantitatively in this and previous light- and medium-duty GHG rulemakings (and in
consultation with NHTSA as it has also analyzed safety effectslits CAFE rulemakings). This
rulemaking's analysis of the impacts on societal crash safety due to mass changes (including
mass changes associated different powertrains and PEV batteries) was conducted using the same
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methodology as previous rulemakings, which is based on a statistical analysis of empirical crash
data. The second group of comments was on the topic of fire safety, for which detailed responses
are provided below. Additional comments related to coordination with other relevant agencies,
fleet turnover, and the proposed elimination of enrichment for ICE vehicles are also summarized
and discussed below.
Valero commented that EPA did not coordinate with the National Transportation Safety
Board and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) on the topic of safety when developing
these standards. EPA disagrees with this comment. EPA has engaged in a long-standing process
spanning multiple rulemakings of continuous coordination with DOT, specifically the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), on safety issues relevant to vehicle emissions
standards. EPA has continued this coordination during the development of this rulemaking, with
technical meetings and exchanges of data and information continuously throughout the
rulemaking process. See, for example, Memorandum from Michael Landgraf "Response from
Shashi Kuppa, Director, Office of Crashworthiness Standards Rulemaking Office, Department of
Transportation, National Highway Safety Administration" (Dec. 8, 2022). Specifically,
throughout this rulemaking process, EPA and NHTSA have exchanged information on the best
available data and information to inform our assessment of the safety impacts of this rule. In fact,
as describe further below, in both the proposed rule and this final rule, EPA has used NHTSA's
recommended mass-safety coefficients in our statistical analysis of historical crash data, and our
methodology is consistent with that used by NHTSA in its most recent proposal for CAFE
standards. Amfree, Arizona State Legislature and Valero commented that the additional weight of
batteries for PEVs may negatively impact crash safety due to an increased risk to drivers of
lighter vehicles and other road users. In response, EPA cannot conclude based on the available
evidence that the final standards will have any impact on societal fatality rates. More detailed
information on EPA's crash safety analysis is provided in RIA Chapter 8.4 and Preamble VIII.K.
Summarizing briefly here: EPA has conducted an analysis of crash safety for these final
standards, using the same methodology as the NPRM analysis, and similar to prior light-duty
GHG rulemakings. The projected mass of each vehicle is estimated by EPA's OMEGA
compliance modeling (including the mass of PEV batteries), and any associated changes in
societal fatality rates are then calculated based on mass-safety coefficients that were developed
by NHTSA's statistical analysis of historical crash data. Consistent with the NPRM, the results
of this societal safety analysis show that the final GHG standards are projected to result in a
small increase in the societal fatality rate. From a statistical standpoint, EPA cannot conclude
that the effect is different from zero (i.e., the effect is not statistically significant).
Several commenters cited statements by Jennifer Homendy, the head of NTSB, as evidence
that BEVs create increased safety risks, particularly due to the increased vehicle weight of BEVs.
EPA carefully reviewed the statement,694 which the NTSB website identifies as advocacy
activity by Chair Homendy. The statement lacks any technical findings regarding BEV safety. In
addition, commenters selectively omit to cite the remainder of the statement, which says "We do
have a climate crisis that needs to be addressed. The U.S. transportation sector accounts for the
largest portion of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, and I firmly believe it is a human right to
breathe clean air. But we have to be careful that we aren't also creating unintended
consequences: more death on our roads. Safety, especially when it comes to new transportation
694 https://www.ntsb.gov/AdvocacY/Activities/Pages/HomendY-20230111.aspx
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policies and new technologies, cannot be overlooked. Ever." We agree with Chair Homendy that
safety risks should not be overlooked. As discussed above and in the preamble and RIA, EPA
has conducted a thorough analysis of safety associated with the standards, including specifically
with increased vehicle weight of PEVs. We find that PEVs are as safe as ICE vehicles and that
the final standards actually result in a slight (statistically insignificant) decrease in fatalities per
mile driven.
ARCO commented that the additional weight of PEV batteries can be offset to some extent
with the expanded use of lightweight materials, and that will help address concerns about crash
compatibility between heavier PEVs and lighter ICE vehicles. EPA appreciates these comments,
and notes that in our compliance modeling, we account for the compounding effect where
lightweighting technologies will enable smaller (and lighter) batteries for a given electric range.
As a result, many of the future PEV models projected for this rulemaking's compliance and
safety analyses include lightweighting strategies as part of manufacturers' cost effective
compliance plans. Beyond our modeling results, EPA believes that manufacturers have an
incentive to pursue strategies to reduce the weight of PEVs to improve efficiency, which could
allow for smaller batteries or to meet customer demands for longer range.
Arizona State Legislature, Amfree commented that there is an increased safety risk from PEV
battery fires, and that EPA did not fully account for that safety impact in the NPRM. EPA agrees
that different kinds of fires have different properties. Vehicle fires involving large capacity
batteries have different properties than the types of vehicle fires that have been more common to-
date, which involve low-voltage electrical systems and liquid fuels. However, EPA does not
agree that the safety risk, in terms of the rate at which harm occurs, is necessarily higher than for
other non-PEV vehicles. Data available today from NTSB indicate that BEV fire rates after a
crash may be lower than from HEV and ICE vehicles. While the number of occurrences may be
too low to draw a definitive conclusion, there is also no statistically significant finding that
shows the safety risk of PEV fires is higher than non-PEVs. See AutoinsuranceEZ: Gas vs.
Electric Car Fires [2023 Findings], Nov. 11, 2022 (rate of fires from BEV light duty vehicles is
nearly two orders of magnitude less than rate for gasoline or hybrid vehicles). EPA recognizes
that battery fires are of a different character, and can pose different and more difficult challenges
to extinguish, and the vehicles may have stranded electrical power, such that first responder
training is desirable. The standard practice for putting out fires involving large batteries today
involves the use of large amounts of water, and first responders can and should be trained to deal
with fires of electrical origin (as they are trained to deal with fires from other chemical, ignitable,
or flammable origins).
Several commenters expressed concern that the high-voltage PEV batteries will pose a shock
hazard, especially for mechanics and first responders. In response, EPA concludes that
appropriate repair and emergency response procedures have been and will continue to be
developed, refined, and applied to manage shock risk effectively. There has been extensive
activity to date by governmental and non-governmental organizations to update the protocols and
guidance for first responders. And EPA expects that information will be frequently reviewed and
updated as the best practices from field experience are communicated and refined.
The Alliance asserted that EPA's proposal to eliminate enrichment operation for ICE vehicles
would potentially expose consumers to a sudden reduction or interruption of power during a
driving maneuver, and result in an unsafe condition. EPA is not finalizing the proposed
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elimination of enrichment for this final rulemaking. At the same time, EPA does not agree that
elimination of enrichment will impact the manufacturer's ability to continue to produce ICE
vehicles that can be safely operated over the full range of conditions. EPA does not agree that
enrichment is a necessary prerequisite for safe vehicle operation. Specifically, EPA disagrees
with the commenters assertion that vehicles without enrichment will inherently exhibit
unpredictable interruptions in power. Through proper design and calibration, EPA is confident
that it's possible to deploy stoichiometric powertrains which operate predictably, even during
aggressive driving maneuvers. Indeed, there are many vehicles in the fleet today that operate at
stoichiometric with no evidence of safety issues.
In response to comments on safety and reliability of EVs, and electrical safety and fire risk,
EPA finds no evidence that the nature of an electric vehicle necessarily leads to lower reliability,
greater safety risk to service or emergency personnel, or a greater probability of a fire. The
smaller number of moving parts in an EV is consistent with a potential for greater reliability and
lower maintenance costs. Regarding electrical safety, all vehicles sold in the U.S. are required to
pass Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) standards. For example, this includes
FMVSS No. 305, "Electric-powered vehicles: Electrolyte spillage and electrical shock
protection." In addition, for all commercially produced vehicles, manufacturers routinely publish
guides to emergency responders to show where mechanical means may be used to access the
interior of the vehicle after a crash without disturbing airbags or other hazardous components,
including high voltage pathways. In regard to fire safety, EPA sees no evidence that EV fires are
more frequent on a per-vehicle or per-mile basis than for gasoline powered vehicles. While some
manufacturers have recalled electric vehicles due to specific fire risks, there is also evidence that
these were caused by specific defects in manufacturing, that are being recognized and addressed
by the manufacturers. EPA also disagrees with comments that batteries are inherently unsafe,
that they contain all of the reactants necessary to combust, or that they generate large amounts of
heat during operation sufficient to jeopardize the safety of the vehicle. Electric vehicles and their
battery systems are designed to maintain appropriate temperature operation and are safeguarded
against usage that would cause excessive heat generation. Battery chemistries being used in
electrified vehicles lack the necessary oxygen to combust without exposure to air.
23 - Economic concerns from industries that are not directly
regulated under this rule
Note that Section 25.2 contains comments regarding industries that are directly regulated
under this final rule.
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Darius
The large-scale shift to electric vehicles, which would comprise two-thirds of all new-car
sales in the U.S. by 2032 under this proposal, will hurt workers, small businesses, and consumers
while doing little to help the environment. The proposed rule would lead to fewer vehicle choices
for individuals and families, reducing the selection of vehicles that fit their household budgets
and unique needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0519, p. 1]
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This proposed rulemaking will disrupt automotive industry supply chains and eliminate large
numbers of jobs in vehicle manufacturing, parts production, and repair businesses. While small
businesses are the lifeblood of the American economy, they will be hit the hardest by a
premature rush to have electric vehicles dominate new vehicle sales. Small, internal-combustion
engine-based businesses are not receiving the billions of dollars that large automakers are to
make the conversion to electric. Thirty-three percent of automotive aftermarket products
purchased by consumers last year were on upgrades and accessories for internal combustion
engines and drive trains. That means as much as $17 billion of small business value will be
wiped out by this proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0519, p. 1]
Organization: Energy Marketers of America (EMA)
EMA is conce'ned over EPA's tailpipe emission standards for light-duty and medium-duty
vehicles for model year 2027 and later which will effectively discourage investment in lower
carbon liquid fuels. EPA projects that a potential outcome of the rule would require nearly 70
percent of all new light duty vehicle sales to be battery electric vehicles (EVs) by 2032.
Unfortunately, the focus on EV production will fundamentally eliminate an opportunity to
provide clean green liquid fuels such as renewable diesel, biodiesel, renewable gasoline, clean
hydrogen and ethanol that immediately lower emissions not only for new vehicles, but for the
vehicles currently on the road. In addition, the rule will limit consumer choice on cleaner internal
combustion engines and threaten the viability and jobs of small business energy marketers
around the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0616, pp. 1-2]
Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
Furthermore, the Proposed Rule implicates "question[s] of deep economic and political
significance," King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015), due to the huge "number of people
affected," United States Telecom Ass'n v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 855 F.3d 381, 423 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Because "Americans
place a high value on car ownership," almost 92% of households have at least one vehicle, and
over 22% have access to at least three. Car Ownership Statistics 2023, Forbes (May 8, 2023),
https://bit.ly/3NnPXnn. A regulation affecting so many people is bound to collide with "a
significant portion of the American economy," West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2608 (cleaned up),
and require "billions of dollars in spending by private persons or entities," id. at 2621 (Gorsuch,
J., concurring) (quoting King, 576 U.S. at 485). By EPA's own estimate, technology increases
"through 2055 are estimated at $260 billion to $380 billion." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,344. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 6-7]
Organization: Matthew DiPaulo
This proposal will disrupt automotive industry supply chains and eliminate large numbers of
jobs in vehicle manufacturing, parts production, and repair businesses. While small businesses
are the lifeblood of the American economy, they will be hit the hardest by a premature rush to
have electric vehicles dominate new vehicle sales. Small, internal-combustion engine-based
businesses are not receiving the billions of dollars that large automakers are to make the
conversion to electric. Thirty-three percent of automotive aftermarket products purchased by
consumers last year were on upgrades and accessories for internal combustion engines and drive
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trains. That means as much as $17 billion of small business value will be wiped out by this
proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1514, p. 1]
Organization: Missouri Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
The impact on small businesses will be far-reaching as well. According to Mike Spagnola,
president and CEO of Specialty Equipment Markets Association (SEMA), "this large-scale shift
would significantly disrupt automotive industry supply chains and potentially eliminate large
numbers of jobs in vehicle manufacturing, parts production, and repair shops. Ford alone
estimates a 30% labor reduction in its transition to electric vehicles. Small businesses would be
the most vulnerable to the disruptions caused by a seismic shift to battery-electric vehicles.
According to the most recent Census Bureau tally of the almost 1,200 auto engine and
transmission parts suppliers in the U.S., more than 60% had 20 or fewer employees. These
companies often make specialized components, operate on tight margins, and rely on long-term
contracts. They employ American workers with technical skills and create the often politically
celebrated blue-collar jobs."l [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0578, pp. 2-3]
1 SEMA President and CEO Mike Spagnola, "New EPA Emissions Proposal Puts Automotive Supply
Chains, Small Businesses at Risk", https://www.sema.org/EPA-Proposed-Greenhouse-Gas-Rules
Organization: Specialty Equipment Market Association (SEMA)
On behalf of our more than 7,000 member companies, SEMA has significant concerns
regarding the impact of the EPA's proposed regulations on automotive small businesses. The
specialty automotive aftermarket industry supports more than one million U.S. automotive jobs.
Thousands of small businesses and their employees will be adversely impacted by this proposal's
overly aggressive push to electrify America's automotive sector. SEMA supports the EPA's
intent to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the American people must have the ability to
choose the vehicle technology that works best for their families. It is crucial for government
policy to remain technology neutral in pursuit of decarbonizing motor vehicles. There are many
options on the road to zero emissions. American-grown biofuels, carbon capture, and innovations
in engine production are all aimed at this shared goal. The specialty automotive aftermarket has
also led the way in fuel innovations and conversions of old vehicles into new and cleaner
technologies and is committed to playing a central role in the evolution of automotive
technology, including the parts and products that power our vehicles. However, this proposal
embraces electrification as the technology of choice to the detriment of many of our members
and their innovations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 1]
This proposal's large-scale transition to Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV) over a truncated
timeline will significantly disrupt automotive supply chains and potentially eliminate many jobs
in vehicle manufacturing, parts production, and repair shops. As drafted, it would adversely
impact small business innovators and the hundreds of thousands of men and women their
companies employ. SEMA members want to continue to be part of the solution to making
vehicles more efficient and reducing emissions. The best way to accomplish this goal is to let the
market and innovation drive solutions to the environmental challenges we all seek to
solve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, pp. 1-2]
Impact on Small Business
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This proposal is effectively a far too fast mandate for automakers to transition their
production to BEVs in order to avoid being fined. It will produce a seismic shift for automotive
aftermarket businesses who don't have the capacity to make the transition to zero-emissions
vehicle technology this quickly, especially when they're not receiving billions in federal and
state grants and incentives to support those transitions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 3]
The specialty automotive aftermarket has lei technology innovation, making vehicles more
fuel efficient, safer, and more appealing to consumers. According to SEMA's data, 55% of our
manufacturing businesses produce internal combustion engine (ICE) components, including parts
for air and fuel, ignition, emissions controls, engine parts, and exhaust systems. To put this in
perspective, 33% of consumer spending on performance and accessory products goes toward
upgrading ICE engines and dri'etrains. That's nearly $17 billion dollars of the $51 billion
specialty aftermarket industry and disproportionately impacts small businesses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0596, p.3]
Government policies should support the work of small business innovators that employ nearly
a million American workers by letting the market and innovation drive solutions to the
environmental challenges that we all seek to solve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 3]
It is no secret that large automakers' BEV programs are losing billions each year despite the
massive financial infusion of taxpayer dollars they receive from the government and subsidies to
purchase EVs. If the largest automakers are struggling right now, how are small automotive
businesses, including specialty aftermarket, repair and replacement parts businesses, and local
garages, expected to survive? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0596, p. 3]
Organization: United Steelworkers (USW)
Also, small and medium manufacturers in the auto supply chain must be informed,
encouraged, and assisted in utilizing these investment opportunities in order to prevent job loss.
At this time, outreach to these companies is limited. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0587, p. 4]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Commenters including Darius, Matthew DiPaulo, MCGA, SEMA and EMA commented that
the proposal would lead to loss in small business value and eliminate jobs. Some commenters
noted that small businesses are not receiving the investments to support the transition to zero-
emission vehicles that the large auto manufacturers are. Some commenters specifically pointed
out these effects for the specialty automotive and automotive aftermarket industries. Darius also
commented that the rule will reduce vehicle choice. SEMA and EMA commented that this rule
will lead to reduced vehicle choice. Kentucky Office of the Attorney General noted that this rule
will affect many people.
EMA noted that the proposed rule will discourage investment in lower carbon fuels and
eliminate opportunities to provide clean green liquid fuels. SEMA commented that there are
other options to zero emission vehicles, and that this rule is a "far too fast mandate." They also
stated that the market and innovations should be allowed to drive solutions to environmental
challenges. USW commented that more outreach is needed to small and medium manufacturers
in the auto supply chain to prevent job loss.
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Response:
Regarding comments that this rule will lead to loss in small business value, including in
aftermarket and specialty automotive markets, we first note we address small business impacts
related to the Regulatory Flexibility Act in RTC Section 25.1. In addition, commenters asserting
that this rule will lead to a loss of small business value generally do not make specific assertions
beyond claims that PEVs will be disruptive. This rule is not a mandate and does not force
manufactures to use any specific technology. Manufacturers can determine the best path of
compliance for them. In addition, as described in Section IV.F and G of the preamble, we
demonstrate that there are multiple pathways to compliance, and that these pathways include a
wide range of mixes of technologies in the fleet, including various mixes of ICE vehicles, strong
hybrid vehicles, PHEVs and BEVs. In the central modeling case for the final rule, results show
that over 80% of the onroad fleet will still be ICE vehicles, and over 50% will still be ICE
vehicles in 2050. As the vast majority of the onroad fleet will continue to be ICE vehicle in 2032,
they will continue to provide business opportunities for small businesses that service ICE
vehicles. In addition, there are considerable opportunities for small businesses to play a role in
the EV supply chain. RTC Section 20 discusses many training and investment opportunities for
jobs along the EV supply chain, including for jobs in high demand like BEV technicians.
Regarding comments that this rule is a "far too fast mandate" we disagree. First, we note that,
as described in Section III.C of the preamble, EPA is finalizing standards for both light- and
medium-duty vehicles that have a slower ramp rate in the early years of the program compared to
the proposal. For the light-duty GHG standards, we have reduced the stringency of the standards
from MYs 2027 through 2031 compared to the proposed standards and have also extended the
phase-down of certain optional credit flexibilities. These changes are responsive to comments
from labor groups and the auto industry that the pace of the standards was too fast, and that more
lead time was needed to provide a more orderly transition that allowed for the scale up of battery
supply chains and vehicle production. In turn, EPA believes that this slower pace of the final
standards will further support workers and labor impacts during the transition to manufacturers
building a range of vehicle technologies to meet the standards, as well as allow for increased
opportunities for training, education and facility upgrades over time.
Regarding comments that more outreach is needed to small and medium manufacturers to
prevent job loss, we note that EPA engaged stakeholders, including labor groups, small volume
manufactures, and others, throughout the proposal and final rule making processes. After the
publication of the proposed rule, EPA held three days of public hearings to provide oral
presentation of data, views and arguments, and held an open comment period during which all
members of the public were encouraged to submit comments on the proposed rule. In addition,
RTC Section 20 discusses some of the programs and investments that may be available to small
and medium manufacturers to support a transition to green sector jobs.
Regarding comments that this rule will discourage investment in lower carbon fuels, refer to
RTC Section 19.1, where other fuels related comments are discussed.
Regarding comments that the rule will hurt workers or eliminate jobs, we refer to our
discussion in RTC Section 20.
Regarding comments that this rule will reduce vehicle choice, we refer to our discussion in
RTC Sections 13 and 14.1.
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24 - [Reserved]
25 - Statutory provisions and Executive Orders
Comments by Organizations
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
Ignoring actual ZEV production costs, including credit trading costs, is arbitrary and
capricious. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 54]
The Administrative Procedure Act requires opportunity for meaningful public input, and
Executive Order 12866 states that, in most cases, agencies should provide a comment period "of
not less than 60 days." Even counting the handful of additional days afforded by EPA's pre-
publication release of the preambles, this period is not sufficient to adequately address the
sweeping scope of EPA's proposals to force electrification of the nation's transportation fleet.
Considerable time is required simply to read and respond to the sheer volume of material
covered in each rulemaking docket, particularly given EPA's evident lack of rigor and discipline
in its citation and characterization of underlying sources. As illustrated in these comments, our
review identified numerous instances in which examination of sources cited by EPA as support
for its conclusions indicated that characterization of these sources is inaccurate, incomplete, or
misleading. Thus, to meaningfully respond to EPA's proposal, the public must fact-check EPA's
work. There are 1,040 footnotes in the text of the HDV rule preamble and 908 in the LD/MDV
rule. Assuming it takes an average of one hour to identify, locate or acquire and read the
underlying reference work cited, and draft a meaningful comment in response, that equates to
130 eight- hour workdays that would be required just to fact-check the HD rule (65 days if one
assumes this work takes only half an hour per cite on average). For the LD/MDV rule, which
would equate to 113.5 eight-hour workdays (or 57 based on assuming 30 minutes per citation).
This analysis does not include the time required to verify sources cited in the DRIAs, much less
the 1,420 supporting and related materials posted to the HDV docket and the 429 posted to the
LD/MDV docket. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 62-63]
Further, the short and concurrently running comment periods on these closely related rules are
exacerbated by EPA's unduly narrow identification of industries affected by this rule. Under the
heading "Does this action apply to me," EPA limits its identification of affected industries to
entities with direct compliance obligations: motor vehicle manufacturers, commercial importers
of vehicles and vehicle components, alternative fuel vehicle converters, and medium duty engine
& vehicle manufacturers.283 Although EPA notes that "this table is not intended to be
exhaustive.. .other types of entities could also be affected," EPA understands many entities
necessarily rely on regulatory screening tools based on search terms tied to their own NAICS
codes to alert them to new proposed rules that may impact them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, p. 63]
283 Proposed Rule at 29,184.
By narrowly limiting the identification of industries affected based on this extremely short
and incomplete list of NAICS codes and by its arbitrary refusal to extend the comment periods,
EPA has unreasonably constrained the number and types of entities that will find out about these
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proposed actions in time to comment. EPA appears to be counting on closing the comment
period before consumers, retailers, farmers, fleet operators, bio and renewable fuel producers,
small businesses, emergency response providers, local governments, or any of the host of other
interests who will be affected by the profound changes in how light and medium duty vehicles
are sold or even realize what is at stake. This sort of gamesmanship is at odds with EPA's
responsibility under the Administrative Procedures Act and the Due Process clause of the U.S.
Constitution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 63]
Organization: Arizona State Legislature
VIII. The proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious because it relies on non-final reports.
On at least two occasions, EPA identifies reports that are not yet final because they are
undergoing peer review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 26]
First, EPA reports that it "commissioned a new full-vehicle teardown study" to compare
manufacturing cost and assembly requirements between gas-powered and electric-powered
vehicles. 88 Fed. Reg. 29,303. "The report was delivered to EPA in February 2023 and will
undergo a contractor-managed peer review process to be completed by mid-2023." Id. EPA even
plans to rely on the report for the final rule: "The results of this study will be used to inform the
analysis for the final rulemaking where appropriate." Id. EPA later admits, "We hope to use this
information in additional analytical discussions in the final rule." Id. at 29,391. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0537, p. 26]
Second, as discussed in Section IV, significant issues exist with EPA's current social cost of
greenhouse gas methodology. However, EPA apparently is working on an update: "Most
recently, EPA has developed a draft updated SC-GHG methodology within a sensitivity analysis
in the regulatory impact analysis of EPA's November 2022 supplemental proposal for oil and gas
standards that is currently undergoing external peer review and a public comment process." After
it published the proposed rule, on May 11, 2023, EPA announced that it had received the peer
review and was "taking the peer reviewers' recommendations under advisement "38 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 26]
38 U.S. EPA, Peer Review of EPA's Draft 'Report on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases: Estimates
Incorporating Recent Scientific Advances' Concludes, May 11, 2023, available at
https://www.epa.gov/environmental- economics/scghg-tsd-peer-review.
Commenters do not know the conclusions and analysis contained in the final versions of these
reports. Presumably, EPA will make changes after receiving the peer-review comments.
Commenters cannot provide fully informed comments on the proposed rule without having the
opportunity to review the final versions of these reports. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 27]
EPA should reopen the public comment process for the proposed rule after it has received the
final versions of these reports. This should occur whether or not EPA intends to make revisions
to the final rule based on the reports or to rely on the reports to support the final rule. If EPA
intends to make revisions of the final rule based on the final versions of these reports,
commenters should have the opportunity to comment on all revisions. The same is true with any
other reports or data that EPA does not cite in the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0537, p. 27]
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Failure by EPA to reopen the public comment process would be arbitrary and capricious. See,
e.g., Texas v. United States Env'tProt. Agency, 389 F. Supp. 3d 497, 506 (S.D. Tex. 2019)
("However, the Agencies' decision not to reopen the Proposed Rule for comment after the
publication of the Final Connectivity Report prejudiced the ability of interested parties to (1)
provide meaningful comments regarding the Final Rule's continuum-based approach to
connectivity and (2) 'mount a credible challenge' to the Final Rule."); Ctr. for Biological
Diversity, Defs. of Wildlife v. Kelly, 93 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1207 (D. Idaho 2015) (granting partial
summary judgment and ordering an additional public comment period after federal agency relied
on peer review comments not discussed or cited in the proposed rule). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0537, p. 27]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
EPA should set strong emissions standards to meet its obligations under presidential
directives on environmental justice. Under Executive Order 12,898, EPA "shall make achieving
environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate,
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs,
policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations." 59 Fed. Reg. 7629
(Feb. 11, 1994). And Executive Order 14,008 directs EPA to develop "programs, policies, and
activities to address the disproportionately high and adverse human health, environmental,
climate-related and other cumulative impacts on disadvantaged communities, as well as the
accompanying economic challenges of such impacts." 86 Fed. Reg. 7619, 7629 (Jan. 27, 2021).
It also establishes the Administration's policy "to secure environmental justice and spur
economic opportunity for disadvantaged communities that have been historically marginalized
and overburdened by pollution." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 18]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
The IRA and BIL both include myriad provisions that seek to support a transition to ZEV
technology through funding of credits for vehicles, components, and critical infrastructure. These
laws were passed with the knowledge that EPA was already setting standards under Section
202(a) that would increase ZEV proliferation and an intent to support those regulations. 15
Congress' aim with the funding was to "combine[] new economic incentives to reduce climate
pollution with bolstered regulatory drivers that will allow EPA to drive further reduction under
its CAA authorities," 16 with the expectation that "future EPA regulations will increasingly rely
on and incentivize zero-emission vehicles as appropriate." 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
pp. 10-11]
15 The BIL was passed after EPA's 2023-2026 light-duty GHG standards, which rely on ZEV technology,
had been proposed and the IRA was passed 9 months after they were finalized. Brief of Senator Thomas R.
Carper and Representative Frank Pallone, Jr. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Texas v. EPA,
No. 22-1031, 29 (D.C. Cir, Mar. 2, 2023), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/Texas%20-
%20Members%20of%20Congress%20%28Sen.%20Carper%20and%20Rep.%20Pallone%29.pdf
(Attachment J).
16 168 Cong. Rec. E868-02 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 2022) (statement of Rep. Pallone discussing the IRA).
17 168 Cong. Rec. at 880-02 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 2022) (statement of Rep. Pallone); see also Greg Dotson
and Dustin J. Maghamfar, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 2022: Clean Air, Climate Change, and the
Inflation Reduction Act, 53 ENV'T L. REP. 10017, 10030 (2023) ("The IRA directs EPA to support zero
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emission technologies for heavy-duty vehicles and port equipment, to reduce emissions in low-income and
disadvantaged communities, as well as to support state ZEV requirements. This is a recognition of the
evolving importance and availability of zero emission technologies."),
https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/files-pdf/53.10017.pdf (Attachment K).
The BIL is another source of considerable federal investment in infrastructure development.
Through its National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) and Charging and Fueling
Infrastructure (CFI) discretionary grant programs, the law allocates $7.5 billion in funding
explicitly towards building out ZEV charging and refueling infrastructure. 130 The NEVI
program directs the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to provide funding to states to
deploy EV charging stations to build an interconnected and reliable charging network. The
FHWA has already announced its first set of plans under the program, which includes investment
in all 50 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. 131 This first round of NEVI
investment is set to bring EV charging to 75,000 miles of highway across the country. 132 The
CFI program provides additional funding for FHWA administered grants to state and local
authorities for development of publicly accessible charging infrastructure. 133 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0786, pp. 52-53]
130 Infrastructure, Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, P.L. 117-58, 135 Stat. 445, 1421. Infrastructure,
Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, P.L. 117-58, 135 Stat. 445, 1421.
131 U.S. Department of Transportation, Historic Step: All Fifty States Plus D.C. and Puerto Rico Greenlit
to Move EV Charging Networks Forward, Covering 75,000 Milles of Highway (Sep. 27, 2022),
https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/historic-step-all-fifty-states-plus-dc-and-puerto-rico-greenlit-
move- ev-charging.
132 U.S. Department of Transportation, Historic Step: All Fifty States Plus D.C. and Puerto Rico Greenlit
to Move EV Charging Networks Forward, Covering 75,000 Milles of Highway (Sep. 27, 2022),
https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/historic-step-all-fifty-states-plus-dc-and-puerto-rico-greenlit-
move- ev-charging.
133 U.S. Department of Transportation, Biden-Harris Administration Opens Applications for First Round
of $2.5 Billion Program to Build EV Charging in Communities & Neighborhoods Nationwide,
https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/biden-harris-administration-opens-applications-first-round-
25-billion- program-build.
On top of these programs, the BIL authorized more than $40 billion combined for the
Congestion Mitigation & Air Quality Improvement Program, National Highway Performance
Program, and Surface Transportation Grant Block Program. 134 These programs are not
dedicated exclusively to charging, but constructing and installing charging infrastructure is an
eligible activity under each of them. Additional funding from the BIL provides grants to states
and local governments for reducing transportation carbon pollution, which will fund additional
infrastructure investments. 135 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 52-53]
134 Infrastructure, Investment and Jobs Act, P.L. 117-58, § 11115.
135 Infrastructure, Investment and Jobs Act, P.L. 117-58, § 11403.
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
III. The Proposed Rule is Arbitrary and Capricious
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, pp. 16-17]
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Organization: Travis Fisher
2. Does not comply with Executive Order 12866; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655,
p. 1]
3. Violates the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 1]
2. THE PROPOSED RULE DOES NOT COMPLY WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER
12866
EPA states that it sought review by the Office of Management and Budget and that "[a]ny
changes made in response to Executive Order 12866 review have been documented in the
docket." 19 Notwithstanding whatever review EPA sought, there remain numerous omissions
regarding the Proposed Rule's compliance with Executive Order 12866. Specifically, section 1
of Executive Order 12866 offers a list of "Principles of Regulation." EPA violates several of the
principles listed. Specifically, the Proposed Rule does not conform with principles 6, 7, 8, nor
10, and thus fails to comply with Executive Order 12866. Before moving forward with a final
rule (or a new proposed rule), EPA should address these areas of non-compliance. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 7]
19 Proposed Rule, 88 FR 29184 at 29404.
Principle 6 states:
"Each agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation and,
recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation
only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, pp. 7-8]
EPA fails to comply with Principle 6 because it has not undertaken a reasonable assessment of
the cost of the Proposed Rule. As discussed above, EPA does not fully account for the Proposed
Rule's impacts on the electricity system, which include increasing the cost of electricity and
harming electric grid reliability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, pp. 7-8]
EPA also overstates the benefits of the Proposed Rule by claiming unreasonably high benefits
from reductions in emissions of fine particulate matter (PM2.5).20 A more accurate estimate of
"co-benefits" from PM2.5 reduction would improve cost-benefit assessments for EPA rules
across the board, including in this Proposed Rule.21 Given the requirement in principle 6 of
Executive Order 12866 for an agency to "adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs," EPA should revisit its cost-benefit
analysis using more accurate estimates of PM2.5 impacts before it can determine that the
benefits of the Proposed Rule in fact outweigh the costs.22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p.
8]
20 Comments to EPA Re: Reconsideration of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate
Matter. Travis Fisher. 2023. Available at: https://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2023/PM25comments.pdf
(accessed July 2, 2023).
21 Will EPA Stop Its Abuse of Costly Pollution-Control 'Co-Benefits' Assessments? Daren Bakst. October
4, 2018. Available at: https://www.heritage.org/agriculture/commentary/will-epa-stop-its-abuse-costly-
pollution-control-co- benefits-assessments (accessed July 2, 2023).
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22 EPA unreasonably treats all species of PM2.5 as equally toxic. This is an incorrect assumption and
should be remedied if EPA moves forward with a final rule. A recent study in the journal Nature (available
at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-35398-0) explains the variability in toxicity among
different chemical species of PM2.5 (and even among combustion temperatures and engine sizes for the
same fuel). Noting the wide range of toxicity of the various chemical components and sources of PM2.5
pollution, EPA should tailor its estimates of PM2.5 co-benefits to match the toxicity of the various forms of
PM2.5. Not all PM2.5 is equally toxic, and therefore not all exposure to PM2.5 is equally costly.
Principle 7 states:
"Each agency shall base its decisions on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical,
economic, and other information concerning the need for, and consequences of, the intended
regulation." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 8]
EPA fails to comply with Principle 7 because, as detailed above, it has not availed itself of the
ample scientific and technical information—well known and published by leading sources such
as NERC, FERC, and PJM—regarding the consequences of EPA regulations on the cost and
reliability of the electricity system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 8]
Principle 8 states:
"Each agency shall identify and assess alternative forms of regulation and shall, to the extent
feasible, specify performance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner of
compliance that regulated entities must adopt." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 8]
EPA fails to comply with Principle 8 because the Proposed Rule is a de facto mandate for
PEVs. Much like the unlawful Clean Power Plan,23 the thrust of the Proposed Rule is to force a
shift away from internal combustion engine vehicles and toward PEVs. Indeed, the performance
objectives outlined in the Proposed Rule are only viable if the regulated entities—drivers in the
U.S.—behave as specified by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 8]
23 See https://archive.epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants-regulatory-
actions.html (accessed July 2, 2023).
Principle 10 states:
"Each agency shall avoid regulations that are inconsistent, incompatible, or duplicative with
its other regulations or those of other Federal agencies." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 9]
EPA fails to comply with principle 10 because, as outlined in the section on electric grid
reliability above, the Proposed Rule is incompatible with the suite of existing and new EPA
regulations that are forcing a large reduction in electricity supply. Although a minor conflict with
an obscure rule from a different agency might be forgivable, EPA's Proposed Rule unreasonably
conflicts with a concurrent proposed rule issued by EPA—the Greenhouse Gas Standards and
Guidelines for Fossil Fuel-Fired Power Plants, issued in May of 2023.24 In fact, it appears that
the DRIA fails to reference or otherwise acknowledge the power plant rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0655, p. 9]
24 New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions From Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean
Energy Rule, 88 FR 33240; May 23, 2023. Available at:
https://www.federalregister.gOv/documents/2023/05/23/2023-10141/new-source- performance-standards-
for-greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-new-modified-and-reconstructed (accessed July 2, 2023).
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3. THE PROPOSED RULE VIOLATES THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM
ACT
The Proposed Rule must satisfy section (a)(3)(B) of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA).25 The UMRA establishes that "before promulgating any general notice of proposed
rulemaking that is likely to result in promulgation of any rule that includes any Federal mandate
that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by
the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any 1 year ... the
agency shall prepare a written statement" containing five categories of analysis, including "any
disproportionate budgetary effects of the Federal mandate upon any particular regions of the
nation or particular State, local, or tribal governments, urban or rural or other types of
communities, or particular segments of the private sector," and "a description of the extent of the
agency's prior consultation with elected representatives ... of the affected State, local, and tribal
governments." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 9]
25 2 U.S.C. 1532. Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edU/uscode/text/2/1532 (accessed July 2, 2023).
The Proposed Rule acknowledges that it would have major financial impacts but claims the
provisions of the UMRA regarding State, local, or Tribal governments do not apply. EPA states:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 9]
This action contains no unfunded Federal mandate for State, local, or Tribal governments as
described in UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1531-1538, and does not significantly or uniquely affect small
governments. This action imposes no enforceable duty on any State, local or Tribal
government.26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 9]
26 Proposed Rule, 88 FR 29184 at 29405.
If the EPA moves forward with a final rule, it should explain why it finds that the federal
mandates included in the Proposed Rule would not significantly affect State, local, or Tribal
governments. As drafted, the Proposed Rule does not detail how it has satisfied the above
procedural requirements of the UMRA and does not indicate that the EPA has undertaken the
required analysis of the impacts on states and local governments and tribes of compliance with
the Proposed Rule. For example, some electric utilities are owned and operated by State, local or
Tribal governments.27 The Proposed Rule will significantly impact the cost of the distribution
systems of those publicly owned utilities, and the DRIA should be amended to evaluate the
extent of the cost increases and the impact of the Proposed Rule on the budgets of State, local or
Tribal governments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, pp. 9-10]
27 Navigating the EV Market: Trends and Changes for Public Power to Know. American Public Power
Association. Available at: https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/documents/Navigating-the-Electric-
Vehicle-Market.pdf (accessed July 2, 2023).
CONCLUSION
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Proposed Rule. For the foregoing reasons,
the EPA should not move forward with this rule without first correcting the many dire flaws in
the Proposed Rule: its violation of section 202 of the Clean Air Act and Executive Order 12866,
its faulty cost-benefit analysis, and its woeful misunderstanding of the U.S. electricity sector as
reflected in the DRIA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0655, p. 10]
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EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
The American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, as well as the Alliance for Consumers,
expressed that the comment period for this rule was not sufficiently long to adequately read and
respond to the material covered in EPA's rulemaking docket. American Fuel & Petrochemical
Manufacturers also expressed that EPA's proposal listed an incomplete list of NAICS codes of
the number and types of entities that will find out about these proposed actions in time to
comment.
Response:
EPA believes that the time for public comment allowed a meaningful opportunity for
comment, as illustrated by the detailed comments submitted by the American Fuel &
Petrochemical Manufacturers and hundreds of thousands of members of the public. The proposal
was announced on April 12, 2023, and the pre-publication version of the notice of proposed
rulemaking was posted to the EPA's website on that same day. The notice was published in the
Federal Register on May 5, 2023, and the public comment period was open until July 5, 2023. In
addition to the written public comment period, the EPA offered a multi-day virtual public
hearing for the public to provide oral comments to the Agency on the proposed rule in May
2023. The EPA considers this a fully adequate amount of time for commenters to provide
comments to the Agency regarding the proposed standards for MY 2027 through MY2032 light
and medium duty vehicles, and we note that EPA received more than 250,000 public comments
on the proposed rulemaking. EPA also considered comments received after the close of the
comment period to the extent practicable.
With respect to identifying the industries that EPA anticipates will be affected by this rule,
EPA identified entities with direct compliance obligations: motor vehicle manufacturers,
commercial importers of vehicles and vehicle components, alternative fuel vehicle converters,
and medium duty engine & vehicle manufacturers. The corresponding table of NAICS codes is
not intended to be exhaustive, and other types of entities could also be affected, as stated in the
rule text.
Summary:
The Alliance for Consumers commented that the rationale for the proposal and its justification
in the context of the tailpipe emissions program is "pretextual," for replacing nearly all gas-
powered cars with EVs.
Response:
EPA neither proposed nor is adopting any mandates for EVs. EPA's standards are
performance-based, meaning that manufacturers choose the mix of technologies they believe best
suited for their fleet to meet the standards, and EPA has demonstrated in this final rule a wide
range of example pathways that manufacturers might choose which include various mixes of ICE
vehicles, hybrids, PHEVs and BEVs.
Summary:
The Alliance for Consumers comments that this rule is arbitrary and capricious under the
APA because it has failed to properly consider the rising price of electric vehicles in the wake of
the Inflation Reduction Act, the limits on credits and subsidies that have resulted from this surge
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in electric vehicle pricing, and the true cost of repairing electric vehicles over a relevant time
horizon. The HF Sinclair Corporation also commented that the proposed rule is arbitrary and
capricious. The American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers commented that this rule is
arbitrary and capricious because it ignores actual ZEV production costs, including credit trading
costs.
Response:
EPA considers in its analysis of the proposed rule in Sections IV.D.4 and VIII of the
Preamble the vehicle technology costs for manufacturers to meet the final standards with a range
of technologies including electric vehicles; we also include estimates for maintenance/repair in
Section VIII. As well, EPA considers a sensitivity case with no credit trading in Section IV.F.5
of the Preamble.
Summary:
The Arizona State Legislature commented that the proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious
because it relies on non-final reports through its commissioned, new full-vehicle teardown study
and social cost of greenhouse gas methodology. Commenters cannot provide fully informed
comments on the proposed rule without having the opportunity to review the final versions of
these reports. EPA should reopen the public comment process for the proposed rule after it has
received the final versions of these reports. Failure by EPA to reopen the public comment
process would be arbitrary and capricious.
Response:
Regarding the full-vehicle teardown study, in the proposal, we described a new full-vehicle
teardown study comparing a gasoline-fueled vehicle and a comparable BEV conducted for EPA
by FEV of America.695 We also indicated in the proposal that we may rely on the information
from this work for the final rule. For example, we indicated that component costs for the BEV
and ICE vehicle might be used to support or update our battery or non-battery costs for
electrified vehicles, or our costs for ICE vehicles; assembly labor data might be used to further
inform the employment analysis; and any other qualitative or quantitative information that could
be drawn from the report might be used in the analysis. Therefore, EPA believes we provided the
public with ample notice about the types of information we were considering for, and in fact now
have applied in, the final rule analysis. The project report was delivered to EPA in February 2023
and underwent a contractor-managed peer review process that has now been completed.696
Regarding social cost of greenhouse gas benefits, EPA noted in the light/medium-duty vehicle
proposal that in the December 2022 Oil and Gas NSPS/EG Supplemental Proposal the Agency
included a sensitivity analysis of the climate benefits of the Supplemental Proposal using a new
set of SC-GHG estimates that incorporates recent research addressing recommendations of the
National Academies in addition to using the interim SC-GHG estimates presented in the
Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide Interim
695 FEV Consulting Inc., "Cost and Technology Evaluation, Conventional Powertrain Vehicle Compared to an
Electrified Powertrain Vehicle, Same Vehicle Class and OEM," prepared for Environmental Protection Agency,
EPA Contract No. 68HERC19D00008, February 2023.
696 Memo to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829, titled "External Peer Review of Cost and Technology
Evaluation, Conventional Powertrain Vehicle Compared to an Electrified Powertrain Vehicle, Same Vehicle Class
and OEM."
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Estimates under Executive Order 13990697 that the IWG recommended for use until updated
estimates that address the National Academies' recommendations are available. EPA believes
this provided sufficient notice for commenters about the updated SC-GHG values that EPA was
considering for, and in fact has decided to apply in, this final rule. A full discussion of the SC-
GHG estimates and the important considerations and limitations associated with its use are
provided in the RIA in Chapter 10. In addition, EPA presents the IWG SC-GHG values as a
comparison in the Appendix to RIA Chapter 9.
Summary:
Environmental and Public Health Organizations commented that EPA should set strong
emissions standards to meet its obligations under Executive Order 12898, which says that EPA
"shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as
appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its
programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations."
Additionally, Executive Order 14008 directs EPA to develop "programs, policies, and activities
to address the disproportionately high and adverse human health, environmental, climate-related
and other cumulative impacts on disadvantaged communities, as well as the accompanying
economic challenges of such impacts."
Response:
As noted in Section IX. J of the preamble that accompanies this final rule, EPA believes that
this action is likely to reduce existing disproportionate and adverse effects on many communities
with EJ concerns. The air pollutant emission reductions that will be achieved by this rule will
improve air quality for the people who reside in close proximity to major roadways and who are
disproportionately represented by people of color and people with low income. We expect that
localized increases in criteria and toxic pollutant emissions from EGUs and reductions in
petroleum-sector emissions could lead to changes in exposure to these pollutants for people
living in the communities near these facilities. Analyses of communities in close proximity to
these sources (such as EGUs and refineries) have found that a higher percentage of communities
of color and low-income communities live near these sources when compared to national
averages. We also note that people of color, low-income populations and/or indigenous peoples
may be especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The GHG emission reductions
from this action will contribute to efforts to reduce the probability of severe impacts related to
climate change.
Summary:
The Environmental Defense Fund commented that the IRA and BIL were passed with the
knowledge that EPA was already setting standards under Section 202(a) that would increase
ZEV proliferation and an intent to support those regulations. Congress' aim with the funding was
to "combine[] new economic incentives to reduce climate pollution with bolstered regulatory
drivers that will allow EPA to drive further reduction under its CAA authorities," with the
expectation that "future EPA regulations will increasingly rely on and incentivize zero-emission
vehicles as appropriate."
697 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (IWG). 2021 (February). Technical Support Document:
Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide: Interim Estimates under Executive Order 13990. United States
Government.
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Response:
EPA acknowledges that Congressional passage of the BIL and IRA represent pivotal
milestones in the creation of a broad-based infrastructure instrumental to the expansion of clean
transportation, including light- and medium-duty zero-emission vehicles, and we have taken
these developments into account in our assessment of the feasibility of the standards (see e.g.,
preamble section I.A.3).
Summary:
Travis Fisher commented that EPA's proposal does not comply with Executive Order 12866,
because it has not undertaken a reasonable assessment of the cost of the Proposed Rule,
overstates the benefits of the Proposed Rule by claiming unreasonably high benefits from
reductions in emissions of fine particulate matter (PM2.5), has not availed itself of the
consequences of EPA regulations on the cost and reliability of the electricity system, is a de facto
mandate for PEVs, and is incompatible with the suite of existing and new EPA regulations that
are forcing a large reduction in electricity supply. Travis Fisher further comments that EPA's
proposal does not detail how it has satisfied the requirements of the UMRA and does not indicate
that the EPA has undertaken the required analysis of the impacts on states and local governments
and tribes of compliance with the Proposed Rule.
Response:
Regarding the comment claiming that EPA did not comply with EO 12866, EPA disagrees.
EPA notes that, consistent with CAA section 202, in evaluating potential standards we carefully
weigh the statutory factors, including the emissions impacts of the standards, and the feasibility
of the standards (including cost of compliance in light of available lead time). We monetize
benefits of the standards and evaluate other costs in part to enable a comparison of costs and
benefits pursuant to E.O. 12866, but we recognize there are benefits that we are currently unable
to fully quantify. EPA's practice has been to set standards to achieve improved air quality
consistent with CAA section 202, and not to rely on cost-benefit calculations, with their
uncertainties and limitations, as identifying the appropriate standards. Nonetheless, our
conclusion that the estimated benefits exceed the estimated costs of the program reinforces our
view that the standards are appropriate under section 202(a).
Comments regarding PM health benefits are addressed in RTC section 8.5. Comments
regarding potential impacts on the electric grid are addressed in RTC section 18. Comments that
this rule is a de facto BEV mandate are addressed in the first response in this section and
elsewhere (e.g., RTC section 3.3.1).
In response to the comment that EPA's proposal did not satisfy the requirements of UMRA,
this action contains no unfunded Federal mandate for State, local, or Tribal governments as
described in UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1531-1538, and does not significantly or uniquely affect small
governments. This action imposes no enforceable duty on any State, local or Tribal government.
This action contains Federal mandates under UMRA that may result in expenditures of $100
million or more for state, local, and Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or the private sector in
any one year. Accordingly, the EPA has prepared a written statement of the costs and benefits
associated with action as required under section 202 of UMRA. This action is not subject to the
requirement of section 203 of UMRA because it contains no regulatory requirements that might
significantly or uniquely affect small governments. This issue is further discussed Section IX.D
of the Preamble.
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25.1 - Regulatory Flexibility Act
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Ad Hoc Tier 4 Light-Duty Small Manufacturer Group
B. Overview
US vehicle sales by Small OEMs have no meaningful environmental impact:
-The above companies as a group represent a tiny fraction of the US automobile market. The
fraction is so small that the companies have a minuscule impact on US air pollution. Together
the companies accounted for about 4000 car sales in the US in CY 2022, which represents 0.15%
of the total 2.9 million US passenger car sales for that year. If we just look at the Small
Businesses in the Ad Hoc Group, they collectively sold about 100 cars in the US in 2022 — a
mere 0.003% of the 2.9 million volume. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 1-2]
-The vehicles of the Ad Hoc Group's members are not "daily drivers" but rather "occasional
use" cars. As a result, the average annual mileage driven by these vehicles is drastically less
than— perhaps 25% of — the average annual mileage of a typical passenger car. Fewer miles
driven is one way to reduce vehicular pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 1-2]
- EPA's apparent misunderstanding of what Small OEMs are selling in the US [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 3]
Neither with regard to criteria emissions nor GHG does EPA explain its thinking behind the
elimination of Small OEM flexibility. But a misstatement in the NPRM preamble may shed light
on the absence of necessary and proper Small OEM additional leadtime / flexibility in the
NPRM: on page 596 of the preamble of the NPRM document, EPA incorrectly states (as it does
the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis) that the "proposed NMOG+NOx standards should have
no impact on the existing Small Business manufacturers, which currently produce only
electric vehicles." This is simply not so. There most certainly are Small Businesses that produce
internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles for the US market. Four of the seven members of the
AD Hoc Group preparing this report are Small Businesses who are, or soon will be, selling ICE
vehicles in the US market.[2] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 3]
2 At least one of these Small Businesses tried in 2022 to participate in EPA's Regulatory Flexibility Act
SBREFA process, but for some unexplained reason was not included by EPA.
3 EPA has mistakenly indicated that the SBREFA process is only open to US small businesses. This is not
correct. In a 2021 US District Court (DC) case, plaintiffs challenged the Internal Revenue Service's alleged
failure to conduct a small business impact analysis under the Regulatory Flexibility Act ("RFA") when it
promulgated a set of rules. The court stated as follows: Defendants [government] argued that because
[plaintiffs] did not have a place of business in the United States and did not make any showing as to the
economic effects of the business in the United States, it had failed to establish itself as a "small business
concern" under the Small Business Act and thus was not a "small entity" under the RFA. ... To complete
the record, the court now rejects that argument. The court is unconvinced that the supplemental definition
contained in 13 C.F.R. § 121.105 applies to the definition of "small entities" for purposes of the RFA. The
Small Business Act allows the SB A Administrator to supplement the Act's statutory definition with criteria
"by which a business concern may be determined to be a small business concern for purposes of this
chapter or any other Act. " 15 U.S.C. § 632(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The regulation on which
Defendants rely, 13 C.F.R. § 121.105, on its face only provides a further definition of "small business
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concern" for purposes of "eligibility] for assistance from SB A"—which is not at issue here. Section
121.105 does not purport to supply additional definitional terms for "any other Act," including the RFA.
So, the court cannot conclude that because [plaintiffs do] not meet the supplemental defining terms
contained in section 121.105 it does not qualify as a "small entity" for purposes of filing suit under the
-EPA is requesting comment on the idea of imposing on Small Business manufacturers an
annual production cap (e.g., 200-500 vehicles per year) on vehicles eligible for the Small
Business GHG exemption. The Small Business members of the AD Hoc Group oppose any such
cap on the grounds that setting a cap at a given level is totally arbitrary, and the environmental
benefits of any such cap are virtually nonexistent and are vastly outweighed by the potential
burden. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, pp. 7-8]
Organization: Job Creators Network Foundation (JCNF)
In addition to being unconstitutional, EPA also improperly certifies the proposed rule as not
having a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act. That is false. Millions of small businesses use a car or light-duty
truck for their work. Cars are an integral part of certain industries, like limousine or other car
service providers. But the local landscaper, caterer, interior designer, or even the hairdresser who
sees clients at their homes, will use a car for all or a significant part of their business. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0709, p. 2]
Electric cars are at least $10,000 more than the equivalent gas-powered car. For the small
business owner operating on razor-thin margins, $10,000 is a significant increased expense. And
that is just the cost represented to purchase the vehicle. It does not include the cost of lost time
waiting forty-five minutes for an electric car to charge. Or the fact that if the battery pack of an
electric vehicle is damaged in an automobile accident, it likely means the car is totaled and
would have to be replaced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0709, p. 2]
EPA should certify that its proposed rule has a significant impact on a substantial number of
small entities under the RFA, prepare the required Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, and
conduct the required Small Business Advocacy Review Panel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0709,
p. 2]
Organization: National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) et al.
VI. The Proposed Rule Is Contrary To The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
Act of 1996.
Finally, EPA's certification that the Proposed Rule will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities is unsupported by the record.72 Our industry is
one of small businesses. More than 60 percent of convenience stores are single-store operators.
Less than 0.2 percent of convenience stores that sell gas are owned by a major oil company and
about 4 percent are owned by a refining company, meaning that independent businesses
comprise more than 95 percent of the industry. Though small, our members in the industry
process more than 165 million transactions every day. While EPA considered effects to
manufacturers it considered small businesses, EPA did not fairly assess the potential impacts of
the Proposed Rule to non-manufacturer small businesses like our members—contrary to
Congress's intent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p. 18]
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72 Proposed Rule at 29,404.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act ("SBREFA"), requires agencies like EPA to determine, to the extent feasible, the
rule's economic impact on small entities, explore regulatory options for reducing any significant
economic impacts on a substantial number of such entities, and explain their ultimate choice of
regulatory approach. But the Proposed Rule is accompanied by little to no information on
potential impacts on these small businesses. There is no formal or informal analysis of the
adverse economic impacts to small businesses, no SBREFA screening analysis, no analysis,
advice, and no recommendation from a Small Business Advocacy Review ("SBAR") Panel. As
reiterated throughout these comments, the impacts on our members are far from inconsequential.
Thus, we urge EPA in any future rulemaking to further engage in a thorough review of adverse
effects to small businesses like our members consistent with their charge under the SBREFA.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0648, p. 18]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary for JCNF and NACS:
EPA received two comments on the draft Regulatory Flexibility Act analysis performed for
this rule, one on behalf of small businesses and one on behalf of fuel providers. JCNF, an
organization founded by entrepreneurs, commented that the proposed rule would affect small
businesses that use cars or light-duty trucks, such as limousine or other car service providers,
landscapers, caterers, interior designers, and hairdressers. This commenter believed that these
small companies should have been included in EPA's RFA analysis because the cost of
purchasing and using EVs would be a significant increase in costs for them. NACS, NATSO,
and SIGMA, which represent the convenience store industry (NACS), travel centers and truck
stops (NATSO), and independent chain retailers and marketers of motor fuel (SIGMA)
commented that many of their members are single-store operators. They stated that these non-
manufacturer small businesses, which together represent 9 percent of the motor fuel sold in the
United States, should be included in EPA's Regulatory Flexibility Act analysis for this rule. The
commenters stated that the proposed rule had little to no information on potential impacts on
these small businesses, and there is no formal or informal analysis of the adverse economic
impacts to small businesses, no SBREFA screening analysis, and no recommendation from a
Small Business Advocacy Review ("SBAR") panel.
Summary for Ad Hoc Tier 4 Light-Duty Small Manufacturer Group:
The Ad Hoc Tier 4 Light-Duty Small Manufacturer Group stated the EPA wrongly excluded
small gasoline vehicle producing OEMs that they believed should have been included in EPA's
consideration of the NMOG+NOx standards. They also responded to EPA's request for
comment on limiting the number of vehicles exempted from the GHG standards stating that they
thought this limitation was arbitrary and provided no environmental protection.
Response for JCNF and NACS:
Our assessment of small business impacts prepared to support EPA's certification that the rule
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities was
appropriately, as required under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, limited to small entities that
would be regulated under the proposed rulemaking (i.e., vehicle manufacturers, alternative fuel
converters and independent commercial importers). Other than those entities, this rule does not
3395
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impose any requirements on small businesses. Other small entities, such as small convenience
store operators, are not regulated entities under the final rule. The impacts on small businesses to
which the commenters refer would not be effects of the rule on regulated entities, and thus are
not impacts that EPA is required to analyze per the RFA. See Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v.
EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that "this court has consistently rejected the
contention that the RFA applies to small businesses indirectly affected by the regulation of other
entities"), Mid-Tex Elec. Coop. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327, 342-43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("An agency
may properly certify that no regulatory flexibility analysis is necessary when it determines that
the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities that
are subject to the requirements of the rule. . . . Congress did not intend to require that every
agency consider every indirect effect that any regulation might have on small businesses in any
stratum of the national economy."); see also Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.
3d 102, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Even though EPA is not required in our Regulatory Flexibility Act analysis to include effects
on non-regulated small businesses since they are not regulated entities under the rule, the Agency
nonetheless considered issues such as vehicle affordability, charging time, and effects on
employment. These are discussed in the RIA for this rule in chapters 4, 5 and 10 as well as in
Sections 8, 13, 14, 17, and 21 of this RTC document.
Response to the Ad Hoc Tier 4 Light-Duty Small Manufacturer Group:
EPA recognizes that small entity manufacturers make up a small portion of total vehicle fleet
sales. As for the commenter's concern that EPA did not consider small gasoline vehicle
manufacturers, EPA did assess these potential manufacturers and determined that none of them
qualified under the RFA for various reasons. One of the potential manufacturers has never
certified a vehicle or initiated the vehicle certification process. EPA believes it is not appropriate
to consider companies that may hypothetically at some future date apply to certify a vehicle.
EPA also cannot consider foreign companies that do not meet all of the requirements for the
RFA. There are specific requirements for a foreign company to qualify under the RFA and none
of the potential gasoline vehicle manufacturers we evaluated met those qualifications. The RFA
defines "small business" as having the same meaning as "small business concern" under section
3 of the Small Business Act. Section 3 of the Small Business Act, in turn, provides that "the
Administrator may specify detailed definitions or standards by which a business concern may be
determined to be a small business concern for the purposes of this Act..." 15 U.S.C. §
632(a)(2)(A). The Small Business Administration has issued regulations with a detailed
definition of a "business concern" as a "a business entity organized for profit, with a place of
business located in the United States, and which operates primarily within the United States or
which makes a significant contribution to the U.S. economy through payment of taxes or use of
American products, materials or labor." 13 C.F.R. § 121.105.698 This is a longstanding
definition which applies broadly to SB A programs under the Small Business Act.699 Indeed one
698 See also, US Small Business Administration, Small Business Compliance Guide, (March 2023), at 7 (same
requirements). A small agricultural cooperative has distinct requirements but those are not relevant here.
699 This provision has been recodified several times. See e.g., 54 FR 52634 (Dec. 21, 1989) (promulgating a prior
recodification to "define 'business concern or concern' for the purpose of Small Business Administration (SBA)
programs"), id. at 52636 ("This section restates SBA's definition of 'concern' previously found at 13 CFR 121.3(b)
and applies to all small business programs, except SBA's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program")
(rejecting proposal to add a requirement of US ownership as well).
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of the central purposes of the Small Business Act is to "to maintain and strengthen the overall
economy of the Nation" and to achieve that purpose Congress directed the SBA to assist small
business by "enhancing their ability to compete effectively and efficiently against imports."
Public Law 85-536, section 2. It would be directly contrary to Congressional purpose to ignore
the SBA's regulatory definition pursuant to the Small Business Act, which is incorporated by
reference in the RFA, and instead interpret the statutory definition of "business concern" in the
Small Business Act to require agencies to make it easier for businesses with no presence in the
United States and which make no contribution to the United States economy to compete with
businesses, including small businesses, that do contribute to the US economy.
Under this final rule, EPA exempted small entity manufacturers from complying with the
GHG standards, subject to a limitation as described in the next paragraph. As for the
NMOG+NOx standards, EPA is finalizing an alternate phase-in which delays compliance for
small entities. Details are available in section III.C. 10 of the preamble.
EPA disagrees with the comments claiming there is no environmental protection from
limiting the number of vehicles exempted from the GHG standards. The comments didn't
provide any data or analysis or offer a specific basis for these claims. Limiting the number of
exempt vehicles will create a cap on the number of vehicles that can be sold with potentially
extremely high GHG emissions compared to other vehicles in the fleet subject to our final fleet-
average standards, which EPA believes is necessary to provide an important safeguard for both
environmental protection and a level playing field for manufacturers. Moreover, EPA's
evaluation shows that existing small entities sell volumes of vehicles well below this limit, and
thus the cap is expected to have no material adverse impact on small entities.
26 - Coordination/harmonization between EPA's GHG
standards, NHTSA's CAFE standards, and state regulations
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
4. NHTSA Car and Truck Definitions
EPA intends to continue to use the NHTSA car and truck definitions for its light-duty GHG
program. We generally support this approach. However, because NHTSA has yet to propose its
CAFE rules for MY 2027 and beyond, we do not know for certain whether NHTSA will
maintain the existing definitions that EPA has based its proposal upon. Additionally, our
understanding is that NHTSA is developing test procedures that may have the effect of changing
the classification of some vehicles regardless of the present definitions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.110-111]
There is also the potential for misalignment between EPA and NHTSA in the definition of
medium-duty passenger vehicles. EPA is proposing to modify the definitions of medium-duty
vehicles / medium-duty passenger vehicles. It is unclear what NHTSA may or may not do to
align with EPA's proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 110-111]
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We urge EPA to coordinate with NHTSA in developing its final rule to ensure that the
proposed greenhouse gas standards in the NPRM are not in conflict with changes NHTSA may
propose in its CAFE rulemaking, or through later test procedure changes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp.110-111]
Organization: Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE)
AVE requests that EPA provide the automotive industry with greater certainty.
AVE is concerned that EPA and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA)
decision to proceed independently of the other with new LD and MD vehicle standards will
create additional regulatory uncertainty for the automotive industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0631, pp. 2-4]
One National Program
In 2010, EPA and NHTSA touted the benefits of joint rulemaking under the umbrella of a
National Program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 2-4]
The National Program will deliver additional environmental and energy benefits, cost savings,
and administrative efficiencies on a nationwide basis that would likely not be available under a
less coordinated approach. The National Program also represents regulatory convergence by
making it possible for the standards of two different Federal agencies and the standards of
California and other states to act in a unified fashion in providing these benefits. The National
Program will allow automakers to produce and sell a single fleet nationally, mitigating the
additional costs that manufacturers would otherwise face in having to comply with multiple sets
of Federal and State standards. 1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 2-4]
1 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 88 / Friday, May 7, 2010, at 25326
This approach was not an isolated occurrence. EPA and NHTSA proceeded in 2012 to finalize
joint standards for LD vehicles starting in 2017 and beyond.2 The agencies then worked jointly
again in 2017 and issued a Final Determination on the Appropriateness of the Model Year 2022-
2025 Light- Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards under the Midterm Evaluation.3
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 2-4]
2 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 199 / Monday, October 15, 2012, at 62624
3 https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P 100QQ91 .pdf
Although EPA states that the Agency has consulted with NHTSA on the Proposal, no
explanation is given as to why the two agencies have changed course after more than a decade of
working jointly. The reasoning stated in earlier rulemakings for one National Program remains
relevant. Without full coordination, the U.S. will emerge with vastly different standards for
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and fuel economy that will vary from state to state. More
importantly, automakers may be forced to choose between compliance with one agency's
program and non-compliance with another. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 2-4]
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Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
Relatedly, Congress established the need to consider technology feasibility in establishing
fuel economy regulations under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act ("EPCA"). Here, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") "may not consider" the fuel
economy of EVs in setting Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. 107 Conducting
joint EPA- NHTSA rulemakings for complementary GHG and CAFE requirements helps OEMs
comply with both agencies' standards. But in forgoing joint rulemaking, EPA ignores Congress'
determination that EVs cannot be considered when determining what is the maximum feasible
fuel economy level from which to develop regulations. Allowing EPA to consider EVs and, in
turn, establish de facto ZEV mandates (and de facto average fuel economy standards) ultimately
skews the new vehicle market and impede NHTSA's ability to establish its own CAFE standards
that comport with EPCA. Most importantly, such an approach directly contravenes the
underlying premise of the Supreme Court's holding in Massachusetts v. EPA that "[EPA and
NHTSA] obligations may overlap, but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both
administer their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency." 108 After implementing GHG
standards jointly withNHTSA's fuel economy standards since 2012, and despite Government
Accountability Office recommendations to the contrary, 109 EPA separated the rulemaking to
undo previously established MY 2023-2026 standards and, in this case, to avoid the direct
statutory prohibition on consideration of EVs when establishing fuel economy standards. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 25-26]
107 49 U.S.C. § 32902(h). Here, NHTSA may not consider the fuel economy of "dedicated automobiles,"
which are defined as those that operate only on "alternative fuel." Alternative fuel, in turn, includes
electricity. 49 U.S.C. § 32901®.
108 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
109 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, "NHTSA and EPA's Partnership for Setting Fuel
Economy and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards Improved Analysis and Should be Maintained"
(February 2010) available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-10-336.pdf
Organization: Arconic Corporation (ARCO)
In general, Arconic urges EPA to consider a few key points as it moves to finalize this
proposed rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741, p. 2]
Organization: BMW of North America, LLC (BMW NA)
With regard to the Agency's Proposed Rule, we respectfully submit that coordination between
NHTSA and EPA during the rulemaking process is critical toward establishing harmonized
standards. In light of differing statutes and regulations between NHTSA's CAFE program and
EPA's GHG program, the Agencies have historically recognized and accounted for these
differences in the standard setting process. However, as of this date, NHTSA has not publicized
an NPRM for CAFE MY27+, and we therefore share the concern of the Alliance of Automotive
Innovators, that the decoupling of the rulemaking timeline of both regulations may lead to
material inconsistencies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 1]
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BMW NA therefore would like to encourage the agencies to continue to work closely
together, to enable manufacturers to abide by both sets of regulations with one single fleet.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0677, p. 1]
Organization: Competitive Enterprise Institute
Second, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) directed the EPA and the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to "avoid inconsistency" between
future corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards and GHG motor vehicle standards.51
Accordingly, in 2010, 2012, 2016, and 2020, the EPA and NHTSA engaged in joint rulemakings,
simultaneously promulgating coordinated fleet-average GHG and fuel economy standards.
Coordination is readily achieved because fleet-average tailpipe C02 emissions and fuel economy
standards are mathematically convertible. For example, NHTSA's CAFE standards are calibrated
in both miles per gallon and grams of C02 per mile:52 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 13-
14]
51 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
52 NHTSA, Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years 2024-2026 Passenger Cars and
Light Trucks, 87 FR 25710, 25735-25736, May 2, 2022, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-
05-02/pdf/2022- 07200.pdf.
Table II-4 - Estimated Average of CAFE Levels *MPG Required under Final Rule [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 13-14]
Fleet 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
2029
Passenger Cars
49
.2
53.4
59.4
59.4
59.3
59.3
Light Trucks
35.
1
38.2
42.4
42.4
42.4
42.4
Overall Fleet
40.
6
44.2
49.1
49.1
49.2
49.3
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 13-14]
Table II-6 - Estimated C02 Levels Equivalent to Average of CAFE Levels Required Under
Final Rule (Gram per Mile C02 Levels) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 13-14]
Fleet 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
2029
Passenger
Cars 181 166 150 150 150 150
Light
Trucks 253 253 210 210 210 210
Overall
Fleet 219 201 181 181 181 180
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 13-14]
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As the EPA and NHTSA's proposed 2018 joint rulemaking put it, "Basic chemistry makes
fuel economy and tailpipe C02 emissions two sides of the same coin."53 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0611, pp.13-14]
53 NHTSA and EPA, The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for 2021-2026 Passenger
Cars and Light Trucks, 83 FR 42937, 43209, 43327, August 24, 2018,
https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/FR-2018-08- 24/pdf/2018-16820.pdf.
Although the agencies no longer conduct joint rulemakings, they profess a continuing
"commitment" to coordinate their respective standards. 54 The seriousness of that commitment
may well be questioned. NHTSA's passenger car target in 2029 is 150 grams C02 per mile. The
EPA's target for 2029 is 99 grams C02 per mile55—51 percent more stringent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0611, pp.13-14]
54 86 FR 74434, 74457; 87 FR 25710, 25730.
55 88 FR 29201.
Table 8 - Comparison of Proposed Car Standards to Alternatives [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0611, pp.13-14]
Model Year Proposed stds C02 (g/mile) Alternative 1 C02 (g/mile) Alternative
2 C02 (g/mile) Alternative 3 C02 (g/mile)
2026 Adjusted 152 152 152 152
2027 134 124 144 139
2028 116 106 126 126
2029 99 89 108 112
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, pp. 13-14]
Congress Prohibits NHTSA, the Only Agency Authorized to Establish Fleetwide-Average
Standards, from Regulating Gasoline-Powered Vehicles Out of the Market.
In 1992, Congress prohibited NHTSA from considering the fuel economy of EVs and other
alternative vehicles when promulgating CAFE standards. The clear intent was to ensure that
NHTSA does not set fleet-average standards that no gasoline-powered vehicle can meet.
Petitioners explain: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, p. 18]
In the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress directed NHTSA to set fuel-economy standards
based on averages, but prohibited NHTSA from setting fuel-economy standards that average in
the fuel economy of electric vehicles. See Pub. L. No. 102-486 §§ 302,403, 106 Stat. 2776,
2870-2871, 2876 (later codified at 49 U.S.C. § 32902(h)). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, p.
18]
Petitioners spotlight the key point:
This prohibition bars NHTSA from doing exactly what EPA is doing here: misusing its
regulatory authority to force a transition from conventional vehicles to electric vehicles by
artificially tightening the "average" standard a fleet must meet. Of course, when Congress
finalized the language of Section 202(a)(1) in 1977, it had no need to explicitly block EPA from
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considering electric vehicles, because it did not contemplate that EPA would set emission
standards using averaging in the first place (or that EPA would be setting standards for
greenhouse gases). The prohibition on NHTSA nevertheless underscores just how far EPA is
reaching here: it is straining statutory language to seize a power that Congress expressly denied
to a sister agency that actually has authority to promulgate fleetwide-average standards.71[EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, p. 18]
71 Petitioners' Initial Brief, pp. 61-62.
Organization: Cummins
A harmonized national program for criteria pollutant, GHG, and fuel efficiency
standards by EPA, the California Air Resources Board (CARB), and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is essential to assure the greatest improvements are
achieved in the most cost-efficient manner and to provide vehicle and engine manufacturers,
suppliers, and end-users with the certainty necessary for investment in technologies to improve
emissions. We urge the agencies to work together towards a single, nationwide program. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0645, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Ford Motor Company
Finally, beyond the regulation proposed here, we encourage EPA, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, and California to harmonize their GHG standards, fuel economy
standards, criteria emissions, testing protocols and ZEV requirements. Each of these
requirements is ultimately regulating the same aspects of the same vehicles and fleets, at the
same time. During this extraordinary period of transition, automakers need harmonization
between these programs. We are concerned that well-intentioned but technically contradictory
rules from different agencies—especially those designed to continue to eke out marginal
improvements on internal combustion vehicles—will divert resources from electrification. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0605, p. 4]
Organization: Fuel Freedom Foundation
Harmonize NHTSA and EPA policies. FFVs are credited under the CAFE program, but not in
EPA's own GHG Standards. From the beginning of the unified National Program, the agencies
have committed to harmonizing the requirements to minimize the regulatory burden on OEMs.
The current disharmony between the programs can be easily addressed by incorporating
equivalent credit for the manufacture of FFVs within the GHG Standards program, to not only
enable more widespread use of lower-carbon E85, but to spur vehicle technology innovation for
high-performance spark ignition engines that can be coupled with electrification in plug-in
hybrid vehicles. Toyota is already leading the way on developing flex-fuel hybrids with its
Hybrid Flex Corolla that is being pioneered by Toyota of Brazil and exported to India. 13 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, pp. 3-4]
13 ET Auto, "Toyota launches pilot project on flex-fuel strong hybrid EVs in India," at
https://auto.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/toyota-launches-pilot-project-on-flexi-fuel-strong-hybrid-
electric-vehicles- ffv-shev-in-india-signs-mou-with-iisc-bengaluru/94786626, and Nikkei Asia, "Toyota to
invest $334m to make compact biofuel hybrids in Brazil, Carmaker seeks to provide consumers with
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cheaper, eco-friendly vehicles," at https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Automobiles/Toyota-to-invest-334m-
to-make-compact-biofuel-hybrids-in-Brazil
There are significant public policy reasons to justify further harmonizing the GHG Standards
and CAFE Standards with a commensurate FFV credit: 1.) maximize the cost effectiveness of
GHG reductions in light-duty transportation, 2.) realize GHG emissions reductions sooner rather
than later, 3.) increase national and energy security by reducing petroleum dependence, and 4.)
achieve GHG Standards program goals while minimizing consumer disruption and cost. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, pp. 5-6]
In light of these rationales, to both fully realize the ambitious GHG reductions in the GHG
Standards Proposed Rule and ensure the program's long-term success in progressing to Net-
Zero GHG emissions in transportation, Fuel Freedom strongly encourages the EPA to re-adopt
credit for the production of FFVs within the GHG Standards program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0711, pp. 5-6]
[See original attachment for Appendix A: Photo of prices at a fueling station in Costa Mesa,
California in April 2022] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, pp. 5-6]
Organization: General Motors, LLC (GM)
GM supports and encourages whole-of-government coordination between the applicable
federal and
state agencies to achieve them. In particular, we encourage the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), Department of Energy (DOE), and California Air Resource Board (CARB) to work
together to ensure a fleet that complies with the finalized EPA greenhouse gas (GHG) programs
(light-duty, medium-duty) also complies with EPA's criteria pollutant (light-duty, medium-duty),
NHTSA's light-duty Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE), NHTSA's medium-duty
Corporate Average Fuel Consumption (CAFC), CARB's criteria pollutant Low Emission
Vehicle IV (LEV IV), and CARB's GHG regulations. Coordination across the US federal
government and with CARB will best ensure that communities, workers, consumers, and
industry can successfully achieve this decarbonization transition [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0700, p. 4]
Including the proposed EPA standards, that makes six regulations with varying sub-level
averaging sets for classes within each (e.g., for cars, trucks, and within given weight thresholds).
These regulations could require each automaker to exceed 50% EVs in at least a dozen vehicle
averaging sets in the approximate 2030 timeframe. GM is confident in its approach to transition
to 50% EVs by 2030, and towards 100% in 2035, but our ability to meet such precise EV shares
in every applicable averaging set in each model year is less clear. As a result, we are concerned
that either a potential lack of clarity or a lack of coordination across the agencies may hinder an
automaker's ability to remain in compliance, year-after-year, across each of these regulatory
programs even while meeting EPA's overall EV targets. Worse, regulatory misalignment can
lead to unanticipated consequences that can include higher emissions through OEM- specific
settlement agreements and added costs for OEMs that will impact jobs, capital investments, and
ultimately the success of the transition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 4]
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GM fully supports GHG regulations in line with the Executive Order goals (i.e., 50% EV
share 2030, 60% GHG reduction from model year 2021 to 2030) and believes it's critical that all
the other associated regulations also allow that same federal GHG-compliant fleet to comply
without paying penalties, restricting product, or purchasing credits. We urge EPA, NHTSA, and
CARB to base their regulations, and their analyses of industry compliance, on the same level of
EV deployment and internal combustion engine (ICE) criteria pollutant and efficiency
improvement. Any mismatch in these assumptions could lead to de facto stringency that
supersedes the technology deployment projected by any of the agencies individually. Any such
mismatches, as mentioned above, have the potential to slow progress on the industry's EV
transition and the nation's decarbonization journey. Finalizing aligned regulations ensures
industry's ability to meet our collective EV transition and climate goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0700, p. 4]
For the agencies to navigate this coordination across regulations, we have four primary
recommendations: First, we recommend the federal agencies develop a "Leadership Pathway"
(described below) which reduces duplicative requirements across the regulations for any
automaker that exceeds national-level EV goals (e.g., 50% EVs by 2030, 67% by 2032). Second,
we recommend that regulators continue their due diligence to ensure that one fleet of vehicles
simultaneously complies across the six regulations with the deployment of the same set of
vehicles. Such an analysis for each automaker would be applicable to each one of the agencies'
final rule regulatory analyses, including how the modeled EPA-, NHTSA-, and CARB-regulated
fleets each maintain a consistent level of EVs and ICE improvement compliant with each of the
regulated classes in the six separate regulations. Third, we recommend that the agencies fully and
completely align their vehicle class definitions. Fourth, we recommend that each agency allow
full fungibility of credits across regulated vehicle classes or otherwise adjust standard stringency,
if vehicle classes have constraints that prevent alignment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, pp.
4-5]
Considering that the transition to EVs can successfully achieve the objectives of each
regulation, we see great potential for EPA, in collaboration with the other agencies, to steer the
regulations to be fully aligned. As vehicle manufacturers move toward all EVs, and the
regulations are each dependent on this same underlying EV trend, the above recommendations
are all warranted and fitting to ease the duplicative burdens in this transformative and
unprecedented industry-wide EV transition to which we are committed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0700, pp. 4-5]
We urge EPA to coordinate with NHTSA and DOE to ensure the agencies have a common set
of assumptions for how companies can comply with the various rules, and also that the relative
compliance value for EVs be aligned across the regulations. If DOE's Petroleum- Equivalent
Fuel Economy Calculation is adopted as published, there is the potential for the NHTSA CAFE
regulation to effectively require much greater EV shares and/or greater internal combustion
improvements than the EPA GHG rule. Such unaligned EV compliance ratings could create
mixed market signals, with some automakers complying with the GHG rule and not CAFE, and
vice versa for other companies, with no deliberate environmental benefit in either case. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 5]
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Organization: Governing for Impact and Evergreen Action (GFI)
Finally, suggestions by some opponents that the EPA must promulgate its emissions standards
in coordination with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"),75 which
sets fuel- economy standards but is prohibited from taking EVs' fuel economy into account in
setting those standards, are wrong. While it is true that the two agencies have jointly
promulgated GHG and fuel economy regulations in the past, there is no statutory requirement
that they do so—and the agencies did not do so in 2021 when the EPA promulgated 202(a) GHG
regulations for MYs 2023-2026.76 In fact, the Supreme Court has described the EPA's authority
to regulate carbon emissions from motor vehicles as "a statutory obligation wholly independent"
from NHTSA's energy efficiency mandate regarding mileage requirements.77 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0621, pp. 9-10]
75 See, e.g., Private Petitioners' brief, Texas v. E.P.A., D.C. Cir. No. 22-1031.
76 "Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards," 86
Fed. Reg. 74434 (Dec. 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/12/30/2021-27854/revised-
2023-and-later-model-year- light-duty-vehicle-greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards.
77 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). See also Coal, for Responsible Regul., Inc. v.
E.P.A., 684 F.3d 102, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining why NHTSA's regulatory obligations do not affect
the EPA's obligations under the CAA); Proposed Rule at fn. 388; Dan Farber, "The Car Rule and the Major
Questions Doctrine," Legal Planet (April 24, 2023), https://legal-planet.org/2023/04/24/the-car-rule-and-
the-major-questions-doctrine/; Proof Brief of the Institute for Policy Integrity at 10-11.
Organization: HF Sinclair Corporation
c. The Proposed Rule Runs Afoul of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act ("EPCA"), Congress provided that NHTSA
"may not consider" the fuel economy of EVs in setting Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards.25 Doing so puts an important restriction on how NHTSA evaluates the
technological feasibility of fuel economy standards. Conducting joint EPA-NHTSA rulemakings
for complimentary GHG and CAFE requirements ensures that OEMs can comply with both
agencies' standards with the same fleet. But in forgoing a joint rulemaking, EPA seeks to ignore
Congress' determination that EVs cannot be taken into account when considering what is the
maximum feasible fuel economy level from which to develop regulations. Allowing EPA to
consider EVs and, in turn, establish de-facto EV mandates will ultimately skew the market of
new vehicles and impede NHTSA's ability to establish its own CAFE standards that comport
with EPCA. Most importantly, such an approach directly contravenes the underlying premise of
the Supreme Court's holding in Massachusetts v. EPA—"[EPA and NHTSA] obligations may
overlap, but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations
and yet avoid inconsistency."26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0579, p. 7]
25 49 U.S.C. § 32902(h). Here, NHTSA may not consider the fuel economy of "dedicated automobiles,"
which are defined as those that operate only on "alternative fuel." Alternative fuel, in turn, includes
electricity. 49 U.S.C. § 32901®.
26 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
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Organization: Kentucky Office of the Attorney General et al.
EPA first regulated GHG emissions from motor vehicles following the Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, which held that EPA had certain authority under the CAA to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Following the
Massachusetts decision, EPA issued an endangerment finding for "six well-mixed greenhouse
gases," including carbon dioxide ("C02"). 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). EPA then
promulgated its initial standards for these gases through joint rulemaking with the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"). NHTSA is authorized to set corporate
average fuel economy standards under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 2-3]
The first of these joint EPA-NHTSA rulemakings occurred in 2010. At that time, EPA and
NHTSA set initial C02 emissions standards for model years 2012-2016 and later. 75 Fed. Reg.
25,234 (May 7, 2010). In 2012, EPA and NHTSA set new, more stringent C02 emissions
standards for model years 2017-2025 and later. 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012). In 2020,
EPA and NHTSA issued a rule ("the 2020 Rule") that revised the standards for model years
2022- 2025, making those standards less stringent and setting a new standard for model years
2026 and later. 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 2-3]
Then President Biden took office and began instituting his climate agenda. By executive
order, he required the whole of the federal government to commit the full extent of its authority
to reducing GHG emissions. Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and
Abroad, Exec. Order No. 14008 of January 27, 2021 ("[W]e must combat the climate crisis with
bold, progressive action that combines the full capacity of the Federal Government with efforts
from every corner of our Nation, every level of government, and every sector of our economy.").
In response, EPA revised the C02 emissions standard for model years 2023 and later (the "2021
Rule"). 86 Fed. Reg. 74,434 (Dec. 30, 2021). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 2-3]
The 2021 Rule fundamentally changed EPA's approach to the regulation of motor vehicle
emissions. Previously, emissions standards occurred via joint rulemaking with NHTSA and were
set in concert with its promulgation of fuel economy standards. This approach made sense
because emissions and fuel economy standards are inextricably linked. But the President's
climate agenda made joint rulemaking with NHTSA problematic. NHTSA is statutorily
prohibited from considering the fuel economy of EVs when setting fuel economy standards. 49
U.S.C. § 32902(h)(1). Consequently, to avoid legal impediments to the President's climate
agenda, the 2021 Rule decoupled EPA emissions standards from NHTSA fuel economy
standards. The State of Texas, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and other state and private
petitioners challenged the 2021 Rule in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C Circuit.
Texas, et al. v. EPA, et al., Case No. 22-1031. Those challenges remain pending. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 2-3]
In December 2021, President Biden issued yet another executive order, stating that "America
must lead the world on clean and efficient cars and trucks" by "bolstering our domestic market
by setting a goal that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-
emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric
vehicles." Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks, Exec. Order 14037 of
August 5, 2021. In support of this policy, the President specifically dictated that "[t]he
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Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) shall, as appropriate and
consistent with applicable law, consider beginning work on a rulemaking under the [CAA] to
establish new multi-pollutant emissions standards, including for greenhouse gas emissions, for
light- and medium-duty vehicles beginning with model year 2027 and extending through and
including at least model year 2030." Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 2-3]
The Proposed Rule is the result of the President's mandate. The Proposed Rule sets
"increasingly stringent" standards for C02. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,240. For light-duty passenger
cars, the proposal would require a reduction in emissions from 152 grams of C02 emitted per
mile traveled ("g/mile") for model year 2026 to 73 g/mile for model years 2032 and later—a
reduction of 52%. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,239. For light-duty trucks, the Proposed Rule would require
a reduction from 207 g/mile for model year 2026 to 89 g/mile for model years 2032 and later—a
reduction of 57%. Id. Fleet-wide for all light-duty vehicles, the Proposed Rule would require a
reduction in emissions from 186 g/mile for model year 2026 to 82 g/mile for model years 2032
and later—a reduction of 56%. Id. at 29,239-29,240. For medium-duty vehicles, the Proposed
Rule would require a reduction in C02 emissions from 438 g/mile for model year 2027 to 275
g/mile for model years 2032 and later—a reduction of 37%. Id. at 29,243. In addition to the
revised C02 standards, EPA's proposal establishes more stringent emissions standards for non-
methane organic gases plus nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, and
formaldehyde. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, pp. 2-3]
The Proposed Rule also generates tension with the regulatory efforts of agencies in other
areas. As described above, the Department of Transportation, through NHTSA, has the authority
to set average fuel economy standards for automobiles. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a). EPA and NHTSA
have previously acted in concert. Now that those efforts have been bifurcated, EPA's proposals
could limit dramatically not just the effect of NHTSA's regulatory scheme, but also automakers'
ability to comply with the suite of regulations. It seems this may have been the plan all along.
See Private Pet'r Opening Br., Texas v. EPA, No. 22-1031 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2023), ECF No.
1996915, at 9-10 ("Before joining the administration, the heads of the Council on Environmental
Quality and EPA's Office of Air and Radiation (which wrote this rule) advocated this
'decoupling' precisely so that EPA could take 'a bolder approach on light duty vehicle
electrification.'" (quoting Climate 21 Proj., Transition Memo: Environmental Protection Agency
11 (2021))). But EPA has no authority to wield this kind of power and reduce NHTSA's role in
this way, especially considering that Congress has spoken clearly that NHTSA "may not
consider" EV fuel economy in setting its own standards. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(h)(1). EPA's
apparent attempt to expand its own authority under the CAA ignores the broader statutory
context. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649, p. 5]
Organization: Kia Corporation
Kia continues to support the long-standing goal where EPA, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), and the California Air Resources Board (CARB) work together to
coordinate emissions regulations, strive to align stringency, and reduce unnecessary testing
burdens. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 3]
Kia Supports Coordinated Programs
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Kia continues to support the long-standing goal where EPA, NHTSA, and the California Air
Resources (CARB) work together to coordinate emissions regulations, strive to align stringency,
and reduce unnecessary testing burden. Harmonization and consistency are even more critical as
technology investments need to be focused on shifting to electrification. Closely coordinated
programs will provide the stability and predictability that automakers need during this important
transition toward vehicle electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 4]
Unfortunately, NHTSA's proposal on Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) for MYs
2027 - 2032 has not yet been released and there is no overlap between the EPA and NHTSA
comment periods. It is critical that the industry understands how these programs interact and
align. Kia is concerned that these two programs could require conflicting fleet compositions,
include unnecessary testing burden, and affect compliance planning. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0555, p. 4]
Coordination and alignment between all three programs are of the utmost importance as the
industry pursues a rapid transition to electrification while working towards one of the most
aggressive regulations in history. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 4]
Organization: Mazda North American Operations
As a member of the Alliance for Automotive Innovation we strongly support the comments
that they have submitted; we have also highlighted some specific areas of the proposed
regulation that will be particularly problematic below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, p. 2]
While noting the massive shift that this proposal would require, we also recognize that other
US federal laws and regulations are also in play. More and better coordination between federal
agencies is desired as various requirements impact the overall market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0595, p. 2]
First, while these comments are on the EPA proposal, a CAFE proposal from NHTSA is also
coming soon. It's imperative that the CAFE proposal align as much as possible to the final EPA
rule. It's untenable to consider different requirements in similar areas, or the possibility that
Mazda could comply with EPA's requirements, but not with NHTSA's (or vice-versa). [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0595, p. 2]
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
EPA must also closely align the final rule for LD/MD Multi-Pollutant Emissions with the
emerging National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards so neither creates confusion or unnecessary burdens. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 4]
The aggressive pace and scope of the proposed rule obliges EPA to work to ensure success
throughout the course of this rule's implementation. EPA must follow through on all assumptions
in the regulatory impact analysis (RIA), and act accordingly to help make them a reality and
reassure manufacturers and consumers along the way. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 4]
MEMA urges:
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the Biden Administration to align regulations and priorities in concert with the Joint
Office of Energy and Transportation throughout the implementation period of this rule to
identify shared concerns and solutions for the many moving parts of the rule. EPA needs this
broad support to follow through on all assumptions regarding critical materials, infrastructure,
and timing of milestones identified in the rule's analyses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 4]
EPA work closely with NHTSA to align the CAFE standards rule with the LD/MD Multi-
Pollutants rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 4]
Organization: Mercedes-Benz AG
The EPA should also strive for regulatory consistency with the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration ("NHTSA") and California to minimize redundancies and look for
opportunities to extend program credits, like air conditioner and off-cycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0623, p. 2]
Organization: Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (MMNA)
C. Potential Effect of UF and PEF on CAFE Standard
The development of the proposed utility factor by EPA considers the impact of changes
within the context of the light-duty GHG standard. However, the utility factor is also used in
developing fuel economy compliance values for the NHTSA CAFE standard. There is little
mention of the utility factor's influence on CAFE compliance, despite the direct effect it has on
PHEV CAFE compliance values. Unlike the GHG standard, which correctly treats electric
operation as zero emissions, the CAFE regulation assigns PHEVs and BEVs a petroleum-
equivalent fuel economy. The disconnect between the GHG and CAFE programs results in
different weighting of compliance benefits for PHEVs and BEVs relative to conventional ICE
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 5-6]
Expanding on this issue, the Department of Energy (DOE) is proposing changes to the
Petroleum Equivalency Factor (PEF) starting with MY27. The PEF is used to estimate the mile
per gallon equivalent (MPGe) of BEV and PHEV electric mode operation. The DOE is
proposing a 72% reduction of the PEF resulting in a significant reduction of the BEV and PHEV
CAFE compliance value. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 5-6]
The combined effect of the changes to the UF and PEF on the CAFE standard are difficult to
assess considering the proposed CAFE standard for MY27 through MY32 has not been
published. For now, we can only assume that the structure of the current CAFE standard will
remain unchanged. Based on this assumption, the combined effect of the UF and PEF will result
in certain PHEVs having less compliance benefit than comparable Strong Hybrid-Electric
Vehicles (SHEVs). Figure 1 is an example of the effects the proposed UF and PEF would have
on the CAFE compliance of small SUV PHEVs relative to comparable SHEVs. In Figure 1
(left), the current Utility Factor and PEF means most PHEVs correctly have fuel economy
greater than all comparable SHEVs. For Figure 1 (center), the proposed PEF with current UF
results in a CAFE compliance value reduction of all PHEVs, in addition, several PHEVs would
have a CAFE compliance value less than many SHEVs. For Figure 1 (right), the proposed
changes to the UF are added resulting in further reductions in PHEVs compliance values and
additional reductions in performance relative to SHEVs. Despite the real-world petroleum
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reduction advantage of PHEVs, the reduced UF and PEF will result lower CAFE compliance
values for several PHEVs relative to comparable SHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp.
5-6]
[See original for graph titled "Figure 1. Comparison of PHEV and SHEV CAFE Compliance
Value with Current and Proposed PEF and UF"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 5-6]
In addition, Mitsubishi recommends EPA coordinate with DOE and NHTSA to ensure the
combined effects of the proposed UF, PEF and structure of the NHTSA CAFE standard ensure
CAFE compliance reflects the real-world petroleum reduction benefit of PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 5-6]
It is important to note that NHTSA's CAFE program in the past has mirrored EPA's GHG
approach to these flexibilities. Since it is not possible to comment on a proposed CAFE
regulation that has not yet been published, it is only reasonable to assume that NHTSA will
follow previous precedent regarding flexibilities and adopt the same structure as EPA. However,
there is a significant deviation with regard to the treatment of EV compliance under the CAFE
and GHG programs. Where EVs are rightly considered zero g/mi under the GHG program, the
CAFE program requires EVs to be assign a mile per gallon equivalent compliance value based
on the PEF. Increasing this discrepancy in the GHG and CAFE programs, DOE has proposed
reducing the PEF by 72% compared to the current value. The PEF reduction will lead to a
substantial decrease in the CAFE compliance value of BEVs and PHEVs. The elimination of air
conditioning and off- cycle credits for EVs combined with changes to the PEF, and UF within
the CAFE program could put BEVs and PHEVs at a distinctive compliance disadvantage relative
to some Strong Hybrid-Electric Vehicles (SHEVs). Keeping these flexibilities in the GHG
program for electric vehicles should reduce potential harmonization issues between the GHG and
CAFE regulations. For this reason and the reasons stated by Auto Innovators, Mitsubishi
supports Auto Innovators proposed approach to apply all available credits at the vehicle level
regardless of propulsion, but ensure fleet-wide average emissions are not allowed to go below a
value equivalent to zero g/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0682, pp. 8-9]
Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
IV. A Single Set of National Fuel Economy/GHG Emissions Standards Are Needed.
EPA asserts that it coordinated with NHTSA in developing its proposed standards and
concluded that, despite EPA and NHTSA jointly adopting fuel economy and emissions standards
on several prior occasions, it is not necessary to do so in this instance.73 NADA disputes EPA's
assertion with respect to GHGs and contends, as it has in prior comments, that a single national
fuel- economy/GHG emissions program, administered principally by NHTSA, is not only
needed, but consistent with the structure designed by Congress in the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act.74 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 16-17]
73 88 Fed. Reg. at 29293.
74 Pub. L. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (Dec. 22, 1975).
The regulation of motor vehicle fuel economy and tailpipe GHG emissions is largely
duplicative. The physics and chemistry involved establish a direct relationship; controlling fuel
economy controls GHG emissions and vice versa. Two federal agencies independently regulating
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essentially the same thing raises government inefficiency and waste concerns, results in
unnecessary regulatory burdens and complexities, inevitably leads to higher vehicle costs for
households and businesses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 16-17]
By acting on its own and in advance of NHTSA, EPA may be rendering irrelevant any
forthcoming NHTSA fuel economy proposal for the same timeframe, and arguably usurps
NHTSA's authority to set fuel economy standards. NADA supports harmonized federal fuel
economy/GHG emissions standards that are technologically feasible and economically
practicable and that will result in cars and trucks that are attractive and affordable to prospective
new motor vehicle consumers. NADA urges EPA to reconsider the unilateral issuance of GHG
emissions standards and to issue standards that are harmonized with the fuel economy standards
expected to be issued by NHTSA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0656, pp. 16-17]
Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
Moreover, Nissan encourages EPA to continue its efforts to coordinate the Federal
greenhouse gas ("GHG") emission standards and Criteria Emission standards ("Tier 4") with the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's ("NHTSA's") corporate average fuel
economy ("CAFE") program and California Air Resources Board's ("CARB's") emission
programs (GHG standards and LEV III/IV criteria emission standards). Manufacturers should be
able to design one cohesive fleet that meets all Federal and state standards. Close coordination
between these three regulatory entities would ensure that manufacturers can focus on developing
the cleanest, most fuel efficient, and most affordable vehicles rather than expend excessive
resources on compliance with uncertain and unnecessarily fragmented regulatory
programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 1]
VI. Continued Support for a Coordinated National Approach
Nissan strongly encourages EPA, NHTSA, and CARB to develop a coordinated national
approach to automotive regulation. A patchwork of different federal and state GHG, CAFE, and
criteria pollutant programs is neither effective nor efficient. In contrast, a harmonized national
program maximizes both GHG, CAFE, and criteria pollutant benefits on a nationwide basis
while also providing regulatory certainty and minimizing unnecessary compliance burdens for
the industry. Such an approach would allow automakers to develop a single, unified fleet that
meets all federal and state requirements while maintaining a full range of vehicle options for
consumers. More importantly, a harmonized approach also would allow manufacturers to focus
their planning and investments on achieving fuel economy improvements and emissions
reductions rather than on tracking compliance with unnecessarily fragmented regulatory
standards and programs. Under a harmonized approach, environmental benefits can be achieved
at a lower cost to manufacturers and consequently a lower cost to consumers. Lower costs will
help address social equity concerns related to EV accessibility and also encourage faster fleet
turnover, replacing older vehicles with more efficient, cleaner, and safer vehicles. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0594, pp. 8-9]
As EPA and NHTSA consider potential changes to the federal GHG, and criteria pollutant
programs, Nissan believes it is essential that the agencies work together to maximize
compatibility and coordination of the programs. Nissan understands that, due to statutory
limitations, certain programmatic elements of the GHG and CAFE programs may not be
3411
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identical. Nissan encourages EPA and NHTSA to make the standards as equivalent and
complementary as possible, however, by adopting appropriate regulatory adjustments where
available. Nissan also encourages EPA to coordinate with NHTSA and the Department of
Energy ("DOE") regarding DOE's proposal for a permanent petroleum equivalency factor
("PEF") for use in calculating petroleum-equivalent fuel economy values of EVs in the CAFE
program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, pp. 8-9]
Nissan also urges the Administration to work with California regulators to harmonize the
federal and CARB programs to the fullest extent possible. This could be accomplished by
reinstating California's "deemed-to-comply" measures, under which vehicles that meet federal
standards are "deemed-to-comply" with CARB standards. Nissan is also open to new alternative
approaches for harmonizing federal and California standards, as well. Nissan encourages EPA to
work proactively with CARB to clarify the relationship between federal and California standards
and harmonize them to the extent possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, pp. 8-9]
- Support coordination and harmonization between EPA, NHTSA, and CARB. One fleet
should meet all programs with a common goal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0594, p. 9]
Organization: Pearson Fuels
On behalf of Pearson Fuels, thank you for the opportunity to submit comments on the Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles (the "Proposed Standards"). These comments are focused on the light-duty greenhouse
gas emissions standards (the "GHG Standards"). As the leading supplier of E85 fuel in
California, Pearson Fuels' primary interests in this proceeding are to ensure that: 1) the
tremendous policy value of flex fuel vehicles (FFVs) that utilize E85 fuel is recognized as an
important GHG mitigation strategy, and 2) this policy value is reflected programmatically by
EPA re-integrating a commensurate level of FFV crediting into the EPA's GHG Standards.
Through precisely calibrated FFV crediting, EPA will revitalize FFV manufacturing by some
automakers and facilitate the development of hybrid FFVs like the Toyota Hybrid Flex Corolla
that is being pioneered by Toyota of Brazil.1 This revitalization will not impede EPA's
aggressive goal of rapid light-duty electrification but will diversify EPA's portfolio of
decarbonization strategies for internal combustion engines thereby catalyzing more rapid and
comprehensive decarbonization of the light-duty sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 1-
2]
1 See ET Auto, "Toyota launches pilot project on flex-fuel strong hybrid EVs in India," at
https://auto.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/toyota-launches-pilot-project-on-flexi-fuel-strong-hybrid-
electric- vehicles-ffv-shev-in-india-signs-mou-with-iisc-bengaluru/94786626, and Nikkei Asia, "Toyota to
invest $334m to make compact biofuel hybrids in Brazil, Carmaker seeks to provide consumers with
cheaper, eco-friendly vehicles," at https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Automobiles/Toyota-to-invest-334m-
to-make-compact-biofuel-hybrids-in-Brazil.
FFVs are a proven, robust, cost-saving and energy security enhancing GHG reduction tool
that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") integrated into the 2012-2016 light-duty
GHG standards in a manner that aligned with the methodology of the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy ("CAFE") program and facilitated extensive FFV manufacturing. Beginning in 2016,
EPA eliminated its use of the 0.15 multiplier in the EPA's GHG Standards which triggered the
rapid decline of FFV manufacturing. EPA explained its elimination of the multiplier based
3412
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on the distinct goals of the CAFE program wherein the use of E85 achieves an 85% reduction in
petroleum use thereby justifying the multiplier as compared to the EPA's GHG program which is
focused on GHG reduction with no comparable justification for a multiplier.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0577, pp.1-2]
2 77 FR 62816.
I. EPA SHOULD ESTABLISH AN APPROPRIATE GHG EMISSIONS FACTOR
FOR FFV CREDITING THAT RECOGNIZES THE GHG BENEFITS OF E85 USAGE
a. EPA harmonized the GHG program with the CAFE program on FFV crediting during
MY 2012-2015 then eliminated the 0.15 multiplier in the GHG program.
The CAFE and GHG programs are distinct programs in terms of history, objectives and
underlying legal authority. The 2021 GHG Rulemaking characterizes the key distinctions
between the programs on the multiplier (termed a "divisor" in the rulemaking) issue as follows:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 4]
"Congress provided the 0.15 divisor for CAFE compliance because a vehicle that operates on
a nonpetroleum fuel (like CNG) consumes zero or near-zero petroleum, and petroleum
conservation is a primary objective of the CAFE program."6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577,
p. 4]
6 77 FR 62816.
(...)
"The primary focus of the GHG standards is GHG emissions."7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0577, p. 4]
7 Id.
(...)
"We also disagree with those commenters who argued that EPA must adopt the 0.15 divisor
in order to not "negate the Congressional mandate" for CAFE credits. (...)"8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0577, p. 4]
8 Id.
b. During the period of harmonized CAFE and GHG crediting, the U.S. FFV fleet grew
rapidly. Now, at a critical time for climate change mitigation, the U.S. FFV fleet is in dramatic
decline.
On April 22, 2021, President Biden announced a "nationally determined contribution" pledge
under the 2015 Paris climate agreement to cut U.S. GHG emissions in half by 2030 at a virtual
climate summit attended by dozens of world leaders. In his remarks about the pledge from the
White House, the President stated, "These steps will set America on a path of net zero emissions
economy by no later than 2050." 10 Thus the President has re-established aggressive GHG
reduction as a priority policy of the federal government and set a goal of carbon neutrality by
2050. While there has been a significant expansion of BEVs, internal combustion engines
continue to dominate the market and roads of America and are anticipated to maintain this
dominant role for the next decade and potentially longer. The following illustrative graphics
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were developed by the Alliance for Automotive Innovation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577,
pp. 5-6]
10 Josh Lederman and Denise Chow, "Biden Commits to cutting U.S. emissions in half by 2030 as part of
Paris climate pact," (April 22, 2021), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-
will-commit- halving-u-s-emissions-2030-part-paris-nl264892.
SEE ORIGINAL COMMENT FOR PIE CHART for the Role of Liquid Fuels and BAR
GRAPH of EPA-Projected Cumulative U.S. Sales 2023-2032 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577,
pp. 5-6]
During the period of harmonized GHG crediting, when both the GHG and CAFE programs
utilized the 0.15 divisor, there was a substantial expansion of the FFV fleet peaking with the
manufacture of 2.8 million total light-duty vehicles in MY 2014. The total registered fleet of
FFVs in the U.S. continued to grow incrementally until 2020, but from 2015-2020 automakers
sharply reduced the number of vehicle offerings. The attached Exhibit 1 developed by the
Renewable Fuels Association details vehicle offerings by model and engine type and shows the
massive reduction of models that occurred due to the near total elimination of light-duty GHG
program crediting. During the peak period of manufacturing, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors
manufactured 76 different models of FFVs. This scale of manufacturing has since been
decimated with only 8 FFV models offered in 2023 with 5 of these being limited to fleet models.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 5-6]
Restoring more harmonized FFV crediting between the CAFE and GHG programs would
benefit automakers, consumers, and marketers by affording all a choice in the market and by
establishing a diversified technology portfolio approach to decarbonization. FFVs deliver a wide
array of real-world benefits when fueled with E85 or other gasoline-ethanol blends, including
improved U.S. energy security, support for the U.S. farm economy, as well as significant
reductions in GHG emissions. FFV consumers can respond to fuel market signals by utilizing
high blend E85 ethanol when the fuel is at the greatest discount to petroleum and conventional
gasoline when ethanol prices are relatively high as compared to gasoline (which has rarely been
the case in the past five years). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 6]
These are all vital flexibilities to a successful evolution of the vehicle market and to achieving
the goals of the GHG rulemaking - increased efficiency, improved energy security, reduced
costs to consumers, and reduced GHG emissions from the transportation sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0577, p. 6]
i. EPA established a new methodology for calculating FFV crediting for MY 2016 and
later in its joint rule with NHTSA for MY 2012-2016.
In the joint NHTSA Final Rule for MY 2012-2016 ("Joint 2012 Final Rule"), EPA
established first the approach for FFV crediting for 2012-2016: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0577, pp. 14-15]
(1) The assumption that the vehicle is operated 50% of the time on the conventional fuel and
50% of the time on the alternative fuel, (2) that 1 gallon of alternative fuel is treated as 0.15
gallon of fuel, essentially increasing the fuel economy of a vehicle on alternative fuel by a factor
of 6.67, and (3) a "cap" provision that limits the maximum fuel economy increase that can be
applied to a manufacturer's overall CAFE compliance value for all CAFE compliance categories
3414
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(i.e., domestic passenger cars, import passenger cars, and light trucks) to 1.2 mpg through 2014
and 1.0 mpg in 2015.28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 14-15]
28 75 FR 25432.
The Joint 2012 Final Rule also established the methodology for FFV crediting for MY 2016
and subsequent years as being distinct from the 2012-2016 methodology as follows: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 14-15]
Starting with model year 2016, as proposed, EPA will no longer allow manufacturers to base
FFV emissions on the use of the 0.15 factor credit described above, and on the use of an assumed
50% usage of alternative fuel. Instead, EPA believes the appropriate approach is to ensure that
FFV emissions are based on demonstrated emissions performance.29 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0577, pp. 14-15]
29 Id. at 25433.
II. EPA SHOULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY IN THIS RULEMAKING TO
RECOGNIZE THE TRUE GHG POLICY VALUE OF FFVS BY RESTORING
MEANINGFUL GHG CREDITING FOR FFVs
We encourage the Agency to re-affirm the policy value of FFVs and American ethanol
production and use by restoring meaningful GHG crediting for the manufacture of FFVs by
modifying the methodology for determining GHG crediting for FFVs beginning MY 2027. EPA
has authority to better harmonize crediting between the GHG and CAFE standards and thereby
expand FFV manufacturing through two alternative means both of which are supported by
Pearson Fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 16]
a. EPA should re-integrate the methodology that continues to exist in the CAFE program
by re-establishing its use of the 0.15 multiplier in the EPA's GHG Standards, or, [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 16]
b. EPA should establish a new GHG Emissions Factor for the GHG Standards that
recognizes the lifecycle emissions reductions of E85 as compared with conventional gasoline.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 16]
Crediting based on lifecycle GHG emissions reductions can be accomplished simply by
establishing a GHG Emissions Factor that is based on the average GHG emissions reduction
provided by ethanol as compared to petroleum gasoline on a lifecycle basis. This GHG
Emissions Factor would be subject to adjustment based on a determination by Argonne National
Laboratory regarding the average lifecycle emissions of U.S. used as a transportation fuel as
compared to the average lifecycle emissions of the U.S. gasoline used as a transportation fuel.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 16]
Organization: POET, LLC
3. Renewable fuels crediting would give vehicle manufacturers more options to comply and
make for a more durable emissions reduction program.
Adding a renewable fuel crediting mechanism would make it more feasible for automakers to
meet EPA's stringent standards. Renewable fuels would further diversify the pathways for
3415
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manufacturers to comply with the proposed standards. This would be especially important in
places, particularly rural areas with lower population densities, where BEV infrastructure will be
difficult to develop at scale and may not be cost-effective. Renewable fuels would serve as a
viable alternative to attain significant light-duty vehicle emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, p. 10]
EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") have experience
with exactly this type of bioethanol crediting that POET proposes. In prior iterations of EPA's §
202 standard through model year 2015, and in the existing NHTSA fuel economy standards,
FFVs receive compliance benefits because they can run on alternative fuels such as E85.23 This
ability to utilize lower GHG fuels is adjusted by an "F Factor" that represents how much
renewable fuel is used in the real world.24 EPA should re-introduce crediting for vehicles that
can utilize higher blends of renewable fuels, and should expand the program to include
technologies other than just FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 10]
23 See EPA regulations at 40 CFR 600.510-12(j)(2)(iv)(B) providing FFV crediting through Model Year
2015. Regarding currently applicable NHTSA regulations at 49 CFR 523.2 (definition of dual-fuel vehicle
includes flexible fuel vehicles); 49 CFR 536.10 (indicating that dual-fuel vehicles can earn credits under
the standards); 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62624, 62829-30 (Oct. 15, 2012) (providing that FFVs
could generate credits under the standards). See the discussion in section IILd below for additional details.
24 40 CFR 600.510-12(k).
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
Porsche notes that EPA's proposed update to the PHEV utility factor will also influence
CAFE compliance calculations due to the allowance within statute and regulation for
manufacturers to optionally select weighted operation. EPA did not provide analysis as to how
this change would affect CAFE compliance especially considering Department of Energy (DOE)
recent NPRM to reduce the Petroleum Equivalence Factor (PEF) by 72% for electric vehicles.
This dramatic proposal from DOE to undercut the incentive for electric vehicles within CAFE is
premature given that proposed CAFE standards for model years 2027 and later have not yet been
released by NHTSA. Porsche recommended in comments to DOE for their NPRM that DOE
include the assessment of EPA's proposed change in the utility factor to better understand the
combined effect of lower PEF and lower utility factor. DOE did not acknowledge, or was
unaware of, the proposed reduction in utility factor from EPA. The PEF statutory basis requires
DOE, as it has done for over 40 years, to incentivize electrified vehicles in CAFE. This statute
also requires DOE, NHTSA and EPA to consult on changes related to PEF and CAFE. Neither
the EPA MPR NPRM nor the DOE PEF NPRM appear to discuss the mutual impacts that each
other's proposed updates could have on future CAFE compliance. As NHTSA has yet to release
their CAFE proposal, it is unclear if NHTSA will address both the EPA and DOE proposals and
how both could impact CAFE compliance. To Porsche, it is unclear as to why these NPRMs
appear disjointed and so far, have failed to discuss the impacts of each other's proposals on the
other regulations. Porsche recommends EPA provide analysis of the impact of the reduced utility
factor on the PEF and CAFE compliance in coordination with DOE and NHTSA. Ideally, all the
proposals would have been released together to provide manufacturers with the ability to
understand how each of the agency's actions would interact with each other and continue to
support and incentivize technologies such as PHEV. This is especially relevant considering the
3416
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overarching goal to achieve a dramatic increase in light-duty electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0637, pp. 21-23]
Organization: Stellantis
EPA must take a more realistic outlook on the policy enablers initiated that are only partially
scoped to grow the EV market EPA predicts and set standards that promote a feasible transition
to electrification without distracting with unnecessary ICE development. The proposed rule and
draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) include projections of numerous variables (such as
benefits and costs) out to 2055 (i.e., well beyond the time period of this rulemaking), which
exacerbates the uncertainties that underlie multiple assumptions contained in the NPRM.
Stellantis agrees with Auto Innovators' concern raised that the NPRM fails to adequately
coordinate and harmonize the stringency between EPA's, NHTSA's, and CARB's standards.
Given the significance of electrification, it is more important than ever that there is consistency
between agencies to ensure multiple sets of standards do not work at cross-purposes with each
other but instead are harmonized allowing automakers to build one fleet that efficiently and
effectively meets all requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
Stellantis recommends that EPA should:
- Include a provision that compliance with EPA's GHG standards would constitute
compliance with CAFE standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 24]
Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
EPA may not use carbon dioxide regulation to displace DOT's exclusive authority over fuel
economy standards.
Setting limits on carbon dioxide emissions for gas-powered vehicles and prescribing fuel
economy standards for those vehicles are two sides of the same regulatory coin. They cannot be
separated, because there is a direct and consistent relationship between the amount of carbon
dioxide a vehicle's internal-combustion engine will generate per mile traveled and the number of
miles the vehicle will go on a gallon of gas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
The problem for the EPA is that ever since enactment of the Energy Policy and Con-
servation Act (EPCA) in 1975, which created the fuel economy program, Congress has given the
Secretary of Transportation, not the EPA, the sole authority to establish fuel economy standards
for new motor vehicles offered for sale to private buyers in the United States8—authority
delegated by the Secretary to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), a
component of DOT. NHTSA consults with EPA and the Energy Department in setting the
standards, and EPA is tasked with measuring the auto- makers' compliance with the standards
NHTSA sets, but neither EPA nor any other agency has authority to supersede or interfere with
NHTSA's mandate under EPCA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
8 See 49 U.S.C. § 32902, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/49/32902.
Congress assigned to DOT the exclusive authority to set fuel economy standards, rather than
EPA under the Clean Air Act, because the fuel economy program is not about environmental
regulation. Congress wanted to prod the automakers toward the production of more fuel-efficient
3417
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vehicle models to help lessen America's strategic dependence on foreign oil in the wake of the
Arab oil embargoes of the 1970s. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
Congress's delegation of authority over the fuel economy program has always been carefully
limited.
Initially, Congress specified mileage targets by statute and put a tight collar on DOT's
regulatory authority: Any proposed fuel economy standard that fell outside the collar was subject
to veto by either House of Congress—a restraint that was nullified when the Supreme Court held
legislative vetoes unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha (1983). And from time to time, Congress
has put statutory caps on the mileage standards through appropriations riders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
Ultimately, when it allowed broader standard-setting discretion to DOT under EPCA,
Congress still did so in a manner designed to ensure that NHTSA's regulatory power would
never be used to frustrate Americans' love affair with the automobile or impose disruptions in
the traditional automotive industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
In administering the fuel economy program, NHTSA must (i) respect the practical needs and
desires of American car buyers; (ii) take into account the economic realities of supply and
demand in the auto markets; (iii) protect the affordability of vehicle options for American
families; (iv) preserve the vitality of the domestic auto industry, which sustains millions of good-
paying American jobs; (v) maintain highway traffic safety for the country; (vi) consider the
nation's need to conserve energy; and (vii) advance the goal of reducing America's strategic
dependence on foreign supplies of critical inputs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
And, significantly, EPCA expressly prohibits NHTSA from considering the fuel economy of
electric vehicles in setting or amending its standards.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-
5]
9 See id. § 32902(h); see also 49 U.S.C. § 32901(a)(1), (8), (9) & (10),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/49/32901.In sum, NHTSA has no authority to compel the
phaseout of internal-combustion engines or to require automakers to use new technologies that are not
responsive to con- sumer demand or that fail to align with the industry's existing production realities.
In Massachusetts v. EPA, 10 the Supreme Court concluded that, in theory, there is no
necessary conflict between the control of carbon dioxide emissions under section 202 of the
Clean Air Act and NHTSA's authority to prescribe fuel economy standards under EPCA. 11 But,
in practice, whenever EPA actually proposes to impose such emissions controls, it must do so in
a manner that avoids displacing NHTSA's authority over fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
10 549 U.S. 497 (2007), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1120.
11 See id. at 532 ("The two obligations may overlap, but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot
both administer their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency.").
EPA may not use carbon dioxide regulation to displace DOT's exclusive auth- ority over fuel
economy standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
Setting limits on carbon dioxide emissions for gas-powered vehicles and prescribing fuel
economy standards for those vehicles are two sides of the same regulatory coin. They cannot be
3418
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separated, because there is a direct and consistent relationship between the amount of carbon
dioxide a vehicle's internal-combustion engine will generate per mile traveled and the number of
miles the vehicle will go on a gallon of gas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
The problem for the EPA is that ever since enactment of the Energy Policy and Con-
servation Act (EPCA) in 1975, which created the fuel economy program, Congress has given the
Secretary of Transportation, not the EPA, the sole authority to establish fuel economy standards
for new motor vehicles offered for sale to private buyers in the United States8—authority
delegated by the Secretary to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), a
component of DOT. NHTSA consults with EPA and the Energy Department in setting the
standards, and EPA is tasked with measuring the auto- makers' compliance with the standards
NHTSA sets, but neither EPA nor any other agency has authority to supersede or interfere with
NHTSA's mandate under EPCA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
8 See 49 U.S.C. § 32902, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/49/32902.
Congress assigned to DOT the exclusive authority to set fuel economy standards, rather than
EPA under the Clean Air Act, because the fuel economy program is not about environmental
regulation. Congress wanted to prod the automakers toward the production of more fuel-efficient
vehicle models to help lessen America's strategic dependence on foreign oil in the wake of the
Arab oil embargoes of the 1970s. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
Congress's delegation of authority over the fuel economy program has always been carefully
limited. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
Initially, Congress specified mileage targets by statute and put a tight collar on DOT's
regulatory authority: Any proposed fuel economy standard that fell outside the collar was subject
to veto by either House of Congress—a restraint that was nullified when the Supreme Court held
legislative vetoes unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha (1983). And from time to time, Congress
has put statutory caps on the mileage standards through appropria- tions riders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
Ultimately, when it allowed broader standard-setting discretion to DOT under EPCA,
Congress still did so in a manner designed to ensure that NHTSA's regulatory power would
never be used to frustrate Americans' love affair with the automobile or impose disruptions in
the traditional automotive industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
In administering the fuel economy program, NHTSA must (i) respect the practical needs and
desires of American car buyers; (ii) take into account the economic realities of supply and
demand in the auto markets; (iii) protect the affordability of vehicle options for American
families; (iv) preserve the vitality of the domestic auto industry, which sustains millions of good-
paying American jobs; (v) maintain highway traffic safety for the country; (vi) consider the
nation's need to conserve energy; and (vii) advance the goal of reducing America's strategic
dependence on foreign supplies of critical inputs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
And, significantly, EPCA expressly prohibits NHTSA from considering the fuel economy of
electric vehicles in setting or amending its standards.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-
5]
9 See id. § 32902(h); see also 49 U.S.C. § 32901(a)(1), (8), (9) & (10),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/49/32901.In sum, NHTSA has no authority to compel the
3419
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phaseout of internal-combustion engines or to require automakers to use new technologies that are not
responsive to con- sumer demand or that fail to align with the industry's existing production realities.
In Massachusetts v. EPA, 10 the Supreme Court concluded that, in theory, there is no
necessary conflict between the control of carbon dioxide emissions under section 202 of the
Clean Air Act and NHTSA's authority to prescribe fuel economy standards under EPCA.l 1 But,
in practice, whenever EPA actually proposes to impose such emissions con- trols, it must do so
in a manner that avoids displacing NHTSA's authority over fuel econ- omy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 4-5]
10 549 U.S. 497 (2007), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1120.
11 See id. at 532 ("The two obligations may overlap, but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot
both administer their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency.").
It is a basic principle of law that when there is a potential for inconsistent application of two
federal statutes, the statutes must be interpreted and applied in harmony, if reason- ably possible.
The agencies charged with faithfully carrying out those statutory mandates are required to
respect and preserve the roles and priorities assigned by Congress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 5-6]
The Obama administration was the first to confront this issue when it launched the EPA into
the business of regulating carbon dioxide emissions from new motor vehicles in 2012. Both the
Obama administration and later the Trump administration addressed the requirement for
harmonization by having NHTSA and EPA conduct joint rulemakings in the setting of common
fuel economy standards and carbon dioxide emissions limits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647,
pp. 5-6]
But the present administration has broken that mold, and the current proposed tailpipe rules
are an egregious example. By acting on its own, in advance of NHTSA, to dictate draconian new
reductions in carbon dioxide emissions limits for future model years of vehicles, EPA would
render entirely irrelevant NHTSA's judgment about the appropriate fuel economy standards for
those same vehicle fleets. If finalized in their current form, the proposed limits on carbon dioxide
emissions from new motor vehicles (both for light- and medium-duty vehicles and for heavy-
duty trucks) would be an unlawful usurpation by EPA of NHTSA's exclusive statutory role. Any
determination by NHTSA to establish fuel eco- nomy standards for gas-powered vehicles that
would allow for greater carbon dioxide emis- sions than EPA's proposed rules would have no
regulatory effect—it would be a nullity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 5-6]
It is a basic principle of law that when there is a potential for inconsistent application of two
federal statutes, the statutes must be interpreted and applied in harmony, if reason- ably possible.
The agencies charged with faithfully carrying out those statutory mandates are required to
respect and preserve the roles and priorities assigned by Congress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0647, pp. 5-6]
The Obama administration was the first to confront this issue when it launched the EPA into
the business of regulating carbon dioxide emissions from new motor vehicles in 2012. Both the
Obama administration and later the Trump administration addressed the requirement for
harmonization by having NHTSA and EPA conduct joint rulemakings in the setting of common
fuel economy standards and carbon dioxide emissions limits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647,
pp. 5-6]
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But the present administration has broken that mold, and the current proposed tailpipe rules
are an egregious example. By acting on its own, in advance of NHTSA, to dictate draconian new
reductions in carbon dioxide emissions limits for future model years of vehicles, EPA would
render entirely irrelevant NHTSA's judgment about the appropriate fuel economy standards for
those same vehicle fleets. If finalized in their current form, the proposed limits on carbon dioxide
emissions from new motor vehicles (both for light- and medium-duty vehicles and for heavy-
duty trucks) would be an unlawful usurpation by EPA of NHTSA's exclusive statutory role. Any
determination by NHTSA to establish fuel economy standards for gas-powered vehicles that
would allow for greater carbon dioxide emissions than EPA's proposed rules would have no
regulatory effect—it would be a nullity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 5-6]
Organization: The Aluminum Association
This disregard for vehicle efficiency distinction across BEV's in the proposed rule conflicts
with the existing and historic approaches of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
program and is a potential disruption to harmonization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0704, pp. 7-
8]
Organization: U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Moreover, we note that a forthcoming rulemaking by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) addressing fuel economy standards has potential to conflict with
EPA's proposal, adding costly and unnecessary compliance burdens on the auto industry.
Accordingly, the Chamber reiterates its longstanding recommendation that EPA and NHTSA
cooperate to ensure a unified set of federal standards that minimize conflicting regulatory
requirements between the overlapping rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0604, p. 3]
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
D. EPA should neither align the proposed rule with the Advanced Clean Cars programs
(ACC), nor rely on ACC or any other state standards.
To the extent EPA is considering extending the model years at issue and increasing the
stringency of the proposed standards in the final rule to align with and/or reflect California's
Advanced Clean Cars programs or any other state greenhouse gas emission standards or ZEV
sales mandates, or is otherwise relying on any such state standards or mandates, such changes
would be unlawful. State greenhouse gas emission standards and ZEV sales mandates are
preempted by both EPCA and the RFS, making any reliance on such standards by EPA equally
unlawful. Moreover, such a radical departure from the proposed rule would require EPA to
reopen the comment period to allow for meaningful public comment on these issues and their
related impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 89-91]
EPCA prohibits States from adopting or enforcing "a law or regulation related to fuel
economy standards or average fuel economy standards for automobiles." 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a)
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court has described "related to" preemption provisions like this
one as "deliberately expansive," Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987), and
"conspicuous" in their breadth, FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990). As the Court has
explained, a state requirement "relate[s] to" a federal law or regulation as long as it has a
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"connection with," or contains a "reference to," the regulated topic. Rowe v. New Hampshire
Motor Transport Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 89-91]
State electric-vehicle mandates have a clear "connection with" fuel economy. Electric-vehicle
mandates like California's require manufacturers to make a certain number of "vehicles that
produce zero exhaust emissions of any criteria pollutant (or precursor pollutant) or greenhouse
gas, excluding emissions from air conditioning systems." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1962.2(a).
Because emissions of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide are "essentially constant per gallon
combusted of a given type of fuel," the fuel economy of a vehicle and its carbon-dioxide
emissions are two sides of the same coin. 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,324, 25,327 (May 7, 2010).
Accordingly, "any rule that limits tailpipe [greenhouse gas] emissions is effectively identical to a
rule that limits fuel consumption." Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1294 (citation omitted). EPA
has previously found California's ZEV mandates are expressly and impliedly preempted by
EPCA. 83 Fed.Reg. 42,986, 43,238-39 (Aug. 24, 2018). That is consistent with the court's
finding in Central Valley Chrysler-Plymouth v. California Air Resources Board, No. CV-F-02-
5017 REC/SMS, 2002 WL 34499459 (E D. Cal. June 11, 2002), that "Plaintiffs have shown that
the 2001 ZEV amendments "relate to" fuel economy standards because they "clearly have the
purpose of regulating the fuel economy performance of... the advanced technology hybrids that
the Executive Officer predicts the industry will sell in California...." Id. at *3. As a result of that
litigation, CARB has "removed all references to fuel economy or efficiency," Fact Sheet: 2003
Zero Emission Vehicle Program Changes, California Air Resources Board (Mar. 18, 2004),370
in its ZEV mandates, but removal of the reference does not equate to removal of the fact that
these regulations relate to fuel economy standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 89-91]
370 The Fact Sheet clarifies that the changes made were a direct result of the EPCA preemption finding:
"In June 2002, due to a lawsuit against the ARB, a federal district judge issued a preliminary injunction that
prohibited the ARB from enforcing the 2001 ZEV amendments with respect to the sale of new motor
vehicles in model years 2003 or 2004. The lawsuit was focused on the assertion that AT PREV provisions
pertaining to the fuel economy of hybrid electric vehicles were preempted by the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975 - the law directing the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to
establish corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards. Since adopting the 2003 Amendments to the
ZEV regulation, the parties to the lawsuit have agreed to end the litigation.... • In order to address the
preliminary injunction ... staff proposed additional modifications to the ZEV regulation in March 2003.".
Id. at 1.
Separately, electric-vehicle mandates also relate to "average fuel economy" because they
restrict manufacturers' choices as to how to meet those standards. EPCA allows manufacturers to
meet NHTSA's fuel-economy standards by producing any combination of vehicles that the
national market will bear, using whatever technological approach to fuel economy they think
best. State electric-car mandates, by contrast, require automakers to comply in a specific way:
either by selling a certain percentage of zero-emission vehicles or purchasing credits from
competitors. The state mandates thus relate to federal fuel-economy standards because they
"force [a manufacturer] to adopt a certain scheme" and "restrict its choice" of compliance, and
are thus preempted. New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995); accord Ophir v. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86, 93 (D. Mass.
2009). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 89-91]
State electric-vehicle mandates are also impliedly preempted by a separate statutory
provision, the RFS. State laws are impliedly preempted when they "stand[] as an obstacle to the
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accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Arizona v.
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 406 (2012) (citation omitted). A "conflict in technique can be fully
as disruptive to the system Congress erected as conflict in overt policy." Id. (citation omitted);
see Geierv. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 89-91]
Here, state electric-vehicle mandates conflict with Congress's objectives in enacting the RFS.
The RFS reflects Congress's policy decision to "move the United States toward greater energy
independence and security" in a specific way: by "increasing] the production of clean renewable
fuels" to be blended with fossil fuels. ACE, 864 F.3d at 697 (citations omitted). Mandating
electrification—in other words, eliminating vehicles that use liquid renewable fuels—puts severe
pressure on regulated entities' ability to comply with the RFS by reducing the percentage of
vehicles that use those renewable fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 89-91]
By contrast, Congress has never included electric-vehicle mandates in its energy-security
plans and in fact has rejected several bills that would have imposed such mandates. See, e.g.,
Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2019, H.R. 2764, 116th Cong. (2019); Zero-Emission Vehicles
Act of 2018, S. 3664, 115th Cong. (2018). State electric-vehicle mandates wreak havoc on
Congress's carefully crafted scheme in favor of an option that Congress has consistently rejected.
Cf. West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2614 (2022). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
89-91]
Because these state standards and mandates are themselves preempted and unlawful, any
reliance on, or consideration of, such standards by EPA would be equally unlawful. Any such
change(s) at this juncture without reopening the public comment period would also deny
stakeholders an opportunity for meaningful comment, particularly because EPA has not made
available for review the factual or legal basis for any such proposed changes or its analysis of
their economic impact and related policy considerations. Moreover, the final rule would
constitute a radical departure from the proposal without fairly apprising stakeholders of the
standards or their underlying bases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 89-91]
Organization: Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
Harmonization with CAFE program - "Deemed to Comply"
Volkswagen supports EPA's goal of transitioning to zero emission mobility. The NPRM
includes ambitious GHG reductions. In recognition of this, Volkswagen asks that GHG
regulations be harmonized with the future NHTSA CAFE targets, or that a "Deemed to Comply"
mechanism be made available, where compliance to the EPA GHG regulations also satisfies
compliance to the CAFE program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0669, p. 3]
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
Harmonization
Unfortunately, US has multiple federal and state agencies regulating auto emissions and this
has created various competing and overlapping rules. The EPA differs significantly from the
CARB ACCII and we are awaiting an NPRM from NHTSA on fuel economy. The Department
of Energy also has a pending proposal that will determine the energy efficiency of EVs. VCC
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encourages EPA to harmonize with the other programs as much as possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0624, p. 5]
VCC has consistently stated that the goal of achieving one single national harmonized
program (California, EPA and NHTSA) is the preferred path forward to increase fuel economy
and lower emissions year over year. However, VCC believes regulatory consistency, and a clear
federal framework are necessary to effectively and efficiently enable the auto industry to develop
more efficient vehicles and to advance the market for advanced technology vehicles. Multiple
vehicle regulatory programs at the Federal and State level that require separate and duplicative
reporting, accounting, and testing are inefficient and increase uncertainty in the market. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, p. 5]
The US should work to minimize disparities between EPA (GHG) and NHTSA
(CAFE) regulations and California regulations. The program should reduce reporting
requirements by allowing manufacturers to demonstrate compliance at the end of the year for all
programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, p. 5]
Compliance reporting should be consolidated so that it is one report for one agency and that
agency determines compliance (so reciprocal recognition). Currently, there are separate
assessments for each program, and this is unnecessary and especially burdensome for smaller
manufacturers like VCC. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, p. 5]
EPA Summary and Response
Many commenters urged EPA to coordinate with NHTSA to ensure the GHG program is not
in conflict with changes NHTSA may propose in its CAFE rulemaking.700 Other commenters
questioned why EPA and NHTSA were issuing separate and not joint rules for their respective
GHG and fuel economy standards as had been done for certain past rules. We discuss in Section
III.I of the preamble issues of consultation and coordination between the EPA and NHTSA
programs and the decision to issue separate and not joint rulemakings. Executive Order 14037
directs EPA and DOT to coordinate, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, during
consideration of this rulemaking. EPA has coordinated and consulted with DOT/NHTSA, both
on a bilateral level during the development of this rule as well as through the interagency review
of the EPA rule led by the Office of Management and Budget. EPA has set some previous light-
duty vehicle GHG emission standards in joint rulemakings where NHTSA also established
CAFE standards. Most recently, in establishing standards for model year 2023-2026, EPA and
NHTSA concluded that it was appropriate to coordinate and consult but not to engage in joint
rulemaking. EPA has similarly concluded that it is not necessary for this EPA rule to be issued in
a joint action with NHTSA. In reaching this conclusion, EPA notes there is no statutory
requirement for joint rulemaking and that the agencies have different statutory mandates and
their respective programs have always reflected those differences. As the Supreme Court has
noted "EPA has been charged with protecting the public's 'health' and 'welfare,' a statutory
obligation wholly independent of DOT's mandate to promote energy efficiency."701 Although
there is no statutory requirement for EPA to consult with NHTSA, EPA has consulted
700 Note that since EPA received these public comments, NHTSA has since issued a proposed rulemaking, "Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards for Passenger Cars and Light Trucks for Model Years 2027-2032 and Fuel Efficiency Standards for
Eleavy-Duty Pickup Trucks and Vans for Model Years 2030-2035." 88 FR 56128, August 17, 2023.
701 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532.
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significantly with NHTSA throughout the development of this rule and closely coordinated with
NHTSA on a full range of issues related to feasibility, modeling and stringency
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation and many auto manufacturers and suppliers (e.g.,
BMW, Mazda, MEMA) encouraged the agencies to continue to work closely together, to enable
manufacturers to abide by both sets of regulations with one single fleet. Some commenters (e.g.,
Ford, GM, Kia, Mercedes Benz, Nissan, Volvo) raised this issue of harmonization across
programs to include the California program as well, noting their goal of a coordinated national
approach to automotive regulations, and further noting that to the extent there are contradictions
among rules from different agencies this could divert resources away from electrification.
Another automaker (Volvo) urged the agencies to consolidate reporting requirements, which they
believe can be burdensome for smaller manufacturers.
In response, EPA notes that since the beginning of the light- and medium-duty GHG
programs we have worked together with NHTSA to harmonize program elements, testing and
reporting requirements where appropriate (e.g., emissions and fuel economy testing). We also
note there have been differences between certain features of the two programs, stemming from
different statutory authorities for the two agencies. For example, EPA's program allows credits
for air conditioning leakage which impacts GHGs but not fuel economy. To the extent that there
remain programmatic differences across the GHG and CAFE programs, due to differences in
statutes, we do not believe that such differences will cause difficulties with or be disruptive to
manufacturers' strategies to comply with both the GHG standards and the CAFE standards. As
we have done for almost 14 years since the EPA GHG program first became effective, we will
continue to coordinate with NHTSA during the implementation phase of the final standards.
With regard to comments regarding harmonization with California, EPA notes that EO 14037
also directs EPA to coordinate with California and other states that are leading the way in
reducing vehicle emissions. EPA has engaged with the California Air Resources Board on
technical issues in developing this rule. EPA has considered certain aspects of the CARB
Advanced Clean Cars II program, adopted in August 2022, and in some cases, where
appropriate, our program is consistent with aspects of the ACC II program, as discussed in the
preamble (e.g., see light-duty vehicle criteria pollutant provisions section III.D. 7; on-board
diagnostics section III.H; battery durability section III.G.2.). As is our long-standing practice,
EPA will continue to coordinate with NHTSA and CARB as we implement the GHG final
standards.
Volkswagen similarly urged harmonization including that CAFE compliance be allowed to be
determined based on an automaker being "deemed to comply" with the EPA GHG standards.
EPA notes that this issue is out of scope for the EPA rulemaking, as such a determination of
CAFE compliance would need to be made by NHTSA under its own authority.
GM and a few other commenters recommended the federal agencies develop a "Leadership
Pathway" which would reduce duplicative requirements across the regulations for any automaker
that exceeds national-level EV goals. EPA responds to this comment in section 3.4 of this RTC.
Auto industry commenters noted EPA's proposed revised definition of "medium-duty
passenger vehicle" and questioned how such a change in regulatory classes might be coordinated
with the NHTSA CAFE program. EPA responds to this comment in section 3.1.1 of this RTC.
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A few commenters (e.g., Fuel Freedom Foundation, Pearson Fuels) urged EPA to adopt
provisions for flex fueled vehicles (FFVs), which can be fueled on gasoline or E85, in a way that
is harmonized with FFV treatment under CAFE. Poet suggested that EPA establish a renewable
fuels credit mechanism as part of the GHG standards. EPA did not reopen provisions for the
treatment of FFVs in this rulemaking, and did not propose or seek comment on a renewable fuels
credit mechanism, and thus considers these comments out of scope. EPA notes that nothing in
our performance-based standards precludes automakers from choosing FFVs, or producing
renewable fueled vehicles, as part of its mix of technologies for compliance with the final
standards. EPA has existing provisions to calculate the emissions weighting of FFVs, based on
our projection of actual usage of gasoline vs. E85, referred to as the F-factor (see 40 CFR
600.510-12(k); 40 CFR 86.1819-14 (d)(10)(i)).
Some commenters (e.g., Mitsubishi) noted that, unlike the GHG standard, which treats
electric operation as zero emissions, and weights PHEV emissions through use of the utility
factor, the CAFE regulation assigns PHEVs and BEVs a petroleum-equivalent fuel economy, or
Petroleum Equivalency Factor (PEF). These commenters further note that this will lead to
different weightings between the two programs of compliance benefits for PHEVs and BEVs.
Several commenters noted NHTSA's restriction for considering BEVs in their standard setting
process and seem to conclude that that one limitation in NHTSA's statutory authority would
automatically result in a single fleet not being able to comply with both EPA and NHTSA's
standards. Another commenter (Aluminum Association) believes that the CAFE program's
treatment of BEVs (through the use of the PEF) accounts for improved efficiency whereas EPA's
program does not explicitly. In response, EPA recognizes that this final rule's compliance
treatment of BEVs (0 grams C02/mile) and PHEVs (utility factor weighting of electric operation
at 0 g/mi vs. gasoline emissions value) is different than that proposed by NHTSA for the CAFE
program which relies on the DOE PEF, pursuant to the CAFE statute. Importantly, this
difference across the program is not new — it has existed in the programs since the beginning of
EPA's GHG program first established in 2010 for the 2012 MY. EPA and NHTSA have had,
and will continue, extensive technical coordination on these issues. Our goal continues to be that
each agency can implement its respective statutory authority while avoiding inconsistency, and
that auto manufacturers will be able to comply with both sets of standards with a single fleet, as
has been the case since the GHG and CAFE programs have existed alongside each other since
MY 2012.
Comments about EPA's statutory authority to issue greenhouse gas standards are addressed in
section 2 of this RTC. Comments about NHTSA's statutory authority are beyond the scope of
this action.
27 - Other comments related to the proposed rule
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Ad Hoc Tier 4 Light-Duty Small Manufacturer Group
The Ad Hoc Group intends to file a Supplemental Comment before the July 5, 2023 comment
due date providing additional details [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0509, p. 1]
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Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
6. C02 Credits for Advanced Technology Vehicles
EPA proposes changes to the method for calculating MY 2022-2024 caps on multiplier-based
advanced technology vehicle credits in the proposed 40 C.F.R. § 86.1866-12.195 Given the
limited comment period and the denial of our request to extend it, Auto Innovators did not have
sufficient time to evaluate the proposed change. Additionally, we were unable to locate a
description of the proposed change in the preamble of the NPRM, so it is difficult to know what
the intent of the proposed change is. Following the formal comment period, we may revisit this
issue and request a meeting with EPA staff if there is a concern. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 108-109]
195 NPRM at 29438.
To reduce costs while still providing similar (and substantial) environmental benefits, the
EPA regulations should seek to align with criteria emissions regulations already adopted by
California in ACC II. We worked closely with the California Air Resources Board (CARB) and
with EPA staff in attendance and participating,25 5 for the past several years to develop standards
that substantially reduce real-world criteria emissions (including NMOG+NOx and PM), as
rapidly as possible without stranding technology or diverting resources from electrification.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 141-142]
255 At no time did EPA staff indicate a different or more stringent pathway was under development
federally, while the auto industry provided input, feedback, and technical data to CARB. The California
process provided an ideal forum for alignment, even if EPA could not commit to alignment at that stage.
Organization: Alliance for Consumers (AFC)
Failure To Provide Meaningful Opportunity For Public Comment]
Because of substantive oversights in the proposal, including the failure to adequately address
EV maintenance and repair costs, the future of cross-subsidization between ICE and EV models
at traditional automakers, and the potential for producers to limit sales of ICE vehicles despite
limited consumer appetite for EVs (resulting in a vehicle shortage for many everyday
consumers), and because of EPA's intended reliance on studies that have yet to
published/finalized and the short time provided for public comment overall, the Agency has
failed to provide a meaningful opportunity for the public to comment. See S.C. Coastal
Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 967 (D.S.C. 2018). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0534, p. 5]
Organization: Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE) Should any of these assumptions be
inaccurate, automotive manufacturers will likely assume significant financial risks as they
modify their operations and production. The Proposal also assumes that consumers will purchase
enough of these new vehicles for manufacturers to meet sales volumes for compliance levels. To
reduce these risks, EPA should re-evaluate the ZEV marketplace to determine the new standards'
feasibility prior to the effective date. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 2-4]
Political uncertainty
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AVE supports a technology-neutral approach to decarbonizing the LD and MD fleets to avoid
looming political and litigation challenges. Suppliers do not need to look too far back to recall
that federal support for a stringent standard may not always continue as planned. Any future
reductions of the subsidies now being promised under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) will
impact future feasibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 2-4]
As recent events have shown, the threat of regulatory ping-pong resulting in changing GHG
regulations is real and costly. In under four years, the automotive industry was required to
respond to the EPA and NHTSA's midterm evaluation, the freezing of those standards in early
2017, the re- issuing of new standards under the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient Vehicles Rule
(SAFE), the repeal of SAFE a mere 12-months later, and new standards issued at the end of
2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 2-4]
With sizable opposition to EPA's recent rulemakings in Congress,4 suppliers cannot have
reasonable assurance of the future standards that will be applicable, and this uncertainty can
impact investment in new advanced technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 2-4]
4 See H.R.2811 -Limit, Save, Grow Act of 2023 andS.J.Res.ll - A joint resolution providing for
congressional disapproval of EPAs "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty
Engine and Vehicle Standards".
This very real "political" uncertainty will bring significant risk to the investments made by
manufacturers and suppliers. We realize that EPA cannot, and should not, account for political
reasoning when planning future standards. EPA can, however, aim to repeat the success of
previous rulemakings that brought together numerous industry and regulatory stakeholders.
Doing so will produce standards that are supported by those that need to make the investments
for future standards to be successful. Without broad support from manufacturers and fleet
owners, technology providers could face stranded investments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0631, pp. 2-4]
Review of the ZEV marketplace
For the reasons stated above, we urge EPA to commit to an assessment of the Proposal's
feasibility in a manner similar to the Agency's midterm evaluation in 2017. The Agency should
re-evaluate the ZEV marketplace, including the cost of manufacturing, the pervasiveness of
charging infrastructure, and consumer acceptance. The basis for doing so is as relevant as it was
when EPA committed to the process in 2012.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0631, pp. 2-4]
8 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 199 / October 15, 2012 / at 62628
Organization: American Chemistry Council Product Approval Protocol Task Group (PAPTG)
The American Chemistry Council's Petroleum Additives Product Approval Task Group
(PAPTG) is pleased to provide this comment on the Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for
Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles. The PAPTG, a task group
of the Petroleum Additives Panel, is comprised of lubricant additive manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0666, p. 1]
Engine and driveline lubricants are an important component of light duty and medium duty
vehicle design and have been demonstrated to impact fuel economy and durability performance.
Lubricants are important in both improving fuel efficiency and enabling fuel efficient engine
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technology including hybrids. To help ensure that vehicle performance remains as close to the
design and certification level as possible, ACC suggests that EPA include language in the
proposed standard which recognizes and highlights the importance of using the appropriate OEM
or industry certified lubricants in factory fill and service fill (aftermarket) applications. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0666, p. 1]
Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
Complementary elements of EPA's LDV program should be extended to MDVs
Two other areas in which MDVs could benefit from being folded into the LDV program are
compliance reporting requirements and consumer labeling. EPA's compliance report for heavy-
duty vehicles24 does not include heavy-duty pickups and vans, and we are not aware of any
other source for this data. This situation has hampered our ability to make informed judgments
on the current proposal for MDV standards, as data on matters such as compliance credit
balances and rates of ICEV technology adoption are not currently available for these vehicles.
These vehicles should be incorporated into EPA's Trends report no later than MY 2027. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, p. 11]
24 https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-05/420r22028A.pdf
MDVs also should have a consumer label, and the label should provide a basis for comparison
with LDVs. This could be an important element, along with the reclassification of vehicles for
purposes of the standards, of EPA's effort to discourage the upward creep in size and
performance attributes of light-duty trucks. California began labeling MDVs on January 1,
2021.25 While the MDV scores are not directly comparable to California's LDV scores, CARB
provides a comparison table with LDV GHG scores. We urge EPA to create a meaningful
consumer label for MDVs in time for MY 2027. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0642, p. 11]
25 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/greenhouse-gas-standards-medium-and-heavy-duty-engines-
and-vehicles/ep-label
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
For starters, we are disappointed with the 60-day comment period you allocated for this major
rulemaking. Given the enormous stakes of this proposal, which effectively bans new internal
combustion engine vehicles, the length of the proposal (262 Federal Register pages), the size of
the docket (10,000 plus pages of supporting documents), and the other, related rulemakings with
concurrent comment deadlines, there is no reasonable justification for such an abbreviated
comment period. No doubt this proposal took EPA many months, if not years, to prepare. Yet,
you're asking the public to make the herculean effort to read, analyze, and provide constructive,
detailed comments in just a matter of eight weeks (and on July 5th no less). The question this
begs is, why? Why would you stifle public feedback on such an important rule? [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, p.1]
EPA also failed to provide a meaningful opportunity for public comment by limiting the
comment period to 60 days, denying requests form AFPM and other stakeholders to extend the
comment period, and concurrently proposing heavy-duty standards and other significant
rulemakings related to vehicle electrification, fuels, and electricity generation. Significant time is
required to read and respond to the voluminous material in each rulemaking docket, particularly
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given EPA's evident lack of rigor in its analysis, and lack of discipline in citing and
characterizing underlying sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 3]
A. Advanced Clean Cars II ("ACC II") Cannot be a Basis for this Rulemaking
EPA points to California's ACC II program and adoption by Section 177 states to support its
projections of increased PEV penetration, 122 but the ACC II has not received a waiver, and EPA
did not even have the waiver application when the Proposed Rule was published. 123 The CAA
requires EPA to evaluate California's waiver request to ensure that California did not arbitrarily
determine that it needs "ZEV mandates" to address compelling and extraordinary circumstances.
As Principal Deputy Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation Joe Goffman testified on
June 21, 2023, EPA just received the waiver request. Given that the EPA official responsible for
overseeing the California waiver request publicly acknowledged that EPA has not determined
whether it will grant a waiver for ACC II, the Agency cannot rely on ACC II as a basis for this
Proposal. Moreover, because California concedes that ACC II will not meaningfully address the
impacts of climate change in California and ACC II will slow fleet turnover and retard
California's progress toward meeting the NAAQS, California is NOT eligible for a waiver and
ACC II is preempted. EPA's reliance on ACC II as support for this rule is pre-decisional and
another example of arbitrary and capricious decision-making. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733,
p. 28]
122 Proposed Rule at 29,118.
123 88 Fed. Reg. 29,189; See, e.g., Initial Br. For Private Petitioners, State of Ohio, et al. v.
Envt'l Prot. Agency, et al., No. 22-1081 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 24, 2022). V. The Proposal Fails to
Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Public Comment
AFPM welcomes the opportunity to meaningfully engage with regulators to discuss cost-
effective, efficient, and feasible measures to reduce the carbon intensity of, and criteria emissions
from, the transportation sector. Unfortunately, the concurrent comment periods for this rule and
EPA's proposed heavy-duty vehicle GHG emissions standards are insufficient to provide fully
informed comments on either proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 61-62]
Although AFPM was one of several entities requesting that EPA extend the comment period
for both rules, the agency declined, claiming that its pre-publication release of material meant
that the public in fact had 83 days to comment on the Proposed Rule and 66 days to comment on
the heavy-duty GHG rule.280 Contemporaneously with these proposals were two related rules
addressing electric vehicles: (1) DOE published a proposal to revise its regulations regarding
calculating a value for the petroleum-equivalent fuel economy of EVs for use in determining
compliance with the CAFE program;281 and (2) the IRS proposed regulations regarding the
IRA's New Clean Vehicle Credit. The table below illustrates that in the span of 88 days (April
11 - July 5), interested parties were required to analyze 531 pages of proposed rules in the
Federal Register and more than 30,000 pages of supporting material to understand the basis for
each proposed rule. The page estimate excludes the voluminous amount of data supporting
EPA's two proposed vehicle rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 61-62]
280 June 2, 2023, letter from Joseph Goffman, EPA Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator, responding
to Patrick Kelly, AFPM; see also letters from Alliance for Automotive Innovation, National Automobile
Dealers Association, Hyundai-Kia America Technical Center, Inc., Hyundai Motor America, and National
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Center for Public Policy Research, available at https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-
engines/proposed-rule-multi-pollutant-emissions-standards-model.
281 88 Fed Reg. 21,525, 21,526 (Apr. 11, 2023).
Proposed Rule: Petroleum-Equivalent Fuel Economy Calculation [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0733, pp.61-62]
No. of Federal Register Pages: 15
Publication Date: April 11, 2023
Comments Due: June 12, 2023
Comment Period (including pre- publication days): 61 days
Estimated Pages of Supporting Documents: More than 500
Proposed Rule: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles—Phase 3
("HDV Rule")
No. of Federal Register Pages: 236
Publication Date: April 27, 2023
Comments Due: June 16, 2023
Comment Period (including pre- publication days): 66 days
Estimated Pages of Supporting Documents: More than 20,000
Proposed Rule: Proposed Rule (Light- Duty Vehicles—Multi- Pollutant) ("LD/MD Rule")
No. of Federal Register Pages: 263
Publication Date: May 5, 2023
Comments Due: July 5, 2023
Comment Period (including pre- publication days): 83 days
Estimated Pages of Supporting Documents: More than 10,000
Proposed Rule: 30D New Clean Vehicle Credit
No. of Federal Register Pages: 17
Publication Date: April 17, 2023
Comments Due: June 16, 2023
Comment Period (including pre- publication days): 60 days
Estimated Pages of Supporting Documents: -30 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 61-62]
EPA's refusal to grant additional time to respond to the Proposal and the heavy-duty GHG
rule denied the public ample time to formulate meaningful comments responsive to the
underlying information in support of the Agency's proposal. The Agency's action is an arbitrary
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departure from its typical practice of granting reasonable extensions of time—often thirty days,
but frequently sixty or even ninety—to provide meaningful input from the public on proposed
rules.282 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 61-62]
282 Around the same time AFPM's extension request was denied, EPA saw fit to grant an extension of
time to submit comments on the "Commercial Sterilization Facilities NESHAP." See EPA Docket EPA-
HQ-OAR-2019-0178-0154.
Further, the short and concurrently running comment periods on these closely related rules are
exacerbated by EPA's unduly narrow identification of industries affected by this rule. Under the
heading "Does this action apply to me," EPA limits its identification of affected industries to
entities with direct compliance obligations: motor vehicle manufacturers, commercial importers
of vehicles and vehicle components, alternative fuel vehicle converters, and medium duty engine
& vehicle manufacturers.283 Although EPA notes that "this table is not intended to be
exhaustive.. .other types of entities could also be affected," EPA understands many entities
necessarily rely on regulatory screening tools based on search terms tied to their own NAICS
codes to alert them to new proposed rules that may impact them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0733, p. 63]
283 Proposed Rule at 29,184.
By narrowly limiting the identification of industries affected based on this extremely short
and incomplete list of NAICS codes and by its arbitrary refusal to extend the comment periods,
EPA has unreasonably constrained the number and types of entities that will find out about these
proposed actions in time to comment. EPA appears to be counting on closing the comment
period before consumers, retailers, farmers, fleet operators, bio and renewable fuel producers,
small businesses, emergency response providers, local governments, or any of the host of other
interests who will be affected by the profound changes in how light and medium duty vehicles
are sold or even realize what is at stake. This sort of gamesmanship is at odds with EPA's
responsibility under the Administrative Procedures Act and the Due Process clause of the U.S.
Constitution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, p. 63]
Organization: American Highway Users Alliance
Feasibility of the proposal is highly questionable and benefits are likely overestimated
Further, the two lengthy NPRMs and the lengthy draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for
each of them do not appear to include any consideration of the adverse impacts of the proposal
on revenues flowing to the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) and resulting Federal highway
infrastructure investment. The proposed rules in the two dockets seek to accelerate a shift from
the public's use of ICE vehicles to EVs. A substantial erosion of revenue into the HTF would
result,3 placing major downward pressure on needed highway and bridge investment, which
already faces an investment backlog of $786 billion per USDOT's latest "Conditions and
Performance Report." Moreover, that $786 billion estimate was developed before recent
significant inflation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0696, pp. 3-4]
3 The draft RIA for the heavy-duty vehicle NPRM includes a brief reference (page 429) that, under the
proposed rule, fuel consumption would be "reduced." Fuel sales, which are subject to a Federal excise tax,
generate the largest share of HTF revenue.
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Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
g. Program Review.
i. Assessment of both vehicle and infrastructure development/deployment progress.
The design of a program with heavy reliance on infrastructure that may not be widely
available on the timeline proposed is optimistic at best. The proposal appears premature on the
stated timeline, and essentially in conjunction with the HD GHG Phase 3 program, which would
be competing for the same resources. If EPA is not willing to adjust the timeline and/or standards
of the proposed programs, API requests that the agency consider incorporating a pre- program
assessment as well as a program progress assessment. It is imperative that EPA provide a real-
world evaluation, with an honest assessment provided to the public, regarding progress on
infrastructure readiness and ZEV technology deployment. The opportunity for stranded
investments by all stakeholders impacted by this program is just too great not to incorporate pre-
and mid-program reviews. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 23]
For a mid-program assessment, EPA could consider something akin to the Midterm
Evaluation that was finalized in the 2012 joint agency rulemaking establishing the MY 2017-
2025 LD GHG standards.77 Further, we recommend that EPA engage a broad stakeholder
community to identify necessary elements to incorporate into such an assessment. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 23]
77 "Midterm Evaluation of Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Years
2022-2025." https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/midterm-evaluation-light-
duty-vehicle- greenhouse-gas.
ii. Future program incentives and program adjustment of standards.
In the development of the program, EPA needs to consider future program incentives such as
adoption of a lifecycle approach, combined with fuel carbon intensity reductions. Such an
approach would provide a broad spectrum of industries that power the transportation system
(e.g., OEMs, petroleum refiners, power generators, and renewable fuel manufacturers) with
incentives to reduce emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 23]
In addition, we also request that the agency report on the findings following review with
enough time to adjust the standards if needed. Adequate lead time must be provided to the
regulated community to allow for necessary adjustments to regulatory compliance strategies, and
to avoid stranded investments as much as possible. A proposal based on stretch goals must
incorporate an "offramp" or some opportunity to pivot if the essential elements of the program,
such as charging/fueling infrastructure, do not materialize. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p.
23]
Organization: Arconic Corporation (ARCO)
Arconic appreciates the opportunity to provide input to EPA as it considers revisions to
vehicle emissions standards for MY 2027 and beyond. Arconic also generally supports the
technical comments submitted by the Aluminum Association. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0741,
p. 4]
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Organization: Arizona State Legislature
8. The proposed rule does not allow comment on key final documents. EPA discusses at least
two documents that have not been finalized after a peer review, and EPA should reopen the
public comment process once the final versions of these documents are available. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 3]
Commenters do not know the conclusions and analysis contained in the final versions of these
reports. Presumably, EPA will make changes after receiving the peer-review comments.
Commenters cannot provide fully informed comments on the proposed rule without having the
opportunity to review the final versions of these reports. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0537, p. 27]
EPA should reopen the public comment process for the proposed rule after it has received the
final versions of these reports. This should occur whether or not EPA intends to make revisions
to the final rule based on the reports or to rely on the reports to support the final rule. If EPA
intends to make revisions of the final rule based on the final versions of these reports,
commenters should have the opportunity to comment on all revisions. The same is true with any
other reports or data that EPA does not cite in the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0537, p. 27]
Failure by EPA to reopen the public comment process would be arbitrary and capricious. See,
e.g., Texas v. United States Env'tProt. Agency, 389 F. Supp. 3d 497, 506 (S.D. Tex. 2019)
("However, the Agencies' decision not to reopen the Proposed Rule for comment after the
publication of the Final Connectivity Report prejudiced the ability of interested parties to (1)
provide meaningful comments regarding the Final Rule's continuum-based approach to
connectivity and (2) 'mount a credible challenge' to the Final Rule."); Ctr. for Biological
Diversity, Defs. of Wildlife v. Kelly, 93 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1207 (D. Idaho 2015) (granting partial
summary judgment and ordering an additional public comment period after federal agency relied
on peer review comments not discussed or cited in the proposed rule). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0537, p. 27]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Lastly, as part of the California Phase 2 GHG program, CARB requires manufacturers to
display environmental performance labels to provide buyers with important vehicle information
when they are considering purchasing a new medium-duty vehicle. CARB recommends that U.S.
EPA establish a similar labeling requirement for medium-duty vehicles as it does for light-duty
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 17]
Serviceability
Vehicle serviceability is the ability for a driver to be able to repair their vehicle at any repair
shop of their choosing and is key to sustaining driver use and maintaining emission benefits from
ZEVs. If consumers cannot find suitable repair shops for their ZEVs, there is a risk that they will
revert to conventional vehicles, limiting the emission benefits. To service vehicles, repair shops
need access to on-board vehicle data and service information defining how to diagnose, repair,
and maintain the vehicle, which not only requires some data standardization but also a way to
access the data on the vehicle through a standardized means, such as the SAE J1962 compliant
diagnostic connector. With the ACC II regulations, CARB added ZEVs to its service information
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regulation 56 to require the same access and disclosure of repair information and tooling, as well
as the requirement that each vehicle be equipped with a standardized data set and equipped with
a SAE J1962 diagnostic connector. 57 This regulation requires manufacturers to provide the
same information to independent repair shops as they provide to their dealerships as is done for
internal combustion engine vehicles today. 58 CARB strongly recommends that U.S. EPA
include serviceability requirements for ZEVs in its proposal and, at minimum, a way to access
that data through a standardized SAE J1962 compliant diagnostic connector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, p. 42]
56 Cal. Code Regs., title 13, section 1969.
57 Cal. Code Regs., title 13, section 1962.5.
58 For additional background on CARB's inclusion of ZEVs in the service information regulation as part
of ACCII, see ACCII Final Statement of Reasons for Rulemaking (FSOR), Including Summary of
Comments and Agency Response Appendix D Summary of Comments to ZEV Assurance Measures and
Agency Response, pp. 59 - 65
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/fsorappd.pdf and ACC IIISOR, Appendix
F-7, pp. 1, 10-13, 16.
Direct Current Fast Charging Standardization
CARB agrees with U.S. EPA's findings that the increased deployment of ZEVs will require
more charging infrastructure to be installed. For this infrastructure to be most effective, CARB
recommends that U.S. EPA require manufacturers to standardize vehicle charging inlets. In
particular, direct current fast charging (DCFC) will play a key role in charging away from home
both for longer travel trips and for those without convenient access to home or workplace
charging. Making sure that consumers can easily access charging and that all BEVs are DCFC
capable can help increase uptake of ZEVs, better ensure they can be effectively used by second
and third owners, and help fully realize emission benefits from U.S. EPA's proposed standards.
Currently, three distinct DCFC inlets exist on BEVs deployed in the U.S.: CHAdeMO, SAE
Combined Charging System (CCS1) Type 1 (SAE J1772), and Tesla's North America Charging
Standard connector. Having three different DCFC inlets, standards, and communication
protocols can lead to inconsistent and unnecessarily complex charging experiences for
consumers, including interoperability and charging reliability concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0780, pp. 45-46]
Most manufacturers are already utilizing the SAE J1772 CCS1 standard in current vehicle
production. In 2020, the CCS1 inlet was on 13 available BEV models and only 2 BEV models
came with the CHAdeMO inlet. For the 2022 MY, 45 BEV models have the CCS1 inlet, with
only 2 vehicle models remaining with the CHAdeMO inlet. 71 The federal government is also
already investing in CCS1 infrastructure through the NEVI program, which requires that each
funded DCFC port have at least one CCS1 connector. 72 However, in Spring 2023, Ford and
General Motors both announced partnership with and future implementation of Tesla's North
America Charging Standard on their vehicles. 73, 74 These moves by industry electric vehicle
leaders are significant and continued lack of standardization could lead to more confusion in the
market and decentralization of resources toward solving those issues that most plague reliable
charging for electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 45-46]
71 ACC II ISOR. Chapter III, Sect C.3. ACC II ISOR (ca.gov)
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72 23 CFR §680.106(c) (2023).
73 Ford. "Ford EV Customers To Gain Access To 12,000 Tesla Superchargers; Company To Add North
American Charging Standard Port In Future EVs." May 25, 2023.
https://media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/fna/us/en/news/2023/05/25/ford-ev-customers-to-gain-access-
to- 12-000-tesla-superchargers~.html. Accessed June 15, 2023.
74 General Motors. "General Motors Doubles Down on Commitment to a Unified Charging Standard and
Expands Charging Access to Tesla Supercharger Network" June 8, 2023.
https://news.gm.com/newsroom.detail.html/Pages/news/us/en/2023/jun/0608-gm.html. Accessed June 15,
2023.
Certification Data Collection for Improved ZEV Fuel Economy Labels
Based on experience gained to date, CARB has identified several shortcomings in the current
fuel economy labels for ZEVs that could be improved to communicate more relevant data to
consumers. Internal combustion engine vehicles have a long history with the label and its
refinements over the years to present the most meaningful data in a concise format for
consumers. For ZEVs in general, and especially for BEVs, however, the current label is
insufficient in communicating useful information in an understandable metric to consumers
regarding the most important BEV attributes. While modifications to the required label
information and format may be out of scope for the current rulemaking proposal, CARB
recommends that U.S. EPA include requirements with this proposal to require vehicle
manufacturers to disclose additional information that could be used for such an improved label
that could be adopted by separate rulemaking in the future. Specifically, CARB recommends that
U.S. EPA require that manufacturers report additional test data and vehicle information
regarding the vehicle's range and charging time at the time of certification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, p. 46]
Improved Electric Driving Range Information
Currently, the existing BEV label highlights vehicle efficiency in units of miles per gallons of
gas equivalent (MPGe) based on testing across five defined drive cycles. The current label also
uses this efficiency for the reported electric vehicle driving range. However, driving range based
on city cycle usage or the combined cycle usage is not relevant to drivers who are primarily
concerned about range for long distance travel which, by definition, is typically conducted at
highway-like speeds. CARB notes that some third parties (including AAA, 75 InsideEVs, 76 and
a recent SAE paper 77) have also previously assessed BEV range and noted a mismatch between
label reported range and what a typical driver would likely experience in-use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, pp. 46-47]
75 American Automobile Association, Inc. "AAA Electric Vehicle Range Testing." NewsRoom.AAA.com.
February 2019. AAA-Electric-Vehicle-Range-Testing-Report.pdf.
76 Moloughney, T., "What's The Real World Highway Range Of Today's Electric Cars? We Test To Find
Out." InsideEVs.com. April 22, 2023. https://insideevs.com/reviews/443791/ev-range-test-results/.
Accessed June 15, 2023.
77 Pannone, G. and VanderWerp, D., "Comparison of On-Road Highway Fuel Economy and All-Electric
Range to Label Values: Are the Current Label Procedures Appropriate for Battery Electric Vehicles?," SAE
Technical Paper 2023-01-0349, 2023, https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0349.
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CARB recommends that U.S. EPA require manufacturers to collect and report some higher
speed highway relevant energy consumption information during ZEV certification to supplement
the highway drive cycle information currently submitted. To minimize added test burden to
vehicle manufacturers, this data could be collected during the constant speed cycle portion of the
already required SAE J1634 certification testing procedure to capture energy consumption rates
at 65 mph and perhaps 75 mph to sufficiently bracket expected usage and ensure sufficient data
exists to inform a future label. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 46-47]
Additionally, based on experience to date as to information consumers are seeking, CARB
recommends U.S. EPA require collection and reporting of additional data to enable calculation
of range under cold and hot weather conditions. As an example, collection of both highway-
speed energy consumption and total usable battery energy while carrying out required testing for
the 20-degree Fahrenheit cold temperature cycle could provide sufficient information to derive a
consistent cold temperature estimated driving range. Likewise, during the required supplemental
test known as SC03 that represents hot weather driving with high solar load and air conditioning
usage, collection of this data could provide the necessary information to allow a more
meaningful future label that transparently presents range information to a consumer. Many
consumers are aware of battery limitations in cold or hot weather but lack accurate information
when making purchase decisions as to the likely magnitude of that impact on any particular
vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, pp. 46-47]
Organization: California Attorney General's Office, et al.
Across the country, states have also adopted laws, regulations, and policies that mandate or
encourage zero-emission vehicle adoption. These state actions range from state fleet acquisition
requirements to zero-emission vehicle purchase incentives and price relief to grants and financial
assistance for public and private fleets. For example: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 19-
21]
Examples of State Fleet Acquisition Requirements
In Maine, 50% of all light-duty vehicles acquired by the state shall to the extent
practicable be plug-in hybrid electric or zero-emission by 2025, and that requirement increases to
100% by 2030. Maine Revised Statutes, title 5, § 1830(12). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746,
pp. 19-21]
In Hawai'i and Maryland, 100% of passenger vehicles in the state's fleet must be
zero- emission vehicles by 2031, and other light-duty vehicles must be zero-emission by 2036.
Hawai'i Revised Statutes § 196-9(c)(ll); Maryland Statutes, State Finance & Proc. Code 14-
418. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 19-21]
In Texas, as of 2010, state agency fleets with more than 15 vehicles may purchase
only alternative fuel motor vehicles (including electric vehicles), and these fleets must consist of
at least 50% alternative fuel vehicles and use those fuels at least 80% of the time they are driven.
Texas Statutes, Gov. Code 2158.004-2158.009. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 19-21]
In Utah, at least 50% of new or replacement light-duty state vehicles must be
propelled to a significant extent by alternative fuels, including electricity and hydrogen. Utah
Code §§ 63A-9-401, 63A-9-403. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 19-21]
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In Missouri, 50% of new vehicles purchased by state agency fleets in a two-year
period must be alternative fuel vehicles. Missouri Revised Statutes §§ 414.410. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, pp. 19-21]
In Connecticut, 100% of all cars and light duty trucks purchased or leased by the state
must be battery electric vehicles by 2030. Connecticut Public Act No. 22-25. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0746, pp. 19-21]
In Rhode Island, 25% of light-duty vehicles purchased and leased by the state must be
zero-emission vehicles by 2025. Rhode Island Executive Order 15-17. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0746, pp.19-21]
In Pennsylvania, state agencies under the Governor's jurisdiction must replace 25% of
the passenger cars in the state fleet with battery electric and plug-in electric hybrid cars by 2025.
Pennsylvania Executive Order 2019-01. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 19-21]
In Washington, state agencies are ordered to electrify their fleets and establish a State
Fleets Zero Emission Vehicle Implementation Strategy. Washington Executive Order 21- 04.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 19-21]
Examples of Purchase Incentives
In Oregon, rebates are available for electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles, including for income-qualified state residents. 116 Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 468.422-
468.444. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 19-21]
116 Oregon.gov, Requirements for Charge Ahead Applicants, available at
https://www.oregon.gov/deq/aq/programs/Pages/Charge-Ahead-Rebate.aspx.
In California, the Clean Vehicle and Rebate Project for Fleets offers rebates for the
purchase of light-duty zero-emission and plug-in hybrid electric fleet vehicles. 117 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 19-21]
117 See California Fleet Rebate Project, Fleet Overview, available at
https://cleanvehiclerebate.org/en/fleet.
In Colorado, the Clean Fleet Vehicle and Technology Grant Program offers grants to
business and government fleets for the purchase of new electric or fuel cell vehicles, or
conversions of vehicles into battery or fuel-cell electric vehicles. 118 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0746, pp. 19-21]
118 See Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, Clean Fleet Vehicle & Technology Grant
Program, available at https://cdphe.colorado.gov/clean-fleet-vehicle-technology-grant-program.
Vermont recently approved a pilot program to subsidize EV purchases by gasoline
"superusers"—i.e., drivers who consume over 1,000 gallons of gasoline per year— maximizing
GHG reductions from the switch to EVs and saving these drivers significant fuel costs. 2020 Vt.
Acts and Resolves No. 151, § 1.119 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 19-21]
119 S. 137, Act Relating to Energy Efficiency Modernization, available at
https://legislature.vermont.gOv/bill/status/2024/S.137
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In New York, the Drive Clean Rebate for Electric Cars offers rebates for the purchase
or lease of eligible plug-in hybrid or battery electric vehicles. 120 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0746, pp. 19-21]
120 See New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, Drive Clean Rebate for Electric
Cars, available at https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Drive-Clean-Rebate-For-Electric-Cars-
Program.
In Massachusetts, the recently enacted Electric Vehicle Adoption Incentive Trust
Fund requires creation of a rebate and incentive program to provide individual consumer rebates
of not less than $3,500 and not more than $5,000 for purchase of zero-emission car and light
duty trucks, with additional rebates for low-income individuals. 121 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0746, pp. 19-21]
121 An Act Driving Clean Energy and Offshore Wind, 2022 Mass. Acts, ch. 179, § 41; Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 25A § 19(b), (c), available at https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2022/Chapterl79;
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleII/Chapter25A/Sectionl9.
In Arizona, drivers of alternative fuel vehicles, including electric vehicles, may obtain
a special license plate allowing them to use high-occupancy vehicle freeway lanes at any
time. 122 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0746, pp. 19-21]
122 See Arizona Department of Transportation, Alternative Fuel Vehicle, available at
https://azdot.gov/mvd/services/vehicle-services/vehicle-registration/alternative-fuel-vehicle.
Organization: CALSTART
4. Lock in a rapid transition to a zero-carbon transportation system, while sending a
clear market signal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0618, p. 2]
Organization: Charles Gordon
REQUEST for EXTENSION of TIME and MEETING
The 2 1\2 months that EPA gave for comments on this massive and complex rulemaking is far
too short for anyone who does not have the resources of EPA to add detail to their comments.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 2]
I also request a meeting with EPA staff on this rulemaking. That is legally permissible as long
as notes are taken and placed in the record. The one group that EPA did not say they met with
are private citizens who are most effected by the propose rule [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747,
p. 2]
ATTACHMENTS to COMMENTS
I request that the cover to this comment and the attached book be considered as part of these
comments. Both make important substantive points. The book is "Unsettled" by Steven E.
Kooning. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, p. 2]
ALTERNATIVES to DRASTIC REDUCTIONS in C02
Research is going forward on carbon sequestration with some operations already working. It
is true the activists oppose this for no apparent reason. It would be easy to add more sulfur
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compounds into the atmosphere by burning more soft coal to cool the atmosphere. The power
plants would also have to emit a basic substance to prevent lake acidification. That is a
challenge, but not Impossible to implement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, pp. 7-8]
Rising sea levels an be contained by sea walls as the Dutch have been doing for centuries.
Beach front residences can be moved back. Alternating droughts and torrential rains may not be
caused by global warming. But it can be controlled by better water management. Forest fires can
be controlled by better forest management. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, pp. 7-8]
ACTIVIST ORGANIZATIONS are NOT UNBIASED
Nowadays activist, nonprofit organizations are an industry. They provide well paid jobs for
their officers and employees. They lie with statistics just as much as industry. They are never
satisfied with regulatory actions that seem to carry out most of their goals because there would
be no more grants and jobs for their employees. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, pp. 7-8]
When OSHA was considering limiting smoking in the workplace, the antismoking
organizations wanted OSHA to regulate based on secret data. When the administration did much
to reduce global warming through the IRA and other actions, activist organizations bitterly
criticized the administration for permitting a 300-mile pipeline which was necessary to save the
IRA and extend the debt ceiling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, pp. 7-8]
Consequently, regulatory agencies need to be as skeptical of activist, non-profit organizations
as they are of industry. They certainly should not consider their views as beyond reproach.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0747, pp. 7-8]
Organization: Chevron
It is important for EPA to plan for uncertainty in the feasibility and timing of meeting the
standards proposed in the light and medium duty rule. We endorse the recommendation from
API in their written comments to implement an interim program review, with provisions for
adjustment of the standards if adequate progress is not being demonstrated. These important
program elements should be incorporated into any final regulatory action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0553, p. 6]
Organization: Competitive Enterprise Institute
The proposal purports to give automakers a nudge in the direction the market is already going.
However, political coercion is a major factor driving the trend. As the EPA acknowledges:
In 2022, California finalized the Advanced Clean Cars II rule that will require, by 2035, all
new light-duty vehicles sold in the state to be zero-emission vehicles, with New York,
Massachusetts, and Washington state following suit, likely to be followed by Oregon and
Vermont as well. Several other states may adopt similar provisions as members of the
International Zero-Emission Vehicle Alliance.73 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, p. 19]
73 88 FR 29188.
Consumers now face the real risk that much of the new-car market will be off-limits to
gasoline- powered vehicles in the near future. The EPA does not merely ride the EV wave. It
launched the wave in January 2013 by withdrawing Clean Air Act preemption of California's
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ZEV program,74 propelled it forward by repealing preemption in March 2022.75 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0611, p. 19]
74 EPA, California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a
Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California's Advanced Clean Car Program and a Within the Scope
Confirmation for California's Zero Emission Vehicle Amendments for 2017 and Earlier Model Years, 78
FR2112, January 9, 2013, https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/FR-2013-01-09/pdf/2013-00181.pdf.
75 EPA, California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Advanced Clean Car Program;
Reconsideration of a Previous Withdrawal of a Waiver of Preemption; Notice of Decision, 87 FR 14332,
March 14, 2022, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-03-14/pdf/2022-05227.pdf.
In so doing, the EPA ignored the Energy Policy and Conservation Act's preemption of State
laws or regulations "related to" fuel economy standards. ZEV mandates are substantially related
to fuel economy standards. As ZEV mandates tighten, fleetwide-average fuel economy increases.
Conversely, as the current rulemaking demonstrates, at a certain level of stringency, fleet-
average C02 standards, which are fuel economy standards by another name, function as ZEV
mandates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0611, p. 19]
Organization: Consumer Reports (CR)
8. EPA Should Improve Consumer Information on the Window Sticker for EVs
If enacted, EPA's GHG rule will help support continued growth in EV sales. To help support
consumers as they make the transition to EVs, CR asks that EPA open a separate rulemaking to
update the consumer information that is provided on the window sticker for EVs. The EV market
has evolved immensely in the years since the window sticker was last revised. Updating the
sticker with more relevant information can help improve the EV buying experience. CR would
suggest the following improvements to the data that is provided to consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0728, pp. 25-27]
8.1. More Useful EV Range Information
As Car and Driver has recently highlighted, EPA's current testing for EV range does not
always match with real world vehicle performance.52 A big portion of the problem is the fact
that EPA only publishes a combined city /highway EV range number. However, EVs tend to
achieve shorter range at real world highway speeds, which is when range is most often relevant
to consumers. Also, range is only estimated under ideal weather conditions, leaving consumers
with no information about how their vehicle might perform in hot or cold weather. While a
single combined number is generally useful in comparing different vehicles against each other,
providing consumers with more information including highway range in both hot and cold
weather would be most useful in helping consumers understand the true performance they can
expect from their vehicle, and better determine if it will meet their needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0728, pp. 25-27]
52 Comparison of On-Road Highway Fuel Economy and All-Electric Range to Label Values: Are the
Current Label Procedures Appropriate for Battery Electric Vehicles?, SAE International, April 11, 2023,
https://www.sae.org/publications/technical-papers/content/2023-01-0349/.
8.2. Consider Alternatives to Mile Per Gallon Equivalent (MPGe)
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While MPGe is somewhat useful in helping consumers understand how EVs compare with
gas and hybrid vehicles in terms of efficiency, it's not a very useful metric for vehicle owners.
EPA should reconsider the use of MPGe on the window sticker and explore replacing or
supplementing it with a more useful efficiency metric. In general most modern EVs present
efficiency in terms of miles per kilowatt hour on their trip odometers, which is more consistent
with how consumers are used to thinking about efficiency in terms of miles per gallon. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 25-27]
8.3. Provide EV Battery Size Information
While manufacturers may choose to include battery size information on the window sticker, it
is not required. CR would recommend that manufactures provide the usable battery capacity of
the vehicle on the window sticker. This also provides useful information for comparison between
vehicles. Two separate vehicles might both have the same rated range, but achieve it with wildly
different battery sizes. Providing that information to consumers can help them potentially
consider more efficient options. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 25-27]
There may also be some value in manufacturers also providing the basic battery chemistry
details as well given that certain types of batteries may perform differently under different
conditions. This type of information may become even more important as the market explores
more diversity in battery chemistries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 25-27]
8.4. Develop and Present Standard Metrics for Charging Speeds
Charging speed is becoming an increasingly important differentiator in terms of the
convenience of driving an EV longer distances. While the range of EVs is still important, it is
charging speed that can most affect how convenient longer trips in EVs will be. CR suggests that
EPA develop standardized testing and metrics for EVs' DC-fast charging speeds. Currently
automakers provide consumers with cherry-picked charging speeds, often based upon narrow
slices of the vehicle's charging curve under ideal conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728,
pp. 25-27]
CR would suggest a standardized test for fast charging speed measuring the time to charge
from 10% to 80% state of charge. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 25-27]
However, that metric is only part of the story because it doesn't tell how many miles of range
are gained over that time. A separate metric should also be included that measures the average
numbers of miles of range gained over a set period of time, potentially average miles per 10
minutes of charging or average miles per minute gained from 10%-80% state of charge. This will
give consumers a more standardized way to understand how long they will have to spend
charging to cover a specific distance using public fast charging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0728, pp. 25-27]
Level 2 charging speeds can also be important information, but more information should be
provided to consumers about the conditions under which the test was performed. At a minimum
EPA should require the amperage of the charger needed to achieve the presented level 2 charging
times be provided. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 25-27]
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Organization: DENSO Corporation
Appendix 2
DENSO GREEN Technology Examples: ZEV Energy Consumption Reduction
1. Internal Heat Exchanger (SCX): An Internal Heat Exchanger reduces load on the
compressor by transferring heat from the high-pressure liquid entering the expansion valve
(TXV) to the low- pressure gas exiting the evaporator. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 9]
2. Motors Generator (MG): A MG is essential for driving hybrid vehicles/BEVs and
generating electricity. It serves as the main power source when starting and driving a vehicle and
assists the engine during acceleration. The regenerative energy generated when applying the
brakes is used to charge the battery. An MG plays a key role in improving the dynamic
performance and fuel efficiency of hybrid vehicles/BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p.
9]
3. Invertor w/Silicon Carbide (SiC): Inverters convert DC power from the battery to AC
power controlling/operating the motor generator for traction/propulsion. During regenerative
braking, the inverter converts AC power from the MG to DC (regenerative braking) to recharge
the battery. SiC power semiconductors consist of silicon and carbon that significantly reduce
power loss compared to silicon (Si) power semiconductors. A cruising test conducted under
specific conditions by BEV using SiC semiconductor inverters demonstrated inverters with SiC
power semiconductor reduce power loss less than half of ones with Si semiconductor. As a
result, the energy efficiency of BEVs is improved and cruising range is extended. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 9]
4. Heat Pump System: Highly Efficient Heat Pump Systems extract heat from the air and
vehicle systems, and uses it as a heat source for the vehicle battery and climate control system.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0651, p. 9]
5. Radiant Heating System: This technology helps to extend electric driving range when
the heating is on. In combination with the heat pump system, the highly heated surface
efficiently warms occupants only and reduces the energy required. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0651, p. 9]
6. Battery Management System with Integrated Circuit (IC): This new generation
battery- monitoring integrated circuit (IC) for lithium-ion batteries increases the efficiency with
which electric and hybrid vehicles use their batteries, improves fuel efficiency and extends
driving range. DENSO's was the first IC that can accurately detect battery voltage while
monitoring multiple cells, a new capability compared to conventional ICs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0651, p. 9]
Organization: District of Columbia Department of Energy and Environment (DOEE)
Advanced Clean Cars 2
Given the health and environmental concerns affiliated with vehicle emissions and climate
change, DOEE is taking action to mitigate those health and environmental effects. As allowed
for under Clean Air Act § 177, DOEE is finalizing efforts to adopt California's Advanced Clean
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Cars 2 (ACC2), which will require vehicles to be zero emission by 2035. By adopting ACC2,
DOEE takes a crucial step toward improving the health and wellness of District residents. DOEE
has also finalized a robust roadmap for transportation electrification, an essential step towards
having the capacity to charge vehicles as would be required in the rulemaking. 18 Using the
roadmap as a guide DOEE and its partners at the District Department of Transportation are
working to secure funds through the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) and
Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0550, p. 6]
18 DOEE. Transportation Electrification Roadmap. September 2022.
https://doee.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ddoe/service_content/attachments/Final%20DC%20Roadmap
%20sm.pdf
While DOEE is finalizing ACC2 and will see improvements following this regulatory change,
most of the vehicle traffic in the District of Columbia originates from outside of the District. A
DC Travel Pattern Analysis comparing pre-covid and post-covid travel patterns indicated that
each day during the work week (Monday through Friday) in 2019, over one million vehicles
traveled into the District. In 2022, these numbers dropped to around 700,000 vehicles traveling
daily into the District Monday through Friday. 19 Ultimately, vehicles traveling from outside of
the District also contribute to the pollution traveling to the District from out-of-state. EPA
modeling indicates that 95% or more of the District's ozone pollution comes from outside of our
borders. Even though the District and other states are electing to adopt ACC2, the District and
states which approve ACC2 will still experience the adverse effects of vehicle pollution from the
states choosing not to implement ACC2 which travel in and out of the state. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0550, p. 6]
19 D.C. Travel Pattern Analysis, https://perkinsandwill.github.io/ggwash-travel-
pattern/analysis_vehicle.html#2_Trip_Pattern
Organization: Elders Climate Action
Commenters understand that additional rulemaking will be required to establish a zero
emission standard and phase-in schedule for L/MDV classes not addressed by this rule.
However, the current proposal can be revised to incorporate this approach for the L/MDV classes
and categories addressed by this proposal. We ask that the Administrator not delay completion of
the current proposed rule so that it can apply to 2027-29 MY vehicles. We ask that the
Administrator open a rulemaking for the additional vehicle classes to promulgate a zero emission
standard and a phase-in schedule that begins with the 2027 MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0737, p. 11]
C. Petition for Finding —
Based on these data and other available evidence, we petition the Administrator to find that -
climate warming already caused by GHG emissions harms the public health and is causing
unacceptable adverse impacts on public welfare and the human environment, and the expected
increase in the severity and frequency of harms to health and the public welfare that will be
caused by more extreme events that will occur as the global mean temperature advances toward
and above the 1.5°C level resulting from growing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere,
establish the need for a zero GHG emissions standard for L/MDVs pursuant to section 202(a)(1)
and (3)(A) of the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 20]
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We petition the Administrator to make this finding as the predicate for re-opening this
rulemaking for the purpose of promulgating a zero emission standard for L/MDVs, and a phase-
in schedule that prescribes for each automaker a share of total L/MDV sales that must be ZEVs
beginning with the 2027 MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0737, p. 20]
Organization: Electric Drive Transportation Association (EDTA)
The Administration has a portfolio of policy initiatives that are essential to accelerating the
transition, including the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) program, the consumer
and manufacturing incentives in the Inflation Reduction Act, the Congestion Mitigation and Air
Quality program, the Low and No Emissions program, DOE's Loan Programs, Clean Cities, and
research and development programs. The broad approach reflects the need for an all-of-
government approach to building the EV ecosystem. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0589, p. 1]
Organization: Environmental, and Public Health Organizations
XI. Revisions to Elements of the Compliance and Enforcement Program Are Warranted.
We also urge EPA to revise certain elements of its compliance and enforcement program, as
detailed below.
A. Clarifications of EPA's existing enforcement authority are appropriate.
As noted in the Proposal, EPA has the authority to remedy non-compliance with its GHG
emissions regulations by correcting credit balances.223 Such action is appropriate under the
Clean Air Act, and EPA has utilized such remedies on occasion in the past, including when
manufacturers were found to be improperly certifying vehicles to lower emissions.224 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 92]
223 88 Fed. Reg. at 29288
224 See "Correction of Greenhouse Gas Emission Credits" in Consent Decree, United States & CARB v.
Hyundai Motor Company et al., 14-cv-1837 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2015), ECF No. 8, at 9.
EPA's in-use testing program is a critical part of ensuring that the regulatory program yields
the reductions anticipated in the real world. Should a manufacturer's in-use testing illustrate
deviations from the fleet level certification, particularly those of a systematic nature resulting in
higher real-world emissions, it is appropriate for EPA to adjust the manufacturer's regulatory
credit balance to reflect this real-world increase. We support EPA's clarification and believe
EPA should act swiftly should a need for such enforcement arise. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0759, p. 92]
Unlike other emissions programs, GHG certification is granted at the precise certified test,
rather than as a bin, where there is some inherent compliance margin. While EPA has some
allowance for in-use values that fall within 10% of the certified value, as discussed in the section
immediately below, EPA is proposing to allow manufacturers to voluntarily certify to a higher
emissions level to better reflect the range of anticipated in-use emissions from the full
configurations of the certified fleet. We support this voluntary approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0759, p. 92]
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These two actions are complementary to each other, and we support EPA finalizing both
together in the final rule. EPA is proposing to allow manufacturers to create their own
compliance margin to reflect the full range of plausible in-use emissions from vehicle
configurations covered under a given certification level. If, after in-use testing is completed, EPA
still determines that the in-use test values do not reflect the emissions levels certified by the
manufacturer, EPA is making clear that it has the authority to remedy the manufacturer's balance
after the fact. This provides adequate opportunity in advance of the sale of vehicles to
preemptively address any concerns about systematic deviation without relinquishing EPA's
ultimate authority to ensure that credits for the regulatory program reflect in-use performance.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0759, p. 92]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF) (lof2)
iii. State leadership further supports the feasibility of protective standards.
Along with this market dynamism, state policy leadership has played an important role in
advancing ZEV deployment and strongly supports EPA's proposal. As part of California's
overall approach to accelerate a large-scale transition to light-, medium- and heavy-duty ZEVs,
the state adopted the ACC II rule in November 2022, which requires the sale of an increasing
share of new passenger ZEVs starting with MY 2026, ensuring that all new passenger cars,
trucks and SUVs sold in California will be zero emission by 2035.62 The program relies on
currently available advanced vehicle technologies, including battery-electric, hydrogen fuel cell
electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and will help meet the state's air quality and climate
change goals. Figure 10 below shows ZEV and PHEV sales percentages required by ACC 11.63
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 26-29]
62 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii;
California's ZEV regulation was first adopted in 1990 as part of LEV I standards and has undergone
significant periodic modifications since that time. In January 2012, the state formally adopted the
Advanced Clean Cars I program that set requirements for the deployment of electric vehicles at over 10%
of new vehicle sales by 2025. Seventeen additional states have since adopted the ACCI regulations.
California Air Resources Board, States that Have Adopted California's Vehicle Standards Under Section
177 of the Federal Clean Air Act (May 13, 2022), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf.
63 ACC II allows manufacturers to sell PHEV50s for up to 20% of the required ZEVs. . Using EPA's
updated PHEV utility factors, PHEV50s equal 0.67 of a BEV. When including PHEV50s as two-thirds of a
BEV in the calculation to compare EPA's proposal to ACC II, ACC II requires a higher percentage of
ZEVs. E.g., in 2030, ACC II requires 68% of vehicles to be ZEVs, with PHEV50s constituting up to 20%
of that 68%. Assuming 20% are PHEVs, the true ZEV share drops to 54%, lower than EPA's modeled
60%. When the PHEV50 share is included back at two- thirds, this raises ACC II ZEV share to 64%, higher
than EPA's modeled 60%.
[See original attachment for Figure 10: California ACC II ZEV and PHEV Sales] [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 26-29]
Source: California Air Resources Board, Advanced Clean Cars II Regulation
The program is expected to provide public health benefits of at least $12 billion over the life
of the regulations by reducing premature deaths, hospitalizations and lost workdays associated
with exposure to air pollution. Six other states - Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Vermont,
Virginia and Washington - have already adopted ACC II and a number of others are currently
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considering it. In February 2023, New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy announced a commitment
to initiate the process to adopt ACC 11.64 And in March 2023, Maryland Governor Wes Moore
announced the state would adopt ACC 11.65 In December 2022, the District of Columbia
released a notice of proposed rulemaking and public hearing for the adoption of California's
clean car standards.66 Rhode Island's Department of Environmental Management held a virtual
public listening session on May 18, 2023 to review the draft release of the "Rhode Island's Low-
Emission and Zero-Emission Vehicle Programs" regulation, which is modeled on ACC 11.67
Colorado Governor Jared Polis' administration is also proposing a modified version of ACC
11.68 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 26-29]
64 Governor Murphy Announces Comprehensive Set of Initiatives to Combat Climate Change and Power
the "Next New Jersey", (February 15, 2023).
https://nj.gov/governor/news/news/562023/approved/20230215b.shtml.
65 The Office of Governor Wes Moore, Governor Moore Announces Maryland Adoption of the Advanced
Clean Cars II Rule to Combat the Effects of Climate Change (Mar. 13, 2023),
https://governor.maryland.gov/news/press/pages/Governor-Moore-Announces-Maryland-Adoption-of-the-
Advanced-Clean-Cars-II-Rule-to-Combat-the-Effects-of-Climate-Change.aspx.
66 DC Department of Energy & Environment, Notice of Comment Period for Proposed Rulemaking -
Adoption of California Vehicle Emission Standards (Dec. 9, 2022), https://doee.dc.gov/release/notice-
comment-period-proposed- rulemaking-adoption-california-vehicle-emission-standards.
67 State of Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, DEM Announces that Rulemaking
Process to Implement Draft Clean Car & Truck Emissions Standards is Set to Start at May 18 Public
Listening Session (May 10, 2023), https://dem.ri.gov/press-releases/dem-announces-rulemaking-process-
implement-draft-clean-car-truck- emissions-standards.
68 CPR News, Colorado Updated EV Plan Boosts Incentives but Avoids California-Style Ban on Gas
Vehicles (Dec. 8, 2022), https://www.cpr.org/2022/12/08/colorado-updated-evs-plan/.
States are also providing significant additional policy support to accelerate deployment of
ZEVs, including billions of dollars in grants and incentives to produce and sell electric vehicles,
batteries and components. WSP's EV investments analysis identified more than $15 billion in
state and local incentives.69 For example, California's ACC II regulations are backed by
Governor Newsom's $2.4 billion dollar investment in vehicle incentives, charging infrastructure
and public outreach.70 Figure 11 shows the announced private investment and added jobs by
state and indicates the contribution of state and local incentives toward that investment. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 26-29]
69 U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs, Characterizing the Impacts of the Inflation
Reduction Act after 6 Months, WSP for EDF, (March 2023).
https://blogs.edf.org/climate41 l/files/2023/03/State-Electric- Vehicle-Policy-Landscape.pdf (Attachment
E).
70 California Air Resources Board, Advanced Clean Cars II Regulations: All New Passenger Vehicles Sold
in California to be Zero Emissions by 2035, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-
cars- program/advanced-clean-cars-ii.
[See original attachment for Figure 11: 86% of Announced EV Investment is in 10 States]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786, pp. 26-29]
Source: WSP, U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs
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Together, these state programs and incentives further support the feasibility of strong
multipollutant emissions standards that drive the deployment of ZEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0786, pp. 26-29]
Organization: General Motors, LLC (GM)
Following EPA's August 2021 GHG regulation proposal, GM submitted comments supporting
the environmental benefits of EPA's historically stringent proposed GHG program for the 2023
to 2026 model years.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 3]
7 EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0208-0234 (September 2021). https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-
OAR-2021 -0208-0234
-In March 2022, GM, as a member of the Alliance for Automotive Innovation, filed a motion
to intervene in support of EPA against petitioners that have challenged the 2023-2026 GHG
regulation.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 3]
8 U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Case #22-1031. Document #1941280 (March
2022). https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/Alliance%20for%20Automotive%20Innovation-
motion%20to%20intervene.pdf
Due to the complex nature of this rulemaking, we encourage continued dialogue in the months
ahead as EPA and the other agencies assess and develop their final rules. In addition to the
detailed technical comments in the attached appendices, GM is open to sharing further
confidential business information in areas that may help the agencies in any areas of the
rulemakings. Especially considering the interactions between the EPA, NHTSA, DOE, and
CARB standards, we welcome future opportunities to discuss how various alternatives might
impact future compliance as we all strive toward our collective EV goals. We remain optimistic
about EPA's ability to develop and finalize an achievable and successful
set of regulatory programs to address climate change, ensure local air quality, and strengthen Am
erican manufacturing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0700, p. 6]
Organization: GROWMARK, Inc.
The proposed rules, by EPA's own estimates, would require 67 percent of light-duty vehicles
and 46% of medium-duty sold in the United States by the 2032 model year to be electric vehicles
(EVs).l [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0560, p. 1]
1 EPA. (2023, April 12). Biden-Harris administration proposes strongest-ever pollution standards for cars
and trucks to accelerate transition to a clean-transportation future.
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris- administration-proposes-strongest-ever-pollution-
standards-cars-and
Organization: Hyundai Motor America
A Federal Advisory Committee Should Be Convened to Help Assess Key Enablers Needed to
Support BEV Penetration Requirements.
The Proposed Rule's BEV penetration forecast assumes that all elements critical to the rule's
success - such as infrastructure and grid resiliency - come together to support BEV adoption,
directly impacting automaker compliance. However, as described above there is much work
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needed in short order to grow infrastructure and grid capacity. We envision a final rule that
includes specific assumptions about infrastructure growth and grid capacity improvements
necessary to enable the MY 2030 standards. We recommend the formation of a Federal Advisory
Committee ("FAC") to include equitable private and public representation. Starting January 1,
2029 and completed by July 1, 2030, the FAC would assess the state of infrastructure
development and grid resiliency against the rule's assumptions and make a recommendation to
EPA about the feasibility of the BEV penetration targets. For example, if the assessment
concludes that the assumptions are correct, then the final rule could continue as-is. However, if
the findings show a shortfall, then EV multipliers would activate for MY 2029 through MY
2032. EV multiplier values should correspond appropriately to the shortfall identified. As a
simplified example, a FAC finding of a ten percent infrastructure shortfall compared to the final
rule's MY 2030 assumptions would trigger an EV multiplier recommendation of 1.1. In this way,
automakers are not penalized for compliance shortfalls directly dependent on enablers necessary
for the rule's success. An automaker's compliance shortfall, after accounting for the EV
multipliers, would be subject to EPA's normal enforcement protocols. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0599, pp. 8-9]
Recommendations
In summary, we support AFAI's proposal as it aligns with Executive Order 14037. In
addition, the final rule should include a: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 9]
- Revised No Action case to more adequately account for infrastructure and grid capacity
constraints, challenges related to IRA-related supply chain restructuring, and significantly
reduced consumer access to EV tax incentives in the near and medium term, [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0599, p. 9]
- Confidential and aggregated industry survey to understand real costs associated with supply
chain and manufacturing changes caused by the 30D tax credit requirements, [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0599, p. 9]
- Off-cycle credit provision consistent with current rules through MY 2030, with a phasedown
beginning MY 2031 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 9]
- Credit incentive for automakers to reduce tailpipe emissions within in disadvantaged
communities, and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 9]
- Federal Advisory Committee to, by July 1, 2030, assess and issue recommendations
regarding the status of key enablers necessary to support the final rule's BEV penetration
requirements [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0599, p. 9]
Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity at NYU School of Law et al.
Moreover, during the April 2021 "Leaders' Summit on Climate" hosted by the United States,
following the announcement of a new U.S. commitment to reduce emissions to 50-52% below
2005 levels by 2030, multiple other countries reciprocally increased the ambition of their own
climate targets. Notably, Japan accelerated its reduction goal from 26% to 46-50%; Canada
strengthened its target from 30% to 40-45%; South Korea strengthened its target to achieve net
zero emissions by 2050; China promised to peak coal use by 2025 and phase down coal
consumption after that, and to join the Kigali Amendment to reduce hydrofluorocarbon
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emissions; Argentina pledged to strengthen its goal by 2.7% and make previously "conditional"
targets "unconditional" instead; Brazil committed to a net zero target by 2050 (ten years earlier
than its previous 2060 goal) and pledged to end illegal deforestation by 2030; South Africa
shifted its emission peak ten years earlier, to 2025; and New Zealand, Bhutan, and Bangladesh
all committed to submit more ambitious plans in the near future.45 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0743, pp. 7-8]
45 U.S. Dept. of State, Leaders' Summit on Climate: Day 1, Apr. 22, 2021, https://perma.cc/3X8A-KF4G;
Climate Action Tracker, Warming Projections Global Update: May 2021 at 3 (2021),
https://perma.cc/7JYN-N2DU.
This flurry of activity is just the latest evidence of reciprocity in international climate actions.
Some past reciprocity has been explicit. The Kigali Amendment, for example, is the latest
internationally negotiated climate treaty, with more than 120 parties so far committing to
common but differentiated responsibilities to phase down hydrofluorocarbons.46 Previously,
under the Copenhagen Accord and the Paris Agreement, some parties, including the European
Union and Mexico, have at times explicitly made conditional pledges, promising to ratchet up
their efforts if other countries make comparable reductions.47 By contrast, when the United
States "failed to take action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions during the George W. Bush
Administration and during ... the Trump Administration," as economist Michael Greenstone has
testified before the U.S. House of Representatives, "both periods were characterized by little
[international] progress, and indeed many instances of backsliding, in reducing emissions
globally."48 By failing to take international climate damages into account, in other words, EPA
and other U.S. agencies would incentivize other countries to do the same, which in turn would
cause greater greenhouse gas pollution originating in other countries that causes climate damage
within the United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, p. 8]
46 See U.N., Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(2016), https://perma.cc/SEX3-HAQA (last visited June 8, 2021).
47 See Eur. Comm'n, Expression of Willingness to Be Associated with the Copenhagen Accord and
Submission of the Quantified Economy-Wide Emissions Reduction Targets for 2020 at 2, Jan. 28, 2010,
https://perma.cc/77DD- M4LS (committing to a 20% reduction but "reiterat[ing] its conditional offer to
move to a 30% reduction by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, provided that other developed countries
commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately
according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities"); Gov't of Mex. Ministry of Env't & Nat.
Res., Nationally Determined Contributions: 2020 Update at 22, https://perma.cc/VF4A-K5HK (making an
unconditional pledge of 22% reduction of GHGs and 51% of black carbon by 2030; and making a
conditional pledge of up to 36% reduction GHGs and 70% black carbon, conditioned on "an international
price for carbon trading, adjustment of tariffs for carbon content" as well as technology transfers and
financial resources).
48 Economics of Climate Change: Hearing before the U.S. H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform's Subcomm.
on Env't at 6 (Dec. 19, 2019) (testimony of Michael Greenstone), https://perma.cc/H5JS-V4H6.
On several prior occasions—again outside the context of climate change—courts have upheld
EPA's authority to consider effects on international reciprocity and cooperation due to domestic
pollution standards. In one case, for instance, the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA's decision to set an
interim tolerance for the chemical ethylene dibromide under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA)—rather than ban the chemical altogether—after EPA concluded that a ban "could
damage cooperative [food-safety] efforts," reasoning that "[s]ince effective enforcement of food
safety laws depends upon such cooperation, a ban might increase the risk that fruit and
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vegetables would enter the U.S. treated with unsafe levels of pesticides or infested with pests or
diseases."100 The D.C. Circuit similarly upheld EPA's consideration of international
harmonization in setting NOx emissions standards for commercial aircraft gas turbine engines,
after EPA issued a standard under the Clean Air Act to align U.S. standards with international
standards. 101 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0743, pp. 15-16]
100 National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 815 F.2d 1579, 1582 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
101 National Ass'nof Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
At the state level, policymakers are charging ahead with their own zero-emission vehicle
regulations, investments, consumer incentives, planning, and infrastructure deployment.
California's Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC II) regulations will require dramatic reductions in
light- duty vehicle emissions to 100% zero-emissions by 2035 through the Zero-Emission
Vehicle Regulation and the Low-emission Vehicle Regulations. Many other U.S. states follow
California's leadership on automotive emissions regulations. As of May 2023, 7 states have
adopted ACC II and it is likely that others will follow. By adopting its proposal, EPA can build
on ACC II and expand access to cleaner vehicles more broadly across the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0569, p.3]
Globally, automakers have already announced over $1.2 trillion in investments in
electrification. These investments will lead to greatly expanded model line-ups and production
volumes, technological advancements, and reduced costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, p.
3]
In parallel, states are also adopting their own zero-emission vehicle regulations, investments,
consumer incentives, planning, and infrastructure deployment. California's Advanced Clean Cars
II (ACC II) regulations will require dramatic reductions in light-duty vehicle emissions to 100%
zero-emissions by 2035 through the Zero-Emission Vehicle Regulation and the Low- emission
Vehicle Regulations.6 Many other U.S. states follow California's leadership on automotive
emissions regulations. As of May 2023, California, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Vermont,
Virginia, and Washington have adopted ACC II. It is likely that many other states will continue
to follow California's leadership and adopt the new ACC II Program to benefit from the
anticipated emissions reduction and health benefits of the program.7 Many additional states
currently follow the Advanced Clean Cars regulations through model year 2026; as of May 13th,
2022, 17 U.S. states have adopted all or part of California's low-emission and zero-emission
vehicle regulations, and about 37% of national new light-duty vehicle sales meet California's
emission standards.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 7-8]
6 California Air Resources Board. (2023). Advanced Clean Cars II Regulations: All new passenger
vehicles sold in California to be zero emissions by 2035. https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-
work/programs/advanced-clean-cars- program/advanced-clean-cars-ii
7 Houk, J., Huang, J., and Sussman. (2023). Benefits of adopting California's Advanced Clean Cars II
standards in sixteen U.S. states. Sonoma Technology Inc. Retrieved from
https://theicct.org/publication/benefits-of-state-level- adoption-of-california-acc-ii-regulations/
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8 California Air Resources Board. (May 13, 2022). States that have adopted California's vehicle standards
under Section 177 of the Federal Clean Air Act. https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf
The U.S. share of global automaker electric vehicle investments is increasing, largely driven
by these state and federal policies and investments. Research from January 2023 estimates that
$210 billion in automaker electric vehicle manufacturing and $54 billion in battery production
investments had been announced for the U.S.9 These electric vehicle and battery manufacturing
investments will lead to greatly expanded model line-ups and production volumes, technological
advancements, and reduced costs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 7-8]
9 Gabriel, N. (2023, January 12). $210 billion of announced investments in electric vehicle manufacturing
headed for the U.S. Atlas EVHub. https://www.atlasevhub.com/data_story/210-billion-of-announced-
investments-in-electric-vehicle-manufacturing-headed-for-the-u-s/
MDV data and transparency
EPA's fuel economy guides, annual certification data, and automotive trends reports are
invaluable resources for detailed information on light-duty sales, emissions, fuel consumption,
vehicle attributes, and applied technologies. This level of detail is absent for medium-duty
vehicles. Public access to this data is necessary for many reasons, including the ability to identify
trends in pickup and van sales, possible shifts from light-duty to medium-duty, and technology
penetration and effectiveness. ICCT recommends EPA collect and make public these data for
MDV as it does for LDV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0569, pp. 62-64]
Organization: Jaguar Land Rover NA, LLC (JLR)
JLR strongly supports efforts to reduce emissions from passenger cars and light trucks,
alongside improving fuel economy and advancing the transition to low emission vehicles. JLR
would welcome the opportunity to continue its constructive dialogue with the relevant
Government agencies in order to agree a balanced solution based on our unique position. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 1]
Additionally, JLR supports the Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Auto Innovators)
comments, including those on criteria pollutants emission standards. In this submission, we
comment further on regulation stringency and EPA NPRM modeling assumptions in relation to
the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, p. 1]
Relationship to Other Regulations
The targets proposed by EPA are extremely ambitious and the projected BEV penetrations
required to meet the standards exceed that of the California Air Resources Board (CARB)
Advanced Clean Cars II regulation, with a trajectory to achieve 100% ZEV by 2035MY (as
shown in Figure 3 below). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 7-8]
In 2022, California's ZEV market share was over three times higher than the federal US BEV
share.9 It is important that EPA acknowledges the inequality between California and non- SI77
states. CARB are a world leader in the pursuit of the 100% ZEV goal, with years of incentives
and effort involved to get to this point. EPA cannot assume that all states will follow a similar
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route and the regulation must balance the various adoption curves across the country. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 7-8]
9 Office of Governor Gavin Newsom - California ZEV Sales Near 19% of All New Car Sales in 2022(Jan
2023) https://www.gov.ca.gOv/2023/01/20/california-zev-sales-near-19-of-all-new-car-sales-in-2022/
[See original for graph, Figure 3, titled "EPA Predicted BEV Mix vs California BEV
Requirement"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 7-8]
10 Advanced Clean Cars II (ACCII) Regulations - Section 1962.4, Title 13, California Code of
Regulations - https ://ww2 .arb. ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/2acciifro 1962.4.pdf
Targets imposed on the automotive industry must be linked to and contingent on the
successful roll-out of a comprehensive and accessible charging infrastructure network. The
current ratio of public chargers in the US is around 1 charger for every 24 EVsl 1. While we
recognize progress made to date in the roll-out of charging infrastructure, it is vital that this
grows proportionally with the increase in uptake of EVs to remain within the EU recommended
ratio of 1 public charger per 10 vehicles 12 especially as these ratios are based on countries with a
much greater population density compared to the United States. With more than 131,200 public
chargers across the US, half (65,300) of them are concentrated across five states. (California,
New York, Florida, Texas and Massachusetts) 13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 7-8]
11IEA (2023), Global EV Outlook 2023, IEA, Paris Trends in charging infrastructure -
https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev- outlook-2023/trends-in-charging-infrastructure, License: CC BY 4.0
12 Directive 2014/94/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the
deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure -https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3 A32014L0094
13 US Department of Energy (Alternative Fuels Data Center (Feb 2023) - U.S. Private Electric Vehicle
Charging Infrastructure - https://afdc.energy.gov/data
JLR urges EPA to re-evaluate the proposed stringency of the regulation so that the required
BEV share does not exceed CARB's targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0744, pp. 7-8]
Organization: John Graham
Or maybe EPA is suggesting to manufacturers that the agency does not approve of HEV
offerings; California has already proposed to ban most hybrids by 2035 and has requested an
EPA waiver to move forward with that plan. If it is EPA's intent to restrict HEVs by regulation,
the agency should say so explicitly rather than spread a fiction that HEVs are not cost effective
compared to BEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0585, p. 15]
Organization: Kari Ostlie
I am concerned that not enough time is being given for important stakeholders to properly
review and adequately comment on these new proposed tailpipe rules. I have read in this docket
that the American Petroleum Institute (API), the American Fuel & Petroleum Manufactures
(AFPM), and the Alliance for Automotive Innovation's (AFAI) all requested a time extension be
given to do a proper review of this proposed new EPA tailpipe rules. These are important
organizations that represent a lot of important companies in the industry, and I believe it is only
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fair to allow the organizations representing these companies the proper time it takes to
adequately give informed responses to all the complex issues in this proceeding.
In their requests the API & AFAI said "we request that EPA grant an additional 90 days for
public comment for each proposal. For rules of this scope and complexity, 50 and 60 days for
each proposal running concurrently are insufficient. API and AFPM respectfully assert that a 50-
day and a 60-day comment period violate EPA's obligation to provide public notice and an
opportunity to comment..The AFAI stated "Moreover, EPA is proposing GHG regulations
and criteria regulations for both light- and medium-duty vehicles. Historically, this would have
been four separate rulemakings with a combined comment period approaching 250 days."
Recently learning that the EPA denied AFPM's request to extend the comment period in this
proceeding is disturbing in light of the fact all these organization felt they needed more time to
review the extensive material and provide meaningful comment in this proceeding. If given the
proper among of time to analyze and respond, these organizations may have brought up some
important points to consider that may have positively affected the outcome of this proceeding.
As a citizen of this country, I am shocked that this request for extended time would not be
granted. Not giving these organizations the proper time to comment means important
perspectives will not even be brought up for discussion before the comment period ends due to
time constraints. With such a significant proposal all perspectives should be given the time to
bring up the points they need and to be fully heard as the points these organizations bring up may
positively affect the outcome of this case for the American public. As it is important to balance
all the concerns in this proposal for the best outcome in this proceeding. Thank you for taking
my concerns into consideration. [EPA-OAR-HQ-2022-0829-1049]
Organization: Kia Corporation
Kia strongly supports comments submitted by the Alliance for Automotive Innovation (AFAI)
on the Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards proposed rule. Kia incorporates AFAI comments
here by reference. Kia also fully endorses comments made by the Hyundai-Kia America
Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI). Kia incorporates HATCI's comments here by reference and
attaches them as Appendix A. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 1]
- Kia continues to support the long-standing goal where EPA, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the California Air Resources Board (CARB) work together
to coordinate emissions regulations, strive to align stringency, and reduce unnecessary testing
burdens. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 3]
Kia supports continuing to collaborate with all levels of the government to ensure
complementary policies continue to be implemented so we can work together to meet the goal of
fully transitioning to vehicle electrification. The electric renewable identification number (eRIN)
component of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program in 2024 is an example of a policy
vital to support the administration's mission of rapidly deploying EVs. It would provide a strong
incentive to produce renewable energy that will decarbonize the energy system that supports
those vehicles. The eRIN program is unique in its ability to directly support automakers like Kia
in its efforts to meet these ambitious goals. However, this program is seemingly in jeopardy and
its omission would make it even more difficult to achieve EPA's proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0555, p. 7]
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EPA's Program Should Include Mechanism to Adjust Standards if Necessary
EPA's proposal does not include any mechanism to adjust standards or correct course if the
various assumptions in the model do not materialize. Market assumptions in EPA's model
include adequate charging infrastructure, consumer acceptance and demand, critical mineral
supply, manufacturing capacity, power capacity, power rates, and low cost discrepancy between
ICE and EVs. All of these elements - market realities and external challenges - are outside the
control of automakers. There needs to be a mechanism that allows or requires EPA to revise
standards if certain market conditions do not materialize at the level necessary to increase
demand for EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0555, p. 7]
Organization: Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown (118 signatures)
Additionally, I am concerned about how these new standards could negatively impact the
Highway Trust Fund. If implemented without addressing the funding structure, these proposed
regulations could strain the already precarious state of transportation funding. It is crucial to
consider additional solutions, such as a Low Carbon Fuel Standard, to address the revenue lost
by having fewer internal-combustion engines on the road. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1701]
In conclusion, I strongly urge the EPA to reconsider the proposed tailpipe emissions rules. It
is crucial that the EPA engage in meaningful collaboration with Congress, automotive
manufacturers, and other stakeholders to develop a comprehensive approach that accounts for the
current limitations in charging infrastructure, safeguards consumer choice, promotes domestic
energy security, and ensures the continued funding of our vital transportation infrastructure.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1701]
Organization: MECA Clean Mobility
EPA should consider incentives and potential future requirements that advance efficiency of
electric vehicles.
MECA requests that EPA explore additional incentivization structures that would allow
consumers to make informed choices when purchasing electric and fuel cell vehicles. For
example, EPA could institute a labeling requirement for electric vehicles with similarities to
Energy Star and displaying how an electric vehicle compares to other similar electric vehicles in
its class. The simplified Energy Star graphic is recognizable and understood by the majority of
consumers who might not be able to interpret the value of an electric vehicle efficiency in
kilowatt-hours per 100 miles, which is currently on the window sticker. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0564, pp. 31-32]
Organization: MEMA, The Vehicle Suppliers Associated
The aggressive pace and scope of the proposed rule obliges EPA to work to ensure success
throughout the course of this rule's implementation. EPA must follow through on all assumptions
in the regulatory impact analysis (RIA), and act accordingly to help make them a reality and
reassure manufacturers and consumers along the way. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 4]
MEMA urges:
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the Biden Administration to align regulations and priorities in concert with the Joint
Office of Energy and Transportation throughout the implementation period of this rule to
identify shared concerns and solutions for the many moving parts of the rule. EPA needs this
broad support to follow through on all assumptions regarding critical materials, infrastructure,
and timing of milestones identified in the rule's analyses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 4]
EPA work closely with NHTSA to align the CAFE standards rule with the LD/MD Multi-
Pollutants rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 4]
Immigration Reform will Help Address Need for More Skilled Workers
The manufacturing industry continues to invest in solutions to our workforce needs. As the
largest employer of manufacturing jobs in the United States, our industry expects to have 2.1
million unfilled jobs by 2030.11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 13]
11 Wellener, Paul; Reyes, Victor; Ashton, Heather; Moutray, Chad. "Creating pathways for tomorrow's
workforce today". Deloitte Insights, 4 May 2021
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/manufacturing/manufacturing-industry-diversity.html
Immigration reform is crucial to the United States developing a new pipeline of talent.
MEMA recommends increasing annual quotas for employment-based immigrant and
nonimmigrant visas, expanding the scope of essential worker programs, and creating new visa
options for international students and other high-demand workers. Immigration reform with a
focus on our workforce needs is crucial for our industry to continue its growth and advancement.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, p. 13]
MEMA urges:
EPA to work with other agencies to enable sufficient skilled labor to support national
EV deployment and infrastructure transformations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0644, pp. 14-
15]
Organization: Missouri Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
The rule is discriminatory to all farmers and rural America whose economies and way of life
depend on agriculture, as well as cars and trucks powered by internal combustion engines (ICE).
The impacts of this rule will negatively impact hard-working farmers, their families, and rural
communities. But the pain won't stop with agriculture. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0578, p. 1]
Organization: National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)
Despite the GHG and criteria pollution reduction benefits of FFVs, as well as the low cost to
purchase and fuel these vehicles, automakers have cut back on FFV models and now offer very
few choices to consumers. Well-structured vehicle credit programs remain an impactful, cost-
effective means for the government to encourage the introduction and adoption of new products
and technologies. To encourage introduction of a wider range of low emission vehicle choices,
NCGA believes EPA must provide equitable crediting across the spectrum of low emission
vehicles, including FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 9]
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NCGA also urges EPA to take steps to update the F-factor in the fuel economy formula to a
forward-looking F-factor of at least 0.2, as we outlined in 2020 comments in response to Docket
EPA-HQ-OAR-2020-0104. Furthermore, we urge EPA to reinstate the 0.15 volumetric
conversion factor for FFVs. EPA should reharmonize the 0.15 factor for FFVs in these standards,
and, if not, in future standards. This change would accurately reflect the significant carbon
emissions reductions from FFVs using E85 because the carbon emissions from the fuel are the
release of carbon taken up through crop growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 9]
Organization: Natural Gas Vehicles for America
(2) EPA to the extent it incorporates other technology advancement credits in its vehicle
regulations should extend these incentives to natural gas and natural gas hybrid- electric vehicles
based on the demonstrated benefits of these vehicles and the need to accelerate the introduction
of a diverse mix of cleaner vehicle technologies; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
(3) EPA should provide enhanced SmartWay designations for trucks powered by low-NOx
engines and fueled by carbon-neutral or even carbon-negative renewable natural gas; [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
(4) Federal agencies should fund pilot programs and infrastructure development that
demonstrate the ways in which natural gas can be used to fuel a variety of different
transportation sectors by supporting the purchase of vehicles and equipment at multimodal
facilities such as ports and rail facilities; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
(5) Federal agencies should ensure that federal funding provided under the CMAQ Program
and the DERA Program and other programs enacted as part of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law
and Inflation Reduction Act are competitively awarded for projects that provide the most cost-
effective emission reductions and offer increased funding levels for engines and vehicles that are
certified to more demanding standards in advance of EPA's adoption of such standards; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
(6) Federal agencies should work with state authorities to ensure that transportation policies
include performance metrics and consider a variety of different technologies as opposed to only
promoting specific technologies regardless of their cost; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp.
14-15]
(7) The Administration should work with Congress to amend the federal excise tax on new
trucks to reduce the impediment to fleets and businesses purchasing cleaner new trucks by either
eliminating the tax altogether since it discourages new purchases or amend the tax so that it does
not penalize more costly, lower polluting technologies (i.e., eliminate the excise tax on the
incremental cost). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
California's Advanced Clean Cars (ACC) regulations require manufacturers of light-duty cars
and trucks to sell increasing percentages of ZEVs. The regulations also include LEV standards to
reduce criteria pollutants and GHG emissions from new internal combustion engine (ICE)
vehicles. To date, in addition to California, 17 states have adopted the LEV standards, and 15
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states have adopted both the LEV standards and ZEV sales requirements. 11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0584, p. 4]
11 A key focus of NESCAUM's clean transportation work is to advise and assist states with respect to
adoption and implementation of California's new motor vehicle emissions standards. Through its Mobile
Sources Committee, NESCAUM helps the Section 177 states to collaborate and coordinate on shared
mobile source regulatory issues.
California's ACC II program, finalized in 2022, requires manufacturers of passenger vehicles
(designed to transport 12 persons or less) and light-duty trucks (gross vehicle weight rating less
than 8,500 pounds) to produce and deliver for sale an increasing percentage of ZEVs over time
and 100 percent ZEVs by 2035. ACC II also establishes increasingly more stringent exhaust and
evaporative emission standards for light- and medium-duty ICE vehicles. To date, California,
Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington have adopted ACC II.
These seven states represent over 20 percent of the LDV market. 15 Six more jurisdictions—
Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Rhode Island—have
announced their intentions to adopt ACC II. More are expected to follow given the anticipated
climate, air quality, and economic benefits of the program. 16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584,
p. 5]
15 Recent modeling for select Section 177 states shows that adopting ACC II will result in even greater
cumulative NOx and GHG emissions reductions than EPA's proposed standards between 2025 and 2040.
Across all of the states modeled, ACC II achieved 30 percent greater well-to-wheel C02 equivalent
reductions and 75 percent greater NOx reductions than EPA's proposed standards. Some states modeled
saw even greater reductions. In Connecticut and New Jersey, for example, ACC II would provide an
incremental benefit of roughly two times more than EPA's proposal. See Sonoma Technology, ACC II
Program - EPA 2027 Proposal Comparison (June 8, 2013), [LINK TO NESCAUM WEBSITE WHEN
POSTED],
16 National Automobile Dealers Association, NADA Data 2021 (2022),
https://www.nada.org/media/4695/download7inline.
California's Advanced Clean Trucks (ACT) regulation requires manufacturers of Class 2b-8
on- road medium- and heavy-duty vehicles to sell increasing percentages of ZEVs. By model
year 2035, 55 percent of sales of Class 2b-3 vehicle sales, 75 percent of class 4-8 vehicle sales,
and 40 percent of Class 7-8 truck tractor sales must be ZEVs. In addition to California, seven
states— Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington—
have adopted the ACT regulation. These states have also adopted California's Heavy-Duty Low
NOx and Phase II GHG regulations, which are designed to reduce emissions from new diesel
fueled heavy-duty vehicles while the market transitions to ZEVs. Many more states are expected
to follow. Like the ACC II regulation, state adoption of the ACT regulation creates economies of
scale, lowers costs, promotes job creation, and provides the regulatory certainty needed to drive
investment in ZEVs and infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 5]
B. Multi-State Collaboration
The NESCAUM and OTC states have long understood the benefits of a coordinated approach
to transportation electrification policy development and implementation. Many are signatories to
the 2013 Multi-State Zero-Emission Vehicle Memorandum of Understanding, 17 which set light-
duty ZEV sales targets for ten states to achieve by 2025; memorialized their commitment to
work together to develop policies and programs to achieve those targets; and created the Multi-
State ZEV Task Force, facilitated by NESCAUM, to enable states to collaborate and coordinate
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on ZEV policy. NESCAUM and the Task Force have developed two action plans with
recommendations for states to accelerate light-duty ZEV adoptionl8 and policy guidance on a
wide range of related issues and topics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 5-6]
17 Multi-State Zero-Emission Vehicles Program Memorandum of Understanding (Oct. 2013),
https://www.nescaum.org/documents/zev-mou-10-governors-signed-20191120.pdf/.
18 See, e.g., Multi-State ZEV Task Force, Multi-State ZEV Action Plan 2018-2021: Accelerating the
Adoption of Zero Emission Vehicles (June 2018), https://www.nescaum.org/topics/zero-emission-
vehicles/multi-state-zev-action- plan-2018-2021 -accelerating-the-adoption-of-zero-emission-vehicles;
Multi-State ZEV Action Plan (May 2014).
Most of the NESCAUM and OTC states are also signatories to the 2020 Multi-State Medium-
and Heavy-Duty ZEV Memorandum of Understanding, 19 now signed by a diverse coalition of
17 states, the District of Columbia, and the Canadian province of Quebec. Collectively, the U.S.
signatories represent 43 percent of the U.S. population, 49 percent of the U.S. economy, and 36
percent of the nation's medium- and heavy-duty vehicles.20 The 2020 MOU commits the
signatories to collaborate to accelerate the market for zero-emission trucks, vans, and buses, and
sets targets to achieve at least 30 percent medium- and heavy-duty ZEV sales by 2030 and 100
percent ZEV sales by no later than 2050. Some of the signatories have established more
ambitious targets. In July 2022, NESCAUM and the Task Force released an action plan with
more than 65 strategies and recommendations for state policymakers to support the rapid,
equitable, and widespread electrification of MHD vehicles.21 The signatories and other Task
Force states are currently working to implement these recommendations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0584, pp. 5-6]
19 Multi-State Medium- and Heavy-Duty Zero-Emission Vehicle Memorandum of Understanding (July
2020), https ://www. nescaum. org/documents/mhdv-zev-mou-20220329.pdf/.
20 Collectively, the U.S. signatories represent 43 percent of the U.S. population, 49 percent of the U.S.
economy, and 36 percent of the nation's MHD vehicles. See Census Bureau, 2020 Population and Housing
State Data (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/interactive/2020-population-and-
housing-state-data.html; Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP and Personal Income,
https://apps.bea.gov/itable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=70&step=l#reqid=70&step=l&isuri=l (visited June 23,
2022) (2021 Real GDP); Atlas Public Policy, EVHub, https://www.atlasevhub.com/materials/medium-and-
heavy-duty-vehicle- registrations-dashboard/#06f2a5dfc39daf9cc (visited June 23, 2022) (2019 IHS market
data).
21 See Multi-State ZEV Task Force, Multi-State Medium- and Heavy-Duty Zero-Emission Vehicle Action
Plan: A Policy Framework to Eliminate Harmful Truck and Bus Emissions (July 27, 2022),
https://www.nescaum.org/documents/multi-state-medium-and-heavy-duty-zero-emission-vehicle-action-
plan/.
Like ZEV sales regulations, the shared ambition memorialized in these multi-state agreements
sends strong and consistent signals to industry and investors and promotes public and private
investment in zero-emission technologies and infrastructure. For example, the public utility
commissions in the U.S. signatories to the 2022 MOU have already approved more than $2
billion dollars of utility funding for medium- and heavy-duty ZEV infrastructure planning and
deployment.22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, pp. 5-6]
22 U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Center, Alternative Fueling Station Counts by State,
https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/states (visited June 9, 2023).
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Organization: Our Children's Trust (OCT)
There is also no justification, no compelling interest, and no rational basis for not aligning
EPA's rule with California and other states that require 100% of light-duty vehicle sales to be
ZEVs by 2035. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 1]
Please include all cited evidence in the administrative record. We are also happy to provide
any of the cited evidence on request. All Juliana v. United States evidence are in the files of the
Department of Justice, which represents EPA and the Administrator in the case, as its clients.
Thus, you have access to all of those documents and evidence, along with the legal bases for the
comments made herein. However, if you have not been provided with those documents, we are
happy to provide them. We would be pleased to meet with you and/or you and your counsel to
discuss the constitutional use of EPA's statutory authority to redress the climate crisis and
protect the Nation's children. Please send us a response to our comments, notification of further
comment opportunities, and all analyses and decision documents to the address and email listed
below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0542, p. 6]
Organization: POET, LLC
The complications associated with EPA's modeling underpinning its Proposed Rule shows
the inadequacy of EPA's 60-day comment period for the Proposed Rule. OnLocation raises
significant questions regarding the robustness of EPA's proposed vehicle GHG regulations and
with "more time allowed than the short comment period provided by EPA on the proposal, a
more comprehensive analysis of LDV policies using the OMEGA module could be performed
leading to a more complete understanding of the consequences of this Proposed Rule." 126 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, p. 28]
126 Id. at 16.
Organization: Roy Littlefield IV
Additionally, I am concerned about how these new standards could negatively impact the
Highway Trust Fund. If implemented without addressing the funding structure, these proposed
regulations could strain the already precarious state of transportation funding. It is crucial to
consider additional solutions, such as a Low Carbon Fuel Standard, to address the revenue lost
by having fewer internal-combustion engines on the road. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0793, p.
1]
Organization: Stellantis
Target Adjustment Mechanisms Needed Based on Market Enablers
Stellantis fully supports the Auto Innovators' comments proposing a target adjustment
mechanism based on key EV market enablers. This mechanism is in addition to making the other
revisions needed to address concerns raised with the standards. There is a great deal of
uncertainty with how critical mineral and raw material supplies, battery cost improvements, and
charging/refueling infrastructure will develop over the next decade. In particular,
charging/refueling infrastructure and supply of critical minerals and raw materials from non-
countries of concern are well outside the control of either EPA or automakers. We understand
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EPA must use projections in its modeling. However, given the uncertainty around these items,
large inaccuracies can lead to a final rule that is grossly misaligned with the market. The Auto
Innovators' proposal of a market-based target adjustment system would allow for year-by-year
adjustments to be made within the framework of a rule that can be finalized on EPA's desired
timeline and will minimize the need to be reopened to react to real-world market conditions.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 7]
This proposal contains three individual adjustment mechanisms of roughly equivalent
magnitude. The first is based on the percentage of the entire U.S. light-duty fleet qualifying for
the full $3,750 30D retail tax credit which is tied to extracting and processing critical minerals in
the U.S. or a country with a free trade agreement. This is the most simple and direct way to
assess whether or not raw material supplies are developing adequately. The second adjustment
mechanism is based on actual EV battery costs that could be confidentially disclosed to the EPA
by each automaker every model year and compared with EPA's projected battery costs used in
the development of this rule. The third mechanism is simply tracking the ratio of public
charging/refueling points to the number of light-duty EVs registered and on the road. As the total
size of the on-road EV fleet grows, so does the amount of charging/refueling infrastructure. If
these three key market enablers develop as envisioned by EPA in this rule, then the impact of
these adjustments will be negligible. But if one or more of these key enablers do not develop
quickly enough, then this proposed system will allow for simple, objective, and transparent
metric-based adjustments to be applied equally to all of industry. These are industry-wide issues
and thus should be resolved on an industry-wide basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 7]
At a House Committee on Energy and Commerce hearing on driving affordability held on
June 22, 2023, Rep. Dingell (D-MI) raised concerns with EPA Principal Deputy Administrator
Goffman on what happens under the NPRM if companies cannot reach BEV as 67% of new
vehicle sales in 2032, consumers cannot afford EVs, the charging stations aren't there, and the
assumptions and forecasting EPA relies upon are not viable. Mr. Goffman's response included a
reference to a possible market assessment review. Stellantis believes the Auto Innovators'
recommended ongoing market-based target adjustment system to be the best embodiment of a
direct market review. However, Stellantis could support an additional market-based review that
is both objective and transparent in reaching the necessary adjustments to allow this rule to be
reasonable and achievable given the large amount of uncertainty with how these key market
enablers will develop over the next decade. At a minimum, Stellantis supports EPA adding
modules to its annual EPA Automotive Trends Reports that capture important metrics such as the
number of public EV charging stations deployed and percent of EVs purchased. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0678, p. 7]
Lastly, this rule is broad in scope and high in complexity, proposing many changes to long-
standing processes (i.e., a variety of new phase in requirements). Stellantis would welcome EPA
providing industry training on implementation details when the rule is finalized. Stellantis
requests that EPA offer classes/training, similar to the material and concise overview provided
after the HD GHG Phase 1 rule was published. EPA's simplified slides provided more straight-
forward rule interpretation and understanding. It would also be helpful for the training to include
compliance calculation examples to resolve any potential ambiguity from the regulation. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0678, p. 25]
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Organization: Steven G. Bradbury
Introduction
With these rules, EPA is proposing to interfere with and displace market forces on a massive
and unprecedented scale, and the effects of these regulatory edicts on the American people and
the U.S. economy will be disastrous if even one of the EPA's many key supporting assumptions
turns out to be incorrect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 3]
It seems apparent that the EPA's primary goal is not to improve environmental per- formance
of new motor vehicles, but rather to force the industry to transform its production processes and
to achieve an artificially rapid transition to zero-emission-vehicle platforms, such as fully electric
vehicles, to the extent and on the schedule that President Biden and the California Air Resources
Board (CARB) have announced as their goals. Thus, the EPA's proposed rules seem to be
guided by and aimed at hitting goals that are more aspira- tional and political in nature; they are
not legitimate standards based on an accurate and objective assessment of technological and
marketplace realities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 3]
And through these rulemakings, the Agency is proposing to align its regulatory objec- tives
with the zero-emission vehicle, or ZEV, mandates recently issued by CARB, the Cali- fornia Air
Resources Board, which are designed to phase out the sale of all gas-powered passenger cars and
light trucks by 2035 and all medium- and heavy-duty trucks by 2045. The EPA now appears to
be committed to a similar trajectory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 6]
It is not surprising the Agency would act to conform its policies to CARB's, since CARB was
able to issue its mandates only because the EPA has granted California a special waiver from
preemption under the Clean Air Act. Both sets of rules flow from the policy decisions of the
EPA in accordance with directions from the White House. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p.
6]
Putting the Highway Trust Fund at risk. The Highway Trust Fund, which covers a large
percentage of the costs of state and local highway improvements and main- tenance in the U.S.,
is currently funded through a gas tax. The gas tax is relatively easy to administer because it is
paid at the level of wholesale gasoline and diesel fuel distribution by a small number of large
distributors. If more than half of new vehicles sold in the U.S. were EVs, as contemplated in the
EPA's proposals, the gas-tax revenues for the Fund would drop dramatically, and the solvency
and utility of the Fund would collapse. That would threaten the viability of the national high-
way system and the capacity of states to maintain highways in good repair. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, p. 19]
If the Fund were to be retained in some form, it would require a new source of revenue, such
as a tax on all vehicle miles traveled, or VMT. The idea behind a VMT tax is that it would
equitably capture the VMT of EVs, just as well as ICE vehicles. However, a VMT tax is likely to
be more complicated and costly to ad- minister than the gas tax. There are significant questions
about the design and ad- ministrability of a VMT tax that would need to be worked out and
proven—for example, through one or more state-wide pilot programs—before implementation.
Since EPA is proposing to adopt rules that would cause a national shift to EVs, which in turn
would undermine the revenue basis for the Highway Trust Fund, EPA should recognize and
consider as part of these rulemakings the upfront costs and dislocations that would be involved in
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transitioning to a new revenue basis for the Highway Trust Fund, as well as the ongoing higher
costs of administering such an alternative tax. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, p. 19]
Increasing highway infrastructure costs. Similarly, the cost of increased wear and tear on
highway infrastructure, including the cost of increased frequency of required repairs, should also
be recognized in the proposals. If, as EPA envisions, EVs were to comprise more than half of
new light-duty vehicle sales, and if a large percentage of new medium- and heavy-duty trucks
were battery powered, that would have a definite negative impact on highway infrastructure. The
batteries in EVs are heavy, and, as a consequence, EVs tend to be considerably heavier than
comparably sized ICE vehicles. The greater weight of EVs would cause faster wear and tear on
high- ways if the number of EVs on the road were to increase significantly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0647, pp. 19-20]
Increasing the costs and burdens of first responders. There is no mention in EPA's
NPRMs or in the accompanying DRIAs of the impact these rules would have on first responders.
If EVs come to comprise a greatly increased percentage of the nation's auto fleet, as EPA's
proposals are intended to achieve, state and local first responders will inevitably incur
significantly higher costs and burdens in the form of specialized fire-suppression chemicals and
equipment and additional hazardous- response training requirements. Lithium-ion battery fires
are a common occurrence with EVs, and these fires generate intense heat and toxic fluoride gas
emissions, making them more difficult to extinguish than conventional vehicle fires and
increasing the costs and management challenges of maintaining effective first responder
capabilities.56 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 19-20]
56 See Fredrik Larsson, et al., "Toxic fluoride gas emissions from lithium-ion battery fires," Scientific
Reports, Nature, August 30, 2017, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-09784-z (corrected March
22, 2018) (also available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5577247/).
EPA should withdraw and reconsider these rulemaking proposals.
In light of the deficiencies in the cost analyses and underlying assumptions laid out above,
EPA should withdraw and reconsider both of its proposed tailpipe rules. If EPA had more
carefully considered its legal authorities under the Clean Air Act and more thoroughly accounted
for the market realities and facts relevant to these proposals, I am confident EPA would not have
proposed the radical and far-reaching approach to emissions control reflected in the current
proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 21-22]
Even if EPA persists in proposing something along the same lines, at a minimum, it should
put these concepts out for public comment in a much more preliminary form—for example, in an
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, or ANPRM. By setting out the general ideas it plans to
consider in an ANPRM, EPA could suggest its own preliminary supporting analysis and view of
the relevant facts and considerations and then ask for meaningful input on all aspects of the
issues, seeking recommendations for alternative approaches from interested parties and the
public. That would be more respectful of the American people and all interested stakeholders and
would be more accommodating of the need for and the value of greater public input and
deliberation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0647, pp. 21-22]
Such an alternative process would provide the opportunity for EPA to receive deeper and
broader information on all sides of the issues raised by these regulatory proposals, as well as a
more probing analysis of the scope of EPA's authority to set emissions limits for automobiles
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and commercial trucks. In that way, an ANPRM process would help redirect EPA's thinking
about the true costs, market disruptions, and secondary consequences of its preferred approach
and about its authority to undertake these transformational proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0647, pp.21-22]
Organization: T. Becker Power Systems
5- Both US EPA and California Air Resources Board (CARB) have illegally blocked the
study of localized emission reduction strategies that would achieve EPA air quality standards
without the need for increasingly stringent motor vehicle emission standards. Those alternative
strategies include reducing VMT in California by 55% from a 2019 baseline by 2040, and
reducing Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach activity (tonnage) by 75% by 2030 from a 2019
baseline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0567, p. 1]
Organization: Tesla, Inc.
Additionally, Tesla notes that the 10 MB size limitation on appending supporting documents
has prevented the attachment of some supporting materials. As a result, Tesla requests EPA
include the following documents in the administrative record: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792,
p. 1]
• Tesla, Impact Report 2022 (Apr. 24, 2023) (full report) available at
https://www.tesla.com/impact
• Tesla, 2023 Investor Day Presentation (March 1, 2023) available at
https://digitalassets.tesla.com/tesla-contents/image/upload/IR/Investor-Day-2023-Keynote
• Tesla, Battery Day Presentation (Sept. 22, 2020) available at https://tesla-
share.thron.com/content/?id=96ea71cf-8fda-4648-a62c-753af436c3b6&pkey=Sldbei4 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 1]
Further, California's recent adoption of the ACC II rule, setting a 100 percent zero-emission
vehicle (ZEV) sales standard by 2035, will also accelerate BEV adoption. As EPA recognizes, a
number of states have already adopted ACC II and the list is growing.85 New research assessing
the impact of additional states adopting California's standards (accounting for the IRA's tax
credits) finds that adoption by California and 16 other states would accelerate electric vehicle
adoption, cut 1.3 gigatons of carbon emissions (equivalent to closing 13 coal plants), create
300,000 new jobs, save households $230 per year, and prevent 5,000 deaths in 2050.86 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, pp. 12-13]
85 88. Fed. Reg. at 29344; Bloomberg Law, More States Join California's Push to Phase Out Gas Cars by
2035 (May 16, 2023) available at https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/more-states-
join-californias-push-to-phase-out-gas- c ars-by-2035
86 Energy Innovation, Nationwide Impacts Of California's Advanced Clean Cars II Rule (April 9, 2023)
available at https://energyinnovation.org/publication/nationwide-impacts-of-californias-advanced-clean-
cars-ii-rule/
Further, as a growing number of states seek to adopt more robust ZEV requirements,
enhancing the ZEV contribution to the establishment of multi-pollutant standards has the
potential to significantly enhance nationwide regulatory and market uniformity. Tesla, as do
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many other manufacturers, strongly supports furthering as much national uniformity as is
possible while still acknowledging California and the Section 177 States' innovation and
leadership. 140 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0792, p. 23]
140 See 42 U.S.C § 7507.
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
G. EPA has not adequately considered the consequences of the proposed rule with regard
to byproducts and coproducts of petroleum refining.
In its consideration of demand destruction on domestic petroleum refining, EPA fails to
consider the full breadth of products made from petroleum that are consumed every day in the
United States. A partial list of more than 6,000 products made from oil and gas is provided in
Table 6. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 51-54]
EPA fails to consider how the U.S. will source asphalt to pave its roads, tires to support its
electrified transportation sector, and a multitude of other consumer products and pharmaceuticals
that are integral to day-to-day life of Americans if domestic petroleum refining is phased out or
disrupted.281 For example, the amount of asphalt produced is in direct correlation to the amount
of liquid transportation fuel refined. Asphalt is a co-product and cannot be independently
manufactured.282 The loss of domestic asphalt production would force rail transport of higher
volumes and from further distances, driving up costs and GHG emissions, and compounding the
burden on communities already impacted by excessive train lengths that in some cases have
resulted in fatalities.283 If the United States' asphalt needs were to exceed the potential for railed
supplies, incremental asphalt would need to be imported by marine vessel, likely from Asia.
EPA's proposal neither accounts for the GHG burdens being outsourced by EPA's policies nor
the logistics-related increases in GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 51-54]
281 See Table 6, below.
282 https://www.wsj.com/articles/you-cant-build-roads-without-oil-fossil-fuel-refining-asphalt-renewables-
synthetic- materials-consumer-products-biden-11664982934.
283 https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2023/long-trains-block-intersections-paramedics/.
Further, the proposed rule fails to account for how the amount of sulfur available in the
United States will be adversely impacted. The chemical can be used in "construction materials,
traditional batteries, rubber (vulcanization), pharmaceuticals, paper bleaching, water treatment,
cosmetics/skin care, detergents,... and most importantly fertilizers."284 Most of the world's
sulfur is now produced through the Claus Recovery Method, which is used at oil and natural gas
refineries to keep sulfur dioxide from escaping into the atmosphere.285 On average, this process
in the U.S. alone creates 8 million tons of sulfur every year.286 Without this product, there
would be a sulfur deficiency in many crops throughout the U.S.287 It is a key ingredient in
phosphate fertilizers with nearly 50% of sulfur supply worldwide being used in this manner.288
Total U.S. economic impact is about $130 billion with 487,330 fertilizer industry related jobs in
the U.S. with wage earnings of $34.31 billion.289 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 51-54]
284 Glossary, The Sulphur Institute, https://www.sulphurinstitute.0rg/about-sulphur/glossary/#uses (last
visited June 2, 2023).
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285 B. Gene Goar, Sulphur Recovery Technology, Conference abstract from the American Institute of
Chemical Engineers Spring National Meeting (Apr. 1986), available at
https://www.osti.gov/biblio/5599326.
286 Mineral Commodity Summaries 2023, United States
Geological Survey, at p. 170-71, https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2023/mcs2023.pdf.
287 The Sulphur Cycle, The Sulphur Institute, https://www.sulphurinstitute.org/pub/?id=30177057-bc30-
5bd9-0719- 6380f37c76f9.
288 Chemical Economics Handbook, S&P Global Commodity Insights,
https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/ci/products/sulfur-chemical-economics-handbook.html.
289 Fertilizer Grows Jobs: Feeding Crops While Growing the U.S. Economy, The Fertilizer Institute
(2020), http://economicimpact.tfi.org/.
Sulfur is also used in manufacturing copper and lithium for batteries. For copper smelting in
the U.S., "approximately 1.4 million tons of [sulfur] is required."290 For the electric vehicle
future that some agencies anticipate, an additional 85,000 tons of sulfur would be needed in only
two years for copper production alone.291 For lithium, the "crushed ore is leached for several
days with diluted [sulfuric] acid."292 With current projections for the lithium need, it is possible
21% of current sulfur will be used in the process.293 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 51-
54]
290 Brief for the Sulfur Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Nat'l Res. Def. Council v.
National Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (2022) (No. 22-1080).
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 14. For more information on the impacts of EVs on sulfur supply, see Brief for the Sulfur
Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. National Highway Traffic
Safety Admin. (2022) (No. 22- 1080).
Table 6 - Partial list of Products made from Oil and Natural Gas294 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 51-54]
294 U.S. DOE, "Products Made from Oil and Natural Gas,"
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/ll/f68/Products%20Made%20From%200il%20and%20Natu
ral%20G as%20Infographic.pdf
Adhesives Deodorant Kayaks Safety glasses
Air mattresses Detergents Laptops Shampoo
Ammonia Dice Life jackets Shaving cream
Antifreeze Dishwashing liquid Lightweight aircraft Shoe polish
Antihistamines Dog collars Lipstick Shoes/ sandals
Antiseptics Drinking cups Loudspeakers Shower curtains
Artificial limbs Dyes Lubricants Skateboards
Artificial turf Electric blankets Luggage Skis
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Asphalt Electrical tape Model cars Soap dishes
Aspirin Enamel Mops Soft contact lenses
Awnings Epoxy paint Motorcycle helmets Solvents
Backpacks Eyeglasses Movie film Spacesuits
Balloons Fan belts Nail polish Sports car bodies
Ballpoint pens Faucet washers Noise insulation Sunglasses
Bandages Fertilizers Nylon rope Surfboards
Beach umbrellas Fishing boots Oil filters Swimming pools
Boats Fishing lures Packaging Synthetic rubber
Cameras Floor wax Paint brushes Tennis rackets
Candies and gum Food preservatives Paint rollers Tents
Candles Footballs Pajamas
Car battery cases Glue Panty hose
Car enamel Glycerin Parachutes
Caulking Golf bags Perfumes
CD's and DVD's Golf balls Permanent press Toothpaste
Cellphones Guitar strings Petroleum jelly Transparent tape
Clothes/clothing Hair coloring Pharmaceuticals Trash bags
Clothesline Hair curlers Pillows Truck and automotive parts
Coffeemakers Hand lotion Plastic toys Tubing
Cold cream Hearing aids Plastics TV cabinets
Combs Heart valves Plywood adhesive Umbrellas
Computer keyboards House paint Propane Unbreakable dishes
Computer monitors Hula hoops Purses Upholstery
Cortisone Ice chests Refrigerants Vaporizers
Crayons Ice cube trays Refrigerator linings Vinyl flooring
Credit cards Ink Roller skate wheels Vitamin capsules
Curtains Insect repellent Roofing Water pipes
Dashboards Insecticides Rubber cement Wind turbine blades
Tires
Tool boxes
Tool racks
Toothbrushes
Denture adhesives Insulation Rubbing alcohol
Yarn
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Dentures
iPad/iPhone [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 51-54]
This list above from the U.S. DOE makes clear that "car battery cases," "car enamel" and
"automotive parts" are "products made from oil and natural gas." Petroleum products have been
key components of EV innovation, making vehicles lighter and more efficient through the
application of plastics, engineered polymers, and fiber-reinforced composites integral to EV
design.295 EVs need petrochemicals, and petrochemicals will continue to play a critical role in
further reducing the weight of EVs, which will help increase their range.296 The HD Phase 3
GHG Rule should not only account for leakage associated with the production of petrochemicals
necessary to produce EVs, but also analyze the impact discontinued oil and refining production
will have on the U.S.'s ability to encourage EV production to scale with its proposals. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 51-54]
295 https://www.visualcapitalist.com/how-much-oil-electric-vehicle/
296 Id.
Organization: Western Energy Alliance
Foreign Justification: Further, EPA cites to other countries as justification for the proposed
rule:
"Globally, at least 20 countries, as well as numerous local jurisdictions, have announced
targets for shifting all new passenger car sales to zero-emission vehicles in the coming years,
including Norway (2025); Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel,
Scotland, Singapore, Sweden, and Slovenia (2030); Canada, Chile, Germany, Thailand, and the
United Kingdom (2035); and France, Spain, and Sri Lanka (2040).. .In addition, in February
2023 the European Union gave preliminary approval to a measure to phase out sales of ICE
passenger vehicles in its 27 member countries by 2035." (p. 29188) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0679, pp. 8-9]
Fundamentally, the fact that foreign countries are dictating EVs is not legitimate justification
for U.S. rulemaking. But even were we to concede any relevance to this rulemaking, EPA surely
should acknowledge the backtracking on these initiatives as many countries recognize the
impracticality of such mandates. While politicians like to decree certain things far into the future,
that does not mean such diktats will become reality. There are many examples throughout history
of centrally planned economies and nationalized industrial sectors failing, with Venezuela
providing the most recent sad example. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 8-9]
EPA has referenced, in footnotes 28 and 29, Reuters articles discussing European Union
legislation to ban ICEV sales and mandate new EV car sales goals. In the final rule, EPA must
likewise reference the Reuters article shortly thereafter discussing how quickly this legislation
was overturned by seven member companies. 19 Germany joined France, Italy, Poland, and
others in demanding the EU scrap the plan to ban ICEVs and mandate EVs. Insofar as EPA
relied on the actions of other countries and the EU in particular to justify this rule, such
justification must be reversed in the final rule and references to the EU mandate removed or at
least supplemented by the fact that the mandate was nullified. We provide a reference for
convenience. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0679, pp. 8-9]
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19 "Germany rejects EU plan for ban on new fossil-fuel cars from 2035," Reuters, June 21, 2023; "E U
was set to bani nternal combustion engine cars. Then Germany suddenly changed its mind," CNN, March
27, 2023.
Organization: Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA)
We also encourage EPA to consider standards for MYs 2033-2035 that would result in the
same level of emissions reductions as California's Advanced Clean Cars II regulation. In doing
so, we urge the agency to undertake a separate final rulemaking under a different OMB
Regulatory Information Number to ensure such standards are severable from these proposed
standards for MYs 2027-2032. ZETA notes that there may be useful parallels between the
ongoing transition to EVs and EPA's phaseout of leaded gasoline from 1973 to 1996130 and we
encourage the agency to apply any potential lessons learned from that phaseout, recognizing that
reducing GHG emissions requires a similar sense of urgency to eliminating lead in gasoline.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 26]
130 "EPA History: Lead," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, accessed June 20, 2023
https://www.epa. gov/history/epa-history-lead
We also encourage EPA to finalize MDV GHG and multipollutant emissions standards for
MY 2033-2035 that align with the stringency of California's Advanced Clean Trucks regulations
for class 2b-3 vehicles. In doing so, we urge the agency to undertake a separate final rulemaking
under a different OMB Regulatory Information Number to ensure such standards are severable
from these proposed standards for MYs 2027-2032. We recommend finalizing MY 2033-2035
emissions standards for both LDVs and MDVs in the same rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0638, p. 28]
Enabling Cleaner Service Calls Through Bucket Truck Technology
Xcel is also taking immediate action on other high-impact emission reduction opportunities,
using technologies such as electric power take-off, idle mitigation, and solar systems to power
jobsite tools. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 60-61]
- Electric power take-off (ePTO) - An ePTO system is a device that uses battery power. It's
similar to an EV, but instead of moving the vehicle down the road, it powers equipment and tools
to avoid engine idling at the job site. These devices are recharged by plugging into the same
chargers that EVs use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 60-61]
- Idle mitigation - An idling truck can consume 1.5 gallons of gas each hour. Idle mitigation
on Xcel Energy's utility bucket trucks works by automatically shutting down the gas-powered
engine when the vehicle is not in use or when the engine is idling for too long. This helps to
reduce emissions and conserve fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, pp. 60-61]
Fleet Electrification Solutions for Customers
Xcel Energy's experience and expertise with fleet electrification doesn't stop with their own
fleet. They have developed a mix of customer programs across service areas to support fleet
electrification for businesses and communities. These customer-centric solutions enable
sophisticated planning, lower upfront costs with various rebates and incentives, and minimize
impacts to the grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 61]
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Xcel's approach for commercial EV fleet development includes:
- Advisory services: Xcel offers a "white-glove service" to meet customers where they are on
their electrification journey by guiding them through customized planning for their infrastructure
needs. For fleet operators, this includes a free assessment to help them determine the best path to
electrify their fleet and advise them on future electric fleet considerations such as charging best
practices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 61]
- Infrastructure installation: Xcel designs and builds EV supply infrastructure to support
charging station installations at minimal to no cost to customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0638, p. 61]
- Equipment recommendations and rental options: Xcel also provides recommendations for
charging equipment and offers customers the option to purchase their own qualifying vehicle
chargers or rent them at a monthly fee that includes installation and maintenance. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 61]
- Grid continuity: Xcel designs long-term clean energy resource and distribution plans to
consider the future impact of new EV load to ensure ongoing grid stability, reliability and
affordability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 61]
- Equitable opportunities: Xcel supports EV adoption in higher emissions communities and
income-qualified neighborhoods through rebates and incentives. This includes facilitating the
electrification of carshare, refuse trucks, school buses, paratransit vehicles, and other fleets
operating in these disproportionately impacted communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638,
p. 61]
Fleet electrification is a key component of Xcel Energy's larger vision, which includes
enabling zero-carbon transportation by 2050 across our eight-state service footprint. This long-
term strategy balances affordability with sustainability across the entire grid. It's why Xcel is
dedicated to assisting fleet managers across the ecosystem in providing fleet electrification
solutions that empower and inspire a clean energy future while also leading by example. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0638, p. 61]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
EPA appreciates all the comments received regarding ancillary topics for the proposed
rulemaking. By the nature of this section, EPA is summarizing and responding to topics which
are related to the proposal and not captured in the other topic specific sections. It also means that
the breadth of the comments summarized in this section is wide and somewhat disparate in
nature.
Comment:
EPA received comments from the Alliance for Consumers (AFC), Charles Gordon, Kari
Ostlie, POET, LLC, and the American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) regarding
the length of the comment period.
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Response:
Regarding the length of the comment period for EPA's proposal, the proposal was announced
on April 12, 2023, and the pre-publication version of the notice of proposed rulemaking was
posted to the EPA's website on that same day. The notice was published in the Federal Register
on May 5, 2023, and the public comment period was open until July 5, 2023. In addition to the
written public comment period, the EPA offered a multi-day virtual public hearing for the public
to provide oral comments to the Agency on the proposed rule in May 2023. The EPA considers
this a fully adequate amount of time for commenters to provide comments to the Agency
regarding the proposed standards for MY 2027 through MY2032 light and medium duty
vehicles, and we note that EPA received more than 250,000 public comments on the proposed
rulemaking. EPA also considered comments received after the close of the comment period to
the extent practicable.
Comment:
The Arizona State Legislature commented that EPA had indicated that it intended to rely on
two updated reports for the final rule, following external peer review, a new vehicle tear down
study and updated estimates for the social cost of greenhouse gases (SC-GHG) and that EPA
should reopen the public comment period to allow commenters the opportunity to comment on
the final versions.
Response:
EPA did indicate in the proposal that it was in the process of obtaining updated information
on these topics. As part of our efforts to ensure that we use the most accurate, up to date
information we often have to update our information in the course of the rulemaking. This
information simply expands on the information we included in the docket. We were transparent
both in our intention to use updated information and in docketing the vehicle tear down study in
Fall, 2023. Moreover, we present benefit-cost analyses for the rule using the same SC-GHG
estimates as we used at proposal and, as discussed elsewhere, because of the limited role benefit-
cost analysis plays in adoption of the standards (i.e., it is not used for identifying the standards,
but rather a positive net benefit is used to confirm the reasonableness of the selection of the
standards under section 202), we believe it was reasonable to present benefit-cost figures using
both sets of estimates and we do not believe any commenter was prejudiced by our decision not
to reopen the comment period to allow further comment.
Comment:
ICCT, Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the Ozone
Transport Commission (OTC), EDF, Tesla, and the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York
City School of Law, the Environmental Defense Fund all pointed towards policies and
regulations made at the state and international level that support EPA's proposal. Commenters
expressed that state and international policies support both the feasibility of the proposed
standards but also could be used by EPA as the basis for regulations. Our Children's Trust (OCT)
and Zero Emission Transportation Association (ZETA) commented similarly and with the
former commenting that there was no reason for EPA not to adopt the CARB ACC II program
and ZETA recommending that EPA initiate a new rulemaking for MY's 2033 to 2035. On the
other hand, commenters such as Jaguar Land Rover and the Western Energy Alliance
recommended that EPA not adopt standards that resulted in BEV penetrations beyond those
adopted by CARB or commented that EPA was wrong to point to international regulations to
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support our feasibility analysis. The California Attorney General's office also took the
opportunity to note various fleet purchase requirements and incentives.
Response:
EPA appreciates the comments regarding ways to address state and regulatory programs in the
final rule. While references to state and international programs are certainly helpful in informing
the public of similar efforts to reduce vehicle emissions, EPA has not based the final standards
on state and international programs. We only note that EPA's final rule, while not based on state
and international programs, is similarly attempting to address emissions from light- and medium-
duty vehicles and, as noted in EDF's comments, such programs help to support our feasibility
conclusions.
Comment:
EPA received comments from the American Council for Energy-Efficiency (ACEEE) and
Consumer Reports that vehicle labeling should be improved, both for BEVs and MDVs. ACEEE,
ICCT and CARB specifically commented on the need for a consumer label for MDVs, while the
Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA) and CARB both commented on the
need for improved labeling in general. In addition to labeling, CARB commented on the need for
standard serviceability requirements, standard DC fast charging, and standardized charging
inlets. CARB also suggested that EPA collect and report additional data for BEVs in cold
weather operation. Consumer Reports added recommendations regarding improved range
estimates, alternative metrics other than miles per gallon, providing battery size information and
for EPA to develop standards for battery charging speed metrics.
Response:
EPA appreciates the comments received regarding labeling, serviceability, and charging.
While EPA recognizes the importance of each of these provisions, however, we did not propose
changes or other reopen any provisions regarding the MDV or BEV labeling, serviceability, and
charging, issues raised by the commenters. Therefore these topics are out of scope for this FRM.
Comment:
EPA received comments regarding a mid-rulemaking check-in and/or tying the standards to
the development of infrastructure from the Alliance for Vehicle Efficiency (AVE), the American
Petroleum Institute (API), Chevron, and Stellantis. API and Stellantis both suggested that the
final rule includes provisions for adjustments with API also recommending that we base the
standards on life-cycle analysis (LCA). AVE also noted that due to political uncertainty,
suppliers were lacking in assurance. Hyundai commented in a related fashion and recommended
that a Federal Advisory Committee should be convened to help assess key enablers.
Response:
EPA appreciates comments received regarding a midterm evaluation and tying standards to
infrastructure development, with potential provisions for standard adjustments. EPA is not
finalizing a midterm evaluation or provisions for monitoring infrastructure development. The
Administrator has the authority to initiate a new rulemaking if he or she finds that there is an
appropriate need to do so without establishing midterm evaluation provisions. Note that similar
comments are addressed in RTC section 3.4. Additional detail on the request for tying standards
to infrastructure can be found in RTC section 17. Comments on LCA are addressed in RTC 19.2.
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Regarding AVE's comment on political uncertainty, EPA has closely engaged with
stakeholders in formulating this rulemaking, consistent with AVE's comment. AVE claims there
is opposition to EPA's "recent rulemakings in Congress." EPA addresses this topic in RTC 2.
Comment:
EPA received several comments regarding the Highway Trust Fund and the potential changes
to fuel revenues that support road maintenance and construction. Commenters included
American Highway Users Alliance, a mass comment campaign, and citizens Ray Littlefield IV
and Steven G. Bradbury. Mr. Bradbury also used the opportunity to note potential increases in
costs for first responder training that might be required for emergencies involving electric
vehicles. Commenters had pointed out that EPA had failed to consider these costs.
Response:
Please see Section 8.3 regarding comments on fuel revenue changes. Regarding comments
that training costs for first responders may increase, we first note that even in the absence of this
rule, PEVs are being purchased at used at increasing rates. With respect to the costs of training
first responders, we note that this is out of scope for this rule.
Comment:
EPA also received several comments on a broad range of topics. The American Chemical
Council Product Approval Protocol Task Group recommended that EPA consider the benefits of
improved lubricants. CALSTART encouraged EPA to "lock in" a rapid transition to zero carbon
transportation while sending a clear signal to the market. Denso Corporation provided a list of
technologies which could be applied to improve EV efficiency while Elders Climate Action
encouraged EPA to initiate a zero-emission rulemaking. The Electric Drive Transportation
Association (EDTA) recommended an all-government approach to for EPA's FRM.
Environmental and Public Health Organizations took the opportunity to recommend
improvements to enforcement of emission standards and improvements for in-use testing.
General Motors encouraged the agency to maintain a strong dialogue between stakeholders and
EPA. The Zero Emissions Transportation Association (ZETA) recommended that EPA consider
electric bucket trucks.
Response:
EPA appreciates all the comments received on these topics. EPA has considered a broad array
of technologies in its technical assessment for this FRM. Technologies, such as improved
lubricants, are part of our ALPHA simulation, and while electric bucket trucks are not
specifically covered, electrification is certainly well captured in our analysis for the light- and
medium-duty vehicle sectors. EPA appreciates the comments which support this rulemaking as a
clear signal to the market. At this time EPA is not able to respond to the nature of future
rulemakings for the light and medium duty vehicle sector.
Comment:
Several fuel interests also provided comments related to a variety of topics. Valero
commented on that EPA had not considered what impact a reduction in refining may have on
other products that depend on refined petroleum. Valero also noted the potential reduction in the
availability of sulphur as the result of reduced petroleum refining. The Missouri Corn Growers
Association (MCGA) commented that the proposed rule was discriminatory against farmers that
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depend on ICE-based powertrains and that the agency had not considered the negative impacts
on farmers. The National Corn Growers Association recommended that EPA update the F-
Factor, used for flex fuel vehicle compliance, to 0.2 and to re-establish the 0.15 divisor for fuel
economy calculations. Natural Gas Vehicles of America provided a variety of suggestions
regarding natural gas incentives and distribution.
Response:
EPA appreciates the comments received regarding these topics. Regarding Valero's comment
that EPA has erroneously failed to consider the alleged broader impacts of petroleum refining on
sulphur, asphalt, and other more than 6,000 other products, we disagree. As we discuss in RTC 2,
given the global nature of today's supply chain, any significant action, whether by the
government or industry, may have indirect impacts on other entities. EPA acknowledges that the
petroleum industry, along with the motor vehicle industry and numerous other industries, is a
significant part of the global supply chain. This does not mean, however, that prior to issuing any
regulation that potentially and indirectly affects the petroleum sector, EPA must evaluate the
impacts on 6,000 different products. As we explain in preamble III.B and RTC 2, CAA section
202(a) directs EPA to promulgate emission standards based on the statutory criteria, including
the costs of compliance on regulated entities. While EPA may consider other factors, the agency
is certainly not obligated to evaluate economic impacts on 6,000 different products, particularly
where the commenter has failed to adduce with reasonable specificity what are the actual impacts
of the regulation on those products.
Moreover, the commenter's concern appears highly exaggerated. While the final rule is
estimated to reduce demand for refined petroleum products in the US, much of that reduction is
associated with reductions in US net oil imports, that is reductions in oil imports from foreign
countries or increases in exports of US oil. Further, as Valero itself notes, refineries produce
many different kinds of products, including gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation fuels, and other
products, that are used by many sectors of the economy, further mitigating the possible refinery
impacts associated with the rule. We further discuss the uncertainty surrounding how changes in
domestic demand for liquid fuel may or may not impact domestic refining of liquid fuel in RIA 8
and preamble VI.
Further, even assuming impacts on domestic refining, it is entirely unclear there will be any
impact on availability of the 6,000 products alleged by Valero. For example, while Valero claims
the rule will adversely impact the amount of sulphur available in the US, it provides no data or
analysis to show that this is likely to happen. As Valero itself acknowledges, there are multiple
methods to produce sulphur, including methods that are unrelated to petroleum refining, for
example the refining of natural gas.
Regarding standards discriminating against farmers, EPA is establishing performance-based
standards for both GHG and criteria pollutant emissions. EPA expects that ICE-based powertrain
equipped vehicles will remain available throughout the timeframe of this rulemaking. EPA did
not propose any changes to the F-factor or the fuel economy calculation, as it relates to the use of
E85, and flex fuel vehicles, therefore changes to the F-factor and 0.15 divisor are out of scope.
EPA is not finalizing any revised provisions regarding natural gas vehicles, and the commenters
requests regarding natural gas incentives and distribution are beyond the scope of the
rulemaking.
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Comment:
Stellantis recommended that EPA conduct an industry training event after the rulemaking is
finalized.
Response:
EPA appreciates this suggestion. We agree that an industry training event may be valuable in
ensuring the regulated industry understands the scope and details of the regulations, and will
consider establishing such an event.
Comment:
The Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association commented on the need for
immigration reform to address skilled worker availability.
Response:
This comment is out of scope for this vehicle emission regulation, though we note that issues
concerning the labor work force are further addressed in RTC Section 20.
Comment:
John Graham commented on the future of HEVs in EPA regulations.
Response:
HEVs are in no way restricted under this rulemaking. Under EPA's performance-based GHG
standards, manufacturers are free to build HEVs as part of their compliance strategy.
28 - Out of scope
Comments by Organizations
Organization: A. Longo
Thank you for considering my detailed comments on this matter of great importance. By
adopting a balanced and evidence-based approach, I believe we can develop effective regulations
that address environmental concerns without unduly burdening the transportation sector and
jeopardizing economic stability. Further, I recommend the EPA evaluate incentive-based
programs, which accelerate the adoption of technology and serve to lower the cost of
implementing such technology providing greater benefits in the achievement of improvements to
air quality versus the imposition of regulations that mandate arbitrary timelines and force
increased manufacturing cost, which can cascade into most areas of the economy. A great
example of this would be the use of tax credits in the industry. The brownfield redevelopment
tax credit program and the alternate fuel vehicle rebates and incentives programs are examples of
successful implementations. The Alternate Motor Fuels Act (AMFA) or 1988 successfully
promoted the use of ethanol and natural gas, a similar stimulus to the industry could serve to
accelerate electronic vehicle production targeting the light to medium-duty vehicle segments.
The EPA should invest more in industry-wide tax credit programs incenting both manufacturers
and consumers to achieve the desired outcome of cleaner air quality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0517, p. 2]
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Organization: Alex Stavis
[.From Hearing Testimony, May 9, 2023] I employ you good people to do whatever is needed
to meet the climate change requirements that have been met by international and national
requirements. As the President just said we are the leader and must set the best example possible
for which we have the tools to do, be it with a cash for clunkers buy back program, be it with
education, be it with sanctioning, be it with more electric vehicles made in a clean way and
disposed of when finished in a clean way and in a way that the public will buy into, i.e., getting
the public to say yes, this is what I want, not only do I want it, I can afford it. It is up to all of us,
the government setting the standards, the EPA setting the standards to do such. [From Hearing
Testimony, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5115, Day 1]
Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
Finally, EPA also ignored the advances being made in carbon capture and sequestration
(CCS) as an alternative means of reducing GHG emissions. While EPA touts available incentives
for ZEVs in federal legislation, it overlooks federal incentives and private sector support for CCS
technology. Many AFPM members are investing heavily in CCS technology to reduce their
GHG emissions. 192 This promising technology has the potential to decrease emissions. EPA
arbitrarily ignored the promise of this technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 41-42]
192 AFPM members ExxonMobil, Chevron, Valero, and INEOS have been at the forefront of CCS.
ExxonMobil invested in CCS for more than 30 years and maintains an equity stake in roughly one-fifth of
all carbon capture projects worldwide. These projects "captured approximately 40 percent of all the
captured anthropogenic carbon dioxide (C02) in the world." Exxon's current carbon capture capacity of
about nine million metric tons annually is the equivalent of planting 150 million trees every year.
Organization: Brian Russo
[From Hearing Testimony, May 10, 2023] I want to speak a little bit about vehicle
manufacturers. The first vehicle was made to runoff of peanut oil. Ford made a vehicle that ran
off of hemp biofuel and was made with hemp body panels. So at some point we started burning
fossil fuels and became dependent on fossil fuels and seems it's by design because vehicles could
have been made to be powered by alternatives. You may be familiar with some of the alternative
lower emission fuels. Some states are using biofuels to mix with our gasoline for the purposes of
lowering emissions and they have been successful. Diesel vehicles can be powered with hemp
biofuel — bio diesel without any modifications so I can't help but wonder if it would be easier to
power these vehicles with hemp bio diesel rather than replace fleets of vehicles. So I worked in
the auto industry for over ten years and I can tell you that vehicle manufacturers have no regard
for their waste. During the Obama administration when vehicle manufacturers were required to
lower emissions, they introduced composite materials that are not going to be biodegradable or
recyclable. When I asked the engineer if there was any consideration for the environmental
impact, they say no. I say what's the point. We can no longer be burying batteries or tires in the
ground, it's contaminating our soil. I live in the land of Lenape where Ford has contaminated our
land and killed many people. They may have paid a small lawsuit but it's nowhere near the
destruction they caused to the environment and the death of the Lenape people. So I support
strong limits on emissions but I don't think it goes far enough. I think we need to be regulating
the vehicle manufacturers as far as the overall environmental impact when it comes to the
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sourcing of the materials and produce a responsibility when it comes to their waste. They could
be making the vehicles with hemp body panels and using — they could be powered off of biofuel
and everything should be recyclable rather than ending up in a junkyard. So I became a climate
activist when I realized I would not be able to retire and most likely die from catastrophic
climate events. So I am asking the EPA to support a strong emission standard but also take it one
step further and protect us from the vehicle manufacturers. [From Hearing Testimony, EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-5115, Day 2]
Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB) (Part 1 of 5)
Running Loss Standards
Running loss emissions are a type of evaporative emissions that occur when fuel vapors
escape from the vehicle during driving. Manufacturers are required to certify vehicles to the
running loss standard by driving a vehicle over a prescribed drive cycle on a dynamometer and
measuring the resulting evaporative emissions as captured in a sealed enclosure around the
vehicle during testing. Under ACC II, California lowered the running loss standard from 0.05
g/mi to 0.01 g/mi. Based on manufacturers' 2021 MY California certification data, 92 percent
were certified as already emitting at or below 0.01 g/mi of hydrocarbons. 46 To ensure vehicles
continue to perform at those levels and to further reduce emissions from the small proportion of
vehicles that are currently certifying at higher emission levels, CARB recommends that U.S.
EPA align with CARB by tightening its current running loss standard from 0.05 g/mi down to
0.01 g/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0780, p. 35]
46 CARB. ACC II. Attachment O - Additional Documents or Incorporated Documents Added to the
Record, MY2021 Evaporative Running Loss Emission Certification Data. July 2022. This is a spreadsheet
of the data which was used to support the proposed new running loss standard of 0.01 g/mi, CARB 2022j.
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/accii/atto.pdf.
Certification Data Collection for Improved ZEV Fuel Economy Labels
Based on experience gained to date, CARB has identified several shortcomings in the current
fuel economy labels for ZEVs that could be improved to communicate more relevant data to
consumers. Internal combustion engine vehicles have a long history with the label and its
refinements over the years to present the most meaningful data in a concise format for
consumers. For ZEVs in general, and especially for BEVs, however, the current label is
insufficient in communicating useful information in an understandable metric to consumers
regarding the most important BEV attributes. While modifications to the required label
information and format may be out of scope for the current rulemaking proposal, CARB
recommends that U.S. EPA include requirements with this proposal to require vehicle
manufacturers to disclose additional information that could be used for such an improved label
that could be adopted by separate rulemaking in the future. Specifically, CARB recommends that
U.S. EPA require that manufacturers report additional test data and vehicle information
regarding the vehicle's range and charging time at the time of certification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0780, p. 46]
Organization: Consumer Reports (CR)
8. EPA Should Improve Consumer Information on the Window Sticker for EVs
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If enacted, EPA's GHG rule will help support continued growth in EV sales. To help support
consumers as they make the transition to EVs, CR asks that EPA open a separate rulemaking to
update the consumer information that is provided on the window sticker for EVs. The EV market
has evolved immensely in the years since the window sticker was last revised. Updating the
sticker with more relevant information can help improve the EV buying experience. CR would
suggest the following improvements to the data that is provided to consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0728, pp. 25-27]
8.1. More Useful EV Range Information
As Car and Driver has recently highlighted, EPA's current testing for EV range does not
always match with real world vehicle performance.52 A big portion of the problem is the fact
that EPA only publishes a combined city/highway EV range number. However, EVs tend to
achieve shorter range at real world highway speeds, which is when range is most often relevant
to consumers. Also, range is only estimated under ideal weather conditions, leaving consumers
with no information about how their vehicle might perform in hot or cold weather. While a
single combined number is generally useful in comparing different vehicles against each other,
providing consumers with more information including highway range in both hot and cold
weather would be most useful in helping consumers understand the true performance they can
expect from their vehicle, and better determine if it will meet their needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0728, pp. 25-27]
52 Comparison of On-Road Highway Fuel Economy and All-Electric Range to Label Values: Are the
Current Label Procedures Appropriate for Battery Electric Vehicles?, SAE International, April 11, 2023,
https://www.sae.org/publications/technical-papers/content/2023-01-0349/.
8.2. Consider Alternatives to Mile Per Gallon Equivalent (MPGe)
While MPGe is somewhat useful in helping consumers understand how EVs compare with
gas and hybrid vehicles in terms of efficiency, it's not a very useful metric for vehicle owners.
EPA should reconsider the use of MPGe on the window sticker and explore replacing or
supplementing it with a more useful efficiency metric. In general most modern EVs present
efficiency in terms of miles per kilowatt hour on their trip odometers, which is more consistent
with how consumers are used to thinking about efficiency in terms of miles per gallon. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 25-27]
8.3. Provide EV Battery Size Information
While manufacturers may choose to include battery size information on the window sticker, it
is not required. CR would recommend that manufactures provide the usable battery capacity of
the vehicle on the window sticker. This also provides useful information for comparison between
vehicles. Two separate vehicles might both have the same rated range, but achieve it with wildly
different battery sizes. Providing that information to consumers can help them potentially
consider more efficient options. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 25-27]
There may also be some value in manufacturers also providing the basic battery chemistry
details as well given that certain types of batteries may perform differently under different
conditions. This type of information may become even more important as the market explores
more diversity in battery chemistries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 25-27]
8.4. Develop and Present Standard Metrics for Charging Speeds
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Charging speed is becoming an increasingly important differentiator in terms of the
convenience of driving an EV longer distances. While the range of EVs is still important, it is
charging speed that can most affect how convenient longer trips in EVs will be. CR suggests that
EPA develop standardized testing and metrics for EVs' DC-fast charging speeds. Currently
automakers provide consumers with cherry-picked charging speeds, often based upon narrow
slices of the vehicle's charging curve under ideal conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728,
pp. 25-27]
CR would suggest a standardized test for fast charging speed measuring the time to charge
from 10% to 80% state of charge. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 25-27]
However, that metric is only part of the story because it doesn't tell how many miles of range
are gained over that time. A separate metric should also be included that measures the average
numbers of miles of range gained over a set period of time, potentially average miles per 10
minutes of charging or average miles per minute gained from 10%-80% state of charge. This will
give consumers a more standardized way to understand how long they will have to spend
charging to cover a specific distance using public fast charging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0728, pp. 25-27]
Level 2 charging speeds can also be important information, but more information should be
provided to consumers about the conditions under which the test was performed. At a minimum
EPA should require the amperage of the charger needed to achieve the presented level 2 charging
times be provided. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728, pp. 25-27]
Organization: Dylan Ondek
Dirt track Racing is a sport that a lot of people love. There is nothing better than going to the
dirt track on a Saturday night in the summer. Racing is in the blood of a lot of people and you
can't take it away. The smell of racing alcohol is amazing; it is not hurting the environment in
any way. If you try to take it away there will be a lot of people very angry. Racing is a sport like
soccer, football, etc.
Organization: Fuel Freedom Foundation
The EPA's rationale for phasing out FFV credits within the GHG program was to defer to the
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) for upstream decarbonization.5 While the GHG requirements
under the RFS have indeed driven down lifecycle carbon intensity of ethanol to between 44 and
52% of the gasoline it replaces according to the GREET model and recent independent research,
the RFS program does not extend to incentivizing the vehicles that enable greater displacement
of petroleum fuels with a lower-carbon alternative.6 Consequently, OEM automakers have no
incentive to incorporate FFVs within their product plans. Incorporating an FFV credit within the
GHG Standards program will amplify the progress in reducing CI upstream by enabling wider
use of lower carbon ethanol as a substitute for high-carbon gasoline for the in-use phase. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, p. 2]
5 75 FR 25434, "EPA recently finalized its RFS2 rulemaking which life cycle emissions from ethanol and
the upstream GHG benefits of E85 use are already captured by this program."
6 Environmental Research Letters, "Carbon intensity of corn ethanol in the United States: state of the
science" (2021) accessed at https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/abde08
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Encouraging the production of FFVs will not impede EPA's aggressive goal of rapid light-
duty electrification. Instead, promoting the use of lower-carbon liquid fuels will diversify EPA's
portfolio of decarbonization strategies to more quickly, broadly, and cost-effectively decarbonize
the light-duty transportation sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, p. 2]
There are multiple public policy rationales for crediting FFVs within the GHG program:
Maximize cost effectiveness of GHG reductions. As GHG reduction targets are strengthened
over time to achieve Net Zero carbon emissions in transportation, economic costs will inevitably
increase. However, the total economic burden can be lessened, and the social benefits
maximized, by keeping the door open to the most cost-effective fuel pathways. Fuel Freedom
funded a study by Lifecycle Associates to evaluate possible scenarios for achieving an 80% fuel
cycle reduction in light-duty vehicle GHG emissions for the U.S. and for California by 2050.7
The analysis used government estimates8 of fuel carbon intensity, vehicle efficiency
improvements, and incremental costs for each fuel-vehicle combination, to develop feasible
market penetrations for various pathways, including high-octane fuels with high-compression-
ratio ICEs coupled with electrification, biofuels used in ICEs with and without hybridization,
hybrid and plug-in hybrid vehicles, fuel cell EVs, and battery electric vehicles, to compare both
feasibility and relative cost effectiveness for carbon reductions.9 Long-term results to 2050 show
that it is critical to provide market flexibility for both electrification and liquid pathways in the
near term to promote long-term feasibility and cost-effectiveness of GHG reductions.
Regulations should therefore encourage and/or facilitate all feasible vehicle-fuel pathways that
can 1.) immediately reduce carbon intensity in the transportation sector and, 2.) maximize long-
term GHG reductions by transitioning to renewable sources, including electricity, hydrogen, and
increasingly lower-carbon and advanced biofuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0711, pp. 2-3]
7 Life Cycle Associates, "Assessing Greenhouse Gas Emission and Petroleum Reduction Scenarios for the
U.S. and California Transportation Sectors Final Report" (March 2019) - Submitted in conjunction with
previous comments at Docket EPA-HQ- OAR-2021-0208
8 EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2016; Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Greenhouse Gasses, Regulated
Emissions and Energy Use in Transportation (GREET) Model, VISION2015, and Cradle-to-Grave
Lifecycle Analysis of U.S. Light Duty Vehicle Fuel Pathways (2016);); National Academies of Science
Transitions report (2013); EPA-NHTSA Draft Technical Assessment Report, EPA Fuel Economy Guide;
CARB VISION2.1 and CA-GREET2 models
9 Each pathway centered on a dominant vehicle technology, constrained by practical limitations and the
attributes of cars versus trucks or SUVs. Vehicles not suitable for battery electric propulsion were assumed
to be ICEs.
Realize GHG reductions sooner rather than later. Given the urgency to forestall the increasing
effects of climate change, the EPA should not foreclose pathways that can immediately reduce
GHG emissions. With a signal from EPA that FFVs will be recognized for their decarbonization
value, higher blends of low-carbon ethanol can be made quickly available in the marketplace to
immediately displace higher-carbon gasoline. Today, more than 20 million FFVs are already on
the road, compared to 3.8 million plug-in EVs. FFVs are a mature vehicle technology that can
quickly be reintegrated into OEM offerings at virtual price parity to existing internal combustion
engine (ICE) vehicles. E85 also has widely available distribution and dispensing infrastructure to
deliver the fuel to retailers and consumers. Another key finding of the Lifecycle Associates
analysis is that policies accelerating a decrease in the carbon intensity of fuels reduce total GHGs
sooner. As EPA has noted, "future [GHG] emissions are expected to produce larger incremental
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damages as physical and economic systems become more stressed in response to greater climatic
change." 10 Given the uncertainties in measuring the long-term impacts of GHG emissions, 11
and the accumulated impacts of carbon emissions, 12 EPA should not discount the benefits of
pathways with significant promise to reduce emissions more quickly in the near-term. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0711, p. 3]
10 Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis (PRIA) for the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE)
Vehicles Rule for Model Year 2021 - 2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, p. 10768
11 SAFE PRIA, p. 1069
12 National Academies of Sciences, Valuing Climate Damages: Updating Estimation of the Social Cost of
Carbon Dioxide, (2017)
Organization: Growth Energy
One way to recognize the GHG benefits of biofuels would be to reinstate the Vehicle
Conversion Factor ("VCF") for FFVs. Through 2015, EPA used the following formula through
which the carbon emissions of FFVs were multiplied by the VCF to reflect the lifecycle
greenhouse gas benefits of ethanol use. The formula, which was phrased in terms of Carbon
Related Exhaust Emissions ("CREE"), was:
CREE = (F x CREEE85 x VCF) + ((1 -F) x CREEgas)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, p. 11]
40 CFR 600.510-12(j)(2)(iv)(B). Through model year 2015, the VCF was established at .15.
This is appropriate given that the tailpipe emissions from the ethanol portion of E85 (nominally
85% of the fuel) can be considered to net out with the carbon sequestered by the corn used to
produce the ethanol. As noted above, RFS calculations have assumed no tailpipe GHG emissions
for ethanol when calculating lifecycle emissions for that reason. EPA should therefore use a VCF
of. 15 (based on the Congressional level set under the CAFE standards) or such other level as
EPA considers reflects the lifecycle greenhouse gas benefits of ethanol. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0580, p. 11]
Reinstating VCF for FFVs would be only one potential step. EPA should ensure that it
accounts for the GHG emissions reductions of all biofuels, including those used in lower blends
like E10, E15, and E30. The best way to do that would be to conduct a lifecycle analysis for EVs
and a lifecycle analysis for ICE vehicles that examines the impact of different blends of biofuels,
including projecting an increase in biofuel blending in future years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0580, p. 11]
VI. EPA Should Establish or Expand Credits for Biofuels and Should Consider Other
Measures to Encourage Greater Biofuel Use.
A. Credits and Other Measures Under Section 202
Simply addressing EPA's errors regarding the lifecycle emissions of biofuels and EVs will
not sufficiently drive biofuel use in a manner consistent with Section 202 and the RFS. EPA
should also establish credits that specifically reward auto manufacturers for taking measures to
incentivize increased biofuel use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 15-16]
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EPA clearly has authority to issue such credits under Section 202. It has for years issued
credits for various measures that reduce emissions that are not reflected in tailpipe emissions,
including credits for efficient air conditioning and off-cycle credits. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,246.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 15-16]
The simplest type of credits to incentivize biofuels are those that allow greater biofuel use in
vehicles, such as flex-fuel vehicles ("FFVs") that can use E85 and higher blends of ethanol.
EPA, along with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), has already
established credits both under CAFE and Section 202 that provide an incentive for E85 use. 77
Fed. Reg. at 62,829. Those credits were initially awarded to FFVs regardless of the fuel they
actually used, but were later adjusted to account for the amount of fuel actually used. In its 2012
rulemaking for MY 2017 and later years, EPA explained that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580,
pp.15-16]
In the final rulemaking for MYs 2012-2016, EPA promulgated regulations for MYs 2012-
2015 ethanol FFVs that provide significant GHG emissions incentives equivalent to the long-
standing "CAFE credits" for ethanol FFVs under EPCA, since many manufacturers had relied on
the availability of these credits in developing their compliance strategies. Beginning in MY
2016, EPA ended the GHG emissions compliance incentives and adopted a methodology based
on demonstrated vehicle emissions performance. This methodology established a default value
where ethanol FFVs are assumed to be operated 100 percent of the time on gasoline, but allows
manufacturers to use a relative E85 and gasoline vehicle emissions performance weighting based
either on national average E85 and gasoline sales data, or manufacturer-specific data showing the
percentage of miles that are driven on E85 vis-[a]-vis gasoline for that manufacturer's ethanol
FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 15-16]
EPA should, at a minimum, extend and expand upon existing credits for FFVs. Existing
credits are limited in several ways—they do not provide an incentive for other technologies that
facilitate biofuel use in vehicles, they do not incentivize investments in blending infrastructure or
other non-vehicle equipment for biofuel use, and they do not incentivize greater use of biofuels
in standard, non-FFV engines. EPA therefore should also develop additional credits that can
further reduce GHG emissions by incentivizing greater biofuel use. To begin with, EPA could
expand credits to include technologies that facilitate different biofuel blends, like E30, and
investments that help facilitate fueling of vehicles with higher blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0580, pp.15-16]
An even better system of credits would be to provide credits based on overall biofuel use in
the manufacturer's fleet, regardless of whether the manufacturer manufactures FFVs or any
specific technology. That type of credit would give manufacturers incentives to increase biofuel
use in their fleet in any way possible—everything from making more FFVs, to making it easier
for non-FFVs to run on higher blends, to facilitating investments in fueling with higher blends.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 15-16]
Given the discussion of various credit programs in the proposal and past FFV incentive
programs, EPA can finalize a credit program based on biofuel use in this rule. But to the extent
that EPA believes it would require an additional rulemaking proposal, EPA should propose and
finalize such an incentive program as quickly as possible—it need not wait until the end of its
currently proposed standards to develop an important additional mechanism for reducing
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greenhouse gas emissions while continuing to maintain options for multiple types of vehicles in
our transportation system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0580, pp. 15-16]
Organization: Jim Hays
America, awaken and pay attention - socialism is communism - it destroys individual
excellence and eliminates private property. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0497, p. 1]
If you have not read and understood that the Constitution of the United States ordained by We
the People did vest limited powers to its Congress, and We the People must claim the Blessings
of Liberty secured in that charter, then you will lose when they infringe your property and
freedom. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0497, p. 1]
Democracy is one step from dictatorship. Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev said we will
fall from internal contention. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0497, p. 1]
a. "Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in
the Constitution" U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607; 120 S.Ct. 1740; 146 L.Ed. 2d 658 (2000).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0497, p. 1]
b. In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their
provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their
operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are
construed most strongly against the Government, and in favor of the citizen. UNITED STATES
v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story 369, Gould v Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0497, p. 1]
c. And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law. Connally et al. v. General
Construction Co. 269 U.S 385, 391 (1926) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0497, p. 1]
d. ... [KJeeping in mind the well settled rule, that the citizen is exempt from
taxation, unless the same is imposed by clear and unequivocal language, and that where the
construction of a tax law is doubtful, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of those upon whom
the tax is sought to be laid .... Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McLain, 192 US 397, 416 (1904)
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0497, p. 1]
If you depend exclusively on government they own you like inventory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0497, p. 1]
Do not let politicians infringe the 2nd amendment or the 9th and 10th will follow. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0497, p. 1]
Federal officers, employees, and all Administrative agencies have no right, authority, or
power Congress has not been vested by the pre-existing limitations of The Constitution of the
United States of America. All rights not delegated are reserved to the people of the several
States. The people are the sovereign power administering government by their agents. RE: U.S.
v. Morrison, 529, U.S. 598, 607; 120 S.Ct. 1740; 146 L.Ed. 2d 658 (2000). Bond v. U.S. 529 US
334 (2000). Officers enforcing unlawful acts against the people are liable personally for their
actions. Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The sworn oath of officers and
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employees of the United States is to support the Constitution for the United States. Any law or
act repugnant to the Constitution is an act of war and treason against the States and the people of
the States, from the beginning. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.,137,174,176 (1803). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0497, p. 1]
Organization: Lillian Davey
Tax credits would be the best incentive for this type of program as more people would be
more likely to make the switch. In my city, Littleton, Colorado, we have incentives to switch to
solar energy for a tax write-off, this made me more likely to switch. This incentive cannot be
little either, you are asking people to change their vehicle in for something more expensive, and
potentially less suitable. In this link: https://www.littletonco.gov/Business/Incentives-
Financing/State-Incentives-Tax-Credits , you can see the incentives and the buzz around
them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0489, p. 2]
Organization: Minnesota Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
LOW CARBON ETHANOL: MOVING TO NET ZERO
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) has already resulted in more 1 billion metric tons of
cumulative GHG savings from 2008-2021, exceeding original projections largely due to the
reduced carbon intensity of corn ethanol, highlighting the importance of using biofuels like
ethanol to enhance the GHG emissions reductions from transportation with the right policies. 18
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 7-9]
18 Unnasch, S. & Parida, D., Healy, B. "GHG Emissions Reductions due to the RFS2: A 2022 Update,"
February 2023; chrome-
extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://d3 5tlsyewk4d42.cloudfront.net/file/2424/GHG%20
Emissions%20Reductions%20due% 20to%20the%20RFS2%20-%20Feb%202023.pdf.
The most recent assessment from the Department of Energy's Argonne National Laboratory
concludes corn ethanol's carbon intensity decreased 23 percent from 2005 to 2019 due to
increased corn yield, reduced fertilizer intensity and improved ethanol production efficiency,
with corn ethanol now between 44 and 52 percent lower in carbon intensity (CI) than the
gasoline it replaces. 19 Argonne's conclusions are similar to analysis from Environmental Health
and Engineering finding ethanol now results in 46 percent fewer GHG emissions compared to
gasoline, due to improved corn production, ethanol production efficiencies and land
productivity.20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 7-9]
19 Lee, Uisung & et al. ANL, "Retrospective Analysis of the U.S. Corn Ethanol Industry for 2005-2019:
Implications for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions," (2021).
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/bbb.2225.
20 Scully, Melissa J., et al, "Carbon intensity of corn ethanol in the United States: state of the science,"
(2021) Environmental Research Letters 16 043001. https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-
9326/abde08.
Corn-based ethanol can reach net zero emissions with continued on-farm improvements and
soil carbon sequestration, along with carbon capture technology and new efficiencies in ethanol
production. Corn farmers are proud of our leadership in adopting conservation and best
management practices. NCGA's recently released Corn Sustainability Report21 details corn
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farmers' history of improvements and our commitment to further sustainability achievements by
2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 7-9]
21 National Corn Growers Association Corn Sustainability Report: chrome-
extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://dtl76nijwhl4e.cloudfront.net/file/392/NCGA%20S
ustainability%20Report_final_digital_ 07 29 21 .pdf.
Sustainable production means corn farmers today are producing more corn using less land and
fewer resources. For example, planted corn acres in 2022, at 88.6 million acres, were less than
planted acres in 2007, the year the RFS was expanded, at 93.5 million acres. USDA data also
shows the area planted to principal crops in the United States is not expanding overall. Corn
production has increased primarily because crop yields have increased from an average of 150
bushels per acre in 2007 to 173 bushels in 2022. With the average yield in 1980 at just 91
bushels per acre, productivity growth is a long-term trend. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp.
7-9]
Using the expertise of Argonne's scientists and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's data, we
believe Argonne's Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Technologies
(GREET) model is the federal government's most accurate tool for evaluating biofuel and energy
lifecycle emissions. Because GREET is regularly updated, this model captures GHG emissions
reductions from farmers' improved production practices and will incorporate the ongoing,
voluntary climate-smart improvements in agriculture production this Administration supports,
ensuring further carbon intensity reductions are accounted for in the LCA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0612, pp.7-9]
Corn production has improved across all measures of resource efficiency, including higher
crop yields per acre, resulting in greater corn production using less land and fewer inputs, further
fortifying ethanol as a sustainable, low-carbon renewable fuel. This progress is reflected in
Argonne's most recent analysis, which builds on and is consistent with other recent reviews.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 7-9]
For example, a 2018 USDA study shows that ethanol then resulted in 39 to 43 percent fewer
GHG emissions than gasoline.22 Building on this progress, additional improvements on farms
and in ethanol production supported by expanding markets for low carbon fuels could result in
ethanol with up to 70 percent fewer GHG emissions than gasoline, according to USDA's
analysis. Furthermore, according to California Air Resources Board (CARB) data, the CI of
ethanol is more than 40 percent lower than the CI of gasoline.23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0612, pp. 7-9]
22 Lewandrowski, Jan, and et. al, "The Greenhouse Gas Benefits of Corn Ethanol - Assessing Recent
Evidence," (202) Biofuels, 11:3, 361-375.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17597269.2018.1546488.
23 California Air Resources Board, Low Carbon Fuel Standard Reporting Tool Quarterly Summaries,
based on data through Q3 2020 at https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/lrtqsummaries.htm.
These increasing benefits have occurred without accounting for corn's ability to sequester
carbon in the soil. Corn as a crop can serve as a carbon sink. As a photo-synthetically superior
C4 plant, corn has an extraordinary ability to sequester carbon and move fertilizer nutrients back
to the surface for plant growth rather than polluting ground water. Corn's extensive, deep root
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system makes it one of the few plants with this important capability to make crop production
sustainable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 7-9]
High-yield corn—combined with the steady adoption of best practices such as reductions in
tillage intensity—is sequestering carbon from the atmosphere into the soil. This sequestration is
increasing soil carbon levels and reducing atmospheric C02. Although GHG lifecycle models do
not currently account for this direct GHG reduction from corn production, NCGA believes the
effect of corn crops on soil carbon sequestration, among other considerations, should be
incorporated into current lifecycle analysis. This increase in soil carbon from corn production,
when included, could result in a 20 gram/MJ carbon credit for corn-based ethanol.24 Fully
accounting for corn's carbon sequestration would further demonstrate significant low-carbon
advantages of a high-octane midlevel ethanol blend. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 7-9]
24 American Coalition for Ethanol, The Case for Properly Valuing the Low Carbon Benefits of Corn
Ethanol, 2018.
FLEX FUEL VEHICLES and CREDITING
Beyond ethanol's utility in all gasoline engines to reduce GHG emissions, other alternative
vehicle technologies can also harness the GHG reductions and air quality benefits of ethanol,
such as Flex Fuel Vehicles (FFVs). FFVs utilizing higher blends of low carbon ethanol, such as
E85, can provide immediate emissions reductions without tangibly altering the price of the
vehicle and reducing fuel costs. In fact, E85 is typically sold at a substantially lower price than
gasoline, translating to monetary savings in addition to the significant air pollution savings.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 11]
Compared to gasoline, E85 leads to significant reductions in NOx and GHG emissions. E85
avoids use of toxic hydrocarbon aromatics in gasoline that are precursors to secondary organic
aerosols that result in harmful fine particulate matter emissions that cause serious respiratory,
cardiovascular, and other health harm, including premature death, according to the American
Lung Association. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 11]
Incentivized to reduce emissions through the state's Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), in
California some FFVs are even powered by a blend of 15 percent renewable naphtha with 85
percent ethanol. These vehicles use zero fossil fuels, have improved air emissions profiles, and
have an extremely low carbon intensity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 11]
Despite the GHG and criteria pollution reduction benefits by use of FFVs, as well as the low
cost to purchase and fuel these vehicles, automakers have cut back on FFV models and now offer
very few choices to consumers. Well-structured vehicle credit programs remain an impactful,
cost-effective means for the government to encourage the introduction and adoption of new
products and technologies. To encourage introduction of a wider range of low emission vehicle
choices, NCGA believes EPA must provide equitable crediting across the spectrum of low
emission vehicles, including FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 11]
NCGA also urges EPA to take steps to update the F-factor in the fuel economy formula to a
forward-looking F-factor of at least 0.2, as we outlined in 2020 comments in response to Docket
EPA-HQ-OAR-2020-0104. Furthermore, we urge EPA to reinstate the 0.15 volumetric
conversion factor for FFVs. EPA should reharmonize the 0.15 factor for FFVs in these standards,
and, if not, in future standards. This change would accurately reflect the significant carbon
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emissions reductions from FFVs using E85 because the carbon emissions from the fuel are the
release of carbon taken up through crop growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, p. 11]
Organization: Natural Gas Vehicles for America
NGVAmerica believes that by its own admission EPA has sought to create an unlevel and
anti-competitive advantage for electric vehicles over other technologies including NGVs. Natural
gas vehicles involve significant cost due to their low-volume and the cost of the storage vessels
and systems. Like electric vehicles, natural gas vehicles when powered by RNG deliver
significant greenhouse emission reductions and therefore should have been similarly encouraged.
Thus, EPA has every reason to treat natural gas vehicles like electric vehicles when providing
regulatory incentives - moreover, since natural gas vehicles have largely not qualified for these
incentives, it is reasonable to extend similar size incentives for natural gas technology at least for
a short-period of time to allow natural gas trucks to increase in market share. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0597, p.13]
Thus, in addition to proposing a mechanism for crediting biofuels based on their upstream
emissions, EPA must provide equal treatment with respect to any future incentives offered to
manufacturers to assist them in overcoming market hurdles, and, moreover, EPA should take
corrective action to address the harm that has been done by its past actions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0597, p.13]
Developing a Credit Mechanism for Biofuels
For greenhouse gas emissions, NGV America previously requested that EPA use the 0.15
factor for greenhouse gas emissions to give credit to manufacturers for RNG use and to create an
efficient method of calculating the benefit of renewable natural gas until EPA moves to adopt a
well-to-wheels regulatory approach for all fuels, or until EPA can develop a detailed assessment
and emission factor specific to RNG use. A benefit of the 0.15 factor is that it is consistent with
the fuel efficiency credits and has been used in the past in EPA's regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0597, pp.13-14]
Given the recent state of developments and based on the increasing amount of carbon
negative RNG that is being used in transportation, a factor of 0.15 may not adequately represent
the credit that is warranted for RNG use. A factor of 0.15 would represent an 85 percent
reduction and therefore is not carbon neutral or carbon negative. Developing a precise factor
based on WTW comparisons of different fuels is complicated for various reasons: moving
baseline targets; year-over-year changes in fuel mix; truck lifetimes, etc. That is probably part of
the reason that EPA decided to abandon developing factors for electric vehicles and retained the
0 g/mi factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 13-14]
One solution might be to adopt a similar approach for NGVs as has been adopted for electric
vehicles. Such a concept has been developed and is explained in the attached European Biogas
and NGVA Europe documents. NGVA Europe has proposed using a carbon correction factor
(CCF) that treats biomethane as having a carbon content of zero, and then providing an emission
offset related to the percentage of biomethane distributed in a country. In the example provided
in the NGV Europe document, 10 percent displacement with biomethane equates to a CCF
discount of 10 percent that is applied to a vehicle's tailpipe emissions of C02. In the case of the
U.S., the CCF for 2022 would be 69 percent if the national average were used or 97 percent if the
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California average were used and credits were assigned based on state registration of motor
vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 13-14]
One limitation of this approach is the fact that if RNG levels go up in the future manufacturers
selling trucks today would not receive the full benefit of future increases, and thus the credit or
CCF used would underrepresent the benefit of their trucks. This could be addressed by
periodically revising the levels of RNG use projected to occur during a vehicle's lifetime and
using that level of displacement to offset emissions. EPA previously proposed a similar concept
for electric vehicles that would have based emissions on future EIA forecasts of renewable
electricity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 13-14]
(1) EPA should amend its greenhouse gas regulations for all types of vehicles including light-,
medium-, and heavy-duty motor vehicles and incorporate the well-to-wheel benefits of natural
gas and renewable natural gas as part of the engine and vehicle certification regulations; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
(2) EPA to the extent it incorporates other technology advancement credits in its vehicle
regulations should extend these incentives to natural gas and natural gas hybrid- electric vehicles
based on the demonstrated benefits of these vehicles and the need to accelerate the introduction
of a diverse mix of cleaner vehicle technologies; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
(3) EPA should provide enhanced SmartWay designations for trucks powered by low-NOx
engines and fueled by carbon-neutral or even carbon-negative renewable natural gas; [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
(4) Federal agencies should fund pilot programs and infrastructure development that
demonstrate the ways in which natural gas can be used to fuel a variety of different
transportation sectors by supporting the purchase of vehicles and equipment at multimodal
facilities such as ports and rail facilities; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
(5) Federal agencies should ensure that federal funding provided under the CMAQ Program
and the DERA Program and other programs enacted as part of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law
and Inflation Reduction Act are competitively awarded for projects that provide the most cost-
effective emission reductions and offer increased funding levels for engines and vehicles that are
certified to more demanding standards in advance of EPA's adoption of such standards; [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
(6) Federal agencies should work with state authorities to ensure that transportation policies
include performance metrics and consider a variety of different technologies as opposed to only
promoting specific technologies regardless of their cost; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp.
14-15]
(7) The Administration should work with Congress to amend the federal excise tax on new
trucks to reduce the impediment to fleets and businesses purchasing cleaner new trucks by either
eliminating the tax altogether since it discourages new purchases or amend the tax so that it does
not penalize more costly, lower polluting technologies (i.e., eliminate the excise tax on the
incremental cost). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0597, pp. 14-15]
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Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
NACAA supports ... lowering] the running loss standard from the current 0.05 gm/mi to the
ACC standard of 0.01 gm/mi.
Organization: National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)
NCGA also urges EPA to take steps to update the F-factor in the fuel economy formula to a
forward-looking F-factor of at least 0.2, as we outlined in 2020 comments in response to Docket
EPA-HQ-OAR-2020-0104. Furthermore, we urge EPA to reinstate the 0.15 volumetric
conversion factor for FFVs. EPA should reharmonize the 0.15 factor for FFVs in these standards,
and, if not, in future standards. This change would accurately reflect the significant carbon
emissions reductions from FFVs using E85 because the carbon emissions from the fuel are the
release of carbon taken up through crop growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 9]
As NCGA recommended to EPA in 2020 comments on Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0604,
actual tailpipe carbon emissions, regardless of the test fuel, must continue to be the only measure
of vehicle emissions performance in vehicle testing. C02 test adjustments would needlessly
complicate vehicle test procedures. Relying solely on test results eliminates uncertainty,
averaging and potential for inaccuracies in procedures to adjust emission test results for the fuel.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 10]
Lower GHG emissions from vehicles benefit consumers, our environment, and our energy
security. Just as updating the test fuel from E0 to E10 reduced GHG emissions by blending
cleaner, renewable ethanol with gasoline, El5 and future clean, high-octane fuels that blend
more ethanol will further reduce emissions and improve fuel economy when used with optimized
engines. Vehicle test procedures for Tier 3 fuel, or any future certification fuel, must not create
impediments to low carbon fuels such as El 5 and higher blends and the vehicle technologies that
help reach our mutual goal of lower GHG emissions. Stringency of the standards is best
maintained through the Administrator's authority to adjust the standards, as EPA is using in this
proposal, not by adjusting emission test results. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 10]
Update the F-factor in the fuel economy formula to a forward-looking F-factor of at least 0.2.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 10]
Reinstate the 0.15 volumetric conversion factor for FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643,
p. 10]
Organization: Pearson Fuels
h. Argonne National Laboratory has studied the lifecycle GHG emissions of ethanol
extensively and found an average carbon intensity reduction of 44- 52% compared to gasoline in
2019, and that this represented a 23% carbon intensity reduction between 2005 and 2019 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 13-14]
A study conducted by researchers at the U.S. Department of Energy's ("DOE") Argonne
National Laboratory ("Argonne") determined that corn ethanol is reducing its carbon footprint
and diminishing greenhouse gases as compared to gasoline. The study analyzed corn ethanol
production in the United States from 2005 to 2019, when production more than quadrupled.
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Scientists assessed corn ethanol's GHG emission intensity (also referred to as carbon intensity,
or CI) during that period and found a 23% reduction in CI.25 The study found that U.S. corn
ethanol has 44%-52% lower GHG emissions as compared to conventional gasoline. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 13-14]
25 Kathryn Jandeska, Argonne National Laboratory, "Corn ethanol reduces carbon footprint, greenhouse
gases," (May 24, 2021), at https://www.anl.gov/article/corn-ethanol-reduces-carbon-footprint-greenhouse-
gases. See also Valerie Sarisky-Reed, Director DOE Bioenergy Technologies Office, "Ethanol vs.
Petroleum-Based Fuel Carbon Emissions," (June 23, 2022), at
https://www.energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/articles/ethanol-vs-petroleum-based-fuel- carbon-emissions.
The time has come for EPA to revisit this decision based on several recent developments in
the international campaign to mitigate climate change [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 2]:
- the increasing lifecycle GHG reductions that modern U.S. ethanol provides as compared to
petroleum-based gasoline that now constitute a sound policy basis for the integration of a GHG
emissions factor,
- the significant and rapidly increasing GHG reductions that California has achieved by
leveraging its existing FFV fleet to rapidly scale E85 use,
- the potential of advanced feedstocks, carbon capture and sequestration and climate smart
agriculture to enable production of carbon neutral ethanol, and,
- the clear need to deploy strategies that can further decarbonize internal combustion engines
("ICE") given the long useful life and expensive costs of vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0577, p. 2]
With the support of EPA, California has instituted a comprehensive program to decarbonize
its economy to achieve 40% GHG reduction below 1990 levels by 2030, and to achieve carbon
neutrality by 2045. President Biden has announced similar goals for the nation and has
succeeded in passing sweeping laws including the Inflation Reduction Act to begin to achieve
these goals. Regarding FFVs, California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard ("LCFS") recognizes the
tremendous value of GHG reductions from biofuels as well as reductions achieved by battery
electric vehicles ("BEVs"). As a result, E85 use in California FFVs has been growing at an
average annual rate of 33% with a usage rate in FFVs of 16% in 2022. California's E85 use in
2022 grew over 65% and exceeded 100 million gallons, as determined by the California Air
Resources Board ("CARB"). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 2]
In the GHG rulemaking for model years ("MY") 2012-2016, EPA explained its decision to
phase down FFV crediting as attributable to the utility of the Renewable Fuel Standard program
("RFS2") as an effective upstream decarbonization policy.3 While RFS2 does recognize the life
cycle emissions reductions that ethanol and other low carbon fuels provide, RFS2 does not
provide any direct or indirect incentive for automakers to manufacture FFVs. To enable these
potential GHG emissions reductions, EPA must reintegrate FFV crediting into the GHG policy
framework at a level commensurate with the GHG reductions achieved. Specifically, EPA
should establish a GHG emissions factor for E85 utilized in FFVs that is derived from the most
recent determination of the carbon intensity of ethanol used in the United States, as determined
by Argonne National Laboratory's Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in
Technologies ("GREET") model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 2]
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3 See 75 FR 25434, "EPA recently finalized its RFS2 rulemaking which life cycle emissions from ethanol
and the upstream GHG benefits of E85 use are already captured by this program."
Given the current and future devastating impacts of climate change that EPA foretold in its
2009 Endangerment Finding, U.S. federal policy must immediately leverage the GHG reducing
benefits of all viable transportation fuels and technologies including FFVs that can utilize E85.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 2]
f. An analysis of the current scale and rate of growth of E85 in California establishes
that the use of E85 is a highly effective GHG reduction strategy that could be deployed nation-
wide to provide a new and annually expanding source of GHG reductions from ICE vehicles.
Utilizing the Argonne GREET lifecycle analysis of corn starch ethanol, the carbon intensity
of ethanol is 45 gC02e/MJ.16 This compares with a 100.82 gC02e/MJ carbon intensity for
California gasoline blendstock, and a 90 gC02e/MJ carbon intensity for E10.17 Thus, each
gallon of corn starch ethanol utilized in E85 provides approximately 55% GHG reduction
compared to California gasoline blendstock. Consistent with California regulations, E85
marketers in California supply at an actual blend rate of 83% ethanol with 17% California
gasoline blendstock such that a blended gallon of California E85 from corn starch ethanol has a
carbon intensity of 54.9 gC02e/MJ carbon intensity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 10-
11]
16 Lee, U., Kwon, H., Wu, M., Wang, M., Retrospective analysis of the U.S. corn ethanol industry for
2005-2019: implications for greenhouse gas emission reductions, Biofuels, Bioprod. Bioref. 15:1318-1331
(2021), at 1, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bbb.2225.
17 Rosenfeld, J., Kaffel, M., Lewandrowski, J. and Pape, D. The California low carbon fuel standard:
Incentivizing greenhouse gas mitigation in the ethanol industry. (2020).
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ CA- LCFS-Incentivizing-Ethanol-Industry-GHG-
Mitigation.pdf.
However, Pearson Fuels does not limit its supply to corn starch ethanol-based E85 blended
with gasoline. Instead, Pearson Fuels has pioneered the use of 100% renewable E-85 fuel into
the California marketplace as well as sourcing ethanol produced from cellulosic feedstocks.
Wherever possible, Pearson replaces the 17% gasoline blendstock for its E85 with renewable
naphtha. Thus the only remaining fossil-based product supplied is the de minimus portion of
denaturant. 18 Some of the renewable naphtha is produced by World Energy in its Paramount,
California facility that also produces renewable diesel and sustainable aviation fuel from a
variety of feedstocks including rendered animal fat. Pursuant to the California LCFS, World
Energy's renewable naphtha from rendered animal fat fuel pathway is certified at 25.08
gC02e/MJ.19 Utilizing the Argonne GREET CI score for the corn starch ethanol of 45g
gC02e/MJ and the CARB score of 25 gC02e/MJ for the renewable naphtha, Pearson Fuels' E85
provides approximately 60% GHG reduction as compared to California gasoline blendstock.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 10-11]
Pearson Fuels' E85/ renewable naphtha blend produced with cellulosic ethanol performs even
better in terms of GHG reduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 10-11]
18 Biomass Magazine, "Pearson Fuels blends ethanol, renewable naphtha into advanced E85," (October 23,
2019), at http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/16560/pearson-fuels-blends-ethanol-renewable-naphtha-
into-advanced-e85.
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19 California Air Resources Board, LCFS Pathway Certified Carbon Intensities access page at
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/lcfs-pathway-certified-carbon-intensities, download of Current
Fuel Pathways spreadsheet at
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/classic/fuels/lcfs/fuelpathways/current- pathways all.xlsx, see
pathway #B004503 (AltAir Paramount).
II. EPA SHOULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY IN THIS RULEMAKING TO
RECOGNIZE THE TRUE GHG POLICY VALUE OF FFVS BY RESTORING
MEANINGFUL GHG CREDITING FOR FFVs
We encourage the Agency to re-affirm the policy value of FFVs and American ethanol
production and use by restoring meaningful GHG crediting for the manufacture of FFVs by
modifying the methodology for determining GHG crediting for FFVs beginning MY 2027. EPA
has authority to better harmonize crediting between the GHG and CAFE standards and thereby
expand FFV manufacturing through two alternative means both of which are supported by
Pearson Fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 16]
a. EPA should re-integrate the methodology that continues to exist in the CAFE program
by re-establishing its use of the 0.15 multiplier in the EPA's GHG Standards, or,
b. EPA should establish a new GHG Emissions Factor for the GHG Standards that
recognizes the lifecycle emissions reductions of E85 as compared with conventional gasoline.
Crediting based on lifecycle GHG emissions reductions can be accomplished simply by
establishing a GHG Emissions Factor that is based on the average GHG emissions reduction
provided by ethanol as compared to petroleum gasoline on a lifecycle basis. This GHG
Emissions Factor would be subject to adjustment based on a determination by Argonne National
Laboratory regarding the average lifecycle emissions of U.S. used as a transportation fuel as
compared to the average lifecycle emissions of the U.S. gasoline used as a transportation fuel.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 16]
As previously noted, utilizing the Argonne GREET lifecycle analysis of corn starch ethanol,
the carbon intensity of ethanol is 45 gC02e/MJ.33 This compares with a 93 gC02e/MJ carbon
intensity for the U.S. average petroleum gasoline blendstock.34 Thus, utilizing only corn starch
ethanol as an example, the CI Reduction Factor would be 0.48. To date, there does not appear to
be a comprehensive analysis of the average CI of U.S. ethanol but the Alternative Fuels Data
Center states that 94% of ethanol produced in the U.S. is corn ethanol.35 For illustrative
purposes, if one were to assume that the other 6% share of U.S. ethanol consisted solely of
cellulosic ethanol with a carbon intensity score of 20 gC02e/MJ, that would reduce the average
CI score of U.S. ethanol to 44 gC02e/MJ. This would reduce the GHG Emissions Factor to 0.47,
and will be utilized for illustrative purposes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 16-17]
33 Lee, U., Kwon, H., Wu, M., Wang, M., Retrospective analysis of the U.S. corn ethanol industry for
2005-2019: implications for greenhouse gas emission reductions, Biofuels, Bioprod. Bioref. 15:1318-1331
(2021), at 1, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bbb.2225.
34 Id. at 1328.
35 U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Center, "Ethanol Fuel Basics," at
https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/ethanol_fuel_basics.html#:~:text=In%20the%20United%20States%2C%2094,
any%20r aw%20feedstock%20into%20ethanol.
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Pearson Fuels would request that EPA consider modifying the equation for measuring the
C02 emissions of FFVs for light-duty GHG program purposes as follows [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0577, pp. 16-17]:
C02 = (E85 Tailpipe GHG Emissions x F Factor x E85 GHG Emissions Factor) + [Gasoline
Tailpipe GHG Emissions x (1- F Factor)]
E85 GHG Emissions Factor (2021) = 0.47 (illustrative based on above parameters) [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 16-17]
Organization: Porsche Cars North America (PCNA)
Policy makers and the auto industry must also continue to find wins in other regulatory
programs. EPA's recently finalized Renewable Fuel Standard for 2023-2025 regrettably was
unable to finalize the innovative and robust proposal for "eRINs". This proposal that was
supported by Porsche could have opened the door for continued growth in electricity derived
from biogas and used transportation fuel and to further incentivize growth in the electric vehicle
market. Porsche appreciates the need for EPA to consider the wide range of input they received
on this proposal and will work proactively to support near-term regulatory actions to finalize this
valuable, supportive policy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0637, p. 3]
Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)
VII. If EPA Maintains its Zero Gram per Mile Incentive for EV Production, the Agency
Should Allow for a Similar Incentive for FFV Production
For the reasons described in detail above, RFA objects to the continued use of a 0 g/mile
compliance value for EVs for the purposes of calculating fleet averages. However, if EPA
ultimately finalizes a permanent incentive of 0 g/mile for EVs, then it must consider applying a
similar incentive for other low-carbon vehicle technologies, including FFVs that can operate on
E85 and other higher ethanol blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 12-13]
EPA's proposed approach for BEVs (i.e., using a value of 0 grams/mile) essentially assumes
every BEV produced by automakers will only use zero-carbon renewable electricity over the
entire lifespan of the vehicle. In other words, EPA's proposal credits all BEVs for their
maximum potential C02 benefit, without requiring any evidence that such a benefit is actually
achieved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 12-13]
In order to create an equitable opportunity for biofuels to contribute to the effort to
decarbonize light-duty transportation, EPA should institute a C02 emissions compliance value
that similarly recognizes the potential carbon benefits of light-duty vehicles designed to operate
on liquid fuels containing high levels of renewable ethanol. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602,
pp. 12-13]
EPA's final rule should adopt an assumption that FFVs operate on E85 all the time, just as the
proposed 0 g/mile value effectively assumes BEVs operate on zero-carbon electricity all the
time. Automakers who manufacture FFVs should be allowed to use a C02 emissions compliance
value that reflects the lifecycle C02 savings from using E85. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602,
pp. 12-13]
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According to the latest Argonne National Laboratory GREET model results, E85 made with
average corn ethanol reduces full lifecycle C02-equivalent GHG emissions by 31% per mile
compared to gasoline.29 This estimate includes hypothetical/potential emissions from direct and
indirect land use changes. Accordingly, for the purposes of calculating fleet averages, EPA
should allow automakers to use a C02 compliance value for an FFV that is 31% lower than the
compliance value for a corresponding non-FFV model. As an example, if a non-FFV car is
determined by the automaker to have a C02 value of 181 g/mile, the automaker should be
allowed to use a compliance value of 125 g/mile for an FFV version of that same car. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 12-13]
29 The GREET2022 model shows that EO gasoline results in fleet average full lifecycle GHG emissions of
421 g/mile, compared to fleet average emissions of 291 g/mile for the use of E85 in an FFV. Results
verified via personal communication between RFA and Longwen Ou of Argonne National Laboratory.
This approach to incentivizing FFVs would be no different than the approach EPA has used
historically, and is proposing to continue, for incentivizing EV production. This FFV mechanism
would create a more level playing field for low-carbon liquid fuels and would provide a
meaningful incentive for automakers to manufacture FFVs in addition to BEVs. Increased
production of FFVs would unlock increased use of lower-carbon liquid fuel blends containing
higher levels of ethanol, such as E85 and E30. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 12-13]
Alternatively, EPA could allow auto manufacturers to use the same 0 g/mile compliance value
for ethanol's portion of FFV operation, given that the ethanol-related "tailpipe" C02 emissions
from an FFV are biogenic in nature and fully offset by atmospheric C02 removal by the biomass
feedstock at the beginning of the lifecycle. That is, if EPA remains committed to focusing only
on tailpipe emissions (and ignoring upstream fuel production and supply chain emissions), then
biofuels like ethanol should be treated as "zero emissions" fuels because C02 emissions from the
vehicle are fully offset by C02 uptake by the feedstock. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp.
12-13]
Organization: Sandra Thomas
I applaud the new regulations on EV cars and trucks. However one essential thing is missing
for me. As a middle class person with low income I have no use for a $7500 tax credit - or any
tax credit. In order to owe that much in taxes a person has to be very wealthy, which excludes
most residents of the United States. Seven year ago when I paid off my current car, I continued
saving the payment amount and now I have enough saved to buy one of the cheaper EV's with
cash - but I will get no tax credit deduction if I do. So I am not buying an EV although I would
VERY much like to help our planet survive.
I hope that you would re-consider a refundable tax credit - or purchase credit, so that this
benefit extends to the average American. We want to do our part for the climate along side the
rifh, but the current policy makes that impossible. Please respond. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
5088]
Organization: South Coast Air Quality Management District
3. Set a minimum range for ZEVs. ACC II requires a minimum certification range of 200
miles for zero emission vehicles. This is to ensure that new ZEVs will provide useful EV miles
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to meet the everyday needs of consumers, which will lead to higher acceptance and uses, and
greater reductions of emissions from on-road vehicles. This range is also easily achievable with
technologies that are currently available. We concur with the need for a minimum range
requirement and recommend a similar range limit for the proposed rule. Setting a 200-mile range
minimum threshold will prevent manufacturers from producing ZEVs with limited ranges simply
for the sake of compliance with State and federal regulations, including the Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0659, p. 3]
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
Therefore, it is disappointing that EPA removed the e-RIN proposal from the RFS set rule as
it is one of the few measures for which EPA has direct authority to provide at least some level of
assistance in supporting the EV shares required in the GHG proposal. After a muti-year
collaboration with the auto industry, a valuable policy tool for establishing PEV markets and
promoting clean energy has been lost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0620, pp. 25-26]
Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
Many uncertainties remain that are critical to implementing the proposal. The impact of the
new separate Department of Energy proposal on the methodology for determining energy
consumption of an EV is pending. This creates uncertainty about the number of EVs that VCC
would need to sell prior to 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0624, p. 2]
Organization: Wisconsin Automobile and Truck Dealers Association
The EPA predicts unprecedented increases in non-hydro renewable energies. This is identified
as primarily wind and solar. Northern Wisconsin has vast expanses of trees and forests making
the non-hydro renewable energies debate the benefits of trees and forests versus the benefits
wind and solar. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0494, p. 2]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Commenters described various concerns and suggestions which were on topics that EPA did
not specifically propose or seek comment on in the light-duty and medium-duty vehicle proposal.
Response:
Comments describing additional incentives, other programs, and other considerations are
unrelated to anything we proposed or analyzed in developing the proposed rule, and we have
determined they are outside the scope of the rule.
28.1 - Directed to the heavy-duty Phase 3 proposal
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Comments by Organizations
Organization: Ceres Corporate Electric Vehicle Alliance (CEVA)
- Heavy-duty vehicle phase 3 GHG emissions standards that are at least as strong as those
proposed, but ideally are stronger to ensure at least 50% zero-emissions vehicle (ZEV) sales
across all market segments by 2032. California's Advanced Clean Trucks (ACT) rule,4
manufacturer commitments,5 and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) funding are all consistent
with such agoal.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, p. 1]
5 https ://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/hdv-phase3 -ghg-standards-benefits-apr23 .pdf
6 https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/ira-impact-evs-us-jan23-2.pdf
Heavy-Duty Vehicle Standards:
Similarly, strong heavy-duty vehicle standards that lead to 50% ZEV sales across all market
segments by 2032 will drive the electrification of the heavy-duty sector by building on the
momentum created by state regulations, manufacturers' commitments, and IRA and
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act funding. Taken together (in concert with modal shifts)
these actions will spur rapid decarbonization of the sector and ensure a diverse supply of ZEVs
that meets the needs of commercial fleets and carriers. 8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, p. 2]
8 https://www.atlasevhub.com/data_story/210-billion-of-announced-investments-in-electric-vehicle-
manufacturing-headed-for-the-u-
s/#:~:text=Vehicle%20manufacturers%20and%20battery%20makers,than%20in%20any%20other%20coun
try-
While medium- and heavy-duty trucks represent only 5% of vehicles on the road, their GHG
emissions represent 23% of the transportation sector's carbon footprint, which grew 75% over
the last three decades.9 They are also largely responsible for the harmful pollutant emissions
that disproportionally impact historically low-income and BIPOC communities located near fleet
depots, major transportation corridors, distribution centers, and ports. 10
In fact, the American Lung Association found that one in three Americans live in places with
unhealthy air pollution, largely due to transportation sector emissions. As such, vehicle
emissions standards serve as a crucial mechanism to protect public health and advance
environmental justice. 11 Further, with many major companies aiming to deploy 50-100%) zero-
emission trucks by 2030, EPA's proposed standards fail to stimulate the rate of commercial
electric truck production that commercial fleet operators seek. 12 By strengthening the proposed
Phase 3 standards to ensure at least 50% ZEV sales across all market segments by 2032, EPA
will accelerate the industry's necessary investments in heavy-duty ZEV manufacturing and the
accompanying investments in charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0511, pp. 2-3]
9 https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-04/US-GHG-Inventory-2023-Main-Text.pdf (p.2-35,
3-25)
10 BIPOC: Black, Indigenous, People of Color
11 https://www.lung.org/getmedia/338b0c3c-6bf8-480f-9e6e-b93868c6c476/SOTA-2023.pdf
12 https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/hdv-phase3-ghg-standards-benefits-apr23.pdf (p.i-19).
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Organization: GreenLatinos et al.
For Greenhouse gas (GHG) Phase 3 HDV standards, we urge the U.S. EPA to finalize the
strongest possible cleaner trucks standards. The standards must require tighter limits on diesel
vehicles, so that we're making diesel trucks increasingly cleaner as manufacturers transition to
zero pollution vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0789, p. 1 ]Organization: Mayor Becky
Daggett, City of Flagstaff, Arizona et al.
On behalf of the 52 undersigned local officials, we urge the EPA to protect the health of our
cities' residents and fight climate change by finalizing the strongest clean car and truck vehicle
emission standards before the end of 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
EPA should finalize the most stringent standards possible for the Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles (LDV) and
the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles Phase 3 (HDV).
We recommend these car and truck standards: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
Be aligned on rulemaking timelines; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
Account for technological advances and cost-savings in zero-emission technologies,
including those made possible by recent legislation; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
Achieve critically necessary reductions in greenhouse gases (GHGs) and other
pollutants; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
Be developed with thorough stakeholder involvement that ensures all affected
communities can engage in the rulemaking process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
Ambitious federal standards, coupled with actions we are taking in our cities and towns to
accelerate the use of clean vehicles, will enable our localities to more quickly cut transportation
pollution and help ensure our residents and businesses have access to zero-emission
technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0732, p. 1]
Organization: Senator Shelley Moore Capito et al.
In addition, there remains a lack of support infrastructure capacity to implement the sweeping
transition envisioned in these proposals, particularly for the heavy-duty vehicle category. While
the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act provides states funding for electric vehicle charging
infrastructure, charging technology and deployment continues to focus on passenger and
commercial vehicles, not on heavy-duty vehicles. The White House has noted that 72 percent of
goods in this country are moved by truck, placing the industry and the center of our critical
supply chains and economic competitiveness.5 Efficient and reliable charging infrastructure for
heavy-duty vehicles is essential for the sort of transition to electric trucks that the EPA has
proposed. However, the technology is nowhere near ready to meet the demand necessary to keep
our supply chain moving at the same rate it is today. Charging heavy-duty vehicles requires
significantly more expensive conduits and transformers, and consumes vastly more electricity,
than what is necessary for charging light- and medium-duty vehicles. Heavy-duty vehicle
charging takes longer and is required more frequently than liquid fueling due to electric trucks
having reduced range compared to conventional diesel vehicles. This proposal will result in
increased curb weight for heavy-duty vehicles due to the significant weight of batteries, leading
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to reduced payload capacity and ultimately more heavy-duty vehicles on our roadways to move
the same amount of freight. This shift may have highway safety implications and create
increased congestion on our nation's roadways. In short, the charging technology for heavy-duty
vehicles is not readily available and it will take many more years to develop and deploy if it is
even economically feasible, making compliance with the EPA's proposal for heavy-duty
vehicles unattainable for the foreseeable future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5083, p. 2]
5 The Biden-Harris Administration Trucking Action Plan to Strengthen America's Workforce, The
White House (Dec. 16, 2021).
Organization: South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR)
Public Safety
This past year South Dakota had a long, harsh winter. During the previous two winters the
South Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) maintenance crews covered about 1.4
million miles and used about 540,000 gallons of diesel fuel. This past winter, DOT totaled 3.2
million miles, used about one million gallons of fuel, and clocked approximately 178,000 man-
hours to keep our roads safe. DANR is concerned the proposed emissions standards and push to
heavy-duty vehicle EV use could significantly limit DOT's and South Dakota municipalities'
ability to keep our roads safe during winter conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0523, p. 2]
Organization: TCWInc.
We currently operate 320 day cab tractors in the southeast, with 434 drivers. So, we "slip-
seat" trucks, assigning a day shift and night shift driver in many trucks. With BEV's, we would
need down time to charge, so we would need to purchase an additional 114 trucks to provide a
tractor for every driver. Most of the freight we haul is international intermodal, with gross weight
ranging from 70,000 to 90,000. With current electric truck capacity, we would have a service
radius of 125 miles vs. a current radius of 250+ miles. Additional relay points would be required,
and with the 50% reduction in service radius, we would need twice the number of trucks to
service lanes that exist today. Electric trucks cost in excess of three times the amount we
currently pay for a new Peterbilt day cab. Those additional expenses would be passed along in
transportation expenses, astronomically impacting our already existing inflation issues related to
supply chain constraints. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0452, p. 1]
Organization: Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF)
The HD Tailpipe Rule Will Devastate Trucking
Former Supreme Court Justice Breyer stated in Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. 457
(2001), that the Clean Air Act "does not require the EPA to eliminate every health risk, however
slight, at any economic cost, however great, to the point of 'hurtling' industry over 'the brink of
ruin.'" Id. at 494. In the Whitman case the Supreme Court vacated the 1997 NAAQS because of
the poor science and lack of discernable criteria underlying them. Likewise here, no scientific
data requires the EPA to enact the most stringent tailpipe emission limits conceivable. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 4-5]
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Electric trucks typically have a higher upfront purchase price compared to traditional diesel
trucks. The HD Tailpipe Rule will effectively bar diesel trucks from sale, forcing trucking
companies seeking to replace their fleet to take on more costs to do so. This will strain the
financial resources of some companies, especially smaller ones. Shifting from diesel trucks to
electric ones will also require adapting to new technologies and training drivers to effectively
operate electric vehicles. This transition period will likely lead to disruptions in the supply chain
and additional costs — both temporal and monetary — for trucking companies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0510, pp.4-5]
Moreover, the availability of charging stations for electric trucks is currently poor and still
developing. It is certainly not as extensive as refueling stations for diesel trucks, and retrofitting
existing truck stops for electric charging will place immense strain on electrical infrastructure
and the national grid, especially in rural communities often frequented by truckers traveling the
nation's highways, causing prices to skyrocket for average Americans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0510, pp. 4-5]
The resulting chaos will limit the range and flexibility of electric trucks for long-haul
journeys. Electric trucks already have limited range compared to diesel trucks, particularly when
fully loaded. This will mean more frequent charging, adjustment to trucking routes, and overall
shipping delays, negatively affecting operational efficiency. And even if the myriad
infrastructure issues involved in getting power to truck refueling stations were solved or
mitigated, the electricity used to charge electric trucks would still primarily come from
America's most reliable and abundant power source: fossil fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0510, pp. 4-5]
In effect, the HD Tailpipe Rule will force truckers to spend substantial financial and human
resources to comply with ultra vires government regulations that fail to make even a marginal
dent in global issue of changing climate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0510, pp. 4-5]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Commenters provide ideas and observations related to the electrification of heavy-duty
vehicles and related issues such as charging infrastructure.
Response:
This rule is limited to light-duty and medium-duty vehicles. As a result, the comments related
to heavy-duty vehicles are outside the scope of this rule. Interested readers should refer to the
Agency's action, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles - Phase 3,
which can be found at https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-
engines/regulations-greenhouse-gas-emissions-commercial-trucks. Note that some of the
comments included in this section were also submitted to the docket for the heavy-duty vehicle
rulemaking (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985).
29 - Additional comments
The Agency has been, is, and will continue to be committed to considering timely comments
received on proposed rules. Although the comment period for this rule closed on July 5, 2023,
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EPA was able to also consider late comments received through December 15, 2023 for this final
action. Comments received that provide specific information and feedback about particular data
or assumptions used in EPA's analysis supporting the proposal or other aspects of the program
and that were received after the end of the comment period through August 27, 2024, are
included in the various sections of this RTC document. Additional comments received after that
date and up to December 15, 2023, and that provide detailed information are included in this
section. Comments received after the close of the comment period that express general support
for or opposition to the proposal and/or contain opinions or statements about issues but without
detailed data, information, or comment relating to specific provisions of the proposal or EPA's
supporting analysis are not included in this RTC document. In the interest of transparency, we
have included all comments we received after the close of the comment period in the docket;
however, we were not able to consider comments received after December 15, 2023 and do not
consider them part of the administrative record for this rulemaking.
List of Additional Comments
Index
Document
Number
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5106
AESI et al.
2
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5085
Alliance for Automotive Innovation
3
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5107
American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce
4
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5087
Center for Biological Diversity et al.
5
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5084
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
6
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5116
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
7
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5118
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
8
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5119
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
9
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5102
Hyundai Motor America
10
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5100
Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
Organization: AESI et al.
The 29 undersigned organizations write to express our strong support for the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) proposal to strengthen standards for harmful particulate matter (PM)
emissions within the Agency's proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Year
2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29184 (May 5, 2023).
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Many of our organizations previously submitted comments to EPA in support of the
multipollutant standards during the open comment period of the proposed rulemaking. Finalizing
strong PM standards that drive the deployment of off the shelf, low-cost gasoline particulate
filters (GPFs) will save lives and reduce asthma attacks and cancer risk, all while saving our
nation billions of dollars in avoided healthcare costs.
Exposure to PM can affect both the lungs and the heart. Numerous peer-reviewed scientific
studies have linked particle pollution exposure to significant heath harms, including premature
death in people with heart or lung disease, nonfatal heart attacks, aggravated asthma, decreased
lung function, and increased respiratory symptoms. 1 People with heart or lung diseases, children,
and older adults are especially vulnerable to particle pollution exposure.
1 https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/health-and-environmental-effects-particulate-matter-pm
Strong standards will also protect vulnerable communities. People of color in the United
States are exposed to disproportionately high levels of ambient PM pollution, including from
motor vehicle emissions. One study finds that on a national level, people of color are exposed to
46 percent more ambient PM2.5 from light-duty gasoline vehicles than white people.2
2 Tessum, C et al. (2021). PM2.5 Polluters Disproportionately and Systemically Affect People of Color in
the United States, Science Advances 7, no. 18: eabf4491, https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abf4491.
EPA's proposed PM limit of 0.5 mg/mile would greatly reduce particulate emissions from
new gasoline vehicles. These proposed standards are critical as there is growing evidence of
increases in particulate emissions from recent model year gasoline vehicles. A June 2023 ICCT
analysis looking at remote sensing data shows that recent model year light-duty vehicles (2015-
2020) show a marked increase in UV smoke, a proxy for particulates, while other pollutants, like
carbon monoxide and ozone-forming nitrogen oxides, showed clear and consistent downwards
trends.3 The issue of elevated particulate emissions from some gasoline vehicles and the need for
more protective PM standards was identified before EPA finalized its Tier 3 standards nearly a
decade ago.4
3 Meyer, M., Khan, T., Dallmann, T., Yang, Z. Particulate matter emissions from U.S. gasoline light-duty
vehicles and trucks: TRUE Initiative U.S. remote sensing database case study. ICCT, June 2023.
https://theicct.org/publication/true-pm-emissions-jun23/
4 Gladstein, Neandross & Associates. (2013). Ultrafine Particulate Matter and the Benefits of Reducing
Particle Numbers in the United States.
https://cdn.gladstein.org/pdfs/MECA_UFP_White_Paper_0713_Final.pdf.
EPA states that the strengthened PM emissions limit will likely be met through the installation
of gasoline particulate filters (GPFs). 5 GPFs are a mature technology and studies have
demonstrated they can reduce particulate emissions by 97% to 100% compared to vehicles
without filters.6 According to EPA they have been used in series production on new gasoline
vehicles in Europe since 2017 and are now being used by U.S., European, and Asian
manufacturers, with several manufacturers currently assembling vehicles equipped with GPFs in
the U.S. for export to other markets.7 GPFs are also cost-effective devices - EPA estimates per
vehicle manufacturing costs of $51—$166.8 Other independent studies conducted over a decade
ago found similar GPF costs of $50-$ 184, indicating that current costs could be significantly
lower. 9
5 88 Fed. Reg. at 29264 (May 5, 2023).
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6 Felix Leach et al. (2021). A Review and Perspective on Particulate Matter Indices Linking Fuel
Composition to Particulate Emissions from Gasoline Engines," SAE International Journal of Fuels and
Lubricants 15, no. 1: 3-28, https://doi.org/10.4271/04-15-01-0001; Jiacheng Yangetal. (2018). Gasoline
Particulate Filters as an Effective Tool to Reduce Particulate and Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon
Emissions from Gasoline Direct Injection (GDI) Vehicles: A Case Study with Two GDI Vehicles.
Environmental Science & Technology 52, no. 5: 3275-84. https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.7b05641
7 88 Fed. Reg. at 29268 (May 5, 2023); See also MECA presentation to OMB, March 6, 2023 (showing
that
U.S.-manufactured models (Ford Mustang and Jeep Grand Cherokee) that are exported to Europe and
China have GPFs installed).
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoDownloadDocument?pubId=&eodoc=true&documentID=210843
8 88 Fed. Reg. at 29270 (May 5, 2023).
9 Minjares, R and Posada Sanchez, F. (2011). Estimated cost of gasoline particulate filters. International
Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.org/publication/estimated-cost-of-gasoline-particulate-
filters/; Steininger. (2011). Particle number emission limits for Euro 6 positive ignition vehicles.
https://www.nanoparticles.ch/archive/201 l_Steininger_PR.pdf
A June 2023 report from the Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA) found
tremendous health benefits of GPFs, even with significant deployment of zero-emission vehicles
projected by EPA. 10 According to the analysis, the health benefits of more protective PM
standards would effectively double the benefit of electrification alone. The cumulative benefits
of standards that drive more GPF use in the combustion vehicle fleet through 2050 include:
• 58,000 to 112,000 tons of particulate matter emissions eliminated;
• 42,000 to 81,000 tons of climate-forcing black carbon emissions eliminated;
• $18 to $163 billion in healthcare cost savings;
• Up to 22,000 premature deaths prevented; and
• Up to 314,000 asthma attacks avoided.
10 MECA Clean Mobility. Impacts Analysis of a Revised Federal Light-Duty On-Road Particulate Matter
Standard. June 2023, https://www.meca.org/wp-
content/uploads/2023/06/LDV_PM_Standard_Final_Report_06272023.pdf. See also MECA presentation to
OMB, March 6, 2023.
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoDownloadDocument?pubId=&eodoc=true&documentID=210843
By finalizing the proposed standards, EPA will bring the U.S. in line with other major vehicle
markets. According to MECA, by 2023, four years ahead of EPA's proposed particulate standard
implementation, two-thirds of the automotive manufacturing markets, including Europe, India
and China, will be meeting tighter PM emission standards similar to those now proposed by
EPA. 11
11 Id.
EPA's proposed updated standard would provide cost-effective and much needed health
benefits through reduced particulate matter emissions. We urge the Administration to finalize its
Multi- Pollutant Emissions Standards, including the strong health-protecting particulate
standards, without delay. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5106]
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Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation submitted comments to EPA on the subject
rulemaking. 1 In those previous comments we noted concerns with the availability of adequate
critical mineral supplies to support the market share of electric vehicles that would effectively be
required under EPA's proposed light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas and criteria pollutant
regulations, particularly given global demand for such materials. We now bring to EPA's
attention recently updated analysis from Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (BMI) on lithium
supplies in the context of automaker production goals and global regulatory policies. Please
consider this a supplemental comment on the proposed rule and update to the section in our
comments that compared an earlier BMI study with EPA's projected lithium ion battery cell
demand to its proposed standards,2 and place this letter in the rulemaking docket.
1 See Alliance for Automotive Innovation Comments, available at Docket Id No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701.
2 Id. at pp. 10-16.
In an article titled "Lithium industry needs over $116 billion to meet automaker and policy
targets by 2030",3 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (BMI) describes its analysis of lithium
needs to meet its "high case" demand under vehicle electrification targets set by automakers and
governments across the world, including a 50% electric vehicle share in the United States by
2030. BMI raises the following points that we feel are potentially informative to the subject
rulemaking.
3 Benchmark Source, "Lithium industry needs over $116 billion to meet automaker and policy targets by
2030" (August 4, 2023). Available at https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/lithium-industry-needs-
over-116-billion-to-meet- automaker-and-policy-targets-by-2030 by subscription.
"The lithium industry needs to invest $116 billion by 2030 if the world is to meet the
ambitions targets set by governments and the largest automakers.
"Even if every asset in the pipeline came online on time and hit their projected lithium
production capacities, the world would still need 1.8 million tonnes on top of that to meet
the high case demand."
"The high case scenario, which encompasses data from Rho Motion on automakers'
passenger EV targets as well as data from the International Energy Agency on enacted
country-level policies, would require 5.3 million tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent
(LCE). This is compared to the 915,000 tonnes LCE production in operation today."
According to a BMI analyst, "It's almost impossible, and definitely a race against time . .
. The players with skin in the game are the least likely to rush their spending . . . They
don't want to flood the market with lithium too quickly. They want to release it slowly to
maximise their return ... As a carmaker, consumer, or EV policy maker, should I be
alarmed? Yes."
The article described above is available by subscription. Much of the content of that article
may also be obtained from Green Car Congress.4
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4 Green Car Congress, "Benchmark: Lithium industry needs more than $116 billion to meet automaker and
policy targets by 2030" (August 5, 2023). Available at
https://www.greencarcongress.com/2023/08/20230805-benchmark.html.
EPA projects that its proposed light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas standards will be met with a
60% battery electric vehicle market share in 2030,5 10 percentage points higher than the "high
case" demand scenario examined by BMI (which includes PHEVs), and beyond the goals of
President Biden's Executive Order 14037.6 EPA's proposal also projects that BEV sales will
continue to grow to 67% by 2032. As detailed in our original comments, the proposed
greenhouse gas targets far exceed the capabilities of internal combustion engine vehicles.7
Therefore, failing to achieve the EPA-projected BEV market share, whether due to battery
material availability or other issues, will have serious consequences for automakers and
consumers alike. Data such as that highlighted above casts serious doubts on the feasibility of
EPA's proposed rule and is significantly different from assumptions EPA made in its proposal.
EPA should take a deeper look into these supply chain challenges, including on-going efforts by
other federal agencies responsible for carrying out President Biden's Executive Order 14037
pertaining to vulnerabilities in our nation's critical mineral and battery supply chains. EPA needs
to address these significant shortcomings as it develops a final rule, rely on data from respected
expert analysts such as Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, and use this data in reassessing the
feasibility of the proposed greenhouse gas standards.
5 88 Fed. Reg. 29333 (May 5, 2023), Table 99.
6 We also note that EPA's projections are premised on only battery electric vehicles, excluding plug-in
hybrids, whereas Executive Order 10437 was inclusive of battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, and fuel
cell electric vehicles.
7 See comments of the Alliance for Automotive Innovation at Regulations.gov, Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, at 90.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5085]
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce
This letter supplements the American Free Enterprise Chamber of Com- merce ("AmFree")
July 5, 2023 comment on EPA's notice of proposed rule- making "Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles," 88 Fed.
Reg. 29,184 (May 5, 2023).
Since our previous comment, there have been several developments that affect the validity of
the proposed rule's estimate of compliance costs. Of note is Toyota's announcement that Model
Year 2025 and later Camrys—the best- selling passenger car in the United States—will be
exclusively hybrids. Joseph White, Toyota's Camry, best-selling car in US, goes all-hybrid,
Reuters (Nov. 15, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/toyotas- camry-
best-selling-car-us-goes-all-hybrid-2023-11-15. David Christ, the head of the Toyota brand in
North America, explained that the decision to move to an all-hybrid vehicle line, dropping four-
and six-cylinder combustion models that made up about 85% of sales in the current model year
was motivated primarily by the need to comply with tougher U.S. fuel economy rules. Id. And
because "any rule that limits tailpipe [greenhouse gas] emissions is effectively identical to a rule
that limits fuel consumption," they presumably had EPA's proposal in mind as well. Delta
Constr. Co. v. EPA, 783 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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But this isn't a cost-free shift: the cheapest Camry hybrid model currently sells for about
$2,400 more than the most inexpensive combustion Camry. Toyota Camry, Toyota,
https://www.toyota.com/camry/ (last accessed Nov. 20, 2023) (showing the Camry LE Hybrid
costing $2,435 than its conventional counterpart, the Camry SE Hybrid costing $2,430 more than
its conventional counterpart, and the Camry XLE costing $2,575 more than its conventional
counterpart.).
As discussed in our previous comments, Section 202(a) requires EPA to consider whether
compliance with the proposed emissions standards is feasible, giving appropriate consideration
to the cost of compliance. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7521(a)(2) ("Any regulation prescribed . . . shall take effect after such period as the
Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of com- pliance within such period.").
The agency must explain why its projections are "reasonable]" and defend "its methodology for
arriving at numerical esti- mates." Id.
In undertaking this task, EPA implausibly calculates that achieving its in- credibly aggressive
greenhouse gas standards will raise the average cost of pas- senger cars by only $844 per vehicle
in 2032, as compared to the no-action al- ternative, and that Toyota's new vehicles are projected
to be hundreds of dollars cheaper than in the no-action alternative in Model Years 2027 through
2030. DRIA at 13-26. As we emphasized in our initial comments, these numbers were highly
implausible when EPA calculated them. Now, just six months later, they have already been
proved incorrect.
As our initial comments explained, EPA's vehicle cost estimates are flawed in many ways,
and failing to account for these costs violates the agency's stat- utory obligations and at the very
least renders the rule arbitrary and capricious. Because of these errors, EPA's proposed standards
must be withdrawn. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5107]
Organization: Center for Biological Diversity et al.
Center for Biological Diversity, Clean Air Task Force, Environmental Law & Policy Center,
National Parks Conservation Association, Public Citizen, and Sierra Club respectfully submit
these comments in response to the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Proposed Rule
titled Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles—Phase 3, 88 Fed. Reg.
25926 (Apr. 27, 2023). As additional support for a strong final rule, we are providing EPA with
important materials that were published after the close of the comment period:
1. Attachment 1: Electric Power Research Institute, EVs2Scale2030 Program
Overview,
https://publicdownload.epri.com/PublicAttachmentDownload.svc/AttachmentId
% 31)84807
a. EVs2Scale is a data-driven, multi-stakeholder initiative to help prepare
the electric grid for expanded deployment of EV charging infrastructure,
including for heavy-duty vehicles. Participants include fleet operators,
truck manufacturers, electric utilities, charging infrastructure providers,
government institutions, and national laboratories. Among other
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projects, the initiative will provide a secure data exchange platform to
help utilities efficiently plan grid investments, and will identify location-
specific EV loads, grid impacts, lead times, workforce needs, and costs
across the 50 states,
b. Further information on EVs2Scale2030 is available
at https://msites.epri.com/evs2scale2030.
2. Attachment 2: Calstart, Phasing in U.S. Charging Infrastructure (Aug. 22, 2023),
https://calstart.Org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Phasing-in-U.S.-infrastructure-
bri ef-082223.pdf
a. This report presents a model and roadmap for a geographically-
targeted, phased approach to heavy-duty charging infrastructure
buildout, showing that the charging needs of those vehicles (in
volumes even higher than associated with the Phase 3 proposal) can be
met feasibly and
cost-effectively.
We urge the Agency to consider these materials and include them in the record for this
rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5087]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF)
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) respectfully submits the attached report, "U.S. Electric
Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs: Characterizing the Impacts of the Inflation
Reduction Act after 12 Months," as supplemental comments on EPA's Proposed Rule, Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29184 (May 5, 2023), and on EPA's Proposed Rule, Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 25926 (April 27, 2023). The
attached analysis, released by EDF and WSP in August 2023, focuses on the impacts of the
Inflation Reduction Act in dramatically accelerating U.S. investments in EV manufacturing and
job growth.
The analysis finds:
Investments in the EV manufacturing ecosystem over the last eight years total more
than $165 billion with 56% of that investment occurring since the passage of the IRA.
These investments support 179,000 direct jobs and are expected to create more than
800,000 additional jobs in the broader economy.
By 2026, U.S. manufacturing facilities will be able to make 4.7 million new EVs
annually (36% of new vehicles sold last year) and by 2027, enough batteries to supply
12.1 million new passenger vehicles (95% of new vehicles sold last year).
[Two PowerPoint attachments:
• U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs Characterizing the Impacts of
the Inflation Reduction Act after 1 Year August 2023
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• EDF Meeting on EPA's Proposed Multipollutant Standards for New Light-, Medium-,
and Heavy-Duty Vehicles, August 23, 2023]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5084]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
Environmental Defense Fund submits the following information for inclusion in the docket
for EPA's Proposed Rule, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later
Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29184 (May 5, 2023).
On Friday, October 20, the Colorado Air Quality Control Commission voted unanimously to
adopt the Advanced Clean Car II (ACCII) standards - second-generation safeguards that will
expand sales of new zero-emitting cars and passenger trucks in Colorado. The standards will be
implemented beginning in 2027 and run through 2032. During that time, the standards will
require increasing sales of new zero-emitting vehicles and will strengthen protections against
emissions from internal combustion engine vehicles. Under the new standards, 82% of new
passenger vehicles sold in Colorado will be zero-emission in 2032.
The Colorado Air Quality Control Commission also voted to require a state agency to bring a
proposal no later than July 31, 2029 for the Commission to consider extending the standards
through 2035. Colorado joins eight other states that have now adopted the Advanced Clean Car
II standards - California, Maryland, Vermont, Washington, Oregon, Massachusetts, Virginia,
and New York - and becomes the first state in the Mountain West to adopt them. New Mexico
and Connecticut are among the states now considering adopting the standards.
The standards will expand consumer choice in the state, furthering current trends. Colorado
saw a 55% increase in electric vehicle sales between 2021 and 2022. New data released by the
Colorado Automobile Dealers Association shows that the YTD market share of electric vehicles
(BEV + PHEV) in the state is 14.5%, up from 10.1% this time last year, and a record 17.1% of
total vehicle purchases were electric the last full quarter of 2023. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
5116]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
We wanted to share an analysis EDF did on alternative pathways OEMs could use to comply
with the LD proposed standards using a low level of or no BEVs. We have also submitted this
document to the docket.
The analysis finds that EPA's proposed LD standards can be met with zero BEVs and still
result in significant net benefits ($770B-$900B). The analysis also looks at compliance pathways
with low-BEV baselines ranging from 7% (roughly today's BEV sales) to 40% (EPA's No
Action Case BEV sales in 2032). We find no additional BEVs are needed to comply with the
standards and these compliance pathways result in significant net benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5118]
[Attached study:]
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Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) respectfully submits supplemental comments on EPA's
Proposed Rule, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-
Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29184 (May 5, 2023) ("Proposal" or "Proposed
Standards"). Since the close of the comment period, EDF evaluated additional alternative
technology pathways for manufacturers to meet the Proposed Standards. Our analysis reinforces
and expands on findings submitted in our earlier comments and concludes that there are
numerous additional pathways that are technologically feasible and cost beneficial even in
counterfactual scenarios of very low and no baseline deployment of battery electric vehicles
(BEVs). The analysis underscores the technology neutrality of the standards and further
demonstrates that there is no single technology necessary to meet the standards (though certainly
not a requirement for standards established under section 202 of the Clean Air Act).
EPA has long established performance-based light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas standards that
allow manufacturers to comply with a range of emissions-improving technologies. The Proposed
Standards are no exception - they are performance-based and can be met using a range of
internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV) improvements and/or electrification technologies.
In our comments submitted on July 5, 2023, EDF evaluated 3 pathways - in addition to those
that EPA modeled - to demonstrate that EPA's proposed standards can be met with a range of
technologies, including battery BEVs, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and ICEV
improvements.1 EDF contracted with Roush to project the relative cost of PHEVs and BEVs in
the 2024-2035 timeframe.2 EDF then used Roush's cost projections for PHEVs in conjunction
with EPA's costs for BEVs and ICEVs to conduct an analysis of compliance costs under possible
scenarios in which PHEV and ICEV sales represent a greater proportional share of
manufacturers' sales than EPA modeled while still meeting the emissions targets set in EPA's
Proposal. The original alternative pathways EDF modeled included:
Pathway 1 (ICEV Pathway): assumed the greatest possible GHG control from ICEVs
using EPA's OMEGA 2 model; assumed no PHEV technologies
Pathway 2: set PHEV and BEV sales to roughly equivalent levels leaving ICEV
emissions at the level projected in EPA's compliance simulation of its Proposed
Standards
Pathway 3: held ICEV sales at the level found in Pathway 2; increased PHEV sales
further than Pathway 2 by maximizing ICEV emission controls as in Pathway 1
1 Comments of the Environmental Defense Fund, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786,
https://www.regulations.gOv/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0786.
2 Vishnu Nair, Himanshu Saxena, Sajit Pillai, Alternative Powertrain Pathways for Light-Duty and Class 3
Vehicles for MYs 2024, 2027, and 2035 to Meet Future C02 Emission Targets, Roush for EDF (June
2023).
Each of these pathways provided a viable example of compliance pathways automakers could
choose to take—one relatively more reliant on ICEVs, one more so on PHEV controls and the
third on both—all of which demonstrating the flexibility afforded manufacturers to cost-
effectively reduce emissions using a mix of technologies with lesser reliance on BEV sales than
was shown in EPA's cost-minimizing modeling.
3508
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Since our original analysis and comment submission, some stakeholders have asserted or
implied that the Proposed Standards could not be met without significant BEV sales.3 EDF has
performed a follow-up detailed analysis, set forth below, assessing additional pathways to
compliance through fuller reliance on PHEVs, hybrids, and ICE efficiency improvements with
zero to moderate levels of battery electric vehicles (BEVs). Our analysis concludes that EPA's
proposed standards can be met with varying levels of technology and that no particular
technology is required - in whole or in part - to meet the fleet-average standards. This is true
even in exceedingly unrealistic low- and no-BEV baseline scenarios. Our analysis also finds that
even a zero-BEV pathway would result in significant net benefits, and as BEV sales increase so
do the net benefits.
3 See, e.g., Comments of the Alliance for Automotive Innovation at i-ii, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701,
https://www.regulations.gOv/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701; Comments of the Kentucky Office
of the Attorney General et al. at 4, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0649,
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ- OAR-2022-0829-0649; Comments of Valero Energy
Corporation at 65, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0451, https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707.
Analysis: Feasibility of low- to zero-BEV pathways
This analysis investigates manufacturers' ability to comply with EPA's standards with fewer
BEVs compared to EPA projections or even no BEVs at all, substituting further ICEV emissions
control and PHEVs compared to our previous pathways analysis. Starting with four different
levels of BEV sales, we evaluate the PHEV sales required to comply with the standards under
two levels of ICEV emissions control—a MY2022 average level of control as estimated by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in its recent proposed rule,4 and an
advanced level of emissions control for a vehicle powered entirely by gasoline. This analysis
included calculations for two model years, MY2027 and MY2032. The different levels of BEVs
included are 0% BEVs, 7% BEVs - roughly the share of BEV sales in the US today, 17% BEVs
- EPA's projection in the final rulemaking for its MY 2023-2026 standards, and finally the level
of BEV sales projected under the current EPA Proposal No Action Case, 27% in 2027 and 40%
in 2032. In all the scenarios presented below, no additional BEVs are deployed beyond the
above-stated baseline sales levels.
4 Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Passenger Cars and Light Trucks for Model Years 2027-
2032 and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Heavy-Duty Pickup Trucks and Vans for Model Years 2030-2035,
88 Fed. Reg. 56128 (August 17, 2023).
MY2022 ICEV Technology Scenario:
The MY2022 ICEV control scenario reflects the ICEV performance of the current fleet. In its
modeling for the Proposal, EPA projected that minimal ICEV improvement would occur and
compliance with vehicle emission standards would be mostly achieved using BEVs. As a result,
MY2022 ICEVs are consistent with all the ICEVs used in EPA's modeling for MY2027 through
MY2032. For reasons described below, we decided to use the level of MY2022 vehicle
emissions as estimated by NHTSA and obtained from the CAFE Compliance and Effects Model
(CCEM) used in NHTSA's recent proposed rule.5 Over half of these vehicles had advanced
engines (turbocharged, with cylinder deactivation, or high compression ratio). Nearly half had
transmissions with more than 8 speeds or continuously variable. Just under 7% and 2% were
strong hybrids or PHEVs.
3509
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5 We did not use EPA's OMEGA 2 model to estimate the emission impact of advanced ICEV emission
control technology because the OMEGA 2 model does not include P2 strong hybrid technology.
Advanced ICEV Technology Scenario:
We also evaluated an advanced level of emission reductions available from ICEV
technologies, which includes nearly complete conversion to strong hybrid technology and is also
taken from a CCEM run. EDF conducted a run of CCEM in which BEV and PHEV technologies
were strictly limited resulting in all ICEV emission control technology available in the model
being applied, converting 94% of ICEV sales to strong hybrids. The use of the CCEM to estimate
the benefit of ICEV technology necessitated the use of 2022 MY emissions from the CCEM to
maintain technical consistency. These strong hybrids include advanced engines, high or
continuously variable transmissions and additional weight reduction in glider mass. Fleetwide,
the application of all ICEV technologies present in CCEM has a significant impact on emission
reductions, reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions for passenger cars by 30% and light trucks
by 28% compared to MY 2022 ICEV control levels. Together, the two ICEV control scenarios
are intended to bookend the realistic and feasible emissions from ICEVs in the near term.
Methodology and Assumptions
In this analysis we assume PHEVs to have an onroad range of 50 miles. Per EPA's Proposal,
PHEV50s have a utility factor of 0.68.6 PHEVs also must have a minimum range over the two-
cycle test of 70 miles (equivalent to an onroad range of 50 miles) to qualify as ZEVs under
California's Advanced Clean Cars II program. Therefore, we assumed that a manufacturer
intending to comply with EPA's proposed standards using PHEVs would aim for an onroad
range of roughly 50 miles.7 PHEV50s are assumed to have the same C02 emissions as an ICEV
with advanced emissions control technology when they are operating on gasoline.
6 Fed. Reg. 88 at 29441 (May 5, 2023), Tables 1 and 2.
7 Even those PHEVs sold outside of California and the states that have adopted California's ACC2 program.
We separate new vehicle sales into their two regulatory classes - cars and light trucks - and
apply ICEV technology and conversion to PHEV and BEV technology proportionately to both
vehicle classes.8 In this portion of our analysis, we focus on compliance with EPA's standards in
MYs 2027 and 2032, the first and last model years covered under the Proposed Rule.
8 While EPA allows unrestricted trading of C02 credits from one category to the other, their emissions need
to be tracked separately due to differences in assumed lifetime mileages.
Manufacturer sales projections for MY 2027 and 2032 are available from both EPA's and
NHTSA's modeling supporting their respective proposed rules. We use EPA's sales projections
for each manufacturer's total sales of cars and light trucks to maintain consistency with the focus
on compliance with EPA's emission standards.
Manufacturer-specific compliance with EPA's proposed CO2 standards is accomplished with
a spreadsheet model. Neither OMEGA 2 nor the CAFE model are designed to allow the user to
specify the mix of technology to be applied as an input to the model. This model is very accurate
in projecting compliance in MY 2032 with a BEV-heavy strategy.9
3510
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9 The model indicates that BEV sales in 2032, assuming 2022 ICEV technology, would need to be 66%.
EPA, using OMEGA 2, projected BEV sales of 67% to meet the proposed standards with 1% strong hybrid
sales (i.e., ICEV emissions essentially consistent with the 2022 ICEV fleet).
Results
The first two tables below show the level of PHEV sales in 2027 that would be required to
meet EPA's proposed standards given various levels of assumed BEV baseline penetration and
the two ICEV technology scenarios described above (2022 ICEV technology and advanced
ICEV control). Table 1 assumes ICEVs with 2022-levels of emission control technology, while
Table 2 assumes advanced application of technology to ICEVs, including strong hybridization.
Our analysis shows that there are many feasible pathways to compliance and no particular
technology is required to meet the standards. Column one in both tables shows that meeting the
proposed standards in 2027 with baseline BEV sales at 0% would require the incremental sale of
36% to 61% PHEVs on a fleetwide basis, depending on the level of ICEV control technology
applied. At a 7% BEVs baseline sales rate, only a quarter to a half of all sales would need to be
PHEVs to meet the proposed 2027 vehicle standards. And assuming BEV sales of 17%,
manufacturers could meet the proposed 2027 vehicle standards with PHEV sales of 11-39%.
Finally, our analysis shows that if BEV sales reach 27% in 2027, then manufacturers would
only need to sell 3% PHEVs if they choose to adopt advanced control technology on all ICEVs
and a quarter PHEVs if they do not. We recognize that 0% and 7% baseline ZEV sales are either
counterfactual (0%) or overly pessimistic (7%) given the current rate of ZEV sales and their
upwards trend. In our earlier comments to EPA, EDF included an analysis that indicates EPA's
projection of high BEV adoption over the next decade is justified and likely an underestimate
greatly lessening the likelihood that any of the low-BEV scenarios would occur.10 We have
nonetheless included them to demonstrate that the same conclusions that no additional BEV sales
are required to meet the standards hold under the full range of possible assumptions regarding
baseline ZEV deployment, including for lower assumed baseline levels that are not reasonably
likely to occur.
10 See supra fn 1.
Table 1: PHEV Sales Enabling Compliance with EPA's 2027 Emission Standards at Four Baseline
Levels of BEV Sales and 2022 ICEV Technology
MY 2022 ICEV Technology
0% BEVs
7% BEVs
17% BEVs
27% BEVs
Fleet
61%
52%
39%
26%
BMW
67%
58%
45%
32%
Mercedes-Benz
67%
58%
45%
32%
Stellantis
68%
59%
47%
34%
Ford
63%
54%
41%
28%
GM
64%
55%
42%
29%
3511
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Honda
57%
48%
34%
21%
Hyundai
52%
43%
30%
17%
Kia
57%
48%
36%
23%
JLR
69%
60%
47%
34%
Mazda
56%
47%
35%
22%
Mitsubishi
56%
48%
35%
23%
Nissan
56%
47%
34%
22%
Subaru
57%
49%
36%
23%
Toyota
56%
47%
34%
21%
Volvo
62%
53%
40%
27%
VWA
65%
56%
43%
30%
Table 2: PHEV Sales Enabling Compliance with EPA's 2027 Emission Standards at Four Baseline
Levels of BEV Sales and Advanced ICEV technology
Advanced ICEV Technology
0% BEVs
7% BEVs
17% BEVs
27% BEVs
Fleet
36%
26%
11%
3%
BMW
49%
38%
24%
9%
Mercedes-Benz
53%
42%
28%
13%
Stellantis
46%
35%
21%
6%
Ford
42%
32%
17%
2%
GM
46%
35%
21%
6%
Honda
33%
23%
8%
0%
Hyundai
23%
13%
0%
0%
Kia
27%
17%
2%
0%
JLR
52%
41%
27%
12%
Mazda
24%
14%
0%
0%
Mitsubishi
16%
5%
0%
0%
Nissan
26%
16%
1%
0%
Subaru
24%
14%
0%
0%
Toyota
26%
16%
1%
0%
Volvo
38%
28%
13%
0%
VWA
42%
32%
17%
2%
Tables 3 and 4 below show the level of PHEV sales that would be required to meet EPA's
proposed standards in 2032 at varying levels of baseline BEV sales and ICEV technology
3512
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adoption. The tables show that on average, manufacturers could meet the proposed 2032
standards by selling zero BEVs if they instead sell somewhere between 86% and 91% PHEVs,
depending on the degree of ICEV control technology. Alternatively, if just 7% of sales are BEVs
in 2032 (roughly today's current rate of BEV sales), PHEV sales could drop to 76% if advanced
ICEV technology is used (Table 4) or 82% if 2022 ICEV technology is assumed (Table 3). And
assuming BEV sales of 40%, in line with EPA's "No Action" projections for 2030-2032,11 fleet
average PHEV sales could be as low as 28% to 40% in 2032. As above, we underscore that the
zero and seven percent BEV baselines are unrealistic; we include them to demonstrate the
robustness of our conclusions.
11 The BEV sales under the No Action Case are 40% in 2030 and 2031 and 39% in 2032. 88 Fed. Reg.
29184 (May 5,2023) Table 81.
Table 3: PHEV Sales Enabling Compliance with EPA's 2032 Emission Standards at Four Baseline
Levels of BEV Sales and 2022 ICEV Tec
inology
¦ : : :
MY 2022 ICEV Tech
0% BEVs
7% BEVs
17% BEVs
40% BEVs
Fleet
91%
82%
69%
40%
BMW
96%
86%
73%
43%
Mercedes-Benz
97%
87%
74%
44%
Stellantis
95%
86%
73%
44%
Ford
94%
85%
72%
42%
GM
95%
86%
73%
43%
Honda
90%
81%
68%
38%
Hyundai
87%
78%
65%
36%
Kia
89%
80%
67%
38%
JLR
98%
89%
76%
46%
Mazda
88%
79%
67%
38%
Mitsubishi
87%
78%
65%
37%
Nissan
89%
80%
67%
38%
Subaru
88%
79%
67%
38%
Toyota
89%
809%
67%
37%
Volvo
92%
83%
70%
41%
VWA
93%
85%
72%
42%
3513
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Table 4: PHEV Sales Enabling Compliance with EPA's 2032 Emission Standards at Four Baseline
Levels of BEV Sales and Advanced ICEV Technology
¦
Advanced ICEV Technology
111B11B11B
0% BEVs
7% BEVs
17% BEVs
40% BEVs
Fleet
86%
76%
61%
28%
BMW
93%
83%
68%
34%
Mercedes-Benz
95%
85%
70%
36%
Stellantis
91%
81%
66%
32%
Ford
91%
809%
66%
32%
GM
92%
82%
67%
34%
Honda
85%
74%
60%
26%
Hyundai
80%
69%
55%
21%
Kia
81%
71%
56%
22%
JLR
96%
86%
71%
38%
Mazda
80%
709%
55%
21%
Mitsubishi
74%
64%
49%
15%
Nissan
81%
71%
56%
22%
Subaru
79%
68%
54%
20%
Toyota
81%
71%
56%
22%
Volvo
88%
77%
63%
29%
VWA
89%
79%
64%
30%
Analysis: Costs and benefits of low- to zero-BEV pathways
In addition to evaluating the feasibility of meeting EPA's Proposed Standards through different
technology pathways, we estimated the net benefits of compliance for the lowest (0% BEV sales)
and highest (40% BEV sales in 2032) BEV scenarios presented above. As shown in Table 7 below,
all of the alternative scenarios evaluated are projected to produce significant net benefits compared
to a No Action scenario, with net benefits ranging from $767 billion to $1.4 trillion.
Methodology
To estimate net benefits, we assessed the differences in the cost of compliance technology,
adjusting the No Action scenario to be consistent with the compliance strategy to which it was
being compared. Vehicle technology is the largest cost associated with the Proposal. The largest
savings or benefits, in order of magnitude, are from reduced fuel costs, health and climate change
impacts, and reduced maintenance and repair costs.
3514
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Alternative Scenarios for No Action Case and Proposal
To estimate net benefits, EDF evaluated the costs and benefits of EPA's Proposal in three
alternative compliance scenarios with corresponding No Action cases. The scenarios are
summarized in Table 5 below. We considered the two Proposal scenarios with the lowest and
highest levels of ZEVs described above and shown in Table 4. In the Zero-BEV sales scenario
we assess the net benefits of compliance with the Proposal using higher sales of PHEVs and
ICEVs with advanced emissions control technology (Scenario 2). In the 40% BEV sales scenario
we assess the net benefits where BEV sales are 40%, and the remaining sales are a combination
of PHEVs and ICEVs with advanced technology (Scenarios 3 and 4).
Table 5: Alternative Scenarios Evaluated
Scenario
No Action Case
Proposal
BEV
PHEV
MY2022
ICEV
Adv.
ICEV
Tech
BEV
PHEV
MY2022
ICEV
Adv.ICEV
Tech
1
EPA Proposal
40%
0%
60%
0%
67%
0%
33%
0%
2
Zero BEV
0%
33%
67%
0%
0%
86%
0%
14%
3
No
Incremental
BEVs
40%
0%
60%
0%
40%
28%
0%
32%
4
Proportional
BEVs
16%
11%
73%
0%
40%
28%
0%
32%
For Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 we assumed different starting points (No Action Case) from that
assumed by EPA (line lof Table 5). We assume that a manufacturer would use a similar strategy
to comply with the current standards under the No Action case as with the Proposed Standards.
For example, as shown in row 1 of Table 5, EPA projected that manufacturer's will use BEVs to
comply with both the current standards and the Proposed standards, in their evaluation of the
Proposal's costs and benefits. Consistent with this approach, in our Zero-BEV scenario as shown
in row 2 of Table 5, in which we assume manufacturers use only PHEVs and ICEVs to comply
with the Proposal, EDF also assumes that these manufacturers will use only PHEVs and ICEVs
to comply with the current standards.12
12 For the purposes of evaluating the net benefits of the zero-BEV compliance pathway, we use a zero-BEV
reference case as well, though extremely unlikely given current BEV sales, and though the 40% BEV
scenario uses a different reference case.
For the 40% BEV scenarios (rows 3 and 4 in Table 5), we used two separate No Action cases
for comparison. These two cases allow for an evaluation of the net benefits of compliance with
the Proposed Standards following manufacturers' compliance with the current standards using
two possible fleet mixes. In the "No Incremental BEVs" scenario at row 3 of Table 5, we assume
the same No Action case that EPA used for the Proposal, with the Proposal leading to increased
sales of PHEVs and improved ICEVs. In the "Proportional BEVs" scenario at row 4, we assume
that manufacturers would sell a mix of BEVs and PHEVs under the No Action case in a similar
ratio to that projected for the Proposal.
3515
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Calculation of Costs and Benefits
To calculate the costs and benefits of these alternative pathways EDF started with EPA's
Proposal and No Action Case costs and benefits to account for the differences. The primary
driver of the differences in benefits from these alternative compliance pathways is the change in
vehicle costs due to the different fleet technology mix.
Emission Benefits
Both tailpipe CO2 emissions and fuel costs are the same whether PHEVs and cleaner ICEVs
or BEVs are used to comply with the GHG standards.1314 We assumed that criteria pollutant
emissions under the Zero-BEV scenario are also the same as under EPA's Proposal. This is a
conservative assumption as a higher use of PHEVs will result in lower overall criteria pollutant
emissions.15
13 While all the scenarios modeled use the same amount of gasoline, scenarios with a higher level of strong
hybrids or PHEVs use slightly less electricity than a scenario of all BEVs and conventional ICEVs like the
ones EPA projected. This means the assumption that the alternative compliance scenarios modeled here
have the same level of emission reductions is conservative since they will have lower EGU emissions.
14 This analysis used a discount rate of 3%. OMB recently released a revised version of Circular A-4 which
lowers the recommended discount rate to be used by agencies in the cost benefit analyses. If this analysis
used the new values, the benefits would likely be higher. Circular No. A-4, Office of Management and
Budget, November 9, 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp- content/uploads/2023/ll/CircularA-4.pdf.
15 EPA's current non-methane organic gases plus nitrogen oxides (NMOG+NOx) emission standards do not
adjust PHEV emissions through use of the utility factor. One result of this is PHEVs must have the same
emission control technology as ICEVs. This is consistent with Roush's approach to estimating the cost of a
PHEV, which includes the same aftertreatment system costs for PHEVs as ICEVs. Thus, any PHEV travel
using electricity will reduce NMOG+NOx emissions relative to those resulting from a BEV strategy to
GHG compliance.
Maintenance Costs
We also assume that maintenance costs would be the same under all the alternative scenarios
evaluated in this analysis as EPA's Proposal. While smaller than climate and health-related
benefits and fuel savings, maintenance cost savings are a significant factor in the estimation of
the net benefits of the Proposal. EPA estimates that PHEVs will have lower maintenance costs
than ICEVs (and higher costs than BEVs), but not to the degree indicated by the utility factor. At
the same time, EPA projected roughly the same maintenance cost savings for strong hybrids as
PHEVs, and very few strong hybrids were projected to be sold in EPA's modeling of the No
Action and proposed standards cases. Thus, our assumption may overestimate maintenance cost
savings assuming ICEVs remain at 2022 emission levels, but both over- and underestimate
maintenance cost savings assuming advanced technology ICEVs. However, any overestimation
of maintenance savings in the former case would be much smaller than the value of reduced
NMOG+NOx emissions resulting from a fleet consisting mostly of PHEVs.
Vehicle Costs
The average cost of MY2022 ICEVs and BEVs were taken directly from EPA's analysis
supporting the Proposal. We then developed incremental costs of 1) a PHEV50 over a BEV300
and 2) of an ICEV with all of the available technology applied over the cost of a MY 2022
ICEV.
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EPA does not include PHEV costs in its modeling for the Proposal. To determine reasonable
PHEV50 cost estimates to use in conjunction with EPA's BEV cost estimates, we adjusted
Roush's PHEV50 costs to match the ratio of PHEV50 to BEV300 costs projected by Roush. 16
Roush projected that PHEV50s would cost $4,800 to $8,100 more than BEV300s across 5
vehicle classes in MYs 2027 and 2032 with fleet average costs of $5,700 and $7,400,
respectively, in MYs 2027 and 2032.17 Adjusting Roush's incremental PHEV costs (relative to
BEVs) to match EPA's methodology reduces the incremental PHEV costs by 30%, to $4,000 in
2027 and $5,200 in 2032. 18
16 Vishnu Nair, Himanshu Saxena, Sajit Pillai, Alternative Powertrain Pathways for Light-Duty and Class 3
Vehicles for MYs 2024, 2027, and 2035 to Meet Future C02 Emission Targets, Roush for EDF (June
2023).
17 This is using vehicle segment sales from EPA's OMEGA 2 modeling for the Proposal.
18 We adjusted Roush's incremental costs for PHEV50s to harmonize with EPA's BEV cost estimates.
EPA's and Roush's accounting for engine, transmission and aftertreatment removal with full electrification
are similar, so no adjustment was necessary. However, EPA's battery capacities for BEV300s18 are 23%
larger than Roush's estimates.18 We increased Roush's projected battery capacities for both PHEV50s and
BEV300s by 23% to match EPA's methodology. And while EPA and Roush battery direct manufacturing
costs for BEVs are comparable, EPA applies a 1.5 RPE factor to BEVs, while Roush applies a factor of 1.2
in 2027 and beyond to the entire electric powertrain. Similarly, we adjusted Roush's battery RPEs for both
PHEV50s and BEVs to reflect EPA's RPE factor of 1.5. There was no need to do this for non-battery
powertrain costs, as these are essentially the same for both BEVs and PHEVs. Both adjustments reduce the
incremental cost of PHEV50s over BEVs. Combining these two
factors, the PHEV50 battery savings are 54% higher using EPA's battery capacities and battery RPEs than
originally projected by Roush.
We obtained the incremental cost of a vehicle with advanced ICEV emission control
technology from the CAFE model.19 The incremental ICEV cost of a MY 2032 vehicle with all
available ICEV technology applied was $1,267 above average MY 2022 costs.
19 This used the same run used to estimate the emission benefits of the advanced application of ICEV
technology described above. Specifically, we modelled a scenario beyond NHTSA's proposal without
allowing any ZEV technologies to be used to ensure that all available ICEV technology was applied.
We then combined these costs for the four vehicle technologies into a single fleetwide cost for
the No Action and Proposal scenarios for each of the alternative pathways being evaluated here.
The average incremental vehicle costs (on a fleetwide basis) of the four scenarios are shown
in Table 6. These fleetwide estimates were developed from the incremental costs for each of the
four vehicle types described above: 1) 2022 ICEVs, 2) advanced ICEV technology, 3) PHEV50s,
and 4) BEV300s.
Table 6: Average Incremental Vehicle Costs
Scenario
Incremental Vehicle Costs
1
EPA Proposal
$1,200
2
Zero BEV
$3,200
3
No Incremental BEVs
$2,900
4
Proportional BEVs
$2,600
3517
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As shown in Table 6, a greater reliance on PHEV sales increases the fleetwide cost of
complying with the Proposal. The average fleetwide cost is highest under the Zero BEV
scenario, as the increase in PHEV sales is 55 percentage points. It is lowest under the
Proportional BEV scenario as the increase in PHEV sales is only 16 percentage points.
No Action Case Costs and Benefits
While EPA projected a significant degree of over-compliance in its modeling of the No
Action scenario,20 the Zero-BEV and Proportional BEV No Action cases are assumed to strictly
comply with the MY2026 vehicle standards. To account for this, EDF developed a second set of
costs and benefits for the case where manufacturers strictly complied with the current MY 2026
standards, the binding regulations under EPA's No Action scenario for the Proposed Standards.21
20 This is due to the expected favorable economics of BEVs leading to more BEV sales than required for
manufacturers to comply with the current regulations.
21 We did this by reducing the number of BEVs sold in EPA's No Action scenario to the level where
manufacturers just complied with the standards. Sales of ICEVs were increased accordingly. As EPA's
OMEGA 2 model provides outputs for BEVs and ICEVs separately, all outputs were adjusted to reflect the
increase or decrease in vehicle sales. This resulting set of OMEGA 2 outputs was then input to EPA's
OMEGA 2 Effects Model to develop an alternative set of costs and benefits for the Proposal where
manufacturers just complied with the current standards. The net benefits from this analysis could then serve
as the basis for estimating the net benefits of the Zero BEV and Proportional BEV scenarios shown in
Table 6. The net benefits of the Proposal relative to the "just complying" No Action scenario from calendar
year (CY) 2027-2055 are about $150 billion higher than EPA's estimates, as the costs and benefits of some
of the BEVs sold under EPA's No Action scenario now contribute to the incremental costs and benefits of
the Proposal.
Net Benefit Results
Table 7 shows the estimated net benefits of EPA's proposed standards for MY 2027 and
beyond under different compliance pathways. As described above, we assume that manufacturers
that intend to comply with the proposed standards using PHEVs would already be deploying
PHEVs to comply with the current standards.
Table 7: Net Benefits of EPA's Proposed Emission Standards
from CY 2027-2055, Discounted at 3%/year to 2027, Per EPA
Methodology ($ Billion)
Scenario
Net Benefits
1
EPA Proposal
$1,400-$1,600
2
Zero BEV
$770-$900
3
No Incremental BEVs
$970-$ 1,100
4
Proportional BEVs
$1,300-$1,400
As shown in Table 7, all of the alternative scenarios evaluated here are projected to produce
significant levels of net benefits relative to their No Action scenarios. The net benefits of the
Proportional BEV scenario are the highest of the three alternative scenarios. They approach those
of EPA's Proposal due to the fact that sales of both BEVs and PHEVs increase between the No
Action and Proposal scenarios. The net benefits are the lowest for the No BEV scenario due to its
3518
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reliance on PHEV sales, though they are still very substantial. The net benefits of the No
Incremental BEV sales fall in between those of the other two alternative scenarios.
Conclusion
Our follow-up detailed analysis assessing additional pathways to compliance through fuller
reliance on PHEVs, hybrids, and ICE efficiency improvements and less reliance on BEVs
concludes that EPA's proposed standards can be met with varying levels of technology and no
particular technology is required - in whole or in part - to meet the fleet-average standards.
Our analysis also finds that even a zero-BEV pathway would result in significant net benefits
of more than $770 billion and as BEV sales increase so do the net benefits. This analysis
reinforces the performance-based nature of EPA's Proposed Standards and the technology
flexibility manufacturers have toward compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5118]
Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EPF)
Please add the attached document to the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-
Duty Engines and Vehicles- Phase 3 (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985) and Multi-Pollutant Emissions
Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles (EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829) dockets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5119]
[Attached study:]
U.S. Electric Vehicle Battery Manufacturing on Track to Meet Demand
The announced U.S. electric vehicle (EV) battery production capacity is more than on track to
meet the projected demand for EV batteries that may occur under the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) proposed emission standards for light- medium- and heavy-duty vehicles with
$92 billion of investment in batteries announced in the U.S.1 Over 1,000 gigawatt hours (GWh)
per year of U.S. battery production capacity has already been announced to come online by 2028
- enough to meet all of EPA's projected demand in 2030 and 85% of the projected demand in
2032.
I EPA's standards are technology neutral: vehicle manufacturers can use any combination of technologies
they choose to reduce emissions from their vehicles. Likely the most cost-effective pathway is using ZEVs,
as EPA modeled in its proposed rules.
Projected Demand for EV Batteries from EPA Proposed Standards
EDF used the EPA's projections for EV adoption and associated battery demand through
2030." Roughly 90% of the potential EV battery demand is from light-duty (passenger) vehicles.
Potential demand for batteries in medium-duty vehicles (large pickup trucks and vans) and
heavy-duty vehicles (delivery trucks, step vans, semi-trucks, buses, etc.) is much smaller.
II Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29184 (May 5, 2023); Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty
Vehicles—Phase 3, 88 Fed. Reg. 25926 (April 27, 2023).
3519
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ssssss Additional Heavy-Duty Demand if no FCEVs
Heavy-Duty Demand
Medium-Duty Demand
Light-Duty Demand
¦ Announced Production Capacity
1,037
2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
Figure 1: Projected U.S. EV Battery Demand and Announced Battery Production Capacity
(2022-2032)
Figure 1 shows EPA projected battery demand by segment:
Light-duty: 539 GWh per year in 2027 growing to 1,053 GWh per year by 2032.
• Medium-duty: 13 GWh per year in 2027 and only 38 GWh per year in 2032.
Heavy-duty: 23 GWh per year in 2027 growing to between 59 GWh to 134 GWh per
year in 2032, depending on whether heavy-duty EV adoption is met with a
combination of fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) and battery electric vehicles
(BEVs) or solely BEVs (which would require more batteries). The additional batteries
for an all-BEV compliance with EPA's heavy-duty proposal are labeled as "Additional
Heavy-Duty Demand if no FCEVs".
Combined, U.S. EV battery demand is projected to be 576 GWh per year in 2027 and 1,151
GWh - 1,225 GWh per year in 2032. Even if heavy-duty EV battery demand increased twofold,
overall battery demand would only increase to 1,359 GWh in 2032.
Announced Battery Manufacturing Capacity in the U.S.
As shown by the blue line in Figure 1, based solely on announced EV battery manufacturing
plants, the U.S. will have an estimated capacity of 1,037 GWh per year by 2028, consistent with
projections made by other sources.iii This includes 45 battery manufacturing facilities with an
average production capacity of 23 GWh per year. Table 1 shows states with the most announced
battery production capacity. To estimate the nation's battery manufacturing capacity, EDF used
publicly announced battery manufacturing plant information, including total monetary
investment, battery capacity, and production start date.
111A DOE estimate from January 2023 found 1,000 GWh of announced battery capacity expected to come
online by 2030. httos://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1271 -ianuarv-2-2023-electric-vehicle-
batterv-manufacturing-capacity Tech Crunch in August 2023 estimated 1,200 GWh per year of battery
3520
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capacity by 2030. hllps://lechcrunch.com/2023/08/16/lrdckina-!he-ey-ballerv-faclorv-construction-boom-
across-riorth-
anierica/?guccouiiter==l&guce referrei=aHR0cHM6Lv93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNybS8&guce referrer_sig=AQA
AACQ3fBohOwikg9
In July 2023, Digi Times Asia estimated the announced battery capacity for 2030 was 900 GWh per year.
https://www.digitimes.co m/news/a2()230726VL202/us-batterv -eleciric-vehiclc-meel-lhe-analvsl.html
Table 1: States with Highest
Announced Battery Manufacturing
Number
Battery
State
of
Production
Facilities
(GWh)
Michigan
6
140
Georgia
5
136
Tennessee
3
128
Kentucky
4
119
Indiana
3
97
Ohio
2
75
South Carolina
5
67
Arizona
4
56
California
1
54
Illinois
1
40
Other
11
125
Total
45
1,037
The announced capacity for battery production outpaces EPA's projected demand through
2028, the last year for which any of the concrete current announcements project production will
begin. Shifting consumer demand together with tax credits and incentives in the Inflation
Reduction Act provide a strong case for battery manufacturers to build EV batteries in the U.S.
Even if construction delays shift production, there would still be enough battery supply. The
average time between announcement and expected start of production for the battery facilities is
2.7 years, indicating that many of the facilities that would come online in 2027 and beyond have
not yet been announced.
Plants Provide Capacity for Passenger EVs and Commercial EVs
3521
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As shown in Figure 1, EPA projects that roughly 90% of projected battery demand will power
light-duty BEVs. While the relative demand for heavy-duty batteries is small, it will likely grow
as demand for heavy- duty EVs grows. A recent announcement by Cummins, Daimler and
PACCAR to build a joint battery plant in the U.S. indicates that heavy-duty manufacturers are
already moving to supply this market™
lv Accelera by Cummins, Daimler Truck, and PACCAR form a joint venture to advance battery cell
production in the United States, Cummins Newsroom, (September 6,2023),
https://www.cummins.co m/news/relcases/2023/09/06/accelcra-cummins- daimlcr-truck-and-paccar-form-
ioint-ventu re-advance.
There can also be significant sharing of vehicle batteries and components across light- and
heavy-duty EVs, including cell modules.v For example, Tesla uses the same batteries for its
electric semi-truck and Model Y passenger car.vl And many of the same battery chemistries are
being used and explored for both vehicle segments, including Nickel Manganese Cobalt Oxide
(NMC) and Lithium-Iron Phosphate (LFP)VU vm
v Vishnu Nair et al., Medium and Heavy-Duty Electrification Costs for MY 2027- 2030, Roush for EDF,
(February 2, 2022), https://blogs.edf.Org/climate411/wp-content/blogs.dir/7/files/2022/02/EDF-MDHD"
Electrification-v 1.6_20220209.pdf.
vi Mark Kane, New Photo Reveals Resla Semi's Massive Battery System, (January 25, 2023),
https://insideevs.com/news/633133/photo-tesla-semi-battery-system/.
vii Nair et al., Medium and Heavy-Duty Electrification Costs for MY 2027- 2030.
viii A Million-Mile Battery From China Could Power Your Electric Car, Bloomberg News, (June 7, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.eom/news/articles/2020-06-07/a-million-mile-battery-from-china-could-power-
your-electric-car
Methodology
EPA's OMEGA2 model tracks fleetwide battery usage by model year. EDF used EPA's
OMEGA2 model outputs for the light- and medium-duty runs for the proposed rule, Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, to quantify the projected battery need. We summed the battery pack size for each
vehicle by EPA's projected sales for a given year for all years between 2022 and 2032.
For the proposed heavy-duty rule, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty
Vehicles—Phase 3, EPA used the HD TRUCS model to project EV adoption, including number
of vehicles and size of battery packs. EPA modeled two years, 2027 and 2032. EPA also
included two types of EVs - battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and fuel cell electric vehicles
(FCEVs). EDF multiplied the projected BEV adoption in 2027 and 2032 (in percentage terms)
for each of the 101 vehicle categories in HD TRUCS by the annual sales and estimated battery
pack size. HD TRUCS includes 2019 sales. To project HDV sales in later years, EDF assumed a
0.8% compound annual growth rate consistent with AEO2023.ix Heavy-duty battery demand in
2022 was assumed to be 10% of the demand in 2027. The battery demand was linearly
interpolated for the years between 2022, 2027 and 2032.
1X U.S. Energy Information Administration's Annual Energy Outlook 2023, Table 49. Freight Transportation
Energy Use, (March 2023), https://www.eia.gov/outJooks/aeo/supplcnierit/cxcel/suptab 49.xlsx.
3522
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To account for a more conservative scenario in which the projected heavy-duty EV adoption
might be met with all BEVs instead of a mix of BEVs and FCEVs as EPA projects, we
calculated the battery demand if adoption projections are met entirely with BEVs. The largest
group of vehicles projected to be FCEVs are sleeper cab tractors. EPA projects sleeper cab
tractors would have very large battery packs, if BEVs were the chosen compliance path versus
FCEVs, with the largest being more than 2 MWh per vehicle. EDF believes that EPA
overestimates the battery pack size needed for many heavy- duty vehicles as explained in more
detail in our comments,x but for purposes of this analysis, we used the EPA projected battery
pack sizes. Assuming all heavy-duty EVs are BEVs results in the same 2027 battery demand
because EPA does not project any FCEVs to be deployed then. Heavy-duty battery demand
increases in 2030 to 90 GWh per year as a result of more BEVs, doubling EPA's projected
demand for heavy-duty vehicles with BEVs and FCEVs of 45 GWh. This additional battery
demand is labeled as "Additional Heavy-Duty Demand if no FCEVs" in Figure 1.
x Comments of the Environmental Defense Fund, EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985-1644,
httpsi//www.regiilafloris.gov/corruiierit/.E -O AR-2022-0985-1644.
To determine the announced U.S. battery manufacturing capacity, EDF updated a previous
analysis performed by WSP in August 2023 for EDF.xi EDF confirmed all plants produced
batteries and not battery components to ensure no double counting. In cases where plans had
changed for battery plants and the timelines for production were uncertain, the battery facilities
were removed from the list. Some of the facilities like the North Carolina Toyota plant have
announced investments ($13.9B) that would likely support much more battery production than
they have announced (30GWh). Due to the conservative measures we took, this is likely an
underestimate of the battery production capacity from already announced plants.
X1 U.S. Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Investments and Jobs: Characterizing the Impacts of the Inflation
Reduction Act after 1 Year, WSP for EDF, (August 2023), hllps://www.edf.on>/siles/dcfault/filcs/2023-
08/EDF%20WSP%20EV%20report%2() > .%20FINAL%20FINAL.pdf.
[EP A-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5119]
Organization: Hyundai Motor America
Hyundai Motor America ("Hyundai") would like to provide supplemental comments to those
submitted on July 5, 2023, for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") notice of
proposed rulemaking entitled, "Multi-Pollutant Emission Standards for Model Years 2027 and
Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles." There are two specific areas that we wish to
supplementally comment on: (1) Slowing EV Sales Rate and (2) Community Energy Savings
Credit. These comments were not included in our previous letter because they are based on
recent activity.
1. Slowing EV Sales Rate
A slowdown in EV Sales across the industry has been making headlines recently. Hyundai
echoes these concerns. Our comment letter, submitted July 5, 2023, provides a balanced solution
that allows EPA to regulate at levels it deems appropriate today while acknowledging that the
unprecedented push to EVs hinges on the materialization of key enablers in just six short model
years from now. The solution: A newly created Federal Advisory Committee (FAC) that would
be charged with assessing, in the 2029-2030 calendar years, key enablers such as but not limited
3523
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to the state of market demand, EV infrastructure development, and grid resiliency against the
final rule's assumptions. The FAC is authorized to activate proportional EV multipliers as a
regulatory cure for model years 2029-2032 if it finds there is a shortfall in the assumptions for
key enablers supporting the rule's stringency and EV-equivalent penetration rates. Please see
pages 8 and 9 of Attachment 1.
2. Community Energy Savings Credit
This is regarding our proposed incentive program for automakers who increase the volume of
plug-in electric vehicles ("PEV") into disadvantaged communities. This concept was refined in
response to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's ("NHTSA") notice of
proposed rulemaking entitled, "Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Passenger Cars
and Light Trucks for Model Years 2027-2032." 1 Specifically, we narrowed its scope and made
it easier to implement while still yielding noteworthy fuel economy improvements and emissions
reductions particularly among America's equity communities. Please see pages 6-7 and the last
page of Attachment 2.
1 88 Fed. Reg. 56,371-56,374 (Aug. 17, 2023)
We appreciate EPA's thoughtful consideration of these supplemental comments and would be
more than happy to discuss further. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5102; 2 attachments]
Organization: Toyota Motor North America, Inc. (submits 2 additional studies)
Toyota Motor North America, Inc. (Toyota) appreciates the opportunity to provide
supplemental comments on the above-referenced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). We
are submitting to the docket the recent correction to the Plotz et al (2021) paper, "From lab-to-
road: real-world fuel consumption and CO2 emissions of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles" (2021
Environ. Res. Lett. 16 054078).
As the only peer reviewed paper referenced in the NPRM in support of the proposed revisions
to the SAE J2841 Utility Factor Curves, we believe it is incumbent upon EPA to incorporate the
published corrections in their analysis of the Final Rule. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) ("[T]he agency must examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
The corrigendum notes that there were errors in the original conventional fuel consumption
(FC) measures based on EPA's data, which now have been substituted with EPA label (window
sticker) values. The resulting correction brings the Plotz work in line with the Toyota/Hamza et
al (2022) paper, "On inferred real-world fuel consumption of past decade plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles in the US." (2022 Environ. Res. Lett. 17 104053); suggesting strong correlation between
real world data and the existing SAE J2841 Utility Factor Curves.
This important correction provides additional rationale in support of Toyota's July 5, 2023
comments that EPA should maintain SAE J2841 for determining utility factor curves for
PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5100]
3524
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EPA Summary and Response
AESI et al., a group of 29 organizations, commented in support of strong standards to control
particulate matter (PM) emissions from light- and medium-duty vehicles. These commenters
discussed the public health needs for further PM emissions control, the benefits of emissions
standards, and the feasibility and availability of gasoline particulate filter technology in being
effective in controlling tailpipe emissions. EPA appreciates these additional comments, and we
are finalizing the proposed PM standards, with an extension of the phase-in to provide
manufacturers with additional lead time. Section 4.1.3 addresses comments on the PM standard.
The Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Alliance) expressed concerns with the availability
of adequate critical mineral supplies to support the market share of EVs under the proposed
standards, given global demand for such materials. The Alliance submitted additional analysis
from Benchmark Minerals Intelligence (BMI) on lithium supplies in the context of automaker
production goals and global regulatory policies. EPA addresses comments related to critical
minerals are addressed in Section 15.
The American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) provided comments
regarding EPA's estimated per-vehicle costs in the proposed rule. EPA has responded to
comment on our cost analysis, which has been updated since the proposal in consideration of
comments and based on the best available information in the public record. Our final analysis
includes several possible pathways toward compliance including pathways that rely on varying
combinations of ICE, HEV, PHEV and BEVs (see Sections IV.F and G of the preamble to this
final rule). We believe that manufacturers could choose to meet these multiple potential
technology pathways at costs that are reasonable. Also see further responses to comments
regarding our technology cost estimates in Section 12.2.7.
Center for Biological Diversity et al provided two additional studies for the record. One
study, by EPRI, relates to aiding utilities efficiently plan investment to prepare the electric grid
for expanded deployment of EV charging infrastructure. We discuss electric grid impacts further
in Section 18. The second report is related to phasing in charging infrastructure and focuses on
the heavy-duty vehicle sector. While heavy-duty infrastructure issues are out of scope for this
rule, we have also included the CBD et al comment in the heavy-duty GHG rulemaking docket
(EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0985-2672).
EDF provided a follow-up detailed analysis, in which it assessed additional pathways to
compliance through fuller reliance on PHEVs, hybrids, and ICE efficiency improvements with
zero to moderate levels of battery electric vehicles (BEVs). EDF's analysis concluded that the
proposed standards could be met with varying levels of technology and that no particular
technology would be required (in whole or in part) to meet the fleet-average standards. EDF
noted that this finding was true even in what it considered exceedingly unrealistic low- and no-
BEV baseline scenarios. EDF further found that even a no-BEV pathway would result in
significant net benefits, and as BEV sales increase so do the net benefits. EDF also shared
additional information on state adoption of clean vehicle programs. EPA appreciates the
additional information provided by EDF. We note that EDF's analysis of alternative pathways
supports EPA's analysis that there is a wide range of feasible technology pathways for auto
manufacturers to choose in complying with the standards, including pathways that rely to
3525
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varying degrees of ICE, HEV, PHEV and BEVs, including pathways that include low levels or
even no additional BEVs beyond those in the marketplace today, or beyond the No Action case.
Hyundai provided information on EV sales rates and community energy savings credits.
Hyundai expressed concern with what they view as a slowing of EV sales in recent months, and
put forward a suggestion to create a Federal Advisory Committee that would be charged with
assessing, in the 2029-2030 calendar years, key enablers such as but not limited to the state of
market demand, EV infrastructure development, and grid resiliency against the final rule's
assumptions. As discussed further in Sections 3.4 and 28, EPA is not finalizing any form of a
midterm evaluation or provisions for formally monitoring development of market demand,
infrastructure or other factors. The Administrator has the authority to initiate a new rulemaking if
he or she finds that there is an appropriate need without establishing these provisions. Hyundai
also suggests an incentive program for automakers who increase the volume of PEVs into
disadvantaged communities. EPA does not believe that further incentive credits are appropriate
under the final standards, and because we neither proposed nor sought comment on such an
approach we consider it out of scope.
Toyota submitted additional information regarding the PHEV utility factor. Specifically,
Toyota submitted a correction to a published paper that EPA had referenced in the NPRM. EPA
has considered the corrections to this paper in our final analysis of the PHEV UF, as further
discussed in Section 3.1.6.
3526
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Appendix A: Other comments received, not reproduced
verbatim in RTC text
This appendix contains a list of comments that are general in nature and do not require
detailed EPA response beyond provided elsewhere in this document, and/or contain opinions or
statements about issues that are raised without reasonable specificity. There are about 4,300
individual comments that fall into this category. The commenters are listed in Table A-3, below.
EPA Summary and Response:
Summary:
We characterize the nature of each of the comments not reproduced verbatim elsewhere in
this document by classifying their statements along eight dimensions (one comment may contain
statements on more than one dimension). The topics are as follows:
• General Support
• Want more stringent
• Oppose
• Environmental and/or health concerns
• Environmental Justice concerns
• Business and/or cost concerns
• Infrastructure and/or resource availability, supply chain concerns
• Incentives Available (IRA, BIL)
As shown in Table A-l, of the 4,300 unique non-detailed comments, 17.8% did not include a
codable statement one of these 8 topics. Most of the comments included statements on 2 or 3
topics.
Table A-l: Number of Topics Raised in Other Comments Received, Not Reproduced
Verbatim in RTC Text
No. Issues Raised
% of Commenters
0
17.8%
1
26.0%
2
33.5%
3
17.4%
4
4.1%
5
1.1%
6
0.1%
Total
100.0%
Table A-2 sets out the general themes raised in these comments. It should be noted that aside
from the categories of "general support," "want more stringent," or "oppose," the coding does
not distinguish between positive and negative comments on a particular theme. So, for example,
comments on business and costs cover both those comments expecting decreased costs and those
3527
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expecting increased costs. The purpose of the analysis is not to tally the comments per se, but
rather to form an impression of the themes these commenters are most concerned about.
Table A-2: Themes Raised in Other Comments Received, Not Reproduced Verbatim in
RTC Text
Theme
% of Comments
Raising Theme
General support
0.7%
Want more stringent
7.5%
Oppose
25.0%
Environmental, Health
19.8%
Environmental Justice
1.9%
Business, Costs
27.1%
Infrastructure, Supply Chain
16.1%
Incentive Availability
2.0%
Total
100.0%
Response:
As noted above, these comments are general in nature and do not require detailed EPA
response beyond provided elsewhere in this document, and/or contain opinions or statements that
are raised without reasonable specificity. EPA's responses included throughout this RtC
document address each of the general topics raised in these comments.
3528
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Table A-3: List of Comments Not Reproduced Verbatim in RtC
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1371
A Davis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4881
A. F. Montealegre
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4374
Aaron Brown
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2484
Aaron Dougherty
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1728
Aaron White
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1060
Abbas Alkaabi
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3929
Abby Brown
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4291
Abigail Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4886
Ada Blankenship
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3682
Adam Callaghan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1406
Adam Dubicki
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2153
Adam Moore
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0855
Addie Green
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4064
Adi Gundimeda
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1678
Adin Benson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0606
Adrian Dominican
Sisters, et al.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3472
Adrian Moeller
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0856
Adrian Osorio
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3292
Adrienne Sarkisian
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0684
Advanced Engine
Systems Institute
(AESI)
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0690
Advancing American
Freedom
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2060
Aggie Per
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3259
Agnes Ann Bouwense
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4855
Agnes Puzak
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3107
Aileen Curfman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3856
Aimee Henry
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3200
Al King
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
29
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4490
Al Moffitt
30
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1563
Al Rakel
31
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2485
Al Romano
32
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3289
Alaina Peterson
33
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3497
Alan Beck
34
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2755
Alan Davis
35
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4950
Alan Fraize
36
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1163
Alan Hood
37
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4200
Alan Horton
38
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4279
Alan Numbers
39
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2181
Alan Pravel
40
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1310
Alan Reckner
41
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4523
Alan Redman
42
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4160
Alan Sayler
43
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3426
Alan Smith
44
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2894
Alan Solomon
45
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2554
Alan Teague
46
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3318
Alan Wadja
47
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1642
Alathea LeBrun
48
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5022
Albert Adcock
49
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4082
Albert Caissie
50
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3837
Albert Downer
51
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0881
Albert Harraman
52
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1938
Albert Harraman
53
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3031
Albert Juergens
54
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1679
Albert Kranz
55
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1524
Albert Moody
3529
-------
1
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3521
Albin Slusarz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2377
Alden Hale
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3783
Alex Kalfayan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1833
Alexa Cox
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3311
Alexander Alperstein
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2934
Alexander J Duschere
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1085
Alexandra Matyja
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1117
Alexandria McLaughlin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3201
alfred petersen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4955
alfred petersen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2968
Algin Bradford
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4678
Ali Boraby
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3319
Alice Freund
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5025
Alice Gossy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2280
Alice Kyburg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3256
Alice Landolt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4488
Alice Lowrey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4284
Alice Markey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0897
Alicia Adams
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2877
Alicia Schubert
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4642
Alida Lumpkins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3298
Allan Overton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4671
Allan Prahl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0972
Allen Godin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4910
Allen Godin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2031
Allen LeBoeuf
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0731
Alliance of Nurses for
Healthy Environments
et al.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4170
Allison Riley
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
84
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4417
Alvin Davis
85
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4786
Alvin Davis
86
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1989
Alvin Lappinga
87
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4645
Alvin Ratliffe
88
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3177
Alysha Edelman
89
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4957
Alyson Rummler
90
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1007
Alyson Shepherd
91
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0443
Amadeus Guy
92
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4922
Amanda Schmidt
93
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3168
Amber Arbogast
94
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0892
Amber LeCoq
95
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4494
Amelia Norman
96
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1682
Americas Podcast
97
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3353
Amy Cummings-Leight
98
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2410
Amy Dodds
99
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3413
Amy Dodds
100
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4882
Amy Dodds
101
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4034
Amy Harlib
102
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1853
Amy Parker
103
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4410
Ana Juarbe
104
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1479
Andre Swinson
105
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1558
Andrea Barth
106
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2832
Andrea Bugbee
107
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3668
Andrea Houk
108
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3850
Andrea Hutto
109
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2725
Andrea LechVanDyke
110
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1492
Andrea Robinson
111
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1239
Andrea Tobias
3530
-------
Index
1
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1120
Andreas Haggenmacher
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2878
Andrew Ashburn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4851
Andrew Calcagno
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2820
Andrew Carey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4258
Andrew Francis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1676
Andrew Jacobs
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1523
Andrew Mclver
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2496
Andrew Meverden
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1376
Andrew Prince
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3791
Andrew Riehl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3765
Andrew Schultz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2760
Andrew Shannon
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1139
Andy Eidson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2946
Andy Gresham
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2939
Andy Jobman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4509
Andy Ruby
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2583
Andy Willis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0837
Angela Callaghan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1910
Angela Giboney
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2428
Angela Jarrett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2083
Angela McClendon
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1503
Angela Meadors Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1375
Angela Navarrete
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4021
Angela Navarrete
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3370
Angela Toghia
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3077
Angelo Zappulla
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3957
Angelo Zappulla
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1887
Angie Flynn
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
140
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2079
Anita Low
141
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4714
Ann Bolen
142
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0817
Ann Clack
143
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2668
Ann Cox
144
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4100
Ann Englehart
145
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1488
Ann Gabel
146
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0433
Ann Garbett
147
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4894
Ann Hassinger
148
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4948
Ann Marks
149
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4138
Ann Outka
150
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2195
Ann Scott
151
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3099
Ann Wakeman
152
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1067
Anna Pierce
153
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4660
Anne Anastasio
154
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0456
Anne Bordonaro
155
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4005
Anne Doherty
156
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4131
Anne Laker
157
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2761
Anne Laurance
158
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1640
Anne Marcum
159
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1773
Anne Marcum
160
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3220
Anne Marcum
161
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2134
Anne Moss
162
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5068
Anne Randolph
163
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4570
Anne Reiser
164
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3359
Anne-Marie Oliver
165
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1620
Annette Bennett
166
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2910
Annie Capestany
167
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4424
Annie Hayes
3531
-------
Index
1
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
Docket No.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2459
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3542
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0430
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0434
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0796
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0799
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0800
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0802
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0809
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0851
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0875
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0876
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0877
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0883
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0894
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0895
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0896
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0906
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0907
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0914
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1053
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1141
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1161
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1164
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1169
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1170
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1171
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1172
Commenter Name
4D Transportation, Inc.
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Annie Provence
Annika Carman
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
196
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1173
Anonymous public
comment
197
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1175
Anonymous public
comment
198
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1176
Anonymous public
comment
199
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1179
Anonymous public
comment
200
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1186
Anonymous public
comment
201
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1233
Anonymous public
comment
202
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1237
Anonymous public
comment
203
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1238
Anonymous public
comment
204
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1245
Anonymous public
comment
205
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1246
Anonymous public
comment
206
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1251
Anonymous public
comment
207
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1252
Anonymous public
comment
208
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1255
Anonymous public
comment
209
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1260
Anonymous public
comment
210
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1261
Anonymous public
comment
211
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1264
Anonymous public
comment
212
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1270
Anonymous public
comment
213
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1272
Anonymous public
comment
214
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1275
Anonymous public
comment
215
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1283
Anonymous public
comment
216
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1292
Anonymous public
comment
217
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1355
Anonymous public
comment
218
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1382
Anonymous public
comment
219
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1409
Anonymous public
comment
220
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1412
Anonymous public
comment
221
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1517
Anonymous public
comment
222
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1521
Anonymous public
comment
223
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1526
Anonymous public
comment
3532
-------
Index
1
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
Docket No.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1535
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1542
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1543
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1545
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1546
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1552
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1553
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1672
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1741
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1786
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2045
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2150
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2151
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2204
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2247
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2261
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2273
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2397
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2404
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2426
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2427
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2432
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2433
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2604
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2739
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2863
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2950
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2956
Commenter Name
4D Transportation, Inc.
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Anonymous public
comment
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
252
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3154
Anonymous public
comment
253
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3160
Anonymous public
comment
254
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3161
Anonymous public
comment
255
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3215
Anonymous public
comment
256
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3281
Anonymous public
comment
257
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3476
Anonymous public
comment
258
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4056
Anonymous public
comment
259
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4107
Anonymous public
comment
260
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4243
Anonymous public
comment
261
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4387
Anonymous public
comment
262
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4545
Anonymous public
comment
263
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4650
Anonymous public
comment
264
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4679
Anonymous public
comment
265
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4690
Anonymous public
comment
266
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4930
Anonymous public
comment
267
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4934
Anonymous public
comment
268
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4960
Anonymous public
comment
269
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4965
Anonymous public
comment
270
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4969
Anonymous public
comment
271
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4971
Anonymous public
comment
272
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4972
Anonymous public
comment
273
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1132
Anthony Catalina
274
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2571
Anthony Magnavito
275
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3481
Anthony Pini
276
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3920
April Crandall
277
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1646
April Purvis
278
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4749
Archibald Allison
279
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2267
Ardie McCaslin
3533
-------
Index
1
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2268
Ardie McCaslin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2674
Arlene Carle
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2203
Arlene Pearson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3416
Arlene Wohlgemuth
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3974
Armand Ciabattari
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3121
Arne Johanson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1001
Arne Skaalure
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4394
Arne Skaalure
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4843
Art Bunting
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2855
Art Hanson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4984
Art Hanson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1661
Arthur Arseneau
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3056
Arthur Gales
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4687
Arthur Gales
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4207
Arthur Larson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1181
Arthur Ohare
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1991
Arthur Parker Jr.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4038
Arza Patterson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1981
Ashlea Young
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4846
Ashley Deal
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3512
Audrey Sailer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0868
Austen Miller
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3340
Austin Bell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3853
Austin Erdahl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4925
Austin Lawrenz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2230
Austin Pick
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1183
Avarose Winner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1178
Averly Reynard
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
308
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3211
BWita
309
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0944
B. Ferrell
310
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3861
Babs Wilkinson
311
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1108
Barbara Bennigson
312
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2351
Barbara Brainerd
313
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3405
Barbara Brainerd
314
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2436
Barbara Canter
315
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1379
Barbara Cole
316
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2649
Barbara Cole
317
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1348
Barbara Croyle
318
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1593
Barbara D. Martin
319
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3268
Barbara D. Martin
320
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2763
Barbara Gaffield
321
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4988
Barbara Harney
322
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1125
Barbara Heintz
323
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4311
Barbara Heller
324
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1744
Barbara Hellman
325
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2980
Barbara Hickman
326
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1988
Barbara Kludt
327
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1152
Barbara La Mort
328
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0968
Barbara Matz
329
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4257
Barbara Matz
330
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4327
Barbara Matz
331
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4986
Barbara McNeely
332
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3293
Barbara Peters
333
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0997
Barbara Sharron
334
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3374
Barbara Thompson
335
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3887
Barbara Thompson
3534
-------
Index
1
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1617
Barbara VonRnipper
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2982
Barbara Zinn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4267
Barrett Roller
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2254
Barry Carlson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2601
Barry Fass-Holmes
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3926
Barry Franklin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2606
Barry Henderson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3495
Barry Ingalls
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1573
Barry Meade
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4295
Barry Miksch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1759
Barry Rava
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1945
Barry Thistlethwaite
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0529
Bart Bartleson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4250
Bea Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2025
Beatrice Elsamahy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4762
Becky Anderson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3636
Becky Pirente
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4648
Bella Croton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4462
Ben Bosher
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4974
Ben Bridge
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4892
Ben Lieberman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1033
Ben Nottingham
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3198
Benedetta Galzin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1059
Benjamin Edwards
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3544
Benjamin Kinney
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3227
Benjamin Park
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3609
Benjamin Wright
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4379
Benny Masdon
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
364
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4530
Benny McClure
365
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4792
Benny Tranbarger
366
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2544
Bernadette Hsing
367
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1154
Bernadine Keber
368
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2566
Bernard Cane
369
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1311
Bernard Sacks
370
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1881
Bernie Thomas
371
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3621
Bernie Thomas
372
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4225
Beth Davidson
373
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4031
Beth Evanko
374
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4419
Beth Magura
375
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4635
Beth Silvers
376
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3032
Betsy Parker
377
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4292
Betsy Parker
378
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1122
Betsy Webster
379
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4692
Bettina Thiel
380
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3739
Betty Fulford
381
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1584
Betty Jane Mister
382
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4223
Betty Jane Mister
383
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3630
Betty Lepard
384
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2841
Bev Gavenda
385
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3693
Beverly Balash
386
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3356
Beverly Churchill
387
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3384
Beverly Gould
388
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1796
Beverly Munson
389
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2605
Bill Abright
390
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2927
Bill Abright
391
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4541
Bill Bradlee
3535
-------
Index
1
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4781
Bill Carey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2511
Bill Christie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4654
Bill Christie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4823
Bill Clement
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1837
Bill Conley
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4487
Bill Dotson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3663
Bill Grap
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3624
Bill Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2728
Bill Liddell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1317
Bill Thoreson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3249
Bill Wickham
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2277
Bill Yancey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2474
Billy Brownll
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3046
Billy Jergins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4844
Billy Jergins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3490
Biscuit Sponar
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3158
Blair Bogens
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2705
Blanche Jones
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5057
Blythe Clark-McKitrick
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2594
Bob Armstrong
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2138
Bob Backus
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3344
Bob Bartlett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1287
Bob Gates
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3015
Bob Golenkow
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1324
Bob Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2774
Bob Rodriguez
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3938
Bob Sizemore
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1726
Bob Sparks
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
420
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2128
Bobbie Jo King
421
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4435
Bobby Huddleston
422
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3027
Bobby Oakley
423
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4283
Bonita Bandaries
424
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1633
Bonnie Chandler
425
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4756
Bonnie Chandler
426
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1410
Bonnie Gorman RN
427
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2737
Bonnie Hackett
428
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4253
Bonnie Hackett
429
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3332
Bonnie Robinson
430
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0867
Bonnie Wine
431
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1229
Bonnie Winslow
432
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3584
Bonnie Winslow
433
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4520
Bonny Cadwallader
434
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3276
Boyce Kluting
435
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0558
Brad Allen
436
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1863
Brad Armentrout
437
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4110
Brad Brown
438
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4840
Brad Lowrey
439
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1635
Brad Parsons
440
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3410
Brad Saffell
441
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4866
Brad Wilson
442
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2488
Bradford Bisbee
443
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1873
Bradley Coy
444
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1997
Bradley Coy
445
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3018
Bradley Coy
446
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3279
Bradley Engleberry
447
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0850
Bradley Howe
3536
-------
Index
1
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4033
Bradley Muhl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2783
Bradley Schuster
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3800
Brandon McMilan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3090
Brenda Brazel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1219
Brenda Coleman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1850
Brenda Dangerfield
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1489
Brenda Hansler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2241
Brenda Haueisen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3441
Brenda Lebsack
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2646
Brenda Lindell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1094
Brenda Ping
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3402
Brenda Prosser
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3680
Brenda Prosser
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2139
Brenda Windom
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2075
Brenna J. Lawrence
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2266
Brent Bailey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4382
Bret Pearcy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5011
Brett Beauregard
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2941
Brett Clark
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2866
Brett Robert
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5063
Brett Robert
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1825
Brian Cooke
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2492
Brian Fager
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2283
Brian Guo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3906
Brian Haynes
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1118
Brian Hill
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3566
Brian Kalina
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0912
Brian Keenan
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
476
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1776
Brian Kiernan
477
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3393
Brian Kreager
478
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2926
Brian Lackie
479
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1942
Brian Lax
480
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1477
Brian Lee
481
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1538
Brian Payne
482
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3585
Brian Slocum
483
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3959
Brian Slocum
484
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2615
Brian Suter
485
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3561
Brian Sutton
486
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4503
Brian Thalmann
487
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0950
Brian Welch
488
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5031
Brian West
489
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4141
Bridget Barker
490
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2036
Brigetta Millen
491
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2666
Brooke Biehl
492
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2619
Brown Bevill
493
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5006
Bruce Barrett
494
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4384
Bruce Blakeman
495
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3317
Bruce Buchholz
496
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3383
Bruce Cameron
497
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2569
Bruce Darling
498
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2621
Bruce De Falco
499
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0959
Bruce Gabriel
500
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4684
Bruce Harcey
501
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2989
Bruce Harris
502
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3758
Bruce Harris
503
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1804
Bruce Higgs
3537
-------
Index
1
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1103
Bruce Hlodnicki
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2675
Bruce Kelling
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0888
Bruce Krawisz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0898
Bruce Krawisz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4822
Bruce Moran
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2997
Bruce Niehm
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4796
Bruce Osborn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1639
Bruce Pitzer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1826
Bruce Stevenson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3452
Bruce Stevenson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2503
Bruce Watters
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1197
Bruce Young
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1923
Bryan Affolter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1433
Bryan Dinkel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0904
Bryan Eichfeld
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4553
Bryan Hallman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1564
Bryan Selph
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1692
Bryce Mclntyre
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1848
Bryce Mclntyre
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3435
Bryce Mclntyre
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4627
Bryon Thornberry
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3360
Buck Schall
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5051
Buck Schall
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3849
Buddhadeb Ghosh
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0808
Buddy Baird
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4364
Byran Jones
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4314
Byron Elberts
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2364
Byron Murphy
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
532
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1909
Byron Provins
533
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3333
C. Badran
534
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4953
C. F. (no surname
provided)
535
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2085
C. Ferreira
536
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0910
Caleb Merendino
537
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5059
Caleb Mitchell
538
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0840
Calvin Ray
539
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1832
Calvin Ray
540
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1057
Candace Anderson
541
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1788
Candy Blokland
542
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2217
Caren Brodt
543
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1028
Caren Jenkins
544
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2056
Caril Noll
545
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4478
Carl Dettwiler
546
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0846
Carl Eickhoff
547
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4333
Carl Kolpin
548
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4155
Carl Mecum
549
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4637
Carl Miller
550
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4819
Carl Prater
551
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0801
Carl Shelton
552
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3992
Carl Walden
553
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1279
Carla Messal
554
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1288
Carla Pflasterer
555
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2419
Carlo Fioranelli
556
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1920
Carlos F. (no surname
provided)
557
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3439
Carmel McHale
558
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2644
Carmen Svalstad
559
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2299
Carol Anderson
3538
-------
Index
1
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0436
Carol Anzalone
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5033
Carol Ashley
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1194
Carol Carson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3683
Carol Clegg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3236
Carol Devine
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0928
Carol Engle
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2044
Carol Griffin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1994
Carol Houghton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4466
Carol Hutton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3106
Carol Kuczora
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0925
Carol Landis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2366
Carol Malone
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3069
Carol McCoy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4744
Carol Mimms
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3725
Carol Pappas
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2155
Carol Parker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3671
Carol Parker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2167
Carol Pratt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3035
Carol Prezioso
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2784
Carol Ring
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2660
Carol Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3320
Carol Sorgenfrei
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3597
Carol Ward
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1551
Carol Woods
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3061
Carol Young
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3394
Carole Cox
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3308
Carole King
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3719
Caroline Gihlstorf
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
588
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2895
Caroline Hamlet
589
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4780
Carolyn Bishop
590
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3094
Carolyn Crosen
591
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3425
Carolyn Gerwin
592
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1755
Carolyn Hink
593
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4176
Carolyn Huff
594
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1822
Carolyn Kragt
595
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4582
Carolyn Marriott
596
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4422
Carolyn McLaughlin
597
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4035
Carolyn Merritt
598
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4686
Carolyn Petrakis
599
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1340
Carolyn Summers
600
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4695
Carolyn Wallenwine
601
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1092
Carolyn West
602
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4438
Carolyn Ziegler
603
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3429
Carrie Green
604
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2023
Carrie Panone
605
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1395
Carrie Stine
606
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2429
Carrie Stolle
607
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5077
Carrie Tilton-Jones
608
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3362
Carson Meier
609
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3474
Carson Meier
610
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3470
Carter Tommy
611
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3283
Cassandra Carmichael
Hamernick
612
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1398
Cassondra OReilly
613
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3575
Catharine Munden
614
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4567
Catharine Neblett
615
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4171
Catherine Carter
3539
-------
Index
1
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1579
Catherine Cocco
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2113
Catherine Cocco
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4174
Catherine Delfs
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4634
Catherine Hadad
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2843
Catherine Kappel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3406
Catherine Pollnow
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2020
Catherine Thornberry
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5061
Catherine Webb
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2243
Cathie Harris
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0454
Catholic Climate
Covenant
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3735
Cathryn Classen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4228
Cathryn Classen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0940
Cathryn Johnston
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2530
Cathryn Johnston
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1115
Cathy Busby
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4043
Cathy Lee
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0861
Cayleb Armentrout
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3078
Cecilia Trent
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4962
Celia McMurry
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2882
Chad Dougherty
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2925
Chad Helton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1010
Chad Norris
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0884
Charming Frederick
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1694
Charlene Brant
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3902
Charlene LaMountain
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3442
Charles Boley
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1222
Charles Buehler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4565
Charles Danick
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
644
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3261
Charles Denton
645
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0977
Charles Dunsford
646
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2456
Charles Grotevant
647
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4072
Charles Gulas
648
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0961
Charles Haub
649
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2197
Charles Hicks
650
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3049
Charles Hoyle
651
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3112
Charles Jameson
652
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4332
Charles Kenyon
653
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3079
Charles Kuboosh
654
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0966
Charles Lincoln
655
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1037
Charles Lincoln
656
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2733
Charles Lincoln
657
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3219
Charles Manning
658
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3991
Charles Martignetti
659
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4030
Charles McLaughlin
660
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1687
Charles Metz
661
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2206
Charles Moeller
662
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4736
Charles Mondelli
663
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3993
Charles Persinger
664
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3616
Charles Price
665
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2032
Charles Reite
666
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2231
Charles Rice
667
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4616
Charles Ross
668
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3734
Charles Sutton
669
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1370
Charles Wallace
670
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4776
Charlotte Fremaux
671
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3033
Charlotte Jackson
3540
-------
Index
1
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3062
Charlotte Maloney
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2657
Charlotte Mclntyre
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2636
Charlotte Whitmire
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4898
Charlotte Whitmire
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4746
Chas Metzger
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4081
Chauvin Emmons
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4120
Cherry Householder
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2337
Cheryl B. Gardey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2603
Cheryl Carney
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3075
Cheryl Little
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3164
Cheryl Robinson
Hoffman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3998
Cheryl Thompson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1134
Cheryl Volesky
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3155
Chester Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5009
Chirantan
Mukhopadhyay
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0903
Chris Adamson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4039
Chris Beltz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2629
Chris Brown
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3847
Chris Cisneros
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0981
Chris Cullinan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4244
Chris Cullinan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1263
Chris Dolinger
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5027
Chris Eaton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2942
Chris Edgington
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4448
Chris Foster
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1927
Chris Kidd
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1594
Chris Kocur
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4731
Chris OKeefe
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
700
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4498
Chris Pedersen
701
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2612
Chris Smith
702
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2779
Chris Thomas
703
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4190
Christen Hall
704
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1562
Christian Jepsen
705
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2396
Christina Hsia
706
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3223
Christina Larson
707
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4689
Christina Morgan
708
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1392
Christina Nieves
709
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1206
Christina Prange
710
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4016
Christina Skeens
711
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1879
Christina Stokes
712
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3100
Christine Dreyfus
713
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1668
Christine Genge
714
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3672
Christine Holley
715
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4280
Christine Holley
716
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2898
Christine Ihde
717
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1300
Christine Joseph
718
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4086
Christine M. Harris
719
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3879
Christine Ozburn
720
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4012
Christine Pierce Seets
721
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2190
Christine Rathbun
722
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3418
Christine Toettcher
723
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4463
Christine Toettcher
724
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3054
Christopher Anderson
725
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2189
Christopher Bigge
726
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4552
Christopher Bush
727
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3170
Christopher Hale
3541
-------
Index
1
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3190
Christopher Hebb
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1527
Christopher Lehe
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3871
Christopher Lish
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3793
Christopher McGowan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4010
Christopher Mondy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2559
Christopher Sedlak
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1807
Christopher Vann
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3956
Christy Gordon
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3975
Chuck Fitch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3207
Chuck Sheldon
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2949
Chuck Souder
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4649
Cindi Andersen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5017
Cindy Davis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1953
Cindy Duffy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1765
Cindy Thorpe
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3858
Claire Chambers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5064
Claire Lynch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4768
Clara Jacobson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1004
Clara Thomas
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3065
Clark Elliott
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1618
Clark Hervert
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2753
Clark Walker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1437
Classic Recreations
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3790
Claudia Schroer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1589
Claudine Hale
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4760
Claudine Hale
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4608
Clayton Bloome
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3733
Clayton Foor
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
756
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1249
Clayton Good
757
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0539
Clean Wisconsin
758
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3946
Clifford Bruber
759
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4666
Clifford Schiewerden
760
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5018
Clifton Powell
761
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5016
Clinton Villines
762
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2932
Clive Rubin
763
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3275
Coalition on the
Environment and Jewish
Life
764
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2467
Cody Capel
765
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1980
Cody U. Watson
766
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0953
Cole Acton
767
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2265
Cole Bocanegra
768
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3116
Colette Carter
769
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1352
Colin Gallagher
770
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1191
Colin Murray
771
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4586
Collin Watters
772
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1900
Conrad Ko
773
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2090
Constance Minerovic
774
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4350
Constance Rainey
775
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1461
Constance Storey
776
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1762
Construction Plus Inc
777
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4093
Cooper King
778
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5042
Cory Pinckard
779
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3532
Craig and JoAnne
Barlow
780
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1331
Craig Dow
781
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4164
Craig Driver
782
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4007
Craig Elam
783
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1289
Craig Madsen
3542
-------
Index
1
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0974
Craig Vernieu
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0863
Cristian Velasquez
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4899
Crystal Reamer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3815
Crystal Sharp
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0987
Curt and Paula Detar
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2262
Curtis Dietz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1506
Curtis Hunt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1006
Curtis Miles
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4074
Cynthia Bickel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2482
Cynthia Choo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4747
Cynthia Cuevas
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0999
Cynthia Fogliatti
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4595
Cynthia Hager
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3604
Cynthia Lyons
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1572
Cynthia Naff
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4180
Cynthia Naff
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2955
Cynthia Papia
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4777
Cynthia Stewart
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0933
Cynthia Winston
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1560
Cynthia Wise
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1975
Cyril Statt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3697
D A (Dolores) Kester
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3212
D Jones
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2318
D. Gerdeman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2765
D. Holl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4921
D.Jones
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1212
D. Mink
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1829
Dale Arnett
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
812
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1557
Dale Clinbeard
813
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1462
Dale Custer
814
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3709
Dale Felty
815
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4473
Dale Gibble
816
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4951
Dale Hartmann
817
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1624
Dale Johnson
818
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1965
Dale Johnson
819
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2655
Dale McAnally
820
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3019
Dale Pierce
821
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1236
Dale Shephard
822
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1273
Dale Simmons
823
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2398
Dale Solaas
824
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3453
Dale Valenti
825
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3824
Dalton Clements
826
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3428
Dan chacon
827
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0824
Dan Futon
828
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3820
Dan Iafrato
829
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4865
Dan Kelley
830
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3814
Dan Lansdown
831
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4428
Dan Moline
832
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4162
Dan Nixon
833
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4821
Dan Pressler
834
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2238
Dana Schultz
835
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2301
Dani Purpero
836
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1408
Dani Schulman
837
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3892
Daniel Atkinson
838
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2552
Daniel Black
839
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4345
Daniel Blair
3543
-------
Index
1
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1016
Daniel Brown
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2699
Daniel Brown
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3751
Daniel Brown
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3870
Daniel Brown
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2754
Daniel Callahan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3260
Daniel Clamage
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1032
Daniel Crawford
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3638
Daniel Crute
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2916
Daniel Duncan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1629
Daniel Gassen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1391
Daniel Hellebuyck
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1650
Daniel Jones
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4465
Daniel Karr
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2000
Daniel Melton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4814
Daniel Melton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2378
Daniel Montano
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0853
Daniel Mr Foster
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4618
Daniel OBrien
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4835
Daniel Parker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1550
Daniel Perry
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0827
Daniel Roberts
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3205
Daniel Sfamurri
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1843
Daniel Stalling
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4602
Daniel Vallero
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2224
Daniel Witman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3029
Danielle Ohanesian
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4113
Dan'l Lewis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2149
Daphne Jackson
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
868
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2522
Daren Thompson
869
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1530
Darin Lauffer
870
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2472
Darla Lee
871
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1931
Darlene Hansen
872
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2543
Darlene Harris
873
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4195
Darlene Luten
874
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3216
Darline Balm-Demmel
875
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2350
Darren OConnor
876
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1148
Darren Parker
877
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3146
Darrin Miletello
878
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3855
DARRIN PRUETT
879
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2455
Darryl Speiser
880
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2526
Daryl Lawrence
881
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4227
Daryl Roberts
882
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0891
Dave Boehringer
883
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2688
Dave Conway
884
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1265
Dave Cook
885
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4057
Dave Gardner
886
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1554
Dave Jawaski
887
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2891
Dave Kisor
888
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2928
Dave Kisor
889
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4808
Dave Kwiatkowski
890
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4213
Dave Leach
891
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3787
Dave Lewis
892
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2719
Dave Nordlund
893
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1486
Dave Porter
894
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1867
Dave Porter
895
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4468
Dave Porter
3544
-------
Index
1
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2395
Dave See
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3304
David (incomplete
surname)
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1436
David Addison
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1511
David and JoAnn
Manke
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3539
David Armstrong
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3617
David Barton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2902
David Bezanson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4997
David Bishop
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1950
David Borosak
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2876
David Brandt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3450
David Chasman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2300
David Christiana
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1948
David Coats
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2570
David Conover
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3088
David Courvier
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4510
David Cummings
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4536
David Cyboron
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3907
David Darflinger
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2024
David Dick
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4888
David Erwin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4764
David F. Scatena
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2773
David Falls
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0973
David Fleisher
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4824
David Fleisher
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4322
David Foltz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3241
David Fones
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1235
David Ford
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1743
David Galloway
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
924
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1146
David Galuhn
925
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2294
David Gantose
926
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1730
David Gorsuch
927
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4230
David Green
928
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2960
David Hamilton
929
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1467
David Haynam
930
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1054
David Haynes
931
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1877
David Heritage
932
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1891
David Hock
933
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2914
David House
934
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2856
David Jaffe
935
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0929
David King
936
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3614
David King
937
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2684
David Koob
938
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4909
David Langley
939
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3401
David Leonardo
940
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4236
David Lucas
941
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1284
David M Hodges
942
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3354
David M. Dunn
943
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3915
David Mapes
944
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3759
David Markle
945
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2624
David Morgan
946
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4799
David Morgan
947
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1905
David Myers
948
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0810
David Olson
949
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2135
David Olson
950
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2115
David Perdue
951
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1611
David Perla
3545
-------
Index
1
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2191
David Potgeter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2141
David Prior
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1666
David Ravnikar
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3258
David Reich
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4811
David Rhodes
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0900
David Rocca
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1693
David Roper
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2967
David Ruben
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0965
David Schafranka
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4693
David Schmedt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3478
David Schoenthal
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1369
David Short
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5021
David Siler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3093
David Sillman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2242
David Simpson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2239
David Sisk
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1005
David Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4233
David Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2328
David Sowerwine
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3301
David Spitler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2812
David Sporkin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1637
David Throop
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1963
David Titzer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3483
David Trieweiler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4829
David Vaught
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3963
David Welz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1592
David Werden
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1400
David Wetzler
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
980
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3210
David Williams
981
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4358
David Zepeda
982
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5000
Davis Anderson
983
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2853
Dawn Casper
984
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4525
Dawn Castle
985
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1967
Dawn Dilley
986
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1316
Dean and Donna
Pankratz
987
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1978
Dean and Donna
Pankratz
988
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3716
Dean and Donna
Pankratz
989
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0439
Dean Bachelor
990
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2539
Deanna Gunter
991
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3681
Deanna Guy
992
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2323
Deanna Johnson
993
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3343
Deb Portney
994
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1160
Deb Schult
995
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1556
Deb Withee
996
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1656
Debb Knarian
997
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3653
Debb Knarian
998
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4344
Debbie McDaniel-
Lindsey
999
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3931
Debbie Rettmann
1000
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3391
Debbie Seelig
1001
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1865
Deborah Coonley
1002
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2478
Deborah Coonley
1003
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4066
Deborah Courtney
1004
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4090
Deborah Coxe
1005
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3715
Deborah Fuller
1006
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3348
Deborah Jacobs
1007
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1688
Deborah Jones
3546
-------
Index
1
1008
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
1014
1015
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026
1027
1028
1029
1030
1031
1032
1033
1034
1035
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1048
Deborah Kiley
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2160
Deborah Scarce
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4976
Deborah Stewart
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3748
Deborah Wells
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4242
Debra Kaufman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3369
Debra Rosenthal
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3862
Debra Shankland
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1627
Debra Simmonds
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4793
Debra Walsh
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2210
Dee A Manire
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2840
Dee Halzack
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2216
DeeAnn Siebum
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3598
DeEtte Moon
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4133
Delaware Electric
Vehicle Association
(DEEVA)
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4939
Den Mark Wichar
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1452
Denise Burns
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4779
Denise Fogel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3386
Denise Greco
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5036
Denise Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1992
Denise Lawson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3456
Denise O'Leary
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4460
Denise Toomasian
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1956
Dermis Aldrich
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2186
Dermis Caldwell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2067
Dermis Crouch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3431
Dermis DAmico
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2662
Dermis Dressier
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2533
Dermis Egbert
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1036
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3010
Dermis Freeman
1037
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0985
Dermis Jackson Sr.
1038
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2658
Dermis Koch
1039
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1658
Dermis Kraus
1040
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2693
Dermis Lane
1041
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4325
Dermis Martin
1042
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1330
Dermis Mattison
1043
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4323
Dermis Morrison
1044
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4968
Dermis Murphy
1045
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3446
Dermis Ramsey
1046
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0941
Dermis Schmit
1047
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2625
Dermis Schmit
1048
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3016
Dermis Sego
1049
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2296
Dermis Tapley
1050
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1532
Dermis Yoder
1051
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1240
Denny Allan
1052
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3971
Denny Huggard
1053
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1243
Derel Latta
1054
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3149
Deshon Orr
1055
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2094
DeWayne Nelon
1056
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1722
Dexter Bauer
1057
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3732
Dezri Dean
1058
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2146
Diana Fairhurst
1059
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3414
Diana Gomez
1060
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2132
Diane Benjamin
1061
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4491
Diane Cooper
1062
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1429
Diane Di Pomazio
1063
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1925
Diane Dofflemeyer
3547
-------
Index
1
1064
1065
1066
1067
1068
1069
1070
1071
1072
1073
1074
1075
1076
1077
1078
1079
1080
1081
1082
1083
1084
1085
1086
1087
1088
1089
1090
1091
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1764
Diane Eaton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2691
Diane Gilbert
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2721
Diane Henning
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3175
Diane Keefe
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1736
Diane Peterson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2808
Diane Swann
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4790
Diane Thomas
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2833
Diane Wallace
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3724
Diane Wallace
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4789
Diane Wallace
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4265
Dianna Ross
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4101
Dianne Coane
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4277
Dianne Fox
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3255
Digby Macdonald
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4607
Dirk Rice
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4454
Dixie Bishop
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4187
DJ Margason
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2622
DL Popowitch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3571
Dm Mink
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4722
Dolly Lynn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4622
Dolores Flanders
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1976
Dolores Lohr
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3484
Don Arnold
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4728
Don Davis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4601
Don Duvall
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3412
DON FISK
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2154
Don Hall
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4978
Don Hebel
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1092
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2547
Don Hilderbrand
1093
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1022
Don Kirchoff
1094
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3673
Don Kirchoff
1095
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4140
Don Lipmanson
1096
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2726
Don Reese
1097
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1787
Don Smith
1098
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2694
Don Volz
1099
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2708
Don Woodward
1100
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4794
Don Woodward
1101
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2976
Donald Beck
1102
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1818
Donald Berrian
1103
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4732
Donald Boggs
1104
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3239
Donald Brumm
1105
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4348
Donald Bush
1106
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3925
Donald Carnley
1107
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3999
Donald Eastlund
1108
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1387
Donald Garlit
1109
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0441
Donald Graham
1110
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3024
Donald Gunnell
1111
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1393
Donald Harms
1112
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1135
Donald Helsel
1113
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4215
Donald Hudgins
1114
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2026
Donald Raynor
1115
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1919
Donald Salyer
1116
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2977
Donald Schoeb
1117
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3064
Donald Shonk
1118
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2385
Donald Smith
1119
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1349
Donald Taylor
3548
-------
Index
1
1120
1121
1122
1123
1124
1125
1126
1127
1128
1129
1130
1131
1132
1133
1134
1135
1136
1137
1138
1139
1140
1141
1142
1143
1144
1145
1146
1147
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2454
Donald Vance
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2053
Donald Waggener
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4386
Donald Wilde
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3893
Donna Alderman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3625
Donna Baynai
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2937
Donna Dettrick
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3543
Donna Ellingsen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1069
Donna Ellis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4932
Donna Fine
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1077
Donna Furches
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4588
Donna Gellman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4710
Donna Gross
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1167
Donna Handshy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3050
Donna Lampkin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4459
Donna Lampkin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4621
Donna McCabe
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1916
Donna Rosa
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2400
Donna Rosa
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1841
Donna Stewart
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2279
Donna Vaughan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1962
Donna Weimer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2321
Dorcas Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3144
Doreen Miller
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4247
Dori Lopez
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4079
Doris McCarter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2316
Dorothy Cline
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4050
Dorthy Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2449
Doug Bernhard
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1148
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1446
Doug Brown
1149
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4040
Doug Cullinan
1150
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3605
Doug Glaspell
1151
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4331
Doug Glaspell
1152
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5001
Doug Heydrick
1153
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4148
Doug Spittler
1154
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4069
Doug Stearns
1155
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2074
Douglas Atkinson
1156
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2609
Douglas Day
1157
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0932
Douglas Hepner
1158
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3270
Douglas Holmes
1159
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4734
Douglas Huston
1160
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3471
Douglas Jones
1161
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3397
Douglas Manuel
1162
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2610
DOUGLAS PERLE
1163
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1105
Douglas Ross
1164
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5052
Douglas Russell
1165
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4652
Douglas Smith
1166
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1619
Douglas Stierheim
1167
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2009
Douglas Wagner
1168
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1677
Douglas Weber
1169
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0995
Duane Kotwicki
1170
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2582
Duane Kotwicki
1171
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3235
Duane Kotwicki
1172
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4889
Duane Robertson
1173
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1038
Dustin Granger
1174
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2714
Dwayne Oxford
1175
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4784
Dwight Gregory
3549
-------
Index
1
1176
1177
1178
1179
1180
1181
1182
1183
1184
1185
1186
1187
1188
1189
1190
1191
1192
1193
1194
1195
1196
1197
1198
1199
1200
1201
1202
1203
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4640
Dylan Hammer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2379
E. Higgins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4105
E. Higgins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2639
E. Lang
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0446
E. Perry
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4800
Earl Alderfer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1723
Earl Rizzo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0993
Ebony Tillman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3172
Ed Carter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4612
Ed Crump
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2835
Ed Jones
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4024
Ed LaGrange
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3229
Ed Loosli
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2716
Ed Love
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1540
Ed Olas
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1641
Ed Rogers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2384
Ed Tommasino
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1271
Ed Travis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3458
Ed Turner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3072
Eddie Byrn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0873
Edgar Baker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0864
Edin Velasquez
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3240
Edith Laufer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1405
Edith Ogella
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1655
Edmund Palmer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1663
Edmund Palmer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4362
Eduardo Fernando
Doriacio de Almeida
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2289
Edward and Beatrice
Simpson
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1204
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4409
Edward and Beatrice
Simpson
1205
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2486
Edward Arndorfer
1206
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1274
Edward Bonach
1207
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1306
Edward Christoffers
1208
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1915
Edward Dunne
1209
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1031
Edward Jonson
1210
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3408
Edward Katz
1211
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1189
Edward Loredo
1212
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5013
Edward Maibach
1213
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5038
Edward Perkins
1214
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0833
Edward Rak
1215
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1780
Edward Rothberg
1216
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4443
Edward Sommer
1217
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5030
Edwin C. Hightower
1218
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2516
Edwin Daughety
1219
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3118
Edwin Sasek
1220
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4945
Edwina Allen
1221
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3589
Eileen Fries
1222
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4591
Eileen Fries
1223
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3973
Eileen Hatch
1224
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3347
Eileen J. Marum
1225
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3652
Eileen Korenberg
1226
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4774
Eileen McCorry
1227
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4211
Eileen Ruppel
1228
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2921
Eileen Vara
1229
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1156
Eilene Fisher
1230
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3404
Elaine Ferguson
1231
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1685
Elaine Pacheco
3550
-------
Index
1
1232
1233
1234
1235
1236
1237
1238
1239
1240
1241
1242
1243
1244
1245
1246
1247
1248
1249
1250
1251
1252
1253
1254
1255
1256
1257
1258
1259
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3527
Elaine Schrade
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1155
Elaine Stackhouse
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2848
Eleanor Dvorak
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2756
Eleanor Mayfield
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0878
Eli Davis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5008
Eli Lu
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4377
Elicia Bowman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4672
Eliece Rybak
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4941
Elise MacDonald
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3104
Elizabeth Banwell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2787
Elizabeth Boardman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3674
Elizabeth Crespo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2750
Elizabeth Dion
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1127
Elizabeth Edinger
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4204
Elizabeth Ellison-Frost
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3300
Elizabeth Giannini
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4444
Elizabeth Iszler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3913
Elizabeth Jones
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1857
Elizabeth Lawhorne
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4733
Elizabeth Mascolo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3169
Elizabeth Pottorff
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3232
Elizabeth Sexton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2837
Elizabeth Sprague
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4737
Elizabeth Sully
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2979
Elizabeth Teal
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1334
Elizabeth Wiese
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4251
Elizabeth Yates
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1995
Elizabeth York
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1260
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4907
Elizabeth Yount
1261
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4883
Ella Saunders
1262
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3885
Ellen Bender
1263
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2872
Ellen Graham-Buchanan
1264
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1899
Ellen Gross
1265
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1202
Ellen Jennings
1266
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1223
Ellen Kent
1267
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1425
Ellen Leyrer
1268
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3921
Ellen Long
1269
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4657
Ellen Schaub
1270
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2170
Ellen Varhalla
1271
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2664
Ellena Anderson
1272
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4492
Ellie Beal
1273
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4659
Elliott Baker
1274
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2585
Elliott Miller
1275
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2004
Ellyn Downs
1276
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3096
Elsie V (No surname
provided)
1277
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1390
Elyce Santerre
1278
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0438
Emia Oppenheim
1279
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3342
Emily A. McCully
1280
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3352
Emily Brandt
1281
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1993
Emily Ching
1282
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4928
Emily Miksic
1283
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2868
Emma Shook
1284
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1114
Emmett Reed
1285
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1116
Enrique Mendez
1286
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0886
Eric and Kari Ostlie
1287
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2359
Eric Blackstone
3551
-------
Index
1
1288
1289
1290
1291
1292
1293
1294
1295
1296
1297
1298
1299
1300
1301
1302
1303
1304
1305
1306
1307
1308
1309
1310
1311
1312
1313
1314
1315
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3246
Eric Kemmerer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4124
Eric Lewis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1431
Eric M Swaisgood
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4504
Eric Mueller
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3464
Eric Muller
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1724
eric nelson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2235
Eric Ostlie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4860
Eric Ostlie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4868
Eric Ostlie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3143
Eric Payne
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4770
Eric Stordahl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4077
Eric Stout
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0956
Erica Mitrano
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2089
Erich Benndorff
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2676
Erich Slimak
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4135
Erich Slimak
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0818
Erin Fuller
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1998
Erin Keane
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2380
ErinRo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3708
Erman Croney
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4336
Ernest Choquette
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4877
Ernest Cuellar
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1021
Ernest Lottman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4392
Ernest Lottman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2442
Ernie Cash
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2103
Ernie Wiggins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2900
Ervin Kelman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1064
Eslai Gersten
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1316
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2875
Esther Diamondstone
1317
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1453
Esther Sheppard
1318
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3922
Esther Thebo
1319
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2202
ET Rosenberger
1320
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3779
Ethan Jensen
1321
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1333
Eugene Kavanagh
1322
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3951
Eugene Korzeniowski
1323
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1494
Eugene Loh
1324
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3774
Eugenia Ramsey
1325
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2271
Evan Doggett
1326
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0468
Evangelical
Environmental Network
(EEN)
1327
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3101
Eve Vogel
1328
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3501
Evelyn Dreher
1329
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0954
Evelyn McCallum
1330
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3082
Evelyn Montalvo
1331
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0822
Evelyn White
1332
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2590
Everett Craft
1333
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2771
Faith Durbano
1334
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3573
Faith Skirvin
1335
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1555
Faith Zimmerman
1336
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3026
Faye Strait
1337
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4653
Felix Alray
1338
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2313
Felix Mbuga
1339
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3560
Felix Yu
1340
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3087
Feng Qin
1341
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4805
Ferdinand Nowicki
1342
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1421
Filiberto Aponte
1343
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3943
Floretta Guanciale
3552
-------
Index
1
1344
1345
1346
1347
1348
1349
1350
1351
1352
1353
1354
1355
1356
1357
1358
1359
1360
1361
1362
1363
1364
1365
1366
1367
1368
1369
1370
1371
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2100
Floyd Collier
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1199
Forrest Covington
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0942
Forrest Patterson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2643
Forrest Patterson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2464
Francesco Angelini
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4360
Francis Dolan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4318
Frank Bettig
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0807
Frank Braun
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1373
Frank Broadwater
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4863
Frank Gonzales
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1394
Frank Janecek
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1969
Frank Janecek
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2140
Frank Parriott
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1129
Frank Pilholski
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2172
Frank Rivera
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4486
Frank Strock
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1966
Frank Voelker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2196
Fred Burr
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3588
Fred Carter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2078
Fred Davis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2029
Fred Goebel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2068
Fred Gowers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1198
Fred Griffith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4862
Fred Haneke
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4632
Fred Hartman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4212
Fred Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3755
Fred Kiehl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3051
Fred MacDonald
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1372
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1529
Fred Montgomery
1373
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3599
Fred Palombi
1374
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4727
Fred Palombi
1375
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5041
Fred R. Davis
1376
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1221
Fred Reitman
1377
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1225
Fred Reitman
1378
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4209
Fred Scheibl
1379
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3286
Fredd Patterson
1380
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3810
Frederick Bull
1381
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2532
Frederick Maureen
1382
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4801
Frederick Piazza
1383
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3687
Freya Harris
1384
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1299
Fritz Beiermeister
1385
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4423
G Siegler (no first name
provided)
1386
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4412
Gabrielle Corson
1387
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4296
Gail Beck
1388
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0990
Gail Daley
1389
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2788
Gail Eastwood
1390
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1126
Gail Lee
1391
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4517
Gar Williams
1392
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0428
Garbett Homes
1393
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4619
Garrett Hawkins
1394
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4598
Garry Niemeyer
1395
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2371
Garry Sanner
1396
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4181
Garth Wilson
1397
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3173
Gary Bennett
1398
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2679
Gary Chapman
1399
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1269
Gary Clowe
3553
-------
Index
1
1400
1401
1402
1403
1404
1405
1406
1407
1408
1409
1410
1411
1412
1413
1414
1415
1416
1417
1418
1419
1420
1421
1422
1423
1424
1425
1426
1427
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2291
Gary Farber
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1839
Gary Green
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3637
Gary Gregoire
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2665
Gary Grissett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3403
Gary James
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0967
Gary Knecht
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4271
Gary Krukemyer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4643
Gary Lantrip
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5040
Gary Lee
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3939
Gary Lohmann
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4758
Gary McQuain
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2802
Gary Nelson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2707
Gary Oakden
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1926
Gary Olson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3221
Gary Olson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4397
Gary Olson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3829
gary reisen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3917
Gary Sabel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3451
Gary Schmierer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2259
Gary Schultz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3203
Gary Scott
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3704
Gary Scott
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3664
Gary Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1874
Gary Stevens
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4027
Gary Stevens
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1634
Gary Strader
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3005
Gary Tate
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4109
Gary Uhlemeyer
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1428
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2104
Gaye Ellis
1429
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3111
Gayla Shoemake
1430
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2109
Gayle Wayne
1431
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5074
Gaylon George
1432
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4477
Gaylord Randel
1433
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2983
Gene Gammon
1434
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4521
Gene Van Buren
1435
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3766
Geneva Lehman
1436
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4411
Genevieve Gavin
1437
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1789
Geoffrey Meyer
1438
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3265
Geoffrey Wood
1439
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4546
George Blackburn
1440
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3877
George Bohman
1441
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2881
George Brieger
1442
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4319
George Bryant
1443
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2002
George Ehlers
1444
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1034
George Farley
1445
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1737
George Hagenauer
1446
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3002
George Harold
1447
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1928
George Harpole
1448
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2335
George Hebert
1449
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4753
George Kooshian
1450
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3838
George Kundert
1451
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2794
George Mihalovich
1452
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2572
George Reed
1453
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3462
George Roesler
1454
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3234
George Schroeder
1455
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4683
George Shelton
3554
-------
Index
1
1456
1457
1458
1459
1460
1461
1462
1463
1464
1465
1466
1467
1468
1469
1470
1471
1472
1473
1474
1475
1476
1477
1478
1479
1480
1481
1482
1483
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4440
George Stock
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3648
George Sussex
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4029
George Tucker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3593
George Vieto
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3778
George Vieto
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3934
George Williams
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4004
Gerald (Gary) Sheperis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1474
Gerald Lavallee
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1323
Gerald Michelsen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4433
Gerard Luciano
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3747
Gerard Rosemeier
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3080
Gerard Wetzel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3498
Gerry Cunningham
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2886
Gilberto Lopez
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3620
Gina Libby
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0835
Gina Muller
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3631
Gina West
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2695
Ginger Burnett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3799
Ginger Silvers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4003
Gladys Davis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1106
Glen Anderson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2839
Glen Anderson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4900
Glen Conkling
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3944
Glen Hand
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1799
Glen Martin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2873
Glen Weisberg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2365
Glen Williams
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3238
Glen Williams
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1484
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4246
Glenda Disney
1485
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1070
Glenda Sarratt
1486
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3591
Glenda Sowders
1487
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1374
Glenn Nelson
1488
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0913
Gloria E. Barrera
1489
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3786
Gloria Gunther
1490
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4511
Gloria Horton
1491
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1512
Gloria Melendez
1492
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1817
Gloria Pippin
1493
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4416
Go Clemson
1494
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3659
Gordon Doughman
1495
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4674
Grace Farago
1496
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3044
Grady McMurtry
1497
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1419
Graham Lief
1498
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0984
Grayson Shaw
1499
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5050
Greg Feigh
1500
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0982
Greg Hawes
1501
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4208
Greg Jeffries
1502
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1298
Greg Knapp
1503
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3390
Greg Lehenbauer
1504
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3840
Greg McElfresh
1505
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1318
Greg Walter
1506
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2357
Greg Weinfurtner
1507
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3091
Gregg Elsom
1508
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4729
Gregory Adam's
1509
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4704
Gregory Anderson
1510
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0825
Gregory Case
1511
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2188
Gregory Pilcher
3555
-------
Index
1
1512
1513
1514
1515
1516
1517
1518
1519
1520
1521
1522
1523
1524
1525
1526
1527
1528
1529
1530
1531
1532
1533
1534
1535
1536
1537
1538
1539
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2290
Gregory Ptucha
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3140
Gregory Ragan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3574
Gregory Ravy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2648
Gregory Stineman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1570
Gregrey Porter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2332
Gunta Alexander
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3222
Guthrie Kushner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2046
Gwen Bleacher
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3337
Gwen Davies
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3692
Gwen McAllen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4383
Gwen Young
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1143
Gyula Bognar
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4051
H. J. Raehn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1131
H.L. Chrissos
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3486
Hal Holmes
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1291
Hal Richards
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4831
Haley Bickelhaupt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1674
Halina Wareen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4445
Halina Wareen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2803
Hancock Mary
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3327
Hannah Decker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3776
Harford Ellis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2573
Harley Jones
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3655
Harold Hodges
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2027
Harold Panabaker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3898
Harold Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4436
Harold Thornbrough
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5048
Harold Uber Kellogg
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1540
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4859
Harold Wallace
1541
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1384
Harold Welborn
1542
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2940
Harriet Moulder
1543
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4294
Harry Holt
1544
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3749
Harry Mathis
1545
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4139
Harry Rothwell
1546
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4048
Harry Townsend
1547
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2253
Harvey Gjesdal
1548
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3030
Harvey Lewis
1549
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4434
Hattie Sponar
1550
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4571
Hattie Sponar
1551
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1509
Hayley Easton
1552
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0598
Healthy Climate
Wisconsin et al.
1553
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0820
Heather Burgon
1554
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3903
Heather Ewing
1555
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1681
Heather Gessler
1556
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2319
Heather Gessler
1557
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4371
Heather Hampton
Knodle
1558
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3825
Heather Janvrin
1559
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3822
Heather Low
1560
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3171
Heather Macleod
1561
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2591
HEATHER
MACNAUGHTON
1562
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4697
Heather Onder
1563
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2317
Heather Stanton
1564
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2903
Heather Stevens
1565
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3826
Hector Haddock
1566
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3244
Heidi Geschwill
1567
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1218
Heidi Gremillion
3556
-------
Index
1
1568
1569
1570
1571
1572
1573
1574
1575
1576
1577
1578
1579
1580
1581
1582
1583
1584
1585
1586
1587
1588
1589
1590
1591
1592
1593
1594
1595
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2120
Heidi Kellett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3552
Heldur Hakk
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2883
Helen Banks
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1332
Helen Jenkins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5080
Helena Melone
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1087
Helmut Zimmerman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2867
Henry Atkins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3023
Henry Koopman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2457
Henry Mackey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1066
Herbert Garber
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4711
Herbert Reed
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3633
Herbert Scott
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4338
Herbert Woodbury
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4467
Herman Whiterabbit
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1921
Hiram Skeggs
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4778
Hollis Helmed
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2184
Holly Buchanan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3757
Holly Carnaggio
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1210
Holly Fairfield
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1162
Howard Campbell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2531
Howard Campbell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3379
Howard Grayless
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2579
HUGH WEST
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3770
Hugo Meier
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4117
Humberto Torralba
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2234
Ian Sloey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3660
Inelda Gebhart
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0471
Ingrida Gray
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1596
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3752
Irene Lee
1597
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1083
Iris Scheibl
1598
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4644
Isobel Dozier
1599
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3727
Ivalene Miller
1600
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3058
Ivars Loce
1601
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4452
J Bell
1602
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1547
JW
1603
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2747
J. B.
1604
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3120
J. J. Morran
1605
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2702
J. S. (no surname
provided)
1606
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3545
Jacalyn Barnes
1607
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4055
Jace Raney
1608
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1732
Jack DeVience
1609
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1364
jack fennimore
1610
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3629
Jack Kirby
1611
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1422
Jack Smith
1612
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2565
Jack Smith
1613
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3059
Jack Stewart
1614
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2854
Jackie Rolfs
1615
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2050
Jackson Ogden
1616
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0986
Jaclyn Finlinson
1617
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1415
Jacob Caler,
Airbagit.com
1618
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1290
Jacob Emrich
1619
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2653
Jacob Kaiser
1620
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4524
Jacqualine Toninihe
1621
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1401
Jacqueline Cuthbertson
Cuthbertson
1622
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3156
Jacqueline Rinker
1623
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4216
Jacques Sapriel
3557
-------
Index
1
1624
1625
1626
1627
1628
1629
1630
1631
1632
1633
1634
1635
1636
1637
1638
1639
1640
1641
1642
1643
1644
1645
1646
1647
1648
1649
1650
1651
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2443
Jacquette Flitter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2302
Jadwiga Spiewak
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2775
Jae Sabol
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0871
Jaelynn Bair
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4981
James Allen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4989
James Allman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3055
James Andrews
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1610
James Baker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4210
James Baker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1144
James Bianco
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3564
James Bohl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2171
James Bristol
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2581
James Burton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1544
James Callahan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2257
JAMES CALLAHAN
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4911
James DePue
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3048
James Deuro
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2515
James Dewitz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1029
James Dini
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0750
James E. Zook
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4721
James Eckroat
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4341
James England
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1432
James Engler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2923
James Fargo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3479
James Ferris
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4321
James Fisher
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1297
James Fitts
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3569
James Fitts
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1652
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4018
James Fosnaught
1653
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1835
James Frank
1654
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5049
James Freeman
1655
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0872
James Funkhouser
1656
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3507
James Godsey
1657
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4861
James Goodson
1658
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3047
James Green
1659
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1575
James Halton
1660
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2444
James Haynes
1661
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4015
James Heine
1662
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4848
James Heine
1663
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3904
James hemund
1664
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4999
James Hughes
1665
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3720
James Jones
1666
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4707
James kaiser
1667
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1908
James Kennedy
1668
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4245
James King
1669
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2715
James LaCroix
1670
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1793
James Lambert
1671
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4987
James Lawrence
1672
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3772
James Lebron
1673
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1041
James Matlock
1674
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1606
James McGill
1675
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4239
James McGill
1676
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1583
James McKeever
1677
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1498
James McPartland
1678
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1345
James Miller
1679
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4739
James Miller
3558
-------
Index
1
1680
1681
1682
1683
1684
1685
1686
1687
1688
1689
1690
1691
1692
1693
1694
1695
1696
1697
1698
1699
1700
1701
1702
1703
1704
1705
1706
1707
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3519
James Ozee
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2892
James Parker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1779
James Parrott
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4482
james Pevehouse
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1911
James Purcell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1000
James Quinn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1505
James Quinn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2346
James Rader
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4044
James Reed
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4600
James Reed
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1138
James Rife
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2922
James Robert
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3610
James Robert
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3612
James Rogers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4249
James Rutland
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2381
James Sawyer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3119
James Sharp
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3052
James Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5090
James Sterman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4500
James Talcott
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2614
James Thurau
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1725
James Trice
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1842
Jamie Bartlett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3373
Jamie Brooks
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3346
Jamie Hill
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1541
Jamie Jepsrb
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1150
Jan Beglinger
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3611
Jan Bonanza
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1708
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4655
Jan Kuehlich
1709
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2177
Jan Lapides
1710
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2007
Jan Peddy
1711
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1095
Jana Bryant
1712
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2984
Jana Doak
1713
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1470
Jana Hargreaves
1714
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5035
Jane B. Schildge
1715
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4970
Jane Burgei
1716
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4255
Jane Byrnes
1717
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3578
Jane Groves
1718
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1337
Jane Pooler
1719
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1778
Jane Terwilliger
1720
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2463
Jane van Dis
1721
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4368
Janene Paramore
1722
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3511
Janet Barwick
1723
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2589
Janet Beaver
1724
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4985
Janet Gerla
1725
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5058
Janet Gilbert
1726
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4273
Janet Graves
1727
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3798
Janet Hanson
1728
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3897
Janet Harden
1729
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1104
Janet Monell
1730
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4047
Janet Reynolds
1731
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2731
Janet Skjonsby
1732
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4485
Janet Skjonsby
1733
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4461
Janice Brans
1734
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1296
Janice Dunbar
1735
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3949
Janice Dupuy-Green
3559
-------
Index
1
1736
1737
1738
1739
1740
1741
1742
1743
1744
1745
1746
1747
1748
1749
1750
1751
1752
1753
1754
1755
1756
1757
1758
1759
1760
1761
1762
1763
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5046
Janice L. Myers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4806
Janice Stanko
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1493
Janice Taylor
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2006
Janice Whaley
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4184
Janiece Archer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0816
Janine Ford
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3496
Janine Hanson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2334
Janis Wagner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1827
Jaquelyn Soto
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2838
Jared Laiti
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1168
Jarett Wonski
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4451
Jarod Kouma
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0431
Jason Barlow
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5037
Jason Clouse
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1662
Jason Eby
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3852
Jason Nigg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1985
Jason Peoples
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2551
Jason Reeder
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4995
Jason Reeder
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1430
Jason Van Lishout
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4797
Jay McCaman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4720
Jay Miller
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4825
Jay Parks
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3615
Jay Stermer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2588
Jay Talsma
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3896
Jay Vierra
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2339
Jay Vines
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4089
Jay Vines
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1764
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1898
Jayme Burkhart
1765
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1473
Jayne Hampton
1766
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3966
Jayson Marvich
1767
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2370
JBrad Lewis
1768
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3128
JC Mayfield
1769
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4549
Jean Dudley
1770
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2142
JeanFinke
1771
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2446
Jean Hagemann
1772
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2129
Jean Peavler
1773
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2520
Jean Weymier
1774
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4946
Jean Wynn
1775
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4572
Jeanette Mitchell
1776
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4118
Jeanette Mott Oxford
1777
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4580
Jeanette Nappier
1778
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3506
Jeanette Schouweiler
1779
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1025
Jeanna Benoy
1780
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1561
Jeanne Carroll
1781
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2412
Jeanne Everett
1782
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4741
Jeanne Ruiz
1783
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1301
Jeanne Schoettle
1784
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3918
Jeannette Wiley
1785
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3448
Jeannie Anderson
1786
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2757
Jeannie Smith
1787
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1742
Jed Hendrickson
1788
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1413
Jeff Alson
1789
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2252
Jeff Bailey
1790
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4147
Jeff Chase
1791
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0939
Jeff Gott
3560
-------
Index
1
1792
1793
1794
1795
1796
1797
1798
1799
1800
1801
1802
1803
1804
1805
1806
1807
1808
1809
1810
1811
1812
1813
1814
1815
1816
1817
1818
1819
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2692
Jeff Gott
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4557
Jeff Gott
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1190
Jeff Hancock
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2448
Jeff Knobloch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4752
Jeff Miller
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2656
Jeff Phi ster
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1256
Jeff Rohal
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2069
Jeff Shrewsbury
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2546
Jeff Vines
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1977
Jeff Weber
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3712
Jeffery Mitchell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3590
Jeffrey Beauman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4702
Jeffrey Conz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2797
Jeffrey Daniels
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2227
Jeffrey DeCristofaro
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4502
Jeffrey Greenstein
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5010
Jeffrey Kerr
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2173
Jeffrey Kochan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4272
Jeffrey Kotyk
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3941
Jeffrey Kovatch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3515
Jeffrey Loomis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5003
Jeffrey Pierce
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4626
Jeffrey Scates
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4713
Jeffrey Torsrud
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2409
Jen Chandler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2831
Jen Rund
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3123
Jenifer Garlitz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4917
Jenifer-Joan Lauren
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1820
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4935
Jennifer Andrews
1821
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3285
Jennifer Capps
1822
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4759
Jennifer DeVault
1823
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2933
Jennifer Drennan
1824
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1377
Jennifer Elliott
1825
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3844
Jennifer Giancola
1826
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3125
Jennifer Hartman
1827
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2586
Jennifer Jaspersen
1828
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3831
Jennifer Johnson
1829
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3914
Jennifer Jordan
1830
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4767
Jennifer McMurtray
1831
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4769
Jennifer Nitz
1832
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3103
Jennifer Pick
1833
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4931
Jennifer Rentfleish
1834
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2447
Jennifer Runquist
1835
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3469
Jennifer Young
1836
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1475
Jenny Kuklok
1837
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0819
Jerald Slatter
1838
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4065
Jeremy hanson
1839
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3147
Jeremy Lee
1840
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1569
Jeri Brooke
1841
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4480
Jerome Lederer
1842
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1039
Jerry Aiken
1843
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1385
Jerry Andree
1844
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4656
Jerry Black
1845
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3640
Jerry Bowers
1846
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4544
Jerry Drummond
1847
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4099
Jerry Dunn
3561
-------
Index
1
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4011
Jerry Ewing
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3940
Jerry Hunt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1580
Jerry Morford
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3199
Jerry Morford
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4647
Jerry Musil
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2995
Jerry Stern
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4484
Jerry Stern
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0969
Jerry Thomas
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1654
Jerry Tipperreiter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1490
Jesse Busby
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0437
Jesse Gamueda
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1802
Jesse White
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2401
Jessica Craven
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3407
Jessica Drauniivilevu
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3228
Jessie Panek
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1602
JG Haley
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2274
Jill Goodrich
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3690
Jill Heins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0832
Jill Irish
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1860
Jill Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3331
Jill Seiden
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2164
Jill Wiseman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2275
Jim Bartos
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1024
Jim Best
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2816
Jim Betty Burrell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1628
Jim Carter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2303
Jim Gearhart
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2499
Jim Gillum
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1876
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4535
Jim Hajek
1877
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2704
Jim Hinkle
1878
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2281
Jim Holm
1879
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3775
Jim Hoover
1880
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1484
Jim Jess
1881
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1055
Jim Montgomery
1882
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3449
Jim Muller
1883
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1266
Jim Neff
1884
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0905
Jim O.
1885
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3987
Jim Plaquet
1886
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2961
Jim Ry
1887
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2180
Jim Schafer
1888
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2807
Jim Steitz
1889
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1870
Jim Thatcher
1890
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3738
Jim Washington
1891
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2471
Jim Zook
1892
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1258
Jimmy Halford
1893
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4426
Jion von Leden
1894
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2952
JJ Smith
1895
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3113
Jo Anna Tobey
1896
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1622
Jo Dee Preston
1897
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3152
Jo Dee Preston
1898
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2799
Jo Reichler
1899
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2745
Joan Donovan
1900
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3335
Joan Flatt
1901
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1383
Joan Formeister
1902
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1791
Joan Hampton
1903
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3336
Joan Hartman Moore
3562
-------
Index
1
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3307
Joan Jacobson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0926
Joan MacDonald
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1903
Joan Mcknatt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2822
Joan Milewski
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2022
Joan Russell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1216
Joan Storlie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2495
JoAnnFord
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1020
JoAnn Thometz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2077
Joanna Bishop
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4404
Joanna Suskawicz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3784
Joanne Bernstein
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1782
Joanne Empie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2460
Joanne Mullins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2545
Joanne Mullins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2049
Jody Benjamin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1576
Jody Cefola
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1072
Joe Baker Jr
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1753
Joe Duffy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2232
Joe Fowler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1009
Joe Gentry
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1510
Joe Gentry
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2176
Joe Haraburda
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0901
Joe Huber
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1896
Joe Huber
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2336
Joe McCarthy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2143
Joe Morrash
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4624
Joe Murphy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4112
Joe Naples
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1932
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4625
Joe Shubert
1933
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4817
Joe Tanasse
1934
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4343
Joe Terney
1935
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4803
Joe Wolfe
1936
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1749
Joel Ellis
1937
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3141
Joel Tooley
1938
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1357
Joelle Harmon
1939
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2663
Joey Nilan
1940
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4954
Joh Oboyle
1941
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2836
Johanna Halbeisen
1942
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2936
John Adams
1943
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4871
John Adams
1944
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4111
John Aiken
1945
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1986
John And Laura Rahe
1946
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2387
John Awezec
1947
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3004
John Bagby
1948
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4028
John Bakkila
1949
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3381
John Belcastro
1950
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1459
John Berg
1951
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1922
John Bergin
1952
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1585
John Betan
1953
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2349
John Boden
1954
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1772
John Broomell
1955
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3499
John Broomell
1956
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1259
John Burns
1957
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3017
John Byrd
1958
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2718
John Cannon
1959
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2682
John Cheeseman
3563
-------
Index
1
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4873
John Cochrane
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4408
John Commerford
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4717
john connell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4475
John Conte
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2804
John Conway
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3866
John Cook
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3803
John Cordell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1321
John Creighton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2497
John Cullings
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4926
John Daggett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2292
John David Craig
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4605
John Dobie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1026
JOhn Doe
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2962
John Droz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4662
John Dulph
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2263
John Ekberg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3763
John Elder
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4115
John Grabowski
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1845
John Grsy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5067
John Halloran
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3867
John Harrington
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4049
John Harris
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4285
John Hovis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3266
John Ims
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0847
John Jackson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0794
John Jay Ulloth
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4290
John Kappus
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1165
John Klos
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
1988
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2597
John Kracht
1989
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4304
John Kracht
1990
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4299
John Lettow
1991
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1525
John Lomax
1992
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2453
John Lowery
1993
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3074
John Markham
1994
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3980
John Masse
1995
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3983
John McCauley
1996
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1192
John McClellan
1997
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1497
John Meier
1998
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1761
John Merola
1999
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4761
John Meyer
2000
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1464
John Miller
2001
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3873
John Mitchell
2002
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2826
John Morris
2003
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4052
John Morrison
2004
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2017
John Murdock
2005
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4429
John Nelson
2006
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1320
John Nicholson
2007
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4157
John Nicholson
2008
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1608
John Nowosacki
2009
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2505
John Oberneder
2010
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4785
John Omaha
2011
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0931
John Owens
2012
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4669
John Petty
2013
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4153
John Pinto
2014
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2727
johnreaux
2015
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2620
John Ruane
3564
-------
Index
1
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2524
John Russell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2358
John Rymer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3592
John Sadler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4201
John Sakers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1508
John Schiano
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1939
John Schiano
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1906
John Schmitt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4032
John Schmitt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1684
John Schultz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1434
John Sekulich Jr
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4755
John Showalter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1483
John Slusser
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1889
John Slusser
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3419
John Slusser
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4471
John Steich
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3722
John Stowe
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2514
John Stull
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2924
John Sweeney
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3769
John Taylor
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0803
John Tischler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4355
John Totten
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4274
John Twigg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2847
John Vanellis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1644
John Viehweg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4528
John Walcott
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2874
John Wallace
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4754
John Ward
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3978
John Wiltsie
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2044
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2964
John Zupanc
2045
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4788
Johnnie McBride
2046
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2001
Joianne Pettigrove
2047
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1112
Jolynn Sitagata
2048
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1463
Jon Antonson
2049
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1496
Jon Coker
2050
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1795
Jon Gildea
2051
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3623
Jon Higley
2052
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2963
Jon Kube
2053
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4623
Jon Rosenstiel
2054
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4577
Jon Sheehan
2055
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4977
Jon Sheehan
2056
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2220
Jon Vonleden
2057
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3952
Jonalee Meyer-Watkins
2058
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4264
Jonathan Powell
2059
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1784
Jonathan Schaff
2060
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1999
Jonathan Sisk
2061
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0908
Jonathan Walker
2062
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3339
Jonathan Wilcox
2063
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3153
Jonathan Wiley
2064
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4706
Jonn Tropp
2065
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3208
Jordan Jones
2066
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0869
Jordyn Jackson
2067
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3181
Joseph B. Cassidy, III
2068
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4670
Joseph Balbi
2069
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1145
Joseph Barry
2070
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1027
Joseph Bell
2071
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4432
Joseph Bell
3565
-------
Index
1
2072
2073
2074
2075
2076
2077
2078
2079
2080
2081
2082
2083
2084
2085
2086
2087
2088
2089
2090
2091
2092
2093
2094
2095
2096
2097
2098
2099
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1582
Joseph Brady
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4330
Joseph Centeno
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3480
Joseph Dauster
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2161
Joseph Eichel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4346
Joseph Felegie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2108
Joseph Ferrell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1686
Joseph Ferrell Sr.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4357
Joseph Flemming
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2742
Joseph Garraffa
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3467
Joseph Garraffa
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4203
Joseph Keenen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4514
Joseph Kessler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3619
Joseph Knapp
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4559
Joseph Lakatos
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2382
Joseph Lindsey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2681
Joseph Pero
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0874
Joseph Sanchez
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2744
Joseph Sardina
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4068
Josh Elliott
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0975
Josh Hunt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5065
Joshua Ezekiel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4006
Joshua Fox
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3162
Joshua Gibson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2431
Joshua Latino
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4137
Joshua Pessar
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4982
Joy Randolph
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3358
Joyce Benenson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4489
Joyce Davis
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2100
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2465
Joyce Edwards
2101
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4878
Joyce Hohner
2102
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2780
Joyce Hyne
2103
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4450
Joyce Mast
2104
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1940
Joyce Tilbury
2105
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2549
Joyce Vinton
2106
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3990
Joyce Vinton
2107
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4275
Joyce Vinton
2108
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2010
Joyce Walczynski
2109
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3182
Joyce Weir
2110
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2506
JR Stern
2111
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2627
Juanita Coffelt
2112
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1101
Judith Branson
2113
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0839
Judith Doyle
2114
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5073
Judith Eda
2115
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3038
Judith Kaplan
2116
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2748
Judith Murphy
2117
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0806
Judith Pfeiffer
2118
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2844
Judith Preciado
2119
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4278
JUDY BUDKE
2120
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0920
Judy Danielson
2121
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0918
Judy Grant
2122
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1388
Judy Hahn
2123
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3937
Judy Lomax
2124
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3688
Judy Lukasiewicz
2125
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2458
Judy Reynolds
2126
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4938
Judy Schultz
2127
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1099
Juli Kring
3566
-------
Index
1
2128
2129
2130
2131
2132
2133
2134
2135
2136
2137
2138
2139
2140
2141
2142
2143
2144
2145
2146
2147
2148
2149
2150
2151
2152
2153
2154
2155
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4738
Juli Kring
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4787
Juli Kring
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1834
Julia Howell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3264
Julia Howell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4378
Julia Ingram
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4537
Julia Viands
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4161
Juliana Cheng
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2871
Julie Adelson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4481
Julie Boles
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4547
Julie Breskin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2076
Julie Carll
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3424
Julie Drake
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2846
Julie Dybdahl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4363
Julie Klumpyan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1883
Julie Martin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5055
Julie Nye
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3658
Julie Porter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4356
Julie Sims
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1174
Julien Zbinden
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4533
Juliet Bailey Bischoff
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1616
June Meek
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1882
June Meek
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3813
Justin Bornstad
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4918
Justin Lester
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3277
Justin Rucker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1213
Justine Beeson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2437
K Grigorian
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3789
Kaitlin Sundling
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2156
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3520
Kara Owen
2157
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3839
Karen Albrecht
2158
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4000
Karen Alderman
2159
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3696
Karen Burke
2160
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1130
Karen Burtness Prak
2161
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4578
Karen Clair
2162
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3245
Karen Coley
2163
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2340
Karen Cox
2164
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2470
Karen Cox
2165
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2348
Karen Enns
2166
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3930
Karen Frischkorn
2167
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3420
Karen Gemar
2168
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4854
Karen Gentry
2169
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1341
Karen Gresham
2170
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2943
Karen Gresham
2171
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4085
Karen Gresham
2172
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4667
Karen Hensley
2173
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4942
Karen Hig
2174
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3546
Karen Johnson
2175
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3341
Karen Kahn
2176
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5044
Karen Knetter
2177
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2207
Karen Leaman
2178
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1821
Karen Llewellyn
2179
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3176
Karen M. Minahan
2180
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1220
Karen Mahan
2181
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4381
Karen Meyer
2182
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2971
Karen Nonnewitz-
Marston
2183
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1595
Karen Nowicki
3567
-------
Index
1
2184
2185
2186
2187
2188
2189
2190
2191
2192
2193
2194
2195
2196
2197
2198
2199
2200
2201
2202
2203
2204
2205
2206
2207
2208
2209
2210
2211
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1893
Karen Perkins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3037
Karen Pickett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1480
Karen Raskasky
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2555
Karen Reese
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0842
Karen Samuelson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1411
Karen Sauers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4193
Karen Ulrich
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3326
Karen Van Atta
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4631
Karen Wolfrom
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2418
Karen Zea
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1499
Kari Fleck Gutstein
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1651
Kari Ostlie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2406
Kari Wagers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4527
Karin Hemming sen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4189
Karin Rader
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1350
Karl Engle
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3489
Karl Kanthak
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3821
Karla Haas
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1052
Karla Markus
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1102
Kate Considine
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3677
Kate Considine
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2796
Katharine OConnell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2439
Katharine Penland
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3665
Katherine Anderson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2286
Katherine Bennett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1047
Katherine Del Conte
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2580
Katherine Hendricks
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5045
Katherine Ziegler
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2212
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3641
Kathleen Barrett
2213
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3422
Kathleen Burpee
2214
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3857
Kathleen Dely
2215
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3226
Kathleen Goryl
2216
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3651
Kathleen Hitch
2217
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4145
Kathleen Hulley
2218
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1785
Kathleen Maloney
2219
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4026
Kathleen O'Regan
2220
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2536
Kathleen Redman
2221
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2345
Kathleen Rollins
2222
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3801
Kathleen Ryan
2223
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4260
Kathleen Seline
2224
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1478
Kathleen Windmueller
2225
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2613
Kathryn Cobb
2226
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2985
Kathryn Elalouf
2227
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1961
Kathryn Hassenger
2228
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3287
Kathryn Hill
2229
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1983
Kathryn Vanderford
2230
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3594
Kathryn Wood
2231
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4388
Kathy Anderson
2232
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3423
Kathy Baltsar
2233
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1609
Kathy Cyganiewicz
2234
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3969
Kathy Haney
2235
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3587
Kathy Hansen
2236
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1957
Kathy Hawes
2237
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1565
Kathy Leblanc
2238
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3916
Kathy Priest-Smith
2239
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2394
Kathy Rayman
3568
-------
Index
1
2240
2241
2242
2243
2244
2245
2246
2247
2248
2249
2250
2251
2252
2253
2254
2255
2256
2257
2258
2259
2260
2261
2262
2263
2264
2265
2266
2267
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4376
Kathy Rogers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2304
Kathy Taylor
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2473
Kathy Thomas
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3076
Kathy Tscheiner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1657
Katie Gates
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1599
Katie Miller
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1097
Katie Spurlock
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1417
Katie West
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1653
Katy Libke
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3602
Kay Arnold
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2295
Kay Hudson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4281
Kay Voge
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2834
Keegan Anderson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2107
Keith Bowe
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1327
Keith Hezmalhalch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1914
Keith Hughes
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3796
Keith Kizer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1748
Keith Lewis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0449
Keith Puntenney
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2124
Keith Rudolph
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1614
Keith Seymour
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3209
Keith Seymour
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2944
Keith Stevens
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2327
Keith Wahl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4975
Keith Wahl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2690
Keith Wilkins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2187
Keith Woods
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2494
Kellen Krueger
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2268
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1731
Kelly King-Rusmisel
2269
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3083
Kelly Marlatt
2270
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2752
Kelly McKee
2271
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4944
Kelly Peterson
2272
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1861
Kelly Uchneat
2273
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2320
Kelsey Keyes
2274
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3159
Kelvin Cheng
2275
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2740
Kelvin Kopp
2276
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3880
Ken Brazier
2277
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4589
Ken Bristow
2278
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0899
Ken Burton
2279
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3432
KenFadeley
2280
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4850
Ken Gurvin
2281
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4633
Ken Hammel
2282
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0823
Ken Keefe
2283
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1758
Ken Meeker
2284
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3042
Ken Oliver
2285
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2228
Ken Payauys
2286
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4563
Kendall Sullivan
2287
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1770
Kenn Olson
2288
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0988
Kenneth Buskill
2289
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1208
Kenneth Cook
2290
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0830
Kenneth Cote
2291
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2462
Kenneth Daniel
2292
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2562
Kenneth Duncan
2293
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3596
Kenneth Falch
2294
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3271
Kenneth Fatula
2295
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4573
Kenneth Ferrell
3569
-------
Index
1
2296
2297
2298
2299
2300
2301
2302
2303
2304
2305
2306
2307
2308
2309
2310
2311
2312
2313
2314
2315
2316
2317
2318
2319
2320
2321
2322
2323
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3737
Kenneth Goss
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3745
Kenneth Hall
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2913
Kenneth Harden
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0947
Kenneth Hasekamp
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1090
Kenneth Jackson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2003
Kenneth Jackson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4328
Kenneth Johnston
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3976
Kenneth Jordan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4237
Kenneth Kimball
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4991
Kenneth Lyon
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3039
Kenneth Mendat
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2047
Kenneth Posey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4849
Kenneth Starr
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3000
Kenneth Terhune
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3895
Kenny Gardner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1890
Kent Hall
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5081
Kent Opal
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3364
Kenton Wells
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3328
Kenyon Karl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2540
Kerry Baum
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2297
Kerry Brooks
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4248
Kerry Luedke
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4329
Kerry Nelson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2640
Kerry Stone
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4668
Kerry Stone
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3670
Kerry Wilson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1036
Kerstin Harper
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1746
Keven Sipe
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2324
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4895
Kevin Dillon
2325
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4375
Kevin Greene
2326
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3463
Kevin Hughes
2327
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3297
Kevin Johnson
2328
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2451
Kevin Keighin
2329
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0949
Kevin Keller
2330
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4879
Kevin Kennedy
2331
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4592
Kevin Moody
2332
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2284
Kevin Mulcahy
2333
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4269
Kevin Rhatigan
2334
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2994
Kevin Then
2335
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4316
Kevin Then
2336
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2945
Kevin Todd
2337
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2948
Kevin Walsh
2338
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2117
Kevin Wells
2339
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2743
Kevin Wildemuth
2340
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4104
Kim Allman
2341
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3835
Kim Head
2342
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0854
Kim Jones
2343
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4675
Kim Martin
2344
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0844
Kim Phillips
2345
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3378
Kim Sebenoler
2346
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1800
Kim Sherman
2347
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2178
Kim Stover
2348
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3273
Kimberlee Cather
2349
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3989
Kimberly Durmis
2350
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3138
Kimberly Gresham
2351
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2018
Kimberly Howard
3570
-------
Index
1
2352
2353
2354
2355
2356
2357
2358
2359
2360
2361
2362
2363
2364
2365
2366
2367
2368
2369
2370
2371
2372
2373
2374
2375
2376
2377
2378
2379
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1586
Kip Plankinton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1864
Kirit Mehta
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4561
Kirk Sheppard
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4092
Kirk Zitzman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1813
Kirt Schritz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2781
Kit Lord
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1051
Kit Odom
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3851
Kory Chase
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4361
Kris Fox
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2827
Krista Lohr
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2102
Kristen Harris
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5002
Kristi Jones
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4694
Kristin Belisle
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5004
Kristin Graziano
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1866
Kristina Blanco
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2911
Kristina Lane
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1846
Kristina Robinson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5101
Kristina Yates
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3706
Kristy Andrews
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2185
Kristy Asao
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3290
Krystal Jenkins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3547
Krystal Jenkins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1951
Kurt Kalenak
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2041
Kurt Schwarz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1615
Kurt Teske
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1180
Kurt von Pessler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1065
Kyla Martin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1838
Kyle Anderson
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2380
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4745
Kyle Anderson
2381
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1182
Kyle Bartholomay
2382
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2403
Kyle McAdam
2383
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0889
Kylen Bowman
2384
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2199
Kyler Westerfeldt
2385
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1254
L. Love
2386
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0862
Laci Custer
2387
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1783
LaDawn Reid
2388
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2652
Lalin Henderson
2389
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4266
Lana Costello
2390
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3606
Lance Hudson
2391
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2064
Lance Keen
2392
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3377
Landon Oliver
2393
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2130
Lane Watkins
2394
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3548
Larry Birdwell
2395
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1151
Larry Burrows
2396
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3563
Larry Cook
2397
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1466
Larry Gremminger
2398
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4023
Larry Langford
2399
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4025
Larry Larson
2400
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3534
Larry Lasiter
2401
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3034
Larry Lasky
2402
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4309
Larry Maier
2403
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1808
Larry McGrenera
2404
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2183
Larry Oberlander
2405
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4046
Larry Oberlander
2406
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3253
Larry Plaster
2407
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4967
Larry Pratt
3571
-------
Index
1
2408
2409
2410
2411
2412
2413
2414
2415
2416
2417
2418
2419
2420
2421
2422
2423
2424
2425
2426
2427
2428
2429
2430
2431
2432
2433
2434
2435
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1603
Larry Reed
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1768
Larry Reed
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3726
Larry Reed
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3819
Larry Reese
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2329
Larry Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2986
Larry Templeton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4293
Larry Templeton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3950
Larry Trompke
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4406
Larry Tucker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4389
Larry Verlinden
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3303
Larson James
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4964
Larson L. (no surname
provided)
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2706
Lary Larson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1567
Latonya McDevitt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3248
Laura Adams
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2248
Laura Belchak
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3509
Laura Black
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2440
Laura Cox
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0946
Laura Drennan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5012
Laura fries
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2951
Laura Gay
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2633
Laura Goodwin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3325
Laura Haule
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3622
Laura Kelly
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0955
Laura Lyons
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2830
Laura Magzis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4217
Laura Melchionne
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3705
Laura Murphy
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2436
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3302
Laura Newman
2437
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4993
Laura Pyle
2438
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4020
Laura Reddington
2439
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3436
Laura Schofield
2440
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3863
LAURA SUMRALL
2441
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1081
Laura Telles
2442
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3568
Laura Van Overschelde
2443
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5069
Laura-Isabella Pais-fries
2444
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4560
Laurel Hardin
2445
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2245
Laurel Mancini
2446
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5060
Lauren Bode
2447
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3945
Laurie Brown
2448
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4129
Laurie Dameron
2449
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2054
Laurie Durgin
2450
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2698
Laverne Larson
2451
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2441
LaWren Booth
2452
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3936
Lawrence Callaway
2453
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2920
Lawrence Kalmbach
2454
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1002
Lawrence Kramer
2455
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2635
Lawrence Page
2456
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2513
Lawrence Slagel
2457
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3269
Lawrence Stice
2458
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0978
Lawrence Turowski
2459
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3742
Lawrence Wilson
2460
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4529
Leah Vandersluis
2461
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1200
Leanne Bynum
2462
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2990
Leanne Crawley
2463
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3686
Lee Guenveur
3572
-------
Index
1
2464
2465
2466
2467
2468
2469
2470
2471
2472
2473
2474
2475
2476
2477
2478
2479
2480
2481
2482
2483
2484
2485
2486
2487
2488
2489
2490
2491
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3350
Lee Newberg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2333
Lee Reinert
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4681
Lee Walters
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0943
Lee Wilson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4906
Lee Wilson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3567
Leisha Cowart
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2852
Lena Nilsson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2162
Lenore Petruso
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1747
Leo Farnsworth
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4425
Leon Donahue
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1959
Leon Moores
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5026
Leonard Helt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3586
Leroy Harbaugh
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4307
Leroy Harbaugh
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1458
Leslie Gregg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2360
Leslie Gregg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4078
Leslie Gregg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3551
Leslie Griffin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2055
Leslie Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1880
Leslie Nunan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3872
Leslie Provence
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2904
Leslie Spurling
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4594
Leslie Taylor
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4664
Leticia Hagstrom
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2213
Lew Warren
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2119
Lewis Bishop
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3043
Lewis James
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4606
Lewis James
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2492
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1636
Lewis Sponar
2493
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2507
Lewis Sponar
2494
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4400
Liane Guthrie
2495
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3812
Lidija Bell
2496
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1293
Lillian Carpio
2497
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4134
Lin Davis
2498
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1203
Linda Calvelage
2499
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4087
Linda Calvelage
2500
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1819
Linda Carlson
2501
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1665
Linda Chrystal
2502
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2309
Linda Engle
2503
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2929
Linda Feiring
2504
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2528
Linda Fenster
2505
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3014
Linda Furlong
2506
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2435
Linda Harris
2507
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5054
Linda Hay
2508
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4103
Linda Hayes
2509
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2829
Linda Henson
2510
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4676
Linda Herman
2511
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1801
Linda Herron
2512
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2501
Linda Huss
2513
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3485
Linda Ingalls
2514
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2005
Linda Love
2515
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2909
Linda Martin
2516
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1207
Linda McCausland
2517
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2697
Linda Mott-Smith
2518
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3986
Linda Oliver
2519
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2152
Linda Osikowicz
3573
-------
Index
1
2520
2521
2522
2523
2524
2525
2526
2527
2528
2529
2530
2531
2532
2533
2534
2535
2536
2537
2538
2539
2540
2541
2542
2543
2544
2545
2546
2547
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1771
Linda Peddie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2438
Linda Petrou
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3202
Linda Petrou
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1495
Linda Racine
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4158
Linda Schelin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2884
Linda Schneider
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2850
Linda Shabot
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4508
Linda Shimko
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2542
Linda Sills
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4483
Linda Sills
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3263
Linda Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3890
Linda Stamper
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0923
Linda Thompson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4165
Linda Thompson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2112
Linda Trocine
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2326
Linda Weimer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2251
Linda Wilson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2367
Linda Wiseman-Jones
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4837
Lindsay Mitchell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2402
Lindsay Wert
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4646
Lindsey Jauregui
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1996
Lindsey Soennichsen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4890
LInna Krumwied
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4876
Lionel Lugo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4884
Lisa Coyne
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1520
Lisa Crabtree
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4393
Lisa Frey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1211
Lisa Hendrickson
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2548
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4420
Lisa Jordan
2549
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2823
Lisa Joy
2550
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2792
Lisa Kunkel
2551
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4920
Lisa Peter
2552
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3698
Lisa Runquist
2553
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4735
Lisa von Deylen
2554
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2315
Lisa Wilhelm
2555
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2908
Lisa Wood
2556
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4783
Liz Amsden
2557
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0813
Liz Wagley
2558
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1798
Liz Wagley
2559
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2096
Liz Wagley
2560
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3389
Llewellyn Lee
2561
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4813
Lloyd Maraist
2562
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1455
Lloyd Smith
2563
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3135
Logan Danko
2564
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4194
Logan Lozano
2565
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3224
Lois Andersen
2566
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2759
Lois Bahle
2567
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2558
Lois Wilson
2568
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3828
Lona Plisek
2569
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4252
Loralee Batten
2570
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0870
Lorelai Hammond
2571
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5053
Lori Bryant
2572
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3603
Lori Hanish
2573
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1868
Lori Harter
2574
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1082
Lori Redifer
2575
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2789
Lori Stephens
3574
-------
Index
1
2576
2577
2578
2579
2580
2581
2582
2583
2584
2585
2586
2587
2588
2589
2590
2591
2592
2593
2594
2595
2596
2597
2598
2599
2600
2601
2602
2603
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3148
Lorita Griffin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4402
Lorraine Akers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4380
Lorraine Geronimo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3371
Lorraine Stromberg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3503
Lou Anderson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4641
Louis Bonin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2650
Louis Bushard
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3556
Louis Combs
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3600
Louis Ginsburg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3843
Louis Gioia
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4287
Louis Schwartz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4576
Louise Doucette
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2953
Louise Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2869
Louise Petering
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4324
Lovola Begin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2487
Lowell Neitzel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1367
Lowell Steele
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3163
Luann Erickson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4088
Luanne Chihoski
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1774
Luanne Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3781
Luc Maker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0963
Lucas Meharry
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0865
Lucas Nava
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0945
Lucianna Molinari
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1096
Lucinda Bedogne
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3702
Lucy Harville
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4615
Luetta Fox
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3387
Lugenia C ounce
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2604
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4282
Luke Lyons
2605
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2824
Luke Valentine
2606
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1904
Lura Elliott
2607
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4818
Luther Golden
2608
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3549
Lydia Emrich
2609
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2865
Lyle Courtsal
2610
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3777
Lyle Klein
2611
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3179
Lyn Janssen
2612
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3773
Lynda Halcott
2613
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1305
Lynda Hirsch
2614
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4449
Lynda Presco
2615
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0821
Lynn Caterina
2616
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4413
Lynn Franks
2617
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4300
Lynn Hanson
2618
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0836
Lynn Hawthorne
2619
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2156
Lynn Hawthorne
2620
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1123
Lynn Larroux
2621
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4540
Lynn Larroux
2622
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2790
Lynn Merrill
2623
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1689
Lynn Saint
2624
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2769
Lynne Hadley
2625
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1502
Lynne Quinn
2626
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2420
Lynne St Angelo
2627
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2272
M & S Plumbing,
Heating and Air
Conditioning
2628
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1752
MQ
2629
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1204
M. Brown
2630
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2363
M. Grove
2631
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1089
M. Janie Mueller
3575
-------
Index
1
2632
2633
2634
2635
2636
2637
2638
2639
2640
2641
2642
2643
2644
2645
2646
2647
2648
2649
2650
2651
2652
2653
2654
2655
2656
2657
2658
2659
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0917
M. Johanna Rickl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2814
Madeline Amalphy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4183
Madeline Amalphy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1439
Maggie Hettinger
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3284
Mahmoud Elgassier
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1448
Maida Pirich
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3488
Maida Pirich
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1056
Malcolm Harbison
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1531
Malinda Perkins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1631
Mandi Baladez
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1196
Mandy Kirkland
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4198
Manuel Suarez
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4763
Marc Duffy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1518
Marc HIscox
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1735
Marc Hiscox
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2893
Marc LeMaire
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1247
Marc Lipkowitz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1250
Marc Morrison
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2491
Marc Rauch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5019
Marcia Gustafson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4301
Marcia Hoy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1811
Marcus Jensen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1234
Marcus Kelly
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3180
Marcus Maloney
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4958
Marcy (no surname
provided)
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0826
Marcy Sanders
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3417
Margaret Boyd
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3645
Margaret Bullitt-Jonas
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2660
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3183
Margaret Elizabeth Fuhr
2661
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3533
Margaret Hopper
2662
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3191
Margaret Kidd
2663
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3196
Margaret Kling
2664
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1806
Margaret Montana
2665
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4933
Margaret Phanes
2666
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4772
Margaret Roth
2667
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2751
Margaret Schubert
2668
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1003
Margaret Smetana
2669
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2424
Margaret Smetana
2670
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1353
Margaret Stolpen
2671
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3165
Margaret Tilden
2672
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1862
Margaret Wilson
2673
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2072
Margaret Wilson
2674
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2081
Margaret Wilson
2675
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2342
Margaret Wilson
2676
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3242
Margaret Wilson
2677
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1397
Margot Lawson
2678
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3646
Margot
T ollefson/Conard
2679
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4464
Maria Davis
2680
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2148
Maria Thereza Santos
Stone
2681
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2479
Maria Thereza Santos
Stone
2682
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2030
Marian Betts
2683
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4705
Marian Malone
2684
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0980
Mariann Benway
2685
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0902
Mariann Bjelica
2686
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3740
Marianne Swon
2687
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1797
Marie Angermiller
3576
-------
Index
1
2688
2689
2690
2691
2692
2693
2694
2695
2696
2697
2698
2699
2700
2701
2702
2703
2704
2705
2706
2707
2708
2709
2710
2711
2712
2713
2714
2715
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3272
Marie Ankrom
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3910
Marie Crawford
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3070
Marie Gronley
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4915
Marie Gronley
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4317
Marie murray
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4558
Marie Taylor
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4802
Marie Wolpers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2786
Marilyn Oser
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4507
Marina Verdun
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1756
Maijorie Hooper
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2063
Maijorie Kirchmeyer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3473
Maijorie Stewart
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1964
Mark Armstrong
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1241
Mark Baumiller
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4893
Mark Besmen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1809
Mark Bondurant
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4603
Mark Bunselmeyer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1447
Mark Coffey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1885
Mark Coffey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5071
Mark Coffey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4457
Mark Coldren
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0849
Mark Davis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3807
Mark Dunford
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1828
Mark Fisher
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2480
Mark Fisher
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1418
Mark Floyd
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4845
Mark Franck
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3134
Mark Gill
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2716
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3252
MARK HAJEK
2717
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2014
Mark Hannah
2718
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3881
Mark Hanson
2719
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3827
Mark Hillenburg
2720
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4063
Mark Horan
2721
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3994
Mark Hutto
2722
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1230
Mark Ingram
2723
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2343
Mark Jacobson
2724
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4661
Mark Knox
2725
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0848
Mark Ledger
2726
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1984
Mark Marshall
2727
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1913
Mark Martell
2728
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4302
Mark Nahmias
2729
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1187
Mark Nicklay
2730
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0887
Mark Nixon
2731
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4144
Mark Pezzati
2732
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0501
Mark Richardson
2733
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2038
Mark Sisk
2734
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4218
Mark Slingerland
2735
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1886
Mark Vance
2736
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3254
Mark Vancil
2737
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1278
Mark Varley
2738
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4973
Mark Willis
2739
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4996
Mark Willis
2740
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4842
Mark Wilson
2741
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3409
Mark Wolchko
2742
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4396
Mark Woolsey
2743
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1485
Marleen Laska
3577
-------
Index
1
2744
2745
2746
2747
2748
2749
2750
2751
2752
2753
2754
2755
2756
2757
2758
2759
2760
2761
2762
2763
2764
2765
2766
2767
2768
2769
2770
2771
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3954
Marlyn McMullen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3367
Marne Stollenwerk
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4238
Marsha Zeitlin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3550
Marshall Richards
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2523
Martha Beach
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4949
Martha Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5005
Martha Karlstad
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2411
Martha Redmond
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4867
Martha Rhoades
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2821
Martha Whitman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5047
Martha Wilson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4833
Martin Barbre
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3361
Martin D. Stephens
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2391
Martin Kralik
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3694
Martin Kralik
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4614
Martin Marr
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1673
Martin Nolan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1079
Martin Poinsett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0885
Martin Presler-Marshall
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3142
Martin Schacht
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2383
Martin Thomas
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4751
Marty Brown
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3868
Marty Koval
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2724
Marty n Taubert
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2468
Mary Ann LaPolla
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3295
Mary Ann Rennels
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1294
Mary Benek
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4658
Mary Beth Thomas
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2772
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1017
Mary Brandow
2773
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3846
Mary Campbell
2774
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1468
Mary Canter
2775
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1638
Mary Canter
2776
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4437
Mary Canter
2777
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3443
Mary Carlton
2778
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2860
Mary D. Moderacki
2779
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4453
Mary Dadian
2780
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3475
Mary DeMartino
2781
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2741
Mary Diehl
2782
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1338
Mary Erickson
2783
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2221
Mary Erickson
2784
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1457
Mary Fritschle
2785
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4568
Mary Fullard
2786
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2686
Mary Grill
2787
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3811
Mary Grill
2788
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1040
Mary Gurganus
2789
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4923
Mary Hawkins
2790
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3982
Mary Hughes
2791
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4757
Mary Jordan
2792
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1578
Mary Kane
2793
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0831
Mary Kay Flinn
2794
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3711
Mary Kay Seymour
2795
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3888
Mary Kelley
2796
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3750
Mary MacDonald
2797
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1574
Mary Meade
2798
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2344
Mary Moylan
2799
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2919
Mary Nedza
3578
-------
Index
1
2800
2801
2802
2803
2804
2805
2806
2807
2808
2809
2810
2811
2812
2813
2814
2815
2816
2817
2818
2819
2820
2821
2822
2823
2824
2825
2826
2827
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3756
Mary Nolan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1924
Mary Orr
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5034
Mary Proteau
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2749
Mary Rehmann
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3675
Mary Rephlo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3562
Mary Sadler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2476
Mary Scallon
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1209
Mary Seberino
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2312
Mary Waggener
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2097
Mary Whelan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2372
Mary Wilbanks
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4538
Mary Wildt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4630
Mary Williams
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2574
Mary Wilson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2862
Mary Ann and Frank
Graffagnino
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4663
Maryann Gardner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3127
Marybeth Auletto
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2595
MaryLou Elsenheimer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2517
Matt Dielman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1407
Matt Reynolds
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3278
Matt Siddall
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2889
Matthew Alschuler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3741
Matthew Anthony
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0795
Matthew Davis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3842
MATTHEW
HENDERSON
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1849
Matthew Liivoja
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1314
Matthew Morehouse
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3388
Matthew Myrick
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2828
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4596
Matthew Raben
2829
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2361
Matthew Richards
2830
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2598
Matthew Tucker
2831
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4493
Matthew Tucker
2832
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1884
Matthew Williams
2833
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2981
Matthew' Burke
2834
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2885
Maureen Kilroy
2835
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5066
Maureen Kilroy
2836
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4748
Maureen Mitchell
2837
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1767
Maureen O'Ferrall
2838
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3415
Maureen O'Ferrall
2839
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2099
Mauri Norman
2840
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3025
Maury Miller
2841
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1014
Meg Wilson
2842
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1015
Meg Wilson
2843
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2144
Meg Wilson
2844
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2389
Meg Wilson
2845
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2405
Meg Wilson
2846
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2626
Meg Wilson
2847
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3137
Meg Wilson
2848
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3139
Meg Wilson
2849
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3710
Meg Wilson
2850
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4152
Meg Wilson
2851
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3376
Meghan Seymour
2852
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1669
Melanie Coffman
2853
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2362
Melanie Flavin
2854
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3650
Melanie Kurdys
2855
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0962
Melanie McGuire
3579
-------
Index
1
2856
2857
2858
2859
2860
2861
2862
2863
2864
2865
2866
2867
2868
2869
2870
2871
2872
2873
2874
2875
2876
2877
2878
2879
2880
2881
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2393
Melany Chrash
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0749
Melissa Anderson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4479
Melissa Hundley
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2352
Melissa Keown
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2791
Melissa Quesinberry
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1012
Mellisa McMillan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4531
Melonia Russell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3576
Member of Congress,
House of
Representatives,
Congress of the United
States Dusty Johnson et
al.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3066
Meredith Piatt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4080
Meredith Ross
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2918
Merle Anderson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1659
Merrilee Ryan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1267
Merrill Berger
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0957
Merry Spencer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1695
MG Gilchrist-Buck
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1326
Michael Armstrong
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3185
Michael Babb
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1046
Michael Barr
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1972
Michael Bergen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2947
Michael Bishop
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3330
Michael Broomfield
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3129
Michael Buchanan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2999
Michael Calandro
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2080
Michael Cervone
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3021
Michael Colley
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1354
Michael Crawford
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2882
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2308
Michael Cronin
2883
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1515
Michael Cunningham
2884
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1763
Michael Desmond
2885
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3516
Michael Diaz
2886
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1854
Michael Dodds
2887
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1855
Michael Dodds
2888
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1856
Michael Dodds
2889
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2240
Michael Dodds
2890
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4053
Michael Dodds
2891
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4059
Michael Dodds
2892
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4062
Michael Dodds
2893
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3282
Michael Dodds Dodds
2894
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4108
Michael Dodds Dodds
2895
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1426
Michael Dow
2896
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4288
Michael Doyon
2897
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3468
Michael Galbraith
2898
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2368
Michael George
2899
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1217
Michael Gleim
2900
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3942
Michael Graham
2901
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0970
Michael Graves
2902
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4730
Michael Greer
2903
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4270
Michael Hale
2904
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3299
Michael Hayes
2905
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1443
Michael Hollan
2906
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4214
Michael Hollan
2907
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3105
Michael House
2908
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1745
Michael Huszar
2909
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2209
Michael Jump
3580
-------
Index
1
2910
2911
2912
2913
2914
2915
2916
2917
2918
2919
2920
2921
2922
2923
2924
2925
2926
2927
2928
2929
2930
2931
2932
2933
2934
2935
2936
2937
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1188
Michael K. Dunbar
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3579
Michael Karslake
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2226
Michael Killian
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4061
Michael Kubiniec
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4585
Michael Long
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3440
Michael Lutter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3580
Michael Luttrell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1933
Michael Mace
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2677
Michael Malsberger
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2088
Michael Manos
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3923
Michael Martin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2483
Michael Matthews
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4782
Michael Matthews
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1456
Michael McGuire
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2858
Michael Nelson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4474
Michael Orloff
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4395
Michael P McAleenan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3988
Michael Patten
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0479
Michael Petelle
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3392
Michael Popik
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3968
Michael Portner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3454
Michael Powers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2642
Michael Quariadi
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3768
Michael Quariadi
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3430
Michael Raulerson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1912
Michael Ray
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2086
Michael Rendleman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3003
Michael Reynolds
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2938
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4726
Michael Ruppert
2939
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3036
Michael Schoeller
2940
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0448
Michael Scott
2941
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4896
Michael Seymour
2942
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4841
Michael Shane
2943
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3466
Michael Shaw
2944
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1319
Michael Sheliga
2945
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3730
Michael Slicker
2946
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3013
Michael Smielecki
2947
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1224
Michael Sofie
2948
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2390
Michael Stasiowski
2949
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2057
Michael Stock
2950
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4816
Michael Thibaudeau
2951
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4075
Michael Thompson
2952
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2678
Michael Trainor
2953
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4677
Michael Vandivier
2954
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3635
Michael Walczyk
2955
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0893
Michael Walsh
2956
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2899
Michael Ward
2957
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4812
Michael Wellington
2958
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4566
Michael Wmery
2959
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1035
Michael Worringer
2960
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4897
Micheal Moses
2961
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4927
Michele Hammond
2962
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1344
Michele Schumacher
2963
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3206
Michele Witkowski
2964
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2175
Michelle Aaron
2965
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4401
Michelle Bannasch
3581
-------
Index
1
2966
2967
2968
2969
2970
2971
2972
2973
2974
2975
2976
2977
2978
2979
2980
2981
2982
2983
2984
2985
2986
2987
2988
2989
2990
2991
2992
2993
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4136
Michelle Escudier
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2592
Michelle Fidler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2408
MichellE Finch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1970
Michelle Gusick
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3676
Michelle McKinney
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3086
Michelle Slyder
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1760
Michelle Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2122
Michelle Stone
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0866
Michelle Thomas
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4446
Michelle Verschueren
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4516
Micki Zettel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3114
Mike Beggs
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0979
Mike Buday
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2700
Mike Croft
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4067
Mike Hammersmith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4506
Mike Hoban
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2166
Mike Knight
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3833
Mike Lafond
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1378
Mike Lawson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4123
Mike MacDonald
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1201
Mike McCool
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3889
mike o'donnell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4992
Mike Pettit
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3581
Mike Rabkin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4306
Mike VonFabian
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4342
Mikel Connewr
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4858
Mildred Myers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4289
Milt Coen
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
2994
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0662
Minnesota Farmers
Union (MFU)
2995
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4415
Miriam Berg
2996
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0992
Miriam Kramer
2997
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1366
Mitchell Leavins
2998
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2137
Mitchell Nicholaides
2999
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1469
Moahengi Fotu
3000
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1424
Moira Pitt
3001
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0447
Monica Frate
3002
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1812
Monica McCrory
3003
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2828
Monica Steensma
3004
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1816
Monica Zamora
3005
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4765
Morgan Songi
3006
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3396
Morgan Walker
3007
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4698
Mr.Derlin Gerard Clair
3008
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2560
Mrs Bradshaw
3009
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1501
Murphy Appling
3010
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3184
Myrle Gorsline
3011
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3685
Myrna Anderson
3012
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2298
Myrna Rubenstein
3013
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4569
Myron Herr
3014
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3642
Nadine Sapirman
3015
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2314
Nadine Young
3016
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2043
Nan Bailey
3017
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3231
Nanci Ross
3018
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4130
Nancy Ariewitz
3019
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3995
Nancy Bridges
3020
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3459
Nancy Crowder
3021
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1664
Nancy Dorrell
3582
-------
Index
1
3022
3023
3024
3025
3026
3027
3028
3029
3030
3031
3032
3033
3034
3035
3036
3037
3038
3039
3040
3041
3042
3043
3044
3045
3046
3047
3048
3049
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2906
Nancy Farmer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3230
Nancy Gillis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2145
Nancy Hartman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1084
Nancy Jeong
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3323
Nancy Kho
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1958
Nancy Koebel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2416
Nancy L Kilgore
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2417
Nancy L Kilgore
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1691
Nancy L. Kilgore
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3536
Nancy Lake
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4719
Nancy Linton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3559
Nancy Mcdonnell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4427
Nancy McDonnell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3247
Nancy Moulaison
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2500
Nancy Nepi
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2051
Nancy Patterson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5056
Nancy Post
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1253
Nancy Prince Jackson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4128
Nancy Shimeall
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5028
Nancy Tate
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0882
Nancy Tower
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4286
Nancy Wainwright
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1670
Nancy Wills
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3097
Naomi Leach
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0934
Natalie Dockins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4556
Natalie Dockins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3395
Natalie Forbing
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3366
Nathan Borstad
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3050
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2498
Nathan Bosch
3051
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3626
Nathan Earle
3052
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1142
Nathan Pine
3053
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3321
Nathan Ruggles
3054
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1947
Nathan Slama
3055
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1423
Nathaniel Evans
3056
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0670
National Religious
Partnership for the
Environment et al.
3057
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0476
National Ski Areas
Association (NSAA)
3058
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2785
Neal Hadley
3059
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2800
Neal Havener
3060
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3187
Ned Hedrick
3061
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1581
Neil Evarts
3062
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3109
Neil Miller
3063
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2208
Nelda McKee
3064
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1632
Nelda Szalay
3065
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0983
Nelson Secord
3066
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2461
Neville Robeson
3067
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3006
Neville Robeson
3068
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0702
New Mount Zion
Baptist Church, et al.
3069
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0491
New Urban Mobility
alliance (NUMO)
3070
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0791
New York State
Common Retirement
Fund (CRF)
3071
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3310
Nicholas Colglazier
3072
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2071
Nicholas Gonzales
3073
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1815
Nicholas Yoder
3074
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0879
Nick Jensen
3075
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1128
Nick Littlejohn
3076
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4636
Nick Maxwell
3583
-------
Index
1
3077
3078
3079
3080
3081
3082
3083
3084
3085
3086
3087
3088
3089
3090
3091
3092
3093
3094
3095
3096
3097
3098
3099
3100
3101
3102
3103
3104
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2600
Nick Melander
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3731
Nick Nicolay
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3717
Nick Picerno
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2369
Nicole McCord
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4924
Niki Hiltz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3537
Niles Johanson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3535
Nilon Hagan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1438
Nima Rosepiper
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3500
Ninon Hills
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3132
Noah Hultgren
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4398
Noel Iverson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1195
Nora Walker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2896
Noreen Weeden
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2890
Norm Conrad
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3979
Norma Bateman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0838
Norma Stephan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3540
Norman Byron
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3011
Norman Metcalf
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0603
North Carolina
Conservation Network
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4359
North Carolina
Federation of
Republican Women
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2237
Oana Miller
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1971
Odella Stiner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3531
Olga M.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1185
Olivia Hulver
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1360
Orrin Payne
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4795
Oudrey Wilson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0798
Owen Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4804
Pam Bragg
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3105
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1566
Pam Hamilton
3106
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1471
Pam Kelly
3107
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1869
Pam Kirpalani
3108
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4373
Pam Langham
3109
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2407
Pam Memmer
3110
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3294
Pam Miller
3111
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2073
Pam Walker
3112
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5078
Pamela A. Lowry
3113
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1630
Pamela Burg
3114
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5014
Pamela Guthman
3115
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3110
Pamela Ho lley-Wilcox
3116
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2082
Pamela Kobin
3117
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3357
Pamela Ledford
3118
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0998
Pamela Lovegren
3119
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1805
Pamela Lovegren
3120
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2219
Pamela Nagle
3121
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1943
Pamela Tyrrell
3122
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4310
Pamela Ware
3123
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5062
Paola Tayvah
3124
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1440
Parrish Miller
3125
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0852
Pat Annoni
3126
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4620
Pat Dumoulin
3127
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3126
Pat Frey
3128
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2066
Pat Long
3129
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2293
Pat Munsch
3130
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2809
Pat Pardun
3131
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0927
Pat Ratkowski
3132
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2434
Pat Smith
3584
-------
Index
1
3133
3134
3135
3136
3137
3138
3139
3140
3141
3142
3143
3144
3145
3146
3147
3148
3149
3150
3151
3152
3153
3154
3155
3156
3157
3158
3159
3160
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1577
Pat Stewmon
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3859
PatTaft
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1895
Pat Waeghe
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4543
Pat Wilkes
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1757
Patrice Hartung
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4940
Patricia Blevins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4885
Patricia Bogan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3865
Patricia Breslin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2270
Patricia Carr
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4548
Patricia Dunn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1894
Patricia Earnesr
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0472
Patricia Guthrie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3186
Patricia Hajek
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2061
Patricia Harlow
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2811
Patricia Harlow
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2764
Patricia Hegland
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2222
Patricia Knebel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2042
Patricia Kolstad
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4775
Patricia Long
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4983
Patricia Messer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2611
Patricia Morgan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2683
Patricia Peloquin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2703
Patricia Peloquin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1516
Patricia Petrecca
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1358
Patricia Piwinski
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1875
Patricia Pryor Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3691
Patricia Roberts
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1626
Patricia Smith
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3161
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3666
Patricia Snodgrass
3162
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4979
Patricia Spevak
3163
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1935
Patricia Stratford
3164
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4188
Patricia Welch
3165
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1339
Patricia Werderitsch
3166
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1076
Patricia Wood
3167
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3522
Patricia Woods
3168
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4875
Patricia Yearout
3169
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2282
Patrick Conley
3170
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1113
Patrick Davan
3171
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2168
Patrick Eves
3172
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1008
Patrick Harmon
3173
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3830
Patrick Lam
3174
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4231
Patrick McDaniel
3175
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3296
Patrick Miller
3176
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1302
Patrick Nelson
3177
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3875
Patrick Russell
3178
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1607
Patrick Santavenere
3179
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4167
Patrick Scott
3180
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3583
Patrick Tracy
3181
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3306
Patti Truslow
3182
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3257
Patty Lunsford
3183
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3131
Patty Mann
3184
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3457
Patty Parker
3185
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2777
Patty Strom
3186
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2778
Patty Strom
3187
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2534
Paul Amos
3188
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1449
Paul Brehmer
3585
-------
Index
1
3189
3190
3191
3192
3193
3194
3195
3196
3197
3198
3199
3200
3201
3202
3203
3204
3205
3206
3207
3208
3209
3210
3211
3212
3213
3214
3215
3216
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3022
Paul Brockman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2015
Paul Bunch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1428
Paul Cannatella
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1363
Paul Cannizzo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4990
Paul Constantine
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4700
Paul Cook
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3217
Paul Daugaard
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3513
Paul DeRocher
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4455
Paul Doty
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1389
Paul Feifert
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0459
Paul Fogarty
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3193
Paul Franzmann
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3678
Paul Franzmann
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1362
Paul Gleske
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2399
Paul Grabowski
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2564
Paul Gurney
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1790
Paul Hoffman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1930
Paul Jarosinski
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4838
Paul Jeschke
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4002
Paul Johanson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2535
Paul Kovach
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4196
Paul Kuchma
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1124
Paul Larson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4037
Paul Liva
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2236
Paul Mason
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3595
Paul McCarty
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2817
Paul Meyers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2912
Paul Newman
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3217
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2577
Paul Ranney
3218
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3204
Paul Reese
3219
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0754
Paul Reid
3220
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3280
Paul S (no surname
provided)
3221
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2996
Paul Salvador
3222
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1729
Paul Schmid
3223
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3816
Paul Smith
3224
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3764
Paul Stetson
3225
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3274
Paul Tucker
3226
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1568
Paul Veen
3227
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2423
Paul Verchinski
3228
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3996
Paul Walling
3229
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3780
Paula Bizot
3230
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4219
Paula Cate
3231
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2667
Paula Christensen
3232
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4036
Paula Christensen
3233
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1596
Paula Downs
3234
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4542
Paula Eachus
3235
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2518
Paula Fries
3236
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1859
Paula Legleiter
3237
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3654
Paula Legleiter
3238
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2602
Paula Mandich
3239
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3805
Paula Mann
3240
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3316
Paula Moore
3241
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1268
PaulaAndra Aigner
3242
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3020
Paulette Hoppesch
3243
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3927
Paulette Kennamer
3244
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2430
Pauline Bruno
3586
-------
Index
1
3245
3246
3247
3248
3249
3250
3251
3252
3253
3254
3255
3256
3257
3258
3259
3260
3261
3262
3263
3264
3265
3266
3267
3268
3269
3270
3271
3272
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3882
Pauline Bruno
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2992
Paulletta Lovett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4405
Peggy Barnette
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0811
Peggy Billhartz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1460
Peggy Schluchter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1045
Peggy Smetana
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1671
Peggy Smetana
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3643
Peggy Smetana
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3823
Peggy Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1356
Penny Bonadonna
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3965
Penny Corbett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2864
Perry Kendall
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4791
Perry Kendall
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2509
Perry Kent
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1403
Perry Pace
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2671
Peter Biggins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4469
Peter Brandlin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4929
Peter Crownfield
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5029
Peter Curtis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2159
Peter Gentry
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1386
Peter Gresens
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3723
Peter Gresens
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4220
Peter Gugliotta
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1226
Peter Lee
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1571
Peter Mazzella
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2720
Peter McCarthy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4019
Peter Mermelstein
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1968
Peter Mishler
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3273
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2801
Peter Mortensen
3274
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2059
Peter Nardone
3275
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1444
Peter Ooms
3276
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2255
PETER PUGLIESE
3277
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4070
Phil and Paul Babish
3278
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4740
Phil Borris
3279
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2229
Phil BrindAmour
3280
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3438
Phil BrindAmour
3281
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2541
Philbrook Collins
3282
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3421
Philip DiNardo
3283
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1214
Philip Griesmer
3284
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1876
Philip Majerus
3285
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1897
Philip Martin
3286
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4313
Philip Tarnaski
3287
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1604
Philippe Dupont
3288
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2818
Phillip Carew
3289
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4665
Phillip Ettelschutz
3290
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1727
Phillip Martin
3291
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3068
Phillip Massie
3292
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2392
Phoebe Morad
3293
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4320
Phyllis Frisbey
3294
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0936
Phyllis Haig
3295
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4071
Phyllis Johnsom
3296
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4584
Phyllis Vedder
3297
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3841
Piotr Wozniak
3298
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4391
PJ Gildernew
3299
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3314
PJ Riddell
3300
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4235
Porter Wilkins
3587
-------
Index
1
3301
3302
3303
3304
3305
3306
3307
3308
3309
3310
3311
3312
3313
3314
3315
3316
3317
3318
3319
3320
3321
3322
3323
3324
3325
3326
3327
3328
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0937
Preston Lane
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1329
Preston Lane
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1074
Preston Noell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2659
Priscilla Kennedy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3874
Priscilla Maine
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1851
Quinn Skinner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1751
R C Water Systems Inc
(DBA White Eagle
Water Systems)
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1781
R James Nelson III
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0427
R&W Kochan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4901
R. J. Willis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1231
R. Johnston
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4014
R. M. Burrow Jr.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2519
R.S. Elam
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1696
Rachel Enflish
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1343
Rachel English
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2897
Rachel Resnikoff
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2201
Rachel Romero
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2477
Rachel Schulman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1932
Rachel Wood
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3771
Rae Jerrel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2376
Raelynn Williams
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0444
Rafael Friedmann
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3958
Ralph Bascom
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1598
Ralph Bierdeman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1840
Ralph K.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1157
Ralph Luciano
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1613
Ralph McKnight
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2670
Ralph Osborne
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3329
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2958
Ralph Sloat
3330
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1878
Ramon DeWitt
3331
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3947
Ramon Zayas
3332
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1507
Randal Gorshe
3333
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3505
Randal Schechter
3334
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3908
Randal Sheppard
3335
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3632
Randall Anstaett
3336
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2121
Randall Bradley
3337
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2338
Randall Bradley
3338
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2587
Randall Griggs
3339
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1215
Randall Holterman
3340
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1476
Randy Bergeron
3341
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2028
Randy Bergeron
3342
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4617
Randy DeSutter
3343
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3894
Randy Dooly
3344
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1871
Randy Dunigan
3345
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2537
Randy Freeland
3346
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2200
Randy Hood
3347
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4192
Randy Hood
3348
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1063
Randy Huntley
3349
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3933
Randy Jones
3350
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2508
Randy Leffler
3351
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4495
Randy Markoff
3352
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0815
Raul Delgado
3353
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1844
Ray and Linda
Agrimson
3354
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3848
Ray Asencio
3355
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1119
Ray Kamenica
3356
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4241
Ray L. Chastain
3588
-------
Index
1
3357
3358
3359
3360
3361
3362
3363
3364
3365
3366
3367
3368
3369
3370
3371
3372
3373
3374
3375
3376
3377
3378
3379
3380
3381
3382
3383
3384
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3860
Ray Michlig
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4513
Ray Sackett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1011
Raye Simpson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2654
Raymond Raulerson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3309
Raymond Reardon
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1952
Rebecca Chappie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1023
Rebecca Haskell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1359
Rebecca Pringle-gleske
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2825
Rebecca Walding
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3349
Rebecca Weinberg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4166
Rebecca Wolfe
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3878
Reese Jones
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4372
Regina Burch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2288
Renee Pastor
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3924
Reta Durham
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4095
Rev. Michael McClain
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3237
Rev. Neddy Astudillo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1960
Rex Burkheimer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2770
Rhoda Schlamm
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1109
Rhonda Stiles
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4182
Rhonda Stiles
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2608
Ric Reed
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2689
Rich Flanders
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0880
Rich Fortunate
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3233
Rich Killmer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3572
Rich Mazzuca
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1013
Richard Allen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4083
Richard Allen
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3385
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2680
Richard Barker
3386
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4771
Richard Beran
3387
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4151
Richard Berger
3388
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4688
Richard Boehlke
3389
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2930
Richard Bradus
3390
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4045
Richard Collins
3391
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4716
Richard Cutlerl
3392
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2021
Richard E Atwood sr
3393
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0474
Richard Easton
3394
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4418
Richard Fischer
3395
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4961
Richard Fox
3396
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1647
Richard Franklin
3397
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1159
Richard Ghazarian
3398
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2106
Richard Hamel
3399
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1766
Richard Johnson
3400
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2701
Richard Kauffman
3401
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2174
Richard Kedrow
3402
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2105
Richard Koethe
3403
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2008
Richard Koon
3404
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2310
Richard L. Mckie
3405
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3538
Richard Lord
3406
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3743
Richard Nottingham
3407
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1454
Richard Paces
3408
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0829
Richard Peterson
3409
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0804
Richard Santalesa
3410
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1955
Richard Schaefer
3411
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4298
Richard Schuster
3412
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2973
Richard Smalley
3589
-------
Index
1
3413
3414
3415
3416
3417
3418
3419
3420
3421
3422
3423
3424
3425
3426
3427
3428
3429
3430
3431
3432
3433
3434
3435
3436
3437
3438
3439
3440
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2182
Richard Spotts
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2575
Richard Steineck
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4526
Richard Stephenson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3891
Richard Stern
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1814
Richard Stojonic
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2975
Richard Swier
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4125
Richard Temple
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0948
Richard Verdugo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3608
Richard Verdugo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2661
Richard Vogler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4856
Richard Walmer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0960
Richard West
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1050
Richard Woodside
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2092
Richard Woulf
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2276
Rick Keaton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2133
Rick Martin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3312
Rick Murray
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3912
Rick Nelson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3157
Rick Rybeck
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1858
Rick Scoggins
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1777
Rick Wolters
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2966
Ricky Mann
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3701
Ricky Martin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1979
Riley Butcher
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2131
Rita Carter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3250
Rita Harris
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2842
Riva Blumenfeld
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3985
RJ Bradner
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3441
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3174
RJ Harrington, Jr.
3442
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4834
Rob Elliott
3443
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4447
Rob Moeder
3444
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3909
Robbie Lang
3445
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1528
Robeert Cross
3446
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3060
Robert Ball
3447
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1675
Robert Bates
3448
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4904
Robert Bates
3449
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1140
Robert Bolton
3450
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2490
Robert Braun
3451
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3746
Robert Canright
3452
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2425
Robert Catlin
3453
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1513
Robert Clark
3454
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4186
Robert Cloud
3455
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3832
Robert Conner
3456
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4098
Robert Connolly
3457
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3487
Robert Davenport
3458
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4173
Robert Davenport
3459
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4590
Robert Davenport
3460
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5072
Robert DeFillipo
3461
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2576
robert dreger
3462
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2687
Robert Dunham
3463
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3067
Robert Endlich
3464
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4224
Robert Gardner
3465
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1621
Robert Gast
3466
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2504
Robert Glover
3467
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3365
Robert Golding
3468
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3197
Robert Grace
3590
-------
Index
1
3469
3470
3471
3472
3473
3474
3475
3476
3477
3478
3479
3480
3481
3482
3483
3484
3485
3486
3487
3488
3489
3490
3491
3492
3493
3494
3495
3496
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4456
Robert Griffith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0938
Robert Gunther
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4857
Robert Haak
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2285
Robert Henninge
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4891
Robert Hirsch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4712
Robert johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4587
Robert King
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2651
Robert Kircher
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2617
Robert LaLanne
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4308
Robert Lawton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4864
Robert Lincoln
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1158
Robert Little
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5020
Robert Lloyd
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4347
Robert Lombardi
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2815
Robert Macek
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3195
Robert Medinger
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2991
Robert Merryman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4499
Robert Merryman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3351
Robert Minton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3901
Robert Popham
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4261
Robert Quinn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3008
Robert Redinger
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2048
Robert Ridge
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4807
Robert Rorke
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0916
Robert Rutkowski
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4305
Robert Sherman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3398
Robert Simpson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1133
Robert Stark
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3497
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2917
Robert Stuendel
3498
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2623
Robert Taylor
3499
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0994
Robert Vacek
3500
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2550
Robert Vaillancourt
3501
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4555
Robert Vance
3502
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3372
Robert Walters
3503
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2879
Robert Wasilewski
3504
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2330
Robert Wegener
3505
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2859
Robert Weingart
3506
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1587
Robert Wilson
3507
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4750
Robert Windle
3508
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4872
Robert Wood
3509
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4407
Roberta Reeves
3510
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4441
Roberto Cueva
3511
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2901
Roberts James
3512
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1372
Robin Burness
3513
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3601
Robin Cheney
3514
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5024
Robin Gregory
3515
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1612
Robin Hamblin
3516
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3009
Robin Kilpatrick
3517
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3508
Robin Lester
3518
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3288
Robin Naeger
3519
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1491
Robin Rivers
3520
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1810
Robin Ward
3521
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2445
Robyn Porter
3522
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3334
Robyn Weber
3523
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2880
Robynne Limoges
3524
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4106
Rochelle Krusemark
3591
-------
Index
1
3525
3526
3527
3528
3529
3530
3531
3532
3533
3534
3535
3536
3537
3538
3539
3540
3541
3542
3543
3544
3545
3546
3547
3548
3549
3550
3551
3552
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2630
Rochelle Montague
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4820
Rod Lowrey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2525
Rodney Hubbard
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4352
Rodney Thompson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4613
Rodney Weinzierl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4836
Rodney Weinzierl
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1820
Roger Bandera
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4094
Roger Benrud
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1193
Roger Flores
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3977
Roger Garner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1901
Roger Hop
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4936
Roger Luckmann
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3178
Roger Martin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3363
Roger Mealey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2388
Roger ODaniel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2561
Roger Prud'homme
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4177
Roger Rutgers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3095
Roger Widenoja
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2111
Ron Berti
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1285
Ron Cash
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3932
Ron Clark
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3063
Ron Engle
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4903
Ron Engle
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3761
Ron Fiscus
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3526
Ron Hertig
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4919
Ron Hubbard
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4367
Ron Jefferson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1093
Ron Kidwell
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3553
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4175
Ron Roberds
3554
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1110
Ron Watrous
3555
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3647
Ron Werkmeister
3556
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3528
Ron wright
3557
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4554
Ronald Becker
3558
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2641
Ronald Bruner
3559
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4505
Ronald Clark
3560
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0915
Ronald Coffman
3561
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1078
Ronald Cole
3562
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1852
Ronald Cole
3563
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2218
Ronald Dibble
3564
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2264
Ronald Early
3565
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2095
Ronald Hanshaw
3566
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2647
Ronald Hitchcock
3567
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1605
Ronald Jarrett
3568
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4742
Ronald Jarrett
3569
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3806
Ronald Keim
3570
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4132
Ronald Mutchnik
3571
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0924
Ronald Watrous
3572
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3953
Ronald Wilson
3573
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3085
Ronnie Collins
3574
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3541
Ronnie Gorzalka
3575
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1591
Rory OBrien
3576
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1625
Rosalie Calhoun
3577
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0828
Rosalind Brown
3578
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3400
Rose Ellen Ray
3579
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2034
Rose M Vegren
3580
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3504
Rose M Vegren
3592
-------
Index
1
3581
3582
3583
3584
3585
3586
3587
3588
3589
3590
3591
3592
3593
3594
3595
3596
3597
3598
3599
3600
3601
3602
3603
3604
3605
3606
3607
3608
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2223
Rose Stone
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3782
Roseann Day
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2631
Roselee Fanelli
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3338
Rosemarie SantiEsteban
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5082
Rosemary Agneessens
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2632
Rosemary Chess
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4262
Rosemary Nichols
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2062
Rosemary Schamp
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2269
Ross Bushman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3028
Rota Medeiros
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4539
Roxanne Radican
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4902
RoxAnne Reineke
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0991
Roxy Rust
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1336
Roxy Rust
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3699
Roxy Rust
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2734
Roy Stanton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4593
Roy Stanton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1342
Roy Wirth
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3797
rpger coers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4766
Ruby Bell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4853
Ruby Fleet
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3324
Ruchi Stair
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4315
Rudolf Hebling
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3098
Rui Liborio
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4421
Russ Gorsline
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1472
Russell Boggs
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4191
Russell Boggs
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1465
Russell C. and Sylvia A.
Pool
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3609
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1588
Russell Davis
3610
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3108
Russell Freeland
3611
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3729
Russell Kuehn
3612
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2084
Ruth Bowen
3613
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0814
Ruth Christie
3614
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1420
Ruth Compton
3615
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2870
Ruth Fishkin
3616
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4963
Ruth Glenn
3617
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3900
Ruth Hoosier
3618
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3329
Ruth Jannello
3619
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1361
Ruth Penner
3620
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3007
Ruth Quartuccio
3621
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3115
Ruth Richards
3622
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4205
Ruth Sentz
3623
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2413
Ruth Steyn
3624
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0859
Ryan Mahanes
3625
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3444
Ryan Mueller
3626
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2278
Ryan Overstreet
3627
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1308
Ryan Robinson
3628
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4097
Ryan Weller
3629
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3984
S. Nazzaro
3630
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4197
Sabrina Zenad
3631
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0890
Saleh Mousa
3632
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4998
Sally Covington
3633
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2738
Sally Duncan
3634
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1740
Sally Hartford
3635
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1504
Sally Mininger
3636
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2098
Sally Tutor
3593
-------
Index
1
3637
3638
3639
3640
3641
3642
3643
3644
3645
3646
3647
3648
3649
3650
3651
3652
3653
3654
3655
3656
3657
3658
3659
3660
3661
3662
3663
3664
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3836
Sam A Farace
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1559
Sam Durrance
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0843
Sam Garbett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4240
Sam Harris Reynolds
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5079
Sam Inabinet
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3736
Sam Waxier
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3935
Samuel Heywood
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1929
Samuel Hogue
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4439
Samuel Mclntyre
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4908
Samuel Musil
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2510
Samuel Noyes
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2452
Samuel Serven
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1902
Sandi Ruble
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2091
Sandra Aseltine
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3558
Sandra Giusti
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1892
Sandra Kelly
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2147
Sandra Lee Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2978
Sandra Perusich
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1100
Sandra Przybylski
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2954
Sandra Roberts
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1071
Sandra Rowan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2538
Sandra Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2861
Sandra Stoffel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4532
Sandra Van Brunt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4143
Sandra Wilmore
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2035
Sandy Boyd
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2306
Sandy Brown
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4013
Sandy Garcia
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3665
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1754
Sara Blackburn
3666
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3955
Sara Carter
3667
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1660
Sara Frankel
3668
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2849
Sara Harstad
3669
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4263
Sara Hartranft
3670
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2857
Sara Roderer
3671
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2087
Sara Schuster
3672
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2101
Sarah Davenport-Smith
3673
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3997
Sarah Greene
3674
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4611
Sarah Hastings
3675
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3345
Sarah Joslin
3676
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2331
Sarah Shah
3677
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4172
Sarah Stephens
3678
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3167
Sarah Tamor
3679
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3817
Sarah Totten
3680
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2762
Sari Steuber
3681
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2970
Saul Schimek
3682
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0477
Schweitzer
3683
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1277
Scott A. Easley
3684
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0911
Scott Baker
3685
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1769
Scott Baker
3686
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1414
Scott Becker
3687
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1794
Scott Burns
3688
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1917
Scott Burns
3689
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3102
Scott Chase
3690
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4268
Scott Coahran
3691
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1281
Scott Dunphey
3692
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5023
Scott Gallagher
3594
-------
Index
1
3693
3694
3695
3696
3697
3698
3699
3700
3701
3702
3703
3704
3705
3706
3707
3708
3709
3710
3711
3712
3713
3714
3715
3716
3717
3718
3719
3720
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3553
Scott Gingery
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4297
Scott Glenn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3754
Scott Griedel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2616
Scott Houde
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3753
Scott Houde
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2905
Scott Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3854
Scott Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5015
Scott Leitschuh
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2723
Scott Olechnowicz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4256
Scott Olechnowicz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2512
Scott Rice
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4497
Scott Stubbs
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1934
Scott Thomas
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1734
Scott Walter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1075
Scott Ward
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0797
Scott Wright
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3802
Scottie McGowan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2013
Scottsdale Electric
Vehicle Association
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2521
Scotty Parker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3089
Sean Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1667
Sean Lottinville
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1623
Seli Benko
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2249
Senator Charles E.
Grassley
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1872
Serena Friedman MD
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2502
Sergio Bernier-Ramos
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0909
Seth Steiner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4054
Shahraiz Qureshi
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3808
Shane Tyler
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3721
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1018
Shanna gratzer
3722
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3845
Shannon Castille
3723
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1368
Shannon Edmondson
3724
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3962
Shannon Hanes
3725
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3411
Shannon Winter
3726
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4102
Shari Temoke
3727
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2374
Sharon Andre
3728
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3785
Sharon Butash
3729
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4154
Sharon Enright
3730
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2126
Sharon Fernandez
3731
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4229
Sharon Fernandez
3732
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1823
Sharon Frampton
3733
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3744
Sharon Lefarth
3734
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4699
Sharon Livesey
3735
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2907
Sharon Morris
3736
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3960
Sharon Morrow
3737
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2179
Sharon Murguia
3738
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2373
Sharon Reynolds
3739
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2669
Sharon Roberts
3740
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3518
Sharon Roberts
3741
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4156
Sharon Rothe
3742
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1091
Sharon Sykora
3743
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1680
Sharon Sykora
3744
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1847
Sharon Thomas
3745
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2767
Sharon Weed
3746
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3460
Shaun Disch
3747
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2776
Shauna Junco
3748
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1941
Shawn Bartosh
3595
-------
Index
1
3749
3750
3751
3752
3753
3754
3755
3756
3757
3758
3759
3760
3761
3762
3763
3764
3765
3766
3767
3768
3769
3770
3771
3772
3773
3774
3775
3776
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4312
Shawn Davlin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5007
Shawn Sedgwick
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1309
Shawn Steves
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4458
Shawn Welch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3794
Sheetal Rao
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2746
Sheila Brockmeier
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1044
Sheila Endsley
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1304
Sheila Holmes
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3728
Sheila Ricioli
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2125
Shelley McCarty
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2415
Shelly Warren
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3493
Shepard Perrin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1068
Sherri Quinn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1548
Sherri Smalling
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3189
Sherry farmer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4472
Sherry Farmer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2211
Sherry Knoppers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1481
Sherry Saiki
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3970
Sherry Stevens
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3886
Sherry Yocum
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1086
Sherryl Florko
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1990
Sheryl Becker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3502
Sheryl Becker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0930
Sheryl Dagman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4703
Sheryl Dagman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2481
Sheryl Maxsom Ph.D.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3657
Sheryl Moriarty
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4337
Shirlee Keffer
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3777
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4001
Shirley Finney
3778
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4912
Shirley Gerace
3779
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4442
Shirley Harrison
3780
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5076
Shirley Jones
3781
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2127
Shirley Kichings
3782
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1313
Shirley Kufeldt
3783
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1973
Shirley Kufeldt
3784
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2136
Shirley Kufeldt
3785
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2256
Shirley Kufeldt
3786
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3883
Shirley Kufeldt
3787
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3707
Shirley Maclean
3788
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4335
Shirley Pyle
3789
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4403
Shirley Schweikart
3790
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3876
Shirley Sheldon
3791
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2225
Shirley Snell
3792
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2311
Silvia Bunge
3793
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3718
Silvia Hall
3794
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1088
Simon Percival
3795
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2052
Sj Jones
3796
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0857
Skyler Miller
3797
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2637
Sondra Polley
3798
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3445
Srinivasa Srivatsan
3799
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2819
Stacy Winnick
3800
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1098
Stan Janzick
3801
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4581
Stan Rogers
3802
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3514
Stan Simpson
3803
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1949
Stan Smith
3804
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4351
Stanley Boling
3596
-------
Index
1
3805
3806
3807
3808
3809
3810
3811
3812
3813
3814
3815
3816
3817
3818
3819
3820
3821
3822
3823
3824
3825
3826
3827
3828
3829
3830
3831
3832
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2998
Stanley Meigs
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2766
Stanley Rothbardt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3656
Statira Petersen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1451
Stella Grant
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4874
Stephanie Carter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4691
Stephanie Lebron
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3041
Stephanie McConkie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2322
Stephanie Molnar
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2212
Stephanie Ponticas
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1643
Stephanie Schwantes
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4956
Stephanie Song
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3218
Stephanie Wyman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3864
Stephen Alborn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4042
Stephen C. Hall
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1442
Stephen Cash
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0996
Stephen Chapman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4353
Stephen Coe
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1830
Stephen Fowler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0971
Stephen Hillman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3315
Stephen Hillman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0951
Stephen Keever
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2475
Stephen Lane
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3045
Stephen Leeb
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3760
Stephen Leonard
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3557
Stephen Lucas
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2548
Stephen Machovic
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4810
Stephen Machovic
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3166
Stephen Mattin
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3833
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1918
Stephen Sawyer
3834
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0976
Stephen Tollison
3835
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2553
Stephen Wallace
3836
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3012
Stephen West
3837
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3151
Sterling Vance
3838
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1147
Stevan Martin
3839
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2116
Steve Atwood
3840
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2713
Steve Cailleteau
3841
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1539
Steve Carter
3842
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3795
Steve Coleman
3843
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3767
Steve Cremer
3844
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2450
Steve Fourez
3845
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4609
Steve Fourez
3846
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3251
Steve Frank
3847
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3053
Steve Froslie
3848
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4334
Steve Froslie
3849
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3555
Steve Gunsior
3850
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4058
Steve Harms
3851
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1549
Steve Heitbrink
3852
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3669
Steve Hicks
3853
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3188
Steve Jones
3854
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1107
Steve Legeay
3855
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2422
Steve Lloyd
3856
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2215
Steve McKenna
3857
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3928
Steve Miller
3858
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4399
Steve Myler
3859
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4518
Steve Osterhus
3860
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2599
Steve Peabody
3597
-------
Index
1
3861
3862
3863
3864
3865
3866
3867
3868
3869
3870
3871
3872
3873
3874
3875
3876
3877
3878
3879
3880
3881
3882
3883
3884
3885
3886
3887
3888
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4366
Steve Reyes
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3455
Steve Rodenberg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3124
Steve Schaefer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1888
Steve Sunderlin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4913
Steven Aman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1946
Steven Aunan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3788
Steven Bonura
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2414
Steven Bowers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3523
Steven Burgert
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2972
Steven Casto
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3529
Steven Casto
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4550
Steven Casto
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3911
Steven Chambers
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1365
Steven Cook
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4515
Steven Coy
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3399
Steven Jones
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3437
Steven Kuhn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1441
Steven Mercurio
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2033
Steven Mortell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4119
Steven Nye
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4839
Steven Parker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4121
Steven Ritt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4163
Steven Roll
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2070
Steven Rosenberg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4206
Steven Scheye
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3524
Steven Tribbey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3313
Steven Walton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3482
Steven Zepeda
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3889
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1282
Stewart Pravda
3890
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3117
Stuart Allen
3891
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3040
Stuart Sipes
3892
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3192
Su Flickinger
3893
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2672
Sue Cooper
3894
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2673
Sue Efant
3895
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3492
Sue Efant
3896
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4017
Sue Hoban
3897
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2988
Sue Madson
3898
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4575
Sue Paulsen
3899
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3607
Sue Sarkis
3900
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2938
Sue Schulte
3901
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3225
Sue Stoudemire
3902
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1295
Susan Bates
3903
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4178
Susan Bertuccelli
3904
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2016
Susan Carden
3905
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1166
Susan Corbelli
3906
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4185
Susan Cox
3907
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3667
Susan DiGiacomo
3908
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2529
Susan Dixon
3909
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4959
Susan Fink
3910
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4354
Susan Goodman
3911
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2325
Susan Harman
3912
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1351
Susan Hein
3913
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1824
Susan J. Reed
3914
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3213
Susan Kater
3915
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4430
Susan Kirschner
3916
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2341
Susan Lefebvre
3598
-------
Index
1
3917
3918
3919
3920
3921
3922
3923
3924
3925
3926
3927
3928
3929
3930
3931
3932
3933
3934
3935
3936
3937
3938
3939
3940
3941
3942
3943
3944
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2813
Susan Lynch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4340
Susan Marinov
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4604
Susan McCammon
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3961
Susan McNary-Murray
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2795
Susan Millar
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4723
Susan Morton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0661
Susan Nossel
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2596
Susan Peters
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0845
Susan Powell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4122
Susan Puryear
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2114
Susan Stanton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1276
Susan Taylor
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3465
Susan Voyles
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2593
Susan Wizer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2157
Susan Zipf
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2065
Susang-Talamo Family
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1228
Susie Jacobson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3565
Sustainable Energy Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1600
Suzanna Liebelt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4221
Suzanne Albright
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4880
Suzanne Buchholz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0919
Suzanne Butcher
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1325
Suzanne Pavlus
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5075
Suzanne Stapler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1346
Suzanne Zimmerman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5032
Suzette Leininger
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2782
Suzie Kidder
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3494
Sydney Gonzales
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
3945
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4574
T Joseph Young
3946
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1936
T Michael Salter
3947
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1137
T. Becker Power
Systems
3948
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1402
T. Becker Power
Systems
3949
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4169
Tamara Ketscher
3950
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3122
Tamara Lewis
3951
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3267
Tammara Gonzalez
3952
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4579
Tammy Eaker
3953
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3291
Tammy Wallace
3954
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3582
Tammy Woten
3955
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4809
Tammy Woten
3956
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1775
Tania Slawecki
3957
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2163
Tanya Barlow
3958
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2165
Tanya Hancock
3959
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2421
Tara Awezec
3960
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4830
Tara D. (no surname
provided)
3961
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4390
Taraza Lawrence
3962
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4696
TashaDove
3963
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1487
Tauno Wirkki
3964
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3662
Tawnie Reed
3965
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1435
Taylor Kang
3966
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3322
Ted Braude
3967
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4870
Ted Meyer
3968
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1445
TedRiedle
3969
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2037
TedRiedle
3970
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3380
Terence Ratcliff
3971
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4715
Teresa Baca
3972
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4060
Teresa Barncastle
3599
-------
Index
1
3973
3974
3975
3976
3977
3978
3979
3980
3981
3982
3983
3984
3985
3986
3987
3988
3989
3990
3991
3992
3993
3994
3995
3996
3997
3998
3999
4000
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4773
Teresa Bessett
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4259
Teresa Darnielle-Morse
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2730
Teresa Dziadul
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1683
Teresa Parcell
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3385
Teresa Paterson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1649
Teresa Risch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1080
Teresa Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3433
Teresa Townsend
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3834
Teresa Villarreal
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4370
Terri Griffin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4724
Terri Parke
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4501
Terrill Cook
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2768
Terry Cooper
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4869
Terry Davis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3919
Terry Fox
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4551
Terry Hall
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2287
Terry Hess
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1381
Terry King
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1073
Terry Kornegay
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2987
Terry Magill
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1030
Terry McCann
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4534
Terry Olivares
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3948
Terry Pease
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3639
Terry Potucek
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2118
Terry Richmond
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2634
Terry Rupholdt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3684
Terry Smith
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3899
Terry Socall
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
4001
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0952
Terry Spellman
4002
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2710
Terry Spellman
4003
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3634
Terry Spellman
4004
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3214
Terry VanderWert
4005
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3554
Thaddeus Howard
4006
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1534
The Muffler shop of
Columbia
4007
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4084
Theodore Fritsche
4008
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4369
Theresa Green
4009
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1043
Theresa Ratliff
4010
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2915
Theresa Warren Roberts
4011
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2489
Therese MacKenzie
4012
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2798
Therese MacKenzie
4013
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2093
Thomas Arnold
4014
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2696
Thomas Baird
4015
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3434
Thomas Bigham
4016
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4159
Thomas Cornwall
4017
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3517
Thomas Curran
4018
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1061
Thomas Darin
4019
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2758
Thomas Devlin
4020
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2965
Thomas Eagan
4021
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3577
Thomas Fitterer
4022
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3262
Thomas Gates
4023
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2772
Thomas George
4024
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0964
Thomas Gisler
4025
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4651
Thomas Go lab
4026
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2375
Thomas Harms
4027
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2260
Thomas Hartford
4028
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1227
Thomas Hutton
3600
-------
Index
1
4029
4030
4031
4032
4033
4034
4035
4036
4037
4038
4039
4040
4041
4042
4043
4044
4045
4046
4047
4048
4049
4050
4051
4052
4053
4054
4055
4056
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2305
Thomas Keenan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2931
Thomas Kiker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3695
Thomas Kirk
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3057
Thomas Knight
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2356
Thomas Koch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2567
Thomas Kohler
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3628
Thomas Lardie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2214
Thomas Laska
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4994
Thomas McCreary
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3818
Thomas Meyer
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2244
Thomas Morrison
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4562
Thomas Panetta
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4952
Thomas Pekol
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4254
Thomas Pichla
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3491
Thomas Puglia
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4610
Thomas Ramus
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0921
Thomas Rausch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1280
Thomas Reed
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2250
Thomas Remmey
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2169
Thomas Sassaman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2969
Thomas Tucker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4022
Thomas Tucker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3530
Thomas voloshen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1335
Thomas Wappes
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2158
Thomas Williamson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2578
Thomas Wynn
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1184
Tierney Clark
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5043
Tim Bardell
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
4057
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1242
TimBieker
4058
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0834
Tim Breuninger
4059
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4966
Tim Browne
4060
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1062
Tim Creveling
4061
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1500
Tim Guffey
4062
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3613
Tim Guffey
4063
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0958
Tim Helms
4064
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0922
TimKautza
4065
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4826
Tim Killian
4066
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4828
TimLenz
4067
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3073
TimMaiers
4068
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2568
Tim O'Connell
4069
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4008
Tim Seidel
4070
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2851
Tim Sunlake
4071
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4827
Tim Thompson
4072
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1244
Tim Young
4073
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4743
Timothy Anders
4074
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4414
Timothy By bee
4075
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3355
Timothy Dudley
4076
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4476
Timothy Frink
4077
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1519
Timothy Karp
4078
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1303
Timothy Kell
4079
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2012
Timothy Kell
4080
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3762
Timothy Kent
4081
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3081
Timothy Mehallick
4082
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2735
Timothy Mishic
4083
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1058
Timothy Northcott
4084
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1522
Timothy Schnaitman
3601
-------
Index
1
4085
4086
4087
4088
4089
4090
4091
4092
4093
4094
4095
4096
4097
4098
4099
4100
4101
4102
4103
4104
4105
4106
4107
4108
4109
4110
4111
4112
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2469
Timothy Spong
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2717
Timothy Spong
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4937
Tina Grosowsky
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4168
Tina Jinkens
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2711
Tina Sackman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3905
Tisa cheney
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1416
Titan Fuel Tanks
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4349
Tod Bartholomew
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4597
Tod Bartholomew
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2258
Todd Coleman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1533
Todd Hendricks
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4701
Todd Jarvis
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4073
Todd Kettering
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0935
Todd Marvin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3194
Todd Middleton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4708
Todd Perry
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3804
Todd Place
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2192
Todd Snyder
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2193
Todd Snyder
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2736
Todd Snyder
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2935
Todd Sparks
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2810
Tom Byrnes
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3713
Tom DeMartini
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2123
Tom Fortner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4564
Tom Goodwin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3071
Tom Graham
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4599
Tom Graham
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2957
Tom Grant
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
4113
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2993
Tom Hunt
4114
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2205
Tom Meyer
4115
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2233
Tom Morgan
4116
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3714
Tom Nobis
4117
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1427
Tom Schafer
4118
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2845
Tom Steinmetz
4119
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0812
Tom Wagley
4120
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3525
Tommie Martin
4121
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2974
TOMMY ROBERTS
4122
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4685
Tony Paskali
4123
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1315
Tony Troutman
4124
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1954
Tonya Dunn
4125
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3150
Tonya Kelley
4126
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2039
Tracey Bonner
4127
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4009
Tracey Powers
4128
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2386
Tracy Angeles
4129
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1399
Tracy Curran
4130
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1121
Tracy Hawkins
4131
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2887
Tracy Heart
4132
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3661
Tracy Price
4133
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1307
Tracy Sparks
4134
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0841
Travis McCullough
4135
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1322
Trent Perkins
4136
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4114
Trevor Bollmann
4137
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1907
Trevor Laurie
4138
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3145
Trey Thompson
4139
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1042
Triangle Republican
women
4140
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3243
Trisha Lucero
3602
-------
Index
1
4141
4142
4143
4144
4145
4146
4147
4148
4149
4150
4151
4152
4153
4154
4155
4156
4157
4158
4159
4160
4161
4162
4163
4164
4165
4166
4167
4168
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1347
Troy Black
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1733
Troy Lindquist
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1482
Trudee Nims
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1739
U.S. Representative
Harriet M. Hageman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0520
United States Climate
Alliance
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1019
Urbiegato Morbidendus
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2058
Ursula Cohrs
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2805
Ursula Cohrs
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3700
Valerie Allar
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1536
Valerie Dunbar
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4725
Valerie Huerta
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4076
Valri Kriner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3618
Van Elander
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4887
Van Heath
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2355
Vance Revennaugh
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4947
Vasu Murti
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1177
Veeral Lad
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4431
Vernon Huber
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4385
Vernon Ryan
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1262
Vic Minish
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3869
Vic Nicholls
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2793
Vicki Bynum
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2347
Vicki Paxton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4222
Vicki Paxton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3627
Vicki Stewart
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4798
Vickie Brown
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2709
Vickie Hatton
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4709
Vickie Riggins
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
4169
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2011
Vicky Rafn
4170
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2527
Vicky Zelenka
4171
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1404
Victor Brown
4172
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2110
Victor Johnson
4173
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4041
Victor Johnson
4174
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4199
Victoria Farrell
4175
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1153
Victoria Pless
4176
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2712
Victoria Skalland
4177
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4496
Vincent Salvatore
4178
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1601
Virginia Choate
4179
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4150
Virginia Choate
4180
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2307
Virginia Harris
4181
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3510
Virginia Lee
4182
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1738
Virginia Metcalf
4183
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3967
Virginia Thomas
4184
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4179
Vivian Broadhead
4185
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3368
Vonn Koshinski
4186
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3703
W. Smith
4187
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3792
Walker Shapiro
4188
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2722
Wallace Alvey
4189
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2557
Wallace Bosma
4190
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4303
Wallace Bosma
4191
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1987
Wallace Judd
4192
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4096
Wallace Mitchell
4193
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4916
Walt Trojanowski
4194
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4519
Walter Adams
4195
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1248
Walter Bright
4196
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2607
Walter Evens
3603
-------
Index
1
4197
4198
4199
4200
4201
4202
4203
4204
4205
4206
4207
4208
4209
4210
4211
4212
4213
4214
4215
4216
4217
4218
4219
4220
4221
4222
4223
4224
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3649
Walter FitzPatrick
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1944
Walter mirczak
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4116
Walter Phillips
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3084
Walter Shonk
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1836
Walter Truitt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1257
Ward Wenholz
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1232
Warren Hostetter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4628
Warren Kitchen
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1380
Warren Musselman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2198
Warren Musselman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1286
Wayne Aarum
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1396
Wayne Bliss
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2628
Wayne Forkum
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2584
Wayne Ginnow
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4126
Wayne Graff
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3964
Wayne Peterkin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4629
Wayne Smyly
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2959
Wells Lynne
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1328
Wendell Hurst
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4832
Wendell Shauman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3461
Wendi R. Wilkinson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2324
Wendy Alberg
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4639
Werner Alber
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4470
Wgh Adyk
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2019
Wilbur Sauerbry
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1149
WiliamHunt
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2466
Will Parker
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2806
Will Perry
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
4225
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4680
William Ackerman
4226
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4847
William Bistak
4227
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1974
William Brethauer
4228
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3382
William Cathey
4229
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4365
William Chalgren
4230
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1803
William Clark
4231
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3305
William Clark
4232
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4682
William Clark
4233
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0989
William Coates
4234
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2194
William Coates
4235
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1652
William Cooper
4236
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1937
William Cunningham
4237
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4226
William Dargan
4238
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1111
William Dixon
4239
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2556
William Foster
4240
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4326
William Foster
4241
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1982
William Frost
4242
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4980
William Geresy
4243
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2638
William Gibson
4244
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2618
William Gradoville
4245
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2645
William Gradoville
4246
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4583
William Gradoville
4247
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4339
william grant
4248
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4232
William Hammons
4249
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3972
William Hewitt
4250
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4202
William Holman
4251
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2888
William Huggins
4252
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4718
William Jackson
3604
-------
Index
1
4253
4254
4255
4256
4257
4258
4259
4260
4261
4262
4263
4264
4265
4266
4267
4268
4269
4270
4271
4272
4273
4274
4275
4276
4277
4278
4279
4280
Docket No.
Commenter Name
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3884
William Johnson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2563
William Kaminske
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3375
William Kamp
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4234
William Kamp
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4276
William King
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3721
William Kinkead
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4127
William M Musser IV
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2246
William McDowell
Mastin
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3689
William McPherson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1792
William Michie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2732
William Michie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3133
William Michie
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1831
William Nelson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4815
William Phillips
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1205
William Pirnat
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1690
William Pirnat
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3679
William Porter
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3427
William Robinson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3447
William S Fairhurst
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4512
William Santo
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3981
William Slicher
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4673
William Tafolla
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2729
William Veitch
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4905
William Vroman
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4522
William Werner
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2685
William Wild
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3130
William Willson
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0524
William Wilson
Index
Docket No.
Commenter Name
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1750
4D Transportation, Inc.
4281
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4914
William Wortman
4282
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4852
William Young
4283
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1590
Willizm Orso
4284
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4142
Wisconsin
Environmental Health
Network
4285
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3570
WJ graves
4286
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4091
Wwayn Smith
4287
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0860
Wyatt Halterman
4288
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0688
Wyatt Tomlinson
4289
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1537
Wyatt Wilkinson
4290
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0858
Yasmine Juarez
4291
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1312
Yolanda Sylvester
4292
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1450
Yolanda Sylvester
4293
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1597
Yolanda Sylvester
4294
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4149
Yolanda Sylvester
4295
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3809
Yunhui Pu
4296
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1645
Yvonne Collins
4297
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2493
Yvonne Smith
4298
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0805
Zach Dunham
4299
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-2040
Zachary Katznelson
4300
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3477
Zachary Rogers
4301
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3136
Zachary Winslett
4302
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-5039
Zane Bennett
4303
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-3001
Zee Alexi
4304
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-4943
Zoe Poteet
3605
-------
Appendix B: Mass comment campaigns
EPA received 46 mass mail campaigns commenting on the proposal, representing 247,767
signatures. These mass comment campaigns are in the form of either a cover letter with many
signatures; individual letters that are identical or nearly identical; or a cover note with a
spreadsheet containing many individual comments. The mass mail campaigns are listed in Table
B-l, organized by the sponsoring organization (if known), along with the number of signatures.
Also reproduced verbatim below is the docketed example of each mass mail campaign or one
excerpt from the associated spreadsheet or attachments.
Sixteen of the mass mail campaigns contain detailed comments and are included verbatim in
the RtC document. These are also noted in Table B-l. The remaining 30 comments are
reproduced below.
Table B-l: List of Mass Comment Campaigns
Docket Number
Sponsoring Organization
Number of
Signatures
Included
Verbatim
in RtC
Section
1
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0505
E2 Environmental Entrepreneur
Business Leaders, (web)
124
2
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0512
Moms Clean Air Force - Arizona,
(web)
40
3
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0535
Moms Clean Air Force - Arizona
Chapter
14
4
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0543
Alliance of Nurses for Healthy
Environments (web)
54
5
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0691
The Climate Reality Project, (web)
7,367
6
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0692
Arizona Interfaith Power & Light,
(web)
216
9
7
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0693
Evangelical Environmental Network
(EEN). (web)
25,303
8
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0717
Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC). (web)
24,038
9
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0718
Missouri Corn Growers Association
(MCGA). (web)
168
19.1
10
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0719
Interfaith Power & Light (IPL). (web)
190
11
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0720
Union of Concerned Scientists, (web)
1,030
12
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0721
Evergreen Collaborative, (web)
8,119
13
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0722
Center for Biological Diversity,
(web)
12,460
3.1
3606
-------
Docket Number
Sponsoring Organization
Number of
Signatures
Included
Verbatim
in RtC
Section
14
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0723
American Lung Association (ALA),
(web)
1,371
15
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0724
Specialty Equipment Market
Association (SEMA). (web)
1,488
15
16
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0725
National Religious Partnership for the
Environment, (web)
10,890
17
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0726
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
22
18
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0727
Climate Hawks Vote Civic Action,
(web)
5,035
19
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0728
Consumer Reports (web) - Petition
included as Attachment 1 to the main
comment
18,817
1.1
20
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0730
Sierra Club, (web)
16,273
21
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0757
Michigan Corn Growers Association
(MCGA). (email)
30
19
22
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1697
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
5,581
23
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1698
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
132
24
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1699
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
2,937
25
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1700
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
679
15
26
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1701
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
118
15, 17, 27
27
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1702
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
5,465
14
28
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1703
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
60
29
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1704
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
44,335
9
30
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1705
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
223
31
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1706
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
1,982
32
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1707
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
2,088
12.3
3607
-------
Docket Number
Sponsoring Organization
Number of
Signatures
Included
Verbatim
in RtC
Section
33
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1708
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
3,105
34
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1709
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
76
19
35
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1710
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
1,851
19
36
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1711
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
44
37
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1712
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
3,164
38
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1713
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
340
39
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1714
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
20
3.2
40
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1715
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
14,249
41
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1716
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
2,309
19
42
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1717
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
513
3.3
43
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1718
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
57
44
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1719
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
261
45
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1720
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
19,816
46
EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-1721
Sponsoring organization unknown,
(web)
5,313
3.1
Total
247,767
Comments by Organizations
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0505 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by E2 Environmental
Entrepreneur Business Leaders, (web) (124 signatures)
As business leaders and supporters of E2, we are writing to urge you to ensure that both the
medium/light duty and heavy-duty vehicle emission standards are as strong as possible.
Specifically, we believe that it is vital the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA):
3608
-------
1. Quickly finalize a standard for Light and Medium-duty vehicles that achieves at least a
75% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by model year 2030.
2. Finalize Heavy Duty Vehicle/clean truck standards by the end of 2023 that puts the nation
on a path to all new heavy-duty vehicle sales being zero emissions by 2035.
E2 is a national, nonpartisan group of more than 11,000 business leaders, investors, and
professionals from every sector of the economy. Our members have founded or funded more
than 2,500 companies, created more than 600,000 jobs and manage more than $100 billion in
venture and private equity capital.
We recognize and appreciate that this administration has driven incredible and unprecedented
federal clean energy investments across a broad range of sectors including vehicles. E2 has been
proud to actively support key components of your agenda including the passage of the Inflation
Reduction Act, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the Chips and Science Act.
As businesspeople from a broad cross-section of the economy, we value these investments
and are seeing, firsthand, the positive benefits. However, we also recognize that without strong
light/medium and heavy-duty vehicle emission standards, the U.S. risks ceding global economic
leadership to other nations and regions such as Asia, Europe or India. These global competitors
have plans in place advancing their transition to zero-emission vehicles in the coming decades.
As of September 2022, automakers and battery manufacturers worldwide will spend more
than $626 billion through 2030 to develop new electric cars, passenger trucks, freight trucks and
buses. That is a $110 billion increase from projections in April of 2022.
To be globally competitive, the US must accelerate the rate that our auto sector is
transitioning to clean vehicles. Strong EPA standards will provide the clear market certainty
needed to support commitments that are already being made by many in the industry and will
provide regulatory support to ensure those commitments are met.
Furthermore, many of our businesses are trying to lower emissions in our supply chains and
lower costs for our consumers. Most businesses are dependent on third party delivery truck
operators. Stronger vehicle emissions standards will drive the availability of lower emission,
lower cost, options in a way that businesses with small market-share cannot.
Strengthening tailpipe emissions and advancing a transition to zero-emission vehicles is a win
for America and all those looking to protect public health, spur job creation, economic growth, as
well as family and business cost savings.
Please redouble your efforts to ensure that the very strongest light-, medium-, and heavy-duty
vehicle emission standards are finalized this year. Doing so will allow us to tackle the climate
crisis and address air pollution. It will also allow us to fully leverage the recent federal clean
energy investments and historic investments from Congress, accelerate the vehicle sector's shift
to a zero-emission future, increase U.S. global competitiveness, save consumers money, and
create good American jobs.
3609
-------
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0512 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Moms Clean Air
Force - Arizona, (web) (40 signatures)
The transportation sector is the largest source of climate pollution in the US, and cleaning up
this pollution is one of the most important things we can do to fight climate change and protect
our children's future. Tailpipe pollution can also harm the health of our families and
communities. Clean Car Standards are a critical tool to fight climate change and reduce
dangerous air pollution. They help protect public health nationwide.
EPA has proposed Clean Car Standards that are a significant step forward In the transition to
zero-emission vehicles. This rule would put us on a path to boosting the electric passenger
vehicle market share to 67% by 2032.
We the undersigned urge the EPA to move quickly to finalize the strongest possible standards
for tailpipe pollution from passenger cars and trucks.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0535 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Moms Clean Air
Force - Arizona Chapter (14 signatures)
The transportation sector is the largest source of climate pollution in the US, and cleaning up
this pollution is one of the most important things we can do to fight climate change and protect
our children's future. Tailpipe pollution can also harm the health of our families and
communities. Clean Car Standards are a critical tool to fight climate change and reduce
dangerous air pollution. They help protect public health nationwide.
EPA has proposed Clean Car Standards that are a significant step forward In the transition to
zero-emission vehicles. This rule would put us on a path to boosting the electric passenger
vehicle market share to 67% by 2032.
We the undersigned urge the EPA to move quickly to finalize the strongest possible standards
for tailpipe pollution from passenger cars and trucks.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0543 - Mass mail campaign submitted Alliance of Nurses for Healthy
Environments (web) (54 signatures)
The transportation sector is the largest source of greenhouse gasses in the United States,
making up nearly 30% of our country's emissions. Emissions from passenger vehicles and trucks
pollute the air we breathe causing adverse health impacts and contributing to the increasingly
urgent issue of climate change. Nurses applaud EPA for finalizing robust clean car standards
through model year 2026 and for taking the important next steps to finalize stricter clean car and
truck standards through model year 2027.
It is critical that EPA finalize the strongest possible clean car and truck standards to drive a
rapid transition to zero emissions vehicles. Numerous studies show that poor health outcomes
and higher incidences of chronic conditions, like asthma, lung disease, and cancer, are linked to
tailpipe pollution from passenger vehicles. In 2020, the national passenger vehicle fleet
represented approximately 94 percent of the nation's on-road vehicles and generated over one
million tons of ozone- and particle-forming NOx emissions, and over 33,400 tons of fine
particles annually. Further, freight truck pollution harms especially those who live near
3610
-------
highways, ports, freight hubs and other high traffic areas. We know that clean car standards are
the most effective policy to reduce dangerous air pollution and protect public health nationwide.
Climate change poses serious threats to the health and lives of all Americans, especially
children, older adults, low-wealth communities, communities of color and people living with
chronic diseases. When poor air quality due to vehicle emissions coincides with climate-related
risks, such as extreme heat or ground-level ozone, adverse health effects are further amplified.
By finalizing the strongest possible clean car standards for cars and trucks, EPA will help the
communities, who often are more exposed to air pollution and the hardest hit by effects of
climate change and will align with the Biden Administration's environmental justice goals.
The Biden Administration has an opportunity to protect public health and fight the climate
crisis with strong long-term clean cars standards. As we transition nationwide to zero-emission
vehicles, we urge EPA to move swiftly to enact the strongest possible long-term standards for
light-, medium-, and heavy-duty trucks to clean our air, keep Americans healthy, and combat the
climate crisis.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0691 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by The Climate Reality
Project, (web) (7,367 signatures)
On behalf of more than 7,300 Americans who want to improve their communities' health and
protect the planet we share, The Climate Reality Project strongly urges you to enact historic
climate regulation by implementing the strongest possible proposed vehicle pollution standards.
We have attached the comment letter we have asked our followers, friends, and volunteers in
the region to sign as well as each signatory's name. As you tabulate the number of comments, we
hope you count each and every one of these signatories as an individual comment.
Thank you for your work and commitment to climate action.
Transportation makes up the largest share United States greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—
28%—due to the fossil fuels we burn for cars, trucks, and other modes of transports This must
change if we are to achieve our climate and justice goals. In combination with recent historic
provisions in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the
proposed standards for light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles could accelerate emission
reductions, while significantly growing the electric vehicle (EV) sector.ii We are encouraged by
the EPA's proposal and urge you to enact the strongest possible limits on vehicle pollution.
Communities of color are more likely to reside near highways, and subsequently experience
the brunt of associated negative health impacts, including impaired lung function, cardiovascular
diseases, and premature death.iii The new standards could address these issues by potentially
reducing emissions for harmful pollutants, such as particulate matter, by over 95%.iv Not only
would this lessen burden of pollution on vulnerable communities, but the standards could yield
up to $1.6 trillion in net benefits from cleaner air to lower vehicle operating costs and fuel
savings.v
EVs made up an estimated 5.6% of cars and trucks sold in 2022.vi To achieve President
Biden's goal of cutting climate pollution in half by the end of the decade, the number of EVs on
the road must significantly increase; the strongest proposed limits could lead to an estimated
3611
-------
69% of new light-duty passenger vehicles sold being electric by 2032.vii Once out of reach for
the average American, EVs popularity is expected to grow as a result of recent incentives making
these vehicles more accessible.viii According to the International Council on Clean
Transportation, EVs could reach cost parity with traditional cars in the next two years.ix
Between the climate and economic benefits, we cannot afford to delay this transition with less
stringent standards.
IPCC recently warned that rapid and deep GHG emission reductions must be executed to keep
warming below the critical 1.5 degrees Celsius threshold.x In 2021, President Biden signed an
Executive Order setting a target for half of all vehicles sold to be zero emission vehicles by
2030.xi We applaud EPA's efforts to exceed this directive and implement ambitious regulation
that will help us to meet our climate targets.
Under the BIL and IRA, Congress showcased its commitment to transitioning toward a clean
energy economy. If we are serious about unlocking the full potential of these laws, we must end
our dependence on dirty fossil fuels. We urge you to enact historic climate regulation by
implementing the strongest possible proposed vehicle pollution standards. Our just energy
transition and the health of our communities depends on it.
i https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions
ii https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris-administration-proposes-strongest-ever-pollution-
standards- cars-and
iii https://www.epa.gov/mobile-source-pollution/environmental-justice-and-transportation;
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/biden-harris-administration-proposes-strongest-ever- pollution-
standards-cars-and
iv https://www.epa.gOv/system/files/documents/2023-04/lmdv-multi-pollutant-emissions-my-2027-nprm-
2023-04.pdf pg. 43
v https://www.epa.gov/mobile-source-pollution/light-and-medium-duty-proposed-standards-model-years-
2027- and-later
vi https://insideevs.com/news/657660/us-electric-car-sales-
january2023/#:~:text=Reference%3A%202022%20EV%20Sales&text=In%202022%2C%20more%20than
%20750%2 C000,Experian%20(via%20Automotive%20News).;
vii https://www.epa.gOv/system/files/documents/2023-04/lmdv-multi-pollutant-emissions-my-2027-nprm-
2023-04.pdf pg. 425
viii https://www.nytimes.eom/2023/02/10/business/electric-vehicles-price-cost.html
ix https ://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Analyzing-the-Impact-of-the-Inflation-
Reduction-Act-on-EV-Uptake-in-the-U.S..pdf pg. 8
x https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syr/pdf/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf pg. 21
xi https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-
strengthening- american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0693 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Evangelical
Environmental Network (EEN). (web) (2,5303 signatures)
As pro-life Christians, we have a special concern for the unborn and believe all human life is
sacred and worth defending. Children deserve the hope and expectation of a healthy, vibrant, and
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full life, unhindered by the ravages of pollution. Tailpipe emissions from passenger vehicles fills
the air we breathe where we live, work, and play with toxic pollution, like soot (PM2.5) and
ozone. Traffic is preventable and puts God's creation and our families - especially pregnant
mothers and the unborn - in harm's way. Medical research links traffic pollution to serious harms
to human health, including asthma, lung cancer, dementia, and pre-term birth.
As pro-life Christians, we have duty to defend life. We urge the EPA to set the strongest
standards possible for tailpipe pollution from passenger vehicles. To create the healthy future our
children deserve, we need the strongest possible long-term standards—beyond model year
2026—that will reduce car and light truck pollution by 75% by 2030 and put us on a path to a
100% zero-emission new vehicle sales target by 2035. Our kids deserve clean air and the right to
an abundant life.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0717 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC). (web) (24,038 signatures)
Please accept these public 24,038 comments from members and online activists of the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) asking you to finalize the strongest possible standards to
reduce pollution and help ensure the transition toward zero-emission vehicles.
Transportation accounts for the largest share of climate pollution in the U.S. and is also a
major source of other harmful pollutants that significantly impact public health, causing deadly
diseases such as asthma, heart problems, and cancer.
Cleaner vehicles are a winner all around. They help clean up the air, deliver savings on fuel,
support domestic job creation, and protect the climate.
Please finalize a strong vehicle standard that would do the following:
• A strong EPA standard for cars, SUVs, pickup trucks, and cargo vans should be finalized by
the end of the year and must lead to significant reductions in carbon emissions by being at least
as strong as the most stringent alternative in the agency's proposal.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0719 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Interfaith Power &
Light (IPL). (web) (190 signatures)
As faith leaders from diverse religious and spiritual traditions, we speak with one voice in
support of bold and just climate solutions. Climate change is a moral issue that is most harmful
to those least responsible for creating the problem. People of faith and conscience recognize the
need for bold, new transportation solutions, and clean cars and light trucks are an integral step
towards addressing the climate crisis. Today we write to ask you to move swiftly to enact robust
light-duty vehicle multi-pollutant emissions standards. As a nation, we have a moral imperative
to enact the most stringent light-duty vehicle standards in order to address our historically unsafe
pollutant emissions and to protect our public health and Shared Home.
Transportation is currently the single largest source of climate pollution in the United States.
In 2020, the national passenger vehicle fleet represented approximately 94% of the nation's
onroad vehicles and generated over one million tons of ozone- and particle-forming NOx
emissions, which create dangerous smog. In order for the U.S to meet our Paris Climate
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Agreement goals we need the strongest possible long-term standards—beyond model year 2026
— that will put the country on a path to a 100% zero-emission new vehicle sales target by 2035.
It is critical to remember that the climate crisis is a challenge of racial, economic, and
generational justice, and these rules target air pollution that disproportionately harms
marginalized communities of color and low-wealth communities that reside in counties closest to
major freeways. Implementing the strongest light-duty vehicle standards is a matter of
environmental justice, and these standards would deliver massive emission reductions and
lifesaving relief to frontline communities.
In addition, electrifying cars and light trucks will be key to improving air quality and saving
lives across the nation. More than 119 million American residents currently live in areas with
unhealthy levels of air pollution. According to research from Harvard University, more than 8
million people died from the effects of fossil fuel combustion in 2018, meaning that fossil fuels
like oil and coal are linked to 1 in 5 deaths worldwide. Pollutants caused by burning fossil fuels
have been linked to early death, heart attacks, respiratory disorders, stroke, and asthma.
It is of the utmost importance that standards require tighter limits on internal combustion
engine vehicles in order to continually make these vehicles cleaner as manufacturers transition to
zero-emission cars.
Now is the time to maximize the impact of our national clean car standards—the most
effective policy that the federal government has to reduce dangerous air pollution, lower
greenhouse gas emissions, and save consumers money at the pump. As policymakers, you have a
critical and sacred role in helping to achieve these goals. As faith leaders, we urge you to
establish strong light-duty vehicle multi-pollutant emissions standards that put our nation on a
trajectory to a zero-emissions transportation future, and we ask you to redouble efforts to
announce the draft rule before the end of 2023. For more than a decade, people of faith and
conscience have advocated for strong safeguards on greenhouse gas pollution from
transportation. Since then, the climate crisis has only accelerated, taking an enormous toll on
human life, our communities, and our world. We have a moral responsibility to act right now as a
nation to do all we can to address climate change for our communities, future generations, and
our Sacred Earth.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0720 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Union of Concerned
Scientists, (web) (1,030 signatures)
We, the over 1000 undersigned scientists, researchers, health professionals, economists,
engineers, and planners respectfully submit this comment in support of standards for heavy-duty
vehicles and passenger vehicles that put us on a trajectory to eliminate tailpipe pollution.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has made explicit commitments to climate,
clean air, and environmental justice under this administration. The transportation sector is the
largest contributor to global warming emissions in the United States. And while heavy-duty
trucks make up only 10 percent of vehicles on the road, they produce 28 percent of global
warming emissions from on-road transportation, as well as 45 percent of nitrogen oxide
emissions and 57 percent of particulate matter emissions, which disproportionately harm
environmental justice communities living near ports and freight corridors. Thus, we believe that
the light- and medium-duty vehicle multipollutant rule and the global warming emissions
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proposal for heavy-duty trucks should live up to these important stated commitments and to set
us on an accelerated path to a zero-emission transportation future.
The light- and medium-duty vehicle rule is on the right track to reduce climate-harming,
smog-forming, and particulate pollution, but the heavy-duty rule trails passenger vehicles,
leaving environmental justice communities in harm's way.l The science and technology, as well
as the urgent need to protect public health and address the climate crisis, are clear on this front:
zero-emission vehicles are available today and must be the number one priority.2
1 https://www.movingforwardnetwork.com/zero-emissions
2 https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/electrify-trucks
New state standards adopted by several states across the country will ensure more than 50
percent of new heavy-duty vehicle sales are electric vehicles by 2030. Also, new tax incentives
for commercial trucks are predicted to push electrification even further.3 As the EPA acts to
accelerate the deployment of zero-emission passenger vehicles, it must also eliminate toxic
tailpipe emissions from heavy-duty trucks and ensure that 100 percent of all new vehicles sales
are electric by 2035 to maximize clean air to breathe. This has also long been an ask of
environmental justice communities across the country.
3 https ://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/hdv-phase3 -ghg-standards-benefits-apr23 .pdf
The urgency of these issues demands a strong response. For far too long, vehicle pollution has
been devastating for the health of communities across the country and the climate.4 The
solutions are here - and we urge the EPA to stand up to this moment, pass the strongest possible
version of the light- and medium-duty standards, and eliminate tailpipe pollution from heavy-
duty trucks and cars.
4 https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/diesel-engines-public-health
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0721 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Evergreen
Collaborative, (web) (8,119 signatures)
Thank you for the proposed light-duty multi-pollutant emissions rule for 2027-2032 (Clean
Car Standards). I want to applaud EPA for using the full force of Clean Air Act authorities to
address climate pollution and public health impacts by proposing the most ambitious standards
yet. It's wonderful to see EPA affirming its commitments to prioritize environmental justice by
proposing standards that will reduce soot and smog in our communities.
Specifically, I am supportive of EPA's proposed "Alternative 1," which sets the most stringent
emissions reduction standards. While these proposed standards are technology neutral, electric
vehicles present the best option for compliance as they emit zero tailpipe pollution, resulting in
improved public health and climate outcomes. Based on the current and growing uptake of
electric vehicles, paired with the investments in charging and manufacturing from the Inflation
Reduction Act and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, these standards should be
achievable under the model years covered.
And, I would be supportive of EPA further strengthening Alternative 1 to increase the
stringency of the rule after 2030, as the market will likely be prepared for stronger standards at
that time.
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I am also supportive of EPA adopting clean car standards that last through 2035, as requested
by auto manufacturers to create market stability. Locking in clean car standards now, and for the
next decade, will give manufacturers, investors, and consumers greater confidence in the
direction of the vehicle market.
We urgently need tailpipe emissions standards that clean up the air we breathe and protect the
climate, and by locking in the strongest possible proposal, EPA can best protect communities
that have long been harmed by transportation pollution.
Please move quickly to finalize the strongest possible Clean Car Standards that align with the
level of ambition needed to protect public health and the planet.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0723 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by American Lung
Association (ALA), (web) (1,371 signatures)
We urge the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to finalize strong emissions standards for
heavy-duty, light-duty and medium-duty vehicles this year. These emissions standards are
critical for addressing climate change, improving public health and promoting environmental
justice.
We appreciate your proposal to strengthen greenhouse gas emissions limits for new heavy-
duty vehicles. We urge you to ensure that they are finalized this year, as new diesel trucks have
long lifespans on our roads. We also urge you to make the final rule even stronger than the
proposal. The final standards should be at least as stringent as the state-level Advanced Clean
Trucks program currently in place in many states.
We also appreciate your proposal to strengthen limits on greenhouse gases and other air
pollutants for new light-duty and medium-duty vehicles in Model Years 2027-2032. We call on
you to ensure these standards for all pollutants are finalized this year as well. We appreciate that
in the proposal, you included alternative levels, and urge you to build off Alternative 1 - the
most stringent option - in the final rule. This alternative will yield the most health benefits from
pollution reductions.
Emissions from vehicles powered by gasoline and diesel pose immediate harm to health. In
the heavy-duty vehicle sector, pollution from diesel-powered trucks and buses drive health harms
including asthma attacks, heart attacks and strokes, and premature death. Seventy-two million
people are estimated to live near truck freight routes, and they are more likely to be people of
color and with lower incomes.
Pollution from light- and medium-duty vehicles powered by gasoline and diesel, like
passenger cars, SUVs, pickup trucks and package delivery vans, also harms public health and is
driving climate change. Particulate matter can cause immediate health harm, including
respiratory and cardiovascular disease and even premature death.
Transportation is the single biggest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. and
transitioning to zero-emission cars is a critical part of addressing climate change. Climate change
is a health emergency, leading to more frequent and intense extreme weather events like
flooding, excessive heat, drought, and wildfires; longer and more intense allergy seasons;
increased risks from water-borne and vector-borne diseases like Lyme Disease; and worsening
air quality.
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Stronger limits on emissions from cars, vans, buses and trucks will help drive a nationwide
transition to zero-emission vehicles, which is crucial for not only addressing climate change, but
also for improving public health and equity.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0725 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by National Religious
Partnership for the Environment, (web) (10,890 signatures)
As Black church leaders, we urge the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the agency
responsible for protecting the health and environment of communities across the United States,
to finalize robust clean car standards that protects human health and the sanctity of God's
creation. Since transportation is the largest source of carbon pollution in our country, strong
pollution standards will protect families from dangerous vehicle pollution and fight climate
change.
Addressing pollution and climate change is a moral and justice matter. Our communities have
traditionally borne an undue burden from pollution and climate change; a burden levied on us
from redlining and other discriminatory practices. Our communities are often located closest to
highways and other sources of vehicle pollution. It is no surprise that black communities are
disproportionately impacted by asthma and other respiratory illnesses. Stronger vehicle emission
standards will help address these unequal health impacts.
For the health and wellbeing of our communities, it is imperative that the EPA deliver
emission standards for cars that set us on the path to zero-emission vehicles by 2035. These
tailpipe emission standards, which will help drive us towards a clean energy future, must be done
in partnership with an investment in infrastructure that will allow all communities access to zero-
emission vehicles.
As Christians, we are called to protect God's creation and care for God's people. The EPA
has an opportunity to help address the injustice of pollution and climate change by enacting the
strongest possible federal clean car standards.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0726 -Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown,
(web) (22 signatures)
I'm writing to urge the EPA to quickly finalize the strongest possible air pollution safeguards
on emissions from passenger cars and light trucks. The EPA's current proposal is a good start,
but it must be stronger to limit climate change and improve public health significantly. I
appreciate that the EPA has said it will consider more stringent alternatives and ask the agency to
implement air pollution safeguards on cars and light trucks that are at least as strong as the
standards outlined in Alternative 1 of the EPA's proposal.
For the U.S. to meet its Paris Climate Agreement goals, the EPA must set the strongest
possible long-term standards that will reduce car and light truck greenhouse gas emissions 75%
by 2030, putting the country on a path to a 100% zero-emission new vehicle sales target by 2035.
According to the EPA's own analysis, the transportation sector accounts for 27% of greenhouse
gas emissions and is the fastest growing emitter of greenhouse gases.
Greenhouse gas emissions accelerate climate change, which poses a serious threat to
Americans' health and well-being, affecting everything from the air we breathe to the places we
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live. Extreme weather events worsened by climate change create more air and water pollution,
destabilize food sources, and put our homes and lives at risk. According to the American Lung
Association, a nationwide transition to zero-emission cars, light trucks, and heavy-duty vehicles
-coupled with a transition to zero-emission electricity - would result in 110,000 premature
deaths prevented (nationwide, 2020-2050); $1.2 trillion in health benefits (nationwide, 2020-
2050); and $1.7 trillion in additional climate benefits (global, 2020- 2050).
The strongest possible air pollution safeguards on cars and light trucks would also deliver
massive emission reductions and life-saving relief to frontline communities that are often closest
to highways and bear the greatest burden from vehicle pollution. Low-wealth and BIPOC (Black,
Indigenous, People of Color) communities experience disproportionate harm from dirty vehicle
pollution, leading to increased rates of asthma and other respiratory illnesses.
I ask that the EPA move quickly to finalize air pollution safeguards on cars and light trucks
that are at least as strong as the standards set forth in Alternative 1 of the agency's proposal.
There is no time to lose. The EPA has the opportunity-and responsibility-to deploy the strongest
possible safeguards to clean up deadly car pollution, limit catastrophic climate change, and
improve public health. Thank you for the opportunity to provide input.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0727 -Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Climate Hawks Vote
Civic Action, (web) (5,035 signatures)
Enclosed and attached, please find the comments of 5,035 Climate Hawks Vote Civic Action
members and supporters encouraging you to finalize the strongest possible clean vehicle
standards. On behalf of all of us, we thank you for your work to promote electric vehicle
adoption, and your recent car emissions standards, which will help America get to 67% clean
cars by 2032. But we, and you, know that America can do more to clean up our cars and protect
Americans' health, as well as the health of our climate. We're writing to ask you to finalize the
strongest possible clean vehicle standards, now.
Transportation is the biggest source of US climate pollution, accounting for roughly a third of
all US Greenhouse Gas emissions. Tailpipe pollution is also a major source of other pollution
that harms public health, such as ozone, smog, and more. These pollutants are known by the EPA
to cause climate chaos, as well as deadly diseases such as asthma, heart disease, and cancer.
Now is the time to protect our climate, and public health, by finalizing the strongest possible
standards for cars and light duty trucks. Here's how your current proposed rule can be improved:
First, new EPA standard for cars, SUVs, pickup trucks, and cargo vans must be finalized by
the end of 2023, and must lead to significant reductions in carbon emissions.
Second, new EPA standards must put us on a trajectory to cut all pollution, including global
warming pollution, 75% by 2030, and to zero emissions by 2035. These targets are significantly
stronger than the most stringent alternative in the EPA's current proposal.
Finally, you must study and publish estimates in the federal record that show that tougher
emissions standards and the transition to electric cars will not only reduce pollution, but save
consumers money. Only by showing that clean, green, climate action to clean up our cars is also
an investment in cheaper, more affordable transportation for all Americans will we build the
support needed to finalize this rule.
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On behalf of climate hawks everywhere, thank you.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0728 - Comment submitted by Consumer Reports (CR) - Mass Mail
Campaign Included, (web) (18,817 signatures; mass mailer was submitted as Attachment 1 to
their main comments)
Petition to the Environmental Protection Agency: 18,817 Consumers Want More Clean
Vehicles for a Better Climate Future
We're urging the EPA to adopt the strongest possible rules to reduce climate- and health-
damaging vehicle emissions and greatly reduce fuel consumption, while helping consumers save
an estimated $12,000 over the lifetime of a new vehicle. The rules will rapidly accelerate the
number of cleaner vehicles like EVs and hybrids in production over the next decade; save lives
due to a dramatic decrease in tailpipe pollution; and put us on the route towards a zero emissions
future. These rules are a win-win for the climate, consumers' wallets, and our health!
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0730 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsored by Sierra Club, (web)
(16,273 signatures)
Sierra Club has collected 16,273 public comments. We have highlighted a selection of
comments below. The names of the individuals submitting comments are listed under the
selected comments. Each of the individuals signed onto the following text:
Please deliver a strong clean cars standard!
We appreciate Administrator Regan and the Environmental Protection Agency for proposing
an updated standard to address light and medium duty vehicle pollution, which contributes to
poor air quality and drives the climate crisis.
This proposal moves our vehicles in the right direction. However, the EPA must finalize the
strongest possible standards this year to accelerate the adoption of zero-emission cars, pickup
trucks, and delivery vans.
The standards must reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 75 percent by 2030 and put the
country on a path so that all new vehicle sales are zero emission by 2035.
Thank you for finalizing these standards as swiftly as possible and delivering public health
and climate benefits.
Thank you for considering this public input
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1697- Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown
(5,581 signatures)
I am aggravated by the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) proposed rule change on
emissions that would require up to two-thirds of new vehicles sold in the U.S. to be electric by
2032, the strictest standards ever proposed. The EPA is once again exceeding their authority by
attempting to dictate national policy without congressional authorization. I believe that the
proposal ignores America's market dynamics, fails to consider current supply chain limitations,
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and and violates the market dynamics which have made the US the greatest nation the world has
ever known. You appear to be poised to destroy that greatness.
Forced compliance with stricter emissions regulations will increase costs for business
equipment and operations, particularly for small businesses in the transportation industry. The
EPA has acknowledged that compliance costs for manufacturers would be $6 billion and could
include businesses spending thousands of additional dollars per business on zero-emissions
vehicles. These burdensome regulations could lead many small businesses to cut jobs or even
face bankruptcy, creating spillover effects that harm the rest of the economy. Increased
transportation costs, for instance, could further drive up the cost of food for families across
America at a time when they are already being crushed by record inflation.
Furthermore, China controls many critical materials for electric vehicle (EV) batteries,
including inputs such as cobalt, graphite, manganese, and lithium. One question is whether you
expect to participate financially in this rule, since it has been rumored, unverifiable, that the
Bidens own 10% of a lithium mine, necessary to make electric vehicles possible. While rules
issued under the so-called "Inflation Reduction Act" exclude sourcing from "foreign entities of
concern," it is unclear how the stimulated increased demand for EVs will be met without relying
on China's production of critical minerals or EV batteries. While the Biden Administration might
be attempting to incentivize domestic supply chain production, the mining and processing of
critical minerals such as lithium remain time-consuming and constrained by strict domestic
environmental laws - one of many significant regulatory barriers that will remain in place even
after this rule goes into effect. I fear that implementing this rule will ultimately harm our
domestic industry while enriching one of our chief geopolitical rivals.
Ultimately, Americans and their families are hurt by this rule because it seeks to increase the
cost of gas-powered vehicles enough to make the less-affordable EVs more appealing.
In an already inflationary environment, it is unconscionable to force American families to
choose between owning a car or putting food on the table. I ask that you withdraw this poorly
considered proposal.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1698 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown
(132 signatures)
American families are counting on you and the EPA to set strong vehicle emissions standards
for cars and light- and medium-duty trucks as soon as possible. Strong tailpipe regulations that
move the U.S. toward a zero-emissions vehicle future will protect public health and fight the
climate crisis. We need the strongest possible long-term standards—beyond model year 2026—
that will reduce car and light truck emissions by 75% by 2030, putting the country on a path to a
100%) zero-emission new vehicle sales target by 2035.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1699 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown
(2,937 signatures)
As an environmental educator and field biologist as well as a parent and grandparent who
cares deeply about the health of our planet and all its inhabitants, I am writing to urge you to
move quickly to finalize the strongest possible standards for tailpipe pollution from passenger
cars and light trucks.
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The transportation sector is the largest source of climate pollution in the US, and cleaning up
this pollution is one of the most important things we can do to fight climate change and protect
our childrens future.
Not only does tailpipe pollution contribute to the climate crisis, but it can also harm the health
of our families and communities. Exposure to pollution from cars and trucks can cause asthma,
lung infections, heart attacks, stroke, premature death, low birth weight, and cancer. Clean car
standards are a critical tool to fight climate change, and they help reduce dangerous air pollution.
They help protect public health nationwide.
Our families want to see a rapid transition to zero-emitting cars and trucks, and we urgently
need cleaner air for our children and our communities. Please move quickly to finalize the
strongest possible Clean Car Standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1699]
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1703 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown
(60 signatures)
Im writing to urge you to prioritize the implementation of robust vehicle emissions standards
for cars and light trucks and medium-duty vehicles. American families are relying on your
leadership to protect public health and combat the climate crisis through stringent safeguards.
The transportation sector alone accounts for a staggering 27% of greenhouse gas emissions, as
highlighted in the EPA's own 2020 study. This makes cleaner vehicles absolutely crucial in
safeguarding our communities from harmful tailpipe pollution.
While the proposed standards for model year model years 2027 through 2032 represent a
crucial first step, we cannot afford to stop there. I implore you to finalize standards at least as
strong as Alternative 1 and set standards that go beyond 2032. By reducing car and light truck
emissions by 75% by 2030, we can set our nation on a trajectory toward achieving a 100% zero-
emission new vehicle sales target by 2035.
To accomplish this, it is essential to increase the pace of progress after 2030 toward cleaner
new vehicles in 2032 and beyond. We also need to ensure that gas cars become even cleaner and
more efficient. By going with stronger final standards, we can create a more sustainable future
while protecting public health and the environment.
Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter. I strongly urge you to take decisive action
by finalizing the strongest possible vehicle emissions standards this year.
I appreciate your consideration in doing whats necessary to move towards cleaner air,
healthier communities, and a more sustainable future.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1705 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown
(223 signatures)
As a supporter of healthy outdoor opportunities for all, I strongly urge the EPA to finalize the
clean car proposal and final rule for cleaner vehicles as soon as possible. This rule is an essential
piece of reducing greenhouse gas and ozone-forming emissions under the Clean Air Act and will
protect waterways, clean, healthy air, and ecosystems across the nation.
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Clean air is vitally important for our health. Vehicles are responsible for 30-40% of
greenhouse gas emissions. It could be a much more beautiful world!
Strengthening national emission standards for vehicles on our roadways will also advance
environmental justice. A significant body of research has established that people of color in this
country breathe more particle-polluted air, on average than White people because communities
of color tend to be located near sources of this deadly pollutant, including major roadways. For
example, a recent study found that Black, Latino, and Asian Americans across the country were
consistently exposed to more soot pollution than White Americans, in both rural and urban
settings, and at all income levels.
I urge EPA to finish this rulemaking process expeditiously and retain the strong emission
standard targets proposed. The EPAs work to implement and enforce the Clean Air Act has
yielded enormous public health benefits and saved countless lives over the years. It is essential
that the agency continue that work by setting the strongest science-based air quality emission
standards to protect our air and the public welfare and advance environmental justice, and
safeguard our health.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1706 -Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown
(1,982 signatures)
My family is directly impacted by the air pollution in Salt Lake City. Personally, I would like
to move to an area with cleaner air, but now with wildfire smoke spreading across North
America, there is no safe area. Already our family suffers from COPD, bronchitis, and frequent
respiratory illnesses. Animals don't soil their dens. Why are we humans soiling the air we
breathe?!
As a person of faith and conscience, I recognize that we have a moral obligation to cut carbon
emissions that harm our Shared Home. People of faith and conscience are ready for bold, new
transportation solutions, and cleaner cars and light trucks are an integral step towards addressing
climate change for our communities, future generations, and our Sacred Earth.
I am asking EPA to move quickly and finalize the strongest possible light-duty vehicle (LDV)
standards. This proposal is a first step and the EPA needs to finish the job by finalizing the
strongest possible standards this year.
In order for the U.S. to meet our Paris Climate Agreement goals we need the strongest
possible long-term standards—beyond model year 2026— that will put the country on a path to a
100% zero-emission new vehicle sales target by 2035. Not implementing the strongest possible
light-duty vehicle standards would create major negative implications for our country's climate
goals.
We must also keep in mind that these rules target air pollution that disproportionately harms
marginalized communities of color and low-wealth communities. For example, "Black and
Hispanic Americans are exposed to 56 and 63 percent more particulate matter pollution,
respectively, than they produce." This is especially concerning for people of faith, as all religions
call on us to treat our neighbors with respect, dignity, and compassion. Implementing the
strongest LDV standards is a matter of environmental justice, and these standards would deliver
massive emission reductions and life-saving relief to frontline communities.
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In addition, electrifying passenger vehicles will be key to improving air quality and saving
lives across the nation. More than 119 million American residents currently live in areas with
unhealthy levels of air pollution. In 2020, the national passenger vehicle fleet represented
approximately 94% of the nation's on-road vehicles and generated over 33,400 tons of fine
particles annually, which are so small that they easily enter our bloodstream and harm our health.
It is also critical that standards require tighter limits on internal combustion engine vehicles in
order to continually make these cars cleaner as manufacturers transition to zero-emission
vehicles.
So again, on behalf of millions of people of faith and conscience around the country, I urge
the EPA to move quickly and finalize the strongest possible light-duty vehicle standards in order
to reap the benefits of light-duty vehicle electrification and accelerate the transition to zero-
emission vehicles.
Thank you for this opportunity to comment.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1708 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown
(3,105 signatures)
Over the centuries, most jobs become obsolete; why should it be any different for people who
work in fossil fuels?
As someone who loves and cares about our national parks, I know that the clock is ticking for
us to curb climate pollution. We need bold climate action now.
We certainly do need bold action and must end all use of fossil fuels!
With the transportation sector now the largest source of climate-altering greenhouse gas
pollution in the U.S., the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must put us on a clear
path to make all on-road vehicles zero emissions as soon as possible.
Vehicle pollution harms the health and well-being of individuals, affects ecosystems and
visibility in our treasured national parks, and exacerbates the global climate crisis. EPAs
proposals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from light, medium, and heavy-duty vehicles will
provide our communities with cleaner air and can prevent the worst effects of climate change.
For this reason, I urge EPA to move forward quickly with ambitious new rules for on-road
vehicles. Specific to EPAs clean cars proposal, I ask that you implement the stronger Alternative
1. For EPAs clean trucks proposal, more must be done sooner, and EPA should follow the lead
of states that have already committed to 100 percent zero-emission truck sales by no later than
2045.
Following significant investments in the Inflation Reduction Act to support transportation
electrification, now is the time for aggressive action to tackle vehicle emissions and deliver
cleaner air and a livable climate for our communities and national parks.
3623
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EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1711 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown
(44 signatures)
My children and grandchildren are looking to our government (not big business) to make our
country and planet habitable for all kinds of fauna & flora for centuries to come.
And we implore the EPA to take the strongest actions right now before all hope is gone...
So we urge EPA to create the strongest possible limits on medium and light-duty vehicle
pollution. The proposal for Alternative 1 constitutes a strong start to regulating dangerous air
pollution for the first three years, but EPA should increase the pace starting in 2030 to require
only zero-emission vehicle sales after 2035. Additionally, gas cars should be made cleaner and
more efficient along the way.
Tailpipe pollution causes tens of thousands of premature deaths nationwide each year,
especially in communities of color. Exposure to air pollution can lead to health problems
including increased risk of asthma attacks, strokes, heart attacks, cancer, and premature deaths.
The EPA can further its commitment to environmental justice this year by issuing stronger and
longer term clean car standards.
Strong tailpipe regulations that move the U.S. toward a zero-emissions vehicle future will
protect public health and fight the climate crisis. We need the strongest possible long-term
standards that will reduce car and light truck emissions by 75% by 2030, putting the country on a
path to a 100% zero-emission new vehicle sales target by 2035.
Increasingly strong clean car standards are the signal the industry needs to provide more, and
more affordable, zero-emission vehicles, along with the infrastructure to support them. EPA
should also require that manufacturers make any combustion engine vehicles that are on the road
increasingly cleaner and more efficient.
Alternative 1 is good for the first 3 years, but we need to increase the pace starting in 2030 to
stay on the route to zero emissions.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1712 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown
(3,164 signatures)
I dont know why you have this job if you cant do the obvious things the Environmental
Protection Agency SHOULD AND MUST DO. Your corporate corrupt backround is clowding
your understanding of this JOB!
EPA must create the strongest possible limits on medium and light-duty vehicle pollution.
The proposal for Alternative 1 constitutes a strong start to regulating dangerous air pollution for
the first three years, but EPA should increase the pace starting in 2030 to require only zero-
emission vehicle sales after 2035. Additionally, gas cars should be made cleaner and more
efficient along the way.
Tailpipe pollution causes tens of thousands of premature deaths nationwide each year,
especially in communities of color. Exposure to air pollution can lead to health problems
including increased risk of asthma attacks, strokes, heart attacks, cancer, and premature deaths.
3624
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The EPA can further its commitment to environmental justice this year by issuing stronger and
longer term clean car standards.
Strong tailpipe regulations that move the U.S. toward a zero-emissions vehicle future will
protect public health and fight the climate crisis. We need the strongest possible long-term
standards that will reduce car and light truck emissions by 75% by 2030, putting the country on a
path to a 100% zero-emission new vehicle sales target by 2035.
Increasingly strong clean car standards are the signal the industry needs to provide more, and
more affordable, zero-emission vehicles, along with the infrastructure to support them. EPA
should also require that manufacturers make any combustion engine vehicles that are on the road
increasingly cleaner and more efficient.
Alternative 1 is good for the first 3 years, but we need to increase the pace starting in 2030 to
stay on the route to zero emissions.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1713 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown
(340 signatures)
Use this space to type out a comment for the EPA explaining what more expensive vehicles
would mean for your family's budget.
UNA FORD ABLE
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1715 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown
(14,249 signatures)
I am opposed to this regulation.
The American spirit built the auto industry and defined the 20th century; the open road
became a symbol of freedom. Now, this regulation threatens to take away our freedoms by
taking away our cars.
These new vehicle regulations proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are
clearly intended to limit the production and sale of gas cars. And it's very clear that President
Biden and the far Left would like to ban gas cars altogether. But this is NOT what the American
people want. We like gas cars and we like being able to buy gas cars. We do not need the
Socialist state to regulate our choice of car.
Regulating gas cars out of existence is extremely unpopular—it's why this policy would never
make it through Congress. It is why the President is instead pushing this policy via the federal
bureaucracy.
This regulation will limit my options when I go to buy my next car. I will be stuck with a car
or truck that is more expensive, of lower quality, dependent on rare Chinese materials, dependent
on the vulnerable electric grid, and otherwise unable to meet my needs. We will be forced to
replace our gas cars with electric cars—which are more expensive, have shorter ranges, take
more time to refuel, and line the pockets of the Chinese Communist Government because of the
lithium mining needed.
3625
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This regulation is the big-government Socialist state at its worst; it hurts Americans and helps
our adversaries. It raises the key question: what does this Administration have against American
citizens?
Let's keep America free—let us buy the car or truck that we want.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1718 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown
(email) (57 signatures)
Thank you for your recently announced proposals to address pollution from light and
medium-duty vehicles. I am worried about the impacts of the climate crisis and dangerous air
pollution on the health of our communities, which is why I hope that you'll finalize this rule by
the end of the year.
With your support we can ensure that all new vehicles are zero-emission in 2035.
The transportation sector is the leading source of climate pollution in the US and is
responsible for significant NOx and particulate matter emissions. The climate crisis and air
pollution are harming our families and our communities today, and vehicle emissions are a major
contributor to this pollution. This is especially true for passenger cars and trucks, which are
responsible for 57% of the total climate pollution from the transportation sector.
EPA's proposed standards will be crucial in addressing this pollution. EPA estimates that the
proposed standards would avoid approximately 7.3 billion metric tons of greenhouse gas
emissions from 2027 through 2055, and would significantly reduce NOx, PM, and VOC
emissions during that time.
It is vital for EPA to finalize the most protective multipollutant standards possible that are
consistent with and build from the proposals, helping to ensure that at least two-thirds of new
light-duty vehicles and at least 40% of new medium-duty vehicles sold in 2032 are zero-
emitting. These standards must put us on a path for all new vehicles to have zero emissions no
later than 2035. Standards at this level are eminently achievable, accounting for the progress
already underway thanks to manufacturer and fleet investments and commitments, federal
spending, and state policies like the Advanced Clean Cars II rule. According to a report by EDF
and WSP, U.S. manufacturing will be capable of producing an estimated 4.3 million new
passenger EVs every year by 2026 (a third of all new vehicles sold in 2022). U.S. manufacturing
facilities will also be able to produce enough batteries to supply up to 11.2 million new
passenger EVs every year by 2026.
Please take action to ensure that EPA finalizes the most protective standards possible that are
consistent with, and build from the proposals, to put us on the path to zero emissions from new
vehicles in 2035.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1719 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown
(email) (261 signatures)
I support the EPA's proposed standards for light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles. These
standards should significantly reduce emissions and grow the electric vehicle sector, helping us
reach important climate goals.
3626
-------
The EPA's proposals reflect the desires of a majority of Americans. Seven in ten Americans
want tougher fuel efficiency standards.
Congress committed to transitioning toward a clean energy economy under the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law and Inflation Reduction Act. To unlock the full potential of these laws, we
must end our dependence on fossil fuels.
I urge you to implement the strongest possible proposed vehicle pollution standards. Our
energy transition and the health of our communities depend on it.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-1720 - Mass Comment Campaign sponsoring organization unknown
(email) (19,816 signatures)
I have lived with Los Angeles smog my whole life. As an EV driver, I am trying to do my
part to reduce emissions and am glad that you have proposed strong emissions standards for
light- and medium-duty vehicle pollution that move us forward in addressing harmful air
pollutants and global warming emissions.
These standards will be a good step in the right direction to limit dangerous smog forming and
particulate emissions that can increase the risk of asthma attacks, strokes, and heart attacks, and
lowering global warming emissions. Transportation is the number one contributor to global
warming emissions in the United States, and curbing these emissions will be critical to
addressing the climate crisis.
However, we can go farther. We need to see the strongest possible standards finalized this
year. The EPA's Alternative 1 is a good start, but we need the agency to set more stringent
standards after Model Year 2030 to accelerate our transition to zero-emissions and continue to
make gas cars cleaner.
Please finalize a regulation at least as strong as Alternative 1 and continue working to make
cars cleaner.
In order to limit dangerous NOx emissions and other air pollutants, and reduce global
warming emissions to address the climate crisis, the EPA needs to pass the strongest possible
cleaner cars standards. Thank you for your consideration.
EPA Summary and Response:
Summary:
Many of these mass mail campaigns are supportive of EPA's proposed program or request
EPA to issue more stringent standards to address climate change and other environmental issues,
as well as Environmental Justice concerns. Some, however, raise concerns about potential
adverse impacts of the rule.
Response:
The mass mail campaign comments reproduced verbatim above are general in nature and do
not require detailed EPA response beyond provided elsewhere in this document, and/or contain
opinions or statements that are raised without reasonable specificity. EPA's responses included
throughout this RtC document address each of the general topics raised in these comments. The
3627
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mass mail campaign comments that are not reproduced above and that contain detailed
comments on specific issues are addressed under the relevant topics of this RtC document.
3628
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Appendix C: List of testifiers at public hearings
This appendix contains a list of individuals who testified at a virtual public hearing on the
proposal, which was held on May 9-11, 2023. The hearing transcript can be found in the docket
for this rule (EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-5115). Over the three days of the hearings, 217
testifiers provided statements voicing their support for or concerns about the proposal: 88
testifiers on May 9, 89 testifiers on May 10, and 49 testifiers on May 11. The testifiers are listed
in Table C-3, below.
EPA Summary and Response:
Summary:
We characterize the nature of each of these comments by classifying their statements along
eight dimensions (one comment may contain statements on more than one dimension). The
topics are as follows:
• General support
• Want more stringent
• Oppose
• Environmental and/or health concerns
• Environmental Justice concerns
• Business and/or cost concerns
• Infrastructure and/or resource availability
• Incentive availability (IRA, BIL, etc.)
As shown in Table C-l, each of the testifiers testified on at least one of these 8 topics. Most
of the testifiers made statements on 2 or 3 topics (36% and 30%, respectively).
Table C-l: Number of Topics Raised in Hearing Testimony
No. Issues Raised
% of Testifiers
0
0%
1
26%
2
36%
3
30%
4
6%
5
1%
Total
100%
As shown in Table C-2, the most commonly raised topics were statements raising concerns
about the climate change and the environment (29%), general support (24%), and Environmental
Justice (13%>).
3629
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Table C-2: Themes Raised in Hearing Testimony
Themes of Non-Detailed Comments
% Testifiers Raising
Theme
General support
24%
Want more stringent
11%
Oppose
3%
Environmental, Health
29%
Environmental Justice
13%
Business, Costs
11%
Infrastructure, resource availability
5%
Incentive availability
4%
Total
100%
Response:
Hearing statements that are specific in nature and are not included in written comments
submitted by the testifier or the testifier's organization are included verbatim in sections of this
document above and responded to by EPA.
Some of the testimony statements are general in nature and do not require detailed EPA
response beyond those provided in the sections above in this document, and/or they contain
opinions or statements about issues without reasonable specificity. EPA's responses included
throughout this RtC document address each of the general topics raised in these general
comments.
Table C-3: List of Testifiers at Public Hearing, May 9-11, 2023
Day
Name of Testifier
Organization
1
Alex Stavis
1
Alexander Gecu
1
Alexandra Grose
Consumer Reports
1
Ali Simpson
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Almeta Cooper
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Amanda Pantoja
Green Latinos
1
Ana Rios
Moms Clean Air Force, EcoMadres
1
Anh Bui
International Council on Clean Transportation
1
Bill Janiga
AZIPL
1
Bob Yuhnke
Elders Climate Action
1
Brent Sieling
1
Brian Jennings
American Coalition for Ethanol
1
Brian Werner
Minnesota Biofuels Association
1
Britt Carmon
National Resources Defense Council
1
Bruce Krawisz
1
Bryan Burton
American Lung Association
3630
-------
Day
Name of Testifier
Organization
1
Cara Cook
Alliance of Nurses For Healthy Environments
1
Carissa Stip
1
Chris Edgington
National Corn Growers Association
1
Dave Cooke
Union of Concerned Scientists
1
David Carter
Lucid Motors
1
East Peterson-Trujillo
Public Citizen
1
Elaine Weir
Sierra Club
1
Elizabeth Bechard
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Elizabeth Brandt
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Erik White
Plaster County Air Pollution Control District
1
Eugenie Lewis
Sierra Club, Climate Reality Project, Citizens Climate Lobby
1
Gary Ewart
American Thoracic Society
1
Geoff Cooper
Renewable Fuels Association
1
Howard Sherman
1
Ida Sami
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Ileagh Macivers
Interfaith Power and Light
1
Illana Naylor
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Jason Dragseth
Sierra Club New York
1
Jeff Alson
1
Jeff Weber
National Automobile Dealers Association
1
Jenna Rlemenschneider
Asthma and Allergy Foundation of America
1
Jessica Moerman
Science and Policy at the Evangelical Environmental
Network
1
Jim Rocco
Energy Marketers of America
1
John Bodine
1
Julie Kimmel
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Karin Stein
Moms Clean Air Force, EcoMadres
1
Kate Shenk
Regulatory Affairs for Clean Fuels Alliance America
1
Katherine Pruitt
American Lung Association
1
Katherine Stainken
Electrification Coalition
1
Kathy Daniel
1
Kathy Kupfer
Environmental Defense Fund
1
Keith Cavallini
Green Diesel Engineering
1
Kevin Martin Brown
MECA
1
Kevin Martin Fisher
Environmental Defense Action
1
Kindra Weid
Moms Clean Air Force, Alliance of Nurses for Healthy
Environments
1
Laura Kate Bender
Healthy Air with the American Lung Association
1
Laura Kate Magzis
New Hampshire Sierra Club
1
Laurie Anderson
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Leslie Vasquez
South Bronx Unite
3631
-------
Day
Name of Testifier
Organization
1
Levi Kamolnick
Ceres
1
Lisa Allee
1
Lisa Patel
Medical Society Consortium on Climate and Health
1
Liz Hurtado
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Lori Byron
Academy of Pediatrics national network of pediatric climate
advocates
1
Lucia Valentine
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Marianne Comfort
Sisters of Mercy
1
Melody Reis
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Mercedes McKinley
Moms Clean Air Force, EcoMadres
1
Michael Geller
MECA
1
Michael Hartrick
Alliance for Automotive Innovation
1
Michael Petelle
1
Michelle Uberuaga
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Mike McAndrews
1
Mollly Collins
1
Ozilynn Frost
1
Patrice Tomcik
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Patrick Kelly
American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers
1
Paul Billings
Public Policy for the American Lung Association
1
Paul Zwiebel
1
Phoebe Morad
Lutherans Restoring Creation
1
Quinta Warren
Consumer Reports
1
Rasto Brezny
MECA
1
Richard Sigler
1
Riley Talbot
Catholic Climate Covenant
1
Roselie Bright
1
Sarah McBride
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Shaina Oliver
Moms Clean Air Force
1
Steven Paul Henderson
Ford Motor Company
1
Susan Hendershot
Interfaith Power and Light, Christian Church Disciples of
Christ
1
Thereza Cevidanes
National Trade Association For Truck Stops and Travel
Centers, National Trade Association For Fuel Marketers
Retailers.
1
Tracy Sabetta
Moms Clean Air Force
1
William Berrett
American Lung Association
2
Alexa Aispuro
2
Alondra Morales
Sanchez
Poder Lantinx
2
Anastasia Gordon
We Act for Environmental Justice
3632
-------
Day
Name of Testifier
Organization
2
Andrew Hauptman
Moms Clean Air Force
2
Andy Burt
2
Ann Mesinkoff
Environmental Law and Policy Center
2
Ann Mudd
2
Anne Mellinger-
Birdsong
2
BeritFoss
POET
2
Billy Brooks
COBB Tuning
2
Brian Russo
Sierra Club
2
Brittany Keyes
2
Brittany Meyer
2
Brooke Petry
Moms Clean Air Force
2
Bryan Just
American Petroleum Institute
2
Cassandra Carmichael
National Religious Partnership for the Environment
2
Celerah Hewes
Moms Clean Air Force
2
Chelsea Lyons
Moms Clean Air Force
2
Chris Biley
Growth Energy
2
Chris Harto
Consumer Reports
2
Chris Nevers
Rivian Automotive
2
Connor Mighell
Center for the American Future of Texas Public Policy
Foundation
2
Constantin Donea
2
Dan Millen
Livernois Motorsports
2
Daniel McCarthy
Sierra Club
2
Darren Bakst
Center of Energy Environment at the Competitive Enterprise
Institute
2
David Gorman
2
David Hill
2
Donna Jackson
National Centers Project 21 Black Leadership Network
2
Doug O'Malley
Environment New Jersey
2
Elizabeth Hauptman
Moms Clean Air Force
2
Emily Pickett
Moms Clean Air Force
2
Gabrielle Lawrence
2
Ginnie Judd
2
Hazel Chandler
Moms Clean Air Force
2
Ian Kolesinkas
2
Jacqueline Georgi
2
James Colen
2
Jennifer Cantley
Moms Clean Air Force
2
Joan Schiller
Oncologists United for Climate Health, Lung Cancer
Research Foundation
3633
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Day
Name of Testifier
Organization
2
Joel Charles
2
Jonathan Walker
Consumer Reports
2
Katherine Garcia
Sierra Club
2
Kelly Senecal
Conversion Science and Vehicles
2
Kent Schaeffer
Consumer Reports
2
Kineema Moore
2
Laura Turner
2
Leah Qusba
Action for Climate Change Emergency
2
Liane Randolph
California Air Resources Board
2
Liz Scott
American Lung Association Healthy Air Campaign
2
Luz Druda
Moms Clean Air Force
2
Marco Castellanos
2
Maribeth Diggle
Moms Clean Air Force
2
Mariela Ruacho
American Lung Association in California
2
Mark Hardin
2
Matthew Le Fleur
Sierra Club
2
Mike Copeland
Arlington Performance
2
Mike Spagnola
Specialty Equipment Market Association
2
Naman Rawal
2
Natalie Ekberg
Moms Clean Air Force
2
Neil Feldmeier
2
Oscar Hauptman
2
Patricia Samples
Elders Climate Action
2
Patrick Quinn
AESI
2
Peter Huether
American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy
2
Rabbi Daniel Swartz
Coalition on the Environment and Jewish Life
2
Rachel Meyer
Moms Clean Air Force
2
Rich Reis
Sierra Club
2
Robert Larew
National Farmers Union
2
Shelley Francis
EVHybridNoire
2
Stacie Slay
2
Thomas Barnstable
2
Thomas Boylan
Zero-Emission Transportation Association
2
Thomas Easley
Colorado Communities for Climate Action
2
Tina Catron
Environmental Defense Action Fund
2
Tonyisha Harris
2
Tyler Kerce
2
Urvashi Nagrani
2
Vanessa Lynch
Moms Clean Air Force
2
Veena Dharmaraj
Massachusetts Sierra Club
3634
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Day
Name of Testifier
Organization
3
Alex Boesenberg
MEMA
3
Andrea Strzelec
N/A
3
Andy Su
Environmental Defense Fund
3
Ash Lauth
Action For the Climate Emergency
3
Beatrice Zovich
Pennsylvania chapter of the Sierra Club
3
Brian Kalina
N/A
3
Cere Begulki
N/A
3
Cindy Le
Action for the Climate Emergency
3
Dan Byers
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
3
Darien Davis
League of Conservation Voters
3
David DJ Portugal
Chi spa Arizona
3
David Myers
Moms Clean Air Force
3
David Patterson
PHEV Coalition
3
Dean Taylor
Strong Plug in Hybrid Coalition
3
Elbert Hill
N/A
3
Erandi Trevino
Moms Clean Air Force
3
Jack Shu
National Parks and Conservation Association
3
Jeffery McMahon
N/A
3
Jessica Enzmann
Sierra Club
3
Jessica Mengistab
Alliance of Nurses for Healthy Environments
3
Jim McCarthy
Electric Vehicle Association of Southern California
3
Josh Skipworth
Campaigns for Active Climate Emergency
3
Keith Puntennery
N/A
3
Kim Anderson
Evangelical Environmental Network
3
Kim Pendergast
Magnuson Superchargers
3
Kyle Meyaard-Schaap
Evangelical Environmental Network
3
Laurel Moorhead
Transfer Flow
3
Linda Ellsworth
N/A
3
Linda Singerman
N/A
3
Lindey Mendel son
Maryland chapter of the Sierra Club
3
Marcus Cole
Evangelical Environmental Network
3
Mark Rose
National Parks Conservation Association
3
Micheal McClain
National Religious Partnership For the Environment
3
Mona Sarfaty
George Mason University Center For Climate Change
Communication
3
Paul Miller
Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management
3
Rachel Patterson
Evergreen Action
3
Reem Rayef
Blue Green Alliance
3
Richard Killmer
N/A
3
Rob Simmons
of Automotive Consulting Services
3635
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Day
Name of Testifier
Organization
3
Saleh Mousa
N/A
3
Sam Beard
Sierra Club Illinois
3
Samantha Scmitz
Moms Clean Air Force
3
Sarah Bucic
Alliance of Nurses for Healthy Environments
3
Shannon Baker-
Branstetter
Center for American Progress
3
Shelly Sallee
Texas Sierra Club
3
Tricia Yacavone-Biagi
N/A
3
Trisha Dellolacono
CALSTART
3
Walter Englert
N/A
3
Yeh-Tang Huang
Natural Resources Defense Council.
3636
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Appendix D: EPA's request for comment on potential fuels
controls for future rulemaking such as gasoline PM
standards
This appendix contains the responses received to EPA's request for comment on including
potential fuels controls in a future rulemaking.
Comments by Organizations
Organization: Alliance for Automotive Innovation
A. EPA Should Act Now to Improve Fuels
EPA should act now to:
- Implement a nationwide clean fuel standard to lower GHG emissions; [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 260-261]
- Regulate the particulate forming tendency of market gasoline by eliminating the heavy
aromatic fraction of gasoline, thereby reducing PM emissions from all ICE vehicles, equipment,
and engines to improve air quality for all; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 260-261]
- Lower the sulfur cap of gasoline from 80 ppm to 10 ppm at the refinery gate to further
reduce non-GHG emissions from ICE-equipped vehicles and engines to improve air quality;
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 260-261]
- Adjust Tier 3 certification fuel specifications to align with current market fuel composition
and to enable fuel suppliers to target a particulate matter index of 1.5 to 1.6; [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 260-261]
- Cap summer vapor pressure of gasoline at 9.0 psi or less, regardless of ethanol content, to
further reduce evaporative emissions as E10 fuel is ubiquitous in the market; [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 260-261]
- Immediately eliminate sub-87 anti-knock index ("AKI") octane fuels from the market to
increase fuel efficiency and reduce GHG emissions; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 260-
261]
- Transition to a higher minimum-octane gasoline (i.e., minimum 95-98 research octane
number) to facilitate higher engine efficiency; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 260-
261]
- Limit air toxics, e.g., olefins and aromatics, and their precursors from the fuel to improve air
quality for all. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 260-261]
In addition to a comprehensive fuels rulemaking, Auto Innovators recommends that EPA also
proceed with finalizing its eRINs proposal from the Renewable Fuel Standard Set Rule for
Renewable Volume Obligations for 2023-2025 NPRM.404 This proposal provides a
complementary approach to EPA's proposed multipollutant rule, including supporting and
3637
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encouraging both EVs and renewable sources of energy, as well as to the overall goal of
decarbonizing the transportation sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 260-261]
404 Renewable Fuel Standard Set Rule for Renewable Volume Obligations for 2023-2025,
htps://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-12-30/pdf/2022-26499.pdf
E. EPA Should Regulate the Particulate Forming Tendency of Market Gasoline
1. Regulatory Authority
All major global regulatory agencies (EPA, CARB, the European Union, China) have taken
steps to reduce vehicle particulate emissions as demonstrated by their regulations limiting
tailpipe emissions of particulate mater ("PM").409,410 While establishing and tightening
particulate emissions standards for future vehicles may lower future PM emissions from those
new vehicles, reducing heavy aromatic content in gasoline will reduce PM emissions today from
the on-road fleet as well as from new vehicles. EPA recognizes that it has the authority to
address gasoline composition as a mechanism to address the in-use fleet, citing the sulfur
standards for gasoline and diesel.411 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 263-266]
409 Engeljehringer, K., Emission Regulation Trends: Overcoming BS6 & RDE Challenges with 2020
getting Closer, in AVL India Seminar May 2018, available at
htps ://www.avl.com/documents/1013 8/8665616/02+AVL+India+Seminar+May+2018_Regulation+Trends
Engelje hringer.pdf (accessed Sep. 24, 2021).
410 Ball, D., Meng, X., and Weiwei, G., Vehicle Emission Solutions for China 6b and Euro 7, SAE
Technical Paper 2020- 01-0654, 2020, available at htps://doi.org/10.4271/2020-01-0654 (accessed Sep. 24,
2021).
411 NPRM at 29402
2. High Leverage for PM Emissions Reduction
We agree with EPA's position that removal of heavy aromatic compounds from gasoline has
a very high leverage to reduce PM emissions from vehicles fueled by gasoline.412 These
compounds have a disproportionate contribution to PM formation in vehicle exhaust, particularly
aromatic hydrocarbons with 10 or more carbons. As discussed by EPA, removing these heavy
aromatic hydrocarbons from gasoline greatly reduces PM emissions from vehicles.413,414 A
regulatory change in fuel requirements to reduce or limit the amount of heavy aromatic
hydrocarbons in gasoline would also reduce PM emissions from off-road equipment fueled by
gasoline (e.g., lawn care equipment, generators, snowmobiles, outboard motors, etc.). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 263-266]
412 NPRM at 29398
413 Aikawa, K., Sakurai, T., and Jeter, J., Development of a Predictive Model for Gasoline Vehicle
Particulate Matter Emissions, SAE Int. J. Fuels Lubr. 3(2):610-622, 2010, available at
htps://doi.org/10.4271/2010-01-2115 (accessed Sep. 24, 2021).
414 Coordinating Research Council, "Evaluation and Investigation of Fuel Effects on Gaseous and
Particulate Emissions on SIDI In- Use Vehicles," Report No. E-94-2, March 2016.
Many studies have shown the contribution of heavy aromatics to tailpipe PM. Early papers of
particular importance were published by Honda and include the development of a PM index
(PMI) for gasoline. PMI values correlate well with tailpipe PM emissions.415,416 The PMI
calculation is based on data from a laboratory technique known as detailed hydrocarbon analysis
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(DHA). Other methods of measuring heavy hydrocarbon content and PM-forming tendency
beyond the DHA method may be more readily implemented.417,418,419,420 Improvements to
one such method, known as Simulated Distillation or SimDis, were recently reported by
EPA.421 Auto Innovators 2018 and 2019 market fuel DHA study reveals the high PMI fuels are
from high molecular weight aromatic hydrocarbons, those with 10 or more carbon atoms (e.g.,
C10+ aromatics).422 Therefore, an upper limit for C10+ aromatics is needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 263-266]
415 Aikawa, K., Sakurai, T., and Jeter, J., Development of a Predictive Model for Gasoline Vehicle
Particulate Matter Emissions, SAE Int. J. Fuels Lubr. 3(2):610-622, 2010, available at
htps://doi.org/10.4271/2010-01-2115 (accessed Sep. 24, 2021).
416 Aikawa, K. and J.J. Jeter, Impact of gasoline composition on particulate matter emissions from a
direct-injection gasoline engine: Applicability of the particulate matter index. International Journal of
Engine Research, 2014. 15(3): p. 298-306. available at htps://doi.org/10.1177/1468087413481216
(accessed Sep. 24, 2021).
417 Chapman, E., Winston-Galant, M., Geng, P., and Konzack, A., Global Market Gasoline Range Fuel
Review using Fuel Particulate Emission Correlation Indices, SAE Technical Paper 2016-01-2251, 2016,
htps://doi.org/10.4271/2016-01-2251 (accessed Sep. 24, 2021).
418 Coordinating Research Council, "An Improved Index for Particulate Mater Emissions (PME)," Report
No. RW-107-2, March 2021.
419 Chapman, E., Winston-Galant, M., Geng, P., and Pryor, S., Development of an Alternative Predictive
Model for Gasoline Vehicle Particulate Matter and Particulate Number, SAE Technical Paper 2019-01-
1184, 2019, htps://doi.org/10.4271/2019-01-1184 (accessed Sep. 24, 2021).
420 Chapman, E., et al., Comparison of the Particulate Matter Index and Particulate Evaluation Index
Numbers Calculated by Detailed Hydrocarbon Analysis by Gas Chromatography (Enhanced ASTM
D6730) and Vacuum Ultraviolet Paraffin, Isoparaffin, Olefin, Naphthene, and Aromatic Analysis (ASTM
D8071). SAE Technical Paper 2021-01-5070, 2021, htps://doi.org/10.4271/2021-01-5070 (accessed Sep.
24, 2021).
421 USEPA, "Assessment and Optimization of ASTM D7096 Simulated Distillation for Quantifying
Heavy Hydrocarbons in Gasoline," April 2023. Document EPA-420-R-23-009.
422 USEPA, "Exhaust Emission Impacts of Replacing Heavy Aromatic Hydrocarbons in Gasoline with
Alternate Octane Sources," April 2023. Document EPA-420-R-23-008.
Several Coordinating Research Council (CRC) research projects have been conducted to
investigate the impacts of PMI, ethanol, and octane ratings on vehicle emissions.423,424,425
The data show a direct and strong correlation between increased fuel PMI and increased tailpipe
PM. Detailed hydrocarbon analysis of the fuels showed that the high molecular weight aromatic
hydrocarbons in the fuel, C10+ hydrocarbons, are particularly significant contributors to
increased tailpipe PM. The greater the C10+ aromatic hydrocarbon content, the greater the
increase inPM emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 263-266]
423 Coordinating Research Council Report No. E-94-1. Evaluation and Investigation of Gaseous and
Particulate Emissions on SIDI In-Use Vehicles with Higher Ethanol Blend Fuels (2014),
htp://crcsite.wpengine.com/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/03-17589_CRC-E94-l_Final-Report_6-2-
2014_Lobato_Morgan.pdf (accessed Sep. 24, 2021).
424 Coordinating Research Council Report No. E-94-2. Evaluation and Investigation of Fuel Effects on
Gaseous and Particulate Emissions on SIDI In-Use Vehicles (2017), htp://crcsite.wpengine.com/wp-
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content/uploads/2019/05/CRC_2017-3-21_03-20955_E94-2FinalReport-Revlb.pdf (accessed Sep. 24,
2021).
425 Coordinating Research Council, "An Improved Index for Particulate Matter Emissions (PME)," Report
No. RW-107-2, March 2021.
Figure 87 shows that fuels with high PMI values have higher proportions of heavy aromatics
(C10+ aromatics).
[See original for box plot titled "Figure 87: 2018 and 2019 Summer U.S. Market Gasoline
C10+ and PMI"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 263-266]
Figure 88 below shows that limiting the content of total aromatic hydrocarbons doesn't
necessarily control against high PMI market fuels, however, limiting the amount of C10+
aromatics would do so.
[See original for graph titled "Figure 88: 2018 and 2019 Summer U.S. Market Gasoline PMI
and Total Aromatics"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 263-266]
More recently, as described in Section IX of the NPRM, a study of this fuel impact on vehicle
PM emissions was conducted by EPA, Environment Canada and several automotive OEMs.426
The program included 10 test vehicles of model years 2015 to 2022. Three test fuels, two E10
and one El 5 (fuels B, C, and D respectively), were constructed that contained a reduced heavy
aromatic content relative to a baseline E10 test fuel (fuel A). The baseline fuel represented a U.S.
market fuel with high C10+ aromatic content whereas the base fuel and the three test fuels
represented fuels with C10+ aromatic content typical of average U.S. gasoline. The fuels
therefore had similar composition except that test fuels B, C, and D had replaced 3 %vol (all
C10+ aromatics) with other lighter hydrocarbons or ethanol (each intended to replace the octane
value of the removed C10+ aromatics). As summarized in Figure 89 below, the three fuels
incorporating this 3 %vol change in composition led to major (25-40%) reductions in average
PM emissions across the test vehicle fleet (40% on the FTP drive cycle and by 25% on US06).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 266-268]
426 USEPA, "Exhaust Emission Impacts of Replacing Heavy Aromatic Hydrocarbons in Gasoline with
Alternate Octane Sources," April 2023. Document EPA-420-R-23-008.
[See original for graph titled "Figure 89: FTP Composite and US06 PM Emissions Results"]
Above figures adapted from EPA-420-R-23-008 (Figures ES.l and ES.2) [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 266-268]
As these multiple studies and others have conclusively shown, the removal of heavy aromatic
hydrocarbons from gasoline, particularly those in the C10+ range, has very high leverage in
reducing tailpipe PM emissions from gasoline vehicles. In particular, the 2023 study by EPA and
others427 showed that a 3% change in gasoline formulation (replacing these heavy
hydrocarbons) yielded tailpipe PM emissions reductions averaging 40% and 25% on the FTP and
US06 regulatory drive cycles, respectively. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 266-268]
427 USEPA, "Exhaust Emission Impacts of Replacing Heavy Aromatic Hydrocarbons in Gasoline with
Alternate Octane Sources," April 2023. Document EPA-420-R-23-008.
The Worldwide Fuel Charter, Sixth Edition,428 published as a cooperative effort between
global vehicle and engine manufacturers, discusses fuel quality needs commensurate with
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meeting emissions control requirements in different global markets. This document gives a
suggested PMI maximum in the range of 1.5-1.8 for markets with highly advanced emission
control requirements, such as the United States (Tier 3 Bin 30) and California regulations.
However, as shown in Figure 42 of the NPRM, approximately 20% of U.S. gasoline still has a
PMI of 1.8 or greater.429 The Charter also notes that "Various fuel-sampling efforts have shown
that many areas of the developed world have achieved a PMI value of 1.5 in their commercially
available gasoline without actively trying to minimize PMI. Setting a maximum PMI value of 1.5
for all grades of commercially available gasoline will reduce and help control the particulate
emissions from legacy, current, and future vehicles." We note that the same outcome can be
achieved through an alternative control metric that achieves the same result (e.g., distillation or
simulated distillation cut point), as discussed in the NPRM.430 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0701, pp. 266-268]
428 htps://www.acea.auto/files/WWFC_19_gasoline_diesel.pdf
429 NPRM at 29401.
430 NPRM at 29402
Therefore, EPA should proceed with controlling the particulate-forming tendency of market
gasoline by requiring the removal of the heavy aromatic components to lower PM emissions
throughout the fleet and improve air quality. Based on the body of information presented above,
we recommend an approach that would limit market fuels to a maximum PMI value of 1.5.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 266-268]
3. Reduction of Heaviest Gasoline Aromatics will have little to no impact on the Octane
Rating
Evaluation of API research report 45,431 where the octane ratings of individual hydrocarbons
have been measured, shows that octane ratings start to tail-off as boiling points increase. A plot
of these data shows the following trends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 266-268]
431 Knocking Characteristics of Pure Hydrocarbons. American Society for Testing Methods, Developed
Under American Petroleum Institute Research Project 45.
[See original for graph titled "Figure 90: API Project 45 Octane and Boiling Points"] [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 266-268]
4. Addresses Entire On-Road Fleet and Off-Road Equipment
We agree with EPA that a new fuel-based PM regulation for gasoline is the only mechanism
to reduce PM emissions from all gasoline engines, both old and new, in on-road vehicles and off-
road equipment. The average lifespan of light duty vehicles has increased over time. S&P Global
Mobility reports that the average lifespan for U.S. light duty vehicles has risen to 12.5 years
(13.6 years for cars, and 11.8 years for SUVs, crossovers, and light duty trucks).432 The on-
road LDV fleet consists of 290 million vehicles of varying age,433 whereas new vehicles are
produced at a rate of only 14-17 million per year over the last decade.434 A fuel-based solution
to address PM emissions from the on-road fleet will have a broad impact. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, pp. 269-270]
432 htps://www.cnbc.com/2023/05/15/americans-are-keeping-their-cars-longer-amid-rising-interest-
rates.html
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433 U.S. Vehicle Registration Statistics, Hedges & Company, htps://hedgescompany.com/automotive-
market- research-statistics/auto-mailing-lists-and-marketing/ (accessed May 23, 2023).
434 htps://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-12/420r22029.pdf
A fuel-based PM regulation is the ONLY option to reduce PM emissions from the on-road
fleet and has a particularly high impact on those vehicles with the highest tailpipe PM emissions
(older vehicles that were subject to higher emissions limits). A fuel-based regulation would also
yield tailpipe PM reductions for new vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 269-270]
5. Improves Resistance to Abnormal Combustion
Additionally, it is well known that Stochastic Preignition (SPI), also commonly known as
Low- Speed Preignition (LSPI), is an abnormal combustion issue that can adversely impact
downsized, boosted spark-ignition engines that now dominate the light-duty vehicle market. SPI
is more than just engine "knock," for which fuel solutions and engine controls strategies exist.
SPI involves early combustion of the air-fuel mixture which can lead to catastrophic engine
damage. Improving fuel economy of future vehicles to meet more stringent requirements will
require that automakers further increase the efficiency and power density of future engines.
However, these engine improvements are constrained by the increased occurrence of SPI under
those conditions. The presence of high boiling point aromatic compounds and high fuel PMI
value have been shown to be positively correlated to the SPI occurrence frequency from engines.
Heavy compounds in gasoline that do not easily vaporize will impinge on the wall, which can
produce SPI events in the current or next combustion cycle. Various papers have been published
about the relationship, 435,436,437,438,439 and on-going studies are in process to confirm it.440
The described fuel-based regulation controlling high boiling point compounds would beneficially
reduce the occurrence of SPI in U.S. gasoline vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp.
269-270]
435 Swarts, A., Chapman, E., and Costanzo, V., "Detailed Analyses and Correlation of Fuel Effects on
Stochastic Preignition," SAE Int. J. Adv. & Curr. Prac. in Mobility 2(6):3248-3267, 2020,
https://doi.org/10.4271/2020-01-0612
436 Chapman, E., Davis, R., Studzinski, W., and Geng, P., "Fuel Octane and Volatility Effects on the
Stochastic Pre- Ignition Behavior of a 2.0L Gasoline Turbocharged DI Engine," SAE Int. J. Fuels Lubr.
7(2):379-389, 2014, doi: 10.4271/2014-01-1226.
437 Mansfield, A., et al. "Effect of Market Variations in Gasoline Composition on Aspects of Stochastic
Pre-Ignition" Fuel 184 (2016): 390-400.
438 Chapman, E. and Costanzo, V., "A Literature Review of Abnormal Ignition by Fuel and Lubricant
Derivatives," SAE Int. J. Engines 9(1):2016, doi: 10.4271/2015-01-1869.
439 Kar, A., Huisjen, A., Aradi, A., Reitz, J. et al., "Assessing the Impact of Lubricant and Fuel
Composition on LSPI and Emissions in a Turbocharged Gasoline Direct Injection Engine," SAE Int. J.
Adv. & Curr. Prac. in Mobility 2(5):2568- 2580, 2020, htps://doi.org/10.4271/2020-01-0610.
440 CRC Project AVFL-33 Phase 1 and Phase 2 - htps://crcao.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Final-2022-
CRC- Annual-Reportv2.pdf
Unlike SPI mitigation strategies employed by automakers today, which are reactive in nature,
reducing heavy aromatic hydrocarbons in gasoline would also help address one of the root causes
of SPI. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 269-270]
6. Addresses Proposed Changes to National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
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A new fuel-based PM regulation, which will reduce tailpipe PM emissions from the on-road
fleet, particularly in areas with high tailpipe PM emissions from gasoline vehicles, would also
help states to meet the proposed lower annual PM2.5 standard that EPA proposed for the
NAAQS earlier this year.441 A fuel-based PM regulation is the only option for reducing PM
across the light-duty vehicle fleet and from gasoline-powered equipment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0701, p. 270]
441 htps://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/01/27/2023-00269/reconsideration-of-the-national-
ambient- air-quality-standards-for-particulate-mater
7. Environmental Justice Considerations
We agree with EPA that a reduction in heavy aromatics in gasoline will produce beneficial
reductions in PM emissions that will further national environmental justice goals. EPA notes in
the NPRM that people living and working near roadways will benefit from fuel improvements
that reduce PM formation, that those individuals are more likely to be people of color and/or
have a low socioeconomic status (SES), and that lower-SES neighborhoods are likely to have
more vehicles with higher emissions than higher-SES neighborhoods.442 A fuel-based
regulation to reduce PM emissions would do so for all vehicles in the on-road fleet. Importantly,
the greatest absolute emissions reductions will occur in and benefit lower-SES communities, as
those communities are more likely to have the highest-emitting vehicles, i.e., a higher proportion
of older vehicles with the highest emissions levels (due to their vehicle's age). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0701, pp. 270-271]
442 NPRM at 29393
EPA also uses this same rationale (proximity of low-SES communities to roadways) in
support of a proposed lower tailpipe PM emissions limit, but the distribution of ages of vehicles
on roadways is not discussed. The emissions reductions from the proposed tailpipe emissions
rule will only reduce emissions for the newest vehicles, which in the near-term benefits higher-
SES communities more than lower-SES communities. Moreover, these new vehicles will tend to
replace vehicles of more recent vintage that already adhere to the newest, most stringent PM
emissions limits. A fuel-based regulation targets all vehicles and is the only approach that
immediately reduces emissions from older, higher-emitting vehicles more often found in low-
SES communities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 270-271]
5. Limit Air Toxics from Market Fuels
The emissions from an average light duty vehicle have been reduced by over 99% since the
introduction of emissions control technology. The reduction has been such that, according to
CARB, in the California south coast air basin, lawn and garden equipment is a greater
contributor to poor air quality than light-duty vehicles.453 The best approach to limiting toxic
emissions is to remove toxics from the fuel prior to distribution. EPA recognized and applied this
approach to limiting benzene emissions. Going forward, EPA must broaden its approach and
limit air toxics, e.g., olefins and aromatics, and their precursors from the fuel prior to
distribution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0701, pp. 277-278]
453 SORE Fact Sheet, California Air Resources Board,
htps://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/offroad/sore/sm_en_fs.pdf?_ga=2.125314186.1460474514.1631206544-
48095875.1631206544 (accessed Sep. 24, 2021).
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Organization: American Chemistry Council, Fuel Additives Task Group (FATG)
In the Program Announcement 2, EPA states that,
2 EPA-420-F-23-009. https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1017626.pdf
... advanced gasoline technologies are expected to play an important role in the future...
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0663, pp. 1-2]
EPA is also seeking comment on potential future gasoline fuel property standards, aimed at
further reducing PM emissions, for consideration in a possible subsequent rulemaking. These
could provide an important complement to the vehicle standards being proposed in the current
action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0663, pp. 1-2]
The proposed standards are performance-based, allowing each manufacturer to choose what
set of emissions control technologies is best suited for their vehicle fleet to meet the standards.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0663, pp. 1-2]
The FATG supports EPA's recognition that multiple technologies can lead to a reduction in
emissions and supports the use of performance-based standards. The longevity of the internal
combustion engines (ICE) of the current car pare means that they, and carbon-based liquid fuels,
will continue to play an important role in the transportation needs of the United States. Fuel
additives have and will continue to play a vital role in the optimization of the fuel and engine
system with the aim of reducing particulate matter (PM) emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0663, pp.1-2]
Fuel Additive Benefits
Fuel additives provide benefits to the environment and the consumer3. Additive technologies
help enhance desired performance attributes beyond the base capabilities of the fuel and help
ensure fitness for use, leading to improved function and performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0663, pp.1-2]
3 Additive Technical Committee, "Fuel Additives: Use and Benefits," Document 113, September 2013.
[Embedded link: https://www.atc-europe.org/public/Docl 13%202013-1 l-20.pdf]
Gasoline deposit control additives play a significant role in engine cleanliness and
performance. They help to control the formation of deposits in port fuel injectors and on intake
valves. In doing so, they help maintain optimum fuel delivery to minimize exhaust emissions and
limit fuel economy degradation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0663, pp. 1-2]
Fuel additives help to optimize the functional efficiency of the internal combustion engine
leading to the reduction of fuel consumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0663, pp. 1-2]
Recognizing the benefits of treating gasoline with detergents, the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1994 require all gasoline sold in the United States to contain additives to limit the formation
of intake valve and port fuel injector deposits and avoid a negative impact on emissions. The
lowest additive treat rate that passes the required certification testing can be registered with the
EPA as the Lowest Additive Concentration (LAC) for the detergent additive. The performance
standards in the voluntary TOP TIERTM Detergent Gasoline program result in deposit control
additive treat rates that are at least as high - and typically higher - than those required to meet
EPA standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0663, pp. 1-2]
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As a stakeholder regarding EPA's potential subsequent rulemaking on future gasoline
property standards, the FATG would welcome a meeting with EPA to detail the role additives
can play in further reducing PM emissions. The additive industry will respond to regulatory and
technology trends to continue to enable the level of performance required of current and future
fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0663, pp. 1-2]
Organization: American Coalition for Ethanol (ACE)
We welcome EPA specifically identifying fuel and the opportunity to address particulate
matter (PM) emission reductions from sources of liquid fuels in a separate future rulemaking.
Given the inescapable link between vehicle emissions and the fuel used to power the engines in
those vehicles, we strongly recommend the Agency not wait for a future rulemaking but rather
address fuel quality and PM reductions as part of the final rule for 2027 and later model year
vehicles. EPA's proposal explains the complications facing refiners with respect to reducing the
content of high-boiling point compounds in gasoline given the need to meet market octane
requirements (since removing aromatics from gasoline requires a method to replace the octane
those aromatics contained). This presents another opportunity for the Agency to rely on greater
concentrations of ethanol in gasoline because ethanol delivers the highest-octane rating for fuel
at the lowest cost, allowing automakers to benefit by continuing to develop high-compression
and fuel-efficient engine technologies to reduce vehicle GHG emissions. We believe high octane,
low carbon blends comprised of 25 to 30 percent ethanol would enable more fuel-efficient
vehicles, reduce GHG emissions, and reduce other pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613,
pp. 4-5]
There are approximately 25 million FFVs in the U.S. today. The ideal way to transition from
today's legacy fleet of internal combustion engines to new vehicles with advanced engine
technologies designed to run optimally on a high-octane fuel is to utilize FFVs as bridge vehicles
that can provide immediate demand for midlevel ethanol blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0613, pp. 4-5]
As a matter of fact, the Department of Energy Oak Ridge National Lab has investigated the
use of high- octane ethanol blends such as E25 and E30 in FFVs that are designed and
compatible with ethanol blend levels from 0 to 85 percent and can therefore seamlessly and with
OEM approval utilize midlevel ethanol blends.9 Key findings from Oak Ridge include:
"Experiments were performed with four FFVs using an E10 (92 RON) and E30 (100 RON) fuel.
The two direct-injection FFVs demonstrated performance improvements for E30 compared to
E10 of 2.5 to 3 percent, based on the 15-80 wide- open throttle acceleration time. Three of the
four FFVs showed performance improvement with high- octane E30 compared to regular E10.
(...) Marketing E25 or E30 to FFV owners as a performance fuel may enable greater utilization
of ethanol in the near term and could help establish the refueling infrastructure to enable
manufacturers to build dedicated vehicles designed for a high-octane midlevel ethanol blend."
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 4-5]
9 Effects of High-Octane Ethanol Blends on Four Legacy FFVs and a Turbocharged GDI Vehicle."
Thomas, J, West, and Huff, S, U.S. DoE ORNL. March 2015.
The full lifecycle GHG emissions analysis in the final rule must be based upon the latest
version of the Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Technologies
(GREET) model developed by U.S. Department of Energy's Argonne National Laboratory.
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GREET is considered the gold-standard for calculating energy use, GHGs, and other regulated
emissions that occur during the full lifecycle production and combustion of all transportation
fuels and sources. GREET is used by the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard program and the
Oregon Clean Fuels program and has more than 40,000 registered users worldwide. Congress
directed the Treasury Department to use GREET for the new 45Z clean fuel production tax credit
in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 5-6]
While it may be an inconvenient truth for some to accept, corn ethanol is a proven and cost-
effective low carbon fuel playing an important role in reducing GHG emissions and air pollution
from the transportation sector. In fact, the RFS has cut GHG emissions by nearly 600 million
metric tons since 2007, exceeding EPA's original expectation of 444 million metric tons. 10
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0613, pp. 5-6]
10 Unnasch. S. (2019) GHG Reductions from the RFS2 - A 2018 Update. Life Cycle Associates Report
LCA. LCA.6145.199.2019 Prepared for Renewable Fuels Association.
Organization: American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) et al.
EPA's projected increase in electric-vehicle adoption also rests on unrealis- tic expectations
of increased future sales. In addition to assuming that "con- sumer uptake" will increase as more
models become available and charging infrastructure develops—issues addressed elsewhere in
this comment—the agency asserts that growing interest and satisfaction with electric-vehicle
tech- nology, as well as decreasing costs, will play a substantial role in turning the tides toward
electrification. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,189, 29,312; Draft RIA at 4- [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0683, pp. 21-22]
17. Available data, however, demonstrate that these assumptions suffer from critical flaws.
Consumer Interest and Satisfaction. Although nearly 95 percent Americans in the market for a
new car chose not to purchase an electric vehicle last year, EPA claims that American consumers
are increasingly interested in, and satisfied with, electric-vehicle technology. That assertion rests
on a collection of un-justified inferences. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0683, pp. 21-22]
First, EPA cites one recent survey reporting that more than one-third of Americans said that
they would either "seriously consider or definitely buy or lease" a battery-electric model today if
they were in the market for a new vehicle. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29,189. But other data undermine
EPA's reliance on abstract consumer "affinity" (id.) for electric vehicles. Other polls show that,
even when there is an expressed interest in purchasing an electric vehicle, consumers often do
not follow through. For example, "[a] 2022 CarGurus survey found that 35 percent of new car
buyers expressed an interest in purchasing a hybrid, but only 13 percent eventually did." Robert
N. Charette, Convincing Consumers to Buy EVs: How Range, Affordability, Reliability, and
Behavioral Changes Figure into Purchase Decisions, IEEE Spectrum (Jan. 23, 2023)
("Convincing Consumers"), https://tinyurl.com/3p26536j. "Similarly, 22 percent expressed
interest in a battery electric vehicle . . . , but only 5 percent bought one." Id. Just as manu-
facturer announcements are not a reliable indicator of actual future production, abstract
consumer surveys are not a reliable indicator of actual future purchase. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0683, pp.21-22]
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Organization: American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
VI. EPA's Consideration of Fuel Controls
EPA requested comment on potential changes to fuel controls to address PM emissions in the
existing fleet. EPA specifically stated that it "has not undertaken sufficient analysis to propose
changes to fuel requirements under CAA section 211(c) in this rulemaking and considers such
changes beyond the scope of this rulemaking."284 Since EPA has declared it is not actually
proposing to change fuel controls in this Proposal, AFPM respectfully asserts that it cannot
provide detailed comments on this issue at this time; however, we are more than willing to work
with the Agency on this issue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 63-64]
284 Proposed Rule at 29,397.
As noted above, AFPM sought a brief extension to the comment period, which EPA
denied.285 AFPM does not have adequate time to thoroughly review and comprehend EPA's
supporting materials, conduct additional research into the unrealistic assumptions and
conclusions embedded in the Proposed Rule, and provide informed comment on each aspect of a
rule that has significant implications for our industry and the nation while also reviewing,
researching, and providing comments on potential changes to fuel controls. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0733, pp. 63-64]
285 See Section V.
That said, at an extremely high level, we would have significant concerns about the adverse
impacts this would have on the supply of gasoline and the minuscule PM benefits that might be
achieved. For example, EPA's assessment must include the significant impacts to refineries and
the gasoline pool such potential measures would entail. The potential fuel controls measures
would cut a significant amount of the gasoline pool that is not contributing to PM generation.
This would translate into both economical and logistical impacts (e.g., alternate disposition, or
blending into diesel pool) that impacts costs to consumers. EPA should consider the significant
contribution to PM from tire wear and entrained road dust, which account for a majority of the
total PM2.5 emissions associated with traffic.286 EPA also must revise its flawed
methodologies. For instance, the ASTM D7096 simulated distillation by gas chromatography
(SimDis) proposed to either calculate PMI or to set high boiling point limits is not adequately
precise to use as a control method and would generate significant errors. We also question the
Agency's legal authority to move forward with these fuel controls, which have no environmental
benefit for new motor vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 63-64]
286 See https://www.epa.gov/air-emissions-inventories.
Please contact the undersigned to explore these issues in greater detail. AFPM is happy to
bring its members' technical expertise to this complex issue to help inform EPA's decision-
making in this area. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0733, pp. 63-64]
Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
EPA is deferring consideration of fuel specifications that would better enable 0.5 mg/mi
emissions compliance] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 17]
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Finally, important fuel specifications changes could assist automakers' abilities to comply
with tighter PM standards, but the agency has chosen to defer action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0652, p. 17]
C. Fuels Issues
In addition to vehicle emissions reductions, the agency also notes the opportunity for
additional PM reductions through fuel specification changes:
The emissions standards for new vehicles (MY 2027 and later) proposed in this rule would
achieve significant air quality benefits. However, there is an opportunity to further address PM
emissions from the existing vehicle fleet, the millions of vehicles produced during the phase-in
period, as well as nonroad engines, through changes in market fuel composition... EPA requests
comments on aspects of a possible future rulemaking aimed at further PM emission reductions
from these sources via gasoline fuel property standards. Such future fuel standards could be an
important complement to EPA's proposed vehicle PM standards.31 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0652, p. 18]
31 88 Fed. Reg. 29397 (May 5, 2023)
Honda supports these efforts and believes strongly that the removal of heavy hydrocarbons
from market gasoline would have a sizable impact in reducing PM emissions — not only from
new vehicles moving forward, but also from the majority of cars and trucks operating on U.S.
roads today.32 It will be important for EPA to consider changes to fuel property standards for
both market fuel and certification test fuel, as applying changes to both fuels would far better
align compliance requirements with real- world emissions performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0652, p. 18]
32 It would also have an emissions benefit of reducing PM emissions from all internal combustion engines,
including motorcycles, marine engines, and small engine products such as lawn mowers, generators and
ICE-based power tools.
The importance of including these changes in certification fuel is clear: removal of heavy
hydrocarbons would have a significant impact on the viability of reaching 0.5 mg/mi levels.
Because it appears the agency will only consider gasoline fuel property standards as part of "a
possible future rulemaking," we strongly urge the agency to maintain alignment with California
LEV IV standards at this time, and revisit mg/mi PM stringency when fuel specifications can
better accommodate such performance standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 18]
Tailpipe emissions are inherently an input-output function. With the entire car pare already
subject to existing fuel regulations at the pump for RVP, octane, lead and other requirements,
reducing the PM potential of market fuel would have a significant impact on our nation's PM
inventory. If market fuel regulation can drive reductions in tailpipe PM, it seems only logical to
also update certification fuel and MOVES modeling to reflect the real-world inventory impacts.
This would also have an ancillary benefit in helping OEMs comply with, as proposed, a
significantly more stringent (than CARB LEV IV) PM requirement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0652, p. 18]
The Honda PM Index (PMI), calculated via a detailed hydrocarbon analysis (DHA) of a
gasoline, has become an established parameter associated with tailpipe particulate matter.33 34
Low-volatility aromatics have huge leverage on the PMI value and also on measured tailpipe PM
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emissions; a percent or two of these heavy aromatics are responsible for a large portion of PM
emissions. Although PMI should remain the "gold standard," Honda realizes that its use as the
only compliance method will meet resistance due to the method's time and technical
requirements. Therefore, alternative compliance methods should be allowed, with the caveats
that (1) any such alternatives would require approval from EPA and (2) all approved methods
should have compliance standards of equivalent stringency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p.
19]
33 Aikawa, K., Sakurai, T., and Jetter, J., "Development of a
Predictive Model for Gasoline Vehicle Particulate Matter Emissions," SAE Int. J. Fuels Lubr.
3, no. 2 (2010): 610-622 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 19]
34 Aikawa, K. and Jetter, J. J., "Impact of Gasoline Composition on Particulate Matter Emissions from a
Direct- Injection Gasoline Engine: Applicability of the Particulate Matter Index," International Journal of
Engine Research 15, no. 3 (2014): 298-306
One promising alternative, as noted in the agency's proposed rule and associated
documents,35 36 is simulated distillation (SimDis) by ASTM D7096. This method is short,
usually requires no post-analysis review, and is sufficiently precise to quantify the heavy tail of a
fuel sample. Although it is based on the volatility of the gasoline and not the fuel's chemistry,
data show that the heavy tail consists primarily of aromatics. This makes it a potential surrogate
for PMI. Also noted in the proposed rule is the vacuum- ultraviolet (VUV) method. Honda
agrees with EPA's assessment that more VUV data on market fuels will be needed to complete a
correlation with DHA-derived PMI values. An example of such work is currently in progress
within the Coordinating Research Council (CRC). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 19]
35 US EPA, "Assessment and Optimization of ASTM D7096 Simulated Distillation - EPA-420-R-23-009,"
April 2023
36 Butler, A, et al., US EPA, "Supplemental Information Related to Potential Fuel Control for Gasoline PM
- EPA-HQ- OAR-2022-0829," April 2023
Recommendation: Reduce PM emissions by reducing the PM potential of fuel. Update fuel
property standards to remove heavy hydrocarbons from both market fuel and certification
fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0652, p. 19]
Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
viii. EPA lacks authority to set limits on aromatics and other high-boiling material.
The proposed rule asks for comments on whether EPA should engage in a rulemaking to
address potential limits on aromatics and high-boiling material as fuel standards under CAA §
211(c). Although EPA has not proposed to engage in a rulemaking at this time, API urges the
agency to avoid a costly and burdensome rulemaking effort that would exceed its authority.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 33-34]
The proposed rule acknowledges that fuel standards would not assist the new vehicle fleet to
comply with the new standards, but suggests the agency is thinking about them to reduce
particulate matter from the existing fleet. However, EPA lacks authority to set fuel standards to
address vehicle emissions from the existing vehicles, which are already able to comply with their
applicable particulate matter standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 33-34]
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EPA's authority to regulate vehicle emissions applies only prospectively. EPA may only set
standards for classes of "new motor vehicles." CAA § 202(a)(1). In turn, EPA may only consider
controlling or regulating fuel after it has determined there are no other "economically feasible
means of achieving emissions standards under section [202]." Regulating fuel cannot be needed
to achieve the Section 202 standards for existing vehicles because those vehicles already meet
their applicable particulate matter standards without any additional fuel regulation. Any attempt
to rely on the inability of existing vehicles to comply with the particulate matter standards for
new vehicles because of lack of alternative controls would be contrary to the Act's focus on
prospective standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 33-34]
In any event, EPA may not issue standards under CAA § 211(c) at this time because, as the
proposed rule readily admits, EPA has not "considered all relevant medical and scientific
evidence available to [it], including consideration of other technologically or economically
feasible means of achieving" the standards under section 202. See § 202(c)(2)(A). Unless and
until EPA completes that analysis and allows stakeholders an opportunity to comment on it, EPA
may not set new standards under CAA § 211(c). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 33-34]
i. Additional Concerns.
EPA must address several aspects of their analysis of vulnerabilities associated with critical
minerals as outlined in Appendix A and related to cost, modeling, and assumptions as outlined in
Appendix B. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 34]
j. Response to EPA Request for Information on Particulate Matter Fuel Controls.
In Appendix C we respond to EPA's request to review the Agency's rationale for considering
fuels controls in a future rulemaking to reduce PM emissions. API finds the Agency has not
appropriately considered all data and issues raised by a potential rulemaking. Furthermore, EPA
needs to reconsider their analytical conclusions, limitations of SimDis, refinery modeling
specifications, and that tire wear and entrained road dust related PM emissions are significant.
Please note that due to the compressed comment period for such a complex request for
information, coupled with the lack of an extension, API may supplement the docket. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 34]
8. Cost and Impacts on Refining
EPA's qualitative description of refining impacts from restriction of gasoline heavy-boiling
components is over-simplified and incomplete. EPA asserts an easy shift of gasoline heavy-ends
to distillates; in the experience of API members, it is often challenging to make such shifts while
keeping distillate fuel properties on specification, especially flashpoint. In addition, EPA's
analysis focuses on octane loss as the only detriment to segregating heavy-ends from the gasoline
pool, neglecting the value of these components' low volatility as a volatility "sink" which allows
blending of butanes and other light components. Eliminating heavy-ends would result in a
significant loss of light components to the gasoline pool as well to meet maximum RVP
requirements. Finally, EPA considers only one refinery configuration where fluid catalytic
cracking (FCC) dominates gasoline production, augmented by alkylation to upgrade FCC light
olefins. Among API member refineries are plants which have neither FCC or alkylation units;
impacts on these refineries are neglected in EPA's analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 36-37]
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EPA correctly identifies LP optimization as a useful tool for estimating refinery cost impacts
of process changes, and provides results from a Haverly optimization program. Unfortunately,
the Agency does not describe how it modeled the single refinery configuration considered.
Although challenging to review without knowing key assumptions, correlations, and constraints
used in the Haverly model, the results presented raise several concerns to API members. Among
these concerns are the apparent lack of proper constraints, allowing the LP to make up lost
gasoline heavy-ends with increased isomerization and alkylation; in practice, these units are
likely fully utilized without headroom for increased production. Also, the results fail to discuss
the light-ends utilization impact from eliminating the heavy-ends as RVP soak. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0641, pp. 36-37]
Finally, the results are again limited to a single, simple refinery configuration. API members
routinely use LP models for refinery planning and preliminary optimization, but the models
required to accurately represent a real refinery are highly complex and unique to a specific plant;
a one-size-fits-all Haverly model is highly insufficient to quantify refining impacts of EPA's
proposed restriction of gasoline heavy-ends blending. EPA should provide access to the model
files with the assumed correlations to allow the public to fully analyze the results. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 36-37]
While the preliminary results suggest some directional relationship, API has concerns with:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 36-37]
(1) The accuracy of the correlation between PMI and the 99% SimDis by D7096; and
(2) Whether the minimum distillate flash and minimum gasoline T50 limits were
modeled sufficiently. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 36-37]
Adding a restrictive max 99% point specification to gasoline, which already has a limiting
minimum T50 specification, puts gasoline blending in a tight box which has the potential to
increase costs to society. Similarly, our ability to shift transitional molecules from gasoline to
distillate is limited by the flash specification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 36-37]
EPA states, "The estimated costs for the 5°F, 10°F, and 15°F reductions in T90 were 0.5, 2.2,
and 3.0 cents per gallon, respectively." These relative costs are questionable, as the cost per
degree should be monotonically increasing as the reduction becomes more severe. An economic
model should be graduated, beginning with the lower-cost steps first. The EPA model seems to
contradict this economic fundamental when its 5°F to 10°F reduction costs 1.7 cpg (=2.2-0.5),
while the 10°F to 15°F reduction costs only 0.8 cpg (=3.0-2.2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 36-37]
Appendix C:
Consideration of Potential Fuels Controls for a Future Rulemaking
EPA notes in the NPRM that the Agency ".. .has not undertaken sufficient analysis to propose
changes to fuel requirements.. ."130 and has not provided enough support to set limits at
this time. In reviewing EPA's rationale for considering fuels controls in a future rulemaking to
reduce PM emissions, API finds the Agency has not appropriately considered all data and issues
raised by a potential rulemaking. In the ten sections below, API provides detailed comments on
EPA's analysis, finding generally that such a rulemaking on potential fuels controls is
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unnecessary. If EPA plans to continue to review this issue, API and its members would like the
opportunity to meet with the agency to work on this topic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p.
52]
130 88 Fed. Reg. 29397 (May 5, 2023).
1. Impacts of High-Boiling Components on Emissions
EPA acknowledges that fuel standards would not assist the new vehicle fleet comply with the
new standards, but suggests the agency is thinking about reducing particulate matter from the
existing fleet, which are already able to comply with their current particulate matter standards.
While vehicle technologies have proven to be the primary means to control vehicle emissions,
fuels quality can enable and support vehicle emissions systems performance. Fuels quality
contributions, however, are smaller than those achieved by vehicle technologies. For instance,
Tier III engine technologies such as higher fuel injection pressures, for gasoline direct injection
(GDI), and future technologies with gasoline particulate filter (GPF), that can be used for both
GDI and port-fuel injection (PFI), are capable to meet the very stringent 2025 LEV III 1 mg/mi
mass particulate emissions standards or beyondl31. Current vehicle technologies, without a
GPF, are capable of reducing significantly PM emissions, and further constraints on the fuel will
have limited impact on further reducing these emissions. The 2023 EPA certification vehicle test
data shows that there were approximately 83 carline models (out of approximately 376 carlines
tested on US06) that achieved a certification level of emissions of 0 gm/mile (and a rounded
emission test results level below 0.5 mg/mile) of PM on the US06 drive cycle. These carlines
were able to meet a 0.5 mg/mile PM emissions level using current certification gasolines,
without the need for specialty lower PMI fuels. Additionally, newer vehicle technologies without
GPFs have been demonstrated to have minimal sensitivity to fuel changes. 132 In regard to future
vehicles, EPA's DRIA states that GPF technologies are more effective at reducing PM emissions
than fuel controls (e.g., PMI limit or T99 limits). Specifically, Figure 3-19 of the DRIA describes
that PM emissions can be reduced by 99%, 96% and 96% for the testing cycles -7°C FTP, 25°C
FTP, and US06, respectively. In contrast when considering a fuel control approach, the NPRM
points to studies where it was found that there was a 1-2 percent PM emissions increase for each
percent PMI increase. When assessed together, fewer PM emission reductions are gained through
fuel controls compared to vehicle hardware approaches. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 52]
131 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2022.161225.
132 Citation: Singh, R., Voice, A., Fatouraie, M., and Levy, R., "Fuel Effects on Engine-out Emissions Part
1 - Comparing Certification and Market Gasoline Fuels," SAE Int. J. Adv. & Curr. Prac. in Mobility
3(6):3121-3137, 2021, https://doi.org/10.4271/2021-01-0541.
Furthermore, even if fuel controls were required to significantly reduce PM emissions from
existent and future vehicles, which they are not, EPA's proposed methodology is flawed. PMI
equations were developed on early, light duty vehicles with Tier 2 technology. New Tier 3
vehicles used advancements in fuel pressure, injector nozzle design and combustion strategy.
PMI calculations are not necessarily correlated with modern vehicle technology. PMI equations
were developed on Tier 2 gasolines, current EPA gasoline would not be expected to have the
same emissions profile. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 52]
PM indices also have proven biased for alcohol molecules and are not accurate for current
vehicle and fuels technologies. "PMI was found to perform well if the fuels being evaluated had
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the same ethanol content, but it proved to be a biased indicator when applied to groups of fuels
with varying ethanol content - i.e., EO (neat), E10 (10% ethanol by volume), and higher ethanol-
content fuels. LA92 Phase I PM emissions from fuels with ethanol were found to be consistently
greater than emissions from nonoxygenated fuels of the same PMI" [CRC Project No. RW-107-
2], [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 52]
A studyl33 presented at the 33rd CRC Real World Emissions Workshopl34, demonstrated
and concluded that PMI was not predictive of engine out (or tailpipe) PM emissions. Further, it
was concluded that FBP performed somewhat better predictor than PMI, but was still a weak
indicator. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 52]
133 "Can modern vehicle emissions be predicted from fuel properties?," Voice, Alexander, Chanel Sito,
Aramco Americas - Transport Technology, March 2023.
134 The 33rd Real World Emissions Workshop, March 26-29, 2023, Long Beach, CA.
(https://crcao.org/33rd-crc-real- world-emissions-workshop/)
2. Survey of High-Boiling Materials in Market Gasoline
EPA discusses their assessment of the trends of T90 from ASTM D86 (high-boiling material)
over the past two decades, followed by a summary of available PMI data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, p. 52]
The PMI Profile of Market Gasoline discussion in this section also points out that median
PMI is 1.6 for US fuels with 10% remaining above 2.0, suggesting an opportunity to reduce PMI.
However, Figure 42135 in the NPRM shows two-time frames (2008-12) and (2021-2022) but no
source for the data. When conducting industry projects (i.e., CRC) where higher PMI fuels are
being solicited, it has become almost impossible to find these in real-world fuels. 136 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 52]
135 88 Fed. Reg. 29397 (May 5, 2023).
136 One API member recently surveyed its gasoline BOB production (i.e., gasoline prior to blending
ethanol) and found 95% of BOBs with PMI below 2.0.
3. Sources of High-Boiling Compounds in Gasoline Production and How Reductions
might Occur - Refinery Impacts
EPA's analysis of high-boiling components in gasoline production is over-simplified and
neglects significant effect of proposed reduction technologies. It should be pointed out that high
boiling point does not necessarily mean high aromatic content. Reducing the gasoline high
boiling point as a surrogate for heavy aromatic content would cut a significant amount of the
gasoline pool that is not contributing to PM generation. This would translate into both
economical and logistical impacts (e.g., alternate disposition, or blending into diesel pool), that
would ultimately impact costs to consumers. Segregation of gasoline heavy-ends to distillates
may impact octane, and replacement of octane is more complex than claimed. A potential impact
resulting in a reduction of octane would reduce vehicle fuel economy limiting the advantages of
higher octane. Work from the Department of Energy's Co-optima concluded, for downsize
boosted engine technology, RON and octane sensitivity (enabled through high aromatic fuels)
have the most potential to improve efficiency among all fuel properties. 137 For naturally
aspirated, port fuel- injected legacy vehicles, CRC138 showed that decreases in energy
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consumption of up to 2% for a small SUV was possible through the use of a 97 RON fuel
compared to 91 RON fuel on aUS06 drive cycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 52]
137 https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.pecs.2020.100876.
138 https://crcao.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/CRC-Project-AVFL-20a_SAE-Paper-2020-01-5117.pdf.
Shifting boiling points of naphtha produced on the fluid catalytic cracker (FCC), reformer,
and coker to produce lighter distillate or kerosene may cause potential market issues, including:
Overall gasoline production may fall if fuel producers are required to shift gasoline
molecules to distillates, which may lead to higher gasoline prices for consumers. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 52]
There may be equipment constraints that prevent shifting of the cut point without
restricting overall refining capacity, which could lead to higher consumer prices if overall
production falls. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 52]
The value of alkylate and ethanol (non-aromatic high octane blend components) may
increase. The alkylate production would probably fall if FCC units were constraint because
of tightened specifications. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 52]
There may also be constraints in aromatics content and cetane number for putting
these aromatic molecules into jet fuel or distillate, which may further reduce capacity or cause
increased shipping of diesel blend components to maintain distillate specifications. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 52]
There are some capital projects that refiners may pursue to help mitigate the impacts,
but these too could result in increased cost of supply to gasoline consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0641, p. 52]
4. Methods of Compliance Determination
ASTM D7096 Simulated Distillation by GC Analysis: EPA proposes to use ASTM D7096
simulated distillation by gas chromatography (SimDis) to control / reduce gasoline particulate
matter index (PMI) because the actual analytical method needed to calculate PMI — detailed
hydrocarbon analysis (DHA) — is too costly and time-consuming to use as a production control.
While API members agree that DHA is inappropriate for the reasons cited by the Agency, our
experience indicates SimDis is not a reasonable alternative because (1) SimDis cannot
distinguish between heavy gasoline constituents that contribute to PMI from those that do not,
(2) SimDis results are not well correlated to PMI by DHA, and (3) SimDis is not adequately
precise to use as a control method. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 52-53]
ASTM D7096 SimDis identifies the carbon number of hydrocarbons and estimates boiling
point ranges, but it does not differentiate molecules that contribute highly to PM emissions (and
PMI) from molecules in the same boiling point range that have minimal contribution to PM
emissions. If EPA were to place limits on gasoline blending by using a SimDis constraint, a
significant part of the available gasoline pool would be eliminated without sound technical
reasoning. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 52-53]
Measurements by API members shows poor correlation between PMI and/or C10+ aromatics
and Simulated Distillation Endpoint, T98, T95, or T90. While the heavy aromatics which
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contribute to PM emissions are in the high end of the distillation, many other non-PM formers
are also present. Consequently, SimDis is too crude in its selectivity to use as a control method
for reducing PMI. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 52-53]
ASTM D7069-19 states reproducibility of the method to be 8.3°F for T95 and 18.5°F for
FBP. At EPA's proposed control point of T99 by SimDis, the reproducibility would be more
closely represented by that of FBP stated in the method. Subsequently, a fuel specification with a
SimDis T99 cut-off of 450 °F or 425 °F would result in an indefinite and inconsistent portion of
heavy gasolines removed from the gasoline pool. From a compliance standpoint, fuel qualities
that can be measured with greater precision are optimal because they can be tightly correlated
with unit operations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 52-53]
VUV Methods: EPA's analysis of VUV as a compliance tool contains errors regarding the
appropriate methods, and inappropriately dismisses VUV as being insufficiently available for use
as a control method. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 52-53]
EPA cities ASTM D8071 as the applicable method to substitute for DHA and use in PMI
calculation, but this is incorrect. The D8071 method only gives compound classifications, not
detailed component analysis needed for PMI calculation. The most suited VUV method for this
application is D8369. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 52-53]
API disagrees with EPA's finding that VUV is insufficiently mature and available for
consideration as a method to quantity gasoline PMI. When using the appropriate method D8369,
API members find the VUV results are equivalent to PMI calculated from DHA but at a fraction
of the analysis cost and time. In addition, most API members companies and many commercial
laboratories have already implemented VUV analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 52-
53]
The proposed 99% SimDis specification would significantly reduce the molecules that can
swing between gasoline and diesel, which is the primary model the industry uses to adapt to
changing demands and inventory imbalances. With reduced blending flexibility, refiners will
have much less ability to increase gasoline yields. Restricting gasoline end points could lead to
gasoline price spikes in periods of market volatility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
5. Statutory Authority
The proposed rule asks for comments on whether EPA should engage in a rulemaking to
address potential limits on aromatics and high-boiling material as fuel standards under CAA §
211(c). Although EPA has not proposed to engage in a rulemaking at this time, API urges the
agency to avoid a costly and burdensome rulemaking effort that would exceed its authority.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
The proposed rule acknowledges that fuel standards would not assist the new vehicle fleet to
comply with the new standards, but suggests the agency is thinking about them to reduce
particulate matter from the existing fleet. However, EPA lacks authority to set fuel standards to
address vehicle emissions from the existing vehicles, which are already able to comply with their
applicable particulate matter standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
EPA's authority to regulate vehicle emissions applies only prospectively. EPA may only set
standards for classes of "new motor vehicles." CAA § 202(a)(1). In turn, EPA may only consider
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controlling or regulating fuel after it has determined there are no other "economically feasible
means of achieving emissions standards under section [202]." Regulating fuel cannot be needed
to achieve the Section 202 standards for existing vehicles because those vehicles already meet
their applicable particulate matter standards without any additional fuel regulation. Any attempt
to rely on the inability of existing vehicles to comply with the particulate matter standards for
new vehicles because of lack of alternative controls would be contrary to the Act's focus on
prospective standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
In any event, EPA may not issue standards under CAA § 211(c) at this time because, as the
proposed rule readily admits, EPA has not "considered all relevant medical and scientific
evidence available to [it], including consideration of other technologically or economically
feasible means of achieving" the standards under section 202. See § 202(c)(2)(A). Unless and
until EPA completes that analysis and allows stakeholders an opportunity to comment on it, EPA
may not set new standards under CAA § 211(c). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
Please note that due to the compressed comment period for such a complex request for
information, coupled with the lack of an extension, API may supplement the docket. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
6. Structure and Level of the Standard
As mentioned at the beginning of Appendix C, vehicle technologies have proven to be the
primary means for controlling vehicle emissions. Fuels quality can improve vehicle emissions
systems and help achieve air quality objectives, but fuels contributions are smaller than those
achieved by vehicle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
To the extent a structure and level of standard may be considered, an averaging, banking, and
trading solution has worked well for mogas sulfur and benzene. Much like a Low Carbon Fuels
Standard program, it allows the industry to meet the goals of the program at the lowest possible
cost while providing flexibility to blend fuel under abnormal operations. This would be
preferrable to a price per gallon cap which could be difficult to both measure and design controls
to ensure operations are below required thresholds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
7. Impact of PMI on Engine Design and Efficiency
EPA mentions that another potential reason to consider a PMI limit is related to low- speed
preignition (LSPI) and requests comments on the impact of PMI on engine design and effciency.
References below point to other factors that impact LSPI that need to be considered. Fuel
specification changes may not be sufficient to reduce LSPI occurrences. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, p. 53]
CRC Project CM-137-17-1 139 [Link: https://crcao.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/CM-
137-17-l_FinalReport-June-2019.pdf] (Review of Low-Speed Pre-Ignition Literature) makes
clear that one single LSPI initiation mechanism cannot be derived from the published literature.
However, the report did allow for the general statement that "improved oil formulation and oil
ignitability as well as a design that leads to reduced oil intrusion from, for example, the
crankcase ventilation system or past the piston rings is of benefit. Further the report went on to
indicate that low calcium and High ZNDTP or MODTC oil formulations are linked to low LSPI
counts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
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139 "REVIEW OF LOW-SPEED PRE-IGNITION LITERATURE," CRC Report No. CM-137-17-1, June
2019, (https://crcao.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/CM-137-17-l_FinalReport-June-2019.pdf).
ILSAC GF-6A and GF-6B 140 [Link: https://www.api.org/products-and-services/engine-
oil/eolcs-categories-and-classifications/oil-categories#tab-ilsac] specifications represent the latest
performance requirements for gasoline engine oils set by the International Lubricant
Specification Advisory Committee (ILSAC). GF-6A and GF-6B were introduced in May 2020
and are designed to provide protection against low-speed pre-ignition (LSPI) in engines
operating on ethanol-containing fuels up to E85. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
140 ILSAC Standard For Passenger Car Engine Oils, (https://www.api.org/products-and-services/engine-
oil/eolcs- categories-and-classifications/oil-categories#tab-ilsac).
For automotive gasoline engines, the latest engine oil service category includes the
performance properties of each earlier category. Therefore, the latest engine oil specifications
will provide full protection for automotive engines where an earlier oil category is recommended
by the engine manufacturer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
SAE paper 2017-24-0061 141 [Link: https://www.sae.org/publications/technical-
papers/content/2017-24-0061/] shows that high aromatic and high sensitivity fuels help to
mitigate knock under high load for boosted SI engines. Similarly, in SAE paper 2011-01-
0342142 low-aromatics fuel blends showed an increase tendency to auto-ignition and knock
(traditional engine knock, not LSPI) characterized by the presence of a low-temperature heat
release regime prior to the main combustion phase. It should be noted that LSPI, autoignition,
and knock are different phenomenon and not related. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
141 Szybist, J., Wagnon, S., Spliter, D., Pitz, W. et al., "The Reduced Effectiveness of EGR to Mitigate
Knock at High Loads in Boosted SI Engines," SAE Int. J. Engines 10(5):2305-2318, 2017,
https://doi.org/10.4271/2017-24-0061.
142 Amann, M., Mehta, D., and Alger, T., "Engine Operating Condition and Gasoline Fuel Composition
Effects on Low- Speed Pre-ignition in High-Performance Spark Ignited Gasoline Engines," SAE Int. J.
Engines 4(l):274-285, 2011, https://doi.org/10.4271/2011-01-0342.
The LSPI phenomenon is complex with some mechanisms strictly related to lubricants
formulation. Fuel specification changes may not reduce LSPI occurrences. Proposed PMI limits
could reduce the aromatic content of the gasoline pool and potentially result in an unintentional
increase of knock or autoignition events for the current on-road carpark. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0641, p. 53]
8. Cost and Impacts on Refining
EPA's qualitative description of refining impacts from restriction of gasoline heavy- boiling
components is over-simplified and incomplete. EPA asserts an easy shift of gasoline heavy-ends
to distillates; in the experience of API members, it is often challenging to make such shifts while
keeping distillate fuel properties on specification, especially flashpoint. In addition, EPA's
analysis focuses on octane loss as the only detriment to segregating heavy-ends from the gasoline
pool, neglecting the value of these components' low volatility as a volatility "sink" which allows
blending of butanes and other light components. Eliminating heavy-ends would result in a
significant loss of light components to the gasoline pool as well to meet maximum RVP
requirements. Finally, EPA considers only one refinery configuration where fluid catalytic
cracking (FCC) dominates gasoline production, augmented by alkylation to upgrade FCC light
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olefins. Among API member refineries are plants which have neither FCC or alkylation units;
impacts on these refineries are neglected in EPA's analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p.
53]
EPA correctly identifies LP optimization as a useful tool for estimating refinery cost impacts
of process changes, and provides results from a Haverly optimization program. Unfortunately,
the Agency does not describe how it modeled the single refinery configuration considered.
Although challenging to review without knowing key assumptions, correlations, and constraints
used in the Haverly model, the results presented raise several concerns to API members. Among
these concerns are the apparent lack of proper constraints, allowing the LP to make up lost
gasoline heavy-ends with increased isomerization and alkylation; in practice, these units are
likely fully utilized without headroom for increased production. Also, the results fail to discuss
the light-ends utilization impact from eliminating the heavy-ends as RVP soak. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
Finally, the results are again limited to a single, simple refinery configuration. API members
routinely use LP models for refinery planning and preliminary optimization, but the models
required to accurately represent a real refinery are highly complex and unique to a specific plant;
a one-size-fits-all Haverly model is highly insufficient to quantify refining impacts of EPA's
proposed restriction of gasoline heavy-ends blending. EPA should provide access to the model
files with the assumed correlations to allow the public to fully analyze the results. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
While the preliminary results suggest some directional relationship, API has concerns with:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
(1) The accuracy of the correlation between PMI and the 99% SimDis by D7096; and
(2) Whether the minimum distillate flash and minimum gasoline T50 limits were
modeled sufficiently. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
Adding a restrictive max 99% point specification to gasoline, which already has a limiting
minimum T50 specification, puts gasoline blending in a tight box which has the potential to
increase costs to society. Similarly, our ability to shift transitional molecules from gasoline to
distillate is limited by the flash specification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
EPA states, "The estimated costs for the 5°F, 10°F, and 15°F reductions in T90 were 0.5, 2.2,
and 3.0 cents per gallon, respectively." These relative costs are questionable, as the cost per
degree should be monotonically increasing as the reduction becomes more severe. An economic
model should be graduated, beginning with the lower-cost steps first. The EPA model seems to
contradict this economic fundamental when its 5°F to 10°F reduction costs 1.7 cpg (=2.2-0.5),
while the 10°F to 15°F reduction costs only 0.8 cpg (=3.0-2.2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, p. 53]
The proposed 99% SimDis specification would significantly reduce the molecules that can
swing between gasoline and diesel, which is the primary model the industry uses to adapt to
changing demands and inventory imbalances. With reduced blending flexibility, refiners will
have much less ability to increase gasoline yields. Restricting gasoline end points could lead to
gasoline price spikes in periods of market volatility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
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9.
Estimated Emissions and Air Quality Impacts
EPA has failed to assess particulate matter impacts from tire wear or entrained road dust. Tire
wear and entrained road dust emissions account for a majority of the total PM2.5 emissions
associated with traffic. 143 There is a high correlation between both tire wear, and entrained road
dust emissions, and vehicle weight. Studies have also found electric vehicles to be heavier than
the equivalent class/size of ICEVs due to the inclusion of the battery. Therefore, converting
ICEVs to ZEVs, as a result of the proposed regulation on "Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards
for Model Years 2027 and Later Light- Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles" would significantly
increase the average vehicle weight on roadways, which in turn would increase tire, brake, and
entrained road dust emissions. Including these emissionsl44, 145, 146,147 in the analysis could
potentially change EPA's conclusions and significance findings in the DRIA. Hence, EPA must
evaluate these emissions and their impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
143 https://www.epa.gov/air-emissions-inventories.
144 https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/ei/areasrc/fullpdf/202l_paved_roads_7_9.pdf.
145 https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2022.156961.
146 htp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.atmosenv.2016.03.017.
147 https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2022.161225.
There are several sources in the literature that raise questions as to the absolute and relative
magnitude of the potential reductions to PM concentrations, and subsequent health benefits, that
reducing PMI could have that are not included in the proposed rule: that EPA needs to evaluate:
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
The 2019 OECD report lays out the relative contribution of primary PM emissions
from road transport, showing approximately 1/3 PM2.5 from non-exhaust (tires, brakes, road
wear) in 2014 148 (Figure 2.1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
148 OECD (2020), Non-exhaust Particulate Emissions from Road Transport: An Ignored Environmental
Policy. Challenge, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4a4dc6ca-en.
The 2019 OECD report also includes data from EPA (2019 NEI) that shows that less
than half of primary PM2.5 from road transportation is from vehicles, and this represents 3% of
total primary PM2.5. See Table 2.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
Total PM 2.5 is a combination of primary PM 2.5 emissions plus secondary species
(inorganic and organic). Secondary aerosols often dominate. Primary PM can range from 10% to
70%, and is often less than 50%. 149,150 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p. 53]
149 https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science. 1180353.
150 https://www3 .epa.gov/tnchie 1/conference/ei 13/mobile/hodan.pdf.
Mobile sources of secondary organic aerosols are a small fraction of the total in both
absolute and population weighted terms. 151 On-road sources already a generally small fraction
without limiting to just light duty/passenger (Figure 7). 152 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, p.
53]
151 https://acp.copernicus.org/articles/21/17115/2021/acp-21-17115-2021.pdf.
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152 https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science. 1180353.
10. Analysis of the references to CRC studies
Comments on references used in Section 1X153: Consideration of Potential Fuels Controls for
a Future Rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
153 **The focus of section IX is PM emissions reduction, and therefore will serve as the focus of
comments.
Proposed Rule Statement:
Statement: "Numerous emissions studies have associated high-boiling compounds in gasoline
with increased tailpipe PM emissions." 154 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
154 88 Fed. Reg. 29398 (May 5, 2023).
Statement references 155: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
155 Statement reference numbers refer to footnote numbering in the proposed rule.
868 Coordinating Research Council, "Evaluation and Investigation of Fuel Effects on
Gaseous and Particulate Emissions on SIDI In-Use Vehicles," Report No. E-94-2, March 2016.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
869 USEPA "Assessing the Effect of Five Gasoline Properties on Exhaust Emissions from
Light-Duty Vehicles Certified to Tier 2 Standards: Analysis of Data from EPAct Phase 3
(EPAct/V2/E-89)," April 2013. Document EPA-420-R-13-002. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 53-63]
Background: references 868 (CRC report E-94-2) and 869 (EPA EPAct study) refer to large
fuel effects-emissions studies seeking to determine what gasoline properties drive vehicle
emissions (mainly PM). E-94-2 looked at emissions across a mix of Tier 2, GDI vehicles (12)
running match-blended gasoline fuels that approximated market gasoline fuels (PMI, AKI, and
ethanol levels were varied). In the EPAct work, ethanol, T50, T90, aromatics, and RVP were
varied. For the study, 27 fuels were developed (i.e., match-blended) and tested in 15 light-duty
vehicles (Tier 2, MY2008, all PFI). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
API Comment: Although PMI was strongly correlated with increasing PM emissions in E-
94-2, PM increased with increasing C10+ aromatics in EPAct, both studies contain faults. E-94-
2, for example, used match-blended fuels, which received criticism when the final report was
released for not being representative of market fuels. In addition, EPAct results are no longer
relevant due to the MY2008 test fleet. In short, the references are dated, and more-recent
attempts by CRC to study emissions impacts of newer, Tier 3 vehicles with injection pressures
approaching 350 bar are inconclusive, warranting further study. Generally, higher injection
pressures lower PM emissions; and the positive correlation between PMI and PM is less clear
(CRCE-135). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
Statement: ".. .analysis of a large number of market fuel samples has shown that the high-
boiling tail of gasoline contains a high proportion of aromatics, and that the heaviest few percent
of this material has very high leverage on PM emissions." 156 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 53-63]
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156 88 Fed. Reg. 29393 (May 5, 2023)
Statement references: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
870 Chapman E., Winston-Galant M., Geng P., Latigo R., Boehman A., "Alternative Fuel
Property Correlations to the Honda Particulate Mater Index (PMI)," SAE Technical Paper 2016-
01-2550, 2016. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
871 Ben Amara A., Tahtouh T., Ubrich E., Starck L., Moriya H., Iida J., Koji N., "Critical
Analysis of PM Index and Other Fuel Indices: Impact of Gasoline Fuel Volatility and Chemical
Composition," SAE Technical Paper 2018-01-1741, 2018. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641,
pp. 53-63]
872 Sobotowski R.A., Butler A.D., Guerra Z., "A Pilot Study of Fuel Impacts on PM
Emissions from Light-duty Gasoline Vehicles," SAE Int. J. Fuels Lubr. 8(1):2015. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
873 Aikawa, K., Sakurai K., Jeter J. J., "Development of a Predictive Model for Gasoline
Vehicle Particulate Mater Emissions," SAE Technical Paper 2010-01-2115, 2010. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
Background: Honda published the SAE paper introducing the PMI concept in 2010 (873), and
while it took a few years to gain notoriety, its dependency on DHA has motivated others to find
alternative, easier pathways towards a predictive PM emissions metric (GM in 870; Toyota in
871). Regardless of metric, heavier fuel components tend to lead to higher PM emissions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
API Comment: So much of the supporting work is based on assessments using Tier 2
technology. We know Tier 3 vehicles are transitioning to higher injection pressures (which
lowers PM, generally), but many fuel effects studies are ongoing or in development. Lastly, it
would be unfortunate if some type of fuel distillation cut limited potential use of low-carbon
feedstocks for future fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
Statement: PMI has been used in several emission studies and modeling analyses correlating
fuel parameters to PM, and our assessment of potential impacts of fuel formulation changes on
PM emission inventories, presented in Section IX.7, rely heavily on PMI "157 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
157 88 Fed. Reg. 29398 (May 5, 2023).
Statement references: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
879 Butler A.D., Sobotowski R.A., Hoffman G.J., and Machiele, P., "Influence of Fuel PM
Index and Ethanol Content on Particulate Emissions from Light-Duty Gasoline Vehicles," SAE
Technical Paper 2015-01-1072, 2015. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
880 Coordinating Research Council, "Alternative Oxygenate Effects on Emissions," Report
No. E-129-2, October 2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
Background: Reference 879 refers to an SAE paper authored by EPA staff members involved
in the EPAct study (2015-01-1072). The authors work to integrate PMI into the EPAct data,
while also observing ethanol-PM interactions. 10 of 15 vehicles used in the EPAct study showed
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a correlation between PM and PMI; in addition, the authors postulated that ethanol addition
appears to exacerbate the inability of heavier components to volatilize, resulting in increased PM
(it should be noted that the remaining 5 vehicles did not exhibit any PM sensitivity to PMI or
ethanol). Reference 880 is a CRC report covering results from E-129-2, a program run out of
NREL on a single cylinder research engine running a couple of base gasolines (low- and high-
PMI) blended with various alcohols. The primary objective of this program was to develop data
to better understand competing effects between heat of vaporization (as mentioned above in
reference to the EPAct study) and dilution (i.e., diluted gasoline results in lower emissions).
While PM emissions generally increased with increasing PMI, correlation strength was highly
variable across multiple test conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0641, pp. 53-63]
API Comment: While PMI has become the most 'robust' parameter for indicating a fuel's
propensity for PM formation, it has limitations. For example, in E-129-2, ethanol blended into
the 'low' PMI (1.21) fuel appeared to show HOV effects dominated. In the 'high' PMI blend
(2.75), HOV effects dominated at the high-speed condition, but dilution seemed to dominate at
the low-speed condition (i.e., PM decreased with increasing ethanol content). The choice to
include this reference is interesting as the results are far from absolute, and beg more questions
for future study. For the SAE EPA paper (reference 879), I have concerns with the age of the
vehicle fleet used in the study (MY2008), technology (PFI), as well as 1/3 of the fleet exhibiting
no sensitivity to PMI and/or ethanol with respect to PM emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0641, pp. 53-63]
Organization: Chevron
5. Potential future fuel controls.
In Section IX. (Consideration of Potential Fuels Controls for a Future Rulemaking) of the
proposed rule, EPA discusses an opportunity to address particulate matter emissions from the
existing and future fleet through changes in fuel compositions. Chevron has extensive technical
expertise in fuel formulation, emissions testing, and analytical methodology. Based on our
experience, we believe EPA's suggested approach to controlling particulate matter may not be
cost effective or necessary. We offer the following comments on Section IX. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0553, p. 7]
Specifically, Chevron recommends against EPA's consideration of Particulate Matter Index
(PMI) methodology as an option to control particulate matter (PM) emissions from gasoline. The
PMI methodology was developed over 10 years ago and is based on testing with Tier 2 vehicles
and fuels. The transition to Tier 3 vehicles and fuels has greatly reduced PM emissions from the
vehicle fleet. Vehicle hardware technology advancements, such as gasoline direct injection and
higher fuel injection pressures are better suited to manage the remaining PM emissions rather
than changing the gasoline composition. When the PMI methodology is used to evaluate current
gasoline samples, Tier 3 gasoline has shown a steady reduction in calculated PMI compared to
Tier 2 gasoline, even where the Tier 3 samples have higher final distillation boiling temperatures.
The combination of advanced vehicle technology and improved Tier 3 gasoline quality suggests
that the PMI methodology may no longer be effective at identifying future PM control measures.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, p. 7]
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As an alternative to PMI, EPA suggests that ASTM D7096 SIMDIS may be the best
technology to evaluate candidate gasoline fuels and to determine a new standard to address PM
emissions. Chevron does not believe the use of SIMDIS is appropriate because it does not
distinguish between molecules that contribute to PM formation and molecules that do not form
particulates. Use of the SIMDIS methodology will result in a fairly imprecise reduction in the
final boiling point of gasoline. Changing the gasoline distillation specification in this way will
eliminate many non-PM forming molecules, like heavy alkylate species, which are valuable
components for gasoline octane, vapor pressure, and economics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0553, p. 7]
In lieu of using the SIMDIS analytical method, Chevron prefers the vacuum-UV (VUV)
technology. Chevron has developed gasoline characterization methods using VUV and believes
that it is well suited to identifying particulate-forming molecules. Chevron is available to work
with EPA in identifying analytical techniques that could be used in evaluating PM formation
from gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, p. 7]
The API comments on the proposed rule contain an extensive discussion of the technical
issues related to particulate matter formation. Chevron made significant contributions to the API
comments. We endorse the API comments on Section IX. in their entirety. We recommend that
EPA should work closely with industry prior to any decision to proceed with a formal
rulemaking to address gasoline particulates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0553, p. 7]
Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CDFC)
SOA from Gasoline Aromatics. On p. 591, EPA noted that "Mobile sources are an important
contributor to secondary aerosols formed from nitrate, sulfate and organic precursors. Studies
have shown that secondary organic aerosol (SOA) formation from gasoline vehicle exhaust can
exceed directly emitted (tailpipe) PM emissions, and that changes to gasoline formulation can
have impacts on SOA that are larger than the associated shifts in direct PM emissions." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 8]
This statement seems at odds with the Agency's claim that the proposed rule would reduce
PM emissions by "more than 95 percent". In fact, EPA historically has vastly understated the
substantial contributions mobile sources—especially gasoline BTEX— make to SOA + PAH
formation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 8]
Former OTAQ Director Grundler offered this explanation to SDFU President Sombke: "With
respect to your concern that the EPA's models incorrectly predict the contribution of light-duty
gasoline vehicles to PM (e.g., as compared to leaf blowers) it is important to note that the EPA
estimates cited in the Wall Street Journal refer only to directly emitted PM. We agree that
ambient levels of PM are a result of secondarily formed particles in addition to direct PM
emissions, and that light-duty gasoline vehicles are important sources of precursors to PM
formation."4 [Emphasis supplied] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 8]
4 Supra, Grundler letter to Sombke, March 15, 2018.
It took several exchanges to elicit this admission five years ago. It is clear from EPA's claim
that the proposed rule would reduce PM emissions by "more than 95 percent" that the Agency
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continues to downplay the disproportionate role SOA plays in fine and ultrafine particulate
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 8]
Leading experts are convinced that aromatics ("organics") are the primary culprit. "An
important recent study, co-authored by the Nobel Prize winner Mario Molina, concluded that
reducing the smallest (ultrafine) particles "without simultaneously limiting organics from
automobile emissions is ineffective and can even exacerbate this problem". [Detchon/Modlin
2021 comments, p. 2.] This has implications not only for GDI engine emissions effects, but also
for the NPRM's gasoline particulate filter (GPF) strategies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p.
8]
Detchon and Modlin went on to note that "Emissions from aromatic compounds in gasoline
were thought to be short-lived, thus posing little threat to human health. But that was wrong. A
recent General Motors study found that nearly 96% of the fine particle emissions from gasoline
are caused by the aromatics in the fuel". [Ibid., p. 1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 8]
In a letter to Acting OAR Administrator Joseph Goffman, former Senate Majority Leader
Tom Daschle cited these experts and then cautioned EPA that failure to control BTEX would
severely compromise, perhaps doom, EPA's PM control strategies
DaschleGoffmanHOLCAexecutedjune2021 .pdf: [Link:
file:///C:/Users/dehbi/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/Content.Outlook/OFSN24I
W/DaschleGoffmanHOLCAexecutedjune2021.pdf] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 8]
"Given the role of aromatic hydrocarbons in PM formation and given the propensity of GDI
engines to increase emissions of UFPs, EPA's strategies for regulating fine particle pollution in
urban areas are doomed to failure unless they significantly reduce gasoline aromatics." A
prescient statement that is proving itself to be even more true as GDI engines dominate the U.S.
fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 8]
EPA Experts Have Warned About "Atmospheric Transformation Products" from Aromatics
for Many Years. Outside of OTAQ, EPA experts have been clear about EPA's duty under the
Clean Air Act to control carcinogenic and mutagenic atmospheric reaction products, the
predominant precursors of which are gasoline aromatics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 9]
"Although oxidized VOCs can be components of primary emissions from a variety of sources,
most result from secondary reactions of hydrocarbons emitted into the atmosphere, making them
late-generation atmospheric reaction products. Assessments of health effects based solely on
direct emissions are incomplete if potentially important contributions from such products are
neglected, as has been noted by the Clean Air Act, which mandates consideration of atmospheric
transformation products. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 9]
5. Conclusions and implications for control strategies
Other than 1,2,4- and 1,3,5-trimethylbenzene, all of the precursor aromatic VOCs investigated
here are classified as hazardous air pollutants by the U.S. EPA, and therefore emissions of these
species from industrial activities are controlled under the Clean Air Act (U.S. EPA, 2015a).
Nonetheless, of the 8 VOCs that produced mutagenic atmospheres, all did so only under
irradiation. Thus, only late-generation reaction products were responsible for the mutagenicity,
not the precursor VOCs, raising an interesting point regarding potential control strategies when
the photochemistry of certain chemical species is similar to those described here. Non-mutagenic
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primary compounds may be less likely to be controlled; however, the resulting late-generation
products may be more likely to be mutagenic. Therefore, consideration should be given to
precursor compounds based not only on their intrinsic health concerns but also on those of their
potential late-generation atmospheric photochemical products. It seems that these products,
which are typically not monitored or controlled, account for much of the gas-phase direct-acting
mutagenicity. Based on these limited studies, reducing the concentrations of primary VOCs
would likely result in a corresponding reduction in the concentrations of the products, with a
parallel reduction in atmospheric mutagenicity."5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 9]
5 "Mutagenic atmospheres resulting from the photooxidation of aromatic hydrocarbon and NOx mixtures",
Theran P. Riedela,* , David M. DeMarinib , Jose Zavalac , Sarah H. Warrenb , Eric W. Corsed, John H.
Offenberga, Tadeusz E. Kleindiensta, Michael Lewandowski]
[Dr. Riedel is a senior scientist at EPA's National Exposure Research Lab in Research
Triangle Park, NC. He and his colleagues published this study in 2018 ResearchGate
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/31586423 l_Mutagenicity_and_Carcinogen icity]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, p. 9]
Conclusion. Thus, the NPRM presents us with "insurmountable opportunities", as Pogo
would say. Recognizing that EPA's primary thrust with this rulemaking is to drive the U.S. to an
electrified transport system, we must also recognize that trillions of miles will be driven by ICEs
powered by gasoline. Unless EPA moves urgently to improve the quality of that gasoline by
substantially reducing gasoline BTEX content— as required by Congress—tens of millions of
Americans will have their health unnecessarily damaged and die premature deaths. The
Detchon/Modlin comments said it best: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 8-10]
"It doesn't have to be this way. Technologies and products have come together to define a
new solution for what the Clean Air Act requires: "the greatest degree of emission reduction
achievable through the application of technology which will be available." Along with a rapid
transition to electric vehicles, a complementary program should include adoption of higher
ethanol blends, which have been shown by U.S. National Laboratories to enable higher fuel
economy and vehicle performance. Such blends would enable a 40% reduction in the use of toxic
aromatics in gasoline. An important recent study, co-authored by the Nobel Prize winner Mario
Molina, concluded that reducing the smallest (ultrafine) particles "without simultaneously
limiting organics from automobile emissions is ineffective and can even exacerbate this
problem." (p. 2) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 8-10]
OTAQ's exclusive reliance on vehicle technology improvements was not only a violation of
clear Congressional directives, it has proven to be a colossal scientific miscalculation. The rapid
adoption of gasoline direct injection (GDI) engines—absent a parallel reduction in gasoline
BTEX levels—will increase emissions of the most harmful UFP + PAH carcinogens by more
than a "septillion" particles over the next decade. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 8-10]
Detchon/Modlin conclude: "Test programs in the rural Midwest have shown that today's
vehicles operate well on higher levels of ethanol blended with conventional gasoline.
Automakers have affirmed that such benefits would be realized by both new and existing internal
combustion engines and therefore should be encouraged as additional solutions as soon as
possible." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 8-10]
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The nation has waited 35 years for EPA/OTAQ to act. The nation's public health and
environment cannot afford to wait any longer. Higher ethanol blends cost less than gasoline
BTEX, they are here today, they would save the nation hundreds of billions of dollars every year
in reduced oil imports and health costs, and automakers require the additional octane. More
importantly, EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to act—one it has ignored for far too long. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0630, pp. 8-10]
[See original submission for Supporting Documentation and End Notes] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0630, pp. 8-10]
Organization: Colorado Energy Office, Colorado Department of Transportation, and Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment
In response to EPA's request for comments on specific aspects of the rule, we offer the
following suggestions to ensure the rule is as successful as possible: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0694, pp. 2-3]
- EPA requested comment on what levels of carbon dioxide (C02) emissions stringency to
pursue between 2026 and 2032, and suggested one recommended stringency schedule and three
alternative schedules. We believe that the federal government needs to streamline widespread
adoption of EVs to avoid the inefficiency that comes with significantly varied markets across the
country. At times, it has been hard to get the products consumers want in Colorado, because the
initial stock of popular models gets sent to larger states like California even though our state is
an ideal market with strong EV incentives. For example, the State of Colorado put in an order for
over 100 Ford F-150 Lightnings, but only four have been delivered thus far. Similarly, it has
been challenging for consumers to access popular models with great potential for mountain
driving, such as the Toyota RAV-4 Prime. Thankfully, delivery times are starting to improve, but
as the supply chain normalizes, it is critical that states like Colorado have equal access to the full
range of vehicle choices, and that will be enhanced by the federal government taking the lead on
regulations that normalize production and delivery across the country. Alternative 1 would
provide the most consistency with what Colorado is already pursuing. We urge the federal
government to place even greater focus on consistency and streamlining of regulations in order
to help us accelerate EV adoption with the urgency that we need. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0694, pp. 2-3]
- Regarding criteria pollutants, we urge EPA to consider ways to align these proposed
standards with California, and in doing so to avoid any backsliding in remaining conventional
vehicles sold, while avoiding a scenario in which OEMs are forced to divert investment away
from transportation electrification and towards technology advancement on conventional
vehicles. We are concerned that the criteria standards in the EPA draft rule could have this
unintended effect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694, pp. 2-3]
- We urge EPA to consider investments in charging infrastructure as an option for
manufacturers to achieve compliance credit. For years, EPA has included a broad range of
crediting options to add flexibility to the program in ways that support its underlying goals. At
the state and local level, one of the greatest challenges we face is completing robust and varied
networks of public and private charging infrastructure so that travelers can travel where they
want to go without range anxiety. We appreciate new funding in IIJA, but achieving this goal
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will require all the tools in the toolbox. We strongly urge EPA to utilize its credit program to
incentivize companies investing in the charging networks which benefits consumers and will
facilitate more public private partnership around this critical need. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0694, pp. 2-3]
- We encourage EPA to coordinate its EV battery durability and warranty requirements with
the maintenance and durability requirements of the ACC II program to the greatest extent
possible. These provisions are critical for ensuring consumer confidence in the performance and
durability of EVs in the new and used market, and alignment to the greatest extent possible can
help avoid confusion for consumers, dealers, and other key stakeholders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0694, pp. 2-3]
- EPA requested comment on whether to consider a future rulemaking for gasoline fuel
property standards to further reduce PM emissions. Colorado supports EPA exercising its
authority under CAA 211(c) to develop gasoline property standards in a future rulemaking.
Cleaner fuel standards will complement the vehicle emissions standards proposed in the current
rulemaking by addressing emissions from the existing ICE vehicle fleet, as well as the vehicles
that will be produced during the phase-in and operative periods of the proposed vehicle
emissions standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0694, pp. 2-3]
Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI)
HMG supports AFAl's public comments regarding criteria pollutant standards related to low
carbon fuels [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 7]
Under the Proposed Rule, EPA seeks comment on fuel property standards proposed to further
reduce PM emissions, and specifically proposed improvements regarding when heavy
hydrocarbon series are reduced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 7]
AFAI cites in its public comments multiple industry and agency studies demonstrating the
effect of fuel composition on PM. Indeed, fuel properties contributing to the reduction of PMI
are thoroughly analyzed and well understood. As a result, HMG supports the demand for
strengthening the specifications for both commercial and certification fuels in future rulemaking
to further reduce PMI. HMG also supports additional industry positions on fuels as reflected in
AFAl's public comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0554, p. 7]
Organization: Illinois Corn Growers Association
Section IX. of the proposed Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards entitled "Consideration of
Potential Fuels Controls for a Future Rulemaking" states: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp.
7-8]
"The emissions standards for new vehicles (MY 2027 and later) proposed in this rule would
achieve significant air quality benefits. However, there is an opportunity to further address PM
emissions from the existing vehicle fleet, the millions of vehicles produced during the phase-in
period, as well as nonroad engines, through changes in market fuel composition. Given the
current population of vehicles and nonroad equipment, we expect that tens of millions of
gasoline-powered sources will remain in use well into the 2030s. Although EPA has not
undertaken sufficient analysis to propose changes to fuel requirements under CAA section 211(c)
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in this rulemaking, and considers such changes beyond the scope of this rulemaking, EPA has
begun to consider the possibility of such changes and in this section, EPA requests comments on
aspects of a possible future rulemaking aimed at further PM emission reductions from these
sources via gasoline fuel property standards. Such future fuel standards could be an important
complement to EPA's proposed vehicle PM standards." (emphasis added) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0756, pp. 7-8]
As previously discussed, the potential technological pathways for automakers for reducing
C02 tailpipe emissions have dwindled from 34 in the 2012 rulemaking to just 9 in the current
rulemaking. Moreover, most of the 9 pathways discussed in the Regulatory Impact Analysis have
already been employed across many automakers' product line. While the proposed standards
have the appearance of being "technology neutral," the only potential option that an automaker
could employ to achieve the called-for massive emission reductions is electrification of at least
half their 2032 model year light and medium duty product line. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0756, pp. 7-8]
Given that the vehicle technology pathways have dwindled to just one, it seems reasonable
that the next most viable pathway would be with improving the liquid fuels that could be used by
the half of the 2032 new vehicle fleet that is not expected to be electrified. Yet EPA is only
proposing future fuel changes that might help automakers meet one small part of the Multi-
Pollutant Emissions Standards - the standards for PM emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0756, pp. 7-8]
EPA should strongly consider opening the scope of any future rulemaking regarding fuel
standards to include a detailed analysis of the benefits and costs of implementing a HOLC fuel
program and compare those costs and benefits to the limited rulemaking discussed in Section IX
of the current Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standard rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756,
pp. 7-8]
EPA has responded to past requests to use its authority to set octane standards and revise their
testing requirements to encourage the use of HOLC fuel with the position that automotive
manufacturers have many other options to comply with the greenhouse gas standards and do not
need a HOLC fuel. With only one viable pathway available to meet the proposed standards, EPA
should expand the scope of the proposed future rulemaking on potential fuel controls to include
the explicit consideration of HOLC fuel and, like was done in the 1970's with unleaded gasoline,
make the regulatory changes to make widespread use of HOLC fuel a reality. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0756, pp. 7-8]
Costs and Benefits of Potential Future Fuel Controls
The focus of Section IX of the current proposed rulemaking (Consideration of Potential Fuels
Controls for a Future Rulemaking) is a future rulemaking to set a cap on aromatic compounds in
gasoline to help automakers comply with the proposed particulate standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0756, p. 9]
EPA identifies the biggest challenge to doing this in gasoline at the refinery level: aromatic
compounds are used to increase the octane rating of gasoline and removing them would cause
the octane rating to fall. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 9]
As EPA explains it:
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"If heavy aromatics were to be removed from gasoline, then not only their volume, but their
octane would have to be replaced. One source for additional octane is via increased reformer
severity or throughput to generate additional light aromatics. This action may require other
adjustments to maintain compliance with gasoline benzene standards or rebalance naphtha
streams. A refinery may also be able to increase high-octane isoparaffin production through
additional alkylation and/or isomerization operations. Finally, a refinery may opt to further
increase reliance on ethanol as a source of octane."6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 9]
6 Pg 584, Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-
Duty Vehicles
Cost of Alternatives to Aromatics Compared to Ethanol. Refineries currently consider
aromatics as the low-cost means of increasing the octane rating of gasoline blend stock. By
limiting their consideration of reducing aromatics at the refinery level, EPA will inevitably see
an increase to the price of gasoline if aromatic levels are reduced. If, on the other hand, EPA
would expand the scope of their future rulemaking beyond the refinery to include gasoline blends
that use more ethanol than is the case today, the price of gasoline would likely be reduced and
the capital costs to refineries would be essentially zero. This fact alone should justify a more
expansive view of fuel controls than reflected in Section IX. One way to illustrate this is to
compare the difference in cost between a gallon of blend stock and a gallon of various octane
boosting alternatives to aromatics. The Oil Price Information Service's weekly reports includes
spot prices for regular and premium grade reformulated and conventional gasoline blend stocks,
ethanol (which only the sales-weighted average is used in this analysis), alkylates and MTBE on
a per gallon basis.7 Assuming the same amount of each aromatic alternative is required to
provide the same octane boost as aromatics,8 then a positive [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756,
pp. 9-10]
7 MTBE is not used in the U.S. as an octane booster, although it is used elsewhere.
8 Since ethanol has the highest blending octane the alternatives, this assumption underestimates the value
of ethanol.
[See original attachment for "Figure 2. Relative Costs of Alternatives to Aromatics"]
difference indicates that the alternative will raise the cost of gasoline blend stock and a negative
value indicates the alternative will lower the cost. As shown in Figure 2, page 9, only ethanol
provides a cost savings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 9-10]
Furthermore, the price advantage of ethanol over gasoline blend stock may well be greater in
the future. The Nebraska Energy Board has been publishing the monthly rack9 price of fuel
ethanol and regular grade gasoline in their state since 1982. These monthly prices are expressed
in nominal dollars (i.e., not adjusted for inflation). After the Defour Group adjusted the annual
average data to reflect 2022 dollars, calculated the implied blend stock price and computed the
difference between the price of a gallon of ethanol and gasoline blend stock, the relationship
between ethanol and gasoline blend stock prices over a 40-year period can be established. This is
shown in Figure 3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 10]
9 The rack price is the price paid by fuel blenders for the blend stock and ethanol they receive from oil and
bio refineries.
There is a statistically significant linear correlation between fuel ethanol and gasoline blend
stock, with the price of ethanol becoming more favorable over time. If this correlation remains
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consistent, ethanol's price advantage over gasoline blend stock could increase to $1.66 a gallon
by 2032. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 10]
[See original attachment for "Figure 3 Ethanol and Figure 4. Gasoline Ethanol Blendss: 1982-
2021"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 10]
The Greenhouse Gas Benefits of Using HOLC Fuel. What is referred to as "gasoline" is a
blend of a fossil fuel (gasoline blend stock) and a renewable fuel (ethanol). Nearly all such
blended fuel consists of 90% gasoline blend stock and 10% ethanol known as E10. As shown in
Figure 4, the total volume of gasoline blend fuels peaked just prior to the Covid pandemic.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 10-11]
Thus, due to the blending of ethanol into gasoline, the fossil fuel component of liquid fuel
peaked in 2006 while total gasoline blend usage peaked in 2018. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0756, pp. 10-11]
The first substantital reduction in the use of fossil fuels in the transportation sector occurred
over a relatively short period of time. While the overall use of motor fuel began to stabilize
starting in 2005, the replacement of gasoline blend stock by ethanol reduced fossil fuel use
enough to turn the trend downward. This was due primarily to the enactment of the Renewable
Fuel Standards (RFS) which dictated the annual volume of biofuel that must be blended into
gasoline and diesel fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 10-11]
[See original attachment for "Figure 5. Impact of Proposed GHG Emission Reductions on
U.S. Fuel Consumption" and "Figure 6. Benefits from a Possible HOLC Fuel"] [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0756, pp. 10-11]
Figure 5 illustrates what these trends would look like if the current rulemaking would achieve
the results shown in Table 1. Note that while overall liquid fuel use goes down, the amount of
ethanol used also declines because the concentration of ethanol in gasoline has remained
unchanged at 10%. Thus, the full potential of the proposed shift to electric vehicles is blunted by
the decreased use of ethanol. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 10-11]
If, on the other hand. EPA were to adopt changes to the regulations to bring about widespread
use of HOLC fuel with triple the ethanol that is in today's fuel, an additional 8% to 16%10 of the
fossil fuel portion of the fuel (the gasoline blend stock) would be displaced by 2055. Figure 6
illustrates what the trends would look like if the current rulemaking would achieve the results
shown in Table 1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 10-11]
10 This assumes a 2% reduction in mpg due to ethanol after energy density, heat of vaporization and
optimization impacts are considered.
To illustrate the difference, consider that the amount of petroleum used for light and medium
duty vehicles in 2055 if the proposed standards are successful would drop to 1962 levels. If,
however, HOLC fuel with 20% to 30% ethanol were to replace E10 by 2055, the amount of
petroleum used would drop to levels not seen since 1952. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp.
10-11]
Aromatic Reductions from the Use of HOLC Fuel. Reducing heavy aromatics in gasoline at
the refinery level is complicated by the corresponding loss in octane. Finding a solution within
the refinery using compounds made from petroleum will be expensive and do nothing to reduce
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overall fossil fuel use. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 1, adding ethanol to an existing
blend stock both increases the octane rating of the resulting fuel but also decreases the
concentration of all the other petroleum compounds, including aromatics and benzene. In
addition, by replacing a portion of the blend stock portion of the fuel with a low carbon
alternative, overall C02 emissions will also be reduced. Finally, if the HOLC fuel is made using
existing blend stocks, then expensive capital investment in refineries will be unnecessary. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 11-12]
In 2020, the Defour Group evaluated the aromatic standards being considered for use in the
Next Generation Fuels Act (NGFA). These standards (shown in Table 4), in conjunction with
octane and carbon intensity standards, would require the production and sale of mid-level ethanol
blend {MLEB} high octane low carbon fuels beginning in the year 2028. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0756, pp.12-13]
[See original attachment for "Table 4. Standards Included in Next Generation Fuel Act"]
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 12-13]
This study was based on data regarding fuel propertites found in the 2016 EPA Fuels Trend
Report. 11 This report contained values for the average and 95% (2 standard deviation for a
normal distribution) for both summer and winter reformulated and conventional gasolines. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 12-13]
11 Fuel Trends Report: Gasoline 2006 - 2016 Office of Transportation and Air Quality U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency EPA-420-R-17-005 October 2017
The Aromatic Average. As proposed in the NGFA, the aromatic standard in retail gasoline for
2027 and beyond will be 17.5%. In its Fuel Trends Report, EPA reported that the average
concentration of aromatics in all grades of fuels during the five-year period from 2012-2016
ranged from 18.8% to 19.6% and average ethanol concentration in gasoline was only 9.51%.
MathPro estimated the average aromatic concentrations for all grades of fuel was 19.0%. 12 For
modeling purposes, Defour Group assumed an average aromatic concentration of 18.5% and an
average ethanol concentration of 9.8%. The aromatic concentration was then apportioned to
regular grade gasoline (17.52%) and premium grade gasoline (24.57%).[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0756, pp.12-13]
12 David S. Hirshfeld et al, "Refining Economics of U.S. Gasoline: Octane Ratings and Ethanol Content,"
Journal of Environmental Science and Technology, August 21, 2014
Under the NGFA: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 12-13]
-A new NGFA fuel will be introduced into the market prior to January 1, 2027. If this fuel is
an E20 fuel (20% ethanol) combined with regular grade E10 gasoline blend stock, its average
Research Octane Number (RON) is estimated to be 96.2 RON and the aromatic average is
estimated to be 15.6%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 12-13]
-New vehicles model year 2028 and later are required to use the new HOLC fuel. About 30%
of these vehicles (approximately 5 million vehicles) are expected to be sold in the 2027 calendar
year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 12-13]
-Some of these new vehicles operating on NGFA fuel in 2027 will be replacing legacy
vehicles that operate on E10 premium. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 12-13]
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-All flex-fuel vehicles (approximately 5 million vehicles) can use the new HOCL fuel or E85
(with an estimated aromatic concentration of 4.7%). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 12-
13]
-All vehicles 2001 and newer can use El 5, with an estimated aromatic concentration of 16.5%
(regular) and 23.2% (premium). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 12-13]
With all these sources of low aromatic gasoline in the marketplace in 2027, multiple scenarios
can be developed that would assure compliance with the 17.5% average aromatic concentration
standard. Furthermore, compliance with the average standard in subsequent years will become
easier as more new vehicles using NGFA fuel enter the market. The aromatic average will
continue to decline over time, and by 2055, the average aromatic concentration is estimated to be
about 14%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 12-13]
Aromatic Cap. As proposed in the NGFA, the aromatic standard in retail gasoline for 2028
and beyond will be 30% for years 2027 - 2031 and 25% for 2032 and thereafter. Since there is
no uniform standard across the country for octane, premium gasolines range from 90 AKI to 93
AKI. 13 The highest-octane premium grade gasoline is 93 AKI with an average aromatic
concentration of 29.8%. An El5 version of 93 AKI premium, however, would have an aromatic
concentration of 28.1%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 13]
13 There are even high-octane specialty premium fuels on the market primarily used for racing. Since these
are already uniquely blended boutique fuels, it is assumed that these fuels could be made with no more than
30% aromatics.
Two options could be employed to meet the aromatic cap in 2027. The first option would be
to replace E10 with E15 in areas that have 93 AKI premium. 14 The second option would be to
replace 93 AKI premium with 91 AKI premium. This second option has the additional advantage
of making the octane standard for legacy premium more consistent across the country. Either
option (or a combination of the two) would enable compliance with the 30% cap for 2027 2031.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 13]
14 Anti-Knock Index, which is the average of a fuel's Research Octane Number (RON) and Motor Octane
Number (MON).
In 2032, the cap drops to 25% under the NGFA. At this point, fuel retailers would need to
limit their premium grade option to El5 with an octane rating no higher than 91 AKI to be in
compliance. By this time, however, nearly half of the fleet will be vehicles designed to run on
high octane NGFA fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, p. 13]
In the past. EPA stated their opinion that, while they had the authority to make significant
changes to vehicle fuel, it would only be possible after all other alternatives have been
exhausted. As established, there is only one realistic technological alternative that can effectively
reduce gasoline consumption by 50%, but that alternative has many issues yet to be resolved and
requires sweeping changes that are not likely to occur in less than nine years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0756, pp. 14-15]
A second alternatitve has been under development for a decade that could assist automakers
in complying with the standards: a new high octane low carbon fuel made with ethanol. It seems
reasonable that any future rulemaking establishing fuel standards would include regulatory
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changes to assist in implementing this new fuel. Such changes include, but are not limited to, the
following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 14-15]
-Specifications for E20 and E25 -E30 certification fuels.
-Octane standards for legacy fuels that would, at a minimum, limit the octane of premium
gasoline nationwide to 91 AKI.
-Octane standards for E20 fuel of 95 RON and for E25 and E30 fuels of 98 RON.
-Permanently extend the RVP waiver for E10 to any gasoline-ethanol blend fuel.
-Aromatic standards for all gasoline that would address both average and maximum levels of
aromatic compounds in gasoline.
-Any other standards or regulations that the Agency believes would facilitate the transition
into a high-octane low carbon fuel as outlined in the 2019 Co-Optima report entitled "Top Ten
Blendstocks For Turbocharged Gasoline Engines: Bioblendstocks With Potential to Deliver the
for Highest Engine Efficiency." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0756, pp. 14-15]
Organization: Marathon Petroleum Corporation (MPC)
EPA is seeking comment on promulgating future gasoline fuel property standards aimed at
further reducing Particulate Matter ("PM") emissions specifically within the existing light duty
transportation fleet. MPC data and testing show that the use of analytical methods as support for
restrictions on the back end, or tail, distillation point of gasoline is misplaced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0593, pp. 4-5]
1. Simulated Distillation does not provide data that reliably predicts PMI.
EPA states that the basis of its discussion and request for comments relies on the theory that
high boiling point compounds in gasoline increase PM emissions and, further, that the high
boiling point tail of gasoline contains a high proportion of multi-ring aromatics. Particulate
Matter Index ("PMI") is a method to analytically predict the tailpipe PM-forming potential of
one fuel compared to another. However, other factors including vehicle hardware design,
calibration, and ethanol content also impact vehicle tailpipe PM emissions. As the agency
correctly points out, the method to calculate PMI using a Detailed Hydrocarbon Analysis
("DHA") via ASTM 6370 is time- consuming and expensive. As a proxy for DHA, EPA
proposes using a final boiling point ("FBP") via Simulated Distillation ("SimDis") as an
indicator of PMI since, theoretically, the majority of the multi-ring aromatics occur in the T90
portion of the distillation curve. The Agency believes that use of SimDis could be an accurate
and cost-effective means of measuring PMI. MPC has already tested this approach to determine
if using SimDis is an accurate way of predicting PMI. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, pp. 4-5]
MPC completed an analysis on sixty (60) gasoline samples before ethanol blending from all
of its refineries. All samples were tested using the SimDis method ASTM D2887, with twenty
(20) of these samples also tested by SimDis ASTM D7096. Results showed that C10+ aromatic
content varied greatly among the fuel types and grades at a given distillation point.
Consequently, MPC's correlation of the SimDis data showed there was no relationship between
the D2887 final boiling points and C10+ aromatic content, see Figure 1. [See original comment
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for Figure 1 - C10+ Aromatics vs. Simulated Distillation Final Boiling Point] For the D7096
simulated distillation data - the method recommended by the EPA— correlations of T98, T95,
and T90 points to PMI showed slightly stronger correlation with R2 values ranging from 0.21 to
0.36. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, pp. 4-5]
Based on MPC's analysis, there is a significant amount of uncertainty that the SimDis method
can accurately predict a lower PM-forming potential fuel. Most importantly, MPC found little
correlation between the PMI of a fuel and its final boiling point minus T98 or T95 values. In fact,
in the analysis, fuels with the highest distillation values had the lowest C10+ aromatics and
yielded the lowest PMI values (see Figure 2). [See original comment for Figure 2 - PMI
Comparison to SimDis Final Boiling Point and Tail (FBP - T95)] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0593, pp. 4-5]
Consumers and refiners will be impacted by changes to gasoline distillation parameters.
Limiting certain portions of gasoline based on distillation properties will impact refiners and
consumers due to restrictions of the gasoline pool. Each refinery is an individual operation, fine-
tuned to run on particular feedstocks based on the type of equipment used at that refinery. The
Haverly model used by the EPA is not reflective of actual refinery operations, and use of
simulations and models, including the Haverly model, rely on generalizations and averaging,
which result in flawed model outputs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, pp. 6-7]
EPA states that to make up for lost gasoline and octane in its Haverly model, it simply
"increased the reformer severity, purchased and isomerized natural gas liquids, and produced
more alkylate," ignoring the reality that each one of these changes represents significant
adjustments to refinery planning, operations, and expense. EPA's simplistic modeling input
changes do not reflect how individual refineries would need to react to new distillation
restrictions. The actual impacts for each refinery would likely be widely varying depending on
each refinery's current operations and expenses. EPA modeling needs to consider hydrotreating
and hydrocracking capacity, hydrogen availability, alkylation capacity to make up octane loss,
and butane blending losses. Changes of these parameters and associated losses due to refining
constraints would represent significant monetary impacts that are not accounted for in the current
proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, pp. 6-7]
Restricting back-end distillation would result in the loss of a significant amount of gasoline
volume. And critically, as has been discussed, the volume that would be removed from the
gasoline pool does not contribute to PM emissions. By way of example, MPC modeled a
refinery's light product outputs using site-specific information to determine the impact of
shifting FCC naphtha from the gasoline pool to the distillate pool. The model showed that the
total gasoline production was reduced by one and one-half (1.5) barrels for each barrel of FCC
naphtha that was shifted to the distillate pool. This resulted in a reduction of the refinery's daily
production of gasoline by approximately 4%. Other refineries likely would be required to reduce
gasoline volumes to restrict back-end distillation. These decreases in daily production could
leave some markets short, translating to consumer impacts at the pump in both price and supply.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, pp. 6-7]
Additionally, if EPA implements changes that limit distillation properties of gasoline, existing
blending practices that occur downstream of the refinery may be prohibited. EPA regulations
currently allow the blending of transmix into fuel because the quality and performance of the
3674
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final fuel is unaffected. Transmix represents a conglomeration of off-specification refined
products and product interfaces that are collected and reintroduced into a final fuel, most often
after the final fuel has left a refinery. The potential fuels specification being discussed could
impact the amount of transmix being used within the gasoline pool, which in turn could also
impact the total available gasoline volume. The alternative to blending transmix would be to
reprocess the off-specification refined products at a refinery creating unnecessary criteria and
GHG emissions from transporting the material to a refinery and reprocessing it. Also, the
transportation of fuels occurs within fungible systems - pipelines, ships, trucks— where products
share transportation assets as these products move to retail locations, often with the same types
of products being commingled. As such, residual fuels present within these shared transportation
assets could alter the distillation properties of any given fuel. Any effort by EPA to change or
disallow these practices would serve to further restrict supplies of gasoline on top of that which
would be caused by changes to distillation parameters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0593, pp. 6-
7]
Organization: Minnesota Corn Growers Association (MCGA)
FUEL QUALITY RULEMAKING NEEDED
The EPA proposed rulemaking requested "comment on potential future gasoline fuel property
standards aimed at further reducing PM emissions, for consideration in a possible subsequent
rulemaking". A major advantage of fuel property standards is that they affect emissions from all
vehicles on the road today - not just new vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 6-7]
In response to EPA's request for input on fuel standards, NCGA supports EPA establishing a
pathway to a higher minimum clean octane standard for fuel of at least 98 RON that enables
mid-level ethanol blends to immediately and cost-effectively reduce both GHG and tailpipe
emissions, supporting greater fuel efficiency and bringing lower carbon and lower cost fuels to
the market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 6-7]
Even with advancements in engine technology, automotive manufacturers are nearing a point
where further improvements are difficult without a higher-octane fuel. This is because advanced
downsized, down sped engines, and their associated technologies, make an engine more
susceptible to knock. Due to its knock-limiting properties, a higher-octane fuel, such as a
midlevel ethanol blend, enables engine designs featuring higher compression ratios,
turbocharging, and down speeding and increases overall engine performance and efficiency. 12
According to Department of Energy (DOE) researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, "the
opportunity for further downsizing and down speeding of engines to improve fuel economy is
limited by the available octane rating of fuels... [which] allow higher efficiency designs of
naturally aspirated and turbocharged engines dedicated to use the high octane fuel." 13 Since
2016, DOE has completed extensive research through its Co-Optimization of Fuels and Engines
initiative (Co-Optima) on innovating fuels and engines together and understanding the types of
fuels that can improve engine performance and efficiency to reduce emissions. 14[EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 6-7]
12 Leone, T., Olin, E., Anderson, J., Jung, H. et al. 2014. "Effects of Fuel Octane Rating and Ethanol
Content on Knock, Fuel Economy, and C02 for a Turbocharged DI Engine," SAE Int. J. Fuels Lubr.
7(l):9-28, 2014, doi:10.4271/2014-01-1228.
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13 Theiss, T., T. Alleman, A. Brooker, A. Elgowainy, G. Fioroni, J. Han, S. Huff, C. Johnson, M. Kass, P.
Leiby, R. U. Martinez, R. McCormick, K. Moriarty, E. Newes, G. Oladosu, J. Szybist, J. Thomas, M.
Wang, B. West. 2016. Summary of High-Octane Mid-Level Ethanol Blends Study. Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, and Argonne National Laboratory. Available at:
http://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/files/pub61169.pdf.
14 . Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, "Co-Optimization of Fuels
& Engines," https://www.energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/co-optimization-fuels-engines.
The recently concluded Co-Optima researchl5 validates the solution of pairing clean octane
and optimized engines to deliver greater environmental and economic benefits on the pathway to
a net-zero transportation future, and DOE confirms ethanol's declining carbon intensity.16
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 6-7]
15 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, "On the Road to a Net-
Zero-Carbon Transportation Future," https://www.energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/articles/road-net-zero-
carbon-transportation-future.
16 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, "Ethanol vs.
Petroleum-Based Fuel Carbon Emissions," https://www.energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/articles/ethanol-vs-
petroleum-based-fuel-carbon-emissions.
- New fuel options can improve fuel economy by 10 percent with today's turbocharged
engines, with an additional 15 percent improvement with advanced engines.
- Domestically sourced bio-based fuels produce 60 percent fewer GHG emissions than
petroleum-based fuels.
- Optimized fuel and engine combinations also cut criteria pollutant emissions. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 6-7]
As DOE explained in its GHG analysis of high-octane fuel, determining GHG impacts of
high-octane fuel relative to current gasoline requires accounting for vehicle efficiency gains,
refinery operation changes and GHG emissions changes from ethanol blending. DOE's results
show the largest impacts on wells-to-wheels (WTW) emissions from high-octane fuel come from
efficiency gains and the level of ethanol blending. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 6-7]
DOE's modeling compared 100 RON E25 and E40 fuels to baseline E10. When used in HOF
vehicles, the E25 reduced WTW GHG emissions by a total of 8 to 9 percent (or 36-40 g
C02e/mile driven) compared to baseline E10. The vehicle efficiency gains from HOF reduced
GHG emissions by 4 percentage points of that total, and the additional 4 percentage points of
GHG reductions with the E25 fuel were realized from ethanol offsetting petroleum. For the E40
HOF, the ethanol content provided a 9 percent reduction in WTW GHG emissions. 17 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 6-7]
17 Theiss et al., 2016.
Current fuels with higher octane, marketed as premium grades, where ethanol blends are
limited to 10%, are not cost-effective for consumers, and fall short of enabling the efficiency and
emissions technology changes automakers need to advance transportation decarbonization.
Because ethanol results in nearly half the emissions of gasoline and is on a pathway to future net-
zero emissions, producing higher-octane fuel with a midlevel ethanol blend would do more to
reduce GHG emissions and support the stringency goals of the proposed rule. Optimized vehicles
3676
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powered by low carbon, high-octane fuel made from a midlevel ethanol blend would have much
lower GHG emissions than vehicles running on either current E10 blends or premium E10
blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 6-7]
Higher ethanol content, reached by removing regulatory barriers to higher blends, would
boost GHG reductions and replace harmful aromatics, providing a cost-effective low carbon fuel
solution for consumers, including low- income consumers, and the environment. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 6-7]
EPA should adopt rules to limit PMI of both finished fuels and the hydrocarbon blend stocks
used for E10, E15, and E85. Limiting PMI of hydrocarbon blend stocks will ensure that the
particulate emissions benefits of ethanol are not offset by negative changes at refineries. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp. 10-11]
Improved fuel property standards should be a high priority because they can achieve
significantly lower particulate emissions and dramatically lower GHG emissions. California's
Low Carbon Fuel Standard already recognizes the importance of fuel standards, and it has led to
dramatic increases in sales of E85 and other low- carbon biofuels. High-octane low-carbon fuels
are a key enabler for continued GHG emissions improvements in the millions of liquid-fueled
vehicles which will be produced over the next 10+ years, as documented by the U.S. Department
of Energy Co-Optimization of Fuels & Engines initiative and in numerous other studies, such as
those by MIT and by automakers. A detailed proposed blueprint for future high-octane low-
carbon fuels exists in the Next Generation Fuels Act, and EPA has the statutory authority to
make these changes without waiting for Congress to act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0612, pp.
10-11]
In summary, EPA should pursue stringent new fuel standards - not only for reduced
particulate emissions but also for dramatically lower GHG emissions. Fuel standards can achieve
benefits much more quickly than standards which only impact new vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0612, pp. 10-11]
Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
Potential Future Gasoline Fuel Property Standards
EPA seeks comment on potential future gasoline fuel property standards aimed at further
reducing PM emissions. The agency writes in the proposal that comments on this topic would
inform a possible subsequent EPA rulemaking that could provide an important complement to
the vehicle standards being proposed in this current action. "The emissions standards for new
vehicles (MY 2027 and later) proposed in this rule would achieve significant air quality benefits.
However, there is an opportunity to further reduce PM emissions from the existing vehicle fleet,
the millions of vehicles that will be produced during the phase- in period [of the proposed
vehicle standards], as well as millions of nonroad gasoline engines, through changes in market
fuel composition. Given the current population of vehicles and nonroad equipment, we expect
that tens of millions of gasoline-powered sources will remain in use well into the 2030s.
Although EPA has not undertaken sufficient analysis to propose changes to fuel requirements
under CAA section [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0559, pp. 8-9]
3677
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211(c) in this rulemaking, and considers such changes beyond the scope of this rulemaking,
EPA has begun to consider the possibility of such changes."29 NACAA agrees with EPA that
fuel property standards to further reduce PM emissions would yield significant and necessary
reductions from the existing fleet and also provide an important complement to the currently
proposed emission standards. We support EPA pursuing such a program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0559, pp. 8-9]
29 Id at 29,397
Organization: National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)
The EPA proposed rulemaking requested "comment on potential future gasoline fuel property
standards aimed at further reducing PM emissions, for consideration in a possible subsequent
rulemaking". A major advantage of fuel property standards is that they affect emissions from all
vehicles on the road today - not just new vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 5]
In response to EPA's request for input on fuel standards, NCGA supports EPA establishing a
pathway to a higher minimum clean octane standard for fuel of at least 98 RON that enables
mid-level ethanol blends to immediately and cost-effectively reduce both GHG and tailpipe
emissions, supporting greater fuel efficiency and bringing lower carbon and lower cost fuels to
the market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 5]
Even with advancements in engine technology, automotive manufacturers are nearing a point
where further improvements are difficult without a higher-octane fuel. This is because advanced
downsized, down sped engines, and their associated technologies, make an engine more
susceptible to knock. Due to its knock-limiting properties, a higher-octane fuel, such as a
midlevel ethanol blend, enables engine designs featuring higher compression ratios,
turbocharging, and down speeding and increases overall engine performance and efficiency. 12
According to Department of Energy (DOE) researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, "the
opportunity for further downsizing and down speeding of engines to improve fuel economy is
limited by the available octane rating of fuels... [which] allow higher efficiency designs of
naturally aspirated and turbocharged engines dedicated to use the high octane fuel." 13 Since
2016, DOE has completed extensive research through its Co-Optimization of Fuels and Engines
initiative (Co-Optima) on innovating fuels and engines together and understanding the types of
fuels that can improve engine performance and efficiency to reduce emissions. 14 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 5]
12 Leone, T., Olin, E., Anderson, J., Jung, H. et al. 2014. "Effects of Fuel Octane Rating and Ethanol
Content on Knock, Fuel Economy, and C02 for a Turbocharged DI Engine," SAE Int. J. Fuels Lubr.
7(l):9-28, 2014, doi:10.4271/2014-01-1228.
13 Theiss, T., T. Alleman, A. Brooker, A. Elgowainy, G. Fioroni, J. Han, S. Huff, C. Johnson, M. Kass, P.
Leiby, R. U. Martinez, R. McCormick, K. Moriarty, E. Newes, G. Oladosu, J. Szybist, J. Thomas, M.
Wang, B. West. 2016. Summary of High-Octane Mid-Level Ethanol Blends Study. Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, and Argonne National Laboratory. Available at:
http://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/files/pub61169.pdf
14 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, "Co-Optimization of
Fuels & Engines," https://www.energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/co-optimization-fuels-engines.
3678
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The recently concluded Co-Optima research 15 validates the solution of pairing clean octane
and optimized engines to deliver greater environmental and economic benefits on the pathway to
a net-zero transportation future, and DOE confirms ethanol's declining carbon intensity. 16
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 5]
15 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, "On the Road to a Net-
Zero-Carbon Transportation Future," https://www.energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/articles/road-net-zero-
carbon-transportation-future
16 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, "Ethanol vs.
Petroleum-Based Fuel Carbon Emissions," https://www.energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/articles/ethanol-vs-
petroleum-based-fuel-carbon-emissions
New fuel options can improve fuel economy by 10 percent with today's turbocharged
engines, with an additional 15 percent improvement with advanced engines.
Domestically sourced bio-based fuels produce 60 percent fewer GHG emissions than
petroleum-based fuels.
Optimized fuel and engine combinations also cut criteria pollutant emissions. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 5]
As DOE explained in its GHG analysis of high-octane fuel, determining GHG impacts of
high-octane fuel relative to current gasoline requires accounting for vehicle efficiency gains,
refinery operation changes and GHG emissions changes from ethanol blending. DOE's results
show the largest impacts on wells-to-wheels (WTW) emissions from high-octane fuel come from
efficiency gains and the level of ethanol blending. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 5-6]
DOE's modeling compared 100 RON E25 and E40 fuels to baseline E10. When used in HOF
vehicles, the E25 reduced WTW GHG emissions by a total of 8 to 9 percent (or 36-40 g
C02e/mile driven) compared to baseline E10. The vehicle efficiency gains from HOF reduced
GHG emissions by 4 percentage points of that total, and the additional 4 percentage points of
GHG reductions with the E25 fuel were realized from ethanol offsetting petroleum. For the E40
HOF, the ethanol content provided a 9 percent reduction in WTW GHG emissions. 17 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 5-6]
17 Theiss et al., 2016.
Current fuels with higher octane, marketed as premium grades, where ethanol blends are
limited to 10%, are not cost-effective for consumers, and fall short of enabling the efficiency and
emissions technology changes automakers need to advance transportation decarbonization.
Because ethanol results in nearly half the emissions of gasoline and is on a pathway to future net-
zero emissions, producing higher-octane fuel with a midlevel ethanol blend would do more to
reduce GHG emissions and support the stringency goals of the proposed rule. Optimized vehicles
powered by low carbon, high-octane fuel made from a midlevel ethanol blend would have much
lower GHG emissions than vehicles running on either current E10 blends or premium E10
blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, pp. 5-6]
Higher ethanol content, reached by removing regulatory barriers to higher blends, would
boost GHG reductions and replace harmful aromatics, providing a cost-effective low carbon fuel
solution for consumers, including low-income consumers, and the environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0643, pp. 5-6]
3679
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Bringing high octane fuel to market in the form of midlevel ethanol blends will be
significantly less capital-intensive than attempting to increase blend stock octane with
hydrocarbon components at refineries. It will also be incredibly cleaner. The avoided production
cost and offset emissions lower end-costs to consumers, reducing both economic costs and social
costs related to health and environment, key considerations in advancing environmental justice
and avoiding adverse impacts from oil refineries on communities that have historically borne
them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 7]As explained in EPA's Fuel Trends Report:
Gasoline 2006-2016, "Ethanol's high-octane value has also allowed refiners to significantly
reduce the aromatic content of the gasoline, a trend borne out in the data." EPA's data shows that
aromatics' share of gasoline volume dropped from nearly 25 percent to 19.3 percent, and
benzene volume dropped from 0.99 percent to 0.58 percent between 2000 and 2016, the same
time as ethanol blending increased from 1 percent to at least 10 percent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0643, p. 8]
EPA's data demonstrates the air quality and human health benefits of increased ethanol
blending in gasoline by replacing harmful aromatics with clean octane from ethanol. Limiting the
aromatics content of gasoline and using higher ethanol blends in high octane fuel would further
reduce risks from SOA formation and exposure to PM 2.5, which causes serious respiratory,
cardiovascular, and other health harm, including premature death, according to the American
Lung Association. The same GDI engine advancements that help lower GHG emissions have the
unfortunate side effect of increasing particulate emissions, which could be reduced by use of
midlevel ethanol blends. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 8]
Petroleum-based aerosol particles represent a significant source of pollution, especially in
population-dense urban areas. Health issues related to PM and other emission-based pollutants
can be reduced by lowering the volume of petroleum in the domestic gasoline pool, which can be
accomplished by increasing octane with higher ethanol blends and replacing more hydrocarbon
aromatics with ethanol. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 8]
It is well known that particulate emissions are a strong function of aromatic fuel components
with a high double bond equivalent and low vapor pressure, and the particulate forming potential
is well represented by the "PMI" metric developed by Honda. 27 The value of the PMI metric
has been validated in many other studies including the joint auto-oil Coordinating Research
Council 28 and the EPA. 29 PMI and particulate emissions can be reduced by altering refinery
processes to reduce heavy aromatic content of the fuel, and, as noted, ethanol can replace those
aromatics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0643, p. 8]
27 Aikawa, Sakurai, and Jetter, "Development of a Predictive Model for Gasoline Vehicle Particulate
Matter Emissions", SAE paper 2010-01-2115, 2010; https://doi.org/10.4271/2010-01-2115
28 Coordinating Research Council, "Evaluation and Investigation of Fuel Effects on Gaseous and
Particulate Emissions on SIDI In-Use Vehicles," Report No. E-94-2, March 2016;
http://crcsite.wpengine.eom/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CRC_2017-3-21_03-20955_E94-2FinalReport-
Revlb.pdf
29 US Environmental Protection Agency, "Exhaust Emission Impacts of Replacing Heavy Aromatic
Hydrocarbons in Gasoline with Alternate Octane Sources", report EPA-420-R-23-008, April 2023
Organization: National Farmers Union (NFU)
VI. Fuel Effects on Particulate Emissions
3680
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EPA's proposal requests "comment on potential future gasoline fuel property standards aimed
at further reducing PM emissions, for consideration in a possible subsequent rulemaking." [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 14]
88 Fed. Reg. at 29,197. A major advantage of supporting biofuels is that their use reduces
emissions from all vehicles on the road today - not just new vehicles. Therefore, emissions
benefits are achieved quickly on a larger scale. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 14]
Particulate emissions are a strong function of aromatic fuel components with a high double
bond equivalent and low vapor pressure. The particulate forming potential is well represented by
the "PMI" metric developed by Honda.33 The value of the PMI metric has been used and
validated by others including the Coordinating Research Council34 and EPA.35 [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 14]
33 See Koichiro Aikawa, et al., Development of a Predictive Model for Gasoline Vehicle Particulate Matter
Emissions, SAE paper 2010-01-2115 (2010), available at https://doi.org/10.4271/2010-01-2115.
34 See Coordinating Research Council, Evaluation and Investigation of Fuel Effects on Gaseous and
Particulate Emissions on SIDI In-Use Vehicles, Report No. E-94-2, March 2017, available at
http://crcsite.wpengine.com/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/CRC_2017-3-21_03-20955_E94-2FinalReport-
Revlb.pdf.
35 See EPA, Exhaust Emission Impacts of Replacing Heavy Aromatic Hydrocarbons in Gasoline with
Alternate Octane Sources, EPA-420-R-23-008 (April 2023), available at
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023- 05/420r23008.pdf.
PMI and particulate emissions can be reduced by altering refinery processes to reduce heavy
aromatic content of the fuel. This may require other refinery changes in order to achieve fuel
octane requirements, and the changes generally increase cost. A more cost-effective option for
octane is higher blends of ethanol, and higher blends of ethanol have been shown to reduce
particulate matter emissions.36 But the petroleum gasoline with which ethanol may be blended
can impact the benefits of ethanol. As such, EPA should adopt rules to limit PMI of both finished
fuels and the hydrocarbon blendstocks used for ethanol blends, including ensuring the ability to
use mid-level ethanol blends. Limiting PMI of hydrocarbon blendstocks will ensure that the
particulate emissions benefits of ethanol are not offset by negative changes at refineries. Such
rules can also incentivize improved pipeline practices, to minimize contamination of gasoline
with diesel and jet fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0581, p. 14]
36 See, e.g., Tianbo Tang, et al., Expanding the ethanol blend wall in California: Emissions comparison
between E10 and E15, Fuel Vol. 350 (2023), available at https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.fuel.2023.128836.
Organization: North Dakota Farmers Union (NDFU)
Fuel Effects on Particulate Emissions
EPA's proposal requests "comment on potential future gasoline fuel property standards aimed
at further reducing PM emissions, for consideration in a possible subsequent rulemaking." A
major advantage of supporting biofuels is that their use reduces emissions from all vehicles on
the road today - not just new vehicles. Therefore, emissions benefits are achieved quickly on a
larger scale. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0586, p. 6]
3681
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Particulate emissions are a strong function of aromatic fuel components with a high double
bond equivalent and low vapor pressure. PMI and particulate emissions can be reduced by
altering refinery processes to reduce heavy aromatic content of the fuel. This may require other
refinery changes in order to achieve fuel octane requirements, and the changes generally increase
cost. Ethanol provides a more cost-effective option for boosting octane and reducing particulate
matter emissions. 12 But the petroleum gasoline with which ethanol may be blended can impact
the benefits of ethanol. As such, EPA should adopt rules to limit PMI of both finished fuels and
the hydrocarbon blendstocks used for ethanol blends, including ensuring the ability to use mid-
level ethanol blends. Limiting PMI of hydrocarbon blendstocks will ensure that the particulate
emissions benefits of ethanol are not offset by negative changes at refineries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0586, p. 6]
12 Tang, T., et. al. (2023, October 15). Expanding the ethanol blend wall in California: Emissions
comparison between E10 andE15. Fuel, Volume 350. Retrieved from
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S00162361230144977via%3Dihub.
Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) and the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC)
C. Potential Future Gasoline Fuel Property Standards
EPA also seeks comment on a potential future rulemaking to establish gasoline fuel property
standards aimed at further reducing PM emissions. NESCAUM and the OTC believe that, while
the proposed emissions standards for MYs 2027 and later would achieve significant air quality
benefits, cleaner fuel standards would provide an important complement to the standards for new
vehicles proposed in the NPRM. It is critical to address emissions from the existing vehicle fleet,
as well as the millions of vehicles that will be produced during the phase-in and operative
periods of the proposed standards. Accordingly, NESCAUM and the OTC support EPA
exercising its authority under CAA 211(c) to develop gasoline property standards in a future
rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0584, p. 11]
Organization: Oryxe International Inc.
3. EPA Should Ensure that the Approach Applied to Any Future Gasoline Fuel Property
Standards Harnesses the Full Benefit that Low Emission Fuel Additives Can Provide.
In the event EPA moves forward with promulgating new gasoline fuel property standards
aimed at achieving additional particulate matter emission reductions, Oryxe urges EPA to
establish waivers under which states desiring to mandate gasoline with lower emission properties
are able to do so. Oryxe also urges EPA to provide credit to original equipment manufacturers
achieving lower emission gasoline through the use of fuel additives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0752, p. 4]
Additionally, Oryxe encourages EPA to move forward with a program that would base the
carbon intensity of fuels on emissions performance. By setting greenhouse gas intensity
standards for lifecycle emissions per unit of transport fuel energy supplied in a specific market,
EPA would encourage innovation and make additional progress toward the Administration's goal
of reducing emissions in the transportation sector. Emissions intensity standards are important
3682
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tools for decarbonizing transport fuels that should be pursued. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0752,
p. 4]
Organization: Pearson Fuels
During the period of harmonized CAFE and GHG crediting, the U.S. FFV fleet grew rapidly.
Now, at a critical time for climate change mitigation, the U.S. FFV fleet is in dramatic decline.
On April 22, 2021, President Biden announced a "nationally determined contribution" pledge
under the 2015 Paris climate agreement to cut U.S. GHG emissions in half by 2030 at a virtual
climate summit attended by dozens of world leaders. In his remarks about the pledge from the
White House, the President stated, "These steps will set America on a path of net zero emissions
economy by no later than 2050." Thus the President has re-established aggressive GHG
reduction as a priority policy of the federal government and set a goal of carbon neutrality by
2050. While there has been a significant expansion of BEVs, internal combustion engines
continue to dominate the market and roads of America and are anticipated to maintain this
dominant role for the next decade and potentially longer. The following illustrative graphics
were developed by the Alliance for Automotive Innovation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577,
pp. 5-6]
During the period of harmonized GHG crediting, when both the GHG and CAFE programs
utilized the 0.15 divisor, there was a substantial expansion of the FFV fleet peaking with the
manufacture of 2.8 million total light-duty vehicles in MY 2014. The total registered fleet of
FFVs in the U.S. continued to grow incrementally until 2020, but from 2015-2020 automakers
sharply reduced the number of vehicle offerings. The attached Exhibit 1 developed by the
Renewable Fuels Association details vehicle offerings by model and engine type and shows the
massive reduction of models that occurred due to the near total elimination of light-duty GHG
program crediting. During the peak period of manufacturing, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors
manufactured 76 different models of FFVs. This scale of manufacturing has since been
decimated with only 8 FFV models offered in 2023 with 5 of these being limited to fleet models.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, pp. 5-6]
II. EPA SHOULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY IN THIS RULEMAKING TO
RECOGNIZE THE TRUE GHG POLICY VALUE OF FFVS BY RESTORING
MEANINGFUL GHG CREDITING FOR FFVs
We encourage the Agency to re-affirm the policy value of FFVs and American ethanol
production and use by restoring meaningful GHG crediting for the manufacture of FFVs by
modifying the methodology for determining GHG crediting for FFVs beginning MY 2027. EPA
has authority to better harmonize crediting between the GHG and CAFE standards and thereby
expand FFV manufacturing through two alternative means both of which are supported by
Pearson Fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 16]
a. EPA should re-integrate the methodology that continues to exist in the CAFE program
by re-establishing its use of the 0.15 multiplier in the EPA's GHG Standards, or,
b. EPA should establish a new GHG Emissions Factor for the GHG Standards that
recognizes the lifecycle emissions reductions of E85 as compared with conventional gasoline.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 16]
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Crediting based on lifecycle GHG emissions reductions can be accomplished simply by
establishing a GHG Emissions Factor that is based on the average GHG emissions reduction
provided by ethanol as compared to petroleum gasoline on a lifecycle basis. This GHG
Emissions Factor would be subject to adjustment based on a determination by Argonne National
Laboratory regarding the average lifecycle emissions of U.S. used as a transportation fuel as
compared to the average lifecycle emissions of the U.S. gasoline used as a transportation fuel.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0577, p. 16]
Organization: POET, LLC
Finally, POET strongly supports EPA's proposal to set gasoline fuel property standards to
reduce particulate matter ("PM") emissions from gasoline-fueled LDVs and medium-duty
vehicles. 11 Bioethanol must play a major role in any future regulatory proposal. Bioethanol has
been shown to significantly reduce PM and other toxic air emissions relative to alternative
aromatics and other blending compounds. It will also boost octane levels in gasoline to make up
for any loss in octane from standards requiring removal of certain high-boiling, heavy aromatics.
Bioethanol also has the added benefit of significantly reducing lifecycle GHG emissions unlike
other, carbon-intensive alternatives. EPA should propose standards that tackle two problems at
once, by promoting increased bioethanol blends, such as El 5, that both reduce PM emissions and
help combat climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 6-7]
11 See Proposed Rule at Section IX, 88 Fed. Reg. at 29397-29404.
VIII. POET Strongly Supports EPA's Suggestion in Section IX of the Proposed Rule to
Institute a Future Regulatory Action to Further Limit PM Emissions from Vehicles and Nonroad
Equipment.
POET strongly supports EPA's consideration of a possible future rulemaking aimed at further
PM emissions reductions for vehicles and nonroad equipment. 134 POET agrees with the EPA's
assessment that reducing certain high-boiling compounds in gasoline could further reduce
vehicle PM emissions. 135 However, removing those heavy aromatic compounds will lower
gasoline octane levels. To most effectively reduce tailpipe PM emissions while retaining high-
octane gasoline, POET urges EPA to support a future rule that would limit the use of high-
boiling compounds while encouraging those compounds to be replaced with higher bioethanol
blends, such as E15. Bioethanol boosts octane while decreasing PM emissions. Bioethanol also
significantly reduces lifecycle GHG emissions compared to more carbon-intensive alternative
octane-boosting compounds, such as heavy aromatics. 136 Bioethanol should be EPA's preferred
solution because it both reduces toxic air pollutants and helps combat climate change. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 29-31]
134 88 Fed. Reg. at 29397.
135 Id. at 29398.
136 See generally Attachment 3.
In support of POET's position, POET retained Environmental Health & Engineering, Inc.
("EH&E"), who prepared a report on the potential changes to EPA gasoline fuel property and
GHG standards for light- and medium-duty vehicles in the Proposed Rule, attached hereto as
Attachment 3. EH&E's report confirms that heavy aromatics have significant negative impacts
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on PM emissions. 137 The report assesses EPA's position that high boiling compounds are
associated with increased tailpipe emissions, reviews the impact of removing high boiling
compounds on gasoline and refineries, analyzes the suitability of EPA's Haverly model, studies
the importance of octane for gasoline, and evaluates increased ethanol blending as an alternative
for octane contributions in gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 29-31]
137 88 Fed. Reg. at 29398.
EH&E's report uses the particulate matter index, or "PMI," to predict the propensity of PM in
various gasoline compounds. PMI values are correlated with emissions of PM: the higher a
compound's PMI value, the higher the tailpipe PM emissions for gasoline containing that
compound. 138 Studies have found that high-boiling compounds—and particularly heavy
aromatics—have significantly higher PMI values than other, lower-boiling compounds in
gasoline blends. 139 And while heavy aromatics are only a small portion of the compounds
making up gasoline, about 2.4% of gasoline by volume, they contribute disproportionately to the
PMI of gasoline, making up about 38 percent of gasoline's PMI value. 140 In comparison,
ethanol has proven to be the most favorable component in gasoline in terms of PMI contribution:
it represents 10% of gasoline volume but contributes less than 1% to PMI. 141 Because the PMI
value of ethanol is so low, the PM emissions associated with gasoline blended with higher levels
of ethanol are significantly lower than gasoline containing heavy aromatics. 142 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 29-31]
138 Attachment 3 at 3.
139 Id. at 1, 3.
140 Id. at 6.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 3-8.
Despite the negative air quality impacts of heavy aromatics, they do serve to increase octane
in gasoline. Sufficiently high octane levels are necessary for the efficient operation of vehicles
with internal combustion engines. 143 Specifically, octane supports high compression ratios,
turbocharging, and advanced spark and valve timing and downsizing. 144 If EPA moves forward
with a rulemaking to limit heavy aromatics in gasoline, EPA should also identify an alternative
to maintain octane levels and develop its standards with that alternative in mind. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 29-31]
143 Id. at 10-11.
144 Id. at 11.
EPA requested comment on several potential alternatives to maintain octane levels, including
increasing alkylation operations, increasing isomerization production, or increasing reliance on
ethanol blending. 145 But increased alkylation and/or isomerization are not workable solutions.
Refiners already produce alkylate and isomerized natural gas liquids at near capacity, so
additional infrastructure would be required to meaningfully increase production. 146 And it is
unlikely that refiners will make any significant investments into alkylation/isomerization
infrastructure, as the gasoline market is facing long-term decline as alternative fuel vehicles
become more popular. 147 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 31-32]
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145 88 Fed. Reg. at 29401-02.
146 Attachment 3 at 2-3, 9.
147 Id. at 9.
POET strongly supports EPA's third proposed alternative: increasing ethanol blending,
specifically bioethanol. Increasing bioethanol blending is feasible. The bioethanol industry
continues to grow significantly, and trends indicate that this growth will continue. Unlike the
infrastructure that supports alkylation and isomerization capacity, bioethanol production
infrastructure continues to expand, providing sufficient capacity for a possible increased reliance
on bioethanol to lower vehicle PM emissions. Bioethanol is also cost-effective. Edgeworth
Economics assessed economic data provided by POET to compare the costs of using gasoline
additives other than ethanol and determined that those alternatives would cost between $0.10 to
$0.24 cents more per gallon based on prices from January 2021 through January 2022.148
Adding alkylate, for instance, costs $0.19 more per gallon than ethanol. 149 [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0609, pp. 31-32]
148 EPA Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0427, comment submitted by POET LLC at 22.
149 Id.
As we have discussed above, bioethanol has a significantly lower PMI value than heavy
aromatics. Bioethanol also contributes significantly to octane in gasoline. Increasing ethanol
blending from E10 to E15 would more than make up for the octane loss related to reducing
heavy aromatics in gasoline. 150 Using bioethanol blending as a replacement would significantly
reduce the PMI beyond the reductions that would be realized simply by imposing the potential
PM emissions standards. 151 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0609, pp. 31-32]
150 Attachment 3 at 10.
151 Id. at 10, 12-18.
Organization: ReginaldModlin andB. ReidDetchon
2. Aromatics
a. Aromatics are hydrocarbons built around one or more benzene rings. Often referred to by
the acronym BTEX, they include not just benzene itself, a known carcinogen, but also toluene,
ethylbenzene, xylenes, and other compounds similar to benzene in their behavior in the
environment. People are exposed to BTEX primarily through emissions from motor vehicles and
cigarette smoke. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
8 Emma P. Popek, "Environmental Chemical Pollutants" in Sampling and Analysis of Environmental
Chemical Pollutants (second edition), Elsevier (2018), p. 36:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128032022000021 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
9 Queensland (Australia) Department of Environment and Science, "BTEX chemicals":
https://environment.des.qld.gov.au/management/activities/non-mining/fraccing/btex-chemicals (accessed
Feb. 24, 2021).
b. Aromatics are derived from petroleum during the refining process and blended into
gasoline to increase octane. Their use increased dramatically during the 1980s when the
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previously used additive, tetraethyl lead, was phased out due to health concerns. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
10 Francesca Lyman, "The Gassing of America," in The Washington Post, April 13, 1990:
https://www.washingtonpost.eom/archive/lifestyle/1990/04/13/the-gassing-of-america/bce94f4d-c8al-
47e5-8c9c-d0a6befd8b80/ (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
11 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Examples of Successful Lead Phaseouts: United States," in
Implementer's Guide to Phasing Out Lead in Gasoline (1999), pp. 10-11:
https://archive.epa.gov/international/air/web/pdf/epa_phase_out.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. Octane is needed in gasoline to prevent premature combustion of the fuel mixture
("knock"), which can damage engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
12 "Engine knocking," in Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engine_knocking (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
ii. The level of aromatics in gasoline is capped at 25% in regions required to use
reformulated gasoline (areas that have high levels of ozone pollution, roughly 30% of the U.S.
market). On average, aromatics comprise 20% of the gasoline sold in the U.S. Levels elsewhere
(e.g., in Europe and China) have been as high as 40%, worsening air pollution and public health
in those regions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
13 42 U.S. Code, sec.77545, "Regulation of fuels," at (k)(3)(A)(ii): P.L. 101-549, sec. 219, enacted Nov.
15, 1990: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7545 (accessed June 17, 2021).
14 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Fuel Trends Report: Gasoline 2006 - 2016" (2017), Table 6:
Summary of Annual Average Gasoline Properties Between 1997 and 2016: EPA-420-R-17-005: p. 27:
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100T5J6.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
15 Guiqian Tang et al., "Organic composition of gasoline and its potential effects on air pollution in North
China," Science China: Chemistry (2015): 58(9): pp. 1416-25:
http://engine.scichina.eom/publisher/scp/journal/SCC/58/9/10.1007/sll426-015-5464-0?slug=abstract
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
iii. In the decade from 1997 to 2006, aromatics made up roughly 25% of the U.S. gasoline
pool. That level fell to 20% over the next 10 years as ethanol's share of the market rose from 3%
to nearly 10%. This 20% level equates to 25.3 billion gallons of aromatics used in cars and light
trucks per year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
16 U.S. EPA, "Fuel Trends Report," op. cit., supra note 14.
17 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Gasoline explained - use of gasoline", online fact sheet:
"Light-duty vehicles (cars, sport utility vehicles, and small trucks) account for about 92% of all gasoline
consumption in the United States": https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/gasoline/use-of-gasoline.php
(accessed Feb. 24, 2021). EIA projects gasoline use in 2021 to total 137.5 billion gallons, or 126.5 billion
gallons for light-duty vehicles: U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Annual Energy Outlook 2021,"
Table 11. Petroleum and Other Liquids Supply and Disposition (Reference case):
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=ll-AE02021®ion=0-
0&cases=ref2021&start=2019&end=2050&f= A&linechart=ref2021 -dl 13020a. 3 -11 -
AE02021&chartindexed=0&sourcekey=0 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
iv. Aromatics have a much higher ratio of carbon to hydrogen than other typical
hydrocarbons do, driving up the carbon content of gasoline and producing higher greenhouse gas
emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
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18 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 1987-
1994" (1995), DOE/EIA-0573(87-94), p. 77: https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/122288 (accessed Feb. 24,
2021).
v. Aromatics contribute about 10% of global anthropogenic emissions of non-methane
organic gases (NMOG), the major source being car exhaust from gasoline-powered vehicles.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
19 I. Barnes and K.H. Becker, "Aromatic Hydrocarbons," in Tropospheric Chemistry and Composition,
Encyclopedia of Atmospheric Sciences (2003): p. 2376:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0122270908004243 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
vi. Aromatics are also responsible for an estimated 30-40% of the ozone and other
photooxidants in urban atmospheres, making them the most important class of hydrocarbons
with regard to photochemical ozone formation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 7-8]
20 Ibid
c. The BTEX chemicals are characterized as hazardous air pollutants "known or suspected
to cause cancer or other serious health or environmental effects." They are identified as mobile
source air toxics and formed in four ways, of which the first two are most pertinent. According to
EPA: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 8-9]
21 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "What are Hazardous Air Pollutants?", online fact sheet:
https://www.epa.gov/haps/what-are-hazardous-air-pollutants (accessed Aug. 29, 2021).
22 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Control of Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile
Sources; Final Rule," Federal Register (2001): 66(61): pp. 17235-39:
https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/FR-2001-03-29/pdf/01-37.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. "First, some air toxics are present in fuel and are emitted to the air when it evaporates or
passes through the engine as unburned fuel. Benzene, for example, is a component of gasoline.
Cars emit small quantities of benzene in unburned fuel, or as vapor when gasoline evaporates.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 8-9]
ii. "Second, mobile source air toxics are formed through engine combustion processes. A
significant amount of automotive benzene comes from the incomplete combustion of compounds
in gasoline such as toluene and xylene that are chemically very similar to benzene." (emphasis
added) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 8-9]
d. According to a review of the literature by a Health Effects Institute panel, "It is estimated
that about 50% of the benzene produced in the exhaust is the result of decomposition of aromatic
hydrocarbons in the fuel. ... [Two] studies showed that lowering aromatic levels in gasoline
significantly reduces toxic benzene emissions from vehicle exhausts." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0570, pp. 8-9]
23 Health Effects Institute, Panel on the Health Effects of Traffic-Related Air Pollution, "Traffic-Related
Air Pollution: A Critical Review of the Literature on Emissions, Exposure, and Health Effects" (Special
Report 17): Chapter 2, "Emissions from Motor Vehicles," Appendix B: "Fuel Composition Changes
Related To Emission Controls" (2010): pp. 3-4:
https://www.healtheffects.org/system/files/SR17TrafficReviewChapter2AppendixB.pdf (accessed Aug. 24,
2021).
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e. Gasoline-powered vehicles accounted for 69% of all U.S. emissions of single-ring
aromatic hydrocarbons, based on source-specific speciation in the 2005 National Emissions
Inventory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 8-9]
24 Katherine von Stackelberg et al., "Public health impacts of secondary particulate formation from
aromatic hydrocarbons in gasoline," Table 3, National emissions inventory of single-ring aromatic
hydrocarbons, Environmental Health (2013): 12(19):
https://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1476-069X-12-19/tables/3 in
https://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1476-069X-12-19 (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
6. EPA's modeling - Part 1
a. EPA has long acknowledged its modeling shortcomings in this area. Noting that "SOA
continues to be a significant topic of research and investigation," it said in 2005: "Despite
significant progress that has been made in understanding the origins and properties of SOA, it
remains the least understood component of PM2.5." [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 21-
22]
106 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Proposed Rule To Implement the Fine Particle National
Ambient Air Quality Standards," Federal Register (2005): 70(210): p. 65997:
https://www.govinfo.gOv/content/pkg/FR-2005-ll-01/pdf/05-20455.pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
i. Atmospheric models have been found to underestimate SOA emissions by an order of
magnitude or more when applied in and downwind of urban areas/polluted regions, (emphasis
added) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 21-22]
107 Q. Zhang et al., "Ubiquity and dominance of oxygenated species in organic aerosols in
anthropogenically?influenced Northern Hemisphere midlatitudes," Geophysical Research Letters (2007):
34(13), L13801: https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2007GL029979 (accessed Feb.
24, 2021).
108 Allen H. Goldstein and Ian E. Galbally, "Known and Unexplored Organic Constituents in the Earth's
Atmosphere," Environmental Science & Technology (2007): 41(5): pp. 1515-21:
https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/es072476p (accessed Feb. 24, 2021).
b. EPA's summary of a 2015 workshop on UFPs contained this admission, based on the
PNNL research described above, unpacking the implications of its knowledge gap: [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 21-22]
i. "[SOA] particles play an important role in air quality but for many years available
atmospheric models were not able to predict SOA formation. The main issue was the fact that:
all models relied on the assumptions that SOA particles were well-mixed low viscosity solutions
and maintained equilibrium with the gas-phase by rapid mixing in the condensed phase with
evaporation and condensation. Recent studies using the multidimensional characterization
approach demonstrated that these assumptions were wrong and that SOA particles must be
viscous semi-solid. These studies showed also that there is a synergetic effect between PAHs and
SOA since PAHs trapped inside the SOA particles slow down SOA evaporation and increase
SOA yield and lifetime. This can explain the long-range transport of toxic compounds like PAHs
and other persistent pollutants. In conclusion, a new SOA paradigm has been
developed." (emphasis added) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 21-22]
109 Richard W. Baldauf et al., "Ultrafine Particle Metrics and Research Considerations: Review of the
2015 UFP Workshop," International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (2016): 13(11):
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p. 13: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5129264/pdf/ijerph-13-01054.pdf (accessedFeb. 24,
2021).
- Note: The modeling that EPA has used to assess and regulate SOA emissions was thus based
on erroneous assumptions and completely missed the scale of the problem. The significance of
this failure is heightened by the finding in the 2011 National Air Toxics Assessment that
secondary formation is the largest contributor of all sources to cancer risks nationwide,
accounting for 47% of the risk. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0570, pp. 21-22]
110 U.S. EPA, "Overview of EPA's 2011 National Air Toxics Assessment," op. cit., supra note 66.
Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)
XI. Potential Fuel Property Controls to Address Particulate Matter Emissions
EPA's proposed rule requests comment on "potential future gasoline fuel property standards
aimed at further reducing PM emissions, for consideration in a possible subsequent rulemaking."
A major advantage of fuel property standards is that they can reduce emissions from all vehicles
on the road today - not just new vehicles. Therefore, emissions benefits can be achieved much
more quickly than with standards that only apply to new vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0602, pp. 21-22]
It is well established that particulate (PM) emissions are a strong function of aromatic fuel
components with a high double bond equivalent value and low vapor pressure, and the
particulate forming potential is accurately represented by the "PMI" metric developed by
Honda.44 The PMI metric has been validated in many other studies, including from the joint
auto-oil Coordinating Research Council45 and the EPA.46 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp.
21-22]
44 Aikawa, Sakurai, and Jetter, "Development of a Predictive Model for Gasoline Vehicle Particulate
Matter Emissions", SAE paper 2010-01-2115, 2010; https://doi.org/10.4271/2010-01-2115.
45 Coordinating Research Council, "Evaluation and Investigation of Fuel Effects on Gaseous and
Particulate Emissions on SIDI In-Use Vehicles," Report No. E-94-2, March 2016;
http://crcsite.wpengine.com/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/CRC_2017-3-21_03-20955_E94-2FinalReport-
Revlb.pdf
46 US Environmental Protection Agency, "Exhaust Emission Impacts of Replacing Heavy Aromatic
Hydrocarbons in Gasoline with Alternate Octane Sources", report EPA-420-R-23-008, April 2023.
PMI and particulate emissions can be decreased by altering refinery processes to reduce the
heavy aromatic content of the fuel. As EPA recognizes, reducing heavy aromatics typically
requires other refinery changes in order to achieve fuel octane requirements, and those changes
generally increase cost and the energy intensity of refining. As an alternative, larger volumes of
ethanol can be added to the fuel, which simultaneously reduces PMI and increases octane. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 21-22]
Emissions studies that use "splash blends" (i.e., a constant hydrocarbon base fuel blended
with varying levels of ethanol), invariably show lower PM emissions with higher ethanol
content. Studies which use "match blends" sometimes show higher PM emissions with higher
ethanol content, because the hydrocarbon portion of the fuel was modified in an attempt to hold
other properties (such as distillation curve) constant.47 Perhaps the most credible and
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comprehensive study on this topic was recently published by the University of California Center
for Environmental Research and Technology,48 showing statistically significant 16-54%
reductions in PM emissions for E15 (15% ethanol) compared to E10 (10% ethanol). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 21-22]
47 Anderson, Wallington, Stein, and Studzinski, "Issues with T50 and T90 as Match Criteria for Ethanol-
Gasoline Blends", SAE paper 2014-01-9080, 2014, https://doi.org/10.4271/2014-01-9080
48 Tang et al., "Expanding the ethanol blend wall in California: Emissions comparison between E10 and
E15", Fuel, June 2023; https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.fuel.2023.128836
Via a future rulemaking, EPA should adopt standards to limit PMI of both finished fuels and
the hydrocarbon blendstocks used for E10, E15, and other ethanol blends. Limiting PMI of
hydrocarbon blendstocks will ensure that the particulate emissions benefits of ethanol are not
offset by negative changes at refineries. The standards should also be designed to incentivize
improved pipeline practices to minimize contamination of gasoline with diesel and jet fuel.
Alternatively, EPA could consider instituting a volumetric cap (per gallon of gasoline) on the
allowable content of the heavy aromatics most closely linked to PM formation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0602, pp. 21-22]
Improved fuel property standards should be a high priority because they can achieve
significantly lower particulate emissions and dramatically lower GHG emissions. As EPA
considers undertaking future rulemaking to address fuel properties, RFA strongly encourages the
Agency to include a higher minimum octane standard (e.g., 95-98 RON) as part of the
discussion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 21-22]
High-octane low-carbon fuels are a key enabler for continued GHG emissions improvements
in the tens of millions of liquid-fueled vehicles that will be produced in the decades ahead, as
documented by the U.S. Department of Energy Co-Optimization of Fuels & Engines initiative49
and in numerous other studies, e.g. by MIT50 and by automakers.51 A detailed blueprint for a
future high-octane low-carbon fuel program exists in the Next Generation Fuels Act, and EPA
has the statutory authority to make these changes without waiting for Congress to act. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0602, pp. 21-22]
49 Farrell, Wagner, Gaspar and Moen, "Co-Optimization of Fuels & Engines: 2018 Year in Review",
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/06/f64/Co-
Optima_YIR2018FINALLO WRES%20190619 0.pdf.
50 Speth et al., "Economic and Environmental Benefits of Higher-Octane Gasoline", Environ. Sci.
Technol., 2014, https://doi.org/10.1021/es405557p.
51 Leone et al., "The Effect of Compression Ratio, Fuel Octane Rating, and Ethanol Content on Spark-
Ignition Engine Efficiency", Environ. Sci. Technol., 2015, https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.5b01420.
Organization: Satya Consultores
As EPA notes in the rule preamble, the International Agency for Research on Cancer has
recently concluded that diesel exhaust is "carcinogenic to humans." 88 Fed. Reg. at 29216.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 1-2]
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Accordingly, EPA also should evaluate the feasibility of further PM2.5 and NOX reductions
from new diesel fuel standards in a future fuel-controls rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0687, pp. 1-2]
Below we share information about Satya's Dispersive Energy Process ("DEP"), which can
achieve further significant emissions reductions of PM2.5 and NOX when used to modify ultra-
low sulfur diesel fuel, bypassing the trade-off that usually exists when controlling for these two
pollutants. The emissions reductions can be accomplished at a reasonable cost, without
compromising the calorific value of the improved, less-polluting diesel fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0687, pp.1-2]
Satya began its DEP work with the goal of solving the tradeoff between reducing diesel soot
and NOX emissions. At higher temperatures, diesel engines achieve more complete combustion,
and emit less soot and other fine particulate matter as a result. However, under these conditions
NOX emissions increase. In turn, lower engine temperatures result in lower NOX emissions but
cause soot emissions to increase. This tradeoff is well known among fuel scientists. 1 Both
pollutants have significant adverse environmental impacts and health effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0687, pp.2-3]
Satya's DEP resolves this conundrum. We call the resulting fuel "Next Diesel." [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 2-3]
1 See, e.g., Narayan et al., Combustion Monitoring in Engines Using Accelerometer Signals, J.
VIBROENGINEERING, Sep. 2019, at 4; Tie Li & Hideyuki Ogawa, Analysis of the Trade-Off between
Soot and Nitrogen Oxides in Diesel- Like Combustion by Chemical Kinetic Calculation.
In DEP, two proprietary additives are mixed into the diesel fuel. The first additive ("Al") is
an ethoxylated fatty acid ester, made with a mixture of stearic and palmitic acid esters of sorbitol
and its mono- and dianhydrides. The second additive ("A2") is a complex water-based blend of
aromatic solvents with methyl radicals mixed with ethoxylated phenol-derived surfactants.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 2-3]
Diesel fuel flows from a tank at the end of the refining process in a continuous stream through
piping to a Shock Wave Power Reactor. En route, Al is metered into the diesel fuel stream via a
Progressive Cavity Injection Pump, and the combination is blended using a static mixer. Once
the fuel/Al mixture is homogenous, A2 is metered in, and that combination is blended in a
second static mixer. The resulting diesel fuel/A 1/A2 mixture then flows into the Shock Wave
Power Reactor where it is subjected to controlled cavitation, a process which creates vapor
bubbles in the fuel mixture. As a liquid passes through the SPR it is subjected to "controlled
cavitation." The heart of the reactor is a specially designed rotor. The spinning action generates
hydrodynamic cavitation in the rotor cavities away from the rotor to prevent damage to metal
surfaces. As microscopic cavitation bubbles are produced and collapse, Shockwaves are given off
into the liquid which can heat and/or mix.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 2-3]
2 Hydro Dynamics, Inc. (n.d.). Retrieved from Harnessing the Power of Cavitation:
https://www.hydrodynamics.com/cavitation-technology/.
The resulting diesel fuel exhibits improved properties, including significantly improved
ignition characteristics. Its electrical conductivity is more than 1,000 times greater than regular
diesel fuel, and the lubricity value is more than 100 times greater. These and other upgraded
properties of Next Diesel enable more complete fuel combustion, which in turn results in less
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soot production and also reduces NOX emissions. The corresponding loss of fuel power, if any,
is negligible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 2-3]
As EPA notes in Section IX of the preamble, fuel controls would address a large category of
air pollutants that the current proposal would not touch: emissions from the existing vehicle fleet.
88 Fed. Reg. at 29397. The preamble discussion considers potential standards that would limit
the amounts of heavy aromatics in gasoline by reducing T90 [4] temperatures and limiting the
production of gasoline with a PM Index ("PMI")5 greater than 2. Diesel fuel controls would be
just as important and impactful to achieve further reductions in soot emissions. Importantly, Next
Diesel can significantly reduce soot emissions and lower the PMI of diesel fuel without
modifying the distillation curve or lowering T90 values. EPA proposed a lower primary annual
PM2.5 ambient air quality standard in January 2023. See 88 Fed. Reg. 5558 (January 27, 2023).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, p. 6]
4 88 Fed. Reg. at 29398 ("The T90 parameter refers to the temperature at which 90 volume percent of the
gasoline sample has been distilled.").
5 Id. ("The PM Index (PMI) parameter, first described in a 2010 publication, combines detailed fuel
composition data (from ASTM D6730) with volatility and structural characteristics for all compounds
identified in the fuel to predict its relative propensity to form PM.").
Further, the air quality benefits of diesel fuel controls would extend beyond highway vehicles
to the many existing non-road diesel engines, including locomotives. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 29210
(nonroad diesel engines are generally older technology and more polluting). The PM in diesel
exhaust consists principally of particles less than 2.5 micrograms, mostly soot, which are most
damaging to human health. 88 Fed. Reg. at 29210. As EPA notes in the preamble, "[t]hese
particles have a large surface area which makes them an excellent medium for adsorbing
organics and their small size makes them highly respirable." Id. In other words, the particles
themselves are dangerous, and they transport mutagenic and carcinogenic organics from diesel
into the body as well. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0687, pp. 6-7]
Diesel engine emissions, especially emissions from existing vehicles, medium- and heavy-
duty vehicles, and nonroad engines, can be effectively addressed with DEP and Next Diesel.
Satya continues to develop the technology and to look for opportunities to demonstrate its
effectiveness in reducing diesel soot and NOX emissions on a large scale [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0687, pp. 6-7]
Organization: Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC)
EPA is also proposing that BEVs and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs)—i.e., vehicles with
no internal combustion—retain a zero gram per mile (g/mi) compliance value and not be
required to account for upstream emissions under the GHG standards.69 This aligns with the
standards' treatment of other, fossil fuel-powered vehicles. Even though this regulatory regime
deals specifically with tailpipe emissions, EPA should not lose sight of the upstream GHG or
other emissions associated with light- and medium-duty vehicles—ZEVs or otherwise. We
therefore support EPA's consideration of future gasoline fuel property standards that could
provide additional meaningful reductions in PM emissions.70 However, even more could be
done. Some states, for example, are leading the way by implementing low carbon fuel standards
that consider lifecycle GHG emissions from energy used for fuel.71 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0591, p. 9]
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69 Id.
70 See id. at 29197.
71 See, e.g., KELSIBRACMORT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46835, A LOW CARBON FUEL
STANDARD: IN BRIEF 2 (2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R46835.pdf.
Organization: Valero Energy Corporation
VI. EPA should not limit heavy aromatics in gasoline.
EPA has requested comments on a possible future rulemaking aimed at further particulate
matter (PM) emission reductions from the current population of vehicles and nonroad equipment
via the introduction of gasoline fuel property standards aimed at reducing heavy aromatics.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 92-94]
As EPA stated, "[i]f heavy aromatics were to be removed from gasoline, then not only their
volume, but their octane would have to be replaced."371 The high- octane properties of heavy
aromatics make them an excellent gasoline blending component as they improve engine
performance and fuel economy. Using heavy aromatics in gasoline blending is superior to their
likely alternate disposition in the diesel pool. The low cetane properties of heavy aromatics make
them detrimental to diesel engine efficiency and therefore a poor diesel fuel component. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 92-94]
371 88 Fed. Reg. 29404, 29401 (May 5, 2023).
Thus, introducing a rule that limits heavy aromatics in gasoline may have the unintended
consequence of increasing diesel engine PM emissions due to less efficient combustion of lower
cetane fuel. Replacing the volume and octane loss from the removal of heavy aromatics from
gasoline would require capital projects and operational changes that would increase emissions
from refinery stationary sources and would increase emissions from the transportation of
components between refineries. Because this potential rulemaking would not reduce emissions
when viewed holistically, EPA should refrain from proposing limits on heavy aromatics in
gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 92-94]
Furthermore, EPA's discussion of a potential future rulemaking is entirely premised on "the
ability to use high boiling point as a surrogate for heavy aromatic content."372 Although we
agree there is some degree of correlation, with some high boiling point components containing
heavy aromatics, that is not always the case. Using high boiling point as a surrogate would
require removal of high boiling point components indiscriminately, including removal of clean-
burning components that do not contribute to tailpipe PM emissions. We therefore disagree with
the use of high boiling point as a surrogate for heavy aromatics. If a limit is proposed, it should
be proposed on heavy aromatics specifically (i.e., C10+ polycyclic aromatics). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 92-94]
372 Id. at 29398.
Before EPA proposes any new gasoline standard aimed at reducing heavy aromatics,
however, CAA § 211(c) requires EPA to consider technologically and economically feasible
alternatives. Further, significant additional analysis is needed to understand the impacts of such a
rule on refineries, gasoline and diesel fuel properties, gasoline and diesel engine exhaust
emissions, fuel supply market dynamics, consumer impacts, and other emissions impacts,
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including potential increases in stationary source emissions and emissions from transportation of
components between refineries. EPA presented oversimplified options for volume and octane
replacement that are unrealistic. In reality, such a limit may require significant capital
investments at some refineries, significantly impact refinery operations, lead to closure of
disadvantaged refineries, exacerbate supply disruptions, increase costs to consumers, and may
even increase emissions in the aggregate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 92-94]
A. At a Minimum, CAA Section 211(c) Requires that EPA Consider Other
Technologically or Economically Feasible Means of Achieving Emissions Standards.
We agree that "EPA has not undertaken sufficient analysis to propose changes to fuel
requirements under CAA section 211(c) in this rulemaking."373 We also agree that CAA section
211(c) requires EPA "to consider other technologically or economically feasible means of
achieving emissions standards under section 202" before introducing a new fuel standard.374
However, we do not agree that limiting the heavy aromatic content of gasoline is the only
"practical means of significantly reducing PM emissions from the existing fleet."375 EPA must
consider other options as required by CAA Section 211(c). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
92-94]
373 Id. at 29397.
374 Id. at 29402.
375 Id.
Just a few examples of additional options for PM reductions that warrant review before
proposing a limit on heavy aromatics in gasoline include vehicle hardware options (potential
retrofits to existing gasoline vehicles and non-road engines such as modern fuel injection and
combustion management); reducing PM emissions from brake, tire, and road wear
(improvements here would be especially impactful for electric vehicle emission control376); fuel
additives to improve combustion; and other ways to improve fuel economy which would result in
lower PM emissions, such as a 95 RON octane standard. The results of a cost-benefit analysis of
technologically or economically feasible options should inform any future rulemaking. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 92-94]
376 EVs tend to be heavier than internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) due to battery weight.
Heavier EVs yield higher PM emissions from increased brake, tire, and road wear. Roadway dust emissions
which include particles from tire wear are correlated with vehicle weight, so increases in vehicle weight
would be expected to increase roadway dustPM2.5 emissions. EPA, Emissions Factor
Documentation for AP-42 (Dec. 31, 2003) available at
https://www3 .epa.gov/ttn/chief/old/ap42/chl 3/s021/final/c 13 s0201 .pdf.
B. If a Limit Aimed at Reducing Heavy Aromatics in Gasoline is Proposed, it Should be
on Heavy Aromatics Directly (not on High Boiling Point as a Surrogate and not on Total
Aromatics).
1. Limiting High Boiling Point Would Cut Out Clean-Burning Gasoline Components for
No Environmental Benefit.
High boiling point is not always correlated with heavy aromatic content; limiting it without
consideration to actual aromatic content would lead to gasoline volume and octane loss and
higher prices to consumers with limited corresponding environmental benefit. There would be no
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environmental benefit from the removal of gasoline blend components such as iso-octene, iso-
octane, and alkylate made from heavier olefins, as these components have high boiling points but
contain no aromatics. Alkylation units typically have a debutanizer make a low Reid Vapor
Pressure (RVP) gasoline blending component, but they seldom have subsequent fractionation
that could split out the heavy portion of the alkylate. To do so would require significant capital
investment, for no environmental benefit - to the contrary, stationary source emissions would
increase due to additional processing and fractionation. Establishing limits solely on end point
and not considering heavy aromatic levels would prevent refineries from using heavy, clean-
burning, high octane alkylate as a gasoline blend component. The extent of the impact depends
on what specific limit EPA may propose on high boiling point. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 94-95]
If EPA proposes a limit based on high boiling point, at a minimum, there should be an
alternative compliance option based on heavy aromatics to allow refineries to continue to blend
clean-burning high boiling point components into gasoline. Such an approach would be similar
to flexibilities provided for jet fuel PM and aromatics defined in ASTM D165 5 - Standard
Specification for Aviation Turbine Fuels and to flexibilities provided for diesel fuel cetane index
and aromatics in ASTM D975 - Standard Specification for Diesel Fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp. 94-95]
2. Limiting Total Aromatics Would Limit Production of Premium Gasoline for Minimal
Environmental Benefit.
If a rule aimed at reducing heavy aromatics is proposed, it should only limit heavy aromatics,
not total aromatics. A total aromatic limit may limit production of premium gasoline with
minimal benefits in terms of emissions reduction and air quality improvement. Premium
gasolines often require higher aromatic content to meet high octane requirements. This is
especially true during summer months when high octane/high RVP blendstock components like
butane and isobutane must be used in lower concentrations due to stringent RVP limitations.
Aromatics provide high octane/low RVP material for blending. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 94-95]
If a limit is proposed, EPA may want to consider specifically limiting C10+ heavy aromatics
such as naphthalenes, which are more likely to result in tailpipe PM emissions. Lighter,
monocyclic aromatics such as toluene and xylene provide significant octane (100+) while
remaining below 2 psi RVP. These compounds contribute less to tailpipe PM emissions in
comparison with heavier polycyclic compounds such as naphthalenes and its derivatives.
Limiting only heavy aromatics (e.g., naphthalenes) would still allow blending of lighter
monocyclic aromatics (xylene/toluene) which would assist in curtailing major production
decreases and price increases for premium gasolines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 94-
95]
C. The Gasoline Pool is the Ideal Location for High Boiling Point Aromatics when
Compared to the Environmental Impacts of Shifting them to the Diesel Pool.
A new limit on heavy aromatics in gasoline would likely result in shifting heavy aromatics out
of the gasoline pool and into the diesel pool. Diesel engine performance improves with increases
in diesel fuel cetane. However, heavy aromatics are low in cetane. Such a shift would therefore
result in increased PM emissions from less efficient combustion of low cetane heavy aromatics
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in diesel engines. These aromatics would not be shifted into jet fuel due to smoke test
requirements. Overall, heavy aromatics are a misfit for their alternate dispositions in diesel and
jet engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 94-95]
1. A Limit Aimed at Reducing Heavy Aromatics in Gasoline would Shift Heavy
Aromatics into Diesel Fuel.
EPA's analysis must consider the alternate disposition of the molecules being discussed.
There are three main sources for aromatics in gasoline: fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) gasolines,
reformate, and hydrocracker naphtha. As discussed below, adjustments to each of these streams
that would likely be made in response to a rulemaking aimed at limiting heavy aromatics in
gasoline would shift heavy aromatics out of gasoline into diesel fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp.95-96]
The aromatics in the swing heavy FCC gasoline are an inherent result of cracking gas oil. The
swing cut is either hydrotreated for sulfur and blended into gasoline or it is routed into a distillate
hydrotreater. Typical distillate hydrotreaters do very little aromatics saturation. Thus, swinging
the endpoint of FCC gasoline to keep heavy aromatics out of gasoline simply shifts aromatics
into diesel, to the extent permitted while continuing to comply with diesel fuel aromatics
specifications (total and/or on polycyclic aromatics, depending on market). [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 95-96]
To reduce the high boiling point aromatics in reformate, refiners would reduce the endpoint of
heavy naphtha feeding the reformer in the upstream crude unit, coker, and/or hydrocracker
fractionators. These heavy naphtha swing cuts are a mix of paraffins, naphthenes, and aromatics.
Straight run naphtha from light crude may be 40% naphthene and aromatic (N+A). Coker and
hydrocracker naphtha streams are typically even higher in N+A content. The net result is shifting
naphthenes and aromatics from gasoline into diesel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 95-
96]
Some refiners further reform hydrocracker naphtha. Many refiners currently blend
hydrocracker naphtha with high aromatics directly into gasoline. Such refiners would reduce the
cutpoint of the hydrocracker naphtha stream to address a high boiling point aromatics limit,
shifting those aromatics into the diesel pool. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 95-96]
Jet fuel is not a suitable alternate disposition for heavy aromatics due to the requirement to
pass a smoke test. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 95-96]
2. Shifting Heavy Aromatics into Diesel Fuel Would Increase PM Emissions from Diesel
Engines.
Given the likely result of shifting heavy aromatics out of the gasoline pool into the distillate
pool described above, EPA should consider what impacts this possible future rulemaking would
have on diesel engine tailpipe PM. Limiting the heavy aromatic content of gasoline may actually
increase PM emissions overall when considering the impact to the distillate pool. Spark ignition
gasoline engines provide more efficient combustion of aromatics than a diesel combustion cycle.
Heavy aromatics are low cetane; swinging them into diesel will directionally diminish the
effectiveness of the PM controls on diesel engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 95-96]
3697
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The potential future rulemaking under discussion may result in an increase in diesel engine
tailpipe PM emissions, greater than the reduction achievable by limiting heavy aromatics in
gasoline fuel, which would be contrary to the purpose of the rule. As such, EPA should refrain
from proposing limits aimed at reducing heavy aromatics in gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp.95-96]
D. EPA's Analysis of Impacts to the U.S. Gasoline Market and Refiners' Ability to
Replace Volume and Octane is Oversimplified and Unrealistic.
The refining industry has notably less capacity to simply replace octane barrels and shift more
production to the export market than EPA's broad statements suggest. Some of the mechanisms
identified by EPA that may help with octane replacement are not feasible, or may only be
feasible at certain refineries, or may only be feasible with significant capital investments, higher
energy consumption, and increased emissions from sources other than the vehicle tailpipes
targeted by this potential rulemaking. Refiners' ability to replace octane and export more
products that are no longer appropriate for the U.S. market vary by refinery, with inland
refineries generally at a disadvantage as they are typically configured to be in balance with little
or no intermediate purchases or sales. The cost to make up gasoline volume and octane while
continuing to comply with gasoline RVP limits could result in significant increases in prices
consumers pay at the pump and could potentially result in refinery shutdowns and exacerbate
supply disruptions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 96-98]
1. EPA's Predictions of How Refinery Production Will Shift with Shifting
U.S. Market Demand Miss the Mark.
EPA has predicted that a new limit aimed at reducing heavy aromatics in gasoline will cause
the gasoline-to-distillate ratio (GDR) to continue to shift downwards over the coming
decades.377 Because a decreasing GDR is associated with a decrease in the T90 level of
gasoline, EPA has predicted that "[t]o the extent that U.S. refinery production shifts along with
U.S. market demand, then the T90 level of gasoline would be expected to continue to decline in
the future as well."378 EPA has also noted a relationship of these changes with the export
market, and assumed refiners will "maintain or expand export markets as much as possible."379
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 96-98]
377 88 Fed. Reg. 29404, 29400 (May 5, 2023).
378 Id.
379 Id.
These predictions rely on the false assumption that these barrels can simply be shifted from
the gasoline pool to the distillate pool with little consequence, and that any excess distillate
barrels can simply be exported. In reality, for some refineries, market size is fixed (e.g., for land-
locked refineries), as the capacity to move barrels into and out of a region is limited. Any notable
shift in products for a refinery with limited to no ability to export products could mean notable
investment to find a new home for additional distillate and could create a short supply for
gasoline. Furthermore, in some cases, the distillate pool cannot absorb these barrels and continue
to meet fuel specifications such as flash, cetane, aromatics, and jet smoke. In other cases,
refineries are running against physical and permitting limits that prevent them from further
3698
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shifting to the distillate pool today; significant capital investments would be needed to shift these
molecules through diesel hydrotreating units. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 96-98]
Refinery shutdowns and exacerbated supply disruptions are a more likely outcome of a new
gasoline standard aimed at removing heavy aromatics from gasoline than EPA's prediction that
the industry will simply seeing a decreasing GDR and a decline in the T90 of gasoline over time.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 96-98]
2. Low RVP Replacement Costs Must be Considered.
We agree that "[i]f heavy aromatics were to be removed from gasoline, then not only their
volume, but their octane would have to be replaced."3 80 Additionally, their low RVP must be
replaced. The RVP of high boiling point aromatics in reformate and FCC gasoline are in the 1-2
psi range; their removal therefore displaces low cost butane from gasoline, resulting in lower
gasoline supply volumes and higher gasoline production costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
pp. 96-98]
380 Id. at 29401.
3. Many Refiners Do Not Have Spare Reformer Throughput Capacity or the Ability to
Increase Reformer Severity for Octane Replacement.
As EPA noted, "[o]ne source for additional octane is via increased reformer severity or
throughput to generate additional light aromatics."3 81 However, many refineries do not have
spare reformer throughput capacity or the ability to increase reformer severity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 96-98]
381 Id.
Throughput and severity may be physically limited and/or limited by refinery permits.
Increasing either throughput or severity would result increased stationary source emissions; both
are typically limited by refinery permits. Physical limitations on existing furnace capacity also
limit a refiners' ability to increase the severity of reacting conditions (temperature). [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 96-98]
Reformer severity may actually have to be reduced at refineries with limited ability to shift
aromatics to the distillate pool. Reducing reformer severity will lower their gasoline pool octane,
requiring them such refineries to import components that are high octane and low heavy
aromatics. It will also cause a reduction in hydrogen production which could have a negative
impact on gasoline sulfur. Hydrogen is used in hydroprocessing units dedicated to meeting low
sulfur requirements. Reformer hydrogen is often the only source of hydrogen for many refiners
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 96-98]
Refinery configurations are tailored to match the range of crude oils they process and the
demand for products in the markets they serve. For example, light sweet crude refineries
typically have little to no spare reforming throughput capacity or the ability to increase reformer
severity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 96-98]
4. Refiners Do Not Have Spare Alkylation Capacity for Octane Replacement and
Isomerization Provides Very Little Octane Benefit.
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EPA's suggestion that "[a] refinery may also be able to increase high-octane isoparaffin
production through additional alkylation and/or isomerization operations" is not a feasible
method of octane replacement without significant capital investment. Refinery alkylation units
are already highly utilized, with little or no spare capacity available to make additional octane
barrels. If an alkylation unit is not operating at its capacity, it is likely maximized to the capacity
of upstream fractionation on the FCC unit producing olefin feedstocks. With significant capital
investment, the industry could expand FCC capacity to allow increased utilization of alkylation
units. However, expanding FCC capacity to increase alkylation rates would also cause an
increase in FCC naphtha production. In many instances, FCC naphtha has a higher production
yield compared to C3-C5 olefin production, so any increases in low aromatic alkylation
feedstocks would be accompanied and overshadowed by increased volumes of high aromatic
FCC naphtha blendstocks, which may ultimately raise the overall aromatic content of the
gasoline blending pool. Additionally, these projects would likewise result in their own stationary
source emission increases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 98-99]
Light straight run (LSR) isomerization provides very little octane benefit relative to reforming
of heavy naphtha. Isomerization also increases the RVP of the stream, backing low cost, high
octane butane out of the gasoline pool. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 98-99]
5. Cost and Impacts on Refining Will Vary Greatly for Individual Refineries and Are Not
Accurately Reflected by EPA's Simplified Application of the Haverly LP Refining Model.
EPA requested comment on their use of the Haverly linear programming (LP) refinery model
to estimate cost and impacts on refining. While LP models such as Haverly or PIMS could
provide directional guidance on likely impacts in a typical refinery, these models are highly
complex and should be run and interpreted by experienced refining engineers using data from
actual operations and laboratory testing to ensure the modeled gasoline streams have sufficiently
extensive definition to correctly balance and optimize to meet finished product specifications.
Furthermore, likely impacts to a "typical" refinery may not sufficiently predict impacts to the
actual U.S. refining industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 98-99]
For example, to simulate the effects of removing high boiling point components from the
gasoline pool, EPA "used the Haverly LP refinery model to reduce the average T90 of U.S.
gasoline by 15°F in 5°F steps."382 However, it cannot be assumed that the entire industry would
make a similar shift. Distillation properties of gasoline vary by refinery. For example, refineries
making California grade gasoline are likely making lower end point reformate and may not have
to change anything (other than possibly building a splitter to cut the tail off of their zero
aromatics alkylate). Refineries with large jet fuel markets are likely operating with lower heavy
naphtha (and therefore reformate); jet fuel has a lower flash specification than diesel and allows
them to operate as such. Refineries with some combination of no jet market, running light sweet
crude, filling a large FCC with purchased vacuum gas oil (VGO) and/or selling low boiling point
components like LSR will have a gasoline pool with higher endpoint and T90. A refinery with a
configuration producing higher baseline endpoint gasoline would be making a larger cutpoint
change. The cost is likely not linear with the number of degrees that the cutpoint is changed.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 98-99]
382 Id. at 29403.
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EPA's cost estimates need to consider different refinery configurations and costs related to
production and logistics, including the potential need for capital expenditures. The cost impact
will be different for every refinery depending on its required cutpoint change, its product
markets, and its location (relative to the alternate disposition for displaced butane and additional
diesel to be marketed and to the supply of gasoline to replace lost volume). Any notable swing in
the formulation of gasoline will likely require significant capital investments to produce the new
fuel specification and for logistics to move excess barrels to their new disposition and to replace
the supply of displaced gasoline barrels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 98-99]
E. Comments on the Structure of the Standard will Depend on the Stringency of any
Standard that May be Proposed in the Future; Advance Notice and Engagement with the
Refining Industry is Essential Ahead of Rulemaking.
We appreciate that EPA "understand[s] that it may be difficult to comment on the various
structures for a standard without having some idea of what the stringency of the standard might
be."383 Given this limitation, and our view that high boiling point is not an appropriate surrogate
for heavy aromatics in gasoline to begin with, we have provided limited general comments in
this area at this time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 99-102]
383 Id.
Before proposing a rule, EPA should provide the refining industry with a specific limit or
narrow range of potential limits and enough time to fully evaluate the feasibility of such a
standard given unique refinery configurations, supply constraints, and demand balances across
the nation. Refiners will need enough time to determine if the proposed limits are feasible, and if
so, time to identify what capital investments and/or operational changes would be needed. The
implementation timeline included in any proposed rule should reflect the time industry would
need to implement such changes, including time for any required federal and regional permitting,
project construction, etc. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 99-102]
EPA has presented many options for consideration, including a "per-gallon cap, a national
annual average standard implemented along with an averaging, banking, and trading program
(ABT), a facility maximum annual average standard, or some combination of these."3 84 [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 99-102]
384 Id. at 29402.
1. If EPA Proceeds With a Rulemaking, a Company-Wide Annual Average Standard
Would Likely be the Best Approach, Depending on the Stringency of the Standard.
Although we agree with EPA's statements about the regulatory burdens associated with
managing a company-wide annual average standard385, we would prefer to manage these
regulatory burdens over the burdens associated with producing a fuel that must meet a per-gallon
standard or a facility maximum annual average standard. A company-wide average standard
would allow some degree of flexibility for refiners to respond to issues with gasoline production,
reduce supply disruptions, and minimize costs to consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
pp. 99-102]
385 Id.
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Depending on what limit may be proposed, an ABT system may be necessary for certain sites
or companies to maintain compliance. While not preferred, providing banking flexibility is better
than causing supply disruptions and increasing costs to consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 99-102]
A thorough review of potential implications of a company-wide annual average standard is
needed before proposing such a standard, and will depend on the stringency of the standard
proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 99-102]
2. Per-Gallon Caps and Facility Maximum Annual Average Standards are Untenably
Inflexible and May Lead to Increased Emissions from Transportation of Components Between
Refineries Among Other Issues.
We strongly agree with the downsides of a per-gallon cap identified by EPA.386 A per-gallon
standard is simply not feasible if refiners are to have flexibility to respond to gasoline production
issues and to reduce supply disruptions and prices at the pump. A per-gallon standard would
have additional downsides beyond those already identified by EPA, and we have similar
concerns with a facility maximum annual average standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707,
pp. 99-102]
386 Id.
Such a standard may lead to an increase in emissions associated with the transportation of
components between refineries that are needed for an individual refinery to comply. For
example, refineries without an FCC generally do not produce alkylate and rely heavily on
reformer aromatics for octane replacement. Such refineries may have to ship light naphtha and
reformate to a third party and backhaul low aromatics alkylate. Shipping barrels around to meet
per-gallon standards, or even to meet annual facility-specific average targets, is inefficient and
may result in increased emissions associated with the transportation of said intermediates. In
addition, compliance may not be possible during necessary refinery turnarounds/planned
maintenance events or during unplanned unit shutdowns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
99-102]
If EPA has health risk concerns for particular areas of the country, they should only target
those areas, and not penalize areas with low PM emissions. Regional variables such as altitude,
humidity, and air temperature have considerable impacts on engine performance and tailpipe
emissions. EPA should consider regional limits for geographies with PM NAAQS non-
attainment issues rather than requiring all refineries across the nation to comply with a facility
maximum annual average or per-gallon limits. For example, this may be similar to local/regional
reformulated gasoline (RFG) requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 99-102]
A thorough review of potential implications of a per-gallon standard or a facility maximum
annual average standard is needed before proposing such a standard, and will depend on the
stringency of the standard proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 99-102]
3. Seasonal Limits May or May Not Be Appropriate Depending on the Stringency of
Any Standard if Proposed.
Gasoline produced and introduced into the market between May 1 and September 15 must
meet summer RVP standards defined in Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations (40 C.F.R.)
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Part 1090 - Regulation of Fuels, Fuel Additives, and Regulated Blendstocks. These standards
require RVP suppression during summer months due to elevated ambient temperatures. Refiners
typically achieve these more stringent summer standards by reducing the volume of lighter
blendstocks in the blend pool such as butanes and pentanes, while also increasing the use of
heavier endpoint blendstocks. Many refineries may not have the ability to purchase isomerate (as
noted in EPA's Haverly study) due to logistical constraints and may not have the ability to
increase reformer severity or produce more alkylate. Individual refineries may be further
constrained by the lack of disposition of high RVP blendstocks which need to be removed from
summer blends. The geography and interconnectivity of a given refinery to other customers or
sources of blendstocks or LPG caverns will determine their flexibility to meet these standards.
Additionally, introducing season average limits could reduce flexibility during maintenance
outages, which will result in lower production and/or higher market prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 99-102]
A thorough review of potential implications of a seasonal standard is needed before proposing
such a standard, and will depend on the stringency of the standard proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 99-102]
F. Test Methods.
Although we do not believe high boiling point is an appropriate surrogate for heavy aromatics
in gasoline, we offer the following comments on test methods EPA presented as possible
candidates for demonstrating compliance with a high boiling point limit. If EPA moves forward
with a limit on distillation as a surrogate for heavy aromatics, EPA should propose ASTM D86 -
Standard Test Method for Distillation of Petroleum Products and Liquid Fuels at Atmospheric
Pressure, the current industry standard, as the default test method. However, we also provide
comments regarding test methods for direct measurement of heavy aromatics, which we think
would be a more appropriate than distillation, as described previously. ASTM D8071 - Standard
Test Method for Determination of Hydrocarbon Group Types and Select Hydrocarbon and
Oxygenate Compounds in Automotive Spark- Ignition Engine Fuel Using Gas Chromatography
with Vacuum Ultraviolet Absorption Spectroscopy Detection (GC-VUV) would be an
appropriate test method to propose for refiners to demonstrate compliance with such standards if
proposed in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 102-104]
1. ASTM D86 is the Industry Standard for Distillation Evaluation and is the Best Test
Method if EPA Proposes a Limit on High Boiling Point as a Surrogate for Heavy Aromatics in
Gasoline.
ASTM D86 is the industry standard for distillation evaluation for distillate and lighter
streams. It is the only distillation test method referenced in 40 C.F.R. Part 1090 - Regulation of
Fuels, Fuel Additives, and Regulated Blendstocks. It is also one of only two methods approved
by ASTM D4814 - Standard Specification for Automotive Spark-Ignition Engine Fuel. The only
other distillation test method approved for use by ASTM D4814 is ASTM D7345 - Standard
Test Method for Distillation of Petroleum Products and Liquid Fuels at Atmospheric Pressure
(Micro Distillation Method). ASTM D86 is the referee of the two methods approved under
ASTM D4814. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 102-104]
ASTM D86 is efficient (refineries already have the equipment), more accurate than simulated
distillation estimates, and provides more precise results (lower published reproducibility)
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compared to other methods. ASTM D86 T90 is preferred over T95 or final boiling point (FBP)
because there is more established data for T90, which was previously reported to EPA under 40
C.F.R. Part 80 - Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, and because distillation curves have
lower published reproducibility and repeatability at T90 than at T95 or FBP. As EPA noted, the
ASTM D86 distillation parameter with the best correlation to the PM Index (PMI) parameter is
T90387; as such, if a distillation limit is proposed, it should be based on T90 by ASTM D86.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 102-104]
387 Id.
2. The Downsides of ASTM D7096 Outweigh the Potential Benefits.
EPA identified ASTM D7096, a simulated distillation (SimDis) method, as "[t]he most
promising alternative" test method.388 However, the downsides of employing ASTM D7096 for
measuring simulated distillation outweigh the potential benefits identified by EPA. [EPA-HQ-
OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 102-104]
388 Id.
ASTM D7096 is not currently referenced or approved by 40 C.F.R. Part 1090 - Regulation of
Fuels, Fuel Additives, and Regulated Blendstocks. It is also not approved by ASTM D4814 -
Standard Specification for Automotive Spark- Ignition Engine Fuel for gasoline certification.
There are no established correlation equations between ASTM D86 and ASTM D7096. If EPA
were to require ASTM D7096 testing, all gasoline certified in the U.S. would need to be tested
redundantly by both ASTM D86 and ASTM D7096 for distillation. Gasoline meeting the ASTM
D4814 Final Boiling Point maximum standard of 437°F using ASTM D86 could produce a value
above 437°F if tested using D7096. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 102-104]
Labs certifying gasoline intended for U.S. consumption may not have trained personnel or
equipment to perform D7096. D7096 is a gas chromatography (GC) method which requires
significant capital and expensive standards to operate. Third party laboratories generally charge
approximately three times more for ASTM D7096 testing than for ASTM D86 testing. [EPA-
HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 102-104]
Flaws with ASTM D7096 distillation prediction cause the method to be less accurate towards
the end of the boiling range because it tends to estimate a longer distillation tail which can
manifest more significantly for heavier gasolines. This is because D7096 estimates distillation
based on molecular composition. Estimates are not always accurate due to abnormalities and
non-linearities when mixing compounds. A similar phenomenon can be seen with RVP. When
pure ethanol (RVP = 2 psi) is mixed with summer gasoline (RVP = 9 psi) in a 10:90 ratio (i.e.,
E10 gasoline), the expected result would be to have a mixture under 9 psi RVP based on the
blending components. However, the RVP of the mixture is actually higher than the individual
sources, resulting in a mixture of approximately 10 psi RVP. Similarly, ASTM D7096 expects a
mixture to have a higher FBP based on the presence of high end point molecules, but in practice,
the mixture physically boils away at a temperature lower than the predicted ASTM D7096 value.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 102-104]
Flaws with ASTM D7096 distillation prediction cause the method to have lower precision
when compared to ASTM D86. For comparison, ASTM D7096-19 has a published FBP
reproducibility of 18.5°F, while ASTM D86-23 has a published FBP reproducibility of 7.1°F.
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ASTM D86 results will have 2.5 times higher precision than ASTM D7096 results when tested
and compared to a quality control sample with an established Accepted Reference Value (ARV).
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 102-104]
3. ASTM D8071 is the Best Test Method if EPA Proposes a Limit Directly on Heavy
Aromatics (i.e., C10+ Aromatics) in Gasoline.
ASTM D8071 - Standard Test Method for Determination of Hydrocarbon Group Types and
Select Hydrocarbon and Oxygenate Compounds in Automotive Spark-Ignition Engine Fuel
Using Gas Chromatography with Vacuum Ultraviolet Absorption Spectroscopy Detection (GC-
VUV) would be an appropriate test method to propose for refiners to demonstrate compliance
with heavy aromatic standards. Any aromatic standards should be limited to heavy aromatics
(i.e., polycyclic C10+ aromatics such as naphthalenes). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp.
102-104]
Vacuum Ultra-Violet (VUV) methods such as ASTM D8071 are preferred over traditional gas
chromatography (GC) methods, such as D5769 - Standard Test Method for Determination of
Benzene, Toluene, and Total Aromatics in Finished Gasolines by Gas Chromatography/Mass
Spectrometry. VUV solves a known drawback of traditional GC technology with the coelution of
molecules at the same retention time resulting in chromatograph peaks which cannot be properly
separated or integrated. VUV has the ability to provide deconvolution to coeluting peaks by
identifying unique spectral fingerprints through first-order molecular absorption. Traditional GCs
would require increased runtime to resolve peak coelution, and even with additional runtime,
many peaks still could not be separated based on molecular similarities. VUV resolved coelution
through algorithms and run times are much quicker than traditional GCs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-
0829-0707, pp.102-104]
As such, VUV is superior to GC and to Detailed Hydrocarbon Analysis (DHA) methods such
as ASTM D6729 - Standard Test Method for Determination of Individual Components in Spark
Ignition Engine Fuels by 100 Metre Capillary High Resolution Gas Chromatography and ASTM
D6730 - Standard Test Method for Determination of Individual Components in Spark Ignition
Engine Fuels by 100- Metre Capillary (with Precolumn) High-Resolution Gas Chromatography.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 102-104]
G. Additional Considerations
1. EPA Should Consider Impacts to Gasoline Benzene and Sulfur.
Displacing aromatics from gasoline shrinks the gasoline pool, thereby concentrating benzene
and possibly sulfur. This could result trigger a need for additional benzene and sulfur removal,
which would further raise costs for the consumer, and may result in other emissions impacts.
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 104-105]
Also, aromatics production is desirable as its production in reformer units results in
production of an essential source of hydrogen that is then used in hydroprocessing units to help
refiners meet low sulfur limits. To meet a new aromatics limit, some refineries may have to
decrease reformer severity, resulting in decreased hydrogen production and related impacts to
gasoline sulfur. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0707, pp. 104-105]
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2. Historical Decreases in Gasoline-to-Distillate Ratio were Not Related to the Tier 2
Sulfur Program.
We agree that "[a] common thread across the market shifts in T90 has been a decreasing
gasoline-to-distillate ratio (GDR) in the product slates produced by refineries" and that this shift
was largely attributable to "the influx of ethanol into gasoline."389 However, we disagree that
lower T90 values can also be attributed to the Tier 2 program.390 As a whole, the refining
industry built Gasoline Desulfurization Units (GDUs) to respond to Tier 2 sulfur limits; the T90
shifts seen in this time period were more related to market pricing impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
2022-0829-0707, pp. 104-105]
389 Id. at 29400.
390 Id.
3. Scope and Applicability of a Potential Future Rulemaking.
If EPA proposes a rule that aims to decrease heavy aromatics in the gasoline pool, EPA
should clarify the scope of the rule and how it interacts with various state programs and for
imports. For example, EPA should clarify if CARB gasoline will be granted the same exemption
criteria it is offered today under § 1090.625. Regarding imports, there may be special
considerations for import by truck similar to those in § 1090.1610. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-
0707, pp. 104-105]
Organization: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
7. Updating fuel property standards. EPA is requesting comment on if it should, in a separate
rule, update fuel property standards to reduce PM tailpipe emissions from legacy light and
medium-duty vehicles. Since updated fuel standards would ensure additional PM emissions
reductions occur in the near term, which would both protect public health and help states attain
and maintain any upcoming revisions to the PM NAAQS, the WDNR recommends that EPA
pursue such a rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2022-0829-0507, p. 3]
EPA Summary and Response
Summary:
Commenters representing petroleum suppliers and refiners generally opposed new standards
aimed at limiting heavy aromatics or other high-boiling components of gasoline. They suggested
that EPA overestimates the amount of heavy aromatics currently in gasoline, noting that it has
declined over time. They also suggest that EPA overstates the benefits of reducing gasoline
heavy aromatics, and underestimates the cost and other negative impacts on refining. They raise
concerns about the suitability of ASTM D7096 SimDis test method as a compliance parameter,
and question whether EPA has the statutory authority to put in place market fuel standards aimed
at a pollutant (PM) that will be greatly reduced under the proposed vehicle emission standards.
Commenters representing ethanol producers and related companies support a limit on heavy
aromatics, and suggest that the limit should apply to the petroleum blendstocks prior to ethanol
blending so that higher-ethanol blends will result in further reductions via dilution. They also
advocated for a high-octane/low-carbon fuel standard to reduce both PM and GHGs.
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Commenters from the auto industry support a limit on heavy aromatics and/or other high
boiling gasoline components, suggesting this will reduce emissions from existing vehicles
regardless of future vehicle standards. An industry trade group cited an emission study recently
published by EPA and several partners showing the impacts of heavy aromatics reductions on
emissions from a range of recent model-year vehicles. They also advocated for other fuel
improvements including a lower sulfur cap (currently 80ppm) and reduction of fuel components
that act as precursors for air toxics. Another commenter voiced support for surrogate compliance
methods (such as ASTM D7096 SimDis) if they can provide equivalent performance to a heavy
aromatics or PM Index standard.
Response:
We are not finalizing fuel standards at this time. We thank the commenters for their
statements and will continue to assess options for limiting the heavy aromatic content of
gasoline.
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